



THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
REVOLUTION AND PROTEST

1500 to the Present

A-C | VOLUME 1



**The International
Encyclopedia of
Revolution and Protest**

1500 to the Present

Volume I

Edited by Immanuel Ness

 **WILEY-BLACKWELL**

A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication

The International Encyclopedia of
Revolution and Protest

**The International
Encyclopedia of
Revolution and Protest**

1500 to the Present

Volume I

Edited by Immanuel Ness

 **WILEY-BLACKWELL**

A John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., Publication

This edition first published 2009

© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Blackwell Publishing was acquired by John Wiley & Sons in February 2007. Blackwell's publishing program has been merged with Wiley's global Scientific, Technical, and Medical business to form Wiley-Blackwell.

Registered Office

John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, United Kingdom

Editorial Offices

350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA

9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK

The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell.

The right of Immanuel Ness to be identified as the author of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books.

Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The international encyclopedia of revolution and protest: 1500 to the present / edited by Immanuel Ness.
v. <1> cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4051-8464-9 (hardcover: alk. paper)

1. Revolutions—History—Encyclopedias. 2. Protest movements—History—Encyclopedias.

I. Ness, Immanuel.

JC491.I58 2009

303.6'403—dc22

2008049806

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Set in 9.5/11pt Ehrhardt by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong

Printed in Singapore by Markono Print Media Pte Ltd

Contents

Notes on the Editors (volume I only)	vi
<i>About the General Editor</i>	vi
<i>Board of Editors</i>	vi
<i>Board of Associate and Advisory Editors</i>	viii
Notes on Contributors (volume I only)	xiv
Introduction (volume I only)	lxix
Acknowledgments (volume I only)	lxxiv
Chronology of Significant Events in Revolution and Protest (volume I only)	lxxvi
Lexicon (volume I only)	xciv
Maps (volumes I–VII)	cl
Volume I: Abalone Alliance – Blanqui, Louis Auguste (1805–1881)	1
Volume II: Bloch, Marc (1886–1944) – Davis, Angela (b. 1944)	405
Volume III: Davitt, Michael (1846–1906) – Haiti, resistance to US occupation	967
Volume IV: Haiti, revolutionary revolts, 1790s – Lempira (d. 1537)	1525
Volume V: Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924) – People’s Liberation Front of Sri Lanka (JVP)	2081
Volume VI: Peoples’ Global Action Network – Sturm und Drang	2635
Volume VII: Sudan, Aba Island Rebellion, 1970 – Zwingli, Huldrych (1484–1531)	3191
Volume VIII: Index	3751

Notes on the Editors

About the General Editor

Immanuel Ness is professor of political science at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, United States. He is also the director of the Graduate Political Science Program at the Brooklyn College Graduate Center for Worker Education in New York City, and has taught at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Union Leadership Program, and Cornell University Institute for Labor Relations. His current research examines the working class and labor unions from a historical-comparative perspective in a regional, national, and global context.

Ness is the author of numerous scholarly articles, chapters, review essays, and books on labor organizing, trade unions, migration, and unemployment, including *Immigrants, Unions, and the New US Labor Market* (2005) and *Chains of Migration* (forthcoming), and (as editor) the *Encyclopedia of American Social Movements*, recipient of an American Library Association Best Reference Award in 2005.

Since 1999, Ness has been editor of *Working USA: The Journal of Labor and Society* (Wiley-Blackwell), a peer-review quarterly social science journal on labor and class. He is founder of the Lower East Side Community Labor Coalition, which received a Proclamation from the City Council of New York in 2001 for advancing labor standards in low-wage occupations.

Ness lectures widely at universities and research institutes in the United States, Caribbean, Europe, and in East and South Asia.

Board of Editors

Dario Azzellini is a PhD candidate at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany, where his dissertation is on "Participatory and Protagonistic Democracy in Venezuela." A political scientist, social investigator, author, and artist, he collaborates with

research institutes and foundations in Germany, Italy, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico. He has written several books and numerous essays, and has produced various documentaries about Colombia, Italy, Nicaragua, Mexico, Venezuela, migration and racism, war, and post-Fordism (for more information, consult www.azzellini.net). For this encyclopedia, Azzellini served as editor for Latin America, the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, and the new left in Italy.

Marcelline Block is currently a PhD candidate at Princeton University, USA, where she was a recipient of a four-year Jacob Javits Fellowship. She has received two Graduate Certificates from Princeton, in the study of women, gender, and sexuality and in media and modernity. Since 2003, Block has taught in numerous departments at Princeton: French, comparative literature, English, politics, the program in visual arts, and the program in the study of women and gender. She is co-editor of *Critical Matrix: The Princeton Journal of Women, Gender and Culture* and text editor of *LINE*. She has published articles in American and European journals including *Excavatio*, *La Revue Française de Harvard*, and *Vingtième siècle*. She is currently editing an anthology of essays about feminist film theory, to be published in England in 2008.

Jesse Cohn is associate professor of English at Purdue University North Central, USA. He is the author of *Anarchism and the Crisis of Representation: Hermeneutics, Aesthetics, Politics* (2007).

Clifford D. Conner is a historian of science. He is the author of *A People's History of Science* (2005) and of two biographies of revolutionaries: *Jean-Paul Marat: Scientist and Revolutionary* (1997) and *Colonel Despard: The Life and Times of an Anglo-Irish Rebel* (2000). He has taught history at John Jay College, City University of New York, USA, and is at present working on a biography

of the Irish revolutionary Arthur O'Connor. A long-time partisan of the anti-war and labor movements, he is currently a member of the United Auto Workers local 1981/AFL-CIO (the National Writers' Union).

Rowena Griem is a catalog librarian for Germanic languages at Yale University, USA. She catalogs library materials in a variety of formats, using MARC 21 (MACHine Readable Cataloging), controlled vocabularies, and national cataloging standards. These bibliographic records are contributed to the international database OCLC, allowing scholars to access the materials worldwide. Her academic background is in history (BA from Franklin & Marshall College), comparative literature (MA from the University of Maryland, College Park), and library science (MS from Simmons Graduate School), including semesters in Mainz, Germany, and Vienna, Austria.

Paul Le Blanc is professor of history at La Roche College, USA. He has worked as a teacher, autoworker, shipyard worker, healthcare worker, social caseworker, dishwasher, and agricultural worker. Among his publications are *Revolution, Democracy and Socialism: Selected Writings of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin* (2008), *Marx, Lenin, and the Revolutionary Experience* (2006), *Black Liberation and the American Dream* (2003), *A Short History of the US Working Class* (1999), *Rosa Luxemburg: Reflections and Writings* (1999), *From Marx to Gramsci* (1996), *Lenin and the Revolutionary Party* (1990), and *Permanent Revolution in Nicaragua* (1984).

Amy Linch is a visiting instructor in comparative politics at Lehigh University, USA and a PhD candidate in political science at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, NJ. Her research focuses on transitions to democracy through social movements and the role of religion in liberal political thought.

Soma Marik is a reader in history at Ramakrishna Sarada Mission Vivekananda Vidyabhavan, India and has degrees in European history and in women's history. Her publications include *Reinterrogating the Classical Marxist Discourses of Revolutionary Democracy* (2008), *Women Under the Left Front Rule: Expectations Betrayed* (with Mira Roy, 2006, 2007), and *Garbhaghati Gujarat* (co-edited with Maitreyee

Chattopadhyay, 2002, 2004). She has done research work on class and gender relationships and on Indian and international socialist and communist movements, and has published around a dozen articles. She has also been a Guest Faculty member in the Department of History, Jadavpur University, as well as the School of Women's Studies, Jadavpur University, India.

Ayokunle Olumuyiwa Omobowale is a lecturer in sociology at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, where he also received his doctorate degree in sociology. His thesis was entitled "Political Clientelism and Rural Development in Selected Communities in Ibadan, Nigeria." He won the University of Ibadan Postgraduate School Award for scholarly publication in 2007. He was a lecturer at the University of Lagos, Nigeria, from April 2007 to May 2008 and has published numerous articles in journals and edited volumes.

Pierre Rousset is the founding director (1982–1992) and currently Fellow of the International Institute for Research and Education, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. As an activist of the French May '68 generation, he engaged in international solidarity activities and traveled extensively in Asia. Author of *Communisme et Nationalisme Vietnamiens* (1978), he contributed articles to several books and numerous magazines on Asian revolutions, national and social movements, and on ecology and the global justice movement. He edits a website (www.europe-solidaire.org) in French and English for the association Europe solidaire sans frontières (ESSF).

Beverly Tomek is a specialist in anti-slavery and race relations in the United States. She has published peer-reviewed articles in *American Nineteenth-Century History* and *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, and is completing a book on the anti-slavery and colonization movement in Pennsylvania. She also contributed to and edited the "Anti-Slavery/Abolition" section of the *Encyclopedia of American Social Movements*. She has been awarded fellowships by the Pew-Younger Foundation, the Library Company of Philadelphia, and the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

Ben Trott is a PhD candidate at the Free University of Berlin, Germany. His work focuses on

class composition and struggle in post-Fordism, along with questions of political organization. He co-edited *Shut Them Down! The G8, Gleneagles 2005 and the Movement of Movements* (2005) and a special issue of *ephemera: theory and politics in organization* (Issue 7.1) on immaterial and affective labor. Additionally, he worked as a co-editor on the German edition of *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anti-Capitalism* (2003), published as *Wir Sind Ueberall: Weltweit. Unwiderstehlich. Antikapitalistisch* (2007).

Board of Associate and Advisory Editors

Debdas Banerjee is professor of economics at the Institute of Development Studies at Calcutta University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India. He is author of numerous books and articles on Indian and global labor markets, labor standards, privatization, and corporations. His books include *Globalization, Industrial Restructuring and Labour Standards: Where India Meets the World* (2005) and (as co-editor) *Labor, Globalization and the State: Workers, Women and Migrants Confront Neoliberalism* (2007).

Walden Bello is a senior analyst at Focus on the Global South, a program of Chulalongkorn University's Social Research Institute, Bangkok, Thailand. In 2003 he received the Right Livelihood Award, also known as the Alternative Nobel Prize, for his efforts to educate civil society about the effects of and alternatives to corporate globalization. An academic as well as an activist, Bello has been a full professor at the University of the Philippines at Diliman since 1997, and has served as visiting professor at the University of California, USA. He has authored numerous books on Asian issues and globalization, including *Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire* (2005), *The Anti-Development State: The Political Economy of Permanent Crisis in the Philippines* (2004), and *Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy* (2004). He is currently a columnist for the *Philippine Daily Inquirer* and *Foreign Policy in Focus*.

Elaine Bernard is executive director of the Labor and Worklife Program at Harvard Law School and the Harvard Trade Union Program,

USA. Bernard has conducted courses on a wide variety of topics for unions, community groups, universities, and government departments. Her research and teaching interests are in the areas of international comparative labor movements and the role of unions in promoting civil society, democracy, and economic growth.

Robert Brenner is director of the Center for Social Theory and professor of comparative history at the University of California, Los Angeles, USA. His recent interests include early modern European history, economic, social, and religious history, agrarian history, social theory/Marxism, and Tudor–Stuart England. His publications include *The Economics of Global Turbulence* (2006) and *The Boom and the Bubble: The US in the World Economy* (2002) as well as numerous other books and articles on the history of modern capitalism.

Stephen Eric Bronner is currently professor (II) of political science at Rutgers University, USA. Senior editor of *Logos*, an interdisciplinary Internet journal, he is also chair of the executive committee of US Academics for Peace and a member of the advisory board of *Conscience International*. Bronner's works have been translated into a dozen languages and include: *Socialism Unbound* (2001), *A Rumor about the Jews: Anti-Semitism, Conspiracy, and the "Protocols of Zion"* (2003), *Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement* (2004), *Blood in the Sand: Imperial Fantasies, Rightwing Ambitions, and the Erosion of American Democracy* (2005), and *Peace Out of Reach: Middle Eastern Travels and the Search for Reconciliation* (2007).

Dennis Brutus is a poet and activist, as well as a Fellow at the Center for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu, Natal, South Africa. Brutus was awarded the Langston Hughes Medallion from City University of New York in 1986 and the Paul Robeson Award for Artistic Excellence, Political Consciousness, and Integrity in 1989. Publications since 1984 include *Salutes and Censures* (1984), *Airs and Tributes* (1988), and *Still the Sirens* (1993).

Paul Buhle is founder and former editor of the new left journal *Radical America*, and later founder of the Oral History of the American Left archive, New York University, USA. He has

written or edited 34 books, mostly on the history of radicalism, most recently in comic art format.

Verity Burgmann is professor of political science at the University of Melbourne, Australia. A veteran of the protest movements of the 1970s, she has remained active in left-wing campaigns over the past three decades. She is a leading Australian academic authority on labor history and politics, environmental politics, anti-corporate radicalism, and other contemporary protest movements. She has published extensively in these areas and is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia.

Dimitrios K. Dalakoglou is a PhD candidate in anthropology at University College London, UK, focusing on the anthropology of politics. He studies cross-border infrastructure, the material culture of migration, and ethnic relationships and post-socialist urban topography in Albania. His doctoral dissertation is titled “An Anthropology of the Road” and he has conducted ethnographic research in Albania, Greece, and the Netherlands.

Lawrence Davidson is a professor of history at West Chester University, USA. His specialization is in the history of American relations with the Middle East. He is the author of *America's Palestine: Popular and Official Perceptions from Balfour to Israeli Statehood* (2001) and *Islamic Fundamentalism* (2003). Presently, he is working on a book entitled *Privatizing American Foreign Policy*. He has also written numerous articles on US perceptions of and policies toward the Middle East. Over the last 20 years Davidson has sought to heighten public awareness of the nature and consequences of US policies in the Middle East.

Geoffroy de Laforcade is an associate professor of Latin American and Caribbean history at Norfolk State University, USA. A former civil rights activist, international journalist, and translator in Europe, he holds a PhD from Yale University, USA and has developed new world-historical curricula in several colleges and universities. His research focuses on labor history, diasporic movements, the transnational articulation of protest and revolution in the Atlantic world, and anarchosyndicalist and socialist traditions in the Southern Americas.

Herbert Docena is research associate with Focus on the Global South, an international policy research and advocacy organization which is affiliated with the Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute in Bangkok, Thailand. He has written several scholarly journal articles on the reconstruction and political transition in Iraq. Docena is co-editor with Walden Bello and Marissa de Guzman of *The Anti-Development State: The Political Economy of Permanent Crisis in the Philippines* (2005).

Chris Ealham teaches history at St. Louis University, Madrid, and is professor of history at Lancaster University. He is author of *Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898–1937* (2005), among other works on Spanish history. Ealham's research to date has focused on the social, political, and cultural dimensions of the four decades of crisis that preceded the Spanish Civil War and the Revolution of 1936–7. He is especially interested in left-wing and revolutionary movements, particularly Spain's mass anarchist and anarchosyndicalist movements, and the way that space and memory affect social protest. He is currently working on a social history of Spanish migrants in the United States of America, ca. 1855–1945.

Bill Fletcher, Jr. is co-founder of the Center for Labor Renewal, an educator, columnist, and longtime activist. He served as president of TransAfrica Forum and was formerly the education director and later assistant to the president of the AFL-CIO. He is co-author with Fernando Gapasin of *Solidarity Divided: The Crisis in Organized Labor and a New Path Toward Social Justice* (2008) and author of *The Indispensable Ally: Black Workers and the Formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, 1934–1943* (2000).

Adolfo Gilly is professor of history at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and is a longtime participant-observer of Latin American revolution. He is the author of numerous books on history and politics, including the classic *The Mexican Revolution: A People's History* (2006 [1971]). Most recently Gilly has written on Chiapas, and on leading contemporary philosophers and historians, including Walter Benjamin, Karl Polanyi, Antonio Gramsci, Edward P. Thompson, Ranajit Guha, and Guillermo Bonafil Batalla.

Michael Goldfield, a former labor organizer and agitator, is currently professor of industrial relations and human resources in the Political Science Department at Wayne State University, USA. He specializes in the study of labor, race, Marxist theory, and issues of globalization. He is the author of hundreds of articles and monographs, and of numerous books, including *The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States* (1987), *The Color of Politics: Race and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (1997), and most recently (with Debdas Banerjee) *Labor, Globalization, and the State: Workers, Women, and Migrants Confront Neo-liberalism* (2007).

George Gona has taught African history at the Department of History and Archaeology at the University of Nairobi, Kenya, for the last 18 years. In the past four years he has also taught in the Masters in Armed Conflict and Peace Studies Program, which he coordinates. He is currently editing a book entitled *Mizizi: Essays in Honour of Prof. G. Muriuki*. For this encyclopedia, Gona served as the associate editor for Eastern Africa.

Mike Gonzalez is professor of Latin American studies at the University of Glasgow, UK and until recently was head of Hispanic studies there. Gonzalez has written widely on issues in Latin American culture, literature, and politics. He is the author of *Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution* (2005), and his analysis of recent social movements in Latin America appeared in 2008. He co-edited the *Routledge Encyclopedias of Contemporary Latin American and Caribbean Culture* (2000) and *Contemporary Caribbean and Latin American Literature* (with Daniel Balderston) in 2004.

Lawrence Goodwyn is Professor Emeritus of History at Duke University, USA. Goodwyn was a former field reporter for the *Texas Observer*. He specializes in the historical study of comparative social movements, populism, and the American South. He is the author of *The Populist Moment: A Short History of Agrarian Revolt in America* (1978) and *Breaking the Barrier: The Rise of Solidarity in Poland* (1991).

J. Megan Greene is associate professor of modern Chinese history at the University of Kansas, USA. Her publications include *The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan:*

Science Policy and the Quest for Modernization (2008), a co-edited volume with Robert Ash titled *Taiwan in the 21st Century: Aspects and Limitations of a Development Model* (2007), and *Imperialism in the Modern World: Sources and Interpretations*, co-edited with William D. Bowman and Frank M. Chiteji (2007).

J. Laurence Hare is assistant professor of history at Emory & Henry College, USA. He earned his PhD in modern European history in 2007 from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His dissertation, "Claiming Valhalla: Archaeology and National Identity in the German–Danish Borderland, 1830–1950," traces the emergence of archaeology in Schleswig–Holstein and Sønderjylland in order to explore the ways Germans and Danes claimed and contested the distant past as part of the process of building their respective national identities.

Daniel Hémerly, now retired, taught East Asian history at the Paris VII/Denis Diderot University, France. He is the author of *Indochina: An Ambiguous Colonization, 1858–1954* (with P. Brocheux, 2008), *Ho Chi Minh de l'Indochine au Vietnam* (1990), and *Révolutionnaires Vietnamiens et Pouvoir Colonial en Indochine* (1975). He has contributed to or edited several other books, including *Pour une Histoire du Développement: Etats, sociétés, développement* (with C. Coquery-Vidrovitch and J. Piel, 2000) and *In the Servitude of Power: Energy and Civilization through the Ages* (with Jean-Claude Debeir and J.-P. Deléage, 1991).

Gerald Horne is John and Rebecca Moores Professor of History at the University of Houston, USA. His areas of expertise are US history and African and Afro-American studies. Horne's recent publications include *The Deepest South: The United States, Brazil and the African Slave Trade* (2007), *Cold War in a Hot Zone: The United States Confronts Labor and Independence Struggles in the British West Indies* (2007), *Race Woman: The Lives of Shirley Graham Du Bois* (2000), *Class Struggle in Hollywood: Moguls, Mobsters, Stars, Reds and Trade Unionists, 1930–1950* (2001), and *From the Barrel of a Gun: The US and the War Against Zimbabwe, 1965–1980* (2001).

Masao Inoue is professor of labor studies at the College of Economics at Rikkyo University,

Japan. His recent publications include “Small Business in Japan: An Overview of its Structure and Functions,” in *Small and Medium-Scale Industry in India and the Model of Japan* (ed. K. Odaka and Y. Kiyokawa, 2008), *The Struggle for Culture: Labor Dispute at Toho Studio 1946–1948* (2007), and “What has Research into Japanese Industrial Relations Elucidated over 20 years?” in *Asian Business and Management* 4, 2 (June 2005).

Boris Kanzleiter is currently a PhD student in history at the Free University of Berlin, Germany, studying the student movement of 1968 in Yugoslavia with the help of a scholarship from the Hans Böckler Stiftung of the German Trade Union Federation DGB. He studied history and literature at the Free University Berlin and at the National School of Anthropology and History in Mexico City. He has experience as a journalist and editor, and in adult political education.

Robin D. G. Kelley is professor of history and American studies and ethnicity at the University of Southern California, USA. His research topics include the history of black radical movements in the United States, the African Diaspora, and Africa (notably South Africa); black intellectuals; music; visual culture; imperialism; and organized labor. Recently Kelley’s work has focused on culture and the politics of art, primarily with regard to the history of jazz and related musical forms. He is currently completing books on Thelonious Monk, jazz and modern Africa in the age of decolonialization, and a general narrative of African American history in a global context.

Jason M. Kelly is an assistant professor of British history at Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, USA. He has authored *The Society of Dilettanti: Archaeology and Identity in the British Enlightenment* (forthcoming, 2009). His current research is a comparative history of civic responsibility and the political meanings of abolition in modern Britain and the United States. Kelly serves on the Council of the North American Conference on British Studies and is co-editor of *H-Albion*.

Margaret Levi is the Jere L. Bacharach Professor of International Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Washington,

Seattle, USA. She is director of the CHAOS (Comparative Historical Analysis of Organizations and States) Center and formerly the Harry Bridges Chair and Director, the Harry Bridges Center for Labor Studies. Levi is the author of three books, *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism* (1997), *Of Rule and Revenue* (1988), and *Bureaucratic Insurgency: The Case of Police Unions* (1977). Concurrently, she is working on a range of issues having to do with labor unions and with global justice campaigns. Some of the work builds on the WTO History Project, which she co-directed.

Au Loong Yu is a reporter with *Globalization Monitor*. He is an activist from Hong Kong who has written extensively on new nationalism in China and the emergence of the “new left.” He is a member of the editorial board of *Globalization Monitor*, a non-profit organization based in Hong Kong that was founded shortly before the World Trade Organization protests in Seattle in 1999. It has been the chief organization in Hong Kong dedicated to promoting awareness of the negative effects of globalization.

Michael Löwy is research director emeritus at the CNRS (National Center for Scientific Research), Paris, France. His major publications are *Georg Lukács: From Romanticism to Bolshevism* (1981), *On Changing the World: Essays in Political Philosophy, from Karl Marx to Walter Benjamin* (1993), *Romanticism against the Current of Modernity* (with Robert Sayre, 2001), *The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx* (2003), and *Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History”* (2005).

Manning Marable is professor of history and political science and founding director of the African American Studies Program, Columbia University, USA. His published works include *What Black America Thinks* (2002), *Dispatches from the Ebony Tower: Intellectuals Confront the African American Experience* (2001), and *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America* (2000). He is completing a comprehensive biography of African American leader Malcolm X entitled *Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention*.

Bryan D. Palmer is the Canada Research Chair in Canadian Studies at Trent University, Peterborough, Canada. He is the author of

numerous books and articles on labor history and the revolutionary left and he edits the journal *Labour/Le Travail*. Palmer is author of many books, including *James P. Cannon and the Origins of the American Revolutionary Left, 1890–1928* (2007) and *E. P. Thompson: Objections and Oppositions* (1994).

Diogo L. Pinheiro is currently a PhD candidate at Emory University, USA and in 2009 plans to complete his dissertation entitled “Risky Business: The Social Construction of Country Risk Ratings.” His work deals with the intersection of culture and economy.

Frances Fox Piven is distinguished professor of political science and sociology at the City University of New York Graduate Center, USA. She is co-author with Richard Cloward of two landmark historical works, *Regulating the Poor* (1993) and *Poor People’s Movements* (1978), and has authored numerous other works. Piven’s accomplishments as a scholar are intertwined with her political activism in the welfare rights movement. She is past president of the American Sociological Association.

Gerardo Rénique is an associate professor of history at the City College of the City University of New York, USA, and member of the board of the Brecht Forum/New York Marxist School. His recent works include “Strategic Challenges for Latin America’s Anti-Neoliberal Insurgency,” in *Dispatches from Latin America* (ed. Vijay Prashad and Teo Ballvé, 2006). He is a co-producer of the video documentary *Land, Rain and Fire: Report from Oaxaca*, and is also the author of “People’s War, Dirty War: Cold War Legacy and the End of History in Post-War Peru,” in *A Century of Revolution* (ed. Greg Grandin and Gilbert Joseph, forthcoming) and “Race, Region and Nation: Sonora’s Anti-Chinese Racism and Mexico’s Post-Revolutionary Nationalism,” in *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America* (ed. Nancy P. Appelbaum, 2003).

Heidi M. Rimke teaches in the Department of Sociology at the University of Winnipeg, Canada. She specializes in the areas of classical and contemporary social and political theory, historical and political sociology, law, criminology, and the history of the human sciences. Her publications examine the role of popular

psychology in neoliberalism, the medicalization of morality in western society, and the history of the doctrine of moral insanity. She is currently researching the psychiatrization of anarchism in addition to a project that examines contemporary biogenic discourses on crime and criminality.

Magda Romanska is an assistant professor and the head of theater studies at Emerson College, USA and a research associate at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, USA. Her articles have appeared in *TDR: The Drama Review*, *Performance Research: A Journal of the Performing Arts*, *Toronto Slavic Quarterly*, *Women’s Studies Journal*, and *The Columbia Encyclopedia of Modern Drama* (2007). Her work has also been published in *Ghosts, Stories, Histories: Ghost Stories and Alternative Historie* (ed. Sladja Blazan, 2007) and *The Cultural Politics of Heiner Muller* (ed. Dan Friedman, 2007).

Paul Rubinson recently completed his PhD thesis in US history at the University of Texas at Austin, USA. His dissertation, “Containing Science: The US National Security State and Scientists’ Challenge to Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War,” investigates the conflicts over nuclear weapons policy between scientists and the US government during the Cold War. For 2007–8 he received a Smith Richardson Fellowship at Yale University International Security Studies.

Sean Scalmer teaches history at the University of Melbourne, Australia. He is the author or co-author of three books on labor and social movements: *Dissent Events* (2002), *Activist Wisdom* (2006), and *The Little History of Australian Unionism* (2006).

Guillermina S. Seri is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Union College, USA, where she teaches courses in Latin American politics and political theory. Seri’s research focuses on the rhetorics and practices of governance embedded in policing, especially in the exercise of discretionary prerogative power by those in charge of policing. Before coming to Union College, Seri was a postdoctoral fellow and a visiting assistant professor in the Program of Peace and Conflict at

Colgate University, USA, and she has taught at different universities in Argentina.

Matthew J. Smith is a lecturer in the Department of History and Archaeology at the University of the West Indies, Mona. His area of research includes Haitian political history, with a focus on radicalism and popular movements in the twentieth century. He is the author of *Red and Black in Haiti: Radicalism, Conflict, and Political Change, 1934–1957* (forthcoming).

Mauro Stampacchia is a researcher at the Department of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy, and has taught courses in contemporary history, labor history, and political thought. He has published widely on the subjects of Italian fascism, labor history, and World War II history. He is a contributor to *Class in America: An Encyclopedia* (2007) and is now translating, editing, and introducing Charles Klopp's *Sentences: The Memoirs and Letters of Italian Political Prisoners from Benvenuto Cellini to Aldo Moro*.

Michael J. Thompson is a professor of political science at William J. Paterson University, USA. His areas of expertise include German idealism, western Marxism, critical theory, and classical Greek political philosophy and ethical theory. His recent books include *The Politics of Inequality: A Political History of the Idea of Economic Inequality in America* (2007) and *Confronting the New Conservatism: The Rise of the Right in America* (2007). He is author of numerous scholarly articles and is the founder and editor of *Logos: A Journal of Modern Society and Culture*.

Edson I. Urano is lecturer at Sophia University, Faculty of Foreign Studies, Department of Portuguese Language and Luso-Brazilian Studies, Japan. His work focuses on the sociology of work, industrial relations, and international migration. He holds a PhD in economics, and has been researching the migratory process of Latin Americans to Japan and the transnational dynamics of this phenomenon. Additionally, he has analyzed community unionism in Japan as an alternative way to organize peripheral workers in

that country, and the meaning of this movement in the context of global social movements.

Lucien van der Walt teaches sociology at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. His research interests lie in the historical sociology of Southern African labor, the study of anarchism and syndicalism, and in political economy, with a focus on neoliberalism. He has published widely on these issues in journals, newspapers, and bulletins, and has been active in unions, social movements, and labor service organizations. Van der Walt is presently completing a two-volume study of the social theory and global history of anarchism and syndicalism over the last 150 years.

Antonios Vradis is a PhD candidate in the Geography Department of the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. He co-edits *Voices of Resistance from Occupied London*, an occasional journal looking at all things urban from an anarchist perspective.

Joseph Wilson, professor of political science, Brooklyn College, USA, is the director of the Graduate Center for Worker Education and founding director of the Center for Diversity and Multicultural Studies. A labor scholar and union activist, his works focus on the convergence of class and race. He is author of *Tearing Down the Color Bar: A Documentary History and Analysis of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters* (1989) and *The Re-Education of the American Working Class* (1990) as well as contributing editor to *The Encyclopedia of American Social Movements* (2004) and *Race and Labor Matters* (2006).

Won Young-su was actively involved in the student movement at Seoul National University, Korea in the early 1980s. After being dismissed for leading a student protest, he was employed as a blue-collar worker organizing laborers for two years. He worked in different social movement organizations, but returned to the labor movement as an activist and researcher. He joined the anti-globalization movement and has been active in international solidarity work. He is author of many articles dealing with issues surrounding the labor and anti-globalization movements.

Notes on Contributors

Animasawun Gbemisola Abdul-Jelil is special assistant on religion and culture to the deputy governor of Ogun State, Abeokuta, Nigeria. He is the author of an *Introduction to Conflict Transformation*. His doctoral thesis was on methods for sustainable peace between the Hausa and Yoruba of Nigeria, and his current research is on “Godfatherism and Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Violence and Political Insecurity in Ibadan,” a project sponsored by the Institute for French Research in Africa (IFRA), Nigeria.

Collin Rajasingham Abraham is a social development consultant at the Malaysian Agency for Skills Development. He has a background in the sociology of development, which he studied at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA. He helped set up the Sociology Program at Science University in 1970, and has continued to be active in teaching and research since retiring from Science University. He was selected to undertake research in Malaysia for the United Nations Development Program in 2003. More recently, Abraham has published *Speaking Out Loud for National Unity and Integration: Social Change and Nation-Building in Contemporary Malaysia* (2008).

Kenneth Wayne Ackerson is currently an associate professor of history at his alma mater, Salisbury University in Maryland, USA, where he teaches courses on British imperial, African, and Indian history. He is the author of *The African Institution (1807–1827) and the Antislavery Movement in Great Britain* (2005).

Barry D. Adam is University Professor of Sociology at the University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada and senior scientist and director of prevention research at Ontario HIV Treatment Network in Toronto. He is author of *The Survival of Domination* (1978) and *The Rise of a Gay and Lesbian Movement* (1995), and co-author of *Experiencing HIV* (1996) and *The Global Emergence of Gay and Lesbian Politics* (1999). He has also published articles on new social movement theory,

on Nicaragua, and on HIV prevention and social aspects of AIDS.

Julius O. Adekunle is an associate professor of African history and culture at Monmouth University, West Long Branch, New Jersey, USA. He has published many articles and book chapters on African politics and culture. He is the author of *Politics and Society in Nigeria’s Middle Belt: Borgu and the Emergence of a Political Identity* (2004) and *Culture and Customs of Rwanda* (2007). He is currently working on an edited volume titled *Religion in Politics in Modern Nigeria*.

Adebusuyi I. Adeniran is a lecturer in sociology at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. His areas of research and teaching include comparative/development studies, African social thought, and political sociology. He is currently pursuing his doctoral degree in development sociology at the University of Lagos, Nigeria. Adeniran’s academic awards include the Unilag Teaching Assistantship and Graduate Fellowship Awards.

Mohamed Adhikari teaches in the Department of Historical Studies, University of Cape Town, South Africa. He has published extensively on the history and politics of colored identity in nineteenth- and twentieth-century South Africa. His publications include (as editor) *Straatpraatjes: Language, Politics and Popular Culture in Cape Town, 1909–1922* (1997) and (as co-editor with Les Switzer) *South Africa’s Resistance Press: Dissident Voices in the Last Generation of Apartheid* (2000) and *Not White Enough, Not Black Enough: Racial Identity in the South African Coloured Community* (2005). He now works in the field of genocide studies.

Lucille A. Adkins teaches women’s studies and US history at La Roche College, USA. She received her BA in anthropology and her MA in US history at the University of Pittsburgh, where she also did her doctoral work in US social history and women’s studies.

Chris John Agee is adjunct lecturer at the City University of New York and a PhD student in political science at the CUNY Graduate Center, USA. Agee first worked at the Center for Constitutional Rights as a paralegal on domestic civil rights litigation and international human rights cases. He went on to organize undocumented immigrants, first through the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Union and then as education director at the Lower East Side Workers' Center. He also founded the Center for Non-Profit Technology. Agee serves on the editorial board for the *Journal of the Research Group on Socialism and Democracy*.

Joshua Kwesi Aikins is a PhD candidate in history and sociology at the University of Bielefeld, Germany. He obtained his Master's in political science at the University of Ghana and the Free University of Berlin. His dissertation examines the reshaping of the politics of development through the interaction of indigenous and western-style political institutions in Ghana. Aikins has published on co-wives in Africa, the politics of memory, and "The Everyday Presence of the Colonial Past" in Germany, as well as on black cultural expression between appropriation and resistance.

Olayinka Akanle is a graduate student of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He has successfully completed a Master of Science (MSc) degree in sociology and began doctoral studies in September 2008. His research interests include social theory, social development, diaspora studies, group dynamics, and conflict.

Kristian Patrick Alexander is a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA. He has lived in Lebanon for many years and has traveled widely in the Middle East. His research focuses on social movements in the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula.

Tariq Ali is a novelist, historian, filmmaker, and an editor of the *New Left Review*.

Eitan Y. Alimi is an assistant professor of political science at Hebrew University, Israel. His research interests include contentious politics, radicalization and political terrorism, and conflict resolution, with special reference to the Israeli political system and the Middle East. Recent publications include articles in *Political Studies*, the *British Journal of Political Science*, *Mobilization*, *International Political Science Review*, *Sociological Forum*, and a book

entitled *Israeli Politics and the First Palestinian Intifada* (2006).

Barbara C. Allen is an assistant professor of history at La Salle University, USA. She received her PhD from Indiana University, Bloomington, USA, where her doctoral dissertation was a partial biography of Alexander Shlyapnikov. She has published articles in the journals *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, *Revolutionary Russia*, and *The NEP Era: Soviet Russia 1921–1928*. Presently, she is revising her dissertation for publication as a full biography of Shlyapnikov.

María Ximena Alvarez Martínez is a PhD candidate in history at the Free University of Berlin, Germany, studying German-speaking exiles in South America and their cultural struggle in the years 1939–49. Originally from Uruguay, Alvarez obtained a Master's in political history at Paraná State University (UFPR) in 2006.

Ernest A. Amador is the testing coordinator at the University of Houston-Victoria, USA. Before earning his Bachelor's degree from UHV in 2007, he served in the Marine Corps. He is currently pursuing his Master's degree from UHV.

Zulma Amador is a social researcher and educator pursuing a PhD in social science at the Center for Research and Higher Studies in Social Anthropology (CIESAS) in Guadalajara, Mexico. She has been dedicated to the training of educators (teachers, activists, agents of social intervention) in Latin America, from the perspective of popular education. Her doctoral thesis discusses the formation of critical consciousness in the Landless Movement of Brazil.

Maria Anastasopoulou is a scholar of comparative literature who taught at the University of Athens, Greece for 22 years. She has published numerous articles on Anglo-American and Greek literature in several literary journals in the USA, Europe, and Australia. She is a founding member of the Greek Association of Comparative Literature. Currently, she is working on an English version of her book on Greek educator Callirrhoe Parren, originally published in Greek, and is editing Parren's novels for publication.

Benjamín Anaya González is a musician, photographer, essayist, translator, and professor, whose work in various media has been performed, published, and exhibited internationally. Since 1987

he has been a professor at the Mexican Dance Academy of the Mexican National Fine Arts Institute (INBA), and from 1994 to 1996 he was the sub-academic director of the National Conservatory of Music. Anaya is currently working on a novel, a book of essays on music criticism, and an anthology on the poets of Mexican rock music.

Alan Angell is Emeritus Fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford, UK and a former director of the Latin American Center of Oxford University. He has written extensively on aspects of Latin American politics, and especially the politics of Chile, the politics of the left, and social policy. His first book was on the Chilean labor movement, *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile* (1972), and his most recent is *Democracy after Pinochet: Politics, Parties and Elections in Chile* (2007).

Allan Antliff holds the Canada Research Chair in Modern Art at the University of Victoria, Canada. He is author of *Anarchist Modernism: Art, Politics and the First American Avant-Garde* (2001) and *Anarchy and Art: From the Paris Commune to the Fall of the Berlin Wall* (2007), and editor of *Only a Beginning: An Anarchist Anthology* (2004).

Maurizio Antonioli is a professor of contemporary history at the University of Milan, Italy. He has written many books on trade unionism, revolutionary syndicalism, and anarchism. He is among the editors of *The Biographical Dictionary of Italian Anarchists* (2003, 2004).

Rita Arditti, originally from Argentina, holds a doctoral degree in biological sciences from Università di Roma, Italy. Arditti has researched and taught at Brandeis University, Harvard Medical School, Boston University, and Union Institute and University. She has co-edited two books, *Science and Liberation* (1980) and *Test-Tube Women: What Future for Motherhood?* (1980), and authored *Searching for Life: The Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo and the Disappeared Children of Argentina*, published in English in 1999, and in Spanish in 2000. She has received several awards for her work on women, peace, and justice.

Victoria Arnold is studying for a doctoral degree at the University of Kent at Canterbury, UK, specializing in early nineteenth-century British political history.

Fernando Artavia Araya is a PhD student in Latin American studies at the Free University of Berlin,

Germany, where he is studying neoliberal reforms in Costa Rica. Since 2004 he has worked as a professor in the Department of Sociology, and also as a researcher with the Institute of Social Research, both at the University of Costa Rica.

Felipe Arturo Ávila Espinosa is a sociologist and Mexican historian. He is a professor in the School of Arts and Philosophy, as well as a researcher at the Institute of Historical Investigations, both at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). He has authored books on the origins of the Zapatista movement, as well as on the interim government of Francisco León de la Barra.

David Bacon is a California-based photojournalist and former labor organizer. His books include *The Children of NAFTA* (2004), *Communities Without Borders* (2006), and *Illegal People: How Globalization Creates Migration and Criminalizes Immigrants* (2008).

James Baer is the assistant dean for history at Northern Virginia Community College, USA. He is the co-editor of *Cities of Hope: People, Protests and Progress in Urbanizing Latin America 1870–1930* with Ronn Pineo, and has published articles in the *Journal of Urban History*, *The Americas*, and the *Latin American Research Review*. He received sabbatical support through a Fellowship for College Teachers from the National Endowment for the Humanities and has completed a book manuscript on Spanish anarchists in Argentina who returned to Spain.

Melanie A. Bailey is assistant professor of history at Centenary College of Louisiana, USA.

János M. Bak is Professor Emeritus of the Department of Medieval Studies in the Central European University of Hungary. He graduated from Budapest and Göttingen universities and has taught at universities in the USA, Canada, and Hungary.

Sruti Bala is assistant professor of theatre studies at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Her doctoral research was on the performativity of non-violent protest in South Asia, with a detailed study of the Pashtun movement Khuda-i Khidmatgar, amongst others. She is currently researching performance practices in zones of violent conflict. She is also a theatre practitioner with a focus on participatory methods.

Jordan J. Ballor is associate editor of the *Journal of Markets and Morality*, published by the Acton

Institute for the Study of Religion and Liberty. He is also a PhD candidate in historical theology at Calvin Theological Seminary in Grand Rapids, Michigan, USA, and a doctoral student in Reformation history at the University of Zurich. His dissertation research is on the theology of Wolfgang Musculus.

Constance Bantman completed a PhD in 2007 on the connections between French and British anarchist movements from 1880 to 1914. Her previous publications include comparative analyses of the anarchist and syndicalist movements in France and Britain, studies on William Morris and anarchism, and on the French anarchist exiles in Britain.

Franco Barchiesi is an assistant professor in the Department of African American and African Studies at Ohio State University, USA. From 1996 to 2002 he taught in the Department of Sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, where he received his PhD. He is the editor (with Tom Bramble) of *Rethinking the Labour Movement in the "New South Africa"* (2003).

Geoffrey Barei is a lecturer in the History Department at the University of Botswana.

James R. Barrett, professor of history and African American studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA, is the author of *Work and Community in the Jungle: Chicago's Packing House Workers, 1894–1922* (1987) and *William Z. Foster and the Tragedy of American Radicalism* (1999), and co-editor of the book series *The Working Class in American History*. He is currently writing a book about the interactions among Irish Americans, New Immigrants, and peoples of color in American cities during the early twentieth century.

Yannick Beaulieu is a member of the editorial board of *Dissidences*, an online journal for the study of revolutionary movements. He received his PhD in 2006 from the History and Civilization Department of the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. His dissertation, "Judiciary and Political Power in Italy, 1918–1943: Sociohistorical Analysis of Ordinary Judges and their Relationships with Politics," is forthcoming from Einaudi, Turin (2009).

Marc Becker teaches Latin American history at Truman State University, USA. His research focuses on constructions of race, class, and gender

within popular movements in the South American Andes. He is the author of *Mariátegui and Latin American Marxist Theory* (1993) and *Indians and Leftists in the Making of Ecuador's Modern Indigenous Movements* (2008).

Anne Beggs-Sunter is an Australian historian who specializes in nineteenth-century Australian history within the context of the British empire. She is a lecturer in history and heritage in the School of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Humanities at the University of Ballarat. Her special research interest is the significance of the Eureka Stockade in Australian history, and the representation of historical events in museums.

Peter Beilharz co-founded the journal *Thesis Eleven* in 1980, and has directed the Thesis Eleven Center since its establishment in 2002 at La Trobe University in Melbourne. He has written or edited 23 books on socialism, labor, and culture, including work on Bernard Smith and Zygmunt Bauman, 130 papers, and many reviews and commentaries. He was professor of Australian studies at Harvard 1999–2000, and is a fellow of the Cultural Sociology Center at Yale. He is presently beginning a major project on Australian rock music.

Jon Bekken is presently associate professor of communications at Albright College, USA and a member of the editorial boards of the *Anarcho-Syndicalist Review* and *Journalism History*. A former general secretary-treasurer of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and editor of the union's newspaper, the *Industrial Worker*, he has also co-authored *The Industrial Workers of the World: Its First 100 Years* (2006), and written several scholarly articles on the labor and immigrant press.

Mary Benjamin currently serves as an associate staff analyst in the New York City Department of Homeless services. Benjamin studied German literature at the Graduate School of the City University of New York, USA, and served as an assistant professor in the German Department of the Faculty of Education, Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt. She has received two scholarships from the German Academic Exchange services (DAAD) to study German linguistics at the University of Essen, Westphalia.

Hans Bennett is an independent multimedia journalist, and a co-founder of the website and newspaper *Journalists for Mumia*. He has worked with *AWOL Magazine*, the *Defenestrator Newspaper*,

Philadelphia IMC, and *INSUBORDINATION* magazine. While mostly focusing on the movement to free Mumia Abu-Jamal, the MOVE 9, and all political prisoners, he has also used his journalism to support radical movements including media justice, anti-militarism, environmental justice, and anti-racism (see insubordination.blogspot.com).

Terri Bennett is a doctoral student in earth and environmental sciences at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, USA. Her research interests include political ecology, participatory development, feminist political theory, and social movements. In 2006 and 2007 she conducted ethnographic research in Northeastern Thailand where she examined grassroots responses to technocratic development projects and the effects of economic development on democratic processes. She has been a contributor to the award-winning *Common Language Project* magazine and is currently organizing a CUNY-wide Social Forum.

David L. Bent is a PhD candidate in Canadian history at the University of New Brunswick in Fredericton, Canada. His research focuses on rural Nova Scotia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly on the impact of the economic, technological, and social tenets of liberalism and modernity on the organization and function of the province's agricultural economy and rural society.

Franco Bertolucci is the director of the Franco Serantini Library, an archive and resource center for social and contemporary history located in Pisa, Italy. He studied contemporary history at the University of Pisa. His main research interests are anarchism and the history of leftist movements.

Nandini Bhattacharya teaches history in Calcutta Girls' College, Kolkata, India. She is the author of the book *Dueling Isms: Soviet and Regional Identity in Central Asia* (2008). Her publications on Soviet Central Asia have appeared in journals and she has also contributed book chapters to several edited volumes.

Amit Bhattacharyya is a professor of history at Jadavpur University, India and teaches courses on modern China, the economic history of modern India, and ancient India. His major publications include *Swadeshi Enterprise in Bengal 1900–1920* (1986), *Swadeshi Enterprise in Bengal 1921–47* (1995), *The Profile of a National Enterprise in Bengal: P. M. Bagchi & Co. 1883–1947, Transformation of*

China 1840–1980, and *A Short History of the Chinese Civilization* (2007).

Brenda Biddle is a PhD candidate in anthropology at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, USA. She is writing a book based on recent research with *Via Campesina* activists in Europe, which will be an account of their struggle to bring forth their vision for food sovereignty on the local, regional, and global levels.

Vicki L. Birchfield is associate professor in the School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, USA. Her research and teaching interests include comparative politics, international political economy and European integration, social movements, and the politics of globalization. Her book, *Institutions, Values and Income Inequality in Capitalist Democracies*, is forthcoming and she is presently working on a new book manuscript entitled *The Transatlantic Values Debate and the Quest for Global Leadership*. She also directs Georgia Tech's European Summer Program and has been a visiting professor at French universities.

Richard J. M. Blackett is Andrew Jackson Professor of History at Vanderbilt University, USA.

Robert H. Blackman is Elliott Associate Professor of History at Hampden-Sydney College, USA. He took his PhD in history under the direction of Timothy Tackett at the University of California, Irvine.

David Bleakney is the National Education Representative (Anglophone) of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers. He has been delivering popular education courses on capitalism, neoliberalism, health and safety, oppression and resistance since 1993. He is active in a variety of local and international struggles and his writings have been published in *Briarpatch Magazine* and *ZNet*.

Filip Bloem is a PhD student in the History Department at Leiden University, the Netherlands.

Helen Bluemel is a PhD student at Cardiff University, Wales, where she is completing her doctoral thesis on German cultural history in the 1940s and its wider implications in the framework of the beginning of the Cold War. Her fields of expertise are modern German and European history, with a focus on cultural history in particular. Her research combines aspects of cultural and political history to broaden perspectives on the past.

Iain A. Boal is a social historian who teaches at the University of California, USA. He is associated with the Bay Area collective Retort, and is a co-author of *Afflicted Powers: Capital and Spectacle in a New Age of War* (2005). A forthcoming work of his, *The Green Machine*, is a global history of human-powered vehicles based on research as a Guggenheim Fellow in Science and Technology.

Jolan Bogdan is a researcher in visual cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK and a visiting lecturer at the University of Birmingham, UK. His current research involves an exploration into how the contemporary viewer approaches images. This research questions how the history of imagery has influenced the present-day impact of television, explores the ramifications of relying on images to tell the story of political unrest, and ultimately investigates the ethics of image production and the claimed authenticity of media images.

Manuela Bojadžijev currently works at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK. She is a member of the Sound Art group Ultra-red. Her research interests include the history and presence of migrant social struggles, the transforming notion and institution of the border, citizenship and the nation-state in contemporary Europe, and migration movements. Her recent publications include *Die windige Internationale: Rassismus und Kämpfe der Migration* (2008) and *Forschungsgruppe TRANSIT MIGRATION: Turbulente Ränder. Neue Perspektiven auf Migration an den Grenzen Europas* (2007).

John Bokina is professor of political science at the University of Texas-Pan American, USA, and he has also taught at the University of Detroit. He has published two books, *Marcuse: From the New Left to the Next Left* (1994) and *Opera and Politics: From Monteverdi to Henze* (1997). He is currently completing another on the portrayals of Spartacus in different eras and media, and he is on the editorial board of the journal *New Political Science*.

Pablo Augusto Bonavena is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology of the University of Buenos Aires (UBA) and the National University of La Plata, Argentina. His research at the Gino Germani Institute of the School of Social Sciences (UBA) involves conflict and social change.

Patrick Bond is professor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal School of Development Studies, South Africa, where since 2004 he has directed the

Center for Civil Society. He has longstanding research interests and applied work in global governance and national policy debates, in urban communities, and with global justice movements in several countries. His research focuses on political economy, environment (energy, water, and climate change), social policy and geopolitics, with publications covering South Africa, Zimbabwe, the African continent, and global-scale processes.

Sally A. Boniece is an associate professor of history and the coordinator of international studies at Frostburg State University, USA. She is currently completing a biography of Mariia Spiridonova.

Yarimar Bonilla is assistant professor of anthropology at the University of Virginia, USA. She has conducted ethnographic research on racial politics, political identity, and historical memory in the Spanish- and French-speaking Caribbean. She is currently completing her first book manuscript about labor movements and the politics of history in the French West Indies.

Yury V. Bosin is a professor of history and Central Asian studies at Moscow State University, Russia. His research has been sponsored by the Fulbright Program, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the International Foundation for Election Systems. Bosin is the author of *Afghanistan: Multiethnic Society and State Power in Historical Context* (in Russian, 2002) and “Afghan Experience with International Assistance,” in *Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Lessons from Development Experience* (ed. John D. Montgomery and Dennis A. Rondinelli, 2004).

Jennifer Westmoreland Bouchard is pursuing advanced doctoral work in French and Francophone studies. Her work on immigration and Francophone literatures can be found in the *Journal of Pan-African Studies*, the *Journal of African Literature and Culture*, and *Migrations and Identities*. Bouchard has also contributed to *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of Children's Issues Worldwide*, *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of LGBT Issues Worldwide*, and *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of Blacks in European Civilization*. She has presented her research at conferences throughout the United States and Europe.

Christos Boukalas is a research assistant in the Department of Sociology of Lancaster University, UK. His Master's dissertation is on the

anarchists' position within the anti-globalization movement (2001), and his PhD thesis is entitled "Empire and Reich: War on Terrorism and the Political Metalaxis of the US" (2007; supervised by Bob Jessop). He has a long international history of political activism.

Ron Bourgeault is lecturer in sociology at the University of Regina, Canada, where his focus is on the political economy of Aboriginal peoples and Canada. He has been active in Aboriginal struggles for many years, both as a researcher and as a labor organizer. Currently, he is completing a PhD in sociology (Carleton University) on Aboriginal labor and Métis political struggles in the mercantile fur trade.

Robyn Bourgeois is a PhD candidate at the University of Toronto, Canada. Her activism and academic work centers on violence against Canadian Aboriginal women. Her other interests include social violence, Aboriginal women's writings, anti-colonial pedagogy, and squaw mythologies.

Marilyn J. Boxer is Professor Emerita of History at San Francisco State University, USA. She is author of *When Women Ask the Questions: Creating Women's Studies in America* (1998, 2001), co-author with Jean H. Quataert of *Connecting Spheres: European Women in a Globalizing World, 1500 to the Present* (2nd ed., 2000), and co-editor with Quataert of *Socialist Women: European Socialist Feminism in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (1978). Her most recent publication is "Rethinking the Socialist Construction and International Career of the Concept 'Bourgeois Feminism,'" *American Historical Review* 112, 1 (2007): 131–58.

András Bozóki, former minister of culture of Hungary (2005–6), is a professor of political science at the Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. He has published both books and shorter pieces in periodicals and collected volumes in several languages and countries on subjects including post-communist transition, comparative democratization, anarchist ideas and movements, transformation of political elites, and intellectuals in politics. He has taught at universities throughout Europe, as well as in the United States.

Ulrich Brand is a professor of international politics at Vienna University, Austria. He has taught at Rutgers University and has done research in Argentina, Mexico, and Canada. His research

focuses on international political economy and global governance, the critique of globalization, social movements and non-governmental organizations, as well as international environmental politics, with a regional focus on Latin America.

Edward T. Brett is a professor of history at La Roche College, USA. He has published several books including *The US Catholic Press on Central America: From Cold War Anticommunism to Social Justice* (2003) and *Murdered in Central America: The Stories of Eleven US Missionaries* (co-authored with Donna Whitson Brett, 1988), which received a Christopher Award. He has also published over 20 scholarly articles and book chapters.

Holger Briel is a professor of media and communication studies at the Management Center Innsbruck, Austria. He has published widely on German literature, cultural studies, manga, and anime, and his publications include *German Culture and Society: A Glossary* (2002) and *Adorno und Derrida, Oder Wo Liegt das Ende der Moderne?* (1993). His research interests include intercultural studies, visual media, and the politics of the digital world.

Bradford C. Brown is assistant professor of history at Bradley University, Peoria, Illinois, USA.

Susan Love Brown is currently associate professor of anthropology at Florida Atlantic University, USA, where she also directs the Public Intellectuals Program and is interim director of the PhD in comparative studies. Her research interests include the origin of ideologies, intentional communities, American individualist anarchism, and political and psychological anthropology. She has done research on national identity in the Bahamas and on New Age religion in the United States. She is the editor of *Intentional Community: An Anthropological Perspective* (2002).

Steeve O. Buckridge is currently an associate professor of African and Caribbean history at Grand Valley State University, USA. His areas of interest are precolonial and colonial Africa, early colonial Caribbean, women/gender, sexuality, and material culture. He was based at the University of the West Indies as a Ford Fellow, and has lectured in South Africa and Ghana. His book, *The Language of Dress: Resistance and Accommodation in Jamaica, 1760–1890*, was published in 2004.

Meredith Burgmann is a former NSW president of the Academics' Union and a co-founder of the

National Pay Equity Coalition. In 1991 she was elected to Australia's State Parliament and from 1999 was the president of the Legislative Council. In 1993 she inaugurated the annual Ernie Awards for Sexist Remarks. She has co-authored *Green Bans, Red Union: Environmental Activism and the NSW Builders' Labourers' Federation* (1998) and *The Ernies Book: 1,000 Terrible Things Australian Men Have Said About Women* (2007).

Olga Burkert is a freelance author and journalist in Berlin. She has studied Latin American studies, sociology, and political science in Berlin, Barcelona, and Buenos Aires. Burkert is an editorial staff member of the monthly journal *Lateinamerika Nachrichten* (News from Latin America). Her fields of research include the politics of memory and identity, as well as the transition from military regimes to democracy in the Southern Cone.

William E. Burns is an independent scholar.

Beatrice Burton is a PhD candidate at the University of Georgia, USA.

Orville Vernon Burton is Burroughs Chair of Southern History at Coastal Carolina University, USA and director of the Institute for Computing in Humanities, Arts, and Social Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA, where he is Emeritus University Distinguished Teacher/Scholar and Professor of History, African American Studies, and Sociology. His most recent book, *The Age of Lincoln* (2007), was the recipient of the *Chicago Tribune's* 2007 Heartland Literary Award for non-fiction and a selection for Book of the Month Club, History Book Club, and Military Book Club.

Melanie E. L. Bush is currently assistant professor of sociology at Adelphi University, USA. She is the author of *Breaking the Code of Good Intentions: Everyday Forms of Whiteness* (2004) and co-author of a forthcoming book entitled *Tensions in the American Dream: The Imperial Nation Confronts the Liberation of Nations* (with R. D. Bush), and has written numerous articles in scholarly journals. She has been active for many years in struggles for equality and justice.

Roderick Bush is an associate professor of sociology at St. John's University, USA. In 1984 he edited *The New Black Vote: Politics and Power in Four American Cities*. His most recent book, *We Are Not What We Seem: Black Nationalism and*

Class Struggle in the American Century, was published in 1999. Bush is currently finishing a new book entitled *The End of White World Supremacy: Black Internationalism and the Problem of the Color Line*.

Richard Butterwick is senior lecturer in Polish history at University College London, UK. He has also been lecturer in modern European history at the Queen's University of Belfast. The author of *Poland's Last King and English Culture: Stanislaw August Poniatowski 1732–1798* (1998) and other works on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as well as on the Enlightenment and its Polish critics, he is now preparing for publication a major study of the Polish Revolution of 1788–92 and the Catholic Church.

Emanuel Buttigieg is currently a PhD student at the University of Cambridge, UK. The holder of a first-class honors degree in history from the University of Malta, he was awarded a Cambridge (Commonwealth) Scholarship to do a one-year MPhil degree at the University of Cambridge. His academic interests are now focused on his doctoral thesis entitled "A Study of the Knights of Malta, with reference to Nobility, Faith and Gender: 1580–1700."

Amy Buzby is a PhD student in political science at Rutgers University, USA. Her research focuses on psychoanalysis and its relevance to and influence on the development of political theory.

Tristan Cabello is a PhD candidate at Northwestern University, USA and a historian of postwar America. His research focuses on sexuality, race, and urban history. He is currently completing his first monograph provisionally entitled *Queer Bronzeville: Race, Sexuality and the Making of Urban Boundaries (1930–1980)*.

Gabriel Cabrera M. works as a teacher in the Mision Sucre, which provides free and ongoing graduate- and undergraduate-level education for Venezuelan citizens. He is also active in training Caracas citizens in community involvement. Cabrera also works at the José Carlos Mariátegui Center for Social Studies, Caracas, Venezuela. His research focuses on Peruvian agrarian structure and Andean folk music, and he also has an abiding interest in the political history of Peru and Latin America.

Daniel Cairns is an English instructor at Beihang University in Beijing, China, and is a member of the

Beijing Anarchist Study Group. He is an independent writer and has contributed pieces on contemporary China to the *Seattle Times*. His historical research focuses on early twentieth-century China, labor, and anarchism. Ongoing projects of his include a history of anarchism in Western Washington, a study of May Fourth periodicals, and a biography of the Italian American anarchist printer, Eugene Travaglio.

Kevin J. Callahan is associate professor of history at Saint Joseph College, USA. His publications include articles in the *International Review of Social History* (2000) and *Peace and Change* (2004). He is co-editor of the book *Views from the Margins: Creating Identities in Modern France* (2008). He is currently working on book projects on gender, war, and peace and a cultural history of international socialism.

Luli Callinicos is a historian and heritage consultant. In 1988 she received the Noma Award for *Publishing in Africa for Working Life: Factories, Townships and Popular Culture* (1987), her second book in the trilogy *A People's History of South Africa*. Council member and first chairperson of the National Heritage Council, she also serves on other heritage and research boards. Of Hellenic descent, Callinicos was awarded the Order of the Phoenix by the Democracy of Greece in 1997. She is the author of *The World that Made Mandela* (2000) and *Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains* (2004).

Leonel Sahagón Campero is affiliated with the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), Mexico.

Julie Carlier is currently working as a research fellow of the Research Foundation, Flanders at the Department of Modern and Contemporary History of Ghent University, Belgium, where she is preparing a PhD thesis under the supervision of Professor Dr. Gita Deneckere entitled “(Trans)national Networks, Political Identities and Individual Trajectories: A Social History of Belgian First-Wave Feminism (ca. 1890–1918).”

Chris Carlsson, executive director of the multi-media history project Shaping San Francisco, is a writer, publisher, editor, and community organizer. He was one of the founders of the ground-breaking San Francisco magazine *Processed World*. He also helped launch the monthly bike-ins known as Critical Mass that have spread to five continents and over 300 cities. He has edited four books, most

recently *The Political Edge* (2004). He published his first novel in 2004, and his latest work, *Nomtopia*, was published in May 2008.

Amy Beth Carney is a PhD candidate in the Department of History at Florida State University, USA. Her primary field of study is modern Germany, with minor fields in twentieth-century Europe, the history of science, and the Atlantic world. She is currently working on her dissertation, which focuses on how the Nazi leadership tried to convince its elite members, the men of the SS, to father many children and how this attempt was a form of positive eugenics.

Peter N. Carroll is Chair of the Board of Governors of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archives, and teaches history at Stanford University, USA. He is the author or editor of 16 books, including *The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade* (1994), *War is Beautiful: An American Ambulance Driver in the Spanish Civil War* (with Peter Glazer, 2008), *The Free and the Unfree* (with David W. Noble, 1977), and *Riverborne: A Mississippi Requiem* (2008).

William K. Carroll is professor of sociology at the University of Victoria, Canada. His research interests are in the areas of social movements and social change, the political economy of corporate capitalism, and critical social theory and method. Some of his major publications include *Remaking Media* (with Bob Hackett, 2006), *Organizing Dissent* (1997), *Challenges and Perils: Social Democracy in Neo-Liberal Times* (with Bob Ratner, 2005), *Corporate Power in a Globalizing World* (2004), and *Critical Strategies for Social Research* (2004).

R. O'Brian Carter teaches modern European history at the University of Georgia, USA and specializes in the study of modern French culture. With the academic journal *Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques*, he has published an article that examines American jazz in 1920s France.

Irina Ceric is a PhD candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University in Toronto, Canada, and holds a Canada Graduate Scholarship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. Prior to pursuing graduate studies, she practiced criminal law and is a long-time social justice activist.

Debi Chatterjee is a professor in the Department of International Relations at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India. Her main areas of academic interest are Indian society and social problems, politics,

political thought, Dalit and gender issues, and human rights movements. She has written extensively in both English and Bengali, and has co-edited several volumes. Her books include *Marxist Thought in India* (1985), *Sociology of National Integration* (1993), and *Ideas and Movements Against Caste in India: Ancient to Modern Times* (1998).

Shibashis Chatterjee, reader at the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India, specializes in international relations theory. He is the author of *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Problem of Threshold States* (1999) and co-editor of *Global Politics: Issues and Trends* (2005) and *Anatomy of Fear* (2005). He has recently completed two projects for the University of Pennsylvania Institute for Advanced Studies on India (UPIASI) on the application of international relations theory to South Asian affairs.

Kunal Chattopadhyay is currently professor of history at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India, where he is also coordinator of the Center for European Studies and a member of the Academic Committee of the School of Women's Studies. His most important recent books include *The Marxism of Leon Trotsky* (2006) and *Bampanthi Andolaner Naya Bitarka: Braziler Lula Sarkar (A New Debate in Left Politics: Lula's Government in Brazil, 2005)*. His recent work has focused on environmental activism and socialism in India, including a study of the Narmada Bachao Andolan.

Joaquín M. Chávez is a doctoral candidate in the Latin American and Caribbean History Program at New York University, USA.

Hongming Cheng is an assistant professor in sociology at the University of Saskatchewan, Canada. Dr. Cheng previously taught at Shanghai Jiao Tong University and St. Thomas University, and served as a public prosecutor in Shanghai. Dr. Cheng's research interests are in the areas of sociolegal studies, white-collar crime, international and comparative criminal justice, criminal law, corporations, securities regulation, and Chinese law and society.

Donatella Cherubini, professor of contemporary history, teaches history of journalism at the Political Sciences Faculty of the University of Siena, Italy. She has written and edited monographs and essays on political and electoral history, the history of journalism, and the history of pacifism, including

Giuseppe Emanuele Modigliani: Un riformista nell'Italia liberale (1990), *Alle origini dei partiti: La Federazione socialista toscana (1893–1900)* (1997), *Les Etats-Unis d'Europe* (2004), and *Pour la Paix en Europe* (co-edited with Marta Petricioli, 2007).

Shari Childers is a PhD candidate in humanities at the University of Texas at Dallas, USA. She focuses her research primarily on the confluence of literature, the environment, and women's studies. Her current project investigates women's visions and voices in American ecoliteratures since 1850.

Samantha M. R. Christiansen is a world historian who focuses on student movements and youth revolt. With particular attention to South Asia, her work seeks to demonstrate the supernational components of student identity and action in the mid- to late twentieth century.

Alexandre J. M. E. Christoyannopoulos is currently completing his PhD on Christian anarchist theory at the University of Kent at Canterbury, UK, where he has also been employed as a sessional teacher for the past three years. He has presented and convened workshops at several national and international conferences, and has recently published two articles on Tolstoy, one in *Anarchist Studies* (Spring 2008), the other in *Politics and Religion* (April 2008).

Michael H. C. Chun is currently a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University. His research interests are Chinese nationalism and Hong Kong history. His doctoral thesis examines the relationship between colonialism, "China complex," and the politics of Chinese nationalism in colonial Hong Kong.

Joaquin Cienfuegos is a member of Cop Watch LA (Guerrilla Chapter, which he helped build) and the Revolutionary Autonomous Communities. Cienfuegos also helped create the Southern California Anarchist Federation – Los Angeles Chapter and Revolutionary Autonomous Communities, a revolutionary federation of community councils helping build a grassroots popular movement, with autonomy, self-determination, self-organization, and an infrastructure for the self-defense of oppressed people and oppressed communities.

Elvio Ciferri is a permanent professor of history and Italian literature at the Leopoldo and Alice Franchetti Institute of Città di Castello, Italy. He is the author of six books and several articles in

historical journals. He has contributed to many encyclopedias.

Rick Clapton teaches several courses about war, the home front, and resultant social movements at the University of British Columbia, Okanagan, Canada. The impact of war, he argues, irrevocably changes public consciousness, society, and the place and purpose of the individual within that realm. Currently he is working on *Feigning Madness: The Life, Trials and Incarceration of Chief Constable David Murdoch*, a book about policing, the criminal justice system, and criminal insane asylums in Western Canada.

John Clarke works as organizer with the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP). He came to Canada from London, England in 1976, where he had previously been active in high school student organizing and in several trade unions. He took a job at the Westinghouse plant in London, Ontario and played an active role in the United Electrical Workers' Union as a shop steward. In 1982 he helped form the London Union of Unemployed Workers (LUUW).

Dorothea J. Coiffe is an assistant professor at the City University of New York's Borough of Manhattan Community College Library, USA. She has extensive experience in protein biochemistry and worked in a Nobel Prize winner's laboratory at Rockefeller University. Besides holding a Master's degree in library and information science, Coiffe holds degrees in biology and liberal studies, and is published in both fields.

Carrie Collenberg is a PhD candidate at the University of Minnesota, USA and is writing a dissertation on the aesthetics of terrorism in Germany and the United States.

Tom Collins is a PhD candidate in American studies at the University of Iowa, USA. His essays on American popular culture appear in *The Columbia History of Post-World War II America* and *The Handbook to Life in America: The Roaring Twenties*. He is the co-author of *Day by Day: 1920s*.

Chiara Colombini is a researcher and collaborator with the Institute for the History of Resistance in Turin, Italy and is now investigating the clandestine networks of Giustizia e Libertà during the time of Italy's fascist regime. She published *Diario di Teresio Ferrero (1943)* (2003) and *Vindice Cavallera: una Lunga Battaglia contro il Fascismo*

(1931–1945) (2006). She has been the organizer, with Professor De Luna, of the Annual Conference “Giellismo e Azionismo: Cantieri aperti” (2005–08).

Sebastián Cominiello obtained his BA in sociology at the University of Buenos Aires (UBA). He has published many articles about class struggles in Argentina and has written articles about international labor costs and employment conditions.

Matthew B. Conn is a PhD candidate (ABD) in the Department of History at the University of Iowa, USA. His dissertation, “Corporeal Rhetorics,” examines the interconnections between the history of forensic medicine, sexual science, and gender politics in Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, 1880–1938.

Justin Corfield has been teaching history and international relations at Geelong Grammar School, Australia, since 1993. He is the author of several books on Australian history, genealogy, and aspects of colonial history, especially for Southeast Asia. He is also a co-author of *The Eureka Encyclopedia*, which was awarded the Victorian Community History Award in 2004.

John M. Cox is assistant professor of European history at Florida Gulf Coast University, USA where he chairs the Center for Judaic, Holocaust, and Human Rights Studies. He is currently revising his dissertation, which examines German-Jewish resistance to Nazism, for publication. He also serves on the editorial board of the *Journal of Jewish Identities*.

Richard Francis Crane, professor of history at Greensboro College, USA, is a historian of modern France, with a specialization in the era of World War II and the Holocaust. He is the author of two books, *A French Conscience in Prague: Louis Eugène Faucher and the Abandonment of Czechoslovakia* (1996) and *Passion of Israel: Jacques Maritain, Catholic Conscience, and the Holocaust* (forthcoming), as well as numerous articles, essays, and book reviews.

Ronald Creagh is Professor Emeritus in Sociology of the University of Montpellier, France. He is currently the co-editor of the online journals *Réfractations* (refractions.plusloin.org) and *Divergences* (divergences.be). He is also in charge of the “Research on Anarchism” website (raforum.info). His latest books include *L'Imagination dérobée* (2004),

L’Affaire Sacco et Vanzetti (2004), and the forthcoming *Laboratoires de l’utopie: Les Communes libertaires aux Etats-Unis de 1800 à nos jours* (2009).

Mark J. Crowley is a PhD researcher at the Center for Contemporary British History, Institute of Historical Research, London, UK. His research interests are in women’s history and trade unionism in twentieth-century Britain.

Carol Klimick Cyganowski is an associate professor in the English Department at DePaul University, USA, where she has also served as director of the Women’s Studies Program and the American Studies Program.

Christine Cynn was the associate director of Africana studies and is now a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow in Women’s Studies at Barnard College, USA. From 2005 to 2006 she was a lecturer/researcher at the University of Cocody, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. She is currently working on a book project on the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Evan Matthew Daniel is a PhD candidate (ABD) in the Departments of History and Political Science at the New School for Social Research and instructor of history at St. Francis College, Brooklyn, USA. He previously worked as an archivist at the Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New York University and as a researcher at the Emma Goldman History Papers, University of California at Berkeley. His dissertation (in progress) explores the transnational ideology and work culture of nineteenth-century Cuban cigar makers in Havana, South Florida, and New York City.

Nupur Dasgupta teaches in the History Department at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India.

J. M. F. Daudeij is affiliated with Erasmus University of Rotterdam, the Netherlands.

Belinda Davis is an associate professor of history at Rutgers University, USA. She is author of *Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin* (2000), and co-editor of *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in the 1960s/70s West Germany and US* (forthcoming) and *Eigen-Sinn, Alltag, und Erfahrung* (forthcoming). She is currently completing *The Internal Life of Politics: The “New Left” in West Germany, 1962–1983*.

Laurence Davis is lecturer in politics in the Department of Sociology of the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. He has previously taught political and social theory at Oxford University, Ruskin College, and University Colleges Galway and Dublin. A founding member of the Anarchist Studies Network, he is the editor (with Peter Stillman) of *The New Utopian Politics of Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Dispossessed* (2005) and (with Ruth Kinna) of *Anarchism and Utopianism* (forthcoming, 2009).

Michael T. Davis has published widely on British political and cultural history, including as editor of *Radicalism and Reform in Britain, 1775–1848* (2000), a six-volume collection on the *London Corresponding Society* (2002), *Newgate in Revolution* (with Iain McCalman and Christina Parolin, 2005), *Unrespectable Radicals? Popular Politics in the Age of Reform* (with Paul Pickering, 2008), and *Terror: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism in Europe, 1605 to the Future* (with Brett Bowden, 2008).

Simone C. Cezanne De Santiago Ramos is currently a PhD student in the Department of History at the University of North Texas, USA. Her primary field of research is modern European history with a concentration on Germany from 1871 to the present. Her research areas include agrarian and food policies, the welfare state, and Nazi Germany’s migration and resettlement practices and the implications for everyday life.

Marco de Waard is a lecturer in English literature at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He wrote his doctoral thesis on “John Morley and the Liberal Imagination: The Uses of History in English Liberal Culture, 1867–1914.”

Michel De Waele is affiliated with Laval University, Canada.

Alicia C. Decker is an assistant professor of history and women’s studies at Purdue University, USA. She is currently working on a manuscript about gender, power, and militarism in Idi Amin’s Uganda. Her research interests include postcolonial African history, gender and militarization, feminism and nationalism, and global feminist movements.

Tilman Dederich is a senior lecturer in the Department of History at the University of South Africa. He is author of *Hate the Old and Follow the New: Khoekhoe and Missionaries in Early Nineteenth-Century Namibia* (1997). He has also published a

number of articles on Namibia, on South African history, and on global history.

Lynnette M. Deem is a PhD candidate at Temple University, USA. Her doctoral dissertation focuses on the organizational and institutional aspects of propaganda companies that operated within the Wehrmacht, specifically those operating during the Scandinavian and Balkan campaigns. She has held teaching positions at Temple University, Rider University, UNC-Charlotte, and Wingate University, teaching such courses as Ancient and Modern World, Western Civilization, and War and Society.

Abraham P. DeLeon is an assistant professor at the University of Rochester, USA, in the Margaret Warner Graduate School of Education and Human Development. His research interests include social studies education, cultural studies, anarchist theory, and critical pedagogy. DeLeon's research interests are grounded in critical theories, and these have led him to explore how social studies education and radical theory can be combined to equip students with the knowledge and understanding of how ideology is reproduced.

Dennis John Deletant is professor of Romanian studies at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, UK and at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands (on secondment). He is the author of several monographs and volumes of studies on the recent history of Romania, including *Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, 1948–1965* (1999). His most recent book is *Ion Antonescu: Hitler's Forgotten Ally* (2006). He has also co-edited, with Ottmar Traşca, *German Documents on the Holocaust in Romania* (2007).

Walter Delrio is affiliated with the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Patricia DeMarco is affiliated with the Rachel Carson Homestead Association, USA.

Khatchik DerGhougassian is a professor of international relations and a researcher at the Universidad de San Andrés in Buenos Aires, Argentina. His field of expertise is security studies, and he has held positions in South Africa, Argentina, and the United States in both academic and advisory roles. The recipient of numerous grants and fellowships, DerGhougassian has published over 30 book chapters, monographs, essays,

articles, and papers in Spanish, English, and Armenian with a focus on security issues, including terrorism, arms transfer, and organized crime.

Liliana Deyanova is professor of sociology at St. Kliment Ohridski Sofia University, Bulgaria, and a member of the Institute for Critical Social Studies, Sofia and Plovdiv University Paisii Hilendarski. Her publications are in the field of the theory and method of sociology, the history of the social sciences and the public sphere, the historical sociology of communism and post-communism, "micro-history," collective memory, and social temporalities.

Sushovan Dhar is an associate of the research and study center, Vikas Adhyayan Kendra, in Mumbai, India. He heads a regional study on "Democracy and Governance in South Asia" and is a frequent contributor on neoliberal economic reforms and their impacts in the South Asian region. He has completed research on the history of the World Bank's intervention in India (unpublished) and monitors the impact of the projects of international financial institutions in India and in the South Asian region.

Pietro Di Paola is lecturer in history at the University of Lincoln, UK. His main interests are the history of anarchism, political migration, and social movements, and he is currently concluding a book entitled *A Short History of Anarchism*.

Naminata Diabate, Fulbright Alumna from the Ivory Coast, is a PhD candidate in the Program in Comparative Literature at the University of Texas at Austin, USA. Her academic interests focus on twentieth-century Francophone and Anglophone West African women writers, twentieth-century African American and Afro-Hispanic women writers, feminist theories, and postcolonial theories. Her dissertation explores the fear of the female body and the body as site of resistance in West African fictions.

H. T. Dickinson was Richard Lodge Professor of British History, 1980–2006, and is now an Emeritus Professor at Edinburgh, UK. His publications include, as author, *Bolingbroke* (1970), *Walpole and the Whig Supremacy* (1973), *Liberty and Property: Political Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (1973), and *The Politics of the People in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (1995), and, as editor, *Britain and the American Revolution* (1998), *Britain and the French Revolution 1789–1815* (1989), and eight volumes of British Pamphlets on the American Revolution.

Angela D. Dillard is an associate professor of Afro-American and African studies at the University of Michigan, USA. She specializes in American and African American intellectual history, religious studies, and conservative thought. She is currently writing a biography of James Meredith.

Nhlanhla Dlamini is lecturer in the Department of History at the University of Swaziland, Swaziland.

Fred Donnelly teaches British history at the Saint John Campus of the University of New Brunswick, Canada. His area of research interest is the radical and reform movements of Great Britain from 1760 to 1840. A former departmental chairperson and associate dean of graduate studies, he has recently developed a second career as a travel writer.

Andrew Dowling is a historian working in the Hispanic Studies Department within the School of European Studies, Cardiff University, UK. His research has centered on Catalan history in the twentieth century, and in particular the political articulation of Catalan nationalism under the Franco dictatorship and in democratic Spain. He has published in a number of journals and is the author of *Reconstructing the Nation: Catalonia since the Spanish Civil War* (2008).

Emma Dowling is a PhD candidate at the School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck, University of London, UK. Her doctoral thesis looks at the role of social activism in the crisis of legitimacy in G8-centered global governance and neoliberalism to understand the relationship between resistance and power. She has recently published on G8 summit protests, the European and World Social Forums, and immaterial and affective labor.

Timothy Dean Draper is an assistant professor of history at Waubensee Community College, USA. He has published in the *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* and *Chicago History* and is editor of *H-Illinois*.

Allison Drew teaches politics at the University of York, UK. Her research examines social and political movements in twentieth-century Africa, and she has published extensively on the struggle for democracy in South Africa. Her major works include *Between Empire and Revolution: A Life of Sidney Bunting, 1873–1936* (2007), *Discordant Comrades: Identities and Loyalties on the South African Left* (2000, 2002), and *South Africa's Radical Tradition:*

A Documentary History (2 vols., 1996–7). She is currently working on a comparative study of communism and nationalism in Algeria and South Africa.

Paulo Drinot teaches history at the University of Manchester, UK. He is co-editor of *Más allá de la dominación y la resistencia: Estudios de historia peruana (Beyond Domination and Resistance: Studies in Peruvian History)* and is the author of various articles on the social, economic, and cultural history of twentieth-century Peru. He is completing a book on labor, race, and state formation in Peru and an edited volume titled *Che's América: The Making of the Revolutionary in 1950s Latin America*.

Sven Dubie teaches courses in United States history at John Carroll University, USA. His doctoral dissertation was a study of the evolution of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division in the mid-twentieth century. He is currently working on a book on the early years of the Civil Rights Division.

Laurent Dubois, a specialist in the history and culture of France and the Caribbean, is a professor of history and Romance studies at Duke University, USA. He is the author of *Avengers of the New World* (2006) and *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804* (2005), which won four book prizes, including the Frederick Douglass Prize. With Richard Turits, he is currently working on a history of the Caribbean. He is also writing a history of the banjo and a book of essays about football, race, and the legacies of empire in contemporary France.

Andrew Durgan has lived and worked in Spain for over 25 years. He has published in various languages on different aspects of modern Spanish history, in particular relating to the Civil War, its origins, and the labor movement. His work includes *BOC: El Bloque Obrero y Campesino 1930–1936* (1996) and *The Spanish Civil War* (2007). He was historical advisor for the award-winning Ken Loach film *Land and Freedom* (1996) and a founding member of the *Fundació Andreu Nin* (Andreu Nin Foundation) in 1988.

Michael Eade works as a translator and freelance contributor to British and Spanish papers. He is author of *Catalonia: A Cultural History* (2007), *Barcelona, the City that Reinvented Itself* (2007), and *Triumph at Midnight in the Century* (2008), a critical biography of the socialist writer Arturo Barea.

Marc Edelman is professor of anthropology at Hunter College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, USA. His books include *The Logic of the Latifundio* (1992) and *Peasants Against Globalization* (1999), as well as the co-authored *Social Democracy in the Global Periphery* (2006) and two co-edited volumes, *The Anthropology of Development and Globalization* (Blackwell, 2005) and *Transnational Agrarian Movements Confronting Globalization* (Blackwell, 2008).

Thomas Edge has taught at the University of Massachusetts, Trinity College, and Elms College. He has presented papers at local and national meetings of the Association for the Study of African American Life and History (ASALH) on the career of Mordecai Johnson and the history of the Crossroads Theatre Company. Edge has also published an article on the role of black female abolitionists in *The Black Experience in America* (2006).

Michael Egan is an assistant professor in the Department of History at McMaster University, Canada. His research focuses on the history of science, technology, and the environment. He is the author of *Barry Commoner and the Science of Survival: The Remaking of American Environmentalism* (2007).

Douglas R. Egerton is a professor of history at Le Moyne College, USA. His publications include *Death or Liberty: African Americans and Revolutionary America* (2008), *The Atlantic World: A History* (with Alison Games, Kris Lane, and Donald R. Wright, 2007), *He Shall Go Out Free: The Lives of Denmark Vesey* (1999), and *Gabriel's Rebellion: The Virginia Slave Conspiracies of 1800 and 1802* (1993).

Deniz Ekici is currently a PhD student at the University of Exeter, Center for Kurdish Studies, UK. He earned his MA degree in political science from Brooklyn College, USA. His Master's thesis was titled "The Role and the Importance of the PKK in Kurdish National Struggle." He is the author of the *Kurmanji Kurdish Reader* (2007).

Sylvia Ellis is reader in history and director of the Governance and Security research academy at Northumbria University, UK. She is a specialist in international history, focusing on post-1945 British and American social and political history. Her major publications include *Britain, America, and the Vietnam War* (2004) and journal articles on British

opposition to the war. She is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.

Charles Wesley Ervin is an independent scholar who specializes in the history of the Trotskyist movement in South Asia. His books include *Tomorrow is Ours: The Trotskyist Movement in India and Ceylon 1935–48* (2006), *Philip Gunawardena: The Making of a Revolutionary* (2001), and *Pilip Gunawardhana: Viplavavadiyakuge Hadagasma* (2005).

Sophie Sarah Esch is studying Latin American studies, North American studies, and political science at the Free University of Berlin, Germany. She is currently writing her Master's thesis on "Canal Ghosts, Border and the Poet at the River: The Constitution of Space in Rio San Juan (Nicaragua, Costa Rica) through Literature." She has studied at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and the College of Mexico, where she worked on water and human rights issues.

Leticia Pacheco Espejel is completing postgraduate studies in political science at the University of Hamburg, Germany. Her Master's thesis was titled "The Internet in Mexico as an Alternative Channel for Communication." Her publications include "Career Changer: CEOs in the Branch of New Economy," in *Gender and Career in the New Economy* (ed. Ralph Schmidt).

Kerstin Ewald is a freelance print and radio journalist and has published with *Neues Deutschland*, *Deutschlandfunk*, and *RBB*, among others. She has a degree in sociology, and her main research is in international division of labor as well as approaches to trade union organization and self-organization. She has performed long-term research in El Salvador, Romania, and the Republic of Moldova. Her publications include "Workers' Voices: The Situation of Women in the Eastern European and Turkish Garment Industries" (2005).

Roger Farr teaches contemporary literature, creative writing, and literary theory at Capilano College in Vancouver, Canada. His critical work on radical social movements and avant-garde literature has appeared or is forthcoming in *Anarchist Studies*, *Fifth Estate*, *Perspectives on Anarchist Theory*, *The Rain Review of Books*, *West Coast Line*, and *XCP: Cross-Cultural Poetics*. The author of a book of poetry, *Surplus* (2006), he also edits the anarchist literary journal *Parser: New Poetry and Poetics*.

Vera Leigh Fennell is an associate professor of political science and global studies at Lehigh

University, USA. She has worked for the Ford Foundation in Beijing and participated in the NGO Forum of the United Nations Fourth Conference on the World's Women, held in Beijing in 1995. She was a postdoctoral research fellow in the Program for the Study of Race, Gender, and Public Policy at the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute for Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota, USA.

Newton Ferreira da Silva is a Master's student in social studies at the State University of São Paulo (UNESP), campus Marília, Brazil. His research and dissertation concern Che Guevara's thought and trajectory. He is also a member of the Brazilian Institute for Contemporary Studies (www.ibec-estudos.org.br).

Rachel Finley-Bowman is an associate professor of education at Elizabethtown College, USA, with specializations in social studies and history education. She previously served as an associate professor of history, chair of the Department of Secondary Education, and co-director of the DVC Honors Program at Delaware Valley College, USA. Her research interests include women's political activism in Ulster, teaching women's history at the secondary level, and the political association of Irish women in Pennsylvania.

Vinzia Fiorino is affiliated with the University of Pisa, Italy.

Cory Fischer-Hoffman is an organizer with the Student Farmworker Alliance. She completed her MA thesis with the University of Kansas, USA, titled "Misión Madres del Barrio: A Bolivarian Social Program Recognizing Housework and Creating a Caring Economy in Venezuela." She has published on women's organizing in Venezuela in *Zmagazine*, *UpsidedownWorld*, and *Venezuelanalysis*.

Claire Fitzpatrick teaches at the University of Plymouth, UK. Her focus is modern Irish history, with a particular emphasis on the Irish labor movement and the development of the modern Irish state. Fitzpatrick has published articles on the Irish labor movement and is currently working on attitudes of the Irish Free State to radical dissent. She is also interested in the history of cricket and imperialism.

Madalina Florescu is affiliated with the University of London, UK.

Gary Foley is senior lecturer in history and indigenous studies at Victoria University, Australia

and is completing a PhD in history at the Australian Center at the University of Melbourne. A native of northern New South Wales of Gumbainggir descent, Foley has been active in political protests and demonstrations since the late 1960s. He set up the first Aboriginal Information Center in London, and in Australia has been a director of the Aboriginal Health Service, the Aboriginal Arts Board, and the Aboriginal Medical Service Redfern.

Paulo Fontes is an assistant professor at the Getulio Vargas Center for the Research and Documentation of the Contemporary History of Brazil (CPDOC/FGV) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He was visiting professor at Duke University, USA (2004) and Princeton University, USA (2006–7). He is the author of several books and articles on Brazilian labor history, including *Um Nordeste em São Paulo. Trabalhadores migrantes em São Miguel Paulista: 1945–1966* (2008).

Michael Forman, associate professor of social and political theory at the University of Washington, USA, is affiliated with the University of Washington's Human Rights Network and the Harry Bridges Center for Labor Studies. His current research focuses on the evolution of ideals in contemporary political and social thought. His first book, *Nationalism and the International Labor Movement: The Idea of the Nation in Socialist and Anarchist Theory*, received the Michael Harrington Award of the American Political Science Association (1999).

Alex Foti is a Milanese activist who works on precarity, urban ecology, and radical Europe. Since 2004 he has promoted a Europe-wide May Day protesting generational precarity and the persecution of migrants (www.euromayday.org). He co-authored the Middlesex Declaration of Europe's Precariat and the Act 4 Radical Europe manifesto. His essays include "Euro Flex Workers: Time to Get a Move On!," "Demoradical vs. Demoliberal Regulation," and "The Grid & the Fork: Critical Dynamics of Advanced Capitalism."

Catherine Cymone Fourshey is associate professor of history and director of international studies at Susquehanna University, USA. Her research focuses on precolonial Tanzania, with special interests in the topics of agriculture, hospitality, migration, and the intersections of environment, economy, and politics. Her current project in progress is a book tentatively titled *Strangers, Immigrants, and the Established: Hospitality as*

State-Building Mechanism in Southwest Tanzania, 300–1900 CE.

Kyle E. Frackman received his PhD in German and Scandinavian studies from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA in 2008. In his research and teaching, he is interested in examining the deployment of gender, sexuality, race, and various forms of Otherness in German-, Swedish-, and Finnish-language literature and film. His dissertation is a study of the development of these forms of Otherness in processes of abjection.

Christopher Frank is an assistant professor of British history at the University of Manitoba, Canada. He is a specialist in nineteenth-century British popular movements, labor, and the law. He has published articles in the *Journal of British Studies* and *Historical Studies in Industrial Relations* and was a contributor to Douglas Hay and Paul Craven's *Masters, Servants and Magistrates in Britain and Empire, 1562–1955* (2004). He is currently at work on a study of truck wages and working-class consumption in Britain.

Benjamin Franks is lecturer in social and political philosophy at the University of Glasgow, Dumfries, UK. He is the author of *Rebel Alliances: The Means and Ends of Contemporary British Anarchisms* (2006).

Johan Franzén is a scholar of modern Middle East history and politics. His research areas are Iraqi and Palestinian political history, the Arab East (Mashreq), and the Middle East; his doctoral thesis was a study of the intellectual history of the Iraqi Communist Party. He has also done extensive work on the consequences of imperialism in the Middle East and the various expressions of resistance to which it gave rise, which has appeared in journals such as the *Journal of Palestine Studies* and the *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies*.

Harris Freeman is a member of the faculty at Western New England College School of Law and at the Labor Relations and Research Center at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA. He is also an associate editor of *Working USA: The Journal of Labor and Society* (Wiley-Blackwell). He is a cooperating attorney with the Massachusetts office of the America Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and an executive board member of the Massachusetts Society of Professors, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Luke Freeman gained his PhD in anthropology at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. His research focuses on matters of education, political communication, and cattle trading in Madagascar.

Annette Freyberg-Inan researches and teaches international relations and European politics at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Her main fields of interest are international political economy, the contestation of neoliberal globalization, democratization, and the enlargement and foreign policies of the European Union. Previous publications related to the ATTAC movement appeared in *Globalizations Journal* 1, 2 (2004), in *Critical Theories, World Politics and the "Anti-Globalization Movement"* (ed. Catherine Eschle and Bice Maiguashca, 2005), and in *Global Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities in the Twenty-First Century* (ed. Sai Felicia Krishna-Hensel, 2006).

Nicole Frisone is currently a first-year graduate student in the Library Science Department at Rutgers University, USA. Her research interests include university administrators of the 1960s, the Beatles, and American suburbs.

Henry J. Frundt has taught at Ramapo College, USA for more than 35 years. He has served as a UN NGO Commissioner for Disarmament and Peace Education, and has received awards from the Organization of American States, the Fulbright Association, and the Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies. Frundt's publications include the award-winning *Trade Conditions and Labor Rights: US Initiatives, Dominican and Central American Responses* (1998). His study *Fair Bananas! Farmers, Workers and Consumers Strive to Change an Industry* will be released in 2009.

Andrea Fumagalli is affiliated with the University of Pavia, Italy.

Keisuke Fuse is an executive committee member of Zenroren, National Confederation of Trade Unions, Japan, which is an organization in charge of international solidarity activities. As an officer of progressive trade unions in Japan, he works to build and connect grassroots class-oriented trade union struggles around the world. He is also experienced in student movements and leads one of the strongest Japanese campaigns for nuclear abolition.

Javier A. Galván teaches history and Spanish at Santa Ana College, USA. He focuses on the history

of Latin America, including the European heritage of Spain and Portugal. His favorite period of research is the Colonial period because it offers an interesting perspective on the blend of European, indigenous, and African legacies in Latin America.

Cayo Gamber is an assistant professor of writing at George Washington University, USA. Her research questions how popular culture icons, such as the Barbie doll and Nancy Drew, encode uncontested conceptions of mass production and consumption, and how they also encode alterity as these icons are subverted, redefined, and personalized by individual consumers. She also studies the way in which representations of the Holocaust are codified by personal, political, collective, or national cultures of remembrance and commemoration.

Francesca Gamber is a doctoral candidate in history at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, USA. She is completing a dissertation on interracial intimacy and the African American civil rights struggle from 1833 to 2000.

C. Andrés Gamboa is a historian dedicated to the study of sexual attitudes and behaviors in Chile in the nineteenth century. He has also worked on the theory of historiography and presented an article titled “Construcción de una Perspectiva Liberal y Santiaguina de la Matanza de la Escuela Santa María” at the Second Meeting of Historians in 2007. He is currently working on a book about the process of building homosexual representation in Chile.

Larry Gambone is an independent scholar from Vancouver Island. He joined the peace movement and the new left in 1965 and graduated from Simon Fraser University in 1970 with a degree in sociology. He then discovered the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and anarchism, was involved in aiding US Vietnam War resisters, and joined what would later be called the social ecology movement. In the early 1980s he was a member of the Open Road collective as well as the IWW. He has published a short history of anarchism.

Robin Ganey is a professor of British history at the University of Regina, Canada. Her research interests include social and cultural history, the history of the ballad, rural history, the history of popular protest and popular culture, the relationship between history and literature, and national identity in

Britain. Her book, *Songs of Protest, Songs of Love: Ballads in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, was published in 2008.

Pedro García Guirao is an independent researcher who currently teaches at the Instituto Cervantes in Prague, Czech Republic. He is working on his PhD dissertation about the first Spanish anarchist minister, Federica Montseny, in the context of the Spanish Civil War. His work, which includes reviews, translations, and articles about Spanish anarchism and international politics, can be found in journals including *Res Publica*, *Daimon*, and *Espinosa*.

Christian Garland is an independent scholar with an MA in social and political thought from the University of Sussex, UK. His research interests include the Frankfurt School, heterodox Marxism(s), and the autonomist and anarchist movements, on which he has published papers and review essays.

Evan M. Gaughan is currently a Master's student in British history at Indiana University/Purdue University, Indianapolis, USA.

Charlie Geoghegan-Clements is an independent scholar. His research focuses on the cultural artifacts of anarchist history, as well as the revolutionary potential to be found in trauma, play, memory, and sadness.

Christina Gerhardt is a visiting scholar at Harvard University's Center for European Studies, USA, finishing her study of representations of terrorism in literature, art, and film from 1970 to 2005, which has been generously funded by the DAAD, Fulbright, Free University of Berlin, and UC-Berkeley, where she taught in the Department of German from 2000 to 2006. Gerhardt has published extensively on the Frankfurt School and Theodor W. Adorno. She is editor of *Adorno and Ethics*, special issue of *New German Critique* 97 (2006) and author of the entry on Adorno in the *Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism* (2004).

Kieran German is currently completing his PhD at the University of Aberdeen, UK. His research interests are Scottish Jacobitism and Scots episcopacy.

César Germana is a professor in the Sociology Department of the National University of San Marcos (UNMSM), Peru and has also been dean

of the Social Science Faculty at UNMSM. He has published numerous articles and several books on the history of political ideas in Peru, including *El Problema de la Racionalidad en las Ciencias Sociales* (2002). He is the winner of the UNESCO-sponsored International Essay Competition organized by the José Carlos Mariátegui Centennial Celebration National Commission, and was awarded an honorary professorship at Universidad San Antonio Abad, Peru.

Andrew Kiiru Gichuru is affiliated with the City University of New York, USA.

Carolyn DeSwarte Gifford is the editor of *“Writing Out My Heart”: Selections from the Journal of Frances E. Willard, 1855–1896* (1995), and co-editor of *Gender and the Social Gospel* (2003) and *“Let Something Good Be Said”: Speeches and Writings of Frances E. Willard* (2007). She has also written numerous articles and encyclopedia entries in the area of nineteenth-century American women’s religious experience and social reform activity.

Christos Giovanopoulos is currently visiting lecturer at the University of Westminster, London, UK, where he also pursues his doctoral research on the representation and relation between youth and national movements and identities in Greek films. He worked as a journalist for five years before his return to postgraduate studies in film and media. He has also edited the book *Cinema and '68: Loaded Cameras* (2008).

Karen C. Glenn currently teaches world history and AP European history at Charlotte Latin School in North Carolina, USA. She earned an MA in American history from University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

Richard Goff is a lecturer in history at Chatham University and a PhD candidate at the University of Pittsburgh, USA. He teaches American history, utopian thought, and labor history.

Asher Goldman is a Jewish anarchist-communist author and filmmaker from New Zealand. He has a special interest in reading and writing about Jewish anarchist history, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and the intersection between class and ecological politics. His writing has been in publications such as the *Earth First! Journal*, *New Zealand Jewish Chronicle*, and *ZNet*. Goldman is currently working on his first book and an associated film, on Israeli Jews involved in anti-occupation struggles.

Reena N. Goldthree is a PhD candidate in the Departments of History and African and African American Studies at Duke University, USA. Her research explores the gendered and racialized nature of Caribbean nationalism in the early twentieth century and the complex relationship among transnational migration, national loyalty, and racial identity. She is currently completing a project on the social and political impact of World War I in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.

Luis A. Gómez is a Mexican journalist. He has worked for various media outlets covering the Bolivian social movements and struggles that have changed the face of history since 2000. He is the author of *El Alto de pie, una insurrección aymara en Bolivia*, a chronicle of the September and October 2003 Bolivian Gas War. He considers it a privilege to have reported and thought alongside many of the country’s social movements and their leaders, particularly the indigenous. He is the editor of the online newspaper *Ukhampacha Bolivia*.

Mauricio González Arenas is a researcher and assistant professor in history and social sciences at the University of Art and Social Sciences (ARCIS) in Santiago, Chile, as well as a teacher at the Fermin Vivaceta School in Santiago. He has studied history, social sciences, and geography at ARCIS.

Robert Goodrich is an associate professor of history at Northern Michigan University, USA. His major research interests lie in modern German history with a broad, integrative approach to the various subfields. Most recently, he has begun investigating the interplay of consumption and religion as part of the experience of modern consciousness. His research into religion and identity stresses a comparative view of European and American experiences.

Uri Gordon is an Israeli activist and academic who teaches environmental politics and ethics at the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel. Gordon has organized with community initiatives and anti-capitalist networks including Dissent!, Indymedia, and Anarchists Against the Wall. His research continues to focus on grassroots sustainability, radical peacemaking, and anarchist politics. He is also active as a facilitator, trainer, and translator. He is the author of *Anarchy Alive! Anti-Authoritarian Politics from Practice to Theory* (2007).

Elliot Gorn is chair of the American Civilization Department and professor of American civilization

and history at Brown University, USA. He specializes in the social and cultural history of the United States during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He is author of numerous books and articles, including *Mother Jones: The Most Dangerous Woman in America* (2001), among other works on working-class life, masculinity and the history of violence, and sports.

Richard Gorrie is the manager of Learning Technologies and Courseware Innovation at the University of Guelph, Canada and a long-time editor of *H-Albion*. He researches and writes about early modern Britain, focusing on theatre riots in London during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He also studies mediated history: the ways in which history is integrated into our culture and our lives at all levels, from education to entertainment and points in between.

Danielle Gougon has a PhD in political science from Rutgers University, USA. Her research interests include women and politics, interest groups, social movements, and feminist theory.

Helen Graham teaches modern European history at Royal Holloway, University of London, UK. She is the author of numerous books and articles on the Spanish Civil War and its long aftermath, most recently *The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction* (2005). She also co-edited (with Jo Labanyi) *Spanish Cultural Studies* (1995). She is currently working on a book about Franco's prisons and also on a hybrid "biographical" project about radical moderns in the wake of the Republican defeat in Spain.

Obika Gray is professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, USA. He has written widely on Caribbean politics and social movements in Jamaica, emphasizing the nexus of power and culture. Gray's published works include *Demeaned but Empowered: The Social Power of the Urban Poor in Jamaica* (2004) and *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1960–1972* (1991). His current research is on the new civic politics in Jamaica, the politics of the Workers' Party of Jamaica, and intellectuals and politics in Jamaica after 1950.

Christina Suszynski Green is a teacher of English literature with the New York City Department of Education. She holds a Master of Arts degree from Brooklyn College and an Education Master's from Harvard University. Her particular field of inquiry is in interdisciplinary

education, incorporating performing and visual art with a political conscience into the language arts curriculum.

Stella Grenat is a professor at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. She is working on her doctoral thesis on the Revolutionary Workers' Party-People's Revolutionary Army (PRT-ERP). She is on the editorial board of the journal *Razón y Revolución*, and she directs the research group on class struggle in the 1970s at the Center for the Study and Investigation of Social Sciences (CEICS). She is the author of *Una Espada sin cabeza. Las FAL y la construcción del partido revolucionario en los '70*, as well as numerous articles on the history of the Argentinian left.

Rabbi Yehiel Grenimann, a Conservative/Masorti Rabbi, currently coordinates activities for Rabbis for Human Rights. He completed a Master's in Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, majoring in Holocaust studies, where his supervisors were Professor Yehuda Bauer and Professor Yisrael Guttman. He subsequently spent ten years in Holocaust education at various Israeli institutions including Yad Vashem, and the Massuah Institute for the Study of the Holocaust. His work focuses on teaching teenagers, young adults, and educators about Jewish Resistance during the period of World War II.

Michael F. Gretz is a doctoral candidate in political science and historical studies at the New School for Social Research in New York, USA. His dissertation research focuses on the history of left-wing communism in Europe following World War I. Gretz previously served as an editor for the journal *International Labor and Working-Class History* and has served as a political and research consultant for academic institutions, labor unions, and political campaigns.

Carl J. Griffin is a historical geographer at the Queen's University of Belfast, UK. Recently, his research has developed to embrace an agenda that, while still focusing upon conflict, examines all relations of transformation, whether between the poor and their employers, the local and the state, or humans and the non-human. Current foci include examinations of the proto-insurrectionary Swing Riots of 1830–1, the decline of food rioting as a mode of popular opprobrium, and the human/non-human ecologies of forests and chases.

Christian A. Griggs is an assistant professor of history at Minnesota State University, Mankato,

USA. His research focuses on politics and religion in late Stuart England, specifically the involvement of High Churchmen in English politics after the Revolution of 1688–9.

Andrej Grubic is a lecturer at the ZMedia Institute and University of San Francisco, USA. Grubic is founding member of the Global Balkans network of the Balkan anti-capitalist diaspora, the Yugoslav Initiative for Economic Democracy, *Kontrapunkt* magazine, and *ZBalkans*. He has been an anarchist organizer in networks such as Planetary Alternatives Network, Peoples' Global Action, and the World Social Forum, and a program director for the Global Commons. His works include books, chapters, and numerous articles related to the history and utopian present of the Balkans.

Héctor Guerra Hernández is a PhD student in social anthropology at the State University of Campinas, Brazil. He has research experience in anthropology, sociology, and history, with an emphasis in urban anthropology and a focus on postcolonialism, post-socialism, ideology and culture, international migration, social conflicts, cultural identity, and historical memory. He has been involved as a human rights activist in the Documentation and Research Center for Chile–Latin America in Berlin (FDCL).

Lisa Guinn teaches at Ferris State University, USA. Guinn specializes in nineteenth-century United States history with an emphasis in social history and women's history. Her current scholarship deals with social reform organizations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Her dissertation was titled: "‘Building Useful Women’ from the Depths of Poverty: A Social History of the Girls Industrial Home and School in St. Louis, Missouri, 1853–1935."

Dwight R. Hahn is an assistant professor of political science at John Carroll University, USA, where he teaches Latin American politics and has served as coordinator of the JCU Latin American Studies Concentration. He is also an associate editor of *Latin American Perspectives* and author of a monograph on twentieth-century Bolivian politics, *The Divided World of the Bolivian Andes* (1992).

Rigels Halili is affiliated with University College London, UK.

Anthony J. Hall has taught and published widely in the fields of Native American studies, North

American history, and constitutional and international law. In 2003 he founded the Globalization Studies Initiative at the University of Lethbridge, Canada (www.globalizationstudies.ca). Currently his major publishing project is *The Bowl With One Spoon*, a two-volume work comprising *The American Empire and the Fourth World* (2005) and *Earth into Property: Aboriginal History and the Making of Global Capitalism* (2009).

Nada Halloway is currently an assistant professor of English at Manhattanville College, USA. Her fields of interest include Arab and African women writers at home and in the Diaspora, and she has written on Assia Djebar and Simin Daneshvar.

Carrie Hamilton teaches history at Roehampton University, London, UK. Her research focuses on the gender and sexual politics of activism and conflict in Spain and Latin America. Her study of women and political violence in the Basque country is entitled *Women and ETA: The Gender Politics of Radical Basque Nationalism* (2007). She is currently writing a book on sexuality and revolution in Cuba.

Mike Hamlin is a labor and human rights activist and a founding member of the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM), the Black Workers' Congress, and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers.

Jin H. Han teaches Old Testament and Biblical Hebrew at New York Theological Seminary, USA. He is a clergyperson of the Presbyterian Church (USA) and has spoken at many conferences and scholarly meetings around the world. He is the author of *Daniel's Spiel: Apocalyptic Literacy in the Book of Daniel* (2007) as well as numerous articles.

Jason Hannan is a PhD candidate in communication at Carleton University, Canada. His research interests concern cross-cultural moral discourse and Islam in the modern world. He is a past recipient of the Van Horne Prize, the award given for the best graduate student paper at the annual meeting of the Canadian Communication Association.

Nicole B. Hansen is president and founder of Glyphdoctors.com, offering the world's only online course in ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs. She received her PhD in Egyptology from the University of Chicago, with a dissertation on connections between ancient and modern Egyptian concepts and practices related to human fertility

and childbirth. Hansen is interested in the history of ancient and modern Luxor and she has published several articles on the continuity of ancient Egyptian culture in modern Egypt.

Peter Hardstaff is head of policy for the World Development Movement (WDM). His background is in advocacy and campaigning. Before joining WDM in 2002, he previously worked on trade policy issues for the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and on biodiversity issues for Friends of the Earth England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

Michael Hardt teaches in the Literature Program at Duke University, USA. He is co-author of the books *Empire* (2000) and *Multitude* (2004).

Casey Harison has taught courses in modern European and world history for more than 20 years. His area of research is nineteenth-century French social history, with an emphasis on the Parisian working class, and his articles have appeared in *French Historical Studies*, *Journal of Social History*, *The History Teacher*, and *History and Memory*. His book on *The Stonemasons of Creuse in Nineteenth-Century Paris* was published in 2008.

Camila Piñeiro Harnecker graduated from the Latin American Studies Master's Program at the University of California, Berkeley. Her thesis project was a study of Venezuelan cooperatives, looking at the relationship between workplace democracy and social consciousness. Her articles have been published in *Cooperatives in the 21st Century: The Road Ahead* (2007) and journals such as *Monthly Review*, *Socialism and Democracy*, and *Temas*.

Bruce T. Harpham is currently a Master's student at the Faculty of Information at the University of Toronto, Canada, where he participates in the Collaborative Program in Book History and Print Culture at Massey College. His MA work included original research on the history of the Manchester Public Library. His historical research interests include nineteenth-century Europe, the history of communications, and cultural history.

Christopher W. Harwood is lecturer in Czech at Columbia University, USA. His main professional interests are nineteenth-, twentieth-, and twenty-first-century Czech literature, Czech theatre and cinema, twentieth-century Russian literature, and Czech language pedagogy. He is currently writing

a book on the semantics of garbage in contemporary Czech literature.

Amy Hatmaker is a PhD student at Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi, USA, where she is researching the role of women in education during the Reconstruction era and early twentieth century. She earned her BA at the University of Houston-Victoria and works at the UH-V Academic Center as well as at the Reading and Writing Center of the Victoria College.

Colin Haydon is reader in early modern history at the University of Winchester, UK. He is the author of *Anti-Catholicism in Eighteenth-Century England c.1714–80* (1994) and *John Henry Williams (1747–1829), "Political Clergyman": War, the French Revolution, and the Church of England* (2007). He co-edited, with John Walsh and Stephen Taylor, *The Church of England c.1689–c.1833: From Toleration to Tractarianism* (1993) and, with William Doyle, *Robespierre* (1999).

Nick Heath is an independent scholar and lifelong political activist. He has been involved in anarchist groups including the Brighton Anarchist Group, the Anarchist Syndicalist Alliance, Big Flame, and the Union des Travailleurs Communistes Libertaires in France. He was involved in the founding of the Anarchist Communist Federation, now the Anarchist Federation. He has authored a number of articles on anarchism.

Stephen Heathorn is a British historian and a member of the editorial team responsible for the ongoing *Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell* (36 vols.). He has published widely on a variety of twentieth-century British history issues, including the social and political thought of Russell.

Larry W. Heiman is a librarian with an MLS from Pratt Institute, USA. He has worked in various academic and research institutions, including the New York Public Library, New York University, and the University of California, Irvine. He is currently a catalog librarian at Yale University Library, specializing in philosophy, religion, and literatures in English.

Aline Helg is a professor of history at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. Her books include *Liberty and Equality in Caribbean Colombia, 1770–1835* (2004) and *Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality, 1886–1912* (1995), both winners of prizes from the American Historical Association, and *La educación en*

Colombia, 1918–1957: Una historia social, económica y política (1987, reprint, 2001). She has also published several articles and book chapters on Cuba, Colombia, comparative race relations in the Americas, black mobilization, independence, and racial ideas in Latin America.

Max Henninger works as a freelance translator in Berlin, Germany. He received his PhD from the City University of New York Graduate Center, USA. He has published on Italy's post-1945 political movements and translated Italian novelist Nanni Balestrini into German.

John R. Henris is a PhD candidate at the University of Akron, USA. His research interests explore the interactions of agriculture, environment, and social ferment in the United States during the first half of the nineteenth century.

Berenice Hernández is a PhD student in sociology at the Free University of Berlin, Germany, where her thesis focuses on the migration of women from Latin America to Berlin. Originally from Mexico, she was involved with the Mexican feminist movement as one of the founding members of Las Brujas and Lunatika. She is responsible for the German sections of TRESEGY and YouMap, two European Union-funded international projects about second-generation youth in Europe.

Walter R. Herscher has a PhD from Marquette University, USA. His dissertation topic was "Evoking the Eagle: The July Monarchy's Use of Napoleonic Imagery." He co-authored *World History: Focus on Economics* (2005), received the NCSS Outstanding Service Award, and chaired the NCSS Instruction Committee. He has served as president and executive director for internal affairs for the Wisconsin Council for Social Studies, and is a former Keizai Koho Fellow.

Kristina Hinds Harrison lectures in political science and integration studies at the University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus. Her current research interests include civil society activism in Caribbean regionalism and Caribbean international affairs, and the political economy of Caribbean international trade and financial relations. Hinds Harrison is also interested in advancing gender-sensitive approaches to scholarship in Caribbean political science and international relations.

Sam Hitchmough teaches US history in the American Studies Department at Canterbury Christ

Church University, UK. His doctoral thesis explored the civil rights movement and its immediate aftermath in Chicago from 1963 to 1976. He specializes in African American and American Indian history and culture, has taught at Keele and Manchester Metropolitan universities, and has presented papers in the UK and US.

Radim Hladík is a PhD student of sociology at the Charles University, Czech Republic. His current research focuses on post-communist visual culture, and his other academic interests include Marxism, cultural studies, narratology, and social change. He has been actively involved with several progressive grassroots initiatives in Prague, including the IMF and World Bank protests in 2000.

Christian Høgsbjerg is currently undertaking doctoral research at the University of York, UK on "C. L. R. James in Imperial Britain, 1932–38," and has written articles on James for *International Socialism*, *Revolutionary History*, and *Socialist History Journal*.

John Holloway is professor in the School of Social Studies and Humanities of the Autonomous University of Puebla, Mexico. He has written widely on Marxist theory and anti-capitalist struggle. His latest book in English is *Change the World Without Taking Power* (2002). He is currently preparing a book titled *Cracking Capitalism*.

Alejandro Horowicz is a sociology professor at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, where he directs the Sociology Department and Postgraduate Journalism Program in the School of Social Sciences. He is the author of *Los cuatro peronismos* (2007), *Diálogo sobre la globalización, la multitud y la experiencia argentina* (with Toni Negri, 2003), and of the two-part *El país que estalló. Antecedentes para una historia argentina (1806–1820)* (2004, 2005). He is also an editor of the *Project for the Critical History of Argentine Literature*, headed by Noe Jitrik, which has seven published volumes.

Peter Hudis has written widely on Hegelian and Marxian theory and is co-editor (with Kevin B. Anderson) of *The Power of Negativity: Selected Writings on the Dialectic in Hegel and Marx*, by Raya Dunayevskaya (2001) and *The Rosa Luxemburg Reader* (2004).

Pang Yang Huei is a history doctoral candidate and tutor at the National University of Singapore. His

research areas include contemporary US–Asia relations, the People’s Republic of China’s political economy, and World War II Southeast Asia social developments. He has contributed to *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, *Biographical Dictionary of the People’s Republic of China* (forthcoming), and an oral history anthology, *Reflections and Interpretations*.

Dongyoun Hwang is associate professor of Asian studies at Soka University of America, USA. He has written articles in both English and Korean, mostly on Chinese wartime collaboration during the Sino-Japanese War of 1936–45 and on Korean anarchism and East Asian radicalism. His current research is focused on East Asian radicals and their networks of relationships in East Asia.

Takashi Ikeda is a PhD candidate of philosophy from Tokyo, Japan. While his academic study specializes in phenomenology and ontology in general, his greatest interest is in Martin Heidegger. He is currently working on a dissertation about contemporary interpretations of Heidegger and translating two volumes of Heidegger’s collected works for the publication of the Japanese edition.

Steven Isaac is an associate professor of history at Longwood University, USA. A specialist in the High Middle Ages, Isaac also pursues research in the history of Islam and its regional expressions up through the contemporary period. He has especially been interested in how culture and religion influence each other, both internally within traditional Islamic lands and with regard to the West. In his teaching he endeavors to immerse students in the richness of the Islamic heritage. He has also reviewed scholarly texts on Islamic/western interchanges.

Ambre Ivöl is a lecturer in American studies in Paris presently completing a PhD at the Sorbonne about the life and work of Howard Zinn. She has conducted personal interviews with Professor Zinn and has access to his personal archives at Boston University. Publications include “‘New Left’ Thinking Reconsidered: A Comparative Study of Historians William A. Williams and Howard Zinn, 1950–1980,” in *US Foreign Policy in the 20th Century: The Influence of Domestic Determinants*, and “USA, nouvelle gauche,” in *La France des années 1968*.

Cathérine Jacques is affiliated with the Free University of Brussels, Belgium.

Pia K. Jakobsson is a PhD candidate at the University of Texas at Dallas, USA. Her teaching and research focus is on the cultural and intellectual history of early modern Europe. Her dissertation topic deals with the public voices of eighteenth-century British women intellectuals. Other publications include an article on Catharine Macaulay and a textbook chapter on “Women in the American Revolution,” both forthcoming.

Bob James is an independent researcher, specializing in fraternalism and fraternal societies such as freemasons, friendly societies, trade unions, the Loyal Orange Institute, and others. He completed a Master’s thesis at La Trobe University, Australia in 1984 from which his book, *Anarchism and State Violence in Sydney and Melbourne, 1886–1896* (1986), is adapted. He then completed his PhD at Newcastle University, Australia, on “Carnival and Labour History” in 1994.

O. H. Jang-Whan is affiliated with the National Culture Research Institute, Seoul, Korea.

Jason Jewell is chair of the Department of Humanities at Faulkner University, USA. He received a PhD in humanities at Florida State University in 2004 under the direction of Professor Richard Greaves.

S. Sándor John teaches Latin American history at the City University of New York, USA and is the author of the forthcoming *Permanent Revolution on the Altiplano: The History of Bolivian Trotskyism*.

Eric F. Johnson is currently an assistant professor of history at Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, USA. His doctoral dissertation was about the changing political uses of religious rituals and imagery in Avignon during the French Revolution. His research interests include popular religious culture in the eighteenth century and secularization. His work has been published in a number of historical journals and edited compilations.

Rhayn Garrick Jooste is a player, composer, and pedagogue interested in musical spontaneity and improvisation in a variety of genres. He holds a BTEC National Diploma in popular music, a post-graduate diploma in performance from the Royal Welsh College, UK, and a Master’s in music, culture, and politics from Cardiff University, UK. His research area is Cuban music and history, but he also studies wider Caribbean issues as well as the

guitar and its unique place in history as an instrument that transcends all musical boundaries.

John Jordan's work merges the imagination of art and the radical engagement of activism. He has co-directed the social art group Platform and worked in the direct action collective Reclaim the Streets. He co-edited the book *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anti-Capitalism* (2003), filmed "The Take" with Naomi Klein, and formed the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army. He is presently co-writing a book and film project about utopian communities in Europe and co-organizing the UK Climate Camp.

Marina Kabat teaches Argentinian history at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, where she coordinates the Working-Class Studies Workshop at the Center for the Study and Investigation of Social Sciences (CEICS). She specializes in economic and labor subjects, and has studied labor process organization and labor conflicts. She has published several articles and a book entitled *From the Workshop to the Factory: Industry Labor Process and the Working Class in Shoe Production (Buenos Aires, 1870–1940)*.

Ackson M. Kanduza currently teaches at the University of Botswana. Originally from Zambia, he has taught at the University of Zambia and the University of Swaziland. He held a Senior Fulbright Visiting Fellowship at the University of California, Los Angeles from 1985 to 1986. He has researched and published widely on the social, political, and economic history of Zambia, Swaziland, and Southern Africa, and on HIV/AIDS, as well as on social movements.

Slobodan Karamanić is a PhD candidate in the Anthropology of Everyday Life at the Institutum Studiorum Humanitatis, Ljubljana Graduate School of Humanities, Slovenia. He is a researcher in the fields of political theory, ideology, and psychoanalysis. Karamanić is a founder and editor of *Prelom (Break) – Journal for Images and Politics* (Belgrade).

Jens Kastner is a research associate at the Institute for Art and Cultural Theory at the Academy of Fine Arts, Vienna, Austria. A sociologist and historian, he has been associate professor at the Institute for Sociology at the University of Münster, at the Center for Latin American Studies (CELA) at the University of Münster, and at the Vienna Art School. He contributes to several newspapers and magazines and is the coordinating editor of

Bildpunkt. Zeitschrift der IG Bildende Kunst (Magazine of the Austrian Fine Artists' Union).

Kimmo Katajala is a professor with the Department of History, University of Joensuu, Finland. He won the Science Book of the Year prize in 2002 and was chair of the Finnish Historical Society in 2005–7. His research areas and interests include European peasant revolts and social conflicts, the history of borders, the social and economic history of eastern Finland, and the methodology of historical research.

Marie Martine Maguetcham-Ruche Kaya is presently a teacher associate at Cornell University, USA, where she teaches French language while completing a PhD in French and Francophone literature. With a background in African cultural anthropology, her current research topics include sexuality and gender in French and Francophone fairytales and feminism in the cinema of Sembène Ousmane.

Anthony E. Kaye teaches history at Pennsylvania State University, University Park, USA. He is a former assistant editor at the *Freedmen and Southern Society Project* at the University of Maryland, College Park, and author of *Joining Places: Slave Neighborhoods in the Old South* (2007). He is currently at work on a book about the Nat Turner revolt.

Chris Keefer is a medical student and community radio journalist based in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. His interests lie in the politics of health, particularly the health outcomes of globalization and neoliberalism. He is a frequent contributor to the National Community Radio Association and the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters.

Tom Keefer is an editor of the anti-capitalist journal *Upping the Anti* (www.uppingtheanti.org).

Lisa Keller is associate professor of history at Purchase College, State University of New York, USA. She is the author of *Triumph of Order: Democracy and Public Spaces in New York and London* (2008).

A. Kemp-Welch teaches at the University of East Anglia, UK and is the author of six books, most recently *Poland under Communism: A Cold War History* (2008).

William Kenefick is a lecturer in Scottish and British social history at the University of Dundee,

Scotland. He has published widely on Scottish maritime and labor history, the impact of World War I and the Russian Revolution on the Scottish working class, Irish and Jewish relations in Scotland from ca. 1870, and the impact of Scottish radicals on the trade union and labor movement. His latest book is *Red Scotland! The Rise and Fall of the Radical Left, c.1872 to 1932* (2007).

Holly M. Kent is a doctoral candidate in the Department of History at Lehigh University, USA. Chief co-editor of *thirdspace: a journal of feminist theory and culture*, Kent has published her work in *Lilith: A Feminist History Journal* and *Limina: A Journal of Cultural and Historical Studies*. She has received fellowships and grants from the Massachusetts Historical Society and the Sophia Smith Collection for her dissertation, which focuses on women's anti-slavery fiction in the early republic and antebellum United States.

Susan Kingsley Kent is professor of history at the University of Colorado, Boulder, USA. She is the author of *Sex and Suffrage in Britain, 1860–1914* (1987), *Making Peace: The Reconstruction of Gender in Interwar Britain* (1993), *Gender and Power in Britain, 1640–1990* (1999), and *Aftershocks: Politics and Trauma in Britain, 1918–1931* (2008). Her co-authored book on the Igbo Women's War of 1929 is forthcoming.

Daire Keogh, a senior lecturer in St. Patrick's College, Dublin City University, Ireland, is currently a Government of Ireland, IRCHSS, Senior Research Fellow.

Deborah Kepple-Mamros is affiliated with Graceland University, USA.

Zarina Rahman Khan is affiliated with the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Alexander King is the parliamentary assistant of MP Heike Hänsel in the German Bundestag (spokeswoman of The Left parliamentary group on economic cooperation and development). His doctoral dissertation explored spatial mobility in Haiti in the context of globalization. He has been researching Haiti since 1996, with an emphasis on the impact of globalization on Haitian society. From 2002 to 2005 he served as consultant to the Party of Democratic Socialism's party executive on local policies.

Cheryl L. A. King currently works in the Drew University Library, USA. She is the author of

Michael Manley and Democratic Socialism (2003), and co-editor of *Search for Identity: Essays on St. Vincent and the Grenadines* (2006), *Quest for Caribbean Unity: Beyond Colonialism* (2006), and *Home Sweet Home: Musings on Hairoun* (2007).

James M. King is a research assistant at the University of Texas at Dallas, USA. As an intellectual historian, he has several research interests in both early modern and modern Europe. His most recent work concerns the presence of the German concept of *Bildung* and its foundational role in the thought of the political thinker Hannah Arendt.

Nathan King currently serves as an assistant to the *American Book Review* at the University of Houston-Victoria (UHV), USA. He earned his Bachelor of Arts in Humanities and Master of Arts in Interdisciplinary Studies at UHV. His areas of research and interest include early United States, Native American, and intellectual history.

Stewart R. King is now professor at the Mount Angel Seminary, USA. He served in the United States Peace Corps and diplomatic service from 1983 to 1991, serving in Togo, Haiti, and Guinea. He received a PhD from Johns Hopkins University, specializing in the colonial Caribbean. He has written extensively on free people of color in the Americas, and has taught in several institutions.

Gary Kinsman teaches sociology at Laurentian University, Canada. He is the author of *The Regulation of Desire: Homo and Hetero Sexualities* (1996), an editor of *Whose National Security? Canadian State Surveillance and the Creation of Enemies* (2000) and *Mine Mill Fights Back, Sociology for Changing the World: Social Movements/Social Research* (2007), and co-author of the forthcoming *The Canadian War on "Queers": National Security as Sexual Regulation*.

Frank M. Kirkland is chairperson of the Philosophy Department at Hunter College, USA and teaches in the PhD Program in Philosophy at the CUNY Graduate Center. He is editor of the volume *Phenomenology: East and West*, and co-editor with Bill Lawson of the volume *Frederick Douglass: A Critical Reader* (1999). He is author of numerous articles on Kant, Hegel, and Husserl as well as on the theme of modernity and African American intellectual life. He is currently at work on two book projects provisionally entitled *Hegel and Husserl: Idealist Meditations* and *Modernisms in Black*.

Gal Kirn is a PhD student in philosophy at the Scientific Research Center, Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Ljubljana. He has been editor-in-chief of the *Agregat* journal, and a jury member of the international festival for radical communication Memefest, in the category Sociology. He has also been a member of the programming committee at the Workers' Punk University, Peace Institute, Ljubljana, and has worked with the Autonomous Tribune (a student movement) and the Anti-NATO movement.

Stanislav J. Kirschbaum teaches at York University, Canada. He specializes in communist and post-communist politics, especially Slovak politics, and security studies. He has published *A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival in 1995* (2nd ed., 2005) and *Historical Dictionary of Slovakia in 1999* (2nd ed., 2007) in addition to 12 books on Central Europe and security and 78 scholarly articles on Slovak politics and international relations. Since 1980 he has been secretary of the International Council for Central and East European Studies and, since 1995, co-président of the Association franco-canadienne d'études stratégiques.

Michael Kline is Edel Professor of Humanities Emeritus at Dickinson College, USA. His work includes literary and film criticism and cultural analysis of nineteenth- and twentieth-century French events. He is a Chevalier dans l'Ordre des Palmes Académiques.

Louise W. Knight is currently an adjunct professor of communication studies at Northwestern University, USA, where she teaches the history of rhetoric. Her independent research has been funded by a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities and grants from the Spencer Foundation, the Lilly Endowment, and the Ludwig Vogelstein Foundation. She has reviewed books for the *New York Times Book Review* and the *Women's Review of Books*.

Loudovikos Kotsonopoulos is currently undertaking PhD research, funded by the Greek State Scholarship's Foundation, in welfare state theory at the University of Panteion, Greece. He has contributed articles to three edited conference volumes concerning the Greek political party system, the socialist movement of the early twentieth century, and the political theory of Antonio Gramsci. His main research interests lie in political theory, welfare state, and Greek politics.

Giorgos Koukoules is affiliated with the Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences, Greece.

Jan Kubik teaches political science at Rutgers University, USA. He works mostly on post-communist transformations in Eastern Europe, the relationship between culture and politics, civil society, and contentious politics. His publications include *Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989–1993* (with Grzegorz Ekiert, 1999) and *The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland* (1994). In 2006–7 he served as the Distinguished Fulbright Chair in East European Studies, Warsaw University, Poland.

Hülya Küçük is associate professor of the history of Sufism at Selçuk University, Konya, Turkey. She is the author of *The Roles of the Bektashis in Turkey's National Struggle* (2002), *Kurtuluş Savaşında Bektaşiler* (2003), *Tasavvuf Tarihine Giriş* (2nd ed., 2004), and *Sultan Veled Ve Maarif'i. Kitâbu'l-Hikemiyye adlı Maârif Tercüme ve Şerhi* (2005). Her current research focuses on the history of Sufism in classical times and today.

Gabriel Kuhn holds a PhD in philosophy and works as an independent author and translator. He has published widely on historical and contemporary anarchism.

Michael O. N. Kunnuji teaches in the Department of Sociology at the University of Lagos, Nigeria. His research interests cut across population studies, human sexuality, and technology and society, inter alia.

Andrew Kurt currently teaches at Grand Valley State University, USA, and has also taught at the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay, USA. He specializes in medieval European and Islamic history and his research interests include Christian-Muslim relations, liturgy, and monetary history, with emphasis on Spain in the Middle Ages. He has also published on late medieval northern African empires.

Geoffrey Kurtz teaches political science at the Borough of Manhattan Community College, CUNY, USA. His book on the political thought of Jean Jaurès is forthcoming.

Aileen Kwa is an independent consultant based in Geneva, Switzerland. Her main activities include

research, writing, training, and providing advice on trade and alternative economic policies. Kwa, formerly a senior analyst at Focus on the Global South, is best known for her commentaries and analysis of World Trade Organization negotiations, as author of *Power Politics in the WTO* (2002) and co-author of *Behind the Scenes at the WTO* (2003, 2005). Her more recent work includes *Rethinking the Trading System*, published in 2007.

Dan La Botz is an independent scholar based in Cincinnati, Ohio, USA. He is the author of several books on labor unions and politics in the United States, Mexico, and Indonesia. He writes frequently for *Against the Current*, *Labor Notes*, *Monthly Review*, and *Counterpunch* and is a member of the editorial board of *New Politics*. He is the editor of *Mexican Labor News and Analysis*. He is currently writing a history of the African American community of Cincinnati, provisionally titled *Struggle for Justice*.

Yves Laberge is an independent scholar and sociologist, who has recently been visiting professor at the Université de Provence in Aix-en-Provence, France. Among some 150 publications and peer-reviewed articles, he has contributed some 20 chapters and entries for reference books including *The Encyclopedia of Rape* (2004), *Men and Masculinities: A Social, Cultural, and Historical Encyclopedia* (2004), *France and the Americas: Culture, Politics, History* (2005), and *The Routledge Encyclopedia of the World's Minorities* (2005). He has also served on the advisory board for *The Encyclopedia of the Blues* (2006).

Ferenc Laczó, a historian, is currently working on his dissertation at the Center for Metropolitan Studies, Berlin–New York, a comparative study of the political cultures and reception history of urban/national revolutions in Berlin and Budapest in the twentieth century. He has published over ten articles in English, Hungarian, and Turkish, and is the project manager of and regular contributor to an online historiographical review database (www.ece.ccu.hu).

Jukka Laitinen is a student researching Paul Goodman's anarchist philosophy at the University of Joensuu, Finland. He is one of the editors of *Väärinajattelija*, a Finnish-language anarchist journal.

Marilyn Lake holds a Personal Chair in History and ARC Professorial Research Fellowship at LaTrobe University, Australia. Between 2001 and

2002, she held the Chair in Australian Studies at Harvard University, USA. She has published widely internationally on the history of feminism and citizenship, nationalism, and anti-racism. Her most recent books include *Getting Equal: The History of Australian Feminism* (1999), *FAITH: Faith Bandler Gentle Activist* (2002), and (with Henry Reynolds) *Drawing the Global Color Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (2008).

Tobias Lambert is a freelance author and journalist in Berlin, Germany. He has studied political science in Bonn and Berlin. A specialist in Bolivarian processes in Venezuela and regional integration in Latin America, he has made several research visits to Latin America.

Fintan Lane is an independent scholar and a former editor of *Saothar*, the journal of Irish labor history. His publications include *The Origins of Modern Irish Socialism* (1997) and (as editor) *Politics and the Irish Working Class, 1830–1945* (2005) and *Essays in Irish Labour History* (2008).

Max Lane is a writer and translator who has guest lectured, taught, and been a research fellow in several universities in Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the United States. He is currently a visiting fellow in the Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore. He has translated five novels and one non-fiction work by Indonesian novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer, and has written on Indonesia, East Timor, and Southeast Asia. His recent publications include *Unfinished Nation: Indonesia before and after Suharto* (2008).

Miles Larmer is lecturer in international history at the University of Sheffield, UK. He has written widely on Zambian political and labor history and on social movements in Southern Africa. He is the author of *Mineworkers in Zambia: Labor and Political Change in Post-Colonial Africa, 1964–1997* (2007).

Giuseppina Larocca is a PhD student at the University of Pisa, Department of Linguistics, Faculty of Modern Languages, Italy. She graduated in Russian literature with a thesis on "The Female World in the Literary Production of Andrei Platonov (1899–1951)." She also studies the women's movement of Russia during the October Revolution and is co-author of the article "Plasmare la storia: la manualistica russa dalla rivoluzione d'Ottobre

all'era post-sovietica" ("Shaping History in Russian Books: From the October Revolution to the Post-Soviet Era"), *Zapruder* 15 (February 2008), Rome.

Mark A. Lause is a professor of history at the University of Cincinnati, USA. His research focuses on nineteenth-century labor and social history, particularly in the Civil War period, and race and class on the western frontier of the Civil War, addressing the interaction of abolitionists and other radicals with the recruitment and leadership of black and Indian soldiers. He is author of *Young America: Land, Labor, and the Republican Community* (2005). His research projects include émigré activism on the eve of the Civil War, spiritualism, and wartime labor movements.

Stephen Leberstein recently retired as the long-time executive director of the Center for Worker Education at City College, USA, which he helped found and where he taught history. He now teaches part-time on race, labor, radicalism, and abolitionism at Brooklyn College's Graduate Center for Worker Education, and occasionally at Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations. A member of the editorial board of *Working USA: The Journal of Labor and Society* (Wiley-Blackwell), he has written on French syndicalism at the turn of the twentieth century and on political repression of the labor left in the US.

Summer D. Leibensperger is the coordinator of the writing center at the University of Houston-Victoria, USA. She has a Bachelor's degree in humanities from UHV and a Master's degree in technical communication from Texas Tech University, USA.

Carl Levy is a reader in European politics at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK. He was previously head of department, from 2002 to 2006. He has been a visiting fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, USA, Magdalen College, University of Oxford, UK, and LUISS, Italy. He is the author of six edited and single-authored books. He is presently completing a biography of Errico Malatesta entitled *The Rooted Cosmopolitan: The Life and Times of Errico Malatesta*.

Joel A. Lewis is affiliated with Saginaw Valley State University, USA.

Mary Dewhurst Lewis is John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Social Sciences at Harvard University, USA, where she teaches in the History

Department. Her book, *The Boundaries of the Republic: Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universalism in France, 1918–1940* (2007), was named co-winner of the 2008 J. Willard Hurst Prize, awarded by the Law and Society Association for the best book in sociolegal history published in 2007. She is currently researching a book on the relationship between everyday life and international relations in the French protectorate of Tunisia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Simon L. Lewis is a research fellow at the School of Geography, University of Leeds, UK. His main academic work is in natural sciences, specifically the interactions of tropical forests and environmental changes, for example climate change. He has also been actively involved in the alter-globalization movement, including attending the first Peoples' Global Action conference, and participation in their first global day of action.

Lars T. Lih is an independent scholar who holds a PhD in politics from Princeton University, USA. He worked for six years in the office of US Representative Ron Dellums (1971–6). He is the author of *Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914–1921* (1990) and *Lenin Rediscovered* (2006, 2008), and was the American editor for *Stalin's Letters to Molotov* (1995). He is now working on a biography of Lenin.

Marisa Linton is a senior lecturer in history at Kingston University, UK. Her first book was *The Politics of Virtue in Enlightenment France* (2001). She edited *Conspiracy in the French Revolution* (2007), and has written numerous articles and chapters on the French Revolution and on the political culture of eighteenth-century France, including "Robespierre's Political Principles," "Ideas of the Future in the French Revolution," and "Women and the Politics of Virtue in Eighteenth-Century France." She is writing a book on *Virtue and Terror in the French Revolution*.

Leonore Loft is a professor of French at the State University of New York, Fredonia, USA. She is the author of *Passion, Politics, and Philosophie: Rediscovering J.-P. Brissot* (2001) and a number of articles on Brissot. Currently, she is working in the area of eighteenth-century history of animal medicine and intellectual history.

Nancy LoPatin-Lummis is professor of modern British history at University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, USA. She has published *Political Unions, Popular Politics and the Great Reform Act of 1832*

(1999), is co-general editor of the *Lives of Victorian Political Figures* series, and has published articles on parliamentary and popular political history in the *Journal of British Studies*, *Parliamentary History*, *Journal of Victorian Culture*, and *Midland History*.

Leonard H. Lubitz is a political scientist currently pursuing his PhD at the City University of New York, USA. He has performed extensive research and fieldwork in both the Middle East and Far East. His academic achievements include being a recipient of the Belle Zeller Scholar Award.

Arnaud Lucien is a teaching and research fellow with the University of Toulon, France. He is also a part-time lecturer at the University of Essex, UK. Affiliated with the French high-level research center Information, Milieux, Médias, Médiations (Toulon-Nice), he is involved in several research activities dealing with communications, identity, and culture in relation to the Mediterranean area, especially Tunisia.

Martina G. Lüke is a PhD candidate (ABD) in the Modern and Classical Languages Department at the University of Connecticut, USA. She received her first and second Staatsexamen (2000, 2002) as well as her Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Hamburg, Germany. Her teaching and research interests are in the field of Romanticism, German and comparative modernism, and modern history.

Howard Lupovitch is the Pulver Family Associate Professor of Jewish Studies at Colby College, USA. He is the author of *Jews at the Crossroads: Tradition and Accommodation during the Golden Age of the Hungarian Nobility* (2007) and the forthcoming *Jews and Judaism in World History*. He is currently completing a history of the Jews of Budapest.

Janet E. McClellan is currently a professor with the Justice Department at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, USA. She has extensive experience in public service as a police officer, police chief, corrections manager, and warden of the Kansas Violent Sexual Predator Maximum Security Facility. Her graduate and undergraduate education includes history, American political science, and public administration and fostered her avid interest in various areas of world history.

John McCormick is professor of political science at the Indianapolis campus of Indiana University, USA. He is the author of multiple books and

articles on British politics, the politics of the European Union, and environmental policy.

Chris McCoy is a teacher, director, choreographer, and scholar whose work focuses on the intersection of politics and performance. He has worked in residence as a teaching-artist for Seattle Children's Theatre, Atlanta's Alliance Theatre, the Denver Center Theatre Company, Saint Louis Opera Theatre, San Diego Opera, and Austin Lyric Opera. McCoy is currently pursuing his PhD in theatre studies.

Michael F. McCullough is an adjunct assistant professor in the Brooklyn College Political Science Department, USA. He teaches at the Graduate Center for Worker Education in New York City. He has a Master's degree in Latin American studies from Stanford University, USA and a doctoral degree in political science from the City University of New York Graduate Center, USA.

Shellie K. McCullough is pursuing her PhD in Jewish studies at the University of Texas at Dallas, USA, specializing in the ethical representation of Holocaust testimonies by examining them through the lens of Jacques Derrida's brand of deconstruction. She is a member of the Modern Language Association, the American Literary Translators Association, and currently works as an assistant to the curator for the Modern Art collection at the Rachofsky House in Dallas, Texas.

Rogério Fernandes Macedo is affiliated with Paulista State University, Brazil.

James R. McIntyre is affiliated with Moraine Valley Community College, USA.

Michael McKee is a freelance writer and lecturer at the University of the Arts, USA, where he teaches freshmen research writing and about post-World War II youth subcultures. McKee has been active in independent music since 1992, touring the United States, Australia, and Europe, organizing all-ages benefit concerts and releasing albums of local artists. He is currently working on a book documenting the 1990s activist punk scene in the United States.

Dale T. McKinley is an independent researcher, editor, lecturer, writer, and political activist. Politically active with the South African Communist Party throughout the 1990s, he is the author of a book on the history of the ANC's liberation

struggle, as well as many research reports, chapters, and articles on various aspects of South African and international political, social, and economic issues and struggles.

Dolly MacKinnon is lecturer and research fellow in the School of Historical Studies and in the Faculty of Music at the University of Melbourne, Australia. She is the author of *Revealing the Early Modern Landscape: Earls Colne, Essex* (forthcoming). Her interdisciplinary work is published in international edited collections, journals, historical guides, and web resources. She co-edited “Madness” in *Australia* (2003) with Catharine Coleborne, and the special issue of the journal *Health and History: Histories of Psychiatry after Deinstitutionalisation* 5, 2 (2003). MacKinnon also co-edited *Hearing Places* (2007) with Ros Bandt and Michelle Duffy.

Paul McLaughlin is a research fellow at the University of Tartu, Estonia. His research interests are in political philosophy, environmental philosophy, and the philosophy of education. He is the author of *Anarchism and Authority: A Philosophical Introduction to Classical Anarchism* (2007) and *Mikhail Bakunin: The Philosophical Basis of His Anarchism* (2002). He is currently working on a study of Murray Bookchin’s thought.

Matthew McMurray is a history instructor at New Jersey City University, USA. His doctoral dissertation, “The British Union of Fascists, 1932–1940,” explored the domestic and international policies of the largest party on the far right in Britain in the interwar era. His articles on European history have appeared in scholarly publications, including the *Journal of British Studies* and *The History Teacher*.

Colleen K. McQuillen is an assistant professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago, USA. Her primary research interests include modernist poetry and prose, cultural history, and experimental drama and theatre. She has published on Adam Mickiewicz in *Polish Review* and her professional translations of Anna Frajlich’s poetry have appeared in *World Literature Today* and in the anthology *Contemporary Writers of Poland* (2005).

John McQuilton is currently Associate Dean (Undergraduate Studies) at the University of Wollongong, Australia. His primary research interests lie in the intersection between policies developed by central governments and their adaptation

(as opposed to acceptance) by regional communities. Adaptation implies accommodation as well as resistance. He has explored these themes in publications across two continents, including work on crime and outlawry, national mythologies, comparative frontier studies, the Boer War, the Great War, and (currently) the American Civil War.

Stacy Warner Maddern is a graduate research fellow at Brooklyn College Graduate Center for Worker Education of the City University of New York and the Labor Policy Institute, USA. He is an established filmmaker, currently completing a documentary on Upton Sinclair’s 1934 campaign for governor of California.

Wendy Maier is an associate professor of history at Oakton Community College, USA, where she teaches American history, western civilization since 1600, and women’s history surveys. She specializes in European history, specifically Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, including the role of female perpetrators.

Mary Lou Malig is a research associate of Focus on the Global South. She coordinates the Focus trade campaign. Malig is co-author of *The Anti-Developmental State: The Political Economy of Permanent Crisis in the Philippines* (2006) and has also written several articles on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and free trade agreements (FTAs).

Muntassir Mamoon is a professor in the Department of History, Dhaka University, Bangladesh. He has published almost 200 books on history and in the different branches of literature. He is a recipient of many awards, including president’s awards and the Bangla Academy award. His most important research works are *Newspapers and Periodicals in 19th-Century Bangladesh*, *Printing and Publishing in Dhaka in the 19th Century*, *Festivals of Bangladesh*, and *Essays on Politics and Governance* (co-author). He has also edited *The Encyclopedia of the Libertarian War*.

David Mandel is a professor of political science at the University of Quebec, Montreal, Canada, and an author of books and articles on Russia/USSR/post-Soviet states, with a special interest in labor. He is active in the labor and socialist movements in Canada and is co-founder of the School for Worker Democracy in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, which organizes educational activities with rank-and-file trade unionists and other social activists.

Attilio Mangano is a contemporary historian, a former professor, and author of *Le culture del 68: Gli anni sessanta, le riviste, il movimento* (1989). He also edited the journal *Per il '68* (1991–8) and is author of a blog, *Duemila ragioni* (duemilragioni.myblog.it).

George Margaritis is a professor of contemporary history in the Department of Political Sciences in the Aristoteleion University of Thessaloniki, Greece. He mainly studies Resistance movements during World War II and social history. His previous publications include *Thirty-Three Days in Athens: The Combat for Athens, December 1944* (2008), *Undesirable Fellow-Citizens: Elements on the Destruction of the Minorities in Greece (Jews, Chams, 1941–1944)* (2005), *History of the Greek Civil War, 1946–1949* (2 vols., 2000–1), and *From Defeat to Revolt, Greece, 1941–1942* (1993).

Craig Marin is an independent scholar who recently received his PhD from the University of Pittsburgh, USA. His research interests include labor relations in eighteenth-century Atlantic port cities and the intersections of race and class in the waterfront environment. He is currently working on a book manuscript based on his dissertation, “Coercion, Cooperation, and Conflict Along the Charleston Waterfront, 1739–1785: Navigating the Social Waters of an Atlantic Port City,” for future publication.

Perry Mars is currently professor in the Department of Africana Studies at Wayne State University, USA. He is the author of *Ideology and Change: The Transformation of the Caribbean Left* (1998), and co-editor (with the late Alma H. Young) of *Caribbean Labor and Politics: Legacies of Cheddi Jagan and Michael Manley* (2004). He has also authored numerous journal articles on the issues of race, class, and political conflicts in the Caribbean and other developing areas.

María N. Marsilli is an associate professor of history at John Carroll University. Originally from Chile, she obtained her MA from the University of California at Davis, and her PhD from Emory University. She specializes in colonial Peru and colonial Chile.

Nathan James Martin is a PhD candidate in history at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, USA. His main research area is Elizabethan foreign policy, and his dissertation research area is Anglo-Swedish foreign relations during the reign of

Queen Elizabeth. His work has appeared in the *Sixteenth Century Journal* and he has presented papers at several international conferences.

Eric Martone is instructor of history in the School of Professional Development at Stony Brook University and a history teacher in Connecticut for Waterbury Public Schools, USA. He is currently a doctoral candidate in the Department of History at Stony Brook University. He has published articles on European history in peer-reviewed journals, essays on teaching methods, and numerous articles for historical reference works. He is currently editing an encyclopedia on blacks in European history and culture.

Nicole Martone is a professor of English at Naugatuck Valley Community College in Waterbury, Connecticut, USA and teaches genre as well as world literature at John F. Kennedy High School in Waterbury. Her interests are British literature and the study of ancient Greco-Roman culture.

Edyta V. Materka completed degrees in women’s and gender studies and political science at Rutgers University, USA, and is continuing her research at the London School of Economics, UK. She is researching property transformation in northwestern Poland (1946–present), where she conducted the first ethnographic study ever in the rural village of Debnica Kaszubska. Materka has presented her published work on land rights disputes in post-tsunami Thailand at international conferences. She is also a grammatical and technical editor for Global Scholarly Publications in New York City.

Anne F. Mattina is an associate professor of communication at Stonehill College, USA. Publications include “‘Don’t Let Them Step on You’: Gender, Ethnicity and Class in the Great Strikes, 1909–1913,” in *Who Says? Working-Class Rhetoric, Class Consciousness and Community* (ed. William DeGenaro, 2007) and “‘Corporation Tools & Time-Serving Slaves’: Class and Gender in the Rhetoric of Antebellum Labor Reform,” in the *Howard Journal of Communications*. She is currently working on a book on the rhetorical construction of womanhood in Progressive-era labor organizations.

Alexander Maxwell teaches at Victoria University, Australia and directs the Antipodean East European Study Group. A historian of East-Central Europe, he has published on linguistic nationalism and contingency in Slovakia, everyday

nationalism in Hungary, and the emergence of particularist nationalism in Macedonia. He worked in Wales, Germany, Nevada, and Romania before settling in Wellington, New Zealand.

Brian Meeks is professor of social and political change at the University of the West Indies (UWI), Mona. He is the director of the Center for Caribbean Thought at UWI Mona and a former chair of the Michael Manley Foundation. He has authored or edited seven books and many articles, including *Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory: An Assessment of Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada* (2001) and *Narratives of Resistance: Jamaica, Trinidad, the Caribbean* (2000). He chaired the committee responsible for assessing the People's National Party's performance in the 2007 Jamaican general elections.

Michael Menser is assistant professor of philosophy at Brooklyn College (BC), USA, and is on the executive boards of the Environmental Studies Program at BC, the Center for the Study of Place, Culture, and Politics at the City University of New York Graduate School, and the US Solidarity Economy Network. He has published essays on architecture, technoscience, participatory democracy, local and global social movements, and agroecology.

Tibor T. Meszmann is a PhD candidate in political science at the Central European University, Hungary. His current research interests include post-socialist transformations, the institutional role and history of trade unions and organized labor in socialism and after, ethnic policies, and post-socialist state formation. He has worked as an activist and project coordinator in various non-governmental organizations, has been a translator, journal editor and columnist, an independent researcher, and an evaluator of programs on minorities.

Petros Metafas is a PhD candidate at the University of Patras, Greece. His research interests concern Michel Foucault's thought, genealogical analysis as a form of critique, power/knowledge relations, the import and influence of Nietzsche, similarity and difference between Foucault's work and Althusserian Marxist analysis, and the dialogue between poststructuralists and the tradition of critical social theory.

Sandro Mezzadra works as an associate professor of the history of political thought at the University of Bologna, Italy. He is currently an eminent

research fellow at the Center for Cultural Research at the University of Western Sydney, Australia. His publications include *Diritto di fuga. Migrazioni, cittadinanza, globalizzazione* (The Right to Escape: Migration, Citizenship, Globalization, 2006), and *La condizione postcoloniale. Storia e politica nel mondo globale* (The Postcolonial Condition: History and Politics in the Global Present, 2008).

Jennifer A. Miller is assistant professor of German history at Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville, USA. She holds degrees in German from Davidson College, women's and gender studies, and modern European history. Miller is currently working on a book manuscript titled *Postwar Negotiations: The First Generation of Turkish "Guest Workers" in Germany, 1961–1973*.

Timothy Miller is professor of religious studies at the University of Kansas, USA and past president of the International Communal Studies Association. He is the author of several books and articles on intentional communities, including *The Quest for Utopia in Twentieth-Century America* (1998), *The 60s Communes* (1999), and *American Communes, 1860–1960: A Bibliography* (1990).

Lalo Watanabe Minto is currently a researcher at the Brazilian Institute for Contemporary Studies (IBEC) and a PhD student in education at the University of Campinas (Unicamp), Brazil. His Master's thesis is titled "The Public and Private in Brazilian Higher Education Reforms: From 1964's Coup to the 1990s," and he is also the author of *As reformas do ensino superior no Brasil* (Higher Education Reforms in Brazil, 2006) as well as other works on higher education, the history of education, and Brazilian history.

José Molina Bravo is a professor in the School of History and Social Sciences and the School of Social Work at the University of Art and Social Sciences (ARCIS) in Santiago, Chile, where he is completing postgraduate work. He currently researches biopolitics and social movements, state policies directed toward youth, and social intervention in impoverished areas.

Nicola Montagna is currently a research fellow at Middlesex University, UK. His main research interests are youth and urban movements, social movements and globalization, civil society and the third sector, and international migration. His recent publications on social movements and protest include *Social Movements: A Reader* (2008), *La globalizzazione dei Movimenti* (2007), and

“The Decommodification of Urban Space and the Occupied Social Centres in Italy” (2006).

Tathiana Montaña Mestizo is an academic coordinator with the Indepaz Foundation, a Colombian non-governmental organization. She has a Master’s in political science from the University of the Andes in Bogotá, Colombia, and her research interests are international cooperation and peace movements.

Andrew Moore teaches Australian history at the University of Western Sydney, Australia, where he has taught for 23 years. He has written four books, most recently *Francis De Groot: Irish Fascist Australian Legend* (2005), as well as more than 60 scholarly articles, principally on the subjects of right-wing politics in Australia, the social history of sport, and Irish-Australian history. With the support of an ARC Discovery Grant he is currently researching the “little people” of interwar fascism in Australia.

Wazha Gilbert Morapedi teaches history at the University of Botswana. His research interests are in labor, migration, and agrarian histories. Morapedi holds degrees in English, education, and comparative studies. In 1990 he joined the History Department of the University of Botswana as a staff development fellow.

Steffan Morgan is currently a documentary filmmaker at ITV in the UK. He has lectured at the universities of Cardiff and Glamorgan and has published numerous articles about the South Wales coalfield and industrial relations. His book on masculinity and the British miners’ strike of 1984–5 will be published in 2010.

Samantha A. Morgan-Curtis is an associate professor of English and women’s studies at Tennessee State University, USA. She has contributed to *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of Love, Courtship, and Sexuality* (2007) and *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Men and Masculinities* (2007) and has presented at numerous national and international conferences on early modern women writers. Having won teaching awards, she focuses on continually integrating and developing her pedagogy and scholarship.

Ian Morley is a former postgraduate student of Leicester University and Sheffield University, UK, where he studied British urban history at the Center for Urban History and School of Architectural

Studies. With work experience in England, Spain, France, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Morley has taught various aspects of urban history. His present-day teaching extends into aspects of Asian as well as European history. Also interested in architectural criticism, Morley has taken part in a documentary for the Discovery Channel about the Taipei 101 Tower.

Chuck Morse is an independent scholar and translator specializing in the history of the anarchist movement.

Antonio Moscato is professor of contemporary history and labor history at Lecce University, Italy. He is the author of many books, most of which are dedicated to the crisis of the Soviet bloc (*Intelletuali e potere in URSS, 1917* [1991]; *Bilancio di una crisi* [1995]) and to the Cuba model (*Che Guevara. Storia e leggenda* [1996], published also in Cuba and the Czech Republic; *Breve storia di Cuba* [2006]).

Chelsea Mozen is an independent scholar.

Beata Mtyingizana is affiliated with the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa.

Thomas Muhr is a PhD student, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), in the Center for Globalization, Education, and Societies, University of Bristol, UK. Currently, Muhr is researching different aspects of contemporary Latin American revolutionary processes, with a focus on Venezuela’s Higher Education For All, social justice, and human rights within the democratic socialist development model and its regionalization and globalization under the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of our America (ALBA).

Frank I. Müller is currently working as copublisher for a book about the US–Mexican border in which he also presents an essay. He graduated from Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany, in 2008 with an MA degree in philosophy and Latin American studies. His main academic interests concern the philosophy of the body, border, and space as well as geopolitical relations of slavery, colonialism, and state-building.

Tadzio Müller teaches international relations and international political economy at Kassel University, Germany, and is also involved in the emerging global climate change movement. His current research addresses the ways in which global

capital(s) and authorities are seeking to productively internalize the climate crisis as the driving engine for a new round of accumulation, and how movements can intervene in this process. More generally, he focuses on global political economy, radical social theory, and social movements. In Gothenburg, he was involved in organizing the ill-fated White Overalls action.

William H. Mulligan, Jr. is professor of history at Murray State University, USA, where he has taught since 1993. He is currently working on a book on migration from copper-mining areas in Ireland to the Michigan Copper Country.

Emma G. Murphy is currently the Australian news and analysis editor for *Green Left Weekly*. She spent three years living and working in remote indigenous communities in the Western Desert in Central Australia, assisting with archiving cultural and linguistic heritage. She was a consultant linguist for the *Yankunytjatjara Picture Dictionary* project. Throughout her linguistics work, Murphy has involved herself in indigenous rights and environmental justice campaigns. She has published various articles and reviews.

Timothy S. Murphy, currently associate professor of English at the University of Oklahoma, USA, is the author of *Wising Up the Marks: The Amodern William Burroughs* (1997), editor of *The Philosophy of Antonio Negri* (vols. 1, 2, 2005, 2007), and translator of Antonio Negri's *Subversive Spinoza* (2004) and *Books for Burning* (2005). He is also the general editor of the scholarly journal *Genre: Forms of Discourse and Culture*.

Sam A. Mustafa is associate professor of history at Ramapo College of New Jersey, USA. He is the author of *Merchants and Migrations: Germans and Americans in Connection, 1776–1835* (2001). A frequent participant in the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era, his articles have appeared in *German History*, *Journal of Central European History*, *The Yearbook of German-American Studies*, *Internationale Schulbuchforschung*, and elsewhere.

Natalie Mutlak is currently a PhD student at the University of Bremen, Germany, where she is studying water supply and its social impact in the Ramallah governorate. She has studied environmental engineering in Berlin and has focused her research and work on environmental economics, water management, and gender studies, with a regional focus on Latin America and the Middle East.

Ichio Muto is a writer on political and social affairs and an activist engaged in the anti-war movement, international solidarity movement, and other social movements. He founded the English magazine *AMPO* in 1969, the Pacific-Asia Resource Center in 1973, organized the People's Plan 21 program, and founded the People's Plan Study Group (PPSG) in Tokyo in 1998. He is co-editor of PPSG's English journal, *Japonesia Review*. He has written many books in Japanese and numerous articles in English for *AMPO*, *Japonesia Review*, *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, *Multitudes*, and other international journals.

A. May-Oo Mutraw is affiliated with Indiana University, USA.

Gwinyai P. Muzorewa is currently a second-year PhD student of history at Morgan State University, USA. He holds degrees in black studies and African American studies.

Mary Ciambaka Mwiandi is a lecturer in the Department of History, University of Nairobi, Kenya. She is an educator, teacher, researcher, and writer with a special research interest in the history and development of education in Kenya and East Africa and its relevance to social development. She is currently undertaking research on the role of research universities in the social development of the Nile Basin at the University of Bergen, Norway.

Henri Myrntinen is currently a PhD candidate at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, writing his doctoral thesis on masculinities and violence in Timor Leste. He has worked extensively on gender and conflict issues in Indonesia and Timor Leste, both as a researcher and as an activist.

Koji Nakakita is professor of Japanese political history in the Faculty of Law and Politics at Rikkyo University in Tokyo, Japan. His major works include *The Politics of Economic Reconstruction in Postwar Japan* (1998), *The Establishment of the 1955 System in Japanese Politics* (2002), and "Incorporating Japanese Labor into the Free World: Cold War Diplomacy and Economic Interdependence, 1949–1964," *Labor History* 49, 2 (2008).

Jürgen Nautz is a professor of economic history in the Department of Economics at the University of Vienna, Austria. He has been a speaker of the interdisciplinary working group "Civil Society in Austria" of the Austrian Research Association (with Ambassador Emil Brix). His recent publications

include *Taxes, Civil Society and the State* (edited with E. Brix, 2006), *Conflict Potentials in Monetary Unions* (with Lars Jonung, 2007), *State and Civil Society* (edited with E. Brix, 2008), and *Frauenhandel: Diskurse und Praktiken* (with Birgit Sauer, 2008).

Atoy M. Navarro is a professor at the University of the Philippines. He serves as national board member of Bahay-Saliksikan sa Kasaysayan (BAKAS/Research House in History) and is a member of AKBAYAN Citizens' Action Party (AKBAYAN!) and Solidarity To Oppose Wars (STOP the War!) Coalition, Philippines. He has presented papers in international and regional conferences and has published numerous articles and books on history, the humanities, and social sciences, including publications on the Philippine Revolution.

James Naylor teaches at Brandon University in Manitoba, Canada. He is the author of *New Democracy: Challenging the Social Order in Industrial Ontario, 1914–1925* (1991), and is currently writing a history of Canadian radicalism in the 1930s and 1940s.

Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatssheni is a lecturer in African studies at the Ferguson Center for African and Asian Studies at the Open University, UK. Ndlovu-Gatssheni is also affiliated with the Department of History at the same institution. He has published extensively on the history and politics of Southern Africa, particularly on nationalism, identity, and governance.

Daniel Tannehill Neely is the director of the New York Music Index and Archive at the ARChive of Contemporary Music in downtown New York, USA. His research interests include ice-cream truck music and Irish identity in punk rock. His writing has appeared in *Caribbean Quarterly*, *Esopus*, *Nieuwe West-Indische Gids*, *Ethnomusicology*, and *The Yearbook for Traditional Music*.

Timothy M. Neeno is currently a teacher at the Lighthouse School in North Bend, Oregon, USA. He has taught in Bolivia, Taiwan, Kuwait, Brazil, and the Navajo Reservation in Arizona.

Paolo Nello is professor of contemporary history at the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Pisa, Italy. He also teaches European history at the California State University International Program in Florence. He is a founding member of

the scientific committee of the journal *Nuova Storia Contemporanea*. He is a scholar of Italian fascism and neo-fascism, and has published several books, including a history of the MSI (Italian Social Movement) and a biography of Dino Grandi, Mussolini's minister for foreign affairs.

David G. Nelson is assistant professor of history at Austin Peay State University, USA. He specializes in medieval and early modern Japanese cultural and institutional history. His current research focuses on violent crime and its punishment in seventeenth-century Kanazawa, a castle town located on the Japan Sea.

Robert Nemes teaches history at Colgate University, USA, where his research focuses on Central and Eastern Europe. He has published *The Once and Future Budapest* (2005), and is currently working on a study of religion, violence, nationalism, and everyday life in the Hungarian provinces between 1848 and World War I.

Caryn E. Neumann is assistant professor of history at Miami University of Ohio at Middletown, USA. She is a specialist in political history.

Paul Douglas Newman is professor of early American history at the University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown, USA, editor of *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, and author of *Fries's Rebellion: The Enduring Struggle for the American Revolution* (2004).

Benjamin P. Nickels is affiliated with Maryland Institute College of Art, USA.

Micheline Nilsen is an urban historian studying the impact of evolutionary forces on cities. She is assistant professor at the Ernestine M. Raclin School of the Arts at Indiana University, South Bend, USA. She has recently published a book about the impact of railway on European capitals.

Henrique Tahan Novaes is a PhD student at the State University of Campinas (Unicamp), Brazil, where he is studying the relationship between universities and social movements in Latin America. He earned his Master's degree at Unicamp, studying recovered factories in Latin America and the history of self-management. He is member of the Brazilian Institute for Contemporary Studies (IBEC: www.ibec-estudos.org.br). In 2007 he published the book *The Fetish of Technology: The Recovered Factories Experience*.

1 Notes on Contributors

Yusuf Nuruddin is currently an independent scholar. He has taught in the African American Studies Departments at the University of Toledo, Seton Hall University, and John Jay College (CUNY), USA. He is on the editorial board of *Socialism and Democracy* (www.sdonline.org) and serves as managing editor of the forthcoming journal *Timbuktu Review* (www.timbuktureview.org). A veteran activist, he has worked with Pacifica Radio Network, the Brecht Forum/New York Marxist School, the Black Radical Congress, Black Left Unity, and the National Reparations Congress.

Jill M. Nussel is currently the interim director of women's studies and visiting assistant professor of history at Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne, USA, where she teaches Asian history. Nussel's research focuses on women and the immigration experience, especially concerning the preservation of ethnic identities through the dissemination of foodways.

Balam Nyeko is associate professor of history at the University of Swaziland. He has previously taught at the National University of Lesotho, the University of Zambia, and Makerere University in Uganda.

Donnacha Ó Beacháin is associate professor of political science at the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics, and Strategic Research. He was previously a Civic Education Project Visiting Fellow in Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.

Stephen O'Brien, an Australia-based librarian, has worked as an information manager in Australia, East Timor, and Nicaragua. He is interested in the politics and ideology of liberation movements and political posters.

Karen Offen is a historian and independent scholar affiliated as a Senior Scholar with the Michelle R. Clayman Institute for Gender Research, Stanford University, USA. She is a founder and former secretary-treasurer of the International Federation for Research in Women's History. Her most recent book is *European Feminisms, 1700–1950: A Political History* (2000). She is currently completing a book on the “woman question” debate in modern France and is editing a collection on global feminisms before 1945.

Mofeyisra Oluwatoyin Ojoawo holds a Master's degree in anthropology and is currently preparing to start a PhD program. Her interests are in medical anthropology, cultural studies, and gender studies.

Olusanya Olumide is an assistant lecturer in the Department of Sociological Studies at the Tai Solarin University of Education, Ijebu-Ode, Ogun State, Nigeria. He is currently pursuing his PhD at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria.

Seun Molatokubo Olutayo is affiliated with Olabisi Onabanjo University, Nigeria.

Vincent O'Malley is a New Zealand historian who has written extensively on the history of Maori responses to colonization. He is the author of two books and a number of shorter works and articles on various aspects of Maori history. He is currently a partner in HistoryWorks, a Wellington-based research consultancy, and is actively involved in researching historical Maori land claims.

Gert J. Oostindie is director of the KITLV/Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology in Leiden and professor of Caribbean history at the History Department of Leiden University, Netherlands. He has published extensively on the colonial history and decolonization of the Dutch Caribbean; on history, ethnicity, and migration in the Caribbean and Latin America in general; and on the significance of colonial history to Dutch national identity. He has been awarded a large number of grants and subsidies, and served on many international editorial, scholarly, and governmental committees.

Gerard Oram is a social, cultural, and legal historian who has published widely on various aspects of military law, discipline, and morale, including their impact on civilians and society. His books include *Military Executions during World War One* (2003).

Scott D. Orr is an assistant professor at Texas Lutheran University, USA. He does research on the relationship between ethnic, national, and regional identities and democracy, especially in Eastern Europe, and his work draws on both social psychology and rational choice. Recently, he has become interested in bridging the disjunctures between empirical knowledge about identity and democracy and normative political theory on the subject.

Raúl Ortiz Contreras is currently a PhD student and a member of the Indigenous Ethnology Research Center (CPEI) at the State University of Campinas, Brazil. He has experience in the fields of indigenous ethnology and ethnohistory, researching

historical processes of territorialization among the Mapuche in Central-Southern Chile and the Kaiowá-Guaraní in Southern Brazil. His doctoral studies concern the recent stages of *indigenismo* in Brazil and Argentina.

Kevin Ostoyich is an assistant professor of history at Valparaiso University, USA and previously taught at the University of Montana. He is a former Erasmus Fellow of Notre Dame and Research Associate of the Harvard Business School. His publications include *The German Society of Pennsylvania: A Guide to Its Book and Manuscript Collections* (2006).

Michael E. O'Sullivan is assistant professor of history at Marist College, USA. His current research project is "Lived Catholicism in Germany: Gender, Reform, and Religious Miracles, 1918–1965." He has published in *Catholic Historical Review*.

Andrés Otálvaro H. is an assistant professor at the University of the Rosary in Bogotá, Colombia. He also works as a researcher at the Center for International and Political Studies (CEPI). His research focuses on the history and development of the Venezuelan political system, the Bolivarian revolution, and political theory.

Alexander V. Pantsov is professor of history at Capital University, USA. He has published ten books and numerous articles on Chinese and Russian communism, including *The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution 1919–1927* (2000), *Karl Radek on China: Documents and Materials* (2005), *Mao Zedong* (2007), *Mao Zedong, Autobiography: Poems* (2008), "The Great Helmsman" and His Epoch (2 vols., 2009), and *Mao Zedong: Complete Poems* (2009).

Vasil Paraskevov is an assistant professor of modern Bulgarian history at Konstantin Preslavsky University, Shumen, Bulgaria. His doctoral thesis, "The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 'Nikola Petkov,' 1945–1947," presented the attitude of the most popular opposition party in Bulgaria toward Communist Party policy in the initial postwar years. He is currently doing postdoctoral research devoted to British–Bulgarian relations during the Cold War.

Valentino Parlato is a journalist in Italy.

Lena Partzsch is currently doing postdoctoral research at the Helmholtz Center for Environmental Research (UFZ) in Leipzig, Germany, and

is a graduate fellow of the Wuppertal Institute. Her research focuses on new forms of governance, social movements, and private sector participation.

Silvina Pascucci teaches courses in theories of social conflict and class struggle at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. Her professional research training took place at the Center for the Study and Investigation of Social Sciences (CEICS). She is a member of the editorial board of the journal *Razón y Revolución*, and is writing her doctoral thesis, with a grant given by CONICET, at the Gino Germani Investigation Institute. She has published several articles and a book entitled *Seamstresses, Nuns and Anarchists: Women's Work, Religion and Class Struggle in the Clothing Industry (Buenos Aires, 1890–1940)*.

Raj Patel is a researcher in the School of Development Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa, and a visiting scholar at the Center for African Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, USA. He is the author of *Stuffed and Starved: Markets, Power and the Hidden Battle for the World Food System* (2007).

Zarina Patel, a physiotherapist by profession, has studied social sciences at Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA. In 1991 she spearheaded the struggle to save Jeevanjee Gardens, which led to her first biography, *Challenge to Colonialism: The Struggle of Alibhai Mulla Jeevanjee for Equal Rights in Kenya* (2002). She is the foremost authority on Kenyan South Asian history and is the managing editor of *AmaaZ*. Her second book, *Unquiet: The Life and Times of Makhan Singh* (2006), is an in-depth study of the founder of the trade union movement in Kenya.

Benjamin J. Pauli is a graduate student in political science at Rutgers University, USA. His chief interests are political theory, religion, and politics. As an activist, he has been involved in anti-war, Latin America solidarity, fair trade, and counterrecruitment activities.

Claudio Pavone, having left his career at the Italian Archives administration, is now professor of contemporary history at Pisa and Rome University, Italy. He has published extensively on Italian history and his *Una guerra civile: Saggio storico sulla moralità nella Resistenza* (1995) is a groundbreaking work on the Italian Resistance. His latest book is *Prima lezione di Storia Contemporanea* (2007).

Jaroslav Pažout works at the Institute for Contemporary History of the Academy of Science and at the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes, Czech Republic. A student of history and archive studies, his doctoral dissertation was on the “Czechoslovak and West European Student Movement in the 1960s.” His interests include Czechoslovakian history between 1960 and 1980 and related international history. He is currently a leader of the project Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted, 1978–1989.

G. K. Peatling is lecturer in modern British and European history at the University of Plymouth, UK, and is the author of books and articles on the modern history of Britain, Ireland, and the British empire. Most recently his research has been concerned with the intellectual foundations of British policy in India.

Shana Penn is affiliated with the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, California, USA.

Gordon N. Pentland lectured at the University of York before becoming lecturer in British history at the University of Edinburgh, UK. His principal research has focused on two themes: the arguments, strategies, and organizations of both parliamentary and popular politics, and national identities in modern Britain. His interest in Britain in the “Age of Revolutions” between 1776 and 1832 has resulted in a number of articles. His first book is an exploration of parliamentary and popular politics in Scotland between the “Radical War” of 1820 and the Reform Act of 1832.

Rubina Perroomian is currently a research associate at the University of California, Los Angeles, USA. Her publications in English and Armenian include *Literary Responses to Catastrophe: A Comparison of the Armenian and the Jewish Experience* (1993), *The Role of Literature in the Armenian Liberation Movement, A Struggle to Comprehend the Catastrophe and Survive*, and *The Teaching of the Armenian Genocide in Armenian Schools* as well as several research articles.

Sean T. Perrone is currently associate professor of history at Saint Anselm College, USA.

Luke Perry is an assistant professor of political science at Southern Utah University, USA. His current research interests include democratic development and the former Soviet Union, religious rhetoric in the War on Terror, and the teaching of American politics across subcultures. Recent pro-

fessional activities include serving as a three-time resident scholar in Ukraine and working as part of the Rural People, Rural Policy Program for the Kellogg Foundation.

Nora Martin Peterson is currently a PhD student in the Department of Comparative Literature at Brown University, USA. A native speaker of German and English, she works on the early modern period, with interests ranging from signs and confessions of the body to the *querelle des femmes* in French, German, and English literature.

Paolo Pezzino is a professor at the University of Pisa, Italy and currently teaches contemporary history at the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy. His fields of study are the history of the Italian Mezzogiorno, the Mafia, and the massacres of civilians during World War II. He is currently working on a major study of the politics of retribution after World War II. He has served on the editorial advisory committee of the journal *Modern Italy: Journal of the Association for the Study of Modern Italy* since its inception.

Mark Anthony Phelps is currently finishing a PhD in ancient Mediterranean history at the University of Arkansas, USA. He has taught in seven disciplines at five different institutions. His research interests encompass history as well as linguistics, religion, cultural anthropology, historical geography, and archaeology.

Paul A. Pickering is Senior Fellow and Director of Graduate Studies in the Research School of Humanities, the Australian National University.

Christopher Pieper is a doctoral candidate in sociology at the University of Texas at Austin, USA. His research interests include political sociology, religion, theory, and cultural sociology. Pieper’s dissertation is a comparative-historical analysis of Christian social movements in the US during the twentieth century.

Pamela Pilbeam is Professor Emerita of French History, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK and a Leverhulme Emerita Fellow 2007–9. She has published extensively on nineteenth-century European history. Her recent books include *Madame Tussaud and the History of Waxworks* (2006) and *French Socialists before Marx: Workers, Women and the Social Question in France* (2000). Her other books include *The Constitutional Monarchy in France, 1814–48* (1999) and *Themes in Modern*

European History, 1780–1830 (1995). She is currently writing *The Saint-Simonians in Nineteenth-Century France*.

Steven Pincus is professor of history and international and area studies at Yale University, USA, specializing in early modern European history. He has just completed a major study reinterpreting the Glorious Revolution as the first modern revolution.

Abel Polese is a Marie Curie Research Fellow at the Hannah Arendt Institute, Dresden, Germany. Prior to this placement, he taught in several universities in Odessa and Kiev (Ukraine). He is co-editor, with Donnacha Ó Beacháin, of the special issue on the color revolution of the journal *Totalitarianism and Democracy*. Currently he and Ó Beacháin are editing *Mapping the (Color) Revolutions: The March of Civic Activism and Political Change from Europe to Asia*.

Emin Poljarevic is a PhD student affiliated with the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute, Italy. His thesis draws on social movement theories while explaining non-violent Islamist activism in two repressive states, Egypt and Uzbekistan. The dynamics of mobilization and contentious politics in these states are the subject of an extensive investigation on the micro level through which he hopes to explain reasons for increased Islamist social mobilization and its perseverance in non-violent strategies. Previously he has published several works on Islam in Latvia and civil conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia.

Joshua E. Polster teaches theatre history and dramatic theory and criticism. His articles have appeared in *Law and Literature*, *The Arthur Miller Journal*, *Texas Theatre Journal*, and *Theatre Tours*. He earned a Modern Language Quarterly grant and the Michael Quinn Prize. Polster recently completed his manuscript *Rethinking Arthur Miller: Symbol and Structure*. Polster has also directed critically acclaimed plays in London and Chicago and his positions have included assistant artistic administrator at the Goodman Theatre, and artistic director of the Steep Theatre Company in Chicago, USA.

Paula Rodrigues Pontes received her BA in economics from the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), Brazil and her MA and PhD from the University of Georgia, USA. Her main areas of interest are the literature, language, and culture of the Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking world. Her publications include works on literary

production under the Brazilian dictatorship, and Brazilian and Lusophone African authors.

Andrea Geddes Poole currently teaches modern British history at Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario, Canada. Her book, *Stewards of Culture*, on the trustees of London's great cultural institutions, is forthcoming. She is currently researching the joint philanthropic works of Lady Frederick Cavendish and Emma Cons.

Steve Poole is principal lecturer in history at the University of the West of England (UWE), Bristol, and director of UWE's Regional History Center. His research focuses on southwest England, and on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English popular politics. He has published *The Politics of Regicide in England, 1760–1850: Troublesome Subjects* (2000), *John Thelwall: Radical Romantic and Acquitted Felon* (2009), and various essays on plebeian protest and culture in the southwest. He is currently researching problems of governance, jurisdiction, and authority in eighteenth-century English garrison towns.

Alex Prichard is currently a postdoctoral research officer on European Union conflict prevention and peace-building at the University of Bath, UK. He gained his PhD from Loughborough University, UK, where his work brought to light Proudhon's international political theory.

Thomas Purcell is a PhD candidate at the University of Manchester, UK. Working within a critical materialist tradition informed by heterodox Marxism, his thesis focuses upon state power and endogenous development in Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution. Empirically, his research investigates new innovative forms of production, such as cooperatives and socialist production companies, that fall under what the state terms "socialism for the twenty-first century."

June Purvis is professor of women's and gender history, University of Portsmouth, UK. She is the founding and managing editor of the international journal *Women's History Review* and also the editor of a *Women's and Gender History* book series. Purvis has published extensively on women's education in nineteenth-century England, and on the suffragette movement in Edwardian Britain. Her many publications include her acclaimed *Emmeline Pankhurst: A Biography* (2002). Other suffrage publications include *Votes for Women* (edited with Sandra Holton, 2000).

Emilio Quadrelli is a researcher in the Department of Anthropological Science at the University of Genoa, Italy. He is currently studying war and “strategic thought.” His publications include *Autonomia operaia: Scienza della politica e arte della guerra dal '68 ai movimenti globali* (2008), *Evasioni e rivolte: Migranti, CPT, Resistenze* (2007), and *Gabbie metropolitane: Modelli disciplinari e strategie di resistenza* (2005).

Victor R. Quñones Guerra is a faculty member at the College of New Rochelle, USA, and is currently an advanced doctoral student in the International Educational Development Program specializing in bilingual and bicultural studies with a concentration in Latin America and the Caribbean. His dissertation research focuses on language policy and national development. His other areas of research include sociolinguistics, language education, education policy, migrant/immigrant studies, urban and minority education, and social-cultural studies.

Hélène Bowen Raddeker is a senior lecturer in the School of History and Philosophy at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. A historian of Japan, she is the author of several works about early twentieth-century Japanese women who were associated with anarchism: Kanno Suga, Kaneko Fumiko, and Itō Noe. Her first major work, *Treacherous Women of Imperial Japan: Patriarchal Fictions, Patricidal Fantasies* (1997), was concerned with Kanno and Kaneko who, in two separate high treason incidents, were each found guilty of conspiring to assassinate Japanese emperors.

Charan Rainford is a researcher attached to the International Center for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka. He specializes in politics of the state and questions of Diaspora, with relation in particular to the conflict in Sri Lanka. He is the co-author of the forthcoming book *Mistaking Politics for Governance: The Politics of Interim Arrangements in Sri Lanka 2002–2005*. He has also contributed a book chapter on the challenges of nation-building in Sri Lanka, as well as conference and policy papers on issues related to the Sri Lankan conflict, nationalism, and the Diaspora.

Zahid Rajan is a founding member of the Coalition of National Convention, the precursor to the present process of constitutional review in Kenya. A printer and graphic designer by profession, he is the executive editor of *AmaaZ*, a journal devoted to Kenyan South Asian history and culture,

which has recorded the histories of notable South Asian personalities in East Africa. His company Zand Graphics Ltd. has published four books on Kenyan South Asian history. He is also presently involved in advocacy work on the Mau Mau reparation suit filed by the Kenya Human Rights Commission.

Adrian Randall is professor of English social history at the University of Birmingham, UK and has published extensively on the subjects of urban and rural popular protest, labor organization, and technological change in England during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He is the author of *Riotous Assemblies: Popular Protest in Hanoverian England* (2006), which includes an in-depth study of the Luddite disturbances in England between 1811 and 1812.

Peter Ranis is Professor Emeritus in the PhD Program of Political Science at the Graduate Center, City University of New York, USA. Ranis's research interests include the political economy and labor studies in Argentina, Latin America, and the United States. He has over 70 publications in various areas of Western Hemisphere social science. He has published four books including *Clases, Democracia y Trabajo en la Argentina Contemporanea* (1997) and *Argentine Workers: Peronism and Contemporary Class Consciousness* (1992). His articles have appeared in numerous scholarly journals.

Jonah Raskin teaches communication law, memoir writing, and journalism at Sonoma State University, USA. He is the author or editor of a dozen books, including *The Radical Jack London* (2008), *For the Hell of It* (1998), *American Scream* (2004), and *The Mythology of Imperialism* (1971). He has also been a Fulbright Professor in Belgium, where he taught American literature.

Kimberly A. Redding is an associate professor of history and director of the European Studies Program at Carroll University, USA. A revised version of her doctoral dissertation, titled *Growing Up in Hitler's Shadow: Remembering Youth in Postwar Berlin*, was published in 2004. Her current research explores the construction of collective memory in postwar Europe.

Adam Reinherz is currently a graduate student at the University of Iowa, USA. His writings focus on jurisprudence and Renaissance Hebraica. He received his Juris Doctorate from Loyola University Chicago School of Law and was a graduate student at the University of Chicago.

Blake W. Remington is a PhD student at the University of Texas at Dallas, USA, where he focuses on modern European Jewish cultural and intellectual history, with an emphasis on Germany. His primary research interests include the literary and artistic representations of the Holocaust and the history of anti-Semitism.

Glen Richards currently lectures at the Department of History, University of the West Indies, Mona Campus. A native of Antigua, he has researched and been a resident of St. Kitts island in the West Indies.

Annette Richardson is a historian who teaches in the Educational Policy Studies Department at the University of Alberta, Canada. Richardson has published numerous articles in scholarly journals, edited a number of books, and has written over 200 encyclopedia articles. Her major research focus concerns the effect of war on children. She is a member and former president of Delta Kappa Gamma Society International, Alpha Chapter and Phi Delta Kappa, University of Alberta Chapter. Richardson is the founder and chair of the International Cultural Research Network.

Daniel Ritter is a PhD candidate in sociology at the University of Texas at Austin, USA. His research interests include political sociology, comparative-historical methods, and non-violent social change. Ritter's dissertation examines the emergence of non-violent revolutions in the late twentieth century.

Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui is a professor of sociology at La Paz's University of San Andres, Bolivia. Of Aymara descent, she founded the Workshop on Andean Oral History in 1983 with other indigenous intellectuals. She is the author of several books, including *Oppressed But Not Defeated: Peasant Struggles Among the Aymara and Quechua in Bolivia, 1900–1980* (1984, translated into English and Japanese), and *Los Artesanos Libertarios y la Ética del Trabajo* (an oral history of the La Paz anarchist movement). As an activist, she works with Bolivian indigenous movements, such as the Katarista and coca growers' movements.

Fabiana de Cássia Rodrigues is currently enrolled in the PhD Program in Education History at the College of Education at the State University of Campinas (Unicamp), Brazil, with a research focus on the agrarian question and social movements in Brazil.

Rosana López Rodríguez is a PhD student at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, where her doctoral thesis is on "Love and Capitalism in Yrigoyen's Argentina." She is a researcher at the Center for the Study and Investigation of Social Sciences (CEICS), and she has published several articles in international journals on popular literature and contemporary cultural criticism and a collection of short stories called *La Herencia: Cuentos Piqueteros*. She is currently preparing an edition of the complete poetic *Works of Roberto Santoro*, a disappeared Argentinian poet.

Edmund Rogers is a PhD candidate at the University of Cambridge, UK, where his thesis looks at the impact of the English-speaking New World on economic debates in Britain from the late nineteenth century to World War I. He specializes in late nineteenth- and twentieth-century British economic history. He has published primarily on the debate over free trade and protection in Britain, including in *Cambridge's Historical Journal*; is a contributor to the History & Policy website; and won the British Australian Studies Association essay prize in 2007.

Gigi Roggero is a researcher at the University of Bologna, Italy. As an activist, he is involved in the "Atelier Occupato Esc" in Rome (www.escatelier.net), the journal *Posse* (www.posseweb.net), and the transnational project "edu-factory" (www.edu-factory.org), and is a collaborator in the newspaper *Il Manifesto*. He is co-author of several books, including *Futuro anteriore. Dai "Quaderni rossi" ai movimenti globali: ricchezze e limiti dell'operaiismo italiano* (2002) and *Precariopoli: Parole e pratiche delle nuove lotte sul lavoro* (2005). He is author of *Intelligenze fuggitive: Movimenti contro l'università-azienda* (2005).

Rady Roldan-Figueroa received his ThD degree from Boston University, USA, and his MDiv from New Brunswick Theological Seminary, USA. He completed his undergraduate work at the University of Puerto Rico, where he majored in political science with a concentration on Latin American studies. He is interested in the political theology of radical and progressive thinkers in Spain and Latin America.

Albert Rolls received his PhD from the National University of Ireland, Galway, and has published work on Renaissance notions of kingship and Shakespeare. His interests, however, are varied; he has edited essay collections on the new media

and international perspectives in education, edited biographical reference works, and written a biography of Stephen King.

Peter Roman is professor in the Political Science Doctoral Program at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, USA. His recent publications include “Electing Cuba’s National Assembly Deputies: Proposals, Selections, Nominations, and Campaigns,” in *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* (2007), and “The Lawmaking Process in Cuba: Debating the Bill on Agricultural Cooperatives,” in *Socialism and Democracy* 38 (2005). He also serves on the editorial board of *Socialism and Democracy*.

Eduardo Romanos received his PhD in social and political sciences at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. His main research interests are in the areas of social movements and political ideologies. He has published on the history of the Spanish anarchist movement, particularly during the Francoist dictatorship. He is currently working on the alternative left in Europe between World War II and May ’68.

Peter Rosenbaum teaches at Trinity College, USA, and at the Free University of Berlin, Germany. In addition to twentieth- and twenty-first-century German literature and aesthetics, his research is centered on the history of commemorative traditions. He has published on the subjects of Holocaust memorials and contemporary German authors.

April Rosenblum is a writer and educator whose work producing activist teaching tools on anti-Semitism earned her recognition by the Jewish Forward as one of the 50 most influential Jews in the US in 2007. She has written for *Bridges*, *New Voices*, and *Righteous Indignation: A Jewish Call for Justice* and has been active for over a decade in grassroots activism on race, criminal justice, and other issues. Her pamphlet, “The Past Didn’t Go Anywhere: Making Resistance to Anti-Semitism Part of All of Our Movements,” has been called “funny, articulate, and shockingly inclusive.”

Catherine Ross studies political science, economics, and reflexive social psychology at the Ludwig-Maximilians University, Munich. In addition to spending six months studying in Puebla, Mexico, she has traveled extensively around South America visiting Ecuador, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela. She is involved in several projects around Germany organizing educational events on

South America and has written a number of papers on South American history, political development, and current social issues.

Michael Rossi is affiliated with Rutgers University, USA.

Trevor Rowe is an independent scholar in Barbados.

Hermann Ruiz is a political scientist originally from Bogotá, Colombia, who has worked in academic and political fields on issues related to human, ethnic, civil, and political rights. He has worked for the executive branch in ethnic conflict mediation and for the United Nations in the protection of the rights of internally displaced people, both in Colombia. His academic work is based in psychoanalytical theory (Lacan/Žižek), discourse analysis (Laclau/Mouffe), and liberal political theory and its critics.

Kathleen Ruppert holds a Master’s degree in modern European history from the Catholic University of America, USA. Her major fields of study include modern Britain and Ireland, modern European intellectual history, and early modern Europe.

Jeff Rutherford is a lecturer in history at the University of Texas at Austin, USA. In addition to teaching classes in Modern European history, he is currently working on a manuscript entitled “Soldiers into Nazis? The German Infantry’s War in Northwest Russia, 1941–1944.”

Michael Rutz is associate professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, USA. He has published articles in *Parliamentary History* and the *Journal of Church and State*. His book concerning politics and dissenting missionaries in the early nineteenth-century British empire is currently under contract.

Peter Ryan is the founder and principal of Tinicum Arts and Science, a Buddhist high school in Pennsylvania. He teaches Italian and American history and is pursuing a PhD in psychology at Chestnut Hill College, USA.

Thierry Saintine is currently pursuing an MFA in creative writing while working at Brooklyn College as a counselor and administrative coordinator for Eris/BMI. He is a graduate from City College Theatre and Speech Department, USA.

Yohichi Sakai was an activist in the Japanese Fourth International group from 1959 to the

1990s. He edited *Revolutionary Controversies of the Second International* (1973) and was the general editor of the *Japanese Writings of Leon Trotsky*.

Ernesto José Salas received his BA in history from the School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. His publications include *La Resistencia Peronista: La toma del frigorífico Lisandro de la Torre* (1991), "Cuando John William Cooke fue acusado de traicionar la revolución," in *Cooke, de vuelta* (1999), and *Uturuncos: Los orígenes de la guerrilla peronista* (2003).

Grace L. B. Sanders is a doctoral student in the History and Women's Studies Joint PhD Program at the University of Michigan, USA. Her research interests include Haitian women's activism, transnational feminisms, and migration and circulation in the twentieth-century Caribbean and Latin America.

Agustín Santella is currently finishing his PhD thesis at the University of Buenos Aires (UBA), Argentina, on labor conflicts in Argentina's automotive sector. He also teaches sociology and the history of the workers' movement at UBA and works as a researcher at the Gino Germani Institute. He has published articles and books on social and labor movements, and his research has been financed by UBA, the Mexican government, and CONICET.

Diana Espirito Santo is a PhD student in anthropology at University College London, UK. Her ethnographic research is on spirit mediums and Afro-Cuban religious experience in Havana, focusing more specifically on personhood, creativity, and concepts of knowledge. Future research projects in Cuba will explore the relationship between science, socialism, and religious processes, both in their historical and contemporary dimensions.

Joseph C. Santora is dean of the School of Business and Management at Thomas Edison State College, USA. He has published numerous articles in leading academic journals.

Eduardo Sartelli is completing his doctoral thesis at the University of Buenos Aires (UBA), Argentina, on "Capitalism and Class Struggle in the Agriculture of the Argentinean Pampa." He is a full professor in Argentinian history at UBA and has lectured at several institutes, labor unions, and popular organizations. He is the director of the Center for the Study and Investigation of Social

Sciences (CEICS) and the author of several books, including *The Square is Ours*, *The Unhappy Meal*, and *The Salt of the Earth*. He has also published dozens of articles in Argentina and abroad.

Stephen W. Sawyer is currently assistant professor of history at the American University of Paris, France. His research focuses on French and American urban political history. Recent publications include "Locating the Center: Confining and Defining the Capital through the Parisian Fortifications," *Nottingham French Studies* (2005) and "A Question of Life or Death: Administrative Bodies and Administrating Bodies in Nineteenth-Century Paris," in *Fields of Expertise: A Comparative History of Expert Procedures in Paris and London, 1600 to Present* (2007). He is currently preparing a book on the history of the Parisian municipality from 1789 to 1880.

Timothy Scarnecchia is an assistant professor of African history at Kent State University in Kent, Ohio. He is the author of *The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940–1964* (2008) and continues to research on topics of trade unions, nationalism, and urban consciousness in Zimbabwe.

Richard Schaefer is an assistant professor of history at the State University of New York at Plattsburgh, USA. Trained in modern European history, his research currently focuses on the European Catholic revival in the nineteenth century.

Albert Scharenberg teaches political science at the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at the Free University of Berlin, Germany. He also works as a staff journalist at the German monthly *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* (Journal for German and International Politics). Scharenberg has published work on US history and politics, with a focus on African Americans, racism, the labor movement, and social inequality, as well as on globalization, urban politics, and German history and politics. He is currently preparing a book about Martin Luther King.

Bernard Schmid works as a lawyer in a non-governmental organization fighting racism against both undocumented and legal immigrants. He holds a PhD in law (with a specialization in labor law). He is the author of several books on the topics of Algerian history, the Lebanon war in 2006, and the political far right in France. He has also made scholarly contributions to a volume concerning trade unionism.

Ingo Schmidt teaches labor relations at Athabasca University, Canada. He wrote his PhD thesis on trade unions and Keynesianism in Germany and has held positions at a number of universities in Canada and Germany. He has also worked for the German metal workers' union, IG Metall, and is active as a labor educator and writer for various progressive newspapers and journals.

Roxanne Schroeder-Arce serves as assistant professor of theatre education at Emerson College, USA. She has also served as artistic and education director of Teatro Humanidad in Austin, and taught high school theatre in Texas for six years. Schroeder-Arce's current artistic and scholarly work focuses on bilingual theatre for young audiences. She is actively engaged with Theatre for Young Audiences/USA (TYA/USA) and the American Alliance for Theatre and Education.

T. M. (Tomás) Scruggs is an ethnomusicologist at the University of Iowa, USA. He has taught at the Central American University, Nicaragua, Florida International University, USA, and the University of the Andes, Venezuela. His research primarily focuses on the use of music to construct social identity in the Americas. He has published on Central American music and dance in audio, video, and print format. He received the Society of Ethnomusicology's Jaap Kunst Prize for the most significant article published in 2005.

Shatarupa Sen Gupta is a research scholar at Jadavpur University, India, where she majored in history. At present she is working on the media representation of the Naxalite movement over the period 1967–72.

Jean-Jacques N. Sène is assistant professor of history, cultural studies, conflict resolution, and peace studies at Chatham University, USA. He also coordinates the Global Focus program. In the late 1980s, he spearheaded a number of community development initiatives with the regional bureaus of UNICEF and UNESCO in West Africa. Sène is currently researching the survival patterns of ancient myths and rituals in postcolonial Africa, and how they can help establish the matrix of a new, pan-African social consciousness to meet contemporary global challenges.

Vittorio Sergi is an independent scholar from Genoa, Italy who holds doctoral degrees in both political philosophy and sociology. His research focuses on the Zapatista movement in Mexico and

on the political, social, and military forms of contemporary social conflicts. In Italy, he studied the detention center's regime for migrants and currently studies grassroots migrant movements.

Jeff Shantz is a community organizer and activist. He has published numerous articles in anarchist publications as well as many academic journals. He is a member of the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP), and has been host of the OCAP radio show. He was also involved in the Who's Emma? info-shop and Anarchist Free Space and Free Skool. Currently he teaches at Kwantlen Polytechnic University in Vancouver, Canada.

Lisa B. Sharlach is an assistant professor at the University of Alabama, Birmingham, USA. Her fields are comparative politics (with a regional emphasis on Africa), international relations, and women's studies. The focus of her research is the intersection of ethnicity, gender, and political violence.

Michael Orlando Sharpe is assistant professor of political science in the Department of Behavioral Sciences at York College of the City University, New York, USA. His research involves the relationship between the Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, and the Netherlands as well as the politics of migration, immigrant political incorporation, and political transnationalism in the Netherlands, Japan, and around the world.

Seema Shekhawat is currently associated with the Center for African Studies, University of Mumbai, India. She holds a doctoral degree in political science from the University of Jammu, India. Her areas of interest include conflict, human rights, and gender. She has written extensively on these issues in national and international journals, magazines, and newspapers besides authoring three books (two co-authored). Her most recent publication is *Afro-Asian Conflicts: Changing Contours, Costs and Consequences* (2008).

Mimi Sheller is visiting associate professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Swarthmore College, USA, senior research fellow in the Center for Mobilities Research at Lancaster University, UK, and a research fellow at the Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies at Princeton University, USA. She is co-editor of the journal *Mobilities*, author of *Democracy After Slavery* (2000) and *Consuming the Caribbean* (2003), and co-editor of *Uprootings/Regroundings* (2003),

Tourism Mobilities (2004), and *Mobile Technologies of the City* (2006).

Benjamin Shepard is an assistant professor of human service at New York College of Technology/City University of New York, USA. He is the author/editor of five books, including *White Nights and Ascending Shadows: An Oral History of the San Francisco AIDS Epidemic* (1997) and *From ACT UP to the WTO: Urban Protest and Community Building in the Era of Globalization* (2002). His forthcoming works include *Queer Political Performance and Protest, Play, Creativity, and the New Community Organizing*, and *Community Projects as Social Activism*.

Nichole Shippen is a PhD candidate in political science at Rutgers University, USA, and is currently a visiting assistant professor at Ohio University, USA, in the Women's and Gender Studies Program. Her research focuses on labor, work, and the fight for time.

Eliakim Sibanda is affiliated with the University of Winnipeg, Canada.

Robert Sierakowski is a PhD student in Latin American history at the University of California, Los Angeles, USA. He has carried out original research in Chile, El Salvador, and Nicaragua focusing on issues of political violence, state formation, and revolutionary movements.

Jill Silos teaches graduate courses in American history at the University of New Hampshire, USA. A specialist in modern US history, with an emphasis on cultural, intellectual, and political history, she is the recipient of the 2005 Paul L. Murphy Award from the American Society for Legal History for her research on civil rights and civil liberties. Her forthcoming book is entitled *Everybody Get Together: The Politics of the Counterculture*.

Fernando T. Silva is a professor in the Department of History at the State University of Campinas in São Paulo, Brazil. A specialist in social labor history, he has written two books about the history of workers in the city of Santos (São Paulo) during the twentieth century, *A carga e a culpa: Os operários das Docas de Santos, 1937–1968* (*The Burden and the Guilt: The Port Workers in Santos: Rights and Culture of Solidarity, 1937–1968*, 1995) and *Operários sem patrões: Os trabalhadores da cidade de Santos no Entreguerras* (*Without Bosses: Workers in the City of Santos Between the Wars*, 2003).

Steven E. Silvern is a political geographer specializing in the study of Native American geographies. His research focuses upon political conflicts over sovereignty, territory, and natural resources between Indian tribes and federal and state governments. He has published in a number of journals, including *Cultural Geographies*, *Political Geography*, *American Indian Culture and Research Journal*, and *Historical Geography*. Currently, he is researching the impact of 9/11 on the discourse of the anti-Indian movement in the United States as well as the politics of Native American history at sites, museums, and commemorations.

Terry Simmons is a geographer and lawyer in private practice in Nevada and California as well as a mediator and arbitrator. He is active in creative environmental problem-solving in the US and in Western Canada. He is also president of the Center for Global Policy Studies. Simmons was a co-founder of Greenpeace in 1969. He sailed to Amchitka Island in 1971 aboard the original Greenpeace protest vessels: the *Greenpeace* and the *Greenpeace II*.

Anna Simone is a researcher and teaching assistant at the University of Bari, Italy, where she completed her PhD program in "Theories of Language and Signs" with a dissertation entitled "Migration and Control: Socio-Anthropological Signs of the Changing Metropolis." Her publications include *Divenire Sans papiers: Sociologia dei dissensi metropolitani* (2001) and *Lessico di biopolitica* (2006). Currently, her interests concern European and American feminist theories.

Yvonne D. Sims is assistant professor of American studies at Pennsylvania State University, Harrisburg, USA. Her publications include *Women of Blaxploitation: How the Action Heroine Changed American Popular Culture* (2006), *The Week Chicago Died: How the 1968 Chicago Riots Changed the Democratic Party's Landscape* (2008), and several encyclopedia entries on race and gender. She is working on a manuscript entitled *Divas of the Silver Screen: The Lives and Careers of Early African American Actresses in Hollywood*.

Marina Sitrin is a writer, teacher, student, militant, and lawyer. She published *Horizontalism: Voices of Popular Power in Argentina* (2006) and a Spanish version of the same book, *Horizontalidad* (2005). She is currently based in Havana, Cuba, where she is working on a new book addressing the questions of revolution and subjectivity.

Giannis (Jean-Marie) Skalidakis is currently working on his doctorate thesis on the subject of the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA) in occupied Greece in 1944 at the Aristotle University Law School of Thessaloniki, Greece. He has a Master's degree in history and civilizations from the Department of Modern Hellenic Studies in the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in France and has published a number of articles in historical reviews.

Balasingham Skanthakumar works for the Law and Society Trust, a non-profit human rights organization in Colombo, Sri Lanka. He has previously taught in the Law and Development Studies Departments at the University of London, UK. His research interests include the labor and left movements, political economy, women and law, and minority rights in Sri Lanka.

David Michael Smith is professor of government at the College of the Mainland, USA. His writings have appeared in *Peace Review*, *Journal for the Study of Peace and Conflict*, *Socialism and Democracy*, *Nature, Society, and Thought*, and other publications. He is presently writing a book on the global protest movement against the war in Iraq.

Harold L. Smith is professor of history at the University of Houston-Victoria, USA, and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society of Great Britain. He is the author or co-author of six books, including *The British Women's Suffrage Campaign 1866–1928* (2007), *Minnie Fisher Cunningham: A Suffragist's Life in Politics* (with Judith N. McArthur, 2003), *Britain in the Second World War: A Social History* (1996), and *British Feminism in the Twentieth Century* (1990).

Gregory R. Smulewicz-Zucker is in the graduate program in history at King's College, University of Cambridge, UK. He is currently editing two books, *Forging Cosmopolitan Dialogue: The Logos Interviews Reader* and *The Idea of African Independence*. He has published in magazines and journals and is the managing editor of *Logos: A Journal of Modern Society and Culture*.

Le'Ann L. Solmonson has been an educator for 25 years, serving as a classroom teacher, school counselor, administrator, and counselor educator. In addition she has numerous years of experience working in a clinical setting and private practice. Dr. Solmonson is passionate about empowering individuals to use their democratic rights and

privileges to enact social change, advocate for educational reform, and engage in professional advocacy.

Karen Sonnelitter is currently a PhD candidate in history at Purdue University, USA, focusing on social reform movements in early modern Ireland. She completed an MA in history from the University of Connecticut, USA and received an MA in Irish studies from Queen's University Belfast, Ireland.

André Spicer is an associate professor of organization studies at the University of Warwick, UK. He is interested in the political dynamics of organizations. He is author of *Contesting the Corporation* (with Peter Fleming, 2007). Recently he completed a large-scale study of alternative media organizations.

Elizabeth Spoden is a graduate student at Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis, USA. Her research concerns gender and identity in the British Navy during the Napoleonic Wars.

R. Scott Spurlock is now a teaching fellow in Scottish history at the University of Aberdeen, UK. He has studied religion at George Fox University, USA and theology and ecclesiastical history at the University of Edinburgh (MTh, MSc, PhD). He has held a postdoctoral fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh, UK.

Heather Squire is currently an organizer with the CUNY student movement and an activist with The Right to the City Coalition. She holds a BA in sociology from Brooklyn College, USA. She has been a restaurant worker for 15 years, an activist for ten years, and an intermittent college student over the last seven years. Her main research and life interests include social movements, non-dominant paradigm economics, urban displacement, and gentrification.

Michael Staudenmaier is an independent historian living in Chicago, USA. His writings have been published in a variety of anarchist and radical journals, including *The Northeastern Anarchist*, *Upping the Anti-*, *Arsenal*, and *Fifth Estate*. He is currently writing a projected book-length history of the Sojourner Truth Organization.

Manfred B. Steger is professor of global studies, director of the Globalism Institute at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Australia, and

a senior research fellow at the Globalization Research Center at the University of Hawai'i-Manoa, USA. His most recent publications include *Judging Nonviolence: The Dispute Between Realists and Idealists* (2003), *Globalization* (2003), and *Gandhi's Dilemma: Nonviolent Principles and Nationalist Power* (2000). He is currently working on a book manuscript titled *Ideology in the Global Age: Transforming the National Imaginary*.

James Steinberg is an associate professor of sociology at Wright State University, Lake Campus, USA. He regularly teaches courses on China after the founding of the People's Republic of China and the social changes that have ensued since its establishment. He is also interested in the social climate of Tibet and teaches courses in criminology.

Bruce E. Stewart is an assistant professor of history at Appalachian State University, USA. He has contributed articles to the *Journal of Southern History*, *Appalachian Journal*, *North Carolina Historical Review*, and *Georgia Historical Quarterly*. He is also the editor of *King of the Moonshiners: Lewis R. Redmond in Fact and Fiction* (2008).

Pamela J. Stewart is a lecturer in the Department of History at Arizona State University, USA. Her research focuses on the significance of working women's participation during the revolutionary 1871 Paris Commune. She also works comparatively, analyzing the role of women and gendered violence during political upheaval, civil war, revolution, warfare in general, and the aftermath of those events. Dr. Stewart publishes on these topics and has received significant teaching awards and research fellowships. Her working book manuscript is titled "*Women Made the Revolution*": *A Social Cartography of the 1871 Paris Commune*.

Suzanne Stewart-Steinberg is associate professor of Italian studies and comparative literature at Brown University, USA. Her research focuses on the Italian nineteenth and twentieth centuries, gender and sexuality studies, and the theory and history of psychoanalysis. She is the author of *Sublime Surrender: Male Masochism at the Fin-de-Siècle* (1998) and *The Pimocchio Effect: On Making Italians 1860–1920* (2007).

Robin Stock has studied political science in Berlin, Germany, with a focus on Latin America.

Isabel Ströhle currently works as a researcher on a project on conflict management in the Balkans

(funded by the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies) at Munich University, Germany. She studied political science, Albanian studies, and East European history at Munich University and holds an MA in Central and Southeast European studies from University College London, UK.

Lars Stubbe is currently a PhD candidate in Kassel (Germany) and Puebla (Mexico) working on the theoretical and political implications of the Zapatista rebellion and the *piquetero* uprising. He is a nursing professional, translator (of, amongst other works, John Holloway's *How to Change the World without Taking Power*), and an interpreter.

Masuro Sugai is affiliated with the United Nations University, Japan.

Farooq Sulehria is a journalist. He has worked in various positions at mainstream Lahore-based dailies including *Frontier Post*, *Pakistan*, and *The Nation*. In 2001, Sulehria moved to Sweden and has been working with *Weekly Internationalen*. He also contributes to Pakistan's leading daily, *The News*, as an op-ed. He has written and translated half a dozen books, including translations of Tariq Ali's *Clash of Fundamentalisms* and *Bush in Babylon*. He is author of the forthcoming *A Letter to Osama*.

Kenneth R. Sullivan is a filmmaker, journalist, and political historian. He specializes in US history, labor, and race. He is completing a graduate degree at the City University of New York, USA.

Srividhya Swaminathan is an assistant professor of English at Long Island University, Brooklyn Campus, USA. She has published several articles examining the rhetoric of the debates to abolish the slave trade that took place in Great Britain during the late eighteenth century. She has also completed a book-length study of these debates and their contribution to the construction of national identity. Her newest project is an examination of the early arguments for slavery and how they developed in the period before the first abolitionist movement in Britain.

Fadwa Taha is an associate professor of modern, contemporary, and diplomatic history at the University of Khartoum, Sudan. She has held fellowships in the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, and Norway. She is an author of several books and articles. Her research encompasses work in the areas of Sudanese independence, the Condominium period, the Sudanese nationalist movement, and

Anglo-Egyptian relations regarding Sudan. She is editor of the *Journal of the Faculty of Arts*, University of Khartoum.

Junko Takeda is assistant professor in Syracuse University's Department of History, USA. Her book manuscript, *State-Building and Civic Identity in Marseille: Navigating France and the Levant in the Age of Mercantilism, 1660–1720*, explores the connections and tensions among absolutism, civic fashioning, and international trade from a transnational perspective. Her research and teaching interests include early modern and modern France, eighteenth-century intellectual and cultural history, the history of medicine and disease, and gender and race in the age of the Enlightenment.

Aiko Takeuchi is a PhD candidate in the Department of American Civilization at Brown University, USA. She is currently working on her dissertation research on the transnational birth control movement and eugenics in the context of US–Japan relations from the 1920s to the 1950s.

Horacio Tarcus is a professor and researcher at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. In 2003 he received a Guggenheim Fellowship to write *The Biographical Dictionary of the Argentine Left: From the Anarchists to the "New Left."* He is the author of *El marxismo olvidado en la Argentina: Silvio Frondizi y Milcíades Peña* (1996), *Mariátegui en la Argentina* (2002), and *Marx en la Argentina: Sus primeros lectores obreros, intelectuales y científicos* (2007). He is a founder and director of CeDInCI (Center for Documentation and Research on Leftist Culture), and is currently working on *The Biographical Dictionary of the Latin American Left*.

Eric Robert Taylor is a freelance television producer in Los Angeles, California, USA. He holds a PhD in history from the University of California, Los Angeles and is the author of *If We Must Die: Shipboard Insurrections in the Era of the Atlantic Slave Trade* (2006).

Jerome Teelucksingh is a lecturer in the Department of History at the University of the West Indies, Trinidad. He has also served as a part-time lecturer at the Cipriani College of Labor and Cooperative Studies and at the University of Trinidad and Tobago. He was the first recipient of the Eric Williams Memorial Scholarship for post-graduate research. His articles have been published in journals such as *Peace Review* and *Slavery and Abolition*.

Aaron Tesfaye is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at William Paterson University of New Jersey, USA. He specializes in international political economy, comparative politics of Africa, Latin America, and Asia, comparative public policy, and hydrogeopolitics of international river basins. His recent publications include *Political Power and Ethnic Federalism: The Struggle for Democracy in Ethiopia* (2002) and *The Political Economy of the Nile Waters Regime* (forthcoming, 2009).

Stefan Thimmel is a freelance journalist and consultant in developmental politics in Berlin, Germany. He works for many different political magazines in Germany and Latin America that focus on Latin America, social movements, participation, youth policies, and urban development. In Germany, he is coordinating the Scientific Council of Attac–Germany. He is also editor of several books about Latin America and political alternatives. His latest publication, with Ulrich Brand and Bettina Lösch, is *ABC der Alternativen* (2007).

Yann Tholoniati is currently associate professor at the University of Strasbourg 2 (Marc Bloch), France. He has written a doctoral thesis on Robert Browning (2003) and a number of articles on Robert Burns, Thomas De Quincey, Robert Browning, and Joseph Conrad. He is also the webmaster of several websites for academic bodies and research societies, such as that of the French Society of Victorian and Edwardian Studies (www.sfeve.org).

Vincent Tirelli currently teaches American politics and political theory at Brooklyn College, USA. His doctoral dissertation is titled "The Invisible Faculty Fight Back: Contingent Academic Labor and the Political Economy of the Corporate University." He is a founder of the Coalition of Contingent Academic Labor (COCAL), a trinational association that seeks to address the issues engendered by the growth of contingent academic labor. He is also a former member of the executive council of the Professional Staff Congress, AFT Local 2334.

Todor Todorov is affiliated with Sofia University, St. Kliment Ohridski, Bulgaria.

Inga Töller is studying Latin American studies, sociology, and Japanese studies at the Free University of Berlin, Germany, where she is writing her Master's thesis on "Constructions of Identity in the

Work of Kafu Banton (a Panamanian artist).” She lived in Panama for several years, where she did an internship and studied literature at the National University of Panama.

Simon Tormey is professor and head of the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Sydney, Australia. His research encompasses the interconnections between continental thought, normative political theory, and radical political practice. He is author of numerous books and articles including *Agnes Heller: Socialism, Autonomy and the Postmodern* (2001), *Anti-Capitalism* (2004), and *Key Thinkers from Critical Theory to Post-Marxism* (2006). He has published articles in journals such as *Radical Philosophy*, *Thesis Eleven*, and the *Journal of Political Ideologies*. He is editor of “Reappraising the Political,” a monograph series, and associate editor of *Contemporary Political Theory*.

Jorge Torre Santos is a historian and author whose work specializes in labor unions and the working class in Italy.

Iván Torres Apablaza serves as a human rights psychologist for victims of political repression by the military dictatorship. His most recent research is linked to the development of subjectivity in political prisoners from revolutionary organizations arrested under the Chilean democracy and imprisoned in a high-security compound. He also researches issues related to psychoanalysis, political philosophy, and critical theory, especially those linked to new forms of subjectivity development, and devices for domination in post-Fordist society.

Michael F. Toussaint is lecturer in the Department of Humanities and Education at the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, where he currently teaches West Indian and African Diaspora history. He is the author of several publications on political developments in Trinidad and Tobago and Trinidad–Venezuela relations in the nineteenth century. He has done pioneering research on West Indian migration to South America.

Eric F. Trump is a PhD candidate at New York University’s German Department and a research associate of the Trauma and Violence Interdisciplinary Studies Program, USA. He has served as the associate editor of the *Hastings Center Report*, a bioethics journal, and has written about science and medicine policy for various journals

and magazines. He is currently writing about German expellees and the politics of belonging in postwar Germany.

John Trumbour is research director for the Labor and Worklife Program at Harvard Law School, USA, and author of *Selling Hollywood to the World: US and European Struggles for Mastery of the Global Film Industry, 1920–1950* (2002). He served as guest editor for the special issue of the *Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal* (Winter 2007) on “The Crisis in Workplace Governance.”

Teruyuki Tsuji is a visiting professor in the Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences at Nova Southeastern University, USA. His research has focused on transnational identity construction and its relations with religious practices in the contexts of the Caribbean and West Indian migrant communities in South Florida. He has published journal articles, presented papers at academic conferences, and contributed essays to various encyclopedias concerning race and ethnicity, immigration, and the Caribbean.

Özlem Tur is affiliated with the Middle East Technical University, Turkey.

Brian Turner is professor of political science at Randolph-Macon College, USA. He is author of *Community Politics and Peasant–State Relations in Paraguay* (1993) and has written articles on the politics and culture of Paraguay published in *Ethnohistory*, *MACLAS Latin American Essays*, and various edited volumes and encyclopedias. He is contributing editor on the politics of Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay for the Library of Congress’s *Handbook of Latin American Studies*. He has served as president of the Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies (MACLAS) and the Virginia Conference of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP).

Christina Turner (d. 2008) was associate professor of anthropology at Virginia Commonwealth University, USA. Her research on Paraguay, published in *Ethnohistory*, *Human Organization*, and various edited volumes and encyclopedias, included work on ethnohistory and identity in peasant communities, linguistics, human rights, and textile traditions. Her work on the “Archive of Terror” was cited by UNESCO. She served as managing editor of *MACLAS Latin American Essays*, as treasurer of the Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies (MACLAS), and as president of the

Virginia Conference of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP).

Christoph Twickel is a German journalist and author. He has traveled in Latin America since 1988, working as a freelance correspondent for German newspapers and magazines. In 2006 he published the book *Hugo Chávez: Eine Biographie*, which is, to date, the best-selling book on Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution. In 2007, together with Tina Petersen, he published a book-length interview with former Red Army Faction guerrillero Karlheinz Dellwo, *Das Projektil sind wir*. He also works as a German theatre playwright and has a weekly radio show named "Tropeninstitut" on the web radio station www.byte.fm.

Jan Ullrich is a student of political science at the Free University of Berlin, Germany. He focuses on development studies and social movements in Latin America and has worked on different research projects in Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua.

Nicole Ulrich is a PhD fellow based at the Wits Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa. She has been involved in worker heritage initiatives, such as the Workers' Library and Museum (Johannesburg), and research and teacher training projects at the History Workshop (University of the Witwatersrand). Nicole Ulrich's academic publications focus on South African trade unions during the 1970s and the use of oral history in the classroom. Her PhD concerns transnational influences on popular protest and imaginations of freedom in the eighteenth-century Cape colony.

Molly Pulver Ungar teaches at the University of the Fraser Valley, Canada. Her area of specialization is Quebec, with an interest in cultural and intellectual history. Her doctoral thesis dealt with culture and modernism in Montreal during the 1930s. Her publications include numerous entries in the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*. She is presently conducting research on the 1939 Royal Visit to Canada and the US, as well as St. Jean Baptiste Parades in Montreal.

Brian Unger is an independent scholar, writer, and PhD candidate in English and American literature at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, USA. His special interests are post-World War II American poetry and

poetics, and British Romantic poetry, including especially the poet John Clare. He is editor of the literary journal *Zen Monster*.

Viviana Uriona is currently teaching in the Economic and Social Department of Rostock University, Germany, and is preparing a PhD dissertation. She studied political science, philosophy, and the history of Iberoamerica and Latin America at Cologne University, and political science at the Free University of Berlin. She is a member of the DVPW (German Association of Political Science) and BdWi (Confederation of Democratic Scientists).

Brett M. Van Hoesen is assistant professor of modern and contemporary art history at the University of Nevada, Reno, USA. She is currently preparing a book manuscript on the lingering legacy of Germany's colonial history in the visual culture of the Weimar Republic. Additional areas of research include the arts and human rights, interwar period politics in Europe, Berlin Dada, Weimar-period popular press publications and documentary photography, women in the arts, museum studies, and aspects of contemporary digital culture studies.

Miroslav Vaněk is a director of the Center of Oral History at the Institute of Contemporary History, a president of the Czech Oral History Association, and a senior researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History at the Czech Academy of Science in Prague, Czech Republic. He teaches at the Charles University, Prague in the Philosophical Faculty and the Faculty of Humanities. His scholarly focus is on Czech modern history, mainly the so-called "Normalization" period (1969–89), the young generation under socialism, including student and ecological movements, and the method of oral history.

Ion Bogdan Vasi holds a PhD in sociology from Cornell University, USA. His research interests are in the areas of political sociology and social movements, organizations, and social psychology. In addition to his work on Romanian miners' protests, he has conducted research on the diffusion of various environmental practices and municipal resolutions in the United States, and on the environmental movement's influence on the global development of the wind energy industry.

Nicolas Verschueren is affiliated with the Free University of Brussels, Belgium.

Pavla Vesela teaches at the Department of English and American Studies, Charles University,

Prague, Czech Republic. The focus of her work has been modern American and Russian literature (especially utopias and science fiction), as well as literary and feminist theory. Her work can be found in *Litteraria Pragensia*, *NWSA Journal*, and most recently, the forthcoming collection *Realism's Others*. She also contributed to several encyclopedias and co-edited a collection of essays, *Feminism in Central and Eastern European Countries* (1997).

Brian Vetruba is the German studies librarian at Washington University in St. Louis, USA. His distinctions include being elected as secretary of the Western European Studies Section of the Association of College and Research Libraries (2008), awarded the Ontario Library Association Anniversary Prize (2001), and selected as a Bundestag (German Parliament) Internship Fellow (1991–2).

Paolo Virno is affiliated with the University of Cosenza, Argentina.

Wessel P. Visser is a senior lecturer in the Department of History at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. His research interests are South African labor and socialist, communist, and trade union history, on which he has published a number of articles in academic journals. He has also contributed chapters to books on strike comparisons and on African urban spaces. His research project on the history of the South African Mine Workers' Union was published in 2008.

Raphaela von Weichs is an associate member of the Institute of African Studies at the University of Cologne, Germany. She is currently finishing her PhD thesis on political culture, modernity, and the return of kingship to Uganda. Her focus lies in the Kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitara, where she conducted extensive fieldwork. She holds degrees in both anthropology and African area studies.

Uta Wagenmann is affiliated with the University of Bielefeld, Germany.

Matthew H. Wahlert is currently working on his PhD in political science at Miami University, Ohio, USA. He has contributed pieces to several works on security and international relations, including chapters in *Homeland Security: Protecting America's Targets* (2006) and *Countering Terrorism in the 21st Century* (forthcoming), as well as a number of entries in encyclopedias of international politics. His research interests include issues of foreign policy, terrorism, and security.

Derek Wall is affiliated with Goldsmiths, University of London, UK.

Ian Wallace is Emeritus Professor of German at the University of Bath, UK. He was previously professor of modern languages at the University of Loughborough, UK and also taught at the Universities of Maine, USA and Dundee, UK. In 1979 he founded *German Monitor* (previously *GDR Monitor*). He has been president of the International Feuchtwanger Society since 2001. His published research focuses mainly on GDR literature and the literature of exile.

Torbjörn Wandel is associate professor of history at Truman State University, USA. He has published in the areas of nineteenth-century French cultural history and historical theory. His current work is on the emergence of the historical profession in the late Second Empire and early Third Republic.

Andrew J. Waskey is professor of social science at Dalton State College, USA. He teaches government, philosophy, logic, and world religions. He has authored over 600 scholarly works on anthropology, law, military history, philosophy, politics, poverty, public administration, religion, and science. He is an ordained Presbyterian (PCUSA) minister. After the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, he taught on Islam and terrorism in churches for the FBI and law enforcement agencies in Georgia, Alabama, and Missouri.

Todd Webb is assistant professor of history at Laurentian University, Canada. He is currently working on a thematic biography of the Upper Canadian politician Robert Baldwin, provisionally entitled *Robert Baldwin's World: A Nineteenth-Century Politician in Context*. He is also in the process of transforming his doctoral dissertation into a book entitled *The Religious Atlantic: British Wesleyanism and the Formation of an Evangelical Culture in Nineteenth-Century Ontario and Quebec*.

Homme Wedman teaches at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands, in the Departments of Contemporary History and Journalism. He studied history and Yiddish at the Universities of Groningen and Amsterdam. His MA thesis was on the Yiddish anarchist press around 1900. He has written articles on anarchism, syndicalism, social democracy, and Jewish history. He edited the memoirs of Christiaan Cornelissen and described his archives, discovered in 1992. He is currently writing Cornelissen's biography.

Bill Weinberg is editor of the online journal *World War 4 Report* and a producer at New York's WBAI radio. He is author of *Homage to Chiapas: The New Indigenous Struggles in Mexico* (2000). He is currently at work on a book on indigenous movements in the Andean nations.

Karolin Weinzierl is an independent scholar and translator. She holds an MA in political science and has conducted field research on community political participation in Venezuela. She served as a guide and translator for a German trade union youth delegation to Nicaragua and Venezuela. She has also been director of the political education programs on Latin America for the Confederation of German Trade Unions.

Jean Weisman is a higher education official at the City College of New York Center for Worker Education, USA. She has taught courses in labor studies at Rutgers University, Empire State College, City College, and John Jay College. She co-directed (with Belkis Vega) a video about transformations in the lives of former domestic workers in Cuba and writes extensively on Cuban women. Weisman's publications include "The Continuing Revolution" in *Cuban Socialism in a New Century: Adversity, Survival and Renewal* (2004).

Simon Wendt is assistant professor of history at the University of Heidelberg, Germany. He is the author of *The Spirit and the Shotgun: Armed Resistance and the Struggle for Civil Rights* (2007).

Niall Whelehan is a PhD candidate at the European University Institute, Italy. His research deals broadly with the phenomena of political violence among revolutionary movements in the nineteenth century and exchanges that occurred across borders and between countries. He has published in the fields of Irish republicanism, colonialism, and anarchism. His dissertation topic deals with European revolutionaries in exile in New York ca. 1870–1900, with specific focus on Irish republicans.

Robert W. White is a professor of sociology and former dean of the School of Liberal Arts at Indiana University–Purdue University, Indianapolis, USA. His research addresses the causes and consequences of small-group political violence, with a special emphasis on conflict in Ireland. He is the author of *Provisional Irish Republicans: An Oral and Interpretive History* (1993) and *Ruairi Ó Brádaigh, The Life and Politics of an Irish Revolutionary* (2006), and co-editor of *Self, Identity, and Social*

Movements (with Sheldon Stryker and Timothy J. Owens, 2000).

Anne Whitehead is an independent historian based in Sydney, Australia. She has published *Paradise Misland: In Search of the Australian Tribe of Paraguay* (1997), winner of the 1998 NSW Premier's Australian History Award, and *Bluestocking in Patagonia: Mary Gilmore's Quest for Love and Utopia at the World's End* (2003), a finalist for the 2004 national Magarey Biography Prize. Her book in progress on an Australian connection with Napoleon Bonaparte is supported by an Australian Arts Council Fellowship.

Jennifer Whitney is a political organizer and freelance writer from New Orleans, USA. She is a member of the Notes from Nowhere collective, which produced the book *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism* (2003), and spent several years traveling to organize and/or document mass political actions and uprisings in Europe and throughout the Americas. When the levees broke and flooded New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, she returned home and started the Latino Health Outreach Project, providing mobile health clinics and education for Latino immigrant workers. She is currently working on a book about international and cross-cultural solidarity.

Graham Willett is a senior lecturer in Australian studies at the University of Melbourne, Australia. He is president of the Australian Lesbian and Gay Archives and author of several publications on various aspects of Australian gay and lesbian history and politics, including *Living Out Loud* (2000). He has a particular interest in the comparative and transnational aspects of Australian sexual politics.

Howell Williams is currently serving as an instructor at an independent high school in Louisville, Kentucky, USA. Her research interests include contemporary social and religious history with a special interest in gender and sexuality. She has taught at Indiana University Southeast and Western Kentucky University.

Kieran Williams is the author of *The Prague Spring and its Aftermath* (1997) and co-author of *Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies* (2000) and *Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe* (2002).

Yohuru Williams is associate professor of history at Fairfield University, USA and the vice-president

for history education at the American Institute for History Education. Dr. Williams is author of *Black Politics/ White Power: Civil Rights, Black Power and Black Panthers in New Haven* (Blackwell, 2006) and *Teaching beyond the Textbook: Six Investigative Strategies* (2008). He also served as general editor for *The Souls of Black Folk: Centennial Reflections* (2003). He is presently finishing his book entitled *Six Degrees of Segregation: Lynching, Capital Punishment and Jim Crow Justice 1865–1930*.

Swithin Wilmot is dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Education, and senior lecturer in history at the University of the West Indies, Mona Campus. His main research interests are post-emancipation politics and society in Jamaica. Among his several publications are *Plantation Economy, Land Reform and the Peasantry in Historical Perspective: Jamaica 1838–1980* (co-edited with Claus Fullberg-Stolberg, 1992) and *Before and After 1865: Education, Politics and Regionalism in the Caribbean* (co-edited with Brian Moore, 1999).

Gregory Wilpert is a German American sociologist who holds a PhD from Brandeis University, USA. In 2000 he received a Fulbright Scholar grant to teach and research in Venezuela, where he launched the website *Venezuelanalysis.com*, which he edits. He has also written a book on the Chávez presidency, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power: The Policies of the Chávez Government* (2007).

Inga T. Winkler is a doctoral candidate in public international law at the University of Düsseldorf, Germany. Her doctoral thesis focuses on the human right to water and she has written several articles on different aspects of the topic. Her research is supported by the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation. She was a visiting researcher at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa and has been involved with work for the UNDP Water Governance Program, the Right to Water Program of the Center on Housing Rights and Evictions, and the German section of Amnesty International.

Yanis Yanoulopoulos taught at Panteion University, Greece until his retirement in 2006. He also worked as a research officer at Birkbeck College, University of London (UCL), UK and as a research fellow at the Department of Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies of King's College, University of London. He previously taught at the University of Crete, Greece.

Anastasia Yianguou is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of

Advanced Study, University of London, UK. Her research focuses on British rule in Cyprus with special reference to World War II and British decolonization in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Christopher Young is a DAAD graduate scholar and an associate visiting researcher with the Zentrum für transdisziplinäre Geschlechter-studien at Humboldt University, Germany. Young graduated cum laude from Boston College with degrees in German studies and English. During his final year, he was named a Scholar of the College and awarded the McCarthy Prize for thesis of the year for his research on the evolution of self- and societal perceptions of homosexuality in Germany. Young is currently pursuing a Master's degree in gender studies at the Humboldt University.

Darij Zadnikar is a professor of philosophy at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, an editor, a publicist, and a political activist. The main topics of his theoretical interest are political philosophy, neo-Marxism, philosophy of education, and the theories of social rebellions. His political activism extends from alter-globalist movements, anti-militarism, and solidarity with Latin American emancipatory movements to other social forms of repudiation of neoliberalism.

Jean-Philippe Zanco presently teaches economics and social sciences in a high school near Orléans, France and researches legal, administrative, and military history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He holds degrees in legal history, criminology, and political sciences. Zanco was a researcher at the University of Toulouse, France and received a grant from the French Ministry of Defense for his research on the Ministry of the Navy under the Second Empire.

Michael Zeitler is associate professor of English at Texas Southern University, USA. He has published on both Victorian and African American literature. He is the author of *Representations of Culture: Thomas Hardy's Wessex and Victorian Anthropology* (2007).

Raul Zibechi is a professor and researcher of social movements at the Franciscan Multiversity of Latin America in Montevideo, Uruguay. He is the author of seven books on movements, the most recent being *Autonomías y emancipaciones. América Latina en movimiento* (2007). He is an international analyst with the weekly *Brecha*, and he won the José Martí Award for Journalism in 2003.

Raina Zimmering is the director of the Department of Political and Development Research in the Institute of Sociology at Johannes Kepler University, Austria. She is also a member of the Civil International Commission of Human Rights (CCIODH), with which she has traveled several times to Mexico to observe the situation on human rights and compose reports for the United Nations and European Union. She has taught in Germany, Colombia, Austria, Mexico, Argentina, and the United States.

Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh teaches at the University of Connecticut, USA. He has published extensively on social movements in Europe, Latin America, and North America. He has also published essays on contemporary democratic theory and political thought in literature. His research has appeared in numerous journals, including *Polity*, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, *The Review of Politics*, and *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. Zirakzadeh's *Social Movements in Politics: A Comparative Perspective* received a 1998 *Choice* Outstanding Academic Book award.

Dima Zito is a social pedagogue and trauma therapist currently completing her PhD in pedagogy at the University of Wuppertal, Germany. Her research focuses on child soldiers living as refugees in Germany. She has worked on

several projects in Central America and has also worked at the information office of Nicaragua in Wuppertal.

Alex Zukas is a professor of history at National University, USA. Zukas's areas of specialization are modern European social and environmental history as well as early modern European cartographic history. He has written on unemployment and unemployed protests in twentieth-century Germany, worker stereotypes in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Britain and Germany, the history of European cartography and colonialism since 1450, the history of poverty, revolutionaries, revolutions and revolutionary movements, and teaching history using the Internet.

Lorna Lueker Zukas is associate professor of sociology and director of the Center for Cultural and Ethnic Studies at National University, USA. Her publications focus on human rights, gender in economic development, and gender and information technology in Sub-Saharan Africa. Her first book, *Women, War, and Social Change: The Challenge to Independence in Zimbabwe* (forthcoming), addresses the tensions between tradition and modernity in the face of colonialism and revolution. Her latest project involves the rise of socialism and the reconfiguration of political landscapes in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Introduction

Immanuel Ness

This encyclopedia encompasses the most comprehensive examination of modern-era revolutions, uprisings, and protest movements. It chronicles the ideas, ideologies, and activists that propelled these movements, tracing their roots, goals, tactics, successes, and failures. While numerous manifestos, analytic perspectives, explanatory works, and compelling larger collections have been assembled previously, this sweeping work elucidates the impressive and path-breaking action of the subjugated, disenfranchised, and ideologically motivated in inciting social change throughout the world, from 1500 to the present era.

This project also examines how different revolutions, uprisings, and protest movements have influenced one another and how they compare politically, economically, socially, and culturally. Accordingly, it introduces readers to the historiography and conceptual debates such manifestations have provoked, suggesting new, critical paths of inquiry into their legacies. This project elevates the study of revolution and protest, comprising a review of actual human behavior and organizational practice, motivated and directed toward expanding historical and social science research on the subject. It seeks to be a definitive account of the actions of human beings that transformed their material and social conditions – actions that frequently transformed the world in the process.

Project Methods

The primary goal of this project was to produce the most definitive exploration of protest and revolution to reflect the state of historical, political, and social science research, providing a reference for what can be called *revolutionary studies*. To attain historical objectivity and rigor, we assembled an extensive team of scholarly editors from every continent. Accordingly, this project includes an international panel of 60 editorial board members specializing in regional and thematic subfields of revolution and protest, who in turn enlisted hundreds of writers possessing the expertise and thematic specialization to frame sociohistorical conflicts; this involved recruiting scholars from every region of the world, all of whom were motivated by the goals and objectives of the project and subscribed to our effort to achieve a rigorous analysis in every entry in this undertaking.

We assigned contributions through an advisory board, rating each topic to build a general consensus of significance, searching for equivalent quality in each entry, and specifying inclusion of both historical rigor and relevance. Each entry passed through a process of peer review consisting of evaluations by at least two specialists in their respective geographic and thematic fields in addition to the general editor. All essays were meticulously reviewed and appraised for accuracy and compelling approaches. Fewer than half of invited submissions were accepted for publication on the basis of topical significance, original scholarship, and academic rigor, irrespective of ideological proclivity. The board called on contributors to apply historiographic balance and methodological precision in their analysis.

A central feature of this work, the first major project of its kind, is an examination of the interplay of history, modernization, economic conditions, politics, and social development through the lens of revolution, protest, and social movements. To achieve the goals of intellectual inclusiveness and historical significance the contributors to this work represent a broad range of disciplines: history, political science, sociology, area studies, anthropology, political economy, philosophy, the arts, languages, and journalism, among other fields of inquiry.

We endeavored to eliminate western or imperialist bias, commonly inherent in works of this kind, and brought together a global community of scholars, many writing on regions where they live and work, and thereby connecting regional perspectives and expertise to broader socialhistorical realities. We further sought balance and nuance in the approaches by selecting writers with an array of sometimes conflicting analytic perspectives. We searched out experts from specific regions of the world to write about the revolutions and protests, utilizing their distinctive regional and disciplinary contexts. Our intent was to provide a cross-referential frame of analysis, including specialists in the global North covering revolution and protest in the global South, and those in the global South covering the global North.

Significance of this Project

Profound world-historical transformations have reshaped the way contemporary historians map the past, chronologically and thematically. One of the major qualitative leaps in scholarship of the past few decades has been the emergence of world history as a field, in the context of a productive dialogue between disciplines, regions, and continents. Theoretical, methodological, conceptual, and pedagogical concerns have irrigated a rich body of comparative research that is in the process of redrawing the way we look at historical change.

Even as such heuristic devices as nationalism, class formation, ethnicity, gender, and regionalism are reexamined, however, revolutionary movements and counterhegemonic protests are often dismissed as localized, outdated phenomena, or else crises incidental to the forward march of market- and technology-driven modernization and transnational economic integration. Yet revolution and protest have altered human civilization in every region of the world. They have played central roles in the emergence and transformation of polities and societies, in war and peace, in the unfolding of knowledge production and spiritual traditions, and in representations of the past. They constitute a universal passageway of human history, one that has ushered in profound epochal changes, defined eras and civilizations, drawn and redrawn boundaries and galvanized peoples.

Revolutions and protest also shape our historical understanding of power and progress, law and justice, freedom and emancipation. Many of humanity's greatest ideas, such as democracy, equality, civil rights, cooperation, peace, and ecology, have been forged in the crucible of revolution and protest. It is impossible to understand the development of philosophy, economics, government, labor, social relations, and ecology without understanding the role that revolutions and protest have played in shaping them.

Not all protests and revolutions have proven beneficent; however, most of the progressive social change achieved over the past 500 years was brought about less by the benevolence of rulers than by the direct result of protest by the ruled. Were this not the case, then the world of throne and altar of the sixteenth century would likely still be in power. Human action, outside the sphere of the state, has always been a principal vehicle of social transformation.

The ideas and practices of revolution and protest are almost always viewed by social scientists and historians as extraordinary, unusual, and frequently shocking events that interrupt the familiar institutional social regulation of human everyday life. But the contributions in this work definitively, and sometimes counterintuitively, demonstrate that among the more surprising elements of revolution and protest is the regularity of volatile and explosive conflicts commonly revealed during waves of protest. We thus examine a past that has a sustained, if staccato, record and a broadly foreseeable trajectory highly contingent on the unfolding of events rooted in social conflict and resistance. This work brings together contributors who, in the aggregate, demonstrate the fact that revolution and protest are not just important moments in history but concurrently are integral to an accurate and comprehensive understanding of modern history and social science.

Defining Revolution and Social Protest

Revolution and social protest destabilize and overturn predictable everyday patterns of social behavior and traditional practices that the powerful expect to continue in perpetuity to advance their entrenched

socioeconomic interests. While revolutions and social protest are the dynamic forces churning and tearing the fabric of modern history, neither has an obvious and apparent definition that is universally accepted. There are many definitions of revolution, and each revolution attempts to define itself in the heat of conflict.

The justification and necessity for revolution and social protest are embedded in specific political ideology and normative values of justice. Since the sixteenth century, with antecedents rooted in the earliest recorded history, the ethical basis for popular protest and resistance against authority is located in the articulated human struggle for justice, equality, and individual rights.

The ideology of protest extends across the spectrum from the political right to the left. During the bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, liberal ideals were espoused to defend the private property rights of the bourgeoisie and then expanded to encompass the wider objective of extending popular collective ownership over all property, thereby fostering greater and genuinely universal equality. As capitalism grew more rapacious in the nineteenth century, socialists launched a critique of the grave consequences of private ownership that dispossessed popular majorities of their capability to survive with dignity. The condemnation of capitalism by a range of opponents, from anarchists, liberals, and socialists, to communists of all ideological proclivities, justified efforts to achieve a broader objective of establishing a more egalitarian and just society through revolution and popular protest. The emancipatory ideals of socialism were immediately and forcefully challenged by an expansive counterattack from capitalists who sought to resist efforts to create redistributive justice. Resistance to socialism typically was grounded in the individual right to own private property as a universal ideal without accounting for those denied and dispossessed of property or those deprived of the ability to survive, harnessed to unbridled capitalism.

This work also examines protests that follow the installation of governments based on unrealized lofty principles that appeared in the twentieth century. In many cases, protests are a consequence of the inherent lack of democracy within so-called egalitarian systems that have become bureaucratic, corrupt dictatorships, engaged in severe repression against opponents who not only question the systems but also potentially challenge the leaders, as in Stalin's Soviet Union and post-revolutionary Communist China.

Certainly, popular protest for justice extends well beyond the revolutionary challenges to achieve social equality. This project documents the array of movements to achieve rights and equality for those oppressed on the basis of their original or ascribed identity, including race, gender, religion, ethnic and national status, sexuality, and political beliefs.

The contributions in this work also examine the practical actions of resistance. Revolutionary and protest movements materialize and are expressed through peaceful and violent means. Among the peaceful forms of civil disobedience in the host of entries are: hunger strikes, establishing alternative communities and lifestyles, leafleting, mass meetings, marches and parades, demonstrations, boycotts, slowdowns, strikes, sit-ins and occupations, displaying flags, banners, distinctive objects, and attire that reveal opposition to oppressive norms, music that mobilizes popular forces to act, conscientious literature, philosophy, and art that is critical of power structures.

Indeed historically, popular recourse to force is typically only used after all forms of non-violent means have been exhausted, or in reaction to the use of force by those in power. In some cases force and violence erupt without organizational support through popular uprisings, often referred to as riots. Specific forms of violent resistance included in this work are popular rebellions, insurrections, revolts, guerilla warfare, armed struggle, liberation armies, and more centralized military coups and interventions.

Organization of this Work

Organized in an alphabetic A–Z format, this project draws together histories and themes of revolution and protest in a broad historical and geographic frame. To guide readers, this work includes a lexicon that draws together the histories and themes that are organized alphabetically throughout this encyclopedia.

Concurrently, each entry includes cross-references to the countries, regions, people, and themes with which these contributions entwine. As such, cross-referencing serves as a seamless guide to

reading the alphabetic historical and thematic entries. We decided on an alphabetic presentation as the most comprehensive means of organization, given the overlapping nature of many of the entries. The references to related books and readings serve as a guide to exploring in greater depth the histories and interpretations of events, subjects, and themes. Thus readers will gain access to a detailed historical analysis and to the most significant literature of the field, which in some cases, on certain subjects, particularly in the global South, are documented scarcely, if at all.

Geographic Organization

Geographically, this work encompasses every populated continent from the sixteenth century to the present. The objective is to comprise and characterize the major social and political struggles in the modern era. In this context the criteria for selection have been influence and qualitative significance in the unfolding of history. Thus, the coverage of protest and revolution is representative rather than exhaustive, and absorbs those forces that are most influential, especially transcendent events, movements, and personalities. This project includes every inhabited continent and region of the world: North Africa, Central Africa, Southern Africa, North America, the Caribbean, Latin America, Eastern and Western Europe, Southwest Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, the Far East, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. As many social struggles are interconnected from the 1970s to the early twenty-first century, the project covers important global justice movements.

We sought to be geographically inclusive and endeavored to ensure representation of the most significant protests and movements. We have also sought to reveal the global character of revolution that spans every region of the world. In this context, we have underscored those popular movements specific to regions during particular eras. Thus, nationalist movements for independence range from the American Revolution to the early twenty-first-century struggles for independence in the global South. The independence movements selected for inclusion are based on representation and importance. We draw attention to independence movements where colonialism and imperialism in the last 500 years were most extensive and lasting, for example Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. In evaluating anti-colonialism, we also asked contributors to consider those movements which advanced multiple ideas of popular liberation beyond simple independence: including racial equality, indigenous struggles, peasant movements, labor and working class, women's rights, student movements, and the religious, ethnic, and ideological thrusts that propelled them forward.

Temporal Organization

The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest: 1500 to the Present examines world history from the sixteenth to the early twenty-first centuries. The only thing that is true of all protests and revolutions is that they have no universal blueprint but are highly contingent on the peculiarities of specific historical eras and geographic areas. The entries demonstrate that while specific protests are almost always uneven and sporadic on a global scale, revolution and protest have persistent and unremitting roots that are never a consequence of a single original historic episode, but spring from multifarious events and social forces, revealing themselves as intensely and historically ingrained arcs of revolt. The timeline provides comprehensive documentation of the central historical events over the past five centuries and serves as a helpful contextualizing tool for readers.

These arcs of historical protest are considered both thematically and regionally. We examine the sixteenth-century struggles of peasants and indigenous peoples, fighting against racial, religious, and monarchic oppression, and explore how these uprisings and revolts continue and also evolve over the centuries into globally and socially diverse expressions of anti-authoritarianism, democracy, liberalism, and anti-imperialism. In surveying the history of revolution and protest beyond its traditional regional and temporal boundaries, we are able to investigate the intricate connections that link these movements across time and space. The nineteenth century, for example, marks the rise and expansion of ideological social struggles for material justice across the globe, including the socialist, anarchist, and communist movements, movements which continue to develop in philosophy and momentum to this day. With the emergence of the global justice movement in the late twentieth century, protest and revolution have redefined themselves as powerful tools of the global collective,

extending beyond territorial borders to petition for human rights and social justice for all, regardless of ethnicity, gender, religion, or social class.

Through a temporal examination of the modern era from 1500 to the present, revolutions and protest movements seldom have a discernible specific origin or a sudden ending, and in fact frequently spill over on a regional and global scale. The origins of revolutions are nuanced and complicated, as are the other stages of social revolution which defy one-dimensional explanation, historical turning points and watershed moments notwithstanding. Virtually all revolutions in the last 500 years have enduring consequences that, in evolving form, have remained moral forces to this day. Accordingly, we have provided multiple scholarly explanations and ideological perspectives to explain the phenomenon.

Thematic Organization

The thematic coverage includes environment and ecology, gender and sexuality, religion, utopianism, non-violent protest, labor, peace and anti-war, indigenous, student and youth, abolitionism and civil rights, the philosophy and theory of protest and revolution, anarchism, socialism, communism, liberalism, democracy, nationalism and anti-imperialism, peasant and agrarian, anti-fascism, anti-taxation, urban uprisings, human rights, global justice, and beyond.

In addition to the thematic essays, we included biographies of leading artistic and cultural figures on the basis of their intersection with popular protests and revolutions. Assessments for inclusion were not based on artistic innovation but the degree to which the genre or artist was a force in specific protests and revolutionary movements. As such, this project includes numerous biographies of influential social actors and theorists who helped shape the theory and practice of revolution and protest.

Conclusion

The academic rigor and editorial expertise that have shaped this project have resulted in a truly definitive and comprehensive work. The encyclopedia is the product of a community of diverse scholars, whose compelling ideas about and analysis of human behavior were motivated by a need to expand historical and social science research on the subject beyond its traditional boundaries, exploring the interplay of history, politics, economics, and social development through the lens of revolution and protest. As the general editor of this project, I am confident that this work adds clarity and nuance to the massive and disparate corpus of research and scholarship on the subject of revolution and protest.

The “End of History” was proclaimed by many following the collapse of the Soviet Union beginning in 1989. This laid the foundation for what could become a disparagement of revolution and protest. It was believed that a new age had dawned in which popular uprisings would no longer challenge either existing power structures or the global dominance of free markets or liberal “bourgeois” democracy. But improbably, this entire discourse sidestepped the major questions of the past 200 years: whether “another world was possible” that could alleviate the grinding misery that remains pervasive throughout the world. It has become apparent that a new global movement dedicated to social justice and human rights has sprung from the ashes of the sociopolitical and cultural experiments of the twentieth century. This work, we hope, will serve as a contribution to that struggle.

Acknowledgments

It has been my great pleasure to work with an international team of editors and scholars during the course of this book, and it gives me even greater pleasure now to thank all of them for their enormous efforts. Many people have contributed in countless ways to make *The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest* the most comprehensive and definitive work on the subject. To turn the objective into reality required conscientiousness, attention to detail, and sustained drive from numerous people with specific academic and editing expertise. Ultimately, the success of this project depended on the skill, intellect, and determination of editors and scholars from throughout the world who contributed at various stages of the project.

First and foremost, Deirdre Ilkson, project manager for this encyclopedia and development editor at Wiley-Blackwell, recognized the importance of the work from the start and oversaw every detail, down to the very last stages of preparing the book for the printer. Deirdre's contribution, carried out with cheerful confidence, intelligence, and dedication, extends to every facet of the project, and infuses the entire work. She was responsible for day-to-day management and the broader long-term demands of the project. Deirdre synchronized all aspects, from formulating a plan to complete this work to coordinating contributions, authors, correspondence, copyediting, illustrations, and production, as well as assembling the myriad pieces of the front matter.

I especially thank Peter Coveney, executive editor for history at Wiley-Blackwell, who decisively visualized this project in formation and orchestrated a comprehensive plan for completing perhaps the most important scholarly work of its kind.

From the beginning, this expansive encyclopedia sought to ensure comprehensive coverage of the significant histories and themes of revolution and protest. I am beholden to the two boards of editors, comprising a team of 60 authorities with special expertise in the range of disciplines comprising this work. The editorial boards identified the entries within each subject area of specialization, identified authors, and peer-reviewed manuscripts on the basis of their areas of specialization.

The contribution of members of the board of editors and board of associate and advisory editors was both considerable and unique, and extends beyond academic scholarship to a dedication and enthusiasm for the subject of revolution and popular movements. Board members devoted an enormous amount of their time and intellectual energy over the past three years to this effort.

To bring this ambitious project to fruition required relentless intellectual rigor that also challenged the stamina of the editors. I am grateful to all the editors and advisors whose contributions were essential to the success of this project. Every editor served a crucial role, both in their scholarship and in their endurance in transforming the idea of a major work on revolution and protest into the reality of a comprehensive eight-volume encyclopedia. Among those editors, several have been mainstays who kept us on track to completion.

From the outset Beverly Tomek recognized the scale of this project and kept her promise to help shepherd it to completion. I was lucky to have Beverly's keen editing assistance and availed myself of her academic rigor, attention to detail, and specialized knowledge of historical social movements. Dario Azzellini contributed equally his abundant scholarship, knowledge of social movements, self-assurance, and determination, and remarkable skills at identifying and persuading authors to contribute to this work.

From the inception of this project Paul Le Blanc was always there to offer wise advice in guiding this project to completion, and consistently contributed his deep and expansive historical knowledge of revolutionary movements and social protest. From the beginning, Pierre Rousset maintained his

strong commitment to the project and its goals, applying both his editorial skills, global contacts, and unceasing dedication to humanity to this work. This project also benefited enormously from Cliff Conner's contribution as section editor for Britain and France and his valuable advice on details, large and small. Soma Marik's scholarship, commitment to the project, and dedication remained strong from beginning to end. Jesse Cohn's contribution to this work as section editor for anarchism reached far beyond what was expected.

A team of editors and major contributors deserve credit and distinction for their substantial editing, contributions, and dedication to meticulous scholarship: Marcelline Block, Verity Burgmann, Dimitrios K. Dalakoglou, Chris Ealham, Megan Greene, Rowena Griem, Herbert Docena, Mike Gonzalez, Daniel Hémerly, Jason Kelly, Max Lane, Amy Linch, Michael Löwy, Ayokunle Omobowale, Diogo Pinheiro, Sean Scalmer, Guillermina Seri, Matthew J. Smith, Ben Trott, Antonios Vradis, and Lucien van der Walt, among many others who uniquely contributed to bring this important work to fruition. Steve Bronner, Bill Fletcher, Steve Leberstein, and Frances Piven provided crucial advice and assistance through decisive phases of this project.

The project benefited from many editorial assistants, but in particular, congratulations must go to the students of the City University of New York and Brooklyn College who shared a commitment to scholarship, and excellence, and provided tangible support for this project. I would like to thank all the editorial assistants serving on this project, notably Heather Squire for bringing to it her scholarship and sense of intellectual honesty. I also thank graduate students Terri Bennett, Stacy Warner Maddern, and Leonard Lubitz for their important contributions. I thank the Graduate Center for Worker Education for its crucial support and assistance. Special thanks also go to the contribution of Ernest Amador, Amy Hatmaker, and Summer Leibensperger.

The dedicated professionals at Wiley-Blackwell were crucial to this project's successful completion and success. Liz Cremona was responsible for managing and coordinating the production of the book, text design, and typesetters; Brigitte Lee Messenger coordinated the copyediting and proofreading process. The encyclopedia greatly benefited from copyeditors Jack Messenger and Sarah Pearsall and proofreaders Helen Kemp, Pandora Kerr-Frost, Marie Lorimer, Caroline Morris, and Clare Zon. In addition, I thank Zeb Korycinska, the indexer, and Leanda Shrimpton and Helen Nash, the picture researchers. Thanks also to Jenny Howell, divisional marketing manager, Katherine Ward, associate product manager, and Matt Bennett, associate director of marketing, who were responsible for promoting this project. Both Julia Kirk and Emily Howard were responsible for liaising with contributors, and Igor Novakovic, product development manager, coordinated building the website for the online edition. I was fortunate to have Sam Stoloff of the Frances Goldin Literary Agency, who recognized the importance of this project and provided sage advice.

All too often, historical and political works gloss over the essential part popular movements play in making and remaking history. The historians and social scientists who have contributed to *The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest* accomplished the goals we set out to collectively achieve in substantially advancing scholarship on the significance of social movements in shaping the modern world.

Immanuel Ness

Chronology of Significant Events in Revolution and Protest

1444–95	Portuguese charting and colonization, Cape Verde
1466–1536	Erasmus of Rotterdam
1469–1527	Macchiavelli, Niccolò
1478–1535	More, Thomas
1483–1546	Luther, Martin
1484–1531	Zwingli, Huldrych; leader (with Luther) of Protestant Reformation
1491–1556	Ignatius of Loyola
1492	Columbus discovers West Indies
1509–67	Calvin, John
1510	first slaves into Caribbean
1513	Ponce de León establishes St. Augustine (first colony in America)
1513	Balboa discovers Pacific
1513	Macchiavelli's <i>The Prince</i>
1514	Copernicus' heliocentric theory
1516	Ottomans conquer Syria and Egypt
1516	Comunero movement (Comuneros' Revolt); first and last major uprising against the Hapsburgs in kingdom of Castile
1517	Ottomans conquer Mecca and Medina
1517	Luther's 95 Theses begins Reformation
1519–21	Aztec capital Teotihuacán captured by Cortes; Aztec empire conquered
1520–2	Magellan (d. 1521) completes first circumnavigation of the earth
1520–66	Suleyman "The Magnificent"
1521	Suleyman captures Belgrade
1525	German Peasant Rebellion
1525	Anabaptist movement begins, Switzerland
1527	second sack of Rome
1532	Pizarro captures Atahualpa, defeating Incas
1534	Henry VIII establishes Church of England
1534	Cartier charts Gulf of St. Lawrence River
1536–9	dissolution of English monasteries
1540	Ignatius Loyola forms Jesuits
1541	Coronado reaches Kansas
1545–63	Council of Trent starts Counterreformation
1550s	peak of Ottoman invasion of Europe
1553	Negro Miguel rebellion (Venezuela); first revolt by Africans enslaved by Spain
1553–8	Mary Tudor restores Catholicism
1554	British slave trade begins with four slaves brought back to England
1555	Mary begins persecuting Protestants
1558–1603	Elizabeth I of England, daughter of Henry VIII (Protestant)
1560	Puritans (English Calvinists)
1562–98	Wars of Religion (France)
1565	St. Augustine is the first permanent settlement in North America
1568–1648	Dutch Revolt

1571–2	Túpac Amaru and Incas rebel against the Spanish (Peru)
1572	St. Bartholomew's Day massacre, France (August–October); Catholics kill Protestants
1577–80	Drake circles globe
1581	Cossacks retake Russia from Mongols
1583–1649	Arundel, Lady Blanche
1587	Mary Queen of Scots executed
1588	Spanish Armada defeated by England
1588–1679	Hobbes, Thomas
1596–1650	Descartes, René
1598	Edict of Nantes (tolerance for Protestants) ends Wars of Religion
1599–1658	Cromwell, Oliver
1602–3	Palmares slave revolts (Brazil)
1603–1868	Edo (or Tokugawa) period, Japan
1605	radical Catholic Guy Fawkes fails in plan to blow up parliament in Gunpowder Plot
1606–7	Bolotnikov's Rebellion, first of four peasant rebellions in Russia
1607	Jamestown is first permanent British colony in North America
1618	revolt in Bohemia begins Thirty Years' War
1619	first North American slaves at Jamestown
1620	<i>Mayflower</i> and Pilgrims arrive in North America
1624	Dutch settle New Amsterdam (US)
1625	Huguenot revolt, France
1628	first slaves in New York City
1629	Christians expelled or executed in Japan
1629	dissolution of parliament, Britain
1632–77	Spinoza, Baruch
1637–9	Shimabara Rebellion, Japan; Catholic Christian samurai and peasants rebel
1638–1715	Louis XIV of France
1638–51	British civil wars
1648–53	The Fronde revolts, France
1649	Charles I executed
1649–60	Reign of Oliver Cromwell (and son Richard for the last two years)
1651	<i>Leviathan</i> by Thomas Hobbes
1653	Swiss Peasants' War
1664/1665	English seize New Amsterdam and New Jersey from Dutch
1670–1	Razin's Rebellion, Russia
1675	Bacon's Rebellion (US)
1675	King Philip's War (Metacomet)
1682–1725	Peter the Great of Russia
1682	La Salle claims all land drained by Mississippi River for France
1683	Turks defeated at Battle of Vienna
1684/1686	Leibnitz differential and integral calculus
1687	Newton's <i>Principia Mathematica</i>
1687	Newton's <i>The Calculus</i>
1687	Yamassee Indian revolt in Florida
1688	James II flees to France
1688	English or "Glorious" Revolution
1690	<i>Two Treatises on Government</i> by Locke
1692	Glencoe massacre
1694–1778	Voltaire; foremost proponent of Enlightenment
?–ca. 1741	Queen Nanny; leader of Windward Maroons (Jamaica)
1703–91	Wesley, John
1707	Union of Scotland and England
1707–8	Bulavin's Rebellion, Russia

1712–78	Rousseau, Jean-Jacques
1712	New York slave revolt
1713–84	Diderot, Denis
ca. 1730–80	historical period of Enlightenment
1730–1840	Industrial Revolution; begins in England
1737–1809	Paine, Thomas
1739	Stono Rebellion (South Carolina)
1741	slave revolt, New York City
1743–93	Marat, Jean-Paul
1743–94	Condorcet, Marquis de
1743–1803	Louverture, Toussaint; leader of Haitian Revolution
1745–97	Equiano, Olaudah
1751–77	publication of French <i>Encyclopédie</i> , edited by Diderot and d’Alembert
1754	<i>Some Considerations on the Keeping of Negroes</i> by John Woolman (US)
1754–63	French and Indian War in North America
1755	Great Lisbon Earthquake kills thousands
1755	<i>Discourse on the Origin and Bases of Inequality among Men</i> by Rousseau
1756–63	Seven Years’ War in Europe; Britain, Prussia vs. France, Austria, Russia
1756–1836	Godwin, William
1758–94	Robespierre, Maximilien de
1758–1806	Dessalines, Jean-Jacques
1759–94	Danton, Georges Jacques
1759–97	Wollstonecraft, Mary
1759–1833	Wilberforce, William
1759	<i>Candide</i> by Voltaire
1760–97	Babeuf, François-Noël
1760–1825	Saint-Simon, Comte de
1761–1837	Buonarroti, Philippe
1762	<i>The Social Contract</i> by Rousseau
1763–98	Tone, Theobald Wolfe
1763–1835	Cobbett, William
1769–1821	Bonaparte, Napoleon
1770–1831	Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
1770	Boston Massacre
1771–1858	Owen, Robert
1772–1837	Fourier, Charles François Marie
1773	Boston Tea Party
1773–5	Pugachev’s Rebellion, Russia
1774	Shakers arrive in US from England
1775–1847	O’Connell, Daniel; Catholic lawyer, emancipation activist
1776	US Declaration of Independence
1776	one-fifth of the US population are slaves
1776	<i>The Wealth of Nations</i> by Adam Smith
1776–83	American Revolution
1778	first Catholic Relief Act (UK)
1780–1	Indian revolt led by Túpac Amaru II in Upper Peru
1781	British surrender at Yorktown
1781–8	<i>Confessions</i> by Rousseau
1783	Treaty of Paris ends American Revolution
1783–1830	Bolívar, Simón
1785–1830	Walker, David
1786–7	Shays’ rebellion (Massachusetts, US)
1787	Committee for the Abolition of the Slave Trade (UK)

- ca. 1787–1828 Shaka Zulu, Southern Africa
- 1788 Australia first settled by British as penal colony
- 1789 storming of the Bastille (July 14)
- 1789 Publication of *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano* creates sensation in London and contributes to abolishing British slave trade
- 1789–94 French Revolution
- 1789–97 George Washington first US president
- 1790 *Reflections on the Revolution in France* by Edmund Burke
- 1791 US Bill of Rights ratified
- 1791 *Rights of Man* by Thomas Paine
- 1791–1804 Haitian Revolution; slave revolt leads to independence
- 1792 Publication of Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*; foundation of modern feminism
- 1793–1880 Mott, Lucretia Coffin; Quaker minister, abolitionist, social reformer, proponent of women's rights
- 1793–1883 Sojourner Truth (Isabella Baumfree); abolitionist
- 1794 Whiskey Rebellion (US)
- 1795 execution of Louis XVI, France
- 1795–1856 Sáenz, Manuela; Central American independence leader
- 1796–1855 O'Connor, Feargus
- 1797–1857 Comte, Auguste
- 1797 Spithead and Nore mutinies (Britain); protesting working conditions
- 1798 Great Rebellion, Ireland
- 1799–1815 Napoleonic Wars
- 1801–9 Thomas Jefferson US president
- 1801–25 reign of Alexander I, Russia
- 1802–85 Hugo, Victor
- 1802–87 Dix, Dorothea (US); reformer on behalf of prisoners, the indigent, and mentally ill
- 1803 Louisiana Purchase
- 1805 Harmony Society, utopian group, founded in Pennsylvania (US)
- 1805–79 Garrison, William Lloyd; American abolitionist
- 1806–72 Juárez, Benito; president of Mexico (1858–71)
- 1807 Britain and America abolish slave trade
- 1810 Creoles establish ruling juntas in Caracas, Santiago, Buenos Aires
- 1810 Mexico begins war of independence from Spain
- 1811 Venezuela and Paraguay declare independence from Spain
- 1812 Napoleon invades Russia
- 1812–14 War of 1812
- 1814 Napoleon abdicates
- 1814–76 Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich
- 1815–1902 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady; US feminist
- 1815 Jackson defeats British at Battle of New Orleans
- 1815 Napoleon's 100 days and Battle of Waterloo
- 1816 Argentina declares independence
- 1818–83 Marx, Karl
- 1818–95 Douglass, Frederick
- 1818 Chile declares independence
- 1819 Peterloo massacre, Manchester (England)
- 1819 Colombian and Venezuelan independence
- 1820–95 Engels, Friedrich; with collaborator Karl Marx articulated theory of communism in the *Communist Manifesto* (1848)
- 1820–1906 Anthony, Susan B.
- 1820 Glasgow general strike (Scotland)

1821	Mexican independence
1821–9	Greek War of Independence vs. Turks
1822	King Pedro declares Brazil independent from Portugal
1822	Vesey's rebellion; Denmark Vesey organizes perhaps largest slave conspiracy in North American history, in Charleston, South Carolina
1823	Monroe Doctrine warns Europe against the recolonization of the newly independent Spanish American republics
1823	Wilberforce forms British Anti-Slavery Society
1824	Peasant Revolt, Egypt
1825	Bolivia declares independence
1829	<i>An Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World</i> by David Walker (US)
1830	July Revolution, France; overthrow of Charles X
1830	Swing riots (England)
1830	November Uprising, Poland
1830–1	Cholera riots, Russia
1830–1905	Michel, Louise; Paris Commune
1831	Nat Turner's rebellion (Virginia, US)
1831–90	Sitting Bull, American Indian leader
1832	Reform Acts, Britain and Ireland
1832	Treaty of Constantinople secures Greece's independence from Ottomans
1833	Slavery Abolition Act is passed in British parliament
1833	William Lloyd Garrison, editor of abolitionist newspaper, <i>The Liberator</i> , helps form American Anti-Slavery Society
1836	Texas declares independence from Mexico; begins war; Santa Anna defeated by Texans
1837–8	Canada Rebellion
1837–78	Most intense period of the Yoruba Wars, Nigeria
1837–1930	Mother Jones (Mary Harris); Socialist Party and union activist (US)
1838	Underground railroad aids flight of slaves to the North (US)
1838–1927	Woodhull, Victoria
1839	Newport rising (Wales); unsuccessful Chartist revolt
1839	<i>Amistad</i> incident
1839	British capture the port of Aden (Yemen); rule as part of British India until 1937
1840–1902	Zola, Emile
1840	first World Anti-Slavery Society meeting, London
1840	Britain annexes New Zealand
1841	Brook Farm founded in Massachusetts (US)
1842–1921	Kropotkin, Peter
1844	Morse's telegraph used for first time
1845	<i>The Condition of the Working Class in England</i> by Friedrich Engels
1845	<i>A Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave</i>
1845–50	Irish potato famine – estimated 1 million die
1846–8	US war with Mexico
1846–91	Parnell, Charles Stewart
1847–8	Maya Indians rebel against plantation owners in Yucatán, Mexico (the Caste War)
1848	<i>Communist Manifesto</i> by Marx and Engels
1848	June Days rebellion, Paris
1848	European revolutions (France, Italy, Prussia, Austria, Hungary) over working-class reforms
1848	Seneca Falls Convention (NY, US)
1848–79	Oneida Community (US)
1849–77	Crazy Horse, American Indian leader
1849	Russia helps Austria defeat Hungarian Revolt
1851	<i>Ain't I a Woman?</i> speech by Sojourner Truth at the Ohio Women's Rights Convention

1851–64	Taiping Rebellion, Qing dynasty, China
1852	Irrawaddy delta region of Burma (Myanmar) annexed by Britain
1854	Treaty of Kanagawa; opening of Japan to West
1854–6	Crimean War; Britain defeats Russia
1855–1926	Debs, Eugene
1855	Santal rebellion (India)
1855	<i>My Bondage and My Freedom</i> by Frederick Douglass
1856–1918	Plekhanov, Georgi
1857	Sepoy Revolt, India
1858–1928	Pankhurst, Emmeline
1858–1943	Webb, Beatrice
1858	Irish Republican Brotherhood founded in Ireland by James Stephens; as Fenian Brotherhood in US by John O'Mahony
1859–1914	Jaurès, Jean
1859–1947	Webb, Sidney; social reformer
1859	abolitionist John Brown raids Harper's Ferry, is tried and executed
1859	oil discovered in Pennsylvania
1859	<i>On Liberty</i> by John Stuart Mill
1859	<i>On the Origin of Species</i> by Charles Darwin
1860–1904	Herzl, Theodore; founder of Zionism
1860–1935	Addams, Jane
1861	Emancipation Edict in Russia frees serfs
1861–5	American Civil War
1861–5	Abraham Lincoln US president
1862–1931	Wells, Ida B.; anti-lynching reformer
1862	<i>Les Misérables</i> by Victor Hugo
1863	US Emancipation Proclamation frees slaves
1863	Draft Riots, US
1864–76	First International
1865	assassination of Lincoln
1865–9	Ku Klux Klan is organized (US)
1866–1925	Sun Yat-Sen
1867	US purchases Alaska
1867–94	<i>Das Kapital</i> by Karl Marx (3 vols.)
1868–78	Independence movements in Cuba and Puerto Rico lead to the 'Ten Years' War in Cuba
1868–1963	Du Bois, W. E. B.
1869–1940	Goldman, Emma; anarchist and labor organizer
1869–1948	Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand
1870–1919	Luxemburg, Rosa
1870–1924	Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich
1870–1936	Berkman, Alexander
1870	Tianjin Massacre, China; largest single anti-western protest prior to Boxer Uprising
1870	Franco-Prussian War
1871–1915	Chilembwe, John; key figure in early resistance in Nyasaland (now Malawi); revered protest figure in Southern Africa
1871	Paris Commune
1872–1940	Abdurahman, Abdullah; popular South African political leader
1872–1970	Russell, Bertrand
1873–80	Dutch war on Aceh; Indonesia (Batavia)
1874–1965	Churchill, Winston S.
1876–1916	London, Jack; author of tales of romance and adventure, and of <i>The Iron Heel</i> (1908)
1876–1948	Jinnah, Muhammad Ali; founder of Pakistan

- 1876–1956 Ishikawa Sanshirō; Japanese anarchist
- 1876 Alexander Graham Bell, telephone
- 1876 Battle of Little Bighorn (US); Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse defeat Custer
- 1877 Great Railroad Strike (US)
- ca. 1878–1923 Villa, Pancho
- 1878–1968 Sinclair, Upton
- 1878–9 Kanak uprising against French colonialism, New Caledonia
- 1879–1916 Pearse, Patrick; a leader of Easter Rising, Dublin; convicted of treason and executed
- 1879–1919 Zapata, Emiliano
- 1879–1940 Trotsky, Leon
- 1879–1942 Chen Duxiu; one of the founders of Chinese Communist Party and earliest leader
- 1879–1953 Stalin, Joseph
- 1879–1966 Sanger, Margaret; socialist and advocate for women’s right to birth control
- 1880s–1890s Hawaiian rebellion against US occupation and annexation
- 1880s–1920s Jadid movement; Islamic reformists (Central Asia)
- 1881–1938 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal; Turkish leader
- 1882–1975 De Valera, Eamon; leader in Irish political life from 1916 to 1959
- 1882 Britain occupies Egypt
- 1883–99 Mahdist revolution in the Sudan
- 1884 *Cooperative Commonwealth* by Lawrence Gronlund
- 1885–1967 Muste, A. J.; socialist, activist, pacifist involved in labor movement and US civil rights movement
- 1885–1971 Lukács, Georg
- 1885–1977 Paul, Alice
- 1885 British General Gordon killed by followers of the Mahdi at Khartoum in the Sudan
- 1886–1934 Hatta Shūzō; Japanese anarchist
- 1886–1944 Bloch, Marc
- 1886–1973 Ben-Gurion, David; first prime minister of Israel
- 1886 Haymarket riot, Chicago (US)
- 1886 Formation of American Federation of Labor (AFL)
- 1887–1920 Reed, John
- 1887–1940 Garvey, Marcus
- 1887 Bloody Sunday demonstration (London)
- 1888–1938 Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich
- 1888 *Looking Backward* by Edward Bellamy
- 1888 Abolition of slavery in Brazil
- 1889–1964 Nehru, Jawaharlal; first prime minister of India
- 1889 Brazil becomes a republic
- 1890–1922 Collins, Michael; Irish republican military and political leader
- 1890–1964 Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley
- 1890–1969 Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh)
- 1890 Massacre at Wounded Knee (US)
- 1891–1937 Gramsci, Antonio
- 1892–1940 Benjamin, Walter
- 1892–1980 Tito, Josip Broz
- 1892 Homestead strike (Pennsylvania)
- 1893–1964 Togliatti, Palmiro
- 1893–1976 Mao Zedong
- 1893–1978 Kenyatta, Jomo
- 1894–1941 Babel, Isaac
- 1894–5 Sino-Japanese War
- 1895–1970 Cárdenas, Lázaro; president of Mexico, 1934–40
- 1895–1974 Perón, Juan; three-time president of Argentina

- 1896 *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision by US Supreme Court legitimizes Jim Crow laws
- 1896–7 Chimurenga; first struggle against British colonialism in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe
- 1897–1980 Day, Dorothy; writer, activist, and matriarch of the Catholic Worker movement
- 1897 birth of Zionist movement; First Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland
- 1898–1948 Eisenstein, Sergei
- 1898–1948 Jorge Eliécer Gaitán; Colombian populist leader
- 1898–1976 Zhou Enlai, leading figure in the Chinese Communist Party and Revolution of 1949
- 1898–1979 Marcuse, Herbert
- 1898–1902 Spanish–American War; US annexes Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, Philippines
- 1899–1901 Philippines insurrection
- 1899–1902 Boer War, South Africa
- 1900–1 Boxer Rebellion in China
- 1901–70 Sukarno; first president of Indonesia; active in struggle for independence from Dutch colonial rule
- 1901–89 James, C. L. R.
- 1901 Socialist Revolutionary Party founded, Russia
- 1901 Socialist Party of America founded
- 1901 discovery of Iranian oil
- 1902 *What Is To Be Done?* by Lenin
- 1902 Australian women are first in world to win full political rights, to vote, to stand for election to national parliament
- 1903–79 Barzani, Mulla Mustafa al-
- 1903 Russian Social Democratic Party splits into Mensheviks and Bolsheviks
- 1903 Wright Brothers' first flight at Kittyhawk, North Carolina (US)
- 1903 *The Souls of Black Folk* by W. E. B. Du Bois
- 1904–73 Neruda, Pablo; Chilean poet, activist, communist, and diplomat
- 1904–86 Douglas, Tommy; Canadian prime minister
- 1904–97 Deng Xiaoping
- 1904–5 Russo-Japanese War
- 1904–7 Herero Wars; resistance to German colonial encroachment results in widespread massacre, South West Africa (Namibia)
- 1904–14 building of the Panama Canal
- 1905–80 Sartre, Jean-Paul; French novelist, existentialist philosopher, literary critic; awarded Nobel Prize for literature in 1964 (declined)
- 1905 Einstein publishes Special Theory of Relativity, $e = mc^2$
- 1905 Russian Revolution of 1905; Tsar Nicholas grants constitution
- 1905 Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) founded, Chicago
- 1905 Sinn Féin organized (Dublin)
- 1905–7 Maji-Maji revolt (Tanzania)
- 1906–75 Arendt, Hannah
- 1906–2001 Senghor, Léopold Sédar; first president of Senegal and one of the founders of the Négritude movement (*La Négritude*)
- 1906 Young Turk movement in Ottoman empire
- 1906 First Russian parliament (Duma)
- 1906 Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) movement, Burma
- 1906 *The Jungle* by Upton Sinclair
- 1907–64 Carson, Rachel
- 1907–67 Deutscher, Isaac
- 1907–89 De Silva, Colvin Reginald
- 1908–74 Schindler, Oskar
- 1908–86 Beauvoir, Simone de
- 1908 Model T Ford
- 1908 oil discovered by the British in Khuzestan (modern Iraq)

- 1909–72 Alinsky, Saul
- 1909–72 Nkrumah, Kwame; African socialist leader and president of Ghana
- 1909 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) founded
- 1909–33 US Marines occupy Nicaragua, Haiti, and Dominican Republic
- 1910 Union of South Africa
- 1910 International Women’s Congress, Buenos Aires, Argentina; Chilean, Uruguayan, and Paraguayan women discuss international laws, matrimonial issues, and wage inequality
- 1910–21 Mexican Revolution
- 1911–95 Djilas, Milovan
- 1911– Vo Nguyen Giap; Vietnamese general renowned for involvement in the Vietnamese communist war against the French, defeat of the United States, and invasion of Cambodia that overthrew Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge
- 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist fire (New York City); deaths of 146 young immigrant women workers spark waves of protest
- 1911 Chinese Nationalist Revolution; third revolutionary tide in modern history of China, following Taiping Rebellion and Boxer Uprising
- 1913–2005 Parks, Rosa
- 1913–2008 Césaire, Aimé
- 1913 Paterson silk strike (US)
- 1913 Dublin General Strike
- 1914–18 World War I
- 1915–47 Aung San
- 1915–2003 Aptheker, Herbert
- 1915 Armenian massacres under Young Turk government (April–August)
- 1916 Irish uprising
- 1916 Margaret Sanger opens first birth control clinic in Brooklyn (US)
- 1916 Arab revolt against Ottoman empire
- 1916 Dadaist movement founded in Zurich by young artists opposed to World War I
- 1916 *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* by Lenin
- 1917–80 Romero, Óscar; archbishop and advocate of liberation theology (El Salvador)
- 1917–93 Tambo, Oliver
- 1917–94 Chakravartty, Renu
- 1917– Commoner, Barry
- 1917 US declares war on Germany; enters World War I
- 1917 Russian Revolution
- 1917 Puerto Ricans become US citizens
- 1917–20 Red Scare (US)
- 1917–23 Russian civil war
- 1918–70 Nasser, Gamal Abdel
- 1918– Mandela, Nelson
- 1918 National Feminist Union is formed (Latin America); promulgates civil and political emancipation of women, access to education, and wage equality
- 1918 Tsar Nicholas II (b. 1868) and family killed by Bolsheviks at Ekaterinberg
- 1918 collapse of Austro-Hungarian empire
- 1918 *State and Revolution* by Lenin
- 1918–24 V. I. Lenin in power
- 1919 Bread and Roses strike, Lowell, Massachusetts
- 1919 Formation of International Labor Organization (ILO)
- 1919 Gandhi is leader of Indian National Congress
- 1919 Amritsar massacre
- 1919 Founding of Communist International
- 1919 General strike, Argentina

- 1919 General strike, Barcelona
1919 Kemal Atatürk is leader of Turkish national movement
1919 Palmer raids (US)
1919 large-scale student demonstration, Beijing (May 4)
1919 League of Nations is formed as part of signing of Treaty of Versailles; first meets
1920
1919 Red Summer; race riots and lynchings across US
1919 Winnipeg general strike (Canada)
1919 General strike, Seattle
1919–23 Turkish struggle against Allied Powers following World War I (“The Liberation War”)
1920–2006 Friedan, Betty
1920 General strike, Turin (Italy)
1920 founding of American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
1920 founding of National Socialist (Nazi) Party, Germany
1920 passage of 19th Amendment ensures US women’s suffrage
1920 Iraq Revolt fails to establish independence from British, who install “indigenous”
monarchy
1920–1 Arab anti-Jewish riots, Palestine
1921–92 Dubček, Alexander
1921–97 Freire, Paulo
1921 Kronstadt Mutiny (USSR)
1921 Tulsa race riot (US)
1922–87 Lévesque, René
1922–97 Castoriadis, Cornelius; political philosopher
1922–99 Nyerere, Julius; Tanzanian socialist; president, Tanganyika African National Union
(TANU)
1922– Sihanouk, Norodom; variously ruler or prime minister of Cambodia, 1941–70
1922 Mussolini becomes dictator of Italy
1922 Rand revolt (South Africa); labor revolt
1922 Britain declares Egypt independent
1923 Turkey declared a republic; Kemal Atatürk first president; westernizes Turkish dress,
government, and alphabet
1923 failure of Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch in Munich
1924–73 Cabral, Amílcar
1924–93 Thompson, Edward Palmer (E. P.); historian, dissident communist, peace activist
1924– Mugabe, Robert; first prime minister of Zimbabwe
1924 death of Lenin
1924 Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association (AAPA) established by Aboriginal
wharfies (members of Maritime Union of Australia)
1925–61 Lumumba, Patrice
1925–61 Fanon, Frantz; radical psychologist and revolutionary writer
1925–65 Little, Malcolm (Malcolm X)
1925–96 Williams, Robert F.; African American civil rights activist
1925– Cardenal, Ernesto
1925 first television transmission
1925–49 Chinese Communist Revolution
1926 general strike, Britain (May)
1927–93 Chávez, César; United Farm Workers leader
1927 Lindbergh flies Atlantic solo
1927 Execution of Sacco and Vanzetti
1927–53 Joseph Stalin in power, Russia
1928– Chomsky, Noam; US political theorist, activist, and professor of linguistics
1928– Gutiérrez, Gustavo; Peruvian priest and founder of liberation theology movement

- 1928 Chinese Nationalists in control of China
- 1928 Britain passes Equal Suffrage Act
- 1928 *The History of Intellectual Movements in Islam* by Palestinian Bandali Jawzi
- 1929–68 King, Martin Luther, Jr.
- 1929–2004 Arafat, Yasser (PLO founder)
- 1929 Igbo “Women’s War” (Nigeria)
- 1929 Khuda-i Khidmatgar founded by Pashtuns; aims to oppose British rule through non-violent resistance
- 1929 Formation of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA)
- 1929–33 Stock Market collapse (October 1929) followed by global Depression
- 1930– Huerta, Dolores
- 1930 anti-salt tax movement, India
- 1930 Nation of Islam founded (US)
- 1930 unemployed and labor movements across US
- 1931–94 Debord, Guy
- 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria
- 1932 Bonus Army marches on Washington
- 1932 Antonio Salazar becomes virtual dictator of Portugal
- 1932–5 Chaco War (between Paraguay and Bolivia)
- 1933– Meredith, James; first African American to enroll at University of Mississippi (1962)
- 1933 *Catholic Worker* founded in New York City by Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin
- 1933 Nazi Party rules Germany
- 1933–45 Franklin D. Roosevelt US president
- 1933–45 Adolf Hitler is Chancellor of Germany
- 1934– Baraka, Amiri (Leroi Jones)
- 1934– Steinem, Gloria
- 1934 Asturias uprising, Spain (October)
- 1934 Toledo Autolite strike (US)
- 1934 Diego Rivera’s mural *Man at the Crossroads* in lobby of Rockefeller Center, New York, deemed anti-capitalist propaganda and demolished
- 1934 Women gain the right to vote in Cuba
- 1934–5 Chinese Long March
- 1935 Harlem race riots (April)
- 1935 Congress passes Social Security Act
- 1935 Birth of Négritude movement
- 1936– Havel, Václav
- 1936–7 Flint sit-down strike (US)
- 1936–9 Spanish Revolution; civil war; Franco takes over
- 1937–45 Sino-Japanese War
- 1938 *Kristallnacht*, Germany
- 1938 Muslim League for independent state of Pakistan
- 1938 Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) is created
- 1938 Germany occupies Czech Sudetenland (October)
- 1938 Day of Mourning and Protest commemorating 150 years of “theft and genocide” against indigenous aboriginals, Australia
- 1939 signing of Molotov–Ribbentrop pact
- 1939 Germany invades Czechoslovakia (September 1), marking the start of World War II
- 1939 start of Saudi Arabian oil production
- 1939–45 World War II
- 1940 Battle of Britain (July–September)
- 1940–1 Japanese conquest of Indochina
- 1941–95 Saro-Wiwa, Ken; Nigerian human rights activist
- 1941–98 Carmichael, Stokely/Kwame Turé

- 1941– Jackson, Jesse; leading US civil rights activist and leader, human rights sponsor, international mediator, and populist presidential candidate
- 1941 Germany invades Russia (June)
- 1941 Japan bombs US naval base at Pearl Harbor (December 7)
- 1942 White Rose (Weiße Rose) founded (Germany); anti-Nazi group
- 1942 Formation of Congress of Racial Equality (CORE)
- 1943– Walesa (Walsa), Lech; co-founder and leader of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” (Poland)
- 1943 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising; largest single revolt by the Jews during the Holocaust
- 1943 Race riots in Detroit (June) and Harlem (August)
- 1944–83 Bishop, Maurice (Grenada)
- 1944–88 Mendes, Chico; Amazonian rainforest protest and resistance leader
- 1944 Guatemalan revolution overthrows Jorge Ubico
- 1944 Glorious May Revolution, Ecuador
- 1944 D-Day; Allied invasion of Europe at Normandy beaches (June 6)
- 1944 attempted plot to kill Hitler fails (July 20)
- 1945– Cohn-Bendit, Daniel
- 1945– Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula da; leader Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores), Brazil
- 1945 German surrender (May)
- 1945 death of FDR
- 1945 Guomindang (GMD) takes over island of Taiwan
- 1945 formation of Arab League
- 1945 partition of Korea
- 1945 United Nations founded
- 1945 US drops atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan (August 6 and 9)
- 1945 Japan surrenders (September)
- 1945 Marshall Plan to restore war-ravaged Europe
- 1945 Hô Chi Minh proclaims the first Democratic Republic of Vietnam (September 2)
- 1945–54 First Indochina War, Vietnam
- 1946 Sudanese Women’s League founded by women members of Sudanese Communist Party
- 1946 Menachem Begin and the Irgun attack and destroy the King David Hotel, Jerusalem
- 1946 Philippine independence
- 1946–9 Pilbara strike of aboriginal stock workers, Australia
- 1946–9 civil war in China
- 1946–9 Greek civil war
- 1946–9 Dutch colonial war in East Indies
- 1946–54 Huk Rebellion, Philippines
- 1946–2008 Protest against US occupation, Okinawa (Japan)
- 1947 India and Pakistan become independent states
- 1947–77 Biko, Steven; South African black leader
- 1948–69 Hampton, Fred; leader of Chicago Chapter, Black Panther Party
- 1948 Nationalist Party in South Africa begins apartheid
- 1948 Union of Burma; independent republic outside British Commonwealth of Nations
- 1948 *al-Wathbah* – “the Awakening”– anti-British protest begins in Iraq
- 1948 Gandhi assassinated
- 1948 formation of Union des Populations du Cameroun; period of active nationalism commences
- 1948 Israel gains independence from Britain
- 1948–9 first Arab–Israeli War
- 1949 Germany divided into East and West Germany
- 1949 People’s Republic of China proclaimed (October 1); Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in power; Mao Zedong becomes premier

- 1950– Foley, Gary; indigenous Australian leader
- 1950 formation of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
- 1950 Chinese conquest of Tibet
- 1950 Sukarno first president of Indonesian republic
- 1950–3 Korean War
- 1951 decolonization of Africa begins with Libya declaring independence
- 1952 bloodless coup in Egypt; King Farouk overthrown, marking the end of direct British influence in state affairs; Nasser assumes power
- 1952–9 Mau-Mau rebellion, Kenya
- 1953–61 Dwight D. Eisenhower US president
- 1953 failure of Mossadegh coup in Iran; US-backed Shah rules for next 25 years
- 1953–9 Cuban Revolution; beginning of Castro regime (1959)
- 1954–81 Sands, Bobby; member of Irish Republican Army (IRA), elected to British parliament
- 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling; segregation illegal in US
- 1954 Viet Minh conquer French fortress at Dien Bien Phu (May 7)
- 1954–62 Algerian National Revolution
- 1955 Ngo Dinh Diem proclaims Republic of Vietnam with himself as president (October 26)
- 1955 murder of Emmett Till and subsequent trial verdict highlight racism in US South
- 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott; protest against segregation on public transit (US)
- 1955–62 French war in Algeria
- 1956 Republic of Tunisia achieves independence from France (March 20)
- 1956 Hungarian Revolution; suppressed by Soviets
- 1956 Nasser’s nationalization of Suez Canal prompts Suez crisis (Egypt)
- 1956 Sudan receives independence from Britain
- 1957 Ghana becomes first Sub-Saharan African country to receive independence (Gold Coast)
- 1957 European Economic Community (EEC; known as “Common Market” in UK)
- 1957–71 Tibetan revolt
- 1958 *Things Fall Apart* by Chinua Achebe; seminal African novel in English
- 1958 Mao’s “Great Leap Forward”
- 1958 Notting Hill riots, Britain
- 1958 Revolution of 1958, Iraq
- 1959 Dalai Lama flees to India
- 1960 creation of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
- 1960 four North Carolina AT&T College students stage lunch counter sit-in at Woolworth store in Greensboro
- 1960 Congo gains independence from Belgium (Zaire)
- 1960 April Revolution (Korea); topples corrupt regime of Rhee Syng-man
- 1960 Ivory Coast gains independence from France
- 1960 Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) founded in US
- 1960 Nigeria gains independence from Britain (October 1)
- 1960 Sharpeville protest and massacre, South Africa
- 1960–3 civil war in Zaire
- 1960–74 Second Indochina War, Vietnam
- 1960s–1970s Communist Party and People’s War, Thailand
- 1960s–1990s Moro National Liberation Movement, Philippines
- 1961 Congo leader Patrice Lumumba assassinated
- 1961 *The Wretched of the Earth* by Frantz Fanon
- 1961 first Freedom Rides in US, organized by Congress of Racial Equality (CORE)
- 1961–3 John F. Kennedy US president
- 1961–89 Berlin Wall
- 1961–90 Imprisonment of Nelson Mandela

- 1962 major buildup of US military forces in South Vietnam begins
- 1962 Algeria gains independence from France after 12-year struggle
- 1962 Trinidad and Tobago become independent and join British Commonwealth
- 1962 Cuban missile crisis
- 1962 Publication of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* ignites environmental movement
- 1962–74 anti-colonial struggle and revolution, Mozambique
- 1963 Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* launches second-wave feminism in US
- 1963 Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) founded in Philadelphia; first black organization in US to call for Marxist revolution
- 1963 Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother assassinated, South Vietnam
- 1963 JFK assassinated, Dallas, Texas
- 1963 Civil Rights March on Washington
- 1963 *The Making of the English Working Class* by E. P. Thompson
- 1963 Zanzibar gains independence from Britain
- 1964 Zanzibar revolution
- 1964 Civil rights legislation in US
- 1964 creation of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by Arab League
- 1964 Free Speech Movement (FSM), University of California, Berkeley; serves as catalyst for student demonstrations around the world
- 1965 three Selma-to-Montgomery (Alabama) marches to secure voting rights (March)
- 1965 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) hold anti-war rally, Washington, DC (April)
- 1965 Voting Rights Act (US) signed by LBJ
- 1965 Watts riots, Los Angeles (US)
- 1965 Suharto seizes power in Indonesia
- 1965 anti-war protests in 40 American cities (October 15–16)
- 1965 aboriginal student in Australia leads bus tour on "1965 Freedom Ride," inspired by activists in US civil rights movement
- 1965 Malcolm X shot and killed during speech at Audubon Ballroom (New York City)
- 1965 Mobutu ascends to power in Congo following coup
- 1965 first US troops to Vietnam
- 1966 Stokely Carmichael inaugurates Black Power movement
- 1966 Black Panther Party for Self-Defense (BPP) founded in Oakland, California
- 1966 formation of National Organization for Women (NOW)
- 1966–76 Cultural Revolution, China
- 1967 beginning of long protest against building of Narita Airport outside Tokyo
- 1967 Israeli–Arab Six-Day War, Middle East
- 1967 Ernesto "Che" Guevara killed in Bolivia attempting to spark revolutionary uprising
- 1967–70 Biafra civil war, Nigeria
- 1967–72 Naxalite movement, India
- 1968 Tet Offensive begins, Vietnam (January 30)
- 1968 My Lai massacre (March)
- 1968 Martin Luther King, Jr., assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee (April); urban disturbances in more than 100 cities across US
- 1968 Vietnam peace talks open in Paris (May 12)
- 1968 Robert F. Kennedy, presidential candidate, assassinated in Los Angeles, California (June)
- 1968 Latin American Bishops' Conference in Medellín (Colombia) affirms rights of the poor and asserts that industrialized nations are enriching themselves at expense of Third World
- 1968 American Indian Movement (AIM) created in Minneapolis
- 1968 Student protests, US
- 1968 Protests, Europe (May '68)
- 1968 Russia invades Czechoslovakia

- 1968 Baathist Party in control of Iraq (until 2003)
- 1968–9 Agbekoya Peasant Revolt, Nigeria
- 1969 Cordobazo and Rosariazo uprising, Argentina
- 1969 Stonewall Riots, Greenwich Village (New York City)
- 1969 first moon walk, Apollo 11 astronauts
- 1969 Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi comes to power (September 1) after coup d'état in Libya
- 1969–71 “Indians of All Tribes” occupy Alcatraz, effectively inaugurating Red Power movement
- 1970 founding of Tamil Students Federation (Sri Lanka), later the Tamil New Tigers
- 1970 Salvador Allende becomes first democratically elected socialist to take power in Latin America
- 1970 US invasion of Cambodia (April–June)
- 1970 Kent State student uprising and shooting (May 4)
- 1970 Australian feminist Germaine Greer’s *The Female Eunuch* becomes international bestseller
- 1971 East Pakistan becomes the sovereign state of Bangladesh (December 16)
- 1971 Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation Front) uprising, Sri Lanka
- 1972 Bloody Sunday, Derry, Northern Ireland (January 30); civil rights protesters shot by British soldiers
- 1972 President Nixon visits Beijing seeking détente with People’s Republic of China (February)
- 1972 Aboriginal “Embassy” action on grounds of Australian parliament leads to demise of McMahon government
- 1972 *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed* by Paulo Freire
- 1972 Nuclear arms treaty (SALT I)
- 1972 martial law is imposed in the Philippines (September 21) by Marcos regime
- 1973 Vietnam War ends for US with signing of Paris peace accords (January 27); all direct American military operations end in Indochina (August 14)
- 1973 Wounded Knee, South Dakota (US); AIM protest
- 1973 *Roe v. Wade*; US Supreme Court ruling overturns all state and federal laws outlawing or restricting abortion
- 1973 Israeli–Arab War
- 1973 oil crisis and global recession
- 1973 Chile falls under rule of Pinochet military dictatorship (September 11)
- 1973 Ezeiza protest and massacre, Argentina
- 1974 Carnation Revolution, Portugal
- 1974 Watergate scandal forces Richard M. Nixon (elected 1969) to resign as US president
- 1974–7 Ethiopian Revolution
- 1975 Green March into Western Sahara, Morocco (November 6)
- 1975 Helsinki Accords on human rights signed
- 1975 International Women’s Day observed worldwide (March 8)
- 1975 general strike, Argentina (June–July)
- 1975 Cambodia falls to Khmer Rouge (April 17); in ensuing four years of Pol Pot regime, an estimated 20 percent of Cambodian population is killed
- 1975 North Vietnam captures Saigon; Vietnam War ends (April 30)
- 1975 Pathet Lao comes to power in Laos and proclaims Popular Lao Republic (December 4)
- 1975–90 Lebanese civil war
- 1977 Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, Buenos Aires, Argentina
- 1978 Camp David Accords signed; lead to Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty following year
- 1978 Islamic Revolution in Afghanistan
- 1978–9 “Winter of Discontent,” Britain
- 1979 Soviet Union invades Afghanistan
- 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran

- 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident in US (March) stimulates global movement against nuclear power
- 1979 Saddam Hussein and Baathists in power in Iraq until overthrown by US in 2003
- 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution
- 1980 Kwangju student uprising (Korea)
- 1980 Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia, becomes independent; Mugabe prime minister
- 1980 Earth First! founded to halt exploitation and destruction of nature by the industrial West
- 1980 Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) guerilla warfare starts in Peru
- 1980–2 Solidarity movement in Poland
- 1980–91 Salvadoran civil war
- 1981 AIDS identified
- 1981 Brixton riots, London (April)
- 1981 Nuclear-Free New Zealand
- 1981–9 Ronald Reagan US president
- 1983 revolution in landlocked West African country of Burkina Faso
- 1984 assassination of Indian leader Indira Gandhi
- 1984 Bhopal chemical disaster kills thousands, India
- 1985 Mexico City earthquake; 9,000 killed, 30,000 injured, 100,000 left homeless
- 1985–6 British miners' strike
- 1985–91 Mikhail Gorbachev Soviet leader
- 1986 Chernobyl nuclear plant in Ukraine explodes; radioactive contamination spreads to Belarus, Russia, Europe, and beyond
- 1987 anti-AIDS group ACT UP formed, New York City
- 1987 Hamas founded, Gaza Strip
- 1987 Bougainville Secession movement against Papua New Guinea
- 1987–93 first Intifada in Middle East
- 1988 popular uprisings in Burma to demand democracy
- 1988 Benazir Bhutto becomes prime minister of Pakistan for 20 months
- 1988–9 USSR leaves Afghanistan
- 1989 Kashmir Muslims revolt against India
- 1989 Tiananmen Square protests – known in China as the June Fourth Movement
- 1989 fall of Berlin Wall; Germany reunified following year
- 1989 Velvet Revolution brings about collapse of communist regime of Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
- 1989 collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe
- 1989 World Wide Web developed at CERN, Switzerland, by Tim Berners-Lee
- 1990 Namibia is last colony on African continent to gain national independence
- 1990 Nelson Mandela freed from South African jail
- 1990 Oka crisis (Quebec)
- 1990–1 student movement (Greece)
- 1990–2000s indigenous uprisings, Ecuador
- 1990–2000s Assam armed struggle against India
- 1990s–2000s Aceh struggle against Indonesia
- 1991 Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) gain independence from Soviet Union
- 1991 USSR collapses
- 1991 Jean-Bertrand Aristide takes power in Haiti
- 1991 breakup of Yugoslavia leads to nationalist wars and ethnic cleansing in 1990s
- 1991 Bangladesh cyclone kills 138,000 and leaves 10 million homeless (April)
- 1991 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma (Myanmar)
- 1991 First Gulf War; US forces chase Iraqi troops out of Kuwait
- 1992 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Rigoberta Menchú for advocacy of indigenous rights, Guatemala

- 1992 Ayodhya Temple destroyed by Hindu nationalists, India
- 1992 Riots in south central Los Angeles following verdict in Rodney King trial (US)
- 1992 Maastricht Treaty (formally, Treaty on European Union, TEU) signed, the Netherlands; creates European Union and leads to creation of the euro
- 1993 European Union (EU) created; EEC transformed into the European Community, one of EU's three parts
- 1993 Via Campesina (Peasant Road) founded in Belgium; transnational social movement
- 1993 Nobel Peace Prize awarded jointly to Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk (South Africa)
- 1993 Oslo Accords signed in Washington, DC, between PLO and Israel, ending first Intifada
- 1994 Zapatista movement rises up in Chiapas (Mexico)
- 1994 African National Congress (ANC) party wins first democratic elections in South Africa; Nelson Mandela is president
- 1994 US, Mexico, and Canada form NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement)
- 1994 massacre of Tutsi people in Rwanda
- 1996–7 South Korea labor uprisings and general strike
- 1997 Asian financial crisis
- 1997 Kyoto Accords; Kyoto Protocol created to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2012; ratified by 140 nations (excluding US and Australia)
- 1998 Peoples' Global Action (PGA) Network formed
- 1998 Taliban rebels conquer Afghanistan
- 1999 11 European States (except UK) adopt euro
- 1999 Hugo Chávez becomes president of Venezuela, planning socialist economy
- 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Seattle
- 1999 Canal Zone returned to Panamanian control (December 31) after 96 years of US occupation
- 2000 second (Al-Aqsa) Intifada begins, led by Hamas (Middle East)
- 2000 Augusto Pinochet arrested in London; first application of principle of universal jurisdiction by European judges
- 2000 global warming confirmed by UN Conference on Climate Change
- 2000 Serbian revolution; downfall of Slobodan Milošević; first in a series of movements across Eastern and Southeastern Europe
- 2001 World Social Forum founded in Brazil (January) as forum for groups resisting globalization
- 2001 terrorist attacks on World Trade Center (New York), Pentagon (September 11)
- 2001 Patani Thai national liberation
- 2002 Gujarat communal uprisings
- 2002 US invades Afghanistan to eliminate Taliban
- 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia
- 2003 over 8 million people in more than 800 cities in 60 countries join in largest synchronized global anti-war non-violent protest in history (February 15)
- 2003 US invades Iraq (Second Iraq War) (March 20)
- 2004 Massachusetts becomes first state to legalize gay marriage
- 2004 European Union has 23 member states
- 2004 earthquake triggers tsunamis that cause destruction across 11 countries, killing more than 225,000 people, mainly in India, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia (December)
- 2004–5 Orange Revolution, Ukraine
- 2005 Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan (March)
- 2005 immigrant uprisings, France
- 2005 Hurricane Katrina devastates New Orleans and Gulf Coast; costliest natural disaster in US history (August)
- 2006 Oaxaca uprising (Mexico)

- 2006 Evo Morales becomes first indigenous leader in Bolivia in 470 years since Spanish conquest
- 2006 immigration protests (US)
- 2006 mass protests in Haiti over vote count manipulation by right-wing parties
- 2006 April Revolution, Nepal
- 2007 Tuareg uprising, Niger
- 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan
- 2008 Fidel Castro retires
- 2008 Supreme Court of California overturns state's ban on same-sex marriage (May 15)
- 2008 Illinois Senator Barack Obama becomes first African American to be elected as US president

Lexicon

This lexicon aims to provide readers with a map to the content of the encyclopedia. The list of entries under each subject heading, be it chronological, geographic, or thematic, is not exhaustive. Each list is a representative selection of significant entries intended to help readers begin their exploration into that specific area of revolutionary studies.

Chronological

16th Century

Agüeybaná (d. 1510) and Agüeybaná II (d. 1511)
Anabaptist movement
Aracaré (d. 1542)
Britain, peasant uprisings, 16th century
Britain, Renaissance-era conflict
Calvin, John (1509–1564)
Caonabo (d. 1496)
Comunero movement
Cuauhtémoc (1502–1525)
Denmark, insurrection and revolt
Diriangén (1496 or 1497–1530s)
Dutch Revolt, 1568–1648
Edict of Nantes
English Reformation
Enriquillo and the Taíno revolt (1519–1533)
Ethnic and nationalist revolts in the Hapsburg Empire, 1500–1848
German Peasant Rebellion, 1525
German Reformation
Guaicaipuro (ca. 1530–1568)
Guatemala, popular rebellion and civil war
Gustav Rebellions
Hatuey (ca. 1400s–1512)
Irish revolts, 1400–1790
Jumandi (d. 1578)
La Boétie, Etienne de (1530–1563)
Lautaro (d. 1557)
Lemba, Sebastian (d. 1547)
Lempira (d. 1537)
Luther, Martin (1483–1546)

Moscow fire and protest, 1547
Müntzer, Thomas (ca. 1489–1525)
Nordic revolts and popular protests, 1500–present
Padilla, Juan de (ca. 1490–1521)
Panama, Cemaco's anti-colonial resistance, 1510–1512
Philippines, colonial protests during the Spanish era
Reformation
Rumiñahui (d. 1535)
St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre
Scottish Reformation
Tecún Umán (d. 1524)
Tisquesuza (d. 1537)
Túpac Amaru (1540–1572)
Urracá, Cacique of Veraguas (d. 1516)
Venezuela, Negro Miguel Rebellion, 1552
Women's movement, United States, 16th–18th centuries
Zwingli, Huldrych (1484–1531)

17th Century

Arundel, Lady Blanche (1583–1649)
Bacon's Rebellion
Barbados and the Windward Islands, protest and revolt
Bolotnikov's Rebellion, 1606–1607
China, peasant revolts in the empire
Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658)
Denmark, insurrection and revolt
Dutch Revolt, 1568–1648
English Revolution, 17th century
English Revolution, radical sects
English Revolution, women and Fawkes, Guy (1570–1606) and the Gunpowder Plot
Fell, Margaret (1614–1702)
Fifth Monarchist women
Fox, George (1624–1691)
French Caribbean in the Age of Revolution

- French Guiana, indigenous rebellions
 Fronde, France, 1648–1653
 Glencoe Massacre, 1692
 Glorious Revolution, Britain, 1688
 Guatemala, popular rebellion
 and civil war
 Haiti, Saint-Domingue and
 revolutionary France
 Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679)
 Hutchinson, Anne (1591–1643)
 Irish revolts, 1400–1790
 Italy, 17th-century revolts in the south
 Khmelnytsky Uprising
 Lilburne, John (1615–1657)
 Locke, John (1632–1704)
 Malta, protest and revolution
 Ming Rebellions, 1600s
 Netherlands, protests, 1650–1800
 Nordic revolts and popular protests,
 1500–present
 Palmares Slave Revolts, 1602–1603
 Pamphleteering and political protest,
 Dutch Republic, 1672
 Philippines, colonial protests
 during the Spanish era
 Ranters
 Razin's Rebellion, 1670–1671
 Roshaniya movement and
 Khan Rebellion
 Scottish Reformation
 Spinoza, Baruch (1632–1677)
 Swift, Jonathan (1667–1745)
 Swiss Peasants' War of 1653
 Winstanley, Gerrard (1609–1676)
 Women's movement, Haiti
 Women's movement, Southern Africa
 Women's movement, Spain
 Women's movement, United
 States, 16th–18th centuries
 Women's movement, Venezuela
 Zumbi (ca. 1655–1695)
- 18th Century**
 American Revolution of 1776
 American slave rebellions
 Andresote and the Revolt against the
 Guipuzcoana (1731–1733)
 Anti-monarchy protests, Portugal
 Anti-slavery movement, Britain
 Anti-slavery movement, United States,
 1700–1870
 Atlantic port seaman resistance,
 American Revolutionary era
- Babeuf, François-Noël (1760–1797)
 and the Conspiracy of Equals
 Barbados and the Windward Islands,
 protest and revolt
 Bengal, popular uprisings and
 movements in the colonial era
 Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821)
 Brazil, rebellions from independence
 to the republic (1700s–1889)
 Brissot, Jacques Pierre (1754–1793)
 Britain, anti-war movement, 1775–1783
 Burdett, Sir Francis (1770–1844)
 Catholic emancipation
 Corsican independence movement
 Counterrevolution, France, 1789–1830
 Cuffe, Paul (1759–1817)
 Danton, Georges Jacques (1759–1794)
 Denmark, insurrection and revolt
 Despard, Colonel Edward
 Marcus (1751–1803) and the
 Despard Conspiracy
 Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806)
 Diderot, Denis (1713–1784)
 Directory, France, 1795–1799
 Durrani empire, popular
 protests, 1747–1823
 Eighteenth Brumaire
 Emmet, Robert (1778–1803)
 and Emmet's Rebellion
 Enlightenment, France, 18th century
 Equiano, Olaudah (1745–1797)
 Estates General, France
 Ethnic and nationalist revolts in
 the Hapsburg Empire, 1500–1848
 Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony
 Fitzgerald, Lord Edward (1763–1798)
 French Guiana, indigenous rebellions
 French Polynesia, protest movements
 French Revolution, 1789–1794
 French Revolution, historians'
 interpretations
 French Revolution, radical factions
 and organizations
 French Revolution, women and
 French revolutionary theater
 Godwin, William (1756–1836)
 Gordon "No Popery" Riots,
 Britain, 1780
 Haiti, revolutionary revolts, 1790s
 Haiti, revolutionary struggles
 Haiti, Saint-Domingue and
 revolutionary France
 Horne Tooke, John (1736–1812)

Ireland, Age of Revolutions, 1775–1803
 Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798
 Irish revolts, 1400–1790
 Jacobite risings, Britain, 1715 and 1745
 Jamaica, rebellion and resistance, 1760–1834
 Labor revolutionary currents, United States, 1775–1900
 Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements, Germany
 London Corresponding Society
 Luxembourg, protest and revolution
 Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–1793)
 Mirabeau, Comte de (1749–1791)
 Muhammad ‘Ali (1769–1849)
 Netherlands, protests, 1650–1800
 Nordic revolts and popular protests, 1500–present
 O’Connor, Arthur (1763–1852)
 Oge’s Revolt, 1790
 Paine, Thomas (1737–1809)
 Philippines, colonial protests during the Spanish era
 Polish Revolution (Sejm), 1788–1792
 Pugachev’s Rebellion, 1773–1775
 Queen Nanny and Maroon resistance
 Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794)
 Rochambeau, Comte de (1725–1807)
 Romania, protests and revolts, 18th and 19th centuries
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778)
 Saint-Just, Louis Antoine (1767–1794)
 Saint-Simon, Comte de (1760–1825)
Sans-culottes
 Schill, Ferdinand Baptista von (1776–1809)
 Sepé Tiarajú (1722/3–1756)
 Sharp, Granville (1735–1813)
 Shays’ Rebellion
 Sheridan, Richard Brinsley (1751–1816)
 Shipboard insurrections in the Atlantic slave trade
 Sieyès, Abbé (1748–1836)
 Smith, Adam (1723–1790)
 Spence, Thomas (1750–1814)
 Spithead and Nore mutinies, Britain, 1797
 Sturm und Drang
 Swift, Jonathan (1667–1745)
 Tennis Court Oath, France, 1789
 Thelwall, John (1764–1834)

Thistlewood, Arthur (1774–1820) and the Cato Street Conspiracy
 Tone, Theobald Wolfe (1763–1798)
 Trinidad, anti-colonial movement
 Tunisia, protests under Ottoman (Bey) rule to 1881
 Túpac Amaru Rebellion II and the Last Inca Revolt, 1780–1783
 Túpac Katari (ca. 1750–1781)
 United Englishmen/United Britons
 United Irishmen
 United Scotsmen
 Utopian intentional communities
 Voltaire (1694–1778)
 Washington, George (1732–1799)
 Wesley, John (1703–1791), Methodism, and social reform
 Whiskey Rebellion
 Wilberforce, William (1759–1833)
 Wilkes, John (1725–1797) and the “Wilkes and Liberty” movement
 Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–1797)
 Women’s movement, Haiti
 Women’s movement, Southern Africa
 Women’s movement, United States, 16th–18th centuries
 Women’s movement, Venezuela

19th Century

Addams, Jane (1860–1935)
 Albanian nationalism
 Amana Inspirationist Utopians
 American Civil War (1861–1864)
 American Civil War draft riots
 American Civil War and slavery
 American slave rebellions
 Anarchism, Argentina
 Anarchism, Australia
 Anarchism, Spain
 Anarchism in the United States to 1945
 Anthony, Susan B. (1820–1906)
 Anti-Corn Law agitation, Britain, 19th century
 Anti-monarchy protests, Portugal
 Anti-slavery movement, Britain
 Anti-slavery movement, British, and the black response to colonization
 Anti-slavery movement, British, and the founding of Sierra Leone
 Anti-slavery movement, United States, 1700–1870

- Arab left and socialist movements, 1861–1930
- Argentina, labor strikes of 1890 and 1902
- Australian labor movement
- Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876)
- Barbados and the Windward Islands, protest and revolt
- Bengal, popular uprisings and movements in the colonial era
- Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932)
- Black nationalism, 19th and 20th centuries
- Blanqui, Louis Auguste (1805–1881)
- Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830)
- Bolivia, War of the Pacific to the National Revolution, 1879–1952
- Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821)
- Bourses du Travail
- Brazil, rebellions from independence to the republic (1700s–1889)
- Britain, trade union movement
- Britain, women’s suffrage campaign
- Brown, John (1800–1859)
- Burdett, Sir Francis (1770–1844)
- Bussa (d. 1816) and the Barbados slave insurrection
- Cabanagem of Grão-Pará, Brazil, 1835–1840
- Cambodia, anti-colonial protests, 1863–1945
- Canada, indigenous resistance
- Canada, labor protests
- Canada, law and public protest: history
- Canada, Rebellion of 1837–1838
- Canudos, religion and rebellion in 19th-century Brazil
- Catholic emancipation
- Central Asian protest movements
- Chartists
- Chile, social and political struggles, 1850–1970
- Chilembwe, John (1871–1915)
- Chimurenga armed struggles
- China, protest and revolution, 1800–1911
- Colombia, Afro-Colombian movements and anti-racist protests
- Connolly, James (1868–1916)
- Corsican independence movement
- Côte d’Ivoire, pre-independence protest and liberation
- Counterrevolution, France, 1789–1830
- Crazy Horse (1849–1877), Sitting Bull (1831–1890), and Native American resistance at the Battle of Little Bighorn
- Cuba, anti-racist movement and the Partido Independiente de Color
- Cuba, struggle for independence from Spain, 1868–1898
- Cyprus, protest and revolt
- Dalit liberation struggles
- Debs, Eugene (1855–1926)
- Decembrists to the rise of Russian Marxism
- Demerara Slave Rebellion, 1823
- Denmark, insurrection and revolt
- Dominican Republic, protests 1844–1915
- Douglass, Frederick (1817–1895)
- Dutch Caribbean, protest and revolution, 1815–2000
- Ecuador, protest and revolution
- Egypt, Peasant Rebellion of 1824
- Enclosure movement, protests against
- Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895)
- Environmental protest, United States, 19th century
- Ethnic and nationalist revolts in the Hapsburg Empire, 1500–1848
- Eureka Stockade
- European revolutions of 1848
- Fenian movement
- Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians
- France, 1830 Revolution
- France, June Days, 1848
- France, Revolution of 1848
- French Guiana, indigenous rebellions
- French Polynesia, protest movements
- Fries’s Rebellion
- Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948)
- Garibaldi, Giuseppe (1807–1882)
- Garrison, William Lloyd (1805–1879)
- Godwin, William (1756–1836)
- Greece, socialism, communism and the left, 1850–1974
- Greek nationalism
- Guatemala, popular rebellion and civil war
- Haiti, protest and rebellion, 19th century
- Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, aftermath
- Haitian Revolution and independence, 1801–1804

- Hawaii, resistance to US invasion and occupation
 Haymarket tragedy
 Haywood, Big Bill (1869–1928)
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831)
 Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel (1753–1811)
 Hugo, Victor (1802–1885)
 Hungary, protests, 1815–1920
 Hungary, Revolution of 1848
 Hungary, women radicals, 1848–1849
 India, Great Rebellion of 1857 (the Sepoy Revolt)
 Indian national liberation
 Indonesia, colonial protests, 16th century to 1900
 Iran, political and cultural protests, 1844–1914
 Jamaica, peasant uprisings, 19th century
 Jamaica, rebellion and resistance, 1760–1834
 Japan, protest and revolt, 1800–1945
 Jewish Bund
 Jews and revolution in Europe, 1789–1919
 Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938)
 Kelly, Edward “Ned” (1855–1880) and the Kelly Gang
 Korea, popular rebellions and uprisings, 1492–1910
 Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921)
 Labor revolutionary currents, United States, 1775–1900
 Lafayette, Marquis de (1757–1834)
 Laos, protest and revolution, 19th and 20th centuries
 Lebanon, 19th-century revolts
 Leeward Islands, labor protests
 Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements, Germany
 Lincoln, Abraham (1809–1865) and African Americans
 Luddism and machine breaking
 Luddite riots in Nottingham
 Magón, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922) and the Magonistas
 Mahdist Revolt
 Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932)
 Malaysia, protest and revolt
 Maori indigenous resistance
 Marcuse, Herbert (1898–1979)
 Marx, Karl (1818–1883)
 Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–1872)
 Michel, Louise (1830–1905)
 Moro national liberation
 Mozambique, worker protests
 Namibia, struggle for independence
 Nat Turner Rebellion
 Nepal, protest movements, 19th and 20th centuries
 Netherlands, protests, 1800–2000
 New Australia movement
 New Caledonia, protest and revolt
 Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900)
 Nordic revolts and popular protests, 1500–present
 O’Connell, Daniel (1775–1847)
 O’Connor, Arthur (1763–1852)
 O’Connor, Feargus (1796–1855)
 Paris Commune, 1871
 Parnell, Charles Stewart (1846–1891)
 Philippines, colonial protests during the Spanish era
 Poland, revolutions, 1846–1863
 Polish Revolution of 1830
 Popelin, Marie (1846–1913) and Belgian League for Women’s Rights
 Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865)
 Radical Reconstruction, United States, promise and failure of
 Reclus, Elisée (1830–1905)
 Red Scotland and the Scottish radical left, 1880–1932
 Reform Acts, Britain and Ireland, 1832
 Romania, protests and revolts, 18th and 19th centuries
 Schleswig-Holstein uprisings
 Seneca Falls convention
 South Africa, labor movement
 Spartacus, historical and modern era
 Student movements, Europe
 Student movements, global South
 Sudanese protest in the Turko-Egyptian era
 Swedish Revolution of 1809
 Swing Riots
 Sylvis, William H. (1829–1869) and the National Labor Union
 Syndicalism, France
 Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864
 Taiwan, anti-imperialism and nationalism
 Togliatti, Palmiro (1893–1964)
 Trinidad, anti-colonial movement
 Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)
 Turkey, protest and revolution, 1800s–1923

- Utopian intentional communities
 Venezuelan War of Independence
 Vietnam, protest against colonialism,
 1858–1896
 Vinegar Hill/Castle Hill Rebellion, 1804
 Wales, nationalist protest, 19th century
 Wilberforce, William (1759–1833)
 Woman’s Christian Temperance Union
 Women in the 1848 Revolution, Poland
 Women’s movement, Australia
 Women’s movement, Britain
 Women’s movement, Greece, formation of
 Women’s movement, Southern Africa
 Women’s movements, Eastern Europe
 World Anti-Slavery Convention, London
 Wright, Frances “Fanny” (1795–1852)
 Yaa Asantewaa (ca. 1840–1921)
 Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Rebellion
 Yoruba Wars, 19th century
 Young Ireland
 Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919)
 and the Comuna Morelense
 Zola, Emile (1840–1902)
- 20th Century–Present**
 Afghanistan, 1978 Revolution and
 Islamic Civil War
 African American resistance,
 Jim Crow era
 Agbekoya Peasant Uprising and
 Rebellion, 1968–1969
 Albania, socialism
 Alcatraz Uprising and the American
 Indian Movement
 Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962
 Anarchism
 Anarchism in the United States,
 1946–present
 Anti-apartheid movement, South Africa
 Anti-nuclear movement, Japan
 Anti-Vietnam War movement,
 United States
 Arafat, Yasser (1929–2004), Fatah, and the
 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
 Argentina, human rights movement
 Armenian resistance, 1915
 ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of
 Financial Transactions for the Aid of
 Citizens)
 Australian aboriginal protests
 Bangladesh, struggle for liberation, 1971
 Ben-Gurion, David (1866–1973)
 and the Haganah
 Biennio Rosso (1919–1920)
 Black nationalism, 19th and 20th centuries
 Bolivia, War of the Pacific to the
 National Revolution, 1879–1952
 Botswana, protest and nationalism
 Burma, national movement
 against British colonial rule
 Cambodia, communist protests
 and revolution
 Canada, indigenous resistance
 Caribbean protest music
 Carson, Rachel (1907–1964)
 Castro, Fidel (b. 1926)
 Chávez, César (1927–1993) and the
 United Farm Workers
 Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian
 Revolution, 1998–present
 Chile, social and political struggles,
 1850–1970
 China, protest and revolution, 1800–1911
 Chinese Communist Revolution,
 1925–1949
 Civil rights movement, United States,
 1960–1965
 Colombia, armed insurgency, peasant
 self-defense, and radical popular
 movements, 1970s–1990s
 Color revolutions
 Congo Crisis, 1960–1965
 Cordobazo and Rosariazo Uprising, 1969
 Côte d’Ivoire, pre-independence
 protest and liberation
 Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959
 Cyprus, protest and revolt
 Dalit liberation struggles
 Dominican Republic, protest and
 resistance to US imperialism
 Dutch Caribbean, protest and
 revolution, 1815–2000
 East Timor, anti-colonial struggle,
 1974 to independence
 Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War
 Ecological protest movements
 Ecuador, protest and revolution
 Fascism, protest and revolution
 Fiji, parliamentary insurrection
 France, post-World War II
 labor protests
 Francophone Africa, protest
 and independence
 G8 protests, Genoa, 2001
 German Democratic Republic protests,
 1945–1989

c *Lexicon*

- Germany, resistance to Nazism
Global Day of Action Against Capitalism,
June 18 (J18), 1999
Global justice movement and resistance
Greece, socialism, communism, and
the left, 1974–2008
Greenpeace
Grenadian Revolution, 1979–1983
Guadeloupe, labor protest
Guatemala, Democratic Spring, 1944–1954
Guatemala, worker struggles and the labor
movement, 1960s–1990s
Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967)
Guyana, protests and revolts
Hindu nationalism, Hindutva, and women
Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh)
(1890–1969)
Hong Kong democracy protests
Huk Rebellion, 1946–1954
Hungary, Revolution of 1956
Immigrant protests, United States, 2000s
Immigrant and social conflict, France
India, armed struggle in the independence
movement
India, Great Rebellion of 1857
(the Sepoy Revolt)
Indochina, World War II and liberation in
Iran, political and cultural protests,
1844–1914
Iraq, Revolution of 1958
Islamic political currents
Israeli peace movement
Italy, from the new left to the
great repression (1962–1981)
Jamaica, independence movement,
1950–present
Japan, resistance to construction
of Narita airport
Jewish Bund
Kenya, national protests for independence
Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot
Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah
Mussau (1902–1989) and the
Shi’ite Islamic Revolution
King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968)
and the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC)
Korea, labor movement, 20th century
Kurdistan nationalist movement and
the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
La Matanza 1932 Peasant Revolt
Labor revolutionary currents,
United States, 20th century
Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP)
and Sri Lankan radicalism
Lesbian, gay, transsexual,
bisexual movements
Malawi national liberation
Malaysia, protest and revolt
Malta, protest and revolution
Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918)
Mao Zedong (1893–1976)
Maori indigenous resistance
Mau Mau Rebellion, 1952–1959
Mendes, Chico (1944–1988)
and Amazonian rainforest
protest and resistance
Mexico, indigenous and peasant
struggles, 1980s–present
Micronesia, nationalist and labor protests
Movement of Recuperated
Factories, Argentina
Mozambique, worker protests
Music, songs, and protest, France
Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945)
Namibia, struggle for independence
Native American protest, 20th century
Naxalite movement, 1967–1972
Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s
Nigeria, protest and revolution,
20th century
Non-violent revolutions
Nordic revolts and popular protests,
1500–present
Pakistan, protest and rebellion
Paraguay, protest and revolt, 1954–1989
Peru, “people’s war,” counterinsurgency,
and the popular movement
Philippines, protests, 1980s–present
Portugal, protest and revolution,
20th century
Prague Spring
Puerto Rican independence movement,
1898–present
Punk movement
Québécois nationalism and
Lévesque, René (1922–1987)
Quit India movement
Reclaim the Streets
Red Brigades
Red Summer, United States, 1919
Romania, protest and revolution,
20th century
Russia, Revolution of October/
November 1917
Salvadoran Civil War, 1980–1991

Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
 Saud, Abd al-Aziz ibn (ca. 1880–1953) and the founding of modern Saudi Arabia
 Saya San (Hsaya San) movement of the 1930s
 Serbia, anti-bureaucratic revolution, 1987–1989
 Sexuality and revolution
 Sierra Leone, protest and revolution
 Slovakia, 1944 Uprising
 Solomon Islands, protest and uprisings
 South Africa, labor movement
 Soviet Union, fall of
 Spanish Revolution
 Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”
 Student movements, global South
 Sudanese protest under Anglo-Egyptian rule
 Swaziland, nationalist and economic protests
 Syria and Iraq, Baathists
 Taiwan, anti-imperialism and nationalism
 Tajikistan, protests and revolts
 Tamil nationalist struggle for Eelam
 Tanzania, protest and independence
 Thailand, popular movements, 1980s–present
 Tiananmen Square protests, 1989
 Tibet Uprising and resistance
 Trinidad, anti-colonial movement
 Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan
 Turkish republic protests, 1923–1946
 Turkmenistan, protest and revolt
 Uganda, protests against British colonialism and occupation
 Unemployed protests
 Urban rebellions, United States
 Uruguay, left-wing politics from the Tupamaros to the Frente Amplio
 Utopian intentional communities
 Uzbekistan, national movement and protests
 Venezuela, MBR-200 and the military uprisings of 1992
 Vietnam, protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974
 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, 1943
 Women and national liberation in Africa
 Women’s movement, Cuba
 Women’s movement, Latin America

Workers’ self-management, Yugoslavia
 World Social Forums
 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Seattle, 1999
 Yugoslavia, anti-fascist “People’s Liberation War” and revolution, 1941–1945
 Zambian nationalism and protests
 Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas uprising
 Zimbabwe, national liberation movement
 Zionism

Geographic

Global

Anti-war movement, Iraq
 ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens)
 Critical Mass
 Eco-anarchism
 Ecological protest movements
 Food Not Bombs, United States
 Food riots
 Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism
 Global Day of Action Against Capitalism, June 18 (J18), 1999
 Global justice movement and resistance
 Grassroots resistance to corporate globalization
 Green Bans Movement, Australia
 Greenpeace
 Imperialism and capitalist development
 Imperialism, historical evolution
 Imperialism, modernization to globalization
 Indymedia global justice campaign, 2000s
 Infoshops
 International Women’s Day
 International Workers of the World, marine transport workers
 Islamic political currents
 Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements
 Marxism
 May 1968 French uprisings
 May Day
 Migration struggles and the global justice movement
 Non-violent movements: foundations and early expressions

- Non-violent movements: struggles
for rights, justice, and identities
- Non-violent revolutions
- Peoples' Global Action Network
- Postcolonial feminism and protest
in the global South
- Sexuality and revolution
- Socialism
- Spartacus, historical and modern era
- Student movements
- Student movements, global South
- Unemployed protests
- Vegetarian protests and movements
- Via Campesina and peasant struggles
- World Social Forums
- World Trade Organization
(WTO) protests, Cancun, 2003
- World Trade Organization
(WTO) protests, Doha, 2001
- World Trade Organization
(WTO) protests, Hong Kong, 2005
- World Trade Organization
(WTO) protests, Quebec City, 2001
- World Trade Organization
(WTO) protests, Seattle, 1999
- Young Communist International
- Yugoslavia, formation of the
non-aligned movement
- Africa**
- Abdurahman, Abdullah (1872–1940)
- Agbekoya Peasant Uprising and
Rebellion, 1968–1969
- Aggett, Neil (1954–1982)
- Algerian Islamic Salvation Front
- Algerian National Revolution,
1954–1962
- Anarchism and syndicalism,
Southern Africa
- Angolan national liberation, 1961–1974
- Anti-apartheid movement, South Africa
- Bain, J. T. (1860–1919)
- Barayi, Elijah (1930–1994)
- Ben Bella, Ahmad (b. 1918)
- Botswana, protest and nationalism
- Burkina Faso, Revolution, 1983
- Cabral, Amilcar (1924–1973)
- Cameroon, popular anti-colonial protest
- Cape Verde, independence struggle
- Chilembwe, John (1871–1915)
- Chiluba, Frederick (b. 1943)
- Chimurenga armed struggles
- Chissano, Juaquim (b. 1939)
- Communist Party of South Africa,
1921–1950
- Congo armed insurgency,
Mobutu decamps
- Congo, Brazzaville protest and revolt
- Congo Crisis, 1960–1965
- Congo, Kinshasa protest and revolt
- Congo, protest and uprisings, 1998–2002
- COSATU (Congress of South
African Trade Unions)
- Côte d'Ivoire, post-independence protest
- Côte d'Ivoire, pre-independence
protest and liberation
- Dahomey Women's Army
- Dunbar, Andrew (1879–1964)
- Egypt and Arab socialism
- Egypt, Peasant Rebellion of 1824
- Egypt, Revolution of 1952
- Ellis, Daniel Edward "Daan" (1904–1963)
- Ethiopia, Revolution of 1974
- Francophone Africa, protest
and independence
- FRELIMO (Frente de
Libertação de Moçambique)
- Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand
(1869–1948)
- Ghana, nationalism and socialist transition
- Gomas, Johnny (1901–1979)
- Guinea-Bissau, nationalist movement
- Hani, Chris (1942–1993)
- Harris, Charles (1896–1939)
- Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949)
and the Muslim Brotherhood
- Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (b. 1938)
- Ife-Modakeke conflict
- James, C. L. R. (1901–1989)
- Kabyl resistance to government
- Kaunda, Kenneth (b. 1924)
- Kenya, national protests for independence
- Kenyatta, Jomo (1893–1978)
- Khama, Seretse (1921–1980)
and Botswana nationalism
- Lesotho, popular protest and resistance
- Liberia, protest and revolution
in the modern era
- Lumumba, Patrice (1925–1961)
- Machel, Samora (1933–1986)
- Madagascar, protests and revolts,
19th and 20th centuries
- Mahdist Revolt
- Malawi national liberation
- Mali, protests and uprisings, 1850s–2005
- Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918)

- Maripe, Knight (1927–2006)
 Marks, J. B. (1903–1972)
 Mau Mau Rebellion, 1952–1959
 Mayekiso, Moses (b. 1948)
 Mboya, Tom (1930–1969) and the
 Kenya labor movement
 Mondlane, Eduardo Chivambo
 (1920–1969)
 Morocco, protests, 1600s–1990s
 Mozambique, worker protests
 Mpho, Motsamai (b. 1921)
 MPLA (Movimento Popular de
 Libertação de Angola)
 Mugabe, Robert (b. 1924)
 Muhammad ‘Ali (1769–1849)
 Mzingeli, Charles (1905–1980)
 Namibia, struggle for independence
 Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970)
 Négritude movement
 Neto, Augustinho (1922–1979)
 Niger Delta, protest movements
 Nigeria, 1993 political and electoral
 protest and conflict
 Nigeria, protest and revolution,
 20th century
 Nigeria, separatist agitation, contemporary
 Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972)
 Nujoma, Sam (b. 1929)
 Nyerere, Julius (1922–1999)
 Oke-Ogun Uprising
 Paulus, Petrus Jacobus “Arrie” (b. 1930)
 Pinto, Pio Gama (1927–1965)
 Qaddafi, Muammar al- (b. 1942)
 Raditsela, Andries (1956–1985)
 Sachs, Solly (1900–1976)
 Samkange, Stanlake John William
 Thompson (1922–1988)
 São Tomé e Príncipe, labor/nationalists
 Saro-Wiwa, Ken (1941–1995)
 Sembène, Ousmane (1923–2007)
 Senegal, anti-neoliberal protests
 Senghor, Léopold (1906–2001)
 Sierra Leone, protest and revolution
 Sigamoney, Bernard L. E. (1888–1963)
 Simons, Ray Alexander (1913–2004)
 Singh, Makhan (1913–1973)
 Slovo, Joe (1926–1995)
 South Africa, African nationalism
 and the ANC
 South Africa, labor movement
 South Africa, water struggles
 South African Communist Party,
 1953–present
 Southern Africa, popular resistance
 to neoliberalism, 1982–2007
 Sudan, Aba Island Rebellion, 1970
 Sudanese protest under
 Anglo-Egyptian rule
 Sudanese protest in the
 Turko-Egyptian era
 Sudanese Women’s League
 SWAPO (South West African
 People’s Organization)
 Swaziland, nationalist and
 economic protests
 Tambo, Oliver (1917–1993)
 Tanzania, protest and independence
 Toivo ya Toivo, Andimba (b. 1924)
 Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)
 Tunisia, protests under Ottoman
 (Bey) rule to 1881
 Tunisian independence movement
 Uganda, protests against British
 colonialism and occupation
Ujamaa villages
 Urabi movement
 Witbooi, Hendrik (ca. 1825–1905)
 Women and national liberation in Africa
 Women’s movement, Southern Africa
 Women’s War of 1929
 Yaa Asantewaa (ca. 1840–1921)
 Yoruba Wars, 19th century
 Zambian nationalism and protests
 Zanzibar Revolution
 Zimbabwe, labor movement and
 politics, 1980–2007
 Zimbabwe, labor movement, 1890–1980
 Zimbabwe, national liberation
 movement
 Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA)
 Zwane, Ambrose Phesheya (1922–1998)
- Asia**
 Ambedkar, B. R. (1891–1956)
 Anarchism, China
 Anarchism, Japan
 Anarchism, Korea
 Anti-nuclear movement, Japan
 April Revolution, Nepal, 2006
 Aung San (1915–1947)
 Bangladesh, struggle for liberation, 1971
 Bengal, popular uprisings and
 movements in the colonial era
 Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945)
 Burma, national movement against
 British colonial rule

- Cambodia, anti-colonial protests, 1863–1945
- Cambodia, communist protests and revolution
- Central Asian protest movements
- Chen Duxiu (1879–1942)
- China, Maoism and popular power, 1949–1969
- China, protest and revolution, 1800–1911
- China, student protests, 20th century
- Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949
- Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911
- Dalit liberation struggles
- Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997)
- East Timor, anti-colonial struggle, 1974 to independence
- Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948)
- Gunawardena, Don Philip Rupasinghe (1901–1972)
- Hindu nationalism, Hindutva, and women
- Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh) (1890–1969)
- Hong Kong democracy protests
- Huk Rebellion, 1946–1954
- India, armed struggle in the independence movement
- India, civil disobedience movement and demand for independence
- India, Great Rebellion of 1857 (the Sepoy Revolt)
- India, Hindutva and fascist mobilizations, 1989–2002
- India, nationalism, extremist
- India, non-violent non-cooperation movement, 1918–1929
- Indian national liberation
- Indigo Rebellion
- Indochina, World War II and liberation in
- Indonesia, colonial protests, 16th century to 1900
- Indonesian revolution and counterrevolution
- Iqbal, Muhammad (1877–1938)
- Japan, labor protest, 1945–present
- Japan, pacifist movement, 1945–present
- Japan, post-World War II protest movements
- Japan, protest and revolt, 1800–1945
- Japan, resistance to construction of Narita airport
- Jinnah, Muhammad Ali (1876–1948)
- Kashmir, under India
- Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot
- Khuda-i Khidmatgar: Pashtun non-violent resistance force (1929–1948)
- Korea, labor movement, 20th century
- Korea, popular rebellions and uprisings, 1492–1910
- Korea, post-World War II popular movements for democracy
- Kwangju student uprising
- Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and Sri Lankan radicalism
- Laos, protest and revolution, 19th and 20th centuries
- Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969)
- Lu Xun (1881–1936)
- Malaysia, protest and revolt
- Mao Zedong (1893–1976)
- Meilidao protests, 1978
- Ming Rebellions, 1600s
- Moplah Revolts
- Moro national liberation
- Narayan, Jayaprakash (1902–1979)
- Naxalite movement, 1967–1972
- Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964)
- Nepal, Maoists' rise
- Nepal, people's war and Maoists
- Nepal, protest movements, 19th and 20th centuries
- Peng Dehuai (1898–1974)
- People's Liberation Front of Sri Lanka (JVP)
- Philippines, colonial protests during the Spanish era
- Philippines, protest during the US era
- Philippines, protests, 1980s–present
- Qu Qiubai (1899–1935)
- Quit India movement
- Rampa rebellions in Andhra Pradesh
- Roy, Manabendra Nath (1887–1954)
- Santal Rebellion
- Saya San (Hsaya San) movement of the 1930s
- Sihanouk, Norodom (b. 1922)
- Singh, Bhagat (1907–1931)
- Sohyo
- Student movements, Korea
- Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925)
- Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864
- Taiwan, anti-imperialism and nationalism
- Taiwan, land reform
- Taiwan, 2-28 protests, 1947
- Tajikistan, protests and revolts

- Tamil nationalist struggle for Eelam
 Thai Communist Party
 Thailand, Patani Malay nationalism
 Thailand, popular movements, 1980s–present
 Tiananmen Square protests, 1989
 Tianjin Massacre, 1870
 Tibet Uprising and resistance
 Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan
 Turkmenistan, protest and revolt
 Uzbekistan, national movement and protests
 Vietnam, anti-colonial, nationalist, and communist movements, 1900–1939
 Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954
 Vietnam, protest against colonialism, 1858–1896
 Vietnam, protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974
 Vietnam, protests, 1975–1993
 Vo Nguyen Giap (b. 1911)
 Wang Ming (1904–1974)
 Women’s movement, India
 Women’s movement, Japan
 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Hong Kong, 2005
 Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Rebellion
 Zenroren Labor Federation
 Zhang Guotao (1897–1979)
 Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)
 Zhu De (1886–1976)
- Eastern and Central Europe**
 Albania, socialism
 Albanian nationalism
 Anabaptist movement
 Anarchism, Hungary
 Anarchism, Russia
 Anti-fascist People’s Front
 Armenia, mass protest and popular mobilization, 1980s to present
 Austria, 20th-century protests
 Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876)
 Balkan socialist confederation, 1910–1948
 Baltic protests in the 20th century
 Benjamin, Walter (1892–1940)
 Bolsheviks
 Brecht, Bertolt (1899–1956)
 Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888–1938)
 Bulgaria, anti-Soviet movements
 Bulgaria, 20th-century leftist and workers’ movements
 Castoriadis, Cornelius (1922–1997)
 Color revolutions
 Communist Party, Germany
 Cyprus, protest and revolt
 Czechoslovakia, resistance to Soviet political and economic rule
 Decembrists to the rise of Russian Marxism
 Dubček, Alexander (1921–1992)
 Dutschke, Rudi (1940–1979)
 Eisenstein, Sergei (1898–1948)
 Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895)
 Ethnic and nationalist revolts in the Hapsburg Empire, 1500–1848
 European revolutions of 1848
 Feuchtwanger, Lion (1884–1958)
 Frankfurt School (Jewish émigrés)
 G8 protests, Heiligendamm, June 2007
 German Democratic Republic protests, 1945–1989
 German Peasant Rebellion, 1525
 German Revolution, 1918–1923
 Germany, socialism and nationalism
 Global Day of Action Against the IMF and World Bank, Prague, September 26 (S26), 2000
 Gorbachev, Mikhail (b. 1931)
 Grass, Gunter (b. 1927)
 Greece, anti-dictatorship protests
 Greece, partisan resistance
 Greece, socialism, communism, and the left, 1850–1974
 Greek nationalism
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831)
 Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism
 Hungary, protests, 1815–1920
 Hungary, Revolution of 1848
 Hungary, Revolution of 1956
 Jabotinsky, Vladimir (Ze’ev) (1880–1940) and revisionist Zionism
 Jewish Bund
 Jewish resistance to Nazism
 Jews and revolution in Europe, 1789–1919
 Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938)
 Kollontai, Alexandra (1872–1952)
 Kosovo, civil and armed resistance, 1990s
 Kronstadt Mutiny of 1921
 Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921)

- Kurdistan nationalist movement and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
 Landauer, Gustav (1870–1919)
 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924)
 Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements, Germany
 Liebknecht, Karl (1871–1919)
 Luther, Martin (1483–1546)
 Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919)
 Makhno, Nestor (1889–1934)
 Marx, Karl (1818–1883)
 Masaryk, Tomas (1850–1937)
Mein Kampf
 Michnik, Adam (b. 1946)
 Milosz, Czeslaw (1911–2004)
 Müntzer, Thomas (ca. 1489–1525)
 Nagy, Imre (1896–1957)
 Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900)
 Pilsudski, Józef (1867–1935)
 Poland, Committee for Workers (KOR)
 Poland, 1956 Uprising
 Poland, revolutions, 1846–1863
 Poland, trade unions and protest, 1988–1993
 Polish Revolution (Sejm), 1788–1792
 Polish Revolution, 1905–1907
 Poulantzas, Nicos (1936–1979)
 Prague Spring
 Pugachev's Rebellion, 1773–1775
 Romania, protest and revolution, 20th century
 Romania, protests and revolts, 18th and 19th centuries
 Russia, cholera riots of 1830–1831
 Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907
 Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917
 Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917
 Russia, Revolutions: sources and contexts
 Russian Civil War, 1918–1924
 Russian revolutionary labor upsurge, 1912–1914
 Serbia, anti-bureaucratic revolution, 1987–1989
 Shlyapnikov, Alexander Gavrilovich (1885–1937)
 Silesian Uprisings
 Slovakia, 1944 Uprising
 Solidarność (Solidarity)
 Soviet Union, fall of
 Spiridonova, Maria (1884–1941)
 Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and "Revolution from Above"
 Student movement, Greece, 1990–1991
 Student movements, Czechoslovakia, 1960s
 Student movements, Europe
 Sturm und Drang
 Syndicalism, Greece
 Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980)
 Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)
 Turkey, anti-secular protest, 1980–present
 Turkey, protest and revolution, 1800s–1923
 Turkey, working-class protest, 1960–1980
 Turkish rebellions, 1918–1925
 Turkish republic protests, 1923–1946
 Ukraine Orange Revolution, 2004–2005
 Union for Women's Equality
 Velvet Revolution, 1989
 Walesa, Lech (b. 1943)
 War communism and the rise of the Soviet Union
 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, 1943
 West German "new left"
 White Rose (Weiße Rose)
 Women in the 1848 Revolution, Poland
 Women in the Russian Revolution
 Women in the Solidarity movement, Polish underground
 Women's movement, Germany
 Women's movement, Greece, formation of
 Women's movement, Soviet Union
 Women's movements, Eastern Europe
 Workers' self-management, Yugoslavia
 Yugoslavia, anti-fascist "People's Liberation War" and revolution, 1941–1945
 Yugoslavia, anti-privatization struggles
 Zasulich, Vera (1849–1919)
 Zetkin, Clara (1857–1933)
 Žižek, Slavoj (b. 1949)
- Latin America and the Caribbean**
 Agüeybaná (d. 1510) and Agüeybaná II (d. 1511)
 Alves, Margarida Maria (1943–1983)
 Anarchism, Argentina
 Anarchism, Chile
 Andresote and the Revolt against the Guipuzcoana (1731–1733)

- Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán (1913–1971)
 Argentina, armed struggle and guerilla organizations, 1960s–1970s
 Argentina, general strike (*Semana Trágica*), 1919
 Argentina, human rights movement
 Argentina, indigenous popular protests
 Argentina, labor strikes of 1890 and 1902
 Argentina, labor unions and protests of the unemployed, 1990s
 Argentina, *Semana Roja*, 1909
 Argentina, social and political protest, 2001–2007
 Argentina, socialist and communist workers' movement
 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (b. 1953)
 Banana Plantation Worker Rebellion, 1928
 Barbados and the Windward Islands, protest and revolt
 Belize, national independence movement
Bogotazo and *La Violencia*
 Bolivarianism, Venezuela
 Bolivia, protest and repression, 1964–2000
 Bolivia, War of the Pacific to the National Revolution, 1879–1952
 Bolivian neoliberalism, social mobilization, and revolution from below, 2003 and 2005
 Brazil, guerilla movements, 20th century
 Brazil, labor struggles
 Brazil, peasant movements and liberation theology
 Brazil, rebellions from independence to the republic (1700s–1889)
 Brazil, workers and the left: Partido dos Trabalhadores and Central Única dos Trabalhadores
 Cabanagem of Grão-Pará, Brazil, 1835–1840
 Canudos, religion and rebellion in 19th-century Brazil
Caracazo, 1989
 Caribbean protest music
 Carney, James Francis “Guadalupe” (1925–1983?)
 Casa del Obrero Mundial
 Castro, Fidel (b. 1926)
 Central America, music and resistance
 Chávez, César (1927–1993) and the United Farm Workers
 Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954)
 Chile and the peaceful road to socialism
 Chile, people's power
 Chile, popular resistance against Pinochet
 Chile, social and political struggles, 1850–1970
Cocaleros peasant uprising
 Cochabamba Water Wars
 Colombia, armed insurgency, peasant self-defense, and radical popular movements, 1960s–1970s
 Colombia, armed insurgency, peasant self-defense, and radical popular movements, 1970s–1990s
 Colombia, indigenous mobilization
 Colombia, Thousand Days' War, 1899–1902
 Colombia, unions, strikes, and anti-neoliberal opposition, 1990–2005
 Cordobazo and Rosariazo Uprising, 1969
 Costa Rican Civil War and Uprising, 1948
 Cristero uprising, Mexico, 1928
 Cuauhtémoc (1502–1525)
 Cuba, anti-racist movement and the Partido Independiente de Color
 Cuba, struggle for independence from Spain, 1868–1898
 Cuban post-revolutionary protests
 Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959
 Cuban revolutionary government
 Daquilema, Fernando (d. 1872) and the 1871 Uprising, Ecuador
 Demerara Slave Rebellion, 1823
 Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806)
 Dominican Republic, protest and resistance to US imperialism, 1916–1962
 Dominican Republic, protests, 1844–1915
 Dominican Republic, resistance to military and US invasion, 1963–1965
 Dutch Caribbean, protest and revolution, 1815–2000
 Ecuador, protest and revolution
 Ejército de Liberación Nacional, Colombia
El Argentinaazo: December 19 and 20, 2001
 EPR (Ejército Popular Revolucionario)
 Ezeiza Protest and Massacre, 1973
 Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)
 FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army)
 FPMR (Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez)
 Freire, Paulo (1921–1997)
 French Caribbean in the Age of Revolution

- French Guiana, ecological
 movements against the Guiana
 Space Center in Kourou
- French Guiana, political movements
 against departmentalization
- Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer (1898–1948),
 UNIR, and revolutionary
 populism in Colombia
- Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo
- Grenadian Revolution, 1979–1983
- Grove Vallejo, Marmaduke (1879–1954)
- Guadeloupe, labor protest
- Guaicaipuro (ca. 1530–1568)
- Guatemala, popular rebellion and civil war
- Guatemala, worker struggles and the labor
 movement, 1960s–1990s
- Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967)
- Guyana, protests and revolts
- Haiti, democratic uprising, 1980s–1991
- Haiti, resistance to US occupation
- Haiti, revolutionary revolts, 1790s
- Haiti, revolutionary struggles
- Haiti, Saint-Domingue and revolutionary
 France
- Haitian Revolution and independence,
 1801–1804
- Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl (1895–1979)
- Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel (1753–1811)
- HIJOS movement, Children of the
 Disappeared
- Jamaica, independence movement,
 1950–present
- Jamaica, peasant uprisings, 19th century
- Jamaica, rebellion and resistance,
 1760–1834
- Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion
- Katarismo and indigenous popular
 mobilization, Bolivia, 1970s–present
- La Ceiba Uprising of 1924
- Latin America, Catholic Church
 and liberation, 16th century to present
- Latin American punk rock and protest
- Machado, popular Cuban anti-government
 struggle, 1930s
- Madres de la Plaza de Mayo
- Magón, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922) and the
 Magonistas
- Manley, Michael (1924–1997)
- Mariátegui, José Carlos (1894–1930)
- Marighella, Carlos (1911–1969) and the
 Brazilian urban guerilla movement
- Mármol, Miguel (1905–1993)
- Martí, Farabundo (1893–1932)
- Mendes, Chico (1944–1988)
 and Amazonian rainforest protest
 and resistance
- Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921
- Mexico, indigenous and peasant
 struggles, 1980s–present
- Mexico, labor movement and
 protests, 1980–2005
- Movement of Recuperated
 Factories, Argentina
- Movimento Sem Terra (MST)
- MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario
 Túpac Amaru)
- Muralista movement
- Music and protest, Latin America
- Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s
- Oaxaca uprising, 2006
- Obregón, Alvaro (1880–1928) and
 the Sonoran generation
- Ogé’s Revolt, 1790
- Palmares Slave Revolts, 1602–1603
- Paraguay, popular resistance to the
 rise of the military (1936–1954)
- Paraguay, protest in the post-
 Stroessner era
- Paraguay, protest and revolt, 1954–1989
- Peronist resistance
- Peru, neoliberalism and social
 mobilization, 1990s–2000s
- Peru, “people’s war,” counterinsurgency,
 and the popular movement
- Prestes, Luís Carlos (1898–1990)
 and Prestes, Olga Benário
 (1908–1942)
- Puerto Rican independence movement,
 1898–present
- Queen Nanny and Maroon resistance
- Salvadoran Civil War, 1980–1991
- Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula da (b. 1945)
- Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian
 Revolution, 1796–1799
- Trinidad, anti-colonial movement
- Túpac Amaru (1540–1572)
- Uruguay, labor and populist
 movements, 1965–present
- Uruguay, left-wing politics from the
 Tupamaros to the Frente Amplio
- Velasco Alvarado, Juan Francisco
 (1910–1977)
- Venezuela, exclusionary democracy
 and resistance, 1958–1998
- Venezuela, guerilla movements,
 1960s–1980s

- Venezuela, MAS and Causa Radical
 Venezuela, MBR-200 and the military uprisings of 1992
 Venezuela, solidarity economy, social property, co-management, and workers' control
 Venezuelan War of Independence
 Via Campesina and peasant struggles
 Villa, Pancho (ca. 1878–1923) and the division of the North
 Williams, Eric (1911–1981)
 Women's movement, Anglophone Caribbean
 Women's movement, Cuba
 Women's movement, French Windward Islands
 Women's movement, Haiti
 Women's movement, Latin America
 Women's movement, Venezuela
 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Cancun, 2003
 Zamora, Ezequiel (1817–1860)
 Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919) and the Comuna Morelense
 Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas uprising
 Zumbi (ca. 1655–1695)
- Middle East**
 Afghanistan, 1978 Revolution and Islamic Civil War
 Afghanistan, resistance to 19th-century British invasion
 al-Sanusi, Muhammad ibn Ali (ca. 1787–1859)
 Arab left and socialist movements, 1861–1930
 Arafat, Yasser (1929–2004), Fatah, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
 Bacha-i Sakkao's movement
 Barzani, Mulla Mustafa al- (1903–1979)
 Begin, Menachem (1913–1992) and the Irgun
 Ben-Gurion, David (1866–1973) and the Haganah
 Bin Laden, Osama (b. 1957) and al-Qaeda
 Black September
 Cedar Revolution, Lebanon
 Durrani empire, popular protests, 1747–1823
 Fahd, Yusuf Salman Yusuf (1901–1949)
 Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1911–1984)
 Hamas: origins and development
 Hezbollah: organization and uprisings
 Intifada I and Intifada II
 Iran, Kurdish national autonomy movement
 Iran, the Mossadegh era: democratic socialists and the US-backed coup
 Iran, political and cultural protests, 1844–1914
 Iranian Revolution, 1979
 Iraq, anti-British nationalists
 Iraq, protest, rebellion, and revolution: overview
 Iraq, Revolt of 1920
 Iraq, Revolution of 1958
 Iraqi resistance, 1991–2007
 Israeli peace movement
 Israeli settlers movement
 Jalib, Habib (1928–1993)
 Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Mussaui (1902–1989) and the Shi'ite Islamic Revolution
 Lebanese insurrection of 1958
 Lebanon, civil war, 1975–1990
 Lebanon, 19th-century revolts
 Mossadegh, Mohammad (1881–1967)
 Nasir, Hassan (1928–1960)
 Nasrallah, Sayed Hassan (b. 1960)
 Pakistan, Bengali nationalist struggles
 Pakistan, protest and rebellion
 Roshaniya movement and the Khan Rebellion
 Salam 'Adel (1924–1963) and the Communist Party, Iraq
 Saud, Abd al-Aziz ibn (ca. 1880–1953) and the founding of modern Saudi Arabia
 Syria and Iraq, Baathists
 Taliban, 1996–2007
Wathbah of 1948
 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Doha, 2001
 Yemen Socialist Revolution of 1962
- North America**
 Abalone Alliance
 Abu Jamal, Mumia (b. 1954)
 ACT UP
 Addams, Jane (1860–1935)
 African American resistance, Jim Crow era
 African American resistance, Reconstruction era
 African Blood Brotherhood

- Alcatraz Uprising and the
American Indian Movement
- Alinsky, Saul (1909–1972) and
the Industrial Areas Foundation
- Amana Inspirationist Utopians
- American Civil War (1861–1864)
- American left and Howard Zinn (b. 1922)
- American Revolution of 1776
- American slave rebellions
- Anarchism, Canada
- Anarchism in the United States to 1945
- Anarchism in the United States,
1946–present
- Anthony, Susan B. (1820–1906)
- Anti-slavery movement, United States,
1700–1870
- Anti-Vietnam War movement,
United States
- Aptheker, Herbert (1915–1903)
- Atlantic port seaman resistance,
American Revolutionary era
- Berkeley Free Speech Movement
- Black Panthers
- Bonus Army Unemployed
Movement, 1932
- Boston Tea Party
- Bread and Puppet Theater
- Bread and Roses Strike
- Brown, H. Rap (b. 1943)
- Brown, John (1800–1859)
- Canada, indigenous resistance
- Canada, labor protests
- Canada, law and public protest: history
- Canada, Rebellion of 1837–1838
- Carmichael, Stokely/Kwame Turé
(1941–1998)
- Carson, Rachel (1907–1964)
- Catholic Worker movement
- Chomsky, Noam (b. 1928)
- Civil rights, United States: overview
- Clayoquot Sound
- Commoner, Barry (b. 1917)
- Communist Party of the United States
of America (CPUSA)
- Concordia University student protests
- Cooperative Commonwealth
- Cop Watch Los Angeles
- CORE (Congress of Racial Equality)
- Crazy Horse (1849–1877), Sitting Bull
(1831–1890), and Native American
resistance at the Battle of
Little Bighorn
- Cuffe, Paul (1759–1817)
- Davis, Angela (b. 1944)
- Day, Dorothy (1897–1980)
- Debs, Eugene (1855–1926)
- Dix, Dorothea (1802–1887)
- Douglass, Frederick (1817–1895)
- Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963)
- Environmental protest, United
States, 19th century
- Evers, Medgar (1925–1963)
- Farm Labor Organizing Committee
- Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley (1890–1964)
- Fox, George (1624–1691)
- Freedom Rides
- Freedom Summer
- Friedan, Betty (1921–2006)
- Galleani, Luigi (1861–1931)
- Garrison, William Lloyd (1805–1879)
- Goldman, Emma (1869–1940)
- Greencorn Rebellion, Oklahoma, 1917
- Grimké, Angelina (1805–1879)
and Sarah (1792–1873)
- Harlem Renaissance
- Hawaii, resistance to US invasion
and occupation
- Haymarket tragedy
- Haywood, Big Bill (1869–1928)
- Hollywood Ten
- Hutchinson, Anne (1591–1643)
- Immigrant protests, United States, 2000s
- Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)
- Jackson, Jesse (b. 1941)
- Kent State student uprising
- King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968)
and the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC)
- Knights of Labor and Terence
Powderly (1849–1924)
- Labor revolutionary currents,
United States, 1775–1900
- Labor revolutionary currents,
United States, 20th century
- La Matanza* 1932 Peasant Revolt
- League of Revolutionary Black Workers
- Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual
movements, United States
- Lincoln, Abraham (1809–1865)
and African Americans
- London, Jack (1876–1916)
- Lowell Female Labor Reform Association
- Malcolm X (1925–1965)
- Masses, The*
- Mother Jones (1837–1930)
- Nat Turner Rebellion

- National Organization for Women (NOW)
 Native American protest, 20th century
 Non-interventionists, 1914–1945
 Oka crisis
 Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP)
 On-to-Ottawa Trek
 Paine, Thomas (1737–1809)
 Palmer Raids
 Parks, Rosa (1913–2005) and the Montgomery Bus Boycott
 Paul, Alice (1885–1977)
 Prince Edward Island protests, 1830s
 Québécois nationalism and Lévesque, René (1922–1987)
 Radical Reconstruction, United States, promise and failure of
 Randolph, A. Phillip (1889–1979)
 Red Summer, United States, 1919
 Regina Riot
 Revolutionary Action Movement
 Robeson, Paul (1898–1976)
 Sacco and Vanzetti case
 Sanger, Margaret (1879–1966) and the American birth control movement
 Saskatchewan socialist movement
 Scottsboro Resistance
 Seneca Falls convention
 Shakers Utopian Community
 Sharp, Gene (b. 1928)
 Shays' Rebellion
 Slave rescues and the Underground Railroad, United States
 Socialist Party, United States
 Sojourner Truth Organization
 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady (1815–1902)
 Steinem, Gloria (b. 1934)
 Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)
 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
 Sylvis, William H. (1829–1869) and the National Labor Union
 Triangle Shirtwaist fire protests
 Tubman, Harriet (ca. 1819–1913)
 Uhuru movement
 Urban rebellions, United States
 US labor rebellions and the rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)
 Utopian communities, United States
 Vesey's Rebellion
 Washington, George (1732–1799)
 Wells, Ida B. (1862–1931) and the anti-lynching campaign
 Whiskey Rebellion
 Woman's Christian Temperance Union
 Women's movement, United States, 16th–18th centuries
 Women's movement, United States, 19th century
 Women's movement, United States, 20th century
 Woodhull, Victoria (1838–1927)
 World Anti-Slavery Convention, London
 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Quebec City, 2001
 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Seattle, 1999
 Wright, Frances "Fanny" (1795–1852)
- Oceania**
 Aboriginal/left struggle for land rights
 Anarchism, Australia
 Anarchism, New Zealand
 Australia, anti-war movement
 Australia, new social movements
 Australian aboriginal protests
 Australian labor movement
 Australian left
 Communist Party of Australia
 Communist Party NZ and the New Zealand revolutionary left
 Eureka Stockade
 Fiji, parliamentary insurrection
 French Polynesia, protest movements
 Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), Australia
 Kelly, Edward "Ned" (1855–1880) and the Kelly Gang
 Labor's Volunteer Army
 Lalor, Peter (1827–1889)
 Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements, Australia
 Maori indigenous resistance
 Micronesia, nationalist and labor protests
 Munday, Jack (b. 1929)
 New Australia movement
 New Caledonia, protest and revolt
 Nuclear-Free New Zealand, 1987
 Solomon Islands, protest and uprisings
 Springbok rugby tour protests, 1981
 Vanuatu, land reform protests
 Vinegar Hill/Castle Hill Rebellion, 1804
 Women's movement, Australia

Western Europe and Nordic Countries

- Abraham Lincoln Brigade
- Adorno, Theodor W. (1903–1969)
- Anarchism, Britain
- Anarchism, France
- Anarchism, Italy
- Anarchism, Spain
- Anti-Corn Law agitation, Britain, 19th century
- Anti-fascist People's Front
- Anti-Franco worker struggles, 1939–1975
- Anti-monarchy protests, Portugal
- Anti-slavery movement, Britain
- Anti-war movement, France, 20th century
- Asturias Uprising, October 1934
- Babeuf, François-Noël (1760–1797) and the Conspiracy of Equals
- Belgium, 20th-century political conflict
- Berlinguer, Enrico (1922–1984)
- Biennio Rosso (1919–1920)
- Blanqui, Louis Auguste (1805–1881)
- Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873)
- Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821)
- Bordiga, Amadeo (1889–1970) and the Italian Communist Party
- Bourses du Travail
- Bread Riots, Britain, 1795
- Brissot, Jacques Pierre (1754–1793)
- Britain, Renaissance-era conflict
- Britain, trade union movement
- Britain, women's suffrage campaign
- Catalan protests against centralism
- Catholic emancipation
- Chartists
- Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT)
- Confédération Générale du Travail and Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire
- Corsican independence movement
- Counterrevolution, France, 1789–1830
- Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658)
- Debord, Guy (1931–1994) and the Spectacle
- Denmark, insurrection and revolt
- De Valera, Eamon (1882–1975)
- Diderot, Denis (1713–1784)
- Disobbedienti/Tute Bianche
- Earth First!
- Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War
- Eighteenth Brumaire
- English Revolution, radical sects
- Enlightenment, France, 18th century
- European revolutions of 1848
- European Union Summit protests, Gothenburg, 2001
- Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI)
- Fifth Monarchist women
- France, 1830 Revolution
- France, post-World War II labor protests
- France, resistance to Nazism
- France, Revolution of 1848
- French Revolution, 1789–1794
- Fronde, France, 1648–1653
- G8 protests, Genoa, 2001
- Glorious Revolution, Britain, 1688
- Godwin, William (1756–1836)
- Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937)
- Gustav Rebellions
- Immigrant and social conflict, France
- Ireland, Age of Revolutions, 1775–1803
- Irish nationalism
- Irish revolts, 1400–1790
- Italian labor movement
- Italian Risorgimento
- Italy, from the anti-fascist resistance to the new left (1945–1960)
- Italy, from the new left to the great repression (1962–1981)
- Italy, operaism and post-operaism
- Jacobite risings, Britain, 1715 and 1745
- Jewish resistance to Nazism
- Lafayette, Marquis de (1757–1834)
- Lilburne, John (1615–1657)
- Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932)
- Malta, protest and revolution
- Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–1793)
- Marcuse, Herbert (1898–1979)
- May 1968 French uprisings
- Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–1872)
- Michel, Louise (1830–1905)
- Morris, William (1834–1896)
- Mujeres Libres
- Music, songs, and protest, France
- Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945)
- Netherlands, protests, 1800–2000
- Newport rising, Wales, 1839
- Nin, Andreu (1892–1937)
- Nordic revolts and popular protests, 1500–present
- Norway, protest and revolution
- O'Connell, Daniel (1775–1847)
- O'Connor, Arthur (1763–1852)
- Owen, Robert (1771–1858)
- Paisley, Ian (b. 1926) and Unionism, Northern Ireland

Pamphleteering and political protest,
 Dutch Republic, 1672
 Paris Commune, 1871
 Parnell, Charles Stewart (1846–1891)
 Portugal, protest and revolution,
 20th century
 POUM (Workers' Party of Marxist
 Unification)
 Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865)
 Reclus, Elisée (1830–1905)
 Red Brigades
 Red Scotland and the Scottish radical
 left, 1880–1932
 Reform Acts, Britain and Ireland, 1832
 Reformation
 Resistenza
 Robespierre, Maximilien de
 (1758–1794)
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778)
 Sánchez Saornil, Lucía (1895–1970)
 Sands, Bobby (1954–1981)
 Serrati, Giacinto Menotti (1872–1926)
 Settimana Rossa
 Sieyès, Abbé (1748–1836)
 Sinn Féin
 Smith, Adam (1723–1790)
 Socialism, Britain
 Spanish Revolution
 Student movements, Europe
 Swing Riots
 Syndicalism, France
 Thistlewood, Arthur (1774–1820)
 and the Cato Street Conspiracy
 Thompson, Edward Palmer (E. P.)
 (1924–1993)
 Togliatti, Palmiro (1893–1964)
 Voltaire (1694–1778)
 Wales, nationalist protest, 19th century
 Wesley, John (1703–1791), Methodism,
 and social reform
 Wilberforce, William (1759–1833)
 Wilkes, John (1725–1797) and the
 “Wilkes and Liberty” movement
 Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–1797)
 Women's movement, Britain
 Women's movement, France
 Women's movement, Italy
 Women's movement, Spain
 World Anti-Slavery Convention, London
 Yorkshire Rising, 1820
 Young Ireland
 Zola, Emile (1840–1902)
 Zwingli, Huldrych (1484–1531)

Thematic

Abolitionism and Civil Rights, Global
 Ambedkar, B. R. (1891–1956)
 Amo, Anton Wilhelm (1703–1759)
 and Afro-Germans
 Andresote and the Revolt against the
 Guipuzcoana (1731–1733)
 Anti-apartheid movement, South Africa
 Anti-slavery movement, Britain
 Anti-slavery movement, British, and
 the black response to colonization
 Anti-slavery movement, British, and the
 founding of Sierra Leone
 Argentina, human rights movement
 Barbados and the Windward Islands,
 protest and revolt
 Benezet, Anthony (1713–1784)
 Bishop, Maurice (1944–1983)
 Black Panthers
Bogotazo and *La Violencia*
 Bolivia, War of the Pacific to the National
 Revolution, 1879–1952
 Brazil, peasant movements and liberation
 theology
 Bread and Roses Strike
 Brissot, Jacques Pierre (1754–1793)
 Britain, post-World War II political protest
 Brixton Riots, 1981
 Bussa (d. 1816) and the Barbados slave
 insurrection
 Cabanagem of Grão-Pará, Brazil, 1835–1840
 Chirinos, José Leonardo (d. 1796)
 Clarkson, Thomas (1760–1846)
 Colombia, Afro-Colombian movements
 and anti-racist protests
 Cuba, anti-racist movement and the
 Partido Independiente de Color
 Cuba, struggle for independence
 from Spain, 1868–1898
 Curaçao, 1969 uprising
 Dalit liberation struggles
 Demerara Slave Rebellion, 1823
 Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806)
 Dominican Republic, protests, 1844–1915
 English Revolution, radical sects
 Enlightenment, France, 18th century
 Equiano, Olaudah (1745–1797)
 Fox, Charles James (1749–1806)
 France, Revolution of 1848
 French Caribbean in the Age
 of Revolution
 French Guiana, indigenous rebellions

Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940)
 and Garveyism
 Gouges, Olympe de (1745–1793)
 Haiti, revolutionary revolts, 1790s
 Haiti, revolutionary struggles
 Haiti, Saint-Domingue and
 revolutionary France
 Haitian Revolution and independence,
 1801–1804
 Hyde, Evan Anthony (b. 1947)
 Jamaica, independence movement,
 1950–present
 Jamaica, peasant uprisings, 19th century
 Jamaica, rebellion and resistance,
 1760–1834
 Leeward Islands, labor protests
 Mackandal, François (d. 1758)
 Morant Bay Rebellion: overview and
 assessment
 Négritude movement
 Notting Hill Riots, 1958
 Ogé’s Revolt, 1790
 Ontario Coalition Against
 Poverty (OCAP)
 Palmares Slave Revolts, 1602–1603
 Queen Nanny and Maroon resistance
 Rodney, Walter (1942–1980)
 Sharp, Granville (1735–1813)
 Shipboard insurrections in the
 Atlantic slave trade
 Spartacus, historical and modern era
 Student movements, global South
 Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian
 Revolution, 1796–1799
 Trinidad, anti-colonial movement
 Venezuela, MBR–200 and the military
 uprisings of 1992
 Venezuela, Negro Miguel
 Rebellion, 1552
 Venezuelan War of Independence
 Wesley, John (1703–1791), Methodism,
 and social reform
 Wilberforce, William (1759–1833)
 Women’s movement, French
 Windward Islands
 Women’s movement, Haiti
 Women’s movement, Southern Africa
 World Anti-Slavery
 Convention, London
 Yugoslavia, formation of the
 non-aligned movement
 Zimbabwe, national liberation movement
 Zumbi (ca. 1655–1695)

**Abolitionism and the Civil Rights
 Movement, United States**

Abdurahman, Abdullah (1872–1940)
 Abu Jamal, Mumia (b. 1954)
 Addams, Jane (1860–1935)
 African American resistance,
 Jim Crow era
 African American resistance,
 Reconstruction era
 African Blood Brotherhood
 American Civil War (1861–1864)
 American Civil War and slavery
 American left and Howard Zinn
 (b. 1922)
 American slave rebellions
 Anthony, Susan B. (1820–1906)
 Anti-Racist Action (ARA)
 Anti-slavery movement, Britain
 Anti-slavery movement, United
 States, 1700–1870
 Anti-Vietnam War movement,
 United States
 Aptheker, Herbert (1915–1903)
 Baker, Ella Josephine (1903–1986)
 Baraka, Imanu Amiri (b. 1934)
 Benezet, Anthony (1713–1784)
 Black nationalism, 19th and
 20th centuries
 Black Panthers
 Brown, H. Rap (b. 1943)
 Brown, John (1800–1859)
 Carmichael, Stokely/Kwame
 Turé (1941–1998)
 Catholic Worker movement
 Civil rights movement, United States,
 1960–1965
 Civil rights, United States, Black
 Power and backlash, 1965–1978
 Civil rights, United States: overview
 Columbia University civil rights protests
 Communist Party of the United
 States of America (CPUSA)
 CORE (Congress of Racial Equality)
 Cuffe, Paul (1759–1817)
 Davis, Angela (b. 1944)
 Douglass, Frederick (1817–1895)
 Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963)
 Dunayevskaya, Raya (1910–1987)
 Evers, Medgar (1925–1963)
 Freedom Rides
 Freedom Summer
 Gabriel’s Rebellion
 Garrison, William Lloyd (1805–1879)

Grimké, Angelina (1805–1879)
and Sarah (1792–1873)
Hampton, Fred (1948–1969)
Harlem Renaissance
House, Callie (1861–1928)
Jackson, Jesse (b. 1941)
King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968)
and the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC)
League of Revolutionary Black Workers
Lincoln, Abraham (1809–1865)
and African Americans
Malcolm X (1925–1965)
Meredith, James (b. 1933)
Nat Turner Rebellion
Paine, Thomas (1737–1809)
Parks, Rosa (1913–2005) and
the Montgomery Bus Boycott
Paul, Alice (1885–1977)
Radical Reconstruction, United
States, promise and failure of
Randolph, A. Phillip (1889–1979)
Red Summer, United States, 1919
Revolutionary Action Movement
Robeson, Paul (1898–1976)
Scottsboro Resistance
Seneca Falls convention
Shipboard insurrections in the
Atlantic slave trade
Slave rescues and the Underground
Railroad, United States
Spartacus, historical and modern era
Student Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC)
Sylvis, William H. (1829–1869) and
the National Labor Union
Truth, Sojourner (ca. 1797–1893)
Tubman, Harriet (ca. 1819–1913)
Uhuru movement
Urban rebellions, United States
Vesey's Rebellion
Walker, David (ca. 1796–1830)
Washington, George (1732–1799)
Wells, Ida B. (1862–1931) and the
anti-lynching campaign
Williams, Robert F. (1925–1996)
Women's movement, United States,
19th century
Women's movement, United States,
20th century
World Anti-Slavery
Convention, London
Wright, Frances "Fanny" (1795–1852)

Anarchism

Abalone Alliance
Anarchism
Anarchism, Argentina
Anarchism, Australia
Anarchism, Britain
Anarchism, Canada
Anarchism, Chile
Anarchism, China
Anarchism and culture, 1840–1939
Anarchism and education
Anarchism, Finland
Anarchism, France
Anarchism and gender
Anarchism, Greece
Anarchism, Hungary
Anarchism, Italy
Anarchism, Japan
Anarchism, Korea
Anarchism, Mexico
Anarchism, New Zealand
Anarchism, Poland
Anarchism, Puerto Rico
Anarchism, Russia
Anarchism and sabotage
Anarchism, Spain
Anarchism and syndicalism,
Southern Africa
Anarchism in the United
States to 1945
Anarchism in the United
States, 1946–present
Anarchocommunism
Anarchosyndicalism
Anti-Racist Action (ARA)
Argentina, *Grito de Alcorta*
Peasant Rebellion, 1912
Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich
(1814–1876)
Berkman, Alexander (1870–1936)
Biennio Rosso (1919–1920)
Brand, Adolf (1874–1945)
Casa del Obrero Mundial
Catalan protests against centralism
Chile, social and political struggles,
1850–1970
Chomsky, Noam (b. 1928)
Colombia, anti-war movements,
1990–2008
Confederación Nacional del
Trabajo (CNT)
Confédération Générale du Travail and
Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire

Cornelissen, Christianus Gerardus (1864–1942)
 Durruti, Buenaventura (1896–1936)
 Eco-anarchism
 Escuela Moderna movement (The Modern School)
 Fanelli, Giuseppe (1826–1877)
 Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI)
 Galleani, Luigi (1861–1931)
 Godwin, William (1756–1836)
 Goldman, Emma (1869–1940)
 Gori, Pietro (1865–1911)
 Hatta Shūzō (1886–1934)
 Haymarket tragedy
 Hoy, Senna (1882–1914)
 Infoshops
 Internationals
 Ishikawa Sanshirō (1876–1956)
 Itō Noe (1895–1923)
 Kim Joa-jin (1889–1930)
 Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921)
 Labor revolutionary currents, United States, 20th century
 Landauer, Gustav (1870–1919)
 MacKay, John Henry (1864–1933)
 Magón, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922) and the Magonistas
 Makhno, Nestor (1889–1934)
 Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932)
 Malato, Charles (1857–1938)
 Michel, Louise (1830–1905)
 Mujeres Libres
 Nechaev, Sergei (1847–1882)
 Ōsugi Sakae (1885–1923)
 Pisacane, Carlo (1818–1857)
 Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865)
 Puig Antich, Salvador (1948–1974)
 Reclus, Elisée (1830–1905)
 Sacco and Vanzetti case
 Sánchez Saornil, Lucía (1895–1970)
 Serge, Victor (1880–1947)
 Settimana Rossa
 Solidarity Federation
 Souchy, Augustin (1892–1984)
 Szabó, Ervin (1877–1918)
 Tolstoy, Leo N. (1828–1910)
 Vaneigem, Raoul (b. 1934)
 Zapatismo
 Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas uprising

Anti-Apartheid
 Aggett, Neil (1954–1982)
 Anti-apartheid movement, South Africa

Barayi, Elijah (1930–1994)
 Communist Party of South Africa, 1921–1950
 COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions)
 Hani, Chris (1942–1993)
 Khama, Seretse (1921–1980) and Botswana nationalism
 Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918)
 Namibia, struggle for independence
 Nujoma, Sam (b. 1929)
 Sachs, Solly (1900–1976)
 Simons, Ray Alexander (1913–2004)
 Slovo, Joe (1926–1995)
 South Africa, African nationalism and the ANC
 South Africa, labor movement
 South Africa, water struggles
 South African Communist Party, 1953–present
 Southern Africa, popular resistance to neoliberalism, 1982–2007
 Springbok rugby tour protests, 1981
 Student movements, global South
 Tambo, Oliver (1917–1993)

Arts and Culture
 ACT UP
 Adorno, Theodor W. (1903–1969)
 Agitprop
 American left and Howard Zinn (b. 1922)
 Anarchism, Argentina
 Anarchism and culture, 1840–1939
 Anarchism, Mexico
 Anarchism, Poland
 Anti-Napoleonic Wars of Liberation (1813–1815)
 Anti-Vietnam War movement, Britain
 Anti-Vietnam War movement, United States
 Arab left and socialist movements, 1861–1930
 Argentina, *piquetero* movement
 Ayim, May (1960–1996)
 Babel, Isaac (1894–1941)
 Beauvoir, Simone de (1908–1986)
 Beethoven, Ludwig van (1770–1827)
 Biermann, Wolf (b. 1936)
 Blake, William (1757–1827)
 Boal, Augusto (b. 1931)
 Brand, Adolf (1874–1945)
 Bread and Puppet Theater
 Brecht, Bertolt (1899–1956)
 Cabral, Amílcar (1924–1973)

- Camus, Albert (1913–1960)
 Cardenal, Ernesto (b. 1925)
 Caribbean protest music
 Central America, music and resistance
 Césaire, Aimé (1913–2008)
 Chernyshevsky, Nikolai G. (1828–1889)
 China, May 4th movement
 Courbet, Gustave (1819–1877)
 Cuban post-revolutionary protests
 Czechoslovakia, resistance to Soviet
 political and economic rule
 DADA
 Debord, Guy (1931–1994) and
 the Spectacle
 Deleuze, Gilles (1925–1995),
 Guattari, Félix (1930–1992),
 and the global justice movement
 Democracy Wall movement, 1979
 Dominican Republic, protest and
 resistance to US imperialism,
 1916–1962
 Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963)
 Eisenstein, Sergei (1898–1948)
 Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1911–1984)
 Feminist performance
 Feuchtwanger, Lion (1884–1958)
 Fo, Dario (b. 1926)
 French revolutionary theater
 Grass, Gunter (b. 1927)
 Guerilla theater
 Guerrilla Girls
 Harlem Renaissance
 Hauptmann, Gerhart (1862–1946)
 Havel, Václav (b. 1936)
 Hollywood Ten
 Hugo, Victor (1802–1885)
 Hyde, Evan Anthony (b. 1947)
 Indonesian protests against Suharto
 dictatorship
 Indonesian revolution and
 counterrevolution
 Indymedia global justice campaign, 2000s
 Iqbal, Muhammad (1877–1938)
 Irish nationalism
 Italy, from the new left to the
 great repression (1962–1981)
 Jalib, Habib (1928–1993)
 Jamaica, independence movement,
 1950–present
 Jamaica, rebellion and resistance,
 1760–1834
 Jara, Víctor (1932–1973)
 Khuda-i Khidmatgar: Pashtun non-violent
 resistance force (1929–1948)
 Latin American punk rock and protest
 Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual
 movements, Germany
 London, Jack (1876–1916)
 Lu Xun (1881–1936)
 Lukács, Georg (1885–1971)
 MacKay, John Henry (1864–1933)
 Marianne, French revolutionary icon
 Martí, José (1853–1895) and the Partido
 Revolucionario Cubano
Masses, The
 Michel, Louise (1830–1905)
 Milosz, Czesław (1911–2004)
 Modernismo
 Morris, William (1834–1896)
 Muralista movement
 Music and protest, Latin America
 Music, songs, and protest, France
 Négritude movement
 Neruda, Pablo (1904–1973)
 Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s
 Ortiz, Fernando (1881–1969)
 Pakistan, Bengali nationalist struggles
 Prague Spring
 Primera, Alí (1942–1985)
 Punk movement
 Reclaim the Streets
 Riot Grrl
 Robeson, Paul (1898–1976)
 Rodríguez, Silvio (b. 1946)
 Roumain, Jacques (1907–1944)
 Sánchez Saornil, Lucía (1895–1970)
 Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–1980)
 Sembène, Ousmane (1923–2007)
 Senghor, Léopold (1906–2001)
 Situationists
 Slovakia, Štúr generation
 Spartacus, historical and modern era
 Student movements,
 Czechoslovakia, 1960s
 Student movements,
 Czechoslovakia, 1980s
 Sturm und Drang
 Sudanese protest under Anglo-
 Egyptian rule
 Swift, Jonathan (1667–1745)
 Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864
 Taiwan, anti-imperialism and
 nationalism
 Tolstoy, Leo N. (1828–1910)
 Vaneigem, Raoul (b. 1934)
 Voltaire (1694–1778)
 Williams, Raymond Henry (1921–1988)
 Women's movement, France

Women's movement, Greece, formation of
 Women's movement, Japan
 Women's movement, Spain
 Women's movement, United States, 16th–18th centuries
 Women's movement, United States, 20th century
 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Hong Kong, 2005
 Žižek, Slavoj (b. 1949)

Democracy
 Anti-nuclear movement, Japan
 April Revolution, Nepal, 2006
 Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán (1913–1971)
 Argentina, armed struggle and guerilla organizations, 1960s–1970s
 Argentina, *Semana Roja*, 1909
 Argentina, University Reform, 1918
 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (b. 1953)
 Australia, new social movements
 Austria, 20th-century protests
 Berkeley Free Speech Movement
 Biermann, Wolf (b. 1936)
 Bloch, Marc (1886–1944)
 Brissot, Jacques Pierre (1754–1793)
 Burkina Faso, Revolution, 1983
 Burma, democracy movement
 Burma, national movement against British colonial rule
 Cambodia, rebellion against France
 Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–present
 Chernyshevsky, Nikolai G. (1828–1889)
 Chile, popular resistance against Pinochet
 China, May 4th movement
 Colombia, anti-war movements, 1990–2008
 Color revolutions
 Congo armed insurgency, Mobutu decamps
 Costa, Afonso Augusta da (1871–1937)
 Cuba, anti-racist movement and the Partido Independiente de Color
 Democracy Wall movement, 1979
 Dictatorship of the proletariat
 Dubček, Alexander (1921–1992)
El Argentino: December 19 and 20, 2001
 English Revolution, radical sects
 Enlightenment, France, 18th century
 Eureka Stockade

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)
 France, 1830 Revolution
 France, Revolution of 1848
 French Revolution, 1789–1794
 German Revolution, 1918–1923
 Giustizia e Libertà, Partito d'Azione
 Greece, anti-dictatorship protests
 Guatemala, Democratic Spring, 1944–1954
 Haiti, democratic uprising, 1980s–1991
 Haiti, protest and rebellion, 20th century
 Hong Kong democracy protests
 Hungary, anti-communist protests, 1945–1989
 Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (b. 1938)
 Indonesian pro-democracy protests
 Indonesian protests against Suharto dictatorship
 Indonesian revolution and counterrevolution
 Iran, the Mossadegh era: democratic socialists and the US-backed coup
 Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798
 Jalib, Habib (1928–1993)
 Kashmir, popular struggles to 1947
 Kenya, national protests for independence
 Korea, post-World War II popular movements for democracy
 Kronstadt Mutiny of 1921
 Kwangju student uprising
 Lesotho, popular protest and resistance
 Lilburne, John (1615–1657)
 Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918)
 Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–1793)
 Marianne, French revolutionary icon
 Marighella, Carlos (1911–1969) and the Brazilian urban guerilla movement
 Marx, Karl (1818–1883)
 Marxism
 Masaryk, Tomas (1850–1937)
 Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–1872)
 Meilidao protests, 1978
 Mexico, labor movement and protests, 1980–2005
 Michnik, Adam (b. 1946)
 Muir, Thomas (1765–1799)
 Nepal, protest movements, 19th and 20th centuries
 Netherlands, protests, 1650–1800
 New Jewel movement

Nigeria, 1993 political and electoral protest and conflict
 Obrador, Andrés Manuel López (b. 1953) and the PRD
 Paraguay, protest in the post-Stroessner era
 Participatory democracy, history of
 Poland, Committee for Workers (KOR)
 Polish Revolution, 1905–1907
 Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974
 Prague Spring
 Prestes, Luís Carlos (1898–1990) and Prestes, Olga Benário (1908–1942)
 Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907
 Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917
 Salvadoran Civil War, 1980–1991
 Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
 Serbian Revolution of October 2000
 Sharp, Gene (b. 1928)
 Solidarność (Solidarity)
 South Africa, African nationalism and the ANC
 Southern Africa, popular resistance to neoliberalism, 1982–2007
 Spanish Revolution
 Student movements, Europe
 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
 Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925)
 Swaziland, nationalist and economic protests
 Thailand, popular movements, 1980s–present
 Thelwall, John (1764–1834)
 Tiananmen Square protests, 1989
 Turkmenistan, protest and revolt
 Velasco Alvarado, Juan Francisco (1910–1977)
 Velvet Revolution, 1989
 Venezuela, exclusionary democracy and resistance, 1958–1998
 Venezuela, MBR-200 and the military uprisings of 1992
 Venezuela, solidarity economy, social property, co-management, and workers’ control
 Voltaire (1694–1778)
 Walesa, Lech (b. 1943)
 Wei Jingsheng (b. 1950)
 West German “new left”

Women in the Russian Revolution
 Women in the Solidarity movement, Polish underground
 Yugoslavia, anti-fascist “People’s Liberation War” and revolution, 1941–1945
 Zionism

Environment and Ecology
 Abalone Alliance
 Anarchism, Finland
 Anti-nuclear campaign, Britain
 Anti-nuclear movement, Japan
 Anti-nuclear protest movements
 Anti-nuclear protests, Marshall Islands
 Britain, post-World War II political protest
 Carson, Rachel (1907–1964)
 Chipko movement
 Clayoquot Sound
 Cohn-Bendit, Daniel (b. 1945)
 Colombia, indigenous mobilization
 Commoner, Barry (b. 1917)
 Critical Mass
 Earth First!
 Eco-anarchism
 Ecological protest movements
 Environmental protest, United States, 19th century
 French Guiana, ecological movements against the Guiana Space Center in Kourou
 French Polynesia, protest movements
 Fromm, Erich (1900–1980)
 G8 protests, Gleneagles, 2005
 Germany, Green movement
 Green bans movement, Australia
 Greenpeace
 Japan, resistance to construction of Narita airport
 Kelly, Petra (1947–1992)
 Mendes, Chico (1944–1988) and Amazonian rainforest protest and resistance
 Micronesia, nationalist and labor protests
 Munday, Jack (b. 1929)
 Native American protest, 20th century
 Nuclear-Free New Zealand, 1987
 Peoples’ Global Action Network
 Reclaim the Streets
 Saro-Wiwa, Ken (1941–1995)
 Shiva, Vandana (b. 1952)
 Sofia demonstrations, 1989
 South Africa, water struggles

Southern Africa, popular resistance to neoliberalism, 1982–2007
 Student movements, Europe
 Turkey, anti-secular protest, 1980–present
 Vegetarian protests and movements
 Vía Campesina and peasant struggles
 Vieques
 Women’s movement, India

Fascism and Anti-Fascism

Anti-fascist People’s Front
 Anti-Racist Action (ARA)
 Arendt, Hannah (1906–1975)
 Begin, Menachem (1913–1992) and the Irgun
 Bloch, Marc (1886–1944)
 Bulgaria, World War II resistance and rise of communism
 Camus, Albert (1913–1960)
 Communist Party, Germany
 Djilas, Milovan (1911–1995)
 Dutschke, Rudi (1940–1979)
 Fascism, protest and revolution
 France, resistance to Nazism
 Germany, Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Group)
 Germany, resistance to Nazism
 Germany, socialism and nationalism
 Giustizia e Libertà, Partito d’Azione
 Grass, Gunter (b. 1927)
 Hindu nationalism, Hindutva, and women
 Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism
 India, Hindutva and fascist mobilizations, 1989–2002
 Italy, from the anti-fascist resistance to the new left (1945–1960)
 Jewish resistance to Nazism
 Luxembourg, protest and revolution
 Maitan, Livio (1923–2004)
Mein Kampf
 Milosz, Czeslaw (1911–2004)
 Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945)
 Netherlands, protests, 1800–2000
 Resistenza
 Rossanda, Rossana (b. 1924)
 Rosselli, Carlo (1899–1937)
 Salvemini, Gaetano (1873–1957)
 Slovenian National Liberation Front (Osvobodilna Fronta), 1941–1944
 Social Democratic Party, Germany

Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands)
 Souchy, Augustin (1892–1984)
 Spanish Revolution
 Tagore, Saumyendranath (1901–1974)
 Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980)
 Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)
 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, 1943
 White Rose (Weiße Rose)
 Workers’ self-management, Yugoslavia
 Young Communist International
 Yugoslavia, resistance to Cominform, 1948
 Zasluch, Vera (1849–1919)
 Zhang Guotao (1897–1979)
 Zhang Wentian (1900–1976)
 Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)
 Zhu De (1886–1976)

Foreign Intervention

Afghanistan, 1978 Revolution and Islamic Civil War
 Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán (1913–1971)
 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (b. 1953)
 Barzani, Mulla Mustafa al- (1903–1979)
 Begin, Menachem (1913–1992) and the Irgun
 Bin Laden, Osama (b. 1957) and al-Qaeda
 Bolivia, protest and repression, 1964–2000
 Bulgaria, independence movement, 1830–1835
 Cabanagem of Grão-Pará, Brazil, 1835–1840
 Cambodia, communist protests and revolution
 Cambodia, rebellion against France
 Castro, Fidel (b. 1926)
 Cedar Revolution, Lebanon
 Chile, protests and military coup, 1973
 China, May 4th movement
 China, protest and revolution, 1800–1911
 China, student protests, 20th century
 Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949
 Colombia, armed insurgency, peasant self-defense, and radical popular movements, 1960s–1970s
 Colombia, armed insurgency, peasant self-defense, and radical popular movements, 1970s–1990s

- Colombia, unions, strikes, and anti-neoliberal opposition, 1990–2005
 Congo armed insurgency, Mobutu decamps
 Congo Crisis, 1960–1965
 Congo, protest and uprisings, 1998–2002
 Counterrevolution, France, 1789–1830
 Cuba, anti-racist movement and the Partido Independiente de Color
 Cuba, struggle for independence from Spain, 1868–1898
 Cuban post-revolutionary protests
 Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959
 Dominican Republic, protest and resistance to US imperialism, 1916–1962
 Dominican Republic, protests 1844–1915
 Dominican Republic, resistance to military and US invasion, 1963–1965
 East Timor, anti-colonial struggle, 1974 to independence
 Ecuador, left and popular movements, 1940s to present
 Ejército de Liberación Nacional, Colombia
 Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)
 Foreign intervention and revolution
 Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967)
 Haiti, democratic uprising, 1980s–1991
 Haiti, foreign-led insurgency, 2004
 Haiti, protest and rebellion, 20th century
 Haiti, resistance to US occupation
 Huk Rebellion, 1946–1954
 Intifada I and Intifada II
 Iran, the Mossadegh era: democratic socialists and the US-backed coup
 Iraqi resistance, 1991–2007
 Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798
 Japan, pacifist movement, 1945–present
 Kosovo, civil and armed resistance, 1990s
 Kwangju student uprising
 La Ceiba Uprising of 1924
 Lebanese insurrection of 1958
 Lebanon, civil war, 1975–1990
 Machado, popular Cuban anti-government struggle, 1930s
 Micronesia, nationalist and labor protests
 Mossadegh, Mohammad (1881–1967)
 Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s
 Niger Delta, protest movements
 Non-interventionists, 1914–1945
 Panama, nationalism and popular mobilization, 1947–2000
 Salvadoran Civil War, 1980–1991
 Sandino, Augusto César (1895–1934)
 Solomon Islands, protest and uprisings
 Spanish Revolution
 Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864
 Taliban, 1996–2007
 Tamil nationalist struggle for Eelam
 Tibet Uprising and resistance
 Urabi movement
 Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954
 Vietnam, protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974
 Zimbabwe, national liberation movement
 Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA)
- Gender and Sexuality**
 ACT UP
 Addams, Jane (1860–1935)
 Alves, Margarida Maria (1943–1983)
 Anarchism and gender
 Anthony, Susan B. (1820–1906)
 Anti-Racist Action (ARA)
 April Revolution, Nepal, 2006
 Argentina, human rights movement
 Arundel, Lady Blanche (1583–1649)
 Beauvoir, Simone de (1908–1986)
 Brand, Adolf (1874–1945)
 Britain, post-World War II political protest
 Britain, women’s suffrage campaign
 Chakravartty, Renu (1917–1994)
 Chartists
 China, Maoism and popular power, 1949–1969
 Cuban post-revolutionary protests
 Dahomey Women’s Army
 Dalit liberation struggles
 Davis, Angela (b. 1944)
 Dix, Dorothea (1802–1887)
 Dominican Republic, protest and resistance to US imperialism, 1916–1962
 Douglass, Frederick (1817–1895)
 Dunayevskaya, Raya (1910–1987)
 Eastman, Max (1883–1969)
 English Revolution, radical sects
 English Revolution, women and
 Enlightenment, France, 18th century
 Feminist performance

- Fifth Monarchist women
 Foucault, Michel (1926–1984)
 French Revolution, women and
 Friedan, Betty (1921–2006)
 Friedländer, Benedikt (1866–1908)
 Fuller, Margaret (1810–1850)
 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand
 (1869–1948)
 Garrison, William Lloyd (1805–1879)
 Goldman, Emma (1869–1940)
 Gonne, Maud (1866–1953)
 Gouges, Olympe de (1745–1793)
 Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo
 Grimké, Angelina (1805–1879) and
 Sarah (1792–1873)
 Hindu nationalism, Hindutva, and women
 Hirschfeld, Magnus (1868–1935)
 Hoy, Senna (1882–1914)
 Huerta, Dolores (b. 1930)
 Hungary, women radicals, 1848–1849
 India, armed struggle in the independence
 movement
 International Congress of Women at
 The Hague
 International Women’s Day
 Iran, political and cultural protests,
 1844–1914
 Israeli peace movement
 Kollontai, Alexandra (1872–1952)
 Korea, labor movement, 20th century
 Kuliscioff, Anna (1853/1857?–1925)
 Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual
 movements
 Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual
 movements, Australia
 Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual
 movements, Canada
 Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual
 movements, Germany
 Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual
 movements, United States
 Lowell Female Labor Reform Association
 MacKay, John Henry (1864–1933)
 Madagascar, protests and revolts,
 19th and 20th centuries
 Madres de la Plaza de Mayo
 Mau Mau Rebellion, 1952–1959
 May 1968 French uprisings
 Mexico, labor movement and protests,
 1980–2005
 Michel, Louise (1830–1905)
 Montessori, Maria (1870–1952)
 Mother Jones (1837–1930)
 Mujeres Libres
 Naidu, Sarojini (1879–1949)
 National Organization for Women
 (NOW)
 Northern Ireland peace movement
 Norway, protest and revolution
 Pankhurst, Emmeline (1858–1928),
 Christabel (1880–1958), and
 Sylvia (1882–1960)
 Paris Commune, 1871
 Paul, Alice (1885–1977)
 Popelin, Marie (1846–1913) and the
 Belgian League for Women’s Rights
 Postcolonial feminism and protest
 in the global South
 Qiu Jin (1875–1907)
 Queen Nanny and Maroon resistance
 Raditsela, Andries (1956–1985)
 Riot Grrrl
 Sánchez Saornil, Lucía (1895–1970)
 Sanger, Margaret (1879–1966) and the
 American birth control movement
 Seneca Falls convention
 Sexuality and revolution
 Shipboard insurrections in the
 Atlantic slave trade
 Shiva, Vandana (b. 1952)
 Simons, Ray Alexander (1913–2004)
 Society for Cheap Lodgings
 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady (1815–1902)
 Steinem, Gloria (b. 1934)
 Sudanese Women’s League
 Sylvis, William H. (1829–1869) and the
 National Labor Union
 Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864
 Tajikistan, protests and revolts
 Thailand, popular movements,
 1980s–present
 Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)
 Triangle Shirtwaist fire protests
 Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)
 Truth, Sojourner (ca. 1797–1893)
 Turkey, anti-secular protest,
 1980–present
 Turkey, protest and revolution,
 1800s–1923
 Turkmenistan, protest and revolt
 Union for Women’s Equality
 Vegetarian protests and movements
 Walentynowicz, Anna (b. 1929)
 Wells, Ida B. (1862–1931) and the
 anti-lynching campaign
 Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–1797)

- Woman's Christian Temperance Union
 Women in the 1848 Revolution, Poland
 Women and national liberation in Africa
 Women in the Russian Revolution
 Women in the Solidarity movement,
 Polish underground
 Women's movement, Australia
 Women's movement, French Windward
 Islands
 Women's movement, United States,
 16th–18th centuries
 Women's movement, United States,
 19th century
 Women's movement, United States,
 20th century
 Women's movement, Anglophone
 Caribbean
 Women's movement, Britain
 Women's movement, Cuba
 Women's movement, France
 Women's movement, Germany
 Women's movement, Greece,
 formation of
 Women's movement, Haiti
 Women's movement, India
 Women's movement, Italy
 Women's movement, Japan
 Women's movement, Latin America
 Women's movement, Southern Africa
 Women's movement, Soviet Union
 Women's movement, Spain
 Women's movement, Venezuela
 Women's movements, Eastern Europe
 Women's War of 1929
 Woodhull, Victoria (1838–1927)
 World Anti-Slavery Convention, London
 World Trade Organization (WTO)
 protests, Cancun, 2003
 Wright, Frances "Fanny" (1795–1852)
 Yaa Asantewaa (ca. 1840–1921)
 Yugoslavia, anti-privatization struggles
 Zapatistas, EZLN, and the
 Chiapas uprising
 Zetkin, Clara (1857–1933)
- Global Justice and Globalization**
 Anarchism, Finland
 Anarchism, Greece
 Assembly of the Poor
 ATTAC (Association for the Taxation
 of Financial Transactions for the
 Aid of Citizens)
 Bread and Puppet Theater
- Deleuze, Gilles (1925–1995), Guattari,
 Félix (1930–1992), and the
 global justice movement
 Disobbedienti/Tute Bianche
 EuroMayDay
 European Union Summit protests,
 Gothenburg, 2001
 Food Not Bombs, United States
 G8 protests, Genoa, 2001
 G8 protests, Gleneagles, 2005
 G8 protests, Heiligendamm, June 2007
 Global Day of Action Against
 Capitalism, June 18 (J18), 1999
 Global Day of Action Against the IMF
 and World Bank, Prague,
 September 26 (S26), 2000
 Global justice movement and resistance
 Grassroots resistance to corporate
 globalization
 Greece, socialism, communism,
 and the left, 1974–2008
 Indymedia global justice
 campaign, 2000s
 Internationals
 Italy, anti-racist movement
 Korea, peasant and farmers' movement
 Korea, protest against neoliberal
 globalization
 Maitan, Livio (1923–2004)
 Migration struggles and the
 global justice movement
 Multitude
 Negri, Antonio (b. 1933)
 Peoples' Global Action Network
 Reclaim the Streets
 South Africa, water struggles
 Via Campesina and peasant struggles
 World Social Forums
 World Trade Organization (WTO)
 protests, Cancun, 2003
 World Trade Organization (WTO)
 protests, Doha, 2001
 World Trade Organization (WTO)
 protests, Hong Kong, 2005
 World Trade Organization (WTO)
 protests, Quebec City, 2001
 World Trade Organization (WTO)
 protests, Seattle, 1999
- Guerilla tactics**
 Anti-Franco worker struggles, 1939–1975
 Argentina, armed struggle and guerilla
 organizations, 1960s–1970s

- Bolivia, protest and repression, 1964–2000
- Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959
- Ecuador, left and popular movements, 1940s to present
- Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)
- FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army)
- Fonseca, Carlos (1936–1976)
- France, resistance to Nazism
- Francophone Africa, protest and independence
- Germany, Red Army Faction (Baader–Meinhof Group)
- Guatemala, popular rebellion and civil war
- Guatemala, worker struggles and the labor movement, 1960s–1990s
- Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967)
- Guillén, Abraham (1913–1993)
- Huk Rebellion, 1946–1954
- India, armed struggle in the independence movement
- Indonesian revolution and counterrevolution
- Irish Republican Army (IRA)
- Kosovo, civil and armed resistance, 1990s
- Kurdistan nationalist movement and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
- Lemba, Sebastian (d. 1547)
- M-19 of Colombia
- Madera Uprising, Chihuahua, 1965
- Marcos, Subcomandante (b. ?)
- Marighella, Carlos (1911–1969) and the Brazilian urban guerilla movement
- Mazumdar, Charu (1918–1972)
- Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–1872)
- Mexico, armed political movements, 1960s–present
- Mexico, indigenous and peasant struggles, 1980s–present
- Mexico, labor movement and protests, 1980–2005
- MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru)
- NAP (Nuclei Armati Proletari)
- Naxalite movement, 1967–1972
- Nepal, Maoists’ rise
- Nepal, people’s war and Maoists
- Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s
- Ortega, Daniel (b. 1945)
- Paraguay, protest and revolt, 1954–1989
- Peru, armed insurgency and the Dirty War, 1980–1990
- Peru, “people’s war,” counterinsurgency, and the popular movement
- Poland, revolutions, 1846–1863
- Queen Nanny and Maroon resistance
- Quintín Lame, 1980s
- Rampa rebellions in Andhra Pradesh
- Salvadoran Civil War, 1980–1991
- Sandino, Augusto César (1895–1934)
- Sendic, Raúl (1926–1989)
- Slovakia, 1944 Uprising
- Soe, Thakin (1906–1989)
- South Africa, African nationalism and the ANC
- SWAPO (South West African People’s Organization)
- Tamil nationalist struggle for Eelam
- Tibet Uprising and resistance
- Tupamaros
- Uruguay, labor and populist movements, 1965–present
- Uzbekistan, national movement and protests
- Vázquez, Genaro (1931–1972)
- Venezuela, guerilla movements, 1960s–1980s
- Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954
- Vietnam, protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974
- Human Rights**
- Argentina, human rights movement
- Armenian resistance, 1915
- Assembly of the Poor
- Bread and Roses Strike
- Caracazo*, 1989
- Carney, James Francis “Guadalupe” (1925–1983?)
- Casement, Roger (1864–1916)
- Charter 77
- Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–present
- Chile, protests and military coup, 1973
- Colombia, Afro-Colombian movements and anti-racist protests
- Colombia, armed insurgency, peasant self-defense, and radical popular movements, 1970s–1990s
- Colombia, unions, strikes, and anti-neoliberal opposition, 1990–2005
- Congo, Brazzaville protest and revolt
- Cyprus, protest and revolt

- Dalit liberation struggles
 Dix, Dorothea (1802–1887)
 Dreyfus Affair
 Dutschke, Rudi (1940–1979)
 East Timor, anti-colonial struggle,
 1974 to independence
 Edict of Nantes
 EPR (Ejército Popular Revolucionario)
 G8 protests, Gleneagles, 2005
 Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo
 Havel, Václav (b. 1936)
 HIJOS movement, Children of
 the Disappeared
 Hugo, Victor (1802–1885)
 Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (b. 1938)
 International Women's Day
 Italy, anti-racist movement
 Jackson, Jesse (b. 1941)
 Jalib, Habib (1928–1993)
 Korea, labor movement, 20th century
 Latin America, Catholic Church and
 liberation, 16th century to present
 Madres de la Plaza de Mayo
 Meilidao protests, 1978
 Menchú, Rigoberta (b. 1959)
 Paraguay, Archive of Terror
 Poland, Committee for Workers (KOR)
 Romania, protests and revolts,
 18th and 19th centuries
 Salvadoran Civil War, 1980–1991
 Saro-Wiwa, Ken (1941–1995)
 Schindler, Oskar (1908–1974)
 Sofia demonstrations, 1989
 South Africa, water struggles
 Southern Africa, popular resistance to
 neoliberalism, 1982–2007
 Thompson, Edward Palmer (E. P.)
 (1924–1993)
 Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)
 Uruguay, labor and populist movements,
 1965–present
 Via Campesina and peasant struggles
 Voltaire (1694–1778)
 Wei Jingsheng (b. 1950)
 Women's movement, Latin America
 World Trade Organization (WTO)
 protests, Seattle, 1999
- Indigenous**
 Aboriginal/left struggle for land rights
 Agüeybaná (d. 1510) and Agüeybaná II
 (d. 1511)
 Alcatraz Uprising and the American
 Indian Movement
- Anarchism, Canada
 Aracaré (d. 1542)
 Argentina, indigenous popular protests
 Australian aboriginal protests
 Bacon's Rebellion
 Barbados and the Windward Islands,
 protest and revolt
 Bolivia, War of the Pacific to the
 National Revolution, 1879–1952
 Cabanagem of Grão-Pará,
 Brazil, 1835–1840
 Canada, indigenous resistance
 Caonabo (d. 1496)
 Caste war of Yucatan (Guerra
 de castas en Yucatan)
 Clayoquot Sound
Cocaleros Peasant Uprising
 Colombia, anti-war movements,
 1990–2008
 Colombia, indigenous mobilization
 Crazy Horse (1849–1877), Sitting Bull
 (1831–1890), and Native
 American resistance at the
 Battle of Little Bighorn
 Cuauhtémoc (1502–1525)
 Daquilema, Fernando (d. 1872)
 and the 1871 Uprising, Ecuador
 Diriangén (1496 or 1497–1530s)
 Durrani empire, popular
 protests, 1747–1823
 Ecuador, indigenous and
 popular struggles
 Ecuador, popular and indigenous
 uprisings under the
 Correa government
 Ecuador, protest and revolution
 Enriquillo and the Taíno
 revolt (1519–1533)
 Francophone Africa, protest
 and independence
 French Guiana, indigenous rebellions
 French Polynesia, protest movements
 Guaicaipuro (ca. 1530–1568)
 Guatemala, Democratic
 Spring, 1944–1954
 Guatemala, popular rebellion
 and civil war
 Guatemala, worker struggles and
 the labor movement, 1960s–1990s
 Hatuey (ca. 1400s–1512)
 Hawaii, resistance to US invasion
 and occupation
 Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion
 Jumandi (d. 1578)

Katarismo and indigenous popular mobilization, Bolivia, 1970s–present
La Matanza 1932 Peasant Revolt
 Lame, Manuel Quintín (1880–1967), Indian/peasant organization, and the struggle for land in Colombia, 1920s–1930s
 Lautaro (d. 1557)
 Lemba, Sebastian (d. 1547)
 Lempira (d. 1537)
 Malawi national liberation
 Malaysia, protest and revolt
 Maori indigenous resistance
 Mapuche Indian resistance
 Marcos, Subcomandante (b. ?)
 Menchú, Rigoberta (b. 1959)
 Mendes, Chico (1944–1988) and Amazonian rainforest protest and resistance
 Mexico, armed political movements, 1960s–present
 Mexico, indigenous and peasant struggles, 1980s–present
 Morales, Evo (b. 1959)
 Moro national liberation
 Munda, Birsa (ca. 1872–1900)
 Namibia, struggle for independence
 Native American protest, 20th century
 New Caledonia, protest and revolt
 Niger Delta, protest movements
 Oka crisis
 Panama, Cemaco’s anti-colonial resistance, 1510–1512
 Peltier, Leonard (b. 1944)
 Peoples’ Global Action Network
 Philippines, colonial protests during the Spanish era
 Quintín Lame, 1980s
 Rampa rebellions in Andhra Pradesh
 Riel, Louis (1844–1885)
 Rumiñahui (d. 1535)
 Santal Rebellion
 Sepé Tiarajú (1722/3–1756)
 Solomon Islands, protest and uprisings
 Taiwan, anti-imperialism and nationalism
 Tecún Umán (d. 1524)
 Tisquesuza (d. 1537)
 Túpac Amaru (1540–1572)
 Túpac Amaru Rebellion II and the Last Inca Revolt, 1780–1783
 Túpac Katari (ca. 1750–1781)
 Urracá, Cacique of Veraguas (d. 1516)

Vanuatu, land reform protests
 Women’s movement, Haiti
 Women’s movement, Latin America
 Women’s movement, Southern Africa
 Women’s movement, Venezuela
 Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919) and the Comuna Morelense
 Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas uprising

Labor and Unemployment

Aboriginal/left struggle for land rights
 Addams, Jane (1860–1935)
 African Blood Brotherhood
 Agbekoya Peasant Uprising and Rebellion, 1968–1969
 Alinsky, Saul (1909–1972) and the Industrial Areas Foundation
 American left and Howard Zinn (b. 1922)
 Anarchism and syndicalism, Southern Africa
 Anarchosyndicalism
 Anti-Franco worker struggles, 1939–1975
 April Revolution, Nepal, 2006
 Argentina, general strike (*Semana Trágica*), 1919
 Argentina, general strike, 1975
 Argentina, grassroots workers’ movement: Villa Constitución, 1975
 Argentina, labor strikes of 1890 and 1902
 Argentina, labor unions and protests of the unemployed, 1990s
 Argentina, *piquetero* movement
 Argentina, *Semana Roja*, 1909
 Asturias Uprising, October 1934
 Australian labor movement
 Austria, 20th-century protests
 Belgium, Strike of the Century, 1960–1961
 Belize, general strikes, 1952
 Bolivia, protest and repression, 1964–2000
 Botswana, protest and nationalism
 Bourses du Travail
 Brazil, labor struggles
 Brazil, workers and the left: Partido dos Trabalhadores and Central Única dos Trabalhadores
 Britain, post-World War I army mutinies and revolutionary threats
 Britain, trade union movement
 Bulgaria, 20th-century leftist and workers’ movements
 Canada, labor protests

- Caribbean islands, protests against IMF
 Chartists
 Chávez, Cesar (1927–1993) and the United Farm Workers
 Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–present
 Chile, social and political struggles, 1850–1970
 Chiluba, Frederick (b. 1943)
 China, Maoism and popular power, 1949–1969
 China, student protests, 20th century
 Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949
 Colombia, unions, strikes, and anti-neoliberal opposition, 1990–2005
 Communist Party of South Africa, 1921–1950
 Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA)
 Communist Party, Germany
 Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT)
 Confédération Générale du Travail and Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire
 Connolly, James (1868–1916)
 Cordobazo and Rosariazo Uprising, 1969
 COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions)
 Cuba, general strikes under Batista regime, 1952–1958
 Debs, Eugene (1855–1926)
 Denmark, insurrection and revolt
 Di Vittorio, Giuseppe (1892–1957)
 Dimitrov, Georgi (1882–1949)
 Disobbedienti/Tute Bianche
 Dublin General Strike, 1913
 Dutch Caribbean, protest and revolution, 1815–2000
 Ellis, Daniel Edward “Daan” (1904–1963)
 ETA Liberation Front (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna) and Basque nationalism
 Eureka Stockade
 European revolutions of 1848
 Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1911–1984)
 France, post-World War II labor protests
 French Polynesia, protest movements
 German nationalism and workers’ movements, 19th century
 German Revolution, 1918–1923
 Glasgow general strike, 1820
 Green bans movement, Australia
 Guadeloupe, labor protest
 Guatemala, worker struggles and the labor movement, 1960s–1990s
 Guyana, protests and revolts
 Haymarket tragedy
 Haywood, Big Bill (1869–1928)
 Immigrant and social conflict, France
 Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)
 Iraq, Revolution of 1958
 Italian labor movement
 Italy, operaism and post-operaism
 Jamaica, 1938 labor riots
 Japan, community labor union movement
 Japan, labor protest, 1945–present
 Jewish Bund
 Knights of Labor and Terence Powderly (1849–1924)
 Korea, migrant workers’ struggle
 Labor revolutionary currents, United States, 1775–1900
 Labor’s Volunteer Army
 Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and Sri Lankan radicalism
 League of Revolutionary Black Workers
 Leeward Islands, labor protests
 Lowell Female Labor Reform Association
 Luddism and machine breaking
 Machado, popular Cuban anti-government struggle, 1930s
 Manley, Michael (1924–1997)
 Marxism
 May Day
 Mboya, Tom (1930–1969) and the Kenya labor movement
 Mexico, worker struggles and labor unions, 1950s–1970s
 Mother Jones (1837–1930)
 Movement of Recuperated Factories, Argentina
 Mozambique, worker protests
 Munday, Jack (b. 1929)
 Mzingeli, Charles (1905–1980)
 Newport rising, Wales, 1839
 Nordic revolts and popular protests, 1500–present
 O’Connor, Feargus (1796–1855)
 On-to-Ottawa Trek
 Pakistan, protest and rebellion
 Paraguay, popular resistance to the rise of the military (1936–1954)
 Peoples’ Global Action Network
 Peronist resistance

Peru, labor and peasant mobilizations, 1900–1950
 Philippines, protest during the US era
 Poland, Committee for Workers (KOR)
 Poor Law, Britain, 1834
 Red Scotland and the Scottish radical left, 1880–1932
 Reform Bills, Britain, 1867 and 1884
 Romania, mineworker protests, 20th century
 Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907
 Russian revolutionary labor upsurge, 1912–1914
 Sachs, Solly (1900–1976)
 Socialism, Britain
 South Africa, African nationalism and the ANC
 South Africa, labor movement
 South African Communist Party, 1953–present
 Spanish Revolution
 Sudanese protest under Anglo-Egyptian rule
 SWAPO (South West African People’s Organization)
 Swaziland, nationalist and economic protests
 Sylvis, William H. (1829–1869) and the National Labor Union
 Syndicalism, France
 Thailand, popular movements, 1980s–present
 Triangle Shirtwaist fire protests
 Trinidad, labor protests
 Turkey, working-class protest, 1960–1980
 Unemployed protests
 Uruguay, left-wing politics from the Tupamaros to the Frente Amplio
 US labor rebellions and the rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)
 Venezuela, solidarity economy, social property, co-management, and workers’ control
 Walesa, Lech (b. 1943)
 War communism and the rise of the Soviet Union
 Winnipeg General Strike of 1919
 Women’s movement, Anglophone Caribbean
 Women’s movement, Australia
 Women’s movement, United States, 20th century

Workers’ self-management, Yugoslavia
 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Hong Kong, 2005
 Yorkshire Rising, 1820
 Yugoslavia, anti-privatization struggles
 Zambian nationalism and protests
 Zenroren Labor Federation
 Zimbabwe, labor movement, 1890–1980

Military Involvement and Armed Uprisings

American Civil War (1861–1864)
 Asturias Uprising, October 1934
 Bolivia, protest and repression, 1964–2000
 Bolivia, War of the Pacific to the National Revolution, 1879–1952
 Chile, protests and military coup, 1973
 Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949
 Cordobazo and Rosariazo Uprising, 1969
 Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959
 Dominican Republic, protests, 1844–1915
 English Revolution, 17th century
 Ethiopia, Revolution of 1974
 Fiji, parliamentary insurrection
 FPMR (Frente Patrioco Manuel Rodriguez)
 French Caribbean in the Age of Revolution
 German Revolution, 1918–1923
 Greece, partisan resistance
 Haiti, democratic uprising, 1980s–1991
 Haiti, foreign-led insurgency, 2004
 Haiti, resistance to US occupation
 Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1801–1804
 Hungary, Revolution of 1956
 India, armed struggle in the independence movement
 India, Great Rebellion of 1857 (the Sepoy Revolt)
 India, post-World War II upsurge
 Intifada I and Intifada II
 Iran, the Mossadegh era: democratic socialists and the US-backed coup
 Iranian Revolution, 1979
 Iraq, Revolution of 1958
 Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798
 Ireland, the Troubles
 Irish Republican Army resistance campaign
 Japan, pacifist movement, 1945–present

- Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion
 Kashmir, under India
 Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot
 Kwangju student uprising
 La Ceiba Uprising of 1924
 Labor's Volunteer Army
 Lebanon, civil war, 1975–1990
 Lebanon, 19th-century revolts
 Lin Biao (1907–1971)
 Luxembourg, protest and revolution
 Machado, popular Cuban
 anti-government struggle, 1930s
 Machel, Samora (1933–1986)
 Malaysia, protest and revolt
 Mao Zedong (1893–1976)
 Mau Mau Rebellion, 1952–1959
 Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921
 Micronesia, nationalist and labor protests
 Morocco, protests, 1600s–1990s
 Niger Delta, protest movements
 Paraguay, popular resistance to the
 rise of the military (1936–1954)
 Paraguay, protest and revolt,
 1954–1989
 Pilsudski, Józef (1867–1935)
 Polish Revolution of 1830
 Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974
 Rumiñahui (d. 1535)
 Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907
 Russia, Revolution of October/
 November 1917
 Russian Civil War, 1918–1924
 Salvadoran Civil War, 1980–1991
 Santal Rebellion
 São Tomé e Príncipe, labor/nationalists
 Sierra Leone, protest and revolution
 Spanish Revolution
 Spithead and Nore mutinies,
 Britain, 1797
 Sudan, Aba Island Rebellion, 1970
 Syria and Iraq, Baathists
 Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864
 Thai Communist Party
 Tiananmen Square protests, 1989
 Torrijos, General Omar (1929–1981)
 Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian
 Revolution, 1796–1799
 Turkey, working-class protest,
 1960–1980
 Venezuela, exclusionary democracy
 and resistance, 1958–1998
 Venezuela, guerilla movements,
 1960s–1980s
 Venezuela, MBR-200 and the military
 uprisings of 1992
 Venezuela, military uprisings, 1960–1962
 Vietnam, protest and Second
 Indochina War, 1960–1974
- Nationalism and Anti-Imperialism**
 African Blood Brotherhood
 Agüeybaná (d. 1510) and Agüeybaná II
 (d. 1511)
 Albanian nationalism
 Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962
 American Revolution of 1776
 Anarchism, Italy
 Anarchism, Korea
 Andresote and the Revolt against the
 Guipuzcoana (1731–1733)
 Angolan national liberation, 1961–1974
 Anti-apartheid movement, South Africa
 Anti-monarchy protests, Portugal
 Arafat, Yasser (1929–2004), Fatah,
 and the Palestine Liberation
 Organization (PLO)
 Armenia, mass protest and popular
 mobilization, 1980s to present
 Aung San (1915–1947)
 Baltic protests in the 20th century
 Bangladesh, struggle for liberation, 1971
 Begin, Menachem (1913–1992)
 and the Irgun
 Belize, national independence movement
 Bengal, popular uprisings and
 movements in the colonial era
 Ben-Gurion, David (1866–1973)
 and the Haganah
 Black nationalism, 19th and 20th centuries
 Bolivia, struggle for independence,
 1809–1825
 Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945)
 Botswana, protest and nationalism
 Brazil, rebellions from independence
 to the republic (1700s–1889)
 Bulgaria, independence movement,
 1830–1835
 Burkina Faso, Revolution, 1983
 Burma, democracy movement
 Burma, national movement against
 British colonial rule
 Cambodia, anti-colonial protests,
 1863–1945
 Cambodia, rebellion against France
 Canudos, religion and rebellion
 in 19th-century Brazil

- Cape Verde, independence struggle
 Castro, Fidel (b. 1926)
 Central Asian protest movements
 Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954)
 Chilembwe, John (1871–1915)
 Chimurenga armed struggles
 China, student protests, 20th century
 Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911
 Collins, Michael (1890–1922)
 Comunero movement
 Congo Crisis, 1960–1965
 Connolly, James (1868–1916)
 Corsican independence movement
 Côte d’Ivoire, pre-independence
 protest and liberation
 Cuauhtémoc (1502–1525)
 Cuba, struggle for independence
 from Spain, 1868–1898
 Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959
 Cyprus, protest and revolt
 Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806)
 De Valera, Eamon (1882–1975)
 Dominican Republic, protest and
 resistance to US imperialism,
 1916–1962
 Dominican Republic, protests,
 1844–1915
 Dutch Caribbean, protest and
 revolution, 1815–2000
 Dutch Revolt, 1568–1648
 East Timor, anti-colonial struggle,
 1974 to independence
 Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War
 Ecuador, protest and revolution
 Egypt, Revolution of 1952
 Emmet, Robert (1778–1803) and
 Emmet’s Rebellion
 English Revolution, 17th century
 ETA Liberation Front (Euzkadi ta
 Askatasuna) and Basque nationalism
 Ethiopia, Revolution of 1974
 Ethnic and nationalist revolts in the
 Hapsburg Empire, 1500–1848
 European revolutions of 1848
 Finland, civil war and revolution,
 1914–1918
 Food sovereignty and protest
 Francophone Africa, protest and
 independence
 FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação
 de Moçambique)
 French Caribbean in the Age of
 Revolution
 French Guiana, political movements
 against departmentalization
 French Polynesia, protest movements
 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand
 (1869–1948)
 Garibaldi, Giuseppe (1807–1882)
 German nationalism and workers’
 movements, 19th century
 Germany, socialism and nationalism
 Gonne, Maud (1866–1953)
 Greek nationalism
 Guadeloupe, labor protest
 Guinea-Bissau, nationalist movement
 Guyana, protests and revolts
 Haiti, revolutionary revolts, 1790s
 Haitian Revolution and independence,
 1801–1804
 Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel (1753–1811)
 Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and
 German Nazism
 Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh)
 (1890–1969)
 Hungary, protests, 1815–1920
 India, armed struggle in the
 independence movement
 India, civil disobedience movement
 and demand for independence
 India, Great Rebellion of 1857
 (the Sepoy Revolt)
 Indochina, World War II and
 liberation in
 Indonesia, colonial protests,
 16th century to 1900
 Indonesian revolution and
 counterrevolution
 Iran, Kurdish national
 autonomy movement
 Iran, the Mossadegh era:
 democratic socialists and the
 US-backed coup
 Iraq, Revolution of 1958
 Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798
 Irish nationalism
 Irish revolts, 1400–1790
 Italian Risorgimento
 Jagan, Cheddi (1918–1997)
 Jamaica, independence movement,
 1950–present
 Kashmir, under India
 Kaunda, Kenneth (b. 1924)
 Kenyatta, Jomo (1893–1978)
 Khama, Seretse (1921–1980)
 and Botswana nationalism

- Kosovo, civil and armed resistance, 1990s
 Kurdistan nationalist movement and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
 Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and Sri Lankan radicalism
 Lebanon, civil war, 1975–1990
 Lesotho, popular protest and resistance
 Lumumba, Patrice (1925–1961)
 Malawi national liberation
 Malaysia, protest and revolt
 Mali, protests and uprisings, 1850s–2005
 Malta, protest and revolution
 Martí, José (1853–1895) and the Partido Revolucionario Cubano
 Mau Mau Rebellion, 1952–1959
 Micronesia, nationalist and labor protests
 Moro national liberation
 Mugabe, Robert (b. 1924)
 Namibia, struggle for independence
 Négritude movement
 Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964)
 Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972)
 O'Connell, Daniel (1775–1847)
 Pakistan, Bengali nationalist struggles
 Panama, nationalism, and popular mobilization, 1947–2000
 Parnell, Charles Stewart (1846–1891)
 Philippines, colonial protests during the Spanish era
 Pilsudski, Józef (1867–1935)
 Polish Revolution (Sejm), 1788–1792
 Puerto Rican independence movement, 1898–present
 Qadafi, Muammar al- (b. 1942)
 Québécois nationalism and Lévesque, René (1922–1987)
 Ríos, Filiberto Ojeda (1933–2005)
 Saya San (Hsaya San) movement of the 1930s
 Silesian Uprisings
 South Africa, African nationalism and the ANC
 Student movements, Europe
 Sudanese protest under Anglo-Egyptian rule
 Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925)
 SWAPO (South West African People's Organization)
 Swaziland, nationalist and economic protests
 Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864
 Taiwan, anti-imperialism and nationalism
 Taiwan, 2-28 protests, 1947
 Tajikistan, protests and revolts
 Taliban, 1996–2007
 Tamil nationalist struggle for Eelam
 Tanzania, protest and independence
 Thailand, Patani Malay nationalism
 Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution, 1796–1799
 Trinidad, anti-colonial movement
 Turkish rebellions, 1918–1925
 Turkmenistan, protest and revolt
 Uganda, protests against British colonialism and occupation
 Velasco Alvarado, Juan Francisco (1910–1977)
 Venezuelan War of Independence
 Vieques
 Vietnam, anti-colonial, nationalist, and communist movements, 1900–1939
 Washington, George (1732–1799)
 Women in the 1848 Revolution, Poland
 Women and national liberation in Africa
 Women's movement, Haiti
 Women's movement, Southern Africa
 Yugoslavia, formation of the non-aligned movement
 Zambian nationalism and protests
- Non-Violence**
 Abalone Alliance
 Addams, Jane (1860–1935)
 Berkeley Free Speech Movement
 Catholic Worker movement
 Cedar Revolution, Lebanon
 Chipko movement
 Civil Rights movement, United States, 1960–1965
 Clayoquot Sound
 Color revolutions
 Cordobazo and Rosariazo Uprising, 1969
 CORE (Congress of Racial Equality)
 Debs, Eugene (1855–1926)
 Food Not Bombs, United States
 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948)
 Greenpeace
 India, civil disobedience movement and demand for independence
 India, non-violent non-cooperation movement, 1918–1929
 Indian national liberation
 Khuda-i Khidmatgar: Pashtun non-violent resistance force (1929–1948)

King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968)
 and the Southern Christian
 Leadership Conference (SCLC)
 Kosovo, civil and armed resistance,
 1990s
 La Boétie, Etienne de (1530–1563)
 Madagascar, protests and revolts,
 19th and 20th centuries
 Madres de la Plaza de Mayo
 Mendes, Chico (1944–1988) and Amazonian
 rainforest protest and resistance
 Non-violent movements: foundations
 and early expressions
 Non-violent movements: struggles
 for rights, justice, and identities
 Non-violent revolutions
 Northern Ireland peace movement
 Norway, protest and revolution
 O’Connell, Daniel (1775–1847)
 Oaxaca uprising, 2006
 Parks, Rosa (1913–2005) and the
 Montgomery Bus Boycott
 Paul, Alice (1885–1977)
 Peterloo Massacre, 1819
 Sharp, Gene (b. 1928)
 Student Non-Violent Coordinating
 Committee (SNCC)
 Taiwan, land reform
 Ukraine Orange Revolution, 2004–2005
 Velvet Revolution, 1989
 Winstanley, Gerrard (1609–1676)
 Women and national liberation in Africa
 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests,
 Seattle, 1999
 Zambian nationalism and protests

Peace and Anti-War

Addams, Jane (1860–1935)
 American left and Howard Zinn (b. 1922)
 Anti-nuclear protest movements
 Anti-Vietnam War movement, Britain
 Anti-Vietnam War movement,
 United States
 Anti-war activism, Yugoslavia, 1990s
 Anti-war movement, France,
 20th century
 Anti-war movement, Iraq
 Aptheker, Herbert (1915–1903)
 Australia, anti-war movement
 Britain, anti-war movement, 1775–1783
 Cannon, James P. (1890–1974)
 and American Trotskyism
 Catholic Worker movement

Civil rights, United States, Black
 Power and backlash, 1965–1978
 Colombia, anti-war movements,
 1990–2008
 Counterrecruitment
 Day, Dorothy (1897–1980)
 Debs, Eugene (1855–1926)
 Food Not Bombs, United States
 Fox, George (1624–1691)
 G8 protests, Gleneagles, 2005
 G8 protests, Heiligendamm, June 2007
 Germany, Green movement
 Germany, Red Army Faction
 (Baader-Meinhof Group)
 International Congress of Women
 at The Hague
 Israeli peace movement
 Italy, anti-war movement, 1980–2005
 Japan, pacifist movement, 1945–present
 Jaures, Jean (1859–1914)
 Kelly, Petra (1947–1992)
 Kent State student uprising
 King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968)
 and the Southern Christian
 Leadership Conference (SCLC)
 May 1968 French uprisings
 Music, songs, and protest, France
 Non-interventionists, 1914–1945
 Northern Ireland peace movement
 Paine, Thomas (1737–1809)
 Russell, Bertrand (1872–1970)
 Student movements,
 Czechoslovakia, 1980s
 Student movements, Europe
 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
 Thompson, Edward Palmer (E. P.)
 (1924–1993)
 Yugoslavia, formation of the
 non-aligned movement
 Yugoslavia, Marxist humanism,
Praxis group, and the Korčula
 Summer School, 1964–1974
 Zenroren Labor Federation

Peasant, Agrarian, and Rural
 Agbekoya Peasant Uprising and
 Rebellion, 1968–1969
 Andresote and the Revolt against the
 Guipuzcoana (1731–1733)
 Anti-Corn Law agitation, Britain,
 19th century
 Aptheker, Herbert (1915–1903)
 Arch, Joseph (1826–1919)

- Argentina, *Grito de Alcorta* Peasant Rebellion, 1912
 Assembly of the Poor
 Bacon's Rebellion
 Banana Plantation Worker Rebellion, 1928
 Bengal, popular uprisings and movements in the colonial era
 Bezerra, Gregório (1900–1983)
 Bolivia, War of the Pacific to the National Revolution, 1879–1952
 Bolotnikov's Rebellion, 1606–1607
 Brazil, peasant movements and liberation theology
 Bread Riots, Britain, 1795
 Britain, peasant uprisings, 16th century
 Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888–1938)
 Bulavin's Rebellion, 1707–1708
 Cabanagem of Grão-Pará, Brazil, 1835–1840
 Cárdenas, Lázaro (1895–1970)
 Carney, James Francis "Guadalupe" (1925–1983?)
 Chávez, César (1927–1993) and the United Farm Workers
 Chernov, Victor (1873–1952)
 Chile, people's power
 China, Maoism and popular power, 1949–1969
 China, peasant revolts in the empire
 Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949
 Chipko movement
 Colombia, armed insurgency, peasant self-defense, and radical popular movements, 1960s–1970s
 Colombia, armed insurgency, peasant self-defense, and radical popular movements, 1970s–1990s
 Colombia, labor insurrection and the Socialist Revolutionary Party, 1920s–1930s
 Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959
 Davitt, Michael (1846–1906)
 Denmark, insurrection and revolt
 Díaz Soto y Gama, Antonio (1880–1967)
 Dominican Republic, protest and resistance to US imperialism, 1916–1962
 East Anglian Wheat County Riots, 1816
 Ecuador, indigenous and popular struggles
 Ecuador, protest and revolution
 Egypt, Peasant Rebellion of 1824
 Enclosure movement, protests against
 English Revolution, radical sects
 European revolutions of 1848
 Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)
 Farm Labor Organizing Committee
 German Peasant Rebellion, 1525
 Greencorn Rebellion, Oklahoma, 1917
 Guatemala, popular rebellion and civil war
 Guatemala, worker struggles and the labor movement, 1960s–1990s
 Guevara, Ernesto "Che" (1928–1967)
 Gustav Rebellions
 Haiti, revolutionary struggles
 Huerta, Dolores (b. 1930)
 Huk Rebellion, 1946–1954
 India, civil disobedience movement and demand for independence
 India, Great Rebellion of 1857 (the Sepoy Revolt)
 India, post-World War II upsurge
 Indigo Rebellion
 Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798
 Italy, peasant movements, 19th–20th centuries
 Jamaica, peasant uprisings, 19th century
 Japan, post-World War II protest movements
 Japan, protest and revolt, 1800–1945
 Japan, resistance to construction of Narita airport
 Katarismo and indigenous popular mobilization, Bolivia, 1970s–present
 Khmelnytsky Uprising
 Korea, peasant and farmers' movement
 Korea, popular rebellions and uprisings, 1492–1910
La Matanza 1932 Peasant Revolt
 Lebanon, 19th-century revolts
 Ligas Camponesas
 Lorenzo Zelaya Popular Revolutionary Forces
 Luxembourg, protest and revolution
 Madagascar, protests and revolts, 19th and 20th centuries
 Madera Uprising, Chihuahua, 1965
 Magón, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922) and the Magonistas
 Malta, protest and revolution
 Martí, Farabundo (1893–1932)
 Mazumdar, Charu (1918–1972)

Mendes, Chico (1944–1988)
 and Amazonian rainforest
 protest and resistance
 Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921
 Mexico, armed political movements,
 1960s–present
 Mexico, indigenous and peasant
 struggles, 1980s–present
 Moplah Revolts
 Morais, Clodomir de (b. 1928)
 Movimento Sem Terra (MST)
 Müntzer, Thomas (ca. 1489–1525)
 Naxalite movement, 1967–1972
 Nordic revolts and popular protests,
 1500–present
 Norway, protest and revolution
 Pakistan, Bengali nationalist struggles
 Paraguay, protest and revolt, 1954–1989
 Paraguay, protest in the
 post-Stroessner era
 Peru, labor and peasant
 mobilizations, 1900–1950
 Philippines, protest during the US era
 Populism
 Pugachev’s Rebellion, 1773–1775
 Reformation
 Romania, protest and revolution,
 20th century
 Romania, protests and revolts,
 18th and 19th centuries
 Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907
 Russia, Revolution of October/
 November 1917
 Russian revolutionary labor upsurge,
 1912–1914
 Saya San (Hsaya San) movement
 of the 1930s
 Shays’ Rebellion
 Silva, Lyndolpho (b. 1924)
 Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925)
 Swing Riots
 Swiss Peasants’ War of 1653
 Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864
 Taiwan, land reform
 Tanzania, protest and independence
 Thailand, popular movements,
 1980s–present
 Torres Restrepo, Camilo (1929–1966)
 Turkish republic protests, 1923–1946
 União dos Lavradores e Trabalhadores
 Agrícolas do Brasil (ULTAB-Brazil)
 Uruguay, labor and populist movements,
 1965–present

Velasco Alvarado, Juan Francisco
 (1910–1977)
 Via Campesina and peasant struggles
 Vietnam, anti-colonial, nationalist, and
 communist movements, 1900–1939
 Wales, nationalist protest, 19th century
 War communism and the rise of
 the Soviet Union
 Women’s movement, Cuba
 Women’s movement, Greece,
 formation of
 Women’s movement, Haiti
 Women’s movement, Latin America
 Women’s War of 1929
 Yaa Asantewaa (ca. 1840–1921)
 Yemen Socialist Revolution of 1962
 Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Rebellion
 Young Ireland
 Zambian nationalism and protests
 Zanzibar Revolution
 Zimbabwe, labor movement, 1890–1980
 Zimbabwe, national liberation movement
 Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA)

Philosophy and Theory

Adorno, Theodor W. (1903–1969)
 Anarchism
 Anarchocommunist
 Anarchosyndicalism
 Arendt, Hannah (1906–1975)
 Autonomism
 Bauer, Otto (1881–1938)
 Benjamin, Walter (1892–1940)
 Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932)
 Boal, Augusto (b. 1931)
 Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830)
 Bolivarianism, Venezuela
 Bolsheviks
 Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888–1938)
 Camus, Albert (1913–1960)
 Castoriadis, Cornelius (1922–1997)
 Césaire, Aimé (1913–2008)
 Charismatic leadership and revolution
 Chernyshevsky, Nikolai G. (1828–1889)
 Chomsky, Noam (b. 1928)
 Class identity and protest
 Class, poverty, and revolution
 Class struggle
 Color revolutions
 Commoner, Barry (b. 1917)
Communist Manifesto
 Comte, Auguste (1798–1857)
 Condorcet, Marquis de (1743–1794)

- Cornelissen, Christianus Gerardus (1864–1942)
 Counterrevolution
 Critical theory
 Debord, Guy (1931–1994) and the Spectacle
 Deleuze, Gilles (1925–1995), Guattari, Félix (1930–1992), and the global justice movement
 Dictatorship of the proletariat
 Diderot, Denis (1713–1784)
 Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963)
 Dunayevskaya, Raya (1910–1987)
 Eco-anarchism
 Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895)
 Enlightenment, France, 18th century
 Eurocommunism
 Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961)
 Fascism, protest and revolution
 Foreign intervention and revolution
 Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians
 Frankfurt School (Jewish émigrés)
 Freire, Paulo (1921–1997)
 French Revolution, historians' interpretations
 Fuller, Margaret (1810–1850)
 Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism
 Global justice movement and resistance
 Godwin, William (1756–1836)
 Goldman, Emma (1869–1940)
 Gouges, Olympe de (1745–1793)
 Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937)
 Guillén, Abraham (1913–1993)
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831)
 Hirschfeld, Magnus (1868–1935)
 Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679)
 Holbach, Baron d' (1723–1789)
 Imperialism and capitalist development
 Imperialism, historical evolution
 Imperialism, modernization to globalization
 International socialism: mass politics
 Islamic political currents
 Italy, operaism and post-operaism
 Jabotinsky, Vladimir (Ze'ev) (1880–1940) and revisionist Zionism
 James, C. L. R. (1901–1989)
 Khuda-i Khidmatgar: Pashtun non-violent resistance force (1929–1948)
 King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)
 Kollontai, Alexandra (1872–1952)
 Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921)
 La Boétie, Etienne de (1530–1563)
 Landauer, Gustav (1870–1919)
 Latin America, Catholic Church and liberation, 16th century to present
 Latin American punk rock and protest
 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924)
 Leninist philosophy
 Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements
 Liebknecht, Karl (1871–1919)
 Lilburne, John (1615–1657)
 Locke, John (1632–1704)
 Lukács, Georg (1885–1971)
 Luther, Martin (1483–1546)
 Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919)
 Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932)
 Mandel, Ernest (1923–1995)
 Mao Zedong (1893–1976)
 Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–1793)
 Marcuse, Herbert (1898–1979)
 Marianne, French revolutionary icon
 Marx, Karl (1818–1883)
 Marxism
 Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–1872)
Mein Kampf
 Migration struggles and the global justice movement
 Montesquieu, Baron de (1689–1755)
 Multitude
 Négritude movement
 Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964)
 Neoliberalism and protest
 Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900)
 Non-violent movements: foundations and early expressions
 Non-violent revolutions
 Nyerere, Julius (1922–1999)
 Owen, Robert (1771–1858)
 Paine, Thomas (1737–1809)
 Participatory democracy, history of
 Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918)
 Populism
 Postcolonial feminism and protest in the global South
 Poulantzas, Nicos (1936–1979)
 Printing press and protest
 Protest and revolution, stages in
 Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865)

- Punk movement
 - Reclus, Elisée (1830–1905)
 - Reformation
 - Revolution, dialectics of
 - Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778)
 - Russell, Bertrand (1872–1970)
 - Saint-Simon, Comte de (1760–1825)
 - Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–1980)
 - Science and revolution
 - Sexuality and revolution
 - Shakers Utopian Community
 - Sharp, Gene (b. 1928)
 - Shiva, Vandana (b. 1952)
 - Sieyès, Abbé (1748–1836)
 - Situationists
 - Smith, Adam (1723–1790)
 - Socialism
 - Spartacus, historical and modern era
 - Spence, Thomas (1750–1814)
 - Spinoza, Baruch (1632–1677)
 - Sturm und Drang
 - Tolstoy, Leo N. (1828–1910)
 - Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)
 - Ujamaa* villages
 - Utopian communities, United States
 - Vaneigem, Raoul (b.1934)
 - Vanguard Party
 - Vegetarian protests and movements
 - Voltaire (1694–1778)
 - Walker, David (ca. 1796–1830)
 - Webb, Sidney (1859–1947) and Beatrice (1858–1943)
 - Williams, Eric (1911–1981)
 - Williams, Raymond Henry (1921–1988)
 - Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–1797)
 - Women’s movement, France
 - Women’s movement, Germany
 - Young Hegelians
 - Yugoslavia, Marxist humanism, *Praxis* group, and the Korčula Summer School, 1964–1974
 - Zapatismo
 - Zionism
 - Žižek, Slavoj (b. 1949)
- Political Movements, Uprisings, and Parties**
- Algerian Islamic Salvation Front
 - Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana
 - American left and Howard Zinn (b. 1922)
 - Anti-fascist People’s Front
 - Arafat, Yasser (1929–2004), Fatah, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
 - Argentina, *piquetero* movement
 - Argentina, social and political protest, 2001–2007
 - ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens)
 - Australia, new social movements
 - Babeuf, François-Noël (1760–1797) and the Conspiracy of Equals
 - Begin, Menachem (1913–1992) and the Irgun
 - Belgium, 20th-century political conflict
 - Berkeley Free Speech Movement
 - Bin Laden, Osama (b. 1957) and al-Qaeda
 - Black nationalism, 19th and 20th centuries
 - Black September
 - Bogotazo* and *La Violencia*
 - Bolivarianism, Venezuela
 - Brandreth, Jeremiah (1790–1817) and the Pentrich Rising
 - Brazil, guerilla movements, 20th century
 - Bristol Riots, 1831
 - Britain, peasant uprisings, 16th century
 - Bulgaria, anti-Soviet movements
 - Burma, democracy movement
 - Canada, law and public protest: history
 - Canada, Rebellion of 1837–1838
 - Cannon, James P. (1890–1974) and American Trotskyism
 - Caracazo*, 1989
 - Catalan protests against centralism
 - Cedar Revolution, Lebanon
 - Chartists
 - Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–present
 - Chile, people’s power
 - Chile, protests and military coup, 1973
 - China, Maoism and popular power, 1949–1969
 - China, protest and revolution, 1800–1911
 - Cocaleros* Peasant Uprising
 - Cochabamba Water Wars
 - Colombia, Thousand Days’ War, 1899–1902
 - Colombia, unions, strikes, and anti-neoliberal opposition, 1990–2005
 - Color revolutions
 - Communist Party of Australia
 - Communist Party, France
 - Communist Party, Germany

- Communist Party NZ and the
 New Zealand revolutionary left
 Communist Party of South Africa,
 1921–1950
 Communist Party of the United
 States of America (CPUSA)
 Comunero movement
 Condorcet, Marquis de (1743–1794)
 Confederación Nacional del
 Trabajo (CNT)
 Confédération Générale du Travail
 and Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire
 Congo armed insurgency,
 Mobutu decamps
 Congo Crisis, 1960–1965
 Cordobazo and Rosariazo Uprising, 1969
 COSATU (Congress of South
 African Trade Unions)
 Costa Rican Civil War and
 Uprising, 1948
 Côte d'Ivoire, post-independence protest
 Counterrevolution, France, 1789–1830
 Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658)
 Cuba, anti-racist movement and
 the Partido Independiente de Color
 Cuban post-revolutionary protests
 Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959
 Cuban revolutionary government
 Cyprus, protest and revolt
 Czechoslovakia, resistance to
 Soviet political and economic rule
 Directory, France, 1795–1799
 Dominican Republic, protest and
 resistance to US imperialism,
 1916–1962
 Ecuador, protest and revolution
 Egypt, Revolution of 1952
 Eighteenth Brumaire
 Ejército de Liberación Nacional,
 Colombia
El Argentinazo: December 19
 and 20, 2001
 English Revolution, 17th century
 Enlightenment, France, 18th century
 EPL Maoist guerilla movement
 EPR (Ejército Popular Revolucionario)
 Escuela Moderna movement
 (The Modern School)
 Estates General, France
 ETA Liberation Front (Euzkadi
 ta Askatasuna) and Basque nationalism
 Ethnic and nationalist revolts in
 the Hapsburg Empire, 1500–1848
 European revolutions of 1848
 Ezeiza Protest and Massacre, 1973
 Farabundo Martí National Liberation
 Front (FMLN)
 FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces
 and Popular Liberation Army)
 Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI)
 Federation of Salvadoran Workers
 (FENASTRAS)
 Fiji, parliamentary insurrection
 FPMR (Frente Patrioco Manuel Rodriguez)
 France, 1830 Revolution
 FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de
 Moçambique)
 French Revolution, 1789–1794
 Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer (1898–1948),
 UNIR, and revolutionary
 populism in Colombia
 Germany, Green movement
 Germany, socialism and nationalism
 Glorious Revolution, Britain, 1688
 Gorbachev, Mikhail (b. 1931)
 Green bans movement, Australia
 Grenadian Revolution, 1979–1983
 Gunawardena, Don Philip Rupasinghe
 (1901–1972)
 Guyana, protests and revolts
 Haiti, protest and rebellion, 20th century
 Hamas: origins and development
 Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and
 the Muslim Brotherhood
 Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl
 (1895–1979)
 Hezbollah: organization and uprisings
 Hungary, protests, 1815–1920
 Hungary, Revolution of 1956
 India, Hindutva and fascist mobilizations,
 1989–2002
 India, non-violent non-cooperation
 movement, 1918–1929
 Indonesian revolution and
 counterrevolution
 Industrial Workers of the
 World (IWW)
 Internationals
 Intifada I and Intifada II
 Iran, political and cultural
 protests, 1844–1914
 Iranian Revolution, 1979
 Irish Republican Army (IRA)
 Islamic political currents
 Italian Communist Party
 Italian Risorgimento

- Italian Socialist Party
 Jacobite risings, Britain, 1715 and 1745
 Japan Socialist Party (JSP)
 Japanese Communist Party
 Katarismo and indigenous popular mobilization, Bolivia, 1970s–present
 Kaunda, Kenneth (b. 1924)
 Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938)
 Kelly, Edward “Ned” (1855–1880) and the Kelly Gang
 Kenyatta, Jomo (1893–1978)
 Khama, Seretse (1921–1980) and Botswana nationalism
 Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot
 Khuda-i Khidmatgar: Pashtun non-violent resistance force (1929–1948)
 Korea, popular rebellions and uprisings, 1492–1910
 Kosovo, civil and armed resistance, 1990s
 Kurdistan nationalist movement and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
 Labour Party, Britain
 Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and Sri Lankan radicalism
 Liberia, protest and revolution in the modern era
 M-19 of Colombia
 Machado, popular Cuban anti-government struggle, 1930s
 Magón, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922) and the Magonistas
 Movimento Sem Terra (MST)
 MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola)
 MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru)
 Nepal, people’s war and Maoists
 New Australia movement
 New Jewel movement
 Nigeria, 1993 political and electoral protest and conflict
 Nigeria, protest and revolution, 20th century
 Oaxaca uprising, 2006
 Obregón, Alvaro (1880–1928) and the Sonoran generation
 Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP)
 Paraguay, protests in the liberal era and the Triple Alliance
 Partito di Unità Proletaria–Democrazia Proletaria
 People’s Liberation Front of Sri Lanka (JVP)
 Philippines, protests, 1980s–present
 Poland, Committee for Workers (KOR)
 Polish Revolution (Sejm), 1788–1792
 Polish Revolution, 1905–1907
 POUM (Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification)
 Reform Acts, Britain and Ireland, 1832
 Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794)
 Russian Civil War, 1918–1924
 Salvadoran Civil War, 1980–1991
 Serbia, anti-bureaucratic revolution, 1987–1989
 Sinn Féin
 Slovenian National Liberation Front (Osvobodilna Fronta), 1941–1944
 Social Democratic Party, Germany
 Socialist Party, United States
 Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands)
 Sojourner Truth Organization
 Solidarność (Solidarity)
 South Africa, African nationalism and the ANC
 South African Communist Party, 1953–present
 Soviet Union, fall of
 Spanish Revolution
 SWAPO (South West African People’s Organization)
 Swedish Revolution of 1809
 Thai Communist Party
 Tibet Uprising and resistance
 Trinidad, parliamentary crisis
 Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan
 Turkey, protest and revolution, 1800s–1923
 Turkish republic protests, 1923–1946
 Ukraine Orange Revolution, 2004–2005
 Unión Patriótica
 United Englishmen/United Britons
 United Irishmen
 United Scotsmen
 Venezuela, exclusionary democracy and resistance, 1958–1998
 Venezuela, MAS and Causa Radical
 Venezuela, MBR–200 and the military uprisings of 1992
 Vinegar Hill/Castle Hill Rebellion, 1804
 Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas uprising

Religion

- Algerian Islamic Salvation Front
 al-Sanusi, Muhammad ibn Ali
 (ca. 1787–1859)
 Amana Inspirationist Utopians
 Anabaptist movement
 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (b. 1953)
 Arundel, Lady Blanche (1583–1649)
 Bacha-i Sakkao's movement
 Begin, Menachem (1913–1992)
 and the Irgun
 Bengal, popular uprisings and
 movements in the colonial era
 Ben-Gurion, David (1866–1973)
 and the Haganah
 Bin Laden, Osama (b. 1957)
 and al-Qaeda
 Böhm, Hans (also Hans Behem)
 (1458?–1476)
 Brazil, peasant movements and
 liberation theology
 Britain, peasant uprisings, 16th century
 Britain, Renaissance-era conflict
 Burdett, Sir Francis (1770–1844)
 Burma, national movement against
 British colonial rule
 Cabañas, Lucio (1938–1974)
 Calvin, John (1509–1564)
 Canudos, religion and rebellion
 in 19th-century Brazil
 Cardenal, Ernesto (b. 1925)
 Carney, James Francis “Guadalupe”
 (1925–1983?)
 Caste war of Yucatan (Guerra
 de castas en Yucatan)
 Catalan protests against centralism
 Catholic emancipation
 Catholic Worker movement
 Central Asian protest movements
 Chakravartty, Renu (1917–1994)
 China, protest and revolution, 1800–1911
 Counterrevolution, France, 1789–1830
 Cristero uprising, Mexico, 1928
 Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658)
 Cuban post-revolutionary protests
 Dalit liberation struggles
 Daquilema, Fernando (d. 1872)
 and the 1871 Uprising, Ecuador
 Day, Dorothy (1897–1980)
 Demerara Slave Rebellion, 1823
 Denmark, insurrection and revolt
 Diderot, Denis (1713–1784)
 Dreyfus Affair
 Dutch Caribbean, protest and
 revolution, 1815–2000
 Dutch Revolt, 1568–1648
 Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War
 Edict of Nantes
 English Reformation
 English Revolution, 17th century
 English Revolution, radical sects
 Enlightenment, France, 18th century
 Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony
 Fawkes, Guy (1570–1606) and
 the Gunpowder Plot
 Fell, Margaret (1614–1702)
 Fifth Monarchist women
 Fox, George (1624–1691)
 German Democratic Republic
 protests, 1945–1989
 German Peasant Rebellion, 1525
 German Reformation
 Gordon “No Popery” Riots, Britain, 1780
 Gutiérrez, Gustavo (b. 1928)
 Haiti, democratic uprising, 1980s–1991
 Hamas: origins and development
 Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and
 the Muslim Brotherhood
 Hezbollah: organization and uprisings
 Hindu nationalism, Hindutva, and women
 Hutchinson, Anne (1591–1643)
 Hutterites
 Immigrant and social conflict, France
 India, Hindutva and fascist
 mobilizations, 1989–2002
 India, nationalism, extremist
 Intifada I and Intifada II
 Iran, political and cultural
 protests, 1844–1914
 Iranian Revolution, 1979
 Ireland, Age of Revolutions, 1775–1803
 Ireland, the Troubles
 Irish revolts, 1400–1790
 Islamic political currents
 Israeli peace movement
 Jabotinsky, Vladimir (Ze'ev)
 (1880–1940) and revisionist Zionism
 Jewish resistance to Nazism
 Jews and revolution in Europe,
 1789–1919
 Kashmir, under India
 Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid
 Ruhollah Mussaui (1902–1989)
 and the Shi'ite Islamic Revolution
 Khuda-i Khidmatgar: Pashtun non-violent
 resistance force (1929–1948)

- Latin America, Catholic Church and liberation, 16th century to present
 Lebanese insurrection of 1958
 Lebanon, civil war, 1975–1990
 Lebanon, 19th-century revolts
 Lugo, Fernando (b. 1951)
 Luther, Martin (1483–1546)
 Madagascar, protests and revolts, 19th and 20th centuries
 Mahdist Revolt
 Malta, protest and revolution
 Moplah Revolts
 Moravian Brothers
 Moro national liberation
 Müntzer, Thomas (ca. 1489–1525)
 Nasrallah, Sayed Hassan (b. 1960)
 Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s
 Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900)
 Oneida Perfectionist Utopians
 Paisley, Ian (b. 1926) and Unionism, Northern Ireland
 Philippines, colonial protests during the Spanish era
 Ranters
 Reformation
 Romania, protest and revolution, 20th century
 Romero, Óscar (1917–1980), Archbishop
 St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre
 Salvadoran Civil War, 1980–1991
 Saud, Abd al-Aziz ibn (ca. 1880–1953) and the founding of modern Saudi Arabia
 Scottish Reformation
 Shakers Utopian Community
 Slovakia, dissidence in the 1970s
 Spinoza, Baruch (1632–1677)
 Sudan, Aba Island Rebellion, 1970
 Sudanese protest under Anglo-Egyptian rule
 Sudanese protest in the Turko-Egyptian era
 Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864
 Tajikistan, protests and revolts
 Taliban, 1996–2007
 Thailand, Patani Malay nationalism
 Tianjin Massacre, 1870
 Tibet Uprising and resistance
 Tolstoy, Leo N. (1828–1910)
 Turkey, anti-secular protest, 1980 to present
 Turkey, protest and revolution, 1800s–1923
 Turkish rebellions, 1918–1925
 Turkish republic protests, 1923–1946
 Turkmenistan, protest and revolt
 United Irishmen
 Utopian intentional communities
 Uzbekistan, national movement and protests
 Venezuela, Negro Miguel Rebellion, 1552
 Vietnam, anti-colonial, nationalist, and communist movements, 1900–1939
 Voltaire (1694–1778)
 Wales, nationalist protest, 19th century
 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, 1943
 Wesley, John (1703–1791), Methodism, and social reform
 Woman’s Christian Temperance Union
 Women’s movement, France
 Women’s movement, United States, 16th–18th centuries
 Women’s movement, United States, 20th century
 Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Rebellion
 Young Ireland
 Zambian nationalism and protests
 Zionism
 Zwingli, Huldrych (1484–1531)
- Socialism and Communism**
 Aboriginal/left struggle for land rights
 Afghanistan, 1978 Revolution and Islamic Civil War
 Albania, socialism
 Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973)
 Anarchism, China
 Anarchism, France
 Anarchism, Hungary
 Anarchism, Japan
 Anarchism, Russia
 Anarchocommunist
 Anti-fascist People’s Front
 Anti-war movement, France, 20th century
 Arab left and socialist movements, 1861–1930
 Argentina, armed struggle and guerilla organizations, 1960s–1970s
 Argentina, general strike, 1975
 Argentina, socialist and communist workers’ movement
 Asturias Uprising, October 1934
 Australian left

- Babeuf, François-Noël (1760–1797)
and the Conspiracy of Equals
- Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich
(1814–1876)
- Balkan socialist confederation, 1910–1948
- Benjamin, Walter (1892–1940)
- Berlinguer, Enrico (1922–1984)
- Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932)
- Blanqui, Louis Auguste (1805–1881)
- Bolsheviks
- Brazil, guerilla movements, 20th century
- Brazil, workers and the left: Partido dos
Trabalhadores and Central Única dos
Trabalhadores
- Britain, post-World War I army
mutinies and revolutionary threats
- Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888–1938)
- Bulgaria, 20th-century leftist
and workers' movements
- Bulgaria, anti-Soviet movements
- Bulgaria, World War II resistance
and rise of communism
- Cambodia, communist protests
and revolution
- Cannon, James P. (1890–1974)
and American Trotskyism
- Castoriadis, Cornelius (1922–1997)
- Castro, Fidel (b. 1926)
- Catalan protests against centralism
- Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954)
- Chen Duxiu (1879–1942)
- Chernyshevsky, Nikolai G. (1828–1889)
- Chile and the peaceful road to socialism
- Chile, people's power
- Chile, social and political
struggles, 1850–1970
- China, Maoism and popular
power, 1949–1969
- Chinese Communist
Revolution, 1925–1949
- Class identity and protest
- Class, poverty, and revolution
- Class struggle
- Communist Manifesto*
- Communist Party of Australia
- Communist Party, France
- Communist Party, Germany
- Communist Party NZ and the
New Zealand revolutionary left
- Communist Party of South
Africa, 1921–1950
- Communist Party of the United
States of America (CPUSA)
- Confederación Nacional del
Trabajo (CNT)
- Confédération Générale du Travail and
Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire
- Connolly, James (1868–1916)
- Cuba, transition to socialism
and government
- Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959
- Cuban revolutionary government
- Czechoslovakia, resistance to
Soviet political and economic rule
- Davis, Angela (b. 1944)
- Debs, Eugene (1855–1926)
- Decembrists to the rise of
Russian Marxism
- Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997)
- Dictatorship of the proletariat
- Dimitrov, Georgi (1882–1949)
- Djilas, Milovan (1911–1995)
- Dutschke, Rudi (1940–1979)
- Ecuador, left and popular movements,
1940s to present
- Egypt and Arab socialism
- Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895)
- English Revolution, radical sects
- EPL Maoist guerilla movement
- EPR (Ejército Popular Revolucionario)
- Ethiopia, Revolution of 1974
- Eurocommunism
- FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces
and Popular Liberation Army)
- Finland, civil war and
revolution, 1914–1918
- Fourier, Charles François Marie
(1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians
- FPMR (Frente Patriótico Manuel
Rodríguez)
- Francophone Africa, protest and
independence
- Frankfurt School (Jewish émigrés)
- French Guiana, political movements
against departmentalization
- G8 protests, Genoa, 2001
- German Democratic Republic
protests, 1945–1989
- Germany, Green movement
- Germany, resistance to Nazism
- Germany, socialism and nationalism
- Ghana, nationalism and socialist transition
- Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937)
- Greece, partisan resistance
- Greece, socialism, communism,
and the left, 1850–1974

- Greece, socialism, communism, and the left, 1974–2008
- Guatemala, popular rebellion and civil war
- Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967)
- Gunawardena, Don Philip Rupasinghe (1901–1972)
- Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh) (1890–1969)
- Hollywood Ten
- Huk Rebellion, 1946–1954
- Hungary, Revolution of 1956
- Indochina, World War II and liberation in
- Indonesian revolution and counterrevolution
- International socialism: mass politics
- Internationals
- Iraq, Revolution of 1958
- Italian Communist Party
- Italian labor movement
- Italian Socialist Party
- Italy, from the anti-fascist resistance to the new left (1945–1960)
- Italy, from the new left to the great repression (1962–1981)
- Italy, operaism and post-operaism
- James, C. L. R. (1901–1989)
- Japan Socialist Party (JSP)
- Japanese Communist Party
- Jaurès, Jean (1859–1914)
- Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938)
- Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot
- Kollontai, Alexandra (1872–1952)
- Labor revolutionary currents, United States, 1775–1900
- Labor revolutionary currents, United States, 20th century
- Labour Party, Britain
- Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and Sri Lankan radicalism
- Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924)
- Leninist philosophy
- Liebknecht, Karl (1871–1919)
- Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969)
- Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919)
- Mandel, Ernest (1923–1995)
- Mao Zedong (1893–1976)
- Mariátegui, José Carlos (1894–1930)
- Mármol, Miguel (1905–1993)
- Martí, Farabundo (1893–1932)
- Marx, Karl (1818–1883)
- Marxism
- Mexico, labor movement and protests, 1980–2005
- Michnik, Adam (b. 1946)
- Morris, William (1834–1896)
- Mother Jones (1837–1930)
- MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru)
- Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970)
- Naxalite movement, 1967–1972
- Nepal, Maoists’ rise
- Nepal, people’s war and Maoists
- Netherlands, protests, 1800–2000
- New Australia movement
- Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s
- Owen, Robert (1771–1858)
- Paris Commune, 1871
- Peng Dehuai (1898–1974)
- People’s Liberation Front of Sri Lanka (JVP)
- Peru, armed insurgency and the Dirty War, 1980–1990
- Peru, “people’s war,” counterinsurgency, and the popular movement
- Philippines, protest during the US era
- Polish Revolution, 1905–1907
- Poulantzas, Nicos (1936–1979)
- POUM (Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification)
- Québécois nationalism and Lévesque, René (1922–1987)
- Quit India movement
- Red Brigades
- Red Scotland and the Scottish radical left, 1880–1932
- Romania, protest and revolution, 20th century
- Roy, Manabendra Nath (1887–1954)
- Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907
- Russia, Revolution of February/ March 1917
- Russia, Revolution of October/ November 1917
- Russian Civil War, 1918–1924
- Saint-Simon, Comte de (1760–1825)
- Salam ‘Adel (1924–1963) and the Communist Party, Iraq
- Saskatchewan socialist movement
- Serrati, Giacinto Menotti (1872–1926)
- Settimana Rossa
- Situationists
- Slovakia, 1944 Uprising
- Social Democratic Party, Germany
- Socialism

- Socialism, Britain
 Socialisme ou Barbarie
 Socialist Party, United States
 Socialist Workers' Party of Germany
 (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei
 Deutschlands)
 Solidarność (Solidarity)
 South African Communist Party,
 1953–present
 Spanish Revolution
 Spartacus, historical and modern era
 Spiridonova, Maria (1884–1941)
 Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and
 “Revolution from Above”
 Syria and Iraq, Baathists
 Thai Communist Party
 Thompson, Edward Palmer (E. P.)
 (1924–1993)
 Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980)
 Togliatti, Palmiro (1893–1964)
 Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)
 Tupamaros
 Uruguay, left-wing politics from the
 Tupamaros to the Frente Amplio
 Uzbekistan, national movement
 and protests
 Venezuela, guerilla movements,
 1960s–1980s
 Venezuela, MAS and Causa Radical
 Venezuela, solidarity economy,
 social property, co-management,
 and workers' control
 Vietnam, anti-colonial, nationalist, and
 communist movements, 1900–1939
 Vietnam, First Indochina War,
 1945–1954
 Vietnam, protest and Second Indochina
 War, 1960–1974
 War communism and the rise of the Soviet
 Union
 Winstanley, Gerrard (1609–1676)
 Women's movement, Spain
 Yugoslavia, Marxist humanism, *Praxis*
 group, and the Korčula Summer
 School, 1964–1974
 Zionism
- Student, Youth, and Education**
 Adorno, Theodor W. (1903–1969)
 Alcatraz Uprising and the American
 Indian Movement
 American left and Howard Zinn (b. 1922)
 Anarchism, Greece
 Anti-Vietnam War movement, Britain
 Anti-Vietnam War movement,
 United States
 Argentina, University Reform, 1918
 Austro-Marxism
 Berkeley Free Speech Movement
 Bolivia, protest and repression, 1964–2000
 Britain, post-World War II
 political protest
 Brixton Riots, 1981
 Burma, democracy movement
 Burma, national movement against
 British colonial rule
Burschenschaften
 Cambodia, communist protests and
 revolution
Caracazo, 1989
 Cedar Revolution, Lebanon
 Charusathira, Prapas (1912–1997)
 Chile, people's power
 Chile, popular resistance
 against Pinochet
 China, Maoism and popular
 power, 1949–1969
 China, May 4th movement
 China, student protests, 20th century
 Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911
 Chissano, Joaquim (b. 1939)
 Civil rights movement, United States,
 1960–1965
 Cohn-Bendit, Daniel (b. 1945)
 Color revolutions
 Columbia University civil rights protests
 Concordia University student protests
 Cordobazo and Rosariazo Uprising, 1969
 Côte d'Ivoire, post-independence protest
 Czechoslovakia, resistance to Soviet
 political and economic rule
 Davis, Angela (b. 1944)
 Dominican Republic, protest and
 resistance to US imperialism,
 1916–1962
 Dunayevskaya, Raya (1910–1987)
 Dutschke, Rudi (1940–1979)
 Ecuador, left and popular movements,
 1940s to present
 EPL Maoist guerilla movement
 Escuela Moderna movement
 (The Modern School)
 Ethiopia, Revolution of 1974
 European revolutions of 1848
 Farabundo Martí National Liberation
 Front (FMLN)

- Finland, civil war and revolution, 1914–1918
 Fonseca, Carlos (1936–1976)
 France, post-World War II labor protests
 Freire, Paulo (1921–1997)
 German Democratic Republic protests, 1945–1989
 Germany, Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Group)
 Greece, anti-dictatorship protests
 Hong Kong democracy protests
 Hungary, anti-communist protests, 1945–1989
 Hungary, Revolution of 1956
 India, post-World War II upsurge
 Indonesian protests against Suharto dictatorship
 Israeli peace movement
 Italy, from the new left to the great repression (1962–1981)
 Kent State student uprising
 Khuda-i Khidmatgar: Pashtun non-violent resistance force (1929–1948)
 King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)
 Korea, labor movement, 20th century
 Korea, post-World War II popular movements for democracy
 Kwangju student uprising
 Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements, United States
 Lovett, William (1800–1877)
 May 1968 French uprisings
 Mexico, labor movement and protests, 1980–2005
 Michnik, Adam (b. 1946)
 Montessori, Maria (1870–1952)
 Nasir, Hassan (1928–1960)
 Naxalite movement, 1967–1972
 Netherlands, protests, 1800–2000
 Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s
 Oaxaca uprising, 2006
 People’s Liberation Front of Sri Lanka (JVP)
 Philippines, protests, 1950s–1970s
 Poland, student movement, 1968
 Prague Spring
 Prasertkul, Seksan (b. 1949)
 Romania, student and worker protests, 1956
 Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
 Serbian Revolution of October 2000
 Slovakia, Štúr generation
 Student movement, Greece, 1990–1991
 Student movements
 Student movements, Czechoslovakia, 1960s
 Student movements, Czechoslovakia, 1980s
 Student movements, Europe
 Student movements, global South
 Student movements, Korea
 Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)
 Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
 Sudanese protest under Anglo-Egyptian rule
 Syria and Iraq, Baathists
 Tajikistan, protests and revolts
 Tamil nationalist struggle for Eelam
 Tiananmen Square protests, 1989
 Tlatelolco 1968 and Mexico student movement
 UNAM Strike, 2000, and Mexican student movement
 Uruguay, labor and populist movements, 1965–present
 Uruguay, left-wing politics from the Tupamaros to the Frente Amplio
 Velvet Revolution, 1989
 Venezuela, exclusionary democracy and resistance, 1958–1998
 Venezuela, guerilla movements, 1960s–1980s
 Vietnam, anti-colonial, nationalist, and communist movements, 1900–1939
Wathbah of 1948
 West German “new left”
 White Rose (Weiße Rose)
 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Cancun, 2003
 Young Communist International
 Yugoslavia, Marxist humanism, *Praxis* group, and the Korčula Summer School, 1964–1974
 Yugoslavia, student protests, 1966–1974
 Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA)
- Taxation**
 Agbekoya Peasant Uprising and Rebellion, 1968–1969
 American Revolution of 1776
 Anti-Corn Law agitation, Britain, 19th century

Bengal, popular uprisings and movements in the colonial era
 Bolivian neoliberalism, social mobilization, and revolution from below, 2003 and 2005
 Boston Tea Party
 Bread Riots, Britain, 1795
 Caribbean islands, protests against IMF
 Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911
 Daquilema, Fernando (d. 1872) and the 1871 Uprising, Ecuador
 Durrani empire, popular protests, 1747–1823
 Egypt, Peasant Rebellion of 1824
 Eureka Stockade
 European revolutions of 1848
 Fries's Rebellion
 German Peasant Rebellion, 1525
 Gustav Rebellions
 India, civil disobedience movement and demand for independence
 Japan, protest and revolt, 1800–1945
 Lebanon, 19th-century revolts
 Luxembourg, protest and revolution
 Mau Mau Rebellion, 1952–1959
 Nordic revolts and popular protests, 1500–present
 Pakistan, Bengali nationalist struggles
 Rampa rebellions in Andhra Pradesh
 Saya San (Hsaya San) movement of the 1930s
 Shays' Rebellion
 Swaziland, nationalist and economic protests
 Swiss Peasants' War of 1653
 Whiskey Rebellion
 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Cancun, 2003
 World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Hong Kong, 2005
 Zambian nationalism and protests
 Zamora, Ezequiel (1817–1860)
 Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919) and the Comuna Morelense
 Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas uprising

Utopianism

Amana Inspirationist Utopians
 Benezet, Anthony (1713–1784)
 Cooperative Commonwealth
 English Revolution, radical sects
 Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony

Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians
 Fox, George (1624–1691)
 Godwin, William (1756–1836)
 Hutterites
 Icaria Utopian Community
 New Australia movement
 New Harmony
 Oneida Perfectionist Utopians
 Owen, Robert (1771–1858)
 Ranters
 Shakers Utopian Community
 Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864
 Truth, Sojourner (ca. 1797–1893)
 Utopian communities, United States
 Utopian intentional communities
 Wright, Frances "Fanny" (1795–1852)

Urban uprisings

Abu Jamal, Mumia (b. 1954)
 Addams, Jane (1860–1935)
 Alinsky, Saul (1909–1972) and the Industrial Areas Foundation
 Assembly of the Poor
 Baker, Ella Josephine (1903–1986)
 Bloody Sunday Demonstration, 1887
 Bristol Riots, 1831
 Britain, post-World War II political protest
 Brixton Riots, 1981
Caracazo, 1989
 Catalan protests against centralism
 Chartists
 China, Maoism and popular power, 1949–1969
 Civil rights, United States, Black Power and backlash, 1965–1978
 Cop Watch Los Angeles
 Cordobazo and Rosariazo Uprising, 1969
 Côte d'Ivoire, post-independence protest
 Critical Mass
 Ejército de Liberación Nacional, Colombia
El Argentinazo: December 19 and 20, 2001
 Food Riots
 France, June Days, 1848
 G8 protests, Genoa, 2001
 Guatemala, popular rebellion and civil war
 Haymarket tragedy
 Iranian Revolution, 1979
 Italy, Centri Sociali

Italy from the anti-fascist resistance to the new left (1945–1960)
 Italy, from the new left to the great repression (1962–1981)
 Jamaica, independence movement, 1950–present
 Kelly, Edward “Ned” (1855–1880) and the Kelly Gang
 Korea, movement of urban poor
 League of Revolutionary Black Workers
 May 1968 French uprisings
 Mexico, labor movement and protests, 1980–2005
 Moplah Revolts
 Oaxaca uprising, 2006
 Oka crisis
 On-to-Ottawa Trek
 Peru, armed insurgency and the Dirty War, 1980–1990
 Quit India movement
 Red Summer, United States, 1919
 Regina Riot
 Urban rebellions, United States
 US labor rebellions and the rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)
 Venezuela, exclusionary democracy and resistance, 1958–1998

Biographies of Key Figures


Addams, Jane (1860–1935)
 Adorno, Theodor W. (1903–1969)
 Alinsky, Saul (1909–1972) and the Industrial Areas Foundation
 Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973)
 al-Sanusi, Muhammad ibn Ali (ca. 1787–1859)
 Ambedkar, B. R. (1891–1956)
 Andresote and the Revolt against the Guipuzcoana (1731–1733)
 Anthony, Susan B. (1820–1906)
 Arafat, Yasser (1929–2004), Fatah, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
 Arendt, Hannah (1906–1975)
 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938)
 Aung San (1915–1947)
 Babeuf, François-Noël (1760–1797) and the Conspiracy of Equals
 Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876)
 Beauvoir, Simone de (1908–1986)

Begin, Menachem (1913–1992) and the Irgun
 Ben Bella, Ahmad (b. 1918)
 Ben-Gurion, David (1866–1973) and the Haganah
 Benjamin, Walter (1892–1940)
 Berlinguer, Enrico (1922–1984)
 Biermann, Wolf (b. 1936)
 Bin Laden, Osama (b. 1957) and al-Qaeda
 Blanqui, Louis Auguste (1805–1881)
 Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830)
 Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821)
 Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897)
 Bordiga, Amadeo (1889–1970) and the Italian Communist Party
 Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945)
 Brecht, Bertolt (1899–1956)
 Brissot, Jacques Pierre (1754–1793)
 Brown, John (1800–1859)
 Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888–1938)
 Burdett, Sir Francis (1770–1844)
 Cabral, Amílcar (1924–1973)
 Calvin, John (1509–1564)
 Camus, Albert (1913–1960)
 Cannon, James P. (1890–1974) and American Trotskyism
 Carson, Rachel (1907–1964)
 Castoriadis, Cornelius (1922–1997)
 Castro, Fidel (b. 1926)
 Chávez, César (1927–1993) and the United Farm Workers
 Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954)
 Chen Duxiu (1879–1942)
 Chilembwe, John (1871–1915)
 Chiluba, Frederick (b. 1943)
 Collins, Michael (1890–1922)
 Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658)
 Cuauhtémoc (1502–1525)
 Davis, Angela (b. 1944)
 Debord, Guy (1931–1994) and the Spectacle
 Debs, Eugene (1855–1926)
 Deleuze, Gilles (1925–1995), Guattari, Félix (1930–1992), and the global justice movement
 Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997)
 Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806)
 De Valera, Eamon (1882–1975)
 Diderot, Denis (1713–1784)
 Dimitrov, Georgi (1882–1949)
 Diriangén (1496 or 1497–1530s)
 Di Vittorio, Giuseppe (1892–1957)

- Douglass, Frederick (1817–1895)
 Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963)
 Dubček, Alexander (1921–1992)
 Dunayevskaya, Raya (1910–1987)
 Eisenstein, Sergei (1898–1948)
 Ellis, Daniel Edward “Daan”
 (1904–1963)
 Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895)
 Equiano, Olaudah (1745–1797)
 Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1911–1984)
 Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961)
 Father Rapp (1757–1847) and
 Harmony
 Fawkes, Guy (1570–1606) and
 the Gunpowder Plot
 Fell, Margaret (1614–1702)
 Fonseca, Carlos (1936–1976)
 Foucault, Michel (1926–1984)
 Fourier, Charles François Marie
 (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians
 Fox, Charles James (1749–1806)
 Fox, George (1624–1691)
 Freire, Paulo (1921–1997)
 Friedan, Betty (1921–2006)
 Fuller, Margaret (1810–1850)
 Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer (1898–1948),
 UNIR, and revolutionary
 populism in Colombia
 Galleani, Luigi (1861–1931)
 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand
 (1869–1948)
 Garibaldi, Giuseppe (1807–1882)
 Garrison, William Lloyd (1805–1879)
 Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and
 Garveyism
 Godwin, William (1756–1836)
 Goldman, Emma (1869–1940)
 Gonne, Maud (1866–1953)
 Gorbachev, Mikhail (b. 1931)
 Gouges, Olympe de (1745–1793)
 Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937)
 Grass, Gunter (b. 1927)
 Guaicaipuro (ca. 1530–1568)
 Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967)
 Gunawardena, Don Philip Rupasinghe
 (1901–1972)
 Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and
 the Muslim Brotherhood
 Hatuey (ca. 1400s–1512)
 Hauptmann, Gerhart (1862–1946)
 Havel, Václav (b. 1936)
 Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl
 (1895–1979)
 Haywood, Big Bill (1869–1928)
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
 (1770–1831)
 Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel (1753–1811)
 Hilferding, Rudolf (1877–1941)
 Hirschfeld, Magnus (1868–1935)
 Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and
 German Nazism
 Hlinka, Andrej (1864–1938) and
 the Slovak People’s Party
 Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh)
 (1890–1969)
 Hugo, Victor (1802–1885)
 Hunt, Henry “Orator” (1773–1835)
 Hutchinson, Anne (1591–1643)
 Ibrahim, Mirza (ca. 1906–2000)
 Iqbal, Muhammad (1877–1938)
 Jabotinsky, Vladimir (Ze’ev) (1880–1940)
 and revisionist Zionism
 Jackson, Jesse (b. 1941)
 Jagan, Cheddi (1918–1997)
 Jalib, Habib (1928–1993)
 James, C. L. R. (1901–1989)
 Jaurès, Jean (1859–1914)
 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali (1876–1948)
 Jumandi (d. 1578)
 Kaunda, Kenneth (b. 1924)
 Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938)
 Kelly, Edward “Ned” (1855–1880)
 and the Kelly Gang
 Kenyatta, Jomo (1893–1978)
 Khama, Seretse (1921–1980) and
 Botswana nationalism
 Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid
 Ruhollah Mussau (1902–1989)
 and the Shi’ite Islamic Revolution
 King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968)
 and the Southern Christian
 Leadership Conference (SCLC)
 Kollontai, Alexandra (1872–1952)
 Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921)
 Lafayette, Marquis de (1757–1834)
 Landauer, Gustav (1870–1919)
 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924)
 Li Lisan (1899–1967)
 Liebknecht, Karl (1871–1919)
 Lilburne, John (1615–1657)
 Lincoln, Abraham (1809–1865)
 and African Americans
 Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969)
 Locke, John (1632–1704)
 Lu Xun (1881–1936)
 Lukács, Georg (1885–1971)

- Lumumba, Patrice (1925–1961)
 Luther, Martin (1483–1546)
 Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919)
 Magón, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922)
 and the Magonistas
 Makhno, Nestor (1889–1934)
 Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932)
 Malcolm X (1925–1965)
 Mandel, Ernest (1923–1995)
 Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918)
 Manley, Michael (1924–1997)
 Mao Zedong (1893–1976)
 Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–1793)
 Marcuse, Herbert (1898–1979)
 Mariátegui, José Carlos (1894–1930)
 Maripe, Knight (1927–2006)
 Mármol, Miguel (1905–1993)
 Martí, Farabundo (1893–1932)
 Martí, José (1853–1895) and the Partido
 Revolucionario Cubano
 Marx, Karl (1818–1883)
 Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–1872)
 Mboya, Tom (1930–1969) and the
 Kenya labor movement
 Mendes, Chico (1944–1988) and
 Amazonian rainforest protest
 and resistance
 Michel, Louise (1830–1905)
 Michnik, Adam (b. 1946)
 Mirabeau, Comte de (1749–1791)
 Morris, William (1834–1896)
 Mossadegh, Mohammad (1881–1967)
 Mother Jones (1837–1930)
 Mpho, Motsamai (b. 1921)
 Mugabe, Robert (b. 1924)
 Munday, Jack (b. 1929)
 Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945)
 Naidu, Sarojini (1879–1949)
 Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970)
 Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964)
 Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900)
 Nin, Andreu (1892–1937)
 Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972)
 Nujoma, Sam (b. 1929)
 Obregón, Alvaro (1880–1928) and
 the Sonoran generation
 O’Connell, Daniel (1775–1847)
 O’Connor, Arthur (1763–1852)
 O’Connor, Feargus (1796–1855)
 Paine, Thomas (1737–1809)
 Paisley, Ian (b. 1926) and Unionism,
 Northern Ireland
 Pankhurst, Emmeline (1858–1928),
 Christabel (1880–1958), and
 Sylvia (1882–1960)
 Parks, Rosa (1913–2005) and the
 Montgomery Bus Boycott
 Parnell, Charles Stewart (1846–1891)
 Peng Dehuai (1898–1974)
 Pilsudski, Józef (1867–1935)
 Popelin, Marie (1846–1913) and Belgian
 League for Women’s Rights
 Poulantzas, Nicos (1936–1979)
 Prestes, Luís Carlos (1898–1990) and
 Prestes, Olga Benário (1908–1942)
 Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865)
 Qu Qiubai (1899–1935)
 Queen Nanny and Maroon resistance
 Reclus, Elisée (1830–1905)
 Robespierre, Maximilien
 de (1758–1794)
 Romero, Óscar (1917–1980),
 Archbishop
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778)
 Roy, Manabendra Nath (1887–1954)
 Saint-Simon, Comte de (1760–1825)
 Salam ‘Adel (1924–1963) and the
 Communist Party, Iraq
 Sánchez Saornil, Lucía (1895–1970)
 Sandino, Augusto César (1895–1934)
 Sands, Bobby (1954–1981)
 Sanger, Margaret (1879–1966) and the
 American birth control movement
 Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–1980)
 Senghor, Léopold (1906–2001)
 Serrati, Giacinto Menotti (1872–1926)
 Sharp, Gene (b. 1928)
 Shlyapnikov, Alexander Gavrilovich
 (1885–1937)
 Sieyès, Abbé (1748–1836)
 Sihanouk, Norodom (b. 1922)
 Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula da (b. 1945)
 Smith, Adam (1723–1790)
 Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and
 “Revolution from Above”
 Steinem, Gloria (b. 1934)
 Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925)
 Sylvis, William H. (1829–1869)
 and the National Labor Union
 Tambo, Oliver (1917–1993)
 Thompson, Edward Palmer (E. P.)
 (1924–1993)
 Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980)
 Togliatti, Palmiro (1893–1964)


- Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution, 1796–1799
Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)
Túpac Amaru (1540–1572)
Velasco Alvarado, Juan Francisco (1910–1977)
Villa, Pancho (ca. 1878–1923) and the division of the North
Voltaire (1694–1778)
Walesa, Lech (b. 1943)
Wang Ming (1904–1974)
Washington, George (1732–1799)
Wesley, John (1703–1791), Methodism, and social reform
Wilberforce, William (1759–1833)
Wilkes, John (1725–1797) and the “Wilkes and Liberty” movement
Williams, Eric (1911–1981)
Winstanley, Gerrard (1609–1676)
Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–1797)
Wright, Frances “Fanny” (1795–1852)
Yaa Asantewaa (ca. 1840–1921)
Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919) and the Comuna Morelense
Zhang Guotao (1897–1979)
Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)
Zhu De (1886–1976)
Zumbi (ca. 1655–1695)
Zwane, Ambrose Pheseyha (1922–1998)



Map 1 *Africa*




Map 2 Asia



Map 3 Central America and the Caribbean




Map 4 Europe



Map 5 The Middle East



Map 6 North America



Map 7 Oceania



803053AI (R02108) 3-04

Map 8 South America



Abalone Alliance

Laurence Davis

Along with the Clamshell Alliance, the Abalone Alliance was one of the pioneering organizations of the non-violent direct action movement in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. Established in 1977 to stop the operation of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company's Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant in California, the Abalone Alliance exercised a profound influence on the protest politics of its time, primarily by means of its successful example of anarchist-inspired prefigurative utopian politics. By the time it disbanded in 1985, the Abalone Alliance had drawn thousands of people into the movement against nuclear power and alerted a wider public to its dangers, trained a generation of activists in consensus decision making procedures and mass civil disobedience, spawned affinity based organizational networks that served as a basis for future movements, and demonstrated the revolutionary potentials of anarchy-feminism, non-violent direct action, and vision-oriented community building.

While the ideological roots of the Abalone Alliance lie deep in the American counterculture, the immediate spur for its formation was the PG&E's construction of a nuclear power plant near the town of San Luis Obispo on the central Californian coast. The site chosen for the plant was one of the two remaining wilderness areas in the state, had some of the largest and oldest oak trees on the West Coast of the United States, was a sacred burial ground for the Chumash Indian tribe almost exterminated by colonial settlement, stood only 2.2 miles from an offshore seismic fault, and was home to the largest concentration of wild abalone in California. None of these factors deterred the businessmen of PG&E, who pressed ahead with their construction plans in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the face of legal challenges and vocal public opposition.

In March 1974, PG&E conducted its first hot test of the plant, resulting in the death of tens of thousands of abalone in Diablo Cove. The Abalone Alliance, formed in May 1977 at a statewide conference of 70 anti-nuclear activists, took its name from this incident. Its stated aims were to "wage a non-violent direct action campaign" to "stop construction and operation of all nuclear reactors in California"; to "promote the realistic alternatives of safe, clean and renewable sources of energy"; to "encourage responsible community control of energy production and use"; to "support efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons"; and to "build a more loving and responsible world for ourselves, our children and future generations of all living things on this planet" (Abalone Alliance Archival Site 2008).

True to its word, the Alliance waged a vigorous campaign of non-violent direct action against the Diablo plant over an eight year period. In August 1977 it staged a civil disobedience action at the gates of Diablo Canyon at which 47 people were arrested while 1,500 others showed their support. In August 1978, 5,000 people attended a rally at the gates, and 487 were arrested for blocking access to the plant. In April 1979, following the Pennsylvania Three Mile Island nuclear reactor partial meltdown in late March, 25,000 people attended an Abalone-organized anti-nuclear rally in San Francisco. In June, 40,000 people came to San Luis Obispo for the largest anti-nuclear rally ever held in United States history. Most notably of all, on September 15, 1981, the Abalone Alliance commenced a blockade of Diablo Canyon that lasted for two weeks. Nearly 20,000 people rallied in support, and over 1,900 blockaders were arrested in a series of dramatic civil disobedience actions. According to many of the backcountry blockaders who managed to camp out for several days before being arrested, the experience of intense mutualistic community and attachment to the land generated by this action seemed like a model of a utopian

society. For some, and not only the anarcha-feminists who played such a prominent role in organizing it, this experience of vision-oriented prefigurative community was what Diablo was fundamentally about.

While the Abalone Alliance ultimately failed in its immediate aim of shutting down the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant, it succeeded in the larger aim of stopping the construction of new nuclear plants, not only in California but throughout the United States. In the wake of the publicity generated by the protests, then-pending plans to build nuclear reactors in the US were cancelled, and no licenses for new ones have been granted in the more than 25 years since. It also succeeded in promoting widespread interest in alternative, clean and renewable sources of energy. Beyond this, it left a creative legacy of non-violent direct action and feminist-inspired cultural revolution that has been emulated and developed further by subsequent generations of protesters and revolutionaries.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchism and Gender; Anarchism, United States; Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Eco-Anarchism; Ecological Protest Movements

References and Suggested Readings

- Abalone Alliance Archival Site (2008) Available at www.energy-net.org (downloaded February 27, 2008).
- Epstein, B. (1991) *Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in the 1970s and 1980s*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wills, J. (2006) *Conservation Fallout: Nuclear Protest at Diablo Canyon*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Abdurahman, Abdullah (1872–1940)

Mohamed Adhikari

Dr. Abdullah Abdurahman was the most influential and popular political leader within the Colored community of South Africa for three and a half decades before his death in February 1940 and won widespread respect within the white establishment.

Abdurahman was born in Wellington, South Africa on December 12, 1872. A descendant of grandparents granted manumission from slavery, his graduation as a medical doctor from

the University of Glasgow in 1893 was a signal achievement. Abdurahman entered public life in 1904, becoming the first black person elected to the Cape Town City Council, representing Wards 6 and 7 for the rest of his life. Abdurahman exerted substantial influence on local government due to his exceptional popularity among Colored voters and energetic chairing of several council committees. In 1914 Abdurahman became the first Colored person elected to the Cape Provincial Council, holding the Castle Division to 1940.

Abdurahman's most important political contribution was as president of the African Political Organization (APO), to which he was elected in 1905 and completely dominated the leadership for 35 years. Under his direction the APO grew from an insignificant, faction-ridden body into an organization of several thousand members with a national network of branches by 1910, comprising the country's largest black political organization of that time. Through the APO Abdurahman waged a futile struggle to stem the erosion of Colored civil rights and coordinated wide-ranging efforts for the socio-economic upliftment of the Colored people, especially in education and public health. Abdurahman left an enduring legacy in helping to found the Teachers' League of South Africa in 1913, and several high schools, including Trafalgar High School in 1911, the Rahmaniye Institute in 1913, and Livingstone High School in 1934.

Although he focused on advancing Colored interests, Abdurahman recognized the need to foster interracial cooperation. He thus participated in the 1909 South African Native and Colored People's Delegation to Britain that protested the color bar in the Union constitution and jointly convened four Non-European Conferences with D. D. T. Jabavu between 1927 and 1934 to mobilize opposition to South African Prime Minister Hertzog's segregationist policies. Although Abdurahman was not of Indian descent, the South African Indian Congress asked him to lead their delegation to request the Indian government intervene in anti-Asian legislation. Abdurahman was the only black member of the Wilcox Commission appointed in 1934 to enquire into the socioeconomic condition of Colored people. With a minority of liberal commissioners, Abdurahman consistently opposed the segregationist recommendations,

including proposals for the outlawing of sexual intercourse between Coloreds and whites, implementation of residential segregation of Colored people, and establishment of a separate university for Coloreds.

The mercurial Abdurahman was a gifted orator and a charismatic leader. His popularity among the Colored electorate emanated from the eloquence and vigor with which he articulated their political desires and as a representation of accomplishment through his personal achievements that embodied their highest social ambitions. He had an unaffected, amicable manner and related to his community, especially the less privileged, with ease and respect.

In one of his last official acts, in June 1999 President Nelson Mandela posthumously awarded Abdurhaman the Order for Meritorious Service: Class I (Gold) for his contribution to the struggle for a non-racial, democratic South Africa.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Apartheid Movement, South Africa; Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918)

References and Suggested Readings

- Adhikari, M. (2005) *Not White Enough, Not Black Enough: Racial Identity in South Africa's Coloured Community*. Athens: Ohio State University Press.
- Lewis, G. (1987) *Between the Wire and the Wall: A History of South African 'Coloured' Politics*. Cape Town: David Philip.
- van der Ross, R. (1990) *'Say It Out Loud': The APO Presidential Addresses and other Major Political Speeches, 1906-1940, of Dr. Abdullah Abdurahman*. Bellville: University of the Western Cape Institute for Historical Research.

Aboriginal/left struggle for land rights

Emma G. Murphy

The modern Australian land rights movement has seen many successful political collaborations between indigenous people, trade unionists, communists, and environmentalists. The legacy of these political relationships emerging in the early decades of the twentieth century, largely due to collaboration between the Communist Party of

Australia (CPA) and indigenous people entering the workforce, served to strengthen land rights struggles from the 1960s to the present.

Gurindji Struggle

In 1966 the Gurindji people of the Northern Territory (NT) went on strike, citing racially discriminatory pay and working conditions on cattle stations. However, it quickly became a struggle for land when the striking Gurindji people moved to their traditional lands of Dagu Ragu (Wattie Creek) in what was, according to white law, an illegal occupation. They demanded 500 square miles of their country to be given back to them. The strike lasted for nine years, and the demand was ultimately met, although the area handed back was smaller than the original claim. In 1975, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam granted the Gurindji people leasehold rights, and in 1986 this was converted to freehold lease.

The struggle won broad support from unionists and activists across the country. The CPA campaigned within the unions in which it held influence, mobilizing financial, material, and political support that was to be critical to the campaign. The struggle coincided with the 1967 referendum, in which over 90 percent of the population voted to give the federal government the power to legislate for indigenous people, thus overriding state laws. The overwhelming success of the referendum indicated the level of national support for indigenous rights within the community, largely due to years of campaigning by a "black-red alliance," predominantly comprising the (indigenous-only) Australian Aboriginal Fellowship and the (combined) Federal Council for the Advancement of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. Many indigenous activists in the campaign were also members of the CPA.

Tent Embassy

On January 25, 1972, Liberal (conservative) Prime Minister William McMahon announced that his government would not recognize land rights, but rather would offer indigenous people 50-year general purpose leases. The response was immediate. The next morning, January 26, Australia Day, indigenous activists established a protest camp on the lawns of Parliament

House in Canberra, proclaiming it the Aboriginal Embassy.

The Aboriginal Tent Embassy went on to become one of the most powerful protests staged by the indigenous rights movement. The politics of the embassy were influenced by Black Power groups from Victoria and New South Wales. This new layer of indigenous leadership had begun to emerge in the late 1960s, and was exposed to a broad range of influences such as Malcolm X, the Black Panthers, and the African National Congress. The tent embassy was closed down but subsequently reopened in 1992. It celebrated its thirtieth anniversary in 2002.

Land Rights Act (NT)

The 1972 election of Gough Whitlam's Labor government saw the abandonment of assimilation – which had been official policy since 1937 – in favor of self-determination. A Land Rights Commission was established to investigate mechanisms for recognizing land rights in the NT (which, unlike the states, is under legislative control of the federal government).

The government's response to the Commission's findings was the 1976 Land Rights Act (NT). It was a significant step forward for indigenous land rights, allowing, for the first time, indigenous groups to claim collective freehold title over their traditional land. However, government amendments did weaken the Commission's original recommendations: land could not be claimed on the basis of "need" alone, and the onus of proof of attachment to land fell on the indigenous people, placing those already dispossessed at a great disadvantage.

Mining

The Land Rights Commission's report noted that "to deny Aborigines the right to prevent mining on their land is to deny the reality of land rights" (Vachon & Toyne, in Peterson & Langton 1983: 320). However, in making its recommendations, the Commission neglected this finding, allowing that the federal government should have the power to veto any indigenous groups' block to mining if the mining was deemed to be in the interest of the nation.

The struggle against mining interests has seen successful collaboration between indigenous and

non-indigenous activists. For indigenous people, the campaigns have not always been *against* mining but *for* the right to directly negotiate with mining companies that seek to mine their land, as well as the right to veto mining proposals and/or be guaranteed economic benefit of commercial activities on their land.

A key contemporary struggle against mining interests was the 1998 campaign against the Jabiluka uranium mine on land over which the Mirrar people were recognized as traditional owners. Environmentalists from around Australia responded to the Mirrar's calls for support by establishing a blockade at the site of the proposed mine in the Northern Territory. The blockade lasted eight months, and coincided with a national campaign, lobbying, and court cases. The project was unable to proceed beyond the entrance to the mine being dug, and the 2005 Jabiluka Long-Term Care and Maintenance Agreement, signed by the government and the Mirrar people, gave the traditional owners of the land veto rights over any future mining proposals.

In 1988, the bicentenary of the European invasion of the continent became a focus for activists seeking to keep land rights on the agenda. Under increasing pressure – and facing growing anger that, although elected with a promise of action on land rights, the Labor government had failed to deliver – in 1991 Prime Minister Paul Keating introduced the Council for Reconciliation Bill. While the reconciliation process, which was to last a decade, was rich with symbolism, there was no mention of land rights.

Mabo

Eddie Mabo, a Merriam man from the Murray Islands in the Torres Strait, was encouraged by legal and academic supporters to launch a case in the High Court after the Protector of Aborigines in Queensland denied him the right to return home. In the 1970s, movement between indigenous reserves in that state was still controlled by the Protector. The case was launched in 1982, and in 1992 it was ruled that the Merriam people did have native title over their country when Australia was colonized and, furthermore, those rights had not been extinguished by European settlement. The judges' findings also indicated that the ruling could have implications for some indigenous people on the mainland.

The Mabo case was heralded by some as a huge advance for land rights, as it overturned the legal doctrine of *terra nullius* (uninhabited land), which had existed until that point. However, many were frustrated with its limitations, and the further limitations of the Native Title Act, the federal government's response to Mabo. Indigenous people who had moved or been driven off their land were discriminated against, in that native title would only be granted where "traditional," uninterrupted connection with the land could be proved. Economic, social, and political needs were not recognized as valid reasons to launch claims. Additionally, land which the government had alienated could not be claimed, which again discriminated against groups whose tribal country fell within what were now towns, cities, or private property. In other words, most native title across the continent *had* been extinguished, simply through the forced acquisition of land by the crown.

Private property and mining interests were not threatened by Mabo. However, the mining industry and other interests launched a campaign focused on the threat of urban backyards and parks being lost to native title claimants. This propaganda backlash against Mabo served to mobilize indigenous people and their supporters. Rallies and meetings took place across the country defending the concept of land rights, countering the spread of misinformation, but also pointing out the shortcomings of the proposed legislation. On September 26, 1993, following a conference in Canberra of 600 indigenous people who discussed how to respond to Mabo, a rally at Parliament House burned a copy of the draft Land Rights Bill. Nonetheless, in December 1993, it was passed by the House of Representatives.

Wik

In 1996 the conservative Liberal/National coalition of Prime Minister John Howard was elected. The land rights campaign up until that point had shifted a significant amount of public opinion in indigenous people's favor. However, under Howard the debate became much more divisive.

In December 1996, the *Wik People vs. Queensland High Court* case was required to examine whether native title in Far North Queensland had been extinguished by the granting of pastoral leases. The ruling found that this was not the case: indigenous native title

and pastoral interests could coexist; however, where there was conflict, the pastoralist rights would override the native title.

Like Mabo, the implications of the Wik ruling posed no direct challenge to pastoral or mining interests. However, indigenous people again faced a backlash of opinion against them. The government prepared its legislative response to Wik in an environment of claims and counterclaims as to the extent to which the ruling threatened current and future mining and pastoral industry. The government's response to Wik, the Native Title Amendment Act 1998, was a further restriction on the already limited rights of native title holders.

The End of "Self-Determination"?

The Liberal and Labor parties' backlash against the policy of self-determination, which had begun prior to Howard's election and increased in intensity throughout the late 1990s, was reflected in the increasing political and media attention to social and economic problems in indigenous Australia – especially in the remote indigenous communities of central and northern Australia. Reports of 100 percent unemployment, substance abuse, and violence within these communities were used to justify the argument that self-management had failed.

Altman (2007) points out that connected to these attacks on self-determination was the question of land and land ownership. Problems in remote communities were blamed on the failed notion of collective ownership, and the government, along with more conservative indigenous leaders, began to point to the need for these communities to enter the "real economy," and the "right" of indigenous people to enjoy private home ownership.

Northern Territory Intervention

In June 2007, the federal government announced an emergency intervention into indigenous communities in the NT. The intervention was in response to the recent report released by the NT Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse. However, as more details of the plan became available, and especially when the relevant enabling legislation was tabled in federal parliament in August, indigenous people, civil libertarians,

and activists raised concern that the measures contained within the legislation had apparently little to do with protecting children.

The legislation required the suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act (1975). Amongst its provisions were the right of the government to acquire townships on indigenous land and convert them to five-year leases, the removal of indigenous people's right to control who enters their land (a right which had been protected through a permit system), and welfare reforms which saw *all* indigenous recipients be issued "store cards" in place of a percentage of their welfare payments.

The NT intervention received widespread condemnation, including from the authors of the report on which the government justified its actions. Across the country, a series of protests and public meetings occurred in response to the intervention. Indigenous people and their supporters were quick to recognize that the legislation constituted a direct attack on land rights, and indeed the government did not attempt to explain how changes to land tenure and the permit system would assist in the protection of children.

The NT intervention became a focus for a national campaign. An indigenous-only National Aboriginal Alliance was convened and, drawing on the left's history of indigenous and non-indigenous collaboration, a broad Aboriginal Rights Coalition emerged. Fears that elements of the intervention might be extended to other parts of indigenous Australia were realized after the Labor Party came to office in the 2007 federal election. With Indigenous Affairs once more under the government and media spotlight, the need for a national, coordinated response to the latest attacks saw a new layer of leadership step forward to continue the struggle that, in one form or another, has been taking place since 1788.

SEE ALSO: Australian Aboriginal Protests; Australian Left; Canada, Indigenous Resistance; Communist Party of Australia

References and Suggested Readings

- Altman, J. (2007) In the Name of the Market? In J. Altman & M. Hinkson (Eds.), *Coercive Reconciliation*. North Carlton: Arena Publications Association.
- Broome, R. (1982) *Aboriginal Australians*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

- Foley, G. (1999) Whiteness and Blackness in the Koori Struggle for Self-Determination. *Koori History Website*. Available at www.kooriweb.org/foley/essays/essay_9.html (downloaded May 20, 2008).
- Foley, G. (2001) Black Power in Redfern 1968–1972. *Koori History Website*. Available at www.kooriweb.org/foley/essays/essay_1.html (downloaded May 20, 2008).
- Goodall, H. (1996) *Invasion to Embassy: Land in Aboriginal Politics in New South Wales, 1770–1972*. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin.
- Lippmann, L. (1981) *Generations of Resistance: The Aboriginal Struggle for Justice*. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
- Peterson, N. & Langton, M. (Eds.) (1983) *Aboriginal Land and Land Rights*. Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies.
- Ross, D. (2007) *Permits Protect*. In J. Altman & M. Hinkson (Eds.), *Coercive Reconciliation*. North Carlton: Arena Publications Association.
- Townsend, T. (2008) *The National Question, the Australian Left and the Aboriginal Struggle*. Sydney: Resistance Books.

Abraham Lincoln Brigade

Peter N. Carroll

The Abraham Lincoln Brigade refers to approximately 2,800 US men and women who volunteered to defend the elected government of Spain against a military rebellion led by General Francisco Franco during the Spanish Civil War (1936–9). The American volunteers served in various units, including the Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, and MacKenzie-Papineau battalions, as well as the Regiment de Tren (transportation), John Brown Artillery Unit, and the American Medical Bureau. Together with 35,000 volunteers from over 50 countries, these units formed the International Brigades; most US volunteers served in the 15th International Brigade.

When the Spanish Civil War began in July 1936, the US government adopted a policy of neutrality or non-intervention. To discourage civilian participation, US passports were stamped after January 1937 "not valid for travel in Spain." Most volunteers enlisted in violation of such laws, though it was legal for medical and

humanitarian aid workers to serve in Spain. The US Communist Party secretly organized their recruitment and travel. Approximately 70 percent of the American volunteers were members of the US Communist Party, though many non-communists merely used membership as a way of reaching Spain.

The volunteers came from a cross-section of society, but most were from large cities. The Brigade consisted of diverse ethnic and nationality groups. African Americans served at all levels of command.

The first 86 volunteers departed from New York on December 26, 1936, landed in France, and traveled to Spain by rail. When travel restrictions were subsequently imposed, volunteers climbed the Pyrenees Mountains at night or sailed illegally from France. Americans first saw action on the Jarama front in February 1937, receiving heavy casualties but succeeded in blocking Franco's troops from seizing the key Madrid–Valencia road. They remained in the trenches until June, visited occasionally by journalists such as Ernest Hemingway and Martha Gellhorn. In July 1937, the Lincoln and Washington battalions fought at Brunete, but suffered so many casualties that the two battalions had to be merged, hereafter called the Lincoln-Washington battalion.

New recruits subsequently formed the MacKenzie-Papineau battalion (named for two nineteenth-century Canadian patriots). Both battalions saw action on the Aragon front at Belchite, Quinto, and Fuentes des Ebro in September–October 1937. In December, the Americans participated in the battles around Teruel. By February 1938, Franco's forces counterattacked and crushed the Republican armies. Many Americans were captured and executed; some were taken prisoner and not released until the war was over. A few hundred retreated across the Ebro River.

The remnants, reinforced by Spanish soldiers, launched a surprise attack across the Ebro in July 1938 but soon confronted Franco's superior armies in the Sierra Pandols. In September, the Spanish Republic attempted a political victory by ordering the withdrawal of all foreign troops, hoping that gesture would pressure Franco to reject German and Italian military assistance. By December, most Americans were home, except for nearly 800 who were buried in

Spain. Of them Hemingway wrote, “no men entered earth more honorably than those who died in Spain.”

SEE ALSO: Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA); Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archives website, www.alba-valb.org.
- Bessie, A. (1939) *Men in Battle*. New York: Scribner's.
- Carroll, P. N. (1994) *The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade: Americans in the Spanish Civil War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Carroll, P. N. & Fernandez, J. D. (Eds.) (2007) *Facing Fascism: New York and the Spanish Civil War*. New York: New York University Press/Museum of the City of New York.
- Carroll, P. N., Small, M., & Nash, M. (Eds.) (2006) *The Good Fight Continues: World War II Letters from the Abraham Lincoln Brigade*. New York: New York University Press.
- Nelson, C. & Henricks, J. (Eds.) (1997) *Madrid 1937: Letters of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade from the Spanish Civil War*. New York: Routledge.

Abu-Jamal, Mumia (b. 1954)

Hans Bennett

Born Wesley Cook on April 24, 1954, and raised in the North Philadelphia housing projects, Mumia Abu-Jamal was a founding member of the Philadelphia chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP). The chapter's lieutenant of information at age 15, he also worked on the national BPP newspaper in Oakland, California. Abu-Jamal was later a prominent radio personality and president of the Philadelphia Association of Black Journalists; he was known as “The Voice of the Voiceless” for his radical journalism spotlighting the plight of the oppressed and covering the revolutionary MOVE organization's conflict with city authorities.

While moonlighting as a taxi driver, Abu-Jamal carried a legally registered .38 caliber Charter Arms revolver with him after being robbed several times on the job. In his taxi on December 9, 1981, he saw his brother, William Cook, in an altercation with police officer Daniel Faulkner, and approached the scene. Minutes

later, Faulkner was shot dead, and Abu-Jamal was shot in the chest. The district attorney would later claim that (1) Abu-Jamal shot Faulkner in the back at close range; (2) while falling backwards, Faulkner responded by shooting Abu-Jamal; and (3) Abu-Jamal then shot down at Faulkner and killed him, while missing two to three times.

While the bullet in Abu-Jamal was officially from Faulkner's gun, police ballisticsian Anthony Paul testified that the bullet in Faulkner could only be tied to "multiples of millions" of .38 caliber guns, including those not made by Charter Arms. Suspiciously, police did not officially perform a routine "smell" test on his gun, or a "wipe" test checking for gunpowder residue on his hands.

Abu-Jamal has always maintained his innocence, and while neither he nor his brother testified at the 1982 trial, they both released sworn affidavits in 2001. Abu-Jamal says that he was shot while approaching the scene, blacked out, and awoke to a vicious police beating. William Cook pointed to his friend Kenneth Freeman, a passenger in his car, as the actual shooter. Recently, authors Michael Schiffmann and J. Patrick O'Connor have argued that Freeman shot and killed Faulkner after Abu-Jamal was shot, and ran away before other police arrived. Freeman was mysteriously found dead in a parking lot (reportedly naked, gagged, handcuffed, and with a drug needle in his arm) the day after the infamous May 13, 1985 police bombing of MOVE, which Schiffmann and O'Connor argue was likely an act of police vengeance against Faulkner's actual shooter.

Abu-Jamal was sentenced to death in 1982. Amnesty International concluded that the trial was unfair, criticizing the bias of Judge Albert Sabo, a likely fabricated "hospital confession" that was not reported for two months, altered testimony from key prosecution witnesses Cynthia White and Robert Chobert, and more. Journalist Linn Washington, Jr. argues that appeals courts have repeatedly disregarded court precedent to deny him a new trial, what he calls the "Mumia Exception."

In 2006, Michael Schiffmann discovered crime scene photos by freelancer Pedro Polakoff that showed (1) Faulkner's hat moved for police photos; (2) the absence of Robert Chobert's taxi cab; (3) officer James Forbes destroying poten-

tial fingerprint evidence by holding Abu-Jamal's and Faulkner's guns in one bare hand; and (4) an absence of large bullet divots, which Schiffmann argues should be visible in the pavement near Faulkner's body, if the DA scenario was accurate. Polakoff says that he offered the photos to the DA in 1982 and 1995 but was ignored, meaning that the DA illegally suppressed this photo evidence.

Arguably the world's most famous death-row prisoner, Abu-Jamal has written five books and records weekly radio essays. Supporters of a new trial have included Nelson Mandela, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the US Congressional Black Caucus, European Parliament, and Japanese Diet. In 2003 he was named an honorary citizen of Paris, France, and in 2006, Paris suburb St. Denis named a street after him.

SEE ALSO: Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Black Panthers; League of Revolutionary Black Workers; Uhuru Movement; Williams, Robert F. (1925–1996)

References and Suggested Readings

- Amnesty International (2000) *The Case of Mumia Abu-Jamal: A Life in Balance*. New York: Seven Stories Press.
- Bisson, T. (2000) *On A Move: The Story of Mumia Abu-Jamal*. Farmington, PA: Litmus Books.
- Lindorff, D. (2003) *Killing Time: An Investigation into the Case of Mumia Abu-Jamal*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
- O'Connor, J. P. (2008) *The Framing of Mumia Abu-Jamal*. Chicago: Lawrence Hill.
- Schiffmann, M. (2006) *Race Against Death. Mumia Abu-Jamal: A Black Revolutionary in White America*. Germany: Promedia.

ACT UP

Benjamin Shepard

The AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) formed in New York City in 1987, challenging the ineffective response to the HIV-AIDS crisis. Beyond the physical disease, the group fought against stereotypes of the disease founded on sexuality, race, and the counter-culture. On its 20th anniversary, in March 2007, Larry Kramer, playwright and founder of ACT

UP, declared the organization “the greatest grassroots group in history.”

“No matter how you look at it, you’re being pushed!” gay activist Vito Russo told 700 demonstrators as the bathhouse closures were taking hold in New York City. “And I don’t want you to jump out of the windows. I want you to push back.” The night was November 14, 1985. New York State Governor Mario Cuomo had just signed legislation prohibiting “high risk” behaviors in commercial establishments such as baths and tearooms.

ACT UP was formed under the rubric “Silence = Death” – condemning the vacuum of opposition to the societal condemnation of those with HIV/AIDS. The appellation Silence = Death asserts that passivity to discrimination against gay people and people of color intensified the AIDS crisis. ACT UP members saw the public passivity as eroding the progress of the gay liberation movement of the 1970s. Thus, at its inception, ACT UP successfully linked the message of the need to seriously address the AIDS crisis to the fierce anti-homophobic agenda first outlined by the gay liberation movement. At its peak in early 1991, ACT UP chapters thrived in 54 US and 10 cities abroad. From 1987 to 1992 the group found a balance between anger and political engagement, between rage and despair, while introducing political theater into its activism. The approach was sustained through ACT UP’s roots in the queer aesthetics of the gay liberation movement, and use of civil rights era non-violent civil disobedience. Thus, vigorous and expressive public displays were directed to policy outcomes, organized within a wide range of activist tactics and strategies.

ACT UP used creative and innovative forms of protest, including a range of public theatrical displays such as sit-ins, die-ins, and kiss-ins, street demonstrations and actions reminiscent of those of the gay liberation era. The organization used smart, glossy advertising posters, research, and frank, sometimes sarcastic posters held aloft by HIV-positive demonstrators with little to lose. The group’s range of media-grabbing, sometimes playful, frequently dramatic stunts helped counter demeaning public perceptions of sexual minorities, intravenous drug users, sex workers, and others stigmatized by AIDS pushed to the margins of society. Through its well-honed understanding of mass media, ACT

UP advanced a storyline that AIDS was a public health issue worthy of the highest levels of government attention, opposing the silence characterizing the response to AIDS during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.

ACT UP used a wide range of social and cultural counter-narratives. The concept that “Sexuality = Life” was a foundation of AIDS activism as a means to overturn the prevailing moral narrative that homosexuality caused the epidemic. Legal and medical discourses advanced this negative message by utilizing science to stigmatize people with AIDS as deviants. Storylines were drafted in black-and-white terms: hetero or homo, natural or immoral, clean or dirty, pure or impure. Through a series of direct-action techniques and pranks, ACT UP sought to reverse the notion that those with HIV were pariahs in society. Vito Russo, a leader in the Gay Activists Alliance, included an appreciation for camp, pleasure, and movies and flair for the dramatic to transform public negative stereotypes and perceptions.

At an ACT UP demonstration at the Department of Health and Human Services in Washington, DC on October 10, 1988, Russo saw activism promoting those with AIDS as a historic struggle: “When future generations ask what we did in this crisis, we’re going to have to tell them that we were out here today.” Russo, who had AIDS, told the demonstrators to consider how future generations will view the efforts of ACT UP members:

Someday the AIDS crisis will be over. Remember that. And when that day comes – when that day has come and gone, there’ll be people alive on this earth . . . who will hear the story that there was once this terrible disease in this country and all over the world – and that a brave group of people stood up and fought, in some cases gave their lives, so that other people might live and be free. (Russo 1988)

Russo’s speech at the Washington demonstration opened a vast social agenda for ACT UP. Opposition to the AIDS pandemic translated into fighting institutional racism, sexism, and the class system, as well as homophobia.

Throughout its first 20 years, ACT UP and its affinity groups worked on a range of issues, from access to treatment, to housing and the

media. By the mid-1990s ACT UP could boast a list of accomplishments that included forcing expedited US government approval for new medications, pressuring pharmaceutical companies to reduce the price for the HIV-inhibitor AZT, highlighting the need for healthcare reform, and pressuring the government to increase spending on research.

To a certain extent, ACT UP helped spur the founding of housing for HIV-positive people, advanced tolerance of gays and lesbians and HIV-positive persons, and educated the public that science, theology, and the state were influenced by cultural bias. Over its first 20 years, ACT UP activism and education helped millions in the US and throughout the world to know that all people have a right to equal treatment, irrespective of sexuality or medical condition.

SEE ALSO: Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Crimp, D. (2002) *Melancholia and Moralism: Essays on AIDS and Queer Politics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Epstein, S. (1996) *Impure Science – AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Halperin, D. M. (1995) *Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Marcus, E. (1992) *Making History: The Struggle for Gay and Lesbian Civil Rights 1945–1990*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Russo, V. (1988) Why We Fight. Speech delivered during a demonstration, October 10, in front of the Department of Health and Human Services building in Washington, DC. www.actupny.org/documents/whfight.html (accessed 1 November, 2005).

Addams, Jane (1860–1935)

Louise W. Knight

Jane Addams spent much of her life working to achieve a revolutionary vision that government should support the development of its citizens' full potential. She also fought to protect freedom

of speech as a form of protest essential to the advance of social justice.

Addams grew up in Cedarville, Illinois. Her father, a successful agribusinessman and politician, was one of the wealthiest men in the region. Addams's stepmother (her own mother died when she was two and a half) was a socially ambitious, cultured woman. Jane Addams earned a college degree from nearby Rockford Female Seminary, at a time when very few women did so. Though raised in an evangelical Protestant household and a graduate of an evangelical Protestant college, she rejected the conviction that Christ was her savior. She did, however, absorb fully the evangelical fire for transformational change, known as social Christianity. As a teen reading her stepmother's *Atlantic Monthly* magazine, she was fascinated to learn about the radical reform visions promoted by abolitionist John Brown and economic and social utopian Robert Owen. She also had an early, passionate belief that women should be free to shape their lives.

By her twenties, Addams was caught in a contradiction – like her hero John Brown, she was impatient to “make something happen” but, unlike Brown, she felt severely constrained by societal expectations of her as a member of the upper-middle class and as a woman. She read Giuseppe Mazzini's popular *Duties of Man* (1860), which argued that men should put their duty to humanity before their duty to their nation or their family, and she combined this message with that of John Stuart Mill's *The Subjection of Women* (1869), which argued that the limitations placed on women's freedom were the mere byproduct of narrow and rebuttable cultural assumptions. Together, these works convinced her to reject her family's expectation that she marry her stepbrother and commit her life to caring for her stepmother. Using the wealth she had inherited following her father's death in 1881, she moved to Chicago and, with her friend Ellen Gates Starr, co-founded the nation's first settlement house, an urban community based organization intended to aid mankind.

Addams's co-founding of the settlement house, Hull House, was bold in several ways. For one thing, the idea of a settlement house was new in the United States. Conceived and founded by Samuel and Henrietta Barnett to address the dangerously widening social distrust between

prosperous and working people that resulted from urban industrialization, the world's first settlement house, Toynbee Hall, opened its doors in the East End of London in 1886. Its purpose was to mingle working-class people and university men socially, to form friendships across class lines. Addams and Starr added two innovations: to locate their settlement house in a mostly immigrant neighborhood and to welcome women *and* men to live there.

At first the work of Hull House was uncontroversial. Starr and Addams welcomed children and adults to social gatherings, clubs, and classes. They visited the ill, and made friends in the neighborhood. Their goal was to create a warmly human community among immigrant and native Chicagoans of all races, ethnicities, and classes. But they soon found that economic conditions could not be ignored. As thousands of Americans and Europeans flocked to Chicago in the 1880s, poverty, the byproduct of low wages, created ghettos in the burgeoning city. Labor unions fought for recognition in order to improve pay and working conditions in factories. On the heavily industrialized near West Side where Hull House was located, unions needed places to meet, and Addams offered Hull House. Thus began Jane Addams's education into the economic struggles of working-class people.

Because Addams had been raised in upper-middle-class comfort, she had no grasp when she arrived in Chicago of the physically and spiritually debilitating consequences of poverty. She also held the notion common to her class that anyone could avoid poverty if he or she was willing to work hard and make sacrifices. Many conversations with workers and union organizers taught her otherwise, but the two searing experiences that left her convinced much poverty was created by the absence of good government policy were the Depression of 1893–7 and the 1894 Pullman Strike. Seeing friends and acquaintances lose jobs and face eviction and starvation through no fault of their own left her badly shaken. The lessons she learned about the need for government action – from providing jobs for the unemployed to supporting mediation between unions and companies – spurred in her a new-found passion for legislative reform.

Perhaps most radical from the point of view of her contemporaries was her support for

unions and her support of the free exchange of ideas. In 1903 she co-founded the National Women's Trade Union League, a cross-class organization whose mission was to support the issues facing union women. While never a Marxist, she read Marx's *Capital* and considered herself a socialist in one of the senses that the word conveyed in the 1890s – a supporter of government policies that would equalize resources to balance injustices. She also welcomed many radical lecturers in Hull House, including Eugene Debs, Henry Demarest Lloyd, Henry George, George Herron, and Emma Goldman.

While Addams's methods of reform – lobbying, public speaking, grassroots organizing, writing, and organized marches – were always non-violent, and while her language was generally designed to create sympathy rather than anger, some of her speeches revealed passion. In an 1895 speech on the Pullman Strike, she argued: “The aroused conscience of men [requires] the complete participation of the working classes in the spiritual, intellectual and material inheritance of the human race.” That same year her anger over the restricting powers barring women's freedom deepened. She explained in a commencement speech at Rockford College that women had not participated in politics or business corporations because “they have been chained down by a military code whose penalty [for violation] is worse than the court martial.” It was this anger that helped fuel her first public endorsement of the campaign for women's suffrage in 1897.

Addams's response to the problem of racism was also increasingly assertive over the years. Troubled since the 1880s by the cruel reality of social segregation, she never let it be practiced at Hull House, and in 1895 she was one of two sponsors for the membership of Fannie Barrier Williams, a prominent African American Chicago woman, to the all-white Chicago Woman's Club. In 1900, at Ida B. Wells's request, Addams organized a meeting with the editors of the *Chicago Tribune* to protest their editorial endorsement of the idea of segregated schools in Chicago and succeeded in causing them to abandon that view. In 1912, as a member of the platform committee of the newly organized Progressive Party, she fought, but failed, to persuade the party to seat the African American delegates from several

southern states. When US Marines occupied Haiti in 1916, Addams joined others to call for the restoration of self-government. She was a co-founder of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and a member of the board of the Chicago Urban League.

The protest that caused the Federal Bureau of Investigation, among others, to call Addams “the most dangerous woman in America,” however, was against war. Committed to non-violence as an ideal since reading Leo Tolstoy’s Christian writings in the 1880s, Addams was first involved with the peace movement in 1893, when she chaired the organizing committee for the American Peace Society Congress at the world’s fair. She spoke out against the Spanish-American War in 1899. In 1904 she was a delegate to the International Peace Congress, but she began to lose popularity and to be vilified in the press after she spoke out against World War I.

Her opposition to the war did not turn her into an openly hostile critic of her government, but she stood her ground as an identified pacifist during the war and defended other pacifists as patriots when they were jailed as traitors. She supported the right of free speech, visited imprisoned conscientious objectors, lobbied the government to exempt conscientious objectors from the Espionage and Conscription Acts, and served on the executive boards of the controversial Fellowship of Reconciliation and the American Union against Militarism, which would evolve, in 1920, into the American Civil Liberties Union. After the war, Addams’s work on peace, mainly through the Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom, which was founded in 1919 and which she served as president of until her death in 1935, was inherently revolutionary. She was honored for that work when she became the first American woman awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931.

SEE ALSO: Brown, John (1800–1859); Debs, Eugene (1855–1926); Goldman, Emma (1869–1940); Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–1872); Marxism; Owen, Robert (1771–1858)

References and Suggested Readings

Davis, A. (1973) *American Heroine: The Life and Legend of Jane Addams*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Knight, L. (2005) *Citizen: Jane Addams and the Struggle for Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Linn, J. (1935) *Jane Addams*. New York: D. Appleton-Century.

Adorno, Theodor W. (1903–1969)

Christina Gerhardt

Theodor W. Adorno began his intellectual career in Frankfurt and Vienna in the 1920s, continued his work in American exile during Germany’s fascist era, and returned to West Germany after World War II to reconstitute with Max Horkheimer the Institute for Social Research, better known as the Frankfurt School. Adorno’s writings span a broad range of disciplines, including philosophy and sociology, psychology and aesthetics, as well as literary and music criticism. While Adorno has often been cast as the most philosophical and least political of the Frankfurt School theorists, in his estimation the two are not mutually exclusive, as demonstrated by his central works: *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, co-authored with Max Horkheimer; *Negative Dialectics*; and *Aesthetic Theory*.

Facing increased criticism from a student protest that his writings had in part inspired, Adorno stated as much in the late 1960s. On June 2, 1967, during a demonstration in Berlin against the Shah of Iran’s visit, a police officer shot and killed Benno Ohnesorg, a student protestor. To many, the date marks the radicalization of the student movement in Germany. Afterwards, German Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) activist Rudi Dutschke declared that the most important task facing members of the Frankfurt School was to describe a concrete utopia towards which the student movement could agitate and organize. Further increasing disaffection between himself and the student movement, Adorno had police clear a group of students from the halls of the Frankfurt School in 1969, mistakenly assuming they had come with the intent to occupy the building. Soon after, he granted the German news magazine *Der Spiegel* an interview to address the uprisings and tensions and, in his own fashion, to respond to Dutschke’s call for concrete action. Taking up the alleged

antithesis between aesthetics and politics, between theory and praxis, Adorno argues that theory informs praxis, that the rhetorical structure of arguments is political and, moreover, has political consequences.

Following Hegel, Adorno frequently uses a dialectical model that examines antagonisms, be they historical, philosophical, political, or rhetorical. He parts ways with Hegel, however, in focusing on the suppressed or negative element of the dialectic. Thus, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, for example, Adorno and Horkheimer argue that the Enlightenment betrayed its own original liberating impulse by reverting to myth in the domination of nature, which is conceived – as in Marx’s writings – as both outer and inner nature and combined with the Weberian motif of rationalization and disenchantment of the world. In order to avoid a less than enlightened consequence of idealist thinking (the historical backdrop is the Holocaust), Adorno and Horkheimer propose that nature – be it an animalistic nature within or the nature around us – not be suppressed. In Adorno’s estimation, suppression or instrumentalization is harmful both to the entity suppressed and to the entity suppressing. Connecting philosophical models to political critiques in *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno (1973) argues: “A new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon unfree mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen again.”

SEE ALSO: Frankfurt School (Jewish Emigrés); Fromm, Erich (1900–1980); Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831); Lukács, Georg (1885–1971); Marcuse, Herbert (1898–1979); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism

References and Suggested Readings

- Adorno, T. W. (1973) *Negative Dialectics*. New York: Seabury.
- Jameson, F. (1990) *Late Marxism: Adorno, or, The Persistence of the Dialectics*. London: Verso.
- Jarvis, S. (1998) *Adorno: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Routledge.
- Jay, M. (1984) *Adorno*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rose, G. (1978) *The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno*. London: Macmillan.

Afghanistan, 1978 Revolution and Islamic Civil War

Yury V. Bosin

The first Afghan left party, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), was founded in 1965 by urban intellectuals who sought to modernize the country and deter foreign intervention. The leftists supported the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973 and were granted four ministerial posts in Muhammad Doud’s republican government. In the next few years, however, Muhammad Doud’s authoritarian trend led to the formation of his absolutist regime, leaving no democratic freedoms. PDPA was banned and leading leftists went into exile.

In the late 1970s, political tensions escalated with the economic stagnation brought about by the drastic shrinkage of foreign development assistance. Afghan–US relations soured over Doud’s support for Pashtun activists waging a longstanding autonomy struggle with Pakistan. The Baluchistan region of Pakistan extends into Afghanistan, and the people of the region have sought to create an independent state. In response to Doud’s support for the Pashtun autonomy movement, the US halted development projects in Afghanistan. Soviet aid was not enough to sustain the Afghan economy and pervasive poverty strengthened public support for communist and Islamist radical movements.

Due to growing impoverishment, spontaneous uprisings flared up in the provinces, and the Afghan government’s effort to repress mounting dissent created even greater public opposition. The assassination of Mir Akbar Khyber, a popular PDPA leader, on April 17, 1978, ignited mass discontent and a surge of protests in Kabul. Most Afghan leftists blamed the Muhammad Doud regime for Khyber’s death. But Doud’s government repressed the PDPA and imprisoned leading activists in the party. The rebellion spread into the army where the leftist sentiment was traditionally high. On April 27, 1978, army units surrounded the Presidential Palace, and following a skirmish, Mohammad Doud and members of his family were found dead. A new government was formed by PDPA leaders who were released from prison by the military, during what became known as the April Revolution.

Islamic Resistance and Civil War (1978–1996)

The April Revolution established PDPA rule in Kabul, which articulated a commitment to egalitarianism, equality, and social justice. But the new government could not focus on social reform, due to considerable opposition, and was forced to concentrate efforts on suppressing challenges from political antagonists. The doctrinaire radical wing of PDPA – Khalk (People) – which assumed power over the government pursued a policy of wiping out any source of dissent in the capital and in the provinces. Massive arrests, purges, and extrajudicial executions angered many traditional leaders, who unified popular resistance against the PDPA regime. In the summer of 1979 armed rebellions took place in Khazarajat, Nuristan, and ethnically disparate areas in eastern Afghanistan, and the PDPA government lost control over significant parts of the national territory. During the 1980s and 1990s, the war contributed to the collapse of the economy and means of subsistence in the countryside, particularly in the Pashtun region, a region where the Taliban emerged.

To control the uprising from overthrowing the government, and to regain control over the territory, the PDPA requested military assistance from the Soviet Union. Appealing to Marxist solidarity, PDPA leaders asked the Soviet Union for military aid, and in December 1979 the Soviet Union dispatched an army of 120,000 soldiers to Afghanistan in support of the PDPA. The Soviet troops assisted the PDPA in securing control over major towns and transportation routes but the countryside remained under the control of insurgents and opponents of the government. The Soviet army presence became yet another catalyst fueling the anti-PDPA rebellion and an arena for Cold War competition between the USSR and the US. PDPA leaders were stigmatized by opponents as betraying the Afghan people, as Soviet puppets, and as infidels threatening to destroy Islam in the country. The coming to power of a moderate PDPA faction – Parcham (The Banner) – did little to alleviate popular resentments.

The major opposition to PDPA leadership was led by Islamic fundamentalists who became known as Mujahedeen (holy warriors). The Islamic Party of Afghanistan and the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (Jamaat-i-Islami) spear-

headed the war against PDPA and the Soviet army, with the help of dozens of smaller religious organizations. As a major site of Cold War competition, the US bankrolled Islamic opposition through covert channels with logistical support from Pakistani intelligence services. During the 1980s a low-intensity military struggle escalated into a large-scale civil war, with numerous atrocities committed by both sides. Attempts to initiate a dialogue and reconciliation between PDPA and Islamists were unsuccessful and stymied by a deadlock.

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party rapidly accelerated political and economic reforms in the USSR, leading to a decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. By 1989, the Soviet army pulled out all its troops from Afghanistan, yet the PDPA survived in power for three years without Soviet support. In 1992, when the Soviet Union severed all weapons and fuel supply to the PDPA army, the US-backed Islamic opposition won the final victory and seized power in Kabul.

The civil war did not end with the removal of the PDPA from power as Islamic parties contended for power, furthering political chaos and economic disarray. Following a purge and execution of PDPA leaders, Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, returned from exile to become president of Afghanistan in 1992. But Rabbani's government was not recognized by Islamic opposition leaders, and the leadership could not secure power outside of Kabul. From 1992 to 1996, virtually all of Afghanistan was governed by local warlords: Abdurrashid Dostum in the northern stronghold surrounding Mazar-i-Sharif; Ahmad Shah Masoud in the Panjsher valley; in western Herat Province, Ismail Khan, a Shia warlord; and Golbeddin Hekmatiar in the east, a major political and military force behind the rise of the Taliban. Relentless and open warfare as well as political chaos helped shape deep popular discontent for the pillage and violence and gave rise to the emergence of the Taliban movement in 1996.

SEE ALSO: Afghanistan, Resistance to 19th-Century British Invasion; Bacha-i Sakkao's Movement; Bin Laden, Osama (b. 1957) and al-Qaeda; Durrani Empire, Popular Protests, 1747–1823; Taliban, 1996–2007

References and Suggested Readings

- Briant, P. (2002) *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*. Trans. P. T. Daniels. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Dupree, L. (1979) *Red Flag Over Hindu Kush*. Hanover, NH: American Universities Field Staff.
- Dupree, L. (1980) *Afghanistan*. Hanover, NH: American Universities Field Staff.
- Gregorian, V. (1969) *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Marsden, P. (2002) *The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan*. New York: Palgrave.
- Masson, V. & Romodon, V. (1964) *A History of Afghanistan*, Vols. 1–2. Moscow: Nauka (in Russian).
- Montgomery, J. D. & Rondinelli, D. A. (Eds.) (2004) *Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Lessons from Development Experience*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Poullada, L. (1973) *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919–1929: King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Rubin, B. (2002) *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sykes, P. (1940) *A History of Afghanistan*. London: Macmillan.

Afghanistan, resistance to 19th-century British invasion

Yury V. Bosin

The British empire invaded Afghanistan twice – in 1838–42 and in 1878–81. In both cases the goal of the invasion was to deflect Russian influence and to prevent it from establishing a foothold in the strategic region. In response to each invasion, the Afghan population revolted against their occupiers.

In 1838 Shah Dost Muhammad Khan, the ruler of Afghanistan, failed to organize significant resistance and soon surrendered. The British army occupied Ghazni, Kabul, and Jalalabad almost effortlessly. The British promoted a puppet emir, Shah Shujah, who agreed to cede to British hegemony.

The majority of the Afghans, however, despised Shah Shujah for his political betrayal and initiated a rebellion against the British, whose army consumed essential food and supplies that raised local prices so high the local population in

the capital of Kabul became impoverished. In turn, the Islamic mullahs began calling for a *jihad* – a holy war against non-believers, or infidels. On November 1, 1842, a popular uprising against the occupation attacked the British garrison in Kabul, killing hundreds of British troops. British commanders decided to withdraw from Kabul and on January 1, 1842, a regiment of 20,000 departed to the nearby cities of Jalalabad and Gandamak. The persistence of raids and ambushes by local militia during a harsh winter turned the retreat into a rout. Fewer than 2,000 reached Jalalabad on January 12, and only 350 of them were lucky to find refuge in Gandamak. Shah Shujah was murdered.

The fate of the Kabul garrison shocked British colonial officials in Calcutta and London, and British garrisons in Ghazni and Jalalabad were ordered to occupy Kabul and to retaliate against the insurgents. The garrison left Kabul in ruins and killed thousands of civilians, but the British recognized that they could occupy Afghanistan only at their own peril. In October 1842, all British troops returned to India.

The second British invasion in 1879 followed a similar scenario. Initially, the British army expedition encountered minimal local resistance, and by January 1879 the Afghan cities of Jalalabad and Qandahar were under military control. On February 20, 1879, Afghan emir Sher Ali Khan died. His son and heir Yakub capitulated by signing the Treaty of Gandamak with British colonial powers, marking the end of Afghan independence. The British mission was established in Kabul.

The military catastrophe during its first invasion of Afghanistan was not instructive to the British, who in the second invasion also ignored swelling popular resentment and animosity all through the country. In September 1879, an uprising in Kabul caught the colonial occupiers by surprise as protesters ravaged British residences, and Louis Cavagnari, the head of the British mission, was killed. The British recaptured Kabul in October 1879, but even brutal reprisals against opponents did not restrain what was then also referred to as a *jihad*, as growing numbers of Pushtun and Tajik guerillas attacked the colonial army. There was, however, no single leader to unite the insurgents. Abdurrahman Khan, the grandson of emir Dost Muhammad, appeared in the north of Afghanistan after 11 years of exile in Russian Turkestan, threatening to

push the British out of Kabul. His challenger, Ayub Khan, an influential ruler of the western province of Herat, launched an offensive on Qandahar and inflicted a complete defeat on the British near the Afghan village of Maywand in July 1880. Though the British fared better in subsequent military engagements with the Afghan insurgents, the popular uprising was not quelled by the British. In effect, through mobilizing military opposition, both khans seized the popular wave of anti-British sentiment to win the Afghan crown after it became clear that the British were unable to fight the guerilla war in Afghanistan. In 1881, British Queen Victoria officially recognized Abdurrahman Khan as emir of Kabul and withdrew British forces to India, while Ayub Khan went into exile after a series of military defeats. Although the British installed a patron in 1881, both British military interventions in Afghanistan suffered a similar fate, defeated by grassroots guerilla resistance rather than regular armies.

SEE ALSO: Afghanistan, 1978 Revolution and Islamic Civil War; Bacha-i Sakkao's Movement; Bin Laden, Osama (b. 1957) and al-Qaeda; Durrani Empire, Popular Protests, 1747–1823; Taliban, 1996–2007

References and Suggested Readings

- Briant, P. (2002) *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*. Trans. P. T. Daniels. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Gregorian, V. (1969) *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Masson, V. & Romodon, V. (1964) *A History of Afghanistan*, Vols. 1–2. Moscow: Nauka (in Russian).
- Sykes, P. (1940) *A History of Afghanistan*. London: Macmillan.

African American resistance, Jim Crow era

Simon Wendt

Black militant resistance played a significant role throughout the Jim Crow era. Prior to the 1950s and 1960s, however, those African Americans who used armed force to protect themselves or their communities against white aggression generally faced overwhelming odds and swift retaliation.

The protective efforts of self-defense groups that operated during the Southern civil rights struggle were more successful than the militant resistance of their precursors, but racist violence continued to rage virtually unchecked in Dixie until the late 1960s. During the Black Power era, the function of armed black resistance changed, serving primarily as a militant symbol of defiance that instilled pride in many male activists.

In the aftermath of the Civil War, former slaves gained the right to bear arms, and a considerable number of them used their newly acquired guns to fight the Ku Klux Klan and other terrorist groups. But black militant resistance during Reconstruction, which conjured up deep-seated fears of armed black insurrection among white Southerners, could not prevent the advent of segregation and disfranchisement in the Jim Crow era. Racist violence also continued. During the 1880s and 1890s, lynching emerged as a new form of racial terror to confine African Americans to a status of politically impotent second-class citizens. Official statistics put the number of black victims at 3,786 in the period 1889 to 1945, although the real numbers are likely to be higher. Lynch mobs frequently tortured and mutilated their black victims, arguing that such ghastly crimes were a justified means to protect white women from alleged black rapists. Outspoken black intellectuals such as Ida B. Wells, Thomas Fortune, or W. E. B. Du Bois refuted such arguments and called for manly self-defense to confront white lynch mobs.

When African Americans joined together, they were sometimes able to repel white mobs. In 1899, for example, during what came to be known as the Darrien Insurrection, a small army of armed black men in McIntosh County, Georgia, thwarted the attempts of a white mob to seize a black prisoner accused of raping a white woman. Seven years later, blacks in Wiggins, Mississippi, traded more than 500 shots with a white mob that had vowed to lynch a member of the black community.

More often, however, black militant resistance provoked rather than deterred racist aggression. Armed blacks who confronted exploitative employers, white lynch mobs, or abusive police officers frequently faced swift retaliation against themselves and their communities. Despite numerous appeals from African Americans to prosecute lynchings and other forms of racist violence, the federal government did nothing to stop the brutal reign of white supremacy.

In the first two decades of the twentieth century a number of black radicals practiced and publicly advocated armed self-defense against racist terrorism. In the aftermath of World War I, when race riots broke out in Houston, Chicago, Washington, DC, and numerous other American cities, a number of combat-experienced black veterans organized the protection of black neighborhoods. Black nationalist leaders such as Marcus Garvey and Cyril Briggs applauded such examples of black militancy and urged their followers to confront white aggression in the same manner. During the 1920s many African American intellectuals hailed the advent of what they called a New Negro, a black man who refused to be intimidated by racist terrorism. As in the case of resistance to lynching, however, self-defense could also trigger anti-black violence. In 1921 in Tulsa, Oklahoma, for instance, blacks' attempt to protect a young African American from a lynch mob led to the invasion and complete destruction of the city's black neighborhood.

Despite such setbacks, black militant resistance continued in the 1930s and 1940s. During the Great Depression, black sharecroppers and tenants relied on armed protection to safeguard the meetings of a nascent union movement in Alabama. World War II further politicized and radicalized African Americans, many of whom refused to acquiesce to white violence. Black soldiers frequently rose up against their mistreatment. Black civilians fought back when attacked by whites during urban race riots. Between 1941 and 1943, hundreds of racial clashes erupted in cities across the United States. As in the case of slave rebellions in antebellum America, black unrest fueled rumors among white Southerners that blacks were planning an armed uprising after the war as a consequence of black militancy. Such revolts never occurred, but numerous black veterans used their guns to defend themselves when confronted by racist attackers upon their return to the United States. In 1946, in Columbia, Tennessee, several hundred black veterans guarded the city's black neighborhood against a rumored white attack. Yet armed resistance to white violence continued to be risky, especially in the Deep South, where Jim Crow remained firmly in place. In Columbia, white policemen overwhelmed the black defenders, destroying black homes and businesses and arresting hundreds of African Americans. Only with the help of the National Association for the Advance-

ment of Colored People (NAACP), whose publicity campaigns also contributed to the decline of lynchings in the 1930s, did the indicted defenders of black Columbia eventually gain their freedom.

During the Southern civil rights struggle of the 1950s and 1960s, white supremacists again launched a reign of terror to stop the black quest for equality, but organized black self-defense sparked less brutal repercussions than in the past and frequently helped local civil rights campaigns survive in the face of white violence. Even Martin Luther King Jr., who later became the most ardent advocate of non-violence, accepted armed protection in the early days of the famous Montgomery Bus Boycott, which successfully desegregated the city's bus lines in 1956. After a bomb destroyed parts of King's home, armed sentries made sure that the young pastor remained unharmed. NAACP activist Robert F. Williams emerged as an early proponent of what he called "armed self-reliance." In 1957, the black military veteran founded a black self-defense organization in Monroe, North Carolina, to protect the local freedom movement against the revived Ku Klux Klan. That same year blacks in Birmingham, Alabama, founded the Civil Rights Guards to prevent dynamite attacks against the church of local civil rights leader Rev. Fred Shuttlesworth, while armed men in Little Rock, Arkansas, formed a "volunteer guard committee" to protect the home of Daisy Bates, a NAACP leader who had supported the desegregation of the city's Central High School.

More sophisticated black self-defense groups emerged in the 1960s, when civil rights activists launched massive non-violent demonstrations and voter registration drives in the Deep South. Highly visible protest campaigns such as the sit-ins, the Freedom Ride, and the Birmingham and Selma campaigns of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) demonstrated the power of non-violent direct action, but activists who organized voter registration drives in the rural areas of the Deep South quickly learned that non-violence had its limitations. Confronted with the federal government's reluctance to provide protection against the Ku Klux Klan, abusive police officers, and recalcitrant local and state authorities, numerous African Americans resolved to rely on their own protection. Non-violence remained the driving force behind the civil rights movement, but it was frequently complemented

by self-defense. In the summer of 1964, for example, black military veterans in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, organized a highly sophisticated defense squad, which guarded African American activists and their white allies. During the Freedom Summer project of 1964, a number of black Mississippians formed similar groups to repel segregationist attacks. That same year, blacks in Jonesboro, Louisiana formed the Deacons for Defense and Justice (DDJ), which patrolled black neighborhoods with guns, provided armed escorts for white and black activists, and guarded the offices of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). In 1965 African American activists formed another DDJ group in Bogalusa, Louisiana, achieving nationwide notoriety after several shootouts with the Ku Klux Klan.

The armed actions of the Deacons and other black self-defense groups in the 1960s helped local freedom movements survive in the face of white violence, bolstered the morale of civil rights activists, instilled pride in black protectors, and sometimes served as an additional means of coercion in the fight against Jim Crow. They also generated frequent and heated debates about their legitimacy among non-violent activists, but most of the black and white civil rights organizers who worked in the Deep South eventually came to accept black self-defense as a pragmatic necessity.

By the late 1960s, when federal authorities finally began to take seriously their responsibility to protect African American citizens, most Southern self-defense groups had disbanded. For the emerging Black Power movement, however, armed resistance became a vital pillar of its multi-layered program. The new militants' focus on self-defense owed much to the long-held skepticism toward non-violence among African American militants. As early as 1961, black nationalist leader Malcolm X lambasted Martin Luther King's non-violent philosophy as unmanly. As the spokesman of Elijah Muhammad's Nation of Islam, the militant Muslim preached the sect's gospel of black pride, moral uplift, and economic self-reliance. In addition, he insisted on blacks' right to self-defense and called upon them to form self-defense groups to repel racist attacks. Malcolm's militant message, which focused not only on armed resistance but also stressed the importance of black pride and Pan-Africanism, had an immense impact on black militants across the United States. Among his earliest devotees

were Maxwell Stanford and Donald Freeman, who in 1962 founded the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), a radical organization that sought to use mass action and armed resistance to foster a revolutionary black movement. In the following years the combination of Malcolm's ideas and unrelenting white violence in the South resolved many African American activists to renounce peaceful protest and to embrace self-defense. In the aftermath of the James Meredith March of 1966, during which SNCC activist Stokely Carmichael first voiced the slogan Black Power, traditionally non-violent organizations such as SNCC and CORE officially embraced the militant tactic.

During the Black Power era, however, self-defense came to play a fundamentally different role and underwent a process of radical reinterpretation. In contrast to their Southern peers, Black Power militants rarely engaged in armed confrontations with the Ku Klux Klan or other racist groups. Black self-defense became a militant symbol of black defiance, which served primarily as a means to affirm and nurture black manhood.

The most prominent advocate of this new type of militant resistance was the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense (BPP). Founded in Oakland, California in 1966, the BPP initially regarded its armed patrols in urban black communities as a way to confront police brutality, but the group's self-defense stance functioned mostly on a symbolic level, helping the organization to boost its male members' self-esteem, to gain publicity, and to recruit new members. Ultimately, the Panthers and other black nationalist groups such as Ron Karenga's US or the Republic of New Africa reinterpreted traditional concepts of self-defense. Using the ideas of Malcolm X, anti-colonial theorist Frantz Fanon, and revolutionaries such as Che Guevara and Mao Tse Tung, they argued that race riots and revolutionary violence constituted a legitimate form of self-defense to resist white oppression. In reality, self-defense played only a minor role in the violent upheavals that rocked hundreds of American cities between 1964 and 1968. African Americans rarely repelled white attacks but rather protested against white neglect of their neighborhoods and police brutality by burning white property and sometimes battling police officers and National Guardsmen who sought to quell the violence. Some of the most destructive upheavals took place after the assassination of Martin Luther

King on April 4, 1968, when 230 riots broke out in 125 cities across the country.

Despite the largely symbolic nature of Black Power militancy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) considered the new militants a threat to the nation's security. Beginning in 1967, it used the highly sophisticated counter-intelligence program COINTELPRO to disrupt and destroy the Black Panther Party and other revolutionary groups that advocated self-defense. FBI agents infiltrated black militant organizations and attempted to fan animosities within black nationalist circles. On several occasions the FBI orchestrated deliberate assassinations of BPP members or aided the police to imprison party leaders on fabricated charges. In the following years, militant groups such as the Panthers either succumbed to the FBI's destructive tactics or toned down their provocative rhetoric. A few black militants, among them the Black Liberation Army, continued clandestine guerilla warfare against the white police, but most activists had abandoned their plans for armed revolution by 1972, focusing on political organizing instead. Nevertheless, the Black Power movement's reinterpretation of black self-defense as part of a protracted struggle for liberation remains one of the most visible forms of black militant resistance in the twentieth century.

SEE ALSO: CORE (Congress of Racial Equality); Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963); Malcolm X (1925–1965); King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC); Wells, Ida B. (1862–1931) and the Anti-Lynching Campaign

References and Suggested Readings

- Brundage, W. F. (Ed.) (1997) *Under the Sentence of Death: Lynching in the South*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Feagin, J. R. (1973) *Ghetto Revolts: The Politics of Violence in American Cities*. New York: Macmillan.
- Mumford, K. (2007) *Newark: A History of Race, Rights and Riots in America*. New York: New York University Press.
- O'Brien, G. W. (1999) *The Color of the Law: Race, Violence, and Justice in the Post-World War II South*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Shapiro, H. (1988) *White Violence and Black Response: From Reconstruction to Montgomery*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Tyson, T. B. (1999) *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Wendt, S. (2007) *The Spirit and the Shotgun: Armed Resistance and the Struggle for Civil Rights*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

African American resistance, Reconstruction era

Simon Wendt

Faced with an upsurge of anti-black violence after the end of slavery, blacks in the American South frequently resorted to armed force to protect themselves and their communities. Compared with similar efforts by militant slaves prior to the Civil War, black defensive efforts during Reconstruction were more widespread and more successful. However, white numerical and military superiority as well as the reluctance of the federal government to come to the aid of embattled African Americans made black resistance a dangerous venture that tended to result in brutal retaliation and failed to halt the advent of segregation and disfranchisement.

As a consequence of the Union's victory in 1865, a wave of racial violence swept across the South in the months and years after the war. White Southerners beat and murdered black men, raped black women, and terrorized black communities. One of the most violent anti-black organizations was the Ku Klux Klan, a secret fraternal society that was founded by former Confederate soldiers in 1866 in Pulaski, Tennessee. Together with the Knights of the White Camelia and other white supremacist groups, the Klan was most active in areas where blacks constituted a large minority, since their votes for the Republican Party could have considerable political weight. From 1868 to 1877, the year that marked the end of Reconstruction, every Southern election was accompanied by white violence. But even before the first elections were held, blacks had to fear for their lives. In 1866, whites killed dozens of African Americans who sought to organize politically during race riots in New Orleans and Memphis. Two years later, violence once more erupted in New Orleans, and similar riots occurred in the 1870s in South Carolina and Alabama.

Congressional Reconstruction exacerbated racial tensions. The sight of black voters and office

holders infuriated ex-Confederates, who stepped up their violent efforts to “redeem” the South. Neither the small contingent of Union troops that was stationed in the South nor the Freedmen’s Bureau – an institution designed to ease blacks’ transition from slavery to freedom – was able or willing to stop the white counter-revolution. In the early 1870s the federal government prosecuted a number of Klansmen for their crimes, but many of them were acquitted, and the small number of convictions did little to stop the violence. Since the federal government refused to intervene in the region, Southern states continued to eliminate black political power with impunity. In 1873, in one of the bloodiest incidents of the Reconstruction era, a large army of white supremacists slaughtered more than one hundred black militiamen in Colfax, Louisiana. Two years later, Mississippi initiated the so-called Shotgun Policy, which led to more mass killings and prompted many black Republicans to leave the state. The Hamburg Massacre of 1876, during which Confederate veterans murdered a group of surrounded black militiamen in cold blood, marked the brutal acme of a reign of terror that had returned white Democrats to power in almost all of the Southern states by 1877.

Yet many African Americans refused to remain passive in the face of white terror, using their newly acquired weapons to resist collectively or on an individual basis. Indeed, the end of the Civil War marked a watershed in the history of black militant resistance in the United States. Slaves had been prohibited from owning weapons, which made militant slave resistance and rebellion extremely difficult. After the war, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution not only ended slavery and made African Americans citizens of the United States, but also allowed them to carry weapons. Across the South, African Americans purchased rifles, shotguns, and pistols, sending shudders up the spines of white planters. Soon after the Union’s victory conservative newspapers in rural areas of Louisiana complained about the practice of blacks carrying concealed weapons even when working in the fields. For black men in particular, the right to bear arms became an important symbol of their new freedom. The ability of freedmen to protect themselves and their families from former masters was the source of an important psychological transformation. For them, the meaning of citizenship went beyond the right to vote and

the ability to work their own land. It also meant the right to own guns and their ability to become the patriarchal provider and protector of their families.

Black Civil War veterans in particular were also determined to fight back. In many parts of the South, former black Union soldiers formed paramilitary organizations to defend their communities against the Ku Klux Klan and other terrorist groups. Black militias were unable to stop entirely the reign of terror that whites launched in the aftermath of the war, and as in the case of the massacres in Colfax and Hamburg, militant resistance frequently meant death for black defenders. But on several occasions black militiamen successfully drove back white vigilantes with force. In 1876, for instance, a black militia successfully repelled an attack by Klansmen near Laurens, South Carolina.

Informal networks that welded post-Civil War black communities together facilitated spontaneous acts of resistance. Sometimes, armed freedmen came to the aid of black Republican politicians who were threatened by racist Democrats. On other occasions they protected members of the black community from the Ku Klux Klan. In 1871, for example, the hooded order attempted to raid a jail in Danville, Kentucky, to seize two black inmates. When the Klansmen arrived, they were confronted by a group of armed black men who fended off the attack with gunfire. Such forms of resistance were most effective in those areas of the South where African Americans were in the majority. In low-country South Carolina, for instance, large black communities were well organized and could easily repel white attackers.

Among white Southerners, such episodes of black self-defense conjured up deep-seated fears of violent black insurrections, echoing fears of slave rebellions before the Civil War. The so-called Black Codes that many Southern state legislatures passed after the war were one attempt to eliminate this perceived threat. While these laws were primarily intended to maintain a cheap black labor force on white plantations, they also restricted African Americans’ ability to defend themselves. The Louisiana code of 1866 prohibited blacks from carrying firearms without the written permission of their employer. Mississippi’s code went even further, barring blacks entirely from owning weapons. Some scholars have suggested that former Confederate states sought to continue such restrictions after the

repeal of the black codes in 1867 by passing concealed weapons laws. Yet the implementation of such regulations proved difficult. Since legal restrictions on blacks' ability to bear arms tended to be unsuccessful, most white Southerners continued to rely on extra-legal violence to suppress black militancy. As during the aftermath of slave revolts and conspiracies, rumors of resistance were frequently sufficient reason for self-proclaimed white vigilantes to indiscriminately search the homes of African Americans and to take away their weapons. Despite former slaveholders' fears that slaves would slaughter thousands of whites once they gained their freedom, very few blacks called for retaliation. In 1876 a few Charleston blacks attacked white men on the street in retaliation for the Hamburg Massacre, and some blacks threatened retribution if white aggression continued. By and large, however, black militant resistance during Reconstruction remained defensive.

SEE ALSO: African American Resistance, Jim Crow Era; Radical Reconstruction, United States, Promise and Failure of

References and Suggested Readings

- Cottrol, R. J. & Diamond, R. T. (1995) "Never Intended to Be Applied to the White Population": Firearms, Regulation, and Racial Disparity – The Redeemed South's Legacy to National Jurisprudence. *Chicago-Kent Law Review* 70, 3: 1307–35.
- Foner, E. (1988) *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Journey, 1863–1877*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Hollandsworth, J. G. (2001) *An Absolute Massacre: The New Orleans Race Riot of July 30, 1866*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Lane, C. (2008) *The Day Freedom Died: The Colfax Massacre, the Supreme Court, and the Betrayal of Reconstruction*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Shapiro, H. (1988) *White Violence and Black Response: From Reconstruction to Montgomery*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Wright, G. C. (1990) *Racial Violence in Kentucky, 1865–1940*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

African Blood Brotherhood

Roderick Bush

W. E. B. Du Bois's *Darkwater* (1920) and Lothrop Stoddard's *Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy* (1921) reflected a growing

worldwide political opposition between an increasingly vocal global whiteness and the rise of the dark world, now joined by a new global black anti-colonialism. The migration of blacks from the South and the Caribbean fostered the emergence of the New Negro radicalism of Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), Hubert Harrison's Liberty League, A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen's *Messenger*, and Cyril Briggs's African Blood Brotherhood.

Historian Hubert Harrison, considered the father of New Negro radicalism, contended that the new radicalism of the Negro in 1920 was based on their observation of international events. These observations did not consist of the exploitation of laborers by capitalists, as the Socialist Party maintained, "but the social, political, and economic subjection of colored peoples by white. It is not the Class Line, but the Color Line, which is the incorrect but accepted expression of the Dead Line of racial inferiority." Harrison was a socialist but held that the American ideology of Race First required the Negro to respond with his own defensive race consciousness. Harrison's experience with the Socialist Party had soured him on coalitions with the white left, but his fellow advocate of Race First nationalism, Cyril Briggs, would evolve a different approach.

The African Blood Brotherhood (ABB) was a semi-secret organization founded by Briggs, an immigrant from Nevis, educated in St. Kitts. It had its headquarters in New York and chapters in various other cities in the United States and the Caribbean. According to its founders, the ABB was the first secret organization to be formed in the western world having as its purpose "the liberation of Africa and the redemption of the Negro race." In 1920 (less than nine months after the call in Briggs's *Crusader* for blacks to join the ABB), the organization was described as numbering over 1,000 men, in the US, the West Indies, Central and South America, and West Africa.

The ABB program called for the creation of a worldwide federation of black organizations for which it would provide the revolutionary cadre. In the colonies this federation would build a great Pan-African Army. In the United States the ABB proposed that blacks organize within the trade unions, build cooperatively owned businesses, and create paramilitary self-defense organizations to protect the black community. In addition the program of the ABB called for a

liberated race; absolute race equality – political, economic, and social; the fostering of race pride; solidarity with people of color around the world and with class-conscious white workers; higher wages and lower rents for black workers; and a black united front.

While the ABB pledged to fight for the liberation of Africa from the colonial powers, the organization took pains to make clear that it had no plans to set itself above the “chiefs and kings” of Africa. In this it differed from the Garvey movement, which was perceived as a threat by the government of Liberia.

The general line of the ABB was close to the line of the UNIA, but there were significant differences which ABB leadership believed would strengthen the hand of the UNIA and the workers’ movement as a whole in the US and internationally.

The year 1919 had been a tumultuous one, featuring a Red Summer in which white mobs rioted against blacks in 26 US cities but were confronted with blacks fighting back. Further, the Bolshevik revolution was followed by revolutions in Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Titanic strikes swept Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Japan. The growth of the New Negro movement and its involvement in socialist politics was accompanied by the growing solidarity of labor, the growth of industrial unionism, the growing radicalism of the US working class, and the general strike in Seattle. Protagonists envisioned that the new utopian, racially just and egalitarian society would come about in the near future.

The Founding Congress of the Communist International announced that “The epoch of the final, decisive struggle has come later than the apostles of the socialist revolution [Marx and Engels] expected and hoped. But it has come.” The American Communist Party (CPUSA) argued that “Europe is in revolt. The masses of Asia are stirring uneasily. Capitalism is in collapse. The workers of the world are seeing a new life and securing new courage.” The uncompromising rhetoric of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, and about the right of nations to self-determination within the Communist International emboldened the ABB to embrace the revolutionary socialist path of the Bolsheviks. Thus when members of the leadership of the ABB joined the Workers’ Party of America, this was the only means by which they could join the Communist Inter-

national, which was their primary allegiance. They felt that even if the white members of the Workers’ Party were hypocrites with feet of clay, the Comintern would force them to follow the right policy.

In 1921 Briggs sent a letter to Garvey making a formal proposal to affiliate the ABB with the UNIA and asking the UNIA to issue a broad call to all Negro organizations outside of the UNIA to send delegates to the UNIA convention. Such a grouping would reflect the heterogeneity of the black world and would provide for a process for validating the leadership of this most important organization. Garvey appreciated Briggs’s support and invited him to the convention, but did not address the larger question in Briggs’s proposal.

Given the stakes the ABB took the radical step of taking its proposal to the floor of the 1921 UNIA convention, leafleting delegates with the ABB program so as to distinguish the organization from moderate socialists such as Du Bois, Randolph, and Chandler. It also had Rose Pastor Stokes, a white member of the CPUSA, address the convention, requesting an alliance with the world communist movement.

Given the intensity of the state’s attack on the left during this period, Garvey decided to oust the ABB, declaring that they were dangerous “Bolsheviks.” From the time of this rupture the ABB set out to topple Garvey from the leadership of the UNIA. Briggs began to probe the legality of Garvey’s operation, particularly his use of the mail to solicit purchases for the Black Star Steamship line’s stock. This provided the line of investigation which led eventually to the prosecution of Garvey.

An enduring controversy in the historiography of the ABB is the role of the CPUSA in its formation. While Robert Hill who collected the facsimile of the *Crusader* argues that the ABB was a black auxiliary organization of the CPUSA, Susan Campbell points out that the ABB had been formed at least six months prior to the September 1919 founding of the Communist Party of America (CPA) and the smaller Communist Labor Party (CLP). Cyril Briggs indicates as much in correspondence with Theodore Draper.

McKay’s statement about his own efforts to develop class consciousness within the Garvey movement seems to apply to the ABB as well. McKay, as an “international socialist,” believed that for “subject peoples” nationalism was the

road to international socialism. As the road to justice and equality for black people appeared to narrow, it seemed that the Soviet-led world communist movement offered options not otherwise available.

SEE ALSO: Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Bolsheviks; Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA); Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963) Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism; Internationals; Red Summer, United States, 1919

References and Suggested Readings

- Briggs, C. (1958) Letter to Theodore Draper in New York from Cyril Briggs in Los Angeles, March 17, 1958 (long extract). Theodore Draper Papers, Hoover Institute Archives, Box 31.
- Bush, R. (1999) *We Are Not What We Seem: Black Nationalism and Class Struggle in the American Century*. New York: New York University Press.
- Campbell, S. (1994) Black Bolsheviks and Recognition of African-America's Right to Self-Determination by the Communist Party USA. *Science and Society* 58, 4 (Winter): 440–70.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. (1920/1999) *Darkwater: Voices From Within the Veil*. Mineola, NY: Dover.
- Griffler, K. (1993) The Black Radical Intellectual and the Black Worker: The Emergence of a Program for Black Labor, 1918–1938. PhD dissertation, Ohio State University.
- Harrison, H. (1997) *When Africa Awakes*. Baltimore: Black Classics Press.
- Hawkins, C. (2000) "Race First versus Class First": An Intellectual History of Afro-American Radicalism, 1911–1928. Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Davis.
- Hill, R. (1987) *The Crusader*, Vols. 1–3. Los Angeles: UCLA Press.
- James, W. (1998) *Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia: Caribbean Radicalism in Early Twentieth-Century America*. New York: Verso.
- Makalani, M. (2004) The African Blood Brotherhood and the Rise of Black Radicalism during the New Negro Movement. Doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
- Stephens, M. (1999) Black Empire: The Making of Black Transnationalism by West Indians in the United States. Doctoral dissertation, Yale University.
- Stoddard, L. (1921) *The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy*. New York: Charles Scribner & Sons.
- Turner, J. M. (2005) *Caribbean Crusaders and the Harlem Renaissance*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Vincent, T. (1971) *Black Power and the Garvey Movement*. San Francisco: Ramparts Press.

Agbekoya Peasant Uprising and Rebellion, 1968–1969

Julius O. Adekunle

Located in southwestern Nigeria, the Yoruba constitute one of the major ethnic groups in the country. Since Frederick Lord Lugard, the British colonial governor-general of Nigeria, amalgamated the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914, the Yoruba have played a leading role in politics by providing nationalist leaders and by participating in the British colonial administration. The Western Region, created by the Richard's Constitution of 1946, was not only the intellectual center of Nigeria, it was also the site of major social and political uprisings.

The foremost political leader of the Yoruba was Obafemi Awolowo, who served in many capacities, but most notably as premier of the Western Region from 1954 to 1959, and later as the opposition leader in the Federal House of Representatives. One of Awolowo's important contributions to the political advancement of the Yoruba was the formation of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Association of the Descendants of Oduduwa), which transformed into the Action Group (AG) political party. AG's stronghold was among Yoruba farmers, evident in its palm tree symbol. During Awolowo's tenure as premier, cocoa farmers enjoyed a boom period in production and revenue, facilitating the construction of the Cocoa House, one of the tallest buildings in Ibadan, which demonstrated the importance of the crop. Encouraged by the British colonial government, cocoa production was produced widely in the Western Region. As a primary center of cocoa production, Ibadan was also the focal point of the politicization of farmers and where the Agbekoya Rebellion broke out in 1968.

Origin of the Rebellion

From 1945 to 1957 cocoa farmers suffered significant economic loss due to an outbreak of "swollen shoot" disease in the plants, leading to the first outbreak of unrest in the Western Region. To keep the disease from spreading the colonial government sought to cut down infected cocoa trees – a drastic action for farmers who relied on the crop for survival and sought other

options, or at least compensation for their loss. The government refused to compensate the farmers adequately, which galvanized anger, despair, tension, and ultimately political action. Refusing the farmers' demand for 10 shillings and 6 pence per tree, the Nigeria Cocoa Marketing Board agreed to pay 1 shilling and 6 pence per tree as compensation. The first protests were organized by the Mayegun Society (meaning the society "to straighten the world") when farmers attacked government laborers assigned to cut down cocoa trees. In the wake of power politics in Ibadan, the society soon lost its power of resistance, eventually splitting into two groups – the Mayegun Society and the Mayegun League. Despite the fact that farmers formed numerous societies to protest the policies of the colonial government, their demands went largely unheeded. But the Mayegun Protests from 1962 to 1965 were a contributing factor in unrest that evolved into a national political crisis, culminating in military intervention in 1966.

Following independence, the Western Region, renamed the Western State in 1967, remained politically volatile. The ensuing political instability was compounded by the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War (1967–70), when the Ibo, under Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, sought to secede from Nigeria through the formation of an independent Biafra state, composed mainly of the oil-rich Eastern Region. To maintain a unified country the federal government ultimately defeated the Biafra military forces. During the war, calls for creation of more states in order to prevent future secessionist plans increased dramatically. General Yakubu Gowon, the head of state, did not oppose efforts to create more political units to maintain a balance of power in Nigeria. Many people wanted a Yoruba Central State to be carved out of the Western State. Issues regarding war and the creation of additional states were in progress in 1968, the advent of the Agbekoya Revolt in Nigeria's Western State.

The Agbekoya was a pressure group formed by cocoa farmers that organized violent protests in opposition to the government's decision to increase taxation on development, marketing, and transportation, increases in water rates, and overbearing and domineering sanitary and town planning officers. The Agbekoya claimed that farmers were suffering excessively from government policies. Literally translated, Agbekoya means "farmers who reject injustice." The Agbekoya

were joined in their protests by the Mekunnu Parapo (Association of Poor People) and Olorunkoya (Society Against Injustice). Given their common interests, all peasant farming societies collaborated to oppose increased taxation. With a recent history of resistance through the Mayegun Society behind them, farmers requested the government to reduce taxes due to the poor harvest in 1968. Instead, the state government raised taxes by 75 percent.

Negotiations and Protests

In accordance with Yoruba culture, farmers protested the new taxes at the palace of the traditional ruler, Olubadan of Ibadan. On November 6, 1968 approximately 2,000 armed farmers gathered at the palace singing war songs and carrying charms for protection. They demanded that the government rescind the new taxes due to heavy rains that adversely affected cocoa production and resulted in a poor harvest. In particular, they claimed the poorest peasants bore the brunt of the tax increase. The Olubadan urged the farmers to eschew violence and remain calm, assuring them that the government would review their situation. The next day, on November 7, the number of peasants surrounding Olubadan Palace swelled to 3,000.

Western State military governor Brigadier Adeyinka Adebayo tried to persuade the peasants to pay taxes without resorting to violence, assuring the farmers that the government would ameliorate their conditions. But the movement spread widely throughout the Western State as many cocoa farmers joined with farmers of other cash crops in revolts that took the form of an agrarian populist movement. Instead of considering the economic plight of farmers, the government viewed the Agbekoya movement as manipulated by ambitious anti-government politicians and lawyers seeking the formation of a Yoruba Central State.

Protesting farmers disassociated themselves from the ongoing agitation by some Ibadan politicians for such a state. Tafa Adeoye, the Agbekoya leader, refuted the claim that the society was manipulated by outsiders, stating emphatically that farmers were not seeking a new state, a matter of official government prerogative, but the welfare of peasant farmers seeking to survive. The Agbekoya was not a political party, but a loosely organized anti-tax organization of farmers seeking economic relief,

improved living standards, release of detained tax defaulters from prison, and prosecution of corrupt government officials.

The Uprising

With the collapse of negotiations a battle line was drawn between peasants and government. In December 1968 an insurrection began at Akanran, a village near Ibadan that was a center of the Mayegun revolt, following government efforts to arrest tax defaulters. The Agbekoya farmers in Akanran led by Tafa Adeoye resisted government tax agents, who they complained were corrupt and rapacious. From Akanran, uprisings spread to Ibadan and quickly engulfed the cocoa producing areas. Government houses were destroyed and many died in the battles. In the wake of bloody encounters between anti-tax farmers and police, Akanran was completely deserted.

Peasants stormed the Agodi federal prisons setting free about 400 tax defaulters and those arrested in the rebellions. By October 1968, after the government rescinded its decision to raise taxes and to reduce the flat rate to £2, and agreed to release all participants in the uprisings, the revolts came to a provisional end. But the protests did not end after Agbekoya movement leaders were criticized by rank-and-file members for failing to gain greater concessions from the government.

The revolt assumed a popular form and rapidly spread from Akanran in Ibadan to many parts of the Western State where cocoa farmers lived and were joined by other farmers in opposition to tax increases. Aside from the villages surrounding Ibadan, the revolt spread very quickly to Oyo, Ishara, Ede, Ogbomoso, Abeokuta, and Ijebu Ode. In Abeokuta many people were killed and the government arrested and detained more than 2,000 tax agitators. In Ishara the king's palace and property were burned. At Ila-Orangun tax-agitators assassinated the traditional ruler and vandalized the police station. The wave of the insurrection reached Ogbomoso in July 1969 when the king and members of his family were murdered by rioters. Farmers in the Oke-Ogun region of the Western State also participated in the protests. Fighting police bearing rifles, most peasants carried charms, clubs, guns, and machetes without access to modern weaponry.

Government Actions and Reactions

The Agbekoya Rebellion formed as the Nigerian federal government's attention was focused on the civil war. While taxation was a fundamental issue for peasants during a period of high inflation, the government saw the unrest as a localized problem of the Western State that would not distract it from the civil war. As a federal minister, Awolowo condemned the rebellion as a distraction from the military operation against Ojukwu and his Biafra State. Similarly, the governor declared that the Western State would not tolerate lawlessness and brigandage under any pretext and warned that all protests would be crushed. Considering the seriousness of the continuing riots in Western State, Awolowo, as a respected leader of the Yoruba, participated in a 10-mile "trek for peace" to meet the aggrieved farmers in Ibadan. Awolowo's meeting and discussion with Tafa Adeoye pleased the farmers.

The state government imposed a curfew and ordered the collection of taxes to stop. The Ayoola Commission was established to investigate causes of the widespread riots and to make recommendations to the government as to the appropriate course of action. Based on the commission's report that the riots were engendered by high taxation, the government dropped the idea of the tax increase, but the acts of violence continued because the demand for tax reduction and public welfare had not been fully addressed. Again, the governor met with the leaders of the Agbekoya, but nothing further was gained from the meeting. The governor adopted the policy of divide and conquer by successfully splitting the leaders of the farmers to break their resistance.

Aftermath of the Rebellion

The Agbekoya revolt was eventually crushed, but the government was forced to make some reforms. On October 15, 1969 the military governor announced the reduction in tax from £3.5s to £2 for the 1969/1970 tax year in addition to the probing of government officers who had been accused of corruption. Along with the tax reduction the state government released the anti-tax riot detainees and certain other new taxes were either reduced or eliminated. Sanitary inspectors, market-masters, and major motor park officers were withdrawn from rural

areas. In addition, the Western State Marketing Board announced an increase in the price of cocoa for the year 1969/1970. For example, grade one cocoa was to sell for £150 instead of £135.

The Agbekoya Rebellion achieved more than financial gains. The farmers proved that the Yoruba were capable of claiming their rights and were able to fight against oppression and injustice. While the rebellion was not directed toward the further creation of states, it prompted the federal government to affirm its interest in establishing them.

The Agbekoya rebellion provides a distinctive example of a popular revolt whose foundations were based on political and economic issues in Western Nigeria. Since the government did not pay adequate attention to the interests and welfare of peasants and small-scale farmers, and efforts to organize strong unions failed, the uprisings were an instrument of redress. All farmers sought improved economic status and with the mobilization of farmers from other parts of the state the rebellion moved outside Ibadan and became a popular revolt, which the government had to put down. To fight their cause the farmers used acts of violence, intimidation, and charms. Government workers who were assigned to arrest tax evaders were brutally attacked.

The government succeeded in crushing the rebellion and in proscribing the movement, while the farmers gained concessions. The Agbekoya Rebellion, which lasted nine months from November 1968 to July 1969, threatened the peace and political stability of the Western State, but surprisingly there remained calm after the government arrested and seriously dealt with the leaders, especially Tafa Adeoye.

SEE ALSO: Ife–Modakeke Conflict; Niger Delta, Protest Movements; Nigeria, Protest and Revolution, 20th Century; Nigeria, Separatist Agitation, Contemporary

References and Suggested Readings

- Beer, C. (1976) *The Politics of Peasant Groups in Western Nigeria*. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
- Beer, C. F. & Williams, G. P. (1976) The Politics of the Ibadan Peasantry. In G. P. Williams (Ed.), *Nigeria: Economy and Society*. London: Rex Collins.
- Berry, S. S. (1975) *Cocoa, Custom and Socio-Economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Lloyd, P. C. (1974) *Power and Independence*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Aggett, Neil (1953–1982)

Nicole Ulrich

Neil Aggett was born in 1953 in the district of Nanyuki in Kenya, and moved to South Africa with his family at the age of 10. He attended a private school at Kingswood College in Grahamstown, and went on to study medicine at the University of Cape Town. Increasingly radicalized, he disapproved of the apartheid society in which he was raised, and rejected the privileges that came with being white and middle class. As a medical student, Aggett lived in a laborer's cottage without any electricity or hot water, and served his internship at black public hospitals in Umtata and Tembisa. Once he completed his studies in 1977, he worked at the Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto.

Aggett believed the ill health of those he treated was rooted in the oppressive social and economic conditions that African workers had to endure, and became increasingly involved in the growing African workers' movement of the 1970s. He initially volunteered at the Industrial Aid Society, a workers support center, and assisted with the establishment of the center's Workmen's Compensation section, which dealt with workers injured at work.

From 1978 onwards, Aggett actively assisted the African Food and Canning Workers' Union (AFCWU), which was linked to the Food Canning Workers' Union, an independent registered union. The AFCWU was unable to pay Aggett a full salary, so he continued to work part-time as a doctor. He was not only a dedicated unionist, but also an effective one, and played an important role in setting up the key AFCWU branch at the Fattis and Monis factory in Johannesburg. The 1980s witnessed the formation of growing popular resistance to apartheid, and the politicization of the trade union movement became a source of great concern for the state. The security police were used to weed out trade unionists with supposed connections to the African National Congress (ANC) underground. On November 27, 1981 a score of trade unionists, including Aggett, were arrested and detained. Seventy days later, Neil Aggett was found dead in a cell at the notorious John Vorster Square police headquarters. Authorities claimed he had committed suicide.

Aggett was the fifty-first person to die in detention since a 90-day detention without trial law was passed in 1963. His death was seen as a

direct attack on interracial and African unions, and the AFCWU issued a call for a half-hour work stoppage on February 11, 1982 to mourn his death. It has been estimated that 100,000 workers responded to the call.

SEE ALSO: South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; South Africa, Labor Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Baskin, J. (1991) *Striking Back: A History of COSATU*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- Bizos, G. (1998) *No One to Blame: In Pursuit of Justice in South Africa*. Bellville: Mayibuye Books.
- Food and Canning Workers Union (1982) Obituary: Neil Aggett 1953–1982. *South African Labour Bulletin* 7 (4 & 5): 118.
- Friedman, S. (1987) *Building Tomorrow Today: African Workers in Trade Unions, 1970–1984*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Agitprop

Joshua E. Polster

Agitprop theater consisted of short stage-pieces for leftist political *agitation* and *propaganda*. It emerged as an artistic response to the turbulent Russian sociopolitical climate of the late nineteenth century and the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917. Agitprop theater also was found in the Soviet Proletkult Theaters and the Workers' Theater movements in Europe and the United States in the early twentieth century.

Agitprop theater was created out of the need for a new kind of working-class theater that portrayed proletarian issues concerning economic and social problems. It was a theater that emphasized Marxist ideology over theatrical aesthetics, and was used as a weapon to agitate minds, emotions, and revolutionary actions. Agitprop performances were crafted to indoctrinate or reinforce communist principles – as opposed to capitalist principles – by illustrating Marxist doctrine to proletarians in abstract stylized productions with revolutionary themes, episodic cabaret-like scenes, stereotyped characters (the workers and ruling class), and direct actor-audience interactions. Performances included skits, dialogues, verses, monologues, and declarative speeches on current topics, as well as songs, music, dances, miming, acrobatics, and gymnastics.

Most early agitprop performances were a blend of chanted dialogue and uniformed mass move-

ment to demonstrate the proletarian collective action needed to overthrow the ruling class. The theater organizations consisted of both amateurs and professionals. Productions were often low budget (homemade props and clothing) and mobile, capable of being performed both indoors (factories and workers' clubs) and outdoors (street corners and farmland) to take the Marxist propaganda straight to the workers' own environments. According to the agitprop group Workers Laboratory Theater, "This [kind of theater] must be organized in such a manner that dramatic troupes may be evolved, ready one day to go to strike meetings to cheer up the strikers, just as ready another day to accompany a demonstration to inspire the workers; it must be a theater where the worker may be inspired to fight for his liberation; a theater of the class struggle – a theater of the workers, by the workers, for the workers" (Anonymous 1931b: 31–2). Notable agitprop groups were the Russian Blue Blouse Troupe, the German Red Rockets, the English Red Players, and the American Prolet-Buehne. Some agitprop productions were as brief as 30 seconds (plotless but passionate chants from proletarian choruses), while others were more developed for an entire evening of performances. The Blue Blouse Troupe, for example, had performances that lasted up to two hours and consisted of the following events: (1) Parade, (2) Oratorio, (3) International Survey, (4) Feuilleton, (5) Satirical Sketch, (6) Living Poster, (7) Dialogue-Duet, (8) Speech/Story, (9) Folk Verse, (10) Local Theme, (11) Finale-March (Drain 1995: 182–3). Agitprop troupes peaked during the belligerent Third Period era of international communism when Stalin declared, shortly before the Wall Street Crash of 1929, that capitalism would reach its final phase and communism would triumph. The agitprop performances of this time were passionate and engaging. For instance, during the US production of *Art is a Weapon* (1931) the audience was incited to participate in a mass recitation:

Hello comrades. We greet you comrades:
 We raise our fists to the fight.
 Workers of the nation, build our federation,
 For victory comes with might.
 The bosses' onslaught is steady
 And we are bearing the brunt.
 PROLETARIANS, Let's get ready!
 RED FRONT! RED FRONT!
 (Anonymous 1931a: 15–17)

The European and American agitprop troupes were closely influenced by the oscillating foreign policies of the Soviet government. In 1935, for example, there was a growing concern in Russia about the rising threat of fascism. As a result, a new Communist Party policy termed the Popular Front was introduced, which set aside revolutionary objectives and advocated cooperation with the liberal bourgeoisie. This drastic turn in policy changed the artistic direction of the workers' theaters as well, for there was dissatisfaction with the schematic form of agitprop plays for the new non-revolutionary audience. The Communist Party's chief cultural administrator said that all plays had to be in the style of socialist realism, so that the proletarian audience could more clearly understand the messages from the didactic plays. There was a new emphasis on the playwright – instead of non-literary agitprop – and more easily recognizable and accessible characters and plots.

After the Popular Front, agitprop theater went on to influence numerous theatrical forms and artists, such as the Political Theater of Erwin Piscator and Sergei Eisenstein, the Epic Theater of Bertolt Brecht, the Living Newspapers of the Federal Theater Project, and the *Actos* of Luis Valdez.

Agitprop theater declined during the realist-dominated productions of the 1930s Popular Front period, when communists sought a more general and accessible theatrical medium as they allied with capitalists and socialists against the growing threat of fascism. Though original agitprop artists viewed the stage as a didactic medium to convey Marxist ideology and incite proletarian audiences to collective revolutionary action against foes such as capitalists and, at times, socialists, the theatrical form came to be used for various kinds and degrees of leftist causes.

SEE ALSO: Boal, Augusto (b. 1931); Brecht, Bertolt (1898–1956); Eisenstein, Sergei (1898–1948); Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Russia, Revolutions: Sources and Contexts

References and Suggested Readings

- Anonymous (1931a) Art is a Weapon. *Workers Theatre* (June): 15–17.
 Anonymous (1931b) Dedication. *Workers Theatre* (April): 3.
 Blake, B. (1935) *The Awakening of the American Theater*. New York: Tomorrow.

- Bodek, R. (1997) *Proletarian Performance in Weimar Berlin: Agitprop, Chorus, and Brecht*. Columbia, SC: Camden House.
 Drain, R. (1995) *Twentieth-Century Theatre: A Sourcebook*. London: Routledge.
 Goldstein, M. (1974) *The Political Stage*. New York: Oxford University Press.
 Himelstein, M. (1963) *Drama Was a Weapon*. Rahway: Rutgers University Press.
 Levine, I. (1985) *Left-Wing Dramatic Theory in the American Theater*. Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press.
 Samuel, R., MacColl, E., & Cosgrove, S. (1985) *Theatres of the Left, 1880–1935: Workers' Theatre Movements in Britain and America*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Agüeybaná I (d. 1510) and Agüeybaná II (d. 1511)

Viviana Uriona

When the conquistador Juan Ponce de León came to the island called Borinquen (today Puerto Rico), he met the Taíno tribe and its chieftains (caciques), Agüeybaná I and Agüeybaná II (Agüeybaná means “big sun”). All other caciques were subordinate to these two.

Agüeybaná I was convinced from the beginning that the conquerors were gods. Thus they were well received and Agüeybaná I and Ponce de León became friends; according to the tradition, their wives got to know each other. De León baptized the chief's mother, and the caciques accompanied de León in exploring the island. Then they visited the island of Hispaniola, where Governor Nicolás de Ovando ruled brutally over the Taínos.

Agüeybaná's hospitality and peaceful treatment of the Spaniards facilitated the Spanish conquest of the island as well as the enslavement of the Taínos. The conquerors forced them to work in the gold mines of the island and in establishing forts. Many Taínos died in the process.

Agüeybaná's brother, Agüeybaná II, doubted the divinity of the Spaniards and developed a plan to check their status. Together with Urayoán, the cacique of Añasco, he sent some of their tribal members to lure a Spaniard named Diego Salcedo into the river in order to drown him there. They examined Salcedo's corpse to ensure that he was dead. His death convinced the Taínos that the Spaniards were no gods.

Agüeybaná I, shocked by the news, organized a revolt and under his leadership the Taínos attacked many Spanish settlements. But Agüeybaná's people, who were armed only with spears, bows, and arrows, stood no chance against the better-armed Spanish forces. In 1510, Agüeybaná was shot by the army of his former "friend," de León. The revolt failed and many Taínos either committed suicide or left the island. Most Indians who stayed soon died due to cruel treatment or to a smallpox epidemic. De León was later badly injured by an arrow and died in the newly founded city of Havana in Cuba.

Many other revolts undertaken until the end of the sixteenth century failed, mainly for two reasons. First, the Spaniards were better armed. Even more importantly, they brought new diseases to the continent that were especially deadly for the Indians.

SEE ALSO: Colombia, Indigenous Mobilization; Cuauhtémoc (1502–1525)

References and Suggested Readings

Cassá, R. (1974) *Los Taínos de la Española*. Santo Domingo: Editora de la Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo.

La rebelión del cacique Agueybana II. Available at www.pcmle.org/EM/article.php3?id_article=258 (accessed May 28, 2008).

Albania, socialism

Dimitrios K. Dalakoglou and Rigels Halili

Rebellions

Socialism appeared in Albania in the 1920s. By 1921 the first strikes had already occurred in Korça and Gjirokastër. In 1922 Avni Rustemi founded the organization Bashkimi (Unity) which, despite the variety of its political influences, was mainly democratic and socialist. Some socialists participated in the anti-dictatorship rebellion against the coup of Ahmet Zog that took place in June 1924. Following their defeat most of these rebels left Albania. Some socialist activists were politically active in exile; those in France published the newspaper *Populli* (People), while others founded the Revolutionary National Committee in Vienna (1925) and the Albanian

Communist Group in Moscow (1928). These two latter groups became involved in the Balkan section of Comintern.

Inside Albania, two of the country's largest towns, Korça and Shkodra, became centers for socialist activity. Besides their growing post-feudal economic activity these two towns hosted forms of cultural activity (e.g., schools and press) which had a role in the development of the socialist movement there. Their geographical position was also important, as Shkodra had links with Yugoslavia and Korça with Greece and the respective communist groups there. Under these circumstances the communist groups of the two cities did not entirely subscribe to the "orthodoxy" of the Comintern. For example, the Communist Group of Korça (formed in 1928) was mostly influenced by Thessaloniki archeo-Marxists and anarchists. As a result of these "deviances" the Comintern sent some of the Albanians who had been trained in Moscow back home to organize the mainstream Communist Party and to enforce the Moscow line. The most prominent among them was Ali Kelmendi, who returned to Albania in 1930 and soon thereafter found himself in an open conflict with well-known activists such as Niko Xoxi. Eventually, he managed to change the prevailing ideological tendencies from Trotskyist and anarchist to Leninist and Stalinist, however causing hostility within the movement. In the meantime (1934–5) other communist organizations were set up in Tiranë, Gjirokastër, Fier, Vlorë, and Elbasan. This period was characterized by constant fragmentation and disputes among the various groups who had adopted a diverse range of communist ideologies. Some communists, including the Korça group, participated in the anti-Zogist and pro-democracy rebellion of Fier (1935). The major communist magazine in Albania at the time was *Bota e Re* (New World), published in Korça. Apart from ideological and personal disputes the rhetoric of Albanian communists was confined to social protests and critique against Zog's regime. Yet they still faced censorship and persecutions: for example, in 1939 Ali Kelmendi was jailed in Gjirokastër, and almost all members of the Shkodra communist group were imprisoned, even though they were released soon thereafter.

Except for the resistance from some gendarmerie units and several officers led by Abaz Kupa in Durrës, the Italian occupation of

Albania (1939) went undisturbed. A new quisling regime was soon established and the crown of Albania was offered to the Italian king Victor Emanuel III. In most cases intellectual and political elites initially collaborated with the Italian administration, with some even welcoming it, not least due to the public and construction works undertaken by the new regime. However, the war waged by Italians against Greece, and the subsequent transformation of South Albania into a battlefield, severely damaged their image. The first demonstrations against Italians, on Albanian Flag Day of November 28, 1940, were organized in Tirana and Shkodra, where a few of the arrested demonstrators declared that they were communists. These events signified the association between communism and a certain type of socialist nationalism, within which the liberation of the nation from foreign occupiers was combined with the demand for social democratization. The most audacious act of resistance was the attempt of Vasil Laçi to assassinate Victor Emanuel III when he visited the country on May 17, 1941.

In the meantime armed bands were forming in different regions of the country, the better known of which were the groups led by Abaz Kupa in Kruja and that led by Muslim Peza and operating in the Peza region. The communists were still a minor force in the spectrum of these scattered resistance forces. One of the places where communists would meet in Tirana was a tobacco shop run by a member of the Korça Group named Enver Hoxha. A former student in France and member of the French Communist Party, he had returned to Albania in 1936 and had started teaching in the French Lycée of Korça. After being fired for his political activity, Hoxha moved to Tirana in order to organize the actions of the local communist group. At this time nothing revealed the principal role he was to play in Albanian communism during the next forty years and that he would lead the country from various government positions between 1944 and 1983.

The turning point for the development of the communist movement was the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The earlier contacts of the Shkodra Group with Yugoslav communists and the directives of the Comintern influenced significantly the future of socialism in Albania. By the autumn of 1941 two Yugoslav envoys, Dušan Mugosha and Miladin Popović, reached

Tirana. Their presence strengthened earlier contacts between the communist groups and on November 8, 1941 the Albanian Communist Party (ACP) was founded, making it the youngest communist party in the Balkans. Later, in 1948, it was renamed the Party of Labor of Albania (PPSh).

Gradually, communists organized their groups and the resistance against the Italians. They contacted the Peza guerilla band and a conference was held there in 1942, when the founding of the National Liberation Front was declared and armed resistance grew in towns and rural areas. Repression by the Italians only fueled support for the communists. Initially, contacts were made with the nationalist organization Balli Kombëtar (National Front) and pro-Zog groups, whose resistance efforts involved more talk than action. As the war continued, and especially after the capitulation of Italy (September 1943), it became clear that this was as much a national liberation struggle as it was a battle for power in postwar Albania. Soon the situation in Albania under German occupation began to resemble civil war. Eventually, the communist-led resistance gained support among the peasantry, as well as backing from the British military mission, leading to a communist victory. But simultaneously most of Balli Kombëtar's members openly collaborated with German forces in a common effort to annihilate the communist resistance, organizing two massive operations in the winter of 1943–4 and in June 1944. This was perceived as an open act of treachery and communist propaganda made use of it to discredit their opponents. Although severely damaged by the Germans, the communists soon regrouped their forces and following the German retreat from Albania they organized a general offensive. By the end of November 1944 they had liberated the country. Albanian partisan forces, in accordance with the Yugoslav communist authorities, entered the Yugoslav territory towards Kosovo and Montenegro and continued their fight against the German army up to the town of Višegrad (Bosnia).

Socialism in Power

In the first months hundreds anti-communists who did not manage to escape from Albania were soon arrested and sentenced by the newly established people's courts, either to death or long-term imprisonment. Nationalist and pro-Zog

forces, which were still active in northern parts of the country, were hunted down and eliminated during the next few years. Nationalization of land and property began immediately after the war and heavy taxation was imposed on the wealthiest landlords and urban bourgeois. On the other hand, the new regime launched a large campaign in order to reconstruct the country. Making use of revolutionary and indeed democratic rhetoric, the Communist Party's propaganda was able to mobilize large masses of people and despite the hard economic situation infrastructures were soon rebuilt. Land taken from former landlords was distributed to the peasants. Such moves secured the new regime the desired support from the largest social stratum in the country, namely peasants. Additionally, a campaign was launched to reduce high illiteracy rates in the country, estimated at 85 percent among the overall population and almost 97 percent among women.

During the war the partisan forces had been assisted by a mission of British officers, who abandoned the nationalist forces and shifted their support towards the communists as the latter were openly fighting the German army. However, with the division into two conflicting political and military blocs – West and East – conditions changed. The British and American missions were soon expelled from the country and Albanian authorities refused to obtain help from the UNRRA and Marshall Plan. Lacking the support of the USA, Great Britain, and France during the Paris Peace Conference, Albania initially faced the fate of defeated fascist countries following accusations by the Greek government, which blamed Albania for acting together with fascist Italy in the invasion of Greece (1940). Only thanks to Yugoslav and Soviet support was Albania (represented by the new communist leadership) recognized as part of the anti-fascist coalition. Regardless, the recompenses due to Albania from Italy and Germany were held by the British government following the incident on the Corfu Channel (1946) when British ships struck mines in Albanian waters.

Until 1948 Albania was politically and economically linked with communist Yugoslavia. Such cooperation dated back to the war and was also in accordance with the directives coming from the Soviet Union, which gave Yugoslavia a primary role in the Balkans. Talks were undertaken between Tito and Georgi Dimitrov in order

to create a Balkan Federation of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, and possibly Greece. In accordance with these plans economic cooperation between Albania and Yugoslavia was to be followed by the customary unification and eventual addition of Albania as the seventh republic of Federal Yugoslavia. These plans were thwarted when the result of the Greek civil war eventually came to favor nationalist-monarchist forces and as Stalin started to feel threatened by the increasingly leading role played by Tito, not only in the Balkans but in the entire communist bloc. In the break that followed between Stalin and Tito, Enver Hoxha sided with Stalin. This was a move not driven by ideological motives as much as it was an effort to strengthen his own position against adversaries within the high levels of the Albanian Communist Party, such as the powerful minister of the interior Koçi Xoxe, who was openly supported by the Yugoslav leadership. The purge that followed saw Xoxe and his followers stand trial and eventually be executed. A monument in honor of Stalin was erected in the main square of Tirana and the Russian language replaced Serbo-Croatian as one of the foreign languages in Albanian schools.

Soviet-Stalinist patterns soon started appearing in the economic, political, social, and cultural life of the country. The beginning of the 1950s was marked by the more radical collectivization of land and creation of cooperatives, analogous to the Soviet kolkhozes. An attempt at widespread industrialization of the country was launched with the initiation of five-year economic plans. An intensification of urbanization followed, highly controlled by the central state. Every type of private ownership over means of production vanished. The politics of terror intensified and the ever-present Sigurimi (Albanian Secret Service) was able directly to control most social activity. Another means of control were the diverse party-managed organizations that established hegemony over everyday life. Examples include the Pioneers (children-students), the Communist Youth, the Democratic Fronts and People's Councils (regional groups), and various professional unions. In contrast to other countries (e.g., Poland and Yugoslavia), membership in the Albanian Communist Party was treated in an elitist manner and one had to pass through a long period of "examination" before joining the communist ranks.

In 1956 another severe purge took place within the PPSH and Soviet-Albanian relations started to weaken. A final breakup followed after Hoxha's critique against Khrushchev for revisionism and opportunism during the Moscow conference of 81 communist parties (November 1960). Soon the two countries ended all relations – economic, military, and diplomatic. Western hopes that Albania (like Yugoslavia) would approach western countries were in vain. As soon as the break with the Soviet Union took place it became evident that Albania had secured another strong foreign ally: the People's Republic of China.

The 1960s saw the increasing influence of Maoist rule in Albania. A type of Cultural Revolution started to take shape with the most evident result being the banning of every religious activity (1967); Albania was declared the first atheist country in the world. Industrialization continued in many ways, although economically the period influenced by China's example failed to address the needs of the population and proved anti-productive in the long term. However, this partly could be attributed to internal problems such as the distance of Tirana officials from everyday reality, increasing bureaucracy, and radical measures such as the collectivization of even the smallest domestic production.

The Albanian government firmly opposed the aggression of the Red Army against Czechoslovakia in 1968 and abandoned the Warsaw Treaty as a result. This event heralded the beginning of the so-called bunkerization of the country. Creating an atmosphere of fear of foreign aggression (be it from Yugoslavia, Greece, or the Soviet Union), the regime constructed some 100,000 bunkers, nowadays one of the most recognizable features in the Albanian landscape. This emphasis on defense severely damaged the financial resources of the country and gradually led to the notorious isolationism of Albania. Two large purges followed in 1972 and 1974, one against the liberalization of cultural life and the other against high-ranking army officers, which saw two former ministers executed for high treason. However, by the mid-1970s, following the death of Mao and the changes undertaken by Zhou Enlai in China, Hoxha began to diverge from the new Chinese leadership. Again, fearing opposition within the party, he undertook another significant break with his foreign allies in 1978.

Commencing a policy of economic autarchy, Albanian high-ranking officials embarked on a disastrous policy blind to the everyday lives of the general population. Throughout the 1980s Albania faced constant economic crisis, reflected in the lack of even basic goods. After a few years of international isolationism Albania improved relations with neighboring countries. Nonetheless, this era of reconciliation with Yugoslavia, which started in the mid-1970s, abruptly ended following the demonstrations of spring 1981 in Kosovo. The connection of these events with the last purge in the high ranks of the PPSH remains a matter of dispute. In December 1981 Mehmet Shehu, then prime minister, committed suicide (or, according to other sources, was murdered) and his wife and the ministers of his circle, including those of Interior and Defense, were arrested and executed. A period of rapprochement with Greece followed: in 1987 the first border checkpoint was opened.

Enver Hoxha died in April 1985. His successor, Ramiz Alia, initially promised to continue the policies of his predecessor, but the events in Poland and eventually all of Eastern Europe also changed the situation in Albania. The beginning of the 1990s was marked by a liberalization of political and economic life. The key point in the political and social life of Albania was summer 1990, when some five thousand people clashed with the police and entered the foreign embassies in Tirana demanding provision of passports and the right to migrate abroad – since migration was fundamentally forbidden. In 1990 people were eventually allowed to leave the country and the first passport in fifty years was issued. The privatization of property and political pluralism soon followed. Despite these major adjustments, during the first multi-party elections (1991) it was the successor of the PPSH, the Socialist Party (PS), that won and Ramiz Alia was nominated the first president of post-communist Albania. Not long afterwards the profound effects of the huge economic crisis, associated with a massive migration to Greece and Italy, forced the socialist government to resign. Another government was formed and the elections that took place on March 30, 1992 saw the victory of the biggest opposition party, the anti-communist Democratic Party (PD). Its leader, Sali Berisha, was soon chosen to be the president of the Republic, officially signaling the end of communism in Albania.

Post-Socialism

The post-communist transition period has been marked by continuous social discord which reflects the lack of parliamentary democratic ethics and the influence of communist-period government models. Indeed, every political organization in Albania could trace its origin to the ranks of the PPSH; for instance, prime minister Sali Berisha – a self-proclaimed anti-communist – was a member of the PPSH for 17 years. The reforms undertaken by the PD government aimed at eliminating its political adversaries rather than meeting the needs of the country. Most civil servants, including army officers, policemen, and jurists, were sacked and replaced with badly instructed or entirely untrained supporters of the PD. The immediate result was a weakening of the public sector and state control, followed by savage privatization, explosive urbanization, corruption, environmental crisis, a rise in criminal activity, and economic stagnation. Despite this turmoil, these effects did not impact too heavily on many Albanians, who were increasingly reliant upon income from migrant remittances.

However, when Berisha started openly displaying autocratic ambitions and especially after the fall of the notorious pyramid pseudo-banks (1997), which saw the loss of almost \$2 billion of citizens' savings, social protests erupted throughout the country. The situation was heavily mismanaged by the government and wisely manipulated by the opposition PS and former PPSH. An armed revolt broke out in the town of Vlora, an action that eventually spread to most of the country. People looted weapons from barracks and police departments, while most of the armed forces joined the rebellion. Soon, most of the official state structures ceased to exist in the country. In many areas the population formed committees similar to those of the communist period, frequently including former PPSH officials who had been members of the party-managed local committees in the past, or army officers who had been sacked by the PD. These committees undertook political functions and formed security against the PD-controlled forces. Eventually, following international intervention and a decision by all parliamentary parties, the rebellion ended; elections were organized and the turmoil ceased while central Albanian authorities gradually regained control of the country – even if the looted weapons remain uncollected to date.

Despite the formal presence of some socialist organizations, there has been little socialist or syndicalist activity in Albania since 1997. This is partly due to rhetoric emphasizing the negative and authoritative elements of communism. This reflects a broader situation in which widespread corruption among political elites (PD-Right or PS-Left) has brought about a loss of faith in politics, especially since both the two largest parties have strikingly similar neoliberal economic programs. Another cause of the stagnation in Albanian political life is migration, as almost one third of the Albanian population resides abroad and is therefore not involved in the political life of the home country, even if sometimes they continue to vote. Conversely, there are Albanian migrants in Italy and Greece who are becoming increasingly involved in both left-wing and anarchist groups in these countries, as these political groups were the first to demand the democratization of discriminative migratory policies.

SEE ALSO: Albanian Nationalism; Greece, Partisan Resistance; Greece, Socialism, Communism, and the Left, 1850–1974; Greece, Socialism, Communism, and the Left, 1974–2008; Yugoslavia, Anti-Fascist “People’s Liberation War” and Revolution, 1941–1945; Yugoslavia, Resistance to Cominform, 1948

References and Suggested Readings

- Anonymous (1982) *History of the Party of Labour of Albania*. Tirana: Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania 8 Nëntori.
- Fischer J. B. (1999) *Albania at War, 1939–1945*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.
- Halliday, J. (Ed.) (1986) *The Artful Albanian: Memoirs of Enver Hoxha*. London: Chatto & Windus.
- Marmullaku, R. (1975) *Albanian and Albanians*. London: Hurst.
- Pearson, O. (2006) *Albania in the Twentieth Century*. 3 Vols. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Pipa, A. (1990) *Albanian Stalinism: Ideo-Political Aspects*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Pollo, S. & Puto, A. (1981) *History of Albania*. London: Routledge.
- Schwandner-Sievers, S. & Fischer, J. B. (Eds.) (2002) *Albanian Identities*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Vickers, M. (2001) *The Albanians: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Vickers, M. & Pettifer, J. (2007) *The Albanian Question*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Albanian nationalism

*Dimitrios K. Dalakoglou
and Rigels Halili*

Proto-Nationalism (1837–1878)

Arbëresh intellectuals introduced the ideas of European Romanticism and Enlightenment into the Albanian-speaking world, including nationalism during the nineteenth century. The *Arbëresh* were an Albanian-speaking diaspora that moved from the Balkans to southern Italy and Sicily during the fifteenth century, following the occupation of the Balkan territories by the Ottoman army. During the nineteenth century their circles shaped a linguistic-cultural movement based upon their Albanian mother tongue. This was the beginning of the so-called Albanian *Rilindje Kombëtare*. This term is generally translated as National Awakening; however, *Rilindje* literally means rebirth, a common term used by Balkan nationalist movements. At this stage the early Albanian nationalist circles of Italy had little or no impact on the Balkans.

The Albanians of the Balkans adopted mainstream modern nationalism after the mid-nineteenth century, partly inspired from the Greek war of independence (1821) and by the earlier separatist aspirations of local Albanian despots. The main reason for this relative delay was the Islamic affiliation of the majority of the Empire's Albanians, among which a large number belonged to the most politically dominant Ottoman classes. The population of the Ottoman Empire was divided administratively and politically according to the millet system, where people were categorized according to their religious affiliation. Moreover, the millet system divided the Albanian-speaking populations of the Empire into three different millets/groups: Muslim, Rum (Christian Orthodox), and Latin (Christian Catholics). Hence it took a significant time to overcome these religious divisions and articulate their common language into standard national identification. Even in contemporary Albania this religious diversity continues to generate internal disagreements. Furthermore, another important division was the linguistic one between *Tosk* (South) and *Geg* (North) Albanian dialect speakers. Albanian-speaking inhabitants of the Empire were divided admin-

istratively into four distinct prefectures (*vilajet*), but most significantly of all they were divided into even smaller groups according to their tribal and clan affiliations.

The parallel development of a cultural nationalism among Albanians of all three different religious categories had a decisive role. That activity was initially concentrated in the South of the country, especially among members of the Bektashi Sufi order who were based within the Bektashi centers (*teke*) (e.g., the *teke* of Frasheri). During the same period, Naim Veqilharxhi, a Christian Orthodox, originally from South Albania, devised an Albanian alphabet in 1845. His attempt was severely condemned by the Greek Orthodox hierarchy that administered the Orthodox Christians of Albania. In the case of the North Albanian Christian Catholics, nationalist ideas spread out among the local intelligentsia following their contact with Austria-Hungary and Italy, but also through the activity of Franciscans and Jesuit orders who controlled the schools where the first generation of the so-called Catholic Cultural Circle of *Shkodra* received their education.

However, until 1885 there were no schools operating in the Albanian language, whereas in the areas where Albanians were living schools would use the Greek, Turkish, Romanian, or Slavic language.

Nationalist Rebellions and the Foundation of Albania (1878–1913)

The sociopolitical relevance of these cultural activities was limited due to the general illiteracy of the population and the divisions among them. It was during the Eastern Crisis that Albanian nationalism made its first appearance as a political and military movement. Following the defeat of the Ottomans in the Russo-Turkish War, the Congress of Berlin and the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) decided that the Albanian-inhabited lands of the Ottoman Empire were to be accorded to Serbia, Montenegro, and partly to Greece.

Albanian religious and clan leaders, along with Ottoman politicians of Albanian origin (mainly from the Northern regions) who faced potential territorial losses and feared for their authority, gathered in the city of Prizren in Kosovo on June 10, 1878. There they formed the Albanian League of Prizren, which was initially

supported by the Ottoman authorities, and acquired the power to impose taxes and raise an army. Ottomans perceived it as a means to help defend the imperial territories. Yet later the influence of Abdyl Frashëri, a politician and former member of the first Ottoman parliament, radicalized the league towards a pro-Albanian identification. Although the league remained a network of local armed groups and political gatherings rather than an institution with a central organization, it achieved its main aim to prevent territorial losses. Simultaneously, it dealt a blow to the Albanian nationalist movement by raising the demand for creation of a semi-autonomous Ottoman administrative unit that would unite the Albanian-inhabited territories of the Balkans to be ruled by mainly Albanian officials. That demand was refused by both the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire.

As the Ottomans lacked the necessary military power in the Balkans they benefited from the arming of Albanian chiefs. When the official Ottoman army left what were once Ottoman territories (and before they were awarded to Montenegro) local Albanian armed groups under the auspices of Istanbul took over. However, it was not very clear if they acted as Albanians or as Ottomans. The league's resistance forced the Great Powers to change the Congress of Berlin's decision to return the disputed territories of Gusinje and Plav to the Ottoman Empire. However, Albanian armed groups refused to give the coastal city of Ulcinj to Montenegro, causing the central Ottoman government to send an army to control the Albanians. Eventually, the Ottoman army, with the support of loyal Albanian leaders, occupied Prizren and Ulcinj and the league was suppressed in 1881.

Despite political and military mobilization, nationalism had not been as popular among the rest of Albanian society as it was among its elites. During that period Albanian intellectuals in Istanbul led by Sami Frashëri turned their attention towards cultural activity. They were conscious of the lack of education in the Albanian language and of the large-scale illiteracy of Albanian-speaking villagers. In 1879 the Society for the Printing of Albanian Writing was founded in the Ottoman capital. Nationalist literature was produced and circulated, but a standardized literary norm did not exist. Nor was there agreement over which alphabet (Latin, Cyrillic, Arabic, or Greek) was to be used,

implying conflicting national orientations. Nevertheless, a large number of publications began to flow into Albanian-inhabited lands, spreading nationalist ideas. However, after the suppression of the League of Prizren, Ottoman authorities turned against Albanian nationalism and began to prosecute its advocates. A second attempt to form anew the League of Prizren and a related Albanian rebellion in Kosovo was suppressed in 1897 and its leader was assassinated, while Albanian publications were banned.

At the beginning of the twentieth century within the Ottoman state the Young Turks movement was emerging, demanding radical reforms. Albanian politicians joined the movement, expecting recognition of their national aspirations. In 1908 in Bitola the Latin alphabet was established as the standard one for Albanian, as the ban upon Albanian publications had been lifted within the new regime. However, not long after this the Young Turks regime organized a policy of Ottomanization of Albanians. This focused on those of the Islamic faith, promoting Arabic as the standard alphabet and repressing nationalists, while arguing that an Albanian nation did not exist and acting accordingly. This repression led to an armed rebellion in Kosovo and North Albania in 1910, also repressed.

Yet in 1911 a rebellion started in the mountains of North Albania. A plethora of North Albanian highlanders remained relatively isolated throughout the centuries of Ottoman rule. This deviance of the highlanders proved decisive, as their otherness was articulated into a distinguishable local identity. Their rebellion was supported by Montenegro, which perceived it as an opportunity to seize some of the disputed Ottoman territories. The most important battle was that of Deçiq on April 6, 1911, where the Turks were defeated.

The Balkan Wars (1912–13) radically changed the situation. Territories inhabited both partially and entirely by Albanians were occupied by Serbian, Montenegrin, and Greek armies in an attempt to realize their own nation-state's programs. Under such conditions Albanian representatives gathered in Vlorë city and proclaimed the independence of Albania on November 12, 1912, but this proclamation did not change the actual situation, since most of the territories of the newly emerging state were under occupation and its borders loosely defined. Additionally, the majority of Albanian villagers were not eager to

become involved in armed conflict and the Vlorë government did not have the means to force them into a war as the governments of the neighboring states had done with their own populations.

The question of the recognition of Albania and the establishing of its territorial shape were the subjects of the Conference of London (1913). Eventually, Albania was recognized as a nation-state. Almost half the territories considered to be Albanian were left out of this newly founded nation-state, including Kosovo, laying the ground for turbulence in the future. Most of the foreign armies in 1913 were reluctant to surrender the occupied cities which were awarded to the new state, while neighboring states had territorial aspirations within the lands of the new state and collaborated with the various ethnic and religious minorities while plotting rebellions. The Greek Christian minority of South Albania, for example, revolted and proclaimed its own independent state in South Albania, while Montenegro mobilized the Catholic Albanian groups of the North against the central Albanian authorities. Alongside this, internal fights for the power of the new state took place, such as that between the Vlorë assembly and Essad Pasha Toptani. While some of the local Muslim chiefs expressed loyalty to Turkish authorities, other tribal leaders and feudal landlords found no reason to recognize a new authority above them.

World War I aggravated the situation as foreign armies occupied anew Albanian territories while a secret London Treaty of April 1915 promised most of the new state's territories to neighboring countries for their participation in the war on the side of the Triple Entente. However, from the end of the war until today, Albania kept most of the territories given to it by the London Conference of 1913. After the war the Italian army refused to withdraw from Albania and fundamentally Italians were expelled from Albania only in 1920, when the government of the new state had the power to mobilize locals, who revolted, semi-armed, against the Italians in Vlorë. The Italian government was not able to send additional troops to Albania as Italian labor unions threatened general strikes if they tried to do so. In 1920 Albania was admitted into the League of Nations.

The population of these territories was a problematic issue, as the new state excluded large Albanian populations in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Greece and included a Greek minority

within Albania. The issue of the Albanian Muslims of Greece (*Chams*) was resolved dramatically after World War II when the Greek state and the nationalist armed bands of Napoleon Zervas expelled Muslim Albanians to Albania. Although that deportation was explained as a reaction to the collaboration of some Albanian nationalist elites with Nazi occupiers, this was no more than an excuse, as many right-wing Greek elites also collaborated with the Nazis.

Albanian Nation-State and Kosovo (1913–2008)

The emergence of the new Albanian nation-state marked the beginning of a new phase in the development of Albanian nationalism. Within the country, after World War II, it evolved into a regular state-run socialist version of nationalism; meanwhile, outside Albania, and especially in Kosovo, a feeling of irredentism was developing.

The Albanian socialist regime (1944–91), which combined socialist and nationalist doctrines, was the most successful Albanian regime in imposing a unique type of homogeneous national identity upon its population and overcoming the various regional, religious, and tribal divisions via an extensive plan of economic and social modernization. The new regime enforced a highly ideological version of history and an extensive program of centrally run education where it imposed a new standardized version of the Albanian language. It also controlled population mobility, attributed party and state affiliations to people, set up forced labor programs, compulsory education, and military training for every citizen, and along with a subsequent ban of religion it overcame previous identifications to merge them into a new one, so-called Albanianism. This Albanianism was understood through the prism of Leninism, Stalinism, and (for a while) Maoism, until the period of Albanian isolationism (1970s), which remained as the leading ideology behind the international relationships of the country until the late 1980s. Although after 1990 this isolationism ended, these nationalist homogenization techniques have not changed much, except for their removal of socialist nuances and the introduction of religious affiliations. The basic doctrines remain the same and include an idea of Albanian commonality emphasizing language and underestimating religious diversity, a scheme of long historical

continuity of the “Albanian nation” in the area and an emphasis upon the anti-Ottoman struggle of the fifteenth century and the consequent emergence of Skanderbeg as a national hero. In the post-socialist period it became evident that the socialist regime had applied a peaceful nationalism within Albania, and rather protective policies for minorities, when compared to the aggressive nationalism displayed by some of its democratic successors. This is especially true in the case of the Greek minority, which is often confronted with repression in response to the parallel aggression and violence of the Greek state against Albanian migrants.

Between 1945 and 1990, in spite of relative tranquillity in the region, fundamentally nationalisms continued to operate, including Albanian nationalism among the Albanian majority of Kosovo. This was a semi-independent region within Serbia, which was in turn part of federal Yugoslavia; larger autonomy was gradually awarded to Kosovo and in 1974 even more powers were ascribed providing it with a near-status of a federal republic, yet remaining part of the republic of Serbia. At that time schools and universities teaching in the Albanian language were encouraged. An Albanian majority controlled most of the governmental and party positions in Kosovo and some local politicians did not hide their nationalist orientations. In 1981 students of the Albanian-speaking University of Pristine protested over practical university issues. Those protests ended in riots in the largest cities of the province; people demanded governmental reforms and the status of a full federal republic for Kosovo. Yugoslavian authorities sent in the police and violently repressed the riots, killing and jailing protesters. More student protests broke out during the 1980s, expressing general disobedience against authorities often articulated as nationalist, autonomist, or anti-state demands. Again, the federal authorities took punitive action against both Albanian and Serbian nationalists in Kosovo, and from the mid-1980s an anti-Albanian tendency emerged among some Belgrade politicians.

During the 1990s Yugoslavia dissolved and Kosovo became a province of Serbia. The Serbian authorities under Slobodan Milošević violently repressed and reduced Kosovan political autonomy. A regime of anti-Albanian policies was established by the Milošević semi-dictatorial government, effectively radicalizing Albanian

nationalism. Albanians were driven out of their jobs; Serbian policemen replaced Albanian ones; the Albanian press and language were censored and repressed. Anti-Belgrade struggles initially began as civilian disobedience, protests, and an internal political antagonism between the Albanians and Serbians of Kosovo. In 1990 an illegal Kosovo parliament proclaimed the independence of Kosovo from Serbia. Two distinct nationalist lines emerged: both aimed at Kosovo independence, yet the one led by author Ibrahim Rugova argued for peaceful disobedience against Belgrade rule, while the other called in arms.

In 1993 Albanian nationalists organized a guerrilla organization, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/AL: UÇK), which in the late 1990s received notable assistance from Albanians of the diaspora and probably from the US government. At the same time a large number of young Albanians joined the KLA. In response to this empowerment of the KLA, in 1998 Serbian forces conducted atrocities not only against the KLA but also against civilians, escalating their activities during 1998 and 1999, causing a major refugee crisis as Albanian civilians fled Kosovo to neighboring countries. KLA counteroffensives begun in the summer 1998; this caused a further increase in violence against civilians by Serbian forces, and atrocities against unarmed citizens were committed by the KLA as well. Diplomatic negotiations were taking place simultaneously with battles and a refugee crisis. The UNHCR later estimated that more than 800,000 Albanians had left their homes, in what seemed as an effort by the Serbian nationalist government to expel Albanians from Kosovo.

In 1999 NATO used the pretext of the dramatic refugee crisis to intervene in support of the KLA, while aiming to get rid of the non-collaborative Milošević government and to solidify US influence in the region. There is no agreement on the number of refugees, nor the number of deaths caused by the war; however, combining the various sources, and taking into account related political interests, one could estimate that more than 12,000 people were killed by Serbian forces, the KLA, and the 78-day NATO air-strikes during the Albanian uprising in Kosovo. The majority were civilians. NATO bombardments also caused extensive infrastructure damage in Kosovo and Serbia, which resulted in large profits for the firms involved in later reconstruction. NATO eventually

forced the Serbian government to abandon Kosovo in 1999.

UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) established a new administration in the province following the peace agreement. However, this chaotic and disturbed period saw not only the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the return of Albanian refugees to almost entirely destroyed villages and towns, but also a large parallel exodus of the Serbian population. The estimated number of these refugees varies from 100,000 (NATO) to 250,000 (Serbian authorities). During UN rule in Kosovo there were numerous cases of mistreatment and harassment of Serbs living within several enclaves by the Albanian population. Such ethnic tensions reached their peak in March 2004 during riots which saw parts of the Serbian cultural heritage in Kosovo destroyed and some 5,000 Serbs displaced. A negotiation process started in 2006 between Albanian representatives and Serbian authorities, but there was a lack of general agreement over the independence of the province. As a result, and cherishing the support of the US and main Western European countries, Kosovo's parliament declared the Republic of Kosovo independent on February 17, 2008. This event signified a milder period for Albanian nationalism in the Balkans.

SEE ALSO: Albania, Socialism; Greece, Socialism, Communism, and the Left, 1850–1974; Greek Nationalism; Young Turks

References and Suggested Readings

- Jelavich, C. (1977) *The Establishment of the Balkan National States: 1804–1920*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Malcolm N. (1998) *Kosovo: A Short History*. New York: New York University Press.
- Marmulaku, R. (1975) *Albania and the Albanians*. London: Hurst.
- Pettifer, J. & Vickers, M. (2007) *The Albanian Question*. London: Tauris.
- Pipa, A. & Repishti, S. (1984) *Studies on Kosova*. New York: Columbia University Press East European Monographs.
- Pollo, S. & Puto, A. (1981) *History of Albania* London: Routledge.
- Puto, A. (1982) *The Albanian Independence and the Diplomacy of Great Powers: 1912–1914*. Tirana: 8 Nëntori (in French and in Albanian).
- Schwandner-Sievers, S. & Fischer, J. (Eds.) (2002) *Albanian Identities*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Skendi, S. (1967) *The Albanian National Awakening 1878–1912*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Albizu Campos, Pedro (1891–1965)

Michael Staudenmaier

Pedro Albizu Campos was the most important figure in the Puerto Rican independence movement during the twentieth century. As leader of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party for more than four decades, he was responsible for a dramatic overhaul in the character of the movement, challenging its respectability and politeness and encouraging the restoration of militant and even armed struggle to a prominent place in its arsenal. He was a gifted theoretician, a skillful organizer, and a renowned orator. In his most famous effort, Albizu Campos coordinated the abortive 1950 insurrection known as the *Grito de Jayuya* (Cry of Jayuya).

Albizu Campos was born into a poor, African-descended (mulatto) family, but his early showing of intellectual promise resulted in a scholarship to attend school in the United States. Between 1913 and 1920 he spent several years at Harvard University, although his time there was broken up by service in an African American battalion of the US army during World War I. While at Harvard he worked closely with Irish republicans, including Eamon de Valera. The multi-faceted struggle for Irish independence, involving armed struggle and legal negotiations, provided inspiration to Albizu Campos in his later efforts in Puerto Rico. Having obtained his law degree from Harvard, he returned to the island, where he initially pursued independence through proposals for a constitutional convention that was to be sanctioned by the United States. Embarrassed by the willingness of other independence activists to capitulate to US demands, Albizu Campos shifted his approach to the struggle. He joined the recently founded Nationalist Party, acting as an international representative for the party throughout Latin America, later becoming its president.

Once in charge of the Nationalist Party Albizu Campos put his militant strategy into practice. He rejected the legitimacy of US rule, while romanticizing the previous era of Spanish domination. He lauded a Puerto Rican identity built on

Spanish heritage and Catholicism. At the same time, he organized across racial and class barriers that had limited the effectiveness of previous independence efforts. He provided support to striking sugar cane workers, while heightening the conflict with the North American-led police force. He also systematically promoted women into leadership roles within the Nationalist Party. By 1935 the party had explicitly affirmed the legitimacy of armed struggle, while pledging to boycott an electoral framework it viewed as inherently colonial.

The next several years saw an escalation of violence between party members and US forces, resulting in Albizu Campos' first prison term in the United States. After serving ten years he returned to the island and immediately began plotting a major uprising for independence. Due to increasing police surveillance and repression the insurrection was rushed into action at the end of October 1950 and was quickly put down. Albizu Campos was again imprisoned and he spent all but a few months of the rest of his life behind bars. While incarcerated he claimed that he was being subjected to radiation experiments, an assertion that was ridiculed by US authorities. He did indeed die of cancer a few months after having been released from prison for humanitarian reasons. Decades later, the US government acknowledged that federal prisoners had been subjected to involuntary radiation experiments during the period of Albizu Campos' incarceration, but his participation in such experiments has never been confirmed.

In death, Albizu Campos has become a reference point for much of the Puerto Rican independence movement, although his methods remain controversial to this day outside radical circles. His legacy includes both the broad affirmation of Puerto Rican identity and the validation of the legitimacy of armed struggle as an option for the independence movement.

SEE ALSO: De Valera, Eamon (1882–1975); Imperialism, Historical Evolution; Irish Nationalism; Puerto Rican Independence Movement, 1898–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Ayala, C. J. & Bernabe, R. (2007) *Puerto Rico in the American Century: A History Since 1898*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Fernandez, R. (1992) *The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United States in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Praeger.

Rosado, M. (1992) *Las llamas de la aurora: acercamiento a una biografía de Pedro Albizu Campos*. Santo Domingo: Corripio.

Wagenheim, K. & Jimenez de Wagenheim, O. (1994) *The Puerto Ricans: A Documentary History*. Princeton: Markus Wiener.

Alcatraz Uprising and the American Indian Movement

Stacy Warner Maddern

From November 20, 1969 to June 11, 1971 a small mix of college activists and urbanites, disenchanted with the US government's economic, social, and political neglect of American Indians, occupied and held Alcatraz Island in San Francisco, California. This event led the American Indian Movement (AIM) to prominence as a revolutionary force for Native American rights. Alcatraz was an ideal place for protesting US disregard for treaties and tribal sovereignty due to the long history of wrongful imprisonment of American Indians there.

After the Civil War, when thousands of emigrants began flooding the West into lands designated for American Indians, conflicts arose and the Indian Wars of the late 1800s began. In order to quell these disputes the US government convicted several American Indians of mutiny and other fabricated crimes, sending them to Alcatraz with some of the worst criminals in the West. In January 1895 the largest group of American Indians, 19 members of the Hopi tribe, was sent to Alcatraz from northern Arizona. Already involved in land disputes with the US government, they had refused to comply with mandatory education programs for their children.

The occupation of Alcatraz was an effort to expose the mistreatment of American Indians during the height of the civil rights era. On November 9, 1969 Richard Oakes, a Mohawk activist, organized a group of American Indian supporters, mostly students he recruited from UCLA, to claim the island as property for "Indians of all Tribes." Oakes, who earlier had played an integral part in developing the American Indian Studies curriculum at San Francisco State University (the first of its kind in the US), believed that American Indians deserved justice and respect and had a right to the land.

On November 20 the protesters landed on the abandoned island and set up housing, a school, and a health clinic in old federal buildings. Soon after, KPFA 94.1 FM, a local listener-supported “free speech radio” station in Berkeley, began broadcasting a feed from the island. The broadcasts could be heard in the San Francisco Bay area and within a year drew mainstream media attention.

The choice of Alcatraz was both strategic and symbolic. Being situated on the site of America’s most infamous prison guaranteed national attention. Alcatraz also served as a symbol of the reservations Indians had been sent to for generations. Like the reservations, Alcatraz was isolated from modern facilities, without adequate means of transportation, and the island had no fresh running water or adequate sanitation facilities, no economic or industrial base, and was designed for a prison population dependent on others.

The occupation of Alcatraz revealed to AIM the power of seizing federal facilities as a means of demonstrating their grievances. In 1970 members seized the *Mayflower II* in Plymouth, Massachusetts and in 1971 occupied the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ offices in Washington. Former Alcatraz “warriors” participated in the Trail of Broken Treaties in 1972 and the infamous “standoff” with FBI officers at Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge Reservation in 1973.

By the end of the 1970s AIM had garnered the tag of the Red Power movement. Serving as a means of protest over injustices to American Indians, Red Power demanded redress across the country and continued to capture attention in the print and broadcast media throughout the decade, but no single event was more significant than the occupation of Alcatraz in serving to seize the nation’s attention.

SEE ALSO: Native American Protest, 20th Century; Peltier, Leonard (b. 1944)

References and Suggested Readings

- Johnson, T. (1996) *The Occupation of Alcatraz Island: Self-Determination and the Rise of Indian Activism*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Johnson, T., Nagel, J., & Champagne, D. (Eds.) (1997) *American Indian Activism: Alcatraz to the Longest Walk*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Smith, P. C. & Warrior, R. A. (1996) *Like a Hurricane: The Indian Movement from Alcatraz to Wounded Knee*. New York: New Press.

Algerian Islamic Salvation Front

Immanuel Ness

The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) is a national political organization that waged a ten-year civil war from 1992 to 2002 against the secular Algerian government, after it was prevented from taking political power through democratic means.

Algeria, the largest country in North Africa, situated on Africa’s northern coast, known as the Maghreb, gained independence from France in 1962 after a 12-year revolutionary liberation struggle. After victory the National Liberation Front (FNL) consolidated power against all other insurgent groups and ruled the country with the support of the military through the 1990s. The economic backdrop to the formation of the FIS and the Algerian Civil War is the imposition of liberal economic reforms that undermined the economy and the emergence of democratic reforms that permitted religious party competition to secular central states. The political shape of liberal democracy in Algeria emerges from the independence era foundation and dominance of the National Liberation Front in national politics and the creation of a secular one-party state. The reforms imposed on Algeria, along with the decline in global oil prices, pushed more working and poor Algerians into poverty. In the late 1980s support for an Islamic fundamentalist party heightened among disillusioned poor and working-class citizens. The FIS emerged as the leading force to challenge the FNL, similar to other countries in North Africa and the Middle East. As prospects for a religious fundamentalist government became stronger in the early 1990s, secular forces and the military annulled religious party participation in elections, leading the way to a decade-long civil war that took the lives of 150,000.

Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism in Algerian Politics

Popular support for the FIS, a fundamental Islamist political party, advanced rapidly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In December 1991 FIS won the first round of a national election. The civil war began when the military annulled the election and outlawed religious fundamentalists

from participating in the government. The FIS formed a guerilla army that conducted a protracted civil war against the secular government until its military defeat in 2002. In the early 1990s the Islamist guerilla forces targeted police and government installations. But in 1994, following the failure of peace talks, the war intensified as the fighting was increasingly directed against secular and fundamentalist Algerian civilians. Increasingly, the military protagonists massacred the residents of entire communities and villages where oppositional sentiment was suspected.

In all, the civil war took the lives of an estimated 150,000 people, the vast majority civilians. As the civil war raged, the Islamist forces fragmented into several factional guerilla wings: the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA), consolidating into the FIS-dominated Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). The leading fundamentalist military opponent to the AIS was the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), itself divided on the question of taking the lives of civilians. In the late 1990s, as the FIS and the AIS were losing militarily to the Algerian military, they intensified the war against civilians. Both the government and the guerillas were implicated as civilians living in the FIS strongholds of Rais and Bentalha in southern Algiers were brutally massacred by guerilla forces. The FIS leadership suggested that the military did not intervene to stop the gruesome mass execution, which drew international condemnation and national popular outrage.

The election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika as president of Algeria in 1999 on the platform of ending the civil war was a major turning point in the conflict. Bouteflika won a subsequent referendum by a landslide majority of the general electorate. Though he had the support of the military, Bouteflika was recognized as a leading figure in the Algerian independence movement and the FNL and was considered to have greater independence from the army than his predecessors. In the next three years Bouteflika urged the guerillas to surrender and established the foundation for peace – a general amnesty for all members of the FIS and AIS guerillas who were charged with committing war crimes. He won over popular sentiment that the war was driving down an economy already shattered by reforms demanded by multilateral economic agencies, lower oil prices, and opening up to foreign competition. To secure greater peace and stability, Bouteflika established the Charter

for Peace and National Reconciliation where aggrieved parties would have the opportunity to convey publicly the brutal atrocities committed by guerillas and soldiers.

The underlying causes of the rise of militant religious fundamentalism in Algeria can be traced directly to the draconian economic reforms imposed on the nation by international economic agencies that created more poverty and hopelessness among the working class and poor. The FIS galvanized widespread opposition to build a party promising to take an autonomous route rather than follow the dictates of global agencies. Ultimately, the failure of the military-backed FNL government to alleviate growing unemployment and the decline in public services drove more Algerians to the FIS.

SEE ALSO: Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962

References and Suggested Readings

- Entelis, J. P. (2000) *The Algerian Civil War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Fanon, F. (1963) *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Press.
- Malley, R. (1996) *Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Call to Islam*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Quandt, W. B. (1998) *Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Stora, B. (2004) *Algeria, 1830–2000: A Short History*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Willis, M. (1996) *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History*. New York: New York University Press.

Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962

Bernard Schmid

Starting in November 1954, Algeria's independence war, mainly known as the Liberation War (French: *guerre de liberation* or Arabic: *harb at-tahrir*), ended in July 1962. It ended after having killed almost 1 million people, most of them Algerian, and the massive utilization of torture by the French army and authorities. The huge number of Algerian victims has to be compared to the figures on the French side where, according to official sources of the French government, some 27,000 soldiers and around 3,000 civilians



Barricades Week during the Battle of Algiers in 1958 in which French military forces sought to defeat the National Liberation Front (FLN). In the liberation war, the FLN struggled to liberate Algeria from French colonialism and establish an independent state. The intensity of French hostility to Algerian independence is depicted here as French citizens display a banner proclaiming “Vive Massu” in support of French Brigadier General Jacques Massu. (© E.C.P.A.D./ France)

died (or disappeared). The relation between Algerian and French (European) victims is about 1 to 30 – and a large majority of the Algerian people wounded or killed in this “dirty war” (*sale guerre*, according to the name its French opponents gave to it) did not wear a uniform.

The result of this war was national independence in combination with an army-based regime whose main aim was national economic development. Since it resulted in independence from French colonial rule, it is also known as the Algerian Revolution. In fact, mass participation in the struggle for independence and the wish for deep social change after the end of colonialism played a very important role on the way to Algeria’s liberation from colonialism – and in that sense, it is correct to name it a revolution. At the same time, the Algerian National Liberation Army (Armée de libération nationale) (ALN) had developed classical military structures and an army-like hierarchy long before it took power in 1962 and formed the base of a regime that became less and less revolutionary and more and more conservative during the following 25 years. So we could say that one part of the Algerian independence war was fought more as a traditional

war (but with very unequal forces) than as a real social revolution, even if it is totally undeniable that the masses’ support for the fight for national independence took an absolutely decisive part into the course of the war.

Before the Outbreak of the Liberation War

The situation in French Algeria before the independence war can be described as a colonial apartheid system, working in a specific way and based on religious criteria. In contrast to the neighboring countries of Morocco and Tunisia, which were considered protectorates and which enjoyed a certain autonomy in their “interior affairs,” Algeria was officially neither a colony nor a protectorate. Instead, it was considered an integral part of the French “mother country” and divided into three French territorial departments: Oran, Algiers, and Constantine. Thus, theoretically, the inhabitants of the whole territory should have been French citizens from the law’s point of view, but the reality was different.

Civil rights were recognized for different ethnic groups under this political system according to their religious belonging. Such rights barely existed for the “lowest” and largest group living in French Algeria – the Muslim Arab and Berber population. The “Christian” group, formed originally by French people but also by other Europeans who had emigrated from Spain, Italy, or Malta, possessed complete civil and political rights, as well as social privileges. It numbered about 1 million people (out of 9 million inhabitants) at the end of the French colonial period, from 1830 to 1962. The second group was Jewish, which consisted of about 140,000 persons by the end of French rule. Many of them were not European immigrants, but were descended from ancestors who had lived in northern Africa. Some were the original inhabitants of the continent (there were Jewish tribes in what became Algeria some 2,500 years ago, and the famous Berber queen Kahina, who fought against the Arab invasion some 1,300 years ago, was probably Jewish), or arrived as refugees to northern Africa after the Catholic *Reconquista* in Spain, which ended in 1492. The French considered the Jews as indigenous to the region, but looked upon the Arab and Berber people as barbarians. They tried to integrate the Jewish population into the structures of European

society. In September 1870 the *Décret Crémieux* – an order of the new republican government that followed the regime of “Emperor” Napoleon III – accorded full citizenship rights to the Algerian Jews, at least at the political level. Social discrimination, however, remained for some decades. In the 1890s, in particular, a violent anti-Semitic, anti-Jewish mass movement took place among the European voters and citizens settling in Algeria, led by the Liges (Leagues, Unions) whose only goal was to obtain discrimination against Jews. This movement was linked to the contemporary anti-Jewish movement in France. It was only in the middle of the 1920s that some social barriers, like the right to be a student in Algiers’ state university, were abolished for Jews.

The majority of Arabs and Berbers – about 8 million of the 9 million people living in Algeria around 1950 – were Muslim. Between 1881 and 1944 these *Musulmans français d’Algérie* were submitted to a special law called the *Code de l’indigénat*, defining the rights and duties of “indigenous” people. Among these rights and obligations was forced labor. There was also a principle of “collective responsibility” (*principe de responsabilité collective*), according to which every member of the “indigenous” group could be punished for a crime committed by another member of this population. Some special “crimes” existed only for Muslim or indigenous people, such as the crime of “making trouble in markets or public places.” In 1944 this “indigenous people’s law” was abolished under the influence of Charles de Gaulle and the National Council of the [French] Resistance, which came to power in France after liberation from occupation. Some Gaullist politicians understood that Algeria could not be stabilized as long as the Arab and Berber majority continued to be so oppressed. Hundreds of thousands of Algerian people had fought in the French army to liberate the mother country from the Nazis and would expect the liberation of their own country in return. In practice, discriminatory rules continued to plague “indigenous” people even after their legal abolition.

The only way for Muslims of Arab or Berber origin to escape their inferior status and become “ordinary citizens” in their own country was to obtain French citizenship. The possibility of becoming “naturalized” was linked to the obligation to “renounce” Islamic civil law, which was officially used by colonial authorities to govern the personal and family circumstances of

all Muslims. This obligation was seen as a sign of “integration” into French, “civilized” society. At the same time, this “naturalization” was only awarded to a small minority of “indigenous” people (primarily those with a high standard of education, such as teachers and pharmacists): perhaps some 60,000 persons in total. Very few Muslims could gain access to a good education via the public school system: when the independence war started, there were about 4,000 European students learning in Algiers’ university, but only some 100 “indigenous.” The school system generally oriented “indigenous” pupils to “hand work” (instead of “mind work”) professions, preparing them only for unskilled work in agriculture.

At first, this group had no right to vote, and when a so-called right of vote was granted to them, Arabs and Berbers had to elect their representatives in a separate voters’ group for “indigenous” people (*collège électoral indigène*). In the 1920s and 1930s this second voters’ group only had the right to elect a minority of local representatives, and the right to vote was only recognized for members of this special voters’ group on a local level – they not could participate in elections for the governor of Alger, for example. Later, beginning in the mid-1940s, theoretically the two voters’ groups had the same collective rights, and each of them could elect the same number of representatives; however, their numbers were very unequal, with “indigenous” or “Muslim” voters comprising the great majority. “Indigenous” people could then also have one part of Algeria’s representatives in the French national parliament. Even these limited rights, however, were not respected by the French colonial lobby and the local administration, which represented much more the interests of European settlers than those of the whole population. In 1951 the results of local elections were strongly manipulated, preventing the political representatives of the Algerian national or independence movement – and even its “most moderate” wing – from choosing the “institutional way” to work for their goals. The result was a radicalization that led to the independence movement.

Independence Movement

The Algerian independence movement started in 1936–7 with the creation first of the North

African Star (Etoile nord-africaine) (ENA), a movement born in French emigration, and one year later the Algerian People's Party (Parti du peuple algérien) (PPA) under the direction of Messali Hadj. The ENA movement had grown up in the milieu of the French Communist Party (Parti communiste français) (PCF). The PCF had been a radically anti-colonial party, especially between 1924 and 1934, when it supported the Moroccan Abdelkrim uprising against French and Spanish colonialism and denounced the "Colonial Exposition" in Paris in 1931. However, in the mid-1930s the PCF distanced itself from the search for independence under pressure from its social base in the "white" European working class within Algerian colonial society, and also because of its new alliance with the Social Democratic Party in the Popular Front which came to power in May 1936. As a result of this new PCF orientation, the leaders of the Algerian national movement kept their own distance from the French left and labor movement. At the same time, the Algerian Communist Party (Parti Communiste Algérien) (PCA), founded in 1936 as a formally independent party but under the control of the French PCF, remained for a long time a colonial party of the white working class. Until the end of the 1940s it was rather hostile toward the aims of the anti-colonial and independence movement and tried to incorporate the social problems the anti-colonialists denounced (those of the "indigenous" population) into a general class struggle – led by white communist and trade union leaders.

The PPA, founded in 1937, adopted a "populist" vision (according to the analysis of Mohammed Harbi, an Algerian historian who was also a leader of the Algerian national movement) and aspired to be the sole legitimate representative of the whole Algerian people. This was founded on the idea that all Algerians were suffering from colonial oppression and that this was much stronger than the tensions between social classes. One part of the Algerian national movement wanted to use the idea of Islam (of which it had a rather vague conception, since there was no real teaching of Islamic theology or the Arab language in Algerian colonial society) to unify Algerians. As the Arabs and Berbers were the most oppressed, and as they were at the same time officially defined by the system as Muslims, the link between the struggle for justice and Islam seemed quite natural in the eyes of some leaders.

Others in the PPA had ideas about the struggle for justice and independence much nearer to a traditional socialist or communist class-based concept, but in application to the specific situation of a colonial society.

In the late 1940s the PPA (illegal under French authority) founded two satellite organizations in order to follow different strategic aims. The Movement for the Victory of Democratic Rights (Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques) (MTLD), born in 1947, was created as the legal front organization for the illegal PPA, in order to enable the party to run candidates in elections. The Special Organization (Organisation spéciale) (OS), founded in 1948–9, would serve to prepare for armed struggle. These organizations coexisted for some months, but the OS was finally discovered and destroyed by the French colonial police force. The electoral way was also closed to the anti-colonial movement when the local elections of 1951 were openly manipulated by the colonial lobby. This took away from the legalist wing of the MTLD its hopes of institutionalization by denying it the seats it had won in local assemblies.

In 1953–4 the international situation seemed to push the anti-colonialists into action. Political troubles took place in Morocco and Tunisia, occupying the forces of the French colonial state for some months. More importantly, the French colonial war in Indochina (the future Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) was coming to its end – the French army was definitively defeated in Dien-Bien-Phu in May 1954. For some of the anti-colonial activists, the time to react was now or never: the French state was weakened by its defeat in Southeast Asia, but soon it would bring home the troops remaining in Indochina and send them to North Africa, whereupon it might be too late to start a successful action.

The PPA's direction imploded into several political groups following different strategies and orientations. Its main leader, Messali Hadj, asked for greater power to be concentrated into his hands. The party's Central Committee was divided about this. When the whole party seemed paralyzed by the internal conflict, a small group of young activists started to prepare itself for action. The group, which began with 33 members, gave itself a new name in an assembly held on October 23, 1954: the National Liberation Front (Front de libération nationale) (FLN). It also created a military wing, the National

Liberation Army (Armée de libération nationale) (ALN). In the beginning it consisted of guerilla fighters, nine leaders (three of whom lived in exile in Cairo), some fantasy uniforms, and only 349 guns. Still, it was with this very small instrument that the Algerian anti-colonialist movement started its independence war on the night of November 1, 1954.

Liberation War

On a strictly military level, the events of November 1, 1954 were not all that important. Direct military confrontation with the French colonial state remained rather limited. However, the political and psychological impact was much bigger. Under cover of darkness, attacks against public buildings (such as the radio station and the oil and gas factory of Algiers), military barracks and police stations, and bridges and central traffic points were organized in 30 different locations. The civil population did not constitute a target for the rebels and generally remained unconcerned, but in an attack on a bus near the town of Lakhdaria a married couple of French teachers was accidentally hit by stray bullets and the woman died.

After the first wave of attacks, when the night dubbed Red All-Holy (*la Toussaint rouge*) by French magazines was over, the French decided to negotiate and find some kind of compromise with the Algerian anti-colonial forces. Compromise or not, they wanted to see the ALN banned as “terrorists.” Thus, they needed to isolate it from other political forces, so the French government in Paris agreed to under-take some reforms. Without minor concessions, the French realized, the colonial system would be condemned, and the masses would sooner or later join the rebels, or at least support their struggle.

The French government replaced the governor of Algiers, Roger Léonard, with the more liberal Jacques Soustelle. On March 28, 1955 the new governor of Algeria met with a delegation representing different Algerian movements, mainly the Union for the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA) around the pharmacist Ferhat Abbas. This group represented the well-educated Algerian elite, who were willing to accept reforms and a legal way to get out of colonialism. Also at the meeting was the Ulema, made up mostly of the conservative Muslim priesthood. The meeting, however, was unsuccessful. A

reactionary settlers’ lobby, speaking in the name of European populations established in Algeria, but especially of big farmers and landowners, blocked all efforts at compromise. Then, on April 3, the French parliament in Paris adopted a new Emergency Law permitting massive repressive measures and violations of human rights in the name of preserving public order. The way was open to bitter confrontation.

On August 20 a peasants’ revolt provoked by the FLN and its army took place in the Nord-Constantinois, the region between north-eastern Algeria’s main city Constantine and the Mediterranean Sea. Thousands of peasants armed with very old weapons and simple wooden sticks, crying for revenge after decades of humiliation, exploitation, and marginalization, attacked public buildings and European settlers and their farms. About seventy civilians from the European population were killed. The French reaction to the revolt was harsh. Within a few days about 12,000 Algerian civilians were killed in massive bombing attacks by the French army. After a week of bloody and extremely brutal repression, any compromise had become impossible, and all other Algerian anti-colonialist forces started to join the FLN as the most radical opposition force against colonial power.

In March 1956 Algerian Communist Party combatants joined the ALN in the underground. Before that date, the party had its own armed force, the Fighters of Liberation (Combattants de la libération) (CDL), but it was entirely destroyed by the French army. After that date, members of the party serving with the French army went over to the ALN, bringing trucks and munitions with them. On July 1 the rest of the CDL was officially integrated into the ALN. In the same period, members of the Ulema started to support or to join the ALN. Before that time, they had accepted French rule on a political level but claimed “cultural autonomy” on domestic religious affairs. Now, they explained that the colonial system was no longer acceptable, and some started to describe the struggle of the FLN/ALN as a kind of holy war. The reformist current around the UDMA of Ferhat Abbas, until now a partisan of the legal way to get out of the colonial system, also joined the struggle of the FLN/ALN after the summer of 1956. Abbas’s nephew had been assassinated by the FLN in Constantine, in order to “warn” Abbas, but what brought him into the alliance was actually the

political polarization between the colonial power and the FLN/ALN. He chose the FLN within which to begin a political career. In 1962 he would become the first parliamentary president in independent Algeria, under the FLN regime.

In October and November 1956, in the valley of the Summam River, in the heart of the Kabylie (Algeria's main Berber region), there took place the first real congress of the FLN. It confirmed the participation of a wide range of political forces, from the communists to the Ulema, in the new FLN. The congress also confirmed the Front's aspiration to be a single party as the only force able to claim to be the legitimate representative of the whole Algerian people. The congress also affirmed that, once national independence was won, there would be a place for free competition between different political forces, as well as political and social pluralism. The congress adopted a progressive social program (even if ideas about the role of Algerian woman remained rather traditionalist), in large part written by former communists. One result of the congress was that the FLN accepted the principle of political control by civilians.

In the winter of 1956–7 the FLN started the Battle of Algiers (*la bataille d'Alger*) by destroying the French colonial power's capital. This included an appeal to mass action like strikes, but also the use of terrorist methods such as bombs detonated in public places frequented by European civilians. The FLN's aim in using such methods was to end the war as quickly as possible by creating panic within the European population. The result was quite the opposite: the FLN was basically destroyed in Algeria's main region as a result of repression and its own strategic mistakes. This created a kind of panic within the military hierarchy of the NLA, which decided to "purify" its organization of "spies and suspect elements." An atmosphere of paranoia was created and spread by the French colonial army's psychological service, which made believe to the FLN that it was massively infiltrated by French agents (which was not true). At that time, the process of real militarization of the FLN/ALN began. The civilian population still supported (probably more than ever) the national liberation forces as their only salvation, but in terms of its interior structures the FLN/ALN had become more and more a movement similar to a classical army.

Around 1960 the liberation army fighting the French colonial power was in large part

dismantled. There still remained some guerilla forces, especially in Kabylie, but the principal organization of the FLN/ALN had become the Frontiers Army (*Armée des frontières*), the part of the ALN that remained at the borders of Morocco and Tunisia and was composed of Algerian refugees living in camps in those two countries. The Frontiers Army was much more organized as a classical army, consisting mainly of Algerians who were former officers in the French colonial armed forces. Some joined the rebel forces out of conviction, but others, though successful in the French army, believed that in an independent Algeria they would be able to occupy much higher places than they ever could in France.

Interior guerilla forces, however, were much more improvised. One non-traditional tactic was the recruitment of women combatants, a new thing in Algerian society. Some 2,000 girls and women joined these forces, if not serving in combat, at least working as nurses or doctors. They were supplied with arms mainly to ensure their own protection. This was a very important step toward the liberation of Algerian women.

By the time of Algeria's liberation, interior guerilla forces had some 5,000 to 10,000 combatants, and the Frontiers Army had some 35,000 to 40,000 soldiers. It never really did fight the French army on the battlefield, partly because France had placed mines and electric fences on the borders between Algeria and Morocco and Tunisia in order to prevent all passage of combatants to Algerian territory. This made it very difficult to cross the border, even after the late 1950s.

The French colonial power did not lose the war on the battlefield but on a political level. It was impossible to win the hearts and minds of the Algerian people. There was also international pressure on France. The US, just like the USSR, did not tolerate the maintenance of traditional colonial powers like France and Britain in its quest for world power. The international competition of the Cold War placed France (and Britain) under the "friendly pressure" of its own allies, at the same time that its brutal methods were condemned in UN assemblies. Last but not least, there was real opposition within French society, especially from the left, against the pursuit of the war. Though its resistance was tepid at first, the French Communist Party eventually adopted forthright opposition to the war, even if



The National Liberation Front (FLN) was the leading anti-colonial socialist political party in Algeria during the independence struggle against France. Here female members of the FLN gather at a rally on June 27, 1962. The FLN waged a revolutionary war with France and was seen as an archetype of anti-colonial resistance against imperialism around the world from the 1950s to the 1970s. (Getty Images)

it never clearly supported the independence fighters. Radical opposition to the war was also supported by some progressive forces: anarchists and “anti-authoritarian communists” (communists libertaires), Trotskyists, and the Unified Socialist Party (PSU), created in the late 1950s by dissidents of the communist and socialist parties. There were also left-wing Christians who were very active in denouncing the use of torture and racism in French colonized North Africa, grouped around the magazine *Témoignage Chrétien* (Christian Witness). A majority of the UNEF, France’s students’ union, also supported the Algerian independence struggle.

De Gaulle made a political calculation: it would be better to sacrifice European settlers’ and landowners’ interests in North Africa and accept Algeria’s independence, in exchange for access to Algerian petrol and gas reserves. France also expected to be able to continue its nuclear and chemical weapons tests in the Algerian Sahara – and those tests continued until 1972. However, control of Algerian petrol and gas reserves did not materialize, and on February 8, 1971 Algeria decided to nationalize those reserves.

On March 19, 1962, after the Evian Agreements (*Accords d’Evian*), a ceasefire was begun.

July 5, 1962 became the day of Algeria’s independence – 132 years after the French conquest of Algiers on July 5, 1830.

SEE ALSO: Francophone Africa, Protest and Independence; Morocco, Protests, 1600s–1990s

References and Suggested Readings

- Fanon, F. (2001) *L’An V de la Révolution Algérienne*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Harbi, M. (1975) *Aux origines du FLN: Le populisme révolutionnaire en Algérie*. Paris: Bourgois.
- Harbi, M. (1980) *Le F.L.N., mirage et réalité. Des origines à la prise du pouvoir (1945–1962)*. Paris: Éditions Jeune Afrique.
- Harbi, M. & Meynier, G. (2004) *Le FLN, documents et histoire 1954–1962*. Paris: Fayard.
- Jackson, H. F. (1977) *The FLN in Algeria: Party Development in a Revolutionary Society*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.
- McDougall, J. (2006) *History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meynier, G. (2002) *Histoire intérieure du FLN (1954–1962)*. Paris: Fayard.
- Naylor, P. (2000) *France and Algeria: A History of Decolonization and Transformation*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
- Pattieu, S. (2002) *Les Camarades des frères. Trotskyistes et libertaires dans la guerre d’Algérie*. Paris: Editions Syllepse.
- Schmid, B. (2006) *Das koloniale Algerien*. Münster: Unrast.
- Sivan, E. (1976) *Communisme et nationalisme en Algérie (1920–1962)*. Paris: FNSP.
- Stora, B. (1993) *Histoire de la guerre d’Algérie (1954–1962)*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Vidal-Naquet, P. (1972). *La Torture dans la république*. Paris: La Découverte.

Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana

Gabriel Cabrera M.

The Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) was originally a continent-wide political front that worked to unify all the oppressed social sectors in Latin America that fought against imperialist domination, and thus to advance their liberation and political and economic union. It was founded in May 1924 by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, a Peruvian politician and

student leader. A few years after its foundation, APRA converted from a front to a party organization, becoming the Partido Aprista Peruano (Peruvian Aprista Party), although it continued to be known as APRA. Even though initially the Aprista Party had revolutionary tendencies, it gradually came to be defined as social democratic and in practice adopted a liberal approach.

Born in the northern Peruvian city of Trujillo, Haya de la Torre worked to unite student, labor, and peasants' movements in his region and throughout the country. As a result of his organizing activity, he was exiled in 1923. His subsequent journeys through several countries affirmed his anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic viewpoints. In May 1924, he and other exiles founded APRA in Mexico City during a public act with leaders of the Students' Federation of Mexico. APRA was defined as a Unique International Front of manual and intellectual workers and adopted a common program of political action, based on five fundamental principles: political action against imperialism, political and economic union in Latin America, progressive nationalization of lands and industries, internationalization of the Panama Canal, and solidarity with all oppressed peoples and classes of the world.

APRA had a strong influence in many trade unions and political and popular organizations over the continent, especially in Central America and the Caribbean. Nevertheless, in 1928, Haya de la Torre decided from Paris to convert the alliance into a party – without consulting APRA members. He initially formed the Partido Nacionalista Libertador (Nationalist Liberation Party), then the Peruvian Aprista Party. This led political leaders like José Carlos Mariátegui, who had been part of APRA while it was a broad front, to leave the organization.

Through the Aprista Party, Haya de la Torre presented his political theories. He proposed an understanding of the Latin American reality according to a “historical space-time” theory, which according to its particular economic and social development was different from the European experience. He maintained that the most pressing task was to fight imperialism, the main cause of Latin American countries' oppression, and to subordinate other social contradictions such as class antagonisms within each nation. For this purpose an “anti-imperialist state” had to be constructed by means of a multi-class party in which the middle class led the new

state, followed by the workers and peasants. This approach thus distanced APRA from Marxist socialism in Peru and abroad. To illustrate its differential stance, the group adopted the slogan “Neither with Washington nor with Moscow.”

APRA attempted to attain power, but was electorally proscribed or persecuted by the political sectors representing the oligarchy. The rank and file of the party conducted significant popular uprisings, such as a 1932 revolt in Trujillo or the 1948 uprising in Callao Port. The group's leaders, however, veered toward more moderate positions and finally assumed rightist attitudes, even approaching the US government during the periods 1956–62, 1963–8, and during its opposition to the Velasco regime (1968–75). In these periods the Aprista Party built an alliance and connived with its former enemies, even obstructing attempts by other political actors to proceed with the reforms Apristas had originally fought for.

In 1985, after the death of Haya, APRA acceded to the presidency for the first time through its young leader, Alan García Pérez. Even though the Aprista government initially attempted some moderate reforms to generate a less dependent economy, it soon turned to right-wing politics. On the other hand, with the guerilla war intensifying, García opted to intensify the state's dirty war, inherited from the previous government, leading to thousands of deaths. In 2006, after the collapse of the Fujimori dictatorship (1992–2000), García was reelected president through an alliance with the right. In this period APRA adopted the neoliberal model that Fujimori had initiated.

SEE ALSO: Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl (1895–1979); Mariátegui, José Carlos (1894–1930); Peru, Armed Insurgency and the Dirty War, 1980–1990; Peru, Neoliberalism and Social Mobilization, 1990s–2000s; Peru, “People's War,” Counterinsurgency, and the Popular Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Cotler, J. (1978) Leguía: consolidación de la dominación imperialista y emergencia de las fuerzas populares antioligárquicas. In *Clases, estado y nación en el Perú*, 4th ed. Lima: IEP Press, pp. 185–226.
- Cragnolino, S. (1984) *Haya de la Torre el indoamericanismo en América Latina*. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina.
- Haya de la Torre, V. (1982) *El antiimperialismo y el APRA*. Lima: Chan Chan Press. Available at www.antimperialismo.tripod.com/id28.html.

Jiménez, C. (2008) El Estado aprista y el Estado Revolucionario. Los límites del proyecto nacionalista burgués. *Cuadernos para la Emancipación* 32 (March): 29–32. Caracas: Fundación Emancipación por la Unidad de América Latina y el Caribe.

Alinsky, Saul (1909–1972) and the Industrial Areas Foundation

Benjamin J. Pauli

Born in Chicago to Russian Jewish immigrants, Saul Alinsky was the leading tactician of community organizing in his day. As a student in the University of Chicago's cutting-edge sociology department in the early 1930s, Alinsky's fieldwork brought him into close contact with the crime and poverty of the inner city, and he began to develop an understanding of the influence of the environment on individual behavior. The anti-delinquency projects of the Institute for Juvenile Research provided him with a jumping-off point for a career as an organizer that would span more than three decades. Alinsky began his activist career by successfully laboring to forge the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council, a very unlikely alliance of the local union, the church, and the community, in the Chicago slum infamously portrayed by Upton Sinclair in *The Jungle*. In 1940 he founded the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), an umbrella organization to oversee the inception of new campaigns across the country. Alinsky's other notable victories would include the organization of the African American ghetto Woodlawn in South Chicago in 1959, and a high-profile battle in the mid-1960s with the Eastman Kodak company in Rochester, New York that pioneered the tactic of stockholder activism. In 1969 Alinsky and his right-hand man Ed Chambers established a training institute for organizers, which versed up-and-coming activists in Alinsky's unique philosophy of social engagement.

Alinsky's self-professed radicalism was primarily tactical, as laid out in two books at the beginning and end of his career, respectively: *Reveille for Radicals* and *Rules for Radicals*. Heavily influenced by John L. Lewis and the strategies he observed among Congress of Industrial

Organizations (CIO) organizers, he embraced conflict and controversy as necessary means to social change, repudiating the conciliatory and moralistic approach of moderate liberals, which ultimately depended on the charity of the oppressor, in favor of realistic power politics. He believed that organizers should enter a community only upon request and stay only as long as was necessary to establish community organizations and provide the locals with the tools to maintain them. Employing a wide array of confrontational and often flamboyant methods, Alinsky always attempted to reveal to people the fruits that could be gained by the power of collective action, beginning with low-level, winnable victories and using the momentum to initiate more taxing, sustained efforts.

Though he was sometimes labeled by detractors as such, Alinsky was never a socialist. To the end of his life he remained eminently pragmatic and focused on helping the underprivileged to get what they wanted, whatever that happened to be. His methods were, however, linked to a broader belief in the potential of American democracy and an emphasis on the need for action on the part of ordinary citizens who could, with a little coaxing from experienced organizers, take their destiny into their own hands. Indeed, Alinsky envisioned himself as one in a long line of American radicals leading back to Tom Paine. Alinsky died suddenly of a heart attack in 1972, leaving the IAF under the guidance of Ed Chambers.

SEE ALSO: Sinclair, Upton (1878–1968); US Labor Rebellions and the Rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)

References and Suggested Readings

- Alinsky, S. (1989) *Reveille for Radicals*. New York: Vintage.
 Alinsky, S. (1989) *Rules for Radicals*. New York: Vintage.
 Finks, P. D. (1984) *The Radical Vision of Saul Alinsky*. New York: Paulist Press.
 Horwitt, S. D. (1992) *Let Them Call Me Rebel: Saul Alinsky – His Life and Legacy*. New York: Vintage.

Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973)

Héctor Guerra Hernández

Salvador Allende Gossens was president of Chile from 1970 until the putsch led by General Augusto Pinochet on September 11, 1973. Allende

died that day in the “Palacio de la Moneda,” which was bombed by the rebels.

From an early age, Allende recognized the contradictions of the times. During his adolescence he studied anarchist thought and was a friend of Juan Demarchi, a carpenter of Italian origin who instructed him in the Chilean social question. He participated in the Socialist Republic of Marmaduke Grove in 1932 and acted as a co-founder of the Socialist Party of Chile in 1933. A medical student of middle-class origins, he was a member of groups with left tendencies during his college years.

He began his political career by participating in the parliamentary election of 1937 and being chosen deputy by Valparaiso. He then served as minister of health in the cabinet of Pedro Aguirre Cerdá between 1939 and 1942. From that point he became the unquestionable leader of the socialist party. In 1952, 1958, and 1962 he presented himself for the presidential elections. On the first occasion he was temporarily expelled from the party due to the fact that he accepted communist support after the party was outlawed. He won on his fourth attempt. In 1958, with socialist and communist support, he was elected second after Jorge Alessandri.

In 1964 Eduardo Frei Montalva advocated a program of “revolution in freedom” and defeated Allende with 56.9 percent of the vote to Allende’s 38.9 percent. The new program, an attempt to modify the fundamental structures of the country in a frame of democracy while respecting the institutional order, included agrarian reform, a program seeking to advance participation of the middle classes, Chilenization of copper by state control of mining benefits, and educational reform. The parliamentary elections of 1969 showed the new political situation of the country by defining the so-called “unreconciled third,” highlighting the diminution of support for the political center and the strengthening of the right and left options. This situation was to be reflected with even greater clarity in the presidential elections of 1970, marked by the opposition of competing projects for society that were impossible to reconcile. Through those projects, a victorious coalition called the Popular Unit emerged, headed by Allende, with 36.3 percent of the vote. The group won because of the narrow margin between the votes received by the other two candidates, Jorge Alessandri on the right and Radomiro Tomic of the Christian Democratic Party. Allende’s election had to be

ratified by the congress, where he met with strong opposition, but finally, on October 24, 1970, after obtaining the support of the Christian Democratic Party by signing a Statute of Democratic Guarantees, Allende was proclaimed president.

Allende was a man of his word. A staunch defender of the working class, he believed that socialism had to be constructed to conform to Chilean reality, not modeled according to a pre-established foreign framework. For these reasons he disagreed with the Cuba of Fidel Castro and the positions of the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, MIR), which was waiting for an opportune moment to arm the population and begin social transformations outside of its respected institutions. During his three years of government, however, Allende never doubted the correctness of his agenda, and his consistency led even his strongest opponents, on both the left and the right, to show him respect.

SEE ALSO: Chile and the Peaceful Road to Socialism; Chile, Popular Resistance against Pinochet; Chile, Protests and Military Coup, 1973

References and Suggested Readings

- Angell, A. (1993) *Chile de Alessandri a Pinochet: en busca de la utopía*. Santiago: Editorial Andrés Bello.
- Dinamarca, M. (1987) *La República Socialista Chilena: orígenes legítimos del Partido Socialista*. Santiago: Ediciones Documentas.
- Goldenberg, G. (1990) *La Muerte del presidente Allende*. Santiago: Ediciones Domicilio Conocido.
- Puccio, O. (1985) *Un Cuarto de siglo con Allende: recuerdos de su mayordomo privado*. Santiago: Editorial Antártica.
- Rivas, M. & Merino, R. (1997) *Qué hacía yo el 11 de septiembre?* Santiago: Ediciones LOM.
- Rocha, J. G. (2001) *Allende, masón: la visión de un profano*. Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana.
- Torres, I. (1974) *Chile, de Allende a la Junta Militar*. Caracas: Editorial Síntesis Dos Mil.

al-Sanusi, Muhammad ibn Ali (ca. 1787–1859)

Andrew J. Waskey

The al-Sanusi (Senussi), called *sanusyyia* in Arabic, is a Sufi order founded by Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanusi, who was born near Mustaghanim in Algeria. The Sanusyyia movement was an Islamic reform movement like the Wahhabi of Arabia and

the Mahdist movement of Sudan. Organized into a brotherhood (*tariqa*), the Sanusyyia method of reform sought to renew devotion to Islam by emphasis upon spiritual experiences. The call for renewal of an Islamic life became a militant mystical movement that was also a call to oppose western colonialism. The expansion of the French into North Africa was resisted by several elements. These included many desert tribes, traditional rulers, and the al-Sanusi.

In 1837 al-Sanusi founded the Sanusyyia at Mt. Abu Qubais near Mecca. Six years later he returned to North Africa, settling in Jabal Akhdar in Cyrenaica. In the mountainous fastness of the area he founded a center of operations at al-Beida in 1843 with the organization of the al-Sanusi Sufi lodge and built the Zawiya al-Baida (White Monastery).

Leadership of the al-Sanusi passed to Muhammad al-Mahdi upon al-Sanusi's death in 1859. As the Grand Sanusi, Muhammad al-Mahdi expanded the brotherhood along the Saharan caravan routes. In 1895 the al-Sanusi moved their main lodge to the oasis of Kufra and afterward to the oasis of Qiru in the central Sahara in 1899. These oases were located along Saharan caravan routes. By 1900 the al-Sanusi movement had spread out of eastern Libya across thousands of miles of the Sahara Desert to many oases and desert towns. The trained Sufi brothers that the al-Sanusi lodges sent out were welcomed as men who were learned in Islamic law and could teach and be judges in disputes.

Prior to the outbreak of World War I the nominal rulers of North Africa were the Ottoman Sultans. However, the al-Sanusi brothers were able by their spiritual influence to be an independent force in the Sahara. The al-Sanusi brotherhood, leaders of the lodges, and their followers among the tribal warriors constituted a significant military force that would fight in a jihad with the hope of martyrdom against great odds. In 1911 the al-Sanusi joined the Turks in their war against the Italian attempt to colonize Tunisia and Libya. The Italo-Turkish War (1911–12) was fought by the al-Sanusi and other traditional tribal leaders. Successful in a number of actions, they were able to increase their supply of war materiel. To aid the al-Sanusi the Ottoman Empire sent officers who provided modern military training in order to increase al-Sanusi combat effectiveness. One of the officers was Nuri Pasha, half-brother of Enver Pasha. Another was Ottoman-Iraqi General Ja'afar al Askari. This

helped them to resist the Italians, so much so that while by 1914 most of western North Africa was controlled by the French and Italians, Cyrenaica was still not colonized.

The Italians were handed a serious defeat on August 26, 1914 when a supply column was captured. Thousands of rifles and ammunition were captured. Several larger guns as well as other supplies were also taken. Most of the Italians in the supply train were killed. Now well armed and organized, the al-Sanusi invaded Egypt in November 1915, probably at the behest of the Turks, but the exact reason is not known. The move was a disaster. On February 26, 1916 they were defeated at Aqqaqir. The British, using armored cars and massed firepower, drove the al-Sanusi from the field. At a critical moment in the battle General Ja'afar was wounded and captured. The surviving al-Sanusi fighters were driven back into Libya where they continued to harass the Italians and French until the end of the war.

In Darfur in 1916 Sultan 'Ali Dinar, who was influenced by the al-Sanusi, joined them in resisting the British. His Fur army was defeated at the Battle of Beringia (May 1916) and he was killed at Juba (Giubu) on November 6, 1916 in a final action. Although defeated militarily, al-Sanusi influence continued. When Libya gained its independence Sayyid Muhammad Idris bin Sayyid Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi, the grandson of Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanusi and head of the Sanusi Sufi lodge, was crowned king.

SEE ALSO: Mahdist Revolt; Qadaffi, Muammar al- (b. 1942); Sudanese Protest Under Anglo-Egyptian Rule

References and Suggested Readings

- Abbott, G. F. (1986) *The Holy War in Tripoli*. London: Darf.
- Childs, T. W. (1990) *Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War Over Libya, 1911–1912*. New York: E. J. Brill.
- Vikor, K. S. (1995) *Sufi and Scholar on the Desert Edge: Muhammad b. 'Ali al-Sanusi and his Brotherhood*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Alves, Margarida Maria (1943–1983)

Fabiana de Cássia Rodrigues

Margarida Maria Alves was born in Alagoa Grande in the state of Paraíba, Brazil. From a rural area, she battled for workers' and women's

rights. In 1973, she was elected the first woman president of Alagoa Grande trade union and served in this position for ten years. During this period, she took owners of sugar factories and big landholders to court over labor rights, fighting for such things as an eight-hour workday and legal vacations. At that time, in the 1980s, a National Agrarian Reform Plan was created, and violence in the countryside increased. In this context, a masked gunman murdered Alves on August 12, 1983, in front of her house, in the presence of her husband and children. The assailant escaped, and the crime remains unpunished. Alves has been nationally recognized as a symbol in the struggle for agrarian reform and women's rights. A human rights foundation has been named for her, and her motto is well known: "Better to die fighting than starving."

SEE ALSO: Brazil, Labor Struggles; Brazil, Workers and the Left: Partido dos Trabalhadores and Central Única dos Trabalhadores

References and Suggested Readings

Comissão Pastoral da Terra (2008) *As mártires da Terra*. Available at www.cptnac.com.br/?system=news&eid=16 (downloaded April 20, 2008).

Amana Inspirationist Utopians

Richard Goff

One of the more enduring utopian communities is the Community of True Inspiration. Comparable to the Shakers and Hutterites in longevity, their teachings have existed for nearly 300 years, their communal society existed 85 years, and their legacy continues in the form of the Amana Church and Amana Society, Inc. (Amana Refrigeration). Akin to the Rappites, the Community of True Inspiration traces its origins to eighteenth-century Pietism. In the 1840s, Christian Metz, a Pietist leader, motivated by divine prophecy, resolved to migrate to America. Metz, along with approximately 700 others, settled near Buffalo, New York, and called their new home Ebenezer.

Upon their settlement, the congregation chose to adopt a communal economic organization. The decision in some respects was pragmatic. Fearful of persecution, creating a large unified

community made sense. Additionally, knowledge of English was severely limited, so living with other German speakers seemed practical. Theological considerations were also important. Modeling themselves after the apostolic community was consistent with their Christian and Pietist beliefs.

The community in Ebenezer developed quickly, blending agriculture and industry. Within a few years they had four villages, each with communal kitchens, residences, churches, workshops, and farms. Additionally, the group had woolen mills, a calico print mill, two grist mills, and an oil mill. Many of the citizens practiced highly skilled trades, including carpentry, masonry, watchmaking, and tanning. The sudden growth spurt combined with the expansion of nearby Buffalo prompted leaders to reevaluate their location. In 1864 the community picked up stakes and moved their 1,300 members just west of Iowa City, renaming their community Amana. The new community was modeled after Ebenezer. They established seven villages, each with residential units, a store, a school, communal kitchens, and shops, and with each specializing in different trades, including farming, woolen production, flour milling, and sawmilling.

Although property was owned communally, the society functioned in an almost corporate fashion, emphasizing efficiency. Economic and social affairs were governed by a Great Council elected by voting members (men over 21, women over 30). Daily operations and decisions were made by managers and smaller councils appointed by the Great Council. Education ended at the 8th grade for most, but in some cases continued for those seeking specialized jobs. Job opportunities for women were relatively limited, confined to domestic work. Job rotation was unusual and sons typically followed their fathers into trades. Daily life was governed by numerous regulations regarding dress, dining habits, and general behavior. Sexual restraint was a central value and intercourse was only to exist within the confines of marriage. Even marriage was viewed solemnly, as newlyweds suffered demotion within the community and couples with large families were viewed negatively.

The relatively strict rules and apparent double-standards generated discontent in the early 1900s. With increased economic development and the availability of new consumer items, certain professionals and some elders received

material privileges such as “fancy” clothes and automobiles based on their supposed necessity. These factors, along with the limited educational and job opportunities, contributed to members’ growing apostasy.

Faced with a declining population and economic problems due to the Great Depression, Amana’s Great Council offered all members the chance to “reorganize” the community in 1931. As a result of the vote, the Council severed the church from the business operations and created a joint-stock corporation in place of the communal ownership. Both organizations continue to exist and Amana remains a thriving community.

SEE ALSO: Cooperative Commonwealth; Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony; Icaria Utopian Community; New Harmony; Oneida Perfectionist Utopians; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Shakers Utopian Community; Utopian Communities, United States; Utopian Intentional Communities; Wright, Frances “Fanny” (1795–1852)

References and Suggested Readings

- Foster, L. (1981) *Religion and Sexuality: Three American Communal Experiments of the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Oved, Y. (1988) *Two Hundred Years of American Communes*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Sutton, R. P. (2004) *Communal Utopias and the American Experience*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Ambedkar, B. R. (1891–1956)

Debi Chatterjee

Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, a defender of civil rights social justice for the lowest-caste Dalit (Untouchables) in India, was born on April 14, 1891, at the Military Headquarters of War near Indore. A son of Subedar Ramji Sakpal and Bhimabai, he hailed from a Hindu, untouchable Mahar family. As such, from an early age Ambedkar had experienced much of the social hazards which go with untouchability. Bhimrao married Ramabai at the age of 17.

Education and Influences

Through financial assistance received from the Maharaja of Baroda, Ambedkar was able to graduate from Elphinstone College (1905–12), spend

three years at Columbia University (1913–16), and one year at the London School of Economics (1916–17). He was awarded an M.Sc. degree in 1921 for his thesis “Provincial Decentralization of Imperial Finance in British India.” In 1922 he submitted another dissertation, “The Problem of the Rupee,” for which he later managed to get a D.Sc degree from London University. He was called to the Bar in 1923.

Ambedkar’s father was a follower of Sant Kabir, a ruthless critic of the Hindu Brahminical order. At the same time he had great reverence for the traditional Hindu texts such as the Ramayana and Mahabharata. Ambedkar was early exposed to these diverse influences. He also had an early exposure to the teachings of Buddha. The western impact, particularly that of John Dewey, Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman, Goldenweiser, and Edwin Cannan, on Ambedkar in later years was equally significant. Even as he relied heavily on the western liberal tradition, the influence of the Soviet Union in the molding of his economic thought could be noticed.

Articulating the Interests of the Untouchables

Ambedkar entered India’s political scene in 1919 through his testimony before the Southborough Committee on Franchise, where he urged that the untouchables should be given community based representation in view of the fact that untouchability constitutes a definite set of interests which the untouchables alone can speak for. When the Simon Commission took up the Depressed Classes issue in 1928, Ambedkar focused mainly on two points: (1) that the Depressed Classes be treated as a minority, distinct and separate from the Hindu community; (2) that the former required far greater political protection than any other minority in the country. At the Round Table Conferences held at London between 1930 and 1932, Ambedkar, along with Rao Bahadur Srinivasan, represented the Depressed Classes, championing strongly in favor of separate electorates for the Depressed Classes.

Ambedkar fundamentally disagreed with Gandhi on matters regarding Indian society and social problems, particularly on the question of the Depressed Classes and their emancipation. Sharp differences surfaced at the time of the Round Table Conferences. Opposing the British government’s announcement on the Communal

Award giving the Depressed Classes separate electorates, Gandhi undertook a fast-unto-death program following which Ambedkar was compelled to soften his own stand in favor of separate electorates and accept a compromise formula of reserved seats and common electorate in what is widely known as the Poona Pact of 1932. Ambedkar wrote a scathing critique of Gandhi under the title *What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables* (1945).

Organizing Movements

Alongside political struggles, Ambedkar launched several struggles on the social plane to combat the ill-treatment of the untouchables by the caste Hindus. Notable among the movements was the Mahad *Satyagraha* (1927) conducted to gain the right of access of the untouchables to the water tank of Mahad. Burning of the *Manusmriti* (The Law of Manu) (1927) and the Kala Ram Mandir *Satyagraha* (1930) were other landmark movements. While in the early years he attempted to awaken the good sense of the caste Hindus and reform Hinduism, his skepticism increased over the years.

Ambedkar had made three attempts to mobilize his followers through the formation of political parties – these parties were the Independent Labour Party (1936), the Scheduled Castes Federation (1942), and the Republican Party (1956). The Independent Labour Party won a number of seats in the 1937 elections to the Bombay Legislative Assembly.

Ambedkar's struggle for social justice was multi-pronged – focusing on social, economic, political, and religious aspects. He strongly believed in the power of the political weapon and aimed at bringing about fundamental social changes through the instrument of law. Through sustained political mobilization and hard bargaining he succeeded in establishing the Scheduled Castes as a politically relevant category and made future generations of the downtrodden people conscious of their legal rights and the political weapons for carrying forward their struggles. Years after his death, Ambedkar continues to remain an icon to the Scheduled Castes.

Constitution and Lawmaking

Ambedkar was elected as a member of the Constituent Assembly in 1946 from Bengal. Later, he

became the chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Assembly, which was assigned the task of drafting the constitution of independent India. His professed purpose in going to the Constituent Assembly was to safeguard the interests of the untouchables. In the Constituent Assembly he revealed both his expertise in jurisprudence and commitment to the cause of the untouchables. As such, he is referred to as the father of the Indian constitution.

In August 1947 Ambedkar became law minister in the first Cabinet of independent India. As law minister, one of the major initiatives taken by him towards reforming the Hindu social order was in the form of drafting the Hindu Code Bill which *inter alia* was aimed at enhancing gender equality in Hindu society. The Bill sought to introduce several new points in the existing laws, namely, (1) abolition of the doctrine of rights by birth, (2) absolute rights over property given to women, (3) a share of property given to the daughter, and (4) provisions for divorce. However, in the face of stiff orthodox resistance the bill was abandoned, following which Ambedkar resigned from the ministry in 1951.

Fed up with majoritarian caste Hindu arrogance, Ambedkar gave up his attempt at reforming Hinduism. Subsequently, he became more and more skeptical and began speaking of conversion. The final step towards conversion came on October 14, 1956. Accompanied by thousands of followers, Ambedkar, shortly before his death, broke his relations with Hinduism and converted to Buddhism at a ceremony in Nagpur. He died on December 6, 1956 at New Delhi. In the voluminous work *The Buddha and his Dhamma*, published after his death, Ambedkar elaborately argued in favor of the decision to convert to Buddhism.

A Prolific Writer

In 1920 Ambedkar launched a Marathi journal, *Mook Nayak* (Leader of the Dumb), to champion the cause of the untouchables. The journal, however, was short-lived. In 1927 he made another attempt and started a fortnightly *Bahishkrit Bharat* (*The Outcaste India*), which also failed to survive for long. Ambedkar's major writings include *Annihilation of Caste*, *Who Were the Sudras*, *The Untouchables*, *Mr Gandhi and the Emancipation of the Untouchables*, *States And Minorities*, and *Thoughts On Pakistan*.

SEE ALSO: Black Panthers; Dalit Liberation Struggles; Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); India, Civil Disobedience Movement and Demand for Independence

References and Suggested Readings

- Jaffrelot, C. (2005) *Dr. Ambedkar and Untouchability: Fighting the Caste System*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kadam, K. N. (1991) *Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar and the Significance of His Movement: A Chronology*. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.
- Kuber, W. N. (1973) *Dr Ambedkar: A Critical Study*. New Delhi: Peoples Publishing House.
- Moon, V. (1995) *Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar*. New Delhi: National Book Trust.
- Omvedt, G. (1994) *Dalits and the Democratic Revolution: Dr Ambedkar and the Dalit Movement in Colonial India*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Zelliot, E. (1998) *From Untouchable to Dalit: Essays on the Ambedkar Movement*. New Delhi: Manohar.

American Civil War (1861–1864)

Mark A. Lause

The American Civil War has long been one of the most popular subjects in US history. Its frequent treatment as a military narrative, framed by political considerations and commentary, often obscures the social and economic tensions that underlie the political protests that erupted in what has often been described as the Second American Revolution.

Most directly, the Civil War finished several tasks left incomplete by the original American Revolution. The Anglo-American states had cooperated to win independence and establish a common national government, but states in both the North and South periodically claimed authority to nullify federal laws they did not want to enforce, and both sections had threatened at different times to secede from the Union. The Civil War put a rest to these threats by establishing the supremacy of the nation. Then, too, the Revolutionary generation had eliminated human slavery in half the states and agreed to exclude it from what became the Midwest, but it took the Civil War to abolish the institution entirely and constitutionally ban unequal treatment of former slaves and their descendants. Such fundamental changes reflected a basic revolution in who ruled the United States.

The Crisis of the Old Order

The Rise of Sectionalism

Antebellum politics pit Democrats against Whigs, with the former as the nationally dominant party, and the Southern cotton interests as the prevailing faction within the party. Democratic leadership promulgated the US War with Mexico (1846–8), and crushed the efforts of Pennsylvania Congressman David Wilmot to exclude slavery from any territory acquired from the war. Afterwards, politics became quickly sectionalized.

The dominance of the South and slavery had become increasingly anomalous. Of the 31.4 million Americans in 1860, fewer than 394,000 whites owned the 4 million slaves in the 15 states that sanctioned the institution. Then, too, of the 40 largest cities, the dominant slaveholding states accounted for only nine, of which five were actually in border states. Similar statistics on population, immigration, commerce, and industry demonstrate the relatively quicker growth of the non-slaveholding states.

This reflected society more congenial to innovation in every aspect of life. Over the generation leading to war, social movements, ranging from dress reform and vegetarianism to spiritualism and the abolition of capitalism, swept the North. Many entrepreneurs, farmers, and the large free working class of the non-slaveholding states shared the rhetoric of a “producer ideology” espousing the value of “free labor.” The political movement to equalize land ownership inspired the largest national petition drives to date in American history. While this openness characterized the North, slaveholding communities, with few exceptions, remained disinterested or overtly hostile.

With Americans generally believing that the West would shape the nation’s future, rival concerns over the extensive tracts taken from Mexico made slavery a national question with frequently sectional answers. In 1848 some Northern Democrats launched a Free Soil Party for federal limitation on slavery. Others advocated “popular sovereignty,” whereby settlers in each territory would get to vote on the measure, something that raised the possibility of slavery in areas from which it had been excluded. The division contributed to a rare national victory for the Whigs, but it did not prevent a Compromise of 1850 that incorporated “popular sovereignty.”



Members of an honor guard of black troops at Port Hudson, Louisiana, hold rifles with bayonets attached. Due to racial prejudice, most black soldiers were initially not permitted to partake in combat missions. However, black regiments served with distinction in a number of battles, namely at Milliken's Bend, Louisiana, Port Hudson, Louisiana, Petersburg, Virginia, and most famously, the assault on Fort Wagner, South Carolina, in July 1863. (© CORBIS)

Southern Rights Innovations

Through the 1850s, “Southern Rights” Democrats fueled Northern fear of a “Slave Power Conspiracy.” While denying federal power to exclude slavery anywhere, the Southern Rights men asserted the universal and equal right of the owners of any property, including slaves, to exercise ownership anywhere, and insisted that the national authorities impose enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act on state and local authorities that did not accord slavery any legal existence. The US Supreme Court ruled in *Dred Scott v. Sandford* (1857) that, anywhere in the country, an African American “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.”

Slaveholders’ aspirations to control a “golden circle” around the Caribbean inspired Southern Democrats in power to ignore diplomacy, the standards of international conduct, and US Neutrality Acts. They launched a series of American “filibustero” interventions into the Yucatan (1847–55), Mexico (1851, 1852, 1854, 1853–4, 1857), Cuba (1849, 1850, 1851), Nicaragua (1855–7, 1857), Honduras (1860), and as far away as Ecuador.

The old political structure could not moderate these innovations. The remnants of the Whig Party sought to avoid these questions of slavery and expansion from 1854 by reorganizing as an “American Party” around hostility to immigrants. The party combined Whig politics with

a suspicion of the German, Irish, Catholics, and other newcomers, which won some local elections from New York to New Orleans, but never overcame local peculiarities to become a coherent national force.

Some of the most prominent Northern Democrats, like Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, believed the only viable alternative to be “popular sovereignty,” which supposedly left the decision over slavery to the qualified voters in each territory and offered Southern leaders a means to bring slavery into a part of the West from which it had previously been excluded. To provide that this would work, the Congress passed a Kansas-Nebraska Act (May 30, 1854) to pave the way for the admission of the territory to the union.

The Republican Alternative

Opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act created the Republican Party. The Free Democrats – those Free Soilers who had remained independent after 1848 – had established some real power across the Northern tier of states, calling for a new “Republican” party to defeat imperial and pro-slavery policies. State conventions in Michigan, Wisconsin, and other states launched parties overtly hostile to the extension of slavery into the territories. Eventually, the national party adopted this stance.

Nevertheless, the Republicans always included some very conservative elements. Some had equivocated on a general hostility to slavery in the territories and wanted to focus exclusively on Kansas. New York’s state organization voted for simple fusion with the remnants of the Whigs and assimilated the politics of that older party. In response, some militants in 1855 launched a multiracial Radical Abolitionist Party that called for the elimination of slavery and racial discrimination everywhere and urged direct action to achieve its goals. Its presence meant the Republicans could not drift so far as to repudiate opposition to slavery in the territories without losing anti-slavery voters.

Even as the Republicans waged their first national campaign, low intensity warfare rumbled through “Bleeding Kansas.” Often with undisguised Southern Democratic sponsorship and filibustering experience, armed bands stuffed ballot boxes and terrorized residents from non-slaveholding states. This strategy drove Northerners uninterested in slavery to become

overtly hostile to it, pushed those already anti-slavery towards abolitionism, and forced abolitionists either to leave Kansas or to take up arms.

The determination of Democratic administrations to demonstrate the value of “popular sovereignty” to the Southern Rights faction backfired. As the settlers from the more populous North began clearly outpolling the pro-slavery residents of Kansas, it became clear that the South would not support the leading contender for the nomination, Senator Douglas. Meanwhile, the success of armed resistance in Kansas inspired John Brown to launch an ill-fated attempt to arm the slaves by seizing the Federal Arsenal at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia (October 17–18, 1859).

Revolution by Default

The 1860 Election

The country entered the 1860 elections with its politics sectionalized. The remnants of the old Whig organization ran John Bell on the Constitutional Union ticket, while the Democratic nomination of Stephen A. Douglas led to a bolt by the Southern Rights faction who nominated John C. Breckenridge. The former third party Republican movement settled on Abraham Lincoln.

A backwoods storyteller, Lincoln actually had been born in a log cabin and split rails in his youth before reading law and seeking public office as a Whig. Particularly after his participation in the Black Hawk War against the Indians, he disparaged militarism and mocked imperial ambitions, asking the Young Men’s Lyceum at Springfield in 1838, “Shall we expect some transatlantic military giant, to step the Ocean, and crush us at a blow? Never! All the armies of Europe, Asia and Africa combined . . . could not by force, take a drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge, in a trial of a thousand years.” Serving a single term in the US Congress, he had lost the seat for opposing the Mexican War. Nevertheless, the 1860 national elections delivered the Republicans a sufficiently distributed plurality of the popular vote to carry the Electoral College and win the presidency.

The Southern Rights faction faced an incoming Lincoln presidency with the weakest mandate of any ever elected to the office, and chose not

to cede the power they had held for a generation. The South Carolina legislature called a state convention that voted on December 20, 1860 to secede from the United States. This severely hurt the prospects of those who favored united action by the slave states within the Union, and every subsequent secession further weakened their position. Partly because of this, six more states of the Deep South followed South Carolina, specifically Mississippi (January 9), Florida (January 10), Alabama (January 11), Georgia (January 19), Louisiana (January 26), and Texas (February 1). A convention of transplanted Texans at Mesilla also voted (March 16) to remove the Arizona Territory (present New Mexico and Arizona).

Rebellion from the Top Down

Representatives of the seceded states convened at Montgomery, Alabama to found the Confederate States of America. Despite the “states’ rights” rhetoric of the secessionists, it adopted a Constitution that differed from that of the US primarily in that it centralized more powers in the hands of the president who got a single six-year term and a line-item veto over the Congress. They selected as president and vice president, Jefferson Davis of Mississippi and Alexander Hamilton Stephens of Georgia. Relatively a moderate, Stephens explicitly said of the new government that “its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery – subordination to the superior race – is his natural and normal condition.”

Northern suspicions that a relatively small but powerful group fostered secession seemed confirmed when eight slave states declined to join the seven that had seceded. Further evidence came with the coordinated attack on some federal installations by state officials before their states had even seceded, specifically the operations of Georgia against Fort Pulaski (January 3); Louisiana against the US Arsenal at Baton Rouge, as well as Forts Jackson and St. Philips (January 10), the US Marine Hospital (January 11), and Fort Pike (January 14) at New Orleans; Florida against Fort Barrancas (January 8) at Pensacola, Fort Marion (January 17) at St. Augustine, and Apalachicola (January 16); Alabama against Forts Gaines and Morgan (January 5) near Mobile; Arkansas against US munitions (February 12) at Napoleon; and Missouri against the US Arsenal (April 19) at Liberty.

The fate of such federal installations in the South sparked open warfare. Secessionist officials moved on national assets at Pensacola, Ship Island, Augusta, and New Orleans. By oversight or luck, federal troops retained control of a number of installations from Fort Taylor at Key West to frontier bases like Fort Filmore and Fort Bliss near El Paso, as well as naval bases like Fort Monroe and the adjacent Gosport Navy Yard at Norfolk. Most importantly, the Confederate forces demanded the Unionist withdrawal in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina from Fort Sumter (April 10), then fired on the fort, compelling its surrender (April 12–13).

Fort Sumter left the Lincoln administration no choice but to ask the states to provide three-month volunteers to suppress the rebellion. In Southern states that had not seceded, officials proved unwilling to help subjugate those that had. The governments of Virginia (April 17), Arkansas (May 6), Tennessee (May 7), and North Carolina (May 20) joined the Confederacy, which moved its capital to Richmond, Virginia, roughly only a hundred miles from the Federal capital at Washington. Other slave state governors simply defied the call for troops.

Unwilling Rebels and Reluctant Revolutionaries

Notwithstanding the wave of volunteerism that came with the outbreak of the war, popular support for secession proved elusive. Southern officials allowed citizens to vote on secession only in Texas (February 23), Virginia (May 23), and Tennessee (June 8). Despite intimidation, death threats, and gross irregularities, over 90,000 citizens of these states voted against secession. Despite war, Unionist majorities persisted in Missouri, Kentucky, western Virginia, northwestern Arkansas, eastern Tennessee, and western North Carolina, as well as parts of Louisiana and the Deep South.

The secessionist authorities in Unionist areas required residents to take oaths of allegiance to the Confederacy or leave, the latter course forfeiting any claim on the Confederate protection of their property or lives. Unionists faced murder, physical assault, and being driven from their homes. As with the Federal installations, formal secession was not necessary for state authorities in places like Missouri to permit the brutalization of Unionist citizens, launching the first rounds of a war of reprisal that lasted

years. Not surprisingly, the greatest imposition of secession on Southerners came to the people of the Indian Territory (present Oklahoma). Although the Indians planned to remain neutral, the Confederate combination of diplomacy, duplicity, and military force secured treaties that generally obligated every adult male to military service at the executive order of the Confederate president.

Neither Lincoln nor his cabinet were revolutionaries by intention, but secession both removed the greatest obstacle to change and created circumstances that demanded innovation. For example, since the war would be fought almost entirely in the South and secession left most Southerners – whites, as well as Indians and blacks – no opportunity to vote on the subject, except with their feet, the war created an increasingly large refugee problem and required the Union authorities to address it. Lincoln later expressed his pragmatic approach to the Congress: “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. . . . As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.”

War for Union

The Onset of the Fighting

Pragmatism served Lincoln well in securing the border states. Military occupation, the suspension of *habeas corpus*, and the arrest of legislators secured Maryland, without which the national capital itself would be vulnerable. Both sides temporarily accepted Kentucky’s declaration of neutrality (May 10). However, the Federal authorities sanctioned insurrections against the state authorities in western Virginia and Missouri, where the first real military clashes took place.

As the three-month enlistments neared their end, both sides tested their hopes that a short war would settle the question. The Union army raised to protect Washington inexpertly flanked a Confederate force in Virginia, along Bull Run creek near Manassas (July 21), and drove them from the field, until rebel reinforcements arrived, routing the Federals. A few weeks later, Unionists in Missouri disastrously attacked a much larger combined force of secessionist state militia and Confederates along Wilson’s Creek (August 10), near Springfield. Contrary

to secessionist expectations, Unionists brushed off these disheartening defeats, as three-year volunteers replaced the troops being discharged.

These early battles often turned on confusion over uniforms and flags. Some Federal units had worn militia gray and some Confederates wore blue, and, in the fog of battle, the secessionist Stars and Bars looked much like the Stars and Stripes. Both sides began to standardize uniforms and the Confederates adopted the far more famous battle flag with 13 stars on a blue X-shaped cross. As that flag indicates, in addition to the 11 states noted, the Confederacy admitted to membership two additional states. Secessionist members of the state government voted Missouri out of the Union (October 28, 31), and their counterparts in Kentucky followed suit (November 18). Often unacknowledged in textbooks, the admission of these states into the Confederacy speaks volumes more about the underlying secessionist unconcern with public opinion or the niceties of political legitimacy.

So, too, the Civil War did not really become a “total war,” but was one from the beginning whenever it touched on matters of race. In the Indian Territory, most of the Creeks and Seminoles simply refused to cooperate with the Confederate authorities and thousands, together with hundreds of black residents of the territory, converged on Creek lands. Treating this encampment of civilians and mostly noncombatants as a hostile force, Confederates attacked it at Round Mountain (November 19), Chusto-Talashah or Caving Banks (December 9), and finally at Chustenahlah (December 26). In the last, the rebels killed hundreds, including many who tried to surrender, re-enslaved blacks, and sent thousands of Indians on a corpse-strewn route through a winter of exposure, starvation, and disease into the refugee camps of Kansas and Missouri.

So, too, war made slavery an unavoidable issue. The Union declared a blockade of Southern ports and set about building the kind of navy necessary to enforce it, while the Confederacy built small, fast blockade runners to race past the Federal ships. In the interests of the blockade, the Union forces captured Hatteras Inlet (August 28–29) in North Carolina, resisted an attack at Fort Pickens on Santa Rosa Island (October 9) near Pensacola, and captured Port Royal (November 7) and the Sea Islands of South Carolina. Almost immediately, local Federal authorities on these beachheads, and around Fortress Monroe,

became overwhelmed by the numbers of runaways fleeing nearby plantations and initially protected them as “contraband of war” rather than returning them to their owners.

The Politics of War, 1861–1862

Despite early defeats, Union forces won stunning successes in the West. When the Confederates moved north, violating Kentucky’s neutrality, both sides poured troops into the state. Towards the southeast end of the state, a large Federal column pushed the rebels back at Mill Springs near Logan’s Crossroads, along Fishing Creek (January 19). Meanwhile, General Ulysses S. Grant combined military forces with an inland river fleet towards the southwest part of the state. His step-by-step operations forced the Confederates to abandon position after position, until his army approached the Kentucky–Tennessee state line. Bombarding the earthen Confederate fortifications on the Tennessee River, Grant received the surrender of Fort Henry (February 6), and repositioned his army to threaten rebel positions on the Cumberland River 10 miles away.

Grant won the first major Union victory of the war when, after several assaults, his men took Fort Donelson (February 14–16), offering as his only terms “Unconditional Surrender” and taking some 15,000 prisoners. This opened the two major waterways between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River for a Union movement on Corinth, Mississippi, where the Confederacy’s east–west rail connections crossed with the north–south rail link from the Ohio River to the Gulf coast. The wheels of the Federal bureaucracy creaked to arrange cooperation between Grant’s force and a second Union army, operating out of different departmental headquarters, which had moved into central Tennessee, capturing Nashville (February 25).

Realizing this, the Confederates amassed an army of about 45,000 at Corinth, Mississippi to destroy Grant’s forces along the Tennessee River before the second Union army could join it. In the battle of Shiloh (April 6–7), some 24,000 of the 110,000 men became casualties. Neither Federal, state, nor local authorities expected battlefield injuries on this scale. In the end, the rebels failed to destroy Grant’s army and lost Corinth to a creepingly cautious Federal campaign (April 29–June 10).

More importantly, the indirect costs of stripping Confederate defenses to make that attack

at Shiloh had long-reaching effects. The Union division left to defend Nashville, recognizing that the Confederates had removed the troops immediately to their south, advanced into northern Alabama, seizing Huntsville (April 11), which actually severed that east–west Southern rail link between Corinth and Chattanooga. This threatened an even more important north–side line running through Chattanooga into Georgia. A small group of volunteers earned the first Congressional Medals of Honor for stealing a train near Atlanta and trying to destroy the railroad bridges between there and Chattanooga on April 12.

Developments on both ends of the Mississippi River proved even more devastating. The Confederates fell back from their northern defenses at Columbus, Kentucky to a seemingly more defensible “S”-curve on the Missouri–Tennessee line, but fewer rebels permitted a Federal landing on the Tennessee side, cutting off and forcing the surrender of 3,000 now-isolated defenders of Island Number Ten (April 7), which pushed Confederate defenses back to near Memphis. At the mouth of the river, the largest and most important city in the Confederacy fell into Union hands without a fight, after the Union navy ran the batteries at Forts Jackson and St. Philip (April 16–28) and moved upriver to seize New Orleans (April 25–May 1, 1862). By early summer, Union forces captured Memphis (June 6) and their gunboats steamed before the high bluffs of Vicksburg, Mississippi.

More Confederate reversals took place elsewhere. In Arkansas a Confederate army attacked a smaller southbound Union army that prevailed at Pea Ridge (March 6–8). In the distant New Mexico Territory, Union volunteers from the western territories fought near Santa Fe at Glorietta Pass (March 26–28), forcing the defeated Confederates to make a long, hungry, often lethal march back to the safety of central Texas. On the Atlantic seaboard below Savannah, Federal artillery breached one of the country’s most imposing masonry military structures, Fort Pulaski (April 10–11, 1862).

Such victories contrasted to General George McClellan’s inaction at Washington, even in defiance of direct orders from the commander-in-chief to take the field. McClellan feared the impact of another under-prepared campaign, but he also exaggerated Confederate strength in Virginia. When pressed, he proposed transporting his army to the coast of the Virginia

“peninsula” between the James and York rivers and marching on Richmond from the sea. This was possible after the Federals countered the appearance of the Confederate armored ironclad, the *CSS Virginia*, with a more radically designed ironclad of their own, the *USS Monitor*, which exchanged indecisive shots for several hours at Hampton Roads (March 9), but the draw denied a Confederate opportunity to challenge Federal control of the waters.

McClellan’s movements brought the largest American army ever raised over poor roads through marshy terrain, and his caution lost any element of surprise. His army bogged down before weak Confederate defenses at Yorktown (April 5–May 4), which bought the rebels time to build stronger defenses and concentrate greater numbers until they had to fight a pitched battle at Seven Pines or Fair Oaks (May 31–June 1), which left McClellan’s army close enough to hear the church bells of Richmond.

As McClellan bombarded Washington with requests for reinforcements, Federal officials grew less likely to send them. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson commanded a small Confederate army of “foot cavalry” that made its initial fight at Kernstown (March 23). As McClellan moved on Richmond, Jackson’s force marched from one end of the valley to the other, meeting small Union armies at McDowell (May 8), Front Royal (May 23) and Winchester (May 25), Cross Keys (June 8) and Port Republic (June 9), effectively rolling the Federals out of the Shenandoah Valley. This forced Washington to build another large Union army to protect Washington, even as Jackson’s little army received orders to hurry to the defense of Richmond.

With their former commander wounded at Seven Pines, the Confederates at Richmond got a new general, Robert E. Lee, who had done poorly in West Virginia and thus seemed a questionable choice. However, under his leadership, the new “Army of Northern Virginia” would fight the larger and better equipped Federal “Army of the Potomac” to a standstill for nearly three more years.

Lee’s almost legendary generalship began by recognizing McClellan’s weakness and using it to his advantage. The Union general, Lee understood, responded to attacks, whether successful or not, by withdrawing to seemingly more defensible positions. Therefore, Lee’s army hit the Federals hard every day over “the Seven Days’

Battles” of Oak Grove (June 25), Beaver Dam Creek or Mechanicsville (June 26), Gaines’ Mill or First Cold Harbor (June 26), Garnett’s Farm or Golding’s Farm (June 27–28), Savage’s Station (June 29), White Oak Swamp or Frayser’s Farm (June 30), and Malvern Hill (July 1). There were about 36,000 casualties out of some 190,000 troops involved. In almost every case, the Federals got the better of the Confederates, but McClellan ordered them to fall back, and ultimately withdrew them from the Richmond area and returned to Washington.

The battles of 1862 were lasting days rather than a few hours, as they had the previous year. The horrific casualty levels reflected the inability of the trained military to adjust to the new technology of war. They built the field tactics and troop evolutions of these close-rank armies around the smoothbores, but the introduction of soft lead “Minié balls” allowed the projectile to expand, making effective rifling of muskets possible. This extended their range three or four times what it had been, but without an accompanying change of tactics.

War as Revolution

Radicalization of the Union War Effort, 1862–1863

The Confederate response to all of these reversals and the manpower drains of unexpectedly bloody battles like Shiloh was to enact conscription (April 16). By the summer, new recruits were no longer volunteers, and desertion became an increasing problem. Although the Federal government later instituted a draft, it was never as numerically large or substantively vital to the war effort as in the South. Each month of the conflict would thereafter bear more crushingly on Southern households and create a mass desertion problem.

The Union response was very different. The scale of slave flight to Federal lines grew with every Union foray into Confederate territory. From the beginning, Union soldiers balked at complying with orders to return runaway slaves to their legal owners. Local commanders like Benjamin Butler had gotten around the problem by declaring slave property to be “contraband of war,” and refusing. In places, blacks and American Indians were volunteering for Union military service.

There exists impressive evidence that Lincoln had always hated the institution of slavery, but he held pragmatic anti-slavery rather than abolitionist views. He had been elected and inaugurated upon a mandate only to prevent the extension of slavery into the western territory. With the unexpected toll of the war, he informed his cabinet (July 22) that he had decided to issue a Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation that would end slavery in those areas in rebellion against the Union as of the end of the year. Willing to take the responsibility for expanding the war goals to include emancipation, Lincoln also wanted to get the issue before the voters in the fall of 1862, so that emancipation would also become the expressed will of the nation. His cabinet convinced him to withhold the announcement until Federal arms won a major victory.

As McClellan’s Federal army moved back towards Washington, “Stonewall” Jackson’s corps hurried back to meet that second Federal army raised to protect Washington, which had started overland towards Richmond. This slowed the advance until the rest of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia arrived, meeting the Union forces a second time at the old battlefield of Bull Run (August 28–30) in a battle that cost another 22,000 casualties.

This provided the Confederate military with an opportunity to influence the Federal elections through concerted counter-offensives along a thousand-mile front. In the east, Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac into Maryland, though one part of it invested Harpers Ferry (September 12–15), capturing over 12,000 Union soldiers. Meanwhile, the bulk of the Federal forces, now combined into the Army of the Potomac and under McClellan, moved slowly to locate Lee near Sharpsburg, Maryland and assemble its own units for a concerted attack. The battle of Antietam (September 16–18) cost 23,000 casualties and included the bloodiest single day of the war.

Counter-offensives beyond the mountains also sought to roll back Union gains. Two Confederate armies poured north into Kentucky, overrunning Federal garrisons and threatening Cincinnati on the Ohio River before turning back south, hastened along the way by a major battle at Perryville (October 8). Another counter-offensive sought to dislodge the Federals in northern Mississippi, hitting them at Iuka (September 19), Corinth (October 3–4), and Hatchie’s Bridge

or Matamora (October 5). After a summer of Confederate recruitment behind Union lines in Missouri, regular troops moved back into the state, concentrating and thwarting the Federals at Newtonia (September 30) before retreating.

Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, and it became the most important issue voters faced in the elections of November 1862. Despite Democratic gains in the House, the administration innovation prevailed.

In the field, Union armies tried to build upon the defeat of the Confederate fall counter-offensives. The Army of the Potomac, under new leadership, failed miserably to push Lee's army aside at Fredericksburg (December 11–15), with a series of assaults that accounted for most of the nearly 13,000 Union casualties, and the Confederates had less than half those losses. In the west, Federal attempts to press the rebels ended at Stones River (December 31, 1862–January 2, 1863), which inflicted 23,500 casualties on the 54,000 participants and at Chickasaw Bayou (December 26–29), where William Tecumseh Sherman, Grant's lieutenant, made the first unsuccessful Federal attempt to storm the defenses of Vicksburg. Beyond the river, Federals turned back a series Confederate drives, ending at Prairie Grove (December 7).

Revolutionizing the Country

The war demanded larger armies and radically increased the logistical problems of recruiting, feeding, equipping, moving, and keeping healthy numbers that eclipsed all but the largest cities on the continent. The implications of this managerial revolution transformed the nation. Before the war, optimistic railroad promoters predicted finishing a line from St. Louis to the Pacific coast in only a few years, but they got less than 40 miles. During the war the government coordinated the repair and replacement of the railroads through central Kentucky and Tennessee because it was necessary to move troops. These changes made the transcontinental railroad realistic.

Financing the war required an unprecedented government debt. This also stimulated an unprecedented economic boom that pulled the country from the depressed conditions that had started with the Panic of 1857 and lasted initially until the Panic of 1873. The greatest beneficiaries, however, likely became the banking institutions, which now had an unprecedented connection with the political authorities.

The impact on industry was transformative. The earliest efforts to build an inland navy on the western rivers, for example, built large factories, forges, and shipyards dramatically creating new industrial neighborhoods at Cincinnati, St. Louis, Louisville, Pittsburg, and other river cities. Brooklyn Navy Yard employed several thousand workers to meet the needs of the war, while those at Boston, Washington, Portsmouth, and elsewhere also began to approach virtually modern industrial sites.

Accelerated industrialization also stimulated a great technological boom, the effects of which would continue beyond the war. Ironclads, rifled muskets, repeating rifles and sidearms, primitive machine guns, balloon reconnaissance, and submarines required rapid and intense research, often under the direct supervision of government authorities. With far fewer resources, the Confederate government even established its own research institution at Augusta.

War created a modern working class. Earlier trade unions largely collapsed when the war came. The largest and most stable, the National Typographical Union, lost about a third of its membership to the military, including its vice president and president (the latter becoming one of three NTU members to win the Medal of Honor). With such vast numbers of workingmen in the field and the demand for labor at home increasing at just that point, the wives, sisters, daughters, and mothers found themselves without male assistance and facing poverty or the job market. Women entered industrial work in unprecedented numbers. They made uniforms, prepared rations, and organized for better conditions and higher pay.

Wartime labor struggles moved all parts of the workforce – from the old crafts through the new industrial shipyards to the working women. The nature of war production and the central role of government in setting the length of the workday established the seed for a politicized labor reform movement. The military sometimes threatened intervention against strikers, and sometimes did so, but the president and his administration, aware of extensive profiteering by the government contractors who employed the workers, sometimes gave tacit encouragement to labor rebelliousness.

Early Republicanism represented a coalition, some components of which still had high expectations. The Lincoln administration promulgated

a series of notable innovations, each of which represented a radical innovation justified at the time by the exigencies of the war. These included slave emancipation; the recruitment of non-white soldiers; the order to commission non-whites as officers (ignored in terms of African Americans until late in the war); the beginnings of black suffrage; plans for reforming Indian policy; a Federal Homestead Act, part of the old land reform demands; a Southern Homestead Act, which seemed to presage land redistribution in the South; the government printing of paper currency; and the adoption of a progressive income tax. Many of these innovations were halted or even reversed after the war's end, as the postwar Republican Party experienced a general turnover in its leadership.

The complexities of that coalition created a genuine ambivalence among wartime Federal authorities as to how to deal with Southern Unionism. Almost at the onset of the war, the Lincoln administration recognized the establishment of rival Unionist governments in Missouri, Kentucky, and Virginia, the last of these later giving permission to the western counties to separate and form West Virginia. Moves to establish loyal Unionist governments also took place in Tennessee, Louisiana, North Carolina, Arkansas, and other states. Republicans concerned about fostering disorder balked at encouraging dual power, but so did radicals, who feared the reconstitution of white Southern governments that would exclude the former slaves.

A similar complexity moved the Republican Party groups in the Republican coalition in response to military manpower issues. The demands of the field exhausted the available volunteers early, and the incentive of bounties had limited use in sustaining enlistments. Making up the difference seemed to require a mix of black recruitment and conscription. The more racially conservative Unionists balked at the former, but the alternative was certain to exacerbate class tensions, particularly as those conscripted could avoid going by payment of a commutation fee or hiring a substitute.

Indeed, the promulgation of the first draft in the summer of 1863 inspired escalating anti-Republican, anti-black rhetoric by Democratic politicians, and coincided with staggeringly heavy casualties. Riots, primarily by the more recently arrived Irish underclass in New York City, challenged the limited political will of the civil

authorities and the numbers of the local police. There were instances of interracial cooperation against the rioters, but troops had to be rushed to the city to restore order. In the end, though, the authorities drew almost 250,000 names, of whom only about 6 percent served.

In contrast, conscripts quickly came to constitute, conservatively, as much as a third of the forces east of the Mississippi. As the threat of conscription loomed much larger in the South, much greater numbers there than in the North would have joined under the threat of conscription. Such reasons explain the debilitating effect of desertions on Confederate arms, particularly after the war turned dramatically against the prospects of secession in the summer of 1863.

War for Slave Liberation

The Turning Points, 1863

Along the Mississippi River, Grant concentrated an impressive force before the impregnable fortified Confederate works on the river bluffs at Vicksburg, Mississippi. Using his armored gunboats to run these batteries, Grant marched his army downriver on the Louisiana side, planning to cross east to the Mississippi side, abandon his line of supply, and “live off the land.” Confederate batteries thwarted a crossing at Grand Gulf (April 29), but the Federals landed at Bruinsburg and pushed passed the rebels at Port Gibson (May 1). Marching west, Grant defeated the Confederates at Raymond (May 12) and drove a second Confederate army from Mississippi's state capital, Jackson (May 14), after which he marched back towards the river, veering north to drive the Confederates from Champion Hill (May 16) and Big Black River Bridge (May 17) into Vicksburg. Now approaching the bluffs from the interior of the state, Grant reconnected with his supply line and settled down to a siege of Vicksburg (May 18–July 4). The Federals tightened their hold on what became a starving city, turning back a Confederate attack on their supply line upriver at Milliken's Bend (June 7). Simultaneously, the Union forces besieged Port Hudson (May 21–July 9), essentially making the Confederate loss of the entire Mississippi River a question of time.

The “turning point” of the Civil War in the East began with yet another Federal defeat. Lee's success in turning back a much larger Union offensive is generally seen as the most brilliant

tactical victory of the war. Attempting to circumvent the Confederate defenses at Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock River, Union troops crossed upriver, hoping to pass through the overgrown and largely unfarmed “Wilderness” for their fourth attempt to march on Richmond. In the face of this larger army, Lee audaciously divided his army, contesting the Federal advance at Chancellorsville (April 30–May 6), while leaving a portion of his force to contest the Union forces at Fredericksburg and turn them back at Salem Church (May 3–4). With the size of his force hidden in the Wilderness and the Federals displaying their usual caution, Lee divided his much smaller army a second time, sending “Stonewall” Jackson on a long flanking march (May 1–2) that successfully rolled up the Union left and ended with Jackson’s mortal wounding by the “friendly fire” of his own picket line. Roughly 30,000 of the 195,000 participants became casualties.

Eastern Confederate successes created a mistaken faith in their ability to forestall indefinitely the impact of numbers and industrial know-how with a mistaken sense that they could overcome them. Southern superiority in the use of cavalry, particularly in Virginia, had been virtually unquestioned, though it came to an abrupt end near Culpepper, at Brandy Station (June 9), where Union horsemen caught the rebels unprepared and noted the absence of infantry support. The Federals realized that Lee’s army had again shifted west into the Shenandoah Valley for a second invasion of the North. Under still another Union commander, the Army of the Potomac countermarched through northern Virginia into Maryland in search of Lee’s army.

Federal cavalry clashed with part of Lee’s infantry, and both sides hurried reinforcements into battle around the crossroads country town of Gettysburg (July 1–3). The first day saw the Federals driven from the field, but with sufficient delays as to permit the establishment of a strong defensive line on the high ground running south of the town. The Confederates tried and failed to take the flanks on the second day. The third saw what many have called the “high-water mark” of the Confederacy in the doomed rebel assault over the open fields before the Union center. As this last day’s fighting demonstrated, all else being equal, victory went to the side with the most, the largest, and the best-supplied artillery.

The losses were overwhelming. Of the 158,000 who fought there, at least 51,000 became casualties. With a few exceptions from places like Antietam, Gettysburg provided the grimmest statistics of unit losses. The recently deployed Twenty-fourth Michigan took 496 into the field and, at the day’s end, only a few dozen men with a single remaining officer answered the roll. The already depleted First Minnesota took 262 men into the battle and lost 215 as casualties. An entire North Carolina company was lost in the fighting. A stunned government arranged for the establishment of a National Cemetery, dedicated with a short address by Lincoln on November 19.

Moreover, within days, the competent management of better resources forced the surrenders along the Mississippi at Vicksburg (July 4) and Port Hudson (July 9), taking 37,000 Confederates prisoner. The Union would replace their losses, but the Confederacy had few reserves left on which to draw.

Beyond the Mississippi River, the Confederates faced other reversals. An attempt to retake bluffs over the river failed miserably at Helena (July 4), and a contingent of Indian, black, and white Unionists defeated a larger Confederate army at Honey Springs (July 17) in the Indian Territory. By the end of the summer, hundreds of draftees who had deserted the Confederates voluntarily turned up to extend the Union line unfolding against the rebel positions at Devil’s Backbone (September 1) near Fort Smith. With such support, Unionists also occupied the state capitol at Little Rock (September 10) and established a nominal control over the area north of the Arkansas River.

The final turning point of the year came in Tennessee. Federal troops there had backed the Confederates out of central Tennessee and pursued what they assumed to be an intact but demoralized army into Georgia. Reinforced by an entire corps from Lee’s army, the Confederates counter-attacked at Chickamauga (September 19–20), which made casualties of nearly 35,000 of the 124,500 soldiers, driving the Union army to Chattanooga, in a bend of the Tennessee River, with the Confederates occupying most of the high ground around them. Grant personally arrived with reinforcements from Vicksburg, and the Union military rebuilt much of the railroads south from Ohio to rush reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac, fresh from its victory at

Gettysburg. West of Chattanooga, the reinforcements seized Brown's Ferry and Wauhatchie (October 28–29), opening a "cracker line" to supply the army by river. In succession, the Unionists pushed the Confederates from Orchard Knob (November 23), Lookout Mountain (November 24), and Missionary Ridge (November 25), which ended in a virtual rout of the rebel army. In a related success, the Federals, aided by strong local Unionist sentiment, survived Confederate attacks at Campbell's Station (November 16) and Fort Sanders, also called Fort Loudon (November 29).

Race and the Noncombatants

Progress proved slower in the Union efforts to reach beyond their beachheads on the coasts. Near Charlestown, the newly mustered Fifty-fourth Massachusetts, a regiment of black soldiers officered by whites, made an unsuccessful but heroic assault on Fort Wagner (July 18) in an effort to neutralize Fort Sumter's defenses, but Confederates eventually abandoned Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg (September 6–7). The general reversals of the summer and fall of 1863 confirmed the new emancipationist war goals and were so significant that the Confederacy no longer had any chance to win the war without major Federal mistakes.

Confederate cavalry sought to bring the war north, crossing into Indiana, seizing the old capital at Corydon (July 9) and riding across southern Indiana and Ohio before being forced to surrender at Buffington Island (July 19) on the Ohio River. Farther west, in Kansas, rebel guerrillas in Union uniforms began concentrating in very larger numbers, converging on the old anti-slavery town of Lawrence (August 21). They then ambushed a racially mixed force at Baxter Springs (October 6), in keeping with their formal position that blacks would not be treated as soldiers, but as slaves in rebellion subject to capture and resale or summary execution. White officers were to be treated as instigators of slave rebellion and fit subjects for the fate of John Brown. Nevertheless, blacks began to have a major impact on the course of the war in early 1864. A Union column struck into the interior of Florida in an attempt to sever Confederate supply lines, but the rebels counter-attacked successfully at Olustee (February 20, 1864)

A similarly ill-fated Union campaign west of the Mississippi tried to get to Shreveport, the

Trans-Mississippi headquarters of the rebellion. A combined operation moved up the Red River but confronted determined defenders at Mansfield (April 8), inspiring a concentrated force that beat the rebels at Pleasant Hill (April 9) and reached their nearest point to Shreveport the next day. Thereafter, though, concerns about the growing Confederate numbers and the falling waters of the river led the Federals to retreat to Natchitoches and begin moving back down the river. With their ships running aground by mid-May, the Federals raised the water level at Pineville with a hastily constructed dam.

The Camden expedition, moving on Shreveport through Arkansas, faced repeated reversals. This ended in a Union retreat punctuated by Confederate attacks on black soldiers covering the supply trains. The execution of the wounded and prisoners characterized the fights at Poison Spring (April 18), Mark's Mill (April 25), and Jenkin's Ferry (April 30).

The most famous atrocity was ascribed to the troops of Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest, a former slave dealer and later Grand Wizard of the postwar Ku Klux Klan. His cavalry had thwarted a Federal offensive into Mississippi at Okolona (February 22), but became more famous for his daring raids against Union supply depots like Paducah (March 25), after which they overran a Union garrison at Fort Pillow (April 12), massacring many of the black soldiers and the white Tennesseans fighting for the Union.

From the onset of the conflict, distinctions between soldiers and civilians and formal standards mandating the humane treatment of prisoners became conditional, particularly in the minds of the weaker, more desperate Confederate forces. White Southerners indifferent or hostile to secession were discouraged by any means the authorities chose to try, and the early Confederate campaigns against the Indians demonstrated that the introduction of race would set aside all considerations of soldierly conduct. By 1864, the introduction of non-white troops into the conflict east of the Mississippi spread this suspension of standards.

The Federal Offensives, 1864

Grant planned a series of offensive campaigns to begin in May. Federal General Benjamin F. Butler moved a racially mixed Army of the James up that river, following McClellan's course of two

years before. It crossed the James to get between Richmond and Petersburg and wound up bottled in the “Bermuda Hundred.” However, it would not long be isolated.

Grant’s “overland campaign” proved far more successful than Butler’s but left an entire army of dead Unionists in its wake. Moving by way of Chancellorsville, the 100,000-man Army of the Potomac encountered the 61,000 of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in the Wilderness (May 5–6), losing 30,000 casualties before Federal flanking to the left resulted in a battle before Spotsylvania Court House (May 8–21) and another 30,000 casualties. Again moving by the flank, the Federals fought their way across the North Anna River (May 23–26) to assault well entrenched Confederates at Cold Harbor (May 31–June 12), resulting in about 15,500 casualties. Again, Grant shifted the bulk of his army around the Confederates, but, rather than strike at Richmond as Lee expected, Grant sent them about 25 miles farther south, to cross the James River and turn up at Petersburg, threatening to cut off Richmond from the rest of the South. Together, both sides lost about 11,400 casualties in the initial Union assaults on Petersburg (June 15–18). Union casualties over the campaign probably approached 70,000 men, but continued reinforcements left Grant with almost as many at the end of the campaign as he had at the start, while Lee’s lesser losses, perhaps as few as a third of those of the Federals, were irreplaceable. From this point onward, the Army of Northern Virginia would continue to shrink, even with the addition of old men and boys.

Grant’s unrelenting pressure accomplished what no previous Federal leadership in Virginia had. For two years, the Army of Northern Virginia had enjoyed a tactical freedom of movement that permitted it to preoccupy the Federals, but the presence of a Federal army before the capital at Richmond and its link to the rest of the South through Petersburg left Lee no alternative but the attrition of trench warfare. Moreover, as both sides entrenched around Petersburg, the Federals continually reinforced and resupplied. They pushed their line west towards the Jerusalem Plank Road and the Weldon Railroad (June 21–24), ultimately cutting that rail link after Globe Tavern (August 18–21). They also had Pennsylvania coal miners dig a long shaft under the Confederate lines and detonate an explosion at the Crater (July 30).

Losses in the western offensive were probably not as severe, but the outcome was much the same. At about the time Grant launched his offensive into Virginia, General William Tecumseh Sherman led Union forces into Georgia from Chattanooga. The Union forces fought and flanked the Confederates at Rocky Face Ridge (May 7–13), forcing them south towards Atlanta, ridge by ridge and road by road, at Resaca (May 13–15), Adairsville (May 17), New Hope Church (May 25–26), and Dallas (May 26–June 1), culminating in maneuvers around Marietta (June 9–July 3) which included a disastrous attack by the rebels at Kolb’s Farm (June 22) and by the Federals at Kennesaw Mountain (June 27). The Union army began extending a long looping line that eventually threatened to encircle Atlanta. In a mere eight days, aggressive Confederate attacks at Peachtree Creek (July 20), southeast of Atlanta (July 22), and Ezra Church (July 28), caused nearly 23,000 casualties. Additional fighting at Dalton (August 14–15), Lovejoy’s Station (August 20), and Jonesborough (August 31–September 1) ended with the Confederates torching their stores and railroad equipment and abandoning Atlanta to Sherman’s Federals.

Such successes eluded the Union Army before Richmond and Petersburg. However, it became capable of coordinated attacks at both ends of the Confederate line, that is, the railroad and road system southwest and west of Petersburg and the opposite end to the north protecting Richmond. They took the outer defenses of Richmond at New Market Heights and Chaffin’s Farm (September 29–30) while attacking southwest of Petersburg at Peeble’s Farm (September 30). The following month, they hit Fair Oaks (October 27–28) and Boydton Plank Road or Hatcher’s Run (October 27–28).

The Popular Mandate for Emancipation

Lincoln’s bid for reelection overshadowed everything in the last half of 1864. Hoping to skirt the major issues of “the Second American Revolution,” the Democrats adopted a platform opposed to the war and nominated a presidential candidate, General George B. McClellan, who favored the war but not emancipation. Lincoln also faced some initially serious dissent in his own party, largely because of his veto of the Wade-Davis Bill, which imposed conditions for the readmission of the Southern states. Confederate

strategists knew that the reelection of Lincoln's persistently aggressive administration would make defeat merely a matter of time.

That summer, a small Confederate column supplied itself through the Shenandoah Valley and moved towards Washington. It brushed aside a Federal force at Monocacy (July 9) and clashed with Union troops on the outskirts of the capital at Fort Stevens (July 11–12) before being driven back into Virginia by the Federals who began destroying the resources of the valley to prevent further another such raid. The two smaller armies clashed repeatedly until fighting at Opequon (September 19), Fisher's Hill (September 21–22), and Cedar Creek (October 19) drove the Confederates out of the Shenandoah.

Renewed combined operations against Charleston, Savannah, and Mobile met success only in the last case, when the Union fleet ran the batteries at Forts Gaines and Morgan and entered Mobile Bay (August 5), capturing Fort Morgan (August 23). In a direct attempt to influence the November elections, a Confederate invasion rampaged through Missouri before being defeated at Westport (October 23) and virtually routed at Mine Creek (October 25), but its political impact ensured the victory not only of the Republicans, but of the most radical factions in Missouri and Kansas.

Defeated before Atlanta, the Confederates in Georgia threatened the railroad link of the Federals at Allatoona (October 5) and unsuccessfully attempted a crossing of the Tennessee River near Decatur (October 26–29). Although delayed, the rebels reached central Tennessee, where their assaults on entrenched Unionists at Franklin (November 30) left nearly 6,300 Confederate casualties, including 65 field officers and 15 generals. Unequipped to survive the winter, they moved onto the heights over the state capital, until the Federals took advantage of a break in the weather to shatter the second largest Confederate army in the field at Nashville (December 15–16).

Sherman's Union army left Atlanta on November 15 for its "March to the Sea" that became the most cited demonstration of "total war." Living off the land, they destroyed not only railroads and public property, but any private property that might be of use to sustaining the rebellion. Its three major columns cut a swath of destruction 60 miles wide and 300 miles to the sea. The Unionists easily overcame their

one-sided encounters with the local militia or small groups of Confederate cavalry before seizing Fort McAllister (December 13), near Savannah, and reestablishing contact through the Federal fleet with the government.

After the reversals of 1863, a few desperate Confederate generals had advocated following the Federal example of arming blacks, offering manumission for military service. In the closing hungry weeks of the war, Robert E. Lee persuaded the Confederate government to adopt this measure, and two companies of black Confederates marched through Richmond as those they were defending pelted them with garbage. (Later state governments gave pensions for Confederate service to large numbers of teamsters, cooks, and laborers who had assisted the army, giving rise to a postwar myth that Richmond authorities had armed large numbers of "black Confederates.")

Lincoln's Second Inaugural (March 4) promised "malice towards none and charity for all," but under a restored Union. In an attempt to challenge Grant's stranglehold on Richmond, the Confederates attacked Fort Stedman (March 25). Union cavalry then hit on Five Forks (April 1), which closed all but one escape route from the Confederate capital. The subsequent capture of Petersburg (April 2) forced the rebel evacuation and Federal occupation of Richmond (April 3). Losing a quarter of his army at Saylor's Creek (April 6), Lee found his dwindling Army of Northern Virginia hopelessly cornered near where Lee surrendered it, at Appomattox Court House (April 9). Shortly after, a pro-Confederate group in Washington attacked several Federal officials, assassinating President Lincoln (April 14).

Elsewhere, the war wound down. Sherman's Union army had started through the Carolinas in February and took the surrender in North Carolina of the western rebel army near Durham Station (April 26). At Mobile, the Federals successfully forced the surrenders of Spanish Fort (March 27–April 8) and Fort Blakely (April 2–9), the latter taken by a costly assault in which black soldiers were major participants. Nearby, those remaining Confederates east of the Mississippi surrendered at Citronelle (May 4). Transmississippi Confederates protected the escape routes into Mexico with one last battle at Palmito Ranch (May 12–13) before capitulating at New Orleans (May 26).

The Possibilities and Limits of the Second American Revolution

Resolution of the conflict had required a “total war” that mobilized its respective societies, blurring the distinctions of soldier and civilian. Of an estimated 5.6 million Americans of military age, as many as 3.5 million served in some capacity, with the proportions higher as one went south. Over 623,000 died and as many emerged from the war maimed or in broken health. The roughly 200,000 African Americans in units of “United States Colored Troops” had won the sometimes grudging respect of whites on both sides.

Nevertheless, securing Union victory turned on civic will rather than military power. Radical new thinking came with the exigencies of war and Lincoln’s pragmatism, but both were gone. The new president, Andrew Johnson, saw his tasks simply as the rebuilding of state governments in the South under US authority, while the “Radical Republican” perspective dominated Congress, arguing for a sweeping social reconstruction to eliminate the planter class and foster the development of an educated, economically independent middle class.

Voters in 1866 returned an even more radical Congress, and its tension with the White House resulted in the first attempt to impeach a president. They largely shaped the “Reconstruction Amendments,” additions to the US Constitution to ensure rights to the former slaves. These were: the Thirteenth Amendment (December 6, 1865) eliminating slavery, the Fourteenth (July 28, 1868) assuring due process and equal protection to all; and the Fifteenth (February 3, 1870) assuring voting rights without reference to “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”

Although frequently seen in sectional terms, Northern business interests eager to return to their pursuits came to favor Johnson’s approach, while the real impulse towards radicalism was the experience of Southerners with secession. In hindsight, Radical Republicanism turned on black suffrage backed by an economic independence, most accessible through radical land reform. Some Radicals argued for such large-scale expropriation of the planter class on the grounds that the landed wealth of the South had been built by the labor of slaves, free blacks, and landless poor whites.

Naturally enough, the capitalism fostered by the war saw the national logic of the Radical argu-

ment and already had influence in government fully sufficient to turn policy into other channels. Not surprisingly, what presaged this shift was the reversal of the wartime defense of official Indian loyalty to declare the nations of the Indian Territory disloyal, and their sovereignty and lands forfeited, and making the restoration of good relations contingent on cooperation with railroad and other interests.

Reflecting the postwar hegemony of business concerns, the Republicans elected General U. S. Grant to serve as president from 1869 through 1877. Although unflinchingly loyal and unquestionably anti-slavery, Grant had shared the antebellum conservatism of other West Pointers, voted Democratic in 1860, and was not among the more eager to recruit and use black soldiers. Personally honest to a fault, he headed an administration characterized by massive financial corruption and scandals. After a contested election in 1876, the Democrats ceded the White House to the Republicans, who then withdrew the last of the troops from the South and ended Reconstruction. Almost immediately, white “Redeemer governments” returned to power, disenfranchising many black voters and imposing Jim Crow segregation in the 1890s.

Completing the tasks of Reconstruction after the “Second American Revolution” would take a “Second Reconstruction” by the civil rights movements that coincided with the centennial years of Civil War.

SEE ALSO: American Civil War and Slavery; American Civil War Draft Riots; Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870

References and Suggested Readings

- The Annals of the War, Written by Leading Participants North and South* (1878) Philadelphia: Philadelphia Weekly Times. Reprinted as *The Annals of the Civil War*. New York: DeCapo Press, 1994.
- Foner, E. (1970) *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Foner, E. (1988) *Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Long, E. B. (1971) *The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac*. New York: Da Capo Press.
- McPherson, J. M. (1988) *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nevins, A. (1947) *Ordeal of the Union*, 2 vols. New York: Scribner’s Sons.
- Nevins, A. (1950) *The Emergence of Lincoln*, 2 vols. New York: Scribner.

- Nevins, A. (1959–71) *The War for the Union*, 4 vols. New York: Scribner.
- Paludan, P. S. (1988) *A People's Contest*. New York: Harper & Row.
- The Rebellion Record* (1861–8) 11 vols. Ed. Frank Moore. New York: G. P. Putnam.

American Civil War draft riots

Stacy Warner Maddern

On July 13, 1863, an angry mob of New York's working people began moving uptown from lower Manhattan, gathering workers from workshops and factories along the way. The protest was an expression of collective outrage over the National Conscription Act passed in March 1863, which made all single men aged 20–45 and married men up to 35 subject to a draft lottery. What was particularly offensive to working people was that the Act allowed deferred conscription to anyone able to pay the government a \$300 exemption fee.

The white working people of New York City were largely Irish immigrants. Some were skilled laborers, but the vast majority were unskilled and competed directly with the city's African American workers. Such competition created an atmosphere of racial tension and violence in the years before the war, and during the draft riots black citizens became the most identifiable targets for the rioters' rage, resulting in the brutal murder and mutilation of hundreds of African American men. Rioters also attacked white New Yorkers who provided shelter for African Americans, sacking and burning their homes.

In lower Manhattan, Horace Greeley's *New York Daily Tribune* was set on fire because of its pro-Republican position. The rioters also attacked wealthy citizens, white and black, who they presumed to be Republicans. Because the crowd outnumbered the Metropolitan police force, efforts to contain the rioting were unsuccessful. Furthermore, because the police were a state agency, with political affiliation to the Republican Party, they were subject to attacks as well.

Upon reaching the Provost Marshall's office, the scene of the first draft lottery, the crowd attacked the building, setting it on fire. By evening, the militant protest grew larger and

violent attacks were waged on a number of human and institutional targets. City merchants and mercantile establishments became targets of looting and destruction. Because Brooks Brothers was under contract to the federal government to supply clothing to the Union army and had been involved in a labor dispute with 400 of its tailors, it was seen as an anti-labor symbol of the city's wealthiest class and one of the stores was destroyed on the second day of the riots.

On the evening of July 14, Democratic and Republican leaders met to discuss ways of quelling the violence. Republicans urged a declaration of martial law, while Democrats wanted to take less drastic measures. Mayor George Opdyke's refusal to request federal intervention or declare martial law led to sharp political divisions and intense debates among the city's political leaders. What emerged were two very different prescriptions for resolution. Tammany Hall and state Democrats tended to view the riots as viable working-class political protests, while those who had been targets of the rioters – Republican businessmen, merchants, journalists, and politicians – were of the opinion that a full-scale insurrection was underway and could only be suppressed by direct federal action. However, both sides agreed that these were very real tensions of social and economic classes, races, city, and nation that must be addressed.

On July 15, Mayor Opdyke wired Edwin Stanton, Secretary of War, to request federal troops, but refused to declare martial law, an action that would give the federal government control of the city. The mayor wanted a local solution to the protests. Tammany Democrats, meanwhile, were drafting a proposal to pay \$2.5 million to cover the \$300 draft exemption fees for every New York City conscript in order "to relieve the City of New York from unequal operation of conscription and to encourage volunteering." However, the rioters did not respond positively to the proposal as violence spread into Staten Island and Brooklyn.

On July 16, over 4,000 federal troops arrived in New York City to quell the rioters. By the early morning of July 17, the draft riots would be put down for good after lasting five days. In terms of loss of human life, the "official" death toll was listed at 119. However, speculation suggests that more than 1,000 people may have been killed.

In late August, 1863, the federal draft resumed in New York City, accompanied by 10,000

federal troops stationed there to insure peaceful proceedings. The city's Common Council, largely made up of Tammany Democrats, was able to approve a \$3 million exemption fund that was eventually vetoed by Mayor Opdyke. However, the mayor could do nothing to prevent the Board of Supervisors from establishing its own Exemption Committee to pay for replacements, a decision that would guarantee any New Yorker not wanting to fight for the Union to avoid being drafted.

SEE ALSO: American Civil War (1861–1864); American Civil War and Slavery; Anti-Vietnam War Movement, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Bernstein, I. (1991) *The New York City Draft Riots: Their Significance for American Society and Politics in the Age of the Civil War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schechter, B. (2007) *The Devil's Own Work: The Civil War Draft Riots and the Fight to Reconstruct America*. New York: Walker.

American Civil War and slavery

Orville Vernon Burton and Beatrice Burton

In many respects the American Civil War was the largest – and most successful – slave rebellion in the United States. Through African Americans' actions, the Civil War proved successful for the Union, leading to the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which protects all citizens from enslavement. The number of fugitive slaves played a pivotal role in the Civil War's success. As early as Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860, many slaves thought the fact that the Republican had been elected president meant that slavery had come to an end. To celebrate Lincoln's inauguration, for example, 17 slaves in Petersburg, Virginia declared their freedom and left their owner's plantation. The number of runaway slaves increased dramatically with the onset of the Civil War.

Runaway slaves usually fled to the Union army camps. Slave owners wanted their slaves returned to them; one owner from a seceding state ironically invoked the federal Fugitive Slave

Law to claim his "property." And the Union troops did not have the infrastructure or supplies to support the large number of refugees. Still, Union officers recognized returning fugitive slaves would only strengthen the Confederacy because slave labor undergirded the Southern economy and allowed whites to focus on the rebellion. The 1857 *Dred Scott* Supreme Court case had ruled that slaves were property, not people. So early in the war, in May 1861, Union General Benjamin F. Butler offered an ironic twist on the decision, declaring that fugitive slaves were "contraband of war" and so the Union could use them against the South.

That August, Congress legitimized this order by passing the First Confiscation Act. The following March, Congress forbade the military from sending fugitive slaves back to their owners in the Article of War Act, and in April 1862 Lincoln emancipated the District of Columbia slaves and compensated their owners. Congress passed the Second Confiscation Act in July 1862, which declared that slaves from rebellious owners were a military asset to the Union army and so "shall be forever free." In this way, the federal government increasingly took steps toward encouraging enslaved labor in the rebelling states to abandon the plantations.

In the fall of 1862 President Abraham Lincoln gave the Confederacy an ultimatum: either return to the Union with slavery intact, or on January 1, 1863 all slaves in the Confederate states would be freed. Lincoln announced this decision on September 22, but the South refused to rejoin the Union. So, 100 days later, on January 1, 1863, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation.

The Proclamation, often credited with freeing all slaves, actually had a much narrower scope. A military maneuver, Lincoln's Proclamation freed only the slaves in areas of the Confederacy still in rebellion, not in slaveholding states that had not seceded or in areas under federal control, such as Louisiana. He declared that "all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free." He promised that the federal government and Union military would recognize and protect their freedom. This, naturally, led to complications because the Confederacy did not see Lincoln as their president, so his Emancipation Proclamation

was moot in states not in control of the Union army, and if the Union army was in control, the slaves were not free. Still, in some cases, slaves learned of the Proclamation, and the African Americans informed the whites of the order. Even before Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, many slaves took it upon themselves to leave their plantations and emancipate themselves based on news of Lincoln's ultimatum.

Despite its technically limited reach, the Proclamation altered the meaning of the Civil War. Slavery, of course, was the cause of and had always been at the center of the Civil War. The Southern politicians – the white elite slaveholders – wanted to be sure the peculiar institution would not come under attack. Without the threat of a Republican president and fear of abolitionism, white Southerners would not have had cause to leave the Union. The Emancipation Proclamation made the cause of the war more apparent. The war no longer was merely about the preservation of the nation, but now the Union also held a high moral ground, fighting to fulfill the United States' promise of democracy.

When the Civil War first began, the prominent African American leader Frederick Douglass wrote a series of editorials in the *Pittsburgh Gazette*. His editorial from April 18, 1861 stated clearly

there is but one . . . effectual way to suppress and put down the desolating war which the slaveholders and their rebel minions are now waging against the American Government and its loyal citizens. Fire must be met with water, darkness with light, and war for destruction of liberty must be met with war for the destruction of slavery. *“The simple way, then, to put an end to the savage and desolating war now waged by the slaveholders, is to strike down slavery itself.”*

Now that emancipation was coming to fruition, white Southerners felt most threatened by the part of the Proclamation that sanctioned slave rebellion by stating that governmental authority “will do no act or acts to repress such person, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.” The document recommended that the people continue peacefully to work for wages and that they “abstain from all violence,” but – previously unheard of in race relations – that admonition against violence did not include “necessary self-defense.”

Along with the new moral stance and the condoning of rebellion and violence, the Emancipation Proclamation also opened the doors to the formation of African American military troops. Before, as a way of keeping slaveholding states in the Union, the military had refused to have fugitive slaves in their lines. Only after the Emancipation Proclamation did the Union officially enlist African Americans; most came from slaveholding states, and especially from Confederate states. In the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln encouraged freedmen to join the military. He stated: “And I further declare and make known that such persons of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.” Douglass, whose two sons enlisted, also called on African Americans to join the army. He declared: “A war undertaken and brazenly carried on for the perpetual enslavement of colored men, calls logically and loudly for colored men to help suppress it.” Equating the Civil War with past slave rebellion, he called on his fellow African Americans to “Remember Denmark Vesey of Charleston; remember Nathaniel Turner of Southampton; remember Shields Green and Copeland, who followed noble John Brown, and fell as glorious martyrs for the cause of the slave.”

And African Americans heeded Douglass' call. With the Emancipation Proclamation, new soldiers flooded into the Union army. Despite pay discrimination, thousands of African Americans enlisted in the army. Estimates run from 140,000 to 200,000 African American soldiers fighting in the Civil War. Regardless of the exact numbers, a significant number of African Americans joined the army following the Emancipation Proclamation, renewing Union strength at the same time that the South lost its labor system.

SEE ALSO: Brown, John (1800–1859); Lincoln, Abraham (1809–1865) and African Americans; Nat Turner Rebellion; Vesey's Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Burton, O. V. (2007) *Age of Lincoln*. New York: Hill & Wang.
- Franklin, J. (1965) *The Emancipation Proclamation*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
- Hahn, S. (2003) *A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South, From Slavery*

to the Great Migration. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

McPherson, J. (1965) *The Negro's Civil War: How American Negroes Felt and Acted During the War for the Union*. New York: Pantheon Books.

American left and Howard Zinn (b. 1922)

Ambre Ivol

Howard Zinn came to national prominence with the publication of his bestseller *A People's History of the United States from 1492 to the Present* (1980). The success of the book is first and foremost a testimony to the social transformations of the 1960s, and the intellectual revisions which ensued. Though anchored in the last century, Zinn remains a political essayist (*The Progressive* and *The Nation* magazines) and has supported the global justice movements against neoliberalism triggered by the famous Battle of Seattle in December 1999. He has become an outspoken critic of the War on Terrorism, and at 86 years of age is one of the most famous anti-war intellectuals in the country.

Zinn's view of history came out of half a century of involvement in social movements. Historians have either cast him as a member of the New Left or of the Old Left, thus revealing the ambivalence of his intellectual trajectory. Couched in a language both generational and political, the distinction between the "old" and the "new" hints at the gap – and thus perhaps at the impossibility – of belonging to both eras.

But Zinn's life and work suggest a different story. Most prominent have been his writings about the southern civil rights movement and against the war in Vietnam, which led him to argue against detached scholarship in times of war and social movements. But as important was his activism inside the labor movement as a union organizer for unskilled workers (himself an apprentice) in the Brooklyn Navy Yards in the late 1930s and early 1940s, and as a member of the American Veterans Committee (AVC), a radical alternative to the more conservative American Legion, in the late 1940s. He was a fellow traveler to the American Communist Party but never formally joined, remaining skeptical about its allegiance to the Soviet Union.

Born to a Jewish immigrant working-class family in New York City, Zinn's Weltanschauung was shaped by the hopes of international communism, the Great Depression, and European fascism. His worldview was enriched by the analytical tools of Marxism and the cultural hegemony of Popular Front communism. A volunteer bombardier in World War II from 1941 to 1945, he participated in the last bombing missions over Europe. Though he never questioned the Good War, discussions with a fellow bombardier (a Trotskyist who tried to organize US soldiers), as well as the bombing of the French town of Royan (involving the use of napalm) in the last weeks of the war in Europe, led him to question the morality of militarism.

Moreover, the working-class life he returned to after the war only deepened his commitment to radical politics. He left the navy yards but continued union organizing and was involved in a wildcat strike as a truck-loader working night-shifts. But the spirit of the 1940s was short-lived because of the brutal reconfigurations of national culture during the McCarthy era. Zinn himself was saved from the repressive atmosphere which weakened the labor movement thanks to the GI Bill, which allowed him to go to college. While working toward his PhD in US history at Columbia University, he took up his first full-time teaching position at Spelman College in Atlanta and moved south as the black liberation movement was gathering momentum in 1956.

Though a radical activist for over a decade, he actually came of age as an intellectual as an adult advisor for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) from 1962 to 1965, sharing the role with longtime activist Ella Baker. Fired from Spelman for insubordination in 1963, he became a freelance historian-participant for the movement until he was hired by Boston University in 1964, where he taught in the political science department for the next twenty years. He soon became an outspoken critic of the war in Vietnam, and was among the first scholars to call for immediate withdrawal of US troops as early as 1967.

Zinn's life illustrates a trend of continuity among generations of political activists and contradicts the generational opposition prevalent in the historiography of the US left. His trajectory reinforces a historical continuity more visible in the black liberation movement and which is embodied in the lives of women activists Rosa

Parks (1913–2005) and Ella Baker (1903–86) and unionists A. Philip Randolph (1899–1979) and E. D. Nixon (1899–1987), as well as black internationalist Malcolm X (1925–65) and influential novelist James Baldwin (1924–87). Hence the presence of Zinn as a middle-aged white male in the southern movement (later a supporter of Black Power) further complicates the generational dynamics of the new social movements of the 1960s. Moreover, Zinn then saw the black struggle (and the SNCC especially) as the driving force for a new radical agenda capable of reconfiguring the whole left. Moving away from white-centered politics, his analyses differ from the disparate identity politics which has come to be the collective heritage of the 1960s. Indeed, discrepancies along race, gender, and class lines were to be combined instead of opposed to each other. Moreover, Zinn's early disillusionment with Stalinism (since the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939, and then during the Cold War) in the repressive context of the Red Scare (he was interrogated twice by the FBI in the early 1950s) also complicates the generally simplistic view of old leftists idealizing the Soviet Union.

In order to understand the ambivalence of Zinn's political identity, one should recast him as a member of the forgotten "Good War generation." Though remembered as the patriotic generation par excellence (with the major exception of the experiences of African Americans and other minorities), Zinn's story suggests it was in fact quite politically aware, holding the memory of a national culture informed by the popular uprisings of the New Deal era and marked by the contradictions of the war, such as racial discrimination in the US armed forces, the bombing of civilians in Europe and Asia, and the use of two atomic bombs by the United States. Historian Ellen Schrecker (1998) has shown how the "mental contours" of the country were reshaped by the Red Scare and how the "social-democratic consensus" of the late 1940s was aborted, remapping national culture for decades to come. Zinn's life serves as a vivid reminder of this forgotten moment of the late 1940s.

The historical amnesia which then set in would be partly overcome during the 1960s. The left was then organizationally weakened, as class issues had become taboo and the labor movement seemed to have been coopted thanks both to a booming economy and union leaders who accepted the

Cold War agenda. But new social movements opened up a space for older activists who had been deprived of networks of activism by the Red Scare. Zinn encountered activists of his generation through the black liberation movement. Civil rights leaders such as World War II veterans Whitney Young (1921–71), Medgar Evers (1925–63), and Amzie Moore (1911–82) became prominent organizers for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and worked with the SNCC. Zinn also became acutely aware of the role of older women in the movement, such as Ella Baker and Fannie Lou Hamer (1917–77). Also, leading pacifist figures of the Vietnam anti-war movement, such as World War II conscientious objector David Dellinger (1915–2004) and Catholic leftists Daniel (b. 1921) and Philip Berrigan (1923–2002), served as important bridges between generations. For older leftists, the 1960s helped to recover from the trauma of the Red Scare. Indeed, the two major organizations of the new left, the SNCC and Students for a Democratic Society, decided to reject the anti-communist consensus and thus signaled, together with growing opposition to the House of Un-American Activities hearings, a readiness to rethink radical politics.

Zinn thus has a double heritage: he is an old left radical who became a new left public intellectual. His class consciousness is embedded in his personal experience of poverty and his union activism. But his race and gender consciousness were shaped by the black liberation movement. Interestingly, his views about war came out of both eras. He revisited the trauma of World War II during trips to North Vietnam as a representative of the US peace movement (with Father Dan Berrigan) and to France in the 1960s. Hence the movement against the war in Vietnam helped older veterans to process their war experiences, and in Zinn's case to draw on it to develop an analysis of US imperialism in his book *Postwar America, 1945–1971* (1973). The Good War generation produced novelists Norman Mailer and Kurt Vonnegut who both wrote about their war experiences, and both intellectually came of age in the 1960s. Historian William Appleman Williams became a leading theorist of Cold War revisionism, himself also a World War II veteran. And Zinn's trajectory is a telling example of how McCarthyism prevented a whole generation from coming of age in the 1950s,

thus exacerbating a generational approach to leftist politics as new movements arose in the 1960s. Hence, perhaps the very concepts of “old” and “new” lefts are a heritage of the Cold War.

Novelist and political essayist Gore Vidal (b. 1925), himself a member of the Good War generation, has criticized what he calls the “United States of Amnesia” in his book *Imperial America* (2004). Zinn has tried to restore a sense of continuity in US history. *A People’s History* is his most popular attempt to bring to life generations of dissenters by drawing on generations of scholars, activists, and artists who recorded this history of resistance. And successive generations of young people have been attracted to his narrative, indeed a powerful antidote against historical amnesia – and generational gaps – in US history.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Vietnam War Movement, United States; Baker, Ella Josephine (1903–1986); Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA); Evers, Medgar (1925–1963); Marxism; Parks, Rosa (1913–2005) and the Montgomery Bus Boycott; Student Movements; Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC); Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)

References and Suggested Readings

- Buhle, P., Buhle, M. J., & Georgakas, D. (1998) *Encyclopedia of the American Left*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Carson, C. (1981) *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Dittmer, J. (1994) *Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Long, P. (Ed.) (1969) *The New Left: A Collection of Essays*. Boston: Porter Sargent.
- Schiffirin, A. (Ed.) (1997) *The Cold War and the University: Towards an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years*. New York: New Press.
- Schrecker, E. (1998) *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Zinn, H. (1965) *SNCC: The New Abolitionists*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Zinn, H. (1967) *Vietnam, the Logic of Withdrawal*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Zinn, H. (1997) *The Zinn Reader: Writings on Disobedience and Democracy*. Boston: Seven Stories Press.

American Revolution of 1776

Mark A. Lause

The power struggle between major European powers in North America created the preconditions for the American Revolution. The term refers primarily to the successful struggle of British colonists for independence and secondarily to the internal social and political upheavals within the colonies. Religious and national rivalries between Catholic Spain and France and the Protestant Netherlands and England framed their transatlantic extension of Western civilization into the Americas.

By the eighteenth century, Britain emerged as the dominant colonizing power on the Atlantic seaboard of North America, though French based in Canada explored and claimed much of the vast interior to the Mississippi River, and the Spanish had a tenuous hold on most of the rest. After a first failed attempt at Roanoke (1585), the English established Jamestown, the inception of Virginia (1607), the plantations of which extended north with Maryland, even as Puritan dissenters from the Church of England, settling at Plymouth (1620), Boston, and other communities later subsumed into Massachusetts. The preoccupations of the English Civil Wars (1642–51) and their aftermath postponed aggressive colonization until the Restoration (1660) of the monarchy, after which it added or reorganized Connecticut, North Carolina, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. After the establishment of Georgia (1732), 13 adjacent English colonies shared more with each other than with England.

The Crisis of the Old Order

Western Civilization in the New World

Several decisive and overriding differences rendered impossible the replication of European societies in the New World. Native populations in the Americas faced exposure to epidemic diseases to which they had no immunity, and the “Great Dying” took an estimated 80–95 percent of the population often before it had any direct contact with the Europeans. In contrast to Latin America, English settlers displaced the Indians in

North America, partly through intensely violent, if localized, conflicts like King Philip's War (1675–6) in New England or the Tuscarora War (1711–13) and the Stono Rebellion (1739) in South Carolina. In central New York, the Iroquois declared wisely, if impossibly, that they would remain neutral in any future colonial wars (1701).

Anglo-America offered tremendous untapped resources and possibilities without having a labor force to realize those possibilities. After experiments with the Indians proved unpromising, the English introduced indentured servants who, in return for passage to America, signed themselves into service for seven years, the system recruiting large numbers of Irish and German peasants rather than English freemen. Those who survived the five-year "seasoning" to regain freedom either returned to Europe or exacerbated the shortage by becoming competitors in the search for cheap labor.

As Virginia turned to tobacco, they imported the first African servants to Jamestown (1619). Thirty years later, contractors brought large numbers of blacks into the Chesapeake. The adoption of comprehensive Slave Codes in Maryland (1661), then in Virginia (1670) and elsewhere, formulated the legal underpinnings of slavery as a lifelong, inherited, and racially defined labor system.

The nascent global imperial system integrated the colonies. The "triangular trade" between North America, the West Indies, and Africa involved the transportation of rum to Africa, slaves to the Indies, and molasses to New England. Most trade within the colonies remained maritime and coastal, although roads linked some of the more important towns. Colonists also manufactured some goods (like beaver pelt hats) for a broader market.

The social formation followed the hierarchic pattern of the old country. Merchants in the seaboard city and the gentlemen-planters on the vast commercial farmlands formed the colonial elites, while the "lower orders" included slaves, indentured servants, day laborers, unskilled workers, farm labor, and a growing group of skilled craftsmen unable to achieve self-employment in their own shops. A significant portion of white men constituted what contemporaries called the "middling sort," mostly small-scale family farmers, professionals, and artisans. Colonial doctors, lawyers, and scientists shared English attainments, and groups like the American

Philosophical Society (1743) reflected their interests. Artisans and craftsmen – usually referred to as "mechanicks" – often shared this standing.

Local records indicate that the balance of these groups varied considerably with climate, geography, and levels of settlement. Society became increasingly stratified as one moved from the "frontier" through subsistence farming areas to commercial agriculture. In the last category, wealth concentrated in relatively few hands and required a large propertyless laboring class. The commercial farming society of the Mid-Atlantic "bread basket" colonies with its day labor and indentured servants clearly differed from the plantations of the Chesapeake, where slaves performed the work.

Finally, the nature of urban life meant that the vast majority of city dwellers could not have afforded the cost of even the small amount of land for home ownership, while the elite there did business globally. Only Philadelphia had nearly 70,000 and New York roughly 40,000. These, with Boston, Charleston, and Newport, were the only cities with more than 8,000, although an additional fifteen towns – a total of twenty – had more than 3,000.

English Values in the American Setting

Colonists shared the taste for political debate that had defined the conflict, protest, and upheaval back in England. In royal colonies, governors appointed by the king clashed with assemblies elected by those white males meeting the proper religious and property requirements. These bodies tended to be "bicameral" (two-chambered), with a more broadly elected lower house and an upper chamber (a council or senate) representing a more exclusive franchise. Assembly deliberations often reflected the tensions between the more settled tidewater and the underdeveloped back country. These conflicts erupted in popular upheavals like Virginia's Bacon's Rebellion (July–October 1676), New York's Leisler's Rebellion (May 31, 1689–March 19, 1691), and other risings against local officials of King James II in Maryland and New England during the "Glorious Revolution" (1688) which overthrew James back home.

The late seventeenth-century British experience codified ideas that would be essential to the American Revolution. Thomas Hobbes described monarchy as less a divinely ordained order than a rational social contract necessary to order. Writing after 1688, John Locke enumerated

conditions that justified setting aside that contract, specifically emphasizing the centrality of individual liberty.

Despite the English terms of the argument, many of the 3,000,000 colonists had no particular allegiance to Britain. Next to the English, Africans constituted the largest group in the colonies, but several hundred thousand Germans and Scotch-Irish resided there, as did locally significant numbers of Huguenots (French Protestants) in New York, Virginia, South Carolina, and Massachusetts; Jews at Newport, New York, and Charleston; and Dutch or Swedes, who remained in, respectively, New York and Delaware.

Moreover, English settlers did not represent a cross-section of the society at home, where the elite lacked an incentive to migrate and the poor the means to do so. Therefore, the human materials used in the construction of an essentially English hierarchy in the colonies would be the “middling sort” who would essentially reproduce the Old World hierarchies. This filling in of a British social pyramid created an elite that had disproportionately risen in the world, and a lower class of families that had actually experienced a relative decline and often returned to the old country. The former shaped the cultural and social self-perceptions, while the latter became largely unnoticeable. Too, ordinary colonists, if actually free, experienced higher wages because of the labor shortage, greater success due to the expanding economy, and a higher level of literacy and learning.

Among white men, an ideology of secular success emerged, personified by Benjamin Franklin, a printer, who became a major power in the colonies. His annually published *Poor Richard's Almanac* (1732–57) gained great popularity for interspersing the usual data found in such works with aphorisms and sayings, such as “Early to bed and early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise.” Franklin himself personified this drive for upward mobility through industry and ambition.

This emphasis on individualism drew strength from the dislocations from the faith of their forebears – and the crisis of Puritanism in a yet unpurified world. These inspired non-denominational revivals called the Great Awakening (1739) that appealed to the emotions, emphasized lay preaching, and carried Protestantism still further from the Catholic idea of salvation through ritual sacraments

among a community of believers towards the idea of individual redemption.

That kind of self-reliance inspired protests over the checking of their elected assemblies by the appointed royal governors, the royal vetoes of colonial laws and revoking of colonial charters, the British imposition of Writs of Assistance to search for smuggled goods, and the quartering of redcoats in the colonies. In Boston, James Otis argued in a 5-hour oration at the State House (1761) that the writs represented a violation of the natural rights of the colonists that contemporaries saw as an argument for resistance.

Most fundamentally, these values among the colonists strained at their colonial status. Codified in a series of Navigation Acts and Acts of Trade, British policies reflected “mercantilism,” measures European powers established to shape colonial commerce in ways compatible with that of the mother country. Goods going to and from the British colonies were to be carried on British ships and properly taxed. Its colonies were to provide raw materials and purchase manufactures from Britain. With English authorities preoccupied at home, colonial merchants and artisans found their own way around the system, essentially an exaggeration of how Britons behaved at home. The royal authorities called ignoring the law “smuggling,” but were in no position to stop, regulate, or tax it.

The colonists moreover participated loyally alongside British soldiers in fighting King William's War (1689–97), Queen Anne's War (1702–13), and King George's War (1744–8), after which the New World itself became the focus of mid-century tensions between England and France. Conflicting claims to the Ohio valley brought explorers, soldiers, and surveyors into the disputed territory. One of the latter, the 22-year-old George Washington, heard rumors of a combined French and Indian ambush and led the British militia with Indian allies of their own against the French at what became Jumonville Glen (May 28, 1754), an event that sparked what became known as the French and Indian War, or the Seven Years' War in Europe. After the defeat of a British force at Monongahela (July 9, 1755), Washington took command and saved the column. Having also played a vital role in the Hudson Valley and Canada, colonists expected to enjoy its benefits. The Treaty of Paris (February 10, 1763) ceded to the British almost everything east of the Mississippi River.

Prerevolutionary Crisis, 1763–1774

Unwilling to accept this division of territory, the Indian leader Pontiac built a broad alliance of native peoples to prevent the British occupation of the area. After destroying a series of forts, Pontiac surrendered at Detroit on October 31, leaving the fate of his people in British hands. To placate his now more numerous Indian subjects, the authorities issued the Proclamation of 1763, pledging to prevent settlement of the West beyond a certain point.

A succession of British measures sought to address the problems. They also began asserting more control over the more immediate functioning of the colonial economy with the American Revenue Act or “Sugar Act” (April 5, 1764) attempting to collect those taxes on molasses and sugar by reducing the amount owed, and the Currency Act (September 1), controlling the use of paper money by colonists. Finally, hoping to recover some of the costs of the war, Parliament passed the Stamp Act (March 22, 1765), requiring an impressed seal on legal documents, permits, contracts, and printed matter like newspapers, tracts, and playing cards, and authorizing appointment of specially appointed stampmasters to oversee its actual enforcement.

Although colonial assemblies prepared to make their protests, Samuel Adams and others in Boston opted to organize to prevent enforcement of the Stamp Act by forcing the resignation of the stampmasters. Directed by an amorphous “Sons of Liberty,” this resistance had small and secretive local leadership, the “Loyal Nine” in Boston. However, these leaders relied directly upon “mob” actions, which required street leaders like Ebenezer Macintosh, the Boston shoemaker, and John Webber, a Newport sailor, to agitate and manage the crowds of common seamen and mechanics. The August demonstrations in New England generated a great deal more violence and destruction of property than expected, although the “Liberty Boys” held more orderly protests elsewhere. The radical strategy worked, forcing the resignation of the stampmasters.

The gathering of representatives of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina in the Stamp Act Congress (October 7–25, 1765) voted its resolutions of protest (October 19). While Parliament did repeal the Stamp Act, it passed a Declaratory Act

(March 18, 1766) asserting its authority to levy such taxes. Legislators then sought to establish the precedent with the Townshend Revenue Act (June 15–July 2, 1767). This set up a Board of Customs Commissioners to collect the duties on the imported lead, glass, paint, oil, tea, and paper. With an eye to the Stamp Act Riots, colonial leaders opted for a strategy of “non-importation” – or “boycott” – of British goods. Local committees of correspondence coordinated these efforts.

The strategy both had an impact on Britain and kept the conflict off the streets. However, it also polarized merchants who made their living directly through commerce and “mechanicks,” who benefited from having to make the items not imported. As time went on, the division found reflection in the formation of distinct mechanics’ parties and associations, committed to more militant action.

From Resistance to Revolution: Establishing Dual Power

Moreover, there were dramatic and sometimes violent encounters with the authorities. The British seized John Hancock’s ship *Liberty* (June 10, 1768), and sent troops to maintain order in Boston. As these occupation troops sought part-time work in the city, tensions flared, most notably in the Boston Massacre (March 5, 1770), where soldiers who had earlier rioted at the ropewalks opened fire on a crowd that included individuals with whom they had earlier brawled. Clashes over a liberty pole raised outside a public house led to New York’s “Battle” of Golden Hill (January 19, 1771). Royal authorities in North Carolina closed the local “War of the Regulation” with back country farmers with the battle of Alamance Creek (May 16, 1771), and Rhode Island radicals attacked and destroyed the British ship *Gaspee* (June 9, 1772).

By making the duties a dead letter, the colonists encouraged the parliamentary repeal of all but the tax on tea. To save the East India Company, the government bought massive amounts of tea and the Tea Act (April 27–May 10, 1773) authorized moving it to the colonies, where it would be sold at a reduced rate, even with the addition of a tax, to the colonists. Seeing this as a precedent for levying the internal tax, the Boston city fathers protested the measure, and looked the other way when the Sons of Liberty boarded the ships and

threw the cargo overboard in the Boston Tea Party (December 16, 1773).

British authorities responded with what the colonists called “the Intolerable Acts.” Parliament’s four “Coercive Acts” aimed at forcing restitution for the destruction of the tea through the Boston Port Act (March 31, 1774) closing the harbor until the community paid for the destruction of property; the Administration of Justice Act and the Massachusetts Government Act (May 20) effectively suspended the colonial government and subjected colonists accused of political crimes to royal justice; and a Quartering Act of 1774 (June 2) making the city responsible for the sheltering and feeding of occupation troops in private homes. The colonists grouped these with a fifth, the Quebec Act (June 22), which placed administration of the western territory west of the Alleghenies and north of the Ohio River under the administration of the King’s Catholic but still orderly subjects in Quebec.

The leadership of other colonies realized that the British assertion of this kind of authority over any colony involved a precedent that had implications beyond Massachusetts. Representatives of 12 of the 13 colonies (all but Georgia) gathered at that point in a general Continental Congress on September 5–October 26, 1774. This First Continental Congress responded to the Coercive Acts with a Colonial Declaration of Rights and Grievances (October 14), demanding the repeal of over a dozen acts of Parliament and agreeing to a Continental Association that would do no business with Britain until the matter was resolved. Britain responded with the New England Restraining Act (March 30, 1775) which barred those colonies from trade with the rest of the empire and from the North Atlantic fisheries. In April the royal officials extended the restrictions to Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virginia, Maryland, and South Carolina. The British outlawing of colonial assemblies did not abolish those governments but placed their functioning beyond the imperial constitutional structure. This establishment of rival governments sewed the real seeds of independence.

The Outbreak of the War: The New England Phase, 1775–1776

General Thomas Gage, commanding the British military occupation of Boston, had to act against a Massachusetts assembly that just refused to dissolve itself. When the British confiscated

munitions and equipment near Boston, the Powder Alarm (September 1, 1774) created a reliable mechanism for watching and communicating about British activities. Town leaders in the area agreed to organize a third of the local militia into special companies of “minutemen.” The system bloodlessly thwarted a British attempt to seize munitions at Salem (February 27, 1775). When the Boston resistance realized that the British were sending a column of about 800 west from the city to seize colonial supplies, Dr. Joseph Warren sent Paul Revere, William Dawes, and others to ride an alert to the Massachusetts officials. When rebels in the Old North Church flashed a prearranged signal, the messengers began their Midnight Ride (April 18–19).

As the English moved west from the city, less than eighty local militia turned out under arms at sunrise to meet the advance of this massive column of regulars at Lexington (April 19, 1775). Their captain was said to have told the men “if they mean to have a war, let it begin here.” The advance companies of the British column wheeled into place against them. When they refused to disperse, shooting began and 18 militia fell as the rest scattered. The later rationalization was that they had bought time for the militia further west to mobilize, but the “first blood” of the war was less a battle than a protest gone terribly wrong. The British reached their goal, where the militia cautiously withdrew across the Old North Bridge to a hill overlooking town. There several hundred militia drove about 115 regulars back into the town.

As the rebel force grew to nearly 2,000, the British regulars abandoned the town and began counter-marching towards Lexington. There, at about 2:30 pm, a reinforcing brigade from Boston brought the British total to about 2,000. By then, about twice as many militias were converging on the road back to Boston, skirmishing and sniping all along the way. Some of the British who returned to Boston had marched 40 miles in 21 hours, 8 under fire, but many never made it back.

Ethan Allen and other settlers from Connecticut had moved north into the New Hampshire Grants, west of land claimed by both that state and New York. Led by radicals like Dr. Thomas Young, settlers adopted the name Vermont and declared their independence simultaneously from Britain and the two states that claimed them. It sought admission to the emerging US but was essentially barred by the

two states that still claimed the land. When Vermont also adopted the radical constitution of Pennsylvania, it found itself further isolated.

Rebel leaders, in turn, had their own plans to get at the British artillery and stores at Fort Ticonderoga, a “Gibraltar” built to protect the route up the Hudson River towards Lake Champlain and Canada. Ethan Allen, the Connecticut leader of settlers on the New Hampshire Grants, raised one force, and Benedict Arnold organized a group in Massachusetts. The two combined and elected Allen to lead them. A detachment took the small garrison at Crown Point, while the main force managed, without a shot being fired, to seize Fort Ticonderoga on May 10. Gage’s forces found themselves bottled in Boston by a militia force from Massachusetts and neighboring colonies that grew to 8,000 or more. General William Howe brought 4,000 British reinforcements on May 15, after which they planned an aggressive attempt to break what there was of a siege.

Fearing British plans to cross the Charles River and fortify the Charlestown peninsula, about 1,400 to 1,500 militia, including a number of African Americans, hurried there to dig some defenses, which they mistakenly dug on Breed’s Hill (June 16). In the heat of the next day, it took some 6 hours for the 2,600 redcoats with their wool uniforms and 60-pound field packs to move against the rebels on what most on both sides thought to be Bunker Hill (June 17). The militia lacked discipline, and some began to slip away through the course of the fighting. One officer, variously identified, advised them, “don’t fire until you see the whites of their eyes,” and the ill-trained defenders held against two assaults. British reserves came up for the third attempt, but the defenders had already run out of ammunition, and most had no bayonets with which to turn back the assault.

In the end, the Americans broke and ran, but only after having stood up to some of the best troops in the world for as long as they had powder. British naval fire consumed Charlestown and militia casualties ran to 450, but the British lost 1,054, disproportionately officers, who had been prominent in leading their men forward. Open warfare followed. The British government replaced Gage with Howe, who remained ever cautious after Bunker Hill, and a British naval expedition from Boston burned Falmouth (near present Portland) on October 18, 1775.

The arrival of General George Washington, sent by the Continental Congress, transformed the militia into a Continental Army. After that, Washington occupied Dorchester Heights (March 4, 1776). Although fearing another Bunker Hill, Howe moved into position for an attack, but a late snowstorm gave his officers the opportunity to dissuade him. In the end, he informed the Continentals of his change of plans and, warning that he would burn Boston should the rebels try to interfere, evacuated Boston for Nova Scotia (March 17).

Beyond New England

Virginia, the most populous of the colonies, mobilized and drove from power the royal governor. The determined and coherent assembly convinced the governor, Lord Dunmore, to withdraw with his supporters from the capital at Williamsburg to fall back to the coast near Norfolk. From there, they pillaged the plantations and farms of the rebels, offering freedom to slaves who would run away. The Tories won a skirmish at Kemp’s Landing and then moved south to protect the approach to Norfolk from the Carolinas. There, the British encountered a large Continental force at Great Bridge in early December, which resulted in the withdrawal of Dunmore, the British, and many Tories from the colony. Virginia issued its own Declaration of Rights on June 12, 1776.

A combined Continental naval and military expedition captured New Providence Island in the Bahamas on March 3, 1776, but American naval strategy rested upon privateers (private ships licensed for war duty) under John Barry and John Paul Jones, among others, who inflicted great damage upon British commerce and prestige. Jones, aboard the *Bonhomme Richard*, captured the British man-of-war *Serapis* near the English coast at Flamborough Head on September 23, 1779. In the course of the encounter, Jones replied to a call for his surrender, “I have not yet begun to fight.” Although so damaged that it would sink later that day, the *Bonhomme Richard* continued to fight until the British surrendered and allowed the Americans to board the *Serapis*.

A Continental move into Canada grew directly out of the experience of these colonists who had helped Britain take the area from France. General Richard Montgomery led about 1,700 Continentals north towards Montreal, and Arnold took 750

towards Quebec. Montgomery's column quickly besieged about 300 enemy infantry at Fort St. Jean (August 21–November 3) on the Richelieu River at the north end of Lake Champlain. The British won but refused to compromise the security of Quebec by moving forward any of its 2000-man force at Montreal.

During the siege, Ethan Allen led a detachment of about 200 of Montgomery's men towards Montreal, where they met about 260 of the enemy on the banks of the St. Lawrence at Longue-Pointe (September 24). The Americans were turned back and Allen himself captured, but the intransigence of the British command in bringing forward its large force at Montreal led to a disintegration of much of the militia. With the surrender of Fort St. Jean, the Continentals occupied Montreal (November 13).

By this point, Arnold had 600 men poised above Quebec on the Plains of Abraham, while Montgomery was supposed to be moving 300 of his force against the lower town, protected by only 100 British regulars supplemented by hundreds of militia. In the attack on Quebec (December 31), Montgomery was killed and Arnold badly wounded. Having failed miserably to take the city by storm, Arnold held the tattered remains of his expedition together through the winter, and American reinforcements arrived in March 1776, bringing the total to 2,000. These had to retreat to New York when 8,000 British arrived in May.

The reinforced British moved quickly, driving the Continentals back up the St. Lawrence. They captured over 500 Americans at Les Cèdres (May 15–16, 1776), though about 2,500 Americans tried a strong counter-attack on 3,000 British pursuers at Trois-Rivières (June 8) about half-way to Montreal. Arnold abandoned Montreal on June 15.

The US Navy claims to have fought its first engagement at Valcour Bay or Valcour Island (October 11–13). Although defeated, Arnold had delayed the British sufficiently to where winter would immobilize them until the spring.

War for Independence: Toward a New Nation

By 1776 what had begun as an armed protest was beginning to turn into a revolution. The British government, claiming to be suppressing a rebellion of Englishmen, contracted to hire Hessian

troops for use against them. Meanwhile, the colonists formed a Second Continental Congress on May 10, 1775 at Philadelphia. While offering its Olive Branch Petition to Britain, it appointed Washington the commander of a unified Continental Army and issued its Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms on July 6, 1775. Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* appeared in January of 1776 and urged that the colonies embrace independence not only as a practical necessity under the circumstances, but as an opportunity to transform the New World into a new kind of civilization. This pamphlet eventually became a published work second in readership only to the Bible.

Because most of the old proprietary government of Pennsylvania clung to the imperial regime, its overthrow became essential to American independence. The radicals favorable to independence clashed with the conservatives over assembly elections, but this failed amid charges of widespread vote fraud and large-scale exclusion of Germans. The Continental Congress subsequently passed a resolution authorizing colonists to establish new institutions where "no government sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs has been hitherto established." Some 4,000 Philadelphians then demonstrated outside the State House for both American Independence and a new constitution. The Committee of Privates, based in the militia, then organized elections for a constitutional convention at Carpenters' Hall.

Richard Henry Lee proposed independence on June 7, and the Congress appointed a committee of five to write a declaration in justification of the move. The committee, in turn, left the initial draft to Thomas Jefferson. The Congress voted for independence on July 2 and sent the declaration to be signed at the printer's on July 4. The declaration not only protested the specific acts of George III, but began with a concise statement of basic Enlightenment assumptions about government and human rights that remain essential, if selectively ignored, to the modern world:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. – That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the

governed, – That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

The vagaries of these assertions reflect the ambiguities implicit in the coalition that had resisted the British, read *Common Sense*, and wanted independence.

The Mid-Atlantic War: New York to Philadelphia, 1776–1778

Despite the earlier expulsion of the British from Virginia, fighting continued to take place in the South. North Carolina Patriots mobilized to block a march by Loyalists to a rendezvous with the British north of Wilmington, routing them at Moore's Creek on February 27, 1776. In Charleston Harbor, the Continentals used palmetto trunks to protect against the unsuccessful British barrage on the Sullivan's Island emplacements that later became Fort Moultrie.

Still, after the British evacuation of Boston, it was clear that they would need a major seaport from which to manage and supply the subjugation of the colonies. The best target, for a myriad of reasons, would be New York. The British enjoyed an unchallenged and unchallengeable naval superiority and July brought into the harbor Howe's massive army that vastly outnumbered the Continentals. Washington saw no viable plan for defending the vast islands and inlets of New York or for reinforcing or evacuating any part of the area. Nobody could have stopped the British from landing in the area, and it was virtually unimaginable to slow or stop them. However, it would have been politically impossible to abandon the area to the British without a fight, so Washington took an untried revolutionary army and entered into a failing campaign.

The British landed at Staten Island and bided time until they had sufficient force to sweep the Americans from the area. After six weeks, they began transporting what became over 20,000 men across the narrows to Brooklyn. Half of the Continentals waited on Manhattan, while the other half took defensive positions around Flatbush, meeting the British in the battle of Long Island from August 27–30. British General Henry Clinton then led a night march that seized

Jamaica Pass, turning the Continentals' left flank, and the subsequent fighting proved very one-sided. The battle ended with a remarkably fortunate night evacuation of some 9,000 Continentals.

The experience on Long Island underscored the problems of defending Manhattan with a small force that could not possibly block all possible points of landing. A few weeks after the fighting in Brooklyn, Howe landed some 4,000 British troops at Kip's Bay on Manhattan (near present 34th Street). With reinforcements landing throughout the day, they easily maneuvered the rebels out of New York City on September 15. Some 2,000 Continentals then took positions in the rugged terrain of the island north of the city (present Morningside Heights and west Harlem), where they met a British force that eventually grew to about 5,000. The fighting at Harlem Heights on September 16 ended when Lord Charles Cornwallis arrived with fresh British troops.

This dismal period gave rise to some of the great legends of the Revolution. In New York, the Connecticut schoolteacher-turned-spy Nathan Hale faced his British executioners on September 22 with "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country." Thomas Paine, participating in the dismal retreat across New Jersey, wrote the first of his *Crisis* papers: "These are the times that try men's souls: The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of his country; but he that stands it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman." Continentals could draw little inspiration from their rear guard actions at Pell's Point (October 18) in the Bronx, and at White Plains (October 28).

What the British did while they controlled New York provided a standing argument against an American acquiescence to the reestablishment of royal authority in the New World. In the aftermath of the battle, the city lost 400 to 500 buildings in the great fire of New York (September 21–22), which each side blamed on the other. The city provided the base for devastating raids that destroyed Danbury (April 25–26), Fairfield (July 8), Norwalk (July 10), and other Connecticut communities. The British hold on New York made it a special nightmare for legions of American prisoners, some 11,000 of whom died of malnutrition, exposure, mistreatment, and disease in the overcrowded prison

ships moored on the Brooklyn side of the East River at Wallabout Bay.

Based at Philadelphia, the Continental government struggled to survive and desperately sought some demonstration of the continued viability of the Revolution while Washington gambled on an unexpected counter-attack, crossing the Delaware and capturing nearly a thousand Hessians at Trenton (December 26). Expecting a strong British drive from Princeton towards his position, Washington held the British at a Second Battle of Trenton (January 2) before slipping away. Rather than retreat across the Delaware into Pennsylvania, though, Washington took his army by back roads to strike the British successfully at Princeton (January 3, 1777) before going into winter quarters at Morristown (January 6–May 28). In the spring, the British marched from New Brunswick and routed a small part of the Continental Army at Bound Brook (April 13), but then counter-marched back toward New York.

Howe assembled and transported about 17,000 men to the upper Chesapeake (August 25) and then began moving north toward Philadelphia, the seat of the rebel government. Washington had fewer than 11,000 to stop him. After several days of preliminary harassment, the Continentals met Howe's British advance at Cooch's Bridge on September 3, 1777 in Delaware, but the redcoats pressed on, inflicting a major defeat on the Continentals at Brandywine Creek (September 10).

In the aftermath of the defeat, disasters compounded each other. Washington's attempt to counter-attack the British was rained out in the Battle of the Clouds on September 16. The British occupied Philadelphia (September 26), putting the Continental government to flight, and Washington's counter-attack at Germantown on October 4 failed miserably. The British failed to capture Fort Mercer (October 22) but captured Fort Mifflin (November 16). When Howe heard that Washington was moving off for the winter, he made a final attempt to lure the Continental Army into a position in which it could be destroyed, but several days of inconclusive skirmishing at White Marsh (December 5–8) ended with Howe's withdrawal to Philadelphia.

The Turning Point

The previous year, American resistance on Lake Champlain, though ending in defeat (October 11,

1776), had put an end to British ambitions to invade the Hudson Valley. The operation, under General John Burgoyne, looked simple on a map. He was to push south from Canada, while Howe kept the bulk of the Continental forces pre-occupied to around New York City. In fact, the French had tried the same thing in the Seven Years' War and the poor roads and logistical problems had dissipated their efforts.

Initially, Burgoyne did quite well, moving three columns south through New York. His forces captured Fort Ticonderoga (July 5–6, 1777) and attacked the Continentals' rear guard at Hubbardton (July 7). However, the column charged with moving through the Mohawk Valley failed to reduce Fort Schuyler (old Fort Stanwix) on August 3, and an American relief column struck the redcoats at Oriskany on August 6. Then, a detachment of Hessians met disaster at Bennington on August 16. The farther south the expedition pressed, the more distant they were from their line of supply and the more Continental militia they faced.

The American occupation of strong defensive positions on Bemis Heights over the Hudson River blocked Burgoyne's way south. About 9 miles south of Saratoga, he concentrated his army on the west side of the Hudson and tried to sweep the Continentals from the high ground in the battle of Freeman's Farm, or Saratoga (September 19). This ended with both sides unable to gain ground. Burgoyne realized that his force was down to 6,000 with no reinforcements and dwindling supplies, while the Continentals had a total of about 7,000 and growing.

The British made a second attempt at Bemis Heights, or Second Saratoga, on October 7, but the Continentals held their ground, largely due to the personal leadership of Benedict Arnold. By the end, Burgoyne had lost enough to where he was outnumbered and his army pulled back several miles to the north. In the end, Burgoyne and 5,791 of his men surrendered (October 17).

Meanwhile, the British at New York City did little to relieve the pressure on Burgoyne. They engaged the Continentals at Fort Clinton and Fort Montgomery (October 6, 1777) near Bear Mountain.

Soon after, Washington's Continental Army went into another desperate winter at Valley Forge (December 19, 1777–June 19, 1778). However, the arrival of Frederick William Rudolph Gerald Augustus von Steuben, Baron

von Steuben, brought the best European battlefield tactics to the rebels and used the hiatus to begin the serious training and drill of the Continentals. More importantly, the French recognized the US and concluded a military alliance on February 6, 1778, landing troops in Rhode Island by the following August.

The British sought to improve their performance from the top down, replacing Howe with General Henry Clinton on March 7, 1778. As Washington bestirred his army, a small force under Lafayette, sent to screen his movements, clashed with the British at Barren Hill (May 20).

As Clinton began withdrawing toward New York, Washington attacked his rear guard at Monmouth on June 28. Both sides had a bit over 13,000 men, and the horrific heat, which probably topped 100 degrees, kept the fight inconclusive, but it was the largest pitched battle of the war, and the Continentals well demonstrated that they could stand up to the best of the British, which they could not have done earlier. Indeed, they displayed a persistence and combativeness that unnerved British strategists. "Mad" Anthony Wayne defeated and captured most of the British garrison of 700 at Stony Point (July 15–16, 1779) and "Light Horse" Harry Lee made a bold night attack on British Paulus Hook (August 19) in New Jersey.

Republican Liberties and Imperial Rivalries: Whose Revolution?

In the wake of the French, Spain agreed to enter the war on April 12, 1779. The united Provinces of the Netherlands then decided to join the alliance, and England declared war on Holland on December 20, 1780. Thus, the war reached global proportions.

A number of internal tensions surfaced among the revolutionary forces. Some of the newly independent states, such as New Hampshire, kept many of the same officials, while others, notably Pennsylvania, experienced an almost complete turnover in the government of the state. More important was the structure of government itself. Since the colonists had overthrown their existing governments, closed courts, and drove British agents and governors from their homes, they needed to establish a new framework within which they could govern themselves. Some simply kept their colonial charters, deleting the references to the king. Others sought a far more thorough transformation.

The course of Pennsylvania reflected some of the arguments of *Common Sense* that went beyond mere independence. Paine had argued for a structure of government that, in effect, would supersede professional office holding by vesting power exclusively in the hands of a single representative assembly, the members of which would serve for a year and not succeed themselves in office. Executive power, in the hands of a presiding officer, would be directly dependent on the representatives and any process of judicial review would be in the hands of a committee of censors chosen from the assembly. Other tracts like *The People the Best Governors* expressed similarly egalitarian and republican views. Farmers and artisans generally supported Pennsylvania's new constitution that lowered the property requirement for voting to almost nothing, and established a unicameral legislature, but the elite resisted the functioning of the most radically representative government in the former colonies.

The resident Continental government tolerated such republicanism, but did not share the arguments of *Common Sense*. In response, John Adams penned his far less popular but much more influential *Thoughts on Government*. Adams rejected purely representative institutions for a "mixed" government, which he, like contemporaries, saw embodied in the British system. Adams hoped to incorporate into his system the alleged virtues of monarchy in a fully independent executive branch with extensive authorities to appoint officials and the power to veto legislative enactments. He also hoped to preserve the bicameral system with a co-equal, deliberately non-representative upper house. Significant property requirements for voting would also confine citizenship to those with wealth at stake in the deliberations of government.

These differences largely reflected the extent to which the previously disenfranchised were capable of influencing events. Massachusetts and New York adopted largely conservative structures, partly because the artisans of Boston and New York City had either scattered or were excluded by the British occupation. In contrast, Pennsylvania's radical course reflected a mobilized artisan base in Philadelphia, and officials in other states waged a persistent struggle against it, until the state adopted a similarly bicameral and hierarchic structure in 1790.

As all these events strangled commerce, urban prices exploded and radicals began mobilizing

against profiteering. “Joyce Junior,” a figure who had mobilized Boston crowds against the Stamp Act, now led mixed “mobs” of workingmen and market women against merchants believed to be gouging prices. Sanctioned by their radical government, Philadelphians formed price-fixing committees and confronted local businessmen in a series of meetings and demonstrations, culminating in the Fort Wilson Riot on October 4, 1779, in which armed Americans confronted each other.

The mixed nature of the American Revolution and its impact is more evident when looking to the rural folk, who had less contact with and hostility towards the British. Particularly outside of New England, they remained more ambivalent. Tenants of rebel landlords in New York or more recent immigrants in the Carolinas would have been as likely as not to have seen the Revolution as a hypocritical disordering force and remained loyal to Britain. Where they sided with the Revolution, as did the settlers on the New Hampshire Grants, they could be very independent. Their “fourteenth” state, Vermont, not only declared its independence from New Hampshire and New York, but adopted Pennsylvania’s radical constitution. It would not be admitted to the US until well after the Revolution.

Social tensions also strained the Continental Army. One of the more conservative American leaders, General Benedict Arnold, had a long history of hostility to the radicals in Pennsylvania. Despairing of the future of the Revolution, he made arrangements to cede West Point to the British (September 21–25, 1780). Discontent with officers, non-payment of the paltry wages due the soldiers, payment in grossly inflated paper script, and similar grievances became worse towards the end of the war, when soldiers were held in service beyond their term of enlistment. After a series of mass desertions and mutinies, the entire Pennsylvania Line rose up and marched on the government (January 1–7, 1781), demanding their discharge with the option of reenlistment. A similar mutiny by the New Jersey Line (January 20–27, 1781) was put down in blood.

The Revolution certainly improved some features of the position of women, though that varied so widely depending on circumstances. Not only did some women such as Abigail Adams and Mercy Otis Warren emerge as individuals from the sources, but the Revolution also offered glimpses of some women in far less social

prominence, such as the elusive “Molly Pitcher,” one of the many women who brought water to the men in the midst of battle and, in the case of the battle of Monmouth, replaced a wounded soldier at his post at a battery of artillery. They participated in crowd activities and returned to spinning and weaving to make the boycotted materials. In the end, some women gained additional rights. Divorce became easier in some states, and some propertied women got the right to vote in parts of Connecticut and New Jersey.

The Revolution did change the circumstances of many African Americans. Thousands joined the Continental Army, though the British sometimes positioned themselves as supporters of slave liberation against the hypocritical slaveholding Continentals. Most Revolutionary leaders believed that Independence would put slavery on the road to extinction, ended the transatlantic slave trade, and ultimately eliminated slavery in half the state.

The indigenous peoples would be the great losers of the American Revolution, as the colonists brushed aside the Proclamation of 1763. Insofar as Native Americans became involved, they wisely sided with the British. South of the Ohio River, Daniel Boone led the first white settlers into what became Kentucky (1775), clashing repeatedly with Indian allies of the British. In New York, Continentals after Oriskany entered the river valleys of the Iroquois Confederacy and began the “Burning of the Valleys” to drive potential allies of the British from the area. A Virginia expedition under George Rogers Clark crossed the mountains and descended the Ohio River, beaching their boats at abandoned Fort Massac in present Illinois. They walked overland to surprise and capture Kaskaskia (July 4, 1778), and, with support of local French inhabitants, secured Fort Sackville and the trading village of Vincennes (present Indiana). British Governor Henry Hamilton, however, led a force that personally retook these posts. In February, Clark led 172 volunteers on a desperate trek through over 200 miles of “drowned country” to retake it. Convincing the British that he had more than three times as many men as he did, he threatened to storm the garrison, giving no quarter, driving home this threat by personally tomahawking Indian prisoners. The British surrendered Fort Vincennes on February 25.

The Continentals never managed to mount a force to seize the British base at Detroit. However,

the British could never seriously challenge the allies in their control over the interior of the continent. Indeed, although vastly outnumbered, the Spanish turned back a British-organized Indian attack on the tiny settlement of St. Louis (May 26, 1780). By then, the British pinned their hopes for success on the South, in part because of the high proportion of Loyalists among the planter elite there.

War in the South: The Final Phase 1778–1781

The different styles of warfare also inspired a series of Continental charges of British atrocities. These included the Paoli Massacre (September 21, 1777); the Wyoming Valley Massacre (July 3, 1778); the Baylor Massacre (present River Vale, NJ) (September 27, 1778); and the Tappan Massacre (September 28, 1779). Most of these seem to have largely reflected the fondness of some redcoats for the bayonet, a weapon to which the Continentals never warmed.

The British occupied Savannah, Georgia on December 29, 1778. As the winter permitted, they attempted to expand their holdings along the coast at Beaufort or Port Royal Island (February 3, 1779), and they began recruiting Loyalists. The Americans caught 340 of them encamped at Kettle Creek (February 14), however, and inflicted a defeat sufficiently humiliating to dampen enthusiasm for actively joining the Crown's cause. After another raid on Charleston, the Continentals made an all night march to attack the British, who sought to establish a garrison on New Cut Church Flats, covering Stono Ferry. They suffered heavy losses, made worse by the heat and exhaustion.

A joint Franco-American force of 5,000 then besieged the 3,200 British in Savannah (September 16–October 18). The effort included a major assault on October 9, which mortally wounded Count Kazimierz Pulaski among the Continentals. Several hundred free blacks from Saint-Domingue also fought among the French allies.

The arrival of Clinton and 14,000 British in South Carolina besieged and forced the surrender of Charleston on May 12, 1780 with its 5,000 defenders. Thereafter, Clinton returned to New York, leaving Lord Charles Cornwallis with instructions to finish the subjugation of South Carolina and continue into North Carolina. American reinforcements on their way south

counter-marched, but Banastre Tarleton's "British Legion," composed of local Loyalists, caught up with – and overran – the Continentals near the border with North Carolina, at Waxhaw Creek on May 29. American accounts indicate that some 113 of the 350 soldiers attacked and were killed, allegedly after trying to surrender. Rebels later used this in justifying incidents in which Tories were given "Tarleton's Quarter."

In general, the British won victories in the field but made little headway in the overall war. Americans responded in large part by a guerilla war conducted by leaders like Francis Marion, a veteran Indian fighter and planter on the Santee River who used local knowledge of the terrain and excellent intelligence to execute hit-and-run guerilla tactics against the occupation. (Tarleton referred to him as the Swamp Fox.) With such tactics, Americans routed a British force at Ramseur's Mill (June 20) in North Carolina and at Hanging Rock (August 6) in South Carolina. Most importantly, the Continentals raised a new force. General Horatio Gates quickly marched over 4,000 southward, encountering a British force of roughly 2,200 under Lord Cornwallis just north of Camden (August 16).

Cornwallis entered North Carolina in September. A loyalist contingent under independent command near the border with South Carolina warned locals that they would "lay waste to their country with fire and sword" should resistance continue. Various independent units of frontier militia converged on the British at King's Mountain (October 7). Using tactics learned from the Indians, the Continentals kept moving and under cover, taking little longer than an hour to force the surrender of the loyalists, though some of the rebels apparently shot some trying to surrender.

Soon after, Washington assigned Nathanael Greene (October 14) to take charge of the rebel forces in the South. That winter, the Americans also turned back a careless pursuit by Tarleton's 1,100 Loyalists near the cattle-grazing site of the Cowpens on January 17, 1781, from which a mere 260 British escaped. The spring would end British illusions that they had actually gained anything in the South.

Cornwallis moved decisively to destroy Greene's troublesome little army in North Carolina, but Greene turned on the British at Guilford Court House (March 15). The British attacks broke on a succession of American lines,

leaving a battle reduced into bitter hand-to-hand fighting. To resolve this, Cornwallis ordered his artillery to fire indiscriminately into the contested part of the field, after which the Continentals quickly fell back, but the British had lost a third of their men and still faced a Continental Army. Convinced that they could not retain territory, the British decided to concentrate their forces in Virginia and, that May, Cornwallis disembarked from Wilmington for Virginia.

Rather than follow Cornwallis, though, Greene took his forces back into South Carolina. Despite defeats like Hobkirk's Hill (April 25) near Camden, or the two attacks around Eutaw Springs at Fort Ninety-Six (May 22, September 8), the Continentals began gradually retaking everything the British had seized earlier beyond Charleston and Savannah.

Once landed in Virginia, Cornwallis effectively established a base for his 7,000 to 8,000 men on part of the old Virginia Peninsula, the site of the original British settlements in the New World. His forces drove back the Continentals near Green Springs Farm on July 6, 1781, but faced enough serious opposition that they settled near Yorktown to await a juncture with more British forces. From here, everything went wrong. A French fleet under Admiral François Joseph Paul, Marquis de Grasse, thwarted the attempt of the Royal Navy to reach Cornwallis, defeating it at the mouth of the Chesapeake (September 5). American and French land forces under Washington and Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, Comte de Rochambeau, backed Cornwallis to Yorktown (October 6–19), where he awaited help from the navy until Admiral de Grasse showed up with the French fleet. After a remarkable joint night operation where the French and Americans respectively captured two redoubts overlooking the York River (October 14), Cornwallis surrendered his army (October 19). As the imperial troops filed out of their positions, the British bands played "The World Turned Upside Down," a tune from the English Revolution.

Whose Victory?

By the time of the surrender, the US had already emerged from the war. After the Congressional writing of the Articles of Confederation (November 15, 1777), enough of the rebellious colonies had adopted it for ratification (March 2, 1781) to secure a unified national authority.

News of Yorktown prompted Parliament to abandon plans for military subjugation, and Lord North resigned as British prime minister (March 20, 1782). By default, then, the mother country ceded the US its existence. Thereafter, the British evacuated Savannah (July 11, 1782), Charleston (December 14, 1782), and New York (November 25, 1783).

However, the War for American Independence continued for almost two years after Yorktown, as great empires strove to shift the balances of power among themselves. American alliances made the Revolution. Not surprisingly, the naval war became intense in the West Indies where the French threatened the British sugar plantations. The French seized and held Saint Vincent Cape (1779–83), although the Royal Navy defeated the French at Les Saintes (April 12, 1782).

Fighting also took place across European waters. British and French ships fought twice in the waters near Ushant (July 27, 1778, December 12, 1781), the second clearly reaffirming the superiority of British naval power. The British fleet also reaffirmed its superiority over Spanish naval power at Cape Saint Vincent (January 16, 1780) off the coast of Portugal. A combined French and Spanish force retook Minorca (February 5, 1782), one of the Balearic Islands in the Mediterranean, and a combined fleet also threatened British supply lines to Gibraltar until the battle at Cape Spartel (October 20, 1782). The entry into the war of the Netherlands became the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–4), although the engagement at Dogger Bank (August 5, 1781) largely bottled the Dutch fleet in its harbors. A French naval expedition surprised and disabled a British squadron at Porto Praya (April 16, 1781) in the Cape Verde Islands, off west Africa, and then continued on into the Indian Ocean, where it campaigned against the British with the help of the Mysore leader, Hyder Ali, and some Dutch bases in Sri Lanka. The British had captured from the Dutch Negapatam on the Indian coast near Cuddalore and Trincomalee (January 8, 1782) in Sri Lanka. The French ships struck a squadron at Sadras, just south of Madras (February 17), then threatened the British hold on Trincomalee, moving on nearby Providien (April 12).

In India the French clashed with the British at Negapatam (July 6), then recaptured Cuddalore. A few weeks later they attacked the small British garrison at Trincomalee (August 25–31, 1782),

thwarting a British naval attempt to relieve it (September 3). The British also made one final effort to retake Cuddalore (June 13–20, 1783), but the timely arrival of French naval forces helped end the effort.

Restoring the balance of imperial power preoccupied the negotiations France hosted. The result was the Second Treaty of Paris (September 3, 1783). The major powers denied each other any further claims to most of the territory west of the Alleghenies and east of the Mississippi River, and the US adopted a series of Land Ordinances (April 23, 1784, May 20, 1785), culminating in the Northwest Ordinance (July 13, 1787). These were based on the Treaty of Fort McIntosh (January 21, 1785) with native peoples.

Washington resigned as Commander of the Continental Army (December 23, 1783), voluntarily submitting military authority to the civilian government. This did not diminish the importance of war and conquest. Almost immediately, settlers clashed with Indians in Kentucky and northern Ohio, leading to the Northwest Indian War (1785–95).

The war saddled the new nation with massive debts to its foreign allies, to the states, and to individuals holding promissory notes issued during the war, many of the latter having been sold out of desperation by the soldiers, merchants, and farmers who got them at a fraction of the price. The US began owing speculators and investors, and the drive to establish a new, more powerful central authority capable of meeting its obligations pressed. These clashed repeatedly with American debtors, such as the participants in Shay's Rebellion (1786–7), which began when rural folk closed the western Massachusetts courts.

Adams' "mixed government" not only emerged as a wartime alternative to Paineite republicanism, but it also became the postwar model for ensuring "domestic tranquility." Representatives of the states eager for a stronger central government gathered for the Annapolis Convention (September 11–14, 1786), which adjourned to reassemble in Philadelphia (May 25–September 17, 1787), proposing a new Constitution to take effect after its ratification by 11 states. The old government under the Articles of Confederation acknowledged ratification of the Constitution on September 13, 1788, and the new government formed with the inauguration of George Washington on April 30, 1789.

Foundation of State

At the close of the war, Dr. Benjamin Rush wisely advised against confusing American Independence with "the American Revolution," which, he wrote, had just begun. The US sought to govern itself through a system of checks and balances. Positive action required a general agreement between different and theoretically competing executive, legislative, and judicial branches, with the legislative embedding a bicameral tension between a lower house representing enfranchised voters and an upper house representing all states equally. This placed many problems – most obviously slavery – beyond the realm of national government. However, the almost immediate ratification of ten amendments, the Bill of Rights (December 15, 1791), restrained the government from restrictions on freedoms of speech, religious worship, assembly, the press, and other rights. Almost immediately, Americans sought to claim their acknowledged right "to alter or to abolish" governments that fail to assure the "inalienable rights" of the people to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

The same argument had always had international ramifications. Even as the US formed, the economies of its former allies collapsed and the French Revolution began (1789). The anti-imperial assertion of the right of nations to self-determination has plagued the US not only in terms of its relations with native peoples but with countries around the world.

SEE ALSO: French Revolution, 1789–1794; Paine, Thomas (1737–1809); Shays' Rebellion; Whiskey Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Barnes, I. (2000) *The Historical Atlas of the American Revolution*. New York: Routledge.
- Commager, H. S. & Morris, R. B. (Eds.) (1958) *The Spirit of Seventy-Six: The Story of the American Revolution as Told by Participants*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Countryman, E. (1981) *A People in Revolution: The American Revolution and Political Society in New York, 1760–1790*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Douglass, E. P. (1955) *Rebels and Democrats: The Struggle for Equal Political Rights and Majority Rule During the American Revolution*. Chicago: Quadrangle Paperbacks.
- Harvey, R. (2002) *"A Few Bloody Noses": The Realities and Mythologies of the American Revolution*. Woodstock: Overlook Press.

- Mays, T. M. (2005) *Historical Dictionary of Revolutionary America*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.
- Middlekauff, R. (2005) *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789*. Revd. ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Weintraub, S. (2005) *Iron Tears: America's Battle for Freedom, Britain's Quagmire, 1775–1783*. New York: Free Press.

American slave rebellions

Simon Wendt

Slaves who resorted to militant resistance in North America initially sought to win little more than their freedom. In the wake of the American and French Revolutions, however, an increasing number of slave rebels became determined not only to liberate themselves but to overthrow the institution of slavery itself. Compared with slave revolts in Brazil and the Caribbean, slave revolts in the United States were relatively rare, small, and generally unsuccessful. Yet militant slave resistance was of significant symbolic value, fueling the abolitionist movement that contributed to the end of slavery in 1865.

Slave resistance began as early as the first African men, women, and children were forced onto slave ships bound for North America. On several occasions, Africans unsuccessfully attempted to overpower the white ship crews that sought to sell them into slavery in the New World. Others refused to eat or drowned themselves during the Middle Passage across the Atlantic to escape bondage. Once in the British colonies, many enslaved men and women showed their opposition through subtle forms of subversion, such as breaking tools or feigning illness. But the most common form of resistance was running away. Until the late eighteenth century, Africans in North America frequently made collective efforts to escape. Some of them formed so-called maroon communities – maroon deriving from the Spanish word *cimarrón*, which meant “fierce” or “wild.” These small settlements were in inaccessible regions such as the swamps of southern Virginia or the Carolina lowlands.

Compared with similar efforts in Brazil and the Caribbean, however, American maroon communities were small and rarely survived more than a few years, with the exception of Florida,

a Spanish colony that remained a refuge for runaways until the 1820s. Unlike Brazil, whose vast mountainous interior offered numerous opportunities to elude white captors, the British colonies in North America offered few of those inaccessible areas, and by the eve of the American Revolution, white settlers and farmers had destroyed most of such natural refuges. In Jamaica, where similar safe havens continued to exist throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, some of the island’s maroon communities were so powerful that the British colonial government negotiated treaties with their leaders.

Conspiracies and rebellions were the most militant form of slave resistance in British North America. Prior to the late eighteenth century, however, the small number of slave rebels that resorted to such militant actions only sought to secure their freedom, not to overthrow the institution of slavery. In New York and the Chesapeake area, several insurrectionary plots, developed mostly by recent arrivals from Africa, were discovered in the periods 1710 to 1722 and 1729 to 1741. The two largest rebellions were the New York City insurrection of 1712 and the Stono Rebellion of 1739, which took place near Charleston, South Carolina. In New York City 27 Africans put fire to an outbuilding and killed or wounded 15 white men. During the Stono Rebellion, about 20 slaves secured guns and ammunition, rallied 80 other bondsmen, and raided several plantations. By the time they stopped to celebrate their victory, they had killed more than 30 whites. Despite the initial success of some rebellions, most conspiracies were discovered before slaves were able to put their plans into action, and white retaliation was swift and brutal. In New York City, for instance, 21 slave rebels were executed. In Charleston, white planters eventually confronted the small slave army and killed 44 insurgents. In the aftermath of revolts and conspiracies, white authorities put tight security measures into place to discourage further unrest.

The American and French Revolutions marked a major turning point in the history of slave rebellions in the Americas. The ideas that revolutionaries used to justify their opposition to traditional hierarchies of power in Great Britain and France – chief among them notions of natural human rights and universal liberty – influenced generations of slave rebels in North

America and the Caribbean, who seized on those concepts to seek not just their freedom but an end to the institution of slavery itself. In 1791 in the French colony of Saint Domingue (modern Haiti), the French Revolution inspired the only successful insurrection in the history of slavery, leading to the founding of a black nation-state and becoming a symbol of freedom for enslaved men and women across the Atlantic world. Led by black rebel leader Toussaint L'Ouverture, almost 100,000 Haitian slaves and their free black allies defeated the large and well-trained armies of Spain, Britain, and France in a bloody struggle that lasted until 1804, when Haiti gained its independence. What came to be known as the Haitian Revolution was a fearful reminder for white planters in North America and the Caribbean that their slaves were neither content with their fate nor hesitant to use force to fight for their freedom.

Most of the slave revolts and conspiracies that took place in the United States in the nineteenth century were similarly inspired by the ideals of the Revolutionary Era. Many black militants viewed the events in Haiti as an additional encouragement to take militant action. In 1800, enslaved blacksmith Gabriel Prosser planned a massive revolt in Richmond, Virginia, hoping to rally other slaves to take control of the state. But shortly before the rebellion was to begin, fellow slaves revealed the plan to white authorities. Gabriel, his followers, and other suspects were quickly rounded up and executed. Eleven years later, almost two hundred slave rebels under the leadership of Haiti native Charles Deslondes rose up near New Orleans, Louisiana. The small army raided and burned several plantations but killed only three people. A large contingent of white militiamen, slaveholders, and US soldiers eventually quelled the revolt, killing 66 rebels and capturing Deslondes and 20 of his followers. Quickly tried and found guilty of rebellion, the survivors were executed, and their severed heads were publicly displayed to intimidate the slave population. Like the Haitian Revolution, the conspiracies of Gabriel and Deslondes terrified Southern white slaveholders, who sought to protect themselves by further restricting the ability of slaves and free blacks to associate with each other and by increasing the number of slave patrols.

Denmark Vesey, a free black carpenter, who in 1822 was discovered to have planned a large

slave revolt in Charleston, South Carolina, was also influenced by the revolutions of the late nineteenth century. Vesey planned to lead a slave army on Charleston on July 14, the same day on which French Revolutionaries had stormed the Bastille in 1789. Vesey had also visited Haiti when working as a sailor and hoped that the newly independent nation would support his attempt to overthrow slavery in South Carolina. As in the case of other conspiracies, however, a house servant alerted his master before the revolution could take place. Local authorities quickly detained Gabriel and seized more than one hundred suspects in the following weeks. During public trials, 71 slaves were found guilty. Thirty-five rebels, including Gabriel, were put to death.

But not all of the slave rebellions in the United States aimed to spark an anti-slavery revolution. The 1831 rebellion of Nat Turner in Southampton County, Virginia, was the most violent one in US history, killing 59 people, including women and children, but it was inspired by its leader's religious convictions rather than by notions of human rights and universal liberty. Turner, who was a privileged and literate slave, became a lay preacher in the 1820s and became convinced that God expected him to lead his people to freedom through violence. As in the past, however, white militiamen quickly put down the revolt. In the following weeks, fearful white planters murdered more than one hundred black suspects. After a public trial, white authorities executed Turner, who had eluded his captors for more than two months, and almost twenty of his followers.

In 1839, in two separate maritime slave revolts, a few slave insurgents finally managed to gain their freedom. A group of Africans that had been recaptured by US authorities in June 1839 after bringing the Spanish slave ship *Amistad* under their control was eventually freed by the US Supreme Court. A similar revolt took place a few weeks later on the American slave ship *Creole*. A group of 135 slaves subdued the white crew and managed to sail to the British Bahamas, where they gained their freedom under British law. Although rumors of slave conspiracies continued to swirl among Southern planters in the following decades, the Turner revolt remained the last major slave rebellion in North America.

Compared with other slave societies, the United States experienced few and relatively small slave

revolts in the nineteenth century. By contrast, numerous massive slave revolts erupted during this period in Cuba, Barbados, Jamaica, and Brazil. In 1812, thousands of Cuban slaves and their free black allies joined together in the massive Aponte uprising that was intended to end slavery and bring about Cuban independence. As in the United States, however, swift retaliation and subsequent security measures silenced slave opposition until 1844, when another large-scale conspiracy was discovered. Four years after the Aponte conspiracy, a large slave revolt enveloped the island of Barbados, where hundreds of cane fields went up in flames before militias defeated the insurgents. In late 1831 almost 60,000 slaves rose up in Jamaica, burning hundreds of plantations and battling militias and British troops for several weeks before their revolt was brutally crushed. Between 1807 and 1835 Brazil also experienced waves of conspiracies and revolts. The largest rebellion took place in 1835 in the city of Salvador, where Muslim Africans led an unsuccessful attack against white city authorities to secure their freedom.

There are several reasons for the comparatively small number of slave rebellions in the United States. Caribbean and Brazilian slaves greatly outnumbered the white population and lived on large plantations with little supervision. By contrast, American slaves tended to be a minority and lived on smaller estates that were closely watched and managed by their vigilant owners. Similarly important, the end of the slave trade in the United States in 1809 halted the importation of single African men, who were at the forefront of almost all slave rebellions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. US-born slaves with families tended to be less militant than native Africans, since they had more to lose than single bondsmen. The lack of large natural refuges further diminished chances of success for slave rebels in the United States.

Though generally unsuccessful, slave rebellions in the United States became important symbols of heroic militancy for many African Americans and contributed to the radicalization of the Abolitionist movement. Until the 1830s, most black and white abolitionists called for gradual abolition, were committed to non-violence, and sought to use moral suasion to convince Americans of the sinfulness of slavery. But the persistent refusal of white Southerners to consider emancipation, waves of anti-abolitionist violence in the North,

and the slave revolts of the 1820s and 1830s led a growing number of anti-slavery activists such as William Lloyd Garrison and Frederick Douglass to support both immediate abolition and more forceful action to make it a reality. Most of them sought to encourage slaves to run away, supporting the activities of the Underground Railroad, a secret network of activists that helped slaves to escape to the northern United States or to Canada. A few, like black abolitionist David Walker in his 1829 pamphlet *An Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World*, called for the violent overthrow of the Southern slave regime. In 1859, white abolitionist John Brown and a small band of 17 armed black and white men heeded Walker's appeal, raiding a federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, to initiate a massive slave revolt across the South. But the poorly planned attack was nipped in the bud by white authorities. During the battle with US marines that ensued after the invaders were discovered, Brown was captured and several of his comrades were killed. Virginia tried Brown for treason and executed him in December 1859. Brown's attack exacerbated the tensions between the North and the South, culminating in the American Civil War and eventually leading to the end of slavery after the defeat of the Southern Confederacy in 1865.

SEE ALSO: Gabriel's Rebellion; Haiti, Revolutionary Revolts, 1790s; Nat Turner Rebellion; Vesey's Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Aptheker, H. (1943) *American Negro Slave Revolts*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bergad, L. W. (2007) *The Comparative Histories of Slavery in Brazil, Cuba, and the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dillon, M. L. (1990) *Slavery Attacked: Southern Slaves and Their Allies, 1619–1865*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Genovese, E. D. (1979) *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Price, R. (Ed.) (1979) *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Rucker, W. C. (2006) *The River Flows On: Black Resistance, Culture, and Identity Formation in Early America*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Amo, Anton Wilhelm (1703–1759) and Afro-Germans

Joshua Kwesi Aikins

Anton Wilhelm Amo (sometimes referred to by the anglicized name Anton William Amo), one of the first Africans to study and teach at European universities, was a philosopher from the West African region now known as Ghana. He lectured at the German universities of Halle, Wittenberg, and Jena. He published on a variety of issues, ranging from black people's rights in eighteenth-century Europe, to medicine, epistemology, and psychology. His academic career, his stance for black people's rights, his affirmation of his African identity, as well as his decision to return home to find his family, are outstanding achievements at a time when many other West Africans – including his own brother, who was deported to Suriname – were stripped of their rights, denied their humanity, and enslaved in European colonies.

Born in Axim, in today's Ghana, at around 1703, he was presented as a "gift" to the Dukes August Wilhelm and Ludwig Rudolf von Wolfenbüttel by the Dutch West India Company in 1707. He was named after Anton Ulrich von Wolfenbüttel and his first son, Wilhelm August. The name Amo is Ghanaian, suggesting that Amo was old enough to remember his name when he arrived in Germany.

The practice of presenting enslaved Africans as "gifts" was common among European nobility at the time. Africans were used as exotic servants and symbols of status, power, and affluence. Amo could thus have served his whole life as one of many *Hofmohren* kept as enslaved servants by German nobility. But the Duke, influenced by early Enlightenment thought and his cousin, the Tsar of Russia, whose African servant Piotr Petrov Petrovitch (alias Abram Hannibal, grandfather of renowned Russian writer Pushkin) received a university education and excelled as an outstanding Russian engineer, decided to emulate the Tsar by granting Amo an education and sending him to university.

Amo began his studies in 1727 at the University of Halle, where he was taught by Christian Thomasius, a central figure in early Enlightenment philosophy. In Amo's view, Thomasius had elevated philosophy by allowing it to permeate

other disciplines and to be used in a practical way. It was during these years of intense debates between the conservative Pietists and the early Enlightenment scholars, with whom he sided, that Amo wrote his *Inauguraldissertation*, "The Rights of an African in Eighteenth Century Europe." Unlike some of his later writings, such as "The Apathy of the Human Mind," and his treatise on mathematics, this key early work has not been preserved. But insights into its content and political purpose can be gleaned from contemporary sources which describe Amo as "one of the courageous men, who have supported . . . the Black cause either in their writing or through speeches at political gatherings where they stood up for the abolition of slavery and the liberation of slaves" (Hountondji 1983: 130).

Only months after the dissertation, Amo left Halle for reasons that have not yet been established. While there is an amount of mystery surrounding Amo's *Inauguraldissertation*, the effect it had on his posture and consciousness is clear: from then on, every further publication or writing of Amo bore in addition to his signature the words "Amo Guinea-Africanus," a clear positioning as an African from Guinea, the contemporary name for the West African coast and hinterlands.

In September 1730 he took up a position at the University of Wittenberg, where his studies focused on rhetoric, psychology, and medicine. In 1734 he defended his second dissertation, after having gained the title of "Magister of Philosophy and Free Arts." Jena was the third renowned university where Amo gave lectures on topics such as "The Rightful Areas of Philosophy" and "The Refutation of Superstition."

By the late 1730s, fortunes began to turn against Amo as his supporters became embroiled in the Prussian–Austrian war and distanced themselves from Enlightenment ideas, to which Amo was still committed. Ultimately, they withdrew their support at a time when Amo had to face increasing racist hostilities. By 1752 he had returned to his native town of Axim in today's Ghana where he is reported to have worked as a goldsmith. The fact that he indeed was able to return to his family is attested to by Galandet, a Swiss physician in Dutch service, who describes meeting Amo in 1752. This is the last recorded reference to Anton Wilhelm Amo, and the exact date of his death is unknown.

As a philosopher in the tradition of the early Enlightenment, Amo challenged established philosophical theories, exposing their inconsistencies by an ironic use of their disputable core tenets. Beninese philosopher Hountondji points out that, his innovative use of a methodical irony notwithstanding, Amo's style of philosophic inquiry has to be placed solely in a Western paradigm. But far from diminishing Amo's achievement this assertion actually highlights Amo's ability to develop and articulate a critical position in his discipline at a time when Germans, like other Europeans, engaged in slave trading, justified by a racist ideology that constructed Africans as inferior beings. His achievement is a manifestation of protest that proves wrong the very assumption of African incapacity for intellectual excellence. To this day, he serves as an inspiration for African scholars and indeed everyone committed to speaking out against the accepted injustices of the day.

SEE ALSO: Enlightenment, France, 18th Century; German Reformation

References and Suggested Readings

- Abraham, W. (1964) The Life and Times of Wilhelm Anton Amo. *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana* 7: 60–81.
- Amo, A. W. & Nwala, T. U. (1990) *Anton William Amo's Treatise on the Art of Philosophising Soberly and Accurately (with Commentaries)*. Nigeria: William Amo Centre for African Philosophy, University of Nigeria.
- Brentjes, B. (1975) Anton Wilhelm Amo, First African Philosopher in European Universities. *Current Anthropology* 16 (3): 443–4.
- Hountondji, J. P. (1983) *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Sephocle, M. (1992) Anton Wilhelm Amo. *Journal of Black Studies* 23 (2): 182–7.

Anabaptist movement

Soma Marik

The Reformation had several strands, including the “Radical Reformation,” which refers to all individuals and groups who rejected both the Roman Catholic tradition and the mainstream Protestant alternatives. Many radicals and their leaders, mostly literate ex-clergy, rejected any connection with the state and any state church. They appealed to the same audience and used

some of the same anti-Roman or anti-clerical arguments as did the preachers of the mainstream Reformation, but they had a more popular social base. Often called Anabaptists, or “rebaptizers” by their contemporary Catholic and Protestant enemies, they advocated adult rather than infant baptism and saw the church as a body of saints in which membership was voluntary, and the most severe form of discipline was banning or shunning. In their separation from the temporal domain, many Anabaptist groups refused to serve the state as magistrates or soldiers, and some even refused to pay war taxes.

Main Currents

In Switzerland, Anabaptism developed from Conrad Grebel's circle and priests from the outlying areas of Zurich. Seeing the Bible as an alternative authority to Rome, these “Swiss Brethren” sought to purify the city's religion of Catholic elements like the mass and establish self-governing people's churches in the rural communities. They opposed tithes, or the payment of one-tenth of produce as tax to the church. In 1525 their meetings were forbidden, and parents were ordered to have their infants baptized within eight days or face expulsion from the city. In response, on January 21, Conrad Grebel, a layman often called the “first Anabaptist,” baptized George Blaurock, an ordained priest. The movement spread rapidly. The Brethren began evangelizing the surrounding territories with great success, converting and baptizing many. Leaders were arrested and rebaptism was banned by the council on March 7, 1526. The penalty for disobedience was death by drowning. In December Blaurock, who was not a citizen of Zurich, was tried and was whipped and banished. Felix Manz was executed by drowning on January 5, 1527, thereby becoming the first Anabaptist martyr. The attempt to emerge as a mass movement failed, and there emerged instead the idea of the church of a separated minority. By 1527, Swiss Anabaptists were being unified through the Schleitheim Confession. Drafted by Michael Sattler, this document attempted to separate congregations of Anabaptist followers from non-believers.

Radical reforming zeal and peasant radicalism also combined in southern Germany. The “Zwickau Prophets,” Thomas Dreschel, Nicolas Storch, and Mark Thomas Stübner, claimed to

be directly commanded by the Holy Spirit and rejected infant baptism and any authority other than the spiritual command of God. They in turn influenced Thomas Müntzer, a priest who became acquainted with Martin Luther around 1519. During the Peasant Rebellion in 1524–5, Müntzer supported the peasants' cause. Seeing the events of 1525 as resistance to godless tyranny and God's instrument to purify Christendom, he placed his considerable talents at the disposal of the great uprising of the peasants and "common man." Although not its instigator, he became one of its theologically most articulate defenders, ultimately being tortured and beheaded for the cause.

Other German Anabaptists included Hans Hut, who disagreed with the need to form separatist communities, and Balthasar Hubmaier, who believed that the state was ordained by God, envisaged the possibility of a Christian magistrate, and sanctioned capital punishment and just wars. Hut's more radical followers called for common ownership of goods and denied that Christians could use the sword in self-defense, serve as magistrates, or pay taxes.

Another radical faction from Austerlitz, which followed Jacob Hutter and was known as Hutterites, was the first Anabaptist community to form a completely communistic society administered by elected officials. They believed that if all things were held in common, selfishness could be overcome and the true imitation of Christ attained. Eventually, Ferdinand I succeeded in getting the Hutterites expelled from Moravia. Hutter was arrested by the Austrian authorities in Tyrol, and burned to death on February 25, 1536. Subsequently, Hutterites moved back to Moravia and were given protection by some nobles. Periods of persecution and relaxation followed. By 1572 they had built up flourishing and hard-working communities, but the death of their protector and unrelenting persecution destroyed the communities in Moravia.

The Münster Rebellion

Another major Anabaptist movement developed in Münster through the influence of Melchior Hofmann, who died after ten years' imprisonment in Strasbourg. Two lines developed to continue and transform his legacy. Soon after learning about Hofmann's arrest, the Haarlem baker Jan Matthys, in the presence of Low Country

Melchiorites, professed to be driven by the Spirit, and claimed to be the second witness of the apocalypse. Meanwhile, in the city of Münster in Westphalia, Bernhard Rothmann, influenced by the Melchiorites, moved to a more radical position, and his followers won the town council, declaring property communal and adopting such biblical practices as polygamy. Adopting a strongly patriarchal line, Rothmann demanded complete obedience of the wife to the husband. All Lutherans and Catholics who refused to join the movement were expelled by early March 1534, but eventually the bishop of Münster, aided by both Catholic and Protestant rulers, captured the city on June 25, 1535. Many of the inhabitants negotiated surrender, only to be executed after they had laid down their weapons.

The survival of Anabaptism after the suppression of the Münster Rebellion was largely the work of Menno Simons, who from 1536 to 1543 worked first in the Netherlands and then in North Germany to reorganize and consolidate the scattered Anabaptist communities. Due to his role in creating a structured network, many Anabaptists came to be called Mennonites.

SEE ALSO: English Revolution, Radical Sects; German Peasant Rebellion, 1525; German Reformation; Hutterites; Müntzer, Thomas (ca. 1489–1525); Reformation

References and Suggested Readings

- Bender, H. S. (1944) *The Anabaptist Vision*. *Church History* (March) 13: 3–24.
- Stayer, J. M. (1991) *The German Peasants' War and Anabaptist Community of Goods*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Williams, G. H. (2000) *The Radical Reformation*. Kirksville: Truman State University Press.

Anarchism

Jesse Cohn

In common parlance "anarchy" refers to a state of chaos or violent disorder and "anarchism" to the rebellious or merely perverse pursuit of this state. Indeed, the word "anarchist" was first used in the seventeenth century as an epithet against the defeated Levellers in the English Civil War. While the ideas and practices that would become known as anarchism were distinctly foreshadowed by movements such as the Diggers

and the Ranters in the seventeenth century as well as by eighteenth-century thinkers such as William Godwin (and arguably by far more ancient schools of thought, from the Cynics of the fifth century BCE to the Taoists of a century later), it was not until Pierre-Joseph Proudhon turned this epithet into a positive self-description that we can speak of anarchism *per se*, as a historical entity. Historically speaking, however, anarchism is the name for a movement, originating in mid-nineteenth-century Europe, characterized by its vision of a society of generalized self-management, its opposition to all forms of hierarchy and domination, and its particular emphasis on means of transformative action that prefigure the desired ends. The word also serves to name the goal of the movement – substantive and universal freedom, sometimes called “anarchy” – elements of which may be found in every society that has ever existed, particularly among peoples living without private property and the state.

Principles and Practices

Popular misunderstandings concerning anarchism, fed by more than a century and a half of sensationalistic media representations, are widespread – and, unfortunately, many scholarly accounts of anarchism do little to correct these distortions. The association of anarchy with chaos and senseless violence, while owing something to a certain phase in anarchist history (that of “propaganda by the deed”), is readily dispelled by even a cursory reading of works by actual self-described anarchists: “Anarchism . . . is *not* bombs, disorder, or chaos,” writes Alexander Berkman (1870–1936). “It is *not* a war of each against all. It is *not* a return to barbarism . . . Anarchism is the very opposite of all that” (Berkman 2003: xv). Similarly, Emma Goldman (1869–1940) defines anarchism as “the philosophy of a new social order based on liberty unrestricted by man-made law; the theory that all forms of government rest on violence, and are therefore wrong and harmful, as well as unnecessary” (1910: 56). The entry on anarchism that Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921) wrote for the 1910 *Encyclopedia Britannica* defined it as “a principle or theory of life and conduct under which society is conceived without government” (2002: 284). These three explanations of anarchism – it would be difficult to find any more widely accepted by anarchists – show that anarchism is

a form of social order rather than mere disorder or absence of organization; the form of social order anarchism represents is intended to maximize freedom, and to do so without recourse to the kinds of coercive institutions that are typically assumed to be necessary, variously called “government,” “law,” or “authority”; and in place of these institutions, anarchists propose to produce social order through a system of “free agreements” to meet individuals’ “needs.”

This much is easily established. What is less tractable, even when informed by these explanations, is the common perception that what is being so explained is an “ideal” – possibly a noble ideal, albeit probably impracticable, and in any case, one that has never been put into practice anywhere. This misunderstanding is reinforced by academic treatments of anarchism as an abstract set of beliefs, the history of which is primarily a history of theorists or believers. The same quotations will furnish evidence for this interpretation: Goldman and Kropotkin, for instance, speak of anarchism as a “philosophy,” a “theory,” and a “principle.” This set of beliefs is generally taken to include the notion that there is something called “human nature,” and that this nature is inherently virtuous and rational – after all, if anarchists intend to do away with “man-made laws,” it must be that they rely on “natural” laws to produce order. This would seem to place anarchism within a history of ideas about “human nature” and “natural law”; in particular, it links anarchism to the more idealistic pronouncements of philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for whom the “state of nature” alone represents true freedom, “civilization” representing compromise and corruption. All that is left is to apply the test of reality: if the belief in a good human nature matched up with the way things are, anarchism would be a valid belief, but since it obviously does not – history seems amply to testify that when people are freed from coercive institutions, they are selfish and violent – anarchism is purely utopian, an image of the perfect life that could never find realization in an imperfect world.

In fact, this conclusion, so apparently self-evident, only finds what it assumes at the start: that anarchism is a theory without a practice. This assumption not only requires that we overlook everything that anarchist writings have to say about anarchist practices (for example, the establishment of “free agreements” among

“various groups”); it also requires that we ignore the concrete, material history of anarchism as a movement. To read the history of the anarchist movement is not to discover a disembodied idea floating in the heads of a few privileged thinkers. On the contrary: practices are everywhere.

The question, for instance, of how agreements are to be established between groups without subordinating them to the will of privileged decision-makers (“representatives”) is not answered by abstract speculations about natural law, but by the institutionalization of very specific kinds of tactics and norms. Here is how José Lluñas Pujols (1855–1905), a Catalan worker and anarchist, describes them: “delegates,” he observes, are to be “instructed in advance on how to proceed” by members of a group meeting in general assembly, and are “subject at any time to replacement or recall by the permanent suffrage of those who had given them their mandate” so that they “can never establish themselves as dictators” (quoted in Nettlau 1996: 187–8). Note that the assumption built into this practice is that delegates who are *not* given specific instructions, who *cannot* be held to account and recalled by the collectivity, may indeed be expected to seek and accumulate power. Indeed, far from assuming the best about “human nature,” it often appears that anarchist practices prepare against the worst: in the words of Mikhail Bakunin (1814–76), anarchists assume that “absence of opposition and control and of continuous vigilance inevitably becomes a source of depravity for all individuals vested with social power” (2002: 245).

Anarchism consists, then, not so much in the elaboration of a “theory” in the abstract which is then to be applied to “practice” from the outside – indeed, this is a model anarchists reject as implicitly authoritarian – but in a “mode of being” (Colson 2004: 14). Indeed, as David Graeber observes, anarchism was never a political philosophy on the model of other political philosophies, speculating about the essence of humanity or offering prescriptions for the perfect society; rather, it has been “primarily an ethics of practice,” the elaboration of practices that embody certain principles (2007: 305). Thus, when Goldman or Kropotkin speaks of anarchism as a “principle,” this is in the sense of an ethical norm, a principle-in-action that can be extrapolated from what it is that human beings already do. For example, in his emphasis on mutualism,

Kropotkin rooted his anarchism in “the countless acts of mutual support and devotion which every one of us knows from his own experience” (1989: 116). That is, anarchists proposed neither to destroy society in favor of untrammelled human nature nor to invent a new society *ex nihilo* (in the manner of classical utopias like Plato’s *Republic*), but to extrapolate and codify certain principles already implicit within ordinary human behavior.

All of the most important formulators of anarchist theory dispensed with notions of instinctual goodness right along with the doctrine of Original Sin, rejecting Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s notion of the state of nature as the idyllic home of the “noble savage” as well as Thomas Hobbes’s conception of the state of nature as a “war of all against all.” Rather than begin from any such imaginary starting point, they took for granted the fairly uncontroversial observation that human beings are capable of altruistic as well as egoistic behavior. To the extent that anarchist theory appealed to “natural laws” as the basis for a new social structure, these “laws” consisted largely of other such commonplaces, such as the recognition that concentrated power corrupts those entrusted with it, or that communities lacking a sense of solidarity and trust tend to require and solicit coercive authority. The point is neither to affirm nor to deny speculations such as Hobbes’s that “man is a wolf to man,” but actively to construct the social conditions under which human beings may be humane: as Paul Goodman remarks, “the moral question is not whether men [and women] are ‘good enough’ for a type of social organization, but whether the type of organization is useful to develop the potentialities of intelligence, grace, and freedom in [women and] men” (1968: 19).

Socialism and the Anarchist Movement

While existing practices – from the survival of convivial social customs to the emergence of modern workers’ associations – supplied Proudhon’s formulation of anarchist theory with its content, historians tend to see an anarchist movement as such emerging gradually within the First International (1864–72), where Proudhonian ideas gained popularity, and within which Mikhail Bakunin exerted an increasing influence until the final split and dissolution of the organization.

Sharing the outlook reflected in the founding document written by Marx, which declared that “the emancipation of the toilers can be the work only of the toilers themselves,” Bakunin argued that this self-emancipation was incompatible with the methods of struggle Marx advocated, which aimed at the capture of state power, and which depended, in view of this goal, on the formation of workers’ parties that would reproduce all the features of the state (or, indeed, the church) within themselves: ideology, hierarchy, and discipline. Anarchism thus gained its identity as a movement from its relation to a broader working-class socialist movement of which it formed the anti-authoritarian wing; in the next generation, Peter Kropotkin would refer to it as “the no-government system of socialism,” and from the 1890s on, the term “libertarian socialism” has entered common use as a synonym for anarchism.

A second distinction that became apparent in the controversies that tore apart the First International would prove just as significant for the future of the anarchist movement. Bakunin objected to Marx’s identification of the socialist movement exclusively with the urban industrial proletariat – the particular segment of the working classes which, from the standpoint of Marx’s conception of history, represented the future, beside which every other class, however underprivileged, necessarily represented the past. For Bakunin, the exclusion from the ranks of potential revolutionaries not only of the petit bourgeoisie (self-employed shopkeepers and small business proprietors) but of the peasantry (small farmers and farm workers) and even the “lumpenproletariat” (the unemployed, criminals, and others living on the margins of the capitalist system), is unacceptable. Since, for the anarchists, revolution was not merely the inevitable outcome of a deterministic historical process but a moral obligation, all of the oppressed – in city or country, in factories or on farms, employed or unemployed, male or female – could participate. By the same token, anarchists refused to limit this revolution to a unique event or a single goal: Proudhon had spoken of “the revolution” as an ongoing process, a “permanent revolution,” the scope of which could be extended indefinitely by “analogy,” so that church, state, and capital appeared as so many different modes of domination. This lateral extension of the potential sites of anarchist resistance gave

it a tactical and theoretical flexibility often lacking in Marxism (which would be slow to embrace forms of revolt that resisted reduction to its economic schemas and class categories), and would give anarchism relevance to political groupings that Proudhon himself had never countenanced, including women, migrant workers, homosexuals, environmentalists, ethnic minorities, and colonized peoples. In Goldman’s (1910: 56) words, anarchists took “every phase of life” as a potential terrain of struggle, from education to sexuality, from art and music to diet and dress.

Migrations

Perhaps just as fundamental to the historical development of anarchism as the transmission of anarchist ideas by people in motion is the fact of motion itself, the unsettling of settled ways and the creation of a “nomadic” working class in ceaseless exchanges (Colson 2001: 140–1). People on the move, “transitional classes,” seem to have constituted one of the great anarchist constituencies: not only immigrants, diasporic peoples, refugees, and exiles, but also migrant workers, hoboes, and peasants and artisans newly arrived in urban factory jobs. Indeed, Benedict Anderson suggests that the history of anarchism is fatefully intertwined with the development of the kinds of transportation and communications technologies – steamships, railways, telegraphs, etc. – that facilitated “early globalization” (2005: 2–3). Thus, anarchism spread to the Americas, Asia, Australia, and parts of Africa, largely in the luggage of immigrants. Italian immigrants, imported as cheap labor to Brazil and to Argentina, brought the anarchist idea with them, joined by Jewish anarchists fleeing pogromist Russia; Russian Jewish immigrants such as the young Emma Goldman, arriving in New York, picked it up from German immigrant anarchists like Johann Most, and her counterparts in London formed a movement around the leadership of another German anarchist émigré, Rudolf Rocker. The American anarchosyndicalist Industrial Workers of the World union exported ideas concerning direct action and extra-parliamentary politics to destinations as far away as Japan and Chile. Chinese anarchists, a number of whom absorbed the ideas of Bakunin and Kropotkin while studying in Paris, became emissaries of anarchism

to the rest of East Asia, as Italian anarchists did to the eastern Mediterranean, as did Eastern Europeans to Central Asia.

What is stranger and more difficult to narrate is the way in which these political missionaries generally found the idea to be in some sense “already there.” Thus, as a conventionally Eurocentric history would have it, the seeds of the Mexican anarchist movement were sown in the 1860s by an itinerant Greek disciple of Proudhon, Plotino C. Rhodakanaty (1828–ca. 1885). At the same time, Rhodakanaty found in the Huichol tradition of the *calpulli* (a form of communal property) a native model of Proudhonian mutualism. Arriving in Spain in 1868, Bakunin’s emissary, Giuseppe Fanelli (1826–77), found that his inability to speak Spanish hardly handicapped him; it seemed that the workers who gathered to listen were ready to hear him – having been prepared, perhaps, by Spain’s relatively early reception of Proudhon’s federalist ideas, popularized as early as 1854 via Francisco Pi y Margall (1824–1901) and demonized even earlier than that by the Catholic conservative Juan Donoso Cortés – and Spain’s anarchist movement quickly became one of the most vigorous in the world. Exiled to the prison colony of New Caledonia for their participation in the Paris Commune of 1871, anarchists such as Louise Michel and Maxime Lisbonne encountered the Kanak people struggling against French colonialism, and on their return to Paris, brought a distinctly anti-colonial élan to the movement there. Rebels from distant corners of the decaying Spanish Empire, encountering Spanish anarchists, adapted their ideas to their own circumstances. Chinese radicals sojourning in Tokyo in 1907 interpreted the reports of Kotoku Shusui (1871–1911) on American anarchosyndicalism in terms of the anti-authoritarian concepts implicit in their own Taoist, Buddhist, and peasant-communalist heritage.

Divisions Within Anarchism

While adherence to the principles of opposition to domination in all forms, self-management, and means-ends coherence have generally stood as the minimal requirements for inclusion in the anarchist movement, anarchists have diverged in their interpretations of them. Divisions emerged fairly quickly, as anarchists questioned what they saw as Proudhon’s inconsistent application of his

own insights. Thus, Joseph Déjacque (1822–65) reproached Proudhon not only for his defense of the patriarchal family, but for his overreliance on an economic system of contracts as a replacement for the state. On the subject of gender, Déjacque’s egalitarianism rapidly became the standard for the entire movement.

On the subject of economy, however, no such consensus was forthcoming. Three distinct positions emerged. One position was Proudhonian “mutualism,” which described an exchange economy minus several of the defining characteristics of capitalism, such as rent, profit, interest, and absentee ownership of land, and bearing several defining characteristics of socialism, such as producer-consumer cooperatives, free credit, and a labor-time currency. Another position was “communism” (also called “anarchist communism,” “anarchocommunism,” or “libertarian communism”), which rejected the wage system entirely in favor of distribution according to need. Finally, there was “collectivism,” a modification of the mutualist system which further emphasized collective ownership of the means of production, but which retained the principle that workers should be rewarded proportionately to their contribution in labor.

Several further developments complicated this division. The combination of anti-statism and laissez-faire capitalism that is currently called “libertarianism” in the United States – a term that, until the mid-twentieth century, was synonymous with “anarchism” *per se* – evolved from an extreme individualist offshoot from the mutualist school, which shed so many of its socialist and anti-capitalist qualities as to become all but unrecognizable. The result, sometimes called “anarcho-capitalism,” is almost universally regarded by anarchists as mere capitalist ideology, an extreme version of the neoliberal doctrine now enshrined in institutions such as the World Trade Organization, no longer a form of anarchism. Nonetheless, varieties of “individualist anarchism,” most ably represented by writers such as E. Armand (1872–1963) in France and Benjamin Tucker (1854–1939) in the United States, enjoyed considerable popularity, inspired partly by the posthumous popularization and translation of the “egoist” writings of Max Stirner (a.k.a. Johann Caspar Schmidt, 1806–56). While these have generally been seen by anarchists as marginal to the movement, the mainstream of which has always been socialist in orientation, they

have generally been seen as remaining within the anarchist orbit.

The collectivist position became associated, for a time, with strategies that integrated anarchism into the trade union movement, what became known as “anarchosyndicalism.” Anarchocommunists often criticized anarchosyndicalists both for including some form of the wage system in their vision of a post-revolutionary society, calling this merely a “mitigated individualism,” and for struggling for better wages and conditions within the capitalist system, a strategy that courted the danger of cooptation and degeneration into mere self-interested reformism. Anarchosyndicalists retorted that to remain aloof from the trade union movement would be to isolate anarchism in the name of ideological purity – and indeed, anarchocommunists from Spain to Japan often called their position “pure anarchism.” Where anarchosyndicalists, like other labor radicals, saw the workplace as the primary site of exploitation and therefore as the primary battleground, individualist anarchists and anarchocommunists insisted that the emancipatory struggle was equally to be located in unwaged time and space, such as in the personal realm and domestic life, where oppression was largely a matter of informal customs and traditional institutions, often reinforced by the state, for example through the apparatuses of law, public education, and medicine.

In long-term strategy, too, the individualist anarchists, anarchosyndicalists, and anarchocommunists diverged. Thus, where the Proudhonian strategy had been to avoid revolutionary “shocks” by building up popular alternatives to capitalism and the state (such as cooperatives and credit unions) so as to gradually supplant them, anarchosyndicalists assigned the task of “forming the structure of the new society within the shell of the old” to the labor union, which, on the eve of the last great general strike, would then serve as a ready-made organ for the self-management of society, a federation of workers coordinating production for use in the absence of capital and the state (*Industrial Workers of the World* 1908: 1). This conception of the union as the “embryo” of anarchy, strikingly similar to the notion of the *soviets* or “workers’ councils” in the libertarian Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg (1870–1919) and others, seemed overly reductive and rigid to anarchocommunists, for whom the proper unit of society was not the workplace but

the community. It is argued that the commune is not only the most appropriate form for the expressions of all sides of the human person (rather than reducing the person to mere producer), but also more suited to the ecological vision of human beings as organisms inhabiting an environment.

Numerous attempts have been made to reconcile these schools of anarchism. As early as 1889, Fernando Tarrida del Marmol (1861–1915) sought to calm tensions in the Spanish anarchist movement by an appeal to “anarchism without adjectives.” As revolutionary unions gained ground in the early twentieth century, the animosity and distrust between anarchosyndicalists and anarchocommunists faded, with prominent representatives of both camps, such as Peter Kropotkin and Victor Griffuelhes, making significant concessions to one another, and ultimately, the most powerful anarchosyndicalist union, the Spanish Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo (CNT), formally adopted “libertarian communism” as part of its official program in 1936. In the 1920s pragmatists like Errico Malatesta (1853–1932) argued that the differences between communist and individualist “schools of thought” could be resolved in practice, while Voline (a.k.a. Vsevolod Mikhailovitch Eichenbaum, 1882–1945) and Sebastien Faure (1858–1942) proposed an “anarchist synthesis” that included elements of all three schools. Meanwhile, from another direction, a group of anarchists including Nestor Makhno (1888–1934) and Peter Arshinov (1887–1937) proposed to reconstruct the anarchist movement around a kind of constitution, a “program” setting forth “hard and fast positions” on matters of theory, tactics, and organization, dubbed *The Organizational Platform of the General Union of Anarchists*. Not only was this controversy not resolved, but other disagreements about means and ends have proliferated.

Another serious dispute concerned the question of organization. “Anti-organizationalists” such as Luigi Galleani (1861–1931), anticipating the advent of what would become known as “insurrectionary anarchism” a century later, saw formal organizations as perpetually in danger of becoming rigid, gradually reproducing all the salient features of the state; “organizationalists” countered, with Malatesta, that “the less organized we have been, the more prone are we to be imposed on by a few individuals” (Galleani 2006: 3; Malatesta 1993: 86).

Anarchopacifists such as Gustav Landauer (1870–1919) have charged that violent means are radically incoherent with anarchist ends – an argument that has been rejected by a majority of anarchists, who have judged that this is to hold the oppressed, who are always in a legitimate state of self-defense, to an impossible standard. Nonetheless, there was a general shift in opinion, particularly after the spectacular violence and reprisals of the early 1890s, against individual acts of violence against persons – e.g., assassinations (*attentats*) and bombings (“propaganda by the deed”) – and toward modes of action, such as labor organizing, cultural resistance, and education, that could be pursued more openly and peacefully even under capitalist and statist conditions.

As early as the 1890s, anarchists such as Henry Zisly (1872–1945), calling themselves “naturistes” “naturianistes,” or “naturiens,” declared machines, science, and “civilization” as such to be oppressive and destructive of both the natural environment and human freedom, declaring themselves in favor of a “return to a more natural life” on the model of primitive peoples. Since the 1970s, John Zerzan (b. 1943) and others have revived this critique of technology and modernity, in forms strongly influenced by the Marxist theory of the Frankfurt School, under the name of “primitivism.” Where the naturiens were largely ignored or ridiculed by the leading anarchists of their day, who generally embraced scientific and technological progress as sources of revolutionary hope, the dire military and ecological trends of the mid-to-late twentieth century have made it more difficult to dismiss the charge that science and technology may both presuppose and reinforce domination and ecocide, and that it is naïve to think that we can use them for other purposes. Nonetheless, a number of “eco-anarchists” such as Bookchin insist that certain sciences and technologies are presently useful and necessary, and that they may be made both humane and ecologically sound; conversely, it is argued, it is primitivism which has been naïve in returning to Rousseau’s “noble savage” mythology (Bookchin 1971: 41–84; 1995: 36–51).

Despite the strongly anti-clerical thrust of anarchism as developed by Proudhon and Bakunin, who dedicated entire books to attacks on the church, and by anarchist educators such as Francisco Ferrer y Guardia (1859–1909),

whose aim was to provide a rational, scientific, materialist alternative to religiously sanctioned pedagogy, a number of anarchists from the nineteenth century on, especially those influenced by the writings of Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910), have argued for the compatibility of some varieties of religion with anarchism. Indeed, a number of important precursors to modern anarchism stem from religious traditions such as Taoism or the radical Protestantism of Gerrard Winstanley (1609–76). While representing a minority tendency within the movement, religious anarchism has exerted for some a strong enough appeal.

The popularity of nationalism has posed a similar problem for anarchist theory and practice. For instance, while the overwhelming majority of Jewish anarchists were atheists and internationalists, enough were attracted by the project of Palestinian settlement in the early twentieth century for the term “anarcho-Zionism” to come into use. Committed to internationalism in principle, anarchists such as Bakunin and Kropotkin nonetheless sympathized with oppressed peoples engaging in nationalist movements, particularly when these were articulated as forms of rebellion against colonial regimes such as those exercised by Russia over Poland. For many, this extended naturally to the struggles of “stateless” peoples such as the Jews against oppression in diaspora. Moreover, anarcho-Zionists such as Bernard Lazare (1865–1903) were careful to differentiate their aspirations from the desire for a state of any kind. Nonetheless, anarchists from Proudhon to Fredy Perlman (1934–85) have warned against support for nationalist aspirations of any kind for any reason, arguing that they always create new forms of oppression.

The tension between anarchism as a particular movement and its universalist aims has never ceased to raise questions. Indeed, the decision of the Spanish CNT union to join other left-wing factions in a Popular Front government in order to resist the fascists – for many then and since, a clear violation of principles – was defended in part by the argument that anarchists were too small a faction to dictate to others what course to take. In more recent decades this tension has manifested itself in connection with solidarity work of various kinds – for instance, of white American anarchists in support of African American movements or the Zapatista revolt in Mexico. For some anarchists, this kind of

support work, reaching across sometimes substantial differences in goals and tactics, often means an unacceptable compromise; it is argued that to abandon, defer, or disguise anarchist goals in order to serve others is either to manipulate them or to be manipulated by them, and that anarchists should instead embrace their specificity, organizing their own movements and arguing openly for their ideas, finding allies where they can. On the other hand, anarchists inspired by the Zapatista principle of *mandar obedeciendo* (“leading by obeying”) as well as by the anarchist tradition of mistrust for Leninist-style vanguardism argue that rather than presuming to “lead” social movements of the oppressed, anarchists should attempt to help existing movements to self-organize, even when not all goals are shared.

Finally, the very fact of living within the state poses routine moral and tactical problems for anarchists, particularly in so far as states adopt some of the characteristics of democracy and socialism. Proudhon himself, in the revolutionary moment of 1848, sought election to the French parliament as a platform for his economic proposals, albeit without success and to his rapid regret. Then and now, each election renews the question of whether it is appropriate or useful for anarchists to vote in defense of civil rights and social welfare. For many anarchists (and perhaps most), this question is always to be answered in the negative, on principle: even when there is something to be gained by voting or lost by abstaining, voting fails the test of means-ends consistency. Moreover, it is argued, such engagement with the system always risks legitimizing it, diluting radical energies; reforms and welfare initiatives stifle discontent and coopt potential revolutionary actors, and even voting defensively against fascists means becoming the tool of political rivals. However, a number of anarchists, from Saverio Merlino (1856–1930) to Noam Chomsky (b. 1928), have objected to hardline abstentionism, which can seem to sacrifice the direct interests of the oppressed in the present for the sake of a principle located in the future.

Decline and Renaissance

While it is extremely difficult to estimate the size of the anarchist movement at any point in its history with any real certainty, it may nonetheless be possible to date the height of its global scope and power to the years just before

and after 1917, the year of the Russian Revolution. However, the triumph of the Bolsheviks in Russia, at first taken as a sign of hope, was to prove disastrous for the anarchist movement on several counts. First, the Soviet state itself became one of the most powerful enemies of anarchist movements within its own territories (crushing the Makhnovist revolt in the Ukraine and the uprising at Kronstadt, jailing and exiling anarchist dissidents) and in Spain, where Stalin’s machinations were instrumental in securing the collapse of resistance to the fascist coup. Waves of anti-communist reaction in the United States and elsewhere pushed workers away from anarchism, serving meanwhile as the pretext for another round of repressive state measures. Perhaps more fatally, Bolshevism became established as the model *par excellence* of revolutionary action and post-revolutionary organization, copied all over the globe by emergent socialist and nationalist movements, reversing the terms of the old rivalry.

Many histories of anarchism written from the standpoint of the end of the twentieth century ring the curtain down after the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939, concluding that while anarchism persisted as an idea among scattered groups and isolated intellectuals, it never again enjoyed the close link it once had to active mass movements. Even the worldwide rebellions of the 1960s and 1970s, after the fact, appeared to have been a radical hiccup in a world-system otherwise stably split between finance capitalism and bureaucratic socialism, giving way in its turn to a monopolar world dominated by multinational capital and American military power.

From the standpoint of the last decade, this assessment seems to have been premature: indeed, quite suddenly, in the wake of the Seattle protests of 1999, observers of the nascent global justice movement noted that anarchism seemed to be “the radical ideology that prevails among its core activists” (Epstein 2001: 13). Over the same period – notably in regions hit hardest by neoliberal doctrines, such as Argentina after the economic collapse of 2001 and New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina – anarchist practices of mutual aid and direct action were spontaneously reinvented as means of survival.

The “new anarchism” is in many ways discontinuous with the old, both institutionally and ideologically. Many of the new anarchists have nothing to do with the surviving anarchist

unions and federations, have little expectation of an imminent revolution, and theorize in terms strongly inflected both by the “New Social Movements” of the 1960s and 1970s (particularly ecology and feminism) and by the post-Marxist and postmodern philosophies that emerged from that era as alternatives to the varieties of Marxist discourse still dominant in the New Left. The continuities, however, are arguably profound – both in terms of the unresolved problems and the unexhausted possibilities.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Culture, 1840–1939; Anarchism and Education; Anarchism and Gender; Anarchocommunism; Anarchosyndicalism; Infoshops

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, B. R. O. (2005) *Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination*. London: Verso.
- Bakunin, M. (2002) *Bakunin on Anarchism*. Montréal: Black Rose Books.
- Barclay, H. B. (1990) *People Without Government: An Anthropology of Anarchy*. London: Kahn & Averill.
- Berkman, A. (1929/2003) *What Is Anarchism?* Oakland: AK Press.
- Black, B. (1997) *Anarchy After Leftism*. Columbia: CAL Press.
- Bookchin, M. (1971/2004) *Post-Scarcity Anarchism*. Oakland: AK Press.
- Bookchin, M. (1995) *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm*. Oakland: AK Press.
- Cahm, C. (1989) *Kropotkin and the Rise of Revolutionary Anarchism, 1872–1886*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Colson, D. (2001) *Petit lexique philosophique de l'anarchisme de Proudhon à Deleuze*. Paris: Librairie Générale Française.
- Colson, D. (2004) *Trois essais de philosophie anarchiste: Islam, Histoire, Monadologie*. Paris: Éditions Léo Scheer.
- Déjacque, J. (1857/2005) On Being Human. In Robert Graham (Ed.), *Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas*, Vol. 1: *From Anarchy to Anarchism (300 CE to 1939)*. Montréal: Black Rose Books.
- Dirlik, A. (1991) *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Dolgoft, S. (1970/2002) *The Relevance of Anarchism to Modern Society*. Johannesburg: Zabalaza Books.
- Epstein, B. (2001) Anarchism and the Anti-Globalization Movement. *Monthly Review* 53, 4 (September): 1–14.
- Galleani, L. (1927/2006) *The Principle of Organization in the Light of Anarchism*. Cascadia: Pirate Press Portland.
- Goldman, E. (1910) *Anarchism and Other Essays*. New York: Mother Earth Publishing Association.
- Goodman, P. (1968) *People or Personnel: Decentralizing and the Mixed Systems and Like a Conquered Province: The Moral Ambiguity of America*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Graeber, D. (2001) *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press.
- Graeber, D. (2007) *Possibilities: Essays on Hierarchy, Rebellion, and Desire*. Oakland: AK Press.
- Guérin, D. (2005) *No Gods, No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Industrial Workers of the World (1908) *Preamble and Constitution of the Industrial Workers of the World*. Chicago: IWW.
- Krebs, E. (1998) *Shifu, Soul of Chinese Anarchism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kropotkin, P. A. (1902/1989) *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*. Montréal: Black Rose Books.
- Kropotkin, P. A. (1927/2002) *Anarchism: A Collection of Revolutionary Writings*. New York: Dover Publications.
- Malatesta, E. (1993) *Life and Ideas*. London: Freedom Press.
- Nettlau, M. (1996) *A Short History of Anarchism*. London: Freedom Press.
- Proudhon, P.-J. (1840/1994) *What Is Property?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Proudhon, P.-J. (1851/1989) *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century*. London: Pluto Press.
- Purchase, G. (1997) *Anarchism and Ecology*. Montréal: Black Rose Books.
- Reclus, E., Clark, J. P., & Martin, C. (2004) *Anarchy, Geography, Modernity: The Radical Social Thought of Elisée Reclus*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Rocker, R. (1938/2004) *Anarcho-Syndicalism: Theory and Practice*. Oakland: AK Press.
- Skirda, A. (2002) *Facing the Enemy: A History of Anarchist Organization from Proudhon to May 1968*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Voline (1924/2005) Anarchist Synthesis. In Robert Graham (Ed.), *Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas*, Vol. 1: *From Anarchy to Anarchism (300 CE to 1939)*. Montréal: Black Rose Books.
- Woodcock, G. (2004) *Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements*. Peterborough: Broadview Press.

Anarchism, Argentina

Chuck Morse

Argentine anarchists built one of the largest, most dynamic anarchist movements in the world and played a pivotal role in that country's history

from the 1890s to the 1930s. Though their numbers are greatly reduced today, traces of the movement's heyday are evident in the Argentine state's corporatist commitments and in a highly egalitarian counterculture.

High Point

The first anarchist groups formed in Argentina in the 1870s, galvanized by refugees from the Paris Commune and the arrival of anarchist literature from Spain, Italy, France, and other countries. French immigrants founded a section of the First International in Buenos Aires in 1872, and Italian and Spanish sections appeared shortly thereafter. Reflecting factional struggles that would split the organization internationally, the French section embraced Marx's views, whereas the Spaniards and Italians identified with Bakunin; the latter dominated among Argentine anarchists after 1876.

Anarchist ranks soon experienced substantial growth, thanks to the waves of European immigrants who began landing on Argentine soil in the 1880s and did not stop for nearly three decades. The majority were Italian, the second largest group was Spanish (from Galicia, in particular), and the third was French. Some had experience in the European anarchist movement and virtually all came to escape political repression and poverty. Instead of finding prosperity and liberty, most encountered crushing economic deprivations and a government that responded to them primarily through repression. This, in the context of a society undergoing massive economic and industrial growth, provided fertile ground for anarchists' revolutionary aspirations.

Initially, anarchist groups focused on discussion and education and stood aloof from larger social struggles; however, this countercultural posture grew increasingly untenable as a debate unfolded among anarchists about the relative merits of intervention in the labor movement. Some believed that such a course would dilute anarchist aims, whereas others saw it as the most effective path to revolution. Advocates of the latter perspective were triumphant, thanks especially to three Italian anarchists: Errico Malatesta, Héctor Mattei, and Pietro Gori. This victory set the stage for the emergence of a mass anarchist movement.

Anarchists were instrumental in creating Argentina's earliest workers' organizations. In

1901 a coalition of anarchists and socialists founded Argentina's first labor federation, the Argentine Workers' Federation (Federación Obrera Argentina) (FOA). The socialists departed soon after, and founded the General Workers Union (Unión General de Trabajadores), leaving the FOA in anarchist hands. The FOA was an explicitly revolutionary body committed to direct action, boycott, sabotage, and class warfare in general. In 1904 the FOA changed its name to the Regional Worker's Federation of Argentina (Federación Obrera Regional Argentina) (FORA). At the FORA's 5th congress in 1905 it made a commitment to anarchocommunist part of organizational statutes.

Anarchists had greater penetration among workers than militants from any other tendency, and their unions won many important victories, such as wage increases, reductions in the length of the working day, and various rights of association. They led the port workers, ground transport workers, and seamen's unions, and were also heavily represented among bakers, metal workers, construction workers, and ship workers. Control of these unions, particularly those operating on the ports and in the ground transport industry, put them in a position to paralyze Argentina's economy. Anarchists did, in fact, disrupt economic normalcy on numerous occasions and in some cases brought the country to a standstill. They led six general strikes in the first decade of the century and many more that were partial, though still significant. Their goal was to organize a revolutionary general strike that would cause the capitalist economy and the political structure to collapse, leading ultimately to complete workers' self-management; however, anarchists believed that confronting and defeating capitalism required more than just battles on the shop floor and along the picket line: it also demanded that workers feel a strong sense of class solidarity and have an enlightened, progressive perspective on social affairs.

Anarchists set out to nurture this through myriad cultural activities. They were extremely active publishers, putting out two dozen periodicals between 1890 and 1904, sometimes as many as twenty at one time, including eight in Italian and three in French. *La Protesta Humana*, which was founded in 1897, became a daily, and sometimes twice daily, publication after 1904. A general-interest anarchist newspaper, it reached a very wide audience. For example, more than 10,000

copies were circulated weekly in 1907, even though it was banned at the time. Another anarchist daily, *La Batalla* (*The Battle*), was founded in 1910. It published a morning as well as evening edition. Additional publications of note were *La Liberté*, *La Question Sociale*, *El Oprimido*, *El Perseguido*, *L'Avvenire*, and *El Rebelde*.

Theater and poetry were also important. Influential wordsmiths included poet and playwright Alberto Ghirardo, Uruguayan-born dramatist Florencio Sánchez, and the novelist Roberto Arlt; as well as Félix Basterra, González Pacheco, Armando Discépolo, Alejandro Sux, and José de Maturana. Drawn to forms that seemed amenable to mainstream literary circles, they scarcely wrote philosophy and never produced anarchist theory of consequence.

Anarchists did not limit their radicalism to the written word. They were pivotal in the development of the tango, the quintessential expression of Argentine working-class culture before World War II. Anarchist dissidence even impacted language: *lunfardo*, the Argentine argot (slang) born of the prisons and ghetto streets, was closely linked to the tango and was part of the anarchist counterculture. Pageantry, in the form of parades and marches, was an integral component of their cultural apparatus. Their annual May Day marches often drew tens of thousands, demonstrating anarchist strength and, by forcing a revolutionary holiday upon the public, punctuating their assertion of a counternarrative to Argentina's historical development. Anarchists also created their own pantheon of heroes and martyrs, often foreign-born (as well as Argentine) revolutionary militants. Anarchists institutionalized their cultural interventions in social centers, theaters, adult and children's schools, popular libraries, and discussion circles. Linked to the unions and seeded throughout proletarian districts, these bodies were a vital dimension of the revolutionary movement, and easily mobilized during times of crisis.

Anarchists' commitment to leveling social hierarchies prompted them to advance a generous social radicalism. For instance, challenges to patriarchy and support for women's self-organization were common elements of anarchist discourse. There was a higher percentage of female activists among anarchists than among other radical tendencies, and an anarcha-feminist paper appeared as early as 1896 (*La Voz de la Mujer*), under the slogan "No god, no boss, no

husband." One prominent anarchist, Virginia Bolten, led what was probably the first strike by women in Argentina. Anarchists also participated in many actions that involved large numbers of females by necessity, such as rent strikes and consumer boycotts.

The government understood that anarchists had the potential to shatter the economic, political, and cultural foundations upon which Argentina lay, and responded with a wide spectrum of measures designed to raise the cost of revolutionary activism. Petty police harassment – humiliating and inconvenient searches and gratuitous demands for identification – was a familiar experience for militants. The outlawing of radical publications, the suppression of the right to public assembly, and mass arrests were also common; martial law was declared for a total of 18 months between 1902 and 1910. There were also legislative attempts to undermine the anarchist movement, specifically the Ley de Residencia (1902) and the Ley de Defensa Social (1910). The former granted the government the right to deport foreigners that it deemed undesirable, whereas the latter levied a series of penalties against anarchist activity specifically.

The state resorted to outright violence as well, which it exercised through the police, the army, and other formal forces, in addition to thugs, acting on its behalf. For instance, police opened fire on the anarchists' May Day march in 1909, killing several people as a result. There was also mass police repression in 1910 during events surrounding the centenary of Argentine national independence. Nine years later, anarchists would be scarred by incidents that took place during the *semana trágica* (tragic week) that transpired between January 7 and January 14, 1919. The turmoil began when several workers were killed during a conflict between striking metal workers and strike breakers. This led to a general strike that crippled the entire country and pushed Buenos Aires into a state of chaos for several days. It took the combined efforts of the police and gangs of hooligans to finally subdue the rebellion. Historians estimate that 700 were killed and 4,000 were injured during the confrontations.

Not all the repression occurred in urban areas. Beginning in 1920, anarchists led a year-long rebellion by agricultural workers in the Patagonia region. The army responded with a crackdown that sent 1,500 to their death before

firing squads. A German anarchist named Kurt Wilkens later responded to these aggressions by assassinating Colonel Héctor Varela, who had directed the army's actions.

Anarchists were also subject to pressure from elements within the workers' movement that wanted them to adulterate their revolutionary convictions. This achieved its most decisive result in 1915, at the FORA's 9th congress, when there was a split between syndicalists, who sought to rescind the federation's commitment to anarcho-communism, and anarchists, who defended it. Both tendencies departed from the congress claiming the FORA's name: syndicalists came to be known as the FORA of the 9th Congress and anarchists as the FORA of the 5th Congress.

Changes in the state (prompted in part by anarchist efforts) also rendered anarchists' anti-statism more tenuous. For instance, the Saenz Peña Law (1912) made (male) voting secret and obligatory. This helped clean up the electoral process, thus enhancing its legitimacy, while also making anarchist abstentionism illegal, thus narrowing the space available to anti-statist social action.

The accumulated impact of government repression, sectarian battles, and social changes meant that the 1920s would be a decade of retreat and internecine conflict for anarchists. Robberies and bombings carried out by Severino di Giovanni (1901–31), an Italian immigrant, propagandist, and partisan of revolutionary violence, were a central catalyst. In addition to other actions, he bombed the American embassy to protest the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti, and the Italian consulate to protest Italian Fascism (killing 9 and injuring 34). His actions specifically, and the issue of "anarcho-banditry" generally, ignited a passionate debate among anarchists. This played out in the pages of the anarchist press, particularly in *La Anthoncha* (which defended di Giovanni) and in *La Protesta* (which attacked him). Historians now attribute the assassination of Emilio López Arango (1894–1929), a *La Protesta* editor and one of di Giovanni's fiercest critics, to di Giovanni himself, who was arrested and executed in 1931.

Decline

The 1930 coup led by General José Félix Uriburu dealt the final blow to anarchism's existence as a mass movement, due primarily to the imposition of martial law and the assertion of a strong cor-

poratist perspective within the state. Although anarchists continued to organize and disseminate their views, they slowly returned to the counter-cultural posture that was characteristic of their efforts in the 1880s.

Anarchists founded the Argentine Anarcho-Communist Federation (Federación Anarco Comunista Argentina) in 1935, which became the Argentine Libertarian Federation (Federación Libertaria Argentina) in 1955. This group, however, never acquired a mass base. Also in 1935, a coalition of socialists and anarchists started the Biblioteca Popular José Ingenieros, a library and social center. The socialists departed shortly after its founding, leaving the project in anarchist control. Anarchists led the solidarity campaigns organized to aid anti-fascists in the Spanish Civil War, and many traveled to Europe to fight among anarchist forces there.

The rise of Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón was paradoxical for anarchists. Although his populism was strongly linked to working-class mobilization and his government provided unprecedented benefits to workers, anarchists rejected Peronism as a jingoistic state-centered project that operated through networks of caciques instead of genuine proletarian democracy.

From the New Left to the Dictatorship

A portion of the many Argentine youth radicalized during the 1960s and 1970s turned to anarchism, although they were largely unable to work cooperatively with the older generation of anarchists. This was a consequence of cultural as well as political differences, particularly the younger militants' identification with the anti-imperialist currents that were then sweeping the globe. This divide caused a bitter wound in Argentina's multi-generational anarchist legacy, although it also prompted the more youthful militants to define their views with a degree of specificity not found among anarchists in countries that avoided such intramural conflicts.

Resistencia Libertaria (RL) was the most significant anarchist group to emerge during this period. Clandestine and cellular in structure, it aimed to spark mass resistance and, ultimately, a prolonged popular war. It agitated in the neighborhood, labor, and student movements, and also had a small armed wing, which it used for the purposes of defense and expropriation.

Though formally a national organization, it operated primarily in La Plata, Córdoba, and Buenos Aires. A significant percentage of RL activists were disappeared in the mid-1970s, and many more after the 1976 military coup, as Argentine society grew increasingly polarized. RL continued to be active under the dictatorship until 1978, when police conducted simultaneous raids throughout the country and seized most of its remaining members. Approximately 80 percent of RL militants spent time in the dictatorship's concentration camps, where all were tortured and most were executed.

From the Return to Constitutional Rule to the Present

Novel and relatively anti-authoritarian social actors emerged during the final years of the dictatorship and immediately after the 1983 reinstallation of civil government. The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, a group of mothers organizing on behalf of people disappeared under the military government, are the best known, although there were also ecologists, feminists, and others. This reflected a turn away from the state as the focus of the left's efforts, and an inclination toward a more decentralist politics. This phenomenon encouraged a renewed interest in anarchism, but not a significant increase in the ranks of the old anarchist groups. Punk rock also played an important role in cultivating interest in anarchism.

Argentina's 2001 economic crisis prompted the appearance of even more confrontational and more anarchistic social actors, such as militant neighborhood assemblies, factory occupations, and aggressive street protests. Their actions, combined with generalized public anger at the government, threw the country into a state of disorder and led successive Argentine presidents to resign. Though anarchists participated actively in these movements, they did not play a central role in defining their goals, and the size and number of anarchist groups did not expand dramatically.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Culture, 1840–1939; Argentina, Armed Struggle and Guerilla Organizations, 1960s–1970s; Argentina, General Strike (*Semana Trágica*), 1919; Argentina, Social and Political Protest, 2001–2007; Argentina, Worker Strikes in Patagonia, 1920–1921

References and Suggested Readings

- Alexander, R. (2003) *A History of Organized Labor in Argentina*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Bayer, O. (1986) *Anarchism and Violence: Severino di Giovanni in Argentina, 1923–1931*. London: Elephant Editions.
- Lopez, F. & Diz, V. (2007) *Resistencia Libertaria*. Buenos Aires: Madreselva.
- Munck, R. (1987) *Argentina: From Anarchism to Peronism: Workers, Unions and Politics, 1855–1985*. London: Zed Books.
- Oved, I. (1978) *El anarquismo y el movimiento obrero en Argentina*. Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno.
- Suriano, J. (2001) *Anarquistas: cultura y política libertaria en Buenos Aires, 1890–1910*. Buenos Aires: Manantial.
- Zibechi, R. (2003) *Genealogía de la revuelta: Argentina, la sociedad en movimiento*. Montevideo: Nordan Comunidad.

Anarchism, Australia

Bob James

At least as early as the 1840s (“Australia” having only been settled by white Europeans in 1788), the term “anarchist” was used as a slander by conservatives against their political opponents; for example, by W. C. Wentworth against Henry Parkes and J. D. Lang for speaking in favor of Australian independence from Britain. This opportunistic blackening of reputations has continued to the present day. What has also continued is that Australian attempts to express the philosophy positively have reflected other countries' concerns or global rather than local issues.

For example, the first positive public expression of the philosophy was the Melbourne Anarchist Club (MAC) which, established in 1886, consciously reflected the Boston Anarchist Club's approach to strategy and philosophy, having a secretary, a chairperson, speakers' rules, and prepared papers which the public were invited to hear. The club was also a response to the 1884 call by the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the US and Canada for a celebration of May 1, 1886 as an expression of working-class solidarity. The first MAC meeting was held on that day at the instigation of Fred Upham from Rhode Island, the two Australian-born Andrade brothers, David and William, and three other discontented members of the Australasian Secular Association (ASA) based in Melbourne.

Australian labor activists had been involved in Eight Hour Day agitations since 1871 and in deliberately associating themselves with the overseas movement for May Day the MAC organizers exposed their lack of involvement in local labor politics and their vulnerability to the rise or fall of distant agendas. Their first meeting, of course, almost coincided with the Haymarket explosion in Chicago, and the longer and more colorfully that tragedy and its aftermath held world attention, the more difficult it was for less sensational views to be put.

In the absence of more detailed and considered research, it also seems reasonable to argue that the infamous arrests, mistrial, and execution of self-proclaimed anarchists for the explosion set the scene for the next century. Not only did short-term conflict between supporters of local Eight Hour Days and those in favor of the more international May Day approach bedevil labor politics for some years, but, in the long term, libertarianism of all forms has been greatly handicapped and on the defensive ever since. This comment can probably be made about much anarchist endeavor around the world, but the close identification of the MAC with “the Haymarket” has possibly had a longer-lasting and deeper negative impact. This is despite the fact that it was, during our own “Reign of Terror,” a focal point for local agitators: “With one possible exception, the trial of the eight Chicago anarchists is the most dramatic in all labour history” (Lane 1939: 16).

In what was a period of great social upheaval, many well-known union leaders and labor spokespeople actually declared their support in the decade, 1886–96. But they had to do so from behind pseudonyms or in private. Years later they could publically acknowledge having being influenced by propagandists from the MAC, in particular by Jack Andrews, a major figure, who, among other things, believed he was the first anywhere to articulate a theory of communist-anarchism.

One of the earliest members of the MAC, Andrews had to overcome a severe stutter and depression brought on by a tormented childhood, an above-average intelligence, and a fragmented cultural background. He developed skills as an inventor, a poet, and a linguist, and was prepared to push his beliefs to the extremes of sleeping rough, refusing payment for work, and living off the land. Renouncing respectability, such as the

yoke of collar and tie, and devoting himself entirely to “the cause,” he impressed his comrades with his learning and sincerity, but was easily picked off by the authorities on trumped up charges when the police failed to involve him in sham dynamite plots. He gave up mass agitational work in 1895, but continued writing, including for overseas journals such as *Freedom* and *Revolt*, and moving in labor circles, becoming editor of *Tocsin* in 1901. He died of consumption in 1903.

Under internal and external pressures, the MAC had by 1890 already fractured into “voluntary-communist,” communist-anarchist, and individualist anarchist factions, the last specifically following Benjamin Tucker and other US writers.

Writer and publicist David Andrade, who wrote the club’s constitution, developed what would be later called lifestyle anarchism. In the 1890s this meant vegetarianism and hydrotherapy and agitation against organized religion and medical interventions such as vaccination and fluoride. He left Melbourne for Gippsland, where he attempted self-sufficiency along the lines of a scheme he’d set out in his book *The Melbourne Riots* (1892). In 1895 his family lost everything in a bushfire. Andrade succumbed to the loss and was institutionalized, where he died in 1929.

Perhaps the best known of all labor organizers in the period when the Australian Labor Party was born, 1890–5, William Lane, brother of Ernie, came to Australia from England in the 1880s. He quickly established himself as a journalist, and as editor of the *Brisbane Worker*, “John Miller,” he espoused libertarian communism under the guise of “mateship” and “cooperation.” Disillusioned with labor politics and convinced useful gains could not be made, he left the paper in 1892. After producing a documentary novel *Working Man’s Paradise*, he helped galvanize a mass emigration of hundreds of labor stalwarts in 1893 to Paraguay. “New Australia” foundered on a lack of preparation and over his leadership, which was veering to the authoritarian. In the early twentieth century he edited a conservative newspaper in New Zealand in which he opposed all labor-based initiatives.

John “Chummy” Fleming was a local agitator attracted to the MAC but never seduced by it. He initiated the first May Day procession in Melbourne, in 1892, and in later years felt that it was his, even when the organizers, political

laborites, told him he was not wanted. With a cow bell and his black flag he would start well ahead, slowing down gradually until it appeared he was leading the march. Among Emma Goldman's correspondents, he continued to speak, rain, hail, or shine, in public parks until his death in the 1950s.

Its international focus and the conservative, even authoritarian nature of Australian society has meant that between that "revolutionary" period and the 1970s "youth movements" anarchism has been kept alive only by individuals or small scattered groups, a number of whom have been part of the continued emigration flow from Europe. Few have been researched in detail – a selection follows:

- A Spanish-language bulletin produced in Innisfail, Queensland by cane cutters and described as "the best anarchist newspaper produced at the time anywhere in the world" deserves mention here, with an Italian-language anti-fascist newspaper, *Il Risveglio*, produced in 1927 in Sydney.
- A school, "Koorngong," which flourished from 1939 to 1948 is just one of numerous examples of efforts for libertarian education.
- The Kleber-Claux family, from France, who energized the nudist movement in Sydney and elsewhere in the 1930s and 1940s and established one of the first communes in north Queensland.
- Harvey Buttonshaw, from Victoria, went to Spain to fight with the Syndicalists in 1936, and told George Orwell to pull his head in, or he'd get shot, just before exactly that happened. He is among the group shown on the front cover of Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia*.
- K. J. Kenafick campaigned for world peace largely on his own in the 1940s and 1950s, but did not live long enough to meet John Zube who articulated a theory he called Panarchy, or anarchism for peace, in the 1960s through to the 1990s.
- English gay man and anti-fascist refugee from Nazi retribution, John Olday developed a cabaret, "Immortal Clown," for his Café La Bohème in 1959 Sydney. His LP record "Roses and Gallows" might have been picked up by the Sydney Libertarians who made a splash from the late 1950s into the 1960s, but they were more interested in free love, personal freedom, and betting systems.

- Australia also provided a haven for Bulgarian, Spanish, Italian, and other European anarchists after World War II, Bulgaria being one of the few places where an anarchist government held office for a period between the retreating Nazis and the Soviets. Some of these were instrumental in setting up the long-running Jura Bookshop in Sydney in the 1970s, from which Red Fern Black Rose was a subsequent breakaway. Again, the split was largely between syndicalist and "lifestyle" anarchisms.

The Sydney Libertarians, or The Push as they were locally known, were survived by Germaine Greer, Clive James, Wendy Bacon, and Frank Moorhouse among others, who went on to establish themselves in the "alternative" 1970s and beyond.

In the mid-1970s, Alternative Canberra, instigated by Bob James, helped organize "Confests" (a combination of conference and festival) after Graeme Dunstan and others 'liberated' Nimbin on the north coast of New South Wales. The Anarcho-Surrealist Insurrectionary Feminists (ASIF) was a South Australian group which developed political street theater to insist that theoretical gender equivalence among anarchists was not good enough; Pio and his sister Thalia were Greek-born performance poets; Vince Ruiz was involved with Melbourne's Free Legal Service and the Free Store movement; *Digger*, *Living Daylights*, and *Nation Review* were important magazines to emerge from the ferment.

With the major events of the 1960s and 1970s so heavily influenced by overseas anarchists, local libertarians, in addition to those mentioned, were able to generate sufficient strength "down under" to again attempt broad-scale, formal organization. In particular, Andrew Giles-Peters, an academic at La Trobe University (Melbourne) fought to have local anarchists come to serious grips with Bakunin and Marxist politics within a Federation of Australian Anarchists format which produced a series of documents. Annual conferences that he, Brian Laver, Drew Hutton, and others organized in the early 1970s were sometimes disrupted by Spontaneists, including Peter McGregor, who went on to become a one-man team stirring many national and international issues.

Community Radio was an important libertarian channel for numerous grouplets and

individuals as feminism and green thinking in all their forms took hold. The not-so-green Libertarian Workers group in Melbourne, led by medico Joe Toscano, has since been a major force. He was instrumental in attempting exorcism of the “Haymarket effect” in May 1986 with the Australian Anarchist Centenary Celebrations. Held over four days and nights, it brought locals and international visitors together but failed in its long-term purposes, perhaps for the same reasons that William Lane failed.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchosyndicalism; Haymarket Tragedy

References and Suggested Readings

- James, B. (Ed.) (1979) *A Reader of Australian Anarchism*. Canberra: Bob James.
- James, B. (Ed.) (1983) *What is Communism? And Other Essays by JA Andrews*. Prahran, Victoria: Libertarian Resources/Backyard Press.
- James, B. (Ed.) (1986) *Anarchism in Australia – An Anthology*. Prepared for the Australian Anarchist Centennial Celebration, Melbourne, May 1–4, in a limited edition. Melbourne: Bob James.
- James, B. (1986) *Anarchism and State Violence in Sydney and Melbourne, 1886–1896*. Melbourne: Bob James.
- Lane, E. (Jack Cade) (1939) *Dawn to Dusk*. N. P. William Brooks.
- Lane, W. (J. Miller) (1891/1980) *Working Mans' Paradise*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.

Anarchism, Britain

Benjamin Franks

As far back as the nineteenth century there was a significant division between class struggle, social anarchism, and the alternative, individualist version of libertarianism. In the UK context this latter branch of anarchism was associated with Henry Seymour, a “disciple” of Benjamin Tucker. Seymour, who some claim edited the first anarchist newspaper in Britain, *The Anarchist* (1885), briefly collaborated with Peter Kropotkin, but their partnership soon folded because of philosophical differences (individualism vs. mainstream socialist versions of anarchism). Kropotkin departed to set up his own anti-capitalist anarchist paper, *Freedom*.

Kropotkin's *Freedom* group also supported the radical organization of largely Jewish immigrants, based around *Der Arbeiter Frainit* (*The*

Workers' Friend) newspaper, which was originally a non-aligned socialist periodical but increasingly identified itself as anarchist. With the assistance of the anarchosyndicalist Rudolf Rocker, the group helped to form unions of Jewish immigrant textile workers, and by 1912 organized a successful mass strike of thousands of tailors from across London's communities.

The first decades of the twentieth century saw a considerable increase in agitation within British industry. By 1907 the growth was such that *Freedom* was producing its own syndicalist journal, *The Voice of Labor*, edited by the shop steward John Turner, a former colleague of William Morris. This intensified militancy did not originate from anarchosyndicalists, but did confirm the relevance of such tactics. The extent of syndicalist thinking in the more mainstream workers' movement was demonstrated by the document produced by members of the unofficial rank-and-file committee of the Miners' Federation of Britain (a forerunner of the National Union of Mineworkers). This plan, *The Miners' Next Step*, was a lucid proposal of federal organization in order to wage effective class warfare. Even after the rise of Leninism in the Welsh coalfields, Albert Meltzer, a later class struggle anarchist, noted with pleasure that a small pocket of syndicalism continued there for decades.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, however, state communism began to dominate the non-social democratic wings of the British labor movement at the expense of more heterodox forms of socialism. The apparent vindication of Lenin's centralized and “disciplined” methods in the October Revolution, along with the use of Russia's financial reserves to provide a competitive advantage to revolutionaries who conformed to Lenin's strategy, marginalized alternative radical movements. As Leninism and Stalinism dominated, the discourse of Marxism came to be associated with the increasingly odious rationalizations for totalitarian governance.

Despite the hegemony of Leninism over the use of Marxist terminology, there was a consistent, recognizable section of British anarchists that retained an insistence on identifying with the economically oppressed class. From World War II until the 1980s these tended to be, but were not exclusively, from syndicalist or quasi-syndicalist sections of anarchism, which, as a result, placed priority on radical action at the point of production. This syndicalist strand can be

traced from the 1940s' Anarchist Federation of Britain and Syndicalist Workers Federation, to Black Flag in the 1960s, the Direct Action Movement of the late 1970s and 1980s, to the present-day Solidarity Federation and the anarchist-influenced Industrial Workers of the World. There were (and are) other class struggle groups whose orientation was not confined to the syndicalist strategy of developing structures for waging industrial warfare at the point of production. Among the longest running of these were Solidarity (1960–92), Class War (1983–), and the Anarchist Communist Federation, now known simply as the Anarchist Federation (1986–).

By the mid-1960s the rift between class struggle anarchists and the increasingly liberal anarchist movement became more apparent. This liberal turn was identified with *Freedom*, a paper which lay claim to being the linear successor to Kropotkin, and produced an edition celebrating the “first century”; however, between 1932 and 1944 there was a break in publication. The new *Freedom* and Colin Ward's influential 1960s magazine *Anarchy* took anarchist ideas and revised and reapplied them to a host of concerns not previously covered by libertarian publications. With the rise of the counterculture, these publications took a more liberal, less class-oriented approach, aiming to influence policy-makers and white-collar employees rather than foment revolutionary change.

The division between the counterculture and class-based politics was permeable, as the squatting movements of the 1960s and 1970s and later punk-inspired milieus were to demonstrate. Nonetheless, the apparent shift away from class-based action was opposed by militants such as Stuart Christie; he sought more direct engagement with working-class opposition, and was famously caught smuggling explosives to the anti-Franco resistance. From the 1960s onwards other concerns that were not directly related to the extraction of surplus labor came to the political fore, such as campaigns against colonialism, promotion of environmental concerns including animal rights, and advocacy of feminism and sexual liberation. Some of these issues and forms of organizing sat uncomfortably with a more programmatic, class-based approach.

By the time of the Miners' Strike in 1984, anarchism had minimal influence on – and in – working-class structures of resistance. The

experience of the Miners' Strike, shortly followed by the intense print workers dispute, however, played an influential role in resurrecting class-struggle anarchism in Britain. The main anarchist groups, as a result of the engagement in the strike (and its subsequent defeat), developed a more robust and coherent conception of the agency for libertarian social change, and helped to create social structures more consistent with the anti-hierarchical principles of anarchism. Whilst class oppression was not always the sole or main structure of subjugation, in many contexts (if not all) it was increasingly recognized as having a substantial role.

The various categories of British anarchism have shared a remarkable consistency in iconography, targets, and critical discourse: they have rejected the state, used the language of “resistance” and “liberation,” promoted self-activity, engaged in direct action, and used and adapted long-established symbols of revolt. More recently, however, degrees of convergence have come to the fore. Class-based anarchists have recognized that not all forms of oppression are reducible to class alone, while those involved in issue-centered campaigns (such as the environmental movement) have recognized the class feature inherent in many of these issues. Networks of solidarity between disparate groups became a prominent characteristic of anarchist organization and were a significant feature of the global justice movement (also referred to as the anti-capitalist and anti-globalization movement).

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchocommunist; Anarchosyndicalism; Britain, Trade Union Movement; Britain, Post-World War II Political Protest; British Miners' Strike, 1984–1985; Class Identity and Protest; Class Struggle

References and Suggested Readings

- Aufheben (1998) *The Politics of Anti-Road Struggle and the Struggles of Anti-Road Politics: The Case of the No M11 Link Road Campaign*. In G. McKay (Ed.), *DIY Culture: Party and Protest in Nineties Britain*. London: Verso.
- Christie, S. (1980) *The Christie File*. Sanday: Cienfuegos Press.
- Communist Party (1957) *Inner Party Democracy*. London: Communist Party.
- Dangerfield, G. (1997) *The Strange Death of Liberal England*. London: Serif.
- Gordon, U. (2005) *Anarchism and Political Theory: Contemporary Problems*. Doctoral thesis, Mansfield College, Oxford University.

Kendall, W. (1969) *The Revolutionary Movement in Britain*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Woodcock, G. (1975) *Anarchism*. London: Penguin.

Anarchism, Canada

Allan Antliff

The history of European-influenced anarchism in Canada begins in the late nineteenth century as the process of colonial state-building reached its apogee. Two US-based French-language anarchist-communist journals, *La Torpille* and *Le Réveil des masses* (produced by exiled Paris Communards), circulated in Quebec during this period, but their readership remains elusive. Just before World War I, anarchist groups are documented in urban centers such as Montreal, Winnipeg, Calgary, and Toronto and in the newly established western province of British Columbia. The anarchist-syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) was mobilizing unskilled and racially oppressed workers (Chinese immigrants, for example) in the thousands. The IWW also circulated a bilingual French/English newspaper, *Travailleur/The Worker*, in Quebec and Ontario. Responding to government repression during World War I, a competing organization, the One Big Union (OBU), was formed in the spring of 1919 by former IWW activists and members of the Canadian Socialist Party. Co-opting IWW organizational tactics, it rejected anti-state syndicalism in favor of reformism. Within months of its founding, the OBU was organizing general strikes in Calgary, Winnipeg, and Edmonton, but the tenor of militancy quickly fell away. Weakened by defections to the OBU, the IWW's last large-scale organizing drive swept the logging camps of British Columbia in 1924. Thereafter the union declined so precipitously that by the 1930s it was "little more than a debating society."

In the 1920s and 1930s, the anarchist movement survived among emigrant populations, primarily within Jewish communities. When Emma Goldman resided in Canada in 1926–8 and again in 1933–5 and 1939–40, she drew support from such groups in Montreal, London, Toronto, Winnipeg, and Edmonton. In the 1930s anti-fascist activists from Italy, Spain, and Germany brought renewed energy to the movement, and before her death in 1940, Goldman

campaigned (successfully) to save an Italian militant, Attilio Bortolotti, from deportation. Bortolotti and other exceptionally committed émigrés (notably Spanish Canadian Federico Arcos) kept anarchism alive during the 1940s and 1950s, when many more grew discouraged and fell away. At this juncture, anarchism's most significant impact was in the arts. On August 9, 1948, Paul-Émile Borduas, Jean-Paul Riopelle, and Françoise Sullivan and 13 other French-speaking writers, painters, and sculptors issued a manifesto of social revolt through anarchism in art – *Global Refusal* – which scandalized Quebec's cultural and political establishment. The "Automatists" are now a celebrated movement in the history of modernism.

After a period of hiatus, the upsurge of the Vietnam era generated a new wave of anarchists who, in the course of the 1970s and 1980s, transformed the face of radicalism in Canada. Anarchists were involved in the feminist movement, ecological protests, indigenous solidarity work, prison support work, the punk movement, and local community initiatives including housing cooperatives, back to the land communes, and info shops. A plethora of journals came out in the 1980s and 1990s – *Demolition Derby*, *Rebelles*, *La Nuit*, *Bulldozer/Prison News Service*, *Endless Struggle*, *Reality Now*, *No Picnic*, *Anarchives*, *Démanarchie*, *Open Road*, *Kick it Over*, *Resistance*, and *BOA* form a partial list. At this juncture, armed struggle also enters the picture. In 1982 the Vancouver-based Wimmin's Fire Brigade firebombed a chain of video stores marketing violent pornography. That same year a second underground group, Direct Action, ended the Canadian production of guidance systems for nuclear-armed cruise missiles by bombing Toronto's Litton Systems plant. Previously, the group had disrupted industrial expansion on Vancouver Island by destroying a hydro substation. Both actions inflicted massive property damage, leading to an intense manhunt that ended with the arrest of all five members on January 20, 1983.

As the 1990s drew to a close, the anarchist movement in Canada was growing exponentially. Anarchist-run bookstores, cooperatives, and social centers had spread across the country and cities in Quebec, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia, and annual anarchist book fairs were hosted. Anarchists spearheaded militant anti-globalization protests beginning

in 1997 with demonstrations against the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Vancouver and culminating in April 2001 with “Carnival Against Capitalism” actions targeting 34 heads of state convening to discuss a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas in Quebec City. Anarchism also made inroads in academe. Sociologist Richard Day’s influential study, *Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements* (2005), is but one example of recent scholarly contributions to the movement.

When considering the nation-state called “Canada,” we must never forget it is a colonial project imposed on indigenous peoples whose homelands were forcibly seized by European colonizers. Indigenous peoples continue to struggle against colonial occupation to this day, and vast swaths of “Canada” are in fact unceded lands, illegally occupied and administered by the colonizing state. Under these circumstances, anarchist solidarity with indigenous struggles has been complemented by the growth of anarchist theory and practice in an indigenous context. Kanienkeha (Mohawk) scholar Taiaiake Alfred has played a leading role in this regard. Theorizing “anarcho-indigenism” as a path to the revitalization and renewal of indigenous peoples, Alfred is transforming anarchism yet again, as befits a movement that regards diversity as integral to its realization.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Gender; Anarcho-communism; Anarchosyndicalism; Canada, Indigenous Resistance; Canada, Labor Protests; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Goldman, Emma (1869–1940); Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Winnipeg General Strike of 1919; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Quebec City, 2001

References and Suggested Readings

- Alfred, T. (2005) *Wasáse, Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom*. Peterborough: Broadview Press.
- Antliff, A. (Ed.) (2004) *Only A Beginning: An Anarchist Anthology*. Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press.
- Borduas, P.-E. (1978) *Ecrits/Writings, 1942–1958*. Halifax: Nova Scotia School of Art and Design.
- Cyr, M.-A. (2006) *La Presse anarchiste au Québec (1976–2001)*. Mascouche, Quebec: Editions Rouge et Noir.
- Day, R. J.-F. (2005) *Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements*. London: Pluto Press.
- Leier, M. (1990) *Where the Fraser River Flows: The Industrial Workers of the World in British Columbia*. Vancouver: New Star Books.

Moritz, T. & Moritz, A. (2001) *The World’s Most Dangerous Woman: A New Biography of Emma Goldman*. Vancouver: Subway Books.

Woodsworth, A. (1972) *The Alternative Press in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Anarchism, Chile

Larry Gambone

The first Chilean anarchists were mutualists. Francisco Bilbao and Santiago Arcos visited Paris during the revolution of 1848 and were influenced by the mutualist anarchism of Pierre Proudhon and the Christian socialism of Felicité de Lamennais. Returning to Chile in 1850, they formed La Sociedad de la Igualdad (Equality Society) (SI) Within a year the group was suppressed by the authorities, but not before the La Serena branch enrolled 100 artisans in the first functioning mutual aid society. Other mutualist societies were formed in the late 1850s, but it was not until 1862, with the founding of La Union in Santiago, that mutualism became influential among artisans. La Union branches spread to more than a dozen cities, providing medical services as well as a workshop for the unemployed.

The mutualists created an alternate culture, a microcosm of a workers’ republic. They believed capitalism could be transformed peacefully through the practical application of the principals of liberty, mutuality, solidarity, and self-education. In 1894 the Chilean mutualists formed the Federacion de Trabajadores de Chile (Workers Confederation) (FTCh), the first national federation. The confederation fought for social reform, as well as the usual activities of education and health insurance. By 1925 it had more than 100,000 members.

Revolutionary anarchism came to Chile in the 1890s through a Bakuninist Spaniard, Manuel Chinchilla. Carlos Jorquera, the first Chilean revolutionary anarchist, was influenced by Chinchilla and in 1892 they formed the Centro de Estudios Sociales, and published a paper, *El Oprimido*. Jorquera also organized a maritime union. Revolutionaries within the Mutualist Confederation produced the journal *El Grito del Pueblo* in 1896. Most of the early revolutionary anarchists were skilled workers who came out of the Mutualist Confederation.

From 1900 to 1910 anarchists were the best organized of all the radical groups, strong in

printing, baking, shoe making, and the docks. The first Resistance Society was formed in 1898 by railway workers, but they also founded a Resistance Society among carpenters, which played a major role in the Santiago General Strike of 1907. The Resistance Societies were anarchist-inspired and influenced by Argentine anarchism. They were decentralized, rotated leadership, and locally autonomous. The movement was concentrated in central Chile, chiefly among industrial workers, and by 1900 there were 30 societies. This mushroomed to 433 by 1910, with a total membership of 55,000.

The *mancomunales* (brotherhoods) developed from the mutualist movement and were simultaneously mutual aid societies and trade unions. First organized in 1900 in Iquique by anarchists, they soon had 6,000 members – the majority of the nitrate and maritime workers in the North, and all the major strikes in that region were organized by *mancomunales*. The movement favored direct action and a much greater level of organization and solidarity than the Resistance Societies. While the Resistance Societies were local, the Brotherhoods were organized on a territorial basis, uniting different trades, first on a city-wide, then a provincial, and finally at a national level. The *mancomunales* federated in 1904 as the Gran Mancomunal de Obreras, uniting 20,000 members. The movement almost died after the 1907 depression and military repression, the worst instance of which was the Santa Maria Massacre in Iquique, where 3,000 miners were killed by machine gun fire.

The Brotherhoods revived in 1916–18 and created the Federación de Obreros de Chile (Chilean Workers Federation) (FOCh). This organization was an umbrella group containing all tendencies – mutualist, populist, anarchist, and socialist – and was the first national labor federation. As militancy increased, the FOCh radicalized. In 1919 the union adopted anarchosyndicalist principles and a federal structure. Most trade unions remaining outside of FOCh in the period 1917–22 were also anarchosyndicalist. During this period and for several years after, anarchism was more influential among workers than Marxism. The syndicalist FOCh was short lived, however, and in a few years it was taken over by the communists.

Many young intellectuals were attracted to anarchism, especially after World War I. University and college students organized the

Federación de Estudiantes de Chile (Federation of Chilean Students) (FECh) as an anarchist union. Some important anarchist leaders of the postwar period were Manuel Rojas, a novelist who was later in the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and the writer Eugenio Gonzalez-Rojas. Pablo Neruda was close to the anarchists at this time as well.

The Chilean IWW was officially launched in 1919 at a national convention, and soon expanded to 19 cities. Total membership stood at about 10,000 at this period. In 1925 Colonel Carlos Ibanez took power in a coup, and in 1927 formally abolished the labor movement. Union offices were raided, the IWW and anarchist groups disbanded, and all their journals shut down. The anarchists and the IWW never fully recovered from the coup. Even though more influential than the communists, they had lost their leadership role among the workers.

In 1950 anarchists formed the Movement for Workers' Unity to combine all labor unions in one central body. Thus was born the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (Chile's United Labor Center) (CUT) in 1953, uniting most of Chile's unions, including the CGT. The CUT executive had four anarchist members, and anarchists controlled the shoe workers, printers, and maritime unions. After the failure of the 1955 General Strike called by CUT, most anarchosyndicalists withdrew from the federation. By 1960 anarchists had little influence in the union movement.

During the Popular Unity government of President Salvador Allende, anarchists were too few to be of any great influence. Nonetheless, there were developments similar in spirit to anarchosyndicalism. These occurred spontaneously, such as the Cordones Industriales (a form of workers' councils), and the Comandos Comunes (self-governing neighborhoods). Six years after the 1973 coup, the libertarian left began to reorganize. An umbrella group, Socialist Ideas and Action (PAS), was formed, bringing together anarchists and libertarian-leaning members of the former Popular Unity coalition. Anarchists were involved in struggles against the dictatorship in the 1980s. With the return of "democracy" in the 1990s, many anarchist groups formed, disappeared, and regrouped.

SEE ALSO: Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973); Anarchism, Argentina; Anarchosyndicalism; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).

References and Suggested Readings

- Angel, A. (1972) *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- DeShazo, P. (1983) *Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 1902–1927*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Illanes, M. A. (1990) *La Revolucion Solidaria – Historias de las Sociedades Obrerades Socorros Mutuos, Chile 1840–1920*. Santiago: SEDEJ.
- Simon, F. (1946) Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism in Latin America. *Hispanic American Review* 26: 38–59.
- Skidmore, T. and Smith, P. (1984) *Chile, Democracy, Socialism, and Repression in Modern Latin America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Troncoso, M. P. (1960) *Rise of the Latin American Labor Movement*. New York: Bookman.

Anarchism, China

Daniel Cairns

Anarchism is a significant though neglected trend in Chinese history. Proto-anarchist ideals that developed during the Warring States Period in works such as the *Zhuangzi* and the writing of Bao Jingyan became integral to traditional Chinese philosophy, followed later by a modernist anarchism that thrived as a set of social, political, and ethical ideas during the revolutionary period. Despite the proto-anarchist legacy, most studies of Chinese anarchism limit their scope to the early twentieth century, focusing on the movement's peak, from 1907 to 1919 – when anarchism was the most influential radical socialist trend in China – and on its marginalization from 1920 to 1949. Post-1949 history is without explicitly anarchist activity, yet because of its earlier influence, anarchism's history is a helpful tool with which to analyze both the communist regime and the post-Mao economic reforms.

The Chinese anarchist movement emerged when it became clear that the Qing dynasty was struggling to adjust to the pressures of foreign imperialism and domestic instability. At that time, intellectuals were actively seeking out and digesting foreign concepts that could ease the transition to modern nationhood. The ideas of mutual aid, voluntary cooperation, and personal liberty that anarchism professed emerged as integral elements of Chinese social and political discourse in this context. Anarchism resonated with elements of traditional thought and a distinctly anarchist sensibility was articulated in

the writings of some Buddhists, Confucians, and Daoists.

Anarchism emphasized political reorganization and social transformation. Specifically, anarchists believed that foreign science and philosophy should be studied, traditions were pernicious myths that must be dispelled, the family was deleterious to the individual's autonomy, patriarchy was harmful and illegitimate, imperialism should be halted, authority over others is degrading, and the state is unnecessary. Anarchists were also the first to advocate a peasant-based revolution in China, a theory later championed by Mao Zedong. In fact, in their commitment to bringing new ideas into revolutionary discourse, anarchists were instrumental in introducing Marxism and other forms of socialism to China. Consequently, while anarchism has its own history, it is often difficult to separate it from the broader revolutionary milieu. Especially in the early years, 1903–6, revolutionaries ignored the minor distinctions in ideology and so many strands of socialism were conflated; anarchism was seen as synonymous with nihilism and populism.

The first explicitly anarchist activity among Chinese citizens began in 1906–7. Almost simultaneously, expatriates in Paris and Tokyo founded anarchist organizations: the New World Society and the Society for the Study of Socialism, respectively. Members traveled to study foreign ideas and methods, but while abroad discovered various radical tendencies that impacted their thinking. Before long, both societies were publishing their own papers. In Paris the *New Era* spread anarchist political analysis and social theory; likewise, the Tokyo group printed *Natural Justice*, which focused on scholarly issues, feminism, and rural communism. The groups shared news and opinions through these organs, but these publications also reveal their contrasts. The Tokyo anarchists were agrarian collectivists, inspired by Tolstoy, while the society in Paris was progressive, placing an emphasis on science, reason, and education.

The second wave of anarchism in China, occurring between the fall of the Qing and the founding of the communist part of China, is marked by an increase in domestic activity. The Society of the Cock Crowing in the Dark, led by Shifu, was the first domestic anarchist group. It was founded in 1911, the year the Qing fell. Shifu was a dynamic personality, both energetic and intellectual. He participated in the founding

of multiple anarchist collectives, unions, and publishing ventures. After his death in 1915, the energy of the anarchist movement shifted towards what would become the May 4th movement.

Between 1919 and 1920 the May 4th movement coalesced around ideals of free expression and personal liberties. Anarchism, sharing similar values, flourished in this climate. It had a radicalizing effect on May 4th thinking, moving it beyond aesthetics and culture to economic, political, and social realms. While May 4th is primarily seen as an intellectual movement, anarchists believed that intellectual and manual work were needlessly divided; they suggested that one must both study in the schools and labor in the fields. This ethos pervaded many educational experiments of the time, from the Work-Study movement to the National Labor University, and was even reinterpreted during the Cultural Revolution.

The next phase of anarchist activity in China was shaped by its relationship to the nascent communist movement. The Communist Party of China was founded in 1921, though Comintern agents started actively recruiting activists into Marxist study circles a year prior. These groups initially drew many anarchists to them. The non-anarchists in attendance often came because they were interested in anarchism. Though there were commonalities between anarchists and communists, the CCP soon purged out many anarchists for the sake of ideological unity. Still, aspects of anarchism were not totally absent from official doctrine: Li Dazhao, China's first Marxist, was greatly influenced by Kropotkin's doctrine of mutual aid; Mao Zedong admitted to being influenced by anarchism; Chen Duxiu's sons were both anarchists before converting to Marxism.

Shortly after the founding of the CCP, the anarchists who did not join the party distanced themselves from the communist movement. They disagreed over the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, anarchists holding that a transformation out of class-based society would come once the general populace became sufficiently conscious. Debates held in the revolutionary press proved the CCP to be better rhetorically equipped.

Sensing pressure to organize against the communists, some anarchists joined the Guomindang. Indeed, for years there was an affinity between anarchists and the GMD – Sun Yat-Sen actually claimed that the ultimate aim of the GMD was

anarchism and communism. The GMD also supported unions and striking workers and helped anarchists establish the National Labor University, a syndicalist training school. The Revolutionary Alliance, the precursor to the GMD, also counted many prominent anarchists as members. Anarchists Liu Shipei, Zhang Ji, and Zhang Binglin even hosted lectures by Japanese anarchists through the RA. Ultimately, however, anarchists proved to be little more to the GMD than ideological weapons against the communists. By 1927 the anarchist movement was atrophying; the last arena of its influence was among sections of workers in Shanghai and southern China, where anarchists were active until the 1940s.

There are two main analyses of anarchism in Chinese history. One emphasizes its anti-traditionalism, stressing the influence of foreign ideas such as socialism and humanism. This view asserts that while Chinese anarchism was born as an ideology of rejection of China's emergent modernity, Chinese anarchists adopted elements of Western thought even as they negated Western modernity. The second analysis suggests that anarchism is not necessarily imported. This view points to the long tradition of proto-anarchist thought in China, encompassing Daoists but also including Buddhists and Utopians. The truth lies somewhere in between: anarchists like Liu Shipei were unquestionably interested in Chinese national heritage, while Li Shizeng was thoroughly European in outlook.

Anarchists demanded absolute social revolution, that is, a bottom-up transformation of quotidian life. Therefore, they disagreed with the nationalist and communist revolutionary groups who believed change could be instituted through policy, from above. Similarly, anarchists were anti-nationalist. Some historians posit that anarchists, unwilling to pander to patriotic sentiments, effectively forfeited ground to groups like the GMD and CCP who based their platform on preserving the Chinese nation-state.

Historians sometimes question the importance of anarchism in China's revolutionary history because it was an ideology that did not achieve success on a nationwide level. Anarchist groups in China never coalesced into a political party, or even a unified network. Anarchist activity was scattered and their platform was inconsistent. However, reflecting on the role that anarchism played in radicalizing communist and nationalist leaders, bringing new ideas to China, and demand-

ing a social revolution, clearly anarchism was an integral and ubiquitous part of the revolution.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, France; Anarchism, Japan; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); China, May 4th Movement; China, Protest and Revolution, 1800–1911; Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911; Dictatorship of the Proletariat; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925); Tolstoy, Leo N. (1828–1910)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bernal, M. (1968) *The Triumph of Anarchism over Marxism, 1906–1907*. In M. C. Wright (Ed.), *China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900–1913*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dirlik, A. (1989) *Origins of Chinese Communism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dirlik, A. (1993) *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gaaster, M. (1969) *The Anarchists*. In *Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Gao J., Wang G., & Yang, S. (Eds.) (1984) *Wu zhengfu zhuyi zai zhongguo* [Anarchism in China]. Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe.
- Ge, M. et al. (Eds.) (1984) *Wuzhengfuzhuyi sixiang ziliao-xuan*. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe.
- Ming, C. K. & Dirlik, A. (1992) *Schools into Fields and Factories: Anarchists, the Guomindang, and the Labor University in Shanghai, 1927–1932*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Pickowicz, P. G. (1990) *The Chinese Anarchist Critique of Marxism-Leninism*. *Modern China* 16 (4): 450–67.
- Rapp, J. A. (1998) *Daoism and Anarchism Reconsidered*. *Anarchist Studies* 6 (2): 123–51.
- Scalapino, R. A. & Yu, G. T. (1961) *The Chinese Anarchist Movement*. Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies.
- Zarrow, P. G. (1990) *Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Anarchism and culture, 1840–1939

Jesse Cohn

Anarchism has traditionally laid great emphasis on the construction of a “counterculture” – a sphere of imagery, symbolism, and sensory experience imbued with its own emancipatory values. In this respect, it does not differ essentially from other social movements with vastly different aims. More unique is the tendency of anarchist culture to blur distinctions between

the *creation* and *reception* of culture as well as between the *ideal* and the *real* in representation.

These tendencies are present from the first phase of the modern anarchist movement, when Pierre Joseph Proudhon argued for the abolition of distinctions between artistic industrial creation. This meant refusing the romantic notion of the artist as solitary genius, apart from and above society. At the same time, Proudhon wanted an art that would refuse to accommodate itself to the social status quo either in the manner of religious art, which averted its eyes from injustice in the world to contemplate divine ideals, or in the manner of a superficial realism that does not look beyond the misery of the present. A revolutionary art, Proudhon argued, would evoke the processes of movement and transformation inherent to life, suggesting the potential for the ideal that is dormant within the real. Conversely, this art would undercut the claim of “the real” to be the entire “truth.” One face of anarchist art, thus, was constructive, utopian, gesturing from the real toward the ideal; the other was deconstructive and iconoclastic. The visual art produced by anarchists from the late nineteenth through the early twentieth centuries bears traces of both impulses.

Anarchist literary styles developed similarly. In France, writers such as Jules Vallès, Émile Pouget, and Henry Poulaille developed “proletarian” forms of writing that blurred genres, travestied norms of polite discourse, and emphasized the energy and directness of speech, while novelists like Octave Mirbeau made the “decadent” style into a powerful critique of capitalism, the state, and religion. In Spain, meanwhile, Federica Montseny pioneered forms of mass literature – two large, successful series, *La Novela Ideal* and *La Novela Libre* – aimed at incarnating anarchist ideals in “exemplary” working-class heroes and heroines, inviting readers to imagine the possibility of their own self-liberation. Chinese anarchists such as Shifu, in association with the broader New Culture movement, promoted the social novel, as exemplified by Ba Jin’s famous *Torrent* trilogy (1931–40), emphasizing moral comment (*xungu xue*) and logic (*lunli xue*) as well as style (*zishi xue*). Meanwhile, American anarchist poets such as the Italian American Arturo Giovanniti, French American Voltairine de Cleyre, Irish-born Lola Ridge, and Russian-Jewish David Edelstadt championed an overtly committed poetry, written in a way that was accessible to every worker. This ideal of

proletarian poetry reached perhaps its greatest extension during the Spanish Civil War, when an estimated 15–20,000 poems were published, over half of the approximately 5,000 authors of which were anarchists.

It was drama that best spread radical thought. Indeed, so strong was the work of Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906) on anarchist culture worldwide that for a time “Ibsenism” was synonymous with anarchist drama. In Germany the working-class subjects of Gerhard Hauptmann’s plays found favor among some anarchists, but Gustav Landauer, among others, was critical of their tendency to make the miseries of capitalism seem natural and inevitable, obscuring the potential for the ideal by excessive fidelity to the real. Institutions such as the Neue Freie Volksbühne of Berlin performed politically charged drama by playwrights such as Ernst Toller, Erich Mühsam, and Georg Kaiser. Italian immigrant anarchists in Argentina and Brazil around the beginning of the twentieth century established popular theater as a means of “consciousness-raising” and “contestation,” a tradition continued by Chilean anarchists through the 1930s. In the United States, where German immigrants flocked to productions of August Spies’ agitational play *Die Nihilisten* as early as 1882, the Wobblies also developed the stage as a means of agitation in such productions as the Paterson Strike Pageant in 1913. Before their suppression by the communist government, Moscow’s anarchist clubs hosted theaters as well as libraries and poetry circles. In Spain anarchist theater companies began presenting works by Teresa Claramunt and Felipe Cortiella alongside Ibsen’s and Mirbeau’s in the 1890s, and during the Spanish Civil War troops were regaled by traveling “anarchist vaudeville” shows.

Anarchists had fewer opportunities in cinema, a more expensive art form, which they regarded as especially prone to capitalist exploitation. However, as early as 1913 anarchists in Paris created a cooperative for film production and distribution, the Cinéma du Peuple. One of its first filmmakers, the Catalan anarchist Armand Guerra (aka José Maria Estivalis Calvo), went on to produce films under the aegis of the Spanish anarchist movement. The journalist Mateo Santos produced numerous documentaries, while directors such as Antonio Sau, Valentín R. González, and Fernando Mignoni made fictional melodramas, comedies, and musicals.

Alongside these attempts to form a proletarian counterculture, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw numerous engagements between the anarchist movement and the avant-garde of the art world. By the time of World War I almost every avant-garde movement had embraced anarchist ideas: Expressionism, Symbolism, Cubism, Dada, Futurism, and Constructivism reflected anarchist influence, and artists as disparate as Wassily Kandinsky, Oscar Wilde, Ezra Pound, Dziga Vertov, Pio Baroja, José Martínez Ruiz (“Azorín”), Man Ray, Franz Kafka, Jean Cocteau, Antonin Artaud, Luis Buñuel, Ramon Sender, and Alexander Rodchenko expressed affinity with the anarchist movements of the time. Nor was this fusion confined to Europe and America: in early 1920s Japan, for instance, a Futurist-influenced group of artists calling itself *Mavo* embraced anarchist ideas and experimented with subversive strategies, some anticipating the shock effects of contemporary performance art, others aiming at the aestheticization of everyday life.

If this confluence of anarchism with the avant-gardes was fruitful, it was not always harmonious. While fascinated with the writings of Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Landauer, Hugo Ball expressed skepticism toward their ideals, and others resisted demands for a “committed” art, insisting on the autonomy of the artist from audience demands. For their part, anarchists such as Bernard Lazare excoriated what they saw as the egoistic excesses of “decadent” art, regarding it as irrelevant to working-class concerns. Where most anarchists favored the “social art” aesthetics of Proudhon, Kropotkin, and Tolstoy, avant-gardists tended to favor Max Stirner’s individualism, as reflected in the title given by Dora Marsden to the American modernist journal, *The Egoist*.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Education; Dada; Guerilla Theater; Landauer, Gustav (1870–1919); Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865)

References and Suggested Readings

- Antliff, A. (2007) *Anarchy and Art: From the Paris Commune to the Fall of the Berlin Wall*. Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press.
- Beach, C. (2005) *Staging Politics and Gender: French Women’s Drama, 1880–1923*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cohn, J. (2007) *Breaking the Frame: Anarchist Comics and Visual Culture*. *Belphegor: Littérature Populaire et*

- Culture Média*tique 6, 2. www.etc.dal.ca/belphegor/vol6_no2/articles/06_02_cohn_comics_fr.html.
- Goldman, E. (1910) The Drama: A Powerful Disseminator of Radical Thought." In *Anarchism and Other Essays*. New York: Mother Earth Publishing Association.
- Krebs, E. S. (1998) *Shifu, Soul of Chinese Anarchism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Pereira Poza, S. (2005) *Antología crítica de la dramaturgia anarquista en Chile*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universidad de Santiago.
- Proudhon, P.-J. (1927) *Du Principe de l'art et de sa destination sociale*. Paris: Rivière.
- Resina, J. R. (1998) Historical Discourse and the Propaganda Film: Reporting the Revolution in Barcelona. *New Literary History* 29, 1: 67–84.
- Shaffer, K. R. (2005) *Anarchism and Countercultural Politics in Early Twentieth-Century Cuba*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Wikler, R. J. (2001) Popular Army, Popular Theater: Spanish Agitprop During the Civil War, 1936–1939. *Theater* 31, 1: 79–91.

Anarchism and education

Abraham P. DeLeon

Although many activists have embraced anarchist theory, anarchism has been present in a variety of different academic areas as well. Anarchist sociology has been argued for (Purkis 2004), as well as the beginning sketches of an anarchist anthropology (Graeber 2004). But, often overlooked is the field of education, which has had an interesting relationship with anarchism and other radical theories of liberation. Anarchist theory is absent in educational literature and this gap exists in even more radical theories of education.

Anarchist theory in the context of education has influenced several key areas, such as organizational structure, political action for teachers, and rethinking the institution of schooling and the purposes that it serves. Anarchism for education means embracing some key factors about schooling. Anarchists contend that the various institutions of schooling help to reproduce racial, class, sexual orientation, and gender divisions sustaining classist practices that weaken working class and poor students. Paul Goodman, in his famous 1964 tract on *Compulsory Miseducation*, argued that schools benefit the rich and powerful and serve to indoctrinate students into an ideological system rather than serving as places of enlighten-

ment and critical dialogue. Anarchists contend that teachers and students should be co-creators of knowledge and the divisions between “teacher,” “student,” and “principal” should be restructured.

Anarchist theory in education seeks to build schools that are not organized around rigid hierarchies and that each school should be as free and open as possible, allowing individuals to explore their identities, free their desires from historically oppressive social norms, and each school should be autonomous so that it better meets the needs of the community. Schools and the communities that they are located in should be in a symbiotic relationship based on mutual aid, community building, and non-coercive practices. Anarchists have played a historic role in education and educational theory, even if a limited one. They have created schools that resemble anarchist conceptions and critiqued the institution of schooling itself. Francisco Ferrer, for example, instituted a “modern school” in Spain that incorporated vastly different ideological frameworks than schools of the time. Children were not exposed to a dogmatic curriculum or a slew of standardized tests that we now find in US schools; instead, the curriculum and the guiding philosophy that Ferrer argued for was the freedom of the individual child to pursue her/his intellectual interests in a non-hierarchical environment. Ferrer argued that schools had to be restructured in completely different ways to escape the colonizing and oppressive role that schools play in indoctrinating students into the status quo. Ferrer wanted teachers to have complete autonomy from state mechanisms so that they could encourage students to pursue educational interests of their choosing.

Other non-authoritarian and democratic schooling projects have existed that have been guided by some of the values and ideas expressed by Ferrer. A. S. Neill, one of the best-known proponents of alternative schooling, created Summerhill, a school that stressed educational growth based solely on the child’s interests. At Summerhill “lessons” arise from the students themselves and children are encouraged to explore their own interests. Although Neill’s ideas have been adopted and reformulated from their original inception, they continue to influence schools that wish to create educational experiences that allow the child an open, free, and non-coercive learning environment. Although not technically “anarchist,” Neill structured Summerhill without a rigid curriculum or a formal timetable for

learning. He recognized the freedom of the individual child, and he rejected traditional teacher authority (Suissa 2006: 93). Other schools have been influenced by Neill's ideas. In Albany, New York, the Albany Free School allows students to explore their own interests in a non-hierarchical way by including guest speakers and teachers in accordance with the students' interests. At Albany, the students are an integral part of the community around them, while the school serves as a center for learning and community action. Students learn to manage their own learning experiences and participate in the school community.

Although many "free schools" do not directly attribute anarchist theory to their ideological mission, they are comparable to what anarchists argue is necessary for building community and inculcating the natural spirit of learning that is non-coercive. Unlike traditional public education, "free schools" allow students the freedom to control their learning experiences and shape their educational goals. In traditional education schools, curriculum, activities, and learning experiences have been scripted, giving students limited choices in shaping their goals and objectives. These schools are structured in a rigid and hierarchical manner. "Free schools," on the other hand, are the polar opposite as they tend not to have a school-wide curriculum. They promote a community based philosophy reflecting individual experience. Attendance is not always mandatory and classes often emerge organically through the inquiry and interests of the students. Student and teacher collaborate in order to pursue individualized academic and intellectual interests.

Besides just building on the concerns of the individual students, anarchist conceptions of schooling view community building as an integral role in the development of children. Students must feel part of a school community to further engage their creative and intellectual pursuits. The main point is that the education of students should rest in the hands of the individual, with the schools guiding that process by providing activities and instruction which meet the goals of the students and the community.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Escuela Moderna Movement (The Modern School); Goldman, Emma (1869–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

Antliff, A. (2007) *Breaking Free: Anarchist Pedagogy*. In M. Coté, R. Day, & G. de Peuter (Eds.), *Utopian*

- Pedagogy: Radical Experiments Against Neoliberal Globalization*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Chomsky, N. & Macedo, D. (2000) *Chomsky on Mis-education*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- DeLeon, A. (2006) The Time for Action is Now! Anarchist Theory, Critical Pedagogy, and Radical Possibilities. *Journal of Critical Education Policy Studies* 4, 2 (November).
- Goodman, P. (1971) Children Should Be Anarchists. *New Schools Exchange Newsletter* 58: 5.
- Graeber, D. (2004) *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press.
- Illich, I. (1983) *Deschooling Society*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Purkis, J. (2004) Towards an Anarchist Sociology. In J. Purkis & J. Bowen (Eds.), *Changing Anarchism: Anarchist Theory and Practice in a Global Age*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Sheehan, S. (2003) *Anarchism*. London: Reaktion Books.
- Spring, J. (1998) *A Primer of Libertarian Education*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Suissa, J. (2006) *Anarchism and Education: A Philosophical Perspective*. London: Routledge

Anarchism, Finland

Jukka Laitinen

Anarchist views and practices became popular in Finland in the radical grassroots activism of the 1990s. This new wave of social protest on such issues as racism, the power of corporations, or the exploitation of animals etched the term "activist" indelibly in Finnish public discourse.

The organizational form of the social movements among the 1990s activists was usually a small, autonomous and leaderless group, even when a group was considered as a local section of a wider network, such as Suomen Anarkistiliitto (SAL, Finnish Anarchist Federation) or Oikeutta Eläimille (Justice for Animals). This anarchic organization was in many ways a direct challenge to the Finnish establishment. Some Finnish authorities considered these anti-hierarchical organizational habits and activists' new methods of direct action as a conspiracy led by "foreign anarchist leaders." They demanded more power for police forces and harsh sentences for those activists who were performing illegal actions such as animal liberation.

Anarchists launched annual "happenings" and demonstrations, which received nationwide publicity, often because of wrangles between police and activists. Kuokkavierasjuhlat (Party of Gatecrashers, 1996–2003) was first organized by

an anarcho-syndicalist federation, *Solidaarisuus* (Solidarity). This was a happening against the power elite and for social justice. Emphasizing the antagonist attitude of its organizers, it took place next to the Finnish President's Palace in Helsinki, during the official ceremonials of independence. *Mustavihreät päivät* (Black and Green Days, 1998–2002) in Tampere marked the shift toward more ecological themes in the Finnish anarchist movement.

In the history of Finland, social and political protests have been mostly tied to centralist organizations, official statuses, and to the state. Even rebellious sixties radicals were quickly assimilated into official institutions and state structures. Against this, most of the 1990s activists and self-styled anarchists were consciously against party politics and against the idea of working “within the system.” Yet, anarchist ideas waned and most local anarchist groups dissolved by the turn of the millennium. Some former anarchists adopted autonomist Marxist views and some even joined political parties. After the big international demonstrations against global capitalism, anarchism in Finland was at its nadir. However, in recent years anarchism in Finland has been slowly growing among a new generation of activists and dissidents.

Finnish anarchism did not spring up from nowhere in the 1990s. In the 1960s there were some small anarchist groups and publications, since when different anarchist views have existed within the larger alternative scene and counterculture. There have been individual anarchists among feminists and environmental activists, among underground artists and labor activists, among lifestyle experimenters, punks, and conscientious objectors. In the early twentieth century, Finnish proponents of the work of Tolstoy became a culturally effective movement. Arvid Järnefelt, who is sometimes called the Tolstoy of Finland, held strict anarchist positions against state institutions. Besides Leo Tolstoy, Peter Kropotkin was another Russian anarchist whose writings had a lasting impact on some Finnish intellectuals and workers. In the United States, Finnish immigrants joined the syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Their daily newspaper, published in Finnish, had a circulation of 13,500 at its peak. But in Finnish historiography, particularly in the history of the labor movement, “anarchist” has usually been a name given for a violent activist, whatever ideology he or she represents. While 1990s activism received a lot

of academic interest, the history of anarchism in Finland remains unwritten.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Russia; Anarchosyndicalism; Eco-anarchism; Finland, Civil War and Revolution, 1914–1918; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Tolstoy, Leo N. (1828–1910)

References and Suggested Readings

- Häkli, P. (1955) *Arvid Järnefelt ja hänen lähimaailmansa* [Arvid Järnefelt and His Inner Circle]. Porvoo: WSOY.
- Juppi, P., Peltokoski, J., & Pyykkönen, M. (Eds.) (2003) *Liike-elämää. Vastakulttuurinen radikalismi vuosikymmenen vaihteessa* [Movement Life: Counter-Cultural Radicalism at the Turn of the Millennium]. Jyväskylä: Kopijyvä.
- Konttinen, E. & Peltokoski, J. (2004) *Ympäristöprotestin neljäs aalto. Eläinoikeusliike ja uuden sukupolven ympäristöradikalismi 1990-luvulla* [Fourth Wave of an Environmental Protest: Animal Rights Movement and the New Generation of Environmental Radicalism in the 1990s]. Jyväskylä: Minerva.
- Lindfors, J. & Salo, M. (1988) *Ensimmäinen aalto. Helsingin Underground 1967–1970* [The First Wave: Helsinki Underground 1967–1970]. Helsinki: Odeon.
- Nokkala, A. (1958) *Tolstoilaisuus Suomessa. Aatehistoriallinen tutkimus* [Tolstoyism in Finland: A Study in the History of Ideas]. Helsinki: Tammi.

Anarchism, France

Evan Matthew Daniel and Nick Heath

Foundations of French Anarchism

From the 1840s to the 1920s an upturn in the number of anarchists in France had an important impact on the development of anarchist thought. In its most basic formulation, anarchism meant the absence of government, not the absence of organizational structures; however, different ideas about how society should be organized legally and economically engendered theoretical evolution and synthesis. Various anarchist tendencies evolved and emerged at this time, both internationally and from within France, such as collectivism, anarchosyndicalism, and anarchocommunism.

Early in the nineteenth century the precursor to full-fledged anarchism – mutualism – emerged and quickly spread throughout France. Mutualism was championed by Pierre-Joseph

Proudhon (1809–65), who perceived it as an alternative to both capitalism and socialism. Unlike the socialists, who advocated economic distribution “from each according to ability, to each according to need,” or the “every man for himself” philosophy of the *laissez-faire* capitalists, the mutualists posited “from each according to ability, to each according to *deed*.” In 1864 French mutualists, anarchists, and workers actively participated in the creation of the International Workers’ Association (the First International) in London. The anarchists who participated placed emphasis on spontaneous action, voluntarism, and federalism, informed by an overarching *ouvrierisme* (suspicion of non-working-class people). This put them in direct opposition to the Marxist platform: nationalization of industry, electoral activity, and the centralization of both the International and the state. Based in French-Switzerland, the Jura Federation, an anti-authoritarian anarchist group that participated in the First International, was influenced greatly by Proudhon’s anti-statist, federalist, and mutualist ideas. The bulk of delegates from the French section, which came to be the largest national section in the First International, were Proudhonists who supported workers’ activity in the economic realm through the formation of unions, cooperatives, and mutual banks (rather than party activity). Interaction with an increasingly militant working class radicalized Proudhon and many of his supporters, however, causing a distinct shift away from mutualism toward collectivism.

The violent government repression of the 1871 Paris Commune destroyed confidence in the Proudhonist notion that emancipation would occur through peaceful evolution. Subsequently, the anarchist movement engaged in terrorist tactics that would beget increased government surveillance and repression of anarchists. Known as “propaganda of the deed,” this concept was accepted by anarchists in France, Spain, Italy, and other countries who sought to murder industrialists and heads of state. Exponents of propaganda by the deed included François Claudius Koenigstein (known as Ravachol), Auguste Vaillant, and Émile Henry. Repression following the terrorist period greatly damaged the anarchist movement.

From the 1890s to the 1920s a distinctive group of social movements, known variously as revolutionary syndicalist and anarchosyndicalist,

developed in many parts of Europe. In contradistinction to the craft unionism prevalent in the United States and England, syndicalism was a form of labor unionism that aimed to overthrow capitalism through revolutionary, industrial class struggle, and to build a utopian social order, free from economic or political oppression.

Twentieth-Century French Anarchism

By the turn of the century there was a clear orientation toward the labor movement and the development of anarchosyndicalism. Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921), who had himself been a supporter of propaganda by the deed, now argued that anarchist communists must turn away from individual action to mass agitation and education. Among those anarchists who orientated themselves towards syndicalism were Fernand Pelloutier (1867–1901), Paul Delesalle (1870–1948), and Pierre Monatte (1881–1960). Emile Pouget (1860–1931) and his paper *La Sociale* supported this trend, as did to a lesser extent Jean Grave (1854–1939) and his paper *Les Temps Nouveaux*. Sebastien Faure (1858–1942) and his paper *Le Libertaire* were opposed to the syndicalist tactic until 1899. This was reinforced with the departure of the individualists in 1905, who set up their own weekly paper, *L’Anarchie*. Whatever the differences, the French labor movement was dominated by anarchism from 1894. The Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) was both led by anarchists and infused with its ideas.

In addition, the new tendency known as revolutionary syndicalism emerged. This was developed by predominantly militants who had been anarchists who now wanted to break with intellectualism and individualism. This new current gradually took on a life of its own separate from anarchism and many within it saw it as a synthesis between Marxism and anarchism, rejecting the parliamentarism of the former and the small group mentality of the latter.

Impatience among some with the lack of organization led some anarchist communists to found the Fédération Communiste Révolutionnaire Anarchiste in 1913. The individualists were expelled from this conference, sparked by their general obstructive behavior and the reaction to the exploits of the Bonnot Gang, a group of anarchists known for criminal activity.

World War I led to a split in the movement, with a minority, including Grave and Charles Malato (1857–1938), backing Kropotkin's support for the Allies. The surrender of the CGT to the wave of patriotism also had a demoralizing effect. The outbreak of war could not have come at a worse time for the proponents of organization, who after years of striving had finally set up a national organization. The majority who opposed the war as internationalists saw their papers closed down, and many militants were conscripted or imprisoned. The outbreak of the Russian Revolution saw an initial enthusiasm for Bolshevism. In fact the first – and short-lived – Parti Communiste, founded in 1919, was made up almost entirely of anarchists. Anarchist communists made another effort to organize, setting up the Fédération Anarchiste, which became the Union Anarchiste (UA) in 1920. By that point, there was a distancing from Bolshevism, and in 1924, following an armed attack by communists on anarchists, this became an irreconcilable rift.

With the controversy over the Organizational Platform, the UA saw itself transformed into the Union Anarchiste Communiste Révolutionnaire and the departure of some, including Faure, to found the Association des Fédéralistes Anarchistes. However, the platformists lost control, leading to the return of most of the AFA and a return to the original name. Meanwhile, the anarchosindicalists had organized their own union, the CGT-Syndicaliste – Révolutionnaire. During the Popular Front there was a growth in numbers, but another split occurred with the setting up of the Fédération Anarchiste de Langue Française, which judged the UA too centralist. This remained outside the UA until World War II.

The war paralyzed the movement. It started reforming toward 1943 and was able to reestablish a public appearance by 1944. The Fédération Anarchiste was founded in 1945, but was already plagued by differences. The FA was to have a certain influence in the Renault strike (1947) and saw its paper *Le Libertaire* reach a print run of 100,000.

The anarchosindicalists organized themselves within the CNT-France, though this remained a minute body. In 1950 a group around Georges Fontenis and Serge Ninn began organizing a secret group within the FA to counter the individualists. This culminated in the transformation of the FA into the Fédération Communiste

Libertaire and the expulsion or departure of many. Many of these regrouped in a new FA set up in 1953, which united different tendencies. Another group that emerged in this period was the Groupes Anarchistes d'Action Révolutionnaires (GAAR) which had left the Fontenis grouping and published a magazine, *Noir et Rouge*, which was to become an influential instrument of theoretical clarification and had a certain influence on the events of 1968. The magazine took on a life of its own when a majority of the GAAR went into the FA.

Certainly, anarchist influence could be seen in the demonstrations in the student committees and in some of the workplace occupations during 1968, but the movement failed to take full advantage. This in part led to the emergence of a tendency within the FA, the Organisation Révolutionnaire Anarchiste (ORA), which became an independent body in 1971. The ORA organized over 100 circles of sympathizers in the 1970s, but by 1976 this had split between the Organisation Communiste Libertaire and the Union des Travailleurs Communistes Libertaires (now Alternative Libertaire).

Today, the movement remains divided into a number of different organizations and groups, but has a certain implantation it has not had for a long time. The FA has a radio station, a weekly paper, and a network of bookshops and is more clearly aligned with social anarchism, while Alternative Libertaire appears to be small but vivacious and growing. The French CNT has experienced a number of splits over the years, with one fragment bearing this name and enjoying a certain growth. Nevertheless, the movement remains divided, despite various unitary initiatives.

Fontenis, Georges (b. 1920)

The son and grandson of militant socialists, Georges Fontenis played an important role in the twentieth-century French anarchist movement. He made contact with the movement through Spanish solidarity work in 1936, joining a group of young militants. In 1944 he joined the underground CGT and as a member of a teachers' union took part in commissions to root out Vichyists (Nazi sympathizers) in national education in 1945. He participated in the reconstruction of the anarchist movement in 1945 and the founding of the Fédération Anarchiste. He was general secretary of the FA in 1946–8 and

1950–3 and director of the FA weekly newspaper *Le Libertaire*.

In 1950 Fontenis helped found the Organisation Pensée Bataille (OPB), a secret group within the FA which gained control over some regions and many leading posts. In 1953 the OPB forced the expulsion of the individualists and turned the FA into the Fédération Communiste Libertaire (FCL). It adopted the Manifesto of Libertarian Communism, written by Fontenis. In 1951 Fontenis took part in an assassination attempt on Francisco Franco, with Spanish anarchist exiles. The FCL was involved in support for the anti-colonialist struggle in Algeria, resulting in fines, raids, and jailings. Fontenis was imprisoned in 1957. That same year the FCL took part in a disastrous election campaign, leading to the departure of some of its militants. These events led to the collapse of the FCL. In 1968–9 Fontenis, together with Daniel Guérin, founded the Mouvement Communiste Libertaire and was a member of its successor organization, the first Organisation Communiste Libertaire. In 1979 he joined the Union des Travailleurs Communistes Libertaires. He is a member of its successor organization, Alternative Libertaire. He wrote *L'Autre communisme*, his view of the events of the 1950s.

SEE ALSO: Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Paris Commune, 1871; Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865)

References and Suggested Readings

- Berry, D. (2002) *A History of the French Anarchist Movement, 1917–1945*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Biard, R. (1976) *Histoire du mouvement anarchiste 1945–1975*. Paris: Editions Gaililée.
- Hyams, E. (1971) *Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: His Revolutionary Life, Mind and Works*. London: John Murray.
- Joyeux, M. (1988) *Sous les plis du drapeaux noir*. Paris: Editions du Monde Libertaire.
- Mitchell, B. (1987) *The Practical Revolutionaries: A New Interpretation of the French Anarchosyndicalists*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Stearns, P. N. (1971) *Revolutionary Syndicalism and French Labor: A Cause Without Rebels*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Anarchism and gender

Jesse Cohn

Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809–65), the first to write the words “I am an anarchist” in 1840,

was at the same time a convinced anti-feminist, regarding women as intellectual and moral inferiors and dedicating an entire book to attacking feminism as a form of modern decadence or “pornocracy” (1858, 1875). These arguments led feminist radical Jenny d’Héricourt (1809–75) to reply not only that his accounts of women were contradicted by historical and scientific fact, but that “you contradict your own principles” (1864: 117). Joseph Déjacque went further, admonishing Proudhon either to “speak out against man’s exploitation of woman” or “do not describe yourself as an anarchist” (1857/2005: 71); he went on to denounce the patriarchal family, “a pyramid with the boss at its head and children, woman and servants at its base.” The inference made by both – that the egalitarian and anti-authoritarian principles which Proudhon opposed to the domination of church, state, and capital must also be consistently applied to relations between men and women – did, in fact, become the preeminent interpretation of anarchism *vis-à-vis* gender, in theory if not always in practice, from the late nineteenth century on.

Precursors

Well before Proudhon, proto-anarchist thinkers such as Gerrard Winstanley (1609–76) laid down some notable precedents for anarchist feminism. A radical Christian, Winstanley suggested that God’s “universall law of equity” required not only the abolition of inequities of wealth and power, but also the establishment of egalitarian relations between men and women. From a secular perspective, William Godwin (1756–1836), later the partner (and then husband) of pioneer feminist Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–97), included in his *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* a reconsideration of “the institution of marriage” in light of the value of “independence.” Nonetheless, Godwin was unable to imagine an egalitarian system of childrearing; even in the absence of possessive bonds, “the personal cares which the helpless state of an infant requires . . . will probably devolve upon the mother.”

A “Grand Domestic Revolution”?

Even before Proudhon’s death, leadership of the nascent anarchist movement in Europe had been taken up by men such as Mikhail Bakunin

and James Guillaume, whose views on marriage, family, and gender roles in general were distinctly feminist. In 1866, Bakunin declared “absolute equality of political rights for all men and women” to be a revolutionary goal – and, more concretely, specified that “adult men and women have the right to unite and separate as they please, nor has society the right to hinder their union or to force them to maintain it.” Moreover, the ability of women to retain or reclaim their independence from men was to be ensured by concrete economic guarantees, such as community support for pregnant and nursing women, as well as some collective structures of responsibility for childcare and education. Likewise, Guillaume looked forward to the abolition of “paternal authority” within the family, arguing that “a free egalitarian society should obliterate what still remains of this authority and replace it with relations of simple affection.”

From the late nineteenth through the early twentieth centuries, a growing number of women were attracted to the anarchists’ rejection of “universal suffrage” as a goal, seeking instead a radical transformation of social relations that could be prefigured here and now. They and their male counterparts imagined and created concrete, material alternatives to the traditional family. In close association with pioneering feminist Victoria Woodhull, individualist anarchist Stephen Pearl Andrews applied his liberal principles to the condition of women and family structures. For Andrews, this meant not only “abolition of the institution of Marriage as a legal tie to be maintained and perpetuated by force,” but also the creation of alternative arrangements for cohabitation, housekeeping, and childcare – a “grand Domestic Revolution” (see Hayden 1981: 93–5). Similarly, Déjacque’s utopian tract, *L’Humanisphère* (1858/1898), had described life in a built environment that allowed women, men, and children a range of voluntary relationships, from independence to interdependence, while dissolving the nuclear family, the cornerstone of patriarchy and capitalism, into “the great family” of humanity (124). The anarcho-communist Peter Kropotkin, while apparently unable to imagine men cooking, anticipated that housewives might choose from a range of options concerning housework, from the private to the communal – implicitly treating “women’s work” as part of the general continuum of labor.

Attempts to practice non-authoritarian family life and cohabitation, in anarchist colonies or *milieux libres* from the end of the nineteenth century on, as well as in the personal lives of individual anarchist men and women, were not infrequent. In the course of her own experiments in non-possessive love, Emma Goldman (1869–1940) encountered Mary and Abraham Isaak, advocates of “sex equality” in *The Firebrand*, and was struck by “the consistency of their lives, the harmony between the ideas they professed and their application . . . ‘If you can’t establish freedom in your own home,’ [Abraham] Isaak often said, ‘how can you expect to help the world to it?’” (1931/1970: 1.224).

“The Capacity of Women”

“The capacity of women to bear arms,” noted the editors of the feminist *Woodhull & Claflin’s Weekly* in 1871, “was fully tested in Paris during the late reign of the Communists” – alluding to the Paris Commune that had been crushed just months earlier, during which women such as Louise Michel (1830–1905) and André Léo (a.k.a. Victoire Léodile Béra, 1824–1900) had indeed taken an active and at times aggressive role, coming to embrace anarchist identities as a result. Indeed, for Léo, the direct participation of women in armed struggle for their rights, as demonstrated by Michel, was of greater importance than participation in the ephemeral or irrelevant “government” of the Commune. The female *Communes* set perhaps the most direct precedent for the entry of women into the militias of the Mexican Revolution and the Spanish Civil War – and, at the same time, for the establishment of the Agrupación Mujeres Libres (the “Group of Free Women”) as an autonomous organization of anarchist women fighting for its own revolutionary objectives. After the Commune, a generation of working-class female anarchist leaders and intelligentsia sprang up, quite often achieving real prominence as organizers: Lucy Parsons (1853–1942) in the US, Charlotte Wilson (1854–1944) in England, Teresa Claramunt (1862–1932) and Soledad Gustavo (a.k.a. Teresa Montseny Mañé, 1865–1939) in Spain. A second generation would prove to be as influential in the early twentieth century, particularly in the nations of the colonial periphery, where appeared such luminaries as Luisa Capetillo (1879–1922) in Puerto Rico, Juana Belén Gutiérrez de

Mendoza (1875–1942) in Mexico, Virginia Bolten (ca. 1870–ca. 1960) in Argentina and Uruguay, and Belén de Sárraga in Uruguay and Chile (1873–1951), but also in the metropolitan centers, where Federica Montseny (1905–94) and Emma Goldman rose to prominence.

The resistance which these women and their cohorts met in every context – working-class, intellectual, bourgeois, and anarchist alike – was instructive, and the lessons were not encouraging for the project of class-based social transformation. Rather than supporting the demands of their female counterparts out of solidarity in oppression, as their ostensible ideals would seem to demand of them, in practice many male workers and anarchists seemed all too happy to have someone to be superior to. The response anarchist women made – creating autonomous associations of their own, such as the Gruppo Femminile Luisa Michel (formed in the mining community of Spring Valley, Illinois in 1901), while continuing to protest and struggle against sexist tendencies within the male-dominated movements – was itself a model of direct action.

From Tendency to Movement

Anarchist feminism existed as a tendency, even a conscious movement within the anarchist movement, with its own associations (e.g., Las Hijas de Anáhuac, or Anáhuac's Daughters, in Mexico, ca. 1907–8) and publications (e.g., *La Voz de la Mujer: Periódico comunista-anárquico*, or *Woman's Voice: A Communist-Anarchist Journal*, Argentina, 1896–7) before the “first wave” of the women's movement won suffrage rights (US, 1920; Spain, 1931; France, 1944; Japan, 1945) and before the anarchist movement was eclipsed by the Bolshevik and fascist victories of 1917–39. However, it appears not to have attained the status of an ideology until well after. In the 1960s and 1970s, “second-wave” feminists in the US, UK, and Canada reinvented and rediscovered – often in that order – libertarian ethics and tactics, subsequently giving themselves the name “anarcha-feminists.” Spreading to Western Europe by way of translations, anarcha-feminist discourses acquired the strength of a movement within the movement, and in 1982 and 1984, at anarchist congresses in Norway and Italy respectively, an “Anarkofeministiske

Manifest” (“Anarcha-feminist Manifesto”) was endorsed.

“No God, No Boss, No Husband”

At the same time as their anarchist counterparts, various organizations of the authoritarian left sponsored women's organizations and fielded militawomen during the Spanish Civil War; libertarian Marxists like Alexandra Kollontai and Clara Zetkin challenged the patriarchal biases of male Communist Party leadership; Marxist theorists from Friedrich Engels (*The Origin of the Family, the State, and Private Property*, 1884/1909) and August Bebel (*Woman Under Socialism*, 1891/1904) to Catharine MacKinnon (*Toward a Feminist Theory of the State*, 1989) and Teresa Ebert (*Ludic Feminism and After: Post-modernism, Desire, and Labor in Late Capitalism*, 1996) have long argued for a Marxist feminism. Where the differences lie between anarchist feminism and other feminisms is in the logic – both theoretical and practical – that serves to link struggles.

Whereas, from the perspective of Marxist theory, the consciousness of the exploited must be deduced from a theory of history and society as a whole, anarchism has traditionally affirmed that members of *any* oppressed group can organize on their own. This is the anarchist paradigm of “direct action.” Nor, for anarchists, is there such a thing as a political center. For Marxists, the center of power is capitalism; for radical feminists, it is patriarchy; for anarchists and anarcha-feminists, even to ask *where* power is located, as if it were “a thing” rather than a *relationship*, is to fall into an error. Thus, instead of reducing revolution to a single event aimed at a single goal, anarchists see revolution as plural and perpetual.

The logic linking one struggle against dominant power to another, then, could be called “affinitary.” That is, instead of referring each particular struggle to a central category, such as placing housewives in relation to wage-workers by conceptualizing women as a “vertical class” or housework as part of a “social factory,” it operates by making direct “analogies” between situations and experiences. Thus, Bakunin's slogan “no gods, no masters!” could become, in the phrase of a correspondent in *La Voz de la Mujer*, “No God, No Boss, No Husband” (Molyneux 2001: 24).

Eco-Feminism and “Virile” Anarchism

Resemblances, affinities, and analogies, of course, work both ways, and feminists’ spontaneous reconstruction of anarchist practices raised the question of whether anarchism might not “resemble” feminism. Indeed, male anarchists had frequently been stigmatized as feminine – as when Marx ridiculed Bakunin as “Hermaphrodite Man” and “Madame Bakunin,” or in the rape of Ben Reitman by a gang of patriots (Stevens n.d.; Goldman 1931/1970: 1.500–1). Might not anarchism, as a practice, be something like a feminine ethics? Conversely, might not hierarchy be an essentially masculine conception of order? In feminist communities of the 1970s and 1980s, increasingly popular arguments that patriarchy had served as the historic prototype for other forms of domination, including the domination of nature, encouraged a confluence of feminism not only with anarchism but also with the ecology and peace movements. “Eco-feminism,” a term coined in 1974 by Françoise d’Eaubonne (1920–2005), daughter of a Christian anarchist and comrade of Daniel Guérin, was from the first imbued with a libertarian spirit, influencing actions from the anti-nuclear campaign of the Clamshell Alliance (1976–9) to the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp (1981–2000) as well as the formation of the German Greens (1980). Speculations of this sort drew criticism not only from “third-wave” feminists, wary of any talk of “essences,” but from other eco-anarchists and anarchist feminists.

Meanwhile, where the male leadership of the eco-anarchist Earth First! movement had demonstrated a macho “cowboy” style, feminists such as Judy Bari were making inroads, uniting eco-anarchism not only with feminism but also with revolutionary syndicalism. Women had traditionally been somewhat marginal to anarchosyndicalism, in part because of the gender politics of wage labor in general. While female wage-workers did find their way into anarchist movements from Mexico to Germany, producing activists such as Milly Witkop-Rocker and “Rebel Girl” Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, leadership was overwhelmingly male, and at best cautious with respect to feminism, while the culture of revolutionary unionism frequently appealed to images of “virility.”

The problem of “virile” anarchism continues. Despite the history of anarchist women’s in-

volvement in armed struggle, a masculinist emphasis on violent confrontation has at times seemed to alienate women otherwise drawn to anarchism. Accordingly, just as their forebears in late nineteenth-century Spain sought alternative routes to women’s involvement in the anarchist movement, contemporary anarchist feminists have invented forms of activism such as the Radical Cheerleaders, which allow them to voice feminist concerns within the confrontational milieu of anarchist protest – a playful alternative to the imagery of an intransigent, mainly male “black bloc.”

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Education; Anarchosyndicalism; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Day, Dorothy (1897–1980); Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley (1890–1964); Godwin, William (1756–1836); Goldman, Emma (1869–1940); Kollontai, Alexandra (1872–1952); Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Michel, Louise (1830–1905); Mujeres Libres; Paris Commune, 1871; Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865); Winstanley, Gerrard (1609–1676); Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–1797); Woodhull, Victoria (1838–1927); Zasulich, Vera (1849–1919); Zetkin, Clara (1857–1933)

References and Suggested Readings

- Biehl, J. (1991) *Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics*. Boston: South End Press.
- Cochrane, R. (2002) (Eco)Feminism as a “Temporary Autonomous Zone”? *Women and Environments International Magazine* 56–7: 24–6.
- Déjacque J. (1857/2005) On Being Human. In R. Graham (Ed.), *Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas*, Vol. 1: *From Anarchy to Anarchism (300 CE–1939)*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- d’Héricourt, J. (1864) *A Woman’s Philosophy of Woman: Or, Woman Affranchised: An Answer to Michelet, Proudhon, Girardin, Legouvé, Comte, and Other Modern Innovators*. New York: Carleton.
- Farrow, L. (1974/2002) Feminism as Anarchism. In Dark Star Collective (Eds.), *Quiet Rumours: An Anarcha-Feminist Reader*. Edinburgh and San Francisco: AK Press/Dark Star.
- Goldman, E. (1931/1970) *Living My Life*. New York: Dover.
- Hayden, D. (1981) *The Grand Domestic Revolution: A History of Feminist Designs for American Homes, Neighborhoods, and Cities*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Kornegger, P. (1975/1996) Anarchism: The Feminist Connection. In H. J. Ehrlich (Ed.), *Reinventing Anarchy, Again*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Merithew, C. W. (2002) Anarchist Motherhood: Toward the Making of a Revolutionary Proletariat

- in Illinois Coal Towns. In D. R. Gabaccia & F. Iacovetta (Eds.), *Women, Gender, and Transnational Lives: Italian Workers of the World*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Molyneux, M. (2001) No God, No Boss, No Husband: Anarchist Feminism in Nineteenth-Century Argentina. In *Women's Movements in International Perspective: Latin America and Beyond*. New York: Palgrave.
- Nutter, A. (2002) Make Your Own Tea: Women's Realm and Other Recipes and Patterns. In Dark Star Collective (Eds.), *Quiet Rumours: An Anarcha-Feminist Reader*. Edinburgh and San Francisco: AK Press/Dark Star.
- Proudhon, P. J. (1875) *La Pornocratie: ou, Les femmes dans les temps modernes*. Paris: A. Lacroix.
- Shor, F. (1999) "Virile Syndicalism" in Comparative Perspective: A Gender Analysis of the IWW in the United States and Australia. *International Labor and Working-Class History* 56: 65–77.
- Shulman, A. K. (1991) Dances With Feminists. *Women's Review of Books* 9 (3): 1–3.
- Stevens, J. (n.d.) On the Class Question. In C. di Stefano (Ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of Karl Marx*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, forthcoming 2008.
- Vaccaro, J. (2004) Give Me An F: Radical Cheer-leading and Feminist Performance. *E-Misférica* 1 (1). Available at www.hemi.nyu.edu/journal/1_1/cheerleaders_print.pdf.

Anarchism, Greece

Antonios Vradis and Dimitrios K.

Dalakoglou

Greek anarchy stands among the largest and most active contemporary movements of its kind in the world. The first organized anarchist group in the country appeared as early as 1876. Near-complete lack of anarchist activity between World War II and the military dictatorship (1967–74) effectively divides the history of Greek anarchism into two distinct phases, 1876–1944 and 1967–present.

1876–1944

Individual anarchists were politically active from the early 1860s (Emanouil Dadaoglou, Amilcare Cipriani, Mikelis Avlihos), while the first organized anarchist group, the Democratic Club of Patras, appeared in 1876. In the same year, the club became affiliated to the Jura Federation – the anarchist/anti-authoritarian section of the

First International. The club was also quick to help form a – primarily regional – federation (Democratic League of the People) and to publish the first anarchist newspaper in the country (*Hellenic Democracy*, 1877). A few months after the foundation of the Patras group an anarchist working club was formed on the island of Syros. This club played an instrumental role in the island's 1879 tannery and shipyard strikes.

In 1898 a group named the Boatmen of Thessaloniki was formed and acted in the spirit of propaganda by the deed: the group's members, of Bulgarian origin, carried out deadly attacks against targets including the city's Ottoman bank, hotels, a theater, and light and gas pipes. Nearly all of the group's members were executed. In 1913, again in Thessaloniki, anarchosyndicalist Alexandros Schinas assassinated King George I.

In the early twentieth century organized groups faded and Greek anarchism centered around the political activity of individuals. In August 1916 anarchosyndicalist Konstantinos Speras (1893–1943) helped organize the historic miners' strike on the island of Serifos, where four workers were killed by the royalist gendarmes. Speras also participated in the fermentation which led to the foundation of the Greek General Confederation of Labor.

The example of Serifos was followed repeatedly for the next 20 years with strikes around the country. The strike of Kalamata (1934) culminated in three days of unrest and ended with a full-scale riot and seven workers killed by the army. Two years later, in 1936, Thessaloniki saw one of the largest pre-World War II strikes, counting 12 dead workers. Cobbler Yiannis Tamtakos participated in the strike and was sentenced as one of its instigators. Tamtakos (1908–2008) was an active anarchist throughout the final decades of his life.

1967–Present

In its most recent phase anarchism in Greece has largely broken away from its anarchosyndicalist origins, now organized around small direct action-based groups and hence much closer to the insurrectionary current. The country's main urban centers (Athens, Thessaloniki, and Patras) host nuclei of intense anarchist activity, while anarchism's popularity among university students has meant that smaller cities with higher

education institutions have also seen a growth of such activity.

During and immediately after the country's military dictatorship (1967–74) the anarchist movement resurged – largely thanks to popular resistance to the regime and widening political polarization within the country. Anti-dictatorship resistance reached its peak with the Technical University of Athens student uprising of November 17, 1973. While the outlawed left-wing parties largely failed to influence the uprising to any significant extent, some of the slogans – “Down with Authority” and “People Revolt” – had anarchist connotations.

Following the collapse of the dictatorship, parliamentary democracy inherited most of the authoritarian state apparatus intact. This fact is exemplified by the police assassination of demonstrators Iakovos Koumis and Stamatina Kanelopoulou in Athens in 1980 and the assassination of anarchist Michalis Kaltezas in 1985.

The anarchist movement reached a peak of activity between 1989 and 1995, partially boosted by widespread disillusionment with the country's mainstream political scene. The 1990s began and ended with high school students and teachers rebelling against proposed conservative educational reform bills (1990–1, 1998–2000). Left-wing and anarchist groups played an instrumental role within these struggles. Students occupied the majority of schools across the country and organized demonstrations, often ending in police violence and riots. On November, 18, 1995 more than 500 anarchists were arrested following riots at the National Technical University of Athens. Most were convicted; a similar wave of arrests after the November 17 commemoration in 1998 cost the movement dearly and it subsequently entered a short period of decline.

The turning point for contemporary anarchism in Greece was the movement against globalization. Greek anarchists had a strong presence at Genoa's anti-G8 mobilizations in 2001. Two years later the 2003 European Union Leader Summit in Thessaloniki was greeted by a 3,000-strong black bloc, while a 5,000-strong anarchist demonstration marched through the city to express their solidarity with migrants, who comprised one of the most heavily exploited and repressed social groups in the country.

Recent years have seen an intensification of state repression against an ever-growing anarchist movement. In January 2008 more than ten

anarchists were either in prison, awaiting trial, and/or absconding from justice as the state convulsed in reaction to a movement becoming more influential, holding an increasingly active role in recent struggles in the country, focusing – among others – on education, ecology, employment, state repression, and migration. Most recently, police have again fired against demonstrators, for example at the higher education students' demonstration of March 1, 2007.

State violence and repression acted – to some extent – as a greenhouse for anarchism, increasing its influence. Since the 1980s Athens boasts two anarchist publishing houses (Free Press and International Library) and numerous regularly published magazines at any given time, along with hundreds of brochures and poster campaigns every year. Squats have emerged and anarchist collectives have appeared all across the country. In parallel to a mass anarchist movement, Greece witnesses the emergence of clandestine anarchist activity, primarily arson and casualty free explosions of symbolic targets. In January 2008 alone the country saw more than ten actions of this kind.

SEE ALSO: Anarchosyndicalism; G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Greece, Anti-Dictatorship Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Kottis, L. (2006) *Konstantinos Speras: The Life and Activities of a Greek Anarcho-Syndicalist*. London: Kate Sharpley Library.
- Megas, Y. (1994) *The Boatmen of Thessaloniki: The Anarchist Bulgarian Group and the Bombing Actions of 1903*. Athens: Trochalia (in Greek).
- Pomonis, P. (Ed.) (2004) *The Early Days of Greek Anarchism: The Democratic Club of Patras & Social Radicalism in Greece*. London: Kate Sharpley Library.
- Sotros, J. (2004) *The Greek Speaking Anarchist and Revolutionary Movement (1830–1940): Writings for a History*. Melbourne: No God-No Masters.

Anarchism, Hungary

András Bozóki

The anarchist tradition in Hungary survived for almost 40 years from the 1880s to 1919, represented by four different waves. The first involved an anarchist-influenced radical socialist group led by Ármin Práger and András Szalay, from 1881 to 1884. These radicals were well acquainted with the principles, revolutionary rhetoric, and

cultivation of the propaganda of the deed associated with Johann Most, a social democrat who became an anarchist. The banning of socialist organizations by Germany's "exceptional legislation" in 1878 had a direct influence on Hungarian radicals as a significant number of German socialists and anarchists settled in Austria and Hungary. By their intermediation, the radical revolutionary point of view could then recruit many adherents. The "radical-socialist" group did not reject violent means of struggle against the system, but it was quickly crushed by the firm intervention of the government in 1884.

By contrast, the later waves of Hungarian anarchism rejected the use of terrorism. In the 1890s, the non-violent ideal anarchism represented the second wave. Philosopher Jenő Henrik Schmitt was convinced that verbal persuasion and true Christian moral example were the means to achieve social transformation. He propagated this approach in his newspapers – *Állam Nélkül* (Without State) and *Erőszaknélküliség* (Non-Violence) – but failed to influence wider urban circles. However, it did have an impact on the peasant-based Independent Socialist Party (ISP) led by István Várkonyi, which later influenced the agrarian-socialist movements of the late 1890s. The ISP would go on to accept a program of abolition of rule and state with an ideal of non-violence, but it did not always abide by this anarchistic principle. Jenő Henrik Schmitt would be remembered more as a philosopher and prophetic preacher than as an anarchistic ideologue. He later withdrew from politics and entered the intellectual world of Gnosticism. Ideal anarchism would remain politically marginalized, surviving only in religious, messianistic peasants' sects until government intervention suppressed harvest strikes and eventually arrested Várkonyi.

The third wave of anarchism in Hungary came through the rationalist, solidarity approach of Ervin Batthyány. As the twentieth century began, Batthyány advocated the labor movement's theory of class war and anarchosyndicalism. He edited anarchist newspapers such as *Testvériség* (Fraternity) and *Társadalmi Forradalom* (Social Revolution) in which he tried to unite anti-systemic forces along anarchist and anarchosyndicalist ideas. Batthyány also took the idea of revolutionary education seriously and, in 1905, he founded a school to nurture critical thinking.

Batthyány and Schmitt were the two most significant figures in the history of anarchism in

Hungary. Both were able to achieve an intellectual consciousness within a western intellectual tradition. While Batthyány hailed from English rationalism and Schmitt from German metaphysics, they were able to share basic principles that were opposed to rule and politics. Both theorized that the creation of the new moral world order was not a political question. However, the realities of their respective movements forced both into active politics and into a schizophrenic position of theoretical conviction and revolutionary practice. Both were forced to abandon pure theory through a series of compromises. Between 1897 and 1899, Schmitt drew near to peasant socialism and Batthyány, between 1906 and 1908, sought association with anarchosyndicalism.

The particular features of Hungarian political life, the high salience of the franchise question, the attacks of the Social Democratic Party, and the party's institutional appeal all contributed to the difficulty of founding an anarchist or anarchosyndicalist movement in Hungary at the start of the twentieth century. However, in 1919, the Budapest Anarchist Group emerged around Károly Krausz to become the fourth wave of Hungarian anarchism. These anarchists, operating legally under the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic between March and July 1919, advocated three distinct paths – critical, revolutionary, and cultural. The Budapest anarchists' efforts were anti-parliamentarism, anti-militarism, direct actions, and the practical questions of the general strike. Because of limited time and rapid-change politics, the Budapest anarchists were prevented from developing a theoretical generalization of their criticism on the contradictory relationship between anarchism and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The pattern of Hungarian anarchism was that it could flourish for relatively short periods of time. The first wave, having split in the Hungarian social democratic movement, was linked to the divide within the German and Austrian movements between 1881 and 1884. In the second wave, social democracy was incapable of covering the political space of the emerging radical agrarian movement (1897–8). In the third wave, Batthyány's efforts were multiplied by his material sacrifices and the appeal of French anarchosyndicalism from 1904 to 1910. Finally, in the fourth case, while the Bolshevik state left a brief opportunity for the small group

of theoretical anarchists, they were unable to find a social base in 1919.

These short periods proved to be exceptional in Hungary as a strong institutional organization of social democracy. Unfortunately, state repression removed radical socialists in 1884, suppressed the agrarian movement in 1897–8, and transferred power to the Horthy regime in 1919, stifling every anarchist initiative in Hungary. The various European anarchist ideas and movements were confronted with a variety of geographic, historical, and cultural challenges. In areas such as Western Europe, where democratic struggles had been established, anarchist movements were able to find a social base. This was equally possible in regions where democracy and anarchism were distant from reality and appeared only on a utopian horizon, as in Russia. Central Europe, in its transitional flux, seemed only to have democracy within its grasp. Thus, its immediacy made it difficult for both pre-democratic and post-democratic anarchism to gain strength. Essentially, the region imagined a solution that combined the advantages of anarchy and democracy without the disadvantages of either. While it craved for the people to hold power, it could not resolve its own disgust with power itself.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Russia; Hungary, Revolution of 1848; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Andersen, A. (1976) *Hungary '56*. Detroit: Black & Red.
- Bak, J. (1991) *Liberty and Socialism: Writings of Libertarian Socialists in Hungary, 1884–1919 Series. States and Societies in East-Central Europe: Contributions to Political Thought*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Bozoki, A. & Sukosd, M. (2005) *Anarchism in Hungary: Theory, History, Legacies*. Boulder: East European Monographs.

Anarchism, Italy

Vittorio Sergi

Anarchism in Italy has its origins in the second half of the nineteenth century in the context of the political radicalism of intellectuals and popular leaders who struggled for national liberation and a republican government, such as Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–1882) and Carlo Pisacane (1818–

1857). From 1864 on, the influence of Mikhail Bakunin was decisive in the creation of a radical and autonomous political doctrine. Together with initial industrialization in the urban centers of the center and north of the country, there was an important growth in workers' associations (*società operaie*), often organized by profession, in which anarchism found supporters. In the south of the country, the majority of workers were landless peasants who, led by an enlightened elite, had engaged in several failed insurrections. This activity was soon channeled into continuous guerilla actions often mixing brigandage with social protest. In 1869, under the influence of Bakunin, Carlo Gambuzzi and Stefano Caporosso founded the first anarchist journal, *Eguaglianza* (Equality), in Naples, edited by Michelangelo Statuti. The first Italian anarchist organizations, such as the Federazione Operaia Napoletana (1874), emerged in the south. There, Bakunin found important supporters and natural leaders such as Carlo Cafiero (1846–1892) and Errico Malatesta (1853–1932). When anarchist tendencies spread to the north, from Rome to the eastern region of Marche and Romagna, Tuscany, and the industrial centers of Milan, Turin, and Genoa, they gained supporters among the working class, artisans, and the urban underclasses. Italian anarchist organizations and groups were part of the First International Workingmen's Association, and at the first meeting of the Italian section of the International, held in Rimini from August 4 to 6, 1872, Cafiero and Andrea Costa (1851–1910) supported the anarchist position against the Marxist currents that would soon drive the anarchists out of the International.

From 1870 to 1880, Italian anarchism defined itself as autonomous from socialism and republicanism, and with the leadership of Costa and Malatesta, tried to find a common organization as a revolutionary party. Anarchists supported and participated in several popular revolts until their important insurrectionary plans were frustrated by the police: in August 1874 near Bologna and Castel del Monte in the southeast, and in 1877 in the northwest of Campania in the Matese region, where after several guerilla actions the rebels were defeated. The crisis of a common organizing project and harsh repression by the state provoked by individualist terrorist practices escalated across Europe, as acts of "propaganda by the deed" were often performed by the hands of Italian anarchists. In 1887, the Italian anarchist

Michele Angiolillo (1871–97) killed the prime minister of Spain, Antonio Canovas; in 1894, Sante Caserio (1873–94) stabbed French president Sadi Carnot to death; and in 1898, Luigi Luccheni (1873–1910) stabbed and killed Princess Elisabeth of Austria. Malatesta criticized this individualist tendency and promoted instead participation in popular organizations and trade unions. An anarchist-led, nationwide protest for “food and work” started in Ancona in January 1898, ending with barricades and bloody military repression in Milan in May. The repression was also enforced by an international anti-anarchist conference of European police forces in Rome from November 24 to December 21 of that year. In this context, Gaetano Bresci (1869–1901), an Italian immigrant to the United States, shot and killed King Umberto I in Monza on July 29, 1900 as a revenge for the victims of the military repression of 1898.

From the Rise of Syndicalism to the Rise of Fascism

At the turn of the century, Costa broke with Malatesta and joined the Italian Socialist Party together with a section of the trade union movement that chose the liberal democratic political terrain opened up by the introduction of universal suffrage. Anarchism in this period was characterized by intense activity among workers, leading to the formation in 1912 of the Italian Syndicalist Union (Unione Sindacale Italiana, USI) as a branch of the International Workingmen’s Association (Associazione Internazionale dei Lavoratori, AIT/IWA). Meanwhile, anarchists participated in the General Chamber of Labor (Camera Generale del Lavoro, CGDL), today the Italian General Confederation of Labor (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, CGIL), with the aim of gaining positions within the working-class organizations. Beginning in 1912, protests against Italy’s colonial war in Libya led to nationwide strikes and to generalized standoffs, with a revival of individualist attacks against military personnel and politicians.

In 1914, conditions of low wages and high prices were exacerbated by heavy police repression. A political meeting attended by Malatesta in the city of Ancona was attacked by the police, and the ensuing protests culminated in riots which soon spread to the major urban centers of the country, as well as to regions where anarchists

had strong bases, such as Romagna and Marche. Riots, strikes, and acts of sabotage broke out all over Italy, often led by anarchists. The majority of republican, socialist, and anarchist leaders chose not to push the popular unrest into a general insurrection, and the state regained control through another round of repression that sent many anarchists to jail and Malatesta into exile. In the same year, anarchist newspapers and activists led a campaign against the possible participation of Italy in the war. When Italy attacked Austria and Germany in 1915, many anarchists chose to respond by acts of individual and collective desertion and sabotage. After the war, in 1919, the Union of Italian Communist Anarchists (Unione Comunista Anarchica Italiana, UCAI) was founded in Florence. One year later it approved Malatesta’s “Anarchist Program” (Malatesta & Richards 1993: 182–98) and became the Italian Anarchist Union (Unione Anarchica Italiana, UAI), publishing its own newspaper, *Umanità Nova* (New Humanity).

When, in 1920, there was another nationwide protest following on from a revolt of military conscripts in Ancona that had popular support, anarchists such as Pietro Ferrero (1892–1922) and Maurizio Gorino joined the radical socialists and the collective of Antonio Gramsci’s *Ordine Nuovo* (New Order) in promoting the occupation of factories and the takeover of the production of essential goods and services. The movement was strong, especially in the main industrial districts of Turin and Milan. This revolutionary movement was defeated in 1921 by the rising violent reaction emerging from the newborn fascist organization. In response, many anarchists joined the Arditi del Popolo, a paramilitary organization formed by ex-soldiers and political militants that practiced armed struggle against fascists until 1924.

Italian Anarchists Abroad

From the second half of the nineteenth century through the 1920s, Italians had migrated to the Americas by the millions. The Italian anarchist presence in the United States, Argentina, and Brazil was significant enough to sponsor newspapers and initiatives, as well as to provide economic support to prisoners and organizations, all of which had a strong impact in Italy itself. Two of the most important Italian anarchist newspapers were founded in New York: *Il Martello* (The Hammer) in 1918 by Carlo

Tresca, which was an organ of revolutionary syndicalism, and *L'Adunata dei Refrattari* (The Call of the Refractory Ones), an organ of the anti-organizational and individualist tendency founded in 1922 by Armando Borghi. In Buenos Aires, Italian anarchism had a strong influence within the labor movement and gained a reputation for its violent and open resistance to repression, notably with the group around Severino di Giovanni (1901–31). *La Battaglia* (Battle) and *Guerra Sociale* (Social War), among many other journals, were edited in Brazil. Giovanni Rossi founded the experimental colony of Cecilia in the province of Paraná (1890–4), and one of his associates, Gigi (Luigi) Damiani, became an important union leader during the strikes of 1917–19 in São Paulo. In addition, individual anarchists, including such luminaries as Malatesta, Galleani, and Luigi Fabbri (1877–1935), also made journeys around the Mediterranean, establishing small groups, educational projects, and publications in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey (Khuri-Makdisi 2003; Gorman 2005).

The rise of the fascist regime in Italy in 1926 forced many anarchists into exile or underground. Various anarchist groups went to Spain to participate in the anti-fascist resistance there on the side of the anarcho-syndicalist Confederación Nacional del Trabajo-Federación Anarquista Ibérica (CNT-FAI), most notably in the enlistment of anarchists from the UAI with the republican organization Giustizia e Libertà (Justice and Liberty), part of the Italian Ascaso Column led by the anarchist Camillo Berneri (1897–1937), later assassinated by Stalinist agents.

Recovery of the Movement and New Crises

After years of underground activity, exile, and detention, witnessing the crisis of the fascist regime, anarchists confined in the island of Ventotene held a clandestine congress in 1942 in which they planned for the fall of fascism and a new revolutionary project. In 1943, the Federation of Italian Anarchist Communists (Federazione dei Comunisti Anarchici Italiani, FCAI) was founded. Anarchists often fought in the popular armed resistance with the republican partisan groups of Giustizia e Libertà, the communist Garibaldi brigades, or autonomous anarchist fighting groups such as the Michele

Schirru battalion in Tuscany, or the Malatesta and Bruzzi battalions in Milan and Genoa. On September 19, 1945, the Italian Anarchist Federation (Federazione Anarchica Italiana, FAI) was founded in Carrara in an attempt to rebuild anarchist unity. The directive committee of the federation refused to support the National Liberation Committee (Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale, CLN), which would be instrumental in the constitution of the new republic. This position, together with the strong hegemony of the Italian Communist Party, closed spaces for the anarchist initiative and its presence among the working class.

In the 1950s, anarchism entered a deep crisis. At the beginning of the 1960s, the formal unity of FAI began to splinter into the three main organizations and tendencies that have continued to the present time. One breakaway group, claiming the heritage of the “anarchist party” projected by Malatesta, gave birth to the Federation of Anarchist Communists (Federazione dei Comunisti Anarchici, FDCA). Local autonomous groups belonging to the anti-organizational and individualist tendency left the FAI in 1965 and founded the Anarchist Initiative Groups (Gruppi di Iniziativa Anarchica, GIA), and then in 1967 the Federated Anarchist Groups (Gruppi Anarchici Federati, GAF), which became the Italian section of the Anarchist Black Cross (an international prisoner-support organization) and the hegemonic group in the country.

Anarchist Struggles and the “Strategy of Tension”

During the movements of 1967–79, anarchists were often attacked and used by the security forces for provocation and infiltration, as part of a “strategy of tension” aimed at arousing public hysteria toward the Italian left (Censor 1975/1997; Sanguinetti 1979/1982). Nevertheless, many anarchists participated actively in local organizations and collectives, and several were imprisoned or killed, such as Giuseppe Pinelli, killed in police custody in 1969 in Milan (the subject of Dario Fo’s famous play, *Accidental Death of an Anarchist*), or Franco Serantini, killed by the police in Pisa in 1973. When armed struggle was on the rise, anarchists Gianfranco Faina and Salvatore Cinieri formed their own armed initiative with the small affinity group-based organization Azione Rivoluzionaria (1976–80). In the

1980s, a part of the movement took on board the discourses and practices of radical ecology, experimented with the creation of autonomous local communities, or practiced individual forms of expropriation.

The 1990s were characterized by a strong repressive turn against anarchists that followed the hegemony of the insurrectionary and anti-organizational tendency. On November 16, 1995, the police launched a major operation involving hundreds of activists. Alfredo Maria Bonanno (b. 1937) and 53 others were accused by the public prosecutor Antonio Marini of many offenses, including forming a terrorist organization. Many were convicted, but their tendency was not defeated and it experienced a strong revival with the start of the anti-globalization movement. In 1998, due to several acts of sabotage against the high-speed train (TAV) project in Piemonte, a number of anarchists were arrested, two of whom, Edoardo Massari and Maria Soledad Rosa, committed suicide in custody. While the FAI and USI maintained a national presence, they did not play a major role in the anti-globalization movement, and by the end of the 1990s neither had a strong influence among the youth who organized mostly in informal groups and Centri Sociali (volunteer-run community spaces, often in squatted premises). Anarchists participated actively in the protests against the G8 meeting in Genoa in 2001 as the so-called “black bloc.” From 1999 to the present, various collectives have joined their anti-organizational and individualist strategies and started campaigns of armed propaganda with sabotage, explosive attacks, and arson. Since 2003, ten acronyms have claimed to be part of an Informal Anarchist Federation (Federazione Anarchica Informale, also sharing the acronym FAI) and have claimed responsibility for more than 30 low-intensity bombings aimed at European Commission president Romano Prodi, military and police stations, detention centers, and tribunals. Responsibility for several other acts of sabotage against productive infrastructure was not directly claimed. It has been suggested that this group may be provocateurs, the initials FAI chosen for their similarity to those of the Federazione Anarchica Italiana.

Anarchists are today present nationwide and are involved in all the principal social and political conflicts, with more than 60 active spaces and an articulated presence on the Internet and in the

militant press. Centri Sociali, libraries, and USI union sections are divided into the two main historical tendencies: unions and federated associations maintain open, public activity, while the anti-organizational and individualist tendency refuses any kind of formalization, stressing the importance of direct action and underground organizing.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Argentina; Anarchism, Spain; Anarchism in the United States to 1945; Anarchosyndicalism; Autonomism; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Fanelli, Giuseppe (1826–1877); Fascism, Protest and Revolution; G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; Galleani, Luigi (1861–1931); Gori, Pietro (1865–1911); Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Infoshops; Internationals; Italian Labor Movement; Italy, Centri Sociali; Italy, from the Anti-Fascist Resistance to the New Left (1945–1960); Italy, from the New Left to the Great Depression (1962–1981); Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932); Pisacane, Carlo (1818–1857)

References and Suggested Readings

- Anon. (2005) *The Marini Trial: Italian State Repression of Anarchist Revolt and Anarchist Responses*. Sacramento: Black Powder Press.
- Antonioni, M. (1990) *Azione diretta e organizzazione operaia: sindacalismo rivoluzionario e anarchismo tra la fine dell'Ottocento e il fascismo*. Manduria: P. Lacaita.
- Bayer, O. (1986) *Anarchism and Violence: Severino Di Giovanni in Argentina, 1923–1931*. London: Elephant Editions.
- Berti, G. (2003) *Errico Malatesta e il movimento anarchico italiano e internazionale 1872–1932*. Milan: Franco Angeli.
- Bianconi, P. (1988) *Gli anarchici italiani nella lotta contro il fascismo*. Pistoia: Archivio famiglia Berneri.
- Bonanno, A. M. (1998) *Armed Joy*. London: Elephant Editions.
- Censor [Sanguinetti, G.] (1975/1997) *The Real Report on the Last Chance to Save Capitalism in Italy*. Fort Bragg: Flatland Books.
- Gabaccia, D. R. & Iacovetta, F. (Eds.) (2002) *Women, Gender, and Transnational Lives: Italian Workers of the World*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Gabaccia, D. R. & Ottanelli, F. M. (2001) *Italian Workers of the World: Labor Migration and the Formation of Multiethnic States*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Dada, A. (1984) *L'anarchismo in Italia fra movimento e partito*. Milan: Teti.
- Di Lembo, L. (2001) *Guerra di classe e lotta umana: l'anarchismo in Italia dal biennio rosso alla guerra di Spagna (1919–1939)*. Pisa: BFS.
- Gorman, A. (2005) Anarchists in Education: The Free Popular University in Egypt (1901). *Middle Eastern Studies* 41 (3): 303–20.

- Khuri-Makdisi, I. (2003) *Levantine Trajectories: The Formulation and Dissemination of Radical Ideas in and between Beirut, Cairo, and Alexandria, 1860–1914*. PhD thesis, Harvard University.
- Levy, C. (1989) *Italian Anarchism, 1870–1926*. In D. Goodway (Ed.), *For Anarchism: History, Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge.
- Levy, C. (1999) *Gramsci and the Anarchists*. Oxford: Berg.
- Malatesta, E. & Richards, V. (1993) *Errico Malatesta: His Life and Ideas*. London: Freedom Press.
- Manfredonia, G. et al. (2005) *La resistenza sconosciuta. Gli anarchici e la lotta contro il fascismo*. Milan: Zero in condotta.
- Pernicone, N. (1993) *Italian Anarchism, 1864–1892*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ravindranathan, T. R. (1988) *Bakunin and the Italians*. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Sanguinetti, G. (1979/1982) *On Terrorism and the State: The Theory and Practice of Terrorism Divulged For the First Time*. London: B. M. Chronos.

Anarchism, Japan

Hélène Bowen Raddeker

Japan has unique traditions of what may be termed “anarchism” rooted in the cultural distinctiveness of the society. Some early twentieth-century anarchists pointed to the horizontal features of village communalism in Japan’s Tokugawa era (1600–1867), while others claim Andō Shōeki, an eighteenth-century doctor, as an anarchist forbear. For Andō, all traditional thought in Japan was mere ideology, an excuse to rob the people. Though he was himself a samurai, Andō saw the samurai ruling class as parasites living off the proverbial sweat of peasant labor and felt that all should engage in “direct cultivation,” coupled with what we might call mutual aid. He contested the antimony of high and low in traditional thinking that had informed “unnatural” and oppressive social relations, including hierarchical relationships between the sexes.

It was fitting, then, that in 1908 the early socialist paper *Nihon Heimin Shimbun* (Japan Commoners’ News) described Andō as a Japanese “anarchist.” This followed what historians refer to as the beginning of Japan’s anarchist movement – setting up of a “direct action” faction in 1907 after a speech given to the Commoners’ Society by Kōtoku Shūsui (1871–1911). The speech was concerned with “The Change in [his] Thought” – to anarchist communism. While visiting com-

rades in the United States, Kōtoku had written to leading theorist Peter Kropotkin, who willingly gave him permission to translate some of his works into Japanese.

In prewar Japan the anarchist movement went in cycles. It was predominantly anarchocommunist at first, then increasingly syndicalist through the teens to the mid-twenties. Under the leadership of Hatta Shūzō (1886–1934) and Iwasa Sakutarō (1879–1967), there was then a swing back to “pure” anarchism (anarchocommunist) which, unlike syndicalism, was seen to be unadulterated by Marxism. The pure anarchists were suspicious of the leading revolutionary role accorded the industrial proletariat by Marxists and syndicalists and saw the practice of “class struggle” in labor unions as essentially capitalist.

Membership figures for the anarchist and Bolshevik labor federations throw doubt on the common assumption of historians that anarchism’s influence on radical movements was eclipsed by that of Marxism-Leninism in the mid-1920s. The anarchists opposed what they saw to be authoritarian centralism in both social democratic and Bolshevik organization and demanded local union autonomy. Hence, an “ana-boru” split came to a head in 1925, at which time the Bolshevik labor council (Hyōgikai) had 12,500 members in 32 unions compared to the anarchists’ 25 in 1926, though one anarchist source gives a figure of 29 anarchist unions by 1928. In 1928, when there was a split in the anarchist federation and 3,000 anarchosyndicalists withdrew, the now anarchocommunist federation claimed 16,300 members.

The anarchist wing of the peasant and arts movements was led by the Nōmin Jichi Kai (Peasants’ Self-Governing League), which claimed 243 branches and 6,300 members in 1927. In addition, 26 anarchist authors established their own “Literary Front” after being removed from the Marxist-Leninist “proletarian” literary federation in 1926. Amongst the women associated with it was the anarchocommunist Takamura Itsue (1894–1964). Two magazines were produced by anarchist women between 1928 and 1931, *Nyonin Geijutsu* (Women’s Arts) and *Fujin Sensen* (Women’s Front), to which some Marxists also contributed.

Of course, not all Japanese anarchists identified with only one stream of anarchist thought. By the 1920s some were expressing sympathy for “nihilism” or “egoism,” which was partly

indebted to individualistic anarchism. Nietzsche was popular; Max Stirner's *The Ego and Its Own* had also been translated into Japanese. The latter's influence can be seen in the writings of the leading anarchosyndicalist Ōsugi Sakae (1885–1923). Also a fan of Stirner was Itō Noe (1895–1923), a former *Bluestocking* editor and anarcho-feminist publicist who by then was Ōsugi's partner. Kaneko Fumiko (1903–26) was another woman who embraced “self-assertion” (egoism) and the “ideology of negation.”

Kaneko and her Korean partner Pak Yōl (d. 1974) were the defendants in the second of two infamous high treason cases involving prewar anarchists. Arrested after the great Kantō earthquake of 1923, the two were later found guilty in 1926 of conspiring to import bombs to use on the imperial family. Originally sentenced to die, both their sentences were later commuted to life imprisonment. It seems that Kaneko exaggerated her own guilt in order to receive the same sentence as Pak; and she got her way. Nevertheless, her testimonies leave little doubt that she took her own life in her cell just a few months later. Pak was released from prison at the close of the war.

The year 1923 was a pivotal one for prewar anarchism. Ōsugi and Itō were among several radical activists murdered by police amidst the chaos following an earthquake. After Ōsugi's death his syndicalist followers were left in disarray as some turned to revenge-motivated political violence. Legal or extralegal repression was a regular feature among Japanese radicals even in response to activities such as publishing, public meetings, or demonstrations. Meiji repression had culminated in a similar high treason trial that resulted in the execution of 12 anarchists and Marxists in January 1911 and life imprisonment for 12 more. Yet, the one woman amongst the first 12, Kanno Suga (1881–1911), was amongst those who testified that only a handful of the total 28 charged (including herself) had had any involvement with a “conspiracy” to rise in a rebellion that would include an attempt on the Meiji emperor's life. Japanese authorities were determined to rid themselves of anarchist theorist Kōtoku, who had apparently lost interest in the group's plans before his arrest, and as many other “anarchists” as possible.

Anarchists would suffer mounting repression after 1925 when a revised and more stringent “peace preservation” law was passed designed

to combat the “twin evils” of bolshevism and anarchism. Activism became near impossible after the Manchurian Incident of 1931. While the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) was severely weakened by a flood of recantations in 1932, it disbanded in 1935. Anarchists continued to resist the rising militarism for a few more years, while syndicalists and “pure” anarchists reunited and even participated in a short-lived “anti-fascist” front in 1933 with social democrats and Marxists. However, in 1935 at least 700 anarchists were rounded up after a “public order” law against anarchism was promulgated in 1936. The last group to survive, though not beyond 1938, was the anarchosyndicalist Tokyo Printers' Union.

After the Fifteen Years' War (1931–45), in 1946, an anarchist federation was reestablished but was weakened once again by splits and finally disbanded in 1968. Anarchists were represented in various postwar struggles including the production control movement during the Allied Occupation, vehement opposition in 1960 to the US–Japan Security Treaty, the treaty with South Korea five years later, the militant student movement of the 1960s (Zengakuren), the fight of peasants and supporters to halt the construction of a new airport at Narita (1968), and anti-war agitation during both the Korean and Vietnamese wars. However, the new left in Japan was dominated by the socialist and communist parties and affiliated youth groups, and anarchists never regained the strong foothold they had secured in prewar social movements, especially in the industrial and peasant unions.

Some stalwarts, such as prewar anarchist leaders Ishikawa Sanshirō (a Christian anarchist: 1876–1956) and Iwasa Sakutarō, were influential again after the war. Another who survived Japanese militarism and the attendant repression of any dissent was the anarchocommunist Ōshima Eizaburō, who was long an inspiration to younger comrades while also providing an invaluable service to researchers of Japanese anarchism after 1970. Amongst the many works reproduced by his publishing house in Tokyo, Kokushoku Sensensha (Black Battle Front), are weighty volumes of original trial documents, including the Kaneko–Pak treason trial.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Japan, Community Labor Union Movement; Japan, Labor Protest, 1945–Present; Japan, Pacifist Movement, 1945–Present; Japan, Post-World War II Protest Movements; Japan,

Resistance to Construction of Narita Airport; Japanese Communist Party; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Ōsugi Sakae (1885–1923); Zenroren Labor Federation

References and Suggested Readings

- Anonymous (n.d.) Anarchism in Japan. *Anarchy Magazine* (London), 2nd ser., 1 (5): 2–30.
- Bowen Raddeker, H. (1997) *Treacherous Women of Imperial Japan: Patriarchal Fictions, Patricidal Fantasies*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Bowen Raddeker, H. (2001) Anarcho-Feminist Discourse in Prewar Japan: Itō Noe's Autobiographical Social Criticism. *Anarchist Studies* (UK) 9: 97–125.
- Bowen Raddeker, H. (2002) Resistance to Difference: Sexual Equality and its Law-ful and Out-Law (Anarchist) Advocates in Imperial Japan. *Intersections* (e-journal, Murdoch University, Western Australia) 7 (March): 1–11.
- Crump, J. (1983) *The Origins of Socialist Thought in Japan*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Crump, J. (1992) Anarchist Opposition to Japanese Militarism, 1926–1937. *Japan Forum* 4 (1): 73–9.
- Crump, J. (1993) *Hatta Shūzō and Pure Anarchism in Interwar Japan*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Crump, J. (n.d.) *The Anarchist Movement in Japan*. London: Kate Sharpley Library.
- Hagiwara, S. (1969) *Nihon Anakizumu Rōdō Undōshi* (A History of Japan's Anarchist Labour Movement). Tokyo: Gendai Shichō.
- Kokushoku, S. (1977) *Kaneko Fumiko, Pak Yōl Saiban Kiroku* (. . . Trial Records). Tokyo: Kokushoku Sensensha.
- Mackie, V. (2003) *Feminism in Modern Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Maruyama, M. (1974) *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Matsuda, M. (Ed.) (1963) *Gendai Nihon Shisō Taikai, 16: Anakizumu* (An Outline of Modern Japanese Thought, Vol. 16: Anarchism). Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō.
- Ooms, H. (1985) *Tokugawa Ideology: Early Constructs, 1570–1680*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tsuzuki, C. (1971) Anarchism in Japan. In D. E. Apter & J. Joll (Eds.), *Anarchism Today*. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Anarchism, Korea

Dongyoun Hwang

Anarchism, accepted by Korean radicals in the early 1920s as an idea for independence from Japanese colonial rule since 1910, was one of the most important currents in the Korean independence movement. While their immediate

goal was to “retake” independence through direct action, motivated by national consciousness, the ultimate goal of Korean anarchists was to achieve a social revolution bent on anarchist principles. Anarchism offered them an alternative to Bolshevism and social Darwinism with its promise of human progress through mutual aid, and hope for a new society with its universal messages of freedom, no compulsory power, and spontaneous alliance.

The circulations of anarchist ideas as well as anarchists themselves in East Asia were of significance in the rise of Korean anarchism in the 1920s, in the sense that it was basically a product of interactions among anarchists in the area, through which Korean anarchists were imbued with national consciousness and shared transnational concerns with other anarchists as a result of mutual influence and inspiration. Transnationalism, like nationalism, was a main force in the rise of Korean anarchism, which may explain why Korean anarchists preferred political independence to social revolution, without which, they believed, no significant political changes could even be made (Hwang 2007).

After 1920 anarchist groups and organizations appeared first among Korean exiles and/or study-abroad students in China and Japan, and then in Korea. In early 1920s China the Beijing Branch of the Black Youth Alliance and the Korean Anarchist Federation in China were successively established. The inaugural editorial of the latter's organ, *The Conquest (talhman)*, published in 1928, clearly expressed its advocacy of social revolution for “the oppressed class,” while Shin Chaeho's 1923 “Declaration of the Korean Revolution” justified mass violence against Japanese colonial government (Graham 2005: 373–6, 381–3). Of importance in the Korean reception of anarchism was support from Chinese anarchists and the role of Vasilij Eroshenko, a blind Russian poet and anarchist, who propagated in early 1920s China cosmopolitanism and anti-Bolshevism (Bak 2005: 26; Hwang 2007). Many Korean anarchists participated in such anarchist projects as the opening of the National Shanghai Labor University (1928), the Movement for Self-Defensive Rural Communities (1927–8) in Quanzhou, and educational experiments (1929–early 1930s) also in Quanzhou. After 1931 many engaged in armed struggles against Japan, in collaboration with some Chinese anarchists. Their goal, however, was still social revolution rather

than political independence, as exemplified in the platform and declaration of the Alliance of Korean Youths in South China (Bak 2005: 161–8).

In Japan the first anarchism-oriented Black Wave Society appeared in 1921, but a group of Korean anarchists withdrew from it to establish the Black Friend Society and published *Fat Korean (Hutoi senjin)*. Park Yeol was a leading figure in the organizations and journal until 1923, when he and his Japanese comrade Kaneko Fumiko were arrested for their alleged conspiracy to assassinate the Japanese emperor. *Fat Korean* and its successor, *The Contemporary Society (Gen shakai)*, both published in 1923, made clear their national and transnational goals under the shackles of capitalism and colonialism (Hwang 2007). Park's arrest was a setback to the Japan-based Korean anarchist movement which was revived briefly with the organization in 1926 of the Black Movement Society, which became a member of the Japanese Black Youth League. Obviously, many Japan-based Korean anarchists partook in the various publications and organizational activities of their Japanese counterparts, which was conducive to their survival under Japanese surveillance. Their activities used to be supported and even sponsored by Japanese anarchists such as Ōsugi Sakae, Hatta Shūzō, and Iwasa Sakutarō.

The Korean anarchist groups in Japan manifested their criticism of capitalism, colonialism, and the nationalist movement, and made poignant attacks on Bolsheviks as a “new privileged class.” Their movement, however, began to decline after 1930 due to tight control of “dangerous thoughts” in Japan after its invasion of China. One exception to this was the *Black Newspaper (Heuksaek sinmun)*, published from 1930 until 1935 with funding from Korean anarchist unions and organizations in Japan, which interspersed a wide range of local, national, and global news of anarchist activities and propagated social revolution, cosmopolitan ideas, and intense interactions among all anarchists and the masses across boundaries, along with criticism of nationalism and patriotism in the independence camps (Hwang 2007).

The ups and downs of the anarchist movement in Korea were closely tied to the situation of Korean anarchists in Japan and China. Any attempts to set up an anarchist organization in Korea, however, always met with swift and brutal suppression from the Japanese colonial

government. Attempts to establish the Black Flag Federation (1924), the Real Friend Federation (1925), and Choi Gabryong's scheme to establish the Korean Anarcho-Communist Federation (1929) were all immediately crushed. Nevertheless, various anarchist groups and organizations continued to appear until the mid-1930s, albeit all short-lived. In the 1930s and 1940s anarchists in Korea were either arrested or forced underground to survive. Similar to their counterparts in China and Japan, their goal was not so much Korea's independence as the realization of an anarchism-oriented society (Mujeongbu jueui undongsa pyeonchan wiweonhoi 1989: 189–274, 394–400).

In the 1930s the Korean anarchist movement began to be at the ebb both at home and abroad, from which it never recovered. The notion and idea of social revolution, however, was sustained at least until 1945, coexisting with its national goal of independence (Yi 1974: 11). It is in this sense that anarchism in Korea was accepted not just to be “utilized” *only* for independence, but rather with reference to a society free of the “social problems” prevalent under capitalism. Anarchism still seems alive in South Korea as an idea for “freedom for the twenty-first century” (Bak 1999).

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchism, China; Anarchism, Japan; Hatta Shūzō (1886–1934); Ōsugi Sakae (1885–1923)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bak, H. (2005) *Sikminji sidae hanin anakijeum undongsa* [A History of Korean Anarchism During the Colonial Period]. Seoul: Seonin.
- Bak, Y. (1999) 21segi jayu, anakijeum! [Anarchism! Freedom for the Twenty-First Century]. *Hankoreh21* 279 (October 21). Available at www.hani.co.kr/h21/data/L991011/1paqab02.html (downloaded October 21, 1999).
- Graham, R. (Ed.) (2005) *Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas*. Vol. 1: *From Anarchy to Anarchism (300 CE to 1939)*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Hwang, D. (2007) Beyond Independence: The Korean Anarchist Press in China and Japan in the 1920s–1930s. *Asian Studies Review* 31, 1 (March): 3–23.
- Mujeongbu jueui undongsa pyeonchan wiweonhoi (Ed.) (1989) *Han'guk anakijeum undongsa* [A History of the Korean Anarchist Movement]. Seoul: Hyeongseol Chulpansa.
- Oh, J. (1998) *Han'guk anakijeum undongsa* [A History of the Korean Anarchist Movement]. Seoul: Gukak jaryoweon.

- Yi, C. (1974) *Ugwan munjon* [Collected Works of Li Chung-kyu]. Seoul: Samhwa insoe.
- Yi, H. (2001) *Hanguk eui anakijeum – sasang pyeon* [Anarchism in Korea: Its Ideas]. Seoul: Jisik saneobsa.

Anarchism, Mexico

Chuck Morse

Anarchist roots in Mexico date back to the 1860s, when a small group of radical intellectuals embraced the doctrine. Greek immigrant Plotino Rhodakanaty, often considered the father of Mexican anarchism, was particularly important to the initial spread of the ideology, as was the Gran Círculo de Obreros de México, a workers' association founded in the Federal District in 1870. Fanned by escalating labor unrest, and a radicalization in the liberal opposition to the government, anarchists helped to lay the organizational and intellectual foundations of Mexico's growing revolutionary movement.

Ricardo Flores Magón was the most prominent anarchist during the first decade of the twentieth century. He, together with his Liberal Party of Mexico (Partido Liberal Mexicano, PLM), mounted the only serious opposition to Porfirio Díaz's government at the time. Organized in a network of Liberal Party "clubs" that were distributed throughout Mexico and in parts of the United States, the Magonists contested the legitimacy of the dominant regime, mobilized workers to challenge its economic foundations, and tried desperately to ignite the revolution.

A dedicated journalist, playwright, and publisher, Magón railed against the government's authoritarianism and hypocrisy in a prodigious stream of texts. His newspapers, *El Hijo del Ahuizote* and *Regeneración*, were major instruments in his battle against the state and had genuine mass appeal: for instance, the former had a circulation of 24,000 in 1904 and the latter reached 30,000 readers in 1906, despite being officially banned. These publications were one source of his repeated incarcerations as well as his 1903 flight to the United States, where he remained for the rest of his life.

On the economic terrain, the PLM organized strikes in vital parts of the national economy, such as in the copper mines in Cananea and in the textile industry in Puebla, Veracruz, Tlaxcala, Querétaro, Jalisco, and the Federal District.

These strikes cultivated working-class militancy and made exploitation a matter of public debate. The Cananea strike was remarkable for its anti-imperialist content: the mines were American-owned and, as a result, the strike forced Díaz to choose between yielding to the workers' demands or acting against them on behalf of an American capitalist. He chose the latter, which inflamed doubts about his fidelity to the fatherland.

The PLM also launched multiple insurrections against the regime. In 1906, when a leading Magonist, Práxedes Guerrero (1882–1910), had 46 guerilla units under his command, they participated in uprisings in Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and Veracruz. In 1908, they staged armed revolts in Viesca (Coahuila), Las Vacas (today Ciudad Acuña, Coahuila), and Casas Grandes and Palomas (Chihuahua). In 1911, Magonists seized Tijuana, which they declared a socialist republic before being routed.

An ambiguity about PLM goals compromised its chances of success. The party's 1906 "Program" was a liberal document that called for constitutional reforms, such as limiting the president's term to four years; the institution of an eight-hour working day; improvements in education; and other, non-revolutionary demands. However, the PLM also had a radical wing, led by Magón himself. Magón, who had grown increasingly – though privately – dedicated to anarchism, hoped to galvanize and lead the resistance to the government and turn the Mexican Revolution into an anarchist revolution. The contradictions between these two positions created discord within the PLM and some public confusion. Commenting on the matter, one scholar observed that the "Magonists took their public discourse from liberalism, and their strategy from anarchism" (Esperanza Valdez 2000: 182).

The PLM attempted to rectify this in 1911 by publishing its "Manifesto," an explicitly anarchist text that superseded the "Program" as the main statement of the party's goals. However, the Magonists had lost their presence in national affairs by this time and thus their clarification had little public impact. Indeed, although Magón continued agitating until his 1922 death in Leavenworth Penitentiary, the years of struggle, and the many unforeseen events linked to the outbreak of the Revolution, had exhausted his capacity to marshal a compelling alternative. Neither he nor the PLM would again occupy a central place in Mexican political life.

During the Mexican Revolution, anarchists would significantly affect the urban labor movement in general and the Casa del Mundo Obrero (House of the World Worker) in particular. The Casa, formed in Mexico City in 1912 by militants who had intended to start an anarchist school, quickly became the anchor of the country's radical workers' movement. In addition to providing a loose confederal structure for the many workers' organizations then operating, it also sponsored myriad cultural activities designed to foster revolutionary consciousness among the country's laborers. It published newspapers, sponsored educational programs, and put on plays and poetry readings, among other initiatives. It was strongly committed to the use of direct action and the general strike in battles with employers and as a mechanism for realizing its long-term, revolutionary aspirations. The Casa had deep roots in the working class and launched major mobilizations, including multiple general strikes.

However, navigating revolutionary Mexico's shifting political landscape, with its multiple contenders for state power, proved difficult. Though Casa anarchists rejected the state in principle, they also realized that alliances with one political force or another could yield tangible benefits. Thus, bowing to the demands of expediency, they formed an alliance with the Constitutionals, which led to the creation of the Casa's "Red Battalions," armed units sent into battle against Pancho Villa and Zapata's forces. This alliance lasted until 1916, when the Constitutionals – troubled by the presence of armed workers – felt powerful enough to dissolve the Casa.

The suppression of the Casa was part of a broader – and successful – government crackdown on worker militancy that took place in the latter part of the century's second decade. Although this campaign, and the passage of the 1917 Constitution, handed a decisive defeat to the Mexican Revolution's most radical tendencies, anarchists continued to resist the consolidation of the post-revolutionary order.

Regrouping after the repression, they challenged the legitimacy of the state in their voluminous writings and through diverse cultural events crafted to reaffirm popular revolutionary aspirations. The Grupo Luz, for instance, circulated its newspapers widely and sponsored frequent public gatherings. Numerous anarchist groups were organized in Mexico City and throughout the country.

Anarchists were instrumental to the 1921 foundation of the General Confederation of Workers (Confederación General de Trabajadores, CGT), a labor federation formed in opposition to the pro-government, Mexican Workers' Regional Confederation (Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana). The CGT embraced anarchist principles such as direct action, class struggle, and libertarian communism. It also fought vigorously against government-sanctioned unionism and, increasingly, members of the Communist Party.

Anarchists were central to a 1922 rent strike that shook Veracruz, a hub for militant workers and anarchists. An anarchist tailor by the name of Herón Proal led this dramatic and bloody confrontation.

It was in the 1930s that anarchists finally lost their mass influence, as the post-revolutionary state assumed a more mature institutional form and established more efficient mechanisms for regulating and repressing dissent. The 1931 passage of the Ley del Trabajo, a labor code augmenting the government's role in the mediation of class conflicts, was pivotal.

Nonetheless, anarchist contributions from this period live on in Mexico's political culture. Magón is revered as a revolutionary hero and parts of the 1917 Constitution have roots in the PLM's 1906 "Program." Likewise, echoes of the Casa's worker mobilizations are perceptible, at least indirectly, in the Mexican government's strong corporatist commitments.

Many Spanish anarchists fled to Mexico after Franco's 1939 victory in Spain. The most famous was former CNT-FAI leader Juan García Oliver (1901–80). Another émigré, Ricardo Mestre (1906–97), helped found the Biblioteca Social Reconstruir (Library for Social Reconstruction), an anarchist library and meeting place in Mexico City that exists to this day.

The Mexican Anarchist Federation, founded in 1941, was the only group with even remote links to the movement's heyday to survive into the post-World War II period, although it never became more than a small publishing circle. Anarchists had no organized impact on Mexico's new left, despite the presence of strong anti-authoritarian sensibilities.

There was a renewal of interest in anarchism in the 1980s, thanks primarily to the impact of punk rock and cultural ties to countries such as Spain and the United States, in which anarchism

also experienced a revival. Anarchists politicized at this time have built a vibrant counterculture linked together by social centers, newspapers, conferences, gatherings, websites, and email lists. The 1994 Zapatista uprising gave a boost to anarchists, who were quick to participate in Zapatista support groups. Anarchists are presently well represented among ideologically defined, left-wing youth, although they have been unable to articulate a compelling program for social change, which has undermined their efforts to rebuild anarchism's mass base.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Culture, 1840–1939; Anarchism in the United States to 1945; Anarchism in the United States, 1946–Present; Anarchosyndicalism; Magon, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922) and the Magonistas; Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Mexico, Worker Struggles and Labor Unions, 1950s–1970s; Spanish Revolution; Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919) and the Comuna Morelense; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Albro, W. (1992) *Always a Rebel: Ricardo Flores Magon and the Mexican Revolution*. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.
- Albro, W. (1996) *To Die on Your Feet: The Life, Times, and Writings of Praxedis G. Guerrero*. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.
- Esperanza Valdez, R. C. (2000) *El fenómeno magonista en México y en Estados Unidos, 1905–1908*. Zacatecas: Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas.
- Gandy, R. & Hodges, D. (2002) *Mexico under Siege: Popular Resistance to Presidential Despotism*. London: Zed Books.
- Hart, J. M. (1987) *Anarchism and the Mexican Working Class*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Hodges, D. C. (1995) *Mexican Anarchism After the Revolution*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Lear, J. (2001) *Workers, Neighbors, and Citizens: The Revolution in Mexico City*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Wood, A. (2001) *Revolution in the Street: Women, Workers, and Urban Protest in Veracruz, 1870–1927*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.

Anarchism, New Zealand

Asher Goldman

As in much of the world, anarchists and sympathizers played a large role in the formation

of syndicalist-leaning unions in New Zealand in the early 1900s. World War I, the 1917 Russian Revolution, and the formation of the Labor Party combined to almost completely decimate the movement until the late 1950s, when it reformed as part of the New Left. Later, the influence of punk and then the anti-globalization movement would help grow anarchism's popularity, although it has still not begun to approach the level of influence it held in the early twentieth century.

Perhaps the first to call themselves anarchists in New Zealand were several activists in the New Zealand Socialist Party, formed in 1901. Within the party, Wellington became the center for a group of anti-parliamentary socialists. In 1908 a 3,000 member Socialist Party held a conference at which parliamentary action was condemned by a two to one majority. In 1913 anarchists in Wellington formed the Freedom Group, which was New Zealand's first recorded explicitly anarchist grouping. First formed in Chicago, USA, in 1905, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) had branches in several centers across New Zealand, starting with Wellington in 1908. Membership included many anarchists. This revolutionary union had significant impact on the 1912 strike in the gold mining town of Waihi.

Anarchism would not rear its head again in New Zealand until the late 1950s, when anarchists became involved in protest movements and socialist discussion groups. By the late 1960s the new left Progressive Youth Movement had branches in many centers. The Wellington and Christchurch branches especially had a high number of anarchists involved. The early 1970s saw Resistance bookshops formed in the three main cities as centers for activism, the longest of which lasted only seven years. Punk anarchists began to get active in the early 1980s, and in one of New Zealand's few political bombings, a punk blew himself up (possibly purposefully) while attempting to attack the Wanganui Police computer.

In 1987 Auckland anarchists founded *State Adversary* magazine, which covered anarchist news and views from around the country until 2000. The year 1995 saw the opening of the Freedom Shop, a Wellington anarchist info-shop, the longest running in New Zealand history (it remains open in 2008). In the wake of anti-globalization protests in Seattle, Prague,

and other cities, anarchism in New Zealand welcomed an influx of new adherents, and regular protest activity increased for a period in the main centers. In October 2007 anarchists were among 16 arrested in the first nationwide anti-terrorism raids, although terror charges were ultimately not laid, with the 16 facing firearms charges instead.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchism, Australia; Communist Party NZ and the New Zealand Revolutionary Left; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)

References and Suggested Readings

- Boraman, T. (2002) *The New Left in New Zealand*. In P. Moloney & K. Taylor (Eds.), *On the Left: Essays on Socialism in New Zealand*. Dunedin: Otago University Press.
- Boraman, T. (2007) *Rabble Rousers and Merry Pranksters: A History of Anarchism in Aotearoa/New Zealand from the Mid-1950s to the Early 1980s*. Christchurch: Katipo Books and Irrecoverable Press.
- Buchanan, S. (1999) *Anarchy: The Transmogrification of Everyday Life*. Wellington: Committee for the Establishment of Civilization.
- Prebble, F. (1995) *Trouble Makers: Anarchism and Syndicalism, the Early Years of the Libertarian Movement in Aotearoa/New Zealand*. Christchurch: Libertarian Press.
- Steiner, P. (2007) *The History of the IWW in New Zealand*. In P. Steiner & F. Hanlon, *Industrial Unionism*. Wellington: Rebel Press.

Anarchism, Poland

Magda Romanska

From 1772 until 1918 Poland as such did not exist; the country was partitioned by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The anarchism movement thus sprang from the emancipatory impulses of various nineteenth-century underground groups that fought to reestablish the Polish state. The area occupied by Tsarist Russia experienced the bloodiest persecutions. The first anarchist group, consisting mostly of young Poles of Jewish descent, was organized in 1903 in Białystok. In the following years, the group's activities spread to other cities: Warsaw, Łódź, Kielce, Siedlce, and others. The goal of these groups was to disrupt the civil order set by the occupants. They often engaged in acts of terror: robberies, assaults on the police, bombings, and so forth. At the same time, some anarchist

groups began to be interested in anarchosyndicalism, which rejected terrorism and focused on organizing revolutionary trade unions and engaging in various propaganda activities.

Polish anarchism thrived among socialist philosophers. Edward Abramowski (1868–1918, author of *Socialism and the State* and *A Public Collusion against Government*) advocated, as an alternative to the state, voluntary unions based on principles of common interest and collaboration. Influenced by Leo Tolstoy, Abramowski suggested that unions provide a foundation for individual freedom, while safeguarding justice and social order.

Jan Waclaw Machajski (1866–1926) began his political career as a member of the Polish Socialist Party, but soon rejected its bureaucracy and intellectual elite and believed the state should be destroyed by the working class. From 1920 to 1939, a short period of Polish independence, Abramowski and Machajski's anarchosyndicalist ideas influenced the Union of Trade-Unions (Związek Związków Zawodowych) (ZZZ), a 130,000-member organization from 1931 to 1939. After World War II began, anarchist ideas influenced Poland's subsequent struggles, opposing the Nazis during the war and Russian rule from 1946 to 1989. During World War II, members of ZZZ created Związek Syndykalistów Polskich (Union of Polish Syndicalists), participating in many resistance activities, including the Warsaw Ghetto uprising.

In the 1980s, anarchist ideas reappeared, with the Movement of Alternative Society. Shortly thereafter, small anarchist groups emerged in various cities across Poland in opposing the communist regime. These groups resorted to what Peter Sloterdijk calls *kynicism*, the recourse to irony and humor to undermine repressive regimes, organizing street happenings, performances, and impromptu performance events. These groups included Pomarańczowa Alternatywa (The Orange Alternative), Klub Sigma (Club Sigma), and Miedzyniastówka Anarchistyczna (Anarchy International). In the 1980s the anarchosyndicalist section of the Anarchist Federation published the newspaper *Kombinat* (*The Factory*), and the Anarchist Workers' Initiative (Anarchistyczna Inicjatywa Robotnicza) (AIR) published the newspaper *Direct Action*. Although initially founded on anarchist organization, in 1989 Solidarność (Solidarity) emerged as an official political party.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Solidarność (Solidarity)

References and Suggested Readings

- Nagorski, R. (1924/1977) History of the Anarchist Movement in Poland. *Cienfuegos Press Anarchist Review* 2: 20–2.
- Osa, M. (2003) *Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Tyszka, J. (1998) The Orange Alternative: Street Happenings as Social Performance in Poland Under Martial Law. *New Theatre Quarterly* 14, 56: 311.

Anarchism, Puerto Rico

Chuck Morse

Anarchists had a profound influence on the revolutionary workers' movement that existed in Puerto Rico during the first and second decades of the twentieth century. Although they never built an island-wide, specifically anarchist organization and for the most part cooperated with activists from other ideological tendencies, they left a unique and lasting imprint on the history and politics of the island.

As champions of workers' self-organization, anarchists were instrumental in the formation of the Regional Workers' Federation, Puerto Rico's first labor federation, established on October 23, 1898, shortly after the island became an American colony, and modeled on the anarchist-dominated Spanish Regional Federation. Anarchists also helped found the Free Workers' Federation, which emerged from a split within the Regional Workers' Federation between those leaning toward the Republican Party and those demanding independence from all "bourgeois parties." The Free Workers' Federation was the principal labor organization on the island for many years and led major strikes among sugarcane, cigar, and tobacco workers.

Cultural ventures were integral to anarchists' overall revolutionary strategy, as a means to foster working-class solidarity and prepare them to govern society after the anticipated collapse of capitalism. Anarchists published newspapers, books, and pamphlets, organized reading rooms and workers' centers, and sponsored theatrical groups, among other endeavors. The ubiquitous poverty and illiteracy among their intended audience prompted anarchists to communicate

their ideals in innovative ways. For instance, radical workers often selected and paid other workers to be "readers," reading revolutionary literature to them while laboring in factories.

These initiatives spread the anarchist message throughout the island, nurturing a strong anti-capitalist and anti-political sentiment among many workers. Anarchists also opened the world of ideas to men and women who would have likely been excluded otherwise, in turn transforming Puerto Rican culture. In this regard, anarchist-feminist organizer, playwright, and occasional "reader" Luisa Capetillo is among the most distinguished militants.

Anarchists lost influence in the labor movement in the second decade of the century, never to regain it since, due to state repression and factional struggles within the Free Workers' Federation. In addition, anarchists were unable to take a strong position on the island's colonial status, which became the central issue in Puerto Rican political life. As revolutionary internationalists and anti-statists, anarchists argued that it mattered little whether native or foreign elites ruled the island if capitalist domination remained intact.

Paradoxically, anarchism's rejection of the dominant terms of political debate in Puerto Rico provides an enduring appeal for those drawn to radical social alternatives. For example, anarchism is an ideological point of reference for participants in the island's punk rock movement.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Culture, 1840–1939; Anarchism in the United States to 1945; Anarchism in the United States, 1946–Present; Anarchism, Spain; Anarchosindicalism

References and Suggested Readings

- Ayala, C. & Bernabe, R. (2007) *Puerto Rico in the American Century: A History since 1898*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Davila Santiago, R. (1988) *El Derribo de las Murallas (Knocking Down the Walls)*. Río Piedras: Editorial Cultural.
- Findlay, E. (1999) *Imposing Decency: The Politics of Sexuality and Race in Puerto Rico, 1870–1920*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Anarchism, Russia

Nick Heath

Despite the fact that two of the most important theoreticians of anarchism, Mikhail Bakunin

and Peter Kropotkin, were Russian, anarchism in that country never really developed as a movement until after the beginning of the twentieth century. Whilst Bakunin made strenuous efforts to recruit among Russian exiles, no credible organization modeled on his ideas emerged in the home country during his lifetime.

Zemfir C. Ralli-Arbore (aka Z. K. Ralli, 1848–1933), a young Romanian born in Bessarabia within the Russian empire and an associate of Bakunin, set up a small group in Geneva, the Revolutionary Commune of Russian Anarchists, in 1873, but it was not until 1892 that Armenian doctor Alexander Atabekian (1868–ca. 1940), an associate of Kropotkin, established a group called the Anarchist Library. This group smuggled literature into Russia with very few short-term results. At the end of the 1890s, the Geneva Group of Anarchists took up this work again.

Unrest within the Russian empire in 1903 led to the establishment of the first viable anarchist grouping in Bialystok. This group, Bor'ba (Struggle), was composed of mainly Jewish young workers and students, disillusioned with what they saw as the gradualism of the Bund, the Jewish Social Democratic grouping, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and the Polish Socialist Party. Meanwhile, young associates of Kropotkin established the paper *Khleb I Volia* (Bread and Freedom) in Geneva, and it was smuggled across the borders into the empire. Yiddish anarchist papers from London also began to circulate in the Jewish Pale.

One of the principal architects of the nascent movement was Nikolai Rogdaev (ca. 1880–1932), who constructed groups in Briansk, Nezhin, and Ekaterinoslav and acted as a coordinator between many groups in Russia and the Ukraine. In 1903, there were 12 organizations in 11 towns; in 1904, 29 groups in 27 centers of the northwest, southwest, and south; in 1905, 125 groups and federations in 110 towns; in 1906, 221 in 155 towns; and in 1907, at the height of the movement, there were 255 groups in 180 localities. The most important centers of the movement were in Bialystok, Odessa, and Ekaterinoslav, but anarchist activity could be found in three-quarters of the empire.

Anarchists turned quickly to armed attacks, not just against the servants of tsarist autocracy but also against factory owners and their managers involved in lockouts and severe repression of

workers. Heavily involved in the events of 1904–5, they were the most committed fighters on the barricades during the Moscow uprising of December 1905. Many hundreds of anarchists died in the fighting or were hanged or died in prison in the aftermath.

A new current, rejecting expropriations and individual terror, and arguing for mass agitation among the workers and the organization of revolutionary unions, began to develop. The principal theorist of this anarchosyndicalist current was Daniil Novomirskii (aka Iakov Kirillovskii, 1882–after 1936), whose South Russian Group of Anarchosyndicalists had some success among workers in Odessa and Ekaterinoslav between 1905 and 1907.

While there were still 108 groups within the empire in 1908, by 1914, only seven remained. Many anarchists were forced into exile. A number of unitary conferences took place, the first in Geneva in 1908 where the groups around the papers *Khleb I Volia* and *Burevestnik* (Storm Petrel) fused and formed the Union of Anarchist Communists. At one of the last of these conferences (London, December 1913) the decision was taken to form a Federation of Anarchist-Communist Groups in Exile with its own paper. These moves were thwarted by the outbreak of war and the acrimonious splits that resulted from the decision of Kropotkin and others to support the Allies. Nonetheless, by 1915, the movement at home had begun to grow again to around 250–300, mostly in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other urban centers, composed mostly of workers and a few students.

The February Revolution of 1917 led to the freeing of many hundreds of anarchists from prison, soon reinforced by many others returning from exile. While this further galvanized a movement that had already started growing as a result of the war, February was a great disappointment to the anarchists, who now were moving into a loose working relationship with their main rival, the Bolsheviks, to overthrow Kerensky's provisional government. In Moscow, anarchists expropriated many mansions of the rich and published two daily papers with 60 affiliated groups. There was a similarly strong following in Petrograd, where the anarchists were a moving force in the July Days, an abortive attempt to overthrow the provisional government. Both the anarchocommunists and anarchosyndicalists engaged in intense propaganda.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the consolidation of Bolshevik power in 1918 soon brought the anarchists into confrontation with their erstwhile allies. The Bolsheviks launched armed attacks on anarchists in Moscow, closing down anarchist papers. This wave of repression continued through the next two years.

In the Ukraine, the anarchist Nestor Makhno had begun organizing a peasant insurrection, first against the Austro-Germans, then against the Whites. Some anarchists from the urban centers began to join this movement, in part because of Bolshevik repression there. The Nabat Confederation of Anarchists was founded, working alongside Makhno's insurrectional army. To the east, in Siberia, anarchists began to organize armed bands against the Whites. Both these movements soon clashed with Bolshevism, leading to their repression. The culminating point was the Kronstadt Revolt of 1921. Kropotkin's funeral was to be the last main manifestation of anarchism in Russia for many years.

Those who did not become Soviet anarchists (either outright embracing of the Communist Party or fellow-traveling) were driven into exile. Many did not have this choice and were either murdered by the Bolsheviks or suffered many years in prisons or camps. As the French anarchist Louis Mercier Vega (1914–77) noted: "In most of the eyewitness accounts of the prisons and camps the anarchists feature, intractable, attached to their convictions, hard like pebbles polished by cruelty and bad treatment." There appears to have been some anarchist involvement in the uprising at the Siberian slave labor camp of Vorkuta in 1953, with the black flag flying.

In exile, some anarchists like Makhno and Arshinov began to argue that the failure of anarchism in Russia was due to chronic disorganization. Whilst anarchism had widespread sympathy there, it had failed to take advantage of this and had succumbed to its Bolshevik rival. There was heated and acrimonious debate over this in exile circles.

Anarchist groups began to appear in the 1980s and 1989 saw the establishment of the Confederation of Anarchosyndicalists (KAS), with groups across Russia. Today, several small and divided anarchist groupings exist in Russia: KRAS (the Russian section of the International Workingmen's Association, IWA), Autonomous Action (AD), and the Association of Anarchist Movements (ADA). Putin's Russia has not been

a favorable environment for the growth of anarchism, and there is much ideological confusion within anarchist ranks.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Poland; Anarchocommunism; Anarchosyndicalism; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Bolsheviks; Kronstadt Mutiny of 1921; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Makhno, Nestor (1889–1935); Nechaev, Sergei (1847–1882); Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Soviet Union, Fall of

References and Suggested Readings

- Avrich, P. (Ed.) (1973) *The Anarchists in the Russian Revolution*. London: Thames & Hudson.
- Avrich, P. (2005) *The Russian Anarchists*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Maksimov, G. P. (1999) *Syndicalists in the Russian Revolution*. Los Angeles: ICC.
- Rabinowitch, A. (1991) *Prelude to Revolution*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Skirda, A. (2000) *Les Anarchistes russes, les soviets et la révolution de 1917*. Paris: Editions de Paris.

Anarchism and sabotage

Benjamin Franks

Anarchists have tended to view the tactic of sabotage more favorably than orthodox Marxists. This category of political behavior is usually associated, as the sociologist Pierre Dubois (1979: 21) describes, with three types of industrial action: the deliberate destruction of the machinery of production; the disruption of the labor process; or the cessation of productive labor. It consequently takes many forms, from arson and vandalism, through to go-slows and working without enthusiasm, to strikes and occupations. For the former radical syndicalist Elizabeth Gurley Flynn (1993), it is any action in which the worker deliberately attempts to reduce the economic efficiency of their labor.

Flynn's more libertarian definition of sabotage is wider than that associated with Friedrich Engels. It is Engels' more critical appraisal of sabotage that has influenced orthodox Marxism, and forms the basis of the division between them and anarchists on this issue. Engels, in *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, associates sabotage primarily with just one part – machine breaking – and this is more commonly associated with the Luddites (Thompson 1991: 604). The Luddites

were largely artisans opposed to the destruction of their livelihoods and communities as a result of the introduction of mechanical manufacture of textiles. For Engels, sabotage is at the lower end of a hierarchy of proletarian action, just above criminal activity and well short of disciplined revolutionary political organization. The historian E. P. Thompson rejects the characterization of the Luddites and their tactics as merely a disorganized attempt by a few malcontents engaged in a futile attempt to roll back progress. Thompson instead suggests that the Luddites' actions were highly creative, well-organized, and targeted assaults at pivotal sites of capitalist development, which also fed into other forms of social protest (1991: 605–7, 629–30).

The division between orthodox Marxists on the one side and revolutionary syndicalists, libertarian socialists, and anarchists on the other, has continued to shape attitudes to sabotage. The latter have regarded sabotage as an often legitimate and creative set of tactics for workers to meet their desires at the expense of hierarchical power (see Convington et al. 2006: 189), while the former consider such methods to be infantile and destructive to longer-term interests of the class (Challinor 1977: 96). Such a difference in part reflects the distinct views on agency. Orthodox Marxism privileges the proletariat acting in unison under the guiding hand of the revolutionary party, while anarchists tend to support wider sets of unmediated responses by a larger set of oppressed subjects, which includes Thompson's artisans.

The distinction in responses to sabotage is also indicative of the division between orthodox Marxists and anarchists on their post-revolutionary vision. For Leninists, the upcoming revolution involved the proletariat seizing control of the means of production and managing it so that production would meet collective needs rather than individual profit; consequently, there was fear that sabotage would destroy the means of production that would provide the post-revolutionary infrastructure. For anarchists, sabotage meant fundamentally altering the means of production such that all productive activity was fulfilling, not merely waiting for a new type of "socialist" management.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchosyndicalism; Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley (1890–1964); Leninist Philosophy; Luddism and Machine

Breaking; Marxism; Thompson, Edward Palmer (E. P.) (1924–1993)

References and Suggested Readings

- Challinor, R. (1977) *The Origins of British Bolshevism*. London: Croom Helm.
- Convington, B. et al. (1966/2006) Freedom: The Only Cause Worth Serving. In F. Rosemont & C. Radcliffe (Eds.), *Dancin' in the Streets!: Anarchists, IWWs, Surrealists, Situationists and Provos in the 1960s as Recorded in the Pages of "The Rebel Worker."* Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.
- Dubois, P. (1979) *Sabotage in Industry*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Flynn, E. Gurley (1915/1993) *Sabotage: The Conscious Withdrawal of the Workers' Efficiency*. London: Pentagon. Also available online at Industrial Workers of the World, www.iww.org/culture/library/sabotage/ (last accessed December 11, 2007).
- Thompson, E. P. (1991) *The Making of the English Working Class*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Anarchism, Spain

Pedro García Guirao

It is commonly accepted that the history of Spanish anarchism started in the early nineteenth century with the economist and social reformer Ramón de la Sagra (1798–1871). In 1845, he launched the first anarchist periodical, *El Porvenir*, which introduced to Spain the ideas of Proudhon, Fourier, and Saint-Simon. Between 1848 and 1849, de la Sagra and Proudhon founded the Banco Popular. Despite this, the Spanish anarchist movement did not properly get underway until after the International Workingmen's Association (IWA) meeting in London in 1864, when the supporters of Bakunin sent the Italian Giuseppe Fanelli to Spain. His mission was to establish the Spanish section of the First International (Sección Española de la Primera Internacional), which occurred in 1869. The triumph of Bakunin's anarchosyndicalist theories was so great that when Pablo Lafargue arrived in Madrid in 1871 with the intention of founding a workers' political party, he was told by the Catalan statesman Francisco Pi y Margall that a Marxist political party would never succeed in Spain.

Francisco Pi y Margall (1824–1901) was one of the most influential thinkers who contributed to the popularization of anarchism in Spain. After emigrating to France in 1866, he came into

direct contact with the theories of Proudhon, which he translated and analyzed in various books. He defended the principle of federalism against centralism and achieved wide popularity among anarchists. After the declaration of the First Spanish Republic in 1873 he became president, but resigned his position after just a week.

After the restoration of the monarchy in 1874, IWA sympathizers were suppressed and workers' organizations were proscribed. In around 1882, an apparently secret anarchist organization, *La Mano Negra* (The Black Hand), dedicated to committing murder and robbery, was persecuted in Andalucía. However, the principal anarchist organization of that time, the *Federación de Trabajadores de la Región Española* (FTRE), denied any connection with it, claiming that the organization did not exist and was simply an invention of police and landowners who needed an excuse to pursue a repressive campaign against peasant associations.

In 1892 in Cádiz, an insurrection took place at Jerez de la Frontera which led to the split of anarchism into two groups: the Andaluz fraction, characterized by primitivism, ruralism, violence, and individualism, and the organized, syndicalist, and urban anarchism of Cataluña, led by Rafael Farga Pellicer and José Lluas (founder of the anarchist satirical periodical *La Tramontana*).

Following the assassination of ten people in the Corpus Christi procession in Barcelona in 1896, during which another 24 were injured, on May 4, 1897, 28 people were sentenced to death. During the so-called Montjuic trial, the government of Cánovas del Castillo persecuted and tortured the presumed leaders of the attack. They included Tàrrida del Màrmol, Pere Corominas, Ramón Sempau, Teresa Mañé i Miravet (known as Soledad Gustavo), and Joan Montseny (known as Federico Urales). In August 1897, the Italian anarchist Michele Angiolillo assassinated Cánovas in revenge for those murdered and tortured in Montjuic.

On August 3, 1907, the labor federation *Solidaridad Obrera* (Workers' Solidarity) was created in Barcelona with the intention of uniting all Spanish social-anarchist movements that refused to join the General Workers' Union (*Unión General de Trabajadores*, UGT), founded in 1888 under the political control of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*, PSOE). *Solidaridad*

Obrera had a profound influence on anarcho-syndicalism in Spain, especially through its periodical, *Solidaridad Obrera*, which disseminated propaganda during strikes. The organization also played a significant role in the *Semana Trágica* in Barcelona from July 25 to August 1, 1909, which led to the execution of the anarchist pedagogue Francisco Ferrer y Guardia, the founder of the *Escuela Moderna* (Modern School), on October 13, 1909. Finally, at its 1910 congress, *Solidaridad Obrera* created the National Confederation of Labor (*Confederación Nacional del Trabajo*, CNT).

At the beginning of February 1919, a strike began in Barcelona at the *La Canadiense* company. The appointment of Governor Martínez Anido and his chief of police Arlegui initiated an epoch during which anarchists and trade unionists were severely persecuted, and *pistolero* ("gunfighterism") ruled Barcelona for several years. Using the chaos of the era as a pretext, King Alfonso XIII allowed General José Antonio Primo de Rivera to form a government that repressed the proletariat and anarchist unions. During the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923–30), all CNT activities were prohibited, although the organization continued to exist illegally.

In 1927, an underground organization of Spanish and Portuguese anarchists, called the Iberian Anarchist Federation (*Federación Anarquista Ibérica*, FAI), emerged. FAI coordinated violent actions aimed at the elimination of the dictatorship and the king. However, violence was not necessary: on January 28, 1930, the dictator resigned and the elections of April 12, 1931, which resulted in the proclamation of the Second Republic, sent the king into exile. Three months later, Angel Pestana, Juan Peiró, Horacio M. Prieto, and a large number of CNT members signed the famous "Manifesto of the 30: To All Anarchists," in which they proposed that anarchism should play a part in professional politics. In opposition to the FAI, which advocated the immediate introduction of libertarian communism, the signatories believed in the necessity of a transitional phase between capitalism and anarchist society. They wanted to create anarchist political parties: the *Partido Sindicalista*, *Partido Libertario*, and *Sindicalismo Político*. However, they were eventually expelled from the CNT, which opened up a rift between trade unionists and the FAI-ists. Those who distanced themselves from reformist anarchism created the Iberian

Federation of Libertarian Youth (FIJL) in 1932, and Mujeres Libres in 1936.

During its early days, the Second Republic was euphorically considered by many to be a panacea powerful enough to resolve the four great problems that had dragged Spain down for over a century: latifundism, religiosity of the state, exploitation of the proletariat, and centralism. It soon became clear that the Republic was nothing more than a reformist political regime perpetuating the same problems. A good illustration of the gap that existed between the government and the people is the crime that occurred in the village of Casas Viejas (Cádiz) in January 1933, when 25 people, including coal merchant Francisco Cruz, known as “Seisdedos,” were burned alive by the republican Civil Guards. The motive for the attack was the proclamation of libertarian communism in Andalucía. The Civil Guards produced an effect contrary to the one they had desired: rather than silencing the anarchists, they elevated the humble peasants to the status of martyrs, ignited libertarianism in a number of areas (mostly in Asturias, Aragón, Barcelona, and Levante), and aroused radical discontent toward the Second Republic.

On November 19, 1933, the elections were won by an alliance of religious political parties sympathizing with Italian and German fascism, the Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas, CEDA), who proceeded to paralyze all progressive reforms and projects that had been started. During the elections, the CNT issued the slogan: “Do not vote, get ready for social revolution. If the right wins, decisive struggles will have to be carried out in the street.” The organization kept its word and ignited uprisings in Aragón and Asturias, which resulted in 3,000 dead, 7,000 wounded, and around 30,000 arrested, almost all of whom were anarchosyndicalists.

During the next elections in 1936, the fear that the right might win again led to the creation of the Popular Front coalition consisting of a number of political parties and trade unions, including the Republican Left (Izquierda Republicana), the Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista, POUM), and the Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, ERC). The CNT, with over 1,500,000 members, decided not to boycott the Popular Front, since

it promised amnesty for all political prisoners. The coalition won and the amnesty occurred.

The unstable coalition fell apart, however, as each group began to follow its own interests. The CNT tried to establish the libertarian communism that it had defended since its congress in 1936 in Zaragoza. In this volatile situation, a part of the army rebelled in July against the Republic. The CNT declared a general strike in response and started to implement revolutionary urban guerilla tactics. These events marked the beginnings of the Spanish Civil War. The anarcho-syndicalists controlled the main Spanish cities, including Barcelona – “the capital of Spanish anarchism” – and collectivized factories, transport, and the health system.

During the Civil War, the revolution was secondary: the priority was the creation of a united front against fascism. Trade unionist Francisco Largo Caballero hoped that with such political burdens, the anarchists would abandon spontaneous struggles in the streets and follow the discipline required to be given weapons. This implied the dissolution of anarchist militias so that they could join the professional army, which the CNT eventually refused to do. In May 1937, the communists betrayed the revolution in Barcelona by directly attacking the libertarian movement, assassinating their own comrades, and assaulting the Telefónica building in which the anarchists had barricaded themselves.

The victory of Franco resulted in a dictatorship that lasted from 1939 until his death on November 20, 1975. Anarchism during this period was characterized by illegality, exile, and decline. Nevertheless, anarchist guerillas known as *Maquis* lived hidden in the mountains, boycotting and sabotaging everything they could in the Francoist regime. Due to both external repression and internal conflicts, however, the CNT continued to deteriorate. History repeated itself: on the one hand were the orthodox defenders of revolutionary syndicalism, direct action, and libertarian communism, on the other were those who believed in ideological change and considered political syndicalism, closer to socialism. The CNT unified in 1961, but the unification was short-lived and the subsequent separation was so severe that the anarchist movement practically disappeared.

On March 2, 1974, as Franco was nearing death, the young anarchist Salvador Puig Antich was executed by garrote. As a member of the

anti-capitalist Iberian Liberation Movement (Movimiento Ibérico de Liberación, MIL), he had contacts with the French anarchist movement and Spanish exiles living in Toulouse. His death was another example of the atrocities carried out by the Francoist regime, recognized by western democracies.

Even after Franco's death, however, anarchism did not regain its former popularity. Democratizing projects, while recognizing communists, did not take anarchists into account, and neither did anarchists want to repeat the mistake of participating in professional politics. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Spanish anarchism has experienced a resurgence, primarily in two ways. The first is through the recovery of historical memory. A number of foundations dedicated to research have been founded, including the Fundación de Estudios Libertarios Anselmo Lorenzo, Ateneo Virtual, Fundación Andreu Nin, Ateneu Enciclopèdic Popular, Centre d'Estudis Llibertaris Federica Montseny, and the Fundación Casas Viejas 1933. The second is through practical anarchism, in the context of which the CNT accommodates such divergent movements and activities as libertarian syndicalism, feminism, anti-globalization protests, environmentalism, the defense of homosexual rights, free love, urban punks and squatters, and centers of free education. This is a reminder that nowhere else in the world has anarchism been so extensively assimilated into the masses as in Spain, where the echoes of the decades-old slogan – *Uníos Hermanos Proletarios: Proletarian Brothers Unite* – can still be heard.

SEE ALSO: Anarchosyndicalism; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Barcelona General Strike, 1919; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Escuela Moderna Movement (The Modern School); Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI); Mujeres Libres; POUM (Workers' Party of Marxist Unification); Puig Antich, Salvador (1948–1974); Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Álvarez, J. (1991) *La ideología política del anarquismo español (1868–1910)*. Madrid: Siglo XXI.
- Herrerín, A. (2004) *La CNT durante el franquismo. Clandestinidad y exilio (1939–1975)*. Madrid: Siglo XXI.
- Kaplan, T. (1977) *Anarchists of Andalusia (1868–1903)*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lorenzo, C. M. (1972) *Los anarquistas españoles y el poder (1868–1969)*. Paris: Ruedo Ibérico.

Orwell, G. (2003) *Homage to Catalonia*. London: Penguin.

Peirats, J. (1988) *La CNT y la Revolución Española*, Vol. 3. Madrid: La Cuchilla.

Termes, J. (2000) *Anarquismo y sindicalismo en España (1864–1881)*. Barcelona: Crítica.

Anarchism and syndicalism, Southern Africa

Lucien van der Walt

Anarchism, and particularly its syndicalist variant, played an important role in early labor and socialist politics in Southern Africa. Emerging in South Africa in the 1880s, and in Mozambique in the early twentieth century, it reached its apogee in the 1910s. Movements influenced by syndicalism continued in the 1920s, and spread to Southwest Africa (now Namibia), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) by the 1930s. The history of anarchism and syndicalism in Southern Africa, largely confined to a minority of the working class, provides a case of how this internationalist movement developed in the context of British and Portuguese colonialism and a racially divided working class.

Capitalism and Imperialism

The region that became South Africa was marginal to the world economy before the 1860s, mainly significant for the port at the Cape of Good Hope and agricultural exports from Western Cape farms. Port Elizabeth emerged in the east, mainly an export point. Both were part of Britain's Cape Colony, the farms worked by Colored workers (descended from slaves and servants), and Africans. The neighboring Natal Colony had an important port, Durban, whose hinterland had sugar plantations, worked largely by indentured Indians. The interior was a patchwork of agrarian African kingdoms and Afrikaner republics (notably the Orange Free State and Transvaal).

Diamond discoveries at Kimberley in 1867 saw an economic boom, with Cape Town, linked by rail, a particular beneficiary. This was followed by the discovery of underground gold deposits at the Witwatersrand in the Transvaal in 1886.

As at Kimberley, gold mining was rapidly centralized in powerful companies: the Wernher-Beit and Eckstein conglomerate dominated diamonds, gold mining, and landownership, and soon employed more people than the railways and harbors of British colonies and Afrikaner republics combined. Towns grew along the Witwatersrand, notably Johannesburg, which quickly overtook Cape Town (and Pretoria, the Transvaal capital) in population and economic importance. The mining revolution was accompanied by the expansion of Cape Town and Durban (Port Elizabeth was marginalized), as well as some secondary industry and capitalist farming. By 1913 Johannesburg had grown to a city of 250,000, and South Africa produced 40 percent of the world's gold.

Growing imperial interest saw a wave of British wars on Africans and Afrikaners from the 1870s onwards, culminating in the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) and the creation of the Union of South Africa, a self-governing white dominion, in 1910, surrounded by British protectorates like Swaziland, and colonies like Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (now Malawi). Germany's Southwest Africa was placed under South African mandate in 1920. In Mozambique, controlled by Portugal, the port of Lourenço Marques expanded rapidly through South African investment and trade, with a railway link to the Witwatersrand from 1895, growing to around 25,000 people in 1915 (Cappela 1981). A large part of the territory's African population became migrant laborers in South Africa.

The Working Class, Anarchism, and Syndicalism

Africans supplied the bulk of mine labor, providing migrant male workers who returned to the countryside after their contracts: they were segregated, subject to coercive labor laws and an internal passport system, and drawn from conquered peoples across Southern Africa. In 1920, David Yudelman and Alan Jeeves (1986) noted, 49 percent of African miners on the Witwatersrand came from other countries, 36 percent from Mozambique alone. White workers immigrated from across the British empire, dominating skilled work. In 1913, according to Hobart-Houghton (1964), there were 195,000 Africans on the Witwatersrand mines, a further 37,000 domestic workers, and 6,000 employed elsewhere, and 38,500 white workers, 22,000 in

mining. Besides the division between free skilled white workers and unfree, nominally unskilled Africans, the working class included intermediate layers of impoverished, unskilled Afrikaners, Coloreds and Indians, and urbanized Africans. In Cape Town, Coloreds were the majority, and Africans marginal, and in Durban, Indians were a large and important group.

Initially based amongst white immigrants, anarchism and syndicalism developed a base amongst Jews, Africans, Coloreds, and Indians in the 1910s. The movement was always faced with a divided working class, fractured by racial as well as ethnic divisions. White workers, afraid of replacement by cheaper workers of color, typically demanded segregation, and formed unions and the South African Labor Party (SALP) on this platform, while unions amongst workers of color developed independently.

Early Anarchists in South Africa

Port Elizabeth's Henry Glasse (1847–unknown), an Indian-born anarchist linked to the *Freedom* group in London founded by Peter Kropotkin in 1886, pioneered local anarchism. He distributed *Freedom Press* materials and formed a Socialist Club at the turn of the century. The anarchist Wilfred H. Harrison formed the Social Democratic Federation (SDF) in Cape Town in 1904 and the Pretoria Socialist Society in 1911. Both groups included socialists with a wide variety of views. Born in England in 1871, Harrison was part of the SDF's substantial anarchist section, a famed orator who expounded Kropotkin to Colored and white audiences, launched an interracial General Workers' Union in 1906, and organized interracial demonstrations of the city's unemployed. Riots broke out during the demonstrations, and two SDF members – one an anarchist, Levinson – were arrested in the first prosecution of socialists in the country.

Henry Glasse and Harrison opposed armed propaganda by the deed, unlike John Sepoul and Henry Larsen, two workers deported from the Transvaal in 1904 for an alleged plot to assassinate the British governor, Lord Milner. Insurrectionism was never an important local current. It was syndicalism that took center stage. The radical weekly *Voice of Labour* was founded in Johannesburg in 1908 by the Scottish fitter Archie Crawford and Mary Fitzgerald from Ireland; both were basically radical state socialists,

but the paper nonetheless provided an open platform for other radical correspondents, including Henry Glasse and Harrison. The network that developed around the paper stressed interracial working-class unity, Henry Glasse writing that “For a white worker in this South Africa to pretend he can successfully fight his battle independent of the coloured wage slaves – the vast majority – is, to my mind, simply idiocy” (*Voice of Labour*, January 26, 1912).

By 1910, a syndicalist current had coalesced around the paper, which was further boosted by the tour of British syndicalist Tom Mann in February. Crawford was replaced as editor by “Proletarian,” an unidentified supporter of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), based in Cape Town. “Proletarian” advocated One Big Union in the *Voice of Labour*, with “a universal general strike preparatory to seizing and running the interests of South Africa” (*Voice of Labour*, October 27, 1911).

In June 1910, a South African IWW was formed in Johannesburg, which organized spectacular strikes by white tramway workers in 1911, formed groups in Durban and Pretoria, and linked up with the IWW in Chicago. Its key figures were Andrew Dunbar, a blacksmith and strike leader from Scotland, and Tom Glynn of Ireland, a former policeman and now tramway worker. A Socialist Labor Party was also formed in Johannesburg that year, advocating Daniel De Leon’s syndicalism. Including in its membership the Afrikaner Philip R. Roux, the Jewish radical Israel Israelstam, and the Scotsman J. M. Gibson, it was mainly a propaganda group and held meetings on the Johannesburg Market Square, as did the IWW.

Despite disagreements on many issues, both groups concurred on the need for an interracial, revolutionary One Big Union, so breaking with the traditions of mainstream white labor. While the local IWW does not seem to have had much success organizing across the color line, it was the only union at the time in South Africa with no racial restrictions on membership, and probably the first such in Britain’s African empire. Both the local IWW and Socialist Labor Party represented a strand in local anarchism and syndicalism that, while notable for its principled internationalism, tended to ignore the specific problems, the civil and political disabilities of workers of color: this helps explain their lack of success in organizing on interracial lines.

There were, however, even at this early stage, developments that pointed to the emergence of a more sophisticated approach that aimed to combine the struggles against national oppression and class domination. Henry Glasse was acutely sensitive to Africans’ situation, Harrison made strides toward interracial unity with his union work, and “Proletarian” argued in the *Voice of Labour* that a “native rising,” which would be a “wholly justified” response to “the cruel exploitation of South African natives by farmers, mining magnates and factory owners,” and should receive the “sympathy and support of every white wage-slave” (*Voice of Labour*, December 1, 1911).

The New Radicals

From 1912 onwards, syndicalist activism ebbed. Glynn left South Africa, later becoming a key figure in the Australian IWW; Crawford took control of the IWW, expelling Dunbar; the SDF, Socialist Labor Party, and other groups united at Crawford’s urging into a United Socialist Party, which soon collapsed into its constituent parts; and the *Voice of Labour* ceased publication in early 1913.

That year a general strike broke out amongst white workers on the Witwatersrand, a militant episode controlled by unofficial strike committees, with gun battles and riots resulting in many deaths and strikers in control of much of Johannesburg. There were syndicalist sentiments amongst a section of strikers, with Crawford and Fitzgerald shifting their views somewhat, as did more white unionists like J. T. Bain, however briefly, but there was no organized syndicalist nucleus. The government nonetheless insisted the strike was due to a “Syndicalist Conspiracy,” and crushed a second general strike in early 1914 with martial law. Crawford and eight others were deported to Britain, and Mann again toured South Africa. On his return Crawford was a changed man, becoming the moderate secretary of the conservative South African Industrial Federation (SAIF).

The 1913 strike had radicalized a layer of trade unionists like British-born George W. Mason of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, and J. Forrester Brown of the South African Mineworkers’ Union (SAMWU), who hailed from Australia, as well as a section of the SALP, most notably S. P. Bunting, W. H. Andrews, and David Ivon Jones. Bunting, born

in London to an upper-class family, was an SALP representative in the Transvaal Provincial Council, Andrews, born in Suffolk, was a leading trade unionist and head of the SALP's parliamentary caucus, and Ivon Jones, born in Wales, was SALP general secretary. The outbreak of World War I polarized the SALP, and the SALP radicals, joined by veterans of the IWW and Socialist Labor Party like Dunbar, Gibson, and Roux, formed a War-on-War League. The SALP split in August 1915, the anti-war group forming the International Socialist League, which published the weekly *International*.

The International Socialist League quickly moved toward syndicalism, with the ideas of De Leon and the IWW central. Its first annual conference in January (*International*, January 7, 1916) stated "That we encourage the organization of the workers on industrial or class lines, irrespective of race, colour or creed, as the most effective means of providing the necessary force for the emancipation of the workers." The *International* called for One Big Union "organized on the broad lines of no colour bar" to "inaugurate the Co-operative Commonwealth" (February 23, 1916).

Branches were established on the Witwatersrand in Benoni, Germiston, Krugersdorp, and Johannesburg, and also in Durban, Kimberley, Pietermaritzburg (the Natal capital), and Pretoria. Initially mainly based amongst radical British immigrants, it soon attracted many immigrant Jews, concentrated in the multiracial slums of Johannesburg, who formed a Yiddish-speaking branch. From 1916 onwards, it also recruited a growing number of African, Colored, and Indian members. One of the first recruits was T. W. Thibedi, a brilliant African schoolteacher from Johannesburg. In Cape Town, close ties were formed with Harrison and the SDF, which (after a fierce internal struggle) had also adopted a radical anti-militarist position.

National Liberation and Class Struggle

The International Socialist League was probably never larger than several hundred members at any one time, but this should not detract from its importance. It was the International Socialist League that played the key role in developing the view that One Big Union was the means of both fighting national oppression and overthrowing

capitalism and the state machinery. It adopted a specific "Native programme" that called for the removal of the civil and political disabilities imposed upon Africans, argued for the unity of workers across the lines of craft, color, and creed, and opposed segregation and color bars.

The *International* argued that "Socialism can only be brought about by all the workers coming together on the industrial field to take the machinery of production into their own hands and working it for the good of all" (June 16, 1916). National oppression divided the working class and increased profits, for "cheap, helpless and unorganized" African labor provided "employers generally and particularly industrial employers, that most coveted plum of modern Imperialism, plentiful cheap labour" (*International*, February 18, 1916). White workers had to choose between becoming a "closed guild," doomed to defeat, or joining the revolutionary movement for the "control and administration of industry" (*International*, February 16, 1917; March 2, 1917). As for discriminatory laws, the *International* called for direct industrial action: "Organize industrially, they become worth no more than the paper rags they are written on" (October 19, 1917).

White Workers and Works Committees

The militancy of all sections of workers rose throughout 1917, with a strike wave building that would last into 1922, and times seemed ideal for the project of uniting all workers into One Big Union. The International Socialist League made ongoing attempts to organize a bloc within the white unions, organizing a short-lived (and interracial) Solidarity Committee in 1917 to work within the SAIF. The Building Workers' Industrial Union, formed in 1916 and headed by the International Socialist League's C. B. "Charlie" Tyler, joined by Mason, was one of the few successes.

Andrews, sent abroad in 1917 to attend the abortive socialist peace conference in Stockholm, visited Britain, where he was deeply impressed by the Socialist Labour Party and Workers' Committee and Shop Stewards' movement. On returning to South Africa, he was employed by the International Socialist League as a full-time organizer, the League hoping to form a Witwatersrand Shop Stewards' Council as a step toward the One Big Union.

While Andrews helped establish independent shop stewards' organizations in engineering, on the mines (known as works committees), and on the railways, most had no links to syndicalists, with one very important exception. A section of the mine works committees was deeply influenced by syndicalism. This group, largely independent of the International Socialist League, was centered on Percy Fisher, a miner born in England in 1891. Fisher and his associate, Harry Spendiff, were involved in organizing a series of unofficial strikes, unsanctioned by SAMWU or the SAIF.

Despite opposition from Crawford and others, Fisher was elected secretary of SAMWU in 1920, but later forced to resign. An unofficial strike in January 1921 led to Fisher, Spendiff, and others being suspended from SAMWU and fined. Rejecting the rulings, the dissidents established the Council of Action in July 1921, issuing a manifesto, reprinted in the *Workers' Dreadnought*, calling for "rank and file control" of the unions and "Industrial Unionism" with "the avowed object of wresting the economic power out of the hands of the capitalist class" (February 18, 1922).

Syndicalism and Workers of Color

At the same time as these initiatives were taking place, the International Socialist League took steps to organize Africans, Coloreds, and Indians into syndicalist unions. In March 1917, Gordon Lee of the International Socialist League's Durban branch helped launch the Indian Workers' Industrial Union, an umbrella body organizing in catering, the docks, laundries, printing, and the growing tobacco industry. One of the very first unions amongst Indians, its size is unclear, but it was probably several hundred strong.

The International Socialist League encouraged the Indian workers to take charge of the union and several Indian activists became prominent militants, such as Bernard L. E. Sigamoney and R. K. Moodley. Born in Durban to Indian immigrants, Sigamoney was a schoolteacher and cricket enthusiast who moved to the left in World War I. Along with other Indian union members, Sigamoney joined the International Socialist League. The union held several strikes, during which the Indian Workers' Choir entertained workers with the *Red Flag*, the *Internationale*, and IWW songs. It also held study classes, emphasizing the works of De Leon. In 1920 and 1921, independent Indian unions in tobacco and furnit-

ure workers struck in Durban, and Andrews, Ivon Jones, Sigamoney, and others were actively involved in solidarity work.

In the meantime, the International Socialist League established a night school for Africans at its Johannesburg headquarters. Starting in July 1917, the school mainly recruited urbanized Africans from the downtown slums and townships of Johannesburg, although a few mineworkers, mainly from nearby mines, also joined. After months of classes run by Bunting, Dunbar, and others, the school launched a syndicalist union, the Industrial Workers of Africa, at the end of September.

Modeled on the IWW, the Industrial Workers of Africa was the first union for African workers in South Africa and (in all likelihood) Britain's African empire. It was a general union, rather than an industrial union, the forerunner of the number of African general unions that sprang up in the next few years, and was headed by an all-African committee, with Reuben (Alfred) Cetiwe and Hamilton Kraai the key figures. Born and educated at Qumbu in the Eastern Cape, Cetiwe worked in Johannesburg as a picture framer's assistant. His views, recorded in police reports, were uncompromising: "We are here for Organization, so that as soon as all of your fellow workers are organized, then we can see what we can do to abolish the Capitalist-System." Kraai, also from the Eastern Cape, worked as a foreman and deliveryman in Johannesburg. Both men joined the International Socialist League.

From 1915, the International Socialist League was also developing connections with sections of the emerging, and rather mild, nationalist movements amongst Africans and Coloreds, like the African Political Organization and the Transvaal Native Congress, which was the provincial section of the South African Native National Congress. The formation of the Industrial Workers of Africa increased nationalist sympathy for syndicalists, and Cetiwe, Kraai, and Thibedi also participated in the Transvaal Native Congress. In 1918 the International Socialist League organized South Africa's first May Day rally directed at Africans and Coloreds in Johannesburg. R. Talbot-Williams of the African Political Organization, and Thibedi, were amongst the speakers.

Developments in June 1918 gave the Industrial Workers of Africa national prominence. That month saw 152 African municipal workers

in Johannesburg jailed for striking, a sentence condemned by the *International*, and evoking a wave of anger amongst the city's African population. A protest rally, called by the Transvaal Native Congress, saw the crowd take its lead from Industrial Workers of Africa activists, who called for a general strike. A joint planning committee of left-leaning nationalists and syndicalists was established. The strike was called off at the last minute, although several thousand African mine-workers struck nonetheless, and eight people (six members of syndicalist bodies, and two sympathetic Congress activists) were arrested for incitement to public violence, the first time Africans and whites in South Africa were jointly prosecuted in a common cause.

By this stage a syndicalist bloc had developed in the Transvaal Native Congress, centered on Cetiwe and Kraai. Dubbed the "black Bolsheviks of Johannesburg" by Solomon Plaatje, a leading African conservative from Kimberley, it was aided by sympathetic nationalists. The syndicalists and left-leaning nationalists tried, unsuccessfully, to get the South African Native National Congress at its August 1918 congress to focus on labor, and were prominent in the Witwatersrand campaign against the pass controls that started in March 1919. Congress moderates and conservatives then managed to wrest control of the Transvaal Native Congress, and called off the campaign. There had been over 700 arrests by May 1919, however, and Bunting acted as counsel for many of the accused, during which he was assaulted by a group of white workers outside the courthouse.

Syndicalism in the Cape

In the meantime, there had been important developments in the Cape Province. The International Socialist League's Kimberley section established two syndicalist unions in that declining town in 1919. These were the Clothing Workers' Industrial Union (which later spread to Durban and Johannesburg) and the Horse Drivers' Union, both of which held successful strikes. The unions were based amongst Colored workers, and 27 enrolled in the International Socialist League, most notably Johnny Gomas, an apprentice tailor from Cape Town.

Radical members of the SDF, frustrated with its loose politics, broke away in 1918 to form the Industrial Socialist League in Cape Town.

Like the International Socialist League, the Cape group was deeply influenced by the IWW. It was initially based amongst white immigrants, such as the Portuguese brothers Manuel and F. Lopes, Jews like A. Z. Berman, a teacher educated in Russia and Germany, and British workers like C. Frank Glass, born in Birmingham in 1901. The elderly Henry Glasse also corresponded with the group.

Like the International Socialist League, the Industrial Socialist League was active in the mainstream unions, but with rather more success. Berman was elected treasurer of the Cape Federation of Labor (formed in 1913), F. Lopes was president of the Tramway Workers' Union, and Frank Glass was active in the Tailors' Union. At the second conference of the Cape Federation of Labor, held in 1920, the Cape syndicalists successfully passed resolutions for the socialization of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, and the restructuring of the Federation into industrial unions. At the third conference of the Cape Federation of Trade Unions in 1921, Berman had the Federation resolve to join the Communist International and abstain from parliamentary action. These resolutions were not, however, carried out.

The group made strenuous efforts to organize amongst African and Colored workers. It established a hall in the predominantly Colored District Six area, recruited a number of Colored activists to its work, and established a syndicalist Sweet and Jam Workers' Industrial Union amongst Colored factory workers. Cetiwe and Kraai arrived in Cape Town in 1919 to form a branch of the Industrial Workers of Africa, and were supported by the Industrial Socialist League. The Industrial Workers of Africa branch, based amongst African dockworkers, claimed 800 members (Hirson 2005). Living in Ndabeni Township, Cetiwe and Kraai also became active in the Cape Native Congress, and reappeared at the May 1920 conference of the South African Native National Congress where they tried, again unsuccessfully, to commit the larger body to a general strike policy. Thibedi, meanwhile, had taken over the Industrial Workers of Africa in Johannesburg.

In December 1919 the Industrial Workers of Africa organized a joint strike with another union on the docks, the recently formed Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU), headed by the charismatic Clements Kadalie, a highly educated immigrant from Nyasaland. The strike

was not a success, and the two unions had a falling out. In June 1920, however, both attended a labor conference at Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State, which aimed to unite the African and Colored general unions that had emerged in Bloemfontein, Cape Town, and Port Elizabeth. There were some syndicalist influences at the Bloemfontein meeting, which described its goal, Peter Wickens (1973) notes, as “one great union of skilled and unskilled workers of South Africa, south of the Zambesi.” The unions, including the Cape section of the Industrial Workers of Africa, merged into the ICU, which came under the control of Kadalie and showed some syndicalist influences in the succeeding years.

The Case of Mozambique

A small anarchist and syndicalist current emerged in Lourenço Marques from the early twentieth century. It was largely isolated from the South African movement, but developed in a similar context: a racially divided working class, with unequal civil and political rights. It started among Portuguese immigrants and political prisoners deported under anti-anarchist laws passed in the 1890s, and was influenced by the rapid growth of anarchist and syndicalist currents in Portugal’s National Labor Union and its successor, the General Confederation of Labor. The Mozambican movement was a minority current, as the local unions generally did not admit people of color.

Local anarchists and syndicalists attracted a series of hostile articles in *O Progresso*, a republican paper printed in Lourenço Marques from 1905. In 1910, the anarchist printer José Estevam, released from prison after the Republic was established, formed the Revolutionary League in Lourenço Marques. Groups like the Revolutionary League and the Libertarian Group Francisco Ferrer promoted anarchist ideas, were noticeable at May Day demonstrations, and wrote in the republican and labor press.

O Incondicional, which appeared from November 1910, had an editorial board of anarchists and republicans. Anarchists and syndicalists similarly wrote for *O Emancipador*, newspaper of the Port and Railway Employees’ Association (the city’s main union), published from 1920, and also distributed *A Batalha*, published by Portugal’s General Confederation of Labor. In 1919, Ivon Jones was prosecuted in Pietermaritzburg for distributing seditious literature: he subsequently

stayed for a while in Mozambique, where he encountered the *O Emancipador* group, and organized for the *International* to be sold by a local newsagent.

There was a lively cosmopolitan café culture in Lourenço Marques, which drew in a number of Africans, including members of the *assimilado* elite (Africans exempted from the discriminatory legal code applied to people of color), and anarchosyndicalist ideas also circulated in this milieu. João Dos Santos Albasini, the city’s most prominent intellectual and *assimilado*, and editor of *O Africano* (distributed in South Africa as well as Mozambique), was somewhat influenced by syndicalism. His articles criticized the racial policies of the Mozambican unions, and periodically echoed the radical pieces in *O Emancipador*. From 1917 to 1921, the Port and Railway Employees’ Association led a strike wave at Lourenço Marques and on the railways, in which individual anarchists and syndicalists were prominent, but the strikes were crushed with martial law.

The 1920s and 1930s

The South African syndicalists initially regarded the Russian Revolution as a confirmation of their most deeply held syndicalist views: indeed, the monthly paper of the Industrial Socialist League was called the *Bolshevik*. From 1920 to 1921 there were moves to form a local Communist Party, and real Bolshevik ideas became better known. After a series of splits, including the formation of a syndicalist Communist Party by Dunbar and others in 1920, the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), affiliate of the Communist International, was launched in July 1921. It incorporated most existing left-wing groups, with the notable exception of the syndicalist unions amongst workers of color. Battered by the onset of recession, and alienated by the CPSA’s focus from 1921 to 1924 on affiliating to the SALP, few activists from these unions joined the CPSA before 1925. A significant number of CPSA members remained influenced by syndicalism, and Dunbar headed an organized syndicalist faction linked to the *Workers’ Dreadnought* group in Britain.

The 1922 Rand Revolt, a general strike over the replacement of white miners by Africans that developed into an armed insurrection, was supported by the CPSA, which condemned the

racial violence that developed during the struggle. The Council of Action (now joined by Andrews) played a more important role. It was, above all, Fisher who pushed the strike into an insurrection. The revolt was crushed with the use of airplanes and troops, with hundreds killed or arrested: Fisher and Spendiff committed suicide at the insurrection's headquarters in Fordsburg, Johannesburg.

The ICU, joined in 1920 by Cetiwe and Kraai, and subsequently by Gomas and Thibedi, grew rapidly in the 1920s, and syndicalist influences became quite pronounced, the union adopting a constitution based on that of the IWW in 1925. However, ICU ideology was a complex and unstable mixture, where the ideas of the IWW jostled alongside those of Marcus Garvey, as well as liberalism, Marxism, and moderate unionism. Other than a failed attempt to call a general strike in 1926, the ICU did not undertake much in the way of industrial organization or action. Unlike the syndicalists of the 1910s, it found its greatest strength not with the workers of the cities, but amongst African and Colored farm workers and tenant farmers, also recruiting heavily amongst the African elite, and claimed 100,000 members by 1927 (Wickens 1973).

Just as white immigration had helped bring syndicalism to South Africa, African and Colored migrancy spread the ICU across Southern Africa, with sections established in Southwest Africa in 1920, Southern Rhodesia in 1927, and into Northern Rhodesia in 1931. However, corruption, infighting, weak structures, the lack of a clear strategy, members' frustration, and repression saw the ICU fragment rapidly after 1927. The movement virtually collapsed everywhere in the early 1930s, although it was revived in Southern Rhodesia in the 1940s.

The end of the Council of Action and the ICU provided two nails in the coffin of local anarchism and syndicalism in Southern Africa. More followed. In Mozambique, martial law inflicted a massive defeat on the unions during a railway strike in 1925–6, and the Portuguese dictatorships of 1926 and 1932 suppressed the radical press, independent unions, and the café culture of Lourenço Marques.

A final nail was provided by changes in the CPSA. In 1928, the CPSA adopted the "Native Republic" thesis on the instructions of the Communist International, which stipulated that capitalist democracy must be attained before

socialism could be considered. This break with the older tradition of combining class struggle with national liberation was coupled to the onset of the "New Line" period, designed to Bolshevize the communist parties. The great majority of veterans of the pre-CPSA period, including Andrews, Bunting, Frank Glass, Harrison, and Thibedi, were expelled. Some later rejoined the CPSA as orthodox members, like Andrews, others moved to Trotskyism, like Frank Glass and Thibedi, and some left politics entirely, like Harrison.

In Conclusion

Anarchism and syndicalism played an important role in Southern Africa from the 1880s onwards, a role often obscured by the ongoing influence of a substantial communist historiography. Migration was a key factor in spreading these ideas into South Africa and Mozambique, and subsequently into Southwest Africa and the Rhodesias. An important minority current, anarchism and syndicalism always battled against the segregationist politics of white labor and the influence of African nationalism, but nonetheless had an important influence on sectors of the wider working class. This history shows that the international rise of anarchism and syndicalism from the 1880s to the 1920s also took place in Southern Africa, and that Bakunin's heirs developed a strategy that saw the One Big Union as the vehicle of both class struggle and national liberation, and the nucleus of a libertarian socialist society.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Bain, J. T. (1860–1919); Bolsheviks; Communist Party of South Africa, 1921–1950; Dunbar, Andrew (1879–1964); Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Sigamoney, Bernard L. E. (1888–1963); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; South Africa, Labor Movement; South African Communist Party, 1953–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Cappela, J. (1981) *O Movimento Operário em Lourenço Marques, 1898–1927*. Porto: Edic es Afrontamento.
 Cope, R. K. (n.d. [?1943]) *Comrade Bill: The Life and Times of W. H. Andrews, Workers' Leader*. Cape Town: Stewart Printing.
 Department of Justice (2001) *The ISL and Coloured Workers*. Pretoria: National Archives.

- Freire, J. (2001) *Freedom Fighters: Anarchist Intellectuals, Workers, and Soldiers in Portugal's History*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Harrison, W. H. (n.d. [?1947]) *Memoirs of a Socialist in South Africa 1903–47*. Cape Town: Stewart Printing.
- Hirson, B. (2005) *The History of the Left in South Africa: Writings of Baruch Hirson*. Ed. Y. Hirson. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Hobart-Houghton, D. (1964) *The South African Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hyslop, J. (2004) *The Notorious Syndicalist: J. T. Bain: A Scottish Rebel in Colonial South Africa*. Johannesburg: Jacana Media.
- Krikler, J. (2005) *Rand Revolt: The 1922 Insurrection and Racial Killings in South Africa*. Cape Town: Jonathon Ball.
- Mantzaris, E. A. (1995) *Labour Struggles in South Africa: The Forgotten Pages, 1903–1921*. Namibia: Collective Resources.
- Pate, F. W. & McDermid, A. (1922) Manifesto of the Mineworkers. *Workers' Dreadnought*, February 18.
- Penvenne, J. M. (1996) João Dos Santos Albasini (1876–1922): The Contradictions of Politics and Identity in Colonial Mozambique. *Journal of African History* 37: 419–464.
- Raftopolous, B. & Phimister, I. (Eds.) (1997) *Keep on Knocking: A History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe, 1900–97*. Harare: Baobab Books for the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Van der Walt, L. (1999) “The Industrial Union is the Embryo of the Socialist Commonwealth”: The International Socialist League and Revolutionary Syndicalism in South Africa, 1915–1920. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 19: 1.
- Van der Walt, L. (2001) Revolutionärer Syndikalismus, Rasse und Klasse in Südafrika: Die “International Socialist League” und die “Industrial Workers of Africa” 1915 bis 1920. *Archiv für die Geschichte des Widerstandes und der Arbeit* 16.
- Van der Walt, L. (2004) Bakunin's Heirs in South Africa: Race and Revolutionary Syndicalism from the IWW to the International Socialist League, 1910–21. *Politikon* 31 (1).
- Van der Walt, L. (2006) Anarchism and Syndicalism in South Africa, 1904–1921: Rethinking the History of Labour and the Left. PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand.
- Wickens, P. L. (1973) The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa. PhD thesis, University of Cape Town.
- Willan, B. (Ed.) (1996) *Sol Plaatje: Selected Writings*. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press.
- Yudelman, D. & Jeeves, A. (1986) New Labour Frontiers for Old: Black Migrants to the South African Gold Mines, 1920–85. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 13 (1).

Anarchism in the United States to 1945

Ronald Creagh

Historians have adopted two approaches in their study of anarchism in the United States. Some narratives concentrate on individuals and grassroots movements with relatively well-defined connections to a historical anarchist movement. Others seek traces of anarchism in a broader sense, in fields such as art or philosophy or in some independent group or personality. There is indeed no single “essence” of anarchism but a wealth of perspectives as well as unexpected rebirths.

Both approaches require specific narratives. Elements of anarchism in the broad sense of rebellions against the state or other established authorities appear during the colonial period and up to the Civil War, while after the 1870s, it is mostly absorbed by emergent anarchist organizations. Both currents will fade after World War I due to a variety of causes: mass culture and repression progressively corrode working-class institutions, union leaders are integrated into the establishment, and the Russian Revolution and the New Deal promote participation in political parties as the sole avenue to social change. Before World War II, protest movements rarely dissent with “the system,” but on the contrary call for state recognition of their requests.

Anarchism at Large

Early colonial dissent offers evidence of anti-statism, originating from the religious and socio-economic radicalism developed by lower-class spokespersons at the time of the English Civil War. Antinomianism opposed inner inspiration to political laws, and in the New England controversy of 1636–8, John Wheelwright went so far as to make a principled condemnation of all legislation. His sister-in-law, Anne Hutchinson, opened in her house a group for free discussion of ministers' sermons, to the great displeasure of the orators. Exiled to Rhode Island, the antinomian mystics rejected all civil authority, with one William Harris claiming that the people should shortly cry out, “No lords, no masters.” The Pennsylvania Quakers had anarchistic patterns of decision-making, and although they

voted, they refused to be sworn in and could not run for office; they also rejected many components of public administration such as army, police, and bureaucracy. The frontier spirit called for decentralization, community self-organization, a distrust of hierarchies, and a form of individualism quite different from the European bourgeois posture: one had to count on one's own resources, learn community life, and make decisions without relying on opinion or prejudice. All through colonial history and even afterwards, a number of riots and rebellions could better be described as insurrections. These uprisings appeared at a time when the state's hold over society was somewhat fragile and collectivities felt deprived of their rights. Such was the case of early movements like Shays' Rebellion and other revolts, including those of black slaves, and at the end of the nineteenth century, the Filipino independence struggle.

The American Revolution offered lessons for the future. After all, the Boston Tea Party was an example of direct action and the war against the British was an insurrection. The American anarchist contestation of state authority could find a justification in the Declaration of Independence which asserted the rights of people "to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with one another" and abolish governments "which have become destructive." In spite of the Constitution, the Insurrection Act of 1807, the Civil War, and the rampant proliferation of state powers, a large number of dissident movements framed their own Declarations of Independence. Anarchism now was at the very core of the nation's imagination. Even if the word could be insulting, anarchists were rarely marginal people. They were marginalized by the establishment, but rarely by their co-workers. Indeed, anti-statism was an American tradition, though far from the only one.

Communal Experiments

Egalitarian associations appeared with the much-publicized experiment in New Harmony, Indiana, promoted by Robert Owen. The founder's communistic ideas inspired three important trends: a condemnation of capitalism as the defense of private interests; an egalitarianism embracing men and women alike; and the notion that the social environment conditions individuals. Individual reform was therefore

insufficient: the whole economic system had to be changed. In 1826, the Kendal commune of Ohio condemned "the system of individual and private interests," declaring: "it is reasonable and justifiable to change the whole system as soon as it can be done prudently, and with safety to the community at large" (Fox 1911/1979: 178). The Owenite movement incited Josiah Warren to start his rural experiments which, in reaction to "socialism" and "communism," advocated individualism. Intentional communities flourished up to the Civil War; they believed that changing the system was a desirable goal, immediately attainable and imitable all over the world.

The 1848 Revolutions

The Paris insurrection of February, and the 1848 revolutions in Europe, introduced in the United States a number of political refugees and spread the spirit of the *Junges Deutschland* and free thought through German papers. In New York, the French Joseph Déjacque invented the word "*libertaire*" (source of the English word "libertarian," originally synonymous with "anarchist"), castigated Proudhon for his anti-feminism, and wrote the first anarchist utopia, *L'Humanisphère*.

Prelude to the Civil War

Josiah Warren initiated the famous "Modern Times" colony in Long Island, and later made deeper contacts with the working class, particularly the Sovereigns of Industry. A number of people circled around him, particularly William B. Greene, who defended working women's interests in Massachusetts, and Stephen P. Andrews, who founded the Unitary Home in New York and participated actively in what we could call today "Free Universities." He also debated free love with Henry James Sr., whose son, William James, would also express some anarchistic sentiments.

The protest against slavery engendered illegal and anti-statist actions as the Underground Railroad or the abolitionist movement, with the New England Non-Resistance Society of William Lloyd Garrison. One of the most outspoken leaders was John Humphrey Noyes, while Henry David Thoreau adopted a strong ethical anti-statism. Signs of distrust and occasional refusals of allegiance to human governments multiplied (Allen 1930: 694–7). John Brown,

who in some ways had been anticipated by Lysander Spooner, became a hero. However, in spite of their condemnation of the institution, many anarchists condemned federal state interference.

Referring to these traditions, early postwar “anarchists” defined themselves as abolitionists – they asked for the abolition of the state.

The International Workingmen’s Association

In the US, the rising working class created its own institutions and, before the age of the penny press, published its own papers, defending its particular aspirations. Cooperativist and mutualist ideas were in the air. Anarchist papers increasingly addressed all social issues, rather than restricting themselves to labor questions, and worked out new concepts of social action.

The foundation of the International Workingmen’s Association (IWMA) in the US brought together people with different convictions, including a fair number of Proudhonians in the American and French sections as well as a strong autonomist current that would not submit to Marx or anyone else. After the eviction of anarchists at The Hague Congress in 1872, most American and French sections decided to maintain their autonomy; some associated with the Swiss Jura Federation, which developed anarchism as a positive conception of social organization.

The dissolution in 1876 of the IWMA, its merging with the Workingmen’s Party of the United States, and later the disastrous electoral experience in Chicago curtailed working-class expectations about political action. Some leaders now embarked on a radical quest for a society in which the worker would no longer be “deprived of the fruits of his labor.”

The Social Revolutionaries

The year 1881 would inspire new actions all over the nation. From Russia came the news of Sophia Perovskaya’s assassination attempt on Alexander II and her execution. She became a revolutionary model and revived the old tradition of tyrannicide. Could the murder of symbolic figures of the establishment spark off an insurrection of the oppressed classes? Not in the United States, said Benjamin R. Tucker, whose

Liberty, the organ of individualist anarchism, debated for several decades on workers’ rights, economic theory, and other topics. But as it shifted from Proudhonism to radical Spencerism to Stirnerite egoism, this caused dismay to a number of readers for whom anarchism was first and foremost an ethical issue.

In London, the 1881 Social Revolutionary Congress set the framework for a proactive movement. Delegates represented Boston, Philadelphia, New York, the young Icarian branch of French Americans, and the Mexican Federation. This nodal event was followed by two Congresses in Chicago (1881) and Pittsburgh (1883), where delegates endorsed a strategy of unionization as a means to revolution. Anarchist structures were being embedded in the working class across the country. Clubs spread in many cities and in metropolitan areas many neighborhoods and immigrant communities had their meeting place. Newspapers, pamphlets, and booklets multiplied. In Chicago, the *Alarm* claimed 3,000 readers, while the Germans had their daily and the Bohemians their weekly. In New York, Johann Most’s *Freiheit* enjoyed an international readership while other newcomers subscribed to anarchist periodicals from the old country. Labor papers expressed popular discontent and unrest but also described the workers’ condition, advocated woman’s emancipation, free speech, free love, and many other causes.

The Haymarket bombing of 1886, followed by the death sentence for innocent anarchists after a mock trial, did not signal the end of the movement, but induced a number of Chicagoans to settle elsewhere and propagate their ideas. Many cities like Chicago, Detroit, or Philadelphia maintained their key figures like Lucy Parsons, Jo Labadie, or Voltairine de Cleyre.

The birth of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) introduced spontaneity. They melted into the working-class culture and enlivened it; they also worked out new ideas such as the rank-and-file organization, the general strike, and the sit-in strike.

Immigrant Circles

As anarchism dwindled within old German communities, new anarchist networks appeared in the immigration of French-speaking miners in Pennsylvania, Italians in the Paterson silk

industry, and other groups like the Mexican Americans and the Russian exiles. The best structured movement was Jewish American, particularly in the clothing industry. Everywhere issues were vehemently discussed, particularly within the Jewish community, which was also confronted with Zionism. Effervescence contributed to promote public figures such as Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, and, on a lesser scale, lecture tours by foreign visitors and organizers such as Peter Kropotkin, Errico Malatesta, Luigi Galleani, Camillo Berneri, or Joseph Tortelier. A sparkling array of newspapers, particularly *Mother Earth*, with a readership of several thousands, and the *Freie Arbeiter Stimme*, a Yiddish daily, covered the country. Anarchist events were now visible on the American scene, including among artists and a few intellectuals.

After the Palmer raids, the movement faded, notwithstanding the arrival in 1931 of another influential couple, Rudolf Rocker and Milly Witkop, and Carlo Tresca's labor agitation. Nonetheless, the cross-fertilization of international relations helped the movement to survive.

The International Impact

American anarchists were associated with the Magón brothers' revolutionary efforts in Mexico. They inspired the Sikh Lala Har Dayal, the Chinese Ba Jin, and the Japanese Kotoku Shusui. May Day celebrations around the world memorialized the Haymarket martyrs. The IWW developed in the US and spread to other countries. In spite of repression, anarchists aroused a world protest against the infamous trial of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti in the 1920s. The protesters later established international anti-fascist organizations. The 1936–9 Spanish Civil War impressed radicals and was a turning point for some. When World War II broke out, it was a recent convert, Dwight Macdonald, who now carried the pacifist torch with fellow writers such as Paul Goodman.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776; Anarchism; Anarchism and Culture, 1840–1939; Anarchism in the United States, 1946–Present; Anarchosyndicalism; Berkman, Alexander (1870–1936); Boston Tea Party; European Revolutions of 1848; Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley (1890–1964); Garrison, William Lloyd (1805–1879);

Goldman, Emma (1869–1940); Haymarket Tragedy; Haywood, Big Bill (1869–1928); Hutchinson, Anne (1591–1643); Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Magón, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922) and the Magonistas; New Harmony; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Palmer Raids; Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865); Sacco and Vanzetti Case; Shays' Rebellion; Slave Rescues and the Underground Railroad, United States; Spanish Revolution; Utopian Communities, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Allen, D. (1930) *Non-Resistance Society: Declaration of Principles, 1838*. In *The Fight for Peace*. New York: Macmillan, pp. 694–7.
- Avrich, P. (1984) *The Haymarket Tragedy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Avrich, P. (1995) *Anarchist Voices: An Oral History of Anarchism in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Chomsky, N. (2005) *Chomsky on Anarchism*. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
- Creagh, R. (2004) *L'Affaire Sacco et Vanzetti*. Paris: Editions de Paris.
- Dolgoft, S. (1986) *Fragments: A Memoir*. Cambridge: Refract.
- Fox, W. F. (Ed.) (1911/1979) *Constitution of the Friendly Association for Mutual Interests*. In H. J. Ehrlich et al. (Eds.), *Reinventing Anarchy: What Are Anarchists Thinking These Days?* Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Goodman, P. (1977) *Drawing the Line: Political Essays*. Ed. T. Stoehr. New York: Free Life Editions.
- Lynd, S. (1968) *The Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism*. New York: Pantheon.
- Martin, J. J. (1970) *Men Against the State: The Expositors of Individualist Anarchism in America, 1827–1908*. Colorado Springs: Ralph Miles.
- Perry, L. (1973) *Radical Abolitionism: Anarchy and the Government of God in Antislavery Thought*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Anarchism in the United States, 1946–present

Gabriel Kuhn and Jesse Cohn

In the first decades after World War II, anarchism did not play a significant role in US politics. One notable organization emerging in the 1950s was the Libertarian League (dissolved in the late 1960s) around anarchosyndicalist Sam Dolgoft (aka Sam Weiner, 1902–90), but the immigrant

communities that anarchists like Dolgoff came from were rapidly integrating, leaving African Americans as the largest pariah group – a community in which anarchists had almost no presence. The pacifism espoused by some anarchists during World War II, in contrast to communists' support for the war after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, further marginalized the movement, though endearing them to a segment of bohemia on both coasts. In this countercultural milieu, the writings of Paul Goodman (1911–72) proved influential.

Partial Revival of Anarchism in the 1960s and 1970s

Anarchism, although rarely in an ideologically pure or traditional form, regained popularity in the late 1960s in the context of the decade's social protest movements. Anarchist elements were present amongst the Yippies, or in Situationist groups like San Francisco's Point Blank or New York's Black Mask, and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) harbored a number of anarchists. It was one of these, decrying the seduction of SDS by authoritarian and vanguardist tendencies, who would come to have the strongest impact on the US anarchist movement and its development: Murray Bookchin (1921–2006).

The emergence of radical feminism, with its anti-hierarchical ethos, afforded another opportunity for the rediscovery of anarchism. Throughout the 1970s, Peggy Kornegger and others contributed to a growing body of anarcho-feminist theory. Meanwhile, although black radicals tended to take Third World Marxist movements as their model, some looked back to anarchism; the Black Panthers reprinted Nechaev's *Catechism of the Revolutionary*, and in 1979, a former Panther disenchanted with communism, Lorenzo Komboa Ervin (b. 1947), published his seminal pamphlet, *Anarchism and the Black Revolution*, introducing the concept of a "Black Anarchism" to radical debate. Another ex-Panther, Ashanti Alston Omowali (b. 1954), began publishing a zine titled *Anarchist Panther* in 1999.

The anarchist press was also recovering. In Tucson, Fred Woodworth founded the oldest still publishing anarchist journal in the US, *The Match!*, in 1969. In 1975, the underground journal *Fifth Estate*, founded 1965 in Detroit, turned into an influential anarchist journal. In 1980,

the individualistic *Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed* was founded in Columbia, Missouri. One of the most influential anarchist books of the 1980s was Fredy Perlman's (1934–85) *Against His-story, Against Leviathan!* (1983), which is widely regarded as a precursor to the anarcho-primitivist movement that developed in the 1990s. Several books published between 1978 and 1995 by historian Paul Avrich (1931–2006) provided essential contributions to the study of anarchist history in the US.

Other forms of anarchist movement infrastructure were slower to emerge. In 1971, Bookchin founded the Institute of Social Ecology, an important center for the development of anarchist thought in the US for the next three decades. Activists involved in the Clamshell Alliance, wedding anti-authoritarian organization to the newly emerged anti-nuclear movement in the late 1970s, inspired the creation of Food Not Bombs. None of these institutions drew much participation from blue-collar workers or communities of color, however, and the cultural identification of anarchism with youth and whiteness would be reinforced by the emergence of the predominantly young and white punk subculture at the end of the 1970s.

Second Revival: The 1980s and 1990s

Punk, while politically ambiguous, espoused an anti-authoritarian, "Do-It-Yourself" ethos that fostered a renewed interest in the anarchist tradition among the young, and by the 1980s punks were anarchism's most visible representatives. In Minneapolis, the Profane Existence collective, founded in 1989, functioned as a focus for the anarcho-punk movement. Meanwhile, links between anarchism and the radical segments of the environmentalist movement continued to deepen, as groups like Earth First! turned to anarchist direct action tactics such as eco-sabotage, while Bookchin's philosophy influenced the emerging Green movement.

Various developments characterized the anarchist movement in the 1990s. While anarcho-syndicalist Noam Chomsky (b. 1928) became US anarchism's most prominent author, Hakim Bey's 1991 essay collection, *T.A.Z.: The Temporary Autonomous Zone*, propounding a non-ideological, artistic, and spiritual understanding of anarchy, was also highly influential. In the same

year, the Love & Rage Federation was founded as a North American anarchist organization. It split in 1999 over disagreements about principles of organization. An anarcho-primitivist movement emerged around author John Zerzan (b. 1943), whose popular essay collection *Future Primitive* (1994) featured radical anti-technology and anti-civilization sentiments. Murray Bookchin caused much debate with his booklet *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm* (1995), a critique of what he condemned as individualistic “lifestylist” tendencies within the anarchist scene. The booklet proved divisive in anarchist circles and marked the end of Bookchin’s dominant influence on anarchist discourse. The reaction against Bookchin peaked in Bob Black’s polemic *Anarchy After Leftism* (1997), a text that also marked the beginning of the post-anarchy movement, most prominently advocated by *Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed*, editor Jason McQuinn (b. 1952). In 2002, Bookchin announced his “break” with anarchism.

The opening of a US branch of British-founded AK Press in 1994 and the foundation of the Institute of Anarchist Studies as a forum for theoretical debate and research in 1996 were both major contributions to the country’s anarchist infrastructure. Throughout the decade, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth Liberation Front (ELF), both with strong anarchist leanings and support, conducted sabotage actions against alleged perpetrators of animal exploitation and environmental destruction.

Anarchists were strongly involved in the 1999 anti-World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle, receiving media attention unknown in decades. A rapid growth of the anarchist movement followed, and numerous anarchist collectives, journals, and projects emerged. While a lot of the media attention after Seattle focused on the militant anarcho-primitivist movement centered in Eugene, Oregon, contemporary US anarchism is remarkably diverse and includes projects like the CrimethInc. Ex-Workers’ Collective, organizations like the Northeastern Federation of Anarcho-Communists (NEFAC), networks like Anarchist People of Color, and a revitalized Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Moreover, anarchism’s influence now extends well beyond explicitly anarchist groups, as anti-authoritarian organizing methods have become widely adopted by radicals of all stripes.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchism and Sabotage; Anarchism in the United States to 1945; Anarchosyndicalism; Earth First!; Food Not Bombs, United States; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Nechaev, Sergei (1847–1882); Punk Movement; Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)

References and Suggested Readings

- Apter, D. E. & Joll, J. (Eds.) (1971) *Anarchism Today*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Avrich, P. (1984) *The Haymarket Tragedy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Avrich, P. (1995) *Anarchist Voices: An Oral History of Anarchism in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Chomsky, N. (2005) *Chomsky on Anarchism*. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
- Dark Star Collective (Ed.) (2002) *Quiet Rumours: An Anarcha-Feminist Reader*. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
- Day, R. (2005) *Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements*. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press.
- Dolgoft, S. (1986) *Fragments: A Memoir*. Cambridge: Refract.
- Filippo, R. S. (Ed.) (2002) *A New World in Our Hearts: 8 Years of Writing from the Love and Rage Revolutionary Anarchist Federation*. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
- Goodman, P. (1977) *Drawing the Line: Political Essays*. Ed. T. Stoehr. New York: Free Life Editions.
- Lynd, S. (1968) *The Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism*. New York: Pantheon.
- Martin, J. J. (1970) *Men Against the State: The Expositors of Individualist Anarchism in America, 1827–1908*. Colorado Springs: Ralph Miles.
- Perry, L. (1973) *Radical Abolitionism: Anarchy and the Government of God in Antislavery Thought*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Anarchocommunism

Jesse Cohn

Anarchocommunism, sometimes also called “anarchist communism” or “libertarian communism,” is the tendency within anarchism advocating the abolition both of the state and the system of wages and prices. Under “the communism of the free,” as Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921) called it, the communist distributive ethic – “from each according to ability, to each according to need” – would constitute the extension of individual freedom into the economic realm, permitting each to take and to give at will, in keeping with the dictates of his or her conscience (1892/1995: 36).

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) and Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876) were both opponents of “communism” in this sense, wary of the potential for “free riders” to take advantage of the system, effectively living off the labor of others, hence becoming exploiters in their turn. Against this, theorists such as Kropotkin and Alexander Berkman (1870–1936) suggested that informal social pressures, new cultural norms, and a sense of solidarity would be sufficient to ensure a balance between production and consumption, with the social sanction of expulsion from the community reserved for the inevitable handful of intransigents. Buoyed by such arguments, anarchocommunism became, by the end of the nineteenth century, the most widely embraced ideological framework in the international anarchist movement, from Argentina to China, largely supplanting the “collectivist” position – favoring the continuation of a wage/price system with “collective ownership of the instruments of work” – that had predominated during the era of Bakunin’s leadership.

Ultimately, anarchocommunism would exercise influence over radical thinkers ranging from Nicaraguan revolutionary Augusto César Sandino (1895–1934) to American social ecologist Murray Bookchin (1921–2006). The Dutch Provos’ “White Bicycle Plan” (1965), the San Francisco Diggers’ “Free City” project (1967–8), Food Not Bombs (1980–), and the Free Software Movement (1985–) can be considered examples of an anarchocommunist system of free distribution in action.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Berkman, Alexander (1870–1936); Food Not Bombs, United States; Galleani, Luigi (1861–1931); Goldman, Emma (1869–1940); Kim Joa-jin (1889–1930); Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932); Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865); Reclus, Elisée (1830–1905); Sandino, Augusto César (1895–1934)

References and Suggested Readings

- Aldred, G. A. (1907) *The Possibility and Philosophy of Anarchist Communism*. London: Bakunin Press.
- Berkman, A. (1929/1972) *What Is Communist Anarchism?* New York: Dover.
- Cafiero, C. (1880/2005) Anarchy and Communism. In R. Graham (Ed.), *Anarchism: A Documentary History*, Vol. 1: *From Anarchy to Anarchism (300CE–1939)*. Montreal: Black Rose.

Kropotkin, P. (1887/2002) Anarchist Communism: Its Basis and Principles. In *Anarchism: A Collection of Revolutionary Writings*. Mineola: Dover.

Kropotkin, P. (1892/1995) *The Conquest of Bread and Other Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Malatesta, E. (1993) *Errico Malatesta: His Life and Ideas*. London: Freedom Press.

Pengam, A. (1987) Anarcho-Communism. In M. Rubel & J. Crump (Eds.), *Non-Market Socialism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Puente, I. (1932/2001) *Libertarian Communism*. Tucson: See Sharp Press.

Anarchosyndicalism

Jesse Cohn

Anarchosyndicalism is the term for the anarchist labor union movement (a labor union is called a *syndicat* in French, or a *sindicato* in Spanish). Powerful anarchosyndicalist organizations included the Federación Obrera Regional Argentina (founded 1901), the Industrial Workers of the World (founded 1905), the Confédération Générale du Travail (founded 1906), and the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (founded 1910). These unions were distinguished from their conventional counterparts not only by their radical goals – the abolition of capitalism and the state in favor of a system of generalized self-management – but also by their decentralized structure and willingness to engage in direct action, including extralegal tactics such as sabotage.

While anarchists had always placed great emphasis on the self-organization of workers at the point of production and on what Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) called “the political capacity of the working classes” as agents of revolutionary change, their attitudes toward unions as vehicles for collective bargaining and toward strikes as a tactic had been more ambivalent for a number of reasons. Proudhon, indeed, saw strikes as futile. Moreover, since trade unions lacked full legality under most governments during the early period of the anarchist movement, their utility was limited. With the legalization of unions, a number of anarchists saw a viable alternative to “propaganda by the deed” (sporadic acts of armed rebellion that failed to gain mass support) as well as to confining themselves to propaganda activities until the people became ready for revolution; by forming revolutionary

labor unions, anarchists could survive within the capitalist and state-dominated order while maintaining and expanding their capacity to oppose it – managing, as Emile Pouget (1860–1931) put it, to “live in the present with all possible combativity, sacrificing neither the present to the future, nor the future to the present.” Moreover, in the words of the IWW’s “Preamble,” by adopting an internally democratic and federative structure, the anarchosyndicalist union would prefigure a post-capitalist and post-statist order, “forming the structure of the new society within the shell of the old” – a conception not unlike that of council communists such as Rosa Luxemburg (1870–1919). The function of the union was often closely bound up with projects of political education, and each particular strike was to be seen as a rehearsal for the general strike that would topple the reigning system.

In practice, there have been tensions between the anarchist and syndicalist aspects of anarchosyndicalism, as unions found themselves pulled toward a politically neutral “pure syndicalism,” designed to maximize workers’ self-interest under capitalism, and an explicitly politicized, anti-capitalist “pure anarchism” that might alienate workers of the diverse political tendencies represented in union membership. Indeed, even within unions such as the CGT and IWW, anarchism was just one element in a mixture of ideologies, including Marxism and even Nietzschean philosophy, which sometimes went by the name of “revolutionary syndicalism.” Potential contradictions also existed between the particular interests of workers and the general interests of communities. Relations with anarchists of other tendencies (e.g., anarchocommunist, eco-anarchism) and priorities (e.g., gender equality, sexual freedom) have sometimes been fraught, despite attempts to bridge them. Finally, anarchosyndicalists past and present have met with opposition within the anarchist movement from “anti-organizationalists” who reject unions as new forms of discipline in embryo. Some labor historians have argued that the CNT behaved in just such a manner during the Spanish Civil War, albeit under the banner of “workers’ control.” Others have emphasized the degree to which anarchosyndicalism gave play to some of the most unruly and creative proletarian impulses.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchocommunist; Bourses du Travail; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo

(CNT); Confédération Générale du Travail and Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire; Dunbar, Andrew (1879–1964); Eco-anarchism; Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley (1890–1964); Galleani, Luigi (1861–1931); Gomas, Johnny (1901–1979); Gori, Pietro (1865–1911); Hatta Shūzō (1886–1934); Haywood, Big Bill (1869–1928); Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Pelloutier, Fernand (1867–1901) and the Bourses du Travail; Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865); Sachs, Solly (1900–1976); Syndicalism, France

References and Suggested Readings

- Ackelsberg, M. A. (2005) *Free Women of Spain: Anarchism and the Struggle for the Emancipation of Women*. Oakland: AK Press.
- Galleani, L. (1927/2006) *The Principle of Organization in the Light of Anarchism*. Cascadia: Pirate Press Portland.
- Pouget, E. (1910/2003) *Direct Action*. London: Kate Sharpley Library.
- Rocker, R. (1947/1989) *Anarchosyndicalism*. London: Pluto Press.
- Rosemont, F. (2003) *Joe Hill and the Making of a Revolutionary Workingclass Counterculture*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.
- Seidman, M. (1991) *Workers Against Work: Labor in Paris and Barcelona During the Popular Fronts*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Andresote and the Revolt against the Guipuzcaona (1731–1733)

Dario Azzellini

During the era of Spanish colonial slavery, Zambo Andresote was a leader of runaway slaves who staged a three-year revolt from 1730 to 1733 against Spanish colonial rule and monopoly control over trade in all goods, including humans, by the monarchy in the Yaracuy and Falcón regions of Venezuela. The son of an indigenous mother and African father, Juan Andrés López del Rosario was born into slavery, probably in Valencia, Venezuela and lived on the Portuguese-owned hacienda of Silva in Yagua.

After escaping with his brother José Francisco, Zambo – who became known as Andresote (Big Andrés) – formed an army of free Africans, indigenous people, mestizos, and Europeans opposed to Spanish monopoly control in the region of present-day Yaracuy State. Andresote’s

struggle was focused against the stranglehold over trade by *Compañía Guipuzcoana* (La Real *Compañía de Caracas*) that in 1728 was appointed by the Spanish crown to combat contraband and granted an exclusive monopoly over the import and export trade. The Spanish crown, with a financial stake in the Guipuzcoana, profited from the low cost of farming goods in colonial Venezuela that were exported and resold at higher prices in the Caribbean and Europe. The company actively engaged in the slave trade and imported Africans for sale as slaves to large landowners. The company's operations were extensive throughout Venezuela, including establishments on the coast in Maracaibo, Puerto Cabello, the Guaira, Cumana, and the more mountainous rural areas. To maintain the slave trade and a colonial monopoly over trade and prevent local peasants and farmers from reselling products to Dutch smugglers from the Antilles, Guipuzcoana applied a regime of terror against the free Africans, peasants, and their families who presented a threat to their most profitable business, the selling of slaves.

Andresote organized a rebel army to fight against slavery and the injustice of the Spanish colonialists, represented by *Compañía Guipuzcoana*. He organized and armed the resistance in the Caracas Valley and the mountains of Yaracuy, along the central coast and the Falcón Basin on the northwest coast of the Caribbean. The northern region had settlements of runaway slaves from Venezuela and the Dutch island of Curacao. Andresote established a dual campaign against Guipuzcoana, both leading rebel armies against the company and establishing commercial relations with Dutch traders from Curacao, who bought goods at higher prices and sold goods at lower prices to farmers than Guipuzcoana. The struggle provided farmers with a means to avoid the monopoly over trade established by the Spanish crown. The Andresote rebellion was supported among farmers from Barquisimeto, Nirgua, Carora, San Nicolás, Guanare, San Felipe, Morón, and other villages on the coast of Venezuela. About sixty Dutch joined his troops. He was the first in Latin America to practice guerrilla warfare and used rivers and sea to move and attack the Spaniards. The governor Sebastián García de la Torre at a certain point prohibited traveling by boat on the rivers.

In July 1731 Andresote defeated the colonial troops under the command of Luis Arias

Altamirano at the Yaracuy river mouth and after that the troops commanded by Juan Romualdo de Guevara, sent by the Spanish crown to suppress Andresote, who attacked several colonial army outposts to rescue confiscated products. In September 1731 Andresote warned the authorities to end the harassment or he would push Guipuzcoana completely from the province. The colonial governor García de la Torre declared war to the death against Andresote and his supporters. To achieve his goal, de la Torre appointed Juan de Manzaneda in October 1731 to form an expeditionary search party for Andresote's rebel army, which was based on the coast of Yaracuy. He stationed his troops in San Felipe and offered a reward of 600 pesos for his capture or death, but nobody betrayed Andresote's trust. On January 26, 1732 Manzaneda embarked on a search for Andresote with a party of 300 troops, but the mission was cut short when Andresote and his guerrillas ambushed Manzaneda and his troops at Guabinas Mountain. The violence led to the killing of five soldiers and the total disbanding of the colonial troops consisting mainly of colored people from Yaracuy and Barquisimeto. Most of Manzaneda's troops deserted the army and many joined Andresote. Manzaneda returned to San Felipe with just 46 men.

The governor decided to lead the search for Andresote personally. In February 1732 he moved with 70 soldiers from Caracas to San Felipe, formed an army of 1,500 men and distributed it along the valley. Any goods moved on the River Yaracuy were confiscated and any person resisting or trying to flee was shot. Several towns of free and runaway slaves were destroyed and a few suspected collaborators of Andresote killed. The Spanish crown appointed Martín de Lardizábal to defeat Andresote and fight Dutch smuggling. He installed a regime of terror with mass arrests, summary judgments, and executions. Andresote's brother José Francisco was arrested and brought to a jail in Cadiz, Spain. Andresote fled on a ship to Curacao. Since too many people were collaborating with Andresote, the colonial authorities suspended the executions. The repression did not stop the resistance. The troops were ambushed. Governor García de la Torre was accused of corruption and replaced in December 1732 by Martín de Lardizábal. The rebellion in the mountains of Yaracuy was finally dominated with the collaboration of the

Capuchin monks. Lardizával promised to pardon the followers of Andresote if they converted to Catholicism. But instead Lardizával planned to send rebels into forced labor, so they fled, armed, towards the Orinoco and built a free community.

Afterwards, Andresote vanished and was not heard from again, but was believed by some to be engaged in smuggling in Curacao. He is considered a national hero, revolutionary, and leader of the first anti-monopolistic struggle.

SEE ALSO: Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); Bolivarianism, Venezuela; Chirinos, José Leonardo (d. 1796); Venezuela, Negro Miguel Rebellion, 1552; Venezuelan War of Independence

References and Suggested Readings

Coello, A. (2000) *Crónicas desde Morón*. Valencia: Editorial El Viaje del Pez.

García, J. (1995) *La diáspora de los Kongos en las Américas y los caribes* Editorial Aplicum. Caracas: Conac y la Unesco.

Pollak-Eltz, A. (1977) Slave Revolts in Venezuela. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 292 (1), 439–45 doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.1977.tb47762.x

Angolan national liberation, 1961–1974

Jeff Shantz

Despite its mineral wealth, the Portuguese colony of Angola was poor, and there were few attempts at modernization until the 1920s, when Portuguese control was finally consolidated and the fascistic *Estado Novo* (New State) regime came to power. The widespread use of forced labor and forced cash-cropping, rapid urbanization and high unemployment, a surge in white immigration and heightened job competition, all generated growing tensions, and a variety of militant African nationalist currents emerged in the 1950s. The Angolan Communist Party was formed in 1953, followed by the Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola (PLUA) in early 1956. These merged to form the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) (MPLA).

The MPLA was influenced by Marxism-Leninism as well as cultural nationalism, and drew its cadres from the educated African and mulatto elite, many of whom were from the tiny

assimilado (“assimilated”) caste of black citizens ostensibly exempt from the racial laws. It initially focused on Luanda’s shanty towns. The collapse of the neighboring Belgian Congo (subsequently Zaire, then the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in 1959 sparked off riots in Luanda, suppressed through mass arrests and military operations. The MPLA’s urban base shattered and the party turned to rural armed struggle, headed by António Agostinho Neto from 1962.

Early 1960 saw military operations against a millenarian movement in the country’s central region, which opposed forced cotton cultivation. In early 1961 Africans attacked Luanda’s prison, and large-scale racial clashes swept the city. This was followed in March by an uprising in northern Angola, inspired by the National Liberation Front of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola) (FNLA). The FNLA had its origins in the Union of People of Northern Angola (later, the Union of Peoples of Angola) (UPA) formed in 1956. It was led by Holden Roberto, partly based in Zaire, and rooted among the Bakongo. This uprising, which involved massacres of whites, was put down by a major Portuguese counteroffensive. When Portuguese military operations ended in late 1961, perhaps 1,000 whites and 50,000 Africans had been killed.

In the early 1960s the FNLA was the only independence group with a mass base, or substantial activity; it expanded through mergers and fronts, pointedly excluding the MPLA. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola) (UNITA) was formed in 1965 as an FNLA breakaway: based among the Ovimbundu of the south-central area, it was more narrowly tribalist than the FNLA. Although the MPLA’s program was fairly moderate – including a pledge to protect sectors of private capital (Harsch & Thomas 1976) – it was aligned to, and supported by, the Soviet Union. The MPLA was weak in the early 1960s. By 1967, however, it had bases in Zambia and Zaire, and ongoing military operations.

As the 1960s progressed, Portugal’s African empire came close to collapse in the face of growing, largely rural liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. Fearing instability and Soviet influence in a strategically important area, the United States decided in 1961 to provide support to Portugal.

Besides providing military training, Washington gave tacit approval to the use of American weapons, obtained through NATO. From 1953 to 1968 it provided more than \$340 million in military aid, and \$151 million in economic aid, to Portugal. At the same time, it also kept in contact with the African nationalists, covertly providing arms and money to the FNLA as early as 1962 (Harsch & Thomas 1976: 17, 21).

Portugal was economically weak, and liberalized foreign investment in its “overseas provinces.” Belgian Petrofina began oil production in Angola in 1955, forming a joint company with the colonial government called Petrangol. From 1966, Gulf Oil started developing the massive oil deposits, notably in Cabinda. Angola became the fourth largest oil producer in Africa by the early 1970s. It was also the second major coffee grower in Africa (and the third largest in the world): the coffee was largely sold to America; production and distribution were controlled by France and South Africa (the latter also dominated the major diamond fields of the northeast). The German multinational Krupp controlled the key iron mines of Huila.

After 1961 the developing Angolan revolution was limited to rural skirmishes, with few strikes or actions in the cities, and competition and armed conflict between the rebel forces left the resistance relatively ineffective. There were at the time, however, major political and military victories in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau by the Soviet-linked African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independencia do Guine e Cabo Verde) (PAIGC) and the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) (FRELIMO).

The colonial wars took a huge toll on Lisbon: 150,000 troops were active in Africa, with military expenditures accounting for half of the Portuguese budget. Growing opposition to the colonial wars emerged within a context of economic crisis, high inflation, and unemployment – conditions that greatly increased popular Portuguese discontent. This culminated in the left-wing military coup of April 1974, which ended the *Estado Novo* and set in a colonial settlement. The Portuguese coup, and the Carnation Revolution that followed, encouraged mobilization among Angola’s African working class, moving the center of resistance from the countryside. A strike wave started that lasted more

than a year. Urban workers in Luanda, Lobito, Benguela, Nova Lisboa, and elsewhere struck for better pay and conditions, and against racial discrimination. Workers walked off the job in such key sectors as the British-owned Benguela railway, and the ports of Luanda and Lobito. On May 26, 1974, 20,000 demonstrated in Luanda for independence. On July 15, in response to vigilante white attacks on African areas, a general strike was called, followed by occupations of universities and high schools by students and staff. African trade unions had been almost non-existent before the coup, but now workers’ committees were widely formed.

Lisbon’s new government did not initially envisage full decolonization. Since none of the independence forces were clear victors, Portugal set out with some success to get the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA into a coalition government with the Portuguese authorities: all three groups worked with Lisbon to end the strike wave, passing a decree allowing the government to place workers under “military control, discipline and jurisdiction.” This was used to break dockers’ strikes in Lobito and Luanda. Later, wildcat strikes were made illegal. All three made regular appeals to end strikes, for the sake of the liberation struggle or of national reconstruction. Socialist rhetoric aside, the MPLA joined its coalition partners in favoring private property and foreign investment.

There were, however, serious tensions in the coalition. In part these were simply those inevitable in power struggles; they were also ideological. While the FNLA and UNITA stressed narrow racial (and also ethnic) nationalisms, the MPLA favored the Soviet Union, recruited mulattos and whites, sought to overcome the *assimilado/indigeno* (“indigenous”) split, and wanted to a unified “People’s Republic”; much of its support was in practice drawn from the Kimbundu.

All three groups sought allies, becoming embroiled in Cold War and regional geopolitics. The FNLA and UNITA worked with Washington and apartheid South Africa, while the MPLA secured Soviet and Cuban support. Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime in Zaire then sponsored an unsuccessful FNLA putsch, precipitating the collapse of the coalition in July and the start of a civil war. Urban battles started; the great majority of Portuguese fled, and UNITA and FNLA supporters were driven from the MPLA

zones. South Africa invaded, sweeping through southern and coastal Angola. The MPLA called in Cuban and Soviet aid, the South Africans withdrew, and the MPLA took Luanda: Neto was proclaimed the first president of the People's Republic of Angola on November 11, 1975. The MPLA was decidedly authoritarian and centralist. Self-defense organizations in Luanda's poor areas were disbanded and reorganized under MPLA control; armed formations outside the MPLA's control were made illegal, and the MPLA's armed wing formed the core of the national army. A one-party state was established until 1991: factionalism in the party was banned, the breakaway Communist Organization of Angola was suppressed, and a coup attempt by a rival MPLA group in 1977 was crushed.

The MPLA government was recognized by Portugal, and Neto's Independence Day speech stressed "the constitution enacted by the MPLA guaranteed the protection of private property, 'including that of foreigners, so long as it benefits the economy of the country and is in the interests of the Angolan people'" (Harsch & Thomas 1976: 88–9). Aid was forthcoming from Canada, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Despite Washington's support of its rivals, the MPLA was even open to American investment. However, the Soviet bloc had a large military and political presence and influence, and the MPLA declared itself Marxist-Leninist in 1976. Like FRELIMO, it moved towards central planning and extensive nationalization, along with Guinea-Bissau increasingly resembling Cuba and Vietnam – this further embroiled them in Cold War machinations.

The FNLA and UNITA established a rival Democratic People's Republic in Huambo, 500 miles from Luanda in the southeast, backed by the United States and South Africa (and occasionally, mainland China and others). American military and other aid was funneled through the Mobutu regime in Zaire. The Mobutu regime had its own interests in Angola, notably control over the oil fields of Cabinda, as well as its port, which would have given Zaire improved access to the ocean. Zaire also transported about 35 percent of its copper, its principal export, through Angola along the Benguela railway. As a long-time backer of the FNLA, Mobutu had good reason to worry that a victory for the MPLA would provide the impetus for opponents of his dictatorship.

A further front was opened up by the Cabinda Separatist Movement. Cabinda was a Portuguese protectorate from 1885, lying between Zaire and the French colonial region of the Middle Congo (now Congo-Brazzaville, or the Republic of the Congo): it was merged into Angola in 1956, contributing to the formation in 1963 of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). The Cabindan separatists were not part of the transitional government established by the Alvor Accord – the agreement also affirmed Angola's integrity – and declared independence in August 1975. Opposed to secession, and fearing the loss of a region that provided most of the oil that funded the Luanda government, the MPLA (joined by Cuban troops) invaded. The FLEC continued to struggle, split into several groups, and the conflict still continues.

American strategists saw Angola as strategically critical to US aims, as did the Soviets. At one time Angola seemed poised to stand alongside Vietnam, Cambodia, and Guatemala as symbols of American intervention, and the American intervention in Angola followed the pattern of postwar adventures in Asia and Latin America. South Africa was also opposed to Soviet influence, concerned with containing African nationalism, and weakened by the fall of its Portuguese ally, and periodically intervened directly, and provided ongoing and substantial support to the FNLA and UNITA.

The civil war ultimately continued until 2002. One of the longest and largest Cold War conflicts, it left more than half a million dead. With the exception of the Cubans, most foreign forces left in 1976. MPLA forces entered South West Africa several times after José Eduardo dos Santos replaced Neto in 1979, and sponsored anti-Mobutu armed groups in Zaire; South Africa invaded Angola again in 1980, and undertook further incursions from 1981 to 1987. The superpowers also increased their support to the rival sides in the 1980s, with perhaps 15,000 Cuban troops fighting alongside the MPLA by 1987. One of Africa's largest battles took place at Cuito Cuanavale in Cuando Cubango province from January to March 1988, as UNITA and South African forces clashed with the MPLA and the Cubans.

The result was a stalemate, leading to a short-lived ceasefire, and indirectly, to Namibia's independence from South Africa in 1990 and Cuba and South Africa's withdrawal from the

conflict. The MPLA was by this stage spending almost half of its budget on the war (including payments to Havana for its troops), adopted elements of neoliberalism in the late 1980s, joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF), formally abandoning Marxism-Leninism in 1991, and ran against UNITA in elections in 1992; the latter withdrew after a narrow loss. The war resumed anew, but the FNLA – by this time a very minor force, having declined sharply since the 1970s – did not participate.

The Angolan civil war would ultimately drag on into 2002, when UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was killed by government troops; the war in Cabinda continues. By this time, the country was left in an ongoing humanitarian crisis and severe economic problems: Neto's dream of an African Soviet future had been buried deep beneath 27 years of war, power struggles, and a changing world. The Angolan Revolution was over.

SEE ALSO: FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique); MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; Zimbabwe, National Liberation Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Harsch, E. & Thomas, T. (1976) *Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War*. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Hodges, T. (2001) *Angola: From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism*. Oxford/Bloomington: James Currey/Indiana University Press.
- Martin, P. (1980) *Historical Dictionary of Angola*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.
- Wright, G. (1997) *The Destruction of a Nation: United States' Policy Toward Angola since 1945*. London: Pluto Press.

Anthony, Susan B. (1820–1906)

Amy Linch

Susan B. Anthony was a crucial force in the 72-year struggle for women's suffrage in the United States. She spent nearly sixty years as an activist, organizer, and lecturer, initially in support of legal protection for women and the abolition of slavery, and later in single-minded dedication to women's suffrage. As an abolitionist, she called for an end to white male dominance

and practical realization of the ideals expressed in the United States founding documents. The Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, she argued, were based on the universal principle of inalienable natural rights. It was not the prerogative of white men to retain these rights for themselves alone; all women and African American men were entitled to full political participation. In the wake of the Civil War, codification of an explicitly male citizenship through the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution led Anthony and her lifelong associate, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, to focus solely on women's rights. Their organization, the National Women's Suffrage Association (1869), represented the radical wing of the suffrage movement, endorsing a broad platform of political and social reforms that addressed the condition of working-class and poor women. Anthony's commitment to women's equal rights never wavered, but over time suffrage increasingly trumped comprehensive social reform as she became determined that once women could vote they would create a better society.

Anthony grew up in a progressive Quaker family where she received the same education as her brothers and was accustomed to the right to speak within her community. Like many women's rights activists of the nineteenth century, she became aware of women's public inequality with men when she entered the workforce to help her family recover from financial ruin after the Panic of 1837. Anthony took a job as a teacher in a girls' school with a salary less than a quarter of that of her male colleagues and few prospects for advancement. Her firsthand experience with practical obstacles to women's autonomy, and women's vulnerability in the face of dependence on fathers and husbands, informed much of her later commitment to women's labor, education, and financial independence. After ten years she retired from teaching and became an active member of the temperance movement. She attended the first Women's Rights Convention in Seneca Falls in 1848 as a temperance advocate. Through subsequent conventions she became acquainted with leading abolitionists and women's rights activists.

The temperance movement was concerned with allaying the social cost of alcoholism borne by women and children, but it did not explicitly politicize the institutional inequality that tied women's fate entirely to that of their husbands.

Anthony recognized the impact of women's lack of political power on their ability to achieve reform when she and several other women were denied the right to speak at a temperance convention in 1853. Much as the denial of public voice at the world anti-slavery conference in 1840 radicalized Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton in the pursuit of women's rights, Anthony henceforth regarded women's political equality as fundamental to the success of the reform movement. She incorporated women's rights into the temperance campaign, the education and labor reform movements, and the struggle to end slavery.

In the 1850s women's rights and abolition were common cause for Anthony and she became an outspoken advocate of freedom from bondage, full citizenship, and full participation for all women and African American men. In 1856 she was recruited by Abby Kelly Foster to the American Anti-Slavery Society, led by Douglass and Garrison, and began traveling the lecture circuit in support of abolition, with the agreement that she could also promote women's rights. In her lectures and writings she challenged both slavery and gender inequality by appealing to the natural rights language of the Declaration of Independence. At the Ninth National Women's Rights Convention in 1859 she asked her audience, "Where under our Declaration of Independence does the Saxon man get his power to deprive all women and Negroes of their inalienable rights?"

In the same year Anthony addressed the State Teachers' Association in both New York and Massachusetts, arguing for coeducation and against the commonly accepted idea that there were mental differences between the sexes. Coeducation was necessary, she asserted, to overcome such social myths by proving women's equal competence with men and providing them with the opportunity for self-development. She campaigned for equal educational opportunities for all, regardless of race or gender – a fight she would extend to include the rights of children of ex-slaves to attend public school once slavery was finally abolished.

During this period Anthony faced intense resistance to women's rights. She frequently met hostility and ridicule as she lectured in support of property rights for married women, guardianship rights for women over their children, relaxation of divorce law, and women's right to their own wages. Her embrace of the short dress

and "bloomers," designed by Libby Miller and popularized by Amelia Bloomer, in the name of comfort, health, and "the principle of rational dress" during the 1853 campaign for these reforms in New York State was a particular target of harassment. The experience ultimately led her to focus on one reform at a time: "By urging two, both are injured, as the average mind can grasp and assimilate but one idea at a time. I have felt ever since that experience that if I wished my hearers to consider the suffrage question I must not present the temperance, the religious, the dress, or any other besides, but must confine myself to suffrage" (Harper 1969: 117).

The depth of this lesson and its impact on her political strategy would not come to fruition until the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment. Prior to the war, slavery was regarded by women's rights advocates and abolitionists alike as the more egregious moral issue. Ending slavery was a clear priority over advancing women's suffrage but Anthony, like many abolitionists, saw the two issues as part of a single project of creating a just society. In an 1863 address to the Loyal League of the North, which she and Stanton organized to promote abolition, Anthony exhorted women to take up their positions as moral educators and cease supporting a social order created out of the pride and ambition of white men. In response to complaints from participants that women should be concerned with their own affairs rather than become distracted by the issue of slavery, she invoked the republican principle of equal representation inherent in the Constitution. Peace within the union, ending slavery, women's political rights, and the rights of the enslaved were inseparable commitments.

After the Civil War, solidarity between the abolitionists and women's rights activists fell victim to the partisan struggle to institutionalize reform. Radical Republicans were interested in enfranchising the freedmen in order to consolidate political control over the defeated South, but women's suffrage had no similar base of support. Radical Republicans refused to jeopardize the proposed amendment to secure the vote for African American men by including women's suffrage – the latter, in their opinion, would guarantee defeat. They argued for suffrage on grounds of expediency as a defense against tyranny: just as it had been necessary to arm African Americans to win the war, they should be armed with the vote to protect themselves against the old

regime. Garrison, Douglass, and other abolitionists supported the Republican argument, hoping to salvage what they could of their Reconstruction agenda and pursue subsequent reforms through the party. In the reactionary postwar climate the soldier-citizen ideal displaced universal equality as the justification for suffrage and reinstated exclusive male equality as the dominant discourse of citizenship.

Anthony was dismayed at the betrayal of Fredrick Douglass and many of the men who had shared her commitment to political emancipation for black men and all women. She opposed the amendment, arguing: “This is the hour to press woman’s claims; we have stood with the black man in the Constitution over half a century . . . Enfranchise him, and we are left outside with lunatics, idiots and criminals” (O’Neil 1971: 17). From her perspective women had moved from equal partners with the abolitionists to second-class constituents. She and Stanton repudiated the Republican Party and sought support from Democrats in their Kansas campaign for women’s rights.

Anthony’s split with suffragists who endorsed a gradualist approach to reform became decisive at the American Equal Rights Association convention in 1869. Anthony and Stanton perceived the largely New England faction of suffragists who supported Garrison and the Fifteenth Amendment as abandoning the commitment to equal rights by insisting that black male suffrage took priority. They further criticized this group for generalizing the experience of all women from their own comfortable, middle-class positions. Immediately after the convention Anthony and Stanton secretly formed the National Women’s Suffrage Association. The NWSA was centrally organized and granted full membership only to women. They mobilized working women, encouraged women’s financial independence, and endorsed equal pay for women as well as reform of marriage and divorce law. For the next 20 years the suffrage movement was divided between the NWSA and the American Women’s Suffrage Association led by Lucy Stone and Henry Blackwell.

Anthony’s focus on women’s rights led her to form pragmatic alliances with groups whose interests ran counter to her own previously held convictions, and occasionally put her at odds with other reform groups. In 1868 she and Stanton drew the wrath of the New England abolitionists

for campaigning with George Train, an outspoken advocate of “educated suffrage,” through which he opposed enfranchising black men in the South. Train provided start up funds for *The Revolution*, a weekly journal Anthony and Stanton produced from 1868 to 1870. *The Revolution* endorsed an eight-hour work day, equal pay for equal work, and a nationalist economic policy to support domestic workers. Her encouragement of women’s labor ultimately challenged the interests of male workers, however, and in 1870 she was accused of strike breaking and expelled from the National Labor Union for urging employers to hire women.

Under Anthony’s direction the National Women’s Suffrage Association pursued a federal strategy toward women’s suffrage. Initially she sought legal recognition of women’s right to vote under the existing Constitution through the courts. Arguing that women, by virtue of their personhood, were entitled to the rights of citizens articulated in the Constitution, Anthony and a number of other suffragists voted in the 1872 presidential election. Their effort brought a great deal of media attention to the cause but not the desired outcome. She was arrested, convicted in a sham trial, and fined \$100. She refused to pay the fine, but the judge did not take further action, denying her the opportunity to appeal the case. During the same period women in other districts also claimed the right to vote, and several of these cases did advance through the courts. By 1875, after a series of rulings that rejected a constitutional right to women’s suffrage, Anthony was convinced that the legal strategy was a dead end. She began the campaign for a federal amendment that became her sole focus for the rest of her life.

The NWSA differed from the AWSA both in strategy and justification for women’s suffrage. The AWSA sought change at the local and state level, arguing that women should vote because their roles as mothers and members of their communities gave them an important vantage on public policy. Anthony argued strategically that this approach was burdensome to women, most of whom were geographically confined by family and domestic responsibilities. In the early years of the movement Anthony’s organization also maintained a clear commitment to broad political reform in the name of universal equality. Strategy increasingly trumped principle, however, as Anthony responded to the changing institutional

and social context of the late nineteenth century. Natural rights arguments gave way to an essentialist discourse of femininity that justified placing suffrage above all other concerns. Women's self-development replaced equality as the movement attempted to appeal to white supremacists in the South and growing nativist and elite republican sensibilities in the North.

By 1890 Anthony had all but abandoned her public commitment to overthrow male domination in the home and workplace in an effort to appeal to as many women as possible. In violation of the bylaws of the NWSA and against the will of many of its members, she created a special NWSA committee to vote on a merger with the AWSA. Convinced that the two organizations must unite forces and focus exclusively on the vote, she strong-armed the merger by stacking the committee with members who favored it and asking two who did not to resign. The new organization, the National American Women's Suffrage Association, consolidated the suffrage movement but it marginalized radical voices and rejected support from African American women. Anthony refused to take a stand on Jim Crow laws and, in deference to the South, took a strong states' rights position on black women's suffrage, betraying her long-held conviction that the right to vote was a federal issue. While privately she rejected racial arguments and continued to support black women's rights organizations, she saw her commitment to universal equality as a public liability in the effort to generate support for suffrage.

Anthony succeeded Stanton as president of NAWSA (1892–1900). Although she was 80 years old when she passed leadership of the organization to Carrie Chapman Catt, Anthony persisted in the fight for women's suffrage. She promoted international solidarity among women and brought worldwide attention to women's rights by co-founding the International Woman Suffrage Alliance with Catt in 1902, and heading the United States delegation to the International Council of Women in Berlin two years later. She also continued her campaign for educational opportunities for women by serving on the board of trustees of Rochester's State Industrial School where she fought for coeducation and equal treatment of girls and boys. In 1900 when the campaign for coeducation at the University of Rochester fell short of the required \$50,000 in pledges, Anthony frantic-

ally worked to close the gap, contributing the cash value of her life insurance policy to make up the final \$2,000 that compelled the university to open its doors to women.

Anthony's last public words, "Failure is impossible," became a rallying cry for the final years of the suffrage movement. She died in 1906, 14 years before the achievement of her goal. The "Women's Suffrage Amendment," written by Anthony in 1878, was ratified as the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in August 1920.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Douglass, Frederick (1817–1895); Garrison, William Lloyd (1805–1879); Stanton, Elizabeth Cady (1815–1902)

References and Suggested Readings

- Buhle, M. J. & Buhle, P. (Eds.) (1978) *The Concise History of Woman Suffrage: Selections from the Classic Work of Stanton, Anthony, Gage and Harper*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Gordon, A. (Ed.) (1997) *The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Harper, I. H. (1969) *The Life and Work of Susan B. Anthony: Reprint of the 1898–1908 Edition*. Indianapolis: Hollenback Press. Available at www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/15220.
- Marilley, S. (1996) *Woman Suffrage and the Origins of Liberal Feminism in the United States, 1820–1920*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- O'Neill, W. L. (1971) *Everyone Was Brave: A History of Feminism in America*. New York: Quadrant Press.

Anti-apartheid movement, South Africa

Dale T. McKinley

The anti-apartheid movement in South Africa can broadly be defined as encompassing those who actively opposed a political, cultural, and socio-economic system defined by separate development based on race. While the roots of this system can be traced back many years, it was in opposition to the institutionalized program of apartheid in 1948 by the white supremacist National Party that an anti-apartheid movement was born. The key purpose of this movement – which encompassed a wide range of organizations

and constituencies but centered on the nationalist African National Congress (ANC) – was the attainment of majority rule. The movement existed until the apartheid system was formally ended with South Africa's first non-racial democratic elections on April 27, 1994.

Early Years

When the National Party (NP) won the white elections in 1948, the main forces confronting the new apartheid regime consisted of a multi-class black national liberation movement, the ANC, its ally the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), and various black unions representing a small portion of South Africa's burgeoning worker population. The ANC had become more militant as a result of the efforts of CPSA leaders like Moses Kotane and J. B. Marks, and of Africanist activists like Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo. The more passive outlook represented by older leaders like A. B. Xuma was marginalized, and a commitment to mass activity was put in place. It did not take long for the NP to implement a raft of oppressive apartheid legislation which, among others, included the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, the Immorality Act, the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act, and the Suppression of Communism Act, the latter aimed at the CPSA but sufficiently broad to be used against most opponents of the regime.

In response, the ANC and some of the unions embarked on a series of stayaways, or mass strikes, in 1950, and launched a Defiance Campaign in 1952 that was designed to repeal Acts passed since 1948 by bringing together, nationally, local grievances that emanated from disparate communities. Conceived as a non-violent mass action campaign, it followed the same strategic logic as previous ANC activities, the belief that through moral argument, and example, the government could be persuaded to mend its ways. While the campaign stated the need to bring the masses into action, the core of the campaign centered on highly public acts of leaders engaging in civil disobedience, in which most workers could not afford to participate. It achieved none of the reforms it demanded.

In 1953 the ANC's approach resulted in the establishment of what became known as the Congress Alliance. This brought together ANC (representing Africans), the Congress of Demo-

crats (representing whites), the South African Colored Organization (representing Coloreds), and the South African Indian Congress (incorporating the Natal Indian Congress and other bodies, and representing Indians). It was later joined by the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), formed in 1955 and in which communists like Ray Alexander Simons and Elias Motsoaledi were active, and the predominantly white Federation of South African Women (FSAW). The underground South African Communist Party (SACP), formed in 1953 as successor to the banned CPSA, was also involved. There was no small irony that the Alliance mirrored the racial categories of the apartheid state: national identification had come full circle.

Although the Congress Alliance certainly represented the largest and widest coalition of anti-apartheid forces to date, opposition did arise. Arguing that the Alliance's "multi-racialism" undermined radical African nationalism, and led to undue Indian, white, and communist influence, a small group of ANC Youth League members opposed ANC participation. It was these men who were, in 1959, to lead a splinter group out of the ANC and form the rival liberation movement, the exclusivist Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). There was also opposition from left critics of the ANC such as the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) and smaller independent trade unions who in the main rejected the Alliance's racial departmentalization.

The Alliance drew up the now-famous Freedom Charter in June 1955, which set out a basic program and demands. Conceptualized as a document that would express the views of the people of South Africa in a nationalist movement for equality, the Freedom Charter became the guiding manifesto of the ANC-led Alliance and came to be regarded by large sections of the black population as representative of their aspirations; it became a rallying point for the majority of those involved in the international side of the anti-apartheid movement.

The adoption of the Freedom Charter represented two important developments in the anti-apartheid movement. First, it codified the ANC alliance's commitment to a strategy for national liberation that advocated a multi-class movement and provided the logical foundation for a strategy of ideological and class accommodationism. The concept of the people came to be seen primarily as constituent of all social classes

divided along racial lines, and national liberation was separated from social liberation. Second, it represented a particular ideological “party-line,” the program of a political organization seeking a prominent role in governing the country. The conscious fusion of a party program with an all-inclusive national “will” provided the ANC with the basis to claim a national mandate, not subject to the scrutiny or to the democratic processes otherwise associated with the principle of popular, mass-based party politics.

The adoption of the Freedom Charter was not well received by the apartheid government. Using the Suppression of Communism Act and the Native Labor Act (1953) the state began to arrest or ban from political activity union and left activists. Pass laws were enforced with greater zeal, and the white authorities vigorously pursued the ethnic fragmentation and control of the non-white population via the Group Areas Act. The state arrested almost the entire Congress Alliance leadership in 1956, among them Kotane, Mandela, Tambo, and Joe Slovo, for treason, setting in motion an infamous Treason Trial that dragged on until 1960. Almost the entire senior leadership was found not guilty for lack of evidence.

In response to both the state’s offensive and local socioeconomic conditions there was a noticeable upsurge in oppositional activity in the late 1950s, with boycotts, stayaways and other strike action, anti-pass struggles, rural revolts, and public demonstrations. The culmination of this intense period of widespread resistance was the Sharpeville Massacre in March 1960, when up to 70 people were killed during a PAC-led march against pass laws. While this was followed by widespread rioting, demonstrations, strikes, stayaways, marches, and a short-lived armed rural revolt led by the PAC, the apartheid state’s iron fisted response, which included the banning of the ANC and the PAC, quickly smashed the resistance.

The unprecedented turmoil that Sharpeville and its aftermath brought to South Africa meant that for the first time the apartheid state had to contend with widespread international condemnation. International investors became jittery and temporarily withdrew substantial amounts of capital from the country, although once it became clear that the state had effectively crushed the resistance, financial support and trade resumed with increased vigor. Small, anti-apartheid solidarity groups were formed in

several western (notably the United Kingdom), Eastern bloc, and “third world” countries and began to lay the foundations for what would later become the international component of the anti-apartheid movement.

Externalized Armed Struggle

In 1961 a small group of leading individuals in the now-underground ANC and SACP declared the formation of an armed organization, *Umkhonto We Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation, or MK): unlike the main sections of the Congress Alliance, this was an interracial organization. In its first months, MK engaged in the sporadic sabotage of minor infrastructure: while proving of important propaganda value, it posed no serious negative military or strategic threat to the apartheid regime. Leaders like Slovo and Tambo were sent abroad to secure international support. Largely through the SACP’s relationships with the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries, military and financial support was secured, and an external ANC headquarters set up in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Before MK was able to make any real progress in consolidating itself abroad, Mandela – who had secretly returned to South Africa after leaving the country in early 1962 – was arrested inside the country in August 1962. Soon after, in early 1963, almost the entire internal leadership of the ANC/MK was arrested in Rivonia on the outskirts of Johannesburg, and subsequently most were sentenced to life imprisonment.

Throughout this period, and for most of the 1960s, mass struggle virtually ceased to exist inside the country. The apartheid state had succeeded in wiping out the organized ANC underground, and showed brutal efficiency in suppressing labor and local community struggles. While SACTU was never banned, it collapsed as a union as its key figures focused on MK. The PAC, whose main leaders had been imprisoned, and which was also attempting to establish an externally based guerilla struggle, had little impact. The externalized ANC-SACP-MK had yet to launch any kind of serious guerilla activity, and was generally moribund.

Although the stated intention of the ANC and MK was to reinforce, and spur, mass struggle, the way in which the armed struggle was undertaken and justified made this almost impossible. The decision taken to use armed

struggle had been unilateral, and justified by the supposed lack of alternatives, which made the old tactics unfeasible. This ignored the possibility of combining “legal and peaceful” struggle with “illegal” mass struggle. In ruling out long-term internal mass mobilization and organization, and opting for armed propaganda – which in the circumstances could only be externally based – to stimulate the same, the ANC and SACP necessarily placed the content of their struggle outside the masses.

The one area where the exiled liberation movement did attain some success was in gaining international support and solidarity. From a very early stage in its strategy of externalization, the ANC/SACP (and to a lesser extent, and less successfully, the PAC) devoted substantial time and effort to diplomatic work. With the support provided by the Eastern bloc, the ANC/SACP/MK was able to establish a modest presence in Tanzania, with the bulk of recruits situated in four camps around the country. The ANC was also beginning to have some success at attracting the support of the Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden. Most of the SACP leadership and structures were located in London, and contacts with the Communist Party of Great Britain and other organizations led to the establishment of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), which in the 1970s and 1980s spawned a global network of similar anti-apartheid movements elsewhere. In Africa the ANC relied on friendly but cash-strapped states, Tanzania and later Zambia and Angola, for bases. The PAC, whose main ally was China, was not well connected, and experienced severe financial problems due to its primary reliance on pan-African support.

The failure of MK campaigns at Wankie and Sipolilo compelled the ANC to convene a national consultative conference, at Morogoro, Tanzania, in 1969: attended mainly by MK delegates, it was very critical of the ANC’s exile leadership, and communists were prominent in the ANC’s new executive. MK was put under the supervision of a “revolutionary council” that answered to the ANC’s national executive, and included non-African communists, among them Slovo. Membership of the ANC (although not senior leadership positions) was opened to non-Africans, replacing the Congress Alliance approach. SACTU, by now basically an exile group, remained closely tied to the ANC.

The ANC adopted the Strategy and Tactics program, largely drafted by Slovo. This argued that South Africa was a system of “colonialism of a special type” and that the immediate task was “national democracy,” not socialism. It solidified the externalized guerilla warfare approach: while the working class constituted a “distinct and reinforcing layer of our liberation and Socialism” (the only place socialism was identified as a goal of struggle), the thrust of the struggle was “destroying the existing social and economic relationships” to “bring with it a correction of the historical injustices perpetrated against the indigenous majority and thus lay the basis for a new – and deeper internationalist – approach.”

By the mid-1970s the anti-apartheid movement was reaping the bitter consequences of its approach: externally based guerilla war was a failure; relationships between the leadership and rank and file were strained; there was a near complete lack of structures in South Africa; the apartheid state was secure; domestic and international capital were prospering in the country. It was not without a degree of irony that the impetus for changing this situation was to come, not from the external ANC, but from renewed internal struggle.

Internal Struggle, Internationalized Politics

While the anti-apartheid movement was trying to deal with its own crisis, apartheid South Africa was beginning to experience the systemic contradictions of apartheid-capitalism. The historic division of labor between well-paid, skilled white workers and low-wage unskilled black workers had been undermined by an expanding economy. Large-scale foreign investment during the 1960s, the subsequent take-off in the manufacturing sector, and the need of the apartheid state to create ever expanding economic opportunities for its white supporters placed contradictory political and socioeconomic demands on a state unwilling and unable to adapt. This was partly a political crisis; it was also a crisis of over accumulation. The apartheid state and domestic capital responded with attempts to corporatize African labor, develop a consumerist black “middle class,” streamline production, and find external avenues for investment. The situation indicated the importance of specifically anti-capitalist struggle, and class oppression, which by

itself the “national” component of the liberation struggle could not really address.

In early 1973 tens of thousands of workers in the coastal city of Durban went on a spontaneous strike and succeeded in getting most of their wage demands met. Their example set off other nationwide struggles which met with mixed responses of repression and attempts at cooption. The workers infused a new sense of struggle among the black population and catalyzed a new breed of independent “workerist” unions, concentrating on industrial unionism and shop-floor organization, which eventually gathered as the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) in 1979. SACTU, maintaining that South Africa was a “fascist” state, demonstrated its profound isolation by claiming the new unions were puppets of the apartheid regime.

On another internal front, there had been growing unrest among African and Colored students in the early 1970s over the poor quality of government education for people of color, the lack of opportunities for further education, and the general lack of any coherent internal struggle. The students had formed their own representative bodies, which soon led to the formation of a new strand of the anti-apartheid movement, the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). Despite its strategic limitations and lack of a mass base, the BCM influenced an entire generation, particularly young intellectuals and urban students. It was this group which sparked off the 1976 Soweto uprisings, and then provided, particularly through mass infusion of young exiles into the ANC, the means to resurrect the armed struggle and a much needed injection of energy. BCM structures, along with new labor formations, were the main focus of internal struggle throughout the 1970s.

Despite the infusion of thousands of young South Africans into the ranks of the external liberation movements (mainly the ANC/SACP/MK) and an increase in armed sabotage activities inside the country during the early 1980s, the apartheid state was far from threatened, the geopolitical obstacles were formidable and the internal conditions necessary for successful guerilla-type operations were tenuous. The one change clearly working in favor of the movements was the growing anti-apartheid sentiment (mainly evidenced through a growing divestment campaign), increasingly among sections of (white) domestic and international corporate

capital who argued for serious political change in order to head off a potential anti-capitalist revolution. The ANC’s international presence had, by the early 1980s, become gigantic. Apart from the thousands of MK cadres in camps around the region, the organization had a large educational complex in Tanzania, an administrative headquarters in Lusaka (Zambia), several hundred ANC members studying at foreign universities, and a diplomatic presence in over thirty countries, with the base in London the most important.

The growing socioeconomic crisis in South Africa, the failure or subversion of various reform initiatives, and intensified resistance from ever-larger sections of the African, Colored, and Indian population, led by workers, students, and community (“civic”) organizations, eventually led to the formation of two national “front” mass movements in 1983: the BCM-aligned National Forum, and the ANC-aligned United Democratic Front (UDF). Although organizations affiliated to the National Forum did wage various struggles, especially within the student movement, and while the Forum had an overtly socialist program, it was the UDF that attracted the majority of grassroots organizations into its fold, and that took center stage as the internal anti-apartheid struggle intensified throughout the 1980s.

By the mid-1980s South Africa was on fire as township residents and organized workers – the majority, including the FOSATU unions, now united in the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU), formed in 1985 – engaged in intense and militant resistance against anything and anyone representing the apartheid state. This internal struggle was spurred on by the externalized ANC’s call at its 1985 conference in Kabwe, Zambia, to make the country “ungovernable.” Given the internal uprisings, the ANC/SACP/MK opted for a strategy of a “people’s war” which sought to use MK to arm and train people in their communities in order to launch effective armed and mass resistance to the apartheid state, a process which, it was hoped, would culminate in an insurrectionary seizure of power. The ANC and SACP adopted a sympathetic approach to COSATU, where they had the support of key figures like COSATU president Elijah Barayi, and won over “workerist” figures like Moses Mayekiso.

Such hopes however, were short-lived as the apartheid state, now controlled by hardline

politicians and military officers, launched its “total strategy” of crushing all resistance. Through a series of legislated states of emergency, banning of internal movements, including the UDF, the massive deployment of security forces, and a program of destabilizing southern African countries supporting the external liberation movements, the apartheid state succeeded in containing attempts at “people’s war” and “people’s power.” However, the financial and strategic costs of the hard-line approach were such that by the late 1980s the state had little choice but to seek a political compromise with its enemies, ranging from the Cubans in Angola, to sections of domestic capital, to international finance capital, to powerful western countries such as the USA, to a global coalition of nongovernmental/student/community/political organizations.

The combined result of the internal and international developments during the 1980s was a concerted, all-round push for a negotiated settlement to end apartheid. The ANC, alongside its external and internal allies, including imprisoned ANC leaders like Mandela, had become the dominant representatives of the anti-apartheid struggle, and were now fully committed to a negotiations strategy. As hopes for a revolutionary seizure of power faded along with the movement’s ability to build a viable internal underground linked to popular armed struggle, the negotiations strategy was, effectively, a *fait accompli*.

Towards 1994 and Beyond

While the apartheid state’s late 1989–early 1990 release of high-profile leaders, and the unbanning of formations like the ANC, PAC, and SACP, was correctly seen as a victory for the anti-apartheid movement, the counter-reality was that such moves placed the same state in the best possible position to control the negotiated transition to a post-apartheid dispensation and securing the interests of the existing white capitalist ruling class and its international counterparts. The armed struggle was suspended, and MK and SACP leaders like Slovo and Chris Hani played a key role in the unfolding of negotiations. The continued existence of a still powerful security apparatus in the hands of the state provided the ultimate guarantor of a favorable outcome.

For the ANC and its partners, among them COSATU, these developments, although unexpected, were a godsend. Besides the admitted

inability to pursue any kind of intensification of popular resistance, events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had a major impact. In addition to the loss of military and financial assistance, the collapse of the Eastern bloc delivered a severe ideological blow to those in the liberation movements who had looked to the Soviet Union as the model for transforming South Africa. Whole generations of cadres had been reared on a steady diet of Stalinism, and when it all disintegrated they were left in an ideological vacuum. The accompanying disillusionment, combined with the new conditions of negotiation, made the movement more susceptible than ever to a strategic and ideological accordant.

As the negotiations process unfolded, so too did the apartheid state’s two-tier strategy of, on the one hand, violence against the grassroots members of the anti-apartheid forces, and, on the other, engaging in talks and negotiations. The result was to weaken the “enemy” on the ground as the means towards the same at the negotiations table. While the ANC leadership responded by drumming up further international moral support and employing occasional mass action to give it further clout in ongoing negotiations, such moves could really only play a narrow role within the overall negotiation framework.

Likewise, the leadership’s position that it was only once the ANC had come to possess state power that major problem areas like monopoly control of the economy and massive inequalities could be addressed, came to represent the official movement response to the so-viewed unrealistic expectations of the masses. Many of the very demands that had driven the anti-apartheid struggle, and around which the vast majority of “the people’s” struggles had coalesced, were no longer viewed as necessary to the immediate transformation of South Africa. Closed-door negotiations among the political elite would now “deliver” the demise of apartheid but not inequality and redress. While the negotiations process eventually delivered the first-ever universal suffrage election of April 1994, the only constituency capable of leading and carrying through a revolutionary struggle against both national and social oppression, the broad working class, had been effectively demobilized and left vulnerable to post-apartheid capitalist restructuring.

The strategic primacy given to the achievement of a narrowly conceived “national democracy”

thus enabled a basically false separation between political and socioeconomic change to pervade the anti-apartheid struggle. Because of this, processes such as democratization took on a narrow bourgeois, nationalist, and predominantly “political” meaning, and “socioeconomic” change became secondary to what was seen as a parallel struggle for “political” change.

The consequent privileging of the economic status quo – capitalism – ensured that the new post-1994 government, dominated by the ANC and its allies, prioritized unity between antagonistic class and social forces. This provided the foundation for the accumulative needs of a new, increasingly deracialized capitalist elite, paved the way for international capital to exercise increased influence and control, and reinforced class, racial, and gender inequality. What post-apartheid South Africa confirms is that a revolutionary struggle against oppression cannot be advanced by attempting to reconcile the priorities of the masses with the priorities of capitalism.

SEE ALSO: Aggett, Neil (1953–1982); Barayi, Elijah (1930–1994); Communist Party of South Africa, 1921–1950; Hani, Chris (1942–1993); Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918); Marks, J. B. (1903–1972); Motsoaledi, Elias (1924–1994); Raditsela, Andries (1956–1985); Slovo, Joe (1926–1995); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; South Africa, Labor Movement; South African Communist Party, 1953–Present; Tambo, Oliver (1917–1993)

References and Suggested Readings

- Davidson, B., Slovo, J., & Wilkinson, A. (1976) *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution*. New York: Penguin.
- Ellis, S. & Sechaba, T. (1992) *Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile*. London: James Currey.
- Fine, R. & Davis, D. (1990) *Beyond Apartheid: Labor and Liberation in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- Holland, H. (1989) *The Struggle: A History of the African National Congress*. London: Grafton Books.
- Johns, S. & Hunt Davis, R. (Eds.) (1991) *Mandela, Tambo and the African National Congress: The Struggle Against Apartheid, 1948–1990*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Karis, T. & Carter, G. (1972/1973/1977) *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa 1882–1964*, 4 Vols. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.

- Lerumo, A. (1980) *Fifty Fighting Years: The Communist Party of South Africa (1921–1971)*. London: Inkululeko.
- Lodge, T. (1983) *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- McKinley, D. T. (1997) *The ANC and the Liberation Struggle: A Critical Political Biography*. London: Pluto Press.
- Marx, A. (1992) *Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition, 1960–1990*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
- Meli, F. (1988) *South Africa Belongs to Us: A History of the ANC*. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.
- Pomeroy, W. (1986) *Apartheid, Imperialism and African Freedom*. New York: International Publishers.
- Wolpe, H. (1990) *Race, Class and the Apartheid State*. London: James Currey.

Anti-Corn Law agitation, Britain, 19th century

Paul A. Pickering

Formed in 1839, the Anti-Corn Law League offered “free trade” as a panacea and presented itself as the vanguard of the emerging industrial middle class, whose interests lay in ending protection and opening new markets abroad. The immediate object of the League’s campaign was the repeal of the Corn and Provision Laws. A tariff barrier that was introduced ostensibly to keep the price of grain crops high following the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, the Corn Laws buttressed the political and economic power of Britain’s landowning aristocracy. The opponents of the Corn Laws sought to introduce the ideas of free trade and economic liberalism into the mainstream of political discourse in Britain. The Corn Laws, they believed, were a tax on food that created demand for higher wages paid for from their profits. More importantly, they were a trade barrier that provoked foreign governments into retaliatory measures against British manufactured goods, particularly textiles.

The League was responsible for major innovations in the tactics and scale of pressure group politics in Britain. Initially, public lectures formed the core of the campaign as the League expanded the boundaries of politics by employing lecturers far more systematically and extensively than

any previous public movement. During 1839 the Manchester Anti-Corn Law Association sent lecturers to 300 of the "principal towns of the Kingdom." This was followed by about 800 lectures in 1840, including 33 or 34 counties in England, 40 or 50 places in Scotland, 20 or 30 places in Ireland, and throughout Wales. Impressive as this effort was, in March 1842 an editorial in the League newspaper, *Anti-Bread-Tax Circular*, promised that lecturers would visit every parish in Britain. England and Wales were divided into 12 districts with a lecturer appointed to each. Underneath this structure the League lecturers were encouraged to appoint a person in every village to serve as a contact point for the organization. Even if the results sometimes fell short of the objective, lecturing provided the League with an extensive network of agents and an organizational structure that extended from its headquarters in Manchester to most parts of England and Wales.

The League also organized petitions to parliament. "A shower of genuine petitions," wrote the editor of the *Anti-Corn Law Circular* in December 1839, was sure to bring quick victory. In fact, the shower soon became a deluge. Between 1839 and 1843 the League was the most persistent petitioner of the House of Commons. Over the five sessions there were 16,351 petitions for repeal tabled in the House (an average of 3,270, containing an average total of 1,153,690 signatures, every session).

Far from relying strictly on familiar methods, League organizers became adroit in using new technology and communications in their campaign. Early in the campaign the League recognized the need to make maximum use of the new Penny Post. In September 1840 the League Council conceived a plan to rouse the country by sending letters containing tracts and handbills to every person listed in a major business directory. As many as 7,000 of these letters were sent out each day. This was only the beginning. In September 1843 the *Circular* was boasting "the most extensive correspondence ever contemplated," with 300,000 letters a week. Over 23,000 letters were posted at one Manchester post office in three days, complained its over-burdened manager to a Parliamentary Committee in 1846. The scale of the League campaign is impressive even when compared with modern political campaigning. In 1842-3, for example, the League distributed over 9 million tracts, weighing more than 100 tons,

from its headquarters in Manchester. Similarly, special trains increased crowds at League meetings and carried visitors to the well-known League Bazaars in Manchester and London.

By this stage the League had given up attempting to convince the members of the existing House of Commons that repeal was essential and had begun to implement a strategy to replace them with men who did not need convincing. At first the new electoral strategy involved extracting a pledge from one or more of the candidates, but this proved to be a short step from standing candidates in their own right. The Rubicon was crossed in December 1840 when a by-election in Walsall in Staffordshire was contested by the inaugural president of the League, J. B. Smith.

An event of notoriety at the time, the Walsall by-election was marred by brutality, corruption, and electoral violence. Smith was narrowly defeated at the poll. Hot on the heels of this defeat, the General Election produced a Tory triumph, but, far from curing the League of the taste for electoral politics, these events sharpened its appetite. The League adopted a strategy of contesting by-elections, but the results were less than hoped for. Between 1843 and 1846, when the Corn Laws were repealed, the majority of by-elections were not contested by free-trade candidates, and even when they were the results were indifferent. The League contested 20 by-elections but managed only half a dozen victories. Nevertheless, this was the first serious attempt to create a third force in British politics.

The shift to electioneering led to two further strategic choices. The first was a bold campaign to revise the electoral register. The narrow loss at Walsall was blamed on the fact that the Tories had added a few names to the voters' register shortly before it closed. Early in 1842 the most prominent leader of the League, Richard Cobden, ordered an analysis of all the boroughs in the kingdom as a prelude to the establishment of Electoral Committees to oversee registration. By September 1845 the League had a team of lawyers at work monitoring elections, but again the results were mixed.

The conversion to electoral politics also involved the League in an elaborate scheme to create new voters. The Reform Act included the retention of the 40 shilling freehold franchise in the counties which provided the opportunity for a breathtaking attempt to manipulate the electoral

system. The plan was eloquent in its simplicity: property was purchased and subdivided to be sold in lots of sufficient value to enfranchise the new multiple owners. Late in 1844 the League set an ambitious target of facilitating the enfranchisement of 1,000,000 freeholders. Here too the results fell short of the public perception. The League's electoral strategy was, however, successful in contributing to a theater of menace that shook the confidence of Tories all over Britain. The League's electoral strategies also contributed to the effectiveness of the conventional forms of declaratory politics in which it excelled.

The shift to electioneering greatly increased the need for fundraising, which was planned and executed in a highly structured, systematic, and successful manner. According to Cobden, the League had spent £25,000 by the end of 1842. Over subsequent years the total increased significantly. In 1842–3 the League raised £50,000; in each of 1844 and 1845 £100,000 was collected and expended and, late in 1845, the League commenced a £250,000 fund, of which only part had been collected when the Corn Laws were repealed. For the most part these funds came from the pockets of individual donors (although the famous bazaars made important contributions in 1842 and 1845). Overwhelmingly the individual donations flowed in from the League's heartland in the north of England, so much so that it is easy to overlook an impressive national spread of supporters. In February 1846, for example, the League published a list of 131 towns and cities where a collector was actively working, forming a truly national movement.

Recognizing that a "new power has arisen in the land," *The Times* declared the League to be "a great fact" of British public life. The League provided a template for "pressure from without" that would find many imitators at home and abroad. Extra-parliamentary politics would never be the same again.

SEE ALSO: Chartists

References and Suggested Readings

- McCord, N. (1958) *The Anti-Corn Law League 1838–1846*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Pickering, P. A. & Tyrrell, A. (2002) *The People's Bread: A History of the Anti-Corn Law League*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
- Schonhardt-Bailey, C. (2006) *From the Corn Laws to Free Trade*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Anti-fascist People's Front

Slobodan Karamanić

The Anti-fascist People's Front was an alliance of plural and heterogeneous political and social forces – parties, organizations, unions, and factions – united in opposition to 1930s fascism in response to the victory of the Nazis in Germany. The popular front unified former "class adversaries" among communist and bourgeois parties against a common fascist enemy.

By the end of the 1920s fascist politics and ideologies were growing rapidly and almost all European countries had their own genuine fascist party or movement. As the examples of Italy and Germany have shown, the fascist politics that gained absolute power in these countries was destructive to both liberal democracy and workers' movements. The absence of political resistance to the expansion of fascism resided not only in the weaknesses, ignorance, or frequently opportunism of the European liberal democrats, but also in the splits within the international left, divided between various communist and non-communist factions.

The idea of an Anti-fascist People's Front was proposed in the Comintern in 1934 by the Bulgarian communist Georgi Dimitrov in his "Report to the 7th World Congress of the Communist International," which called for an urgent unification of all "progressive forces" under broad anti-fascist popular fronts. Dimitrov affirmed that communist parties should engage in flexible and situation-oriented policies of coalitions, based on the analysis of the balance of class and political forces in each country. He argued that rather than arriving at abstract and theoretical analyses, the struggle against fascism must be concrete and effective, "depending on the historical, social and political peculiarities of each country, and the concrete situation existing therein" (Dimitrov 1975: 200). Thus, according to Dimitrov, popular coalitions could include all parties from left to center in common opposition against fascism, but also diverse social classes and groups, including organized and unorganized workers, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, the urban petty bourgeoisie, youth, women, and oppressed peoples of the colonies.

Comintern's appeal to unify against fascism was welcomed uniquely in different countries. On the

one hand, in France and Spain, where the fascist threat was acute, a popular front was formed in opposition. In 1934 the French Popular Front (*Front Populaire*) was established by the Communist Party and socialist parties, and later joined by the Radical Party and other heterogeneous left and center political groups. In Spain an analogous popular front (*Frente Popular*) also united various political factions and parties – republicans, socialists, communists, anarchists – in common defense of the Spanish Second Republic. Both the *Front Populaire* and the *Frente Popular* received considerable support, winning elections against the right and forming governments in May–June 1936. On the other hand, in other cases the Comintern's proposal did not lead to unification, but confirmed substantial political differences and animosities on the left.

From the very beginning, numerous social democrats and socialists (for instance, in Britain, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the US) criticized and rejected the popular front policy as a tactical maneuver orchestrated by Moscow with the defense of the Soviet Union as the primary objective. This distrust was a result of the sectarian policy in the Comintern's so-called third period (1928–35), which relied ultimately on the singular avant-garde role of communist parties in the working-class movement. During this period the moderate left was described as “social-fascist” and trade unions labeled as reformist agents directed by the capitalist class (Stalin 1954). This rigid Comintern policy had particularly fatal consequences for political developments in Germany and Austria, resulting in division of the anti-fascist forces on the left. The new popular front policy came too late to prevent fascism's advance in these two countries and was unconvincing for socialists and social democrats previously marked as the prime enemies of the working class by communists.

A wide external leftist rejection was not the only constraint on the popular front policy. The policy also carried an internal conceptual ambiguity, implicated in its principal task to recast a tension between the liberal disposition of the defense of the bourgeois democracy and the leftist radicalization towards the proletarian revolution (Dell 2006). This tension proved that the coalition policy based entirely on the negative (anti-fascist) ground, without a common affirmative and program of emancipation, could

not be consistent and effective. Ultimately, such conceptual ambiguity caused failures in the French *Front Populaire* and the Spanish *Frente Popular*. In the former, the electoral victory of the Popular Front produced enthusiasm in the masses and political mobilization of the working class. A vast workers' strike and two-month occupation of the factories in 1936 was both supportive and critical of a newly established Popular Front government led by the socialist Léon Blum from June 1936 to June 1937. Although the French Communist Party did not join the government, it supported Blum decisively, resulting in the politics of mutual compromise. While the Communist Party sought peacefully to end the workers' general strike, Blum's government in turn introduced new labor laws, including the 40-hour week, the right to strike, arbitration in industrial disputes, and paid holidays. However, these social reforms were insufficient to surmount the deep economic and political crisis. The French Popular Front government fell in just a year, and finally the Popular Front majority in parliament voted in support of the Petain and Laval pro-fascist regime.

The popular front policy of concession also caused political disaster in the course of the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939. In Spain the Communist Party influenced by the Comintern first turned against the socialist-anarchist revolution in Catalonia. Only after the elimination of their political opponents did the communists decide to fight the right wing with the popular front coalition. Mainly due to such internal conflicts, the *Frente Popular* lost political unity and strength, in part leading to military defeat of the Spanish Second Republic.

The official policy of the Anti-fascist People's Front came to a conclusion with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939. However, inspired by the popular front policy, during World War II the new concept of an Anti-fascist Liberation Front emerged, unifying many political forces in armed struggle against fascism. In most of these fronts, for example in Albania, Bulgaria, China, France, Greece, Italy, and Yugoslavia, communist parties took significant leadership roles.

SEE ALSO: Communist Party, Germany; Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA); Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Dell, S. (2006) *The Image of the Popular Front – The Masses and the Media in Interwar France*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dimitrov, G. (1975) *The United Front – The Struggle Against Fascism and War*. San Francisco: Proletarian Publishers.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1994) *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991*. New York: Vintage.
- Mazower, M. (2000) *Dark Continent – Europe’s Twentieth Century*. New York: Random House.
- Morrow, F. (1986) *Revolution und Kontrarevolution in Spanien, einschließlich: Der Bürgerkrieg in Spanien*. Essen: Gervinus.
- Stalin, J. V. (1928/1954) The Right Danger in the German Communist Party. In J. V. Stalin, *Works*. Vol. 11. Moscow: Foreign Language.

Anti-Franco worker struggles, 1939–1975

Michael Eaude

General Franco came to power through the Spanish Civil War (1936–9) following a military coup on July 18, 1936. The immediate reaction of the working class in the main cities such as Barcelona and Madrid defeated the coup and, especially in Catalonia, full-scale social revolution broke out.

Franco’s vengeance and his commitment to root out any sign of democracy were extreme. Opponents were executed in every village conquered by his armies. These killings reached their peak in the immediate postwar period. Several hundred thousand people left for exile and some 270,000 political prisoners were tortured, starved, and/or used as slave labor by the regime. Many others were destitute after confiscation of property and loss of jobs. Some 200,000 children died of hunger in the early 1940s.

The terror meant the population was cowed for many years. Communists and anarchists organized guerrilla bands (the *maquis*) in the mountains with little success, though they did tie down large parts of the security forces during the 1940s.

All trade unions were illegal, apart from the corporatist Organización Sindical Estatal (State Union Organization) (OSE). Membership was compulsory for all bosses and workers. Its full-time workers were falangists appointed from above. Its ideology was based on replacing the class struggle, considered communist and “diabolic,” by combined “capital, labor, and skill”

to take forward the “fatherland.” In the words of Marcelino Camacho (1976), the OSE “was designed to tame the working class by putting it into a double straitjacket, both material and ideological.” All strikes were illegal and were judged in military courts.

Remarkably, despite the repression, there were strikes in Manresa in 1945 and in Euskadi (the Basque Country) in 1947. They were strikes of desperation: historian Sebastian Balfour calculated that in 1950 an unskilled worker had to work 8 hours to buy a kilo of bread. In March 1951 a tram boycott against fare rises in Barcelona was followed by a three-day general strike of about 300,000 workers. The boycott won the withdrawal of fare rises and the strike won the release of people arrested during the boycott. This famous struggle led to the summary sacking of the governor, mayor, police chief, and head of the OSE in Barcelona. However, Barcelona ’51 was a false dawn. Twenty more years of stubborn organization and the heroic work of thousands of anonymous militants would be needed before such broad struggles emerged again.

February 1956 saw the rebirth of a student movement. A new generation of students entered in conflict with the regime, when some non-falangists won student elections. The annulment of the results led to the first protest demonstration in Madrid since the Civil War. From then on the Falange lost its hegemony in the universities. Many student activists from 1956 became important anti-Francoists in many professional associations of lawyers, journalists, and architects in the 1960s and 1970s. Also in 1956, strikes in various parts of the state were answered by not only the customary beatings and prison, but wage rises, too. The poverty and hunger were such that the rises only restored wages to 1936 levels.

During these first two decades of dictatorship Franco followed an economic policy called “autarchy” or self-sufficiency. It was a total failure: products were scarce, there was no industrial or agricultural planning, and corruption was rife. Rescued in 1952–3 by US financial aid in exchange for military bases in Spain, by 1959 the regime faced economic collapse. The World Bank reported that the country was just two months from bankruptcy (Sartorius & Alfaya 1999: 78–92).

Despite the dictatorship’s grandiloquent rhetoric of independence and empire, it was forced to open its doors to foreign investment, which was delighted to enter a friendly country where wages were not only low but guaranteed

by the police. This led to the expansion of the economy by about 10 percent a year throughout the 1960s, stimulating mass emigration from the hungry countryside to the cities and producing rapid and chaotic industrialization. This new (relative) wealth meant that workers began to organize. Profits were so high in the 1960s and worker protests so stubborn that real wages doubled between 1959 and 1970.

Birth of Workers' Commissions

The first Workers' Commission (Comisiones Obreras) for which data exist was organized at the La Camocha mine in Asturias in 1957. According to Marcelino Camacho (1976), "communist workers, socialists, the priest and the mayor of the workers' quarter of La Camocha, who was a falangist, took part." Given that the OSE was useless to workers, this practice of electing a local committee extended to other workplaces. Once a specific problem was solved, then the commission dissolved.

The internal contradictions of the dictatorship also helped the commissions develop. The failure of autarchy meant that some capitalists rebelled against the imposition, through the OSE at a state-wide level, of wages and conditions. It was an inefficient, rigid system. They wanted powers to make local productivity agreements. Their lobbying resulted in the 1958 Collective Bargaining Act, which permitted collective bargaining with OSE representatives elected by the workers. The existence of these representatives, known as *enlaces sindicales* (union links), gave business a certain margin for local negotiation. It meant too that workers could elect non-falangist representatives. "We didn't like taking part in these state-controlled structures," explained Cipriano García, leader of the commissions in Catalonia, "but we had to take advantage of any crack that appeared in the system."

In these commissions, maximum democracy was a precondition of survival. If militants organizing in workplaces were isolated, they could easily be sacked or arrested. To achieve the participation needed in a climate of fear and repression, militants had to discuss carefully with every fellow-worker and then debate proposals fully in assemblies. Paradoxically, at the start of the 1960s, under Europe's most repressive regime, more advanced forms of direct democracy were developed than in the bureaucratized unions of Europe's parliamentary democracies.

The prewar unions UGT (General Workers Union – socialist) and CNT (National Labor Federation – anarchist) and the front set up by the PCE (Spanish Communist Party), the Oposición Sindical Obrero (Workers' Union Opposition), had failed in the 1950s to take root in workplaces. Workers trying desperately to survive found these organizations too closely identified with dangerous political commitment. The commissions, however, were successful because they were organizations forged by workforces themselves for specific purposes.

Consolidation of Commissions

The strikes throughout the state in 1961 and 1962 saw a second stage in the development of the workers commissions. These included a strike in a city of reactionary tradition such as Granada, a two-month strike in Asturias (with solidarity actions in Madrid), and a general strike in Bizkaia (Euskadi) that broke the government wage freeze.

In this wave of strikes the ephemeral workers' commissions, organized some years before, arose again. Soon, commissions were being set up in other parts of the state. Many now became more permanent structures, though they maintained their democratic character. Max Gallo wrote that the commissions

were an original and spontaneous creation of the Spanish working class, born of its experience and bearing witness to its strong democratic traditions. Delegates elected at one meeting could be dismissed at the next. These committees were not the fruit of any one political trend, but naturally militants, whether Communist, Socialist or Catholic, were involved, and the Communist Party tried to establish them throughout the country. (Gallo 1973: 289)

A third stage in the development of the commissions can be identified from 1964, when the first coordinating group of plant-based commissions was created in Bizkaia, followed by similar coordination in Madrid and Catalonia. In this period, links between workplaces were strengthened. Increasingly, too, alongside workplace demands, more political aims were expressed, such as calls for trade union rights and democratization.

Marcelino Camacho, communist and central leader of the commissions, described how in Madrid, in September 1964, some 500 *enlaces* from the main engineering companies elected in assembly a 13-person commission to negotiate their demand for a 20 percent wage rise. The commission

then met every Wednesday in the offices of the vertical union. However, no one came to consult the OSE full-timers, but the commission. “Its birth was spontaneous,” explains Camacho, “but it was also the culmination of several years’ experience, of factory commissions, of contacts through the Paloma Union School.” This example of the engineering workers then spread to other sectors. Barcelona saw a similar process.

This was a new, young working class, migrated from the countryside and without prejudices or taboos. Unlike the Civil War generation, they were undefeated.

Table 1 Changes in the structure of Spanish society under Francoism

	1950	1975
Service sector	25% of the economy	40%
Industry	26%	38%
Agriculture	47%	20%

Source: Gallo (1973)

Table 2 Distribution of the working population in sectors

Year	Agriculture	Industry	Services
1940	50.52%	22.13%	27.35%
1950	47.57%	26.55%	25.88%
1960	39.70%	32.98%	27.32%
1967	27.90%	38.20%	34.00%

Source: Gallo (1973)

Another key factor in the commissions’ consolidation as permanent structures was “the idea that the catacombs represent the death of the mass movement” (Camacho 1976), i.e., it was essential to flee clandestinity whenever possible. Thus the commissions looked for legal meeting places, often in OSE offices and even, on occasion in Madrid, in the premises of José Antonio Circles (José Antonio was the founder of the Falange).

Several political forces coexisted in the commissions, but the main force was the PCE. Its policies of organizing guerrilla bands (abandoned in 1948) and then a union front (1950s) failed. Its call for a Peaceful National Strike in 1959 failed spectacularly: it showed that the party’s leaders in exile were out of touch with reality inside Spain. The decision to enter the vertical union and take advantage of this space to promote the commissions was taken by militants on the ground and then endorsed by the overseas

leadership. The policy made the PCE the leading force in the internal opposition by the 1960s.

In the 1966 union elections, the tactic of infiltrating the OSE bore spectacular fruit. In Barcelona, for instance, 75 percent of the new workplace representatives were young and had not previously formed part of the official structures, which strongly suggests they were workers’ commissions supporters. The broad success of the 1966 candidacies threatened the regime. Many representatives had their credentials withdrawn in March 1967. Three years of increased repression followed, which halted the slow process of constructing an organizational fabric. Arrest, torture, and sackings were again the order of the day. Despite these reverses and the blow to the young movement’s optimism, illegalization did not long diminish combativeness. This started rising in 1969, with 491 strikes, and in 1970 with 1,547. Following the reverses, the response became more politicized.

The success of the PCE within the commissions meant certain pressure on other groups. Democracy within the commissions had been due to the requirements of the situation. In itself, the PCE was a hierarchical organization in the Stalinist tradition, with no culture of debating different lines of thought. Its line of National Reconciliation, defended since the mid-1950s and by which it meant a grand alliance of all sectors of Spanish society against the regime, brought it into conflict with many militants and revolutionary groups within the commissions. For instance, the Frente de Liberación Popular (People’s Liberation Front) (FLP), born in the 1956 student struggles, believed Spain was ripe for socialist revolution and found itself marginalized by the PCE within the commissions.

The Socialist Party, with the exception of the UGT’s traditional feud in Bizkaia, took little part in the workers’ struggle. It used Cold War rhetoric to justify its refusal to work alongside communists. The anarchists saw the commissions as collaborationist and thus condemned themselves to irrelevance. The other factor was left-nationalist forces, especially in Euskadi, where ETA (founded 1959) came to prominence in 1968 with the assassination of the San Sebastián police chief and torturer, Melitón Manzanás. ETA (Basque Land and Freedom) was an urban guerrilla band, inspired by Algeria and the Cuban Revolution. After the Burgos trial of December 1970 it had a considerable effect on the mass movement. In Euskadi in the early 1970s

ETA had the strength to call general strikes and gave the opposition throughout the state enormous confidence with its assassination of the president of the government, Admiral Carrero Blanco, on December 21, 1973.

Last Years of the Dictatorship

After the repression of 1967 and 1968, struggles such as the broad mobilizations against the Burgos trial (which included enormous international pressure on the regime) and the development of neighborhood associations demanding basic services such as transport, sewerage, and water, meant that industrial struggles were not so isolated. In Catalonia, the founding of the Assembly of Catalonia to fight for democratic and Catalan national rights in 1971 united much broader sectors than the workers' movement.

Unlike the 1950s, repression in the 1970s tended to deepen struggles. A vivid example is the killing by the Civil Guard of Pedro Patiño in Madrid while he was distributing leaflets during the September 1971 building strike. The response was the extension of the strike. Similarly, the police murder of a worker at the St. Adrià del Besòs (Barcelona) Power Station not only did not break a 1973 strike, but led to a General Strike in the cities of Cerdanyola and Ripollet, extended by the worker commissions' networks. Fear was still strong and universal, but anger against the regime and confidence in the possibility of victory overcame fear. A sign of the radicalization of the workers' movement in these last years of the dictatorship was the growing number of solidarity strikes.

In October 1971, 7,000 workers at Barcelona's SEAT car factory occupied the plant. The police tried to evict them, but the workers defended themselves with high-pressure hoses. Many bosses saw the regime's brutality as an obstacle: to avoid strikes, negotiation with directly elected workers' representatives became common.

The policy of Carrero Blanco, president of the government since 1969 and Franco's chosen successor, was in difficulties. Increased repression failed to break the workers' and opposition movements. Even the use, from 1971 on, of paramilitaries – often off-duty cops – to beat and murder opposition militants, failed to stop resistance. Towards the end of 1973, Carrero's government prepared a show-trial of ten leaders of workers commissions for unlawful assembly (known as the 1,001 trial, for the number of years

in prison the prosecution demanded). It seemed that Carrero had not learnt the lesson of Burgos: big trials galvanize and unite the opposition.

In 1974, encouraged by Carrero's assassination and uncowed by the jailing of the "1,001" defendants, the mass movement advanced again. The world energy crisis and 25 percent inflation were eroding wage packets. Whereas, before 1974, strikes were limited to mines and large industry – the classical working class – now they spread to wider sectors. Bank workers, teachers, and employees in offices and smaller plants began to move.

1975 was the year Franco's regime unraveled. The country's 300,000 university students were at boiling point all year. Madrid building workers and Catalonia's engineering industry saw the biggest strikes. ETA continued active and various General Strikes were called in the Basque Country: three in September to try and stop the September 27 executions of two ETA and three FRAP militants.

Franco died on November 20 amid maximum disorder: after the September executions, mass protests throughout Europe (four embassies burnt, withdrawals of several ambassadors, EEC suspending trade with Spain); a disorganized withdrawal from the "Spanish" Sahara; army machine-gun emplacements on the streets of Basque cities; student and worker assemblies having to defend themselves against armed attacks by fascist groups such as the Warriors of Christ the King; police occupation of the streets.

1975–77: Rapid Reform to Douse Workers' Struggle

King Juan Carlos replaced Franco, but the longed-for change did not come at once. It required another huge effort from the working class to force the ruling class to dismantle the regime and install a parliamentary democracy.

The level of strikes in 1975 and 1976 was the highest in Europe, precisely in the country where strikes were forbidden and repression was extremely violent. In 1976, 110 million hours of work were lost to strikes. In Euskadi, where the demands for national rights and amnesty for political prisoners intertwined with workers' struggles, there were 13 general strikes between January 1976 and May 1977, always inseparable from huge demonstrations, paramilitary murders, and clashes with the police.

This caused the ruling class to move rapidly towards parliamentary democracy, fearful that

the mass movement could expel the restored monarchy, as had happened in Athens in 1974, or enter a revolutionary process, as occurred in Portugal from April 1974. In this emergency for the ruling class, the PSOE (Socialist Party) and PCE gave their support to the king's new president of the government, Adolfo Suárez. They accepted the monarchy, restrained activity in the streets and, in general, agreed to a transition controlled from above to a limited Spanish democracy, to avoid (in their view) another military coup. There was no open constituent process: the coming of democracy was totally controlled by Suárez and other "reformists" coming out of the Franco dictatorship.

In the state-wide strikes at the start of 1976 for wage rises in the middle of galloping inflation, Madrid was paralyzed in February. The army was mobilized to break the underground train strike. Postal, building, and engineering workers were out at the same time. Even Madrid's theaters struck. In Andalusia the workers' movement was reborn in these first six months of 1976.

The struggles reached their peak in the city of Vitoria during the first nine weeks of the year. Previously, Vitoria had experienced little of the mass mobilizations that shook the rest of Euskadi. Here the PCE had a smaller base, allowing the revolutionary left (mainly Maoist in orientation) to rival it during the 1976 events. The conflict started on January 9 in most of the city's big companies. The Vitoria Workers' Coordinating Committee had drawn up demands in assembly that were then taken out and argued for in all the factories. The Platform's central demands were the 40-hour week and to end the government's wage freeze. Other demands were extremely radical, such as retirement at 60 on full pay.

Several companies settled in a few days, but in a dozen plants the conflict radicalized over the succeeding weeks. Assemblies controlled the struggle from below, serving as a school in democracy for inexperienced workers. There were near-daily assemblies of each workforce, with power of recall over delegates to the Coordinating Committee.

Women's assemblies (most strikers were men) organized their own pickets and demonstrations. Assemblies of students, neighborhoods, and workers not on strike were organized to achieve the widest possible unity, leading to three city-wide one-day general strikes and mass demonstrations. The bosses' attempt to reopen the

factories mid-February with scabs and massive deployment of armed police failed.

After 60 days on strike, a city-wide General Strike was called for March 3. Shops and schools shut down. Barricades were raised against police attacks. At 5 p.m., the police surrounded a church with 5,000 workers in General Assembly, hurled in smoke bombs and then fired live bullets at people escaping. Five people were killed. In subsequent days, police occupation of the city and mass arrests of leaders led to a return to work. Despite this military defeat, the workers succeeded in breaking the wage freeze, achieved effective direct negotiation with the bosses (marginalizing the OSE), and won the readmission of sacked workers and the rights of strike and assembly. The police killings led on March 8 to the biggest strike in Euskadi since the 1930s.

Vitoria scared Spain's ruling class. The king moved quickly to sack Franco's appointee Arias Navarro as president of the government. Adolfo Suárez was sworn in on July 3 with the brief to introduce democracy as quickly as possible. Vitoria, the climax of all these years of multiple struggles against the dictatorship, showed that it was the workers' struggles that forced the end of the dictatorship, and not the good-heartedness of Suárez or the king. These reformed Franco's regime to avoid a new Republic or a more radical democracy.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Spain; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Mondragon Collective; Mujeres Libres; POUM (Workers' Party of Marxist Unification); Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Ariza, Julián (1976) *Comisiones Obreras*. Madrid: Avance/Mañana.
- Balfour, Sebastian (1989) *Dictatorship, Workers and the City: Labour in Greater Barcelona since 1939*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Camacho, Marcelino (1976) *Charlas en la prisión*. Barcelona: Laia.
- Gallo, Max (1973) *Spain Under Franco*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Guindal, Mariano & Giménez, Juan H. (1976) *El libro negro de Vitoria*. Madrid: Ediciones 99.
- Morán, Gregorio (1986) *Miseria y grandeza del Partido Comunista de España*. Barcelona: Planeta.
- Sartorius, Nicolás (1975) *El Resurgir del Movimiento Obrero*. Barcelona: Laia.
- Sartorius, Nicolás & Alfaya, Javier (1999) *La memoria insumisa*. Madrid: Espasa.
- Sartorius, Nicolás & Sabio, Alberto (2007) *El final de la dictadura*. Madrid: Temas de hoy.

Anti-Japanese boycotts, early 20th century

J. Megan Greene

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries China was subjected to a series of humiliations perpetrated by western and Japanese imperialist nations. China lost wars against British, French, international, and Japanese armies, and as a consequence was compelled to open its markets to foreign products, transform its approach to diplomacy, pay large indemnities, and cede control of numerous territories to foreign powers. Beginning in 1905, Chinese citizens increasingly responded to these humiliations with boycotts of foreign-made goods. Although the first such boycott was in response to United States exclusion laws that severely limited the number of Chinese that could enter the United States, most of the boycotts that followed over the next four decades were aimed at the Japanese. These boycotts were acts of protest against imperialist encroachment, but at the same time they served to mobilize nationalism among Chinese consumers of all social backgrounds.

Ever since the eighteenth century, when European and American traders were severely restricted by the Chinese imperial court in the manner in which they could conduct business in China, trade had been a point of contention between China and the West. In the nineteenth century, western powers gradually turned what had been an unfavorable trading relationship to their own advantage, first by developing an illicit opium trade, and later by waging war against the Qing to defend their economic interests. The treaties that concluded the Opium War in 1842 and subsequent altercations between China and the foreign powers had as centerpieces a series of provisions that opened Chinese markets to foreign access through the establishment of so-called "treaty ports" and the elimination of other trade barriers. Although foreign states imposed themselves on China in a number of other visible ways, most notably by seizing direct control of Chinese territories such as Hong Kong, parts of Shanghai, Taiwan, Shandong, and Manchuria, it was through the increasing distribution of foreign consumer goods in the Chinese marketplace that most Chinese came into contact with the foreign powers. For this

reason, it is perhaps logical that protest against and resistance to foreign imperialism increasingly manifested itself through boycotts in the early twentieth century.

Major boycotts occurred in 1905, 1908, 1909, 1915, 1919, 1923, 1925, 1928, 1931, and then more steadily until the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945. These events, far from being spontaneous protests against foreign mistreatment, were part of a sustained and increasingly well organized movement that aimed, above all, at building and mobilizing Chinese nationalism. Although these boycotts were not always especially economically effective (in 1905 overall trade between the United States and China actually increased, though most of that new trade was not in the areas most affected by the boycotts), they were effective at building nationalism through anti-foreign protest.

Japan became the primary focus of boycotts, in addition to other sorts of protest, in 1915, as a consequence of the Twenty-One Demands. These demands represented an overt attempt by the Japanese government to extend its economic and political influence in China, particularly in north China. Among other things, the Japanese demanded part ownership of a large Chinese iron and coal works, the right to station police officers and economic advisors in north China, and commercial rights in coastal territories. Chinese observers were offended by Japan's unobtrusive imperialistic advances, but they were equally appalled by the failure of China's republican government to repel the Japanese advances. The event thus generated a nationalistic, anti-Japanese anger that could be mobilized by nationalist activists and Chinese capitalists alike. Continued Japanese advances upon Chinese territories, especially during the 1930s, provided further fodder for boycotts and anti-Japanese protest.

The boycott constituted a powerful way for Chinese outside the government to express political views toward foreign powers in an environment in which the state was so weak as to be unable to resist Japanese advances. Boycotts were typically organized in China's major port cities and spread between them. Organizers included student groups, patriotic associations, and merchant associations, such as the National Products Preservation Association, which were eager to capitalize on an opportunity to increase the market for their own goods.

Since boycotters were encouraged to change their own habits of consumption by substituting Chinese products for foreign-made products, the beneficiaries of boycotts were often Chinese merchants and manufacturers. Many merchants, therefore, used nationalistic, anti-Japanese or anti-foreign strategies to market their goods. For example, in 1915 many merchants began to use the numbers 5–9 on their product labels to remind buyers of the humiliating date (May 9, 1915) on which the Japanese had submitted their Twenty-One Demands to China. These strategies not only helped Chinese merchants to sell their goods, they also constantly reminded buyers of China's national humiliation and reinforced the patriotic sentiment behind the boycotts. Even as boycotts themselves flagged, therefore, the heightened patriotic consciousness that they had aroused tended to remain in areas that had been active in boycotts, and this consciousness was easily revived when new reasons for boycotts presented themselves.

Boycotts constituted an important mode of protest for Chinese citizens in an era during which the Chinese state was quite weak and Chinese territory was being lost to imperialist aggressors, most notably the Japanese. Through boycotts, nationalistic consciousness was raised, populations were mobilized for political and economic action, and Chinese goods were sold.

SEE ALSO: China, May 4th Movement; Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911

References and Suggested Readings

Karl, G. (2003) *China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard East Asia Monographs.

Anti-monarchy protests, Portugal

Javier A. Galván

Initially struggling to retain its independence in the Iberian Peninsula, Portugal emerged as a global power during the European Age of Discovery. Dynastic difficulties and a faltering system led to the demise of the monarchy. During the 1900s Portugal had three main forces of protest and revolution. First, the general population compelled the king to abdicate

in 1910. However, the first attempt to run a republic failed rather quickly, and an authoritarian government took over in 1928. Second, following a long dictatorship of almost fifty years, the Portuguese, led by a worker's movement, toppled fascism with a massive populist revolution. Third, one of the largest sources of economic and political tension for Portugal in the late 1900s was the effectiveness of retaining its overseas colonies in Africa and Asia. The constant revolts in the colonies contributed to the overall *coup d'état* to overthrow the dictatorship in 1974.

Early Struggles

Portugal became an independent nation in 1143, when the king of Leon and Castille, Alfonso VII, recognized the country of Portugal's independence under King Afonso I. Afonso I and his successors, with the assistance of military monastic Orders, worked to expel the Moors from the Iberian Peninsula to expand Portuguese territory. The Portuguese Reconquista ended in 1249, when forces reached the southern coast of the Algarve. In 1383, when Ferdinand I, king of Portugal, died without a male heir, the king of Castille, who was married to the daughter of the Portuguese king, claimed the right to the throne of Portugal. The lack of a suitable heir led to a popular revolt, leading to the 1383–5 Crisis, which was a chaotic period of civil war. John of Aviz, brother of Ferdinand I, with the support of General Nuno Alvares Pereira, petty noblemen, and the common people, won the Battle of Aljubarrota, defeating Castille, and later ascending to the Portuguese throne in 1385 as John I. The battle is one of the most celebrated victories in Portuguese history, symbolic of the struggle for independence against Spain.

Development of a Global Empire

Portugal emerged as one of the leaders of the European Age of Discovery. Prince Henry, known as the Navigator, was an early and famous royal patron of exploration. In 1415 Portugal conquered Ceuta in North Africa to begin its global empire. Following Ceuta, Portugal accumulated territory in the Atlantic, including Madeira and the Azores, which in turn fostered colonization movements. During the fifteenth century Portuguese sailors sailed along the coast of Africa, establishing trade and supply

stations along the route, in search of a passage to India to secure trade of desirable commodities, such as spices. Portugal later used these stations for slaving purposes and to expand its colonial presence in Africa. Vasco de Gama reached India successfully in 1498, leading to a period of Portuguese economic prosperity. In 1500 Pedro Alvares Cabral claimed Brazil for Portugal. In 1510 Portugal expanded its global empire in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic, seizing Goa, Ormuz, and Malacca.

Renewed Spanish Control

King Sebastian of Portugal died in battle in Morocco. Since he did not have an heir, Philip II of Spain claimed the Portuguese throne. From 1580 to 1640 Philip II of Spain ruled Portugal separately as Philip I. In 1640 the future John IV of Portugal led a revolt with the aid of the Portuguese nobility to establish the House of Braganza. The Portuguese Empire was already on the decline by this time, losing in competition to Britain and the Netherlands. This trend would continue into the twentieth century, particularly after the devastating loss of Brazil, which attained independence in 1822.

Political Chaos and Civil Wars

The period from the reign of Maria I in 1777 to the end of the Liberal Wars in 1834 is marred by political chaos that weakened the absolutist regime in Portugal and paved the way for the country's initial attempts to establish a constitutional monarchy and then a democratic system of government.

Spain invaded Portugal in 1801 with French aid (War of the Oranges), although French forces did not arrive until after the invasion, since it was so quick. Portugal refused to join Napoleon I's continental blockade due to a longstanding Anglo-Portuguese alliance. In 1807 France and Spain reached an agreement partitioning Portugal into Northern Lusitania (to be governed by the former king of Etruria), the Algarves area and territory south of the Tagus to be ruled by Spanish General Manuel de Goody, while the rest of Portugal would be ruled by France. To impose the partition Napoleon I invaded Portugal in 1807, forcing the royal family to flee to Brazil. Anglo-Portuguese resistance forces, under the command of the Duke

of Wellington, managed to hold off three French invasions, despite some French success in northern Portugal.

Britain governed Portugal while the royal family was abroad. However, John VI of Portugal demonstrated little interest in leaving Brazil. Furthermore, Brazil traded directly with other European powers, financially circumventing Portuguese economic interests. Discontent brewed in Portugal, leading to a series of protests culminating in the Liberal Revolution of Oporto in 1820. Revolutionaries demanded the royal family's return to Portugal, the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, and the return of Brazil to colony status (thereby limiting Brazil's trade to Portugal). The British governorship was replaced by a provisional junta, which called for a Constituent Cortes to write a constitution in 1821. John VI returned to Portugal, leaving his heir, Peter, in charge of Brazil. In September 1821 the Cortes voted to reduce Brazil to colony status and ordered the return of Peter to Europe. Meanwhile, Brazil petitioned Peter to remain. Portuguese troops were sent to Brazil and Brazilian units were placed under Portuguese command. Tensions mounted between Portuguese and Brazilian soldiers when Peter vowed to remain in Brazil. Following an uprising forcing Portuguese troops from Brazil and the Portuguese government's declaration of such acts as traitorous, Peter declared Brazil independent and himself king.

Peter's brother Michael supported an attempt to restore absolute rule in Portugal (the *Vilafancada* Revolution). The revolution was in part against his father, John VI, who supported the new constitution. Under force, John VI returned to an absolutist system. Michael attempted to manipulate his father's abdication in 1823, resulting in the *Abrilada* rebellion in which Michael attempted to seize the throne. John VI sought British assistance and he exiled Michael. John VI reestablished a liberal government, recognizing Brazil's independence and restoring Peter's right to the Portuguese throne before dying in 1826. Following John VI's death, a regency junta was established under his daughter.

In 1826 Peter accepted the Portuguese throne as Peter IV. The Brazilian constitution limited him from ruling both Portugal and Brazil. Consequently, he abdicated his right to the Portuguese throne in favor of his daughter, whom he betrothed to his brother-in-exile,

Michael. Peter IV had approved a revised version of the 1822 constitution, which was hoped to serve as a compromise between liberals and absolutists. Michael returned to Portugal as king, and with the support of absolutist members of the nobility and the church, deposed the liberal constitution and its bicameral legislature, and recalled the Cortes of the three estates to elect him king. Michael's actions initiated the Liberal Wars, or Portuguese Civil War. Liberals rebelled, but were ultimately suppressed.

Peter returned to Portugal with an Anglo-Portuguese force to face his brother in the Liberal Wars, leaving his son to rule Brazil. The May 1834 Battle of Aceiceira was the last and decisive engagement of the Portuguese Civil War, resulting in Peter IV's victory. Michael was exiled with a pension, barred from the Portuguese succession. Peter restored the liberal constitution before his death in 1834; his daughter assumed the Portuguese throne as Maria II. As a result, liberal ideas became entrenched in Portugal.

Following the Civil War, however, the Portuguese monarchy failed to bring stability to the country and lost influence due to generals' coups and the growth of republicanism. Charles I imposed a dictatorship-like government in the person of João Franco.

Overthrow of the Monarchy

Portugal began the twentieth century with a revolution to depose its king. In 1908 republican revolutionaries killed Charles I and his son in Lisbon to end the power of the monarchy. The youngest son, Manuel II, assumed the throne, but revolutionary movements overthrew him in 1910. The main drive to remove the king was a general feeling of economic stagnation, the deterioration of the infrastructure, and overall lack of opportunities in Portugal. The result was a new government in the form of a republic, in which people could elect their own leaders. However, the new political system of government did not necessarily solve the nation's economic problems.

Portugal experienced the emergence of a conservative ideology after 1914. Its proponents supported religious-based values and despised liberal ideas in society, the economy, and politics. This movement, known as the *Integralismo Lusitano* (Lusitanian or Portuguese Integralism), developed a strong nationalistic ethic among

the general masses, especially young people. The Integralism movement developed into Portuguese fascism following examples offered by the legacies of Italian and Spanish fascism. By the late 1920s fascism became increasingly popular among the middle and upper classes, as well as the intellectuals in Portugal. Portugal's first experience with democracy was not successful. The political leaders faced numerous minor revolts, both by civilian groups and military officers.

SEE ALSO: Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, J. M. (2000) *The History of Portugal*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Birmingham, D. (1993) *A Concise History of Portugal*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- De Figueiredo, A. (1976) *Portugal: Fifty Years of Dictatorship*. New York: Holmes & Meier.
- Marques, A. H. de Oliveira (1976) *History of Portugal*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sobel, L. A. (Ed.) (1976) *Portuguese Revolution, 1974–1976*. New York: Facts of Life.

Anti-Napoleonic Wars of Liberation (1813–1815)

Martina G. Lüke

The Wars of Liberation ended the period of revolutionary and post-revolutionary wars in Europe since 1792 and the French occupation in Germany, Italy, and Spain. They are part of the Napoleonic Wars and the War of the Sixth Coalition.

The end of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 and the political change of large territories and states initiated a series of reforms in Germany, particularly in Prussia. Political leaders such as Baron Karl vom und zum Stein and Count Karl August von Hardenberg and military reformers such as Carl von Clausewitz and Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst believed in the potential of insurrection rationalizing popular concepts of the French Revolutionary and the Napoleonic Wars of “nation in arms” through the enthusiasm of mass armies. At the same time, the oppression by France and the economic impact

of the embargo in continental trade with England, as well as the impact of the cult of patriotism during the French Revolution, led to a new spirit of nationalism. This provided additional possibilities for irregular operations, as seen in the Spanish guerilla tactics in the Peninsular Campaigns (1808–9 and 1810–12). Similarly, Austria's attempt to challenge Napoleon I (1809) led to independent military actions such as those by Prussian Major Ferdinand von Schill, who without orders left Berlin to start an insurrection, or the Duke of Brunswick-Oels, who rallied to Austria's support. Tyroleans took up arms against Bavaria, the French ally in the Confederation of the Rhine. Nevertheless, these uprisings failed.

However, when in late 1812 the extent of the devastating results of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow and the collapse of the *Grande Armée* became apparent, the crisis with France developed. At the Convention of Tauroggen (December 30, 1812), Prussian commander Johann Ludwig Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, in a revolutionary act unheard of in the absolutist state, signed an agreement with the Russian General Hans Karl von Diebitsch guaranteeing neutrality. Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm III opposed Yorck and gave orders to remove him from command and arrest him. At the same time, without prior permission from the king, vom Stein began to mobilize resources and helped to form the *Landsturm* (home guard) and *Landwehr* (militia) that declared war on the French. Finally, the state of Prussia agreed to a full military alliance with Russia and signed the Treaty of Kalisch on February 25, 1813. Friedrich Wilhelm III established the decoration of the Iron Cross in remembrance of the queen of Prussia on March 10 and called for the establishment of Free Corps. Patriotic proclamations by the king, such as the declaration of war against France on March 16 and the "Appeal to My People!" on March 17, in which he called for sacrifices from all classes, led to public uprisings and large numbers of volunteers. All former exemptions and privileges on military service were abolished and universal military conscriptions in the meaning of the French principle of the *levée en masse* became law. With the slogan "I gave gold for iron," millions of *Taler* for military insurgency were spontaneously collected. Literature and music further spread the word of a war of liberation and patriotic feelings. This enthusiasm was not shared by other German states. Austrian leader

Prince Klemens von Metternich vacillated in joining the coalition against Napoleon I due to the revolutionary dimensions of the people's fight for freedom and the new Hapsburg-Bonaparte dynasty. In the summer and fall of 1813, however, Austria, joined by Britain and Sweden, entered the alliance of Russia and Prussia. Napoleon's states in Northern Germany and the Confederation of the Rhine began to dissolve.

The autumn campaign led to the battle of the Nations in Leipzig (October 16–19, 1813), the largest battle in the Napoleonic Wars, which ended with the military defeat of Napoleon I and the end of his political dominance in Central Europe. In the early months of 1814 Napoleon was driven back to Paris. The city was conquered and occupied by coalition forces on March 31. In the First Treaty of Paris (May 30), France was established in the borders of 1792. Napoleon I was banished to the island of Elba, and the house of Bourbon was restored with the enthronement of Louis XVIII as king of France. The Congress of Vienna (October 1814–June 1815) at the end of the Napoleonic Wars restored the old regimes in Europe. The Congress was briefly interrupted when Napoleon I escaped from Elba and reestablished his regime in March 1815. The Allies Austria, Britain, Russia, and Prussia immediately promised to fight until the defeat of Napoleon. Field Marshals Arthur Wellesley Duke of Wellington and Gerhard Leberecht Blücher were able to halt Napoleon's first attack. The decision came as result of the battle of Waterloo (also known as the battle of Belle-Alliance), southwest of Brussels, on June 18, 1815, when Blücher arrived to support Wellington's troops. Cavalry by Neithardt von Gneisenau pursued and dissolved the remains of the French army. Napoleon I was forced into his second and final abdication. The second Treaty of Paris (November 20) restored France in the borders of 1790.

The impacts of the Wars of Liberation included, amongst others, new tactics and realities of war. The patriotism of the allies was reflected in annual celebrations in 1814 and 1815 and centennial events. They also served in subsequent decades as important historical events for national identification, tradition, and myth. In World Wars I and II poetry and declarations of this time were in circulation, while movies in particular were used as propaganda during World War II.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); Enlightenment, France, 18th Century; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Schill, Ferdinand Baptista von (1776–1809)

References and Suggested Readings

- Koch, H. W. (1998) *Die Befreiungskriege. 1807–1815. Napoleon gegen Deutschland und Europa*. Berg am Starnberger See: Verlagsgesellschaft Berg.
- Leggiere, M. V. (2002) *Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in North Germany, 1813*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Nipperdey, T. (1993) *Deutsche Geschichte. 1800–1866. Bürgermelt und starker Staat*. Munich: C. H. Beck.
- Riley, J. P. (2000) *Napoleon and the World War of 1813: Lessons in Coalition War Fighting*. London: Routledge.
- Rotheberg, G. E. (1980) *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Anti-nuclear campaign, Britain

Stacy Warner Maddern

Opposition to nuclear weapons emerged in Britain in 1955 following the government's announcement that it would manufacture a hydrogen bomb. In the midst of the Cold War, on July 9, 1955, Bertrand Russell issued the Russell–Einstein Manifesto, which targeted the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and urged world leaders to find alternative peaceful methods to resolve international conflict. This manifesto became the basis for the Pugwash Conferences on Scientific and World Affairs, which brought together a group of scholars to seek solutions that might reduce armed conflict and global security threats. In 1957, the issue of nuclear disaster was further exposed when J. B. Priestley published an article in the *New Statesmen* entitled “Russia, the Atom and the West,” which suggested an imminent threat to Britain.

In 1957, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was founded in Britain and elected Bertrand Russell as its president. It was centered on a “ban the bomb” movement and originally planned to work in collaboration with Britain's main opposition party, the Labour Party, to organize an H-Bomb Campaign Committee within parliament. However, the movement was overtaken by enthusiastic public support that made it a mass movement. Five thousand people

attended its inaugural meeting on February 17, 1958, and a few hundred participated in the march to Downing Street that followed.

Between 1958 and 1962, CND was joined by a diverse selection of society from the working class to scientists and religious leaders. Other organizations, such as the British Peace Committee, Direct Action Committee, and National Committee for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests, all lent their support. At Easter 1958, CND organized a march to Aldermaston that attracted tens of thousands of people. “Ban the Bomb,” the chief slogan of CND, became a central icon of the youth peace movement of the 1960s.

In 1960 Bertrand Russell resigned from CND to organize the Committee of 100, which went on to become active in several political campaigns from the Vietnam War to homelessness in the United Kingdom. The Committee of 100 made a practice of civil disobedience, creating public criticism and eventually affecting the image of other protest movements like CND. After the passing of the Cuban Missile Crisis, public concern over nuclear weapons began to wane, and with it interest in CND.

In the 1980s CND experienced a resurgence as the Labour Party, gaining in the political polls, became committed to policies of unilateral nuclear disarmament. On October 26, 1980, some 70,000 people assembled at Trafalgar Square in London to protest the continued nuclear crisis. These developments reorganized and rejuvenated CND, resulting in new branches, local anti-missile groups, women's groups, and an array of scientists and university scholars joining a movement that was larger than that of the 1950s. Social historian and political activist E. P. Thompson and a host of others began to criticize the global policies of the United States and the Soviet Union, suggesting that British soil was now at risk of preemptive strikes as a result of the nuclear arms race.

Today, CND remains active in protest of the possible threat of nuclear disaster. Its current campaigns include a “No to Trident Replacement” protest over Britain's most recent nuclear technology, “No to NATO,” and assertive opposition to the use of nuclear power.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Movement, Japan; Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Anti-Nuclear Protests, Marshall Islands; Russell, Bertrand (1872–1970); Thompson, Edward Palmer (E. P.) (1924–1993)

References and Suggested Readings

- Parkin, F. (1968) *Middle-Class Radicalism: The Social Basis of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament*. New York: Praeger.
- Steck, H. (1965) The Reemergence of Ideological Politics in Great Britain: The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. *Western Political Quarterly* 18, 1 (March).
- Thompson, E. P. & Smith, D. (1981) *Protest and Survive*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Anti-nuclear movement, Japan

Masuro Sugai

Nuclear power is among the most crucial topics concerning Japan's democracy movement. Since the late 1940s, electricity companies have worked closely with the Japanese government in opposing local communities who seek to oppose nuclear power. The electric utility industry is exceptionally strong in Japan. Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tokyo Electric) is the largest private electricity company in the world.

The government and electric utility industry have long promoted the notion that nuclear power development would "do good to local communities" and "serve as part of a regional revitalization." In opposition, Japanese citizens have organized in localities to call for direct democracy, or "referendum movements," opposing indirect legislative measures to build nuclear facilities.

Consequently, since the late 1990s, acquiring new construction sites has become a more difficult task for promoters of nuclear power. Some nuclear proponents have resorted to enhancing the capacity of existing plants where communities are dependent on nuclear power, even as local opposition expands.

In Japan, the state has used nuclear power development to influence and shape national energy policy. Most municipalities chosen as sites for nuclear power plants or nuclear fuel recycling are dominated by conservative legislative assemblies. From the early 1960s to the early 1970s, public antagonism has grown in response to deception by the government and electricity companies. Often confronted by government police and riot squads, anti-nuclear protesters have forced the government and utility industry to consider issues of safety and the construction

of new sites. In other instances, organizers have gathered petitions demanding plebiscites.

In the early 1960s a fishermen's campaign against Chubu Electric's Ashihama plant in Mie Prefecture resulted in mass protests and government arrests in Nagashima. But the protests also led to an inspection by Nakasone's ministry of international trade and industry in 1966, forcing Mie Prefecture's governor to address the issue of nuclear safety. By the late 1960s as rapid economic growth created severe pollution, a shift in public opinion against nuclear power emerged. Local residents of coastal and scenic seaside areas nationwide were suddenly opposed to nuclear power plant construction as farmers and fishing communities witnessed the damaging health and business consequences of industrial pollution. These coastal communities were the first to recognize the danger of nuclear power development and initiate independent opposition to the government/nuclear plans for what the government euphemistically called "regional revitalization."

By the late 1960s, the anti-nuclear power movement intensified more broadly as the Japan anti-pollution movement expanded throughout the country. The anti-nuclear movement began a protest campaign at several planned construction sites considered risks for radioactive contamination. The movement included local resistance in Onagawa Town in Miyagi Prefecture, Kariwa Village and Kashiwazaki City in Niigata Prefecture, and Ikata Town in Ehime Prefecture. However, residents of Tokyo, Osaka, and major urban centers remained somewhat indifferent to anti-nuclear power movements, in part due to propaganda campaigns by nuclear producers promoting new sources of energy as a means to rapid economic growth.

In 1970, just after Kansai Electric and Tokyo Electric began operating Tsuruga Plant Unit No. 1, Mihama Plant Unit No. 1, and Fukushima Plant Unit No. 1, artificially radioactive cobalt 60 was detected in Wakasa Bay as a result of leakage from the nuclear power facilities. In another scare, in September 1970, an accident caused a radiation leak in the nuclear-powered ship *Mutsu*, further drawing public attention and opposition to nuclear power.

In January 1974, the Japan Analytic Chemical Research Institute, commissioned to measure radiation in a port visited by a US Navy nuclear-powered vessel for environmental monitoring, was found to have fabricated data. Nonetheless,

in June 1974, at the request of local nuclear power promoters, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka passed the Three Electric Utility Laws to counter strong opposition movements. The laws were designed to provide special subsidies for municipalities with electric power facilities, placing nuclear producers in an advantageous position.

In an effort to resolve what was becoming a national nuclear power crisis, the Atomic Energy Administrative Commission was created to revise the Atomic Energy Basic Law and divided the Commission into the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission. From the outset, questions abounded as to the capability of the Nuclear Safety Commission, which appeared to act only in an advisory capacity. In March 1979, the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the US stimulated a global movement in urban communities against nuclear power. In Japan, some 8,000 people engaged in direct action against nuclear power development, confronting armed squads hired by producers. In 1981, the local assembly of Kubokawa Town in Kochi Prefecture passed a referendum ordinance calling for a vote on nuclear power development for the first time in the country. No referendum was held, but construction plans for a nuclear plant were withdrawn.

Despite opposition, nuclear construction continued in the early 1980s. In April 1986, following the completion of the Rokkasho Village nuclear facility, the Chernobyl plant in the Ukraine exploded into flames. Serious radioactive contamination spread to Belarus and Russia, to Europe and beyond. In Japan, radioiodine was found to contaminate vegetables and milk. Intense anti-nuclear power movements emerged in European countries, notably in Germany, where Green Party members advocated the abolition of nuclear power generation.

Chernobyl also served as an impetus for denuclearization in Japan, as a growing number of urban residents joined anti-nuclear movements. One year after the accident, citizens vociferously protested an output adjustment test plan at Shikoku Electric's Ikata Plant. While the protest failed to reverse the national government's pro-nuclear policy, more local governments began refusing nuclear power. Notably, residents of Maki Town in Niigata Prefecture implemented a referendum, reversing the decision of the Electric Power Development Coordination Council to construct a plant in 1981. Even with

the warnings that followed in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, Japan's nuclear safety continued to pose a risk, in some cases following smaller accidents, forcing the evacuation of residential communities and killing workers through radiation exposure.

In Niigata Prefecture, the residents of Kariwa Village and Kashiwazaki City launched a signature campaign against a nuclear facility. In May 2001, residents conducted a referendum rejecting the project in Kariwa Village. Subsequently, the mayor and governor declared a postponement of the program. In 2002, Tokyo Electric and other firms were implicated in covering up and fabricating accident data, damaging the industry's reputation in Japan.

In the early 2000s, arguments against nuclear power revolved around plans to build new facilities. While it is difficult for individuals to have direct influence on legislative and administrative policy, they have resisted plans for new plants through petition and referendum campaigns. In 1981, after debating nuclear power generation since 1969, Maki residents in Niigata Prefecture, despite fervent opposition, implemented a referendum on nuclear power for the first time in the country. The government and pro-nuclear power groups persistently criticized the Maki referendum as violating Japan's parliamentary democracy. However, citizens have been quick to charge that since nuclear power was not debated in the assembly, the referendum was necessary.

Since initial efforts in 1981, Maki residents have resisted nuclear power through referendums and recall initiatives. In 1995, 1997, and 1999 petitions were gathered for the recall of the pro-nuclear power town mayor and assembly members who had not revealed their support for nuclear plants while initially campaigning for office.

Nuclear power promoters have continued to use economic leverage to press public officials and local residents to support plant construction. As the deregulation of the electric business progressed in the 1990s and 2000s, the question of the permanent disposal of radioactive waste increases, in addition to the reprocessing costs in an earthquake-prone country.

As a result of the Maki referendum other such policies were enacted by other local governments in Japan, including Hokuriku Electric's Shiga plant sites in Togi Town in Ishikawa Prefecture and the Arahama Community in

Kashiwazaki City. In 2001, another referendum was conducted by Kariwa Village to call for votes on the Plutonium-Thermal Project. Referendums are taken on a variety of nuclear and environmental issues, from construction of waste disposal plants and dams to installation of power lines and mobile phone relay antenna. The number of referendums increased rapidly beyond local areas in the early 2000s, expanding the municipal-level rebellion initiated with the historical referendum by Maki Town to the prefecture level.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Campaign, Britain; Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Anti-Nuclear Protests, Marshall Islands; Japan, Resistance to Construction of Narita Airport; Nuclear-Free New Zealand, 1987

References and Suggested Readings

- Harrison, S. (1996) *Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Helmar, K. (1992) *Energy Politics and Schumpeter Dynamics: Japan's Policy Between Short-Term Wealth and Long-Term Global Welfare*. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
- Kaku, M. (1989) *Nuclear Power: Both Sides*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Sugai, M. (1995) The Community Chose Maki Town without Nuclear Power: Sovereign Power Resides with the Residents. *Science/Society/Human Beings* 58.

Anti-nuclear protest movements

Paul Rubinson

Residents of the planet Earth did not sit idly by as nations developed nuclear weapons capable of mass destruction during the twentieth century. Citizens of all nations demanded a damper on the nuclear arms race, resulting in arms control treaties that restricted the development, testing, and proliferation of nuclear weapons across the globe, extending even to Antarctica and outer space. And yet the true legacy of the anti-nuclear movement remains unclear. Its champions credit the movement with branding nuclear weapons with a mark of abhorrence that prevented their use. The movement's leading historian, Lawrence Wittner (1993), has argued that anti-nuclear activists shifted the geopolitical landscape away



In January 1991, five years after the radiation-releasing accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine, a crowd gathers to commemorate the countless victims and to protest nuclear power. Nearly 60 deaths were estimated to be directly related to the radiation leak. Other estimates suggest that around 4,000 people contracted cancer as a result. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

from nuclear confrontation and the Cold War. According to Wittner, it was the world anti-nuclear movement that shook the foundations of the nation-state system, as “opponents of the Bomb, by subjecting it to an onslaught of criticism, helped turn public sentiment against the weapon and thereby made it politically less acceptable as an instrument of war and diplomacy” (pp. ix–x).

Skeptics posit that the movement was more coincidental than influential, and describe the anti-nuclear movement, and nuclear weapons themselves, as having coincided with the Cold War, but having had little role in its outcome.

Protests in the Atomic Age

Protest against nuclear weapons began even before the first atomic bomb had been created. Scientists working on the Manhattan Project, the US effort to build an atomic bomb, began to reconsider the wisdom of atomic weapons once Germany surrendered in May 1945. At the forefront of this current of thought was physicist Leo Szilard, who circulated a petition to Manhattan Project scientists opposing military use of the bomb. Szilard's petition read in part:

The development of atomic power will provide nations with new means of destruction. The atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the first step in this direction, and there is almost no limit to the destructive power which will become

available in the course of their future development. Thus a nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.

Biophysicist Eugene Rabinowitch, also a Manhattan Project scientist, worked with Szilard and James Franck on a report that recommended a demonstration of the bomb in front of Japanese officials rather than immediate military use of the bomb; a demonstration would thus provide the Japanese with a chance to surrender before the bomb would be used.

Szilard's petition and the Franck Report came to naught; Hiroshima was bombed on August 6, 1945 and Nagasaki on August 9. Japan consequently offered the first reactions to the direct effects of atomic weapons. In his speech of surrender, Japanese Emperor Hirohito told his subjects, "the heavy casualties are beyond measure. To continue the war further could lead in the end not only to the extermination of our race, but also to the destruction of all human civilization." In the ensuing years the Japanese people would voice consistent opposition to nuclear weapons. But the Japanese were not alone in seeing nuclear weapons as a threat to the entire human race.

In the United States, victory in World War II was muted by a newfound sense of fear at the very weapon that many credited with winning the war. Journalist Edward R. Murrow was one who sensed this anxiety. He stated: "Seldom, if ever, has a war ended leaving the victors with such a sense of uncertainty and fear, with such a realization that the future is obscure and that survival is not assured." Early anti-nuclear activism was largely limited to older bands of pacifists, including the Fellowship of Reconciliation and religious groups such as the Quakers. Other activist groups included advocates of world government, who came to include a significant number of former Manhattan Project scientists. Conscious that atomic weapons threatened world stability and aware that the US monopoly of atomic weapons would not last, atomic scientists joined with world federalists in arguing that only a world government could adequately control atomic energy, a belief succinctly summarized by their slogan, "One World or None." In Japan, public opinion reflected profound anti-

nuclear sentiment – hardly a surprise given that they were the only people against whom atomic weapons were used. But US occupation authorities in Japan stifled anti-nuclear opinions, forcing the Japanese to express their opposition to nuclear weapons by endorsing world government. From its beginnings, the anti-nuclear movement was not aligned with any single nation and thus challenged the nation-state system and aimed to transcend the nationalism of the coming Cold War.

These initial scientific approaches to nuclear protest were not as innovative as has been argued. In fact, scholars have only recently recognized that scientists' activism after World War II was in many ways a reprise of activism during the interwar years. During World War I, airplanes brought a new level of destruction to warfare, menacing civilians and soldiers alike. After the armistice, scientists, engineers, and other observers advocated for international control of aviation, a debate that reverberated in the arguments for international control of atomic energy after World War II.

In addition to world government, many US atomic scientists also lobbied for civilian, rather than military, control of US atomic energy policy. That they succeeded and established the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) is a testament to the newfound respect that civilians and politicians had for scientists. Yet the conventional nature of their movement reflects the fact that from the beginning, the bulk of anti-nuclear activism aimed to create changes in policy through participation in democratic politics. With few exceptions, the anti-nuclear movement did not employ tactics of disruption or civil disobedience, as activists were determined to work within the bounds of democratic politics. Accordingly, as Cold War bipolarity divided the globe in the late 1940s and dissent faded from mainstream politics, the initial surge of anti-nuclear sentiment began to disappear.

In the United States the rise of the Cold War and the concurrent Red Scare largely smothered opposition to nuclear weapons. The scientists' campaign for civilian control of atomic energy had been successful, but the AEC proved just as hawkish as scientists had expected the military to be. In the late 1940s the commission began a purge of liberal scientists that culminated in the humiliating dismissal of physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, who had been largely responsible

for the creation of the first US atomic bombs during World War II.

Europeans felt some uneasiness about atomic weapons after World War II, but did not engage in much activism. Small numbers of pacifists and clergy advocated world government, primarily in Britain, a nation that, because of its size, was particularly vulnerable to a nuclear attack. The residents of mainland Europe, however, were not overly impressed by atomic weapons since conventional weapons had efficiently devastated the landscape of the continent during the war. The Catholic Church saw atomic weapons as a bulwark against the rapacious Soviet empire, thus limiting atomic dissent in Europe's Catholic nations. The dictatorships of Spain and Portugal refused to tolerate anti-nuclear dissent, as was also the case in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union joined the arms race by developing its own atomic weapon in 1949, opposition to nuclear weapons increased slightly in parts of Western Europe, including Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. For the most part, however, Europeans maintained faith in military strength – including atomic weapons – to confront the communist powers.

The communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe developed their own unique anti-nuclear ideology for arms control and disarmament. Represented by the World Peace Council (WPC), the communist argument against nuclear weapons alleged that the arms race was spurred by US militarism and defended Soviet atomic weapons as a necessary response. The WPC did reflect a genuine fear of atomic weapons among many of its adherents, but the organization was so blatantly partisan that it attained little influence in non-communist states. Nevertheless, some genuine activists and independent thinkers aligned themselves with it, including the British scientist J. D. Bernal and the French scientist Frederic Joliot-Curie. Since the WPC existed by official fiat, it could count on the state for resources and the public for adamant support, though much of this was undoubtedly expressed under duress. The WPC managed to create the trappings of a mass movement, including widespread canvassing, large rallies, and lengthy petitions; even poets were mobilized in the name of the WPC. Because of its highly visible efforts, the WPC enabled western governments to dismiss all anti-nuclear activists as communists.

Escalation in the Thermonuclear Age

In 1954 and 1955 the United States and Soviet Union respectively developed thermonuclear weapons vastly more powerful than the atomic bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This increased destructive power of nuclear weapons resulted in increased anti-nuclear activism around the world. As before, intellectuals and scientists were the first to respond to the nuclear danger. British philosopher Bertrand Russell and the legendary physicist Albert Einstein called upon scientists to search for a solution to the nuclear dilemma. "Scientists should assemble," their manifesto read, "not as members of this or that nation, continent, or creed, but as human beings, members of the species Man, whose continued existence is in doubt."

Protest against thermonuclear weapons generally coalesced not in opposition to their destructive power, however, but in objection to the radioactive fallout released by testing these weapons. During a 1954 US nuclear weapons test, radioactive ash fell on a Japanese fishing boat named *The Lucky Dragon* that had been sailing well outside the boundaries of the test zone. When the crew began to suffer radiation poisoning, it became clear that innocent people could suffer from nuclear weapons even during peacetime. When the United States government created a nuclear test site in Nevada, mass-based organizations quickly mobilized against nuclear weapons, many of them adopting "Ban the Bomb!" as their slogan. Groups such as the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) drew middle-class Americans to powerful campaigns for nuclear test bans. When products of fallout appeared in milk and baby teeth, Nobel Prize-winning chemist Linus Pauling mobilized wide support by arguing that US national security policy was harming those it was meant to protect. Although the Dwight Eisenhower administration had made nuclear weapons the centerpiece of US defense policy, Eisenhower himself seriously pursued a test ban during his second term.

In Europe a similar brand of activism appeared to contest nuclear weapons. British anti-nuclear activists founded the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in February 1958; the organization dedicated most of its efforts to influencing the British Labour Party, with mixed

results. But grassroots demonstrations, including annual marches to and from the British nuclear facility at Aldermaston, were also a large part of CND's efforts. As the mainstream, political approach to anti-nuclear activism grew stronger, the movements for pacifism and world government quickly waned.

Elsewhere in Europe, including West Germany, Scandinavia, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ireland, public opinion most often opposed nuclear weapons, though this did not always translate into political change. Some anti-nuclear sentiment could be heard in France, but most of it came from the Communist and Socialist parties. The ruling French government, meanwhile, had become obsessed with developing its own *force de frappe*, leaving the French people with little opportunity to challenge nuclear weapons.

The world communist anti-nuclear movement also challenged the development of thermonuclear weapons, though its critique of the arms race made little headway outside of the Eastern bloc. The WPC was useful for Warsaw Pact nations, since communist leaders were fearful of a US nuclear attack and their armies held an advantage in conventional weapons. In addition, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev desired an arms control agreement of some sort, though it is unclear whether this was out of genuine desires or propaganda. With official sanction, the WPC received plenty of funding but no independence from Soviet directives. The Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 only further eroded the credibility of the WPC outside of the Eastern bloc.

Although the non-aligned anti-nuclear movement refused to cooperate with the WPC, many opponents of arms control in the West continued to claim that all anti-nuclear activists were communists and therefore seditious. In 1960 US Senator Thomas J. Dodd brought SANE and Linus Pauling before Congress and accused each of being under the sway of communists. He linked the US campaign for a nuclear test ban to Soviet foreign policy. Such claims caused protestors to distance themselves from radical tactics and activists; SANE, for example, asked for government assistance in purging its organization of leftists.

Although mainstream political campaigns made up the bulk of anti-nuclear activism in the 1950s and 1960s, some activists transcended borders in radical grassroots attempts to halt the arms race.

These transnational approaches, though small, had the potential to create difficulties for national governments. In early 1958 a small group of pacifists set sail from Honolulu aboard a boat called *The Golden Rule* toward the US Pacific nuclear testing zone, where they hoped to disrupt an impending nuclear test. Alerted to their plans, an alarmed Secretary of State John Foster Dulles predicted that a global alliance of even a few activists would lead to international problems. Undersecretary of State Christian Herter also worried that US efforts to apprehend an international union of ships would have detrimental effects on other US interests. US authorities took swift action, having the ship's crew arrested and, after a second sailing attempt, imprisoned.

Alternating crises and advances involving nuclear weapons in the late 1950s and early 1960s led to a huge growth in anti-nuclear protest. In 1957 the Soviet launch of its *Sputnik* satellite portended the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. But a nuclear test moratorium, agreed to by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1958, indicated a possible break in the arms race. The fear of nuclear war and fallout from tests continued to spur activism, drawing heavily from the educated middle classes. Intellectuals, women's groups, churches, and college students made up the majority of nuclear protesters in the United States and Europe, while the movement failed for the most part to connect with the working class.

In Western Europe the CND continued to grow, though it came into conflict with activists who used direct action tactics against pro-nuclear governments. Bertrand Russell formed the Committee of 100 with the express purpose of bringing sit-ins and other methods of civil disobedience to bear on the British nuclear weapons complex, though CND officials disdained this radicalism. More mainstream anti-nuclear sentiment thrived in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, West Germany, France, Italy, and Greece. Eastern European states and the Soviet Union saw only small pockets of anti-nuclear dissent outside the approved activities of the WPC. Only those with influence could risk speaking out against Soviet nuclear policy; the nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov was one such rare dissident. The WPC itself continued to shred its own credibility as it vocally supported the Soviet Union's ending of the nuclear test moratorium in September 1961. Neutral and

non-aligned governments, such as those in Ireland, Yugoslavia, and Finland, were generally friendly to their citizens' anti-nuclear movements. In NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, however, governments mobilized against dissent from the arms race. Soviet authorities repressed non-aligned activists, while West German and Greek authorities used coercion against anti-nuclear protestors. French anti-nuclear activists were arrested, while British authorities sentenced the esteemed 89-year-old Russell to two months in prison.

France's first nuclear weapons test in February 1960, the end of the US-Soviet test moratorium a year later, and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, all foreshadowed an impending nuclear Armageddon. As the arms race increased, protests movements increased as well. Eventually, world leaders began to see that arms control agreements could be politically expedient. Sweden's Social Democratic Party renounced nuclear weapons in the 1960s, while Norway, Ireland, Finland, and Denmark all enacted arms control measures. The British government even began to hedge and attempted to push the United States to accept a test ban. In 1963 Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union signed a Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) that banned nuclear tests above ground. Other measures soon followed, including the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that pledged nuclear nations "not to transfer nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear weapon state" and non-nuclear nations "not to make or acquire nuclear weapons." An Outer Space Treaty that banned the testing of weapons in space and an Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty came on the heels of the NPT. According to Wittner, "the leaders of the nuclear powers recognized that nuclear arms control made good politics." This is no doubt true, but good politics did not necessarily make for effective measures. All of the arms control treaties of the 1960s and 1970s were of dubious value. The LTBT, for example, only moved nuclear weapons tests underground, where testing actually increased. Of all US tests between 1945 and 1980, 54 percent took place after the signing of the LTBT, while in the Soviet Union 56 percent of its tests between 1949 and 1980 occurred after the LTBT. The widely praised NPT only created a nuclear caste system, as its adherents have made no serious effort to comply with Article VI of the treaty that requires them to "pursue negotiations in good

faith at an early date on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament."

Arms control treaties were not particularly effective in hindering the arms race, but they proved very effective in quashing anti-nuclear protest. The movement against nuclear weapons began a quick spin into irrelevance after the signing of the LTBT in 1963. For the most part, many of these anti-nuclear activists were siphoned off into the anti-Vietnam War movement. But arms control treaties and the ensuing rise of détente gave the impression that the superpowers were doing something about the arms race, and anti-nuclear activism began to fade even as nuclear arsenals continued to grow.

Mass Mobilization in the 1980s

During the 1970s, parties of the center-left came to power in parts of Western Europe and the United States. Accordingly, Jimmy Carter in the United States, and social democrats in Scandinavia, for example, openly supported arms control measures. But the abrupt halt of détente at the decade's end brought forth a newly invigorated arms race. US nuclear policymakers sought innovations in weaponry, such as the MX missile, and expansion of the NATO nuclear deterrent in the form of nuclear missile deployment in Western Europe. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, also contributed to détente's end by invading Afghanistan and deploying SS-20 missiles in Warsaw Pact nations. Further arms control measures were subsequently abandoned, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

Anti-nuclear activists again responded to the escalation of the arms race with an escalation of their own efforts. The years between 1981 and 1985 saw anti-nuclear sentiment erupt into a mass movement in Europe. Western Europe in particular displayed massive protest against nuclear weapons, in particular the NATO Cruise and Pershing missiles and the Soviet SS-20s, collectively disdained by the movement as Euromissiles. Unions, churches, and social democratic parties all opposed the Euromissiles, while CND continued to lobby the British Labour Party for disarmament, which the party supported during the 1980s. By 1985 CND had over 100,000 members and over 1,000 local groups in the UK.

But a new approach to disarmament characterized the anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s, as many Europeans sought to transcend the national and political efforts of earlier anti-nuclear groups. The European Nuclear Disarmament (END) campaign became the leading voice in deploring both US and Soviet militarism. END and other European activists demonstrated as much against the Euromissiles as against the Cold War ideologies of capitalism and communism, but the movement encompassed other forms of resistance as well. In August 1981 a British protest group made up exclusively of women surrounded a nuclear missile base at Greenham Common. In the ensuing days, months, and even years, the women remained encamped at Greenham Common in order to engage in continuous civil disobedience aimed at disrupting the military functions of the base. This led to the formation of a movement of German Women for Peace.

In the United States opposition to nuclear weapons coalesced around Randall Forsberg's bilateral "nuclear freeze" proposal to stop the development and production of nuclear weapons. A budding Nuclear Freeze movement aimed at passing a Freeze resolution through Congress, a movement that gathered such steam that in June 1982 some 750,000 people gathered in New York's Central Park to demonstrate against nuclear weapons. Numerous states passed Freeze referenda, and the House of Representatives eventually passed a Freeze resolution. The movement remained a middle-class movement and continued to work within the bounds of polite politics.

Such a scope did not limit the size of the movement. Anti-nuclear fever swept up Europeans, particularly in the northern part of the continent. In the Netherlands the Interchurch Peace Council worked for disarmament, while in West Germany the Greens combined environmental and anti-nuclear efforts. Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland all harbored significant anti-nuclear opposition; in the fall of 1983 alone, according to one estimate, roughly 5 million Western Europeans took part in anti-nuclear protests. Such dissent indicated a declining faith among Europeans in the leadership of the US-NATO alliance – just as the 1980s saw the American people rise to oppose the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Nevertheless, conservative leaders often managed to maintain

power in western nations, as when the British Conservatives defeated the Labour Party in 1983, and Republican Ronald Reagan won reelection as US president in 1984.

Both NATO and Warsaw Pact governments generally took a hard line against the anti-nuclear movement. After years of tolerating his anti-nuclear stance, the Soviet government sentenced Sakharov to internal exile in Gorky in January 1980. Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Reagan in the United States made public suggestions that the anti-nuclear movement was run by communist agents, while Christian democrats in West Germany and socialists in France under François Mitterrand endorsed the Euromissile deployment. Eastern Europe did witness some sporadic unaligned protests against Soviet SS-20s by East German and Czech intellectuals. The Moscow Trust Group organized Soviet dissidents and attempted to push the Soviet Union to end the arms race and halt its human rights abuses. For its efforts the Trust Group received beatings, jailings, and imprisonment in the gulag. The governments of France, Italy, Belgium, and West Germany occasionally relied on violence to disrupt anti-nuclear demonstrations, while their counterparts in Czechoslovakia and East Germany similarly assaulted those who demonstrated for disarmament. In their shared disdain for the anti-nuclear movement, the ruling elites of East and West demonstrated that the Cold War was not entirely a competition between East and West, but rather a struggle of the non-aligned people of the world against their pro-nuclear governments.

The mid and late 1980s saw the superpowers reach agreement on arms control accords, though had the Soviet Union not unexpectedly dissolved in 1991 there would be little reason to link these agreements to the end of the Cold War. In fact, neither nuclear weapons nor movements against them were a major factor in the Cold War's end. As the superpowers resisted disarmament movements, this intransigent reliance on weapons of mass destruction came to be seen – in the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, the United States – as a reflection of the superpowers' lack of concern for human welfare. Accordingly, human rights protest and economic factors played a more direct role in bringing down the Soviet Union and ending the Cold War.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Campaign, Britain; Anti-Nuclear Movement, Japan; Anti-Nuclear Protests, Marshall Islands; Nuclear-Free New Zealand, 1987

References and Suggested Readings

- Bess, M. (1993) *Realism, Utopia and the Mushroom Cloud: Four Activist Intellectuals and Their Strategies for Peace, 1945–89*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Boyer, P. (1984) From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963–1980. *Journal of American History* 70: 821–44.
- DeGroot, G. (2005) *The Bomb: A Life*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wittner, L. (1993) *The Struggle Against the Bomb, Vol. 1: One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, through 1953*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Wittner, L. (1997) *The Struggle Against the Bomb, Vol. 2: Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Wittner, L. (2003) *The Struggle Against the Bomb, Vol. 3: Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Anti-nuclear protests, Marshall Islands

Justin Corfield

The Marshall Islands were ruled by Germany until World War I, when they were taken over by Japan and ruled under a mandate from the League of Nations. After World War II the US navy took control of them, with the United States controlling them as a United Nations Trust Territory from 1947. Between 1946 and 1958 the United States used the Marshall Islands for nuclear tests at Bikini Atoll and at Eniwetak.

The first major political protest in the Marshall Islands took place in 1982, when over 1,000 landowners who had been dispossessed from Kwahjalein Atoll took part in Operation Homecoming, fighting for four months against missile testing on their atoll. This led to other protest groups campaigning against US nuclear tests, although the Marshallese held back from introducing an anti-nuclear constitution as was the case in nearby Palau.

There were a number of protests against the use of the Marshall Islands for US nuclear tests,

but there was little publicity for these until 1985 when the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior* sailed to Rongelap Atoll to help relocate some of the people away from the nuclear waste. There was a large protest in 1996 when the people from Bikini Atoll commemorated the 50th anniversary of their forced evacuation so that the US could conduct nuclear tests. They had been moved to Rongerik Atoll where many fell ill from eating poisonous fish, while others nearly starved from food shortages. Following protests later that same year and reports by German scientists hired by the people from Bikini Atoll, much of the residual nuclear radiation in the lagoon was removed to allow the people to return. This successful protest was followed by another by the people of Eniwetak Atoll who had been exiled for 33 years. The Nuclear Claims Tribunal awarded \$578 million in compensation to these people and another \$73 million to the people of Rongelap Atoll, where people had been exposed to radiation some 20 times the rate that the US government had previously claimed.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Campaign, Britain; Anti-Nuclear Movement, Japan; Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Micronesia, Nationalist and Labor Protests; Nuclear-Free New Zealand, 1987

References and Suggested Readings

- Cockrum, E. E. (1972). The Emergence of Modern Micronesia. PhD thesis, University of Colorado.
- Coulter, J. W. (1957) *The Pacific Dependencies of the United States*. New York: Macmillan.

Anti-Racist Action (ARA)

Michael Staudenmaier

Anti-Racist Action (ARA) has been a militant form of anti-fascist organizing in North America for two decades. ARA is best described primarily as an organizing model, and only secondarily as a formal organization. The Anti-Racist Action Network functions as a loose coordinating framework. While emphasizing physical confrontation with fascists, ARA groups have also struggled against institutional forms of white supremacy, and against sexism and homophobia. Although it has been strongly influenced by anarchism, Anti-Racist Action has remained largely

non-sectarian and open to activists of many ideological backgrounds.

McGowan (2003) notes that Anti-Racist Action began in the Minneapolis skinhead scene of the 1980s. A multiracial crew of anti-racist skinheads, the Baldies, organized public and sometimes violent opposition to a growing fascist presence. To expand their struggle, the Baldies initiated the first ARA group, with mixed results. Broadening activities beyond opposing fascism initially proved easier than recruiting activists from outside skinhead circles. Physical defense of abortion clinics and opposition to police brutality became key areas of struggle, but the activists remained primarily skinheads and punks.

By the 1990s, however, in response to surging fascist organizing in the Midwestern US, and the often tepid or legalistic response from mainstream organizations, ARA groups formed in many cities. At a conference in Ohio the Anti-Racist Action Network was founded to coordinate activities and discussion. The Network (1996) adopted four "Points of Unity" which have remained largely unchanged: "1) We go where they [fascists] go; 2) We don't rely on the cops or the courts to do our work for us; 3) Nonsectarian defense of other anti-fascists; 4) We support abortion rights and reproductive freedom." The final sentence reads: "We intend to win."

The rapid growth of Anti-Racist Action led to increasing repression, both legal and physical. Dozens of ARA supporters were arrested during or after protests in the late 1990s, although few were convicted of serious charges. At least two ARA activists were killed by fascists, and others were injured, many during mass public confrontations. The question of violence in anti-fascist organizing was not easily resolved, contributing to the decline in ARA groups during the years after 9/11, when violent protest in the US became increasingly associated with terrorism. Disarray in the fascist movement during the same period, and the continued tendency of ARA groups to rely on subcultural affinity rather than political agreement, also had a negative effect.

Anti-Racist Action groups continue to organize in various parts of North America, notably Los Angeles and Toronto. Other contemporary formations tied to ARA's legacy include the Northeastern Federation of Anarchist Communists (NEFAC), and the small "three-way fight" tendency within the North American left.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Fascism, Protest and Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Anti-Racist Action Network (1996) *Points of Unity*. Available at www.antiracistaction.us (downloaded February 15, 2008).
- BRICK Anarchist Collective (2003) *Above and Below: Them, Them, and Us*. Available at three-wayfight.blogspot.com/2005/06/above-and-below-them-them-and-us.html (downloaded February 15, 2008).
- Hamerquist, D. & Sakai, J. (2002) *Confronting Fascism: Discussion Documents for a Militant Movement*. Montreal: Kersplebedeb.
- McGowan, R. (2003) *Claim No Easy Victories: An Anarchist Analysis of ARA and Its Contributions to the Building of a Radical Anti-Racist Movement*. *Northeastern Anarchist* 7 (Spring/Summer).

Anti-slavery movement, Britain

Jason M. Kelly

The abolition of slavery in Britain and its Atlantic empire was a protracted process that took centuries to accomplish. While historians often focus on one element of the anti-slavery movement – the abolition campaigns of the late eighteenth century – anti-slavery resistance was, in fact, a much more complex phenomenon that ranged from slave resistance to evangelical pressure to mass boycotts and petitioning. The diversity of anti-slavery resistance in the early modern period necessitates that scholars understand the end of slavery in Britain as the accomplishment of many grassroots movements rather than that of a single, monolithic organization of middling reformers.

The abolition of slavery in the British Atlantic took place in three phases. The first phase, lasting roughly from the seventeenth century to the 1770s, saw the expansion of the British slave trade and the earliest, decentralized anti-slavery resistance. The second phase, from the 1770s to 1807, witnessed the rise of massive British support for the abolition of the slave trade, which many leaders believed was the first step in bringing an end to the institution of slavery. The third phase, between 1808 and 1838, brought the legal emancipation of slaves in the British Atlantic world.

Phase I: Expansion and Resistance (1607–1770)

By the end of the sixteenth century, English traders were actively participating in the transatlantic slave trade. With the establishment of several permanent American colonies during the first decades of the seventeenth century, the institution of slavery became part and parcel to these colonies' economic success. The tobacco, sugar, and, eventually, cotton that fed a growing consumer society in Europe demanded large labor forces to plant, grow, harvest, and process them.

The introduction of a massive slave society into the English world required philosophical and legal justifications. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, plantation owners, merchants, scholars, and politicians alike cobbled together a regime built on control and exploitation that was bolstered by philosophical notions of difference and protected by a legal superstructure. The English borrowed from a set of preexisting discourses to defend their engagement with the slave trade and forced labor. These included arguments from natural philosophy, which emphasized cultural, physiological, and even moral differences, and the Christian scriptures, from which contemporaries extrapolated that black Africans were descended from Ham and thus condemned to be slaves. Clergy in the Church of England, such as the seventeenth-century missionary Morgan Godwyn, argued that the institution of slavery was not inconsistent with the doctrines of Christianity. Thus, the extension of the slave system and the articulation of a racial hierarchy became mutually enforcing processes. English common law did not initially provide strong support for the Atlantic slave system, but the legal institutionalization of slavery was forthcoming, although there was never a legal formula as comprehensive as France's *Code Noir* (1685). By the 1660s, colonial statute law recognized slaves as property, a status that was hereditary through matrilineal descent, and miscegenation laws, protection for masters who killed their slaves, and restrictions on equal rights under the law, even for free blacks, soon followed.

Early resistance took many forms that stretched from Africa to the Americas to Britain and Ireland. African strategies included open military confrontation, revolts, and even reconfiguring

the layout of villages and establishing sites of refuge. Likewise, slave revolts in African slaving ports were not uncommon. Records indicate that for every ten slaving voyages, there was a shipboard revolt. Most of these took place while the ship was anchored and loading its victims. In a significant number of examples, Africans in boats attacked anchored slave ships in order to free the captives. Once slaves found themselves working on the American plantations, their resistance continued. A Virginia statute from 1680 prevented slaves from carrying any weapons or leaving their master's estates, a reaction to the continued efforts of Africans to undermine the slave system. In the Caribbean, slave owners experienced regular revolts. Escape proved another mode of resistance, and no group embodied this example more than the Jamaican Maroons, who, for 140 years, resisted the imposition of British rule.

Before the 1770s, European resistance to slavery was limited. Both Anglicans and non-conformist sects justified slavery, and even the Religious Society of Friends, or the Quakers, were reluctant to take a firm stance against it. As early as 1671, one of the Quaker founders, George Fox, argued for the spiritual equality of all humans, but he did not reject slavery outright. Instead, he used the Christian scriptures to justify a period of temporary slavery after which slaves should be freed with some form of compensation. When four Quakers and Mennonites in Germantown, Pennsylvania signed a petition in 1688 against the "traffik of men-body," the event marked the beginning of the anti-slavery movement amongst peoples of European descent. From this community of mid-Atlantic non-conformists came more sustained and significant opposition to slavery in the mid-eighteenth century.

The most influential document of the pre-1770 abolition movement was John Woolman's *Some Considerations on the Keeping of Negroes* (1754), in which he spoke out against both the slave trade and the institution of slavery. A Quaker, his conscience led him to the conclusion that "the Colour of a Man avails nothing, in Matters of Right and Equity." Speaking out against slavery at the annual Philadelphia Meeting of Friends in August 1758, he convinced his fellow Quakers to begin freeing their slaves. His journals record his visits to his fellow Quakers, encouraging them to end their participation in the slave

system. Woolman's voice was joined by another Philadelphia Quaker, Anthony Benezet. Benezet devoted himself not only to the cause of abolition, but also to social reform. Arguing that humans were not just spiritual equals, but that they were social equals, he was an advocate for black and female education. As early as 1750, he tutored free blacks and slaves at his house. In 1770, using his own fortune and funding from the Philadelphia and London Quakers, Benezet founded a free school for Philadelphians of African descent.

Woolman and Benezet were part of an increased move toward abolitionism among the eighteenth-century devout – in part, the product of the Great Awakening. John Wesley preached openly against slavery to his fellow Methodists. Likewise, mid-century Moravian, Baptist, and Mennonite leaders spoke out against the institution. Slaves and free blacks were encouraged to join their congregations. Nevertheless, despite the radical nature of their theologies and the potential challenge that they posed to the slave system, none of these sects rejected slavery altogether. Preaching spiritual equality was not the same thing as practicing social equality. Many of their members continued to own slaves, and evangelicals typically imagined abolition in gradualist terms.

Phase 2: The Abolition Movement (1770–1807)

Anti-slavery resistance during the last decades of the eighteenth century resulted in the abolition of the slave trade in the British Atlantic world in 1807. Most British and American abolitionists believed that their success rested in a two-phased attack on the slave system: first outlaw the slave trade, and then outlaw slavery. The reasons for the end of the slave trade were many, but one recognizable feature of the movement was an increasingly vocal public rejection of the institution. The public critique of slavery was inspired by ideas about religious and natural equality. It found its voice in the burgeoning literacy and print culture of the Anglo-American world.

In 1771–2, the cause of abolition found an unprecedented success in the English courts. A slave, James Somerset, who had come to London as chattel to a Scottish merchant, Charles Stewart, claimed freedom as a consequence of his 1771

baptism. While many colonies had passed laws prohibiting manumission upon baptism, precedent in England was unclear. Stewart had Somerset captured and prepared to send him to Jamaica, at which point Somerset's lawyer, Granville Sharp, filed a writ of *habeas corpus*. Thus, Somerset and his abolitionist friends orchestrated a case against Stewart's claims of ownership and the institution of slavery in England in general. William Murray, 1st Earl of Mansfield, heard the case and produced a carefully worded ruling that held that masters could not send slaves out of England. Despite its precision, much of the public interpreted the ruling as the end to the institution of slavery in England. A similar case lasted from 1772 to 1778 in the Scottish courts. Inspired by the Somerset ruling, Joseph Knight claimed his freedom from John Wedderburn.

The press coverage of the Knight and Somerset cases generated momentum for abolition during the 1770s. Abolitionists in Britain joined their American counterparts in their calls to end slavery, even as the colonies went to war against the British government. In 1773, slaves in Massachusetts unsuccessfully petitioned the state legislature to end slavery. The following year, the colonial assemblies began a long and uneven process of withdrawal from the slave trade. At their annual meeting in 1776, Pennsylvania Quakers banned members who owned slaves. But, in the North American context, it was the British government that did the most to manumit slaves between 1775 and 1783. In 1775, the Governor of Virginia, John Murray, 4th Earl of Dunmore, declared that slaves who fought for the British against the American revolutionaries would become free. While self-serving reasons motivated the British, thousands of African Americans fought against the odds by escaping plantations and joining the British. While many of them found themselves recaptured at the end of the war, more than 14,000 former slaves eventually found their freedom.

In Britain, abolitionists continued their campaigns. Former slaves, such as Olaudah Equiano and Quobna Ottobah Cugoana, added their voices to activists such as Ignatius Sancho and Ukawsaw Gronniosaw. Appealing to Christian morality and philosophical arguments about human equality, their pamphlets, newspaper articles, and books used autobiography to expose slavery's evils. Their descriptions were

confirmed in the courts, most horrifically in a King's Bench case of 1783 – the *Zong* massacre. Typical of the period, the *Zong* was making an overcrowded and sickly slave voyage in autumn 1781. With its high mortality rates, the ship's captain, Luke Collingwood, decided to cut his losses and throw 133 ill slaves overboard. Considered as chattel under the law, the Liverpoolian owners would have lost money if the slaves died of disease. However, Collingwood claimed that water reserves were low. By throwing these slaves overboard to save the other slaves from dehydration, the owners could claim them as lost property to the underwriters. The case that entered Lord Mansfield's court in 1783, *Gregson v. Gilbert*, was a suit by the ship owners to collect the insurance. When Olaudah Equiano, a former slave and abolitionist, heard about this case, he worked with Granville Sharp to publicize the horrors of the Atlantic slave trade.

In the 1780s, a formal coalition developed to pressure parliament to end slavery. As in the Americas, Dissenters were at the forefront. At the London yearly Meeting in 1783, 273 Quakers petitioned parliament to end the slave trade. They also set up the Committee on the Slave Trade, which became the first abolitionist organization in Britain. Following their mandate, two members on the Committee, William Dillwyn and John Lloyd, published *The Case of Our Fellow-Creatures, the Oppressed Africans* in December 1783, a denunciation of slavery that had print runs of 2,000 and 10,000 within the year. Granville Sharp, who had worked closely with Anthony Benezet as early as 1772, developed the links between the Anglican community, the British and American Quakers, and the British evangelical community – most notably, the emergent Clapham Sect. Their association culminated in the Committee for the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1787, the group that has often been widely interpreted as the single voice of abolition.

The success of the Committee for the Abolition of the Slave Trade relied upon the politicization of the British masses, coupled with parliamentary pressure. A growing reading public and new forums for the discussion of the abolitionist cause played a major role in their achievement. Likewise, a modern mass marketing campaign accompanied the cause. The icon of a supplicant slave in chains and the accompanying motto,

“Am I not a Man and a Brother?,” found itself repeated on everything from medallions created by Josiah Wedgwood's Staffordshire factory to anti-slavery tokens to folk art. The motto appealed to Enlightenment notions of human equality and Christian ideas of brotherhood. The image of the slave as supplicant confirmed paternalistic middling attitudes toward people of African descent and their duty to raise people up from their oppression. Furthermore, the tireless campaigning of people such as Hannah More and Thomas Clarkson made the colonial humanitarian crisis palpable to provincial English publics.

Using the technique of petitioning to pressure members of parliament (MPs), hundreds of thousands of Britons added their voice to the abolitionist cause. This provided MPs, such as William Wilberforce, with the leverage that they needed to legislate against the slave trade. As early as 1787, over 10,000 enfranchised men from Manchester signed an anti-slavery petition. Organizing themselves through a nationwide epistolary network, within a year petitioners numbered nearly 100,000. In 1792, these numbers approached 400,000. It was not just the wealthy who added their names to these petitions. For example, in 1789, 769 Sheffield metalworkers signed an anti-slavery petition, knowing that to do so undermined their livelihoods. In their petition, they recognized that slavers traded Sheffield cutlery for slaves in Africa. By the 1790s, some provincial anti-slavery organizations took the lead in organizing a boycott of West Indian sugar.

When the French Revolution began in 1789, radical-minded British abolitionists such as Clarkson saw an opportunity to join their cause with that of the *Société des Amis des Noirs* in France. Unexpectedly, however, the course of the French Revolution undermined the cause of abolition in Britain. When the French Revolution entered its radical phase in 1793–4, British conservatives saw all reform movements as a potential threat to the British state, a perspective that was as much a reaction to Jacobinism as it was to the Saint-Domingue slave revolt of 1791. When the slaves of Saint-Domingue, driven by their desire for freedom and inspired by revolutionary rhetoric, revolted against French plantation owners, British anti-abolitionists argued that the abolition movement was to blame. This perspective gained more credibility with revolutions in Dominica and Jamaica the same year. The

slaving lobby proved tenacious in the 1790s. Panicked by the abolition movement, plantation owners increased the numbers of slaves that they imported from 5,662 per year in 1784–7 to 25,960 in 1793 (Geggus 1981: 222). In turn, sugar and coffee plantations saw their profits increase as Saint-Domingue's imports fell during its civil war. Thus, even though William Wilberforce nearly succeeded with an abolition bill in 1796, it was not until 1807 that the abolitionists successfully passed a slave trade bill.

Phase 3: The Emancipation Movement (1807–1838)

After the abolition of the slave trade, abolitionists initially turned their attention to enforcing the end of the slave trade. The most ardent exponent of enforcement was the African Institution, which included many prominent abolitionists such as Clarkson and Wilberforce. While British ships could not participate in the slave trade, the African Institution recognized that this did not mean the slave trade had ended. They pressured the government to pass legislation to require Caribbean colonies to compile slave registers. By 1817, these registers allowed the government to monitor slave smuggling. Abolitionists saw the registers as a way to trace plantation mortality rates, numbers with which they could press for humanitarian reform.

In the Caribbean, plantation owners continued to protest reforms, and a succession of conservative governments generally responded with a gradualist approach toward legislation. Slaves, however, were unwilling to suffer the abuses of the slave system, and they continued their anti-slavery resistance. In 1816, a revolution in Barbados, often called Bussa's Rebellion, marked a new moment in British slavery. The slaves, inspired by Haitian independence and abolitionist sentiment, planned a complete overthrow of the Barbadian government. Their leaders, Bussa, Washington Franklin, Nanny Grigg, and others, led a rebellion for three days. While unsuccessful in their ultimate aims, their revolt led to reforms, including extended rights in the 1825 Consolidated Slave Law.

With pressure for and against slavery, the British government responded with an approach known as "amelioration." Amelioration would institute gradual reforms, in particular the Christian education of slaves. Groups such as the

London Missionary Society sent evangelicals to proselytize Christian non-resistance. Once they saw the horrors of plantation slavery, some missionaries became vocal abolitionists. This was the situation in the Demerara, Guyana revolt of 1823. Jack Gladstone, a slave, led approximately 13,000 slaves against plantation owners. Following the advice of the Christian missionary John Smith, the slaves generally revoked violence. When plantation owners violently suppressed the revolt, John Smith was arrested and eventually died from pneumonia in prison. He became a symbol for abolitionists and slaves alike, "the Demerara Martyr."

The cases of Barbados and Demerara infused new life into the abolition movement, which in 1823 formed the Society for the Mitigation and Gradual Abolition of Slavery throughout the British Dominions, also known as the Anti-Slavery Society. Like its predecessor, the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade, the Anti-Slavery Society became the national voice of a network of regional organizations. While women had been integral to the pre-1807 abolitionist movement – numbering up to a quarter of subscribers in abolitionist societies – women featured even more prominently in the Anti-Slavery Society and its affiliates. Over 70 women's organizations joined the cause, including the Birmingham Ladies' Society for the Relief of Negro Slaves, later the Female Society of Birmingham. These groups were essential to the success of the petitioning campaigns of the 1820s and 1830s, which gathered over 1.5 million signatures.

In a world of patriarchal hierarchies, the cause of emancipation became implicated in the burgeoning women's rights movement. Against the stance of the Anti-Slavery Society, Elizabeth Heyrick, who formed the Female Society of Birmingham with Susannah Watts in 1823, argued for the immediate emancipation of slaves in her 1824 pamphlet, *Immediate, not Gradual Abolition*. She called for voters to elect MPs who supported immediate emancipation. And she was at the center of a new wave of sugar boycotts. In response, William Wilberforce, the aging leader of the gradualist Anti-Slavery Society, spoke out against Heyrick and the role of women in politics. He even sought to undermine their influence. In 1830, the Female Society of Birmingham, a major contributor to the Anti-Slavery Society, used its financial muscle to force the national

organization to call for immediate emancipation. If the Anti-Slavery Society insisted on a gradualist approach, then the Female Society of Birmingham would withdraw its support. Its influence was bolstered by its prominence among other women's groups which controlled roughly 20 percent of all contributions. Thus, in 1830, the national campaign became one of immediate abolition.

As the immediatist movement grew, the final and most significant slave revolt in the British colonies took place in 1831–2 in Jamaica. Sometimes known as the Baptist War, as planters laid blame on evangelical missionaries, Samuel Sharpe led 60,000 slaves to take their freedom. Orders were to harm no whites, perhaps indicating the leadership's awareness of anti-slavery momentum in Britain. Instead, the revolutionaries focused their attacks on property, causing perhaps £1 million in damage. Only 14 planters died, but 540 slaves died or were executed. The consequence of the revolt showed many in Britain the futility of perpetuating the institution of slavery.

The 1832 Reform Act, coupled with popular abolitionist momentum, proved the decisive factor in legally ending the institution of slavery in Britain and its American colonies. Nevertheless, the Slavery Abolition Act that passed through parliament in 1833 was hardly radical. Overall, the government paid slave owners nearly £20 million for their losses, which were determined by a Slave Compensation Commission. The Act mandated immediate emancipation of slaves under 6 years of age after August 1, 1834. Slaves over 6 years of age were forced to serve an apprenticeship of between four and six years. When abolitionists, including Joseph Sturge and the Central Negro Emancipation Committee, led the campaign against apprenticeship, the colonies passed legislation ending the institution of slavery in the British Americas in 1838.

Nevertheless, slavery still existed in the British empire and around the world. From 1839, the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society became a new voice for international slavery issues. Holding the first World Anti-Slavery Convention in London in 1840, the group invited some of the most prominent abolitionists from around the world. British leaders, such as Clarkson, Thomas Buxton, and Sturge, organized with American leaders, such as Louis Lecesne and

S. L'Instant de Pradine. Noticeably, however, the male leaders prohibited female involvement. Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, visiting from the United States, found that they could not even sit at the convention. Prominent British abolitionists Anne Knight and Elizabeth Pease petitioned to the committee, but to no avail. Inspired by their dismissal from the 1840 World Anti-Slavery Commission, these women went on to organize various women's rights organizations and, most prominently, the Seneca Falls Convention of 1848. Thus, the cause of abolition also catalyzed the women's rights movement in Britain and the United States.

SEE ALSO: Benezet, Anthony (1713–1784); Bussa (d. 1816) and the Barbados Slave Insurrection; Clarkson, Thomas (1760–1846); Demerara Slave Rebellion, 1823; Equiano, Olaudah (1745–1797); Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath; Queen Nanny and Maroon Resistance; Seneca Falls Convention; Sharp, Granville (1735–1813); Stanton, Elizabeth Cady (1815–1902); Wilberforce, William (1759–1833); World Anti-Slavery Convention, London

References and Suggested Readings

- Brown, C. L. (2006) *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Costa, E. V. (1994) *Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood: The Demerara Slave Rebellion of 1823*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Diouf, S. A. (2003) *Fighting the Slave Trade: West African Strategies*. Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Drescher, S. (1987) *Capitalism and Antislavery: British Mobilization in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Geggus, D. P. (1981) Jamaica and the Saint Domingue Slave Revolt, 1791–93. *The Americas* 38: 219–33.
- James, C. L. R. (1963) *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*, 2nd ed. New York: Vintage.
- Oldfield, J. R. (1995) *Popular Politics and British Anti-Slavery: The Mobilization of Public Opinion against the Slave Trade, 1787–1807*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Richardson, D. (2001) Shipboard Revolts, African Authority, and the Atlantic Slave Trade. *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 58 (1): 69–92.
- Whyte, I. (2006) *Scotland and the Abolition of Black Slavery, 1756–1838*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Williams, E. E. (1944) *Capitalism and Slavery*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Anti-slavery movement, British, and the black response to colonization

Beverly Tomek

The emphasis on the Atlantic World as a dynamic, interactive community has provided a fresh perspective on New World slavery. Social historians and African studies specialists have learned to greater appreciate the roles black members of this community played, not just as slaves, but also as merchants, sailors, and activists. Former slaves contributed to this complex transatlantic society by participating in an abolitionist crusade that spread to three continents during the last half of the eighteenth century. During this time, educated former slaves in England including Ignatius Sancho, Ottobah Cugoano, and Olaudah Equiano joined British philanthropists in an effort to educate the public about the evils of slavery. Their work helped to convince the British government to make slavery illegal in England in 1772, to halt the slave trade in 1807, and to emancipate colonial slaves in 1833.

One major tactical controversy that developed among anti-slavery activists was that of colonization, or repatriation of blacks to Africa. This question became an issue in Britain during the late eighteenth century, and it drew the attention of black abolitionists in both the British Isles and the United States. Equiano was the first black British abolitionist drawn into the debate. At that time, colonization was a white-initiated, white-led movement, but many supporters were well-intentioned philanthropists. White humanitarians such as Granville Sharp, John Wesley, James Ramsay, Thomas Clarkson, and William Wilberforce saw colonization as a way to redeem a continent and a people that had been ruthlessly exploited. Unable to overcome their own patriarchal assumptions, they argued for the rights of blacks by seeking to convince the public that even if slavery had conditioned the bondsperson to adopt negative racial characteristics, the enslaved were indeed human beings. To make up for past transgressions, many of these philanthropists sought a means not only to free the slaves but also to positively affect the entire continent. For many, the best solution was to send a select

number of the most educated and skilled blacks to Africa where they could serve as colonial leaders, creating societies which would in turn influence the remaining indigenous population and put an end to the slave trade.

Sharp saw this plan as an “experiment in freedom.” London’s poor blacks had been appealing to him for assistance for years and when they heard about a proposal for a West African colony put forth by Dr. Henry Smeathman, an English naturalist who had lived in Sierra Leone from 1783 to 1786, they became interested and approached Sharp for details. While Smeathman stressed the possible economic and commercial benefits of founding such a colony, Sharp envisioned a grander scheme – “the chance to construct the perfect society on Earth.” By the end of 1788 he had donated over £1,700 and had personally written the plan of government for the settlement. Although Sharp’s proposed government included Victorian-type regulations on personal behavior, with taxes imposed for pride and indolence, it clearly would have provided for self-government by the settlers, had it been adopted.

A group of evangelicals, known as the Clapham Sect, added another humanitarian element to the Sierra Leone venture. Instead of seeing the colony merely as a chance to create a model society, they recognized the opportunity to spread European civilization and Christianity. They hoped this would help end the slave trade at the source.

The idea may have sounded good in theory, but the British government had provided funding and would eventually govern the colony. Cugoano realized that, unlike the humanitarians, the government was concerned only with alleviating the problem of a growing population of poor blacks in London. He voiced his concerns and spoke out against the proposed colony of Sierra Leone in his 1787 pamphlet *Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil and Wicked Traffic of the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species*, which provided a series of reasons that the colony was doomed for failure. First, sufficient preparations for the success of the colony had not been made and no legitimate treaty had been reached with Africans as to the terms and location of the settlement. He added that the settlers had not been provided for, and that they “were to be hurried away at all events, come of them after what would.” He contended that maltreatment

of the proposed colonists and high mortality among them as they waited aboard delayed ships served as evidence of a less altruistic motivation behind the settlement plans. Finally, he explained that many potential black settlers would not participate in such a government-supported, white-initiated scheme because they had learned from centuries of forced captivity and exploitation not to trust the “European seafaring people in general.” Although promoters had made great efforts to recruit colonists, “the wiser sort [of blacks] declined from all thoughts of it, unless they could hear of some better plan taking place for their security and safety.” Cugoano thus did not rule colonization entirely out of the question, but settlement initiated by whites and funded and promoted by the British government was suspect.

Cugoano was not alone in espousing these sentiments. Though he had initially supported the idea that legitimate trade with Africa would help stop the slave trade, Equiano’s experiences with the British government turned him against the Sierra Leone project as well. When asked by the government to serve as commissary of stores for the expedition, he initially praised the project and accepted the post. During his four months as commissary, however, he discovered sufficient evidence to refute government claims of benevolent motivation for the scheme. He uncovered acts of corruption in which “pilfering agents” had pocketed money and provisions allotted for the settlers. He also witnessed the “most wretched” conditions of the settlers as they waited on board for the ships to set sail for the colony. Determining that the government was being cheated and his countrymen “plundered and oppressed, and even left destitute of the necessities for almost their existence,” he tried to correct the situation by reporting the abuses to the Navy. Rather than applauding his honesty, however, the government quickly dismissed him from his post. This humiliating experience made Equiano believe that the British government hoped to use well-educated, free blacks as pawns to achieve its own desires. Perhaps even more disheartening, he began to realize that even the supporters of abolition were often unwilling to allow blacks true leadership roles.

By the time the lords of the treasury cleared Equiano of any wrongdoing and paid his lost wages, the damage had been done. He had learned that white abolitionists were willing to “save” the slaves but, although they did not realize it, their

faith in blacks’ ability to help themselves was insincere. Though white philanthropists had good intentions, they failed to realize that blacks such as Equiano had the ability to truly contribute to the movement. This paternalistic outlook offended men like Equiano, who wanted to be more than symbols or tokens in the anti-slavery crusade.

Realizing their marginal status within the white abolitionist movement, Equiano, Cugoano, and other blacks living in England rejected colonization and founded their own organization, the Sons of Africa. After rejecting the Sierra Leone venture, they focused their writings and public appeals on the job of convincing the British government to end the slave trade and abolish slavery throughout the British Empire. By taking active roles in the anti-slavery crusade, these men created a legacy of black participation in the abolition movement.

Unaware of Equiano’s plight, African Americans of the same era also felt initial hope for Sierra Leone. Paul Cuffe of Massachusetts and James Forten of Philadelphia tried to recruit qualified representatives of the American free black community to emigrate to Sierra Leone to open businesses and help ensure the colony’s self-sufficiency. Cuffe, a successful merchant sailor, personally took a group of settlers to the colony, but he died before he could contribute more. Forten worked as a recruiter until Cuffe’s death left the movement void of black leadership and revealed the extent to which it was a white initiative. This, plus the development of a similar colonization scheme by American whites, caused Forten to question both schemes.

The colonization effort that alarmed Forten and other African Americans was led by the American Colonization Society. Aware of growing British anti-slavery sentiment and the Sierra Leone project, officials of the ACS actively marketed their own scheme for settling the colony of Liberia. They borrowed the arguments of Sierra Leone’s founders that a colony in Africa would lead to the end of the slave trade, allow “enlightened” blacks to spread their knowledge throughout the “Dark Continent,” and provide trade opportunities for Britain and America. Their appeals brought colonization back to the forefront of British philanthropic thought.

Dr. Thomas Hodgkin was perhaps the most prominent British humanitarian to accept the American colonizationists’ arguments. While

Hodgkin argued against the possibility of forced expulsion of blacks, he was convinced that American racism was so deeply rooted as to be incurable, and he was enticed by the benefits colonization could provide for slaves as well as for Africans. He agreed with the ACS argument for gradual emancipation, accepting their arguments that moral suasion would convince slaveholders to join the cause and that immediate and unconditional abolition would foster resentment and racial hatred. This conservative argument backfired, however, by fueling free blacks' fears that colonization was really just an effort to get rid of them and strengthen slavery.

African American abolitionists who were touring Britain to enlist aid for a number of antislavery causes seized the opportunity this argument provided to take the lead in resisting the ACS. They used the society's own words and publications to prove the strength of pro-slavery sentiment among many colonizationists, expose the irony of the argument that black colonists could provide a civilizing force in Africa, and refute the illogical claims that American-born blacks wished to be transported to an unfamiliar foreign land. Thus, just as Equiano and Cugoana had realized that the Sierra Leone project was partly fueled by a government desire to rid England of poor blacks, most African American leaders saw a similar motivation behind the Liberia project.

In light of such vehement opposition to repatriation, humanitarian arguments in support of colonization lost credibility by the last half of the nineteenth century. British humanitarians largely ignored the efforts of American colonizationists to gain their support, once attempts to "help" blacks leave a country they had no desire to leave no longer appeared altruistic. Furthermore, observers began to see humanitarian appeals to help slaves as hypocritical at a time when Britain was directly supporting slavery with its reliance upon American slave-produced cotton.

However, just as the humanitarian appeals for white-led colonization lost the last vestiges of strength, African American advocates of a different back-to-Africa movement seized on this economic argument as they sought to capitalize on British philanthropic paternalism and gain support for a scheme of their own. The general goals of this movement focused on self-sufficiency for blacks as they sought an important place in the economic world. Because the economic goals of

black colonizationists coincided largely with the needs of the British textile industry, African American emigrationists argued for the benefits of West African agricultural colonies, emphasizing their potential to provide alternative sources of cotton.

By the 1850s African American emigrationist leaders had adopted the ideas put forth by Sharpe and the Clapham Sect a generation before. They began calling for the uplift of the African race, and they saw themselves as uniquely qualified to lead in this process. The crucial difference between their proposals and those of the ACS was that theirs was a black-initiated, black-led movement. Another important difference was their addition of a strongly commercial argument. In this spirit, Jamaican Robert Campbell, one of the leading proponents of commercial colonization, insisted that blacks who had already returned to the motherland, particularly those at Sierra Leone, had, by serving as "teachers, catechists, clergymen, and merchants, inaugurated a mighty work, which, now that it has accomplished its utmost, must be continued in a higher form by the more civilized of the same race, who for a thousand reasons, are best adapted to its successful prosecution." But they needed help to further their efforts.

As black support for emigration grew, the movement's leaders realized the need for financial backing. When they failed to gain substantial support from white Americans, they turned to Great Britain. Building upon the British abolitionist and colonizationist legacy, they referred to the project as African Regeneration. This tactic managed to pique the curiosity of a number of British nobles and gentlemen, including Hodgkin and Charles Buxton, a member of Parliament. After a series of meetings, this committee of notable Britons founded the African Aid Society in 1860 and asked Robert Campbell and the American Martin R. Delany to meet with them. In helping form the goals of the society, Campbell explained to the committee that the emigrationists wanted "to be dealt with as men, and not children" and to be allowed to rule their own colony. The committee agreed to support voluntary emigration of American blacks through this black-initiated scheme.

As the campaign for British support of emigration solidified, black emigrationists developed a coherent set of goals that focused mainly on the "free produce" idea. British abolitionists had used

similar arguments throughout their anti-slavery crusade. They had argued that the purchase of goods produced by slave labor encouraged the slave trade, and they insisted that every seven families in Britain employed one slave by purchasing slave-produced goods. The solution, argued the abolitionists, was to boycott the rice, sugar, and cotton grown by slaves in order to make slavery unprofitable. Even as emigrationists sought British support, they continued to insist that the colonies being settled were first and foremost ventures in black independence and would remain free from white rule.

Ultimately, the African Aid Society abandoned support of the colony, instead opting to pressure the British government to simply extend its sphere of influence in West Africa. They soon began calling for direct and swift imperialistic intervention in the autonomous governments in the area. Choosing exploitation over paternalism, the society abandoned black emigrationist leaders in favor of adopting goals that were strictly commercial. Just as white abolitionist motives were coopted by the government in the 1790s, so were black abolitionists overcome by commercial interests in the 1860s. Both groups learned how easily their former allies in the colonization scheme could transform the proposed colonies into self-serving entities with no regard for black interests.

These colonization ventures played their own unique role in the transatlantic community, but, despite the grand hopes of Sharp and Delany, they failed to serve as model societies. The failure lies not only in the economic greed of manufacturers or the self-serving motives of the British government, but also in the paternalistic attitude shared by both white and black abolitionists toward Africa and Africans. Tragically, they not only contributed little to the anti-slavery movement, but they also helped encourage the further exploitation of the continent and its people.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, Britain; Anti-Slavery Movement, British, and the Founding of Sierra Leone; Clarkson, Thomas (1760–1846); Equiano, Olaudah (1745–1797); Wilberforce, William (1759–1833)

References and Suggested Readings

Bell, H. H. (Ed.) (1969) *Search for a Place: Black Separatism and Africa, 1860*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Blackett, R. J. M. (1983) *Building an Anti-Slavery Wall: Black Americans in the Atlantic Abolitionist Movement, 1830–1860*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Campbell, R. A. (1969) Pilgrimage to My Motherland: An Account of a Journey among the Egbas and Yorubas of Central Africa, in 1859–60. In H. Bell (Ed.), *Search for a Place: Black Separatism and Africa, 1860*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Delany, M. R. (1969) Official Report of the Niger Valley Exploring Party. In H. Bell (Ed.), *Search for a Place: Black Separatism and Africa, 1860*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Edwards, P. (Ed.) (1988) *The Life of Olaudah Equiano*. Harlow: Longman.

Ripley, C. P. (1985) *The Black Abolitionists' Papers*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Scobie, E. (1972) *Black Britannia: A History of Blacks in Britain*. Chicago: Johnson Publishing.

Walvin, J. (1972) *The Black Presence: A Documentary History of the Negro in England, 1555–1860*. New York: Schocken Books.

Anti-slavery movement, British, and the founding of Sierra Leone

Kenneth Wayne Ackerson

Europeans had visited the West African coast since the 1400s, and the area that became Sierra Leone was explored first by the Portuguese in the 1460s. Contact and settlement attempts were sporadic until after 1600, however. Not surprisingly, the earliest semi-permanent white settlements established in West Africa were slave-trading outposts, but a British botanist, Doctor Henry Smeathman, was the first to suggest a permanent settlement to combat, rather than foster, the slave trade.

The plan Smeathman created was revolutionary in several ways. Not only would the colony be free from the slave trade, but free labor and not slave labor would provide the basis for agriculture. Perhaps even more revolutionary was the fact that both white and black settlers would live together in a free, democratic, and egalitarian arrangement. A group of poor but free blacks living in London, known as the Black Poor, were interested in Smeathman's scheme and so

approached Granville Sharp (1735–1813), the noted humanitarian and abolitionist who had served as a patron for the group, for advice on the botanist's proposals. Sharp's input was crucial and influential in the development of Sierra Leone, first as a single settlement and later as a colony. The Clapham Sect, a reform group that included such abolitionist figures as William Wilberforce (1759–1833), Henry Thornton (1760–1815), and Zachary Macaulay (1768–1838), also expressed some interest, believing that the colony could become an ideal base from which European culture could be spread throughout Africa. Even at this early date in their movement, anti-slavery supporters believed that a successful settlement based on legitimate (non-slave trade based) commerce would be an effective means of damaging or even destroying the slave trade.

There were several delays and mishaps, but finally 411 blacks and whites left Britain for West Africa in 1787. While members of the Black Poor figured prominently in this initial number of settlers, they were by no means the entire group, which included poor whites, other free blacks, a number of prostitutes, and some whites simply looking for a new start. From the day of their arrival the settlers faced numerous difficulties. Almost immediately upon disembarking the rainy season arrived and disease claimed many lives. Most of the local leaders proved troublesome and less than hospitable.

The original settlement was abandoned in 1791 for a nearby but more favorable location, and new blood was injected into the young colony with the arrival in early 1792 of black settlers from Nova Scotia. These new settlers were black loyalists who had fought for the British in the American War for Independence and had been given refuge in Nova Scotia after Britain's defeat. They had never really adjusted to life in the harsh climate, however. Hungry for freedom and an equal opportunity for a good life, the Nova Scotians proved a vital and vibrant, if sometimes unruly, addition to the struggling colony.

By the time the Nova Scotians arrived, Sierra Leone was under the auspices of a newly chartered Sierra Leone Company. Although the company's purpose was really to encourage commerce between Britain and Africa, it did not abandon earlier concerns such as civilization and Christianization. Indeed, its board of directors included many of the regular anti-slavery figures such as Sharp and Thornton. Lieutenant John

Clarkson (1764–1828), a naval officer and the brother of the famed abolitionist Thomas Clarkson (1760–1846), was appointed governor and, despite gaining the respect of most of the settlers, had very little success running a colony inhabited by increasingly discontented citizens. Macaulay followed as governor, serving from 1794 to 1799. Problems persisted, however, and a bill was introduced into parliament for the government to assume control of the failing colony. Subsequently, Sierra Leone passed from company control on January 1, 1808 and became a crown colony.

Abolitionists continued to monitor Sierra Leone, and after 1807 it was the African Institution who carried this mantle. Founded in 1807, the African Institution was Britain's premiere anti-slavery organization until the 1820s. Several members of the Sierra Leone Company's board of directors were also well placed in the African Institution, and the group's membership rolls read like a veritable "who's who" of abolition – Wilberforce, Thomas Clarkson, Macaulay, Sharp, and William Allen (1770–1843), among many others.

Crown government faced many of the same problems that the Sierra Leone Company had faced, however. Settlers often made a good living for themselves, but many did not take up agriculture as was hoped and had been expected. There were also continual troubles with settlers complaining about rights and freedoms, mainly due to the influence of the Nova Scotians, who brought these ideas with them from North America. Nonetheless, the first crown governor, Thomas Perronet Thompson (1783–1869), was on his way. Thompson had been recommended by Wilberforce, so it is not a stretch to say that abolitionists hand-picked Thompson. It is also quite clear that the African Institution exerted considerable influence on British policy on Africa in general and on Sierra Leone in particular; correspondence between Zachary Macaulay and Lord Castlereagh, the secretary of state, spells this out. Macaulay essentially put forth the overall "platform" of the organization as recommended policy for Britain in West Africa.

Thompson attempted to fix the colony's problems, dealing with social, economic, and military matters, but he ran afoul of both the directors of the African Institution and of his superiors in the Colonial and Foreign Offices. Thompson was recalled and while abolitionists

continued to have some influence in choosing governors, they never again hand-picked one.

Sierra Leone became a base of sorts for western culture, much as abolitionists had hoped. The establishment of a vice-admiralty court in Sierra Leone was instrumental in the colony's development. The slave cargoes of captured slave ships were often landed there, and over 60,000 slaves were resettled there following the condemning of over 500 slave ships in court.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, Britain; Anti-Slavery Movement, British, and the Black Response to Colonization; Clarkson, Thomas (1760–1846); Sharp, Granville (1735–1813); Wilberforce, William (1759–1833)

References and Suggested Readings

- Ackerson, W. (2005) *The African Institution (1807–1827) and the Antislavery Movement in Great Britain*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Fyfe, C. (1961) *A History of Sierra Leone*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Peterson, J. (1969) *Province of Freedom: A History of Sierra Leone 1787–1870*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Walker, J. W. S. G. (1976) *The Black Loyalists: The Search for a Promised Land in Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone*. New York: Africana Publishing.
- Walvin, J. (1986) *England, Slaves, and Freedom, 1776–1838*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi.

Anti-slavery movement, United States, 1700–1870

Francesca Gamber


The use of enslaved African labor to wring profits from the plentiful natural resources of the New World began in what would become the United States in the seventeenth century, but the system ironically carried the seeds of its own demise. Opposition to slavery in the United States began as soon as the system itself did, and as plantation slavery expanded over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, anti-slavery sentiment only grew stronger and gained more adherents. Opponents of slavery offered a number of possible solutions that ranged from supporting gradual abolition of slavery that compensated slaveholders for the loss of their investment, to relocation of freed slaves to Africa,

to the pursuit of immediate abolition without compensation through either violent or non-violent means. Though formal abolition societies never claimed more than a small percentage of the population among their members, the sustained efforts of white abolitionists as well as free and enslaved African Americans kept anti-slavery dissent within public view. Often fraught with internal disagreements over goals and tactics, the anti-slavery movement in the United States succeeded in bringing about the abolition of slavery at the end of the Civil War and in pioneering techniques that would be used by generations of later activists.

Opposing Slavery in Colonial America

The first abolitionists were the slaves themselves, and the first of these arrived in the American colonies in 1619 when John Rolfe purchased 20 Africans at Jamestown, Virginia. Europeans had begun trading in African slaves in the fifteenth century, entering into a form of commerce already well established within African societies as a means of demonstrating wealth and status. The majority of African slaves, sold to European traders in exchange for luxury goods like cloth, iron, and alcohol, were sent to sugar-producing plantations in the Caribbean. As Europeans began to settle the Atlantic coast of North America, African labor was only one of several forms of servitude that included white indenture and Native American slavery. For the first half of the seventeenth century, African slavery was not widely used, given the high cost of purchasing a slave. Yet the susceptibility of Native Americans to disease and decreases in the number of available white servants increased the practice of African slaveholding in Virginia, and its example was followed by both northern and southern colonies established after it.

In its first decades in North America, slavery was not yet the stringent, racially based institution it would become. African slaves worked side-by-side with white servants and even with slaveholders. It was possible for slaves to accumulate their own property and wealth, and this allowed some of them to purchase freedom for themselves and their families. Slaves also pursued extralegal ways of becoming free, establishing a tradition of resistance that would last until emancipation.



The *Anti-Slavery Record* was a monthly publication of the American Anti-Slavery Society. Its July 1835 issue, exhibited here, contained articles on the fate of recaptured fugitive slaves in New York City; the kidnapping and sale of a young African American woman in Ohio; arguments against the colonization movement that proposed sending African Americans to Liberia; reports on state and local abolitionist meetings; and a list of contributors. Although cheaply printed, the tract is illustrated and its small size enables folding for easy mailing. The sale of tracts was an important source of financing for the usually impoverished anti-slavery movement and its traveling speakers. (Courtesy Antislavery Literature Project, Arizona State University)

Slaves never accepted the conditions of their bondage without challenge. Resistance took both overt and covert forms, including revolt, murder, suicide, running away, feigning illness, breaking tools, slowing work, and setting fires. For women, abortion and even infanticide figured as extreme forms of keeping another generation from becoming enslaved, particularly because African American women were susceptible to the unwanted sexual advances of white men in the household. Nearby Native American tribes, particularly the Creeks and Seminoles, often aided

fugitive slaves, who then established maroon communities of other runaway slaves. This interracial cooperation was a forerunner of the Underground Railroad in the antebellum period. Former slaves were also sometimes incorporated into Native American settlements and, as first the colonies and then the United States expanded their borders, lent support to Native American efforts to halt encroachment upon their land.

Though plantation sizes, work regimes, and the type of crop grown varied from place to place and over time, what remained constant was the slaves' determination to be free whenever and however possible. During the colonial period, slaves demonstrated that determination in a number of violent uprisings. In New York City in 1712, slaves set fires and murdered nine whites, resulting in new policies to discourage manumission and prevent slaves from meeting. The revolt also created an atmosphere of suspicion that manifested itself in the execution in 1741 of over thirty African Americans accused of conspiring to rebel once more. In South Carolina the 1739 Stono Rebellion of about one hundred slaves resulted in the deaths of about two dozen whites and harsh new codes to monitor slave behavior. In the colonial period, slave revolts only intensified the desire of whites to keep the slave system in place rather than convincing most whites of its inhumanity.

Anti-slavery sentiment among white colonists was confined to members of the Society of Friends during the colonial period. Quakers, as they were called, adhered to a dissident version of Protestantism that argued the equality of all people, no matter their race. Yet when Quakers arrived in the British colonies in the late seventeenth century, their predecessors in other British settlements had already established agricultural economies based on enslaved African labor. Many Quakers, despite their religious principles, followed suit as they settled the new colony of Pennsylvania. The colony's founder, William Penn, owned a farm of 8,000 acres called Pennsbury that utilized slave labor. Other Quakers were dismayed by the involvement of their religious brethren in the buying and selling of slaves and registered some of the earliest written critiques of slavery in the American colonies. In 1688, four Quakers from Germantown, Pennsylvania condemned the institution in a statement, known as the Germantown Petition, to their local church officials. A 1693

anti-slavery pamphlet by George Keith prompted the earliest voluntary manumissions among Philadelphia Quakers. Other individual critiques proliferated in the eighteenth century. Such writers as Benjamin Lay, John Woolman, and Anthony Benezet urged fellow Quakers to free their slaves. Moved perhaps as much by the declining profitability of slavery in southeastern Pennsylvania as the exhortations of slavery's opponents, the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting barred its members from purchasing slaves in 1755 and prohibited any slaveholding in 1776.

Revolutionary Ideals and the Beginning of Organized Abolitionism

In the same year that Philadelphia Quakers severed their link to slavery, the Declaration of Independence severed America's colonial relationship to Great Britain. Revolutionary rhetoric of freedom and equality did much to generate anti-slavery sentiment among whites and to encourage African Americans to take advantage of the disruption of war to become free.

During the war, British officials detected the contradiction between Revolutionary ideals and the persistence of African American bondage and attempted to use it to their advantage. In April 1775 Lord Dunmore promised freedom to any slave who escaped to British lines. Both the British and the rebels counted African Americans among their supporters as both the free and the enslaved hoped that the victor would finally institute emancipation. The leaders of the new United States, as the colonies now called themselves, attempted to hold at bay the influence of Revolutionary ideals on the fate of slavery in the new nation. Beyond pledging to end the nation's participation in the transatlantic slave trade, the Constitution did nothing to abolish slavery and even formalized the process by which three-fifths of a state's slave population could be added to its population for purposes of determining Congressional representation, the so-called three-fifths compromise. Slavery continued to be essential to the economy of the Southern states, and Constitutional framers feared that abolishing the institution would prevent the colonies from forming a single union. Congress prohibited slavery from the Northwest Territory in 1787 but left it intact elsewhere.

Given the reluctance of the national government to bring about the end of slavery, the anti-slavery impulse was continued by African Americans and by whites inspired by Revolutionary values. Northern states, where large-scale slavery was already of little economic value, began instituting emancipation policies after the Revolution, starting with Vermont in 1777 and Pennsylvania in 1780. These policies, however, usually entailed gradual emancipation and were more difficult to institute in states, including New York and New Jersey, where slave labor could still be used in agriculture. Free blacks in the North participated in petitioning their state legislatures to abolish slavery. They also formed mutual aid organizations, an independent press, and their own churches to help a community that had grown during the war as slaves either ran away or were manumitted. In the upper South states of Maryland and Virginia in particular, slaveholders freed many of their bondsmen and women as a result of the inconsistency of slavery with the principles of the new nation, as well as the shift from tobacco to cereal crop cultivation, which required a smaller labor force. Elsewhere in the South, the effect of Revolutionary ideals was blunted by the advent of a more efficient way to harvest cotton in 1793 with the invention of the cotton gin. As Americans settled the new states of Mississippi and Alabama in the early nineteenth century, the successful cultivation of cotton in these areas entrenched slavery even more deeply in the economy and politics of the South.

Despite the challenges in instituting emancipation there, Northern states soon witnessed the development of an organized anti-slavery movement after the Revolution. The first anti-slavery society formed among Philadelphia Quakers in 1775 and dissolved after four meetings. In 1784 Quakers met again to form a more enduring organization known as the Pennsylvania Abolition Society. The group helped African Americans pursue their freedom in the courts and also worked with black community organizations to provide education and other support. In 1816 the founding of the American Colonization Society (ACS) ushered in a new phase in anti-slavery agitation that focused on relocating freed slaves to Africa. Only the most radical opponents of slavery challenged prevailing notions at the time of the inherent differences between blacks and whites.

Members of the ACS, including Henry Clay and Francis Scott Key, believed that slavery should be abolished but that African Americans and whites could not live together in the same country. Though they did not join the ACS, some black leaders like Paul Cuffe also supported colonization because they doubted that white Americans would ever accept blacks as equals in their society. In cooperation with the government, the ACS founded the African colony of Liberia in 1821 and eventually resettled 12,000 African Americans there.

Colonizationist sentiment prevailed among the anti-slavery movement throughout the 1820s. Indeed, many white abolitionists participated in the colonization movement first before pushing anti-slavery activism to more radical goals beginning in the 1830s. At the same time, a number of African Americans also advocated resettlement, in the form of emigration. Very few, however, supported the African experiment, and most chose instead to move to Haiti or Canada. Though colonization was a form of anti-slavery, this focus on separation of the races prevented its adherents from focusing their efforts on acquiring true freedom and full citizenship for black Americans at home.

If formal abolitionism hesitated to advocate full citizenship as well as emancipation for African Americans, the threat of slave revolts in the early nineteenth century reminded Americans that not all of slavery's opponents would be so cautious. In the summer of 1800, Virginia officials uncovered an insurrection plot by a slave named Gabriel Prosser to march on the state capital, seize its arms, and force the government to free its slaves. Authorities in Charleston, South Carolina foiled a similar plot by Denmark Vesey in 1822. Seven years later, an African American tailor in Boston named David Walker criticized the use of colonization as an anti-slavery tactic and encouraged Southern slaves to rebel against their masters in his *Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World*. When the Virginia slave Nat Turner led a bloody insurrection in 1831 that resulted in the deaths of about sixty whites, many observers claimed that Turner had been influenced by Walker's appeal. While it is unclear whether or not this was so, both Walker and Turner occupied the same radical position along the spectrum of anti-slavery sentiment. Both men saw violence as a legitimate tool in achieving emancipation.

The Growth of Abolitionism in Antebellum America

Though critiques of colonization as an abolitionist goal began to surface in the early decades of the nineteenth century, it would take a new wave of religious fervor to unseat it from its prominence within the burgeoning abolitionist movement. By the late 1820s and early 1830s, thousands of Americans subscribed to the evangelical Protestantism most famously preached by Charles Grandison Finney. Known as the Second Great Awakening, this religious revival emphasized human agency and the ability to perfect oneself and one's society. Its egalitarian rhetoric also attracted African Americans, particularly to the Methodist and Baptist denominations, although dissatisfaction with continued racism in evangelical churches prompted Philadelphia blacks to form the African Methodist Episcopal Church in 1815. Evangelical Protestantism encouraged Americans to engage in social reform, and hundreds of new societies dedicated to temperance, education, and missionary work were formed. These societies gave women an opportunity to participate in the public life of the United States at this time. Despite the dominant understanding that a woman's place was at home, reform work was acceptable as an outgrowth of women's task of guarding the morality of their families.

The anti-slavery movement was another reform activity influenced by the principles of the Second Great Awakening, and it changed in an important way in the 1830s. Evangelical Protestantism made opponents of slavery unwilling to wait for gradual emancipation, and it encouraged them to challenge the assumption beneath colonization schemes that American society could not be improved in order for blacks and whites to live together. In 1826 anti-slavery activists added a new tactic in the form of the free produce movement. Between 1826 and 1867 abolitionists opened more than fifty stores in the Northeast and Midwest that sold only goods produced without slave labor. An even more important ideological shift soon followed the advent of the free produce movement. A new form of abolitionism arose, called immediatism, that demanded emancipation without delay or compensation to slaveholders and extension of full citizenship rights to African Americans. In 1831 William Lloyd Garrison signaled his abandonment of colonization and his acceptance of immediatism with the publication of

his newspaper *The Liberator*, which would become one of the premier abolitionist newspapers in the nation. The first immediatist organization, the New England Anti-Slavery Society, formed in 1832 and was also the first anti-slavery society to admit both African Americans and whites as members. In 1833 the immediatist orientation of this regional group was translated into a national organization with the foundation of the American Anti-Slavery Society (AASS). Under Garrison's leadership, the AASS replaced the American Colonization Society as the most outspoken abolitionist society in the antebellum United States.

The American Anti-Slavery Society was first headquartered in New York City but relocated to Boston in 1843. Supported by hundreds of local affiliates, it attracted thousands of fervent opponents of slavery and admitted both whites and blacks as members. The Society distinguished itself from earlier abolition societies and from the message of militant anti-slavery writers like David Walker by combining a commitment to an interracial society with an insistence upon achieving this society through non-violent means.

Though abolitionists never constituted a majority in American society at any time, the AASS sustained constant pressure on local, state, and federal government as well as on ordinary Americans themselves. In addition to its newspaper, the *National Anti-Slavery Standard*, the AASS published thousands of anti-slavery pamphlets, most notably *American Slavery As It Is* (1839), that publicized the brutal treatment slaves received. It sponsored anti-slavery fairs, often organized by women, to raise money. It sent thousands of petitions to Congress demanding the abolition of slavery, and their agitation became so troublesome within the legislature that it issued a gag order from 1836 to 1844 prohibiting the discussion of any of these petitions. The AASS also employed dozens of field agents who traveled throughout the Northern and Midwestern states delivering lectures. Many of these agents were former slaves like Frederick Douglass and Sojourner Truth whose firsthand experiences lent even more strength to the Society's message. The Society courted further controversy by employing women, starting with sisters Sarah and Angelina Grimke, as lecturers as well and permitting them to speak before audiences of both men and women.

Its tactics and unrelenting critique of slavery won the AASS as many enemies as friends. In the South, postal workers refused to circulate anti-

slavery materials, and the region's intellectuals and lawmakers crafted a spirited defense of slavery as a benevolent institution that benefited slaves as well as slaveholders. AASS meetings in the North were often interrupted by mob violence, incidents that were particularly driven by suspicions that the biracial organization really sought to legalize interracial marriage. In 1837 one of these mobs murdered Elijah Lovejoy, an anti-slavery newspaper publisher in Alton, Illinois. The following year a mob burned down the Philadelphia meeting hall where a women's anti-slavery meeting had convened. While many of these mobs were composed of white Northern workers whose opposition to abolition was grounded in fears of job competition with newly freed slaves, there were also segments of the emerging working class that recognized the affinity between their interests and those of the abolitionists. Skilled artisans dismayed by the effect of industrialization on their craft and unskilled laborers in groups like the National Reform Association could embrace abolitionism's critique of slavery as another example of the consequences workers felt when capitalism was permitted to run rampant.

The immediatist abolitionists of the AASS faced an unfriendly environment outside the anti-slavery community, but disagreements within the society posed threats of their own. Throughout the organization's history, African Americans charged that white AASS members and leaders often displayed the same sense of black inferiority that characterized slavery's defenders. Dissatisfied African Americans frequently met in their own conventions throughout the antebellum era, although others continued to emphasize the importance of interracial cooperation and avoided these separate gatherings. Other abolitionists were troubled by the activism of women in the AASS. The Society moved toward establishing gender equality in the late 1830s, allowing women to attend its annual meeting as delegates in 1839 and electing Abby Kelley to its business committee in 1840. Fearful of hampering the anti-slavery cause by linking it to the even less popular drive for women's rights, conservative AASS members led by Arthur and Lewis Tappan left the organization in 1840 and formed a rival group, the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society (AF&AS). The new AF&AS worked throughout the rest of the antebellum period to secure the commitment of churches to anti-slavery principles.

Other abolitionists objected to the rejection of organized politics that William Lloyd Garrison had introduced to the AASS. Garrison had argued that the Constitution itself was a pro-slavery document and that abolitionists should not endorse political candidates or even vote. In 1840 those who disagreed with Garrison formed the anti-slavery Liberty Party and proposed its own candidates for president. The Liberty Party became the Free Soil Party in 1848, a shift that replaced the demand for immediate abolition with that of opposing the spread of slavery to territory acquired through the Mexican War. Also known as the Free Democratic Party by the 1852 election year, the Free Soil Party eventually merged with the factions that formed the Republican Party in 1854. The Liberty Party also spawned a more radical offshoot, the Radical Abolition Party or Radical Political Abolition Party, in 1855. This multiracial group, whose supporters included Frederick Douglass, Gerrit Smith, and James Mc-Cune Smith, departed from Garrisonian principles by accepting violence as a means of ending slavery and embracing the Constitution as fundamentally opposed to slavery. It was active until 1860, but its radical message never garnered any electoral victories.

Another conspicuous presence in antebellum abolitionism was the Underground Railroad, an interracial network of activists who provided fugitive slaves with safe places to hide as they escaped to the North. The activities of the Underground Railroad were challenged in 1850 by the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law, which permitted slaveholders to reclaim even those runaway slaves who had safely made it to the free soil of the North. The law touched off a new wave of abolitionist protest in the North. It was the focus of a lecturing campaign by the AASS between 1851 and 1853. Individual abolitionists did their best to prevent federal marshals from returning fugitive slaves to the South. A riot broke out in Christiana, Pennsylvania in September 1851 when a Maryland slaveowner attempted to seize four runaway slaves. In the so-called Jerry Rescue of October 1851, an anti-slavery mob marched on a prison in Syracuse, New York, and freed the jailed fugitive William “Jerry” Henry, who then escaped to Canada. Another group of abolitionists unsuccessfully attempted to keep a Boston fugitive named Anthony Burns from recapture in 1854.

The Fugitive Slave Law was just one of a number of events in the 1850s that worsened tensions

between the North and the South. Stoked by the continued agitation of the abolitionists, these tensions would eventually lead to civil war. In 1852, Harriet Beecher Stowe moved hundreds of Americans to sympathize with the anti-slavery cause in her novel *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*. The novel, which depicted cruel slaveowners and slave families torn apart by sale, sold 300,000 copies in its first year of publication and later became a popular stage show. Southerners attempted to suppress the sale of the novel and even imprisoned African Americans who were found with it.

In 1854 tensions mounted as pro-slavery and anti-slavery partisans flooded into the new territory of Kansas, where legislation passed that year permitted its residents to decide whether or not it would enter the Union as a free or slave state. Violent confrontations between opposing sides ensued, fueled in part by the rifles that the abolitionist Henry Ward Beecher had sent to anti-slavery settlers there. Kansas would not be admitted to the Union until 1861, by which time most Southern states had left the union and ceded their claim to it. One veteran of the so-called Bleeding Kansas was a fierce abolitionist named John Brown. In 1859, with the financial backing of six prominent New England abolitionists, he mounted a raid on the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry in what is now West Virginia. Brown, whose band of rebels included whites and blacks, hoped to use the weapons to arm the slaves and start a revolt, but he was captured and hanged in December 1859. Most abolitionists, even radical immediatists, disagreed with Brown’s violent tactics but supported his ultimate aim of ending slavery.

Though Abraham Lincoln was not a radical abolitionist, his election in 1860 symbolized to pro-slavery Southerners the beginning of the end of their way of life if they stayed in the union. Southern states began seceding in 1861, and the Civil War began in April.

Civil War and Emancipation

Many abolitionists hoped that the Civil War would present an opportunity for the final abolition of slavery. To their chagrin, Lincoln moved slowly on the subject. As it had happened throughout the history of anti-slavery activism, slaves took the initiative in turning the chaos of war into an opportunity for freedom. Thousands ran away from their sites of bondage, often seeking refuge

with Northern armies in their area. Republican congressmen including Charles Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens pushed for the passage of the Confiscation Acts in 1861 and 1862, which freed those slaves who escaped to Union lines, as a means of weakening Southern resources. After the battle of Antietam in September 1862, Lincoln announced his intention to emancipate all of the slaves held in the South, effective January 1, 1863. Though many critics point out that the Emancipation Proclamation only applied to the rebellious states of the Confederacy and left slavery intact in the border states still loyal to the union, it succeeded in transforming the nature of Northern military intervention in the South. Whereas Lincoln had denied any association between the Civil War and the end of slavery at the start of the war, the Union army became a force for emancipation after 1863. It also began enlisting African American soldiers in 1863, and black abolitionists like Mary Ann Shadd Cary and Martin Delany served as active recruiters.

Abolitionists cheered the Emancipation Proclamation, and some local anti-slavery societies began to dissolve. The national office of the American Anti-Slavery Society began to curtail its lecturing and publishing activities. The abolitionist cause assumed new forms after the Emancipation Proclamation affirmed the federal government's commitment to abolition. Anti-slavery women raised money and provided material aid for slaves who escaped to the North. Many Northern women also went South during and after the war as teachers or missionaries to African American communities. In Congress and in the abolitionist press, opponents of slavery demanded a constitutional amendment abolishing the institution forever. Their call was answered with the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865.

At this point, many abolitionists believed they had completed their task and moved to close down anti-slavery societies. In 1865 the stalwart activist William Lloyd Garrison resigned his presidency of the AASS and stopped publishing his newspaper. Other activists, including new AASS president Wendell Phillips, vowed to remain active until additional legislation could be obtained to guarantee African Americans the same legal and civil rights as whites. Only the most radical remaining abolitionists, such as Thaddeus Stevens, went even farther by calling for the government to provide newly freed slaves with land that once belonged to Southern

planters. Most abolitionists were certain that, once accorded equal citizenship status under the Fourteenth Amendment in 1864 and given the right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, African Americans would be equipped to participate equally in American society and politics. The American Anti-Slavery Society disbanded in 1870, and the last of the female anti-slavery societies dissolved in this year as well. Many veterans of the abolitionist movement went on to further activism in the temperance and women's rights movements of the late nineteenth century.

The government committed federal troops to the South during Reconstruction to prevent former Confederates from instituting restrictive laws and economic policies that would have resembled the antebellum order. The removal of these troops in 1877 and the dissolution of the Freedmen's Bureau five years earlier signaled the limits of the nation's commitment to ensuring racial equality for newly freed African Americans. Southern state governments rapidly instituted harsh legal codes and segregation in public accommodations while Northern whites did little to intervene. African Americans carried on the freedom struggle in their communities, churches, schools, and newspapers as the nineteenth century entered its final decades of segregation, violence, and lynching. Some former abolitionists also aided Southern black communities by founding black colleges.

Lessons from the Anti-Slavery Movement

The end of slavery was not enough by itself to ensure civil rights for African Americans; that struggle would continue and mature into the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. But the anti-slavery movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries left important legacies for later activists. Throughout these two centuries, opponents of slavery kept abolition on the public agenda through tactics including non-violence, media campaigns, lecturing, and boycotts that would be staples of subsequent movements. They braved violence and even broke the law in pursuit of their cause. Women and African Americans demanded equal footing within anti-slavery organizations and would do so in the civil rights groups of the twentieth century. Although the struggle for racial equality was far from over in

1870, the anti-slavery movement succeeded in its goal of bringing about the final abolition of slavery.

SEE ALSO: American Slave Rebellions; Brown, John (1800–1859); Douglass, Frederick (1817–1895); Garrison, William Lloyd (1805–1879); Nat Turner Rebellion; Slave Rescues and the Underground Railroad, United States; Truth, Sojourner (ca. 1797–1883); Walker, David (1785–1830)

References and Suggested Readings

- Blue, F. J. (2005) *No Taint of Compromise: Crusaders in Antislavery Politics*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Bordewich, F. M. (2005) *Bound for Canaan: The Epic Story of the Underground Railroad, America's First Integrated Civil Rights Movement*. New York: Amistad.
- Egerton, D. (1993) *Gabriel's Rebellion: The Virginia Slave Conspiracies of 1800 and 1802*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Egerton, D. (1999) *"He Shall Go Out Free": The Lives of Denmark Vesey*. Madison, WI: Madison House.
- Goodman, P. (1998) *Of One Blood: Abolitionism and the Origins of Racial Equality*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Greenberg, K. (Ed.) (2003) *Nat Turner: A Slave Rebellion in History and Memory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jeffrey, J. R. (1998) *The Great Silent Army of Abolitionism: Ordinary Women in the Antislavery Movement*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Nash, G. B. & Soderlund, J. R. (1991) *Freedom by Degrees: Emancipation in Pennsylvania and Its Aftermath*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Newman, R. S. (2002) *The Transformation of American Abolitionism: Fighting Slavery in the Early Republic*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Soderlund, J. R. (1974) *Quakers and Slavery: A Divided Spirit*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wood, P. H. (1974) *Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Zilversmit, A. (1967) *The First Emancipation: The Abolition of Slavery in the North*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Anti-Vietnam War movement, Britain

Sylvia Ellis

In the 1960s, opposition to the Vietnam War provided a focus for political protest and cultural

rebellion in Britain, uniting students, dissident MPs, activists, and cultural rebels into a single-issue campaign. The movement began as early as 1953 when a communist sympathizer, Commander Edgar Young, formed the British–Vietnam Committee (BVC) and began publishing the *Vietnam Bulletin*. In 1962 the BVC held a rally with 70 protesters outside the US embassy in London.

The movement grew in intensity after the US began bombing North Vietnam and introduced ground troops in February 1965, sparking protest demonstrations at universities around the country and the formation of the communist-run British Council for Peace in Vietnam (BCPV) in April 1965. Labour MP Fenner Brockway served as its president. The BCPV was an umbrella organization that attempted to pull together the spiraling number of religious, labor, and political organizations that opposed the war, calling for a negotiated settlement and British dissociation through a concerted poster and newspaper campaign.

In 1966 a more radical anti-war group, the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC), was formed with Bertrand Russell as one of its supporters. The VSC, led by Trotskyists Tariq Ali and Pat Jordan, supported the National Liberation Front (the Vietcong) and campaigned openly for their victory. Ali was a member of the International Marxist Group, as well as editor of its newspaper, *Black Dwarf*, and encouraged the idea that students could be a revolutionary vanguard.

Student radicals, many belonging to far-left groups such as the International Socialists, had organized many of the occupations of university buildings between 1967 and 1968 and helped organize demonstrations against the war. The most potent symbol of youth protest was provided by the televised pictures of students attempting to march to Grosvenor Square, the location of the American embassy. On March 17, 1968 a VSC-organized march ended with police horses charging into the 10,000-strong crowd and making several arrests; the apogee of the movement came on October 2, 1968, when the largest London demonstration took place, with up to 100,000 protesters.

There was also a cultural dimension to the anti-war protests, noticeably by students in art colleges producing striking expressions of anti-war sentiment through posters and symbols, but

also through the participation of artists, actors, and musicians in the demonstrations. After attending the March 1968 Grosvenor Square rally and witnessing over-reaction by the police during the demonstration, Mick Jagger of the Rolling Stones was inspired to write his most political song, "Street Fighting Man."

The anti-Vietnam war movement in Britain was not confined to student protest and direct action campaigns. Many left-wing members of the Parliamentary Labour Party condemned American action in Vietnam, participating in motions in the House of Commons and organizing petitions to the prime minister and the American embassy. A small minority of MPs participated in organized anti-war groups such as the BCPV. Constituency Labour parties, trades councils, trade unions, cooperatives, and women's groups also expressed anger at the American bombing campaign and outrage and disappointment at Britain's support for US policy in Vietnam, urging British dissociation.

Many of the early accounts of the anti-Vietnam War movement emphasized its smallness and the dominant role of students. More recent assessments have also acknowledged that protest against the war did not constitute a mass movement, that demonstrations against the war were predominantly student affairs, and that the anti-war protests in Britain were less radical than those in the United States and continental Europe. The movement's largely middle-class composition and US-inspiration has also been noted, and the altruistic nature of the movement has been stressed, noting that British student protesters were not faced with the draft. The political symbolism of the Vietnam War for British youth, in particular, has also been recorded. Not only did activists oppose the war on humanitarian grounds, but the war allowed them to criticize the Labour government for betraying their social democratic ideals.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Vietnam War Movement, United States; Britain, Post-World War II Political Protest

References and Suggested Readings

- Ali, T. (1987) *Street Fighting Years: An Autobiography of the Sixties*. London: Collins.
- Caute, D. (1988) *Sixty-Eight: The Year of the Barricades*. London: Hamish Hamilton.
- Edmonds, A. O. (1994) The Viet Nam War and the British Student Left: A Study in Political Symbolism. *Viet Nam Generation* 5, 1-4 (March).

Ellis, S. (1995) British Opposition to the Vietnam War, 1964-68. In K. Versluys (Ed.), *The Insular Dream: Obsession and Resistance*. Amsterdam: Vu University Press.

Fraser, R. (1988) *1968: A Student Generation in Revolt*. London: Chatto & Windus.

Widgery, D. (1976) *The Left in Britain, 1956-1968*. London: Penguin.

Anti-Vietnam War movement, United States

Rick Clapton

The first protests in the United States against the Vietnam War were small and little noticed. Yet by the 1970s, opposition to the war divided Americans more deeply than any issue since the country's Civil War (1861-5). Most importantly, Vietnam War protests, in combination with other 1960s movements, destroyed Americans' unquestioning faith in their government.

American merchant marines became the first Americans to protest their country's involvement in Vietnam. Within two months of Vietnam's independence, US authorities diverted as many as twelve troop ships from their task of returning soldiers to the States and sent them to transport US-armed French troops and Foreign Legionnaires from France to Vietnam. The entire crews of four of the merchant marine ships met in Saigon and drew up a resolution against the US government, protesting the use of American ships to transport French troops for the purpose of subjugating a native population. In the almost two decades after World War II, few voices of dissent were heard addressing the Cold War's greatest attacks on communism. Yet by 1963 the waning popularity of Ngo Dinh Diem's American backed government had reached a boiling point within Vietnam. Much of this dissent originated from the patronage, the corruption, and the manipulation of the peasant population on which Diem's family oligarchy rested.

On May 8, 1963 in Hue, government troops fired into a crowd protesting a Diemist law forbidding the flying of religious flags celebrating the 2,527th anniversary of the Buddha's birth, killing eight unarmed Buddhists. Diem's government denied the shootings and shifted

blame to the communists. Despite the deceptive spin, the Buddhist revolt against Diem's family rule deepened. On June 11, 1963 Thich Quang Duc immolated himself on a busy downtown Saigon street. Forewarned about the event, reporters captured graphic images that splashed across American and global newspapers and television. The coverage brought international pressure, questioning why the Americans would support a regime that persecuted religious worshippers.

The self-sacrifice of Duc brought others to protest the war in a similar manner. On a Detroit, MI street in March 1965, 82-year-old Alice Herz attempted self-immolation. An unidentified man and his two sons were driving by and saw the flames. Stopping, they extinguished the fire. Their efforts failed, and Herz died ten days later in hospital. Seven months later, below the third-floor Pentagon window of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Norman Morrison, a 31-year-old Quaker pacifist, doused his body in kerosene and set himself alight. Morrison brought his 1-year-old daughter Emily, and it remains unclear whether he set her down or threw her to the crowd. Many believed Morrison's daughter signified the senseless murder of children in Vietnam. A week later, Roger LaPorte immolated himself outside the United Nations Building in New York. In mid-October 1967 Florence Beaumont set herself alight outside the Federal Buildings in Los Angeles. George Winne Jr. stands as the last American to self-immolate in protest of the war. On May 10, 1970 he set himself alight in Revelle Plaza on the campus of the University of California, San Diego. He died ten hours later. With his final words he asked his mother to write a letter to President Richard Nixon.

Most acts of protest against the war were not as horrifying. Still, by 1966 – one year after the US officially entered the war in Vietnam under the Tonkin Gulf Resolution – politicians became concerned with the growing number of protests. The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) began investigating Americans they believed to be supporting the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and began drafting a bill that would make such activities illegal. On August 16, during the HUAC's first meeting convened to discuss the bill, police and security forces arrested 50 anti-war protesters who disrupted the meeting.

Many forms of protest against the Vietnam War proved controversial, as signified by the labeling of politicians as either hawks (those who supported the war) or doves (those who opposed the war). No doubt, draft dodging stood as one of the most controversial forms of protest. Draft evasion occurred in a number of different forms. First, because National Guard soldiers remained exempt from active duty in Vietnam, young men that came from well-connected political families avoided active duty in Vietnam by enlisting. Second, others avoided the draft by exploiting loopholes in legislation: staying in post-secondary education; feigning mental illness; and inflicting some form of physical ailment that would cause draftees to fail the military physical were all viable means to avoid the draft. Also, claiming homosexuality caused potential recruits to be rejected, but ardent homophobia made this option unattractive. Third, tens of thousands emigrated to Sweden, Canada, and to a lesser extent Mexico to avoid the draft. Ironically, the number of Americans that avoided the draft by moving to Canada remained equal to the number of Canadians that voluntarily served in Vietnam.

It remains difficult to separate the Vietnam protests from the other social movements of the 1960s, particularly the civil rights movement. Martin Luther King Jr. remains the most famous pastor and civil rights advocate that spoke out against the war in Vietnam. In April 1967 King stated that the crusade for civil rights and protest against the war in Vietnam were one and the same, citing the government's exploitation of the poor as evidence; black men and white men fought side-by-side in battle, but could not live on the same city block in America. This disastrous disparity, King argued, taught people that violence worked to solve problems. Peace, he believed, stood as the moral cornerstone of the United States of America. In light of the sheer amount of dissent at the end of the 1960s, many believed that the United States had truly lost its way, spurning King to declare that "if America's soul becomes totally poisoned, part of the autopsy must read Vietnam."

As early as 1954 civil rights activist Malcolm X had spoken out against the war in Vietnam, drawing parallels between the war there and the Mau Mau rebellion against the British in Kenya. Further, as a member of the Nation of Islam he protested the draft, stating that its people believed in a peaceful nation – they rejected

waging war on any nation and the senseless acts of aggression in Vietnam went against their convictions. In August 1963, two years before the official entry of the US into Vietnam, Malcolm X spoke publicly, encouraging African Americans to resist the draft – and they did. In February of the following year, Cassius Clay won the World Heavyweight Boxing Championship; immediately after the fight he announced that he had joined the Nation of Islam and discarded his slave name, choosing instead Muhammad Ali. Three years later the US government drafted Ali. He politely cooperated with military personnel, but refused the army oath; later, an all-white jury found him guilty of draft evasion and he was sentenced to time in prison and stripped him of both his boxing licence and championship belt. In 1971 the Supreme Court overturned the conviction and returned his boxing licence. Still, the refusal to serve by one of the sport's most famed and inflammatory figures fueled the fires of protest in the latter part of the 1960s.

To the growing list of dissident voices, musicians added a tempo to which the protesters marched and chanted their rallying cries. In 1965 Tom Paxton wrote "Lyndon Johnson Told the Nation," producing one of the first specific Vietnam War protest songs. By 1968 a significant number of protest songs reached billboard charts. Although Buffalo Springfield's "For What It's Worth" protested anti-loitering laws, it became a hit single and rallying cry of the Vietnam War protesters. Arlo Guthrie's 18-minute "Alice's Restaurant" song told of the tale of his being convicted of littering, getting drafted, and not being selected to join the army due to his inane criminal past. The most poignant protest song remains Jimi Hendrix's 1969 rendition of the "Star Spangled Banner" at the Woodstock Music Festival. Showcasing his talent as one of the greatest guitarists of all time, Hendrix's version injected imitated sounds of war into the US National Anthem. Others such as Bob Dylan, John Lennon, Pink Floyd, Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young, Martha and the Vandellas, and Marvin Gaye gained widespread popularity for their stand against the war. So popular were many of these songs that decades later they still stood as the greatest ballads of the classic rock era.

Although still smarting from the HUAC-instigated communist "witch hunts" that occurred during the 1950s, celebrities also

made an impact on the anti-war movement. As a young adult, Danny Glover worked tirelessly in the civil rights movement. His beliefs fueled his anti-war sentiments and during the late 1960s he worked as an anti-draft counsellor. Jane Fonda – daughter of actor Henry Fonda – proved to be one of the most ardent anti-Vietnam protesters. She participated in demonstrations and spoke passionately against the war during rallies; in 1972 she posed for a photograph with a North Vietnamese anti-aircraft gun. Some viewed the act as unpatriotic, while others labeled Fonda as a traitor and expressed their outrage by nicknaming her "Hanoi Jane." That same year, Canadian-born actor Donald Sutherland and Fonda co-produced and starred together in the anti-Vietnam touring company called the Free Theater Associates. The company put on a series of sketches performed outside army bases in the Pacific Rim. These shows included interviews with American troops who were then on active service, and contributed to the growing dissent among military personnel and veterans.

Although not a public figure at the time, John Kerry emerged as a leader of Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). In April 1971 Kerry made a statement to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The statement urged the United States government to withdraw from Vietnam, stating that communism was not the enemy, and that a lack of purpose for Americans in Vietnam demoralized troops. That same month VVAW made a poignant statement against the war by throwing their combat medals onto the steps of the White House. Morale among the soldiers in Vietnam had been declining since 1968, largely due to President Nixon's Vietnamization program. Both its amorphous objectives and policy of not winning the war undermined the military's effectiveness. By the early 1970s substance abuse, desertion, racial violence, and insubordination plagued the ranks of the US army. Further, in response to not wanting to be "the last man to die in Vietnam," many soldiers began adopting the dress of peace protesters. In the years after 1969 incidents of "fragging" (assault or killing with a fragmentation grenade) of military superiors more than doubled, and due to the difficulty of gathering sufficient evidence, few soldiers were court-martialed.

Like the actions of some soldiers, student protests at times became violent. In response to President Nixon's announcement on April 30,

1970 that the Vietnam War was expanding into Cambodia in an attempt to stop supplies coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail, student protest erupted. Fanned by Nixon's inflammatory statement that those "blowing up the campuses" were "bums," violence on American campuses expanded. Protesters bombed and burned Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) buildings from Yale to the University of Wisconsin. On May 3, at Kent State University in Ohio, protesters burned down the ROTC building. The next day, after massive unrest and protest, authorities called in police and the National Guard in an attempt to restore public order. Police opened fire on the crowds, killing four students and injuring nine others. Afterwards, Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young epitomized the event in their song "Four Dead in Ohio." Two days later, police shot and wounded several students at the SUNY-Buffalo campus. On May 14 police were called to Jackson State University in Mississippi by firefighters after protesters started fires and overturned several vehicles. After confronting protesters for a period of time, city and state police fired into the crowd of protesters, killing two and injuring twelve. In late August 1970 four students, tired of the federal government's lack of action, resorted to violence. At the University of Wisconsin-Madison they bombed Sterling Hall, which housed the physics department where researchers conducted experiments for the US military and its dealings in Vietnam. The enormous car bomb inflicted tremendous damage and killed Dr. Robert Fassnacht, who was working in the building during the early hours of the morning.

Although eclipsed by the violence, a large portion of student protests remained planned and peaceful. Non-violent student groups emerged during the 1960s, often to rebel against many of the injustices that plagued American society. During the second half of the 1960s student activists protested against the Vietnam War largely due to the possibility of their being drafted. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) emerged in the mid-1960s as the biggest student organization. In late March 1965 SDS organized the first major teach-in at the University of Michigan. Approximately 2,500 attended the event. The teach-in consisted of debates, lectures, movies, and musical events aimed at educating people about the immorality of the war. The widespread popularity of teach-

ins caused the movement to spread across the country; these forms of protests, in combination with sit-ins, caused the SDS to become a household name.

Intellectuals and academics joined the growing voices of dissent on university campuses. In 1968 the *New York Times* published Noam Chomsky's "The Responsibility of Intellectuals." In his anti-war essay Chomsky argued that all Americans held responsibility to question the deceit and deception of the American government, but more so intellectuals due to the privilege they enjoyed. Some of these privileged few, however, supported the US government's foreign policies that exploited and colonized other nations through outright deception. Chomsky felt that erudites, with their access to information and freedom of expression, should expose the lies and misinformation, thus providing leadership for the resistance against the war in Vietnam. In keeping with his exhortatory essay, Chomsky refused to pay taxes that he believed supported the US government's flawed foreign policy in Vietnam.

In 1966 British philosopher Bertrand Russell published *War Crimes in Vietnam*. In his book Russell compared the atrocities occurring in Vietnam with the Holocaust. Shortly after the book's release, Russell organized an International War Crimes Tribunal to investigate and evaluate US foreign policy. Here, distinguished award-winning members of the global community heard testimony about the war crimes that had occurred in Vietnam. Still, no direct representation from either Vietnam or the United States sat on the tribunal. Consequently, the US labeled it a leftist show trial and the whole affair was largely ignored. The tribunal received some attention from the international community and it provided further awareness about US dealings in Vietnam.

In 1969, after Nixon introduced his program of Vietnamization, the US began its withdrawal of troops. Despite this change in government policy, the war later expanded into Cambodia and Laos and protests against the war escalated. Most protests outside of Washington had little impact on government policies or actions; however, the unauthorized release of "The United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense," or the "Pentagon Papers," in early 1970 and their subsequent printing in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* spurred a host of legal actions by

the US government. Commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967, this 47-volume, 7,000-page study documented the politico-military involvement of the US in Vietnam. The release of the papers proved embarrassing not only to the Nixon administration, but also to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations by showing that the government had repeatedly lied and misinformed Americans. This leak led to the development of the Plumber's Group, Watergate, and the first resignation of an American president.

Over the course of the Vietnam War, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand supported the US with equipment and troops. By the early 1970s these countries began to remove their support in response to international and diplomatic pressure for the US and its allies to end the war in Vietnam. Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, for example, won the 1972 election by promising to withdraw Australian troops from Vietnam. After winning the election he fulfilled his election promise. During the same period peace talks between the US and Vietnam broke down. In response, President Nixon initiated the most intensive bombing campaign of North Vietnam of the entire war. Sweden's Prime Minister Olaf Palme denounced the escalated aggression, comparing the bombings with Nazi atrocities committed during World War II. Both Russia and China threatened to reconsider *détente*, which had been the most successful peace negotiations of the entire Cold War. China's Premier Zhou Enlai and Jiang Qing – Mao Zedong's wife – attended a mass rally in Beijing in support of North Vietnam.

In response to domestic and international protests, the war ended in January 1973 when the US and North Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Accord. Two years later North Vietnamese soldiers invaded Saigon in violation of the agreement. Authorities evacuated the American embassy there under the cover of helicopter gunships.

Some have argued that protesters prolonged the war, that their action emboldened the enemy and eroded any chance the US had of winning. Whether or not this is the case, there is little doubt that the movement opposing the Vietnam War irrevocably altered America's social, political, and military landscape.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Vietnam War Movement, Britain; King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the

Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Russell, Bertrand (1872–1970); Students for a Democratic Society (SDS); Vietnam, Protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, T. H. (1996) *The Movement and the Sixties: Protest in America From Greensboro to Wounded Knee*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Foley, M. S. (2003) *Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance During the Vietnam War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Garfinkle, A. (1997) *Telltale Hearts: The Origins and Impact of the Vietnam Antwar Movement*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Moser, R. R. (1996) *The New Winter Soldiers: GI and Veteran Dissent During the Vietnam Era*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Moss, G. D. (1994) *Vietnam: An American Ordeal*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Small, M. (1994) *Covering Dissent: The Media and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Anti-war activism, Yugoslavia, 1990s

Boris Kanzleiter

The outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia in 1991/92 was a first reminder that the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War would not lead to a period of prosperity and peace, as many had hoped, but to a world of increasing conflict and social destruction. During the military conflicts in Slovenia in 1991, Croatia 1991–5, Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992–5, Kosovo 1996–9, Serbia 1999, and Macedonia 2001, an estimated 150,000 people were killed and millions were made homeless. The breakup of the multinational state, war atrocities, and images of “ethnic cleansing” were widely interpreted as signs of a new era of a “clash of civilizations” and “ethnic conflict.”

A closer look at the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, however, reveals that the wars were much more linked to social and institutional crisis, the rapidly changing international power relations after the end of the precarious stability of bloc-confrontation, and the political agendas of local power elites than to “ancient ethnic hatred” among different peoples in the country that was destroyed. Although nationalist political

forces in a different scale gained mass support in all of the former Yugoslav republics, there was also widespread active and passive resistance to violence and the forceful breakup of the society on ethnic lines. According to opinion polls in the summer of 1990, only one year before the conflict escalated, only a small minority of 16 percent of the total population favored the idea that every national group should form its own national state.

Active resistance against nationalism and war came from different layers of society and political groups. The most notable attempt of elite groups to stop the destruction of the country was led by the communist politician and former partisan Ante Markovic (b. 1924), prime minister of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRFY) from March 1989 until December 1991. After the official dissolving of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia (LCY) in January 1990, he formed the League of Reform Forces aiming to hold the country together and to start a process of democratization. His work was torpedoed by nationalist presidents of the republics like Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, and Milan Kucan in Slovenia.

At the same time, a range of grassroots organizations and an emerging civil society were engaged in anti-nationalist and anti-war activism. A serious attempt by intellectuals from all parts of the country to form a political alternative was the founding of the Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI). It brought together many former student activists from 1968. The UJDI program sought a democratic federal Yugoslavia, legalization of a multi-party system, and direct elections to the Chamber of Citizens in the federal parliament. Its attempts failed, but UJDI was a nucleus for many non-governmental organizations and groups, which continued to campaign against nationalism and war during the 1990s. These included human rights organizations like the Helsinki Committees in the different republics, women's groups like Women in Black (Belgrade), political organizations like the Citizens Union of Serbia (GSS), and media like the journal *Republika* (Belgrade), *Arkzin* (Zagreb), and *Radio Zid* (Sarajevo).

While the international media spread the image of an "ethnic war" in which virtual neighbors were killing each other, the reality on the battlefields often looked very different. It was mainly

(para-)military groups which terrorized the civilian population, making any resistance to the killings almost impossible. In spite of this there were many examples of "interethnic" support and help at an individual level. Apart from organized attempts to oppose the policies of nationalism and war, many citizens resisted and often risked their lives. For example, the Serb teenager Srdjan Aleksic defended his Muslim friend Alen Glavovic against an attack of Serbian paramilitaries in the town of Trebinje in Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 1993. He was subsequently killed by the aggressors. According to estimates, more than 200,000 young male citizens refused to be drafted by the army during the 1990s. Many of them had to emigrate or to go underground, often for a long period of time.

The war in Yugoslavia was a breaking point for the international peace movement. A part of the international left embraced the idea of "humanitarian intervention" as a means to stop war by foreign military intervention. Key figures of these ideas were some prominent intellectuals and politicians from the 1968 protest movements in Germany and France, like Joschka Fischer and Daniel Cohn-Bendit from the Green Party. Another segment of the international left – like linguist and political activist Noam Chomsky or literature Nobel Prize winner Harold Pinter – strongly opposed "humanitarian intervention" as a form of new "imperialism." The opposing views were motivated by differing analyses of the character of war in Yugoslavia. While the "interventionists" claimed the breakup of the state was mainly due to internal factors, the "anti-interventionists" saw the war mainly as a result of western politics favoring the destruction of Yugoslavia.

SEE ALSO: Yugoslavia, Anti-Fascist "People's Liberation War" and Revolution, 1941–1945; Yugoslavia, Student Protests, 1966–1974

References and Suggested Readings

- Popov, N. & Gojkovic, D. (Eds.) (1999) *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Sekelj, L. (1992) *Yugoslavia: Process of Disintegration*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Women in Black (Eds.) (1995) *War Deserters in the Former Yugoslavia*. Belgrade: Women in Black.
- Woodward, S. L. (1995) *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. Washington, DC: Brooking Institution Press.

Anti-war movement, France, 20th century

Melanie A. Bailey

Anti-war movements in France evolved from the broad internationalist efforts of the first half of the twentieth century to take the form of focused protests against particular kinds of conflicts, such as the “imperialist” war in Indochina or the “dirty” war in Algeria. Although the effect of such activism may be debated, it is clear that their efforts have shaped modern French culture.

In the decade before 1914, French socialists and pacifists promoted the formation of institutions that would dispose nations toward diplomacy. By means of newspaper articles, speeches, and rallies, they celebrated the early efforts of the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague; they pressured the French government to empower conflict resolution by funding the court and by fully supporting the work of French delegate Aristide Briand. Internationalists repeatedly averred that their cultivation of pan-European fraternity did not imply that they loved France any less than financiers and businessmen who formed international partnerships.

The tension between patriotism and internationalism would be broken in favor of the former. Throughout July 1914, socialist leader Jean Jaurès strived to persuade the French government to declare its neutrality in a Russo-German conflict. War, as he asserted in various articles published in *L'Humanité*, would be the product of a desire for war on the part of governments and citizens, not of necessity. The July 31 assassination of Jaurès by an ardent French nationalist rendered it virtually certain that France would become involved in World War I, especially as the socialists lost any will to organize a general strike against troop mobilization. Indeed, most socialists and anarchists supported the war. The “sacred union” of political parties within a wartime government of national unity kept potential anti-war leaders in check. Most citizens firmly believed that the French had been tasked with defending liberty and their territory against German aggression.

By 1917, evidence of war profiteering and conspicuous consumption revived class conflict. Workplace conditions and low wages prompted

increasing numbers of strikes. Tensions between officers and men, who endured miserable conditions and who did not always receive scheduled rotations away from the front, led to mutinies. Though Marshal Pétain believed that pacifists were to blame for these mutinies, soldiers were in fact expressing discontent more with the manner in which the war was fought than with the war itself. Opposition to the war was restricted to a relatively small minority.

After 1918, however, the material and human costs of the war began to weigh upon the consciousness (and consciences) of leaders and citizens alike. Socialists strived to reduce the willingness of future generations of French men and women to go to war. Since most public schoolteachers were socialists or communists, the curriculum offered to French children was informed by pacifist ideals. International exchanges of students, especially between Germany and France, occurred, as did conferences between French and German intellectuals. French organizers of such activities hoped that their efforts would inspire similar goodwill on the other side and diffuse the hatreds that were empowering fascism.

By the mid-1930s, “pacifism” was an element in the ideologies of both left-wing internationalists and right-wing fascists in France. In the years after the “strange defeat” of 1940, French men and women pondered the differences between pacifism and defeatism. Those who joined the Resistance concluded that violence was a legitimate response when confronted by evil; basic liberties and human rights should be defended even when doing so entailed bloodshed. Although the Resistance involved only a relatively small percentage of French citizens, it left an indelible mark. The principles of the Resistance later inspired efforts to end the wars in Indochina and Algeria.

The fractious political left in France unified in opposition to French war to retain control of Indochina. Although the socialists did not share exactly the same hopes for an independent Southeast Asia as the French Communist Party (PCF), they all rejected French imperialism. Hence, they vociferously supported Henri Martin, a French naval officer and member of the PCF who had enlisted to fight the Japanese but instead found himself deployed to suppress the independence movements in Indochina. Upon returning to France, Martin distributed leaflets

about the war in Indochina; he was arrested by the military police in 1950 for sedition and sentenced to five years in prison. His case became a *cause célèbre*, given Martin's stature as a former participant in the Resistance and the disproportion between his "crime" and the sentence. Meanwhile, anti-war workers sabotaged armaments production. Although many conservatives decried negotiations, the majority of French citizens accepted the 1954 decision by Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France to end the French presence in Indochina and in Tunisia: the public had become averse to "imperialist" wars.

Whereas French military activities in Indochina could be cast as imperialism almost without controversy, opponents to the conflict in Algeria found it more difficult to apply that label. According to the constitution of the Fourth Republic, the three *départements* into which Algeria had been divided were theoretically equal in status to those on the mainland. A large population of European settlers identified Algeria as their home, and these *pièdes noirs* urged the French government to crush Algerian nationalism. During the Sétif massacres of 1945, French soldiers killed thousands of Algerian Muslims, intending to stifle any independence movement. However, poverty, injustice, and general disillusionment with French leadership galvanized nationalism and increased support for groups such as the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN).

Public reaction to the situation in Algeria was muted, for the most part, until the 1956 decision by the socialist government of Guy Mollet to grant emergency powers to the military and civilian administrators. In so doing, Mollet gave license for the military to use torture to secure victory. The case of Maurice Audin, a university mathematician arrested, tortured, and "disappeared" (after being accidentally killed by his police captors) in Algiers, caused intellectuals and many ordinary citizens to express opposition to the methods being used in the "dirty war." The political and military situation reminded some French citizens of fascism. Some decided to oppose the policies of their government actively, just as they or those they admired had done as part of the Resistance to Nazism. Perhaps as many as a few hundred French men and women aided the FLN by ensuring that funds collected from Algerians living in France reached FLN leaders. These French "suitcase carriers" were members

of the Jeanson group (founded by intellectual Francis Jeanson); they were prosecuted and sentenced to prison terms in 1960. The trial provided anti-war activists with a platform from which they could justify their opposition to the French military's behavior and the overall French presence in Algeria.

The advent of such a platform was important because the government had eliminated virtually all legal means to express opposition to the war publicly. Efforts to publicize the use of torture in Algeria were censored. Although Henri Alleg's *La Question* (The Question) (1958), which described his torture at the hands of the French military, was initially available in bookstores, newspapers were not allowed to print excerpts from the memoir. After thousands of French citizens purchased a copy in the first month of its publication, the government decided to prevent further sales. When a group of prominent intellectuals and celebrities, ranging from Jean-Paul Sartre and Marguerite Duras to Simone Signoret and François Truffaut, signed what became known as the Manifesto of the 121 (1960), the government prevented newspapers from printing the text. The signatories of the Manifesto expressed approval of French citizens who aided the FLN, describing resistance in such circumstances as a "sacred duty." Despite censorship, periodicals such as *Esprit* and Sartre's *Les Temps Modernes* (Modern Times) helped their readers to understand the conflict and to evaluate what responses they were morally or politically obliged to make.

Although opponents to the Algerian War were always a small minority of the French citizenry, their efforts probably encouraged the government to develop a strategy to end the violence. A large demonstration in support of the government in its negotiations with the FLN (and against the insurrectionary efforts of the Organisation de l'armée secrète, OAS) indicated that the 1964 Evian Accords would be endorsed by referendum. Although the French had not generally opposed the war, they supported peace: the Accords were ratified by more than 90 percent of the population in mainland France.

The Algerian War was the last major conflict in which French troops have become involved and against which large numbers of anti-war activists became engaged. Most of the French political left supported the deployment of French troops to Bosnia as part of the NATO

operation in the former Yugoslavia. European peace and the end to the French empire – both achieved in the wake of twentieth-century conflicts and the opposition that they inspired – have reduced the likelihood that anti-war activists will need to oppose a French-led war in the near future.

SEE ALSO: Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962; Anti-Vietnam War Movement, Britain; Anti-Vietnam War Movement, United States; Anti-War Movement, Iraq; Counterrecruitment; Jaurès, Jean (1859–1914); May 1968 French Uprisings; Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954

References and Suggested Readings

- Defrasne, J. (1994) *Le Pacifisme en France* (Pacifism in France). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Evans, M. (1997) *The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War (1954–1962)*. Oxford: Berg.
- Ingram, N. (1991) *The Politics of Dissent: Pacifism in France, 1919–1939*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Shalk, D. L. (1991) *War and the Ivory Tower: Algeria and Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Siegel, M. (2005) *The Moral Disarmament of France: Education, Pacifism, and Patriotism, 1914–1940*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Anti-war movement, Iraq

David Michael Smith

International resistance to the US invasion of Iraq became the largest, most diverse, and arguably first genuinely global anti-war movement in the annals of human experience. By March 2002, people throughout the world had begun mobilizing to oppose the George W. Bush administration's increasingly obvious plans for war in Iraq. On March 16, in Barcelona, about 300,000 people participated in the European Social Forum's march against globalization and war. When the president visited Berlin and Paris in late May, tens of thousands of protesters greeted him with anti-war slogans and epithets. In early September, former South African President Nelson Mandela expressed the view of the majority of the world's peoples when he described Bush's plans for war as a threat to world peace.

In the autumn of 2002, the extraordinary size and scope of the global movement against

war in Iraq became clear. On September 28, about 400,000 people participated in an anti-war demonstration in London called Stop The War Coalition (STWC) and the Muslim Association of Britain. It was the largest anti-war event held in the UK in decades. On the same day, more than 100,000 people took to the streets in Rome, while scores of thousands of others marched in Beirut, Gaza City, and in cities in Australia and New Zealand. As many as 20,000 people gathered for an anti-war rally in New York City's Central Park, and thousands more participated in protests in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, and other US cities.

On October 26, 2002 ANSWER organized a national anti-war demonstration that brought some 200,000 people to Washington, the largest anti-war demonstration since the Vietnam War. At the same time, thousands of others turned out for protests in other US cities. The turnout, diversity, and energy of the October 26 actions confirmed that a serious anti-war movement was developing in the US. But it was also increasingly clear that the anti-war movement in the US did not speak with one voice. The day before the October 26 protests, several organizations from the left announced the creation of a new anti-war coalition, which became known as United for Peace and Justice (UPJ). On November 9, as many as one million people participated in an anti-war march and rally sponsored by the European Social Forum in Florence. This was one of the largest protests held in Europe since the end of World War II, and the inclusion of US peace activists on the speakers' platform in Florence was only one indication of growing international coordination in the global anti-war movement.

In late December 2002 and early January 2003, as the Bush administration deployed a growing number of US military forces to the Persian Gulf, anti-war protests broke out in Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, Pakistan, and India. On January 8, 2003, train drivers in Scotland refused to operate freight trains carrying ammunition from the Glasgow area to the Glen Douglas military base, the largest North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) weapons storage facility in Europe. Growing opposition to war among US union members led to the formation of US Labor against the War (USLAW) in Chicago on January 11. By mid-January, hundreds of peace advocates from around the world were arriving in Baghdad to voice their opposition to the impending invasion

in Jakarta, Osaka, Tokyo, and Geneva called for internationally coordinated protests on September 27. But after a summer of waning actions against the war and occupation, much smaller numbers of people participated in the September 27 demonstrations. Tens of thousands marched in London and several Spanish cities, and turnout in a dozen other countries was even smaller. On October 25, an anti-war protest jointly organized by UPJ and ANSWER in Washington drew between 50,000 and 100,000 people.

Although many people drifted away from the global anti-war movement because of disillusionment and demoralization after the fall of Iraq, others continued to organize marches, rallies, civil disobedience actions, and educational programs. On February 15, 2004, the first anniversary of the historic global day of action against war, more than 150,000 rallied in Madrid. The following month, in the aftermath of terrorist attacks on Madrid trains, the Spanish anti-war movement helped ensure the electoral defeat of Prime Minister José Maria Aznar, one of the few Western European leaders who had supported the invasion of Iraq. As many as 500,000 people demonstrated against the Republican National Convention in New York City on August 29, and opposition to the Iraq war was a prominent theme of the day. However, on November 2, Bush narrowly won reelection but received no popular mandate to continue the war and occupation in Iraq.

By 2005, as US casualties in Iraq mounted and domestic public opinion increasingly came to view the war as a mistake, anti-war activities began to increase again throughout the country. In January, tens of thousands of people protested Bush's second inauguration in Washington, while thousands of students walked out of their high school and college classrooms in California, Washington State, Colorado, and Illinois. Former military personnel who had served in the war launched Iraq Veterans against the War, and families who lost members in the war formed Gold Star Families for Peace. In February, dozens of towns in Vermont discussed, debated, and adopted anti-war resolutions while student organizers planned protests against military recruiters in several states. On March 19, internationally coordinated protests commemorating the second anniversary of the invasion drew much smaller numbers than the previous year but confirmed that the global movement had not disappeared. More than 100,000 people marched in London,

and tens of thousands protested in New York City, but the turnout was lower at demonstrations in Barcelona, Stockholm, Oslo, Athens, Warsaw, Istanbul, and other cities in Asia, Africa, and Australia.

In August, Cindy Sheehan, whose son had died in the war, galvanized the US movement by setting up a camp outside Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas for three weeks. On September 24, as many as 300,000 people participated in a march in Washington organized by UPJ, ANSWER, and Troops Out Now Coalition (TONC). Fifty thousand rallied in San Francisco, and 100,000 protested in London. Protests also took place in Rome, Brussels, Baghdad, Seoul, and some other cities. Two days later, more than 400 people were arrested in civil disobedience actions near the White House and the Pentagon.

As 2006 began, the anti-war movement in the US faced new opportunities and challenges. A majority of people in the US now believed that the war was a mistake and supported the withdrawal of troops from Iraq within the year. A growing number of students, workers, and military families began to take part in local anti-war activities across the country. Activists from the US and more than a dozen other countries planned another wave of coordinated protests on the third anniversary of the invasion of Iraq. While most activists recognized the need to organize larger civil disobedience actions and support the development of resistance within US military forces, concrete work on these projects continued to be limited.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Vietnam War Movement, Britain; Anti-Vietnam War Movement, United States; Anti-War Movement, France, 20th Century; World Social Forums

References and Suggested Readings

- Achcar, G. (2005) Whither Iraq? *International Viewpoint*. Available at www.internationalviewpoint.org/article.php?id_article=574 (posted February 24).
- Agence FP (2003) World Condemns Iraq War, Fears for Civilian Lives. Common Dreams News Center. Available at www.commondreams.org/headlines/03/0321-02.htm (posted March 21).
- Cortright, D. (2004) *A Peaceful Superpower: The Movement against War in Iraq*. Goshen, IN: Fourth Freedom Forum.
- Epstein, B. (2003) Notes on the Anti-War Movement. *Monthly Review* 55, 3 (July–August): 109–16.
- Ewert, J. (2005) Another Anti-War Movement Taking Shape? *Columbia Chronicle*. Available at

- www.ccchronicle.com/paper/citybeat.php?id=1917 (posted November 14).
- Gupta, A. (2006) Moving Forward: UFPJ and the Anti-War Movement. *Left Turn Magazine* #19. Available at www.leftturn.org/Articles/Viewer.aspx?id=827&type=M#top (posted January 28).
- Murray, A. & German, L. (2005) *Stop the War – The Story of Britain’s Biggest Mass Movement*. London: Bookmarks.
- Smith, S. (2005) The New Anti-War Majority. *CounterPunch*. Available at www.counterpunch.org/sharon08112005.html (posted August 11).
- Tyler, P. (2003) A New Power in the Streets. *New York Times*, February 17.

April Revolution, Nepal, 2006

Sushovan Dhar

On June 1, 2001, King Birendra of Nepal, his wife, and several members of the royal family were shot and killed by his son, Crown Prince Dipendra, who then committed suicide by shooting himself. Prince Gyanendra, the younger brother of King Birendra, was crowned king.

King Gyanendra dismissed the government in October 2002, labeling it corrupt and useless. He declared a state of emergency in November and ordered the army to crack down on the Maoist guerillas. On February 1, 2005, the royal coup was further advanced when the king appointed a government led by himself and simultaneously enforced martial law to deal with the insurgency. Several top political leaders were apprehended and other opposition leaders fled to India and regrouped there. A broad alliance, the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), was formed, including about 90 percent of the parliamentarians from the dissolved parliament, who came from the Nepali Congress Party (NCP), the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) (CPN-UML), and others.

In December 2005, the SPA signed a 12-point understanding with the Maoists by which the Maoists committed themselves to multiparty democracy and freedom of speech, while the SPA accepted Maoist demands for elections to a Constituent Assembly. In early 2006, the situation became even more volatile as the SPA launched a series of agitations, followed by waves of arrests of opposition leaders. The agitations reached a peak around the February 8

municipal elections, which were boycotted by the SPA and the Maoists. Official figures claimed participation of about 21 percent of voters, a figure which is questioned by the opposition. The SPA’s call for a four-day nationwide general strike on April 5–9 elicited a massive spontaneous demonstration. Even the curfew from April 8 with orders to shoot protesters on sight could not deter the people’s protest.

On April 9, the SPA announced an indefinite strike and called for a tax boycott. The government responded with plans to step up its enforcement of the curfew and claimed that the Maoists had infiltrated the protests. Protests continued on the following days, involving about 100,000 to 200,000 people in Kathmandu, more than 10 percent of the city’s population. On April 21, opposition sources claim that about 500,000 took part in the protests in Kathmandu, forcing the king on the same evening to announce that he would return political power to the people and call early elections. He called on the SPA to nominate a new prime minister of Nepal in a speech on a state-owned television channel. However, the royal proclamation was rejected by the opposition. The next day, the leaders of the SPA met in the capital and set out three demands: the reinstatement of the old parliament; the formation of an all-party government; and elections to a Constituent Assembly that would draft a new constitution.

In a nationally televised address, King Gyanendra reinstated the Nepal House of Representatives on April 24, 2006 and called upon the SPA to bear the responsibility of running the nation. The reinstatement of parliament was accepted by the SPA and it nominated G. P. Koirala as head of the new government, stating that the new parliament would elect a body to draft the constitution. The move was rejected by the Maoists, with Baburam Bhattarai, a prominent leader of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M), stating that merely restoring the parliament was not going to resolve the problems and that the rebels planned to continue fighting against government forces. They still demanded the formation of a Constituent Assembly and abolition of the monarchy.

The events in Nepal leading to the April Revolution were tumultuous and what was once regarded as antique and fixed changed rapidly. Citizenship rights were conferred on millions of formerly disenfranchised Nepalese, especially of

the Tarai region, through the Nepal Citizenship Bill, and the very ground rules of nationhood were rewritten. The period also witnessed the transition of the Nepalese from being the king's subjects to citizens of a nation. The fundamentals of Nepali life were reviewed, including the roles of women or Dalits (marginal social groups who, according to the Hindu caste system, were considered untouchables) in the parliament and the fate of Hinduism as the official state religion. The Madhesi ethnic group, which comprises a third of Nepal's population of 29 million, was granted citizenship rights for the first time in the 50-year history of independent Nepal.

On April 27, 2006, the Maoists announced a unilateral three-month truce in the Nepal Civil War, responding to demands by G. P. Koirala, with a resolve to abolish the monarchy and elect a Constituent Assembly. In addition, Bhattarai announced that the Maoists would abide by the results of elections provided they were free and fair. This was a large step forward as it exemplified the first signs of Maoist acceptance of the democratic process and of liberal and moderate left parties.

On May 2, Koirala announced the new government cabinet, which included himself and three other ministers from the NCP, the CPN-UML, the Nepali Congress (Democratic), and the United Left Front. This was followed on May 12 by the arrest of four ministers from the ousted royalist government and an investigation into alleged human rights violations by the army during the general strike.

On May 18, 2006, parliament voted a bill stripping most of the king's powers, including placing the army under the control of parliament, imposing a tax on royal property, abolishing the royal advisory council, declaring Nepal a secular country, scrapping the existing national anthem, and removing references to the king as the supreme commander of the army. This overrode the 1990 Constitution. Though there were plans for a constitution through a Constituent Assembly, these provisional measures came into force for the time being. On June 16, 2006, the political parties of the government of the urban areas and the leadership of the CPN-M, representing the *de facto* government of the rest of the nation, reached an eight-point agreement as a precondition for immediate fair elections to a Constituent Assembly as demanded by the popular movements. The terms were as follows.

- The implementation of the earlier 12-point pact of November 2005 and the signing of a 25-point Ceasefire Code of Conduct between the SPA government and CPN-M on May 26, 2006.
- A commitment to the universal application of democratic norms and values, including a competitive multiparty system, civic liberties, fundamental human rights, press freedom, and the concept of the rule of law.
- A request to the UN to help monitor and manage the armies and weapons of both the government and Maoist sides prior to free and fair elections to the Constituent Assembly.
- The guarantee of democratic rights achieved through the popular movements of 1990 and 2006; the drafting of an interim constitution based on the 12-point pact and the Ceasefire Code of Conduct; the formation of an interim government; the announcement of a date for the Constituent Assembly elections; the dissolution of the House of Representatives through consensus after making alternative arrangements; and the dissolution of the parallel people's governments of the CPN-M.
- A consensus decision on the long-term issues of national interest.
- The guarantee of the fundamental right of the Nepalese to participate in the Constituent Assembly elections without fear, influence, threat, or violence; the invitation of international observers and monitors during the elections as necessary.
- The advancement of a forward-looking plan to restructure the state so as to resolve the class-, race-, region-, and gender-based problems through the Constituent Assembly elections; the transformation of the ceasefire between the Nepal government and CPN-M into a permanent peace by focusing on democracy, peace, prosperity, and change, and on the country's independence, sovereignty, and pride; a commitment to resolve problems through talks.
- A directive to the government and Maoist negotiators to accomplish all the tasks related to the above-mentioned points immediately.

The Role of Women, Labor Unions, and the Dalits in the Revolution

The overwhelming participation of women was a major force in the success of the anti-king

protests, a fact that the CPN-M admitted in its statements. During the April movement, women comprised 45–70 percent of protesters. In urban and remote rural districts ranging from 10,000 to 50,000 people, women made up the majority of the protesters. Parliamentary approval for two important rights – namely, the reservation of 33 percent of seats for women representatives in parliament and citizenship on the basis of the mother’s nationality – were essential steps to ensure the participation of women in shaping the post-revolutionary society.

Yet despite their major role in the democracy movement in Nepal, women were excluded from all decision-making processes. In the cabinet, just one out of 20 ministers was a woman, Sahana Pradhan of the CPN-UML, who was minister of foreign affairs. Not one woman participated in the six-member committee formed to draft an interim constitution, nor did any woman in government or among the Maoists participate in peace negotiations. In a country where women comprise 52 percent of the population, the embedded patriarchal bias in the social and political spaces remained, despite the social revolution.

Nepali trade unions stood firm against the royal takeover from the very beginning. They embarked on a grand procession on May 1, 2005, the first of its kind since the royal takeover. More than 10,000 workers participated in Kathmandu. The royal regime responded by creating fake unions to divide workers. The anti-worker ordinance of “hire and fire” was promulgated in order to ban government employees’ unions from aligning with the Nepali journalists’ federation. Various trade union leaders were arrested, houses were searched, and a number of people fled. Several trade unionists were injured in clashes with the police and the army, and in Kavre district 12 workers were injured on April 6, 2006. The workers of Nepal Bank Limited ceased work in solidarity and support. The trade union federations led by the General Federation of Nepalese Trade Unions (GEFONT) rallied on April 8, 2006 and were fired at, leaving hundred of agitators injured. There was a series of strikes and agitations in which government employees and workers from banks, schools, universities, the health sector, industries, factories, transport, and hotels participated. Repression continued on a grand scale with the arrest and illegal detention of trade unionists. Nevertheless, the Nepalese working

class remained committed to the struggle for democracy and the nation witnessed the largest mobilization of the working class, along with all other sections of the oppressed.

Dalits too played an important role in the democratic movement by actively participating in protests amidst many reports of Dalits being arrested and injured. On April 18, 2006, Dalits demonstrated in different parts of the country. In Dhangadi, thousands of Dalits, Janjati (tribals), and Kamaiya (bonded laborers) jointly protested in a mass demonstration, carrying with them *halo* (plow), *juwa* (yoke), and *kodalo* (spade) and organizing a mass rally demanding a republican Nepal. Dalits also protested in Nepalganj, where one young Dalit woman, Setu Sunar, was killed by the police. In Bhojpur, Khotang, Shankhuwa Shava, and Dhankutta districts, Dalits joined hands with Janjatis, while in Biratnagar, Dharan, Rajbiraj, Bharapur, and Kakarbhitta, they demonstrated independently in conjunction with the nationwide movement, reiterating that only in a democracy could all their rights be realized.

SEE ALSO: Nepal, Maoists’ Rise; Nepal, People’s War and Maoists

References and Suggested Readings

- Brown, T. L. (1996) *The Challenge to Democracy in Nepal: A Political History*. London: Routledge.
- Gellner, D. N. (Ed.) (2002) *Resistance and State: Nepalese Experience*. New Delhi: Social Science Press.
- Mikesell, S. L. (1999) *Class, State and Struggle in Nepal*. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Ogura, K. (2001) *Kathmandu Spring: The People’s Movement of 1990*. Kathmandu: Himal Books.
- Parajulee, R. P. (2000) *The Democratic Transition in Nepal*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Reaper, W. & Hoftun, M. (1992) *Spring Awakening: An Account of the 1990 Revolution in Nepal*. New Delhi: Viking.
- Saha, R. (1993) *Politics in Nepal 1980–1991*. New Delhi: Manohar.

Aptheker, Herbert (1915–2003)

Yusuf Nuruddin

Herbert Aptheker was a US Marxist historian and political activist who achieved recognition for his pioneering and prolific contributions to the

field of African American history, and as a long-standing spokesperson for the CPUSA who took uncompromising stances against McCarthyism and US military involvement in Vietnam.

Aptheker was born in Brooklyn, New York, the youngest of five children of Benjamin Aptheker and Rebecca Komar Aptheker, Russian Jewish immigrants who became wealthy through the garment manufacturing business. He developed an early interest in American racial matters through a close relationship with his Trinidadian nanny and family domestic servant, Angelina Corbin. This interest was intensified in 1932 when at age 16 he accompanied his father on a business trip through the Jim Crow South. Appalled by the poverty and legalized segregation which he witnessed, he composed his first article on racial injustice entitled “The Dark Side of the South” for his Erasmus High School newspaper. He returned to the South six years later, after graduating from college, to work as a union organizer and educator of black food and tobacco farm workers. Recognizing that black tenant farmers were virtually still enslaved under a system of debt peonage, he then became the secretary of an organization advocating the abolition of this sharecropping system.

Aptheker attended Columbia University, receiving an undergraduate degree in geology and a doctorate in history. His master’s thesis was a study of the Nat Turner Rebellion of 1831. His doctoral dissertation was published as a book entitled *American Negro Slave Revolts* in 1943, and became a classic study in African American history. It challenged the prevailing pro-slavery theories of racist historians such as Ulrich B. Phillips who sought to portray blacks as child-like, submissive, docile, and content to be enslaved. Aptheker also hotly contested William Styron’s 1966 revisionist psychohistorical novel *The Confessions of Nat Turner*, which cast the slave rebellion leader as an emasculated psychopath who lusted after white women. Aptheker produced numerous notable contributions to the field of African American history, and also edited the 40 volumes of scholarly and literary writings of his dear friend and mentor W. E. B. Du Bois.

Viewing the Communist Party as a progressive anti-racist and anti-fascist organization, he joined it in 1939. Aptheker enlisted in the army in 1942 and served as a commissioned officer, but lost his commission in 1950 because of his communist views and activities. During this decade, which was marked by McCarthyism, Aptheker was

blacklisted. He sought a career in academia but was barred from lecturing in US colleges and universities. He was employed instead as the editor of two publications: *Masses and the Mainstream* (1948–53) and *Political Affairs* – the journal of the CPUSA (1953–63). He also served on the National Committee of the CPUSA (1957–91) and for nearly two decades as executive director of the American Institute for Marxist Studies. In 1991 he left the Communist Party to help found the Committees of Correspondence.

In the 1960s Aptheker became one of the earliest and fiercest critics of the war in Vietnam. In 1966 he made a widely publicized trip to Hanoi and Beijing with Staughton Lind and Tom Hayden in an effort to negotiate an end to the war. This brought down upon them the ire of the US State Department, which tried unsuccessfully to restrict their right to further international travel. Aptheker resumed university teaching in the 1970s, holding appointments as lecturer, professor, and visiting faculty member at several institutions. By the time of his death in 2003 at age 87 he is reputed to have authored over fifty books.

Aptheker’s reputation as a icon of the left was somewhat tarnished during his lifetime by charges of Stalinism and posthumously by a controversial memoir, *Intimate Politics*, written by his daughter Bettina Aptheker, a professor of women’s studies which, based on “recovered memory,” accused her father of sexually molesting her for several years during her childhood.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights, United States: Overview; Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA); Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963); Marxism; Nat Turner Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Aptheker, H. C. (1983) *American Negro Slave Revolts*. New York: International Publishers.
 Phelps, C. (2006) Herbert Aptheker: The Contradictions of History. *Chronicle Review* 53, 7.
 Thompson, C. et al. (Eds.) (2003) *White Men Challenging Racism: 35 Personal Stories*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Arab left and socialist movements, 1861–1930

Steven Isaac

One of the key problems pointed out by scholars in defining Arab socialism resides in the term

“socialism” itself. The term has a multivalent history within Arabic more as a symbol than as a label with a clearly attached dogma. The Ottoman world paid little attention to the 1848 revolutions that brought contending visions of socialism to the center of European debates. Nonetheless, socialism, if not a full understanding of its claims and agendas, began to seep into the Middle East as refugees brought treatises and revolutionary pamphlets in their original European languages into Istanbul. In 1861, the neologism *ishtirak* may have appeared for the first time to describe socialism in an English–Turkish lexicon. The term was apparently built from the root *sh-r-k*, describing a form of common ownership of water, fire, housing, and other necessities before the Prophet Muhammad’s time. This idea of communal property was effectively endorsed in the Constitution of Medina, the agreement under which Muhammad’s refugees from Mecca merged their future with that of the “helpers” (*ansar*) who received them in Medina.

In 1871, when the Paris Commune broke out, Arab interest in Europe’s affairs had grown considerably, matched by a growing Arabic press, particularly in Egypt and Lebanon. As the editors of the leading papers reported on the events of 1871, they invoked *ishtirak* to describe the agenda of the Communards, but also employed a number of other terms and circumlocutions demonstrating the ongoing novelty of socialism. For the most part the editorial slant of the journals rested against the Communards, perhaps out of a need to avoid causing any domestic political irritation. Still, a quite interesting development came with the reportage in Istanbul’s *al-Jama’ib* (Tidings) of the Commune’s spread to Lyons and Marseilles: while explaining the socialist vision, the writer drew parallels with communal ideas practiced in the Acts of the Apostles, including the death of Ananias for not truly sharing all his possessions. Socialism’s perceived relationship with religion (especially Islam, but Christianity and Judaism as well), if not its actual genesis therein, was foundational for many Arabs’ understanding of the ideology.

In the 1890s, Boutros al-Bustani undertook to educate readers of both his encyclopedia and journal (*al-Muqtataf*) of socialism even as he criticized the movement. In 1890 his paper’s editor launched a critique of socialism, beginning with a full explanation of its claims, and used

the term *ishtirakiyya* (the modern Arabic designation) for the first time. Bustani’s 1894 encyclopedia article on socialism showed a deepening understanding of the terminology and issues: participation (*ishtirak*) had now become an “ism.” He also distinguished between communists and socialists, arguing that participation in property described the Commune, but that genuine *ishtirakiyya* derived from Robert Owen and described a reform, not a revolution, of society.

This gradualist approach would mark much of Arab socialism, which often downplayed, or outright ignored, class struggle in socialism. Simultaneously, a leading voice for modernizing Islam, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, wrote a series of essays outlining his understanding of contemporary socialism in the West and, more importantly, how it was once practiced in the Arab world. The primary problem was the resentment of laborers who were unjustly compensated in capitalism. Al-Afghani argued that in pre-Islamic Arabia, Bedouins of means shared their goods. Once the Islamic community had the Qur’an to guide them, the rules were clear on sharing of material goods.

War spoils were parceled out to non-participants, alms mandated, and injurious usury forbidden. For al-Afghani, the caliphs abu Bakr and ‘Umar established proper examples of socialism in practice – both continuing austere lives despite the riches pouring into the nascent empire. Under ‘Uthman, the system began to go askew as the leadership began to enjoy material privileges. Discontent grew among a class of “intelligent poor” who understood that Islam’s guidelines were being dismissed; al-Afghani thus characterized the dissension of Abu Dharr as a populist and religious movement. In the end, this Companion of the Prophet was shown not simply as one advocating material equality but, just as vital, as one chiding the caliphs to avoid the creation of faction in the *‘umma*, or community.

Despite some efforts to demonstrate an original Arab penchant for social equity, or the socialism implied in the arrangements in Medina, socialism, as a European construct, remained suspect. Even a modernizer like al-Afghani could only go so far in Arabizing or Islamizing ideologies and practice, but he also realized that very different conditions in the East from those in the West could make socialism seem so compelling.

The Early Twentieth Century

Even as a few Muslim Arab intellectuals grappled with socialism and attempted to show harmony with an Arabic/Islamic heritage, other residents of the Ottoman empire were drawn to it for quite different reasons. Because of the many closed doors they faced in territories still firmly under Ottoman control, Syrian Christians were drawn to the new opportunities the new British intrusion into Egypt's administration appeared to offer. Many espoused a *laissez-faire* approach that suited their own commercial pursuits and endeared them to the British, but a significant few saw socialism as a way to progress that might avoid further divisiveness between religious confessions. By espousing socialism, intellectuals gained the advantage of distance from the very western policies making Egypt's economy a satellite of Europe's. Donald Reid sketched the literary contributions of three of these Syrians in Egypt, plus the seminal work of one Egyptian disciple who was a Copt.

In the first two decades of the twentieth century, novels and newspaper articles presented socialism, both in its western formulation and in ways suited to the region's needs. One recurring theme was an emphasis on gradual, democratic transition to socialism; in Farah Antun's novel *al-Din*, revolution yielded self-immolation, not progress. Doubtless, as members of a minority, they recognized vulnerability in any outbreak of hostilities, or recognized the oddity of stressing class struggle in a pre-industrial culture. By 1908, Sibli Shumayyil was promoting a socialist party advocating government wage control, public health, education, and provision of jobs for the unemployed. Niqula Haddad authored one of the earliest books on socialism, but even his 1920 monograph made cursory mention of the Bolshevik Revolution. The revolutionary angle received more attention in the work of Salamah Musa, whose 1913 pamphlet *al-Ishtirakiyah* is often accounted the first "book" in Arabic dedicated to the topic. Musa was more an activist than his Syrian counterparts, traveling to Europe to meet with Marxists, honing his understanding of Marxist tenets, and eventually helping found a socialist party in 1920. He was jailed often for his activities, but lived long enough to see Egypt embrace socialism after the century's mid-point.

World War I was pivotal in shaping Arab relations with the West, both in the hopes dashed

by the creation of the mandate system and in how Arab thinkers began to relate to socialism and its communist sibling after the Bolshevik Revolution. Even as the understanding of Marxist principles gained depth, proponents of socialism grounded their espousal ever more on Islamic foundations. Flirtation with communism's adamant secularism proved too unsettling both for Arab intellectuals and for the masses. Alongside nationalism – especially as manifested by pan-Arab nationalism – Islam was the great shaper of socialism in the Middle East, soon able to voice differentiation from the Marxist version.

Interest in Bolshevism appeared in most new Arab politics after expectations of independence were dashed by Britain and France. Arab frustration with failures of liberalism and constitutionalism, however, did not suffice to introduce another western ideology. In addition, the mandate powers had enough leverage in their positions to use local institutions to suppress Bolshevik activity. As an option limited mostly to a small group of intellectuals, the early communist parties had little influence, remaining still a *quantité négligeable* in one historian's estimation. The Egyptian Socialist Party, which soon became the Egyptian Communist Party, was founded in 1921 and demonstrates the above points. Bankrolled by the heir to a cotton-exporting fortune, the Egyptian communists had pledges of support from 22 of Egypt's 30 trade unions, leading to the formation of the first Egyptian Federation of Workers, which had 40,000 members during its brief lifetime.

Working with the Third International in Moscow, Egyptian communists joined efforts at a worldwide general strike in 1923, but they had also secured approval from the International to abandon the strike if Egypt's new, nominally independent government requested an end to such participation. The government made such a request, and the Federation complied, save for workers in three Alexandria factories who were dislodged by force. While the 1923 government took little repressive action, the following year's government, operating more under British direction, banned the party and made all communist activity illegal. Hosni El Orabi, who financed the party, was jailed for five years. He tried publishing a socialist journal afterwards, but the government shut down the operation after six months. According to one of Arab socialism's

proponents, the 1930s saw socialist activity in the Arab world “almost at a standstill.”

If activism was stymied, however, intellectual consideration of socialism’s fitness for the Arab-Islamic world was not. The great theorist of Arab nationalism, Shaqib Arslan, wrote: “[I]f Islam has socialist principles, it has no connections with communism and therefore cannot be Bolshevized in the meaning known to Russia.” Still, he and other leading voices did see good reasons why Arabs and Bolsheviks could cooperate: “The Bolsheviks appear as the enemy of the states of imperialism who are hostile states to all the Islamic world.” But the commonality of interests had its limits. Rashid Rida outlined his stance in 1919: “The Muslims wish for the success of the socialists, success which would abolish the slavery of peoples – all of them are workers – even as they rebuke them as they rebuke others for all that is contrary to the Islamic law.” The appeal of the Bolsheviks, according to Arslan, was in their call “to liberate the weak.” That call was more to Arslan than just an anti-imperialist slogan, but was an appeal for the poor, including those of the Islamic world, to be freed from abuse by the rich, including rich Muslims. School texts which appeared in the 1920s and 1930s presented these ideas to students across the Middle East. The 1930s also saw the redaction of al-Afghani’s essays on socialism that argued the inherently socialist nature of Islam.

The discontent against the imperialism of the western powers entailed much self-examination as Islamic thinkers countered western charges that Islam was inherently defective and retarded the economic and societal development of its faithful. Not surprisingly, this led some Muslim apologists to embrace socialism as a framework for their opposition; by itself, however, socialism as propounded in the West could not answer the accusations. Al-Afghani was only one voice who noted modern socialism’s creation in negative circumstances and eschewed the call for class conflict. On the other hand, socialism as embodied by Islam was presented as a positive call to action, a call incumbent on all good Muslims, and a complete system of social justice long before Marx.

The most daring statement of this position was probably that of Bandali Jawzi, who wrote the first wholly Marxist analysis of Islam’s foundation by the Prophet. Little noticed at the time of its publication in 1928, Jawzi’s *Min Tarikh*

al-Harakat al-Fikriyyat fi’l-Islam (The History of Intellectual Movements in Islam) has since garnered the Palestinian author more attention in the latter twentieth century. Analysis of his work stressed that he did not view Islam as “essentially socialist”; instead, he argued that wherever societies attempted socialist programs, one finds the purist manifestations of Islam. In Jawzi’s interpretation, “social solidarity” was a primary goal of Islam, and Muhammad had struck at the economic inequity which prevented this. The Prophet, however, had not attacked property *per se*, but instead the acquisition of property when that pursuit meant disadvantaging others. Muhammad’s balancing act in this matter was not so skillfully followed by his political heirs as the Islamic community saw much poverty and injustice propagated by public authorities. For that reason, Jawzi expressed a wish that Muhammad had abolished private property. In the rest of his analysis, Jawzi looked at several groups, most notably the Isma’ilis and their associates, the Qarmatians, as examples of socialist principles enacted within Islamic settings. He attributed the longevity of each group to socialist principles and their demise to interference by external foes. The emphasis once again was on consensus, not on raising class consciousness to the point of creating strife within the Islamic community.

SEE ALSO: Egypt and Arab Socialism; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Paris Commune, 1871; Syria and Iraq, Baathists

References and Suggested Readings

- Dawn, C. E. (1988) The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 20, 1 (February): 67–91.
- Hanna, S. (1967) Al-Afghani: A Pioneer of Islamic Socialism. *Muslim World* 57: 24–32.
- Hanna, S. & Gardner, G. (1969) *Arab Socialism: A Documentary Survey*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Kerr, M. (1968) Notes on the Background of Arab Socialist Thought. *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, 3 (July): 145–59.
- Reid, D. M. (1974) The Syrian Christians and Early Socialism in the Arab World. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5, 2 (April): 177–93.
- Sonn, T. (1985) Bandali al-Jawzi’s *Min Tarikh al-Harakat al-Fikriyyat fi’l-Islam*: The First Marxist Interpretation of Islam. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17, 1 (February): 89–107.

- Tibi, B. (1986) Islam and Modern European Ideologies. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 18, 1 (February): 15–29.
- Wahba, M. M. (1990) The Meaning of *Ishtirakiyah*: Arab Perceptions of Socialism in the Nineteenth Century. *Alif: Journal of Contemporary Poetics* 10: 42–55.

Aracaré (d. 1542)

Stefan Thimmel

Aracaré, a chief of a tribe of the indigenous Guaraní in the actual state of Paraguay, was the first and one of the most important leaders who resisted the Spanish conquistadors in the sixteenth century. In 1542 Aracaré and approximately 800 Guaraní people guided Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca in his expedition to find the mystic kingdom of Peru with all the promised gold and treasures. However, the famous cacique only pretended to lead the conquerors to the Promised Land, instead going upstream the Rio Paraguay. Contrary to other representatives of the Guaraní, he realized early that his people would have to suffer under the regime of the Spanish Corona. So during the expedition more and more Guaraní scouts disappeared and the Spanish lost themselves in the impermeable jungle. Aracaré utilized the situation to attack the troops of Cabeza de Vaca, and the desperate Spanish soldiers had to withdraw and abort the expedition. Shortly afterwards there was a second expedition, but the recruited Guaraní once again only presumed to guide the conquerors; in effect they were leading them to regions where the cacique Aracaré commanded his fellowships. They got lost and they were attacked by the chief's men. For Cabeza de Vaca, Aracaré became the main enemy. Finally Aracaré was caught by the Spanish troops and at the end of 1542 he was hanged. This led to the first real rebellion of indigenous people in the Paraguayan territories (1543), led by Tabaré, Aracaré's brother.

SEE ALSO: Caonabo (d. 1496); Cuauhtémoc (1502–1525); Hatuey (ca. 1400s–1512); Jumandí (d. 1578); Lempira (d. 1537); Tisquesuza (d. 1537); Túpac Amaru (ca. 1540–1572)

References and Suggested Readings

- Roulet, F. (1993) *La resistencia de los Guaraní del Paraguay a la conquista española*. Posadas: Editorial Universitaria.

Arafat, Yasser (1929–2004), Fatah, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

Lawrence Davidson

Yasser Arafat was born in Cairo (this is disputed; some sources say Gaza and others say Jerusalem) on August 24, 1929. He was the youngest of seven children of a well-to-do merchant family. His mother died when he was five years old and his father sent him to live in the house of his maternal uncle in Jerusalem. At the time, Palestine was controlled by the British under the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine. The 1930s saw growing Arab rebelliousness against British rule and Arafat's place of residence was raided by British troops. This incident constituted one of his earliest memories.

At the age of nine or ten, Arafat was sent to Cairo to live in the home of his eldest sister. By 1946, at the age of 16, he was fully aware of the dire situation faced by the Palestinian people. They had lost their national patrimony and faced the threat of cultural extinction. He was politicized to the point that he was aiding in the smuggling of weapons into Palestine. These weapons were used by the growing resistance movement to British rule and Zionist immigration. During the 1948 war Arafat joined the resistance forces in the Gaza Strip. After the resistance was defeated by Zionist forces, Arafat returned to Egypt where he attended the University of Faud I (later Cairo University). There he became involved with the Muslim Brotherhood and served as president of the Union of Palestinian Students from 1952 to 1956. In 1956 he graduated with a degree in Civil Engineering. That same year he served with the Egyptian army in the Suez War, again experiencing defeat at the hands of the Israeli army.

It was after the Suez War that Arafat left Egypt and moved to Kuwait. There he worked as a civil engineer in the Kuwait Department of Public Works and eventually established his own contracting company. His business thrived; however, Arafat's heart was still with the Palestinian movement for national liberation and he used much of

his income to support that cause. His ongoing political activism led him to help form Al Fatah (conquest) in 1958. Fatah stood for the Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine and identified itself as a revolutionary movement in the line of other third world movements of the day, such as those in Cuba and Vietnam. On the other hand, Fatah tended to stand apart from that revolutionary tradition by purposely not adopting any specific political ideology. This is particularly true in reference to the prevailing Arab ideologies of the time (Nasserism, Baathism, Islamism, etc.). To tie the movement to one or another of these would make entanglement in inter-Arab rivalries inevitable. Thus, Fatah adhered strictly to the generic, non-ideological goal of liberating Palestine mainly by the actions of Palestinian Arabs. Over the next six years Arafat helped build Fatah into a network of underground groups trained and armed for guerilla war against Israel. Then, in 1964, he left Kuwait to serve as one of the leaders of that effort.

Fatah was initially backed by the government of Syria. The organization pledged a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of host countries as long as they reciprocated by practicing non-interference towards the Palestinian movement. Initially Fatah sought to launch its “fedaayin” raids into Israel from Lebanon and Jordan, as well as from Syria. Since this was before the 1967 war, Fatah’s concentration was on pre-1948 Palestine and not what are now known as the Occupied Territories. There was no lack of volunteers for military operations against Israel from this generation of Palestinian refugees. As a 1959 issue of Fatah’s underground journal, *Filastinuna*, stated, “The youth of the catastrophe are dispersed . . . life in the tent has become as miserable as death . . . to die for our beloved Fatherland is better and more honorable than life.” Therefore, the organization fought for the rights of the original 1948 refugees which would be restored through the eventual transformation of Israel, a state first and foremost for Jews, into the secular democratic nation of Palestine wherein all citizens, regardless of religion or ethnicity, had equal rights. In this sense, Fatah’s political goals were and continued to be Western in orientation.

Yet this was not the aspect of Fatah that caught the public’s attention throughout the Middle East or made Arafat and his lieutenants into popular heroes. It was their willingness to

challenge Israel militarily and, on occasion, hold their own against much greater odds. This was demonstrated in the Battle of Karameh in March 1968. Karameh was a town in Jordan not far from the Jordan River border with Israel. In 1968 the town served as a military staging area for armed incursions into Israel. The Israelis eventually launched an invasion of the town but were fought to a standstill by Fatah forces. The Jordanian army eventually intervened and the Israelis withdrew under a Jordanian artillery barrage. The withdrawal of the superior Israeli forces was characterized as a victory for Palestinian fighters and was a great boost in morale for the Palestinian refugee population. Fatah also attacked civilian targets within Israel (its very first raid was an attempt to sabotage Israel’s National Water Carrier project) that earned Fatah and other Palestinian resistance groups the label of terrorists in the Western media. Arafat struggled in vain against this image. He once observed: “Those who call us terrorists wish to prevent world public opinion from discovering the truth about us and from seeing the justice on our faces. They seek to hide the terrorism and tyranny of their acts, and our own posture of self-defense.” It is a historical fact that in struggles against occupation and colonization the violence of the oppressed usually rises to the level of the violence of the oppressor. Thus, it is in the struggle in Palestine that the brutality of the occupier gave rise to the terrorism of the occupied. Yet American audiences in particular were never given this reality in sixty years of media reporting.

In 1964, some six years after Fatah was organized, the Arab League, at the behest of Egyptian President Nasser, created the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO, created as an umbrella organization for the increasing number of small Palestinian resistance organizations then appearing, was designed to channel the restiveness of the Palestinian refugees into an organization that could be controlled by the Arab regimes. The elites which led these states, particularly those that bordered on Israel, understood that the Palestinians had the potential to provoke an unwanted war with the Zionist state. This meant that up until 1967, Fatah and the PLO were rivals for the loyalty of the Palestinians; the PLO received official backing from the Arab regimes, while the independent stand of Fatah earned it mounting hostility. Increasingly, its operations had to be launched

clandestinely. After the Israeli victory in the Six Day War of 1967, it was clear that the Palestinians could not rely on the Arab states for their liberation. Fatah was able to take over the PLO by 1969, when Yasser Arafat became chairman of the organization's executive committee. At that point Arafat was recognized not only regionally, but also internationally, as the leader of the Palestinian struggle for justice.

As we will see, that struggle has gone through a great number of hardships and reversals; however, Arafat did achieve great initial successes in non-military areas. The PLO position was that, if the struggle for national liberation was to be long and hard, the organization must organize the refugee population to improve their living conditions in the refugee camps where many of them now resided. With the financial aid of the wealthy Arab states of the oil rich Persian Gulf, Arafat and the PLO created a social welfare system that looked after the health, education, and general welfare needs of hundreds of thousands of people. This was part of a process of institution building that would mimic those of an established state. It also helped the PLO to become recognized worldwide as representing the rights of all Palestinians.

The fact that Fatah and the PLO had no territorial base they could truly control seriously limited its military effectiveness and proved a standing threat to its independence. This can be seen when, in 1970, the Palestinian resistance organizations based in Jordan were attacked by the Jordanian army. This was the so-called Black September incident. King Hussein of Jordan claimed that the Palestinians were acting as a "state within a state" (in Jordan) and provoking war with Israel. In a short but bloody war, the PLO was pushed out of Jordan. Arafat moved the organization to Lebanon. In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon and forced Arafat and the PLO into exile in Tunisia (and thus far from any border with Israel).

Events took yet another turn in 1987 with the outbreak of the first Palestinian Intifada (shaking off). While Arafat and the PLO did not initiate this rebellion (it began spontaneously), it did bring both back into the Palestinian struggle. From his office in Tunis, Arafat encouraged, supplied, and popularized the Intifada, directing it when and where he could. It was the ongoing nature of the Intifada that forced the Israeli government, for the first time, to negotiate directly with

Arafat. This led to the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. The Accords called for mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO.

One of the remarkable consequences of the Oslo Accords was that they allowed for the return of Yasser Arafat and his organization to Palestine. But they did not bring peace. In many ways the Accords were dependent on the will of the leadership of both parties to carry them through in the face of domestic opposition. Only Arafat could do this for the Palestinians. He was easily elected President of the Palestine National Authority in national elections held in January 1996. In April of that same year Arafat was able to amend the Charter of the PLO, removing from it the clause that called for the destruction of Israel. However, his Israeli counterpart at the time, Yitzhak Rabin (whom Arafat always referred to as his "partner in the search for peace"), proved unable to reciprocate. The Israeli opposition to Oslo was so intense that it led to Rabin's assassination by a right-wing Jewish fanatic in December of 1995. It was a sign of Israeli popular intentions that in the national elections that followed the hardline conservative Benjamin Netanyahu came to office. Israeli adherence to the Oslo Accords then began to erode.

In the years that followed, Yasser Arafat continued to struggle for a settlement with Israel that would give the Palestinian people a viable state under conditions of peace and justice, now voluntarily restricted to the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. What he got from a continuous line of Israeli governments was intensified and illegal colonialism, as Jewish settlements were built rapidly on confiscated Palestinian land. When, in 2000, US President Bill Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, meeting at Camp David, tried to pressure Arafat into accepting Israeli territorial encroachment, the Palestinian President had the fortitude to refuse. From that time on, both Israeli and American policy aimed at undermining Arafat's leadership of the Palestinian National Authority. In 2004 Arafat fell ill under mysterious circumstances. Many Palestinians believe he was poisoned by agents of the Israeli government. He died in a French military hospital on November 11 of that year.

SEE ALSO: Black September; Intifada I and Intifada II

References and Suggested Readings

- Aruri, N. (1995) *The Obstruction of Peace: The US, Israel and the Palestinians*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
- Gowers, A. & Walker, T. (2005) *Arafat: The Biography*. London: Virgin Books.
- Khalidi, R. (1997) *Palestinian Identity*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Said, E. (1995) *Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process*. New York: Vintage.
- Wallach, J. (1997) *Arafat: In the Eyes of the Beholder*. London: Citadel Books.

Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán (1913–1971)

Dima Zito

Jacobo Guzmán Arbenz was president of Guatemala from 1951 to 1954. After implementing democratic and economic reforms, he was overthrown by a CIA-organized coup d'état and replaced by a military dictatorship.

Jacobo Arbenz was the son of a Guatemalan mother and a pharmacist who had immigrated from Switzerland. He pursued a career in the Guatemalan army and taught history and science at the Guatemalan Military Academy. In 1939 he married a Salvadorian immigrant, Maria Cristina Villanova Castro, who had contacts with left-wing activists and who influenced Arbenz toward socialist ideas and opposition to the military dictatorship of Jorge Ubico.

In 1944 a growing movement of teachers, students, and skilled workers demanded democratic reforms. After the killing of more than 200 demonstrators by the army, Ubico lost support and passed power to General Francisco Ponce, who announced elections to gain public backing. The presidential candidate of the democratic opposition was Dr. Juan José Arevalo Bermeja, an exiled professor. As Arevalo was to be arrested on returning to Guatemala, Arbenz and other young officers organized a military rebellion. On October 20, 1944, they killed their superiors and distributed arms to Arevalo's supporters. Ponce and Ubico had to leave Guatemala. This "Guatemalan October Revolution" was the beginning of the decade of the "Democratic Spring."

Arbenz was a member of a provisional junta that prepared the country's first free elections, which were won by Arevalo in March 1945.

Arbenz became defense minister. A new constitution was enacted, and democratic and labor rights were strengthened. The main opponent of the reform agenda was the US enterprise United Fruit Company. It controlled the country's only port, the electric power company, the railway, and the telegraph system. Under the Ubico dictatorship, United Fruit had become Guatemala's largest landowner with 550,000 acres and had received dispensation from taxes. To preserve these interests, several coups against the Arevalo government were attempted.

At the elections of 1951, Jacobo Arbenz became president with 65 percent of the vote. His political program was to develop Guatemala to a modern capitalist state with economic independence. In his inaugural speech Arbenz promised "an agrarian reform which puts an end to the latifundios and the semi-feudal practices, giving the land to thousands of peasants, raising their purchasing power and creating a great internal market favorable to the development of domestic industry" (Schlesinger & Kinzer 1982: 59). A port, a hydroelectric plant, and a highway to the Atlantic coast were built by the government, and a new tax system was introduced.

The agrarian reform was enacted in June 1952. Through this program, 1.5 million acres, uncultivated portions of large plantations, were expropriated and distributed to about 100,000 landless peasant families, and 46 farms were given to cooperatives. The disappropriated landowners were compensated according to the worth of the land claimed in the May 1952 tax assessments. As United Fruit cultivated only 15 percent of its land, more than 386,901 acres were expropriated from it.

On the initiative of United Fruit, the so-called "Operation Success" was planned. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, CIA director Allen Dulles, shareholders with close ties to the company, organized the coup. A "liberation army" of mercenaries was built up, commanded by the Guatemalan officer Carlos Castillo Armas and trained by CIA member Rip Robertson in Nicaragua and Honduras. The CIA started a disinformation campaign against Arbenz's "communist tyranny," distributing articles and pamphlets which contained false information. The Guatemalan government learned of the CIA activities and asked the UN Security Council for help. The US government stated falsely that the conflict was a Guatemalan

civil war. Arbenz tried in vain to buy weapons for the defense of his government in western countries. He ultimately purchased Czechoslovak weaponry, which arrived in May 1954 on board a Swedish vessel, which was presented as a proof of Arbenz's Soviet links. A CIA-run radio station started transmitting in May 1954, jamming Guatemalan national radio. It called in vain for a popular uprising, announcing the arrival of the "liberation army." Guatemalan military commanders were paid by the CIA to surrender. Finally, Arbenz ordered the distribution of weapons to popular organizations, and Ernesto Guevara also participated in the failed attempt to organize militias.

In June 1954 Guatemalan cities were bombed by CIA planes, and Arbenz became convinced that there was no longer any chance of resisting the invasion. On June 27, 1954, he announced his resignation over the radio and sought refuge in the Mexican embassy.

Castillo Armas was installed as president and Arbenz's reforms were taken back. All opposition newspapers, political parties, trade unions, and peasant organizations were forbidden. In the following weeks, thousands of Arbenz's supporters were arrested on charges of communist activity. Many of them were tortured and killed. This was the beginning of more than four decades of military dictatorship and scorched earth policy with more than 200,000 deaths.

Arbenz sought exile, going to Mexico, Switzerland, France, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Uruguay. Following the Cuban Revolution he was invited to live in Cuba. After the suicide of his daughter Arabella in 1965, he returned to Mexico. On January 27, 1971, Jacobo Arbenz died under suspicious circumstances in his bath tub. He was buried in El Salvador. In 1995 his remains were brought to Guatemala.

SEE ALSO: Guatemala, Democratic Spring, 1944–1954; Guatemala, Popular Rebellion and Civil War; Guatemala, Worker Struggles and the Labor Movement, 1960s–1990s

References and Suggested Readings

- Alfonso, J. M. (1969) *Guatemala: Subdesarrollo y violencia* (Guatemala: Underdevelopment and Violence). Madrid: IEPALA.
- Asturias, M. A. (1956) *Week-end en Guatemala*. Buenos Aires: Losada.
- Black, G. (1984) *Garrison Guatemala*. London: Zed Books.

Informationsstelle Guatemala (Ed.) (1982) *Guatemala. Der lange Weg zur Freiheit* (Guatemala. The Long Way to Freedom). Wuppertal: Peter Hammer Verlag.

Schlesinger, S. & Kinzer, S. (1982) *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*. New York: Doubleday.

Arch, Joseph (1826–1919)

Stacy Warner Maddern

Joseph Arch is considered one of the key figures in the development of British trade unionism because of his efforts to help organize England's agricultural laborers. Born in 1826 in Barford, Warwickshire, Arch was the son of a farm laborer who later became a Primitive Methodist preacher. In the early 1870s, when farm laborers in the southern and central areas of England began protesting low wages and harsh working conditions, Arch came to their aid by creating the National Agricultural Labourers' Union (NALU).

The NALU came up against a landed aristocracy that wielded a great amount of power and influence. Arch held that the rich were bent upon treating those who worked the land no differently from the animals that grazed it. Citing the position of the rich, the land belonged to the rich man and the poor man had no part nor lot in it. As such, the poor had no sort of claim on society. Arch criticized the rich for censoring the needs of the poor and demoralizing them with a starvation wage.

In 1872 the organization had a membership of 86,000 despite immense hostility from the landowners and farmers, who claimed that unions were just another communist challenge of the existing social system. However, by 1874, after a prolonged strike, the NALU suffered from depleted funds and decreasing membership. By the 1880s the NALU was struggling to survive, and morale among workers and their interest in building a strong union began to wane. Arch turned his attention to politics and in 1885 served the first of several terms as a Liberal member of parliament (1885–6, 1892–1900) representing a Norfolk constituency. As the first agricultural laborer to be elected to parliament, Arch utilized his influence to benefit farm workers by securing legislation with the 1885 Redistribution

Act, which granted agricultural laborers the right to vote.

In 1888, the labor force was rejuvenated by the London dock workers' strike, which led to record numbers of organized unions in Great Britain. In 1896, the NALU formally collapsed, but in 1906 it reorganized in Norfolk as the Eastern Counties Agricultural Labourers and Smallholders' Union. In 1910 it changed its name to the National Agricultural Labourers and Rural Workers' Union before becoming the National Union of Agricultural Workers (NUAW) in 1920. By 1964, the NUAW had a stronghold over the agricultural sector in Norfolk, Lincolnshire, and Dorset, where it held a membership of 90 percent of all agricultural workers in those regions.

SEE ALSO: Britain, Trade Union Movement; Combination Laws and Revolutionary Trade Unionism; Reform Bills, Britain, 1867 and 1884; Thompson, Edward Palmer (E. P.) (1924–1993)

References and Suggested Readings

- Arch, J. (1898) *The Life of Joseph Arch by Himself*. London: Hutchinson.
- Hamish, F. (1999) *History of British Trade Unionism, 1700–1988*. New York: Palgrave.

Arendt, Hannah (1906–1975)

James M. King

Born in Hanover, Germany, Hannah Arendt was a German Jewish political theorist of nationalism and revolution who was eventually forced to flee her home country due to the rise of National Socialism, an exile prompting her to direct her efforts toward combating totalitarianism.

During her university years Arendt was uninterested in contemporary political issues, and in 1926 attended her first Zionist lecture by Kurt Blumenfeld, in Heidelberg. While frustrated with the lack of political awareness, she did not immediately become a Zionist.

Arendt's initial political activity was allowing use of her apartment as a hideout or form of Underground Railroad to house communists and other opponents of the Nazi regime. In spring of 1933, Zionists asked Arendt to participate more actively. She was sent to the Prussian State

Library to collect materials on the anti-Semitic activity of non-governmental organizations. These documentary materials were to be examined at the 18th Zionist Congress and distributed to the foreign press, which had no ready access to such materials. After collecting much material Arendt and her mother were arrested and held for eight days before fleeing for France.

Arendt's political activity continued while in France, working as a secretary for *Agriculture et Artisanat*, overseeing the contributions that the Baroness Germaine de Rothschild made to Jewish charities, and acting as director of the Paris branch of the *Youth Aliyah*, a Jewish organization that rescued thousands of Jewish children from Nazi Germany. In May 1940 Arendt was sent to Gurs internment camp, although she soon escaped, and fled to New York City, where she found work as a columnist for *Aufbau*, a German-language newspaper. Arendt used her position at *Aufbau* to advocate her political positions, specifically her stance on the need of a Jewish army. In 1944, Arendt became research director for the Conference of Jewish Relations and the Commission on European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, which sought to reclaim the lost cultural treasures of European Jewry.

Several of the articles Arendt produced during the 1940s were incorporated into her first major publication, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951). The book examines the contribution of anti-Semitism and imperialism to totalitarianism. Total terror did not cease once individuals were deprived of their public lives, as tyrannical terror did; nor when the opposition was eliminated, as revolutionary terror did. Totalitarian terror thrived once the political opposition was eliminated, turning on the innocent, and thereby continuing endlessly.

Seeking to prevent rather than analyze this evil, Arendt turned her focus toward human action, which totalitarianism must destroy to maintain power. In *The Human Condition* (1958), Arendt describes the three fundamental activities – labor, work, and action – that she believes compose the *vita activa*, the active life.

Arendt attended the trial of the Nazi Adolf Eichmann in 1961 to better understand the impetus behind totalitarianism's destruction of action and, ultimately, of people. At the trial, Eichmann maintained that he was never anti-Semitic nor willed the murder of human beings. His guilt came from obedience that was praised

as a virtue under Nazism. He contended that his virtue was abused by Nazi leaders and he was a victim and “only the leaders deserved punishment.” Indeed, Arendt claimed that Eichmann did not have a radically evil core or motivation that fueled his monstrous actions, but a banal evil that was perpetrated by his thoughtless obedience.

While Arendt depicted this bleak picture of horrendously evil actions committed from obedience rather than an evil motivation, she continued to have hope for future generations. In her work *On Revolution* (1963), Arendt described revolution as the act of foundation for a public realm. She singled out the American Revolution, in contrast to the French Revolution, as a model that placed authority in the foundation itself, as Rome had done and as states should do. This foundation, i.e., the US Constitution, was achieved through the conditions that Arendt constantly reiterated as necessary for the creation of a public realm – free deliberation and debate.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776; Germany, Resistance to Nazism; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Jewish Resistance to Nazism; Zionism

References and Suggested Readings

- Arendt, H. (1968) *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. New York: Viking.
- Arendt, H. (1979) *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace.
- Arendt, H. (1998) *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Arendt, H. (2005) *Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954*. Ed. J. Kohn. New York: Schocken Books.
- d’Entrèves, M. P. (1994) *The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt*. London: Routledge.
- Villa, D. R. (1999) “*Terror and Radical Evil*.” *Politics, Philosophy, Terror: Essays on the Thoughts of Hannah Arendt*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Young-Bruehl, E. (2006) *Why Arendt Matters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Argentina, armed struggle and guerilla organizations, 1960s–1970s

Pablo Augusto Bonavena

There is a long history of armed struggle in defense of popular interests in Argentina. One of

its first antecedents can be found among *colonos*, agricultural immigrant workers in the Santa Fe province in 1893. As the poor saw themselves hurt by the tax burden, *colonos* rose in arms against the authorities, an event that paralleled the creation of the Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical, UCR) – a political party that still survives. Another early case of armed action was carried out by anarchist groups at the beginning of the twentieth century, with the street executions of police chief Ramón Falcón (1909) and of Colonel Héctor Benigno Varela (1923) – both condemned for leading bloody repression against workers’ protests. These attacks were carried out respectively by Simón Radowitzky (1891–1956) and Kurt Gustav Wilkens (1886–1925). Another important anarchist figure was Severino di Giovanni (1901–31), who promoted direct actions such as bank robberies and bombing state buildings. After being arrested, Di Giovanni was executed. These libertarian experiences with armed struggle accompanied the formation of the working class and the trade union movement in Argentina.

Years later, in 1946, elections made Perón’s Partido Justicialista (Justicialist Party) the governing party. Peronism, an ideology embodied by the populist nationalist class alliance led by Juan Domingo Perón (1895–1974) and dominated by industrialist bourgeois groups, framed working-class social, economic, and political conquests. It materialized in, among other things, the idea that trade unions would relinquish the right to strike, in exchange for which the state would assume the role of negotiator between conflicting interests.

In 1955, Perón was overthrown by a pro-imperialist bourgeois faction in a military coup d’état (dubbed the *Revolución Libertadora*), which installed a dictatorship. From that moment, several organizations were exiled, including many Peronist parties. With all institutional paths to political participation closed and with workers’ gains under threat, armed actions resumed in order to gain a place within the repertoire of workers’ protest and popular struggle. Small groups of militants (*commandos*) emerged spontaneously from Peronist bases, carrying out sabotage and sometimes even attacks with explosives, thereby corroding the legitimacy of the *de facto* government. These groups supported workers’ strikes, and some of them accompanied a civic-military Peronist uprising in June 1956 led

by retired Generals Juan J. Valle and Raúl Tanco, which was supported by some army units and subordinate military personnel. The attempt was crushed and 27 military and civilian participants were executed.

Peronist commandos seeking the return of Perón, who was living in exile in Spain, were active until approximately 1960. One of their last appearances occurred during that year, when a group of left-wing Peronist youth attacked a guard post at the airport in Ciudad Evita, Greater Buenos Aires. Even though these groups were unable to coordinate their campaigns effectively, they gained sympathy among workers and became a reference for their struggles.

In order to defuse the situation, the military dictatorship of General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu (1903–70) once again violated the constitution in 1958 by calling for restricted elections, outlawing Peronism and many other leftist groups, a practice that continued until Arturo Illia's overthrow by another military coup in 1966.

The impossibility of participating in elections was the context for the emergence of the first guerilla organization in Argentina. The Peronist Liberation Movement–Army of National Liberation (Movimiento Peronista de Liberación–Ejército de Liberación Nacional), known as Uturuncos (Tiger-Men), settled in the hills of the Tucumán and Santiago del Estero provinces. The group operated between October 1959 and June 1960, when the group disbanded as a result of repression. Its members were Peronist commandos led politically by John W. Cooke and militarily, it is believed, by Spanish anarchist Abraham Guillén (1913–93). The group demanded Perón's return to government and the return of the trade union headquarters (which had been seized by the military dictatorship) to the workers of the General Confederation of Labor (Confederación General del Trabajo, CGT).

The second guerilla manifestation also had a rural character. Towards the end of 1963, the People's Guerilla Army (Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo, EGP) settled in the area of San Ramón de la Nueva Orán in the province of Salta. Unlike previous guerilla experiments, this one was related not to Peronism but to the Cuban Revolution and its continental strategy. Its militants included Cubans and youths who had left the Communist Party of Argentina (Partido Comunista Argentino, PCA) after its reformist

turn. The group was rapidly dismantled by the Gendarmería (border guards).

The first attempt to organize an urban guerilla campaign was made in 1963 by the Armed Forces of the National Revolution (Fuerzas Armadas de la Revolución Nacional, FARN), a split from the Trotskyite organization Workers' Word (Palabra Obrera, PO), which expressed its support for armed actions in 1961 under the influence of the Cuban Revolution. The FARN group also sought to install a rural *guerilla foca* (small cell of guerillas in the countryside), but its main leaders died accidentally in 1964 while making a bomb.

In June 1966 a new military coup d'état, known as the *Revolución Argentina*, ended the cycle of limited democracies. The military sought to end the political crisis initiated by the overthrow of Perón by reorienting the economy in favor of concentrated capital. Paradoxically, the dictatorship's economic and repressive policies ended up by mobilizing large groups of resistance among workers and students, giving rise to widespread political radicalization. Considerable sectors of the working and middle classes, especially the student movement and Christian activists, formed a massive force that took to the streets to resist the dictatorship, incorporating the use of direct violence as an everyday instrument of combat in clashes with the police.

With these developments, the impulse toward new guerilla organizations gained vitality. The impact of the Cuban and Chinese revolutions, in addition to the anti-imperialist struggles in Indochina, further reinforced such determination. In this way, national events combined with events worldwide fueled support for the use of violence in political struggles.

Groups coming out of the PCA and the Argentine Socialist Vanguard Party (Partido Socialista de Vanguardia, PSAV) created the Army of National Liberation (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) in support of the *guerilla foca* launched by Ernesto "Che" Guevara in Bolivia. In 1970, joined by other leftist groups, it founded the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, FAR). The ELN's first public appearance consisted of taking over the city of Garín in the province of Buenos Aires, although the group had been in existence since 1969 when it carried out actions against 13 grocery stores of the American chain Minimax in repudiation of Nelson Rockefeller's

visit to Argentina. The group ended up by growing closer to and vindicating Peronism.

In 1968 a rural *guerrilla foca* was sent to Taco Ralo in the Tucumán province by a small group of Peronist activists. Having only meager means at their disposal, its members were rapidly captured by the police; however, they reappeared later under the name of the Peronist Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas, FAP). Comando Descamisados (Shirtless Commandos), another Peronist guerilla group, appeared the following year, targeting Peronists who were judged traitors by the group. By 1969, urban armed struggle and guerilla activity began to escalate rapidly. That year, important worker and student uprisings took place in Córdoba and Rosario. Spontaneous armed struggle, including sabotage, incendiary and explosive attacks, the use of homemade arms, and the use of snipers, accompanied the uprisings.

After 1969, violence gained increasing legitimacy as a means to confront the military dictatorship, generating an intense debate among popular and leftist groups regarding strategies and tactics, while politicization grew among worker and youth vanguards. Different insurgent forces combined military actions with political and union activities that appealed to the people. Support for armed struggle did not involve terrorist methods; rather, when the military called for elections to reestablish the constitutional system, several organizations actively participated in electoral campaigns.

In April 1969, when a commando captured a guard post in the army facilities of Campo de Mayo, the Armed Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación, FAL) were born, with militants coming from the Communist Party and other groups evolving out of it. At the same time, the Popular Commandos of Liberation (Comandos Populares de Liberación, CPL) also came into existence, created by Peronists and Marxists who sought to integrate their political traditions. Similar initiatives steadily expanded after 1970; new organizations, both Peronist and Marxist, proliferated and gained political momentum.

On May 29, 1970, the Montoneros, a leftist Peronist guerilla group with Catholic affiliations, made its first public appearance by kidnapping and executing ex-President Aramburu, one of the most virulent enemies of Perón who had taken part in his overthrow. Absorbing several

preceding guerilla groups, the Montoneros soon became the most important political and military organization in the country. Its program, with a populist basis, defended what it called *socialismo nacional*, arguing for the need to acknowledge the Peronist identity and Perón's leadership. The Montoneros mostly developed as an urban guerilla organization, with rural guerillas only in areas where it had a presence through the Christian Agrarian Leagues (Ligas Agrarias), especially in the province of Chaco.

Also in 1970, at its Fifth Congress, the Combatant Workers' Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores El Combatiente) founded a guerilla group, the People's Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo, ERP), and immediately began military operations "for the construction of socialism." Its main leader, Mario Roberto Santucho (1936–76), was the most important political figure of the Argentinian left. The creation of this guerilla group was endorsed by the Secretariat of the Fourth International, led among others by Livio Maitan (1923–2004) and Ernest Mandel (1923–95), which promoted the formation of guerilla organizations in all Latin American countries. Even though its actions were mostly urban, ERP also created a rural guerilla force in Tucumán's jungle areas.

By 1971, the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Argentina (Partido Comunista Marxista Leninista Argentino, PCMLA) was created. With a Maoist orientation, the party advocated armed struggle, but only implemented it in 1975 with a modest group of militants that carried out a few attacks and kidnappings. Toward the end of 1973, the Communist Workers' Power Organization (Organización Comunista Poder Obrero, OCPO) emerged out of the fusion of small Marxist groups; its guerilla groups were called Red Brigades (Brigadas Rojas).

In different ways, all of these organizations were linked to the popular force that developed after 1969, enjoying significant support among various sectors of the population.

As the confluence of mass and guerilla actions confronted the military dictatorship, the regime responded by reopening the electoral system and legalizing Peronism in an attempt to separate the popular sectors and the working class from the revolutionary vanguards. The move was partially successful, as many organizations split over the call for elections. The Montoneros were part of

the Justice Liberation Front (Frente Justicialista de Liberación, FREJULI) electoral alliance that won the elections in 1973, and a few of its members secured positions in the government and Congress. Between May 25, 1973 and March 1976, democratic institutions were in place. Perón returned to the presidency after 18 years in exile, but part of the popular military organizations continued their struggle. After the elections the Montoneros carried out their actions mostly through normal institutional channels, until they eventually distanced themselves from Perón, whose policies failed to progress toward the proposed social reforms. On September 6, 1974, the group again went underground by announcing its return to armed struggle.

Repression against the guerillas was headed by Perón himself, using both legal and illegal means. Perón condoned the clandestine action of paramilitary organizations such as the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (Alianza Anticomunista Argentina, AAA), which murdered revolutionary militants from different organizations. Illegal repression mounted after Perón's death on July 1, 1974 and reached a whole new level after the coup d'état of the military junta on March 24, 1976. The military dictatorship of *El Proceso* (National Reorganization Process) implemented a policy of direct and clandestine extermination of members of all political and military organizations, as well as of all the other popular groups that threatened the status quo. The result was the massacre of thousands of popular, socialist, and democratic militants. During the dictatorship, which lasted to the end of 1983, guerilla groups were totally disorganized. Only the Montoneros attempted a counteroffensive in 1979, but it cost many lives and achieved few political results.

With the return of democracy, armed struggle declined. The most prominent action was an attempt to capture the Mechanic Infantry Regiment 3 in La Tablada, in Buenos Aires province, on January 23, 1989. The action was carried out by the All for the Fatherland Movement (Movimiento Todos por la Patria), a group holding mixed socialist and nationalist ideas and containing former members of ERP. Most of the assailants were killed, "disappeared," or arrested.

Various small guerrilla groups came and went in later years, including: Tendencia Revolucionaria, Brigada Che Guevara, and Frente de

Resistencia Popular, although their actions were barely noticed. Of more salience was the Marxist Revolutionary Armed Organization of the People (Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo, ORP), created in 1992, which carried out actions against several banks and attacked and seriously injured medical doctor Jorge Bergés, known as the "Argentinian Mengele" for his role in torturing prisoners during the last military dictatorship. One of the group's main political goals was to fight against the laws of impunity. All of these groups were quickly suppressed.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Argentina; Argentina, *Semana Roja*, 1909; Argentina, Socialist and Communist Workers' Movement; Cordobazo and Rosario Uprising, 1969; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Ezeiza Protest and Massacre, 1973; Guevara, Ernesto "Che" (1928–1967); Madres de la Plaza de Mayo; Peronist Resistance

References and Suggested Readings

- Antognazzi, I. (1997) La lucha armada en la estrategia política del PRT-ERP (1965–1976). *Revista Razón y Revolución* 3 (Winter). Available at www.razonyrevolucion.org/textos/revryr/luchadeclasses/ryr3Antognazzi.pdf (downloaded July 1, 2001).
- Bonavena, P. et al. (1995) *Orígenes y desarrollo de la guerra civil en Argentina: 1966/1976*. Buenos Aires: Oficina de Publicaciones del Ciclo Básico Común de la Universidad de Buenos Aires.
- Brunetto, L. (2007) *14250 o paro general*. Témperley: Estación Finlandia.
- Caviazca, G. (2006) *Dos caminos: ERP y Montoneros en los '70*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones del Centro Cultural de la Cooperación.
- Dias, M. (1978) *La guerra en la Argentina*. Lisbon: A Regra do Jogo.
- Gallo, E. (2007) *Colonos en armas: Las revoluciones radicales en la provincia de Santa Fe*. Argentina: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
- Gillespie, R. (1982) *Soldados de Perón: Los Montoneros*. Buenos Aires: Grijalbo Editor.
- James, D. (1999) *Resistencia e integración*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana.
- Löbbe, H. (2006) *La guerrilla fabril*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Razón y Revolución.
- Lofredo, J. (1996) Herejes y alquimistas. Grupos radicalizados en la Argentina. *Revista Nueva Sociedad* 146 (November/December). Caracas.
- Marín, J. C. (1996) *Los hechos armados. Argentina 1973–1976: La acumulación primitiva del genocidio*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones PICASO/La Rosa Blindada.
- Pozzi, P. (2001) *El PRT-ERP. La guerrilla marxista*. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
- Pozzi, P. & Schneider, A. (2000) *Los setentistas*. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.

- Pucciarelli, A. (Ed.) (1999) *La primacía de la política: Lanusse, Perón y la nueva izquierda en tiempos del GAN*. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
- Seoane, M. (1991) *Todo o nada: La historia secreta y la historia pública del jefe guerrillero Mario Roberto Santucho*. Buenos Aires: Planeta Bolsillo.
- Werner, R. & Aguirre, F. (2007) *Insurgencia obrera en Argentina (1969–1976): Clasismo, Coordinadoras Interfabriles y estrategias de la izquierda*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones del Instituto del Pensamiento Socialista Karl Marx.
- Zamorano, E. (2005) *Peronistas revolucionarios*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Distral.

Argentina, general strike (*Semana Trágica*), 1919

Eduardo Sartelli

Semana Trágica, or “tragic week,” refers to the workers’ insurrection that took place in Buenos Aires in January 1919. The term alludes to the bloody outcome of the event, which shook Argentine society and briefly transported it to the climate of the Russian Revolution. The events of the *Semana Trágica* need to be framed in the international and local dynamics of class struggle. At the local level, they begin with the 1916–17 successful strike of the Maritime Worker Federation (FOM), the union of coasting trade ships workers, and ends with the 1921 failed general strike. At the international level, *Semana Trágica* inscribes itself in the revolutionary wave by cutting across a significant part of the world, in particular under the influence of the Russian and German revolutions. Looking at the phenomenon from the standpoint of economic and social trends, the period framing the event includes the economic and social crisis following World War I. In that juncture, between 1916 and 1921, wages fell, unemployment was more than 20 percent of the economically active population, and immigration came to an end.

From a political perspective, the events of January 1919 were determined by the development of bourgeois democracy, installed in Argentina after the 1912 Sáenz Peña Law established secret and universal male suffrage. Seen in the context of proletarian history, the event inscribes itself at the crossroads of the exhaustion of anarchism and the emergence of a trade union bureaucracy, the first represented by FORA V (Argentine Regional

Workers’ Federation of the Fifth Congress), and the second by FORA IX (the worker Federation arising from the Ninth Congress).

Semana Trágica began on January 7, 1919 and ran until January 13. The epicenter was located in the warehouses of the Vasena Workshops in Barracas, the main metal factory of the period and one of the largest companies in the country, with more than 2,000 workers. The workers were on a strike demanding a salary rise, a reduction of the workday from 11 to 8 hours, no work on Sundays, and the reincorporation of union delegates fired as a result of the strike. The triggering episode leading to the metal worker general strike was the death, at the hands of the police, of four workers who tried to prevent strike breakers from entering the plant. The next day the two FORAs decide to extend the general strike to the entire nation, beginning on 9 January with almost 100 percent compliance. The Vasena plant was surrounded by anarchist forces while FORA IX negotiated with the management defended by dozens of private police. Meanwhile, serious episodes took place, especially in the passing of the funeral cortège accompanying the dead workers to the cemetery and escorted by a formation of a hundred armed workers. On their way to the cemetery, several workers were assaulted and killed upon entering a church. Protestors broke into gun shops to take arms, but there were no other thefts from other stores. At 5 p.m. the cortège arrived in the cemetery of Chacarita, where the massacre restarted: posted on the cemetery’s walls, the police and firefighters shot at the multitude indiscriminately without the armed worker guard being able to do much. Estimates of workers’ deaths range from 12 to 50.

After the cemetery’s massacre infuriated the strikers, shootings took place throughout the city of Buenos Aires, especially in the vicinity of the Vasena workshops, where the workers successfully confronted the police until the 3rd infantry regiment took control of the situation. At dusk, shootings were widespread. The number of the dead on January 9 ranged from 40 to 100, according to different sources.

On January 10 railway workers from FOF (Railway Worker Federation) joined the general strike on account of the Vasena Company’s reluctance to acknowledge the negotiations began by FORA IX with the government. The strike of maritime and railway workers had Buenos Aires paralyzed and isolated from the rest of the

country. Anarchist propaganda reigned in the streets, seeking to give the strike a wider content. The same day, the police and the Liga Patriótica, or patriotic league, a paramilitary Fascistoid organization, attacked and destroyed the printing facilities of *La Protesta*, the newspaper of anarchist FORA. In the rest of the country a large number of strikes gave a sense of the extension of the movement, which matched a general strike declared in Montevideo. Fighting between anarchist workers and the police helped by the Patriotic League took place throughout the day and resulted in the deaths of several workers. Children also participated in the struggle, throwing stones at public lighting to be able to operate safely in the night. Some 500 workers attacked a police station to free their imprisoned fellow workers.

In the meantime the government surrounded the city of Buenos Aires with the army and forced Vasena to accept the workers' demands to prevent the further expansion of the strike. FORA IX accepted and decided to lift the strike, yet in practice the federation's workers rejected the decision and continued carrying out actions, overall under anarchist influence. January 10 ended with 50 more workers dead. On January 11 the strike continued throughout the country, with strengthened repression from the police and the Patriotic League, especially in the Once neighborhood, where synagogues were attacked and members of the Jewish community beaten up and even shot, leaving behind a considerable number of dead.

Anarchists became increasingly isolated under the pressure of both "novenarios" (members of FORA from the Ninth Congress) and members of the Socialist Party to lift the strike, which in any case they continued until January 13, as the unions involved did not want to abandon the struggle until achieving their specific goals. More attempted assaults on police stations took place, but the movement rapidly declined. The persecution of union leaders, especially anarchists, became a priority for the government from then on. An assessment of casualties on January 14 ranged around 700 dead and 2,000 wounded, as reported by *La Vanguardia*, the newspaper of the Socialist Party, to the 100 dead and 400 wounded acknowledged by *La Nación*, the newspaper of the Argentine aristocratic bourgeoisie. The number of those arrested during and after the events is difficult to establish, but different anarchist sources count between 20,000 and 50,000.

After the *Semana Trágica*, which many choose to remember as *Semana de Enero*, the January week, to stress the component of the struggle instead of just the repression marking the episode, the union movement continued on the rise until the mid-1920s, a rise that placed FORA IX at the head of the working class throughout the whole of Argentina. FORA V also expanded yet to a lesser degree. From the end of 1919 and during the 1920s, however, workers met increasing resistance among managers, and their main private war machine, the Patriotic League. Strikes followed throughout the provinces, many of which ended in massacres, such as the strike of forest workers in the Northeast, the strike in Patagonia, Tres Arroyos, and Jacinto Aráuz. There was a sense among the workers that the trust in President Hipólito Yrigoyen expressed by FORA IX behind a curtain of "apoliticism" would be fatal for the movement. A claim for a general strike to force the government to disarm the Patriotic League, to derogate repressive laws, and to free political prisoners began. Finally, the general strike took place in June 1921, ending in a complete failure, with all its leaders – even those from FORA IX – being taken to jail. This 1921 defeat closes the cycle of struggles that had peaked during the *Semana Trágica*.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Argentina; Argentina, Labor Strikes of 1890 and 1902; Argentina, *Semana Roja*, 1909; Argentina, Worker Strikes in Patagonia, 1920–1921

References and Suggested Readings

- Bayer, O. (1974) *Los vengadores de la Patagonia Trágica*. Buenos Aires: Galerna.
- Bilsky, E. (1984) *La Semana trágica*. Buenos Aires: CEAL.
- Godio, J. (1986) *La Semana trágica de enero de 1919*. Buenos Aires: Hyspamérica.
- Rock, D. (1984). *El radicalismo argentino, 1890–1930*. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu.
- Romariz, J. (1952) *La semana trágica*. Buenos Aires: Hemisferio.

Argentina, general strike, 1975

Eduardo Sartelli

The general strike of June–July 1975 incribes itself in the most intense period of class struggle in Argentina, a period which begins with Cordobazo (1969) and ends with the military coup

of March 24, 1976. The strike belongs to the last revolutionary wave of the twentieth century, which begins with the Cuban Revolution and ends with the revolution in Nicaragua (1979). In Argentina, this particular event marked the highest point of revolutionary struggle led by the industrial working class, with the arrival of revolutionary tendencies to the industrial belt of greater Buenos Aires, which until then had been isolated from the processes taking place elsewhere in Argentina. The strike was led by organizations of the “new” left (Trotskyites, Guevaristas, Maoists) together with the Peronist left (Montoneros), thus displacing the hegemonic peronist union bureaucrats. The movement led to the demise of Celestino Rodrigo, the minister of economy in the government of President Isabel Perón, and his furious plan of economic adjustment called *rodrigazo*. It also led to the resignation (and fleeing the country) of José López Rega, minister of social welfare and main organizer of the paramilitary squads of the Triple A (Argentine Anti-communist Alliance), which were responsible for dozens of political murders. The general strike of June–July 1975 marks the end, then, of the peronist experience.

Perón, removed from office through a military coup in 1955, controlled Argentine politics in exile. He could not, however, return to the country until political conditions were favorable. It was the social and political crisis of the time, a product of Argentina’s stagnation, that gave him this opportunity. From his exile, Perón played both with the right and the left, promoting himself especially in his party’s youth. With them and with other moderate sectors he attempted to control the unions which were trying to organize a “peronism without Perón.” The dictatorship of General Onganía (1966–9) provided this possibility to some union leaders, especially to Augusto Vandor, the leader of Unión Obrera Metalúrgica, at the time the most important union in Argentina.

The support of leftist youth helped Peron also to harass the military in power, especially General Agustín Lanusse, the successor of Onganía after General Levingston’s brief term in office. This is how from peronism an experience of intense militancy opened up to progressively acquire leftist tones as well as a remarkable capacity to mobilize. Cordobazo, the famous worker-student insurrection in Córdoba city, marked the beginning of Perón’s

offensive against his political enemies, a process in which a number of leftist tendencies and organizations converged in the context of a worsening economic crisis.

Once in power, Perón needed to contain inflation. He organized the Pacto Social, through which union bureaucrats committed themselves for two years to avoid strikes and to accept frozen wages. In exchange for their support, union bureaucrats were favored with a law of Professional Associations sanctioned by Congress at the end of 1973, which recognized only one union for each productive sector, allowed the intervention of unions’ local and regional chapters, gave union leaders power to force the mandates of grassroots representatives of Comisiones Internas de fábrica (factory councils) to expire, and extended the tenure of union leaders from two to four years.

The agreement in June 1973 set an objective limit to claims regarding wages, and led to the rise of workers’ demands for improvements in their conditions of labor, requests to reincorporate workers who had been fired, and demands for new forms of representation. These struggles led to tensions and confrontation with union bureaucrats.

Three months before the expiration of the Social Pact, in February 1975, the bureaucrats began preliminary talks with the government to reopen salary negotiations that had been suspended in the context of the Pact. On May 12, 1975, the minister of economy Gómez Morales set a limit of 25 percent for salary raises, while the unions asked for 40 percent. This conflict led to the fall of the minister and his gradualist policies. On June 2 the new minister of economics, Celestino Rodrigo, took office and announced a series of shock measures, *el Rodrigazo*, consisting of a strong devaluation, an increase in tariffs and gas prices, and absolute price deregulation, which resulted in a brutal, unseen inflationary escalation. Salary negotiations were interrupted against a background of strong mobilization; the Confederación General del Trabajo (the national union confederation) obtained 100 percent salary rises. Defeated, the government delayed confirmation of the agreements with the unions, only to announce its withdrawal on June 25.

Both in the city of Buenos Aires and in greater Buenos Aires the crisis led to assemblies, strikes, workers abandoning their posts, and mobilizations around union headquarters, the CGT, and the Casa Rosada presidential palace. Street assemblies

were also organized, such as that on June 17 in Puente Pueyrredón by General Motors workers from Barracas and San Martín, and Chrysler workers from Monte Chingolo, to whom the police tried to prevent access to the city of Buenos Aires and CGT headquarters. In this context, on June 24, Unión Obrera Metalúrgica leaders saw themselves forced to mobilize 25,000 metal workers in the Plaza de Mayo to put pressure on the government. The CGT had to call a strike with mobilization for June 27 in the Plaza de Mayo.

The day after the general strike the first Plenary of Unions, Internal Commissions, and Bodies of Delegates in Struggle took place with the goal of addressing three topics: the analysis of *paritarias* (joint boards of employers and employees) by unions, the defense of salaries, and the recuperation of unions for the workers. The government's announcement of the non-confirmation of wage agreements – known that day – triggered the struggle. On July 1, Ford workers from Pacheco, workers from the Tigre and San Fernando Shipyards, COMETARSA, and of Dálmine Siderca from Campana, Mercedes Benz workers from Isidro Casanova, from General Motors in San Martín and the city of Buenos Aires, Chrysler workers from San Justo and Monte Chingolo, from Fiat in Caseros and Citroën in the city of Buenos Aires, carried out an on-site strike. Protests, mobilizations of all kinds, and confrontation with the police took place daily. In this context, a movement for the coordination of grassroots factory delegates emerged. On June 4 the CGT attempted to set a limit to workers' activism, and announced a 48-hour strike without mobilization, to be held on 7 June, which gave the government time to confirm the (previously rejected) agreements before being forced to do so as a concession to the workers. The government thus confirmed the agreements.

The *Coordinadoras* made their appearance between May and June 1975 and lasted until the March 1976 military coup. These organizations played a key role in convoking and mobilizing against Celestino Rodrigo's economic program, which peaked with the great strikes of June and July 1975. In both the city of Buenos Aires and greater Buenos Aires the struggle against union bureaucrats pivoted on two elements: regaining control over the organs of representation of the class (bodies of delegates and internal commissions) and debate over the conditions of production. There thus arose a new grassroots

leadership in countless factories: Astilleros Astarsa, Ford, Indiel, Philips, Bagley, General Electric, Molinos Río de la Plata, Zárate-Brazo Largo, Petroquímica Mosconi, Frigorífico Minguillón, General Motors, etc. Union bureaucrats were caught by surprise and were overwhelmed by a movement arising from the base.

The mobilizations of June–July 1975 had a decisive impact on Argentine politics, with the apparent outcome of the government's confirmation of collective agreements over salaries and the estrangement of both López Rega and Rodrigo. The inter-factory coordinators continued in activity in the months following the general strike. In March 1976 the (minister of economy) Mondelli Plan triggered a new wave of protests, which saw a rise in the activity of the coordinators, a development that was interrupted by the military coup. Because of the strike, the chief concern of the military moved from the activity of guerillas to factory activists, who would be symptomatically called “factory guerillas.” It is from this sector that most of the workers who were made to “disappear” by the military dictatorship of El Proceso would come from.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Labor Unions and Protests of the Unemployed, 1990s; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967); Madres de la Plaza de Mayo; Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s; Peronist Resistance; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- Colom, Y. & Salomone, A. (1998) Las coordinadoras inter-fabriles de Capital Federal y Gran Buenos Aires, 1975–1976. *Razón y Revolución* 4, Otoño de 1998.
- Cotarelo, M. C. & Fernández, F. (1998) Lucha del movimiento obrero en un momento de crisis de la sociedad: Argentina, 1975–76. *Razón y Revolución* 4, Otoño de 1998.
- Lobbe, H. (2006) *La guerrilla fabril*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones ryr.
- Milagros no hay* (2003) Film documentary directed by Gabriela Weber.

Argentina, grassroots workers' movement: Villa Constitución, 1975

Agustín Santella

The military government of Argentina (1966–73) lost support after the popular revolts of Cordo-

bazo and Rosaríazo from May to September 1969. Popular sectors increasingly opposed the government's authoritarian political and economic measures that benefited concentrated transnational industrial capital. Since 1969, grassroots union organizations had challenged the inaction of the CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo), rejecting "bureaucratic" unions eager to negotiate with management. Workers' radicalization was nurtured by a new generation of youth who took inspiration from the path of armed struggle of the Cuban, Chinese, and Vietnamese revolutions. The elites allowed Juan Perón, labeled a "populist," to return to government after 18 years of proscription (1955–73). Nevertheless, not even the democratically elected Peronist administration could stop social mobilization, despite its many attempts to contain it through both reforms and repression. After 1973, Perón's government exercised armed violence against Marxist subversion with the goal of disciplining youth organizations (especially in universities) and workers (in unions). In 1976, a new military dictatorship closed the cycle of social mobilization through the bloodiest repression in Argentine history, with tens of thousands of *desaparecidos*.

After the 1950s, investments had led to the industrialization of Villa Constitución, on the Paraná River, 250 kilometers northeast of Buenos Aires. The implantation of big factories offering high salaries attracted internal migrants. Between 1960 and 1970, the population grew by 42 percent, while the national growth rate was 13 percent. In 1960, 23 percent of the Argentine population was rural; in 1970, the proportion had dropped to only 3 percent. In Villa Constitución, the district center, where the majority of metal workers lived, the population reached 25,148.

Metal sector industries consisted of a few large transnational companies: Acindar, Marathón, Metcon (supplier to Ford), and Villber. Acindar led the sector with a workforce of 3,500. The company had close ties with the Argentine military industrial elite, so much so that the company's president from the early 1970s, Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, became the neoliberal minister of the economy for five years from 1976. One of the ten most important companies in Argentina, Acindar made metal parts for the construction sector and the automotive industry. In its plant, the most powerful sector of the Argentinian working class – the Peronist Unión Obrera

Metalúrgica (UOM) – started a movement of rebellion. Before 1970, levels of participation in UOM-Villa Constitución were low.

Accompanying what was happening elsewhere in Argentina at the time, a strike began to change the passivity of Villa Constitución. In December 1969, delegates opposed to UOM's national leadership presented a list of demands regarding labor conditions and salaries. With the support of union leaders, Acindar fired the activists. In response, the workers went on strike until March, when demoralization and isolation defeated them. Even though activists accepted monetary compensation for retirement, they went back to struggle for UOM's local chapter. In January 1973, the tactic finally paid off: most of Acindar's elected delegates joined the leftist opposition. In Argentina's trade union system, workers could choose factory section delegates who in turn chose an Internal Commission by plant. In Acindar, grassroots delegates voted for opposition leader, Alberto Piccinini, who obtained 53 votes against 23 for the official union candidate.

With 50 percent of the vote, on March 11, 1973, Peronism won its third presidential election (the previous ones were in 1946 and 1952). Massive worker support for Peronism legitimized the position of the local UOM leadership. However, the problems that had led to the strike in 1970 were still unresolved. The legal rights of entire factory sections were not recognized, and union members did not enjoy health services like those of other sections. Their union dues, administered by the central union board, were never returned to the union's local office. In addition, the national UOM leadership denied Villa Constitución's union affiliates the right to hold elections. Thus, the victory of the leftist opposition in Acindar, plus the growing chances of a coalition to win the local chapter, became unbearable for UOM's national leadership.

In this context, on March 7, 1974, union representatives entered Acindar proclaiming that there were communists there, and that it was the duty of every single Peronist to vote for Peronist delegates. The plant workers received them with boos. In retaliation UOM fired 11 activists, triggering what was called *el Villazo*, or a major movement of protest in town. The workers decided to go on strike for an indeterminate time to protest the firings and to support democratization of the union. The strike extended from Acindar to

the Marathon factory, where workers occupied the factory premises. Worker committees elected in assemblies took hostages among the management and threatened to blow up the factory if there was any police or other form of violent repression. The occupation was supported by the city's population. The wives of metal workers organized a Women's Committee and the strike became general, comprising workers from all metal factories as well as workers in textiles, the port, railways, trade, and the food industry.

The strength of the mobilization forced President Perón to intercede on behalf of the workers. In the agreement, approved by an assembly of 5,000, union elections were decided for the UOM chapter of Villa Constitución. On March 16, 12,000 people celebrated in the main local square. The *Villazo* became a symbol of the new anti-bureaucratic workers' union struggles, as well as a focus of attention in national politics. In November, the Lista Marrón group, incorporating grassroots delegates and leftist activists, obtained 2,636 votes, substantially more than the 1,473 votes cast for the Lista Rosa group representing the traditional UOM leadership.

Over the following three months, the new UOM leftist leadership expanded the number of union affiliates, organized the local CGT, and fought for labor demands (for example, achieving a reduction in the workday to six hours for dangerous factory jobs). At the beginning of 1975, just before the national round of negotiations, the new leadership advanced radical proposals.

The rise of the new union leadership in Villa Constitución took place amidst intensifying efforts by both the government and the traditional union leadership to control the grassroots. Tactics included reforms centralizing union structure as well as a campaign of illegal violence with state sponsorship. Claiming to have discovered a "subversive plot" to "paralyze the nation's industrial capacities," the government implemented a surprise operation against Villa Constitución. Starting at dawn on March 20, 1975, security forces arrested more than 300 local union activists and almost the entire local UOM leadership in town. These arrests led metal workers to call an indefinite strike. During the first week, the workers occupied the plants. Surrounded by police, they had to abandon the occupation only to reorganize and mobilize from the neighborhoods where they lived with their families. Over 60 days, the strike mobilized

a significant part of the population in solidarity with the workers. The strike was deeper and more violent than the 1974 *Villazo*. The UOM national leadership supported repression by paramilitary squads, both politically and morally. Workers suffered 46 armed actions, with a total of 14 violent actions by guerillas in support of the strikers. During the strike 15 activists were murdered, and another 13 were killed later under the military dictatorship. Most members of Villa Constitución's UOM leadership were detained until 1981, while others managed to go into exile.

The 1970s workers' rebellion in Villa Constitución needs to be examined as part of the post-World War II trade union struggle between bureaucracy and democracy. Because of the strong centralization that accompanied union growth after 1946, there was little renovation of union leadership. Under Peronism, internal union conflicts confronted political identities, while the left disputed Peronist loyalties. The specialized literature discusses the dynamic of opposite identities in the mobilization of workers in light of E. P. Thompson's concept of experience. M. C. Cangiano draws on the "linguistic turn" to argue that the experience arose through a new class language in Villa Constitución's revolutionary mobilization. A. Andujar studies workers' radicalization and focuses on their social rather than linguistic experience. A third perspective arising from the sociology of conflict examines the dynamics of struggle between actors in antagonistic relations. Even though the general implications of the case remain contested, Villa Constitución shows that political violence in Argentina during the 1970s indeed expressed deep social confrontations.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Armed Struggle and Guerilla Organizations, 1960s–1970s; Argentina, General Strike, 1975; Cordobazo and Rosario Uprising, 1969; Thompson, Edward Palmer (E. P.) (1924–1993)

References and Suggested Readings

- Andujar, A. (1998) *Combates y experiencias: las luchas obreras en Villa Constitución (1974–1975)*. *Taller. Revista de Sociedad, Cultura y Política* 3 (6). Buenos Aires: Asociación Sociedad, Cultura y Política.
- Brennan, J. P. (1998) *Peronism and Argentina*. Wilmington, DE: SR Books.
- James, D. (1988) *Resistance and Integration: Peronism and Argentine Working Class 1946–1976*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Marín, J. C. (1996) *Los hechos armados. La acumulación primitiva del genocidio. Argentina 1973–1976*. Buenos Aires: La Rosa Blindada.

Argentina, Grito de Alcorta Peasant Rebellion, 1912

Horacio Tarcus

In June 1912, in Alcorta in the province of Santa Fé, a group of farmers declared a rural strike that became known as the *Grito de Alcorta* and extended to other Argentinian provinces. The farmers were small family producers, many of them immigrants, who rented the land they worked under extremely onerous conditions, paying landowners, colonial companies, or large commercial corporations (such as Dreyfus and Bunge & Born) between 34 and 50 percent of their production. They were also responsible for threshing, packing, and leaving the produce at the train station.

According to the terms of their lease, tenants were forced to buy everything from food to clothes and tools at company-owned grocery stores and warehouses and to sell landowners their surplus, which was then resold in the stores. They had to use their own threshing machines and buy bags, seed, and even insurance from the landowners. Contracts forbade farmers from keeping pigs or other farm animals; they even had to fight locusts themselves, in addition to maintaining streets and roads. The leases had to be renewed yearly, and tenants could be evicted if they failed to comply with any of the clauses.

Nevertheless, the definitive trigger of the *Grito de Alcorta* was the poor harvest of 1910 and the fall in the international price of cereals, while the rent, fixed in an earlier period of economic prosperity, remained high. The first clandestine meetings of farmers took place in the basement of an *almacén*, or local store, in mid-June 1912. A few days later, on June 17, in an assembly held at the Sociedad Italiana de Socorros Mutuos in Alcorta, about 300 farmers declared themselves on strike until further notice. The meeting gathered on the initiative of the farmers of Alcorta; they were led by Francisco Bulzani, and the group enjoyed support from local priests José and Pascual

Netri, as well as from small shop owners in the area. Socialist lawyer Francisco Netri, the priests' brother, played a notable role in the assembly, writing a new lease for the farmers and insisting that they "organize their own autonomous union."

The new terms of the lease established a reduction of 25 percent in the harvest included as payment, changed the location of payments from the local train station to the farms themselves, extended the term of the contracts from one to four years, and freed the farmers to rent machines and tools from any company, not necessarily from those of their landowners. A strike committee was designated.

The movement was supported from the beginning by anarchist-led unions of dockers and craftsmen and spread throughout the *pampa gringa*, a region populated by immigrants, to the corn-growing areas of southern Santa Fé and Córdoba as well as to the provinces of Entre Ríos and Buenos Aires. As the strike continued to grow, the idea that farmers needed to organize themselves gained force. Finally, on August 15, at the Sociedad Italiana in Rosario, Santa Fé, the Argentine Agrarian Federation (Federación Agraria Argentina) was born. Its first vice-president was Antonio Nogueras, an anarchist of Catalan descent.

Landowners and the police reacted with virulence to both the strike and the organization. In a political meeting held in Firmat, Santa Fé, anarchist agrarian union leaders Francisco Menna and Eduardo Barros were murdered, while lawyer Francisco Netri was killed in Rosario. In the Argentine Congress, socialist representatives Juan B. Justo and Alfredo Palacios defended the farmers' demands, protesting the repression of the workers and interpellating the agriculture minister. In addition to the initial support of anarchists and socialists, the cause of the rural strikers gained new adherents among priests, small shop owners, professionals, and wide popular sectors. Facing the possibility of considerable economic losses, landowners slowly began to make concessions and by mid-1913, in the context of an improved harvest, most tenants had obtained a significant reduction in their lease.

Even though the *Grito de Alcorta* did not transform the unequal structure of Argentinian landownership, it helped to achieve some improvements and led to the creation of the Argentine Agrarian Federation, a group that has



An estimated two million anti-war protesters in London demonstrate on February 15, 2003, an international day of protest against the impending invasion of Iraq. Over the weekend of February 15–16, approximately 12 million protesters in more than 800 cities across the globe participated in rallies, marches, and civil disobedience. This was the largest mass protest in history. (REUTERS/Stephen Hird)

of Iraq. Four US citizens who had lost family members in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks came to Baghdad and spoke out against war.

On February 15–16, 2003, approximately 12,000,000 people around the world participated in the global day of action against the approaching invasion of Iraq. Marches, rallies, vigils, civil disobedience actions, and other anti-war activities occurred in more than 600 cities in about 75 countries. As many as 3,000,000 people marched in Rome and other Italian cities. More than 1,000,000 rallied in Barcelona, and several hundred thousand protested in Madrid. As many as 1,000,000 joined the London demonstration organized by STWC, and as many as 500,000 took to the streets in Berlin and Paris. Hundreds of thousands of people marched in Dublin, Athens, and other European cities. More than 500,000 marched in Sydney, Melbourne, and other

Australian cities. This global day of action was the largest mass protest in history and a historically unprecedented demonstration of international solidarity against war.

On March 14, several million workers in Spain, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland stopped work at midday in an anti-war action called by the European Trade Union Confederation. The following day, another wave of internationally coordinated anti-war protests swept across the planet. About 1,000,000 people gathered in Madrid, and about 500,000 assembled in Barcelona. Over 400,000 joined a demonstration in Milan organized by the General Italian Confederation of Labor. In other cities across Europe, North America, the Middle East, and Asia, hundreds of thousands of people participated in anti-war marches and rallies. On March 17, four members of the Catholic Worker movement entered a military recruiting center in Ithaca, New York and poured their own blood on the walls, windows, posters, and the US flag in the office.

On March 20, 2003, when the US invasion of Iraq began, new protests erupted around the world. In Greece, a four-hour general strike virtually paralyzed the country, and as many as 500,000 people took to the streets in Athens and other cities. Daily anti-war protests continued in Greece for several weeks. In Italy, the three largest labor unions organized a two-hour general strike, and hundreds of thousands of workers joined with students leaving high schools and colleges for demonstrations in several cities. More than 300,000 protested in cities across France. Riot police in Geneva fired rubber bullets at students marching on the US mission to the United Nations. Hastily organized demonstrations took place throughout the US and Canada. In San Francisco, thousands of protesters engaged in civil disobedience actions; within three days, more than 2,300 were arrested. In Melbourne, over 40,000 protesters brought traffic to a standstill in the first of four days of anti-war actions. Demonstrations also took place in Palestine, Lebanon, the Philippines, Indonesia, and dozens of other countries.

By mid-April, as US-led military forces consolidated their control of much of Iraq, the global anti-war movement began to decline. In the weeks and months that followed, peace actions continued to occur in dozens of countries, but their frequency, size, and intensity steadily diminished. In May, activists attending peace conferences

since gained political significance in the country. On June 12, 1920, the Federation subscribed to the Pacto de San Pedro, an agreement to collaborate with FORA (Federación Obrera de la Región Argentina), an anarchist workers' organization. According to the terms of the pact, each Federation would keep its own specific field of action but would work in parallel for a similar objective, to put the land and the means of production in the hands of the workers themselves and abolish capitalism's and landowners' arbitrary expropriations.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Argentina; Argentina, General Strike (*Semana Trágica*), 1919; Argentina, Labor Strikes of 1890 and 1902; Argentina, *Semana Roja*, 1909; Argentina, Socialist and Communist Workers' Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- García, J.-M. (1972) *El Campo Argentino a 60 Años del Grito de Alcorta*. Buenos Aires.
- Grela, P. (1958) *El Grito de Alcorta. Historia de la revolución campesina de 1912*. Rosario: Tierra Nuestra.
- Solberg, C. (1971) Rural Unrest and Agrarian Policy in Argentina, 1912–1930. *Journal of International Studies and World Affairs* 13 (1): 18–52.

Argentina, human rights movement

Horacio Tarucus

Argentina's long history of human rights movements began in the early twentieth century with activists linked to leftist political movements. Socialist lawyers defended working-class leaders who led protests and demonstrations, while anarchists and syndicalists demanded the release of anarchists Simón Radowitsky, Sacco and Vanzetti, and the "Bragado prisoners," among others. The Pro-Prisoners Committee in the 1920s and the 1930s, the Red Socorro and its successor, the Argentine League for the Rights of Man, were inspired by communists and the more ecumenical Permanent Assembly for Human Rights.

In the late 1970s organizations such as the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo were born in the core of civil society without any direct links to political parties. To understand the emergence of the latter, the starting point is the military coup

of March 24, 1976, which overthrew the weakened Peronist government of Isabel Martínez, Juan Domingo Perón's widow. A military Junta, formed by members of the three armed forces, placed itself in power, shutting down Congress, suspending political life, dissolving political parties and leftist organizations by decree, intervening in trade unions, and declaring a state of emergency. It named its own government Proceso de Reorganización Nacional, setting as its goals the "annihilation of subversion" as well as the economic, social, and labor reorganization of the country, while declaring that the political process would be reopened and elections called once the country was "normalized."

What distinguished the 1976 military dictatorship from other similar dictatorial experiences in Argentina which, as in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, and 1966, had limited themselves to deposing a government and sending its supporters to prison, was the scope of its repression as much as its peculiar methods. The 1976 military dictatorship of El Proceso not only sought to depose the Peronist government, but it also transformed the economic and social structure of the country in such a way as to dislocate the industrial and urban centers that had produced and reproduced the Peronist working class. While crushing leftist armed organizations that defied the power of the state and the armed forces (especially the Peronist Montoneros and the guevarista Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo), the dictatorship also attacked the social and cultural roots of the "new left" among students, artists, intellectuals, and wide sectors of the population by imposing a true regime of terror.

The government intervened in universities, dissolved student governments, shut down publishing houses, banned hundreds of books, and hunted down leftists, as had previous military regimes. Yet the distinct trait of the 1976–83 Argentine military dictatorship was state terror in a systematic policy of persecution of "subversives" (a loose category that included armed combatants, union and student activists, leftist sympathizers, and relatives and friends of activists), who were kidnapped, tortured, stripped of their property, and in most cases also murdered, with their remains either being thrown into the sea or buried in common graves as "N.N."

Tens of thousands of detainees, tortured and kept clandestine, were too many for police

stations. Thus, about 350 clandestine centers of detention were set up throughout the country. One of the best known and most ominous was ESMA, the Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. With the families of the disappeared actively looking for them in police stations, prisons, courts, and state offices, detainees received the juridical label of *desaparecidos* or “disappeared.” The corpses of the victims were never returned to relatives. Human rights organizations estimated the number of detainee-disappeared as 30,000, adding the victims of the military dictatorship to those of the paramilitary squads during 1974 and 1975. The method of forced disappearances created a climate of terror and uncertainty among the civilian population.

The mothers of many detainee-disappeared, tired of traveling fruitlessly to police and military offices to inquire about their children’s whereabouts or filing *habeas corpus* in court, began meeting in the Plaza de Mayo in front of the Casa Rosada (the president’s headquarters) from Thursday, April 30, 1977. The initiative was taken by Azucena Villaflor de Devinenti, who invited other mothers she had met on her journey through different state offices to gather peacefully in front of the Casa Rosada to request an interview with General Jorge Rafael Videla, Argentina’s *de facto* president. From then on, the mothers met every Thursday. In the first weeks, there were only 14 of them, later joined by others. When security forces asked the mothers to move along, as the state of siege made any meeting of people illegal, they decided to march in circles around the Mayo Pyramid in the center of the plaza. The mothers recognized each other by the white handkerchief on their heads, which eventually turned into a symbol that traveled around the world.

As the mothers embraced values understood as belonging to Christian traditionalism, the military dictatorship never dared openly to attack the movement, who embodied a deeply rooted sensitivity that as women, no obstacles should prevent them from protecting their offspring. However, the Mothers were maligned in the media (who called them “the madwomen of the Plaza”), threatened, suffered persecution, and even disappeared themselves. By late 1977 Navy Captain Alfredo Astiz had infiltrated the Mothers organization and kidnapped several members, including French nuns Alice Domon

and René Leonnie Duquet, following a secret meeting at Santa Cruz Church in the *porteño* neighborhood of San Cristóbal. Two days later, Azucena Villaflor was taken from her home.

Despite this blow, the movement of the Mothers persisted, marching around the Plaza de Mayo. During the 1978 Soccer World Cup in Argentina, Mothers gained international recognition when cameras captured their Thursday rounds. The following year, the visit of the OAS Interamerican Human Rights Commission contributed to raising international awareness of the serious situation in Argentina. Such recognition was reinforced when Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, leader of a human rights group resisting the military dictatorship, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

After the Argentine defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands War (1982), important new groups began accompanying the Mothers in their Thursday rounds. A few months earlier, in December 1981, the Mothers themselves had begun convoking a special 24-hour annual round named *Marcha de la Resistencia*, which eventually attracted tens of thousands of people. In one of these marches, thousands of protesters wore white masks as a way to represent the unrepresented: the presence of the disappeared. In another demonstration, thousands of silhouettes drawn by protesters with chalk covered the streets following the line of march.

The movement of the Mothers retained political relevance following the end of the dictatorship in 1983, through claims of “truth and justice” to the governments of the democratic transition. Internal disagreements among the Mothers over the degree of confrontation with post-dictatorial governments and the assessment of the actions of armed organizations in the 1970s led to a split into two groups: the Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo, led by Hebe Pastor de Bonafini, and the Madres de Plaza de Mayo – Línea Fundadora, led by Nora de Cortiñas.

Some of the Mothers attending the Thursday rounds in the Plaza de Mayo knew that their daughters or daughters-in-law were pregnant and had grounds to believe they had given birth in secret detention centers. One such “mother-grandmother” was Alicia Zubasnabar de De la Cuadra. Maria Isabel Chorobik de Mariani began looking for other mother-grandmothers. Toward the end of 1977, following the suggestion of Lidia Pegenante, a remarkably courageous

lawyer working in La Plata courthouse, Mariani went to De la Cuadra's house in La Plata. From their conversation, Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, the Group of the Grandmothers, was born, who sought and joined together with other grandmothers of the disappeared. According to the testimony of "Chicha" de Mariani,

Licha [Alicia de De la Cuadra] looked for the other grandmothers she knew from Plaza de Mayo, we met, and decided to start working together. We were twelve at the time. I was surprised to see their serenity; I was a wreck, I was crying all the time, I saw them so serene and said to myself "I must be like them." First we made ourselves known as *Abuelas Argentinas con Nietitos Desaparecidos* [Argentine Grandmothers with Little Grandchildren Disappeared]. But we grew, people started to know us and to call us the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo.

That initial group split from the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, since – without stopping the search for their disappeared children – they understood that the recovering of kidnapped babies and young children called for specific strategies and methodologies. In the first place, they tried to sensitize the local and international public about the dictatorship's systematic plan to steal babies by publishing paid announcements in the media, requesting meetings with government officers and members of the Catholic Church, and meeting figures of international relevance such as the pope. In 1977 they appealed to the OAS, following which the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights visited Argentina in 1979 to file a report on the situation in the country.

Thanks to several testimonies, the Grandmothers exposed the existence of clandestine maternity hospitals (such as those in detention centers like Campo de Mayo, Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada, Pozo de Bnafield, etc.) as well as "waiting lists" among military families. Some sources estimate the number of kidnapped children at 300 from 1975 and 1980, whereas others refer to 500. Children, treated as "war booty," used to be given in "adoption" to military families, but in some cases they were abandoned or sold.

The Grandmothers initiated a tracking of their grandchildren (e.g., searching in minor courthouses, orphanages, and maternities) with

the goal for their return to their legitimate families and retrieving their true identity. After the end of the military dictatorship, the Grandmothers promoted the trial of perpetrators who had kidnapped the babies, while resorting to the latest genetic innovation – DNA tests – to confirm the biological identity of many children and youths suspected of having been stolen and renamed with a fake identity. To ensure the validity of blood tests the Grandmothers implemented a Bank of Genetic Data, created by law, storing the genetic maps of all the families who had children disappeared. Starting in 1997, the Grandmothers developed an intense campaign so all youths born between 1975 and 1980 who had doubts about their identity could go to the Asociación Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo to run a DNA test. To date (June 2008) the Grandmothers have recuperated 90 grandchildren.

The first president of the Grandmothers was Alicia de la Cuadra, later replaced by "Chicha" de Mariani in 1984, who left the group in 1989 because of differences with Estela Barnes de Carlotto, who went on to preside over the organization. For her part, in 1996 Mariani founded a new human rights organization, Fundación Anahí. In May 2008 the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo were nominated candidates for the Nobel Peace Prize.

In the 1990s the generation of the children of the disappeared emerged in public life, beginning by meeting each other at memorial commemorations of their parents, popular mobilizations, and participation in university student governments. The first group was organized in 1994 after a Day of Memory and Commitment held in the School of Architecture at the Universidad Nacional de La Plata. In October 1995 more than 300 children of the disappeared from throughout Argentina gathered in the city of Córdoba, founding a human rights organization known by the acronym HIJOS (Hijos por la Identidad y la Justicia, contra el Olvido y el Silencio). Since then, HIJOS has gained public recognition with appearances in the media by offering testimonies and making their claims to truth, justice, and identity heard through banners exhibited in *Resistencia* marches and other human rights public events, adding "vindication of the spirit of struggle of our parents."

The rapid visibility of HIJOS owes much to its innovative method of denunciation of the government's failure to bring perpetrators to

justice. The organizers appealed to the *porteño lunfardo* of “escrache,” a local dialect that refers to public denunciation. Protesters staged mass demonstrations at the homes of perpetrators released or exempted from prison by the government of President Carlos Menem’s pardons or “impunity laws,” as a means of identifying and exposing them publicly in their true character before their neighbors and society at large.

Among other human rights groups formed to protest the abuses of the military dictatorship were the Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos (Permanent Assembly for Human Rights), Familiares de Detenidos y Desaparecidos por Razones Políticas (Relatives of Detainees and Disappeared for Political Reasons), Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (Center of Legal and Social Studies), Servicio de Paz y Justicia (Service of Peace and Justice), and the Movimiento Ecueménico por los Derechos Humanos (Ecumenic Movement for Human Rights).

SEE ALSO: Argentina, *Piquetero* Movement; Argentina, Social and Political Protest, 2001–2007; Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo; HIJOS Movement, Children of the Disappeared; Madres de la Plaza de Mayo

References and Suggested Readings

- AA.VV. (1997) *Historia de las Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo*. Buenos Aires: La Página.
- CONADEP (1984) *Never Again: Report of the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons*. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
- CONADEP (1995) *Never Again: Report of the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons*. Buenos Aires: Eudeba and Página.
- Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo (2008) Official website www.madres.org.

Argentina, indigenous popular protests

Walter Delrio

The situation of indigenous peoples in Argentina has been shaped, on the one hand, by a political history of failure to acknowledge their existence and influence in the nation and, on the other, by the continual expropriation of resources by the state. Although from 3 to 5 percent of Argentina’s population acknowledge member-

ship in the 27 indigenous groups within the country, Argentinian society identifies itself almost exclusively with European immigrant descendants.

In the 1870s, the Argentine government launched a military expedition, led mainly by General Julio Argentino Roca, to conquer the indigenous people, known as the “Conquest of the Desert.” The military campaign, which defeated indigenous people in the south (the pampas and Patagonia) and the northeast (Chaco), forms an integral narrative of Argentinian national expansion and historical consolidation. The military conquest terminated previous agreements between indigenous people and the Spanish colonizers in Argentina’s Andean region. By removing the indigenous people from their lands, the “Conquest of the Desert” shaped a new national identity that excluded indigenous people as an extinct population.

Throughout the twentieth century, Argentina has evolved through several forms of governing regime – from democracies and military dictatorships to oligarchies and popular governments – and has remained primarily an exporter of raw materials. The different regimes set in motion several disciplinary measures against indigenous peoples, who were categorized either as uncivilized or invisible, their existence, sociopolitical organization, and rights completely denied. Thus, indigenous peoples have been evicted from their territories, violently incorporated into the agrarian or industrial labor force, or concentrated into religious or state missions in rural and urban areas.

The Argentinian military dictatorship of 1976–83 systematically suppressed social and political militancy. During that time, indigenous organizations were only just beginning to define themselves and lacked organizational cohesion. From the early 1980s a new leadership emerged, which identified the basic problems of aboriginal communities as residing in their absence of juridical security and the occupation of their lands by government, military, or private interests. Following the end of the dictatorship and the return of Argentinian democracy in 1983, the new leaders set out to advance their rights.

In 1983 the “indigenous issue” was invisible and there was no acknowledgment of indigenous rights. However, as human rights activists began to criticize the state terrorism of the military dictatorship, the demands of Argentina’s

indigenous peoples were made visible. The growing maturity of indigenous organizations also earned them the support of many international organizations. Questions were asked of Argentina's policies of exclusion of indigenous peoples from civil and political society. Throughout this process of inquiry, the rights of indigenous communities were advanced through judicial decisions at the national and provincial government levels. The *Aborigine Integral Law* in Formosa (1984) was the first piece of legislation to propose rights to land ownership and participation. In 1985, National Law 23.302 conceived four principal areas for indigenous policy: land policy, production, education, and health. It also created the National Institute of Indigenous Affairs (INAI) – unregulated until 1989 – within which indigenous representatives would actively participate. This office was responsible for defining who was indigenous and for registering indigenous communities such as civil associations as legal entities.

From 1986 to the early 2000s, as indigenous peoples and organizations mobilized resistance, legal reforms were advanced in 11 of Argentina's 23 provinces, increasing the pressure to modify the 1853 national constitution, which did not recognize aboriginal rights. In 1990, indigenous people actively coordinated reform at the national level. A crucial antecedent was Argentina's adoption of the International Labor Organization (ILO) convention No. 169 in 1992, incorporating in the constitution the criteria of "peoples," "self-identification," "territory," and "participation." As a consequence of the pressure on the constitutional convention by indigenous militants, Article 75.17 of the new constitution acknowledged indigenous peoples' preexistence and their specific rights to land and participation in decisions regarding their communities. The article was included in the programmatic part of the constitution, requiring state regulation to implement the rights of indigenous people.

The primary aim was to rise above the mere acknowledgment of indigenous rights and to effectively implement demands in official projects and program planning in the areas of health, education, and land, and in the management of the INAI. Under a legal obligation, in 1998 the INAI created the Indigenous Peoples Council as an overarching organization, without specifically defining different community interests. The Indigenous Participation Council was created

in 2006 as a representative body of individual communities in Argentina.

Between 1996 and 1997, the Indigenous Peoples Participation Program met as a consultative body to implement the new constitution within indigenous communities. Various organizations engaged in local, regional, and national meetings, agreeing to share claims on the basis of three fundamental concepts: indigenous peoples, territory, and culture. The body represented one of the first national instances in Argentina of political expression and the pooling of experiences to strongly influence the process of recognition and organizational participation.

At the same time, during the 1990s indigenous struggles advanced demands for private companies, particularly firms engaged in natural resource extraction, to share their wealth, which had been earned through expropriation of indigenous land. In the southern Patagonia region, where the Mapuche and Tehuelche communities are located, mining and petroleum companies have large interests. In other regions, lumber companies and cash crop farming have encroached further on indigenous lands, particularly in the provinces of Formosa or Salta, where hunter-gatherer communal territories and forests have been severely reduced.

The growth of large farms has concentrated rural property into large *latifundia* and vast farming estates, further extended through the sale of lands to foreign firms in the early 2000s. Indigenous peoples seek reparations from landowners, private companies, provincial governments, and the army.

As part of the historic claim for cultural and political autonomy, indigenous peoples have struggled for the right of self-identification for community and urban organizations, and for the acknowledgment of existence prior to the consolidation of the Argentinian state. In addition, indigenous communities demand laws to expand their participation in national and state organizations beyond the pattern of paternalism and dependence. The new indigenous organizations seek to expand multicultural respect of their cultural diversity, and demand greater economic rights. The majority of indigenous peoples live in a position of structural poverty. In addition to addressing economic inequality and poverty, indigenous peoples seek to recover their "other history," recognizing, documenting, and denouncing the state's history of genocide against them.

The indigenous struggle from the early 1980s through the early 2000s has opened up a new space for political projects and organizational agendas on the basis of regional and generational status. Organization and articulation of demands have been multiplied outside the indigenous community in rural communities, urban settlements, and cross-communitarian organizations, among different communities, provinces, and nations. After the mid-1990s – following mobilization for constitutional reform and opposition to the consolidation of neoliberal policies – the indigenous struggle appeared at a provincial level. Since the Argentinian economic and political collapse of 2001, indigenous peoples have introduced new proposals for action throughout the state.

The creation of the Organization of Indigenous Nations and Peoples in Argentina (ONPIA) in 2004 was intended to represent indigenous interests at the national level in order to press for state indigenous policies. A multiplicity of positions has emerged among Argentinian indigenous peoples, depending on historic policies of expropriation, control, and tutelage as well as on culture, class, and generation. Indigenous peoples are seeking direct relations with multi-lateral organizations, without the mediation of state agencies. They are also seeking to construct a social and political space for themselves without interference or assistance by the state.

SEE ALSO: Canada, Indigenous Resistance; Colombia, Indigenous Mobilization; Ecuador, Indigenous and Popular Struggles; Mexico, Indigenous and Peasant Struggles, 1980s–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Briones, C. (Ed.) (2005) *Cartografías argentinas. Políticas indígenas y formaciones provinciales de alteridad*. Buenos Aires: Antropofagia.
- Briones, C. & Carrasco, M. (2000) *Pacta Sunt Servanda. Capitulaciones, convenios y tratados con indígenas en Pampa y Patagonia (1742–1878)*. Buenos Aires: IWGIA-Vinciguerra.
- Briones, C. & Díaz, R. (2000) La nacionalización/provincialización del “desierto.” Procesos de fijación de fronteras y de constitución de “otros internos” en el Neuquén. *Actas del V Congreso Argentino de Antropología Social*. “Lo local y lo global. La antropología ante un mundo en transición,” Part 3. La Plata: Entrecorillas impresores, pp. 44–57.
- Carrasco, M. (1997) La juridización de “lo indígena o la conveniencia estratégica de utilizar las leyes para defenderse.” *Desarrollo Agroforestal y Comunidad Campesina* 7 (33): 18–25.

Argentina, labor strikes of 1890 and 1902

Horacio Tarcus

Argentina, May 1, 1890

The International Workers’ Congress held in Paris in June 1889 designated May 1 as the workers’ global day of protest to commemorate the martyrs of the Haymarket tragedy in Chicago. At the conference, Argentina was represented by an exiled French citizen, Alejo Peyret, while the Buenos Aires Vorwärts Association, formed by socialist workers exiled from Germany after the implementation of Bismarck’s anti-socialist laws, sent a report and was represented by Wilhelm Liebknecht. The members of the Vorwärts Association in Argentina decided to adopt the program agreed upon in Paris.

At the beginning of 1890 the Association designated a commission, comprising José Winiger, a Swiss journalist and editor of the Buenos Aires *Vorwärts Weekly*, shoemaker Gustav Nohke, cabinetmaker Guillermo Schultze, laborer Marcelo Jackel, and graphic worker Augusto Kühn, to coordinate with other trade unions as well as with the International Socialist Circle, an anarchist group that had been in existence since 1888. The initiative was welcomed, especially by labor associations, as the loss of purchasing power in previous years had led to an important strike movement, especially among railway workers, bakers, hatters, and shoemakers. The protests were not isolated incidents but were part of a definite resistance movement that had gained the sympathy of many union organizations.

With the support of different unions a larger commission was constituted under the name of the International Committee. The Committee designated Winiger its provisional president and asked him to write a Manifesto, of which 20,000 copies were printed. The Committee established its plan of action: (1) to summon workers of the Buenos Aires capital district to a meeting on May 1; (2) to organize a Workers’ Federation; (3) to edit a newspaper to defend working-class interests; and (4) to petition the Argentine Congress for legislation protecting workers.

At the same time, the *Vorwärts Weekly* promoted a campaign in support of the eight-hour workday and an extension of the May 1 protest.

The document presented to Congress invoked the right of petition, established by the constitution to demand laws protecting the working class, the eight-hour workday, the prohibition of child labor, the reduction of the workday to six hours for workers aged between 14 and 18, the abolition of night work, apart from in branches of industry that required uninterrupted labor, work safety standards, the prohibition of piecework, state factory inspections monitored by workers, control of productive processes in factories and punishment for counterfeiting, and, finally, arbitration tribunals formed by worker and management delegates.

The International Committee collected 500 pesos to pay for posters and flyers calling for a mass rally and the launching of a new Workers' Manifesto. On May 1, despite rain and the threats of factory owners to fire protesters, about 2,000 workers met in the Prado Español and in the amphitheater in the Recoleta neighborhood of Buenos Aires. The event began with a workers' parade. At 3 p.m., Winiger, the Committee's president, took the platform, explaining the reasons for the event and praising socialism and May 1, which "found socialists of all over the world congregated in their respective countries." He then presented a report of the work of the Committee, which the assembly approved with applause.

Fourteen other speakers were also at the event, among them Bernardo Sánchez, the delegate of the cigar makers and secretary of the Committee, who spoke in Spanish; Marcelo Jackel of Vorwärts, who spoke in French; A. Uhule, also of Vorwärts, who spoke in German; and Tyrolese cabinetmaker Carlos Mauli, who spoke in both French and Italian. An anarchist from the International Socialist Circle argued against petitioning Congress. Finally, the assembly voiced its objections against the management resolution to fire protesters and collected 120 pesos to help those affected. The offer was received with an ovation; according to the Committee's treasurer, Augusto Kühn, one worker who later came asking for help was awarded 20 pesos.

According to journalists' accounts, at the rally the Vorwärts newspaper was distributed, a petition was circulated for signatures, and attendees left cheering for socialism and May 1 while singing the *Internationale*. Later that evening, a small celebration with singing, music, and dancing was held at the Vorwärts Club. The next day, the press gave the event extensive coverage,

rejecting the existence of a "social problem" in Argentina and calling it "a land of opportunities" where "everybody finds jobs."

The three currents of the workers' movement that converged in the celebration of May 1, 1890 were socialists, who were the authors of the initiative, especially German socialists whose positions ranged from supporters of Lassalle to the socialism of the Second International; Mazzinist republicans, who led most of the Italian associations that had joined the International Committee; and finally anarchists, who already occupied a hegemonic position in the incipient Argentinian workers' movement but who played a subordinate role on that particular day.

Argentine General Strike, 1902

The Argentinian working class grew out of the flows of European immigrants that were concentrated in the country's larger cities, especially in Buenos Aires, the capital, as well as in Bahía Blanca, Rosario, and Córdoba. The nascent urban working class was concentrated in sectors such as transportation and port and railway activities, as well as in a number of crafts that supplied the demand for goods and services in the expanding cities. The Argentine Workers' Federation (Federación Obrera Argentina, FOA) was founded on May 25, 1901 by construction workers, workers in the graphic industry, transport workers, cabinetmakers, workers in metal, wicker, and marble, mechanics, bakers, stonecutters, plasterers, saddlers, candlemakers, rug makers, and shoemakers. The Federation attempted to unify anarchists and socialists and drew heavily on direct action methods, beginning with a major boycott in August 1901 and a general strike in 1902.

The year 1902 began with a strike that paralyzed the port of Rosario. In February railway firemen, sailors from Buenos Aires, and dockers from Bahía Blanca went on strike. In April, transport workers went on strike in Buenos Aires, as did bakers for five weeks between July and August. At that time, dockers had to carry cereal bags weighing up to 120 kilos, while the length of the workday and remuneration were at the managers' discretion. In August, the workers of the Buenos Aires port refused to carry bags unless certain conditions were met (e.g., maximum weight, payment, working conditions). They were joined by dockers from other cities

in the Buenos Aires province, such as Campana and San Nicolás. The Chamber of Commerce was forced to concede.

The real starting point of the 1902 general strike was the Buenos Aires Central Fruit Market workers' struggle. Before unionizing in 1901, market workers labored for more than 14 hours a day, carrying bags weighing more than 100 kilos. In October, the workers petitioned their managers for the abolition of piecework, a minimum of 4 pesos per day for adults, and 2 and a half pesos for minors under 15, a nine-hour workday, and legal recognition of the union. As managers ignored their demands, they formed an assembly on October 16 and decided to go on strike. The government responded by sending in strikebreakers. Dockers and transport workers joined the strikers in support, blocking the transportation of fruits and cereals. Promoted by anarchists, a chain of solidarity strikes extended from the end of October to the beginning of November to factories, workshops, ports, and the streets; there were 70,000 strikers and Buenos Aires and other cities were paralyzed. Police and military forces persecuted and arrested strikers. The government shut down union offices, both anarchist and socialist, sent dozens of workers to prison, and closed down worker newspapers. An anarchist majority in the FOA voted a general strike for November 20, despite the reservations of socialists, who considered an extension of the strike imprudent.

Employers demanded more drastically repressive measures, but the government alleged that it lacked adequate legal instruments. It was then that the government of General Julio A. Roca submitted to Congress a bill banning "any foreigner whose behavior compromises national security or disturbs public order." What eventually became the Residence Law was hastily approved by the Argentine Congress. Law 4144 was brutally implemented. From that time on, as reported by anarchist Diego Abad de Santillán, "Buenos Aires turned into a military camp: a few tens of thousands of worker activists were deported, prisons became packed with detainees." On November 23, in a meeting of the FOA Federal Committee, anarchists and socialists finally split, with anarchists calling to ratify the strike despite the repression while the socialists judged the strike ineffective. Arrests and deportations produced a crisis in the strike movement, placing a temporary halt on anarchist activities. However,

some anarchist militants succeeded in evading the law by throwing themselves overboard while ships stopped over in Montevideo. A few hid temporarily in Uruguay while others reentered Argentine clandestinely. Others quit politics altogether, to be replaced by a new generation of activists who emerged in 1903.

There are different interpretations of the outcome of this strike depending on ideological positions. According to a manifesto of the Socialist Party from the end of 1902, the strike ended in a clear defeat: "Under the pressure of the state of emergency, managers felt themselves stronger than ever before, while workers were dispersed and gagged by the ignominious law." On the other hand, Diego Abad de Santillán ponders the question: "What have been the consequences of the November movement?" His response was unequivocal: "A great moral victory. The awakening of the proletariat of this country."

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Argentina; Argentina, General Strike (*Semana Trágica*), 1919; Argentina, *Semana Roja*, 1909; Argentina, Socialist and Communist Workers' Movement; Argentina, Worker Strikes in Patagonia, 1920–1921; Brazil, Labor Struggles; Internationals; Haymarket Tragedy; May Day

References and Suggested Readings

- Abad de Santillán, D. (Ed.) (1933) *Ideología y Trayectoria del Movimiento Revolucionario en la Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Nervio.
- Oddone, J. (1934) *Historia del Socialismo Argentino*, 2 vols. Buenos Aires: La Vanguardia.
- Oddone, J. (1949) *Gremialismo Proletario Argentino*. Buenos Aires: La Vanguardia.
- Ratzer, J. (1970) *Marxistas Argentinos del 90*. Córdoba: Pasado y Presente.
- Tarcus, H. (2007) *Marx en la Argentina. Sus Primeros Lectores Obreros, Intelectuales y Científicos*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.

Argentina, labor unions and protests of the unemployed, 1990s

Marina Kabat

Organizations of the unemployed stepped into the limelight of Argentinian political life in the 1990s. Their mobilizations were a response to both the high unemployment rate and the economic recession that followed from the Tequila

Effect: the economic crisis of the Southern Cone that resulted from the Mexican economic crisis of 1994. These organizations experienced a tremendous growth that allowed them to move from scattered and isolated actions associated with protest movements into the development of a national struggle with a broader spectrum of demands.

Background

In the 1990s the growth in Argentina's unemployment rate accelerated rapidly; equally swift was the organization of unemployed workers' movements, which benefited from strong Argentinian political and organizational traditions.

In early 1991, Domingo Cavallo was appointed minister of the economy. He implemented the convertibility plan (Plan de Convertibilidad), which pegged the Argentinian peso to the US dollar, and proposed the National Employment Law (Ley Nacional de Empleo), which facilitated and reduced the cost of dismissals, allowed the hiring of temporary workers, promoted "flexible" work contracts, and extended working hours. The result was an exponential increase in the unemployment rate. When Cavallo took office, the unemployment rate was 6.6 percent; in three years it doubled, and by 1995 it had risen to 18.6 percent. The total percentage of underemployed and unemployed workers nationwide reached 30 percent, and was up to 50 percent in the country's interior. Until 1991, Argentinian workers did not have unemployment benefits. In that year, as part of the Employment Law – and in hopes of administering a palliative to the instability sparked by the growth of unemployment – a derisory unemployment benefit was created totaling less than \$300 per month, to be received for one year. Even so, only 5 percent of workers met the requirements to apply for it. The mass of unemployed workers did not have any unemployment compensation.

Worker Response

The demands of organized unemployed workers ranged from the takeover of private companies to setting objectives for a deeper transformation of society. The movement started in the poorest provinces in the extreme north and south of the country, and later spread into greater Buenos Aires. Even though it was born in more marginal

areas, the movement grew and expanded until it had a strong impact on the heart of the Argentinian economic and political system. The unemployed workers' movement, along with the *piquetero* movement, was crucial in the struggle against the economic reforms implemented first by Carlos Menem's government, then by De la Rúa's, as well as in the political process that converged in the *Argentinaazo* insurrection that forced De la Rúa to resign from the presidency in December 2001.

Roadblocks were a popular tactic of the workers. The first roadblock organized by the unemployed took place in Senillosa, in the province of Neuquen, in 1994. By 1995, the movement had spread to different points of the country. The strong Argentinian union tradition and history of insurrectional protest help explain the rapid growth of the movement. These experiences were embodied in the leaders of the movement themselves. Some had been union representatives of private companies, and their disappointment with the bureaucratic unions, which had taken no action against privatizations, drove them to resume the combative traditions of the Argentinian working class. Direct action, especially the roadblock, was the method chosen in favor of seeking parliamentary regulations. Assemblies became places where decisions were made, and a system in which mandates could be revoked was implemented to prevent the co-optation of leaders and to guarantee internal democracy within the movement. Working together with the factory and state workers who had lost their jobs were young people and women, most of whom were housewives with no work experience.

In 1995, the year of President Menem's reelection, the first demonstrations of the *piquetero* movement took place in the city and province of Buenos Aires. The following year, the coordinator of the unemployed of Berazategui set up a popular open canteen in front of the local town hall. The coordinator received an allowance of some bags of food, which she accepted on condition that they were distributed by her. This criterion of local rather than government control, which was intended to break with the clientelist governmental structures, has been persistently defended by the unemployed organizations all across the country.

In June 1996, the first insurrection took place in Cutral C6, in the province of Neuquen.

Workers from this city and from Plaza Huincul blocked Road 22 for a week in protest against the reduction in unemployment benefit and the announcement that a new factory would not be set up as planned. Five thousand neighbors blocked the road, and when the gendarmerie attempted to evict them, the people revolted, organized barricades, and forced the government to negotiate. Ultimately this led to new benefits for the unemployed as well as the reconnection of gas and electricity, which had been cut off. A year later, the experience was repeated, but this time it affected an even greater part of the province. In the middle of a teachers' strike, the teachers, together with student and parent assemblies, blocked interprovincial access bridges and roads; the gendarmerie again tried to prevent the blockages. It took the authorities three days to clear the streets, and they proceeded to chase picketers through the city. This provoked a popular uprising; in trying to suppress it, the police murdered a young woman, Teresa Rodríguez. The gendarmerie was confronted by 15,000 people who forced it to retreat.

In Cutral Có and Plaza Huincul barricades were mounted. The unemployed blocked access roads and demanded not only unemployment benefits or social service plans but also genuine work. During this period, new unemployed organizations emerged in Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Jujuy, and Salta. In September 1996, the first *piquetero* march to Plaza de Mayo was organized. The March Against Hunger, Unemployment, and Repression gathered more than 1,000 people in front of Government House. In 1997 similar uprisings took place, but this time they were more radicalized. Between 1998 and 1999, the movement ebbed as expectations grew regarding a change of president. However, it reemerged stronger than before in the face of the aggravation of the economic crisis and disappointment with the new president, De la Rúa, in 2000 and 2001.

The internal political debate within the movement was difficult to surmount. Different political orientations competed for leadership: Trotskyists, Maoists, communists, autonomists, nationalists, even a group of priests who had been expelled from the church led different unemployed organizations. The intellectual debates surrounding this phenomenon have focused on the degree of novelty that this form of protest, or the individuals who carry it out, entails. In this sense, one aspect of the debate

is the conceptualization of the unemployed and whether they constitute a faction of the working class, an industrial reserve army, or new social actors generally conceived as marginal within the greater system.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, General Strike (*Semana Trágica*), 1919; Argentina, General Strike, 1975; Argentina, Grassroots Workers' Movement: Villa Constitución, 1975; Argentina, *Piquetero* Movement; Argentina, Social and Political Protest, 2001–2007; Argentina, Socialist and Communist Workers' Movement; Argentina, Worker Actions, October 17, 1945; *El Argentinazo*, December 19 and 20, 2001

References and Suggested Readings

- Dinerstein, A. (2001) Roadblocks in Argentina: Against the Violence of Stability. *Capital and Class* 74.
- Oviedo, L. (2001) *Una historia del movimiento piquetero. De las primeras coordinadoras a las Asambleas Nacionales*. Buenos Aires: Rumbos.
- Sartelli, E. (2007) *La plaza es nuestra. La lucha de clases en la Argentina a la luz del Argentinazo*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones ryr.
- Svampa, M. & Pereyra, S. (2004) *Entre la ruta y el barrio. La experiencia de las organizaciones piqueteros*. Buenos Aires: Biblos.

Argentina, *piquetero* movement

Silvina Pascucci

The existence of the *piquetero* movement marked a milestone in the political history of the post-dictatorship Argentinian working class. The movement's name is derived from its members' affinity for direct action methods, especially picketing, blocking roads, and occupying buildings and factories during moments of intense struggle. The most common image of the *piquetero* is a person armed with sticks and stones, wearing a hood, and blocking the traffic with blazing fires.

Much of the significance of the picket as a direct action tool is derived from its traditional use as a strike tool. In the *piquetero* movement, the unemployed status of its members precludes the use of the strike as a tool. What characterizes the *piquetero* movement, then, is the use of the picket *without* the strike, in direct contrast to employed workers who strengthen their strikes with picket lines. With roots in the struggles of unemployed workers, *piqueteros* have

instigated a political movement that includes the most active factions of the employed and unemployed working class and established alliances with factions of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie (such as small agrarian producers, merchants, and professionals). Due to the struggle's methods (based on direct action) and its forms of organization (linked to the Popular Assemblies), the *piquetero* movement became, from 1999 to 2003, one of the most critical players in Argentina's class struggle. Its insurreccional tendency helped facilitate the events of December 19 and 20, 2001, known as the *Argentinazo*. During this event, an alliance of class factions challenged the state and overthrew President Fernando de la Rúa. The *piquetero* movement played a central role in the formation of this process, and exercised a moral leadership of the protagonists of the 2001 insurrection.

The economic roots that gave way to the emergence of the *piquetero* movement go as far back as the 1990s, a time period characterized by the disintegration of capitalist social relationships that would lead up to the 2001 economic crisis. The crisis resulted in a permanent increase in unemployment, precarious employment, the destruction of the health and educational systems, and a food crisis. Unemployment rates largely exceeded 20 percent of the economically active population, whereas underemployment rates reached even higher levels. The lower and middle classes got poorer, leaving almost 50 percent of the population below the official poverty line. The growing presence of the unemployed and pauperized workers influenced the *piquetero* movement to take an active role in the creation of free soup kitchens, schools, first aid clinics, and workers' co-ops. Even a *piquetero* culture was born: *piquetero* cinema, mostly documentaries on popular struggle, *piquetero* rock bands, *piquetero* painting, especially murals and graffiti, among other artistic manifestations, have had a worldwide audience and impact.

A great variety of platforms, as well as different political tendencies, have coexisted within the movement since its inception. Both collective struggle and disputes over the movement's direction have always been present. On the whole, the movement adopted two strategies that functioned alongside one another until 2001. One was reformism, which sought an alliance with the progressives and the national bourgeoisie. Groups using this strategy included the Combative Class

Current (CCC) and the Land and Housing Federation (FTV). The second strategy, of a more revolutionary character, rejected any bond or commitment with bourgeois factions, and aimed at a policy of class independence that confronts the capitalist system and allows the struggle for socialism. Several left-wing parties embody this tendency, most of which gave birth in 2002 to the National *Piquetero* Bloc (PBN). Some movements worth highlighting are the Workers' Party (Polo Obrero), the Teresa Lives Movement Without Work (from the Socialist Workers' Party), the Territorial Movement of Liberation (associated with the Communist Party), the Teresa Rodriguez Movement (MTR), the CTD of Aníbal Verón, and the Unemployed Workers' Movements (Movimientos de Trabajadores Desocupados).

At the movement's inception, proponents of both strategies worked well together, helping to organize the first pickets and mobilizations and taking part in the national *piquetero* assembly, where the battle plans and slogans that marked the political characterization of each phase were decided upon. However, insofar as the insurreccional tendency existed alongside the growing economic and political crisis, the revolutionary strategy gained greater power. This is how the CCC, which had decided not to take part in the 2001 insurrection, founded the basis for what was later called the "Soft Picketers" due to its conciliatory tendency and rapprochement to the new president, Néstor Kirchner, who was elected in 2003.

The second, more revolutionary group of activists increased in number and cohesion after the insurrection of 2001. The organizations that embodied this tendency formed the PBN and became organized in National Assemblies of Employed and Unemployed Workers. Delegates from all over the country met in those assemblies on behalf of the unemployed workers' organizations, internal committees, workers' unions, petty bourgeoisie organizations, students, occupied factories, and any other type of political association with an active role in the struggle. Theirs was a revolutionary political platform based on class independence. Internal struggles, arguments, and break-offs also occurred, but all within a frame of unity. These assemblies worked with thousands of workers, who were in turn representatives of tens of thousands of other workers. It was a mass organization.

The visibility that the *piquetero* movement achieved brought several historians, sociologists, and journalist into a closer study of the case. One of the most common interpretative lines identified it with the concept of new social movements. According to this tendency, the eruption of *piqueteros* marked the end of the traditional struggles of the working class linked to workers' unions, with the strike as their primary tool. Contrary to this, the *piquetero* movement was made up of unemployed workers, who were identified as a new social subject. Likewise, the movement's quintessential method of struggle, the roadblock, was shown as innovative and unprecedented in the history of Argentina. New "alternative" methods of organization were also emphasized, which would lead to the formation of new subjectivities, opposed to traditional forms of struggle and association with political parties. These views are discussed within Marxist studies, which conceptualizes the *piquetero* movement as the vanguard of the working class (employed and unemployed) that resumes its historical method of struggle – direct action – and proposes itself as the revolutionary leadership.

Since the beginning of economic recovery in 2003, the employed workers' movement has come back into the limelight. If in the 1990s the movement was relatively paralyzed due to the advance of labor flexibility and unemployment, the economic recovery – though weak – made it possible to demand better conditions. Whereas the most institutionalized worker factions remained in the bureaucratic trade union organizations, the employed workers who belonged to the most dynamic factions (subway, rail, and health workers, for instance) joined in the *piquetero* movement. Most of the left-wing organizations and political parties that were part of the *piquetero* movement gained control of some internal committees in the trade unions and formed new boards of delegates, outnumbering the traditional trade union leaders who were hindering the process. The new leaders thereby reasserted the unity of employed and unemployed workers – which had already existed, in an embryonic form, since the beginning of the movement. However, as the economic recovery advanced, the movement seemed to sway and scatter, a trend that began in 2004 and continues today. In spite of this, the organizations that were set up during the boom of the movement (1999–2003) have not disappeared and still have a significant role.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Labor Unions and Protests of the Unemployed, 1990s; Argentina, Social and Political Protest, 2001–2007; Argentina, Socialist and Communist Workers' Movement; *El Argentinazo*, December 19 and 20, 2001; Movement of Recuperated Factories, Argentina

References and Suggested Readings

- Cominiello, S. (2007) Tres semanas de cortes que iniciaron el Argentinazo. Estudio del Piquetazo de julio-agosto de 2001. *Anuario CEICS* 1. Buenos Aires.
- Isman, R. (2004) *Los Piquetes de la Matanza*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones nuevos tiempos.
- Mazzeo, M. (2004) *Piqueteros, notas para una tipología*. Buenos Aires: FISyP.
- Oviedo, L. (2004) *Una historia del movimiento piquetero. De las coordinadoras al Argentinazo*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Rumbos.
- Sartelli, E. (2007) *La plaza es nuestra. El Argentinazo a la luz de la lucha de la clase obrera en la Argentina del siglo XX*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones ryr.
- Svampa, M. & Pereyra, S. (2003) *Entre la ruta y el barrio*. Buenos Aires: Biblos.
- Zibechi, R. (2003) *Genealogía de la revuelta. Argentina: la sociedad en movimiento*. Buenos Aires: Letra Libre.

Argentina, Semana Roja, 1909

Eduardo Sartelli

Semana Roja (Red Week) is the name given to the general strike of May 1909 that had insurrectional characteristics. The strike is framed within the historic struggle of the Argentinian working class for democratic liberties, especially resistance against repressive laws and regulations, the defense of freedom of expression, and the right of assembly. *Semana Roja* marked the beginning of escalating repression against union organizing, culminating with the Centenario celebrations in 1910 marking 100 years since Argentina gained independence from Spain.

In the late nineteenth century, the Argentinian working class gained greater self-identification during the economic crisis of 1898–1904, when labor strikes – an unknown phenomenon up to then – unleashed the rapid expansion of labor organizing and labor unions, and the national FORA (Regional Argentinian Workers' Federation) was created. The first decade of the century represents the dawn of Argentinian working-class consciousness. In this decade,

union actions were met with extreme repression by the state, which proved itself incapable of responding through conciliation, leading to general strikes in 1902, 1904, and 1906. Although each strike had different objectives, all sought to end working-class oppression.

In 1902, the Argentinian government initiated its first major anti-labor policy through the passage of the Law of Residence of 1902, permitting the national executive power to expel foreigners who “compromised national security or disturbed public order,” understood to refer to any immigrant seeking to form a union. Given that, at the time, immigrants comprised the great majority of workers and leaders in Argentina, the law was considered a means to hamper union organization. The law, which remained in force until 1965, was the object of all the general strikes before 1930. Partly as a response to the *Semana Roja* of 1909, a second repressive law, the Law of Social Defense, was passed in 1910, permitting the government to incarcerate any worker who “disturbed public order” in a prison intended for serious criminals near Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego, the extreme south of Argentina.

In the early twentieth century the proletariat labored under severely degrading conditions, enduring 11-hour workdays or longer, low pay, unhealthy workplaces, and tenement dwellings (*los conventillos*). The period was marked by the absence of centralized production and limited industrial development, with few large factories and many small workshops. The working masses were employed in the rural sector and transport industry (as rail workers, longshoremen, or in sea transport). Unions were weak and the few members there were had a tendency to disperse.

Politically, this period is characterized by rampant fraud, corruption, and a clientelist system controlled by large bourgeois families. There were no modern mass political parties, with the exception of the socialists. The restrictive circulation of political power triggered the mobilization of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, who were broadly linked to the Radical Civic Union (UCR) led by future president Hipólito Yrigoyen. The level of labor repression stimulated popular mobilizations and workers’ protests to advance democratic freedoms that were recognized by the subordinated classes as a whole.

Semana Roja is central to the political evolution of the working class, whose most distinguishing

feature was a tripartite division that would later contribute to the development of the Peronist party in the 1940s: anarchists, who evolved into communists, socialists, and revolutionary labor unionists. The three currents would later struggle for leadership of the workers’ movement for 40 years. In 1909, at the time of the dispute, anarchists – who controlled FORA – were the dominant power, while the revolutionary labor unionists under the General Workers’ Union (UGT), a socialist offshoot, were a significant presence. The rising influence of the UGT and revolutionary labor unionism during the *Semana Roja* further contributed to the decline of the anarchists after the repression of 1910.

May Day celebrations on May 1, 1909 by the three political tendencies of the working class triggered the beginning of the *Semana Roja*. FORA demonstrators gathered in Plaza Lorea in Buenos Aires (currently named Plaza de los Dos Congresos). As the protesters were about to begin their procession to another square, they were attacked by the police, who fired 300 bullets and killed ten people, injuring another 70. The crowd scattered in all directions; as if planned in advance, ambulances rushed to remove bodies and the injured, and firefighters hosed the blood off the streets.

The socialist May Day rally originally planned for the Plaza Constitución on the south side of Buenos Aires redirected its course and was transformed into a protest action. The three political orientations created a committee and declared a general strike, while the government of Roque Sáenz Peña launched an assault, calling out more policemen and military troops, arresting hundreds of people, and closing all workers’ meeting places. The strike leaders demanded the reopening of meeting places, the liberation of prisoners, and the repeal of the Municipal Penalty Code, which forced transport workers’ unions to accept a series of government controls that virtually eliminated the right to strike.

Many workers also sought the resignation of the police chief, Ramón Falcón – widely believed responsible for the massacres – but strike organizers did not make the demand due to ideological differences. Whereas socialists vigorously demanded the police chief’s resignation, anarchists and revolutionary labor unionists considered that the demand acknowledged the legitimacy of the bourgeois state, with which they refused to negotiate.

In the following days, 200,000 to 300,000 workers of the city's working population of 500,000 demonstrated in the streets of Buenos Aires against the massacre. The protests were clear proof of the enormous popularity of the strike and of high-level mobilization. Further proof would be provided in response to government actions as it mobilized the city's police force, armed with war ammunition, 5,000 army soldiers, two regiments of artillery, three cavalry regiments, six infantry battalions, two engineer battalions, and 1,500 students from the shooting school. Government House, known as the Pink House (*Casa Rosada*), was protected by a squadron from the regiment of grenadiers.

The burial of victims brought out 50,000 to 80,000 people, the largest mass gathering ever before 1909 in Buenos Aires. Mourners were attacked by the police on their way to the cemetery: 70 people were injured and 120 arrested. On the fourth day of the strike, a socialist speech resulted in another death and several casualties; on the fifth and sixth days, the city was paralyzed. In response to the mass unrest, the government seemed willing to relent and to revoke the penalty code. Negotiations with the government were opened on the seventh day of the strike, with Benita Vilanueva, president of the senate, serving as mediator.

Paradoxically, the socialists, who were the least militant of the three groups, demanded that Falcón's resignation be a condition of negotiations. Backed by popular sentiment that sought Falcón's dismissal, the socialists refused to enter into negotiations unless the government opened a discussion to include the dismissal of Falcón. But the anarchists and radical labor unionists, refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the bourgeois state, agreed to negotiate a settlement. After the government agreed to free prisoners and allow workers' meeting places to reopen, the strike was ended.

The protagonists' analysis of the outcome differed according to their viewpoints: the socialists considered the strike a failure because the police chief had not resigned; the anarchists held ambiguous views; and the labor unionists called the strike a total success. These differences show the political divisions and limitations of the working class at that time: strong union awareness undermined by weak political awareness, best expressed as a high combativeness marred by a limited capacity to influence national politics.

Paradoxically, again, those who had a better understanding of political problems – the socialists – were the least committed to revolutionary change, while those who were most devoted to revolutionary outcomes were the most politically limited. This contradiction would remain unresolved up until the creation of the Communist Party in the 1920s and was one factor in the emergence of Peronism. Falcón was ultimately punished in 1910 when anarchist Simón Radowitzky threw a bomb at his carriage and killed him. To this writing, the Argentinian government's National Police School is still named after Falcón.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Argentina; Argentina, General Strike (*Semana Trágica*), 1919; Argentina, University Reform, 1918

References and Suggested Readings

- Bilsky, E. (1989) *La FORA y el movimiento obrero*. Buenos Aires: CEAL.
- Frydenberg, J. & Rufo, M. (1992) *La Semana Roja de 1909*. Buenos Aires: CEAL.
- López, A. (1987) *La FORA en el movimiento obrero*. Buenos Aires: CEAL.
- Rock, D. (1984) *El radicalismo argentino, 1890–1930*. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu.

Argentina, social and political protest, 2001–2007

Khatchik DerGhougassian

After the “lost decade” of the 1980s, Argentina rose as the “poster child” of the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. Following the guideline of the Washington Consensus, the government of Carlos Saúl Menem (1989–95 and 1995–99) implemented a plan known as *convertibilidad* (convertibility), which fixed the peso value to the US dollar on a one-to-one basis and liberalized the economy through a vast plan of price stabilization and tied fiscal adjustments to the privatization of state-owned enterprises. Tired of hyperinflation and the burden of foreign debt, Argentinian society, including the popular sectors, gave broad support to the first phase (1990–6) of these reforms. After the initial shock therapy, popularized in the words of then president Menem as “*cirujía sin anestesia*”

(“surgery without an anesthetic”), the economy grew despite the Mexican (1994) and Asian (1997) crises, until 1998 when it entered a recessive phase. Despite increasing difficulties in keeping the one-to-one exchange rate, convertibility was maintained during the Fernando de la Rúa government (1999–2001), mostly for fear of a return of hyperinflation.

With the recession it also became clear that the social consequences of the neoliberal reforms had been disastrous. By the end of 2002, 20.8 million people were living in poverty (more than half of the population), almost 10 million people lived in impoverished conditions, and infant mortality for lack of food in a country that produced 300 million tons of grain per year reached an unforgivable level. The unfairness of income distribution was even more striking: in the federal capital and Greater Buenos Aires, the most densely populated province in Argentina, the richest 10 percent of the population, some 1.2 million people, earned 37.6 percent of the national income, whereas the poorest 10 percent, also some 1.2 million people, earned as little as 1.1 percent. The gap between the richest and the poorest sectors had reached 34.2, when it was only 12.26 in 1974. The participation of the middle class in income distribution was less than 30 percent, the lowest level in the history of Argentina.

These conditions explain the general social outburst on December 18, 2001, when, unable to sustain convertibility and eager to stop the capital flow out of the country’s banking system, the De la Rúa government implemented the *corralito* forbidding any cash withdrawal from banks beyond a strict minimum and imposing the use of checks, credit and debit cards, and other non-monetary means for all economic transactions. Following two days of massive popular mobilization known as the *cacelorazo*, referring to the middle-class protest of clanging empty stew pans and pots, riots and clashes between demonstrators and police left more than 30 dead, tens of wounded, and hundreds of people arrested. De la Rúa, who had tried unsuccessfully to impose a state of siege on December 19, resigned two years before ending his constitutional mandate. After four frustrated attempts, the Congress finally elected the governor of the province of Buenos Aires, Eduardo Duhalde, as the president of the nation. Meanwhile, the country declared default and ceased paying its foreign debt.

Duhalde declared the end of convertibility on January 1, 2002 and devalued the peso.

For the next year and a half, until the election of Néstor Kirchner in April 2003, Argentina went through one of the worst social and economic crises of its history. During the years of convertibility, \$60 billion flew out of the country. According to a congressional investigation, 30 multinational corporations took the leading role in this capital flight, alone being responsible for half of the money leaving the national financial system. The middle class went from a life of luxury, including vacations in Miami, Florida, and shopping in Bal Harbor, to heavy indebtedness. They had no choice but to build their own safety nets to survive the crisis. They were only latecomers along a path already taken by the 40 percent of the society that earned less than a dollar a day. But as these precarious means of protection against the market proved to be seriously limited, resistance and protest movements became inevitable.

The mobilization in late 2001 and 2002 of the Argentinian middle class, whose standard of living had declined dramatically, was triggered by two political decisions – the freeze and limitations placed on access to bank accounts and the forced conversion of frozen foreign money, mostly savings in the form of US dollars, to pesos, which had been devalued in a highly unfavorable exchange rate. Despite their frustration, the protest and mobilization of the Argentinian middle class remained within the legal framework and used court procedure to denounce the violation of property rights, a process that became known as *la judicialización de la política*. In essence, they consciously used lawsuits against the government to create a sharp confrontation between the executive and the judiciary. In the process, they created important savers’ networks all over the country that took the lead in organizing protests and legal actions. This network of savers became a typical safety net that the impoverished middle class created as protection against further damage by the savage expansion of the free market.

Inter-Class Cooperation? Social Safety Nets for Survival

Unlike the protests of the poorer classes, which were deeply rooted in the structural consequences of the neoliberal model, the middle-class

protest was motivated by the specific policies that hurt their savings. Thus, the middle-class protesters ended up bargaining their individual cases. Yet it is wrong to conclude that there was no connection between the two classes. Indeed, some original surviving experiences reflect a loose inter-class strategy that emerged during the crisis. One of these survival strategies was the barter club, which in early 2002 made headlines in the Argentinian media. Barter fairs were organized in clubhouses, auditoriums, and abandoned factories where goods and skills were exchanged without the need for money. As the networks grew, the simple forms of bartering became increasingly complex. The number of participants also increased, especially after the 2001 economic collapse. In early 2002, an estimated 2 million people were involved in 4,500 barter clubs functioning in more than 20 provinces.

Another protest/safety net-building initiative of the Argentinian urban middle class was the neighborhood assembly (*asamblea*), which emerged after the social explosion of December 19–20, 2001. Similar to the spontaneous eruption of popular protest that for the first time in Argentinian history provoked the fall of a government without military intervention, neighborhood assemblies were created without the interference of any political party. There were no ideological restrictions and no conditions for participation. Self-insured with the resurging “power of the people,” the assemblies aimed at “reclaiming the street,” according to the analysis of an active participant. In the context of a city abandoned by a bankrupt state and left to the mercy of crime, “reclaiming the street” gained a concrete meaning.

Most importantly, the neighborhood assemblies aimed at the reconstruction of social ties among people. Typical initiatives of each assembly included meals for the most needy, temporary jobs for the unemployed, cultural events, protest marches against the price rises of public goods, and support for workers occupying and managing a closed industrial plant. The assemblies combined the claim for a state and, at the same time, replaced it where it had retreated as a result of the process of privatizing public services. In some neighborhoods, the assemblies took the initiative of recovering abandoned municipal markets, cafés, bars, and even clinics. They then converted them into communitarian enterprises. Thus, in August 2002, the assembly of the Flores

neighborhood recovered an abandoned clinic and was surprised to find out that it was fully equipped. Since then, with the voluntary help of physicians and nurses, the clinic has provided health coverage for workers of occupied plants. In another neighborhood, Palermo Viejo, the assembly converted an abandoned municipal market into a workshop for handmade goods that provided means of subsistence for hundreds of unemployed people. In short, in abandoned places that became useless for the market and brought nothing but insecurity and health problems to the neighborhood, a sense of society and communal belonging began to emerge thanks to the assemblies. Though political power was not their aim, most neighborhood assemblies became an embryonic state, legitimized by the people living nearby and recognized by municipal authorities. The assemblies thus fomented political participation and a sense of civic duty and citizen responsibility.

The State Response: Incorporation

On April 27, 2003, Argentinians chose a new president to take office on May 25. The two candidates who received the highest percentages of the vote, former president Carlos Saúl Menem and the Santa Cruz province governor Néstor Kirchner, went to a second round on May 18. Both were from the Peronist Party, in power since 1989 with a two-year (2000–1) interlude, yet they had opposite views of how to deal with the crisis. Whereas Menem promised tough measures, including the use of the military, to end the protest, Kirchner declared his opposition to any form of repression. Furthermore, the former was inclined toward deepening the market reforms, while the latter favored an industrial growth model. The almost 80 percent of participation in the first round of presidential elections showed democracy’s deep roots in Argentina after its restoration in 1983. Indeed, the social protest and safety net-building experiences during the economic hardship and the 2002 crisis had only strengthened the engagement of Argentinian society with democracy and confirmed that military interference in domestic issues was history. Moreover, faced with a potentially massive defeat in the second round of the 2003 elections, Menem preferred to step out of the race and let his opponent have the presidency.

Within less than a year, Kirchner's popularity was boosted, the economy was stabilized, and exportation growth ensued. The government also successfully negotiated its foreign debt. On the domestic front, Kirchner left open lines of communication with the societal sector, and, as promised during his campaign, refused to use force against protesters. Moreover, he followed a strategy of incorporation by including several working-class leaders in official institutions.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Labor Unions and Protests of the Unemployed, 1990s; Argentina, *Piquetero* Movement; Argentina, Socialist and Communist Workers' Movement; *El Argentino*, December 19 and 20, 2001; Movement of Recuperated Factories, Argentina

References and Suggested Readings

- Algranati, C., Seoane, J., & Taddei, E. (2004). Neoliberalism and Social Conflict: The Popular Movements in Latin America. In F. Polet & CETRI (Eds.), *Globalizing Resistance: The State of Struggle*. Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press.
- Di Marco, L. (2006) El fogonero. *La Nación, suplemento Enfoques*. Buenos Aires, October 29.
- Grimson, A. & Kessler, G. (2005) *On Argentina and the Southern Cone: Neoliberalism and National Imaginations*. New York: Routledge.
- Novaro, M. (Ed.) (2002) *El derrumbe político en el ocaso de la convertibilidad*. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editorial Norma.
- Schuster, F. L., Naishtat, F. S., Nardacchione, G., & Pereyra, S. (Eds.) (2005) *Tomar la palabra: Estudios sobre protesta social y acción colectiva en la Argentina contemporánea*. Buenos Aires: Prometeo.
- Swampa, M. & Pereyra, S. (2003) *Entre la ruta y el barrio: La experiencia de las organizaciones piqueteras*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos.

Argentina, socialist and communist workers' movement

Eduardo Sartelli

The origins of socialism in Argentina go back to the second half of the nineteenth century and are linked to the action of typographers. The first workers' mutuality society, the Bonaerense Typographical Society, was organized in the 1850s. Soon, other similar organizations linked to corporate interests and ethnicity appeared. Most had an eclectic ideology, mixing utopian socialism

with republican liberalism. The best example of this convergence is the newspaper *El Artesano*, the first socialist publication in Argentina, which began to be published in 1863 by Bartolomé Victory y Suárez, a pioneer of the Argentine workers' movement and socialism. But it would be the typographers who made contacts with the International Workers' Association in 1870, and who were consequently chosen by the Marxist sector of the International to lead their expansion in Latin America. The presence of the International in Argentina was reinforced by a large number of exiles coming from the 1871 Paris Commune. Again the typographers played a prominent role by organizing the first union and carrying out the first strike in 1878. From then on the Argentine worker movement grew, accompanying the pace of the development of the working class after successive migration waves that caused it to grow in size and quality, considering the considerable union and political experience that many immigrants brought with them.

Socialist tendencies developed along with the growth of the working class and its trade unions, which would solidify in the extension of the socialist press and the organization of the Socialist Party. Examples of the first are *Le Révolutionnaire* (1875), *El Descamisado* (1879), and *El Socialista* (1877). The Socialist Party arose from the evolution of different groups, in particular from the action of German immigrants organized in the Club Vorwärts, founded in 1882. The Club was responsible for the organization of the first workers' federation, the Partido Obrero, the organization of the first May 1 commemoration, and for publishing a very influential newspaper, *El Obrero* (1890). *El Obrero*, whose main figure was Germán Ave Lallemand, had a clear Marxist inspiration. The 1890 crisis, with its social and political sequels, brought many intellectuals to nascent socialism, including the founder of the future Socialist Party, Juan B. Justo. By 1894, *La Vanguardia* began to be published. The oldest socialist newspaper in Argentina, *La Vanguardia* became the newspaper of Justo's party after its foundation two years later.

It would take several years for Justo to govern his party, especially against the left wing represented by Leopoldo Lugones and José Ingenieros, who had their own newspaper, *La Montaña*, which had promoted the legitimacy of violence and the refusal to ally with bourgeois parties. Under Justo's leadership the Socialist Party gained

a distinctive character, merging the ideas of the intellectual elite with a reformist program not far from democratic liberalism.

The party slowly expanded both in electoral and union influence. Electorally, it confronted the peculiar Argentine political system of the time: in formal terms, the regime was a full democracy, but in fact it was governed through fraud, through mechanisms guaranteeing the circulation of a few members of the political elite. As a result of Argentina's entrenched leadership, anarchism's anti-state and anti-political message resonated and received considerable popular support. Public antipathy for the established political system only changed with the passage of the Sáenz Peña Law in 1912 providing for mandatory, secret, and automatic voter registration.

From that moment on the party experienced exponential growth, overall in the city of Buenos Aires, making *La Vanguardia* a wide-circulation newspaper and turning its representatives into recognized political figures. Among the latter was a small circle of professionals linked by family ties: Justo, Nicolás Repetto, Enrique Dickman, and Alicia Moreau (Justo's wife). The circle incorporated figures with a relevance of their own, such as the lawyer Alfredo Palacios, the first socialist elected representative in the Americas (1904). Its reformist style, akin to Bernstein's German revisionism and to British Fabian socialism (yet directly influenced by the experiences of New Zealand and Australia), together with the "personality cult" toward Justo, earned the party criticisms from anarchists and revolutionary syndicalists, who judged it just one more bourgeois party. For similar reasons the party experienced a number of splits: the newly created International Socialist Party later turned into the Communist Party (1918), the Independent Socialist Party (1927), and the Worker Socialist Party (1936).

In the trade union world the Socialist Party gained only weak support. It was never the dominant choice among organized workers. Until 1910, it remained a minority *vis-à-vis* anarchism; between 1910 and 1920, it was weaker than revolutionary syndicalism; between 1920 and 1945, it was weaker than communism. Such ineffectual trade union roots were due to the fact that the Socialist Party was a reformist liberal party whose main field was the electoral parliamentary arena, which is where it obtained its major victories. During the 1930s the party grew closer to the Unión Cívica Radical, even though socialists

always criticized the *radicales* as a "populist" and "demagogic" party. The Socialist Party eventually allied with the Unión Cívica Radical against Peronism in 1945, fusing into an alliance known as the Unión Democrática. The electoral triumph of Peronism left the Socialist Party even further from the working class, moving toward an increasingly conservative ideology, a circumstance that provoked new splits with the creation of, on the left, the Argentine Vanguard Socialist Party and, on the right, the Democratic Socialist Party. The Socialist Party's atomization accelerated during the 1960s, at the same pace as society's political radicalization. The party's political decadence peaked with its support for the last military dictatorship (1976).

In Argentina, the most important split in the history of the Socialist Party is the one giving rise to the Communist Party. Before World War I, leftist tendencies within the party served as the basis for the organization of a group linked to the workers' movement. In 1917, the group edited *La Internacional* and adopted positions close to the Zimmerwaldian left against war and militarism. Their anti-war position clashed with that of the dominant group, whose agenda supported military actions against the allies, creating a split in the party that led to the formation of the International Socialist Party in 1918. The Russian Revolution permanently fused the split, after the dissident group openly expressed support for the Soviet Republic, accepted the conditions for joining the Third International, and adopted the name of the Communist Party.

In its early years the Communist Party experienced intense activism, leading it to gain the place vacated by the decline of anarchism during the 1920s. The Communist Party furthered strategies of political intervention first developed by the Socialist Party in a dispute with anarchists and syndicalists, to which the communists added a will to power lacking among socialists which they had learned from the Bolshevik program.

The Communist Party followed the swaying politics of the Communist International, positioning itself within the International as supportive of Stalinist tendencies. It practiced the class against class tactic until it received abrupt orders to join the Popular Front. During the 1930s the Communist Party expanded, notably among the workers, to the point of becoming the most powerful force within the CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo), assuming a protagonist role

in historical strikes such as that of construction workers in 1935, and in the organization of unions by productive branch, which replaced old anarchist unions with their local, artisanal bases.

Following the Popular Front tactic, the communists joined socialists and *radicales* in opposing electoral fraud in Argentina during the 1930s. In agreement with the Soviet Union's foreign policy, the Argentine Communist Party gave support to the pro-democratic positions that led most communist parties around the world to support their own bourgeoisies against the rise of fascism, especially after the invasion of the Soviet Union. This alliance with the liberal bourgeoisie culminated with the opposition to Peronism and the communists joining the Union Democrática.

With Perón in power, communism suffered a loss of union influence. Harassed and with many of its activists in prison, Argentine communism witnessed Perón's fall in 1955 with delight and tried to recuperate positions among the working class, which was hostile because of the Communist Party's anti-Peronism. Even though it regained a protagonist role during the 1960s, its support for Stalinism, added to its anti-Peronism, alienated the support of younger generations, who saw in Peronism and Guevarism a way out of the Communist Party's reformism and *de facto* "democratism."

A small group of activists within the party started to control its growing political apparatus. They were notably endowed with material resources and became politically and culturally influential. This situation led to divisions within the party. Some groups of youths were eager to reinterpret Peronism and to associate themselves with the dynamism of the Cuban Revolution. Several collectives would thus be formed, one of the most important among them, Past and Present, defending Guevarist tendencies closer to Peronism. Other tendencies led to the organization of guerilla groups such as FAR (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias). The most important, however, was provoked by the eruption of Maoism in 1968, which gave rise to the Revolutionary Communist Party. Even though severely damaged by the repression of the third Peronist government (1973–6), this group ended by giving its support to the military dictatorship of Videla, which they defined as *dictablanda* (or "soft dictatorship"). After the dictatorship (1982), the party became a shadow of its former self, with a

number of splits barely contained by the weight of an economic apparatus inherited from the past.

Support for Trotskyism appeared early in the Communist Party's history. Argentine Trotskyism developed in the 1930s, with weak appeal within the workers' movement and with a panoply of tendencies represented by small groups of intellectuals. Liborio Justo, Posadas, and Héctor Raurich were influential during this period. The first, the son of conservative president Agustín P. Justo, played a key role in the Trotskyist movement, opposing even Trotsky himself. Posadas, a former soccer player, organized a Trotskyist tendency close to the workers' movement, while Raurich's group consisted exclusively of intellectuals. During the years of Peronism new tendencies arose, in particular one known as *morenismo* from its founder Nahuel Moreno, who has had an enduring influence on the Argentine left. Another influential tendency in the formation of a "new left" in the 1970s was led by Silvio Frondizi and his group Praxis. As well as the Argentine left in general, both of these tendencies were influenced by the Cuban Revolution, which Frondizi openly supported. The *morenista* group joined *guevaristas* to found the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT), which was dominant in the left during the 1970s, especially once the *morenistas* left the party in the hands of its main figure, Mario Roberto Santucho. The PRT launched an armed struggle against the military dictatorship of General Onganía (1966–9) that continued until the 1976 military coup. Other Trotskyite groups, such as Política Obrera, and a renewed *morenismo* in the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, defended workerist positions, rejecting the guerilla strategy. The revolutionary process opened up by Cordobazo in 1969, the popular uprising in the city of Córdoba, made it possible for the left, especially *guevaristas* and Trotskyites, to achieve important breakthroughs among the workers, and their representatives were elected to leadership positions in unions, especially in unions' internal commissions. By that time the Maoists had split from the Communist Party.

The Peronist left deserves a treatment of its own. Emerging with the Resistencia Peronista (1955–62), it suffered the impact of anti-colonial struggles in Asia and Africa, as well as that of the Cuban Revolution. Its main concern was to effect Perón's return to Argentina from his enforced exile, although it was progressively influenced

by the remaining left as well as by a few Marxist intellectuals such as Rodolfo Puiggrós. These groups and tendencies, which had their most important expression in the guerilla group Montoneros, developed a confusing ideology which they characterized as “national socialism.” The Peronist left experienced serious difficulties in interpreting the political scenario that opened with Perón’s return and his third government. Despite its strong representation in the labor movement, the Peronist left resented its ambiguous position in relation to the Peronist government, which quickly moved to the right and carried out ruthless clandestine repression, in particular through the Alianza Anti-comunista Argentina (Triple A). Most of the victims of this repression were members of the Peronist left. Together with the PRT, Montoneros led vanguard labor groups and important worker organizations, who were key protagonists in the great general strike of June–July 1975. The mass of those “disappeared” by the military dictatorship came from these groups.

The March 1976 military coup definitively changed the political situation of the Argentine left. It marked the downfall of the *guevarista* and the Peronist left, and the definitive decline of the Communist and Socialist parties on account of their support for the military. Peronism was no longer a living force in the heart of the working class, leaving a legacy of leadership that remains vacant, despite the self-proclaimed heirs emerging from the Trotskyite and Maoist groups that are dominant in the contemporary Argentine left.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Argentina; Argentina, Armed Struggle and Guerilla Organizations, 1960s–1970s; Argentina, General Strike (*Semana Trágica*), 1919; Argentina, Labor Strikes of 1890 and 1902; Argentina, Worker Actions, October 17, 1945; Argentina, Worker Strikes in Patagonia, 1920–1921; Cordobazo and Rosariazo Uprising, 1969; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Marxism; Peronist Resistance; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- Campione, D. (2005) *El comunismo en Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones del CCC.
- Coggiola, O. (2006) *Historia del trotskismo en Argentina y América Latina*. Buenos Aires. Ediciones ryr.
- Corbiere, E. (1984) *Orígenes del comunismo argentino*. Buenos Aires: CEAL.
- Moreau de Justo, A. (1983) *Qué es el socialismo*. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.
- Vazeilles, J. (1968) *Los socialistas*. Buenos Aires: Jorge Álvarez Editor.

Argentina, University Reform, 1918

Rosana López Rodríguez

The University Reform of 1918 was a milestone in Argentina and Latin American student struggles, resulting in the installation of democratic principles that are still intrinsic to university systems today. These principles and reforms include: university autonomy, co-governance of university councils, fair and open admission procedures, selection of university officials through public examination and democratic means rather than by nepotism and seniority, and substantive academic freedom to insure a plurality of ideas. The movement for reform also had a strong impact on wider social struggles, especially with regard to worker–student collaboration, which helped the reforms to take on a politically progressive slant.

Though originally localized in the National University of Cordoba during the presidency of Hipólito Yrigoyen, Argentina’s 1918 University Reform eventually altered the entire Argentinian university structure. The process was framed within the development of electoral democracy in Argentina and was one outcome of the 1912 Sáenz Peña Law, which established compulsory, secret, universal suffrage (for males) and resulted in the elimination of electoral fraud. Once the new law was brought into effect, conservative groups were displaced from the management of state affairs by the Union Civica Radical (Radical Civil Union), a left-leaning and ultimately powerful political party.

The University Reform was born out of this changing political climate and began in Cordoba because the power of conservative oligarchs and the Catholic Church was greater there than in other areas. Though an air of intellectual backwardness and political conservatism was present in all Argentinian universities, in Cordoba it was perceived to be more pronounced. The 1918 reforms were preceded by student agitation as early as 1903 and 1904, when a powerful strike movement brought universities to a halt.

The factors that triggered the reform movements initially did not seem to foreshadow any serious upheaval, being primarily scheduling problems and some pedagogical demands. Still, these factors would eventually bring an end to an

archaic governmental university structure. Until the era of reform, University Boards of Directors were not subject to reelection or a similar process, but instead belonged to a group called *Corda Frates*, members of which held lifelong positions and were linked by political, ideological, and at times kinship bonds. The group essentially held control of all university positions and worked alongside the political and clerical elite that governed the province. Higher education was marked by a pointedly right-wing Catholic viewpoint, and curricula were remarkably anti-scientific. Libraries lacked any books that might contradict the domineering ideology in the boards, most notably works by Charles Darwin and Karl Marx.

The conflict that led to the University Reform began at the end of 1917 with the protests of engineering students who opposed new regulations imposed regarding attendance. Students of medicine also joined in this protest, as they rejected the removal of the patient beds at the Hospital Nacional de Clínicas. In March the following year, after creating student centers and demanding changes to university governance policies that were not met by university authorities, students reacted violently and authorities resorted to a call for police intervention. In the wake of the first reactions, a pro-reform committee was set up. In light of the events – disturbances to prevent students' enrollment, repudiation of professors, collective absence, for example – the authorities closed the university until further notice. A month later, the committee asked for the intervention of President Yrigoyen, who consented and was appointed mediator. Meanwhile, the movement provoked repercussions throughout the country and the FUA (Argentine University Federation) was founded. At Cordoba, the new reforms, which many hoped would take effect with the replacement of the old chancellor, did not go through. Instead, the new chancellor was elected through the conservative groups' influence and had the explicit support of the church of Cordoba. The students prevented the new chancellor, Nores, who was affiliated with *Corda Frates*, from taking power, and the struggle intensified. In the following months there were arrests, protests, occupations of buildings, and other disturbances. The demonstrations had public support and the support of the workers' movement, and included as many as 10,000 people demonstrating in the streets of Cordoba.

The movement led to the extension of student organizations, and Cordoba was the host of the first national student congress organized by FUA. Finally, and as a result of the student struggle, Nores resigned in August, paving the way for a new executive power. Yrigoyen failed to intervene in a manner consistent with student demands, and the students occupied the university by surprise, appointing authorities and resuming their lessons. Afterwards, the conflict came to an end, leaving the university government in the hands of the reformists.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, General Strike (*Semana Trágica*), 1919; Argentina, *Semana Roja*, 1909; Student Movements; Student Movements, Global South

References and Suggested Readings

- Ciria, A. & Sanguinetti, H. (1968) *Los reformistas*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Jorge Álvarez.
 Rock, D. (1984) *El radicalismo argentino, 1890–1930*. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu.
 Hurtado, G. (1990) *Estudiantes: reforma y revolución*. Buenos Aires: Cartago.

Argentina, worker actions, October 17, 1945

Alejandro Horowicz

The battle fought and won on October 17, 1945 by workers through a massive mobilization in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires brings class struggle into the arena of parliamentary politics in Argentina. It was a decisive victory. Between 1930 and 1945, the period of military government known as the era of “patriotic fraud” made it impossible for workers and other citizens to vote. Prior to those years, most workers were foreigners and therefore did not vote. Through the October 17 mobilization, workers achieved a new status, acquiring full political citizenship under their own leadership and initiative.

The October 17 action was the culmination of a series of important events. On October 13, Cipriano Reyes, a veteran leader of the union of meat workers, which was affiliated not with the General Confederation of Labor (Confederación General del Trabajo, CGT) but with the Comité de Enlace Intersindical (Interunion Liaison Committee), requested its Federal Central

Committee (Comité Central Confederal) to call a meeting for a general strike. General Avalos, chief of the military center in Campo de Mayo, who had been responsible for stripping Juan Perón of his positions as vice-president of the republic, war minister, and secretary of labor, met Luís Monzalvo, a representative from the railway workers' union then in charge of the CGT General Secretariat, at the war ministry on October 15.

Monzalvo informed the general that the working class was ready to strike. On October 16, the Federal Central Committee met and after a passionate debate decided to support the strike as workers were advancing over the city of Buenos Aires from all directions. Silverio Pontieri, a railway worker acting as CGT general secretary, assessed the situation in the following terms: "The managerial class has declared war on Colonel Perón, not because of Perón himself, but because of what he has done for the workers, to whom he has granted the demands they were seeking as well as others they had not even dreamt of . . . The Capitalist class here as well as in the entire world seems to have forgotten that the war against Fascism has been won by the workers; thus they pretend to return to the previous situation of injustice, denying [the workers] what legitimately belongs to them." Pontieri insisted that it was the CGT's duty "to lead this defensive movement of the workers" (Anon. 1973).

The nature of the debate poses problems. First, protagonists established a relationship between Perón's fall and his social democratic policies at the department of labor. Second, they ascribed a defensive character to the move they needed to execute, seeing it as a question of preserving their gains. Third, they believed themselves to be operating in a situation of internal conflicts and splits within the armed forces, even though their analytical precision was less acute on this point. Despite understanding the political nature of the dispute, the movement's leadership placed itself to the right of the workers: the CGT did not categorically endorse a claim for Perón's release, only pleading against turning power over to the Supreme Court. The workers, on the other hand, mobilized behind a clear slogan: Freedom for Perón. For the CGT leadership, the question was not to transform its organization into the basis of a new political structure, but to decide on the struggle between

union organizations in the political arena. That is, it did not understand that a new political order was in the making.

The Military Crisis

Rival factions within the military dealt with their conflicts by proposing either to transfer the government from General Edelmiro Farrell to the Supreme Court (Admiral Héctor Vernengo Lima's position) or to keep Farrell in power (the position of Eduardo Avalos, chief of the army). Vernengo Lima counted on the support of the protesters in the October 12 March of Liberty, including conservatives, socialists, communists, and members of the Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union, UCR), while Avalos counted only on military support from the Campo de Mayo. The only person with the workers' full support was Colonel Perón, yet Avalos had overthrown him. Avalos needed Perón in order not to be outmaneuvered by the navy. Considering that the workers also needed Perón to guarantee the stability of their gains, the October 17 movement clearly had a defensive character. The challenge ahead consisted of "stopping Vernengo while making sure power was not left in the hands of the Supreme Court; otherwise, both Farrell and Avalos would be sent to the prison in Martín García to accompany Perón" (Horowicz 2007: 90).

Tellingly, it was not the CGT but the least organic leadership that was closer to the feelings of the mobilized workers. The Interunion Liaison Committee had for three days between October 15 and 17 encouraged and maintained the workers' mobilization. On October 15, workers marched in La Plata and Berisso, and on the 16th they tried to reach the city of Buenos Aires, only to find the southern access to the city across the Avellaneda Bridge blocked. It was only on October 17 that the inconceivable happened: the workers entered the citadel of the ruling classes.

The issue at stake was not an alliance between a nationalist army faction and the working class, but a situation in which the immediate interests of the military faction headed by Avalos and those of the CGT coincided. The army groups of Campo de Mayo represented by Avalos had placed in danger the social democratic policies of Colonel Perón. If Avalos had not plotted against Perón on October 9, October 17 would not have happened. Thus, if Avalos let the mobilized workers cross the Avellaneda Bridge, it was

not due to police complicity in exaggerating the numbers of protesters, but because of his need to guarantee his own place in events. Working-class mobilization was required to oppose Admiral Vernengo Lima.

Through the cracks in the military conflict slipped thin lines of industrial workers. Of course, this was not a revolution passing underneath the horse's belly, as Leon Trotsky describes 1917 in his *History of the Russian Revolution*. It was not the working class winning over a decisive faction of the armed forces to its own cause. Rather, it was the majority of military officialdom determining that the labor movement's defensive mobilization included them.

October Days

October 17 was not a revolutionary strike, a pre-insurreccional mobilization, or a scaled-down democratic revolution. Rather, it marked the birth of political Peronism. Surrounding the center of the bourgeois citadel with the instruments of trade union struggle, workers gained political citizenship by their own means. For the CGT leadership, it was not a question of trying to transform the trade union organization into a launching pad for a new political structure, but one of determining a union struggle in the broader political arena. October 17 was the extreme limit; in its debate of October 16, the CGT had made it clear that revolution was not on its program.

The mobilization did not seek to reinstate Colonel Perón to his three previous positions, thereby restoring matters to the situation that existed before October 9. These were not the terms of the military dispute, and the workers' movement did not even consider them. The important thing was to stop Vernengo Lima and to let the forthcoming elections determine whose perspective would oversee the reorganization of Argentinian society.

Perón did not organize October 17, which Peronists acknowledge by calling it the Day of Loyalty. In other words, when Perón no longer possessed authority, when his power had evaporated and he could command neither from the heart nor on the ground, loyal workers rescued him from the hands of his civilian and military enemies and installed him in the balcony of the Casa Rosada (Government House). Perón, in his own way, was always clear about this.

Throughout his extended political career, he devoted himself to preventing another October 17 and impeding workers from responding to political differences between the ruling classes through direct mobilization. This was the task that Perón claimed for himself.

October 17 was a legal mass mobilization of opposition forces, but it was not yet a struggle. It was both a popular and workers' mobilization, but it set no limits on bourgeois politics. "It is mobilization for a military leader by the workers' movement, without military mobilization in defense of the workers' movement" (Horowicz 2007: 95). For the army, on the other hand, October 17 was the moment when it became clear that governing Argentina was not a military task, unless the ruling classes decided otherwise. The parties had reorganized and their alternative programs were conducive to perpetuating the bourgeois state. From that point on, all government parties would be parties of state seeking legitimacy by electoral means. The army's time would come again. Until then, the army's loyalty to the chief was rewarded with the participation of the armed forces in the national budget.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Armed Struggle and Guerilla Organizations, 1960s–1970s; Argentina, Human Rights Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Anon. (1973) *La CGT y el 17 de octubre de 1945*. Actas del Comité Central Confederal. *Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente*, n.s., 2–3 (July/December). Buenos Aires.
 Horowicz, A. (2007) *Los Cuatro Peronismos*. Buenos Aires: Edhasa.

Argentina, worker strikes in Patagonia, 1920–1921

Horacio Tarcus

The first large rural strike in Patagonia took place in November 1920 in Santa Cruz, a wool-exporting area dominated by large *latifundios* and British meatpacking plants.

In October 1920, police arrested several leaders from the city of Río Gallegos's Miscellaneous Craft Workers' Society (Sociedad Obrera de Oficios Varios), an organizational member of the syndicalist Argentine Regional Workers'

Federation (Federación Obrera Regional Argentina, FORA IX). Led by Antonio Soto, the Sociedad Obrera demanded the release of detainees as well as a number of measures to improve the conditions of both rural and commercial workers. Initially prisoners were released, but Soto proposed to continue with the struggle until their economic demands were met as well, pending the arrival of the radical new governor, A. Guzmán Iza, a member of the Radical Civic Union (Union Civica Radical, UCR). When toward the middle of January 1921 the federal government of President Hipólito Yrigoyen, also of the UCR, sent military forces to occupy Río Gallegos under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Héctor Benigno Varela, the new governor arrived in town and awarded a decision favorable to the strikers. Soto then distributed a pamphlet announcing the lifting of the strike, judging the outcome a great victory for the workers.

However, by September 1921, *estancia* (cattle ranch) owners and large merchants decided not to honor the governor's decision, ostensibly because of a decline in the international price of wool. Manuel Outerelo, an anarchist of Galician origin as well as a delegate of the workers at the Port of Santa Cruz to the regional Workers' Federation, called for a general strike and the reinstatement of dismissed workers among other demands. Faced with an extension of the strike, the federal government dispatched a new military expedition headed by Varela, which this time left more than 1,500 rural workers dead.

At the beginning of November, leaders of the Port of Santa Cruz's Sociedad Obrera were detained, beaten up, and sent as prisoners to Buenos Aires. Nevertheless, Outerelo continued visiting *estancias* to recruit rural workers and collect food and arms for the strikers. On November 16, 1921, he and 400 other strikers occupied Paso Ibáñez and resisted military troops by using *estanciero* and police hostages as shields. Outerelo sent a commission to the Port of Santa Cruz, led by Avendaño, to negotiate an agreement. The workers' delegates met with the captain of the *Almirante Brown*, the ship that was guarding the Armour meatpacking plant, yet he refused to negotiate. The commission also went to the meatpacking plant, threatening a general strike if troops were sent in again.

On November 23, Outerelo met Varela in Paso Ibáñez. In response to Varela's demand for

unconditional surrender, Outerelo opted to continue the strike and not to abandon workers in other regions. Avendaño argued in favor of surrender. However, both leaders agreed to release the hostages and called an assembly of strikers to decide on further action. Outerelo hoped to win the motion for a strike if he could persuade the workers from Puerto San Julián, led by José Albino Argüelles. He was later murdered along with more than 30 other workers, while the remaining 400 or so strikers were arrested on December 1, 1921 in the vicinity of Cañadón León. At his execution, Outerelo addressed the firing squad so persuasively that its members refused to shoot him. He was eventually killed by an army captain using a saber.

With the murder of Outerelo and the defeat of his group controlling the strike movement in the center of the region, both Soto in the south and Jose "Facón Grande" Font, a leader in the north, were left isolated, and the victory of Varela was secured. For his part, the leader of San Julián's Sociedad Obrera, socialist José Albino Argüelles, proposed carrying out boycotts and other measures to force *estancieros* to comply with the workers' demands. Later, he and his followers joined the second Patagonian strike after witnessing widespread rural worker support for unions in other cities in the region. On their way to the San José *estancia* to help its workers to organize, Argüelles and a group of strikers were met by a cavalry force led by Captain Elbio Carlos Anaya. Despite Argüelles's attempt to negotiate, he was executed by Anaya.

Toward the end of September 1921, the office of the Workers' Federation was raided and its leaders were arrested. The target of the attacks, Antonio Soto, resigned from his position as union secretary and started to prepare for action, calling for a strike in those places where workers' demands had not been met and condemning petty theft by some of the members. On October 21, Soto distributed a pamphlet calling for the people of Río Gallegos to go on strike until union leaders were released, thus ratifying the call for a general strike launched by the few members of the Workers' Federation who had not yet been arrested. Toward the end of October, Soto and his men were influential in instigating a rebellion in the southeastern part of the territory of Santa Cruz.

At the beginning of November, while traveling to Río Gallegos to meet with the governor,

leaders accompanying Soto were arrested by the police. Isolated, Soto reorganized his column around the *estancia* of La Anita, which became the movement's general headquarters. At the end of November, an encounter with army troops left several strikers dead and many wounded. Until early December 1921, Soto and his 600 men dominated the area of Lake Argentino and Lake Viedma. From La Anita, the group sent parties of strikers to other *estancias*, entering clandestinely to take supplies and leaving credit notes for the value of the confiscated goods. When news reached him of the executions of the strikers led by Outerelo and Avendaño at Paso Ibáñez, Soto decided not to meet Varela.

At dawn on December 7, 1921, army troops descended upon the strikers concentrated in La Anita. Soto tried to convince his fellow workers that the army could not be trusted and that they had to flee in order to continue the strike. Despite his pleas, the assembly decided to send two delegates to negotiate; they were killed soon after meeting the troops. Soto rejected the majority decision to surrender unconditionally and escaped to Chile along with a few followers. With Soto gone, the Sociedad Obrera ceased to exist.

The final attempt at resistance was led by José "Facón Grande" Font, who headed a column of men through the northern part of the territory of Santa Cruz, recruiting people and taking horses from *estancias* along the way. At Tehuelches train station on December 20, 1921, Font's men confronted army troops, leaving three strikers and one soldier dead. Through the intermediary of one of the *estanciero* hostages from the Fitz Roy station, Font negotiated an agreement with Varela by telephone. Afterwards he went to the army headquarters in Jaramillo to negotiate the demands of the strikers, but both he and the strikers were executed and buried in a common grave.

On January 27, 1923, Lieutenant Varela was shot by German-born anarchist Kurt Gustav Wilckens in Palermo, a neighborhood of Buenos Aires.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Argentina; Argentina, General Strike (*Semana Trágica*), 1919; Argentina, *Grito de Alcorta* Peasant Rebellion, 1912; Argentina, Labor Strikes of 1890 and 1902; Argentina, Socialist and Communist Workers' Movements

References and Suggested Readings

- Bayer, O. (1978) *Los vengadores de la Patagonia trágica*. Buenos Aires: Galerna, 1971–1973, Vols. 1–3; Essen, Germany: Hammer, Vol. 4.
- Suriano, J. (2001) *Anarquistas: Cultura y Política libertaria en Buenos Aires, 1890–1910*. Buenos Aires: Manatíal.

Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (b. 1953)

Thierry Saintime

Jean-Bertrand Aristide was the leader of the Haitian Rebellion of 1980–90, which culminated in the deposition of the US-imposed dictatorship of François and Jean-Paul Duvalier. As a young Catholic priest in the 1980s, Aristide used his pulpit to rally the destitute peasantry for economic justice and democracy. He was instrumental in organizing the Haitian peasantry to engage in mass resistance against the military-dominated government through advocacy of economic equality and democratic rights for all citizens of Haiti. Following the overthrow of the Duvalier regime, Aristide decisively won a popular election as the first democratic president of Haiti since independence in 1804.

Aristide was born on July 15, 1953 in Port-Salut, Haiti, but grew up in Port-au-Prince, under the care of priests of the Salesian order of the Roman Catholic Church. Accordingly he was educated in Salesian parochial schools. He then studied at the University of Haiti and left Port-au-Prince for advanced biblical studies in Israel, Egypt, Canada, and Britain. He was ordained in the Salesian order in 1982 but in 1988 was expelled for preaching radical ideas and criticizing Haiti's lack of democracy. He was accused of inciting the poor against the state by increasing their awareness of their oppression.

In the early 1980s Haiti was dominated by the Duvalier dynasty. The US-backed army installed François "Papa Doc" Duvalier in 1957, and he was succeeded by his son Jean-Paul, "Baby Doc," in 1971. Aristide's career as a preacher began under Baby Doc's reign, enforced by the *tontons macoutes* ("cannibal uncles") military corps, whose sole purpose was to report, arrest, and kill all opponents of the government and to counter all emergent opposition

movements. The militia was known for its fierce brutality and slaughter of thousands of Haitians seeking greater equality and democracy. Aristide used the pulpit to publicly denounce the dereliction, inequality, injustice, corruption, and violence of the Duvalier government and *tontons macoutes*.

In 1985, at the age of 35, Aristide founded Ti Legliz (little church), a theological liberation group composed mainly of peasants and urban workers, which spread rapidly throughout the nation through the Haitian Catholic Church. Aristide used the Catholic Church to reach out to Haiti's poor and dispossessed in both the rural areas and major cities. It was the first time in Haiti that a priest was delivering liberation and anti-oppression speeches instead of biblical scriptures. He faced many threats and assassination attempts, but he continued his radical and revolutionary sermons, in effect launching a national mobilization against the Duvalier regime.

On February 7–8, 1986, after months of popular demonstrations and aided by the army and its chief, General Henry Namphy, Duvalier was forced out of office and out of the country. Namphy proclaimed himself the new ruler of the country until new elections, which he promised would take place in November of the same year. Instead, the country went through four years of coup after coup and leader after leader, and the result was Haiti's rapid economic, social, and political deterioration.

During those four very tumultuous years, Aristide's popularity and political presence grew stronger. For one, amidst the violence and power struggles, the country's other leaders had lost all respect and trust of the Haitian population. Aside from that, two events played important roles in Aristide's rise into the presidency. The first was one of the several attempts on his life in September 1987 while he was leading mass at his parish of St. Jean Bosco. At about 9.15 a.m. on Sunday morning of September 11, 20 men, all wearing red handkerchiefs on their left arm (sign of the *tontons macoutes* corps) and armed with guns, machetes, and sticks, took the church and its congregation hostage, threatening to kill them all if they did not turn over Father Aristide, who had mysteriously disappeared with the help of some of the parishioners. Sixty to seventy people were severely wounded and a dozen killed; Aristide blamed himself

for the massacre. Then, months later, the St. Francis De la Sale priests' association expelled Aristide from the church and priesthood, accusing him of using the church for his personal and political agenda. These last two events brought home to Aristide the depth of the political anarchy clouding the island and led him to run for president to push forth his social agenda.

Aristide won the December 1990 presidential election with nearly 70 percent of the total votes. At age 37, then, he entered history by becoming the first democratically elected president of Haiti since its birth in 1804. Once in power he remained true to his radical and revolutionary ideologies: "Power for the people." It was also the first time that there was a direct relation and communication between the government and the population. Several local and regional movements were formed to keep the government abreast of the various communities' needs and requests. Even Haiti's judiciary and legal system, nearly nonexistent since the fall of the Duvalier regime, seemed functional again. Economically, the country appeared to be moving toward a brighter path as well. Aristide's senior delegation, sent to Paris to attend a World Bank international lenders conference, was successful in obtaining promises of a \$442 million loan for the reconstruction of the country. Haiti finally seemed to be taking steps toward a promising future.

Seven months into the presidency, the army staged a coup. Joseph Nerette was made president, but army commander Raoul Cedras held the real power. Cedras justified the coup on the claim that Aristide was forming a secret and personal armed corps of about 300 men (later known as "Attachés") and that he was creating a dangerous conflict between the affluent class and the poor. Many prosperous business men and women who lived in the hills of Port-au-Prince and owned more than 70 percent of the country's wealth echoed Cedras's latter claim, insisting that during the seven months of Aristide's reign, they were in constant fear for their lives and property. They cited Aristide's speeches, such as the one in which he told listeners: "my famished, unemployed, uneducated and broke men, women and children, if the sun is burning you, if your stomach is growling, your kids can't go to school . . . and you look up in the hills at your brothers and sisters who have more than they

need, I say go to those hills and ask them for a slice, a piece of bread, a penny, ask them for shelter” as the reason for their fear.

Aristide rallied international support and the military regime was forced to back down. He returned to Haiti in late 1994 to complete his presidential term. He then disbanded the Haitian army and created instead a civilian police force. The Haitian constitution does not allow for consecutive terms, so when Aristide’s presidency expired in 1996 his ally and former prime minister, Rene Preval, ran as his successor and garnered 88 percent of the vote. This was the first democratic and peaceful power transition in Haiti.

Aristide ran for a second term in 2000 and won under the newly created Fanmi Lavalas Party. However, most opposition parties boycotted the election, creating a crisis in legitimacy from the beginning. Aristide’s government was dependent upon foreign aid, and the US, Canada, and France led an embargo on some types of aid, leaving him vulnerable to a coup attempt. This led to a rebellion by an armed gang sponsored by the US and France in 2004, and Aristide’s departure from Haiti for a second time, in what many observers view as a kidnapping. He went to South Africa and earned a doctorate in African languages from the University of South Africa in 2007.

SEE ALSO: Haiti, Democratic Uprising, 1980s–1991; Haiti, Foreign-Led Insurgency, 2004; Haiti, Protest and Rebellion, 20th Century; Haiti, Resistance to US Occupation; Haiti, Revolutionary Struggles

References and Suggested Readings

- Aristide, J. B. (2000) *Eyes of the Heart: Seeking a Path for the Poor in the Age of Globalization*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
- Chomsky, N., Goodman, A., & Farmer, P. (2004) *Getting Haiti Right This Time: The US and the Coup*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
- Dupuy, A. (2006) *The Prophet and Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti, and the International Community*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hallward, P. (2008) *Damming the Flood: Haiti, Aristide and the Politics of Containment*. New York: Verso.
- Robinson, R. (2007) *An Unbroken Agony: Haiti from Revolution to the Kidnapping of a President*. New York: Basic Civitas Books.
- Wilentz, A. (1990) *The Rainy Season: Haiti since Duvalier*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Armenia, mass protest and popular mobilization, 1980s to present

Khatchik DerGhougassian

Armenian “Terrorism” as a Diaspora Phenomenon

Between 1975 and 1985, an estimated total of 222 violent actions were perpetrated against targets related to the Turkish state or Turkish interests, in approximately 20 western and non-western countries, including former Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, both at that time under a socialist regime. Armenian secret organizations claimed responsibility for these acts perpetrated in demand of the recognition of the Armenian genocide (1915–23), as well as moral and material reparations, often formulated in terms of the devolution of the Armenian historical homeland – Western Armenia – in today’s eastern Turkey. The RAND Corporation characterized the geographical scope of these actions as the broadest of its time, not equalized by any other group.

According to an early observer of what the Armenian press called “armed propaganda,” more commonly labeled “Armenian terrorism,” some 20 organizations released public statements either claiming responsibility for an action or to announce the formation, aim, and course of action. Nevertheless, only two groups stand as the leading organizations that generated the phenomenon: the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). The former had a national orientation, limiting the scope of its actions to the Turkish state, whereas ASALA defined the struggle in the broader context of anti-imperialism and seldom targeted both Turkish non-state objectives (including the civil population) and western interests. A third organization, the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA), closer to the ideological position of the JCAG, became widely known after five of its members occupied the Turkish embassy in Lisbon (Portugal) on

July 27, 1983, blowing themselves up during the operation. The last important action of Armenian “terrorism” was the occupation of the Turkish embassy in Ottawa (Canada) on March 14, 1985 by three members of the ARA, who eventually gave themselves up to the Canadian government. After the Ottawa operation, the phenomenon of Armenian “terrorism” came to an end, although some of the organizations continued releasing public statements. The legacy of the decade made an important political impact on what is widely known as the Armenian cause.

Armenian “terrorism” stands apart from the terrorism usually linked to liberation movements in that it constitutes primarily a protest against the denial and forgetting of the 1915 Armenian genocide. Nevertheless, it pursued a political agenda more broadly known as the Armenian cause, the up-to-date characterization of the nineteenth-century Armenian Question. Furthermore, Armenian “terrorism” is a phenomenon proper to the Diaspora in that it is the violent expression of a struggle for memory, truth, recognition, and reparation; yet, it also has deep roots in terms of a historical legacy dating back to the Armenian national liberation struggle at the end of the nineteenth century in the Ottoman and Russian empires, when Armenian revolutionaries used terrorist tactics widely practiced at that time by other, usually anarchist and leftist, but also national liberation, revolutionary movements. The immediate antecedent of the 1975–85 Armenian “terrorism” closely linked to the 1915 genocide, however, is Operation Nemesis, popularized in the Diaspora as “the Armenian Nuremberg,” which aimed at punishing the Turkish Ottoman government officials who planned, organized, and executed the mass extermination plan of the Armenians. Yet, precisely because it was a Diaspora phenomenon, Armenian “terrorism” was strategically limited in terms of evolution toward guerilla warfare or mass mobilization. Its only achievement was making the “forgotten” genocide visible worldwide, first in the mass media, and later in international forums. This limitation notwithstanding, Armenian “terrorism” had a deep impact on the politicization of the Diaspora. In fact, it helped the institutionalization of political activism for the Armenian cause, and in this sense it left a strong political and cultural legacy.

Motivations, Strategic Aims, and the International Context of the “Forgotten” Genocide

Both a psychological and a political-strategic approach to understanding Armenian “terrorism” are useful. The resort to violence in 1975–85 reflects both the psychology of the victim and a strategic choice in the political struggle for the Armenian cause. Moreover, both approaches are complementary when the phenomenon is studied in context, that is, within the social conditions of the Diaspora and the particular international situation of the historical moment. In fact, Armenian “terrorism” cannot be understood without looking at the trauma of the 1915 genocide and its centrality to the social construction of the Diaspora, as well as the learning process and intellectual interaction of its ideologues with the international environment. In other words, Armenian “terrorism” is both a singular phenomenon and circumscribed in what David Rapoport has considered the third “new left wave” of terrorism, though with a marked presence of elements of the second “anti-colonial wave.”

As every human tragedy, the mass extermination of the Armenians in the Ottoman empire from 1915 to 1923 has its singular characteristic. For more than 50 years, from 1915 to 1965, it has been “forgotten” by the world following the self-imposed amnesia of the World War I Allies. There are five main reasons for the emergence of the “Great Silence,” a term coined by the Armenian writer Berj Zeituntsians in one of his plays, about the Armenian genocide. First, official Turkish denial, as the Republic founded by Mustafa Kemal (known as Atatürk) never recognized the responsibility of the Young Turks government in the official planning and execution of arguably the first crime against humanity in the twentieth century. Over the years following the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, which ambiguously claimed to be both the successor of the Ottoman empire and a break from it, official Turkish policy varied from silence to open denial, questioning of the historical truth, and a rationalization and relativization of the facts.

Second, the economic and strategic interests of the Great Powers: the geopolitical position of Turkey as a “benevolent” neutral during World War II, as well as a Cold War NATO ally

crucial for the containment of the Soviet Union, provided the political rationale for the West to accept Ankara's policy of denial. In this sense, the Armenian Question, as it was formulated on the international agenda by the end of the nineteenth century, within the broader context of the Oriental Question, became a disturbing detail after World War I, and was taken out of the international agenda after World War II.

Third, it was impossible for the Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) of Armenia to lead an international process for justice because of its lack of sovereignty; the Soviet Union, in turn, had no intention of assuming the initiative (neighborly relations with Turkey became a diplomatic tradition with the strategic cooperation of the Bolsheviks with Mustafa Kemal against the Allies in the early 1920s). Fourth, the Diaspora was not ready for a massive political mobilization, as it was in the early stages of formation and organization. Fifth, it was not until 1944 that Raphael Lemkin conceived of the concept of "genocide" as a legal term. However, Lemkin had no doubt about the planned and systematic nature of the 1915–23 massacres.

The Diaspora as a Nation in Exile: Memory as Identity

The organized Armenian communal presence outside its historical homeland is not a twentieth-century phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is only after the 1915 genocide and the Sovietization of Armenia that the Armenian dispersion was identified as a "Diaspora." The word was rarely, if ever, used before these founding events of a new Armenian national identity. In fact, as a common concept it came into being in early 1930s when the hopes for a rapid solution to the Armenian Question, and hence the return of the survivors of the genocide to their homeland, started to fade away. In short, Diaspora was defined as a temporary existence forced upon the Armenians by the genocide; its aim could be nothing less than return to the homeland once the international conditions became favorable again and justice was done. This particular self-awareness of the Armenian identity in Diaspora also provided an organizational principle for the communities, which were designed as closed structures consisting of institutions where cultural particularity was preserved and perpetuated. Political emancipation in Diaspora was firmly grounded upon the centrality of the memory and the

preservation of national identity and cultural heritage.

The Critical Juncture: 1965

The fiftieth anniversary of the genocide, however, became a critical moment for the evolution of the Diaspora and Soviet Armenia. For the first time, the commemoration of the genocide became a popular mobilization and demand for justice. An agreement between the three main political organizations of the Diaspora provided the grounds for massive rallies in almost all Armenian communities in the world, demanding recognition and reparations for the genocide. In Soviet Armenia, for the first time since 1920, the silent commemorations of the anniversary of the genocide led to a popular outburst with the provocative cry of "Our lands! Our lands!," referring to Western Armenia. For almost three days the government lost control of the situation and risked a military intervention from Moscow if order was not restored. To both the Diaspora and Soviet Armenia, the fiftieth anniversary of the genocide meant a critical juncture with the revival of the Armenian cause in forthcoming years. Understandably, only in the Diaspora was the struggle politicized in terms of public demands, and ultimately the use of violence. The critical juncture of 1965 was the consequence of the coalescence of three factors: the coming of age of a third generation of Armenians in the Diaspora since the genocide; the persistence of the silence about the crime; and the international context. Indeed, the Armenians born in Diaspora who came of age in the late 1960s and 1970s were the grandchildren of genocide survivors. This generation was not faced with the survival problem of their grandparents or the need for success in business as a way of integration and assimilation, as had been their parents, the generation of the 1940s and the aftermath of World War II. Moreover, the third generation of Diaspora Armenians was the generation that grew up within ghettoized community institutions, foreseen by their parents as the way of preserving their national identity while waiting for the day of redemption – the massive return to the Fatherland. The third generation is also the generation of Armenians who received higher education, started to wander outside the community, and were much more politically engaged with the world than the generation of their fathers, who usually defined engagement in the

struggle with the preservation of a national identity. It is precisely this contact with the world that drove the third generation of Armenians to question the persistent international silence about the genocide in a world that had condemned the Holocaust in Nuremberg and created the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948. Preserving the national culture, identity, and memory through passivity in politics did not satisfy them anymore, as they witnessed how the very element perpetuating national identity, the Armenian language, was already vanishing from everyday life. The third generation also grew up with Vietnam, May '68 in France, and Palestinian emancipation following the Six Days' War of 1967. The international context of the late 1960s and 1970s, of detente and the emergence of Third World politics, thus motivated the third generation to begin a new phase of politicization of the Armenian cause through direct action.

Recognition and Beyond: Analyzing the Actors and the Actions of Armenian "Terrorism"

The Persistent Political Culture of the Struggle for National Liberation

The international context of the 1970s motivated and encouraged the 1975–85 Armenian "terrorism"; however, the latter was part of a political culture forged in the late nineteenth-century national liberation struggle, which persisted in the collective memory of the Diaspora. Moreover, at least for a considerable sector of the Diaspora, the legacy of this political culture formed an essential element of both identity and destiny to fulfill. Largely inspired by the activists of Narodnaya Volya (late nineteenth-century Russian organization struggling against autocracy), Armenian revolutionaries used terrorist acts against specific targets, usually to punish traitors or (Turkish or Russian) government officials and agents identified as repressors, as well as for tactical ends such as propaganda aiming to attract international attention to the Armenian Question (e.g., the occupation of the Ottoman Bank on August 14, 1896 or the 1905 assassination attempt of Sultan Abdul Hamid II).

An immediate antecedent of the Armenian "terrorism" of 1975–85 was the Nemesis Operation against Turkish officials who planned and

executed the extermination of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915. The secret decision was made during the Ninth World Assembly of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF-Dashnagtsutiun) in 1919, and implemented from 1921 to 1923. After World War I, members of the Union and Progress government were condemned as war criminals, yet the sentences of the martial court were never implemented, as they became fugitives, living hidden in Europe. Under the leadership of Garo Armenian and Shahan Natali, a group of selected militants – Soghomon Tehlirian, Aram Yerganian, Arshavir Shirakian, and Missak Torlakian among others – tracked the minister of interior affairs and those responsible for the genocide, eventually eliminating them. The Nemesis Operation was popularized in the Armenian Diaspora as the Armenian Nuremberg, but was kept a secret until the 1980s, when French writer Jacques Derogy was granted access to the archives of the ARF-Dashnagtsutiun in Boston and the Zorian Institute in Toronto to write the book *Opération Némésis* (1986; published in English as *Resistance and Revenge: The Armenian Assassination of the Turkish Leaders Responsible for the 1915 Massacres and Deportations*).

The Nemesis Operation was in essence a punitive expedition, an act of justice perpetrated by the stateless victims of an unpunished crime; it had a deep impact on Armenian post-genocide political thought in the Diaspora. Yet terrorism as a tactical tool for propagandistic aims became an issue of discussion as early as 1933, when, in the aftermath of the violent repression of the Kurdish rebellion in Anatolia (1925), the perspective of an Armenian–Kurdish joint insurgency against Turkey vanished. The use of terrorism against Turkish diplomatic representatives was thus thought of as a new strategic phase of struggle; however, it never got the chance to be implemented given the political conditions of the moment. The idea of a natural right to resist – by violent means including armed struggle if necessary – for the propagation of the Armenian cause reemerged in the 1960s.

The Road to Armed Propaganda

From 1970 to 1975, just before the emergence of the secret organizations that would use terrorist tactics for the propagation of the Armenian cause, in total five random and individual attacks were registered against Turkish interests

and representatives. The best known of these attacks was the assassination of the Turkish general consul and his deputy in January 1973. The assassin, Kurken Yaneekian, a genocide survivor, gave himself up to the US authorities and in court declared that he had no remorse whatsoever for an act he characterized as revenge for the killing of all the members of his family during the 1915 genocide. Condemned to prison for life, Yaneekian became a hero for the young generation of Diaspora Armenians.

Yaneekian's assassination came in the same year that a UN Subcommission for Human Rights submitted a report that, in the thirtieth paragraph, designated the mass extermination of Armenians in the Ottoman empire as "the first genocide of the twentieth century." Upon opposition and pressure from Turkey, however, the paragraph was eliminated. The decision caused widespread indignation in the Armenian Diaspora. The Armenians interpreted the elimination of the paragraph as the final act of denial, and hence the denial of memory and the proper existence of a whole group of people.

Fighting for the Armenian Cause, or Struggle Against Imperialism?

The two main organizations that started to use armed propaganda as a means of struggle for the Armenian cause, JCAG and ASALA, initially targeted Turkish diplomatic representatives and Turkish interests. In this sense, Armenian "terrorism" emerged as a protest against the denial of the Armenian genocide, an act of both self-affirmation and revival of a new Diasporan generation and an outcry against silence, a demand for justice. Not coincidentally, "breaking the wall of silence" became a metaphor for the use of guerilla tactics as the only way to be heard after the failure of all peaceful means. Yet there was general confusion about the identity and purposes of the two organizations, in spite of general enthusiasm over these acts and widespread support from the Armenian press. Soon the substantial difference between the two groups over the use of terrorism as a tactical tool within a broader strategy of political struggle became all too clear; the way each group conceived of this strategy depended on its perception of the Armenian cause.

JCAG exclusively targeted Turkish officials and diplomatic representatives, arguing that it was the Turkish state that was mainly responsible for the

policy of denial. ASALA, however, conceived the struggle for the Armenian cause as part of a worldwide struggle against "imperialism," seldom targeting western interests, including commercial ones supposedly linked to Turkish interests. This broad use of terrorist violence inevitably ended up in criminal actions against innocent civilians, such as the 1982 suicide attack in Istanbul which killed two, including a 13-year-old boy, and wounded 27 civilians, as well as the bombing of Orly Airport in Paris, which killed eight civilians and wounded 60 others. As early as 1979, ASALA started to target Armenian Diaspora organizations and public figures accused of being "reactionaries" or pro-western and pro-US. According to a statistical analysis of all ASALA violent actions, out of a total of 181 between 1975 and 1988, 57 (31 percent) targeted Turkish representatives and interests, 74 (41 percent) targeted non-Turkish interests, and 50 (28 percent) targeted Diaspora Armenians and Armenian interests. Although ASALA claimed responsibility for 81 percent of all Armenian acts of "terrorism," JCAG and ARA (Armenian Revolutionary Army) claimed only 15 percent (33 actions), with the 4 percent remaining (eight actions) claimed by other little-known organizations. Whereas JCAG and ARA made an obvious effort – in both their actions and public statements – to manifest their independence and focus on the Turkish state, ASALA, whether consciously or not, ended up linked to international terrorism.

Not surprisingly, ASALA split in two following the bombing of Orly Airport, and the two factions – hardliners who remained firm in their "anti-imperialist" orientation and dissidents who openly criticized the indiscriminate use of terrorism and the killing of fellow Armenians – were engaged in a bloody internal struggle for power. Dissidents of ASALA, such as Monte Melkonian (1957–93), a US-born militant who later joined the national liberation struggle in Nagorno Karabagh, later claimed that ASALA never had a single identified strategy, never defined a final goal, and often used vague terms, such as the call to "liberate Armenia," to manipulate the emotions of fellow Armenians. In contrast, the armed campaign conducted by JCAG and ARA followed a clear strategy aimed at projecting the Armenian cause into the arena of international politics. The armed propaganda pursued the goal of breaking the international

silence about the 1915 genocide and thus opened the way for recognition and reparations by Turkey.

SEE ALSO: Armenian Resistance, 1915; Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938); Young Turks

References and Suggested Readings

- Chalian, G. & Blin, A. (2006) *Histoire du terrorisme: De l'Antiquité à Al Qaida*. Paris: Bayard.
- Dadrian, V. N. (1997) *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus*. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books.
- Derogy, J. (1986) *Opération Némesis: Les vengeurs arméniens*. Paris: Fayard.
- Gaspard, A. (1989) *The Struggle for Armenia: Between Terrorism and Utopia*. Trans. and Ed. A. Donoyan. Glendale, CA: Navasart.
- Hovannessian, R. G. (Ed.) (1999) *Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide*. Detroit: Wayne University Press.
- Krikorian, A. (2002) *Dictionnaire de la Cause Arménienne*. Paris: Edipol.
- Kurth, C., Ludes, A., & Ludes, J. M. (Eds.) (2004) *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Melkonian, M. (Ed.) (1993) *The Right to Struggle: Selected Writings of Monte Melkonian of the Armenian National Question*. San Francisco: Sardarabad Collective.
- Ritter, L. (2007) *La longue marche des Arméniens: Histoire et devenir d'une diaspora*. Paris: Robert Laffont.
- Tololyan, K. (1987a) Cultural Narrative and the Motivation of the Terrorist. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 10 (4).
- Tololyan, K. (1987b) Martyrdom as Legitimacy: Terrorism as Symbolic Appropriation in the Armenian Diaspora. In P. Wilkinson & A. Stewart (Eds.), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*. Aberdeen, WA: Aberdeen University Press.
- Walter, R. (Ed.) (1998) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Armenian resistance, 1915

Rubina Perroomian

The Armenian Genocide is commonly thought to have started in April 1915. However, the roots of this event and the Armenian resistance to annihilation stretch back for centuries, begin-

ning with the fifteenth-century occupation of Armenia by the Ottoman Turks. Indeed, Ottoman rule over Armenia was one of oppression and discrimination. Armenians were treated as second-class citizens and were subjected to illicit taxation, discriminatory laws, and constant harassment and persecution. Armenian culture and civilization suffered significant setbacks, and Armenians were turned into subservient slaves who showed absolute compliance even when their belongings were looted, their villages ransacked, and their women kidnapped. This situation changed in the early nineteenth century, as the liberal ideas of Europe began to reach the Armenians. National awareness was on the rise, and the will to stand up for their basic rights escalated.

The first act of resistance against oppression occurred in 1862 in the mountainous region of Zeitun, where Zeituntsies refused to pay the discriminatory and illegal taxes levied upon them and took up arms against a 12,000-strong Turkish army, bolstering the 6,000 irregulars who had arrived to punish the defiance. The unprecedented resistance, which ended successfully with the interference of the French government, became an inspiration to all Armenians. Political parties were formed; bands of revolutionary militants called *fedayees* went from village to village to protect defenseless Armenians against the Turkish and Kurdish assaults; pleas and supplications were sent to Sultan Abdul-Hamid II, and the intervention of European governments was sought. The Ottoman government responded with increased persecutions. Crushing any form of resistance and brutal reprisals against the innocent population became a governmental policy, culminating in the widespread massacres of 1895–1896. With a few exceptions, most notably Zeitun and Van where resistance warded off disaster, these massacres resulted in an enormous destruction of life and property.

Significantly, the incident that triggered this bloodshed was the resistance in Sasun in the summer of 1894, spurred once again by refusal to pay the impoverishing high taxes the Kurdish chieftains and government tax collectors demanded. With the Hnchakists (Social Democrat Hnchakian Party) encouraging, arming, and leading them, the Sasuntsis organized fighting bands and repelled the Kurdish irregulars and the Turkish army. The resistance lasted about a

month and was eventually crushed; the entire region was ransacked, and the population was massacred.

Protests, petitions, and memoranda by the European Powers to stop the carnage bore no results. The Ottoman government labeled the incident an uprising with an intention of sedition, therewith justifying the ensuing massacres. Genocide scholars believe that these massacres mark the beginning of the Armenian Genocide.

Acts of protest, peaceful or otherwise, against these extreme measures were turned into bloodbaths. Examples include the September 1895 peaceful rally organized by the Hnchakists in Constantinople, the attack to avenge the destruction caused by the Mazrik Kurdish tribe (the Khanasor Expedition, July 1897), the vengeful plot against the sultan's life on July 21, 1905, and the capture and threatened destruction of the Ottoman Bank, housing European capital, in August 1896, organized by the ARF (Armenian Revolutionary Federation; Dashnakists). As a manifestation of resistance, the ARF joined the Turkish opposition aimed at toppling the government and breaking the sultan's absolute power, and supported the July 1908 constitutional revolution led by the union of opposition factions, the Ittihad ve Terragi Party (Young Turks). A few months later, however, in April of 1909, incited by the Muslim religious leaders and under the indifferent eyes of the police and the army, the Turkish mob began to attack the Armenians in Adana. The carnage of looting, rape and murder soon spread into the towns and villages of Cilicia.

The Armenians, having gained the right to bear arms after the Young Turk revolution, engaged in armed resistance in a few places including Adana, Hajin, Sis, Zeitun, and Dort Yol. The bloodshed stopped only after the Turkish army chose to intervene. Although total extermination ("genocidal intent") was not yet a part of the government policy, the path chosen was certainly one that was leading to the annihilation of a people. The ground was being prepared for the Young Turk ultranationalists – the triumvirate of Enver, Talat, and Jemal – who took over the government in a coup in January 1913, and who would finish the job in 1915.

The task was not an easy one: the Armenians were more or less organized, and even had representatives in parliament to protest against the mistreatment and injustices that were going

on in the empire. The plans for Armenian annihilation could not be executed without first neutralizing all likely resistance. World War I gave the opportunity to isolate the empire and cut off intervention by Great Britain, France, and Russia – the enemies of the Ottoman Empire (now the ally of Germany).

To preempt possible armed resistance, the government promulgated the law of general conscription, and almost all Armenian men aged 18–45 were drafted into the army. Next the populace was disarmed; those who did not have weapons to turn in were often tortured and killed; houses were looted and churches were desecrated on the pretext of searching for hidden weapons. The arrest, exile, and execution of Armenian civic, political, and religious leadership was the last blow aimed at beheading the Armenian people.

From April to August of 1915, Armenians from across the empire, and not only the battle zones as the denialists claim, were ordered to leave their homes, leaving their belongings behind. In the process, the male deportees were the first to be liquidated, executed or shot on the deportation route. Very soon, the caravans consisted only of women, children and elderly men – prey to the frequent attacks of the bandits, Muslim villagers, and even the gendarmes accompanying them.

While collective resistance was almost impossible, individual acts of resistance were numerous. Eyewitness accounts, memoirs, and reports speak of those who refused to obey orders, stayed behind and defended their homes and belongings to the last breath against the Muslim refugees from Thrace or Bulgaria, sent by the government to settle in Armenian houses. These accounts also describe young women who plunged to their death from the cliffs or drowned themselves in the Euphrates River, resisting the evil intentions of the perpetrators. Young survivors of the Armenian Genocide remember their mothers teaching them the Armenian alphabet, tracing it on the desert sand, reading them the Bible, and encouraging them to keep their spirits up, despite hunger and thirst, and despite the misery and death around them. These children were taught not to forget their Armenian ancestry, to remember the great Tragedy, and uphold their national identity. The transmission of this memory by the survivors is the one form of resistance that has outlasted the Genocide.

The possibility of organized armed resistance was crushed at the outset. In this uncompromising process, the very few exceptions include the resistance in Zeitun, Van, Shabin Garahissar (June 1915), Mush (July), Sasun (August), Urfa (late August), and Musa Dagh. With the exception of Van and Musa Dagh, resistance only gained these cities several weeks of respite, at the end of which the population was brutally massacred or deported. With regard to the unyielding resistance of the 35,000 Armenians in Urfa against an 11,000-strong army, Fahri Pasha, the army commander, is quoted as saying “What we would have done if in these difficult times we had a few Urfas to deal with.”

The unrestrained assaults against the Armenians of Zeitun began in late March 1915. Twenty-five youth protested against the treatment and took to the hills. The local army, with the help of a battalion of 5,000 soldiers from Aleppo, attacked, captured and killed the fighters and drove the Armenian population of Zeitun out on a death march. The date was April 8, marking the first act in the process of deportation of the entire Armenian population of the empire and the first futile attempt to resist the government’s plans of extermination.

News of massacres in the surrounding villages and deportations from Zeitun and other Cilician towns and villages was reaching Van, and Armenians were preparing to defend the city. They had been able to muster some makeshift arms and ammunition and organize strongholds. The battle, headed by Dashnak Aram Manukian (1879–1919), began on April 20 and lasted about four weeks until the Russian army entered the city and the Turks fled. As a result of this brave act, the lives of 30,000 were saved. The city enjoyed a few weeks of semi-independence until the sudden withdrawal of the Russian army, which was followed by the perilous exodus of the Armenian population toward eastern Armenia. The Van self-defense was labeled an uprising and the reason for the government’s decision to drive out the entire Armenian population.

The self-defense of the Armenian population of Musa Dagh on the shores of the Mediterranean was another successful operation which saved 4,000 Armenian lives. Musa Dagh Armenians decided not to obey the government decree of deportation. On July 31, they climbed up the mountain carrying food, arms and ammunition and fought for seven weeks

before they were rescued by a French warship which saw their signals calling for help.

The Musa Dagh resistance is typical of all instances of Armenian resistance to the Genocide of 1915, in that it involved the participation of not only the fighting men, but also the women, carrying food and ammunition to the fighters, caring for the wounded, and even making bullets, as well as the children, who risked their lives to run from one bunker to another to dispatch orders and bring news to the headquarters. The Musa Dagh resistance inspired the Austrian-Jewish journalist Franz Werfel to write the world-renowned novel, *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh* (1934). Some Holocaust scholars believe that the Jewish resistance in the Warsaw ghetto was inspired by that novel.

SEE ALSO: Armenia, Mass Protest and Popular Mobilization, 1980s to Present; Turkey, Protest and Revolution, 1800s–1923; Young Turks

References and Suggested Readings

- Auron, Y. (2000) *The Banality of Indifference*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Dadrian, V. N. (1995) *The History of the Armenian Genocide*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Hovannisian, R. G. (Ed.) *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Vol. 2: Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Nalbandian, L. (1963) *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties Through the Nineteenth Century*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Walker, C. J. (1980) *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Artigas, Gervasio José (1764–1850)

Viviana Uriona

José Gervasio Artigas was a South American military man, politician, and freedom fighter. He was born in Montevideo, Uruguay, the son of police officer José Artigas Martín and his wife Antonia Rodríguez Arnal. His grandfather was one of Montevideo’s first settlers. Artigas is considered the “father of Uruguayan independence.”

Gervasio received a moderate primary education in the Franciscan Monastery of

St. Bernardino. When he was 12 years old he went to the family lands in the Banda Oriental del Uruguay, “East Bank of the Uruguay River,” today Uruguay. The people living there were called *orientalis* by the Spaniards in the Río de la Plata. There he became close to the Gauchos and learned horse riding and weapon handling. In 1797, when he was 33 years old, he joined the corps of Blandengues, a special militia of the Viceroyalty of the River Plate. They had the primary functions of police and surveillance along the border with Brazil. The Viceroyalty limits contained the territories of present Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

From 1806 to 1807 he participated in the Spanish resistance against the British invasion at the River Plate. He was appointed captain of the militia and later adjutant major for his efforts to liberate Montevideo and Buenos Aires. During the Battle of Montevideo (1807) Artigas was captured by the British army and was supposed to be shipped to England, but he was abandoned because he had been wounded during the battle.

The Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata saw an uprising on May 25, 1809 in the city of Chuquisaca. Two years later, the viceroy was deposed in Buenos Aires. As a result of this May revolution, a council was elected in his place, and the Spanish colonial government moved its seat to Montevideo. By this point Artigas had gone back to his position with the police; however, he was prepared for the ideas of the new time of independence. In 1811 he joined the revolutionary forces and soon became Uruguay’s leader of the independence movement in the Banda Oriental. But Montevideo, the important city with political power, was under control of the Spanish authorities. Spanish power was weakened in the colonies, however, because of Napoleon’s intervention in Spanish domestic politics with the abdication of King Charles IV. That same year the new viceroy, Francisco Javier de Elío, declared war to the Council in Buenos Aires.

Artigas took command of the revolution in the Banda Oriental, issuing the Call of Mercedes on April 11, 1811. On May 18 he defeated the Spaniards in the Battle of Las Piedras. Elío and the Argentineans faced the possibility of losing the whole area to the Portuguese, and they signed a ceasefire treaty, but they did not consult Artigas. Thereafter Artigas and his people’s aim was separation both from Spain and its representatives in Montevideo, and from Buenos

Aires. Artigas signed the ceasefire agreement with the viceroy Elío for the Council in Buenos Aires. Then he moved in protest with about 10,000 troops and civilians to the western bank of the River Uruguay in what is known as the east exodus. In the province of Misiones, in the area north of the present city of Concordia, Artigas created a new camp with equipment, livestock, and 16,000 people in January 1812. From there, he held contacts with the leaders of the provinces of Entre Ríos and Corriente, creating a base for his influence on the territories in the Argentine coastal region. With the withdrawal of the Portuguese, Artigas and his people could come back to Banda Oriental. There they fought in all directions: against the troops from Argentina and the royalists.

During an assembly at Artigas’ camp, two members were elected to participate in the constituent assembly in Buenos Aires (1813), but all of their demands were rejected. Then José Rondeau called a second congress which elected new deputies, none of whom shared Artigas’ political ideology. Artigas withdrew angrily to his supporters on the River Uruguay. From there he launched several campaigns in the interior of the Banda Oriental and Entre Ríos. The director supreme of the United Provinces, Gervasio Antonio Posadas, then declared Artigas “traitor of the fatherland” on February 11, 1814. He offered a 1,000-pesos reward to anyone who would deliver Artigas, alive or dead.

Artigas saw the American constitution as a model and wanted the provinces at the Río de la Plata to become unified. Leaders in Buenos Aires preferred a central government according to European standards. In 1814 Artigas organized the League of the Free Peoples (*Liga de los Pueblos Libres*; today, Córdoba, Corrientes, Entre Ríos, Misiones, Uruguay, and Santa Fe), of which he was declared Protector. When the Portuguese again occupied the provinces in 1816, the union broke but the government in Buenos Aires did not react. Artigas fought militarily for four years and fled to Paraguay in 1820, after losing the Battle of Tacuarembó. The Paraguay dictator Dr. Francia banished him to Candelaria. After a long exile, without reentering Uruguay, Artigas died on September 23, 1850 in Ibiray near Asunción in Paraguay.

Artigas’ political and military career lasted nine years, during which he tried to weaken the economic dominance of Buenos Aires with the

opening of the ports of Montevideo and Colonia and tried to create social equality by redistributing the land that had been confiscated by the Spaniards to Indians, blacks, Zambos (mixed African and Amerindian ancestry), and poor whites.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Indigenous Popular Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Luna, F. (2000) *José Gervasio Artigas*. Buenos Aires: Planeta.
- Méndez Vives, E. (1968) *Artigas y la Patria Grande*. Montevideo: Tauro.
- San Martín, Z. (1930) *La Epopeya de Artigas*. Montevideo: Nacional Colorada.
- Street, J. (1971) *Artigas and the Emancipation of Uruguay*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arundel, Lady Blanche (1583–1649)

Samantha A. Morgan-Curtis

Blanche, Lady Arundel, a Royalist supporter of Charles I, is counted among the heroes of the English Civil War and stands as a heroine in English folklore and Catholic annals. In May 1643 during the early days of the English Civil War, Lady Blanche, then about 60 years old, held Wardour Castle in Wiltshire, England, during a six-day siege against 1,300 Parliamentary troops led by Sir Edward Hungerford. Parliamentary forces, also derisively known as Roundheads, had been dispatched to the largely Royalist West Country supposedly to maintain order. Hungerford demanded the surrender of Wardour Castle, claiming it sheltered “cavaliers and malignants” so that its money and resources were forfeited to Parliamentary use (Plowden 1998: 34).

Lady Blanche’s husband Thomas, the second Lord Arundel of Wardour and a declared member of Charles I’s Cavaliers, had taken most of his able men to fight with the king at Oxford, leaving Lady Blanche, her daughter-in-law, and three grandchildren with little protection. Citing her husband’s order to hold the castle, however, Lady Blanche refused to surrender and instead organized and commanded the remaining 25 men of her garrison to hold the castle and had her ladies-in-waiting carry food and bullets to the men at their posts. After six days of siege, with her

men falling asleep at their posts, and artillery preparing to breach the castle, Lady Blanche negotiated a surrender to protect her people from capital punishment and her home from plunder.

Unfortunately, certain parts of Lady Blanche’s surrender agreement were broken, as the castle’s considerable treasures were plundered irreparably, though Lady Blanche’s son, Henry, the third Lord Arundel, later retook the castle from Parliamentary control. Lady Blanche’s troubles multiplied, as she lost her husband ten days after her home when he died at Oxford in Charles’ service, leaving her temporarily captive and penniless. However, Lady Blanche would eventually survive these indignities; when she died, she was buried with her husband at Tisbury near Wardour Castle. The inscription on Lady Blanche’s tomb lauds her valor and recognizes her as possessing a “spirit above her sex” and cites Proverb 31 to recognize her as a “valiant woman” (Jones 2000: 73). Tradition holds that Lady Blanche’s ghost still haunts the area around the original Wardour Castle.

A descendant of Thomas Woodstock and the Plantagenet line through her mother, Lady Blanche was the sixth daughter of Edward Somerset, the Earl of Worcester. Her father, though a staunch Catholic, had served as Master of the Horse late in Elizabeth Tudor’s reign. Her son Henry, the third Lord Arundel, was imprisoned during the reign of Charles II based on the testimony of Titus Oates because of his avowed Catholicism, but was eventually freed and appointed Keeper of the Privy Seal in 1687 by James II.

Historian Alison Plowden (1998) suggests that the extensive and active involvement of strong women like Lady Blanche on both sides contributed to the English Civil War being less “barbarous” than its contemporaneous European counterparts.

SEE ALSO: Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658); English Revolution, 17th Century; English Revolution, Women and

References and Suggested Readings

- Cooper, T. (1873) *A New Biographical Dictionary: Containing Concise Notices of Eminent Persons*. London: Bell.
- Herberman, C. G. et al. (1907/1913) *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. New York: Universal Knowledge Foundation.

- Jones, D. E. (1997/2000) *Women Warriors: A History*. Washington, DC: Brassey's.
- Plowden, A. (1998) *Women All on Fire*. Stroud: Sutton.
- Shed, J. A. (2000) Legalism Over Revolution: The Parliamentary, 1647–1655. *Historical Journal* 43, 4 (December): 1093–107.

Assembly of the Poor

Terri Bennett

The Assembly of the Poor (AOP) is a large network of grassroots activists from across Thailand, comprised predominantly of peasant farmers and urban slum dwellers, but joined by development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academic allies. Founded in 1995, the group has united around various issues that disparately affect the nation's poor, including natural resource use, land and property rights, and safe working conditions. The AOP also pressures policymakers toward agricultural policy that supports small-scale farmers and food sovereignty. Membership has fluctuated, but at times up to 200,000 activists have belonged to the Assembly. Among other successes, the AOP has been instrumental in bringing public attention to the plights of both the rural and urban poor, garnering support for structural changes in favor of the poor, and challenging a top-down development paradigm that champions technocratic, state-led projects devoid of local input.

The group is well known for its highly visible, large-scale demonstrations; certainly, its 99-day protest at Bangkok's Government House in January 2007 cemented the AOP's struggles into public discourse. Over 25,000 villagers and slum dwellers joined the demonstration, vowing to stay until the government responded to their petitions, which cited 122 grievances and necessary reforms. The predominantly rural AOP lived in makeshift camps on the streets of the capital, making their communities' struggles heard via national television and newspaper stories. The event provided Assembly members with opportunities to foster solidarity between geographically disparate community groups and People's Organizations (POs) as well as to confront – sometimes face-to-face – government bureaucrats and officials.

The grievances and demands contained in this and other AOP petitions range from quite practical and specific to broad based and ideo-

logical; they characterize the depth and scope of the AOP itself. For instance, the Assembly mandated that thousands of small-scale, rural fisherfolk be compensated for displacement by the state-led Pak Mun Dam project, which was designed to supply electricity to a growing urban middle class. However, such demands are linked to overarching critiques of a dominant development model that often benefits a small, wealthy, urban population at the expense of the rural poor. Much of the AOP's public discourse can be interpreted as an indictment of capitalist development schemes, as well as an indictment of a hierarchical political order that discounts villagers' demands as "backward" or "reactionary" because they are peasants. In fact, a fundamental goal of the Assembly lies in granting Thailand's poor a legitimate and credible voice within debates concerning resources and over what it means to develop them.

For the AOP, combating unjust and exclusionary social hierarchies requires providing an example of more just social relations. One way this is accomplished is by employing a horizontal organizational model within the network itself. Though no social movement can claim to have eradicated all aspects of entrenched power disparities within its interactions, the Assembly makes deliberate and decisive moves to recognize and value the voices of all its constituents. This characteristic is particularly crucial to AOP, as one of its primary principles is that local wisdom *must* be a factor in development decision-making – such situated knowledge is the foundation for villagers' expertise in managing their own resources. This commitment to inclusivity is representative of the reciprocal objectives of the Assembly – it seeks to achieve a radically democratic society by using radical democracy as a methodology.

SEE ALSO: Food Sovereignty and Protest; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Korea, Peasant and Farmers' Movement; Neoliberalism and Protest; Participatory Democracy, History of; Thailand, Popular Movements, 1980s–Present; Via Campesina and Peasant Struggles

References and Suggested Readings

- Baker, C. & Pasuk, P. (2005) *A History of Thailand*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chalermripinyorat, R. (2004) Politics of Representation: A Case Study of Thailand's Assembly of the Poor. *Critical Asian Studies* 36 (4): 541–66.

Missingham, B. (2003) *The Assembly of the Poor*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.

Phatharathananunth, S. (2006) *Civil Society and Democratization: Social Movements in Northeast Thailand*. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press.

Asturias Uprising, October 1934

Andrew Durgan

In October 1934 the coal miners of Asturias rose up against the Spanish government and for two weeks not only held off the army units sent to crush them, but created their own embryonic “socialist republic.” The Asturian uprising was part of a far wider domestic and international crisis that marked a decisive step towards Civil War (1936–9).

The rise of fascism internationally was an important factor in the radicalization of the Spanish workers’ movement. In particular, much of the powerful Socialist Party (PSOE), frustrated by the sabotage of reform and under pressure from its rank and file, turned sharply left. This radicalization was symbolized by the transformation of the once-cautious trade union leader, Francisco Largo Caballero, into the leader of the socialists’ erstwhile revolutionary left. With the rise of Hitler in January 1933, an armed uprising a year later by the Austrian socialists in response to the formation of the Dollfuss government, despite its defeat, inspired anti-fascists in Spain. “Better Vienna than Berlin” became their watchword.

Spain’s main conservative party in 1933, the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rightist Groups) (CEDA), despite its supposed commitment to democracy, was increasingly sympathetic to the Nazis. The right won the election in November 1933 due to the changing alliances of the center Radical Party, anarchist abstention, and disunity on the left. The possibility that the CEDA could enter government alongside Prime Minister Alejandro Lerroux’s Radicals alarmed the left. The similarities between the reactionary Catholic corporatism of CEDA leader Gil Robles and the would-be Austrian dictator Dollfuss convinced most workers’ organizations that the entry of this party into the

Cabinet would signal the introduction of an authoritarian regime.

To confront the threat of the authoritarian right, Workers’ Alliances against Fascism were established in different parts of Spain by local socialist, syndicalist, and dissident communist groups. However, the absence of the anarcho-syndicalist CNT, with the notable exception of Asturias, meant the labor movement remained divided. The participation of the CNT in Asturias was due to the long tradition of collaboration that existed in the local workers’ movement, in part a by-product of the specific conditions of the mining industry. Collaboration in a series of labor disputes and opposition to unemployment laid the basis for the creation of a truly united Workers’ Alliance. Only orthodox communists remained aloof, but even they would adhere to the Alliances on the eve of the October revolt – a reflection of the incipient move away from the Comintern’s previous ultra-left sectarianism. There was also a clear economic basis to working-class radicalism in Asturias due to the crisis in the coal industry. The fact that many of the miners’ leaders were followers of the moderate socialist Indalecio Prieto, rather than Largo Caballero, illustrates the breadth of the radicalization that had taken place.

At a state-wide level, the socialists had responded to their defeat at the polls by threatening revolution if there was an attempt to introduce an authoritarian regime through parliament. The socialists established a Revolutionary Committee to prepare any eventual insurrection. But such preparations amounted to very little. The socialist leadership hoped that the threat of revolution would be enough to dissuade the Radicals from inviting the CEDA into power. Thus, when the Southern farm workers struck in June 1934, despite the provocations they had suffered under socialist leadership, the PSOE and UGT refused to organize solidarity action. The resulting defeat meant any forthcoming revolutionary movement would be deprived of its potential mass base in the rural South. The Alliances had a strong local base in Asturias and Catalonia where there were successful mobilizations. In Catalonia on March 13, a one-day General Strike was organized in solidarity with strikers in Madrid “against fascism.” On September 8 a General Strike was declared in Asturias in protest of the CEDA’s fascist-style rally at Covadonga.

Unable to govern alone, and under pressure from the right, Lerrox invited the CEDA to join his Cabinet in early October. Gil Robles was aware that his entrance into government would provoke social disorder, but believed it was better to have an inevitable showdown while the workers' movement was still unprepared. The socialists' bluff had been called and their Revolutionary Committee reluctantly called a General Strike on October 4.

The response to the call was uneven. In Madrid, the Revolutionary Committee was immediately arrested and given the socialists' reluctance to work through the Workers' Alliances, the movement lacked even nominal leadership at a national level. The strike dragged on for ten days in the capital, punctuated by abortive attempts by the Socialist Youth militias to seize strategic buildings. Elsewhere there were stoppages in Valencia, Aragon, and in much of the Basque Country, where there were also armed clashes with the security forces. In Catalonia the movement overlapped with the rebellion of the Catalan government against attacks by Madrid on its regional autonomy. Yet without the CNT and given the half-hearted attitude of the Catalan nationalists, the movement was soon defeated.

In Asturias a Provincial Revolutionary Committee representing the workers' organizations coordinated the insurrection. Local committees set about organizing different aspects of daily life, from food distribution through to hospitals. Money was abolished in some villages. A make-shift arms industry was rapidly set up. Apart from the capture of the arms factory at Trubia, other workplaces turned out armored vehicles, weapons, rudimentary hand-bombs, and ammunition. A "red guard" arrested known right wingers and dealt with looters. The Provincial Committee was initially based in the leftist stronghold of Mieres, an industrial and mining center with a population of around 40,000. It was there on October 5 that the committee proclaimed from the balcony of the town hall to an enthusiastic crowd the founding of a "Socialist Republic."

Hastily formed militias soon lay siege to the region's Civil Guard barracks. Vehicles and trains were seized to transport the armed workers and columns of miners descended on the capital, Oviedo, and the mountain passes that led into

the region. Despite the miners' ingenious use of dynamite, lack of arms and ammunition soon took its toll on the revolutionary forces. Unable to completely take over Oviedo and threatened by government forces pressing down on the region, the Provincial Committee dissolved itself, after ordering a general retreat. A new committee, composed of young communists and socialists, was determined to resist to the end, refusing to believe the news that the movement had failed in the rest of Spain. Two days later the miners finally abandoned the capital. In the anarchist stronghold of the Port of Gijón the strike continued until October 16 despite the arrival of government forces. The main centers of resistance were the mining villages and the mountain passes where, devoid of ammunition, the revolutionaries used giant catapults to shower the advancing troops with dynamite.

On October 18 a third reconstituted Provincial Committee, faced with the advance of government forces, the lack of arms and ammunition, and the movement's debacle elsewhere, agreed to surrender. Despite assurances that there would be no reprisals, the occupying troops, many from the Army of Africa, under General Franco, launched a campaign of terror in the mining villages. Of the over one thousand workers who lost their lives during the rebellion, most were victims of repression. Thousands more were imprisoned. The brutality faced by those detained contrasted with the generally correct treatment that rightist prisoners had faced during the insurrection. The execution of 34 members of the clergy and a few factory managers by insurgents, widely publicized by the conservative press, proved an exception.

The revolt of October 1934 was an important step on the road to Civil War. For conservative historians, it was proof that the left did not respect democracy and was therefore to blame for provoking the military uprising of July 1936. However, the experience of Germany and Austria was foremost in the minds of the most militant sections of workers' movements. The insurrection probably deterred the introduction of an authoritarian regime by "legal" means and the brutal repression that followed in Asturias would prove a salutary lesson for the left. The military coup nearly two years later would thus be met with desperate popular resistance under the battle cry of October: ¡UHP!

(¡Uníos Hermanos Proletarios! Unite Proletarian Brothers!).

SEE ALSO: Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Mujeres Libres; POUM (Workers' Party of Marxist Unification); Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Díaz Nosty, B. (1974) *La Comuna Asturiana. Revolución de octubre 1934*. Bilbao: Zero.
- Grossi, M. (2000) *The Asturian Uprising. Fifteen Days of Socialist Revolution*. London: Socialist Platform.
- Jackson, G. et al. (1985) *Octubre 1934*. Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno.
- Molins i Fàbrega, N. (1977) *UHP. La insurrección proletaria de Asturias*. Madrid: Ediciones Júcar.
- Ruiz, D. (1988), *Insurrección defensiva y revolución obrera. El octubre español de 1934*. Barcelona: Labor Universitaria.
- Shubert, A. (1987) *The Road to Revolution in Spain: The Coal Miners of Asturias 1860–1934*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Taibo, P. I. (1980) *Asturias 1934*. Madrid: Ediciones Júcar.

Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938)

Andrew J. Waskey

Turkish nationalist Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was born in Salonika (Thessaloniki, Greece) in the Ottoman empire in 1881. His father, Ali Rıza Efendi, was a Turkish-speaking minor official of the Ottoman empire who had also achieved some business success. Kemal attended a number of military schools before graduating from the War Academy in early 1905. He then joined the army, where he organized the Fatherland Society and eventually joined the revolutionary activities of the Young Turks, which later broadened into the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP). Abandoning hope in reforms, Kemal and others marched on Constantinople in order to overthrow the authoritarian rule of Sultan Abdulhamit II.

While in the army, Kemal gained leadership training as well as his nationalist outlook. In 1911, as a major in the Turkish army, he was sent to fight in the nominally Ottoman province of Trablusgarp (Libya) against Italy. The fighting gave him experiences for effective leadership in the future. Fighting in the Balkan Wars of

1912–1913, with the empire's loss of further territory to European powers, stimulated the development of Kemal's nationalist ideology. He was heavily influenced by the writings of Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), an ardent promoter of a Turkish nationalism.

In November of 1914, the Ottoman empire joined Germany in the Great War. The British navy in February of 1915 unsuccessfully attempted to seize the Dardanelles and Constantinople, which would have ended Ottoman participation in the war. The failure allowed the Ottomans time to fortify Gallipoli, where Kemal was to make his reputation as Turkey's leading general in the Gallipoli campaign (1915).

After the war, as the Allies prepared to carve up the whole of the empire, resistance developed in eastern Anatolia. Several Turkish army commanders took control of Ankara. The disorder led the British to send Kemal to Samsun to command the Ninth Army. He arrived on May 19, a day he would later declare his official birthday.

Instead of restoring order as the British had hoped, Kemal organized resistance into the War of Independence. The British demanded his arrest by the sultan; Kemal responded by resigning and then signing the Amasya Protocol, which called for independence. Forming a National Congress in Erzurum, the nationalists drafted their manifesto, the National Pact. By January 1920 the nationalists were claiming to be the true government of Turkey.

In March 1920 Kemal established a new parliament in Ankara as an alternative to the old parliament in Constantinople. Under the authority of the Grand National Assembly, Kemal became the president of Turkey under a new constitution proclaimed on January 20, 1921. When the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres (later codified by the Paris Peace Conference), which was signed by the sultan's government, became known, the nationalists declared the Istanbul government to be traitors. In several campaigns between 1920 and 1922 Kemal defeated Armenian attempts to take control of their traditional homeland in eastern Anatolia and thwarted French attacks in northern Syria. He also defeated the Greeks and drove them out of Anatolia. The fighting established the modern boundaries of Turkey with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923. On November 1, 1922, the sultanate in Istanbul was abolished and the Ottoman empire

was ended. The capital was officially moved to Ankara on October 13, 1923. On October 29, 1923, the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed with Kemal as its president.

Kemal next set about transforming Turkey into a nationalist society. The calendar and clock were changed in 1925, the metric system was adopted in 1931, street numbering was instituted, the traditional fez hat was abolished, and “Turkification” of the language and vocabulary promoted. In 1928 the Latin alphabet was adopted for the Turkish language. To promote it, Kemal went to village schools where he taught the new system. In 1934 all Turks were ordered to adopt a surname. Kemal chose Atatürk, which means “father of the Turks.” In 1930, Kemal instituted reforms in agriculture, industry, and banking. New crops were introduced. Mining and industry were promoted with the aid of new banks that provided financing. A new labor code was adopted in 1936.

Opposition to Kemal came from several quarters, but the strongest was from devout Muslims. In 1923 Ali Sukru, the deputy for Trabzon and a devout Muslim, verbally attacked him for excessive drinking and accused him of wanting to make himself the sultan. The subsequent discovery of Ali Sukru’s body in a shallow grave near Kemal’s villa damaged the latter’s reputation.

The new constitution allowed for the existence of other political parties than Kemal’s party, the Republican People’s Party. The Progressive Republican Party arose in opposition but was proscribed in June 1925. In 1926 plots to assassinate Kemal were uncovered. The plotters were tried and hanged for treason.

On November 8, 1938, Atatürk died at the Dolmabahce Palace in Istanbul. The cause of death was cirrhosis of the liver due to excessive drinking. He was buried in Ankara.

SEE ALSO: Turkey, Protest and Revolution, 1800s–1923; Turkish Rebellions, 1918–1925; Turkish Republic Protests, 1923–1946; Young Turks

References and Suggested Readings

- Armstrong, H. C. (2001) *Kemal Atatürk*. Phoenix: Simon Publications.
- Atilasov, Y. (2002) *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*. Woodside, NY: Woodside House.
- Gulbeyaz, H. (2005) *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*. Berlin: Parthas Verlag.
- Mango, A. (2002) *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey*. New York: Overlook Press.

Atlantic port seaman resistance, American Revolutionary era

Craig Marin

In November 1747 the inhabitants of Boston were up in arms. What began as a group of 300 sailors swelled, according to one contemporary source, into a “mob” of several thousand residents of the port town. The protestors focused their anger on the press gangs sweeping the port for sailors to replace the 50 who had deserted from a British naval vessel, the *Lark*, under the command of Commodore Christopher Knowles. Part of the mob gathered at the waterfront, where they successfully intercepted some of the *Lark*’s officers attempting to return to their vessel with forced recruits. To further interfere with the press gang, a contingent of the crowd seized what they mistakenly assumed was a naval barge and carried it through the streets of the town, eventually setting it ablaze on Boston Common. The Massachusetts governor attempted to intervene but was threatened by the crowd that had gathered around the Provincial Council Chamber. With some of his officers seized as hostages until the return of the pressed sailors and townsmen, the enraged Commodore Knowles threatened to bombard the town with his cannons. The protests and exchange of threats only ended when Knowles agreed to release the pressed men.

This event, known to historians as the Knowles Riot, while certainly not the first group action instigated by sailors and supported by the residents of a port city, began a string of protest actions in Colonial North America that would culminate in the American Revolution. Commodore Knowles, on the way to his new station in the West Indies, desperately sought to fill his complement of sailors before departure. In authorizing the press gangs that combed the streets of Boston and the vessels in the harbor, the commodore acted within his legal rights and expected cooperation from local law enforcement. The response of the sailors and then large numbers of town residents caught him by surprise, despite his knowledge of recent small-scale resistance to impressment in the West Indies. Historians argue that the sailors engaged in these protests were asserting their rights to liberty based on a loose interpretation

of an earlier Act of Parliament that exempted sailors in the Sugar Islands from impressment, implicitly demanding that this protection be extended to the British North American colonies. The sailors exhibited a clear willingness to confront authority to protect that liberty. Additionally, historians argue, as a population of multi-ethnic laborers, some free and some enslaved, these sailors did more than simply assert protection under English law. Drawing upon a mixture of radical Enlightenment thought and traditional views of a just and moral economy, sailors called both for the recognition of universal human rights and for control over their bodies and their labor. In this battle, seamen would find more and more allies among the land-bound on both sides of the Atlantic.

Following the Knowles riot, unrest among sailors spread throughout the Atlantic, where resistance to impressment continued, and sailors made broader claims about their rights to control their own bodies and the fruits of their labor. Back in the North American colonies, the Stamp Act, with its freezing of trade, loosed the wrath of sailors again. A group of seamen, determined to obtain and destroy the stamped paper sent from England, forced their way into Charleston merchant Henry Laurens's house to demand the papers they suspected him of holding. Laurens was at first intimidated by their threat of violence, and later impressed with their restraint after determining that they had accused him unjustly. Indeed, despite their large numbers and aggressive demeanor, they did him no physical harm and only committed minimal, and incidental, destruction to his property.

Directed actions such as this one would continue through the next few decades. For example, in Newport, Rhode Island in 1763 and 1765, sailors and other residents attacked press gangs and naval vessels used in forced recruitment of sailors. In Boston in 1768 sailors dragged a naval barge to the Boston Common and burned it, just as others had done in 1747. In various Atlantic ports over the next decade (Wilmington, North Carolina in 1765; Nevis in 1765; Newport again in 1769 and 1772; twice in New York in 1775; and London in 1770 and 1776) sailors again and again responded forcefully to perceived attacks on their own liberty. They also allied themselves in protest with other workers in or near the maritime environment. In 1775 in Liverpool, for instance, sailors joined the land-

bound laborers in protests against lowered wages. When the mustered militias directed musket fire on the crowd of 3,000, sailors responded by hauling guns off ships in the harbor and bombarding the trading house in the center of town.

Historians attribute sailors' radical nature when ashore to their experiences of naval warfare, and to their traditions of resistance to the brutally violent discipline that characterized labor at sea. Furthermore, the cooperative nature of ship's work built a strong sense of interdependence and loyalty among common seamen – everyone had a part to play in the successful navigation of a vessel from port to port. This sense of brotherhood extended to all crew members, frequently trumping divisions of race and ethnicity. In order to compel sailors to continue to labor on board leaky vessels and on voyages plagued with warfare, short rations, and disease, masters of vessels and their officers employed extreme violence to coerce labor, curb disobedience, and reinforce their authority. This type of arbitrary and brutal violence engendered intense resentment among most sailors, making them prime candidates for strong action against the heavy-handed and arbitrary policies of British trade and colonial government enacted from the late 1740s through the Revolution and beyond.

In the narrative of worker resistance, the ship has been likened to the first factory, and the sailor as the first wage worker. When sailors experienced the loss of control over their labor power, they essentially became commodified. From this perspective, their resistance to these unfair conditions can be understood as forms of labor organization. The connection is clearest in the 1768 work stoppage on the River Thames in London, during which sailors, demonstrating an awareness of their strength in numbers, agreed to strike (lower) the sails in a show of solidarity to abused fellow workers along the river. This action gave rise to the use of the term "strike" to refer to a group's refusing to work and preventing others from using the work place in their stead.

Traditional histories of the American Revolution, drawing on elite-authored sources, have accorded sailors very little agency or ability to develop and/or express a coherent ideology. In these accounts, sailors are characterized as pointlessly unruly, frequently drunk, and easily bought with cash in hand or tankards of rum; sailors are present in these histories as easily manipulated figures rather than autonomous

actors. Work by George Rudé (1964) and Eric Hobsbawm (1968) on crowd actions in the context of European food riots, labor militancy, and political protests successfully challenged the notion that sailors lacked their own ideology or initiative, and encouraged a reconceptualizing of sailors as historical actors. Moving beyond notions of American exceptionalism allowed historians of the American Revolution to likewise approach the actions of sailors in port cities, before and after the outbreak of hostilities with Great Britain, with a greater appreciation for the self-activation of seamen and their cohort.

The influence of sailors outside of the maritime world is the subject of many works from the late 1960s through 2007. Jesse Lemisch (1968) and Gary Nash (1976, 2005) both have placed the sailor at the center of the radical activities leading up to the Declaration of Independence, suggesting that their forms of protest, including taking to the streets, tarring and feathering, targeted destruction of property, and other forms of intimidation were adopted by other groups. Thus, seamen's aggressive responses to unjust authority and oppression influenced the land-bound laborers of many of the port cities of North America, forcing many of the middling and lesser elites of these locales to take much more direct action in response to British policies of the 1760s and 1770s than they might otherwise have done.

This transfer of revolutionary ideas and protest actions from sailors to others is well documented. The Knowles Riot and other anti-press actions became the models for protests against British customs policies and duties in port cities throughout British North America. The effectiveness of sailor activism and the popularity of sailors' anti-tyranny ideology resonated both with the working poor and middling elements of colonial society. Even outside of the port city environment, sailor ideology and activism resonated with American colonists. Indeed, Irvin (2003) has noted that tarring and feathering, a traditional act of sailor retribution, was not uncommon among land-locked social activists as a punishment for over-zealous British officials or open Loyalists in inland areas from the 1760s through the war years. While not the inventors of group protest or the original defenders of a moral economy, within the context of struggles against British policies in the mid-eighteenth century, sailors set the bar, and their radical and

aggressive responses were incorporated into the independence movement.

While the working poor of port cities either were part of the population of sailors or worked closely with them, they were not the only members of the "lower sort" who participated in or incorporated the tactics of sailors' protests. Slave and free black sailors were an important part of the ethnically and nationally diverse naval and merchant marine fleets in the British colonial theater. As ubiquitous workers in the West Indies and the plantation economies of South Carolina, Virginia, and Georgia, slaves were frequently employed as hands on local and deep sea vessels. This put them in all of the ports of the Atlantic, and ensured their presence at all moments of protest and rebellion sparked by or including sailors. The narrative of Olaudah Equiano offers a clear picture of the possibilities for cooperation across race and condition of servitude, as Equiano's shipmates were alternately co-workers, fellow sufferers, teachers, mutual survivors of disasters, and champions of his rights. As a sailor, Equiano found ways to partially escape the restrictions and brutality of slavery, despite being surrounded by slaves who were constantly brutalized and slave owners who were consistently brutal. Indeed, Equiano's experiences radicalized him and prompted his determination to attack slavery from within by refusing to be controlled as his masters wished; and from without by publishing his intensely abolitionist narrative.

Equiano was by no means unique in finding empowerment as a slave or free black sailor. Witness the activism in the Boston Massacre of Crispus Attucks. Although written out of the event in Paul Revere's famous engraving, Attucks was a recognized leader of the crowd of seamen and apprentices attacking the British soldiers billeted in Boston. His knowledge of both British policies and working conditions in Boston not only shaped his strong oppositional response toward the British soldiers who undercut local workers by accepting lower wages, it allowed him to make connections to others outside of his ethnic group to engage in cooperative protest. Indeed, slave sailors and boatmen were often uniquely positioned to understand and draw attention to attacks on sailor rights and liberties, and to lead the attack against arbitrary authority. River boatmen along the James River in Virginia, for example, still holding out for the

promise of liberty and equality so broadly circulated in the early years of the Revolution, took leading roles in Gabriel's Rebellion in 1800 and a subsequent plot in 1802.

While the middling and wealthy of early America made concerted efforts to curb group protests after the Revolution, sailors and slaves continued through the next several decades to push back at oppressive work conditions and social repression. Recent studies suggest that, in the Caribbean, the information disseminated through slave communication networks, many of them created and supported by enslaved sailors and boatmen, fueled and spread protest and rebellion from island to island and to and from mainland North America. The spread of the more radical American and French revolutionary ideals sparked protests and revolts in the Caribbean, contributing to the impetus and success of the largest slave-led revolt and social revolution in the Atlantic: the Haitian Revolution. In turn, the Haitian Revolution sparked revolts throughout the Americas. The boatmen of Gabriel's Rebellion knew of the struggles in Haiti and planned on assistance from the island nation if their own plans bore fruit.

While slave revolts and revolution marked the western side of the Atlantic, on the eastern side British sailors, still dissatisfied with impressment, lack of pay, and horrible treatment in the navy, staged a massive mutiny that was, in essence, a strike not unlike the 1768 action along the Thames. Refusing to take their posts in 1797, the seamen of the fleet stationed at Spithead and the Nore made their collective voice heard as they protested unpaid wages and attacks upon traditional practices and their liberty as Englishmen. In this way, despite the culmination of the American Revolution and the reassertion of elite power there, sailors demonstrated their willingness to continue in their struggles against tyranny and oppression.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776; American Slave Rebellions; Gabriel's Rebellion; Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath

References and Suggested Readings

- Bolster, W. J. (1997) *Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Egerton, D. (1993) *Gabriel's Rebellion: The Virginia Slave Conspiracies of 1800 and 1802*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

- Hobsbawm E. & Rudé, G. (1968) *Captain Swing*. New York: Pantheon.
- Irvin, B. H. (2003) Tar, Feathers, and the Enemies of American Liberties, 1768–1776. *New England Quarterly* 76, 2 (June): 197–238.
- Lemisch, J. (1968) Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America. *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd Series 25, 3 (July): 371–407.
- Linebaugh, P. & Rediker, M. (2000) *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Nash, G. (1976) *The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nash, G. (2005) *The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America*. New York: Viking.
- Rediker, M. (1987) *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–1750*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rodger, N. A. M. (2004) *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815*. London: Allen Lane.
- Rudé, G. (1964) *The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730–1848*. New York: Wiley.

ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens)

Vicki L. Birchfield and
Annette Freyberg-Inan

The international social movement ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens) was launched in France in 1998 and has since evolved into a transnational network that spans the globe with associations in over forty countries. Pushing for alternatives to neoliberal globalization, ATTAC is a loose network of non-hierarchical, decentralized associations in many different countries – from the most highly developed to the most impoverished – and includes diverse groups and individuals, ranging from public intellectuals, teachers, and ecumenical leaders to small farmers, environmentalists, and advocates for the homeless

and unemployed. ATTAC characterizes itself as an alter-globalization movement that promotes some limits to commodification and the reign of market forces, more transparent and equitable forms of international economic exchange, and greater political and democratic control of financial markets.

The Crisis of Global Capitalism and the Emergence of ATTAC

The birth of ATTAC and the transformation of a protest statement and critical discourse into an organized social movement in France and beyond were preceded by two crucial events. First, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 sparked a reaction among French intellectuals, which culminated in a widely discussed editorial by Ignacio Ramonet in *Le Monde Diplomatique* published in December 1997. As the East Asian economies began to crash due to rampant capital flight and the ensuing collapse of their currencies, Ramonet used the crisis as an opportunity to underscore the consequences of deregulated global financial markets and the volatility and systemic risks generated by short-term, speculative capital flows. He highlighted the inherent instability and inequity generated by unregulated global capitalism and called for a “disarming of the power of financial markets.”

Moreover, Ramonet proposed that an organization be created to implement the so-called Tobin tax to impose some degree of control over financial markets and set up a redistributive mechanism to aid disadvantaged citizens (especially in developing countries). Such a tax of 0.1 percent to 0.5 percent on foreign exchange transactions was proposed in 1972 by Nobel prize-winning economist James Tobin to discourage private speculation in money markets that can undermine national monetary policies. It would also both stabilize global markets and raise funds which could potentially be used towards debt relief for developing countries. The acronym ATTAC was originally derived from the name “Action for a Tobin Tax for the Aid of Citizens,” but it later came to stand for the “Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens.” The plea for a Tobin tax allowed for a critique of unrestrained capitalism while at the same time proposing a strategy for change that emphasized the interconnection of societies of the developed and developing worlds.

According to opinion polls at the time, as much as 71 percent of the French population supported the idea of such an international solidarity tax. Thus, Ramonet’s critique resonated with many in French society and produced an outpouring of support in the form of thousands of letters professing solidarity and endorsement. The letters of support precipitated a meeting held in March 1998 bringing together intellectuals, trade unions, civic groups, representatives of political publications, and others to discuss the general political and moral principles shaping their views on globalization and to seek agreement on strategies and goals. Three main points were agreed at this first meeting: the need to confront the hegemony of neoliberalism and propose credible alternatives; the necessity of curbing increasing economic insecurity and inequality through the implementation of a Tobin tax; and an urgency to transcend traditional cleavages in French society and reinvigorate participatory politics locally and globally in order to counter the ill effects of financial globalization. This meeting was followed up three months later and the association was formally established on June 3, 1998, with the first general assembly electing a board of directors and a president, Bernard Cassen, managing director of *Le Monde Diplomatique*, and adopting an official platform.

Simultaneous to discussions and preparations for the meeting, but actually preceding the formal launch of ATTAC, the second trigger event occurred which revolved around the negotiations for the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) taking place at the headquarters of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris. These negotiations were an effort to produce a comprehensive framework for the liberalization of international investment that, according to its opponents, would severely limit the ability of national governments to regulate certain public sectors and aid domestic industries. A coalition of 70 different associations in France, including many prominent individuals such as Susan George and François Dufour, who later became vicepresidents of ATTAC, had actively opposed the MAI and lobbied the French government to pull out of the negotiations. Most vociferous among the MAI opponents were individuals from the entertainment sector, who claimed the agreement would effectively kill French cinema, as it would spell an end to the complex public

financing and subsidy scheme that has been in place in France since the inception of the cinematic arts.

Such intense criticisms and political pressure coupled with increasing internal disputes among OECD members themselves led the French to officially pull out of the negotiations. Upon announcing withdrawal, France released the Lalumière Report, in which it argued that the MAI “marks a step in international economic negotiations. For the first time we are witnessing the emergence of a ‘global civil society’ represented by non-governmental organizations, which are often active in several countries and communicate across borders. This is no doubt an irreversible change.” As for the suggestions made in the report, Susan George commented in her published debate with Martin Wolf (editor-in-chief of *The Financial Times*) that the Jospin government actually incorporated most of the arguments she and other opponents had made against the MAI. Such tangible influence provided considerable motivation for more comprehensive action that would come to define the essence of the ATTAC movement.

In this way the critique of neoliberalism crystallized into a vision for a deliberate, sustained contestation of the forces of globalization that were seen as usurping governments’ and citizens’ power to shape the contours of their own societies. Though many French intellectuals had long agitated against the increased powers of the WTO, the neoliberal direction of EU integration, and growing foreign ownership of French companies, pension funds, and the stock market, until the establishment of ATTAC, no coherent links had been made between all these developments. Once these connections were made, the movement very rapidly spread beyond France, as groups in many countries began to organize at local, national, and transnational levels to counter neoliberalism with their own agendas for a more equitable and humane international political economy.

Guiding Values and Principal Objectives

The platform adopted by the General Assembly in France on June 3, 1998 begins by stating that financial globalization exacerbates economic insecurity and social inequality and that this process bypasses democratic institutions and

sovereign states and restricts people’s choices. It refers to financial globalization as guided only by speculative logic and the private interests of multinational corporations and financial markets. The platform lays out its critique of the economic fatalism and claims of inevitability that are often associated with the present transformation in the global economy and argues that only vigilant pressure on governments can halt the process. The document specifically mentions the hegemony of US-inspired neoliberalism and criticizes the EU for being a handmaiden to the crusade even as it jeopardizes the public welfare and the audiovisual and agricultural sectors throughout Europe. There is a reference to the growing gap between North and South and a call for the implementation of the Tobin tax. The organized resistance is aimed at giving more room to maneuver to states and citizens, and the platform concludes with a proposal for a formal association and an appeal to common action at the European and international levels. In addition to invoking the need “to reclaim our future,” the platform specifies the following more concrete objectives: (1) to hinder international speculation; (2) to tax financial capital transactions; (3) to sanction tax havens; (4) to inhibit the privatization of pension funds; and (5) more generally to oppose the abandonment of state sovereignty to investors and markets.

ATTAC in general does not focus on lobbying to achieve public policy change directly, but rather seeks to function like a consciousness-raising movement to fundamentally affect the ideational structure of civil society. This is an important factor in accounting for the movement’s potential to function at the core of an emerging global civil society. ATTAC uses parallel strategies to achieve this goal. For one, it organizes peaceful protest activities with publicity value to draw attention to its agenda points. Examples are the blockade of the conference center in Genoa at the G8 summit in 2001, a floating “tax oasis” (tax haven) on the River Alster in Hamburg to stimulate public curiosity concerning the issue of tax evasion, various decentralized activities on the occasion of WTO meetings, and mass demonstrations on the occasion of important EU summits in Brussels.

A second and parallel strategy contributes vitally to the credibility of the movement’s assessments and propositions. Reflecting its self-perception as a movement of popular education, ATTAC

creates and provides expertise on its subjects of concern. Its member organizations actively inform themselves and each other in a complicated network of working groups on all aspects of the organization's agenda. Collaborating with scientists, investigative journalists, and analysts (many of them members), they are building themselves up as educational resources while continually working to share their expertise with the larger public. ATTAC France, for example, has a Scientific Council responsible for publishing books, articles, and tracts of general, critical education on the global economy. ATTAC Germany as well as ATTAC groups in Belgium, Sweden, and Italy all publish a range of material, from scholarly works on political economy to brochures on hot policy topics. The emphasis on education is also reflected in the local ATTAC associations in most European countries, which are encouraged to adopt campaigns that suit the local concerns and needs but also contribute to the formulation of ATTAC strategies at the national and transnational levels.

ATTAC's self-perception as a movement of popular education is also realized, especially in Germany and France (two of the largest associations), through ATTAC-sponsored *Sommerakademien* or *universités d'été*, as well as many smaller seminars and workshops, held for dialogue between activists, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens to discuss developments in political economy that pose threats to jobs, the environment, cultural diversity, and ways of life. In August 2008 a first European-wide Summer University was held in Germany, hosted by the University of Saarbruecken and Attac Saar working in collaboration with a cross-regional preparation team under a European working group responsible for the program. The organization of this event, which drew about 1,000 participants from a range of European countries, illustrates the progress the movement is making towards closer collaboration between different national associations across Europe.

ATTAC as a Transnational Movement: Organizational Structure and Political Strategy

The key organizational principles for all ATTAC associations are decentralization and non-hierarchical forms of decision making. Even though differences can be observed between

countries, ATTAC organizations everywhere share the same basic concerns. The idea is to maintain a democratic and transparent organization which functions based on active grassroots participation in all major decisions and activities and which pursues the ideal of consensual decision making. What is most significant about ATTAC's organization within different national contexts is the inclusiveness of the decision making procedure.

Only six months after the establishment of ATTAC France, the international ATTAC movement was launched and a platform adopted on December 11–12, 1998 in Paris. Representatives from Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America were present, as well as numerous social networks and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Three broad objectives were identified: (1) to launch an international movement for the democratic control of financial markets and institutions; (2) to enlarge and consolidate the political struggle against neoliberalism and its consequences; and (3) to offer more effective means of communication and to work collectively to provide information and counter-expertise on the international economy as tools for social movements. By June 1999 ATTAC membership had already grown significantly and the first official international conference was held in Paris under the title "The Dictatorship of Markets: Another World is Possible."

The next major event took place at the WTO meeting in November 1999 in Seattle, as ATTAC delegations mobilized and joined the protests under the slogan "The World is not a Commodity." Simultaneous protests were held by ATTAC groups across Europe. ATTAC's international campaign against the WTO revolves around the critique that trade agreements are increasingly negotiated behind the backs of citizens and are involving more and more areas of everyday life, including the provision of goods and services crucial for survival, which had previously been viewed as requiring state control and protection. There is a call for a moratorium on negotiations in the areas of agriculture, services, and intellectual property, with a special emphasis on avoiding the inclusion of any more public services in international trade negotiations. The same concerns are expressed at protests against other main protagonists of neoliberal globalization, such as in June 2007 at the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany. At such

events, which bring together a great variety of alter-globalization groups and activists, ATTAC is often a key organizer and can gain visibility and new members.

The expansion of the international movement appears to have been a rather spontaneous phenomenon that surprised the founding members by its volume as well as the speed with which new associations emerged. At the global level, the counter-summit has been the key organizational form. It began with the idea of mounting a counter-conference during the World Economic Forum held initially in Davos, Switzerland, which took place in 2000 and brought together social movements from five different continents in a dialogue initiated and facilitated by ATTAC in association with the Coordinating Center against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, the World Forum for Alternatives, and a Latin American branch of SAPRIN – the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network. In 2001 a conference was held both in Davos and in Porto Alegre, Brazil to emphasize the contrast between the “planet of superrich and Porto Alegre, the planet of the poor, marginalized, and concerned.” Since then, counter-summits have known different venues. Responding directly to the priority of democratizing the global economy, the yearly gathering of the World Social Forum has involved massive coordination among ATTAC groups as well as numerous other networks and NGOs. These networks have organized the panels and workshops, mobilized protests, and featured key speakers, from officials like the UN Secretary General to important activists, which gives the conference both thematic coherence and visibility.

ATTAC has no organizational structure at the global level. The fact that in spite of consistent networking no official transnational organizational structure has emerged is a reflection of the commitment to local autonomy. Yet the movement has generated effective collective action through its ability to solidify discontent and achieve mass mobilizations at the national, regional, and global levels. ATTAC’s slogan “Another World is Possible” has become a rallying cry for the transnational contestation of neoliberal globalization that reaches far beyond the formal organizations of the ATTAC network themselves, indicating the successful internationalization of the movement.

SEE ALSO: G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; G8 Protests, Heiligendamm, June 2007; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; World Social Forums; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999

References and Suggested Readings

- Ancelovici, M. (2002) Organizing Against Globalization: The Case of ATTAC in France. *Politics and Society* 30 (3): 427–63.
- Birchfield, V. & Freyberg-Inan, A. (2004) Constructing Opposition in the Age of Globalization: The Potential of ATTAC. *Globalizations* 1 (2): 278–304.
- Della Porta, D. & Diani, M. (1998) *Social Movements: An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- George, S. (2002) Another World is Possible. *The Nation*, February 18.
- Ruggiero, V. (2002) “ATTAC”: A Global Social Movement? *Social Justice* 29 (1–2): 48–60.

Aung San (1915–1947)

Nupur Dasgupta

Bogoyoke (General) Aung San was the most important of the generation of Burmese nationalists who matured into national leaders in the watershed period of World War II. The anti-colonial struggle and the dream of a consensual Union of Burma with all ethnic communities are inextricably linked with Aung San, considered the father of modern Burma.

He was born in the town of Natmauk, Magwe district, in central Burma to an affluent family. His uncle Bo Min Yaung participated in the anti-British resistance movements in 1886. In 1932 he matriculated with distinctions in Burmese and Pali and joined Rangoon University. In 1936 he was elected secretary of the Rangoon University Students’ Union (RUSU). Soon Aung San became the crusading editor of the RUSU magazine, *Omay* (*Peacock’s Call*) and his days of anti-establishment political writings were initiated in this atmosphere of criticality. Along with U Nu, the president of the RUSU, he was slapped with an expulsion threat by the university when they supported an article criticizing a university official. This was followed by a massive students’ strike in 1936. In 1938 Aung San was elected president of the All Burma Student’s Union. His appointment by the government as the student representative in the Rangoon University Act Amendment Committee was a gesture of cooperation. Aung San married Daw Khin Kyi in 1942. Aung San Suu Kyi, who carries the torch of

her father in continuing to fight for democracy in Burma, was his youngest daughter, born in 1945.

Nationalist Politics: Collaboration and Confrontation with Japan

In October 1938 Aung San moved into the wider arena of nationalist politics. He joined the Dobama Asiayone (We-Burmans Association) and acted as the general secretary. Emerging as an ideologue for Burmese nationalism in 1938–9, Aung San had also developed close relations with the nationalist leaders in India and was imbued with the ideas of democracy as well as socialism in these years.

World War II seemed to pose nationalists with a choice between anti-fascism and anti-colonialism. Aung San and the *Thakins* (members of Dobama Asiayone often called “masters,” signifying that they and not the British were the real masters of Burma) opted for the path that they thought was quickest to achieving freedom for Burma. Ideological issues had been in Aung San’s conscience and this is brought out in his post-1943 speeches and actions. During the war years he became the pivot of the nationalist movement in Burma. The decision of turning to an anti-British movement was influenced by his own patriotism and the politics of the British in the prewar years, which made him suspicious of their motives. In October 1939 he helped to found Bama-htwet-yat Ghine (Freedom Bloc) and became its general secretary. Aung San was contacted in China by the Japanese. The Burma Independence Army was raised in 1941 with the help of the Japanese to aid them in their 1942 invasion of Burma. Aung San was its chief of staff. It accompanied the Japanese occupation forces and grew in numbers as the Japanese entered Burma.

Even before the August 1, 1943 Japanese declaration of Burmese independence with Dr. Ba Maw as the *Adipadi* (head of state), Aung San had lost his faith in the Japanese intruders. He retraced his policy and vision for Burma’s future. From the middle of 1943 till June 15, 1945, when the Allied victory parade was held in Rangoon, Aung San, along with the members of the Communist Party of Burma and the People’s Revolutionary Party led by U Nu, developed a strong anti-Japanese movement under the Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO). This was a major achievement for Aung San, as this popular front brought together different ideological and political interests. While delivering the Independence Day anniversary speech in August 1944, Aung

San openly declared Burma’s independent status as fake. He led the anti-Japanese movement with help from the communists hiding in the hills of Burma and contacted the British Force 136 through them in India. In March 1945 Burmese troops throughout the country rose up against the Japanese.

British Return and After

British rule was reinstated in September 1945. British policies, however, did not meet with the expectations of the Burmese nationalists. Aung San had formed the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) on August 19, 1945, and began to press forward with the issue of Burma’s independence. Having denounced the White Paper containing His Majesty’s Burma Policy in 1945, Aung San led the nationalists in the country in protest against British policy. In 1946 Governor Dorman-Smith was replaced and Hubert Rance’s government inducted the AFPFL leaders into the Executive Council. In September 1946 Aung San was appointed deputy chairman of the Executive Council of Burma with portfolios for defense and external affairs. This was followed by the Aung San-Attlee Agreement signed in London on January 27, 1947, guaranteeing Burma’s independence within a year. Aung San and his colleagues in the council came back to press forward with plans of action for consolidating the future of Burma with a consensual government ensuring the participation of all ethnic communities. His concept of the Burmese nation was that of an integrated plural culture. During the negotiations with British Prime Minister Attlee, Aung San had asked for “the full freedom of all races in our country.” It was with such a vision that he entered into the Panglong Agreement on February 12, 1947 with leaders from nationalist groups expressing solidarity and support for a united Burma. In April 1947 the AFPFL won 196 of 202 seats in the election for a constituent assembly. In June 1947 Aung San convened a series of conferences at the Sorrento Villa in Rangoon for reconstruction of the country. On July 13, 1947 he delivered the last public speech before his assassination on July 19, 1947.

Middle Path

The Manifesto of the Thakin Party, supposedly penned by Aung San before Japanese Occupation, has aroused debates over the nature of his

political vision for Burma. It has been held that the Blueprint in the Manifesto was the theoretical basis for military dictatorship (Maung Maung 1969: 298–9). However, Houtman (2007) has sharply criticized the inclusion of this document in Aung San's writings, claiming with some evidence that Maung Maung did this to justify Ne Win's dictatorship with reference to Aung San and his popularity. Certainly, the sentiments did not match Aung San's stand in 1946–7. It is true that in view of the total body of his writings and speeches, the ideas expressed in the Manifesto do not appear to be central to Aung San's thought (Silverstein 1993: 219; Houtman 1999: 19).

Aung San conceived democracy as the Buddha's Middle Path between the two extremes of communism and capitalism, which he bracketed with fascism (Houtman 1999: 21). He talked of sham democracy, which uses the people as a lever, "in the name of the people." His relationship with Marxist ideology and the Communist Party has been much debated. Both he and leading communists like Thakin Than Tun emerged from the nationalist *Dobama* movement and its left wing. He was certainly attracted by the appeal of egalitarianism in communism. But as a nationalist, his tactics during World War II differed from those of the communists. Like nationalists across Southeast Asia, he had a phase of collaboration with the Japanese before becoming disillusioned, after which he again collaborated with the communists. Then the decision to enter into government under Rance led to a rupture with the communists. Nonetheless, unlike in subsequent years, the relationship between nationalists and communists was not hostile. He approached the question of Burma's future from the standpoint of a middle path. His assassination put an end to this approach to democracy for Burma.

His daughter Aung San Suu Kyi described his memory as the guardian of the people's political conscience. Given the distrust between the Burman majority and the national or ethnic minorities, Aung San showed a great ability to bring about unity among peoples.

SEE ALSO: Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945); Burma, Democracy Movement; Burma, National Movement Against British Colonial Rule; Soe, Thakin (1906–1989)

References and Suggested Readings

Houtman, G. (1999) *Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League*

for Democracy. Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

Houtman, G. (2007) Aung San's *lan-zin*, the Blue Print and the Japanese occupation of Burma. In K. Nemoto (Ed.), *Reconsidering the Japanese Military Occupation in Burma (1942–45)*. Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

Kyi, A. S. S. (1991) *Aung San of Burma: A Biographical Portrait by His Daughter*. Edinburgh: Kiscadale.

Maung Maung, U. (1969) *Burma and General Ne Win*. London: Asia Publishing House.

Naw, A. (2001) *Aung San and the Struggle for Burmese Independence*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.

San, A. *Speeches*. Available at www.aungsan.com/Speeches.htm. Accessed May 3, 2008.

Silverstein, J. (1993) *The Political Legacy of Aung San*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Australia, anti-war movement

Terri Bennett

Organized and sustained anti-war and peace movements occurred in Australia as early as World War I and have persisted with each foreign war in which Australian troops have been involved, including World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam, and the US War in Iraq.

During World War I, Australia's early feminists were at the forefront of the movement against the war. Vida Goldstein (1869–1949) and Cecilia John (1877–1955) co-founded branches of a militant anti-war group, the Women's Peace Army, in Brisbane, Melbourne, and Sydney. According to Marilyn Lake (1999), meetings were often opened by John, a celebrated vocalist who sang popular anti-war songs considered so influential in shifting public opinion against the war and hampering recruitment that they were outlawed in the War Precautions Act of 1915. Also formed was the Sisterhood of International Peace, which would later become the Australian chapter of the worldwide (and still active) Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Proponents of feminist pacifism also worked within other organizations with anti-war aims, such as the Australian Freedom League, which most notably fought compulsory conscription and military training, referred to as "military tyranny."

World War II saw similar anti-war movements, although, as in much of the world, peace

activists were sometimes split by the complexities of simultaneously opposing war and fascism. Many groups, however, stood their ground, such as the Labor Anti-War Committee of the Australian Labor Party, who, in a 1935 pamphlet entitled "Labor's Case Against War and Fascism," called for the "application of science to the social betterment of the entire people" rather than "to the purposes of death and destruction in the interests of an exploiting minority of capitalists." The recurrence of such a great war so soon after World War I, for the Australian Labor Party in its greater social analysis, signaled an incriminating failure of the capitalist social system itself.

The Korean War marked the beginning of what would become a long legacy of Australian resistance to wars of US imperialism. The issue of safety was magnified during the Korean War for Australians, as many feared that the country's proximity to the war-torn region would increase the threat of attack if Australia involved itself in the warfare. In 1950, more than half a million people supported the Australian Peace Council in its statement that Australian involvement in the Korean War would not only be a danger to the Australian people, but would implicate Australia in what was viewed as an unjust obstruction to that country's right to self-determination. The US was further accused of denying the right of the Korean people to choose their own form of government, thus violating tenets of the Marshall Plan and contravening a United Nations charter. Because the US promulgated dubious claims of Soviet aggression toward Korea, the Australian anti-war movement claimed the US misrepresented security information to instill fear in the international community in order to garner support and military assistance. Activists staged prolonged campaigns aimed at informing the Australian people of these issues.

Less than two decades later, similar criticisms were launched during the US war in Vietnam. The anti-war movement in Australia visibly emerged in 1965, where Sydney's first anti-war rally was held at the US consulate in Sydney and organized by the Eureka Youth League, a youth organization affiliated with the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), just before Australia announced that it would send troops to Vietnam. After the announcement, hundreds of protesters gathered in front of Parliament

House. A year later when US President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Australia, he was met by over 10,000 protesters. Groups such as Vietnam Action Committee (VAC), Australian Student Labor Federation, Association of International Cooperation and Disarmament (AICD), and unaligned student activists proved intrinsic to organizing future actions. Multiple anti-war publications began circulating the nation. Coalitions of mothers also proliferated to demand their sons never be conscripted to join the war. By 1970 the anti-war movement had spread widely, and it continued until 1975, when the war was over and *Direct Action*, a popular anti-war movement monthly, ran the headline "A Victory for All Humanity."

The Australian movement against the US war with Iraq began, as in much of the world, before the war commenced in March of 2003. Though opposition to Australia's involvement in the Iraq War was evident in media outlets and in public discourse earlier, massive anti-war sentiment made itself known the weekend of February 14, 2003 when an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 demonstrators marched on the streets of Melbourne (with smaller demonstrations throughout Australia) during the global days of action organized by anti-war and peace activists around the world. Resistance to the Iraq War in general, as well as Australian participation in the war in particular, has been pervasive since the onset of the war. Anti-war activists in Australia have been credited with some victories, including Prime Minister Rudd's withdrawal of 550 Australian troops in June of 2008, and continue to challenge the legitimacy of the war in Iraq as well as US imperialism and the proliferation of US military bases around the world.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Vietnam War Movement, Britain; Anti-Vietnam War Movement, United States; Anti-War Movement, Iraq; Australia, New Social Movements; Australian Left; Communist Party of Australia; Women's Movement, Australia

References and Suggested Readings

- Lake, M. (1999) *Getting Equal: The History of Australian Feminism*. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin.
- Marshall, J. V. (1969) *World of the Living Dead and Jail from Within*. Sydney: Wentworth Press.
- Moore, E. (1949) *The Quest for Peace as I Have Known it in Australia*. Available at www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/pdf/a000699.pdf (accessed July 16, 2008).

Australia, new social movements

Sean Scalmer

Since the early twentieth century, the term “social movements” has been used to denote socialist and industrial campaigns of labor. “New social movements” are generally dated from the middle 1960s. The term was invented by a group of European thinkers impressed with the radicalism of contemporary protest and convinced of labor’s exhaustion. They depicted the “new” movements as critics of industrial society; advocates of post-material values; democratically organized; staffed by the new middle class; and devoted to the most radical and extra-parliamentary of actions. They were, so the argument ran, the social actors of the future (Touraine 1971; Offe 1985; Melucci 1989).

Many Australian radicals were impressed by these ideas, and they seemed to sum up the rhythms of recent history. From 1965, a wave of political protest crashed across the Australian polity. It began with protests against racial segregation, the Vietnam War, and conscription, and soon swept up students, trade unionists, indigenous people, Christian believers, and many else besides. “Black liberation” was followed by “women’s liberation,” “gay liberation,” and even “tree liberation” (Scalmer 2002). Opposition to the Vietnam War formed the center of political anger and dissent. However, younger activists also created “Free Universities,” scribbled manifestos, held conferences, and led occupations. The peak of political protest was not reached until 1971. In a few exhilarating years, a series of apparently “new” movements was imagined into sudden and exciting life.

Writing was important to all of these campaigns. Germaine Greer discovered *The Female Eunuch* and thereby fed the growth of women’s liberation. Dennis Altman helped to invent gay politics in *Homosexual: Oppression or Liberation?* Geoff Sharp and Doug White explained the rise of student protest with a theory of the “intellectually trained” that stimulated great excitement in their new journal, *Arena*. Later, Peter Singer opened a fresh front with *Animal Liberation*, and Helen Caldicott and Jim Falk championed the cause of anti-nuclear disarmament. These were more than local contributions. Most of

these writers were published internationally, and they had a substantial impact on radicals outside of Australia.

Unlike the supporters of the Australian labor movement, this new generation of “social movement” activists were also university intellectuals. The possibility of holding these dual identities represented an important shift. The boundaries between the academy and the street were increasingly crossed over the 1970s and 1980s. If the campus had been radicalized, then the politics of dissent had also become an object of acceptable academic contemplation. As a result, scholarship was considerably changed.

Adherents of the new social movements reshaped the institutions of higher education. New journals were launched in the fields of political economy, feminism, and social theory. Courses were also established in these fields, sometimes after long struggle with resistant universities. In later years, histories of the new movements tumbled forth, but also more critical studies, seeking to diagnose the structures of racial and sexual difference, and to ponder the procedures of tenable reform.

The Labor Party was receptive to some of these developments. This was strongly evident in the program of the Whitlam government (1972–5), and also in the more cautious activity of its successors, the Hawke–Keating governments (1983–96). Labor administrations in the states also provided opportunities for change. In consequence, “femocrats” entered the bureaucracy over the 1970s and 1980s as directors of new programs devoted to gender equity. There were also initiatives dedicated to the recognition of multiculturalism and the rights of indigenous peoples. And the rise of environmentalism led to the establishment of consultative mechanisms to promote “economically sustainable development.”

Outside of the bureaucracy and the parties of labor, further institutional changes were evident. Advocacy groups became increasingly professionalized and expert. In the 1980s, some of them formed close ties with a party dedicated to liberalism, the Australian Democrats. Then, in 1993, a national Green Party was formed, building upon preexistent organizations and campaigns in a number of states. Over recent elections, the Greens have consolidated their support and have gained important representation in the upper houses of most Australian parliaments. Their policies address wider issues than environmental

collapse, and at present they are the major electoral alternative to the parties of labor and conservatism.

The overall trajectory of the “new social movements” has therefore largely conformed to the pattern set by the Australian labor movement 100 years earlier: protest has been met by integration and institution-building; while revolution has not occurred, successful reforms have been enacted, and moderate social improvements achieved. Onlookers have seldom grasped these historical parallels, however.

From the later 1980s, a strong political reaction to the “new movements” began to gather pace. Drawing inspiration from American neo-conservatism, the Australian right developed a powerful critique of contemporary trends. Its leaders were scornful of the welfare state, derisive of “political correctness,” and celebratory of market forces. Their arguments won substantial support, and a conservative government ruled Australia from 1996 to 2007. Its leaders attacked the new social movements as “special interests,” “elites,” and spokespeople of a “victim industry.” They removed the funding previously enjoyed by advocacy groups and sought to silence dissent across the polity (Hamilton & Maddison 2007). The universities were mocked as cradles of propaganda, and their share of public funding was greatly reduced. And far-right movements opposed to immigration emerged as the most obvious signs of contemporary protest and dissent.

As a result, the theory of the “new social movements” was increasingly discredited. It is now generally accepted that its key theoretical insights were vastly overdrawn. The contrast between the “old” labor movement and the “new” social movements ignored the tendency for feminism and environmental activism to become institutionalized, as well as their sometimes hidden histories, before the radicalism of the 1960s. It blinded many to the contribution of working-class people to the “new” politics (see Burgmann & Burgmann 1998). At times, it became an unedifying means for middle-class intellectuals to proclaim their own importance (Burgmann & Milner 1996, for a critique). It cannot explain contemporary movements that respond directly to the globalization of people and of capital. It leaves the movements of the political right unexamined. And it offers little guidance as to “how” social movements (of all kinds) manage to mobilize politically.

In recent years, the concept of the “new social movements” has therefore lost its intellectual centrality. Attention has turned more squarely to globalization. Verity Burgmann (2003) has analyzed the global justice movement. Kevin McDonald (2006) has explored global movements of many different kinds. And other scholars have sought to document the tactical dilemmas common to a range of contemporary campaigns, and the attempts of activists to negotiate them (Scalmer 2002; Maddison & Scalmer 2006). The “new social movements” of Australia form part of a common field of protest, rebellion, and reform, and are no longer regarded as the central actors of the future.

SEE ALSO: Aboriginal/Left Struggle for Land Rights; Anarchism, Australia; Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Australia, Anti-War Movement; Australian Aboriginal Protests; Australian Left; Ecological Protest Movements; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Green Bans Movement, Australia; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements, Australia; Student Movements; Women’s Movement, Australia

References and Suggested Readings

- Burgmann, M. & Burgmann, V. (1998) *Green Bans, Red Union: Environmental Activism and the New South Wales Builders’ Labourers’ Federation*. Sydney: UNSW Press.
- Burgmann, V. (2003) *Power, Profit and Protest: Australian Social Movements and Globalisation*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Burgmann, V. & Milner, A. (1996) Intellectuals and the New Social Movements. In R. Kuhn & T. O’Lincoln (Eds.), *Class and Class Conflict in Australia*. Melbourne: Longman Australia, pp. 114–30.
- Doyle, T. J. (2000) *Green Power: The Environment Movement in Australia*. Sydney: UNSW Press.
- Hamilton, C. & Maddison, S. (Eds.) (2007) *Silencing Dissent: How the Australian Government is Controlling Public Opinion and Stifling Debate*. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin.
- McDonald, K. (2006) *Global Movements: Action and Culture*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Maddison, S. & Scalmer, S. (2006) *Activist Wisdom: Practical Knowledge and Creative Tension in Social Movements*. Sydney: UNSW Press.
- Melucci, A. (1989) *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Offe, C. (1985) New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics. *Social Research* 2 (4): 817–68.
- Scalmer, S. (2002) *Dissent Events: Protest, the Media and the Political Gimmick in Australia*. Sydney: UNSW Press.

Touraine, A. (1971) *The Post-Industrial Society: Tomorrow's Social History: Classes, Conflicts and Culture in the Programmed Society*. New York: Random House.

Australian aboriginal protests

Gary Foley

Australian indigenous political resistance of the modern era can be traced to the first aboriginal political organization, the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association (AAPA), established in 1924 by aboriginal wharfies (members of the Maritime Union of Australia) Fred Maynard and Tom Lacey. The AAPA had in part been inspired by Jamaican Marcus Garvey and shared the motto of Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association: "One God, One Aim, One Destiny." The AAPA stood for self-determination, economic independence, and land rights for aboriginal people, and its adaptation and incorporation of the ideas of Garvey demonstrates a far higher level of political sophistication than white Australian historians have ever acknowledged. Operations of the AAPA were largely restricted to the north coast of New South Wales (NSW). It managed to last only four years due to intense police and Aborigines Protection Board harassment, but the AAPA nurtured the flame of resistance, embedded ideas of self-reliance and independence, and was to have a powerful influence on the next generation of NSW indigenous activists in the 1930s.

Between the late 1920s and mid-1930s, Salt Pan Creek, an aboriginal squatters' camp southwest of Sydney containing dispossessed refugee families of NSW and people seeking to escape the harsh and brutal policies of the Aborigines Protection Board, became a focal point of intensifying aboriginal resistance in NSW. Significant alliances, strategies, and future leaders were developed at Salt Pan Creek. People such as Jack Campbell, George and Jack Patten, Pearl Gibbs, and Bill Onus all spent time in the camp. In 1933 Joe Anderson was filmed at Salt Pan Creek by Cinesound News making a strong statement in support of indigenous land rights. Thus the spirit of resistance had a strong focal point until new organizations were developed.

A decade after the AAPA succumbed to police and Aborigines Protection Board pressure, two

new indigenous political organizations emerged, one in Melbourne and one in Sydney. In the Melbourne suburb of Fitzroy during the 1930s a growing aboriginal community saw an influx of refugees from the bitter struggle on Cummeragunja reserve on the NSW/Victorian border. Among these dispossessed and disaffected refugees were William Cooper, Bill Onus, Marge Tucker, and Doug Nicholls, who in 1936 were among the founders of the Australian Aborigines League (AAL). AAL membership was open to all Aborigines, and the aim of the group was "to gain for aboriginal people those civil and human rights denied since occupation."

One year later in NSW former shearer Bill Ferguson joined forces with Jack Patten and established the NSW Aborigines Progressive Association (APA). The APA was created as a follow-up organization to the earlier AAPA. Jack Patten had links with the old AAPA, and interestingly, so too did the AAL's Bill Onus. Thus the two new organizations were regarded as the next generation of the resistance. In 1938, on the occasion of the 150th anniversary celebrations of white settlement, the two organizations joined forces to mount a protest. William Cooper of the AAL declared January 26, 1938 as a Day of Mourning, and a protest meeting was held in Sydney. This protest was a great success in terms of the national and international attention it attracted. The protests were successful despite difficult and tough times for aboriginal political organizers, who were subject to a broad range of restrictive and discriminatory state laws that controlled the movement of indigenous people.

The particular methodology of the 1938 protest marked the start of a long strategy by the indigenous resistance of challenging the popular myths of white Australia in a variety of ingenious, satirical, and subversive ways. The Day of Mourning protest left a profound imprint on the consciousness of a generation of political activists, and the leaders of the 1938 action all went on to become enormously influential in indigenous politics for the next 30 years. They would collectively mentor the next generation of activists that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s.

In 1958 the first national indigenous political organization was founded in Adelaide. The Federal Council of Aboriginal Affairs (FCAA) was created as a national voice for indigenous people, yet paradoxically at the inaugural meeting of the 25 people who were there, only three (Bert



Demonstrators demanding Aboriginal indigenous land rights at the 1982 Commonwealth Games in Brisbane, Australia, march without a permit. A state of emergency was declared by the premier, Malcolm Fraser, making street protests illegal, resulting in the arrest of hundreds of indigenous protesters and their supporters. (© Penny Tweedie/CORBIS)

Groves, Doug Nicholls, and Jeff Barnes) were aboriginal. As the organization grew, the dominance of non-indigenous people on its governing committee became entrenched, and even as it changed its name at its Easter conference in 1964, there were rumblings of aboriginal discontent at the lack of indigenous control. Before that discontent surfaced, there were two major events in the late 1960s that had a powerful effect on the younger generation of that era on all parts of the continent.

In 1965 an ex-soccer player and aboriginal student at Sydney University, Charles Perkins, led a group of white students on a bus tour into some of the most racist country towns and into history. What we now know today as the 1965 Freedom Ride was inspired by an action of the same name conducted by activists in the civil rights movement in the US earlier that decade. Like their American counterparts, Perkins and the students deliberately confronted segregation and racism in such notorious towns as Moree, Walgett, and Bowraville and not only generated riots and outrage, but also headlines around the world. The Freedom Ride exposed Australian racism to the world and as such was a significant embarrassment to the Australian government and nation. It had the much more important effect of radicalizing a new generation of activists who were teenagers when the Freedom Ride passed through their towns, and they saw the local white racist establishment exposed and shamed in the most powerful way. This left a deep im-

pression in the minds of such people as Lyall Munro Jr., Billy Craigie, Michael Anderson, Lyn Thompson, and Gary Williams.

In 1967 the Federal Council for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI, its name changed in 1964) ran a national campaign to change the constitution to make the federal government, rather than the states, responsible for aboriginal affairs. It was felt that the Commonwealth would be able to deliver a standard and more compassionate administration of indigenous affairs than the notoriously negligent and racist state regimes. The concept of the referendum was imposed on the increasingly impatient younger generation by the “elders” of FCAATSI. The young people were told to assist in the campaign for a “Yes” vote, as that would be the answer to indigenous people’s ongoing oppression and marginalization.

When the referendum resulted in the biggest “Yes” vote in Australian history, the old guard of the aboriginal movement effectively declared the battle won. However, nothing really changed. In fact, in southern states, things got significantly worse as the NSW government repealed its Aborigines Welfare Board and withdrew administration from the 45 reserves around the state, effectively abandoning more than 40,000 aboriginal people. This led to considerable discontent on the part of the younger generation, whose white counterparts were challenging the white political mainstream over issues concerning imperialism and neo-colonialism (in the Vietnam War) and personal freedom. Between 1968 and 1970 at the annual FCAATSI conference in Canberra, there were a series of increasingly intense confrontations between indigenous representatives and the organizational leadership who were mostly non-indigenous. Young indigenous activists were arguing for “Black control of Black Affairs,” which was also being promoted as the idea of Black Power.

The term Black Power had entered the Australian vernacular in 1969 when an incident occurred at the Aborigines Advancement League (not to be confused with the AAL of the 1930s) in Melbourne. The incident itself was very mild and innocuous in that it was a short talk and press conference held at the League by West Indian academic Professor Roosevelt-Brown, an advocate of Black Power. The Australian media artificially contrived a controversy out of the incident by equating the term Black Power with “black

violence and anarchy,” playing on the fears of an already xenophobic Australian public. Thus the term Black Power became synonymous with evil.

The aboriginal political movement split into two distinct camps in 1970 when the annual FCAATSI conference that year resulted in a confrontation between those who believed in Black Power (aboriginal control of FCAATSI) and those who believed in maintaining the status quo (mostly whites and older aboriginal delegates). When the Black Power delegates lost the vote for aboriginal control of FCAATSI, they split and formed a new body, the National Tribal Council. More importantly, younger activists in Sydney, Brisbane, and Melbourne were developing their own ideas and methods.

In Sydney’s inner-city suburb of Redfern, an aboriginal community of some 25,000 people had grown since the mid-1960s as part of an exodus from rural settlements and reserves to inner-city Sydney. Redfern in 1971 was the largest aboriginal community in Australia, comprising more than 10,000 landless refugees from the old apartheid system of the NSW Protection Board. This was an impoverished but dynamic, struggling community which developed its own social networks and entertainment. But it also attracted an undue amount of attention from the local police force, which began to conduct a protracted campaign of harassment and intimidation of the Redfern black community. Certain younger members of the community who had been radicalized by the Freedom Ride and gained political experience in the campaign for the 1967 Referendum began a discussion group that became known as the Black Caucus. This group began to consume radical anti-imperialist political literature and, because of contact with black US soldiers in Sydney on R&R from the Vietnam War, developed a close interest in such US groups as the Black Panther Party in California.

Utilizing tactics partly adopted and adapted from the US, and partly developed along indigenous philosophies, the young Redfern radicals began to create local community self-help organizations such as free shopfront legal aid centers, community controlled free health clinics, housing cooperatives, and a Breakfast for Children program. The early success of these self-determination ventures coincided with an intensification of street demonstrations in support of

a campaign for land rights. Redfern activists such as Paul Coe began attending anti-Vietnam War demonstrations, challenging the young white student radicals about their own racism, and taunting them with accusations of hypocrisy.

In 1971 the Australian anti-apartheid movement staged major demonstrations against a touring white South African rugby team, and again Coe and fellow members of the Redfern Black Caucus challenged white protestors about why they were not supporting the land rights campaign. This time the anti-apartheid movement accepted the challenge and began to organize joint demonstrations with Koori activists. These demonstrations led to a series of violent confrontations in Sydney, Brisbane, and Melbourne, increasing mainstream community fears about a violent form of Black Power. In early January 1972, a front-page article in the *New York Times* reported the “emergence of a militant black power movement among dissatisfied young Aborigines” that was said to be stirring Australia.

All of this action, plus the handing down of the Gove Land Rights case, compelled Prime Minister William McMahon to make a major policy statement on aboriginal land rights. McMahon decided to make this statement on the symbolically powerful and politically contentious day known to white Australia as Australia Day and to indigenous peoples as Invasion Day. The statement essentially denied the right of aboriginal people to land, and it triggered widespread outrage in indigenous communities nationwide. That night in Redfern the Black Caucus dispatched a group of four young men – Michael Anderson, Billy Craigie, Bert Williams, and Tony Coorey – to Canberra to set up a protest on the lawns of Parliament House. The idea of the protest was originally simply to stage a small demonstration, be arrested, and hope that the media would take photos before the men were dragged away. This would make the point that aboriginal people were rejecting the McMahon Australia Day statement, and would hopefully keep media interest high until a major demonstration was organized for that weekend. But this plan went spectacularly wrong, to the pleasant surprise of everyone but the McMahon government.

The young Redfern activists duly arrived on the lawns of Parliament House and set up a beach umbrella with the sign “Aboriginal Embassy.” This was the idea of Tony Coorey, a poet, who said, “The PM’s statement has

effectively declared us aliens in our own land. If so, we should have an embassy like all the other aliens.” When the ACT police arrived, they informed the protestors that there seemed to be no appropriate law to prevent them camping. The group was told by police that if they only had 11 tents they could not be moved. If they had 12 tents they could be deemed a camping area and evicted. To the amazement of the activists, and everyone else, they had accidentally discovered a loophole in ACT laws whereby it was not actually illegal to camp on the lawns of Parliament House.

The next day the campers installed a proper tent to serve as the “office” of the Aboriginal Embassy and in front of the tent placed a letter-box on top of a pole. The following day mail started to be delivered. The Embassy rapidly became the most popular new tourist attraction in the national capital. Tourist bus operators began delivering their busloads of tourists to the Embassy, where they would be given talks about land rights by the Embassy crew and asked for donations and to sign a petition before trooping off to visit Parliament House across the road. The protest rapidly became a great success, enjoying broad community support to an extent rarely seen in indigenous affairs. This was in part due to the larrikin appeal of a protest that snubbed the authorities and was simultaneously peaceful and highly creative, and also due to the extensive publicity it received both nationally and internationally. Television crews from more than thirty countries filmed and broadcast stories about the Embassy and the situation of aboriginal peoples in Australia. Among the international media that covered the Embassy were the *Guardian*, the *New York Times*, *Le Figaro*, *Time* magazine, the *Israeli Post*, *Le Monde*, and newspapers from such faraway places as Norway, Jamaica, Malaysia, and New Delhi. With that sort of local and international media coverage it very quickly became apparent that the Embassy protest was becoming a major political embarrassment for the McMahon government.

The most important development occurred in February when opposition leader Gough Whitlam visited the Embassy and was challenged by Paul Coe about ALP Aboriginal Affairs policy which, Coe asserted, was little different from the position of the McMahon government’s. Whitlam’s response was to change ALP policy to support land rights for aboriginal people.

This was a significant moment in Australian history and would directly result in 1976 in the Northern Territory Land Rights Act.

This proved too much for the McMahon government, which had been extremely embarrassed and flummoxed by the campers on their lawn. So McMahon moved, in May 1972, to create a new law making it illegal to camp on the lawns of parliament. That law became reality on the morning of July 20, 1972, when the Trespass on Commonwealth Lands Ordinance was gazetted. Within 20 minutes of the new ordinance coming into effect, ACT police moved on the Embassy and forcibly removed the tents in the midst of a brawl in which nine protestors were arrested and many more were injured.

The televised images of the forced removal of the Embassy were shown around the nation and around the world, to the further embarrassment of the McMahon government. Three days later more than 2,000 indigenous people and their supporters marched on Parliament House and re-erected the Embassy. They linked arms around the tent, forming a solid wall of people and defying the police. In the resulting melee, many were injured, and 18 people were arrested. Again, the violent scenes were broadcast around the world and a week later more than 3,000 people marched on parliament and set up the Embassy again.

This time they were confronted by overwhelming force in the form of ACT police backed up by two contingents from the NSW Police Riot Squad and several busloads of soldiers from the Royal Military College at Duntroon, which was also on special alert in case more troops were needed. In the face of such assembled force, the leaders of the demonstration (conscious of the numerous elderly and children in their ranks) decided to seize the high moral ground and claim victory by peacefully allowing the police to remove the tents from over the heads of a token delegation. This generated TV news footage that enabled the Embassy campers to claim a “moral victory” and further undermine the image and standing of the McMahon government. These events directly contributed to the rapid demise of the McMahon administration which, six months later, in December 1972, was voted out of office in one of the biggest political landslides in Australian history.

The Aboriginal Embassy protest of 1972 initiated more than a decade of high-profile indi-

genous protest actions that placed questions of land rights, sovereignty, and self-determination firmly on the national political agenda ever since. It also created a greater international awareness of the local indigenous struggle for justice.

Indigenous people in Australia had high expectations when Gough Whitlam was elected prime minister of a Labor government in December 1972. The Whitlam government's two major indigenous policy initiatives were the establishment of the first national, elected indigenous representative body, the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC), and the framing of the 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights Act (Northern Territory), which was later passed by the Fraser Liberal government. However, despite Whitlam establishing some limited reforms in the area of aboriginal affairs, his tenure as PM was cut short in 1975 and indigenous political activists were upset at a return to a conservative Liberal government in Canberra. This led to the aboriginal political movement seeking greater international links and support when the National Aboriginal and Islander Health Organization (NAIHO) set up an "information center" in London and began organizing support for aboriginal rights all over Europe.

In keeping with the tactic of embarrassing the Australian government in the international political arena, aboriginal activists organized major demonstrations at the Brisbane Commonwealth Games in 1982. These demonstrations saw hundreds of aboriginal people arrested on numerous occasions as the state government had implemented anti-demonstration laws that made it illegal for more than three people to gather in public in Brisbane for the duration of the Games. The resultant mass arrests made headlines around the world and proved an extreme embarrassment for the Federal government of Malcolm Fraser, who was until then enjoying a positive image from his efforts to assist in negotiating a peaceful settlement to racial problems in Rhodesia.

In 1983 a Labor government returned to Canberra with former trade union leader Bob Hawke as prime minister. Hawke had come to power ostensibly strongly committed to granting aboriginal people land rights in the form of "national, uniform land rights legislation," utilizing Commonwealth government powers gained in the 1967 referendum. The promised

legislation would, according to Hawke, be along the lines of the federal 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NT) that enabled aboriginal people to gain land in freehold title, and state government opposition would be overridden by federal legislation. The Hawke government's commitment to aboriginal land rights came at the end of a decade of effective peaceful and creative protest actions by the aboriginal political movement, and Hawke was initially praised by aboriginal activists.

However, in a matter of months, Hawke did a political backflip when he reversed his position on land rights after an intense, racially charged, multi-million dollar advertising campaign mounted by vested interests in the mining and pastoral industries. The final nail in the coffin of freehold title land rights came after a meeting between PM Hawke and the Labor premier of Western Australia, Brian Bourke, who was acting as an advocate of the powerful WA mining lobby. (Bourke would some years later be exposed as a corrupt politician who ultimately was jailed for his activities, but would continue to be an ALP powerbroker for decades to come.) After Hawke met with Bourke, the prime minister revoked his earlier strong statements on aboriginal land rights and instead claimed that mining interests were the "national interest" and would be protected. This instantly incurred the wrath of the aboriginal community, where activists declared that they would mount major protests at the forthcoming 1988 Australian Bicentennial celebrations.

Given the effectiveness of the 1982 Brisbane Commonwealth Games demonstrations, the Hawke government was understandably nervous about the prospect of indigenous anger being expressed during the Bicentennial year. The Hawke government decided that it would be necessary to offer some items of appeasement to aboriginal anger and announced several significant reforms to that end. The first was a major reform of the old, hated Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA), which was given some minor cosmetic changes, along with attaching a component of elected representatives and a new name, ATSIC. Because this ill-conceived organization was cobbled together in a climate of political expediency it was destined to fail, which it ultimately did more than a decade later in spectacular fashion with its cynical architects blaming aboriginal people for its demise.

Another Hawke government initiative that would have long-term divisive effect was the creation, by an Act of parliament, of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR). The government at that time wanted to deflect public attention from Hawke's backflip on land rights and defuse the resultant aboriginal community anger. So, to get everyone talking about something else, they had pulled the reconciliation rabbit out of the hat. The problem was, as aboriginal activists pointed out, that this notion of reconciliation was not an issue that had emerged spontaneously from either the indigenous or non-indigenous communities, and was certainly not on the indigenous political agenda. Thus the issue and debate about reconciliation would divert and dilute debate for the next two decades and beyond.

Unfortunately for the Hawke government, these attempts to redirect aboriginal energies away from Bicentennial protest failed spectacularly when the biggest assembly and protest march by aboriginal people in Australian history was held peacefully in central Sydney in the heart of the Bicentennial celebrations. Two hundred years after the invasion, the survivors of the original Australians declared to the world that "We Have Survived" and that the struggle for justice continued.

The international interest in the Australian indigenous struggle for justice, generated largely by the activists at the 1972 Aboriginal Embassy action, has continued to bedevil and embarrass subsequent Australian governments' attempts to downplay the issue in international forums. The Embassy should be regarded as the apex of the indigenous peoples' struggle for justice in the twentieth century, and the moment that the world realized that Australia's indigenous population had not all "died out" as the assimilationist Australian government propaganda had claimed, but rather had developed throughout the twentieth century a highly sophisticated resistance struggle. From 1972 until the 1990s this indigenous political movement dominated debate on issues of race relations and justice in Australia, and it was not until the Mabo High Court decision and the subsequent and deeply flawed Native Title Act, as well as the advent of the extremely conservative Liberal government of John Howard, that the pendulum began to swing the other way.

SEE ALSO: Australia, Anti-War Movement; Australia, New Social Movements; Australian Left; Canada,

Indigenous Resistance; Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism; Native American Protest, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Attwood, B. & Markus, A. (1999) *The Struggle for Aboriginal Rights: A Documentary History*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin Academic.
- Broome, R. (1982) *Aboriginal Australians*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Libby, R. T. (1992) *Hawke's Law: The Politics of Mining and Aboriginal Land Rights in Australia*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Lippmann, L. (1981) *Generations of Resistance: The Aboriginal Struggle for Justice*. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
- Peterson, N. & Langton, M. (Eds.) (1983) *Aboriginal Land and Land Rights*. Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies.
- Wills, N. (1982) *Give Me Back My Dreaming: Background to the Australian Aboriginal Claim to Land Rights*. Melbourne: Communist Arts Group.

Australian labor movement

Sean Scalmer

The long history of the Australian labor movement discloses a pattern of precocious advance, swift integration, periodic challenge, and recent exhaustion. Revolution has loomed as a common fear, a marginal cause, but never a likely prospect.

European Australia began as a penal colony in 1788. By the third decade of the new century, the skilled male workers of the new cities had begun to form their own associations. These consolidated an already strong group identity and secured a range of protections: subscription to benefit funds; resistance to the employment of convicts and apprentices; guarantees of workmanship; maintenance of a fair price.

The circumstances for rapid unionization were propitious. With the discovery of gold in the summer of 1851, a long economic boom began. Unionists took advantage of the new conditions. In 1856 stonemasons in Melbourne and Sydney pressed for and won an eight-hour day. Workers in other trades struggled for their own improvements in a series of strikes, and in 1883 one observer claimed that the "eight-hour system" was generally accepted across the land.

Now the spirit of unionism spread to less skilled workers, among them wharf laborers, miners,

shearers, tailoresses, and salesmen. These workers lacked the prestige of their more respectable comrades. Without the protections of trade, their methods were necessarily more aggressive, their fellowship wider, and their challenge sharper. The organizations they established were dubbed “new unions”; they enrolled mass memberships, and they claimed wide aims.

By the end of the nineteenth century, this growing movement comprised a political as well as an industrial challenge. More than 100 labor newspapers were established over the three decades from 1870. Labor’s devotees created their own schools, libraries, and bookstores. Historians canonized the movement’s successes, and annual processions celebrated the winning of the eight-hour day. Agitators attracted large audiences when they stood on rough platforms and spoke of a new and just order. The unions formed central bodies to expand their association at this time: the Trades and Labor Councils of major cities and towns. These were the parliaments of the workers, and their members soon massed in great, bold, stately buildings.

This remained an exclusive movement, however. Unionists dreamt of an Australia that was “white, pure and industrially good” (McQueen 1975: 24), and racism drew a line across the labor force. Those workers deemed non-white were typically forbidden membership in the labor family. When they tried to form their own organizations, these were shunned, too. And despite women’s central contributions to industrial struggle, their unions remained weak and marginal and their working conditions poor.

Nonetheless, the advance of organized male labor was general enough to frighten many employers. From the middle of the 1880s, they began to form their own associations. From August 1890 a series of industrial disputes pit the powers of capital against labor: a maritime strike; shearers’ and seamen’s strikes; the repeated locking-out of miners. These were conflicts of desperate extremity and enduring rancor. Special constables and soldiers buttressed the resources of conventional police. Leading militants were arrested at bayonet point and marched through the city streets in chains. Magistrates punished strikers for breach of contract, or with crimes of conspiracy and sedition. With the connivance of colonial governments, the employers emerged victorious, and the unions were smashed. Some disappointed radicals left for Paraguay, to found



The campaign for an eight-hour workday by unskilled and rural workers led to several strikes in Australia during the 1890s. Protesters calling for an eight-hour day are depicted marching through Melbourne on May 1, 1895. These events eventually led to the formation of the Australian Labor Party and the organization of trade unions in the twentieth century. (Courtesy of the State Library of Victoria)

a utopian community (a “New Australia”). Everywhere, the optimism of Australia’s youth seemed now embittered and concerned citizens sought a new means of bringing order and peace.

The “great strikes” of the 1890s bequeathed two institutions. Both had a decisive impact on the career of labor: advancing the movement’s immediate interests, but also containing the prospects of revolution.

The Labor Parties established in various colonies were an experimental response to recent defeat. Their original impulses lay in the recognition of defeated strikers: “trade unionists must use the parliamentary machinery as it has in the past used them.” The new institutions were commonly acknowledged as a collective challenge to bourgeois democracy. Labor’s policies were formed by a conference, made up of

delegates from affiliated unions and local branches. Its representatives elected to parliament were pledged to vote as a bloc and to enact conference decisions. In this way, the autonomy of the politician was superseded by the solidarity of the delegate; the policies “to be submitted to the people” would now be “determined by the people” (Childe 1923: 28).

These unfamiliar Labor Parties stormed into colonial parliaments from 1891, and then into the new Commonwealth Parliament after the Federation of 1901. Australians elected the first Labor governments in the world. These were formally dedicated to a “socialism” defined with increasing (if still slight) rigor over the first decades of the twentieth century. Their achievements were limited, but genuine: the nurturing of unionism; the regulation of minimum standards; the extension of state enterprises; old-age pensions; child endowment; and then, after World War II, a more substantial welfare state. Some international visitors thought Australia a beacon of reform in the years before mid-century; local worthies declared pride in their undoubted achievements.

However, Labor governments also disappointed many. Australian Labor firmly rejected revolutionary politics and consistently repressed more radical movements. It developed an internal culture dominated by deal-making and oligarchic control. Politicians refused the dictation of conference. The party split and its leaders repeatedly defected during moments of political and economic crisis: World War I, the Depression, and the Cold War. Looking across the decades, Labor’s time in office was comparatively brief, and its formal dedication to “socialism” was consistently blocked by political timidity and constitutional impediments. Critics have derided the party as “laborist” rather than “socialist.” Labor’s champions have embraced the former label, proclaiming the virtues of a “civilized capitalism” and the intrinsic rewards of political longevity.

For good or ill, Labor governments were keen supporters of a second antipodean departure: the system of compulsory wage arbitration. This described special courts established from the middle 1890s to regulate industrial relations and to avoid long-running disputes. In the event of strikes or lockouts, arbitration courts were empowered to direct a reconciliation of disputants. And if agreement could not be reached, then they could also enforce a settlement.

These new institutions reshaped the conditions of employment. In a landmark judgment of 1907 (the “Harvester Case”), Justice Higgins of the Commonwealth Court determined the payment of a “fair and reasonable” wage for an unskilled laborer. In order to make precise calculations, the judge imagined a family of five living in frugal comfort, with the wife and children dependants of the man. The cost of housing, clothing, food, transport, and moderate amusements was calculated, and this became known as the “basic wage.” The new standard was extended across the workforce over subsequent years and regularly adjusted for changes in the cost of living. It became bedrock for all white, employed males. From this point, the vicissitudes of the market were supplanted by the determinations of law. A “new province of law and order,” to adopt a phrase of Higgins, was born.

Arbitration courts offered legal recognition for unions and a formal process of register. The maintenance of the basic wage ensured that white Australian men would never be employed at starvation wages. As a result, unionism quickly rebounded. On the brink of the Great War, 33 percent of employees held a union card. At this time, Australians were more likely to combine for industrial protection than any other people in the world.

However, not all unionists were enamored of the new order. It was a condition of an arbitration court judgment that workers accept the court’s decision without demur. The new courts possessed “penal powers” to discipline the unruly and these were rapidly reinforced by a brace of further legislation. Unsurprisingly, the unions nurtured by arbitration were therefore often small, defensive, and competitive. They spent scarce resources in lengthy court submissions and built fragile empires through judicial favor. Legal and political preoccupations now increasingly displaced the immediacy of direct action and popular involvement.

Moreover, the protections of the “basic wage” were limited. The court assumed that male workers supported their wives and children; women, by contrast, were assumed to support only themselves. They were paid at a lesser rate, and corralled into a limited range of occupations. Aboriginal workers faced a similar fate. And even white men went hungry in frequent moments of economic downturn and insecure employment.

Not surprisingly, the most radical protests of the twentieth century therefore emanated from those citizens least protected by this patchy regime. The pattern is clear. Unemployed and irregularly employed workers were the major supporters of the most revolutionary organizations: the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and the Communist Party of Australia. Women launched protests and strikes for equal pay over several decades. Aboriginal workers consistently fought for improved pay; one of their struggles, the Wave Hill dispute of 1966, became a successful fight for land rights. Postwar migrants, excluded from meaningful union protection, demanded justice in wildcat strikes that over the 1960s and 1970s were not supported by officialdom.

These were all challenges to the priorities of the labor movement and to the leadership of its officials. They were typically succeeded by a renovation of union structures and by an attempt to widen the family of labor. In this way, the failures of the movement were successively addressed by the energy and the radicalism of those most excluded from its protections. Slowly, the principles of unionism were extended across the lines of gender and race.

However, the apparently settled structures of the labor movement were also periodically convulsed by more widespread instabilities. Australia participated in three major wars over the twentieth century: the Great War, from 1914; World War II, from 1939; and the Vietnam War, from 1965. Each moment was associated with heightened industrial conflict, skepticism toward arbitration, and the language of revolutionary aspiration. Insurgent organizations enlivened labor's activities during each of these moments: the IWW, around World War I; the Communist Party of Australia, around World War II; the new left and new social movements, in the era of the Vietnam War.

Unionists were swept up in these developments. Many militants sought to build "One Big Union" under the influence of the IWW; communists led long-running strikes after World War II; radical unionists in New South Wales developed "green bans" against environmentally damaging development in close dialogue with the new left. The Labor Party's response to these episodes was typically more ambivalent. It repressed labor's most militant activists and organizations. However, the stirring of the wider movement also enlivened Labor's policies. The

party formulated a more robust "socialization objective" in response to radicals in 1921. Under prime ministers John Curtin and Ben Chifley in the 1940s, it sought postwar reconstruction, a welfare state, and even attempted, unsuccessfully, to nationalize the private trading banks. The brief period of Whitlam government (1972–5) was marked by a more independent foreign policy, greatly enhanced provision of public education and health care, and an increasing sensitivity to inequalities of gender and race.

Since the middle 1970s, the labor movement has been in retreat. The protections of arbitration and the basic wage have been removed by successive governments. Employers have increasingly opposed unions as illegitimate intruders upon the intimate relationship between boss and worker. The old strongholds of blue-collar unionism have been swept away by economic change; contemporary workplaces are smaller, more diffuse, and harder to organize than ever before. Labor governments between 1982 and 1996 sought formal cooperation with the unions, but this often compromised the latter's ability to win rewards at the shop floor. Conservative governments from 1996 to 2007 sought to eliminate union influence, conspired with employers in notable disputes, and drafted strongly anti-union legislation.

It is therefore not surprising that union membership has fallen. From one in two workers at the beginning of the 1980s, it has recently fallen below one in five. The Labor Party was elected in 2007 with the strong support of the unions and promises of a more equitable industrial environment. However, the ties linking the unions and the party are no longer so close. They rest mostly on the career histories of leading politicians. While the need for working-class challenge to capitalism's inequalities has rarely been greater, the capacity of the Australian labor movement to lead that fight has rarely appeared so weak.

SEE ALSO: Aboriginal/Left Struggle for Land Rights; Anarchism, Australia; Australia, New Social Movements; Australian Left; Class Identity and Protest; Class Struggle; Communist Party of Australia; Green Bans Movement, Australia; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), Australia

References and Suggested Readings

Burgmann, V. (1985) *In Our Time: Socialism and the Rise of Labor, 1885–1905*. Sydney: George Allen & Unwin.

- Burgmann, V. (1995) *Revolutionary Industrial Unionism: The Industrial Workers of the World in Australia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Childe, V. G. (1923) *How Labour Governs: A Study of Workers' Representation in Australia*. London: Labour Publishing Company. Available at www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/pdf/b000125.pdf (downloaded June 2008).
- Connell, R. W. & Irving, T. H. (1980) *Class Structure in Australian History*. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
- Macintyre, S. (1999) *The Reds: The Communist Party of Australia from Origins to Illegality*. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin.
- McQueen, H. (1975) *A New Britannia*. Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin.
- Scalmer, S. (2006) *The Little History of Australian Unionism*. Carlton North, Victoria: Vulgar Press.

Australian left

Peter Beilharz

The left in Australia across the twentieth century had two main coordinates – the USSR and the Australian Labor Party (ALP). The mistake made by the Australian communists was to imagine that the experience of the Soviet Union was entirely relevant to Australia – but it was not. The mistake made by Australian radicals more generally was to imagine that the Labor Party would somehow become the vehicle or encourager of the cause of Australian socialism. They were also wrong, though they did much good work in the process of testing these fantasies.

Early Australian radicalism was much influenced by both American and British movements and ideas, from Bellamy to Henry George. Australian practices, such as arbitration and conciliation, which were forged in league with New Zealand, were in turn highly influential in the north. The left in Australia had a strong new liberal impulse, where the project of the state was seen to be that of civilizing capitalism. Other parallel trends like anarchism and syndicalism were equally apparent.

Provincial Labor governments were active from the 1890s. The Federal Labor Party agreed to a Socialization Objective in 1921, which, as elsewhere, functioned as the Sunday China. The Federal Labor government followed a deflationary policy in the Depression. The Golden Age of Labor emerged in the 1940s, in direct parallel to the British case, though with less success; there was nothing like the National

Health Service introduced in Australia. National Fordism began to emerge into the 1940s, together with a Californian form of suburbia. From the 1950s, Labor was marginalized by the Cold War and the Democratic Labor Party split of 1955. A newly social democratic glaze adhered to the Whitlam government, elected in 1972 but dismissed by the vice-regal in 1975. Labor returned to office from 1983 to 1996 in the highly controversial “Labor Decade,” which combined some traditional commitments to social justice with serious steps toward economic deregulation. The apparent policy centerpiece of these years was the ALP–ACTU (Australian Council of Trade Unions) Accord, which looked like a social contract though it harbored many dreams attached to the idea of industry development policy and full employment. This was a particularly interesting moment in radical political and intellectual history, as some of the key actors in this process were communists or ex-communists whose great dream was to produce a robust economic base for national development, this at the very moment when globalization destroyed all such old modernizing hopes.

Federal Labor returned to power in 2007, looking again to modernize and to restore some aspects of an administrative social democratic tradition. But, needless to say, without even a word about socialism. The last Labor government to use this term, in the form of democratic socialism, was the Whitlam government of 1972–5, where the affiliations were with postwar British Fabianism. Labor has progressively moved to the right, or center, and taken much of the Australian left with it. The prospects of a globalized economy replaced those of localized innovation, this in Australia but also, more emphatically, in New Zealand, where Labor also pioneered the global project at the expense of the state tradition. In terms of political geography, the point is an important and overlooked one: developments in the antipodes led, first in the 1890s with innovations like Arbitration, then into the 1980s with deregulation.

The Labor Party has thus dominated the history of the left in Australia, whether practically, because of electoral significance and union ties, or symbolically: for the point is that discussion of socialism in Australia always at some point became discussion of the Labor Party. The left projected its fantasies onto the ALP as bearer, while the ALP shifted away from social justice

talk, becoming a party of state rather than the party of the labor movement.

There were always, of course, determined revolutionaries who would have none of this. They belonged less to the Communist Party than to the Trotskyist or Maoist sects. The history of Trotskyism in Australia develops to the point at which it duplicates the entire histories of the Fourth Internationals. Trotskyism emerged as anti-Stalinism in the 1920s, and revived in opposition to the Great Patriotic War in the 1940s. It then grew significantly into the 1960s, mainly in connection with local opposition to the war in Vietnam and to conscription. The cult of Mao and Che were strong among radical youth, but Maoism was mainly influential in the building trades unions, where the more radical initiative of the New South Wales CPA led to so-called green bans in defense of urban ecology. The most influential variant of Trotskyism, the Socialist Workers' Party, itself reformed as the Green Left. Trotskyism in Australia since the 1960s follows this pattern, of identifying popular single issues and seeking to steer parts of the youth movement around them. In Australia, as elsewhere, opposition to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the most apparent focal point for public mobilization today. Feminists organized alternatively, outside the sects or through the ALP.

In a small country, or a big country connected by small distances, left culture is also the culture of its cities – Melbourne, more traditionally reformist, Sydney, traditionally more libertarian, Brisbane, Adelaide, Perth. Australia has an urban structure of maritime cities, which sometimes means that they are better connected out than to each other, and globalization stands logically to extend this. As elsewhere, left politics is usually reactive, responding to global changes rather than leading, this again, in acceleration since the 1980s. The issue today is less that the Australian left has illusions about the Labor Party, or other places, than that it is increasingly difficult to see beyond the fragments of postmodern life and its immediate personal challenges. We are too busy just coping, or renovating the self, to imagine changing the world.

SEE ALSO: Australia, Anti-War Movement; Australian Labor Movement; Australian New Social Movements; Communist Party of Australia; Eurocommunism; Green Bans Movement, Australia;

Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), Australia; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Women's Movement, Australia

References and Suggested Readings

- Beilharz, P. (1994) *Transforming Labor: Labor Tradition and the Labor Decade in Australia*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
- Beilharz, P. (2008) *Socialism and Modernity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Macintyre, S. (1989) *The Labour Experiment*. Melbourne: McPhee Gribble.
- O'Lincoln, T. (1985) *Into the Mainstream*. Sydney: Stained Wattle.

Austria, 20th-century protests

Helen Bluemel

Protests in Austria have taken a variety of forms, from ethnic minority issues surrounding demands for autonomy in the Hapsburg empire to anti-democratic left- and right-wing protests in the First Republic (1918–34) and eventual fascist takeover. When describing the development of conflicts in Austria from 1900 to the present day, it is important to discern the change in what “Austria” means. The country has undergone multiple forms of government; it has progressed from a monarchy at the onset of the century to a parliamentary democracy today. Furthermore, it also has changed its territorial and ethnic character immensely. It ceased to exist as an independent state for seven years from 1938 to 1945. All these factors had an influence on the form protests took in the country itself.

Austria at the Turn of the Century

In 1900, Austria had progressed in less than 50 years from an autocratic to a parliamentary monarchy. The multi-ethnic state under German-Austrian Hapsburg rule also had to make concessions to its largest minority: the double monarchy of Austria-Hungary was established in 1867. This meant that Austria's Hapsburg emperor was concurrently the king of Hungary, which otherwise had become a rather autonomous state. What was thought to defuse the mounting ethnic tensions that had concerned the empire throughout the 1800s only inspired

greater unrest amongst its different people. The “ascendance” of the Hungarians to a position on par with the Austrians sparked hopes and movements for recognition amongst the other ethnic minorities in the empire. Most notably, the Czechs tried to reach a similar agreement to that of the Hungarian autonomy but failed in their attempts. This was received as a bitter blow as the Czech-inhabited territories of Bohemia and Moravia were the main industrialized areas of Austria-Hungary, thus playing a pivotal role in the growth of the Austrian economy. To be denied at least some form of autonomy in the light of this increased the perception of being treated with contempt. The conflicts between Slavic nationals and German speakers grew throughout the empire, and were generally solved by suppressing the demands of the Slavic minorities.

The final decades of the nineteenth and the first years of the twentieth centuries were marked by growing tensions throughout Europe. Economic and political animosities, and the growing importance of nationalism, led to the establishment of two hostile camps within Europe. On the one hand were the Central Powers, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy (which changed sides in 1915), and on the other was the alliance of Great Britain, France (the entente cordiale of 1904), and Russia (Triple Entente, 1907).

In the first decade of the new century, all European powers were flexing their muscles and the hostility and readiness for war grew. In 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia, which it had occupied decades earlier. This caused discontent amongst the other great European powers, yet an open international conflict could still be avoided. The wait, however, was not long.

World War I

The annexation of Bosnia increased tensions between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which seemingly was next on the list to be consumed into the Austrian empire. Therefore it was hardly surprising that during a visit to Bosnia on July 28, 1914, the Austrian crown prince, Franz Ferdinand, and his wife became the victims of an attack. The attacker was the Serbian-trained Gavrilo Princip. Although this killing was not the reason for the events that followed, it presented a formidable trigger in releasing all the pent-up tensions in Europe in World War I.

Austria-Hungary deliberately set Serbia an impossible and degrading ultimatum, with Germany standing firmly behind her ally. Serbia, with Russian backing, rejected the problematical order. Austria declared war on Serbia, and Germany declared war on Russia and France. Furthermore, through the German violation of Belgian neutrality, Great Britain became involved as well. Other countries had grouped around these states and the fighting became fully internationalized. It was an Austrian state affair that led to the greatest conflict the world had seen so far. What was thought to be a matter of a few months – every European country greeted it jubilantly and expected a quick victory – turned into four years of war with over ten million dead.

From the beginning of the war, Austria was ruled by emergency laws and the War Economy Enabling Act. This meant that the entire industrial production was directed toward the war effort. To reach the highest possible output, workers were forced to work long hours and to exceed normal production. When the promise of a short, victorious war receded, these working conditions in connection with progressively harsher living circumstances for the civil population generated growing unrest amongst the Austrians. The October Revolution in Russia in 1917 made a huge impression on Europe and its people and stirred further commotion. In Austria-Hungary, the revolutionary spirit found its expression in a first great strike on January 14, 1918. Resentment had grown amongst the working class due to the hardship caused by the war and oppression encountered at the hands of state authorities. Thus a spontaneous strike in Vienna spread quickly throughout Austria and encroached also into Bohemia and Hungary. As the strike erupted at grassroots level, the Social Democratic Party, the political representation of the working class, was taken by surprise and acted to calm down the radical elements within the strike with the promise of small concessions. However, this did not fully stifle the revolutionary momentum in the Austrian empire. The armed forces were also inspired by the events and several mutinies followed. The biggest mutiny, involving several battleships of the Austrian navy, took place on February 1, 1918 in the gulf of Cattaro. These uprisings were suppressed by the state forces, which managed to conceal the events from the wider public. Therefore,

fraternization between civilians and soldiers – a factor that would later lead to widespread revolutionary actions – was averted.

However, the beginning of the process of dissolution of the Hapsburg monarchy and especially its multi-ethnic empire could not be halted. Several national minorities demanded their own states, inspired by American President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Point" Plan which included the claim for self-government of ethnic groups in their own states. On September 26, 1918, a Czechoslovakian republic was proclaimed. This proclamation in exile was repeated in the soon-to-be capital Prague a month later on October 28. The Czechs and Slovaks were not the only peoples to declare independence. The Croats and Slovenes together with the Serbians established a national assembly in early October, and their republic was proclaimed a day after the Czechoslovakian one, on October 29, 1918. The German Austrians also prepared for the time after the multi-ethnic empire, and under Karl Renner they constituted a cabinet on October 31, 1918. The Hungarians left the battlefield on November 3, 1918, having decided that this was no longer their fight. The Hapsburg empire had broken down. The revolutionary spark erupted again in protests in Vienna. However, these remained largely non-violent as the final breakdown of the empire and the end of the war were clearly in sight. Military defeat was obvious. On the day of the armistice, November 11, 1918, the Hapsburg emperor declared his retreat from all state business. On November 12, a German Austrian republic was proclaimed in Vienna. Ethnic tensions and the catalytic catastrophe of war had destroyed Austria-Hungary.

First Attempt at Democracy

The remaining Austria, a territory of German speakers, encountered a period of continuous political unrest with a revolutionary character from 1918 to about 1920. The new form of state, the parliamentary democracy, was not welcomed by the people. The government was blamed for the peace settlements, which were less than favorable for the Austrians: the pursued union with Germany was forbidden as a condition of peace and the territory of Austria was considerably reduced. Repeated attacks from the left and the right followed; attempts to create a socialist

regime according to the Soviet example as well as efforts to reestablish the monarchy were undertaken to overthrow the new government. Several conflicts of ethnicity marred the fledgling state: this time the German national minorities in the newly founded Slavic states fought for autonomy or annexation of their territory to the Austrian state. In 1920, South Carinthia, part of the Austrian state, was occupied by Slavic forces. Only the protests of its German-speaking citizens and the ensuing international response saved Carinthia from being torn away from Austria.

Considerable stabilization of the Austrian republic was achieved in 1921, but this did not mean that social protest and politically motivated violence had ceased. The opposing parties in parliament, the Social Democrats and the ruling Conservative Christian Socialists, had formed paramilitary troops, the *Schutzbund* and the *Heimwehr* respectively. Street fights between these two groups were a common sight. In addition, the National Socialist *Sturmabteilung* (SA) took part in the violent conflicts, a clear sign that populism fought out on the streets rather than parliamentary government was to hold sway. The economic crisis triggered by the war increased in the early 1920s as hyperinflation eradicated savings and threw many Austrians into despair. The social tensions this caused led to a polarization of society, which found expression in ever more ferocious battles between the paramilitary forces of each political persuasion.

The mounting pressure reached a peak on July 15, 1927 in Vienna. Seven months before, an invalid and a child had been killed during an attack on a *Schutzbund* march. The accused attackers were tried and the decision expected for July 14. The working class took a particular interest in the outcome as it saw the attack as an affront against them. However, instead of a guilty sentence, all the defendants were pronounced innocent. The news spread amongst the workers and outrage over the verdict sparked mass protests on July 15. The demonstration against a perceived injustice turned violent when protesters stormed into the Viennese law court and set the building ablaze. The police reacted with force of arms and shot into the crowd. The day saw 89 dead and over 1,600 injured. Pursuant to these events, the *Schutzbund*, which was falsely seen as a protagonist by the state, and members of the working class in general were persecuted severely by the authorities.

Even the Catholic Church, traditionally the spiritual home of the Austrians, showed an inclination toward the right of the political spectrum, leading to a mass secession from the church.

A general anti-democratic turn can be observed in Austria in the years following 1927. The Heimwehr, having benefited from the Schutzbund's downfall, became a more autonomous force whose political aspirations turned fascist. Italy's fascist leader Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) supported the Heimwehr's actions with weapons and money. The SA acted more violently and openly against the government. The world economic crisis, which began with Black Friday in 1929, was another destructive factor in the breakdown of democracy, leading to even more social tensions. In the following years unemployment more than doubled, leaving a third of the population without income. Economic hardship in combination with political oppression of the working class and its representatives led to a further entrenchment of the social divide.

Fascism in Austria and the *Anschluss*

In 1932 Engelbert Dollfuß (1892–1934) became chancellor of Austria. When the Austrian parliament failed to close a sitting according to its regulations in March 1933, Dollfuß seized the opportunity to declare the parliament null and void and to take over rule in Austria. Utilizing the War Economy Enabling Act and countless emergency laws, he established a dictatorial, fascist system that was directed against the Social Democrats as well as the National Socialists. The latter, inspired by the Nazis' takeover in Germany, increased their terrorist acts to further their power in Austria. Dollfuß fended off these ambitions and subsequently banned the Austrian NSDAP and its sub-organizations in July 1933. They took refuge in Germany and were to return with a vengeance, as will be seen below.

The final elimination of the other political camp – the Social Democrats and their Schutzbund – was the result of events that are sometimes referred to in the literature as the “Austrian civil war.” The Schutzbund, which since 1927 had been operating clandestinely, was often “visited” by police forces searching for weapons, especially since Dollfuß's takeover. A weapons search of the Schutzbund's headquarters in Linz on February 12, 1934 was

greeted with shooting and followed by fights. This revolt was also the starting signal for more protests by workers in other areas of Austria. However, within a few days the insurgencies were crushed due to the chaotic unpreparedness of the protesters and the brutal use of force by the police and the mobilized army. A ban of the Social Democratic Party followed.

Dollfuß's autocratic rule might have found favor with Mussolini, but Austria's northern neighbor, Nazi Germany, disapproved of the NSDAP ban and the country's refusal to yield to Germany. Economic sanctions were imposed by the Nazi regime to break the Austrian resistance but showed no noticeable effect. However, National Socialist terror acts increased immensely after the events of February 1934. It might have been the government's focus on the regime's enemies on the other side of the political spectrum that allowed the terror acts, mainly bombings, conducted by the SA and Schutzstaffeln (SS) to reach a level of hitherto unknown brutality. The climax of the mounting violence was the putsch of July 25, 1934. The attempt to take over governmental power failed: the putschists were quickly encircled and forced to yield to the police, but nevertheless Chancellor Dollfuß was murdered.

Internationally, the failure of the putsch and the pressure from Austria's fascist patron, Mussolini, forced the German leader Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) to distance himself from the events and lessen his ambitions for influence in Germany's south. It was not until February 1938 that Hitler could exercise enough pressure to achieve National Socialist involvement in the cabinet of Austria's chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg (1897–1977). That this was not the final stroke was shown a month later when Hitler and the Wehrmacht marched into Austria on March 12, 1938. With the *Anschluss* (alignment) and the law about “reunification” of the country with Germany, Austria ceased to exist as an independent state. Within the next year, Austria was politically, economically, culturally, and socially transformed into a part of National Socialist Germany. Even the country's name was banished from official use. Racially motivated laws came into being installing the same discriminatory conditions for Jews, Sinti and Roma, disabled people, and other “undesirables” that were in force in the north of the German Reich.

World War II and Aftermath

World War II began on September 1, 1939. It saw the Austrians fighting alongside Nazi Germany. Although Austria was declared to be “the first victim of National Socialism” at an Allied war conference in Moscow in 1943, and about 2,700 Austrians died as resistance fighters, one must not forget that Hitler was greeted jubilantly during the *Anschluss* in 1938 and many Austrians were active National Socialists in party, SS, and similar Nazi organizations.

However, unlike Germany, Austria managed to throw off National Socialism in the final days of the war. Karl Renner, who was already the leading figure in establishing the first Austrian republic, facilitated a new constitution of the Austrian government. On April 1, 1945 (over a month before the war ended in Europe with Germany’s complete capitulation), he was recognized by the Russian forces as the head of government and assigned the task of forming a cabinet. On April 27, 1945, this government proclaimed Austria’s independence and declared the *Anschluss* null and void.

In September 1945, the Renner government was finally recognized by the western Allies as well. Despite this, the division of Austria into four occupational zones (American, British, French, and Soviet Russian) continued until 1955 when the *Staatsvertrag* (state treaty) was signed and Austria once more became a fully independent state, the Second Republic, albeit under the condition of full neutrality. The situation only changed in the 1990s when Austria became a member of the European Union, thus relinquishing its position of complete neutrality for that of a member of a community of states with economic, political, and social ties.

Since the end of World War II it has become customary to view Austria as mainly a victim of National Socialism. Indeed, the new Second Republic used the phrase “first victim” to boost morale within Austria and gain respect on a foreign political scale. It is only in recent years that Austria is finally coming to terms with its past and facing all, especially the uncomfortable, facts of its history.

SEE ALSO: Austro-Marxism; Bauer, Otto (1881–1938); Ethnic and Nationalist Revolts in the Hapsburg Empire, 1500–1848; Fascism, Protest and Revolution; German Revolution, 1918–1923; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Hungary, Protests, 1815–

1920; Landau, Kurt (1903–1937); Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945); Russia, Revolution of October/ November 1917

References and Suggested Readings

- Barker, E. (1973) *Austria, 1918–1972*. London: Macmillan.
- Bérenger, J. (1997) *A History of the Hapsburg Empire, 1700–1918*. London: Longman.
- Botz, G. (1983) *Gewalt in der Politik*. Munich: Fink.
- Jelavich, B. (1987) *Modern Austria: Empire and Republic, 1815–1986*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Martha, C. W. (1993) *The Hidden Life of Tyrol*. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press.
- Mazower, M. (1998) *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century*. London: Penguin.
- Steininger, R., Bischof, G., & Gehler, M. (2002) *Austria in the Twentieth Century*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Vocelka, K. (2005) *Österreichische Geschichte*. Munich: Beck.
- Williamson, S. R. (1991) *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*. London: Macmillan.

Austro-Marxism

Robert Goodrich

Noted for its theoretical engagement with contemporary philosophical and social scientific thought and for its political activity up to 1934 in “Red Vienna,” Austro-Marxism developed after 1900 out of the Viennese socialist student movement. Its members included M. Adler, O. Bauer, R. Hilferding, G. Eckstein, K. Renner, and others. The movement coalesced in 1903 with the Fabian-style association *Zukunft* (*Future*) and the publication of *Marx Studien* (1904–34) and *Der Kampf* (*The Struggle*) (1907–34).

Largely a nationally specific reaction to the revisionist debate within the Second International, Austro-Marxism dealt less with political strategy than with the question of Marxist theory and methodology. Thus, while open to revision, it did not directly challenge the revolutionary platform of orthodox Marxism. Austro-Marxists instead expanded Marxism’s theoretical basis by avoiding monocausality and economic reductionism while engaging non-Marxist theory, especially Neo-Kantianism, the Austrian Marginalist School of economics, and positivist philosophy. Less a coherent system than a methodological pragmatism, Austro-Marxism favored a social scientific Marxism that was methodologically reflective,

anti-dogmatic, and empirical. Essentially, Austro-Marxism prioritized a social scientific methodology within Marxism rather than a general Marxist social theory.

Initially, the Austro-Marxists played a significant role in international socialist discourse, especially in Germany. Adler not only provided the seminal explanation of Marxism as a social science, but also opened Marxism to the strong German tradition of Kantianism in philosophy in *Causality and Teleology* (1904). In economics, Hilferding engaged the neoclassical critique of the Marxist theory of value and presented the first systematic treatment of finance and non-finance capital in *Finance Capital* (1910), a work of great influence on Lenin and Bukharin. Bauer's analysis of the national question, *The National Question and Social Democracy* (1907), suited the context of Eastern Europe and influenced Lenin's theory of national self-determination and the platforms of several interwar parties such as the Bund, left-wing Zionists, and the Jewish Folkspartei. He also led the attempt to create a coherent left socialism that sought a "third way" between Bolshevism and social reformism after 1917 and found adherents among Independent Socialists. Renner worked as a legal and political theoretician and wrote *The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Function* (1904), a foundational text for the sociology of law as a discipline. The breadth of work influenced diverse schools from Western Marxism, with its representatives ranging from Lukács and the Frankfurt School in the 1920s to leading Bolsheviks.

Additionally, the Austro-Marxists were active as politicians. Bauer served as Austria's first foreign minister; Renner oversaw the experimental socialist governance of Vienna and later became the first president of the Second Republic (1945–50). And Hilferding was directly involved in ministerial responsibility in Germany.

However, growing polarization and an ascendant fascism meant that outside of Austria support declined for Austro-Marxism, while the destruction of the First Austrian Republic in 1933/34 destroyed its institutional basis. Nonetheless, Austro-Marxism's pragmatism inspired the international socialist movement in the 1970s and 1980s. Both Eurocommunism and the New Left looked to it as an alternative to Cold War polarization. Even after the collapse of communism in 1989, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) regarded it as

uniquely appropriate to its condition. A number of German, Austrian, and Slavic monographs began appearing in response by the 1970s, but little English scholarship exists.

SEE ALSO: Bauer, Otto (1881–1938); Frankfurt School (Jewish Emigrés); Germany, Socialism and Nationalism; International Socialism: Mass Politics; Internationals; Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Marxism; Socialism; West German "New Left"

References and Suggested Readings

- Böhm, H. (2000) *Die Tragödie des Austromarxismus am Beispiel von Otto Bauer. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Österreichischen Sozialismus*. Frankfurt: Lang.
- Bottomore, T. & Goode, P. (Eds.) (1978) *Austro-Marxism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Leser, N. (1968) *Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus. Der AustroMarxismus als Theorie und Praxis*. Vienna: Europa.
- Löw, R. (1986) *Austromarxismus. Eine Autopsie*. Frankfurt: ISP.
- Rabinbach, A. (1985) *The Austrian Socialist Experiment: Social Democracy and AustroMarxism, 1918–1934*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Autonomism

Christian Garland

The term "autonomism" or "autonomist" may broadly refer to a number of different theories and movements that, while in some ways disparate, can be said to share several underlying aims and principles. Autonomism assumes a perspective of critical and reflexive Marxism, emphasizing both its essentially negative and open-ended nature – as with any critical theory – and identifying its own theory and practice as *anti-hierarchical*, *anti-capitalist*, and *anti-authoritarian*. Similarly, while retaining the centrality of class struggle, autonomist currents maintain the need for revolt and *self-emancipation* by the exploited and oppressed themselves, as a self-valorizing agency, and not by a "vanguard party" or other self-declared liberator. The theory of autonomy can thus be defined as one of self-determination over the form and substance of life, both collectively and individually. Unlike orthodox Marxism, autonomous movements can also be defined as "anti-political" and indeed "anti-state," in that they reject the traditional means of political action and the traditional goal of assuming "political power" embodied in the state-form.

Autonomy, then, is not rigidly fixed in ideological terms, but rather can be defined as the power to freely determine the conditions of one's existence. Against hierarchical power, and its embodiment in the forces of market and state, autonomist practice stresses the possibility of alternative modes of being in the here and now, without losing sight of the need for this to become *total*, both in the sense of encompassing a majority of society and acting against the existing system in its entirety. However, in so far as we can speak of "autonomism" it should be stated that this very broad term is basically anti-systemic and non-ideological, and the various theories and movements associated with it deliberately resist any easy assimilation into a standard definition.

Autonomist theory has much in common with class struggle anarchism, and many autonomists and anarchists recognize the affinity. However, the Marxist character of autonomist theory makes for an important distinction with anarchism. Being a heterodox tradition, autonomism has more than one historical forerunner; as such, many within the broad movement identify a line of continuity with the critical and libertarian aspects of Marx's original theory, as much as the anti-Leninist Left Communist currents which followed in the early twentieth century.

The term "autonomism" has its origins in the Italian *Autonomia* and *Operaismo* movements of the late 1960s, which reached their high point in the Hot Autumn of unofficial strikes, sabotage, occupations, and street protests of 1969, before reemerging in the tumult of 1977. Italian autonomist Marxism found its best theoretical expression in the likes of Antonio Negri, Mario Tronti, and Sergio Bologna, but the movement, which their theories fed into, was not defined solely by such theories. In terms of late twentieth-century revolutionary ruptures, it can be argued that the two Italian movements of the late 1960s and late 1970s are second only to the French May Events of 1968 for significance and impact. In both cases, currents usually confined to the margins swept across the entirety of social relations in an advanced industrial society, to radically and permanently alter it.

The Italian movement of 1969 offers a number of notable examples of "autonomous practice," in which effective collective action undermined and subverted capitalist social relations. Besides mass squatting as a solution to housing need,

equally wide-scale rent strikes offered a further refusal of the market imperative of having to pay for the privilege of a roof over one's head. This mass movement spread to include the infamous use of *autoriduzione*, or "self-reduction," in which thousands refused to pay full price, or indeed anything at all, for essential services such as electricity, gas, water, and transport. In the workplace, too, when not sabotaging production, workers engaged in an endless wave of unofficial strikes and stoppages outside of the control of trade unions and political parties.

In the converging struggles of the first movement of 1968–9 there can be discerned something of the more fluid and dynamic definition of "the proletariat" that autonomists continue to theorize, encompassing a non-unionized white collar sector and also recognizing the unpaid domestic labor performed by women. Instead of "the party," either Leninist or Social Democratic, pressing for official recognition from the powers that be through legal and electoral channels, autonomous movements can be seen to assume a dynamic, negative "anti-power" aimed at subverting and challenging hierarchical power in all its forms. Such examples of direct action taken by social subjects themselves remain anathema to the Leninist belief in the need for a single, disciplined party, which will lead and oversee social revolt. However, as John Holloway and other autonomist theorists have argued, such movements do not merely propose passive withdrawal, because they are opposed to engaging with the existing structures of political power. Instead, autonomist theory favors an anti-political practice: the material contestation of the totality of social relations.

Although "autonomism" – or at least the theoretical shorthand this term has come to assume – may have its origins in Italy, its heterogeneous and fluid dynamic means it cannot be temporally or spatially confined to a particular historical context. As the Italian movement of 1977 was consumed by an escalating cycle of armed provocation and repression, its force as a social movement acting in and against the existing society ebbed away until it evaporated altogether. The great strength of the movements of 1969 and 1977 was that they could not be isolated or contained and at their peak threatened to actually overwhelm the existing social order.

The other, later focus for "autonomism" found a somewhat different expression in the West

German Federal Republic of the 1980s. Here, the *autonomie* movement consisting mostly of radicalized youth strove to develop distinctive alternative modes of being, which by their very nature were antagonistic to that of mainstream German society. Here, again, squatting offered an immediate answer to the problem of housing while challenging and undermining the market relations responsible for it. The usually communal nature of the squats of Hamburg and Berlin facilitated free experimentation with new egalitarian, non-hierarchical ways of living as distinct from the atomization experienced in advanced urban societies. Likewise, the networks of “social centers” and “info shops” offering non-commercial non-institutional space for meeting, socializing, and exchanging ideas, originating in northwest and central Europe, now exist in most parts of the world, albeit with varying degrees of success.

The German and central European movement has also been notable for its willingness to take offensive action against the forces of the state and in the destruction of symbolic targets of consumer capitalism: prestige cars, retail outlets, fast food chains – what Georgy Katsiaficas calls “civil luddism.” This willingness to engage in militant offensive action continues to be a source of heated debate among the varying tendencies in the broad autonomist tradition, but it is noticeably more one of tactics than of outright hostility to such strategies.

In the “anti-capitalist” or “alter-globalization” movement of the last decade we find similar issues at stake, with the appearance of “black blocs” of militant affinity groups openly advocating revolution and indeed prepared to take offensive action as well as create alternatives in the present. The anti-capitalist or alter-globalization movement has arguably been most visible in the mass mobilizations at the various global summits of the G8, WTO, IMF, and World Bank, where black blocs of militants have also been present. However, this is not to overemphasize the role such groups play, or to ignore the shortcomings of some of their actions, which on at least two occasions have resulted in protesters being wounded or shot dead by police. Despite its undoubted successes, the German autonomist movement of the Cold War Federal Republic, no less than in the reunified Germany of today, found itself comparatively isolated from the proletariat

in a society where no rupture on the scale of those in Italy in 1969 or 1977 was experienced.

In analyzing the autonomous movement in Germany, and other countries, notably Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia, and its relative isolation from the rest of the population, it is important not to attribute this to the absence of sufficient organization and failure to build the party. As Katsiaficas has argued, “The autonomen do not subscribe to the belief that there is one overriding truth or one true form of autonomy.” In this sense there is a clear distinction between autonomous anti-political action and indeed cultural subversion in everyday life, and the standard orthodox Marxist view of the necessity for following the usual political paths to arrive at the usual political end of governmental or state power. Autonomist practice does not ignore “politics” as such, but rather refuses to accept the terms this dictates, instead waging irregular battles on a terrain as far as possible of its own choosing. One such example in which the movement successfully spread its influence was at the height of the Cold War, when in Germany at least, autonomists fueled the fires of discontent with American nuclear bases being stationed in the country and helped catalyze a wider opposition that had noticeable political repercussions.

Autonomist currents as they exist today continue to draw inspiration from a wide range of theoretical influences and unsurprisingly diverge as much as they agree, one obvious example being the substantial differences between those for whom Antonio Negri’s recent work, especially with Michael Hardt, is a major inspiration, and those for whom this offers at best limited critical insights. Without attempting a division of the clearly very broad autonomist tradition into opposing camps, the differences between the poststructuralist and Deleuzian Negri, and those working more in the dialectical tradition of Hegelian Marxism and the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, should not be ignored. Another major criticism of the later Negri is what many have argued is his somewhat timid insistence on focusing rebellious energies on reform-based demands for a minimum or “social” income.

Autonomism has a number of important antecedents. In the Left Communist currents of the early twentieth century lie a number of notable precedents, specifically opposition to

traditional “political action” using parliamentary and electoral strategies, and the need for anti-hierarchical or at least radically democratic and diffuse forms of organization. Rosa Luxemburg’s insistence on the creative spontaneity of class struggle is echoed in the autonomist belief that it is only from a radical collective subjectivity that real opposition stems. Similarly, other Left Communist principles such as the refusal to adopt the methods of party politics with an eye to state power can be observed in the autonomists’ belief that revolutionary means should prefigure revolutionary ends and strive to avoid replicating those of the existing system.

A later continuity in the lines of autonomist thought can be found in Cornelius Castoriadis and the “council-communist” influenced French Socialisme ou Barbarie (SoB) group of the 1960s, which had its British equivalent in Maurice Brinton’s Solidarity grouping. Castoriadis and SoB were especially notable for developing the theory of the USSR as being bureaucratic state capitalism, a result also of Lenin’s belief in the necessity for the party to create a bureaucratized, militarized state in which the Bolshevik concept of “democratic centralism” came into its own. Likewise, the Situationist International’s preference for cultural subversion and its critique of the totality of consumer society has had a noticeable influence on autonomist thought and practice, as has Gilles Dauve, perhaps better known by his pen name Jean Barrot, who has sought to develop a theory of communism antagonistic to ideological categories or containment.

Though autonomism is a broadly defined concept, the currents within it do indeed share several definite similarities in terms of theory and practice. We can recognize the primacy that “autonomy” is, if nothing else, the *freedom to be, to live*, which by its very definition is antagonistic to the dominant material forces shaping the world. It is this antagonism towards capitalism and the state and party politics, and the values and norms of existing society, which autonomist theories and movements share, the refusal of the existent, of “that which is” in Adorno’s phrase, posing again the question of alternatives, that remain merely “not yet.”

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Marxism; Negri, Antonio (b. 1933); Socialisme ou Barbarie

References and Suggested Readings

- Bonefeld, W. (Ed.) (2004) *Revolutionary Writing: Common Sense Essays in Post-Political Politics*. New York: Autnomedia.
- De Angelis, M. (2007) *The Beginning of History: Value Struggles and Global Capital*. London: Pluto Press.
- Dyer-Witheford, N. (1999) *Cyber-Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Holloway, J. (2002) *Change the World without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today*. London: Pluto Press.
- Katsiaficas, G. (2006) *The Subversion of Politics: European Autonomous Social Movements and the Decolonization of Everyday Life*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Wright, S. (2002) *Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism*. London: Verso.

Ayim, May (1960–1996)

Joshua Kwesi Aikins

May Ayim was a Ghanaian German artist, academic, and activist; both her poetry and her scholarly writings have been crucial in the inception of the Afro-German movement, and continue to challenge and inspire scholars and activists in Germany and beyond. Her pioneering academic work on Afro-German history, innovative analysis in the field of critical whiteness studies in the German context, and her empowering poetry, continue to attract readers interested in the insights she gained from developing and deploying a conscious Afro-German woman’s perspective in her interaction with Germany and the global African diaspora.

Born to a Ghanaian father and a German mother, she grew up in a foster home and with foster parents (the Opitz family whose name May carried until 1992) – as an African student in Germany, her father had no right to take the child to Ghana, as he had wished. Her mother, apparently unable to cope, took the infant to a foster home, from where she was taken to a white foster family.

Her thesis, first rejected by her professor on the grounds that “there is no racism in Germany,” was the first thorough research on the presence of black people in Germany from the early middle ages to the present. It later formed the basis of *Farbe Bekennen – Afrodeutsche Frauen auf den Spuren ihrer Geschichte (Showing Our Colors:*

Afro-German Women Speak Out) (Oguntoye et al. 1991). Along with May Ayim's increasing popularity, which bought her speaking and performance engagements in the UK, the US, the Caribbean, and South Africa, this publication introduced the Afro-German experience to other African diasporas.

May became a founding member of the Initiative of Black People in Germany, the first organization of its kind, which provided a much needed forum for Afro-Germans to step out of isolation and take collective political actions. One of the key manifestations of protest from those years in the mid-1980s was the transformative intervention into German language, an area of activism where May played a key role. She was part of a group that developed and coined the term Afro-German, thereby replacing derogatory terms like *Neger* or *Farbige* (colored) that had been routinely used to refer to people of African descent. The demonstratively defiant act of usurping and redefining a language over whose "correct" use white Germans had assumed exclusive authority is felt in her poetry as well as in other topics she subjected to critical inquiry. While *Farbe Bekennen* had already shaken the German colonial amnesia by connecting Germany's imperial past with prevailing racist stereotypes and language, her later works drew other critical connections. The book *Entfernte Verbindungen. Rassismus, Antisemitismus, Klassenunterdrückung (Distant Connections: Racism, Antisemitism, Class Oppression)*, published in 1993 and co-edited by May Ayim, looked at the interlocking of different systems of oppression and the possible ways for women's activism to counter and transgress such overlapping hierarchies of domination.

She caused controversy with her critical analysis of German Reunification, which she aptly referred to as "U-not-y," capturing the way in which a newly invigorated post-reunification nationalism translated into an upsurge in violent racist attacks on foreigners and Germans of color.

A high-profile appearance on German television in January 1996 left a wider audience impressed, but close friends concerned – under the surface of a sovereign interview and poetry performance they sensed May Ayim's mental

troubles, which were to erupt into a psychosis that left friends with tough choices. Should they commit her to psychotherapy, of which she had said there was no place free of racism? She was brought to temporary in-patient care. After reporting earlier vision problems, she was moved to neurology and examined for multiple sclerosis. For unexplained reasons, the neuroleptic medication for her psychosis was abruptly ended. There was no psychological support when she was informed that she was suffering from incurable multiple sclerosis. After the diagnosis, the doctors knew of her psychological illness, yet simply discharged her from hospital. On August 9, 1996, May Ayim committed suicide.

Her achievements, life, and death were commemorated by dub poet Linton Kwesi Johnson, who wrote the song "Reggae fi May Ayim." At the African Women Living in Europe Conference, held in London in 1992, May Ayim gave a talk entitled "My Pen is My Sword: Racism and Resistance in Germany." Through her scholarly writing and her poetry, May Ayim's pen is felt to this day, providing empowerment and inspiration for resistance far beyond the borders of Germany.

SEE ALSO: Amo, Anton Wilhelm (1703–1759) and Afro-Germans

References and Suggested Readings

- Ayim, M. (1997) *Grenzenlos und unverschämt*. Berlin: Orlanda Frauenverlag.
- Ayim, M. (2005) *Blues in schwarz weiss*. Berlin: Orlanda Frauenverlag.
- Ayim, M. & Adams, A. V. (2003) *Blues in Black and White: A Collection of Essays, Poetry and Conversations*. Lawrenceville, NJ: Africa World Press.
- Binder, M. (1997) *Hope In My Heart: The May Ayim Story*. 29-min. documentary on May Ayim.
- Hügel, I., Lange, C., Ayim, M., Bubeck, I., Aktas, G., & Schultz, D. (1999) *Entfernte Verbindungen. Rassismus, Antisemitismus, Klassenunterdrückung*. Berlin: Orlanda Frauenverlag.
- Oguntoye, K., Opitz, M., & Schultz, D. (1991) *Showing Our Colors: Afro-German Women Speak Out*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Oguntoye, K., Opitz, M., & Schultz, D. (1992). *Farbe bekennen*. Frankfurt: Fischer.

B

Babel, Isaac (1894–1941)

Amy Buzby

Isaac Emmanuelovich Babel was born in 1894 to a Jewish family in Odessa during a period of social upheaval, anti-Semitic persecution, and the flight of Jews from the Russian Empire. As a youth he survived the 1905 pogrom through the assistance of Christian neighbors, but his grandfather was among the victims. In 1915 he graduated from the Institute of Financial and Business Studies in Kiev and moved to Petrograd, despite residency laws that prohibited Jews from the Pale, to establish himself as a writer. Babel quickly earned the respect of Maxim Gorky, who published two of his stories in *Letopis*. During the Russian Civil War Babel enlisted in the Red Army and briefly saw action before contracting malaria and returning to Petrograd to work on Gorky's *Novaya Zhizn*.

In 1920 Babel was given the pseudonym Lyutov and sent to the front as a reporter to work with Budyonny's First Cavalry. He wrote virulent propaganda and pieces for *The Red Cavalryman*, the unit's newspaper. Babel channeled his military experiences into the *Red Cavalry* cycle of stories. Babel's innovative style enabled him to describe the violence and ambiguity of war on the front in stark, chilling, and devastating terms that stood out critically against the dull backdrop of socialist realism, as he insisted: "No iron spike can pierce a human heart as icily as a period in the right place." He portrayed both White and Red fighters as both morally and rationally bankrupt in their conduct, as he reflected: "Murderers, it's unbearable, baseness and crime . . . Carnage. The military commanders and I ride along the tracks begging the men not to butcher the prisoners." Babel also fearlessly employed the real names of powerful Soviet army officers and officials even

as they, and the sociopolitical circumstances they engendered, were exposed and critiqued in his work.

In 1924 four of Babel's stories were published in Mayakovsky's *LEF*, which earned Babel national fame. Soviet critics praised Babel, but Budyonny vehemently condemned his work as libel and Babel was forced publicly to ameliorate some of his more daring portrayals of influential leaders. Babel's family emigrated to Paris in 1925, one year before the publication of the *Red Cavalry* cycle, but Babel remained in the Soviet Union despite his increasingly vulnerable position in Soviet society as a critic of Soviet policy. As Babel lamented to his friend Yuri Annenkov: "Revolution indeed! It's disappeared! The proletariat? It flew off, like an old buggy with a leaky roof, that's lost its wheels . . . now, dear brother, it's the Central Committees that are pushing forward – they'll be more effective. They don't need wheels – they have machine guns instead." Even so, Babel was driven artistically by the Russian environment and was determined to become a free man in the confines of the Soviet state.

In September 1928 an additional controversy erupted over an interview he gave to Alexander Dan. Dan attributed several anti-Soviet statements to Babel, which Babel denied ever making. Babel struggled until 1930 to clear his name with the Soviet authorities, but even so his inability to conform to Soviet guidelines condemned his works – especially those which graphically portrayed the tragedy of collectivization – to be rejected and censored by the authorities, leading to charges of "silence" – the crime of being unproductive. With the death of his patron Gorky in 1936, Babel's fate was all but sealed. He was arrested in May 1939 and charged with espionage and membership in a Trotskyist terrorist organization. Babel was shot on January 27, 1940, although Soviet officials informed his wife that his official date of death was March 17, 1941. His final plea before being shot was not for himself, but for

the power of his literary creation: “Let me finish my work.”

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Russian Civil War, 1918–1924; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”

References and Suggested Readings

- Babel, N. (2002) *The Collected Stories of Isaac Babel*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Carden, P. (1972) *The Art of Isaac Babel*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Luplow, C. (1979) Paradox and the Search for Value in Babel’s Red Cavalry. *Slavic and East European Journal* 23, 2 (Summer): 216–32.

Babeuf, François-Noël (1760–1797) and the Conspiracy of Equals

Robert H. Blackman

François-Noël Babeuf, better known as Gracchus Babeuf, and his Conspiracy of Equals have been a source of inspiration for political activists on the left at least since the publication of Buonarroti’s *Babeuf’s Conspiracy for Equality* (1828). The Conspirators wanted to create a just and egalitarian society. This was to be accomplished not by redistributing land, the “agrarian law” proposed by the Gracchus brothers in ancient Rome, but by the communal ownership of real property. They sought equality of outcomes, arguing that every person’s labor was equally important to society. They also favored women’s political and economic rights. To achieve their goals, the Conspirators put together a uniquely modern formula for revolution, combining propagandizing poor urban workers, subverting the military, and creation of a revolutionary vanguard operating in secret dominated by an anonymous central committee. Commentators on the left and right have claimed Babeuf as a forefather of Marxism and Leninism.

Babeuf had humble origins. He worked as a manual laborer and as a domestic servant before becoming a specialist in seeking out evidence and preparing cases to enforce feudal obligations. Lacking formal education, Babeuf taught himself economic and political philosophy and was particularly moved by the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In the 1780s Babeuf corresponded

with the secretary of the Academy of Arras, from whom he received encouragement and books. In 1787 Babeuf wrote a book on the reforms needed regarding land ownership and taxation, but events overtook his efforts.

After 1789 Babeuf became a public official in Picardy overseeing matters regarding land ownership and transfer of land. He pushed for reforms in local taxes and advocated a tax strike. He fled to Paris in 1793 after being charged with forgery. There he worked as secretary for the Subsistence Committee of the city government. In this position, Babeuf collected information and wrote orders concerning the provisioning of Paris, seeing firsthand the misery of the urban poor. It was his good fortune to be away from Paris during the height of the Terror. When he returned to Paris in late 1794, Babeuf started a newspaper in support of the so-called Thermidoreans, those who had overthrown Robespierre and his allies in July of 1794. Babeuf quickly soured on their corrupt opportunism and in October he changed its name to *Tribune of the People*. He took to denouncing the Thermidorean deputies in print, calling for a return to the principles of Robespierre and his Jacobin allies, including price ceilings for basic goods and the use of the guillotine to terrify hoarders. Babeuf was jailed for his words in February 1795. He was released as part of a general amnesty declared to celebrate the adoption of the Constitution of 1795, that of the Directory.

Babeuf found his co-conspirators while in prison. There he met Buonarroti and others jailed for their radicalism, and there he formed the idea of conspiring to overthrow the Directory. The details of the platform remain in some doubt – the group was an eclectic mix of the far left, from anarchists to militarists to unreconstructed Jacobins, as well as former members of the Committees of Public Safety and Public Security who had overseen the implementation of the Terror. Babeuf led the group and through the *Tribune of the People* he was its voice. It was his ideas concerning *le bonheur commun* (the public good) and radical equality that were used to propagandize the military and the people of Paris.

The Conspiracy was probably doomed from the beginning. Lazare Carnot, a former member of the Committee of Public Safety and a member of the Directory, had opponents of the regime under constant surveillance. He sought to infiltrate

the Conspiracy. When the Legion of Police, a militia formed in Paris under the Directory, rose up on April 28, 1796 rather than deploy to the front lines of the ongoing war, Carnot had his chance. The Conspirators had infiltrated the Legion and hoped to use it as their military force in support of an uprising in Paris. When Carnot crushed the revolt the Conspirators lost their access to military force. Desperate to subvert the military, they brought a dissident army captain into their inner circles. This captain was a government agent and betrayed the Conspiracy.

On May 10, 1796 Babeuf and the leaders of the Conspiracy were arrested and their papers and effects seized. The Directors had decided to make the trial of the Conspirators into a showpiece of the differences between the new order and the old government by Terror. The trial was moved for from Paris to Vendôme, where lawful procedure was taken to be of the essence. The Conspirators pursued the dual strategy of denying that there had been any conspiracy on one hand while arguing that a conspiracy to help the people of France was no crime. This defense worked – not one of the almost 100 charged was convicted of conspiracy to overthrow the government. Only eight were convicted of any crime, and of these only Babeuf and one other were sent to the guillotine, in 1797. The Conspiracy had been crushed, but its members went on to organize further plots.

SEE ALSO: Buonarroti, Philippe (1761–1837); French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution, Radical Factions and Organizations; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794); Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Birchall, I. A. (1997) *The Spectre of Babeuf*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Buonarroti, P. (1828/1965) *Babeuf's Conspiracy for Equality*. Trans. B. O'Brien. New York: Augustus M. Kelley.
- Daline, V. (1976) *Gracchus Babeuf à la veille et pendant le Grande Révolution française (1785–1794)* (Gracchus Babeuf at the Dawn and During the French Revolution). Moscow: Editions du Progres.
- Mason, L. (2007) "Never was a Plot so Holy": Gracchus Babeuf and the End of the French Revolution. In P. R. Campbell, T. E. Kaiser, & M. Linton (Eds.), *Conspiracy in the French Revolution*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Mazauric, C. (1962) *Babeuf et la conjuration pour l'égalité* (Babeuf and the Conspiracy of Equals). Paris: Editions sociales.
- Rose, R. B. (1978) *Gracchus Babeuf: The First Revolutionary Communist*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Soublin, J. (2001) *Je t'écris au sujet de Gracchus Babeuf* (I write to you on the subject of Gracchus Babeuf). Villelongue d'Aude: Atelier de Gué.
- Talmon, J. L. (1952) *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Bacha-i Sakkao's movement

Yury V. Bosin

On the death of Khabilulla Khan in 1919, Emir Amanulla Khan assumed the Afghan throne. Inspired by European nationalist ideas, Khan embarked on a course of reforms designed to unify Afghanistan into a modern nation-state. He adopted a constitution that advanced individual freedoms, the rights of women, and religious tolerance. However, the creation of liberal democratic modernization met with great popular opposition. Many Afghans resisted the radical changes, owing to a long tradition of Islamic religious conservatism and the inability to unify the country, which was divided by ethnic, regional, and clan loyalties. Amanulla Khan's effort to reform centuries-old family and marital traditions provoked wide opposition at the grassroots level. While conflict escalated into a series of ethnic and clan revolts, Amanulla Khan's determination to continue his program of Afghan transformation was not diminished. On returning from a long trip to Europe in 1928, Khan sought to accelerate and expand social and economic reforms. As the plans were implemented, an organized, broadly based social protest movement was gaining momentum in Afghanistan's northern provinces, led by Tajik Habibulla Kalakani, better known under the nickname Bacha-i Sakkao (Son of a Water Carrier).

Kalakani formed an army of resistance fighters comprised predominantly of Tajik and Uzbek nationals rather than Pashtun peoples of Afghan origin. The Khazara, Afghan indigenous people, despite extensive and longstanding grievances against Kabul, did not join the uprising. Ideologically, Bacha-i Sakkao was a militant Islamist movement that promoted the restoration

of the Holy Caliphate, an orthodox government based on the principles of the Qur'an.

In January 1929, the capital city of Kabul was captured by Kalakani and Amanulla Khan abdicated and escaped to India. Bacha-i Sakkao named himself Emir Habibulla II and established an authoritarian government that was highly unpopular, remaining in power for nine months. The Pashtun people considered Bacha-i Sakkao a foreign usurper, and this sparked nationalist sentiment in Afghanistan. A Pashtun militia was mobilized by Nadir Khan, the former minister of war, that successfully drove out Bacha-i Sakkao from Kabul. He was later captured and hanged. The new king, Nadir Khan, repealed many of Amanulla Khan's reforms and instituted an authoritarian government.

SEE ALSO: Afghanistan, 1978 Revolution and Islamic Civil War; Afghanistan, Resistance to 19th-Century British Invasion; Bin Laden, Osama (b. 1957) and al-Qaeda; Durrani Empire, Popular Protests, 1747–1823; Taliban, 1996–2007

References and Suggested Readings

- Briant, P. (2002) *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*. Trans. P. T. Daniels. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Gregorian, V. (1969) *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Masson, V. & Romodon, V. (1964) *A History of Afghanistan*, Vols. 1–2. Moscow: Nauka (in Russian).
- Sykes, P. (1940) *A History of Afghanistan*. London: Macmillan.

Bacon's Rebellion

Nathan King

Bacon's Rebellion was the culmination of a series of events that aggravated small Virginia back-country tobacco farmers, and it played a large role in the development of race-based chattel slavery in the United States. In 1675–6 small farmers were faced with repeated attacks from Native Americans, low tobacco prices, and high taxes. The Virginia Colony, led by Sir William Berkeley, was perceived as ineffectual, particularly with regards to protection against Native American attacks. In the previous year, colonists retaliating against a Doeg attack on a plantation mistakenly attacked the Susquehannocks. Governor Berkeley organized a meeting with the Susquehannocks that led to

the death of several tribesmen. This provoked increased attacks upon plantations, but the government would not take military action. Berkeley called for restraint on the part of the colonists. Nathaniel Bacon and other colonists refused.

In the spring of 1676, Bacon requested a commission to fight against the Native Americans but was not granted one. Against the wishes of the governor, he seized a group of friendly Appamattox, and Berkeley declared him a rebel because of his disregard for the government. In March 1676 Berkeley called the Long Assembly, which supplied friendly natives with ammunition and powder and set up a defensive perimeter around the colony. Further taxes were levied against the already overtaxed farmers to pay for this endeavor. Bacon continued his attacks upon Native American tribes. By June 1676, word of the rebellion had spread to England, but a formal account was not received until September.

Governor Berkeley realized that his forces were no match for Bacon's forces and promised to issue a pardon to Bacon if he would stand trial before King Charles II. Bacon did not comply. Fortunately for Bacon, many members of the Legislative Assembly held sentiments similar to his own and elected him to office. Once in office Bacon was pardoned after forcibly apologizing for his previous actions. While in office, Bacon and his followers pushed for better defense against Native American attacks. On June 23 the debate escalated and Bacon surrounded the assembly house in Jamestown, demanding to be allowed to campaign against the Native Americans without government interference. Governor Berkeley gave in to the demands but later reneged. The rebels took control of Jamestown between July 30 and September 1676.

For almost three months Nathaniel Bacon was in charge of Virginia. On July 30, 1676, he issued the Declaration of the People of Virginia, stating the grievances of the Virginians against Governor Berkeley. When merchant ships from England arrived to aid Governor Berkeley in his attempt to recapture Jamestown in September, Bacon and his rebels burned the town. Bacon was unable to savor his success, because he died on October 26, 1676 from dysentery. In the aftermath Governor Berkeley rounded up as many rebels as he could find and tried and executed them. When the Royal Navy and Royal Commissioners arrived, Governor Berkeley was relieved of his post and sent back to England. Royal

Commissioners concluded that the majority of Virginians had supported Bacon, and they issued pardons against convicted rebels.

Although Bacon's Rebellion was not a success, it did have some lasting effects. During Bacon's rule in Jamestown, he recognized the right to keep and bear arms. Historians have argued that this is where future colonists got the idea that they had the right to keep and bear arms. Perhaps the most long-term outcome of the rebellion was the change in social classes. Poor backcountry farmers who were either former indentured servants or children of former indentured servants played key roles in the uprising. Some of these former servants were African, and the specter of class-based interracial cooperation frightened authorities. Thus, after the rebellion, new Virginia slave laws made slavery lifelong and inherited. This new legal race-based slavery, coupled with a decrease in English immigration, led to increased slave importation and broke the common bond that poor black and white farmers shared during Bacon's Rebellion.

SEE ALSO: American Slave Rebellions; Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Atlantic Port Seaman Resistance, American Revolutionary Era

References and Suggested Readings

- Anonymous (1900) Bacon's Rebellion. *William and Mary Quarterly* 9, 1 (July): 1–10.
- Billings, W. M. (1978) The Causes of Bacon's Rebellion: Some Suggestions. *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 78: 409–12.
- Washburn, W. E. (1957) *The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia*. University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill.
- Webb, S. S. (1984) *1676: The End of American Independence*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Bain, J. T. (1860–1919)

Lucien van der Walt

Born in Dundee, Scotland to a working-class family in 1860, J. T. Bain (James Thomas Bain, Jimmy Bain) served in the British army in South Africa and India, before returning to Scotland. There he learned socialism from Thomas Carlyle, William Morris, and John Ruskin, and trained as a fitter, moving to the Transvaal in 1890. He formed the Witwatersrand Mine Employees' and Mechanics' Union in 1892, better known as the Labor Union, and pioneered socialist ideas,

distributing the *Clarion* to miners, and publishing the *Johannesburg Witness* in 1898 and 1899, the first socialist paper in South Africa. Bain's politics were a mixture of segregation and socialism: the Labor Union, for example, supported the color bar, and Bain worked as a spy for Paul Kruger's Transvaal government. Bain fought for the Transvaal in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), and was captured by the British, narrowly escaping execution for treason when it was discovered that he had Transvaal citizenship.

After the war, Bain helped revive the unions, initiated a local Independent Labor Party, and worked with Archie Crawford, the two men leading a march of several hundred people from Johannesburg to Pretoria on May 1, 1907 to demand the government employ white labor at fair wages. The delegation was rebuffed, the movement collapsed, and Bain became involved in the founding of the South African Labor Party (SALP) in 1909. His relations with Crawford soured around this time. Bain secured a job on the railways in Johannesburg, stood unsuccessfully for the SALP in the 1910 general elections, and worked as an organizer for the Transvaal Federation of Trade Unions, formed in 1911.

Bain played a central role in the 1913 general strike, during which he advised workers to come armed, and briefly adopted the syndicalist view that it might be necessary for the strikers to take over, and run, the mines. Prominent in the 1914 general strike, he was deported to Britain for his troubles, along with Crawford and others. In 1919 workers at the Johannesburg power station struck against retrenchments, and, at the urging of Bain, established a Board of Control to administer the municipal workshops and services from the council chamber. It ran the light, power, and tram services for several days, before the municipality conceded the strikers' demands. Bain died later that year, a venerated and complex figure.

SEE ALSO: South Africa, Labor Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Gitsham, E. & Trembath, J. F. (1926) *A First Account of Labour Organization in South Africa*. Durban: E. P. and Commercial Printing.
- Hyslop, J. (2004) *The Notorious Syndicalist J. T. Bain: A Scottish Rebel in Colonial South Africa*. Johannesburg: Jacana Media.
- Rosenthal, E. (Ed.) (1966) *Southern African Dictionary of National Biography*. London: Frederick Warne.

Ticktin, D. (1973) *The Origins of the South African Labour Party, 1888–1910*. PhD thesis, University of Cape Town.

Walker, I. L. & Weinbren, B. (1961) *2000 Casualties: A History of the Trade Unions and the Labour Movement in the Union of South Africa*. Johannesburg: South African Trade Union Council.

Baker, Ella Josephine (1903–1986)

Susan Love Brown

Ella Josephine Baker was a civil rights activist best known for her work with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Her emphasis on grassroots activism and her ability to work with several organizations and causes at a time made her one of the most effective leaders in the civil rights movement.

Baker was born in 1903 in Norfolk, Virginia, but spent most of her childhood in Littleton, North Carolina, where her family originated. She was the second of three surviving children of Anna Ross and Blake Baker. She was named after her maternal grandmother, Josephine Elizabeth Ross, a former slave. Her parents emphasized a deep spirituality among their children through participation in the Baptist Church and instilled a sense of service that involved working to improve the lives of other people across class lines. Baker attended Shaw Academy and Shaw University, graduating in 1927 as valedictorian of her class.

After graduation, Baker went to live with an aunt in Harlem, and it was there that she learned the art of coalition building, immersing herself in the many streams of intellectual and political thought from which she would draw in later years. In 1934, she began working at the Harlem Public Library, running the Young People's Forum (YPF) and the Adult Education Committee. In 1936, she joined the Workers' Education Project of the Works Progress Administration (WPA).

In 1941, she became assistant field secretary for the NAACP, a job which required her to travel throughout the South recruiting members. She developed an excellent reputation as an organizer

and became the highest-ranking woman in the organization. Noted for her ability to organize effective leadership conferences that helped to decentralize the power within the NAACP, she was always critical of the bureaucracy. By 1952, Baker became the first woman president of the New York City NAACP. She focused her attention on such problems as police brutality, desegregation, and building coalition with other groups.

In 1957, Baker helped found the SCLC, a coalition of ministers and activist leaders, served as its first paid staff member, and acted on more than one occasion as its interim executive director. The organization played an important role in voter registration drives and desegregating the South. Baker, along with A. Philip Randolph, organized the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom, a rally of 30,000 that eventually led to the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which established the Civil Rights Commission, a small step toward the goal of establishing voter rights in all states.

After a group of students from Greensboro, North Carolina, staged sit-ins at local lunch counters, Baker organized the Southwide Student Leadership Conference on Non-Violent Resistance to Segregation in April 1960 at Shaw University in Raleigh, and it was attended by students from all over the South. By the end of the conference, the students had formed the SNCC, and Baker served as an advisor, helping it to set up the organizational structure.

Baker continued to work in multiple capacities throughout the civil rights era and into the 1970s and beyond, slowing down only when she developed arthritis and asthma in her later years. She died on December 13, 1986.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963); Evers, Medgar (1925–1963); King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Parks, Rosa (1913–2005) and the Montgomery Bus Boycott; Randolph, A. Philip (1889–1979); Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

References and Suggested Readings

Bohannon, L. F. (2005) *Freedom Cannot Rest: Ella Baker and the Civil Rights Movement*. Greensboro, NC: Morgan Reynolds.

Elliott, A. (1996) Ella Baker: Free Agent in the Civil Rights Movement. *Journal of Black Studies* 26, 5 (May): 593–603.

Grant, J. (1999) *Ella Baker: Freedom Bound*. New York: Wiley.

Payne, C. (1989) Ella Baker and Models of Social Change. *Signs* 14, 4 (Summer): 885–9.

Ransby, B. (2003) *Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876)

Paul McLaughlin

Mikhail Bakunin is among the most significant anarchist activists and theorists of the nineteenth century. In both roles he came into conflict with Karl Marx, and he developed a particularly influential form of non-Marxist socialism.

Born of noble descent, Bakunin was raised in privileged if isolated conditions 60 miles east of Tver in central Russia. As a child, he received an extensive liberal education under the guidance of his well-educated and traveled father. However, in the more difficult political and economic circumstances that followed the Decembrist uprising of 1825, he was sent to St. Petersburg to enter military school in 1828. He graduated in 1832 and was commissioned an ensign, though he secured a discharge less than three years later, having decided that the military was not for a man of his intellectual interests and rebellious character.

In 1836 he moved to Moscow to study in the circle of Nikolai Stankevich and to pursue an academic career. He immersed himself in German philosophy, initially concentrating on the subjective idealism of Fichte before falling under the spell of Hegel. Under Hegel's influence, Bakunin developed a rather speculative interest in political reality, though it was only after he made it to Berlin in 1840, to further his philosophical studies, that his political radicalism became apparent.

In the early 1840s Hegel's younger disciples, the so-called Young or Left Hegelians, were busily interpreting – or willfully misinterpreting – his doctrines in a radical way. Bakunin came to embrace Ludwig Feuerbach's humanistic interpretation of Hegel's speculative theology, Bruno Bauer's revolutionary interpretation of Hegel's logic, and Arnold Ruge's democratic interpretation of Hegel's politics. His new Left Hegelian



Mikhail Bakunin, portrait ca. 1860. It was around this time that Bakunin further developed his collectivist form of anarchism, publishing articles and supporting the social revolutionary project of a federal reorganization of popular life “from below” on an international scale. (Getty Images)

sentiments gained noteworthy expression in “The Reaction in Germany,” published in 1842. In this seminal article, Bakunin claimed that true democracy could only be achieved by the complete and uncompromising negation of the existing world condition. Nothing of the old could remain if a new world were to be created. This new world was to be created by the “greatest part of humanity”: the “poor class” (Bakunin 1973: 57).

Giving up on academic life, Bakunin went to Dresden in the spring of 1842 to work with Ruge. It was here, under the influence of the poet Georg Herwegh above all, that the radical Hegelian moved towards socialism. He began reading French socialism and was impressed by his reading of the communist Wilhelm Weitling, who he later met in Switzerland en route to the capital of European revolution, Paris, where he arrived in March 1844. In Paris he was to meet the two greatest influences on his later brand of anarchism: Proudhon and Marx. Bakunin was struck by Proudhon's revolutionary temperament and libertarian sentiments, and he maintained a lifelong respect for him. Marx, by contrast,

Bakunin found to be intellectually impressive but, on a personal and political level, “vain, perfidious, and cunning” (Bakunin 1980: 119).

Having made a dramatic speech on the cause of Polish liberation in November 1847, Bakunin was expelled from France. He settled briefly in Brussels, but returned to revolutionary Paris in the following February, before setting off for revolutionary adventure in central Europe: in Breslau, Prague, and ultimately Dresden. Between his activities in Prague and Dresden, Bakunin penned his next significant work, “An Appeal to the Slavs,” in which he advocated the cause of pan-Slavic liberation, social revolution, and the federation of European republics.

Escaping the failed May 1849 insurrection in Dresden, in which he had played a leading role, Bakunin was arrested by Saxon authorities at Chemnitz. He was sentenced to death for treason, had his sentence commuted, and was passed over to Austrian authorities. They also sentenced him to death for treason, commuted his sentence, and passed him over to the Russians. Thus, in May 1851, Bakunin returned to Russia in chains after more than a decade abroad, including two years in Saxon and Austrian prisons. He was held for three years at the Peter and Paul fortress in St. Petersburg, where he wrote an ambiguous and unsuccessful plea for clemency: his famous “Confession” to Tsar Nicholas I. It was only in 1857, after further imprisonment at Schlüsselburg, that Bakunin had his sentence commuted to permanent exile in Siberia by the next tsar, Alexander II. His time in Siberia was relatively free: he married, secured paid employment, and became friends with the governor of the eastern province. However, Bakunin still wished to escape and managed to do so, quite spectacularly, in June 1861, making his way to Japan and onward via the United States to England, where he arrived just after Christmas.

In London, Bakunin collaborated uneasily with the liberal Alexander Herzen, a friend from his youth, and wrote in support of the Russian Land and Liberty movement and the Polish insurrection of 1863 (in which he attempted to participate). Both causes proved to be unsuccessful and, having declined Marx’s personal invitation to join the International Workingmen’s Association, Bakunin moved on to Italy in 1864 in search of revolutionary activity. He remained there for three years, participating in secret organizations and formulating, for the first

time, his anarchist position. In a series of articles published in the Italian press in the autumn of 1865, Bakunin rejected private property, church, state, nationalism, and political revolution. From this point on, he would consistently support the social revolutionary project of the federal reorganization of popular life “from below” on an international scale. This project alone would, Bakunin believed, usher in a free and equal society. He elaborated further on these themes in his important “Revolutionary Catechism,” written the following year.

August 1867 brought Bakunin to Geneva. He would remain in Switzerland for most of his remaining years, and was to write his most important theoretical works there. The first of these works, *Federalism, Socialism, and Anti-Theologism* (1867), was written in response to the creation of the liberal League of Peace and Freedom; Bakunin optimistically hoped to radicalize this association and to move it in an anarchist direction. After his failure in this respect, he turned his subsequent attention to the First International and attempted, from 1868 onwards, to propagate anarchist ideas within the organized socialist movement. Open hostilities between Bakunin and Marx – with ideological, ethnic, and personal roots – developed from this point. These hostilities would fatally undermine the First International, which effectively collapsed in September 1872.

In March 1869 a young Russian revolutionary named Sergei Nechaev arrived in Geneva. This committed and energetic nihilist made a strong impression on Bakunin, and the two began to collaborate on the production of revolutionary propaganda. This collaboration gave rise to controversy with the appearance of two pamphlets later in the year. Both “Principles of Revolution” and “The Catechism of a Revolutionary” urged revolutionary violence without moral restraint and proved extremely damaging to Bakunin’s reputation. However, the evidence pointing to Bakunin’s authorship of these documents is very weak, and Bakunin himself broke with the deceitful and dangerous Nechaev in the summer of 1870.

By this stage, political events in France were taking a dramatic turn with the defeat of Napoleon III in the Franco-Prussian War. Bakunin traveled to Lyon in September to try to capitalize on subsequent political unrest there. He helped organize a popular uprising, but this was a

complete failure. Eluding the French authorities, he returned to Switzerland to concentrate on his major (though unfinished and unedited) work, *The Knouto-Germanic Empire and Social Revolution* (1870–2). Significant portions of this work were inspired by the March–May 1871 events of the Paris Commune, a revolutionary experiment that drew startling praise from Marx as well as Bakunin. In other notable documents from the same period, Bakunin wrote in response to Mazzini, whom he knew personally and who had strongly criticized the Paris Commune as anti-religious and anti-nationalist. But larger parts of *The Knouto-Germanic Empire* developed Bakunin’s important critique of Marx, a critique that was to be developed in his last important work, *Statism and Anarchy* (1873).

The remainder of Bakunin’s life was spent in bitter and disheartening dispute with Marxist opponents. Apart from an aborted attempt to participate in an insurrection in Bologna in July 1874, he spent his last days in Switzerland coping with poor health and financial troubles. He died in Berne on July 1, 1876, and was buried there.

Anarchist Theory

Bakunin developed his collectivist form of anarchism under the influence of, and as a critical reaction to, the communist position of Marx. Thus, in order to understand the essential features of Bakunin’s position, it is best to consider the theoretical relationship between these two major figures of nineteenth-century socialism. The differences are extensive: many of them are often ignored, while others can be overstated.

There are a number of fundamental philosophical differences between Bakunin and Marx that are of more than academic significance. *Metaphysically*, they differ with respect to their conceptions of human nature or even their willingness to speculate about it. If Marx can be said to have a conception of human nature, it is of human beings as productive mediators of nature, of utilizers and shapers of what exists for their sake. However, it is arguable that Marx, taking on board Max Stirner’s critique of metaphysics, does not wish to make any claims about human nature as such, and that he simply identifies what we supposedly *are* with what we verifiably *do* (that is, produce in accordance with historically developing needs). Bakunin, by con-

trast, regards the man-as-producer conception as, at best, inadequate or reductive; and he readily speculates on human nature, regarding human beings as a constituent part of nature that can be understood “as it essentially is” by means of “positive science.”

In terms of their respective *philosophies of history*, Bakunin and Marx differ on the logic of socio-historical development. Marx holds to a semi-preservative logic, based on the principle of sublation (*Aufhebung*), according to which each stage of development retains elements of previous stages. Bakunin, on the other hand, believes in a revolutionary logic, based on the principle of negation, according to which the new represents the “creative destruction” of the old: its “annihilation” in order that the new be authentically such.

Ethically, Marx’s moral deflationism contrasts starkly with Bakunin’s ethical anarchism. Marx holds, fundamentally, that capitalism is *contradictory* (and therefore, by his logic, *bound* to give way to another stage of development that is necessarily premised on it). Bakunin considers capitalism *unjust*, and therefore *ought* to be overcome, that is, by his socio-historical logic of development, must be negated. In other words, Bakunin is happy to make what Marx would consider ideological claims: he is not wholly committed to the materialist conception of history.

This brings us to the sociological differences between Bakunin and Marx. Bakunin often voices his respect for and approval of Marx’s great scientific insight – that is, as Bakunin sees it, the *materialist conception of history*. At times, he seems to accept it completely. But he also notes his reservations about this conception when it is “set down in an absolute manner as the only foundation and first source of all other principles” (Bakunin 1950: 20). Bakunin’s own theory emphasizes the social significance and determining capacity of various “ideological” factors: political, religious, ethical, educational, and so on. Moreover, he continually states that human will is a necessary (though insufficient) condition of social change. Thus, he appears to believe that economics is a particularly important social factor, but that it is not the only, or even the ultimate, determining factor in each and every instance.

A second sociological difference here concerns *class analysis*. Both Bakunin and Marx take such sociological analysis seriously, but they differ significantly on the historical role of

various classes. Most notably, Marx attributes a leading role to the proletariat in the capitalist mode of production and its “sublation.” Bakunin, however, points to the revolutionary potential of the peasantry and the *lumpenproletariat*; he also insists on the potential of “pre-industrial” societies to become socialist – very much in contrast to Marx, at least until late in his life.

This point leads us naturally to the crucial ideological differences between Bakunin and Marx. In the first place, they differ in their respective *critiques of existing society*. Marx concentrated on the exploitative nature of the modern economy, while Bakunin concentrated on the dominative nature of modern society. Neither phenomenon (nor the critique thereof) necessarily excludes the other, but Bakunin found Marx’s critique partial in this respect, while he never ignored the issue of modern exploitation. It has been claimed in this context, therefore, that Marx paid insufficient attention to issues of social power, control, and authority. And this point becomes especially pertinent as we consider the next difference.

Bakunin and Marx differ substantially on their *visions of a future socialist society*. While neither of them paints a utopian picture of the future (contrary to popular belief), both have something to say about the fate of the state and both propose a basic principle of distributive justice (morally desirable, in Bakunin’s case, or historically necessary, in Marx’s). Bakunin claims that a social revolution requires the abolition of the state and its replacement with a federated system of freely constituted communes. Marx, on the other hand, sees a transitional role for a revolutionary state and its ultimate replacement by a socioeconomic “administration” of some kind. Bakunin considers the transitional step fatal to social revolution and the possibility of a free socialist society. He considers the ultimate administration a real impossibility or hypothetically indistinguishable from the state. On the issue of distributive justice, Marx countered that Bakunin’s collectivist principle (distribution according to effort) was inadequate from a socialist perspective. Many later anarchists conceded this point and adopted the communist principle (distribution according to need).

A final and related difference between Bakunin and Marx concerns the *means of achieving a socialist society*. As stated already, Bakunin rejects the possibility of a revolutionary state (transitional

or otherwise). Such a state would be, he claimed, the most despotic kind, acting knowingly, if oppressively, in the presumed long-term interest of the ignorant masses. Thus, he identified it with the illegitimate “government of science.” Bakunin also criticized the involvement of Marxists in parliamentary politics, believing this to be both ineffective and corrupting. Bakunin himself looked to other “non-political” means – such as education – as well as means that have been termed “anti-political” – ranging from revolutionary conspiracy to revolutionary violence against the state and its agents. These means remain controversial, though Bakunin’s attachment to them also remains questionable.

Influence

While Marxist and liberal critics, including Friedrich Engels and Isaiah Berlin, have taken great pleasure in mocking Bakunin’s practical and theoretical achievements, his life and thought have inspired generations of activists and thinkers on the libertarian left. Thus, to cite just two notable examples, Errico Malatesta was to take up Bakunin’s role as anarchist revolutionary internationalist, while Noam Chomsky has been profoundly influenced by his writings on libertarian socialism. Justifiable criticism of Bakunin’s personal flaws and prejudices, as well as his often careless writing, persists. Nevertheless, Bakunin’s main claim for himself, as a relentless opponent of the authoritarian socialists, may be equally justified: “my name will remain, and to this name . . . will attach the real, legitimate glory of having been the pitiless and irreconcilable adversary, not of their persons, which matter very little to me, but of their authoritarian theories and ridiculous and detestable pretensions to world dictatorship” (Bakunin 1973: 250).

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchism, Russia; Chomsky, Noam (b. 1928); Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831); Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich (1812–1870); Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865); Young Hegelians

References and Suggested Readings

- Bakunin, M. (1950) *Marxism, Freedom, and the State*. Ed. K. J. Kenafick. London: Freedom Press.
 Bakunin, M. (1973) *Selected Writings*. Ed. A. Lehning. London: Jonathan Cape.

- Bakunin, M. (1980) *Bakunin on Anarchy*. Ed. S. Dolgoff. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Bakunin, M. (2000) *Oeuvres Complètes* (CD-ROM). Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.
- Carr, E. H. (1937) *Michael Bakunin*. London: Macmillan.
- Kelly, A. (1982) *Mikhail Bakunin: A Study in the Psychology and Politics of Utopianism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Leier, M. (2006) *Bakunin: The Creative Passion*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books.
- McLaughlin, P. (2002) *Mikhail Bakunin: The Philosophical Basis of His Anarchism*. New York: Algora.
- Morris, B. (1993) *Bakunin: The Philosophy of Freedom*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

Balkan socialist confederation, 1910–1948

Slobodan Karamanić

The concept of a Balkan socialist federation emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century from among left, socialist, and communist political forces in the region. The idea sought to synchronize the strivings of the Balkan people by articulating questions of national liberation with class struggle, anti-imperialism against foreign domination, and the struggle against capitalist exploitation and economic colonization. The central aim was to establish a new political unity: a common federal republic unifying the Balkan Peninsula on the basis of internationalism, political solidarity, and economic equality. The underlying vision was that despite social, economic, and cultural differences among the Balkan peoples, the historical need for emancipation was a common basis for unification.

This critical political concept went through three successive historical phases in its development. In the first phase, the idea of the Balkan federation was articulated as a response to the political crisis in the Balkans caused by the collapse of the Ottoman empire at the beginning of the twentieth century – this sequence could be framed between the First Balkan Social Democratic Conference (1910) and the end of World War I. In the second phase, mostly through the interwar period (1919–35), the dream of the Balkan federation was taken up by

the Balkan communist parties. The third phase, characterized by attempts to bring about the practical realization of the Balkan (con)federation, began with the armed rebellion of the partisans in the Balkans during World War II and ended with the Stalin–Tito split in 1948.

The initial phase is characterized by the shaping of the Balkan federation ideas expressed within the framework of Marxist analyses and criticisms of the Balkan social and political reality. The first proponents of the Balkan socialist federation (Paul Argyriades [Panagiotis], Svetozar Marković, Christian Rakovsky, Vasil Kolarov, Dimitrije Tucović, Georgi Dimitrov, and others) criticized European imperialist efforts to dominate the Balkan Peninsula and the chauvinist policies of Balkan nation-states whose opposing interests were pushing peoples into division, wars, and destruction. Rather than an abstract blueprint for a desirable political arrangement, aspirations for the Balkan socialist federation resulted from a negative critique. As such, the idea was simultaneously an anti-war slogan and an appeal to overcome the condition by relying on the new uniting subjective power: the emerging Balkan proletariat.

In January 1910, the First Balkan Social Democratic Conference was held in Belgrade, bringing together Bulgarian, Croatian, Greek, Macedonian, Romanian, Serbian, and other Balkan social democrats. The conference established the idea of a Balkan Federative Republic and declared the following principles:

To free ourselves from particularism and narrowness; to abolish frontiers that divide peoples who are in part identical in language and culture, in part economically bound up together; finally, to sweep away forms of foreign domination both direct and indirect that deprive the people of their right to determine their destiny for themselves. (Trotsky 1991: 30)

Although the Belgrade Conference unified around the idea that the Balkans' future lay in a common socialist federation, its political realization was left unresolved. The basic problem was a lack of popular impetus behind the socialist ideas and proletarian internationalism, leading to a political dispute on the left. If Balkan social democrats urgently called for the creation of a common federal state, the immediate application of this demand would lead to an alliance of the

existing Balkan monarchist regimes, and thus endanger the principles of social revolution. However, if social democrats strictly followed the principles of the socialist republic, they could not assertively prevent and impede war. The basic dilemma was thus a choice between the unification of the Balkan states or social revolution in the Balkans.

Ironically, the “Balkan Alliance” would indeed be created two years later, but on the principles of military cooperation against the Ottomans. The Alliance was initiated by the Bulgarian and Serbian states, joined by Greece and Montenegro. The united Balkan military forces defeated the Ottomans and expelled them from the peninsula in the First Balkan War (1912). But territorial disputes and animosities immediately transformed the Balkan Allies into adversaries, leading to the slaughter of the Second Balkan War (1913), developments that radicalized the social democratic critique of the devastating effects of bourgeois policies in the Balkans. As a result of firm anti-war and anti-imperialist positions, representatives of Balkan social democratic parties collaborated closely, creating an autonomous revolutionary platform in opposition to the reformist policy of the Socialist International. Instead of taking sides in the bloodshed of World War I, Bulgarian and Serbian social democratic parties refused to vote for war credits in national parliaments. In 1915, they met again in Bucharest, and decided to create a Revolutionary Balkan Workers’ Social Democratic Federation as the practical organization for propaganda and coordination.

According to socialist activist and future communist leader Georgi Dimitrov, “The first major practical step for the unification of the Balkan nations has been made by *unifying the socialist proletariat* in Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece into one *Balkan Social Democratic Federation*” (Dimitrov 1971: 50) This organization, however, appeared as a transition to a new political phase, providing a link between radical factions of Balkan social democracy and later establishing the Balkan communist movement.

A new momentum in the organization of the Balkan federation was induced by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia (1917). In January 1920, the third conference of the Balkan social democratic parties in Sofia established the Balkan Communist Federation (BCF) as a union of the communist parties of Bulgaria, Greece, Romania,

Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Led by Christian Rakovsky and Georgi Dimitrov, the BCF formed a section within the Communist International (Comintern). The principal task of the BCF was to coordinate actions among the Balkan communists, creating conditions for establishing the Balkan Soviet Socialist Republic. The programmatic orientation of the BCF included two interrelated Leninist principles: the principle of proletarian internationalism and the proletarian revolution, guided by the Communist Party as a vanguard of the working class, and the principle of the right of nations to self-determination – the principle that saw national liberation movements as possible triggers for the social revolution.

The combination of national and socialist revolutionary principles thus became a decisive trait of communist politics in the Balkans, taking seriously the multinational and multicultural character of the region and reconsidering the possibilities of the dissolution and rearrangement of the existing Balkan nation-state order.

Within this framework, the Balkan communists engaged in intense discussions over particular “national questions” and territorial disputes (for instance, the questions of Bessarabia, Bucovina, Dobrudja, Pirin, and Transylvania). One of the central focuses of the BCF was the situation in Yugoslavia, where many nations were subjected to the rule of the Serbian crown. Especially with regard to the Macedonian national question, the BCF, after considerable disputes between Bulgarian, Greek, and Yugoslav parties, came to a common position in favor of the creation of “an independent and united Macedonia (and Thrace)” within a future Balkan Soviet Federation. With the 7th Congress of the Comintern (1935), which inaugurated the policy of the “Popular Front,” the concept of the Balkan federation fell off the agenda, due to the political urgency in uniting the national forces against the fascist threat.

The insurrection of partisan liberation movements against the fascist occupation of the Balkans in World War II opened a third and politically the strongest phase of the concept. Led by the Balkan communist parties, these movements provided a tangible possibility of realizing the Balkan socialist federation. In 1943, the leadership of the Yugoslav Partisans sent an emissary (Svetozar Vukomanović [Tempo]) to the Bulgarian, Greek, and Albanian parties to discuss military and political coordination of the revolutionary struggle in the Balkans. By

way of concrete collaboration, Tempo proposed the establishment of a Balkan General Staff – a military organ to coordinate common army operations. This initiative, however, was blocked under pressure from Britain, whose influence rapidly expanded after the Allies invaded Sicily in July 1943. Two months earlier, in May 1943, Stalin decided to dismantle the Comintern and pursue a conciliatory course of *realpolitik* toward the Allies. Such a stance was confirmed in the Yalta agreement (February 1945), according to which the Balkans were supposed to be divided into two zones of interest – Soviet and western – preventing any attempt at bottom-up revolutionary unification.

After the war, however, the project of the Balkan federation was revived, albeit in the form of interstate dialogues among newly established communist authorities in Belgrade, Sofia, and Tirana. Confederation among Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia was particularly provided as an option. A more ambitious project was proposed by Georgi Dimitrov, who envisaged a Balkan–Danube confederation that would also include Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. By 1947, the first practical steps at establishing the Balkan socialist (con)federation were initiated by Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The Albanian communist leader Enver Hoxha met Yugoslav communist leaders in Belgrade to sign the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation, opening up the possibility for Albania to become Yugoslavia's seventh republic in a future Balkan federation. In addition to this initiative, Georgi Dimitrov and Tito also tried to establish a common state agenda. In Slovenia, they signed a document called the Bled Agreement, which was intended to provide an economic and political framework for union.

The break between Stalin and Tito in 1948 put an end to plans for a Balkan federation. In June 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform and all communications with other communist states were blocked. Furthermore, the communist schism in the Balkans also influenced the final political and military defeat of the Greek revolutionary movement in August 1949. As such, a concept striving to unify the Balkan Peninsula around the aim of independence and emancipation could never prove its revolutionary potential, falling prey to the geopolitical interests and contradictions of Stalin's USSR.

SEE ALSO: Albania, Socialism; Dimitrov, Georgi (1882–1949); Greece, Partisan Resistance; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Yugoslavia, Anti-Fascist “People's Liberation War” and Revolution, 1941–1945; Yugoslavia, Resistance to Cominform, 1948

References and Suggested Readings

- Dimitrov, G. (1915/1971) The Significance of the Second Balkan Conference. In *Selected Works*, Vol. 1. Sofia: Sofia Press, pp. 49–52.
- Lalkov, M. (1998) *Ot nadežda kām razočarovanie. Idejata za federacija v balkanskija Jugoiztok (1944–1948)* (From Hope to Disappointment. The Idea of the Federation of the South-East Balkans). Sofia: Vek 22.
- Lee, M. (1983) Kosovo between Yugoslavia and Albania. *New Left Review* 1, 140 (July–August): 62–91.
- Nadoveza, B. (1997) *Balkanski socijalisti i balkanska federacija* (The Balkan Socialists and Balkan Federation). Belgrade: Zadužbina Andrejević.
- Petranović, B. (1991) *Balkanska federacija 1943–1948*. Belgrade: Šabac.
- Pupovac, O. (2006) Project Yugoslavia: The Dialectics of the Revolution. *Prelom (Break): Journal for Images and Politics* 8: 9–21.
- Sakasoff, J. (1911) Neoslavism, Balkan Federation and Social Democracy. *Der Kampf* IV/5. Available at www.revolutionary-history.co.uk/otherdox/JanSak.htm (downloaded March 15, 2008).
- Stavrianos, L. S. (1942) The Balkan Federation Movement: A Neglected Aspect. *American Historical Review* 48 (1): 30–51.
- Trotsky, L. (1991) *The Balkan Wars 1912–13*. New York: Pathfinder.
- Tucović, D. (1945) *Srbija i Arbania – Jedan prilog kritici zavojevačke politike srpske buržoazije* (Serbia and Albania: A Contribution to the Critique of the Imperialist Politics of the Serbian Bourgeoisie). Belgrade and Zagreb: Kultura.

Baltic protests in the 20th century

Scott D. Orr

Until the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania received little global attention. However, in the twentieth century, Baltic nationalist movements for independence in the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917, World War II, and the anti-Soviet revolutions of 1989 to 1991 mirror analogous struggles in Eastern Europe. The Baltic revolutions in the twentieth century provide most complex examples of how movements for

self-determination in “the lands between” correlate to the waxing and waning of the German, Russian, and Soviet empires.

Russian Revolution of 1905

Until the nineteenth century, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian were spoken by peasants, while the nobility in the Baltic region were Germans in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania Minor (Lithuania in East Prussia and modern-day Klaipėda), and Poles in Lithuania. The cities of the region were inhabited by Germans, Jews, Poles, and Russians. After “awakening” of national consciousnesses in the nineteenth century based on the standardization of territories in the three Baltic states and the transformation of peasant dialects into literary languages, nationalists opposed Russian and German rulers seeking to impose their languages and traditions in the region.

In January 1905 both nationalist grievances and class conflict boiled into revolution in heavily industrialized Estonia and Latvia, as in other parts of the Russian Empire. In Estonia and Latvia, strikes and mass demonstrations broke out among urban workers, while peasants demanding land reform attacked German landlords in the countryside. In Lithuania violence did not erupt, due to a smaller urban proletariat and less egregious resentment between peasants and their Polish-Lithuanian landlords. However, a Lithuanian Assembly convened in the capital of Vilnius demanded territorial autonomy.

After Tsar Nicholas II conceded to moderate demands, tsarist forces crushed the radical opposition. In the Estonian and Latvian countryside, with the support of Baltic German landlords, the crackdown resulted in violent reprisals. Despite this forceful reaction, the creation of an elected *Duma* (parliament) and the legalization of political parties provided a critical impetus to political organizing by nationalists in all three Baltic states.

Russian Revolutions of 1917, Russian Civil War, and Independence

During World War I, Germans captured Lithuania and Latvia and began a program to Germanize the population. In the unoccupied Baltic territories, the February Revolution of 1917 initiated a chaotic chain of events. Estonians and

Latvians established local governing institutions under the provisional government, seizing power from Baltic Germans, and in some cases calling for independence. In May 1917 Bolsheviks took power in the Latvian provisional government and later in Estonia, following the October Revolution.

The Bolshevik victory was short-lived, as a German offensive occupied the rest of Latvia, and then Estonia, by February of 1918. National assemblies in Estonia and Lithuania declared independence, though these declarations had little practical effect until the German monarchy collapsed in October 1918. The Latvian National Council declared independence in November. The Red Army quickly launched an invasion to regain the lost territories of the empire, but Estonia cut short the attack with assistance from Britain and Finland, and Latvia and Lithuania repelled the Bolsheviks by May after forming a tactical alliance with Germans and White Russians.

In a final round of fighting, Estonian and Latvian forces turned on Baltic German *Landeswehr* and German *Freikorps* units in June, precipitating a complete German withdrawal by October 1918. The two new states also seized small strips of territory in Russia where Baltic ethnics resided. Lithuania lost Vilnius to Poland in late 1920, but in 1932 seized the Klaipėda region from Germany.

Interwar Years

In the interwar era from 1918 to 1939 major land reform was instituted in Estonia and Latvia, and to a lesser extent in Lithuania. In December 1924, following two years of worker insurgencies in Estonia, a Soviet-supported military coup was crushed by the government. In 1926 the right-wing military ousted a coalition government that included ethnic minorities and was itself threatened by a number of subsequent coup attempts by various factions. In 1934 right-wing nationalists in Estonia and Latvia opposed to unstable parliamentary governments and popular rule instituted authoritarian rule with little resistance. In all three Baltic states, right-wing authoritarian regimes emerged with fascist overtones.

World War II

The secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 between Nazi Germany and Stalinist

Russia turned Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania over to the Soviet "sphere of interest." The Soviets stationed troops in the region under the guise of defense pacts and in June 1940 installed puppet governments assenting to the USSR annexation of the three Baltic states, never recognized by the West.

No armed resistance or popular protests ensued following the occupation. However, nationalization of businesses and collectivization of farms was highly unpopular, and the execution, imprisonment, deportation, or conscription of tens of thousands undermined the legitimacy of the new Soviet regime for many in the Baltic region. Many individuals targeted for deportation escaped and fled to the forests and organized guerilla opposition. As the Germans invaded in June 1941, opponents to Soviet control headed a general uprising attacking retreating Soviet forces, and in Lithuania, targeting Jews, frequently seen as sympathetic to the communists.

Nazi Germany quickly ousted the provisional governments and installed its own puppet regimes with limited resistance aside from difficulty recruiting Balts into their armed forces and war industries. The Lithuanian partisan resistance to Nazi control discouraged many from joining the military. But by 1943, after Nazi Germany began conscription, many dodged this draft or deserted the army. In Estonia some 6,000 joined Finland to fight the Soviets in Karelia. Efforts to recruit police and home defense units proved more successful, and ethnic Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians could be found on all sides of a multi-party struggle among Nazis, Soviet partisans, Baltic partisans, and (in Lithuania and the southeastern Latvian province of Latgale) the Polish resistance, known as the Home Army. As members of the German formations, ethnic Balts also took part in the extermination of the region's Jews in the Holocaust.

In its effort to oust the Nazi armies from the region the Soviets reoccupied the Baltic states in 1944, meeting resistance from some nationalist military units joined with the Germans. In Estonia several thousand Estonians returning from Karelia joined the battle on their own territory. As the Soviet occupation was consolidated after German withdrawal, many Balts went into exile. The Soviet territory captured by Estonia and Latvia in 1920 went back to the Russian Republic within the USSR, creating the basis of future border claims. New resistance movements,

later called the Forest Brothers, formed, mostly organized and armed in Lithuania, where a Territorial Defense Force disbanded and fled into the forest after the German attempts to incorporate the army into the SS.

The guerilla war reached a height in the late 1940s in response to postwar opposition to collectivization and transfer of several hundred thousand Balts to Siberia and Central Asia. The resistance to the Soviets in each of the Baltic states numbered tens of thousands in a guerilla war with atrocities committed by Soviet police forces and armed opponents. By the mid-1950s, as the West tacitly accepted Soviet occupation and collectivization of the Baltic states and deportations cut guerillas' supply lines in the countryside, the opposition receded.

Under Soviet control, ethnic Russians and other Russian speakers settled in the Baltic states to repopulate areas where Baltic Germans and Jews, and émigré Estonians and Latvians, once lived. By the late 1980s, Russian-speakers constituted 45 percent of the population in Latvia and 35 percent of the population in Estonia. Far fewer Russians migrated to less industrialized Lithuania, which had a higher birthrate, and where Forest Brothers and later the communist leadership of the republic more effectively opposed settlement than Estonia and Latvia.

Baltic Revolutions of 1989 to 1991

As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, dissident movements expanded after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the signing of the Helsinki Accords on human rights in 1975. In the Baltic states, anti-Soviet movements were comparatively weaker than the independent states of Eastern Europe. By the late 1970s, Estonian and Latvian opposition expanded and nationalism was on the rise as Russian linguistic and cultural ascendancy expanded.

In 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and with the introduction of *glasnost* policies of openness and tolerance, Baltic dissent against the Soviet Union gradually increased, at first among ecological activists in Latvia opposing the building of hydroelectric facilities and a subway in Riga, the country's capital. In Estonia, environmentalists opposed the Soviet dumping of toxic wastes in restricted military zones. By the late 1980s, ecological

protests metamorphosed into nationalist movements against the Soviet Union.

In 1987 Latvians initiated the “calendar demonstrations” on symbolically important dates, including Latvian Independence Day, anniversaries of deportations, and the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In April 1987 Estonian nationalists formed a Popular Front to push for autonomy (or “sovereignty”) within the Soviet Union, and over the course of the year similar organizations formed in Latvia and Lithuania, where they were called *Sajūdis*. In October 1987, following Gorbachev’s proposal to centralize constitutional reforms, calls for independence increased, and the ruling Estonian Supreme Soviet Council passed a declaration of sovereignty.

The Estonian declaration began a slow-motion nationalist movement, where all activists inched forward in incremental steps, hesitant to take dramatic actions. The Baltic nationalists feared provoking violent reactions from the Soviet Union or local Russians. The nationalist movements were supported by Western warnings against the Soviet Union to refrain from violent repression. In mid-1989 the Lithuanian and Latvian Supreme Councils also passed declarations of sovereignty as popular protests continued. The Soviet government belatedly responded to Baltic concerns, calling for greater autonomy for the republics, while the Congress of People’s Deputies, the Soviet parliament, in December recognized the Molotov-Ribbentrop protocols as illegal, though the Gorbachev administration still maintained that Baltic incorporation into the Soviet Union was voluntary.

At the end of 1989 radical nationalists in Estonia and Latvia, who considered the Supreme Councils illegitimate, began organizing elections to parallel legislatures, called Congresses, claiming them as legal successors of the pre-1940 regimes. The organizers of the Congresses conducted voter registration, which included only the descendants of pre-1940 citizens, excluding the majority of Russian-speakers. Initially, many Estonian and Latvian politicians opposed this radical approach. It is notable that many Russian-speakers also expressed support for the Popular Fronts, and even, finally, independence itself, seeing the benefits of cutting the relatively advanced economies of the region from the USSR. Still, from 1989 on, many ethnic Russians joined protests against moves toward independence.

While many saw the declarations of independence and inclusive electoral participation as an effort to expand democracy, some argue that Baltic nationalists initially supported universal citizenship out of fear of Soviet intervention or revolt by Russian-speakers. Once these potential threats vanished, Estonian and Latvian support for granting citizenship to all evaporated, and the Popular Fronts, controlling the Supreme Councils, adopted the restrictive policies of the Congresses.

Estonian and Latvian nationalists viewed excluding citizenship to Russian-speakers as a means of ridding the state of a colonial occupying power. However, Russians born or living in the two countries for decades rejected relegation to non-citizen status. Ethnic Estonians and Latvians insisted that citizenship for all would undermine the legal basis of the newly independent states as the possessors of unbroken sovereignty inherited from the pre-1940 regimes. In contrast, Lithuania, with a small Russian minority, granted citizenship automatically to all inhabitants at independence.

In 1991 the three Baltic republics gained independence with little opposition from the Soviet Union. In Latvia a substantial number of Russian-speakers were not granted citizenship in the new state. In March 1990 in Lithuania a newly elected Supreme Council dominated by *Sajūdis* issued a surprising declaration of outright independence. In a mild response, Soviet units occupied several Communist Party buildings in Vilnius, and in April the Soviet government imposed sanctions on Lithuania, including on oil. In 1991, after elections, Estonia and Latvia declared *de jure* independence that would come into effect only after a transitional period. In 1991, after limited and sporadic military operations to block independence in Latvia and Lithuania, the Soviet Union and countries throughout the world recognized the independence and secession of the three Baltic republics.

In the 1990s, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania successfully transited out of the Soviet orbit and adopted democratic and neoliberal market systems. In Estonia and Latvia the treatment of the non-citizen Russian-speaking minorities has remained a sensitive and uneasy domestic, European, and international matter.

SEE ALSO: Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Non-Violent Revolutions; Russia, Revolution of

1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russia, Revolutions: Sources and Contexts; Russian Civil War, 1918–1924; Soviet Union, Fall of

References and Suggested Readings

- Lane, T. (2001) *Lithuania: Stepping Westward*. New York: Routledge.
- Lievan, A. (1994) *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence*, 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Pabriks, A. & Pürs, A. (2001) *Latvia: The Challenges of Change*. New York: Routledge.
- Smith, D. J. (2001) *Estonia: Independence and European Integration*. New York: Routledge.
- Smith, G. (Ed.) (1996) *The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Banana Plantation Worker Rebellion, 1928

Andrés Otálvaro H.

In November 1928 a strike broke out in the banana plantation region of Magdalena, Colombia, as almost 30,000 workers and peasants called for better labor and living conditions. The United Fruit Company (UFC) exercised a powerful monopoly over the department of Magdalena, controlling production and commercialization. In support of the UFC the Colombian armed forces perpetrated a massacre in the town of Ciénaga on December 6 in order to repress the rebellion. Around 1,000 workers were killed.

The repression followed the ironically named Heroic Law approved by the government of Miguel Abadía Méndez on October 30, 1928. This law prohibited the right to strike, any action which could incite class struggle, and attacks on private property. The fact was that a profound fear was spreading across different sectors of society and foreign commercial interests: it derived from an international communist “threat,” its recent practical success in the USSR, and domestic socialist expressions. Thus, claims for better labor rights and standards of living were seen as dangerous revolutionary forces led by violent rioters against the public and the economic order.

The strike which broke out on November 12, 1928 was stigmatized as a rebellion against the state, manipulated by the interests of the

Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), which had been founded in Bogotá in 1926. Actually, some leaders of the RSP influenced events, but their role and engagement were not at all clear. In truth, this massive strike was guided by strong democratic principles and autonomous interests that motivated the protest as a response to the miserable circumstances of the peasants and the workers exploited by the banana conglomerate. The organization of the strike was spontaneous and decentralized, and it relied on the structures of the Magdalenian Labor Union (Unión Sindical de Trabajadores del Magdalena) (USTM), created in 1926, and the participation of numerous committees that were in charge of suspending the harvesting and transportation of crops. These committees also distributed food to the strikers and led negotiations with the company.

Although the ministry of industry sent a delegation to the region, attempting to promote negotiation between both sides, the company never accepted the USTM as legitimate. In addition to this refusal, the UFC always denied the existence of labor contracts with the workers. Due to a juridical stratagem, it exclusively signed indirect contracts with them (using the figure of intermediaries), which reduced considerably its legal responsibilities and deepened the controversy.

The workers' demands were expressed in accordance with Colombian legislation. They included calls for regular and weekly payment of their salaries, recreational and work-free Sundays, an improvement in their living conditions (housing and medical care), social security benefits, and the abolition of vouchers that were only redeemable for merchandise at the company store, as a tender of payment. They were also inspired by a revolutionary spirit, something that could be seen from the posters distributed during the strike. The slogans on the posters accused “American capitalism” and its “imperialist procedures,” and asserted that their resistance was the consequence of the appalling situation of the “exploited” workers and the humiliation of the “proletarian class.”

The modus operandi of the UFC consisted of a huge extraction mechanism based on the Caribbean export economies of Jamaica, Cuba, República Dominicana, Costa Rica, Panamá, Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia. It was a powerful monopolistic extension of imperial commerce. The tentacles of this multinational

“octopus” controlled the socioeconomic needs of the inhabitants of the region and the whole banana production and commercial network that included railroads, telegraph and telephone connections, ports and docks, ownership over vast plantations and vacant lots (due to displacement of peasants), modern systems of irrigation, a big fleet of ships (*la Gran Flota Blanca*), and markets and clients overseas. The powerful and conservative plantation owners, or *hacendados*, of Santa Marta were on the side of the UFC; they sold their products to the company and received huge contracts and loans in exchange. The company had over time won important alliances in the local and national governments in order to expand its growing power structure.

On the other side, the liberal *hacendados* of Ciénaga and Aracataca and some regional traders supported the strike, which continued until December 6, 1928, the tragic day when the strikers gathered near the train station of Ciénaga and waited peacefully for the arrival of the department’s governor, who was going to visit and promote a negotiation. That same night, amid great expectations, they received the news that he was not coming. Almost simultaneously the commandant Carlos Cortez Vargas was empowered by an official decree, allowing him to establish martial law in the region, something he carried out at the cost of hundreds of lives when he gave his troops the order to open fire on the crowd. The number of casualties is still uncertain, but probably exceeded 1,000. Many corpses were thrown into the sea or buried in mass graves with the help of the company. There were no judicial processes after the fact, and those responsible for the massacre were left unpunished.

SEE ALSO: Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1960s–1970s; Colombia, Thousand Days’ War, 1899–1922; Colombia, Unions, Strikes, and Anti-Neoliberal Opposition 1990–2005

References and Suggested Readings

- Cortés, V. C. (1929) *Los sucesos de las bananeras*. Bogotá: Editorial Desarrollo.
- Gaitán, J. E. (1929/1988) *El debate sobre las bananeras: cuatro días de verdad contra 40 años de silencio*. Bogotá: Editorial Retina.
- García Márquez, G. (1971) *Cien años de Soledad*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Suramericana.
- Kepler, C. & Soothill, J. H. (1949) *El imperio del banano: las compañías bananeras contra la soberanía*

de las naciones del Caribe. Ciudad de México: Ediciones del Caribe.

- Le Grand, C. (1989) *El conflicto de las bananeras*. In A. Tirado (Ed.), *Nueva Historia de Colombia*. Bogotá: Editorial Planeta.

Bangladesh, struggle for liberation, 1971

*Muntassir Mamoon and
Zarina Rahman Khan*

Emergence of Bangali (Bengali) Nationalism

The Bangali nationalist movement gathered strength under the leadership of *Bongobondhu* (friend of Bengal, a title conferred on him by popular acclaim) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, chief of the political party the Awami League. The Awami League had been founded as the Awami Muslim League in 1949, but dropped the word “Muslim” in 1955. In the course of the 1960s it became the leading political party in East Pakistan. In 1970 it won the first election to the National Assembly held on the basis of a universal adult franchise, with an overwhelming majority of seats. But the central rulers of West Pakistan refused to hand over power to the elected Bangali leaders. This resulted in a movement against the Pakistanis. The central government retaliated by declaring war against the East Pakistanis on March 25, 1971, unleashing a massive genocide on the Bangalis, forcing large numbers of them to cross the border and take refuge in India. Soon India got involved in the war. On December 16, 1971 the Pakistani army surrendered to the joint Bangladesh-India military forces in Dhaka. East Pakistan became the sovereign state of Bangladesh.

Liberation or Independence?

Some politicians, right-wing parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami or the Bangladesh Freedom Party, and especially the army, refer to the Liberation War as *swadhinata sangram* (War of Independence), emphasizing the process of transfer of power from the West Pakistani elite to its eastern Bangali counterpart. The words *swadhinata sangram* gained currency after 1975, when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was killed by the army and Lt. General

Ziaur Rahman became president. He was propagating a different kind of nationalism known as Bangladeshi nationalism, which has religious connotations (connected to an Islamic identity as well as Bangali).

Political activists and supporters of democratic parties like the Awami League and the Communist Party prefer to use the term *mukti yuddho* (Liberation War), signifying struggle to achieve democratization of social and political spaces. The difference became clearer when the word *sadhinata* (independence) started to be used for official purposes during military rule and not in the period of democratic regimes. With repeated bouts of military dictatorship since 1975, the generation born after 1971 have not felt the dual meaning of the term “liberation war” as strongly as did the older generation. The concept of *mukti yuddho* is much wider than the concept of *swadhinata sangram*. It is on this point that the perception of the people’s representatives differs from that of the military rulers who were directly or indirectly in power from 1975 to 1990. Since the politicians represent the people, they could understand that liberation was the prime issue. To the military, the immediate issue was the freeing of a particular geographical area from occupation by Pakistani forces.

The dual meaning of the Liberation War does not create as much debate at the grassroots level as it has among the educated elite. To many at the grassroots the year 1971 is also the Year of Unrest. To them, 1971 is the year of turmoil because the Bangalis did not face such conflicts and clashes before, though they had aspired for freedom during long years of accumulated humiliation and repression.

Prelude

After the creation of Pakistan in 1947 the Bangalis discovered that only their master had changed. One part of Pakistan – West Pakistan – became their new colonial rulers. This was evident in a number of ways. For one, they faced disparity in the administration. Until 1968 there were no Bangalis in the positions of secretary, chief of the planning commission, governor of the state bank, or finance minister. Despite the fact that East Pakistan, whose inhabitants were almost all Bangalis, had about 56 percent of the total population of the country, only 20.8 percent in the foreign service were Bangali in 1962. In the

defense department, the ratio was 1:25 for soldiers and 1:90 for officers.

There was also disparity in the education and economic sectors. In investment in education in East and West Pakistan between 1947 and 1969, for primary, secondary, colleges, and university the growth rate in West Pakistan was 369 percent, 176 percent, 675 percent, and 425 percent, respectively. And despite the steady growth of population in East Pakistan the respective figures were 4.6 percent, 11.4 percent, 320 percent, and 300 percent (Rahman 1982). Economically, from 1947 to 1955 central government spending in East Pakistan amounted to 10.2 percent. Until 1966 the surplus in trading in East Pakistan was 4924.1 million taka. In West Pakistan there was a deficit of 16,634.6 million taka. The West Pakistan deficit was covered from the surpluses of East Pakistan. Almost 90 percent of the investment in the banking sector of East Pakistan went to West Pakistan (Rahman 1982).

Finally, from the very beginning the central government unleashed a policy of political, cultural, and social disparity and repression on East Pakistanis. At the center, or even in the province, if the opposition won against the rulers in elections they were removed from power on one pretext or another. Arrest and repression were daily events. Socially, the Bangalis were looked down upon. It was held that they were not true Muslims or were Muslims influenced by the Hindus. Any incident of protest was branded as an Indian conspiracy or a threat to Islam. Also, during the conflicts between India and Pakistan from 1947 to 1970, East Pakistan was always kept undefended. There was also an attempt to reject Bangla, the language of the majority, and Bangali culture was termed Hindu culture. All this created frustration and anger in the Bangalis. Their protests were channelled through different movements in 1952, 1954, 1962, 1966, and 1969.

The central government of Pakistan started to use Urdu along with English as the state language without any prior declaration. Urdu was the mother tongue of 3.27 percent of the population and Bangla was the language of 56 percent of the population. This led to the Language movement, which started in 1948 and culminated on February 21, 1952, when police fired on a procession of students and ordinary people, with huge casualties. The Muslim League was completely defeated in the 1954 provincial election. The *Jukta*

(United) Front, formed by a coalition of many political parties following the popular protest since 1952, came to power. The Muslim League never gained popularity in East Bengal or East Pakistan. In 1954 Bangla was given recognition as a national language. The Language movement of 1952, followed by the unleashing of Bangali nationalism, strengthened secular politics by replacing the communal politics of the Muslim League. It is often held that the Language movement inspired the liberation war of Bangladesh.

Democracy in Pakistan was destroyed by the army in 1958, when army chief General Ayub Khan usurped the civil government. The creation of Pakistan had been based on a communal identity without a strong basis in civil society. The armed forces rapidly became the central element in holding together the state, especially because of the opposition of the Punjabi elite that emerged to the autonomy not only of East Pakistan, but also of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province. During Ayub Khan's regime (1958–69) students, particularly from East Pakistan, started a movement against the new constitution promulgated by the military dictator in 1962. Ayub Khan also formed an Education Commission, under the secretary of education S. M. Sharif, to prepare the education policy of Pakistan. Students started the movement against the Sharif Commission in 1962, when it recommended limiting the scope of education, particularly for ordinary or poor people. On September 23, 1962 one student was killed. The report of the commission was withdrawn. But the student unrest continued, and gradually it turned into a political movement.

This political movement was strengthened by a Six Point Demand made by Mujibur Rahman in 1966. In short, it was a demand for the greater autonomy of East Pakistan. Though Sheikh Mujib was arrested immediately, the Six Point Demand laid the basis for the Bangladesh movement later on. To thwart the movement, Ayub Khan started the Agartala Conspiracy Case in 1968, accusing Sheikh Mujib of going to Agartala (capital of Tripura, India) and conspiring with India to create an independent state. It became clear that the central government wanted to suppress Bangali nationalist sentiment, which was gaining momentum. The movement, later known as the Mass Upsurge of 1969, actually started on October 6, 1968 when different political parties organized *hartals* (general strikes and

shutdowns). Gradually, it gathered momentum. Many students, workers, ordinary people, and even an eminent professor at Rajshahi University, Dr. Shamsuzzoha, were killed. Ayub Khan was forced to withdraw the Agartala Conspiracy Case and release Sheikh Mujib in February 1969. The next day a huge reception was accorded to Sheikh Mujib, who became the undisputed leader of the Bangalis. Though Ayub Khan had to resign in 1969 when he rejected all the proposals of the Awami League, martial law was again imposed and army chief General Yahya Khan became president and chief martial law administrator.

Victory of the Awami League: Era of Conflicts and Protests

General Yahya Khan came to power after the fall of Ayub Khan on March 25, 1969 and declared that he would transfer power to directly elected representatives of the people. But in the meantime the military government initiated a process to control politicians. When general elections were held on March 7, 1970 the Awami League won 288 of the 300 provincial seats and 160 of the 162 seats at the center in East Pakistan. Sheikh Mujibur led the Awami League and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was at the head of the People's Party. Both were regional parties. Almost all seats in East Pakistan were won by the League, while the People's Party won a provincial majority in the Punjab and Sindh.

According to the verdict of the vote, power was to be transferred to Mujibur Rahman, since East Pakistan had a majority of seats in the parliament, but as usual the civil-military establishment in Pakistan delayed the transfer of power. Basically there was an understanding on this between the representative of the military establishment, Yahya, and Bhutto, representing the West Pakistani political establishment. Yahya postponed convening the Assembly scheduled for March 10, 1971, and the Bangalis started to protest these attempts to withhold their due political power. The non-cooperation movement began. Pakistan had not witnessed non-violent non-cooperation on such a massive scale since the time of Gandhi, which made the central government totally ineffective. On March 7 Sheikh Mujibur declared at a huge rally held in Dhaka that this time it was the struggle for freedom. In order to gain time, Yahya and Bhutto came to

Dhaka and started a dialogue. But at the same time they started deploying troops in East Pakistan, transported from West Pakistan.

Backlash and War

From March 1 to March 25, 1971 the army opened fire on Bangalis in different places in what appeared to be a closely coordinated effort with the non-Bangalis residing in East Pakistan. The numbers of dead kept mounting. Under these circumstances Yahya, Bhutto, and West Pakistani policy-makers left Dhaka on the night of March 25, leaving orders to the army to continue the attack and kill unarmed Bangalis in what was known as Operation Search Light. At midnight the Pakistani occupation army started the genocide in Dhaka, particularly in Dhaka University. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested and taken to Pakistan. His arrest could not kill the spirit of the *Bongobondhu* who passionately declared the independence of Bangladesh. On March 27 Major Ziaur Rahman, making another announcement on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from a small radio station in Kalurghat (Chittagong), appealed for international support and solidarity.

The Liberation War started with massive murders in Dhaka by the Pakistan Occupation Army on March 25. Soon the attack spread to other regions as well. The Bangalis started to resist with whatever they had. The Bangali officers and *jamans* (troops) in the Pakistani army deserted their posts. Police, Ansars, and other paramilitary forces did the same. People from different professions and classes – particularly at the grassroots – joined them. Until the second week of April, resistance took various forms in different places. But by this time the Pakistani army had established its control.

When the genocide started political leaders and the people looking for shelter started to cross borders and take refuge mostly in India. Some also went to Myanmar, but the Myanmar government was not very happy at the arrival of the refugees. On the other hand, the Indian people and government accepted 10 million refugees, assisting them with food, clothing, and shelter. Once in India, Awami League leaders organized themselves, and the leadership was vested in the secretary general, Tajuddin Ahmed. They declared independence on April 10, 1971. On April 17, 1971 the government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh was formed in Baidyanathala

in Meherpur of Kushtia district of Bangladesh. Baidyanathala was named Mujibnagar. *Bongobondhu* Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was elected as the president of the republic. In his absence, Vice President Syed Nazrul Islam became acting president. Tajuddin Ahmed became prime minister. Three ministers were also appointed to the Cabinet.

Following this, Bangladesh was divided into 11 sectors and several subsectors for conducting the war and organizing armed resistance. An administrative structure was also set up and Colonel M. A. G. Osmani was appointed commander-in-chief of the military. The Mukti Bahini (liberation army) was formed with the freedom fighters. Its members were divided into regular and irregular forces. The regular forces were formed with the former Bengali members of the Pakistani army and members of the East Pakistan rifles (border forces), who conducted conventional combat with the enemy. The irregular forces were formed with the professionals, students, peasants, laborers, and ordinary people who volunteered to fight for the independence of the country. They were mostly involved in guerrilla warfare. A number of guerilla groups were also formed in the countryside.

Initially, Pakistani forces could establish control only in the cities. For assistance, they formed paramilitary Razakar forces. The Shanti Bahini (peace force) was formed all over the country in order to control the Muktiyoddha and their supporters. And a killer group, the Al-Badr Bahini, was formed by the Pakistan government to annihilate the intellectuals. The members of these forces were primarily from the Jamaati Islam Party, its student wing Chatra Shibir, Muslim League, non-Bangali Mojaher and other right-wing parties that were opposed to the Awami League. The Pakistani military adopted the scorched earth policy known as *poramati*, and the Al-Badr Bahini, under the command of Jamaat leader Matiur Rahman Nizami, and with the assistance of the Pakistani forces, murdered innumerable Bangali intellectuals and professionals. In nine months the Pakistani forces and their collaborators killed lakh Bangalis and raped lakh women in a massive genocide not seen since World War II.

However, the forces of reaction started facing serious resistance from April-May 1971, and this gradually became stronger. Internationally, the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, and

Middle Eastern Muslim countries supported Pakistan. India, the Soviet Union, and the non-aligned nations took the side of Bangladesh. India supported the cause of Bangalis by giving shelter to refugees, providing the Mukti Bahini with arms and necessary training, and helping to influence public opinion worldwide. As a result, ordinary people all over the world built up strong opposition to the Pakistani genocide. The prime minister of India, Indira Gandhi, also played an important role in this. Bangali diplomats in Pakistan's embassies defected and became active with the help of expatriate Bangalis, not only in building public opinion, but also in providing assistance and support to the Bangladesh government.

Pakistan attacked India on the western front on December 3, 1971. On the eastern front the Mukti Bahini and Indian forces formed a mitra bahini (joint command) for conducting the all-out war on this front. On December 14, 1971 the joint forces reached the suburbs of Dhaka and finally entered the city on December 16. On that day Lt. General Abdulla Niazi and 93,000 soldiers of Pakistan Eastern Command surrendered to Lt. General Jagjit Singh Arora of the joint forces at the Dhaka Ramna Race Course.

When Bangladesh became independent on December 16, 1971 there were wide-scale repercussions in West Pakistan. Yahya Khan was forced to relinquish power. With the army discredited, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took over state power and was forced to release *Bongobondhu*. It can be said that the Liberation War was completed when *Bongobondhu* returned on January 10, 1972. However, the coup against Mujibur Rahman in 1975, and subsequent patronage given to Muslim fundamentalists by right-wing forces in Bangladesh, meant the war criminals have not been tried for their genocide.

SEE ALSO: India, Nationalism, Extremist; India, Non-Violent Non-Cooperation Movement, 1918–1929; Indigo Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Mamoon, M. (Ed.) (2005) *Muktijudho Kosh* (Encyclopedia of the Liberation War), 5 Vols. Dhaka: Somoy.
- Rahman, H. H. (Ed.) (1982) *Bangladesher Swadhimota Juddha: Documents* (War of Independence of Bangladesh: Documents), Vol. 3. Dhaka: Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.

Sur, N. (1982) *Chhiattorer Monnontor O Sannyasi-Fakir Bidroho* (Famine of '76 and Sannyasi-Fakir Revolt). Kolkata: Subarnarekha.

Umar, B. (2006) *The Emergence of Bangladesh, Vol. 2: The Rise of Bengali Nationalism, 1958–1971*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Baraka, Imanu Amiri (b. 1934)

Magda Romanska

Amiri Baraka, also known as Imanu Amiri Baraka, a playwright, writer, poet, and one of the leaders of the Black Revolt of the 1960s, was born in Newark, New Jersey, on October 7, 1934, under the name Everett LeRoi Jones. He studied philosophy and religious studies at Rutgers, Columbia, and Howard universities. He joined the US Air Force in 1954, but was discharged after being accused of being a communist sympathizer. Baraka moved to Greenwich Village, where he began writing. In 1964 his play *Dutchman* won an Obie Award. In 1965, after the assassination of Black Muslim leader Malcolm X, Baraka moved to Harlem and became involved in the Black Nationalism movement. In Harlem, Baraka founded the Black Arts Repertory Theater School, which became an influential breeding ground for talented black artists and writers. Baraka rose to prominence during the Modern Black Convention movement, which began in 1966 with the Black Arts Convention in Detroit and the National Black Power Conference summit in Washington, DC. Under Baraka's leadership, factions of the Black Arts and Black Power movements merged, fostering the politics of black cultural nationalism that began to define the Modern Black Convention movement. Baraka's movement focused on developing a number of organizations that focused on the formation of black nationality, among them, the United Brothers and the Committee For a Unified NewArk (CFUN), the NewArk Student Federation, Unity and Struggle, and a few Jihad publications. In the 1970s the local organizations emerged into the national spotlight, forming the Congress of African People, the African Liberation Support Committee, the National Black Assembly, and the Black Women's United Front. During that time, adding to his own anti-white sentiments, Baraka began using

anti-Semitic and anti-gay rhetoric. In 1974 Baraka distanced himself from Black Nationalism and became a Marxist, arguing against the imperialist tendencies of the West. In 1979 he became a lecturer at SUNY–Stony Brook in the Department of African Studies. Although during the 1980s he denounced his former anti-Semitic statements, he continued to refer to himself as anti-Zionist. In 1984 Baraka became a full professor. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Baraka wrote a poem accusing the Bush administration, together with Israel, of participating in the plot.

SEE ALSO: Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Malcolm X (1925–1965); Marxism

References and Suggested Readings

- Baraka, I. A. (1964) *Dutchman and The Slave, Two Plays*. New York: Morrow.
- Baraka, I. A. (1969) *Four Black Revolutionary Plays, All Praises to The Black Man*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Baraka, I. A. (1973) *Afrikan Revolution: A Poem*. Newark, NJ: JIHAD.
- Baraka, I. A. (1997) *The Autobiography of LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka*. Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books.
- Benston, K. W. (1976) *Baraka: The Renegade and the Mask*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Brown, L. W. (1980) *Amiri Baraka*. Boston: Twayne.
- Hudson, T. R. (1973) *From LeRoi Jones to Amiri Baraka: The Literary Works*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Woodard, K. (1999) *A Nation Within a Nation: Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) and Black Power Politics*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Barayi, Elijah (1930–1994)

Lucien van der Walt

Born in Lingelihle in the Eastern Cape, South Africa, Barayi joined the Youth League of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1948. The ANC, the country's main African nationalist organization, was adopting an increasingly confrontational position, and developing into a mass-based party. The ANC Youth League, then influenced by Pan-Africanism, and the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), played an important role in the organization's revival and

growing militancy. Barayi worked as a government clerk, and joined the Youth League following a racial clash with white youths. He was active in the 1950s civil disobedience campaigns of the Congress Alliance, comprising the ANC, the Colored Peoples Congress, the (White) Congress of Democrats, the Indian National Congress, and, from 1955, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). Arrested during the 1952 Defiance Campaign, he was jailed for a month in Cradock, and he was among those arrested in the state of emergency declared in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre of March 21, 1960, and held for four months.

Following his release he moved to the Witwatersrand where he worked as a mine clerk, mainly in the Brakpan and Carletonville areas. He was a founder member of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), formed in 1982, and its vice-president until his death. The NUM was a successor to the African Mineworkers' Union formed in 1930 by S. P. Bunting and T. W. Thibedi; the NUM claimed 110,000 members by 1984 (Baskin 1991), and helped establish the Congress of South African Trades Unions (COSATU) in 1985. Barayi was COSATU president until 1991, and notable for his strong stand against apartheid, and played an important role in aligning the NUM to then-underground ANC. Barayi was involved in the 1987 NUM strike – this was the biggest single industry-wide strike in South Africa to that date, but defeated – and in the civil disobedience and union campaigns of the late 1980s. The ANC was legalized in 1990, and Barayi was a candidate on its list of election candidates for the first all-race election in April 1994, but died in January that year.

SEE ALSO: COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions); South Africa, Labor Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Baskin, J. (1991) *Striking Back: A History of COSATU*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- New York Times* (2006) Elijah Barayi, African Nationalist, 63. November 9.
- National Union of Mineworkers (n.d.) Tribute to the Late Comrade Elijah Barayi, Former NUM Vice President. National Union of Mineworkers website. Available at www.num.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=38&Itemid=77#two (downloaded November 1, 2006).

Barbados and the Windward Islands, protest and revolt

Jennifer Westmoreland Bouchard

The Windward Islands are located in the southeastern portion of the West Indies. Their name comes from the fact that they are in the path of the northeast trade winds. The Windward Islands include Dominica, Martinique, St. Lucia, Grenada, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines. Barbados is also in this region. Each of these islands gained independence from its colonizing power (France, Spain, or Great Britain) at different times after 1962; however, the histories of resistance concerning both the emancipation of slaves and decolonization in these islands are closely related. The focus here will be on forms of resistance related to emancipation and decolonization of the Anglophone islands of Dominica, St. Lucia, Grenada, St. Vincent, and Barbados.

To understand the processes of emancipation and decolonization in these islands, one must first have a sense of the colonial system and the practice of European domination in general. Complete economic, political, and to a certain extent physical control is inherent in both slavery and colonialism. There is, from the slave or the native island inhabitant's standpoint, a total lack of control over one's own freedom, or, on a larger scale, the community or country's development. Thus, exploitation of both resources and labor and widespread human rights injustices were the norm in the former British colonies. The processes of emancipation, liberation, and eventual decolonization in these islands necessitated a unification of the African and Creole peoples and a complete, yet gradual, reconfiguration of power.

This complex power dynamic gave way to myriad manifestations of protest and revolt, beginning with slave revolts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, most notably the 1674 revolt in Barbados and the 1796 revolt in St. Lucia. Historian Eugene Genovese describes the ideological impetus behind these early uprisings as a search to restore an African past through cultural or religious rituals. Religious practices were an effective way of staging ongoing, smaller-scale rebellions. Often, slave owners did not understand, or were wary of, these "exotic"

manifestations. Religion not only gave the slaves a set of ideals and practices around which to rally, but also provided a forum for continual, and at times subversive, resistance. Individually, many slaves revolted on a smaller scale by deliberately ruining farming equipment, feigning illness to reduce productivity, and running away from their masters. This was especially prevalent in Barbados, where these runaways established settlements in the interior of the island.

These first revolts provided a sense of solidarity that laid the ideological foundations for later rebellions in which Creoles and Africans banded together in an attempt to overturn slavery as a social system. Emancipation from slavery in most Caribbean islands was achieved between 1820 and 1840. The granting of freedom to slaves was, in many islands, simply a political gesture. Between 1838 and 1865, a period referred to by historians as the immediate post-emancipation era, the patterns and rituals of power between the formerly enslaved and their owners persisted. Gross injustices were committed against newly emancipated slaves who were treated as second-class citizens at best. For the majority of the formerly enslaved African population in the Windward Islands, working conditions continued to be unrelentingly harsh. In addition, they were given very few opportunities to purchase and farm their own land. As a result, a majority of the newly emancipated slaves were forced to stay and work on the plantations for meager wages. By 1896, this negative trend had led to widespread social unrest and serious economic difficulties.

The next intense round of uprisings began in the 1930s for most of these Anglophone islands. Historians typically divide the decolonization period in the Anglophone Caribbean into three phases. From the 1920s to 1930s, there was a series of protests by the Afro-Caribbean and Creole communities, spawned by unfair labor and social conditions. Eventually, these protests gave way to a slow movement toward a more equal government system in which those other than the European dominators were represented. However, even with these gradual changes, it was clear that colonization and the governmental systems it engendered would continue. Between 1934 and 1962, a series of labor rebellions precipitated the process of constitutional decolonization. In the context of the Anglophone Caribbean, constitutional development, synonymous with

constitutional advancement, is the process in which constitutional elements are changed, thus allowing local citizens more legal rights and the ability to run their country. Thanks to the labor rebellions and other social disturbances, many such reforms were made to the constitutions of each island. In the Windward Islands, primary reforms included those to allow greater adult suffrage, as well as changes to the Committee System and the Ministerial System. In addition, the Executive Council was transformed into a Council of Ministers, representative of more ethnic groups from each of the islands. These and other systems were established to allow full internal self-governance that would eventually lead to independence from Britain. In 1958, the British colonies throughout the West Indies were encouraged by Britain to form a federation. They did so, and the federation failed shortly thereafter in 1962. This failure instigated the movement toward individual independence for each of the British colonies. Finally, between 1962 and 1980, the majority of Anglophone Caribbean islands, including those among the Windward Islands and Barbados, became independent. Barbados gained independence in 1966, followed by Grenada in 1974, Dominica in 1978, and St. Lucia and St. Vincent in 1979.

SEE ALSO: Bussa (d. 1816) and the Barbados Slave Insurrection; Caribbean Islands, Protests against IMF; Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1801–1804; Jamaica, Independence Movement, 1950–Present; Trinidad, Anti-Colonial Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Anstey, R. (1975) *The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1760–1810*. London: Macmillan.
- Bolland, O. N. (2006) Historiography of Decolonization in the Anglophone Caribbean. In J. De Barros, A. A. Diptee, & D. V. Trotman (Eds.), *Beyond Fragmentation: Perspectives on Caribbean History*. Princeton: Marcus Wiene, pp. 265–96.
- Cox-Alomar, R. (2004) Revisiting the Transatlantic Triangle: The Decolonisation of the British Caribbean in Light of the Anglo-American Special Relationship. *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 15 (2): 353–73.
- Farrel, T. (1983) Decolonization in the English-Speaking Caribbean: Myth or Reality? In P. Henry & C. Stone (Eds.), *The Newer Caribbean*. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, pp. 3–12.
- Nesbitt, N. (2007) Departmentalization and the Logic of Decolonization. *L'Esprit Créateur* 47 (1).

Taylor, P. (1993) Narrative, Pluralism, and Decolonization: Recent Caribbean Literature. *College Literature* 20.

Barcelona General Strike, 1919

Summer D. Leibensperger

The Barcelona General Strike of 1919 was sparked when workers at an electric plant were fired for political reasons. The National Confederation of Workers (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, CNT), led by Salvador Seguí, called for a general strike after initial negotiations failed. The workers were at first successful (winning an eight-hour workday), and the general strike ended in less than a month, but the situation deteriorated dramatically as the military (philosophically in line with the bourgeoisie) defied civilian authorities, setting off additional strikes and a wave of violence.

In 1919, an oppressive Spanish government faced a constitutional crisis: Catalan separatists were arguing for autonomy, and economic conditions were strained in the post-world war society. Workers across the world were trying to gain improved working conditions, better pay, and legitimacy for their unions through general labor strikes, and the Bolshevik Revolution was viewed as a success of working-class action. During this time in Catalonia (the capital of which is Barcelona), the CNT, an anarchosyndicalist union formed in an October 1910 meeting of trade unionists, gained in strength (in membership and effectiveness).

When the eight workers at the electric power plant La Canadiense were dismissed in February 1919, CNT's leadership leapt into action: by the end of February, the majority of the plant workers were striking, and the city lost power. The strike escalated when workers from other industries joined La Canadiense's workers. The captain-general of Barcelona, Milans del Bosch, initially pushed the Conde de Romanones (then prime minister) to draft workers into the army to force an end to the strike and later to declare martial law in the city. When the call to arms failed (because workers ignored it), some workers were confined to military barracks.

While their motives for striking varied, most strikers wanted an eight-hour workday, union

recognition, reinstatement of fired workers, and/or wage increases. Some also demanded the release of political prisoners (many of whom were strikers). Government officials sent by Romanones negotiated with CNT, planning to concede to these demands, but army officials were furious at the government's negotiations, seeing them as conceding to anarchism, and refused to release a number of prisoners.

That refusal sparked a general strike that began on March 24 and ended in early April. The situation worsened after Romanones resigned on April 14. In the months that followed, workers went through a pattern of working and striking (to obtain better pay or improved conditions), and employers exploited the situation: workers (especially union activists) were often fired or were victims of lock-outs or blacklists, even when employers had agreed that workers could come back to work. This duplicity, in turn, increased tensions, often leading to the next strike.

Beginning in December 1919, the more militant factions within the CNT began to increase violence against employers and the police, and the situation worsened after General Martínez Anido was appointed civil governor in 1920. CNT members were terrorized using illegal means: assassinations of unionists were ordered; unionists responded in kind. Oliveira (1972: 182) describes the time period from 1918 to 1923: "law suffered a total eclipse, delinquency was put down with delinquency, political crime with political crime. Darkness closed over Barcelona and blotted it out."

The strike allowed the military to demonstrate its power, enabled the bourgeoisie to consolidate its power, and shifted focus from the movement for Catalan autonomy. Miguel Primo de Rivera dissolved the CNT in May 1924, although it continued to operate underground and reemerged in the 1930s when de Rivera's dictatorship fell.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Spain; Anarchosyndicalism; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Catalan Protests against Centralism; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Brenan, G. (1950) *The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Oliveira, A. R. (1972) *Politics, Economics, and Men of Modern Spain, 1808–1946*. New York: Arno Press.

Peirats, J. & Ealham, C. (2001) *The CNT in the Spanish Revolution*. Hastings: Meltzer Press.

Smith, A. (2007) *Anarchism, Revolution, and Reaction: Catalan Labour and the Crisis of the Spanish State, 1898–1923*. New York: Berghahn.

Barzani, Mulla Mustafa (1903–1979)

Deniz Ekici

Mulla Mustafa Barzani was a Kurdish leader who became the symbol of the twentieth-century Kurdish nationalist movement. Barzani inspired a sense of pride not only among Iraqi Kurds but also among the Kurds of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and the Kurds in diaspora, which is how he became a national leader. With his dedication to the Kurdish freedom movement, Barzani led the Kurds in an armed struggle for over five decades against Iraqi and Iranian states. However, because of the feudal structure of Kurdistan, different tribal affiliations, and intertribal rivalries the Barzani-led Kurdish movement could not develop into a unified national struggle.

Barzani and his mother were detained in Mosul Prison in 1906, after an uprising against the Ottomans led by his older brother Sheikh Abdul Salam II, who was later executed. In 1919, at age 16, Barzani joined Sheikh Mahmud Berzenci's rebellion and led a force of 300 men. Sheikh Mahmud and Barzani withdrew to the mountains after the British brigades crushed the rebellion.

In 1931 Barzani and his older brother, Sheikh Ahmad, led a rebellion against the British after they settled with the Assyrians in the Barzan region, a move that was interpreted as a British extension of influence. With the help of the Iraqi government, the British quelled the rebellion as planes dropped bombs on the region to isolate the Kurdish forces. After the uprising was finally defeated in the summer of 1932, Barzani and Sheikh Ahmad fled to Turkey where they were captured and handed over to the Iraqi authorities. The Barzani family was eventually exiled to Nasiriya and later to Sulaimania, where they stayed under house arrest. In the summer of 1943 Mulla Mustafa Barzani escaped from Sulaimania and returned to the Barzan region after gaining assistance from the Partî Hîwa (Party of Hope). In the Barzan region he led a

number of armed clashes against the government and pro-government Kurdish tribes. In 1943–5 Barzani conducted a successful campaign with some Kurdish factions including the Partî Hîwa in which the Iraqi army, backed by British air forces, carried out heavy attacks on Kurdish peshmergas (freedom fighters). In October 1945, after Barzani was hemmed in by the Iraqi forces, he was forced to cross the Iranian border with many of his fighters.

In Iranian Kurdistan, Barzani supported the short-lived Mahabad Republic of Kurdistan under the president, Qadi Muhammed. The forces of General Mulla Mustafa Barzani soon became a source of strength and confidence for the Kurdish state. Because they were deemed “outsiders,” the Barzani faction provoked rivalries among Kurdish tribes in the region, especially among the Mamish and Mangurs. In August 1946 Barzani became the leader of the Partî Demokratî Kurdistan-Îraq or Kurdistan Democratic Party, an extension of the Partî Demokratî Kurdistan-Îran.

When the Mahabad Republic collapsed in 1946 Barzani crossed the Soviet border with his 1,000 peshmergas and stayed there until 1958, when Colonel Abd al Karim Qasim carried out a successful coup d'état against the Hashemite monarchy. After the coup, amnesty was granted to the Kurds involved in the 1943–5 rebellion, which allowed those in exile to return home. After Barzani sent telegrams to Qasim and the Council of Sovereignty offering his congratulations the new government invited him and his peshmergas back to Iraq.

At first, friendly relations were established with the Qasim government, but when reconciliation with the Kurds began to deteriorate in 1961, Barzani would emerge as the formidable political power in the region. Barzani revolted against the Qasim government, demanding official and extensive autonomy. Qasim secured the support of pro-government Kurdish tribes and took military action against Barzani. Conflict between the two forces would continue for years, with Barzani taking control of most of Iraqi Kurdistan. Under Barzani, the Iraqi Kurds would enjoy a *de facto* independence until the Baa'th Party came to power in 1968 by means of a coup. In 1970 a peace agreement was signed that recognized the Kurds as equal partners in the Iraqi state. However, when the Baa'th Party failed to uphold the treaty, Barzani once again took up

arms in March 1974, this time with the support of Iran and the United States.

In 1975 the United States and Iran withdrew their support and the Kurdish national movement was defeated again. Barzani retreated to Iran with a few thousands of his followers. In 1979 Barzani traveled to the United States to receive medical treatment, where he died on March 1 in Washington, DC. The Kurdish leader was later transported and buried in the town of Barzan where he was born.

SEE ALSO: Kurdistan Nationalist Movement and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)

References and Suggested Readings

- Barzani, M. & Ferhadi, A. (Eds.) (2004) *Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Brifkani, Abd al-Qadir (2000) *Mustafa Barzani: Leader of the Modern Kurdish Nationalist Movement*. London: Kegan Paul International.

Bastille

Nicole Martone

The Bastille was a prison located in eastern Paris that held political prisoners during the *ancien régime* in France. Widely regarded as a fearful symbol of aristocratic corruption and oppression, the Bastille emerged as a focal point of popular discontent when, on July 14, 1789, commoners stormed the old fortress, thus igniting a major insurrection that launched the French Revolution.

The Bastille was constructed from 1370 to 1383 as a fortress to provide protection for Paris. During the reign of Charles VI (1380–1422), the Bastille became a prison, primarily intended to hold political prisoners and spies, but also religious prisoners, heretics, and freethinking writers who threatened the government. Those held captive within the Bastille included the unknown Man in the Iron Mask, Voltaire, and the Marquis de Sade. It was also immortalized in Charles Dickens' *Tale of Two Cities*.

During the rule of the house of Bourbon in France, beginning in the sixteenth century, the Bastille began to be perceived as a symbol of injustice. Many of the prisoners within the Bastille were arrested under *lettres de cachet*, which were royal warrants containing direct orders from the king, usually to enforce arbitrary judgments

that could not be appealed. Those arrested under *lettres de cachet* were sentenced without a trial or even an opportunity to plead for mercy. Frequently, the wealthy who enjoyed the king's favor would purchase *lettres de cachet* to dispose of rivals. Such arrests and imprisonments consequently became symbolic of the corruption and inequality of the Old Regime, and fed the perception that those confined within the Bastille were innocent.

A confrontation between the people and the royal government intensified during 1788 and erupted into the open in July 1789. On July 14, following several days of disturbances in Paris, a crowd of about 1,000 gathered to demand the surrender of the Bastille, which by then contained only seven prisoners and was being used primarily as an armory. The crowd's main objective was to seize the fortress's guns and ammunition to arm a militia. The Bastille was under the governorship of Bernard René de Launay and protected by a force of about 80 veteran soldiers who had been wounded or were otherwise unfit for regular duty, and a detachment of 32 Swiss mercenary grenadiers.

The governor opened negotiations with representatives of the crowd. Frustrated with the slow process of negotiation, the crowd broke into the prison's outer courtyard and cut the chains on the drawbridge to the inner courtyard. The Bastille's defenders opened fire, but the attackers were reinforced by mutinous members of the French Guard of the Royal Army, armed with cannons. De Launay surrendered and the crowd stormed the fortress, freeing its prisoners and carrying off its supplies. De Launay was dragged toward the Hôtel de Ville (city hall) and killed en route. Members of the French Guard attempted to protect the Swiss grenadiers and soldiers charged with the Bastille's defense, but several of de Launay's officers were killed nonetheless.

The storming of the Bastille has been mythologized as the founding event of the First Republic. Its propaganda value was recognized even in 1789, when entrepreneur Pierre François Palloy began demolishing the old structure to accentuate the destruction that occurred on July 14. He turned it into a museum where visitors paid a fee and could purchase mementos. Today, nothing remains of the original structure, although its outline has been etched into the pave-

ment. The area where it stood has been named the *Place de la Bastille* and Paris's modern opera house, the Opéra Bastille, occupies the site.

French governmental leaders of the Third Republic (1870–1940), attempting to portray themselves as the legitimate heirs of the Republicanism of the French Revolution, created a new national holiday to commemorate the storming of the Bastille. July 14 has been celebrated as Bastille Day throughout France since 1890.

SEE ALSO: French Revolution, 1789–1794; Hôtel de Ville, Paris; Mirabeau, Comte de (1749–1791); *Sans-Culottes*

References and Suggested Readings

- Fitzsimmons, M. P. (2002) *The Night the Old Regime Ended: August 4, 1789 and the French Revolution*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Ross, S. (2001) *The Fall of the Bastille: Revolution in France*. Oxford: Heinemann Library.
- Shapiro, B. M. (2002) *Revolutionary Justice in Paris, 1789–1790*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bauer, Otto (1881–1938)

Robert Goodrich

Otto Bauer emerged as the most eminent of the Austro-Marxist theoreticians and as leader of the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Austria (SDAPÖ) during the First Republic (1918–34). Born into a wealthy Jewish Viennese textile manufacturing family, Bauer joined the SDAPÖ in 1900 and graduated from the University of Vienna in 1906 in law. Active in the student socialist movement, he met K. Renner, M. Adler, R. Hilferding, and others, who formed the nucleus of Austro-Marxism. By 1907 Bauer was already a rising star, and became the head of the SDAPÖ following V. Adler's death in 1918. The Austro-Fascist coup of 1933 and the subsequent socialist uprising in 1934 led to his exile, from where he organized the socialist opposition. He died from a heart attack in Paris and was buried in Pere Lachaise cemetery.

Bauer's contributions to Marxism confronted the rapidly changing political contexts of central Europe and the revisionist debates within the Second International. Bauer sought to liberate Marxism from the sweeping generalizations and increasingly doctrinaire categories of both

Vulgar Marxism and revisionism and stressed that Marxism “should not be a schema that controls us, but rather only a method that we control” (Bauer 1975–80, 7: 938). Consequently, Bauer was one of the first to argue that Marxism was not a philosophy but instead an empirical social science, and thus compatible with all philosophical directions.

Bauer immediately applied his methodological insights to the pressing issues of the day. His *The Nationalities Question and the Social Democracy* (1907) led to immediate controversy in its support of national self-determination and emphasis on the cultural rather than economic origins of national identities and formation. Bauer thus formulated a non-territorial and associative notion of national organization based on the “personal principle.”

Bauer also led the Austro-Marxist attempt to negotiate a “third way” between reformist social democracy and revolutionary communism as part of the left socialist movement. In a series of articles in the early 1920s, including *Bolshevism or Social Democracy?* (1920) and *The New Course of Soviet Russia* (1921), Bauer supported the Russian Revolution yet questioned its socialist nature and opposed its suitability for Western conditions. His stance led him to co-found the International Working Union of Socialist Parties, or Vienna International (derisively dubbed the 2½ International by K. Radek).

Further, under the influence of the Neo-classical Austrian School, or Marginalists, Bauer consciously sought to engage non-Marxist economic analyses. He rejected Kautsky’s agrarian policy and his *Accumulation of Capital* (1912) involved one of the first comprehensive critiques of *Das Kapital*, which had only been published in full form in 1909. Unlike many revisionists, Bauer responded to the rise of fascism in 1936 with a new theory of capitalist “breakdown” arising from underconsumption.

Bauer was also an active politician. Under the Austrian Republic, Bauer regarded Austro-Marxism as a means of preventing the split between communists and socialists and shepherded the internationally recognized success of municipal socialism in “Red Vienna.” Based on these experiences, Bauer’s *The Austrian Revolution* (1923) laid the foundation for left socialism in practice and was adopted in the Linzer Program in 1926. While exiled, Bauer pub-

lished *Between the Two Wars?* (1936), regarded as his political testament, in which he developed the concept of “integral socialism” as a guide for joint communist–socialist anti-fascist and anti-war activity.

SEE ALSO: Austro-Marxism; Germany, Socialism and Nationalism; International Socialism: Mass Politics; Internationals; Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Marxism; Socialism; West German “New Left”

References and Suggested Readings

- Albers, D., Hindels, J., & Radice, L. (1979) *Otto Bauer und der “dritte” Weg. Die Wiederentdeckung des Austromarxismus durch Linksozialisten und Eurokommunisten*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
- Albers, D. et al. (Eds.) (1985) *Otto Bauer. Theorie und Politik*. Berlin: Argument.
- Bauer, O. (1975–80) *Werkausgabe*, 9 vols. Vienna: Europa.
- Klein, H. (1994) *Otto Bauers Gesellschaftsidee für eine bessere Welt*. Leipzig: Leipziger Gesellschaft für Politik und Zeitgeschichte.
- Leichter, O. (1970) *Otto Bauer. Tragödie oder Triumph?* Vienna: Europa.
- Löw, R. (1980) *Otto Bauer und die Russische Revolution*. Vienna: Europa.

Beauvoir, Simone de (1908–1986)

Nichole Shippen

Simone de Beauvoir, French existentialist, novelist, autobiographer, journalist, and self-described “woman of letters,” is considered one of the founding thinkers of Western feminism. Predominantly known for what many now consider a canonical text in feminist theory, *The Second Sex* (1949), Beauvoir dramatically influenced what came to be known as Second Wave feminism by disrupting traditional understandings of sex, gender, and identity.

In her most famous line from *The Second Sex*, “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman,” Beauvoir contests the “biology is destiny” argument historically used to justify women’s economic, political, and social subordination. Drawing on existentialism and Marxism, Beauvoir illuminates the historical and material constraints surrounding women’s “situation” in a patriarchal society. She reveals not only how patriarchy

oppresses women, but also how women are sometimes complicit in their own oppression by a refusal to exercise freedom outside the prescribed boundaries of gender roles. By confronting the sexism prevalent within psychology and within the hard sciences of her time, she recognizes the signifier “woman” as a historical and thus not a universal or essential category. Thus she departs from her long-term intellectual interlocutor and partner Jean-Paul Sartre’s early attempts to posit existentialist categories of freedom and choice as independent of an individual’s social constraints. In contrast, Beauvoir makes a distinction between the freedom of an individual and an individual’s limited ability to exercise that freedom. The line she draws remains ambiguous and controversial as some accuse Beauvoir of identifying freedom with an overly masculinized notion of freedom.

The two main arguments she puts forth in this text are the idea that the category “woman” is socially constructed and the contention that women have historically been designated, in Hegelian terms, as man’s absolute “Other.” However, Beauvoir does not simply translate Hegel’s master/slave dialectic into man as master and woman as slave. Instead, she creates a more novel adaptation of the dialectic. In Hegel, the struggle for one’s “consciousness,” or the conception of one’s identity, must necessarily end in the death of another’s consciousness. In Beauvoir’s interpretation of the master/slave dialectic, the struggle for consciousness does not end in the death of either actor’s consciousness. Rather, Beauvoir leaves open the possibility for “reciprocity” or the mutual recognition of one another’s humanity. Beauvoir first formulates her philosophical categories in *Pyrrhus et Cinéas* (1944) and in *Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté* (1947), translated as *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (1994).

Beauvoir’s literature also reflects her philosophical interests. Highly autobiographical and regarded by many critics as thinly disguised, Beauvoir’s *The Mandarins* (1954) describes the aftermath of the French Resistance following the withdrawal of Germany. Awarded the Prix Goncourt in 1954, *The Mandarins* is an exercise in existentialist thought describing the varying situations confronted by the characters involved in the French Resistance post-liberation. Individuals, for example, face the decision of how to handle French citizens who collaborated with the Nazis. The author illustrates other themes by

relating the plight of a woman who finds herself exercising bad faith by refusing to recognize her inherent freedom outside of a relationship that has long since ended.

Beauvoir’s autobiographies include *Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter* (1958), the first volume, which extends from her childhood to her meeting Sartre; *The Prime of Life* (1960), the second volume, which picks up from her meeting Sartre and continues to the end of World War II; and *Force of Circumstances* (1963), the third volume, which includes her affair with American novelist Nelson Algren (also described in *The Mandarins*) and her and Sartre’s emergence as public figures. *A Very Easy Death* (1964) is an account of her mother, Françoise de Beauvoir’s death from intestinal cancer in 1963.

The prolific philosophical, literary, and autobiographical works of Beauvoir are a testament to the lives and works of her intellectual circle, including Sartre, Albert Camus, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. There is little doubt of Beauvoir’s influence on French existential thought despite the fact that she is often not given the credit she deserves for her efforts. Some critics claim Beauvoir is little more than a mouthpiece for Sartre’s existentialism. This analysis fails to address the theoretical challenges Beauvoir’s work poses to Sartre’s work or the ways in which she fundamentally revises original theoretical terms such as the category of the “Other” through a gendered lens.

From the 1970s until her death, Beauvoir was an ardent feminist activist. She fought for women’s rights in Algeria during the Algerian War for Independence (1954–62); campaigned for free contraception and abortion, which was legalized in 1974 for a 5-year trial period and made permanent in 1979; and fought for equal pay for equal work and a fairer redistribution of domestic chores in the household. *The Second Sex* continues to inform a wide range of thinkers ranging from the early radical feminists to postmodernist queer feminists such as Judith Butler.

SEE ALSO: Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–1980)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bair, D. (1990) *Simone de Beauvoir: A Biography*. New York: Summit Books.
- Bauer, N. (2001) *Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy, and Feminism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Grosholz, E. R. (Ed.) (2004) *The Legacy of Simone de Beauvoir*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Tidd, U. (2004) *Simone de Beauvoir*. New York: Routledge.

Beethoven, Ludwig van (1770–1827)

Walter R. Herscher

Ludwig van Beethoven was a revolutionary nineteenth-century German composer of classical and romantic music. Born in Bonn, Germany, Beethoven moved to Vienna, Austria, while in his teens. Living in Vienna during Emperor Joseph II's reforms, Beethoven often discussed liberal ideas, including those of the French Revolution, but his friendship with aristocrats, who were also needed as patrons, probably softened his politics. He espoused liberal ideas while accepting aristocratic patronage, and he remained friends with individual aristocrats while criticizing the aristocracy.

Politically liberal but never a political revolutionary, these contradictions never troubled him. In 1793 his writing praised the love of freedom above all. Yet in 1802, as the political current changed, he refused to write a sonata containing references to the French Revolution. Indeed, he avoided obvious political overtones in his music. In his opera *Prometheus* he portrayed Prometheus as an Enlightenment philosopher dispensing knowledge rather than as the rebel Titan who stole fire to aid humankind. This approach made the opera more palatable to Austrian censors, yet the audience still identified Prometheus' heroic act with rebellion and freedom. Similarly, though he admired Napoleon Bonaparte's reforms as First Consul of France and planned to name his third symphony for him, after Bonaparte proclaimed himself emperor, Beethoven crossed out "Bonaparte" on the title page and substituted "to the memory of a great man." This symphony became known as the *Sinfonia Eroica* (Heroic Symphony).

As French armies spread across Europe, Beethoven composed operas promoting the human spirit and individual liberty. *Leonore* (rewritten as *Fidelio*) depicted a prisoner unjustly incarcerated. *Egnont* (written while Austria was under French control) praised a Flemish hero who had led an unsuccessful revolt against Spanish

tyranny; however, the implicit message was that freedom would eventually triumph. The nascent nationalism spread by French armies affected him, and in 1817 he announced that he would thereafter annotate some music in German instead of the traditional Italian.

The French Revolution and Napoleon had raised liberal hopes. These hopes were exploited in pledges made by monarchs seeking their subjects' support against Napoleon. However, liberals became disillusioned as the restored regimes grew increasingly conservative. Austria's ultra-conservative government especially disappointed Beethoven. He made many private references to politics and censorship, and after Napoleon's death admitted that perhaps he had been wrong to condemn the leader so harshly. In 1821–4 he wrote music for the German poet Friedrich von Schiller's *Ode to Joy* and incorporated it into the climax of his ninth symphony, thus creating what has become an anthem for universal freedom. He continued to complain privately of political injustices until his death in 1827.

During his life, Beethoven was recognized as a musical revolutionary, and later generations have sought the political aspect in his music. During World War II the French Resistance utilized the fifth symphony's famous opening theme to symbolize victory because it spelled the letter "V" in Morse code. Before the collapse of communism, East Germans used his music as rallying symbols, and when the Berlin Wall fell, celebrations ended with a performance of his ninth symphony.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); French Revolution, 1789–1794

References and Suggested Readings

- Cooper, B. (2000) *Beethoven*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Forbes, E. (Ed.) (1967) *Thayer's Life of Beethoven*, 2 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, S. (1997) *Ludwig van Beethoven: An Essential Guide to His Life and Works*. London: Pavilion Books.
- Kerman, J. & Tyson, A. (1983) *The New Grove Beethoven*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Knight, F. (1973) *Beethoven and the Age of Revolution*. New York: International Publishers.
- Lockwood, L. (2003) *Beethoven: The Music and the Life*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Solomon, M. (1998) *Beethoven*, 2nd ed. New York: Schirmer Books.

Begin, Menachem (1913–1992) and the Irgun

Lawrence Davidson

Menachem Begin was born in the Polish city of Brest–Litovsk in 1913. He was the youngest of three children and, like his lifelong rival David Ben-Gurion, he was born into a family with strong Zionist leanings. He was educated in a Mizrahi Hebrew school, a Polish gymnasium (high school) and later, in 1935, he obtained a law degree from the University of Warsaw. While still young, Begin became a follower of Vladimir Jabotinsky's Revisionist Zionist movement which sought the immediate founding of a Jewish state in Palestine by violent means if necessary. Begin joined the Revisionist youth movement organization Betar at 16, worked for it full time after graduation, and became its leader in Poland by 1939. During this time he encouraged thousands of young Polish Jews to move to Palestine.

When the Nazis moved into Poland in 1939 Begin fled to Vilna (then controlled by the Soviet Union). There he was arrested in 1940 by the Soviets for Zionist activity and sentenced to eight years of prison in Siberia. He was in Siberia for over a year (he would subsequently write a book about this time of imprisonment entitled *White Nights*) when he was recruited, along with other Polish prisoners, into a newly formed Free Polish Army to fight the Nazis. It was as a member of this Polish Army that he found his way to Palestine in 1942. His parents and one older brother remained trapped in Poland and perished in the ensuing Holocaust.

Soon after arriving in Palestine, Begin joined the main Revisionist Zionist militia, the Irgun Tzevai Leumi (National Military Organization). The Irgun, which had been formed in the early 1930s, was a product of a split in the main Zionist defense militia, the Haganah. The "rules of engagement" for the Haganah, set by the Jewish Agency and its leader David Ben-Gurion, were basically defensive. There was, at this point, to be no retaliation against Palestinian civilians for the violent acts of resistance that the Arabs put up against the Zionist incursion into their country. It was this defensive position that frustrated a group within the Haganah and they broke off and formed the Irgun as well as aligning them-

selves politically with Jabotinsky's Revisionist movement. This new Zionist militia had a policy of what Jabotinsky called "active retaliation," attacking Palestinian fighters and civilians alike. They also attacked British soldiers.

With the outbreak of World War II the Irgun leadership declared a truce with the British forces in Palestine, though not with the Arab resistance. This was because many of the Irgun fighters wished to join the British army's Jewish Brigade being formed to fight the Nazis. However, there was a minority of Irgun fighters who objected to this truce. They broke off from the Irgun and, under the leadership of Avraham Stern, formed their own militia (known as the Stern Gang) to carry on attacks against the British in Palestine. The future Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir was associated with the Stern Gang.

This was the situation in 1942 when Menachem Begin reached Palestine. He quickly joined the Irgun and by the end of 1943 he became its commander. It was Begin who reoriented the Irgun away from its position of truce with the British. He insisted that the Irgun's main mission was to push the British out of Palestine as quickly as possible, violently if necessary. Begin moved the organization to act toward this end. Knowledge of the Nazi Holocaust was now spreading among the Jews of Palestine and it seemed to Begin imperative that the immigration barriers maintained by the British be overcome. The fact that the British were still fighting Nazi Germany and had to divert troops to quell unrest in Palestine did not mean much to Begin. Later Irgun spokesmen would rationalize this issue by claiming that "in 1943, it was already clear that the victory of the Allies was only a question of time" (see the official Irgun website, www.etzel.org.il/english/ac06.htm). Thus, in early 1944, the Irgun broke the truce with the British that had been maintained since the outbreak of the war and declared "armed warfare" against their colonial government. As with so many other groups past and present, seeking to expel foreign occupiers, the Irgun used terrorist tactics to achieve its ends. Immigration offices in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa (considered symbols of British refusal to allow open Jewish immigration into Palestine) were attacked in February 1944, a month later income tax offices were attacked, next came an attack on the British intelligence headquarters and then, finally, the destruction of the King David Hotel.

The attack on the King David was Begin's most famous (or infamous) wartime act. The King David was a Jewish-owned luxury hotel in Jerusalem. Opened in 1931, the southern wing of the hotel was requisitioned by the British mandatory authorities in 1938. In that wing were housed many of the British government offices as well as their military command center. About a third of the hotel's 200 rooms were reserved for civilian use. After the end of World War II there was coordination between the forces of the Haganah, Irgun, and Stern Gang. Thus, there is evidence that Begin did not order the attack on the King David in isolation. Indeed, Moshe Sneh, a leader in the Haganah, probably was part of the operation's initial planning. The attack took place on July 22, 1946. Disguised as Arabs, the Irgun attackers broke into the hotel through its ground floor restaurant. They planted explosives against the basement supporting beams of the building, lit 30-minute fuses and then, the Irgun leadership claimed, called the hotel switchboard to issue a warning that an "explosive device" had been planted in the hotel by the "Hebrew Underground." The British government denied that such a call was ever received, and it is clear that no attempt to evacuate the building was made. The subsequent explosion collapsed the southern wing of the hotel and killed 91 people, including 17 Jews. After the attack the British began making mass arrests of suspected Irgun fighters (sometimes with the help of the Jewish Agency and the Haganah), and drove the Irgun underground. They labeled Begin a terrorist and put a price of £10,000 on his head. The Jewish Agency, ignoring the Haganah's involvement in the early planning of the action, condemned the attack on the King David Hotel and called the perpetrators "a gang of criminals." David Ben-Gurion, then in Paris, gave an interview to a French newspaper in which he called the Irgun "the enemy of the Jewish people." Begin eventually told his side of the story of the years of struggle in the Irgun in a book entitled *The Revolt*.

With the end of World War II, Begin and the Haganah leaders began to cooperate in an armed effort to drive the British out of Palestine once and for all. Such cooperation seemed to suggest that, once the Israeli state was proclaimed in 1948, Begin would approve of the Irgun forces merging with the Haganah to form the Israeli army. This issue was momentarily put in doubt when, in 1948, an Irgun-owned ship laden with arms,

the *Altalena*, arrived at the port of Jaffa near Tel Aviv. Ben-Gurion ordered the arms to be turned over to the Haganah, as it was the main core of the new state's army. However, in the ensuing negotiations Begin seemed to hesitate and Ben-Gurion ordered an attack on the ship. This incident clearly proclaimed that Menachem Begin had to give up the idea of an independent Irgun militia. He accepted the reality of this fact and soon went from being a militia commander to becoming a successful politician.

After the establishment of the state of Israel, Begin became the leader of the Revisionist Zionist Herut (Freedom) Party, a position he would hold for the next 30 years. Herut, which later became the core of the Likud bloc, was the principle opposition party to the dominant Labor Party in Israel. In many ways the uncompromising attitudes of the Irgun were carried over into the new party's policies. Herut became known for its strident nationalism and expansionist aspirations. Begin and his party briefly joined a Government of National Unity in 1967 (in which he served as a minister without portfolio) but later resigned in protest over Israeli consideration of United States peace initiatives which suggested a possible willingness to trade land for peace.

Begin finally attained power in 1977 when his Likud bloc defeated the Labor Party in parliamentary elections. He became Israel's first non-socialist prime minister. At first glance Begin proceeded to do things that one might not have expected of such a passionate Zionist. For instance, he was the first Israeli head of state to officially and publically meet with an Arab leader. This happened in November of 1977 when Anwar Sadat broke ranks with the Arab League and came to Jerusalem to offer the Israelis peace. Begin was also the first Israeli prime minister to sign a peace treaty with an Arab leader, also Sadat, and then proceed to evacuate Jewish settlements from the Sinai desert. However, on closer inspection, Begin's behavior becomes more understandable. The Revisionist notion of Eretz Israel – for which the Irgun had fought and to which Begin obsessively clung – stretched from Gaza into Jordan. It did not include the Sinai. As a tactical move, the peace treaty with Egypt removed Israel's main enemy in the west, allowing the Israeli government to concentrate on expansion and consolidation in the east. Proof of this position was seen when Begin reneged on his Camp David promise to President Jimmy

Carter to grant the Palestinians autonomy. Begin's subsequent receiving of the Nobel Peace Prize (1978) was thus only partially deserved.

Begin went on to reprise his Irgun fighting role in 1982 when he launched a bloody invasion of Lebanon rather ironically named Operation Peace in Galilee. Aimed at pushing the fighters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization out of Lebanon (from where they had launched violent raids into northern Israel), Operation Peace in Galilee resulted in terrorist actions by the Israeli army reminiscent of past Irgun behavior. These included an attack on a United Nations refugee center, massacres in Palestinian refugee camps, and the indiscriminate shelling of parts of Beirut.

Begin's direct action policies and his apparent disregard for international law and opinion made him quite popular in Israel. He was a true reflection of the national consciousness that saw Israel as standing alone against numerous enemies, ultimately able to rely only on itself and the Jews of the diaspora.

Begin resigned from the office of prime minister in 1983, shortly after the death of his wife. The last nine years of his life were spent in seclusion and it is reported that he suffered prolonged periods of depression. He died of heart failure in March of 1992.

SEE ALSO: Ben-Gurion, David (1866–1973) and the Haganah

References and Suggested Readings

- Begin, M. (1977) *The Revolt*. New York: Nash.
 Carter, J. (2007) *Peace, Not Apartheid*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
 Gervasi, F. (1979) *The Life and Times of Menachem Begin: Rebel to Statesman*. New York: Putnam.
 Silver, E. (1984) *Begin, The Haunted Prophet*. New York: Random House.
 Stein, K. (1999) *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace*. New York: Routledge.
 Temko, N. (1987) *To Win or to Die: A Personal Portrait of Menachem Begin*. New York: Morrow.

Belgium, 1959 coal strike

Nicolas Verschueren

In February 1959 a major revolt took place in the Borinage, the oldest coalfield in Belgium. Aware

of the structural problems of the coal mines, the Belgian government had joined with France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany in an agreement to pool coal and steel resources through the Schuman Plan. With the prospect of the Common Market, Belgian coal, compared to other coal partners, was at a disadvantage. In fact, the price of coal was much higher in Belgium than in Germany or the Netherlands. Brought on by the resulting closure of the Borinage pits, this spontaneous movement marked the first sign of the unavoidable decline of the coal industry in Europe and was the first major social crisis since the start of the European Coal and Steel Community.

In spite of investments to develop infrastructure in the Borinage so that Belgian coal could enjoy the benefits of this planned cooperative, by 1958 stockpiles and unemployment had greatly increased, especially in the unprofitable collieries in Belgium. There were 28 mines in 1950, 18 in 1959, and 9 in 1960. The number of mineworkers decreased from 26,000 to 12,000 between 1950 and 1960. The main problem was the single-industry characteristic of the Borinage. Indeed, the coal industry was the center of all economic activities. Because of this regional recession, and with the pressure of the High Authority of the ECSC, the Belgian government had to close the unprofitable pits, including the Crachet, a coal mine that had recently been modernized for 10 billion Belgian francs.

On February 12, 1959 the National Council of Collieries, a tripartite organization, decided to close nine pits in the Borinage, leaving only four collieries active. The next day, a spontaneous strike started in the Crachet-Picquery mines. The trade unions were run over by strikers, and the movement quickly spread all over the Borinage and into other Walloon coalfields. This upheaval lasted ten days and had in some instances bordered on insurrection.

The population feared that the coal industry would not be replaced by other industries. Therefore shopkeepers, craftsmen, workers belonging to other professions, and the whole Borinage population took part in this conflict. Wagons, picket lines, and roadblocks covered the streets and slogans were written on walls: "No pit closures," "We want bread," "The Borinage must not die." Negotiations began between the Belgian government, the trade unions, the collieries, and the High Authority, but it was

obvious that the closures were the only solution. The mineworkers' trade union leaders had no other choice but to accept, and they were only able to delay the closures to the end of the year.

For the European newspapers, particularly the communist press, this strike was the first social crisis in the context of European integration. Aware of that threat, the High Authority renewed allocations several times to help the mineworkers who met with difficulties following the opening of the Common Market. However, this crisis emphasized the weakness of the High Authority and the fragile nature of the supranational concept. A feeling of abandonment grew within the population of the Borinage and gradually gave place to deep resentment.

SEE ALSO: Belgium, Strike of the Century, 1960–1961; Belgium, 20th-Century Political Conflict; France, Post-World War II Labor Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Cammarata, F. & Tilly, P. (2001) *Histoire sociale et industrielle de la Wallonie, 1945–1980*. Brussels: Editions Vie ouvrière.
- Carion, C. (1969) *Conséquences sociales et économiques des fermetures d'entreprises et de la reconversion au Borinage*. Brussels: ULB.
- Poidevin, R. & Spierenburg, D. (1993) *Histoire de la Haute autorité de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier : une expérience supranationale*. Brussels: Bruylant.

Belgium, Strike of the Century, 1960–1961

Nicolas Verschueren

The winter of 1960–1 witnessed the most important protest movement of the twentieth century in Belgium. Called the Strike of the Century, this event left long-lasting marks on the political history of Belgium. It ended a decade of deep social unrest linked to the Royal Question, the secondary school war, and the industrial collapse of the southern regions of Belgium.

The violence and extent of these events left a deep impression on Belgian society. The triggering factor was Eyskens' Bill. Called *Loi unique*, it was proposed to the Parliament on September 27, 1960 and introduced a number of austerity policies to reduce the public deficit and fight threats of economic destabilization after

decolonization. The workers' anger spread to all industrial areas, including Flanders, and especially Ghent and Antwerp. The mineworkers, steelworkers, and public servants became the spearheads of this movement, which started on December 14, 1960. At first, the trade unions and the Belgian Socialist Party were overwhelmed by events. Facing the Catholic-Liberal coalition government, the Belgian socialists federated the party, the trade union, and the socialist mutual insurance company to fight the Eyskens' Bill. This union was called Common Action. The public service socialist trade union (CGSP) and the unionists and workers who followed André Renard were the most virulent actors in this protest movement.

During the socialist trade union congress held on December 16, 1960, two main positions were brought up: the moderate Dore Smets' proposal and a tougher proposal supported by André Renard demanding a general strike. The Flemish trade unionists voted by a majority for the Smets' proposal while the Walloons chose to vote for the one supported by Renard. From then on, a deep divide grew within the socialist trade union. The workers, especially within the public service, were determined to go on strike on December 20. On the same day, discussions on the bill *Loi unique* began in the House of Representatives while tension spread all over the country.

At a national level, the socialist trade union had not called for a general strike. Instead, the movement was encouraged by the workers themselves and by local trade unions. While the Walloon strikers supported the federalist plan, the Catholic trade union was tied down by its links to the Catholic Party and the workers opposed to the Eyskens project, and thus had a more reformist position, hoping to avoid the strike's violence. The Christian workers' movement took a more moderate line and preferred to avoid discussion. However, there was serious unease voiced by the Walloon Christian workers facing Flemish supremacy in the Christian Worker organizations. Alongside this, confusion reigned among the socialist trade unionists, and incoherence and disorder marked their actions.

During the second week, the demonstrators in Wallonia gradually adopted a community withdrawal while the movement ran out of steam in the Flemish industrial areas and in some parts of Wallonia. The following week, the socialist

trade unionists, especially in Wallonia, toughened up their speeches and tried to use the political front when they understood that they could not impede the Eyskens' Bill. On January 13, 1961 the House of Representatives voted on the bill. The strike finished on January 21 and had lasted five weeks in some parts of Wallonia, such as Liège and Charleroi.

The strike was linked to Belgian economic developments. For the first time, in 1960 Flemish industry did better than Walloon industry. From then on this trend played a very important role in the emergence of a Walloon identity. At the same time, there was a demand for structural reforms. The holding companies' domination of the Belgian economy was strongly criticized by the Walloon socialists, and Renard, a steel-worker trade unionist from Liège, provided a strong leadership presence in the pursuit of the federalist claim. A few weeks after the strike, the pressure group Walloon Popular Movement emerged with Renard as leader. The struggle continued through this movement supported by numerous Walloon strikers and trade unionists.

SEE ALSO: Belgium, 1959 Coal Strike; Belgium, 20th-Century Political Conflict

References and Suggested Readings

- Deprez, R. (1963) *La Grande grève: décembre 1960–janvier 1961: ses opinions, son déroulement, ses leçons*. Brussels: Fondation J. Jacquemotte.
- Féaux, V. (1963) *Cinq semaines de lutte sociale: la grève de l'hiver 1960–1961*. Brussels: Institut de sociologie de l'Université libre de Bruxelles.
- Mabille, X. (2000) *Histoire politique de la Belgique: facteurs et acteurs de changement*. Brussels: Crisp.
- Neuville, J. & Yerna, J. (1990) *Le Choc de l'hiver 60–61: les grèves contre la loi unique*. Brussels: Politique et histoire.
- Tilly, P. (2005) *André Renard: biographie*. Brussels: Le Cri.

Belgium, 20th-century political conflict

Stacy Warner Maddern

Belgium had acquired independence in 1830 and throughout the nineteenth century it remained a neutral state. From its inception the National Congress of Belgium chose a constitutional monarch as its form of government and designated

Leopold I as its first king. Throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries the upper-class Francophile population controlled the political arena, treating the Dutch-speaking or Flemish as second-class citizens. In 1914, under the reign of King Albert I, Belgium was invaded by Germany en route to France.

During the German occupation, Flemish national identity experienced a reawakening as the occupying authorities utilized a policy of administrative separation to exploit French/Flemish animosity to their advantage. Because of these measures, benefits were afforded to the Flemish since their language was closely related to German. This was in contrast to French Belgians or Walloons, who were both culturally and linguistically aligned with the French. With this existing characteristic the Germans had an excellent opportunity to use Flemish frustrations to their advantage, creating further division between the two groups. However, while these attempts were carried out to benefit the German cause, they ended up serving Belgium's interests as well. By the time the Germans left Belgium in 1918, there was concrete influence for conditions for the Flemish to be improved.

Belgium was again invaded during World War II, on May 10, 1940. The new king, Leopold III, remained in Belgium while the government fled into exile in Paris (and later London). His decision to remain in Belgium to greet the Nazis would later bring accusations from Paul Reynaud, president of France, that Leopold III had committed treason. However, Leopold III refused to cooperate with the Nazis or administer Belgium as a German satellite. Despite his defiance of the Nazis, the exiled Belgian government refused to recognize Leopold III's right to rule, effectively deposing him as their monarch in protest of his actions. After the war Leopold III was exonerated of treason in 1946, causing civil uprisings that forced him to abdicate in 1951. World War II was not nearly as economically devastating for Belgium as it had been for neighboring countries. However, its political situation was to enter a period of flux that would attempt to reinstate those institutions that had existed before the war, while new factions and parties fought to build a new structure.

The Christian Socialist Party was founded in 1945 as an alternative to the Catholic Party's church affiliations. It had separate Walloon and Flemish wings, which allowed for political

victory in 1946. In the process the Socialist Party broadened its political base, while the liberals and communists maintained their previous approach. However, when Leopold III returned to Belgium in 1945, he was supported by the Christian socialists, while the communists demanded his abdication. The liberals, on the other hand, maintained that the monarchy should be abolished altogether. The Christian socialists would later resign from government in protest, followed by the communists, which left the government unable to function. In response the Christian socialists formed a coalition with the socialists and together they implemented reforms, including the establishment of a central economic council and the granting of the right to vote to women.

In 1950, the Christian socialists gained an absolute majority and a referendum was held to determine what constitutional rights the monarch should be granted. While 58 percent of voters throughout Belgium favored the king's return to the throne, these results were regionally polarized, with Wallonia favoring abdication. After parliament voted to reinstate the king on July 22, 1950, a wave of protests followed in industrial Wallonia. After much negotiation a compromise was worked out which resulted in the abdication of Leopold III on the condition that his son, Baudouin I, would be crowned within one year.

The difficulties between the Flemish north and the Wallonian south, since the end of World War II and liberation, had softened in regards to economic and social solidarity. The practice of reform by successive governments had not allowed either side to drift too far apart. However, one of the greater difficulties during this period seemed to be the debates over educational reform. The Catholics demanded that a more autonomous form of education be mandated, while anti-clerics supported a standard public education. As with the previous referendums on King Leopold III, the Catholics, socialists, liberals, and communists were again clearly divided. Because of these ideological differences, the wedge between north and south had made it clear that a principal consensus on this issue was impossible. As such, on December 3, 1953, the Walloons and the Flemish moved to reform the current centralized state.

Belgium's existing linguistic disputes were in large part a constant source of agitation within political parties, causing further divisions. The

century-long linguistic development was one that would shape social relations throughout Belgium. Within each community, both north and south, the political progress of democracy was driven and shaped by this central conflict. In addition, it did not help that the majority of the new economic structures established during the 1950s seemed to favor the Walloons. However, by the end of the decade, Walloon industry suffered setbacks as American industry increased activity in the region, bringing benefits to the Flemish population. Wallonia began a cycle of decline. By the 1960s, linguistic disputes would be compounded by questions regarding the economic future of the region. Several strikes and demonstrations in the early part of the decade addressed the "law of uniformity," which regulated economic development through the reorganization of state finances. However, while these were times of great tensions in the areas of language, religion, and labor, the 1960s was a period of great economic prosperity that saw new heights in consumer spending, construction, and infrastructure. But this prosperity benefited a small portion of the population as approximately 900,000 people remained in poverty.

By the 1970s, the desire for complete cultural, linguistic, and territorial autonomy amongst the Flemish and Walloon populations increased. In their effort to pull themselves out of economic despair, the Walloons sought new divisions that would give them the right to administer their territory according to their terms. This brought about constitutional revisions and legislation in the 1980s that preserved the language, culture, and lifestyle of the different groups in Belgium. Thus the country became a fractured state of three separate regions – Flemish-speaking (Flanders), French (Wallonia), and German (Brussels). In 1980, these regions were given their own authority of independent rights and institutions, resulting in the current system of government that operates on an independent provincial and regional level under the guidance of a centralized state. Under the current system, the state controls 60 percent of the national government, while the remaining 40 percent is divided amongst the remaining regional governments.

The division of Belgium along linguistic lines has also led to strict institutional splitting along the same lines as members of parliament remain loyal to their linguistic heritage. This has led some political critics to suggest that the government

is run from a dualistic premise that has relegated a great portion of the power to be divided between the Flemish and Wallonian regions. For the Flemish this crisis existed on an economic level, since they were under constant oppression by the Wallonian bourgeoisie. The means by which they were able to unify was the difference in language first exploited during World War I.

SEE ALSO: Belgium, 1959 Coal Strike; Belgium, Strike of the Century, 1960–1961; Congo Crisis, 1960–1965; Mandel, Ernest (1923–1995)

References and Suggested Readings

- Beaufays, J. (1988) *Belgium: A Dualist Political System?* *Publius* 18 (2). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cook, B. (2002) *Belgium: A History*. New York: Peter Lang.
- De Meeüs, A. (1962) *History of the Belgians*. Trans. G. Gordon. New York: Praeger.
- Deprez, K. & Louis, V. (Eds.) (1998) *Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities, 1870–1995*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Kelly, G. A. (1969) *New Nationalism in an Old World*. *Comparative Politics* 1 (3). New York: City University of New York.

Belize, general strikes, 1952

Edward T. Brett

The 1952 general strike in British Honduras played an important part in the colony's struggle for independence from British rule in that it increased the national appeal of the People's United Party (PUP), the organization that would eventually win independence for Belize.

Forestry, which had long been the mainstay of the economy of British Honduras, had declined precipitously by the end of the 1940s, thereby causing widespread unemployment and poverty throughout the colony. Thus, when the colonial governor, Sir Ronald Garvey, using his special powers to override the opposition of the legislature, devalued the British Honduran dollar on December 31, 1949, the plight of the Belizean working class became even more desperate. This devaluation meant that the worth of the Belizean dollar was now lowered from \$4.03 to the pound sterling to \$2.08, and in terms of the

US dollar, from \$1 to 70 cents. Since most goods in British Honduras were imported from Britain or the United States, the governor's unilateral decree was the last straw for already hard-pressed Belizeans.

To protest Garvey's action, a group of young creoles formed a People's Committee in January 1950 and soon committee leaders widened their grievances to include British colonialism in general. On September 29, the People's Committee was transformed into the People's United Party, a political organization whose goal was to end colonial rule. Its main leaders were George Price, Leigh Richardson, and Philip Goldson. From its inception, PUP allied itself with the General Workers Union (GWU) and in April 1952 gained full control of the latter when Price was chosen as its leader.

In October 1952 citrus workers in Stann Creek went on strike. Seizing the moment, PUP-GWU officers called for a national strike. Soon government workers as well as laborers from Belizean Estate, United Fruit, and other private sector companies joined their Stann Creek counterparts. The general strike ended after ten days, when all but the Belizean Estate Company agreed to meet with union officials in arbitration talks. Belizean Estate had been the main target of the strike leaders, but rather than negotiate a settlement, it chose to close its sawmill operations until it could replace its 268 striking workers with scab labor. After 49 days the desperate strikers were forced to capitulate and the strike ended.

Although the strike was only partly successful in obtaining higher wages for workers, it was nevertheless important in that it significantly increased membership in the GWU. It likewise gained widespread popular support for the PUP, which won eight of nine Legislative Council seats in 1954 in the first-ever Belizean general elections.

SEE ALSO: Belize, National Independence Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Barry, T. (1989) *Belize: A Country Guide*. Albuquerque: Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource.
- Bolland, N. (1986) *Belize: A New Nation in Central America*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Fernández, J. (1989) *Belize: Case Study for Democracy in Central America*. Brookfield, VT: Gower.
- Shoman, A. (1987) *Party Politics in Belize, 1950–1986*. Benque Viejo del Carmen, Belize: Cobula Productions.

Belize, national independence movement

Edward T. Brett

Belize gained full independence from Great Britain in 1981, but only after a struggle that lasted nearly a half-century. When the English settled Belize (officially called British Honduras until 1973) the colonial government created a socio-economic structure that assured lumber companies a cheap source of labor. The Belize Estate and Produce Company (BEC), for instance, was granted ownership to about one-third of the colony's territory and refused to lease or sell any of its land for agricultural use. This meant that most men had little choice but to work for extremely low wages as loggers for the BEC. Salaries ranged from about \$12 to \$15 per month throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. Furthermore, through a variety of unjust company practices that robbed workers of the little they made, most were forced into constant debt and therefore obligated to perpetually work for the logging company. Loggers who attempted to leave their jobs before fulfilling the terms of their contracts or before paying off their debts were subject to imprisonment. The Great Depression, coupled with a devastating hurricane in 1931, only made the plight of Belizean workers and their families worse. Less global demand for Belizean lumber and other products meant large-scale unemployment, which in turn brought many to the verge of starvation.

In 1934 a group of almost 18,000 desperate men, dubbing themselves the Unemployed Brigade, marched to the governor's office demanding employment. When the governor responded by offering only 80 jobs, and these at 25 cents a day, one of the marchers, Antonio Soberanis Gómez, decided to fight back. He began to hold meetings in Belize City, where he denounced colonial rule and explained to workers the structural reasons for their poverty. He formed the Labor and Unemployed Association (LUA), whose members began to picket the businesses of wealthy merchants. He also called for a national boycott of their products. Through such methods Soberanis was able to get dockworkers in Stann Creek (now called Dangriga) a raise from 8 cents an hour to 25. Picketing at the BEC sawmill in Belize City,

however, resulted in a riot and the destruction of property. Consequently, 17 LUA members were arrested and when Soberanis attempted to post their bail, he too was incarcerated and kept in jail for five weeks. The riot and subsequent arrest of Soberanis caused a split in the LUA and as a result the association lost much of its effectiveness. In 1939 Soberanis formed the General Workers Union (GWU), which grew in membership throughout the next decade.

Economic hardship eased somewhat during the World War II years, since thousands of workers emigrated to the United States, Britain, and the US Canal Zone, where the war effort caused a scarcity of labor. When the war ended, however, their jobs were terminated and they were forced to return home, creating even greater unemployment. Despite such hardship, on December 31, 1949, the colonial governor, Sir Ronald Garvey, devaluated the Belizean dollar, even though the Belizean legislature had opposed the move. In response to his callous decree, a People's Committee was formed in early January. By the end of September, it had metamorphosed into the People's United Party (PUP), a political organization whose goal was independence from Britain. One of its talented leaders was George Price and when he was chosen to head the GWU in April 1952, the two organizations merged, thereby creating a powerful nationalistic movement.

When citrus factory workers in Stann Creek went on strike in October, PUP-GWU leaders decided to seize the moment and called for a general strike. The strike lasted 49 days, and although it was only partly successful in obtaining its aims, it increased the popularity of the PUP immensely. Price and his party were able to win for the people the right to universal adult suffrage and on April 28, 1954, in the colony's first ever general elections, the PUP won eight of the nine contested seats. From this time until December 1984, the PUP totally dominated Belizean politics, winning every general election.

Although colonial officials skillfully sowed discord within the leadership ranks of the PUP and were a factor in causing ten central committee members to leave the party in 1956 to form a rival party, the British were nevertheless unable to dent the PUP's countrywide popularity. In 1961, following Price's acquittal by a jury on questionable charges of sedition, his party won all 18 seats in the Belizean House of Representatives.

With this victory, Price, who now totally dominated the PUP, was able to force the British government in London to agree to accept a new Belizean Constitution, which granted the small colony full internal self-government. The new Constitution went into effect on January 1, 1964. It allowed Great Britain to retain jurisdiction over national defense and foreign affairs, but this was wholly due to the fact that neighboring Guatemala was claiming the right of sovereignty over Belize and the British were needed to prevent a threatened Guatemalan invasion.

Price now dedicated himself to nation building. He created a new flag for Belize, a new national anthem, and even a new national prayer. Since the founding of the PUP, its leaders had refused to use the name British Honduras, choosing instead to refer to their nation as Belize. In 1973 Britain finally capitulated to Price's demand and Belize was recognized as the official name of the nation.

In accordance with the provisions of the 1964 Constitution, a general election took place on March 1, 1965. The PUP again demonstrated its popularity by winning 5 of the 8 seats in the Senate and 16 of the 18 in the House of Representatives. Price was also elected to a five-year term as premier. In the 1969 elections the PUP again fared well, even picking up a seventeenth House seat. But it was in this year that the PUP began to face a new challenge from the left. Evan Hyde, upon his return from Dartmouth College, formed the United Black Association for Development, a radical Black Power organization, which commenced to assail Price and his party, dubbing them neo-colonialists. Meanwhile, the newly constituted conservative United Democratic Party (UDP) attacked from the right. Such challenges took their toll. In the 1974 general election, although Price won another term as premier and the PUP maintained control of the National Assembly (the House and Senate), the UDP won six House seats, thereby establishing itself as a serious challenger to the PUP. Although the PUP finally gained full independence for Belize on September 21, 1981, internal divisions and strife weakened the party. Consequently, it was defeated for the first time in the 1984 general election by the UDP.

SEE ALSO: Belize, General Strikes, 1952; Hyde, Evan Anthony (b. 1947)

References and Suggested Readings

- Barry, T. (1989) *Belize: A Country Guide*. Albuquerque: Inter-Hemispheric Education Resources.
 Bolland, N. (1986) *Belize: A New Nation in Central America*. Boulder: Westview Press.
 Fernández, J. (1989) *Belize: Case Study for Democracy in Central America*. Brookfield, VT: Gower.
 Shoman, A. (1987) *Party Politics in Belize, 1950–1986*. Benque Viejo del Carmen, Belize: Cobula Productions.

Ben Bella, Ahmad (b. 1918)

Andrew J. Waskey

Mohamed Ahmad Ben Bella is an Algerian politician considered to be the father of modern Algeria. He is an Arab nationalist who fought in the struggle against colonialism. Ben Bella was born December 25, 1918 in Maghnia, Algeria, into a family of Sufi Muslims. He attended school at Tlemclen where the anti-Moslem prejudice of his European teacher deeply affected him.

In 1936 Ben Bella joined the French army. During the early stages of World War II he was awarded the Croix de Guerre. After the fall of France he was demobilized. He then joined a Moroccan infantry unit and fought in the Italian Campaign. He was then promoted to the rank of warrant officer and was awarded the Medaille Militaire for bravery. In 1945 Ben Bella was offered a commission in the French army but he refused it after learning of reprisals against the Algerian town of Setif following a revolt by Muslims in May of 1945. Turning instead to politics, he won election as a municipal councilor. While serving as a municipal councilor Ben Bella founded a secret organization, the Organisation Speciale, dedicated to the overthrow of French colonialism. The underground organization was the predecessor of the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN).

In 1951 Ben Bella was arrested and sentenced to prison for eight years. He escaped and fled first to Tunisia and then to Egypt. While in Egypt Ben Bella served as a member of the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action. The nine-member committee was headed by the FLN which was leading the Algerian independence movement.

In 1956 the French arrested Ben Bella following the mid-air interception of his airplane

by French fighter planes. Imprisoned by the French until 1962, he learned Arabic as a second language to his first language of French. After Algeria gained its independence Ben Bella returned to become a leading politician. As his popularity grew he challenged Benvoucef Ben Khedda for the premiership in June 1962. When challenged himself by FLN rivals he used his growing support, especially in the military, to suppress opposition. By September 1962 Ben Bella was in control of all of Algeria. He was elected premier on September 20, 1962. In 1963 he was elected unopposed Algeria's president. However, in 1965 he was overthrown by Houari Boumedienne (1932–78). He was put under house arrest until 1980, at which time he was granted exile to Switzerland. In 1985 Bella founded a new political party called the Mouvement pour la Democratie en Algeria (MDA). He returned from Lausanne in 1990.

In 2003 Ben Bella was elected president of the International Campaign Against Aggression in Iraq (ICAAI) at the Cairo Anti-War Conference. ICAAI is a coordinating group for a coalition of anti-war organizations.

SEE ALSO: Algerian Islamic Salvation Front; Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962; Francophone Africa, Protest and Independence

References and Suggested Readings

- Ageron, C. R. (1991) *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
- Ben Bella, A. (1986) *Ben Bella revient*. Paris: Jean Picollec.
- Ruedy, J. (1992) *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Benezet, Anthony (1713–1784)

Srividhya Swaminathan

In 1750 a minor revolution took place among the Philadelphia Quakers that eventually eliminated slavery within the community. The most active and visible proponent of this revolution was Anthony Benezet, whose impassioned publications and personal good works put him at the forefront of change in colonial America and Great Britain.

Born a French Huguenot, Benezet was educated in London and immigrated to Philadelphia at the age of 18. There he joined the Society of Friends.

After a brief and unsuccessful attempt at a trade, Benezet began teaching in 1739 and developed an awareness of the multiple inequities within his society over his lifetime. He sought to address those inequities through education, establishing the first girls' public school in 1755 and the Negro School at Philadelphia in 1770. The primary inequity that captured his imagination was the keeping of African slaves, a practice which was justified by their supposed intellectual inferiority. In 1750 he began tutoring the children of slaves out of his home in the evening and observed first hand both their intellectual capabilities and the injustice of keeping sentient human beings as chattels. He argued that belief in the "inferior capacities" of Africans was a "vulgar prejudice" based on the "pride or ignorance" of slavemasters (Armistead 1971: 18). From his interactions with these eager and disenfranchised pupils, Benezet took a more active role in the leadership of his community and published pamphlets on the evils of the slave trade. He advocated that current Quaker slaveholders gradually manumit their slaves and refrain from purchasing any new slaves. His antipathy for slavery prompted him to move beyond his own community and agitate for change in the larger political context.

His first two publications described the violence and injustice of the slave trade. He used the widely read travel narratives of Europeans to Africa in order to show how detrimental the slave trade was to African societies as well as Pennsylvania slaveholders. Aimed at the Quaker community, Benezet emphasized the violation of Christian principles, particularly the Golden Rule that slavery and the slave trade represented. Though reluctant to advocate the radical solution of immediate emancipation, Benezet's writings focused on the African slave trade as the first step to ridding Britain and her colonies of the blight of slavery. His next publication, *Caution to Great Britain and her Colonies* (1767), addressed all Britons and advocated strongly for the political solution of ending the slave trade. He sent a copy of this publication and a letter of support to Granville Sharp, the mastermind of the Somerset Decision outlawing slavery in England. Impressed with the writing and the message, Sharp reprinted Benezet's pamphlet in London. Benezet further developed the message in his final

publication, *Some Historical Account of Guinea* (1772), and both tracts were reprinted several times and widely distributed in the campaign to end the British slave trade. Benezet's influence can be seen in the abolitionist writings of Granville Sharp, John Wesley, and Thomas Clarkson, who canonized him as an early "Saint" of the abolition movement. Benezet is also credited with helping to draft the first petition for the abolition of the British slave trade that was presented to Parliament in 1783. Though he did not live to see the slave trade abolished in Britain or the United States, Benezet's writing had a profound impact on the British anti-slave trade movement, and his lifelong commitment to teaching educated successive generations of the most disenfranchised members of Philadelphia society.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, Britain; Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Clarkson, Thomas (1760–1846); Sharp, Granville (1735–1813)

References and Suggested Readings

- Armistead, W. (1859/1971) *Anthony Benezet: From the Original Memoir: Revised with additions*. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press.
- Brendlinger, I. (2003) Anthony Benezet: True Champion of the Slave. Wesley Center for Applied Theology. Available at www.wesley.nnu.edu/wesleyan_theology/theojrnl/31-35/32-1-7.htm#_edn1.
- Davis, D. B. (1975) *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Soderlund, J. R. (1985) *Quakers and Slavery: A Divided Spirit*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bengal, popular uprisings and movements in the colonial era

*Muntassir Mamoon and
Zarina Rahman Khan*

Bengal, Bangladesh, and Consolidation of British Rule

The state of Bangladesh came into existence only in 1971. Before August 15, 1947, present-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh were known as one country, India. Bengal was in the east-

ern part of India. East Bengal was the part of Bengal including a sizable part of Bangla-speaking north Bengal (i.e., excluding areas like Darjeeling, where the inhabitants more often speak Nepalese dialects), along with east and south Bengal. The territory of the old East Bengal is more or less the same area that is known as Bangladesh today. Bengal was a *Suba* (a province administered by a *Subadar*, with a *Diwan*, collecting revenues) in the Mughal Empire. But after the death of Aurangzeb, *de facto* power passed to the *Subadars*, now styling themselves *Namabs* (Emperor).

In 1757 the British East India Company's Robert Clive conspired with certain local notables to wage war against and defeat the *Namab* of Bengal, Siraj-ud-Daulah. Between 1757 and 1765 the powers of the East India Company grew until in 1765, after defeating another *Namab*, Mir Qasim, it forced the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II to grant the company *Diwani*, or the right to collect the revenue. By 1772 it emerged as the all-powerful ruler of Bengal, and Calcutta (Kolkata) was established as the capital. Beginning that year, the consolidation of British rule took place when Warren Hastings, governor of Bengal, declared the British intention to collect revenue directly rather than through intermediaries. During the next couple of decades an administrative and revenue collection system was set up. In 1857 there was a widespread uprising in India against the British, but the rebels were defeated and Queen Victoria of Britain took over the rule of India in 1858, replacing the defunct Mughal Empire. India became a part of the British Empire, to be ruled by viceroys, the queen's representatives.

Fakir-Sannyasi Revolt (1763–1800)

The *Fakir-Sannyasi* revolt was a unique uprising in the history of Bengal, which continued for nearly forty years. The word *fakir* means Muslim spiritual persons or ascetic mendicants. *Sannyasi* is a (generally Hindu) person who renounces all worldly interest in search of spiritual attainment. The *fakirs* and *Sannyasis* had established settlements in many regions of Bengal and Bihar. And although they were known as *fakir-Sannyasis* they were basically peasants who often went on pilgrimage in groups.

Under colonial rule the oppression of the peasants and artisans reached such heights that many artisans soon became unemployed and peasants landless. The dispossessed began to form small armed groups to loot the food and property of landlords and wealthy English traders. Some soldiers of the declining Mughal army joined these armed bands. At this time the colonial rulers imposed a tax on pilgrimages. This enraged the *fakir-Sannyasis*, who saw it as an imposition on their religion. They identified the colonial rulers as their enemy in their pursuit of religion and earning a living and revolted in different regions. Rather than a centrally organized movement, this was a spontaneous uprising led by individual leaders in different parts of Bengal and Bihar. The unemployed artisans, landless peasants, soldiers from the disbanded Mughal army, and small armed bands organized under the leadership of the *fakir-Sannyasis*.

The first phase (1763–9) took place in Dhaka, Rajshahi, Bihar, and Jalpaiguri, beginning in Dhaka in 1763 with the attack on the *Kuthibari* (trading center). In Rampur and Boalia of Rajshahi the English *Kuthis* were attacked in 1763 and 1764. Although the English withdrew from these places, they eventually recaptured them.

Between 1770 and 1772 other groups started revolting. Inspired by the earlier uprising the *fakir-Sannyasis* stopped paying taxes in many districts. A devastating famine broke out in 1770. According to the English, 5 million people perished, but unofficial estimates are much higher. Under these circumstances the rebel groups expanded in different parts of Bangladesh and the strength of the force in Dinajpur was over 5,000. At this stage the leader of this rebellion was *Fakir* Mojnu Shah. Ordinary peasants supported the rebels with shelter, food, and even funds. From 1773 to 1780 the third phase of the revolt centered around Rangpur, Dinajpur, Bogra, and Mymensingh districts. In the fourth phase Mojnu Shah attempted to reorganize the movement, but at this point short-lived internal disputes broke out between the *Sannyasis* and the *Fakirs*.

Although the *fakir-Sannyasis* started as separate movements in different parts of the country, in the fifth phase Mojnu Shah's efforts put an end to the internal feud and consolidated the movement. Mojnu Shah was killed in a fight near Bogra, but the war continued under the leadership of his brother Musa Shah. From 1793 to

1800 (the last phase) the British initiated organized efforts to suppress the revolts, achieving their goal in 1800. During this 40-year period many rebels not only became popular but also turned into legends and became the inspiration for popular resistance movements. Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay's attempts in the late nineteenth century at creating images of resistance included a mythical version of the *Sannyasi* revolt, with a heroic female character named Debi Chowdhurani.

Shamsher Gazi's Revolt (1767–1768)

The oppression of the people reached the highest level immediately after the East India Company took over revenue collection. During the rule of Siraj-ud-Daulah, the rate of revenue in Roshnabad Chakla (present Comilla) was *Taka* 33,305 and 10 years later in 1765 it rose to *Taka* 150,000. This resulted in such economic degradation of the peasants that many lost their homesteads.

Shamsher Gazi was the son of a poor peasant. He was sold by his father to Nasir Mohammad, *zamindar* of South Sik. When on reaching adulthood Shamsher was appointed the *Tahsildar* (revenue collector) of the *zamindari* he was able to witness the poverty and deprivation of the ordinary peasants. Sympathetic to their plight, he started to organize them. Declaring rebellion against the *zamindars* in 1767, Shamsher stopped revenue payment to the king of Tripura and proclaimed himself the king of the newly independent Roshnabad Chakla. He distributed land to the landless and the slaves and became involved in many social welfare activities in the region. However, his rule lasted only two years. In 1768 the king of Tripura, with the assistance of the British-supported soldiers of the *Nawab*, suppressed the uprising. He was arrested and killed in 1768.

Sandwip Revolt (1769)

A clerk and *benian* (employer of traders) named Gokul Ghoshal was the *Ahaddar*, or revenue collector, of Sandwip. Most of the population of the Bay of Bengal island of Sandwip were peasants or artisans. There were a few *zamindars* as well, and the *Ahaddar* had the permanent revenue settlement with them. Abu Torap Chowdhury was a small *zamindar* of Sandwip, who succeeded

in overpowering other *zamindars* and gaining the loyalty of most of the peasants. He soon became the most powerful man in Sandwip. To counter this, Gokul Ghosal, with the help of the British, attacked Sandwip and Abu Torap was killed in a fight in 1766. With Gokul Ghosal's acquisition of all powers in Sandwip his oppression increased. The desperate peasants openly revolted in 1769. Unable to suppress this rising by the peasants alone, Gokul once again sought the help of the British and ultimately quashed the uprising.

Chakma Revolt (1776–1787)

The northwest frontier of Bangladesh is the Chittagong hill tract area. It is the habitat of an indigenous tribal population, predominantly the Chakmas. Their source of livelihood was *jhoom* (terrace cultivation) and *karpash* (cotton) cultivation. There was no private ownership of land, and during Mughal rule they paid a small amount of cotton as revenue and cultivated without any interference. From 1760 the British started leasing out "cotton enclaves" to middlemen or speculators. The indigenous people were forced to pay in large quantities of cotton. At the same time they were restricted to cultivating small designated plots, which was contrary to the traditional system of cultivation. Colonial encroachment and extortion rose to such heights that the Chakmas revolted.

The Chakmas rebelled four times between 1776 and 1787, in rebellions that remain mostly unrecorded. The little that is known shows that a Chakma chief, Sher Daulat, and his military chief Ramu Khan led the first uprising in 1776. In this the rebels destroyed the crop silos and command quarters of the land leasers. Even the support of the British soldiers did not enable the speculators to suppress the rebels. They then took a new strategy. The Chakmas traded cotton for other essentials in the markets of the plain land. Knowing that this was crucial for Chakma survival, the British closed off the Chakmas' road to the markets. As a result the Chakmas were forced to surrender to the speculators in less than a year. The war came to an end at the agreement of the Chakmas to provide 501 *maund* (measurement of weight equal to approximately 1,000 pounds) of cotton as yearly revenue.

The Chakmas rebelled again in 1782 under the leadership of Jan Bux Khan, the son of Sher

Khan, for the same reason. Unable to suppress the Chakmas in the hills, the British kept the plain land out of bounds to them. Eventually, the Chakmas were forced to surrender once more. Jan Bux revolted again in 1784 and 1787, but was completely overtaken and subdued in 1787. In 1789 the British abolished the system of revenue collection through agents and established direct collection by the company officials. This system reestablished peace in the region.

Bulaki Shah's Revolt (1792)

In the southern part of Bangladesh is Barisal, also known as Bakerganj. Bakerganj was renowned for its abundant crop production. The peasants of Bakerganj also faced the oppression and exploitation of the *zamindars* as in other parts of the country. This exploitation during the initial stage of colonial rule became so severe that when the area was hit by famine in 1789 over 6,000 people died in Bakerganj.

In 1792 an uprising started in south Bakerganj under the leadership of Bulaki Shah, a peasant. He was initially associated with the *Fakir* revolts, but the latter had no connection with Bulaki Shah's revolt in Bakerganj. The oppression of the landlords and the traders did not stop even after the famine. Bulaki organized the peasants and built up a strong resistance in a place named Shubandia. Bulaki even managed to acquire seven Mughal guns. After preparations, Bulaki declared that the "rule of the foreigners has ended" and so there was no need to pay taxes to the *zamindars*. The *zamindars* attacked the stronghold of Bulaki with their armed forces. The illiterate and poorly armed followers of Bulaki either perished under this onslaught or fled, and the fortress was destroyed. It was in the following year that Governor General Cornwallis pronounced the Permanent Settlement of land in Bengal.

Early Nineteenth-Century Revolts

The establishment of the Permanent Settlement with the *zamindars* changed the nature of British colonialism. It now developed a class of indigenous collaborators who were strongly tied to its rule. At the same time, the Permanent Settlement transformed *zamindars* from revenue collectors (a status they had under the Mughals) to absolute landowners. A further dimension

of British rule as it was consolidated was the importation of juridical concepts and practices from Britain. These also created popular opposition.

A significant early nineteenth-century popular protest was the *Faraiizi* movement, which had two phases: the first phase led by Haji Shariatullah and the second phase with his son Dudu Mia as leader. Shariatullah of Madaripur (1781–1840) traveled to Mecca at the age of 18 and was educated in the Wahabi religious ideology. Returning after 20 years, he started preaching Wahabism, the objective of which was to reform Islam. His influence started to spread. Though this initiative started as a religious movement, it gradually became a peasant uprising because most of the cultivators were Muslims and the landowners Hindu.

On the death of Shariatullah his son Dudu Mia took up the responsibility of organizing the *Faraizis* throughout the country. The movement turned into a peasant uprising under his leadership. The central idea of Dudu Mia's philosophy was that God and not man is the owner of all land, so no man has the right to levy tax on land, nor can it be inherited by succeeding generations. He rejected the 18 types of taxes levied by the *zamindars*. His followers included Muslim and Hindu peasants and artisans who set up their own *Panchayet* (local self-government) to resolve disputes. All this led to the non-payment of taxes in many areas. Consequently, the Hindu landlords and the indigo planters organized their forces against the movement. In many areas confrontation took place between the followers of Dudu Mia and the armed men of the *zamindars*. When it turned into a massive conflict in 1838, the colonial rulers stepped in to suppress it. Dudu Mia was arrested and a number of criminal cases were filed against him, but he was acquitted because of the absence of any witnesses against him. He was again arrested as a state prisoner on charges of treason during the revolt of 1857. However, he was released in 1860 and died in 1862 in Dhaka.

Hatikhedra Revolt

The Garo hills are located in north Mymensingh in what is now the Indian province of Meghalaya. The valley was inhabited by tribal communities of whom the majority was Hajong. Towards the middle of the sixteenth century Shamsheer Singh, a soldier in the army of Isha

Khan (one of the 12 major landlords who fought the Mughals), settled in this *Pargana* (administrative division) as its ruler. With the help of the Hajongs he succeeded in subjugating the Garos, another tribal community, and founded the *Susanga-zamindari* line in this region.

In 1770 one of the *zamindars* of this descent, Raja Kishore, settled a large number of Hajongs in Durgapur thana for catching wild elephants. It was profitable to trap and sell wild elephants, an animal used for transporting and other purposes. Later, a system known as the *Begar* (a system of unpaid labor akin to *corvée*) was introduced in the process of trapping elephants and led to a level of oppression that caused the Hajongs to declare war against the *zamindars* under the leadership of Mona Sardar. Soon this revolt spread to all parts of the *Susanga pargana*.

The Garo peasants who were the victims of *zamindari* domination started to join this uprising. When the *zamindars* arrested and murdered their leader, Man Singh, the revolt flared up and spread to all parts of the region. The rebels started to attack the *zamindars* with all their strength. Many of the forces of the *zamindar* were killed; many others fled. The *zamindar* fled to Netrokona, and the rebels destroyed the traps dug in the ground for trapping elephants. The conflict continued for five years before peace returned. At the end of it the system of trapping of elephants by unpaid labor was banned.

Pagolponthi Revolt (1825–1872)

Pagolponthi is a mystic philosophy like that of the *aul-bauls* (syncretic folk sect). Central to this philosophy is the concept of brotherhood, equality, and the quest for truth. In 1775 when a *fakir* named Korom Shah started to spread this philosophy it was well received by the Garos and the Hajongs in the *Susanga* hills because they were badly oppressed by the *zamindars* and the British. Korom Shah succeeded in building solidarity and brotherhood among the hill people to resist the exploitation of the *zamindars*. When Korom Shah died in 1813 a follower of the *pagolponthi* named Tipu from Lentiakanda village of *Susanga* started disseminating this philosophy intensely among the Garos. The core of Tipu's preaching was that all humans are created by the Creator. Therefore, all are equal and no one has a right to exploit and oppress another. Under the leadership of Tipu the Garos united against the

oppression of the *zamindars* and, defeating them in Sherpur, established a new Garo kingship in 1825. The new king, Tipu, developed an administrative and judicial system. Tipu's rule lasted for two years and survived several English attempts to dethrone him. In 1827 an English battalion from Rangpur arrived in Sherpur and started to fight Tipu. He was defeated, arrested, and jailed. Although the first *Pagolponthi* uprising under Tipu failed, it was never totally eliminated. After this, the Garos revolted against the British administration in 1832, 1833, 1837, 1848, 1861, 1866, 1871, and 1872.

Popular Struggles in the Late Nineteenth Century

The revolt of 1857 was followed by the ending of rule by the East India Company and the takeover of India directly by the British government. A number of laws slightly modified the extent of control over rural Bengal by the *zamindars*. Peasant protests also gained a little space to express grievances within the framework of the colonial state. The most important of these peasant protests, the Indigo revolt, is discussed in a separate entry. Another important peasant protest was the Sirajganj revolt of 1872–3.

The Sirajganj uprising of 1872 is also known as the Pabna uprising because it was under the Pabna district. It is significant because it was conducted under the command of an efficient agrarian league. Perhaps patterned on the Pabna model, these movements gradually took the aspect of a widespread and popular protest against the forms of landlordism in the cash-crop producing areas of Bangladesh. All six of the most influential Sirajganj *zamindars* were absentee landlords. The *zamindars* were extremely exploitative and in addition to the land revenue they extracted a number of illegal taxes known as *abwab*. The peasants had to pay over fifteen types of *abwab* on top of the tax on agriculture.

Some peasants filed and won cases against such unauthorized revenue collections. Encouraged by this, many peasants stopped payment of illegal taxes and started payment of the land taxes through the courts. Antagonized, the *zamindars* intensified their oppression of the cultivators. The peasants then organized and formed agrarian leagues under the leadership of Ishan Chandra Roy, Raju Sarkar, Gangacharan Paul, and others and started attacking the offices

of *zamindars*. When the uprising spread to different parts of the region, the *zamindars*, their employees, and the wealthy fled to the town of Pabna and sought assistance from the administration. The administration suppressed the uprising through police action, jailed the leaders, and then slapped different terms of punishments on them.

The Sirajganj uprising had far-reaching consequences. In response to the uprising the British passed the Bengal Tenancy Act, Act VIII of 1885, which came to be known as the Declaration of the Peasants. Empowered by the Permanent Settlement Act of 1773 and the Act of 1859 the *zamindars* could increase the rates of taxes and evict peasants from their land by taking permission from lower courts. The Act of 1885 abolished this privilege and passed the law that a peasant having occupancy for 12 years could not be evicted from the land.

SEE ALSO: Bangladesh, Struggle for Liberation, 1971; Pakistan, Bengali Nationalist Struggles

References and Suggested Readings

- Basu, S. (1987) *Gono Oshontosh O Unish Shotoker Bangali Samaj* (Popular Unrest and Nineteenth-Century Bengali Society). Kolkata: Pustak Biponi.
- Bhattacharya, A. (2006) A Critique of the Existing Historiography of the Sannyasi Rebellion. *Journal of History*, Jadavpur University, 22–3: 18–50.
- Dasgupta, A. K. (1992) *The Fakir and Sannyasi Uprising in Bengal*. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi.
- Kaviraj, N. (1972) *A Peasant Uprising in Bengal, 1783*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.

Ben-Gurion, David (1886–1973) and the Haganah

Lawrence Davidson

David Ben-Gurion was one of the three principal leaders of the Zionist movement along with Theodor Herzl and Chaim Weizmann. He helped to found the Haganah, the precursor of the Israeli army, and served as Israel's first prime minister. He is considered by many Israelis to be the founder of his country.

David Ben-Gurion was born David Gruen in Plonsk, Poland. His father was an early Jewish nationalist, and thus Ben-Gurion grew up in



Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion (center left with jacket) presides as the last of the British troops are dismissed on July 4, 1948. Israel had previously declared its independence from Britain on May 14, 1948, the day before the British Mandate of Palestine expired, signaling the beginning of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War over control of the region. (© Bettmann/ CORBIS)

a Zionist household. His education included the learning of modern Hebrew. In 1906 Ben-Gurion left Poland for Palestine, which was then part of the Ottoman Empire. In Palestine he worked as a farm laborer and became active in Zionist organizations.

Ben-Gurion's motivation was secular rather than religious. He was a socialist and, in 1921, declared that Zionists in Palestine were "following a new path which contradicts developments in the whole world except Russia." He was, in those early years, a great admirer of Vladimir Lenin. He was active at the 1907 convention of the Zionist Socialist Party, and there helped insert into the party's platform the declaration that "The party aspires to the political independence of the Jewish people in this land [Palestine]." From the very beginning of his political activities in Palestine, Ben-Gurion sought the creation of a Jewish state.

Ben-Gurion was strong willed and ambitious. In 1910 he edited the party's newspaper and in 1911 attended the eleventh Zionist conference in Vienna. At one point he traveled to Istanbul after concluding that it was necessary for the Zionist leaders to learn Ottoman law, but World War I intervened. By the time the war broke out he was well known to the Ottoman authorities as a person working for Jewish independence, and so was arrested for conspiring against the Empire. He was subsequently sent into exile by the authorities.

In exile, Ben-Gurion made his way to New York City in 1915 to build a socialist Zionist movement in the United States. It was in the US that Ben-Gurion first experienced a democratic political environment and his admiration for it helped temper his Leninist style of leadership. It was in New York that he met his wife, Paula Munweis, who was also a Zionist activist.

After World War I Ben-Gurion returned to Palestine, now a British mandate territory, and rapidly rose in the ranks of the Labor Zionist Party. He helped found and lead the Histadrut (the General Federation of Labor), the huge labor organization that represented and provided services for most of the Jewish workers in Palestine, and later Israel. It was also at this time (the early 1920s) that serious resistance to Jewish immigration flared among the Arab Palestinians. At this stage Ben-Gurion saw the Palestinians as rather primitive people, lacking any nationalist consciousness and having no collective rights. He ultimately thought that most of them could be bribed to leave the country. This latter assumption was overturned when Palestinian Arab demonstrations against Jewish immigration turned violent. By late 1920 he seemed to have concluded that the Jews of Palestine could not rely on the British to protect them from Arab violence or to suppress Arab resistance to further Jewish immigration. Indeed, he decided that a war with the Arabs was inevitable, and began to advocate for Zionists in Palestine to create their own armed force.

This led to the creation of the Haganah (defense) in December of 1920. Initially, it was a loosely organized militia force of the Histadrut, which had branches in the larger Jewish towns and settlements, and looked after their defense. After the Arab rebellion of 1929, the Haganah's organization was overhauled. Leadership was centralized and as many of the Jewish youth of Palestine as possible were enlisted and trained. Urban corps were also established in the cities and officer training courses were initiated. Arms were purchased on the black market and small factories were secretly established to manufacture small arms; clandestine arms depots were created. According to the Israeli version of the Haganah's history, Ben-Gurion created a doctrine of restraint for the organization throughout much of the 1920s and 1930s. That is, the Haganah's duty was to maintain a strict defensive posture, refrain from retaliation, and avoid civilian casualties.

The policy of restraint caused a split in the Haganah movement. Those opposed to it left the organization to start their own militias. This led first to the formation of the Irgun Zva'i Leumi (National Military Organization), led by Menachem Begin, and eventually Lehi (Fighters for Israel's Freedom) led by Abraham Stern. Both organizations adopted the strategy of retaliation against the Arabs, and later against the British forces as well; both used terrorist tactics that targeted civilians. Palestinian commentators on the struggle between Zionists and Arabs at this stage assert that the policy of restraint was mere camouflage on the part of Ben-Gurion and the Haganah. They argue that the Haganah never made any effort to stop independent attacks on Arab civilians and so, unofficially, went along with them.

As far as the British mandate authorities were concerned, the Haganah was an illegal, underground operation; however, until the end of World War II, there is evidence that the British turned a blind eye to Haganah actions and even utilized Haganah fighters on occasion. For instance, in 1938 the British created a special Jewish commando unit, called the Special Night Squad, for counterinsurgency operations against Arab rebels. These men were drawn from the Haganah. It was also in this year that Ben-Gurion created a professional military general staff for the organization.

After 1939 the main job that Ben-Gurion gave to the Haganah was to organize and facilitate illegal immigration operations. Simultaneously, he encouraged elements of the Haganah to enlist in the British army's "Jewish Brigade" that was to be used in the war against the Nazis. This latter move was to give the Haganah forces as much real military experience as possible. No similar Palestinian Arab force was created by the British. All of these activities resulted in a professionalized Zionist military organization in place by the end of World War II.

Ben-Gurion may have expected that with the coming of World War II and the dire conditions facing Europe's Jews the British would increase their rate of Jewish immigration into Palestine; however, this did not happen. On May 17, 1939 the British government issued a White Paper that stated "the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab

population of that country." In the light of the impending outbreak of World War II and the need for the support of the Arab and Muslim worlds against the fascist powers, the White Paper announced a new policy for Palestine. It promised an "independent Palestinian state" within ten years. Jewish immigration was to be kept at 15,000 per year for five years, and thereafter allowed only with the (highly unlikely) agreement of the Arab population. It was estimated that at the end of the ten-year period the Jewish population would be no more than one-third the total population. Thus the White Paper, if fully implemented, spelled the end of the dream of a Jewish state in Palestine.

Ben-Gurion and the rest of the Zionists were now in a bind. They could not begin a serious struggle against the British because that country led the fight against Nazi Germany, a much more deadly enemy of the Jews than either England or the Palestinian Arabs. On the other hand, with Europe's Jews in ever greater danger, the western nations maintaining overly restrictive immigration laws, and the Zionist ideology being decidedly oriented toward Palestine, that land seemed to be the only place for refugees to go. Thus, Ben-Gurion made his famous declaration that the Zionists would fight with the British against the Nazis "as if there were no White Paper" and fight against the White Paper "as if there were no war" with the Nazis. The latter fight took the form of smuggling refugees into Palestine.

Once World War II ended, Ben-Gurion again might have expected the British to evacuate Palestine and allow for the creation of a Jewish state. Once more, that is not what took place. The British hung on to Palestine, even as they transformed much of the rest of their empire into the British Commonwealth. Now, however, there was no Nazi threat to complicate the situation for Ben-Gurion and the Haganah. The Zionists were free to wage war against British forces in Palestine. Ben-Gurion, who was now head of the influential worldwide organization known as the Jewish Agency, as well as leader of the largest Zionist political organization in Palestine, ordered the Haganah to begin to prepare for a showdown struggle with both the Arabs and the British. Indeed, both Jewish and Arab resistance to British rule eventually forced them to announce, in December of 1947, a date (May 15, 1948) upon which they would unilaterally withdraw from Palestine.

On May 14, 1948, a day before the British withdrawal, Ben-Gurion declared the establishment of the State of Israel. He became the country's first prime minister, and its first minister of defense. Fighting between the Haganah, now joined by the Irgun and Lehi, against Palestinian Arab irregular forces had already begun. In March 1948 Haganah commanders came up with a campaign strategy known as Plan Dalet (D). The Haganah claimed that this plan was for the defense of the impending new state. The Palestinians claimed that, as executed, the plan aimed to rid as much of the territory as possible of its non-Jewish inhabitants. As it turned out, both sides used terror as a tactic; however, since the Zionist forces proved the stronger, it is the Palestinians who ended up fleeing for their lives or being pushed out by the combined forces of the new Jewish state, including the Haganah.

David Ben-Gurion was now prime minister of Israel and the Haganah now provided the troops for the Israeli army. Besides securing the country from invading Arab armies and pushing as many Palestinians out of Israel as they could, the Israeli army had to subdue the militia of their long-term rival, the Irgun. Ben-Gurion despised his rivals in the Irgun and seemed to have seriously believed that its leader, Menachem Begin, was capable of attempting to take over the country through an armed coup. Thus, destroying the Irgun militia became a strategic goal for Ben-Gurion. He accomplished this in June 1948, when an old naval ship, renamed *Altalena*, belonging to the Irgun arrived off the coast of Tel Aviv laden with arms. Ben-Gurion ordered the weapons turned over to the Haganah and, when Begin hesitated, he ordered the ship shelled. There was to be only one government, one prime minister, and one army in Israel.

After the establishment of the state, Ben-Gurion retired from government several times (the first time in 1953), but could never stay away entirely. He was defense minister again in 1955 and responsible for the policy of systematic reprisal actions for Palestinian raids. These were to be carried out beyond the armistice lines and inflict punishment on Jordanians, Syrians, and Egyptians greater than any damage done by Palestinian raiders. Ben-Gurion's rationale was that such punishment would force the neighboring governments to close their borders to the Palestinians. This strategy only worked partially,

though it killed a lot of Arab civilians. Ben-Gurion finally retired from politics permanently in 1965 after losing electorally during a final comeback attempt. He died in 1973 at the age of 87.

SEE ALSO: Begin, Menachem (1913–1992) and the Irgun; Intifada I and Intifada II; Zionism

References and Suggested Readings

- Ben-Eliezer, U. (1998) *The Making of Israeli Militarism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Ben-Gurion, D. (1970) *Memoirs: David Ben-Gurion*. New York: World Publishing.
- Ben-Gurion, D. (1974) *The Jews in Their Land*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Van Creveld, M. (1998) *The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Zweig, R. (1991) *David Ben-Gurion: Politics and Leadership in Israel*. New York: Routledge.

Benjamin, Walter (1892–1940)

Michael Löwy

Walter Benjamin, born in Berlin on July 15, 1892 to a German Jewish middle-class family, occupies a unique place in the history of modern revolutionary thought: he was the first Marxist to break radically with the ideology of progress. His thinking has therefore a distinct critical quality that sets his apart from the dominant and “official” forms of historical materialism.

This peculiarity has to do with his ability to incorporate into the body of Marxist revolutionary theory insights from the Romantic critique of civilization and from the Jewish messianic tradition. Both elements are present in his early writings, particularly *The Life of the Students* (1915), where he rejected “a conception of history, whose confidence in the infinity of time only distinguishes the speed by which men and epochs roll, quicker or slower, along the track of progress” (Benjamin 1974, I, 1: 75).

Benjamin's first reference to communism appeared in his (1921) *Critique of Violence*, where he celebrated the “devastating and on the whole justified” critique of the Parliament by the Bolsheviks and the anarcho-syndicalists (Benjamin 1974, II, 1: 191). This link between communism and anarchism was an important aspect of his political evolution as his Marxism began to take

a libertarian color. But it was only after 1924, when he read George Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) and discovered practical communism through the eyes of Asja Laciš – a Soviet artist and political activist he met in Capri – that Marxism became a key component of his worldview. In 1929 he still referred to Lukács' opus as one of the few books which remained lively and topical and continued to influence his independence of mind towards the "official" doctrine of Soviet Marxism despite his sympathies for the USSR (Benjamin 1974, III: 171).

The first work where the influence of Marxism is clear is *One Way Street*, written from 1923 to 1925 and published in 1928. In this work, Benjamin charged his former neo-romantic criticism of progress with a revolutionary Marxist tension, as in the section called "Fire Alarm": "if the abolition of the bourgeoisie is not completed before an almost calculable moment in economic and technical development (a moment signaled by inflation and poison-gas warfare) all is lost. Before the spark reaches the dynamite, the lighted fuse must be cut." Survival or destruction of "three thousand years of cultural development" depended on the proletariat being able to fulfill this historical task (Benjamin 1978: 84). Yet, in opposition to the evolutionist brand of Marxism, Benjamin did not conceive the proletarian revolution as the "natural" or "inevitable" result of economic and technical progress, but as the critical interruption of an evolution leading to catastrophe. This critical standpoint explains why his Marxism has a peculiarly pessimistic spirit – a revolutionary pessimism which has nothing to do with resigned fatalism. In his 1929 article on Surrealism – where he again tried to reconcile anarchism and Marxism – he defined communism as the organization of pessimism (Benjamin 1974, II, 1: 308).

When Hitler seized power in 1933, Benjamin, like many Jews and anti-fascists, had to leave Germany. Exiled in Paris, he survived precariously with a small stipendium from the Institute of Social Research, the "Frankfurt School" exiled in New York. During those years he worked on his unfinished project on the Parisian Arcades, while producing some remarkable Marxist essays on Baudelaire and on the "Work of Art in the Age of its Mechanical Reproduction" (1935).

Politically, Benjamin was very critical of social democracy, and after 1937 he also increasingly distanced himself from Soviet (Stalinist) Marxism.

His 1937 article "Edward Fuchs, Collector and Historian" contains a severe criticism of social democratic ideology, which combined Marxism with positivism, Darwinist evolutionism, and the cult of "progress." Its greatest mistake is that it saw in the development of technology only the progress of natural sciences, never the social regression. It never perceived the danger that the energies produced by technology could serve above all for the technical perfection of war. Against the shallow optimism of the pseudo-Marxists, Benjamin opposed his pessimistic-revolutionary perspective, referring himself to Engels and Marx's prognosis on the possibility of a barbaric development of capitalism (Benjamin 1974, II, 2: 474–5).

Benjamin's Marxism, nourished by Romantic culture and Jewish theology, was a new and original reinterpretation of historical materialism radically different from the orthodoxy of the Second and Third Internationals. It should be considered as an attempt to deepen and radicalize the opposition between Marxism and bourgeois ideology, to heighten its revolutionary potential, and to sharpen its critical content. This was also the aim of the Arcades project: "One can perceive as one of the methodological aims of this work to demonstrate the possibility of a historical materialism, that has annihilated in itself the idea of progress. Here is precisely where historical materialism has to dissociate itself from the bourgeois habits of thought" (*Passagenwerk*, in Benjamin 1974, V, 1: 574). Such a program did not aim for "revision," but rather, as Karl Korsch tried to do in his 1936 book *Karl Marx* (one of Benjamin's major sources), sought a return to Marx himself.

In 1939, as the war began, Benjamin was interned as an "enemy alien" by the French government. He managed to escape the internment camp, but after the German victory and occupation of France in 1940, he had to leave Paris for Marseille. Under these dramatic circumstances he wrote his last piece, the thesis *On the Concept of History*, perhaps the most important document in revolutionary theory since Marx's celebrated *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845). In these few but extraordinarily dense pages, the ideology of progress is criticized in its philosophical foundations, the linear and empty time, with the help of a messianic conception of time.

Soon after, in August 1940, Benjamin and a group of German anti-fascist refugees tried to

cross the French border at the Pyrenées but were arrested by the (Franco) Spanish police. They were taken to the village of Port-Bou and told they would be delivered to the French or German police. In his final act of protest, Benjamin chose to commit suicide.

The question of the relationship between Marxism and messianism in Benjamin's later writings is controversial. Some explain this relation in terms of "secularization." Others, however, speak of "theologization." During the sharp polemics of the 1960s in Germany, some insisted on the religious dimension, others on Marxist materialism. Benjamin himself referred to his "Janus face," but the critics looked at one face only, ignoring the other one. In reality, his faces were manifestations of one single thought which had simultaneously a messianic and a Marxist expression. His works offer a critique of the sort of Marxism that understands history as a mechanical process leading automatically to the triumph of socialism; the reestablishment of the explosive, "theological" (i.e., messianic), and revolutionary spirit of historical materialism, reduced to a miserable automaton by its epigones.

One must take seriously the idea according to which theology is "at the service of" historical materialism – a formulation that reverts the traditional scholastic definition of philosophy as *ancilla theologiae*. Theology, as memory of the victims and hope of redemption, is not for Benjamin an aim in itself, a mystical contemplation of the divine: it is at the service of the oppressed's struggle. Indeed, a few decades after Benjamin's death, the idea of a theology at the service of the poor in the struggle for their self-liberation, a theology intimately linked with Marxism, came to life again through the liberationist Christianity of Latin America.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Lukács, Georg (1885–1971); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Benjamin, W. (1969) *Illuminations*. New York: Schocken.
- Benjamin, W. (1974) *Gesammelte Schriften*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Benjamin, W. (1978) *One Way Street*. In P. Demetz (Ed.), *Reflections*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Leslie E. (2000) *Walter Benjamin: Overpowering Conformism*. London: Pluto Press.
- Löwy, M. (2005) *Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin's "On the Concept of History"*. London: Verso.

Marcus, L. & Nead, L. (1998) *The Actuality of Walter Benjamin*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Berkeley Free Speech Movement

Nicole Frisone

The 1964 Free Speech Movement (FSM) at the University of California, Berkeley served as a catalyst and inspiration for countless student demonstrations around the world for over a decade. The issues debated during the Free Speech Movement extended beyond free speech to include the relationship between students and the university, the meaning of individuality and education, and the role of the university in American society.

During the years preceding the FSM, the University of California system experienced a massive expansion of its student population, campuses, and bureaucracy. Administrative duties decentralized to form separate campus and state-wide administrations. In undergraduate courses, graduate teaching assistants increasingly replaced faculty, while the growing bureaucracy further separated both students and administrators from the university's president, its board of regents, and the faculty. By 1964 the civil rights movement reached the Bay Area. Many Berkeley students participated in demonstrations and sit-ins against area businesses such as the Sheraton Palace and Mel's Diner. The civil rights movement politicized many Berkeley students, including FSM student leaders Mario Savio and Jackie Goldberg through their involvement in Bay Area civil rights activities as well as Mississippi Freedom Summer.

In July 1964 a local newspaper notified university officials that the sidewalk students used for political advocacy belonged to the Board of Regents, who expressly forbade political advocacy on campus – so administrators closed the area to campus clubs. When students returned to campus that fall, the university banned advocacy on the sidewalk at the intersection of Bancroft and Telegraph Avenues. An area usually reserved for political advocacy, students could no longer recruit for demonstrations, pass out leaflets, or collect donations. Administrators picked the worst time possible to implement the change – the November ballot included a presidential election and important California equal housing legislation.

Students, infuriated, demanded the area be returned to them. Campus groups selected representatives to speak with administrators. Student clubs ranging from the Young Socialist Alliance, Young Republicans for Goldwater, and Friends of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee coalesced into what they called the Free Speech Movement. By October, student demands changed to include the students' right to advocate and recruit for off-campus illegal demonstrations, such as sit-ins, anywhere on university property.

The February 1, 1960 sit-in in Greensboro, North Carolina launched the civil rights sit-in movement that dominated early 1960s activism. In similar fashion, Berkeley students launched the on-campus demonstrations that pervaded the decade when they sat-in around a police car on October 1–2, 1964 for over 30 hours to prevent the arrest of activist Jack Weinberg. Weinberg, a former Berkeley student and Congress of Racial Equality member, joined students to defy the administration's prohibition of advocacy on university property. In December, Berkeley set a record for the largest mass arrest on a university campus, a record that remained intact. Police took over 12 hours to arrest over 700 participants in the Sproul Hall sit-in. The FSM ultimately won the support of the Faculty Senate, which met all their demands. The movement ended, but the message of personal freedom and questioning of university authority remained strong on the Berkeley campus and spread to others.

Savio's words on the steps of Sproul Hall on December 2, 1964 gave voice to a new generation of students:

There is a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you so sick at heart, that you can't take part, can't even tacitly take part; and you've got to put your bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon all the apparatus, and you've got to make it stop. And you've got to indicate to the people who run it, to the people who own it, that unless you're free, the machine will be prevented from working at all!

Campus administrators around the country learned little from President Clark Kerr or Chancellor Edward Strong. Students, however, took note of the FSM's strategy, organization, and message, which held mass appeal to a new generation of students. European activists cite Berkeley and

Savio as an influence; Columbia University students in 1968 echoed the feelings of "intellectual lock step" and concern over their university's role in society in the same way Berkeley students did four years earlier. The Free Speech Movement's adept use of the media, centrally organized bureaucracy, and coalition of disparate campus groups provided a blueprint for future activists seeking change on their campuses.

FSM leaders had the foresight to create an archive of documents for future study, currently a part of the Bancroft library at the University of California, Berkeley. Trial transcripts, leaflets, and Berkeley newspapers comprise only some of their immense holdings. At Berkeley, faculty at the university during the FSM often rushed out to study the events as they unfolded or immediately afterward. Berkeley sociologists in particular published many studies of the student movement, while the students themselves wrote and published their own accounts, leaving behind a rich written record of their activities.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Vietnam War Movement, United States; Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; CORE (Congress of Racial Equality); Student Movements

References and Suggested Readings

- Cohen, R. & Zelnik, R. (Eds.) (2002) *The Free Speech Movement: Reflections on Berkeley in the 1960s*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Draper, H. (1965) *Berkeley: The New Student Revolt*. New York: Grove Press.
- Goines, D. L. (1993) *The Free Speech Movement: Coming of Age in the 1960s*. Berkeley: Ten Speed Press.
- Heirich, M. (1971) *The Spiral of Conflict: Berkeley, 1964*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lipset, S. M. & Wolin, S. S. (Eds.) (1965) *The Berkeley Student Revolt: Facts and Interpretations*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
- Searle, J. (1971) *The Campus War*. New York: World Publishing.

Berkman, Alexander (1870–1936)

Jeff Shantz

Alexander Berkman was a leading US and Russian anarchist activist and author from the 1890s to his death in 1936. Born Ovsei Osipovich Berkman in Vilnius, Lithuania in 1870, Berkman

moved to the US at age 16 following the death of his parents. He ardently embraced anarchism and syndicalism following the Chicago Haymarket Tragedy in 1886 and through his association with his lover, Emma Goldman. In the pages of his own journal *Blast* (1915–17) Berkman consistently advocated direct action and political violence as critical acts of “propaganda of the deed,” a notion that individual acts of violence could encourage mass uprisings.

In 1892 Berkman was arrested after his attempt to assassinate industrialist Henry Clay Frick during the Homestead strike. Hoping to arouse the striking workers to rebellion through the inspiration of his act, Berkman provoked only the contempt of the workers, who threw their sympathies over to Frick. Following his release after 14 years in prison, Berkman was a devoted anarchist organizer, notably with the Ferrer Modern School that sought to educate children outside the restrictions of the Church, and contributed to Emma Goldman’s publication *Mother Earth*.

A victim of the state repression by US Attorney General Mitchell Palmer under the notorious Red Scare, Berkman was arrested and imprisoned for two years for opposing conscription and US entry into World War I. In 1919 Berkman and Goldman were deported to Russia. While initially enamored of the Bolsheviks, including translating Lenin’s writings, Berkman became disillusioned by the persecution of anarchists and what he saw as the deferring of revolutionary objectives to the self-interests of the party bureaucracy. Berkman and Goldman left Russia for Germany in 1921, following the Soviet suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion and murder of sailors and workers.

In his later years, informed by his direct experience in the US and Soviet Russia, Berkman questioned the expediency of violence in anarchist social transformation. In his classic work *What is Anarchist Communism?* (1929) Berkman provides a clearly written introduction to anarchocommunist ideas as influenced by Kropotkin’s work on mutual aid and the practices of anarchist approaches to social development. Berkman identifies violence as a “method of ignorance” and a “weapon of the weak,” condemning even the violent suppression of counterrevolutionaries. He considered that promoting anarchism is most effective and lasting through providing practical examples of liberty and equality through action.

Berkman spent the last years of his life as a leading progressive critic of the Bolshevik regime and authoritarian communism. In severe pain during the final years of his life, Berkman committed suicide on June 28, 1936 mere weeks before the beginning of the Spanish Revolution.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism in the United States to 1945; Escuela Moderna Movement (The Modern School); Goldman, Emma (1869–1940); Haymarket Tragedy; Kronstadt Mutiny of 1921; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Palmer Raids; Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Avrich, P. (1990) *Anarchist Portraits*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
 Berkman, A. (1980) *What is Communist Anarchism?* Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith.
 Horowitz, I. L. (2005) *The Anarchists*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press.

Berlinguer, Enrico (1922–1984)

Mauro Stampacchia

Enrico Berlinguer was secretary of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from 1972 to his sudden death in 1984. He strongly influenced his party by proposing “historical compromise” and “Eurocommunism,” but failed to succeed politically in both goals. Berlinguer was born in Sassari on the island of Sardinia on May 25, 1922, to a liberal democratic, anti-fascist family that was actively involved in politics. Young Enrico enrolled in the PCI in 1943, and three years later joined the Central Committee in Sassari. From 1949 to 1956 Berlinguer headed the Young Communist Federation. He was elected deputy in 1968 and vice-secretary of the PCI at the 12th Congress, when serving PCI secretary Luigi Longo’s health was in decline.

In 1972 Berlinguer became secretary of the Italian Communist Party. His career as a party official did not hinder him from acquiring strong charismatic appeal. As the head of a party now at the top of its electoral and popular support, Berlinguer was perceived as a potential agent of transformation of the Italian political system.

In the aftermath of the Chilean coup of September 11, 1973, Berlinguer wrote three articles in the party weekly *Rinascita*, pointing

out that any Popular Front-like alliance in Italy would cause the rise of right-wing reaction similar to that in Chile. He argued that the only way to bring about political change was through “historical compromise,” a new alliance of the three parties that had founded the Italian political system, the communists, socialists, and Christian Democrats (DC), the latter, in that political pattern, to be brought back to their “popular roots.” Berlinguer voiced this proposal, representing a dramatic turn in communist politics, during the 1970s, a decade of great upsurge in social and political dissent, and drew sharp criticism from the new left. PCI leaders, however, endorsed the plan as the party strategy.

In international relations the strategy of historical compromise in internal politics was matched with stronger criticism of the Soviet Union, a quest for more independent policies in the “national path to socialism,” and support for “Eurocommunism,” a common strategy of European communist parties seeking to free themselves from strong Soviet control. Berlinguer fought against the idea that the association of the PCI with the Italian national government would intensify the Cold War through creating an imbalance in global relations between the US and the Soviet Union. The plan also laid the groundwork for ending the unofficial *conventio ad excludendum* (covenant to exclude) that kept the PCI from participating in Italian governments.

The 1976 general elections brought the PCI a close second, just behind the DC, and the way seemed clear to winning electoral control. In parliament communist deputies took a moderate stance, not voting to support DC government policies but, by abstaining, not voting against. Berlinguer appealed to “national solidarity” in facing the economic crisis and supported the idea of “austerity,” meaning a cut in working-class conditions. However, 1977 saw an upsurge of protest by young people and workers, aimed also against the PCI and its trade union, the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL).

In the Christian Democrat Aldo Moro, Berlinguer had found an interlocutor and a link with the party. On the same day, March 15, 1978, that parliament was planning to vote in support of a new executive expressing the new alliance, Aldo Moro was kidnapped by the Red Brigades

in Rome. Berlinguer and the PCI followed a rigid stance of non-negotiation with the Red Brigades and launched a broad campaign against terrorism. However, the campaign did not bring the PCI nearer to the executive. Aldo Moro was killed, and a year later Berlinguer returned to the opposition, ending the era of “national solidarity.” In the meantime the Eurocommunist project continued to decline, adversely influenced by Moscow and Washington policies.

In the last years of his leadership from November 1980, Berlinguer positioned the PCI with the hope that a “democratic alternative” could be achieved through the communists and socialists sharing a party. However, the Socialist Party leader Bettino Craxi opposed Berlinguer’s effort, and the PCI again failed to gain a governing role. Berlinguer then turned to what he called the “moral question,” a strong rebuke of big business, politics, and corruption, later revealed to be widespread in the 1990s. In the international arena, in the depths of the so-called “second Cold War,” Berlinguer expanded the prestige the PCI had gathered in its Eurocommunist days by condemning Jaruzelski’s coup d’état in Poland and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, even declaring in Moscow that the forward thrust of the 1917 Russian Revolution had come to a halt – an assertion condemned by Soviet leaders.

Berlinguer’s political project, though hampered, was to remain incomplete. On June 11, 1984, during a PCI mass rally in Padua for the European elections, Berlinguer was unable to finish his speech and died of a stroke. His death caused widespread mourning and the funeral was a mass event. In the European elections the PCI gained more votes in the polls than any other party in Italy.

Berlinguer sharply reshaped the political culture of the Italian Communist Party from a class-based doctrine to what he saw as a third way between Soviet socialism and European social democracy, but failed in his efforts to put the plan into practice. Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledged that he was influenced by Berlinguer in his attempts to reform Soviet socialism, although the plan was never fully realized. The PCI was never completely integrated within the mainstream European political system. Despite his failures, Berlinguer’s efforts are widely recognized in Italian politics, and he remains a popular political icon.

SEE ALSO: Eurocommunism; Gorbachev, Mikhail (b. 1931); Italian Communist Party; Italian Socialist Party; Italy, from the New Left to the Great Repression (1962–1981); Red Brigades

References and Suggested Readings

- Barbagallo, F. (2006) *Enrico Berlinguer*. Rome: Carocci.
- Berlinguer, E. (2001) *Discorsi parlamentari 1968–1974*. Rome: Camera dei Deputati.
- D'Alema, M. & Ginsborg, P. (1994) *Dialogo su Berlinguer*. Florence: Giunti.
- Fiori, G. (1992) *Vita di Enrico Berlinguer*. Bari-Rome: L'Unità-Laterza.
- Gorbachev, M. (1994) *Le idee di Berlinguer ci servono ancora*. Rome: Sisifo.
- Pons, S. (2006) *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*. Turin: Einaudi.
- Tronti, M. (1994) *Il profeta disarmato*. Rome: Sisifo.
- Veltroni, W. (2004) *La sfida interrotta: Le idee di Enrico Berlinguer*. Milan: Baldini Castoldi Dalai.

Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932)

Manfred B. Steger

Eduard Bernstein was a leading German social democratic politician and theorist. His life is a microcosmic reflection of the first century of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Like the German labor movement itself, Bernstein started out as a socialist eclectic, then he “converted” to Marxist orthodoxy only to return to an eclectic position which, enriched by Marxist theory, nonetheless espoused a non-revolutionary, democratic socialism that recognized Marxism only as one among several important theoretical sources. Reviled by his enemies as a “traitor of the working class” and celebrated by his supporters as a “champion of democracy,” Bernstein contributed more than any other pre-World War I socialist theorist to the conceptual framework of twentieth-century European social democracy.

Born in Berlin on January 6, 1850, Bernstein grew up in modest circumstances. After a short career as a bank clerk in Berlin, he joined the SPD as a campaign speaker and pamphleteer. After being expelled from Germany in 1878 as a result of German Chancellor Bismarck’s repressive “Anti-Socialist Laws,” Bernstein settled in Zurich, Switzerland, from where he edited *Der Sozialdemokrat*, the rallying point of the underground

SPD press. When Bismarck secured his expulsion from Switzerland, Bernstein continued publication of the periodical from London, where he cultivated close contacts with Friedrich Engels and the leaders of the British socialist Fabian Society. When Engels died in 1895, Bernstein served as his literary executor and was widely regarded as one of the leading Marxist voices in Europe.

Thus, it came as a shock to his party comrades when Bernstein launched a series of tough criticisms of Marxist theory. In a number of articles and books that appeared between 1896 and 1900, the former Marxist stalwart rejected the central Marxist dogma of the inevitable collapse of capitalist society and the ensuing revolutionary seizure of power by the working class. In his view, Marx and Engels had painted an unrealistic picture of a revolutionary “final goal.” As Bernstein (1988: 168–9) put the matter famously, “I must confess that I have very little interest in what is usually referred to the ‘final goal of socialism.’ This goal, whatever it may be, is nothing to me, while the movement is everything.” He added: “By ‘the movement’ I mean the progressive social change and its political and economic organization by working people.”

Suggesting that capitalism was getting better at containing its weaknesses, Bernstein rejected revolution in favor of an “evolutionary” road to socialism through peaceful, parliamentary means centered on success at the ballot box and gradual democratic reforms. Stressing the tight connection between means and ends, he insisted that the extension of democracy required democratic methods. Moreover, he argued that the SPD ought to broaden its narrow working-class base and appeal to the middle class as well, thus turning itself into a genuine “people’s party.” Finally, rejecting the Marxist view that liberalism and socialism constituted diametrically opposed worldviews, Bernstein urged socialists to consider themselves “the legitimate heirs of liberalism” and embrace the Enlightenment language of citizenship, human rights, rule of law, and universal ethics.

Although Bernstein’s views became the widely accepted cornerstones of modern European social democracy after World War II, they were severely condemned at three successive SPD congresses at the turn of the century. Various European Marxists like V. I. Lenin in Russia and

Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky in Germany, wrote vitriolic pamphlets against Bernstein, calling him a “muddle-headed revisionist” betraying the cause of the working class. Unlike these leading Marxist theorists, however, Bernstein proved himself to be a skillful orator and organizer who recognized the importance of practical politics. Allowed to return to Berlin in 1901 after 23 years of political exile, he was elected to the Reichstag, the German parliament, from 1902 to 1906, 1912 to 1918, and 1920 to 1928.

At the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, Bernstein first voted with the entire SPD leadership in favor of the war, but reversed his opinion a year later, arguing that the German Imperial Government had been the aggressor. Three years later, when Lenin’s Bolshevik Party successfully seized power in Russia, he emerged as one of communism’s earliest and fiercest critics, warning that Lenin’s brand of “socialism” was based on the “erroneous belief in the omnipotence of brute force.” Bernstein (1996: 190) predicted, correctly as it turned out, that the Soviet regime represented an “odd repetition of the old despotism of the Czars” that would eventually lead Russia into a “social and economic abyss.” In the short-lived German Weimar Republic (1918–33), the aging Bernstein held high political posts, including the cabinet position of under-secretary of the treasury. During his parliamentary tenure in 1920–8 he concentrated on matters of taxation and foreign affairs while maintaining his busy journalistic schedule. Bernstein died on December 18, 1932, only six weeks before Adolf Hitler took power in Germany.

The core of Bernstein’s non-revolutionary, democratic socialism is perhaps best expressed in a passage taken from his revisionist masterpiece, *The Preconditions of Socialism* (1993: 142): “Democracy is both means and end. It is the weapon for the struggle for socialism, and it is the form in which socialism will be realized.”

SEE ALSO: Germany, Socialism and Nationalism; Social Democratic Party, Germany; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Bernstein, E. (1988) *Marxism and Social Democracy: The Revisionist Debate 1896–1898*. Ed. H. Tudor and J. M. Tudor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bernstein, E. (1899/1993) *The Preconditions of Socialism*. Ed. and trans. H. Tudor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bernstein, E. (1996) *Selected Writings of Eduard Bernstein, 1900–1921*. Ed. and trans. M. B. Steger. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Gay, P. (1952) *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein’s Challenge to Marx*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Steger, M. B. (1997) *The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Betances, Ramón Emeterio (1827–1898)

Michael Staudenmaier

Ramón Emeterio Betances was a prominent Puerto Rican nationalist and social reformer during the latter half of the nineteenth century. He is considered by some to be the “father of the nation” as a result of his leadership of the early struggle for independence from Spain. His greatest fame came as a central organizer of the insurrection later known as the “Grito de Lares” (Cry of Lares), a seminal uprising against Spanish rule in 1868. Betances also campaigned actively for the abolition of slavery in Puerto Rico, which was finally achieved in 1873, eight years after the end of the US Civil War. Throughout, he was an ardent internationalist, working closely with radicals throughout the Caribbean, in the United States, and further afield in Europe.

Born to a mixed-race father and a French mother, Betances was at home in several worlds from birth. He lived much of his life in France, but also spent time in the Dominican Republic, the United States, and the Virgin Islands. He studied medicine in Paris and became an accomplished surgeon with a strong focus on public health. While in France he witnessed the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions, and this experience, along with his active participation in freemasonry, colored his approach to social change. He prioritized secretive conspiracies but also cultivated well-known and powerful individuals to advocate publicly for independence and abolition. This two-pronged approach was first utilized in his campaign against slavery, for which he was exiled from Puerto Rico in 1858. Subsequently, drawing on both the Bolivarian tradition of revolutions in South America and the internationalism of the 1848 events in Europe, Betances

called for a Confederation of the Antilles, which entailed independence for Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Jamaica, as well as sovereignty for Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

In 1867 Betances initiated a conspiracy to stage an armed insurrection against Spanish rule in Puerto Rico. The plot was far-flung, including, among other elements, an attempt to gain support from the Chilean government, a purchase of weapons coordinated between New York and the Dominican Republic, and a ship chartered to transport the arms and reinforcements to Puerto Rico via the Virgin Islands, where Betances, again in exile, coordinated the conspiracy at a distance. In the end, the effort fell victim to a perfect storm of misfortune: the emissary sent to Chile fell ill and died upon arrival, the vessel carrying weapons and volunteers was impounded in the Virgin Islands, and the clandestine cells established in Puerto Rico were discovered by agents of the Spanish military shortly before the planned date of insurrection. The uprising, short of weapons and men, and deprived of any practical support from outside the island, was crushed by the Spanish after only a few days of combat.

Despite its spectacular failure, however, the Grito de Lares marked a turning point in the history of Puerto Rico. Betances and his comrades had drafted a constitution for an independent island, and in Lares on September 23, 1868 the insurgents had proclaimed the Republic of Puerto Rico. Every subsequent generation of the independence movement has drawn inspiration from Lares and from Betances. In a broader sense, the internationalism of the uprising foreshadowed later interactions among Puerto Rican, Cuban, and Dominican revolutionaries that have continued up to the present. Betances himself spent much of the next two decades working with the Cuban revolutionary movement.

Betances spent the remainder of his life in exile, mostly in France. Late in life he is reported to have assisted the Italian anarchist Michele Angiolillo in his assassination of the Spanish prime minister, Antonio Canovas. The evidence for this claim is limited, but it is clear that Betances was associated with anarchists in Paris and had met with Angiolillo. His support for armed action against Spain suggests the accounts are at least plausible. In the end, a commitment to internationalism and revolution ensured that

Betances participated in and supported a strikingly wide range of struggles. At the time of his death, he was basically penniless, but his life's work has been remembered by radicals, in Puerto Rico and elsewhere, for more than a century.

SEE ALSO: Cuba, Struggle for Independence from Spain, 1868–1898; European Revolutions of 1848; Puerto Rican Independence Movement, 1898–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, B. (2005) *Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination*. New York: Verso.
- Jimenez de Wagenheim, O. (1993) *Puerto Rico's Revolt for Independence: El Grito de Lares*. Princeton: Markus Wiener.
- Ojeda Reyes, F. (2001) *El Desterrado de París: Biografía del Dr. Ramón Emeterio Betances (1827–1898)*. San Juan, PR: Ediciones Puerto.

Bethune, Henry Norman (1890–1939)

Chris Keefer

Norman Bethune was a Canadian surgeon, social activist, and internationalist. He innovated a revolution in military medicine on the frontlines of the anti-fascist struggle of republican Spain and the anti-imperialist struggle of China between 1936 and 1939. After his death Bethune became a Chinese cultural icon and example of communism's selfless "New Man."

Before his political conversion to communism in 1935 Bethune was a respected thoracic surgeon who dabbled in painting and art collecting. However, this period was characterized by a commitment to serving the poor. He contracted tuberculosis (TB), likely from the immigrant and working-class patients whom he tended despite their inability to pay. Bethune's own brush with death between 1926 and 1927 led him on a "crusade" against TB in which he recognized the primacy of the need for radical changes to the social and economic conditions that foster the disease. This realization, coupled with a trip to the Soviet Union in which he saw the possibilities of a radical restructuring of society, led Bethune to join the Canadian Communist Party in 1935. Bethune became an advocate for progressive healthcare reform and a founding father

of Canadian Medicare by organizing Montreal healthcare workers to draft a manifesto for socialized medicine.

In 1936 he began his involvement with military medicine when he traveled to Spain to aid the republican cause. There he innovated the technique of battlefield blood transfusion, which brought medicine to the wounded and avoided the high mortality rate associated with delayed treatment and transportation of casualties. Returning to Canada in 1937, Bethune led a country-wide propaganda campaign in order to raise funds and solidarity for the Spanish republican cause.

Bethune spent the last two years of his life with Mao Zedong's 8th route army in China where he developed a legendary reputation as a courageous and extraordinarily hard-working battlefield surgeon. He expanded upon his work in Spain by developing mobile army surgical hospitals (MASH), training medical personnel, and writing textbooks on guerilla warfare medicine. He died of sepsis in 1939 after cutting himself while operating on a wounded soldier. He left behind a powerful legacy of solidarity and service which was immortalized by Mao in an essay that was made compulsory reading for Chinese students as one of the "three constantly read articles" of the cultural revolution.

Bethune's relevance is best understood in the West by comparing him to Argentinean revolutionary doctor Che Guevara. Like Che, Bethune left behind a bourgeois background and his country of origin to throw in his lot with a foreign people's struggle for socialism and national liberation. He ultimately became a martyr for this cause and continues to be celebrated as an example of the "New Man."

SEE ALSO: Guevara, Ernesto "Che" (1928–1967); Mao Zedong (1893–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- Hannant, L. (Ed.) (1998) *The Politics of Passion: Norman Bethune's Writing and Art*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Lethbridge, D. (Ed.) (2003) *Bethune: The Secret Police File*. Salmon Arm, BC: Undercurrent Press.
- New Media, D. A. (n.d.) "Comrade" Bethune: A Controversial Hero – People – CBC Archives. Retrieved 05:03:58 3, 2008, from www.archives.cbc.ca/IDD-1-74-1345/people/bethune/.
- Stewart, R. (1977) *The Mind of Norman Bethune*. Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside.

Bezerra, Gregório (1900–1983)

Rogério Fernandes Macedo

Gregório Lourenço Bezerra was born in 1900 in Pernambuco, Brazil. In 1917, he participated in demonstrations in support of the Bolshevik Revolution as well as in the first general strikes for labor rights in Brazil, being arrested for the first time. In 1922 he joined the army, where he was taught to read and write. In 1929 he enrolled in the Sergeant School in Rio de Janeiro, and a year later he joined the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB). He was a leader of the National Alliance for Liberty (ANL), founded in 1935. After the movement's defeat, he was arrested and condemned to 27 years in prison. He received amnesty in 1945, went back to Pernambuco, and presented himself as a PCB candidate for the Federal Congress. In 1948, after the PCB had become illegal, his mandate was abrogated. Bezerra fought for agrarian reform and for rural labor organization. After the military seized power in 1964, he dedicated himself to organizing the rural army's struggle; however, he was arrested and publicly tortured on television. In 1969 Bezerra was exchanged for US ambassador Charles B. Elbrick, who had been kidnapped by the October 8 Revolutionary Movement (MR8). He went into exile in Mexico and the USSR, where he lived for ten years, before returning to Brazil in 1979 and leaving the PCB Central Committee. On October 23, 1983, he died in the city of São Paulo.

SEE ALSO: Brazil, Guerilla Movements, 20th Century; Brazil, Labor Struggles

References and Suggested Readings

- Bezerra, G. L. (1979) *Memórias*, Vol. 1. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.
- Bezerra, G. L. (1980) *Memórias*, Vol. 2. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.

Biennio Rosso (1919–1920)

Pietro Di Paola

The "Biennio Rosso" (Two Red Years) identifies the period between 1919 and 1920 when Italy

seemed to be on the verge of a revolution. Social and industrial protests of unprecedented intensity and scale broke out all over the country. The failure of this insurrectionary movement and the subsequent reaction of industrial and landowner elites with the use of fascist violence, and the support of a middle class frightened by the specter of “bolshevism,” have long been regarded as crucial factors in determining the failure of the liberal state and Mussolini’s rise to power (Detti 1978).

After World War I discontent was widespread. The population was confronted with rising inflation and a dramatic increase in the price of basic goods, whilst extensive unemployment was exacerbated by mass demobilization. Concurrently, affiliation to the trade unions, the Socialist Party (PSI), and the anarchist movement increased dramatically. The PSI grew to a membership of 250,000, and the major trade union, the General Confederation of Labor (Confederazione Generale del Lavoro, CGL), reached two million members, while the anarchist-led Italian Syndicalist Union (Unione Sindacale Italiana, USI) ranged between 300,000 and 500,000 affiliates. The vitality of the anarchist movement was bolstered by the return from exile of the anarchist leader Errico Malatesta, welcomed as the “Lenin of Italy.” The Italian Anarchist Union (Unione Anarchica Italiana, UAI) was founded in July 1920 in Bologna and *Umanità Nuova*, the first anarchist daily newspaper, appeared in Milan in the same year.

However, most social conflicts of the period were characterized by an unparalleled level of autonomy from the direction of parties and trade unions. Indeed, popular discontent quite often burst out spontaneously and unexpectedly.

The question of land was one of the first contradictions to tackle. The government’s failure to fulfill wartime promises to give land to the peasants led to vast rural unrest. These disturbances took different forms depending on the various agricultural systems and social structures characterizing the Italian regions (Vivarelli 1991). From the beginning of 1919, trade unions, landless peasants, ex-servicemen’s groups, and socialist and Catholic leagues promoted the seizure of public and private wasteland dominated by large land estates particularly in the south. Parts of these seizures were later ratified by the Italian government. In the center and the north, where independent small land properties and holdings

were in the majority, strikes were organized by leagues of sharecroppers and day-laborers especially at harvest time.

Disturbances in the countryside accompanied those in urban areas. In May and June 1919, disruptive food riots broke out, posing one of the most dangerous challenges to the established order in postwar Italy (Clark 1973). Cost-of-living riots spread quickly from La Spezia to central and northern Italy, following the contours of anarchism’s political geography (Levy 1999: 121). People assaulted city councils, looted shops, requisitioned goods and food, and organized local food committees. Socialists and Chambers of Labor often had difficulty maintaining control over the insurgents. In broad terms, riots in central Italy were more organized and mobilized different social categories. In big towns, such as Milan, Turin, Naples, or Rome, the participation of the working class was more marked. In the south, Sicily, and Sardinia, peasant leagues and groups of ex-servicemen replaced the socialists and the Chambers of Labor; riots here were often violent and spontaneous. However, in the southern urban areas where the socialist and trade union presence was prevalent, government repression turned out to be particularly harsh and bloody (Bianchi 2006: 118).

It was in this insurrectionary atmosphere that, in 1920, conflict erupted in the industrial triangle in northern Italy. In April, a general strike in defense of the factory council movement was called in Turin.

Through the pages of *L’Ordine Nuovo* Antonio Gramsci and his associates had contributed significantly to the transformation of the internal commissions, a form of workshop organization that had obtained formal recognition by the employers in 1919, into “factory councils.” Factory councils, elected directly by all workers, were meant to become the building blocks of the revolution. They had not only to perform the functions of the internal commissions, but also to assume a managerial role and to maintain and develop organization and discipline among the working class. The factory council movement faced the opposition of the moderate wings of the trade unions and of the Socialist Party, while it was supported by the USI and the anarchists.

Between 1919 and 1920 factory councils experienced dramatic growth. They were established in all the major industries in Turin; however, they did not expand into its hinterland, in Piedmont

and in the other regions. The concept of councils was taken up also by the Catholic leader Guido Miglioli, who organized the peasants' courtyards farm councils in the Po Valley during the harsh rural struggles of summer 1920. In the early spring of 1920, industrial employers launched an offensive against the factory council movement that was challenging their authority in the factories. After the failure of the negotiations regarding the role of the factory councils and the workshop commissars, a lockout was declared on March 29. A Committee of Agitation was promptly established independently of official trade unions, and a general strike was proclaimed in Turin. As factory councils were limited to that city, the strike could only be successful if it gained national support. However, the PSI refused to launch a national campaign to support it and the CGL did not intend to negotiate recognition of the factory councils. Thus, the CGL accepted the employers' terms and the strike was called off on April 23. This event was taken by the radical sectors of the labor movement as ultimate proof of the bad faith and even treason of the reformists (Maione 1975).

Bitterness between revolutionaries and reformists was exacerbated after the Ancona insurrection. A detachment of the rifle regiment to be deployed in Albania mutinied on June 26 with anarchist support. The revolt spread quickly among the population of Ancona and the surrounding villages. The navy bombed the town and after three days of fighting, during which more than 25 rebels were killed, the insurgents surrendered. The revolt was used as a pretext by the PSI to withdraw its participation from the Genoa Congress of the Revolutionary Single Front, a committee launched by the anarchist leader Borghi in an attempt to create a united revolutionary front that would have included the PSI, CGL, USI, the anarchists, and the Railwaymen's Union.

The apex of the Biennio Rosso was reached at the beginning of September when, after several months of weary dispute on pay raises, metalworkers occupied factories all over the peninsula to prevent a lockout by employers. Several non-engineering factories were occupied as well. Paramilitary troops – the Red Guards – were mobilized in defense of the factories, while the workers managed production themselves. Prime Minister Giolitti decided not to intervene. Throughout the occupation, the USI urged for

the extension of the occupation to all industries and for its transformation into an “expropriating general strike,” moving from economic negotiation onto political terrain. But the PSI and the CGL did not intend to follow that route.

Negotiations between leading industrialists, Giolitti, and the CGL ended in a compromise. The prime minister agreed that a joint commission of employers and trade unions should draw up a bill introducing trade union control of industry. After three weeks of occupations without pay, the metalworkers accepted a solution presented as a great victory in a national referendum. In fact, the extent and the consequences of the defeat became evident in a very short time. The bill never materialized and the employers regained full control. The economic crisis of the following year, the disillusion of the workers, the split of the Socialist Party with the creation of the Partito Comunista d'Italia (Communist Party of Italy), and the employers' spirit of revenge opened the doors to the fascist reaction (Spriano 1964).

Historical interpretations of the Biennio Rosso mirror the political divisions and the mutual accusations regarding its failure and its relation to the advent of fascism. The idea that fascism was a direct reaction to stop the revolutionary movement was advanced in the immediate aftermath of the Biennio Rosso (Fabbri 1922). This interpretation remained predominant for a long period. Linked with the above is the view that considered the Biennio Rosso as a “missed opportunity,” the result of reformism and the lack of a proper revolutionary party (Maione 1975). Other scholars instead challenge the “myth” of the Biennio Rosso, questioning whether it actually ever represented a real revolutionary opportunity (Spriano 1964; Clark 1973; Vivarelli 1991).

SEE ALSO: Anarchosyndicalism; Anarchism, Italy; Bordiga, Amadeo (1889–1970) and the Italian Communist Party; Di Vittorio, Giuseppe (1892–1957); Galleani, Luigi (1861–1931); Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Italian Communist Party; Italian Socialist Party; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932); Serrati, Giacinto Menotti (1872–1926)

References and Suggested Readings

Bianchi, R. (2006) *Pace, Pane, Terra. Il 1919 in Italia*. Rome: Odradek Edizioni.

- Clark, M. (1973) *The Failure of Revolution in Italy, 1919–1920*. Reading: Department of Italian Studies, University of Reading.
- Detti, T. (1978) Il Biennio Rosso. In F. Levi, U. Levra, & N. Tranfaglia (Eds.), *Storia d'Italia: Il Mondo Contemporaneo*, 2 vols. Florence: La Nuova Italia.
- Fabbri, L. (1922) *La Contro-rivoluzione preventiva. Riflessioni sul fascismo*. Bologna: L. Capelli.
- Levy, C. (1989) Italian Anarchism, 1870–1926. In D. Goodway (Ed.), *For Anarchism: History, Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge.
- Levy, C. (1999) *Gramsci and the Anarchists*. Oxford: Berg.
- Maione, G. (1975) *Il Biennio Rosso. Autonomia e Spontaneità Operaia nel 1919–1920*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Spriano, P. (1964) *L'Occupazione delle Fabbriche, Settembre 1920*. Turin: Einaudi.
- Vivarelli, R. (1991) *Storia delle Origini del Fascismo. L'Italia dalla Grande Guerra alla Marcia su Roma*, 3 vols. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Biermann, Wolf (b. 1936)

Filip Bloem

The singer-songwriter and poet Wolf Biermann was one of the most prominent socialist dissidents of the communist regime in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). His expulsion from the country in 1976 for supporting democratization and greater individual freedom in the socialist system sparked a flood of protests among leftist dissidents in the GDR and throughout Germany.

Wolf Biermann was born and raised in a communist family in Hamburg, West Germany. His father was killed in Auschwitz in 1943. In 1953 Biermann immigrated to East Berlin to live in a socialist society, where he studied political economy, philosophy, and mathematics. From 1957 to 1959 he was an assistant at the Berliner Ensemble theater, founded by Bertolt Brecht. In his satirical songs Biermann criticized the absurdities of socialist bureaucracy, although he remained a committed socialist. In 1965, after many problems with the East German authorities, he was forbidden to publish or perform any more. This ban did not silence him. Home-made recordings of his songs circulated in the GDR and he gave interviews to West German media that were smuggled into and broadcast in East Germany. Together with his friend and long-time ally, the physicist Robert Havemann (1910–

82), Biermann consistently called for a more democratic socialism in the mode of the Prague Spring, the brief period of democratic reform in Czechoslovakia. He also had sympathies for Eurocommunism, the democratic movement in western communist parties which he hoped would influence the communist parties of Eastern Europe. For all its faults, however, Biermann still thought the GDR better than West Germany, since it had abolished capitalism. Biermann therefore adamantly rejected emigration to the West.

In 1976 Biermann was unexpectedly granted permission to travel to West Germany for a series of concerts. While there, his East German citizenship was revoked. The expulsion of Biermann from East Germany prompted an outcry of protests from leading East German writers such as Stefan Heym and Christa Wolf and is regarded as a turning point in the history of the GDR. In the following years, hundreds of artists, actors, and writers would abandon their hopes for a more liberal cultural policy and leave for West Germany, thereby further undermining the legitimacy of the GDR regime.

Once in West Germany, Biermann slowly lost his belief in the reform of communism. He continued to write songs, commented on political issues, and toured widely. After the fall of the GDR in 1989, Biermann became an ardent supporter of opening the archives of the Ministry for State Security (*Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* or Stasi), the East German secret police, to the public. He also played an important role in the so-called *Literaturstreit*, a debate on the role of writers in the GDR.

SEE ALSO: Brecht, Bertolt (1898–1956); Eurocommunism; German Democratic Republic Protests, 1945–1989; Prague Spring; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Anz, T. (Ed.) (1995) *“Es geht nicht um Christa Wolf”:* *der Literaturstreit im vereinten Deutschland*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch.
- Berbig, R. (Ed.) (1994) *In Sachen Biermann: Protokolle, Berichte und Briefe zu den Folgen einer Ausbürgerung*. Berlin: Links.
- Pleitgen, F. (Ed.) (2006) *Die Ausbürgerung: Anfang vom Ende der DDR*. Berlin: List.
- Neubert, E. (1997) *Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949–1989*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Bonn.
- Rothschild, T. (Ed.) (1976) *Wolf Biermann: Liedermacher u. Sozialist*. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.

Bin Laden, Osama (b. 1957) and al-Qaeda

Lawrence Davidson

Osama bin Laden was born in 1957 into the wealthy bin Laden clan of Saudi Arabia. His father, Awad bin Laden, started as a poor laborer but ended up owner of the largest construction company in the country. The bin Laden family has been close to the royal Saudi family for decades.

Osama was his father's seventh son. Awad died when the boy was only 13. Osama was educated in Jeddah and eventually received a college degree in public administration. He was also raised as a religious Sunni Muslim. He has almost no experience outside of the Muslim world and little understanding of Western secular culture.

As a student Osama was disciplined and hard working, but did not stand out. He appeared to be non-confrontational in nature. When the Grand Mosque in Mecca was taken over by Islamic radicals in 1980, he was as critical of the action as were most other Saudis. Nonetheless, the religious orientation of the family, as well as its high social position, brought him into contact with numerous leading Islamic fundamentalist leaders and scholars. These contacts were influential in his religious and intellectual development and no doubt structured his faith in a way that caused him to accept the need for activism.

Bin Laden saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 as an act of colonial aggression on the part of a godless, but imperialist, Western country. He soon began to raise money to support the Afghan resistance. This effort led to a more personal involvement in the struggle. By 1984 he had established a "guest house" in Peshawar, Pakistan, to house Arab and other fighters bound for the Afghani front. It soon turned into something of a logistical center involved in training and the funneling of men and equipment into Afghanistan.

By 1986 bin Laden was using his immense wealth to establish his own camps within Afghanistan. He had his own command structure, recruited men with military experience from Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere in the Muslim world, and thus created his own private army. The entire apparatus became known as al-Qaeda, or "the firm base." Between 1986 and 1989 bin Laden saw

considerable combat. He was involved in at least five major battles and hundreds of smaller operations. With the Soviets in retreat, bin Laden had reason to believe that his efforts had helped defeat one of the world's two great superpowers.

When bin Laden returned to visit Saudi Arabia in 1989, the government banned him from leaving the country. The reason for this was the Saudi government's fear that bin Laden would now spread his military operations to other Muslim lands, attacking those regimes he perceived as corrupt and inimical to Islam. He was also giving talks throughout the kingdom warning of Iraqi plans to invade Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This embarrassed the Saudi government which, at the time, was on good terms with Saddam Hussein.

When the Iraqis did invade Kuwait in 1990, bin Laden submitted a detailed plan to the Saudi king for the defense of the state. As part of this plan he offered to mobilize the Arab fighters he had commanded in Afghanistan to confront the Iraqis in Kuwait. His reasoning was that if these fighters could defeat the Soviets they could certainly take on Saddam's forces. The Saudi government, however, had no desire to see thousands of radicalized Muslim fighters operating just across their borders, and accepted American military assistance instead of bin Laden's offer.

The Americans had a lot at stake in the Gulf and so were anxious to stop the Iraqis – they were not going to leave the security of their oil interests in the hands of bin Laden's fighters. Bin Laden reacted with disapproval, and he expressed this publicly as well as privately to many of the kingdom's religious scholars and Muslim activists. The Saudi government then limited his movements to the city of Jeddah. In 1991 he was finally able to slip out of Saudi Arabia. He went first to Pakistan and then into Afghanistan, where he sought to mediate between the factions then fighting a civil war for control of the country. The Saudis made several attempts to kidnap him and so, in late 1991, he secretly fled to Sudan.

In Sudan, bin Laden used his experience and contacts in the construction industry to help the government organize and fund large domestic projects. During this time anti-American incidents occurred in Somalia and South Yemen. In both countries the incidents involved people who had been trained in Afghanistan; however, bin Laden's direct connection to these incidents

has not been proven. Nor did he involve himself in Sudan's civil war. Nonetheless, the Saudi regime had him classified as an enemy of the state and, in 1992, froze his assets. In 1994 they withdrew his citizenship. In 1996, feeling that he had become an embarrassment to the Sudanese government, he returned to Afghanistan where he eventually came under the protection of the Taliban government. Shortly after his return to Afghanistan, the Khobar towers, a US military housing complex in Saudi Arabia, was bombed. There is strong suspicion that bin Laden was involved in the planning and financing of this attack.

Also in 1996 bin Laden issued his first "bayan," or public announcement against the United States. Bin Laden titled this statement a "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places." This was a reference to the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden accused the United States of having started, in alliance with the Israelis, a war against the Muslims in which "the Muslims' blood became the cheapest and their wealth as loot to their enemies." He went on to suggest his long-range goal:

There is no other duty after belief than fighting the enemy who is corrupting life and religion. . . . If it is not possible to push back the enemy except by the collective movement of the Muslim people, then there is a duty on the Muslims to ignore the minor differences among themselves. The ill effect of ignoring these differences, at a given period of time, is much less than the ill effect of the occupation of Muslim lands by the main Kafr [infidel]. (www.lib.ecu.edu/govdoc/terrorism.html#binladn)

Bin Laden seeks to unite the Muslim world against the United States, which he sees as the leader of an infidel invasion of Muslim lands. In lieu of the unification, however, the battle has been joined using many of the same fighters who had defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan. Bin Laden describes these men in his declaration, "I say to you [the American leadership] that these youths [Muslim fighters] love death as you love life." By 1998 his threats were turning from theory into practice. In that year bomb attacks were launched against US embassies in East Africa. In 2001 the US naval vessel *Cole* was attacked in Yemen. Bin Laden was almost certainly involved in these actions.

While American (non-Muslim) troops operating on Muslim soil, and especially in the holy land of Arabia, were seen as a sacrilege, this was not bin Laden's only grievance against the United States. He regarded US policy in Iraq, Egypt, and Palestine as part of a Western war on Islam. The way bin Laden interpreted US behavior reflected his worldview and ultimately led to his involvement in the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. At that point he became, at least in the West, the world's best-known, and most wanted "terrorist mastermind." The United States has been hunting for him ever since. However, since 2002, the US government's emphasis on bin Laden has lessened (perhaps because, so far, they have failed to capture him) in favor of seeking out al-Qaeda cells in general.

Bin Laden gave one post-September 11 interview and this was to the Al-Jazeera TV network. It was recorded on October 21, 2001 and subsequently broadcast by CNN in February 2002. In this interview bin Laden stated that "we will work to continue this battle, God permitting, until victory or until we meet God. . . . If killing those who kill our sons is terrorism, then let history be witness that we are terrorists."

The American government has not responded to bin Laden's accusations. No US politician will publicly entertain the possibility that America's post-World War II foreign policy in the Middle East has anything to do with the terrorist (or non-terrorist) actions taken against the country. Thus, since September 11, 2001 American policy has seen a steady escalation in terms of military involvement in the region (as is witnessed by the war in Iraq), the alliance with Israel has grown stronger, and the Bush administration has adopted behaviors that appear to be inviting war with such countries as Iran and Syria. At the same time, however, efforts to pursue Osama bin Laden appear to have become less and less of a priority for the American government.

This may be because bin Laden has proved very difficult to catch. He is allegedly hiding on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border among a population that is willing to protect him. To pursue him would mean alienating the Pakistani government, which shows little interest in angering the border tribes by going after bin Laden. On the other hand, bin Laden alive gives a certain central reality to the otherwise increasingly amorphous nature of al-Qaeda.

The elusiveness of Osama bin Laden has by now earned him the name of “Elvis” among the intelligence agents that still pay attention to him. The suggestion here is that while many people might think they see bin Laden, nobody really does. However, most of those intelligence agents do see clearly that, while his capture would have great symbolic value for the American government, it would not stop terrorism against the United States.

SEE ALSO: Islamic Political Currents

References and Suggested Readings

- Bergen, P. (2002) *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden*. New York: Free Press.
- Coll, S. (2004) *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*. New York: Penguin.
- Hamud, R. B. (2005) *Osama Bin Laden: America's Enemy in His Own Words*. San Diego: Nadeem Publishing.
- Lawrence, B. (2005) *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*. London: Verso.
- Pape, R. (2006) *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House.

Bishop, Maurice (1944–1983)

Immanuel Ness

Born in Aruba on May 29, 1944 to the son of a Grenadian nationalist and populist leader, Maurice Bishop was a revolutionary leader and prime minister of the island nation of Grenada, located in the southern Lesser Antilles, in the Southeastern Caribbean Sea. Growing up in Grenada in abject poverty, he was drawn to political life through the British disregard for the island's Afro-Caribbean working class and peasant population. Like a growing number of Caribbean nationalists, Bishop was drawn to Marxist-Leninism as a means to create independence and class and racial equality. To achieve this goal Bishop helped form the New Jewel movement in 1973 and was critical to the organization's growth through advancing a Marxist democratic political program of nationalization of the island's sparse economic resources and the formation of an equalitarian society.

Bishop's connection to communist governments, especially Cuba, alarmed the US, and historians

have found documentary evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) orchestrated a political crisis in Grenada through supporting opponents of the Bishop government in 1982 and 1983. The CIA coordinated a *coup d'état* against Bishop by arming military supporters of Bernard Coard, former deputy prime minister. On October 13, 1983 Coard, Bishop's former law partner, seized power and six days later mass demonstrations against the military coup fomented a national crisis.

Bishop was placed under house arrest and the Grenadian army seized control of the major military and communications installations. However, popular support for Bishop broke into mass demonstrations which overwhelmed the military government. On September 16 protesters overtook the beleaguered military guard, setting Bishop free. In the ensuing days the Grenadian army fired rounds of ammunition into large crowds of supporters shielding Bishop from the military at Market Square and the Fort Rupert military installation in St. George, Grenada's capital. On September 19, 1983 Bishop and his Cabinet ministers in the NJM were executed without trial immediately after the military overpowered the masses that were protecting them at Fort Rupert. Nonetheless, since the majority of the population continued to support Bishop and the New Jewel movement, the military government stood on shaky ground.

On October 25, 1983, two days following the bombing of the US government's own military installation in Beirut, Lebanon, Ronald Reagan used the opportunity to order an invasion of Grenada on the grounds that growing popular unrest and the presence of Cuban forces posed a threat to American medical students (who were known to be out of harm's way). The contingent of some 6,000 US Marines, joined by a small delegation of troops from Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, routed all opposition, imprisoned activists, and killed leading officials in the NJM. Subsequently, the Grenadian government arrested 16 leaders of the military that overthrew and killed Bishop and sentenced them to life imprisonment. However, more than twenty years after the coup d'état, popular support remains for the legacy of Bishop, who sought to bring economic justice to the island where poverty is rampant and inequality continues to grow. In Grenada, nostalgia remains for the legacy of Maurice Bishop among the country's working class and peasants.

SEE ALSO: Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (b. 1953); Caribbean Islands, Protests Against IMF; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Grenadian Revolution, 1979–1983; New Jewel Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Crandall, R. (2006) *Gunboat Democracy: The United States Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Marcus, B. & Taber, M. (1983) *Maurice Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution and Its Overthrow 1979–1983*. New York: Pathfinder Books.
- Meeks, B. (2001) *Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory: An Assessment of Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada*. Kingston: University of West Indies Press.

Black nationalism, 19th and 20th centuries

Albert Scharenberg

As a general idea, Black Nationalism is present where African people live – on the continent as well as in its diaspora. As a social movement, however, it first surfaced about two centuries ago and has mostly been associated with the African American resistance tradition and the fight against racism and oppression in the United States. Theoretically, it can be conceptualized as a minority's "nationalism of liberation," and politically it may be articulated either as a progressive or a reactionary program.

Theoretical Context

In the theoretical context, Black Nationalism can be classified as a specific "nationalism of liberation" which evolved in response to the legacy of racial slavery in the United States. The institutionalization of racial slavery in the English colonies established an American apartheid that remained in effect even after slavery had been abolished during the Civil War. Residential, educational, workplace, and other forms of segregation continued to forcefully exclude blacks from the benefits of white society. This systemic exploitation, exclusion, and unequal distribution of power was symbolically upheld and reproduced by a white American nationalism which developed immediately after the American Revolution and was founded on an ideological marriage of egalitarian democracy and biological racism. Racism was thereby deeply inscribed into American

society and consciousness; skin color became, as African American writer James Baldwin noted in "The Fire Next Time" (1963), "a political reality."

For African Americans, it was a hostile environment created by white supremacy and "uneven development." Martin R. Delaney, one of the founding fathers of Black Nationalism, compared the American situation to internal colonialism within Britain, the Habsburg Empire, and Russia. Blacks eventually were, as a means of their survival, forced to form their own parallel institutions, most importantly the black churches, starting with the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME Church) founded by Richard Allen in 1786. These separate black institutions in turn provided the social space for the creation of a semi-independent black civil society. They gradually became "nationalizing institutions" for the social construction and daily reproduction of black minority nationalism.

This sense of being part of, yet separate from, white America led to a feeling that black intellectual W. E. B. DuBois described as a "double consciousness" in his 1903 "The Souls of Black Folk." Black nationalists emphasize the "African" side of this duality, while integrationist approaches have traditionally made the case for the "Americanness" of blacks. While the latter have fought for inclusion into the existing institutions of American society, the former have rejected the values, practices, and institutions of white America, conceived of as still closed for blacks, and tried to obtain some sort of independence or even territorial separation from the former slaveholders. Historically, integrationism was strongest in times of high mobilization of blacks, for instance, after the Civil War or during the heyday of the modern civil rights movement. In contrast, Black Nationalism was particularly strong in times of black disillusionment, such as from the late nineteenth century to the time of Marcus Garvey in the 1910s and 1920s (described by historian Wilson J. Moses as "Golden Age of Black Nationalism") and in the Black Power period of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Black Nationalism contains two aspects: anti-racist solidarity and "orthodox" nationalism. On the one hand, it represents the collective black resistance struggle against racial domination and exclusion. In this respect, Black Nationalism differs substantially from European or American nationalism. On the other hand, it is still a

form of nationalism. Opposition to the blacks' exclusion from the American national community is articulated in nationalist terms, symbols, and concepts. To this extent, "orthodox" Black Nationalism signifies – as many works have shown for nationalisms of liberation in Asia and Africa as well – a reaction to and "an adoption or even imitation of European ideas" (Kedourie 1971). As any nationalism of liberation, it thus represents an ambivalent phenomenon.

Definition and Common Denominators

As a response to white racism, Black Nationalism can be defined as a nationalism of the racially excluded. However, "nation," "nationalism," and "nationalist minority" are not substantialist, but rather contingent terms; they mark a field of competitive positions adopted by different organizations, parties, movements, or individuals seeking to represent the minority, as Rogers Brubaker states in "Nationalism Reframed" (1996). In fact, African Americans have at times adopted varying interpretations and contesting constructions to make sense of their situation in the United States. As a contingent phenomenon, "Black Nationalism, like other nationalisms, is no clear-cut guide to present action; it represents rather a cluster of related ideas" (Carlisle 1975). The main related ideas characteristic of the various black nationalist approaches are (1) the historically founded distrust of white people, their deeds and institutions; (2) a "black" standpoint, i.e., the assessment of politics from the perspective of the dominated blacks; (3) the imagination of the black community as a "nation within a nation"; (4) the reference to common African roots and enslavement; (5) the positive emphasis of the black culture that evolved in the context of racial segregation; (6) the accentuation of the necessity for acting jointly and organizing "all-black" organizations, i.e., of anti-racist and nationalist solidarity; and (7) the perspective of autonomy, i.e., of economic, social, political, and cultural (but not necessarily territorial) independence (Scharenberg 1998).

Beyond these rather general denominators black nationalists share little common ground. There is neither a common interpretation of the blacks' plight in the United States, nor agreement on proper political action. Its adherents may embrace left-wing or right-wing political pro-

grams, revolutionary or cultural nationalism, territorial separatism or "soft" community control, etc. While in the twentieth century, religious nationalism, cultural nationalism, and revolutionary (left) nationalism have been the most important currents, black nationalist ideologies can be distinguished according to both their contents and strategies.

As regards content, economic, political, cultural, educational, and religious nationalism may be distinguished. With respect to strategy, the main goals of Black Nationalism are emigration to Africa, territorial separatism in North America, self-determination within the United States, revolutionary nationalism, and Pan-Africanism. These distinctions, however, are largely analytical; in reality, many different combinations of these elements exist.

Contents of Black Nationalism

In particular, concerning content, the different elements to a certain degree belong together, as Marcus Garvey's internationally organized "Universal Negro Improvement Association" (UNIA) demonstrates, which included elements of economic, political, religious, educational, and cultural nationalism. On the other hand, most forms of Black Nationalism put one of these elements at the center of their ideology.

Economic Nationalism

The economic form of Black Nationalism stresses the importance of the economic advancement of black people. In this respect, Booker T. Washington's emphasis on "Black capitalism" has served as the ideological basis of most forms of economic nationalism, but the roots of this line of thought can actually be traced back to Paul Cuffe's involvement with Sierra Leone and the British African Institution. Martin Delany's plans for settling American blacks in the Yoruba territory in western Africa also rested largely upon economic nationalism. The best-known enterprise, however, was Marcus Garvey's Black Star Line designed to bring blacks "back to Africa." The basic idea behind the advocacy of black capitalism is that business owners may do good for the community by employing blacks, by giving back a portion of their earnings to blacks, and by giving blacks a place to shop and do business beyond the reach of white hostility. More often than not, economic nationalism mainly

reflects the interests of those sections of the black upper and middle classes who have historically strived for economic control of the black segregated communities. However, the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaigns of the 1930s and in particular the formation of all-black unions such as A. Philip Randolph’s Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters or the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM) associated with the League of Revolutionary Black Workers of the 1960s reflect another (left) interpretation of economic nationalism.

Political Nationalism

Another form of Black Nationalism focuses on the political organization of African Americans. The best-known case in point is the cry for Black Power of the 1960s first articulated by Stokely Carmichael (later renamed Kwame Touré) of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). The goal was to redistribute power and to change the society’s power relations, thereby liberating African Americans from the whites’ enduring political domination. Political nationalism may also be expressed in the formation of “all-black” political parties such as the revolutionary nationalist Black Panther Party. Moreover, elements of political nationalism also exist within “black caucuses” (including the Congressional Black Caucus founded in 1970), or in the electoral campaigns of certain black candidates running for public office, especially in black majority cities, where nationalism has served as a foundation of radical political activism, as James Jennings notes in “The Politics of Black Empowerment” (1992).

Cultural Nationalism

Cultural Black Nationalism emphasizes the autonomy, longevity, and value of black culture – and particularly the African roots and heritage of black Americans. Focusing on the cultural and psychological effects of slavery and racism, this nationalism particularly cuts across the other variants, uniting quite different ideologies and movements ranging from “soft” versions merely emphasizing “black pride” (“Black is beautiful”) to “hard” interpretations of mental separatism. Generally, there are two levels of cultural nationalism. First, as an expression of African American culture, the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s and the Black Arts movement led by Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) in the 1960s are

examples of cultural nationalism (as was the international *Négritude* movement). Second, and apart from cultural production and the arts, the term refers to nationalists in the tradition of Maulana Ron Karenga and his Californian “US Organization” (United Slaves) of the 1960s. Karenga’s ideas such as Kwanzaa represent the prototype of cultural nationalism. In this tradition, “Afrocentricity” propagated by, among others, Molefi Kete Asante, has in recent years turned out to be the most visible form of cultural nationalism. Generally, cultural nationalists refrain from politics; they have either rejected or remained silent about the state and the need to capture state power. Black cultural nationalists instead focus on a spiritual return of American blacks to their supposedly “true” African culture and identity, and thus on a strict “mental separatism” vis-à-vis white American society.

Educational Nationalism

Black Nationalism aiming at both child education and the reform of educational institutions is known as educational nationalism. This is more or less closely linked to cultural nationalism in a broader sense. Concerning child upbringing, nationalists aim at instilling “black pride” and “self-respect” into black children. Concerning the reform of educational institutions, students as well as faculty in the Black Power period of the late 1960s started criticizing college curricula for not really dealing with African Americans or dealing with them only in stereotypes. A further critique was that college faculty did not include a proper share of blacks. As a result, Black (or African American) Studies Departments were institutionalized at many universities and colleges, beginning in 1967 at San Francisco State College. More recently – and sparking off a national controversy – cultural nationalists have been demanding a specific “African-centered education” for high schools and colleges.

Religious Nationalism

Religious nationalism criticizes the oppression of African Americans primarily in religious terms. Whites are often seen as collective sinners or as “the devil,” violating God-given rules. Religious nationalists do not see political action, but God’s intervention, as the road to liberation. Religious nationalists come from various denominations. There are black Christian nationalists in the tradition of Henry McNeal Turner (AME

Church), Marcus Garvey (African Orthodox Church), Albert B. Cleage (Shrine of the Black Madonna) and others, preaching a black liberation theology based on the idea that “God is found among the black oppressed who were being destroyed by ‘respectable’ white murderers,” as James H. Cone writes in “For My People: Black Theology and the Black Church” (1984). Another religious nationalist group is the Black Hebrew Israelites.

The most important religious nationalist organization, however, has been the Lost-Found Nation of Islam in the Wilderness of North America, or Nation of Islam (NOI). As an offspring of Noble Drew Ali’s Moorish Science Temple of America, the NOI was founded by Wallace D. Fard in 1930, who subsequently was deified by his successor Elijah Muhammad. The NOI rose to national prominence in the late 1950s and 1960s under the leadership of Malcolm X, and after Elijah’s death, his son Wallace Muhammad moved the organization closer to Sunni Islam. Louis Farrakhan reestablished the “old” NOI in the late 1970s. The NOI claims that whites are genetically determined to be a “race of devils,” and that Christianity and Judaism are their “devilish” religions. Contrary to this, blacks are supposedly “chosen,” and Islam is said to be their “natural” religion. Only by taking on the Islamic faith will blacks save themselves from destruction (a claim already established by Americo-Liberian Edward W. Blyden). The so-called Nation of Gods and Earth, commonly known as the Five-Percent Nation, is a radical offspring of the NOI and an important reference for many nationalist rappers.

Goals and Strategies

Although many black nationalists favor separatism, either physically or mentally, Black Nationalism should not be limited to territorial separatism (Hall 1978). As regards strategy, self-determination within the United States, revolutionary nationalism and Pan-Africanism represent non-separatist forms of Black Nationalism. In addition, there are various intersections between the following strategies, as well as between goals and contents.

The oldest strategy that was popular during much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was “Back to Africa.” The collective exodus from the white man’s Babylon, ending

the involuntary presence of African people in the Americas, was perceived as the road to liberation. Emigration was, however, more a negative reaction than a positive identification. In other words, if things in America got worse, glorification of Africa mushroomed – in particular, because American blacks at that time had little if any knowledge about the African past and present.

There were many attempts to realize black re-migration, starting with Cuffe, who managed to bring the first 38 blacks to Freetown, Sierra Leone, in 1815. At times, white people, including Abraham Lincoln, have supported emigrationism, in particular via the American Colonization Society (ACS). This group, which survived until the 1960s, brought thousands of blacks to Africa and founded the colony of Liberia. Most blacks resisted the efforts of the ACS and chose to support their own African settlement schemes. Prominent advocates of independent emigrationism include Martin R. Delaney and Marcus Garvey. Contemporary cultural nationalists have taken up the idea, too, though they claim to “go back” only spiritually. Today, the main ideology still favoring long-term emigration is Jamaican Rastafarianism.

The “classic” nationalist goal is to establish an independent nation-state. This is true for Black Nationalism as well, and some demand a separate black state on the territory of what today is the United States. Assuming that American whites will never accept the full emancipation of African Americans, territorial separatism is seen as the key to black liberation. Already in the nineteenth century, black nationalists had tried to promote a black state by encouraging African American migration to Kansas and later Oklahoma (Carlisle 1975). Between 1928 and 1934, the American Communist Party (CPUSA), following Cyril Brigg’s African Blood Brotherhood, propagated the right of African Americans to establish an independent nation-state on the territory of the Black Belt in the Deep South. When the party abandoned this position in favor of the “popular front” concept, a nucleus of black nationalist communists had formed around Harry Haywood and Queen Mother Moore.

Moore later co-founded the Republic of New Africa (RNA), along with Milton and Richard Henry (later renamed Gaidi and Imari Obadele) and other activists from the Malcolm X Society. The RNA follows Malcolm X’s idea from his

“Message to the Grassroots” (1963) that “land is the basis of independence.” Today, the RNA’s radical left territorial separatism – ideologically founded on the assumption that Africans in the US have become a new people, i.e., “New Afrikans” (Lumumba 1992) – is also upheld by groups such as the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement. Territorial separatist demands have also been raised by the Nation of Islam.

Importantly, however, Black Nationalism on American soil is not necessarily separatist. A “softer” version primarily aims at African American self-determination in the form of community control. In a society still largely dominated by white people, the underlying idea resembles the political demand for Black Power, but this power is supposed to be obtained within the – albeit reformed – framework of American society. Therefore, such strategies, which have also been described as “a Black version of ethnic pluralism” (Robinson 2001), are located at the intersection of nationalism and radical integrationism and have been pursued by nationalists and radical reformist activists alike.

Yet another strategy is revolutionary nationalism. Revolutionary nationalist positions were already popular before the Civil War. In 1829 two black activists – David Walker, in his famous “Walker’s Appeal,” and Robert A. Young, in his “Ethiopian Manifesto” – claimed that African Americans were “a nation within a nation” and raised their voices for a “second American revolution.” Since the twentieth century, revolutionary nationalism has generally referred to the radical left wing of Black Nationalism in the United States, i.e., the various socialist, communist, and New Afrikan organizations. Their adherents have come up with a distinct analysis and political strategy.

Presuming that the root cause for the oppression of African Americans rests with the economic and political system of the United States, revolutionary nationalists claim that the only way to black liberation is to overthrow the existing order. Due to their anti-capitalist stance, they usually favor some sort of cooperation with radical leftists from other ethnic/national groups, including whites. The most important revolutionary nationalist organization was the Black Panther Party for Self-Defence (BPP), founded in Oakland in 1966 by Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale. Known worldwide for its call to take up firearms to protect black people

from police brutality and white racist violence, it was the leading all-black organization of the late 1960s and was very popular with the international student movement. Like other radical black groups, the BPP was targeted by the FBI’s illegal Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO). During the downfall of the BPP, the Black Liberation Army (BLA), loosely allied with the Weather, an offshoot of the militant Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), radicalized the BPP’s concept and went underground.

Finally, Pan-Africanism, originally largely developed in the Caribbean, revolves around the connection between the blacks’ plight in the Western hemisphere and in Africa. Its adherents claim that progress can only be achieved through blacks’ mutual support. Pan-Africanism, which may be termed a form of black internationalism, seeks to unite and uplift Africans both on the continent and in the diaspora as part of the global African community. Some organizations such as the African People’s Socialist Party (APSP), the All-African People’s Revolutionary Party (A-APRP), and the National Black United Front (NBUF) have particularly focused on Pan-African solidarity. However, in a broader sense, many (if not most) black nationalists claim to be sympathetic to this cause.

Commonly, W. E. B. Du Bois (1869–1963), an academic and progressive political activist, is considered to be the father of Pan-Africanism in the United States. Next to many other activities, including the founding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Du Bois organized a series of Pan-African Congresses between 1919 and 1945. The last one was attended by, among others, George Padmore from Trinidad, as well as African leaders Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta and was a precursor of the Bandung Conference ten years later. Another key figure of Pan-Africanism was Malcolm X, in particular, because of his journeys to Africa and his Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU), patterned after the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Criticism

Black Nationalism has been criticized by academics as well as activists, though at times even critics staunchly defended the anti-racist element constitutive of this nationalism of liberation

(Collins 2006). In their view, the fight against enduring white racism requires some form of “national” solidarity among the racially excluded. National/ethnic discrimination should thus not be understood as a mere ideological construction that can be overcome rather easily, but as a form of systemic oppression. In this context, Black Nationalism has to be conceptualized as part of the African American resistance tradition.

The dialectic of Black Nationalism means, however, that it contains two sides: anti-racism as well as “orthodox” nationalism. The latter has been subjected to fierce criticism. Much of this criticism, though specifically directed at Black Nationalism, applies to any nationalist ideology.

Nationalists have repeatedly been charged with using false categories in historiography and with “reading back” nationality into history. Likewise, black nationalists have been criticized for their primordial views of history and culture, as well as for “inventing” tradition. Afrocentric writings about history are a good case in point. By celebrating the reputed “greatness” of African (in fact, mostly Egyptian) culture, cultural nationalists are inventing a “feel-good history,” romantically leaving out the dark sides inherent in any culture, as liberal historian Arthur M. Schlesinger criticizes in his book *This Disuniting of America* (1992). Moreover, if they derive today’s individual rights and duties, moral values and behavioral principles from what is supposed to be ancient African traditions, they are actually “freezing” ever-changing culture – as if there were solutions for contemporary problems to be found in the ancient tombs of Pharaohs. Accordingly, African American culture is not the outcome of any “substance” inherent in African traditions and peoples, but rather a new “hybrid” culture determined by the various necessities of surviving in a racialized, segregated, and hostile environment.

The nationalist approach is also problematic with respect to politics. It has often been argued that the post-colonial development of many African liberation movements demonstrates the deep ambivalence of nationalist ideologies – after their leaders got in power, they more often than not quickly reestablished traditional power relations, in particular with respect to gender and ethnic/tribal affairs, and returned to “business as usual.” Currently, Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe’s Black Nationalism is a good case

in point. Ignoring this historic experience or playing it down as a mere “accident” imprisons reason and openly invites its historic repetition.

Also, Black Nationalism, as any nationalism, is a politically contingent phenomenon that may be articulated in different ways. According to Marable and Mullings (1994), “Black nationalism can be progressive, but it can also be reactionary, sexist, homophobic and pro-corporate capitalist.” It is the latter, reactionary version that has drawn most of the criticism directed at black nationalist identity politics. Since black nationalists see white racism as the main (if not only) form of domination, African American identity is supposed to revolve around issues of “race” and nationality. Black nationalism, therefore, tends to reduce the society’s complexity and power relations to just one factor, “insisting that the individual has no identity apart from his nation” (Kedourie 1971). This ideological “reductionism” inherent in (black) nationalist ideology serves as a means not only for generating unity, but also for the legitimization of internal domination; issues such as class and gender tend to be neglected or completely done away with.

Within conservative Black Nationalism the interests of the economically superior are usually depicted as being identical with the interests of all – despite the fact that capitalism has largely failed black people in the US, as well as globally. Accordingly, many black nationalists argue against welfare as “generating dependency” among blacks. Furthermore, socially constructed roles such as gender and “race” are depicted as naturally given. Likewise, homosexuality has been condemned as “European decadence” and a deviation from “true blackness.” In fact, many black nationalists propagate views about “Black manhood” that are quite similar to the “traditional family values” put forth by white Christian fundamentalists. In his book *Black Nationalism* (1962) Nigerian scholar Essien U. Essien-Udom has to that effect compared the NOI to the Puritans. Black nationalists’ reactionary gendered visions of black liberation have been increasingly targeted within the black community, in particular, by feminists/womanists.

In public discourse, especially within the media, Black Nationalism is furthermore labeled racist. This accusation has to be carefully scrutinized though, because firstly it can be (and in fact is) used as an excuse for white racism, and secondly because only access to power

provides the opportunity to transform ideological constructs of “race” into a relationship of racial dominance. However, reactionary Black Nationalism does indeed essentialize “race” and has accordingly been criticized for remaining imprisoned by the logic of racialization (Glaude 2002). In particular, visions such as the NOI’s mythology of “Yacub’s history” are as much a response to white racial domination as a copy of it. Moreover, a biological understanding of “race” has historically served as the ideological basis for the much-criticized cooperation between certain black nationalists (including Garvey and the NOI) and white supremacist groups.

Black Nationalism has also been charged with anti-Semitism. While many (if not most) black nationalists are not, some reactionary groups may indeed be called anti-Semitic. Again, it was the NOI that published a treatise on “The Secret Relationship Between Blacks and Jews” (1991) that was shaped by anti-Semitism, and Farrakhan’s speeches have at times had clearly anti-Semitic overtones. While the NOI seems to recently have toned down its anti-Semitism, the so-called New Black Panther Party (no relation to the historic BPP), basically a splinter group led by expelled NOI leader Khalid Muhammad until his death in 2001, frankly admits to being anti-Semitic, blaming Jews for, among other things, the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, as white racists have also done. As a result, these groups have increasingly been counted among “hate groups.”

Finally, “hard” particularistic versions of Black Nationalism have repeatedly been criticized for falling into the trap of “divide and conquer.” The more particularistic their ideology is framed, the more unity is prevented among blacks through internal gender and class divisions, as well as concerning potential alliances with other oppressed groups which many activists have strived for. The question remains: How should racial and ethnic domination be addressed within liberation politics of the twenty-first century?

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism; Malcolm X (1925–1965)

References and Suggested Readings

Bracey, J. H. et al. (Eds.) (1970) *Black Nationalism in America*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

- Carlisle, R. (1975) *The Roots of Black Nationalism*. Port Washington: Kennikat Press.
- Collins, P. H. (2006) *From Black Power to Hip Hop: Racism, Nationalism, and Feminism*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Cone, J. H. (1984) *For My People: Black Theology and the Black Church*. Maryknoll: Orbis Books.
- Glaude, E. S., Jr. (Ed.) (2002) *Is It Nation Time? Contemporary Essays on Black Power and Black Nationalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hall, R. L. (1978) *Black Separatism in the United States*. Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College.
- Kedourie, E. (Ed.) (1971) *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Lumumba, C. (1992) *The Roots of the New Afrikan Independence Movement*. Jackson, MS: New Afrikan Productions.
- Malcolm X, with Alex Haley (1965) *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*. New York: Grove Press.
- Marable, M. & Mullings, L. (1994) The Divided Mind of Black America: Race, Ideology and Politics in the Post-Civil Rights Era. *Race and Class* 36 (1): 61–72.
- Moses, W. J. (Ed.) (1996) *Classical Black Nationalism: From the American Revolution to Marcus Garvey*. New York: New York University Press.
- Pinkney, A. (1976) *Red, Black, and Green: Black Nationalism in the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Robinson, D. E. (2001) *Black Nationalism in American Politics and Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scharenberg, A. (1998) *Schwarzer Nationalismus in den USA: Das Malcolm X-Revival* [Black Nationalism in the United States: The Malcolm X Revival]. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
- Segal, R. (1995) *The Black Diaspora: Five Centuries of the Black Experience Outside Africa*. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.
- Stuckey, S. (Ed.) (1972) *The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Van Deburg, W. L. (Ed.) (1997) *Modern Black Nationalism: From Marcus Garvey to Louis Farrakhan*. New York: New York University Press.

Black Panthers

Yohuru Williams

Born out of diverse elements of protest in the late 1960s, including the civil rights movement, a parallel Black Power movement, and third world liberation struggles, the Black Panther Party (BPP) emerged in Oakland, California in October 1966. The Panthers articulated a program that called for Marxist revolution as a remedy for

the unequal distribution of wealth and rampant racism they saw at the core of American society. Through their Ten Point Program its leaders Huey Newton (1942–89) and Bobby Seale (b. 1936) demanded full employment for the black community, education reform, armed patrols of the police to insure the defense and safety of black people, and in a final summary, land, bread, peace, and justice.

The Panthers' armed patrols of the police garnered the most attention, and soon the group was the target of investigation from both state and federal law enforcement agencies. Although often at odds with their "survival programs" that approximated the work of liberal government anti-poverty initiatives, of a stripe that became common especially during President Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, the Panthers' militant posturing and use of revolutionary rhetoric invited closer scrutiny by law enforcement, most notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Law enforcement agencies often emphasized the revolutionary nature of the organization and its ties to third world revolutionary violence. The Panthers were soon one of the primary targets of the FBI's counterintelligence program COINTELPRO, which often crossed the line into provocation and violence in an effort to arrest the growth and influence of the organization. This government campaign, coupled with political infighting, organizational troubles, and problems in the leadership, ultimately led to the demise of the organization in the early 1980s.

In spite of its reputation as a violent and revolutionary group, Alkebulan (2007) has argued that over the course of its history the party underwent three distinctive phases, transforming from an organization committed to armed revolutionary struggle to one that embraced community service and even electoral politics as the key to substantive social, economic, and political change. The Panthers proved to be the most radical during their first phase, which Alkebulan argues lasted between 1966 and 1971. Calling for a violent revolution in the United States, it is this image of the party that remains most dominant in scholarship and popular culture.

Murch (2007) attributes the emergence of the BPP to three important factors: black southern migration to California in the decades during and after World War II, migrants' subsequent encounter with the carceral state, and the

younger generation's response to the worldwide expansion and democratization of education that coincided with their arrival on the West Coast. From the South the party inherited not only its ideas about armed self-defense, but also a deep investment in the transformative power of education. In Oakland black youth benefited from the state network of public campuses. Merritt College, located on the edge of northwest Oakland, became the genesis point for a number of different black radical organizations, including the Soul Students Advisory Council, West Coast RAM, and finally the BPP. Murch's work challenges the popular view of the Panthers as little more than a politicized street gang by exploring the party's origins in the rich intellectual and cultural milieu of the East Bay and its extensive network of public colleges and universities. At the heart of the Panther movement was a remarkable story of black youth trying to make their education relevant to the plight of generations of African Americans long denied participation in the political process, access to decent housing, and relentless exposure to the dehumanizing impact of incarceration and police brutality.

Both contemporaries and scholars have debated the nature of the Panthers. More sympathetic assessments see the party's angry rhetoric and call for retaliatory violence as a logical outgrowth of black oppression. Others, however, argue that the media has paid the group too much attention, adding substance to something that was really hollow symbol. Recent accounts, such as Joseph (2006), have treated the party in a more sophisticated manner, showing that the Panthers were more than an angry reaction to the slow pace of civil rights. Those who joined the ranks of the Panthers were not merely disenchanting urbanities, but lay claim to a parallel Black Power movement that was local, national, and international in its goals and focus. When the BPP looked to third world revolutionaries for ideas and inspiration, for instance, they were continuing a tradition within the Black Power movement of individuals like Malcolm X and Robert Williams of seeing the global nature of social, economic, and political oppression.

One thing that is clear is that the Panthers impacted the civil rights movement. They functioned as a protest organization by anchoring their activities in the local communities in which they

became involved. While their radical posture often proved a problem for more staid civil rights organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), they had serious appeal among both radical and moderate influences for their ability to inspire change through action as protest. Indeed, their revolutionary rhetoric inspired parallel organizations who adopted the Panthers' methods and often its message. Ogbar (2005) demonstrates how a host of other like-minded organizations including the American Indian Movement and the Puerto Rican Young Lords experimented in their own ways with the Panthers' radical critique of American society, creating parallel raced-based movements for community and cultural empowerment.

A subtext to this discussion is just how revolutionary the Black Panthers were. Rhodes (2007) argues that the Panthers rejected the United States, a country that had long oppressed blacks, but that they maintained hope in the country's democratic principles. Thus, in spite of their radical critique of American society, the Panthers helped deepen American democracy by challenging it to live up to its broadest and most liberal interpretations.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Malcolm X (1925–1965)

References and Suggested Readings

- Alkebulan, P. (2007) *Survival Pending Revolution*. Tuscaloosa: Alabama University Press.
- Austin, C. (2006) *Up Against the Wall: Violence in the Making and the Unmaking of the Black Panther Party*. Fayetteville: Arkansas University Press.
- Garrow, D. (2007) Picking Up the Books: The New Historiography of the Black Panther Party. *Reviews in American History* 35: 650–70.
- Joseph, P. (2006) *Waiting 'Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Lazerow, J. & Williams, Y. (Eds.) (2006) *In Search of the Black Panther Party*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Lazerow, J. & Williams, Y. (2008) *Liberated Territory: Toward a Local History of the Black Panther Party*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Murch, D. (2007) The Campus and the Street: Race, Migration, and the Origins of the Black Panther Party in Oakland. *CA Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society* (October–December): 333–45.

Ogbar, J. (2005) *Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Rhodes, J. (2007) *Framing the Black Panthers: The Spectacular Ride of a Black Power Icon*. New York: New Press.

Williams, Y. (2008) *Black Politics/White Power: Civil Rights, Black Power and Black Panthers in New Haven*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Black September

Kristian Patrick Alexander

Often referred to as the “era of regrettable events,” Black September draws its lineage from the consequences of the Arab–Israeli War of 1948 and the exodus of more than half a million Palestinian refugees to Transjordan. After the annexation of the West Bank that same year, King Abdullah of Jordan had to account for an additional 400,000 Palestinians now settled in his territory, shifting Jordan's total population to two-thirds Palestinian. This set the stage for future clashes between a politicized majority of discontented Palestinians and the Jordanian monarchy.

During the 1950s and 1960s the Jordanian regime, now under the reign of King Hussein, was subjected to various currents of Nasserism, Baathism, and communism that led to a heightened sense of pan-Arab and anti-western sentiments. This would eventually lead to the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964. The PLO's mission was the complete annihilation of Israel and the promotion of an Arab state. In addition the PLO recognized the pan-Arabism of Egyptian President Nasser. These ideological currents were especially appealing to Palestinians in Jordan, making its ties to Britain a serious liability. King Hussein eventually severed the mutual defense pact with Britain and ultimately refused to join a pro-western Baghdad pact. In 1967, King Hussein would join Egypt and Syria in the Arab–Israeli War, a move that would prove fatal and lead to the loss of the West Bank.

The defeat at the hands of Israel seemingly weakened Nasser's influence, which allowed for the emergence of Yasser Arafat, an advocate of guerilla warfare and a founding member of the Fatah, one of the largest Palestinian political parties. Arafat was instrumental in incorporating the Fatah into the PLO and began to use

fedayeen guerillas in a campaign of cross-border attacks into Israel. The failures of 1967 left a lasting impression on Palestinians as they began to doubt that the Jordanian government could facilitate a return to their homeland. King Hussein initially permitted PLO guerillas to organize and strike at Israel from Jordanian territory, believing that he would gain some level of influence over their operations. However, as time passed, it became evident that the PLO desired to establish an independent base of operation, with its own administrative networks in refugee camps.

In 1968, Israeli forces launched a counterattack on the Fatah in the village of Karameh, the home of a Palestinian refugee camp. During the attack the fedayeen received support from Jordanian troops against the orders of King Hussein, which allowed them to avoid a complete slaughter. By 1970, after several failed attempts to negotiate a ceasefire amongst all involved in the conflict, King Hussein called upon the United States for assistance. That summer US Secretary of State William Rogers formulated a peace plan between the Arabs and Israelis that was supported by both Egypt and Jordan but was vehemently opposed by the PLO. The Rogers Plan called for recognition of the state of Israel. Certain radical organizations within the PLO were now aiming at undermining pro-western Jordan by publicly calling for the overthrow of King Hussein.

On September 7, 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the second largest faction of the PLO, hijacked four civilian airliners and landed three of them on Jordanian territory, where they were later blown up after all the passengers had been released. As noted by Philip Robins in *A History of Jordan* (2004), this event symbolized to Jordan and King Hussein “a humiliating demonstration of weakness and the lawlessness into which the kingdom had sunk.” King Hussein considered the hijackings as a direct threat to his authority in Jordan and responded by declaring martial law on September 16. The fedayeen were then ordered to lay down their arms and to evacuate the cities. Ironically, Arafat became supreme commander of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), the regular military force of the PLO, on the very same day.

Over the next ten days an intense, bloody civil war was fought between the PLA and

Jordan Arab Army, with Syria coming to aid the fedayeen. The United States Navy and Israel both took “precautionary military deployments” to aid Hussein. After Syrian forces began to withdraw on September 24, the fedayeen finally agreed to a ceasefire on September 25. Three days later Hussein and Arafat met in Cairo and signed an agreement that would relocate fedayeen guerilla forces from Jordanian cities to “appropriate” towns for continuing the battle with Israel.

On October 13, Hussein and Arafat signed an additional agreement in Amman that would require the fedayeen to recognize Jordanian sovereignty and the king’s authority, to withdraw their armed forces from towns and villages, and to refrain from carrying arms outside their camps in exchange for full amnesty. In the end, Black September would claim nearly 5,000 lives, although exact numbers have never been confirmed. The number of Palestinian deaths throughout the 11 days of fighting has been estimated at 3,400, although Arafat contended that some 20,000 were killed.

SEE ALSO: Arafat, Yasser (1929–2004), Fatah, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Hamas: Origins and Development; Intifada I and Intifada II; Israeli Peace Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Bailey, C. (1984) *Jordan’s Palestinian Challenge 1948–1983: A Political History*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Bar, S. (1998) *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan*. Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies.
- Milton-Edwards, B. & Hinchcliffe, P. (2001) *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*. New York: Routledge.
- Robins, P. A. (2004) *A History of Jordan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tal, L. (1995) Dealing with Radical Islam: The Case of Jordan. *Survival* 37, 3 (Autumn): 139–56.

Blake, William (1757–1827)

Robin Ganev

William Blake is considered one of the first and most important Romantic poets. His poetry and art are uniquely powerful and expressive against the background of elite, genteel, eighteenth-

century culture. Influenced partially by the Bible, Blake created his own mythology and his own imaginary world. Underappreciated in his own time, he was rediscovered in the 1860s and has had an immense influence on succeeding generations of poets, artists, and political radicals.

The son of a hosier, Blake belonged to the class of prosperous London artisans. He can be connected to several strands of eighteenth-century popular protest. He belonged to Joseph Johnson's radical circle in London, where he met people like Joseph Priestley and Thomas Paine; however, the poet is not known to have belonged to any formal radical organization or to have participated in any demonstrations. Raised in the tradition of religious dissent, Blake was an Antinomian, believing that the true Christian did not have to obey conventional moral laws.

Blake had ties to the anti-slavery movement. He illustrated the work of Captain J. G. Stedman, *A Narrative, of a five Years' expedition, against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam* (1796), which became an important text for the abolitionist cause. It has been argued that Blake's *Visions of the Daughters of Albion* (1793) was also inspired by Stedman's narrative. In the poem the wicked character Bromion is a slave owner and he rapes Oothoon, "the soft soul of America."

A staunch defender of liberty, Blake supported causes he felt would help free humanity from bondage and tyranny. He shared the widespread sentiment in England that opposed the American war and saw the king's attempt to control American trade as an injustice. He also supported the French Revolution, especially before 1792, seeing it as a milestone on the way to humanity's liberation. He recorded his utopian and millenarian hopes for the Revolution in his unfinished epic poem, *The French Revolution*.

Blake has been appropriated by everyone from the labor movement to the Anglican Church. This desire to make his visionary poetry serve different ends is also visible in the scholarship. Initially, emphasis was placed on Blake's allegorical mysticism, but later scholars began to look more closely at Blake's social and political context. Some have claimed that Blake feared disorder and riot and was no supporter of rebellion. But Erdman (1977) convincingly argues that Blake's prophetic epics can be read as anti-war and anti-imperialist. Thompson (1993) places Blake in the context of radical dissent.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, Britain; Britain, Anti-War Movement, 1775–1783; Paine, Thomas (1737–1809)

References and Suggested Readings

- Erdman, D. V. (1977) *Blake, Prophet against Empire: A Poet's Interpretation of the History of his Own Times*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mee, J. (1992) *Dangerous Enthusiasm: William Blake and the Culture of Radicalism in the 1790s*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Thompson, E. P. (1993) *Witness against the Beast: William Blake and the Moral Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blanc, Louis (1811–1882)

Yann Tholomiat

Jean-Joseph-Charles-Louis Blanc was a French politician and historian who played an integral role in the Revolution of 1848 and its aftermath in France, emerging as an important spokesman for socialism. Born in Madrid, Spain, he was the son of a general tax inspector of King Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon's brother. Blanc went to Paris in 1830 to study law after his family had been ruined by the Revolution of 1830. He worked two years in Arras as a private tutor and as a freelance journalist for *Le Progrès du Pas-de-Calais*.

In Paris in 1834 Blanc joined the Republican cause and worked for *Le National* and *Le Bon Sens*, of which he became the chief editor in 1837. His reputation grew as he campaigned in favor of the extension of universal suffrage, thanks to the *Revue du progrès* (1839–42) and *La Réforme*. Meanwhile, from 1841 to 1844 he wrote the five-volume *Histoire de dix ans, 1830–1840* (*The History of Ten Years*), which attacked the Louis Philippe government. He also expounded his Republican opinions in *L'Organisation du travail* (1839) and in the *Revue du progrès*, which was reprinted ten times between 1841 and 1848.

In his books and writings Blanc argued that three principles governed the history of societies: authority (vanquished in 1789), individualism (which emerged after 1789), and fraternity. In order to reach this last goal, ruthless competition in the economy and among people had to be abolished and replaced by workers' cooperatives, or social workshops. The state would provide the financial means, appoint the staff, and hire the

workers for these cooperatives. It would then act as a regulator of the market, which would not disappear, but would be controlled. A strong believer in state intervention, Blanc advocated the interrelationship of social and political reforms. Blanc expressed the ideas of a state socialism that gained a wide popularity among the workers and the artisans and led Karl Marx to call him a “utopian Socialist.”

The 1848 Revolution brought Blanc to power. He took part in the provisional government as a representative of the left, with Albert L’Ouvrier, known as “the worker Albert,” and his ideas grew in popularity. On February 25 he wrote a right-to-work proclamation, insisting that work should be guaranteed by the state and workers should be allowed to create trade unions. He also advocated the creation of a ministry of work, but no such agency was ever established. However, named at the head of the Luxembourg Commission, which was the government’s commission department for workers, he was able to implement the first social workshops, but the workshops were rapidly transformed into charity workshops and became a means of drawing the mass of unemployed workers out of Paris and thus remove a radical force from the city.

Blanc was elected in March 1848 to participate in the Constituent Assembly, but he had to resign from executive power under the resistance of moderate Republicans, who now formed the majority of the new assembly. His national workshops also perished, and this helped to fuel the June uprising of 1848. He did little to prevent the closings and instead fled to Brussels, then London, where he remained during the Second Empire from 1852 to 1870. While in exile he dedicated himself to writing historical books, such as the 13-volume *Histoire de la révolution française*, which defended Robespierre, the Jacobin French revolutionary leader. Between 1865 and 1867 the newspaper *Le Temps* published his “Letters about England.”

Blanc returned to Paris on September 4, 1870 and worked in favor of national union and war against Prussia. Elected the first representative of Seine to the National Assembly in 1871, he condemned the Parisian Commune as illegal and a threat to the new republic. He was reelected in 1876, and in 1879, alongside the senator and literary icon Victor Hugo, he campaigned for the amnesty of the Communards, which was eventually voted on July 11, 1880. He died in Cannes

in 1882 and was given a state funeral in Paris by the Third Republic.

SEE ALSO: European Revolutions of 1848; France, June Days, 1848; Hugo, Victor (1802–1885)

References and Suggested Readings

- Blanc, L. (1848) *A History of Ten Years, 1830–1840*. 2 Vols. Trans. W. K. Kelly. Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard.
- Fortescue, W. (2005) *France and 1848: The End of Monarchy*. New York: Routledge.
- Loubère, L. A. (1961) *Louis Blanc: His Life and Contribution to the Rise of French Jacobin-Socialism*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Pilbeam, P. (2001) *French Socialists Before Marx: Workers, Women, and the Social Question in France*. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.

Blanqui, Louis Auguste (1805–1881)

R. O’Brian Carter

As a French socialist and protest leader, Louis Auguste Blanqui was an influential and indefatigable nineteenth-century insurrectionist and populist radical, for which he spent large portions of his life imprisoned. He participated in the French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, as in several other rebellions, including those of 1839 and 1870.

Blanqui was born on February 1, 1805 in Puget-Théniers, situated on the Var River, north of the Mediterranean port-city of Nice, a region that was incorporated into France, and then only temporarily, in the broad course of the 1789 French Revolution. The region is now encapsulated in the modern French department of Alpes-Maritimes. Even before the young Louis Auguste turned revolutionary, the Blanqui family made its mark, albeit a minor one, on French history. During the Convention the French Revolutionary legislative assembly convened to draft a constitution from 1792–5. Blanqui’s father, Jean Dominique, was a Girondist, a faction of independent radical theoreticians in the legislative assembly. The Girondins were ultimately outflanked on the left by the Jacobins, who were also republicans, but representative of Paris’s more radical elements. As a Girondist, the elder Blanqui opposed the monarchy of Louis XVI and promoted the interests of the wealthier elements

of the bourgeoisie. With the radicalization of the Revolution from 1793 to 1794, the Girondins were outflanked by the Jacobin revolutionary Maximilien Robespierre (1758–94). Blanqui's father was imprisoned and narrowly escaped execution. He later became an official of the Napoleonic Empire. Blanqui's older brother, Adolphe, was in his own day an important French liberal economist, a student of the influential Jean-Baptist Say (1767–1832).

Although infinitely better known than either his father or brother, the legacy of Louis Auguste Blanqui is proportionately more ambiguous and debatable. Blanqui was lauded in some circles, but deemed diabolical in others. His enemies frequently referred to him as “little Robespierre.” This was as much a reference to Blanqui's diminutive stature as to his fiery devotion to revolutionary causes. Curiously enough, Blanqui detested the radical heritage of Robespierre. The grudge certainly owed something to the imprisonment and near execution of Blanqui's own father, at the hands of the Jacobin leader.

Despite his roots in southern France, Blanqui was politically active and made his mark in Paris, where he first joined his brother in 1818 to pursue his education at the Lycée Charlemagne, graduating in 1824. He was a brilliant student. Matriculating at the University of Paris, he enrolled at both the School of Law and Medicine. Quickly putting his studies aside, he was drawn into the circle of the Carbonari, a secret society modeled on the original Italian revolutionaries of that same name. Extolling liberalism, the Carbonari pledged the overturn of the Restoration monarchy of Louis XVIII (1814–24). Blanqui learned much during this period of revolutionary apprenticeship. His relentless persistence and skill in organizing clandestine groups would prove formidable and representative for future generations of revolutionists in the centuries to come. Blanqui began organizing the streets and took to the barricades with the Revolution of 1830. However, the crown of Charles X (1824–30) merely passed to the more open, yet still repressive July Monarchy of Louis-Philippe (1830–48). The house of Bourbon was simply replaced by its junior branch, that of Orléans.

Blanqui became an increasingly active participant in the slow march towards the Second Republic of mid-century. In the service of another secret society, the Friends of the People, Blanqui earned his first imprisonment. Placed on trial

for conspiracy in January 1832, he and François Vincent Raspail (1794–1878) were initially acquitted of any wrongdoing, but found guilty of seditious remarks made while testifying on the stand. They were sentenced to a yearlong prison term at Sainte-Pélagie, beginning in March 1832. Free again in 1833, Blanqui made the acquaintance of revolutionary Philippe Buonarroti (1761–1837). A descendant of the great Renaissance artist Michelangelo, Buonarroti had participated in the French Revolution of 1789, as an accomplice of Gracchus Babeuf (1760–97). Their Society of Equals hatched a failed plot against the Directory in 1796. Executed for this, Babeuf is often regarded as the founder of communism, although a branch distinct from that later articulated by Karl Marx (1818–83). As for Blanqui, his links to Buonarroti helped situate him within the more radical matrix of the French revolutionary tradition, a place not afforded by his father's Girondin past.

With the assistance of Armand Barbès (1809–70), Blanqui established, in 1835, the Society of Families, constructed along Carbonari lines. Linked hierarchically, each society cell was made up of five members, who stocked munitions in anticipation of their pending activities. The group was inadvertently discovered by French authorities in the 1836 clampdown that followed an unsuccessful attempt on King Louis-Philippe's life. Serving as his own lawyer, and using the stand as a pulpit for his message, Blanqui was condemned to two years imprisonment. The sentence was revoked after just nine months, in 1837. Working again with Barbès, Blanqui reorganized, creating the Society of the Seasons. Seeking to take advantage of an 1839 ministerial crisis within the monarchy, he ordered a 12–13 May uprising, which left 50 dead and 190 wounded before fizzling out. Blanqui was finally apprehended in November. Put on trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to death on January 31, 1840. The next day, however, the sentence was reduced to life imprisonment. Blanqui remained incarcerated until his early release in 1847. Although his health had suffered, Blanqui's revolutionary zeal continued undiminished. After his release he organized the Central Republican Society. Surprising and unforeseen evidence then surfaced regarding his 1839 rebellion. It was insinuated that Blanqui may have acted with duplicity, appearing to plot against crown authorities, while acting as an informant for

those very same powers. It was suggested that this was at the root of his having his death sentence commuted to life imprisonment. The scandal was known as the Taschereau Affair. Jules Taschereau was an official of Louis-Philippe's regime, and a journalist. The evidence Taschereau published about Blanqui never completely explained away. The charges were to reemerge at critical junctures in his life.

As revolutions erupted throughout Europe in 1848 Blanqui and a group of activists seized the opportunity afforded by the turmoil and surged into the French National Assembly, commandeering the rostrum on May 15 to demonstrate their opposition to the government. A constitution marked the founding of the Second French Republic later that same year. Louis Napoléon Bonaparte, the nephew of Napoléon I, was elected by a landslide as president. Blanqui's unsuccessful storming of the National Assembly and revolutionary effort to overthrow the government warranted his immediate return to prison. In 1852 President Bonaparte reversed course, overturned the republic, and established the Second Empire, assuming the title Napoléon III.

Serving a ten-year sentence, Blanqui managed to publish articles under a pseudonym in the revolutionary newspaper *Candide*. Liberated in 1859, he plotted with his new group, Social Well-Being (Bien-Être Social). Arrested once more for conspiracy in 1861, he was sentenced to four years in prison. Although nearing the end of his term, Blanqui still chose to make an escape in 1865. He was aided by a group of admiring students who referred to him affectionately as the Old Man. For this new generation, ignorant of the Taschereau Affair, Blanqui was an archetype of civil disobedience and permanent revolt. Forced to live abroad in Belgium and Spain, the Old Man tried with varying degrees of success to orchestrate the maneuvers of his young Blanquists. With the 1870 outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, the Second Empire collapsed, creating circumstances propitious to Blanqui's return. He began publication of a revolutionary, nationalistic newspaper, *The Fatherland in Danger*. An uprising of Blanquists at La Villette, located on the fringes of Paris, failed despite its violence. Blanqui's own seizure of the city hall, the Hôtel-de-Ville, was ephemeral and unsuccessful. Adolph Thiers (1797–1877), who would oversee the armistice signed with the newly created Germany, before serving as the

first president of the French Third Republic, called for Blanqui's arrest. This new prison term ended only in 1879. In 1880 Blanqui launched a newspaper, *Neither God Nor Master*. He died on January 1, 1881.

Blanqui was a gifted writer, one who labored over his craft. His revolutionary newspapers were peppered with biting invective. He was no theoretician. Both his writing and his revolutionary actions were practical and action-oriented, as he participated in nearly all of the pivotal uprisings of post-Restoration France. Blanqui regarded the budding labor movement with suspicion, and disparaged the 1864 formation of the International Working Men's Association (IWMA), or First International. Although his contacts with Karl Marx, the founder of the IWMA, were cordial, they were limited to letters. Marx still considered Blanqui as the "head and heart" of the French proletariat, owing to his uncompromising tenacity and courage. Blanqui's contacts with the French working classes were, however, practically non-existent, and there is no indication that he ever received more than paltry support from their ranks. More to his credit, Blanqui was a lightning rod of sorts, attracting the charged spectrum of nineteenth-century French revolutionary thought and tradition.

SEE ALSO: Babeuf, François-Noël (1760–1797) and the Conspiracy of Equals; Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873); Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); Buonarroti, Philippe (1761–1837); Directory, France, 1795–1799; France, June Days, 1848; France, Revolution of 1848; French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution, Radical Factions and Organizations; Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; Raspail, François-Vincent (1794–1878); Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bernstein, S. (1971) *Auguste Blanqui and the Art of Insurrection*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Dommanget, M. (1957) *Les Idées politiques et sociales d'Auguste Blanqui*. Paris: Rivière.
- Dommanget, M. (1969) *Auguste Blanqui: Des origines à la révolution de 1848*. Paris: Mouton.
- Dommanget, M. (1971) *Auguste Blanqui au début de la IIIe République, 1871–1880*. Paris: Mouton.
- Hutton, P. H. (1981) *The Cult of the Revolutionary Tradition: The Blanquists in French Politics, 1863–1893*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Paz, M. (1984) *Un Révolutionnaire professionnel, Auguste Blanqui*. Paris: Fayard.
- Spitzer, A. (1957) *Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Bloch, Marc (1886–1944)

Richard Francis Crane

Marc Bloch was a historian, soldier, and a member of the French Resistance during World War II. He was an influential founder of the *Annales* school of social and economic history, which reached prominence in the middle of the twentieth century, as well as the author of the posthumously published *Strange Defeat*, a seminal account of the 1940 fall of France to Nazi Germany. A veteran of both world wars, and a patriot devoted to French democracy, Bloch ultimately gave his life in the French Resistance.

Born in a middle-class Jewish home, Bloch identified less with his religious background than with forbears who had fought in the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century and in the Franco-Prussian Wars in 1870–1. Growing up near the turn of the century, however, he was still affected by anti-Semitism, especially by the Dreyfus Affair, in which a Jewish captain in the French army was wrongly convicted of espionage.

Following distinguished service during World War I (1914–18), in which he received the Croix de Guerre and the Legion of Honor, Bloch went on to achieve considerable success as a historian. He published his doctoral thesis in 1920, taught at the University of Strasbourg, then the Sorbonne, and made his scholarly reputation with pioneering studies of medieval agrarian history and feudal society. An emphasis on long-term, as opposed to event-centered, history inspired his founding of the journal *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* (*Annals of Economic and Social History*) with fellow scholar Lucien Febvre in 1929.

Though the father of six children, Bloch also served as a reserve captain and was recalled to active duty in 1939, when war with Germany appeared imminent. As a staff officer within the French army's command structure from May to June 1940, Bloch witnessed the stunning 6-week collapse of French arms in the face of the German Blitzkrieg, or "lightning war," followed days later by the dissolution of the Third French Republic. In late 1940 he wrote a book about the defeat, what he termed his own "white heat of rage." This examination of contemporary events marked a departure from his typical historical approach. Providing an analysis that was anything

but detached or impersonal, Bloch offered a diagnosis of military disaster with social-political roots, emphasizing the selfishness and shortsightedness of the bourgeoisie with which he identified.

Failing to get his family out of the country when France fell to Germany, Bloch nonetheless was spared immediate persecution under the anti-Jewish laws promulgated by Marshal Philippe Pétain's new authoritarian regime based at Vichy. But Bloch's name no longer appeared on the *Annales'* editorial list, and he eventually lost his professorship. After German occupation of the southern zone that included Vichy in November 1942, Bloch participated in the Franc-Tireur Resistance group in Lyons and in the larger Mouvements Unis de la Résistance (United Movements of Resistance). Under pseudonyms such as "Narbonne" he coordinated resistance activities and contributed to underground publications until arrested in March 1944. The arrest was depicted in the Nazi-collaborationist press as the capture of a leading "Jewish-Bolshevik terrorist." After interrogation and torture, the Germans shot Bloch on June 16 among a group of younger resisters. Bloch's legacy can be appreciated today both in the school of historical inquiry he helped establish, and in his contemporary analysis of the fall of France.

SEE ALSO: France, Resistance to Nazism

References and Suggested Readings

- Blatt, J. (Ed.) (1998) *The French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments*. Providence: Berghahn Books.
- Bloch, M. (1968) *Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940*. Trans. G. Hopkins. New York: Norton.
- Fink, C. (1989) *Marc Bloch: A Life in History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jackson, J. (2001) *France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Reid, D. (2003) Narratives of Resistance in Marc Bloch's *L'Étrange défaite*. *Modern and Contemporary France* 11, 4: 443–52.

Bloody Sunday Demonstration, 1887

Lisa Keller

Bloody Sunday was the nickname given to a violent confrontation between demonstrators and police in Trafalgar Square, London on Sunday,

November 13, 1887. The clash occurred when more than 4,000 police and hundreds of special constables and armed soldiers attempted to block tens of thousands of people from protesting against unemployment and asserting free speech rights. The word “Bloody” reflects British intolerance of unjustified civil force and of public casualties. By most standards, violence was limited: three fatal injuries occurred, 75 people were hospitalized, and 50 people arrested.

Though casualties were few, the event was sensational because it symbolized “law and order” government policy, temporary repression of free speech and assembly rights, and the perception that socialist and other left-wing groups had failed to establish themselves as mainstream political forces. In the long term the event opened a debate resulting in the reestablishment of rights; the acknowledgment that law and order were necessary in a city but that authority had limits and could not abridge basic rights; and the realization that British leftist and labor groups were key in the evolving political landscape. It also focused public attention on the newly reorganized Metropolitan Police, established in 1829 as London’s public order arbiters.

The confrontation that Sunday resulted from an unusual government ban on a working-class demonstration in Trafalgar Square, a popular meeting ground, following a turbulent year of demonstrations and government worries over public order. A February 8, 1886 meeting of labor and leftist groups in the square had resulted in violence (though no fatalities), with marauding crowds breaking windows and looting. Black Monday, as the day was dubbed, shook London to its very core. Merchants closed their shops, viewing the attacks on property as a sign of revolution. The Home Office, the government branch which oversaw London and its police, took drastic steps to ensure that order be maintained. Police were criticized for ineffectiveness and, following a parliamentary investigation, were reorganized and given a new commissioner, a former military man who imposed severe and unprecedented restrictions on public meetings.

Black Monday and Bloody Sunday were indicative of the increasing number of street demonstrations in London during the 1880s, as economic depression and high unemployment rates spurred public protest. The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw the rise of a wide array of political groups challenging the status quo, including

the Social Democratic Federation, the Socialist League, the Fabians, the Metropolitan Radical Federation, and the Irish National League. Labor as a political movement was in its ascendancy and dependent upon accessing public spaces to get its message across to the newly expanded electorate. London’s parks, commons, and squares, always popular for public meetings, became a daily meeting ground for various causes by the 1880s. British socialists viewed public meetings as key to providing the public with information and receiving its support, thus avoiding the violence that had roiled the Continent.

Bloody Sunday signaled the end of the government’s effort to repress free speech and assembly rights, which had started with Black Monday. A new debate opened on civil rights in Great Britain involving parliament, government law officers, and the public; the first civil liberties group in the nation, the Law and Liberty League, was formed in this period. The lasting outcome was a reassertion of British “birthright” principles of tolerating public speech and assembly.

SEE ALSO: Reform Bills, Britain, 1867 and 1884; Socialism; Socialism, Britain

References and Suggested Readings

- Cole, G. D. H. (1941) *British Working Class Politics 1832–1914*. London: G. Routledge & Sons.
- Keller, L. (2008) *Triumph of Order: Democracy and Public Space in New York and London*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Thompson, P. (1967) *Socialists, Liberals and Labour: The Struggle for London 1885–1914*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Boal, Augusto (b. 1931)

Roxanne Schroeder-Arce

Brazilian theater activist/theorizer Augusto Boal is best known for his development of the Theater of the Oppressed during the 1950s and 1960s. The primary objective of his life’s work was to incite audiences into action, emphasizing the inherent nature of theater and performance. Boal was engaged in theater from a young age, and his earliest professional work was at the Arena Theater in southern Brazil. It was at the Arena where Boal began to explore interactive and political theater, which led to his arrest, torture, and ultimate exile to Argentina in 1971. Greatly influenced by

Paulo Freire's book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Boal titled his first text *Theater of the Oppressed*, an exploration of how theater gives voice to subjugated peoples. The book attacked Aristotelian elitist ideals, insisting that the Greek philosopher's theories were coercive, paralyzing people rather than inspiring them to proactive ideas and behavior. Boal's text, eventually translated into 25 languages, shared his preliminary theories on employing theater to foster social change and transformation through protest and activism.

Boal contributed several other texts to the fields of theater practice and pedagogy, including *The Aesthetics of the Oppressed*, *Legislative Theater*, *Games for Actors and Non-Actors*, and *Rainbow of Desire*. Through his literary contributions and workshops around the world, Boal introduced multiple theories and practices to theater artists and community activists. One of Boal's most celebrated forms is forum theater, where actors stop mid-conflict to include audiences in exploring solutions to social problems introduced in performance. Boal termed his audiences "spect-actors," insisting that theater has a responsibility to invite and inspire audiences to participate in what they see on stage and consider their power to act beyond the performance itself. Image Theater was another of Boal's contributions to the theater. In *Playing Boal: Theater, Theory, Activism*, theater critics Mady Schutzman and Jan Cohen-Cruz describe Image Theater as "a technique that privileges the human body over spoken word . . . [using the body] as an expressive tool to represent, non-verbally, a wide repertoire of feelings, ideas, and attitudes."

Boal lives in Rio de Janeiro, where he continues theorizing and writing on art and protest. He offers Theater of the Oppressed workshops throughout the world at conferences, prisons, and in communities, which thrive internationally. Theater of Oppressed techniques have been appropriated by fields beyond theater, including psychology, to promote mental health through drama therapy, where patients engage in acting.

SEE ALSO: Agitprop; Anarchism; Brecht, Bertolt (1898–1956); Eisenstein, Sergei (1898–1948); Freire, Paulo (1921–1997); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Žižek, Slavoj (b. 1949)

References and Suggested Readings

Boal, A. (1985) *Theater of the Oppressed*. New York: Theater Communications Group.

- Boal, A. (1992) *Games for Actors and Non-Actors*. London: Routledge.
- Boal, A. (2001) *Hamlet and the Baker's Son*. London: Routledge.
- Boal, A. (2006) *The Aesthetics of the Oppressed*. London: Routledge.
- Colleran, J. & Spencer, J. (1998) *Staging Resistance: Essays on Political Theater*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Peixoto, F., Epstein, S., & Schechner, R. (1990) Brazilian Theatre and National Identity. *TDR* 34, 1 (Spring): 60–9.
- Schlossman, D. A. (2002) *Actors and Activists*. New York: Routledge.
- Schutzman, M. & Cohen-Cruz, J. (1994) *Playing Boal: Theatre, Therapy, Activism*. London: Routledge.

Bogotazo and La Violencia

Andrés Otálvaro H.

Forty-five years of conservative hegemony ended in 1930 when Enrique Olaya Herrera won the presidential elections in Colombia and the Liberal Party assumed control over the state apparatus after decades of political exclusion. The electoral victory was the origin of a new and especially violent period for Colombian society, culminating in the tragic events of April 11, 1949: the *Bogotazo* insurrection.

The initial efforts to implement urgent social, constitutional, tributary, and land reforms by the Liberal governments of Enrique Olaya Herrera (1930–4) and Alfredo López Pumarejo (1934–8) were constantly blocked by Conservative opponents. López Pumarejo's political project from 1934 to 1938 was designated *La Revolución en marcha*. Conservatives opposed his reforms, especially measures designed to promote a new distribution of farmland based on the official slogan "the land belongs to those who work on it."

After the administration of Eduardo Santos (1938–42), López Pumarejo was reelected president for a second term. But a strengthened domestic opposition, World War II and international crisis, and personal family problems obliged him to resign in 1946 and confer power on Alberto Lleras Camargo. While López Pumarejo sought early elections, his resignation marked the end of this Liberal dynasty, which had been shaken by arduous political battles and violence

from the moment the Liberals gained executive power in 1930.

Committing what has been seen by Liberals as a tremendous political error, López Pumarejo appointed a candidate as his successor, leading the way to a more general battle between Liberals and Conservatives. The Liberal Party itself was divided by a centrist faction led by Gabriel Turbay and a leftist one led by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. Intense political propaganda campaigns were stoked by the newspapers from each faction (*El Liberal* on the side of Turbay and *La Jornada* supporting Gaitán). The Conservatives were unified under one candidate, Mariano Ospina, who won the elections and took power as president in August 1946.

Under the Ospina presidency, paramilitary groups called Los Chulavitas and Los Pajaros were formed, with the support of police, who devastated the country through terror and murder in the name of the government, the Conservative Party, and the interests of wealthy landowners and merchants. The desired objective of the paramilitary forces was to ensure that land remained in private hands. In turn, members of the paramilitaries received land rights as a reward for their services. As a consequence, violence intensified in the cities, towns, and rural areas, which suffered multiple combats, persecutions, and assassinations among Liberals and Conservatives. It was dangerous to travel around Colombia and there were several restrictions on movement by road in order to prevent assaults and other criminal activities. The army was unable to offer security to the inhabitants of Colombia. It usually supported the Liberal Party, while the police force was on the Conservatives' side.

In 1948, the Liberal Party refused to participate in elections for the Congress, giving Conservatives the opportunity to extend their grip on executive and legislative power. One of the most radical Conservatives of all time, Laureano Gómez, gained absolute influence over the debates in Congress during this time, thanks to enormous prestige based on his rhetorical skills, and he was able to single-handedly pursue his objectives of legitimizing the status quo, thus perpetuating the perks and privileges of the wealthy class. His political counterpart on the left, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, stood at the opposite extreme, favoring the rights and demands of the poorest inhabitants of the country. On April 9, 1948, Gaitán was murdered and one of the most tragic and

bloody episodes in the nation's history was unleashed.

"I am not a man, I am the people," Gaitán would say, in speeches that mercilessly attacked the Colombian oligarchy and demonstrated a commitment to the popular struggle. The strong revolutionary spirit that influenced the life and ideas of this charismatic leader, who was supported by millions of Colombians, is usually tainted by those who accuse him of being a fascist autocrat on account of his political methods, which are presumed to resemble those of *il Duce*, Benito Mussolini. The truth was that the death of Gaitán produced major national turmoil whose revolutionary character was expressed mainly in the country's capital, Bogotá. It was a Friday noon when the Liberal leader left his office with friends. At the entrance of the building, his assassin opened fire and Gaitán received three bullet wounds. He died a few minutes later in the Central Clinic, despite receiving medical attention.

From that point on, madness and fear invaded the streets of the city. Churches, public buildings (including the Congress and the Supreme Court Building), stores, buses, historical monuments, schools, cars, and other vehicles were burned or attacked. Rioters used any tools as weapons. For several days and nights, the sound of gunfire and shouting marked the rhythm of that chaotic and bloody symphony. People looted stores indiscriminately and the rule of law vanished during the most critical hours. It took the military forces almost seven days to restore public order. While there are no exact records of the number of people killed, estimates suggest that 1,000 people lost their lives in the uprising.

Gaitán's murderer, Juan Roa Sierra, was killed while being dragged to the front gates of the Presidential Palace and demonstrators demanded justice and vengeance. Nevertheless, the *Bogotazo* cannot be understood as just an emotional reaction to the assassination of a beloved political leader. The destructive impulse not only became a massive killing and plundering spree but was an expression of popular anger and frustration against the century-old injustices within Colombian society – a violent outcry of the poorest sectors who had not had the historical chance to voice their demands until that day.

The popular uprising became a proclamation against the social hierarchy in Colombia, which dated back to the earliest days of national independence. The revolts were conducted by many

who had suffered exclusion and expropriation since the days of colonial domination and then throughout the republican period at the service of the political and economic establishment. As Gaitán once asserted: "People can be subdued for a long time to an order against their interests, but this only results in making their rebellion even more violent" (cited in Pécaut 2001: 437).

Thus the disturbances were not merely violent acts but in many respects a revolutionary impulse of Gaitanism and the mass movement it inspired – a denunciation of the abuses of power and a general claim for sweeping changes inside Colombian society. But this spirit was effectively crushed when the government declared martial law to stifle the demonstrations with as much military force as would be necessary. With the loss of Gaitán, the absence of real leadership and organizational skills also dealt a critical blow to revolutionary aspirations.

As outsiders to the popular insurrection, Liberal leaders ran the gauntlet of the furious armed crowds that surrounded the Presidential Palace as they convened a meeting with the head of state, Ospina, in the latter's office. This historic 17-hour meeting between the Liberal and Conservative leadership set the course of the political events that followed.

Although the Liberals, represented mainly by Dario Echandía and Carlos Lleras Restrepo, suggested that the president resign for the "good of the nation," Ospina refused to stand down as president and commander-in-chief of the army. After intense debate and some concessions from both sides, a final resolution was taken: the Conservatives and Liberals called upon themselves to constitute a government of national unity supported by the armed forces. Fundamental beliefs linked to the restoration of the status quo, enforcement of the rule of law, and personal ambitions explain this step.

The Liberal speakers could have obtained power independently without Conservative support, based on the strong popular feeling expressed by the angry and revolutionary masses throughout Colombia. Instead Echandía, who was appointed by Ospina as his minister of government, remarked laconically: "power: what for?" With the most prestigious revolutionary leader dead, the Liberals preferred an alliance with the Conservatives – a strategic agreement that would deepen in the coming decades (especially from 1958 to 1974). The cost of this arrangement

was the loss of popular support and the consolidation of a hermetical political regime, based on exclusion, elitism, corruption, and, last but not least, surreptitious ties with criminal forces.

After the suppression of the uprising, the capital city appeared as a scene of destruction, pain, and mourning. A stronghold of resistance was the Police Fifth Division. The national army could not defeat their revolutionary persistence and surrender was only achieved after the combatants received assurances of amnesty and privileges from the government. Although an informal trade thrived due to rampant pilfering, the population did not have a sufficient supply of basic food, and starvation endangered the inhabitants of the capital.

The Liberal Party blamed the Conservative regime for the crime against Gaitán, but no responsibility for the assassination was ever established. The division inside the Liberal Party (Gaitán vs. Turbay) also nurtured suspicion about the complicity of one or several Liberal figures. Whoever was guilty, both Liberals and Conservatives benefited by the killing of this powerful political advocate: Gaitán effectively symbolized the opposition and would have been Colombia's next president without doubt.

Most scholars assume that the historical period of *La Violencia* began in 1948, but the roots of these events can be found in previous decades when Liberals and Conservatives fought relentlessly for farmland and political position, primarily in the Santander, Tolima, el Valle, and Boyacá regions. The obstacles placed by the Conservative Party in the way of the Liberal project promoting land reform triggered continuous and violent clashes that involved both parties and their followers. The rural conflict led to a "territorialization" of violence, and complete towns, municipalities, and regions were assigned to one or other party. Geographical landmarks were defended and conquered with fire and blood, while peasant displacement was constant. By official estimates, more than 300,000 people perished from 1948 to 1953.

After Gaitán's death, guerilla groups with Liberal tendencies occupied eastern Colombia, especially the Los Llanos territory facing el Orinoco and el Amazonas. Organizations like Los Bautistas, Los Parras, and Los Fonsecaes fought against troops of Chulavitas, the armed forces, and the Conservative government, and Colombian revolutionaries like Guadalupe Salcedo and Eduardo Franco emerged.

The disorder surrounding the *Bogotazo* enabled Manuel Marulanda, known as Tirofijo, to escape from jail and emerge as leader of the Armed Revolutionary Forces and Popular Liberation Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) until his death in March 2008. He went to the Tolima territories, joined a radical faction of the Liberal Party, and with Guadalupe Salcedo declared “La Ley del Llano,” the first political manifesto written by peasant rebels, which legitimized the use of violence as a political strategy against the establishment.

Guerilla militants emerged not only as revolutionary Liberals, but also with strong political connections to the Communist Party. Liberal political leaders, primarily in urban areas, distanced themselves from the strategy of the rural fighters, searching for a peaceful approach in terms prescribed by the constitution.

As a symbol of political dissent, mainly because of the lack of fundamental rights for any legal opposition, Liberals decided not to participate in the presidential elections of 1950, which accounts for the Conservative Laureano Gómez’s victory in the polls. Some guerilla factions accepted the beginnings of peace talks with the government, whose representative was Alfonso López Pumarejo, which extended them the benefit of amnesty. Nevertheless, the government of Laureano Gómez was cut short by a putsch carried out by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who governed Colombia from 1953 to 1957. Despite the “progressive dictatorship” imposed by the regime of Rojas, the violence never subsided and military forces promoted every means of systematic violence available to punish opponents.

SEE ALSO: Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1960s–1970s; FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army); Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer (1898–1948), UNIR, and Revolutionary Populism in Colombia

References and Suggested Readings

- Alape, A. (1983) *El Bogotazo: Memorias del olvido*, 2nd ed. Havana: Ediciones Casa de las Américas.
 Braun, H. (1998) *Mataron a Gaitán*. Bogotá: Norma.
 Campos, G., Falls Borda, O., & Luna, E. (2005) *La violencia en Colombia*, Vol. 1. Bogotá: Taurus.
 Espinosa, O., Varela, E., & Tirado, M. A. (1990) *La Cultura de la Violencia en Colombia durante el Siglo XX. La Cábala* 11.
 Gaitán, J. E. (1929) *La Masacre de las Bananeras: 1928*. Medellín: Editorial Pepe.

- Pécaut, D. (2001) *Orden y Violencia*. Bogotá: Norma.
 Melo, H. (Ed.) (1989) *Reportaje de la Historia de Colombia: 158 documentos y relatos de testigos presenciales sobre hechos ocurridos en 5 siglos*. Bogotá: Planeta.
 Tirado, A. (Ed.) (1989) *Nueva historia de Colombia*. Bogotá: Planeta.

Böhm, Hans (also Hans Behem) (1458?–1476)

Matthew H. Wahlert

Hans Böhm was a popular fifteenth-century German preacher who gained fame as the “Drummer of Niklashausen” following a vision directing him to advocate greater social equality. Although his exact date of birth is unknown, Böhm was born in the village of Helmstadt in the south-central region of Germany known as Franconia. In 1476, Böhm, a shepherd and street entertainer, claimed to have had a vision of the Virgin Mary in the village of Niklashausen. The vision prompted a series of sermons that challenged the elites of Germanic society.

The vision prompted Böhm to burn his drum in a medieval ritual called the Bonfire of the Vanities. Traditionally, citizens would burn their possessions (their vanities) in a public display of dependence on God and adherence to a lifestyle of poverty. Böhm declared that the vision of the Virgin Mary spoke of the need for more social equality. Social equality, Mary claimed, could only be accomplished with the cessation of payments to the corrupt clergy. In addition, all rents and forced labor at the hands of the nobles should stop. Although Böhm lacked both a religious and secular education, peasants were drawn to his sermons calling for their repentance but also critically attacking clergy and nobles. Böhm’s call for equality based upon the words of the Virgin Mary even called for the end of taxes and, quickly, emerged as a threat to the status quo. Thousands of peasants would often converge on Niklashausen in order to hear the preaching of the Drummer Boy. Böhm soon gained fame throughout all of central and southern Germany, and often crowds of pilgrims exceeded 40,000. As the crowds increased, Böhm became more and more radical, even calling for the deaths of the clergy. A popular uprising, known as the Niklashausen peasant revolt, began in May of 1476.

Böhm drew the wrath of Bishop Rudolph von Sherenberg of Wurzburg and was arrested on July 12, 1476, based upon the bishop's fears that Böhm would ultimately lead peasants in an armed uprising. An estimated 16,000 of Böhm's followers attempted to rescue him on July 14, but were soon dispersed. On July 19 a trial of Böhm, on the charge of heresy and on enchanting, led to a recantation and his execution. On the eve of the Reformation, many historians consider Böhm and the revolt as symptomatic of many of the problems associated with the condition of peasants. In addition, experts of the period note that the ability of Böhm to gain such a following points to the role of spiritualism in medieval Europe, which was the only available vehicle to express change in the societal order. The fact that the peasant revolt began during the period of Carnival (the mystic celebration on the eve of Lent) suggests that Böhm emboldened the peasants at a time when they were most susceptible to mystical calls to change the social structure.

Most of the story of the Drummer of Niklashausen comes from primary sources of the clergy and nobles of the period, including Bishop Rudolph von Sherenberg of Wurzburg. Johann Trithemius recorded the story in 1514. More recently, historian Richard Wunderli contributed a modern treatment of the Drummer Boy in 1992. The work, however, is somewhat controversial in that Wunderli, for lack of primary sources, often was forced to base the exact nature of Böhm's sermons on modern perspectives.

SEE ALSO: German Reformation

References and Suggested Readings

Wunderli, R. (1992) *Peasant Fires: The Drummer of Niklashausen*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830)

Jan Ullrich

Simón Bolívar was a central character in the Hispanic American movements for independence against Spanish colonial domination. “The Liberator,” as he was called after his victories over royalist forces in today's Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Bolivia, became the first president of the Great Colombian Republic



Simón Bolívar, ca. 1820, called El Libertador (the Liberator). He is credited with helping South America achieve independence from Spain, specifically the countries of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Bolivia, where he is canonized in the culture and political mythology. (Getty Images)

(Gran Colombia) in 1821. While his thinking and struggle for independence, liberty, and unity profoundly influenced the political development of contemporary Latin America, the historical interpretation of his life and ideas is a subject of historical disputes and ideological conflicts even today.

Bolívar was born on July 25, 1783 in Caracas to an aristocratic Creole family. After the early death of his parents, Bolívar was educated by liberal teachers Andrés Bello (1781–1865) and Simón Rodríguez (1769–1854). Bolívar's ideals, such as a free and popular education system, were greatly influenced by the revolutionary pedagogue Rodríguez, who was an enthusiastic disciple of Rousseau. Bolívar and Rodríguez met up again in Europe, where the two made the acquaintance of Alexander von Humboldt and witnessed Napoleon Bonaparte's coronation ceremony. The impressions made on Bolívar by

Europe's Age of Revolution led him to the famous *Oath of Monte Sacro*, in which he dedicated his life to the liberation of the Americas from the domination of the Spanish.

When he returned to Venezuela in 1807, the profound crisis of the colonial order, brought on by growing conflicts between aspiring Creole elites and the Spanish aristocracy, had created the historical backdrop for the beginning of Venezuela's War of Independence in 1810. Bolívar was colonel of the republican forces under Francisco de Miranda (1750–1816) before they were defeated by the royalists in 1812. Bolívar went on to New Granada to join the struggle for the independent United Provinces. In his *Cartagena Manifesto* (1912), he concluded that the division of the republicans and the absence of broader popular support had enabled the return of the royalists and that a unified and centralized republican government had to be the basis for independence.

Bolívar had conquered Caracas in 1813, but the Second Venezuelan Republic was defeated and Bolívar fled to Jamaica. From Haiti he returned to Venezuela in 1816 and continued his struggle. In his *Angostura Address* of 1819 he outlined the constitutional principles of the Venezuelan Republic. A democratic republic, he announced, without a king, would abolish privileges and inequality and respect human rights, the right to work, and freedom of thought, expression, and publication. But even if these ideas made him too revolutionary for his time, Bolívar's republican thinking was more oriented toward the British constitutional monarchy. A strong executive power, with an elected president instead of a king at its head, would be accountable to the parliament, which would have legislative functions and financial control.

By 1821 Bolívar had liberated today's Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Ecuador from the royalists, and in the Congress of Cúcuta in the same year he became president of the newly founded Great Colombian Republic. Bolívar, who by then had received the title of The Liberator, moved on to Peru and Bolivia, where the last royalist resistance was defeated in 1824. In his *Letter from Jamaica* (1815), Bolívar had insisted that the new republic had to abolish any kind of racial hierarchies, but his attempts at complete abolition of slavery were thwarted by resisting conservative forces in the Cúcuta Congress, even though slaves who

had fought in the republican army were released and the slave trade became outlawed. In the Bolivian Constitution of 1825, Bolívar could finally assert this idea.

In the Panamerican Conference in Panama in 1826, Bolívar realized his ideal of a United Confederation of the independent South American nations. But growing divisions among the republican elites and the regions' particular interests threatened the confederation, which fell apart after a few months. Peru and Bolivia evaded Bolívar's domination and Great Colombia's fragile unity was answered by The Liberator's increasing authoritarianism. His skepticism of liberal forces increased, and his insistence on unity and centralization opposed democratic federalism. Constitutional reforms and his self-proclamation as dictator on August 27, 1828 could not prevent the final division of Great Colombia in 1830. Bolívar finally resigned and died on his way to European exile on December 17, 1830 in Santa Marta in present-day Colombia.

The life of The Liberator and contradictions between the realist politician and idealist thinker became the source of a national myth that was created only a few years after his death. South American conservative and progressive forces compete over interpretations and the significance of Simón Bolívar even today.

SEE ALSO: Bolivarianism, Venezuela; Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–Present; Rodríguez, Simón (1769–1854); Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778); Venezuelan War of Independence

References and Suggested Readings

- Carrera Damas, G. (1969) *El culto a Bolívar. Esbozo para un estudio de la historia de las ideas en Venezuela*. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela.
- Liévano Aguirre, I. (1988) *Bolívar*. Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia.
- Lynch, J. (1983) *Simón Bolívar and the Age of Revolution*. London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London.
- Pino Iturrieta, E. A. (2004) *La independencia de Venezuela: historia mínima*. Caracas: Funtrapet.

Bolivarianism, Venezuela

Dario Azzellini

Bolivarianism refers to Simón Bolívar (1783–1830), Venezuelan liberator and general who fought

for independence throughout South America and promoted the unification of the continent. Bolivarianism occurred in various South American countries, but its heart and stronghold is in Venezuela, where most movements and the government define themselves as Bolivarian and the transformation process is called Bolivarian Process or Bolivarian Revolution. In twenty-first-century Venezuela Bolivarianism has become a set of political ideas and collective experiences and values without a clearly defined program or theoretical framework, and thus is a work in progress rather than a meticulous ideology or theory.

Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, the modern exponent of Bolivarianism, traces the ideology to the thought of Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Leon Trotsky, and Mao Zedong, to the Italian philosopher Antonio Negri, and even Jesus Christ. Bolivarianism reaches across a wide ideological spectrum reflecting the large diversity of political, social, cultural, and religious influences feeding it. Chávez views his role as providing a political framework rather than expounding a political dogma.

The diverse forces converging in the process of the Bolivarian Revolution are seen by political analysts Luis Bonilla-Molina and Haiman El Troudi as historical currents for change, a variety of leftist and emancipatory tendencies emerging from the Latin American economic crises of the 1980s to 2000. While the 1980s were considered a lost decade by socialist ideologists, a growing network of groups and organizations in Venezuela saw the events that led to the economic collapse of workers as strengthening the idea of a non-dogmatic revolution. The crisis created multiple spaces of convergence, encounter, and disencounter between the forces resisting neoliberalism, free market policies, and injustices in society. Workers, peasants, and cells within the army were driven by discontent with societal corruption and the expropriation of the nation's resources by the upper classes and foreign capital. This historical encounter built the base for the forces known in later years as the Bolivarian Revolution.

The basic idea of Bolivarianism provides direct reference to the history of local, regional, national, and continental experiences of emancipatory resistance and struggle against oppressive forces. The primary Venezuelan historical references of Bolivarianism are Simón Bolívar, Simón Rodríguez (1769–1854), and Ezequiel Zamora (1817–60).

The progressive and revolutionary reference to these historic figures can be traced back to the mid-1960s debates that divided the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) that was actively supporting the FALN (Armed Forces of National Liberation) guerrilla movement. In 1964 some FALN guerrilla members of the PCV began to define themselves as revolutionary Bolivarian Marxists, leading to defections, divisions, and expulsions from the party. The new group formed the guerrilla PRV-FALN (Revolutionary Party of Venezuela) and viewed the historical heritage of black and indigenous resistance through Bolívar, Rodríguez, and Zamora as the foundation for Venezuelan socialism. They considered civilian-military alliances and future uprisings as a historical strategy for creating revolutionary transformation.

Simón Bolívar represents the importance of independence, sovereignty, and armed resistance. Simón Rodríguez, philosopher and teacher of Bolívar, was forced from Venezuela after he supported an uprising against Spanish colonialism in 1797. While in exile in France, Rodríguez was exposed to the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rodríguez, often characterized as an early socialist, advocated for the search for independent social and political organization. He saw the necessity to create innovative models for institutions and government in Latin America in contrast to importing hierarchical European models into South America. Rodríguez asserted that “We invent or we mistake.” Rodríguez saw the importance of education. As the teacher of Bolívar, Rodríguez is considered a pioneer of mass education in Latin America. The notion of armed struggle is embodied through Ezequiel Zamora, peasant general of the Venezuelan federal war in the postcolonial and ongoing struggle for justice and democracy. Zamora led peasant uprisings with slogans like “free land and free people,” “popular elections,” and “horror to the oligarchy.” Zamora's peasant army was known for burning the manor houses of landlords and immediately redistributing the land they monopolized to peasants.

Since 1964 a growing number of Venezuelan social movements, political organizations, and progressive sectors inside the army have adapted the ideas of Bolivarianism or contributed to their collective creation. Between the end of the 1960s and the mid-1970s the political and military defeat of the guerrilla movements led

inside the revolutionary left to a radical criticism of the focus theory, of the simple transfer of revolutionary experiences from Eastern Europe, Cuba, or Asia, and of the authoritarianism of the communist parties. The critical debate spread among the currents that gave up the armed struggle, as well as among those that continued with it. They all oriented themselves more to social movements, most in recognition of the autonomy of such movements.

Historians and political theorists have rooted Bolivarianism within a range of categories and influences. There are various social, historical, and philosophical currents, beginning with the critical Marxism of Ernesto Che Guevara, José Carlos Mariátegui, Anton Pannekoek, and European models of autonomous labor councils that are rooted in the self-activity of workers. The movement is also founded in the work of Antonio Gramsci and Antonio Negri, whose work examines the historical and social factors that influence worker consciousness and liberation theology as found in the work of Gustavo Gutiérrez, Frei Betó, Camilo Torres, and popular Christian movements that fused with guerrilla and national liberation movements in Latin America that can be traced back to Bolívar, José Martí in Cuba, or Augusto César Sandino in Nicaragua, and expressed in the Cuban and the Nicaraguan revolutions. Bolivarianism is also founded in the critique of European civilization and development of indigenous movements in Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico; and currents of black resistance from the US to their social, cultural, and militant expressions in the Caribbean and Brazil.

The influences comprise collective insurrectional experiences like the student revolt of 1987, the popular anti-neoliberal uprising on February 27, 1989, and the two civil-military insurrections of 1992 and 2002, when the people and the army reversed the *coup d'état* and put Chávez back in power.

Other influences include sociopolitical events that break with the dominant powers in history and prefigure historical processes of liberation, like the guerrillas of the 1960s and 1970s; the cultural congress of Cabimas in 1973, introducing a vision of cultural resistance as part of all revolutionary process; the experiences of workers councils and revolutionary syndicalism in the 1980s; the national student congress in Merida in 1985 at the root of the 1980s student rebellion;

the rebirth of the peasant movement and land occupations in Yaracuy in 1987; the neighborhood councils of Caracas from 1991 to 1993, as beginning the movement of popular councils and direct democracy; the libertarian pedagogical movement of the 1990s based on the democracy of knowledge, with its highest expression in 2000–1; the development of the constituent powers of the people from 1995 onwards; the electoral campaign and victory of Chávez in 1998 as a break in the historical power framework; the constituent assembly and first constitutional specification of a participative and protagonic democracy in 1999; and the widespread experience of self-organization during the entrepreneurs' lock out and oil sabotage in 2002–3.

In 1971, like many other young Venezuelans, 17-year-old Hugo Chávez joined a reformed military academy with new educational content and where young recruits, mostly from working-class backgrounds, were educated in the social sciences and exposed to critical ideas. Chávez recognizes as his primary influences Bolívar, Mao, and sociologist Claus Sélzer, especially his book about the army as agent of social change, sympathizing with the Peruvian leftist nationalist Velasco Alvarado and Panama President Omar Torrijos (both militaries).

As a young soldier between 1975 and 1980 Chávez was relegated to anti-guerrilla activities. In his intelligence work he was encouraged to familiarize himself with the readings of the guerrillas to anticipate their strategies, including Mao, Ho Chi Min, Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Camilo Torres, Marx, and Mariátegui. The reality that Chávez recognized in both these writings and on the ground was the poverty of the rural population standing in sharp contrast to the moral decay of the politicians in power and most of the high-ranking militaries.

Beginning in 1980 Chávez and leftist military officials began working at the military academy and influenced thousands of young recruits. In December 1982 Chávez and other officials founded the Bolivarian Army 200 (Ejército Bolivariano 200, EBR-200), renamed the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 200 (MBR-200) after the people's uprising in Caracazo in 1989. The MBR-200, a conspirative civil-military organization, developed far-reaching ideological and programmatic fundamentals, organizational, tactical and strategic orientations, and positions on various social and political issues. So the ideological and program-

matic work of the MBR-200 represents an important cornerstone of modern Bolivarianism.

The initial criticism of Chávez and his supporters was directed against the corrupt political system that promoted social injustice. Besides Bolívar, Zamora, Rodríguez, and Rousseau and their conceptions of radical democracy represented strong reference points. The basic organizational structure comprised Commands of Revolutionary Areas (CAR), civilian-military groups with indigenous names.

Through the 1980s MBR-200 gained in strength and experience in response to the brutal repression of the urban uprising in Caracas during and after Caracazo 1989, as civilian allies convinced the MBR-200 to pursue an armed uprising in 1992. MBR-200 deepened contacts with political and social movements, organizations, and individuals. While the coup d'état of February 4, 1992 was crushed, the MBR-200 changed strategy from a clandestine group to a popular organization, especially among the poor and revolutionary left.

The MBR-200 was conceived as a civil-military organization, with a strong emphasis on promoting democracy. According to Chávez, it recognized itself as a deeply dynamic entity, with various liberated forces in movement. The different social movements and grassroots organizations were considered independent forces, indispensable for the political project of the MBR-200 to build a unified Bolivarian Front. Given the prohibition against political participation of army members, the civil-military nature of the MBR-200 created difficult obstacles to overcome.

The MBR-200 opposed consolidation of the organization through participation in elections as a means of institutional collaboration, considering the political sphere as antithetical to expressing the will of the people. It did not reject elections entirely, but sought to engage pragmatically in electoral activities at propitious moments, assume government powers, and adopt changes at once. Between 1994 and 1996 the strategy of the MBR-200 was – apart from the construction of grassroots structures – mainly characterized by the demand for a constituent assembly.

The MBR-200 postulated the need for a far-reaching transformation of all social structures in order to build a society of solidarity. The aim was defined as popular democracy, a direct democracy with the people as decision-makers.

Based on a new philosophical-political model with Bolivarian-Robinsonian-Zamoran ideological fundamentals, a new model of a mixed economy was constructed that would provide the federal state with five powers: legislative, judicial, executive, moral, and electoral; a model of society based on equality, justice, and freedom. The MBR-200 model of civilian-military relations was based on integration of the army and not on domination. It was dissolved before the elections in 1998, but the political project to a great extent characterized the perspective of the government of Hugo Chávez when he became president in 1999.

From 1999 to 2005 Bolivarianism moved dramatically to the left. By 2005 the movement defined itself as socialist and dispensed with nationalist and anti-communist approaches traditionally common in the military. Instead, the program pursued a socialist democratic position that defined Bolivarianism as a means of developing a socialism of the twenty-first century for Venezuelan society. Bolivarianism distanced itself from conventional perceptions of historical state socialism by defining freedom, democracy, and participation as fundamental elements of society.

SEE ALSO: Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); *Caracazo*, 1989; Castro, Fidel (b. 1926); Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954); Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967); Gutiérrez, Gustavo (b. 1928); Hồ Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh) (1890–1969); Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Mariátegui, José Carlos (1894–1930); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Negri, Antonio (b. 1933); Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778); Torres Restrepo, Camilo (1929–1966); Torrijos, General Omar (1929–1981); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Velasco Alvarado, Juan Francisco (1910–1977); Venezuela, Guerilla Movements, 1960s–1980s; Venezuela, MBR-200 and the Military Uprisings of 1992; Zamora, Ezequiel (1817–1860)

References and Suggested Readings

- Azzellini, D. (2007) *Venezuela Bolivariana*. Cologne: ISP.
- Denis, R. (2007) La profecía de ALCASA. In *aporrea*, 26.3.2007. Internet version 26.3.2007: www.aporrea.org/actualidad/a32464.html.
- Ellner, S. & Tinker Salas, M. (2007) *Venezuela: Hugo Chávez and the Decline of an “Exceptional Democracy.”* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Garrido, A. (2000) *La Historia Secreta de la Revolución Bolivariana*. Merida: Editorial Venezolana.
- Garrido, A. (2002) *Documentos de la Revolución Bolivariana*. Caracas: Ediciones del autor.

- Gott, R. (2005) *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*. New York: Verso.
- Zago, A. (1998) *La rebelión de los ángeles*. Caracas: Warp Ediciones.

Bolivia, protest and repression, 1964–2000

S. Sándor John

The year 1964 marked a turning point for Latin America. In March, a military coup ousted the left-nationalist regime of João Goulart in Brazil. The Brazilian military junta was heavily backed by the US government, which placed counter-insurgency at the center of its regional policy, and became a linchpin of the “Southern Cone model” of hard-line dictatorships using techniques taught at the US Army’s School of the Americas then located in the Panama Canal Zone.

In Bolivia, discontent with the regime grew ever more intense among wide sectors of the population. New cuts in the Comibol workforce touched off a long and bitter miners’ strike, in response to which the government jailed prominent leftist union activists. Meanwhile, supporters of different Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, MNR) factions clashed violently in several peasant regions. Popular revulsion against the ruling party reached the point that Bolivian Labor Federation (Central Obrera Boliviana, COB) leader Juan Lechín left the MNR to set up his own Revolutionary Party of the National Left (PRIN), while the MNR right wing also split off to form what it called the Authentic Revolutionary Party.

As his 1960–4 term neared its end, President Victor Paz Estenssoro declared that he would seek reelection, with the bitter opposition not only of Lechín’s sympathizers but of Hernán Siles Zuazo and a segment of the MNR as well. As his running mate, Paz chose General René Barrientos (1919–69), a flamboyant air force officer from Cochabamba who spoke Quechua and was known for his close relations with the US Pentagon. Barrientos was a *cachorro de la Revolución* (a child [literally puppy] of the revolution), who had co-piloted the plane that brought the exiled Paz back to Bolivia after the April 1952 revolution. In the early 1960s, he came to public attention as a leader of the Washington-financed “Civic

Action” plan and was befriended by Curtis Le May, the US air force general later infamous for his call to bomb Vietnam “back to the Stone Age.”

Despite cries of election fraud, Paz was reelected. In the ensuing wave of unrest, many workers and left-wing students frustrated with the MNR hoped it would be thrown out and replaced by a leftist regime. Instead, as the country became a pressure cooker of protests and mobilizations, almost all the political forces disenchanted with Paz came together in a tragic marriage of convenience. Guided by Siles, this alliance included the groupings formed by the former MNR left and right wings, as well as the Francoist Falange and the remnants of the 1940s Stalinist Revolutionary Left Party (Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, PIR). Behind the scenes, US representatives cultivated Barrientos as the up-and-coming strongman.

A pitched battle near Oruro between armed miners and government troops, including US-trained “Rangers,” was the immediate prelude to Barrientos seizing power. In early November 1964, the general carried out a coup, beginning a new cycle of military rule that would last until 1982. Barrientos took aim at what had long been the stronghold of insurgent movements in Bolivia, declaring a state of emergency in the mining districts, demanding that the workers’ militias give up their arms, then dismantling the miners’ union outright. Leading militants of the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario, POR), notably César Lora and Isaac Camacho, paid with their lives for their efforts to organize clandestine unions to defend workers against this onslaught.

The junta also proclaimed a “Military–Peasant Pact,” cultivating support among peasant sectors that could be persuaded to see the military as benefactors, even protectors against a “communist threat” to take the land parcels they had gained as a result of agrarian reform.

United States support for Barrientos was enthusiastic and munificent. As the US government consolidated its own “national security doctrine,” one historian notes, Bolivia became a “laboratory” for programs through which the armed forces of Latin American countries could shore up the region against new setbacks such as the Cuban Revolution. The American Institute for Free Labor Development (an arm of the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations] leadership

that worked closely with the Central Intelligence Agency in Latin America) helped the junta identify which labor groups to purge.

Kennedy increased military assistance to Bolivia by 800 percent. His successor Johnson viewed the regime as an important element in regional counterinsurgency, and Barrientos became a symbol of Latin American “*gorila*” (military) dictators allied with the White House and Pentagon as the US was drawn ever deeper into a massive, losing counterinsurgent war in Southeast Asia.

Che Guevara’s Guerilla Experiment (1967)

“Create two, three, many Vietnams” was the call made by Ernesto “Che” Guevara (1928–1967), whose attempt to establish a base for guerilla warfare in the heart of South America drew the attention of people around the world to Bolivia. The impoverished Andean country became especially important to Che given the quick frustration of efforts in his native Argentina. He hoped to replicate the victory the guerilla strategy had achieved in the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and to spread the combat throughout the region.

The attempt at guerilla warfare in Bolivia was, however, virtually doomed to failure. At the tactical level, the decision to establish operations in the Ñancahuazú region in Bolivia’s east was particularly misconceived. Not only was the terrain unsuitable, but the local peasantry was markedly conservative, having received significant parcels of land from the government. Che Guevara also received little real backing from the Cuban leadership, faced outright hostility from the Soviets, and clashed repeatedly with the pro-Moscow Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB).

A more basic problem was Che Guevara’s *foco* (guerilla) theory itself. Conceiving of revolution as the project of a small group of heroes in the mountains, it practically ignored the actual class struggle in Bolivia. Che’s strategy relegated the tens of thousands of Bolivian miners to the role of sideline supporters. Yet both before and after Che’s Bolivian tragedy, wide sectors of the country’s impoverished population repeatedly grouped themselves around the miners when the time came for head-on conflicts with the regime. This vanguard role of the mining proletariat was engraved in the country’s historic

memory. Yet the *foco* strategy was not based on mobilizing this class power in alliance with the indigenous peasantry and other oppressed sectors. (Guevarism’s publicist, Régis Debray, went so far as to call the Bolivian proletariat “a class deluded as to its own political importance and with an overweening self-confidence.”)

As the army zeroed in on the guerilla *foco*, the government targeted well known radical activists, sending many into internal exile. The period’s most horrific episode of repression took shape in early June 1967 as Barrientos raged against the miners of Huanuni, who had declared the mines “*territorios libres*” (liberated territory). Defying his threats, a miners’ assembly was called at Siglo XX to demand the reinstatement of fired workers and restoration of wages cut by inflation and government decree. As the government hunted down Che Guevara’s guerillas, the workers decided to donate a *mita* (day’s pay) to send them medicine.

For Barrientos, the miners’ assembly was an opportunity to set a bloody example. Troops invaded Siglo XX and Catavi in the midst of the fiesta of the Night of San Juan (corresponding to the Andean solstice ceremony) and carried out yet another large-scale massacre of mine workers and their families. In October 1967, the government’s manhunt against guerillas and their sympathizers reached fever pitch with the capture and summary execution of Che Guevara.

Ovando’s Interregnum (1969–1970)

After two more years of the Barrientos regime, the Bolivian left, labor and student movements breathed a collective sigh of relief in April 1969, when the strongman died in a helicopter crash. The ensuing period brought a new swing to the left in Bolivian politics, a new upsurge of labor and student radicalism, and a reawakening of peasant activism. The chameleon of Bolivian nationalism changed shades once again, taking on the olive-green coloration of a new populist military regime, only to give way to a new and brutal rightist regime that predated the Chilean dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet by two years.

The death of Barrientos set off a power struggle with far-reaching consequences. His vice-president took office but lasted only five months before being ousted in September 1969 by General Alfredo Ovando (1918–1982). The new Ovando government was strongly influenced

by the nationalist military “revolution” that began in 1968 in Peru. While Ovando shifted government discourse leftwards, officers who played central roles in tracking down Che Guevara’s guerillas remained prominent in the military hierarchy.

Ovando’s new departure included bringing a number of left-leaning civilian intellectuals into his cabinet, most importantly the young intellectual Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz (1931–80) as oil and mining minister. Recalling measures taken by the “military socialists” of the late 1930s, at Quiroga’s urging Ovando nationalized the Gulf Oil Company. This measure was widely popular, but the government’s decision to compensate the US company was met with protests from the left.

As the political situation opened up, labor organizations suppressed under Barrientos began to emerge from illegality. The COB leadership called for the establishment of an “anti-imperialist united front” of workers, peasants, professionals, members of the clergy, and “forward-looking” military officers. This last group found an increasingly prominent spokesman in General Juan José Torres (1921–76), the new armed forces commander whose variations on the old theme of military national-populism would soon open a new chapter in the country’s politics.

In March 1970, students at the foremost institution of higher education, the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (UMSA), launched the “University Revolution.” Students in each department threw out the deans and administration, setting up a Revolutionary Student Committee which took control of the university. The radicalization of labor and student movements generated a reaction within the Bolivian military and business community, which came out against the Gulf nationalization, as did civic leaders in Santa Cruz, the eastern department (province) which had received an 11 percent royalty on Gulf revenues. Responding to pressure, the Ovando regime made a sharp right turn in March 1970, firing oil minister Quiroga and relieving Torres of his command due to the tone of his speeches.

Political polarization sharpened further in May, when the COB held its Fourth Congress and adopted a new programmatic text known as the “Socialist Theses of the COB,” worked out through the joint efforts of the POR and the pro-Moscow PCB. In July, young adherents of Che Guevara’s ideas attempted to reignite

guerilla warfare at Teoponte in the northern part of the department of La Paz. When the army quickly wiped out almost all the Teoponte guerillas (including Benjo Cruz, a pioneer of Bolivia’s folk music movement), La Paz was swept by student protests against this massacre of young idealists.

Torres and the People’s Assembly (1970–1971)

In October 1970, tensions within the armed forces exploded in a new round of coups and counter-coups. Rightist officers, together with the Falange and the right wing of the MNR, backed a power bid by hard-line officers, among them Ovando’s son-in-law Hugo Banzer (1921–2002), a strident anti-communist influenced by the Falange. Ovando refused to relinquish his post, but after extensive negotiations, power was turned over to a military triumvirate on October 6.

Later on the same day, General J. J. Torres proclaimed that he would be the one to take power. Bolivia’s main left parties issued a call for a “popular anti-imperialist government” and formed a “Political Command,” which coordinated a general strike and mass demonstrations that tipped the balance in favor of Torres. The new president sought to institutionalize labor support as one pillar of his regime, restoring miners’ pay to 1965 levels and courting the COB and left parties. The other pillar was the “institutionality” of the armed forces. Rightist officers continued to occupy high positions, and General Reque Terán, a leader of the CIA-supervised counterinsurgency against Che Guevara, was made commander of the armed forces. In office, Torres found himself obliged to carry out a continual balancing act between social forces whose antagonisms were breaking out after years of rightist rule.

The Military College remained under the leadership of General Banzer, who attempted a new coup in January 1971. In response, miners went out on strike and marched on La Paz. The workers rallied in the Plaza Murillo outside the presidential palace, demanding arms to “smash the military fascists” and a complete purge of the military high command. The “Trotskyist” labor leader Filemón Escóbar (later the key strategist for the party of Evo Morales) recalls: “The walls resounded with chants of *Workers to power!* and *Long live socialism!*”

Over and over during the following period, the demand for arms would be repeated. Instead, Torres insisted that the people should have confidence in the army. The failed January *putsch* was followed in March by another rightist coup attempt in Santa Cruz. Arrested for his involvement, the head of the Falange was, like Banzer, set free. These events were dress rehearsals for the all-out assault Banzer would launch a few months later.

In May, responding to growing demands for action against US agencies, Torres declared that his government was expelling the Peace Corps from Bolivia. This and other symbolic steps against US interests fueled growing disquiet on the right, already up in arms against advances by the Zafra Roja (Red Harvest), as they called the radical left.

The right wing was further alarmed by the foundation of the Asamblea Popular (People's Assembly) at Bolivia's Legislative Palace, which Torres had provided for the event, which was chaired by Lechín together with other union and student leaders. Sixty percent of the Assembly's delegates would be representatives of working-class organizations. Middle-class organizations and peasant groups would contribute 30 percent, and political parties the remaining 10 percent. (Acrid debates would soon break out over the number of peasant delegates.) Although the former government party, the MNR, was not formally represented, the biggest bloc of labor delegates came from the MNR's "Labor Command."

Lora's POR, as well as some Latin American news correspondents, hailed the Assembly as "the first soviet of the Americas," harking back to the workers' councils of the Russian Revolution. However, the body proved strikingly ineffectual. Citing the absence of some delegates, it decided not to reconvene until late June. Acutely aware that right-wing officers and political leaders had no intention of abandoning their plans to seize power, the Assembly passed a motion stating that in the event of a coup, "the Asamblea Popular, as the expression of workers' power, will take over the political and military leadership of the masses."

Yet no real preparations were made for defense against the rightist danger. The Assembly's watchword turned out to be "later"; the matter of workers' defense was put off for discussion sometime in September. In reality, Lechín

and his allies on the left relied on Torres's assurances that the army would remain loyal. The Assembly met ten more times, adjourning on July 2 with the decision to reconvene more than two months later.

The right wing, both military and civilian, was less inclined to wait. Bolivian rightists had powerful friends and were energetically encouraged by their Brazilian and Argentine colleagues. Nor did the US government sit idly by, as the Nixon administration promoted plots against the Allende government on the other side of the Andes. Operation Condor, the joint counter-insurgency plan of the region's military dictators that would bring torture and death to leftists throughout the Southern Cone, was just over the horizon.

Hugo Banzer's followers in the armed forces joined with the Falange and the MNR (now led by Paz Estenssoro) to set the stage for a coup. This was a *golpe anunciado* – a coup foretold – for which intensive preparations had proceeded at least from early April. The military rising began on August 19 in the city of Santa Cruz. On August 20, up to 100,000 people gathered outside the presidential palace shouting at Torres and Lechín: "*Armas, armas!*" Torres again refused.

When Banzer's forces seized the historic mining center of Oruro, government representatives used Radio Illimani to call on the miners to join loyal army units in "Operation Centipede–Flying Eagle," a battle to retake the city. The radio kept repeating this call even as those military units went over to the coup. The miners marched to fight and were massacred. Rural union leaders from Norte Potosí reported that 8,000 peasants waited in vain for the government to tell them where they should march in order to resist the coup.

In La Paz, resistance began to be organized long after the coup began in Santa Cruz, and only after local regiments joined Banzer's revolt. By that time a Banzer-controlled regiment named after the "Liberator" Simón Bolívar was advancing through El Alto, and tanks began descending towards the nation's capital. Thousands of workers and students came out to fight, but the vast majority had no weapons. When civilians seized a stock of Mauser rifles left over from the Chaco war, many of these obsolete guns would not fire. Ammunition was so scarce that each combatant was given one or two bullets. Resistance was "completely disorganized, the

Assembly had done absolutely nothing to prepare,” one participant recalled.

Students and factory workers searched for ways to fight. Receiving no direction from their leaders, young revolutionaries joined crowds of students and factory workers clamoring for arms. The news spread that resistance to the coup was concentrating at the foot of Laikacota Hill, where civilians hoped to dislodge a pro-Banzer army unit that had seized this point overlooking the city.

While students had received some rudimentary weapons training during their obligatory military service, the only activists with serious military preparation and cohesion were those from the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) guerilla movement. Still, the crowd advanced up the hill, facing withering fire; participants vividly remember friends and comrades falling dead around them. Determined to dislodge the hostile troops, the young activists kept firing and finally, to their surprise, succeeded in storming the army position. The frightened and demoralized soldiers surrendered and were told to run away. Yet there was no real leadership to advise the leftists what to do next.

Rumours that the Torres regime would finally distribute arms, spread by the leaders of the COB and left parties, proved fatal. Just as false were the promises that the military would “defend the people.” General Reque Terán, the anti-guerilla veteran who headed the armed forces, had categorically denied that officers were plotting a rising. When the coup broke out, he pledged loyalty to Torres, only to resurface the next day to command pro-Banzer troops in downtown La Paz. At Laikacota, word arrived that the air force – Torres’s branch of the armed services, still supposedly under his control – would provide support. Civilians holding the strategic hill were told to come down so that planes could bomb the rightist army positions. Planes began flying overhead, but it was the young revolutionaries who were the targets of their strafing: the air force was supporting the coup. When the main army barracks were close to being taken by workers and students, the special army regiment which had been built up to bolster the Torres regime joined the rightist revolt. Its tanks reached downtown La Paz in half an hour. When these World War II relics arrived at the presidential palace, Torres was gone, leaving a lieutenant and six soldiers behind.

A New Cycle of Military Dictatorships (1971–1982)

The Banzer coup placed power in the hands of a “Nationalist People’s Front” made up of rightist military officers, the Falange and the Paz Estenssoro wing of the MNR. This coalition lasted until late 1974, when Banzer consolidated his personal power in an *autogolpe* (“self-coup”). The new “dark night” of repression (as British historian James Dunkerley has called it) left deep scars on the labor movement, which found itself forced back underground.

Euphoric pronouncements about the first soviet of the Americas gave way to the Anti-Imperialist United Front (FRA), an alliance of “bourgeois” political figures, notably the deposed President Torres, and left parties, among which Lora’s POR played the leading role. Calling for the patriotic unity of all Bolivians, the FRA replicated the policy of subordination to nationalist forces practiced by the left and labor leadership during the National Revolution period.

Despite the heavy toll exacted by military repression, Banzer was not able to eliminate social conflict. In January 1974, large-scale peasant protests broke out against the elimination of government subsidies to a range of products and services. Soldiers moved in on the village of Tolata, in the valley of Cochabamba, killing up to 200 peasants in what came to be called the “Massacre of the Valley,” which some compared to the My Lai massacre US troops had carried out in Vietnam. Yet the incident backfired on the junta, leading to a resurgence of the peasant movement and, eventually, the rise of new “indigenist” political currents.

Banzer’s government came to the end of its rope amidst a series of dramatic developments centered, once again, on the tin miners. In mid-1976, miners’ strikes swept the country under the leadership of militants from the POR, PCB and other left groups. Almost a thousand miners were fired as a result of these strikes. Hunger and destitution pressed down on their families in mine camps across the altiplano. In response, a hunger strike was launched by four miners’ wives from Siglo XX (among them Trotskyist militant Aurora Villarroel and Domitila Chungara, the Pulacayo-born activist who achieved world renown for her accounts of the struggle). Their demands included the rehiring of fired miners, freedom for political

prisoners, and withdrawal of troops from the mine camps.

Normally a tactic of desperation, the hunger strike touched off large-scale protests. The government failed in its attempts to intimidate or repress the miners' wives, whose courage and determination galvanized Bolivia's working people. Their fast lasted over three weeks and eventually included a thousand people, leading labor and student groups to launch demonstrations widely credited with hastening the end of the Banzer regime. The dictator was forced to agree to the women's demands, with the exception of withdrawal of troops from the mines.

Greater trade union freedom and political amnesty once again opened the floodgates to left and labor organizations. In elections already scheduled by the regime, a number of leftist groupings presented candidates, while Hernán Siles Zuazo, the nationalist leader who now had his own party, the MNR-Left, ran as the head of the People's Democratic Union (UDP), a classic "popular front" which included the PCB, the formerly Castroite Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), the indigenist Túpac Katari Revolutionary Movement, and other groups.

The elections ended in blatant electoral fraud. In the face of popular outrage, a sector of the armed forces cited the threat of international communism as justification for a new coup. Over the next two years, five presidents held office and two more elections were held. Another round of elections in July 1979 yielded no clear winner, although the UDP got the largest number of votes. In November of 1979, yet another coup placed the presidency in the hands of Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch. The *putsch* was answered by the first general strike in almost a decade, and the new junta responded by "disappearing" large numbers of protesters, left and labor activists.

Faced with widespread repudiation of the massive repression, Congress named former MNR activist Lidia Gueiler interim president. When her government enacted austerity measures prescribed by the IMF (International Monetary Fund), mass protests erupted. New elections held in June 1980 yielded a decisive plurality for Siles's front, but the UDP was prevented from taking office by the bloodiest military takeover in Bolivia's coup-ridden history. This *putsch* was carried out by a group of military officers – headed by Colonel Luis García Meza (a cousin of Gueiler, who had appointed him army com-

mander) – who became world-famous for the intensity of the violence they unleashed and the astonishing scope of their corruption.

In previous takeovers, military leaders sometimes supplemented their forces with paramilitary gangs. In the García Meza coup, paramilitary forces played a central role, most notoriously in the all-out attack on the central offices of the COB, in which labor and left leaders were killed or arrested and the building was reduced to rubble. The new junta became notorious for its close links to cocaine cartels that had developed a symbiotic relationship with death squads connected to Klaus Barbie, the Nazi "Butcher of Lyons." One of the SS officers spirited out of Europe by the "rat line" after World War II and protected by US intelligence, Barbie had received citizenship from Siles in the late 1950s and been entrusted by Barrientos with funds for a phantasmagorical "warship for Bolivia" (supposedly to be deployed on Lake Titicaca). The extraordinarily high level of corruption and brutality exhibited by the military junta brought it increasing international isolation.

The colonels' troubles multiplied when a series of working-class strikes and protests broke out against the regime's repression and IMF-inspired austerity measures. The armed forces were wracked by new splits, as dissident officers launched one plot after another against García Meza. In the wake of a general strike, the military ousted the narco-dictator in August 1981 and replaced him with less notorious officers.

Yet it was the miners of Huanuni who dealt the death blow to military rule. In November 1981 they launched militant strikes that spread to other mines and industries. The government was forced to agree to legalize the unions and the COB. The labor federation followed up with highly effective general strikes against the government's devaluation of the peso and cuts in subsidies for basic items of consumption.

Siles, the UDP, and the "Days of March" (1982–1985)

Faced with rising mass mobilizations, the military decided to cut its losses, preparing to turn power over to the congress elected in 1980. The COB convoked a new general strike, proclaiming that the walkout would continue until the military ceded power. Siles, MNR cofounder and nemesis of the miners' union in his first term

(1956–60), was installed anew in the Palacio Quemado presidential palace in October 1982. His UDP front populated the ministries with left-nationalists, MIRistas, and leaders of the pro-Moscow PCB.

It was not an auspicious time for popular-front governments, in a world marked by the anti-communist offensive of the Reagan White House. The UDP's difficulties were exacerbated by the high inflation and fiscal crises inherited from its military predecessors. Siles found himself caught between the IMF, with its demands for austerity, and the plebeian sectors that had swept him into office.

The combustible mixture of high popular expectations and harsh living conditions fueled increasing social unrest. Miners marched repeatedly in La Paz against the government's austerity measures. The Bolivian Congress gave the president new headaches when it refused to back his "anti-narcotics program." Unable to satisfy the demands of labor and other impoverished sectors, the UDP found itself on a collision course with the working class. This was particularly excruciating for the PCB, which had one foot in the cabinet and the other in the top FSTMB (Bolivian Mine Workers' Union Federation) and COB leadership.

The explosion came in March 1985, as the miners were at the center of mobilizations that once again posed the question of revolution on the altiplano. Twelve thousand miners occupied La Paz to protest against the UDP's austerity measures and the 40 percent drop in wages the working class had suffered since 1980. Armed with dynamite, miners' pickets took up position on the city's central arteries. Now it was their detachments that patrolled the capital. Police and army troops abandoned the streets. The strikers met daily in mass assemblies in the Open Air Theater. "*Obreros al poder!*" (Workers to power) was chanted over and over at mass demonstrations.

Paralyzing the capital, the mobilization polarized its residents. Entire layers of the plebeian and middle-class population, seeing their hopes and frustrations crystallize in the miners' protest, came over to the workers' side. Market women organized to provide food for the strikers; other sectors took charge of giving them lodging. The miners' "vanguard role," told and retold in their history, traditions and class memory, asserted itself once again. This time the miners' enemy was not a military junta or oligarchic government, but

the popular front of "left" nationalists (Siles), "Communists" (PCB) and former guerrillas influenced by social democracy (MIR).

Yet far from putting forward a strategy to put the slogan of workers' power into practice, the labor leadership, headed by veteran COB chief Lechín (who flanked himself yet again with allies from the "far left"), let the miners' mobilization continue with no clear direction. When it began to run out of steam, the union leaders called a retreat. After the majority of the COB leadership voted to lift the strike, the miners gathered at a farewell meeting, with a slogan that became famous: "*Volveremos*"—"We will return."

Paz Estenssoro's Revenge: "Neoliberalism" on the Altiplano (1985–2001)

As none of the strike's central demands were met, demoralization spread in the labor movement. In early elections called by Siles, middle-class sectors that had looked to the miners for a way out of a desperate situation now swung sharply to the right. Large swathes of voters who had previously backed the UDP switched over to right-wing candidates, including former dictator Banzer and MNR founder Paz Estenssoro. History seemed to be cycling backwards, as Siles was replaced by his aged ex-Jefe Paz, who emerged as Bolivia's new president.

Paz returned to the Palacio Quemado not as the man who had denounced the Catavi Massacre four decades before but as a *criollo* version of Margaret Thatcher, the "Iron Lady" who made privatization an ideological crusade, closed Britain's mines, and routed the powerful miners' union. Advised by Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs and the young technocrat Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (himself a private mine owner), Paz was intent on structurally adjusting the mine union into oblivion. He seized on a drastic fall in the price of tin to shut down the majority of the mines he had, in a previous incarnation, nationalized in 1952. Over the next years, Paz and Sánchez de Lozada turned Bolivia into a laboratory for the policies popularly known as "neoliberalism," based on wholesale privatizations, the gutting of social services, and the drastic reduction of the labor movement's power.

The centerpiece of their program was Decree No. 21060, a number that became synonymous with misery and defeat for tens of thousands of

workers. The hated “21060” closed most mines, gave private employers wide powers to fire workers for “absenteeism” (including strikes), and turned over production and much of the nation’s infrastructure to private, largely foreign capital. In September 1985, the miners carried out a desperate “March for Life” against the decree. As workers, their wives and children marched along the highway towards La Paz, their dramatic appeal for survival captured the imagination of much of the country. Nonetheless, the march was surrounded and turned back by the armed forces, ending in a new and bitter defeat.

Decree No. 21060 had large-scale effects on Bolivian society. Among them was the government’s drive to “relocate” laid-off miners to regions far away from their historic mine camps. Many relocated to the sprawling Aymara township of El Alto on the outskirts of La Paz. Others found themselves in agricultural regions like Cochabamba’s Chapare and the Yungas zone of La Paz province, where a little green leaf called coca would help turn another page in Bolivia’s history. Displaced and sometimes demoralized, the miners nonetheless brought their own forms and methods of organization to these new areas.

Over the following years, as the US intensified “drug wars” in Latin America, indigenous peasants in Bolivia’s Chapare region became increasingly prominent in the nation’s social struggles, becoming the nucleus of one of Bolivia’s most powerful social movements. Against the government’s drive to “eradicate” crops it argued were destined for cocaine production, peasant activists pointed out that coca had been chewed by most of the country’s laboring population since long before the Spanish Conquest, that large sections of the peasantry depended on its cultivation, and that Bolivia had no business being a junior partner in Washington’s neocolonial drug wars. The resulting movement combined the defense of the *cocaleros* (coca-growing peasants) with an affirmation of pride in indigenous culture, history and language.

Eventually, the movement put the young Aymara *cocalero* organizer Evo Morales (b. 1959) into parliament at the head of a new political party called the Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento Al Socialismo, MAS). Morales’s mentor was the former Trotskyist miner Filemón Escóbar, but the MAS was a pragmatic grouping that oriented to electoral politics while speaking in general terms of “communal socialist” values.

In the 1990s, the difficulties of the Bolivian left were magnified with the election of right-leaning governments. The first was a coalition between ex-dictator Banzer’s “Nationalist Democratic Alliance” and the MIR, which was originally formed in the resistance against Banzer’s 1971 junta but later shifted rightwards. This was followed by the first presidency of MNR technocrat Sánchez de Lozada, who deepened the policy of “capitalization” (privatization). In 1997, Banzer won the presidency again; his term was cut short when he died of cancer.

In the late 1990s, new struggles and realignments in Latin America began to challenge the “Washington consensus” on economic and political issues. A range of ideologically diffuse movements arose under the banner of opposition to “neoliberalism” and “globalization.” Bolivia was thrust into the headlines in 2001, when a “Water War” erupted in Cochabamba. Massive opposition broke out against a plan to turn the city’s water supply over to a subsidiary of the giant Bechtel conglomerate. The protests were led by a *Coordinadora* (coordinating committee) headed by a factory workers’ leader influenced by anarchism.

SEE ALSO: Bolivia, War of the Pacific to the National Revolution, 1879–1952; Bolivian Neoliberalism, Social Mobilization, and Revolution from Below, 2003 and 2005; *Cocaleros* Peasant Uprising; Cochabamba Water Wars; Katarismo and Indigenous Popular Mobilization, Bolivia, 1970s–Present; Morales, Evo (b. 1959)

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, J. L. (1997) *Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life*. New York: Grove Press.
- Debray, R. (1975) *Che’s Guerrilla War*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Gill, L. (2000) *Teetering on the Rim: Global Restructuring, Daily Life and the Armed Retreat of the Bolivian State*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Grindle, M. S. & Domingo, P. (Eds.) (2003) *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Klein, H. S. (1992) *Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lagos, M. (1994) *Autonomy and Power: The Dynamics of Class and Culture in Rural Bolivia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Rabe, S. G. (1999) *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Bolivia, struggle for independence, 1809–1825

S. Sándor John

The Seven Years' War (1756–63), sometimes described as the first global war, left the belligerent powers with an enormous burden of debt. Like the British and French, Spain's rulers reacted by decreeing a series of controversial new measures to raise revenue and revamp administrative structures. Designed to strengthen the Spanish empire, the Bourbon Reforms (named after the ruling family) wound up weakening it.

"War is the mother of revolution," Russian revolutionary leader Leon Trotsky (1879–1940) noted at the end of World War I. The same may be said of the events leading to the struggle for independence of Spanish colonies and the formation of the Bolivian republic.

The crown created Creole army units and expanded the colonial militias, many of whose officers and men would join the independence struggle. It separated Upper Peru from the Viceroyalty of Peru and made it part of a new Viceroyalty governed from Buenos Aires. It created a new layer of colonial administrators (*intendants*), mainly Spanish-born *peninsulares*, seemingly limiting the upward mobility of Creole elites. And it launched a limited liberalization of trade while blocking local entrepreneurs from pushing through commercial policies designed to further their own interests.

It was the Napoleonic Wars that brought the latent conflicts to the surface and rang the death knell of Spanish rule. In 1808 Napoleon deposed the king of Spain, placing his brother on the throne. *Juntas* loyal to the ousted monarch were formed in many areas, but Spain's control of its colonies had been fatally disrupted.

Bolivia can lay legitimate claim to being the birthplace of Spanish American independence, as *juntas* in Chuquisaca (today the city of Sucre) and La Paz sought to seize power in early 1809. The following year, the young Venezuelan Creole Simón Bolívar became the central leader of the nascent movement for colonial independence, which grew rapidly but suffered a major setback in 1813 when an Argentine army was defeated in its attempt to seize Upper Peru. Lower Peru

won its independence in a series of struggles culminating in the battle of Ayacucho in late 1824. Soon after, Bolívar's forces under Antonio Sucre took Upper Peru, which in August 1825 declared itself the independent Republic of Bolivia, named after the Liberator himself.

Shortly thereafter, Bolívar brought his triumph to Potosí. He climbed the Rich Mountain of Silver and made an impassioned speech paying tribute to generations of miners. The new republic would need them too, but it did not put an end to the inferno of life in the mines, nor did it view Indians as citizens. Neither did independence liberate African slaves in the country named after El Libertador. As Bolivia inaugurated its tradition of writing one new constitution after another, lawmakers tinkered with provisions related to slavery, which continued to exist for another quarter-century, coming to a definitive end only under the presidency of Belzu.

This was a sign of how things would be on most social questions in the new republic. Independence had severed Spanish control over Bolivia, while opening new opportunities for penetration by British capital which had favored the independence forces. It did not fundamentally alter the social structure of the country, in which political and economic power continued to be a near monopoly of a narrow "white" elite.

Indeed, independence brought sharply increased pressures on the indigenous population that made up almost three-quarters of the population. Of the approximately one million Indians living in the countryside, about two-thirds still lived in Indian communities; the remaining third lived on *haciendas* (estates) where fewer than 25,000 whites subjected them to a regime of free labor and personal service (*ponguaje*). New laws inspired by prevalent liberal concepts of individual ownership helped paved the way for constant inroads on community landholdings by hacienda owners. The indigenous population was almost entirely excluded from national life, feared and generally despised by the white ruling stratum. The oppressive social reality of independent Bolivia contrasted harshly with the noble rhetoric with which it had been launched.

SEE ALSO: Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); Bolivia, Protest and Repression, 1964–2000; Bolivia, War of the Pacific to the National Revolution, 1879–1952; Bolivian Neoliberalism, Social Mobilization, and Revolution from Below, 2003 and 2005

References and Suggested Reading

Stern, S. J. (Ed.) (1987) *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Bolivia, War of the Pacific to the National Revolution, 1879–1952

S. Sándor John

In 1879, war broke out, pitting Chile against the alliance of Bolivia and Peru. Bolivia's weak central government had done little to prepare for the conflict, and suffered a decisive defeat. The outcome was the loss of Bolivia's sea-coast, a national humiliation that would leave the country landlocked and provide material for revanchist agitation up to the present day.

The war opened a breach in the Bolivian elite, which divided into supporters of a peace accord with Chile, grouped around the "Conservative" ideologue Mariano Baptista, and opponents of the accord, who began to call themselves "Liberals." With the temporary ascendancy of the Conservatives, the postwar period came to be known as the rule of the "Conservative oligarchy." While both parties took for granted that elections were a matter for the small "white" minority to decide (as unlettered Indians did not have the vote), they took on some of the ideological coloration common in Latin America at the time, with the Conservatives presenting themselves as defenders of traditional Catholic values, and the Liberals putting themselves forward as partisans of progress and modernity.

Whereas Bolivian politics had been largely "personalist" until this time, without clear or stable political party demarcations, it now polarized sharply into Conservative and Liberal camps. This polarization became increasingly violent, as disputed elections led to armed clashes and, in 1888 and 1890, to the defeat of Liberal insurrections against Conservative presidents. While their opponents depicted them as enemies of all progress, Conservative presidents carried through important road and railway construction projects, as well as mapping the remote Beni region to facilitate exploitation of its vast rubber reserves.

In 1898, the Liberal Party was handed an explosive issue in its struggle against the Conservatives, when legislators voted to require that the president and congressmen live in Sucre, the nation's titular capital, rather than La Paz. Enraged, the populace of La Paz launched a "Federalist Revolution." Backed by the Liberals, the revolt coincided with and drew in a wave of indigenous resistance and rebellion on the altiplano. Liberal leader José Manuel Pando enlisted the support of Aymara rebel Pablo Zárate (also known as "El Temible Willka"), reportedly promising the return of communal lands taken by hacienda owners. Pitched battles culminated in the military defeat of the Conservative government's forces outside Oruro.

Victorious, the Liberals turned on their Indian allies, subjugating them by force and renewing the assault on community lands in the name of the principles of modernity, development and free enterprise. Zárate was imprisoned on sedition charges and later executed. As for "federalism," with La Paz firmly established as the center of the nation's political life, the Liberals quietly put this issue aside.

The Age of Tin

Having entrenched themselves in power, the Liberal oligarchy presided over the new Age of Tin. War made the new boom: tin was used for canning the food and making the armaments the great powers increasingly required. Bolivia had large reserves of this metal, some of it in the very mountains that had yielded so much silver.

As the twentieth century began, the production and export of tin became Bolivia's economic *raison d'être*. By 1929, tin accounted for three-quarters of the country's exports, and Bolivia was one of the four nations that provided 80 percent of the world supply of the metal. Tin reconfigured Bolivia's ruling sectors into a "ring" – *La Rosca*, in popular parlance – centered on the three principal tin companies, the politicians and newspapers they controlled, and the landowning interests with which they allied.

Dominating affairs at home, the "tin barons" Simón Patiño, Mauricio Hochschild and Carlos Aramayo depended on European and US firms which processed their tin – Bolivia had no smelters – marketed it, and provided them with loans when necessary. Weapons provided from

abroad outfitted the army that openly served to protect the Rosca's power.

In the Indian countryside, *ponguaeje* (the system of personal service to the "white" landowner) continued to hold many peasants in bondage, although many indigenous communities were able to maintain some of their traditional *ayllu* structure. When indigenous people ventured into cities they often found that the public squares were closed to them. Declared guilty of a multitude of offenses and infractions, indigenous people in chains were routinely exhibited in newspaper photographs. For Bolivian elites, "modernization" was seen largely as a process of overcoming the Indian origins of the nation's majority. This attitude characterized not only the Liberals but their successors in the Republican Party, whose July 1920 *putsch* (styled the "July Revolution") ended two decades of Liberal rule.

The Mining Proletariat

The lode mining system used in Bolivia's tin industry required a high concentration of workers in the mines. Living in mining camps on the high plateau, they worked amidst extreme heat and cold. Accidents were frequent and often deadly, and clouds of dust left many miners with *mal de mina* (mine sickness – silicosis). Miners rarely reached the age of 40; and still today, most die before the age of 50. Exhausting work combined with bitter poverty: in 1940 a miner earned half an American dollar in the average *mita* (the Inca word still used today for a day's work). Five years before the 1952 revolution, a miner's wage could buy only 20 percent of the necessities of a family of five.

The nature of underground mining, in which solidarity is essential for survival, made mine laborers a combative labor sector in many parts of the world. In Bolivia, this combined with their central role in the nation's economy to put the miners at the head of the nascent labor movement. This role as the advance-guard of the laboring poor became a crucial part of Bolivian miners' identity. While giving voice to an increasingly militant syndicalism, Bolivian miners, most of whom were Quechua or Aymara, remained in close touch with rural society.

Nor did the miners lose touch with their pre-Colombian (and pre-Inca) roots. Ideological syncretism mirrored the cultural world of

miners who prayed to the Virgin Mary above ground before descending to the realm of the "Tío [uncle] of the Mines." This deity, also known as Supay or Huari, was called *diablo* (devil) by the Spaniards. El Tío, in turn, is intolerant of Christian symbols, and requires regular tribute in coca, alcohol, and tobacco.

The Massacre of Uncía (1923) and the Growth of the Labor Movement

The years at the close of World War I brought a wave of labor agitation to Bolivia, just as in many other parts of the world. The growth of railways facilitated the emergence of a trade union movement. Labor disputes erupted among factory and transport workers, as well as among the miners, who launched strikes in 1917, 1918, and 1919. Railway workers launched a large-scale protest in 1920 which was suppressed by government troops.

Matters came to a head in June 1923, when the army shot down striking miners at Uncía. (The Patiño firm paid the expenses of mobilizing and feeding the troops and destroying the local miners' union.) This massacre became the symbol of repression by the employers and government against the mine workers and the nascent labor movement as a whole. The clash at Uncía also became a symbol of miners' resistance, a landmark in their historical memory, and an important episode in their increasing politicization.

Over the following years, the miners would become central to the nation's political life. By the time the old regime was finally overthrown two decades after the Uncía massacre, in the "National Revolution" of 1952, the Bolivian Mine Workers' Union Federation (FSTMB) was widely seen as the single most powerful force in Bolivian society.

As in many parts of Latin America, some of Bolivia's pioneering trade unionists identified with anarchism. This was particularly the case among urban skilled tradesmen and artisans, as well as female culinary workers; less so among miner activists. The anarchist orientation extended to the early leadership of the La Paz labor federation. Yet in Bolivia anarchism never achieved the level of allegiance and organization it won in Argentina, Mexico or Brazil. By the time the core of the Bolivian proletariat entered the field of union and political militancy, anarchism was in decline on most of the continent.

Under the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution, the 1920s saw the emergence of significant communist parties in many Latin American countries. Bolivia, however, was an exception to this pattern. Several of the country's best-known labor activists and radical intellectuals sympathized with the Communist International or participated in movements aligned with the Comintern, such as the Red International of Labor Unions and the Anti-Imperialist League. However, a structured Communist Party did not emerge until much later. This conditioned the emergence of an influential movement in the ensuing period that identified itself with the ideas of exiled Bolshevik revolutionary Leon Trotsky.

Bolivian Leftists and the Chaco War (1932–1935)

In 1932, war broke out between Bolivia and Paraguay, over a remote region called the Chaco Boreal. It pitted against each other the losers in two crucial clashes of the late nineteenth century in Latin America: Bolivia had lost the War of the Pacific and Paraguay had lost the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870), in which it was devastated by Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay.

The causes of the Chaco war have been the subject of considerable debate. The contested region was not merely inhospitable but virtually uninhabited; a Comintern report stated, "there is nothing [there] but mosquitoes, crocodiles and oil." Many believed oil was the real prize being fought over, even that Bolivia and Paraguay were little more than stand-ins for Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Shell. Yet hoped-for oil deposits in the Chaco may have been less important than Bolivia's desire to use the Paraguay River as an outlet to the sea, particularly for oil in other parts of the country whose transport over the Andes was prohibitively expensive.

Domestic politics provided additional motives for the war. The Republican government of Daniel Salamanca (president 1931–5) had grown increasingly concerned with the "red threat" that loomed larger as the world depression brought increased unemployment and misery. War with Paraguay would provide a useful stimulus to national unity. Indeed, the outbreak of war was greeted with a wave of jingoistic enthusiasm in almost all sectors of society, with only small

groups of communist and anarchist sympathizers opposing it.

Yet as the conflict dragged on until 1935, it increasingly exposed the fault lines in Bolivian society. In terms of casualties, it was the hemisphere's most costly conflict since the US Civil War, with 100,000 Bolivian and Paraguayan deaths in what the leftist intellectual René Zavaleta Mercado later called "a kind of self-cannibalism," an "absurd . . . mass duel" between two of the hemisphere's poorest countries. Tens of thousands of Bolivian and Paraguayan soldiers were taken prisoner. Yet the majority of the soldiers called upon to die for the fatherland were Indians excluded from most aspects of citizenship and publicly derided as "savages." Each new final offensive ended in new defeats and new national humiliations.

As the Bolivian state hurled itself against its neighbor, its inability to emerge from the Chaco quagmire came to be seen as the moral, political and social bankruptcy of the old order and the social groups that ruled it. Thus, the war was a watershed in the nation's political, social and cultural life. It would be a defining experience for many protagonists of Bolivia's 1952 revolution.

Bolivia and "Military Socialism"

In response to the manifest failure and decrepitude of the country's political system, a group of young military officers took power in the aftermath of the war and established a regime they called "military socialism." In some respects, the new regime was an episode in Latin America's experience with military reformers and adventurers, from the rebellion of Brazilian *tenentes* (lieutenants) to Argentina's nationalist strongman Juan Domingo Perón. This early Bolivian experiment was noteworthy for carrying out the nationalization of a powerful foreign oil concern, as well as for its unusual end.

The new regime was, in an immediate sense, a response to labor unrest. In May 1936 a graphic workers' strike turned into a general strike demanding a 100 percent wage increase. La Paz was patrolled by the strikers, who virtually controlled the capital city. In mid-May a military coup was carried out in alliance with nationalist civilian groups that had adopted a "socialist" coloration. Colonel David Toro was named head of a "socialist military junta" and a red banner was raised over the city hall of La Paz.

Toro's junta moved to incorporate labor directly into the government, appointing the leader of the graphic workers as head of the newly created Ministry of Labor. Toro also created a "State Socialist Party" and decreed a labor code, minimum wage and limits on commercial profits. He proclaimed his intention to establish what he called "corporatist unionism": obligatory syndicalization through unions that would explicitly be an arm of the state. While Toro was not in power long enough to fully implement this project, it anticipated future corporatist experiments in several Latin American countries. In late 1936, the regime moved further to the right, as Toro issued a decree against communism, and jailed and exiled leftists.

While short-lived, the Toro government made its mark on history by confiscating Standard Oil's Bolivian properties in 1937. This measure was based on the company's 1920–1922 contracts, which included a clause allowing for oil fields to revert to the state if the government demonstrated that the firm had defrauded the nation. Toro's regime carefully demonstrated that Standard Oil had done just that.

In July 1937 Toro was overthrown by his military colleague Germán Busch, who called a convention which decreed the "protection" of Indian communities, "limits" to the exercise of private property, and other populist measures. Busch declared himself dictator in 1938, flirting with Hitler's Germany while making sure not to burn his bridges with the United States. He was one of a line of Latin American rulers who used rivalries between the great powers before, during and after World War II to gain space for modernizing national-populist regimes.

But where Brazil's Getúlio Vargas, Mexico's Lázaro Cárdenas and Argentina's Perón succeeded in establishing corporatist regimes, Busch failed. Having come to power with the support or at least tolerance of the Rosca (the "ring" of ruling families), his demagogic posturing became a liability. Finding himself in a dead-end, he committed suicide in August 1939. "Military socialism" gave way to a more traditional military regime. The "suicidal dictator" entered the picturesque pantheon of failed nationalist idols that would furnish the mythology of the future Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, MNR). Most significant for Bolivia's political future

was the formation of the circle of Busch advisors, led by Victor Paz Estenssoro (1907–2001), a populist nucleus that later created the MNR.

New Political Parties

Meanwhile, a number of new political parties and movements emerged from the Chaco crisis. The first was the Revolutionary Workers' Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario, POR), founded in exile in 1935 as a merger between two currents: anti-war "defeatists" and dissident communists led by José Aguirre Gainsborg, and the "Túpac Amaru Group" of Tristán Marof (pseudonym of the flamboyant bohemian Gustavo Navarro). Marof had become Bolivia's most famous leftist with impassioned manifestos denouncing the ruling elite in a rhetoric that borrowed from indigenism, nationalism and Marxism. While its own ideology reflected the idiosyncrasies of these origins, the POR proclaimed its sympathy with the exiled Soviet revolutionary Trotsky, but lacked real ties to his international movement. Disoriented by "military socialism," the POR collapsed three years after its foundation. Only after it was "refounded" by a new generation of leaders in the late 1930s did the party eventually become a section of the Fourth International.

Another group emerging from the Chaco cataclysm was the Revolutionary Left Party (Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, PIR), led by prominent intellectual José Antonio Arze. While staunchly favoring Stalin and Soviet foreign policy, the PIR was not a section of the Communist International – indeed, the Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB) was only founded in 1950 by a split in the PIR's youth organization. The PIR achieved considerable influence on university campuses and among railway and factory workers.

By far the most influential new political force arising from the war experience was the MNR, which took shape in the early 1940s under the leadership of young members of the country's urban elite headed by Paz Estenssoro, a journalist, congressman and former Patiño mine company lawyer who became the party's "Jefe" (chief). The early MNR was influenced by the Axis powers, identifying Anglo-American imperialism as the nation's nemesis and Germany as the "enemy of my enemy." Stridently anti-Marxist and anti-Semitic in this period, it was nonetheless not a fascist party but an organization

voicing the nationalist aspirations of a frustrated, modernizing sector of the urban elite.

While incorporating a quasi-indigenist strand into its ideology, the MNR had no base among the rural population and did not propose to carry out agrarian reform. It did begin to win support from tin miners after Paz Estenssoro used the parliamentary tribune to denounce the massacre of workers at Catavi (see below). The party won the allegiance of a number of union leaders, most importantly Juan Lechín (1914–2001), the charismatic head of the FSTMB miners' federation whose speeches and documents were often written by young members of the "Trotskyist" POR.

World War II and the Villarroel Regime

The outbreak of World War II made Bolivian tin a strategic mineral for the US war effort. The US Senate's Armed Services Subcommittee stressed the importance of freezing Bolivian tin prices for the duration of the war. As a result, the Bolivian government sold tin at "democratic prices" far below those current on the open market. In monetary terms, Bolivia contributed ten times more to the Allied war effort from 1941 to 1945 than the total of US aid to all Latin America throughout the 1940s.

While mine companies reaped enormous profits, the indigenous labor force faced speedup, inflation and tightened labor discipline. In line with Soviet foreign policy, however, Bolivia's best-known leftist party, the pro-Moscow PIR, opposed any actions that might reduce the flow of tin to the Allies, and aligned itself with the parties of the tin barons' Rosca, which it now identified as part of the "progressive bourgeoisie." PIR leaders even participated in government massacres of striking miners. This provided important openings for the POR, which built a base among the miners, often in alliance with Lechín and other FSTMB leaders linked to the nationalist MNR.

Labor radicalism, as well as the popularity of the opposition MNR, grew under the pro-US military dictatorship of General Enrique Peñaranda (ruled 1940–3), particularly after army troops shot down supporters of a miners' strike at Catavi, including an elderly woman named María Barzola, who became an important symbol of worker resistance.

In December 1943, a coup was carried out by the nationalist Cause of the Fatherland military lodge. Headed by Major Gualberto Villarroel (1908–1946), this group of young officers invited Paz Estenssoro and other MNR leaders to join its new government, which carried out a number of labor reforms while vowing to respect private property and back the Allied war effort. "I am not an enemy of the rich, but I am more a friend of the poor" was Villarroel's motto. His government convened an Indian Congress to discuss the situation of the indigenous peoples and promote education in the countryside. It also promised to abolish *pongueaje*, but in practice this form of servitude in the countryside remained a dead letter until after the revolution of 1952.

Simultaneously, the Villarroel regime sought to control labor and grassroots organizations, and cracked down hard on opposition from both the left and the right. These repressive measures, together with Villarroel's inability to meet the basic needs of the urban population, led to a peculiar situation in which the right wing, the Stalinist PIR, and the US Embassy supported a popular uprising against him.

Villarroel was dragged out of his office and repeatedly stabbed with the long pins that *chola* (urbanized Indian) market women of La Paz use to fasten their ponchos, then hanged from a lamppost in front of the presidential palace. The "Anti-Fascist Democratic Front" which coordinated the rising turned power over to a coalition of Rosca parties and the PIR.

The Theses of Pulacayo

Shortly before the fall of Villarroel, the "danger of Trotskyism" became major news in both the pro- and anti-government press, as young POR leaders, particularly Guillermo Lora (b. 1922), spoke at a nationwide congress of the FSTMB miners' union. Opposing support to either the government or the right-wing parties, they called for creating workers' defense groups, a "sliding scale" of wages and hours, and other demands drawn from the "Transitional Program" of the Fourth International. They also called for a "workers bloc to fight against capitalism," which soon led to a Miners' Parliamentary Bloc (including Lechín, Lora, and others) being elected to the Bolivian senate and house of representatives.

Months later, another congress of the FSTMB approved the document that would

be the most important ideological statement of Bolivian labor over the course of the subsequent decades. Called the “Theses of Pulacayo,” it was written by POR members and stressed the central role of the mining proletariat in leading the peasantry and other oppressed sectors in a revolution against imperialism and the local ruling class. Again drawing slogans and demands from Trotsky’s Transitional Program, it called for “proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship,” while declaring solidarity with the working class of North America.

The most advanced program adopted by any union movement in the western hemisphere, the Theses of Pulacayo both reflected and further stimulated the militancy and class consciousness of Bolivian miners. The thesis vowed “war to the death against reformist collaborationism,” although it did not mention any party by name nor pose the need for a party of the working class. The contradiction was that this program was written for union leader Lechín, a member of the nationalist MNR, and helped burnish his “revolutionary” credentials. The document categorically denounced the entry of “worker ministers” into any capitalist government, but six years later Lechín and other labor leaders became “worker ministers” in the MNR regime brought to power by the 1952 revolution.

The *Sexenio Rosquero* and the Civil War of 1949

The period of reaction lasting from late 1946 to 1952 has entered Bolivian history as the *sexenio rosquero* – six years of Rosca rule. These were years full of repression, mass firings of radical workers, continual MNR conspiracies for a *putsch*, and the disintegration of the political order, preparing the way for the April 1952 revolution.

The year 1947 began with a new massacre, at Potosí, when miners joined a wave of protests against a new retirement law unfavorable to labor. The authorities appealed to well-off sectors’ fear of the Indian masses, denouncing the miners as “savages.” Large numbers of demonstrators were shot down in the streets on the orders of the Potosí mayor and police chief, who were members of the “Stalinist” PIR, as was the minister of labor who ordered troops into the mines.

Repression escalated as President Enrique Hertzog (ruled 1947–9) declared a state of siege,

which was followed by a “white massacre” (mass firing) of miners, a new “red” (bloody) massacre of Patiño company workers and the arrest and exile of FSTMB and POR leaders. The government’s troubles were compounded by a series of indigenous peasant revolts in the Cochabamba region, the largest of which occurred at Ayopaya.

A fiscal crisis and spiraling inflation set off by a downturn in the price of tin confronted the government with a further escalation of mass discontent. In August 1949, the MNR launched a *pronunciamiento* (coup attempt), seeking to take over the capital and regional centers. When the nationalist party’s hopes for backing from sectors of the military did not materialize, it was forced to rely on its own, clandestine fighting groups. At the eleventh hour, the MNR decided to mobilize some labor and middle-class sectors in the attempted seizure of power.

The insurgents were quickly defeated in La Paz, but managed to seize some provincial cities. The ensuing struggle between the government and the MNR has come to be known as the “Civil War of 1949.” The government forces won this conflict, but theirs was a Pyrrhic victory. While the MNR suffered heavy losses, its reputation rose as the party of resistance to the Rosca. Fearing that the social order could be torn apart by class conflict, the nationalist party was reluctant to distribute arms to the population. Nonetheless, miners, some of whom had received military training during the Chaco war, played an important role in the fighting.

After two months of bloody clashes, the rebels were driven out of the areas they had managed to seize. Their last redoubt was the remote area near Ñancahuazú in southeastern Bolivia where Che Guevara would perish two decades later. Miners captured in the fighting were put on military planes and thrown into Lake Poopó near Oruro, in an anticipation of the technique the Argentine armed forces would use in the 1970s in their “dirty war” against the left.

In May 1950, a general strike was launched by a clandestine coordinating committee of trade unionists (in which members of the POR, MNR, and the newly formed Communist Party [PCB] were prominent). Workers built barricades in response to military repression and summary trials of strikers. Defeat came after the army surrounded the La Paz textile workers’ *barrio* of Villa Victoria, using artillery fire and strafing from the air to level the entire neighborhood.

National Revolution of 1952

In the general elections of May 1951, popular discontent led to a landslide victory for MNR presidential and vice-presidential candidates Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles Zuazo. In response, President Mamerto Urriolagoitia (ruled 1949–51) carried out a “self-coup,” popularly dubbed the *Mamertazo*, turning power over to a military junta headed by General Hugo Ballivián.

This latest military dictatorship was unable to overcome mass disaffection, which was further inflamed by an acute shortage of basic articles of consumption brought on by a dispute with the US over the price of tin. The government tried to distract the populace with a renewed campaign to “regain the sea-coast” lost to Chile in the Pacific War, but the gambit had little success.

What began on April 9, 1952 was not supposed to be a revolution. Instead, the MNR had planned a coup d'état in concert with a section of the armed forces. The plan called for armed MNR cells to back the coup, but the nationalist party did not initially call on the masses to mobilize. Instead, they made an agreement to take power with the head of the elite Carabineros police force, as well as the fascistic Bolivian Socialist Falange (Falange Socialista Boliviana, FSB). However, the FSB backed out and the insurgents encountered unexpected resistance from government-loyal military units. When mass sectors entered the fighting, the head of the Carabineros withdrew from the rising. The MNR leadership proposed a joint army–MNR government, but seemed ready to give up the attempt when the military refused.

At this point the situation changed in a way that would deeply affect Bolivian history. In the face of the army's advance on La Paz, the civilian population came out to wage street battles which rapidly turned into an all-out insurrection. A crucial part was played by factory workers, notably those of the main La Paz glass factory. Armed with rifles from the Chaco war, dynamite, homemade bombs or nothing but wooden sticks, the miners of Milluni entered the fray, followed by those of Oruro and Potosí. The seizure of the military arsenal in the capital's Ayacucho plaza gave civilian rebels access to ammunition and more modern weapons.

The standing army fell to pieces during the April Days; its demoralized remnants took refuge in their barracks. After the victorious insurrec-

tion, militias of miners and factory workers became the only effective armed force. With the Rosca's repressive apparatus shattered, who controlled the workers' militias became the key to power. FSTMB leader Juan Lechín, the central leader of the April rising, was thus the linchpin of MNR control. At the head of throngs of armed workers, it was Lechín who “took” the presidential palace (the old government had fled) and promptly turned it over to Siles, who announced that a new government would be headed by MNR Jefe Paz Estenssoro, with himself as vice-president and a cabinet including Lechín and two other “worker ministers.”

Representatives of the MNR hastened to assure the US that their regime was not anti-capitalist but anti-communist. The uprising was still in progress when Siles declared to the foreign press that the revolt “is completely democratic, without any connection with international communism.” Bolivia's international agreements “will be respected,” he vowed, and the MNR would begin an era of “pacification.”

Social and Political Changes under the New Regime

Under Lechín's leadership, a powerful new labor federation was formed a week after the uprising: the Bolivian Labor Federation (Central Obrera Boliviana, COB). The COB exercised what was formally and officially called “co-government” with the MNR. This was both a recognition of the federation's power and a means of containing and co-opting that power. In the first years of the revolution, the functions of the COB went far beyond the normal reach of a trade union body, as innumerable social sectors affiliated to the federation.

In the period after April 1952, peasants, street vendors, and many other non-proletarian but downtrodden sectors turned to the COB to resolve problems that would, elsewhere, have been the province of government functionaries. In the countryside, peasant unions linked to the COB often became the highest authority in their communities. The workers' militias and the exceptional weight of the COB meant there were some “elements of dual power in Bolivia,” according to the international Trotskyist press, making a partial analogy to the situation in Russia between the February and October revolutions of 1917, when workers' councils (soviets)

shared and contested power with the bourgeois Provisional Government.

Immediately after the April 1952 insurrection, the labor movement demanded nationalization of the mines: the old slogan “mines to the state” (which Tristán Marof had popularized even before the Chaco war) became the order of the day. There was a real threat that if the government did not nationalize the major mines, the workers would take them over directly. Paz Estenssoro sought to assuage US fears while granting an important concession to mass pressure. Rather than nationalizing the mines at once, he named a commission to study the issue for six months, after which the government carried out the nationalization of the mining properties of the “tin barons” Patiño, Aramayo and Hochschild under the aegis of the newly created Bolivian Mining Corporation (Comibol).

Only the three large mining firms were taken over; medium-sized and small mining properties were unaffected. Bolivia’s tin remained subject to the monopolies that dominated the market (notably in the London Metal Exchange). Meanwhile, the government opened the door to foreign oil companies. At the same time, “co-government” was extended to the mines through an institutionalized “workers’ control” consisting of the integration of labor leaders into Comibol management.

One of the regime’s most significant measures was the decree of universal suffrage (July 1952), which put an end to one of the most visible mechanisms by which the Indian majority had been excluded from political rights (voting had been reserved for those who could read and write Spanish).

SEE ALSO: Bolivia, Protest and Repression, 1964–2000; Bolivia, Struggle for Independence, 1809–1825; Bolivian Neoliberalism, Social Mobilization, and Revolution from Below, 2003 and 2005

References and Suggested Readings

- Barrios de Chungara, D., with Viezzer, M. (1978) *Let Me Speak! Testimony of Domitila, a Woman of the Bolivian Mines*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Dunkerley, J. (1984) *Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952–1982*. London: Verso.
- Gill, L. (2000) *Teetering on the Rim: Global Restructuring, Daily Life and the Armed Retreat of the Bolivian State*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Grindle, M. S. & Domingo, P. (Eds.) (2003) *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lagos, M. (1994) *Autonomy and Power: The Dynamics of Class and Culture in Rural Bolivia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Larson, B. (2004) *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810–1910*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Nash, J. (1992) *I Spent My Life in the Mines: The Story of Juan Rojas, Bolivian Tin Miner*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Stern, S. J. (Ed.) (1987) *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Bolivian neoliberalism, social mobilization, and revolution from below, 2003 and 2005

Dwight R. Hahn

The implementation of neoliberal “shock therapy” in 1985 with President Victor Paz Estenssoro’s New Economic Policy, through Presidential Decree 21060, followed by privatization via the 1994 Law of Capitalization promoted by President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, had initially turned Bolivia into something of a model for neoliberal development. Among the first of the developing countries to throw out a state-centered economic development model, Bolivia became an early test case for the effects – economic and political – of relatively rapid neoliberal implementation within the institutional context of an electoral democracy.

By the year 2000, it was clear that the model was not working as neoliberal ideologues had promised. In that year, the population of the department of Cochabamba erupted in outrage over the loss of water rights and steep rate hikes for water charged by the new foreign owners of the Cochabamba water system. Perhaps as many as 100,000 people participated in barricades and open-air assemblies; the government of President Hugo Banzer was forced to back down as the contract with the private investors of Aguas de Tunari was withdrawn; and water distribution returned to the publicly managed SEMAPA.

Undaunted, Sánchez de Lozada returned to the presidency in 2002 for a second (non-consecutive) term and negotiated contracts with foreign oil and gas companies for the extraction and export of Bolivian oil and natural gas. Viewed by the opposition social movement leadership as highly favorable to the foreign companies, and set in the context of growing inequality in the distribution of income and productive land, unemployment, and foreign-sponsored efforts to eradicate the major cash crop of coca, these deals caused Bolivia's political system – an elite pact forged in the 1952 National Revolution – to collapse. The major portion of that collapse came with the events of October 2003, forcing the key architect of neoliberal policy in Bolivia, Sánchez de Lozada, to resign the presidency and flee the country. The completion of the collapse came in 2005 as the October 2003 successor to the presidency, Carlos Mesa Gisbert, was also forced to resign and power was handed over to a caretaker government. In December 2005, Bolivia demonstrated that it had undergone a significant political realignment, if not revolution, with the election of Evo Morales Ayma to the presidency.

October 2003

Commentators on the popular mobilization that brought down Sánchez de Lozada generally agree that agitation leading to the events of October began in February of that year with the imposition of a new flat rate income tax of 12.5 percent on salaries over \$110.00 a month in order to placate the lenders at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In La Paz, the measure caused police to go on strike to demand higher wages. This led to violent conflict between protesters, including striking police, on one side, and the presidential guard and military police on the other side, as protesters gathered in the Plaza Murillo in front of the presidential palace.

The deaths of several protesters set loose a revolt in the ensuing days as crowds set fire to the offices in La Paz of the major “neoliberal” parties – i.e., the major parties of the post-1952 party system. Within a few days 29 people had been killed and another 205 had been injured by government troops. However, the police returned to work within the week, and the violence subsided, even as political conditions remained tense as Sánchez de Lozada repealed

the tax and brought in a new cabinet. Kohl and Farthing contend that though this protest did not contain the same element of a sustained social movement as that demonstrated in the earlier “water war” in Cochabamba, the events of February demonstrated that the Bolivian government was clearly willing to use violence against Bolivians in order to impose the dictates of an external agency. Hence, the Sánchez de Lozada government allowed leaders of several causes to portray neoliberal policies as a betrayal of Bolivian national sovereignty. Issues ranging from coca leaf eradication to the sale of the railroads to Chile and the proposed sale of gas, also to Chile – the enemy of Bolivia since the War of the Pacific and the loss of its coastline to Chile in the early 1880s – would become the basis of a unified nationalist popular opposition to the imperialism viewed as implicit to neoliberal policies.

The movement-based opposition, unified by its nationalist opposition to neoliberalism, came to a head over the government's plan to allow foreign companies to extract and export natural gas, through Chile, to California. Opposition parties – the MIP (Pachakuti Indigenous Movement) led by Felipe Quispe and MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) led by Evo Morales – as well as the union movement of the coca growers, a peasant/indigenous union, and the community organization of El Alto – the largely Aymaran urban area that sits on the edge of the altiplano above the city of La Paz – mobilized together in opposition to the government's plan, through street marches and the erection of road barricades, to shut down and isolate La Paz in September 2005.

These protests coincided with a protest led by Quispe over the government's detention of an Aymara community leader, Edwin Huampu, for the murder of two individuals who had been found guilty of stealing cattle by a community assembly in the village of Cota Cota.

The mobilization of 10,000 Aymarans who marched from El Alto and into the central district of La Paz to protest against the arrest of Huampu was not unconnected to the other mobilizations against the privatization and export of Bolivian natural gas. Rather, the mobilization in defense of local Aymaran jurisdiction in criminal matters was intimately linked to the nationalist opposition movements by the common cause of an indigenous-rooted national identity.

This same common cause was the basis for the coca grower mobilization in opposition to government as they couched their protest against coca eradication in the symbolism of coca as the sacred leaf of the indigenous population.

Loss of life began in late September outside La Paz in the village of Warisata when the Bolivian army used force to break through a barricade to evacuate foreign tourists trapped in the town of Sorata by the shutdown of the road back to La Paz. In response there were more mobilizations and the construction of more barricades on the major roads connecting La Paz to the rest of the country and on other major roads as well. By early October, more protesters marched into the streets of La Paz, calling for the industrialization of gas and not its export through Chile; no to the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas; repeal of the law that had been used by the government to enhance its powers against the protesters, especially at the road blockades; and the resignation of the president. As October progressed the mass demonstrations within La Paz and El Alto continued and grew as protesters arrived from other departments. The use of violence to suppress the protests, and loss of life, also grew.

By the middle of October, the major urban centers throughout the Andean region were controlled by protesters. The number of protesters in La Paz swelled to 300,000, and more were on their way from the mining centers on the altiplano. The use of violence against the protesters was a self-defeating mechanism as it motivated more groups to support the uprising in La Paz. As the army command made it clear that it would not use extraordinary means to protect the Sánchez de Lozada government, and as the vice-president, Carlos Mesa, publicly distanced himself from Sánchez de Lozada, the president recognized that he could no longer hope to govern. He resigned and slipped out of the country on October 17. Carlos Mesa was sworn into office that same day. With promises from Mesa that he would act in compliance with the demands of the protesters, Bolivia demobilized and awaited results from the new government.

June 2005

Granted something of a breathing space, Mesa's government was nevertheless still constrained by the IMF, and by the economic necessity for foreign investment to exploit Bolivia's resources,

as well as by the US government's demand to continue coca eradication efforts. That is, Mesa's government would attempt to soften the impact of neoliberal policy and thus hope to avoid arousing the nationalist sentiment that had ended the government of Sánchez de Lozada; but his government was, still, committed to neoliberal policy. As promised to the protesters, Mesa introduced a referendum on the exploitation of oil and natural gas in Bolivia for a vote by the people in July 2004. Contrary to what had been promised, or at least what the leaders of the movements believed had been promised, the proposal did not allow voters to respond yes or no to the question of renationalization of hydrocarbon resources in Bolivia. Most of the major social movement leaderships called for the boycott of the referendum. The single major political party leader to support Mesa was Evo Morales – leader of the recently created MAS Party which had been formed out of the Coca Growers' Federation of the Chapare of which Morales was the leader. The referendum contained five separate questions all of which were passed. The wording was clearly an effort to strike a politically acceptable compromise between property rights and profit demands of foreign capital on one side, and the October 2003 demand for nationalization on the other. Implementation of the referendum's allowance of foreign exploitation of gas and oil depended on the inability of the popular opposition movements to remobilize and the ongoing support of the Mesa government from Mesa's party in the congress in conjunction with the support of the traditional parties.

In January 2005 Mesa conceded quickly to a protest, this time in El Alto, over water privatization. Although lacking the heroic confrontation of the 2000 water war in Cochabamba, Mesa's concession emboldened the popular opposition and aroused the hostility of the pro-neoliberal right wing in Bolivia. By March of 2005, as the Mesa version of the hydrocarbons law advanced through the legislative process, the popular opposition began once again to mobilize. This time, Mesa dug in, depending on continued support from the neoliberal right and Morales. After some hesitation, but with street protests growing, Morales and the MAS withdrew their support of the Mesa government in June. Mesa was thus left in a position identical to that of his predecessor, except, perhaps, that Mesa

would not order the use of violence against the demonstrators. Once again, more than 100,000 protesters marched into the streets of La Paz. With the return of mass mobilizations and the loss of support in congress, Mesa resigned from the presidency.

The normal constitutional procedure would have been for the president of the senate, Hormando Vaca Diez, to assume the presidency, given that the vice-presidency was vacant. However, the mobilized popular groups made it clear that it was unacceptable for Vaca Diez, from the neoliberal right, to assume the presidency. The congress moved its discussion from La Paz to Sucre in hopes of escaping the pressure of the street demonstrations. In a show of organizational strength and determination of the popular groups, the protesters followed the congress to Sucre and forced a compromise in which the head of the supreme court, Eduardo Rodríguez Veltze, assumed the presidency as caretaker. New elections for the presidency and congress were set for December 2005.

To the astonishment of nearly all observers, Morales won the December election for the presidency with an outright majority of the vote – 54 percent. No candidate had obtained an outright majority since the return of electoral democracy in 1982. As such, previous presidencies had been determined by the congress. Further, the MAS became the dominant party in the congress, with 73 seats out of a total of 130 seats in the chamber of deputies and 12 out of 27 seats in the senate (second to the neoliberal opposition party PODEMOS – Democratic and Social Power Party – which took 13 seats). At the very least, the stunning electoral results for Morales and the MAS were indicative of a major realignment in Bolivian politics. Many observers of the current Bolivian situation have engaged in the debate over whether the results of the election indicate that the mobilizations of October 2003 and June 2005 were indicative of a social and political revolution.

The political conditions for this Morales government were born of the failures of the neoliberal policy of the preceding two decades. Morales had deftly drawn a political accommodation between the need for foreign capital for the development and exploitation of oil and gas, and the need to demonstrate that Bolivia is not giving away its patrimony at a bargain price to international capital. Morales has also pushed

ahead aggressively with land redistribution in the face of opposition from the political elites of eastern Bolivia – the so-called Half-Moon. On the issue of coca eradication he has refused to cooperate with the United States while, at the same time, insisting that he is very open to cooperation with the United States on the separate issue of narcotics trafficking.

More recently, the political implications of ethnic identity have come to the fore in the events surrounding the constituent assembly that was originally promised by Mesa and delivered by Morales in 2006. Resulting from the effort to write a new constitution that would, among other things, centralize the collection of revenues from resource extractions, and the refusal of the “white” elites of the eastern “Half-Moon” departments of Bolivia to compromise on their current access to that revenue, the rhetoric of “racial” and ethnic identity has intensified. It remains to be seen whether any common vision of Bolivian “national identity” can actually be constructed to unify that country within a single state.

SEE ALSO: Bolivia, Protest and Repression, 1964–2000; Bolivia, War of the Pacific to the National Revolution, 1879–1952; *Cocaleros* Peasant Uprising; Cochabamba Water Wars; Morales, Evo (b. 1959)

References and Suggested Readings

- Albo, X. (2007) *El Alto: Mobilizing Block by Block*. NACLA Report on the Americas (July/August): 34–8.
- Grindle, M. S. & Domingo, P. (Eds.) (2003) *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hylton, F. & Thomson, S. (2007) *Revolutionary Horizons: Past and Present in Bolivian Politics*. New York: Verso.
- Kohl, B. & Farthing, L. (2006) *Impasse in Bolivia*. London: Zed Books.
- Vann Cott, D. L. (2005) *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bolotnikov's Rebellion, 1606–1607

Yury V. Bosin

Russia suffered considerable economic and political upheaval in the early seventeenth century

as raids by Crimean Tatars and the protracted Livonian War (1558–82) with the Polish-Lithuanian Confederation destabilized Russian society. The agricultural crop failure of 1601–2 caused a great famine: in Moscow alone, 127,000 people starved to death. Against this backdrop of struggle and crisis, Bolotnikov's Rebellion was the first of four peasant wars that shook Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The reign of Tsar Fyodor from 1584 to 1598 marked the end of the Rurick dynasty and ushered in the "Time of Troubles" denoting economic crisis and a political power vacuum. Following Fyodor's death, the crown was turned over to Boris Godunov (1598–1605), then to False Dmitry, an impostor claiming to be the son of Ivan the Terrible and true heir to the throne. This political volatility accentuated rumors that spread quickly to the masses, leading to popular ferment and dissension. When Vassiliy Shuysky ascended to the throne following False Dmitry's assassination in 1606, the foundation for a vast uprising had already been built in southern and southwestern Russia, where Russian fugitives typically fled for asylum. Ivan Bolotnikov, a nobleman who became a serf, fled to the Don River to join Cossacks to organize an insurrection against the tsar. He was captured by Tatars, sold to Turkey, and escaped to Venice, returning to Russia through Hungary, Germany, and Poland where he initiated the movement against Shuysky, otherwise known as Vassiliy Ivanovich, who was tsar from 1606 to 1610. Bolotnikov, seeking control over Moscow, formed an army of 180,000 that controlled 70 towns, and defeated Shuysky's army in two battles in October 1606.

To prevent the onslaught, Shuysky purchased the services of Bolotnikov's closest commanders who assisted in defending Moscow from the approaching troops. Bolotnikov was defeated and retreated to the towns of Serpukhov and Kaluga. The war was not over. In 1607, Bolotnikov captured the large town of Tula and sent reinforcements to defend the settlement from a siege by Shuysky's army of 150,000 through October of that year. Bolotnikov was taken into custody in a remote northern town of Kargopol, and a year later blinded and drowned in an ice hole.

SEE ALSO: Bulavin's Rebellion, 1707–1708; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Pugachev's Rebellion, 1773–1775; Razin's Rebellion, 1670–1671

References and Suggested Readings

- Avrich, P. (1976) *Russian Rebels, 1600–1800: Four Great Rebellions Which Shook the Russian State in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Peasants' Wars in Russia in the 17–18th Centuries* (1966) Moscow and Leningrad (in Russian).
- Smirnov, I. I. (1951) *Bolotnikov's Rebellion of 1606–1607*. Moscow (in Russian).

Bolsheviks

Alex Zukas

Bolsheviks were Marxist revolutionaries active in early twentieth-century Russia who devoted their lives to creating a tightly knit political organization with the intention of leading a mass insurrection of discontented workers and peasants against the oppressive social, economic, and political conditions of the autocratic tsarist regime. Their efforts earned them an important place in modern history because, distrustful of the coalition socialist-liberal provisional government that had replaced the tsarist regime in the wake of the first Russian Revolution of February 1917, led by Lenin (1870–1924) and Trotsky (1879–1940) they harnessed a wave of popular radicalism among the peasantry and proletariat and organized a second revolution in October 1917. The first revolution in world history carried out by a self-consciously Marxist party, it eventually transformed the huge Russian empire into the Soviet Union, the first militantly communist and anti-capitalist nation in the world and one of only two superpowers to emerge from World War II. Today "Bolsheviks" generally refers to those men and women who were members of the Leninist party in the pre-revolutionary era of exile and underground struggle and the revolutionary upheavals of 1917 through 1921.

Initially, Russian Marxists were united in one party, the revolutionary Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). The RSDLP was formed by Russian socialists at an 1898 congress in Minsk to unite a variety of Russian revolutionary organizations into a cohesive political force. The congress founded the party on key Marxist ideas: the historical universality of class exploitation and class struggle, the historical necessity of working-class revolution to bring the exploitation of one class by another to an end, and the creation of a future communist society

of socially and politically equal citizens who engaged in freely chosen, non-alienated labor. Since any independent political activity or organizing was against the law in tsarist Russia, the party existed as an illegal, underground organization. In 1902, the year before the Second RSDLP Congress, the revolutionary Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, better known to history by his underground alias Lenin, published *What Is To Be Done?*. In this work Lenin explained his strategic vision for the RSDLP in a tsarist autocracy which allowed no political parties, no open political campaigning, and no form of representative government. In his vision the party would become the institutional home of activists, agitators, and organizers who would assume the role of a disciplined vanguard of proletarian revolution. Party members would need to commit themselves full time to revolutionary agitation and organization. Lenin dubbed this organizational paradigm “a party of a new type.” That is, it was a party that was not concerned with electoral success but with inculcating a transformative revolutionary consciousness and activism in the mass of workers and peasants and with organizing the overthrow of the government in order to create a new kind of society that would realize Marx’s ideas of human emancipation. Sympathizers and those who could not make such a commitment would remain outside the party structure. They could contribute to the revolutionary cause by forming or joining institutions like trade unions, cooperatives, and other “mass,” general membership organizations. Having dealt with structural issues, Lenin then turned to decision-making processes within the party. In order for this underground organization of professional socialist revolutionaries to be both an effective and legitimate organization that could hold the loyalty of its members under the conditions of tsarist repression, he proposed that “democratic centralism” govern all internal party processes and debates. Party members had the right to discuss and debate matters of policy and direction freely and openly within the party and vote for leaders in an open, fair, and democratic process, but once they came to a decision by majority vote, all party members, including those in the minority, had to uphold that decision and present a united front to the outside world. As Lenin described it, democratic centralism embodied freedom of discussion and criticism within the party tied to unity of action

and purpose outside the party. That is, discussions and decisions would be based on grassroots participation of party members “from below,” but democratically arrived-at decisions would be implemented uniformly, centrally, “from above,” and apply to every comrade’s conduct as part of party discipline until decisions were revised at a later date by the same process.

The Second Party Congress met in Belgium in November 1903 and Lenin moved that his ideas from *What Is To Be Done?* be adopted by the RSDLP. He and his supporters, members of the editorial board of the party’s newspaper *Iskra* (Spark), could not persuade the congress that the RSDLP should be transformed into a disciplined party of professional revolutionaries (cadres). The RSDLP majority voted that the party remain a mass-based organization open to militant trade unionists, radical workers, and other social activists. Lenin’s faction did not come away empty-handed, however. It did win a less crucial vote concerning the composition of *Iskra*’s editorial board. After winning this vote Lenin began calling his faction *Bolshevik*, which meant “members of the majority.” The main faction opposing the Bolsheviks at this congress subsequently became known as *Mensheviks* (“members of the minority”), even though they were the majority at the congress. Despite defeat at the 1903 congress, Bolsheviks put Lenin’s ideas of a vanguard party and democratic centralism into practice in their faction. Factions within the RSDLP were porous and members joined and left often in 1903 and 1904. For example, the godfather of Russian Marxism, Georgi Plekhanov (1856–1918), at first allied himself with the Bolsheviks but found a permanent home in the Menshevik camp by 1904. On the other hand, Trotsky first sided with the Mensheviks but broke with them in September 1904 over their resolve to ally themselves with Russian liberals and their refusal to reconcile with Lenin and the Bolsheviks. He remained an independent social democrat who worked to unify the factions until August 1917. By that time he became convinced of the necessity of a vanguard party and a second, workers’ revolution and joined the Bolsheviks.

To harden boundaries, the Bolsheviks held a Bolsheviks-only conference in London in April 1905, which they termed the Third Party Congress, while the Mensheviks organized a rival conference. With greater organizational separation,

ideological differences between the two groups became more pronounced. While both Marxist groups expected a future revolution against tsarist rule would be bourgeois in nature, the Bolsheviks believed that this revolution had to be led by the working class in alliance with the peasantry because unlike the self-confident and rising bourgeoisies of seventeenth-century Britain and eighteenth-century France, the bourgeoisie of twentieth-century Russia was too small, weak, and indecisive to lead a popular revolution against autocratic rule and install liberal democratic government and freedoms. The Mensheviks held the more orthodox Marxist position that a bourgeois revolution was logically the work of bourgeois parties, such as the liberal Constitutional Democratic Party (*Kadet*) in Russia, and workers and peasants would play only a subordinate role. At the Fourth (Unification) Conference in Stockholm in April 1906, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks sought to reconcile their differences and work together within a reunified RSDLP. However, to avoid arrest by the tsarist police for seditious activities, Lenin began a self-imposed exile in 1907, living for a time in various European countries and finally landing in Switzerland in September 1914. His exile corresponded with an era of serious internal factional and party disputes. At the Fifth Conference in London in May 1907, the Bolsheviks achieved a majority but cooperation between the factions soon broke down. Part of the problem was that, hoping to forestall future revolutionary insurrections after the urban revolts of 1905/6, Tsar Nicolas II (1868–1918) loosened his autocratic rule. Political concessions included legalizing parliamentary political parties, granting a limited franchise, and establishing an elected Duma (parliament) with restricted powers. Divisions soon appeared within the Bolshevik faction as a result of these reforms. Lenin, Grigory Zinoviev (1883–1936), and Lev Kamenev (1883–1936) held that Bolsheviks should participate in the Duma to exploit the newly opened political space, while Alexander Bogdanov (1873–1928) held that Bolsheviks should shun the Duma. After criticizing Bogdanov's position in *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (1909), Lenin won majority support at a Bolshevik conference in Paris in 1909 as well as Bogdanov's expulsion from the Bolshevik faction. Contacts between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks to revive a unified RSDLP in 1910 bore no fruit. Instead, at a

January 1912 Bolshevik-only conference in Prague, the Bolsheviks declared that they were no longer a faction within the RSDLP but an independent party, the RSDLP (Bolshevik), with no organizational ties to the Mensheviks or other RSDLP factions.

Bolsheviks repudiated Russian involvement in World War I (1914–18), basing their stance on socialist internationalism. From their point of view, the war was an inter-imperialist conflict that redirected the revolutionary energies of the lower classes into fratricidal warfare when they should be uniting to overthrow their own ruling classes. Bolshevik agitation among Russian workers, peasants, and soldiers tried to foment an insurrectionary mood and persuade them to channel their energies into a rebellion against a semi-capitalist regime and ruling class at home that would end the war and establish a workers' and peasants' state. That is, a war for imperialist ends should be transformed into a war for social emancipation. Bolsheviks were instrumental in organizing numerous international anti-war conferences, including the famous one at Zimmerwald, Switzerland in 1915. The defeat of revolutionary forces in 1905 and the pro-war stance of the Russian bourgeoisie convinced Lenin and the Bolsheviks that Marx's historical teleology did not fit Russia and that the historically separate bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolutions would have to occur simultaneously involving a class-conscious proletariat led by a vanguard party in conjunction with the mass of the peasantry. The revolutions would install a dictatorship (i.e., emergency rule) of the proletariat, that is, a class-based democracy in which workers and peasants exercised political power through elected councils known as soviets. Lenin and the Bolsheviks maintained that without a proletarian revolution there could never be true social emancipation because the ruling classes would turn the class-based power (i.e., "dictatorship") of the state, whether autocratic or bourgeois-democratic, against the massed power of workers and peasants as they had done in the past. Only when the proletariat and peasantry were the "ruling classes" could socialism be built.

After two years of war, the overextended Russian army and economy imploded. Encouraged by Bolshevik agitators, peasants and workers absconded from the front in the face of severe casualties, officer ineptitude, and staggering defeats. Physical deprivation surpassed human endurance

and by early 1917 Russia was in a revolutionary situation with strikes and food riots in every major city instigated and led by local Bolshevik cadres. To hasten Russia's collapse on Germany's eastern front, in early 1917 the German government provided transportation and financial support for anti-war Bolshevik leaders living in exile to return to Russia. Unable to contain the revolutionary upsurge, Nicholas II abdicated in February 1917 and a Provisional Government of liberals and agrarian socialists assumed power. The February Revolution ended the autocracy. While the Bolshevik leadership living outside Russia played no role in this first revolution, local Bolsheviks organized the daily strikes and street demonstrations that convinced the tsar to abdicate. The differences between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks remained unbridgeable, however. Following orthodox Marxism, Mensheviks held that Russia needed a liberal-capitalist revolution so that the country could make the transition to socialism at a later date once capitalism and the proletariat had matured. For that reason they backed the Provisional Government. Back in Russia Lenin championed the workers' soviets as the legitimate government of the country and opposed the Provisional Government in his *April Theses* (1917). Bolsheviks soon rallied mass support for their position to end the war, redistribute land, socialize production, and create a workers' democracy with the widely popular slogans "All Power to Soviets" and "Land, Bread, and Peace." Keenly aware that their promoting socialist revolution in a "backward" country went against orthodox Marxist ideas, Bolsheviks argued that world capitalism was an interlinked system and the world war had fomented mass unrest in all belligerent nations in Europe. In this unique conjuncture, a worker-peasant revolution in semi-capitalist, semi-industrial Russia would spark classic Marxist proletarian revolutions in the capitalist and industrially developed countries of Europe which would then be in a position to export socialist development to Russia.

Bolsheviks gained strong support in the soviets over the summer and fall, and Lenin persuaded reluctant Bolsheviks to launch an insurrection on October 24, 1917 and overthrow the Provisional Government. As head of the Petrograd soviet, Trotsky organized the almost bloodless uprising after joining the Bolshevik party in mid-1917. During the uprising the

Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets met and instituted a new government, the Council of People's Commissars. The Congress chose Lenin to head the new government with other Bolsheviks as commissars for major government departments. With one foot in the past and one foot in the future, the Seventh Party Congress of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks) met in March 1918 and officially changed the name of the party to the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). In December 1925, after the formation of the Soviet Union, the party became the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). The designation of "Bolshevik" was only dropped from the party's formal name in October 1952, very near the end of the Stalin era.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Russia; Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888–1938); Class Struggle; Counter-revolution; Kollontai, Alexandra (1872–1952); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Leninist Philosophy; Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marxism; Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918); Reed, John (1887–1920); Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russian Civil War, 1918–1924; Socialism; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and "Revolution from Above"; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Women in the Russian Revolution; Zetkin, Clara (1857–1933)

References and Suggested Readings

- Acton, E. (1990) *Rethinking the Russian Revolution*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Budgen, S., Kouvelakis, S., & Žižek, S. (2007) *Lenin Reloaded: Towards a Politics of Truth*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Burbank, J. (1989) *Intelligentsia and Revolution: Russian Views of Bolshevism, 1917–1922*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Carr, E. H. (1985) *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, Vol. 1. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Carr, E. H. & Davies, R. W. (2004) *The Russian Revolution from Lenin to Stalin 1917–1929*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cohen, S. F. (1980) *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, S. F. (1985) *Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History since 1917*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dukes, P. (1979) *October and the World: Perspectives on the Russian Revolution*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Fitzpatrick, S. (2001) *The Russian Revolution*, 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Haimson, L. H. (1985) *Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism*. Boston: Beacon Press.

- Haimson, L. H. & Tilly, C. (Eds.) (1989) *Strikes, Wars, and Revolutions in an International Perspective: Strike Waves in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Medvedev, R. A. (1985) *The October Revolution*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Pipes, R. (1991) *The Russian Revolution*. New York: Vintage.
- Rabinowitch, A. (2007) *The Bolsheviks in Power: The First Year of Soviet Rule in Petrograd*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Read, C. (1996) *From Tsar to Soviets: The Russian People and Their Revolution, 1917–21*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Service, R. (2002) *Lenin: A Biography*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap.
- Service, R. (2007) *The Russian Revolution, 1900–1927*, 3rd ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Stites, R. (1989) *Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ulam, A. B. (1998) *The Bolsheviks: The Intellectual and Political History of the Triumph of Communism in Russia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Woods, A. (1999) *Bolshevism: The Road to Revolution*. London: Wellred Books.

Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873)

Casey Harison

Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, a nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, seemed an unlikely heir to his uncle's legacy. Conspirator, politician, and then emperor of France, Louis-Napoleon established a political system whose closest counterpart is Mussolini's Italy of the twentieth century. Louis-Napoleon's ambiguous personal and political history has been the subject of scholarly debate ever since.

Following Napoleon I's exile in 1815, the Bonapartes were forbidden to live in France, and so Louis-Napoleon was raised in Switzerland and Germany. He spent years traveling, developing a special fondness for Italy, where he joined the Carbonari in its struggle for an independent Italy. As heir to the Napoleonic crown, Louis-Napoleon made two ill-fated, almost comical attempts to come to power in France: the first launched from Strasbourg in 1836 and the second from Boulogne in 1840. The latter led to imprisonment, where he wrote *Napoleonic Ideas*, giving a social and economic dimension to the "bonapartism" he would later call upon as emperor.

The chance to come to power legally came with the presidential elections following the French Revolution of 1848. Louis-Napoleon returned to France during the Second Republic and gained financial and political support from sections of society unhappy with the turmoil of revolution and the June Days. Louis-Napoleon promised order; his famous name helped win votes. He received almost 5.5 million votes and gained the presidency in a landslide. It was a remarkable ascendancy for a person many considered to be a shadow of the great uncle.

Louis-Napoleon, it turned out, was an authoritarian. He ended the republic in December 1851 with a well-planned coup d'état and subsequent repression. Thousands of opponents were arrested or exiled. The next year (1852), he formally abolished the republic and declared France an empire. Louis-Napoleon now became Napoleon III.

With the coup, Louis-Napoleon became the object of scorn from famous critics like the exiled Victor Hugo, who labeled him "Napoleon the Little." Karl Marx, too, offered a biting analysis with *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, denigrating the younger Napoleon's seizure of power in comparison with that of his great uncle in 1799: "The first time as tragedy, the second time as farce." Later historians described the empire as a form of caesarism or proto-fascism. By the mid-1860s, the empire had become more "liberal," though it was undermined by the misadventure of an invasion of Mexico (1862–7). The Second Empire ended with military defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1). Napoleon III was himself taken prisoner at the battle of Sedan and died in exile in England in 1873.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); European Revolutions of 1848; France, June Days, 1848; Marx, Karl (1818–1883)

References and Suggested Readings

- Guérard, A. (1972) *Napoleon III: A Great Life in Brief*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Marx, K. (1984) *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. New York: International Publishers.
- Price, R. (1997) *Napoleon III and the Second Empire*. London: Routledge.
- Spitzer, A. B. (1962) The Good Napoleon III. *French Historical Studies* 2 (2): 308–29.
- Thompson, J. M. (1955) *Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Truesdell, M. (1997) *Spectacular Politics: Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte and the Fête Impériale, 1849–1870*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821)

Annette Richardson

The towering figure of his era, Napoleon Bonaparte (born Napoleone di Buonaparte) was a French army general who rose to prominence in the 1790s during the French Revolutionary Wars and became emperor of France in 1804. His success on the battlefield enabled him to dominate Europe for much of the early nineteenth century. Napoleon established constitutional monarchies and social reforms in the European states that he conquered, spreading the anti-aristocratic transformation wrought by the French Revolution, while establishing a strong centralized government – some would say dictatorial and anti-democratic – within France. Forced to abdicate in 1814, Napoleon returned briefly to power in 1815 but was then exiled from France for the rest of his life.

Napoleon was born on August 15, 1769, in Ajaccio, Corsica, to Carlo Buonaparte and Maria Letizia Ramolino. Although the Buonapartes were minor nobles of Italian ancestry, the island of Corsica had recently become a French possession. Napoleon attended the Military Academy at Brienne-le-Château on a scholarship from 1779 to 1784, and then the *Ecole Royale Militaire*, where he studied artillery and emerged as a second lieutenant at age 16.

At the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, Napoleon was a lieutenant colonel in the Corsican National Guard. After coming into conflict with Corsican nationalist leader Pasquale Paoli, Napoleon fled to mainland France, where he became an artillery officer for the revolutionary government. He earned promotion to the rank of brigadier general after leading an attack in 1793 on British-held Point l'Éguillette during the siege of Toulon, which had risen up against the revolutionary government with British aid.

Napoleon had joined a provincial branch of the Jacobin Club in 1791 and had gained a reputation as a “Jacobin general.” He became friendly with Augustin Robespierre, brother of the revolutionary leader Maximilien Robespierre. Shortly after the latter was overthrown in July 1794, Napoleon was arrested due to his Jacobin connections, but he was released in early 1795. Napoleon refused an order to suppress an upris-

ing in the royalist Vendée region of western France, but redeemed himself with the revolutionary leadership on October 5, 1795, when, with what he famously described as a “whiff of grapeshot,” he dispersed a royalist uprising against the National Convention at the Tuileries Palace. This earned him appointment as commander of the French “Army of Italy” on March 2, 1796. On March 9 he married the charming and lively Josephine de Beauharnais, a widow with two children, and shortly thereafter dropped the “u” from his name to take it into the more French-sounding “Bonaparte.”

Although not a military innovator, Napoleon was a good strategist and excellent tactician. In late March 1796 he launched an invasion of Italy, winning victories at Lonato, Castiglione, Mantua, and Rivoli. He occupied the Papal States, dethroned Pope Pius VI, occupied Venice, defeated the Austrians, organized several Italian Republics, and was responsible for the Treaty of Campo Formio on October 17, 1797. In the eyes of French public opinion, he had become a military hero, which seems to have given rise to political ambition. Among other indications, he founded journals to promote himself.

Following his success in Italy, Napoleon embarked on a military expedition to Egypt in an effort to challenge British influence in the region. A group of scholars accompanied the expedition to study Egyptian artifacts and landscape. Napoleon defeated the Mamelukes at the Battle of the Pyramids on July 21, 1798, and triumphantly entered Cairo. However, on August 1–2, British Admiral Horatio Nelson annihilated the French fleet at Abukir Bay, leaving Napoleon landlocked in Egypt. He invaded Palestine (present-day Israel) and took Jaffa. During the expedition, his troops contracted plague. Napoleon failed to wrest the key fortress of Acre from the English. Upon his return to Egypt, he defeated the Turks at Abukir on July 25, 1799. On August 23, Napoleon left his troops in Egypt (his detractors would say he abandoned them), leaving many to die under the command of subordinates, and returned to France on October 9. The British repatriated the remaining French troops in 1801.

He received an enthusiastic welcome in France, although the country was in turmoil. Napoleon and the Abbé Sieyès engineered a coup d'état to overthrow the Directory, the five-man governing council that had become widely perceived as

corrupt and inadequate. Sieyès was one of the five Directors, but he hoped the coup – known as the Eighteenth Brumaire, after the date on the French revolutionary calendar on which it occurred – would increase his personal power. Napoleon, however, was more interested in his own career. He quashed the two existing legislative bodies, the Council of Elders and the Council of the Five Hundred. A few compliant members of both bodies formed a rump assembly that appointed a new three-man governing council consisting of Sieyès, a Sieyès ally named Pierre Roger Duclos, and Napoleon himself, with Napoleon at their head as First Consul.

Napoleon legitimized his new position of power by organizing a plebiscite to approve a new constitution of his making. He gained the Catholic Church's support for his rule by negotiating a Concordat with Rome on July 15, 1802, officially recognizing Catholicism as the country's primary religion, thus ending the hostility between France and the church that the Revolution's anti-clerical and de-Christianizing reforms had engendered. Napoleon retained the power to appoint the church's bishops, but allowed the pope to claim "spiritual control" over them. The deal was sweetened for the church by the government's promise to pay the clergy salaries.

Meanwhile, French armies had suffered setbacks in Italy, so Napoleon set out to reconquer the lost territory. He entered Milan on June 2, 1801, and was victorious at Marengo on June 14. He secured peace with Austria on February 9, 1802, and a peace treaty with England – the Peace of Amiens – was signed on March 25, 1802. Napoleon became Consul for Life on August 4, 1802, with the adoption of yet another new constitution that once again greatly increased his powers.

Despite his growing popularity and authority, Napoleon was not without opposition. Monarchists continued to plot against him and the royalist Vendée region remained a source of insurrection. Democratic-minded intellectuals resented and feared the increasingly dictatorial style of his rule. Assassination plots were uncovered. A revolt had erupted in Haiti, a key French colony in the Caribbean. But on May 18, 1804, a carefully managed plebiscite (the vote was about 3,500,000 to 2,500) ratified a Senate proposal to create a hereditary emperor, and Napoleon, of course, was the only candidate for the position. On December 2, 1804, in the presence

of Pope Pius VII, Napoleon had himself crowned emperor of France and king of Italy.

Napoleon was an able administrator. In addition to reorganizing and further centralizing the administrative divisions of France, he introduced a comprehensive system of laws, the Code Napoléon (or Civil Code), which institutionalized the bourgeois property relations established by the French Revolution and served as a model for other countries where a similar socioeconomic transformation occurred. He also regulated finances, changed the tax system, and founded the Bank of France. His reorganization of the French educational system emphasized military education and reduced educational opportunities for girls. At the same time, he shored up his increasingly autocratic rule by imposing strict censorship and developing a secret police force.

Meanwhile, war with the other European powers continued. The Peace of Amiens between France and England had lasted only one year. Napoleon prepared an invasion of England, but was forced to abandon the plan when his nemesis, Admiral Nelson, demonstrated England's naval superiority by defeating the French navy at the Battle of Trafalgar on October 21, 1805. Napoleon's land forces fared much better, however, against a challenge to his claim to Italy by a coalition of British, Austrian, and Russian armies. After his Grand Army defeated the Austrians at Ulm on October 18, he scored his greatest victory against the Russians and Austrians at Austerlitz on December 2, 1805.

In 1806 another coalition of Britain, Prussia, and Russia once again challenged Napoleon's military dominance of the continent, but he defeated the Prussians at Jena on October 14, 1806, and the Russians at Eylau on February 8, 1807, and at Friedland on June 14, 1807. On July 7 he imposed the Treaty of Tilsit on Russia, after which Tsar Alexander I and Napoleon agreed to collaborate in establishing the "Continental System" to combat growing British economic influence in Europe by prohibiting British imports into the continent. By this time, Napoleon held dominion over seven kingdoms and 20 principalities in Europe, many of which he had placed under the control of his brothers and adopted children.

But when Spain refused to join the Continental System's economic blockade against Britain, Napoleon invaded the Iberian peninsula.

He took Madrid on December 13, 1808, and after defeating British forces in the country, crowned his brother Joseph as king of Spain. Although Napoleon left to fight on another front, his troops remained, but Portuguese guerillas, supported by Britain's Duke of Wellington, eventually forced the French out of Spain. Meanwhile, he won an important victory against Austria at the Battle of Wagram on July 5–6, 1809, and imposed the Treaty of Schonbrunn on Emperor Francis I on October 14, 1809.

Napoleon's long-range plan was to establish a Bonaparte dynasty that would rule Europe long into the future. With no male heir, however, and his wife Josephine no longer capable of bearing children, he divorced Josephine and on April 12, 1810, married 18-year-old Archduchess Marie Louise of Austria. The marriage allied Napoleon to one of the most prominent royal houses in Europe and was meant to lay the basis for permanent peace between France and Austria. The couple had a son, Napoleon Francis Joseph Charles, on March 20, 1811, and the infant was designated the king of Rome.

After Tsar Alexander I abandoned Napoleon's Continental System, in June 1812 Napoleon invaded Russia under the pretext of enforcing the Treaty of Tilsit. He had been warned against the venture by numerous advisors, but felt vindicated by initial successes at Vilna, Vitebsk, and Smolensk. After a major victory at Borodino on September 7, 1812, he pursued the retreating Russian forces, who burned everything in their path to make supplies scarce for Napoleon's troops. On September 14 Napoleon entered Moscow with his Grand Army of 500,000 men. The Russians burned the city, however, and Tsar Alexander refused to enter into negotiations. With supplies rapidly depleting, Napoleon was forced to retreat. The Grand Army left Moscow on October 19, but massive defections, starvation, Cossack harassment, and lack of preparation for the extreme cold on the return journey contributed to an extreme rate of attrition among the French troops: only 30,000 survivors reached France. The Russian campaign had ended in a major defeat.

Reminiscent of his earlier departure from Egypt in 1799, Napoleon left his army in Russia on December 5, 1812, and returned to France. Although he raised another army, he was overextended on too many fronts. Although victorious in battles at Lutze on May 2, 1813, at

Bautzen on May 21, and at Dresden on August 26–7, he suffered a critical loss at Leipzig on October 16–19. Early in 1814, a coalition of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Britain invaded France, and the allied armies reached Paris on March 30. Unable to offer effective resistance, in early April Napoleon was persuaded by his generals to abdicate unconditionally.

The Bourbon monarchy was restored in France with the enthronement of Louis XVIII, and Napoleon was exiled to the island of Elba. Less than a year after his abdication, however, he engineered one of history's most spectacular comebacks. On March 1, 1815, he escaped from Elba, landed in France with about 600 men, and began a march toward Paris, gathering masses of devoted soldiers along the way. One of his former commanders, Marshal Michel Ney, was sent to arrest him, but Ney joined him instead. His army grew to number hundreds of thousands, and when he triumphantly entered Paris on March 20, the streets were lined with cheering crowds. King Louis XVIII and his government fled.

Napoleon's return to power was short-lived, however; it has entered the history books as "the Hundred Days." Picking up where he had left off, he invaded Belgium, but on June 18, 1815, he was decisively defeated by British and Prussian forces at the Battle of Waterloo. Once again he was forced to abdicate and this time was sent into exile to a more distant island, Saint Helena, from which escape was much more unlikely. Louis XVIII returned to France on July 8, 1815, and the Bourbon restoration recommenced. During his final exile Napoleon wrote his *Memoirs*, later published in ten volumes, in which he portrayed himself as the savior of France. He died on May 5, 1821; his body was returned to France in 1840 and now lies in the famed Hôtel des Invalides monument in Paris.

Even in defeat, his popularity grew, and his posthumous influence continued to roil French politics for decades to follow. In the late 1840s an adventurous nephew, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, would ride his uncle's enduring legend to power and eventually establish himself as Emperor Napoleon III.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873); Directory, France, 1795–1799; Eighteenth Brumaire; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Sieyès, Abbé (1748–1836)

References and Suggested Readings

- Alexander, R. S. (2001) *Napoleon*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Barnett, C. (1978) *Bonaparte*. London: Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux.
- Bergeron, L. (1981) *France Under Napoleon*. Trans. R. R. Palmer. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Broers, M. (1996) *Europe Under Napoleon*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chandler, D. (1996) *The Campaigns of Napoleon*. New York: Macmillan.
- Eglund, S. (2005) *Napoleon: A Political Life*. New York: Scribner.
- Geyl, P. (1965) *Napoleon: For and Against*. New York: Penguin.
- Johnson, P. (2002) *Napoleon*. New York: Penguin.
- LeFebvre, G. (1969) *Napoleon*. Trans. J. E. Anderson. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lyons, M. (1975) *France Under the Directory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Markham, F. (1963) *Napoleon*. New York: Mentor Books.
- Tulard, J. (1984) *Napoleon: The Myth of the Saviour*. Trans. T. Waugh. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897)

Atoy M. Navarro

Andres de Castro Bonifacio was a Filipino patriot and revolutionary, considered the “Father of the Philippine Revolution” against Spanish colonialism in the Philippines. Recognized as the leader of the first revolution in Asia and the first independent government of the Philippines, he is regarded as a national hero and his birthday is commemorated as a national holiday known as Bonifacio Day.

Bonifacio was the oldest of six children born to a lower-middle-class family in Tondo, Manila, on November 30, 1863. His parents, Santiago Bonifacio of Tondo and Catalina de Castro of Zambales, were both devout Catholics. He had three brothers and two sisters who all became part of the Filipino revolutionary movement.

He first studied under his aunt, who taught him the alphabet and Catholic prayers, before his father sent him to study under a private tutor, who taught him arithmetic, Spanish, and Tagalog. Orphaned at an early age, Bonifacio was forced to give up his studies to support his brothers and sisters. With the help of his siblings, he made canes and paper fans and sold them in

the streets of Manila. Making the most of his interest in calligraphy and penmanship, Bonifacio also made posters for commercial establishments. Eventually, he found a job as a clerk-messenger and was later promoted as an agent of Fleming and Company, a British trading company, where he learned English. Not long after, Bonifacio transferred to Fresell and Company, a German trading house, where he worked as agent-warehouseman.

To further educate himself, Bonifacio bought and fervently read different historical, legal, and literary books. Bonifacio also joined various endeavors contributing to his self-education. He became an actor and organizer of plays for a dramatic society in Tondo that made him even more proficient in Tagalog. Subsequently, Bonifacio and his friends formed the Teatro Porvenir. He also affiliated himself with the Masonic lodge Taliba and joined José Rizal’s socio-civic organization, La Liga Filipina, where he participated in discussions on social reforms in the Philippines.

With the dissolution of La Liga Filipina and the exile of Rizal, Bonifacio and several others founded the Kataastaasang Kagalangalang na Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (Katipunan) in Manila on July 7, 1892. Unlike Rizal’s La Liga Filipina, which advocated social reforms through legal means, Bonifacio’s Katipunan formed a secret society whose primary goal was independence through revolution.

While working for the Katipunan, Bonifacio married Gregoria de Jesus. They had a son, Andres de Jesus Bonifacio, who died two months after being born. After the death of their son, the couple’s lives revolved around social transformation. In the Katipunan, Bonifacio distinguished himself as its foremost organizer and one of its leading thinkers, resulting in his election as the society’s Supremo. De Jesus, with the symbolic name Lakambini, was made the society’s primary custodian of valuable papers and seals.

Together with Emilio Jacinto, Bonifacio wrote most of the official documents of the Katipunan including most of the contributions to *Kalayaan*, the society’s official publication. The literature written by Bonifacio and Jacinto provided Katipunan not only with a philosophy of revolution but also with a practical propaganda tool. With the release of *Kalayaan*, the membership of the society substantially increased,

gaining footholds in the various provinces of the Philippines. With significant growth in membership, the Katipunan was inevitably discovered by the Spanish authorities in Manila.

Responding to the Spanish authorities' arrest of members of the Katipunan, Bonifacio led the society in launching the Philippine Revolution on August 24, 1896. He was elected president of the first independent government of the Philippines that attacked Spanish installations in Manila on August 29 and 30, 1896. Under the leadership of Bonifacio's supreme council in Manila and the various Katipunan local councils in the provinces, the revolution spread throughout the country.

From its initial foundation in Manila, the revolution increasingly moved southwest to Cavite. The Katipunan in the province was divided into two factions, the Magdalo, headed by Emilio Aguinaldo, and the Magdiwang, led by Mariano Alvarez. To settle disputes, the factions invited Bonifacio as Supremo of the Katipunan to intercede through a convention. But the convention became the venue for forming a new government and electing Aguinaldo as president under dubious circumstances. Citing convention irregularities, Bonifacio, acting as Supremo of the Katipunan, declared the proceedings invalid. Subsequently, Aguinaldo moved to legitimize his new republican government and ordered the arrest of Bonifacio. Within days Bonifacio was arrested and charged with sedition and treason. After a mock trial, Bonifacio was found guilty and sentenced to death. On May 10, 1897, Bonifacio was shot near Mount Buntis, Maragondon, Cavite. The Philippine Revolution nevertheless continued. With the end of Spanish rule in the country, Filipino nationalists gradually viewed Bonifacio as the "Father of the Philippine Revolution," a national hero, and most recently, as president of the first independent government of the Philippines.

SEE ALSO: Huk Rebellion, 1946–1954; Philippines, Colonial Protests during the Spanish Era; Philippines, Protest during the US Era; Philippines, Protests, 1950s–1970s; Philippines, Protests, 1980s–Present; Rizal, José (1861–1896)

References and Suggested Readings

Agoncillo, T. (1956) *Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Andres Bonifacio and the Katipunan*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.

Almario, V. (1993) *Pamitikan ng Rebolusyon (g 1896): Isang Paglilingon at Katipunan ng mga Akda nina Bonifacio at Jacinto* (Literature of the (1896) Revolution: A Look Back and Compilation of the Writings of Bonifacio and Jacinto). Manila: Cultural Center of the Philippines.

Guerrero, M. & Schumacher, J. (1998) *Kasaysayan: The Story of the Filipino People*, Vol. 5: *Reform and Revolution*. Hong Kong: Asia Publishing Company.

Salazar, Z. (1994) *Agosto 29–30, 1896: Ang Pagsalakay ni Bonifacio sa Maynila* (August 29–30, 1896: The Attack of Bonifacio in Manila). Quezon City: Miranda Bookstore.

Sarmiento, A. (2005) *The Trial of Andres Bonifacio: The Appeal*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.

Bonus Army Unemployed Movement, 1932

Stacy Warner Maddern

In 1924 the US Congress voted to give the veterans of World War I a bonus consisting of \$1.25 per day for overseas service and \$1 a day for all remaining service. However, it stipulated that no payments would be made until 1945. In 1932, as the Great Depression worsened, some 15,000 unemployed veterans would make their way to Washington to demand payment of their bonuses. Members of this Bonus Expeditionary Force, later dubbed the Bonus Army, feeling ignored by the administration of President Herbert Hoover, embedded themselves in makeshift camps at Anacostia Flats across the river from the Capitol.

On June 17 the Senate voted on a bill already passed by the House to give veterans their bonuses in full. Local newspapers described it as "the tensest day in the Capitol since the war." After the bill was defeated by a vote of 62 to 18 a silent "death march" ensued in front of the Capitol for a month, disbanding on the day Congress adjourned. Unmoved by their action, Senator William Borah announced that he was unwilling to "vote for one penny for veterans as long as they are in the Capitol exerting pressure on the Congress by their physical presence."

Rather than leaving Washington after the legislative defeat, the Bonus Army dug in for an indefinite stay determined to have their demands

met. Hoping to gain popular support, the veterans shifted their agenda to include “all suffering Americans,” a move that was plausible due to the looming economic depression that established the American family as a symbol worthy of political action. This was of great concern to District officials who, fearing a national movement, called for more extreme measures. In response, Attorney General Mitchell ordered that the veterans be removed from government property on July 28 in what would later become known as the Battle of Washington.

Led by newly appointed Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur, under the reluctant orders of President Herbert Hoover, the US Army drove its own veterans out of Washington by a military force that utilized tanks, cavalry, and bayonets. Those veterans who resisted were doused with tear gas until they withdrew and retreated across the river where Hoover had ordered MacArthur to stop. However, the General ignored the order and continued on to the Anacostia camp where, by nightfall, the remaining veterans were forced out of the District. Later, under MacArthur’s orders, the camp was torched, burning what was left of the Bonus Army to the ground. Major Dwight D. Eisenhower, who served as liaison to MacArthur, later wrote, “The whole scene was pitiful. The veterans were ragged, ill-fed, and felt themselves badly abused. To suddenly see the whole encampment going up in flames just added to the pity.”

Considering its place in United States history, the Bonus Army stands as a landmark of political protest that further extended the boundaries of justifying the presence of citizenry in the Capitol. In 1933 the *Nation* speculated that marches on Washington had become “a successful American technique for direct action.”

SEE ALSO: Coxey’s Army and the Unemployed Movement; Unemployed Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Barber, L. G. (2002) *Marching on Washington: The Forging of an American Political Tradition*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Daniels, R. (1971) *The Bonus March: An Episode of the Great Depression*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Dickson, P. & Allen, T. B. (2004) *The Bonus Army: An American Epic*. New York: Walker.

Bordiga, Amadeo (1889–1970) and the Italian Communist Party

Elvio Ciferri

Amadeo Bordiga was one of the founders and first secretary of the Italian Communist Party. Born in Resina, Bordiga joined the Socialist Party in 1910 and soon, as a student at the engineering faculty, became a leader of the socialist left in Naples, advocating the rejection of electoral alliances with radicals and democrats, to him a source of corruption and misleading of socialists, who should rather act as a working-class and militant force, and reject reformism. The new militant tendencies in social conflicts in 1912–14 were met by Bordiga with reaffirmation of Marxist principles, and he stood strongly against Italy’s participation in World War I.

The 1917 Russian Revolution provided him with further evidence of Marxist doctrine. He founded and edited *Il Soviet*, turning it into a national organ of a left-wing fraction of the Socialist Party at the 1919 Bologna Congress, advocating abstention as a means of political and revolutionary propaganda and gained nationwide visibility in the Red Biennium. Bordiga did not engage in social movements like *Ordine Nuovo* in Turin, but rather stressed working inside the party to strengthen his fraction so that it could turn as soon as possible into an independent Marxist revolutionary party. He went to Russia to attend the Second Congress of the Communist International, but although he stressed the similarity of his program to the Bolsheviks, he was criticized in *Estremism* by Lenin himself, who on the contrary stood for a revolutionary use of elections and parliaments, therefore rejecting abstention.

Bordiga accepted this rejection by Lenin and committed the fraction he led to split with the Socialist Party, as the Communist International indicated. The 1921 Leghorn Congress gave birth to a new Communist Party, although the majority of socialists stuck with the old party. Bordiga was the natural leader of a party that desired to stress its difference to socialists.

The Bordiga leadership of the Communist Party (PCd’I, later PCI) rejected any alliance with socialists and other popular parties in defense against mounting fascism, which he regarded as

a temporary phenomenon to be identified with bourgeois reaction, and soon conflicted with the Moscow International that wanted PCd'I to engage in "united front" tactics against fascism and accept the Serrati "internationalist" fraction of PSI into the new party. On these issues, Bordiga led the party to near rupture with the 1922 Fourth Congress of the International. In spite of that, Bordiga's influence inside the Italian party was strong and the years to follow were at the same time years of repression (Bordiga was incarcerated in 1923 and years later confined) and of conflict within PCd'I. The long internal debate initiated by Gramsci ended with the Third PCd'I Congress in Lyon (France) and Bordiga's marginalization. He was expelled from the PCI in 1930 for his critical defense of Trotsky.

Bordiga was one of the first to criticize Stalin's Soviet Union as a form of state capitalism. During World War II he opposed any anti-fascist alliance, favoring the founding of the Partito Comunista Internazionalista, while his views were to influence also Lotta Comunista. The idea that "tactic is to be derived from principles" made his Marxism very consistent but unpopular and incapable of gaining wide support. Bordiga was an antagonist to Gramsci. In his later years he was a vigorous thinker and a prolific, and in some sense original, writer. He died in Formia on July 23, 1970.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Italian Communist Party; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- De Felice, F. (1974) *Serrati, Bordiga, Gramsci e il problema della rivoluzione in Italia*. Bari: De Donato.
 Grilli, L. (1982) *Amadeo Bordiga: capitalismo sovietico e comunismo*. Milan: La Pietra.
 Peregalli, A. & Saggioro, S. (Eds.) (1995) *Amadeo Bordiga (1889–1970). Bibliografia*. Milan: Colibri.

Borge, Tomás (b. 1936)

Kerstin Ewald

Tomás Borge was the only founding member of the Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) to survive the revolutionary process leading to the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1979. As a socialist activist and guerilla commander within the FSLN, he took part in vari-

ous steps to overthrow the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, including the unification of the popular movement and a nearly 20-year-long guerilla conflict. After the revolution and until his party was deselected in 1990, he was Nicaragua's minister of the interior. After the FSLN was reelected in 2006, he was delegated as the Nicaraguan ambassador to Peru.

Borge was born in Matagalpa, Nicaragua, and grew up during the time when Anastasio Somoza García ruled as dictator, relying on the Guardia Nacional (National Guard) to protect his rule. The Somoza dynasty ruled Nicaragua for 43 years, backed strongly by North American governments. Borge met Carlos Fonseca, the later FSLN leader, in Matagalpa, where both started to show their opposition to the dictator. When García was killed by Rigoberto López Pérez, Borge was taking part in a student resistance organization in León. As Borge was accused of involvement and of covering up the assassination, he was condemned to nine years' imprisonment. In 1959, a student campaign for the liberation of political prisoners led to the change of Borge's jail sentence into house arrest. He managed to escape, first to Honduras, and then to Costa Rica.

During this time he prepared for armed resistance. He attended military training as exiled Nicaraguans, supported by the Costa Rican Party of National Liberation, prepared armed operations. Later, together with Carlos Fonseca, Silvio Mayorga, and José Reyes Monterrey, Borge agitated among Nicaraguan migrants, who worked in Costa Rica on banana plantations or as shoemakers. In 1959 and 1960 he visited post-revolutionary Cuba and was deeply impressed by the personality of Fidel Castro, to whom he feels bound in friendship to this day. While in Cuba he furthered his military training. He was a member of the group that founded the FSLN in 1961–2, whose first crucial goal was to raise all forces against the Somoza dictatorship.

Borge supported an FSLN tendency that was defined by the strategy of prolonged popular war. This strategy included various means that were designed to lead to an insurrection by the whole Nicaraguan population after an armed vanguard had created the necessary political conditions. He took part in numerous guerilla operations such as bank robberies, the purchase of weapons, and training new combatants. In 1974 Borge prepared and supervised a raid on

a farewell party given in honor of the US ambassador in which guerilla units took several Nicaraguan officials hostage, including foreign minister Alejandro Montiel Argüello and members of the Somoza family. This operation led to the liberation of Sandinist prisoners, including Daniel Ortega. Borge was once again arrested in 1976 by the Nicaraguan Security Police in Managua. After a press campaign that demanded a proper trial and fair treatment, he was put on trial and condemned to 180 years' imprisonment. He was liberated in 1978, when the FSLN occupied the National Palace.

After the Somozas' overthrow, Borge was minister of interior affairs from 1979 to 1990, representing the Marxist leftist wing of the FSLN government. Under his guidance, the interior ministry built up a large police and security apparatus for the Contra war. He was elected to the position of vice-general secretary of the FSLN in 1994 and remains in that office to the present day. During the 1990s Borge's popularity declined, due largely to the bankruptcy of the former party organ, the daily newspaper *Barricada*, while under his management. After the reelection of the FSLN Party in 2006, Borge was sent by the government of President Ortega as ambassador to Peru. As an author and journalist, Borge has also published poetry and several books about Latin American politicians.

SEE ALSO: Fonseca, Carlos (1936–1976); Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s; Ortega, Daniel (b. 1945); Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)

References and Suggested Readings

- Borge Martinez, T. (1992) *The Patient Impatience*. Willimantic: Curbstone Press.
- Hodges, D. C. (1987) *Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Vickers, G. R. (1990) A Spider's Web. *Nacla* 24, 1 (June). Available at www.nacla.org/node/2842 (downloaded May 2008).

Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945)

Kunal Chattopadhyay

Subhas Chandra Bose, an Indian nationalist and advocate of armed struggle, was born on January 23, 1897. He was influenced in a nationalist direc-

tion from his schooldays. When he passed his Indian Civil Service (ICS) examinations from England in 1921, the nationalist struggle was proceeding in a radical direction. Subhas resigned from the ICS, choosing not to work as a voice of the colonial rulers. Returning to India in mid-1921, Subhas met Mahatma Gandhi. He was deeply respectful of Gandhi, but somewhat critical of Gandhi's strategy and promises of attaining *swaraj* (self-rule) in one year. The man who attracted him was Chittaranjan Das, a leading nationalist with contacts with revolutionary nationalists.

From Swarajya Party to Congress Leftism

In the second half of 1921, as the unquestioned leader of the national movement in Bengal, Das was passionately calling for Hindu-Muslim unity and for the end of bureaucratic rule and the installation of self-government. In this situation the Congress Working Committee (CWC) called for a boycott and a general strike and black flag demonstration wherever the Prince of Wales went in late November 1921. Put in charge of volunteers in Calcutta, Subhas was instrumental in organizing a total *hartal* (general strike, including shops, schools, courts). Overnight, he shot to fame as a rising national leader of Bengal, and imperialism responded by arresting him when the prince was scheduled to visit Calcutta.

Following the unilateral withdrawal of the Non-Cooperation movement by Gandhi in 1922, a section of the Indian National Congress wanted to take part in Assembly elections. Led by Das, Motilal Nehru, and others, they formed the Swarajya Party within the Congress, opposed by Gandhi loyalists. Bose, as the chief lieutenant of Das and unlike many Hindu nationalists, strongly supported the latter's policy of job reservation for Muslims in order to strengthen Hindu-Muslim unity in Muslim-majority Bengal.

In 1924 the Swarajya Party contested and won the Calcutta municipal corporation elections. Chittaranjan Das became the first Indian mayor of the corporation and Subhas Chandra Bose was appointed the chief executive officer of the corporation. Measures were undertaken designed to strengthen nationalist politics as well as provide some service to the people. Primary education was extended, dispensaries opened for free medical treatment of the poor, and in giving appointments the claims of Muslims and other deprived

groups were prioritized. At the same time, family members of revolutionary nationalists were often given jobs, and this was viewed with a jaundiced eye by imperialism. On October 25, 1924 Bose was arrested along with a large number of radical Congressmen as suspected revolutionaries. He then spent nearly four years in prison, much of it in Mandalay in Upper Burma.

While historians like Leonard Gordon (1990) and Gautam Chattopadhyay (1997) have found no evidence of Bose being the mastermind behind the revolutionaries, as alleged by imperialism, it is true that Bose greatly admired the courage and self-sacrifice shown by the revolutionaries. It is now also well known that in 1922–4 he had extended help to former revolutionary nationalists who had become communists, like Nalini Gupta and Abani Mukherjee. In that sense, imperialism was right in paying such attention to him as a dangerous man.

Prison treatment in Mandalay was very rough, and in protest the prisoners went on hunger strike from February 22, 1926. It was lifted on March 4, after the prison authorities acceded to some of their demands. But Bose's health was shattered and he would join full political work only from 1928.

In the late 1920s, following the death of C. R. Das, the Bengal Congress was divided between supporters of Jatindra Mohan Sengupta and Subhas. A powerful surge of the working-class movement, led by the young Communist Party of India (CPI), had arisen in 1927 and by 1928 had assumed massive dimensions. The CPI wanted wider links with the nationalist movement, especially leftists like Jawaharlal Nehru and Bose. Bose welcomed workers' struggles but feared that the CPI might turn the working-class struggle into an alternative to the nationalist movement. In 1928 there was almost a confrontation during the Calcutta session of the Congress. In it, left nationalists like Jawaharlal Nehru and Bose were thwarted by Gandhi in their bid to pass a resolution calling for complete independence. Yet when a procession of 50,000 red-flag waving workers turned up at the Congress session, Bose as the volunteer in charge tried to block the procession. Only the intervention of Motilal Nehru, president of the session, allowed the workers to come in and hold a short meeting. The incident profoundly impressed Subhas, and turned him to closer collaboration with the communists. In 1929, when Sir John Simon was appointed to

head an all-white commission to take a look at further constitutional changes in India, Bose and the communists united to organize a total *hartal* on January 19, along with a demonstration of nearly 100,000 people. By slapping the Meerut Conspiracy Case (1929) on prominent trade union leaders, and the Second Lahore Conspiracy Case against members of the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association, imperialism was pushing left nationalists and communists closer. Within the Congress, too, Subhas Bose was emerging as a major leader of the leftists, opposing not only traditional moderates but also Gandhi. As a result, at the Lahore Congress, Subhas and his close ally Srinivas Iyengar were kept out of the CWC. Back in Calcutta he was given a one-year imprisonment term for a case previously launched against him.

Bose was elected the mayor of Calcutta on August 22, 1930, while still in prison. But after his release on September 23 in his speech during the oath-taking ceremony, Subhas suggested that in India there was a need to combine the justice, equality, and love in socialism with the efficiency and discipline of fascism. On January 26, 1931, while trying to hoist the national flag at the Calcutta Maidan (a large open field), Bose was beaten up by the police, kept in a lock-up for a day with no food or medical attention, and then sentenced by a magistrate to six months' imprisonment.

The countrywide civil disobedience movement launched by Gandhi in 1930 subsided in 1931 when the Gandhi-Irwin Pact was signed. It was perceived as a great comedown, for after proclaiming the demand for independence, the Congress was agreeing to suspend the movement in exchange for relatively paltry concessions. A special meeting of the Congress was called at Karachi towards the end of March 1931. The youth of India condemned the Gandhi-Irwin Pact. While presiding over the Annual Conference of the Naujawan Bharat Sabha (Young India Association) founded by Bhagat Singh, a nationalist revolutionary hanged a few days previously in March 1931, Bose criticized the Gandhi-Irwin Pact but told the youth that they could not denounce their commander (Gandhi) in the middle of the struggle. The same logic made him criticize the pact in the Subjects Committee but speak for it in the full Congress session. Only a handful of communists and revolutionaries present as delegates voted against the pact. But

the forebodings of Bose were correct, and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact only benefited imperialism. The Round Table Conference was a failure, and a second round of struggle began. In 1932 Subhas was arrested again. He fell ill in prison and doctors diagnosed tuberculosis. The British government ultimately agreed to release him only on condition that he should leave India.

Europe and Fascism

Between early 1933 and March 1936 Bose lived in Europe. He met Mussolini and expressed his admiration for the efficiency of the fascist state. In 1938, confronted on this issue by Communist Party of Great Britain leader R. Palme-Dutt, he responded that when he had expressed his admiration, fascism had not yet shown its imperialist tendencies, the focal point of his admiration being the strong state, which he wanted in India as well. Yet he also condemned the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and hailed the struggle of the Abyssinians. He also criticized Hitler openly when the latter made some anti-Indian remarks. His reactions to fascism, unlike that of Nehru, who was influenced by the Marxist views of fascism, were colored chiefly by his perspective of an Indian nationalist for whom British imperialism was the main enemy, and Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union were all equally potential allies. He returned to India, was arrested on April 8, 1936, and imprisoned until March 1937.

Leader of the Left

The growth of the left inside the Congress led to the election of leftist presidents for several years. In 1936 and 1937 Jawaharlal Nehru was twice elected president. He called for scientific socialism and condemned imperialism and fascism, which had a great impact regardless of the fact that he always deferred to Gandhi in the end. The Congress right wing tried to put pressure on him. Surprisingly, Subhas at this juncture remained silent. In his book *The Indian Struggle* he mentioned only the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) leaders among the left, and not the communists or Royists (followers of the ex-communist M. N. Roy). In January 1938, while again in England, he received news that he had been elected Congress president. But he found that the Working Committee was heavily stacked with right wingers. In 1939 as the presidential candidate of all the left forces, Subhas defeated

Gandhi-backed right-wing candidate Pattavi Sitaramayyah, a defeat that Gandhi conceded was his own defeat. But the right struck back. On February 22, 1939 all CWC members, including Jawaharlal Nehru, and excluding just the brothers Subhas Chandra and Sarat Chandra Bose, resigned. The left urged Bose to set up a strongly leftist CWC.

At the Tripuri session of the Congress, Govind Ballabh Pant moved a resolution expressing full confidence in Gandhi and asking the president to nominate the Working Committee in accordance with the wishes of Gandhi. In full session, the CSP leaders decided to abstain, and as a result the left was defeated. Instead of resolutely selecting a left-wing Working Committee, Subhas Chandra ultimately tendered his resignation as Congress president. On May 3, 1939 he formed a new group within the Congress, named the Forward Bloc. He wanted it to unite all radical and anti-imperialist progressive elements on the basis of a minimum common program. In mid-June, seeing that other left trends were not joining, the Forward Bloc Conference called for the formation of a Left Consolidation Committee, with equal representation for the CSP, the Royists, the CPI, and the Forward Bloc. But neither the CPI nor the CSP wanted to join the Forward Bloc, for they argued it would lead to a split in the national movement. This showed a lack of confidence in the political consistency of Bose. Moreover, as a result of the Popular Front line of the Communist International, the CPI was hesitant to fight for hegemony within the national movement, conceding leadership to the bourgeoisie. This made them spurn Bose's offer.

Meanwhile, the Congress high command now proceeded to action after action against Subhas Chandra. When he called for July 9, 1939 to be Left Day, the high command banned it, and when he went ahead, he was removed from his position as president of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee. Rabindranath Tagore, the great poet, made one of his rare interventions in politics, requesting Gandhi to reconsider the measure, but Gandhi turned him down. Jawaharlal Nehru, the idol of the left, showed once again that he would not move a step against Gandhi, and in a letter of March 2, 1940, dismissed Bose as talking "arrant nonsense."

One of Bose's achievements as Congress president was to initiate discussions on planned economic development for a free India, based on the experience of the Soviet Five Year Plans.

Ultimately, this would result in the Planning Commission and the Indian Five Year Plans.

When World War II began, the CWC met at Wardha, and Bose was invited. The committee unanimously decided not to support the war effort unless the British government gave assurances that India would become independent after the war. Bose wanted to go beyond this and utilize the crisis to further the freedom struggle by force of arms. When the Congress held its annual session at Ramgarh in 1940, Bose held a parallel meeting, the Anti-Compromise Conference. Thousands of peasants were mobilized for it by his ally, Swami Sahajanand Saraswati. His speech at Ramgarh shows he was not praising the Nazis but was willing to seek help from them. On July 2 Bose was arrested. He went on hunger strike to secure release from jail, and then planned an escape from India with the help of the communists of Punjab. Helped by the young communist Bhagat Ram Talwar of Peshawar, he escaped to Afghanistan. There, the Soviet Embassy did not entertain his requests seriously, but the German and Italian embassies were more responsive. In the first week of April 1941 he reached Berlin via the Soviet Union. A new phase in his political career began.

Armed Struggle

What Bose did not know was that Operation Barbarossa was already sanctioned. On June 22, 1941 Hitler invaded the USSR, declaring that what India was for England, the Russian territories would be for Germany. Bose knew nothing of this and hoped for German support for the cause of Indian independence. Ribbentrop, the Nazi foreign minister, promised German aid, but refused to recognize the Free India Government set up by Bose.

During his previous European tours Bose had met Emilie Schenkel, and now he married her. In India this was disbelieved for a long time, because after his death he was turned into a cult figure, and cult followers had a difficult time accepting that their hero had married a non-Indian. In May 1941 he went to Italy. The Italian minister of foreign affairs Ciano's diary shows that the Italians also regarded him as little more than an upstart.

The German invasion of the USSR came as a shock and Bose reacted sharply. German secret service reports show him as taking the stance that Germany was an imperialist aggressor. By the

end of 1942 Bose had become convinced that Germany would not give him real help to wage armed struggle. Meanwhile, Japan had begun its war with the western Allies. So Bose left by submarine on February 8, 1943, with only one Indian assistant, Abid Hasan, transferring to a Japanese submarine on April 24.

Subhas's relationship with the Japanese government was much better. On June 10, 1943 Prime Minister Tojo met him, and two days later he was invited to the Japanese parliament. On June 19 he held a press conference. He then moved on to Singapore, where Captain Mohan Singh had organized out of the Indian prisoners of war a free Indian army. Bose was to rename this the Azad Hind Fauz (Indian National Army) (INA). A veteran revolutionary, Rashbehari Bose, had been living in Japan for many years. On July 4, 1943 he presented Subhas to a cheering crowd. Three and a half months later, in October 1943, Bose publicly announced from the Cathay Theatre of Singapore the formation of an Azad Hind (Free Indian) government. The tides of war had already started moving against Japan. But Subhas Chandra nonetheless persuaded them to attack India from Manipur, neighboring Burma in the northeast corner.

Bose's decision to ally with the Japanese has been questioned, as many argue that had Japan been victorious, he would have been as much a puppet as the Manchukuo ruler Pu-Yi. Bose was not unaware of the danger. But he sought consistently to establish his autonomy, including the military autonomy of the INA. Moreover, he probably felt that the Japanese were already stretched too far to try and hold India against its will. But Bose does seem to have ignored the terrible way in which Japan treated the peoples in the Asian countries it occupied as part of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Nonetheless, the accusation that he was a Quisling, made by the CPI, was incorrect. He refused to fight any enemy except the British. When Aung San rose in revolt in Burma, Bose refused to let the Japanese use the INA against Aung San's soldiers.

The INA itself was organized in a secular manner. Though himself a religious person, Bose did not allow religion to dictate politics. The units of the INA were named after national leaders. From the beginning, Bose laid emphasis on recruiting women. A young Tamil doctor, Lakshmi Swaminathan, who was recruited, became the leader of the women's battalion, the Rani of Jhansi regiment.

On May 25, 1945, when the war was virtually lost, in a speech delivered from Singapore, Bose warned that wartime alliances would no longer hold good, and the war aims of the USSR and those of the western powers being different, there would be a clash. When Japan surrendered, he tried to fly to the Red Army in Darien, accompanied by an aide, Habibur Rahman. But his plane crashed almost immediately after taking off. Habibur Rahman's testimony is that in hospital a badly injured man next to him told him he was Subhas Chandra. Bose told him to tell his countrymen that he had fought to the last for the freedom of his country. A peculiar Bengali sentimentalism refuses to accept that he died in the air crash, though the evidence clearly points in that direction.

SEE ALSO: Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); India, Armed Struggle in the Independence Movement; India, Civil Disobedience Movement and Demand for Independence; India, Non-Violent Non-Cooperation Movement, 1918–1929; Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bose, S. C. (1996) *The Indian Struggle 1920–1942*. Calcutta: Oxford University Press.
- Bose, S. K., Werth, A., & Ayer, S. A. (Eds.) (1973) *A Beacon Across Asia: A Biography of Subhas Chandra Bose*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
- Chakrabarty, B. (1990) *Subhas Chandra Bose and Middle Class Radicalism: A Study in Indian Nationalism, 1928–1940*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Chattopadhyay, G. (1997) *Subhas Chandra Bose, The Indian Leftists and Communists*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.
- Gordon, L. (1990) *Brothers Against the Raj – A Biography of Indian Nationalists Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kumar, R. (Ed.) (1992) *Subhas Chandra Bose: Correspondence and Selected Documents, 1930–1942*. New Delhi: Inter-India.
- Toye, H. (1991) *The Springing Tiger: Subhas Chandra Bose*. Bombay: Jaico.

Boston Tea Party

Nathan King

The Boston Tea Party was, on the surface, an act of protest against a monopoly that the East India Company held on tea importation. More significant in the broader scheme of US history, however, the Boston Tea Party popularized



An early act of civil disobedience against the British government, the Boston Tea Party is seen as an iconic moment and one of the catalysts of the American Revolution. In this eighteenth-century hand-colored lithograph (artist unknown), the “Sons of Liberty” throw 90,000 lbs. of non-taxed tea belonging to the British East India Company into the Charles River. The Tea Act of 1773, passed by the British parliament, undermined colonial tea merchants by removing any taxes levied on tea imported to the US colonies by the British East India Company. (Private Collection / The Bridgeman Art Library)

one of the most important rallying cries of the American Revolution: “No taxation without representation.”

By the eighteenth century tea was a mainstay in the diet of a majority of Great Britain and her colonies. By the 1760s illegal importation of tea into the British colonies was rampant, and in 1767 the Townshend Act was passed in an effort to curb illegal tea imports. The plan would have worked had the East India Company been able to sustain a low price, but by 1771 tea prices were steady at 3 shillings per pound, and Dutch tea was illegally imported into the colonies and sold for under 2 shillings per pound. In June 1773 parliament passed a statute that allowed the East India Company to be its own exporter and to open branch houses in the colonies. Colonists were outraged at the favoritism shown to the East India Company by the government and the creation of a monopoly on tea. By November 1773 Samuel Adams, John Hancock, and other Bostonians began to organize town meetings at the Old South Meeting House to decide what action to take in response to the importation of dutied teas by the East India Company into Boston.

Throughout November 1773 members of the town hall meeting demanded the resignation of tea consignees of the East India Company. The consignees denied their requests. At the town hall meeting of November 30, 1773 a resolution was

passed to prevent the landing and sale of dutied tea. The *Dartmouth* landed in Boston with tea in late November, but was prevented from unloading its tea. The colonists used Mr. Rotch, partner of the *Dartmouth*, to appeal to Governor Hutchinson to send the tea back to England. The governor refused. On the night of December 16, 1773 one last town hall meeting was held and the governor's response was given. Within a few minutes there was yelling in streets near Griffins Wharf as people disguised as "Indians" raided the *Dartmouth*, *Eleanour*, and *Beaver*. All of the tea aboard the ships was thrown overboard. The Boston Tea Party had occurred.

Parliament was appalled by the Boston Tea Party. It called it an act of vandalism and condemned it. It responded with the Coercive or Intolerable Acts that closed the Boston port until the tea was paid for, restricted town meetings and local authority, and eventually introduced the Quartering Act.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776

References and Suggested Readings

- Labaree, B. W. (1964) *The Boston Tea Party*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mui, H. & Mui, L. H. (1968) Smuggling and the British Sea Trade before 1784. *American Historical Review* 74, 1 (October): 44–73.
- Puls, M. (2006) *Samuel Adams: Father of the American Revolution*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Schlesinger, A. M. (1917) The Uprising Against the East India Company. *Political Science Quarterly* 32, 1 (March): 60–79.

Botswana, protest and nationalism

Wazha Gilbert Morapedi

Botswana (formerly the Bechuanaland Protectorate) was one of three British dependencies in southern Africa, and is roughly the size of France. A landlocked country long surrounded by white-minority ruled states in southern Africa, a region marked by war and conflict, Botswana was notable for its peaceful road to independence and sustained parliamentary democracy. The people of the country are often called Batswana, but the term also includes ethnic groups that do not speak the Setswana language: the Bakalanga, Bakgalagadi, Bayei, Baherero,

Basubiya, Batswapong, Babirwa, and Basarwa (derogatively called Bushmen). The Setswana-speaking groups are the Bangwato, Bangwaketse, Bakwena, Barolong, Bakgatla, Balete, Batawana, and Batlokwa.

Pre-Colonial Times and the Bechuanaland Protectorate

The non-Setswana-speaking tribes were, since pre-colonial times, regarded as subject groups subordinated to the Setswana, who, in turn, were traditionally ruled by *dikgosi* (chiefs) in hierarchical societies headed by the *dikgosana* (nobles), followed by *bafaladi* (foreigners recently absorbed into tribes), and *malata* (hereditary serfs) who paid tribute and labor; the latter were largely Basarwa or Bakgalagadi.

Britain declared a protectorate over Botswana in 1885 during the Scramble for Africa, mainly for strategic reasons. Batswana lands were being eyed by the Afrikaners in the Transvaal (today, part of South Africa), and the Germans in South West Africa (now Namibia). Britain viewed Bechuanaland mainly as part of a corridor connecting the Cape in South Africa to its colonies in Central Africa. Cecil Rhodes, one-time Cape premier, owner of the British South Africa Company (BSAC), and ardent imperialist, also wanted Bechuanaland a white settler colony.

The British government retained much of the traditional social structure as part of a system of indirect rule. The declaration of the protectorate was met with opposition by several Batswana *dikgosi*, mainly Sekgoma Letsholathebe of Batawana, Gaseitsiwe of Bangwaketse, and Sechele and his son Sebele of Bakwena. These *dikgosi* questioned the usefulness of British protection, as they had earlier managed to ward-off conquest, and they feared interference in their prerogatives. In the end they reluctantly accepted the protectorate. The colonial administration imposed taxes and a host of laws to govern the country. Despite the proviso that Batswana rulers would rule as they had previously, some legislation undermined the chiefs, reducing their powers and subordinating them to British authorities in the 1890s. The high commissioner of the protectorate was armed with powers to punish or even depose *dikgosi*. Recalcitrant *dikgosi* like Sebele I of Bakwena were threatened with deposition, and Sekgoma Letsholathebe of the Batawana was in fact deposed in 1906 for refusing to cooperate.

However, when Britain considered transferring the Protectorate to BSAC rule to avoid shouldering unnecessary costs (along the lines of Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe), Batswana *dikgosi* resisted tenaciously, as they viewed company rule as exploitative; they preferred protectorate status. The *dikgosi* finally succeeded after visiting England in 1895, where they received public support against a BSAC takeover. "Throughout the first part of the colonial period, the chiefs acted individually and collectively to prevent their own absolute subordination to Britain and the dissolution of their respective tribal nations" (Parson 1984: 27).

The population of Bechuanaland was small, with the first census in 1911 showing about 123,000 Africans and about 600 Europeans; the largest ethnic group was the Bangwato (34,886), followed by the Bangwaketse (18,098). The whites were mainly engaged as freehold farmers and general dealers, or employed in the government bureaucracy, mainly as district commissioners, clerks, superintendents of works, teachers, and nurses. They did not constitute a working class, nor form unions or professional associations. Even in 1946 the census showed a total population of only 304,000.

Rise of Batswana Nationalism

It was in the 1920s that early forms of what can be termed Batswana nationalism emerged. From the beginning of colonial rule Britain neglected the development of Bechuanaland, which provided Batswana nationalists with ammunition against the colonial power. Throughout the colonial period the capital was located at Mafeking in South Africa; there were few modern urban centers, and hardly any industrial development. There was also significant land alienation to whites in the 1890s and early 1900s, mainly in areas ceded as freehold farms like the Tuli block, the Ghanzi block, the Gaborone and Lobatse farms, and the Tati Concession.

Discontent can be traced to the early 1920s, when a growing number of young educated citizens started to demand greater participation in administering the country, and came to view representation via the *dikgosi* as inadequate. In part to address this discontent and pressure, the colonial administration set up the Native (later African) Advisory Council (AAC) in 1919, as well as a European Advisory Council for whites. The

AAC was an advisory body composed of representatives from different tribes, and was meant to advise the government. Although the AAC was only an advisory body, Africans used it as a platform to criticize the racial discrimination prevalent in government service, low salaries for Africans in government employment, lack of economic development, and the lack of educational and health facilities. (Discrimination also had an ethnic dimension, mainly directed against the subject tribes; for instance, the Batawana regent blocked the appointment to a government job of Motsamai Mpho, an educated Moyei, later a notable activist. Black South Africans were also often recruited in place of Batswana.) When Britain, which continued to regard the colony as economically unsustainable, considered incorporating it into the recently formed Union of South Africa, Africans like the Bangwato regent Tshekedi Khama and the Bangwaketse *kgosi* Bathoen II used the AAC to oppose this move.

The AAC scored some successes. The educated Batswana in the council were usually united across ethnic lines and spoke for the whole country. The council made some useful suggestions on improvements in the administration. AAC members championed improvements in education, health, and agriculture. Crucially, the AAC provided "a training ground for self-rule later" (Tlou & Campbell 1997: 245). Although the AAC is often overlooked because of its advisory nature, it sensitized the British to the needs of Batswana when formulating policies because it became a platform from which Batswana exposed the limitations of colonial rule. Some modest developments in education and agriculture were also made.

Although mass politics and militant nationalism really started in the 1950s, these were built upon two strands of intellectual nationalism dating to the 1920s. The first centered on progressive chieftainship and was spearheaded by *dikgosi* Tshekedi Khama, Bathoen II and Seepapitso I of the Bangwaketse, and regent Isang of the Bakgatla, who called for a body with real legislative powers. These educated chiefs "held progressive ideas of economic development and of bureaucratizing their administrative machinery" (Picard 1985: 13). They stressed presenting a united front to the colonial authorities, and appealed to the precedent of the *dikgosi* who went to London in a united delegation in

1895. It should however be noted that despite their progressive ideas, these *dikgosi* were firm in the defense of their aristocratic privileges. They wanted, above all, to preserve their autonomy and avoid colonial interference in the administration of the tribes.

The second strand of nationalist movements from the 1920s and 1930s was that of intellectual democratic nationalism led by men such as Simon Ratshosa and S. M. Molema. These men were different from the progressive *dikgosi* in their education and background: they did not possess the power and influence of traditional society. They adopted a form of bourgeois nationalism, which wanted Bechuanaland to move towards a western-type elected parliamentary state, and end what Ratshosa regarded as the dictatorial and feudal practices of the chiefs. Ratshosa was a nationalist who called for a united Botswana nation, led by a national intelligentsia, and inclusive of the subject tribes. He was well educated and became a teacher and then head teacher of primary schools in Serowe. Ratshosa was an idealist, but not a revolutionary; his type of nationalism was against the authority of the *dikgosi* but it was also reformist and non-socialist. This brand of nationalism was crucial to the transformation of Bechuanaland, as it provides a critical antecedent to the anti-colonial nationalism that emerged later. Although Ratshosa was not a revolutionary, his call for a western-type parliamentary system was a significant development in a period when Batswana leaders were largely concerned with opposing incorporation of the country into South Africa and maintaining British overrule.

There was also some nationalist and socialist influence from neighboring South Africa in the 1920s. Marxist intellectuals from that country regarded Bechuanaland as a labor reserve and held that the chiefs ruled on behalf of imperialism. Batswana had started migrating to South Africa in significant numbers following the discovery of diamonds and gold in Kimberley and the Witwatersrand in 1886 and 1884, respectively. The rates of migration followed an upward trend until the 1980s. At the time of the declaration of the protectorate, Bechuanaland was a very poor country, with an economy based on subsistence agriculture. Beef exports to South Africa were the country's main source of income. The society was also highly stratified, with cattle ownership largely in the hands of

a few, mainly notables. There were very few wage-earning opportunities within the country, and the high levels of poverty contributed to mounting migration rates.

In line with their stress on industrial and African recruitment, members of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), and its successor the South African Communist Party (SACP), recruited Batswana mine laborers. Some Batswana attended night schools and party meetings in South Africa. Efforts were also made to spread propaganda in the Protectorate through the clandestine distribution of the party newspapers *Umsebenzi* and *Inkululeko*. Following the banishment of *kgosi* Sebele II in 1931 to Ghanzi, and the temporary suspension and banishment of Tshekedi to Francistown in 1933 for flogging a white man, *Umsebenzi* called for the establishment of an independent republic of Botswana. Although the agitation of the 1920s and 1930s did not achieve much, it was a forerunner of later struggles.

“Reformist” Phase, 1945–1959

The next phase of protest in Bechuanaland was a “reformist” stage when no nationalist or political party emerged: associations and small groups were formed with the intention of improving members' welfare. Batswana, like Africans elsewhere, focused on an improvement in conditions within the existing colonial framework. Batswana working outside the country learnt about mutual aid groups, like burial societies and sporting clubs, and formed a number of associations abroad, like the Bechuanaland Cultural Club in Southern Rhodesia.

In 1954 the nationalist leader Leetile Raditladi formed the Francistown African Cultural Organization for educated residents of the African townships. This body was succeeded by the Tatitown Cultural Organization in 1959. Francistown was the oldest town in Bechuanaland and was the country's industrial and commercial center. The organization was the first body to openly discuss political issues in the country, and it was a crucial building block towards decolonization nationalism because its members later played a key role in forming the first mass-based political party in the country: the Botswana People's Party (BPP), formed in December 1960. Several other small and loosely organized sporting clubs and cultural groups emerged

throughout the Protectorate in the late 1940s, and, among other things, discussed political issues.

Rise of Organized Labor

Trade unionism was another weapon of protest used by Batswana to transform the country during the reformist stage. Unions were a rather belated development and remained small because of the low level of economic development in the country. In 1949 the African Civil Service Association was formed to promote and protect the rights of African workers in the civil service. Africans in the tribal administration endured poor working conditions and low pay. Senior and better-paying positions were held by whites, and Africans occupied the lower rungs under white supervision. Educated Africans with widespread experience were not promoted to top positions. The association called for the protection of African rights, promotion of qualified Africans, and better pay for all ranks. It criticized the lack of adequate educational facilities in the country, which resulted in the recruitment of many black South Africans. Due to pressure from the association some Africans were elevated to higher positions in the early 1960s.

Because of unfavorable working conditions in the civil service, Africans had formed the Bechuanaland Protectorate African Teachers Association (BPATA) in 1937. Working conditions for teachers were even poorer than for other civil servants. They had lower salaries, no benefits from the pension fund, and lacked accommodation and adequate classrooms. This body also called for the participation of teachers in curriculum development. It scored some successes, as a provident fund was later established to provide a retirement income for teachers.

Industrial unions also emerged. Unionism in Bechuanaland was clearly influenced by both African workers' activities in the neighboring countries of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. For example, Batswana working outside the country like Knight Maripe and Kenneth Nkhwa were prominent leaders of the transnational Rhodesia Railways African Workers Union (RAWU), and applied their experience in Bechuanaland.

Local conditions also contributed to workers forming unions to advance their rights. In Francistown workers often worked 12 hours a day instead of the stipulated 10; wages were very low,

while the cost of living was very high, particularly after World War II. The government did not stipulate minimum wages, living conditions were squalid, and squatting mushroomed in the town. Workers in Francistown were also subjected to racial discrimination: white employees received higher salaries regardless of qualification. Because they were exploited, racially discriminated against, and denied any prospects of a better future, workers formed the Francistown African Employees Union (FAEU) in 1948. The goals of the FAEU were to regulate relations between members, to protect and further their interests in relation to employers, to encourage settlement of disputes by conciliatory methods, and to assist members to obtain employment. The FAEU made some gains, winning an 8-hour day; in 1949 it succeeded in negotiating a 2.5 percent increase in wages of workers in the Francistown creamery. It collapsed in 1958 for several reasons. Peaceful negotiation did not always succeed, and the union shied away from strikes. It lacked a clear-cut ideology and strategy, and inefficient leadership was a source of weakness. There were also allegations of embezzlement of funds. The union did not have a strategy of collective bargaining. The low level of economic development hampered the union because it was difficult to organize the small number of workers.

In 1957 the Bechuanaland Protectorate Workers Union was formed in Serowe at the instigation of the progressive chief Tshekedi Khama. Members of this union included shop assistants, domestic servants, and low-paid tribal administration employees. Its objectives were to secure satisfactory working conditions for African employees by constitutional means, and to secure and maintain reasonable hours, wages, and other conditions. The union intended to do all in its power to improve the social and economic conditions of members and to make representations to the Chamber of Commerce, the African Traders' Union, and other organizations and persons who employed Africans. It was successful in obtaining the release of garage workers and those in the tribal administration during the plowing season. However, the union was also short-lived and collapsed in the mid-1960s. It had no clearly stated ideology or working-class guiding principles. The leadership was inexperienced, ineffective, and lacked initiative. It also did not fare well as far as collective bargaining

was concerned, and it suffered because of the low level of industrial development.

The other notable trade unions formed in the early 1960s were the Bechuanaland Trade Union Congress (BTUC) and the Bechuanaland Federation of Labour (BFL) in 1962. Both were influenced by the newly formed nationalist political parties. The BTUC was influenced by the radical and Pan-Africanist BPP, while the BFL was influenced by the moderate Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) of Seretse Khama, which was formed in 1962. The BTUC was more radical than earlier unions because of the influence of the BPP: its declaration of principles demanded the unity of the working class regardless of color, ethnicity, or creed, and it strove to form alliances with the progressive sections of society in the struggle for economic and political emancipation. The objectives of the BTUC were to coordinate the activities and interests of unions in Bechuanaland, to organize the unorganized, to oppose discrimination in employment, to fight for equal pay for equal work, and to promote the democratic rights of workers. These high ideals were a radical departure from those of the FAEU and BPWU.

The BTUC inspired workers with hopes of better working conditions and wages. It drew its inspiration from the dynamism provided by the first wave of African decolonization struggles, which it saw as symbolized by the BPP. Working closely with the BPP in its political rallies, the BTUC made tireless efforts to expose the plight of workers and improve their working conditions. In 1963 the BTUC made strong representation to the labor officer responsible for enforcing colonial labor laws and mediating employer-employee relationships concerning the conditions at the Tati beer hall in Francistown. It protested that employees worked 56 hours a week instead of the stipulated 45, earned low wages, had no clearly defined leave days, and were not supplied with protective clothing. These protests led to an enquiry that confirmed that workers worked 10 hours more than the norm. The labor officer also successfully requested an increase in wages and provision of protective clothing to the management of the beer hall, to the credit of the BTUC.

The union was relentless. In August 1963 it decried the working conditions at the Lozi quarry near Mahalapye, where workers worked with dangerous stones but without protective

clothing; they were not provided with accommodation. A committee appointed to look into the union's charges confirmed most of them. The management conceded some union demands, increased wages, and provided free accommodation and protective clothing. It also provided for 26 days of paid leave.

In short, BTUC strategy centered on the identification of workers' concerns, and then presenting grievances, and it evidently achieved some success. Yet by the end of 1965 it was in decline. One of the main reasons for this was the absence of Klaas Motshidisi, its secretary general and the most experienced and dedicated official. The union faced the general problem of low industrial development, and its fate remained tied to a small leadership.

Mass Politics and Nationalism

Mass anti-colonial nationalism really only started in the late 1950s. This was largely due to "a peculiar twentieth-century relationship between nationalist sentiment and support for British overrule, and the survival of traditional Tswana political culture within the colonial context" (Ramsay 1988: 101).

For most of the colonial period Batswana were largely concerned with the struggle against incorporation into South Africa. Until the last decade of the colonial period nationalists generally favored retaining British overrule rather than ending it, as it was deemed preferable to incorporation into white-ruled South Africa or Southern Rhodesia. However, the situation altered. The likelihood of transfer to South Africa receded after the 1948 elections which put the National Party in power. Independence then became seen as a viable option. At the same time, many activists had put their energies into political movements in South Africa itself, developing activists like Mpho and Philip Matante who would later bring the lessons learnt in South African movements to bear in organizing political parties in Bechuanaland.

Another factor that hindered the emergence of political parties was the extent to which the traditional Setswana political culture continued to operate as both a weapon for local activism as well as an effective tool of colonial control. Even the nationalists drew on this style of politics: thus, Seretse Khama – later Botswana's first president – was regarded as a *kgosi* and drew much of his

support from this status, even while he stood for a multi-party democratic parliamentary system. Politics was in this sense based on continuity and set for peaceful transition.

From the 1950s the constitutional transformation that would ultimately usher in independence developed rapidly. In the late 1940s Batswana in the AAC called for the setting up of a Joint Advisory Council (JAC) because they were against the existence of the two separate councils for Africans and whites, which they regarded as divisive and likely to lead to the adoption of racist laws that were practiced in white-ruled neighboring states. The JAC was formed in 1950 with equal representatives from both councils. Africans then used the JAC to demand increased participation in administering the country. The JAC was an important organ in the transformation of the country because from 1956 to 1965, when self-government was achieved, its members – together with its successor, the Legislative Council (Legco) – cooperated in creating a non-racial nation. Africans in the JAC continued to use it as a platform to criticize British colonialism in Bechuanaland, especially the lack of economic development and continuing racial practices.

The establishment of Legcos in British colonies was a crucial step towards self-rule. Originally, Legcos were reserved for whites and meant to enable greater participation in ruling the country. Eventually, Legcos were extended to largely African colonies to allow Africans to participate in governance. In Bechuanaland the administration resisted the formation of a Legco because it was content with the existing councils. However, as Legcos involving Africans were established in many British African colonies, Batswana also demanded a Legco in place of existing councils, regarded as powerless. Moreover, a Legco was seen as a step towards independence. After *kgosi* Bathoen's call for a Legco was rejected by the resident commissioner and the white members of the JAC in 1952, he, together with Seretse Khama, Tshekedi Khama, and M. Kgasa, tabled a motion at the JAC for the speedy setting up of a Legco. The Legco was set up in 1960 with equal numbers of Africans and whites (although Africans were a majority in the country). The Asian population was represented by one member. The EAC, AAC, and JAC were all dissolved into the Legco. With the founding of the Legco the process was started for the coun-

try to move through the constitutional phases towards independence. The Legco was also used by Africans to criticize the colonial government for its failure to develop the country, and to make suggestions for various improvements. Batswana also used the Legco to demand independence.

The development of mass party politics in Bechuanaland is coterminous with the period 1957–66. This was the period of the bourgeois democratic nationalism of the “new man,” as opposed to the earlier traditionalist nationalism of the *dikgosi* and the intellectual nationalism of men such as Ratshosa (Picard 1985: 16–17). By 1957 a core of the “new” nationalists had gathered around Seretse Khama. Several nationalist leaders had attended school and worked in South Africa, where they became involved in that country's African nationalist movements: these included Kgalemang Motsete, Matante, and Mpho. Before the nationalist movement was banned by the apartheid regime in 1960, many Batswana who might have become involved in nationalist politics at home had directed their energies to what they viewed as the more fundamental issue of the minority regime in South Africa. With a Pan-Africanist outlook, they had approached the problem of decolonization regionally, and perhaps also thought that change in Bechuanaland was dependent on change in South Africa. It really was only when prospects for change diminished in South Africa after 1960 that these activists returned to Bechuanaland to engage in nationalist politics.

The first real attempt to form a countrywide political party was in April 1959 when Raditladi, who had connections to the Bangwato royalty, formed the Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party (BFP). The formation of the party was linked to his aim of influencing the results of the ongoing talks about the composition of the Legco. He believed the Legco would be dominated by the JAC, which he distrusted as a coalition of whites and *dikgosi*. Raditladi also wanted to counter the reemergence of his old rival, Tshekedi Khama, as the dominant political figure in the Bangwato area. The BFP wanted the federation of tribes and greater representation for non-royals in running the country. It also called for use of the ballot to replace hereditary appointments to political office. The BFP opposed the racial composition of the Legco because it believed this encouraged racism. Some of its members later played crucial roles in

forming other parties, such as Matante of the BPP and Archie Tsoebebe of the BDP. In November 1959 Raditladi accepted a tribal position in the African Authority at Mahalapye, and the BFP collapsed by 1962. The BFP had remained small and did not gain support countrywide. It was short-lived because Raditladi was incapable of leading it. However, the party was important because it was the first political party and because it called for democratically elected political leaders. The BFP represented a critical connection with intellectual movements and a transition to its successor, the BDP.

The first real mass political movement in Bechuanaland was the BPP. Once the process of constitutional and political change began with the Legco and the birth of the BFP, the pace moved swiftly. The leadership and political philosophy of the BPP had their origins in the racially unstable situation of South Africa, and was influenced by its African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). It was formed after these were banned. The founders of the BPP drew their political experience from their involvement in nationalist movements outside the country. Mpho had worked in South Africa since 1948 and had been secretary of the ANC's Roodepoort branch from 1953. He was charged for treason, imprisoned, and later released, and returned to Bechuanaland in 1960. Motsete had helped in the formation of the Nyasaland African Congress in 1944 in Nyasaland (now Malawi), and also had contacts with the ANC in the 1950s. Matante had been an ANC activist in Johannesburg in the early 1950s, but became sympathetic to the PAC after it broke away from the ANC in 1959. It was Mpho, a member of a subject tribe in Bechuanaland, who spearheaded the formation of the BPP; he was later joined by Motsete and Matante. Motsete became president, Matante vice president, and Mpho secretary general.

The BPP grew quickly, especially in Francistown and towns along the railway line such as Mahalapye, Lobatse, and Palapye, built on the earlier work of different organizations, and also had branches among Batswana migrants in South Africa. Francistown and the centers along the railway line were critical, attracting people because of jobs and providing a transport linkage that connected the north and south, as well as connecting the country with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

Because of its radical influences the BPP was anti-colonial and espoused a militant nationalism. It opposed the Legco, which it viewed as unrepresentative: the Africans had only one third of the votes and the seats were racially segregated. It opposed the role of the royalty, since it represented inequality and tribal superiority. It attacked racism, racially biased salaries, unequal pay for equal work in government service, and the racially imbalanced civil service. The BPP criticized white settler domination of the north-east by the Tati Company. It also attacked the colonial government for neglect of economic development. The BPP demanded immediate independence through an open election based on adult suffrage, and a common voter's roll. The colonial government and the *dikgosi* felt threatened by the BPP's radicalism. Probably because of BPP pressure, the colonial authorities moved forward the date of the revision of the Legco constitution from 1968 to 1963. The BPP, however, demanded that the Legco constitution be abolished and an independent constitution set up immediately. As part of its strategy, Matante twice addressed the United Nations committee on colonialism in 1962 and 1963, attacking British colonialism in Bechuanaland. The Organization of African Unity supported the BPP until 1965. The BPP scored successes as it gained international recognition as the country's liberation party, and was supported and funded by Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah.

One of the strategies used by the BPP to push for political change was through protest demonstrations. During one such demonstration, Matante led over 800 people to the High Court in Lobatse. Because of its criticism of the colonial government, the BPP attracted many supporters, especially in towns. BPP strategy also included establishing political structures such as women and youth leagues, and in addressing audiences in beer halls, football grounds, and "freedom squares." The BPP was Pan-Africanist and it demanded the Africanization of the civil service and some nationalization of land. Land alienation was particularly severe in the freehold areas of the Tati and South East district, which bordered the Gaborone and Lobatse farms. The party played a crucial role in political development because it stimulated the rapid spread of political consciousness via its radical leadership, supported by an influx of politically experienced refugees from South

Africa. It sought to mobilize the workers and the emerging middle class in support of its demands. The party enjoyed successes especially in mobilizing members in urban and semi-urban areas, because of poor living conditions in towns and the growth of the politically conscious, albeit small, working class.

The BPP organized large and impressive anti-colonial demonstrations in Lobatse and Francistown in 1963. In that year riots organized by the BPP women's league erupted in Francistown against the Tati Company's monopoly on the brewing and selling of traditional beer. The BPP's youth wing supported the rioters. Stones and petrol bombs were used against the police and rioters were arrested. At its zenith the BPP had 17 branches in Bechuanaland and five in South Africa. Despite its failure to win the first general elections in 1965, the BPP contributed to the establishment of multi-party democracy in Botswana as it formed the first opposition in parliament. The BPP can be credited for having introduced radical politics in Botswana and for pushing the colonial government to heed the call for immediate independence.

However, the BPP had some major weaknesses, which finally ended in a debilitating split. Because of its opposition to *dikgosi*, the party faced difficulties in mobilizing many Batswana peasants. Party membership was largely confined to the few major centers such as Mochudi, Lobatse, and the Tati area, and it did not cover the whole country. The BPP failed to attract local moderates such as Moutlaggola Nwako, Archie Tsoebebe, Quett Masire, and Lenyeletse Seretse. In 1961 the party made a strategic blunder by boycotting elections to the AAC, and it also lost the crucial support of Seretse Khama, who was widely regarded as the crown leader of the Bangwato, the largest ethnic group. The BPP was also wracked by dissension and Mpho was expelled in 1962. He formed his own party, originally called the BPP No. 2 and later renamed the Botswana Independence Party (BIP). In 1963 there was another split in the party when Matante criticized the more moderate Motsete and broke away to form his own party, the BPP Matante. The feuds within the BPP were caused by several factors. Alleged financial mismanagement caused major misunderstandings. The splits in the BPP were largely those of personalities, not ideological. The splits weakened the party, hence its failure to win the elections in 1965.

The BPP also faced a serious rival in the form of the other major political party that emerged during the final transition to independence: the BDP, formed by Seretse Khama to counter the BPP. He was a lawyer who had studied in South Africa and London, the tribal secretary of the Bangwato, a member of the Legco, and heir to the Bangwato throne. He had renounced his chieftainship after his marriage to a British woman (opposed by the British and initially by a section of his tribe). The leadership of the BDP was drawn from Legco members, who were from the African elite. It was a party of educated notables and progressive nobles, and supported the chieftainship. The BDP founders had contacts with the peasantry, for many of whom loyalty to the party was just an extension of existing loyalties. Nonetheless, the BDP leaders were determined to transfer power from the *dikgosi* and the colonial government to a central, national, and democratic government. None had any direct association with the South African nationalists. It was loosely organized as a coalition of prominent Africans, led by the politically shrewd Seretse Khama and Masire. Seretse Khama was president, Tsoebebe the vice president, Masire the secretary general, Amos Dambe the vice secretary general, and B. Steinberg the treasurer. Masire was a key leader, a commoner, teacher, farmer, and journalist. He was an astute organizer and hard worker. He had gained political experience while serving as a member of the Bangwaketse Tribal Council, the African Council, and the Legco, and this placed the BDP in a good position. Masire's tireless organization at grassroots level ensured the transformation of the BDP from an elite organization into a large national movement, with structures in all the regions and villages of the country. The position of Khama was also a major asset to the BDP. Although he had renounced chieftainship after his marriage crisis, he was still regarded as a *kgosi* by most Bangwato, assuring the BDP of grassroots support.

The BDP wanted the independence of Botswana, but the immediate stimulus in starting the party was to oppose the BPP. BDP leaders believed the BPP would not lead the country to peaceful independence; its splits and tendency towards a racial nationalism worried them. They were also worried by the influence of the ANC and PAC on the BPP. The BDP emphasized multi-racialism, which attracted

support from whites in the country and the colonial administration. The BDP was portrayed as a party that would ensure racial coexistence and therefore attain peace and development. The BPP's nationalism, by contrast, often tended to an exclusivist "Africa for the Africans." The BDP seized upon this and portrayed the BPP as an anti-white party.

Independence and Beyond

Under pressure from the political parties, the colonial administration arranged constitutional talks in Lobatse in August 1963. The constitutional agreement provided for a National Assembly, to which members would be elected by adult suffrage. The country would then achieve self-rule, with Britain remaining in charge of defense, the public service, and external affairs. The Legco was dissolved in January 1965 and elections were held on March 1, 1965 on the basis of the 1963 constitution. The BDP won the elections, gaining 28 out of 31 seats, while the BPP obtained only three.

The country obtained internal self-government with Seretse Khama as prime minister. The new government then demanded full independence. A constitutional conference was held in London in February 1966. The new constitution adopted was similar to the one of 1963. Independence was granted on September 30, 1966, and Seretse Khama became the first president of the independent republic of Botswana.

At independence, Botswana was surrounded by white settler-dominated regimes in South Africa, South West Africa (now Namibia), and Southern Rhodesia, while Angola and Mozambique remained Portuguese colonies. Wars of liberation started in these countries from the early 1960s, and Botswana inevitably got involved. Botswana, together with independent Tanzania and Zambia, formed the Frontline States and played a crucial role in the liberation struggle. It provided moral and diplomatic support to liberation movements in international forums such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of African Unity. Botswana provided sanctuary to what it called genuine refugees from wars and human rights violations. However, official policy was that the country should not be used to launch attacks on its neighbors. The country was also used as a transit route for refugees

who wanted to proceed north to Zambia and Tanzania to join liberation movements. For harboring refugees and for supporting liberation movements Botswana incurred armed attacks, intimidation, and threats from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, ending with the 1985 South African raid in Gaborone that left 14 dead.

After independence, Botswana adopted a multi-party political system with elections held every five years, based on a first-past-the-post system where the party that gains the most seats assumes power. New political parties were formed after independence, from the Botswana National Front (BNF) which was formed just before independence, to the Botswana Congress Party (BCP) and the Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) – both splinters from the BNF – and the National Democratic Front (NDF) and the Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin (MELS) group. Nonetheless, Botswana has been described as a one party-dominant democracy because the BDP has won all general elections. Its successes have largely been due to splits in the opposition, the conservative nature of Botswana's peasant majority, the low levels of literacy, the youthful population (Molutsi 1988), and the massive resources at the BDP's disposal. The country's political landscape has been characterized by continuous infighting and factionalism in the BDP and the BNF (Maundeni 1998). Also important has been the ongoing struggle between the government and the traditional rulers, with the powers of the *dikgosi* being systematically eroded – a process that started to intensify from the 1930s (Molutsi 1988).

Besides its unprecedented level of political stability and tolerance, compared to elsewhere in Africa, Botswana has also achieved immense economic growth fueled by the discovery of diamonds and copper nickel in the early 1970s. It has moved from one of the poorest countries at independence to a middle-income country, although high levels of poverty and inequality persist. New unions were formed, including the Botswana Mineworkers Union (BMWU), several teachers' unions, and the umbrella Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU), which was formed in 1977. These have been largely concerned with negotiating agreements on labor policies; strikes have been used on rare occasions. The unions have largely remained weak, divided, and somewhat elitist, in that only about 20 percent of eligible workers join a union

(Parson 1984: 94). The majority of workers are employed in the civil service, and it has been difficult to unionize or mobilize these workers

In the 1980s and 1990s a wave of democratization swept through African countries. Botswana was affected in that the new democratic dispensations in Zimbabwe and South Africa enhanced trade and economic cooperation in Southern Africa, and eased tensions along the country's borders. Botswana was and is also viewed as a leading example of democracy because of its unmatched history of multi-party democracy. On the other hand, donor assistance has shifted to what are seen as democratizing countries and cut aid to Botswana as a medium-income country.

Recently, a burning issue surfaced around the question of the relocation of the Basarwa, the most underprivileged ethnic group, from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) to the Kweneng district, in order to pave the way for game development and for the Basarwa to be provided with social amenities. This has aroused intense controversy, with the Basarwa and Survival International (SI) accusing the government of removing the Basarwa to prepare for diamond exploration and mining. This issue resulted in a marathon high court case which ruled that some Basarwa should return to the CKGR. This issue is still causing much controversy and has placed Botswana in the international spotlight for violating the human rights of the Basarwa.

Conclusion

Botswana is unique in Southern Africa. The transition to independence was through a peaceful process, in contrast to the protracted and bloody liberation wars preceding independence elsewhere in the region. Surrounded by white-ruled minority regimes at independence, and economically and militarily vulnerable to them, Botswana nevertheless played a crucial role in the liberation of Southern Africa that paid dividends with the final democratic dispensation in South Africa in 1994. The post-independence era has been characterized by a multi-party democratic political system. Political stability and economic growth and development are crucial features of today's Botswana.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Apartheid Movement, South Africa; Khama, Seretse (1921–1980) and Botswana Nation-

alism; Maripe, Knight (1927–2006); Mpho, Motsamai (b. 1921)

References and Suggested Readings

- Colclough, C. & McCarthy, S. (1980) *The Political Economy of Botswana: A Study of Growth and Distribution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hosia, T. (1992) A History of Trade Unionism in Bechuanaland, 1940–1960. BA research essay. Gaborone: University of Botswana.
- Maundeni, Z. (1998) The Struggle for Political Freedom and Independence. In W. Edge & M. Lekorwe (Eds.), *Botswana: Politics and Society*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Molutsi, P. (1988) Elections and Electoral Experience in Botswana. In W. Edge & M. Lekorwe (Eds.), *Botswana: Politics and Society*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Morton, B. (1994) *The Making of a President: Sir Ketumile Masire's Early Years*. Gaborone: Pula Press.
- Morton, F. & Ramsay, J. (1987) *The Birth of Botswana: A History of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1910–1966*. Gaborone: Longman Botswana.
- Ngidi, G. (1985) A History of the Botswana Mining Workers Union (BMWU). BA research essay. Gaborone: University of Botswana.
- Parson, J. (1984) *Botswana: Liberal Democracy and the Labour Reserve in Southern Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Parson, J. (1987) The "Labour Reserve" in Historical Perspective: Toward a Political Economy of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. In L. Picard (Ed.), *The Politics of Development in Botswana: A Model for Success*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Parsons, N. (1982) *A New History of Southern Africa*. London: Macmillan.
- Parsons, N. (1987) The Evolution of Modern Botswana: Historical Revisions. In L. Picard (Ed.), *The Politics of Development in Botswana: A Model for Success*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Parsons, N. & Ramsay, J. (1998) The Emergence of Political Parties in Botswana. In W. Edge & M. Lekorwe (Eds.), *Botswana: Politics and Society*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Picard, L. (1985) From Bechuanaland to Botswana: An Overview. In L. Picard (Ed.), *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*. London: Rex Collins.
- Picard, L. (1987) *The Politics of Development in Botswana: A Model for Success*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Ramsay, J. (1988) Twentieth Century Antecedents of Decolonizing Nationalism in Botswana. In W. Edge & M. Lekorwe (Eds.), *Botswana: Politics and Society*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Sekgoma, G. (1987) A History of Trade Unionism in Botswana, 1940s–1978. BA dissertation. Gaborone: University of Botswana.
- Tlou, T. & Campbell, A. (1997) *History of Botswana*. Gaborone: Macmillan.

Tlou, T., Parsons, N., & Henderson, W. (1995) *Seretse Khama, 1921–1980*. Gaborone: Macmillan.

Bourses du Travail

Stephen Leberstein

The Bourses du Travail (labor exchanges or workers councils) that spread throughout France during the 1890s were self-governing working-class institutions that contributed to the radical syndicalist ideology characteristic of the French labor movement in the period before World War I. While the national and local governments that established and funded them hoped the Bourses would help diminish social strife, the Left seized on them as centers for worker self-activity and as generators of class consciousness.

In an effort to accommodate an increasingly restive working class and bring a measure of social peace to a rapidly industrializing nation, the Third French Republic under President Leon Gambetta legalized trade unions in 1884. Following that step the Paris municipal council agreed to create and help fund a Bourse du Travail in 1886, and the next year provided a building for it on the Rue Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In 1892 the Parisian Bourse moved into a new building on the Rue du Chateau d'Eau, which it still occupies.

By the end of the 1890s municipalities across the country had established 57 Bourses in total. Among them they brought together 1,065 separate trade unions (*syndicates*), 48 percent of the total in France. In 1892 a Federation des Bourses du Travail was created, headed by Fernand Pelloutier after 1895. The Federation des Bourses merged with the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) in 1902.

Pelloutier, originally a member of the French Knights of Labor, rejected parliamentary politics, instead advocating anarcho-syndicalism. Under his influence the Bourses became a focal point of the revolutionary syndicalist ideology, and centers of working-class mutual aid, self-improvement, and protest activity. Practically, the Bourses were gathering places with meeting rooms and other facilities for all the trade unions in their respective localities. Their main function was to serve as job placement bureaus, saving workers from the perils of private employment agencies. They also offered support to itinerant workers as they traveled the country in search of work through the *viaticum*, or material subsidy,

and to the unemployed, measures that Pelloutier called “a debt of solidarity.”

The Bourses were controlled by activist workers themselves rather than administered by bureaucrats. As Georges Sorel saw them, rank and file control of the Bourses would “convince workers that they would easily find men capable of running their institutions among their own ranks when they stopped being hypnotized by political utopias. To show the proletariat its will-power, to have it develop through its own action and so reveal its own capacity – there’s the whole secret of the socialist education of the people” (Pelloutier 1901: 1).

For another contemporary commentator, the Bourses were the actual places “where that great thing, working-class consciousness, is born. There, men of the people meet other men of the people, in a room that belongs to them, in an institution that they themselves wanted and run . . . the exchange becomes more than an ‘exchange,’ but a Home, the fresh nucleus of a class” (Halevy 1901: 86). In the eyes of Pelloutier and his supporters, the Bourses would be the well-springs of militant workers, the “active minorities” of the coming revolution. Ubiquitous police spies certainly agreed with them!

Like the Wobblies in the US, French syndicalists believed that “We can bring to birth the new world from the ashes of the old, for the union makes us strong” (Ralph Chaplin, “Solidarity Forever”). Workers organized a range of activities at the Bourses, from job placement and the *viaticum* for the unemployed and itinerant, to trade courses as well as language classes and labor education. The trade courses tended to be in artisanal crafts, like the apprenticeship training in typography at the Toulouse Bourse, mechanical design and geometry for the building trades at the St. Etienne Bourse, or training in coachwork or surveying elsewhere.

Other efforts included building libraries in every Bourse. The one in Paris reportedly held 2,700 volumes. Plans were also made for creating labor museums, showing the evolution of particular trades, and for an office of labor statistics. In one nine-month period in 1899–1900, there were 597 class meetings offered at the various Bourses at an average length of 2 hours and an average attendance of 426 (Raynaud, *Etude sur l'enseignement professionnel*, cited in Pelloutier 1901: 120). Along with these mundane examples of self-activity, workers at the various Bourses

participated in strikes, May Day demonstrations, eight-hour day demonstrations, and the like.

As worker militancy and strike activity began to peak around 1906, some municipalities began to withdraw their subsidies to the Bourses. Ironically, the withdrawal of state support for Bourse activities not only curbed the scope of their efforts, but also showed the limits of their ideological goals. At a moment when a revolutionary uprising was not in sight, their worker self-activity was not sufficient to bring to birth the heralded new world. Much as Pelloutier and his comrades unwittingly followed Marx's injunction "that circumstances are changed by men . . . [and] the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can only be comprehended and rationally understood as *revolutionary practice*," the ferment the Bourses created in the labor movement was insufficient to achieve the overarching goal of social transformation.

If we believe contemporary critics like Daniel Halevy, the syndicalist movement, and the Bourses that were at its heart, began to develop a cadre of the "new men" who would be needed both for the transformative moment but also for the success of the new society itself. "Our militants," he said, "are new creatures . . . the harbingers of the future society" (Halevy 1901: 295). We can regard them as the necessary but insufficient condition for the revolution that the syndicalists dreamed of.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Confédération Générale du Travail and Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire; Internationals; Pelloutier, Fernand (1867–1901) and the Bourses du Travail; Syndicalism, France

References and Suggested Readings

- Ansell, C. K. (2001) *Schism and Solidarity in Social Movements: The Politics of Labor in the French Third Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berry, D. (2002) *A History of the French Anarchist Movement, 1917–1945*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Guerin, D. (n.d.) *Ni Dieu, ni maître: anthologie historique du mouvement anarchiste*. Lausanne: La Cité.
- Halevy, D. (1901) *Essais sur le mouvement ouvrier en France*. Paris: Société nouvelle de librairie.
- Julliard, J. (1971) *Fernand Pelloutier et les origines du syndicalisme d'action directe*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
- Lefranc, G. (1967) *Le Mouvement syndical sous la Troisième République*. Paris: Payot.
- Maitron, J. (1951) *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France, 1880–1914*. Paris: SUEDEL.

- Pelloutier, F. (1895) L'Anarchisme et les syndicats ouvriers. *Les Temps nouveaux* (November 2–8).
- Pelloutier, F. (1901) *Histoire des bourses du travail, origines, institutions, avenir*. Paris: Schleicher.
- Rappe, D. (2004) *La Bourse du travail de Lyon*. Lyon: Ateliers de création libertaire. Available at www.Pelloutier.net (accessed February 24, 2008).
- Seilhac, L. de (1899) *Syndicats ouvriers, fédérations, bourses du travail*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Vidalenc, G. (1947) *Histoire du syndicalisme*. Paris: Centre confédérale d'éducation ouvrière.

Brand, Adolf (1874–1945)

Larry W. Heiman

Adolf Brand was a German publisher and anarchist whose strong belief in individual freedom was intrinsic to his advocacy of male homosexual emancipation. He argued "the right of self-determination over body and soul is the most important basis of all freedom" (Brand 1991: 155). After a brief career as a schoolteacher, Brand started a publishing company in Berlin and in 1896 began publication of *Der Eigene* (*The Self-Owner* or *The Special One*). Initially conceived as an individualist anarchist journal, it soon focused entirely on male homosexual culture, making it the first journal of its kind in history. It ceased publication in 1931.

Brand initially joined with sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld and his *Wissenschaftlich-humanitäre Komitee* (Scientific-Humanitarian Committee) in support of the repeal of Paragraph 175, the provision of the German Criminal Code that made male homosexual acts a crime. But due to his disagreement with Hirschfeld's medical/biological views on homosexuality, Brand later turned against Hirschfeld and co-founded the world's second homosexual emancipation organization with Benedikt Friedländer and Wilhelm Jansen, the *Gemeinschaft der Eigenen* (Community of the Special), as a counterbalance to the *Komitee*. The *GdE* viewed homosexuality as a vigorously masculine cultural movement, advocating love relationships among male friends akin to those of ancient Greece as a noble ideal, although Brand and Friedländer believed men were essentially bisexual and both married women. The *GdE* never achieved the prominence of the *Komitee* and its reputation has suffered from its exclusivity, promotion of pederasty, and misogynistic views.

Brand's homosexual publications and often brazen political activism repeatedly resulted in litigation and even jail time. He was imprisoned for a year for using a dog whip on a member of the German Parliament in 1899. He published articles "outing" prominent figures as homosexual, including one in 1907 accusing two advisors of Kaiser Wilhelm II of a homosexual affair, which resulted in a libel conviction and another 18 months in prison. He was also periodically prosecuted for publishing lewd materials.

After the Nazis came to power, Brand's home and publishing house were raided and his publications destroyed. Although never prosecuted for his homosexuality, he was left financially ruined and curtailed his political activities in the early 1930s. He and his wife were killed in their home in 1945 by an Allied bombing.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Culture, 1840–1939; Friedländer, Benedikt (1866–1908); Hirschfeld, Magnus (1868–1935); Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements, Germany

References and Suggested Readings

- Brand, A. (1991) What We Want. *Journal of Homosexuality* 22 (1/2): 155–66.
- Kennedy, H. (2005) Brand, Adolf (1874–1945). In *gbtq: An Encyclopedia of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Culture*. Available at www.gbttq.com/social-sciences/brand_a.html (downloaded April 13, 2008).
- Oosterhuis, H. (Ed.) (1991) Homosexuality and Male Bonding in Pre-Nazi Germany: The Youth Movement, the Gay Movement, and Male Bonding Before Hitler's Rise: Original Transcripts from *Der Eigene*, the First Gay Journal in the World. Also published as *Journal of Homosexuality* 22 (1/2).
- Steakley, J. D. (1975) *The Homosexual Emancipation Movement in Germany*. New York: Arno Press.

Brandreth, Jeremiah (1790–1817) and the Pentrich Rising

Summer D. Leibensperger

Jeremiah Brandreth, known as the "Nottingham Captain," was one of the leaders of the unsuccessful Pentrich Rising against the British government. Brandreth was born in Wilford, Nottingham, and became a stocking maker by

trade. He later moved to Sutton-in-Ashfield where he lived with his wife and two children. It is likely that he took part in Luddite activities in 1811.

By 1817, industrialization, agricultural recession, and repressive legislation from a government concerned about insurrections set the stage for the rising, which was unique for its working-class origins. The unemployed Brandreth, along with Isaac Ludlam and William Turner, led a group of approximately 200 men from Pentrich, Derbyshire, to Nottingham on June 9, planning to continue to London as part of a wider uprising they had been led to believe was occurring. The group was armed mostly with primitive weapons like pikes, but some had pistols. During the march to Nottingham, they stopped at farms and houses, demanding a man and gun from each. Brandreth promised roast beef and rum and talked of a new government. He also killed a servant when he fired a gun through a window during the march.

When the rebels arrived in Nottingham, they discovered that there was no larger rising and instead encountered a force of Hussars. The rebels dispersed in a panic, but many were captured. Brandreth, Ludlam, and Turner were sentenced to be hung, drawn, and quartered at Derby for high treason for their roles as the leaders. The prince regent commuted the sentence to hanging and beheading only, which was carried out on November 7, 1817. Others were sentenced to imprisonment or transportation.

On the scaffold, one leader claimed: "This is the work of the Government and Oliver." William Oliver, the "London delegate" (better known as "Oliver the Spy"), had met with radicals in May 1817, discussing with them the gathering of local workers as part of a larger armed uprising in London. Many believe Oliver was working as an agent provocateur for the government, a paid informer directed to provoke locals to action, thereby allowing the government to make examples of them. Freemantle (1932) and White (1955), however, both suggest that Oliver's role in the rising has been overstated.

After the Pentrich Rising and other demonstrations, the Six Acts of 1819 were passed in an attempt to maintain order and were seen as the high point of repression. It has also been noted that Oliver's role in the rising encouraged a constitutionalist outlook for the working-class reform movement.

SEE ALSO: Luddism and Machine Breaking; Luddite Riots in Nottingham

References and Suggested Readings

- Freemantle, A. F. (1932) The Truth about Oliver the Spy. *English Historical Review* 47: 601–16.
- Pentrich Historical Society, www.pentrich.org.uk.
- Royle, E. (2000) *Revolutionary Britannia? Reflections on the Threat of Revolution in Britain, 1789–1848*. New York: Manchester University Press.
- Stevens, J. (1977) *England's Last Revolution: Pentrich 1817*. Buxton: Moorland.
- Thompson, E. P. (1963) *The Making of the English Working Class*. New York: Pantheon.
- White, R. J. (1955) The Pentrich Revolution, 1817. *History Today* 5 (8): 534–41.

Brazil, guerilla movements, 20th century

Diogo L. Pinheiro and Paula Rodrigues Pontes

Unlike many neighboring countries, Brazil did not experience any sort of large-scale guerilla movement during the twentieth century. Despite the severe inequality and, for most of the century, disenfranchisement of the lower strata of society from the political process, all armed revolts in Brazil were relatively short lived, very limited in scope, and mostly unsuccessful. This is partly explained by significant class, regional, and racial differences that prevented the formation of any kind of broad compromise necessary to form a large-scale military movement. Unlike other Latin American nations, such as Bolivia, Brazil did not have large Amerindian-descended populations that lived in similar conditions and provided the basis for so many social movements and guerillas in the region. Regional disparities in income meant that urban blue-collar workers had distinct interests from rural laborers, who in turn were scattered throughout the hinterlands, and under the control of local bosses and their armed henchmen. Furthermore, throughout a significant portion of the twentieth century, governments that mixed populist policies aimed at specific sectors of society and brutal repression of dissenters ruled Brazil. Early social security measures and labor protection laws only applied to certain specific and more mobilized sectors,

creating an inherent interest in the maintenance of the status quo for those groups.

Armed guerilla movements appeared in three distinct moments in twentieth-century Brazilian history: the old republic (1889–1930), the Vargas era (1930–45), and the military dictatorship (1964–85). One of the key features of most of these movements is that they were organized by small groups, usually with links to disgruntled members of the military, who overestimated the support that they would get from the population in general.

The Old Republic (1889–1930)

Brazil differed from the rest of Latin America in that it continued to be a monarchy for a significant amount of time after its independence. The republic was only established in 1889, but it was far from a full democratic regime. The first direct presidential elections came in 1894, when the first civilian president was elected. Only a small minority had the right to vote – mostly literate, white, propertied male citizens – and there was no secret voting. The relative federalization of the republic gave local bosses, the *Coronéis*, more power, something that was reinforced by the lack of secret voting, which effectively allowed them to determine the winners of local elections. This led to the creation of an alliance between local oligarchies and the federal government, allowing the ruling parties to decide the winner of the national elections. The two richest and most populous states, São Paulo and Minas Gerais, used this sort of alliance (which became known as “coffee and milk politics” because of the main products of these states) to control the presidency for the entire period in question. This configuration generally gave the federal government important allies in the suppression of any popular revolts. The repression of the Prestes column relied to some extent on the henchmen controlled by local bosses (see below). On the other hand, in the rare instances when these local bosses were displeased with the federal government, they became formidable foes, such as when one local boss decided to support the rebels in the Contestado war. Because of these factors, this period saw the most significant guerilla movements of the twentieth century. Besides the Contestado war and the revolts of the Tenentismo movement, the period also saw a number of

disorganized revolts, such as those over the compulsory vaccination laws in 1904 and the mutiny of low-ranking naval officers in 1910.

The Contestado War (1912–1916)

The Contestado war took place between rebels and the Brazilian military in a region that was disputed by two Brazilian states, Paraná and Santa Catarina. The causes of the conflict are numerous and are reflected in the diversity of the rebel forces. A mixture of messianic movements, dissatisfaction over land expropriation, and border disputes led to a situation that allowed a broad coalition of different sectors of society, due to which the rebels were able to fight federal and state troops for almost four years in a costly war that was the longest and bloodiest conflict in the Brazilian republic. The rebel leader was the self-proclaimed monk and prophet José Maria de Santo Agostinho (unknown–1912), who appeared in the region shortly before the conflicts began. The region had a long history of messianic leaders dating back to the previous century. Before conflicts began, he acted mostly as a sort of medicine man, using herbs and prayer to heal the faithful. Soon, he gained a reputation as a miracle worker, winning the trust of dozens of followers and even of a local *Coronel* after he allegedly healed his wife. He gained even more followers after the federal government granted the American Brazilian Railway Company the ownership of the land that was within 30 kilometers of the railroad it was constructing between São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul. Hundreds of displaced peasants and farmers sought José Maria's leadership in dealing with this issue. Already distrustful of the republic and the federal government, particularly because of the official separation of church and state, José Maria saw this as further evidence of the corruption and decay of the republic. He and his followers decided to organize themselves in a community that was independent from Brazil, and went so far as to crown an emperor to the area under their control. The community was named Quadro Santo, and several villages joined it, forming what José Maria called a *monarquia celeste* (heavenly monarchy). Even though this act of secession went unnoticed for a while, a number of different factors led to the mobilization of both federal and state troops from Paraná in order to destroy the rebelling community.

The first battle of the war took place in a town-ship called Irani claimed by both Santa Catarina and Paraná. Fearing repression from the federal government and from local *Coronéis* not allied with him, José Maria decided to unite all his followers in that city. The state of Paraná, however, saw the huge influx of people from Santa Catarina into that town as a threat to their claims over that region, and soon dispatched state troopers to expel José Maria's followers. Troops from the Regimento de Segurança do Paraná (Paraná's Security Regiment) entered into combat with José Maria's followers in October of 1912. The resulting bloodbath saw the leaders from both sides, José Maria and Colonel João Gualberto, killed. But, despite the loss of their leader, the rebels came out of the combat with renewed strength and a significant part of the Paraná troops' arsenal. The messianic element of this movement is evident in that the rebels strongly believed that José Maria would resurrect and lead them to victory, so much so that he was buried in a way that would facilitate his return to this world.

During the following year confrontations between rebels and the government were small and limited, with the rebels employing guerilla tactics in order to avoid prolonged confrontations. But that would change in February 1914, when the federal government and the states of Paraná and Santa Catarina decided to send a joint force to repress the rebellion. Over 700 soldiers, armed with artillery and machine guns, marched to the rebel camp of Taquaruçu. Most rebels, however, were aware of the impending offensive and fled. As a result, government troops were able to raze the camp, but that had very little effect on the rebel movement, as they lost very few lives and even fewer resources. The rebels took refuge in Caraguatá, where they would face government troops for the second time just a few weeks later. In March of that same year new troops were dispatched to the new rebel refuge with the goal of completely wiping out the rebellion. This time, however, the rebels stood their ground and routed the government troops. Emboldened by their success, the rebels went on the offensive, raiding large plantations and small towns for supplies. On September 1, 1914 they issued a "Monarchist Manifesto," calling for a holy war against the republic and *Coronéis* who did not accept their vow of poverty and asceticism. Among their targets were the city of Curitiba, and

where they destroyed the public archives that held the information on land ownership on the region, and the Southern Brazil Lumber and Colonization mill, an American company that was located in the area and belonged to the railroad company.

After these bold actions, the federal government picked General Carlos Frederico de Mesquita, a veteran of the Canudos campaign, to deal with the rebels. After failing to negotiate a peaceful treaty with the rebels, Mesquita and his troops crushed one of the rebel camps, while their main base, Caraguatá, was decimated by a typhus epidemic. Mistakenly interpreting the lack of a rebel reaction as the end of hostilities, Mesquita declared the conflict over and returned to Rio de Janeiro. But this period of calm was followed by the boldest actions yet by the rebels. After regrouping in Santa Maria, they initiated a large-scale offensive, capturing several towns, destroying many railroad stations, and causing panic in many of the larger cities. At this point, the rebels controlled about 25,000 square kilometers of land. Seeing the seriousness of the situation, the federal government dispatched its strongest expedition yet – 7,000 men, heavily armed, and, for the first time in Latin American history, two planes that were used in military operations. Leading this expedition was General Setembrino de Carvalho, and this time the federal troops made sure that they did not underestimate the rebel forces and their ability to regroup. So much so that his first action as commander of the federal forces was to offer the rebels their land back if they decided to cease fighting and lay down their arms. Not many rebels accepted this offer, and the fighting continued. But Setembrino had learned from previous mistakes, and this time did not engage the rebels head on, as he was aware that this would just drive them underground without really dismantling them. Instead, he chose to surround the main rebel camps, cutting off rebel supply lines and preventing people from moving in or out. This strategy gradually worked, as soon the rebels started to experience shortages of food and supplies. Over time, many rebels decided to surrender instead of facing starvation. Internal fights within the rebel forces also became more common, especially as rebel leaders ordered those caught trying to surrender to be shot on the spot. Despite all of this, the few times the federal troops decided to attack the rebels,

fighting was fierce. The main rebel camp fell on April 5, 1915, and the last rebel camp was only dismantled in December of that year. Even after these victories, the government troops remained in the region until the last leader of the rebels was captured, in August 1916. In the end, after five years of bloody conflict, almost 20,000 people had been killed and dozens of villages and towns partially destroyed. It was the largest insurrection against the Brazilian government of the twentieth century, and certainly the most violent. The most immediate and significant impact of the uprising were the accords that finally ended the dispute over state borders in the region. Despite a few skirmishes between peasants and local bosses following the end of the rebellion, its impact was small and the status quo was preserved.

Tenentismo

The Tenentismo movement, and especially the Prestes column, was the rebellious movement that had the greatest impact on Brazilian politics in the first half of the century. Tenentismo involved several small revolts by low-ranking military officers as well as one prolonged guerilla movement, the Prestes column, which roamed the hinterlands for over two years. As a movement, it defended a number of different democratic policies, but it lacked a coherent overarching ideology. It was a reaction to the existing political arrangement between the two largest states and the Coffee and Milk policies of that era. More specifically, it was a direct reaction to the events of the 1922 presidential elections. Minas Gerais and São Paulo chose the Minas governor, Artur Bernardes, as its official candidate. Other states, resentful of their exclusion from this process, chose the former vice president Nilo Peçanha as the opposition candidate. One of the major points of disagreement between the two sides was the role that the government played in maintaining coffee prices by purchasing surplus and manipulating the currency exchange rate, something that greatly benefited São Paulo and Minas Gerais.

The opposition campaign tried to use urban support and the dissatisfaction of those who were not related to the coffee sector to win the election, but because of the characteristics of the existing system, which made it easy for elites to verify and control voting by the populations under their control, and extensive voter fraud,

Bernardes was easily elected. Large sections of the military had sided with Peçanha, and their distrust of Bernardes became even more evident after letters attributed to Bernardes were published in Brazilian newspapers. In these letters, which were later discovered to be false, Bernardes allegedly attacked the Military Club and its president, former Brazilian president Hermes da Fonseca, which was seen by many in the military as an attack on the corporation as a whole. Things got further out of hand as Fonseca started to discuss ways of stopping Bernardes' inauguration. Fonseca was arrested and the Military Club closed for six months. This was the last straw, and on July 5, 1922, lieutenants (hence the name "Tenentismo") led a revolt at the Copacabana Fort to save the "honor" of the military. No other military units joined then, however, and soon many of the rebelling officers surrendered. Only 18 people, the Fort's 18, as they would be called, resisted. After a brief fight, only two, Siqueira Campos and Eduardo Gomes, survived. Despite its resounding failure in mobilizing forces in its favor, this revolt was important in that it provided the impetus for further actions.

These actions happened two years later, this time better prepared and planned. Besides deposing Bernardes, who they saw as being anti-military, the members of the Tenentismo also thought that the ruling regime, which elected such figures as Bernardes, was exclusively controlled by the existing oligarchies. As such, despite the lack of any overarching ideology, the movement also proposed a number of measures to modernize and strengthen democracy, such as extending suffrage and instituting secret voting. On July 5, 1924, a date that was selected to pay homage to the Fort's 18, forces led by General Isidoro Dias Lopes rebelled in São Paulo. They were initially successful: on July 9 they forced the state governor to flee the city, leaving it effectively under their control. This control was short lived, however, and on July 27 they fled the city under intense bombardment by federal forces.

Their revolt was not the only one to take place that year. Forces in Rio Grande do Sul, led by Captain Luis Carlos Prestes, also rebelled. Just as in São Paulo, their success was brief. After the failure of both revolts, forces from São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul were on the run. They met each other in Paraná in April 1925, forming the Coluna Prestes, or Prestes column, Brazil's most

politically significant guerilla movement. After a brief skirmish in the western area of that state, the column set out on a march throughout the country. Numbering 1,500 people at its peak, it began a journey through the Brazilian hinterlands trying to gather support for its cause, actively avoiding direct confrontations with the pursuing federal forces. In almost two years of existence, it marched for over 24,000 kilometers, from the extreme South to the Northeast, ending in the Midwest by crossing the border into Bolivia. It failed to garner the support of the rural population, and, suffering from disease and starvation, its members were chased out of the country by henchmen from northeastern Coronéis. Despite this relative failure, they had a profound impact on the political landscape, and gained some support within urban areas, to the point that Prestes was nicknamed Cavaleiro da Esperança (Hope's Knight). Many of their leaders went on to become significant political figures, such as Prestes, the longtime leader of the Brazilian Communist Party, and Eduardo Gomes, eventual presidential candidate.

The Tenentismo movement was important at least symbolically in its opposition to the politics of the Old Republic. Ironically, however, the end of the Old Republic would be the event that would divide the movement forever. Events like the Tenentista revolts helped to wear down the Old Republic, but the defining factor in bringing about its end was the economic crisis of 1929. There was some dissatisfaction in the other states with the political dominance of Minas Gerais and São Paulo, especially when it came to the government's policies of maintaining coffee prices and indirectly subsidizing its producers. With the Great Depression and drastic decreases in coffee prices, however, for the first time the interests of these two major states differed. São Paulo had a greater interest in maintaining the existing policy with regards to coffee, and in the 1930 elections it broke its pact with Minas Gerais. Part of the pact was that the president would always support the candidate supported by the governor of the other state for president, so that the states would always alternate on who held the presidency. In 1929, however, the ruling president, Washington Luís Pereira de Sousa, a former governor of São Paulo, declared his support for the current governor of São Paulo, Júlio Prestes. Because of this, Minas Gerais' oligarchies supported the

governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Getúlio Vargas, for president. Political leaders from both states created the Aliança Liberal in 1929 in order to support his candidacy. Besides the opposition to São Paulo dominance in the political sphere, the alliance also supported secret voting, a greater independence for the judiciary, and amnesty to all those who participated in the Tenentista revolts. Vargas was defeated in an election surrounded by claims of fraud, but his alliance had enough power to overthrow the government, especially since they had the support of most of the military and of the Tenentistas. Despite the amnesty to the Tenentistas, part of the movement, especially the more left-leaning leaders, strongly opposed the new government. Notably, Prestes went so far as to write a manifesto condemning Vargas and calling for a real revolution. This division marked the end of the Tenentismo as a united movement. Others who initially supported Vargas would also move to the opposition as he extended his powers. And members of the movement would continue to have an important role in Brazilian politics, as they helped depose Vargas in 1945, launching Eduardo Gomes as candidate in the presidential elections of 1945 and 1950 and Juarez Távora in 1955, all unsuccessfully.

The Vargas Era (1930–1945)

The Vargas era can be divided into three periods: the provisional (1930–4), the constitutional (1934–7), and the Estado Novo (New State) (1937–45). Getúlio Vargas was kept first as an interim president until a new Constitution was crafted. When that happened in 1934, he was elected by Congress as president, and in 1937 he used the threat of communism to grant himself extraordinary powers and extend his mandate. This was a period of relative calm, compared to the Old Republic. New labor laws, cooptation of labor unions, and a stronger and more centralized state made revolts like the Tenentista uprisings and the Contestado war a thing of the past. There were only two significant uprisings during these years, and only one of them used anything that resembled guerilla tactics. The first was the Constitutionalist Revolution of 1932. This was an organized action on the part of the São Paulo state, and did not involve guerillas in any significant way. São Paulo oligarchies were dissatisfied with the Vargas government and with the fact that he had been in power

for two years in a “provisional” way with no end in sight. The revolt was suppressed that same year, but some of its stated objectives were achieved, as elections for Congress were held sometime later and a new Constitution crafted.

More significant, although far less successful, was the Intentona Comunista of 1935, a communist uprising led by Prestes. Organized with some help from Moscow, it was quickly suppressed, but gave Vargas the perfect excuse to grant himself extraordinary powers, prolonging his government and leading to a more brutal repression of left-wing forces.

The Intentona Comunista (1935)

After being forced to leave Brazil, members of the Prestes column stayed in exile until 1930, when many of them returned and joined other Tenentista movement members in supporting the Vargas government. One of the few exceptions to this was Prestes himself. After returning to Brazil and meeting with Vargas, he decided not to support him and issued a manifesto calling for a socialist revolution. Even though he explicitly supported communism, Prestes was rejected by the Brazilian Communist Party, as they deemed that his personality and celebrity status would overshadow the party. He then went on to live in Moscow for a few years, where he worked as an engineer. There, he became a member of the Comintern, which then forced the Brazilian Communist Party to accept him. In a meeting of Latin American communist parties it was decided that Brazil was a prime location for an insurrection, with Prestes as the leader.

In the meantime, Vargas was indirectly elected president. Forces in Brazil began to mobilize to oppose his government. One such was the Aliança Nacional Libertadora (National Liberation Alliance). It was created in March 1935 by former Tenentistas, socialists, and communists with the goal of fighting fascism, and specifically to depose Vargas. Prestes, who was out of the country at the time, was elected honorary president, a post he assumed when he returned to Brazil clandestinely in 1935. It must be stressed that the goals of the ANL were not the establishment of communism in Brazil, although several of its members would certainly have welcomed that. It was (or at least it was supposed to be) a popular anti-imperialist front, following

a very common conviction among communist leaders of the time that before communism could be implemented in the peripheral nations they had to undergo a bourgeois revolution that freed them from the exploitation of imperialism, allowing capitalism to fully develop. As such, the ANL was supposed to congregate not only the left-wing sectors of society, but also the progressive bourgeoisie and parts of the elites who were in sectors that were not directly linked to the export-import economy. This can be seen in its goals, which were mostly nationalistic and non-revolutionary: default on the external debt, nationalization of foreign companies, democratic reforms and stronger individual freedoms. Its only difference from other popular fronts of the time is that, even though it emphasized the need for inter-class coalitions, it still believed that an armed insurrection was the way to go.

With plans for an armed insurrection ready, Prestes gave an eloquent speech upon his arrival in Brazil in which he called for “all power to the ANL.” By this time the ANL was a large organization with thousands of members. They were constantly involved in street fights with fascist supporters. The speech, which had national repercussions, gave Vargas the excuse he needed to outlaw the ANL and drive its members underground. But instead of weakening the movement, preparations for the uprising intensified. In November 1935 a military revolt in the northeastern area of Brazil signaled the start of the rebellion. Military battalions with the help of some civilians tried to take over the cities of Natal and Recife. They were successful in Natal and took over the government of the state. In Recife the insurgents were easily defeated. The ANL government in Natal was able to hold power for a few days, but it was eventually defeated by federal troops. A few days later, military battalions in Rio de Janeiro also rebelled, but again they were easily defeated by troops loyal to Vargas. The reasons for the rebels’ failure are several, two of which should be underlined. They hoped that their rebellion would incite the progressive bourgeoisie and its leaders to help them, and as such they had hoped that people such as the governor of Rio de Janeiro would use available resources to assist the ANL – something that never happened. They also hoped that the masses would fight on their side, which again failed to happen. Instead, the sectors upon which they were counting decided to support Vargas

and his fight against the alleged communist threat of the ANL.

These events were followed by a wave of brutal repression. Prestes was jailed for ten years, his wife deported to Germany, and all other leaders of the movement incarcerated and tortured. For all its attempts to broaden its goals and generate inter-class support, the movement was still branded as communist and used by the ruling powers as a pretext for further authoritarian measures.

The Military Dictatorship (1964–1985)

The period following the overthrow of the Vargas government was one of relative calm. Populist policies coupled with the cooptation of class and union leaders and the fact that communist parties were outlawed for most of this time meant that there was very little support to organize any sort of meaningful guerilla movement. That would all change in the 1960s. The success of the Cuban Revolution, the João Goulart government, and the ensuing military coup led to greater mobilization by Brazilian left-wing organizations.

Goulart, or “Jango” as he was popularly called, was part of a political tradition called *Trabalhismo*, which originated with Vargas’ government and involved limited gains in terms of labor laws, cooptation of unions, and nationalization of industries in certain key infrastructural sectors. With the advent of the Cold War, the labor laws passed late in the first Vargas tenure, and the new divisions within Brazilian society (generated by rapid urbanization), such a tradition was now seen as dangerously close to “communist subversion.” So much so that when Jango, who was elected vice president in 1960, was set to assume the presidency in 1961 after the incumbent resigned, the military conspired to prevent it. After a brief standoff between troops loyal to Jango and those who supported the intervention, Jango was allowed to assume the presidency, but with limited power due to a compromise that established a parliamentary system of government. This led to a situation where demands and hopes by left-wing organizations were high, but the actual power to implement any sort of change was lacking. Established left-wing groups were also reluctant to engage in more decisive action. The Brazilian Communist

Party firmly believed that the first priority of revolutionary movements was to save Brazil from imperialistic exploitation, as this would be the only way for national capitalism to develop. Once more, it emphasized the need for an inter-class alliance, and hoped that by forgoing armed struggle such a compromise could be reached.

The lack of action by the Communist Party and the federal government, coupled with the high expectations of some left-wing militants, quickly led to divisions within left-wing organizations. These divisions accelerated with events in the Soviet Union and the denunciation of Stalinism, which led to the expulsion of Stalinists from the Brazilian Communist Party. In this period of left-wing fragmentation several small groups started to plan armed insurgencies.

These splinter groups were small and had few resources, but nevertheless they made plans for establishing communism within a relatively short time frame. The inspiration behind this was the Cuban Revolution and the idealized view that a small group of rebels acting in isolation could inspire the masses to rise up in support. Such a perspective was called *Foquismo* because of its emphasis on a localized revolutionary focal point, which would spread the revolution throughout the region.

Numerous attempts at armed insurrection were repressed before they even left the planning stage. The first of these – the only one attempted during the democratic period – involved the Ligas Camponesas (peasant leagues), organizations comprised of small land owners and landless peasants who called for land reform. A few sectors and influential members of the leagues tried to create revolutionary camps in the distant town of Dianópolis, in the northern section of the Midwest state of Goiás. However, they were arrested within months of settling there. This sort of failed action would become commonplace in the early years of the dictatorship.

The military dictatorship started on April 1, 1964. Internationally, the independent foreign policy of Jango, coupled with the nationalization of a few foreign companies, drew the ire of the United States, which helped military conspirators plan the coup and provided resources to groups that would spearhead protests against the government. Internally, Jango's proposed reforms, including land reform, upset local elites, while the fact that such reforms did not go far enough in the eyes of left-wing organizations meant he had

little or no support. Thus the military were able to overthrow him without force.

Two important splinter groups from the Communist Party were able to carry out successful actions against the government in local areas. The Ação Libertadora Nacional (ALN) was organized by Carlos Marighella after he was expelled from the CP. The Movimento Revolucionário Oito de Outubro (MR-8) was named after the date Che Guevara was captured and killed. They carried out several bank robberies and some kidnappings as a way of obtaining resources for larger actions, as well as pressuring the government into releasing political prisoners. The most daring of their actions was a joint operation in which they captured the American ambassador in 1969 and negotiated the release of several prisoners. These groups were never able to move beyond this stage, however, and the increasingly brutal dictatorship either dismantled such groups or drove their members into exile.

The Araguaia Guerilla Movement

In addition to such groups, Brazil also witnessed two distinct guerilla movements during the dictatorship. The first one was the Caparaó guerilla, a movement that was repressed in 1967 before it had a chance to move beyond the training stage. It was organized by the Movimento Nacional Revolucionário, a short-lived movement that disbanded as soon as its leaders were arrested. Much more significant was the Araguaia guerilla, named after the region where its training camp was located. It was able to resist the first government attack, but eventually all its members were killed, arrested, or driven into exile.

The Araguaia guerilla took place on the borders of the Araguaia River, in the desolate jungles of northern Brazil. Its history is familiar enough: the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) – Stalinist dissidents from the Brazilian Communist Party – decided to organize a guerilla movement to establish a state of “prolonged popular war” in the Brazilian hinterlands. It was designed on the Maoist model and it was supposed to prepare and educate local populations about their objectives before engaging in any form of military struggle. The first members arrived in the region in 1970 and began to provide basic needs such as schooling and medical services to local populations. At its peak it had about

eighty members. Ironically, it ended up following the Foquista example based on the Cuban Revolution, becoming an armed, autonomous guerilla movement acting alone and hoping to draw local support. This occurred because the military found out about the movement's plans in 1971 and dispatched federal troops. The rebels were able to avoid capture and fend off the federal troops until 1974, when over 15,000 troops were sent to the region to fight fewer than 100 rebels. Casualties were estimated at 16 army soldiers and 68 rebels, many of them killed after being captured and tortured.

The history of guerilla movements in twentieth-century Brazil is filled with organizations that never left the planning stage. Those that went further were mostly short lived. Most revolutionary movements mistakenly believed that Brazil was on the verge of a revolution and that the masses and some of the bourgeoisie would support them. This mistake cost them dearly.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Armed Struggle and Guerilla Organizations, 1960s–1970s; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Ligas Camponesas; Marxism; Prestes, Luís Carlos (1898–1990) and Prestes, Olga Benário (1908–1942)

References and Suggested Readings

- Gorender, J. (1987) *Combate nas trevas. A esquerda brasileira: das ilusões perdidas à luta armada*. São Paulo: Ed. Ática.
- Löwy, M. (Ed.) (1992) *Marxism in Latin America from 1909 to the Present*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
- Marighella, C. (1971) *For the Liberation of Brazil*. Trans. J. Butt & R. Sheed. Penguin: Harmondsworth.
- Prestes, L. C. (1992) Manifesto, May 1930. In R. Levine (Ed.), *The Brazil Reader: History, Culture, Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Quartim, J. (1971) *Dictatorship and Armed Struggle in Brazil*. Trans. D. Fernbach. London: New Left Books.

Brazil, labor struggles

Paulo Fontes and Fernando T. Silva

In 1858 the printers of Rio de Janeiro went on strike for a wage increase. While they considered themselves qualified craftsmen, they articulated a certain class identity and language leading to identification with the oppression suffered by all

workers. This movement is considered to be the first workers' strike in Brazil, but such a view is valid only if one ignores the experience of enslaved peoples in working-class formation. Even before the printers' stoppage, the slaves of a large foundry and shipyard in Rio de Janeiro had stopped their activities in protest against punishment inflicted on their companions. Starting from the second half of the nineteenth century, breakouts, rebellions, legal actions in the courts to purchase liberty, formation of *quilombos* (communities of fugitive slaves), abolition movements, strikes, and associations of various kinds were just some of the combat and survival strategies around which free workers, freed slave workers, and enslaved workers shared their traditions, experiences, and common goals. In the aftermath of the Great Migration at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, white laborers, former slaves, and descendants of Africans participated in working-class uprisings with strong political reverberations, such as the 1904 Rio de Janeiro Vaccine Revolt against the compulsory vaccination campaign aimed at curbing the smallpox epidemic in the city.

With urban and industrial growth in the late nineteenth century, intense immigration, and the deception that succeeded the proclamation of the republic, urban workers developed a strong associative movement that was considerably in evidence from at least 1850, as demonstrated by the many religious fraternities formed among ethnic and occupational categories, and large numbers of mutual aid associations. This associative culture expressed a visible class identity although it stemmed mainly from the initiative of skilled workers who were not typically militant. Brazil's mutual aid societies reached an apogee with the advance of urbanization, organized according to ethnic group, trade or occupational categories, company of employment, or neighborhood. Most programs of these mutual aid groups were directed strictly to objectives of assistance and were expressly politically neutral, but many engaged in resistance, counting among their ranks republican, socialist, and even anarchist militants.

In the period of the First Republic (1889–1930), trade unions usually formed during strikes or right after, and had an ephemeral existence. The better-structured unions, and those with greater influence in the labor movement, comprised skilled workers (bricklayers, printers,

stonemasons, etc.) whose professional skills provided labor market power over employers and bargaining advantages unskilled workers did not have. Textile workers, who numbered in the thousands, encountered greater difficulty in mobilizing; industrial unions predominated and formed federations in municipal and state spheres, setting the stage for the foundation in 1906 of the national *Confederação Operária Brasileira* (COB) (Brazilian Worker Federation), a union with nominal power.

Enthusiastic about prospects for widening citizenship for workers with the Proclamation of the Republic, many socialists tended to prefer the political-parliamentary field to defend workers' interests. The socialists' performance was marked by evolutionist scientificism, by Saint Simon-type industrialism, and a moderate and legalist orientation. The socialists' political success was slight, though several were significant, including São Paulo's *Círculo Socialista Avanti!* trade union.

Interaction and integration among workers' parties and trade unionism was, however, fragile due to very limited worker participation in elections. Less than 6 percent of the population participated in the 11 presidential elections of the First Republic, where electoral recruitment was the monopoly of parties of rural oligarchies in the states. Electoral fraud, prohibition of votes for the illiterate, and the overwhelming presence of immigrants indifferent to any appeals for naturalization were all sufficient motives for the advance of anarchism and revolutionary syndicalism, and both viewed the electoral process as mere farce.

Up until the end of the 1920s anarchists were divided into those refusing to participate in trade unions, those defending their tactical or contextual presence in unions to disseminate anarchist principles, and still others who thought that trade unions should be free of ideological disputes. In practice differences tended to become diluted, but revolutionary syndicalism was definitely the most important tendency during the First Republic, notably in São Paulo. That faction rejected party politics, political proselytizing, and the existence of the state, holding that direct action was the only legitimate means of emancipation for the working class. Revolutionary syndicalists considered the general strike as the workers' most efficient weapon, defending the idea that trade unions should be the preferential locus for the class struggle and inculcating a

sense of collective ownership over the means of production.

In Rio de Janeiro the reformist faction of syndicalism attained the greatest visibility in the labor movement, comprised of a heterogeneous group of positivists, republicans, socialists, and others. They all had in common a minimum set of principles: actions within the limits of legality, defense of mediators in labor-capital conflicts, support for legislative measures in favor of workers, use of strikes only as a last resort and, in some cases, supporting worker candidates in electoral disputes. Reformists, strongest among port and transport workers, were widespread in Rio de Janeiro, which was the seat of government and the most dynamic political-administrative center in the country, where politicians, journalists, and union leaders held negotiations with public authorities in moments of conflict, much less evident in São Paulo.

In general terms, workers confronted a range of dangers to their living standards and divisions: low wages, long working hours, precarious housing, insalubrious working conditions, unemployment, ethnic rivalry, political repression, and the intransigence of managers. In response to such adversity the labor movement, until the end of the 1910s, engaged in collective actions consisting of strikes in a single company or in entire categories, including the stoppage at all the textile factories of the federal capital from August to September 1903, which led to a general strike that was severely repressed. In 1906 and 1907 the movement in defense of an 8-hour day paralyzed the city of Porto Alegre, but in São Paulo worker struggles reached a significant level in 1912 and 1913, notably strikes in opposition to the law for deporting foreigners, and the increase in the cost of living.

The 1917 general strike in São Paulo was a labor convulsion of unprecedented dimensions. The death of the Spanish shoemaker Antonio Martinez from a shot fired by a policeman on July 9 instigated a militant strike wave as some 50,000 workers put down their tools during a four-day period of looting, shooting, and barricades. At the root of the insurrection was worker discontent over exhausting, unhealthy, and dangerous conditions in the factories, and mostly, the high cost of living. Anarchist leaders, revolutionary syndicalists, and one socialist formed the *Comitê de Defesa Proletária* (Proletarian Defense Committee) to elaborate a list of

demands. The workers won a 20 percent wage increase, the commitment of employers not to sack strikers, and the promise of the state government to free those imprisoned during the melee and to legislate for better living and working conditions. The workers celebrated their victory and a fever of associative sentiment swept the city, leading to a proliferation of new unions, neighborhood leagues, and worker newspapers. But the euphoria was short-lived, as an upsurge in arrests, deportation of foreigners, closure of unions, and total disrespect for the agreement on the part of the company owners followed. In 1919 and 1920 a strike wave arose in other Brazilian cities, with workers presenting similar demands to those of 1917. The São Paulo strikes provoked redoubled reaction among employers in the next few years: continuous repression and the formulation of social and labor laws.

In the 1920s new actors appeared on the scene. In 1922 the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) was founded, including in its ranks ex-revolutionary syndicalists and ex-anarchists. In São Paulo and Santos the PCB only managed to acquire a more expressive presence in the syndical movement at the end of the decade. In Rio de Janeiro, by means of the Bloco Operário (Workers' Bloc), the PCB elected one city councilor in 1926 and two others in 1928, but generally speaking the party gained only meager electoral success.

In 1922 in Rio de Janeiro, and 1924 in São Paulo, insurrections among young military officers were important turning points for the working class in the army. The Coluna Prestes (Prestes Column) carried that movement forward and soon became a myth: in two years troops under the command of Captain Luís Carlos Prestes marched 25,000 kilometers without suffering a single military defeat. Such movements, which were called *tenentistas* ("Lieutenantist"), sought to instigate a coup d'état, but to do so without the participation of the ordinary classes in the process of political and social transformation. In the struggle against the domination of the agrarian oligarchy, *tenentismo* viewed itself as a movement to regenerate republican institutions and autonomy of the armed forces, defending state centralization and secrecy of the vote, and imbued with a vague sense of nationalism. During the 1930s the left-wing sectors of *tenentismo* incorporated themselves into the Communist Party, thereby considerably expanding the influ-

ence of the PCB on the Brazilian political scene. Luís Carlos Prestes became the main party leader in the decades to follow.

The "revolution of 1930," supported by the majority of the "lieutenants," brought the reformist rural oligarch Getúlio Vargas to power. The "revolutionaries" defended the line that class conflict ought to make way for harmony between workers and employers. In 1931 a law instituted a single union for each category and municipality, to be submitted for recognition to the ministry of labor. The ministry, in turn, was empowered to intervene in union activities, removing "undesirable" directors, including anarchists, communists, and socialists, who ferociously opposed such "official unionism" of the early 1930s.

In a context of economic crisis and increasing political polarization, those political currents took the lead in the strikes and protests mobilizing thousands of workers, especially from 1934 to 1935. The continual intervention of the state in workers' organizations, conditioning eventual legal rights to form official unions, and especially the generalized repression unleashed by the Vargas government after a military insurrection set in motion by communists in the armed forces in November 1935, finally defeated any possible effort for organized resistance of the autonomous trade union movement.

The dictatorship of the *Estado Novo* (New State) from 1937 to 1945 crowned the victory of corporate unionism, and on May 1, 1943, after nearly a decade of intense legislative activity, the Consolidated Labor Laws (CLT) were instituted, regulating the work of several labor categories and arbitrating individual and collective disputes between workers and employers, with the exception of rural workers. But Brazil's entry into World War II on the side of the Allies led to a suspension of labor rights and the recrudescence of employer despotism.

However, in the euphoria following the end of the war, thousands of workers engaged in a mass strike wave, many organized by workers' committees, ignoring trade union leaders who refused to support them. Many categories of workers opened direct negotiations with the owners and employers, ignoring and brushing aside the corporative institutions. In cities with high concentrations of industrial workers the PCB achieved important electoral victories. In December 1945, among the 15 communists elected as federal deputies, 9 were workers.

The objective of workers in the postwar period was to deliver a message: it was going to be increasingly difficult to govern without taking into consideration the interests of the working class. However, President Dutra (1946–50) would not accept that message, intervening in the unions and declaring the Communist Party illegal.

The labor movement only surfaced again in the second Vargas government (1951–4), in the midst of rising prices. In March 1953, 60,000 workers demonstrated in the streets of São Paulo in a parade known as the “empty pot” march, expressing dissatisfaction culminating in the Strike of the 300 Thousand. For 27 days from March to April, textile workers, metalworkers, glass workers, printing industry workers, and others paralyzed the country’s businesses. Despite winning a wage increase of only 23 percent (37 percent less than demanded) the movement was successful, as union membership grew, new leaders emerged from factory committees, union boards opposing the strike were marginalized, and the Pact for Inter-Union Unity was created, which crystallized around 100 unions.

The Strike of the 300 Thousand was a mark of the future challenges of the working class. In the 1950s intense labor migration from rural regions, above all from the Northeast, to the great urban centers added 3 million industrial workers in steel, automobiles, national petroleum, and gigantic hydroelectric plants, creating a new class calculus. From the mid-1950s on, development with nationalism was the great rallying force of leftists who defended strengthening the national bourgeoisie and the state in the productive sector, while controlling foreign capital and demanding social justice.

Alliances between communists and the left wing of the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) (Brazilian Labor Party) fashioned a labor movement on a national scale, including a massive mobilization and unionization of rural workers in the early 1960s. In 1962 the Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT) was created, in defiance of the CLT, which expressly forbid federations of union organizations. With João Goulart president of the republic from 1961 to 1964 the union movement pressed for wide-scale “base reforms” (agrarian, welfare, and others) and participation in the national government, managing to influence

the choice of ministers committed to their cause. The opposition considered working-class participation as a “Cubanization” of the country, the “Trade Union Republic,” and communist atheism. “Enough!” cried newspaper headlines, and on April 1, 1964 João Goulart was deposed in a military coup d’état. Upon taking power, the government intervened in trade unions, deposed leaders, arrested militants (some were tortured to death), and set in motion a process of rigid control over the labor movement.

In spite of the repression, the labor movement found interstices where it could be active, at least during the first four years of the military regime. In the explosive situation of 1968, workers appeared once more on the scene. Generalized strikes broke out in the industrial cities of Osasco (São Paulo) and Contagem (Minas Gerais), but were violently suppressed by police and army. Given the context of growing discontent among the common people, and student demonstrations, the military government closed parliament, abolished a whole set of civil rights, and intensified the dictatorial nature of the regime. Under the dictatorship, the country entered on a new phase of economic growth anchored by external debt, transnational corporate investment, and vigorous state participation in the economy. From 1969 to 1973 the country’s GNP expanded at average rates of over 10 percent per annum in what became known as the Brazilian miracle. Urbanization, industrialization, and internal migrations accelerated, as did social inequities. In the factories and workplaces the rhythm of work intensified, management authoritarianism prevailed, and wages were tightly controlled. In an atmosphere of intense societal repression and control over unions, strikes practically disappeared and worker struggles fragmented, sometimes appearing clandestinely within companies.

Working-class neighborhoods remained an important space for popular resistance. With the military and political defeat of left-wing factions opting for armed struggle, and intense persecution of the Communist Party and the inheritors of populist and laborite traditions, progressive sectors of the church that had adopted the directives of the theology of liberation ever since the 1960s became increasingly influential in emerging urban and rural social movements. The crisis of the economic miracle in the 1970s and

the process of gradual political distension controlled by the military regime were the basis of a new workers' struggle.

In 1978 a spontaneous strike of metalworkers in the ABC industrial region of São Paulo took the country by surprise. In the following three years, hundreds of strikes across labor sectors – metalworkers, bank workers, teachers, rural laborers, and beyond – demonstrated strong dissatisfaction with the government, challenged the military regime, and put workers at the forefront of the struggle for re-democratization. The strikes that played a decisive role in the labor movement also brought to the fore the leadership of a young trade unionist of the ABC metalworkers, Luis Inácio da Silva, better known as Lula.

On one side, trade unionists demanded greater participation of the social bases, greater freedom for unions, and a radical re-democratization for the country. On the other, the more conservative and moderate sectors of the labor movement, including members of the Communist Party, counseled caution defending not only the establishment of an ample political alliance to combat the military regime, in which workers would not necessarily be protagonists, but also preservation of essential aspects of trade union structures inherited from the policies of Vargas. The rift between the two perspectives characterized the labor movement from 1979 to 1983 in spite of efforts to create a unified labor confederation for joint action. Trade unionists of the first group, allied with militants of various social movements, sectors linked to the progressive factions of the Catholic Church, and a variety of left-wing groups, founded the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) (Worker's Party) in 1980, and three years later its own trade union federation, Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT). In turn, part of the more conservative sectors of the Brazilian trade union movement continued entrenched in the confederations of the official union structure while yet another faction, supported by communist trade union leaders, founded the Central Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT) in 1986. In 1991, advocating a business unionism of North American inspiration, a significant group of labor leaders broke with the CGT and founded the Força Sindical, which became the second largest labor national organization, after CUT.

In contrast to all the international tendencies of the 1980s, trade unionism and intense social struggle expanded dramatically in the 1980s. The trade union movement played a fundamental role in Brazil's re-democratization, actively participating in massive campaigns for direct presidential elections in 1984 and applying pressure in defense of worker rights at the National Constituent Assembly (1987–8). Against a background of renewed economic crisis and growing inflation, strikes to preserve the purchasing power of wages and reduce working hours multiplied. Indeed, from 1985 to 1992 workers engaged in more than 15,000 strikes, more than any period in Brazil's history. Brazilian trade unionism in the 1980s definitively extended its outreach to all sectors of the country, expanding well beyond traditional strongholds to civil services and rural workers. However, despite the significant presence of trade unions in the public realm, former problems persisted. The 1988 constitution abolished many elements of labor repression, but the pillars of the official trade union structure remained intact. Labor organization in the workplace was fragile and restricted to a few sectors, and equally trade union penetration in the growing informal sector of the economy was minimal.

The neoliberal reforms and deregulation of the economy, and insertion of the country in the framework of globalization initiated during the government of Fernando Collor (1990–2), deepened during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's two terms as president (1995–2002), were a setback for Brazilian trade unionism. The defeat of the petroleum workers' strike in 1995 was emblematic of a new phase of labor repression, comparable to the defeat of the British coal miners' strike by Margaret Thatcher ten years earlier. Cornered by hostile media and successive governments, the labor movement went on the defensive and moved in a retrograde cooperative direction. The control of inflation followed by a period of low economic growth and increasing unemployment, together with an intense process of productive restructuring, industrial reallocation, and increasing precariousness of labor relations, greatly reduced workers' mobilization and strike capacity.

In 2002 Lula was elected president (and was re-elected in 2006), the first time a left-wing workers' leader took power in Brazil, awakening

enormous expectations among workers and labor leaders. While Lula could not advance the much-anticipated and far-reaching labor and union reforms first envisioned, he created a relatively favorable context for strengthening union bargaining power.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Brazil, Guerilla Movements, 20th Century; Brazil, Workers and the Left: Partido dos Trabalhadores and Central Única dos Trabalhadores; Movimento Sem Terra (MST); Prestes, Luís Carlos (1898–1990) and Prestes, Olga Benário (1908–1942); União dos Lavradores e Trabalhadores Agrícolas do Brasil (ULTAB-Brazil)

References and Suggested Readings

- Araújo, A. (1998) *A construção do consentimento: corporativismo e trabalhadores nos anos trinta*. São Paulo: Scritta.
- Batalha, C. (2000) *O movimento operário na Primeira República*. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar.
- Cardoso, A. (1999) *Sindicatos, trabalhadores e a coqueluche neoliberal*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getulio Vargas.
- Chalhoub, S. (1999) *Cidade febril: cortiços e epidemias na corte imperial*. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras.
- Fortes, A. et al. (Eds.) (1999) *Na luta por direitos. Estudos recentes em história social do trabalho*. Campinas: Editora da Unicamp.
- French, J. (2004) *Drowning in Laws: Labor Law and Brazilian Political Culture*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Gomes, A. (1988) *A invenção do trabalhismo*. São Paulo: Vértice.
- Hall, M. (2004) O movimento operário na cidade de São Paulo, 1890–1954. In P. Porta (Ed.), *História da cidade de São Paulo*, Vol. 3. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra.
- Luca, T. (1990) *O sonho do futuro assegurado: o mutualismo em São Paulo*. São Paulo: Contexto.
- Mattos, M. (Ed.) (2004) *Trabalhadores em greve, polícia em guarda*. Rio de Janeiro: Bom Texto, Faperj.
- Munakata, K. (1981) *A legislação trabalhista no Brasil*. São Paulo: Brasiliense.
- Oliveira, C. & Mattoso, J. (Eds.) (1996) *Crise e trabalho no Brasil*. São Paulo: Scritta.
- Rodrigues, I. (1997) *Sindicalismo e Política: a trajetória da CUT*. São Paulo: Scritta.
- Toledo, E. (2004) *Travessias revolucionárias: idéias e militantes sindicalistas em São Paulo e Itália (1890–1945)*. Campinas: Editora da Unicamp.
- Vianna, L. (1999) *Liberalismo e Sindicato no Brasil*. Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG.
- Weinstein, B. (1996) *For Social Peace in Brazil*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Welch, C. (1999) *The Seed Was Planted: The São Paulo Roots of Brazil's Rural Labor Movements,*

1924–1964. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Brazil, peasant movements and liberation theology

Michael Löwy

Liberation theology is the expression of a vast social movement that emerged at the beginning of the 1960s. It is best expressed in a body of writings produced since 1970 by Latin American figures like Gustavo Gutiérrez (Peru), Hugo Assmann, Carlos Mesters, Leonardo and Clodovis Boff, Frei Betto (Brazil), Jon Sobrino, Ignacio Ellacuría (El Salvador), Pablo Richard (Chile/Costa Rica), Ruben Dri (Argentina), and Enrique Dussel (Argentina/Mexico) – to name only some of the best known. The theology began to emerge, however, well before these writers began to describe it. It involves significant sectors of the church (priests, religious orders, bishops), lay religious movements (Catholic Action, Christian University Youth, Young Christian Workers), popularly based pastoral networks (workers pastoral, peasants pastoral, urban pastoral), ecclesiastic base communities (CEBs), and several popular organizations created by CEB activists: women's clubs, neighborhood associations, and peasant or workers' unions. This social movement helped facilitate the emergence of a new workers' movement in Brazil and the rise of revolutions in Central America and Chiapas.

Usually this broad social/religious movement is referred to as “liberation theology,” but this is an inadequate term insofar as the movement appeared many years before the new theology – its first manifestations can be seen in Brazil at the beginning of the 1960s in certain documents of the JUC (Christian Academic Youth) – and most of its activists are hardly theologians at all. Sometimes it is also referred to as the “Church of the Poor,” but this social network goes well beyond the limits of the church as an institution, however broadly defined. To say that it is a social movement does not mean necessarily that it is an “integrated” and “well-coordinated” body, only that it has, like similar movements such as feminism, a certain capacity for mobilizing people around common aims.

Aspects of both “church” and “sect” can be found in liberation theology, perhaps better termed liberationist Christianity, which embraces the community ethics of brotherliness and neighborliness. All these elements can be found, in almost “pure” form, in the ecclesiastic base communities and popular pastorals in Latin America.

Liberationist Christianity is vigorously opposed by the Vatican and by the heading body of the church hierarchy in Latin America, the CELAM (Latin American Bishops’ Council), led since the early 1970s by the conservative wing of the church. This tension to some extent reveals a class struggle within the church since certain positions correspond to the interests of the ruling elites and others to those of the oppressed. On the other hand, the bishops, Jesuits, or priests who head the “Church of the Poor” are not themselves poor. Their rallying to the cause of the exploited is motivated by spiritual and moral reasons inspired by their religious culture, Christian faith, and Catholic tradition. Furthermore, this moral and religious dimension is an essential factor in the motivations of thousands of Christian activists in the trade unions, neighborhood associations, base communities, and revolutionary fronts. The poor themselves become conscious of their condition and organize to struggle as Christians, belonging to a church and inspired by a faith.

Liberation theology is the spiritual product of this social movement, but in legitimating it and providing it with a coherent religious doctrine, it has enormously contributed to its extension and reinforcement. Summarized in a single formula, the central idea of liberation theology is best expressed by the Puebla conference of the Latin American Bishops (1979), which described it as the preferential option for the poor. Importantly, however, it must be added that in this theology the poor are the agents of their own liberation and the subject of their own history – and not simply, as in the traditional doctrine of the church, the object of charitable attention.

For liberationist Christianity, choosing the side of the poor is not a mere literary phrase: it is expressed in practice by the commitment of hundreds of thousands of Christian members of base communities, lay people involved in pastoral work, priests, and members of religious orders. It is seen in the setting up of neighborhood committees in shantytowns, of class struggle

currents in the trade unions, in the organization of landless peasant movements and the defense of political prisoners against torture.

The full recognition of the poor’s human dignity and the special historical and religious mission attributed to them by liberationist Christianity is certainly one of the reasons for its relative success, in some countries at least, in enlisting the support of the poorest layers of society. The motives for this can be better understood by referring to a most remarkable ideal-typical analysis proposed by Max Weber in his study of the economical ethics of the world religions: “The sense of dignity of socially repressed strata or of strata whose status is negatively (or at least not positively) valued is nourished most easily on the belief that a special ‘mission’ is entrusted to them.”

Whatever the differences between liberation theologians, several basic tenets can be found in most of their writings, which constitute radical innovations. First is the fight against idolatry, specifically the new idols of death adored by the new Pharaohs, the new Caesars, and the new Herods: Mammon, Wealth, the Market, National Security, the State, Military Force, and “Western Christian Civilization” as the main enemy of religion. Second is historical human liberation as the anticipation of the final salvation in Christ, the Kingdom of God. The third tenet is a critique of traditional dualist theology as the product of Platonic Greek philosophy, and not of the biblical tradition where human and divine history are distinct but inseparable. Fourth is a new reading of the Bible, giving significant attention to passages like Exodus as a paradigm of an enslaved people’s struggle for liberation. The fifth tenet is a sharp moral and social indictment of dependent capitalism as an unjust and iniquitous system, as a form of structural sin. Sixth is the use of Marxism as a social-analytical instrument in order to understand the causes of poverty, the contradictions of capitalism, and the forms of class struggle. The last two tenets include the preferential option for the poor and the solidarity with their struggle for self-liberation and the development of Christian base communities among the poor as a new form of church and as an alternative to the individualist way of life imposed by the capitalist system. These ideas of liberationist Christianity directly contributed to the rise of peasant/indigenous movements in several Latin American countries.

Rebellious Peasant Movements in Latin America

Liberation theology has contributed to the rise of rebellious peasant and indigenous movements in several places in Latin America. In some cases this has led to armed uprisings, as in Nicaragua in the 1970s, in El Salvador in the 1980s, and to a lesser extent in Guatemala during those years. More commonly, however, it has led to mass peasant mobilizations.

One such mass mobilization occurred in Ecuador. During many years the progressive sector of the church there helped to promote an autonomous movement among the Quechuas. The charismatic Monsignor Leonidas Proaño, bishop of Riobamba (Chimborazo), became well known in Latin America as “the Bishop of the Indians” because of his lifelong commitment to social justice and in support of the Ecuadorean Indian outcasts. With the help of 1,300 pastoral agents, including lay and clerical, local, national, and international personnel, he built an impressive network of parishes, schools, medical teams, centers, and institutes and created, with a group of Quechua leaders, the Indian Movement of Chimborazo (MICH) in 1982. Mgr. Proaño and his followers rejected the capitalist model of development as destructive of the indigenous culture and society and tried to propose an alternative model, a sort of Indian communalism based on the Quechua peasant tradition. Their action helped Indian communities throughout the country to take consciousness of their rights and claim them, for the first time in centuries. This is how a broad association was created – the National Indian Confederation of Ecuador (CONAIE). After his death in 1988, Mgr. Proaño was replaced by a new bishop, Mgr. Victor Corral, who continued the pastoral action of his predecessor.

In June 1994 the Ecuadorean government issued a neoliberal agrarian law, which offered strong guarantees to private property and excluded any further distribution of land. It aimed also at the complete submission of agriculture to the exclusive logic of the market: the communitarian lands could be parceled out and sold, and even the water could be privatized. Mgr. Victor Corral led the protest against the law, declaring that it defended the interests of those who “wanted to transform the country into an agro-industrial enterprise and reduce land to a commodity.”

The Indian movement – CONAIE, cooperative associations, MICH, peasant unions – and other popular forces mobilized against the law, with the support of the progressive church (the conservative bishops sided with the government). For two weeks the rural areas of Ecuador were in a semi-insurreccional state as Indian communities blocked roads, stopped traffic, and demonstrated in the towns. The army tried in vain to suppress the movement by arresting some of the leaders, closing the church radio stations that supported the Indians, and sending troops to open the roads. Only through an outright civil war could the Indian upsurge be crushed, and the government was forced to retreat and to introduce substantial modifications in the agrarian law. While the Indian rebellion was neither “led” nor “promoted” by the progressive church, liberationist Christianity – represented by Mgr. Proaño, his pastoral agents, and his successor – was certainly a crucial factor in developing a new awareness and stimulating self-organization among the Quechua communities. Other rebellions organized by CONAIE took place in the next 15 years, and the movement is still an important factor in the struggle for social change in Ecuador.

Another example is the peasant indigenous uprising in Chiapas in 1994, under the leadership of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN). The Zapatistas were described by the media as inspired by liberation theology and led by Jesuits, while Monsignor Samuel Ruiz, the bishop of San Cristobal de las Casas (Chiapas), was accused of being “God’s guerilla fighter.” In reality, however, it was not so simple.

Mgr. Ruiz studied at the Gregorian University in Rome and arrived in Chiapas in 1965, working for several years as head of the Department of Missions of the CELAM after taking part in the Medellín conference. Influenced by liberation theology, he published *Teología Bíblica de la Liberación* in 1975, celebrating Christ as a revolutionary prophet. By a patient work of pastoral education – with the help of Jesuits and female religious orders – he created in his diocese a vast network of 7,800 indigenous catechists and 2,600 base communities. The pastoral agents helped to raise consciousness among the indigenous and to organize them in order to struggle for their rights, in particular for the recovery of their ancient lands. Mgr. Ruiz supported the indigenous communities in their

confrontation with the landowners and in particular with the rich cattle-raisers of Chiapas. He also took under his protection the numerous Guatemalan refugees who arrived in southern Mexico, fleeing the brutal military repression in their country.

This very concrete and practical option for the poor led to an increasing conflict with the Mexican authorities and with the cattle-raisers' association of Chiapas, who accused the bishop of "agitating the Indians." During the pope's visit to Mexico in 1990, a strong campaign was launched asking for the removal of the "troublemaker." In October 1993 the papal nuncio in Mexico, Mgr. Geronimo Prigione, summoned him to Mexico City and ordered him to resign – probably following a request from the Mexican authorities. While Mgr. Ruiz was appealing to Rome against this decision, the Zapatista uprising took place and the Mexican government, unable to suppress the movement, had to call on Mgr. Ruiz as a mediator in order to negotiate with the EZLN.

From the available data, it appears quite obvious that neither Mgr. Ruiz nor his Jesuit and religious agents were the "promoters" of the upsurge. As in El Salvador, consciousness raising and the impulse for self-organization created a new political-religious culture among a significant part of the indigenous population. In a second stage, a revolutionary cadre, probably of Marxist background, built on this new social and political consciousness and helped to organize several thousand Indians, with the support of their communities, into an armed force. The ideology of the EZLN is not religious and draws its main symbolic references from the Mayan culture. It is true, however, that the patient work of education and empowerment of the indigenous communities by Mgr. Ruiz and his catechists created a favorable environment for the rise of the Zapatista movement.

One of the most important examples of the impact of liberationist Christianity in the rise of peasant movements is Brazil's Rural Landless Workers' Movement (MST), founded in 1985 (see below). Today the MST is one of the largest social movements in Brazil and in all of Latin America. It brings together thousands of peasants, poor farmers, *posseiros* (small landowners without titles), and salaried agricultural workers – a significant proportion of them women – in a tenacious combat against the

formidably non-egalitarian structure of land ownership and for a radical agrarian reform. The term rural workers encompasses this diversity by emphasizing work and class as the common denominator and as the basis for a necessary alliance with urban workers against neoliberalism. Completely secular and non-denominational, the MST still has its roots in the socioreligious culture of what could be called liberation Christianity.

After supporting the April 1964 military coup in Brazil (in the name of defending Christian values against an imaginary "Bolshevik menace"), the church became in the 1970s the main force of opposition to the dictatorial regime and to its strongly non-egalitarian development model. For the most advanced Catholic sector, inspired by liberation theology and inspiring, in turn, the ecclesiastical base communities, responsibility for the people's poverty and sufferings lay with capitalism itself. For example, in a joint declaration of 1973, the bishops and superiors of religious orders in Brazil's Central Western Region published a document entitled "The Cry of the Churches," which concluded that "Capitalism must be defeated: it is the greatest evil, the accumulated sin, the rotten root, the tree that produces all these fruits which we know so well: poverty, hunger, disease, death."

In his studies on economic history and the sociology of religion, Max Weber had already drawn attention to the "profound aversion" of the Catholic ethic – of Lutheranism as well – to capitalism's cold and impersonal spirit. This "traditional" attitude is found in the positions of the most radical current of Brazilian Catholicism, with two important differences: (1) the moral protest against capitalism is supplemented by a modern social analysis of Marxist inspiration (dependency theory); (2) the poor are no longer perceived primarily as victims and objects for compassion and charity, but as the subjects of their own history, the actors in their own liberation.

Brazil's Landless Workers' Movement

Of all the structures tied to the church, few have incarnated this "preferential option for the poor" in as radical and consistent a fashion as the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), founded in 1975. The CPT is a vast network composed

of members of the clergy, especially from the religious orders but also priests and even some bishops, and lay people of various types, such as theologians, experts, Bible scholars, sociologists, and above all lay workers, often coming from the rural milieu. The CPT, then, has been a formidable school for peasant leaders. At first established in the North Region – Amazonia – and the Northeast Region, it has spread out little by little to the whole of the country, thanks to its direct connection to the CNBB (National Conference of Brazilian Bishops).

Many lay workers, but also some members of the clergy, of whom the best known is Father Josimo Tavares, the organizer of the so-called Parrot's Beak region, have paid with their lives for the CPT's active and intransigent commitment to the side of the rural workers struggling for their rights. The millenarianism of the CPT – but also of the CEBs and in a general way of liberationist Christianity – is expressed in the socioreligious utopia of the "Kingdom of God," not as a transcendent quality projected into another world, but as a new society here on earth, one based on love, justice, and freedom. However, contrary to traditional millenarian beliefs, this "Kingdom" is not conceived as imminent but as the result of a long march (*caminhada* is the Brazilian word) toward the Promised Land, following the biblical model of the Exodus. The present social struggles are theologically interpreted as stages that prefigure and herald the "Kingdom." This is a reading of the Bible that is innovative and charged with a social message, including the "illegal" occupations of idle land and the setting up of democratically self-managed camps.

An important stage in the movement's establishment was the regional (South) meeting in January 1984 in Cascavel (Parana state), the first to be organized by the members themselves and not by the CPT. Among the resolutions adopted were a declaration of autonomy in relation to the CPT as well as all other institutions, and the definition of the movement's objectives: agrarian reform and a new society that is "just and egalitarian, different from capitalism." The final document denounced the Land Statute granted by the military as capitalist, anti-popular, and favorable to the concentration of landed property.

The CPT supplied a decisive contribution to this process of self-organization, but tensions gradually appeared as the movement was freeing itself from its "advisors." Some members of the

clergy and some bishops had trouble accepting that the MST would escape entirely from their friendly solicitude and would not follow their reasonable advice. The question of "violence" crystallized the disagreements. For example, at the time of the occupation of the Annoni estate (Rio Grande do Sul), 49 progressive bishops – participating in the Sixth Interchurch Encounter of the CEBs in July 1986 – published a declaration which supported the occupation but laid great emphasis on its peaceful character and warned the movement, in veiled terms, against an "explosion of violence" that would have a "bloody repression" as its consequence. But, little by little, the organizers of the CPT and the majority of the bishops who were close to it resigned themselves to the MST's separation, and supplied consistent support while respecting its autonomy.

The MST was, therefore, constituted as a secular independent movement that encouraged the "illegal" occupation of idle land and the setting up of democratically self-managed camps, yet it had ties to religious organizations. Despite its secular and non-confessional character, it is no secret that the great majority of the active members and cadres of the MST are originally from the CPT and the CEBs. Some have retained ties with these structures, but all of them have borrowed their socioreligious culture and the deepest ethical motivation for their commitment from liberation Christianity.

The socioreligious utopia of liberation Christianity is present, implicitly or explicitly, in the numerous rituals that mark the struggles and the way of life of the MST's encampments: celebrations, processions, marches, songs, speeches. These rituals, organized by the cadres and members of the movement – of whom the majority are oriented toward liberation theology – are well received by the peasants, despite the fact that the majority of the population of the camps are closer to (Catholic) traditional popular religious practice – belief in the magical powers of the saints – than to the new theology. A growing minority of neo-Pentecostalist Protestants are also present, a little disconcerted by the simultaneously Catholic and politicized ambiance of the encampments, but drawn by the struggle for land. Two other minorities, less important, of European origin and present especially in the south of the country, are the "Romanized" Catholics (strictly obeying the doctrine of the Vatican) and the historical

Lutherans, who are often close to liberation theology.

But the “mystique” pervades the MST’s secular socioreligious culture in a more general fashion. The term is used by the members themselves to designate their moral intransigence, emotional commitment, devotion to the cause at the risk of their lives, and hope for radical social change. The movement’s mystique displays itself, writes João Pedro Stedile, one of the principal leaders of the MST, “in the symbols of our culture, in our values, in the conviction that you have to struggle,” and above all in the belief in “the possibility of a more just and fraternal society.”

This secular mystique and this lay millenarianism are present in the rituals, the texts, the speeches, and the education of the movement’s activists. They represent a sort of investment of the members’ “believing energy” in the MST’s revolutionary utopia. This stubborn faith in the coming of a new society “different from capitalism” – the lay equivalent of the “Kingdom” – does not prevent the MST from acting with a perfectly modern rationality, by setting itself immediate and concrete objectives, by negotiating with the authorities from a position of strength, and by organizing profitable and productive agricultural cooperatives. This successful synthesis of utopia and realism has undoubtedly contributed to making the MST not only the organized expression of the struggle of the poor of the countryside for radical agrarian reform, but also the central reference for all the forces of Brazil’s “civil society” – unions, churches, left parties, professional and academic associations – which struggle against neoliberalism.

SEE ALSO: Brazil, Workers and the Left: Partido dos Trabalhadores and Central Única dos Trabalhadores; Canudos, Religion and Rebellion in 19th-Century Brazil; Ejército de Liberación Nacional, Colombia; Gutiérrez, Gustavo (b. 1928); Latin America, Catholic Church and Liberation, 16th Century to Present; Movimento Sem Terra (MST); Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Gaiger, L. I. (1987) *Agentes religiosos e camponeses sem terra no sul do Brasil*. Petropolis: Vozes.
- Gorgen, F. S. A. (1959) *Os cristãos e a questao da terra*. São Paulo: Editora FTD.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1959) *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. New York: Norton Library.

Löwy, M. (1978) *Los Obispos Latinoamericanos entre Medellín y Puebla*. San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana.

Löwy, M. (1996) *The War of the Gods: Religion and Politics in Latin America*. London: Verso.

Stedile, J. P. (1977) *A Reforma Agraria e a Luta do MST*. Petropolis: Vozes.

Weber, M. (1967) “The Social Psychology of the World Religions” and “Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions.” In H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber*. London: Routledge.

Brazil, rebellions from independence to the republic (1700s–1889)

Diogo L. Pinheiro

The history of the process through which Brazil achieved independence is unique in the world. It is the only case of a colony becoming the *de facto* head of an empire. Independence was achieved almost bloodlessly in 1822, when the son of the Portuguese monarch was crowned Emperor of Brazil. Brazil became a republic in 1889.

Independence Movements in the Colonial Period

Brazil had been continuously colonized by the Portuguese since they first landed in the northeast in 1500. For a long time, the exploitation of fertile lands and the discovery of gold in the interior of the colony guaranteed prosperity for the metropole. For most of the seventeenth century, Brazil had a near-monopoly on the global production and export of sugar, and by the time sugar production spread to the Caribbean and elsewhere, gold was discovered in the interior. During the first three quarters of the eighteenth century, Brazil was the world’s largest producer of gold. Portugal was heavily dependent on its main colony: it is estimated that about 60 percent of Portugal’s exports during this period were re-exports of Brazilian produce. However, for all this bounty, Portugal was still a semi-peripheral nation far behind other empires such as the British, the French, and even the Spanish.

Portugal’s fragility is shown in its many treaties and trade relations during this period. In the

early stages of the War of Spanish Succession (1701–14) Portugal allied itself with France, assuming a submissive role in exchange for naval protection. However, given the ease with which the British could reach Portuguese shores, it soon began negotiations to switch sides. The result was the 1703 Treaty of Methuen, named after the lead English negotiator, Lord John Methuen (1650–1706). Besides affecting the War of Spanish Succession, this treaty had an immense impact on British–Portuguese trade relations, which in turn deeply affected Portugal’s relations with its colonies. The treaty granted Portuguese wines free access to the British market, while reducing tariffs of English cloths to zero. While this boosted the Portuguese wine industry, it also led to the virtual disappearance of Portuguese manufacturing, which was competing on unfavorable terms with English goods. This generated a long-term trade imbalance. Portugal sustained itself by re-exporting goods and gold from its colonies. This essentially turned the metropole into a mere intermediary. Such a system was only possible because of the extensive restrictions placed upon Brazil by the Portuguese. Brazil was only allowed to trade with Portugal and no manufacturing could take place within Brazilian territory. Even culture was restricted: censorship outlawed the importing of most books to Brazil, and universities and colleges were strictly forbidden.

However, the Brazilian elite still had close ties to the Portuguese. Brazilian colonization was slow and most of the land was given by the Portuguese crown to a select few *donatários*, which meant that a significant part of the landed aristocracy still strongly identified with the colonizers. Pro-imperialist sentiment extended throughout the colonial administration, where, unlike the rest of Latin America, it was common to see native-born persons holding important posts. These connections extended to trade relations, since the export-oriented Brazilian economy involved lasting ties with Portuguese merchants. Additionally, slow colonization that benefited those well connected with the Portuguese crown, combined with a large influx of African slaves to work the plantations, created a society sharply divided between landowners and slaves. Thus, many landowners actually desired the Portuguese presence as a way of maintaining order and suppressing any slave uprisings. Given the weakness of the metropole and all these close ties, it was relatively easy to circumvent the rules when necessary.

There were only four notable movements organized by Brazilians to gain independence, and all were of limited scope. Two of them, the 1794 *Conjuração Carioca* and the 1801 *Conspiração dos Suassunas*, were more like organized debating societies that shared some Enlightenment principles. They were repressed before they could even consider planning any sort of concrete action. The Carioca movement was centered on a literary debating society that met regularly in Rio de Janeiro. This society brought together intellectuals who would discuss works by progressive writers. In 1794 they were prosecuted for possessing books outlawed by the authorities. Most of the society’s members were tried for conspiracy, but due to the lack of evidence the charges were dropped. The 1801 conspiracy was similar: a secret society dedicated to discussing the principles of the French Revolution was unsuccessfully prosecuted by the crown. The two other movements, the *Inconfidência Mineira* of 1789 and the *Conjuração Baiana* of 1798, were far more significant.

Inconfidência Mineira

In the first quarter of the eighteenth century the captaincy of Minas Gerais experienced what was to that point the greatest gold rush in the Western hemisphere. By 1711 that gold rush led to the town of Vila Rica (modern Ouro Preto) being given the status of city, and, soon afterwards, capital of Minas Gerais. It soon became the largest city in the Americas, attracting thousands with the promise of a golden fortune. The region became the largest producer of gold in the world, helping Portugal fulfill its obligations with its trade partners. However, by the middle of the century the gold began to give out, and soon the local economy started to shift to a more self-reliant mix of agriculture and export-led mining. Portuguese reaction to the disappearance of such an important source of income was the imposition of even stricter and more oppressive regulations. Besides the already existing prohibitions on manufacturing, starting in 1785 even the production of items handcrafted through the putting-out system was outlawed, with the prices of similar goods imported from Portugal substantially increased. Additionally, the existing tax codes disregarded the actual gold production of the captaincy, becoming more problematic as production slowed

down. The Portuguese crown was entitled to a fifth of the gold extracted from Minas Gerais, but starting in 1750 a new law was passed requiring gold from the captaincy of not less than 1,500 kilograms, and entitling the crown to raise by force more gold to meet this quota. To begin with this was not problematic, but as time went on Minas Gerais had a harder time fulfilling the quota, and in 1789 the dreaded *Derrama*, as the collection of extra gold was called, was announced. This provided the background and the motivation for revolt in the region.

The evolution of local elites in Ouro Preto was such that, with fortunes accumulated throughout the century, a great many local families were able to send their sons to universities abroad, especially the Universidade de Coimbra. There, these men were exposed to the ideals of the Enlightenment and the American Revolution, and later brought them home to Brazil. It was this mixture of youthful idealism and economic desperation among debt-ridden families that led to the creation of the Inconfidência Mineira. In December 1788 renowned poets like Tomás Antônio Gonzaga (1744–1810), powerful landlords, clergymen like Padre Rolim (1747–1835), and idealists like Joaquim José da Silva Xavier (1746–92) began a series of meetings with the intent of rebelling against colonialism and the heavy taxes placed upon them. This conspiracy went beyond those outlined previously in that they were already deep into the logistical planning of their actions when they were discovered and arrested. In 1789 Joaquim Silvério dos Reis (1756–1819), one of the conspirators, denounced the movement to the crown in exchange for cancellation of his tax debts. All the conspirators were arrested, and the revolt, which was supposed to take place on the day of the *Derrama*, was aborted. All the “Inconfidentes” were sentenced to death, but, with one exception, all had their sentences converted to exile or imprisonment. The only one to be hanged was Tiradentes, the sole conspirator of modest means and poor background. He was killed on April 21, 1792, in Rio de Janeiro. He is to this day celebrated as a national hero, and the anniversary of his death is a national holiday.

Conjuração Baiana

If the Inconfidência Mineira was made up mostly of oligarchs in debt, the Conjuração Baiana, which took place in 1798, was organized by the

poor urban sectors of the former colonial capital of Salvador, Bahia. Also known as the *Revolta dos Alfaiates*, its members included freed slaves, tailors (hence the name “Alfaiates”), and soldiers and low-ranking officers. Once more the backdrop to the conspiracy was the severe economic crisis of the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The crisis was particularly acute in the Bahia captaincy, given its steady decline in importance within the colony. Once the local seat of power, the most populated and richest city in the colony, its sharp decline can be attributed to a drop in sugar production. In 1763 the colonial capital was transferred to Rio de Janeiro, the main port for the southeast region and its gold and agricultural production. This combination of local decline and general crisis had a severe impact on Salvador, as shortages of goods and foodstuffs led to a series of riots in 1797 and 1798.

Things were further exacerbated by news of the planned revolt in Minas and the American and French revolutions. Many underground organizations were formed, among them the *Academia dos Renascidos*. This was a literary society that soon broadened its discussions to encompass the social and political situation of the region. As the situation deteriorated, it started to go beyond the discussion of philosophy and literature and into the realm of concrete political action. It had several goals, most of which were closely tied to the ideals of the international revolutions. Besides the independence of the Bahia captaincy, it supported the abolition of slavery and changes in the public administration system, so that merit played a greater role than personal connections and political patronage. The members of this association, however, made the same mistake as several other insurgent movements in Brazil: they underestimated the state’s repressive apparatus and overestimated popular support. Underground rebellious ideals started to appear in pamphlets and other literature distributed in front of churches and busy places. Most pamphlets contained texts by Luiz Gonzaga das Virgens (ca. 1761–99) and Cipriano Barata (1762–1838). Such actions were swiftly and brutally repressed, and the movement was soon dismantled. Through torture and intimidation the local government was able to apprehend most group members. As in Minas Gerais, punishment for this “act of sedition” was uneven: poorer members were condemned to death, while those with ties to the ruling oligarchy were either

exiled or received shorter prison sentences. The crown was particularly brutal to mulattoes and blacks, as it feared a revolution similar to that which had taken place in Haiti. Luiz Gonzaga das Virgens and three others were hanged and their bodies left on display. Several others were publicly flogged and imprisoned for long terms. Cipriano Barata and other members of the conspiracy with close ties to the powerful received sentences that ranged from six months to a few years.

This was the last meaningful resistance to Portuguese rule in the colonial period. A few years afterwards, circumstances affecting the balance of power in Europe changed the relationship between colony and colonizer, setting in motion a series of events that would eventually lead to a unique independence, obtained not on the battlefield, but around the bargaining table.

United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarve (1808–1822)

If, internally, there was little explicit resistance to Portuguese rule, international conflicts, starting with the French Revolution, eventually put Brazil on the path to independence. The French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802) set the European continent on fire, weakening the colonial powers so that they failed to repress several independence movements in the New World. France itself was unable to hold on to Haiti and Louisiana. Even though Portugal was a member of the First Coalition to fight alongside the royalists in France, it soon withdrew from the conflict, remaining neutral for over a decade.

The French Revolutionary Wars were soon followed by the Napoleonic Wars (1803–15), and this time Portugal would eventually get dragged into the conflict, even though it tried to remain neutral for as long as possible. The recrudescence of British and French hostilities eventually presented a dilemma to the Portuguese. Soon the French were allied to or controlled most of Europe, while the British unequivocally ruled the seas, particularly after their overwhelming victory at Trafalgar. At first, Portugal tried to play a balancing act, adopting weak, poorly implemented anti-British measures that would not anger its longtime ally and main trading partner, nor the French and its Spanish allies. For a while the strategy worked, especially as France had its hands full with Russia and Prussia. But

with the Berlin and Milan decrees, Napoleon forbade his allies from trading with the British. Soon the Americans followed suit and embargoed most trade with its former metropole. With the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807, Prussia and Russia joined France in the blockade against Britain. With the Spanish allied with Napoleon, only Portugal and a handful of smaller states were still openly trading with England. This made it impossible for Portugal to maintain its neutrality. Napoleon threatened to invade Portugal, while England threatened to destroy the Portuguese fleet and take over Brazil and other colonies. Whereas in the past the Prince Regent of Portugal, Dom João (1767–1826), had been able to stall negotiations on both sides, this time he was not able to do so. By the end of 1807, French and Spanish troops were marching towards Lisbon. On November 23, 1807, French troops crossed the border, and were only a few days from capturing the capital. Sensing imminent defeat in Europe, and desperate to maintain power over the colonies, Dom João decided to accept the British offer and move the court and the royal administration to Brazil, gaining British protection and leaving Portugal itself to the French.

In the week following the French invasion, over 10,000 Portuguese boarded ships to Brazil. They took with them the royal treasury, different libraries, and even a printing press. For the first time in history the former colony was now the head of the empire. While the provincial and local administrations remained virtually unchanged, the colonial administration was completely replaced by the institutions of the Portuguese state. More importantly, however, the change in Brazil's status within the kingdom meant that the oppressive restrictions it faced before were gone. Within days Brazilian ports were opened to trade with all friendly nations. A few months later, Dom João revoked the laws that banned manufacturing in the colony. Also revoked were the laws preventing the imports of books and printing presses. While this was initially deemed temporary, Brazil was officially raised to the condition of United Kingdom with Portugal in 1815. These changes would eventually lead to Brazilian independence, as local oligarchies would resist any attempt to reduce Brazil to its former colonial status.

For all the newfound freedom that Brazil enjoyed, the system also brought with it new

burdens. With Portugal under French occupation, Brazil had to sustain the courts and the crown mostly by itself, bearing a larger share of the tax burden. Some of the new conditions imposed by the English on the Portuguese clearly contradicted the interests of the Brazilian oligarchy. Most notably, the English were eager to suppress the slave trade, on which a large part of the local economy was based. Portuguese slave trade was to be restricted to the Southern hemisphere, and could only involve Portuguese territories. The British navy was even given permission to inspect any vessels suspected of carrying slaves illegally. Another major point of contention was the deployment of Portuguese troops in most major Brazilian towns. So while on one hand the Brazilian populace welcomed the easing of restrictions, on the other hand the administration of Brazil was now more “Portuguese” than ever.

Revolução Pernambucana (1817)

These tensions were particularly significant in the northeast region of Brazil, where the new restrictions on the slave trade and the increased presence of the Portuguese were felt more acutely. Not only was there increasing regional inequality, but now the weight and power of the central administration were more evident. Combined with a drought and increased export taxes to pay for the military campaign in the Cisplatine captaincy, these factors resulted in the *Revolução Pernambucana*, a revolution in the captaincy of Pernambuco. Recife, the provincial capital, was taken, and soon the revolt spread through the hinterlands. Pernambuco was proclaimed a republic, with a new “organic law” that was supposed to maintain vaguely stated goals of equality and religious tolerance. The unifying factor behind this uprising was dissatisfaction with the Portuguese, which was evident despite all the differences between the members of the movement. Even though it preached equality, it was mute about slavery, with a substantial portion of its leadership actively endorsing it. Additionally, no effort was made to alter the existing class structure. For all its internal differences, however, the movement was surprisingly organized. It sent representatives to meet several of the leaders of other colonies and even foreign governments. They were successful in obtaining the support of the governments of Paraíba and Rio Grande do Norte, neighboring

colonies facing the same problems. Despite this regional support the rebels were swiftly crushed by the increased Portuguese military in the colony. A few days after the uprising the Portuguese fleet initiated a blockade of Recife, and a few days later troops landed in Alagoas. The internal differences between the rebels proved to be significant. They failed to mount a unified resistance and in less than two months the entire region was back under Portuguese control. If on one hand the revolution fell short of its stated goals and failed to present a lasting resistance to the empire, on the other hand it nurtured a new generation of leaders who wanted an emancipated Northeast – leaders like Frei Caneca, who would play a central role in the Confederation of the Equator in 1824. (The Northeast would become the focus for most of the rebellions and revolts after the 1822 independence.) The *Revolução Pernambucana* was the only significant revolt during the time Brazil was raised to equal status with Portugal.

Independence and the Reign of Dom Pedro I (1822–1831)

While there had been some dissatisfaction with the Portuguese court in Rio, especially in the Northeast, what really concerned many Brazilians was a reversal in its equal status with Portugal (especially after Portugal’s own liberation) – a reversal desired by a significant portion of the Portuguese, especially within merchant circles. The French invasion created a vacuum in the upper levels of Portuguese society. The court was in Brazil and the British controlled the military stationed in Europe, as well as trade with the colonies. Discontent was at an all-time high in the former metropole, and many saw the solution to these problems in reinstating Brazil’s colonial status. This discontentment led to the events of 1820–1 in Portugal, which in turn sped up the process of independence. The bourgeoisie and the military, unhappy with the situation and the budget problems which left civil servants and the army stationed in Europe unpaid for long periods. Towards the end of 1820, first in Oporto and then in Lisbon, a liberal revolt broke out. It was liberal because many of its objectives related to abolishing the absolutist state, but at the same time it intended to restore Brazil as a colony and reestablish Portugal as the intermediary in the English trade. A provisory

Junta was established, and it called for an assembly – the Cortes Gerais Extraordinárias e Constituintes – to be created and to formulate the new constitution for the kingdom. In the first few months of 1821 the Portuguese military stationed in Brazil rose up in support of the revolt. The Junta established that the members of the Cortes were to be indirectly elected – one deputy for every 30,000 free citizens. Facing his own military, Dom João had no choice but to acquiesce to the creation of this new assembly. If the goal of the Cortes was to diminish the power of the king and change the absolutist state, it also had an important side-effect. Given the distribution of seats in this assembly, Brazil would elect fewer than 80 of the over 200 deputies. This definitely swung the pendulum of power towards the Portuguese and their interests.

The Cortes began the process of returning Brazil to its colonial status by ordering the return of Dom João to Europe. Faced with the risk of losing territories in Europe, he acquiesced and returned on April 6, 1821. Dom Pedro became Prince Regent of Brazil in his place, and it became clear to the Brazilian oligarchies that they would have to take the Cortes seriously if they wanted to retain the privileges the status of United Kingdom had granted them. As such, political debate in the empire became polarized between the Brazilian and Portuguese factions. The differences between the factions centered on the relationship between the two nations, and not so much on ideological grounds (with a few radical liberals on both sides, including Cipriano Barata, one of the members of the *Conjuração Bahiana*). The move towards independence would gain momentum as the Portuguese deputies pushed ahead with their agenda, taking advantage of the lack of Brazilian representatives in the first few months of the Cortes. The assembly had met for the first time in January 1821, and ordered the return of Dom João to Portugal by April of that same year, but elections for Brazilian representatives were only held from May through September. Those elected would only begin arriving in Lisbon by late August, with several only reaching Lisbon later still. In the meantime the Portuguese representatives decided in April that provincial governments in Brazil should report directly to Lisbon instead of Rio. In September they ordered that all imperial institutions that had remained in Rio were to be dismantled, and in October Dom Pedro was

ordered to return to Europe. These decrees signaled the futility of trying to retain Brazilian autonomy via the Cortes. Some Brazilian deputies fled Lisbon, and Dom Pedro himself was determined to circumvent some of these decrees.

Full independence, however, was something that many were not ready to fight for. Dom Pedro announced on January 9, 1822 that he would remain in Brazil, a date that became known as the *Dia do Fico*. Instead of completely repealing the Cortes, Dom Pedro and his ministers decided in May that, even though they recognized the authority of the assembly, all decisions that involved Brazil should be approved by the prince. This same sort of ambiguity was evident when members of the military refused to recognize his authority and, instead of being repressed or expelled, they were simply reassigned to the Northeast. It should not be forgotten that Dom Pedro, for all his defiance of the Cortes, was the next in line in succession to the Portuguese throne: given his position in Brazil, regardless of what happened the throne of both nations would surely remain in the hands of the Bragança family. So instead of moving for separation from Portugal, the struggle was to establish institutions to govern the nation locally, albeit still maintaining its ties to the former metropole. A local constituent assembly and a ministry headed by a Brazilian-born politician were the first steps in that direction. These measures were more of a reaction to the deeds of the Cortes, and only a few of the more radical Brazilians would support any change to the existing structure of power within the territories, so that institutions such as the monarchy were secure.

However, in September 1822 Dom Pedro received a series of decrees charging his ministers and other members of his government with treason, revoking all his own decrees and laws, and once more demanding his return to Portugal. On September 7, 1822 Brazilian independence was proclaimed. The Southeast region at this stage was *de facto* independent, as all troops stationed there were loyal to Dom Pedro. He had at his disposal a number of loyal troops, the henchmen from several landlords, and a navy assembled by the British Lord Cochrane. The only remaining forces that resisted independence were those loyal to the Portuguese in the Northeast, especially Bahia. Despite a few minor scuffles and a short-lived siege of

Salvador, by mid-1823 most Portuguese troops had left the former colony. The bargaining table was where independence was won. The deal between Portugal and Brazil that led to independence was brokered by England. Brazil paid compensation to its former metropole and agreed not to support the independence of other parts of the empire. By 1825 Brazil was widely recognized as an independent nation, including by Portugal. Informal recognition had come much earlier.

De jure independence, however, brought very limited changes to Brazil. Its position in the international division of labor was the same, as was its trade relation to England. Internally, the social structure was left virtually intact. Despite pressures by the English to force the abolition of slavery, all they got was a mild effort to curtail the slave trade. Even the local administration was mostly left in the same hands as before. An assembly to craft a new constitution was called by Dom Pedro, but was eventually dissolved for its reluctance to accept a system in which the emperor had too much power. The result was a constitution promulgated in 1824 by the emperor, which established Catholicism as the official religion of the nation and granted no rights to slaves. A house of representatives and a senate were established, but their elections were indirect and limited to white male landowners, and even then the monarch retained significant power, as the provinces were only allowed to elect lists of possible senators, from which the executive would choose the elected. Besides a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary, the constitution also created a fourth power, the moderating power, which was an attribute exclusively of the emperor, who would have the power of “moderating” disagreements between the other three powers, *de facto* giving the emperor veto power over every decision made. It is in this context of continuity that conflicts and civil strife took place.

Confederação do Equador (1824)

The events that took place in 1817 in Pernambuco were swiftly repressed, but their underlying motivation remained. Hostility to the centralized bureaucracy, its taxes and its Portuguese ties, never really went away. If anything, it only grew stronger when independence brought little change. From a regional standpoint, there was

little difference between being subjugated to the whims of the Portuguese crown or to those of the Brazilian crown in Rio de Janeiro, led by the same people as before. The return of Frei Caneca and Cipriano Barata to the region, coupled with the subsequent arrest of the latter, stirred up anti-absolutist feeling. Newspapers in the major cities of the region ran lengthy attacks on the established authority. Finally, with the arrest of Barata and the appointment of a new provincial governor loyal to Dom Pedro, tensions boiled over. On July 2, 1824 the former governor of Pernambuco, Manuel de Carvalho, proclaimed regional independence and the creation of the Confederação do Equador (Confederacy of the Equator).

The Confederacy of the Equator included the provinces of Rio Grande do Norte, Ceará, and Paraíba, besides Pernambuco. Unlike the Revolução Pernambucana this was mostly an urban and popular upheaval and had a distinct ideological component. Representatives were sent to the US to try to gather support against European intervention in the continent. However, the British and Portuguese were still immensely influential and the appeal to the US failed. The uprising had a very distinct liberal component: defense of the implementation of a federalist republic in the region, with direct elections. Thus, some of the rural elite decided to support the federal government, fearing that the institution of slavery might be at risk. The confederation was unable to form a solid military defense, although the Brazilian government itself did not have much military strength and had once again to count on the paid services of Lord Cochrane and his forces. By September 1824 Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, and Paraíba were back in the hands of the federal government, with Ceará following in November. The leaders of the democratic uprisings were imprisoned and executed, despite appeals even by loyal troops. Frei Caneca, for example, had to be shot when his executioner refused to carry out his hanging.

If the confederation was a failure because it lacked the means to achieve its ambitious goals, it was nevertheless a further indication of the deteriorating situation in the Brazilian Northeast and the increasing regional inequality that still plagues Brazil. The 1824 uprising would not be the last one in the region, which would see many revolts even after the abdication of Dom Pedro I.

Regency and Reign of Dom Pedro II (1831–1889)

Brazil's independence was marked by a great deal of continuity, so much so that Dom Pedro I would simultaneously rule both Portugal and Brazil for a short period in the 1820s, before abdicating the Portuguese throne in favor of his daughter. His decision to maintain so many Portuguese in influential positions alienated parts of the Brazilian population. His popularity with the Brazilians took a further dent when he began to get involved with the Portuguese succession, trying to prevent his brother Miguel from claiming the throne. Uruguayan independence after the Cisplatine war further divided the polity, with Brazilian liberals and Portuguese conservatives bitterly opposing each other. With the dissolution of his Cabinet in 1830, and with pressures from all sides on who to select for the new one, tensions reached an all-time high, culminating in the *Noite das Garrafadas* on March 13, 1831, when a generalized brawl broke out between members of the “Brazilian” and “Portuguese” parties. Soon high-ranking Brazilian military commanders joined the revolt against Pedro I. On April 7, 1831 Dom Pedro renounced the Brazilian crown in favor of his five-year-old son, also named Pedro.

Given his age, young Pedro could not be crowned as the new emperor. Instead, for the next decade, Brazil was ruled by interim governments. After defeating their common foe, Brazilians became divided between moderates and radicals. As a compromise, the power of the national executive was curtailed for the specific period of the regency. Greater power was granted to the provinces, and the so-called moderating power, which made the legislature and judiciary subordinate to the head of the executive, was diluted, at least until a new emperor was crowned. This greater decentralization and reduction of central state power led to some of the bloodiest internal conflicts in Brazil. The regency lacked the legitimacy of an emperor, while the greater power afforded to the provincial governments increased local tensions as different factions started fighting for regional supremacy. Four notable revolts marked the regency period. They all had a distinct separatist goal, caused by dissatisfaction with a central government that was at its weakest.

In 1840, after nearly a decade of crisis and in-fighting, Pedro, now only 14 years old, was crowned, becoming Emperor Dom Pedro II of Brazil. This was the result of internal pressures that saw the return of an emperor as head of the executive as a way of reunifying the nation.

The Cabanagem (1835–1840)

The Cabanagem took place in the scarcely populated province of the Grão Pará, the modern-day state of Pará. It was the result of local tensions over the provincial presidency. A number of groups had fought aggressively against the Portuguese and other foreigners. Once independence was achieved, however, the leaders of these groups saw themselves isolated from the positions of power in the region. Among them were members of the military, including João Batista Gonçalves Campos (1782–1834), who led an unsuccessful revolt among the military in 1831. The provincial government appointed by the regents tried vicious repression, which in turn led to a popular revolt. In 1835 open fighting broke out as the rebels assaulted and took over the provincial capital, Belém. Led by 21-year-old Eduardo Angelim (1814–82), the rebels – called *Cabanos*, in a reference to where they lived – were made up mostly of the poor and destitute of mixed heritage. It was a rebellion against foreign influence and in defense of Catholicism (part of the clergy had been persecuted by the former provincial government), Dom Pedro II, and nationalism. Despite the social origins of its members and its attacks on local oligarchies, the rebels had no interest in deep reforms or abolishing slavery. They themselves repressed slave uprisings while they controlled the local government.

The battles that ensued as the central government tried to regain control were bloody and vicious. Some historians estimate that as much as 40 percent of the provincial population died as a result of this fighting. Control of Belém alternated between rebels and troops before rebel forces were driven to the countryside after a naval blockade of the city. Fighting continued until 1840, after the rebels were granted amnesty in 1839. This sort of rebellion, which combined folk elements with a sort of radical Catholicism and defense of the monarchy, would happen again many times in the North and Northeast, the most notable example being the Canudos.

The Sabinada (1837–1838)

The Sabinada was a rebellion in Salvador, province of Bahia. Its name is derived from that of the leader of the rebellion, Francisco Sabino Vieira. Salvador had witnessed a few minor rebellions soon after the abdication of Pedro I, but in 1835 a full-blown movement emerged. As with the Cabanagem, the Sabinada was an ambiguous movement: it defended the monarchy and Pedro II, but despised the central government and what it saw as its excessive power over local affairs. On November 7, 1837 Sabino and others proclaimed the República Bahiense. This was in fact a reaction against a number of policies, including the military draft instituted in the province. The rebellion was fully supported by the military stationed in Salvador, and they were able to take over the city with relative ease. While this new republic broke with the regency and the provincial government, its goals were modest: a temporary government, and when Pedro II was crowned the rebels would rejoin the union. As was the case in several other revolts, there was little intention of promoting changes that altered the existing class structure in the region. What unified this broad class coalition was its distaste for the regency. The only significant change adopted was that Brazilian-born slaves who took up arms in the name of the new republic would be granted freedom.

While initially successful in unifying Salvador behind their cause, the rebels soon found themselves confined to that city. The Bahian hinterlands, dominated by an agrarian oligarchy that depended on the Southeastern market for its products, remained loyal to the federal government. Soon, Salvador was encircled by land and sea. In March 1838 the troops that had laid siege to the city marched in, crushing the rebellion. Its leaders were either executed or exiled, and the provincial government restored.

Balaiada (1838–1841)

More than the other revolts examined so far, the Balaiada was the result of tensions between local dominant elites. Maranhão, the province where the rebellion took place, was in transition during the 1830s. The production of cotton, which had been the main export of the region, was in severe crisis due to North American competition. In turn, an influx of people, including freed

slaves, had boosted cattle production. Each sector was linked to a different party, with the farmers siding with the conservatives and the cattle herders siding with the liberals. With the arrest of a popular liberal, and the subsequent attempt by troops loyal to the liberals to release him, open fighting broke out. What was initially a liberal movement soon became a widespread popular uprising against the provincial government, with the liberals losing control over their objectives. One of the leaders of the rebellion, Manuel Francisco dos Anjos Ferreira, was a maker of *balaios* (baskets), hence the name of this movement.

As the liberals lost control over the rebels, it became mostly a popular affair, with over three thousand freed or escaped slaves participating on the side of the *Balaios*. They were able to move swiftly through the hinterlands, capturing major cities along the way. The movement became a revolt against the local elites and the regency, while at the same time the rebels defended the monarchy and Pedro II. As they began to disrupt the business of the local oligarchies, the latter requested the help of the central government, which dispatched Colonel Luís Alves de Lima e Silva (1803–80). Lima e Silva used a two-pronged approach to disband the rebels: on one hand he offered amnesty to those who surrendered and volunteered to help fight the insurgency, while on the other hand he ruthlessly pursued rebels throughout the region. His success earned him the title of Baron of Caxias (a town in the Maranhão hinterlands) and the nickname of “the pacifier.” From this point on he would become a key figure in Brazilian history, leading the repression of several regional uprisings. His strategy of creating internal divisions among the rebels soon proved very effective, and by 1841 they were crushed, often having to fight their old comrades.

Guerra dos Farrapos (1835–1845)

The longest lasting and perhaps most significant conflict of the regency was the Guerra dos Farrapos, which occurred in the extreme south and began in the province of São Pedro do Rio Grande do Sul. The causes of this conflict were essentially economic and in many ways a result of Uruguayan independence years earlier. Rio Grande do Sul’s economy was mostly based on the production of *charque* (salt-cured meat) for



This painting depicts a cavalry charge during the Guerra dos Farrapos (War of the Farrapos) in 1835. The war followed a republican uprising in Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina in southern Brazil over perceived economic inequalities. The state of Rio Grande do Sul consistently played a secondary role in Brazilian politics; as a result, both Uruguay and Argentina were given free access to its markets, while gauchos (residents of the region) were forced to pay high tariffs on products normally produced inside Brazil. (Museu Julio de Castilhos)

consumption in the internal market. Most lands, especially those close to the Uruguayan border, were used for raising cattle. With Uruguayan independence, competition from foreign producers for the Brazilian market increased, and with a favorable exchange rate, Uruguayan and Argentinean producers were able to sell at cheaper prices than Brazilians. Furthermore, as the Brazilian government instituted a new tax on live cattle crossing the border, many farmers who owned land in Uruguay saw themselves with extra costs. Landowners and the urban middle classes were increasingly dissatisfied with the federal government, whom they saw as extracting too much in taxes for too little in return. As tensions increased, the province was divided between the conservatives, sometimes called *caramuru*, who were loyal to the federal government, and the liberals.

On September 20, 1835 the liberals rose up against the provincial government and federal authorities, arresting members of the Conservative Party and taking over most of the state. A conservative reaction expelled the rebels from the provincial capital, and they established their new basis of operations in the town of Piratini. On September 11, 1836 the rebels proclaimed the establishment of the Rio-Grandense Republic, which the conservatives derogatorily called the

Piratini Republic, and its members *farrapos*, those with torn clothes. It is unclear if the objective of the rebels was an outright permanent secession from the Union. All other provinces were called to join them in establishing a new union with a new federative pact. The rebels controlled a substantial part of the province. Regional landowners, who mostly sided with the rebels, usually had military experience dating from the wars for the control of the former Cisplatine region, and had at their disposal horses and resources to establish a powerful military, one that at least initially faced little resistance from federal troops. With the leadership of Bento Gonçalves (1788–1847) and the Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–82) the rebels were able to push north, conquering part of the Santa Catarina province and creating the República Juliana. During the conflicts the rebels were able to sustain themselves by exporting *charque* through Uruguay.

The federal government saw no choice but to accept some of the demands of the insurgents. In 1840 a new import tax on *charque* was created. But even after the introduction of these measures and the crowning of Pedro II the fighting continued. It was Lima e Silva, now Baron of Caxias, who would restore peace to the region. Assigned to the conflict in 1842, he adopted the same strategy as before, offering amnesty and concessions to those who surrendered, while pursuing victory on the battlefield. Peace was finally achieved in 1845 after conciliatory measures were taken by the federal government. Those who fought on the Farrapos side were integrated into the Brazilian military at the same rank they obtained with the rebels, the federal government absorbed the debts of the Juliana republic, and the rebel leadership was given unconditional amnesty. The only ones not to receive favorable terms were the former slaves who fought on the rebel side, as they were either forced into exile or resold as slaves.

Revoltas Liberais (1842)

The accession of Pedro II to power in 1840 was supposed to bring greater stability to the nation, but the initial years of his reign proved to be troublesome. The first of the revolts the young king would face were the liberal revolts of 1842. The origin of this conflict was political: the king's Cabinet was dominated by the conservatives,

who promulgated a series of decrees further concentrating power in the hands of the central government. More importantly, the Cabinet recommended the dissolution of the legislature, which the king had the power to do and which he yielded. Liberals in both São Paulo and Minas Gerais rose up in response. Led by Rafael Tobias de Aguiar (1795–1857) in São Paulo, and by José Feliciano Pinto Coelho da Cunha (1802–69) in Minas, the rebels assembled a small force in order to “defend the constitution and the Emperor” and remove the conservatives from the Cabinet. Once again, Lima e Silva was dispatched to repress the rebels, who were swiftly defeated. Small in scope and effect, this revolt is important because of where it took place and the involvement of key political figures. Despite the initial harsh punishment of the rebels, they were offered amnesty in 1844, when a new Cabinet was assembled, this time with greater participation of the liberal party.

Revolta Praieira (1848–1850)

The Revolta Praieira was the last significant revolt of Pedro II’s reign. It took place in Pernambuco in 1848 and was perhaps the most ideologically charged revolt of the period. Just as Europe was being swept by revolutions, socialist ideals inspired many in the province. It is important to note, however, that the socialism they defended was not that of Marx, but that of Owen and Fourier. As we have already seen, Pernambuco saw the birth of several other revolts. By the late 1840s discontentment was increasing as the sugar industry was in crisis. The final straw that led to the mobilization and uprising of the rebels was the destitution of a popular liberal provincial president, Antônio Pinto Chichorro da Gama (1800–87), and the selection of a conservative to take his place. Da Gama had been an adversary of the large landowners of the region, trying to reduce their power and influence on politics. With him out of power, the radical sectors of the Liberal Party decided to organize revolution. On November 7, 1848 troops led by General José Inácio de Abreu e Lima (1794–1869) removed the newly appointed conservative from power. On January 1, 1849 the rebels published their manifesto, in which they defended universal suffrage, freedom of the press, the expulsion of the Portuguese and the nationalization of retail commerce, the abolition

of the moderating power, the end of the military draft, and several other measures. For all its socialist inspiration it said very little about property or redistribution of wealth, which is unsurprising given the number of the wealthy who adhered to the movement.

The rebels were able to remove the unwanted appointee from power, but had significantly less success militarily. In February 1849 an attempt to conquer the provincial capital, Recife, was repelled by loyal troops. Soon, federal troops defeated the rebels. As before, punishment for the insurgents was determined by class and wealth. The most powerful of the rebels were granted amnesty and returned to their old posts in the provincial administration, while the poorest were incarcerated, forcibly drafted into the military, or even executed. The end of the revolt marked a new period of calm in the nation, which would only be disturbed again in the proclamation of the republic.

Proclamation of the Republic (1889)

Brazil became a republic on November 15, 1889, after a military coup removed Pedro II from power. The demise of the monarchy was caused by tensions between the monarch and three central social institutions of the period: slavery, the military, and the church. Additionally, the crisis and debt that followed Brazilian involvement in the War of the Triple Alliance also generated enough popular discontent, especially in the coffee-growing provinces of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, to boost the popularity of republican movements.

Under the monarchy there was no separation of church and state. The monarch was also the head of the Catholic Church in Brazil. If on one hand this increased the influence of the clergy over the state, on the other hand the reverse was also true, and the king was in a position to interfere with papal decrees. The source of the tensions between monarchy and church was Pope Pius IX’s encyclical and his commands to ban or excommunicate freemasons. Dom Pedro II used the powers granted to him by the constitution to bar bishops from doing so, and ordered the arrest of the clerics who decided to follow through on Pius IX’s orders. As the result, Pedro II lost the support of the church in Brazil.

The military, which had lost influence during the middle of the century, was once again highly

influential after the War of the Triple Alliance. However, the debt accrued from the war led to a virtual freeze in salaries, promotions, and so forth, leading to greater military discontentment, and the government ruled that members of the military had to ask for permission before speaking publicly about politics. The ensuing crisis led to the resignation of the minister of war, and even though the new law was repealed, dissatisfaction with the monarchy remained.

Additionally, Brazil had been slowly moving towards the abolition of slavery. The British had severely limited the traffic of slaves from Africa to Brazil. Slaves who fought in the War of the Triple Alliance were granted freedom, and from 1871 onwards newborns were free. This gradual shift towards abolition culminated in the Golden Law of 1888, which freed all slaves. The abolition of slavery meant that the last pillar of support for the monarchy – large landowners who still depended on slave labor – also became dissatisfied.

In the backdrop to these changes was the growing influence of republican ideas. In 1873 the Partido Republicano Paulista was formed. Republicanism was especially influential in the provinces of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul, who felt that for all their size and influence they were underrepresented in the Cabinet and Parliament. Their original basis of support was the coffee-growing sector, which was export-oriented and felt unsupported by the central government. As it gained adherents from the military and from the growing urban middle classes it became more vocal in its opposition to Pedro II. As these economic, political, and religious crises deepened, the republicans found themselves in a position to claim power. While Pedro II was ill and not very active in political circles, the military, led by Deodoro da Fonseca (1827–92), proclaimed the republic in a bloodless coup on November 15, 1889. Two days later, Pedro II left the country. His government was the last monarchy to exist on the American continent, and its end marked the beginning of a new period in Brazilian history, that of the Old Republic, dominated by oligarchs in Minas Gerais and São Paulo.

SEE ALSO: Canudos, Religion and Rebellion in 19th-Century Brazil; Cuba, Struggle for Independence from Spain, 1868–1898; Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians; Imperialism

and Capitalist Development; Imperialism, Historical Evolution; Imperialism, Modernization to Globalization; Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Owen, Robert (1771–1858)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bethell, L. (Ed.) (1984) *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, Vols. 3 and 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bethell, L. (Ed.) (1989) *Brazil: Empire and Republic, 1822–1930*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Furtado, C. (1970) *Economic Development of Latin America: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Cuban Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Maxwell, K. R. (1973) *Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1750–1808*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wilcken, P. (2004) *Empire Adrift: The Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1821*. London: Bloomsbury.

Brazil, workers, and the left: Partido dos Trabalhadores and Central Única dos Trabalhadores

Diogo L. Pinheiro

The Brazilian Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party), or PT, and the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Unique Workers Center), or CUT, are the two most significant organizations to have emerged from the new Brazilian left that appeared during the late 1970s. The PT was founded in São Paulo in 1980 by a group of union leaders, progressive sectors of the Catholic Church, and left-wing intellectuals. It has become Latin America's largest workers party. It has controlled the Brazilian presidency since 2002 when Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, one of the founders of the party and its first leader, was elected. The PT has close ties to the CUT, Latin America's largest association of unions, which was founded in 1983. Together, they have helped shape the history of left-wing policies and labor relations in Brazil.

The Brazilian Left Before the PT

The creation of the PT marked a significant break with Brazil's two historical political



In March 1984, Luiz Inácio da Silva (Lula) addresses a trade union rally in São Bernardo do Campo, São Paulo, Brazil. In 1983 Lula was a founding member of the independent Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), and in 1984 he helped build the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT/Workers' Party), which demanded a democratically elected government. On October 27, 2002, Lula was elected president of Brazil. (© Alain Keler/Sygma/CORBIS)

traditions associated with the working class, the *Trabalhismo* and the Brazilian communist parties. *Trabalhismo* was associated with Getúlio Vargas and his party, the populist Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro. Vargas ruled Brazil twice, in 1930–45 as a dictator, and in 1950–4 as a democratically elected president. The PTB also held the presidency from 1961 to 1964 with João Goulart, who was deposed by a military coup. *Trabalhismo* left two important legacies for left-wing organizations in Brazil: a set of labor laws that remained virtually unaltered for decades and a mode of party organization centered on charismatic leaders and a top-down decision-making structure. Labor relations in Brazil are regulated to this day by the Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (Consolidated Labor Laws), promulgated by Vargas in 1943. The CLT provided certain classes of urban workers with fundamental basic rights, such as an eight-hour workday, maternity leave, paid vacations, and so on. More importantly, it also strictly regulated unions. Unions were organized from the top-down as a way of maintaining social order. Each occupational category was to be represented by a state-recognized union, which would have a legal monopoly over that category. In addition, the government was given the right to regulate these unions directly, and could legally replace union leaders with government workers. Besides this direct control, labor union leaders were also coopted through other means, such as the

possibility of working in the labor courts or the administration of the new social security agencies. These forms of cooptation also played a key role in the formation of the PTB. From 1945 through 1964 the members of that party used the legacy of Vargas as the “father of the poor” to gain the support of the urban working classes, which were those who benefited the most from the CLT. As the dictatorship that started in 1964 eased its suppression of political freedoms and political parties were once again formed, Leonel Brizola, a political heir to Vargas, organized the Partido Democrático Trabalhista on the same model as the PTB, with a charismatic leader controlling virtually the entire party. Despite the greater influence of European-style social democratic ideas, the party was organized in a top-down fashion.

The Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party) was one of the first to be created in Latin America, in 1919. For many decades it concentrated most Brazilian left-wing groups. It competed with the PTB for working-class support. Except for brief periods, such as in the mid-1940s, the PCB had to act clandestinely for most of its history. This, coupled with a close association with the Comintern, led the PCB to be organized in a strict centralized fashion. And even though divergences, such as those generated by the Sino-Soviet split, led to several party divisions, the new parties and groups that formed maintained the same model of what was called “democratic centralism,” or the strict enforcement of party discipline. Besides having similar centralized, top-down, decision-making structures, both the PCB and the PTB emphasized the necessity of a national alliance between the working class and the national bourgeoisie (though their methods and ultimate objectives were very different). The PCB believed that this alliance was important, as it was the only way of ridding the nation of imperialistic exploitation, which was necessary for the full development of Brazilian capitalism and subsequent communism. As such, it opposed general strikes and other tactics that might compromise the possibility of such an alliance. It was because of the dissatisfaction of workers with these tactics that the PT would emerge.

The PT was created by a group of labor unionists, left-wing intellectuals (many of them Trotskyites) and liberation theologians interested in giving a greater voice to social movements, rank

and file union members, and workers who were seen as left out of decision-making in other left-wing parties. It emerged at a specific point in time as a new generation of leaders assumed control of the unions that had been previously purged by the 1964 dictatorship. Economic and political conditions in the late 1970s created the opportunity for these leaders to organize themselves in a new party, one which was supposed to fight for working-class interests as ends in themselves, not as the means of achieving social harmony.

Military Dictatorship

In 1964 PTB's João Goulart was ousted by a military coup. His government had been marked by extensive in-fighting among the left and was strongly rejected by the conservative sector of society, who were fearful of proposed policies such as land reform. The new military government made full use of the provisions in the CLT that allowed it to intervene directly in established unions. Over 500 elected union leaders were replaced with persons selected by the military. Furthermore, the government relegated unions to a more administrative role, managing things such as dental plans and healthcare instead of engaging in negotiations on behalf of those they were supposed to represent. The dictatorship also established a number of economic policies that would reduce the purchasing power of the minimum wage by about half between 1964 and the late 1970s. One of the main tenets of the economic policy of the dictatorship was the use of wage controls to reduce industry costs to keep inflation low. Thus, working-class wages declined significantly while Brazil experienced its so-called economic miracle in 1967–73, a period in which gross domestic product grew at about 10 percent a year. Part of this loss of purchasing power came from the establishment of wage indexation. Wages were tied to inflation, but since wage adjustments were made only from time to time, real wages were always trying to catch up with the inflation of the previous period. It was also shown later on that the government actually manipulated inflation data in order to reduce real wages.

These policies created a vacuum in the leadership of the labor unions at precisely the time when pressure for better wages provided a rallying cry for the working class. Together, these two factors generated space within the

labor movement for new figures such as Lula. Lula's personal history is representative of this sort of trajectory. Born in 1945 in the town of Garanhuns in the poor state of Pernambuco, he was the seventh of eight children. His family moved to São Paulo when he was seven, a journey made in the back of an open truck. He started working in menial jobs at the age of 12, and a few years later he became a lathe operator. Uninterested in politics, his first experience in a leadership role in a union came in 1969 when his brother, José Ferreira da Silva, asked Lula to be a part of his slate in the union elections. Elected, he became more active within the union, but still refused to get more involved in politics. Unions themselves were largely apolitical and dominated by *pelegos*, union leaders closely aligned with employers and the government. Things began to change in 1975. Lula was elected to the presidency of the São Bernardo metalworkers union that year, with even the support of some of the *pelegos*, who did not see him as a threat precisely because of his apolitical stance. But that same year his brother, a member of the clandestine PCB, was arrested on the grounds of being a communist subversive. This event awoke Lula's political consciousness and soon he would join other newly elected union leaders, such as Olívio Dutra from Porto Alegre, in organizing the first general strikes in years.

The first issue that drew Lula's attention and served as a way of mobilizing workers against employers and the government was the wage recovery campaign. One of the first things that the new union leaders did was to use more effectively the Departamento Intersindical de Estatística e Estudos Socioeconômicos (DIEESE), the union research center. In 1977 DIEESE found that the government had manipulated official cost of living figures in 1973 in order to give lower wage raises. This launched the wage recovery campaign, which initiated the first mass mobilization of workers in years. The campaign was unsuccessful: both the courts and the government refused to recognize workers' rights to wage recovery. But the event was a clear sign for most workers that if they wanted anything from employers and the government they would have to "get tough." Additionally, this experience taught the new generation of union leaders a number of lessons: the importance of organizing at the plant level, and that unions could be more than bureaucratic organizations in charge

of social welfare programs. The following years were marked by intense union activity, which included several general strikes that, as a side-effect, helped to galvanize society against the dictatorship and in favor of a return to democracy.

The first of the wave of strikes that marked the 1978–80 period took place in Santo André at the Scania factory. Soon after, other strikes broke out, especially in the highly industrialized ABCD area, comprising the cities of Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, São Caetano do Sul, and Diadema. These strikes were successful in winning workers higher wages and served as a prelude to the general strikes of 1979. In 1979 more than three million workers from 15 different states went on strike. This time the demands included more than wage increases, such as the recognition of workers' rights to debate about democracy – not in lofty terms but in the very practical questions of worker mobilization. However, employers and the government were much better prepared to deal with the situation this time. For all the organization and effort that was put into the strikes, all the workers obtained was a modest 6 percent wage increase. The successes and failures of these strikes convinced some union leaders that they needed to organize in ways that went beyond bargaining with employers: they needed to gain some control over the state if their efforts to improve worker conditions were to be successful. As the dictatorship slowly started to relinquish some of its powers and allowing the creation of new political parties, some union leaders believed that the next step in their mobilization should include the creation of a party exclusively dedicated to workers' concerns.

Creation of the PT

During the strikes of 1978–9 the union leaders in different cities, especially in the ABCD region, Belo Horizonte, and Porto Alegre, began to discuss the creation of a political party as a way of avoiding the restrictions imposed on the ways unions could fight for improvements in the lives of workers. The creation of such a party did not happen overnight, and it faced difficulties dealing both with the laws that allowed the creation of new parties and with sectors of the labor movement that were already associated with other parties, such as the still-clandestine PCB

and the centrist *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (Brazilian Democratic Movement), or MDB.

From 1964 to 1979 only two parties were legally permitted in Brazil: the *Aliança Renovadora Nacional* (ARENA) and the *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (MDB). The MDB was the officially recognized opposition party. By 1978 it had become clear that it would be just a matter of time before new parties were allowed to organize, a development that set off a wave of intense debate throughout Brazil. Lula first raised the idea of a workers party in 1978 in a conference of oil workers. This idea was echoed in the many meetings and conferences of the different confederations of labor unions that took place during this period. The São Paulo State Metalworkers' Congress in January 1979 passed a resolution calling for a national debate with the purpose of establishing a workers' party. A committee was formed and it came up with a statement of principles that was distributed throughout the nation during the May Day rallies of 1979. Besides outlining a set of principles that the party should follow, the statement went as far as setting a date on which the party should be officially registered with the government: May 20, 1979. This statement was extremely controversial. Even those who supported the idea thought that the date set was too soon and that further discussions were needed. Opposition to the creation of a workers party also came from those sectors closely associated with the MDB and the PCB. Those connected with the MDB thought that a new party would only create division within the opposition to the military dictatorship, thus weakening it. The communists held a similar position. They thought that the creation of a workers party would increase tensions between the workers and the national bourgeoisie, fragmenting what they thought would be the only way to fight imperialistic exploitation, a broad alliance congregating all those who had an interest in the development of national capitalism.

Despite this opposition, another meeting of a confederation of unions passed a resolution later that year also calling for the creation of a workers party, and a number of meetings were scheduled between union leaders, left-wing intellectuals, and MDB politicians. These developments broadened the scope of the proposed party: it should be a party not only of

the workers, but of all those who did not own the means of production. MDB members were skeptical about this new party, but Lula and others felt the risk of depending on a bourgeois party such as the MDB was greater than the risk of failure. With the support of Trotskyite groups, left-wing intellectuals, liberation theology priests, and several different unions the Partido dos Trabalhadores was founded on February 10, 1980. Soon, progressive members of the MDB, now called the PMDB to incorporate the word "party," joined the PT.

The PT was organized differently from most other labor parties around the globe, in a conscious effort to avoid what they saw as a problematic cooptation of the labor movement by existing parties. PT leaders saw the party's duty as that of serving the labor movement, not controlling it. Therefore, it had no formal relationship with unions, in order to maintain their autonomy. Internally, the PT was set up to avoid the "democratic centralism" and the top-down structure of other left-wing parties. The differing groups within the party are organized into different sectors called *tendências*, which have some freedom of action within the party. Each group is given proportional representation within the party hierarchy. Furthermore, party members are locally organized into different nuclei, which are supposed to organize grassroots mobilization. All these arrangements were put in place to avoid excessive bureaucratization and centralization of the party, and to give unions, grassroots organizations, and social movements an active voice in the party and the governments it would eventually control.

Creation of the CUT

The PT remained at least formally disconnected from the labor unions from which it had emerged. It was supposed to fight for workers' interests in the political arena, not to serve as a central organization of labor unions. As such, the need to create some sort of an organization that would be responsible for inter-union coordination remained. In 1980, after the creation of the PT, unions initiated a new round of general strikes. This time the military responded in a more aggressive manner. Union leaders, including Lula, were arrested and removed from their positions within the labor movement. This repression led to a new emphasis on the local

organization of unions. Unionists associated with the PT thought that the labor movement should emphasize the strengthening of the unions and their power at the plant level. With the goal of creating a national organization that would be in charge of strengthening unions at the plant level, the first Conferência Nacional da Classe Trabalhadora (National Conference of the Working Class), or CONCLAT, was held in August 1981. The idea of a national organization that congregated unions from all sectors was a controversial one. While most agreed on the importance of such an organization, there was much debate over what its main objectives should be. Some of the union leaders associated with the movement Unidade Sindical wanted this new organization to function not as a way of strengthening plant-level representation, but as an organization that would set policies for all unions.

In order to continue the debate about this new national organization, an interim commission, called Pró-CUT, was established. However, tensions within this commission remained high, as the two sides could not come to an agreement. The 1982 version of CONCLAT was postponed because of this impasse. In 1983 the Pró-CUT commission split when differences became irreconcilable. Besides the issue of what the role of the new national inter-union organization should be, there was significant disagreement over who would be eligible to be a part of the organization, with the group closer to the PT favoring a broader membership which would include workers from occupations not officially recognized by the CLT. After the split, those who favored the latter position decided to go ahead and hold the CONCLAT in 1983. The Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) was founded on the last day of the 1983 conference, on August 28. Those associated with Unidade Sindical created their own version of a national organization, the Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores (General Confederation of Workers).

Unlike the CGT, the CUT has often employed more confrontational tactics, such as general strikes. It has remained closely allied with the PT, even though they maintain a formal independence from each other. Through the years CUT has grown to become the largest union in Latin America. As it has become more influential, it has faced a dilemma similar to that of the PT: how can an institution created to counter the

excessive centralism and bureaucratization of previous organizations remain loyal and open to criticism from its rank-and-file members when it becomes more powerful? The Lula presidency presented such a challenge to both the PT and the CUT, some of whose members left to create dissident organizations.

The PT's First Electoral Victories

The PT's first electoral campaigns took place during the 1982 general elections. Expectations were high, especially in the state of São Paulo, where the bulk of PT members were located. The results, however, were largely disappointing. Lula did poorly in his attempt to win the gubernatorial election, only receiving about 10 percent of the vote. The only significant PT victory was in the mayoral election in the city of Diadema, in the ABCD region. Governing Diadema proved to be a real challenge, and before his term was over, Mayor Gilson Menezes saw most of his Cabinet resign over allegations that the local government was trying to coopt local unions and grassroots organizations through public employment and monies. These challenges showed the PT the difficulties involved in balancing party discipline with open internal debate. It did not do much better during the 1985 mayoral elections. Its only important victory came in the city of Fortaleza, capital of the state of Ceará. Maria Luisa Fontenelle surprisingly won the election, becoming the first woman to become mayor of a state capital in Brazil. But her government was once again marked by divisions within the PT and she was eventually expelled from the party.

It was during the 1988 elections that the PT gained national recognition. Riding a wave of discontentment with the federal government and its failed policies to combat inflation, the PT elected the mayors of three state capitals – São Paulo, Porto Alegre, and Vitória – as well as those of a number of significant medium-size cities. Better prepared for holding office, this time the PT established a number of innovative policies, such as the participatory budget, a program under which neighborhood associations had a voice in deciding where the city's funds would be invested. The PT was especially successful in Porto Alegre, where it held power for the next 16 years. These victories made the PT a national force, but it was only during the 1989

presidential elections that it became the most important left-wing party in Brazil.

The PT's Presidential Campaigns

In 1989 Brazil held its first presidential elections in 29 years: 22 candidates from different parties ran for office. Among them were Leonel Brizola, the president of PDT and the political heir to *trabalhismo*, and Mário Covas, the representative from the newly created Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB). In the first round of the election, Fernando Collor de Melo received the most votes, but fell short of the majority needed to avoid a runoff. In what surprised many, Lula, the PT's president and candidate, edged Brizola by a small percentage of the vote. In the runoff, the PT was able to assemble a large coalition of left-wing parties. Lula lost the runoff, but the fact that the PT had made it that far and had led a large coalition immediately made it a major party and Lula a nationally recognized figure.

In 1992 Collor was impeached due to corruption allegations. In the ensuing negotiations to form a new government, there occurred a major split between the PSDB and the PT. The PT had decided to remain in the opposition as Itamar Franco, Collor's vice president, took office. The PSDB, however, decided to join Franco and embrace neoliberal economic policies such as massive privatization. So in 1994 the presidential elections had two main candidates: Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a former political ally of Lula, who ran on the initial success of the Real Plan, which established a new currency and drastically reduced inflation; and Lula, who ran on a more explicitly left-wing policy, denouncing the lack of land reform and the privatization of several companies. The Real Plan was popular enough to give Cardoso a victory without the need of a runoff, something that would happen again in 1998. Despite these defeats, Lula and the PT became the main opposition party, and in 2002, in his fourth attempt, Lula was elected president.

The Lula Presidency

After losing the presidential elections three times, the PT decided to soften its left-wing discourse in order to gain a larger share of the vote in 2002. Once a ferocious critic of the orthodox economic policies of the Cardoso era,

Lula and the PT released a document entitled “Carta ao Povo Brasileiro” (Letter to the Brazilian People) in which it announced its intention to continue with the economic policies of its predecessor. Lula went so far as to align himself with the Partido Liberal (Liberal Party). Running as a moderate instead of the aggressive left-wing leader of the previous elections paid off, and he was finally sworn in as president in 2003.

The Lula presidency remains extremely controversial within left-wing circles. The PT abandoned many of its traditional positions and supported austerity policies, yet unified and greatly expanded social programs under the newly created Bolsa Família, which provides extremely poor families with a monthly stipend. Such controversies reached their peak in 2003 when social security reform was approved despite heavy internal opposition. A number of influential figures within the PT were expelled for not following the party line. Heloísa Helena and others left the PT to create the dissident Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (Socialism and Liberty Party). The CUT has remained largely loyal to the government, which also generated a dissident group, as many started to consider CUT as an organization coopted by the government. Thus, significant questions remain about how to balance party discipline with internal debate.

In 2006 Lula was reelected president. His support came mostly from the lower classes, especially those who benefited the most from the Bolsa Família. Corruption scandals and the social security reform eroded some of his support among civil servants and the middle classes.

SEE ALSO: Mendes, Chico (1944–1988) and Amazonian Rainforest Protest and Resistance; Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula da (b. 1945)

References and Suggested Readings

- Baiocchi, G. (Ed.) (2003) *Radicals in Power: The Workers' Party and Experiments in Urban Democracy in Brazil*. New York: Zed Books.
- Branford, S. & Kucinski, B. (1995) *Brazil: Carnival of the Oppressed*. London: Latin American Bureau.
- Carr, B. & Ellner, S. (Eds.) (1993) *The Latin American Left: From the Fall of Allende to Perestroika*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Keck, M. (1992) *The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Leal, P. R. F. (2005) *O PT e o dilema da representação política*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas.

Bread and Puppet Theater

Terri Bennett

The politically radical Bread and Puppet Theater was founded in the early 1960s on the Lower East Side in New York City by Peter Schumann, and has been based on a farm in Glover, Vermont since the 1970s. The theater's name stems from its practice of distributing free bread during its performances. Themes of the performances, circuses, or pageants address contemporary social and political issues and serve as a means of communicating information, publicly resisting social injustices, and building community. The act of distributing bread to its audiences is a symbol of a basic tenet of the theater: that art, like bread, is a necessity.

The theater is best known for its use of giant puppets and effigies, sometimes operated by persons on stilts and measuring up to 20 feet tall. The puppets were regular features at demonstrations against the Vietnam War and each subsequent war or military occupation by the US government since that time. Bread and Puppet puppeteers have been active in the global justice movement and participated in the World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle in 1999. During the 2000 Republican National Convention (RNC) in Philadelphia, Bread and Puppet puppeteers were among more than 70 people arrested at a warehouse where out-of-town puppetistas and demonstrators were temporarily housed for the event. Many puppets and puppet-making supplies were seized during the raid, and the arrests prompted the largest civil suit against the City of Philadelphia that resulted from the RNC, citing violations of protesters' basic civil rights and misconduct on the part of the Philadelphia police department.

In addition to its presence at demonstrations across the US and abroad, the Bread and Puppet Theater held a weekend-long “Domestic Resurrection Circus” on farmland in Glover each summer for 23 years until 1998. Attendees, sometimes in the tens of thousands, camped at the site, which included a large outdoor amphitheater, often with their families. The pageants were not advertised in advance in an effort to dissuade audiences deemed too large to manage. Events consisted of a large pageant

and many smaller sideshows in the woods surrounding the amphitheater. The premises of the performances ranged from condemnation of US foreign policy, to criticisms of New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani's controversial tenure, to celebrations of international social movements. These yearly events were canceled in 1998 after a man was accidentally killed during a fight in the campgrounds.

The theater continues to host smaller pageants on weekends throughout the summer at its Vermont farm, though now they are no longer overnight affairs. Bread and Puppet continues to be a fixture at large-scale demonstrations. The group also maintains a museum on the farm, conducts street theater workshops, and operates the Cheap Art Press. Sales from the press support the theater and help the company uphold its philosophy that art and the act of artistic creation should be inexpensive and accessible to everyone. The Cheap Art movement began in 1982 in response to the exclusionary corporatization of the art world, and the "Why Cheap Art" manifesto remains one of the theater's best-known works.

SEE ALSO: Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Guerilla Theater; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999

References and Suggested Readings

- Brecht, S. (1988) *The Bread and Puppet Theater*. New York: Routledge.
- Estrin, M. & Simon, R. T. (2004) *Rehearsing with Gods: Photographs and Essays on the Bread and Puppet Theater*. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green.

Bread riots, Britain, 1795

Michael T. Davis

The bread riots of 1795 were a series of extensive disorders in Britain over the scarcity and high price of provisions, especially wheat and bread. Traditionally, food riots tended to be localized and transient in nature, but the bread riots of 1795 and into 1796 were more prolonged and outbreaks occurred in most regions of Britain. Palmer (1988: 141) counts some 74 disturbances in the period 1795–6, which the most significant set of disturbances since the 1760s and 1770s.

During the course of the eighteenth century, the diet of most Britons changed toward a greater dependency on wheat-based foodstuffs rather than products derived from oats or barley. In 1795, wheat yields were extremely low as an unfortunate alignment of bad weather and war brought Britain to the brink of famine. The previous year witnessed a poor harvest due to a hot, dry summer and the winter of 1794–5 was extremely cold, affecting crop production and preventing farmers from undertaking field work. The spring of 1795 was equally unfavorable to agricultural production, with bad weather further reducing market supply. At the same time, the war against revolutionary France disrupted European trade and the market balance derived from importing grain when necessary was impeded.

As supply was shortened, prices began to rise quickly and sharply. Britain entered crisis mode. Some towns organized food subscriptions for the neediest members of the community and other forms of remedial charity were instituted in an effort to alleviate the situation and to avert disaster. However, popular discontent rose as the price of bread and other foodstuffs continued to increase. The government budget of February 1795 did little to appease the people, with new taxes imposed on items such as tea, coffee, and spirits. The threat of the situation was abundantly clear to all contemporaries. The diary of William Goodwin, Earl Soham, for example, constantly refers to the high price of provisions and the discontent of the population during the course of 1795. In June he wrote: "Complaints for Bread (now 2d per lb) are universal and risings among the People are very general" (Suffolk County Record Office, William Goodwin diaries, 1795).

The operations of market speculators served only to exacerbate the situation. They bought remaining supplies of grains, which forced up prices and created shortages across the country. Moreover, grains and foodstuffs were sent to markets offering higher prices, fueling the anger of some communities who regarded locally grown products as their own. Angry rioters would typically attack the premises of millers and bakers as well as barges used for carrying grain. Their targets and tactics were in many senses traditional, embedded in the longstanding ritual of food protest. Women were prominent participants in bread riots and the disturbances of

1795 were no exception. Indeed, the Hammonds have described the bread riots of 1795 as “the revolt of the housewives” (Hammond & Hammond 1913: 120–1).

The authorities initially responded to the bread riots with force. Troops were often sent in to quash the rioters, but on some occasions this only served to heighten the level of violence. When dragoons attempted to arrest the ring-leaders of bread riots in Manchester in July 1795, one diarist recorded how “the mobers made a Terable attack with stones on the Military in order to rescue the prisoners the Soldiers sent for more assistance which Emedeatly Joined them and by firing their pistols and slashing away wit their swords wounded several of the Riotters” (Randall 2006: 212). While physical force was sufficient to defeat riots at a local level, a broader remedy was required to address the fundamental problem of food shortages. Ultimately, the situation was stabilized through a massive campaign of grain importation and increasingly favorable weather conditions saw an expansion of wheat yields in the winter of 1795–6. A glut was created in the market, forcing prices down and dampening the heated environment.

John Stevenson (1975: 66) argues that there is “no evidence to suggest that the disturbances of 1795–6 denoted a crisis of revolutionary proportions.” Certainly, the number of riots offered potential for a revolutionary force and there was some alignment with radical interests. Indeed, groups such as the London Corresponding Society undoubtedly gained momentum during 1795 as a result of popular discontent over food prices.

Radicals sometimes made the connection between the need for political reform and the burdens of the time. However, they never fully exploited the political potential of the bread riots or rioters. In fact, the broad conclusion that can be drawn is that the riots lacked any real political potential. While some historians might argue that the bread riots of the period 1795–1801 marked a transition from traditional community politics to violent class conflicts of the industrial age, the food riots of this period were underpinned by a fundamental appeal to the moral economy. The bread riots of 1795 were limited in focus and motive and as such lacked any substantial revolutionary potential.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Corn Law Agitation, Britain, 19th Century; Enclosure Movement, Protests against; Food

Riots; Gordon “No Popery” Riots, Britain, 1780; London Corresponding Society; Spithead and Nore Mutinies, Britain, 1797; Swing Riots

References and Suggested Readings

- Bohstedt, J. (1983) *Riots and Community Politics in England and Wales 1790–1810*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gilmour, I. (1992) *Riot, Risings and Revolution: Governance and Violence in Eighteenth-Century England*. London: Pimlico.
- Hammond, J. L. & Hammond, B. (1913) *The Village Labourer, 1760–1832*. London: Longman.
- Palmer, S. (1988) *Police and Protest in England and Ireland 1780–1850*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Randall, A. (2006) *Riotous Assemblies: Popular Protest in Hanoverian England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stevenson, J. (1975) Food Riots in England, 1792–1818. In J. Stevenson & R. Quinault (Eds.), *Popular Protest and Public Order: Six Studies in British History 1790–1920*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Wells, R. (1988) *Wretched Faces: Famine in Wartime England, 1793–1803*. Gloucester: Alan Sutton.

Bread and Roses Strike

Anne F. Mattina

The Lawrence, Massachusetts Woolen Mills Strike of 1912, popularly known as the Bread and Roses Strike, had its roots in protective legislation enacted by the state of Massachusetts, reducing the hours of labor for women and children from 56 per week to 54, causing a *de facto* reduction in wages. On January 11, women in the Everett Mills walked out upon discovering their pay was short. By the end of the next week, 10,000 workers had joined them, and by the end of the strike, 30,000 were out.

Though the strike itself lasted only 63 days, it looms large in the history of American labor reform, by representing an enormous victory for the workers and the Industrial Workers of the World. A presence in Lawrence for five years, IWW organizers helped with work slowdowns and wildcat walkouts in the months prior to the strike, and the “One Big Union’s” inclusive message served to bind together the myriad of ethnic groups employed in the city.

In addition to the IWW, the Italian Socialist Federation, the most visible and organized of the ethnic labor groups in Lawrence, played a major

role in the strike's success. Female networks in Lawrence's neighborhoods also added considerable strength to the strike force. Workers, wives, and mothers forged strong alliances with neighbors in their tenement blocks out of necessity born of poverty. They shared food and childcare, laundry and "papers" necessary for gaining their children employment. The strength of these networks contributed to the solidarity essential to sustaining the strike of 1912.

The workers organized quickly and formed a general strike committee of 56 members, with each person responsible to the different ethnic groups involved. These individual units were charged with taking care of their own, providing soup kitchens, medical assistance, and clothing among other resources for their compatriots. The ISF, along with the IWW, raised money nationally and internationally to support the local efforts.

On January 15 the state militia was called in to aid the Lawrence police, who were having trouble containing the strikers. Fire hoses were proving ineffectual at crowd control, so bayonets and clubs were employed. A young Syrian striker, John Ramey, was killed after being stabbed by a bayonet during one confrontation. Over the next several days, massive parades of strikers were met and turned back by the militia. Workers met nightly in halls, listening to speakers and plotting their resistance. Early on, the IWW warned against violence as a strategy. City officials and mill owners, however, were fearful and called in private security consisting of Pinkerton agents and Harvard undergraduates as reinforcements and strikebreakers.

January 29 was a watershed day for the strike. After hearing of the arrival of trolley cars filled with strikebreakers, workers swarmed the scene. Newspaper reports and city officials blamed strikers for the ensuing riot as "scabs" were dragged from the cars. The "thugs" were actually Pinkertons hired by the owners, disguised as workers, in an attempt to beat the workers back while generating fear and hostility among the general populace. Later that same day, Anna Lopizzo died after being shot while the militia attempted to control the riot. City officials began to close access to public gathering places, forcing the workers to meet outdoors. It was here that existing communication networks of women became essential to the life of the strike.

The women of Lawrence seized the neighborhoods around the mills. Large numbers of

women would link arms to create a human chain incapable of being broken by police, protecting each other from arrest. "Scab mugging," another tactic, included following strikebreakers to the gates of the factories all the while hectoring those who dared cross the line. In response, the police doused the strikers with fire hoses, clubbing and finally arresting them.

Perhaps the most publicly creative action associated with the strike was the strategy of sending the striker's children out of Lawrence. Common among Italian strikers, the strategy was based on the premise that the workers might be compelled to return to the mills before the strike was settled if they were worried about their hungry offspring. "The Children's Exodus" occasioned a violent response from the police, the mayor, and the militia. On February 10 the first group boarded a train, bound for New York and sympathetic socialist host families. By and large, public response to the event was favorable, save in the city of Lawrence. Mill owners and the mayor were furious at the stunt. City officials called for the National Guard, and workers were threatened with jail if they tried to send any more children out of the city. On February 24 the strikers returned to the train station with more children. Brutal opposition met them. Police seized children as parents fought to get them on trains. A ferocious battle ensued with the city prevailing, the captive children ferried out of town to an orphanage.

The rest of the country reacted with outrage to the actions of Lawrence officials. National labor activists and social reformers called for an immediate investigation. Congressional hearings began on March 6, in Washington, DC. Under mounting public pressure and unable to break the strike force, the mill owners began to settle with the strikers. By mid-March, most had capitulated to the demands of reduced hours without a pay reduction. The workers won.

SEE ALSO: Anarchosyndicalism; Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley (1890–1964); Haywood, Big Bill (1869–1928); Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Lowell Female Labor Reform Association

References and Suggested Readings

- Cahn, W. (1980) *Lawrence, 1912: The Bread and Roses Strike*. New York: Pilgrim.
- Cameron, A. (1995) *Radicals of the Worst Sort: Laboring Women in Lawrence, Massachusetts, 1860–1912*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Foner, P. (1965) *History of the Labor Movement in the United States: The Industrial Workers of the World 1905–1917*. New York: International Publishers.

Watson, B. (2005) *Bread and Roses: Mills, Migrants and the Struggle for the American Dream*. New York: Viking.

Brecht, Bertolt (1898–1956)

Christina Suszynski Green

Bertolt Brecht was a German playwright, poet, librettist, and dramaturge during the early twentieth century. Born in 1898, in Augsburg, Germany, Brecht lived to be one of the most celebrated and controversial playwrights of his time. The frequency with which his dramas were performed in the 1950s rivaled that of Shakespeare and Schiller in western Europe. Yet the combination of his narrative style, dramaturgical choices, and critical theory earned him more than a few adversaries. Brecht was a proponent of social change through the theater, believing that if he could present the contradictions driving modern Western societies (both politically and socioeconomically), audience members would cease to be passive receivers of empty entertainment, and process such contradictions as a dialectic for the mind to contemplate with seriousness. This process is what Brecht considered to be the removing of the *fourth wall*, a screen of illusion between the performance and the audience. Such a direct relationship with the action of the stage would then, Brecht posited, cause audiences to form connections between the stage and the outside world, leading to uprising action on the street.

The theory of *epic theater* unfortunately relied on the presence of the working class, the supposed beneficiaries of Brecht's poetic talent. In actuality, the working class formed such a small percentage of his audience that he was compelled to express how troubled he was over this fact in his personal writings. His own friend and colleague, Theodor Adorno, predicted the likelihood of this coming to pass, claiming Brecht was only preaching to the choir. These details do not diminish the great influence Brechtian drama has had over Western theory and art. In exile from 1933 to 1947, the American period led to numerous collaborations that poised Brecht to be

a leading voice against industrialized capitalist and fascist regimes.

A central theme in many of Brecht's dramas is the degradation into which the masses are thrown when they no longer control the means of production, and are forced to sell their labor, even when it necessitates their exploitation and contradicts their values or commitments to loved ones. In this category, *St. Joan of the Stockyards*, *Mother Courage*, and *The Threepenny Opera* remain the most recognized today. The last of these is a musical written with Kurt Weill (a frequent collaborator with Brecht), and it may be the one work truly considered to have popular appeal. Similarly, *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*, another of Brecht's most performed and read dramas, sheds light on the contradictions to our values and the danger to ourselves that we can become immersed in when motivated by compassion to help others or, conversely, when motivated by greed to help others.

Such countercultural thinking earned Brecht an interview with the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1947, which labeled him a communist. He never admitted to being a communist in his hearings, though his theory of epic theater is grounded in Karl Marx's *Das Kapital*. His trip to Moscow in 1932 and his collaborations with the communist writer Sergei Treiakov were also cause for American paranoia, and it would be ridiculous to suggest that his world of ideas was not bound with communist ideals. Shortly after this hearing, Brecht returned to Germany, where he died in 1956.

Brecht's dramas have been an important part of the post-colonial and Marxist dialogues in literary, dramatic, social, anthropological, and political theory. However, it is little recognized that Brecht also wrote prose, poetry, musical lyrics for ballads, cantatas, and operas – endeavors that were praised highly by Hannah Arendt. His *Buckow Elegies*, *The Baden Cantata of Acquiescence*, and *Mahagonny* stand out as excellent examples.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W. (1903–1969); Arendt, Hannah (1906–1975); Dictatorship of the Proletariat

References and Suggested Readings

- Brecht, B. (1992) *Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic*. Trans. J. Willett. New York: Hill & Wang.
- Brecht, B. (1995) *Bertolt Brecht: Journals 1934–1955*. Trans. S. S. Brecht. New York: Routledge.

- Brecht, B. (1997) *Bertolt Brecht: Poems 1913–1956*. Ed. J. Willett & R. Manheim. New York: Routledge.
- Demetz, P. (Ed.) (1962) *Brecht: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Demetz, P. (1967) *Marx, Engels, and the Poets: Origins of Marxist Criticism*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Tomson, P. & Sachs, G. (Eds.) (1994) *The Cambridge Companion to Brecht*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brissot, Jacques Pierre (1754–1793)

Leonore Loft

Jacques Pierre Brissot was one of the most misunderstood men of his generation and ours. Best known for his prominent political role during the French Revolution, his earlier career as a publicist, journalist, and disciple of the French *Philosophes* provides the key to his lifelong commitment to reformist, egalitarian, and democratic ideals.

Born in 1754 to a master chef and caterer of Chartres and a highly devout mother, Jacques Pierre was one of seven surviving siblings. He began studying for a legal career, but as a voracious reader of Enlightenment philosophic and deistic works, he soon felt driven to begin writing down his own reflections concerning religion, politics, society, and human rights.

Early in life, Brissot experienced a wrenching crisis of faith, resulting in a violent break from the Catholic Church. From there he went on to condemn Catholicism for its despotic collusion with the state, reinforcing an exclusive, hierarchical system. Although he came to embrace a Rousseau-style deism, he adopted his own version of the humanitarianism of the Judeo-Christian tradition.

He left Chartres for Paris, but his fierce ambition, intellectual curiosity, and the tumultuous events of late eighteenth-century society and politics led him to London, to the cantons of the future Switzerland, to Holland, and to the United States. His writings of the late 1770s, 1780s, and during the Revolution reflect his commitment to political and social reform and humanitarian progress. Among his early works were polemics on Catholicism, a two-volume theory of criminal law (his magnum opus), and numerous other pamphlets and collections

dealing with criminal jurisprudence and legal reform. He attempted to establish a European-wide correspondence among intellectuals and scientists who would learn from one another. Financial difficulties ended these efforts.

As Brissot's awareness and understanding of contemporary political events deepened, his sense of himself as reformer and activist intensified. His *Le Philadelphien à Genève* discussed the unsuccessful Genevan democratic revolt of 1782 and gave full expression to what he believed were the pernicious effects of ministerial and aristocratic complicity. His contributions to the Englishman David Williams' *Letters on Political Liberty* contained radical ideas on constitutional reform and indicated the extent to which Brissot was absorbing a broad-based political ideology and applying it to France. He wrote two open letters to Emperor Joseph II, the second advocating the right of the oppressed to revolt in the Transylvanian peasant uprising of 1784.

Rather than put his faith in the corrupt legacy of European models, which he saw as paralyzed by aristocratic privilege, he drew his inspiration instead from the New World where the American republic offered vibrant proof of possibilities for progress. By the time he left for the New World in 1788, he had already formed lasting ties with English Quakers and had exported and enlarged their emancipationist efforts, founding the *Société des Amis des Noirs*, the first French anti-slavery group. While in the United States, he traveled through New England, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia, carrying a letter of introduction to George Washington from the Marquis de Lafayette. Having received an invitation to visit the president in Mount Vernon, he attempted to persuade Washington to abolish slavery in the new democracy. Although he was horrified by the continued existence of slavery, which he considered to be a sign of Old World infection not yet rooted out, Brissot nevertheless planned to relocate his wife, *Félicité née Dupont*, and their three sons to Pennsylvania. Instead, receiving news from France of the calling of the Estates General in 1788, he returned to participate wholeheartedly in events and reform efforts he felt he had helped to create.

Late in July of 1789 Brissot founded a daily news sheet, the *Patriote français*, which became one of the most influential of the

pro-Revolutionary journals. He was elected deputy to the Legislative Assembly (September 1791 to September 1792) and then to the National Convention. He became the leader of an influential faction to which he was so closely associated in the minds of his contemporaries that it was known as the Brissotins; only later would it become generally known as the Girondins (after the Gironde, the area of France that many of its other members represented).

In March of 1792, during the period of constitutional monarchy, the king called upon Brissot and his Girondins to join, and in effect head, the government. Brissot's prolonged struggle with Maximilien Robespierre began when the Girondins advocated, and then put into effect, a policy of revolutionary war against the crowned heads of old-regime Europe. The radical journalist Jean Paul Marat (with whom Brissot had formerly been closely associated) and Robespierre strongly condemned this militaristic adventurism, but Brissot's call to war was very popular with the radicalized Parisian population, and war with Austria was declared on April 20.

Within a few months, counter-revolutionary armies were threatening Paris and the ensuing crisis served to rapidly deepen the radicalization of the Parisian *sans-culottes*. In a great insurrection on August 10, 1792, the constitutional monarchy was overthrown. Although a few months earlier Brissot and the Girondins had represented the leading edge of revolutionary radicalism, events had passed them by and they increasingly appeared as defenders of moderate political policies against Robespierre's ever-more-radical Jacobin party. Their moderation was attractive to revolutionary intellectuals, including Thomas Paine, the Marquis de Condorcet, and Madame Roland's circle, but it increasingly alienated the rank-and-file *sans-culottes*.

When a chest of Louis XVI's private correspondence was discovered, and it proved that he had been engaged in treasonous plots against the Revolution, overwhelming sentiment for his trial and execution came to the fore. The Girondins resisted the call to put the king to death, putting themselves ever more at odds with the rising revolutionary tide. Brissot's political career came to an end in yet another Parisian insurrection, May 31 to June 2, 1793. He fled, hoping to escape arrest, but was captured and imprisoned. Charged by Jacobin deputies

with conspiracy and treason, he and virtually the entire leadership of the Girondin faction were condemned to death. Brissot and 19 of his colleagues were executed on October 31, 1793; he was 39 years of age.

Although Brissot did not live to see it, the remnants of his faction eventually made a political comeback after the Revolution's radicalism had run its course. Robespierre's fall in July 1794 resulted in the return of the moderates to power in the period that came to be known as Thermidor.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, Britain; Condorcet, Marquis de (1743–1794); Counter-revolution, France, 1789–1830; Danton, Georges Jacques (1759–1794); Enlightenment, France, 18th Century; Estates General, France; French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution, Radical Factions and Organizations; Haiti, Revolutionary Struggles; Lafayette, Marquis de (1757–1834); Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–1793); Paine, Thomas (1737–1809); Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794); Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778)

References and Suggested Readings

- Burrows, S. (2003) The Innocence of Jacques-Pierre Brissot. *Historical Journal* 46, 4 (December): 843–71.
- Darnton, R. C. (1968) The Grub Street Style of Revolution: J.-P. Brissot, Police Spy. *Journal of Modern History* 40: 301–27.
- De Luna, F. A. et al. (1991) Forum: Interpreting Brissot. *French Historical Studies* 17: 159–218.
- d'Huart, S. (1986) *Brissot: La Gironde au pouvoir*. Paris: Editions Robert Laffont.
- Ellery, E. (1915/1970) *Brissot de Warville: A Study in the History of the French Revolution*. New York: AMS Press.
- Loft, L. (2002) *Passion, Politics and Philosophie: Rediscovering J.-P. Brissot*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Bristol Riots, 1831

Steve Poole

The Bristol Riots of October 29–31, 1831 were the single most serious provincial urban disturbance in modern English history and the most catastrophic since the Gordon Riots of 1780. Several public buildings were set on fire, between 100 and 250 people were killed or wounded, mostly by military action, and the cost of damage to property was estimated between

£50,000 and £150,000. Eighty-one rioters were later convicted and four hanged. The cause was the House of Lords' rejection of the Reform Bill, for which there was strong cross-class support in the city. Unlike Nottingham and Derby, however, where rioting occurred immediately, disturbances at Bristol did not break out until three weeks later, when crowds mobilized to demonstrate against the arrival of Tory Recorder Sir Charles Wetherell, a notorious opponent of reform, to open the assize.

There were important local causes of discontent too, however, chief of which was the unaccountable nature of the Corporation. The civic elite, still drawn predominantly from wealthy merchant dynasties, had become irretrievably unrepresentative of the growing economic influence of the commercial and industrial middling sort. Against a background of perceived decline and Corporation inactivity, a considerable proportion of the population felt alienated from the historical mythology of civic cohesion. The refusal of the middling sort to report for duty as special constables when Wetherell first arrived in the city, and of the Political Union to become the "cat's paw of the Corporation," was a clear enough expression of disinterest and a primary cause of escalation in disorder.

Magistrates responded by hiring 300 intemperate sailors, whose violent attempts to make arrests amongst the crowd protesting Wetherell's presence at the mayor's Mansion House in Queen Square were largely responsible for much of what followed. By the following day, magistrates had little choice but to request military intervention, but there were few precedents for the wholesale use of soldiers for crowd control in England and, after Peterloo, most local authorities were reluctant to introduce them. Nervousness and misunderstandings between magistrates and military commanders produced inertia for two days while crowds went largely unopposed.

The destruction was not indiscriminate. To begin with, only the Mansion House was attacked. The jails were liberated on the second day, chiefly to recover arrested prisoners, followed by assaults upon other symbols of local governance – the harbor toll houses, the Bishop's Palace, the Custom House, and the Excise Office. In the closing stages, a number of private houses and warehouses in and around Queen Square were looted and set on fire, and this appears to

have finally spurred the middling sort, including members of the Political Union, to volunteer as constables. Magistrates finally regained control on the third day after ordering a series of devastating cavalry charges across the square and through the principal streets.

SEE ALSO: Gordon "No Popery" Riots, Britain, 1780; Peterloo Massacre, 1819; Reform Acts, Britain and Ireland, 1832

References and Suggested Readings

- Caple, J. (1991) *The Bristol Riots of 1831 and Social Reform in Britain*. Lampeter: Edwin Mellon Press.
 Harrison, M. (1988) *Crowds and History: Mass Phenomena in English Towns, 1790–1835*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 LoPatin, N. D. (1999) *Political Unions, Popular Politics and the Reform Act of 1832*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Britain, anti-war movement, 1775–1783

H. T. Dickinson

Throughout the crisis leading to the War of American Independence, successive British administrations secured comfortable majorities in parliament for their efforts to subordinate the American colonies to the sovereign authority of the Westminster parliament. There was always, however, some opposition in parliament to these policies and even greater opposition outside parliament. These critics were alarmed by the outbreak of war in 1775 and most urged reconciliation before it was too late. In parliament, William Pitt, the Earl of Chatham, and Edmund Burke were simply the most famous who aired this opinion. Their views were increasingly shared by such men as Charles James Fox and David Hartley.

There were even more critics of the war outside parliament. Rational Dissenters and Real Whigs, such as James Burgh, John Cartwright, and Catharine Macaulay, and leading publishers and publicists, such as John Almon and Thomas Holcroft, were vociferous critics of the American war. Probably the most celebrated critic was Richard Price, who produced bestselling pamphlets, such as *Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty* in 1776 and *Additional Observations on the Nature and Value of Civil Liberty, and the*

War with America in 1777, which attacked government policies, supported American claims, and condemned efforts to subordinate the American colonists to British authority by force of arms. Price regarded the war as an unmitigated disaster and believed that victory would prove elusive. He urged Britain to concede American independence rather than wage war. Although far from sharing the political views of Price, the two foremost British economists of the age, Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations* (1776) and Josiah Tucker, argued that war should be avoided and that what should matter to Britain was her trade with America, not her right to subordinate America to her political authority.

While it is difficult to be certain how the British people as a whole regarded the American war, there is considerable evidence to suggest that many were opposed. The London supporters of the popular radical John Wilkes, including such resident Americans as Arthur Lee and Stephen Sayre, encouraged the London Common Council to address the king and to petition parliament against the war in 1775–6. These London radicals not only condemned the war, but actually tried to block efforts to recruit men into the army and to impress men into the navy. Their efforts encouraged a petitioning movement against the war from many parts of Britain, and particularly from commercial centers and towns with many inhabitants who were Protestant Dissenters (Bradley 1986). Opposition to the war frequently appeared in several leading London and provincial newspapers and in a host of individual pamphlets. In 1776 a virulently republican magazine, *The Crisis*, circulated in the provinces until it was suppressed by the authorities. In the early stages of the conflict, Lord North himself confessed to George III that the war was not sufficiently popular with the British people, while Lord Camden, a close ally of Chatham, warned the House of Lords that the common people strongly opposed the war and that less than half the nation supported the government. John Wesley, who had traveled around the country more than anyone else, warned that the bulk of the people were dangerously dissatisfied with the government's policies (Dickinson 2000: 2–3).

In the first years of the war, however, opposition was fragmented and demoralized, even though there were many expressions of serious concern that the war was unwise and that victory might

not be achieved. It was news of the stunning American victory at Saratoga, which arrived in Britain in late 1777, that convinced a considerable body of opinion in Britain that the war could not be won and should be abandoned as soon as possible. On March 23, 1778 the Duke of Richmond moved a resolution in the House of Lords that British troops should be withdrawn from America. Although he was easily defeated there was growing support for concentrating on the new war with France rather than seeking an elusive victory in America. For several months, from April to June 1779, the parliamentary opposition regularly condemned the government's conduct of the war and made it clear that American independence would need to be conceded. Charles James Fox and David Hartley became two of the most vocal members of the House of Commons to take this position. From late 1779 these views received considerable support outside parliament as a widespread popular movement, mainly initiated by Christopher Wyvill's Yorkshire Association, began to condemn the government's policies, urged economic and parliamentary reform, and advised an end to the American war. When news of Cornwallis's surrender at Yorktown reached London in late 1781, the opposition, in and out of parliament, became fully convinced that the war with America must be abandoned. Even Lord North acknowledged that the military effort in America must be scaled down. On February 27, 1782 the opposition in the House of Commons secured a majority for a motion urging an end to offensive operations in America.

Less than a month later, Lord North resigned. His administration was replaced by one controlled by those who had long criticized his American policies and who were ready to end the war in America and to concede American independence. Negotiating peace not only with America, but also with France, Spain, and the Dutch Netherlands, who all had different objectives, proved very difficult and took many months of tortuous negotiations. Those who had long opposed the American war still hoped to retain some relationship with America, particularly strong commercial links, but they were ready to concede independence and to offer quite generous territorial concessions in North America in order to end what they had always regarded as a misguided war.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776

References and Suggested Readings

- Bonwick, C. (1977) *English Radicals and the American Revolution*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Bradley, J. E. (1986) *Popular Politics and the American Revolution in England: Petitions, the Crown, and Public Opinion*. Macon: Mercer University Press.
- Conway, S. (2000) *The British Isles and the War of American Independence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dickinson, H. T. (Ed.) (1998) *Britain and the American Revolution*. New York: Addison Wesley Longman.
- Dickinson, H. T. (2000) "The Friends of America": British Sympathy with the American Revolution. In M. T. Davis (Ed.), *Radicalism and Revolution in Britain, 1775–1848*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Sainsbury, J. (1987) *Disaffected Patriots: London Supporters of Revolutionary America 1769–1782*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Britain, peasant uprisings, 16th century

Jason Jewell

During the sixteenth century England's Tudor dynasty and Scotland's Stuart dynasty suffered a number of rebellions against their authority. Members of the aristocracy instigated and led the majority of these rebellions, but some of them featured enough initiative, leadership, and participation from the lower classes to be termed peasant uprisings. The most important of these were the Cornish Rebellion of 1497, the Pilgrimage of Grace of 1536–7, and two uprisings of 1549 – the Western Rebellion and Kett's Rebellion.

The Cornish Rebellion, on the cusp of the sixteenth century, originated as a tax revolt against a parliamentary grant levied in 1497 to finance an invasion of Scotland. Cornishmen saw no threat to themselves from the Scots and protested the heavy tax. Michael Joseph an Gof (a blacksmith) and Thomas Flamank (a lawyer) led an estimated 15,000 Cornishmen on an orderly march across England to rid King Henry VII of his "evil advisors." In June the rebels arrived at Blackheath, where they were confronted and defeated by a larger royal force. The rebel leaders were executed and Henry VII laid heavy fines on the regions that had supported the rebels.

The Pilgrimage of Grace was a popular response to the Dissolution of the Monasteries proclaimed by Henry VIII in 1536. This threat to traditional religion, combined with dissatisfaction over taxation, eventually led to risings in Lincolnshire, Yorkshire, Cumberland, Durham, Westmorland, and Northumberland. The name Pilgrimage of Grace properly refers to the rising in Yorkshire, led by lawyer Robert Aske. In October 1536 he occupied York with 9,000 followers, reinstated monks and nuns to their houses, and resumed Roman Catholic religious observances. Later that month the rebel force, now grown to 30,000 with the support of many gentry, negotiated with the Duke of Norfolk at Doncaster Bridge. Petitions were sent to London and disingenuous royal assurances were given that the rebels' grievances would be addressed. Aske persuaded the "pilgrims" to return home; he was later arrested and executed.

The uprisings of 1549 had different causes. Anger over the new Book of Common Prayer motivated the Western Rebellion, which was primarily composed of men from Cornwall and Devon, but the rebels also displayed clear hostility towards almost all members of the upper class. Kett's Rebellion, centered in East Anglia, had motivations that were more clearly economic; enclosure of common lands was a chief grievance. In both cases, thousands of commoners mobilized to seize control of local administration. After some vacillation the Duke of Somerset, the leader of Edward VI's regency, ordered sharp military reprisals which resulted in the deaths of 3–4,000 commoners in each region.

SEE ALSO: Class, Poverty, and Revolution; English Reformation; German Peasant Rebellion, 1525

References and Suggested Readings

- Beer, B. L. (2005) *Rebellion and Riot: Popular Disorder in England during the Reign of Edward VI*. Kent: Kent State University Press.
- Cornwall, J. (1977) *Revolt of the Peasantry, 1549*. London: Routledge.
- Fletcher, A. & MacCulloch, D. (1968) *Tudor Rebellions*. London: Longman.
- Hoyle, R. W. (2001) *The Pilgrimage of Grace and the Politics of the 1530s*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Moorhouse, G. (2002) *The Pilgrimage of Grace: The Rebellion That Shook Henry VIII's Throne*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Britain, post-World War I army mutinies and revolutionary threats

Gerard Oram

Following the Bolshevik revolution that overthrew its Russian allies, the British government – increasingly fearful of similar threats – placed responsibility for monitoring and managing “industrial and revolutionary unrest in the United Kingdom” in the hands of the army, a role it would fulfill from the end of 1917 to 1920. As well as civilian unrest, the army’s Intelligence Branch (A2) concerned itself with the growth of trade unionism in the army and with the attitude of troops toward labor unrest and strikes (Englander 1987: 24–32). Unlike his wartime equivalent, the postwar soldier was less concerned with his immediate survival and instead looked more to the future – a future in which few envisaged continuing military service – and many were prepared to use collective bargaining to this end. But a great fear developed within the government and A2 surrounding a potentially politicized or revolutionary soldier.

In Britain, the end of the war precipitated a wave of mutinies in the army, navy, and airforce. Army units at Shoreham mutinied merely two days after the armistice, but January 1919 saw a rash of mutinies all across the country involving many thousands of men. At RAF Biggin Hill in Kent, the *Internationale* was sung. Elsewhere, soldiers’ and sailors’ councils were set up or (as in the case of a naval mutiny at Milford Haven) the red flag was raised. However, the demands and grievances of the mutineers show a remarkable lack of any Bolshevik agenda and instead emphasized poor pay and conditions, uncertainty about further deployments, general dislike of army discipline, and, most of all, the slow pace of demobilization. Mostly, these mutinies were dealt with peacefully by local commands that tended to adopt a conciliatory approach whilst at the same time isolating and arresting the ringleaders. But at Kempton Park, where mechanics of the Army Service Corps went on strike to demand civilian rates of pay, A2 placed one of the ringleaders (Private George Gray) on its payroll by employing him as an informer.

Not all mutinies were peaceful. At Kimmel Park, Canadians, aggrieved at the slow pace of repatriation, rioted. Three rioters and two sentries were killed in the incident. The raising of the red flag and the role played by a Russian Canadian, William Tarasevich, no doubt lay behind an incorrect and sensational article in *The Times* (March 7, 1919) which blamed Bolshevik ringleaders. But this incident was exceptional, and the most striking characteristic of these postwar mutinies was the lack of orchestration.

Significantly, the only true attempt at orchestrating military personnel’s protests – the formation of a union – elicited a rather different response from the state. On January 3, 1919, at the ports of Folkestone and Dover, several thousand troops refused orders to embark for France and seized the harbor, thereby preventing any further crossings. Elsewhere, men of the Army Service Corps took their protest over demobilization direct to Whitehall. In both cases the War Office capitulated to demands for extra leave, early demobilization, and indemnity from prosecution. Delegates elected by the Folkestone mutineers then joined with the Discharged Consumptives’ Society and Sailors’ and Soldiers’ Protection Society to form the Sailors’, Soldiers’, and Airmen’s Union (SSAU). The metamorphosis from “society” to “union” and its implications of politicized and revolutionary soldiers caused alarm at A2, which immediately strove to infiltrate what it described in its fortnightly report on revolutionary organizations as “a very active and mischievous body” (National Archives 1919).

The new union quickly established a list of objectives reflecting common concerns, including leave, pay, pensions, and status, but crucially it also aimed to prevent servicemen being used as strike breakers in industrial disputes. Amidst fears that the real object of the meeting was to urge soldiers to mutiny if called upon to assist the civil power during coming disturbances, *The Times* (March 16, 1919) published an article that blamed “revolutionary wire-pullers” for leading astray the “misguided servicemen” to establish “soldiers’ councils of the approved Bolshevik pattern.”

Largely thanks to the intrigues of the A2 spy George Gray, the leadership of the SSAU was fractured and its president was forced to resign amidst accusations of financial wrongdoing. His successor, Jack Byrnes, was in fact another A2 spy

who then set about radicalizing the union and forging links with other potential revolutionary groups such as Sylvia Pankhurst's British Socialist Party. Clearly, acting as an agent provocateur in an attempt to flush out any revolutionary threat, Byrnes also pledged the union's support for the planned police strike. But the threat had diminished by late 1919 and with it the great fear of the revolutionary soldier. Byrnes was redeployed to infiltrate the Irish nationalist movement and was executed in 1920 by the IRA.

Overseas, there were mutinies in France, Italy, Russia, Mesopotamia, and India, where the Connaught Rangers mutinied in protest of British actions in Ireland. A total of 511 men were tried by courts martial for mutiny between the signing of the armistice and March 31, 1920. This is a small percentage of the number who actually refused orders, the vast majority of whom did not face trial at all. Fewer still were revolutionary, and the deployment of Bolshevik symbolism was just one of a range of bargaining strategies. But Bolshevism had become the new "folk devil" and the cause of a moral panic through sensationalist reporting. As such it was likely to alarm an increasingly insecure state that faced widespread industrial unrest and a police strike. Broadly, where military mutinies were motivated by soldiers' immediate concerns, government and army acquiesced. But where a degree of orchestration was suspected, or when any prospect existed of a union between military personnel and industrial workers, the reaction was markedly different.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Britain, Strikes, 1905–1926; Britain, Trade Union Movement; Irish Nationalism; Irish Republican Army (IRA); Pankhurst, Emmeline (1858–1928), Christabel (1880–1958), and Sylvia (1882–1960)

References and Suggested Readings

- Englander, D. (1987) Mutiny and Myopia. *Bulletin for the Study of Labour History* 52 (1): 5–7.
- Gill, D. & Dallas, G. (1985) *The Unknown Army*. London: Verso.
- National Archives (1919) Fortnightly Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom and Abroad. CAB24/76, GT6976. March 10.
- Putkowski, J. (1989) *The Kimmel Park Camp Riots 1919*. Hawarden: Flintshire Historical Society.
- Putkowski, J. (1998) *British Army Mutineers 1914–1922*. London: Francis Boutle.

- Ward, S. R. (1973) Intelligence Surveillance of British Ex-Servicemen 1918–20. *Historical Journal* 16: 197–88.

Britain, post-World War II political protest

Bruce T. Harpham

British society has frequently been convulsed by protests, riots, and other uprisings since the conclusion of World War II. Starting in the 1960s, protests became a fixture of British life, though these varied in significance and efficacy. In general, protests can be broken into two main categories: those centered around group identity protest and those that involve single issue protests.

Group Identity Protest and Organization

Race Riots and Immigration

Following World War II, there were significant increases in immigration to Britain. From 1948, when the British Nationality Act was introduced, until the 1970s, residents of Britain's former colonies, as citizens of Commonwealth countries, were allowed to emigrate to Britain. Riots and political unrest greeted these new immigrants, many of whom came from the Caribbean, South Asia, and Africa, and the government responded by moving to restrict black immigration in 1972. Racial tensions largely smoldered in Britain until they erupted with riots in the 1980s.

In 1981 a series of race riots convulsed Britain, revealing significant socioeconomic disparities between the white majority and recent immigrants from Africa, the Caribbean, and South Asia. The rioting began in the Brixton area of London, where there was high unemployment, poor housing, and endemic crime. As a response to this crime, police began stop-and-search tactics, which ignited a two-day riot that resulted in significant property damage. Several hundred police officers were injured and 82 people were arrested. Similar riots occurred in Toxteth, Liverpool, and elsewhere, with white youths frequently joining in, and sometimes outnumbering, their black counterparts. Such riots tended to occur in areas where racist police tactics were implemented in deprived urban districts suffering from high

unemployment and having a large visible minority population.

Government response to this rioting brought only limited success. Though there were government inquiries into the riots, such as the Scarman Report of 1981, and greater efforts at community policing, riots continued, especially as fringe political groups formed to oppose “colored immigration,” claiming that it was changing British identity for the worse. The first of these was the National Front, founded in 1967 as a merger of several conservative groups. It was active in opposing immigration as well as membership in the European Economic Community. The Front declined in the 1980s, as Thatcherism absorbed some of its immigration views, but other groups, such as the British National Party, formed in its place. Founded in 1982, the BNP, infamous for limiting party membership to “indigenous Caucasians,” had some limited success in local elections in 2006.

Youth Culture: Riots and Protest

The rise of youth culture in postwar Britain has also generated disturbances. There was a student movement where different youth subcultures clashed, as well as a more politically minded student movement focused in a handful of universities. The development of several distinct youth subcultures has been explained by the increase in prosperity in the postwar era, and the increasing liberalization of the 1960s. Youth riots in the postwar era were caused for a wide variety of reasons, ranging from musical differences to political protests. In the early 1960s, Rockers and Mods – adherents of different lifestyles mainly defined by music and fashion – witnessed some moderate clashes. More serious were the riots in British universities and at the American embassy against the Vietnam War.

The anti-Vietnam War protests were one aspect of the 1968 protests that convulsed Western Europe and the United States. These protests were inspired partly by the actions of university students in Paris, who were protesting their poor treatment and lack of participation in university governance. In Britain, university students at the London School of Economics (LSE) and the University of Essex demanded a voice in university administration and won a limited role as a result. In addition to these student concerns there was considerable anger at the failure of Prime Minister Harold Wilson to denounce the

US war against Vietnam. This upsurge of radical politics, concentrated in youth culture, assumed a violent aspect when a group called the Angry Brigade bombed the homes of several Cabinet members in 1970. Following the end of the Vietnam War, protests declined markedly until 2003, when about 1 million individuals marched in London to protest the imminent Anglo-American invasion of Iraq and the complicity of Prime Minister Tony Blair.

Women and Homosexuals

In the 1960s, liberation movements were seemingly everywhere. In this context, women and homosexuals began concerted efforts for both social acceptance and better treatment. Women had been granted the vote in 1918 after World War I to highlight their social contribution. Despite this major political advance, however, there was a realization that few gains had been made since.

Although women went to universities, female graduates were often expected to return home to raise families. This sense of discontentment came to a head in the late 1960s with industrial struggles that put women front and center. When Ford automobile workers went on strike in 1968, their main concern was to establish equal pay for equal work for women. The Dagenham Ford plant had an overtly sexist pay system: a woman’s pay was lower than the lowest male pay grade, regardless of experience or skill. This struggle for economic equity would continue to be a mainstay of the women’s movement for many decades. Through the 1970s, disparate women’s groups tackled the issue of domestic abuse and access to abortion, which had been limited in 1967. When a bill was brought forward in parliament in 1979 to further restrict access to abortion, women’s groups persuaded the Trades Union Congress to organize a demonstration. The resulting October 1979 demonstration attracted an estimated 100,000 people, a high point for the women’s movement.

The lesbian and gay liberation movement in Britain had a slower beginning, with the first hints of postwar activity only becoming apparent in 1970. As with other political movements, homosexual politics had its beginning in the universities. One of the first organizations, the Gay Liberation Front (GLF), had its genesis at the London School of Economics in 1970, an institution that had seen considerable student unrest

a few years earlier. Rapidly expanding from its student base, the GLF issued a manifesto in 1971 outlining some of the movement's priorities. The manifesto sought both political and social change: that school sex education no longer be exclusively heterosexual, that homosexuality no longer be treated as an illness, and that discrimination by employers and others be made illegal. One of the key confrontations for the GLF was its agitation against the Festival of Light in 1971–2. Networking with activists in the women's movement, the GLF was opposed to the festival's reactionary views of 1960s liberation. The experience of disrupting the festival was a major organizational achievement for the GLF. However, the group quickly devolved. Lobbying continued through the 1970s but faced major challenges when the Conservatives took power in 1979.

Single Issue Protest Politics

Peace, Environmentalism, and Anti-Poll Tax

The postwar era witnessed the rise of new advocacy groups dedicated to the concerns of the modern age. Some groups were explicitly dedicated to changing government policy. One such group, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), was established in 1958, proposing that the United Kingdom unilaterally rid itself of nuclear weapons. This is especially notable given that the British military only had its first successful nuclear test in 1952 on the Monte Bello Islands, off the northwest coast of Australia. Prominent early members of the CND included mathematician and intellectual Bertrand Russell, and historians A. J. P. Taylor and E. P. Thompson. In 1984 the membership of the CND reached approximately 100,000 people, but its popularity went beyond the official membership: its Hyde Park rally in 1982 drew an estimated crowd of 400,000. Beginning in 1958, the group has made an annual protest march to the Aldermaston nuclear base, initially attended by some 10,000 people. In addition to demanding British disarmament, the CND also has opposed US nuclear weapons stationed in Britain, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and US President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative and other efforts at ballistic missile defense. Though it has not achieved its goal of disarmament, nuclear testing was much reduced in the later twentieth century.

There were also a series of ecological movements that had their origin in the postwar era, which did much to alter the British political landscape. Greenpeace UK was founded in 1977 and quickly made an impact with its opposition to nuclear technology, pollution, and other environmental concerns. British environmentalists became famous for opposing the use of genetically modified organisms in the 1990s, citing health and ecological issues. At times, these organizations took the form of direct action – destroying experimental crops – but these groups generally limited themselves to publicity and public education. Animal rights groups were also prominent in Britain, opposing the use of animals in both scientific and industrial research. The Coalition to Abolish the Fur Trade (founded in 1997) and Animal Aid (founded in 1977) are the most notable animal rights organizations. Many of these ecological organizations lobby corporations, as well as governments, in order to further their objectives.

Beyond defense policy, government actions generated opposition movements which achieved a very wide following. For instance, the introduction of a poll tax by the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher in 1989 ignited widespread criticism and protest across Britain. The tax was conceived as a way for local governments to finance their own activities rather than relying on subsidies from the central government, which had been the case before. There were organized campaigns of non-payment and protest, which did much to undermine the popularity and credibility of Thatcher. Opposition to these measures was widespread on the political left and right; two Conservative MPs attempted to amend the tax to make it sensitive to income. The tax was rescinded in 1990, but so damaged Thatcher's reputation that she did not lead the Conservatives in the 1992 election.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Campaign, Britain; Anti-Vietnam War Movement, Britain; Brixton Riots, 1981; Ecological Protest Movements; Greenpeace; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements; Reclaim the Streets

References and Suggested Readings

- Byrne, P. (1988) *The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament*. London: Croom Helm.
- Cruickshank, M. (1992) *The Gay and Lesbian Liberation Movement*. London: Routledge.
- Garner, R. (1998) *Political Animals: Animal Protection Politics in Britain and the United States*. London: Palgrave.

- Glynn, S. (1995) *Modern Britain: An Economic and Social History*. New York: Routledge.
- Lent, A. (2001) *British Social Movements since 1945: Sex, Color, Peace and Power*. New York: Palgrave.
- Mason, D. (2000) *Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Osgerby, B. (1998) *Youth in Britain since 1945*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Britain, Renaissance-era conflict

Nicole Martone

Following the Hundred Years' War between England and France in 1453, civil war engulfed England as two factions of the royal family – the House of York and the House of Lancaster – competed for the throne from 1455 to 1485. The war, caused by succession irregularities following the deposition of Richard II (r. 1377–99), has become known as the Wars of the Roses because, according to legend, the York's symbol was a white rose while the Lancaster's symbol was a red rose. The Duke of York and his supporters challenged the Lancastrian monarch, Henry VI (r. 1422–61). In 1461 the Duke's son, Edward IV (r. 1461–83), managed to maintain his hold on the throne and increase the finances and power of the monarchy with the assistance of capable ministers. Edward IV's brother, Richard III (r. 1483–5), usurped the throne from Edward IV's son, Edward V, but was defeated by the exiled Henry Tudor in 1485.

Henry Tudor ruled as Henry VII (r. 1485–1509) and founded the Tudor dynasty, which controlled England until 1603. He worked to restore royal prestige, crush the power of the nobility, and establish law and order at the local level. He curbed the authority of the English nobility through the Court of Star Chamber, which sometimes involved procedures contrary to English common law, such as preventing the accused from seeing evidence against them, secret trials, torture, and the omission of juries. He also used English laws to the monarchy's benefit by confiscating lands and fortunes of nobles, thereby governing without having to depend on parliament for funds. Through such actions he laid the foundations of what would emerge as one of Europe's most significant governments during the reigns of his successors.

English Reformation to 1553

Demands for ecclesiastical reform dated back to at least the fourteenth century. In the 1520s a group of future English reformers gathered in Cambridge to discuss the Protestant writings of Martin Luther. One of those in attendance was William Tyndale, who had translated the New Testament into English while in Germany. By the middle of the 1520s Tyndale's English translation began to be circulated in England.

Furthermore, Henry VIII's challenge to papal authority had precedent. Medieval English kings had traditionally maintained their rights against the pope, most notably Edward I (r. 1272–1307) against Pope Boniface VIII to prevent secular taxation of the clergy. Furthermore, Statutes of Provisors and Praemunire passed in the fourteenth century paved the way for curtailing payments and judicial appeals to the pope, as well as rejecting papal appointments in England.

In addition, the Lollard movement, led by John Wycliffe, had established a tradition of religious protest in England by the time of the Renaissance. The Lollards had been driven underground during the fifteenth century, but persisted in parts of southern England and the Midlands. The movement was especially popular among the working classes and stressed an individual interpretation of the Bible, which was considered the only standard of Christian faith. As a result, Lollards were anti-clerical and skeptical about the sacraments, opposing the wealth of the clergy, the veneration of the saints, and prayers for the dead.

However, the Catholic Church was well established in sixteenth-century England. Traditional Catholicism still maintained a powerful hold over the popular English imagination and loyalty. Catholic teachings were reinforced through the liturgy, sermons, plays, and art.

Henry VIII became heir to the throne upon the death of his brother Arthur in 1502. He was betrothed to Catherine of Aragon, Arthur's wife, to maintain the alliance with Spain. The two were married days before Henry became king in 1509. However, to marry the wife of one's brother was against canon and biblical law. Consequently, a special dispensation had to be secured from Pope Julius II, eliminating all legal technicalities about Catherine's previous union. During Henry VIII's early reign, Cardinal Thomas Wolsey, and later, Sir Thomas More,

guided royal opposition to Protestantism, and, ironically, Henry even earned the title Defender of the Faith from Pope Leo X.

Henry went from defending Catholicism to splitting from the church when Catherine failed to produce a male heir. She gave birth to a healthy girl, the future Mary I, in 1516, but by 1527 Henry began to feel that the marriage was cursed and that the anarchy of the Wars of the Roses would be repeated under a female heir. Thus, he sought an annulment so he could marry his younger mistress, Anne Boleyn, in an attempt to produce a son. He formally requested an annulment from Pope Clement VII in 1527, stating that a valid marriage to Catherine had never existed. Excuses were commonly found for papal annulments during this time, particularly if the marriage had produced no heirs, but Clement VII had reasons for denying Henry's request.

The pope's attention was focused on the Lutheran movement in Central Europe and the Habsburg-Valois struggle for domination of the Italian peninsula. When Imperial soldiers fighting in the Italian peninsula mutinied and sacked Rome, Clement came under the protective custody of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, nephew of Catherine of Aragon. Due to the influence of Charles V, combined with the fact that the marriage between Henry and Catherine had been made through special papal permission, and had lasted for almost 20 years, Clement refused to grant Henry an annulment. Furthermore, Clement believed that Julius II never had the right to grant permission for the marriage of Henry and Catherine in the first place, for it violated the law of God, but to admit that Julius had subjugated church law to his own judgments would lend credence to the arguments of the Protestant reformers. Dismayed, the king charged Wolsey with securing the royal annulment and dismissed him in disgrace when he failed, replacing him with Thomas Cranmer, who harbored Lutheran sympathies. Henry's new advisors advocated a course in which the king would be declared supreme in spiritual affairs as he was in temporal affairs and could thus resolve his dilemma himself.

In 1529 the "Reformation Parliament" convened for what would become a seven-year session, passing a series of legislation that ultimately placed the clergy under royal control and ended the pope's power in England. This created the precedent that religious change in England was to be made by the monarch in conjunction with par-

liament. In 1531 the Convocation, an assembly representing the English clergy, recognized Henry as the head of the church in England, and in 1532 parliament passed the Submission of the Clergy, which placed canon law under royal control and the clergy under royal jurisdiction. In 1534 parliament ended all payments to Rome and accorded Henry jurisdiction over ecclesiastical appointments. Through an Act of Succession the future children of Henry's union with Anne were declared legitimate heirs to the throne. The Act of Supremacy completed the king's break with the pope by declaring the monarch the supreme head of the Church of England. Thomas More and John Fisher refused to recognize the Acts of Succession and Supremacy and were executed shortly thereafter.

From 1536 to 1538 parliament disbanded monasteries and nunneries, seizing their wealth and lands. At this time, monasteries comprised about 20 percent of land in England. Consequently, this act increased royal power and expanded the royal treasury. Henry sold the property to the aristocracy, raising revenues for war while tying loyalty to the crown.

Despite the break with Rome, Henry remained religiously conservative. In 1536 the Ten Articles granted only moderate concessions to Protestant tenets. Church doctrine remained mostly unchanged. For example, the clergy was not allowed to marry, and those repeatedly caught in concubinage were punished. Angered by growing Protestant views in England, in 1539 Henry passed the Six Articles, which reaffirmed transubstantiation, denied the Eucharistic cup to the laity, declared celibate vows unbreakable, and called for the continuation of oral confession and private masses, all Catholic practices.

Henry's changes were not greeted with universal support from the English people. Many laypeople wrote to the king to petition him to spare monasteries. In 1536 a popular rebellion known as the Pilgrimage of Grace broke out in the north in opposition to the king's religious reforms. The rebels, who derived from several different classes, eventually accepted a truce, and the leaders were executed. In 1546 rebellions broke out in East Anglia and in the west. Such actions demonstrate that despite the Protestant dispositions that had existed in England, there was considerable opposition to Protestantism.

Henry's marriage to Anne Boleyn was deemed unsuccessful, for she too failed to give birth

to a male heir, instead producing the future Elizabeth I. Anne was later charged with adulterous incest and beheaded, thereby making Elizabeth illegitimate. Henry's third wife, Jane Seymour, was able to give him a son, Edward (the future Edward VI), but died in childbirth. Henry's marriage to Anne of Cleves was an attempt to create an alliance with the Protestant German principalities. The marriage, conducted through proxy, was arranged by Thomas Cromwell. Henry VIII was dissatisfied with the marriage, which he had annulled, and executed Cromwell. He later married Catherine Howard, who was executed, and then Catherine Parr, who outlived him. In 1536 he relegitimized Mary and Elizabeth as his daughters.

On January 28, 1547 Henry died, leaving a legacy of religious change that would have a lasting impact on his country. His ten-year-old son, Edward VI, became king and reigned through regents, first the Duke of Somerset and then the Earl of Warwick (later known as the Duke of Northumberland), both men with Protestant sympathies.

Consequently, during Edward's reign, England enacted a true Protestant Reformation. Henry's Six Articles and laws against Protestant heresy were repealed, clerical marriage and communion with cup were sanctioned, and chantries, places where endowed masses had been said for the dead, were dissolved. Thomas Cranmer's Book of Common Prayer was imposed on all churches through the 1549 Act of Uniformity, and in 1550 images and altars were removed from churches. The Second Act of Uniformity (1552) imposed a revised version of the Book of Common Prayer on all churches, and Cranmer wrote a 42-article confession of faith, articulating a moderate Protestant doctrine, which advocated justification by faith, the denial of transubstantiation, and the recognition of only two sacraments.

These changes, however, did not last long. Edward was a sickly king and died young (and without an heir) in 1553. His eldest sister, Mary, the Catholic daughter of Henry and Catherine of Aragon, seemed the likely successor to the throne. Many devout Protestants feared the ascension of Mary, so some Protestant nobles developed a scheme to place Lady Jane Grey, the daughter of a powerful Protestant aristocrat and, through her mother, the granddaughter of Henry's sister, on the throne. Within days of Queen Jane's

crowning, uprisings broke out in London and elsewhere in support of the principle of hereditary monarchy and the rights of Mary. Mary quickly regained the throne from Jane, whose reign totaled only nine days.

Era of Religious Conflict

Mary (r. 1553–8) returned the country to Catholicism and in 1554 married her cousin, Philip of Spain (later Philip II), to further a Catholic alliance. Her domestic policies divided the English people, creating protest and conflict. Parliament repealed the Protestant statutes of Edward VI and fully restored Roman Catholicism. The major Protestant reformers during Edward VI's reign, including Thomas Cranmer, Hugh Latimer, and John Hooper, were executed for heresy. Over 280 Protestants were burned at the stake, forcing many religious dissenters to seek asylum abroad in Germany and Switzerland where they became exposed to more radical Protestant ideas than those that had existed in England. Many of these exiles would later hold positions in the Church of England during the reign of Elizabeth I (r. 1558–1603).

Mary I died without issue in 1558 and was succeeded by her Protestant sister, Elizabeth I, the daughter of Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn. At the beginning of her reign, sharp differences existed in England. While Catholics wanted a Catholic ruler, a number of returning Protestant exiles wanted all Catholic elements in the Church of England purged. Elizabeth and her first advisor, Sir William Cecil, worked to rebuild England's image abroad and create a united domestic front, guiding a religious settlement through parliament that prevented religious differences from destroying England. A *politique* who subordinated religious doctrine to political unity, Elizabeth developed the Anglican Church, merging a centralized episcopal system under her firm control with broadly defined Protestant doctrine and traditional Catholic practices. As a concession to Protestants, priests in the Anglican Church were permitted to marry and could deliver sermons in English rather than Latin. As a concession to Catholics, the Anglican Church maintained some of the ornate elements of the Catholic mass, including detailed robes and golden crucifixes. The Elizabethan Settlement required outward conformity to the Church of England and uniformity

in all ceremonies. Those who refused to attend Anglican services paid a fine.

A 1559 Act of Supremacy repealed all of Mary's anti-Protestant legislation and confirmed Elizabeth's role as supreme governor over both spiritual and temporal matters. Also in 1559, an Act of Uniformity imposed on every church in England a revised version of the second Book of Common Prayer. In 1563 a convocation of bishops approved the 39 articles, a revision of Thomas Cranmer's 42 articles, establishing moderate Protestantism as the official religion within the Church of England.

Elizabeth hoped to avoid both Catholic and Protestant extremism by following a moderate path. However, when she ascended the throne, Catholics were the majority in England, and zealous Catholics, urged by Jesuits, plotted against her. The Spanish also assisted conspirators against her, especially after she refused a marriage proposal from Philip II of Spain, Mary's former husband. Catholic radicals favored the Catholic Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, as queen of England and wanted to use the fact that Elizabeth had been declared illegitimate during Henry's reign to bar her from the succession. This would leave Mary Stuart, a granddaughter of another of Henry VIII's sisters, in possession of the throne. Elizabeth dealt with such plots decisively, demonstrating little mercy to those who threatened her rule.

One group that proved to be a source of agitation was the Puritans, whose numbers in England steadily grew. Puritans worked within the national church to rid it of what they perceived as impure elements and vestiges of "popery." To Puritans, the maintaining of Catholic practices within the Church of England and the continuation of the Episcopal system undermined true Protestant reformation. Puritans at this time were not true separatists and enjoyed popular support. They worked through parliament to establish an alternative national church of semi-autonomous congregations governed by representative presbyteries based on the model of Calvin and Geneva. Radical Puritans wanted each congregation to be autonomous, with neither higher Episcopal nor Presbyterian control. Elizabeth found their views subversive and passed the Conventicle Act of 1593, providing such separatists with the options of conforming to the Church of England or facing exile or death.

A series of events deteriorated relations between England and Spain, ultimately leading to war. In 1567 the Duke of Alba marched into the Netherlands to quell an uprising there. If Spain were successful, England feared that Spain could invade England from the Netherlands, so Elizabeth supported Protestant Dutch rebels against Spain and was excommunicated for heresy in 1570 by Pope Pius V. This encouraged Catholics abroad and within England to act against her. Furthermore, in fear of Spain's growing naval power, England signed a mutual defense pact with France. Elizabeth also sponsored privateers, such as Sir John Hawkins and Sir Francis Drake, to prey upon Spanish galleys in the Americas. Finally, Mary was implicated in a plot to assassinate Elizabeth and was executed. Philip, hoping to reunite England with Catholic Europe, had supported the conspiracy. He received news of the execution and, with promises of financial support from the pope, declared war, counting on the support of English Catholics.

The Spanish were ultimately defeated. The English naval victory in 1588 marked the decline of Spain as a global power and gave inspiration to Protestant resistance throughout Europe. Philip failed in his attempt to impose Catholic unity on Europe, and Elizabeth died in 1603, leaving behind a strong and unified nation positioned to become a leading global power. To maintain Protestantism in England, she made certain that the succession passed to James VI of Scotland, a Protestant who ruled England as James I, the founder of the Stuart dynasty.

SEE ALSO: Luther, Martin (1483–1546); Reformation

References and Suggested Readings

- Bernard, G. W. (2005) *The King's Reformation: Henry VIII and the Remaking of the English Church*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Colby, P. & Carnes, M. (2005) *Henry VIII and the Reformation Parliament*. White Plains, NY: Longman.
- Dickens, A. G. (1989) *The English Reformation*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Lander, J. R. (1990) *The Wars of the Roses*. London: Grange.
- Randell, K. (2001) *Henry VIII and the Reformation in England*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
- Tyler, S. (1993) *Tudor Queens and Princesses*. New York: Barnes & Noble.
- Weir, A. (2001) *Henry VIII: The King and His Court*. New York: Ballantine.

Britain, strikes, 1905–1926

Edmund Rogers

The 1905 bootmakers' march, industrial unrest over 1910–14, and the 1926 General Strike have been perceived as defining moments in British working-class consciousness, demonstrating labor's capacity to organize to achieve social change, with workers across various trades united in sympathy in shared battles between labor and capital. These strikes were, however, less revolutionary than many writers have recorded.

In March 1905, Northamptonshire bootmakers employed by War Office contractors struck to win minimum pay. With employers holding firm, the strike's leader, Joe Gribble, organized a march to London, initially without union approval, to "intimidate" the War Office into enshrining union wages in all army contracts. On May 8, 115 bootmakers marched, prompting Secretary of State for War Arnold-Forster to promise an inquiry into army contract wages. Trade unionists and socialists supported the marchers at a demonstration in Trafalgar Square on May 14, attended by an estimated 8,000–10,000 people. Following negotiations, the bootmakers won standard rates and the establishment of a conciliation board. Gribble remedied an industrial grievance using public protest and a mass show of working-class strength against the key player: the democratic state amenable to public opinion. Although the cause was less revolutionary than some socialist demonstrators believed, the march nevertheless illustrates organized labor's effective use of public protest.

The motivations behind the 1910–14 unrest, most infamously in coal and transport, have been a matter of historical debate. Contemporary and interwar writers identified rampant syndicalism, an ideology envisioning coordinated industrial action replacing capitalism with control of industry by organized labor. Postwar revisionists instead emphasized industrial grievances. However, the current consensus is that syndicalism was a minority ideology in Britain, locally concentrated, and less a cause of the unrest than a symptom. The major strikes arose from an upsurge in union organization in favorable economic conditions in which workers tried to win concessions from employers, who themselves

faced cost pressures and were unwilling to engage in constructive collective bargaining. Militancy to a great extent reflected less-skilled workers' organizational difficulties. Historians have tempered the idea that 1910–14 was even extraordinary: apart from the exceptionally bad year of 1912, the worst years of the 1890s were more tumultuous.

There are several reasons for syndicalism's exaggerated importance. First was its relative strength among South Wales miners. The South Wales coal strike of September 1910–October 1911 has become associated with the "Tonypany Riots" of November 7–8, when picketing descended into violence and looting. The national coal strike of February–April 1912 saw the South Wales miners' Reform Committee publish *The Miners' Next Step*, generally considered the high point of British syndicalism, which explicitly called for a syndicalist industrial system. However, for the vast majority of British miners, syndicalism meant little and the strike was about securing minimum pay. An overwhelming majority of South Wales miners actually voted to resume work. Secondly, the syndicalist trade unionist Tom Mann was prominent in the transport strikes of summer 1911. Seamen struck for union recognition in mid-June, and dock workers soon joined, initially in sympathy but then for wage increases. Britain's first nationwide rail strike, for higher pay and shorter hours, followed on top of this. In Liverpool Mann led a particularly militant strike, resulting in "Bloody Sunday," on August 13, 1911, when police and troops dispersed 80,000 workers, resulting in his conviction for sedition and brief imprisonment. Involving 120,000 men at their height, the transport strikes were less a unified assault on capital than interconnected opportunistic attempts to extract better pay and conditions.

The General Strike of May 3–12, 1926 involved roughly 1.75 million workers, mainly in transport, striking in sympathy with around one million miners. Socialists and communists regard the strike as a seminal moment for working-class consciousness and organization. However, it arose not from revolutionary ideology but from the internal politics of the trade union movement. With the government pursuing a deflationary monetary policy to return sterling to the gold standard in 1925, employers sought to reduce wages. After an official inquiry recommended wage reductions for miners in March 1926, mine owners proposed pay cuts as high as 28 percent,

and miners' resistance resulted in a lock-out. The Trades Union Congress (TUC) General Council felt morally obliged to support the miners following "Black Friday" (April 15, 1921) when the National Union of Railwaymen and the Transport and General Workers' Union had backed out of striking in sympathy with the miners. The Council now organized a general strike to support the miners. As in 1910–14, unskilled workers turned to violence and intimidation to enforce the strike: in Glasgow, workers attacked the tram depot and looted shops following rumors that students were to drive the trams. The TUC intended merely to defend the miners' wages. Realizing it had overstepped the mark, the General Council ended the strike after nine days, although the miners persevered until December. By demonstrating labor's organizational strength, it arguably made employers more willing to avoid confrontation, as demonstrated by the consequent Mond–Turner talks between labor and industry.

SEE ALSO: Anarchosyndicalism; Britain, Trade Union Movement; Combination Laws and Revolutionary Trade Unionism

References and Suggested Readings

- Fox, A. (1958) *A History of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives 1874–1957*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Fraser, W. H. (1999) *A History of British Trade Unionism 1700–1998*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Perkins, A. (2006) *A Very British Strike: 3 May–12 May 1926*. London: Macmillan.
- Reid, A. J. (2004) *United We Stand: A History of Britain's Trade Unions*. London: Allen Lane.
- White, J. L. (1978) *The Limits of Trade Union Militancy: The Lancashire Textile Workers, 1910–1914*. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Britain, trade union movement

Mark J. Crowley

The Historical Context

It was the lack of workers' rights first emerging in the eighteenth century that highlighted the need for a representative body to campaign for workers' welfare in Britain. The Combination Laws passed by Prime Minister William Pitt in

1780 and 1799 made it illegal for workers to lobby their employers for improved pay and conditions. This effectively made trade unions illegal. Opposition to the acts was led by trade unionist Francis Place, with Joseph Hume and Sir Francis Burdett leading the parliamentary charge. The acts were repealed in 1824, but a series of strikes erupted, leading the government to pass the 1825 Combination Acts, which effectively restored the powers of the previous act and reasserted their power over the workers, confining trade union roles purely to meeting to discuss wages. If they met under other provisos, they would be subject to arrest and prosecution, defined as criminal conspiracy in restriction of trade.

The Conservative government under Benjamin Disraeli responded by passing the Masters and Servants Act in 1867, which ensured that those engaging in strikes could only be prosecuted for breach of contract, and criminal action could only be brought if it was deemed that the strike was aggravated.

This prompted the head of the Conservative government, the Earl of Derby, to set up a Royal Commission on Trade Unions in 1867. However, he resisted calls for the inclusion of a working man in the Commission. Trade unionists refused to accept the report, as it was hostile to the existence of trade unions, and instead produced a report of their own. In short, they campaigned for trade unions to be given full legal recognition under British law.

The Trade Union Congress successfully campaigned for the new Liberal government under William Gladstone to accept the proposals. This led to the passage of the 1871 Trade Union Act, which ensured that trade unions received full legal recognition under British law and that no trade union could be regarded as illegal. The result, however, was bittersweet. The Criminal Law Amendment Act, passed on the same day, made picketing illegal. However, the Trade Union Act provided the platform for the increased status and power of trade unions in the remaining part of the nineteenth century.

One of the main motivations behind the formation of trade unions in the late nineteenth century was to politically represent the British working classes, who until then were denied the right to vote and did not have access to parliamentary representation. Their views were effectively ignored. Although the formation of

the Independent Labour Party in 1905 and the introduction of the much-triumphed Representation of the People Act 1918 were heralded as major steps toward the political emancipation of the working classes, this did little to increase the power of the masses, who remained largely marginalized within a political framework dominated by an aristocratic, upper-class elite. It was they who prevailed as the dominant decision-making force. Secondly, working-class protests were not a new phenomenon in twentieth-century Britain and had indeed been a distinct feature of the nineteenth century, in which disenchantment with governmental policies toward the workers was largely articulated through a series of popular protest groups, such as the Rebecca rioters (beginning in the 1830s), the Chartists (by 1834), and the Blanketeers (by the late 1830s).

Twentieth Century

The elevation of protest and political campaigning articulated through trade unionism at the beginning of the twentieth century provided a greater legitimacy to the working-class cause. The political presence of the trade unions would, in theory, ensure the eschewal of government mistreatment previously attributed to popular protest groups on the grounds of their non-political status.

Nevertheless, trade union protests in the 1930s can be considered from two differing perspectives. First, *internal protests* occurred *within* the British Labour Party. Trade unions and affiliated organizations formed a significant part of these, serving merely to undermine the electoral and political stance of the parliamentary party. Second were *external protests*, in which trade union disaffection became publicly witnessed through marches, lockouts, and strikes. This formed the most prevalent component to contemporary anti-government reactions. However, their effectiveness remained constrained by far-reaching legislation passed in the preceding decades, especially the 1920s with the passing of the 1927 Trades Disputes Act in the aftermath of the 1926 general strike. During that strike all workers in the public services struck over the issue of pay and conditions for nine days in 1926. The trade unions called for this strike, arguing that the people deserved better pay and conditions for their work. However, the strike was crushed

by the Conservative government, who refused to cooperate with the trade unions and forced the workers back to work. The 1927 Trades Disputes Act was passed to heavily regulate trade union activity, making strikes illegal without a mandate from a clear majority of all trade union members.

Nevertheless, the label of an illegitimate, disparate “rabble” previously attached to popular protest movements prior to the creation of trade unions was now replaced with a movement claiming legitimacy at a far higher level. Leaders of nineteenth-century popular protest movements did little to address the difficulties attached to their “mob rule” image, which ultimately culminated in the acceptance by some and emulation by others of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Ultimately, this failed to create a favorable image of working-class political concerns amongst the political elites. Conversely, trade unions claimed political status. Comprising elected officers, subscribing members, and a hierarchically defined organization, the perception of a coherently structured movement with a constitutionally defined aim and power structure was presented to the political sphere. Their purpose was to represent, through democratic means, the interests of the working classes.

The 1920s: The “Internal” and “External” Politics of Trade Union Protests

By the late 1920s, the fortunes of the British economy could be described as “mixed.” Britain had experienced its first major industrial dispute of the twentieth century, serving as a warning shot across the bows of the ruling elite. The general strike of 1926 had demonstrated the potential strength of the working class and the dangers of militant trade union protests. Contrary to the feelings of some Conservative members, within whom a deep-rooted desire was prevalent to unceremoniously smash the trade unions, the Conservative leader, Stanley Baldwin, believed a more conciliatory stance was now necessary. He sought to integrate, rather than isolate, the trade unions into governmental business through promoting discussion and debate with major union leaders.

Many politically important steps had already been taken. The appointment of Ernest Bevin as minister of labor, the merging of the Trade

Union Congress and the Workers' Movement, the construction of Transport House in London to house Labour Party headquarters and the Trade Union Congress, together with the publication of the socialist newspaper, the *Daily Herald*, all provided an important platform for the furtherance of trade union activity. This, nevertheless, did not occur without the essential prerequisite of political concessions clearly exercised by the unions themselves.

Rationalization as a means of securing increased growth at limited cost was an aspect dominating political discussion in this period and was prevalent in what became known as the "Mond-Turner" talks at the end of 1929. The talks, which included trade union leaders and senior government officials, were successful in brokering a deal between the conflicting parties. It was agreed that each side would exercise mutual respect toward their opposing political viewpoints, thus ensuring a cessation of hostilities in the interest of national development. Although ultimately these promises were not adhered to, it initially appeared that Baldwin had succeeded in finding a platform with which compromise could be reached between employers, trade unions, and the government, thus facilitating a move away from militant protest and toward professional collaboration in the national interest.

Despite this accommodative stance, however, Baldwin's success at the polls in the British general election of 1929 was undermined by the wider appeal articulated by the British Labour Party, which effectively used its newly acquired resources and capitalized on the inexorable rise of socialism amongst the working classes to espouse a socialist-loaded manifesto to the electorate. The manifesto, by the very nature of its title, *Labour's Appeal to the Nation*, was suggestive more of a plea to a disillusioned electorate rather than a substantive political document. It promised amendments to trade union laws passed in the aftermath of the general strike, better working conditions, and Committees of Inquiry into the causes of and remedies to the depression in the cotton and iron industries.

Baldwin's desperate election machine appealed to the electorate for retention of their faith in the Conservative Party. Conservative election posters compared Britain to a cruise-liner heading straight toward the rocks, a fate they believed would befall Britain if the electorate

were to elect a socialist government. Despite this desperate plea, it was the Labour Party, supported by the newly emancipated trade unions, who would taste victory at the polls.

The economic event that followed shortly after the 1929 election could not have been foreseen by either the Conservative or Labour Party. The Wall Street Crash of October 1929 brought economic collapse on an unprecedented scale, and with it the inevitable and inexorable rise of unemployment in industries largely associated with the dominance of the British empire, including coal and steel. The catastrophic events that followed proved Baldwin's cautionary economic policy of "Safety First," which was a series of cautionary and conservative economic policies that did very little to address the root cause of the problem.

This led to Baldwin being replaced by his predecessor, the socialist Ramsay MacDonald, who had been voted out of office in 1924, largely as a consequence of working-class disillusionment at his failure to implement socialist policies for the benefit of the working classes. Although he claimed to have learned his lessons from 1924, the evidence of this was not conclusive. The working-class feeling of betrayal provided the platform for the strengthening of trade unionism, articulated through high-profile protests in Britain during the 1930s.

"Lockouts" and Protests against Working Conditions

Protests escalated and adopted many different forms. Marches were accompanied by "lockouts," where workers would refuse to enter their factories in protest against their working conditions. This provided further impetus for the strengthening of trade unionism in Britain. The first example of this can be seen by the government response to a union-supported strike in Yorkshire, northern England, in 1930, in which woolen workers refused to work in a protest against pay and conditions. Although the protest could not be considered a lockout on the same scale as that of the 1926 general strike, it acted as a means of demonstrating, both to the employers and the government, that the workers remained disenchanted with government employment policy and were again willing to take direct action as a method of seeking reform. The new minister of labor, Margaret Bondfield,

intervened but provided little support to the disenchanted workers, who were forced to return to work in what was regarded as a humiliating defeat.

Nevertheless, it later appeared that this protest had not been completely in vain. One of the earliest promises put forward by the Labour government was to reduce the length of the working day to a maximum of seven hours. The action of the British Miners' Federation in pushing for this legislation proved to be instrumental. However, despite being open to this concession, the government was less conciliatory toward the Federation's increased wage demands. In the closing stages of 1930, the seven-hour working day had become law but was largely confined to the mining industry. The miners' call to bring the minimum wage legislation up to date from its previous 1912 index was duly rejected by Chancellor Philip Snowden, who argued that the coal industry, unlike in previous decades, would no longer receive generous subsidies from the state. This, amongst other marginal events in 1930, proved to be a catalyst for what became militant trade union protests for the remaining part of the decade, with shorter working hours and improved pay being the two major planks of union demands.

Internal Protest: The Fall of the Labour Party and Decline of the Trade Unions

The provision of employment with fair working conditions remained a priority for the trade unions throughout the 1930s, although prevailing legislation meant that their voices in support of these moves remained largely muted. Much to the annoyance of senior trade unionists, the new Labour government, despite their socialist ideals, remained opposed to the provision of an initiative which had been long supported by the trade union movement: the provision of a Public Works scheme. This scheme, funded by the government, would provide factories for the unemployed and guarantee employment in a period dominated by uncertainty and strife. Ironically, despite their bold claims of future economic reform whilst in opposition, the upheaval caused by unprecedented worldwide economic collapse forced MacDonald and his colleagues to follow a much more prudent economic course than originally advocated in his 1929 manifesto.

This pragmatism nevertheless received considerable opposition from workers and political figures alike, especially David Lloyd George, Britain's inspirational leader for the latter half of World War I, who claimed, in his 1929 general election manifesto, that the Liberal Party would "conquer unemployment" if it ever returned to power. Nevertheless, such was the acute nature of the economic crisis that befell Britain in 1929 that the commitment of the Labour government to implement socialist ideals was completely overridden by its desire to revive capitalism as a method of ensuring stability in the short term, a move provoking outrage amongst trade unionists and workers alike.

Discontent amongst the trade unions, the Labour Party's biggest supporters, led to many internal political protests, many advocated by senior trade unionists unhappy with the Labour Party's apparent abandonment of its socialist credentials. These protests, in tangible political terms for the unions, achieved very little, and merely served to destroy the Labour Party from within, leaving the party susceptible to factionalism and depriving it of the united support of its loyal and financial support base, the trade unions.

At the 1931 general election, the Labour Party was comprehensively defeated and replaced with a new coalition government comprising senior political figures from the three major political parties, united in crisis policymaking for the regeneration of Britain. A further assault came upon the fortunes of the British Labour Party with the defection of its leader, Ramsay MacDonald, to become the leader of this new coalition government. This coalition included both Conservative and Labour Party members of parliament working to incorporate a range of views to help solve the economic crisis. Coalition governments were only traditionally used in British politics during a period of crisis. The last coalition was during World War I, but MacDonald believed that such was the problem facing Britain, with unprecedented economic collapse, that a coalition was once again needed. However, his decision to form this coalition split the Labour Party spectacularly.

This demise in the party's fortunes effectively signaled not only the temporary capitulation of the party's political quest for power, but also impacted considerably upon the influence, motivation, and status of their major financial

and “moral conscience,” the trade unions. Once again, in the same vein as their political vanguard, the trade unions were confined to the political wilderness, and furthermore lacked a strong political party with whom they could align and espouse their political demands. It could be argued that an axiomatic shift was occurring within British politics. What emerged was an increased bureaucratization of the political system, with the inception of Royal Commissions as investigative bodies developing strategies to alleviate the problems of unemployment and working conditions, which were the unions’ two major concerns.

Moreover, the increased use of “economic experts” did much to marginalize the trade unions. Academics, articulating grand economic theories as the resolution to the nation’s problems, now occupied the political limelight. This merely served to relegate once more the trade unions from their recently revived status of relative importance, secured through agreements of mutual cooperation with the government, to that of marginality, with newfound economists appointed by the government as the arbiters of Britain’s future legislation in all public policy areas.

To make matters worse, much to the anger of trade unionists, it appeared that even their most loyal members and supporters who had reached positions of authority, such as Ernest Bevin, were turning their back on the movement. Bevin, as early as 1931, when quizzed about government inaction vis-à-vis unemployment policy, contemptuously commented: “I know that I could be answered by the usual socialist philosophy, but when you go on a Royal Commission you have to deal with the facts as they are and the problem as it is.” In what could only be regarded as a conciliatory gesture, Bevin published a proposal, *My Plan for the 2,000,000 Workless* (1933), which gave some people the illusion that new jobs were actually being created.

The reality, however, proved to be considerably different. Jobs were merely being redistributed, and unemployment remained at staggeringly high levels (above three million at its highest point in 1933), thus serving merely to fuel further resentment amongst trade unions, who became increasingly concerned about the welfare of their members. However, this, coupled with their political paralysis as a consequence of the legislation passed in the aftermath of the 1926

general strike, meant that there was indeed very little that they could do to register their discontent other than to turn away from the ballot box toward direct action, which became a distinct feature of trade union activity for the remaining part of the decade.

Protests against the Means Test: The “Hunger Marches”

Measures to deal with the unemployed poor could be traced back to nineteenth-century Disraelian politics, which is associated with the former prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli. He was famous for his several initiatives to help the poor, developing laws such as the 1834 Poor Law Act, which ensured that those who were out of work had payments from the state until they found more work. Moreover, the state would also help them to find alternative employment, although many people were forced to attend workhouses, where the conditions were harsh and people were forced to work long hours. The work they would do was also mundane (such as boot repairing) and they often worked for 16 or more hours without food and without breaks.

Many revisions took place in the intervening period to these laws, but by 1930 one aspect of this legislation became a highly contentious issue for the working class. The development of what became known as the “Household Means Test” was extremely controversial. People’s eligibility to claim unemployment benefits from the state depended upon their ability to prove their destitution to the authorities. The intrusive nature of these investigations, commissioned by members of the Local Employment Exchanges, opened the lives of the poor to the scrutinizing eye of government-employed personnel, thus making the unemployed an object of ridicule. Government inspectors would be sent to claimants’ houses to see what assets they had, and this would be used as a basis for judging whether they would be eligible for state support. In many cases, officials would tell claimants to sell their possessions in order to raise money before they would allow them to claim assistance from the state. By its very nature, this test aimed to reduce dependency on the state by forcing the unemployed to seek employment, thereby eschewing the widespread humiliation and anguish brought about by resorting to this system.

The government could not have foreseen the widespread protest that this would inevitably generate. These early protests culminated in what became known as the "Hunger Marches" of the 1930s. These marches brought together not only people confined to destitution by the existing laws, but also those in employment frustrated by their lack of power. The employers' strength appeared to be increasing while workers' rights, despite trade union prominence, appeared to be diminishing.

As trade unions began to decline, the National Unemployed Workers' Movement (NUWM) remained strong. Protests were organized regularly, primarily against government treatment of miners in the aftermath of the 1926 general strike. The government now sought repayment from the miners who claimed state benefit during the strike, and cited the undertaking signed in 1926 by these workers, which signaled their compliance with this arrangement. The major grievance of the NUWM nevertheless was that in the aftermath of the general strike, the miners had experienced reductions in their wages, which had consequently made living conditions more difficult, and to a great extent led to the impoverishment of many miners. Demanding repayment under these unfavorable conditions appeared unreasonable.

As the government refused to negotiate, trade unionists, together with extreme militants from both the left and right wing of the political spectrum, came together to organize a national march to London. Participants included the fascist Oswald Mosley and leading figures in the Communist Party, like Arthur Horner. Preparations began in February 1930, bringing together workers from Scotland, Wales, and the north of England, marching against the Labour government's policies toward the workers. Despite its unwillingness to negotiate, the government was prepared to offer overnight accommodation to the marchers at the numerous Victorian workhouses prevalent along the marchers' route. Combined with this conciliatory gesture came the condition that any food provided to the protesters would be below the standard of nutrition provided to the workhouses' regular inhabitants, which, to the contemporary observer, would be almost unimaginable. Nevertheless, this was an offer duly declined by leaders of the march, and marchers declared clearly their preference to spend the night out of doors rather than resorting to the

humiliation to which their ancestors were previously subjected in the much-loathed Victorian workhouse.

The most considerable protests against the means test were seen in Wales, a country that had the highest density of unemployment within a given area, and where protests intensified and occasionally became violent. The Communist Party, which remained marginalized throughout the rest of Britain, proved considerably influential within the South Wales valleys, largely as a consequence of the deep-rooted left-wing political values of its citizens, accentuated by their entrenchment in a long industrial history of coal mining. Their extreme left-wing views acted as a consolidating force to trade unions and motivated movements toward direct action. Anger amongst these groups toward the Labour Party, who appeared disinterested in the plight of the workers, remained a feature of grassroots political sentiments. The NUWM, created as a representative force for an unemployed population that now numbered, on average, one in every three people, emphasized the importance of consolidation and unity on a local level.

One of the major causes of the protests against this system was the lack of uniformity in the application of financial assistance regulations. There were severe anomalies which created considerable resentment amongst claimants. For example, certain areas in southern England were awarded higher payments than their counterparts in northern England. Variations also existed within Wales, with certain areas of the Glamorganshire Valleys benefiting more than their counterparts. The major contributory factor to this anomaly was the implicit statutory stipulation that gave discretionary powers to the public assistance officers in their allocation of benefits. Their presence as assessors operating in a relatively autonomous fashion, subject only to limited government control, ensured the eschewal of arbitrary and centralized financial control.

Protests against the means test were becoming prominent by 1931. In January, a protest was organized by workers in London's Battersea area, incorporating thousands of workers. The protest gathered strength as it progressed down London's Embankment toward Temple Underground Station. A procession through Oxford Street led by the prominent Red Communist flag and accompanied by brass bands and people

singing the *Internationale* caused some disorder, bringing traffic on the busy London streets to a standstill. However, the original plan to march on to Whitehall was aborted, with the protesters diverting toward London's Hyde Park instead. Nevertheless, the events in London acted largely as a catalyst for the cathartic outburst that was to be witnessed in Britain later that decade.

Unemployment had reached three million and was not declining, but harsh governmental treatment of the protesters merely reinforced the conviction that the government had not changed its outlook toward trade unionists and the unemployed since the days of the general strike. The militaristic and authoritarian fashion in which protesters were treated, with many suffering injuries at the hands of police on horseback, led to dissenting voices amongst the popular press, especially the left-wing newspapers, who expressed their disgust. The *New Statesman* was one of many newspapers contributing to the condemnatory tone expressed toward the government for their actions during this time.

The Jarrow March

By 1936, Britain was suffering from the worst effects of the Great Depression, and a Royal Commission was deployed under the guidance of Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain to investigate ways to create employment in the areas worst affected. The findings of the Investigative Commissioners were echoed somewhat by King Edward VIII during his brief visit to South Wales in November 1936, when he observed the abject poverty of the unemployed masses and concluded that "something must be done."

Tacitly reflecting his despair at the perceived government inaction, the king's comments merely reiterated in a more conciliatory tone the sentiments of the Jarrow marchers. This group was led by the Labour MP Ellen Wilkinson (affectionately known as "Red Ellen") in June 1936 in a 300-mile march to London to present a petition for the construction of a steelworks in the area to reinvigorate employment there. This northern English town had, the previous year, been decimated by the closure of its lifeblood, Palmers Shipyard, which left 70 percent of its population unemployed with very little prospect of obtaining further employment. Despite his previously conciliatory gestures toward protesters

and trade unionism, Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin refused to meet the marchers or enter into any negotiations. Likewise, the petition presented by the marchers to parliament merely fell on deaf ears, symbolizing the government's refusal to address the workers' plight.

News traveled very quickly, and it was not long before the masses of unemployed throughout the nation knew the fate that befell their Jarrow comrades. As a consequence, winning the support of the working class for government employment initiatives became increasingly more difficult.

Protests against British Work Centers

In the latter half of the 1930s, the Commissioners for the Special Areas concluded their investigations with findings largely reinforcing trade unionists' claims that British employment policy had, for the previous two decades, been inadequate. As a final attempt to address this issue before the onset of war, the government sought to redefine the problem of unemployment into an issue of retraining. The government committee created to examine the issue of unemployment concluded that by retraining workers with new skills, diversity and transferable skills would create greater employability in a range of areas and specializations through the provision of Work Centers.

The first Work Centers were opened in London in 1938 and were greeted in an unfavorable way by the trade unions. The workers protested against a program which they claimed presented them in an unfavorable light. Their position as unemployed workers was presented as evidence of their fecklessness by the government, which described them as "workshy." As a result of this attitude, the government linked payment of unemployment benefit to attendance at a Work Center. This, largely reminiscent to the days of the much-loathed Victorian workhouses, did very little to aid the government's efforts to win the "hearts and minds" of the working classes, and in fact did more to provoke further unrest and resentment. Some refused to attend, while others refused to cooperate when they attended the centers.

The main cause for concern among trade unionists was that this system would once again create major anomalies, further deepening the inequality cleavage between the unemployed

masses and wider society. Trade unionists believed that men at the Work Centers would be producing the goods that were already produced by the few who were fortunate to be employed. Even worse, for their effort they would only receive unemployment payments, which were a fraction of the ordinary wage. However, the Unemployment Assistance Board, which was responsible for coordinating the activities of the Work Centers, argued that the goods produced by the workers were for training purposes only, and would not be sold to the commercial market. This did much to quell the original suspicions of the unionists of government exploitation of the workers. The government argued that the purpose of the Work Center was to train the men in new skills, thus increasing their employability, and to keep them fit until they could find alternative work.

The 1930s in Britain witnessed numerous trade union protests which in themselves created a considerable impact. However, the nature of the protests evolved in this period as unions leaned their lessons from the mistakes of the 1926 general strike, realizing that successful protests meant that numerous tactics needed to be deployed. With the onset of war in 1939, though, despite a few dissenting voices within the trade unions, most began to see collaboration between the government and the unions as essential in the national interest for the mobilization of workers on the home front to defeat the fascist enemy.

SEE ALSO: Britain, Post-World War I Army Mutinies and Revolutionary Threats; Britain, Post-World War II Political Protest; Britain, Strikes, 1905–1926; British Miners' Strike, 1984–1985; Burdett, Sir Francis (1770–1844); Chartists; Combination Laws and Revolutionary Trade Unionism; Glasgow General Strike, 1820; Labour Party, Britain; Place, Francis (1771–1854); Poor Law, Britain, 1834; Red Scotland and the Scottish Radical Left, 1880–1932; Wales, Nationalist Protest, 19th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Clarke, P. (1996) *Hope and Glory: Britain 1900–1990*. London: Penguin.
- Cohen, M. (1946) *I Was One of the Unemployed*. London: Victor Gollancz.
- Constantine, S. (1980) *Unemployment in Britain Between the Wars*. London: Longman.
- Evans, N. (1999) South Wales Has Been Roused as Never Before: Marching against the Means Test, 1934–36. In D. W. Howell et al., *Crime, Protest and*

Police in Modern British Society. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

- Kingsford, P. (1982) *The Hunger Marchers in Britain, 1920–40*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Pelling, H. (1971) *A History of British Trade Unionism*, 2nd ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Skidelsky, R. (1970) *Politicians and the Slump: The Labour Government of 1929–1931*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Taylor, A. J. P. (1967) *English History*. London: Readers' Union.
- Williamson, P. (1982) Safety First: Baldwin, the Conservative Party and the 1929 General Election. *Historical Journal* 25.

Britain, women's suffrage campaign

Harold L. Smith

The British organized women's suffrage campaign began in the mid-1860s when a reform bill was under consideration that would expand the electorate. John Stuart Mill, a member of Parliament (MP) and a prominent women's suffrage advocate, agreed to introduce a women's suffrage amendment to the bill if the women's groups would generate a petition supporting that reform. Suffrage societies were formed in London and Manchester and provided Mill with a petition requesting women's suffrage with 1,499 signatures. Mill proposed his amendment when the 1867 Reform Bill was under consideration by the House of Commons, but it was easily defeated. Some MPs thought the idea of women voting was ludicrous.

Although there was strong resistance to granting women the parliamentary franchise, they were accepted as voters in local elections. The 1869 Municipal Corporations (Franchise) Act granted women the right to vote in local elections on the same terms as men, and the 1870 Education Act permitted them to vote in local school board elections. Those who opposed women's parliamentary suffrage often argued that because women were rightfully concerned with their communities and the education of their children it was appropriate that they vote in local elections, but parliamentary elections were a different matter. Parliament was concerned with issues of defense and foreign policy that were considered as being outside women's sphere; it was also argued that since women did

not serve in the military it would be inappropriate for them to decide whether men should be sent off to war.

The establishment of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies in 1897 was a key turning point in the development of the constitutional suffrage movement. Led by Millicent Fawcett, the NUWSS began as a federation of 17 of the largest suffrage societies that evolved into the largest and most influential suffrage organization. Its objective was to obtain equal parliamentary suffrage rights for women. Its first major victory came in 1897 when the House of Commons passed a women's suffrage bill by a large majority, but the Conservative government blocked further consideration of the measure.

The NUWSS's members tended to be Liberals, and originally the NUWSS assumed that lobbying the Liberal government and working for the election of pro-suffrage Liberal MPs would bring about reform. But after Herbert Asquith became prime minister in 1908 this assumption seemed questionable since he opposed adding women to the existing electorate because most of those enfranchised would be property owners who were likely to be Conservative voters. When Asquith indicated he would support legislation granting adult suffrage, however, many working-class and Labour women's organizations began to support this instead of the more limited equal suffrage reform (working-class women would not have gained the vote if equal suffrage rights were granted). Democratic suffragists inside the NUWSS also preferred a wider extension of the suffrage and began to agitate for the NUWSS to associate itself with the Labour movement's demand for a democratic suffrage.

The formation of the Women's Social and Political Union in Manchester in 1903 by Emmeline Pankhurst and her daughters Christabel and Sylvia was an important turning point in the suffrage campaign. In contrast to the NUWSS, most of its original members were working-class women who, like Mrs. Pankhurst, were active in the Independent Labour Party. Because of their Labour movement background, they were accustomed to methods such as open-air meetings and the politics of disruption which the NUWSS spurned. The WSPU justified its confrontational tactics by claiming that working-class men had gained the vote during the previous century through militant methods. Although the

WSPU is often perceived as being more radical than the NUWSS because it used militant methods, they shared the same objective: equal parliamentary suffrage rights for women.

The WSPU declared "Deeds, not words" to be its motto as part of its attempt to distinguish itself from the NUWSS, and the group soon became famous for militant deeds. Mrs. Pankhurst's daughter Christabel transformed the campaign in October 1905, disrupting a Liberal Party rally by demanding women's suffrage and then securing her arrest by committing a technical assault on a policeman. She realized that this would generate powerful images of male brutality against women that would place women's suffrage back on the front page of the newspapers. Although her mother offered to pay her fine, Christabel refused, and by serving a week in prison became a martyr for the cause. This brought a surge in WSPU membership and revived support for the suffrage campaign.

During the following years the WSPU encouraged women to engage in a variety of types of militant methods, such as street marches involving clashes with the police, disrupting political meetings, and breaking windows in public buildings. Militancy was not valued solely as a way of gaining the vote. Christabel viewed it as a means by which women could shed the submissive attitude that Victorian culture had ingrained in them. This is why she insisted that the vote not simply be given to women; they would be empowered only if they forced the government to concede it.

The NUWSS and the WSPU moved in opposite directions between 1910 and 1914. While the WSPU increasingly recruited well-to-do women and was drawing closer to the Conservative Party, the NUWSS became a mass movement with formal ties to the Labour Party. Although the NUWSS was originally mainly a "bourgeois" women's organization, after 1910 its support from working-class women increased significantly. The NUWSS expanded rapidly during the period, growing from 210 affiliated societies in 1910 to over 500 by July 1914, and from 21,571 members in 1910 to over 100,000 members or Friends of Women's Suffrage in 1914.

Before 1912 the WSPU had limited its attacks to public property and had sought to win over public opinion to the cause. But when the Liberal government repeatedly prevented suffrage bills from becoming law, the WSPU began to

attack private property in the hope that the public's desire for order would force the government to proceed with reform. In 1912 the WSPU initiated a campaign of arson and bombing of unoccupied buildings that included setting fire to about fifty churches because the clergy were unwilling to speak out on behalf of women's suffrage. This resulted in a reduction in public and parliamentary support for reform.

Although the WSPU began as an ILP women's movement, its leaders had already severed their ties to the Labour movement by 1912 when the WSPU declared war on the Labour Party for refusing to help drive the Liberal government from office. When Sylvia Pankhurst ignored this policy and created an East London WSPU branch that worked closely with Labour and trade union leaders, she was expelled from the WSPU.

Prior to 1912 the majority of NUWSS members were Liberals, and it had always been assumed that the Liberal Party would establish women's suffrage. But the Liberal government's refusal to endorse that reform discredited this assumption, and in 1912 the NUWSS established an electoral alliance with the Labour Party, which was committed to women's suffrage. Although some, including Fawcett, viewed the Labour alliance as a temporary expedient, the democratic suffragists in the NUWSS considered the Labour Party to be feminism's natural ally and intended that the alliance should become a permanent link.

The NUWSS intervened in several by-elections between 1912 and 1914 to support Labour candidates. Their assistance helped reduce the Liberal vote sufficiently that four Liberal MPs lost their seats. Liberal leaders realized that NUWSS electoral work in the approaching general election could result in their being replaced by a Conservative government, and began discussing possible suffrage legislation with the women's leaders. But the WSPU's continued militancy prevented further steps toward reform prior to World War I.

The principle of women's suffrage was conceded in 1918, but historians disagree as to whether World War I was the cause or merely the occasion for reform. Some historians have claimed that women gained the vote as a reward for their contributions to the war effort as munitions workers. But since only women aged 30 and above gained the vote in 1918, and almost

all female munitions workers were under 30, this seems improbable. What the war did do was remove the major obstacles to reform. By 1914 women's suffrage was being prevented by Prime Minister Asquith's opposition, WSPU militancy, and party conflict over the form legislation should take. The war removed all three: the WSPU abandoned militancy in 1914, Asquith resigned in 1916, and the establishment of a coalition government removed the issue from overt party politics.

The suffrage issue was revived in 1916 when the possibility of a general election forced the government to reform the law to enable men in the armed forces to vote. When the Cabinet considered reform legislation, Arthur Henderson, the Labour Party's leader, insisted that women's suffrage be included in any reform bill. A Speaker's Conference was established to review the issues and recommended that women's suffrage be included in the bill, but that restrictions be imposed to ensure that women were not a majority of the new electorate. Most women's organizations accepted these terms and in 1918 the Representation of the People Act enfranchised women aged 30 and above who were also local government electors or the wives of local government electors. This meant that the women who gained the vote were disproportionately middle-class housewives aged 30 and above.

Although the 1918 Act conceded the principle of women's suffrage, it did not grant equal suffrage rights, and the campaign for this continued for the next decade. Since the Labour Party's 1918 election manifesto called for equal suffrage rights, the NUWSS and Labour women initially allied in support of the Labour Party's Women's Emancipation Bill to obtain that reform. But the Coalition government blocked it, and when the 1924 Labour government failed to introduce suffrage legislation the women's movement began to work more closely with Conservative Party women.

The issue divided the Conservative Party. Even many of those supporting equal suffrage rights preferred making 25 the voting age for both men and women. But since this was politically impossible, the party reluctantly began to edge towards enfranchising women at 21. Reform opponents desperately sought to portray women under 30 as "flappers" – unmarried, independent, and politically ignorant – but this attempt to appeal to gender and generational stereotypes

failed. In 1928 the Conservative government secured passage of the Representation of the People (Equal Suffrage) Act with little parliamentary opposition, enabling women, as well as men, to vote at age 21.

SEE ALSO: Pankhurst, Emmeline (1858–1928), Christabel (1880–1958), and Sylvia (1882–1960); Reform Bills, Britain, 1867 and 1884; Women's Movement, Britain

References and Suggested Readings

- Holton, S. (1986) *Feminism and Democracy: Women's Suffrage and Reform Politics in Britain 1900–1918*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Purvis, J. (2002) *Emmeline Pankhurst*. London: Routledge.
- Rosen, A. (1974) *Rise Up, Women! The Militant Campaign of the Women's Social and Political Union 1903–1914*. London: Routledge.
- Smith, H. (2007) *The British Women's Suffrage Campaign 1866–1928*, new ed. Harlow: Longman.
- Vellacott, J. (1993) *From Liberal to Labour with Women's Suffrage: The Story of Catherine Marshall*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

British miners' strike, 1984–1985

Steffan Morgan

The miners' strike of 1984–5 was a defining moment in the history of the British labor movement. The strike was not only an industrial dispute concerned with the future closure of a significant number of collieries within the British coalfield or the dramatic job losses that would occur as a result. It was also symbolic of the wider conflict between the trade union movement, embodied by National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) president Arthur Scargill, and the Conservative government, embodied by the entrepreneurialism promoted by Margaret Thatcher.

The dispute started in response to the announcement of the closure of Cortonwood Colliery, in Yorkshire. This decision formed part of a wider strategy by the National Coal Board (NCB) to further contract the British coal industry. In this context, Cortonwood can be understood as the “final straw” in the disintegrating relationship between the NUM and the NCB. The scale of the proposed closures and

the manner in which the announcement was made – without any consultation with the union – also marked a turning point in the way in which the Conservative government understood the role of the coal industry.

The NUM sought to endorse local area strikes that were already underway in Yorkshire, Scotland, and South Wales, in an attempt to instigate a domino effect. Therefore, rather than calling for a national ballot, the NUM decided to appeal for worker support and to promote an “area by area” stoppage. On March 12, NUM president Arthur Scargill proclaimed that these local strikes would be part of a national strike. Levels of support varied, and in some areas it was distinctly lukewarm; however, despite the overwhelming antagonism to strike action shown by the majority of the Nottinghamshire miners, by April 2, over 80 percent of the British miners were out on strike. The decision not to hold a national ballot, however, meant that the strike was illegal according to the Conservative government's new anti-union legislation. As a result, the striking miners were not entitled to any state benefits; support networks, staffed mainly by women, became an important part of the strike effort.

The main tactic employed by the NUM in their attempt to force the NCB to halt their pit closure program was picketing out workers from other working collieries, or power stations. The most famous picketing incident during the strike was the Battle of Orgreave, at Orgreave coking works in South Yorkshire on June 18, 1984. On the day of the battle approximately 7,000 police officers were prepared for approximately 5–6,000 miners who had traveled from all over the country to stop coal entering the coking plant. In an attempt to obstruct the pickets, Assistant Chief Constable Clement, the Ground Commander in charge of the police, deployed a wide cordon of long shields in front of other non-shielded officers. Mounted police were deployed at the rear of the police line. As the day went on, clashes between miners and the police became more and more violent, and police on horseback were sent to challenge the picketing miners. Both sides disputed to the cause of the violence – the police claimed that the miners threw stones, and the miners claimed that the police attacked without provocation or warning.

Whatever sparked the violent scenes, the dominance of the police was unquestionable. The

miners were much less prepared for physical confrontation than the police. Once the initial objective of clearing the entrance and the roadways surrounding the coking plant had been achieved, the police continued to push back pickets. Under a heavy barrage of missiles, and with the miners setting fire to a car taken from a nearby scrap yard, police on horseback again decided to charge at the miners.

By mid-afternoon, the final phase of the battle involved police on horseback chasing the miners through the residential streets of the village of Orgreave. Official police reports state that 51 pickets and 72 policemen were injured; however, this number was skewed by the fact that many miners did not seek medical attention because they were afraid of being arrested. Ninety-five pickets were charged with riot and unlawful assembly, but by 1987 no one had been convicted. South Yorkshire police later awarded £425,000 and £100,000 in legal costs to 39 pickets who challenged their arrest in an out of court settlement.

Strikers failed to halt coal transportation through Orgreave, and the strike ended on March 3, 1985, nearly a year after the dispute had begun. Twelve deaths occurred during the dispute. David Wilkie, a taxi driver, was killed while carrying a strike-breaker back to work in South Wales by a rock thrown on his car by Russell Shankland and Dean Hancock. Eight picketing miners died in clashes with the police, and three young men died while picking coal. During the strike 11,291 men and women were arrested and 8,392 were charged with a number of offenses, such as breach of the peace and obstructing the highway.

The defeat had a dramatic effect on the British coal industry and its surrounding communities. On the eve of the strike in 1984 there were 170 collieries in Britain. By 2005, there were only eight deep shaft coalmines in Britain; furthermore, the miners' strike of 1984–5 can also be considered the final occasion when the British trade union movement attempted to use mass, nationwide, picketing in an industrial dispute.

SEE ALSO: Britain, Trade Union Movement; Socialism, Britain

References and Suggested Readings

Adeney, M. & Lloyd, J. (1986) *The Miners' Strike 1984–5: Loss Without Limit*. London: Lawrence Wishart.

Deller, J. (2002) *The English Civil War Part II*. London: Artangel.

Fine, B. & Millar, R. (1985) *Policing the Miners' Strike*. London: Lawrence Wishart.

Richards, A. J. (1997) *Miners on Strike: Class, Solidarity and Division in Britain*. Oxford: Berg.

Winterton, J. & Winterton, R. (1989) *Coal, Crisis and Conflict: The Miners' Strike in Yorkshire*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press.

Brixton Riots, 1981

Christian Hogsbjerg

From April 10 to 12, 1981, about 1,000 Londoners, mainly black youth, fought the police in the Brixton Uprising. The Brixton Riots brought violence to Britain's capital on a level unseen for a century, and saw the first use of petrol bombs against the British state on the streets of Britain. They were the most explosive events in an arc of black-led but multiracial riots in anger at unemployment, poor housing, and institutional police and state racism that had



Brixton, South London, April 13, 1981: A man holds up his fist in the Black Power salute as he stands on top of a burned-out car, hit by a petrol bomb during rioting over the previous two days. The result of ongoing economic pressures and police harassment in the poor and predominantly black neighborhood of Brixton, the rioters' aggression was primarily focused on the police and police property. (Getty Images)

begun in Bristol in 1980, and would soon spread to engulf Liverpool and other towns and cities of Britain.

Brixton in south London was the undisputed "capital of black Britain," home to generations of migrant workers. However, general social deprivation and a rise in unemployment after the arrival in power of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 had hit the young black population particularly hard. Insult and injustice were added to injury on an almost daily basis by an institutionally racist police force. In 1978 Thatcher had played the race card, arguing that "people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture." In April 1981 the local police launched Operation Swamp '81 in Brixton, which saw the hated and feared Special Patrol Group (SPG) aggressively target black youth.

This new provocation came after sustained police racism, in particular given license by the "sus" laws, which empowered the police to stop and search anyone they "suspected" of committing a criminal offense. In January 1981 the police did not bother to investigate adequately the tragic death of 13 black youngsters from a fire in New Cross. Proof that years of systematic harassment had lost the police the consent of local people came on Friday, April 10. Black youth rioted for an hour after a misunderstanding concerning a seriously injured black youngster who was seen as being helped into a police van. Rumors that he had subsequently died because of police neglect spread that night around Brixton, and when the SPG was sent in force into the heart of Brixton's black community the next day it was a recipe for disaster.

The area around Railton Road and Atlantic Road, known as the Front Line, was to be the epicenter of the new wave of rioting, which left hundreds injured and damage to property in the region of £10 million. Yet the riots forced the Thatcher government to accept that "something had to be done" with respect to Britain's materially impoverished black communities, and Home Secretary William Whitelaw appointed Lord Scarman to undertake a public inquiry into the riots. Operation Swamp '81 was abandoned and the hated "sus" laws eventually repealed.

SEE ALSO: Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Britain, Post-World War II Political Protest; Notting Hill Riots, 1958; Unemployed Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Fryer, P. (1984) *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain*. London: Pluto Press.
- Gilroy, P. (1981/1982) You Can't Fool the Youths . . . *Race and Class* 23 (2/3).
- Harman, C. (1981) The Summer of 1981. *International Socialism* 14.
- Scarman, Lord (1981) *The Brixton Disorders, 10–12 April 1981: Report of an Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. The Lord Scarman, OBE*. London: HMSO.

Brown, H. Rap (b. 1943)

Yusuf Nuruddin

H. Rap Brown, born Hubert Gerold Brown (October 4, 1943) and now known as Jamil Abdullah Al-Amin, is an African American political activist who first gained national prominence in the 1960s and 1970s as a leader in the civil rights and Black Power movements.

Born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Brown attended Southern University where he joined the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), a civil rights organization whose interracial membership was drawn largely from college and university students. Brown became SNCC's director of the Alabama Project, empowering disenfranchised blacks through voter registration and the encouragement of locals to seek public office.

Increasingly disenchanted in the face of white resistance, many of SNCC's black members, under the leadership of Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Turé), made a transition in 1966 from the advocacy of non-violence and integration to the advocacy of militancy and Black Power. In this climate, H. Rap Brown ascended to national prominence in 1967 as the newly elected chairperson or National Director of the reconstituted SNCC, which now relied heavily on black rather than interracial solidarity. Brown's fiery oratory and uncanny ability to move crowds by impassioned rhetoric earned him the nickname "Rap."

As urban uprisings increasingly occurred across the nation, Brown became an articulate spokesperson advocating black insurrection. The media billed him as a Black Power advocate to be feared and hated by white America, seizing upon his more sensationalized comments, such as his emphatic repudiation of non-violence with its allusions to the American Revolutionary War:

“Violence is as American as apple pie” and his oft-quoted “Burn, Baby, Burn,” which became an exclamatory refrain as insurrectionists looted and torched the exploitative white-owned stores in the inner cities.

Brown was one of the prominent participants at the Black Power Conference held in Newark on July 20, 1967. Because the Newark Uprising had erupted one week before the pre-scheduled conference, the meeting drew national attention. In the immediate aftermath of the Newark rebellion and conference, Brown escalated his call for urban guerilla warfare. An insurrection erupted in Cambridge soon after Brown’s call, and Maryland Governor Spiro Agnew called for Brown’s arrest for inciting a riot. He also used the tensions to articulate a state policy curtailing freedom of speech in the event of future black militant oratory. Brown was arrested two days later on charges of flight to escape prosecution.

Brown turned to an alliance with more radical forces. He and Carmichael were invited to speak at a Black Panther Party rally in Oakland in support of jailed Panther leader Huey P. Newton in February 1968. At this rally, Brown was named minister of justice of the Panther Party.

Brown faced a variety of legal entanglements and found himself continuously in and out of courtrooms and jails for parole violations and other charges, including firearms possession. Convicted in the hold-up of a bar in New York, supposedly to obtain money for revolutionary endeavors, he was sentenced to 15 years at Attica State Prison but was paroled in 1976. While incarcerated, he converted to orthodox Islam and adopted the Muslim name Jamil Abdullah Al-Amin. Upon his release, he settled in Atlanta, where he became the imam or religious leader of a community of Sunni Muslims and the proprietor of a community-based grocery store. He rose to the leadership of a national Sunni Muslim organization, the Dar’ul-Islam movement, and repudiated his former Black Power politics, denouncing black solidarity in deference to religious solidarity. In 2000, he was once again arrested, this time for shooting black policemen Ricky Kinchen and Aldranon English, Fulton County, GA sheriff’s deputies. The officers were fired upon after stopping Al-Amin’s car in an attempt to serve a warrant for his arrest for failure to appear in court for a previous traffic violation. He initially eluded capture, but in 2002 was convicted of 13 criminal charges, including the

murder of Kinchen. He was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole.

SEE ALSO: Black Panthers; Carmichael, Stokely/Kwame Turé (1941–1998); Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

References and Suggested Readings

- Brown, H. R. (1969) *Die Nigger Die! A Political Autobiography*. New York: Dial Press.
- Carson, C. (1981) *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Goldberg, L. (1968) Ghetto Riots and Others: The Faces of Civil Disorder in 1967. *Journal of Peace Research* 5 (2): 116–32.

Brown, John (1800–1859)

Amy Hatmaker

Believing from a young age that God had destined him to destroy the institution of slavery, John Brown lit the fuse that sparked the American Civil War. He also brought a level of violence to the anti-slavery campaign that has historians even today debating the morality of his actions and the stability of his mind. The staunchest of abolitionists, he waged a bloody battle against the pro-slavery forces in the struggle over Kansas and led the failed raid at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia.

Born in Torrington, Connecticut, Brown was the child of strict Calvinists Ruth and Owen Brown. John was close to his mother Ruth and was distraught for years following her death in 1808. His father, a tanner and shoemaker, was an abolitionist who believed that all men were social equals. John Brown’s intense hatred of slavery developed due to a combination of his father’s influence and his witnessing a slave boy’s mistreatment while on a cattle drive as a child.

Brown married Dianthe Lusk, the daughter of his housekeeper, on June 21, 1820 in Hudson, Ohio. Together they had five children who survived into adulthood. Dianthe died in 1831, shortly after giving birth. Finding it difficult to tend to the needs of a young family on his own, Brown married Mary Ann Day, the 16-year-old sister of his housekeeper, in 1833 in New



“The Last Moments of John Brown” (1887) by Thomas Hovenden depicts John Brown as he is led to his execution for his attempted raid at Harpers Ferry on July 3, 1859. Brown was an abolitionist who favored armed insurrection as a means to end slavery, and his failed attempt to start a slave rebellion at Harpers Ferry is seen as the nascent spark of the American Civil War. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

Richmond, Pennsylvania. Mary and John Brown had 13 children, but only four outlived Mary. Brown raised his family in the Calvinist tradition, ruling as a strict disciplinarian. Though several of his sons would turn away from religion later in life, Brown’s children shared his hatred of slavery. Three of his sons – Frederick, Oliver, and Watson – would die fighting against the institution.

Brown was inept as a businessman. Over the course of his life he had a variety of failed business ventures, at various times operating a tannery, raising cattle, surveying land, trading wool, and speculating in land. He filed for bankruptcy in 1842, losing all his belongings except the bare essentials. Continued problems with business endeavors and creditors followed him throughout his life, and he and his family lived in impoverished conditions.

The one consistent presence throughout Brown’s life was his intense hatred of slavery and his belief that blacks and whites were equals. He

dedicated his life to destroying the institution. Unlike other abolitionists, Brown chose to fight slavery and discrimination through action rather than legal means. Brown consistently aided fugitive slaves. He attempted to start a school for black children in 1834, though his financial misfortunes prevented its opening. Brown also moved his family in 1849 to live within a community established for black farmers in North Elba, New York. Like all abolitionists Brown was outraged at the passage of the Compromise of 1850 and the Fugitive Slave Law. He formed the League of Gileadites in January 1851, meeting with several black friends and advocating the killing of slave catchers. Though this would be the first mention of retributive action by Brown, it was in the battle over Kansas that he completely split with pacifist abolitionists and began to see violence as the only way to settle the issue of slavery.

When Congress passed the Kansas–Nebraska Bill in July 1854, obliterating the Missouri Compromise line by allowing residents to vote on the slavery issue, Brown was outraged. Like many in the northeast he viewed it as a Southern plot to extend slavery. Five of his sons – Owen, Salmon, Frederick, Jason, and John Jr. – decided to take advantage of the opportunity for a new start and headed to Kansas in 1855. John decided to follow after collecting money and weapons in order to do battle with the proslavery forces that were also immigrating to Kansas in droves.

The battle between free-soil and pro-slavery factions in Kansas escalated to civil war proportions. As pro-slavery forces resorted to violence and intimidation to achieve their goals, Brown, disgusted at what he viewed as the cowardly response of free-staters, decided to take direct action. Two events culminated in Brown’s decision – the looting of Lawrence, Kansas by pro-slavery forces and the beating of Senator Charles Sumner. On the night of May 24, 1856 Brown led a group of six, including four of his sons, in the late night murder of five influential pro-slavery men in the Pottawatomie Creek area. The Pottawatomie Massacre, as it was dubbed, was the most contentious of his anti-slavery acts, but Brown never stood trial for these killings. Two of his sons, John Jr. and Jason, were arrested and later released. Another son, Frederick, was shot by Martin White, a pro-slavery man, on May 30.

Brown had planned on instigating a slave insurrection as early as 1847. The violence in Kansas convinced him more than ever that this would be the only way that slavery could be stopped. On a trip to the East in 1857 to raise funds for the Kansas fight, Brown met with a group of influential individuals, known as the Secret Six, who would provide financial support for his slave liberation plan. Inspired by Nat Turner's rebellion, the Haitian rebellion, and the Calvinist militant Oliver Cromwell, Brown devised a plan that involved raids into slave country and developing an asylum for escaped slaves in the Allegheny Mountains. He chose the federal arsenal located in Harper's Ferry, Virginia, as the first site of attack. Brown believed that word of the attack on federal property would travel quickly and he would be joined by slaves, freedmen, and abolitionists. His own men were only told of the target the night before the raid was to commence.

Brown, with a group of 21, including six blacks, initiated their raid on Harper's Ferry on October 16, 1859. The group split up upon arrival – some to cut telegraph wires, others to capture the night watchman and guard the bridge, and the remainder descended on the arsenal. Several hostages were taken on the way, and Brown successfully took control of the armory. Raiders were sent out in the area to take hostages and free slaves. The plan began to disintegrate when the relief night watchman reported for duty. Brown's men fired on the man. Wounded, he warned an approaching train. Brown allowed the train to pass, so word spread and militias sprang up immediately to converge on Harper's Ferry. Surrounded and with some of the men wounded, including Brown's sons Watson and Oliver, the group held up in the armory until it was stormed by a federal company under the command of Robert E. Lee on October 18, 1859. A total of 17 people died as a result of the raid, including 10 of Brown's recruits.

Brown was tried by the state of Virginia for the charges of murder, treason against the state of Virginia, and conspiring to incite a slave rebellion. On October 31 the jury convicted Brown. He was sentenced to hang on December 2. Though initially they objected to his violent attacks, abolitionists came to see John Brown as a leader in the fight against slavery.

SEE ALSO: American Civil War and Slavery; American Slave Rebellions; Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658); Nat Turner Rebellion; Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution, 1796–1799

References and Suggested Readings

- Chowder, K. (2000) The Father of American Terrorism. *American Heritage* 5, 1: 68–78.
- Oates, S. B. (1984) *To Purge This Land with Blood: A Biography of John Brown*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Phillips, C. (2005) John Brown Raids Harpers Ferry. *American History* 41, 4: 16–71.
- Reynolds, D. S. (2006) *John Brown, Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed Slavery, Sparked the Civil War, and Seeded Civil Rights*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Sanborn, F. B. (Ed.) (1885/1969) *The Life and Letters of John Brown, Liberator of Kansas, and Martyr of Virginia*. New York: Negro Universities Press.
- Trodd, Z. (2006) Writ in Blood: John Brown's Charter of Humanity, the Tribunal of History, and the Thick Link of American Political Protest. *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 1, 1: 1–29.

Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888–1938)

John Bokina

Nikolai Bukharin was a Soviet Communist Party leader and theoretician who was executed following a Stalinist purge trial, and so much is made of his engaging personality and tragic fate that his prominent position within the Communist Party is often obscured. Approximately ten years younger than the other Bolshevik leaders at the time of the November Revolution, there were frequent remarks about how he was the Party favorite, with his zest for life, intellectual curiosity, sense of humor, and general amiability. And then there is that tragic, but fascinating, denouement. Arrested on false charges; imprisoned and interrogated; attempting to retain his integrity during the sham trial; his execution not enough to prevent reprisals against his family. But between his appearance as the Party favorite and his demise, there were Bukharin's two decades of power and prominence: founder of the Communist youth organization (Komsomol), member of the Politburo, editor of the Party newspaper *Pravda*, official theorist of Soviet Communism, and head of the Communist International.

Bukharin was born in Moscow. His parents were primary school teachers. As a university student, he participated in the 1905 Russian Revolution. The following year he joined the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Party. After several arrests he went into exile in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and finally the United States. While in exile he wrote two theoretical works, *The Economic Theory of the Leisure Class* (1914) and *Imperialism in World Economy* (completed in 1915 and published in 1918). He returned to Moscow during the February Revolution. There he edited the theoretical journal *Spartak*. After the November Revolution brought the Bolsheviks to power, Bukharin was prominent in Moscow politics and appointed to the Party Central Committee. In 1919, along with Evgenii Preobrazhensky, he wrote *The ABC of Communism*, an influential textbook.

In the early years of Bolshevik power Bukharin was identified with the Party's left wing for two reasons. First, he wanted a continuation of the emergency economic measures known as "war communism." And second, and contrary to Lenin's desire to get Russia out of World War I at any price, Bukharin opposed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Bukharin wanted Soviet Russia to stay in the war as a way of inciting world revolution. The 1921 publication of *Historical Materialism* established his reputation as the Party's most important theoretician. That same year Bukharin was reconciled with Lenin, and by 1924 he was a full member of the ruling Politburo.

Indeed, Bukharin was the leading advocate of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) between 1921 and 1928. Before Stalin turned it into the slogan of "socialism in one country," Bukharin believed that socialism could be created in the Soviet Union without the help of socialist revolutions in more developed nations. For Bukharin, the NEP signified a balanced and long-term approach to this goal. Heavy industry, consumer goods, and agriculture were all high priorities. The Soviet state supported both the working class and the peasants, with their private plots of land. Relative freedom prevailed in academia and the arts. Between 1925 and 1928 Bukharin and Stalin – with the support of Mikhail Tomsky and Alexei Rykov – became the dominant figures in the Soviet Communist Party.

In 1928 Stalin turned left, advocating a policy of massive and rapid industrialization and the

complete collectivization of agriculture. With a new majority dependent upon Stalin's support on the Politburo, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky were isolated as a Right Opposition. A by-now familiar pattern ensued. Bukharin was vilified as a capitalist reactionary and patron of the peasants. He and his supporters were removed from their Party and governmental positions. There was a brief respite when Bukharin was appointed editor of the government newspaper *Izvestia* between 1934 to early 1937, but by the end of February 1937 Bukharin was arrested and spent the next 13 months in a cell in Moscow's Lubyanka Prison.

Unlike previous victims, Bukharin refused to humiliate himself during his March 1938 show trial. He sparred with the prosecutor, but without an outright public denunciation of Stalin. He pleaded guilty to the set of charges against him as a whole, while claiming innocence to every specific charge. As expected, he was found guilty and sentenced to death on March 13. The sentence was carried out two days later. His wife Anna Larina was also arrested in 1937 and she spent the next 20 years in Stalin's Gulag. Their 11-month-old son, Yuri, was raised in orphanages and foster homes under another name. They only met again in 1956. The efforts by Anna and Yuri to clear Bukharin's name came to fruition in 1988 when he was rehabilitated by Mikhail Gorbachev.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and "Revolution from Above"; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); War Communism and the Rise of the Soviet Union

References and Suggested Readings

- Bergman, T., Schaefer, G., & Selden, M. (Eds.) (1994) *Bukharin in Retrospect*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Bukharin, N. I. (1969) *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Bukharin, N. I. (1972a) *The Economic Theory of the Leisure Class*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Bukharin, N. I. (1972b) *Imperialism and World Economy*. London: Merlin Press.
- Bukharin, N. I. (1998) *How It All Began*. Trans. G. Shriver. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bukharin, N. I. & Preobrazhensky, E. A. (1988) *The ABC of Communism: A Popular Explanation of the Program of the Communist Party of Russia*. Trans. E. & C. Paul. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

- Cohen, S. F. (1975) *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888–1938*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Gluckstein, D. (1994) *The Tragedy of Bukharin*. London: Pluto Press.
- Heitman, S. (1958) *An Annotated Bibliography of Nikolai I. Bukharin's Published Works*. Fort Collins: Colorado State University Press.
- Katkov, G. (1969) *The Trial of Bukharin*. New York: Stein & Day.
- Larina, A. (1994) *This I Cannot Forget: The Memoirs of Nikolai Bukharin's Widow*. Trans. G. Kern. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Medvedev, R. A. (1980) *Nikolai Bukharin: The Last Years*. Trans. A. D. P. Briggs. New York: W. W. Norton.
- People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR (1988) *Report of the Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites"*. New York: Howard Fertig.

Bulavin's Rebellion, 1707–1708

Yury V. Bosin

Like numerous Russian peasant rebellions, Bulavin's uprising emerged in the Cossack areas along the Don River. While the Russian government sought to limit the power and independence of the Cossacks, at the same time it sought to control the border region to prevent serfs from escaping beyond the Don. In the early 1700s, the Russian government was under political pressure from Russian landowners to capture more than 60,000 serfs who fled their masters to the Don River. In response to calls for action by landowners, Peter the Great signed a decree on July 6, 1707 calling for a census in Cossack settlements as a pretext to track down all runaway serfs and return them to their lords. Peter the Great appointed Duke Dolgorukiy to lead the military expedition that initially captured about 3,000 fugitive serfs. But Cossacks saw Dolgorukiy's mission as a threat to their own rights and freedom. In response to the Russian military infiltration, Cossack chief or *ataman* Kondratiy Bulavin formed a rebel army to repel the Russian forces. On the night of October 8, 1707, Kondratiy Bulavin staged an attack and killed Dolgorukiy and his entire forces.

Not all of the Cossacks supported Bulavin's effort. Some *atamans* remained loyal to the tsar

and sought to capture Bulavin and his insurgents, who had already escaped to Zaporozhye, a town on the western Donetsk River Basin, to regroup before staging a second attack. During the winter hundreds of Cossacks and non-Russian nationalities, including Kalmyks, Mordva, and Tatars, joined the rebels. In February 1708, Bulavin and his rebel army returned to the Don to commence a second uprising against the Russians, seizing Cherkassk, the political center of the Don, and seeking to advance to Moscow. Simultaneously, the tsar organized an army of 32,000 soldiers to capture Bulavin and quell the insurgency. Meanwhile, some Cossacks in Bulavin's entourage conspired against him, surrounding his house on July 7, 1708 and killing him in a shootout. While Bulavin's defeat was seen as a decisive victory in the royal court, and Peter the Great sought extensive control over the Don, he could not abolish Cossack customs and traditions and future popular uprisings against the Russians.

SEE ALSO: Bolotnikov's Rebellion, 1606–1607; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Pugachev's Rebellion, 1773–1775; Razin's Rebellion, 1670–1671

References and Suggested Readings

- Avrich, P. (1976) *Russian Rebels, 1600–1800: Four Great Rebellions Which Shook the Russian State in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Buganov, V. I. (1986) *Moscow Chronicles: Popular Uprisings in the 11–18th Centuries*. Moscow (in Russian).
- Pod'yapolskaya, E. P. (1962) *Bulavin's Rebellion of 1707–1706*. Moscow (in Russian).

Bulgaria, anti-Soviet movements

Vasil Paraskhevov

Protests 1944–1954

The Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria on September 5, 1944 and the coup d'état by the Fatherland Front coalition four days later put the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) in control of critical government ministries. With Soviet backing the BCP gradually eliminated their partners in the coalition, suppressed dissent,

and consolidated control over the country. Although the initial Fatherland Front coalition had been broadly representative of political factions in Bulgaria, by the end of the Soviet occupation in 1947 political power was concentrated entirely in the BCP, economic resources had been nationalized, and the opposition had been completely suppressed.

In 1945 there were four main opposition parties: the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, the Bulgarian Workers Social Democratic Party (United), the Democratic Party, and the Radical Party (United). Independent intellectuals were part of the opposition as well. The Agrarians and Social Democrats were members of the ruling Fatherland Front coalition at the time of the coup, and some of their leaders were ministers in the government as late as August 1945. However, objections to the communist agenda and the sweeping purges of government the communists conducted through control over the ministry of the interior and the ministry of justice soon led these initial partners to leave their parties, and the government, to organize in opposition.

The Agrarian Union was the most influential among the opposition parties. Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, who had returned from exile to take control of the Agrarian Party in 1944, began challenging communist dominance immediately, arguing that Agrarians, by virtue of their numbers, should manage the reconstruction of Bulgaria. Communist authorities forced Dimitrov to resign in January 1945 and Nikola Petkov assumed leadership of the party. Petkov had worked with the communists during the war and participated in the Fatherland Front coup, but he sought democratic reforms and strongly opposed sovietization of Bulgaria.

The Communist Party deployed the security apparatus, the legal system, and the mass media against the opposition. Accusations of fascism or wartime collaboration with the Nazi-supporting government were a tool for communists to purge the government and society of opponents of their agenda. Conspiracy charges and show trials were a common means of contending with officials and opposition leaders, while many people simply disappeared or were detained in labor camps. Nikola Petkov was accused of treasonous sabotage and organizing a coup d'état against the Fatherland Front. His arrest and subsequent execution resulted in the dissolution of the Agrarian Union and the end of organized

opposition in Bulgaria. The other opposition parties were weaker than the Agrarians and were easily isolated by the authorities. In 1948 the BCP banned opposition completely.

The elimination of legal opposition parties marked the beginning of illegal armed insurrection by "forest people" (*goriani*) squads. These squads, composed of adherents of the opposition, agrarians, and former military officers, were active in the regions of Sliven, Pazardjik, Samokov, the Rhodops, and Pirin Mountain. Their main motivation was objection to the communist government's appropriation of private property and curtailment of political freedoms in Bulgaria. Among their commanders were Gerasim Todorov, Hristo Buzov, Kostadin Deikov, Georgi Tarpanov, and Atanas and Ivan Batalovi. Some groups trained in Greece and Turkey and entered Bulgaria illegally. The *goriani* movement reached its peak in 1950–1, with some squads numbering 70–80 men. The state began a serious campaign of suppression and by 1956 the insurgents were all but eliminated. According to state security data, 440 men were killed and over 800 were arrested.

Political Emigration

Forced emigration of non-conforming political leaders was among the strategies the communists employed in consolidating control over Bulgaria. According to state security files, 4,542 people emigrated between 1944 and October 1953 and after that point between 300 and 600 emigrated each year. The first wave of emigrants included adherents of the old regime, monarchists, former politicians, diplomats, and members and supporters of the opposition parties. Many of these people remained active critics of the communist government while in exile, and continued to promote political change.

The largest and most influential ex-patriot resistance group was the Bulgarian National Committee, "Free and Independent Bulgaria," led by former agrarian leader G. M. Dimitrov, who escaped from Bulgaria in 1945 with American support; and the Bulgarian National Front led by Ivan Dochev and Hristo Statev. A deep ideological rift put the two organizations in perpetual conflict: the Bulgarian National Committee was made up of agrarians and republicans, some of whom had ruled along with the communists after 1944; the Bulgarian National Front was made

up of monarchists and ardent anti-communists, politically active prior to 1944. Other important organizations were the Bulgarian Liberating Movement led by Tsenko Barev and the Temporary Bulgarian Representation supported by the former king, Simeon II.

In the 1960s and 1970s a number of influential intellectuals such as Georgi Markov, Dimitar Bochev, Dimitar Inkirov, and Atanas Slavov immigrated to Western Europe. They worked with radio stations such as the BBC, Radio Free Europe, and Deutsche Welle to communicate information to and about Bulgaria. Their broadcasts openly declared the state of the Bulgarian government, breaking domestic silence about both the problems that plagued the country and the injustice of the regime, and efforts to challenge communist hegemony. The Bulgarian authorities reacted to these challenges with surveillance and secret operations by the state security forces against famous emigrant figures such as Markov, Dochev, Slavov, and Vladimir Kostov. The government waged a media campaign to discredit the emigrants by sponsoring films, articles, and books that undermined their moral authority. They also tried to jam foreign radio stations, but people continued to find ways to receive the broadcasts throughout the period.

SEE ALSO: Bulgaria, 20th-Century Leftist and Workers' Movements; Bulgaria, World War II Resistance and the Rise of Communism; Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Soviet Union, Fall of; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”

References and Suggested Readings

- Baev, J. & Grozev, K. (2005) Bulgaria. In K. Persak & L. Kaminski (Eds.), *A Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe 1944–1989*. Warsaw: Institute of National Remembrance.
- Black, C. E. (1979) The Start of the Cold War in Bulgaria: A Personal View. *Review of Politics* 41, 2: 163–202.
- Dimitrov, G. (2003) *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1939–1949*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Horner, J. E. (1974) The Ordeal of Nikola Petkov and the Consolidation of Communist Rule in Bulgaria. *Survey* 20, 1 (Winter): 75–83.
- Hristova, N. (2005) *Spetsifika na balgarskoto “disidentsvo”*. *Vlast i intelligentsia 1956–1989* (Specificity of Bulgarian “Dissidence”: Power and Intelligentsia, 1956–1989). Sofia: Letera.
- Kalinova, E. & Baeva, I. (2001) *La Bulgarie contemporaine entre l'est et l'ouest*. Trans. V. Lebedevska. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Markov, G. (1983) *The Truth that Killed*. Trans. L. Brisby. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Moser, C. (1979) *Dimitrov of Bulgaria: A Political Biography of Dr Georgi M. Dimitrov*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Oren, N. (1973) *Revolution Administered: Agrarianism and Communism in Bulgaria*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Padev, M. (1948) *Dimitrov Wastes No Bullets: The Inside Story of the Trial and Murder of Nikola Petkov (Leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party)*. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.
- Slavov, A. (1986) *With the Precision of Bats: The Sweet and Sour Story of Real Bulgaria During the Last Fifty Years or So*. Washington, DC: Occidental Press.
- Statelova, E. & Tankova, E. (2002) *Prokudenite (The Exiles)*. Plovdiv: IK Janet-45.

Bulgaria, independence movement, 1830–1835

Todor Todorov

Bulgarian nationalism emerged in the early nineteenth century as the Ottoman Empire was beset by pressures domestically and internationally. In 1830 the once-dominant Ottoman Empire was under pressure from political and economic competition from the colonial expansion of England and France, gradually eroding the apparatus of the Turkish central authorities in Constantinople. Known as the sick man of Europe, the Ottoman Empire's passive partnership with Russia under the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, in which it agreed to control the Dardanelles on Russia's behalf, was just one example of the loss of political power and status within the region.

By 1830 Greece had become an independent country, and autonomous Serbia, Montenegro, Walachia, and Moldova were striving for complete political independence from the Ottomans. Bulgarians had provided armed and financial assistance to the Greeks in their six-year struggle against the Ottomans, and fought alongside Serbian troops in the regions adjacent to the rebellious territories. The success of Greece and the Balkan struggles stimulated a movement for national liberation among Bulgarians as well. Several peasants' rebellions broke out in north-eastern Bulgaria in 1833, initiating an extended period of resistance to Ottoman central control and domination.

The Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi fostered hopes among the Bulgarian population for liberation with the support of the Russians. Two revolutionary bases were established in northern Bulgaria. One organized a rebellion against Ottoman authority in Silistra, under the leadership of Captain G. Mamarchov (a Bulgarian national in Russian service). The other orchestrated rebellion occurred in Turnovo, under the leadership of Velcho Atanasov, the Glazier. In the midst of feverish preparations for the insurrection the rebels were betrayed by Hadji Yordan Kissyov, a wealthy man from Elena. The conspirators were caught, and most were executed, including Velcho Atanasov. Captain G. Mamarchov escaped the death penalty because he was a Russian subject, but was banished to the Mediterranean island of Samos.

SEE ALSO: Bulgaria, Anti-Soviet Movements; Bulgaria, 20th-Century Leftist and Workers' Movements; Greek Nationalism

References and Suggested Readings

- Crampton, R. J. (2005) *A Concise History of Bulgaria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Macdermott, M. (1962) *A History of Bulgaria, 1393–1885*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Bulgaria, protests against economic hardships, 1990s

Vasil Paraskevov

In the early 1990s Bulgaria began a slow transition from the former communist state-directed economy to the market economy. Initially, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the former Communist Party, took the responsibility to lead the country after electoral success in the first free elections held in June 1990. However, economic conditions in Bulgaria became worse and undermined the domestic and international prestige of the government led by Andrei Lukanov – in April 1990 the Cabinet stopped payment of the foreign debts of the country, the level of foreign investments was low, and reforms did not begin. Social discontent grew in the autumn of 1990 because of lack of basic foodstuffs. In September queues in the shops began and the government set up coupons for

certain foodstuffs. In this situation in November 1990 street protests and strikes began. The demonstrators wanted the resignation of the government. The trade union Podkrepa organized a political strike in the entire country which increased the tension and threatened social turmoil. On November 29, 1990 Lukanov resigned.

In the following years governments followed inconsistent reform policies which led to a fall in living standards. In December 1994 the BSP won the parliamentary elections and formed a new government, but it could not solve the economic and political crisis in the country. Furthermore, during the rule of Zhan Videnov's government (January 26, 1995–December 23, 1996) the aftermath of this policy became more obvious – significant unemployment, increasing inflation, criminality, etc.

In early 1997, amid permanently increasing inflation, mass protests started. On January 10 demonstrators encircled the parliament in order to support the demand of the opposition parties: the BSP to leave power. As the day progressed the tension rose and finally the gathered people rushed into the parliament and besieged the deputies of the BSP, but the police succeeded in dispelling the demonstrators and later that night evacuated the deputies. Henceforth, the opposition began daily peaceful demonstrations which gathered tens of thousands of people on the main streets in Sofia. The protests continued for around a month and took in other Bulgarian cities as well. In early February the tension reached its peak. Demonstrators blocked major streets in the capital for some days, as well as in Plovdiv, Varna, Russe, etc., and main roads and highways throughout the country. Finally, on February 4, Nikolai Dobrev, the socialist nominee for prime minister after Videnov's retirement, decided to return the mandate for formation of a new government in the face of strong pressure from the street and political opposition. This opened a road for more determined market reforms as well as reevaluation of the old position within the BSP.

SEE ALSO: Bulgaria, Anti-Soviet Movements; Sofia Demonstrations, 1989

References and Suggested Readings

- Dainov, E. (2000) *Politicheskiyat debat i prehodat v Balgaria* (The Political Debate and the Transition

- in Bulgaria). Sofia: Fondatsia Balgarska nauka i kultura.
- Dimitrov, V. (2002) *Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition*. London: Routledge.
- Kalinova, E. & Baeva, I. (2002) *Balgarskite prehodi 1939–2002* (Bulgarian Transitions, 1939–2002). Sofia: Paradigma.
- Zloch-Christy, I. (1996) *Bulgaria in a Time of Change: Economic and Political Dimensions*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Bulgaria 20th-century leftist and workers' movements

Vasil Paraskevov

The agrarian and workers' movements were the most significant challenges to the monarchy and bourgeoisie in Bulgarian society in the beginning of the twentieth century. The workers' movement drew upon the Marxist-social democratic tradition, while the agrarian movement adopted some of the ideological tenets of Marxism, but looked to the peasants rather than factory workers as the source of social and political transformation. Differences in the demographics the movements appealed to, and communist rejection of the agrarian movement because it sought reform within the bourgeois economic system rather than its overthrow, ultimately set the two movements in conflict with one another rather than in alliance against their common enemies.

The workers' movement in Bulgaria emerged during the last decade of the nineteenth century. In 1891, Dimitar Blagoev and Nikola Gabrovski established the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party; the following year, Slavi Balabanov formed the Bulgarian Social Democratic Union. The organizations merged to form the Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party (BWSDP) in 1894, but differences with respect to ideological purity and programmatic scope led the party to split in 1903. The Broad Socialists, led by N. Gabrovski and Yanko Sakazov, embraced an inclusive platform and political strategy, arguing that Bulgarian society relied not only on workers but also on peasants, who were the majority of the population. The Narrow Socialists, whose leader was D. Blagoev, were adherents of Marxism and worked only among the proletariat in the cities. In the interwar years the Broad

Socialists, who preserved the name of the BWSDP, were inclined to compromise with non-socialist parties and insisted on democratization of political life. The Narrow Socialists became the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) in 1919 and accepted the goal of a socialist revolution and guidance of the Comintern.

The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) was originally established in 1899 as a professional association exclusive to peasants. It generated broad support throughout the country with peaceful demonstrations against regressive tax policies, but it eschewed political partisanship. The union changed course in 1901 and became a political party. In 1909, Aleksander Stamboliski provided the party with a much needed ideological foundation in a series of articles elaborating the historical relationship between peasants and the state.

Like the workers' movement, the agrarians were concerned with large-scale social reform to address the unequal distribution of wealth and obligation in Bulgarian society. While the social democrats emphasized industry and factory workers as the site of economic and political transformation, the agrarians focused on agriculture and the plight of farmers. They sought to improve the lot of peasants by fostering efficient production through equal distribution of land, state-supported education, and agrarian cooperatives. Stamboliski saw the party as a source of unity and education among peasants as well as a means of securing their interests against large-scale corporate agriculture.

Public disaffection following World War I due to inflation and high taxes increased support for the socialist and agrarian party alike, but the agrarians had broader appeal for the largely peasant population of Bulgaria. BANU won a plurality of the vote in the 1919 election. Stamboliski invited the BCP, which finished second, and the BWSDP to form a ruling coalition, but they rejected a junior partnership, forcing Stamboliski to ally with factions on the right.

His government won the support of political and economic elites by harshly suppressing a mass transportation strike – organized by communists and social democrats – that lasted for three months in late 1919 and early 1920. The following year BANU won a majority in the parliamentary elections and, with full control of the government, Stamboliski immediately instituted radical reforms. He broke up large land holdings

and redistributed them to the poor, and implemented a progressive income tax and compulsory secondary education. His reforms were directed against "parasitic" elements of society such as lawyers, usurers, and merchant capitalists, and toward achieving more equal distribution of social benefits and burdens. The Stamboliski government further renounced imperialist territorial claims, pursued rapprochement with the European powers and Turkey, and sought membership in the League of Nations.

The agrarian government was brought down by an alliance of tsarists, nationalists, and members of the military, who were alarmed at Stamboliski's reforms and conciliatory foreign policy, and social democrats, who were opposed to the repressive measures he employed in controlling dissent. On June 9, 1923, Stamboliski was assassinated by Macedonian extremists and control of the government fell to the right-left alliance led by Alexander Tsankov.

Tens of thousands of peasants rose up in an effort to protect agrarian rule, but they were poorly armed and badly organized. The authorities neutralized the resistance fairly quickly, killing Stamboliski's brother Vasil, Raiko Daskalov, Krum Popov, Stoyan Kalachev, Dimitar Kemalov, and other prominent agrarian figures. In the districts of Shumen around 1,400 people were arrested, in Pleven 700, and in Karlovo 1,200.

The communists were not part of the coup but neither did they aid the peasant resistance, initially intending to remain neutral while the rival factions weakened each other. On the advice of the Comintern, they revised this position and staged an ill-conceived uprising in mid-September. The government was aware of the planned insurrection and arrested about 2,500 communists on September 12 in a preemptive strike. The party leadership stuck to its plan despite clear indications that the conditions did not favor success, and the army quelled the uprising by the end of September.

The Democratic Alliance that assumed power in Bulgaria after the 1923 coup severely repressed both the agrarian and communist opposition. The authorities arrested and accused communists such as Hristo Kabakchiev, Anton Ivanov, Nikola Penev, and Tina Kirkorova, along with Vasil Kolarov, Georgi Dimitrov, and T. Lukanov who were in exile, of conspiring with Moscow to overthrow the government. Prominent members of the agrarian govern-

ment, among them Nedyalko Atanasov, Stoyan Omarchevski, and Spas Duparinov, were tried for anti-constitutional activities during their rule. The government proceeded with caution in this trial, however, because of international interest and the threat of new peasant unrest, and on April 9, 1924 the court discharged all defendants.

The Communist Party was officially dissolved in 1924, but low-level insurgency continued. In 1925 the government undertook a mass purge of leftist resistance when on April 16 the communists detonated a bomb in the Sveta Nedelya cathedral in Sofia, killing over 150 people. The police arrested some 13,000 people in response to the bombing, many of whom disappeared in custody. Both the agrarian and communist movements lost some of their most distinguished members. Poet Geo Milev and journalists Sergei Rumyantsev and Iosif Herbst, for example, who were not involved in the events but criticized the regime for its inhuman violence, were executed.

The abortive communist uprising in 1923 split the Communist Party geographically as well as ideologically. The majority of the rank and file remained in the country while the leadership fled en masse to the Soviet Union between 1923 and 1927. Most of the Bulgarian exiles became party functionaries in southern Ukraine, but the upper ranks of leadership were given extensive training and positions within the Comintern. Within Bulgaria communists who survived the purges reorganized as the Bulgarian Workers' Party (BWP) in 1927. They sponsored the Independent Workers' Trade Union, which became the center of political activity for labor, and voluntary associations for university students. The BWP won 31 seats in the 1931 general election and a plurality in the Sofia municipal elections. The communist victory in Sofia was overturned by the court, however, and in 1933 the BWP deputies were banned from parliament by the ruling People's Bloc, a coalition that included BANU.

The Communist Party's experience organizing under repressive conditions and the support of the Comintern left it well positioned to contend with the government ban on organized party activity in 1933 and after the 1934 coup. However, the leftists who had gained control of the party in the 1920s interpreted the events through the lens of orthodoxy, seeing them as one more step in the process of capitalism's

self-destruction. The fascist Zveno group, in the orthodox view, would hasten the path to revolution by exacerbating the contradictions within the bourgeois system. The communists opted for neutrality in the situation as they had in 1923, only to again find themselves in conflict with the Soviets and Comintern, who thought the communists should have supported the democratic faction rather than passively foment revolution.

Meanwhile, in 1934 Dimitrov, the leader of the Old Guard communists who was responsible for communist neutrality in 1923, returned from exile in Germany where he had been sent after earning the disfavor of the left-dominated Bulgarian faction within the Comintern. With Stalin's shift to the right, Dimitrov was more in line with Moscow than with his compatriots in the Comintern and he was welcomed with open arms. Dimitrov sought to regain control over the Bulgarian communist émigrés and began to purge the "left sectarians" from positions of authority, calling them Trotskyites. Dimitrov's accusations of conspiracy fed his opponents into Stalin's great purge and hundreds of Bulgarian communists – from the Ukraine as well as the Comintern – were arrested by the Soviet secret police and either executed or sent to perish in concentration camps.

Dimitrov attempted a similar purge within Bulgaria but his task was less easily accomplished in the underground against formidable resistance from the leftist leadership. After the coup the party decided to dissolve the BWP rather than maintain two illegal organizations. Dimitrov favored the opposite course on the grounds that the BWP was better positioned to work with the democratic factions, and the Communist Party was superfluous. The left leadership refused to surrender their organization and for five years there were two underground communist organizations in Bulgaria. Dimitrov managed the more intractable leadership by "inviting" them to Moscow where they met their deaths in Stalin's purge. The leftists in Bulgaria knew nothing of the fate that befell their comrades in the Soviet Union. They maintained their opposition to Moscow's agenda out of the belief that their actions served the true needs of Bulgarian communism. Their ranks were ultimately decimated. Some survivors left the party; others participated in the resistance during the war, and were later forgiven for their deviance

and allowed to aid the communist consolidation of power after 1944.

SEE ALSO: Bulgaria, Anti-Soviet Movements; Bulgaria, World War II Resistance and the Rise of Communism; Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and "Revolution from Above"; War Communism and the Rise of the Soviet Union

References and Suggested Readings

- Bell, J. D. (1977) *Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899–1923*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Crampton, R. (1997) *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – and After*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Daskalov, D. (1999) *Politicheski ubistva v novata istoria na Bargaria* (Political Murders in the Modern History of Bulgaria). Sofia: Izdatelska Kashta Petar Beron'.
- Groueff, S. (1987) *Crown of Thorns: The Reign of King Boris III of Bulgaria, 1918–1943*. Lanham, MD: Madison Books.
- Kosev, D. (1978) *Septemvriuskoto vastanie* (The September Uprising). Sofia.
- Lewis, P. G. (Ed.) (2001) *Party Development and Democratic Change in Post-Communist Europe: The First Decade*. London: Routledge.
- Markov, G. (1994) *Kambanite biyat sami. Nasilie i politica v Bargaria, 1919–1947* (Violence and Policy in Bulgaria, 1919–1947). Sofia.
- Oren, N. (1977) *Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power, 1934–1944*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Rothschild, J. (1959) *The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development, 1883–1936*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Bulgaria, World War II resistance and the rise of communism

Vasil Paraskovov

By 1941 Bulgaria was already strongly allied with Germany. Cultural ties had existed since before World War I, Bulgaria's economy was entwined with Germany's, and Tsar Boris's tight management of political representation and control over elections ensured that the National Assembly was dominated by ministers who shared his own pro-German sentiments. In

1939 the previous prime minister had declared Bulgaria Germany's "natural ally" since they had both been victims of injustice after the war. Cultural exchanges had been established between the two countries and Nazi-like celebrations were conducted in Bulgaria. In deference to Hitler, laws imposing restrictions on Jews had been under consideration in Bulgaria since July 1940, and in January 1941 the Law on the Protection of the Nation subjected Bulgarian Jews to many of the disabilities they suffered in Germany. Bulgaria formally joined the Axis powers in March 1941, intending to limit its military involvement to the Balkans and reclaim the territories it had lost in World War I: neither would be the case.

The Agrarians staged the first serious resistance to Bulgarian support for the Germans in late 1940. Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, a radical Agrarian member of parliament in the early 1930s, planned a coup with the support of British intelligence. In February 1941, however, the police neutralized the conspirators and tried 35 people. Dimitrov fled Bulgaria but received a death sentence *in absentia*.

The communists took up armed resistance in Bulgaria and Germany after the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. In conjunction with the Bulgarian ex-patriots who fled their homeland after the communist uprising in 1923, the Soviet government inaugurated the resistance through a series of radio broadcasts in Bulgarian: Radio Hristo Botev was followed by Radio Narodn Glas and Radio Moscow. Police data indicate that small groups were responsible for the bulk of the resistance in 1941–2: 27 armed groups with 381 partisans implemented approximately 70 actions in Bulgaria's major cities. They employed tactics such as sabotage, strikes, and infiltration of the armed forces.

The Bulgarian government brutally repressed the resistance through arrests, murder, and imprisonment in concentration camps. In August and September 1941 the Soviet Union sent 56 people to Bulgaria to aid the resistance; the police arrested or killed all but seven. Between 1941 and 1942 authorities arrested 5,279 people, of whom 3,882 were sentenced and 130 were executed. Among the victims were Anton Ivanov, Nikola Vaptsarov, General Vladimir Zaimov, and Tsvyatko Radoinov. By 1943 the regime had sent 3,770 people to concentration camps.

In addition to underground activities there was legal civic resistance to the Bulgarian

government's submission to Germany. The Law on the Protection of the Nation, passed in 1941, had not been implemented due to a general lack of anti-Semitic sentiment in Bulgaria. In 1943 Germany increased pressure on the government to support Hitler's elimination of Jews from the region. A special agreement was signed ordering the deportation of 20,000 Jews from Bulgaria's recently reclaimed territories in Macedonia and Trace; 11,400 people were deported directly, and preparations for the deportation of 8,500 more Jewish people from the territories were underway. Popular resistance to the decision from all areas of society – intellectuals, politicians, and ecclesiastics – culminated in a clash between demonstrators and police in Sofia on May 24, 1943. Over 400 people were arrested, but the deportation order was canceled by the action of the National Assembly and on the orders of Tsar Boris.

Germany's losses in the Soviet Union and North Africa in early 1943 emboldened communists to intensify their armed struggle. Between February and May 1943 the insurgents killed General Hristo Lukov, Sotir Yanev, and Colonel Atanas Pantev, who were famous for their pro-German and anti-communist positions. In February 1943 the Communist Party distributed *A Directive for Armed Rising* to support the Bulgarian resistance, but the plan was useless under the current conditions. The partisan movement was strengthened nonetheless. In 1943 the Communist Party divided Bulgaria into 12 zones of rebellion and the partisan groups were named the National Liberation Revolutionary Army. Between November 1943 and September 1944 the number of armed partisans grew from 1,340 to 6,900 and over 9,600 people were involved in some aspect of the resistance. The Bulgarian authorities responded by creating a special police force with unlimited power to pursue partisans. The special police committed atrocities on partisans, murdering their families and burning down their homes. Between 1943 and 1944 the regime killed 2,740 members of the resistance and sent thousands of others to concentration camps.

The Rise of Communism

The end of 1943 brought the war to Bulgarian soil with the beginning of Allied air raids on Sofia. It was clear that Germany could no longer

protect Bulgaria, but the presence of German forces in the country prevented Bulgarian officials from unconditionally surrendering. The Soviet Union further threatened the country with war if it did not quickly move to assert its neutrality vis-à-vis Germany. Support for the resistance greatly increased as people experienced hunger and homelessness, and the majority of this effort was organized by the communists.

The communists had proposed the Fatherland Front in 1942 in an attempt to unite resistance to Tsar Boris's regime. The Front's program, first broadcast over Soviet Radio Hristo Botev in the summer of 1942, was limited to complete neutrality in the war, withdrawal from the occupied territory, and full institution of civil rights. The communists downplayed their own role in an effort to generate mass support, but they had been unable to secure the cooperation of the Agrarian, Social Democrat, and Democratic Party leadership. As the war progressed some of the second-tier leadership agreed to cooperate despite their mistrust of the communists. Among their most important allies were the Pladne (noon) Agrarians, a leftist faction of the Agrarians that had worked with the communists in the 1930s. Nikola Petkov, the leader of the group in the absence of Dr. G. M. Dimitrov – who was in exile for attempting to overthrow the government in 1941 – admired the Soviet Union and supported a democratic–communist alliance. In 1943 the Fatherland Front formed a National Committee that became an important tool in the communists' consolidation of power at the end of the war.

Support from some of the leadership of the democratic factions greatly strengthened the communist position by dividing its potential opposition. Tsar Boris's death in 1943, and the deterioration of the regime's anti-communist, pro-German stance due to the rise of the resistance and encroachment of the Soviet Union during the last year of the war, had further dealt significant blows to the opposition at the other end of the political spectrum. Nonetheless, the communists sought a broad coalition and courted the support of bourgeois leaders.

On September 5, 1944 the Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria. Before the Red Army reached Sofia, on the morning of September 9, members of the Military League (a faction of reserve officers and tsarists) and communists staged a coup, arresting the government and

replacing it with one of the Fatherland Front Coalition. The new government was broadly representative of Bulgarian political factions but communists, despite their pivotal organizing role, were relatively inconspicuous. There was one communist on the three-member Regency Council, and two on the 16-member Council of Ministers.

Over the next two years communists gradually purged the government and society of opposition. With control of the ministry of the interior and ministry of justice, and the support of the occupying Soviets, the communists labeled real and potential enemies as “fascists” and eliminated them. Many were executed; some simply disappeared; others were tried and convicted as war criminals. The Agrarians were the first to challenge the communists. Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, who returned from exile to lead the party, was broadly critical of communist policies and argued that Agrarians, by virtue of their numbers, were entitled to direct the reconstruction of Bulgaria and manifest the peasant democracy Stamboliski envisioned.

Georgi Dimitrov, who had been responsible for initiating the purge of the Bulgarian leftist in the Soviet Union, coordinated the final suppression of opposition. He organized a referendum on the monarchy which returned overwhelming support for establishing a republic. The day the US Senate signed the peace treaty recognizing Bulgaria as a sovereign state, Georgi Dimitrov accused Petkov, the Agrarian leader, of conspiring with the army to overthrow the government. He was stripped of his parliamentary immunity and arrested on the assembly floor. Three months later he was tried and sentenced to death. His execution marked the end of real opposition in Bulgaria.

SEE ALSO: Bulgaria, Anti-Soviet Movements; Bulgaria 20th-Century Leftist and Workers' Movements; Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”

References and Suggested Readings

- Bar-Zohar, M. (1998) *Beyond Hitler's Grasp: The Heroic Rescue of Bulgaria's Jews*. Holbrook, MA: Adams Media Corporation.
- Brown, J. F. (1970) *Bulgaria Under Communist Rule*. London: Pall Mall Press.
- Chary, F. (1972) *The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, 1940–1944*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

- Miller, M. L. (1975) *Bulgaria during the Second World War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Moser, C. (1979) *Dimitrov of Bulgaria: A Political Biography of Dr. Georgi M. Dimitrov*. Ottawa, IL: Caroline House.
- Oren, N. (1971) *Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power, 1934–1944*. New York and London: Columbia University Press.
- Pundeff, M. (1992) Bulgaria. In J. Held (Ed.), *The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Buonarroti, Philippe (1761–1837)

Robert H. Blackman

Philippe Buonarroti has been called the first professional revolutionist. A Florentine noble, Buonarroti abandoned home, family, and country to support the French Revolution in its Jacobin and Robespierreist guise. A leader with Babeuf of the Conspiracy of Equals, Buonarroti survived prison and exile to found secret societies dedicated to restoring the Jacobin republic in France and fostering revolution throughout Europe. His history of the conspiracy led to renewed interest in Babeuf and his ideas of communal property and radical egalitarianism. Buonarroti's combination of secret political organization and public pronouncements influenced generations of European radicals, including Louis Blanc, August Blanqui, Giuseppe Mazzini, Karl Marx, and Mikhail Bakunin.

Buonarroti preached Jean-Jacques Rousseau's ideals of popular sovereignty and individual equality well before the French Revolution. During the Revolution Buonarroti moved to Corsica, where he became a bureaucrat in Pasquale Paoli's government. In time, he became an ardent Jacobin and a friend of the Bonaparte family. These twin connections led him to oppose Paoli and prompted his move to Paris in 1793. There he became a French citizen, frequented the Jacobin club, and came to know Robespierre. Buonarroti was sent by the National Convention to administer territory near Menton conquered in 1794. He retained this post past Thermidor (July 1794) but was jailed in March 1795 for seizing the property of a local noble. While in jail, he met Babeuf and had a jailhouse conversion to the religion of conspiracy. Freed in the general amnesty following the adoption of the Constitu-

tion of 1795, Buonarroti set about agitating for a return to the Jacobin constitution of 1793 and for an invasion of Italy to establish a unified Italian state on the model of the French republic.

Buonarroti was arrested in May of 1796 as member of the Conspiracy of Equals and was sentenced in 1797 to be deported to Guyana. He never left Europe, remaining in French jails until 1806, then sent into exile. He plotted incessantly to overthrow Bonaparte and later the restored monarchy in order to bring back the Jacobin republic. Under the guise of giving music lessons or teaching Italian, he taught revolution. A secret society he formed in Geneva ran from 1809 until 1823, when a messenger was arrested carrying documents that exposed the conspiracy. Forced to flee from Geneva to Brussels, he began a new conspiracy and wrote his justification of the Terror and denunciation of the post-Thermidor republic. Buonarroti returned to Paris after the Revolution of 1830, where he continued plotting to create a republic. Experience had taught Buonarroti that he could no longer hope that the people would spontaneously arise and topple their masters. Instead, he led the way in establishing long-term plots meant to undermine a sitting government to the point of collapse while setting up a shadow government made up of professional revolutionaries.

SEE ALSO: Babeuf, François-Noël (1760–1797) and the Conspiracy of Equals; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Blanc, Louis (1811–1882); France, 1830 Revolution; French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution, Radical Factions and Organizations; Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794); Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Buonarroti, P. (1828/1965) *Babeuf's Conspiracy for Equality*. Trans. B. O'Brien. New York: Augustus M. Kelley.
- Eisenstein, E. (1959) *The First Professional Revolutionist: Filippo Michele Buonarroti (1761–1837)*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Talmon, J. L. (1952) *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Burdett, Sir Francis (1770–1844)

Victoria Arnold

Sir Francis Burdett was one of the most important reformers of his period. A controversial

figure, particularly in his early career, Burdett played a significant and leading role in several of the most popular agitations of the early nineteenth century.

Born in Foremark, Derbyshire in January 1770, Burdett was the eldest surviving son of Francis Burdett (1743–94) and Eleanor Jones, daughter of Sir William Jones of Ramsbury Manor in Wiltshire. He was educated at the Westminster School and Christ Church College, Oxford, but did not graduate. In 1793 Burdett married Sophia Coutts, daughter of the wealthy London banker Thomas Coutts (1735–1822). They had six children, only one a son. Burdett became the fifth baronet upon the death of his grandfather Sir Robert Burdett in February 1797. With the title, Burdett received lands in Foremark and Bramcote in Warwickshire. In 1800 he also inherited Ramsbury Manor from his maternal aunt, Lady Jones.

Burdett first entered parliament in 1796 as MP for Boroughbridge, a seat purchased by his father-in-law from the Duke of Newcastle for the sum of £4,000. He determined to be an independent member and voted against Pitt's ministry on a regular basis, opposing almost all fiscal and tax bills, the suspension of Habeas Corpus, the Combination Acts, the Act of Union, and the exclusion of reporters from the House. In these early days, Burdett's views were seen as extremely radical. His contacts with suspected traitor Arthur O'Connor, convicted traitor Colonel Despard, and his mentor, the radical John Horne Tooke, ensured that the government watched him closely.

Burdett's experience of Parliament in this period was a frustrating one and by 1802 he was ready to retire, but he was persuaded to stand as candidate for Middlesex. Using the mistreatment of political prisoners at Coldbath Fields Prison, Clerkenwell, as the central issue of his electoral campaign, Burdett was returned ahead of the government candidate William Mainwaring. In 1804 Burdett's election was voided, resulting in a new contest in which parliamentary reform rather than prison conditions became his emphasis. He was defeated as a result of the dubious practices of the county sheriffs, but in 1805 his appeal against the result was successful and he was restored to the seat. His victory was to be short-lived, as he was once again unseated in 1806 after the success of Mainwaring's counter-appeal. Once again,

Burdett expressed a wish to retire from public life, the Middlesex election campaigns having cost him thousands of pounds. He resolved to spend no more on campaigning, or even to participate, resulting in his defeat.

By this time Burdett was seen as an important advocate of reform. It was for this reason that in 1807 leading metropolitan radicals worked for Burdett's return as MP for Westminster, a seat he was to hold for the next 30 years. In Parliament Burdett moved for the abolition of flogging in the army and supported moves for an inquiry into allegations of corruption on the part of the Duke of York. In 1809 he introduced a motion for parliamentary reform, calling for a ratepayer franchise, shorter parliaments, single-day elections, and equal electoral districts. Predictably, it was defeated.

In April 1810 Burdett fell foul of the Commons when William Cobbett's *Political Register* published his parliamentary speech in defense of John Gale Jones, a radical publicist jailed for publicizing a debate held at the British Forum in February 1810. Burdett was declared guilty of breach of parliamentary privilege and ordered to the Tower. This judgment provoked the largest mass agitation in London since 1780 as thousands gathered outside Burdett's Piccadilly home, where he had barricaded himself inside to prevent his removal to the Tower. He was forcibly arrested on April 9 and remained in the Tower until the end of the parliamentary session in June. His refusal to join in the mass celebrations on the day of his release offended many of his supporters, but did not permanently damage his status as a popular hero, and he remained a champion of the reform movement.

By the mid-1810s Burdett returned his attention to prison reform and the issue of flogging in the army. This period saw the beginnings of his breach with metropolitan radicals, who turned to more extreme radical leaders such as Henry "Orator" Hunt. To them, the moderate reform advocated by Burdett was not enough. As radicalism began to center more and more on the plight of the working classes and the devastating effects of industrialization, Burdett became further estranged from the radical movement. During this period he had a series of very public disputes with his former ally Cobbett, who frequently criticized Burdett in his *Political Register*.

In Parliament Burdett moved for parliamentary reform in 1812 and 1818, the latter effort being the product of a brief union with Jeremy Bentham, but without much success. He supported Brand's Parliamentary Reform Bill in 1812, seeing it as a step in the right direction, opposed plans for the renewal of property tax, and bombarded the House with reform petitions. However, his reluctance to call for universal suffrage and to back mass meetings, such as that in Spa Fields in 1816, damaged his reputation in radical circles. Burdett remained dedicated to the cause of liberty and in 1820 was fined and imprisoned for seditious libel for his attack on the government's brutal suppression of a public meeting in Manchester, commonly known as the Peterloo Massacre. This, and his support for Queen Caroline, improved his radical standing for a time and ensured he was returned unopposed for Westminster in the election of that year.

Throughout the 1820s Burdett moved away from the radical reform movement and concentrated more on the campaign for Catholic Emancipation, in which he played a central role, bringing the subject before the House of Commons more than any other MP of the period. It was also during this period that he formed a closer relationship with the parliamentary Whigs. In the Commons Burdett supported calls for repeal of the Corn Laws and the Combination Acts. During the campaign for Parliamentary Reform in the late 1820s, Burdett acted as mediator between the government and the radicals and worked for the passage of the 1832 Reform Act. In 1837, after a public argument with Daniel O'Connell over O'Connell's extremist tactics, Burdett was asked by Westminster electors to resign his seat. He did so but won the resulting by-election. Two months later at the general election, Burdett turned his back on Westminster and stood for North Wiltshire, which he represented until his death in 1844. This later period of his life saw Burdett cross the floor of the House and side with the Conservatives.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Corn Law Agitation, Britain, 19th Century; Catholic Emancipation; Cobbett, William (1763–1835); Combination Laws and Revolutionary Trade Unionism; Despard, Colonel Edward Marcus (1751–1803) and the Despard Conspiracy; Hardy, Thomas (1752–1832); Horne Tooke, John (1736–1812); Hunt, Henry "Orator" (1773–1835); O'Connor, Arthur (1763–1852); Peterloo Massacre, 1819; Reform Acts, Britain and Ireland, 1832

References and Suggested Readings

- Dinwiddy, J. R. (1980) Sir Francis Burdett and Burdettite Radicalism. *History* 65.
- Galbraith, G. (Ed.) (1965) *The Journal of the Rev. William Bagshaw Stevens*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hodlin, C. S. (1989) *The Political Career of Sir Francis Burdett*. D. Phil. dissertation, Oxford University.
- Hone, J. A. (1982) *For the Cause of Truth: Radicalism in London, 1796–1821*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Patterson, M. W. (1931) *Sir Francis Burdett and His Times, 1770–1844*. London: Macmillan.

Burkina Faso, Revolution, 1983

Animasawun Gbemisola Abdul-Jelil

Much of sub-Saharan Africa has failed to develop economically and, due to the continued legacy of colonialism, remains mired in political and economic chaos, unable to provide for the basic necessities of life. The causal role of colonialism and imperialism is too obvious to ignore for a proper critical analysis. Burkina Faso, the country hitherto known as Upper Volta, is no exception. Following independence from France on August 5, 1960, Upper Volta remained in economic destitution and political turmoil until 1983, when Thomas Sankara sparked a revolutionary transformation that brought many achievements, although they remain unfulfilled.

In the early twentieth century, Thomas Sankara was among the most respected modern political figures in modern Africa. In 1983 he led the National Council of the Revolution (Conseil National de la Révolution, CNR) and founded a modern African state that sought to secure total emancipation from neocolonialism and imperialism. On taking power, Sankara's first major step was to rename the landlocked West African country through asserting cultural independence and rejecting the dependent terms of development offered by the West, represented by multilateral institutions and transnational corporations (Christoff 2007).

The name of the former French colony was changed from Upper Volta to Burkina Faso, meaning "the land of the upright or righteous," a step that reflected a move toward socialism. Sankara also opted for a locally generated concept of development based on the specific needs of Burkina Faso to secure an independent and

prosperous future for the country and its people. Ironically, Sankara enhanced popular participation by citizens in national affairs through a military government rather than through a democratic neoliberal regime imposed by the West in the interests of foreign capitalists. The military government was embraced by the citizens of the country as a viable alternative to the failed democratic regimes that had preceded it, marking a new concept in civil–military relations and demonstrating a more independent form of rule for African nations (Skinner 1988).

The revolutionary action of the government dramatically transformed the society through the emancipation of women, democratic transparency, a war against corruption, and greater access to health care. Sankara's government advanced health care rapidly, vaccinating three million children against deadly diseases such as yellow fever, measles, and meningitis (Skinner 1988). Through advancing societal rather than liberal western democratic forms, Sankara gained the support of the vast majority of people, while inciting opposition from France, western capitalists, and neighboring capitals in Francophone West Africa, leading to his ultimate demise.

Thomas Sankara believed it was criminal for soldiers to lack political education, a prerequisite for holding political office. If soldiers trained to defend the territorial integrity of their country were in positions of authority, he also thought there was a strong propensity to inadvertently or deliberately do a great disservice to the people. Sankara believed that postcolonial Africa had been plundered by military and civilian leaders primarily concerned with accumulating wealth for themselves. Through his charisma and integrity, Sankara represented a vision of action based on clear-headed thinking and sure-footedness, all of which made him unique as an African soldier in a postcolonial African state. Sankara led a humble and transparently Spartan lifestyle, which earned him the confidence and trust of the citizenry. Although he sought to promote egalitarian development, Sankara may have neglected to recognize the scarcity of the country's economic resources, which halted efforts to dramatically transform the society.

Sankara drew the ire of neighboring African regimes when he called for mass action against elites, believing that the cause of African poverty and underdevelopment was the active connivance of those regimes with imperialists. In 1987,

French President François Mitterrand (1981–93) colluded with leaders of Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Mali, and Togo to depose Sankara, a conspiracy that ultimately kept Burkina Faso perpetually underdeveloped.

In 1987, Blaise Compaore, a member of the CNR, seized power in a military coup, then proceeded to execute Sankara. Under Compaore's rule, Burkina Faso restored the power of the elites who had opposed Sankara's revolutionary transformation and who also had close ties to France and international capital. Compaore restored formal democracy and in 1991 ran unopposed for the presidency of Burkina Faso. He became an ardent opponent of socialism, privatized key sectors of the economy in accordance with International Monetary Fund precepts, and won the presidency continuously through 2005, despite an ostensible multiparty system.

While the Burkina Faso Revolution was reversed by France and neighboring countries, it remains a proud moment in the history of the country and of Africa, being recognized throughout the world for advancing democracy, women's rights, education, and health care during a time of scarcity.

SEE ALSO: Côte d'Ivoire, Post-Independence Protest; Francophone Africa, Protest and Independence; Ghana, Nationalism and Socialist Transition; Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972)

References and Suggested Readings

- Ake, C. (1996) *Democracy and Development in Africa*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
- Christoff, S. (2007) *Echoes of Revolution: Burkina Faso's Thomas Sankara*. Available at www.thomasankara.net/article.php?id_article=0524.
- Sene, J. J. (N. D.). *Burkina Faso: The Country of Honourable Men*. Pennsylvania: Center for the Study of Conflict, Chatham University.
- Skinner, E. P. (1988) Sankara and the Burkinabe Revolution: Charisma and Power, Local and External Dimensions. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 26 (3): 437–55.

Burma, democracy movement

A. May-Oo Mutraw

The origins of Burma's struggle for democracy are subject to debate. Historians disagree as to the



A member of the National League for Democracy Party holds a portrait of General Aung San, the esteemed negotiator of Burmese independence from Great Britain in 1947 and father of Aung San Suu Kyi, a pro-democracy political prisoner under house arrest since 1990. (AFP/Getty Images)

factors that brought about the movement for change. To some extent it is accurate to conclude that each of the periodic movements was the result of backward leadership. Others argue that the country's economic and intellectual development could not keep up with the social and political demands of the time.

Britain's final annexation of Mandalay in 1885 ended the Burman monarchy and feudalism by early 1886. In early British Burma a state of lawlessness contributed to the animosity between the Burman ethnic group and the rest of the population. One contemporary historian, Thant Myint-U, observed that "Burmese nationalism as it developed in the early 20th century [was] a big problem, and [nationalism] sees [Burma] as basically 'Burmese' with ethnic minorities either as nice museum pieces or problems to be 'managed' or 'foreigners' to be expelled (like the Indians and Anglo-Burmans)." Thereafter, the independence movement came in the 1920s – some of the most vibrant years in Burma.

In light of Burma's composition of solidly diverse ethnic groups, as Burma strived for independence, Aung San (a well-known Burman leader highly regarded as the architect of Burma's independence, and father of Aung San Suu Kyi) proposed the idea of a federal union. Considering the importance of the development of culture and national identity on the one hand, and the importance of freedom on the other, such an idea was compelling; and so the endeavor to establish a federal union or *Pyidaungsu* was born. However, many ethnic Burman leaders at the time saw a solid unitary state as the only option. This was true even as a significant amount of discussions and constitutional debates persisted about the establishment of a federal union at the time of the independence movement.

Neither British rule nor the independence movement necessarily led to democracy in Burma; in fact, British colonization and competing ethnic nationalisms were the fundamental cause of the first movements for change. It was those periodic movements that brought the idea of democracy closer to Burma. Historical as well as contemporary events in Burma illustrate two unpopular points about Burma: (1) the aspiration for democracy in Burma has always been understood only in majority ethnic Burman terms; and (2) democracy that excludes the interest of ethnic minorities – all other ethnic groups – and does not accommodate diversity will only result in disastrous political and economic instability.

Parliamentary Democracy and Ethnic Minorities (1952–1962)

Burma became independent from Britain in January 1948. The first constitution of independent Burma, known as the 1947 constitution, came into effect in 1948. Multi-party elections were held as Burma started to exercise parliamentary democracy. Because Burma had enjoyed a parliamentary democracy and an elected government with a free press in the 1950s, it has been argued that Burma was a place where democracy flourished. Ensuing events such as communist resistance and the Karen revolt after the elected government came into power in 1952 illustrated preventable but deliberate failures. Neither the constitution nor the leadership was prepared to deal with many of the realities in the country.

These were the years during which Burma faced the most uncertain future – ranging from

ideological conflict between groups that were predominantly Burman, to the unaddressed question of ethnic minorities. Notwithstanding “equal participation toward the Union of Burma,” the majority of ethnic groups were marginalized. After the Communist Party of Burma commenced an armed revolution against the ruling parliamentary regime on the eve of Burma’s independence, the Karen people also took to the streets, demonstrating and demanding their right to equal participation in the Union on the basis of the principle of ethnic equality in 1949. Systematic militarization of the regions housing the majority of Burma’s minorities during the parliamentary era also gave a horrible impression of democracy to ethnic minorities. The growing political instability and discontent under the elected government resulted in the 1962 military coup led by General Ne Win.

Military Coups and Pro-Democracy Uprisings (1962–1988)

Analysts – Burmese and non-Burmese – often tend to evaluate the 1962 military coup orchestrated by General Ne Win as the end of democracy in Burma. The military men took several years to prepare their transformation into civilian government and adopted the *Burmese Way to Socialism* (Ne Win’s personal ideology) with a change of constitution in 1974. Burma came under the iron-tight rule of the former General Ne Win and his Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). This ensured the permanent death of any prospect for democracy, at least until 1988. For 26 years the socialist regime reigned and ruined the country – economically and politically. At the same time, the avoidance of the question of ethnic minorities and their demand for the right to self-determination and equal participation in the affairs of the Union continued. With the nationwide suppression of all the rights that might carry the slightest sense of democratic value, the socialist regime put the *Tamadaw* (Burma’s army) to good use handling the rebelling ethnic minorities. Ne Win also introduced the infamous Four-Cut Policy in 1968 – cutting supplies, communications, transportation, and the means to recruit, all of which targeted ethnic resistance. The Four-Cut Policy caused massive internal displacement, flows of refugees into neighboring countries, and destruction of hundreds of thousands of villages.

The BSPP nationalized industries and trade. Many critics of the regime claimed that the depth of the government’s intervention in the nation’s economy resulted in the disaster that led to a public protest in 1988. Although the nation at large ignored the aspect of civil war in the form of “ethnic rebellion,” the mismanagement of the country’s economy made it impossible for citizens to continue to be indifferent – until the 1988 uprisings occurred.

The popular 1988 uprisings began with an argument between a small group of students from the Rangoon Institute of Technology (RIT) and the township people over the music played in a café. The government mishandled the incident and overreacted by using riot police. On August 8, thousands of protesting students were gunned down by the military – the citizens of Burma were stunned and outraged. The situation only got worse as leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, viewed the situation as “the concern of the entire nation.” An American Congressman offered his observation, saying: “Burma could plunge into civil war if demands were not met since most rank-and-file-Burmese soldiers are sympathetic to anti-government protests” (Lintner 1990). However, there was no mention of the ongoing civil war in Karen State, Karenni State, Shan State, and Kachin State. Although the movement was nationwide, the demands were disjointed until thousands of students and non-students fled into the ethnic minority regions after the military coup in September 1988. For many citizens of Burma, entering into these areas – mostly war zones – was an epiphany.

Democracy Movements and Ethnic Minorities

The year 1988 was significant in Burma’s contemporary history of social movements for at least two reasons. First, nationwide protests demanded a total change – both of the political system and of people who had been in power for too long. Demonstrators all over the country demanded a change from the “Burmese way of socialism” to democratic rule. They specifically asked for free and fair elections and democracy be “reinstalled,” and wanted no military in the government. The 1988 uprising was what seemed to create a semi-permanent chasm between the military (the *Tamadaw*) and the rest of the country, with almost no prospect to reconcile the

two. Second, the military coup (following violent crackdowns against the demonstrations) broke down some walls isolating ethnic minorities from the Burman majority and the rest of the country. Many Burmese/Burman students, monks, lay persons, and even some defecting Burmese soldiers from the government army fled into areas controlled by armed ethnic resistance groups in order to escape the massive retaliation by the military regime. As many Burmese/Burmans penetrated ethnic resistance-controlled areas, they frightened villagers along the way simply because they were ethnic Burmans. This was an enlightening moment for ethnic minorities and ethnic Burmans – the city-dwellers. Burmese/Burman politicians and political activists began to learn about the plight of Burma's ethnic minorities that they had failed to acknowledge over the previous 40 years. The focus of the movement began to change – from pressing for mere democracy, to demanding a democratic federal union.

The 1990s were years of rebuilding a much-needed understanding between ethnic minorities and ethnic Burmans. When the general elections took place in May 1990, as promised by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the election was held relatively successfully, fairly, and freely. The National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a landslide victory and was eager to take power. Unfortunately, the ruling regime, which changed its name to the State Peace and Development Council, has refused to transfer power as of 2008.

Under the current military regime, two general approaches to a democratic Burma can be witnessed. One is led by the military government and the other is loosely led by the National League for Democracy under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi. Both are the result of the 1988 political upheavals that demanded democracy. Both attempts for transition to democracy have progressed little since that memorable time – in structure or content. The prevailing movement among the ethnic minorities to establish a democratic union based on the federal principle has always been an afterthought, although the mainstream movement for democracy (as well as the military regime) does not fail to rhetorically address the importance of establishing a union.

If democracy, in fact, is a set of rules and institutions that allow the people a hand in their

own government – elections, referenda, legislatures, and the like – it is apparent that Burma's efforts for transition to democracy need some major adjustments. Democracy is irrefutably a desired value for many in Burma; however, to understand democracy as merely a contest for power through elections is too simplistic for a situation as complex as Burma's. In a broader context, Burma's movement for democracy should be seen and understood as a movement towards a peaceful union, firmly built on the principles of federalism and democracy. In other words, for Burma, democracy is an element of a larger struggle. In order for a relatively successful transition to a democratic Burma to be accomplished, the military regime, as well as the non-ethnic democracy movement, must devise a system that can accommodate the nation's rich diversity both structurally and politically.

SEE ALSO: Aung San (1915–1947); Burma, National Movement Against British Colonial Rule; Student Movements, Global South

References and Suggested Readings

- Callahan, M. P. (2003) *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Lintner, B. (1990) *Outrage: Burma's Struggle for Democracy*. Chonburi: White Lotus Press.
- Myint-U, T. (2001) *The Making of Modern Burma*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Myint-U, T. (2006) *The River of Lost Footsteps*. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.
- Reynolds, A. (Ed.) (2002) *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, M. (1999) *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*. London: Zed Books.
- Win, U. K., Han, U. M., & Hlaing, U. T. (1990) Commission to Re-write True History. In *Nationalities' Affairs and the 1947 Constitution*. Rangoon: University of Rangoon Press.

Burma, national movement against British colonial rule

Nupur Dasgupta

The genesis of the Burmese nationalist movement can be traced to the urban-elitist Young Men's

Buddhist Association (YMBA) movement of 1906. However, Adas (1974), Ghosh (2000), and others have located anti-British protests in nineteenth-century rural uprisings, stigmatized as banditry. This changed perception relates to the agency of the vast rural mass in Burma, who lost their political voice over the years under the British military state.

Young Men's Buddhist Association

The annexation of the Irrawaddy delta region by the British in 1852 was followed by nearly half a century of local uprisings mainly led by the displaced *thugyis* (traditional village chiefs) and *myothugyis* (township heads), *pongyis* (Buddhist preachers), and the displaced officials of the court of the *Konebaung* dynasty. It had taken the British over five years after the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1886) to bring about order in the countryside. The legacy of these unorganized and largely localized uprisings left a tradition of anti-colonial resistance, which would reach a peak in the 1920s and 1930s.

Formal public movements began in Burma with the founding of the YMBA by a group of English-educated middle-class Burmese youth such as U Ba Pe, Maung Maung Gyi, and Maung Hla Pe. It was an attempt at retaining Burmese cultural identity within the British rule to which its members expressed loyalty at the 1917 Henzada conference held at Moulmein. The major demands comprised free and compulsory education for Burmese youth, social reform, and adherence to the *Pancashila* (the five Buddhist precepts). By 1911 the organization had launched the English-language *Burman-Buddhist Weekly* and the vernacular *Thuriya* (Sun). The first largescale protest against the colonial presence began over a religious issue, as the Burmese saw the British not just as a threat against their culture and religion, but against the oneness and totality of the universe in the Burmese Buddhist concept. In 1916 the YMBA staged sustained protests against the use of footwear in the precincts of Buddhist pagodas without any exception made for foreigners. The colonial government was forced to accept it. This marked the first success of the YMBA. Buddhism remains central to Burmese concepts of nationalism and purity to this day (Gravers 1999: 7–9).

General Council of Buddhist Associations: *Wunthanu* Movement

The first politically nuanced movement of protest began in Burma in 1918 in view of the proposed Montague-Chelmsford reforms under the aegis of the slowly transforming YMBA. A split took place in the YMBA. Two veterans, U Ba Pe and Maung Gyi, decided to accept the Montague-Chelmsford reform and participate in the elections, and for this purpose founded new parties – the 21 Party and the Progressive Party, respectively. The YMBA, which by then had 45 branches, remained under younger radical leaders – U Chit Hlaing, Tharrawaddy U Pu, and U Tun Aung Kyaw.

The YMBA movement entered a new phase with the participation of a Buddhist monk, U Ottama, who had been exposed to the Gandhian movements in India in the 1920s and was labeled as “Mahatma of Burma.” U Chit Hlaing organized meetings and accompanied U Ottama on tours in the districts, preaching the ideas of nationalism and self-rule. The YMBA was also quick to provide leadership to the 1920 Rangoon University students’ strike against the authorities over the University Bill. They received support from parents, school teachers, and veteran political leaders. Thus the YMBA began tapping the reserves of the student community for the first time. From the 1920s the YMBA, which was transformed into the General Council of Buddhist Associations (GCBA), was led by U Ottama and U Chit Hlaing, who spearheaded a district-level boycott and self-rule movement by setting up district-level patriotic bodies, known as *Wunthanu* (protector of national interest or family, race, and lineage) *Athins* (local associations). This was the third force within the nationalist forum that carried the legacy of the nineteenth-century grassroots sentiments revitalized with new economic and social issues. U Ottama was inspirational for the involvement of Buddhist monks in mainstream politics. He was arrested in 1921 for his anti-British speeches. With the formal introduction of the diarchy in Burma the YMBA declared a permanent boycott of the diarchy reforms and local government which “graduated to non-cooperation” (Maung Maung 1980: 43). The British government passed the Anti-Boycott Act in 1923.

The late 1920s witnessed district-level agitation and the active involvement of the Buddhist *Sangha* (Order) in politics. The political forum

of the General Council of *Sangha Sammeggi* branched out into local bodies, called the *Sangha Sammeggi Apwe*. This was also the phase which witnessed an increasing flow of newspaper publications, both in English and the vernacular. The *Wunthanu Athins* and *Konmayi Athins* (women's patriotic organizations) were active in organizing local rural protest over economic issues, including demands for the repeal of the Village Act, capitation tax and the *Thatameda* (poll) tax, and other specific demands. The peasant uprising thus assumed a constitutional form with a nationalist goal. The religious messages for the grassroots of Burma were interspersed with political overtones. This method of protest was similar to that of the Gandhian principle of *satyagraha* (a program of peaceful violation of specific laws and boycott of colonial institutions). Some of the branches took the shape of secret societies like the ones headed by Thet Kywe, the leader of 11 *Wunthanu Athins*. The boycott of circle boards and Legislative Councils elections in 1922 and 1925 were extremely successful (Moscotti 1974: 123–4; Maung Maung 1980: 43). Government repression came in the form of force and constitutional measures. The village centers of *Wunthanu* activities faced strong government repression. Arrests, quick trials on the spot, strong sentences for rigorous convictions, and police atrocities affecting whole villages weakened the movement by 1927 and it was concomitant with the period of worst conditions for the rural economy and a crisis in national leadership. The GCBA had witnessed a further split in its organization in 1925 and the party was now led by So Thein, a radical leader who maintained close association with young *dhammakatikas* (Buddhist radicals) and district-level lay leaders. U Chit Hlaing had opted out and formed the new organization *Innya Minya Thanbanda Apwe*. The *Sangha* elders in the meantime broke up with So Thein and had also set up a separate faction at Rangoon. The waning of the sincerity of the members, failure of a successful central leadership, scandalous activities of the leaders, and loss of the members to government prisons, Councils, or death, led to the dwindling of the *Wunthanu* movement by 1929.

1930s: Waves of Movements

In the turbulent 1930s Burma was swayed by waves of labor riots and student movements,

as well as the famous and last of the old form of millenarianist grassroots rural upsurge led by *Saya San* in 1930–2. It is important to note that all these developments from the 1930s were related to the economic conditions confronting Burma, when the rice business was hit hard by the Great Depression. The *Sipmae Baho* (Central Economic) Committee formed by Burmese landowners and rice mill owners put forward proposals to the government for relief measures, especially by regulating the price of paddy which was falling rapidly. But this was to no avail. Together with the government's determination to go ahead with plans for imposing the *Thatameda* (household and fuel taxes), this led to the *Saya San* rising in the countryside. Economic depression continued and multitudes of peasants, now landless, flocked to the cities in search of laboring jobs. Clashes between the already entrenched non-Burman *Coringhee* (persons from Coringa, a seaport of southern India) labor and the swelling bands of Burmese laborers exploded in the form of widespread labor and racial riots (the Coolie Riots) in the early 1930s.

Youth Movements

The year 1930 may be seen as a watershed. It marked the beginning of a new phase of the national movement in Burma, leading to new directions, especially towards youth movements. A few small cultural bodies appeared on the scene, reminiscent of the YMBA but secular in nature. In 1925 a few middle-class Burmese serving under the colonial government founded the Friendly Correspondence Club, which graduated into the Youth Improvement Society in 1926. By 1930 a subtle change took place in its composition and aims. *Tats* (voluntary groups), particularly oriented to the physical training of young men, were set up under the leadership of U Maung Gyi. These caught the imagination of the youth and multiple *Tats* spread to the districts, organizing regular drills and social services, later known as the Green Army. The All Burma Youth League was also founded in 1930 by school teachers and college students. By the mid-1930s the League openly led revolutionary nationalist movements. It was at the First All Burma Conference of the Youth League in 1934–5 that the new organization with wider visions – the *Dobama Asiayone* (We-Burmans Association) – was established by Ko Ba Thuang,

a translations tutor at Rangoon University. He used his own funds to produce pamphlets spreading nationalist ideas. The tone of the writings in these pamphlets was revolutionary and classically political. *Dobama* (We Burmans) was also the rallying cry in the Coolie Riots. *Dobama* members Ko Ba Thaug, Ko Hla Baw, and other young men organized mass rallies and raised the Peacock flag in memory of the Coolie Riots. The members, consisting of college students, tutors, businessmen, and clerks in government offices, used the title *Thakin* (a prefix which literally meant Master). The *Dobama* or the *Thakin Party* inspired the new generation and was instrumental in the fundamental transformation which occurred in the Burmese nationalist movement during the decade prior to World War II, i.e., the emergence of a mass nationalist party. The young Burmese men who joined the party set the trend of delivering public speeches, soon banned by the government. They were arrested but acquitted in trials where they were helped by young Burmese legal professionals. Within a short time a number of branches were set up in the districts. By 1936, when the second conference was held in Myingyan, the *Dobama* had emerged as a nationwide mass organization. The *Thakins* passed the resolution to contest the coming elections and formed the Komin-Kochin Party (Our King and Our Kin Party). All these acquired significance when Burma came directly under the British Parliament with the enactment of the 1935 Government of Burma Act. Dr. Ba Maw and U Ba Pe became prominent figures under the new system. In 1936 Ba Maw formed his Sinyetha Wunthanu (Poor Man's) Party and keenly contested the general election held in December. U Ba Pe's United GCBA won the largest number of seats. However, Ba Maw, an astute politician, soon made alliances and emerged as the first prime minister of the Dominion of Burma.

Students' Movements

The years 1936–8 witnessed the widening of the sphere of student participation in active politics. It was in fact from 1934 onwards that the more radical students had begun to join the *Dobama Asiayone*. The Rangoon University Students' Union (RUSU), founded in 1926, was evolving as a more active, socially oriented body in the 1930s. The student community was changing

in character with exposure to new ideologies. Ko Tun On, Ko Kyaw Nyein, and Ko Thein Pe were the famous trio who imparted nationalist color to the Union. The students were establishing contacts with the important leaders in the Rangoon community, the *Gampaka* (trustees) of the Shwedagon Pagoda. They had begun an economic drive to contribute funds to the people suffering in the Dry Zone in the central part of the country. The newly elected president of the union in 1935–6, Ko Nu, delivered a highly nationalist speech at the presidential inauguration. Rangoon University threatened to expel both Ko Nu and Ko Aung San, the secretary of the union, for refusing to reveal the author of the article *Hell Hound At Large*, which criticized a high official of the university in 1936. A massive students' strike forced the university to retract. The students steered into the wider arena of politics. Among them was young Aung San, who would emerge as the foremost nationalist leader in the years to come. In 1937 the Students' Union set up the *Thanmani Tat* or the *Steel Tat*, a Green Army organization. This was also the phase when the student leaders were drawn to communist ideology. Marxist literature was smuggled into Burma. The Socialist Club was formed under the RUSU in early 1938. The club later shifted under the *Dobama Asiayone* headquarters in Yegyaw.

The period 1938–9 witnessed the waning of *Dobama* activities and popularity, as eventually it split (in November 1938), with a section of older members emerging as conservative nationalists, while their opponents favored leftist politics. Student organizations continued and concerned themselves with political and economic issues like the passing of the Tenancy Bill, Land Alienation Bill, Lower Burma Land and Revenue Amendment Bill, and the Measuring Basket Bill. A series of reports and comments were published by Aung San. He had resigned from the RUSU and joined the *Dobama* and participated in the *Thakins'* initiative to organize workers' movements. The workers of the Burma Oil Company joined in a strike in October 1937. This gave a signal for further combined labor and student strikes under the direction of *Thakin* leaders. The Ba Maw government came under serious criticism from the nationalists for compromising with British interests on all counts. A general All Burma Congress was planned, synchronizing workers' and peasants' movements

in January 1939. By the end of February 1939, 34 strikes had been organized involving 17,645 workers from the oil fields, dockyards, steamer services, and small factories. At the same time there were widespread school strikes. Protests broke out over police atrocities. The main thrust of the students' mass movements was to put pressure upon the government. In 1939 Ba Maw's government was defeated in the House of Representatives.

Emergence of the Freedom Bloc

World War II sparked off a new phase of Burmese nationalist agitation which was fraught with the contrasting aims of multiple parties. Leaders of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) Thakin Than Tun and Thakin Soe, while in Insein prison in July 1941, had co-authored the Insein Manifesto, which called for temporary coalition with the British, identifying fascism as the main enemy in the coming war. This was counter to the prevailing anti-British feeling among the nationalists led by the *Thakins*, who strongly resented the British decision to enter Burma in the war. Meanwhile, Soe had already gone underground to organize resistance to the Japanese Occupation. The country was put in a state of war. Defense laws and regulations were clamped down on the people. The nationalists began to plan their anti-British wartime strategies. The Sinyetha Wunthanu Party of Ba Maw and the leftist *Thakin* or Dobama Party, along with the Students' Organization, formed the Freedom Bloc in October 1939 with Dr. Ba Maw as the "dictator" and Aung San as secretary. In the first few months the Freedom Bloc organized mass meetings and demonstrations in Rangoon. At the February 1940 session of the Burmese Legislature, Freedom Bloc's resolution for the complete independence of Burma was defeated by opposition from all non-Burman members. Thwarted on the constitutional front, the Freedom Bloc began to agitate. *Thakin* leaders intensified their movement and organized a conference in 1940 in the Tharrawaddy district. The Sinyetha Party had its meeting in Mandalay, which lasted for three days and was attended by over 15,000 people. Government repression was heavy, leading to the prevention of meetings and arrests of a number of leaders. Ba Maw, Ba Pe, Ba U, Ba Thi, and Thakin Nu were sent to jail. Aung San and some of his

colleagues averted arrest and went to India and then to China. The Japanese were in search of a foothold in Southeast Asia since 1940 after the opening of the Burma Road. They eventually contacted Aung San and his colleagues.

In the years between 1941 and 1944 the ideological ambivalence of the nationalists was reflected in their tactical and political actions. The confusion was sharpened with divisions within their own ranks. The choice before the Burmese nationalists was between collaboration with the Japanese or resistance. While the communist leaders were strengthened in their anti-fascist resolve on ideological grounds, the nationalists saw the war as an event leading towards freedom at any cost.

War, Japanese Occupation, and the Burma Independence Army

U Maung Maung (1969) claimed that some time in January–February 1941 Aung San had drafted the Blueprint for Burma, a controversial document of the Thakin Party which apparently set down the vision of the radical leaders for the future of Burma. The manifesto declared the party's resolution for complete freedom of Burma and the introduction of a free, independent people's democratic republic with a dictatorship, on the ground that western democracy was a sham democracy. How far the message in this manifesto represented Aung San's real aims is a debated issue (Silverstein 1996: 218–19). The vision contained in the manifesto appears blurred with contrasting aims, especially in comparison with the stand he adopted later. Houtman (2007) has sharply criticized the inclusion of this document in Aung San's writings, claiming with some evidence that Maung Maung did this to justify Ne Win's dictatorship with reference to Aung San and his popularity. It should be noted that Aung San considered the Japanese and the British both as fascists, and neither as role models.

Aung San and his colleagues were trained in Japanese-occupied Hainan Island and formed the Burma Independence Army (BIA). The BIA accompanied the invading Japanese force into Burma, with "30 comrades" led by General Aung San. It fought a few wars on the northern frontier and became the living symbol of Burmese nationalism in these early days of the war. Aung San's aims, however, were not realized. The *Thakins'* expectation that the Japanese would

immediately recognize Burma's independence and treat the new nation as an ally in the war was shattered. And the Japanese took more than a year to declare an independent Burma. Seeds of doubt were sown in the minds of Aung San and his colleagues. However, they were not in a position to retrace their steps.

Shadow of Independence: Anti-Japanese Movement

Burma was proclaimed "a fully independent and sovereign State" on August 1, 1943. Ba Maw, installed as the *Adipadi* (head of state), displayed his indebtedness by declaring war on the "Anglo-Americans." The Axis countries, Japan, Germany and Italy, recognized Burma's "independence"; however, doubts were growing in the minds of the Burmese leaders about its nature and extent. A whole year of Japanese occupation was enough to alienate the people. The Japanese army lived off the land and the peasants were pressed to provide supplies of rice and food which were transported outside the country to feed the army. This meant prolonged starvation for the Burmese and famine broke out. The transport system and infrastructure had been cut down by the retreating British army, following scorched earth tactics. The puppet Burmese government under Ba Maw admittedly worked under serious constraints. It had no resources of its own and borrowed the paper currency from the Japanese, who reaped all the essential benefits. The confusion and ambivalence nagging the Burmese nationalists in this phase is reflected in the writings of U Maung Maung. He wrote that independence was empty and the Burmese nationalist leaders as well as the general people knew it – but it gave them some self-respect.

However, by 1944, anti-Japanese feeling overrode all other considerations. Aung San, the defense minister in the Ba Maw government and the commander of the Burma army, emerged at the nucleus of the anti-Japanese movement. At the celebration of the first anniversary of Ba Maw government in 1944, Aung San declared in his speech that Burmese independence was only a paper independence, and a long and hard road still had to be trod. An anti-Japanese resistance movement gathered force from the middle of 1944. During 1943 and 1944 the BIA made contacts with other political groups inside Burma

such as the communists who had taken to the hills in 1942. Eventually, a popular front called the Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO) was founded by the CPB led by Thakin Soe, the BNA, led by Aung San, and the People's Revolutionary Party, later renamed the Socialist Party, led by U Nu, at a secret meeting in Pegu in August 1944 to resist the Japanese Occupation. The nationalists were eventually able to make contact with the British Force 136 in India through the communists and the Arakan Defense Army. Lord Mountbatten supported the AFO-led movement. In March 1945 the BIA was transformed into the Burma National Army (BNA) and launched resistance against the Japanese, while the Axis powers were collapsing on all fronts. The Allied troops entered Burma with full support from the AFO and the BNA and the expulsion of the Japanese was completed by May 1945. The military administration was withdrawn. The AFO was transformed into the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) on August 19, 1945, under the leadership of Aung San.

Reimposition of British Rule

British rule was reintroduced in Burma with Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith's appointment as governor with full executive and legislative powers by His Majesty's Order-in-Council, dated September 8, 1945. The governor declared in his first public speech in Rangoon on October 17, 1945 that the British had returned with a new approach to old problems and a definite and practical program of offering Burma the same degree of freedom as enjoyed by Great Britain itself. However, the words were hollow and the Burmese nationalists were impatient. The White Paper on the Burma Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government, 1945 was denounced by the Burmese as reactionary. A head-on collision was inevitable between the British governor and the most popular nationalist front, the AFPFL, over the issue of the power of representation in the government and the function of the new Executive Council as a National Provisional Government. The AFPFL was shunned by Dorman-Smith and the new council of 11 members was formed without representation from the most popular party.

The League, however, had the people behind it and commanded the widest membership. The large and growing force of ex-soldiers and

guerrillas, who joined the party, formed into the People's Volunteer Organization (PVO) and operated like a patriotic military force. As the clamor for independence grew in magnitude the governor's *de facto* powers waned. The PVO drilled with dummy rifles outside Rangoon. It was an impossible situation. Aung San decided to go to London and plead Burma's case before the new Labor Cabinet in 1946, but was stopped from leaving Burma by the governor. The news of the situation in Burma had reached the House of Commons and questions were raised. In 1946 the AFPFL called a general strike of workers and government personnel to demonstrate the strength of the people's will. The government in Britain under Prime Minister Clement Attlee replaced Dorman-Smith with Hubert Rance, who was more astute, liberal, and aware of Burmese sentiment.

Transfer of Power

A new Executive Council was formed with Aung San as deputy chairman. The transfer of power was planned to be in a gradual manner, but the intentions of the British were now clear. Attlee's ministry had paved the way for India's independence. It had also initiated the negotiations for the independence of Burma and Ceylon and the genesis of the British Commonwealth.

The nationalists in the Executive Council were preparing for the transfer of power. They were now concerned with the more pressing job of consolidating Burma's future. Plans for economic development were proposed. Consolidation of the different ethnic communities and minority groups into a union was the goal. Aung San spent time touring the remote parts of the country, getting acquainted with the people. He and his colleagues were invited to England at this juncture. During the negotiations Aung San asked for the full freedom of all races in his country within a year. Attlee promised to see the Burmese people attain their self-government by the quickest and most convenient time possible (Isaacs 1947: 145–9). The Aung San-Attlee Agreement was signed in January 1947. Elections were held in April of that year. The AFPFL won an overwhelming victory at the polls. The general feeling was inclined towards a Burmese Union. The new Constituent Assembly sat down to work on June 17, 1947 and moved the

resolution to define the basic principles for the constitution. Events were moving fast towards realization of the goal, but an event of great magnitude halted this process. On July 19, 1947 Aung San and six of his colleagues were shot to death by a group of assassins while in a meeting at the secretariat. The plot was thought to have been masterminded by U Saw, the ex-premier (1940–2), who had been implicated in conspiring with the Japanese and exiled by the British to Uganda during the war years. The perpetrators were arrested and sentenced to death. The AFPFL ploughed ahead in this dire situation. Thakin Nu was nominated as the deputy president of the League and president of the Constituent Assembly. In November 1947 the Nu-Attlee Treaty was signed in England and Attlee introduced the Burma Independence Bill in the House of Commons. On January 4, 1948 the Union of Burma came into existence as a sovereign, independent republic outside the British Commonwealth of Nations.

SEE ALSO: Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945); Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); Saya San (Hsaya San) Movement of the 1930s

References and Suggested Readings

- Adas, M. (1974) *The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier, 1852–1941*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Ghosh, P. (2000) *Brave Men of the Hills: Resistance and Rebellion in Burma, 1824–1932*. London: Hurst.
- Gravers, M. (1999) *Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma: An Essay on the Historical Practice of Power*. London: Routledge Curzon.
- Houtman, G. (2007) Aung San's *lan-zin*, the Blue Print and the Japanese Occupation of Burma. In K. Nemoto (Ed.), *Reconsidering the Japanese Military Occupation in Burma (1942–45)*. Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.
- Ileto, R. (1999) Religion and Anticolonial Movements. In N. Tarling (Ed.), *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Isaacs H. R. (Ed.) (1947) *New Cycle in Asia: Selected Documents on Major International Developments in the Far East, 1943–1947*. New York: Macmillan.
- Maung Maung, U. (1969) *Burma and General Ne Win*. London: Asia Publishing House.
- Maung Maung, U. (1980) *From Sangha to Laity: Nationalist Movements of Burma 1920–1940*. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Moscotti, A. D. (1974) *British Policy and the Nationalist Movement in Burma 1917–1937*. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii.

- Silverstein, J. S. (1996) The Idea of Freedom in Burma and the Political Thought of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. *Pacific Affairs*, 69 (2): 211–28.
- Stockwell A. J. (1999) Southeast Asian War and Peace: The End of European Colonial Empires. In N. Tarling (Ed.), *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, R. H. (1987) *The State in Burma*. London: Hurst.

Burschenschaften

Matthew B. Conn

Burschenschaften refer to German student fraternities or clubs that became politically active following the Napoleonic wars of national liberation. The first political student fraternity formed at Jena on June 12, 1815, and its members sought freedom and national unity. Branches also formed in Berlin, Halle, and Heidelberg. Members demonstrated their nationalism by expressing the motto: “Honor, Freedom, and Fatherland.” They wore traditional German costumes, and adopted the colors worn by patriotic volunteers in the Wars of Liberation – black, red, and gold. Important leaders such as Karl Follen drew inspiration from the French Revolution and its ideals, in particular, popular sovereignty.

The radical student fraternities are perhaps best known for their participation in the 1817 festival held near Wartburg Castle. The original occasion, planned by the Jena *Burschenschafiler*, planned for a two-day celebration (October 18–19) commemorating both the third centenary of Martin Luther’s nailing his thesis to a church door in Wittenberg, and also the fourth anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig. What began as a national conference of student radicals quickly turned into a mass celebration of virulent German nationalism. Students built bonfires on to which they piled various symbols of despotism, including a corporal’s walking stick and a French corset. Most notably, the students piled books onto the flames – in particular works by foreign or “un-German” authors, as well as Prussian police laws and the Code Napoléon. Although only approximately 500 students attended the *Wartburgfest*, it served as a key moment of social protest by the German youth.

The year 1819 marked a turning point for the *Burschenschaften*. On March 23, 1819, the

theology student Carl Ludwig Sand stabbed to death the reactionary writer (and tsarist apologist) August von Kotzebue in the latter’s Mannheim home. Sand was a disciple of Karl Follen, and it is widely agreed that the latter had prior knowledge (if not direct influence) over the former’s action. The murder of von Kotzebue served as a pretext for conservative politicians to enact increasingly repressive policies. On September 20, 1819 the Austrian Chancellor Clemens von Metternich enacted the anti-liberal Carlsbad Decrees, which disbanded fraternities, forbade the wearing of “old German costumes,” and censored all publications containing “breathtaking theories and infectious madness.” The final provision of the Decrees dealt with universities, and placed fraternities under surveillance. Prussian citizens were forbidden to study at “foreign” universities such as Jena; the Jena *Burschenschaft* disbanded on November 26, 1819.

Historians have found that there were different factions within the *Burschenschaften*, and have offered a general periodization of their development (Jarusch 1984). The most radical branches consisted of students at the universities of Jena and Giessen under the leadership of Karl Follen, and were commonly referred to as the Blacks. The first and perhaps most radical phase lasted between 1815 and 1819. During the second phase (late 1820s and 1830s) student demands were split between constitutional reform and a reform of university life. In the 1840s, the third (or Progress) phase of student protest called for equality and educational reform – these demands predated the March 1848 revolutions.

SEE ALSO: European Revolutions of 1848; Germany, Socialism and Nationalism; Student Movements

References and Suggested Readings

- Breuer, K. (2002) Constructing Germanness: The Student Movement from the *Burschenschaft* to the *Progressbewegung*, 1814–1849. PhD dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Hartwig, W. (1986) Studentische Mentalität – Politische Jugendbewegung – Nationalismus: Die Anfang der deutschen Burschenschaften [Student Mentality, Political Youth Movement, Nationalism: The Origins of the German *Burschenschaften*]. *Historische Zeitschrift* 242: 581–628.
- Jarusch, K. (1984) *Deutsche Studenten, 1800–1970*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- McClelland, C. (1980) *State, Society, and University in Germany, 1700–1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bussa (d. 1816) and the Barbados slave insurrection

Trevor Rowe

Bussa is the architect of Barbados's African Rebellion of 1816, an uprising that was crushed by the British colonial authorities and failed in the immediate objective of abolishing slavery, but which demonstrated the long-term effectiveness of popular insurrection in bringing the system to an end. Bussa's Rebellion of 1816 is a signal event in the fight toward emancipation in Barbados.

Born a free man in Africa, Bussa was captured and transported to Barbados in the late eighteenth century to work as a slave in the sugar cane fields. Bussa was a house slave who did not experience many of the hardships endured by field slaves who planted and harvested the cash crop. While some domestic slaves felt superior to field slaves and exposed plans for agrarian rebellions to gain favor with their masters, Bussa was exceptional. He apparently enjoyed the confidence of his master and the respect of the slaves. Given his age at capture and the amount of time it would have taken to learn the language and customs required of a house slave, he was likely a respected middle-aged man who nurtured the seeds of revolt by forming an alliance with agrarian workers as he planned a rebellion to end slavery.

Bussa planned to set the sugar cane fields on fire during April harvest season, when planters were complacent and most vulnerable to attack. This would sharply limit sugar exports and

concretely damage the financial interests of plantation owners, jeopardizing their relations with traders. Plantation owners were caught off guard by the insurrection, as African slaves fought valiantly against troops of the colonial administration's First West India Regiment. The revolt spread quickly across Barbados and engulfed half the island. After four days, the colonial forces routed the slaves, executing Bussa and the agitators.

Nearly 100 Africans were killed in battle, 214 were executed by the colonial government, and another 123 men were sent into exile. While the uprising destroyed 25 percent of the year's cash crop, damaged property, and instilled fear among plantation owners, only two members of the First West India Regiment and one white were killed during the battle.

Several years later, in 1824, the House of Assembly granted slaves the right to own property and give evidence in courts and permitted owners to free slaves through manumission. The new legislation, however, allowed whites immunity from prosecution for killing slaves in the 1816 revolt and maintained the death penalty for any slave who threatened a white person.

SEE ALSO: Barbados and the Windward Islands, Protest and Revolt; French Caribbean in the Age of Revolution; Nat Turner Rebellion; Queen Nanny and Maroon Resistance; Vesey's Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Hilary, H. M. (1990) *A History of Barbados from Amerindian Settlement to Nation-State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hoyos, F. A. (1978) *Barbados: A History from the Amerindians to Independence*. London: Macmillan.

C

Cabanagem of Grão-Pará, Brazil, 1835–1840

Newton Ferreira da Silva

Cabanagem was one of the most important insurrections in Brazil's history. It took place in the province of Grão-Pará (currently the States of Pará and Amazonas) during the years 1835–40 and is known for the violence implemented in its ruthless suppression, during which 30,000 people – more than 35 percent of Grão-Pará's population in 1819 – were killed.

After a fairly calm independence process conducted by large-scale farmers in 1822, Brazil faced difficult economic and political circumstances. With the maintenance of slavery and the heavy demands of its crop exportation policy, Brazil did not alter its colonial production structure and all the social and economic inequalities of the colonial systems were transferred to the new period. The new government, suffering a lack of resources, was not financially able to provide the new state with institutions. Brazilian export products were passing through a deep crisis of demand, so the new empire could not increase export taxes. In order to solve this complicated situation, the government developed paper money. Inflation rates increased, and the whole society was obliged to pay for the losses caused by the export-related economic policy that favored the ruling class. However, the newly created middle class (soldiers, public servants, small owners and traders), the poor, and sectors of the ruling class not connected to export business were unwilling to accept impoverishment.

In this context the first emperor of Brazil, Dom Pedro I, abdicated and returned to Portugal. Between 1831 and 1840, the country was commanded by regents who maintained power until Dom Pedro II was able to assume control. It was a period full of social fermentation and political

agitation – in nearly half of its provinces, rebellions and revolts exploded. Cabanagem was one of the most popular and successful of these movements.

Although the revolution of Cabanagem was characterized by massive participation of the poorest sectors of society – the *cabanos* were Indians, slaves, and mestizos (people of mixed race) who lived in huts near rivers – the middle class and some farmers took part in the rebellion as well. Of course their goals were quite different. The *cabanos* were trying to overcome their unbearable and miserable situation through the abolition of slavery, an end to the submission to the Portuguese class that was very powerful in that region, and the adoption of popular sovereignty, while the middle class was resisting the intense impoverishment that it had long been suffering.

In the beginning of the 1830s the province of Grão-Pará had already experienced social agitation, led by the priest Batista Campos and farmer Felix Malcher. The *cabanos* participated directly in these initial struggles. Concerned about the unstable situation in Grão-Pará, the regency government named Bernardo Lobo de Sousa president of the province. He assumed command of the region in December 1833 and started a violent repression against popular movements. Persecutions, arbitrary arrests, and murders were used to suppress any voice against the president, causing even more dissatisfaction and hatred among the population.

On January 6, 1835, the government's palace of Grão-Pará in Belém was surrounded by 200 *cabanos*. After they occupied the palace and killed Lobo de Sousa, Felix Malcher was proclaimed president of Grão-Pará. His short-lived government was controversial from the first day as he largely ignored *cabanos* demands. Accused of treason – he was negotiating surrender with the empire and asked people to drop their weapons – he was arrested and murdered. On February 22, 1835, Francisco Vinagre, a small landowner,

assumed the presidency. Vinagre was the military chief of the *cabanos* and was more in tune with their desires and plans. Nevertheless, he behaved questionably as president: on one hand he gave the people hope concerning their demands, and on the other he recognized the regency power over Grão-Pará. Again, an environment of suspicion and distrust was created and the instability continued.

In June 1835 Diogo Feijó, regent of Brazil, helped by the British army and European mercenaries, sent the Brazilian navy to take Belém back from the rebels. The *cabanos* were expelled and fled to the countryside to reorganize. They initiated guerilla warfare and after ten days of struggle, on August 23, 1835, the *cabanos* retook Belém. On this occasion, in contrast to the first takeover, there was intense persecution of Portuguese merchants, seen as responsible for the poverty and abuse of the workers (mainly slaves and Indians).

Eduardo Angelim, who commanded the new invasion along with Antônio Vinagre (Francisco Vinagre's brother), became the third president appointed by the revolt. He tried to solve some of the province's most pressing problems, such as epidemics and the lack of food, which were decimating Grão-Pará's population. He built bakeries and butcher's shops in order to improve people's social conditions, but the economic embargo imposed by the central government on the province made it impossible to fulfill these aims. Although Angelim had made some attempt to improve the lives of *cabanos*, he was not willing to accept all of their demands – including the abolition of slavery. In the end, Angelim did not intend any great transformation in the lives of Indians and black people – those who had placed him and the other two *cabanos* presidents in power.

Militarily well organized but with many problems in their political constitution, the *cabanos* were unable to modify the structure of society. Divided and weakened, they could not resist the attack from the central government in May 1836. The empire recovered the capital and began a tough and severe policy of repression, torture, and killing. The *cabanos* survivors fled in disarray to the rural areas and tried to continue their resistance there, until the last leader of the great Cabanagem rebellion, Gonçalo Jorge de Magalhães, surrendered on March 25, 1840.

SEE ALSO: Brazil, Rebellions from Independence to the Republic (1700s–1889); Class Struggle; Mendes, Chico (1944–1988) and Amazonian Rainforest Protest and Resistance

References and Suggested Readings

- Prado Jr., C. (1975) *Evolução Política do Brasil e outros estudos*. São Paulo: Brasiliense.
- Ricci, M. (2006) *Cabanagem, cidadania e identidade revolucionária: o problema do patriotismo na Amazônia entre 1835 e 1840*. Available at www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S1413-77042007000100002&script=sci_arttext&tlng=g.
- Santos, S. C. (2004) *Cabanagem: crise política e situação revolucionária*. Master's degree dissertation. Campinas: Unicamp.
- Werneck Sodré, N. (1967) *Formação Histórica do Brasil*. São Paulo: Brasiliense.

Cabañas, Lucio (1938–1974)

Benjamín Anaya González

The former leader of the Poor People's Party (Partido de los Pobres, PDLP), teacher Lucio Cabañas Barrientos was born in Atoyac de Álvarez on December 12, 1938 and killed in combat against the Mexican army in Tecpan de Galeana on December 2, 1974, both villages located in the southern state of Guerrero, Mexico.

Cabañas participated in a number of political movements. In addition to the PDLP, in which he worked with Octavino Santiago, Félix Bautista, Serafin Núñez, César Núñez Ramos, Inocencio Castro, and Jacob Nájera, he was active in the Communist Party (PC), the Revolutionary Action Movement (Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaria, MAR), the Revolutionary Teachers' Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario del Magisterio, MRM), with Othón Salazar, and the Guerrero Civic Association (Asociación Cívica Guerrerense, ACG), with Genaro Vázquez Rojas, in which he led the Atoyac branch. The regional director of the public education ministry sent Cabañas and Serafin Núñez to the northern state of Durango, where they organized protests. On their return to Guerrero, after several attempts at being recognized as a political organization, the ACG became the PDLP.

On May 18, 1967, as secretary of section 14 of the teachers' union, Cabañas led a protest when the head of an elementary school in Atoyac de

Álvarez asked poor students for extra money. The protest became a massacre, for which the Guerrero government blamed Cabañas, prompting him to go underground. At that point the PDLP became primarily an armed guerilla group, operating mainly in the Sierra of Guerrero and finding support among peasants and farmers as well as students and teachers. Other organizations from Guerrero joined Cabañas and the PDLP, including the Peasant Organization of the Southern Sierra (Organización Campesina Sierra del Sur), the Guerrero People's Self-Defense Council (Consejo de Autodefensa del Pueblo de Guerrero), and radical students from the Autonomous University of Guerrero. After another massacre, this time at Tlatelolco on October 2, 1968, Cabañas intensified his actions.

From 1968 to 1974, Cabañas and the PDLP built up the movement with social support in the northern area of the state of Guerrero. They accepted help from other guerillas, including MAR (who had trained in North Korea) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces. The appearance of the September 23 Communist League (Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre) in the PDLP's headquarters, however, marked a breaking point in Cabañas's struggle. He and his supporters had rallied around a peasant, Christian-oriented ideology focusing on poverty and dignity and saw little or no appeal in Marxism-Leninism, which was often hostile to Christianity. Thus they expelled the League's *guerrilleros* from their coalition.

In late May 1974, former Senator Rubén Figueroa Figueroa, who was running for governor, insisted on visiting Cabañas's headquarters. Figueroa and four other people were kidnapped by Cabañas but freed by military troops after three months. After being betrayed by Isabel Ramos, Cabañas and six other *guerrilleros* were killed by the army and the PDLP ceased to exist.

SEE ALSO: Latin America, Catholic Church and Liberation, 16th Century to Present; Tlatelolco 1968 and the Mexican Student Movement; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Suarez, L. (1985) *Lucio Cabañas, el guerrillero sin esperanza*. Mexico City: Grijalbo.
 Tort, G. (2005, dir.) *The Guerrilla and the Hope: Lucio Cabañas*. DVD. Mexico City: Macondo Cine.

Cabral, Amilcar (1924–1973)

Adebusuyi I. Adeniran

Pan-African socialist, poet, and revolutionary theoretician, Cabral was central to the establishment of the African Party for the Independence and Union of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, PAIGC) between 1956 and 1959. He also assisted Agostinho Neto (1922–1979) in creating a freedom party in Angola. Cabral was a major proponent of armed struggle in liberating African society from colonial rule, and is today considered to be one of the greatest cultural advocates of contemporary African society.

Amilcar (Lopes) Cabral was born in Bafata, Portuguese Guinea (Guinea-Bissau) on September 12, 1924. Amilcar's parents were of Cape Verde descent. His father, Juvenal Cabral, worked as a basic school teacher and opinion leader, while his mother, Iva Evora, primarily engaged in tailoring and community work.

Upon the death of Simoa Borges (Juvenal's adopted mother) in 1932, Juvenal, Iva, and young Amilcar returned to Cape Verde, where they remained throughout the difficult World War II period, which was marked by Portuguese dictator António de Salazar's disastrous financial policies that amplified the cost of living in creating scarcities of goods. Between 1940 and 1948, drought and famine led to the death of an estimated 55,000 Cape Verdeans. This and other related developments during Amilcar's formative years helped to shape his emancipatory philosophy later on.

Cabral attended Mendelo High School on São Vicente Island from 1941 to 1943. He thereafter proceeded to the Agronomy Institute in Lisbon on a scholarship in 1945, where he met his first wife, Maria Rodrigues, with whom he had two children: Iva Maria and Ana Luisa. At the Institute, among the books Cabral came across was Léopold Senghor's edited *Anthology of the New Black and Malagasy Poetry* (1948), which he confessed reassured him of the fact that "the Negro is (re)awakening everywhere in the world." He believed that it was imperative to return home: a view that similarly impacted other Negro students.



Amilcar Cabral, leader of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, gives an interview in Havana, Cuba, in 1970. Cabral, a leading African intellectual exponent of decolonization and socialism, was assassinated on January 20, 1973 outside his home in Conakry, Guinea, by Portuguese agents a few months before Guinea-Bissau declared its independence from Portugal. (AFP/Getty Images)

Cabral completed his studies at the Agronomy Institute in 1950 and began working in Santarem as an agronomist. During his time at the Institute, Cabral became involved notably in various African reinvention movements. He proposed searching for the real “African identity” that differentiated Africans from “the white.” This facilitated the establishment of the Center for African Studies. Cabral’s contributions to the activities of the Center were overtly anti-Eurocentric, drawing intermittent intrusion from the secret police (PIDE).

Upon his return to Guinea-Bissau in 1952, Cabral continued even more zealously with his anti-imperial endeavors, engaging and organizing the local indigenous population. His anti-colonial position led to his exile from Portuguese Guinea in 1955. He subsequently relocated to Angola, where he worked assiduously as a member of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular da Libertação de Angola, MPLA), which was formed in 1956.

Meanwhile, Cabral and his colleagues were inspired to establish the PAIGC in 1956 by a confluence of events including the conference of a group of non-aligned African and Asian states in Bandung, Indonesia, and the commencement in 1955 of a militarized struggle between the Algerian National Liberation Front and the colonial government. Among his colleagues were Fernando Fortes, Aristides Pereira, Elisée Turpin, and Luis Cabral – Amilcar’s half-brother who eventually became the president of Guinea-Bissau upon independence in 1974.

In 1957, Cabral attended an anti-Portuguese colonialism meeting in France, and in 1960, he was a participant at the second conference of African peoples held in Tunis. The PAIGC began functioning in Bissau on September 19, 1959 as an underground outfit. Its main objectives were: to train armed fighters and party loyalists for the interior Guinean communities; to gather support from neighboring countries; and to secure foreign sympathy and patronage. Having operated outside the Republic of Guinea since its establishment, the PAIGC eventually launched an open militarized confrontation with the Portuguese colonialists on January 23, 1963 with the destruction of a military installation situated in southern Guinea-Bissau. By July 1963, the PAIGC took the battle to the northern flank of the country. The primary goal of the insurgency was to achieve liberation for both Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde. By 1972, Cabral was already arranging for an Indigenous Assembly in anticipation of independence. However, disgruntled elements within the rank and file of the PAIGC, in active connivance with imperial Portuguese agents, assassinated Cabral on January 20, 1973 in the presence of his second wife, Ana Maria.

Paradoxically, the killing of Cabral brought no respite for the Portuguese colonial administration. Rather, the PAIGC insurgents persisted, gaining the upper edge in the ensuing altercation. On September 24, 1973, the PAIGC declared independence for Guinea-Bissau.

SEE ALSO: Agbekoya Peasant Uprising and Rebellion, 1968–1969; Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962; Cape Verde, Independence Struggle; Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961); Guinea-Bissau, Nationalist Movement; MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola); Négritude Movement; Neto, Agostinho (1922–1979); Senghor, Léopold (1906–2001)

References and Suggested Readings

- Chabal, P. (1983) *Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chailand, G. (1969) *Armed Struggle in Africa: With the Guerrillas in "Portuguese" Guinea*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Chilcote, R. H. (1991) *Amilcar Cabral's Revolutionary Theory and Practice: A Critical Guide*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Fobanjong, J. & Ranuga, T. K. (2006) *The Life, Thought and Legacy of Cape Verde's Freedom Fighter Amilcar Cabral (1924–1973): Essays on his Liberation Philosophy*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
- McCulloch, J. (1983) *In the Twilight of Revolution: The Political Theory of Amilcar Cabral*. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Calvin, John (1509–1564)

Amy Hatmaker

John Calvin radically changed religious interpretations, restructured church organizations, and altered the relationship between the church and community governance. He was born July 10, 1509 in Noyon, France to a staunch Roman Catholic family. His father served as a bishop's secretary, and this relationship resulted in Calvin interacting with aristocrats and other influential people. Calvin received a humanist education in Paris. He studied theology and planned for the priesthood until his father requested in 1527 that he study law. That same year he switched to Lutheranism. Calvin completed his law degree in Orléans in 1532. When several of his reformist associates were persecuted for heresy, Calvin fled Paris. His *Institutes on the Christian Religion*, a defense of French Protestants, was published in 1536 in Basel. Following this he planned to move to Strasbourg; however, he was detoured through Geneva where a leading reformist Guillaume Farel used the threat of God's wrath to convince him to stay in Geneva and aid their struggle to make Geneva a Protestant city.

Calvin, using his beliefs as a guide, profoundly altered church and civil institutions in Geneva. Believing in strict biblical interpretation, he used a literal reading of the scripture to organize the church into a four-part hierarchical

organization: pastors, teachers, elders, and deacons. Pastors preached the word, teachers studied and wrote, deacons oversaw the social welfare institutions, and elders governed in all moral matters. Calvin believed in predestination, the theory that only a select few were chosen by God for salvation, yet he added to this with the belief that the elect were obliged to govern over those who were not. Because of this belief, discipline became a central concern of the church. Calvin and Farel used this doctrine to impose a strict moral code on Geneva; initially Genevans rebelled against this, and Calvin lived in exile for a number of years until new city officials invited him back in 1540. After his return, Calvin restructured city government, making clergy part of the municipal decisions, especially in areas of civil discipline. Calvin based his organizational changes, both church and civil, on the theory of voluntary association, a belief that communities should choose their own members and that those members, in turn, elect to participate in that society. Calvin remained in Geneva until his death on May 27, 1564.

Due to Calvin's reforms, Geneva was the center of Protestantism by the mid-sixteenth century, attracting Europeans ejected from their own provinces. The Calvinist influence on foreign refugees is thought to be responsible for the quick spread of Calvinism throughout Europe. Calvinism would remain the dominant form of Protestantism throughout the seventeenth century.

SEE ALSO: Fox, George (1624–1691); Luther, Martin (1483–1546); Reformation; Wesley, John (1703–1791), Methodism, and Social Reform

References and Suggested Readings

- Bouwsmas, W. J. (1988) *John Calvin: A Sixteenth-Century Portrait*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Calvin, J. (1975) *John Calvin: Selections from His Writings*. Missoula, MT: Scholars Press for the American Academy of Religion.
- Jones, S. (1995) *Calvin and the Rhetoric of Piety*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.
- Kingdon, R. M. (1971) Social Welfare in Calvin's Geneva. *American Historical Review* 76, 1 (February): 50–69.
- Muller, M. (2000) *The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cambodia, anti-colonial protests, 1863–1945

Justin Corfield

During the 90 years of the French Protectorate of Cambodia (1863–1953) the French faced a number of challenges to their rule. They assumed rule on August 11, 1863 under the “Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and French Protection,” signed by King Norodom (1834–1904). This treaty established the French Protectorate of Cambodia whereby the French would control foreign policy and defense matters, with the king maintaining his rule, albeit heavily restricted.

The first rebellion against the French actually began before the establishment of the Protectorate. An anti-French nationalist named Assoa led an armed uprising which lasted from 1862 until August 1866, when he was killed in the fighting. A former monk, he had claimed that he was the youngest son of Prince Ang Em. Although his royal lineage is extremely doubtful, the fact that he claimed it was to set the scene for further and more serious rebellions.

A much more significant revolt was led by another former monk, Poukombo, who also falsely claimed to be a prince. He rallied many supporters in Kompong Thom in central Cambodia, gaining support in 1865. The French denounced his rebellion as an illegitimate rebellion led by an opportunist, but it caused major trouble for the colonial power and their Cambodian supporters. Nervous that Norodom might be overthrown, the French had 700 marines, aided by gunboats and artillery, stationed in Phnom Penh.

In October 1866 Poukombo succeeded in defeating the Royal Cambodian army, killing the minister of the navy, who was in command. Many royal soldiers deserted, and Poukombo’s men then laid siege to Phnom Penh, a siege which was only lifted when French marines defeated the poorly equipped peasant army in January 1867. Poukombo’s men were forced to flee, with the French pursuing them into the mountains and Poukombo himself escaping to Laos. In November 1867 Poukombo received a petition from the people of the township of Kompong Thom, returning with 100 or so of his supporters to try to keep his revolt going. On arrival the party

camped near the main monastery at Kompong Thom; when they awoke in the morning they must have suspected that they had been lured into an ambush. Poukombo retreated under a sacred fig tree, where he was surrounded by his supporters for protection against attack by the people from Kompong Thom. Poukombo escaped from the mêlée into the middle of a lake, where he was pursued by two slaves who beat him to death and brought his body back onto land. He was beheaded and the head was taken to Phnom Penh, where it was put on display.

Some of Poukombo’s men fled into the jungle and were later to join the revolt of Si Votha, the third uprising against the French. In 1877 Prince Si Votha, younger brother of King Norodom, decided that he had to try to eject the French. His revolt quickly petered out, but began again in 1883–4, gaining some support from a few of Poukombo’s lieutenants. Si Votha fought stubbornly and, because of his close palace connection, received help from many members of the royal family, though the French were never able to prove this.

The French imposed the convention of June 17, 1884 on Cambodia, forcing King Norodom to sign away customs duties to pay for the rising costs of the French presence. Norodom had clearly been reluctant to sign the treaty, but the presence of a French gunboat and the French governor-general of Cochin China, Charles Thomson, as well as a compliant interpreter, Son Diep, managed to persuade Norodom to concede. Even so, one of his close palace advisors, Kol de Monteiro, vigorously resisted, reportedly telling Norodom: “Sire, this is not a convention that is proposed to Your Majesty, this is an abdication.” The French escorted him away under armed guard, and, under increasing pressure, Norodom finally signed the convention.

Resistance grew after the signing of the convention. Prince Sisowath, hoping to claim the throne for himself, was anxious to deal with the French. Another contender for power, Prince Si Votha, immediately recruited more supporters from those who wanted to fight the French. By 1886 the French had taken control of only parts of the country, with Si Votha still proving troublesome, especially in Kompong Thom. French soldiers in the field suffered losses from cholera, dysentery, and malaria as much as from attacks by the rebels. They soon found themselves fighting a guerrilla war, and had to resort to harsh

measures. It has been estimated that 40,000 peasants fled the fighting.

By late 1886, the French realized that they might have to compromise in order to win the war. They promised not to take control of provincial administration and to restrict the number of advisors (*Résidents*) to four: in Kampot, Kompong Svay, Kratié, and Pursat. In return Norodom issued a proclamation in favor of the French and promised his support. By this time the French had better knowledge of the country, and had also managed to win over Prince Sisowath as their firm ally in return for a promise to make him heir to the throne, ahead of Norodom's numerous children.

Although Si Votha's supporters were largely routed by the end of 1884, he did manage to keep his rebellion going along the Cambodian–Laotian border. In May 1890, Si Votha asked to meet with the French, who found him “in the most extreme misery,” wanting to live in France and worried about what Norodom might do to him if he returned to Phnom Penh. Si Votha died on December 31, 1891.

The revolts of Assoa, Poukombo, and Si Votha had many similarities. All three were led by men who were, or claimed to be, of royal heritage. Even if the connections of Assoa and Poukombo were invented, the fact that they chose to claim to be members of the royal family is important, as it showed that they believed that the peasants would only follow royal pretenders rather than any opponents of the French. This resulted in the French beginning to keep a closer eye on the royal family.

The French had long suspected Prince Duong Chakr and Prince Norodom Phanouvong of supporting Si Votha. Duong Chakr was seen by many as Norodom's possible successor, since his mother, Norodom's tenth wife, was the daughter of a senior mandarin and one-time chief minister of the Cambodian government. The French were never able to prove conclusively that Duong Chakr had helped Si Votha, but when he went to Paris to urge the French government to dismiss the head of their colonial administration there, they refused to allow him return to Cambodia. Duong Chakr went to Thailand, then returned to Paris. The French had him deported to Djelfa, Algeria, where he died on March 25, 1897.

The French maintained their interest in Prince Norodom Phanouvong, but another prince was

inciting rebellion. Prince Norodom Mayura, another son of King Norodom, started criticizing the French in 1896 and working with the governor of Battambang, still under Siamese (Thai) rule, to stage a revolt. In March 1897 he was found guilty of treason and sentenced to death, but his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He was released in 1916 but had to remain in exile in Vietnam for the rest of his life. He died two years later.

A much more publicized incident concerned yet another son of Norodom, Prince Aruna Yukanthor. He was recognized by many as the crown prince of Cambodia, and was technically senior to Duong Chakr. His anger at the French, however, had a completely different origin than the others. The reason for his opposition to their rule was that the French were appointing people outside the traditional aristocracy to positions in the administration. The most important of these was a pro-French politician named Thiounn, who was to amass a vast fortune and incredible power in the service of the French as minister of the palace from 1898 to 1941. Prince Aruna Yukanthor failed to press his case in Phnom Penh and decided to follow the example of his half-brother, Duong Chakr, by heading to Paris. He arrived in 1900. The “Yukanthor Affair,” as it became known, led to the French refusing to allow Yukanthor to return to Cambodia, and he ended up in exile in Thailand. After a short stay in Singapore, he returned to Thailand, where he died in 1934.

At around this time, the French decided that, rather than exile all the troublesome princes and courtiers, it would be easier if they were given administrative positions. Kol de Monteiro had already been welcomed back into the government as minister of the navy, and in 1918 Prince Norodom Phanouvong, a former leading critic of the French, had become Akkamohasena (prime minister).

King Norodom died on April 24, 1904, and was succeeded by Prince Sisowath, who became King Sisowath and reigned until his death in 1927. Sisowath ruled over a much more peaceful Cambodia. Battambang and Siem Reap were reincorporated into the country. In 1914, when World War I broke out, the Cambodians sent about 2,000 men to Europe, some for combat duties, others in labor detachments. However, on their return, the French refused to allow them to form veterans' groups for fear that their military

training and camaraderie would be used against them.

The next outbreak against the French was in 1925 when, on April 18, Cambodian villagers in Krang Leav, Kompong Chhnang, murdered the French Résident, Félix-Louis Bardez. Fifteen villagers were eventually found guilty of the murder, and three were sentenced to death. However, there were few protests against the French during the 1930s, unlike in neighboring Vietnam, where the Communist Party was active.

In April 1930, the first communist organization, a branch of the Chinese Communist Party, was founded in Cambodia. Located in Kampot, its organizers were Huynh Nghi and Lao Hun. The French were worried about this development, and when some 350 leaflets and posters were displayed in Kampot and nearby towns on July 31, they arrested three communists, followed by 36 others. Lao Hun was sentenced to ten years in jail, with Huynh Nghi getting five years. That same day, Vietnamese-language leaflets were distributed in Phnom Penh, organized by 24-year-old Ben Kraham (“Red” Ben) and two teenage Vietnamese school students, Sau Mel and Prak Sim. They were also arrested. Other attempts were made during the 1930s to try to establish communist groups among Cambodians, but they also ended in failure: most of the recruits came from the ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia, many of whom worked on the rubber plantations along the Cambodia–Vietnam border, such as at Chup, or in bureaucratic positions. Even Ben Kraham’s connection to the communist movement seems to have been through his wife, who was Vietnamese.

Cambodian opposition to the French during the 1930s was again connected with political machinations at the royal palace. King Sisowath had died in 1927 and his son, Sisowath Monivong, had become king. One of Monivong’s daughters, Kossomak, was married to Prince Norodom Suramarit, minister of the navy from 1929, and was becoming interested in nationalist ideas, centering on Son Ngoc Thanh, a Khmer Krom who had studied law in Paris on a government scholarship. Soon after Thanh’s arrival in Phnom Penh, he joined the Alumni Association of the Collège Sisowath (later Lycée Sisowath), although he had never attended the school. He also became deputy director of the Buddhist Institute and started working as a public prosecutor.

In 1936, Thanh began publishing *Nagaravatta* (Angkor Wat), the first-ever Khmer-language newspaper. Its editorial team included a World War I veteran, Pach Chhoeun, and Sim Var, later prime minister, and it was initially funded by Prince Suramarit. Though never anti-French, the newspaper was anti-colonial, arguing for greater opportunities for Cambodians in business and further education and equal treatment before the law. It played an important part in the foundation in 1938 of Yuvasala, a youth organization that promoted fraternal relations with Vietnam. In fact, Thanh viewed Thailand as a greater danger to the long-term safety of Cambodia than Vietnam.

In 1940, the fall of France to Nazi Germany after less than six weeks proved the inherent weakness of French military power, and hence its colonial rule. Thailand was able to defeat the French in Indochina and seize the provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap. Two senior members of the royal family, Prince Sisowath Monireth and Prince Sisowath Monipong, the two older sons of King Monivong, both served in the war. They returned to Cambodia to see that the French were forced by the Japanese to allow them to establish bases in Cambodia to use as a springboard for their attack on British Malaya in December 1941. King Sisowath Monivong, increasingly anti-French, died on April 23, 1941, and his 18-year-old great-nephew (son of Prince Suramarit), Prince Norodom Sihanouk, succeeded him as king. The French administration in Cambodia, as well as in neighboring Vietnam and Laos, was strongly pro-Vichy, supporting the pro-German government in France.

Protests against French rule started in Phnom Penh in July 1942. The French were concerned about the role played by Son Ngoc Thanh, Pach Chhoeun, and a Buddhist monk, Hem Chieu. When they arrested Hem Chieu, the act of taking a monk for trial in Cochin China angered many Cambodians, leading to a massive demonstration on July 20, 1942 involving up to 2,000 people and 500 monks. It became known as the “Umbrella Revolt” because of the large numbers of monks who held umbrellas to protect themselves from the heat of the day during the demonstration. The French reacted quickly and arrested many of the ringleaders, including Pach Chhoeun from the *Nagaravatta* newspaper and Bunchhan Mol (minister of religion in the early 1970s), sending them, along with Hem Chieu,

to the French penal island of Poulo Condore off the coast of Cochin China. Son Ngoc Thanh went into hiding, and the Japanese were able to smuggle him to Tokyo. Hem Chieu died in prison in 1943, the year the French unveiled plans to Romanize the Khmer alphabet, which provoked massive protests from Buddhists and others.

On March 10, 1945, the Japanese staged a *coup de force*, overthrowing the French administration because they feared that, after the liberation of Paris in June 1944, the French in Indochina might try to support the Allies. King Sihanouk was unsure of what course of action to take, but after some vacillation, he was persuaded by his uncle Prince Monireth to proclaim the independent kingdom of Cambodia on March 12. Six days later Ung Hy, a longtime pro-French bureaucrat, became the first prime minister of Cambodia.

The immediate effect of the overthrow of the French – in Vietnam and Laos as well as in Cambodia – was the release of political prisoners, with Pach Chhoeun, Bunchhan Mol, and others returning to Phnom Penh. A number of political groups were also created soon afterwards. The best known was a youth group called the Greenshirts, which included many college students, the most important among them being Prince Norodom Chantaraingsey, Oum Mannorine, and Sak Suthsakhon.

In early August 1945, Son Ngoc Thanh returned from Japan to lead the Cambodian nationalists. On the night of August 12, nine radicals among his supporters, led by Prince Norodom Thon from the National Guard, stormed the royal palace. After a shoot-out with some royal guards, they managed to force the cabinet to resign *en bloc*, making King Sihanouk proclaim Thanh prime minister on August 14. On the following day the Japanese surrendered to the Allies.

Son Ngoc Thanh inherited a country that was in poor shape financially and also in a precarious political position. On October 16, British troops arrived in Phnom Penh to oversee the surrender of the Japanese. In a grand ceremony, the Japanese surrendered to the Gurkhas who had accompanied the British commander, Colonel Murray-Lyon. The British also arrested Son Ngoc Thanh, released the French who had been interned by the Japanese, proclaimed the restoration of French rule, and supervised the appointment of Prince Sisowath Monireth as prime minister on October 17. Although French

rule was to last for another eight years, the French had to make massive concessions: they had to agree to grant internal autonomy in the country, allow for the establishment of political parties, have an elected legislature, and reach agreements with many of the rebels who were fighting against them.

SEE ALSO: Cambodia, Communist Protests and Revolution; Cambodia, Rebellion against France; Sihanouk, Norodom (b. 1922)

References and Suggested Readings

- Corfield, J. (1993) *The Royal Family of Cambodia*. Melbourne: Khmer Language and Culture Centre.
- Corfield, J. & Summers, L. (2003) *Historical Dictionary of Cambodia*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
- Kiernan, B. (1985) *How Pol Pot Came to Power*. London: Verso.
- Osborne, M. (1969) *The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia: Rule and Response 1859–1905*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Tully, J. (2002) *France on the Mekong: A History of the Protectorate in Cambodia 1863–1953*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Cambodia, communist protests and revolution

Justin Corfield

On September 30, 1960, Cambodian communists held a secret congress at Phnom Penh railway station where, under the leadership of Tou Samouth, they changed their name from the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party to the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They were uncertain what to do in the short term. Some clearly favored an accommodation with King Norodom Sihanouk, the current ruler, and a number of leading communists joined the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Community), commonly referred to as the Sangkum, which had been founded in 1955 by Sihanouk. Others were keen on launching an armed struggle, while another group wanted a closer alliance with the Vietnamese communist movement. Although a number clearly supported what Sihanouk was doing in terms of providing education and health care for the vast majority of people in the country, and they welcomed his rapprochement with China, they were nervous about the level of influence of men like Lon Nol,

the police chief and now army strongman who was clearly anti-communist and pro-American. They were also bitter over the incident on August 11, 1957, when Sihanouk invited some left-wing democrats to the palace for a debate: the five who appeared met with Sihanouk but were beaten up by palace guards when the prince left the room. In 1962, Tou Samouth was betrayed, arrested, tortured at Lon Nol's house for a week, then taken to the Stung Meanchey pagoda, where he was killed. He refused to name any names, and after his death Saloth Sar (later known as Pol Pot) was elected as the leader of the communists, who changed their name again to the Workers' Party of Kampuchea.

In the National Assembly elections on June 10, 1962, a number of pro-communist candidates managed to get themselves preselected as Sangkum candidates. Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, and Hu Nim all took up their seats in the National Assembly after being duly elected. There were also some other anti-Sihanouk candidates, including the right-wing diplomat Douc Rasy, brother-in-law of nationalist hero Pach Chhoeun. Even though the new assembly had been "hand-picked" by Sihanouk, he had allowed for dissenters, and the Sangkum National Congress became a forum for many people to debate political issues, short of being critical of Sihanouk himself.

On May 1, 1963, the Chinese president Liu Shao-chi visited Phnom Penh. The visit went fairly well. It showed that Sihanouk was clearly a friend of communist China, and the Chinese gave him massive aid. With the Sangkum National Congress later that year rejecting US aid, it was clear that Sihanouk was opposed to the American involvement in the growing war in Vietnam. Cambodia broke off diplomatic relations with South Vietnam over the Buddhist Crisis during that year, and after the coup d'état in Saigon, South Vietnam's capital, which led to the overthrow of the South Vietnamese president, Ngo Dinh Diem, Sihanouk was certainly unnerved. He named his son Prince Norodom Naradipo his heir.

Opposition to Sihanouk recoiled slightly in January 1964 with the public trial of Preap In, a fairly insignificant Cambodian supporter of Son Ngoc Thanh. Preap In was executed for treason on January 20, and photographs and film of his execution were shown around the country as a clear example of a vindictive government action. This led to murmurings in many right-wing

political circles about the possibility of overthrowing Sihanouk. If these opponents looked to the United States for help, finding support from that quarter became harder when Cambodia broke off diplomatic relations with the US on May 3, 1965.

The turning point came in 1966 when, on September 11, just after a visit to Cambodia by France's president, Charles de Gaulle, elections were held for the National Assembly. Sihanouk decided to allow a plurality of Sangkum candidates to stand in the election, with the result that all but one constituency had a contest. Some Cambodian communists gambled on managing to get their candidates back into the National Assembly, with Hu Nim, Hou Youn, and Khieu Samphan all comfortably reelected. Other communists despaired when the final results were published and it became clear that there had been a large swing to the right, with many conservative candidates elected, and Lon Nol able to form the new government.

Lon Nol had been the police chief and army commander, and had only twice contested elected office – in the 1947 and 1951 elections for his Khmer Renewal Party. He was from a family which had served in the Cambodian administration for several generations. He emerged as a major political figure with the formation of Sangkum and his appointment in 1961 as commander-in-chief of the Royal Khmer armed forces. He became prime minister on October 22, 1966, and on November 4, Sihanouk announced the formation of a shadow cabinet of other politicians who would be able to put a check on Lon Nol's moves to free up the economy and reduce the amount of central planning.

It is not clear what followed, but an uprising broke out in Samlaut, in the province of Battambang in the west of the country, on April 2, 1967. Its cause appears to have been rice requisitions which were ordered by Prince Sihanouk and then carried out by Lon Nol. These were supposed to make up for a significant shortfall in rice caused by large amounts being sold illegally to the Vietnamese communists. The leaders of the Cambodian communist movement were in the northeast of the country at the time, but with Samlaut being a particularly radical area, they quickly endorsed the uprising and tried to turn it into a rebellion. In Phnom Penh, both in the National Assembly and in the press, the three pro-communist members of

the National Assembly were heavily criticized. On April 25, Khieu Samphan and Hou Youn fled Phnom Penh to try to make contact with the rebel communists in the jungle, which they eventually did, and were joined by Hu Nim, who fled on October 7. It was also during this time that Hun Sen, a school student, joined the communist guerillas.

Lon Nol sent in soldiers to Samlaut, and many peasants were killed. On April 30, facing intense criticism for allowing the Samlaut uprising to break out, and for his inability to deal with it, Lon Nol resigned and was succeeded by a neutralist, Son Sann. On April 30, 1967, Lon Nol became minister of defense, and on August 14, 1969, he became prime minister again. By this time the communist movement in Cambodia had decided that the only way it could come to power was through an armed struggle, and it abandoned street protests, although a few individuals did speak out against police heavy-handedness.

With the war in Vietnam intensifying, many Vietcong and North Vietnamese sought refuge on Cambodian soil, establishing bases along the Cambodian–South Vietnamese border. The United States started a program of “secret” bombing of these bases on March 18, 1969, and on June 11, Cambodia finally reestablished diplomatic relations with the United States. By this time the right-wing forces had begun to get together and plan their next course of action. Their obvious route would have been to try to constitutionally sideline Sihanouk, reduce his powers, and strengthen the office of the prime minister. However, nobody was sure what role Sihanouk fulfilled as leader of Cambodia, as his mother, Queen Kossamak, actually held the leadership position.

Prime Minister Lon Nol started taking advice from Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak, another member of the royal family, who was a strong supporter of capitalism. He had served as ambassador to China and Mongolia, and then as ambassador to Japan and the Philippines. Prince Sirik Matak clearly believed that it would be impossible to sideline Sihanouk. Instead the conspirators would have to depose him entirely, preferably when he was overseas.

On January 6, 1970, Sihanouk left for France to see his doctor, but his right-wing opponents were not sure of their numbers in the National Assembly, so they tried a convoluted way of attacking Sihanouk by bringing up allegations of

corruption against his brother-in-law, Lieutenant-General Oum Mannorine, head of the “surface police.” Apparently the customs service had found large parcels of silk at the airport with Oum Mannorine’s name on them, and he was accused of trying to bring them into the country without paying duty, a charge he denied. While this was being discussed in the National Assembly, on March 8, some 1,500 people started protesting in the township of Svay Rieng, close to the Vietnamese border. These people demonstrated against the presence of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese on Cambodian soil. The demonstration seems to have been organized by Hem Keth Sana, the governor of Svay Rieng and an ally of Lon Nol.

On March 11, a very large demonstration took place in Phnom Penh, where up to 20,000 schoolchildren, students, and adult protesters, along with large numbers of monks, demanded that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese leave Cambodia. It has long been alleged that Sihanouk and Lon Nol planned these demonstrations together. Indeed, they did meet at Rome airport while Sihanouk was on his way to France in January, and Lon Nol was returning to Cambodia after medical treatment in Europe. Sihanouk was planning to go to Moscow and then Beijing, and a demonstration against the Vietnamese presence in his country would certainly strengthen his hand. The protesters marched on the embassy of the Provisional Revolutionary Government – the communist government of South Vietnam whose armed wing was the Vietcong. They sacked the embassy, then marched on the North Vietnamese embassy and the office of the North Vietnamese commercial attaché, sacking both those buildings as well. An attempt to attack the Chinese embassy was stopped by Cambodian soldiers.

Sihanouk had undoubtedly wanted a large peaceful demonstration and was horrified when he heard what had happened, and what had been done essentially in his name. He tried to shore up his diplomatic position by condemning the Lon Nol government, but made the mistake of privately raging against Lon Nol’s cabinet ministers, claiming that he would return to Cambodia and have them shot. The outburst took place inside the Cambodian ambassador’s residence in Paris, but a Cambodian official, Prince Essaro, taped the shouting and the tape was flown back to Phnom Penh, where Prince

Sirik Matak, Essaro's brother, urged the other conspirators to act soon or risk being killed when Sihanouk returned. As this was happening, some of Sihanouk's closest supporters tried to escalate the disturbances in Phnom Penh by rioting against the Vietnamese civilians in the city. The aim was to make the place so unruly that Sihanouk would have to return quickly and the right-wing conspirators would have to distance themselves from the escalating lawlessness.

On March 16 at a meeting of the National Assembly there was an attempt to put forward a motion against Oum Mannorine as a way of testing the support for the conspirators. However, student protests outside got out of hand. On the following day Oum Mannorine tried to forestall Lon Nol by having him arrested. This failed and Oum Mannorine was himself seized and held in custody for the next three years. At dawn on March 18, Prince Sirik Matak urged Lon Nol not to back down but to stage a takeover of the government and formulate plans to draw up a republic. Lon Nol eventually agreed, and at a joint session of the National Assembly and the High Council of the Kingdom that followed, the parliamentarians voted to dismiss Sihanouk and appoint the little-known speaker of the National Assembly, Cheng Heng, as the new head of state. In a blaze of publicity, Lon Nol released all political prisoners, including many communists, some of whom briefly supported his government, but were to be quickly disenchanted.

Sihanouk was just leaving Moscow when he was told the news. He was flying to Beijing and was surprised that on his arrival at the Chinese capital he was still greeted as a visiting head of state. The Chinese government announced that they had no intention of recognizing the Lon Nol government and would support Sihanouk if he chose to fight his way back to power.

On March 23, 1970, Prince Sihanouk announced the formation of the National United Front of Kampuchea, calling on the Cambodian communists to support him, which they did. Preempting any request from Sihanouk, the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong then attacked Lon Nol, driving back his badly armed and inexperienced forces. Lon Nol was desperate to survive and called for US support. On April 30, large numbers of US soldiers and their South Vietnamese allies came across the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border to attack the Vietcong and North Vietnamese bases. The next day

Sihanouk announced the formation of the Royal Government of National Union, a government-in-exile, and the Cambodian civil war began. On October 9, 1970, the Lon Nol government formally ended the Cambodian monarchy and proclaimed the formation of the Khmer Republic.

The rule of Lon Nol from 1970 to April 1975 is one of the paradoxes in the history of Cambodia. On the one hand the government was fighting an increasingly deadly civil war, which it eventually lost, and saw the emergence of the Khmer Rouge and the massacre of hundreds of thousands of the population, with the deaths of over a million more. On the other hand, Lon Nol allowed much greater freedom, including the right to protest and freedom of the press. Lon Nol saw himself as the father-figure of the country, and although he reacted badly to criticism of himself personally, he did try to maintain as much democratic spirit as was possible during a civil war.

In particular, Lon Nol always had a respect for university students, even though he himself had never attended university. While he could be brutal against peasants, he was rarely heavy-handed with university students. He met regularly with a number of the leading student activists such as San That and Im You Hay, the latter being given a safe seat in the National Assembly in 1972. As a result, Lon Nol was a little indecisive in the actions of February 1972. On the one hand he was not keen on antagonizing the students who had been loyal supporters, but on the other hand he could not sit idly by as they started a sit-in at the faculty of law, demanding the reinstatement of Keo Ann. However, it also seems that Lon Nol thought that he could use the student protesters in his moves to try to stop Prince Sirik Matak from taking over the government.

By this time Lon Nol had become angered by the National Assembly delaying the introduction of a new constitution and he preempted their moves by proclaiming himself president on March 10. Son Ngoc Thanh, the veteran nationalist hero who had returned to Phnom Penh in 1970, became prime minister ten days later. A referendum to approve the new republican constitution was held two days after the end of the Koy Pech affair and presidential elections were scheduled for June 4, 1972. It was obvious that Lon Nol would contest the elections, and he certainly hoped to be elected easily. However, with the Paris peace talks on Vietnam being

dragged out, the United States, the main financial backer of the Cambodian government, was eager for a genuinely democratic election, far better than that in South Vietnam at the end of the previous year.

On the day of the election, vast crowds of people turned out to vote, and there was little doubt that the public was endorsing the process. The results were awaited with anticipation. It seems certain that Thappana Nginn and Lon Nol's brother, Lon Non, altered the voting figures and results to give Lon Nol 578,203 votes to 257,320 for In Tam and 217,341 for Keo Ann. Douc Rasy, a supporter of In Tam, immediately claimed election fraud. A member of the constitutional court resigned in protest as the remainder of the court proclaimed Lon Nol the overall winner.

The election split the three forces that had supported the formation of the Khmer Republic. Lon Nol and In Tam became bitter opponents, and Keo Ann and the students started to become disenchanted with the whole electoral process. With Lon Nol confirmed as president, elections were held for the National Assembly on September 4, and for the Senate on September 17, both resulting in every seat being won by the Socio-Republican Party. There were many irregularities in these elections, with the Republican Party of Prince Sirik Matak and the Democratic Party of In Tam both boycotting the elections and being quickly sidelined.

Lon Nol survived an assassination attempt on March 18, 1973, when the boyfriend of a daughter of Prince Sihanouk bombed the presidential palace. Three days later a state of siege was proclaimed, and from then on, heavy restrictions were placed on royalists and suspected royalists, as well as all enemies of the regime. Finally, after pressure from the Americans, the High Political Council was formed with Lon Nol, In Tam, Cheng Heng, and Sirik Matak forming a coalition government with In Tam as prime minister.

In 1974 large student protests began again. During one of these, Keo Sang Kim, the minister of education, and his deputy, Thach Chia, were "abducted" by students who marched them, in relatively good spirits, to their strike headquarters. Both were then shot dead, with the assassin, who definitely was not a student, fleeing. At the time the newspaper *Nokor Thom* accused Sirik Matak of organizing the shooting,

but subsequently a man from the communists came forward to claim responsibility. It was the last anti-government protest in the Khmer Republic. The final pro-government protest was on August 15, 1974, when the government held a demonstration to show that its regime had lasted on its own a year after the US halted bombing.

By early 1975 the military situation for the republicans was dire, with many senior officials fleeing the country and going into exile overseas. The prime minister, Long Boret, tried hard to keep up the flagging morale of the army. When Lon Nol left the country on April 1, some people thought that it might be possible for a ceasefire to be negotiated. On April 12, the US embassy evacuated its staff, some third country nationals, and the acting president, Saukham Khoy. Prince Sirik Matak refused to leave "in such a cowardly fashion" and Long Boret also refused the offer to evacuate himself and his family.

On April 17, 1975, the republican forces collapsed and the forces of Sihanouk and the communists – now totally dominated by the communists with a few Sihanoukists in symbolic positions – took control of the capital. The republican military commander, Sak Suthsakhon, fled the capital for Thailand, and Long Boret was captured by the communists and killed. Sirik Matak sought refuge in the French embassy but later handed himself over to the communists, who killed him as well. With the shelling of Phnom Penh over, vast crowds cheered the communists, only to find themselves forcibly evacuated into the countryside. Supporters of the communists in France, Australia, and elsewhere held small rallies to mark the end of the war in Cambodia, two weeks before the final collapse of South Vietnam.

Initially it was thought that Prince Norodom Sihanouk would lead the new government that came to power on April 17, 1975. Although he was officially the leader, he remained a figurehead, with the real power lying with a number of Cambodian communists. The "public face" of Cambodian communism up until that time had been Khieu Samphan, a respected former teacher who had led protests in the mid-1960s against corruption – and, indeed, he had been a member of the Cambodian National Assembly at the time. However, the real power lay with three men, Saloth Sar (Pol Pot), his brother-in-law Ieng Sary, and a close ally, Son Sen. The three of them had worked in the communist

movement since the 1960s and had built up close relations with the Chinese communists. All three, who had been educated in France, were also passionately anti-Vietnamese. Indeed, Ieng Sary was a Khmer Krom – one of the Cambodian minority in Vietnam – and had long harbored a deep resentment against Vietnamese influence in Cambodia. It was around this time that Saloth Sar assumed the identity “Pol Pot,” the name by which he became better known.

The three – Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Son Sen – engineered one of the most violent revolutions in the modern era. On taking control of Phnom Penh and the other cities on the morning of April 17, 1975, they ordered all of them to be evacuated at gunpoint, with everybody forced to leave for the countryside. In the new communist society, city people were forced to work in the villages, where many of the peasant farmers enjoyed having members of Cambodia’s middle class forced to work in the fields for them. A large number of the displaced headed for the villages where they had family, in the hope of better treatment. Some certainly achieved this, but it also allowed them to be quickly recognized and identified, then denounced by other villagers. Others ended up in villages where they were not known, and as a result some of them survived. As many as 100,000 people were killed, and as many as a million others died from starvation, overwork, malnutrition, disease, or a broken heart.

By this time Pol Pot had established a security apparatus that became known as S-21. With its headquarters in a former high school in Phnom Penh, and now better known as Tuol Sleng, over the next three and a half years the center held about 15,000 detainees. Many others were also held in regional detention centers. Whilst most “enemies of the state” were summarily executed, those deemed important enough to be questioned were held at these centers, with Tuol Sleng being used for the highest-ranking prisoners. Most of the prisoners were interrogated, tortured, and executed either at the prison or, in most cases, at execution sites elsewhere in Phnom Penh.

The security apparatus during the Cambodian revolution essentially involved interrogating people to find out their collaborators, friends, and co-conspirators, who were then arrested and also interrogated or tortured to reveal further “enemies of the state.” Gradually a number of the guards at Tuol Sleng found

themselves denounced, and it was not long before the security apparatus was turning in on itself and executing former guards and interrogators. By late 1978 the finger was also pointing to some in the leadership of the Khmer Rouge, notably Son Sen. By that time, quite a number of senior members of the communist movement, such as Hu Nim, former student leader Phouk Chhay, and Keo Meas, had all been killed.

With Democratic Kampuchea backed by the People’s Republic of China, and Vietnam backed by the Soviet Union, war was looming between the two countries. Indeed in late 1977, the Vietnamese sent a large military force into Cambodia to threaten the government of Democratic Kampuchea, which responded, on December 31, by breaking diplomatic relations between the two countries.

From February to May 1978 Radio Hanoi started broadcasting attacks on the leadership of Democratic Kampuchea and urging for an insurrection to overthrow Pol Pot. More ominously, it was also collecting pro-Vietnamese Cambodian communists to serve as a rival government to Pol Pot should he be overthrown. In response, the government of Democratic Kampuchea started virulent anti-Vietnamese broadcasts on its radio station, and cross-border attacks mounted.

With both sides arming themselves for an eventual confrontation, Democratic Kampuchea appealed for help from Beijing. The Khmer Rouge leaders had closely linked themselves to the so-called “Gang of Four” in Beijing, and their overthrow in 1976 had led to a brief strain in relations. However, Beijing promised help if Vietnam did attack. In order to show the outside world its peaceful intentions, the Khmer Rouge invited a Yugoslav television crew to film in Cambodia, and even interview Pol Pot himself, and then invited three westerners, Scotsman Malcolm Caldwell, and US journalists Elizabeth Becker and Richard Dudman, to visit the country. Unfortunately, this trip went badly, and Malcolm Caldwell was shot dead by unknown assailants on December 23.

On December 2, the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea had been proclaimed. It consisted of pro-Vietnamese Cambodian communists and set itself up essentially as a rival government to that of Pol Pot. On December 25, the Vietnamese army launched

its attack on Cambodia, ostensibly in support of this government. The Vietnamese attack on December 25, 1978 is believed to have followed a Khmer Rouge attack on Vietnam. The Khmer Rouge forces are thought to have penetrated deep into South Vietnam, where they were surrounded and destroyed. With most of their soldiers dead, the Khmer Rouge were unable to prevent the Vietnamese invasion, which led to the Vietnamese capturing Phnom Penh, still largely deserted after the forced evacuation of April 17, 1975, on January 7, 1979.

The Vietnamese backed a new People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), which failed to make any diplomatic headway, and was only recognized by Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and its allies. India was the only non-communist country to extend diplomatic recognition. Its leader Heng Samrin was denounced in the West and by China as a Vietnamese puppet. By 1989 the PRK was anticipating the fall of communism. Seeing the chance for a peace settlement, on April 29–30, 1989, the National Assembly adopted a new constitution by which it changed the name of the country to the State of Cambodia (SOC), introduced a new flag and national anthem, and enshrined the right to own property, as well as declaring Buddhism the state religion. In September 1989, the Vietnamese announced the withdrawal of all their military forces from the country, and peace talks started again.

SEE ALSO: Cambodia, Anti-Colonial Protests, 1863–1945; Cambodia, Rebellion against France; Sihanouk, Norodom (b. 1922)

References and Suggested Readings

- Chandler, D. P. (1991) *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Corfield, J. (1994) *Khmers Stand Up! A History of the Cambodian Government 1970–1975*. Clayton, Australia: Monash University.
- Kiernan, B. (1985) *How Pol Pot Came to Power*. London: Verso.

Cambodia, rebellion against France

Justin Corfield

Although French colonial rule was officially restored on October 16, 1945, the French

Protectorate of Cambodia was much weaker than it had been prior to the fall of France in 1940. In its last eight years it was to face many problems, both from internal rebellions, often helped by people in neighboring Vietnam and Thailand, and from major constitutional opposition from Cambodian socialists, often with the help of French socialists. These forces sometimes fought each other but often made common cause, leading to France having to grant Cambodia full independence on November 9, 1953.

Since the end of the Si Votha rebellion in 1891 with the death of Si Votha, there had been no organized armed group aiming to end French colonial rule in Cambodia. However, a number of individuals, mainly members of the royal family, wanted changes in the way the place was administered, most realizing the impossibility of defeating the French militarily. The situation changed in 1940 with the fall of France. Some Cambodians decided to form a resistance group, which became known as the Khmer Issarak (Khmer Independence). It was founded in December 1940 in Bangkok by Poc Khun, a well-connected ethnic Khmer (Cambodian) who was himself the grandson of Poc, minister of the navy from 1889 to 1895, minister of the palace in 1898, and then minister of justice. Poc Khun was a representative of Battambang in the Thai parliament and had clear support from some sectors in Thailand.

Although the Khmer Issarak was created in 1940, it was not until 1945 that the group became active in Cambodia. The leading nationalist of the period, Son Ngoc Thanh, had been leery of them when the movement had been created because he had wanted pressure on the French from an urban elite rather than a guerilla war. However, following his arrest by the British on October 16, 1945, the urban supporters of Thanh and the Khmer Issarak, aided by the anti-colonial government of Pridi in Thailand, made common cause. They gained support from some prominent Cambodians, including Pach Chhoeun and Chau Sen Cocsal, a Khmer Krom (ethnic Cambodian from South Vietnam). The latter left Kompong Cham on October 26 to join up with the former in Triton, South Vietnam, where the two established a Free Cambodia Party that operated briefly until the French occupied the region.

Of more significance, militarily speaking, was the rise of a Battambang warlord called Dap

Chhuon, who came to lead the Khmer Issarak in the northwest, with a power base in Siem Reap. A guerilla war seemed inevitable, but nothing on the scale of what was happening in neighboring Vietnam was expected.

The French made a major concession on January 7, 1946, establishing a *modus vivendi* in which they granted internal autonomy to Cambodia. Its major conditions included allowing Cambodians to form political parties, elections to be held for a constituent assembly, and then elections for a national assembly with legislative powers. These moves helped win over some of the wavering Issarak who believed that they might be able to make gains constitutionally. On February 20, 1946, Chau Sen Cocsal and some of his supporters surrendered and accepted the authority of the Cambodian crown, encapsulated in the young king, Norodom Sihanouk.

In early 1946, the first Cambodian political party was established. Known initially as the Constitutional Party, it was quickly renamed the Liberal Party. It was founded by Prince Norodom Norindeth with the support of some French officials, notably Louis Manipoud, the head of the education system, and sought "gradual" independence within the framework of the French Union. It also advocated wider individual rights, especially civil rights and the right to hold property, and it had the support of court mandarins, courtiers, some wealthy landowners, Chinese businessmen, and the Cham Muslim minority. It wanted the franchise to include all men and women, including monks and nuns, who could read and write in the Khmer language.

The formation of the Liberal Party helped persuade many radicals who wanted full independence to create the Democrat Party, which had been organizing since January 1946, but only became an official political party in March with the return to Cambodia of Prince Sisowath Youtévong. He had been in Paris during the German occupation and had established numerous contacts among members of the French Socialist Party. On his return to Phnom Penh, support for his political party came from some French lawyers associated with the socialists, and the party started to establish a provincial network, with committees in the capital of each province, and encouraged people to join. Although the party advocated that Cambodia should remain within the French Union, the role of the French would be significantly reduced

and the Cambodian king would assume the role of a constitutional monarch. There would be a single legislative chamber, and concentrated development of public health and public education, with scholarships offered to French universities for the brightest children. With Prince Youtévong as the party president, it drew support from many of the people connected with the *Nagaravatta* newspaper – Sim Var, Pach Chhoeun, his brother-in-law Chuop Hell, and many others including Prince Sisowath Sirikmatak and his brother Prince Sisowath Essaro.

Another political party was formed soon afterwards. The Progressive Democratic Party was led by Prince Norodom Montana, who had been minister of religion, minister of the economy, and minister of agriculture. This group advocated increased public health and education provision, as well as more public works, but it lacked the party structure or the specific policies to gain much support.

On September 1, 1946, elections were held throughout Cambodia for the constituent assembly. It was the first time elections on a wide franchise had been held in the country, and the result was that the Democrat Party won 50 of the 69 seats, with 14 seats going to the Liberals, and three to independents (two of whom were openly sympathetic to the Democrats). In the following month, Thailand returned the provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap to Cambodia, and on December 15, Prince Sisowath Youtévong became prime minister.

The new Democrat government found that it did not have as wide a range of powers as it had hoped to have, with the French still controlling the police and the army. It was not long before simmering resentment between the French and the Democrats came into the open.

In March 1947 the French arrested a number of leading Democrats, accusing them of being members of a secret society. It meant that the French were holding in custody 18 Democrat deputies at the time the assembly was voting on a new constitution. This allowed the Liberals and some rebel Democrats to choose a constitution which had two legislative chambers, the National Assembly, elected by universal male suffrage, and the High Council of the Kingdom, with members elected or nominated by small interest groups, such as the chambers of commerce, branches of the bureaucracy, and the palace.

For the elections, two new political parties were established: the Khmer Renewal Party and the National Union, both registered in September 1946. The former, with support from the palace, was formed by Nhiek Tioulong, a man with close court connections, and Lon Nol, the police chief, aiming to get much support from the recently incorporated Battambang and Siem Reap provinces. It was well funded and campaigned heavily on supporting the Khmer Krom. The National Union was a small party bankrolled by Khim Tit, an ambitious politician who had served in World War I, and Tayebbhay Hiptoola Machhwa, a prominent Muslim Indo-Cambodian businessman. It had little wide support but aimed at using its elite connections to take control of a number of seats in the High Council.

With so many political machinations in Phnom Penh, the effect was for the Issarak insurgency to hold off from major attacks on the French. They expected that a Democrat victory would lead to the promised amnesty for all political prisoners and eventual independence from the French. However, they became worried when Prince Sisowath Youtévong died on July 11, 1947. He had been ill for some time, suffering greatly from stress, but his death shocked the Democrat Party and worried the Issarak, with rumors incorrectly attributing his death to unnatural causes.

Nevertheless, on December 21, 1947, the first National Assembly elections were held, with the Democrats winning 55 of the 75 seats. The Liberals won all the remaining 20 seats. This was reassuring news for the Issarak, but the Democrats soon found their victory “spiked” with the elections to the High Council of the Kingdom in January 1948, with the National Union managing to get the largest block – eight seats in the upper house.

It was not long before the Democrat Party started to experience internal dissensions, and a major series of splits occurred. This led to Yèm Sambaur, a member of the Democrats but closely aligned to the palace, becoming prime minister on February 12, 1949. By this time the Khmer Issarak rebels were making headway in much of the countryside, and Yèm Sambaur made his main aim balancing the budget and ending the insurgency. The former was achieved largely by the establishment of the Phnom Penh casino. For the latter, it was obvious that the

Issarak could not be defeated by military means, and a political compromise would have to be reached. The main Issarak commander in the northeast of Cambodia, Dap Chhuon, surrendered to the government in October 1949. The French granted semi-independence to Cambodia on November 8, making the country an Associated State of the French Union.

On January 14, 1951, an assassin killed the Democrat Party leader Ieu Kocus by rolling a hand grenade into his house. The man arrested soon afterwards initially claimed to be connected with Prince Norindeth of the Liberal Party, but seems more likely to have been acting on the orders of Yèm Sambaur, the prime minister, who later left the Democrat Party with a large number of deputies, forming the National Recovery Party in April 1950. In February 1951 Dap Chhuon and other Democrat rebels established the Victorious Northeastern Khmer Party. By mid-1951 there was a major political impasse, and on September 9, new elections were held for the National Assembly.

The elections saw the Democrats again win, taking 54 of the 78 seats in the National Assembly. The five right-wing parties split their votes badly, and although they did achieve an absolute majority of the vote, they only picked up 24 seats between them, of which 18 were won by the Liberals. Yèm Sambaur lost his seat very narrowly, and no other members of his party came close to winning any seats. The only success from the new parties was the Victorious Northeastern Khmer Party, which won four seats in Battambang and Siem Reap, its power base.

Three weeks after the election, on September 30, 1951, the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party was established. It was the first Cambodian Communist Party and was formed in secret, with a public front, the Krom Pracheachon (People’s Group), to fight in elections. In the heightening tension, Huy Kanthoul, a moderate Democrat, became prime minister on October 13, and on October 29, Son Ngoc Thanh returned from six years’ exile in France. Thanh’s arrival in Phnom Penh led to massive street protests in his favor. Whole schools emptied when the children saw his plane circling as it was coming in to land, and thousands of his supporters lined the route from the airport into Phnom Penh.

Although Son Ngoc Thanh was one of the major political forces in the country, and had

briefly been prime minister in 1945, the new Cambodian parliamentary system of negotiations and compromise was anathema to him. The murder of the French commissioner, Jean de Raymond, on the day of Thanh's return, albeit by a servant with no political motive, confused the issue for some time. Thanh believed that his popularity alone would be enough for the French to concede ground to him, but he was badly mistaken. He was also hopelessly misled by the importance of the Issarak who, with the rallying of Dap Chhuon, were only able to provide limited resistance in particularly remote parts of the countryside. Believing that an insurgency was possible, on March 9, 1952, Son Ngoc Thanh left Phnom Penh and formed his "Movement of the People," a resistance group aimed at ejecting the French from Cambodia.

Thanh's actions were disastrous for the Democrats in Phnom Penh. The French were easily able to brand the two disparate groups as working together and turned to King Norodom Sihanouk for help. Sihanouk, advised by Yem Sambaur and others, launched his Royal Crusade for Independence. He proclaimed himself in favor of Cambodia's unconditional independence, and to this end he retired to Siem Reap to lead a very mild campaign of civil disobedience against the French. Ten days later he sacked Huy Kanthoul as prime minister, becoming prime minister himself, and on January 13, 1953, he dissolved the National Assembly.

Throughout 1953 King Sihanouk urged the French to grant independence, persuading them that they had the choice between having a friendly and cooperative royalist government, or facing a potentially serious campaign of civil disobedience by the Democrats, or even an insurgency by Son Ngoc Thanh. Sihanouk enlisted the help of foreign powers and gained much support from the US administration. With these options, and facing major problems in Vietnam, the French agreed to Sihanouk's demands. On November 9, 1953, Cambodia became an independent country and a member of the United Nations.

SEE ALSO: Cambodia, Anti-Colonial Protests, 1863–1945; Cambodia, Communist Protests and Revolution; Sihanouk, Norodom (b. 1922)

References and Suggested Readings

Chandler, D. P. (1991) *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Corfield, J. (1994) *Khmers Stand Up! A History of the Cambodian Government 1970–1975*. Clayton, Australia: Monash University.

Kiernan, B. (1985) *How Pol Pot Came to Power*. London: Verso.

Camejo, Pedro or Negro Primero (1790–1821)

Catherine Ross

Pedro Camejo was born into slavery as a servant of the Spanish royalist Vicente Alonzo in San Juan de Payara (Estado Apure, Venezuela). Forced to serve under the Spanish army, he fought against the independence fighters led by Simón Bolívar until joining them in the battle for independence in 1816. Until his death in the famous (second) Battle of Carabobo against the troops of Miguel de la Torre in 1821, which finally led to Venezuelan independence, he served under the eminent general José Antonio Páez, who, apart from playing an important role in the fight for independence, was elected president of Venezuela after 1831. Pedro Camejo, who is also known as "El Negro Primero" (the first black), stands as a symbolic figure of courage and strong will who made his way from slavery up to participating in the glorious struggle for independence from the Spanish colonialists, reaching the rank of lieutenant.

He was conspicuous by his engaging role in defending Lieutenant José María Córdoba, who had been sentenced to death because of his desertion and murder of two compatriots. This action by Pedro Camejo and his friend Trinidad Traveso brought them high regard. In 1818 he met Simón Bolívar in San Juan de Parayara, who appeared to be impressed by his alertness and intelligence.

With General Antonio Páez he took part in the battle of Las Queseras del Medio in 1819, for which he and his comrades were honored with the Orden de los Libertadores de Venezuela (medal of the Venezuelan liberators). In this battle Páez, accompanied by his personal guardian Pedro Camejo and only 150 men, attacked Pablo Morillo, who had a force of more than 6,000 soldiers. It resulted in victory for Páez and his men. Using special tactics and because of their

familiarity with the region, Páez and his men lost only two of their comrades, whereas Pablo Morillo lost over 500 men in the battle. It was a successful diversionary tactic that was planned by Simón Bolívar within the scope of the Apure campaign to distract General Morillo, while leading his troops west and freeing Nueva Granada from Spanish occupation.

Pedro Camejo was honored for his role as a brave and faithful independence fighter under Antonio Páez, and as a representative of African slaves in Venezuela. He became a very important figure in the struggle for freedom in the colonies and in the abolition of slavery at the same time. With the implementation of the new Venezuelan currency in 2007, Pedro Camejo was honored by being placed on the five Bolívares fuerte (strong Bolívar) bank note.

SEE ALSO: Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); Venezuelan War of Independence

References and Suggested Readings

- Angel Jaramillo, H. (1991) *El encubrimiento de América*. Pereira, Colombia, Fondo Editorial del Departamento de Risaralda.
- Armas Chitty, J. A. (1971) *La batalla de Carabobo: antecedentes y efectos*. Caracas: Armitano.
- Graziano, F. (2007) *Cultures of Devotion: Folk Saints of Spanish America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Solorzano Márquez, C. (1971) *El negro primero*. Caracas: Edición Sesquicentenario de la Batalla de Carabobo.

Cameroon, popular anti-colonial protest

Ayokunle Olumuyiwa Omobowale

Cameroon came under French rule in 1919, having been seized from German control during World War I. It remained a Mandate Territory until it was redesignated a Trust Territory after World War II. Of all French controlled territories in sub-Saharan Africa, it was the most economically viable, with a considerable number of educated elites and imbued with huge French economic and infrastructural investments. Indeed, Cameroon was seemingly a favored territory in the comity of French colonies. Against this backdrop, Cameroon was the territory with the most radical nationalist movement in black

Africa and the only one where the French colonial regime was engaged in armed rebellion.

Nationalism and Um Nyobe's UPC Revolt

Active nationalism commenced in Cameroon with the birth of the Union des Populations du Cameroon (UPC) on April 10, 1948. It became most vibrant and radical under the charismatic leadership of Reuben Um Nyobe. Um Nyobe was a nationalist with just a primary education. He was, however, exposed to Marxist ideology by French associates. He is generally described as the father of French nationalism, even by opponents. Right from inception, the UPC unequivocally demanded independence, which was not part of French policy for its colonies at that time. Internationally, the UPC was affiliated to the interterritorial Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) (with membership cutting across French sub-Saharan Africa) and the French Communist Party (PCF). Locally, the UPC enjoyed the support of the Union des Syndicats Confédérés du Cameroon (USCC), whose membership cut across about 75 percent of the working population. Ethnically, the UPC drew its supporters predominantly from the Bamileke and Bassa people, who had somewhat been exposed to and become conscious of the dialectics of French rule, which favored European settlers, French companies, and members of the colonial administration. Whereas among the Bamileke there had grown a class of the economically empowered, whose farms competed with those of European settlers, the Bassa formed a class of largely literate people, in whose environment colonial economic infrastructure had been established with little returns to the indigenous population.

The UPC was strategically organized with a large network of local branches (numbering about 450 by 1955), numerous affiliate organizations, and newspapers to publish its thoughts and campaigns. As the UPC gained prominence among the Cameroonian population, the colonial government sought to curtail its popularity and growth through repression. Thus, the police and the military were empowered to carry out repressive operations against the leadership and supporters of the UPC, while pro-French groups and local administrators attacked UPC followers. In one such attack Um Nyobe and other

UPC leaders were ruffled in the Bamileke area in 1955. When the UPC retaliated by attacking state infrastructures, its leadership and supporters were ruthlessly hunted down, arrested, imprisoned, and killed. The colonial government further advanced its policy of containment of the UPC. Hence, the RDA, which had by 1950 severed relations with the French Communist Party, was apparently influenced to expel the UPC due to its refusal to discontinue relations with French communists in July 1955. Furthermore, in the same month, following a proposal from Roland Pre, the colonial governor, the French government proscribed the UPC and prevented it from presenting candidates for election to the parliament as France prepared Cameroon for self-rule.

Banned and incessantly subjected to brutal acts of repression, the leadership of the UPC retreated underground and subsequently engaged the colonial regime in armed struggle. From his native region of Sanaga Maritime (a predominantly Bassa region), Um nyobe led the UPC and commanded its guerrilla army. Having been excluded from the impending elections, the UPC responded by carrying out acts of sabotage and attacking public institutions in order to disrupt the elections slated for 1956. The elections still went on, however, culminating in the election of moderates into the parliament. Having failed in reconciliatory attempts with colonial authorities, Um Nyobe once again deployed his militia to carry out actions in a number of locations around the Sanaga Maritime province, which was his main area of operation. The attacks, which were carried out in September 1957 in Eseka and Ngambe, led to the killing of 44 people, the wounding of 55, and the kidnapping of 61.

French authorities responded with a requisition force deployed to the Sanaga Maritime province. The UPC resistance gradually succumbed under French superior firepower, and on September 13, 1958, Um Nyobe was killed in action. By November as many as 2,070 militants had surrendered, 371 had been killed, and 882 captured.

Post-Um Nyobe UPC Resistance and Anti-Nationalism

With the demise of Um Nyobe and the surrender of some of his lieutenants, the government allowed

members of the UPC who had surrendered to participate in elections and assume positions at the parliament in 1959. This was meant to reintegrate the UPC, but it led to its factionalization. Since the Bassa had largely surrendered with the killing of Um Nyobe and the suppression of his resistance, the new revolutionists recruited mostly from the Bamileke region, reorganizing its army into the *Armée de Liberation Nationale Kamerounaise* (ANKL).

Meanwhile, the French government commenced a process of devolution of power to moderates who would not threaten French influence in Cameroon. Hence, in 1958, the anti-nationalist Ahmadou Ahidjo was elected prime minister. Thus, the revolt of 1959 was not just one against the colonialists, but also one that posed the threat of toppling Ahidjo. Hence, while Ahidjo offered amnesty to those who surrendered, he opted for a total military onslaught against those holding out.

By January 1, 1960, then, independence was officially granted to Cameroon but power ended up in the hands of the very people who opposed independence. With independence granted, the new Cameroonian authorities called on the French government for military assistance in the crushing of the Bamileke revolt. The French government responded by deploying troops and weapons in January 1960.

By the time the rebellion was fully crushed, about 20,000 revolutionaries and civilians had been killed, and about 1,000 soldiers had died in action. Unlike other African colonies, Cameroon gained independence through the suppression of the nationalist forces that fought for it, while ironically power was handed over to those who did not desire independence. Hence,

the modern political state of Cameroon has risen not so much as a realization of a national consciousness uniting diverse peoples into one movement against the colonial power – as was the case of most African countries – but out of the repression of such a movement . . . it was on the basis of struggling against the most politicized sections of its own population that the independent Cameroon has established its authority. (Joseph 1974: 447)

SEE ALSO: Charismatic Leadership and Revolution; Marxism; Revolution, Dialectics of

References and Suggested Readings

- Atangana, M. (1997) French Capitalism and Nationalism in Cameroon. *African Studies Review* 40 (1): 83–111.
- Djiffack, A. & Mitsch, R. (2000) The Myth of Reuben. *Research in African Literatures* 31 (2): 91–116.
- Hallet, R. (1974) *Africa since 1875*. London: Heinemann.
- Joseph, R. (1974) Reuben um Um nyobe and the Kamerun Rebellion. *African Affairs* 73 (293): 428–48.
- Smith, T. (1978) A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 (1): 70–102.

Camus, Albert (1913–1960)

Jin H. Han

Albert Camus, French novelist, essayist, and playwright, was a major exponent of existentialism along with Jean-Paul Sartre. His writings centered on the notion of human alienation from the world and from one's own self. His philosophy taught that one should embrace courageously the absurdity of life and pursue truth and justice through moral rebellion. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1957.

Camus's vision of human existence as a paradox of wonder and absurdity informed his spirit of rebellion. In his philosophical essay, *The Myth of Sisyphus* (*Le Mythe de Sisyphe*, 1942), he described the human condition that yielded no fruit despite endless efforts. In spite of the meaninglessness of life, however, Camus refused to surrender to the grip of death without a fight. His personal rebellion was made manifest in political activism. In 1934–5 he was a member of the Algerian Communist Party. As a left-wing intellectual of Algiers, he wrote articles for *Alger-Républicain* that portrayed the injustices suffered by the Muslims in the Kabylie region. Camus's writings provided a humanitarian view on the colonial woes that eventually led to the Algerian War (1954–62). His critique of colonialism was paired with his hope for France's role in Algeria.

During World War II, Camus was a member of the Resistance. His writings from the war years demonstrated that he sought to come to terms with the absurd in life and history. In the novel

The Stranger (*L'Étranger*, 1942), which was also translated under the title of *The Outsider*, he portrayed an alienated person who was condemned for failing to conform to the conventions of his society. Camus's wartime writings are marked by the awareness of the brunt of nihilism and the threat of the absurd while refusing to surrender to them. The war apparently kept him from becoming a pure theorist of the absurd.

From 1944 to 1947 Camus wrote for *Combat*, the Resistance newspaper of Paris, promoting morality-based politics. After World War II he became a representative voice of postwar estrangement and disillusionment. His second novel, *The Plague* (*La Peste*, 1947), showcased a vision of human dignity in the face of a devastating epidemic that drove home the finality of death. It depicted the heroism of those who fought the bubonic disease that rampaged Oran. Camus declared that it was an allegorical account – in other words, a political novel, which permitted the reader to identify the disease with every form of social evil inflicted upon humanity. Though efforts to save lives from the epidemic were largely unsuccessful, the characters in the story embodied the perseverance of the human spirit that defied the evil condition, as well as the capacity of human beings to come together to combat the malady. His later novel, *The Fall* (*La Chute*, 1956), traced the Christian framework of sin and judgment, but in the final analysis showed that frustrated modern life had no redemption in sight.

In his second major essay, *The Rebel* (*L'Homme révolté*, 1951), Camus pursued the notion of rebellion that aspired for human dignity in defiance of oppression. He described the process in which the oppressed became awakened to political consciousness. The conscientized rebel recognized the moral imperative embedded in his revolt, and the revolt became more than an individual protest against death and the absurdity of life – it gave birth to a revolution. Camus was aware of the danger of the rebellion subverting itself by spawning systems of totalitarianism. As such examples of deformation, he pointed to the institutionalized church and dogmatic communism. In contrast, he argued, the French Revolution was a historical example of the triumph of justice, which lasted only until the Reign of Terror.

It is not easy to delineate Camus's vision of a society born out of rebellion and revolution.

In Camus's design, the revolt is triggered by the rebelling human being's defiance to oppression and desire for life, but does not grow into a revolution until it is propelled by supra-personal moral mandates. Camus posited certain meta-physical norms that would guide the rebellion, but the contraposition of his pure revolt and historical revolutions drew heavy criticisms from Marxists and others, including Sartre.

In addition to his better-known novels and essays, Camus wrote plays that portrayed scenes of life's disappointing endeavors. His *Cross Purpose* (*Le Malentendu*, first produced in 1944) and *Caligula* (first produced in 1945) became classics in the Theater of the Absurd. Until his death, Camus was involved in various aspects of the Workers' Theatre (Théâtre du Travail) in Algiers, whose efforts were to bring quality plays to working-class audiences.

One of the less frequently discussed themes of Camus's writings was the problem of poverty; he stated that it was not Karl Marx but poverty that taught him the meaning of freedom (Letemendia 1997). He observed the devastation caused by destitution that affected every aspect of the human experience and threatened to eclipse human dignity. The peril of poverty worsened the already overburdened life with threat of sickness and death. While Camus accepted the inevitable reality of the absurd, he found poverty to be a form of unnatural suffering caused by inexcusable social injustice.

SEE ALSO: Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962; Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–1980)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bartlett, E. (2004) *Rebellious Feminism: Camus's Ethic of Rebellion and Feminist Thought*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Carroll, D. (2007) *Albert Camus the Algerian: Colonialism, Terrorism, Justice*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Cruikshank, J. (1959) *Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Eubanks, C. L. & Petrakis, P. A. (1999) Reconstructing the World: Albert Camus and the Symbolization of Experience. *Journal of Politics* 61, 2 (May): 293–312.
- Fitch, B. T. (1982) *The Narcissistic Text: A Reading of Camus' Fiction*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Letemendia, V. C. (1997) Poverty in the Writings of Albert Camus. *Polity* 29, 3 (Spring): 441–60.

Tarrow, S. (1985) *Exile from the Kingdom: A Political Rereading of Albert Camus*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

Willhoite, F. H., Jr. (1961) Albert Camus' Politics of Rebellion. *Western Political Quarterly* 14, 2 (June): 400–14.

Canada, indigenous resistance

Anthony J. Hall

Indigenous peoples have reacted to various forms of colonization and imperialism in Canada with accommodation, adaptation, and resistance. Early on, indigenous resistance to the expropriation of land and the tyranny imposed by European settlers was passive and conciliatory, commonly involving alliances and treaties with the empire-builders themselves. In time, the governments with whom the First Nations held treaties reneged on their promises; indigenous peoples were forced onto reservations and into Indian boarding schools, and poverty, exploitation, and social iniquity plagued the indigenous communities that had managed to survive. Indigenous resistance during the first half of the twentieth century often involved lobbying and other forms of top-down political engagement with the state. With the ascendance of the civil rights movement in the 1950s, however, indigenous organizers became more militant in their demands for civil and treaty rights, and more recalcitrant in their methods.

Accommodating the Empire

The success of the fur trade in New France was the primary vehicle for the geopolitical emergence of Canada in its original incarnation. The fur trade's viability depended initially on the thick web of commercial, diplomatic, military, and familial ties that allied Indian groups and agents of the French empire in North America. After the British military defeated the French army on the Plains of Abraham in 1759, the governors of a dramatically expanded British North America opted to retain Canada primarily as an Indian reserve, and also as a hinterland of the fur trade metropolis of Montreal. This decision, as formalized in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, was in some measure a concession aimed at appeasing

a loose confederacy of Indian nations whose military opposition to the British occupation of the Great Lakes area was given strategic leadership by the Ottawa sage, Pontiac. The resulting decision of the imperial sovereign to prohibit unauthorized Anglo-American settlements beyond the height of land defining the eastern extreme of the Mississippi Valley was one of the primary causes of the civil war in British North America that gave rise to the creation of the United States. In the split that developed between patriots of the new republic and those who opted to remain within the British empire, the largest numbers of Indians in Canada were drawn to the second camp.

This pattern of alignment culminated in the military mobilization of a powerful Indian Confederacy that saved Canada from annexation by the United States in the War of 1812. The call to arms came from Tecumseh, a gifted Shawnee general whose goal was to promote Indian unity in the North American interior as the necessary precondition for the creation of a sovereign Indian polity with British imperial protection. Some influential figures in imperial Britain were prepared to back the goal of creating a sovereign Aboriginal Indiana as a way of creating a buffer between the US and the vulnerable Crown colony of Upper Canada.

The 10,000 Indian soldiers who answered Tecumseh's call changed history. Although they failed to obtain a sovereign state for themselves, the Indian Confederacy's defense of Canada entailed the most concerted Aboriginal resistance ever faced by the United States in the course of its transcontinental expansion. The Indian intervention in the War of 1812 occurred at a time when Canada would otherwise have fallen because the vast bulk of British soldiers were tied down on the European continent in the fight against Napoleon's forces. Tecumseh's martyrdom in 1813 at the hands of the US Army presaged a fate that would befall many indigenous freedom fighters struggling to defend their peoples and lands.

Assimilation and the Emergence of Indigenous Organizations

Indigenous peoples lost a lot of political ground after the War of 1812 in eastern Canada, and after the building of the Canadian Pacific railway in western Canada. As Canada was remade

to accommodate large-scale immigration from Europe and elsewhere, the pressure grew to contain indigenous peoples within the legal and physical constraints of Indian reservations. This desire to enclose indigenous peoples within narrow enclaves, combined with a renewal of the missionary drive, inspired the policies of the 1800s and early 1900s, which sought to acculturate indigenous people according to a vision of civilization that gave prominence to Christianity, capitalism, and European culture. After confederation in 1867, Canada's new federal government advanced this assimilationist ideology through the activities of a Department of Indian Affairs, the agency charged with implementing a body of statutes known as the Indian Act (1876). Together these instruments of federal power transformed those native people registered under the Indian Act into wards of the federal state who could not, amongst other things, vote in Canadian elections, make binding contracts, or bring civil litigation to court. While many native people were thus placed outside the circle of Canadian citizenship, they were subjected simultaneously to the authority of laws not of their own making and administered by a Minister of Indian Affairs not of their own choosing. As part of this process, the Christian churches in Canada were financed and empowered by the federal government to run about 80 residential schools where about 120,000 indigenous youths were trained to renounce their Aboriginal heritages, belief systems, and languages, and adopt instead the ethos and skills deemed essential for integration into Canadian society. Almost half of those who went through these schools died in the process, many from epidemics of tuberculosis that ravaged the inmates of these institutions.

Indigenous leadership faced serious recriminations whenever it attempted to directly oppose these blended policies of church and state. Federal Indian agents collaborated closely with the federal police to monitor and sometimes criminalize those individuals who challenged the power of the Dominion government to aggressively govern Indians. In 1885 federal officials apprehended several key figures, such as Big Bear (ca. 1825–88) and Poundmaker (1842–86), who had most effectively opposed the imposition of the Indian Act and the reserve system in the central plains of Canada. Another of those so targeted was the Métis leader Louis Riel (1844–85). Riel was executed in 1885, the year of the

completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, for leading an armed opposition against the dispossession and disempowerment of those peoples of mixed ancestry whose interests he had first represented in the negotiations resulting in the creation of the province of Manitoba in 1870. In his final address to the court before being sentenced to death for treason, Riel warned that officials of the federal government had erred “when they began treating the leaders of the small [Aboriginal] community as bandits, as outlaws, leaving them without protection”; in this way they “disorganized that community.” As demonstrated by the socioeconomic maladies that today disproportionately plague the First Nations, Riel’s warning proved prophetic. The wrongful criminalization of Big Bear and Poundmaker, both of whom died shortly after their incarceration, as well as the execution of Riel, did indeed contribute significantly to the disorganization of indigenous peoples.

20th-Century Associations

The Canadian government’s effort to discredit and marginalize the natural leadership of the movement to assert the sovereign rights of indigenous peoples in Canada continued into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. At the large Six Nations community near Brantford, Ontario, for instance, Dominion officials intervened in 1923 to preempt the system of Longhouse governance responsible for the diplomatic mission of its ambassador, Levi General, to the League of Nations in Geneva, Switzerland. Another Six Nations activist, Lieutenant Fred Loft, faced persistent harassment from Indian Department officials in his efforts throughout the 1920s to organize Indians across Canada into an effective lobby. Jules Sioui, a Huron Indian from a small reserve in the area of Quebec City, took up this organizational task, culminating in the creation of the League of Indian Nations of North America in 1944. Among Sioui’s aims was to use the newly formed United Nations as an international venue where the Crown–Aboriginal treaties of Canada could be validated. The government of Canada responded to Sioui’s more radical approach and to the reality that many Aboriginal soldiers had volunteered for military service in World War II by recognizing the legitimacy of a class of Aboriginal political leaders whom it believed it could control through the power of federal funding.

In the late 1940s, Andy Paull continued the work of a long line of Indian activists in British Columbia to found the North American Indian Brotherhood as the more moderate cousin to Sioui’s organization. Paull’s strand of activism was taken over by Len Marchand and George Manuel. Manuel gave early leadership to the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) founded in 1968. That organization led the rejection of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s attempt in 1969 to bring both Crown–Aboriginal treaties and the Indian Act to an end. Sensing the trap of the domestication of Indian nations, Manuel founded the World Council of Indigenous Peoples in 1975 in order to internationalize the struggle for the recognition of Aboriginal rights. In 1980 the leadership of the NIB, composed of chiefs elected through the procedures of the Indian Act, reconstituted their organization as the Assembly of First Nations (AFN). The change came in anticipation of the major role the AFN would play in attempts to elaborate a made-in-Canada constitution. While the leaders of the AFN, as well as other Ottawa-based organizations for Inuit, Métis, native women, off-reserve, and so-called non-status Indians, were willing to accept federal funding for their political activities, this conditional compromise with the very agencies that had colonized indigenous peoples offended some Aboriginal leaders. Leaders within this uncompromising camp were inclined, rather, to see themselves as servants of the real First Nations whose sovereign existence was rooted in indigenous constitutions of custom and convention that long predated the existence of Canada. This more difficult heritage of leadership, some have argued, was more consistent with the true legacies left by the likes of Tecumseh, Big Bear, Levi General, Jules Sioui, and many others.

Challenging the Constitutional Order

At the same time, many indigenous leaders were harkening back to the imperial promises of Great Britain, as legally secured in King George’s Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Covenant Chain of Crown–Aboriginal treaties. From 1979 to 1982, Indian organizations from throughout Canada mounted a major lobbying campaign at the Westminster parliament in London. The aim of this intervention was to challenge the right of the British government to transfer constitutional powers to the federal and provincial governments without the consent

of Indian nations, but especially those whose leaders had made treaties directly with the sovereign of the British imperial government. The role of indigenous peoples in the *patriation* of the Canadian constitution helped establish patterns of interaction that remain integral to the workings of Canada's political culture to this day. In the process of trying to articulate the legitimate place of indigenous peoples in the changing constitutional order of Canada and the larger global community, many indigenous leaders emerged, bolstering a widespread movement of indigenous peoples to resist assimilation by insisting that Canada must be transformed to give fuller and more equitable expression to Crown-Aboriginal treaty relationships, Aboriginal titles, as well as the right and responsibility of the First Nations to govern themselves.

Much of this effort revolved around processes of constitutional negotiation and judicial arbitration aimed at determining how section 35 of Canada's Constitution Act, 1982 would be interpreted and implemented. That provision "recognizes and affirms" the "existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada." Aboriginal peoples are said to include "Indians, Inuit, and Métis." The wording of the new constitution was amended in 1983 to address a systemic problem in Canadian law that has historically disadvantaged Aboriginal women even more than Aboriginal men. Aboriginal involvement in Canada's constitutional politics became increasingly intertwined with the politics of contestation over title to Canada's lands and resources. The Supreme Court intervened in this dispute first in 1973 with its ambivalent ruling on the assertions brought forward by Nisga'a Indians of the Nass River Valley in British Columbia. The effect of this ruling was to pressure the federal government to adhere to the legal requirements of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 by extending the Covenant Chain of Crown-Aboriginal treaties into those areas of Canada, including much of Quebec, most of British Columbia, and all the eastern Arctic, where indigenous peoples had never given consent for the imposition of non-Aboriginal settlements, laws, and institutions.

Militancy and Direct Action

The creation of the American Indian Movement (AIM) in the late 1960s and early 1970s was

rooted in the view that indigenous peoples in North America should not accept some municipal or corporate status as subordinate polities within the nation-states that colonized them. Instead the treaty relationships of Indian nations with other sovereign powers were proof of the sovereign character of Aboriginal polities within the framework of international law. The leadership of AIM attempted to assert these principles by taking a stand at Wounded Knee in South Dakota in 1973 and at Anicinabe Park in Kenora, Ontario, in 1974. Louis Hall, AIM's chief iconographer, became a key figure in the genesis of the Mohawk Warriors Society. That group of militant Longhouse traditionalists became prominent in 1990 with its armed refusal to allow the expansion of a municipal golf course at Oka, Quebec. The confrontation at Oka set off a series of confrontations that escalated into an Indian occupation of a major bridge in Montreal, train blockades in northern Ontario and British Columbia, and an armed stance by Peigan Lonefighters opposed to the building of an irrigation dam up river from their reserve in arid southern Alberta. In making their stand the Lonefighters continued to draw attention to a range of issues similar to those raised in previous years by the Lubicon Cree in northern Alberta. By leading the call to boycott a museum show connected to the Calgary Winter Olympics in 1988, the Lubicons emphasized how the failure to observe Aboriginal rights and titles in their traditional lands prevented indigenous peoples from exercising some degree of continuity with the traditional cultural practices of their ancestors.

The influence of AIM was a factor in the armed confrontation at Gustafsen Lake in 1995, when a small group of protesters called into question the legitimacy of the format for negotiating modern-day Crown-Aboriginal treaties throughout extensive territories in British Columbia. Those inside the besieged camp were insistent that the legitimacy of these negotiations was undermined because their structuring within the administrative and funding mechanisms of the Indian Act denied the true international character of the transactions. The stand was closely connected in time and philosophy to the unarmed occupation of an Indian burial ground at Ipperwash, Ontario. This peaceful protest, rooted in a government failure to live up to a promise to return territory to an Ojibway community, resulted in the

unprovoked murder of Dudley George by a member of the Ontario Provincial Police. George's martyrdom stands at the extreme end of an ongoing process aimed at preventing targeted individuals from asserting effective leadership in the quest to exercise First Nations sovereignty. One of those so targeted was William Jones Ignace, a Shuswap elder who was sentenced to a long jail term as a result of his actions during the confrontation near Gustafsen Lake.

The lobster fishery off the east coast of Canada became the site of major confrontations between Indian fishers, federal fisheries officials, and non-Aboriginal fishers in 1999, after a Supreme Court ruled in the Marshall decision that a Crown-Aboriginal treaty should be interpreted to give members of the Mi'kmaq nation a measure of autonomy in regulating the harvesting of that renewable resource. The exercise of that right generated a violent response from the non-Aboriginal community in and around Burnt Church, New Brunswick. The Supreme Court responded to this vigilante protest by issuing a "clarification" that effectively limited the extent of the Indian win before the judges. The west coast fishery, too, has been the scene of considerable conflict on the waters. One of the main sites of conflict between the federal Department of Fisheries and Aboriginal fishers has been the Sto:lo community of Cheam on the Fraser River. Chief June Quipp has been a formidable leader of this Aboriginal resistance movement, one closely connected to the AIM-related Native Youth Movement.

In Ontario, the Six Nations community near Brantford and the Mohawk community of Tyendinaga have been sites of important indigenous resistance movements in the early twentieth century. In 2005 a movement originating in the actions of clan mothers led to the occupation of a suburban building site at Caledonia. The occupation had its roots in the Indian contention that the Six Nations community was wrongfully deprived of its title to land going back six miles on either side of the Grand River. This land grant was meant to compensate those Six Nations peoples who had lost their traditional lands south of Lake Ontario after allying themselves militarily with the British imperial army during the American Revolution. In 2007, Shawn Brant of Tyendinaga faced a long jail sentence after he led a series of protests culminating in a blockade of the 401 Highway between

Toronto and Montreal. Brant's militant stance was founded on his contention that the wrongful taking of lands from his own community was simply a local manifestation of a more elaborate array of injustices faced by indigenous peoples in Canada.

SEE ALSO: Alcatraz Uprising and the American Indian Movement; Crazy Horse (1849–1877), Sitting Bull (1831–1890), and Native American Resistance at the Battle of Little Bighorn; Native American Protest, 20th Century; Oka Crisis; Riel, Louis (1844–1885)

References and Suggested Readings

- Allen, R. S. (1996) *His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in Defense of Canada 1774–1815*. Toronto: Dundurn.
- Benjamin, D. (1852) *Life of Tecumseh and His Brother the Prophet*. Cincinnati: H. S. & J. Applegate.
- Hall, A. J. (2005) *The American Empire and the Fourth World*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Kulchyski, P. A. (1988) Considerable Unrest: F. O. Loft and the League of Indians. *Native Studies Review* 4 (1 & 2): 95–113.
- Morris, A. (1880) *The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories*. Toronto: Belfords, Clark.
- Sprague, D. N. (1988) *Canada and the Métis*. Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press.
- Tobias, J. L. (1983) Canada's Subjugation of the Crees, 1879–1885. *Canadian Historical Review* 64 (4): 519–48.
- White, R. (1991) *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region 1650–1815*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Canada, labor protests

David L. Bent

Labor protests accompanied the rise and maturation of industrial capitalism and urbanization in Canada during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and continued in new forms afterwards. As the employment relationship became more common, workers sought to improve their economic position and the condition of their workplaces through collective action and protest, which in turn led to the birth of a more formal Canadian labor movement.

The earliest acts of working-class agitation came from canal builders, artisans, and longshoremen in the early to mid-nineteenth century. These workers used their numerical strength

and influential position in the colonial economy with some success to seek better wages and other improvements. Labor organization at this time often took the form of fraternal organizations or charitable societies, though a number of these societies also functioned as unions in setting hours and wages. However, their employers' willingness to use force against strikes, the seasonal nature of much labor, and the exploitation of ethnic rivalries ensured that gains could also be taken away. Early protests sometimes took the form of crowd actions or riots, and some 350 to 400 such incidents are reported in the years prior to 1850.

The most successful labor protests came from urban craftsmen whose traditional skills were threatened by the rise of industrial production after the middle of the nineteenth century. These craft unions often exhibited a strong centralized authority that allowed them to coordinate actions, share information about wage and working conditions, and distribute funds to member branches in need. In this vein, tradesmen from different towns and cities formed regional alliances, and several of these unions were connected with larger American and British unions, reflecting the large number of immigrants and their cultural and political ties to both countries. Many unions were organized along occupational lines, such as the Knights of St. Crispin, an American shoemakers' association with 16 locals in Canada, whose protests focused on the threat that mechanization posed to their craft. Other labor protests were geared toward specific grievances, such as the Nine Hour League, a multi-occupational movement dedicated to shorter hours for industrial workers; it was the first coordinated act of labor protest in Canadian history and was responsible for a wave of strikes in the burgeoning industrial centers of Québec and Ontario in 1872. The most notable was the Toronto printers' strike which led to large protests against the arrest of union leaders for conspiracy and was followed by the enactment that year of the Trade Unions Act, which recognized the legality of union organization. Strike activity showed a general increase in the years following Confederation, as 204 strikes are known to have occurred in the 1870s, a decade of depression, compared with the 72 reported in the 1860s.

The labor movement developed further in the 1880s in tandem with a maturing industrial capitalism. In this decade 425 strikes were

reported, most in the country's large urban centers such as Toronto, which accounted for 122. The ideology of labor also developed further in this period, and with it came questions about the place of workers in society. One reform-minded organization that questioned the subordination of labor to capital in this period was the Knights of Labor, a movement founded in Philadelphia in 1869 which enjoyed relatively more success in Canada. It was built upon the principles of worker cooperation and education and was styled after the secret fraternal societies that were then in fashion. It allowed workers from nearly all backgrounds (Asians being excluded) and industries, including women, to join in the quest for recognition and respect for workers as well as better wages and conditions. At its peak in the 1880s and 1890s the Knights organized some 450 local assemblies across Canada, almost all in Ontario, Québec, and British Columbia.

However inspiring the utopian aspirations of the Knights could be, workers still faced the tough realities of the capitalist system; a system in which pragmatism was as important as reform sentiment. For this reason the framework of the old craft unions became a source of strength for workers possessing the vital skills of the industrial economy, which gave them considerable bargaining power within the developing economy. In 1886 the Trades and Labor Congress (TLC) was established by the unions in order to lobby governments for improvements in legislation and to coordinate the efforts of its members.

An influx of immigrant workers from Britain and other countries where labor radicalism was more firmly entrenched in working-class culture, including Europeans such as Finns and Ukrainians, led to new forms of labor protest. Because many of these immigrants settled in the newly opened West, becoming farmers, fishermen, loggers, and railway workers, this region became the heartland of Canadian labor radicalism. Some of these workers supported the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), founded in Chicago in 1905, dedicated to organizing workers under a single banner to confront the capitalist system. The IWW made several efforts to organize western workers, with its greatest impact possibly being in the Fraser River Railway strike of 1912 when it organized over 7,000 poorly treated railway construction laborers into an ill-fated year-long strike against the Canadian Northern Railway.

Canadian labor entered the twentieth century in a fractured state, while the capitalist class showed remarkable cohesion and was not shy about using its influence to ensure that police and militia forces were available to quash strikes. Such incidents occurred more than thirty times in the years leading up to 1914, reflecting the precarious legal position of unions. Though legal by the terms of the Trade Unions Act of 1872, unions had few rights under the law, as employers could fire union members at will and were not legally required to recognize the unions chosen by their workers.

Though keen to maintain economic growth, the Dominion government was also eager to maintain social order and prevent ugly confrontations between capital and labor. It was thus propelled to reduce confrontation by enacting the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907, the brainchild of industrial relations expert and future prime minister William Lyon Mackenzie King. This act required workers, especially in vital sectors such as transportation and mining, to go through an extensive "conciliation" process before going on strike legally.

World War I proved to be a catalyst for greater class conflict and a further sundering of the Canadian labor movement along radical and moderate lines. The spirit of patriotism that accompanied the first years of the war ensured that industrial relations were relatively calm, but as the war dragged on, casualties mounted, and evidence of profiteering piled up, workers became restless. They protested the contentious conscription legislation of 1917, and strikes became more frequent in the last two years of the war. Union membership reached 378,000 in 1919, and 400 strikes were reported that year, most of them in Ontario and Québec. The apex of increased strike activity occurred in the 1910s when a total of 2,349 strikes were reported. This atmosphere and the news of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia buoyed the hopes of the radical faction of the labor movement that the time had come for the overthrow of the capitalist system. Three general strikes occurred in 1919 in Amherst, Nova Scotia, Toronto, and the famous, and violently put down, Winnipeg General Strike. Most strikers were more concerned with securing themselves a better standard of living than overthrowing capitalism, but the "red scare" of the era ensured that the ruling classes would be tuned to the radical rhetoric of the

strikes rather than their practical demands. Radical ideals were resurrected in the form of the One Big Union (OBU) in 1919, which was followed in 1921 by the formation of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC).

The 1920s did not prove kind to labor protest, as the strength of the increasingly moderate TLC ensured that labor could not present a united front. The fragile industrial economy of the era did not encourage strike activity (only 989 were reported in this decade), but the exception to this was seen in the coal fields of Cape Breton Island, where miners and steel workers under radical leadership, most notably the fiery Scottish immigrant J. B. McLachlan, waged a series of violent strikes against the British Empire Steel Corporation over wages and union recognition. By 1925 these strikes had resulted in the preservation of the status quo in wage and working conditions, and the formal recognition of the workers' chosen union, but in the face of their continued exploitation and the decline of Cape Breton industry, these provided small comforts.

Labor protests became more widespread in the course of the Great Depression of the 1930s, which demonstrated the need for further organization and for a stronger place for workers within the economy. Though outlawed, the CPC continued to exert influence over unions and labor politics during the 1930s, while moderate socialists founded the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in 1932, a political party that was dedicated to social and economic transformation through parliamentary means. Unemployment was the direst problem facing workers during the 1930s, and thus most labor protests and agitation were geared towards unemployment relief and job security.

The Depression pushed community relief systems to the limit, and the government-based relief was hard to come by or inadequate. One of the major government depression relief initiatives was the establishment of a system of work camps for unemployed single men. The poor conditions of these camps led to protests and strikes among camp inmates which culminated in the Ontario-Ottawa Trek and Regina Riot of 1935, and the abolition of the camp system the following year. The need for a comprehensive system of national unemployment insurance was behind many depression-era labor protests and was a key platform plank in all labor parties. This reform was finally achieved in 1940.

It was also during the 1930s that the idea of industrial unionism achieved greater acceptance as workers in the new mass production industries joined organizations that met their needs more effectively than the craft unions based on particular skills. These new industrial unions included all workers in one industry, regardless of craft or skill. The Oshawa Strike of 1937, when 4,000 workers struck against General Motors, was among the most significant of the new organizing drives among industrial workers, in this case by workers who supported the United Auto Workers. In 1940 the industrial unions formed the Canadian Congress of Labor (CCL), a more aggressive counterpart to the moderate TLC.

The onset of World War II strengthened this drive, as workers protested against government attempts at wage controls and other restrictions. Strike activity rose considerably in the 1940s, with 2,537 strikes reported. Such action convinced the government to change in 1944 to issue an emergency order-in-council, PC 1003, which protected the workers' right to join unions and required employers to recognize unions chosen by their employees. This reform was codified after the war by the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act of 1948 and in complementary provincial legislation.

Further gains in wages and job security were achieved after a series of postwar strikes, such as the Ford strike in Windsor, Ontario in late 1945. This strike was noteworthy for the decision by Justice Ivan C. Rand, later known as the Rand Formula, which allowed for the compulsory check-off of union dues, thus making it possible for unions to achieve greater financial security. These decisions proved to be the foundations of Canada's postwar welfare state and ensured that the working class of Canada would enjoy a more secure and comfortable lifestyle than their predecessors had.

Despite these gains, challenges remained for workers, their unions, and their parties in the postwar world. Although legal, there were still attempts to suppress the rights of workers to strike. This was perhaps strongest in Québec, where the government of Premier Maurice Duplessis did all it could to clamp down on union activity. Québec always remained distinct in the Canadian labor movement. International unions had strong support in Québec, but the perceived socialist and anti-Catholic leanings of these organ-

izations did not endear them to the province's powerful Catholic hierarchy and conservative nationalists who organized the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labor (CCCL) in 1921. By the late 1940s, however, workers in one of these "conservative" unions waged an illegal strike against their American employers for better wages in the asbestos mining district. Subsequent years saw Québec unions become staunch critics of the Duplessis regime, and the CCCL was secularized and modernized as the Confederation of National Trade Unions in 1960.

Another notable example of persistent labor protest in the face of state resistance to unions occurred in the newly confederated province of Newfoundland. In 1958–9 loggers organized under the International Woodworkers of America (IWA) struck for better wages and working conditions but were met with hostility from the government of Joey Smallwood, who managed to set up a rival union under state sponsorship and drive the IWA from Newfoundland. Such direct squelching of strike activity by the government was less common after the 1950s, with the state more often turning to legislated settlements or arbitration to terminate disputes.

Challenges also came from within the labor movement itself and from changing economic and social conditions. The postwar environment was not friendly to workers' parties, and the prosperity of the era and the Cold War paranoia surrounding socialist politics caused the CPC to fade into obscurity. The CCF found itself moribund at about 8–10 percent of the national vote, but fared better at the provincial level, and in 1944, under Tommy Douglas, it began a 20-year period of governing Saskatchewan, the first time a socialist party won political power in North America.

The changing economic landscape also imposed changes upon organized labor. From the 1950s onward the traditional blue collar industrial base was in decline and a white collar office-based workforce, particularly in the civil service, was growing. Organizing this segment of workers became a key effort of unions, but it was not easy and often unsuccessful. Banks and retail outlets proved to be resistant to drives to unionize their employees, but union organizers had more success in the civil service. Government work, be it in the bureaucracy, public works, health services, or education, was the

“growth industry” of the postwar era, and by 1970 one in five workers was on the public payroll. However, they did not enjoy union rights until the mid-1960s. A series of illegal strikes by postal workers in 1965 convinced the state that allowing their employees the right to organize and bargain was better than the threat of wildcat action. Thus the Public Service Staff Relations Act of 1967 was passed giving public servants union rights similar to other workers.

The workforce was also changing due to the rising number of women workers, who reached about 35 percent of the workforce by the end of the 1960s. Their increasing numbers led them to demand pay equity and fair representation in union leadership. Gains were slowly made on these fronts, so much so that by 1984 a woman, Shirley Carr, was the president of the Canadian Labor Congress (CLC).

The CLC was itself another strategy for coping with the changing times through further unity within the labor movement. Founded in 1956, it united the TLC and CCL unions under one banner. It also made strides to ensure that unions had a stronger political voice by joining forces with the CCF to form the New Democratic Party (NDP) in 1961, which has formed governments in four of the provinces at various times but has had less success at the federal level. In the years following 1970 labor organizations and workers have faced many new challenges, such as deindustrialization, inflation, globalization, and free trade, and have responded to them by building on an established tradition of protest that has contributed to the shaping of modern Canada.

SEE ALSO: Canada, Law and Public Protest: History; Cooperative Commonwealth; Regina Riot; Winnipeg General Strike of 1919

References and Suggested Readings

- Avery, D. (1979) *“Dangerous Foreigners”: European Immigrant Workers and Labor Radicalism in Canada, 1896–1932*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
- Cruikshank, D. & Kealey, G. S. (1987) Strikes in Canada, 1891–1950. *Labor/Le Travail* 20 (Fall): 85–145.
- Frank, D. (1999) *J. B. McLachlan: A Biography*. Toronto: James Lorimer.
- Heron, C. (1989) *The Canadian Labor Movement: A Short History*. Toronto: James Lorimer.
- Heron, C. (Ed.) (1998) *The Workers’ Revolt in Canada, 1917–1925*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Kealey, G. S. (1995) *Workers and Canadian History*. Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press.
- Kealey, G. S. & Palmer, B. D. (1982) *Dreaming of What Might Be: The Knights of Labor in Ontario, 1880–1900*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kealey, L. (1998) *Enlisting Women for the Cause: Women, Labor, and the Left in Canada, 1890–1920*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Morton, D. (1998) *Working People: An Illustrated History of the Canadian Labor Movement*. Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press.
- Palmer, B. D. (1992) *Working Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labor, 1800–1991*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.

Canada, law and public protest: history

Irina Ceric

Moments of protest and rebellion have always challenged systems of power and authority, but particularly since the rise of the liberal democratic state, laws and legal institutions have mediated the tensions and contradictions between individuals, social movements, and the existing order. In the Canadian context, the ongoing history of law and social protest has been shaped by the evolution of a legal framework inherited from England but continually altered by the demands of settlement and nation building, and more recently, by constitutional rights guarantees. While criminalization of dissent, particularly of street demonstrations and other forms of collective action, remains a key issue in studies of the relationship between law and protest, law has also become a tool of resistance in itself, either in conjunction with or instead of other forms of mobilization.

Many of the provisions which still constrain political protest and assembly in Canada, such as riot, unlawful assembly, and breach of peace, first arose under English common law and, beginning in the nineteenth century, subsequently developed as public order offenses in an attempt to replace treason and seditious libel as the primary, and increasingly unpopular, political crimes committed. Some of these offenses can only be described as archaic. For example, it appears that the earliest recorded definition of an unlawful assembly stems from the reign of King Henry VII (1485–1509). Sir William Holdsworth’s *A History of*

English Law concludes that unlawful assembly and its allied offenses (such as riot) began to acquire their modern characteristics at the end of the sixteenth century, based partly on the treatment of these offenses by the Court of Star Chamber. By 1986, when the Public Order Act was introduced, public order law in England had become “depoliticized,” in that the explicit political crimes such as treason and sedition were no longer prosecuted in favor of resort to the “ordinary” criminal offenses to deal with outbreaks of disorder (Smith 1987). Nonetheless, the old common law offenses of riot and unlawful assembly continue to be deployed in England, a notable example being the police response to the 1985 coal miners’ strike.

Canadian criminal law traces its genesis to English law (the influence of the French civil code having been relegated to civil matters in what would become the province of Québec), and the early colonial era reflects this influence in instances of social unrest. A representative example arose in 1788 in the district of Ferryland in what is now Newfoundland, when 114 Irish immigrants were convicted of riotous or unlawful assembly, with some sentenced to transportation (deportation) or banishment, following clashes among the Irish Catholics in Ferryland – divisions which were exploited and exacerbated by the town’s Protestant merchants and employers. The English and Canadian criminal justice systems have, perhaps not surprisingly, diverged considerably since the colonial period. In *The Birth of a Criminal Code: The Evolution of Canada’s Justice System*, Desmond Brown argues that the particular economic and social conditions in colonial North America initially resulted in short, concise proscriptions on criminal behavior that became more comprehensive over time as life in the colonies itself became more complex and stratified. It was not until almost three decades after Confederation, however, that the first Criminal Code of Canada came into force in 1893, with common law offenses abolished only in 1953, thereafter precluding further resort to the some of the political crimes inherited from England.

The public order offenses have remained almost unchanged since the inception of the Criminal Code, yet both the unlawful assembly and riot provisions remain relevant and are regularly charged and prosecuted to varying degrees across Canada. Unlike the now disused

charges of seditious libel and treason, riot and unlawful assembly (as well as general provisions such as mischief and breach of peace), are predicated on the claim of proscribing the manner of political speech rather than its content – in other words, by criminalizing political action or even the very assembly of the disaffected, rather than searching for evidence of seditious or treasonous intent in their words. The fallout from two key events signaled this evolution in the Canadian state’s legal practice: the sedition trials following the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike which engendered public scrutiny of such political crimes, and the debate over the repeal of the Criminal Code’s unlawful association provisions following the trials of Community Party leaders in the early 1930s (MacKinnon 1977). Nonetheless, the resilience of public order offenses, as reflected in their resurgence in the face of increased political activism in the last decade and the failure of challenges to the constitutionality of the unlawful assembly provisions, demonstrates that the legal regulation of political activity has not entirely escaped its repressive roots. Despite the constitutionally protected status of political speech and peaceful assemblies, the actual regulation of such activities reveals a pattern of criminalization and repression in which the utilization of criminal charges has played a central role.

Historically, the use of criminal law, including unlawful assembly, riot, and picketing-related charges, has followed the trajectories set by expressions of political, social, and economic dissent and disruption, peaking at moments when protests and resistance boil over onto the streets, including two main spikes: the first during the Great Depression and the second during the last decade. During the 1930s, perhaps not surprisingly, disputes arising out of strikes, unemployed workers’ movements, and emergency relief related protests formed the bulk of public order prosecutions. Palmer (2003) argues that

the ways that law was actually challenged most directly in the 1930s was in the class-related but union-separated struggles of the jobless, the homeless, and the relief-dependent poor. Such victims of the capitalist marketplace’s vicissitudes sustained a creative arsenal of resistance and opposition that flaunted the laws of the land in the same way that the laws of the market had bluntly bypassed their needs.

The creativity in tactics cited by Palmer is evident in the range of marches, occupations, protests, and other collective actions which would give rise to criminal charges. Although the reported cases from the 1930s are primarily related to the actions of unemployed workers, media archives suggest a parallel targeting of socialist and communist organizers, and there was certainly an overlap between these movements. A key example is the Québec case of *R. v. Pavletich* which arose from a May Day meeting at a Ukrainian Temple in 1932. Police moved in to arrest the speaker, sparking off a confrontation that began with the throwing of rocks at the officers, use of a fire hose against the assembled crowds, warning shots fired by officers, and finally, the arrest of 32 people.

The decades following the Depression saw few public order prosecutions, although strikes and other labor actions continued to be criminally proscribed, as did the activities of religious minorities, including the Doukhobors in British Columbia and Jehovah's Witnesses, particularly in Québec. Nonetheless, the 1954 parliamentary debates on the public order provisions of the Code reveal the ideological cleavages then still evident in Canadian politics. One member of Parliament from the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, Angus MacInnis, framed his opposition to the riot and unlawful assembly offenses in broad terms, maintaining that "useful as these provisions might be in time of trouble, they will not of themselves maintain an orderly society. We have riots, and we have riots only when economic and social conditions have brought people to the point of desperation. These are the basic causes of this sort of disturbances of the people."

By 1970, however, a different sort of political action captured attention across Canada. Members of the Front de liberation du Québec (FLQ), a leftist movement with the aim of independence for the province of Québec, had been engaging in illegal activities for close to a decade, including bombings and robberies; but the kidnappings of James Cross, a British trade commissioner, and Pierre Laporte, a Québec cabinet minister, in October of 1970 raised suspicions of a broad insurgency. Led by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, the Canadian government invoked emergency legislation suspending civil liberties and arrested close to 500 people, the majority of them later released without charges. Some FLQ leaders, however, were tried twice on charges of seditious

conspiracy, and although none were convicted of those charges (convictions on other criminal charges were upheld), the October Crisis represents the apex of legislative and judicial responses to political activity in modern Canada.

Only a few years later, however, and despite sporadic prosecutions for political protests and strike-related activities, the relative lull in social activism in the 1980s and early 1990s was reflected in the minimal deployment of public order criminal charges. But this situation changed dramatically again in 1997 with the resurgence of political activism by a new generation of activists clustered around the emerging anti-globalization and urban anti-poverty movements, and a concomitant revival in public order prosecutions across Canada, but particularly centered in Toronto and Montreal. Dozens of small local or regional protests and other actions have attracted criminal sanction, as have larger gatherings such those opposing the Free Trade Area of the Americas meeting in Québec City in 2001 and the Organization of American States Ministerial in Windsor in 2000; however, the number of incidents does not even approach the number of individuals affected, as many of the smaller events throughout Québec actually involved the arrests of hundreds of people and the cumulative prosecution of almost 2,000 people in the last decade.

Although it has always been the case that the voices of the poor and powerless are heard in the streets and workplaces, this recent trend suggests that the significance of the public order offenses has grown in tandem with the rise of protest and public demonstrations as the primary expressive vehicles for marginalized groups and individuals. As Stoykewych (1985) argues, in the current Canadian context, "the public demonstration can be seen as a functional corrective to a capitalist-democratic form of order that, by restricting the scope of discourse within its representative institutions in order to preserve the legitimacy of its decisions, denies many of its citizens the possibility of meaningful political participation." Despite the centrality of public protest as an embodiment of political speech, the limits on state sanction of such protest have not been greatly reduced by the inclusion of rights of assembly and expression in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the regulation or outright criminalization of demonstrations and other expressive activities

continues to constitute a significant restraint, despite the focus on expressive form rather than content. It was not until 2000, for example, that a Charter challenge to the Criminal Code's unlawful assembly provision reached a provincial appeal court, and the resulting judgment is notable for its explicit rejection of the notion that a pre-Charter statute or doctrine merits reexamination on constitutional grounds. Nonetheless, in the modern Canadian context, the deployment of unlawful assembly and other public order offenses has resulted in a cumulative impact that has criminalized dissent nearly as effectively as a content-based sanction would, particularly during eras of increased political mobilization.

Constitutional rights guarantees have also had a negligible effect on the broader political context informing judicial and policing policy. The limits of constitutional rights are reflected in the Canadian state's repeated use of force against Indigenous activism, particularly land claim disputes, such as the deployment of military personnel in Mohawk territory in 1990 and the killing of protester Dudley George in an Ontario park in 1995. More recently, as in other liberal democracies, the introduction of antiterrorism legislation in late 2001 created a chilling effect on legitimate but potential unlawful advocacy.

SEE ALSO: Peterloo Massacre, 1819; Winnipeg General Strike of 1919; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Quebec City, 2001

References and Suggested Readings

- Esmonde, J. (2003) Bail, Global Justice and the Limits of Dissent. *Osgoode Hall Law Journal* 41: 322–61.
- Greenwood, F. M. & Wright, B. (1996) Introduction: State Trials, the Rule of Law, and Executive Powers in Early Canada. In F. M. Greenwood & B. Wright (Eds.), *Canadian State Trials, Volume I: Law, Politics and Security Measures, 1608–1837*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- MacKinnon, P. (1977) Conspiracy and Sedition as Canadian Political Crimes. *McGill Law Journal* 23: 622–43.
- Palmer, B. D. (2003) What's Law Got to Do with It? Historical Considerations of Class Struggle, Boundaries of Constraint and Capitalist Authority. *Osgoode Hall Law Journal* 41: 465 at 481.
- Sheldrick, B. (2004) *Perils and Possibilities: Social Activism and the Law*. Halifax: Fernwood.
- Smith, A. T. H. (1987) *Offences Against Public Order: Including the Public Order Act 1986*. London: Sweet & Maxwell.
- Stoykewych, R. (1985) Street Legal: Constitutional Protection of Public Demonstration in Canada. *University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review* 43: 43–69.
- Waddington, D. (1992) *Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder: A Comparative and Historical Approach*. London: Routledge.

Canada, Rebellion of 1837–1838

John Robert Henris

The Canada Rebellion of 1837 and 1838 resulted from a number of disparate political and social grievances that increasingly gained momentum among political reformers and the rural populace during the 1830s. In Lower Canada, Louis-Joseph Papineau led the Parti Patriote and spoke out against the power of the Château Clique, a group of wealthy British and French Canadian businessmen wielding almost absolute political authority in Lower Canada. Papineau increasingly agitated for reforms providing individual voters, as well as the elected assembly, with more political power. In Upper Canada William Lyon Mackenzie led other reformers against a group of similarly privileged officeholders known as the Family Compact. Despite the seeming collusion of reformers in Upper and Lower Canada, there were substantial differences. A strong current of French Canadian nationalism ran through many of the supporters of the Papineau faction, while many of McKenzie's rural supporters originally came from the United States and harbored particular resentment toward the monopolization of large tracts of land by the Anglican Church. Such longstanding grievances were only exacerbated by the agricultural and economic crisis of the 1830s. The international wheat market collapsed and harvests were poor on a number of occasions during the 1830s as well.

In May of 1837, Patriot leadership learned that the British parliament rejected earlier calls for reform under the Ninety-Two Resolutions and placed further limitations upon the elected assembly. The agitation for reform having always been stronger among the rural populace of French ancestry in Lower Canada, the nature of the Patriot movement became increasingly radical in the fall of 1837. The political leadership of the Patriot movement demanded political reform

while agrarians increasingly sought the end of such traditional forms of rural oppression as seignorial rents. Alarmed at the growing instances of protest and unrest in the rural districts, British regulars were brought in to bolster colonial authority even as Patriot militias began assembling in the countryside around Montreal and in the Richelieu Valley.

Armed conflict broke out in the winter of 1837 when Sir John Colborne ordered British military forces on a punitive expedition to break up Patriot strongholds and arrest their leadership. Despite initial Patriot success in holding St. Denis, British regulars crushed rebel positions at St. Charles and St. Eustache. William Mackenzie, taking advantage of the absence of British troops and hoping to relieve pressure on Lower Canada, moved against Toronto only to have his force dispersed by Canadian loyalist militia at Montgomery's Tavern. As the rebellion collapsed in Upper and Lower Canada, Patriot leaders, including Papineau and Mackenzie, abandoned their respective colonies and were across the US border by January of 1838.

In the United States the Patriot leadership found refuge in northern states like Michigan, Vermont, and New York. Sympathetic American supporters established secret societies called Hunters' Lodges while Patriots formed similar organizations called Frères Chasseurs in Lower Canada. The Hunters' Lodge movement proved particularly active in Vermont, New York, Ohio, and Michigan.

Americans embraced the Patriot cause for a number of reasons. Some wanted fervently to bring republican government to the colonies of Upper and Lower Canada, while others, hostile toward the British, wanted only to cause instability in the empire. Still others were related to American emigrants who settled, particularly in Upper Canada, following the end of the War of 1812. Agricultural hardship and the subsequent market panic of 1837 provided the catalyst for Americans to embrace the Patriot cause for potential economic gain as well. Some of the Patriot leadership even offered prospective American recruits land in Canada should the rebellion eventually succeed in toppling British authority.

In December of 1837 the destruction of the steamer *Caroline* threatened to escalate tensions between Britain and the United States. American regulars came to the border and New York and

Vermont called up their militias. The following month the United States again affirmed neutrality; however, federal officials did little to prevent the northern states bordering Upper and Lower Canada from being used as staging areas for the Patriot movement. During the spring and summer of 1838 Patriot forces made a number of raids into Upper and Lower Canada at Week's House, Pelee Island, and Short Hills. British regulars and loyal militia easily repelled cross-border raids.

Conflict again broke out in early November in Lower Canada as the Frères Chasseurs assembled in the rural districts and Robert Nelson gathered a large Patriot contingent at Napierville. In the northern states, Patriot rebels and American sympathizers crossed the frontier into Upper Canada and were defeated by British and royalist forces at both Prescott and Windsor. Nelson managed to briefly hold Napierville before a large British force under Colborne reentered the city and the remnants of the Patriot army fled south across the border. In the aftermath of the fighting of November and December 1838 soldiers burned many farms, and British authorities executed a handful of Patriots and transported others to Australia. Some of these were Americans.

Ultimately, the elite leadership of the rebellion under men like Papineau, McKenzie, and Nelson failed to channel popular rural discontent into sustainable rebellion. In response to their unsuccessful uprisings, however, the British government sent Lord John Durham to report on grievances in Upper and Lower Canada. Lord Durham concluded that British authorities should grant more political autonomy and that Upper and Lower Canada should be united. British officials hoped the merging of the two colonies into the Province of Canada might weaken French Canadian cultural identity and help assimilate the rural populace of Lower Canada. Consequently, the merging of Upper and Lower Canada came to pass under the Act of Union in 1840, marking the beginning of more decentralized rule and responsible government in Canada.

SEE ALSO: Canada, Law and Public Protest: History

References and Suggested Readings

Greer, A. (1993) *The Patriots and the People: The Rebellion of 1837 in Lower Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Guillet, E. (1968) *The Lives and Times of the Patriots: An Account of the Upper Canada Rebellion of 1837–1838 and of the Patriot Agitation in the United States, 1837–1842*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Cannon, James P. (1890–1974) and American Trotskyism

Bryan D. Palmer

Growing up in Rosedale, Kansas in the 1890s, James P. Cannon was the son of Irish immigrants. But he would have fit comfortably in a Mark Twain novel, his Midwestern twang and homespun aphorisms marking him as very much a native son. By 1911, however, he was a self-identified professional revolutionary, committed to the creation of a world in which the exploitation of the working class was brought to a decisive halt.

Cannon's father, John, was a small-town socialist who supported a complicated and changing family (two wives predeceased him and a third did not remain in his home long) through waged work and, by the turn of the century, on the earnings of marginal business ventures. He revered Eugene Debs and had socialist publications like the *Appeal to Reason* in the home. Jim Cannon was won to radical ideas by reading such journals and through active involvement in labor defense campaigns.

Joining the Socialist Party in 1908, Jim Cannon thirsted for knowledge. After a stint working in Kansas City's packinghouses, he returned to high school, where he quickly gained a reputation as Rosedale's boy orator and star debater. Older than his fellow students by four-to-five years, Cannon struck up an intimate bond with his teacher, a free-thinking woman of Scandinavian descent, Lista Makimson.

Economic pressures forced Cannon out of his classes and back into the job market. Keen to be directly involved in class struggle, he joined the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). From 1911 to 1914 Cannon soapboxed and hoboed his way from Kansas City to Chicago, from Newcastle, Pennsylvania to Duluth, Minnesota, agitating and organizing workers. He was soon a veteran strike leader and free speech militant, a galvanizing advocate of workers' uprisings.

He also married. Fearful that a threatened jail sentence would part them decisively if they did not sanctify their union, Lista and Jim wed in 1913. With two children, Carl and Ruth, born in the difficult years of World War I, Cannon returned to Rosedale-Kansas City. His antiwar views and the menacingly anti-radical climate led him to be ostracized and caused him to question the possibilities of revolutionary social change.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 revived Cannon's commitments. Drifting from the IWW, Cannon rejoined the Socialist Party and was a staunch member of its vocal left wing. Cannon was soon a leading activist in the Nebraska, Missouri, and Kansas regional development of the fractured underground communist milieu, and he helped establish the Communist Labor Party (CLP). With Earl Browder, another Kansas revolutionary, Cannon founded and edited one of the few communist newspapers in the Midwest, the *Workers' World*.

As the post-World War I Red Scare unleashed by Attorney-General A. Mitchell Palmer drove the revolutionary underground deeper and deeper into its subterranean lairs, Cannon was numbered among the thousands of activists arrested and imprisoned. He languished in jail for two months in 1919–20, arrested for stirring up the Kansas miners.

Upon his release, Cannon grasped that the critical need was to unite the communist forces, divided into foreign-language sections (which formed the core of the Communist Party of America) and a more Americanized, labor-oriented contingent in the CLP. Cannon played a pivotal role in bridging various divides, chairing a December 1921 Manhattan convention that founded the Workers' Party, later to be renamed the Workers (Communist) Party and, eventually, in 1929, the Communist Party, USA.

As one of the leading figures of communism in the United States in the 1920s, Cannon made a number of trips to Moscow, meeting with prominent Russian Bolsheviks such as Leon Trotsky and Gregory Zinoviev. He pioneered the creation of the party's most successful united front endeavor, the International Labor Defense, dedicated to the non-partisan defense of all class war prisoners. A stunning orator and a party official with a keen sense of the importance of trade union issues, Cannon dedicated himself to making communism a legal movement that registered its importance in US working-class

circles. Perhaps his strongest ally in these years was Rose Karsner, and in the mid-1920s, while in Chicago and separated from Lista and the children, Jim began a lifelong love relationship with Rose that was sealed in political convictions. Cannon and Makimson separated as a consequence.

Cannon battled factional intrigues and party opponents, gathering around him an able group that included youth leaders Max Shachtman and Martin Abern and trade union stalwarts Bill Dunne and Arne Swabeck. They eventually ran headlong into other factions headed by, on the one hand, William Z. Foster, and, on the other, Jay Lovestone. The factional log-jam in the American communist movement worsened in 1927 with the death of Charles Emil (C. E.) Ruthenberg, long the leading functionary in the party. Lovestone quickly usurped the communist administrative apparatus. Undoubtedly the most unscrupulous of American communism's leaders, Lovestone relied on his contacts with the Communist International's (Comintern/CI) increasingly bureaucratized Stalinist officialdom, the leading emissary in the United States being a Hungarian exile known as John Pepper.

Cannon grew increasingly disillusioned. He tended not to appreciate the larger animating political degeneration within the Soviet Union and the Comintern, concerning himself largely with the American troubles. Attending the Sixth World Congress of the CI in the summer of 1928, reading the exiled Leon Trotsky's *Draft Program of the Communist International: A Critique of Fundamentals*, and discussing the document with Maurice Spector, a Canadian revolutionary and theoretician, Cannon came to believe that the Comintern had lost its way. Stalin had subordinated the world revolutionary movement to the protection and preservation of "socialism in one country," and Cannon began to appreciate how this larger political degeneration fostered the factionalism in the American party by balancing forces against one another and keeping all sufficiently weakened and incapable of exercising effective leadership.

Returning to the United States, Cannon was committed to forging a left opposition within the CPUSA by convincing the ranks of the rightness of Trotsky's critique. This was not to happen. Cannon and about 100 sympathizers were soon expelled, forming the Communist League of

America (Opposition). The CLA lived through a difficult period, which saw Cannon and his long-time ally, Shachtman, cross factional swords.

By 1934, however, the two leading figures in the CLA had worked through their early 1930s differences sufficiently to develop the strategy behind the Minneapolis teamsters' General Strike. The CLA merged with A. J. Muste's American Workers Party and then orchestrated a 1936 entry into the Socialist Party (SP) of Norman Thomas. Cannon and the Trotskyists were expelled from the SP in 1937, forming the first Trotskyist political party in the United States, the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) on New Year's Day, 1938.

No sooner was the SWP formed, however, than it faced the onslaught of state repression. The 1940 Smith Act, passed as war broke out in Europe, made criminal any act or advocacy of overthrowing the constituted government of the United States. This legislation, combined with an antiquated Civil War statute, was soon used to bring indictments against 29 leaders of the SWP, among them the national secretary, Jim Cannon, and most of the leadership of the rebel Minneapolis Local 544 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, long a thorn in the side of the union's conservative bureaucracy. Eighteen of the indicted eventually went to trial, and Cannon spent almost 14 months in jail, finally released in January 1945.

Between 1939 and 1953 the SWP also weathered a series of internal oppositions and factional contests that drained members and leading cadres in splits and expulsions. But these challenges also clarified programmatic issues on the nature and meaning of the Soviet Union; the obligation of members to exist under some form of party discipline; and the tasks of a revolutionary organization in the changing context of post-World War II America, one part of which was the danger of right-wing revival, evident in McCarthyism, another component being the softening of Stalinism with the "Great Leader's" death and the increasing defections from the ranks of orthodox communism.

As World War II ended, the Cannon-led SWP seemed poised for a breakthrough. It had grown to 1,500 members, had significant strengths in certain trade union sectors, and was beginning to recruit African Americans to its ranks. The party press, the *Militant*, had a circulation of over 30,000.

This, however, was to prove the SWP's height of influence and importance. Cannon's capacities to exercise leadership in the United States and international Trotskyist movements (where other factional contests had also fractured national sections and weakened the global movement) was waning. Approaching 65 years of age, Cannon retired as national secretary in 1953, but held on to the more honorific post of national chairman for the rest of his life.

Over the course of the late 1950s the SWP did not fare particularly well. It continued to lose members and leading cadre, especially as contentious debates developed with respect to the meaning of policies and practices in China and Cuba. The party led few campaigns, concentrating more and more on electoral politics by running candidates for office. The SWP thus entered the 1960s ill-suited to capitalize on the rise of the New Left.

Cannon's last years were spent in an uneasy tension as he saw the SWP and its new leadership adapt to the changes of a tumultuous decade. The rise of black nationalism and the mass mobilization of hundreds of thousands against the war in Vietnam affected the SWP greatly. Cannon welcomed some of this but was cognizant of how distanced much of the new political terrain was from a radical revival of the working class.

With Rose Karsner's death in 1968 Cannon was deeply shaken, missing acutely her companionship, both social and political. His own death followed in 1974. Cannon left a legacy of revolutionary continuity reaching from the pre-World War I syndicalist and socialist movements into the 1960s. He is unrivalled in the history of the American revolutionary left for his organizational acumen, his refusal to compromise revolutionary principle, and his capacity to build a party of communist opposition on the basis of programmatic clarity, centralized in its essential purpose but democratic in everyday governance.

SEE ALSO: Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA); Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917

References and Suggested Readings

Breitman, G., Le Blanc, P., & Wald, A. (1996) *Trotskyism in the United States: Historical Essays and Reconsiderations*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

- Cannon, J. P. (1943) *The Struggle for a Proletarian Party*. New York: Pioneer.
- Cannon, J. P. (1972) *The History of American Trotskyism: From Its Origins (1928) to the Founding of the Socialist Workers Party (1938) – Report of a Participant*. New York: Pathfinder.
- Cannon, J. P. (1973) *Notebook of an Agitator*. New York: Pathfinder.
- Cannon, J. P. (1983) *The First Ten Years of American Communism – Report of a Participant*. New York: Pathfinder.
- Cannon, J. P. (1992) *James P. Cannon and the Early Years of American Communism: Selected Writings and Speeches, 1920–1928*. New York: Prometheus Research Library.
- Cannon, J. P. (2002) *Dog Days: James P. Cannon vs. Max Shachtman in the Communist League of America, 1931–1933*. New York: Prometheus Research Library.
- Evans, L. (Ed.) (1976) *James P. Cannon as We Knew Him: By Thirty-Three Comrades, Friends, and Relatives*. New York: Pathfinder.
- Myers, C. A. (1977) *The Prophet's Army: The American Trotskyists, 1928–1941*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Palmer, B. D. (2007) *James P. Cannon and the Origins of the American Revolutionary Left, 1890–1928*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Wald, A. (1987) *The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left from the 1930s to the 1960s*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Canudos, religion and rebellion in 19th-century Brazil

Diogo L. Pinheiro

Canudos was the name of the abandoned farm where Antônio Vicente Mendes Maciel (1830–97), popularly known as Antônio Conselheiro (the Counselor), and his followers settled in 1893. It is now associated with the massacre of Belo Monte, the most brutal event of the early days of the Brazilian republic, which had been established in 1889. Though the exact figures are the subject of some historical controversy, at least 15,000 people were killed by the army, many of them after their capture. This event had a profound impact on Brazilian self-identity and inspired one of the greatest novels of lusophone literature, *Os Sertões*, by Euclides da Cunha (1866–1909). The official version of what transpired in Canudos described Antônio

Conselheiro as a religious fanatic who was staunchly opposed to the recently established republic and who used his charisma to attract thousands of uneducated peasants to the village he created. Recent historiography has called this into question, and there exist different definitions of the events at Canudos, which have been called a war, a revolt, and a massacre at different points in time by different people.

Historical Background

Brazil underwent significant changes in the last quarter of the nineteenth century which were particularly severe for those living in the *sertão*, the arid backlands of the Brazilian Northeast. The period was marked by economic recession and significant shifts in the national distribution of income. The monarchy that had ruled Brazil since its independence in 1822 was overthrown by a military government in 1889; eventually, a president was elected by the minority of the population eligible to vote. These changes significantly affected the northeastern states, which saw both their political and economic power reduced drastically.

As in most Latin American nations, industrialization proceeded at a very slow pace in Brazil during the nineteenth century. The nation was still heavily dependent on the export of primary agricultural goods. The production of sugar, the Northeast's principal economic resource, underwent drastic transformations. Large plantations responsible for the majority of sugarcane production had relied almost exclusively on slave labor up until 1888. The abolition of slavery that year, coupled with the long cycle of droughts that plagued the region from 1870 onwards, led to a deeply felt economic crisis in the region.

This crisis increased growing regional disparities of income as coffee production, concentrated mostly in the southeastern states, grew in importance, absorbing most of the immigrant labor force from Europe. The growing disparity also generated internal migration flows as many fled the deteriorating conditions of the Northeast. The abolition of slavery and internal migration created a problem for sugar producers, as they saw their main sources of cheap labor dwindle. The creation of centralized refineries and the modest efforts at mechanization that accompanied them did little to alleviate the problem. One of the main impacts of these changes on the local economy

was the growing importance of the *sertanejos*, or peasants from the *sertão*. They lived under miserable conditions as sharecroppers, but were usually self-reliant and enjoyed a greater degree of freedom than their counterparts throughout the region. Most of Conselheiro's followers would come from this class, who became a significant force in the reaction to the establishment of Belo Monte.

In 1889 Brazil saw a monarchic authoritarian regime replaced by an authoritarian military one, with a civilian elected to the presidency only in 1894, in another election that allowed only a few white, literate property owners to vote. Given Brazil's minimal transition toward greater popular participation in government at that point, the late adoption of a republic (seven decades later than in most other South American nations) had a profound effect on the national distribution of power. A new constitution was adopted, exhibiting an extreme form of federalism. A republican movement emerged in the southern half of the nation as coffee planters sought the power to create militias, subsidize immigration, and finance investment in infrastructure through foreign loans – all things deemed vital to their interests. The states with the most dynamic economies, such as São Paulo and Minas Gerais, benefited greatly from this federalism, while the Northeast, with its economy in a significant downturn, saw state power greatly weaken. With federal and local state power decreasing, the figure of the *Coronel* – a local boss with a land monopoly organized in large plantations – became central to northeastern political life. These bosses employed armed henchmen, known locally as *jagunços*, as their own private police forces, charged with violently resolving disputes over land and rent. It is against this background – which saw increased power for the *Coronéis* alongside the growing importance of local peasants in the economy – that the events staged in Canudos must be understood.

Antônio Conselheiro and Millenarianism

Antônio Vicente Mendes Maciel was born on March 13, 1830 in the town of Quixeramobim, Ceará. His family raised cattle elsewhere in the state, and from early on he experienced the violence of the Brazilian backlands. Family feuds were common in the region at that time, and they

were solved through force, not legal action. In 1833 the Maciel family started a feud with the locally powerful Araújo family, a conflict that would last for decades and result in numerous deaths on both sides. In 1834 Antônio's mother died and a few years later he went back to his hometown of Quixeramobim to study Latin, geography, and other subjects with his grandfather, a local school teacher.

Young Antônio grew up in this unsettled environment with an alcoholic father, an abusive stepmother, and a history of violence in his family. Despite this, he was described as a quiet, hardworking, and incredibly pious boy. At the age of 25 he took over the family's business after his father died. A couple of years later, in 1857, he married Brasilina Laurentina de Lima, with whom he had two children. In 1861 his wife began an affair with a police officer, an event that left Maciel deeply disturbed. After leaving his family, he went on to live in several different towns and work in a number of different occupations, from teacher to salesperson, all of them unsuccessful. Deeply religious, in the early 1870s he decided to embark on a journey through the backlands, preaching and serving as a sort of lay religious advisor. A very charismatic man, it was not long before he had a number of devoted followers. In addition to his charisma, two factors contributed to his popularity: the state of the Church and the Millenarian tradition in the region.

For all its power and prestige, the Brazilian Roman Catholic Church had little control over several parishes in the backlands. Very few priests wanted to minister in the isolated and impoverished regions of the nation. Most parishes in those regions only had part-time ministers, if any at all. Overworked priests appreciated at first the type of support that Antônio and other lay preachers gave them. Ministering to a number of parishes, Antônio soon had a loyal following of *jagunços* and *sertanejos*. His followers called him Antônio Conselheiro and later on he was even called Bom Jesus Conselheiro (Good Jesus the Counselor). He and his followers moved across the backlands, not only preaching, but also performing certain services – building and reforming churches, among other things. His sermons mixed orthodox Catholicism with more mystical elements of the Millenarian tradition.

Millenarianism refers to a belief that a major transformation of society is about to occur and

that all wrongs will be corrected. In its Christian version popular in the Brazilian Northeast during this period, the return of Jesus Christ would be preceded by a number of catastrophic signals. Many saw the severe droughts of the region as such a signal, and turned to charismatic leaders for direction. Conselheiro became such a leader in the eyes of his followers. But his leadership soon started to upset the traditional leadership of the Church, especially after the reforms of the 1880s. The Roman Catholic Church in general and the Brazilian Church in particular promoted a number of administrative changes designed to root out heterodox elements. The Church saw its authority threatened by secularism, Protestantism, mysticism, and other outside influences, and it sought to reestablish traditional liturgical practices. These "Ultramontane" reforms led to large numbers of European priests being sent to Brazil. Figures such as Conselheiro were soon seen as threats, and in 1882 the Archbishop of Bahia banned him from giving sermons in all churches. He was considered politically subversive and theologically unorthodox. These tensions mounted with the proclamation of a republic in 1889 and the official separation of Church and state. Conselheiro became a thorn in the side of not only the Church, but also the republic, against which he preached violently, and the landed oligarchies, which saw him as spreading "fanaticism" among their labor force.

Creation and Destruction of Belo Monte

Through his preaching and the work that he and his followers performed in the poorest areas of the region, Conselheiro's following continued to increase throughout the 1880s and early 1890s. Just as his popularity grew, so did tensions with the republic, the Church, and the landed oligarchies. In 1893, in an act of protest against the federal government, he and his followers burned tax notices in the town of Bom Conselho, Bahia. They were chased by police forces, but these forces were soon routed. After this confrontation, Conselheiro and his followers settled in the abandoned Canudos farm, on fertile land at the margins of the Vaza-Barris River in Northern Bahia. This settlement received the name of Belo Monte, and soon a number of *sertanejos* and *jagunços* flocked there.

Life in Belo Monte was pastoral. Inhabitants lived in mud-brick houses, farmed the land, and raised cattle. Property was communal, and many, if not all, donated proceeds to the community from the sale of their properties outside Canudos. The local elites initially tolerated the village. The owner of the land where the village was created had no interest in expending the resources needed to either reactivate the Canudos farm or to root out its new inhabitants. This attitude slowly changed as Belo Monte's population grew. At its peak, most estimates place Belo Monte's population at between 30,000 and 35,000. This meant that it had become the second largest city in the state of Bahia, smaller only than the capital, Salvador. The local *Coronéis* saw their pool of available labor dwindle. Church authorities, despite their opposition to the newly established separation of Church and state, wanted to avoid being seen as monarchists in a state where support for the new republic was far from universal. The pressure to do something to disband the village of Belo Monte was mounting.

The first attempt to hem in Belo Monte occurred in May 1895. A Church delegation, led by Italian Capuchin missionary João Evangelista de Monte Marciano, was sent to establish Church control over the village. Conselheiro's refusal to cooperate, as well as his open disdain for the new republic, led the Capuchin to report that Belo Monte housed a political sect that was a source of resistance to the federal government. Soon afterwards the first armed conflict since the events of 1893 took place. Conselheiro and the residents of Belo Monte spent much of 1895 and 1896 planning and building a new church. They ordered a large supply of timber from the river port town of Juazeiro. But the transaction was blocked by the local magistrate, who requested protection from the state government. The governor, under mounting pressure to do something about Conselheiro, sent 104 policemen to intercept the *jagunços* who were in charge of taking the timber. This force, and the conflict that ensued, became known as the First Military Expedition. In October 1896 Conselheiro's followers and the police clashed in a battle that lasted four hours. Ten policemen were killed and another 16 wounded, causing the government forces to withdraw. It was the beginning of the end for Belo Monte, as now it received unwanted attention from federal authorities.

The Second Military Expedition was dispatched to attack Belo Monte in January 1897. It comprised 543 federal troops with artillery support. Poorly prepared, these troops were ambushed by a group of *jagunços* from Belo Monte and, lacking in ammunition and supplies, failed even to reach the village. The Third Military Expedition was planned a little more carefully. Led by Colonel Antônio Moreira César, considered a hero for his role in the suppression of previous revolts, this expedition involved about 1,300 federal troops. It set out to attack Belo Monte in February 1897. Despite a prolonged bombardment of the village, the federal troops were once again overcome. Colonel Moreira César himself was mortally wounded and on March 3 the troops withdrew.

This defeat was considered a national tragedy, with the Brazilian minister of war himself declaring a state of national mourning. The following expedition, the Fourth, involved a considerable number of soldiers, supplies, and guns. In April 1897 over 8,000 troops equipped with the most modern weapons available to the Brazilian army set out to destroy Belo Monte once and for all. This massive contingent encircled Belo Monte. After weeks of fighting, it finally razed the village on October 2, 1897. Conselheiro died a few days earlier, on September 22, of dysentery. Most of the survivors of the final assault were brutally killed, and only a handful of residents survived. At least 15,000 people from both sides died during this final expedition. The events of Canudos went on to mark Brazilian culture and politics for decades to come.

Impact of Canudos on Brazilian Politics and Culture

The newly established Brazilian republic was inspired in many ways by its own brand of Comtean Positivism. It emphasized the need to modernize the nation with a government of those who were considered the most capable. Race played an important role in determining just who were "the most apt" to govern. The inhabitants of the backlands, of mixed race and little formal education, were considered by most urban elites to be ignorant, superstitious, and naturally inferior. The events of Canudos served to reinforce these notions in their minds. Conselheiro's followers were described as crazed fanatics who sought to destroy the modernizing

efforts of the new republic. They were accused of taking part in a secret conspiracy to promote the return of the monarchy. Therefore, the brutality of the fights and the description of the residents of Belo Monte as religious fanatics served to galvanize support for the republic among the urban areas near the coast.

If Canudos served politically as a means to delegitimize the last defenders of the Brazilian monarchy, its cultural function shaped national self-identity for a significant time. Of key importance here is the publication of *Os Sertões* in 1902 (translated into English as *Rebellion in the Backlands*), a vivid first-hand account of the last military expedition against Belo Monte. Its writer, Euclides da Cunha, a former military officer, accompanied the Fourth Military Expedition as a reporter for a traditional São Paulo newspaper. His deep ambivalence towards the conflict and his treatment of the Brazilian racial question generated an account in which the national character itself became a central figure. An advocate of the deterministic biological theories of the time, da Cunha believed that the *jagunços* were naturally inferior to the white urban elite. At the same time, he admired their determination and inventiveness in fighting the federal troops and surviving in such a hostile environment, going so far as to call them the basis of the “Brazilian race.” Besides this ambivalence towards the inhabitants of the backlands, the book also marked Brazilian culture by describing the primitive conditions of the region to urban readers, that there lay beyond the fast-growing cities a land apparently unaffected by all the modernization that was supposed to be taking place. The question of what was “the real Brazil” was never more alive.

No longer seen as a case of mere religious fanatics trying to secede from a republic they opposed, the history of Canudos now takes into account the complex economic relations of the region, the neglect and disdain with which authorities treated the backlands, and a more insightful analysis of Conselheiro’s motivations.

SEE ALSO: Brazil, Peasant Movements and Liberation Theology; Brazil, Rebellions from Independence to the Republic (1700s–1889); Latin America, Catholic Church and Liberation, 16th Century to Present

References and Suggested Readings

Cunha, E. da (1957) *Rebellion in the Backlands*. Trans. S. Putnam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Levine, R. M. (1991) Canudos in the National Context. *The Americas* 48 (2): 207–22.

Levine, R. M. (1992) *Vale of Tears: Revisiting the Canudos Massacre in Northeastern Brazil, 1893–1897*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Caonabo (d. 1496)

Viviana Uriona

Caonabo was a cacique of the Cibao region on Hispaniola Island at the time Christopher Columbus arrived in the Americas. A native of the Caribs tribe, he was well known and feared for his skills and ferocity in combat. When Columbus tried to land on the north coast of the island (now known as Punta Flecha), he suffered an attack of arrows and was pursued by Caonabo.

The attack forced the Europeans to disembark in the south of the island near where Bartolomé Columbus founded the city of Santo Domingo. The ship *Santa Maria* was destroyed during the December 25, 1492 landing, so the stranded Spaniards stayed and built Fort Christmas. Caonabo attacked this fort in 1493, destroying it and killing the 39 Spaniards commanded by Diego de Arana. Caonabo’s wife, Anacaona, confessed later to having incited him to exterminate the Spaniards because their abuses of indigenous people had led her to see them as a threat. When Columbus returned, he found the fortress destroyed and the inhabitants killed.

The following year, Caonabo also tried to attack the fortress of St. Thomas, but was defeated by Alonso de Ojeda and made a prisoner. His brother Manicac prepared the frontal assault, but the attack became a slaughter. Caonabo was sent to Spain and died during the voyage. His body was thrown into the sea.

The governor of Jaragua, Nicolás de Ovando, received false news that Anacaona was plotting against the Spaniards and took a group of more than 350 men to stop her. When they arrived they were received with celebrations and dances in a house of wood and straw, known as a caney. When everyone was gathered at feasts hosted by Ovando in the caney, his men set the building on fire, but Anacaona escaped with the help of some indigenous friends. Others who managed to escape included Anacaona’s daughter Higüemota, her nephew Guarocuya, who was handed over to Fray Bartolomé de las Casas and baptized

Enriquillo, her granddaughter Mencía, and tribal leader Hatuey, who subsequently escaped to Cuba and organized resistance there, but was captured in battle, tortured, and burned alive on the orders of Diego Velázquez de Cuéllar. When Nicolás de Ovando realized that Anacaona was missing, he launched a search until she was captured. Three months later, she was sent to the gallows.

SEE ALSO: Enriquillo and the Taíno Revolt (1519–1533); Jumandi (d. 1578); Lempira (d. 1537); Túpac Amaru (ca. 1540–1572); Urracá, Cacique of Veraguas (d. 1516)

References and Suggested Readings

Grimshaw, W. (1830) *The History of South America from the Discovery of the New World by Columbus to the Conquest of Peru by Pizarro*. New York: Collins & Hannay.

Cape Verde, independence struggle

Justin Corfield

The Cape Verde Islands, off the west coast of Africa, were taken over by the Portuguese from 1462, with governors appointed from 1698. When the Portuguese arrived, the islands were uninhabited and the Portuguese quickly established vineyards, bringing slaves from adjacent parts of Africa and turning the Cape Verde Islands into a transit point for the transatlantic slave trade. In 1585 the English buccaneer Sir Francis Drake attacked Riberia Grande, on the northernmost of the Cape Verde Islands. This, and the worry about possible slave revolts, led the Portuguese to fortify their bases on the islands. Portuguese rule then remained unchallenged until the twentieth century, with little unrest during most of the period. Even so, the harsh conditions caused by food shortages and a rapid depletion in arable land caused many Cape Verdeans to migrate to other parts of the Portuguese empire or the United States.

In June 1951 the Cape Verde Islands became an overseas province of Portugal, which was trying to lock in its overseas territories more closely, economically and politically. Some nationalists on the Cape Verde Islands saw the future of the islands being with Portuguese Guinea (modern-day Guinea-Bissau), and in

1956 one of the leading African nationalists, Amílcar Cabral, formed the Partido Africano da Independência do Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC). Five years later this group launched an “armed struggle” for independence.

Cabral’s parents were from Cape Verde but he was brought up in Portuguese Guinea. Seeing links between the two, he hoped to unite the territories in common struggle against Portugal. However, there were problems with this plan. Although from the start Cabral’s supporters were able to gain the upper hand in Portuguese Guinea, the better educated Cape Verdeans were less keen on a revolution. He did, however, find an ally in Cape Verde when Aristide Maria Pereira, who had been with Cabral at school and then worked in the post and telegraph office in Portuguese Guinea, joined the insurrection.

Pereira was born on November 17, 1923 on the island of Boavista, Cape Verde and attended Mindelo secondary school, where he met and befriended Cabral. Pereira read extensively on uprisings around the world while he was working at the post and telegraph office in Portuguese Guinea. In 1955 he was deported for his political activities, and in the following year joined as a founder member of the PAIGC.

The first move towards independence took place in 1959 when Pereira helped organize dockworkers in the port of Bissau during the Pijiguiti strike. It was the first major move against the colonial power in Portuguese Guinea, although Pereira remained chief of telecommunications in Bissau until 1960. After that he went into exile to Conakry, in the Republic of Guinea, which had gained its independence from France two years earlier. There he became a member of the Council of War in 1965. He then succeeded Cabral as general-secretary of PAIGC after Cabral was assassinated. The actual fighting began in the early 1970s when about thirty revolutionaries, trained in Cuba, landed in Portuguese Guinea to widen the revolution, and the PAIGC managed to easily take control of much of Portuguese Guinea, leading to a unilateral declaration of independence in 1973.

On the Cape Verde Islands the people waited, hoping that the Portuguese would leave without fighting, and few were shocked when this did come to pass. After the April 1974 coup d’état in Portugal, it was announced that the Cape Verde Islands would become independent, gaining their full independence on July 5, 1975 with

Aristides Pereira being elected as the first president by the National People's Assembly. At first there was talk of union between the Cape Verde Islands and Guinea-Bissau – as Portuguese Guinea had been renamed. However, this came to nothing.

The first years of independence in Cape Verde were a period of want with drought hitting the islands in 1969 and lasting through to the mid-1970s. Accordingly, in 1977 no beans or maize were harvested. Many people migrated overseas, famine relief was sent to the islands to feed the population, and talks of merger recommenced. On November 14, 1980 a coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau, deposing the president, Luís de Almeida Cabral, who was from the Cape Verde Islands, led to strained relations with Cape Verde, and the PAIGC officially split in January 1981. The Cape Verde arm of the organization then became the Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde (PAICV). The two countries then enjoyed better relations after talks in June 1982. Pereira was reelected president in January 1986 for a further five-year term, but there was discontent in July 1987 and January 1988 over laws which decriminalized abortion. These led to wider protests against the nature of the government, leading the PAICV to accept constitutional proposals that would result in multi-party elections. These took place on January 13, 1991, and saw the PAICV defeated by the Movement for Democracy (MPD), which had been founded a year earlier by Carlos Veiga, a Portuguese-trained lawyer. The MPD won decisively with 68 percent of the vote. On March 22, after losing the presidential election to António Mascarenhas Monteiro, a former Supreme Court judge, Pereira stood down. On April 4, Carlos Veiga became prime minister, taking over from Pedro Pires who had held that position since independence.

Veiga introduced changes which reduced the power of the presidency and increased those of the National Assembly. He also reduced the civil service, eventually halving its size, amid protests from those being retrenched. In March 1993 he dismissed his foreign minister Jorge Carlos Fonseca, and in February 1994 Enrico Monteiro, the minister of justice and labor, resigned to form his own opposition party. However, in December 1995 the MPD won 50 of the 72 seats in the National Assembly, and in February 1996 Monteiro was reelected president unopposed.

In 1998 the Solidarity Party was formed by Onesimo Silveira, keen on forming a socialist alternative to the MPD. The PAICV, still in opposition, decided to elect Pedro Pires, the ageing former prime minister, as its leader and candidate for the 2001 presidential election, over the much younger José Maria Neves. In the January 2001 parliamentary elections the MPD was defeated by the PAICV, who narrowly won with 37 of the 72 National Assembly seats, and Neves became prime minister. In the following month, Pires was elected president, taking office on March 22.

Neves has tried to get many overseas Cape Verdeans to return to the islands, especially from the United States and Wales. The overseas Cape Verdeans now significantly outnumber those who remain on the islands, with many being much better educated than those who remained. The Cape Verde Islands, with a population of 423,613 (July 2007 estimate), operate as a stable democracy with a very good human rights record, and the largely homogeneous and highly literate population has seen almost no ethnic or religious tensions.

SEE ALSO: Cabral, Amílcar (1924–1973); Guinea-Bissau, Nationalist Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Davidson, B. (1989) *The Fortunate Isles: A Study in African Transformation*. London: Hutchinson.
- Foy, C. (1988) *Cape Verde: Politics, Economics and Society*. London: Frances Pinter.
- Fyfe, C. (1981) The Cape Verde Islands. *History Today* 31: 5–9.
- Galli, R. E. & Jones, J. (1987) *Guinea-Bissau: Politics, Economics and Society*. London: Frances Pinter.
- Lobban, R. & Lopes, M. (1995) *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Cape Verde*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.
- Meintrel, D. (1984) *Race, Culture and Portuguese Colonialism in Cabo Verde*. Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY.
- Pereira, A. (1980) *Vencer a batalha da ideologia* [With the Battle of Ideology]. Bissau: Edições PAIGC.

Caracazo, 1989

Christoph Twickel

The *Caracazo*, also known as 27 F, was a spontaneous rebellion that began on February 27, 1989 in Venezuela's capital city of Caracas and which

lasted about five days. The popular revolt – in response to a package of economic measures applied by the government – not only led to the worst state-led massacre in twentieth-century Venezuela, but is also seen by many as the starting point of a mass movement that a decade later brought Hugo Chávez to power.

On February 16, 1989, Carlos Andrés Pérez, president of Venezuela's social democratic Acción Demócrata (AD) Party, announced a series of economic adjustments which he referred to as "the Package." Pérez, sworn in as president just three weeks before in a costly ceremony commonly known as "the coronation," coordinated the measures with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the basic conditions for a US\$4.5 billion loan that it was hoped would remedy Venezuela's debt crisis, which followed years of economic boom dependent on petrodollars. Between 1986 and 1988, the country had accumulated an external debt of \$7 billion. In the midst of falling oil prices, there were no foreign currency reserves to depend on. The measures Pérez and the IMF agreed upon seem to have been drawn from a Chicago Boys' textbook: the termination of price controls, the discontinuation of subsidies, and the deregulation of the currency rate, a macroeconomic instrument for the allocation of goods on the Venezuelan market.

In the weeks before the "big turn," even Venezuelans without economic training foresaw the consequences of Pérez's announcements. Milk, rice, corn, coffee, sugar, salt, and eggs disappeared from the shelves and rumors spread that opportunistic merchants were stockpiling food in anticipation of the price increases to come. Moreover, a spectacular corruption scandal at Recadi, the state office for foreign exchange control, caused unrest as people became upset by a political class that imposed austerity measures on the poor while enjoying its own affluence.

Early on Monday morning, February 27, commuters in the suburbs of Caracas began to protest against the drastic rise in bus fares. Following a petrol price increase of 100 percent, bus fares had doubled over the weekend. It was end of the month. Many commuters around Caracas were almost broke and could not afford the higher fare. Quickly the protests led to the spontaneous burning of buses and the looting of nearby supermarkets and shopping centers. In Guarenas, northeast of Caracas, cars burned and windows were broken as early as 7.30 in

the morning. Transmitted by hundreds of Moto taxis from Caracas, news about stockpiled goods found by looters spread like wildfire in the *barrios* of Caracas, inciting similar actions across the city. Students of the Central University of Venezuela and the Instituto Universitario Politécnico blocked two main roads in the city center. At 2 p.m. the protesters succeeded in closing the Francisco Fajardo Highway, forcing truck drivers to surrender their freight. By nightfall, the entire center of Caracas had been taken over. Protesters and looters swarmed the city from the mountainside in an effort to achieve some sort of revenge; similar situations dominated in almost all the major cities of Venezuela: Barinas, Barcelona, Puerto La Cruz, Maraicaibo, and Porlamar.

On the morning of February 28 the National Guard took over Caracas. Most of the soldiers were young men from the countryside; many had never before even visited the capital. While the army descended upon the streets of Caracas, the poor *caraqueños* were busy appropriating things they had always had dreamed of. Furniture, beds, washing machines, tires, stereos, kitchenware – all found their way from city shops to shacks in the *barrios*. Footage from Venezuelan filmmaker Lillian Blazer showed a man rolling a Hammond organ up into the hills. When President Pérez announced the state of emergency, along with a 6 p.m. curfew, almost nobody assumed that this would mark the beginning of a terrible crime on the part of the state.

After dark, an inferno erupted in the Venezuelan capital. In the densely populated areas soldiers began to fire bullets with little discretion. The chaos was terrifying. Days after the massacre the Venezuelan government claimed that 277 persons were killed during the "disturbance," but later investigations proved a single morgue alone counted 322 corpses following the violence. In April 1989, the human rights organization COFAVIC (Committee of Families of Victims of the *Caracazo*) published a list of 396 documented deaths that occurred during the conflict. After opening mass graves, where the army had secretly dumped hundreds of bodies, forensic doctors reported that 86 percent of the victims had died from gunshot wounds, 29 percent of which were from a bullet in the head. Some officials, including Fernando Ochoa Antich, challenged politicians who blamed the conflict on civil unrest, claiming that it was simply a

“massacre.” In his book *Los Golpes de Febrero*, Ochoa Antich bore testimony that the command to fire came from President Pérez in person.

The influence of the *Caracazo* on the later Bolivarian Revolution and rise of President Hugo Chávez is undisputed. Chávez himself, in those days a technical officer at the National Security Committee, did not participate in the events because he was suffering from chickenpox. The MBR 200 (Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 200), a conspiratory cell led by Chávez, eventually benefited from the fact that many of the lower ranks in the Venezuelan army were no longer willing to obey leadership that commanded them to use military force against the people. When three years later, on February 4, 1992, Chávez and his fellow officers led a military insurgency, it was backed by an estimated 10 percent of the armed forces.

On the other hand, the February 27 rebellion and the subsequent massacre was the starting point of a process of political awareness and organization that transcended the scope of traditional leftist parties or unions and can be seen as the nucleus of the Bolivarian Movement in Venezuela. The *Asamblea de Barrios* (Assembly of Shantytowns), founded after the *Caracazo*, became the protagonist of massive protests against the government of Pérez and a movement for communal self-organization.

The *Caracazo* is one of the most globally disregarded state-led crimes of the twentieth century. While the Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing, just three months later, gained worldwide attention and harsh reactions from both the United States and European governments, the *Caracazo* was barely covered by the international media. The international business press quickly filed the massacre as an operational accident necessary to insure economic reform, deregulation, and free trade. Not accidentally, during events following the massacre, Venezuelan soldiers presented to the press trucks with goods that had been recaptured from the lootings. The message was obvious: at the beginning of the neoliberal decade in Latin America, it was by all means necessary to clarify that the free market had to be protected against the poor.

SEE ALSO: Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); Bolivarianism, Venezuela; Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954); Chávez, Hugo, and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–Present; Venezuela, Exclusionary Democracy and Resistance,

1958–1998; Venezuela, MBR-200 and the Military Uprisings of 1992

References and Suggested Readings

- Blanco Muñoz, A. (1998) *Habla el Comandante Hugo Chávez Frías*. Caracas: Catedra Pio Tamayo.
- López Maya, M. (2003) The Venezuelan Caracazo of 1989: Popular Protest and Institutional Weakness. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 35: 117–37.
- Ochoa Antich, E. (1992) *Los Golpes de Febrero. De la Rebelión de los Pobres al Alzamiento de los Militares*. Caracas: Fuentes Editores.
- Twickel, C. (2006) *Hugo Chávez: Eine Biographie*. Hamburg: Edition Nautilus.

Cardenal, Ernesto (b. 1925)

Edward T. Brett

Ernesto Cardenal was a leader in the effort to overthrow the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza García dictatorship in Nicaragua. Born into a wealthy family in Granada, Cardenal attended Catholic schools run by Christian Brothers and Jesuits and joined a circle of Nicaraguans opposed to the Somoza dictatorship. In 1942 Cardenal entered the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. After receiving a licentiate (master's degree) in letters in 1947, he went to New York where he studied literature for two years at Columbia University. Following another year of European travel and study in Spain, he returned to Nicaragua in 1950. By this time, he was already receiving notice for his romantic and political poetry.

For the next seven years he ran a small publishing company and a bookstore in Managua, while continuing to build his reputation as a poet. In 1954 he was part of a group that planned an attack on the presidential palace. The so-called April Rebellion was aborted, however, when the Somoza government discovered the plot. This episode provided him with subject matter for his *La hora cero* (1960).

In 1957, after experiencing a religious conversion, he entered Our Lady of Gethsemane Trappist monastery in Kentucky. There he developed a close friendship with the monk-scholar and poet Thomas Merton, who served as his novice master and spiritual director. He was not permitted to write poetry while at the Trappist monastery. However, he kept a journal that later

served as the basis for his *Gethsemani, Ky* (1960) and his spiritual diary, *Vida en el amor* (1970).

In 1959 Cardenal was forced to leave Gethsemani due to health problems. He transferred to a less physically rigorous Benedictine monastery in Cuernavaca, Mexico, where he continued his studies for the next two years. He then transferred again, this time to a seminary in Columbia, where he completed his studies for the priesthood. He was ordained in 1965 for the archdiocese of Managua. By this time he had written *Con Walker in Nicaragua* (1952), a collection of poems on the history of Nicaraguan resistance to foreign domination, *Oracion por Marilyn Monroe, y otros poemas* (1965), *Antología de la poesía Norteamericana* (1963), and *Literatura indígena Americana: Antología* (1964), all of which merited him a reputation as one of the finest modern poets of Latin America.

Following his ordination, Cardenal returned to Gethsemani to confer with Thomas Merton. With the latter's support he made plans to establish an experimental Christian community for mostly illiterate peasants on the remote archipelago of Solentiname in Lake Nicaragua. On February 13, 1966, with the help of the Colombian poet William Agudelo and his wife Teresita, the commune became a reality. Influenced by liberation theology and employing the techniques of the *comunidad de base* movement, Cardenal eventually published *El evangelio en Solentiname* (1975–7), a four-volume set of peasant discussions on the scriptures that document the transformation of commune members from fatalistic peasants to radical anti-Somoza Christian revolutionaries. During this phase of his life Cardenal also published four volumes of mostly political poetry, *El estrecho dudoso* (1966), *Homenaje a los indios americanos* (1969), *Canto nacional* (1972), and *Oraculo sobre Managua* (1973). Increasingly critical of the Somoza regime, the Solentiname community was finally attacked and destroyed by the Nicaraguan National Guard in 1977.

In 1970 Cardenal visited Cuba and his laudatory views of the Cuban Revolution soon found poetic expression in his *En Cuba* (1972). Up to this time the poet-priest had advocated change through Mertonian non-violent methods, but his Cuban experience convinced him that for the Nicaraguan revolution to succeed, violent methods had to be employed. Thus, he proclaimed "Christian Marxism" and became a

proponent of the Marxist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), traveling to Peru, Chile, and the US as an advocate of its cause.

In 1979 he was appointed minister of culture in the new Sandinista government, but as the Marxist regime and the Nicaraguan Catholic hierarchy began to clash, he, along with three other priests who also held government positions, were ordered by the Vatican to resign their posts. When they refused, the Vatican, in February 1985, suspended them from the priesthood. Shortly after the electoral defeat of the FSLN in February 1990, Cardenal broke with the Sandinista Party over ideological differences.

SEE ALSO: Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s; Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)

References and Suggested Readings

- Beverly, J. & Zimmerman, M. (1990) *Literature and Politics in the Central American Revolutions*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Borgeson, P. W., Jr. (1984) *Hacia el hombre nuevo: Poesía y pensamiento de Ernesto Cardenal*. Woodbridge: Tamesis Books.
- Cabestrero, T. (1983) *Ministers of God, Ministers of the People: Testimonies of Faith from Nicaragua*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Cárdenas, Lázaro (1895–1970)

Felipe Arturo Ávila-Espinosa

Lázaro Cárdenas del Río was president of Mexico from 1934 to 1940. He was born in Jiquilpan, Michoacan to a rural family. At 18 he joined the Mexican Revolution on the side of the constitutionalist troops and participated in several campaigns in central Mexico. In 1915 he joined the troops of future president Plutarco Elias Calles in Sonora, where they fought Pancho Villa and his followers, the Villistas, until 1917. After Calles gained the presidency, Cárdenas became governor of his home province in 1928 and gained a reputation as a progressive reformer. This reputation carried over into his presidency.

During the Revolution, Cardenas witnessed the manner in which the British and American oil companies treated Mexican workers, and this, among other factors, led him to seek better conditions for the poor in Mexico. After he gained

the presidency he carried out the most comprehensive agrarian reform of the twentieth century, distributing among peasants and farmers some of the most fertile land. He took a paternalistic attitude, assuming guardianship over peasants as he promoted his National Peasant Confederation, which was established in 1938 to help promote his agrarian reform. He also supported urban and industrial workers in the quest for wage increases and the right to unionize, and he nationalized the railway and expropriated the nation's oil, using the proceeds to fund national development. To perform these transformations, Cárdenas relied on the strength of workers, peasants, and bureaucrats. The climax of his efforts came with the establishment in 1936 of the Confederation of Mexican Workers.

The success of Cárdenas's policies was largely due to the contentment of the peasants and workers, who obtained tangible improvements. The workers enjoyed wage increases and collective strength. The peasants gained land, technical assistance, and credit at a rate that they had never seen before. Cárdenas distributed almost 18 million hectares of land and even gave the peasants weapons to defend their lands.

With this support, Cárdenas made one of his most momentous moves: the expropriation of oil. This move put in the hands of the state the most important industry in the country, which had been controlled by American and British companies. Cárdenas took advantage of the international situation, calculating that American President Franklin D. Roosevelt would be respectful of the independence and sovereignty of nations like Mexico, that supported the United States against Germany, Italy, and Japan and would not take military reprisals against his decision. However, the seizure resulted in the serious displeasure of the American government, which placed a trade embargo on Mexican exports of oil and silver, demanding compensation immediately.

Just as the Cardenista reforms reached their zenith, however, they lost their radical momentum. The fear was that continued reform would polarize Mexican society further. The imminence of World War II, the defeat of the Spanish Republic, which the Cárdenas government had supported, and the reaction from conservative groups, led Cárdenas toward a more moderate stance. However, the reforms of the Cardenistas modernized the country

and brought economic development and relative political stability to Mexico for the next 50 years.

SEE ALSO: Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Villa, Pancho (ca. 1878–1923) and the Division of the North; Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919) and the Comuna Morelense

References and Suggested Readings

- Knight, A. (1998) "The Rise and Fall of Cardenismo, c. 1930–c. 1946." In L. Bethell (Ed.), *Mexico Since Independence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 241–320.
- Kraunze, E. (2005) *General Misionero, Lazaro Cardenas*. San Diego: Fondo de Cultura Economica.

Caribbean islands, protests against IMF

Kristina Hinds Harrison

English-speaking Caribbean countries share colonial pasts, a common sea, developing country status, and often financial difficulties. Financial troubles in this Caribbean sub-region have led Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Jamaica, the Commonwealth of Dominica, the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago to seek loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such IMF assistance has been contentious and has resulted in protests in five of these seven small states.

Anti-IMF protests in the Anglophone-Caribbean have generally taken the form of workers' strikes, which other marginalized groups in society have joined to vent their frustrations. Anti-IMF protests in the sub-region have also included roadblocks in Jamaica and an attempted coup in Trinidad and Tobago. Regardless of the form protests have taken, they all represented public responses to suffering brought by governments repositioning themselves *vis-à-vis* citizens in compliance with market-oriented IMF proposals.

Debt and IMF Conditionality

From the 1980s many developing countries began to face rising interest rates on commercial bank loans that they acquired at favorable interest rates during the 1970s. Although not always used efficiently, debts accumulated by English-

speaking Caribbean states were mostly used to finance social spending, infrastructure development, and other interventions aimed at bolstering their economies. By the 1980s all of this led to developing countries spending more on debt and imports than they were earning from their exports (balance of payments difficulties) and prompted some Caribbean states to seek loan assistance from the IMF.

Access to IMF help, however, came with conditions. Governments usually were asked to reduce their spending by privatizing state-owned enterprises, by decreasing or stabilizing public sector wage bills, by cutting back on social services spending, and by ending subsidization schemes wherever possible. States were encouraged to abandon interventionism and instead liberalize their economies by promoting private sector-led growth and by allowing markets to direct trade, to determine interest rates, and to set rates of exchange. Additionally, countries were advised to devalue their currencies both to make domestic exports more attractive to importers and to put a brake on the outflow of foreign exchange spent on imports. IMF counsel also led to new taxes being introduced to generate supplementary government revenue. These structural adjustment policies were thought to allow struggling countries to better meet their external obligations. Yet the assumptions on which the IMF's approaches to lending were grounded often led to social dislocation. Currency devaluations did not halt imports in heavily import-reliant countries in the Caribbean, but led to consumer price increases. What is more, wage decreases and layoffs, decreased government spending, and increased taxation meant that the already poor lower classes faced privation while the middle classes began to experience decline. In essence, people struggled to make less money, or money worth less, go at least as far as it did previously.

It is not totally surprising, then, that protests emerged in opposition to IMF prescriptions. However, lurking beneath these more obvious motivations for protesting the demands that states abruptly change their relationships with their societies by metamorphosing from interventionist to minimal should not be separated from the discontent expressed by Caribbean citizens. Hence, anti-austerity protests were also protests against the way in which IMF-led structural adjustment policies pushed Caribbean countries in a neoliberal or market-oriented direction as

part of a wider international trend for managing national economies.

The Protests

IMF loans to the Caribbean commenced with loans to Jamaica and Guyana in the late 1970s. Jamaica commenced borrowing from the Fund in 1977, received further funding in 1981 and, thereafter, to cover every year between 1984 and 1996. It appears that the fourth lending arrangement with the Fund, though, truly began to burden the country's population. Consequently, in January 1985, following Prime Minister Edward Seaga's announcement of the conditions to be met as part of the 1985 IMF loan agreement, workers shut down virtually all essential services in the country. Especially significant in sparking these protests was the government's decision to increase fuel prices by 20 percent. Citizens signaled their defiance by burning tires in streets across the country and by setting fire to sugar cane fields.

Like Jamaica, Guyana also saw a time lag between its first IMF encounter and anti-IMF protests. Guyana secured its first IMF loan in 1978 and subsequently received loans in 1979 and 1980. However, by 1985 the country was listed ineligible for IMF loans, for failing to implement sufficiently the advised austerity measures and for failing to meet its financial obligations to the Fund. Nonetheless, Guyana regularized its relationship with the IMF after committing to the Fund's lending terms in 1989. It is to this event that citizens responded in protest on April 4, 1989. Workers in the bauxite and sugar industries and employees of the University of Guyana struck in protest over a 70 percent devaluation of the Guyanese dollar in compliance with IMF conditions for the release of funds in 1990. The devaluation, which commenced on March 30, 1989, had the immediate effect of making life in Guyana difficult by increasing consumer prices. Therefore, as in Jamaica, citizens' reactions to devaluations can be linked to price hikes that were precipitated by government attempts to comply with IMF conditions for financial assistance.

Unlike the previously presented countries, Trinidad and Tobago was able to prolong its receipt of IMF loans until the close of the 1980s when it obtained loans in 1989 and 1990. In response to the difficulties that these measures

bought, protests emerged in the country on March 6, 1989. Trade unions across Trinidad cooperated to stage a general strike in which workers peacefully demonstrated over the government's decision to decrease civil service salaries by 10 percent. The dislocations that accompanied IMF austerity were further met with opposition between July 18 and August 2, 1990, this time in a more violent form when the country's president along with government Cabinet members were taken hostage in an attempted coup. Although this coup can be viewed more widely as an embodiment of opposition to the administration in power, this protest should not be disentangled from anti-IMF sentiment, especially since those attempting the coup demanded that IMF austerity measures be suspended. As in the previously noted cases, government efforts to meet IMF conditionality directly impacted on citizens' abilities to provide for themselves. However, protests against austerity measures in both Trinidad and Guyana during 1989 and 1990 coincided with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the apparent bankruptcy of development models that were heavily state interventionist. Protests in Guyana, Trinidad, and those that followed, therefore, should not be disconnected from the emergence of neoliberal orthodoxy that by the end of the 1980s was transforming the world and taking the Caribbean with it.

Following the Trinidadian experience, protests against public sector wage decreases and concomitant hardships expected to follow also occurred in Barbados during 1992. Although Barbados received its first stand-by loan from the Fund in 1982, it was to the country's second encounter with IMF loans that workers across the country responded. Barbados' structural adjustments comprised employment cuts, wage cuts, and various other measures to decrease public expenditure. Decreasing wage rates without controlling inflation inevitably made life more arduous in Barbados. Furthermore, the Barbadian government attempted to short-circuit the norm of negotiating public sector pay cuts with unions when it went directly to public sector employees to arrange an 8 percent pay cut. These actions combined to propel workers to take to the streets bearing placards on October 24 and November 4–5. In addition, the opposition political party (the Barbados Labour Party) attempted to oust the prime minister (who was also the minister of finance) via a vote of no-

confidence in response to popular discontent, and unions attempted to take the Democratic Labour Party government to court over unconstitutionally reducing public sector pay. Ten years later, protests against IMF prescribed adjustments continued in Dominica.

Dominica received IMF loans in 1984, 1986 and, so far for the twenty-first century, in 2002 and 2003. In response to the latter two loans, employees in the country's public sector took to the streets led by the Dominica Public Service Union and with the support of the Opposition United Workers Party, first in September 2002 over a 4 percent stabilization levy imposed by the government on those earning at least \$9,000 per year. Subsequently, in February 2003, public sector workers stayed off their jobs to demonstrate over a host of government proposals geared towards decreasing the country's public sector wage bill. The proposed policies included a work furlough that would reduce the number of days public servants worked per month and thus the amount they would earn. The following month public sector employees struck in opposition to a 6 percent reduction in their wages – once more a government initiative to comply with IMF advice.

The foregoing accounts of protests in the English-speaking Caribbean should make it clear that, no matter the country or the decade, increasing costs of living brought by IMF loan conditions were highly contentious. In each of the countries mentioned, higher commodity prices, lower wage rates, heavier tax burdens, currency devaluations, or some combination of these measures were intimately linked to IMF lending arrangements. Inseparable from these occurrences, too, was a neoliberal shift being thrust on developing countries via the IMF and further supported by the demise of non-market based developmental options. This commonality may further be extended to the non-English speaking Caribbean as protests in the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti demonstrate.

The Dominican Republic saw anti-IMF protests in 1984 following the signature of a loan agreement with the Fund in January 1983. The Fund recommended reductions in public subsidies, a reduction in the supply of money, that market forces determine the value of the Dominican peso, and that a sales tax be introduced. These measures bore heavily on the country's people by increasing food prices to the extent that

Dominicans, particularly from the urban poor, rioted in the streets to express their disgust. Almost twenty years later, further strikes befell the Dominican Republic in coincidence with negotiations with the IMF when in November 2003 and then January 2004 Dominicans rallied in the streets supported by citizens groups, unions, and opposition parties. Citizens created roadblocks to protest continual power outages, sharp currency devaluations, and increases in the prices of significant commodities (e.g., fuel and medications). Once more citizens responded to hardships connected to IMF prescriptions for economic recovery.

As for Haiti, the story is much the same. Anti-IMF protests erupted in this country during 1995. Already existing in a turbulent political and economic climate and with experience of IMF austerity measures throughout the 1980s, Haitians launched demonstrations in March, May, and September of 1995 in connection with the signature of an IMF loan agreement that entailed the privatization of state entities and contributed to rising costs of living. These protests were also supported by widespread leafleting in August of 1995 in efforts to raise awareness about the role of the IMF in worsening the plight of Haitians.

Conclusion

This survey of the Caribbean illustrates that Caribbean populations have responded to social dislocations attributed to IMF austerity measures through protest. Decreases in wages, increases in the prices of significant commodities, and currency devaluations have been particularly contentious in both the English-speaking Caribbean and in the non-English speaking Caribbean states of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Moreover, one can assert that these protests were responses to changes in state-society relations across the region. IMF conditionality sped the retreat of the state from economic activities by reducing states' spending on wages; by decreasing states' funding of social services; and by liberalizing trade, rates of interest, and exchange. In so doing, IMF prescriptions led to unease in societies that faced sudden changes in the ways in which their states related to them. IMF austerity measures signaled a neoliberal turn; a turn towards markets, based on private sector-led growth and away from state-sponsored

economic interventions. Consequently, one can further argue that though locally bounded responses to specific difficulties brought through compliance with IMF counsel, Caribbean anti-IMF protests have been reactions to a broader neoliberal shift that commenced in the early 1980s, intensified from 1989 with the demise of a communist option, and that continues to date.

SEE ALSO: Barbados and the Windward Islands, Protest and Revolt; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Guyana, Protests and Revolts; Haiti, Protest and Rebellion, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Auvinen, J. Y. (1996) IMF Intervention and Political Protest in the Third World: A Conventional Wisdom Refined. *Third World Quarterly* 17, 7: 377–400.
- Baritlow, H. A. (1997) *The Debt Dilemma: IMF Negotiations in Jamaica, Grenada and Guyana*. London: Macmillan.
- Espinal, R. (1995) Economic Restructuring, Social Protest, and Democratization in the Dominican Republic. *Latin American Perspectives* 22, 3: 63–79.
- Ghai, D. (Ed.) (1991) *The IMF and the South: The Social Impact of Crisis and Adjustment*. New York: Zed Books.
- McAfee, K. (1991) *Storm Signals: Structural Adjustment and Development Alternatives in the Caribbean*. Boston: South End Press.
- Massiah, J. (1990) *Economic Change, Structural Adjustment and Women in the Caribbean*. Cave Hill, Barbados: Institute of Social and Economic Research (Eastern Caribbean), University of the West Indies.
- Mobekk, E. & Spyrou, S. I. (2002) Re-evaluating IMF Involvement in Low-Income Countries: The Case of Haiti. *International Journal of Social Economics* 29, 7: 527–37.

Caribbean protest music

Daniel Tannehill Neely

In the West Indies, music plays an important social role. Symbolically, it is a part of how people construct reality and helps give life to both the dominant and oppositional ideological aspects of Caribbean society and culture. As a means for protest and contestation, music plays a particular role by giving voice to the oppressed and helping to develop ideological and social solidarity among those with common values and kindred social identities.

One of music's functions is to help develop cohesion by appealing to and reinforcing values and identities through ritualized performance. This sometimes occurs in state-approved contexts that balance bureaucratic organization with informal exuberance. Trinidad and Tobago's Carnival, for example, is an important seasonal reference point that mobilizes the public and momentarily overturns the social order by creating a context within which people can express ideas about cultural, political, and economic inequality.

Although Trinidad and Tobago's is the largest and best known Carnival in the West Indies, Carnival celebrations take place elsewhere in the region, including Antigua, Aruba, the Bahamas (Caribbean Muzik Festival), Barbados (Crop Over), Carriacou, and Jamaica. Each of these uses local music to rally opinion in different ways. Carnival events are also held in diasporic West Indian communities in Toronto, London, and Brooklyn, where the music of a pan-Caribbean polity becomes a means for expressing West Indian unity and defining cultural difference. Other annual community-based festival traditions that use music and contribute to social solidarity (albeit with a lower level of official intervention) exist in the Caribbean as well, including Jonkonnu in Jamaica, Junkanoo in the Bahamas, Gombey in Bermuda, and Masquerade in St. Kitts-Nevis.

More often, social cohesion is developed outside of state contexts. Another institution in which ideology is negotiated largely through performance is the dancehall. Both a physical space and a theoretical concept, dancehalls are common throughout the Caribbean, although they represent an especially important area in Jamaican cultural studies. Within the dancehall, musical performance has a strong effect on how social alliances are made and unmade and how cultural tensions are created and resolved.

Perhaps the most poorly theorized (but no less important) articulation between music and community mobilization in the West Indies is radio. Radio has great cohesive power and because the technology is widely available and disseminated, it is uniquely capable of reaching all strata of society. However, radio's role in rallying political opinion generally only garners an oblique mention in studies of music and politics.

Song lyrics are perhaps the most obvious source for defining and articulating oppositional political ideology. In Trinidad and Tobago, for

example, resistance can be found in the lyrics of calypso and rapso artists including Sniper, Chalkdust, Lancelot Layne, and Cheryl Byron. In Jamaica, reggae is famous for its revolutionary rhetoric and confrontational philosophical stance. Often infused with the political and spiritual beliefs of Rastafari, reggae helped transform Jamaican society in the 1970s and 1980s and has since become a symbol of protest by the marginalized the world over. More recently, dancehall music has become a forum for expressing similar ideas.

Music's value in building ideological solidarity is not, however, limited to the content of song lyrics. Performance genres, the handling of musical elements, and even the use of individual instruments often involve elements that have ideological and symbolic value to oppressed groups. For example, a strong argument can be made that improvised jazz is the most overlooked protest music in the West Indies.

The accents, rhythms, and stylistic idiosyncrasies of jazz are reflective of a shared history of social oppression and melodic improvisation is an ideological expression of both individual and group identity. Jazz has been played in the West Indies since at least World War I, but its role in developing a black cultural awareness became even more pronounced after World War II. In Jamaica, for example, many musicians (including Johnny "Dizzy" Moore, Tommy McCook, and Don Drummond) better known for their role in developing an Africanist sensibility in the emergence of ska and reggae began as jazz musicians, learning their craft from noted local jazz performers (including Lennie Hibbert and Eric Deans) at the Alpha Boys School in Kingston. There has been comparatively little research into jazz in the West Indies. Many internationally known jazz musicians (including Leslie Hutchinson, Shake Keane, and Joe Harriott) were born there, and many others (including Wynton Kelly, Sonny Rollins, and Randy Weston) were of West Indian heritage and brought a cultural awareness to their music.

In addition, musical instruments also accrue symbolic value around which ideological solidarity develops. Perhaps no other instrument embodies this as fully as the drum. Under colonialism, the drum was long considered a symbol of oppositional power and was often banned by authorities. However, it also had a major role in helping oppressed groups, particularly those

of African descent, develop social solidarity in opposition to power.

One of the most important musics in which drums and drumming have symbolic value is *nyabinghi*, a neo-traditional style that was the product of the cross-fertilization of *buru* and *kumina*, two neo-African drumming traditions. *Nyabinghi* consists of three drums, the repeater, fundeh, and bass, which play a steady heartbeat-like rhythm and accompany chanted adaptations of psalms, hymns, local traditional songs, and sometimes original songs. While it first came to national prominence in Jamaica in 1961 through the Folks Brothers' recording of "Oh Carolina," *nyabinghi* drumming can be heard in countless subsequent recordings in every stylistic period. Because it was drawn from traditional styles of marginalized groups in Jamaican society, *nyabinghi* imparted an ideological value to Rastafari that stressed the importance of Jamaica's African heritage.

Another instrument with symbolic value is the steel pan from Trinidad and Tobago. After drums were banned in Carnival masquerades by the British colonial authority at the end of the nineteenth century, bamboo-bamboo bands (comprised primarily of black men from the grassroots working class playing instruments made of bamboo) emerged in their stead. In time, members of these bands began to incorporate metal objects into their musical revelry. Soon, metal objects became the norm and out of this, a tunable "steel drum" developed. While its popularity was seen as a threat to the social order, it nevertheless became a symbol of the struggle against colonial oppression. By the 1960s, it was dispersed throughout the West Indies and had become a symbol of Trinidadian independence. In 1992, the steel pan was formally declared Trinidad and Tobago's national instrument, and contemporary support from corporate and government sectors has made the steel pan's class and political associations ambiguous. Such ambiguity has helped redraw the boundaries of pan's symbolic value in Trinidadian culture. Official elevation of steel pan yielded opposition from Trinidad and Tobago's East Indian community, who held that the harmonium better represented their experience and should be accorded similar recognition. While little came of the protest, the episode underscored the symbolic value of instruments in West Indian culture.

A final example is the abeng, a cow's horn, which was an important part of the liberation struggles of Jamaican Maroons in the eighteenth century. Capable of passing on messages through a secret musical language, it has long been a part of strategic Maroon communication. The abeng's symbolic importance was recognized in the late 1960s when the instrument's name and form were appropriated by Jamaican intellectuals for a weekly newspaper known for its pointed critique of colonialism and cultural imperialism.

SEE ALSO: Bread and Puppet Theater; French Revolutionary Theater; Harlem Renaissance; Latin American Punk Rock and Protest; Music and Protest, Latin America; Punk Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Cooper, C. (2004) *Sound Clash: Jamaican Dancehall Culture at Large*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dawes, K. (1999) *Natural Mysticism: Towards a New Reggae Aesthetic*. Leeds: Peepal Tree.
- Guilbault, J. (2000) Racial Projects and Musical Discourses in Trinidad, West Indies. In P. Bohlman & R. Radano (Eds.), *Music and the Racial Imagination*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Liverpool, H. (2001) *Rituals of Power and Rebellion: The Carnival Tradition in Trinidad and Tobago, 1763–1962*. Frontline Distribution International.
- Manuel, P. with Bilby, K. & Largey, M. (2006) *Caribbean Currents: Caribbean Music from Rumba to Reggae*. Revised and expanded ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Murrell, N. S., Spencer, W. D., & McFarlane, A. A. (Eds.) (1998) *Chanting Down Babylon: The Rastafari Reader*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Paquet, S. P., Saunders, P. J., & Stuempfle, S. (Eds.) (2008) *Music, Memory, Resistance: Calypso and the Caribbean Literary Imagination*. Kingston: Ian Randle.
- Stolzoff, N. (2000) *Wake the Town and Tell the People: Dancehall Culture in Jamaica*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Carmichael, Stokely/Kwame Turé (1941–1998)

Kenneth R. Sullivan

Stokely Carmichael (later, Kwame Turé) was born into a working-class family on June 29, 1941 in Port of Spain, Trinidad. Carmichael remained in Trinidad with his grandparents when his

parents left for the United States in search of work, and was eventually reunited with his parents in 1952, moving with them to the South Bronx in New York City. The family later moved to the working-class Italian American, Morris Park-White Plains neighborhood in the Bronx. As a young man, Carmichael frequented Michaux's African Bookstore on 125th Street and the Schomburg Museum on 141st Street. It was in Harlem, on 125th Street especially, where Carmichael became familiar with the passionate oratory of numerous "stepladder" speakers, as well as elder Trinidadian activists C. L. R. James (1901–89) and George Padmore (1902–59).

Carmichael's interest in social activism took hold while he was a senior at Bronx High School of Science, where he met some young communists and was deeply influenced by their radical analysis of history and capitalism. Early on, he supported the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) pickets of New York area department stores that discriminated against blacks in their Southern stores. Later, Carmichael organized students at Bronx Science for one of Bayard Rustin's Youth Marches for Integrated Schools in Washington, DC. It was in DC that he met students from the Nonviolent Action Group (NAG), an affiliate of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) at Howard University, a historically black university. In 1960 Carmichael turned down scholarships at several other universities to be a part of the vibrant academic and political community at Howard University, where Carmichael's life as a civil rights activist intensified.

At the age of 19 Carmichael received his apprenticeship in non-violent struggle during the Mississippi Freedom Rides of the early 1960s. Carmichael, along with CORE's James Farmer (1920–99), was sentenced to a month in Mississippi's infamous Parchman Prison Farm for attempting to integrate train service in the state. Through his organizing in Mississippi, Carmichael met noted civil rights activist and organizer Fannie Lou Hamer (1917–77), whose authenticity and commitment to the grassroots had a profound effect on him and other SNCC activists.

In 1963 Carmichael and the SNCC joined Cambridge movement leader and activist Gloria Richardson in her efforts to desegregate its public schools and hospitals and develop public housing for Cambridge, Maryland's black community. In August 1965 Carmichael and the SNCC

teamed with the Lowndes County Freedom Organization (LCFO, in Alabama) to organize what would later become an all-black political party: the Black Panther Party of Lowndes County. The press referred to the LCFO as the Black Panther Party primarily because of their "snarling" black panther ballot symbol, which would later be appropriated by Oakland, California Black Panther co-founders Huey P. Newton (1942–89) and Bobby Seale (b. 1936).

Many in the civil rights movement viewed the rising Black Power militancy of Carmichael and the SNCC as racially divisive, and worse – "anti-white." Carmichael, however, viewed Black Power as the coalescence of mounting black frustration over state violence against civil rights protesters, and the dwindling accomplishments of the civil rights movement. This shift in consciousness and a growing frustration with non-violent protest was documented in the book *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (1967), which Carmichael co-authored with Charles V. Hamilton: "Each time the people saw Martin Luther King get slapped, they became angry; when they saw four little black girls bombed to death, they were angrier; and when nothing happened they were steaming. We had nothing to offer them that they could see except to go out and be beaten again. We help build their frustration." *Black Power* was also the first time the term "institutional racism" was used; it identifies what Carmichael and Hamilton describe as "the real effect of power and race in the society."

Carmichael's increasingly radical positions, heavily influenced by Malcolm X (1925–65) and Frantz Fanon (1925–61), soon alienated others within the SNCC, which split into two factions – one advocating for non-violence and integration, the other taking a more revolutionary stance and advocating for Black Power. Soon after writing *Black Power*, Carmichael left the SNCC and joined the Black Panthers as their honorary prime minister. This was short-lived, however, as Carmichael – then living in Guinea with his wife Miriam Makeba – published a letter in 1969 condemning the Black Panthers for their lack of revolutionary Pan-Africanist nationalism, as well as their associations with white radicals.

Carmichael spent the later half of his life primarily in Guinea, writing and speaking for the Pan-African socialist cause. He died of prostate cancer in Guinea at the age of 57.

SEE ALSO: Baker, Ella Josephine (1903–1986); Black Panthers; Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961); Malcolm X (1925–1965); Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

References and Suggested Readings

- Carmichael, S. & Thelwell, E. M. (2003) *Ready for Revolution: The Life and Struggles of Stokely Carmichael*. New York: Scribner.
- Jefferies, H. K., Theoharis, J., & Woodard, K. (2005) *Groundwork: Local Black Freedom Movements in America*. New York: New York University Press.
- Kelley, N. (2003) *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*. *The Nation*, December 8. Available at: www.thenation.com/doc/20031208/kelley. Accessed June 5, 2008.
- Ogbar, J. O. G. (2004) *Black Power: Radical Politics and African American Identity*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Carney, James Francis "Guadalupe" (1925–1983?)

Edward T. Brett

James Francis Carney was born in Chicago, Illinois. After living in several cities in Ohio, his family settled in St. Louis, Missouri in 1941, where he was awarded a football scholarship to St. Louis University. When the US entered World War II, however, he left school to serve in the Army Corps of Engineers. Following the war, he entered the University of Detroit to study engineering. In August 1948 he decided to study for the Jesuit priesthood and therefore began matriculating at the order's seminary in Florissant, Missouri. After 13 years of study and pastoral training he was ordained in 1961.

As part of his training, he taught English and elocution in British Honduras at St. John's College (a Jesuit high school) from 1955 through 1958, while also ministering to the region's poor blacks and Ketchi Indians. Perhaps because of this experience he was immediately assigned after ordination to mission work in Honduras, where he served mostly in the department of Yoro. There he trained village catechists to lead Bible services and helped them form peasants into Christian base communities (*comunidades de base*), where scripture study was employed to raise

awareness among the rural poor of structural socioeconomic injustice. In 1963 he became chaplain for the newly formed National Association of Honduran Peasants (ANACH) and quickly developed a national reputation for his support of land reform and labor rights. In 1974 he became a naturalized Honduran citizen, but in 1979 the military government of General Policarpo Paz García revoked his citizenship and expelled him from the country.

He was next assigned by his Jesuit order to rural Nicaragua, where the social programs of the new Sandinista government greatly impressed him. Consequently, in 1983 he became chaplain to a Honduran guerrilla group known as the Central American Workers' Revolutionary Party (PRTC), which had been trained by the Sandinistas. After writing his autobiography, *The Metamorphosis of a Revolutionary*, where he declared himself a "Christian Marxist," he and the 96-member PRTC, led by Dr. José María Reyes, entered Honduras. They hoped to spark a Sandinista-like revolution, but were quickly located and destroyed by the Honduran military, which had been assisted by logistics supplied by US military advisers. All the guerrillas were either killed or captured.

Although the Honduran government claimed that Carney had died of starvation in the rugged mountainous terrain prior to the battle, the fact that it was unable to produce his body made this assertion highly suspect. For this reason, his family along with some human rights organizations began an investigation of his case. Requests were made in the United States for Carney's files through the Freedom of Information Act. The CIA, the Defense and State Departments, and the US army did send some documents, but they were heavily censored with about 50 percent of their contents blacked out. Over 300 requested documents were withheld in their entirety on the grounds of "national security." A major break in the case occurred in 1987, however, when Florencio Caballero, a former sergeant in Honduran military intelligence, told the *New York Times* "that the Honduran Army high command maintained a network of secret jails, special interrogators and kidnapping teams who detained and killed nearly 200 suspected leftists between 1980 and 1984." He further claimed that the teams were trained and advised by CIA operatives who had access to the jails, as well as "to written reports

summarizing the interrogation of suspected leftists.” Caballero added that Carney and several other members of his guerrilla unit had been captured, taken to Aguacate, a Honduran military base, and turned over to his unit, the Battalion 3–16. After several days of interrogation he was thrown to his death from a military helicopter. In 1995, under a new reformist government, the Honduran Commission for Human Rights requested that the US government turn over its files on the Carney case. What they received was CIA and US army documents with 50 percent of their contents blacked out. Although President Bill Clinton promised that Carney’s file would be declassified by the end of 1997, to date this has not happened.

SEE ALSO: Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)

References and Suggested Readings

- Brett, D. W. & Brett, E. T. (1988) *Murdered in Central America: The Stories of Eleven US Missionaries*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Carney, J. G. (1985) *To Be a Revolutionary: An Autobiography*. San Francisco: Harper & Row.
- LeMoyné, J. (1987) Honduras’s Army Tied to 200 Deaths. *New York Times*, May 2: 1, 8.

Carson, Rachel (1907–1964)

Patricia DeMarco

Rachel Louise Carson was born on May 27, 1907 in Springdale, Pennsylvania, a small industrial town on the banks of the Allegheny River. She was the third child of Marion and Robert Carson, people of modest means, who settled in the Allegheny Valley in 1906. Rachel Carson’s father had a dream to develop his 65 acres of land for residential use to offer homes for the burgeoning town of Pittsburgh. This dream never materialized in his lifetime, but the area surrounding the Carson homestead is now a suburban neighborhood with a high school and junior high school on the former Carson property.

Rachel Carson grew up in Pittsburgh at a time when the industrial age was at a pinnacle. The Allegheny Valley and the Monongahela Valley were bordered with factories that manufactured steel, chemical products, and power for

a growing city. The workers of Pittsburgh who manufactured steel and other products were crucial to the further expansion of the US into a major industrial era. Many of the public and private institutions that flowed from its wealth, once driven by steel production, stand to this day. But Rachel Carson saw the production of steel and metal products as detrimental to conserving the natural environment. When she looked out her windows over the Allegheny Valley, the view looked like this:

From whatever direction one approaches the once lovely conjunction of the Allegheny and Monongahela, the devastation of progress is apparent. Quiet valleys have been inundated with slag, defaced with refuse, marred by hideous buildings. Streams have been polluted with sewage and waste from the mills. (R. L. Duffus, *Atlantic Monthly*, 1930)

With close tutoring from her mother, Rachel formed her bond with nature as she grew up among the fields and farm animals as the once bucolic environment was transforming into a gritty industrial suburb. She wrote of her natural history observations and was curious about the world around her from an early age. She was published in *St. Nicholas Magazine* at age ten. She attended the Pennsylvania College for Women, now Chatham College, where she gravitated toward biology as her great educational pursuit. She graduated magna cum laude in 1929, and moved to Baltimore to continue her academic studies at Johns Hopkins University, where she earned a Master of Science degree. Upon completion of her studies, Carson was drawn to pursuing further research at Woods Hole, but financial constraints during the Great Depression prevented her from achieving a doctorate. Carson took a position for the Fish and Wildlife Service from 1932 to 1951, ascending in various positions to the level of editor-in-chief of conservation publications, the first woman ever to hold that level of appointment in the civil service of that department.

Rachel Carson’s literary works convey her deep passion and eloquent connection to the wonders of nature. Her first published books were about the ocean and the intercoastal ecosystems she studied closely: *Under the Sea-Wind* (1941), *The Sea Around Us* (1951), and *The Edge of the Sea* (1955). Her most influential work, *Silent*

Spring, was published serially in the *New Yorker* magazine, and appeared as a book in 1962. It drew tremendous attention to the environment and brought Carson worldwide acclaim. Because she had distributed chapters for review and comment, and the chapters were exposed in advance through serial publication, many influential people were aware of her work and her message of warning. That message was received with great concern among a growing number of scholars and academics, but with outrage and disdain from the chemical companies whose products she argued despoiled the environment.

Rachel Carson's Environmental Ethic

Against this backdrop of concern for the wholeness of the earth's environment, Rachel Carson wrote her most influential work to urge for caution in introducing dangerous chemicals without knowing their effects on the ecosystem as a whole. She was one of only a few predictors of the future – noting the connection between people and their environment. Human action could cause damage to the earth, and concomitantly human action could also reverse or prevent damage. Carson introduced the observation that when we see serious effects on the health of plants and animals we should take precautions because people are animals too and may be subject to health risks. This was a completely revolutionary and controversial concept at that time.

Rachel Carson's environmental ethic is simple:

- Live in harmony with nature.
- Preserve and learn from natural places.
- Minimize the impact of man-made chemicals on natural systems of the world.
- Consider the implications of human actions on the global web of life.

In 1958 when Rachel Carson began work on *Silent Spring*, DDT was all the rage. DDT stands for dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane, a potent insecticide used widely as a de-lousing agent during World War II. This and a number of other chemicals came into broad commercial use after the war ended as munitions providers sought non-military markets. DDT was widely touted in all the media as the savior of mankind, the answer to pests and diseases of all kinds. Broadcast spraying of crops and fogging of neighborhoods occurred all over the world as part of public health campaigns to control malaria,

typhus, and insect pests such as fire ants. Reports of poisonings, death of wildlife, and illness – especially in children – were dismissed, or not directly proven to be the result of DDT use. When Rachel Carson began her writing, pharmacologists and scientists already had begun to question the wisdom of the increasing toxicity of insecticides used broadly. Insects had within a few years begun to show resistance to DDT, precipitating the development of even more toxic chemicals. President Kennedy and Congress convened independent investigations on pesticide policy in 1963.

Rachel Carson's testimony before the Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations regarding Environmental Hazards, Control of Pesticides, and Other Chemical Poisons on June 4, 1963 summarizes her position on the matter. After reviewing a large body of evidence, she presented two significant conclusions:

All the foregoing evidence, it seems to me, leads inevitably to certain conclusions. The first is that aerial spraying of pesticides should be brought under strict control, and should be reduced to the minimum needed to accomplish the most essential objectives. Reduction would, of course, be opposed on the grounds of economy and efficiency. If we are ever to solve the basic problem of environmental contamination, however, we must begin to count the many hidden costs of what we are doing and weigh them against the gains or perceived advantages.

The second conclusion is that a strong and unremitting effort ought to be made to reduce the use of pesticides that leave long-lasting residues, and ultimately to eliminate them. I concur with this recommendation of the President's Science Advisory Committee, for I can see no other way to control the rapidly spreading contamination I have described.

In her testimony, Rachel Carson made six recommendations for legislative action:

1. Citizens have a right to be secure in their own homes and property against the intrusion of poisons applied by other persons.
2. The government should establish new programs of research and education of medical professionals, because physicians are generally unaware of the wide distribution of pesticides, their toxicity, and their effects on human health.

3. Restrict the sale and use of pesticides to those who have been trained in their safe use and application, who are capable of understanding the hazards and following directions.
4. The registration of chemicals used as pesticides should be the function of all agencies, rather than the Department of Agriculture alone.
5. The hazards of pesticides are compounded by the fantastic number of chemical compounds in use as pesticides, whose great proliferation has been driven more by economic competition than by actual need. New pesticides should only be approved when no other existing chemical or other method would do the job.
6. I hope the government will fully support research on new methods of pest control in which chemical use will be minimized or entirely eliminated. One of the outstanding values of biological controls for insect pests is that they are specifically adapted to a particular species or group of species. We must search, not for a super weapon that will solve all problems, but for a diversity of options, each precisely adjusted to its task.

Rachel Carson's Legacy

Rachel Carson died of cancer in Silver Spring, Maryland on April 14, 1964. Her work spawned a new direction for several environmental organizations, including the Sierra Club and the Audubon Society of which she was a member, and to whom she left modest bequests. Her work laid the foundation for modern activism and social protest. The Environmental Defense Fund took as part of its charter the implementation of her recommendations, and other organizations such as the Rachel Carson Council and Beyond Pesticides continue in that effort. Carson was so influential that a new public policy agenda was introduced in response to the wide outcry that her research and writing generated among the public. Some of the consequent actions taken include the following:

- The Environmental Protection Agency was established in 1970.
- The Clean Air Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act began to address air and water pollution.
- Environmental Protection Agency and Federal Drug Administration regulation of poisons,

chemicals, and labeling of their properties became law.

- Hundreds of organizations, such as the National Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club, and the World Wildlife Fund, developed a focus on protecting the environment, and a strong environmental watchdog presence became an integral part of the public policy process.

Why Was Rachel Carson So Effective?

Time Magazine named Rachel Carson one of the most influential people of the twentieth century in 1999. In 2006 the Environment Agency of the United Kingdom named Rachel Carson the most effective environmental activist. Her popularity and effectiveness continue to transcend national boundaries and persist today. Her message was simple, visionary, and courageous. She spoke out for the masses of working-class people who had no voice in decision-making, and she was effective because she exhibited the qualities of a selfless leader with great humility. Her seminal achievements were the culmination of her undaunted persistence in defending the environment against corporate polluters. Carson possessed three important qualities that made her a leader. These are qualities that grew from her own life experiences, and her own strong training and cultivation from her early childhood forward.

These three qualities contributed to her great credibility and her own personal acceptance by such a large part of the public:

- Strong research on the basis of documentation of oceans and ecology of the estuarine areas.
- Passion and a deep personal connection with the natural world and the concept that people are part of nature.
- Eloquence in her writing through creating an image of the future as a consequence of the introduction of new policies powerful enough to move Congress to act to protect the environment.

The Continuing Challenge

There are several issues at the turn of the twenty-first century which pose significant challenges to the future of the world and the environment's capacity to sustain humans, flora, and fauna. The most striking is the disparity

in the consumption level of resources per capita between the United States population and the consumption levels of other nations. This is especially significant when we examine the needs of emerging economies. The challenge we face is to provide for the sustainability of the earth, which means we must find ways to meet the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Some ways to approach a more environmentally sustainable future are:

- Align public policies and laws with the laws of nature.
- Consider the global implications of US policies and practices.
- Incorporate the precautionary principle into law.
- Incorporate sustainability policies into law.

The Rachel Carson Homestead Association preserves and promotes Rachel Carson's environmental ethic through education programs, publications, and projects.

SEE ALSO: Ecological Protest Movements; Environmental Protest, United States, 19th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Carson, R. (1962) *Silent Spring*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Carson, R. (1991) *The Sea Around Us*, 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Grunwald, M. (2006) *The Swamp: The Everglades, Florida, and the Politics of Paradise*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Lear, L. (1997) *Lost Woods: The Discovered Writing of Rachel Carson*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Lear, L. (1997) *Rachel Carson: Witness for Nature*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Matthiessen, P. (Ed.) (2007) *Courage for the Earth: Writers, Scientists and Activists Celebrate the Life and Writing of Rachel Carson*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Rachel Carson Homestead Association (RCHA) at www.rachelcarsonhomestead.org.

Casa del Obrero Mundial

Leticia Pacheco Espejel

On September 22, 1912, the Casa del Obrero Mundial (House of World Workers, COM) was

founded by four union syndicates – the Sociedad Mutuo Cooperativa de Dependientes de Restaurantes (Mutual Society of Restaurant Employees), the Sociedad Mutualista Union y Concordia de Ramo de Meseros (Mutualist Union and Gastronomic Unity of Waiters), the Confederación Tipográfica de México (Typographic Confederation of Mexico), and the Union de Canteros Mexicanos (Union of Mexican Stone Crushers) – and the Grupo Luz. The Grupo Luz, whose members had formerly cooperated with the Socialist Party, established the Escuela Racionalista (Rationalist School), which was comparable to the existing schools in Spain headed by Francisco Ferrer y Guardia. COM assumed the political direction of the Corte Anarchosindicalista group, which worked to improve working conditions, create international cooperation between workers, encourage self-organization, raise standards for all workers, and reject the power of church and state. The Syndicalist Union and the Grupo Luz created COM and immediately appointed Luis Mendez as treasurer and Jacinto Huitrón as administrator. From the beginning COM was an anarcho-sindicalist center, a place for encounters and sharing ideas. Gradually other syndicates joined COM, and others were founded with COM's help.

Syndicalism is the movement of workers fighting to achieve rights concerned with their labor, independently from the state. Syndicalists believe that with active struggle through unions, better labor conditions and liberation will finally be achieved, and they disregard parliamentary reforms as ineffective. The goal is to raise workers' awareness of the reasons for their misery and exploitation and to show them the need to organize themselves against capitalism. One of the tasks of the syndicate is the political formation of its members. Before changing existing systems in centers of production, the proprietors' influence over the means of production must be eliminated without interference from the state. Syndicalists call this the socialization of the means of production, the working instruments, and the accumulated wealth that is generated from the labor of all workers. Freedom of speech, free agreements, and free federalism were the basic principles of COM.

On June 6, 1914, President Victoriano Huerta began to clamp down on COM's activities. Various members were arrested, but some held

out undercover until the fall of President Huerta on June 15, when COM resumed its activities. As General Alvaro Obregón, a supporter of Venustiano Carranza, returned to politics, he granted COM the right to use the installations of the former Jesuita de San Juan de Letrán convent in Mexico City. At that point, the workers' organization gained support, but it also began to split. New syndicates had been established under the guardianship of COM, and, perhaps more importantly, a second COM was founded in Monterrey, along the lines of the first in Mexico City. The Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), founded in 1918, emerged as the first regional workers' confederation, differing from COM in propounding a regulated syndicalism instead of a strategy of direct action, which had debilitated Mexican syndicalism because of constant repression against syndicates and their leaders. During the Labor Congress in Saltillo in 1918, the majority of delegates expressed their support for CROM. At that point the Mexican Labor Party (PLM) was founded as the first Mexican party for workers. The divergent strategies and ideologies of CROM and COM provoked a separation of the syndicates. Years later COM was consolidated within CROM, which finally became the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM, Mexican Confederation of Workers), which continues to exist and receives support from the government.

COM was also affected by the creation of the Batallones Rojos (Red Battalions), which were set up in 1917 to help the constitutional government. This decision was not accepted by all members of COM, provoking further splits in the organization. The collaboration between COM and the *constitutionalistas* was cemented in a firm pact on February 17, 1915. Members of COM also agreed to further efforts at propaganda and help win sympathizers for the constitutional government. They also assembled revolutionary committees, known as "rojos" (red), which actively collaborated with the constitutional government.

The constitutional government never felt comfortable with these agreements, which had been provoked by the protests of the different syndicates. As COM worked in solidarity with the strikers, the government reacted by locking out COM. With the approval of the Constitution of 1917, the right of workers to an eight-hour

workday and the right to strike were upheld by Venustiano Carranza. With the consolidation of CROM and COM, the COM steadily declined, disappearing altogether in 1918.

SEE ALSO: Anarchosyndicalism; Escuela Moderna Movement (The Modern School); Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Mexico, Labor Movement and Protests, 1980–2005; Mexico, Worker Struggles and Labor Unions, 1950s–1970s

References and Suggested Readings

- Carr, B. (1976) *El Movimiento obrero y la política en México, 1940–1929 I*. Mexico City: Secretaria de Educación Pública.
- Huitrón, J. (1976) *Orígenes de la Historia del movimiento obrero en México*. Mexico City: Editores Unidos Mexicanos.

Casement, Roger (1864–1916)

Fintan Lane

Roger Casement was a British diplomat, human rights activist, Irish revolutionary nationalist, and anti-imperialist. He was born in Sandycove, County Dublin, in Ireland on September 1, 1864, the son of Roger Casement (an officer in the British army) and Anne Jephson. His father was Protestant and his mother was Roman Catholic, but he was raised a Protestant by his father's relatives in Ulster, following the deaths of both his parents by the time he was 13 years old. Casement left formal education at the age of 16, securing a clerical position with a shipping company in Liverpool. In 1892, he entered the British colonial service.

He subsequently served as a consul in Africa (1895–1904) and South America (1906–13), developing a reputation as a human rights activist. While in Africa, Casement served in the Niger, Mozambique, Angola, and the Congo. In 1903, while British consul in Léopoldville, he was commissioned by the British government to investigate human rights abuses by colonists against the indigenous population; the following year, he delivered a detailed eyewitness account exposing widespread human rights abuses in the Congo Free State. The Congo Free State had been under the control of King Leopold II of Belgium since 1885, when it was granted to him by the Berlin Conference, and the king,

acting as a private capitalist, exploited the area's natural resources – mostly rubber – while annihilating the existing inhabitants. Casement's damning report played a significant part in Leopold's eventual relinquishment of his personal holdings in Africa.

Casement's human rights work continued during his time in South America, and in 1910 the British Foreign Office asked him to investigate the actions of an Anglo-Peruvian rubber company in the northwest Amazon region. Casement's inquiries and his subsequent report on the Putumayo atrocities did much to alert the European public to the brutal nature of the colonial commercial exploitation of South America. He detailed the genocide of indigenous peoples at the hands of ruthless companies engaged in rubber extraction, and his exposures led to the establishment of a lengthy Parliamentary Select Committee Inquiry in the British parliament. In 1911, he was awarded a knighthood for his work in Peru.

Casement retired from the British civil service in 1912, by which stage he had developed hostility to imperialism and to the British empire in particular. His growing interest in Irish nationalism led him to join the Irish Volunteers in 1913, a paramilitary organization which sought home rule for Ireland and a weakening of the link with Britain. As World War I unfolded, he traveled to Germany and sought to persuade captured Irish-born British soldiers to fight against Britain in an "Irish Brigade"; his efforts were mostly unsuccessful. He had more success in soliciting arms from Germany to assist a rebellion in Ireland, and, in April 1916, he attempted to smuggle a shipment of weapons into the country via submarine, but was arrested at Banna Strand, near Ardferit in County Kerry. The arms were intended for the rebellion that broke out in Dublin at Easter that year, by a section of the Irish Volunteers led by Patrick Pearse, Tom Clarke, and James Connolly.

Casement was conveyed to London and charged with treason. His knighthood was taken from him and, in an attempt to discredit him, excerpts from his alleged private diaries were circulated during his trial by the British government; these diaries, which highlighted Casement's homosexuality, remain a source of controversy, with some commentators claiming that they are British forgeries. However, they are now generally considered to be genuine.

Roger Casement was convicted of treason and hanged on August 3, 1916. He converted to Catholicism while awaiting execution. Following a campaign, his remains were later returned to Dublin in 1965 where they were reinterred following an official state funeral.

SEE ALSO: Connolly, James (1868–1916); Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War; Irish Nationalism; Pearse, Patrick (Pádraig) (1879–1916)

References and Suggested Readings

- Daly, M. (Ed.) (2000) *Roger Casement in Irish and World History*. Dublin: Royal Irish.
- Doerries, R. R. (2000) *Prelude to the Easter Rising: Sir Roger Casement in Imperial Germany*. London: Routledge.
- Hochschild, A. (1998) *King Leopold's Ghost*. Boston: Mariner Books.
- Mitchell, A. (Ed.) (1997) *The Amazon Journal of Roger Casement*. London: Anaconda.
- Siocháin, S. O. (2008) *Roger Casement: Imperialist, Rebel, Revolutionary*. Dublin: Lilliput Press.
- Siocháin, S. O. & O'Sullivan, M. (Eds.) (2004) *The Eyes of Another Race: Roger Casement's Congo Report and 1903 Diary*. Dublin: University College Dublin Press.

Caste war of Yucatan (Guerra de castas en Yucatán)

Vittorio Sergi

The caste war was a wide rebellion of the Mayan population of Yucatan against the white elite of the colonial government. The rebellion began as a widespread guerilla war against white rural properties. The Mayans then established autonomous territories; when they had gained enough strength, they threatened the main colonial centers of Valladolid and Merida. The war, influenced partly by religious ideology, was organized by a segmental political and military organization and lasted with unequal intensity from the upheavals of 1847 to the last armed clashes of 1933.

In the nineteenth century, the society of Yucatan was a mixed system of colonial rule and institutions, with a combination of Mayan and colonial cultures. The ideological frame of the rebellion was established in a syncretic cult: several sanctuaries of the talking Holy Crosses

arose in different centers of the rebellion. The cult had various prophets, the best known of whom was Juan de la Cruz, who claimed to foresee the resurrection of the Mayan culture and the punishment of white colonialists. Beginning in 1847, whites, led by Governor Miguel Barbachano, were driven out of almost all the territories of Yucatan. Then, between 1848 and 1851, with the support of the Mexican state, they regained the majority of the peninsula. The first Mayan leaders, Cecilio Chi and Jacinto Pat, were killed in 1849 over internal conflicts, and leadership passed to Florentino Chan and Venancio Puc. The Mayan rebels recovered in the southeast, with the support of the border state of Belize, with which they established a trade in weapons and other war implements. The main rebel territory was established around the ceremonial center of Chan Santa Cruz, southeast of Tulum. There were also other autonomous Mayan centers, such as Ixcanha and Icaiche Maya in the south-center of Yucatan.

In 1857 Puc led a new wave of rebellion. His army, called the Cruzob, attacked and conquered the colonial towns of Bacalar and Tekax. In 1861 the new governor of Yucatan, Agustín Acereto, sent a strong army to regain Chan Santa Cruz and crush the rebellion. The colonial army of more than 3,000 men entered the ceremonial center, abandoned by the Mayans without a fight, but soon they suffered heavy guerilla attacks from the natives and were forced to retreat, having suffered more than 2,000 casualties.

In December 1863, Puc tried to organize a strong column of 5,000 to attack Merida, but when the planting season came the majority of the soldiers abandoned their units to take care of their crops. In the next years, guerilla attacks continued with lower intensity from the autonomous Mayan zones. Negotiations in 1883 led to a treaty signed on January 11, 1884 in Belize, between Mexico and Chan Santa Cruz territories. Bacalar remained in the hands of Mayans until January 22, 1901, when it was conquered by Mexican Admiral Angel Ortiz Monasterio, while General Ignacio A. Bravo occupied Chan Santa Cruz. The conflict caused between 40,000 and 50,000 casualties.

SEE ALSO: Cuauhtémoc (1502–1525); Cuba, Struggle for Independence from Spain, 1868–1898; Ecuador, Indigenous and Popular Struggles

References and Suggested Readings

- Abreu Gómez, E. (1997) *La conjura de Ximúm: la guerra de castas en Yucatán*. Mérida, Yucatan, Mexico: Maldonado Editores.
- Dumond Don, E. (1997) *The Machete and the Cross: Campesino Rebellion in Yucatan*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Reed, N. (1964) *The Caste War of Yucatan*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Rugeley, T. (Ed.) (2001) *Maya Wars: Ethnographic Accounts from Nineteenth-Century Yucatan*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Castoriadis, Cornelius (1922–1997)

Christos Boukalas

Political philosopher, economist, psychoanalyst, and “sovietologist,” Castoriadis was among the most radical and original postwar thinkers. His theory informed the 1968 uprising in France and has deepened its influence since. Born to Greek parents in 1922 in Istanbul (then Constantinople), he soon moved to Athens, where he experienced the Nazi occupation, the resistance and liberation, the Greek civil war, and the Stalinist attempted coup of December 1944. His life can be seen as a series of ruptures, unified by the quest for autonomy.

During the Greek civil war (1945), and persecuted by both Fascists and Stalinists, he fled to Paris and joined the Trotskyite Parti Communiste Internationaliste (Internationalist Communist Party) (PCI). While the latter defended the Stalinist regimes, seeing them as a temporary deviation from socialism, Castoriadis insisted that the rise of the bureaucracy was an organic, permanent element of “soviet” societies, which were as exploitative and repressive as any capitalist regime.

A scission occurred in 1949 when the PCI offered enthusiastic support to Tito’s dictatorship in Yugoslavia. Together with Claude Lefort and others, Castoriadis formed the Socialisme ou Barbarie (Socialism or Barbarity) group. In a series of publications in the group’s review, Castoriadis conceptualized the widespread workers’ struggles throughout the 1950s (East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Britain, France, US) as revolts against the *bureaucracy*: against the state (in the East) and against trade unions (in the West). Drawing from the experience of these

struggles, and attempting to contribute to their advance in a revolutionary direction, he engaged with the question of the “revolutionary organization.” He saw the latter as necessary for connecting topical struggles with the question of the overall social organization, thus opening their horizon of action to transcend the capitalist-bureaucratic institution of society; and he fervently opposed the Leninist premise that “vanguard” organizations should be leading social movements.

This critique of the bureaucracy (including “revolutionary” vanguards) and the idea that social struggles contain seeds of a social organization *beyond* capitalism and statism, combined into developing the positive content of revolutionary theory, encapsulated in the notion of autonomy.

Apart from predating the many revolutionaries who adopted autonomy as their goal since 1968, Castoriadis is the only one to offer a clear explanation of the term. Given that “society” can only exist through institutions (norms, practices, ethos, structures), “autonomy” refers to the *relation between society and its institution*. An autonomous society is one that is conscious of, and explicitly recognizes “itself” as, the only creator of its institutions. It can thus at any time question, challenge, and alter them. This unceasing instituting work is especially clear in revolutionary periods, when society shatters its old institution and seeks to create a new one.

Opposed to autonomy is heteronomy: the condition that occults social self-creation by imputing it to an extra-social source. For millennia, heteronomy meant that societies could not question their institution, since it was perceived to be deriving from Divinity. Modern societies have, through their revolutions, rejected God and recognized human beings as the instituting source. This autonomous tendency is countered by heteronomy in the perception that Laws (of nature, history, or the economy) determine social institution.

In the political plain, autonomy corresponds to democracy: since society recognizes itself as the sole source of its institution, politics (i.e., the institution, organization, and direction of society) is a process equally involving all its members. Heteronomy, on the contrary, is pertinent to “government by experts”: since society is instituted by some extra-social force, the direction of social affairs is the prerogative of those who

successfully claim knowledge of that source and its ways.

Subsequently, statehood is incompatible with democracy, and a condition of heteronomy. Among forms of political organization, statehood is characterized by the radical division of political labor it introduces. All directing functions are monopolized by a tiny fraction of the population, and everyone has to conform with and execute their decisions. This division is based on the premise that “public affairs” are the realm of special knowledge and expertise possessed by state leaders. Whether this expertise derives from the knowledge of “God’s will” or of the “laws of the market” makes little difference. Additionally, permitting the ruled to choose their ruler does not cancel the rulers-ruled relationship. Thus, the quintessential condition for democracy is to shatter the myth that politics is a distinct “science.” Politics implicates everyone in a society, hence everyone should have equal participation in the political process.

In this context, Castoriadis vehemently rejected techno-rationality (and its buzzwords: “development,” “progress,” “productivity”) for denying the possibility for social self-determination. On the same grounds he broke (in the mid-1970s) with Marxism – and Marx – *tout court*. In his critique, ongoing for two decades, Castoriadis perceived an apparent tension between revolutionary and determinist features in Marx – the former evident when Marx addressed phenomena as historically specific, the latter when he attempted to construe ahistorical universals. Nonetheless, the revolutionary elements are invariably subservient to determinism. Thus, Marx’s theory of history extrapolates an understanding of the dynamics of capitalist society into universally valid “laws,” and his economic theory is based on essentializing “socially necessary labor.” While class struggle is recognized as the motor of history, classes are in fact compelled to execute their historically determined role once a mode of production has exhausted its capacity to develop the productive forces. In short, by placing it “on its feet,” Marx has kept the Hegelian framework intact: history is the gradual materialization of preexisting universals. Thus Marxism reinstates heteronomy and impedes the revolutionary project of autonomy.

Attempting to broaden and deepen the project of autonomy, Castoriadis focused on the autonomous individual as a product and producer

of autonomous society. He also recuperated ancient Greek social organization and thought as reference points for the project, and sought to inscribe a horizon of autonomy to the feminist and ecological movements.

Castoriadis' importance for revolutionary politics is hard to overstate. He is the only political thinker to undertake a tortured, honest break with Marx for the sake of the revolutionary project; his notion of autonomy informs the organization and defines the horizon of action for every post-1968 radical/revolutionary gesture worth the name; and his conception of democracy can serve as a point of orientation, *and* as a basis for a radical critique of statism – which currently parades its “democracy” as the ultimate justification for its brutality.

SEE ALSO: Autonomism; Leninist Philosophy; Marxism; May 1968 French Uprisings; Socialisme ou Barbarie; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Vanguard Party

References and Suggested Readings

- Castoriadis, C. (1984) *Crossroads in the Labyrinth*. Brighton: Harvester.
- Castoriadis, C. (1988–93) *Political and Social Writings*, 3 vols. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Castoriadis, C. (1991) *Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Castoriadis, C. (1997) *The Imaginary Institution of Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Curtis, D. A. (Ed.) (1997) *The Castoriadis Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Castro, Fidel (b. 1926)

Mike Gonzalez

Few figures have excited such hostility or inspired such unconditional loyalty as Fidel Castro. The Cuban Revolution of 1959, from which Castro emerged the undisputed leader, turned the tide of politics in Latin America. The Revolution challenged the regional domination of the United States, which until then had regarded the southern continent as its backyard. The response from Washington, predictably, was to seek to overthrow Castro and bring down the Cuban Revolution by means ranging from crude attempts at assassination to full-scale military assault and economic siege. Forty-nine years later, an ailing Castro defiantly remained the leader and representative of a Cuba that has

survived every attempt to destroy it, although the day-to-day tasks of leadership passed to his brother, Raúl. It is testimony to Castro's determination, his political skill, and his enormous personal authority that he has survived his erstwhile allies in the Soviet bloc and every external attempt to subvert his regime.

Fidel was the third of five children born to Galician immigrants. The Castros became a landed family whose *finca*, at one point, measured 26,000 acres. In 1945 he entered the Faculty of Law at Havana University, where he became involved in an often violent world of student politics. The university directly reflected the wider society where successive presidents – Batista, Grau, and Prío Socarrás – governed by corruption and violence in equal measure. The Havana campus was run by two criminal organizations which tended to resolve disputes in armed confrontations. Belonging to neither, Fidel Castro took to carrying his own revolver.

There were other active political organizations as well, but the Cuban Communist Party (PSP), as far as Castro was concerned, was wholly discredited as a result of its collaboration with the Batista and Grau governments. The nationalist organizations emerging from the previous decade were corrupt and personalistic. The only other alternative was the Directorio Universitario, also born out of the events of 1933 that brought Batista to power and committed to a politics of armed actions and clandestine organization. In 1947, Castro participated in an abortive armed expedition against Trujillo, the dictatorial ruler of the Dominican Republic, escaping arrest by a marathon swim across dangerous waters. A year later he was in Bogota when the assassination of Liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán sparked the violent events known as the *Bogotazo*.

Upon his return to Havana, Castro began to work with one of the few political leaders who had not succumbed to corruption – Eduardo Chibás, whose Ortodoxo Party was formed to rescue the nationalist tradition from its more cynical users. A radio journalist, Chibás was hugely popular, and Castro – already a well-known figure in Cuban politics – joined his team in preparation for the elections of 1952. Chibás's sudden death at his own hands in August 1951 left Castro to assume his mantle. The opportunity never came, however, as in March 1952 the ubiquitous Fulgencio Batista took power in a military coup and the elections were annulled.



Fidel Castro lifts a young admirer in the air after assuming power following the Cuban Revolution. Castro arrived in Havana on January 8, 1959 following the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship. On February 16, Castro was sworn in as prime minister of Cuba. (Burt Glinn/Magnum Photos)

For Castro, this was definitive evidence of the futility of electoral politics. The history of the Cuban Communist Party, itself mired in the politics of corruption and patronage, could offer him no alternative. Instead he began to mobilize for a strategy of armed struggle. One year later, on July 26, 1953, he led 165 young people in an assault on the Moncada Barracks. It was a failure. Nineteen soldiers and eight rebels died in the attack and over 60 rebels were tortured to death under Batista's direct orders in subsequent days. Castro was put on trial in September and sentenced to 15 years in jail. His speech in the court lasted four hours, and represents the first manifesto of the 26th of July Movement. The title of the speech, named after its presentation, was "History will absolve me." In it he sets out a program of political independence and economic reform within a national, capitalist framework.

Released two years later under amnesty, Castro went to Mexico where he immediately began

to plan a new and ultimately successful armed campaign against Batista. Among those who joined him there were his brother Raúl and the young Argentinian doctor, Ernesto "Che" Guevara. In November of 1956, 82 men boarded the motor launch *Granma* to sail to Cuba and establish the base of a new guerilla army.

They landed on December 3. The voyage took longer than expected and the group sent to meet the boat had dispersed, thinking there had been a change of plan. In effect this first action of Castro's 26th of July Movement (J-26-M) was inauspicious, all the more so since the rebels were met by Batista's troops and only 19 survived the first armed encounter with the state.

Formed in 1955, J-26-M was presented to the world in March 1956 as the inheritor of Chibás's nationalist *Ortodoxo* tradition. At that point it had the support of José Antonio Echeverría's *Directorio Revolucionario* and the backing of some more sinister individuals, including ex-president Prío Socarrás. Within Cuba, the organization could claim supporters among young officers in the armed forces, students, and some young trade unionists, chief among them Frank País, a teacher based in Santiago de Cuba.

The failure of the landing left Castro and the 18 survivors adrift for several days in the Sierra Maestra. Castro's strategy was to establish a guerilla base in the mountains and from there to harry Batista's troops. The clear assumption was that in a remote area where landowners and local bosses held power over a poor landless peasantry, support for the rebel army would come quickly. In fact, the initial support came from local groups that could more accurately be described as bandits than revolutionaries. But some individuals did join the small armed band. When Herbert Matthews, the correspondent for *Life* magazine, arrived in the Sierra in February 1957, there were no more than 18 people in Fidel's encampment. He convinced Matthews that they were many more, however, and the journalist's admiring report had a double effect. It challenged Batista's false claims of having eliminated all the rebels, and it boosted Castro's reputation within and outside Cuba. Fidel was quick to use the opportunity it offered him. The "First Sierra Maestra Manifesto" followed some days later, calling on the population of Cuba to rise against Batista. It was characteristically over-confident.

There were unresolved tensions within the Movement, particularly between Frank País, the acknowledged leader of the urban movement, and Castro. País felt Castro was arrogant and overbearing and unwilling to negotiate with his colleagues. Beyond the personal there were matters of strategy at issue; País argued for a strategy based on the urban movements, including the trade unions, and for a broad resistance front. Castro, on the other hand, insisted that the mountains should lead and the urban movement should act in a support capacity. A second manifesto published in July assimilated some of these suggestions, and argued for agrarian reform with compensation and a return to the liberal 1940 Constitution. This formed the basis of an agreement among anti-Batista forces signed in Miami in October, but Castro drew back from it when it became clear that the Rebel Army would be expected to place itself under the orders of returning exile leaders. In the internal battle within the Movement, the balance was clearly tipping in Castro's direction. And despite their enduring hostility to the Movement in the cities, the Cuban communists had a permanent representative in Castro's camp.

By early 1958 the revolutionaries controlled significant areas of the Sierra Maestra and Raúl opened a second front in the Sierra Cristal in March. Regular radio broadcasts and some judicious seizures of land and cattle for redistribution raised the profile of the rebels and Batista responded with the declaration of a state of emergency in March 1958. Castro then issued a call for an uprising, but the general strike in April failed and ushered in a period of extremely intense repression lasting until late June. Despite their propaganda successes there were no more than 300 rebels and for a brief period Castro's camp was in imminent danger of being overrun. Yet the tide turned by the end of the month and in July a meeting of opposition groups in Venezuela proclaimed Castro the sole leader of the revolution. The communists had refused to engage with the April strikes; now they sent one of their leaders to the mountains to acknowledge Castro's leadership.

As the last days of the Batista regime approached, it was clear that the leadership of J-26-M rested now with Castro. Through skillful maneuvering between factions, he had won over the communists as well as several sections of the right-wing nationalist opposition. In August Che Guevara

moved to the center of the island, to Escambray, to open a second front. This would prove crucial as a wounded national army and a regime rotten with corruption lost the support of its Washington mentors and came under pressure from the guerrillas. The first column that moved into Havana on January 1, 1959 was led by Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos; Castro himself arrived eight days later after a triumphant motorcade across Cuba starting in Santiago. There was now no doubt as to who was the leader of the Revolution – the manner of Castro's entry into the capital proved it beyond doubt.

Yet for the initial period Castro exercised power indirectly. He had first to negotiate with other forces – the bourgeois opposition to Batista, the remnants of the Directorio, and most crucially the communist party and the old trade union leaders. What was not clear was where Castro stood politically. His earlier manifestos expressed the ideas and strategies of a revolutionary nationalist and an anti-imperialist, but beyond shaping a new relationship with the United States, nothing was very clear. "The Revolution is Cuban and democratic in its core and its conceptions," wrote Castro in an article in January 1959 (Skierka 2004: 72). He repeated these views during his visit to the United States in April. The new government, led by high court judge Manuel Urrutia, consisted almost entirely of members of the old Cuban bourgeoisie; Castro himself had no official role beyond commander of the armed forces, though the reality of his leadership was uncontested. At this stage it seemed that Castro was primarily concerned with negotiating with Washington and cautious about alienating US interests.

At the same time, Castro was meeting regularly with PSP leadership, even though the public relationship between the PSP and J-26-M remained extremely hostile. The PSP had acknowledged Castro's leadership of the Revolution, and he in turn was concerned to contain any threat from what remained, after all, a significant organization (its membership was around 50,000). Most importantly, perhaps, it was an *organized* and disciplined political structure, whereas Castro had created a structure of command, which would be increasingly reflected in the state, and a culture of mass support – but not an independent political organization capable of acting outside the state and of demanding accountability for the leadership.

The relationship between Castro, the PSP, and the trade unions changed and shifted through 1959 as he tested US attitudes toward the Revolution. His April visit to Washington, with President Eisenhower permanently unavailable and the virulently anti-communist vice-president, Richard Nixon, conducting high-level discussions, was a clear sign of things to come. Nixon's discussions with Raúl and Che at a refueling stop in Houston while Castro was traveling to Venezuela clearly gave the US an opportunity to warn Castro not to move too close to the United States. In any event, Washington's attitudes certainly pushed a wary Castro toward the PSP and a more radical strategy than the one set out in his speech from the court in 1953.

In the trade unions, for example, the new leadership, coming from the urban wing of J-26-M, was fiercely anti-communist; later that year, at the first congress of the new national union, the leaders were removed and replaced by communists. This opened splits within J-26-M as well as creating tensions between Castro and his old bourgeois allies. The president resigned in July and in October Huber Matos, an ex-Ortodoxo and military leader during the guerilla war, resigned in protest at the growing communist presence in government. He was immediately arrested and sentenced to 20 years in prison after trial.

The Matos trial not only indicated the internal rifts within J-26-M and the growth of communist influence, it also left little doubt as to how opposition would be dealt with by Castro. Within the United States, liberals like C. Wright Mills despaired that government intransigence was driving Castro to the left; the right, meanwhile, pointed to the (fairly moderate) agrarian reform law passed in May 1959 as evidence of Castro's determination to attack US interests on the island and argued that Castro had secretly always been a communist. This clearly was not the case. On the other hand, two developments were clearly already shaping the new Cuban state. First, the belligerence of US attitudes (then as now), expressed in a *de facto* economic boycott made official early the following year, meant that Cuba had urgently to seek other allies and other markets. Secondly, it was clear that the closeness of a sworn enemy made national defense a priority – indeed, it became the justifying ideology for an increasingly militarized state whose political culture was shaped by concepts of command and hierarchy. The

Revolutionary Armed Forces, under Castro's command, numbered around 100,000; a new Intelligence Directorate was and remained a highly effective unit; the armed militias were a reserve force of a further 100,000; and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) effectively comprised a locally based apparatus of control.

In February 1960, the signing of a Cuban–Soviet trade arrangement signaled a fundamental change. Economic rapprochement would imply also a much closer political relationship with the Cuban Communist Party as the pro-Soviet force within Cuba. As the US cut the sugar quota and prepared for direct intervention, Castro had very little choice. When US oil companies refused to refine Russian oil in August 1960, Castro nationalized the oil companies; their refineries would now process Soviet oil and Cuban sugar would flow to Eastern Europe in return. At the same time, the exodus of the middle classes intensified, reaching half a million by the end of 1960. Internally, the closure that year of the cultural magazine *Lunes de Revolución* signaled a growing control over dissent.

Against this backdrop Castro attended the United Nations General Assembly in September. The decision to house the Cuban delegation in a Harlem guest house endeared him to the public and enraged the North American right. His four-hour speech was not long by his standards, and it was in many ways conciliatory, keeping the door open to further negotiation. While he met stony silence from many delegates, Russian Prime Minister Khrushchev expressed audible delight. But US attitudes were hardening and there seemed little alternative for Castro than to further a relationship with the Soviets. As the year ended, a series of small-scale attacks and acts of sabotage were a sign of things to come.

The Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 showed Castro at his most resolute and charismatic. The invasion was defeated in less than three days and proved Castro to be a far more prepared and formidable enemy than had been expected. It was also a turning point. In December Castro unexpectedly announced that the Revolution was now “Marxist-Leninist.” Although Raúl Castro and Che had long been pressing for political radicalization, Castro's decision was, as ever, pragmatic and realist. Relations with the United States were clearly severed and Cuba's economic survival now depended on the Soviet

connection. This move had internal implications, as far as the role of the Communist Party in particular was concerned. An overall political shift occurred, as the Soviets began to take an increasingly central role in economic planning with all its political consequences. In more general terms, the centralized structure of power, with Castro now its unassailable political and military leader, echoed the shape of the Soviet state as well as the command model that informed Castro's more general strategy. The popular organizations, strengthened in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, were conduits of control rather than organs of mass democracy. Yet they also counterbalanced the growing influence of the PSP. The denunciation of the "microfaction" led by Anibal Escalante, the communist leader closest to the Soviets, and his later incarceration, were a clear warning note as to where control lay in the new Cuba.

There were other tensions in the air early in 1962, as inadequate planning, waste, and bureaucracy had produced crises in the economy and the introduction of rationing. At the same time, negotiations with the Russians led Castro to accept the construction of missile launch bases on the island. Their discovery by US spy planes, and the subsequent confrontation between the Soviets and Washington, produced the 13 days of global tension known as the October Missile Crisis. For Castro, the security of Cuba was the sole priority; if Cuba were to be attacked, then the Soviets must strike back with full force. During the event, the Soviets withdrew and the doomsday clock ticked a few minutes back. For Castro, however, this was a betrayal and a clear expression of the real limitations of Soviet support for Cuba. Clearly Castro expected a different response, and his anger produced a shift in Cuban foreign policy.

The image of Castro for decades to come would be shaped by this new direction: a search for an alternative framework for the Cuban Revolution. These were the years in which Fidelismo was closest to the ideas of Guevara, with its emphasis on extending the Revolution and its new discourse of third world solidarity and tricontinentalism. Che's travels in Africa and Asia as well as Eastern Europe were clearly exploratory, and the emphasis within Cuba on the symbolism of the guerilla no doubt reflected a genuine search for an alternative road to revolution and for an end to Cuba's isolation. It also made very clear that Castro's primary and overriding concern

would always be the survival of the Cuban Revolution rather than ideological dogmatism.

The following year, 1963, was a difficult one: continuing inefficiencies and miscalculations in the economy meant that demand outstripped capacity while productivity fell in many areas. Castro's own explanation is that the Revolution tried to run before it could walk. By the end of the year it was clear that the rapid industrialization that Guevara had pushed for would not be possible. The 1964 sugar agreement with the Soviets was an example of Cuba's continuing economic dependence. This made Che's position increasingly difficult, though none of this emerged publicly. Che's decision to leave Cuba and open a new guerilla front, first in the Congo and later in Bolivia, was clearly taken with Fidel's knowledge and consent – though subsequent accounts have often differed as to what was discussed between them. What is known is that Guevara left an undated resignation letter with Fidel in case his death or capture on foreign territory should prove an embarrassment to Cuba. In October of 1965, Fidel read the letter at the first congress of the new Communist Party of Cuba. Effectively this severed Che's relationship with Cuba, though he would return once more in secret before moving on to Bolivia.

There are a number of explanations offered for Fidel's decision. Some suggest that Che was a rival for political leadership, though this explanation seems unlikely. Still, Guevara had recently been writing and speaking from a critical perspective against the backdrop of a deteriorating relationship with the Soviets. His last speech, in Algiers, had been overtly critical of the Soviet role in the world. Fidel, for his part, seemed to have been cognizant of the fact that the continental armed struggle was increasingly a rhetorical device and that the survival of the Cuban Revolution – always his priority – necessarily depended on the relationship with the Soviet bloc. Soviet disapproval of Che required that Fidel distance himself from his comrade in arms.

Fidel was equally unwilling to sacrifice his own political independence, especially in the light of the October crisis. Thus, he did not attend the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the Russian Revolution in Moscow in October 1967, and in his speeches at the time emphasized Che's concept of the "new man" as distinct from the economic realism advocated by Soviet advisors.

In January 1968, the Cultural Congress in Havana drew together radical and revolutionary intellectuals from around the world in a debate deeply imbued with the “spirit of 1968” and overseen by iconic portraits of Guevara. The strains between Cuba and the Eastern European bureaucracies were far from resolved. The Cuban economy was in a serious crisis, and the criticisms coming from Eastern Europe were specifically directed at Castro who was, it seemed, the source of all decision-making. Criticisms of his autocratic style were legion, and the concentration of power in the hands of Castro and his immediate circle gave credence to those arguments. It seemed strange, therefore, that the intellectuals of the new generation should give such uncritical support to a leader who enshrined many of the problems which that generation was beginning to acknowledge within existing socialist models. It is perhaps testimony to Castro’s charisma, or equally to the third worldist idealism typified by Régis Debray, that so little of the critical thought of the period should have been applied to Castro.

In March 1968 Castro launched the “Revolutionary Offensive,” an apparent radicalization of the Revolution which nationalized the remaining small businesses and caricatured their owners as a parasitic class. It was not a new device, nor would it be the last time an ideological offensive was launched to veil material difficulties. At the same time, the theme of the “new man,” who championed social responsibility over personal comfort, appeared again in anticipation of the Gran Zafra, the Great Sugar Harvest of 1970. In fact, Castro simultaneously invoked the spirit of Che and distanced himself from the continental revolution identified with the dead guerillero. In August 1968, Castro supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as an unfortunate necessity and condemned the political reforms initiated there by Dubček in the Prague Spring as a concession to imperialism.

The decision to produce a 1970 harvest of ten million tons of sugar fell far short of its objective. The attempt to increase production, however, mobilized huge numbers of voluntary laborers, brought production and activity to a halt in many areas, and yielded only some six and a half million tons. If the intention had been to generate a surplus sufficient to relaunch a program of diversification, then it manifestly failed. Castro’s speech at the Third World Summit in

Algiers in 1970 gave unequivocal support to Soviet foreign policy objectives; it coincided too with Cuba’s entry into the Warsaw Pact. While Castro would frequently seek opportunities to emphasize minor differences with the Soviet bloc, in reality Cuba had now become a member. The consequences within Cuba were increasingly draconian measures affecting labor and a clear integration of the Cuban economy into the Soviet ambit.

Cuba’s reliance on Soviet markets and supplies deepened as the US embargo became increasingly savage. Cuba’s role in Africa, and in particular in Ethiopia and Somalia, must be seen in the context of Soviet geopolitical strategy. The presence of the Cuban military in Angola undoubtedly tipped the balance in favor of the Angolan liberation movement in its struggle against South African-backed forces – but their presence there was not unproblematic and the social consequences for Cuba of the returning dead, sick, and wounded were greater than was ever officially acknowledged. The new Constitution of 1976 formalized a system that had already existed on a *de facto* basis. While establishing certain mechanisms for election, the concentration of state power in the hands of a series of small interlocking commands with Castro as their undisputed head was confirmed by the constitution rather than changed by it.

In 1986 Castro’s sudden call for rectification, with its recognition of bureaucratic failures, corruption in the regime, and the inequalities that undoubtedly existed in Cuba, was not so much a road to Damascus as a deft political shift. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* threatened Cuba’s very existence, given the continuous and tightening US siege. Soviet trade was now to be conducted in dollars only – and within three years the Revolution faced the end of subsidies and support of every kind. The potential crisis was incalculable, especially given the inefficiencies that Castro had exposed in his call for rectification. In 1989, the full consequences of two decades of dependence would be exposed in the absence of spare parts and the catastrophic decline in energy supplies. The “Special period in Time of Peace” that Castro announced in 1989 was in reality a period of extreme austerity, scarcity, and disastrous economic decline. Electricity was available for only a few hours a day, some diseases of malnutrition reappeared, factories cut production, and ox-drawn plows reappeared to replace the tractor.

Yet Castro and the Cuban state survived. It can be argued that this was once again evidence of Castro's extraordinary charisma, though it is an unconvincing explanation on its own. The continuing US siege, however, provided a unifying focus which Castro and the government continually emphasized. Secondly, the Mariel boatlift and the regular expulsion of dissidents and malcontents certainly removed one potential source of opposition. More significantly still, the hardening of state control at every level of the society certainly dissuaded public criticism of Castro's leadership. The summary execution of Arnaldo Ochoa, Castro's old comrade in arms and a hero of Angola, on corruption charges certainly served to discourage the others.

By the mid-1990s, Cuba was registering positive results of economic growth. Ironically, remissions of dollars from Cubans resident in the United States became as significant as the rapidly growing tourist industry, which was Cuba's real salvation. Cuba's opening to the world market was a reality, even if it was systematically denied in its leader's speeches. By the mid-2000s Cuba was receiving over two and a half million visitors and was locked into joint initiatives with European and Canadian capital in both service and industrial areas. Castro's Charm Offensive embraced the Vatican and the king of the Yorubas. Cuba was opening to the world in the wake of 1989 but without a major change of regime, as had happened elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Cuba had changed, as was evident to anyone walking the streets of Havana. Many government bureaucrats were now successful entrepreneurs in what was an unacknowledged but burgeoning private sector. Increasingly, economic decisions were made in a more managerial style, a response to the demands of international economic relations rather than the needs of the Cuban majority.

Fidel Castro's term of leadership lasted until 2008 when he finally yielded political power to his brother Raúl after a lengthy bout of illness. Still, it was clear that Fidel, from his sick bed, remained in charge.

For some that longevity is evidence of success. Cuba's survival in the face of unremitting hostility from its powerful neighbor is certainly an achievement. But there has been a cost, especially if socialism is to be defined as a process of self-emancipation and increasing control by the majority of their own lives. The democratic

principles at the core of the socialist tradition have been the victim of the central presence of Fidel Castro at the heart of Cuban politics for almost 50 years.

SEE ALSO: *Bogotazo* and *La Violencia*; Cuba, General Strikes under Batista Regime, 1952–1958; Cuba, Struggle for Independence from Spain, 1868–1898; Cuba, Transition to Socialism and Government; Cuban Post-Revolutionary Protests; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Cuban Revolutionary Government; Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967); Martí, José (1853–1895) and the Partido Revolucionario Cubano; Prague Spring

References and Suggested Readings

- Castro, F. (2007) *A Fidel Castro Reader*. New York: Ocean Press.
- Castro, F. & Ramonet, I. (2007) *Fidel Castro: My Life*. London: Penguin.
- Franqui, C. (1994) *Family Portrait with Fidel*. New York: Random House.
- Gonzalez, M. (2004) *Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution*. London: Bookmarks.
- Schlesinger, A. (1965) *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
- Skierka, V. (2004) *Fidel Castro: A Biography*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Szulc, T. (1986) *Fidel: A Critical Portrait*. New York: HarperCollins.

Catalan protests against centralism

Andrew Dowling

The Spanish Civil War of 1936–9, a conflict that saw Spanish democracy overthrown, was fought over many issues. One key component that bound the disparate forces of the Spanish right wing together was the perceived challenge to the unity of Spain, from both the Basque Country and Catalonia. The fear of territorial dismemberment expressed by broad swathes of the Spanish right reflected the acute anxiety within Spanish nationalism at the international status and position of Spain if it lost the important territories of Catalonia and the Basque Country. By the 1930s the Catalan national movement embodied in the project of Catalanism was in the ascendant, though a complex dynamic and conflict with the anarchist-led working class was apparent, above all in the city of Barcelona. Autonomy

for Catalonia was obtained in 1932, though this measure was highly controversial and led to much anxiety on the part of the right at a perceived break-up of Spain and much anti-Catalan hysteria.

Catalan society in the 1930s had four main political constituencies. There was a revolutionary left, in which the anarchist and anarchosindicalist movement of the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) was hegemonic. In this sector were also to be found other smaller forces of varied forms of socialism and communism. Catalanist liberals and a moderate left were led, above all, by Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), whose main political base was formed around professionals and petit bourgeois sectors and was also supported by rural smallholders. The Catalanist right was led by the once dominant forces of the Lliga Regionalista. In particular this force felt threatened by both liberal Catalanism and, more profoundly, by the forces of organised labor. Finally, there were the anti-Catalanists, which ranged from important sectors of anarchism to right-wing monarchical sectors, who were known as the Espanyolists.

Catalonia, prior to the Spanish Civil War, displayed a complex and fluid political situation. Catalan society was relatively modernized and socially advanced, and within it was to be found a stronger bourgeois sector than in any other area of Spain. This sector of society had not only provided much of the social base for Catalanism since the late nineteenth century, but it was also able to provide cultural patronage. In spite of the reversals experienced by Catalan culture since the early eighteenth century, language and culture had been preserved, in particular in Barcelona. This was in marked contrast to the absence of the regional language in Bilbao and Santiago de Compostela. Catalan exceptionalism in this regard was expressed by the fact that many workers and most peasants, as well as bourgeois sectors, continued to speak the Catalan language. Furthermore, until the mid-1930s, Barcelona was Spain's most dynamic city, though Madrid would soon displace it.

The defeat of the Spanish Republic in the Civil War led to a particularly hostile expression of revenge on the part of the Spanish right towards Catalonia, as the territory contained both a strong nationalist movement and the most powerful organised labor movement in Spain. One of the most important weapons in the

ideological armory of the Franco regime was that of Spanish unity: *España, una grande y libre* (One Spain, Great and Free). Franco's bloody victory in the Civil War gave an opportunity to fanatical anti-Catalanist elements to attempt the extirpation of Catalan national identity. The Franco regime was unconcerned with achieving a political consensus and the Catalans were portrayed as disloyal betrayers of Spain. A program of the full incorporation of Catalonia into the Spanish fatherland was begun with the prohibition of all that marked out Catalonia as culturally and politically distinct from the rest of the Spanish state. The aim became to harmonize the "national territory" both culturally and linguistically. The main thrust of this attack was centered on the Catalan language and all public usage of Catalan was prohibited. What marked repression in Catalonia from the Castilian-speaking areas of the state was the linguistic and cultural character of the regime's assault. However, in proportionate terms, actual executions in Catalonia were relatively small, at around 3,000. This was because of geographic proximity to the Pyrenees, where Catalanists and anarchists fled to France and many onwards to Mexico, where most would remain exiled until the 1970s. One execution which had great symbolic importance for Catalan nationalists was that of Lluís Companys, the legally elected president of the Catalan autonomous government of the Republic, the Generalitat.

Francoist victory and the institutionalization of a long-lasting and brutal dictatorship would lead to the disappearance of two pre-1936 actors: the anarchists and the old Catalanist right. Over the course of the 1940s the anarchist movement was subject to constant repression and at least 11 CNT organizing committees were captured by the regime's secret police. By 1950 the historic anarchist movement as a mass movement was dead. It failed to adapt to new times and new social forces, including what can be termed a new working class that emerged in the 1950s and beyond. Secondly, the political expression of right-wing Catalanism, the Lliga, also disappeared. This process had begun in the 1930s as it exhibited increasing hostility to the Republic, and in the summer of 1936, with increasing polarization and the outbreak of the Civil War, it collapsed and mostly supported Franco. Bourgeois and Catholic sectors that had been represented by the Lliga had been subject to

revolutionary persecution in the first year of the war. Most welcomed the Franco regime, bringing with it the restoration of property, order, a disciplined working class, and the restoration of the Catholic religion. For most of the peasantry and the working class in particular, conditions were especially brutal. Workers who had experienced a radical transformation in their lives during the Civil War were now subject to harsh neo-military discipline in their employment.

Organized protest against Francoism came from two main areas. Firstly, a transformed left led by the Catalan communists of the Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC). Secondly, the nationalist movement would be rebuilt by a new generation from within sectors of Catholicism. The PSUC was, in 1936, weak and unimportant in the Catalan political spectrum. However, the circumstances of the Spanish Civil War and the role of the USSR and International Communism transformed its status, as also occurred with the PCE. The PSUC was the only stateless communist party in the Comintern and by the 1960s it became the dominant force of opposition in Catalonia. Above all, it was a *Catalan* communist party, as it repeatedly demonstrated its commitment to Catalan identity during the course of the dictatorship. Its major publications, *Treball* and *Nous Horitzons*, were published in Catalan and it played an important role in the incorporation of Spanish-speaking immigrants into Catalan society. The PSUC resisted incorporation by the PCE, while as with its sister Spanish party, its Leninist structure aided it in conditions of clandestinity, in spite of many of its leading figures being captured and executed by the dictatorship.

However, the PSUC was caught unawares by the first major protest against the regime, the Barcelona tram strike of March 1951, which rapidly spiraled into a general strike. By the late 1950s the party sought a policy of national reconciliation and hoped to lead a broad-based opposition. Even so, most other Catalan opposition forces, from Christian Democrats to other branches of Marxism and socialism, remained extremely suspicious of the party. The PSUC also began to see the Church as a potential ally in this new strategy of opposition to the dictatorship. The mass migration of Spanish-speaking immigrants in the 1950s led to the transformation of Catalan society and a new labor movement appeared

which was principally organized by the forces of communism. Between 1930 and 1970 Catalonia doubled its population. The emergence of the Workers Commissions, the CCOO, was testimony to the new sociology of labor in Catalonia. Furthermore, the strength of this indigenous communism prevented the emergence of hostility towards Catalanism, which had certainly existed prior to 1936. Although this migration certainly produced discourses of anxiety and sometimes hostility to this Spanish-speaking migration, for the immigrants, the acquisition of the Catalan language, if not for themselves, for their children, developed an aspirational content.

The Catalan cultural renaissance, la Segona Renaixença that emerged in the 1960s, was based on the activities and organizations that bourgeois Catholics had carefully constructed throughout the 1950s. Catalan-language publishing, having its origins in Church-led and Catholic publications, expanded into all areas of cultural life. Prior to 1936 the Catalan Church had been deeply unpopular in many sectors of society, and strong anti-clerical traditions culminated in persecution during the Civil War. This sector of Catalan society welcomed the Franco regime as it became part of the triumvirate of power including the military and the Falange. However, the restoration of the Church gave it relative autonomy, allowing it slowly to rebuild and, to some extent, mold a new version of Catalanism. By the mid-1950s almost all cultural expressions of Catalanism were possible due to Church patronage. Furthermore, from 1965 to 1975 communists and Catholics cooperated, as churches and other religious buildings become sanctuaries for CCOO meetings.

Social issues emerged among new Church sectors, in particular through younger urban priests. In ideological terms, a proto-liberation theology can be discerned. Symbolic of the breach made with the regime by bourgeois Catholic sectors were the events of the early 1960s. In 1960 Catholics sang publicly a Catalanist song in the presence of regime dignitaries. This resulted in the imprisonment and torture of some individuals, including the future president of democratic Catalonia, Jordi Pujol. Catholics also led a boycott of the Barcelona daily *La Vanguardia* when the editor, Luis de Galinsoga, described all Catalans as "shits." The boycott led to his removal as editor. In 1963 the Abbot of Montserrat was forced into exile after describing the regime as "un-Christian" in *Le*

Monde. Finally, a group of priests demonstrated in Barcelona in 1966 against police torture and were subject themselves to beatings by the police.

The second half of the 1960s was marked by enormous international investment in the Catalan economy, drawn by low labor costs. An increasingly affluent society was able to support a variety of new cultural forms. By this time, the worst of the persecution of Catalan culture was over. The year 1966 remains important in the history of popular music through the electrification of folk embodied by Bob Dylan. In Catalonia this inspired the *Nova Cançó*, the new song movement. From this period of the mid-1960s we see an explosion in cultural production. As the PSUC noted in 1969, “the Franco regime has lost the battle over Catalan identity.” The Franco regime conceded that it could do no more than contain Catalanism, as its attempt at suppression, though vigorously pursued for many years, had to be abandoned. The final ten years of the Franco dictatorship were a period marked by popular democratization and the reconstitution and vertiginous expansion of civil society. The emergence of the student protest movement was another component of this process. The PSUC led the way in the positioning of the left as inheritors of Catalanism. Almost all of the opposition to the regime within Catalonia had become Catalanist by the late 1960s. Expressive of this transformation and unity of purpose is the *Assemblea de Catalunya* (Assembly of Catalonia) in 1971. Its creation symbolized the transformation in Catalan political culture that took place over the course of the Franco regime. The *Assemblea*, which brought together almost all sectors of the Catalan opposition to devise a common program, was communist-led yet took place under the protection of a monastery, at Montserrat.

The final years of the dictatorship, a period that became known as the “agony of Francoism,” were marked by an increase in intolerance and repression. The regime began to wither to a hardcore of fanatics, a sector known as the “bunker.” Regime insecurity included the prohibition of performances of the *Nova Cançó* and the executions of 1974 and 1975, including that of the Catalan anarchist Puig i Antich. Organized labor protest and strikes grew enormously in every year from 1969 to 1976. The working class in Catalonia, itself composed overwhelmingly of native Spanish speakers, was more radicalized

than at any time since the 1930s. Catalan protest, combining Catalanist demands with calls for popular democratization, continually mobilized the largest numbers of any protest culture throughout Spain. In the period from 1975 to 1977, at a time of popular mobilization for the restoration of Catalan autonomy, the presence of migrants from other parts of Spain was notable. In September 1977, on Catalan national day, over one million people protested in Barcelona calling for freedom, amnesty for political prisoners, and the restoration of a Statute of Autonomy. Catalan autonomy was restored in 1979 and the first elections to its parliament took place in 1980, where victory went to conservative Catalanism and the left, dominant under Francoism, were defeated.

The Catalan question has remained central to the politics of democratic Spain since the end of the Franco dictatorship. The Francoist attempt at the crushing of Catalan identity led rather to it being more deeply rooted and politically powerful than was the case in 1936, prior to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Franco Worker Struggles, 1939–1975; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT)

References and Suggested Readings

- Balfour, S. (1989) *Dictatorship, Workers and the City: Labour in Greater Barcelona since 1939*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Dowling, A. (2001) The Reconstitution of Political Catalanism 1939–1975. *International Journal of Iberian Studies* 14, 1 (April): 17–25.
- Eaude, M. (2007) *Catalonia: A Cultural History*. Oxford: Signal Books.
- McRoberts, K. (2001) *Catalonia: Nation Building Without a State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mir, C., Agustí, C., & Gelonch, J. (Eds.) (2001) *Violència i repressió a Catalunya durant el franquisme. Balanç historiogràfic i perspectives*. Lleida: Espai/Temps.
- Solé i Sabaté, J. (Ed.) (2005) *La repressió franquista a Catalunya, 1938–1953*. Barcelona: Edicions 62.
- Termes, J. (1984) *La immigració a Catalunya i altres estudis història del nacionalisme català*. Barcelona: Empúries.

Catholic emancipation

Nancy LoPatin-Lummis

Catholic emancipation was the popular campaign in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth

centuries to end political restrictions on the Catholics of the United Kingdom, which had been established by the Act of Uniformity, the Test Act, and the Penal Laws. Daniel O'Connell (1775–1847), a Catholic lawyer, was the primary mover in establishing, organizing, and leading the campaign for Catholic emancipation and removing political restrictions from Catholics in the United Kingdom through the strategic use of cultivating and organizing the unenfranchised in extraparliamentary political organizations and exerting the force of popular opinion on a variety of governments.

The first Catholic Relief Act, passed in 1778, allowed Catholics to own and inherit land as well as join the military. However, popular discontent at the end of the century, most notably the Great Rebellion of 1798 led by Theobald Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen, only grew with the Act of Union in 1800. This granted Irish Protestant landowners representation in Westminster and the British government full political and legal authority over Ireland. Prime Minister William Pitt consistently promised that legislation abolishing political restrictions on Catholics would follow, but Catholic emancipation legislation failed to pass in 1801 and then again in 1807. Thus, about 80 percent of Ireland remained disenfranchised and Protestant political domination over the island continued.

Catholic emancipation advocates began to organize politically in 1809 with the Catholic Association. Consisting of lawyers, businessmen, and Catholic gentry, the middle-class and moderate group was interested in both promoting Catholic interests and maintaining good relations with Westminster. But when the Catholic Committee suggested emancipation go hand in hand with the right of the British government to veto Catholic bishopric appointments, O'Connell's vehement refusal to accept this proposal began a new phase of the Catholic emancipation movement.

After biding his time and forming alliances with more radical Irish Catholic leaders like Richard Lalor Shiel, O'Connell founded the new Catholic Association in 1823. Rejecting violence as a tool of political protest, O'Connell sought to use only legal and constitutional means to end Catholic political restrictions, although he also sought to give the disenfranchised a political voice, sometimes in direct violation of the British laws defining seditious behavior. The Catholic

Association instituted mass politics by opening membership up to any individual who could pay one penny a month dues. Thousands paid the "Catholic Rent" and identified with the Association as their political voice. The Catholic Church became supportive, allowing churches to hold meetings and priests to serve as local agents of the national organization by collecting rent and distributing information. Within months, a national political extraparliamentary organization of Irish Catholics was fully operational and Irish Protestants as well as the British government were nervous.

Despite its popularity, the Catholic Association did not succeed in eliminating restrictions against Catholics. What it did do was give enormous public support to O'Connell when, in 1828, he won a by-election for the seat in County Clare. The Association made it clear that if the government did not end all political restrictions that prohibited a legally elected representative from taking his seat based upon his religious affiliation, its peaceful campaign would turn into civil war.

In 1829, Wellington and his leader of the House of Commons, Sir Robert Peel, capitulated and pushed through a Catholic emancipation measure. Historians of the nineteenth century give credit to O'Connell for launching a national movement, but many argue that his insistence on linking Ireland with Catholicism and his refusal to utilize violence in any mass political campaign put him out of touch with the very masses he gave political voice to in the Catholic Association. Irish nationalism displaced Catholicism as the primary force behind Irish identity and extraparliamentary political organization, be it Young Ireland, the Fenians, or the Irish Republican Brotherhood.

Ironically, the impact of the Association, mass political action, and extraparliamentary organization had a longer-lasting effect in Britain than in Ireland. Though most historians have not made the direct connection between them, LoPatin-Lummis (1999) has argued that the Catholic Association was the main influence in the first British national popular political movement – the Political Union campaign of the Reform Act period. In 1830, Thomas Attwood formed the Birmingham Political Union with a penny associate membership status and a goal to create a national movement with regional branches. The *Birmingham Argus* described the

two organizations as “a noble pair of twins.” From the Birmingham Political Union came the one hundred-plus Political Union movement, and from that sprang Chartism. The Catholic Association thus became a model of political organization and public opinion that launched popular campaigns and protest that impacted mass politics and modern political party machines in Britain throughout the nineteenth century.

SEE ALSO: Chartists; Fenian Movement; Ireland, Age of Revolutions, 1775–1803; Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798; Irish Nationalism; O’Connell, Daniel (1775–1847); Tone, Theobald Wolfe (1763–1798); Young Ireland

References and Suggested Readings

- Gwynn, D. (1947) *Daniel O’Connell*. Cork: Cork University Press.
- Lefevre, G. J. S. (1887) *Peel and O’Connell: A Review of the Irish Policy of the Parliament from the Act of Union to the Death of Sir Robert Peel*. London: Kegan Paul.
- LoPatin-Lumms, N. (1999) *Political Unions, Popular Politics and the Great Reform Act of 1832*. Basingstoke and New York: Macmillan.
- McCaffrey, L. (1966) *Daniel O’Connell and the Repeal Year*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
- O’Farrell, F. (1985) *Catholic Emancipation: Daniel O’Connell and the Birth of Irish Democracy*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.

Catholic Worker movement

Benjamin J. Pauli

The Catholic Worker movement is an association of communities concerned with radical social change informed by the spiritual ideals of Catholicism. The movement began in New York City in 1933 with the founding of the *Catholic Worker* newspaper by Dorothy Day, a former journalist and member of the bohemian left, and Peter Maurin, a French peasant who had spent much of his life as an itinerant laborer. The paper’s stunning success and rapid growth laid the groundwork for the movement’s other activities, which took their cues from Maurin’s original three-step program of round-table discussions, houses of hospitality, and agricultural communes. Day’s and Maurin’s principal influences included the personalism of Emmanuel Mounier and Nicholas Berdyaev, the Sermon on the Mount and Christ’s

exhortation to spiritual and corporal works of mercy, the pacifism of Tolstoy, the active love of Dostoevsky, the agrarian and ethical anarchism of Peter Kropotkin, and the “distributism” of Hilaire Belloc, G. K. Chesterton, and Father Vincent McNabb. They envisioned their movement as a reaction to the depersonalizing effects of economic logic, the anonymity of the bureaucratic state, and the destructive consequences of nationalism, war, racism, and technological “progress.” Thus, Catholic Worker philosophy emphasizes the spiritual and personal nature of human beings, “subsidiarity” and the viability of decentralized social coordination, and extreme skepticism toward political action and the state. Worker communities arise autonomously, receiving inspiration and support rather than direction from the original New York branch. The lack of membership requisites or centralized authority of any kind (besides the exemplary spiritual authority of Day) has ensured that the movement stays true to its organic roots.

The activities of the Catholic Worker fall into three major categories: non-violent protest against social injustice, direct aid to the disadvantaged, and attempts to create alternative models of community. On the first front, the Worker has supported and organized strikes, protests, and boycotts, and Catholic Workers have refused to pay taxes, register for conscription, or take part in civil-defense drills. Active resistance has, however, always been complemented by the recognition that positive assistance to the poor is just as immediate an imperative. The hospitality houses which have arisen around the country and the world under the Worker’s name have offered free living accommodations, meals, clothing, and spiritual instruction, all the while functioning within the limits of voluntary financial “precarity,” meant to illustrate a deep solidarity with the plight of the poor and emboss the sustaining life-force of Christian love and charity. The Catholic Worker’s vision of just and moral community is evident in both the organization of these houses and the various agricultural experiments the Worker has tried throughout its history, both of which illustrate the movement’s commitment to building a new society within the shell of the old. This aspect of the Worker’s activities, far from evidencing a desire to withdraw from society and delimit the movement’s broader relevance, in

fact reflects a strong belief in the power of an example, the force of which will be multiplied as surely as loaves and fishes in the gospels. Limited resources and skills, as well as the Worker's non-coercive principles, have tended to hamper the viability of the large-scale agricultural endeavors, though smaller agricultural projects have continued to supplement the enduring backbone of the houses of hospitality.

From the beginning of the movement until her death in 1980, Dorothy Day was the spiritual center of the Catholic Worker, and her large role in the production of the New York paper, as well as her indirect influence as a figure of matriarchal authority, gave her broad leeway in setting the movement's agenda. This was perhaps most consequential in determining the relation of the movement to the institutional Church and its teachings. As a lay movement, the Catholic Worker has considerable autonomy from the Church and has always made a distinction between the fallibility of the Church's teaching about the temporal order and the eternal validity of the theological truths under its care. Radicalism on social questions has not always carried over to theological questions. Despite the mildly anti-clerical leanings of many of the Catholic Worker's members, Day effectively put a moratorium on criticism of Church authorities, and strictly toed the Church line on matters such as abortion, birth control, and the role of women. Day's passing has opened up a space in the mainstream of the movement for discussion of these controversial topics, but the Worker lost an immeasurably important source of cohesion and moral clout in the figure of Day. Nonetheless, Catholic Workers continue to carry on the movement's core agenda in over 185 Worker communities around the world.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchism, United States; Day, Dorothy (1897–1980); Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Tolstoy, Leo N. (1828–1910)

References and Suggested Readings

- Kleiment, A. & Roberts, N. L. (Eds.) (2006) *American Catholic Pacifism: The Influence of Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker Movement*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Meyer, D. (2006) *The Politics of Protest: Social Movements in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, W. D. (2000) *A Harsh and Dreadful Love: Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker Movement*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

Zwick, M. & Zwick, L. (2005) *The Catholic Worker Movement: Intellectual and Spiritual Origins*. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.

Cedar Revolution, Lebanon

Kristian Patrick Alexander

Gathering in opposition to Syrian military control of Lebanon through a surrogate government that denied freedom and basic rights, peaceful demonstrations were led by a multi-confessional coalition of Lebanese in 2005. While many believed that Syria had successfully restored peace and political order after the 1980s civil war, a growing number opposed their military presence, even if a withdrawal could potentially renew communal and factional conflicts.

The demonstrations were triggered by the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005, who was believed by some to have been killed by Syria after calling for it to pull its troops out of Lebanon. After Hariri's assassination the opposition called for a timetable for the complete withdrawal of Syrian armed forces and intelligence services. In addition, it demanded an international investigation into Hariri's death. The degree of US and other foreign influence and pressure on the Lebanese at this writing remains unclear.

Dubbed the "Cedar Revolution" by the US State Department, the majority of the protesters were young Lebanese from Beirut's middle and upper classes, predominantly Christian, Druze, and Sunnis. Opposition groups included members of the Socialist Party (mostly Druze), the Qornet Shahwan Gathering (Christian), the student movement of the outlawed Christian Lebanese Forces Party, the Christian Phalangist Party, and Hariri's own predominantly Sunni Future Movement. Also present were large numbers of Shi'ite Muslims who belonged neither to the Amal movement or to Hezbollah.

Though the US may have instigated the protests, the events were transformed beyond its control. The Cedar Revolution was heralded as a return of class politics. Many marchers openly opposed governmental reforms that sought to slash pensions, increase VAT from 10 to 12 percent, raise fuel prices by 30 percent, and impose short-term contracts on government workers



A mass rally called by Hezbollah brings out hundreds of thousands of Lebanese in opposition to foreign military presence. The primary goal of the Cedar Revolution was to end Syrian occupation and unify Lebanon as one country. On April 27, 2005, after months of demonstrations triggered by the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on February 14, the Syrian military withdrew all 14,000 of its troops. (REUTERS/Sharif Karim)

and teachers. The demonstrations were locally referred to as the “uprising of independence,” and Lebanese flags, red and white scarves, and slogans such as “Freedom, Sovereignty, Independence” came to symbolize the marches, gatherings, and events. Opposition groups organized daily vigils and marches, promoted by various elements of civil society using mobile phones, email, and public announcements. All efforts by the authorities, such as issuing bans, were relatively ineffective.

When the force of opposition led to the resignation of pro-Syrian Prime Minister Omar Karami, a counterdemonstration was mounted by the Shi’ite movement Hezbollah, together with several other smaller pro-Syrian groups. Their slogans advocated pro-Syrian sentiments against US interference, and the right of Hezbollah to sustain its military resistance against Israel. Although both groups supported a withdrawal of the Syrian military, the discourse differed over the implementation of the Taif agreements (1989) ending the civil war in Lebanon. The Taif agreements, supported by the pro-Syrian movement, basically stated that after various institutions had been rebuilt and the economy revitalized, a bilateral Syrian–Lebanese agreement would stipulate a gradual Syrian military disengagement from Lebanon, but this had yet to be achieved.

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1559, issued in September 2004 and

sponsored by the United States and France, had called for free and fair elections in Lebanon without foreign interference and the ultimate disarmament of any remaining operating militias (Hezbollah). However, a day after UNSC Resolution 1559 had been issued, the Lebanese parliament endorsed a constitutional amendment allowing sitting pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud to remain in power for three more years, suspending Lebanese presidential elections.

As a result of the Cedar Revolution, fierce international pressure forced the remaining Syrian troops out of Lebanon by April 2005. However, segments of the population were pro-Syrian, especially Shi’ites, who considered Syria to be their protector. While a poll conducted in February 2005 by Zogby International revealed widespread revulsion for Hariri’s murder, it also showed that most people were split on who was responsible. Non-Shi’ites were significantly more inclined to pin the blame on Syria, with some 50 percent of Druze and Maronite Christians blaming Syria or its allies, while 53 percent of Shi’ites blamed Israel, and 19 percent held the US responsible.

When elections finally did arrive on May 29–June 19, 2005, many supporters began questioning the veracity of politics as usual. While the elections ushered in new candidates, they also saw the return of the same politicians who had previously dominated the country’s political scene. In April 2005, Syrian troops exited Lebanon after 20 years. However, without Syrian military intermediaries and offsetting power, in July 2006 war broke out between Israel and the Hezbollah.

SEE ALSO: Hezbollah: Organization and Uprisings; Lebanese Insurrection of 1958; Lebanon, Civil War, 1975–1990; Lebanon, 19th-Century Revolts

References and Suggested Readings

- Blandford, N. (2006) *Killing Mr. Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and its Impact on the Middle East*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Deeb, M. (2003) *Syria’s Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process*. New York: Palgrave.
- Knio, K. (2005) Lebanon: Cedar Revolution or Neo-Sectarian Partition? *Mediterranean Politics* 10, 2 (July): 225–31.
- Safa, O. (2006) Getting to Arab Democracy: Lebanon Springs Forward. *Journal of Democracy* 17 (1): 22–37.
- Weinberger, N. (1986) *Syrian Intervention in Lebanon*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Central America, music and resistance

T. M. Scruggs

While relatively small geographically, Central America encompasses a variety of distinctive musical cultures that have suffered from poor cultural communication and cross-fertilization with one another across national borders. This isolation has often been even more pronounced between regions inside nations, especially the fundamental divide between indigenous/mestizo Pacific coast majorities and smaller Afro/indigenous Caribbean coast communities. With the advent of the massive social mobilizations throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Central America – and therefore its music – received unprecedented attention from many sources, probably the highest global recognition the region’s music has received besides the novelty introduction of the marimba by Guatemalan and Mexican bands in the 1910s and 1920s.

Socially committed music from El Salvador and Nicaragua received most of the world’s notice, but it should be noted that musicians in Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama formed part of the search for solutions to the region’s purportedly intractable social ills. Many were not able to record, and those that did often circulated primarily through informal cassette distribution. Fitting an established historical pattern, it was an unfortunate reality that communication between the seven Central American nations was difficult and that artists frequently remained unaware of committed song in neighboring countries. It is even fair to say that most Central American musicians had as much or even more access to political music from outside the region than from their colleagues on the isthmus. This fact does not detract from the significance of the musical movements within each of the nation-states, but complicates any claims of a pan-Central American political music.

As in the rest of Latin America, there is no one single nomenclature for socially committed music: *Música de protesta* (Protest Music), *Música testimonial* (Testimonial Music), and especially *Nueva canción* (New Song) are the most common. After the *triumfo* (triumph) of the Sandinista Popular Revolution in 1979, an innovative term to describe Central American political music was coined from conflating *volcán* (volcano) and *canto*

(song) to form *volcanto*. Inspired by the line of impressive volcanoes that distinguishes the topography of western Central America, *volcanto* was offered as a new label to encompass all Central American socially committed music, but in actual practice the term has remained essentially limited to post-1979 Nicaraguan political music.

Mention should be made that there is no reason not to think that music was used to advocate for better conditions under the various Mayan kingdoms, the large Chorotegan-Mangué and Nahuatl-speaking realms in Nicaragua/Costa Rica and other smaller indigenous groups, but any record has been completely obliterated over time. Surviving written records after European and African contact ushered in the colonial period are almost entirely devoid of any mention of music or any other expressive cultural forms of the popular classes, including the decades following separation from Spanish rule in the 1820s. Thus, the first remaining documentation of protest music stems from post-independence struggles against foreign intrusions. An early (and prophetic) example is the still-famous “La Mama Ramona,” sung in the 1850s in the city of Granada, Nicaragua, lauding its defense against the North American filibusterer (mercenary) William Walker (for lyrics, see Mejía Sánchez 1976: 116–17).

A more direct musical precursor to the flurry of activity of the 1970s is the musical proselytization of Nicaraguan Augusto César Sandino’s nationalist and reform movement in the early 1930s. Just as Sandino drew political inspiration from the Mexican Revolution, Sandino followers turned to the *corrido*, the “musical newspaper” of the Mexican Revolution, a song form based on 4-line *coplas* (verses) with simple melody lines and rudimentary guitar accompaniment. The *corrido*, also known by its earlier Iberian form *romance*, remains well known throughout Spanish-speaking Central America and has frequently been employed by contemporary New Song musicians. Its format is well suited to political communication: the repetitive musical format emphasizes the verses that recount exploits of important figures and major events and conclude with a moral message.

Nicaragua

Nicaraguan political music is the best known outside of Central America. A continuity to

the present can be traced back to the first protest song under the Somoza dictatorships (1936–79), “Campesino” by Jorge Isaác Carvalho, accompanied by also-important Otto de la Rocha, released in the late 1960s. However, the prolific singer-songwriter Carlos Mejía Godoy established socially committed music in the early 1970s with his musical and lyrical syntheses of rural *campesino* (peasant/small farmer) and urban popular culture. It would be hard to underestimate the importance of the role Carlos Mejía Godoy and other musicians played in the social movement that overthrew the Somoza regime (Scruggs 2002a.)

Carlos Mejía Godoy’s prolific output starting in the mid-1970s was supported by his group Los de Palacagüina, a name invented by the Nicaraguan people themselves in honor of his immensely influential song “El Cristo de Palacagüina” (The Christ of Palacagüina). This song typifies the strength of the best of socially conscious Central American music’s appeal to the majority exploited population. It takes a familiar moral tale, localizes it, and calls for action to transform unjust conditions: Christ is born in the northern Nicaraguan village of Palacagüina, from a carpenter of the rural working class and “una tal Maria” (“some Mary”), and he resolves at the song’s end to become a fighter, specifically a guerilla fighter. The verses recount the circumstances of misery in a minor key in low register; then happily announce the birth of this “Christ” in a higher register in a major key. Though perhaps never done more effectively than in this continent-wide “hit,” the systematic alternation between major and minor chords is a hallmark of Iberian, and therefore much Latin American, folk-rooted music, a formal feature used repeatedly by New Song composers to contrast a negative past/present with an optimistic future. At the height of the civilian insurrection against the dictatorship in 1978, Carlos Mejía Godoy put aside his noted subtle form of criticism when he composed *Guitarra armada* (Armed Guitar), an album unique in world political music for it essentially musicalized instructions on the assembly and use of weapons for untrained street fighters.

Music groups proliferated during the insurrectionary period of the late 1970s and several were able later to record on the new state label ENIGRAC, Empresa Nicaragüense de Grabaciones Culturales (Nicaraguan Company

for Cultural Recordings) (Pring Mill 1987; Avendaño, Cuadra, & Cedeño 1989). *Volcanto* groups drew from a wide palette of local and continental musical styles. Among the most important groups (all of which disbanded by the late 1980s) were: Pancasán, which used an eclectic array of Latin American and Caribbean styles and made their first LP clandestinely at night between patrols of Somoza soldiers; Grupo Pueblo, whose compositions centered around strong vocal arrangements; the jazz-influenced Igñi Tawanka; and especially Mancotal, which collaborated with Carlos’s younger brother Luis Enrique Mejía Godoy and achieved the highest profile of the *volcanto* groups after his brother (Scruggs 2002b). Besides the Mejía Godoy brothers, the only early *volcanto* group sporadically to continue into the twenty-first century is Duo Guardabarranco (named after the national bird), the duet of Katia and Salvador Cardenal, which has recorded and traveled extensively outside Nicaragua. Luis Pastor is a folk-rooted singer-songwriter who has become increasingly politically involved in recent years.

The return of neoliberalism in force from 1990 onwards brought on a deliberate governmental and corporate policy of “acoustic white-out” (Scruggs 2004: 265), a wholesale import of English- and Spanish-language popular music dovetailed with an evisceration of national music production. Nevertheless, the 1980s in Nicaragua stimulated an awakening of the majority, mestizo Spanish-speaking population to the reality of the Caribbean coast, and the English-Creole Afro-Nicaraguan popular music related to Trinidadian soca, known as Palo de Mayo (Maypole), displaced imported styles as the nation’s dance music of choice. Despite misunderstandings such as the majority mestizo condescension evident in the title of Luis Enrique Mejía Godoy’s “Un Gigante Que Despierta, La Costa” (A Giant That Awakes, The Coast), music played a paramount role in creating a new, inclusive national consciousness that moved the nation towards a multi-ethnic identity (Scruggs 1999.)

El Salvador

The 1932 “matanza” (“massacre,” estimated at over 30,000 deaths) so severely repressed the left and indigenous peoples generally that it marks an unfortunate national cultural watershed. For

instance, the same diminutive *marimba de arco* found throughout the isthmus earlier in the twentieth century in indigenous enclaves moved on to develop its current near-national instrument status in Nicaragua, but Salvadoran musicians burned their marimbas in 1932 as part of a widespread erasure of any indigenous cultural markers. Thus, as the social movements recuperated through the 1960s, politically committed culture workers confronted an environment of heavy North American and Mexican influence. The use of native musical elements took on a special significance, though one often diminished by the passage of time since their near-elimination in the early 1930s.

Xolotl was the first important New Song, formed in 1969 and still active. Typical of many Latin American New Song groups, they performed music stylistically inspired by Chilean New Song, but also emphasized local forms and instruments, such as the *marimba de arco*. Other groups active in the 1970s include Guinama and Hombres de Maíz (Men of Corn), the latter disbanded under the government repression that would eventually kill several of its members. Socially committed music was transmitted through underground cassette distribution and the important Radio Venceremos that broadcast from the liberated eastern part of the country (López Vigil 1994). This network popularized a peasant-based group inside the country, Los Torogoces de Morazán (The Songbirds of Morazán), named for their home province in the FMLN-controlled east. Their Mexican-influenced acoustic string instrumentation and nasal peasant singing style resonated with the popular classes and they became by far the most popular political group based within El Salvador (González 1994); they helped elevate “El Sombrero Azul” (“The Blue Hat,” written for the Salvadoran struggle by Venezuelan Ali Primera) to be the left’s unofficial hymn.

Many groups that provided new music for the intense revolutionary struggle of the 1980s were only able to do so from outside the country. These are the bands best known to non-Salvadorans and feature a broader musical palette and urban sensitivity. Yolocamba Ita (Lenca: The Rebellion of Sowing), whose changing membership included Mexican nationals, and Catumay Camones produced several albums on US and European labels and toured incessantly through the 1980s (Kirk 1985). Yolocamba Ita

pointedly purchased a Nicaraguan *marimba de arco* while in exile there in 1980 and with other folk instruments attempted to contribute to a new status for traditional musical forms within a synthesis of modern styles. Banda Tepanhuani, in exile in Managua, Nicaragua, especially emphasized Hispano Caribbean-based rhythms.

The lyrics of these groups closely followed the changing strategic goals of the FMLN through the 1980s (Almeida & Urbizagástegui 1999), and their success in transmitting these goals through internal Salvadoran distribution was matched by their success in representing the popular struggle through international solidarity conduits. Since the peace accords of the early 1990s, Radio Venceremos transferred to the capital city and modified its format to attract a more urbanbased audience. Recent groups whose repertoire includes social critique include Exceso de Equipaje (Overweight Baggage) and the duo Juan Carlos Berríos and Lenín Álvarez.

Guatemala

There is much less documentation of the many musical groups that flowered in Guatemala in the late 1970s through the early 1990s. First, much of the music was created in Mayan languages in home recordings and their cassette distribution often did not move beyond the particular Mayan language group. Second, the mountainous Guatemalan highlands limited the effectiveness of low-power clandestine radio. Third, and perhaps most important, the murderous dictatorship’s wholesale destruction of entire village populations kept any progressive political opposition deep within the countryside. The non-Mayan musicians in the salient group of Kin Lalot (Kiché: We Sing) produced several albums while in exile in Nicaragua that supported the armed struggle inside their country. Their music both received significant underground distribution in Guatemala and contributed to the international awareness of the genocidal reality in their country, which always remained lesser known than the situations in El Salvador and Nicaragua.

With the peace accords of the early 1990s other New Song groups have appeared, particularly in the university environment. The most noteworthy contemporary critical commentary comes from the unexpected source of Ricardo Arjona, whose early career revolved around apolitical romantic ballads. He continues that

same trajectory interspersed with an eclectic array of (sometimes vaguely) socially informed musical statements. His best-known songs with political content achieved continent-wide popularity with their acerbic anti-imperialist lyrics, the most popular being “Si el norte fuera el sur” (“If the North Were the South,” 1996) and the most recent a collaboration with the Tejano/Norteño band Intocable (Untouchable), in a call for US immigrant rights, “Mojado” (“Wetback,” 2005).

Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama

All three of these countries generated several New Song groups in a process that accelerated through the 1970s and 1980s, though the majority never made recordings. In Honduras no single group distinguished itself until Guillermo Anderson’s debut recordings in the 1990s. His most socially engaged songs to date relate to the challenge of environmental destruction. Of mestizo background, his danceable compositions are based on *punta* rhythms from the Garifuna/Garinagu peoples from his native Caribbean coast, a further consolidation of this Afro-Honduran population’s acceptance into the majority inland mestizo population. Several Garifuna/Garinagu musicians include references to the need for respect of their culture and social rights, the best known outside Honduras being Andy Palacios, whose promise as social commentator and cultural representative was cut short by his tragic death in 2008 at the height of his career (Greene 2002).

Creole-speaking Afro-Costa Ricans on the Caribbean coast have often sung of the stark racism directed against them by the majority inland population of heavy European background, though virtually no compositions have been recorded by the mestizo-controlled studios. Beginning in the 1980s, Manuel Monestel, himself mestizo, helped to introduce and legitimize Afro-Creole calypso to the broader national population with his group Centroamérica that has not shied away from including politically tinged lyrics. The foremost composer and performer of patently socially conscious music is Argentinean exile Adrián Goizueta, who formed El Grupo Experimental (The Experimental Group) in 1979. With 14 albums and still active, the group is one of the longest-surviving political bands on the isthmus despite many personnel changes. Goizueta’s eclectic style integrates folk and rock

in a type of essentially pop-New Song, using both acoustic and electric instruments.

In Panama Rómulo Castro and his Grupo Tuira has been the leading exponent of politically conscious music. Originally in a New Song band, Grupo Liberación, Castro’s excellent work from the 1990s on sets a new artistic standard that combines a sophisticated musical exploration of diverse styles with poetic lyrics that cast a critical eye on the nation’s social reality. Rubén Blades moved from his humble origins in Panama City to New York in the 1970s and composed some of the best salsa compositions with overt social consciousness. In the 1990s he redirected his creative activity towards Panama and reestablished his career for a time with the Grammy-winning album *La rosa de los vientos* (1996), the title track and major hit being a cover of Rómulo Castro’s original. This album and Blades’ *Tiempos* (1999) feature Panamanian styles and musicians, with the political content more muted than the heyday of his hard-hitting political salsa.

Religious Music

A fundamental aspect of left politics in the region is the impact of liberation theology within the overwhelmingly Catholic population. When Vatican II opened the mass to the linguistic and musical vernacular, progressive clergy in Central America were among the first and most fervent in creating new musical material that carried strong messages denouncing social injustice. The first mass in Latin America with significant liberation theology content was created in Nicaragua in 1968, *La Misa popular nicaragüense* (The Nicaraguan Popular/People’s Mass). The best known within Latin America remains *La Misa campesina nicaragüense* (The Nicaraguan Peasant Mass), composed almost in its entirety by Carlos Mejía Godoy in 1975. Though initially banned by the Somoza government, *La Misa campesina nicaragüense* went on to have a tremendous impact throughout the continent (Scruggs 2005). In Central America it directly inspired *La Misa salvadoreña* and *La misa panameña*, as well as much other socially conscious Christian music. The Misa Campesina (as it is known in English) remains Central America’s most enduring socially engaged musical composition, and has been celebrated worldwide and translated into several languages.

Pan-Central American Initiatives

The impulse to move from national to regional integration reached a new level with the formation in 2000 of the Central American All-Stars. This innovative pan-national grouping included Guillermo Anderson and Rómulo Castro and showed promise of presenting a progressive political agenda of the region incorporating a “unity in diversity” artistic approach. The project, however, soon fell under the leadership of Costa Rican keyboardist Manuel Obregón, who transformed it into Manuel Obregón and the Orquesta Papaya. In its various incantations, Papaya became a mostly apolitical “planet soup” amalgam of Central American musical forms highly influenced by Obregón’s own US “suburban blues” stylistic predilection; they have released three CDs.

SEE ALSO: Caribbean Protest Music; Music and Protest, Latin America; Music, Songs, and Protest, France; Primera, Alí (1942–1985)

References and Suggested Readings

- Almeida, Paul & Urbizagástegui, Rubén (1999) Popular Music in El Salvador’s National Liberation Movement. *Latin American Perspectives* 26 (2): 13–42.
- Avendaño, X., Cuadra, J., & Cedeño, F. (1989) *Cantos de la lucha sandinista*. Mangaua: ENIGRAC – Editorial Vanguardia.
- Carrasco, E. (1982) La nueva canción en Nicaragua, Costa Rica y Puerto Rico. *La Nueva Canción en América Latina*, CENECA (Santiago, Chile): 58–61.
- González, I. (1994) *Las guitarras del fuego de ayer*. San Salvador: Ediciones Arcoiris.
- Greene, O. (2002) Ethnicity, Modernity and Retention in the Garifuna Punta. *Black Music Research Journal* 22 (2): 189–216.
- Guerrón Montero, Carla (2006) “Can’t Beat me Own Drum in me Own Native Land”: Calypso Music and Tourism in the Panamanian Atlantic Coast. *Anthropological Quarterly* 79 (4): 633–63.
- Judson, F. (2002) Central American Revolutionary Music Lyrics. In Regula Burckhardt Qureshi (Ed.), *Music and Marx: Ideas, Practice, Politics*. New York: Garland.
- Kirk, J. (1985) Revolutionary Music, Salvadoran Style: “Yolacamba Ita.” In Hernán Vidal (Ed.), *Literature and Contemporary Revolutionary Culture, I*. Minneapolis: Society for the Study of Contemporary Hispanic and Lusophone Revolutionary Literature, 338–352.
- López Vigil, J. (1994) *Rebel Radio: The Story of El Salvador’s Radio Venceremos*. Willimantic, CT: Curbstone Press.
- Mejía Sánchez, E. (1976) *Romances y corridos nicaraguenses*. Managua: Banco de América.
- Pring Mill, R. (1987) The Roles of Revolutionary Song: A Nicaraguan Assessment. *Popular Music* 6 (2): 179–90.
- Scruggs, T. M. (1999) “Let’s Enjoy As Nicaraguans”: The Use of Music in the Construction of a Nicaraguan National Consciousness. *Ethnomusicology* 43 (2): 297–321.
- Scruggs, T. M. (2002a) Socially Conscious Music Forming the Social Conscience: Nicaraguan *música testimonial* and the Creation of a Revolutionary Moment. In Walter A. Clark (Ed.), *From Tejano to the Tango: Popular Musics of Latin America*. New York: Routledge, pp. 41–69.
- Scruggs, T. M. (2002b) Musical Style and Revolutionary Context in Sandinista Nicaragua. In Jan Fairley & David Horn (Eds.), *I Sing the Difference: Identity and Commitment in Latin American Song*. Liverpool: Institute for Popular Music/University of Liverpool Press, pp. 117–34.
- Scruggs, T. M. (2004) Music, Memory, and the Politics of Erasure in Nicaragua. In L. Knauer & D. Walkowitz (Eds.), *Memory and the Impact of Political Transformation in Public Space*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 255–75.
- Scruggs, T. M. (2005) (Re)Indigenization? Post-Vatican II Catholic Ritual and “Folk Masses” in Nicaragua. *World of Music* 47 (1): 91–124.
- Scruggs, T. M. (2006) Música y el legado de la violencia a finales del siglo XX en Centro América [Music and Legacy of Violence in late Twentieth Century Central America]. Trans. Revista Transcultural de Música. *Transcultural Music Review* 10 (December). www.sibetrans.com/trans/trans10/indice10.htm.

Central Asian protest movements

Dorothea J. Coiffe

A recurring theme through Central Asian history is protest and rebellion against foreign occupying powers. Contacts with ancient cultures like Greece, Persia, and regions in the East, Middle East, Europe, and Central Asia both antagonized and enriched Central Asia. Each of these invaders, in turn, introduced customs and language that Central Asians assimilated in complex ways.

In the mid- to late nineteenth century, tsarist Russia asserted its dominance over Central Asia. During the 1700s and mid-1800s, the Russians had already incorporated much of

Central Asia, including the Khivan Khanate and the Bukharan Emirate. The British in South Asia viewed Russia's capture of the Bukharan Emirate as a potential threat to its interests in the region. In what is known as "The Great Game," the English and the Russians struggled for access, control, and occupation of Central Asia. The Russo-Anglo battles for control over this area killed thousands of people.

One imperial decree that reverberated in Central Asia up to the early twentieth century was the replacement of subsistence farming with cash crops, a practice that was widespread throughout the world during the era. The tsars resettled (*pereselenie*) ethnic Russian peasants into these new territories, creating local resentment and Central Asian ethnic groupings. Russian expansionism, national chauvinism, and supremacy remained a point of contention through the twentieth century, even after the fall of the Soviet Union.

In the late nineteenth century, Central Asia lacked centralized authority, maintaining clan- and familial-based allegiances. Central Asians identified through complex detailed nomadic genealogies dating back several centuries. After numerous invasions, nomadic mobility guaranteed a degree of autonomy and was a source of power, unlike neighboring settled peasant peoples who were frequently viewed as weak and easily victimized. Despite a more sedentary lifestyle in the nineteenth century, patrilineal genealogies defined tribal clans and remained important in political, economic and social life.

With the rise of the Soviet Union, the countries of the region gained nominal independence, but as pressure mounted from internal and external opponents in the 1930s and 1940s, autonomy was curtailed in the broader interest of preserving the USSR. Following the Bolshevik revolution local modernizing forces gained ascendancy over traditional Islamic authorities, who engaged in insurrections to maintain and extend control over the new regional powers, which in turn were suppressed. Following the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, traditional and modernizing forces continued to struggle over the region's future.

One reason for the Soviet Union's delineation of the boundaries of Central Asian republics in the 1920s was to recognize the nationalist ethos of people in the region, long denied to them by their predecessors. At times, the new structure

of authority was in conflict with traditional decentralized ways. The Soviet leaders in the region, many from Central Asia, sought to modernize their nations rapidly under the leadership of local authorities, with the goal of a "great synthesis" through socialist union of people in a multinational Soviet Union.

The socialist republics in the region sought to modernize through diminishing religious influence, which created discord among the most orthodox Muslims and the basis for future insurgencies. Another major source of antagonism was the fact that urbanized populations and ethnicities modernized more rapidly than those in the rural regions. The Soviet Union's effort to advance the standard of living for all peoples in the region had the unintended consequence of expanding the power of the urbanized and educated populations, who typically rose to leadership positions in a polity already entangled with rankings among local clans. The effort to collectivize the land and reduce land inequality was often challenged by larger landowners and those associated with orthodox religious currents.

Moscow's Central Asian Bureau tried to have a balance of tribal representation on the titular national bureaus, the committees that actually drew the borders for the socialist republics in 1924. Based on boundaries drawn in an Anglo-Russian treaty of 1895 and faulty 1897 census data, the committees drew the borders of the Central Asian states.

Soviet theory was that all groups of humans were equal and all would eventually evolve as one given the correct guidance and conditions. The USSR supported dividing the region to allow distinct populations to assimilate and modernize quickly so that they might evolve into socialism. The Soviet thinking was that all their nations' interests would never take precedence over the "all-union" interests. By October 1924 the various Central Asian Soviet socialist republics were established, under central Soviet leadership.

Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, once these republics were fully established, the Soviets actively promoted "national cultures" with policies that were known as *korenizatsiia* or indigenization. The devolution of power was a means to initially compensate for the tsarist mistreatment and neglect of native languages and cultures of ethnically non-Russian peoples, stimulating a sense of nationality among non-Russian minorities.

In the Soviet era, Central Asia continued to violently resist indigenization of leadership and collectivization, especially among traditional sectors of society composed of the less educated semi-nomadic Central Asians who spoke different languages and a multitude of dialects. Before the states' delimitations in 1924 the Soviets ordered new indigenous cultural commissions to standardize each republic's language and publish textbooks in the language/dialect officially selected in the early 1920s. The Soviet administration used various state languages to rapidly modernize Central Asia.

In the 1930s, conflicts over the future of Central Asia, between forces of modernization and tradition, contributed to military conflicts. In an effort to create a Soviet ethos, or *Homo Sovieticus*, the central state's attempt to forge an identity was a cause of political turmoil, especially among conservative traditional religious forces, who violently resisted efforts to homogenize the culture.

Initially imperialist Russia sought to Christianize those in Central Asia. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, cultural change began emerging internally and externally. The conquest of Central Asia brought European modernization which spurred a reformist movement by the Muslim elites and intellectuals, called *Jadid* (Arabic for "new"), which sought to protect the local Islamic culture of these countries while adapting to modern conditions. Jadidists called themselves Young Bukharans, akin to the Young Turks. Bukhara and Samarkand were religious and cultural centers in Central Asia and a source of great pride amongst Muslims.

The Jadid reformists sought to modernize the society through combining the best of Islam and the European enlightenment. Prior to the upheavals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the social and political structures of the native population had been practically unchanged since the twelfth century, when the area was an important Islamic center. Towns and villages were primarily populated by Muslims, and cities typically by Russian Christians. Jadids wanted Islamic values to intersect with European knowledge and skills, and sought to modernize politics, social institutions, and especially education.

The Jadids saw their Muslim opponents stubbornly clinging to traditional ways that had not changed in centuries. Jadids believed that literacy was essential to modernization, and established local and independent newspapers.

Printed languages came to Central Asia with the Russian military. The Jadids established innovative teaching methods and curricula and taught in Arabic and in local languages. They used pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic ideas to further local social struggles in Central Asia. Their main goal was to modernize Islam. By 1914 there were as many as 30 new-method Jadidist schools in Central Asia. These schools educated and influenced many early twentieth-century Central Asian political and civic leaders.

On November 2, 1917, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov Lenin (1870–1924) signed the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia, which guaranteed the equality and sovereignty of all peoples of Russia no matter what nationality or religion. Some historians characterized the Declaration as a cynical ploy for the support of Russia's non-Russian people, because when it was put to the test thousands lost their lives. For example, the Kokand Autonomous Provisional Government of Turkestan, formed on December 13, 1917, followed Shari'a, or Islamic, law. The traditional and modernizing Islamic religious currents came into conflict, and both sides engaged in attacks on the other.

The Soviet effort to end formal religious practice, though embraced by some, was another source of resentment and unrest, and was a factor in the formation of the Muslim *Basmachi* movement. *Basmachi* was a derogatory name given to this resistance by the Russians, meaning plunderer, brigand, or bandit in Turkic. The Turkestanian fighters called themselves *Beklar Hareketi* (the *bek* or freeman's movement). Though they had no single centralized leader or political agenda, this movement lasted through the 1930s. One reason for this long-lived and popular Turkestanian resistance may be attributed to Muslim resistance to what was seen as the atheistic Soviet system, viewed by many as an attack on their identity and way of life.

Gaigysyz Atabayev (1888–1937), the first prime minister of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, told a subcommittee of the Politburo that the *Basmachi* was "the strongest reproach to all of our work in Turkestan." It was the decentralized character of the *Basmachi* that made the many anti-Soviet attacks successful. At their height, the *Basmachi* had between 20,000 and 30,000 activists.

The Soviets were increasingly fearful of "nationalist deviations" in the Central Asian

republics, especially as the USSR was under threat from global powers. From the mid-1920s, the Bolsheviks sought to create greater gender equality for women in civil society. At times, the Soviet and Jadid efforts to advance women's equality were fiercely opposed by traditional elites. When the Bolsheviks encouraged women to stop wearing the *hijab* or veil in public, local elites saw this as a sign of religious interference, and the effort was defeated.

When the Soviets came to power, three broad peasant groups were classified: the *bednyaks* (poor peasants), *seredniaks* (peasants who were not impoverished), and *kulaks* (landowning farmers). Vladimir Lenin oversaw the 1922 Land Code, the nationalization of all lands for purposes of regulating ownership by local communities. The new Soviet republics adopted similar land codes throughout the 1920s. However, once collective farming decrees were initiated under Stalin, land codes no longer carried weight. Initially, peasants were allowed to work their own land, use what they needed, and sell surplus to the state.

Under collectivization most farmers were forced onto either state *sovkhoz* farms, created by seizing large estates, or *kolkhoz* farms, created through combining smaller farms. Peasants on *kolkhoz* farms could own one acre and several animals privately while retaining a share of the collective farm's product and profit. Both *sovkhoz* and *kolkhoz* farms were issued quotas and produce was exchanged using state-controlled prices.

In 1928 Stalin introduced the Socialist Offensive, increasing Moscow's central powers, and promoting industrialization and collectivization, while eliminating the capitalist market. Impatient to modernize the Soviet Union, the Bolsheviks began a series of five-year plans under Stalin, seeking to advance manufacturing and collectivization of farming.

In the late-1980s the Soviet republics began moving toward independence. Some declared sovereignty, citing Article 72 of the USSR Constitution, which freed constituent republics to secede. On March 17, 1991, only 9 out of 15 Soviet republics voted "yes" in a referendum to stay the course and preserve the Soviet Union, a course that was abandoned under the Russian nationalist, Boris Yeltsin.

Central Asia's relations with the non-socialist Russia in the decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union have been volatile, linked to past ethnic and clan divisions. The first 15 years

since independence in Central Asia have been marked by autocratic rule, ethnic conflict, and socioeconomic instability, and protests and insurrections that have been violently suppressed by the state. Official and public sentiment toward Russia and the former Soviet Union in the region during the early twenty-first century is complex, encompassing perspectives ranging from ex-colonizer to powerful friend.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and "Revolution from Above"; Tajikistan, Protests and Revolts; Turkmenistan, Protest and Revolt

References and Suggested Readings

- Allworth, E. (2002) *Central Asia: One Hundred Thirty Years of Russian Dominance. A Historical Overview*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Crews, R. (2006) *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hopkirk, P. (1992) *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*. New York: Kodansha America.
- Khalid, A. (2007) *Islam After Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Luong, P. (2003) *The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Césaire, Aimé (1913–2008)

Magda Romanska

Aimé Césaire, a writer, activist, and playwright, was born on June 25, 1913 in Martinique. In 1932 he moved to Paris, where he attended the Lycée Louis-le-Grand. In 1934 he published the essay "L'Étudiant noir" (The Black Student), in which the word *négritude* was used for the first time. In 1935 Césaire was accepted into the Ecole Normale Supérieure and he became actively involved in the Négritude movement, which aimed to liberate African and Caribbean countries from colonial rule. In 1939, on the eve of World War II, Césaire returned to Martinique, where he began teaching at the Lycée Victor Schoelcher. At that time he also traveled and lectured in Haiti. In 1945 he became a mayor of

Fort-de-France and deputy of the Communist Party to the National Assembly. The new position allowed him to request that Martinique and Guadeloupe become departments of France; the request, although controversial, was granted in 1946. In 1948 Césaire published his landmark *Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre et malgache*, introduced by Sartre's essay "Black Orpheus."

Like many intellectuals of his time, Césaire was initially drawn to communism as a solution to colonialism, but he eventually became disillusioned with it in 1956 after the Russian invasion of Hungary. In 1956 he also participated in the First International Congress of Black Writers in Paris. Césaire's most important political writings include the 1950 essay "Discours sur le colonialisme" (Discourse on Colonialism), "Lettre à Maurice Thorez" (1956) (Letter to Maurice Thorez), in which he openly rejected communist ideology, followed shortly thereafter by "Culture et colonisation" (Culture and Colonization), "L'Homme de culture et ses responsabilités" (1959) (The Man of Culture and His Responsibilities), and "Crisis dans les départements d'outremer" (1961) (Crisis in the Overseas Departments), the historical study *Toussaunt Louverture* (1961), the essay "La Grandeur de Lumumba était de nier la réalité" (1966) (The Greatness of Lumumba Was to Deny Reality), and many other essays published in *Le Monde* and *Présence africaine*. Césaire's two most important plays are *La Tragédie du roi Christophe* (*The Tragedy of King Christopher*) and *Une Tempête* (*A Tempest*), a reworking of Shakespeare's classic, told from Caliban's point of view. In 2006 Césaire refused to meet with Nicolas Sarkozy, then the leader of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) and an anticipated presidential candidate, because of the 2005 law sponsored by the UMP that required schools "to recognize the positive role of the French presence abroad" (this was the official title of the law). The law, generally viewed as a nod to colonialism, was eventually repealed by President Jacques Chirac.

SEE ALSO: Hungary, Revolution of 1956; Négritude Movement; Senghor, Leopold (1906–2001)

References and Suggested Readings

- Césaire, A. (1969) *A Season in the Congo*. Trans. R. Manheim. New York: Grove Press.
 Césaire, A. (1970) *The Tragedy of King Christophe*. Trans. R. Manheim. New York: Grove Press.

- Césaire, A. (1972) *Discourse on Colonialism*. Trans. J. Pinkham. New York: Monthly Review Press.
 Césaire, A. (1978) *Tropiques*. Paris: Jean-Michel Place.
 Césaire, A. (1990) *Theater and Politics: An International Anthology*. New York: Ubu Repertory Theater Publications.
 Davis, G. (1997) *Aimé Césaire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Frutkin, S. (1973) *Aimé Césaire: Black Between Worlds*. Coral Gables, FL: Center for Advanced International Studies.
 Pallister, J. L. (1991) *Aimé Césaire*. New York: Bowling Green State University Press.

Chakravartty, Renu (1917–1994)

Soma Marik

Renu Roy, daughter of Sadhanchandra and Brahmakumari Roy, was born on October 21, 1917, in Calcutta. Born to a well-off Brahmo (strict monotheistic Hindu sect) family, she studied in Cambridge, where she did her tripos.

Renu was acquainted with Nehru, Sarojini Naidu, and others from the early years through her uncle, the well-known Congress politician Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy. Due to her mother's influence, she was inclined to work actively for women's causes. However, it was her stay in Cambridge in the 1930s that turned her to communism. Returning to India, she was among the first middle-class women to work in the communist milieu. She joined the Communist Party of India (CPI) in 1938 and remained a member until her death. In 1942, she married a fellow communist, Nikhil Chakravartty.

In 1942, the CPI came out from its underground conditions, after supporting the British in World War II. A small number of women set up a women's fraction in Bengal, which soon changed to a broader organization, the Mahila Atma Raksha Samity (Women's Self-Defense Association, MARS). It grew in leaps and bounds due to its active role in famine relief work during the Bengal famine of 1943. By 1944, the Second Conference of MARS recorded 43,000 members. Renu Chakravartty was, along with Manikuntala Sen, one of the two key communist women organizers of MARS. In 1943, at the height of the famine, MARS organized an unprecedented demonstration of over 5,000

women in front of the State Legislative Assembly. She was also involved in organizing civil defense as well as relief kitchens.

MARS, and Chakravartty personally, played a leading role in the campaign for the Hindu Code Bill from the middle of the 1940s – an attempt to codify and reform Hindu laws relating to marriage, inheritance, and other issues collectively called “personal laws” in favor of women.

After the war, MARS faced difficulties owing to sharp conflicts and even violence between nationalists, who had taken part in the Quit India movement, and communists, who had opposed it. But MARS continued its work. When communal violence broke out in Calcutta in 1946, Renu Chakravartty was active in mobilizing women to support Gandhi, who was on a fast in an effort to call for communal harmony.

Apart from working in MARS, communist women also worked in the All-India Women’s Conference (AIWC). From the Bombay session of 1944, communist women tried to broaden the AIWC, whose membership climbed from 8,000 in 1944 to 35,000 in 1946. Chakravartty was one of the communist women involved in this work.

After independence, the CPI adopted a line calling for an immediate revolutionary struggle to overthrow the new government (1948–51). In West Bengal, the CPI as well as many mass organizations were banned, including MARS. Chakravartty went underground. The CPI line changed in 1951–2 and the party emerged into the open. In 1952 Chakravartty became a CPI candidate in the first parliamentary elections in independent India. She was elected for the rural Basirhat constituency in 1952 and 1957, and for the Barrackpur industrial seat in 1962. In parliament, she participated strongly in debates over the Hindu Code Bill. In the 1950s Chakravartty was among the founders of the National Federation of Indian Women. She was also connected to the Women’s International Democratic Federation.

In 1958, Renu Chakravartty was elected to the National Council of the CPI. In the same period, she played a leading role in the historic working-class strike in Jamshedpur. In 1962, when war broke out between India and China, she was among those in the CPI who denounced China as an aggressor. Combined with previous differences, this led to a party split in 1964 and Chakravartty remained with the much shrunken CPI. In 1967, and again in 1969, anti-Congress

parties combined to form a United Front government in West Bengal. In the 1969 state government, she served as minister for cooperatives and social welfare.

For many years Renu Chakravartty served as a member of the Central Control Commission of the party. In 1980 she wrote an important book, *Communists in the Indian Women’s Movement*. She died on April 16, 1994.

SEE ALSO: Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); India, Post-World War II Upsurge; Indian National Liberation; Quit India Movement; Women’s Movement, India

References and Suggested Readings

- Chakravartty, R. (1980) *Communists in the Indian Women’s Movement*. New Delhi: Peoples’ Publishing House.
- Marik, S. (2004) Interrogating Official and Mainstream Discourses: Communist Women Remember the Forties. *Jadavpur University Journal of History* 21: 77–98.
- Sen, M. (2001) *In Search of Freedom: An Unfinished Journey*. Kolkata: Stree.

Charismatic leadership and revolution

Paul Rubinson

Conventional wisdom dictates that a social movement’s success depends on a charismatic leader. Such an individual can galvanize the masses through passionate oratory and mobilize people into action for their cause. Men and women as diverse as Mohandas Gandhi, Adolf Hitler, Jesus Christ, and Mother Jones have been cited as leaders who used their charisma to bring people to their cause through sheer force of personality, rhetoric, and will. From this perspective, a charismatic leader becomes the physical embodiment of a movement’s cause, leading by eloquence, passion, and example. But charismatic leaders appear relatively rarely, and movements have often succeeded without one. While a charismatic leader can indeed awaken the forces of social change, their relationship to their movement is far more complicated than the traditional leader–follower dynamic. Furthermore, a charismatic leader can be a curse if a movement relies too heavily on him or her. Finally, the concept of a charismatic leader was shaped, to an extent,

by the specific context in which it was created, which has led social movement scholars to move beyond an exclusive focus on charisma.

Weber and the Origins of Charisma

In its original meaning, charisma referred to religious or spiritual qualities, but today it can refer broadly to any sort of engaging personal demeanor. Although contemporary uses of the term have gone far beyond his intent, the initial transformation of this term can be traced to one individual: the influential sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Weber formulated the idea that charisma can be as much a secular characteristic as a religious one. In many writings, including his influential analysis of political systems *Economy and Society*, Weber outlined three types of legitimate political rule: legal, traditional, and charismatic. In each type of ruling system the governed accept their particular system for a different reason. This concept implicitly endorses a belief that individuals can have some influence on their political system, similar to the Enlightenment idea that political rule rests on the consent of the governed. According to Weber, authority is destiny – the established authority system ultimately determines the behavior of actors within each system.

Legal and Traditional Rule

According to Weber, a system of legal rule grants political power to a leader through accepted procedures and institutions. Legal rule then consolidates its authority through bureaucracy, which is legal rule's defining characteristic. Since a bureaucracy in its ideal form consists of individuals chosen by merit rather than patronage, all the structures and functions derive their authority from impartial rules and procedures. Weber modeled his idea of legal rule on constitutional democracies but argued that this style extended as well to institutions outside of government, including capitalist businesses and voluntary organizations. Because of legal rule's impartiality and limited power, Weber believed people accepted its authority over them.

Traditional leaders, in Weber's taxonomy, derive their power simply from having always held power. Weber had in mind monarchies, but he extended the definition: "Every sort of authoritarian rule that successfully claims legitimate

authority simply on the basis of acquired custom belongs to the same category." Under traditional rule, the laws of the land are dictated by the personality and whims of the ruler; the leader's handpicked cronies fill the roles of government functionaries. Because they have never known any other system, the people willingly assent to this system.

Charismatic Rule

Weber's political theories reflected the ongoing geopolitical revolution of his time, as nationalism created new nation-states, constitutional democracies, and colonial empires. As the nations of the world drew closer through technology and conquest, however, Weber realized that many countries did not exhibit either traditional or legal rule. Even more importantly, as political regimes rose and fell, Weber desired to explain how systems could change from one form of rule to another. Thus he formulated his concept of charismatic rule.

Weber defined charismatic rule as "affectual surrender to the person of the lord and his gifts of grace, in particular magical capabilities, prophecies or heroisms, spiritual power and oratorical powers." Charles Tilly refers to charismatic leaders as "religious and ideological virtuosos" who manage to gain adherents to support their belief system. Weber did not discriminate in giving examples; he included people as different as the Dalai Lama, Jesus Christ, Napoleon, and a "Norse berserker" as charismatic individuals. To attain power, Weber explained, a charismatic leader must prove his or her righteousness by performing some sort of heroic feat and exhibiting superhuman qualities. Given its mixture of fervent belief and iconoclastic behavior, charismatic rule is inherently unstable.

In a charismatic system the people play a more active role than in legal and traditional systems. Here Weber balances the power of charisma with individual agency. Only dedicated followers can validate the charismatic leader's claim of authority; concurrently, the leader loses his or her authority if the followers withdraw their loyalty.

Each of Weber's three systems of rule has leaders, but charismatic leaders differ greatly from traditional and legal ones. Although Weber acknowledged that systems could cross – for example, a democracy could legally elect a charismatic leader – the source of authority in each system does not change. That is, even an elected charismatic leader would hold power because

of his or her election, not charisma. Likewise, although people swear allegiance to a king, it is the king's mantle of tradition and connection to God's will – what the king represents – that people fear. On the other hand, charismatic leaders draw adherents because of themselves and their cause.

Revolutionary Power of Charismatic Rule

In his ideology Weber intended charismatic rule as an academic explanation for the transition from one political system to another, a sort of *deus ex machina* of political revolution. To do so, charismatic leadership had to explain what would spur people to revolt against established systems. Central to this concept is Weber's characterization of charismatic rule as the antithesis of traditional and legal rule.

More than anything else, traditional and legal forms of rule establish a daily routine, either through the routine of bureaucracy or the creation of tradition. But Weber believed that people also had needs that transcended the everyday. These needs most frequently manifested themselves in times of distress. At these times, Weber wrote, a charismatic figure was most likely to arise directly because the established ruling system failed to address the people's deeper concerns. Weber then explained that the rise of a charismatic leader is inherently revolutionary. Iconoclastic and willful, charismatic leaders oppose routine and order and allow their followers to envision a world beyond the one they inhabit. Since charismatic leaders stand diametrically opposed to order, their cause is destabilizing; it overturns and upsets the daily routine. Weber liked to use the example of the charismatic leader's ability to tell his followers, "It is written, but I say unto you." As proof of their otherworldliness, charismatic leaders live above the concerns of the ordinary, such as jobs and families.

Despite the revolutionary nature of charisma, Weber maintained that power – be it legal, traditional, or charismatic – is domination. The charismatic leader, if successful in his or her revolution, would naturally want to establish a legacy. At the same time, charisma is unique to one person and its "fate" is to wane. So Weber developed a formula of the "routinization" of charismatic authority, explaining how charisma is transferred to successors and various institutions. Through this process, charismatic power transforms into lasting political rule, but charisma itself dies.

Adapting and Critiquing Weber

As one of the early giants of sociology, Weber has strongly influenced scholars ever since he offered his conceptualization of the modern world. Although Weber wrote more about routinization than charisma, his idea of revolutionary charisma has interested scholars far more because consolidation of power is relatively easy to understand. Conversely, scholars still debate the causes of social change.

Weber's theories have set the terms of debate. Most scholars accept Weber's arguments about political rule, but have adapted them in many ways. Scholars of social movements, protests, and collective action, attracted to Weber's assertion that charisma drives large-scale social change, have been particularly active in reshaping Weber's theories. One major adaptation has been the application of the charismatic leader theory to leadership on all levels, rather than just heads of state, as Weber implied.

Although Weber's conception of charismatic rule provided a useful template, his description was brief and only preliminary. The theory needed to be adapted for the twentieth century because – most fundamentally – charisma occurred far more frequently than Weber predicted. Scholars identified other problems with Weber's theories, including his unbalanced focus on transition and routinization; his failure to explain the circumstances of how leaders arise (as opposed to just when they arise); and his relatively incomplete explanation of charisma. At the opposite end of the spectrum, some scholars have questioned the basic utility of Weber's taxonomy, arguing that charisma as Weber envisioned it no longer exists.

But Weber appeals to most scholars interested in social change; his vision of charisma tantalizingly hints at why people engage in social protest. The reason why scholars find Weber's theory of charisma so influential can be seen in his comments about the revolutionary power of charisma: "charismatic authority is indeed one of the great revolutionary powers of history," undoubtedly a bold and telling statement that hints at a prime mover of social change. Charisma, however, has a negative side as well, as Weber continues: "but in its pure form it [charisma] has a thoroughly authoritarian and dominating character," an aspect of charisma with which many scholars have struggled. Thus Weber's

theory of charisma simultaneously presents many explanations and challenges to those who study collective action.

Leadership and Social Movements

Weber's three-system model not only attempted to explain how political systems changed, but also suggested that ordinary individuals had a role in determining their own political fate. Scholars since Weber have adapted these ideas into the core question of social movement studies: why do people join social movements? Although the question seems simple, closer examination reveals a web of contradiction. The costs of activism are terribly high and reward is unlikely – and yet social change undoubtedly does occur. Much of the scholarship about social movements has thus started its analysis by adopting Weber's concept of charisma. Scholars feel that leaders (especially charismatic ones) might have a role in galvanizing members who would not otherwise mobilize.

Many ideas about leadership stem from Vladimir Lenin's adaptation of Marxist revolutionary theories. Since Lenin believed that working-class organizations would mobilize only in favor of their narrow personal interests, he proposed the creation of the "vanguard," a select group of revolutionaries who would assume leadership of the working class. Scholars of social movements managed to separate the decidedly counterrevolutionary nature of the Soviet Union from Lenin's theories about leadership, which resonated with those seeking to understand collective action. In the 1960s sociologist Mancur Olson characterized Lenin's dilemma as the "free-rider" problem – the idea that in groups, few people will willingly participate for the collective good. Only those with the most interest in attaining the group's goal will work hard at it. Regarding social movements, Olson posited that only the most important members of a group have a major interest in achieving the collective good, and so these individuals take on a leadership role (essentially similar to Lenin's vanguard). Upon assuming leadership, the leaders must give members incentives to avoid free riding.

Since Olson first addressed the free-rider problem, scholars have gone from looking at the importance of leadership to examining collective forms of behavior within movements. But many

still consider leaders important. Tarrow has summarized leadership's "creative function" as responsibility for selecting the concrete forms of collective action by inventing and adapting tactics to gain the support of neutral observers.

Charismatic Leaders

With conventional wisdom suggesting the importance – or even necessity – of a charismatic leader, it is essential to ask: What do charismatic leaders do for social movements? A main challenge to scholars of charismatic leaders is the inherent difficulty of the term *charisma*. Although charisma is an evocative term accessible to any audience, one can hardly measure its occurrence scientifically. Furthermore, scholars have wondered how something as abstract as charisma actually works. In general, scholars have examined Weber's theory in four ways. The main refinements to Weber's theory have been to define charisma, identify the origins of charisma, explain how charisma works, and outline what effect charismatic leadership has on a movement.

Definitions of Charisma

Weber stressed the importance of charismatic leaders, but he also made it clear that a leader could not be considered charismatic until his or her followers recognized him or her as such. Nevertheless, Weber spent a lot of time describing many different examples of charismatic individuals and their power over people, including doctors, prophets, judges, generals, and even "leaders of big hunting expeditions." The idea that one person could sway whole movements fits in well with the "Great Man" vision of history and politics that was popular in the first half of the twentieth century. Until the late 1960s, scholars tended to see charisma in this psychological sense – that is, charisma was a result of the personal qualities of one individual who almost hypnotized people into following him or her. But since the late 1960s, with the advent of social history, definitions of charisma have shifted away from the individual and back toward Weber's initial conception of charisma as a relationship between a leader and followers. Thus the study of charismatic leadership balances Great Man history with history "from the bottom up." Essential to recent studies of charismatic leadership is Weber's argument that a charismatic

leader depends on the people's devotion, "a devotion born of distress and enthusiasm." Since people can take their devotion away, they exhibit a form of control over their leader.

Above all, definitions of charismatic leadership emphasize the relationship between a leader and his or her followers, reflecting the fact that movement adherents are not automatons but individual agents. In their study of Peronists in Argentina, Madsen and Snow (1991) define charisma as an "an influence relationship marked by asymmetry, directness, and, for the follower, great passion." In his groundbreaking study of the American civil rights movement, Aldon Morris (1984) defines charisma as "strong face-to-face personal relationships that foster allegiance, trust, and loyalty, and give rise to a shared symbolic world that provides an interpretation of earthly affairs and the anticipated after life." These definitions also reflect Weber's concern that charisma acts in ways opposed to routine and bureaucracy, and that charisma also contains an aspect of "performance."

Origins of Charisma

Weber described the times when charismatic leaders would arise as moments of "psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious, political distress," and scholars have apparently appreciated Weber's vague description of charisma's emergence. In general, it seems that the opportune moment for a charismatic leader is the same as that for a social movement, which Tarrow (1998) identifies as a change in political opportunities or constraints that creates incentives for launching a new phase of contention. Because a charismatic leader relies on his or her potential adherents, the need for a leader must start with the people. Put another way, plenty of individuals are always espousing causes and preaching for revolution, but only when these messages resonate with the public will a charismatic relationship begin.

How Charisma Works

In her work on charismatic political figures, Willner (1984) identifies four factors that catalyze a charismatic leader's ascendance. First, the would-be leader must assimilate his or herself into a dominant cultural myth, such as when Fidel Castro presented himself as the heir to the legendary Cuban revolutionary José Martí. Second, the leader must perform a heroic feat,

which differs depending on the cultural and historic context. US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, frequently received credit for ending the Great Depression of the 1930s. Third, the leader must possess a powerful aura, such as Gandhi's otherworldly asceticism. Fourth, a charismatic leader must have an outstanding rhetorical ability that inspires followers.

Although this list provides useful criteria for deciding who can be characterized as a charismatic leader, one way Weber's ideas have been adapted is by applying them to individuals outside of mainstream politics, including subalterns and revolutionaries. Furthermore, other scholars have not taken Weber's talk of heroic acts and superhuman deeds so literally. A charismatic bond can be created in personal relationships described by Morris (1984) as "face-to-face" interaction. Examining the role of leaders in southern black churches, Morris follows Weber in writing "allegiance was conferred by the congregation on the earthly but charismatic leader." The church, furthermore, encouraged preachers to practice and hone their charisma. But beyond all that, charismatic leadership was a function of the mass participation of an entire community, of which leaders were but a vocal minority. Ministers who became charismatic leaders "occupied strategic community positions which enabled them to become extremely familiar with the needs and aspirations of blacks." Because the ministers knew the community and shared its values, the people accepted them as leaders.

With charisma so dependent on the individuals and political context, the mechanics of charisma surely differ in each instance. Wasielewski (1985), however, has suggested that, in general, charismatic leaders reframe adherents' beliefs by using an emotional appeal followed by a logical conclusion. First, the charismatic leader articulates the feelings of others in "emotionally charged situations," making an emotional connection to the people. The leader then disrupts this emotional connection by questioning the basis of these emotions; that is, he or she challenges the group by telling them that their emotional reactions are inappropriate or counterproductive. The leader then introduces concrete plans for change. Finally, the leader motivates the adherents by fusing goals with new framing rules. This approach brings a new perspective to the study of social movements by looking at emotions rather than interests as motivational factors.

What Charisma Does for a Movement

After all the various ways in which people have analyzed Weber's writings on charisma, the effect of a charismatic leader on a movement seems relatively simple. Scholars generally agree that a charismatic leader mobilizes more people, reaches a broader audience, and gets more people-power behind their cause. In political terms, a charismatic leader can easily mobilize popular support for legislation or a particular agenda. Outside mainstream politics, charismatic leaders make it easier for a movement to recruit, mobilize, and sustain adherents. As Morris (1984) puts it, "a movement organization with a charismatic leader rooted in a mass-based institution is more likely to mobilize masses of people than a movement organization without such a leader. Charismatic leaders of this type play a crucial role in the mobilization process and the building of an internal organization."

The End of Charisma

As Weber pointed out, charisma is unique to one person. It can thus be inferred that the death of a charismatic leader incites, at the very least, a crisis for the movement. Some activists believe that the presence of a charismatic leader makes people too dependent on that leader, leaving them unable to exist beyond the lifespan of that leader.

Weber argued that charismatic leaders can consolidate their power through routinization, but this meant the death of true charisma, as the leader's revolutionary charisma inevitably turned into another form of domination. Schweitzer (1984), however, has argued that charisma can insinuate itself into non-charismatic political structures and institutions that Weber thought would nullify charisma's power.

Example of a Charismatic Leader

The popular perception of Martin Luther King Jr.'s role within the civil rights movement epitomizes the relationship between a charismatic leader and a movement. King clearly fits within the traditional Weberian definition – as well as more recent ideas – of a charismatic individual. King eloquently preached a revolutionary message and spurred countless people to commit acts of bravery and resistance.

King's emergence as a leader began amid southern blacks' anger with the stifling effects of

institutionalized racism, manifested most visibly in Jim Crow laws. As white America experienced unprecedented economic growth during the 1950s, blacks remained an oppressed and humiliated underclass. Pivotal events, including the lynching of Emmett Till in Money, Mississippi, and the Supreme Court's *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, further inspired a budding movement. When NAACP activists in Montgomery, Alabama began a boycott of the local bus company in 1955, King assumed a leadership role. Soon, the Montgomery protest encouraged blacks across the nation to engage in non-violent protest against racial injustice. Because of King's appeal to observers of both races in the north and south and his ability to reach agreements with radical student activists as well as elite political leaders, the civil rights movement reached goals it would not have otherwise achieved.

King's particular brand of charisma fits in with established theories. In her analysis of King's speeches, Wasielewski (1985) finds that he connected emotionally with listeners by empathizing with their anger about unequal status. But he then reframed their beliefs by questioning if anger was the best solution. Instead, King offered a feasible program of non-violent, direct action against injustice. King also exhibited some of the superhuman qualities of a charismatic leader. He endured bombings, survived a stabbing, and subjected himself to numerous arrests – all evidence of heroism, if not superhuman fortitude. And reflecting the two-sided relationship theory of charismatic leadership, King's charisma emerged from the black community as much as from his own personal qualities. The black church encouraged charismatic relationships between ministers and their congregations. King and other ministers could become charismatic leaders because they knew the community, shared its values, and enjoyed the people's support. Charisma alone did not achieve civil rights; the movement depended just as much on organizations such as the Southern Christian Leadership Coalition and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and networks of activists across the country. The movement combined solid organizational skills with the charisma of religious leaders – of which King was the most powerful.

Weber predicted that charisma's fate is to fade. When King took his non-violent brand of activism to Chicago in 1966, his non-violent

tactics failed. As King faltered, younger, more radical black activists began to distance themselves from his leadership. King's death by assassination proved an even greater blow to the civil rights movement. With no unifying figure, the movement splintered further into factions with different goals. The trajectory of the movement, centered as it was around King's charismatic leadership, indicates both the strengths and weaknesses of reliance on a charismatic leader.

Charisma Reinterpreted

As straightforward as the above interpretation of the civil rights movement may seem, the charismatic leader paradigm no longer dominates the study of social movements. Scholars have indeed continued to apply Weber's theories to the study of social movements, including identifying as charismatic leaders individuals who have not traditionally been seen as such. Belinda Robnett (1997) analyzed the experiences of individuals in the civil rights movement and found that black women often acted as charismatic leaders, using their personal qualities to lead young people in the movement. For the most part, however, scholars tend to de-emphasize the importance of a charismatic leader for five reasons.

First, although Mancur Olson's free-rider theory explains the emergence of leaders, charisma alone does not fully explain why people follow leaders. In fact, the free-rider problem indicates that people are not predisposed to join a movement. Instead, McCarthy and Zald (1987) place more emphasis on organizations than leaders. Snow et al. (1997) refer to framing processes in which individuals' beliefs come to reflect a social movement's ideology. Scholars generally speak of "collective action," a phrase that emphasizes a grassroots effort rather than a call-and-response dynamic implicit in the relationship between leaders and followers.

Second, as noted above, theories emphasizing a charismatic leader too closely resemble the Great Man theory of history – that a powerful individual has shaped events according to his will – resulting in many studies looking at charisma among major political leaders. Meanwhile, the rise of social history and subaltern studies over previous decades emphasize the power inherent in ordinary, anonymous individuals. According to this interpretation, overemphasizing a charismatic leader robs ordinary actors of their agency.

Third, many scholars have objected to the near-ubiquity of the term charisma. Glassman and Swatos (1986), for example, argue that the business world, mass media, and modern politics have all coopted the term. As used today, the term has been desiccated of the revolutionary connotations Weber gave to it. Instead, so-called charismatic leaders only exhibit pseudo-charisma: the ubiquity – and vacuity – of the modern celebrity. Scholars have even suggested that, depending on one's definition of the term, charismatic leaders can arise in groups as minuscule as friendships and therapy sessions.

Fourth, contemporary and mainstream social movements tend to consist of bureaucratic organizations, which more closely resemble Weber's *first* rule of legal authority, rather than the charismatic model. Indeed, Weber explicitly included voluntary associations – precursors to modern, mainstream social movement organizations – as examples of bureaucratic, legal rule. Although the civil rights movement joined charisma with organization, this combination does not occur very frequently. Spontaneous, insurrectionary movements would seem to lack the time needed to develop the relationship required of charismatic leaders and followers.

Fifth, it seems evident that social change can happen without a charismatic leader. Ever since Weber discussed charismatic leadership, scholars have looked at the concept to explain activism, rebelliousness, and political change. But history contains plenty of examples of successful movements that lacked a charismatic leader. Recent work suggests that mild-mannered bureaucrats have done as much or more for environmental protection as iconoclasts like John Muir and Henry David Thoreau. The American anti-nuclear movement in the 1950s helped pressure the government for a nuclear test ban without an obviously charismatic leader; although the Nobel Prize-winning chemist Linus Pauling mobilized people for a test ban, he based his arguments on the rational basis of scientific logic and data, rather than the emotional appeal of charisma. For a successful protest movement, more important factors include shared interests, access to resources, and the favorable reaction of elites.

The term charismatic leader carries such a stigma of Great Man history that scholars have even begun to disassociate Martin Luther King from the label. Debunking King's charismatic leadership as a myth, Carson (1987) argues that

King's leadership qualities were far less influential than "impersonal, large-scale social factors." Unlike traditional charismatic leaders, Carson argues, King did not have the unquestioning support of his followers; indeed, he competed with other charismatic leaders, including James Farmer, Fannie Lou Hamer, Malcolm X, and Stokely Carmichael. Civil rights activism, such as the 1960 sit-ins, occurred in communities without any connection to King, instigated by activists with no particular loyalty to him. Although many people embraced King's rhetoric, plenty of activists differed over specific tactics. The SNCC worried that people would become too dependent on King. Carson praises King's leadership skills that enabled him to reconcile – for a time – the movement factions who disagreed with him, but still maintains that the movement would have happened without King. The idea that a Great Man is necessary for social change, Carson argues, is comparable to waiting for the messiah to arrive.

Conclusion

For all the asserted benefits and potential drawbacks of a charismatic leader, the fact remains that charismatic leaders seem to just happen. They cannot be willed into being, nor nominated by a group. In fact, this magical quality of charisma is what gives Weber's theories their continued salience. For those under the thrall of a charismatic leader, charisma might go a long way toward explaining why people engage in activism they might not otherwise attempt. Still, scholars recognize that other factors besides a leader's charismatic qualities influence people's behavior. The recognition that the adherents are as important as the leader has led many to question the importance of a charismatic leader at all, since activists might be just as well off if they mobilize themselves rather than wait for a leader.

However one defines charisma, a charismatic leader helps a movement reach potential adherents it might not reach otherwise. The charismatic leader acts as a focal point of the movement, giving the unit purpose and specific goals as outlined by one individual. And the mere existence of a charismatic leader challenges the dominant classes of society. At the same time, reliance on a charismatic leader can substitute the leader's personality for goals. Without the leader, the movement risks obsolescence.

But as Tarrow (1998) points out, true movements are seldom under one leader's control; consequently, scholars now place less emphasis on the importance of a charismatic leader. Since Weber posited the idea of a charismatic leader as an explanation of broad political change, other theories have challenged this. Scholars take many more factors into consideration when discussing revolution. Still, as long as people continue to dedicate themselves to a seemingly obscure, unpopular, difficult, or destructive cause defined by a charismatic individual, Weber's theories will hold great appeal.

SEE ALSO: Carmichael, Stokely/Kwame Turé (1941–1998); Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Malcolm X (1925–1965)

References and Suggested Readings

- Carson, C. (1987) Martin Luther King, Jr.: Charismatic Leadership in a Mass Struggle. *Journal of American History* 74, 2 (September): 448–54.
- Friedland, W. H. (1964) For a Sociological Concept of Charisma. *Social Forces* 43, 1 (October): 18–26.
- Gerth, H. H. & Mills, C. W. (1946) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Glassman, R. M. & Swatos, W. H., Jr. (Eds.) (1986) *Charisma, History, and Social Structure*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Hager, T. (1995) *Force of Nature: The Life of Linus Pauling*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Harvey, M. (2005) *Wilderness Forever: Howard Zahniser and the Path to the Wilderness Act*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- McCarthy, J. D. & Zald, M. N. (1997) Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. In S. M. Buechler & F. K. Cylke, Jr. (Eds.), *Social Movements: Perspectives and Issues*. Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing.
- Madsen, D. & Snow, P. G. (1991) *The Charismatic Bond: Political Behavior in Time of Crisis*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Morris, A. D. (1984) *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change*. New York: Free Press.
- Robnett, B. (1997) *How Long? How Long? African-American Women in the Struggle for Civil Rights*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schweitzer, A. (1984) *The Age of Charisma*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Jr., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986) Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. In S. M. Buechler & F. K. Cylke, Jr. (Eds.), *Social*

- Movements: Perspectives and Issues*. Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing.
- Tarrow, S. G. (1998) *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, C. (1978) *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Wasielewski, P. L. (1985) The Emotional Basis of Charisma. *Symbolic Interaction* 8, 2: 207–22.
- Weber, M. (1978) *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Whimster, S. (Ed.) (2004) *The Essential Weber: A Reader*. London: Routledge.
- Willner, A. R. (1984) *The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Charter 77

Joseph C. Santora

In 1977, as more and more Czechoslovakians strived for greater freedoms and human rights, 243 citizens from different walks of life signed a document published in a West German newspaper calling for the government to conform to international human rights rules of behavior. Two of the most important articles that the Czechoslovakian activists demanded adherence to were the Helsinki Accords and United Nations protocols for human rights. Charter 77 took on national prominence as more and more prominent citizens signed the document.

In effect Charter 77 was no more than a document that gained movement status as more and more Czechoslovakian citizens became signatories. According to some observers, the document gained a movement status as it encouraged political opposition to the government. Still, notably, Charter 77 did not call for illegal opposition. By the mid-1980s the document had 1,200 signatories. Significantly, Charter 77 was initiated less than a decade after the deposition of reformist Communist Party leader Alexander Dubček in 1968 by USSR and Warsaw Pact troops after instituting a series of sweeping political reforms to initiate a period of liberalization he called “socialism with a human face.” In March 1968 Dubček abolished censorship and permitted open criticism of the government. Following the Soviet invasion, Dubček lost his position as party leader and was replaced by Gustav Husak, who immediately introduced what he called normalization, a process of five interconnected

policies. Essentially, these policies returned Czechoslovakia to the status quo prior to the Dubček reforms.

Demanding freedom of speech and human rights, in January 1977 Václav Havel, Jan Patocka, and Jiri Hajeka, writers and members of the Czechoslovak intelligentsia, prepared, wrote, published, and became the spokespersons for a revolutionary document called Charter 77 in West Germany. The document criticized the Czechoslovakian government for its failure to address human rights issues in their country in accordance with the Final Act of the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which had been signed by 35 nations, including Czechoslovakia. In addition to the original designers and spokespersons of the document, many of the original 243 signers and more than 1,000 future signers through the 1980s did not consider themselves dissidents.

In response to Charter 77, in newspaper articles, the Czechoslovak government officially called the document “an anti-state, anti-socialist, and a demagogic, abusive piece of writing.” Besides public scolding, the government harassed Charter 77 spokespersons, signers, and their families. The actions the government took against signers of Charter 77 included loss of work, suspension of drivers’ licenses, and denial of education to their children. These forms of harassment and further retaliation escalated into more severe forms of persecution: loss of citizenship and exile from the country. For example, in mid-January 1977 Havel, one of the chief spokespersons for Charter 77, was arrested, tried, and incarcerated for a few months as a result of his leadership role.

Charter 77 was only the beginning of several forms of protests by outspoken leaders seeking basic human rights for all Czechoslovak people. In April 1978 the Committee for the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS), a support group, was founded, and about 18 months later Civic Forum, a political reform movement, which consisted of Charter 77 and other groups, was founded to champion human and civil rights, contributing to the withdrawal of the USSR, regular elections, and institution of greater freedoms.

SEE ALSO: Dubček, Alexander (1921–1992); Havel, Václav (b. 1936); Prague Spring; Velvet Revolution, 1989

References and Suggested Readings

- Bugajski, J. (1987) *Czechoslovakia: Charter 77’s Decade of Dissent*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

- Havel, V. (1991) *Disturbing the Peace: A Conversation with Karel Hviždala*. New York: Vintage.
- Keane, J. (2000) *Vaclav Havel: A Political Tragedy in Six Acts*. New York: Basic Books.
- Kusin, V. V. (1978) *From Dubček to Charter 77: A Study of Normalization in Czechoslovakia, 1968–78*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chartists

Jason M. Kelly

Chartism was a massive, working-class political movement that became a prominent feature of British politics between 1837 and 1848. The name Chartist was a derivation from their petitioning activities, which culminated in the presentation of three People's Charters to parliament in 1838, 1842, and 1848. While unsuccessful in achieving their immediate goals, the group became a potent symbol of early working-class political agitation, for radicals and conservatives alike.

Background

To understand the significance of Chartism to early Victorian politics, it is necessary to understand the political and social milieu from which the coalition emerged. The late 1820s and early 1830s were heady years for British reformers. The Whig party, with the aid of Daniel O'Connell's massive support in Ireland, had outmaneuvered the Tories, forcing them to submit to the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in 1828 and to Catholic emancipation in 1829. The death of George IV brought with it hope that the new regime would bring the reform of "old corruption" – the end to sinecures, preferments, rotten boroughs, and more. A poor harvest in 1829 sparked higher bread prices and the increased politicization of the working classes. In the south and east of the country, agricultural laborers expressed their anger at high prices and low wages in the so-called Swing Riots. In the wake of the repeal of the Combination Acts (1824), trade union activity was on an upswing, and in April 1831 a variety of London-based radical groups combined their resources into the National Union of the Working Classes. In some instances workers and moderate middle-class reformers were willing to work together to campaign for national electoral reforms. This was the case with the Birmingham General Political

Union, which formed in 1830. Robert Owen, while reeling from the failure of New Harmony, had returned to Glasgow to find that over 300 cooperative societies had been founded throughout Britain. In 1830 Owenite socialism provided Britain's most viable philosophic alternative to laissez-faire political economy, and it found an increasingly eager reception among the British proletariat. Given the July Revolution in France (1830), these events created an atmosphere that many believed was ripe for social and political change.

Despite some concern among conservatives that an alliance between the working classes and the middle classes was possible in the early 1830s, it was unlikely. In general, the middle classes were uninterested in wide-sweeping electoral reform that would embrace all workers. Likewise, the interests of the middle classes were being well served by a government whose policies generally steered toward laissez-faire economic policies – the Corn Laws notwithstanding. So the 1832 Reform Acts and the Municipal Corporations Act (1835), which attempted to reform the grossest electoral abuses within the kingdoms, left the working classes little to show for their alliance with the bourgeoisie. The Reform Acts removed many of the rotten boroughs and they gave more representation to growing cities such as Leeds, Sheffield, and Manchester. Furthermore, they regularized property qualifications for voting and expanded the franchise. Nevertheless, the resulting legislation only extended the vote to one out of every seven adult males. This was hardly the wish of radical reformers, many of whom argued for universal male suffrage. And the fallout from the 1832 reforms was such that it put the interests of the increasingly politicized working classes at odds with the enfranchised wealth of the growing middle classes. By splitting the coalition of the middle classes and the working classes, the elite had maintained their hold on power and undermined the potential for more radical reform, at least in the short term.

The failure of the working classes to gain any political leverage in 1832 did not put an end to working-class radicalism. In fact, spurred by the potential for reform, they continued to organize and pressure the government, both through legal and illegal means. The enfranchised inadvertently gave the working classes the motivation to organize more cohesive class-based political organizations. The conservatives were generally

opposed to major social or political reforms. They were ardent protectors of the Church of England and their own landed interests. Thus, they strenuously protected the 1815 Corn Laws, which guaranteed their financial well-being through protective tariffs. Their status as landholders put them at odds with their tenants, who felt their greed in the form of high rents and evictions. The land situation was particularly pronounced in Ireland, sparking the creation of secret societies such as the Whiteboys and the Rockites, who used violence and intimidation to protect their meager possessions.

For their part, landowners used the potent legal mechanisms at their disposal to retaliate. A particularly apt example of this retaliation relates to the 1834 case of the Tolpuddle Martyrs, a group of six agricultural workers from Dorsetshire who had organized legally as the Friendly Society of Agricultural Labourers. They were prosecuted by a local landowner, not for combining, but for administering an oath, prohibited under the 1797 Illegal Oaths Act. Just one of many examples of the elite's abuse of power, the Tolpuddle case became a *cause célèbre* in the radical and trade union press – a powerful symbol for disenfranchised British and Irish workers.

Likewise, the enfranchised liberals found themselves at odds with the desires of the masses. While they were willing to remove the privileges of the Church of England, including the imposition of church rates, liberals tended to favor free trade capitalism as a panacea to social ills. Thus, for them, especially among the factory owners of the North, the Corn Laws became symbolic of illegitimate landed influence on the economy. These businessmen argued that the Corn Laws kept grain at an artificially inflated price. Ostensibly a humanitarian appeal on the grounds that the repeal of the Corn Laws would raise the average standard of living, astute radicals recognized that a drop in grain prices would be accompanied by a decline in wages. At best, the standard of living would stay the same for the average wage laborer.

For the working classes, the most objectionable action from the free trade liberals was the passage of the English Poor Law Act of 1834, followed by similar acts in Scotland (1845) and Ireland (1838). Overturning the Elizabethan statutes, the 1834 act – the child of the Benthamite Edwin Chadwick – took a draconian approach to poverty. Working from the assump-

tion that relief for the poor created a cycle of dependence and laziness among otherwise able-bodied laborers, the new Poor Law mandated the creation of workhouses in every parish. Workers had to submit themselves to a prison-like regime of workhouse order to receive aid. For many, the cure was worse than the disease. And, in any case, economic cycles – especially in the industrial North – often led to high rates of unemployment with which the workhouses were ill-prepared to cope. The response was an anti-Poor Law movement, which helped consolidate the political ambitions of the various working-class movements, including the nascent Chartist movement of the late 1830s.

Birth of Chartism

Chartism was a broad-based national coalition that formed from several movements among the working classes. Because of the diversity in leadership and different regional concerns, there were, at times, breakdowns in leadership and consensus among self-professed Chartists. Nevertheless, the Chartists had an overarching political and social reform agenda that gave the group a unified character for a decade. The leaders articulated the group's platform within a class-conscious framework. However, unlike the Owenites who suggested that social inequality was the product of economic disenfranchisement, the Chartists argued that the roots of social and economic inequality could be found in the political system. Thus, their ultimate objective was to reform the political system, but this did not mean that they were unconcerned with relieving social ills.

As early as 1836 the Chartist leadership began to coalesce. Led by William Lovett, a London cabinetmaker, a small group of artisans formed the London Working Men's Association (LWMA). Focusing much of their energies on pamphleteering, Lovett, the group's secretary, was effective in creating a large coalition of like-minded individuals and organizations throughout Britain. This included influential organizers such as Robert Owen and Feargus O'Connor, the editor of the *Northern Star*, a Leeds newspaper which became the printed voice of Chartism after 1838. Between 1836 and 1837 Lovett drafted what became the People's Charter, a six-point program for a massive reform of the electoral system. The first draft of the People's Charter called for universal suffrage. However,

to solidify their support among male laborers, the provision for female suffrage was soon dropped. Despite this, many women were supportive of Chartism, and they played an integral role in the movement through organizing, petitioning, writing, fundraising, and forming nearly 150 women's Chartist organizations throughout Britain and Ireland between 1838 and 1852.

In general, Chartist women supported the primacy of universal male suffrage, often with the assumption that universal female suffrage would follow soon thereafter. The People's Charter also called for the abolition of property qualifications to vote, annual parliaments, voting by ballot, and a rewriting of electoral districts. A sixth demand would provide a salary for MPs, a provision that would allow working-class MPs to participate in the London parliament. Traveling the countryside in the wake of the 1837 economic depression, Lovett, O'Connor, and their fellow Chartist leaders were able to generate mass support for their program.

O'Connor quickly became the *de facto* leader of the movement. He linked the Chartist agenda with that of the anti-Poor Law movement. And, traveling through the midland and northern counties, he formed close associations with radical leaders such as Richard Oastler and Joseph Rayner Stephens. Massive torchlight meetings, which accompanied Oastler's and Stephens' calls for sabotage and strikes, troubled moderate Chartists and led to division within the ranks soon thereafter. In December 1838 Stephens was arrested for unlawful assembly, one of the earliest arrests of the Chartist leadership. Throughout the countryside the Chartists circulated their People's Charter in print, and with massive support the leadership decided to organize a national petition as well as a national convention – the General Convention of the Industrious Classes.

A failed national convention in London in February 1839 was followed by another in Birmingham in May. The Birmingham convention was also unsuccessful, in part because of a polarized vision of the means to achieve Chartist ends. On the one hand, the “physical force Chartists” were willing to use violence and intimidation to attain their goals. On the other hand, the “moral force Chartists,” which included William Lovett, sought to induce change through non-violent rallies, pamphleteering, and petitioning. Nevertheless, the convention

decided on several courses of action. They planned a run on the banks, which would disrupt financial systems. “Exclusive dealing” would mean that they would only buy from Chartist tradespeople. And, finally, they decided on the “Sacred Month,” a general strike that would force the government to concede to their demands. On June 14 the Chartist leadership presented parliament with their first charter, with 1.28 million signatures. Before it was read in parliament the Birmingham police force broke up a Chartist meeting on July 4, 1839, arresting two Chartist leaders. Denouncing the arrests at the convention, William Lovett was subsequently arrested. These so-called Bull Ring Riots led to the withdrawal of the moderate Birmingham Political Union's support for the Chartists. On the heels of the riots, parliament rejected the People's Charter and the convention collapsed.

As the government began arresting the Chartist leadership over the next months, they met small pockets of spontaneous resistance by workers. In November the government faced up to 5,000 Welsh ironworkers and colliers in armed confrontation. Descending on the town of Newport, the men were inspired by Chartist ideology and frustration over working conditions. Soldiers intercepted the men and killed over twenty workers, following this with the arrest, trial, and transportation of their leaders. In the wake of the Newport Rising, more workers organized themselves in Dewsbury, Sheffield, and Bradford, but these were easily suppressed, and the government continued arresting Chartist leaders and suspected conspirators. By January 1740 Chartism was in a shambles.

National Charter Association and the Decline of Chartism

The second stage of Chartism took place from the summer of 1840 to 1842. This period in the movement's history was characterized by strong organization in the Midlands and the North. While Chartism's leaders were still in prison, James Leach, a radical organizer from Manchester, and Robert Kemp Philp, a news vendor from Bath, organized the National Charter Association (NCA). The NCA's stated purpose was to pursue universal male suffrage through peaceful means, specifically through petitioning. Its significance was in providing a centrally organized administration for Chartism, which

would have branches throughout Britain. While the branches were generally concentrated in the industrial towns of the Midlands, the NCA gained a larger following in the economic downturn of 1841–2. And, with O'Connor's support – most significantly through turning over the *Northern Star* to the NCA – the second Chartist petition in 1842 gathered 3.3 million signatures. The NCA's branches eventually totaled 400 with 50,000 members. Nevertheless, their success was short lived.

For a second time, parliament rejected the Chartist petition outright. And once again, in the wake of its failure, the political climate merged with social dissatisfaction and economic turmoil to mobilize the working classes. In the industrial towns of the Midlands and the North, laborers sabotaged machinery and went on strike, protesting cuts in their wages. Removing boiler plugs was a popular way to shut down production, and the prevalence of this action led to this period in working-class activism to be known as the Plug Plots. Violence increased throughout the summer of 1842 and there were frequent confrontations with the military. The workers' demands reflect the extent to which their economic situation found voice through Chartist politics. Many of the strike petitions required that Chartist principles be met before they would return to work. Despite their ambivalent reaction to what nearly amounted to a general strike, the Chartist leaders were once again arrested. Even as the NCA failed to support the workers, the government quelled the movement through extensive arrests.

Between 1842 and 1848 the Chartist agenda transformed. There was some disagreement among the leadership about the next course of action. Some, such as Bronterre O'Brien, favored joining reform-minded moderates in the abolitionist Joseph Sturge's National Complete Suffrage Union. O'Brien failed in the face of O'Connor's objections, and the two men disagreed publicly in debates and in the press. Chartism's six points were put on hold while leaders pursued a variety of alternative agendas. O'Brien battled the Anti-Corn Law League in his *National Reformer*. O'Connor focused on creating a Chartist Cooperative Land Society, for which he received approval from the NCA in 1843. His idea was to form cooperatives which would give land back to the people, potentially giving them the right to vote, and relieve some of the pressures caused by an oversupply of urban labor.

Between 1845 and 1848 O'Connor had 70,000 subscribers contributing small amounts to a subscription total of £2.10s. He used this money to purchase five estates, which were divided into smaller properties and let by ballot. Complicated lawsuits and failed efforts to create a friendly society and a joint stock company eventually caused O'Connor's land scheme to collapse in financial turmoil.

As Chartism's leaders struggled to address social reform, the government pursued a similar path, but to different ends. Much of the support for Chartism came from people who saw that their social condition was, in part, the product of a government that was unwilling to reform itself. Disenfranchised, Chartism was their political voice. Once the government responded with limited reforms that appealed to the working classes, Chartism's base of support began to erode. Those wishing for moderate reform found that parliament was responding, and they began to abandon more radical reformers – especially the “physical force Chartists.” For example, the administration found widespread working-class support for the Factory Acts of the 1840s. These laws removed women and children from certain industries, such as mining. Or, they limited the hours that women and children could work in factories.

The justifications and implications had important consequences for working-class gender and labor relations. On the one hand, the Factory Acts worked from the premise that women were degraded by certain forms of labor – in particular those that undermined the idealized image of bourgeois domesticity. Many among the working classes, including the Chartists, absorbed the image of domesticity and separate spheres ideology as a way to reassert a patriarchal vision of the family. To be masculine was to be the wage-earning head of a household. To be feminine was to be “the angel in the house,” as Victorian writers later described the ideal. On the other hand, the removal of women from wage labor promised less competition and higher wages for men. From this perspective, female workers had become a threat to the success of male workers in a laissez-faire economy. By passing these Acts the government appeared to be reasserting the patriarchal moral order as well as moderating the economic order. Coupled with inquiries and reforms of public health, education, and even the Poor Laws, the British government seemed, to many, to be protecting the rights of the people.

When the 1848 revolution swept through France, Feargus O'Connor and his fellow Chartists prepared to petition the government in a third People's Charter. Promising 5 million signatures, the Chartists were only able to muster 1.9 million. This lack of support reflects a general dissatisfaction with the Chartist cause among the working classes. Still, with revolution spreading in Europe, the palpable threat of an Irish revolution, and riots sparked by economic distress in England and Scotland, O'Connor believed that he could force constitutional change.

In April 1848 he amassed 150,000 workers at Kennington Common, just south of Westminster. These men planned to march the petition to parliament, but over 12,000 troops and police stood in their way. Rather than risk a violent clash, O'Connor presented the petition to parliament himself. And, for a final time, the government rejected the Chartist petition. As in 1839 and 1842, the rejection of the petition led to violent confrontation and mass arrests in urban areas. However, unlike previous incarnations of Chartism, the movement faded after the 1848 defeat. In part, this was the result of an ensuing alliance between reformers, trade unionists, and liberals. Nevertheless, the Chartist movement provided a model for working-class organization and helped establish a working-class consciousness in nineteenth-century Britain.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Corn Law Agitation, Britain, 19th Century; Britain, Trade Union Movement; Class Identity and Protest; European Revolutions of 1848; Irish Nationalism; O'Brien, Bronterre (1805–1864); O'Connor, Feargus (1796–1855); Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Poor Law, Britain, 1834; Reform Bills, Britain, 1867 and 1884; Swing Riots; Tolpuddle Martyrs, Britain, 1834

References and Suggested Readings

- Briggs, A. (1959) *Chartist Studies*. London: Macmillan.
 Epstein, J. & Thompson, D. (Eds.) (1982) *The Chartist Experience: Studies in Working-Class Radicalism and Culture, 1830–1860*. London: Macmillan.
 Jones, G. S. (1983) Rethinking Chartism. In G. S. Jones (Ed.), *Languages of Class: Studies in English Working-Class History, 1832–1982*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 90–178.
 O'Higgins, R. (1961) The Irish Influence in the Chartist Movement. *Past & Present* 20: 83–96.
 Pickering, P. A. (1986) Class Without Words: Symbolic Communication in the Chartist Movement. *Past & Present* 112: 144–62.

- Pickering, P. A. (1995) *Chartism and the Chartists in Manchester and Salford*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
 Schwarzkopf, J. (1991) *Women in the Chartist Movement*. New York: Palgrave.
 Taylor, M. (1996) Rethinking the Chartists: Searching for Synthesis in the Historiography of Chartism. *Historical Journal* 39, 2: 479–95.
 Thompson, D. (Ed.) (1971) *The Early Chartists*. London: Macmillan.
 Thompson, E. P. (1963) *The Making of the English Working Class*. New York: Vintage.

Charusathira, Prapas (1912–1997)

Justin Corfield

Prapas Charusathira was appointed deputy prime minister of Thailand and minister of the interior in December 1972, during a difficult time in his country's history, becoming the military strongman who tried to end the pro-democracy movement in Thailand. Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn had dissolved parliament the previous November, banning all political parties. Charusathira, a tough army general who had been deputy prime minister from 1963 to 1971, was to provide the brawn to ensure there were few demonstrations. Charusathira saw his greatest achievement as maintaining an anti-communist Thailand.

Charusathira was born November 25, 1912 at Udon in northeast Thailand, and in 1933 entered the Royal Siamese Army (renamed Royal Thai Army in 1939). He graduated from the elite Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, where fellow students included future prime ministers Thanom and Sarit Thanarat. (The academy's former students have run Thailand for 47 of the past 60 years.) He then went to the National Defense College and began his career in the infantry. His first big campaign was against the French when Thailand claimed western Cambodia in 1940. It was a short military conflict, and after Japanese "mediation" the French ceded two Cambodian provinces.

In September 1957, dictator Pibul Songgram was overthrown in a coup d'état organized by Thanom, and a provisional government was formed under the diplomat Pote Sarasin. Three months later Thanom was chosen by the Nationalist Socialist Party as prime minister. After another coup in October 1958, General Sarit

took over. When Sarit died in 1963, Thanom returned as prime minister, remaining in the post for the next ten years. Throughout all these upheavals (during these 16 years there were only two coups, both of which were to strengthen the hand of the military), Charusathira was minister of the interior. He was content to remain the strongman behind the scenes, but he exercised real power and served on the boards of 11 companies. From 1963 to 1971 he was deputy prime minister, army deputy commander, deputy supreme commander, and supreme commander.

The US was then increasing its role in South Vietnam and was ejected unceremoniously from Cambodia between 1963 and 1965. Thus the importance of keeping Thailand as a bastion against communism was something that dominated much western planning – and Charusathira was a key link in this. In 1971 he was appointed to the National Executive Council, and as director of the Security Council for Defense and Interior he relinquished these posts in 1972 to become deputy prime minister again and minister of the interior. He was appointed in December 1972 to end the student pro-democracy movement in Thailand. In addition to his political role, he was vice-president and rector of Chulalongkorn University, the most famous and influential seat of learning in the country.

Student activism was on the rise in Southeast Asia. Partly taking inspiration from Keo Ann's demonstrations against the Lon Nol government in Cambodia in May and June 1972, students eventually went out on the streets of Bangkok to demonstrate against Thanom, his son Colonel Narong Kittikachorn, and Charusathira. The protests reached a peak in late 1973. In an attempt to release some of the tension, Charusathira announced on September 10 that he would resign as commander of the army on October 1. But he remained interior minister and on October 6 ordered the arrest of student leaders, accusing them of involvement in a "communist plot."

On October 13, 300,000 students demonstrated in Bangkok – the largest rally the city had seen. Some of the students who had been arrested were released, but on the following day disturbances began again. Charusathira's successor as army commander refused to intervene. But when some students tried to take over a government broadcasting station, Narong's 11th Infantry Regiment, backed by a helicopter

gunship, opened fire on crowds at Thammasat University. Officially, 66 people were shot dead, but some estimates put the death toll as high as 300. Angry at the developments, King Bhumibol Adulyadej called the triumvirate to an audience and announced their immediate exile, thus ushering in three years of democracy. The demonstrations only stopped when news was broadcast that Charusathira and Narong had left the country. Charusathira spent most of his remaining years in exile in Taiwan. It was only in January 1977 that he was allowed to return to Bangkok, where he lived until his death on August 18, 1997.

SEE ALSO: Student Movements; Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954; Vietnam, Protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974; Vietnam, Protests, 1975–1993

References and Suggested Readings

- Bartak, E. (1993) *The Student Movement in Thailand 1970–1976*. Clayton, Australia: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.
- Corfield, J. (1997) Deputy Behind Thai Bloodbath. *The Australian*, September 4: 14.

Chávez, César (1927–1993) and the United Farm Workers

Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh

Toward the end of the twentieth century, César Chávez promoted a distinctive type of social rebellion in the United States, which became associated with the phrase *la Causa* and with a hybrid poor-people's organization, the National Farm Workers Association (later renamed United Farm Workers, or UFW). Chávez, a passionate activist who knew how to arouse listeners, celebrated the spirited and unruly citizen who confronts bosses and government officials alike and who refuses to suffer injustice silently. Conversely, Chávez distrusted the selfish ambitions of not only the wealthy but of elected politicians (including self-described liberals), and sought to pressure government leaders into action that they (in Chávez's opinion) would normally not undertake if exposed to convincing arguments alone.



César Chávez (center), leader of the National Farm Workers' Association (NFWA), walks a picket line in California in 1966. In 1962 Chávez, along with Philip Vera Cruz, Dolores Huerta, and Larry Itliong, founded what later became the United Farm Workers of America (UFW) to urge migrant workers to join in the fight for better wages and workers' rights. (Paul Fusco/Magnum Photos)

Political Education and Evolution

In his autobiography Chávez attributes his moral sympathies largely to his parents' experiences, their egalitarian maxims, their commitments to unions, their hostility toward violence, and their compassion toward others who were suffering from poverty. When Chávez was a child, his father lost his mortgaged farm and became a migrant farm worker who hoped to save enough from wages to purchase another farm. He dreamt in vain. Since the late nineteenth century California's enormous agribusinesses not only monopolized the state's arable land but also exercised control over local government officials, banks, newspapers, water works, and other private forms of power. Spared of fears about legal prosecution and social censure, agricultural corporations paid below-subsistence wages to short-term field hands, housed them in unheated and crowded hovels, and did not worry about their need for potable water and toilets. As a result, migrant farm hands, such as the Chávez family, were too busy surviving day-to-day to salt away investment capital. Despite chronic "hard times," the Chávez family generously shared its moments of good fortune with neighbors and fellow workers whose sufferings, in the eyes of César's mother and father, seemed even greater than their own. The parents' practice of selflessly helping the poor (and not simply trying to escape poverty) shaped their son's outlook, which, he argues, became a psycho-

logical inclination that he could not resist as he grew older.

After serving two years in the military, Chávez married and settled in a Mexican American barrio in San Jose, California. There, he met a priest, Father Donald McDonnell, who exposed Chávez to the social justice ideas of Left Catholics, such as Dorothy Day. Chávez also made friends with community organizer Fred Ross, an Anglo Chávez initially expected to dislike but whose ideas about poor people collectively fighting for better conditions made intuitive sense to him.

With the help of Ross's connections to a community service organization oriented toward the ideas of Saul Alinsky, Chávez soon became a professional community organizer, working in Mexican American neighborhoods. When entering a new community, Chávez would arrange for friends and neighbors to meet at a local's home and talk about their immediate problems, which could involve discrimination at schools or banks, difficulties navigating welfare bureaucracies, or locating affordable housing. With Chávez's suggestions and encouragement, the local groups planned collective projects – for example, the establishment of a credit union – that might reduce their stress. Chávez also helped local residents process citizenship papers and register to vote.

In the course of organizing communities, Chávez became convinced that poverty per se was the most salient issue for many Mexican Americans. Economic topics seemed to excite the individuals he met and generated levels of participation that related social issues, such as discrimination at schools or shortages of medical centers, seldom produced. Unable to convince his superiors to mobilize residents around explicitly economic themes, such as joblessness and low wages, Chávez resigned from the Community Service Organization (CSO), founded the National Farm Workers Association, and dedicated the remainder of his life to helping rural poor people address perceived economic injustices.

Chávez never saw the negotiation of contracts between employers and employees as the sole aim of his fledgling union. He saw his union as part of a more comprehensive program of community organizing and empowering poor people. When working with field hands, Chávez typically employed the recruitment techniques he had mastered in the CSO. He scheduled house meetings, where poor people conversed, pondered

alternative courses of action, and later derived lessons from both the successes and mistakes of their actions. Chávez believed that local projects and social services – for instance, the establishment of a neighborhood medical center or credit union, or help in completing legal documents – generated gratitude and loyalties that his nascent labor organization could draw upon when negotiating contracts with resistant employers. In addition, through such small-scale achievements, everyday people acquire the confidence and self-esteem necessary to initiate their acts of self-defense.

In the course of organizing California's rural poor, Chávez discovered that many farm hands worried about temporary Mexican immigrants who, despite laws that required growers to first offer jobs to US workers, took jobs (and at extremely low pay) from US citizens and permanent residents. The curtailment of the employment of non-permanent residents was an early priority of the UFW, which saw itself initially as a nationalist organization for all US farm workers – regardless of the worker's skin color, ethnic background, or religious beliefs. Over the years, the UFW would become more immigrant friendly and more cosmopolitan in its approach to the plight of the poor, but this was not its initial orientation.

Part of the UFW's challenge in organizing California's farm hands was their transience. Laborers moved from place to place according to the harvesting season, which made verification of union membership, votes for strikes, and votes on negotiated contracts very difficult. Conversely, growers could count on the lack of stable communities among workers and their continual need for paid work as potential breeding grounds for strikebreakers. To offset the workers' fluid social life (as well as their need to secure money during strikes) Chávez sought outside sponsors and allies, such as students, the clergy, established unions, and the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. To generate knowledge about and sympathy for the plight of farm workers, the UFW combined traditional strikes and worksite picketing with long-distance marches to population centers, dramatic fastings by Chávez, and nationwide boycotts of selected products, such as Gallo wine. Chávez also began to use California's legal system to register complaints about growers' hiring practices, and he pressured judges and police to enforce

frequently ignored labor laws (if, of course, the laws on the books seemed to help the rural poor, which was not always the case).

The UFW acquired national fame in the late 1960s and early 1970s when Chávez, against great odds, compelled grape growers to sign a contract with their pickers that would not only promise better pay, but a reasonable hiring policy (through UFW hiring halls) and protection of workers from dangerous pesticides. The victory was, however, short lived. In retrospect, it was the first exchange in an on-again, off-again war between the UFW and growers in California – a war that continues today, as contracts are renegotiated, abrogated, and reinterpreted amid changing political climates.

Vision

Chávez never promoted a single, comprehensive political philosophy. Nonetheless, his political activism was characterized by an identifiable set of moral concerns and precepts that loosely hung together.

For example, he was not preoccupied with advancing the interests of Latinos as a distinct social group. Chávez had suffered from discrimination throughout his life and was extremely sensitive to ethnic slights. This is not surprising. Mexicans and Mexican Americans were continually ridiculed in school, ushered to separate seating areas in movie theaters, and harassed by police (patterns of behavior that endure in many places). Still, Chávez viewed his cultural inheritance ambivalently. He believed deeply in the personal and political value of religious faith, and often used symbols and rituals that resonated among Mexicans and Mexican Americans – such as the eagle on the Mexican flag and the Catholic Church's penitent marches and fasting – to galvanize onlookers' support and manipulate activists' passions. At the same time, Chávez often spoke of his distrust of all racialist and ethnic enthusiasms. In his opinion, narrow cultural pride allows the wealthy to divide and conquer the have-nots. Chávez, therefore, pointedly prohibited discrimination by UFW activists against people of non-Latino backgrounds. Indeed, he expelled several Chicano activists from the UFW who would not welcome African Americans. This resulted in Chávez and his followers being called *negreros* (which, translated roughly, derogatorily means “Negro

lovers”) in communities where large numbers of residents were committed to the post-Mexican Revolution notion of *La Raza* (or a cosmic Mexican race).

Even though Chávez intentionally distanced himself from numerous Chicano groups and ideologies of his time, he took seriously the notion that everyday people have the capacity to be remarkably creative when thinking about how best to fight for their rights and interests. Chávez concedes in his autobiography that sometimes he is impatient with the temerity of the poor, their willingness to engage in violence, and their silly stereotypes of women, students, and other ethnic groups. He nonetheless insists that poor people are remarkably generous, courageous, and playful about ideas, and ultimately are the source of effective political action.

Chávez sometimes calls his faith in the creative energies of the populace a “non-violent” approach to politics, partly because of its resemblances to the practices of Mahatma Gandhi and the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. Like Gandhi and King, Chávez chastised his followers whenever they physically attacked an opponent or goaded an opponent into violent behavior. Such aggressive behavior is counter-productive, Chávez argued, because police forces typically will arrest and jail the poor, while lightly slapping the wrists of the wealthy and their henchmen (or “goons,” in Chávez’s words). The refusal to strike back when attacked, on the other hand, will convince onlookers of the nobility of poor people’s character and the justness of their position. The challenge for poor people is to have enough faith in their creativity and their ability to inspire onlookers to ward off the despondency and desperation that lead to physical violence.

The long-term goal of *la Causa* was economic: to overthrow “capitalism,” which Chávez saw as inherently and inevitably exploitative. The unqualified rights of property owners to use their land and tools as they wish (and, conversely, the legal helplessness of those without property) reward the ruthless and demanding boss who does not wish to spend more than the absolute minimum on his temporary employees. Consequently, Chávez questioned the wisdom of proposals for “Black capitalism” or “Brown capitalism.” Regardless of skin color, reasoned Chávez, a private capitalist will be pressured by market conditions to exploit employees. At the

same time, Chávez refused to embrace socialism because of the excessive power that he believed socialists wished to place in the hands of the state. Socialism, because it innocently celebrates state intervention in human affairs, naturally becomes “totalitarian,” according to Chávez.

Towards the end of his life, Chávez began to champion what he considered to be a satisfactory “third” way of organizing modern economies. He advocated the establishment of a large cooperative sector (about 15 percent of all firms) in every capitalist economy. Private businesses owned and managed by the workers themselves would, Chávez argued, lead to increased enthusiasm among employees and, therefore, increased productivity. Challenged by the efficiency of producer cooperatives, traditional capitalist firms would be pressured by their competitors into treating their workers better. Shortly before his death, Chávez visited Spain to observe the Mondragon collection of cooperatives, which he believed illustrated the feasibility of a coop-based capitalist economy.

Criticisms

Chávez has become an icon on the American left partly because of his deep and unwavering commitment to improving the lot of the poor, as evidenced in a number of physical and economic sacrifices, including his jailing. In addition, he successfully organized California’s migrant farm workers – a population that previously had been immune from labor organization.

Nonetheless, some American progressive, rebel, and radical writers and activists criticize aspects of Chávez’s program and behavior. Some former UFW activists, for example, argue that Chávez’s “non-violent” theory about the virtues of grassroots democracy was superficial and weak. Allegedly, he refused to hold elections for key leadership posts within the UFW and instead personally appointed officials who were devoted first and foremost to him. He also, some say, used gestures, symbols, and slogans to inhibit critical thinking and promote conformity at the grassroots.

Some proponents of Latino politics have expressed unease with Chávez’s relative indifference, if not hostility, to identity politics. As mentioned before, Chávez argued that many proponents of *La Raza* and Brown Capitalism in fact buttressed the power of the wealthy. In

addition, UFW officials, trying to secure jobs for their members, sometimes have helped US immigration officials identify and expel illegal immigrant workers, episodes that do not sit well with most activists committed to international solidarity.

Finally, Chávez's passion for cooperatives (especially when combined with his profound distrust of government leaders and state initiatives) arguably reflects a romantic, frictionless syndicalism that exaggerates the absence of exploitation and inequalities within modern working classes. Chávez seems to have been either unaware of, or indifferent to, the criticisms of the internal workings of the Mondragon cooperatives (such as the poor treatment of temporary workers, who are not given the rights of full-time cooperative members) that have been made by Iberian trade unionists and Spain's socialist and communist parties. Conversely, distrusting almost all government leaders and suspecting their hidden agendas, Chávez may have unnecessarily discounted the potential of states to help the poor in modern capitalist societies.

SEE ALSO: Alinsky, Saul (1909–1972) and the Industrial Areas Foundation; Day, Dorothy (1897–1980); Farm Labor Organizing Committee; Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); Huerta, Dolores (b. 1930); King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Mondragón Collective

References and Suggested Readings

- Bardacke, F. (2002) César's Ghost: Decline and Fall of the UFW. In R. W. Etulain (Ed.), *César Chávez: A Brief Biography with Documents*. Boston: St. Martin's.
- Dunne, J. G. (2008) *Delano: The Story of the California Grape Strike*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Etulain, R. W. (Ed.) (2002) *César Chávez: A Brief Biography with Documents*. Boston: St. Martin's.
- Jenkins, J. C. (1999) The Transformation of a Constituency into a Social Movement Revisited: Farmworker Organizing in California. In J. Freeman & V. Johnson (Eds.), *Waves of Protest: Social Movements Since the Sixties*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Ley, J. E. (2007) *César Chávez: Autobiography of La Causa*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Meister, D. & Loftis, A. (1977) *A Long Time Coming: The Struggle to Unionize America's Farm Workers*. New York: Macmillan.
- Mendel-Reyes, M. (1995) *Reclaiming Democracy: The Sixties in Politics and Memory*. New York: Routledge.
- Mooney, P. H. & Majka, T. J. (1995) *Farmers' and Farm Workers' Movements: Social Protest in American Agriculture*. New York: Twayne.

Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954)

Christoph Twickel

On December 17, 1982, under a historic Samán tree in Maracay where Simón Bolívar used to spend shady hours, that Hugo Chávez made his first revolutionary promise, swearing to three fellow officers “my arm will not rest nor will my soul find peace until the chains are disrupted that hold us prisoners.” After this pledge, inspired by Bolívar's “juramento de Monte Sacre” from 1805, the four young officers, all members of a parachutist regiment, founded the Ejército Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (EBR-200), a clandestine cell within the Venezuelan army. This step toward conspiratorial political work marked the beginning of a political career that led Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías, the son of poor teachers from the Venezuelan Llanos, to the presidency and made him the leader of the Bolivarian Revolution.

Hugo Chávez was born on July 28, 1954 in a palm-leaf cabana in the small town of Sabanetas. His family moved to Barinas when Chávez was of high school age, and there he befriended the two sons of a historian and member of the communist party named Esteban Ruiz Guevara. It was in the library of the former political prisoner Ruiz Guevara where Chávez first read not only classic socialist literature – from Marx and Engels to Lenin – but also the writings of Simón Bolívar and Bolívar's teacher Simón Rodríguez. There he also learned about the life and times of Ezequiel Zamora, an anti-oligarchic general in the Venezuelan civil war of 1859.

Aiming at a career as a baseball pitcher, the 17-year-old Chávez joined the military academy in Caracas, where within a year his interest had shifted completely from baseball to the history of Venezuela's independence wars, which he investigated intensively in the libraries. The class of 1974, to which he belonged, was the first one studying not only in the military academy but also at the civil university. Thus, Chávez and his fellow cadets, many of whom became ministers



Hugo Chávez surrenders on television after a failed coup attempt on February 4, 1992. Chávez and the group he founded, *Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200* (MBR-200), had planned the coup in response to popular dissatisfaction and economic decline following the International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programs implemented by then president Carlos Andrés Pérez. During this television appearance, Chávez famously remarked that he had only failed *por ahora* ("for the moment"). (Ali Gomez/AP/PA Photos)

in the Bolivarian government, must be seen as a new generation within the military.

During the 1980s Chávez, in search of a revolutionary civilian-military pact, met with key figures of the left, such as Alfredo Maneiro, founder of *Causa Radical*. His elder brother Adán Chávez, member of the illegal *Partido Revolucionario de Venezuela* (PRV), convinced him to team up with PRV leader and legendary guerilla Douglas Bravo. Bravo knew that it was impossible for a civilian-military pact to build on socialist ideologues like Karl Marx because of the powerful anti-communist tradition within the Venezuelan army, in those days still strongly influenced by the Cold War military doctrine of the US. So Bravo introduced Chávez to a progressive, left-wing reinterpretation of Venezuelan independence heroes.

The so-called *árbol de los tres raíces* (Tree of three roots), founded in the supposedly re-

volutionary thinking of Simón Bolívar, Simón Rodríguez, and Ezequiel Zamora, became the ideological foundation of the neo-Bolivarian movement fronted by the PRV and the Chávez cell within the army. Bolívar stood for *gran patria*, Latin American integration. Rodríguez stood for liberation from colonialism through education, and Zamora was the reference figure for land reform and anti-oligarchism.

Chávez first gained public attention as the leader of a failed military coup against the government of the social-democrat president Carlos Andrés Pérez on February 4, 1992. It was not at all obvious whether the charismatic 37-year-old parachutist was a leftist revolutionary or a nationalist caudillo. Andrés Pérez called him the head of a fascist coup, but among the people living in the poor *barrios* (shantytowns) of Caracas, the young lieutenant, obviously not part of the higher army hierarchy, was hailed as a rebel against the corrupt and elitist regime of the Punto Fijo pact of the social democratic AD and the Christian democratic COPEI, signed in 1958 and installing a formal parliamentary democracy totally controlled by the two parties. When oil prices went down in the 1980s and Venezuela faced a financial breakdown, this two-party system showed its brutal face. On February 27, 1989, following a government agreement with the IMF on economic shock therapy, a spontaneous uprising known as *El Caracazo* in Caracas and other cities led to a massacre. Repressive forces killed thousands of people. The massacre was a turning point for Chávez's conspiratory movement within the army, and the young officers decided to organize their military rebellion as soon as possible.

When he was freed in March 1994 after only 782 days of prison, Chávez had already changed the face of Venezuelan politics. Denominated "the imprisoned candidate of the people" by left-wing groups in the presidential election of 1993, he was constantly visited by intellectuals, political leaders, and activists. Out of prison, Chávez began to regroup the MBR-200 as a revolutionary organization and to conquer Venezuela by car. The men who joined him were of great political diversity, ranging from radical-left perspectives to extreme militarism. The group embarked upon a political tour de force in a black Toyota Samurai, with Chávez giving speeches in little towns throughout the country, sharpening his rhetorical skills, and showing an exceptional talent

in relating to the poor people, their needs and worries. However, the tour became a political failure. The MBR-200 was persecuted by the secret police (DISIP) and the military police (DIM). People were restrained from joining its gatherings, and although there was much sympathy for its leader, MBR-200 remained marginalized.

In 1996 Chávez made a political turnaround, remodeling the MBR-200 from a semi-conspiratorial group aimed at taking power by revolutionary force into a party that would take part in the elections in 1998. Although there was strong radical-left opposition against the parliamentarization of the movement, in 1997 the MBR-200 renamed itself *Movimiento Quinta República* (MVR) and registered for the presidential elections with Chávez as the candidate. It was at this point that Chávez gained the support of influential circles of the Venezuelan establishment that disagreed with the neoliberal project of President Rafael Caldera. Under advice from businessman and spin doctor Luis Miquilena, Chávez climbed in the polls. And the marriage with blonde TV anchorwoman Marisabel Rodríguez Oropeza won him further votes.

On December 6, 1998 Chávez, candidate of a broad alliance of parties named *Polo Patriótico*, won the presidential elections with 56.2 percent of the vote. When he took office on February 2, 1999 he introduced himself as a reformer and a reliable partner, ready to make friends with everybody, from Fidel Castro, to Pope John Paul, to British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

The Chávez of the late 1990s was a man in search of an ideology. In the early speeches there are traces of traditional Latin American developmentalism, of social democratic reformism, and of a nationalist, anti-corruption attitude. Critics also point at the influence of Norberto Ceresole, a right-wing Peronist who became adviser to Chávez during this period and wrote a tailor-made, proto-fascist essay “*Caudillo, ejército, pueblo,*” which suggested replacing democracy with a regime based on a military junta plus direct acclamation from the masses. After Ceresole openly admitted anti-Semitism, he was fired from his job and expelled from the country.

Despite the ideological diversity, there was one clear hint that Chávez was a man of the left – his first official act after being sworn in as president was to decree a referendum for a new consti-

tution, the main election pledge of the *Polo Patriótico*. The constitutional assembly that convened on August 3, 1999 for the first time did not comply with the original radical leftist idea of a Soviet-based constitutional process, but it gave birth to a broad discussion that engaged all sectors of society. The new constitution of March 2000, gender balanced and conceding dozens of new forms of civil participation, became the main foundation for “*Chavismo*.”

While Chávez gained popularity among poor people, middle- and upper-class Venezuelans began to feel more and more uncomfortable with his reformatory politics. An agrarian reform, the readjustment of duties and taxes for the petroleum sector, and an educational reform provoked protests and demonstrations in the white-collar areas of Caracas during the years 2000 and 2001. Because the traditional parties had lost credibility, the private media – four national TV stations and the national newspapers – assumed the role of a political opposition. The consequence was a constant media war with anti-Chávez news and propaganda, answered by the president with a growing number of “*cadenas,*” chain-switched proclamations that intercepted the program.

In April 2002 a plot of mass-media owners, generals, and politicians escalated the situation. Following a general strike, the opposition mobilized for a mass demonstration in Caracas on April 11. When the demonstrators marched upon the presidential palace of Miraflores, snipers fired from the roofs, killing and injuring two dozen protesters and Chávez-followers. The killings were then attributed to a group of activists from the so-called *Bolivarian Circles*, a *Chavista* mass organization.

A group of high-ranking military withdrew their support for the president and ordered tanks and helicopters to surround Miraflores, putting pressure on Chávez to resign. He refused, but agreed to be taken away from the presidential palace in the early hours of April 12. That afternoon Pedro Carmona Estanga, president of the employer’s association, declared himself president and dissolved the National Assembly and the High Court. The private TV stations hailed the putsch and the US Bellsouth-Telcel put up a full-page ad, saying: “*Telcel is celebrating freedom with all of Venezuela.*”

But a massive mobilization of Chávez’s followers from the *barrios* of Caracas and other

cities, and a spontaneous counter-putsch planned by lower-ranking officers, finally drove away the coup-government in the afternoon of April 13. Chávez, held prisoner on the small Caribbean island La Orchila, was brought back by helicopter in the early morning of April 14 and instantly reinstated as president.

The failed coup in April 2002, logistically and diplomatically supported by the US government, became a highly significant episode in Chávez's Bolivarian Revolution. First, it exposed the Chavista multitude from the poor *barrios* as the subjects of revolutionary sovereignty. It was they who had forced the illegitimate Junta out of the presidential palace. Second, it had neutralized many of his opponents within the military ranks. That is why the next oppositional strike took place on the economic battlefield when in December 2002 most of the administration and data-processing offices of the national oil company *Petróleos de Venezuela S.A.* (PdVSA) went on strike for almost two months. During the 1990s the PdVSA management had outsourced and privatized more and more services and did not adhere to OPEC quotas, resulting in a massive downfall of prices during this decade. Plus, it had deprived the nation of a good part of its income, reinvesting the petrodollars outside Venezuela. With the strike against Chávez, the oil company's management tried to get rid of a government that had put a halt on this gradual privatization of Venezuelan oil and gas and the removal of PdVSA from state control.

After two months of a strike that brought Venezuela near to bankruptcy and caused impoverishment among its people, students, retired workers, and the military finally succeeded in resuming oil production and distribution. With the strike the PdVSA management had handed over the company to the control of the government – an extremely important step for Chávez, because it gave the Bolivarian Revolution a solid economic base. With PdVSA under his control and oil prices rising, Chávez was able to fund his so-called missions, which included social programs designed to improve conditions for the poor majority of the population. This included the *Misión Barrio Adentro* that brought more than 20,000 Cuban doctors to the poor *barrios*. Backed by these extremely popular programs, Chávez won election after election. The oppositional referendum in July 2004 for his dismissal was defeated by 59.1 percent of the vote. The

presidential elections in 2006 resulted in a 62.84 percent vote for Chávez. And after a 2005 election boycott by the opposition parties the National Assembly fell completely into the hands of Chavistas (though in 2007 the *Podemos* Party shifted from pro-government to opposition).

At the 2005 World Social Forum Chávez for the first time spoke of socialism as the only way to overcome capitalism and the hegemony of the US. The centerpiece of his “socialism of the twenty-first century” became the *Alternativa para la Américas* (ALBA), a pan-American alliance based on solidarity and economic and political relationships, designed as the opposing model to the US-backed Free Trade of the Americas (ALCA in Spanish), which Chávez helped to bury at the Fourth International Summit of the Americas in Mar de Plata, Argentina in November 2005.

In December 2007 Chávez had to face his first major defeat in domestic policies. A constitutional referendum about institutionalizing new forms of collective property and civil participation (such as the Communal Councils) was defeated by a razor-thin majority.

Chávez's vision of *la gran patria*, a socially balanced integration of the Latin American nations emancipating the continent from US domination, is a distant prospect. Nevertheless, Chávez has become the key figure in the Latin American shift to the left. Not only does he represent an answer to neoliberal politics that had dominated the continent for almost five decades, pushing the reconstruction of the welfare state that has been dismantled all over Latin America in the last decades, but he also spectacularly plays the role of the *enfant terrible* of the global South, calling US President G. W. Bush “the devil” in front of the UN General Assembly. Last but not least, he is a politician who successfully brings politics to the common people, for example in his Sunday TV show *Aló Presidente*, which seldom lasts less than six hours – a mix of edutainment and government declaration. Thus, apart from being a politician, he must be seen as a people's educator: “There will be no revolution, if we do not decolonize our souls,” he said in a speech on April 30, 2008.

SEE ALSO: Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–Present; Rodríguez, Simón (1769–1854); Zamora, Ezequiel (1817–1860)

References and Suggested Readings

- Blanco Muñoz, A. (1998) *Habla el comandante Hugo Chávez Frías*. Caracas: Fundación Catedra.
- Ceresole, N. C. (2000) *Ejército, pueblo. La Venezuela del Comandante Chávez*. Madrid: Al-Ándalus.
- Chávez, H. & Harnecker, M. (2002) *Un hombre, un pueblo*. Caracas: Entrevista.
- Denis, R. (2001) *Los fabricantes de la rebellion. Movimiento popular, chavismo y sociedad en los años noventa*. Caracas: Primera Línea.
- Garrido, A. (1999) *Guerrilla y conspiración military en Venezuela*. Caracas: Lithopolar.
- Golinger, E. (2005) *El código Chávez. Decifrando la intervención de los EE.UU en Venezuela*. Caracas: Fondo Editorial Question.
- Gott, R. (2000) *In the Shadow of the Liberator: Hugo Chávez and the Transformation of Venezuela*. London: Verso.
- Twickel, C. (2006) *Hugo Chávez. Eine Biographie*. Hamburg: Nautilus.

Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–present

Gregory Wilpert

That Venezuelans should elect Hugo Chávez, a complete outsider, someone who only six years earlier tried to overthrow a president via a military rebellion, should not have come as much of a surprise given the political and economic crisis the country suffered. In the 20 years prior to Chávez's election, poverty had increased from 15 percent to over 60 percent, corruption was perceived to be rampant, and abstention had reached historic proportions. Chávez promised to set the country right again by promising nothing less than a revolution – a Bolivarian revolution, named after Latin American independence hero Simón Bolívar.

While Chávez initially enjoyed support from a broad segment of Venezuela's middle class and even from some of the country's elite, such as segments of its domestic business class and even from a key member of its transnational business class (Gustavo Cisneros, Latin America's media mogul), his support shifted dramatically after his first three years in office. His middle- and upper-class support rapidly turned into enmity, so that his support eventually came almost entirely from the country's urban and rural poor. The process by which this shift in support

took place was the result of Chávez's rejection of the country's old elite, his identification with the country's poor, and his pursuit of policies that redistributed the country's oil wealth and political power towards the poor.

1998 Election

Chávez's promise of radical change appealed to a broad segment of Venezuela's population, including most progressive groups and social movements, leftist and even centrist political parties, and large parts of the middle and even upper class. The reason for this broad support was that the country had been undergoing a 20-year period of steep economic and political decline, which had pushed a large part of the country into poverty and had completely destroyed the old regime's legitimacy. Venezuelans thus were desperate for real change. However, to get elected, Chávez needed to form a political party. He could not directly transform his clandestine revolutionary organization that had organized the 1992 coup attempt, the MBR-200 (Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200/Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement-200) into a political party because it was a loose movement and because Venezuelan electoral law did not allow the use of the name Bolívar for political parties. Chávez's new political party was thus named the Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento Quinta República) (MVR). The party wanted to found a fifth republic (using the Roman numeral "V") in that it counted four since Venezuela's independence and the fifth would begin with the passage of a new constitution.

Parties that ended up supporting Chávez's bid for the presidency included the PPT (Patria para Todos – Fatherland for All), MAS (Movimiento Al Socialismo – Movement Towards Socialism), Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo (Electoral Movement of the People) (MEP), Partido Comunista de Venezuela (Communist Party of Venezuela) (PCV), Bandera Roja (Red Flag), and Gente Emergente (Emergent People). Of the parties in the pro-Chávez coalition only the MVR had some centrist nationalists in it. The others were all parties with a long leftist tradition.

The 1998 presidential contest boiled down to an establishment candidate (Henrique Salas Römer), who was supported by the country's two former governing parties, the social democratic

Acción Democrática and the Christian democratic Copei, and the anti-establishment candidate, Hugo Chávez. Given the country's disgust with the old political establishment, Chávez won easily, with 56.2 percent of the vote – one of the largest margins in Venezuela's history.

However, even though Chávez had a clear mandate for the task of transforming Venezuela's political system, the country's old political class, once it realized that Chávez could not be coopted, rejected Chávez as the legitimately elected president. At first, there was not much this former governing class could do, except to denounce the new president in the private mass media outlets that it controlled. Eventually, though, the opposition gained momentum and managed to destabilize the country severely in its all-out effort to oust Chávez. One can divide this battle into four distinct phases: new constitution and consolidation of power; coup attempt and Chávez's retreat; oil industry shutdown and Chávez's comeback; and recall referendum and radicalization.

1999 Constitution and Consolidation of Power

Chávez's landslide election, with crucial support from segments of Venezuela's middle and upper classes, gave him a mandate to convoke a constitutional assembly and to introduce far-reaching changes to Venezuela's political system. At first, those segments of the upper class that supported Chávez assumed he would be just like many politicians before him and would agree to do their bidding by appointing ministers out of their ranks. They presented him with a list of possible appointees, all of which came from the upper ranks of the country's business and media elite. Chávez rejected all of their suggestions and thus the stage was set for confrontation. Chávez proceeded with his plan to convoke a referendum on whether the country should hold a constitutional assembly. Voters easily approved the project. Next, a vote was held for who should constitute this assembly. Still riding his wave of popularity, Chávez won this vote overwhelmingly when 95 percent of the assembly members who were elected were supporters of his. Following a relatively accelerated discussion process, the new constitution was put to a vote in December 1999, when it passed with 72 percent in its favor. With the new constitution in place, all

elected offices had to be renewed in August 2000. In the National Assembly election the pro-Chávez coalition won two-thirds of the seats, with Chávez's own party, the MVR, winning just under an absolute majority. Also, in the regional elections for state governors and city mayors, Chávez supporters won a majority. Chávez was also reelected, this time to a six-year term, winning 59 percent of the vote.

The new 1999 constitution introduced many important changes to Venezuela's political system. One of its main objectives was to create a democracy that was both representative and participatory. The participatory elements included the possibility of organizing citizen-initiated referenda to recall any elected official, to rescind or approve laws, and to consult the population on important policy issues. Also, the new constitution opened up the possibility of forms of direct democracy at the local level, via local planning councils and citizen assemblies, which would later become the basis for the creation of communal councils. Another key objective of the 1999 constitution was to include previously marginalized segments of the population, such as the country's indigenous population, which received a series of new rights to their lands, culture, and language, and Venezuelan women, who received rights to non-discrimination and to affirmative action in all governmental programs. Also, in terms of human rights, the new constitution gives constitutional rank to all international human rights treaties. Another important change includes the creation of two new independent branches of government, the electoral power and the "citizen" power, which includes the attorney general, comptroller general, and human rights ombudsperson. The new constitution's most controversial aspect was that it slightly strengthened the office of the president by increasing the term in office from five to six years, allowing for one immediate reelection, and by giving the president stronger control over the military by allowing him or her to make all upper-level promotions. Finally, in an important departure from most constitutions in the world, it raises the state's commitment to achieve social justice to the same level as the state's commitment to the rule of law (article 2).

By winning the so-called "mega-elections" of August 2000, Chávez consolidated his control over the country's executive, with his supporters controlling the other four branches of government:

the judiciary, the legislature, the electoral power, and the “citizen” power. Chávez then had to act fast to introduce social programs to address some of the most urgent needs of the country’s poor. Since state revenues were quite low, largely due to an oil price that had hit rock-bottom in 1998 at around \$10 per barrel, Chávez immediately set about reconsolidating OPEC, so as to raise international oil prices. Chávez visited all OPEC members in 1999, plus several non-OPEC oil producers, and managed to convince them to lower oil production. The result was immediate and prices started to climb again. However, in order to save money, Chávez also got the military involved in the organization and provision of a new social program known as Plan Bolívar 2000. This plan provided free food in the country’s poorest neighborhoods and improved barrio housing, among other issues.

Meanwhile, the opposition, since it was increasingly locked out of political power for the first time in 40 years, still could not accept Chávez as the legitimately elected president. At first, given Chávez’s political momentum, there was little the opposition could do to stop him. However, as Chávez’s honeymoon began to wear off and his approval ratings started to go down – as they had to – from the unheard of heights of 90 percent approval, the former political class managed to regain its foothold in Venezuela’s middle class by waging a relentless media campaign against the new president. Chávez ignored this development, which took place throughout 2001, and forged ahead with his larger political program by presenting a set of 49 law decrees in October of that year, which Venezuela’s National Assembly had in the previous year given him the authority to pass. The 49 law decrees were supposed to bring Venezuela’s legal framework up to date with the new constitution and introduced far-reaching reforms, particularly in terms of a comprehensive land reform and large tax increases for the oil industry.

Heightened Resistance, Coup Attempt, and Retreat

The outcry against these law decrees was immediate. Fedecamaras, the country’s largest and most important chamber of commerce, which unites most of Venezuela’s big businesses, complained that the laws were anti-business,

undermined private property rights, and were passed without consulting them or anyone outside of government circles. Venezuela’s main union federation, the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV), quickly supported Fedecamaras, arguing that the laws were harmful to Venezuela’s business community and therefore harmful to Venezuelan workers. A more likely explanation for the CTV’s support, in addition to its ties to the former governing party AD, was that the CTV had just gone through a pitched battle with the government over who would control the organization. A month earlier Chávez had forced the CTV leadership to submit itself to a grassroots vote, which the federation’s old established leadership won amid Chávez supporters’ claims of fraud, resulting in the government’s non-recognition of the leadership. The result of this vehement CTV/Fedecamaras opposition to the government was that the two organizations called for a general strike on December 10, 2001. The strike met with moderate success, but the private media’s bias and the private sector’s lockout of employees for a day gave the strike a heightened visible effect.

But it was not only the package of 49 laws that added fire to Venezuela’s conflict. Another crucial factor was that the economy abruptly slowed down in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attack on the US. The attack sparked a worldwide recession and with it a drop in the price of oil. This double blow forced the government to adjust its budget and cut back spending in all areas by at least 10 percent, meaning that Plan Bolívar 2000 had to be abandoned, among other things. The impact was almost immediately noticeable, as unemployment and poverty began inching upwards again after they had declined in 2000 and 2001.

Meanwhile, there was an escalation of verbal attacks between Chávez and the opposition. The economic downturn, the 49 laws, and Chávez’s strongly worded discourse against the “squalid opposition” and the “rancid oligarchy” all made it relatively easy for the opposition to chip away at Chávez’s popularity, along with substantial help from the private mass media. Opposition opinion polls indicated that Chávez’s popularity declined rapidly in this period, from a popularity rating of around 60–70 percent to 30–40 percent between June 2001 and January 2002.

This was the context in which the opposition became convinced that it could oust Chávez –

whose legitimacy it never truly accepted – before the end of his presidency. Three specific attempts took place between January 2002 and August 2004. The first was the April 2002 coup attempt, whose apparent detonator was the oil industry management's resistance to Chávez's efforts to wrestle control of the state-owned oil industry away from the old management. Crucial to the coup, however, was a disgruntled sector of the military that, for a variety of ideological and opportunistic reasons, believed it could and should get rid of Chávez. The failure of the coup, a mere 47 hours after Chávez was removed from office, was emblematic of all subsequent opposition failures to oust Chávez from the presidency. The opposition consistently underestimated the president's popularity – especially among the poor – believing instead the mass media's constant claim that Chávez was highly unpopular and incapable as president. It was precisely Chávez's popularity among the country's poor and the military that swept him back into the presidency.

For the opposition this was a bitter defeat because it lost an important base of its power: the military. With Chávez's election, the country's old elite had already lost the presidency, which in Venezuela's very presidentialist society is by far the most important form of political power. Each subsequent effort to oust Chávez, the oil industry shutdown and the recall referendum, represented the loss of another base of opposition power.

Chávez's reaction to the coup attempt, after his return, was to moderate his tone and to play it safe. He put a new economic team in charge that appeared to move to the mainstream and promised to include the opposition more in his policy deliberations. Also, he reinstated the old board of directors and former managers of the state oil company PDVSA, whose replacement had been one of the reasons for the coup.

Oil Industry Shutdown and Chávez's Comeback

Following a brief period of uncertain calm and few policy initiatives, the opposition interpreted Chávez's retreat as an opportunity for another offensive against him, this time by organizing an indefinite shutdown of the country's all-important oil industry in early December 2002. While the opposition labeled this action

a general strike, it actually was a combination of management lockout, administrative and professional employee strike, and general sabotage. Also, it was mostly the US fast food franchises and the upscale shopping malls that were closed for about two months. The rest of the country operated more or less normally during this time, except for food and gasoline shortages throughout the country, mostly because many distribution centers were closed down. Eventually, the shutdown was defeated, once again due to the opposition's underestimation of Chávez's support. While about 19,000 employees (about half of the oil company's workforce) were eventually fired for abandoning their workplaces, the government managed nonetheless to restart the oil company with the help of blue collar workers, retired workers, foreign contractors, and the military. The opposition thus lost another crucial base of power, this time in the oil industry, whose managers were practically all opposition supporters and were all removed from their jobs.

Despite the oil industry's eventual recovery, the strike represented a severe blow to Venezuela's economy, which shrank an unprecedented 26 percent in the first quarter of 2003, relative to the same quarter of the previous year. Unemployment skyrocketed to over 22 percent in March and capital flight caused the currency to plummet. It is estimated that the oil industry shutdown cost the industry over \$14 billion in lost revenues. The oil industry's recovery – which was said to be complete by May 2003 – along with a dramatically increasing price of oil and thus oil revenues, meant that Chávez gradually had the resources to introduce new social programs, called missions, to address the desperate needs of the country's poor. The first missions Chávez introduced between late 2003 and early 2004 were for literacy training (Mission Robinson), high school completion (Mission Ribas), university scholarships (Mission Sucre), community healthcare (Mission Barrio Adentro), and subsidized food markets (Mission Mercal). The population living in the barrios welcomed these missions with great enthusiasm, contributing to Chávez's renewed rise in opinion polls.

Recall Referendum and Radicalization

The third and last attempt to oust Chávez during his first full six-year term in office was

the August 2004 recall referendum. After having suffered defeat in two consecutive illegal attempts, the opposition was forced to follow the only democratic and constitutional route for getting rid of the president. The commitment to follow a strictly constitutional route for resolving Venezuela's political crisis was formalized following many months of negotiations in a signed agreement between opposition and government that the Organization of American States and the Carter Center facilitated in May 2003. Eventually, once the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the rules governing recall referenda were in place, which took until the end of 2003, the opposition collected 3.1 million signatures in December of that year. Of these, following much political debate, 2.5 million signatures were validated – a mere 100,000 over the required sum of 20 percent of registered voters – and a referendum was convoked for August 15, 2004. The vote took place peacefully and the following morning, shortly after 4 a.m. on August 16, the CNE announced the first preliminary results of the referendum, giving Chávez a 58 percent to 42 percent victory. Immediately after the announcement, opposition leaders held a press conference in which they stated unequivocally that fraud had been perpetrated. They offered no evidence for this claim, however. Election observer missions of the Organization of American States and of the Carter Center ratified the official result.

For the opposition, this was perhaps the most bitter defeat of them all. Not only did it no longer have a base of power in the executive, in the military, or in the oil industry, it had also lost perhaps its most important base of power in the middle class. That is, following three years of continuous battle with Chávez, promising its supporters that he was on his way out and that Chávez was illegitimate because the opposition represented the majority, opposition supporters increasingly saw their leadership as being hollow and incompetent. Polls shortly after the recall referendum documented a dramatic loss of support for the opposition, so that only 15 percent of Venezuelans said they identified with the opposition.

While the opposition leadership managed to win over and then gradually lose middle-class support, between 1999 and 2006 Chávez won over ever more solid support from the country's poor. This can be seen most clearly in the

voting pattern of different neighborhoods with different average incomes. For example, while middle-class neighborhoods voted for Chávez by around 50–60 percent in 1998; for the 2004 recall referendum these neighborhoods tended to vote against him at a rate of 60–70 percent. In contrast, although support for Chávez in poor neighborhoods remained in the range of 60–70 percent in 1998 and 2004, voter registration and participation increased dramatically in these neighborhoods, thus giving Chávez a decisive edge in 2004 and 2006.

Chávez and the Bolivarian movement that supported him realized the near total loss of opposition power and thus saw themselves in a position to further radicalize the government's political program. In his victory speech following the recall referendum, Chávez announced that a new phase of his government would begin. "From today until December 2006 begins a new phase of the Bolivarian revolution, to give continuity to the social missions, to the struggle against injustice, exclusion, and poverty. I invite all, including the opposition, to join in the work to make Venezuela a country of justice, with the rule of law and with social justice." Later, in January 2005, Chávez took this call for a new phase even further by announcing that from now on his government would seek to build socialism of the twenty-first century in Venezuela. Thus, the continuous efforts of the opposition to oust Chávez, based on its non-recognition of his legitimacy, led to a continuous weakening of this opposition and to the concomitant opportunity for Chávez and the Bolivarian movement to radicalize their program.

The main expression this radicalization found during this period was in the creation of a nationwide effort to develop communal councils. These councils, which were first launched in early 2005, are constituted by 200 to 400 families in a contiguous neighborhood. They represented an effort to deepen participatory democracy by giving them power and funds to decide on important infrastructure projects in their neighborhoods. Also, these councils represented a pooling of grassroots mobilizing that had taken place over the previous five years, whereby communities founded health committees to work with the community health program, water committees to work on improving the water supply, urban land committees to work on acquiring ownership title to barrio homes, and

education committees to work with educational missions, etc. With the creation of communal councils all these committees were turned into work committees of the councils, thereby pooling and systematizing community organizing. While the opposition decried the communal councils as tools of patronage and clientelism, the communities themselves largely welcomed them enthusiastically and formed over 20,000 throughout the country by late 2007.

Chávez's call to build twenty-first-century socialism received another boost on December 3, 2006 when he decisively won a second six-year term. Chávez beat the opposition candidate Manuel Rosales with 62.9 percent to 37.9 percent. This 26 percentage point margin of victory was the largest in Venezuelan history. Also, Chávez managed to nearly double his support from an initial 3.7 million votes in 1998 to 7.1 million in 2006. More significant than the increase in support, though, was that Rosales admitted that Chávez defeated him. This was the first time that an opposition leader conceded defeat in a confrontation with Chávez since he was first elected in 1998. In none of the opposition's confrontations with Chávez, whether following the 2002 coup attempt, the 2003 oil industry shutdown, or the 2004 recall referendum, did the opposition admit defeat. This implies that the 2006 presidential election was the first time in Chávez's presidency that the opposition recognized Chávez as the legitimately elected president and thus opened the path towards a normalization of Venezuelan politics in the Chávez era.

Hubris and Renewal of the Bolivarian Movement

At the start of his second term in office in January 2007 Chávez seemed unstoppable. His popularity had reached new highs and his mandate to create twenty-first-century socialism for Venezuela was indisputable. The first thing Chávez announced after his reelection victory was the creation of a new political party for socialism, the reform of the 1999 constitution, a new enabling law that would allow him to nationalize key industries, the politico-territorial reorganization of the country, and the deepening of communal power.

When the broadcast license of the oppositional TV station RCTV was up for renewal on May 27, 2007, Chávez decided to let the license

lapse and to give the wavelength to a new state TV channel. This was perhaps Chávez's most unpopular decision of his presidency, since RCTV was the country's most widely watched TV station. However, Chávez and his supporters argued that since RCTV participated in the April 2002 coup attempt and since it continued to violate broadcast regulations, it did not deserve to have its license renewed. This move gave the opposition an opening to launch a new movement against Chávez, this time, though, headed by new student leaders mostly coming from the country's private universities.

Many of the other changes Chávez had announced for 2007 depended on the constitutional reform effort, which he presented in August of that year. The National Assembly, which had to pass the president's proposal before it could be put to a national referendum, added another 36 articles to be reformed to Chávez's original proposal of 33 articles. The reform was to address four major areas: strengthening participatory democracy, broadening social inclusion, supporting non-neoliberal economic development, and strengthening central government. The first two of these were relatively uncontroversial, but the second two, which included shortening the working week, strengthening land reform, removing central bank autonomy, and removing the two-term limit on holding presidential office, were far more controversial.

The combination of the reform's top-down development, its complexity, well-orchestrated disinformation by the opposition, the government's neglect of key social programs, and the defection of prominent Chávez supporters all contributed to the referendum's eventual failure, despite Chávez's continuing popularity. The reform was defeated with a vote of only 50.7 percent against it, but it was generally interpreted as a major loss for Chávez and the Bolivarian movement. Based on an analysis of the referendum results by voting center, it was clear that the main reason the referendum failed was because Chávez's supporters did not turn out to vote as strongly as they did in previous elections. The result prompted Chávez to launch a process of "reevaluation, revision, and relaunch" of the effort to establish twenty-first-century socialism.

The demise of the constitutional reform project took place in parallel to the effort to start a new party, the Unified Socialist Party of

Venezuela (PSUV), which brought together supporters from all parties of the pro-Chávez coalition. By April 2008 PSUV delegates, who had been elected in a grassroots democratic process, approved of an explicitly anti-capitalist party program and a new leadership for the Bolivarian movement that came mostly from the country's traditional left (between the center left and the far left). With the formation of the PSUV it seemed that the Bolivarian movement was gradually developing a structure that would be less dependent on Chávez and thus more long lasting and better equipped to develop new leadership and to channel debate within the movement.

SEE ALSO: Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); Bolivarianism, Venezuela; Venezuela, Exclusionary Democracy and Resistance, 1958–1998

References and Suggested Readings

- Ellner, S. (2008) *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Ellner, S. & Hellinger, D. (Eds.) (2003) *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Ellner, S. & Tinker Salas, M. (Eds.) (2007) *Venezuela: Hugo Chávez and the Decline of an "Exceptional Democracy"*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Gott, R. (2005) *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*. New York: Verso.
- Jones, B. (2007) *Hugo! The Hugo Chávez Story from Mud Hut to Perpetual Revolution*. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press.
- Raby, D. L. (2006) *Democracy and Revolution: Latin America and Socialism Today*. London: Pluto Press.
- Wilpert, G. (2007) *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power: The History and Policies of the Chávez Government*. New York: Verso.

Chen Duxiu (1879–1942)

Alexander V. Pantsov

If there is one individual who deserves to be remembered as the “father of Chinese Communism” it is not Mao Zedong but Chen Duxiu. And yet in China and elsewhere Chen Duxiu's name has been all but forgotten. The obscurity of Chen's historical reputation is not accidental. His leading role in the origins of the political party that came to power in China in 1949 was deliberately erased from the standard history books

in a concerted effort by Mao Zedong and his minions.

Chen Duxiu, whose real name was Chen Qiansheng, was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its earliest leader. He was born at Huaining (now Anqing), capital of Anhui Province, into a moderately wealthy middle-class family and received a classical Chinese education. He also attended lectures at various modern schools in China and Japan. In Tokyo in 1902, together with Zhang Ji and Feng Ziyou, who later rose to prominence in the Guomindang (Nationalist Party), Chen organized the Chinese Youth Society to promote the National revolution. Returning to China the next year, he engaged in intense revolutionary activity and participated in establishing progressive newspapers and magazines in Shanghai as well as Anhui.

Following the anti-monarchical Chinese Nationalist Revolution of 1911–12, Chen served as head of the secretariat of the new revolutionary provincial government in Anhui. In the summer of 1915, in Shanghai's foreign settlement, he founded the journal *Qingnian* (Youth), later renamed *Xin qingnian* (New Youth). This journal quickly became one of the most influential forces in promoting western-style concepts such as democracy, humanism, and scientific methods. Such was the origin of Chen Duxiu's seminal campaign for a new culture to replace the “Confucian Family Shop,” as he contemptuously described China's traditional Confucian ethos. This campaign stimulated China's new-style intelligentsia to search for new theories and concepts with which to resolve China's continuing economic, political, and social crisis. *Xin qingnian* also played a vital role in promoting the replacement of China's archaic classical language with a literary form of the vernacular in education, literature, and the press.

In 1917 Chen was invited to become the dean of Beijing University's Faculty of Letters, a post he occupied until 1919. In Beijing, along with Cai Yuanpei, the university's president, and Professors Li Dazhao and Hu Shi, Chen initiated and led the May 4th movement of 1919. The political content of this activity was anti-imperialist, and aimed at combating Japan's occupation of Chinese territories and the West's collusion with that occupation. The May 4th movement also opposed the reactionary Beijing warlord regime that had failed to resist Japan's

encroachments. Because of his role in the movement, Chen was arrested and jailed for 83 days. Upon his release, he left Beijing for Shanghai.

During the May 4th movement, workers entered upon the stage of Chinese politics for the first time. This action alerted Chen Duxiu to the Marxist tenet that workers play a vital historical role in world progress. In April 1920, shortly after the May 4th movement, Grigorii Voitinsky (Zarkhin), a Russian Jew who was the special envoy of the Vladivostok department of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Russian Communist Party, arrived in China. His special mission was to make contact with radical democrats and help them to create Marxist “nuclei” (small leadership groups with the goal of developing mass movements). Voitinsky met Chen Duxiu and in the summer of 1920 helped him establish the Shanghai Marxist nucleus, which was the first such organization in China. *Xin qingnian* became the chief voice of these Marxist groups. In late July and early August 1921 representatives of various Chinese Marxist organizations assembled in Shanghai to hold the inaugural congress of the CCP, at which Chen Duxiu was elected secretary of the party’s central bureau. (In 1922, this post was renamed “chairman,” and in 1925, “general secretary of the party’s central executive.” Chen Duxiu occupied this post until July 1927.) As the party’s central leader, he took an active part in organizing the First United Front with the Guomindang, and in the preparation and execution of the National Revolution of 1925–7.

During the revolution, as leader of the CCP Chen Duxiu was obliged to submit to Comintern discipline and to follow the Stalinist concept of the united front, which required Chinese communists to subordinate themselves to Guomindang leadership. In 1927 this policy proved disastrous, resulting in the Guomindang’s massacre of many thousands of communists. Stalin used Chen Duxiu as the scapegoat for the failure of a policy for which Stalin himself bore ultimate responsibility in designing.

In July 1927 Chen Duxiu resigned as general secretary. Unwilling to accept the role of scapegoat, he declined invitations to Moscow from the executive committee of the Comintern (ECCI). Nevertheless, the new CCP leadership as well as the ECCI launched a harsh campaign of criticism against him. In response to this challenge, in the autumn of 1929 an important group of party members gathered around Chen Duxiu, form-

ing an internal fraction within the CCP. They denounced the increasing tendency to subordinate party policy to the state interests of the USSR, and demanded an end to the campaign of vilification waged against Chen Duxiu. In addition they called upon the party to admit the extent of the defeat suffered by the communist movement, advancing the argument that the country had entered a period of relative bourgeois stabilization. After several warnings from the new party leaders to toe the line or face the consequences, Chen and four of his closest associates were expelled from the party on November 15, 1929, a decision confirmed by the Presidium of the ECCI on December 30, 1929 and formally implemented on June 11, 1930. A number of others were expelled a month later.

Meanwhile, through some of his followers who were in touch with several of Leon Trotsky’s supporters in China, Chen Duxiu became acquainted with Trotsky’s ideas about the Chinese revolution. Contrary to Stalin, Trotsky supported the complete political independence of the CCP, emphasizing that the true aim of the communists should be to prepare the workers’ liberation. Encouraged by the Trotskyist program, on December 10, 1929 Chen Duxiu sent an open letter to all members of the party in which he exposed the Comintern’s fateful mistakes in China. Soon afterward, in early 1930, he founded the Communist Left Opposition group and began to publish a propaganda journal entitled *Wuchanzhe* (The Proletarian). Chen and his followers continued to denounce the Comintern and CCP leadership, and defended Trotsky’s theory of the Chinese revolution. Even though it was the largest pro-Trotskyist organization in China, Chen Duxiu’s group did not exert much influence on the revolutionary movement. This situation did not change even after the unification conference of various Chinese Trotskyists that was held in May 1931. At this conference Chen Duxiu was elected secretary of the executive committee of the merged party, which numbered just 483 members.

This small Trotskyist group existed for only a short time. By the end of 1932 all of its founding leaders were in Guomindang prisons. Chen himself was the last to be arrested, on October 15, 1932. In the spring of 1933 he was tried before the Jiangsu provincial High Court and sentenced to 15 years in prison. On August 19, 1937, just six weeks after the outbreak of war

against Japan, he was paroled. Upon his release, he announced that he would not associate with any political group. He went into retirement in a small town in Sichuan Province, and devoted himself to the study of modern political science, philosophy, and ancient Chinese philology. In 1940–2 he wrote a number of papers and letters to his friends in which he expressed his deep disappointment in any kind of totalitarian dictatorship, including the proletarian one. Thus, toward the end of his life, he returned to the ideals of his youth, pointing out the significance of “eternal” principles such as democracy, humanism, and scientific methods. He died on May 27, 1942, at the age of 63. After Mao Zedong came to power his regime attempted to eradicate Chen Duxiu and the Chinese Trotskyists from historical memory, even to the extent of dynamiting his grave.

SEE ALSO: China, May 4th Movement; China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911; Marxism; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- Dangshi yanjiu ziliao* (1982) Study Materials on Party History, Vol. 2, 2nd ed. Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 796.
- Pantsov, A. (1996) Chen Duxiu (1879–1942). In *Collier's Encyclopedia*, Vol. 6. New York: P. F. Collier, pp. 180–180A.
- Reusch, J. (1977) Die Marxismus Rezeption bei Ch'en Tu-hsiu, 1879–1942. PhD dissertation, Bonn, Germany.

Chernov, Victor (1873–1952)

Sally A. Boniece

Victor Mikhailovich Chernov, co-founder and leader of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party from its inception in 1901 until its demise at the hands of the Bolshevik/Communist-led Soviet government in the early 1920s, drew from both Marxism and populism to advocate the union of the “toiling” classes of workers and peasants against political and economic oppression. Architect of the party's maximum and minimum programs approved at the first SR congress in early 1906, his unique contribution to Russian socialism was his emphasis on “socialization of the land,” a concept

that he took care to differentiate from “nationalization of the land” as proposed by European and American agrarian reformers and as implemented by the Bolshevik/Communist Party several decades later. For Chernov, socialization meant taking the land out of commodity circulation by doing away with private ownership. The land would then belong to all of the people. His idea was quite different to nationalization, however, which called for the transfer of all land ownership to the central power.

The author of a land socialization platform that would ultimately be appropriated and corrupted by the victorious Bolshevik/Communist Party, Chernov was born the grandson of a serf in Samara province; his father, however, had advanced the family's social status through education and service in the provincial bureaucracy. He became involved in student radicalism while completing his secondary education in Saratov and led a circle of “young populists” as a law student at Moscow State University in the early 1890s. Exiled under police supervision to Tambov province in 1895, Chernov joined local intellectuals in propagandizing the ideals of Russian populism among secondary students, workers, and peasants, an experience that imbued him with a mission to focus on socialism as a movement of social justice rather than selfish economic gain. After assisting in organizing Russia's first peasant Brotherhood for the Defense of the People's Rights in Tambov, Chernov focused on establishing a national organization of like-minded populists that would coordinate propagandizing and agitation among peasants across the empire.

Having emigrated to Europe to avoid imprisonment by the government of Tsar Nicholas II, Chernov returned to Russia after the February revolution of 1917 forced the tsar to relinquish his throne. In the summer of 1917 Chernov served as minister of agriculture in the Provisional Government of the new Russian republic; in the winter of 1917–18 he was elected chair of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, over which he presided for a single session before it was dispersed by the Bolshevik-led government that had come to power in October.

One of the first decrees issued by the new regime guaranteed the redistribution of all the land to those who worked it; moreover, the Bolsheviks, anxious for peasant support, formed a short-lived alliance with a breakaway group of leftwing SRs who had become disenchanted

with Chernov. The Bolshevik-Left SR coalition allowed the Constituent Assembly to go forward as scheduled but unsuccessfully demanded that its predominantly SR membership acknowledge the primacy of the October revolution and the government of soviets. Instead, the Constituent Assembly in its final hour under Chernov's direction passed a land socialization law that excluded the soviets from carrying out land reform.

During the civil war that followed the Soviet government's dismissal of the Constituent Assembly, Chernov proposed that the SRs lead a democratic "third force" against both the Bolshevik/Communist "Red" dictatorship in the Russian heartland and the rightwing "White" dictatorship in Siberia. While he did not recommend armed combat for his party, "Red" and "White" regimes alike considered him such a pernicious influence that he escaped capture only by leaving Russia. He lived in Prague in the 1920s and 1930s and after 1940 in the United States, where he died of pneumonia in Manhattan in 1952.

SEE ALSO: Leninist Philosophy; Marxism; Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russian Civil War, 1918–1924; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and "Revolution from Above"

References and Suggested Readings

- Chernov, V. (1966) *The Great Russian Revolution*. Trans. P. E. Mosely. New York: Russell & Russell.
- Perrie, M. (1976) *The Agrarian Policy of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party from Its Origins through the Revolution of 1905–1907*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Radkey, O. H. (1958) *The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism: Promise and Default of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, February to October 1917*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sossinsky, S. B. (1995) *Pages from the Life and Work of an SR Leader: A Reappraisal of Victor Chernov*. PhD dissertation, Boston University.

Chernyshevsky, Nikolai G. (1828–1889)

Paul Le Blanc

Nikolai Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky (1828–1889) was a Russian revolutionary populist thinker, writer, and activist. Chernyshevsky's "popul-

ism" blended various elements: a commitment to Enlightenment thought; hostility to the tsarist autocracy; a desire for a democratic society and a socialist economy; a human community in which human freedom would be available to all; and a belief that the masses of Russia's people, particularly the vast laboring classes of countryside and city, must become involved in the struggle for this better future. He became a powerful influence among the Russian intelligentsia in his generation and beyond, due to his writings, his example, and his virtual martyrdom – for "the translation of Populist Socialism into active politics," historian Franco Venturi has noted, "cost Chernyshevsky his life."

Born in Saratov, a town in the lower Volga, into a family with a long tradition of producing ecclesiastics for the Russian Orthodox Church, it was initially assumed that he himself would enter the priesthood. His voraciously inquiring mind and obvious intellectual brilliance, however, drew him along more secular pathways – to literature, the natural and social sciences, philosophy, and history. In contrast to many of Russia's older, aristocratic intellectuals, Chernyshevsky was of more modest birth. He won a scholarship to attend St. Petersburg University, graduating in 1850.

While studying in Petersburg, Chernyshevsky had been radicalized by intellectual currents given special impetus by the revolutionary upsurge that swept through Europe in 1848 – particularly Hegelian philosophy and the atheist-materialist perspectives of Ludwig Feuerbach, and the utopian socialism of Robert Owen and Charles Fourier. These and other interests – for example, what became an influential orientation in the realm of aesthetics – were hardly abandoned when he returned to Saratov to take up a teaching position. From 1855 to 1862 he was a central figure in the widely read journal *The Contemporary* (*Sovremennik*), which took up a wide range of cultural, social, and political questions. Among other contributions were a critical analysis of Darwin's writings, and an engagement with the work of John Stuart Mill (whose *Principles of Political Economy* he translated into Russian). His greatest innovations, however, were in the realm of revolutionary political theory.

Chernyshevsky developed a more radical orientation than that represented by such figures as Herzen, but also a more systematic orientation

that that of such anarchist theorists as Bakunin. In his view, the great mass of Russia's peasant toilers could be the key to the country's future – carrying out a revolution that would topple the tsarist system and creating an agrarian-based socialism based on the traditional village commune (*obchchina*) that – in conjunction with socialist revolutions in the more industrialized areas of Western Europe – could enable Russia to achieve a detour around what he saw as an oppressive capitalist development. While by no means a student of Karl Marx, Chernyshevsky's views did have an influence on the thinking of Marx in the 1870s, and they also helped to shape the orientation of later generations of Russian revolutionaries, including such Marxists as Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

Chernyshevsky was arrested in 1862 on specific charges that appear to have been trumped up, although the more general accusations – that he was steeped in “extremely materialistic and socialist ideas” and was “an extremely dangerous agitator” who was “plotting to overthrow the existing order” – were true enough. Imprisoned while awaiting trial, he continued to write, including his famous novel entitled *What Is To Be Done?*, partially written in response to Ivan Turgenev's literary assault on Russia's revolutionaries in the novel *Fathers and Sons*.

Chernyshevsky's novel has been criticized for limitations of literary style and character development. Nonetheless, as intellectual historian Avrahm Yarmolinsky has noted, “it became the Bible of radical youth.” While its revolutionary message was somewhat veiled in order to avoid censorship, the censor soon caught on, and the work was banned until 1905. Yet *What Is To Be Done?* enjoyed a widespread clandestine circulation among those who shared its author's dream of overthrowing the existing order. (In 1902 Lenin reverently used the title of Chernyshevsky's novel for his own major political tract.) The book's heroine, Vera Pavlova – socialist, free thinker, and feminist – gently preaches her ideals but also demonstrates their positive qualities through the determined way she lives her own life. Other characters in the novel also seek to develop an understanding of the world as it is and the world as it should be, and to live their lives in a manner that can bring a transition from the one to the other. We see the consequent communes of students and intellectuals as a model of cooperative living of all of

society, which will be made possible by production cooperatives providing for the lives of all the people. The paths of personal freedom and devotion to the people are inseparable from uncompromising opposition to the despotism of the tsar, the aristocrats, and the newly emerging capitalists.

Cherneshevky was condemned to 14 years' hard labor and to penal exile for the rest of his life. Amid widespread protests, the Tsar lightened the sentence. Yet he remained in the Siberian hinterland until 1883, when he was allowed to return to Saratov, his health shattered, where he died a few years later.

SEE ALSO: Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich (1812–1870); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marx, Karl (1818–1883)

References and Suggested Readings

- Chernyshevsky, N. G. (1989) *What Is To Be Done?* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Chernyshevsky, N. G. (2002) *Selected Philosophical Essays*. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific.
- Shanin, T. (Ed.) (1983) *Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and “The Peripheries of Capitalism.”* New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Venturi, F. (1983) *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth-Century Russia*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Yarmolinsky, A. (1962) *Road to Revolution: A Century of Russian Radicalism*. New York: Collier Books.

Chile and the peaceful road to socialism

Alan Angell

Chile was the first country in the world to elect a Marxist government. Salvador Allende became president in 1970, heading a coalition of parties, known as the Popular Unity (UP), committed to the revolutionary transformation of the economic, social, and political structure of the country. Yet it was also committed to do so within the confines of the constitutional and legal order. This unique combination of features brought widespread international attention to the country and sparked off a debate about the correct road to socialism, notably within Latin American but also in European countries with powerful left-wing parties such as France and Italy.

Yet the attempted revolution collapsed in 1973 facing hostility from the opposition right, from business sectors, from large sectors of the middle class, from the United States and, finally and decisively, the military. The international debate over the lessons of Chile preoccupied the socialist world for years after 1973, as in Chile a ruthless and repressive dictatorship embarked upon its own revolution – but one combining neoliberal economics with an authoritarian political order.

At first sight, Chile seemed an unlikely country for a revolution – whether peaceful or not. More than many European countries, Chile had a long tradition of respect for the constitution and the laws, well developed political parties of all colors, a military that last intervened in politics in the early 1930s, and regular and fair elections with rotation between the various shades of the political spectrum from a Popular Front government elected in 1938 to a right-wing businessman elected as president in 1958. Unlike neighboring Peru or Bolivia there was no ethnic majority facing entrenched discrimination, left-wing parties and unions were allowed to act freely (though not in the countryside until the 1950s), and there were no real separatist movements in the provinces.

Yet there were profound reasons for political and social discontent, and there were powerful parties and unions of the left that were prepared to act to secure a more egalitarian society. Social discontent was fueled by a combination of erratic growth with persistent inflation. Growth was lower than the Latin American average for the 1950s to the 1970s and inflation was significantly higher. All sorts of remedies were tried but the problem of inflation remained intractable and gave rise to political discontent – not least among labor as it saw incomes eroded by inflation – and a search for new solutions.

Increasing social discontent was one factor producing in the 1960s and early 1970s a massive expansion of political participation. The electorate grew from 1 million in 1958 to over 4 million by 1973. The labor movement doubled in size from 1964 to 1970, including for the first time rural unions. But not only had the working class organized. There were also powerful middle-class associations, known as the *gremios* (guilds) – grouping together professional occupations such as lawyers and doctors, and also the many sorts of small businesses that employed a

majority of the labor force. Society became highly organized and polarized – too much so for the ability of the state to deal with the sharp increase in demands.

Chile was home to the strongest left in Latin America. The Communist Party (PC) had a strong base in the union movement, especially among the coal and copper miners, and was the largest and one of the oldest communist parties in Latin America, and with support from prominent intellectuals such as Chile's Nobel Prize winning poet, Pablo Neruda. But unusually for the continent there was an even larger and more radical socialist party (or rather parties, for splits were a recurring phenomenon). The Socialist Party (PS) has its origins in a short-lived socialist republic in 1932, was electorally stronger than the PC, had a more widespread national presence, and attracted many middle-class members. Always open to new ideological currents, it became much influenced in the 1960s by the success of the Cuban Revolution and declared its sympathy not just for revolution but for a violent revolution if necessary – but only at a theoretical level, as it took no practical steps to engage in revolutionary violence. There were smaller though influential parties even further to the left – notably the Left Revolutionary Movement (MIR) with a strong following among university students, and active leadership in the seizures of farms and the takeover of factories. The MIR was not part of the UP coalition, but gave it what it called “critical support,” and indeed supplied the bodyguards for President Allende.

The Chilean labor movement was highly politicized, with leaders elected with clear political affiliations to the two major forces on the left, but also to the radical but non-Marxist Christian Democratic Party (PDC). A major boost to the union movement came with the decision of the Christian Democratic government to allow rural trade unions to form. Levels of unionization rose and militancy increased, led by the powerful copper mining unions.

But if there was ideological fervor and increasing organization on the left, there were similar developments in the center and the right. Indeed, the prelude to Allende's election was a Christian Democratic government (1964–70) elected on a non-Marxist but very radical platform known as the Revolution in Liberty. Although this government failed in its promise

to curb inflation, it oversaw a process of profound social change with a dramatic expansion in the number of unionists, an equally dramatic expansion of the movement of shanty town dwellers who began an extensive process of land seizures, and the start of the process of state takeover of the copper mines which supplied the vast majority of Chile's export revenue.

The PDC government, and then the election of an even more radical UP government in 1970, galvanized the political right. Chile was very unusual in Latin America in having a political right that commanded the support of close on a third of the electorate. Alarmed by the threat, and then by the reality, of massive land reform and factory expropriation, it abandoned commitment to the democratic process and from the first day of the Allende government sought – with help from the USA – to depose Allende and impose an authoritarian alternative.

The period preceding the 1970 elections was marred by violence. Squatters were killed in the southern town of Puerto Montt by the police. There were constant seizures of farms and factories by their workers. Even the military reflected political unease when the Tacna regiment took to the streets to protest about pay and conditions, and about the rise of the revolutionary left.

The presidential campaign of 1970 was fought between three evenly balanced movements. Former president Jorge Alessandri, candidate of the right and a prominent businessman, was the first to announce his candidacy, and seemed to take the political initiative, but he did poorly in TV programs and in the campaign. Radomiro Tomic, the candidate of the PDC, was on the left of his party. His electoral platform was as radical as that of Allende: he promised to complete the agrarian reform by expropriating all the large estates "from the Andes to the sea." Salvador Allende, a senator and at 62 the presidential candidate of his party for the fourth time, only barely received the nomination of his Socialist Party – a foretaste of the difficulties he was to have with his party when he became president.

Allende had only a narrow margin of victory over Alessandri, with a vote of 36.2 percent to 34.9 percent. Tomic was placed third with 27.8 percent. Although Congress had in the past normally ratified the candidate with the most votes, on this occasion the PDC insisted that

Allende sign a statute of guarantees before they gave him their support in Congress. This was a foretaste of the political suspicion and hostility that was to come. And as a prelude to the violence that was to disfigure Chilean political life, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, General Rene Schneider, was killed in an attempted coup by a group of the extreme right encouraged by the CIA. A capital flight heralded the difficulties that the incoming government was going to have with the business sector.

The UP took power with an ambitious program. It was going to nationalize the commanding heights of the economy, implement a massive program of income distribution, end the dominance of the large farms, transform the political system through the creation of a unicameral legislature, develop popular participation in the running of the economy and the political and legal system, and pursue an independent foreign policy. Yet all this would be achieved within the existing constitutional system: the Chilean road to socialism would be legal and peaceful.

How could this be done? The UP never clearly answered the question, not least because it was a coalition of six different parties all with their distinct ideas over tactics and strategy. Moreover, the president never really controlled his own Socialist Party, which generally advocated more radical measures than Allende thought possible. But most serious of all, the UP lacked a majority in Congress. In the Senate it had 18 seats but the opposition had 32: in the lower house it had 57 to the 93 of the opposition. The gains that the UP made in the 1973 elections only narrowly reduced the majority of the opposition.

A successful economic policy might have overcome these problems, but after a good first year, when there was idle capacity in the economy to be utilized, the deterioration set in. The government's initial action was a massive wage and salary increase – but in effect there was a wages explosion rather than redistribution in favor of the poor. There was an acceleration of land reform, important industries were nationalized (including the copper mines), and by 1971 virtually all the financial sector was under government control.

The government fell victim to international factors as the price of the major export, copper, fell sharply, and to compound the difficulties on the external front, traditional credit sources dried up, and as a result of increased living

standards, the importation of food rose sharply. As workers seized factories, employers in general refused to invest. A black market grew up in response to government attempts to control the distribution of basic necessities. Daily life was a round of queuing for goods in short supply. Inflation went out of control. The opposition in Congress blocked measures for tax reform. The government's strategy had failed. The cost of ignoring short-term fiscal considerations in the interests of a long-term growth strategy based on redistribution was simply too high for a small vulnerable economy like Chile to bear. Worker pressure for higher wages was difficult for a government elected by the workers to resist, but it added to the inflationary spiral and further discouraged those private enterprises that were still functioning. There was some international help from the socialist bloc, but it came too late and was insufficient to help an economy that was already locked into a spiral of recession and inflation.

Economic collapse and political intransigence interacted and reinforced each other. The famous Chilean constitutional system proved too weak to contain political conflict in Allende's Chile. Neither government nor opposition was prepared to make concessions in order to safeguard that system. The opposition indulged in a whole series of measures designed to obstruct the executive: measures which if not illegal certainly violated the conventions of the congressional system. The government too employed measures of dubious legality. Such actions reinforced mutual suspicions and made it difficult to see any way out of the impasse.

The UP government did well at elections in 1971 and 1973, but not well enough to give it unquestioned legitimacy for its reform program. In the municipal elections of 1971 it gained 48.6 percent of the vote to the 48.2 percent for the opposition, but this was still short of a majority and in any case municipal authorities had very little political power. The congressional elections of March 1973 were also rather inconclusive. The UP gained 44.2 percent of the vote (with the socialists taking 18.4 percent and the communists 16.2 percent) and the opposition 54.2 percent (with 28.5 percent for the PDC and 21.1 percent for the far right National Party) and 1.6 percent of the votes blank or void. This result meant that if the government still lacked the moral authority to impose its program then

the opposition for its part lacked the congressional two-thirds majority necessary to impeach the president. The UP considered at various times the possibility of dissolving Congress and calling for a plebiscite to support the president and allow for new congressional elections, but was never united enough to enact the proposal.

The remaining hope for a peaceful resolution was an agreement between the government and the PDC. There were always members of the PDC and always members of the government who wanted and who worked hard for an agreement. And in several cases discussions reached such a level of substantive agreement that it only needed an act of political will for the agreement to be concluded. But forces both inside the PDC and the UP were keener on confrontation than they were on agreement and they were strong enough to have their way. In the end the UP found it easier to bring the military into the Cabinet in October 1972 to deal with the so-called "bosses' strike" than it was to revive talks with the PDC.

Both government and opposition began to mobilize for political confrontation, though the government never seriously considered arming the workers, for such an action would inevitably have produced a military coup from the formidably powerful and united military. The lines of confrontation did not neatly coincide with social classes, for the opposition, especially the PDC, had strong elements of support in the working class. In the elections for the trade union confederation, the CUT, in mid-1972 the PDC took 16 percent of the vote in the blue collar unions and was front runner with 41 percent of the vote in the white collar unions. Indeed, in Santiago the PDC had most votes, with 35,000, compared with 30,000 for the communists and 25,000 for the socialists. In the countryside the PDC and the National Party had considerable support, not least among those farm workers who had benefited from the PDC reforms and did not want to lose those benefits by further reforms involving the collectivization of agriculture.

Political life became increasingly bitter and parties began to organize themselves to fight the class war. On the government side, this process was known as *poder popular* or people's power, and there were a whole host of organizations at the factory and communal level that demanded a share in political power. The most radical expression was the *cordones industriales*, the organizations of

workers and squatters set up in the working-class belt that surrounded Santiago. They took shape during the bosses strike of 1972 in an effort to run industries and administer local services, and at their height counted on some 100,000 members. They were not, however, docile supporters of the government. On the contrary, they argued for an intensification of the revolutionary process just at a time when the government was trying to restrain change in the hope of restoring some degree of political and economic order. The *cordones* were never strong enough to launch a successful revolution, but they were strong enough to alarm the right, and to add fuel to its conviction that the only way out of the deadlock was by military coup.

As impressive as the growth of popular organizations was the parallel development of those professional associations known in Chile as the *gremios*. They brought together doctors, lawyers, architects, small shopkeepers, taxi drivers, small businessmen, and other non-manual workers in an impressive range of organizations dedicated to defying the UP government. In 1973 a Comando Nacional del Defensa Gremial was created to coordinate the activities of hundreds of *gremios*.

Although these associations enjoyed financial support from Chilean big business and the USA, it would be a mistake to see them as the pliant instruments of larger interests. The UP failed to win over the support of the middle class, in spite of Allende's insistent and consistent attempts to do so. But whatever Allende said, there was the example of factory and farm takeover, of worker indiscipline, and of economic shortages to persuade small businessmen and farmers that their real interests lay with the right. The opposition press incessantly played on these fears by drawing parallels between Chile and Castro's Cuba.

The major confrontation with these groups came in October 1972 after a proposal to increase state control over supplies to the trucking companies. The truckers went on strike and economic activity was paralyzed. There were solidarity strikes from other *gremios*. The armed forces were incorporated into the Cabinet and this brought the strike to an end, but it was a temporary reprieve only. The slide into anarchy continued.

With both government and opposition lined up against each other in bitter confrontation, with the economy out of control, with the commander-

in-chief of the armed forces resigning after his failure to mediate, with the Church unable to bring the sides together, and with increasing violence, there was little prospect of a peaceful solution. The end came with a violent military coup on September 11, 1973, with the bombing of the presidential palace, with the death of Allende, and with the murder and imprisonment of thousands of Chileans.

It seems difficult to see how Allende could have avoided a coup. He was too weak and the opposition too strong. Allende was never in complete control of his followers and that control weakened even more as time passed. There was bitter disagreement inside the UP coalition about the right road to take and no effective mechanism for reconciling differences. As the economy deteriorated, massive mobilization in the shanty towns and factories put pressure on a government unable to meet their demands.

But as the government weakened, the opposition grew stronger. It could use its congressional strength to veto government proposals, it could mobilize support on the streets on a scale enough to worry any government, it had substantial backing from the USA, and it gained the support of the courts, which abandoned their normal political neutrality to join the call for the ousting of the president. The final blow came with the decision of the military to overthrow the government.

The UP, and indeed civilian politicians in general, tended to assume that the Chilean military was constitutional and not likely to be drawn into politics. Allende himself was scrupulous in not interfering in internal military affairs, and in paying higher salaries to the military. But the military could hardly remain indifferent to the political conflict and not long after the election groups of civilian right-wing politicians began to call on them to intervene. Once involved in the Cabinet at a result of the October 1972 conflict, it became inevitable that they would consider political solutions to the crisis. The commander-in-chief, Carlos Prats, was a loyal defender of the constitution, but he lost the confidence of the other generals, and when he resigned in August 1973, those who favored a coup were in a stronger position. Tensions between the army and the left heightened as military searches for arms in the factories led to bitter clashes, though few arms were actually found. The major plotters were the commander

of the navy, Admiral Merino, and the commander of the air force, General Leigh. The newly appointed head of the army, General Augusto Pinochet, was a late and reluctant plotter, but once he signaled his support the armed forces moved with terrifying speed and ferocity to install a military government. Another utopia was eventually offered – or more accurately imposed by force – but this time the offer was to be a dramatically different combination of free market economics and political dictatorship.

It is difficult to exaggerate the impact of the failure of the UP experiment on the political consciousness of a wide variety of countries. In the European Parliament the country most debated (and condemned) for many years after 1973 was Chile. In Britain Allende's ambassador to that country, Alvaro Bunster, became the first foreigner to address the conference of the Labour Party since La Pasionaria at the time of the Spanish Civil War. In Italy analysis of the coup by the Communist Party and its intellectual leader Enrico Berlinguer led to the "historic compromise" by which the Italian CP joined the government for the first time for many years. In France the Socialist Party debated long and hard how to change its tactics after the Chilean coup. In Moscow the lesson learnt was that revolutionary transformation needed to be slower and more gradual and with the CP in the dominant role. China – and Cuba – drew the opposite lesson, arguing that the government lacked audacity and that only armed violence could achieve success against the domestic and international bourgeoisie.

But the most important lesson for Chilean politicians – though agreement was reached only in the late 1980s – was that the errors of the UP had to be avoided and that only political consensus and a market economy would produce political stability and sustained economic growth. There would be no more attempts at revolutionary transformation.

SEE ALSO: Mapuche Indian Resistance; Uruguay, Labor and Popular Movements, 1965–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Angell, A. (1972) *Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Angell, A. (1991) Chile since 1958. In L. Bethell (Ed.), *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, Vol. 8. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Bitar, S. (1986) *Chile: Experiment in Democracy*. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Inter-American Issues.
- Davis, N. (1985) *The Last Two Years of Allende*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Faundez, J. (1988) *Marxism and Democracy in Chile: From 1932 to the Fall of Allende*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Garces, J. (1976) *Allende y la Experiencia Chilena*. Barcelona: Ariel.
- Valenzuela, A. (1978) *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Chile, people's power

José Molina Bravo

In Chile during the period of the People's Unity (Unidad Popular, UP) government (1970–3), people's power was conceived by revolutionary-oriented currents as the movement toward socialist transformation by self-organization, self-management, and the construction of participation and decision structures from below. It was a concept supported by mobilizations, organizations, and alliances of political parties, unions, students, community organizations, and peasants.

From the 1960s to 1970, several workers' and community organizations emerged in Chile, especially those linked to the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), founded in 1965. The most important organizations of people's power arose in poor areas of Santiago and in industries and factories. On a theoretical level, people's power complemented the analysis and interpretation of working-class reality in Chile, giving strategic direction to the programmatic proposals of the parties of the revolutionary left. Organization, party, government, and territory became part of a new political language in the midst of a situation of institutionally radicalized political conflict, which was ultimately crushed by the coup of 1973.

The traditional left, comprised mainly of the Communist Party (PC) and the Socialist Party (PS), upheld the concept of consolidating the Salvador Allende government with the support of social movements. The strategy was one of gradual reforms, with the state understood as an instrument of social change, the first step in establishing a socialist society. By contrast, the

strategy of the revolutionary left was to build a parallel power to the state, in the belief that the people and their organizations had the ability to radicalize their struggles and develop their own power. According to the MIR, the alliance between workers and community organizations needed the support of student protests and direct action by peasant organizations. This period saw the formation of the Revolutionary Workers' Front (FTR), the Movement of Revolutionary Communities (MPR), the Revolutionary Students' Front (FER), and the Revolutionary Peasants' Movement (MCR).

In the 1960s, social mobilizations and protests had multiplied. Social movements pressured the state to take measures to reduce poverty, improve education and health, ameliorate working conditions, and enhance access to housing. While the UP government and the social movements linked to the traditional left mobilized for nationalization (for example of copper) and the redistribution of wealth, movements and protests linked to the revolutionary left fought for the development of socialism through the control of the productive apparatus, a new distribution of land tenure, and the state ownership of factories and industries, among other measures.

In this period of acute social conflict, political institutions were heavily criticized and lost much of their legitimacy. Broad social sectors, including the Christian Democrats, were in favor of the state and its social policies to improve general living conditions as a means of controlling social conflict. However, it proved impossible to avoid a crisis of the Chilean democratic system, considered to be one of the most stable in Latin America. This generated a growing rift between left-wing parties involved in the political system and the burgeoning movements of the revolutionary left.

The revolutionary left saw people's power as a necessary political response to the context of marginality and poverty in Chile, exacerbated by ongoing migration from rural to urban areas and the shortcomings of the national development project headed by the state. In addition, the UP project of gradual political and economic transformation assigned an important role of support to the national bourgeoisie and made concessions in their interests. According to the UP, gradual reforms were necessary to prevent civil war in the country.

People's power had opposed the welfare policies of the government of Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalva (1965–70), which attempted to improve living conditions among the poor but were unable either to solve the economic crisis or control the social conflict. The UP thus received broad popular support, based on its perceived ability to accelerate the rate of the country's transformation. Nevertheless, there were conflicts between the socialist government and its social base. This division deepened in the period from 1972 to 1973. The main conflict arose in relation to workers' demands to expropriate factories and industries and hand over their administration, as well as control over the production and distribution of goods, to the workers. At the heart of the conflict between the "Chilean road to socialism" and people's power were different ideas about how to build socialism: gradual reforms by the state, or increasing the role of social movements by giving them control over the means of production and local political institutions.

The revolutionary left promoted an alliance with grassroots and community organizations that involved extending the hegemony of workers into the territories. This occurred, for example, in the Yarur textile industry and in industries and factories of the so-called Cerrillos–Maipú Belt, in a process that became known as revolution from below. The revolutionary left also developed revolutionary organs of power in popular areas and factories. These were guided by the political logic of the duality of power: namely, to build up people's organizations and to destroy the bourgeois state institutions and their means of domination. These Leninist ideas also corresponded to the organic conception of the MIR as a "revolutionary vanguard," which was believed necessary to lead the organized workers, communities, and peasants to take control of their territories and socialize the means of production and distribution of goods.

This approach produced a change in the political conception of social emancipation. Demands to provide solutions to the problems of the country were no longer directed toward the state; rather, concrete leadership in the political process was to be taken up by grassroots organizations, which would combine the struggle against capitalist exploitation with direct political control of their territories.

People's power reflected the experiences of the settlers' movement and their direct actions to occupy sites and build homes and communities. These occupations had been increasing since 1957, and were especially prolific from 1969 to 1971. Community organizations embraced the practice of a more participatory democracy, planning the production and distribution of goods and organizing their own system of "people's justice." For example, at Camp New Havana (created November 4, 1970), inhabitants themselves punished theft, alcohol abuse, family violence, and public disorder, among other social problems. In these popular neighborhoods, people organized themselves around health, food, and education and came into dialogue, as well as conflict, with the state over these issues.

Moreover, people's power reorganized the relationship between management, production, and consumption. Along with developing direct democracy in the territories, social movements also controlled the market and exchange of goods in local communities – this in a context of economic crisis, famine, inflation, and the black market. To meet the crisis of supply, the UP had formed Boards of Supply and Price Control (JAP). Food and essential goods were delivered through delegates and neighborhood committees. Scarce goods were available only in neighborhood stores through a ration card controlled by a delegate.

The JAP bureaucracy aggravated shortages, resulting in long queues for food or fuel. In some places, like Camp New Havana, "people's warehouses" were set up to streamline distribution of family food baskets through the operational structure of the camp. The camp was divided into "blocks" (smaller units), which each elected a delegate as part of the camp directory. The distribution of food baskets was the responsibility of the "head of supply," composed of representatives from each "block." In addition, workers' control in factories aimed to produce what was necessary to meet the needs of the people.

The coup of 1973 brutally suppressed all social organizations and leftist political parties. Military operations included attacks on worker-controlled factories and popular neighborhoods, hitting areas where progress had been made in building up organs of people's power particularly hard. There were clashes between the army and community workers in the early days of the

dictatorship. However, people's power could not resist the military offensive.

SEE ALSO: Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973); Chile and the Peaceful Road to Socialism; Chile, Protests and Military Coup, 1973; Chile, Social and Political Struggles, 1950–1970; Class, Poverty, and Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Angell, A. (1972) *Politics and the Chilean Labor Movement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Espinoza, V. (1987) *Para una historia de los pobres de la ciudad*. Santiago: SUR.
- Gaudichaud, F. (2004) *Poder Popular y Cordones Industriales*. Santiago: LOM.
- Mires, F. (2001) *La Rebelión Permanente. Las revoluciones sociales en América Latina*. Mexico City: Siglo XXI.
- Moulián, T. (1997) *Chile Actual. Anatomía de un mito*. Santiago: LOM.
- Salazar, G. (1990) *Violencia Política Popular en las "grandes alamedas," Santiago 1947–1987*. Santiago: SUR.
- Salazar, G. & Pinto, J. (1999–2003) *Historia Contemporánea de Chile*, 5 vols. Santiago: LOM.
- Silva, M. (1999) *Los Cordones Industriales y el socialismo desde abajo*. Santiago: n.p.
- Winn, P. (2004) *Tejedores de la Revolución, los trabajadores de Yarur y la vía chilena al socialismo*. Santiago: LOM.

Chile, popular resistance against Pinochet

Héctor Guerra Hernández

Following a Popular Front period that saw unity among communists, socialists, and radicals, Chile fell under the rule of a military dictatorship on September 11, 1973. The dictatorship began with the firm intention of breaking down the popular advance. The military junta imposed a repressive system to assure the process of "national restoration." This repressive system worked in the first years of the dictatorship as Congress was dissolved, political parties and trade union organizations were prohibited, and revolutionaries were jailed, tortured, summarily executed, and disappeared. Concentration camps were established to lodge hundreds

of leaders and militants and exile began to be the only alternative to death for revolutionaries.

Perhaps the main cause of the coup was related to the negotiating character of Salvador Allende's government. On the one hand, it negotiated with a disguised oligarchy and a more and more reactionary political center. At the same time, the government also negotiated with peasants occupying big estates to expropriate them in their favor, and workers occupying factories, fulfilling the revolutionary itinerary conceived by the same government. Trying to mediate between all factions, it negotiated a revolution with different social actors to avoid, in vain, the constituent violence of the process. This conciliatory stance alarmed the peasants and workers, who feared the results such concessions might have on their revolutionary program. In sum, it was a government which wanted to negotiate when where there was little real room for maneuver.

The difference between this coup d'état and previous ones was that it not only desired to reestablish "order" and favor a threatened oligarchy. It also aimed to destroy the foundation constructed over almost a century of popular, confrontational, and legalist fights to favor the majority of workers. It was a brutal process, labeled by many historians as the period of terror because of the repressive apparatuses the military regime applied systematically and with impunity to crush popular and workers' organizations. At the same time, a political and legal framework was created to introduce a neoliberal economic model. Thus, political repression and reprivatization of the economy at any cost were the main ingredients that marked the years between 1973 and 1976.

This political repression also extended into the period of institutionalization of the dictatorship, between 1977 and 1981. The parties of the left, unions, and neighborhood organizations were totally repressed. However, this did not prevent sporadic protests from the population. The church, as the only sector untouched by the repression, offered its spaces to the resistance and initiated the process of rearticulation of social movements against the dictatorship and for the fight for human rights.

A new stage in the dictatorial regime was inaugurated when the absolute power of Augusto Pinochet was consolidated by the constitution of 1980 in a context of juridical exception. This

constitution legitimized the military government in the legal sense and from there the repression broadened, since it created an authoritarian political and legal framework, allowing those in charge of the repression to operate without any fear of resistance or protest. While the left parties fought to survive in the underground, popular organizations began to regroup, mainly in secondary schools, universities, churches, and communities of marginalized populations.

The period from 1980 to 1983 saw the imposition of a new neoliberal economic model, which with its new Labor Law (1979) eradicated all the gains made by the working class since the end of the nineteenth century. This new law, together with laws and "transitory" decrees created to support the repressive activity of the dictatorship, began to collapse in 1982 and 1983. Although there was growth in the economy at the beginning of the dictatorship, the exchange crisis of 1982 and the high level of unemployment (19.2 percent in 1983) caused by the closing of many national industries created conditions that led the population to demonstrate its displeasure. In 1983 the first street protest and the first union strike opened the way for such demonstrations. The main actors were the young people of the second generation, rather than organizations of workers, although the call to strike was made by the national coordinator of workers. The working organizations were extremely debilitated by the repression and control to which they were exposed, as well as by the new labor laws that practically removed all the advances made by union organizations.

In the meantime, young people began to resist, initiating an accelerated process of politicization and becoming unexpected protagonists in the protests and strikes that followed that of 1983. Students in secondary schools began to organize themselves, culminating in the creation of regional and supranational organizations, and at universities they began to win positions in student federations previously occupied by Pinochetist elements. Christian base organizations promoted local neighborhood organizations, thus initiating a process of politicization that culminated in the first hunger marches and violent protest and confrontation with the police.

Much of this activity grew out of an important antecedent which had taken place in 1980, when the Communist Party, by means of its organizations in exile, renewed its policy of

using violence to overthrow the dictatorship. This changed the forms of resistance, encouraging spontaneous *cacerolazos* to the barricades and the organization of youths' military groups. Some political organizations like the MIR (Movement of Revolutionary Left) and the MAPU Lautaro (Movement of Popular and Unitarian Action Lautaro), began to express themselves politically and militarily. The Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez) (FPMR), an armed wing of the Communist Party, was also born.

On the other hand, the political parties, still banned, began to work through organizations of a multi-party character. Participating parties included the Democratic Alliance, represented by Christian Democrats, the Radical Party, some socialist parties, the MDP (Movimiento Democrático Popular), which represented the Communist Party, the socialist parties of Marxist and "Allendist" tendencies, the Christian left, and MAPU – all the parties that had belonged to the Popular Unit of Allende.

These combined forces led to increasing protest against the dictatorship between 1983 and 1986. In spite of renewed repression – mainly through the arbitrary detention and torture of many Chileans – protests became more confrontational, with assaults on banks, bombings, neighborhood protests organized by armed military groups, and even the murder of members of the police and torturers. This growth in organized political violence was sustained by the hope of overthrowing the military regime by insurrection. Even youths in the moderate parties, like the Christian Democrats, began to adhere to the thesis of civil disobedience. This climate of rebellion reached its climax with the discovery of a large cache of arms in Carrizal Bajo in the North in 1985 and an attack by the FPMR against the dictator in September 1986.

Some historians have called the period 1987–9 an opening to democracy, while other, more radical, writers define it as one of negotiation towards an authoritarian democracy. Within the first group are the parties of the Democratic Alliance, which had supported the military coup. They promoted dialogue with the dictatorship to negotiate free elections and to reduce violence and repression. The dictatorship, on the other hand, began to feel vulnerable in the face of what amounted to a delegitimation decree issued by the people. The incapacity of the

parties of the left to agree a unified policy, their hesitancy about the possibility of overthrowing the dictatorship by insurrection, and their efforts to negotiate with the regime were perceived by young people as a betrayal of the revolutionary ideals that accompanied the anti-dictatorial fight. An important part of this body of youth was absorbed by existing political-military organizations, which augured a negotiated exit for the regime and gained the support of sectors of the left such as the MDP. The Communist Party began to review its policy of popular rebellion and insurrection. A fraction of its armed sector, the FPMR, departed and set out a new policy called "national patriotic war," rescuing the thesis of armed resistance. Young people with an accumulated experience in the confrontational fight with the dictatorship began to adhere to this thesis and to swell the ranks of other insurrectionist organizations like the MAPU Lautaro and a fraction of the MIR. Between 1987 and 1988 armed actions, including the execution of members of the military and torture squads, increased drastically.

Chile, already considered by the international community as politically unstable, began to suffer reduced commercial activity with the rest of the world. To rectify this, negotiations between all Chile's contending parties would have to be hurried. Taking advantage of the ebb tide produced by the failed attempt to assassinate the dictator and the wave of repression that culminated in the murder of resistance leaders, the moderate opposition began negotiations, framing discussions within the parameters established by Pinochet's constitution. The idea was to ensure the continuity of the regime and the maintenance of economic stability. A referendum was then held on October 5, 1988 to decide whether or not to continue with the dictatorship or hold free elections. The second option was the one that won. At the same time, the armed organizations of the left continued their fight.

The election of Patricio Alwyn in 1989 was seen as the triumph of reason over force. Even so, it did not prevent the continuation of armed activities – mainly the execution of torturers and important personages of the dictatorship. Many in the popular movement felt betrayed by the political leadership, from both the left and moderates. Youth saw in this negotiation a disciplining by the Pinochetist machinery of the old guard of parties, including those of the left.

A new phase was begun in the history of “democratic” Chile with a return to the old belief in the supposed Chilean democratic tradition. In reality, however, the new Chile, a product of neoliberal orthodoxy, was no more democratic than the old. It remained submissive, obedient, and forgetful.

SEE ALSO: Chile, Protests and Military Coup, 1973; Chile, Social and Political Struggles, 1850–1970

References and Suggested Readings

- Barros, R. (2005) *La Junta Militar Pinochet y la Constitución 1980*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Sudamericana.
- Ensalaco, M. (1999) *Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Huneus, C. (2000) *El Régimen de Pinochet*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Sudamericana.
- Katz, C. (1998) *Chile Bajo Pinochet*. Barcelona: Anagrama.
- Oppenheim, L. H. (2007) *Politics in Chile: Socialism, Authoritarianism, and Market Democracy*. New York: Basic Books.
- Vial, G. (2002) *Pinochet La Biografía*. Santiago de Chile: El Mercurio – Aguilar.

Chile, protests and military coup, 1973

Uta Wagenmann

The 1973 military coup did not only eliminate Unidad Popular (Popular Unity, UP), the only elected government in Chile dominated by Marxist parties. Beyond interpretations concerning Chilean society, it can be seen as a landmark within the global process of reframing fascist methods in terms of “freedom” and “democracy.” Moreover, the putsch was the starting point for a momentous historical change: under Augusto Pinochet, Chile – a veritable laboratory of class struggle – became the first factory of neoliberalism.

The Chilean 9/11

On September 11, 1973, Chilean armed forces launched an all-out offensive to seize power. Some 100,000 soldiers were mobilized to overthrow the government led by socialist president Salvador Allende. After the Chilean navy had stationed marines throughout the central coast,

radio and television stations were either shut down or bombed by the air force. Around 9 a.m., all of Chile was controlled by the armed forces, with the exception of some parts of Santiago. It took about six more hours, a few tanks, and an air force bombardment to defeat the small group of civilians who were defending the presidential palace, La Moneda. Allende, who refused to resign, died when the building was invaded by troops.

However, it took much more to destroy the socialist project. Armed resistance against the military forces continued about 36 hours in some working-class areas of Santiago, stopped by mass executions on September 12 (Rojas 1975). Factories occupied by workers were destroyed by bombardments or violently evicted. A period of unprecedented terror had begun in Chile.

The commando units composed of military personnel and civilian fascists were raging particularly in the first days and months after the coup. According to the Valech Commission (National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report, the second part of which was published in 2005), on September 11 alone, about 6,000 persons throughout the country were arrested. Up to the end of the year, the number of documented cases increased to more than 13,500, most of them involving leaders of unions, leftist political parties, or cultural organizations. Prisoners were taken to military headquarters, tortured, and interrogated. Some of them were executed immediately; others disappeared or were held in concentration camps. In the National Stadium in Santiago, approximately 40,000 people were imprisoned in the aftermath of the coup. Physical as well as psychological torture was the order of the day. Members of the army described the actions as “cleaning up the motors of Marxism” (Rojas 1975: 3).

The number of victims depends on the definition adopted by those who are doing the counting. According to the Latin American Mental Health and Human Rights Institute, approximately 200,000 persons were affected by situations of extreme trauma. Official investigations in the post-Pinochet era specified 3,195 assassinations and acknowledged 28,459 political prisoners, of whom 94 percent were tortured (Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation [Rettig Report] 1991; Valech Commission 2005).

Global Power Relations

Two days after the coup, parliament was dissolved by the junta. UP's member parties were outlawed as well as all political activity. While unions and leftist organizations all over the world protested against the coup, western governments reacted cautiously. Owing to the prevailing global, bipolar world order, the generals with their anti-communist ideology seemed to be better allies than an elected president promoting an experiment in democratic socialism.

At least the Nixon administration was bent on overthrowing the UP government right from the start. Between 1970 and 1973, approximately US\$8 million was spent on Chilean covert actions. Details of US involvement in Chilean politics have been verified by CIA documents declassified at the end of the 1990s (Hinchey Report 2000; see Kornbluh 1998). Although the documents that are publicly available do not indicate direct CIA participation in the 1973 putsch, they attest the agency's support of terrorist attacks and the involvement of multinational corporations. They also show the strategic background of US intervention: the UP government was seen as a danger because of its socialist program regardless of the actions it implemented. As Nixon's national security advisor Henry Kissinger put it: "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people. The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves" (Fagen 1975: 3).

Local Inconsistencies

Despite various attempts to undermine the UP government, it was tolerated initially by the Chilean bourgeoisie. The nationalization of the copper mining industry in 1971 and the expropriation of large landowners by an agrarian reform were approved by members of all parties in parliament. Nevertheless, UP's attempt to integrate the bourgeoisie in its non-capitalist project failed. Beyond the US destabilization policy, the UP administration underestimated the power of class differences. The middle class tolerated the socialist project as long as its living conditions were not affected but became openly opposed when its own power seemed to be at risk. Cooperation was easy in the first year of the UP

government when inflation and unemployment decreased and the living conditions of many people improved. But then, in response to UP's call for forming organs of *poder popular* (popular power), Chilean workers began occupying, managing, and, in some cases, expropriating factories in which they were employed. Simultaneously, the rapid reduction of foreign exchange reserves resulted in a severe economic crisis. World prices for copper, Chile's main export, collapsed. In addition, due to the persistent effort of the Nixon administration to undermine Allende, Chile was boycotted by international financial institutions.

The crisis became a motor *of* as well as an instrument *for* the right-wing offensive. In October 1972, these activities culminated in a CIA-funded strike by truck owners, headed by members of the far-right paramilitary group Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Freedom). The 24-day road blockade not only exacerbated the economic crisis but also resulted in an important concession: as a sign of appeasement, the head of the army, General Carlos Prats, was appointed minister of the interior.

The Right-Wing Offensive

Despite destabilization policies and economic problems, popular support for UP even increased. In March 1973, the government was confirmed by parliamentary elections, obtaining about 44 percent of the vote. Since this made it clear that UP would not be voted out in the near future, the elections initiated a period of increasing violence, demonstrating that parts of the state apparatus were no longer under UP control. Police and military forces violently dispersed demonstrations and legal meetings. Factories and *poblaciones* (poor neighborhoods) with a high degree of organization were provocatively searched. There were even cases of torture among members of the marines who had been politically active. In May the parliamentary opposition formally declared a boycott of the government, and in June the first attempt to overthrow Allende by military force further heated up the situation. The so-called *tanquetazo* (tank putsch), instigated by chief leaders of Patria y Libertad, failed only because of loyal soldiers led by Carlos Prats. When in August negotiations between opposition and government led nowhere, Allende appointed the four

military commanders-in-chief as ministers. This last attempt at appeasement resulted in a loss of support for the government among the left wing.

Three weeks before the putsch, a motion of no-confidence in parliament was followed by the resignation of the generals, and Augusto Pinochet became commander-in-chief of the army. When on September 4 the largest demonstration ever in Chilean history took place in Santiago, mobilizing about 700,000 people in support of Allende, the course of the disaster that began one week later was already set.

A Factory of Neoliberalism

During Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship, the neoliberal project of a market-driven society, a mere theoretical concept until then, was implemented for the first time. One and a half year after the putsch, the generals appointed as policy advisors a group of Chilean economists who had been educated at the University of Chicago. The "Chicago Boys" recommended cuts in social services and the broad privatization of public goods and services. The junta radically put these policies into effect, financially and ideologically supported by the United States and by international financial institutions. Foreign multinational corporations, expropriated by the Allende administration, returned to Chile.

The junta's policy brought about a society where the idea of the market is the leading principle and opportunities for social organization are rare. The Chilean model served as a pilot project: in the 1980s, promoters of neoliberalism like Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom based their policies on the experiences made in Chile under Pinochet before them.

SEE ALSO: Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973); Chile and the Peaceful Road to Socialism; Chile, People's Power; Chile, Popular Resistance against Pinochet; Neoliberalism and Protest

References and Suggested Readings

- Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura (2005) *Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura* (National Commission Report on Political Prisoners and Torture). Santiago de Chile: Ministerio del Interior. Available in Spanish at www.comisiontortura.cl.
- Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación (1991) *Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación* (Report of the Chilean National

- Commission on Truth and Reconciliation). Santiago de Chile: CNVR. Available in English at www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/chile/chile_1993_toc.html.
- Fagen, R. R. (1975) *The United States and Chile: Roots and Branches*. *Foreign Affairs*. Available at www.foreignaffairs.org/19750101faessay10135/richard-r-fagen/the-united-states-and-chile-roots-and-branches.html.
- Kornbluh, P. (1998) *Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup*. Available at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8i.htm.
- Kramer, A. M. (1974) *Chile: Historia de una Experiencia Socialista*. Barcelona: Peninsula.
- Rojas, R. (1975) *The Murder of Allende and the End of the Chilean Way to Socialism*. New York: Harper & Row. Available at www.rrojasdatabank.org/murder.htm.
- Valdes, J. G. (1995) *Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chile, social and political struggles, 1850–1970

Héctor Guerra Hernández

Protest in Chile from 1850 to 1970 emerged as the working class sought to improve labor and living conditions against a dominant national oligarchy, which had consolidated control over land and industry. To maintain its grip on power and control over natural resources and industry, the oligarchy repressed strikes and other forms of labor militancy, leaving the working class particularly receptive to radical political ideologies. This led to the emergence of strong anarchist, socialist, and communist movements. As labor's capacity to resist grew, the state and its oligarchic benefactors periodically advanced reforms to improve working conditions by legally expanding labor rights and permitting a process of negotiation and bargaining.

In the years leading up to the civil war, the national oligarchy consolidated economic power through annexation of land in the north (Tarapacá and Antofagasta) and south (the Araucanía region in 1887) on the territorial frontiers, incorporating strategic mining and agricultural regions. In the late 1880s and early 1890s, tensions mounted between President José

Manuel Balmaceda and the Chilean Congress over control of state resources, particularly the rich nitrate (saltpeter) industry. Balmaceda sought to advance the interests of national capitalists against foreign investors, chiefly from the United Kingdom and North America. Subsequently, the state instituted reforms to protect and extend the influence of the Chilean capital in the extraction of nitrate used in explosives and fertilizer industries, and to weaken foreign monopolies. Balmaceda also sought to reinforce Chilean capitalist control in agriculture and the emerging industrial sectors. The process culminated in civil war in 1891 and the overthrow of Balmaceda's government.

The discovery of silver deposits in Chañarcillo and the growth of nitrate companies after the annexation of the northern provinces of Tarapacá and Antofagasta in the 1880s stimulated a wave of labor migration to the mining centers. This migration advanced the process of the proletarianization of Chilean workers. Deplorable working conditions and poor wages led to worker militancy and the proclivity to strike and engage in other forms of resistance.

Chile's first general strike occurred in 1890 in response to a weak currency, which intensified exploitation among mining workers. The industrialists, backed by the military, swiftly responded to the strike by arresting and executing workers, leaving hundreds injured and the organizers imprisoned. As the strike expanded working-class consciousness, anarchist and socialist influences became particularly popular in Chile's northern and southern mining enclaves.

In the 1870s and 1880s, mutual aid organizations (*mutuales*) were the most significant form of working-class organization in mining centers, harbors, and among craftsmen in cities. In 1880, 39 mutual aid institutions encouraged the material and intellectual advancement of workers, organized recreational activities, and opened small libraries for Chilean workers. Mutual aid organizations were not labor unions but strictly sought the improvement of workers without regard to confronting employers or the state.

A stronger ideological movement emerged, however, as *mutuales* transformed into societies of resistance called *mancomunales*, and labor parties began to develop. The objective of *mancomunales* was to organize workers in cooperative or regional confederations, cultivate class consciousness, and coordinate insurrectionary gen-

eral strikes. The associations constituted the first Chilean organizations of craftsmen and industrial workers, and their radical methods of resistance against the company and the state served as a model for Chilean labor organizations that followed. They also became centers of working-class social and cultural life. Working from outside the established system, *mancomunales* fought against supervisors and advocated the socialist transformation of society. These geographically based associations unified workers on provincial lines, crossing occupational and ideological boundaries to form broader, more powerful coalitions.

Anarchism appealed increasingly to workers in Chile as the material conditions of life and class-based ideology advanced among workers and the popular masses. On the one hand, in 1895 a considerable growth of the urban and mining proletariat had occurred, creating the social base for the development of a revolutionary ideology. The prevailing political system of repression toward workers and peasants was propitious for strikes – the primary means of collective action for anarchists. Anarchists helped form labor organizations and were a driving force in the cooperative development of the *mancomunales*, federations, and the societies in resistance that gained popularity among workers and craftsmen in Santiago, Valparaíso, Talca, and Concepción.

Anarchists were primarily involved in extra-legal action. When protests culminated in arbitration and negotiation with employers, democrats and socialists typically led bargaining teams on behalf of workers. The combination of ordered mobilization, negotiation, and arbitration seemed a successful formula for gaining concessions from employers and the state. The “maximalist” position among anarchists of opposition to state intervention in disputes between labor and capital was most effective under repressive conditions. When the state began implementing mediation, arbitration, and conciliation, the maximalist position faded as many workers considered state intervention a safer means of defending their rights.

From 1902 and 1908, some 200 strikes occurred. Most notable were the 1903 Valparaíso harbor strikes, the 1905 Santiago meatworker strike, and the 1907 miners' strike in Tarapacá province. While the strikes demonstrated strong worker militancy, state repression severely diminished the growth of the labor movement. For example, in December 1907, an estimated 2,000

men, women, and children were killed by army forces in the Santa Maria School Massacre. This brutality against nitrate workers in Iquique demonstrated the state's determination to repress militancy and strikes.

Concomitantly, by 1880 the Democratic Party sought to advance legal means of worker representation, through recognizing their societal importance to the state and capital. A new independent working-class movement headed by Luís Emilio Recabarren formed a Marxist working-class labor movement to foster collective bargaining. As a legal means to representation was advanced, anarchists continued to use militant forms of collective action from 1910 to 1920. The combined efforts led the way to obtaining the eight-hour workday, six-day work weeks, the end of child labor, and safer workplaces.

The formation of the Communist Party (1922) and the Socialist Party (1933) also paved the way for a workers' presence within the political framework of the 1920s and 1930s. The differences among leftist organizations and their objectives over the direction of the workers' movement reflect the diversity of political ideology in Chile. According to historian Luis Vitale, standard forms of anarchism confronted greater obstacles in Chile than in other Latin American countries due to the strong influence of Marxist anarchosindicalism in the early twentieth century. Under Recabarren, Marxists challenged anarchists over the direction of the labor movement, primarily following the foundation of the Socialist Working Party in 1912. By the 1930s, anarchosindicalism remained influential but entered a crisis period due to its inability to improve working-class conditions among the industrial proletariat.

At the formation of the Confederation of Workers of Chile (CTCH) in 1936, a majority of delegates supported state-sanctioned legal protection for workers, and the anarchists' opposition to formal engagement with the state marginalized their position in the labor movement. The result was what Moulian refers to as a phase of "pseudo-parliamentarism" characterized by "weak governments who distributed benefits between the oligarchic groups and of bloody workers' massacres" from 1891 to 1924. The "social question," a well-known aphorism of the time referring to the sprouting militancy of the urban popular masses, began dominating Chilean political debates (Moulian 1997: 153). In

the north, the cyclical crisis of nitrate resulted in masses of unemployed workers swarming near mining establishments and in cities to protest the delay of a new labor contract. Meanwhile, a public workers' movement began emerging. In the south, workers demanding wage and housing improvements went on strike.

The political renaissance led to the emergence of a growing anti-oligarchic sentiment. This led first to the formation of *mesocratismo*, a populist movement personified by Arturo Alessandri, a charismatic liberal leader who in 1920 tried to neutralize the power of the oligarchy. Alessandri's populist program was obstructed by conservatives and parliamentary oligarchic groups. Then, in 1922, the Communist Party emerged from Recabarren's Socialist Working Party, assuming the position of leadership over the labor movement.

The anarchists, on the other hand, continued organizing strikes. The most important of these was that by the Working Federation of Magallanes, which ended in another massacre in 1921. In the same year, the closing of the San Gregorio nitrate mining center led to a revolt suppressed by the military, killing 65 workers and injuring 35. It was followed by another massacre in June of 1925 in the Coruña office. The nitrate workers raised, among others, the following demands: increase of wages according to the rise of the cost of living, improvement of the conditions of work, nationalization of the saltpeter offices, replacement of authorities who had shown anti-labor behavior, abolition of the Association of Producers of Saltpeter of Chile, recognition of union rights, correct weight of the saltpeter coats, "dry laws" in the saltpeter camps and their gradual extension throughout the country, and immediate nationalization of the longitudinal railroad.

Historically, 1925 marks the end of Chile's "parliamentary" regime and the beginning of the "presidential" government. Following approval of a new constitution that diminished the power of oligarchs, new labor laws prefigured a more hopeful future. In the summer of 1925 the military junta led by Generals Juan Pablo Benett, Luis Altamirano, and Admiral Francisco Neff was overthrown by the young officials of the army commanded by Colonels Carlos Ibáñez and Marmaduke Grove. The coup d'état was caused by discontent against the oligarchic opposition to social reform laws, proposed by President

Arturo Alessandri Palma. In February of 1927 a crisis cabinet was formed, and Ibáñez was named home secretary. Ibáñez initiated what appeared to be a campaign of remarkable welfare and called for limited economic reforms. Nevertheless, the plan was canceled in the aftermath of the October 1929 collapse of the stock market in New York, which ushered in the Great Depression and led to a global downturn that shook Chile's precarious economy in the 1930s.

The serious economic crisis aggravated political instability, as workers, students, and intellectuals protested Ibáñez's authoritarianism. Ibáñez left Chile and went into exile on July 26, 1931, handing power over to members of his government. After Ibáñez fled, the socialist Marmaduke Grove was allowed to return from exile and was reincorporated into the army. On June 4, 1932, Grove and other members of the military led a coup d'état against the government, proclaiming the Socialist Republic of Chile in which the military, intellectuals, and workers combined to create a republic with a revolutionary character. But Carlos Davila, a military leader proclaimed president, betrayed the movement and crushed the Socialist Republic with another coup d'état after 12 days. In the October 1932 presidential elections, Grove came in second with 17.7 percent, even though he had returned from exile just two days before the elections.

In sum, this period, which began with the civil war of oligarchic sectors against President Balmaceda and concluded with a socialist rise against a military dictatorship (1891–1932), was crucial to understanding the development of the labor movement. The confrontational means of the anarchists in the late nineteenth century was replaced by a process of interaction with Marxist sectors. In April 1933, Grove was among the founders of the Socialist Party of Chile (PS), the same party to which Salvador Allende would later belong. Thus, the experience of the Socialist Republic of Grove laid the foundations for the development of socialism in Chile and defined the future trajectory of popular struggles, which started to be influenced by reformists, social democrats, and bourgeois nationalist intellectuals – a tendency which became visible during the periods of the Radical Party governments between 1938 and 1952.

The significant popular support for worker parties provided an opening for the left into the electoral arena. Moreover, working-class organiza-

tions did not surrender a confrontational style of politics to the oligarchy. Despite some losses, such as an increased state role in the economy from 1932 to 1952, the working class remained socioeconomically and politically powerful in Chilean society. The Popular Front (FP) was formed, unifying communists, socialists, and radicals in a center-left electoral and broad coalition that supported presidential candidates of the Radical Party. The FP spanned diverse constituencies, from reformist syndicalist, socialist, and communist, to social organizations supporting electoral and revolutionary politics. The diversity stimulated many controversies as to whether changes would be achieved by legal means or by revolution.

The contradictions reached their peak in the last radical government of Gabriel González Videla (1946–52), who after winning the elections with Communist Party support outlawed the party and started a broadly systematic suppression of communists. The persecution was extended after Ibáñez was elected president again for the period 1952–8. Meanwhile in 1952 the Socialist Party, which had not been outlawed, named Senator Salvador Allende as its candidate for the presidential elections. Because of divisions within the Socialist Party (some sectors were supporting Ibáñez), he obtained just 5.4 percent of the vote. These years were also marked by labor strike waves and huge social discontent.

According to Moulian (1997), between the 1930s and the 1960s a new romantic humanism arose in Chile, spreading the myth of political-democratic stability that supposedly differentiated Chile from the experiences of other Latin American countries. This narrative of Chile's exceptional democratic tradition perhaps grew out of the incorporation of the working-class parties into electoral politics and the abandonment of the position of class struggle confrontation. However, as Moulian asserts, an "illusion of a solid democratic tradition" concealed "an implicit pact of interests that regulated the political interchanges, in a society with strong class perception" (1997: 157). The contradictions that emerged among the working class unfolded again in a forceful way during the Allende government of Popular Unity, a period during which two positions – the legal and confrontational – challenged each other. While the legal position was concerned with ensuring that the bourgeoisie would not have a legitimate

reason to overthrow the Allende government, the social transformation process led to a revival of revolutionary struggles.

The growing popular discontent led to the victory of Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalva in the 1964 presidential elections. He won the majority by promising extensive social reforms in education, health, and housing as well as agrarian reform. But the reforms did not go far enough to thoroughly resolve massive social problems, and Frei was criticized by the left. The failure of his reforms contributed to the strengthening of the left and Allende's electoral victory in 1970.

SEE ALSO: Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973); Anarchism, Chile; Anarchosyndicalism; Chile and the Peaceful Road to Socialism; Chile, Protests and Military Coup, 1973

References and Suggested Readings

- Aldunate, H. (1991) *Antecedentes sobre el movimiento obrero*. Santiago de Chile: Instituto de Ciencias Alejandro Lipschutz.
- Barr-Melej, P. (2001) *Reforming Chile: Cultural Politics, Nationalism, and the Rise of the Middle Class*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Collier, S. & Sater, W. F. (2004) *A History of Chile: 1808–2002*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- De Shazo, P. (1983) *Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile: 1902–1927*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Greaz, S. (2007) *Los anarquistas y el movimiento obrero La alborada de "la Idea" en Chile, 1893–1915*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Latinoamericana.
- Jobet, J. (1955) *Luis Emilio Recabarren: los orígenes del movimiento obrero y del socialismo chilenos*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Latinoamericana.
- Moulian, T. (1997) *Chile actual autonomía de unimilito*. Santiago de Chile: ARCIS LOM Ediciones.
- Pinto, J. & Valdivia, V. (2001) *¿Revolución proletaria o querida chusma? Socialismo y Alessandrismo en la pugna por la politización pampina (1911–1932)*. Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones.
- Ramírez Necochea, H. (1988) *Historia del movimiento obrero en Chile: antecedentes siglo XIX*. Concepción: Editorial Lar.
- Recabarren, L. E. (1965) *Ricos y pobres a través de un siglo de vida republicana. Obras escogidas*. Santiago: Edit. Recabarren.
- Salazar, G. & Pinto, J. (2002) *Historia contemporánea de Chile*, Vols. 1–5. Santiago de Cuba: LOM Ediciones.
- Winn, P. (1986) *Weavers of the Revolution: The Yarur Wars and Chile's Road to Socialism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chilembwe, John (1871–1915)

Eliakim Sibanda

John Chilembwe was the key figure in early resistance in Nyasaland (now Malawi), and a revered protest figure in Southern Africa. Chilembwe was born in June 1871 at Sangano, Chiradzulu, near present-day Blantyre. His father's name was Kaundama, and he was a member of the Yoa people; his mother, Nyangu, was a member of the Mang'anja. Chilembwe grew to manhood in the era of the Scramble for Africa. The territory that became Nyasaland was traditionally claimed by the Portuguese, but had a significant British commercial and missionary presence, and was declared a British protectorate in 1891, controlled by the British South Africa Company of Cecil John Rhodes from 1893 to 1907, after which it reverted to direct British rule.

Like many men of his generation, John Chilembwe was exposed to Christianity and was apparently educated in a Church of Scotland mission. Like many converts, he was strongly opposed to polygamy and beer-drinking, emphasizing thrift and industrious labor. His identity was, however, complex, playing on both traditional and modern traditions. His mother's name, Nyangu, could be traced to a kingdom in Central Africa, suggesting a royal descent that Chilembwe sometimes evoked; at the same time, he adopted the name "John" from the Bible.

Chilembwe's next encounter with Christianity came while employed by Joseph Booth, a radical British missionary who espoused an apocalyptic Baptist doctrine and racial equality. Born in Derby, England in 1851, Booth came to Africa to promote radical Christianity, African advancement, racial equality, and, ultimately, independence. Chilembwe worked for Booth from 1892 at his Zambezi Industrial Mission at Mitsidi and his Nyasa Industrial Mission near Blantyre, the first of a number of missions Booth established. In 1893, Chilembwe was baptized, becoming Booth's interpreter and travelling companion. While Chilembwe worked with Booth – he moved quickly from servant to protégé – he was exposed to the latter's radical Christianity, stressing African economic and political independence. The two men founded a Christian

Union of Nyasaland on a platform of equal rights for black and white.

In 1897, Booth published *Africa for the Africans*, which condemned European colonialism and advocated African independence and self-reliance. That year, Chilembwe accompanied Booth and his family to the United States where he studied for three years at the Virginia Theological Seminary and College, an African American Baptist institution, qualifying as a minister. He was exposed to Booker T. Washington, as well as abolitionist works and the story of John Brown's attack on Harper's Ferry.

Chilembwe traveled across America with Booth, who hoped to generate support for his project of African independence and self-help. Chilembwe witnessed firsthand not only segregation, but also the activism of the African American. Segregation was, presumably, not a complete shock: in Nyasaland, even educated Africans were expected to defer to Europeans, and racial boundaries were stark. Chilembwe and Booth approached black organizations such as the Methodist Episcopal Church and the Black National Baptist Convention: while warmly received, they gained little moral and material support. In 1889, Booth circulated a petition advocating African independence within 21 years, and free higher education for 5 percent of the African population. The two men parted amicably that year. Booth, on returning to East Africa, was deported, and later barred from Nyasaland.

Armed with his seminary diploma, Chilembwe returned to Nyasaland in around 1900 for the American National Baptist Convention, and he established the Providence Industrial Mission (PIM) at Chiradzulu, adjacent to the white-owned farm, the Brant Estate. Chilembwe founded the first fully independent African Baptist industrial mission, which was an important factor in the rise of independent African churches across southern and central Africa in the early twentieth century. The PIM was run by Africans, who planted cotton, coffee, and tea to achieve economic independence. Like Booth, Chilembwe believed that industrious labor on the land was the key to prosperity, and that African economic and political advancement required a strong African peasantry.

In the PIM grounds Chilembwe also had independent African schools built, with seven schools serving 1,000 students and 800 adult learners by 1912. He was leader of a growing community, and also dabbled in commerce by

running a small store. On the whole, the mission was a success, hosting more than 1,000 people over its first 11 years of existence.

Through education, Chilembwe tried to inculcate in the mission's residents the values of self-respect, hygiene, hard work, and abstinence from drinking alcohol. He also insisted that European clothes be worn at the mission. Yet Chilembwe also promoted African leadership, and was increasingly critical of the harsh treatment of Africans by white settlers, as well as the racial attitudes of many white churchmen. He condemned the British government for effectively condoning abusive treatment of Africans.

From 1912 onwards, Chilembwe became increasingly radicalized. Like many educated Africans, he was dissatisfied by the barriers to African advancement, racial discrimination, the failure of Britain to protect Africans from settlers, and the harsh conditions facing African tenants and workers on white-owned farms. The neighboring Brant Estate had a hostile relationship with the PIM. Many of Chilembwe's parishioners resided at Brandt, which heavily exploited the labor of Africans, prevented tenants from traveling without restrictions, and burned down buildings – including churches linked to the PIM.

Whereas some educated Nyasas in his situation, like Clements Kadalie, left for work in the neighboring countries, Chilembwe was heavily invested in the future of Nyasaland, and chose to stay and resist. With the support of a small minority of missionary-educated Nyasas, Chilembwe began promoting non-violent protests, including withholding of taxes. Serious grievances were lodged against William Jerves Livingstone, a notoriously brutal manager at the Brant Estate.

Tensions grew from 1912 to 1915, as new restrictive laws were introduced, as many areas experienced famine, and as Africans were conscripted to support the British forces, with the outbreak of World War I. Chilembwe became convinced of the futility of petitioning colonial authorities to honor the promises of social justice and equality embodied in the Bible and English law. In November 1914, he published a letter in the *Nyasaland Times* condemning colonial rule, and called on Africans to refuse to join the war effort.

Then, inspired by John Brown, Chilembwe started an uprising on January 23, 1915. Armed parties advanced on the estates, killing Livingstone

and two other white farmers, as well as several Africans, and attacking an ammunition store. The uprising seems to have been somewhat rushed due to concerns that Chilembwe was about to be deported, and the actions were often disorganized and unsuccessful. Chilembwe hoped the rising would spread quickly, but this did not happen.

The rebels carefully avoided attacks on white women and children, but a climate of fear gripped the settlers. Concerned about the rising spreading – and perhaps inviting an invasion from the neighboring German colony of Tanganyika – the authorities responded swiftly and ruthlessly. Chilembwe’s church was demolished, a number of his followers were killed, and the rising ended when Chilembwe was killed as he fled to Mozambique.

While a military failure, Chilembwe’s rising was a watershed in that it drew in Africans from a range of ethnic backgrounds in a common struggle, presaging the later history of African nationalism, and in a sense foreshadowing the beginning of decolonization. Chilembwe remains a revered figure in today’s Malawi, where his face appears on the 200 *kwacha* Malawi banknote.

SEE ALSO: Brown, John (1800–1859); Malawi National Liberation; Non-Violent Movements: Foundations and Early Expressions

References and Suggested Readings

- Phiri, D. D. (1976) *John Chilembwe*. Blantyre, Malawi: Longman.
- Shepperson, G. & Price, T. (1958) *Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, Setting and Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Chiluba, Frederick (b. 1943)

Miles Larmer

Frederick Chiluba was a product of the powerful Zambian trade union movement, which played a leading role in overthrowing the post-colonial one-party state of Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP) in 1991. Chiluba’s subsequent election as president of Zambia, a position he held for ten years, was the labor movement’s greatest triumph – and its

greatest disaster. Under his presidency, employment collapsed as part of the wider devastation resulting from economic liberalization. Chiluba serves as a warning that leaders who emerge from social movements to take up national political leadership are sometimes the bitterest enemies of those movements once in power.

Chiluba was born in 1943 in the Copperbelt town of Ndola in what was then the British colony of Northern Rhodesia. His secondary education was interrupted by his expulsion for political activities, but he continued his studies by correspondence. Chiluba worked as credit manager at Atlas Copco, a company supplying equipment to Zambia’s copper mines. His later political allies recall an ambitious young man whom they initially underestimated, both because of his limited education and his diminutive stature. Chiluba became the chairman of the National Union of Building, Engineering and General Workers (NUBEGW) in 1971. At a time when the labor movement’s political autonomy was threatened by Kaunda’s one-party state, Chiluba won popularity through his outspoken defense of union autonomy.

In 1974 Chiluba was elected chairman-general (equivalent to president) of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), in the first free election of ZCTU leaders since independence. This was a turning point in the congress’s transition from agent of UNIP’s corporatist state to an autonomous representative of the Zambian working class. In the late 1970s Chiluba and Secretary General Newstead Zimba turned the ZCTU into a leading critic of UNIP. Although careful to express their loyalty to “the party and its government,” they highlighted the gap between UNIP’s socialist rhetoric and its economic policies. In 1980–1 a major confrontation arose during a dispute over changes to local government in mining areas. Following a number of major wildcat strikes, union leaders were accused by UNIP of failing to control their members. In July 1981 Chiluba, Zimba, and two colleagues were detained for two months, prompting further industrial unrest. The refusal of union leaders to be intimidated led to the labor movement being identified as the *de facto* opposition to UNIP (Woldring 1984). The negative impact of structural adjustment policies, adopted against the backdrop of a downward economic spiral, became a focus of ZCTU criticism; Chiluba condemned the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) for putting African governments on a collision course with their peoples. In 1986 IMF pressure led to the removal of subsidies on basic foodstuffs. Large-scale protests across the Copperbelt secured the reversal of the decision. Workers also fought for wage rises to address soaring inflation. Faced with popular unrest, the government broke temporarily with the IMF in 1987.

During these campaigns the ZCTU leadership made common cause with local business interests and wider civil society; such alliances formed the basis of organized opposition to the one-party state. In the late 1980s the Copperbelt was the center of underground opposition: Chiluba traveled incognito to meetings at people's houses, leading discussions on how UNIP could be removed (Larmer 2007). In 1989 Chiluba was the first to suggest that the fall of the regimes in Eastern Europe showed the need for a parallel transition in Zambia.

Chiluba also played a leading role in the emergent opposition Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD). The MMD was a diverse formation, including business groups, labor, churches, and former UNIP leaders. Chiluba was one of the few MMD leaders not tainted by a previous leadership role in UNIP. By placing the union movement at the party's disposal, he not only provided the MMD with a country-wide infrastructure, but also secured the MMD's presidential candidature. Some colleagues felt he used strong-arm tactics reminiscent of UNIP politics (Mbikusita-Lewanika 2003). Others saw him as a front man, selling the policies they believed necessary.

Chiluba and his colleagues abandoned their opposition to structural adjustment for a focus on political power. Following the MMD's election victory in October 1991, Chiluba's government enacted one of Africa's most sweeping economic liberalization programs, with the new president calling on union members to sacrifice in the national interest. With the opening up of the economy, Zambia experienced a calamitous economic decline (Rakner 2003). Chiluba, far from being marginalized by the powers behind his throne, proved adept at using presidential powers to marginalize his opponents. When the MMD was threatened with electoral defeat in 1996, Chiluba changed the constitution to prevent Kaunda from standing, and in 1997 detained Kaunda on spurious grounds.

Despite being a second-generation African leader, Chiluba competed with his predecessors in self-aggrandizement. His expensive wardrobe became notorious, and along with his inner circle, he accumulated vast sums from the corrupt privatization of Zambia's loss-making mining industry. Chiluba was not, however, able to overcome the multi-party system he had helped establish. In 2001 he was prevented from overturning the constitutional limit of two terms in office by a popular campaign that resembled the pro-democracy movement he had led a decade earlier. Chiluba nominated Levy Mwanawasa as his successor and helped place him into power in elections condemned by observers as neither free nor fair. This was Chiluba's biggest political miscalculation. Far from being Chiluba's puppet, in 2002 Mwanawasa waged a campaign that led the Supreme Court to remove Chiluba's immunity from prosecution: Chiluba made history as the first former African president to stand trial for corruption. A London court found Chiluba guilty of stealing \$46m of public funds in 2007, a verdict he refused to recognize. The ailing Chiluba is unlikely to face jail for his offenses. Once a respected, fearless, and radical popular leader, he is now reviled by most Zambians. Chiluba's fall from grace symbolizes the wider failure of African pro-democracy movements to turn their victory into improvements in the lives of their supporters and to overcome the inequities of the post-colonial political order.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Syndicalism, Southern Africa; Kaunda, Kenneth (b. 1924); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; South Africa, Labor Movement; Southern Africa, Popular Resistance to Neoliberalism, 1982–2007; Zambian Nationalism and Protests; Zimbabwe, Labor Movement, 1890–1980; Zimbabwe, Labor Movement and Politics, 1980–2007; Zimbabwe, National Liberation Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Akwey, E. O. (1994) *Trade Unions and Democratization: A Comparative Study of Zambia and Ghana*. Stockholm: Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm.
- Larmer, M. (2007) *Mineworkers in Zambia: Labor and Political Change in Post-Colonial Africa*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. (2003) *Hour for Reunion, Movement for Multi-Party Democracy: Conception, Dissension and Reconciliation*. Mongu-Lealui: African Lineki Courier.

- Nordlund, P. (1996) *Organizing the Political Agora: Domination and Democratization in Zambia and Zimbabwe*. Uppsala: Uppsala University Press.
- Rakner, L. (2003) *Political and Economic Liberalization in Zambia, 1991–2001*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.
- Woldring, K. (1984) Survey of Recent Inquiries and their Results. In K. Woldring (Ed.), *Beyond Political Independence: Zambia's Development Predicament in the 1980s*. Berlin: Mouton.

Chimurenga armed struggles

Gwinyai P. Muzorewa

The term “Chimurenga” means revolution or rebellion which is continuous. Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia or just Rhodesia, has seen two Chimurenga. The first occurred between 1896 and 1897. The second commenced in 1970 and ended in 1979. The Chimurenga engaged with here is the first Chimurenga, along with directly connected events which influenced the rising of the Africans in Zimbabwe both before and after the continuous armed resistance of 1896–7.

The Shona

The Shona “state” just prior to 1850 cannot be characterized as a centralized state, though various chiefs gave tribute to the Rozvi-Changamire dynasty. Rather, the Shona may be considered as a society which for the most part is religiously, culturally, economically, socially, linguistically, and historically homogeneous. Collectively, Shona society also extended into present-day Mozambique, along the Zambezi River to as far south as Sena. While the political aspects of Shona life among the leaders were relatively decentralized, all Shona sought religious guidance in matters including war and peace, as well as issues pertaining to spiritual favor or to bring about rains and other blessings. There were many strong political alliances, as well as rivalries. Prior to 1850 the most influential state was that of the Rozvi-Changamire dynasty, which was militarily, politically, economically, and spiritually the most capable. Most other Shona states regarded it as preeminent among them and looked to it for protection and security in times

of distress, danger, or famine. A good example is when the Ndebele encroached upon Shona territory. The Rozvi-Changamire state had at that time the best opportunity to create a centralized pan-Shona state capable of assuring security for all Shona.

In addition to the Shona who lived in present-day Zimbabwe, there were the Shona who lived in present-day Mozambique. These Shona enjoyed amicable trade relations with the Portuguese as far back as the late 1500s, when they settled the coastal areas of Mozambique. Though the Portuguese were driven from present-day Zimbabwe by the Changamire in 1628, the relations with the Shona in Mozambique endured. This agriculturally based economy also traded in gold, ivory, and other natural resources. Thus the agrarian economy of the Shona was also supplied with goods including rifles, ammunition, cloth, and glass beads. It is not clear when, but the Shona in the Zambezi valley acquired the techniques of gun powder production. The sites of production were strategically located, and this supply would be used by the Shona on the plateau during their Chimurenga.

The Ndebele

The Ndebele, an Nguni-speaking group, originated from the Khumalo clan and were former allies of the Ndwande. Upon Ndwande defeat the Ndebele were nominally under the authority of Shaka Zulu. Rather than submit to Shaka's rule, the Khumalo chief, Mzilikazi, led his highly trained people to the South African highveld in 1822. There they took on the name Matabele and adopted Amandebele or Ndebele from the Sotho, of whom they absorbed large numbers of men and women. They continued to develop and expand their Zulu-style regiments into a highly centralized and militarized people. The Ndebele had a short-lived settlement, as they would be expelled after attacks in 1837 by the Boers and their collaborators, the Griqua and the Rolong, whom they had previously expelled. Thereafter, they withdrew further north past the Limpopo River from 1838 to 1840.

The Shona and the Ndebele, 1850–1894

When the Ndebele entered the plateau in present-day Matabeleland they encountered the

resident Shona. The Ndebele nation and Rozvi-Changamire kingdom would come to war with cattle raids and counter-raids as the pretext. From 1850, however, the Ndebele would emerge victorious, and the Shona warriors who were not killed or captured in battle would withdraw from Matabeleland. Skirmishes and tension continued between the Shona and Ndebele, as the Ndebele regularly pillaged and raided cattle from their Shona neighbors. In response to the constant threats to their sovereignty and interests, resident Shona developed a defense system which advanced their abilities in warfare. Casualties during this period included the widely revered and probably most influential of the Shona *Mwari*-cult officers, Pasipamire, who was the spirit medium of Chaminuka. This and other events subsequently intensified tensions between the two to the point where the Shona had to collaborate with the Portuguese in anti-Ndebele treaties as late as 1890. The alliance between the Shona and the Portuguese against the Ndebele, however, would be nullified as the Shona came to view the more imminent threat posed by the British South Africa Company (BSAC). The Shona in Zimbabwe would ally themselves with those who opposed the Portuguese in Mozambique, the Makombenguruve who reigned in Mozambique.

The Makombe-nguruve dynasty waged full scale *hondo* (war) against the Portuguese as they turned their attention from occupying a meager settlement to efforts at solidifying their tenuous empire and asserting their hegemony. The supplies of manpower and arms would be utilized by the Shona in Zimbabwe during their Chimurenga and more so after 1897. Indeed, relations with longstanding Portuguese trade partners, who indirectly supplied a fair amount of arms to the Shona in Zimbabwe, experienced dramatic changes as the Portuguese and the British under the auspices of the BSAC engaged in imperialist ambitions across the continent in the scramble for Africa. However, elements of the Shona in Mozambique would continue with some aspects of trade as the Portuguese in many instances illicitly continued to supply arms to the Shona. These Shona, who were the Makombe, would later be instrumental in supplying manpower and even refuge for the Shona of Zimbabwe to fight colonial powers – both the BSAC in Zimbabwe and the Portuguese in Mozambique.

The effect of the Ndebele victory in 1850 was that the Rozvi-Changamire suffered severe

damage. While the state did not fall, its prestige diminished to such an extent that tribute was no longer paid. As with the Ndebele in Matabeleland, other Nguni speakers who were similarly displaced from their native South African lands also clashed with the Shona in Mozambique and along the eastern border of Zimbabwe. The Nguni groups were not as successful as the Ndebele, but the Shona collectively experienced formidable threats to their sovereignty individually and collectively. After the war in 1850 and subsequent assertions of Ndebele hegemony in and around Matabeleland, many Shona were absorbed into the Ndebele state.

Among the conquered was the Shona by the name of Mkwati, who was a *Mwari* (God)-Cult officer and a spirit medium or *svikiro*. Mkwati was of considerable importance and stature, as he was a *svikiro* of the *mhondoro* spirits or royal ancestors, who when not in possession of a medium spirit of the royal ancestor was said to roam the wilderness in the form of a young lion. Thus, *mhondoro* are also referred to as royal lion spirits. This distinction was recognized by the Ndebele as they came to adhere to his directives, especially after the loss of their king in 1894 with no agreed-upon successor, and more so with the opening of offensives against the BSAC in 1896. In religious and cultural terms, the Ndebele resisted the missionary efforts of John Smith Moffat and instead accepted the teachings of the *Mwari* cult, renaming it *M'limo* (God). The Shona are monotheistic. While having many religious sites across their territory such as designated caves, pools, and altars around which religious activity was observed, they kept no fetishes. In *Mwari*, the creator was believed to be so divine that human beings could not gain access to him without the use of an intermediary. The spirits of deceased ancestors were thus looked to in order to appeal to *Mwari* on their behalf. It is believed that royal spirits had closer proximity with *Mwari* and thus *mhondoro* spirits were more highly revered. These ancestral spirits concerned with their descendents also relayed information to them through spirit mediums that they possessed. This religious form of *Mwari* worship was reportedly ushered in and led by the Ndebele captive Mkwati, who was then their *M'limo* high priest. This religious cohesion would supply a unifying context whereby the Ndebele and the Shona would join forces in Chimurenga.

Other significant events in this period for the Ndebele include the death of Mzilikazi and the installation of Lobengula in 1874. The BSAC, recognizing that the Ndebele were a tightly unified and formidable force, sought a treaty with them. Moffat, who had built relations with the Ndebele, was a supporter of the BSAC and encouraged Lobengula to ally himself with the British. On February 11, 1888 Lobengula signed the Moffat Treaty in which Lobengula promised to refrain from entering into any correspondence with European powers with a view to negotiate any or all of the land under his control without prior sanction from Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa. This essentially initiated the British occupation of Zimbabwe. This was followed by Cecil John Rhodes' efforts to obtain full and exclusive rights to Lobengula's mineral resources, which essentially cited that any measures necessary to attain those resources would be permitted. Unwittingly, Lobengula signed the Rudd concession, as the terms of the treaty were deceitfully cited to him by the BSAC agents. Lobengula was led to believe that the BSAC would send no more than ten prospectors and have only limited access to natural resources. Also, he was under the impression that he would be supplied with 1,000 Martin-Henry breech loading rifles, 100,000 rounds of ammunition, and £100 per month to him and his subsequent heirs. A further provision that Lobengula thought was included was that the BSAC would provide troops and supplies to Lobengula as needed, of which Lobengula would be in command. A known condition set by the treaty was that Lobengula would enter into no diplomatic relations with any other European power.

When the real terms of the treaty were revealed to Lobengula, he published a repudiation of the concession in the *Bechaland News* in February 1889. He also sent emissaries in order to appeal to the British queen to declare the treaty void or to declare a protectorate over Matabeleland and MaShonaland. These efforts were in vain, and Rhodes had his monopoly. In early 1890 Rhodes led a column of 1,200 white soldiers, 200 imperial troops, 1,000 auxiliary African troops, and 600 mounted horsemen. This column moved from South Africa through Matabeleland and then onto MaShonaland, where they arrived and hoisted the Union Jack at Harare on September 12, 1890. With Lobengula's appeals rejected,

no European allies, and surrounded by Shona groups weary of them, the Ndebele were in peril.

Lobengula went to great pains to avoid warfare with the BSAC. The administration of the BSAC's newly formed Native Commission enacted policies which had the objective of disrupting and subjugating the Ndebele way of life. The effects of such policies included the seizure of massive tracts of land, raiding cattle, and conscripting unpaid labor hands, among other acts intended to humiliate elders and others of traditional importance. This resulted in relatively minor instances of Ndebele firing on BSAC patrols as they collected taxes. Offensives against the Shona by the Ndebele also continued. Impi or Ndebele regiments were sent to raid Shona settlements in and around Matabeleland. On one such occasion near Victoria (presently called Masvingo) in April 1893, Lobengula's Impi engaged the BSAC and a battle ensued. Neither the BSAC nor the Ndebele were interested in pursuing the matter as both had interests at stake. The BSAC were not interested in engaging the Ndebele unless they could muster a convincing victory. Anything less would be protracted and costly. The Ndebele did not want to engage the BSAC, whose advanced weaponry would inflict devastating losses and unquestioned defeat. However, this incident as well as further Ndebele raids against the Shona would culminate in the BSAC establishing a pretext for marching on Bulawayo in order to wage war against Lobengula and finally bring the centralized and militarized state firmly under BSAC domination.

As part of their pretext for entering MaShonaland provinces and demanding taxes from the Shona, the BSAC stipulated that they would protect the Shona against the Ndebele. This coupled with the Victoria incident, in addition to fabricated reports of Lobengula planning attacks against the BSAC stationed in MaShonaland, instigated a rationale by which whites assembled in mid-1894 and prepared to march on Bulawayo. The resulting conflict was very light and awarded the BSAC a swift victory, as Ndebele generals used conservative tactics and surrendered quickly. Upon news of the coming BSAC forces, Lobengula opted for flight rather than send his 20,000 warriors into warfare against the superior firepower of the BSAC forces, who had maxim guns. This battle was not representative of Ndebele military

capability or courage; rather, it was tactful maneuvering on the part of the Ndebele in order to avoid suicidal confrontation. Lobengula would withdraw north toward present-day Zambia in the hopes of escaping the conditions in Matabeleland. He fell ill and died while in flight in late 1894, with no named successor. While there were many credible candidates, the position of king of the Ndebele was never reoccupied.

The BSAC, 1890–1896

The objectives of the colonizing power before the Chimurenga can be divided into two parts, from 1890–4 and from 1894–6. The major objective of the 1890–4 period was to find and mine the upper-reef gold deposits rumored to be vast on the plateau. When attempts to find these deposits failed, further settler objectives emerged. For the Shona and the Ndebele, this meant that relations with BSAC agents became more volatile. From 1894 to 1896 the objectives of colonization shifted. They were to provide raw materials for the emergent industrial complexes of the West: in the case of Zimbabwe these raw materials were agricultural and mineral. They would also import manufactured goods from the West, converting the Shona and Ndebele into consumers of British manufactured goods. The colonies would become self-sufficient producers, enriching the colonists and promoting their interests, including religious, economic, political, and cultural hegemony. An instance of this aspiration manifested itself in the 1894 offensive against the Ndebele. The Victoria Agreement of August 14, 1894 was a contract whereby mostly poor European volunteers would enlist and battle the Ndebele in the hope of acquiring land and loot by right of conquest. Such plunder included some 6,000 acres of land per volunteer, and the acquisition of the king's cattle, which was in excess of 30,000 head, among other goods.

These objectives entailed huge changes for the Africans. In many cases the native Shona were forcibly removed from their land and relocated to native reserves. Hut tax was imposed, as well as conscripted labor. Colonial laws were arbitrarily adhered to by BSAC representatives, who were often farmers who settled in the area. The BSAC comprised executives and commissioners who formed a minority elite, educated and skilled. The majority of the settlers were volunteers, many of whom were uneducated and until recent acts

of incursion under the auspices of the BSAC, poor. The majority of BSAC agents were then given charge of areas in which they settled and exercised their newly found authority over native populations. BSAC mismanagement of the new colony was attributed to Rhodes and weakness in methods of administration. For instance, the BSAC police force was withdrawn from MaShonaland provinces and reassembled near the Limpopo close to the Transvaal in order to raid President Kruger to the south.

The duties of policing and administrative functions such as tax collection were placed in the inexperienced hands of former volunteers. Many BSAC agents adjudicated versions of justice by means of corruption, as they decided disputes between Shona parties on the basis of who promised a share of the award with the local authority. Wanton brutality with the intent of humiliating those who traditionally held offices of stature was widespread, as elders or people of high social standing were flogged in public for nominal offenses. Other acts of abuse of power included the rape of women, random unpaid labor conscription, and cattle theft in the name of the hut tax. Such acts quickly became common against the Africans. The Shona's assumption of a brief and non-invasive BSAC visitor was quickly being replaced with the reality that these settlers intended to stay, and that they wanted ever more.

Though the Shona were not conquered at this point by the Europeans, the settlers were fairly confident that the Shona were sufficiently divided such that resistance to BSAC rule was out of the question. The BSAC were also confident that the Ndebele threat was well behind them as the highest authority of their centralized kingdom; Lobengula had been neutralized, so that the BSAC believed that militarily the Ndebele were irreparably subdued. It was certainly outside of the BSAC's comprehension that the Shona, who they believed to be docile, would ally themselves with the Ndebele, as the BSAC believed the Shona would be grateful for their intervention against the Ndebele. Thus when Chimurenga commenced in March 1896 in Matabeleland, its was a complete surprise. The BSAC was further astonished when it commenced in the central and eastern districts of MaShonaland in June of the same year. The BSAC overestimated its contributions to the Shona and underestimated the resilience of the Shona in the face of BSAC

posturing against the traditional way of life the Shona had enjoyed for millennia.

The attempts at western indoctrination of the Africans included a demonization of their religion, as well as a change from subsistence agriculture to a directed one. Imposed changes to the economy of colonial Zimbabwe included cash crops such as coffee, tobacco, wheat, maize, and cotton which were valuable to the West's interests and so were systematically pursued. Conditions on the plateau as set by the colonizers were such that the indigenous groups were to be their cheap supply of labor. Mining, farming and other building work were taken on by other African migrant workers, as well as "Coloreds" or those of a mixture African, Indian, and/or White ancestry. Taxes were to be implemented in 1894 and the BSAC moved to capitalize on and settle Zimbabwe. Native laws taken from South Africa were implemented, rich farmlands were appropriated, and with the assistance of missionaries the four objectives of colonial settlement were underway. As of 1893 the search for vast deposits of gold converted to ventures in agricultural wealth.

As if the prevailing factors in Zimbabwe were not harsh enough, the 1895 season brought severe drought, plagues of rinderpest (a viral disease fatal to cattle), and locusts, all of which were deleterious to the mixed-farming economy. Such occurrences were occasions for the Shona to seek spirit mediums in order to find solutions to their problems. The *svikiro* told both the Shona and the Ndebele that the white man had brought all their sufferings, namely forced labor, the hut tax, and flogging, as well as the natural disasters of locusts, rinderpest, and drought. They told the people that *Mwari* (God), having been moved by the suffering of his people, had decreed that the white men were to be driven out of the country; and that the Africans had nothing to fear because *Mwari*, being on their side, would turn the white man's bullets into harmless water.

Armed Struggle, 1896–1897

The act of uprising or resistance called Chimurenga commenced in March 1896, initiated in the Matabeleland under the direction of the spirit medium Mkwati. In contrast to the random, unconnected, and often more subtle acts of resistance to date, Chimurenga was widespread,

continuous, and effectively coordinated by the *mhondoro* and allied chieftaincies. The first five days of the Chimurenga produced 100 European casualties. The Ndebele rising in Matabeleland was effective and demonstrated that the Ndebele were indeed still a state able to make war. This prompted the company to mobilize against Matabeleland in efforts to break the rebellion. This had the effect of thinning their armed forces in MaShonaland.

The initial attacks were sudden and after a long period of relative calm. These strikes took place in relatively isolated locations and against persons who knew their assailants. They took place on farms and rural stores: the rebels calmly approached their targets and after a brief exchange, killed them. These small attacks turned to massive offensives against BSAC outposts and patrols. It is said that after the first week, no whites existed outside of *laagers* or defensively fortified enclosures in Matabeleland. Migrant workers and known collaborators were also targeted in these attacks, as were women and children. This was total revolution, whereby the complete expulsion of whites and the restoration of the traditional African paramounts were the objectives. As the offensives extended throughout the province, Chimurenga warriors used the guerilla tactics of collecting the enemies' weapons after battle, as well as ambush and withdrawal maneuvers, whereby passing patrols were targeted. Seizures and frontal attacks also comprised the offensives employed by the Ndebele.

The initial BSAC response was muted, as the events were downplayed in reports back to the London Board of the BSAC. The response of a media blackout concerning these events would soon change to pleas for 500, then 700 or more troops to be sent into Zimbabwe, as the priority of holding the perception of control of the colony gave way to the reality of the threat faced in Zimbabwe. BSAC holders in Zimbabwe did not want imperial British troops to have an extended presence in the land, as this would threaten their charter there. However, the rash of quick defeats forced the BSAC to weigh risking their charter against annihilation. Troops were dispatched to Zimbabwe via Beira, but did not arrive until January 1897. In the meantime, the BSAC enlisted volunteers and retreated to *laagers*, with incoming relief from South Africa. Early Ndebele victories would become fewer and further between as the element of surprise

passed. Also, of the four paramounts in and around Matabeleland, only three chiefs adhered to the calls for revolt. The fourth was positioned to block the road to South Africa, which was instead a safe thoroughfare for reinforcements.

After weathering the colonial response, Mkwati sent a messenger, Tishiwa, who was a Rozvi Mwari-cult officer, under the pretext of collecting anti-locust medicine, to inspire Chimurenga in the central districts of Zimbabwe. Before May 1896 Tishiwa would procure the support of Bonda, a Rozvi Mari-cult officer in the Charter district, and Mashayamombe, a head man for the Hartley district, as well as gain audiences with various paramounts, headmen, or trusted court officials, and possibly sons of some of the chiefs. Mashayamombe would immediately contact Gumboreshumba, who was the spirit medium for *mhondoro* spirit Sekuru Kaguvi (also known as Kagubi, or Kagumi). He would be endorsed as the lead *mhondoro svikiro* among the *mhondoro svikiro* Nehanda and Mkwati by Mashayamombe. Gumboreshumba had credibility by lineage, as his relative was Pasipamire, who was the spirit medium for Chaminuka.

Bonda, upon receiving the call to arms from Tishiwa, went about as a facilitator of communication, carried messages himself, raided loyalist Shona, and was a field commander. By June 1896 preparations for the Shona rising commenced in earnest, using prearranged fire signals or *chivara* from hill top to hill top as the indicator to start the rebellion in the central and eastern Shona lands. Mkwati was forced out of Matabeleland and tactically retreated to Mashayamombe's stronghold, thus reinforcing it. This area in the Hartley district became the headquarters of the Shona offensive.

Kaguvi, also stationed in Mashayamombe's district, planned to revive the Rozvi-Changamire Empire. In July Kaguvi and Mkwati planned, against Mashayamombe's wishes, to go north near his home area to support the resistance there and encourage warriors not to surrender. They also intended to install a would-be *mambo* (king), Mudzinganyama a Rozvi, who would be a politically unifying force for that empire. He was subsequently apprehended and arrested, however. The loss of that political figure lent more credibility to the *mhondoro svikiro*, as the people who were in resistance looked to their spiritual leaders more earnestly. However, many obstacles remained to be overcome.

In August 1896, after successfully holding positions and effecting raids against BSAC positions, the Ndebele, who started their rising after a devastating agricultural season, and also before harvest time, were inclined to hold negotiations with Rhodes. The BSAC were taxed in terms of the cost of funding their efforts and so a quick end to hostilities was their goal, as bankruptcy was an increasing possibility. Rhodes sponsored talks over the next four months which produced drastic results. The *Indunas* or tribal head men/generals were able to air their grievances and cite terms, as they had earned Rhodes' attention. Head men such as Nymanda, Lobengula's eldest son, and generals such as Umlugulu, Sikombo, Bayaan, and Somabulana were incorporated into the BSAC structure by being given back some of their land and cattle, holding positions of authority where they resided, and being salaried. Such measures were viewed by Rhodes as an investment in quieting the resistance in Matabeleland as well as resolving the risings in western, central, and eastern MaShonland. He held to the belief that the Ndebele were the true instigators of Chimurenga, and that the Shona who had chronologically followed suit would do the same again and lay down their arms. This gamble was calculated in order to put an end to the expensive venture of war, and to get Zimbabwe back to being profitable for him. He was wrong.

As the planting season approached, negotiations were attempted. Some Shona chiefs such as Makoni and Mashingombi entertained envoys as a stall tactic. While *indabas* or negotiations proceeded, they were planting their crops for the coming year. They also fortified their respective territories with walls, some as high as 10 feet and as thick as 3 feet, in order to repel offensives. Other measures included fortifying near caves, where rebels could continue to fight and hold positions indefinitely. In addition to this, other Shona groups held the major arteries to and from Harare and the other major urban areas of Bulawayo, Mutare, and Masvingo. However, the arrival of 700 British troops along with their 7-pound mortar rounds would turn the tide in BSAC's favor.

The previous drought had depleted food reserves. Perhaps that is why the Shona element of Chimurenga coincided with the end of the harvest season of 1896, went into a lull at the beginning of the wet season of 1896 into 1897,

and then started again at the end of that season as crops began to ripen. As hostilities resumed in 1897 the ability of the rebels to resist was limited by a lack of pan-Shona cohesion, old rivalries, and the question of supplies. Strategic hindrances existed for the Shona. Chimurenga did not immediately spread in the south, as Shona there were still weary of the Ndebele, regarding them as a greater threat than the BSAC. Thus, some paramounts remained neutral or even collaborated with the BSAC. In some instances some would join in Chimurenga after the most strategically opportune moment had lapsed. Thus, a lack of unanimous support coupled with the BSAC tactics of slash and burn crippled resistance efforts. By the end of January negotiations with the Ndebele were all but complete, and the troops that were stationed in Matabeleland were redeployed to MaShonaland districts. The addition of artillery and dynamite to BSAC positions meant that rebels were forced to retreat to their defensive positions in nearby caves. They were then blasted continuously by dynamite charges lowered into the caves. Upon fleeing from the caves, rebels were often shot, including Makoni and Mashiangombi, both of whom perished in separate incidents. Though at one point up to a tenth of whites in Zimbabwe were reportedly killed, the ranks of collaborating Africans made up for lacks in police, and demoralizing defeats also took their toll.

Further frustrating the rebellion was the fact that Shona paramounts had yet to achieve a greater form of pan-Shona unity. The British tactic of divide and conquer was utilized in exacerbating cleavages between and among Shona groups. This tactic proved effective as old rivalries among some Shona groups persisted. In addition, chiefs seldom combined forces in order to mount offensives or hold gains unless those groups had been pushed off of their territories. While many Shona did provide guerillas with supplies and information, in addition to joining them in battle, the resistance would end unfavorably for the Shona as slash and burn tactics eroded the ability to continue defending strongholds. In due course the strongholds of chiefs central to the resistance efforts such as Mashiangombi, Makoni, and Kunzwi Nyandoro, were each militarily overwhelmed as they were killed or captured.

It became apparent to the BSAC that the negotiated settlement with the Ndebele which

ran from August 1896 until December of that year, as well as many violent victories against the Shona in 1897, was not enough to break the rebellion. The BSAC came to the recognition that the central actors, without whom the resistance would end, were indeed the Shona *svikiro mhondoro* Sekuru Mkwati, Sekuru Kaguvi, and Ambuya Nehanda. As efforts intensified against these, supplies as well as morale and refuge among the rebels became exhausted.

Mkwati, after being separated from the other mediums, was reportedly killed by Shona who accompanied him in late September or early October of 1897. On October 27, 1897 Sekuru Kaguvi was captured, as was Ambuya Nehanda in December of that same year. They were both hung on March 2, 1898, effectively ending the Chimurenga in Zimbabwe. Shortly before execution, Father Richartz converted Sekuru Kaguvi to Christianity, while Ambuya Nehanda remained defiant. Other chiefs such as Maporenda who survived Zimbabwe's Chimurenga would again take up arms and rebel against the BSAC and eventually the Portuguese, as he and other chiefs crossed the border to the east in continuation of resistance efforts alongside the Makombe. Nonetheless, the continuous armed revolt in Zimbabwe ended, but inspired future rebellion.

SEE ALSO: Southern Africa, Popular Resistance to Neoliberalism, 1982–2007; Zimbabwe, Labor Movement and Politics, 1980–2007; Zimbabwe, National Liberation Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Alpers, E. A. (1970) Dynasties of the Mutapa-Rowzi Complex. *Journal of African History* 11, 2: 203–20.
- Beach, D. N. (1974) Ndebele Raiders and Shona Power. *Journal of African History* 15, 4: 633–51.
- Beach, D. N. (1979) "Chimurenga": The Shona Rising of 1896–97. *Journal of African History* 20, 3: 395–420.
- Gelfand, M. (1977) *The Spiritual Beliefs of the Shona: A Study Based on Field Work Among the East-Central Shona*. Gwelu (Gweru): Mambo Press.
- Huffman, T. N. (1972) The Rise and Fall of Zimbabwe. *Journal of African History* 13, 3: 353–66.
- Isaacman, A. (1973) Madzi-Manga, Mhondoro and the Use of Oral Traditions: A Chapter in Barue Religious and Political History. *Journal of African History* 14, 3: 395–409.
- Isaacman, A. (1976) *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique: The Zambezi Valley 1850–1921*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Ranger, T. O. (1967) *Revolt in South Rhodesia 1896–1897: A Study in African Resistance*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Ranger, T. O. (1982) The Death of Chaminuka: Spirit Mediums, Nationalism and the Guerilla War in Zimbabwe. *African Affairs* 81, 324: 349–69.

China, Maoism and popular power, 1949–1969

Pierre Rousset

With the proclamation of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) found itself at the head of a country three times larger than Western Europe, with a population of some 500 million. The internal situation was favorable to the revolutionary regime. At the end of a long series of civil and foreign wars, the population sought and relied on the new leaders for peace while the ongoing people's mobilization opened the way for an in-depth reform of society.

In December 1949, while fighting against the Guomintang nationalists still raged in the south, Mao Zedong flew to Moscow to meet Stalin. The USSR may have been the first country to recognize the People's Republic, but it had not yet abrogated the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty, signed with Mao's opponent, Chiang Kai-shek. For three consecutive weeks, the two heads of state played a game of cat and mouse before the Soviets agreed to prepare a new treaty – signed on February 14, 1950 by Zhou Enlai and A. Y. Vychinski, foreign ministers respectively of China and the USSR.

After the victory of October 1949, distrust was the rule between the Russian and Chinese leaderships. Mao noted how Stalin looked down upon his experience (“He thought our revolution was fake,” he said) and did not want to commit to supporting China if it were attacked by the United States. However, it was Beijing that indirectly came to the help of Moscow when the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950. The Korean War was not propitious timing for the Chinese leaders, who would have preferred to prioritize consolidation of the regime, revival of the economy (industry was ruined, famine hit the central plains), and reconquest of Taiwan.

Faced with the advance of American forces in North Korea, the Politburo of the CPC was split on Chinese intervention. But the decision was made to join the war effort when US troops approached China's northern border, with Peng Dehuai leading the Chinese counteroffensive. Following four months of intensive and bloody fighting, the front line was stabilized around the 38th parallel. Two years later, the armistice was eventually signed, on July 27, 1953, with up to 800,000 Chinese killed or injured.

The Korean War overshadowed and dominated the whole period following the 1949 Chinese communist victory. The confrontation (revolution/counterrevolution) assumed an international dimension, the United States building a security belt around China, with important military bases in South Korea, Japan (Okinawa), the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam. For the United Nations, under the hegemony of the United States, there was only one China: that of Guomintang, retrenched in Taiwan.

Faced with a new US imperial threat, China reverted to the Soviet bloc. But the seeds of Sino-Soviet conflict of the 1960s were already sown as Mao and the Chinese leadership lost trust in Moscow, Stalin's promises of military failing to materialize. The Russian leadership, on this occasion, gauged the power and the capacity of China to act independently with trepidation.

The first and primary consequence of the Korean War was disorganizing the effort to consolidate the new regime, leading to a hardening of policy.

The Social Upheaval: 1949–1953

In China, the Korean War provoked vast anti-imperialist demonstrations. Workers sacrificed part of their wages and peasants increased production to support the war effort at the front. In this context, the campaign launched by the Maoist regime to liquidate the counter-revolutionaries took a particularly violent turn. Over a period of six months, 710,000 people were executed (or driven to suicide) for their links, no matter how tenuous, with the Guomintang. Probably more than 1.5 million others were confined to camps of “reform by labor.”

Landlords and Rural Notables

China's agrarian reform itself also took a violent turn in a society where class divisions in villages

were wide: poor peasants did not forget the arrogance, contempt, stinginess, and inhumanity (at their expense) of the wealthy. Poor peasants could not forget the manner in which large landlords, traders, and notables had provoked deadly famine by speculating on cereals – refusing to return rice to the famished villagers to sell at a good profit in the cities. They could not forget all the militant members of peasant associations summarily tortured and assassinated by police, the army, or the goons of the rich. They remembered the dispossession by powerful owners of children and young women from powerless families. Social relationships in the countryside were not brutal everywhere, but the domination of the wealthy over poor peasants was widespread. It was time for the historical settling of scores.

Where class divisions in the villages were narrow, and no one was really rich, social tensions were nevertheless acute because of extreme poverty, where notables and clan networks were the first target of the CCP. To address the complexity and the regional variations of rural stratification, the CCP classified families into five categories, from landless to landlords. In some places, middle or even poor peasants could suffer repression.

The CCP organized and encouraged mass meetings against landlords and the wealthy, at the risk, in its own words, of “excesses.” But the collective anger of poor peasants was not feigned. The revolutionary violence in the countryside was social, much more than a simple police operation. Beyond settling scores, it paved the way to a real change of power, the overthrow of the old order. In most villages, one landlord, sometimes several, was killed, summarily beaten to death, or publicly executed. Many fled or were shielded from people’s vengeance. At the end of 1950, the class that ruled the rural world for centuries ceased to exist as a coherent social layer.

Urban Bourgeoisie

In the urban centers social antagonisms, even if profound, were less acute than in rural regions. Moreover, in 1949, the CCP, stemming from the rural people’s war, was quite incapable of supporting industrialization. In the framework of the “New Democracy,” the CCP tried to win the private entrepreneurs’ favor. But in 1952, the bourgeoisie felt strong enough to take the initiative against the new regime through sabotaging and blocking implementation of govern-

ment policies, refusing orders given by the administration. Class struggle reasserted itself. On June 6, 1952, Mao Zedong announced that the entrepreneurs were becoming a target of political struggle.

In the cities, the Communist Party launched three mass mobilization campaigns to remold the urban society. The first two targeted the underworld and capitalist class, the bourgeois elites: the “Three Anti” (against corruption, waste, and bureaucracy) and the “Five Anti” (against corruption, fiscal evasion, fraud, embezzlement, and leakage of state secrets) campaigns. Once again, most were not classical police operations and their implementation varied according to region or the fluctuating relationship of forces among factions of the CCP. Everyone was called to inform the authorities: workers denounced their superiors, cadres denounced each other, wives denounced husbands and children their parents. Psychological pressure was so great that the majority of human losses were suicides and not executions.

The fines imposed on private firms for illicit activities during these campaigns amounted to US\$2 billion, a colossal amount at the time. The majority of the large traders and entrepreneurs withdrew to Hong Kong (transferring their means of production) or abroad. The capital drain actually began as early as 1946 in reaction to Guomindang rule. A certain number of large capitalists, however, remained and sometimes benefited from a very favorable situation. The activity of microentrepreneurs (craftsmen, hawkers, peddlers, and so on) was both repressed and tolerated by the regime. Chinese capitalists were not physically liquidated and some collaborated in exchange for departure from the country. Following the “Five Anti” campaign, the bourgeoisie (merchants and industrialists) ceased to exist as a coherent class dominating the modern economic sector. Seven years after victory, in 1956, the nationalization of industries and trade sanctioned the capitalist class’s disappearance as an autonomous social force.

As the old order was uprooted, the power structures of the Guomindang were dismantled, both in the urban centers and in the countryside.

The third campaign – reform of thought – targeted mostly urban intellectuals, in particular those trained in the West. Conceived ideologically as the “movement of rectification,” implemented in Yen’an (Yan’an) during the war to consolidate the Maoist leadership’s authority,

the campaign denounced individualism, elitism, indifference to politics, and pro-Americanism. This campaign was implemented in different ways to the “Three” and “Five Anti” campaigns: through successive self-criticism implemented by small discussion groups, combined with police repression. As such, intellectuals found themselves under the firm control of the Communist Party.

“Class origin” became an important criterion to gain access to education, political positions, or good employment. Not without perverse effects, children of rich families (or classified as such) became forever “responsible” for who their parents were before 1949. But the symbolic upheaval of the social hierarchy had a radical ideological importance in a society where “inferior” classes were despised, at everyone’s beck and call. The process was not merely symbolic. In parallel to the disintegration of the old dominating classes, the status of the dominated classes was substantially modified as new social layers developed.

Peasantry

The fact that the peasantry played an important role was peculiar to the Chinese Revolution. Before the Long March, the Comintern enjoined the CCP to work among the peasantry, but for a long time the Chinese Politburo turned a deaf ear to the advice of its Russian comrades. The CCP became the principal political force organizing the peasantry – which was not the case in Russia, where the influence of revolutionary socialists or anarchists (or, more simply, of local non-politicized rural elites) was much more significant than communist influence.

In the years following the conquest for power, the CCP was careful not to impose a Stalinist type of forced collectivization. The party started through the creation of “mutual aid” teams, paving the way to the formation of cooperatives of “inferior” level and relatively modest size. The approach evokes what Lenin envisaged retrospectively in one of his last critical and self-critical writings, constituting his “testament”: “On Cooperation” (January 4, 1923). The approach helped to consolidate the new status of the poor peasantry, while offering the peasant class a future in the revolution rather than demanding their transformation into agricultural workers in state farms. But in order to block any rural migration, the peasants had no right to change their residence without authorization.

Working Class

With the rapid industrialization policy initiated by the Maoist regime, the working class was considerably reinforced: from 3 million before 1949 to 15 million by 1952 and nearly 70 million in 1978. The change was not only quantitative, as a new state-directed industrial sector was born together with a new working class with a radically different status than had prevailed before 1949.

Workers were recruited in the framework of a policy of massive salarization (“low wages, many jobs”). Only urban workers benefited from the new administrative status of “worker and employee.” As a general rule, peasants had no right to migrate in search of work in cities. Once obtained, employment became a guaranteed right. Low wages were offset by social benefits (including residence, health service, life employment, old-age pension). Each worker was assigned to an enterprise and to a work unit as in other countries civil servants are assigned to a position. Workers reaching retirement age could frequently pass on their status to a family member. Benefiting from important privileges in relation to the rest of the population – notwithstanding political cadres – the working class was for a long time a solid social base of the regime.

Women

In the 1920s in Chinese progressive circles, it was commonplace to denounce both “feudal” and “patriarchal” oppression. The emancipation of women and the criticism of Confucian conservatism were considered essential to modernization. Laws in favor of gender equality were adopted under the Soviet Republic of Jiangxi. The establishment and development of feminist organizations were crucial in the national and civil war eras. Membership in the CCP-led Women’s Democratic Federation reached 20 million in 1949 and 76 million in 1956.

In 1950, the law on marriage was among the first two pieces of legislation (with agrarian reform) promulgated under the young People’s Republic. This new legislation insured in theory, and often concretely, the free choice of partner, monogamy, women’s equal rights, and protection of the legal interest of women and children. The law opposed traditional arranged marriages and permitted administrative divorce by mutual consent. Thanks to measures of agrarian reform, women gained the right to own land. The law’s

implementation faced strong social resistance – including within the CCP – but was supported by a strong women’s movement.

Cadres and Bureaucracy

Two parallel power structures were established in China: the administration and the Communist Party. Cadres in both structures emerged from the revolutionary struggle. Those among them from well-to-do family backgrounds sacrificed wealth and social status to advance the revolution and were not privileged similarly to the old dominant classes. Henceforward, those in both cadres enjoyed mostly modest privileges but, more importantly, a quasi-absolute monopoly of political power. Even before the victory, the CCP cadres constituted a thin “bureaucracy of war” in “liberated zones.” After 1949, the politico-administrative structure was considerably enlarged with the reconstruction of the state at the national level and the development of a vast public economic sector. These new social strata assumed an unprecedented place in Chinese society, rapidly gaining consistency and giving birth to a ruling social elite.

Army

To relieve the population, as early as the 1930s soldiers were called to produce food when possible. In the postwar reconstruction, the movement for an autarchic economy within the Red Army (initiated at the beginning of the 1940s) was extended. The army was essential in the aftermath of 1949, but continually occupied an ambivalent position in the Maoist structures of power. As the backbone of the revolutionary struggle, the army was the only institution that resisted all crises, including the “Cultural Revolution.” Nevertheless, up to the end it remained subordinate to the political leadership. In the words of Mao Zedong, “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” and always, “the party commands the gun.” This role of the army, both central and subordinated, is typical of the Maoist revolution.

A Succession of Crises

The new Maoist government in 1949 was a radical revolutionary and dynamic force. But in 1966 – less than 20 years later – the society was shaken to the core by a paroxysmal crisis: the misnamed “Cultural Revolution.” The tumultuous

history of the People’s Republic in the first two decades has been interpreted variously: apologetically, critically but progressively, and in a bluntly reactionary way (considering revolution illegitimate), based on the weight of the past on international pressures. But there are also recurrent political questions that help understand the succession of unresolved crises leading to the explosion of 1966: pluralism, legality and socialist democracy, and one-party rule.

During the 1950s, debates raged within the Communist Party on the independence of unions and other mass movements like the Women’s Federation. But the CCP reaffirmed its direct leadership, refusing to grant any political autonomy. These organizations were responsible for implementing official policy and also, thanks to their genuine social roots, for informing the leaders on the people’s state of mind – or their grievances. But this conception of the cadres “listening to the masses,” of a two-way transmission belt, was inoperable, at least in times of peace.

The Hundred Flowers

In 1954–5, strong tensions emerged between numerous intellectuals and the Communist Party. The latter reacted by repression, incarcerating even some close fellow travelers like Hu Feng. The leadership of the CCP anxiously monitored the crises that hit the eastern bloc (for example, in Hungary and Poland) in 1953–6, wondering about the implications of the death of Stalin and Khrushchev’s report at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. In 1957, in the same speech, Mao denounced both the vestiges of bourgeois ideology and the gravity of the “bureaucratic style of work” hampering “socialist development.” Given Mao’s popularity, he had the legitimacy to exert pressure on the apparatus, seeking political and cultural liberalization and launching the slogan “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend.” Mao could not foresee the extent to which his words would be acted upon.

In May–June 1957, the CCP became the target of a wave of criticism concerning the recruitment process of its members (who then numbered over 10 million), the abuse of cadre privileges, authoritarianism in its organisms, and domination of the party. Students rapidly took over where intellectuals had left off, denouncing the dogmatism of study and demanding

respect for constitutional rights: freedom of speech and expression. In response to this flurry of criticism, on June 8, 1957 the *People's Daily* denounced the “poisonous weeds.” In Wuhan, worker activists brutally intervened on June 12 and 13 to reestablish order after two days of near rioting.

The repression of the Hundred Flowers severed the CCP from an important sector among intellectuals and students – a missed opportunity that deeply influenced the future course of events. The main leader (in title at least) of the Federation of Unions, Lai Ruoyu, again raised the demand for trade union independence: to no avail. The issue of socialist legality was eluded by the party leadership: recognition of civic rights was only a question of political opportunity. Such an approach had far-reaching consequences in all spheres of life, especially in the women's emancipation struggle. Under the circumstances, the women's movements were unable to intervene as an autonomous force to shatter deeply rooted patriarchal ideologies. Whatever the progress in women's rights, the “other revolution” of gender equality remained largely an unreachable utopia.

Rapid Collectivization and the Great Leap Forward

The Hundred Flowers movement had barely ended when another crisis of even greater proportions erupted, threatening the relationship between the party and the peasantry as well as the political balance within the CCP.

In 1956–7, new social tensions manifested themselves in the countryside and enterprises. A meager harvest provoked peasant discontent and poor working conditions pushed dockers in Canton (Guangzhou) to launch a strike. As a whole, the regime resolved the crises and the protest movements remained localized, but the social unrest was a warning signal. After its seizure of power, lacking experience, the CCP had initially copied the Stalinist model of heavy industrialization. In the late 1950s, the CCP had to define a “Chinese way” that was adapted to the peasantry and to the demographic density of the country, since by 1958–60 China's population had reached 700 million.

The economic orientation elaborated by the CCP in 1956–7 sought to respond to real needs. To prevent the impending formation of a huge megalopolis in the coastal urban areas (similar to,

if not worst than, those in the early twentieth century in the Global South), the CCP found it necessary to avoid the European model of urbanization, industrialization, and massive rural–urban migration. However, in spite of strict controls, rural migration started spontaneously, to the point of instigating conflict between undocumented labor of rural origin and urban workers with “official” status.

To avoid mass relocation of the population, the CCP favored local development through the creation of large peasant cooperatives, the introduction of infrastructures and services in the countryside, and the creation of industries in small towns and rural centers. To increase women's participation in the workforce, many canteens, nurseries, and children's playgrounds were opened. Ideologically, the ideal of the abolition of wage labor was again raised. China had to become a vast federation of communes, largely decentralized and self-sufficient, linked together through the powerful apparatus of the Communist Party and its mass organizations.

The CCP leadership assigned to this new economic model unrealizable goals (to “overtake Great Britain in 15 years,” in Mao's words), which quickly proved highly problematic. The regime chose to resort to mobilization methods that were successful in times of war, but not in peacetime. In China, the policy of the “Great Leap” placed intolerable burdens on the administration and the population. The policy left no time to prepare, coordinate, or plan economic measures. After an initial success, it retreated into chaos and failure. Micro-industrial production (iron, steel, tools) proved to be of low quality, and harvests and transport were disorganized. In 1959–61, various regions of the country were hit by scarcity and deadly famine, aggravated by a succession of natural catastrophes, with the tragic consequence of possibly 30 million deaths.

The Communist Party leadership lacked the capacity to respond quickly to the disaster. In the absence of independent mass organizations and democratic political institutions, the CCP did not perceive the development of the crisis in time. Tensions between the Communist Party and peasantry reached breaking point and upheavals erupted in some areas. Belatedly, appeasement measures were taken. In 1961–62, at the initiative of leaders such as Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping, a new, more modest concept of cooperatives was adopted,

leaving space for family production. Emphasis was placed on the development of light industry to assist agriculture rather than on heavy industry.

The failure of the Great Leap deeply impacted the leadership of the CCP. Mao Zedong offered a half self-criticism. Previously, he had enjoyed a unique position in the summits of the party on account of his role during the revolutionary struggle and a cult of personality that had been built up from the early 1940s. With the Great Leap's failure, CCP cadres realized the Great Helmsman could commit catastrophic errors.

In the early 1960s, Mao's authority in the party and the authority of the party in society were seriously weakened, while social tensions remained highly acute. Adding to the crisis, from 1958 the Sino-Soviet conflict rapidly worsened. Moscow called back Russian experts from China, then negotiated and signed a treaty on nuclear tests with Britain and the US, excluding China. For the Maoist leadership, the USSR gradually replaced the US as the country's "main enemy."

The "Cultural Revolution"

The post-Great Leap conflicts in the CCP leadership could not be contained within the party. In 1965, the political confrontation became public under the guise of cultural polemics – hence the title of "Great Cultural Proletarian Revolution." But much more was at stake than terminology. Each faction began launching mass mobilizations to strengthen its hand, opening Pandora's box and giving way to extensive social contradictions. The resulting crisis in China was so explosive that it destroyed a large part of the state apparatus.

In spite of the many failures, the country undeniably experienced significant economic growth and real social progress. But the Maoist revolution nourished radical egalitarian aspirations while inequalities among villages, between the countryside and cities, and between social sectors remained enormous. Many students did not find jobs corresponding to their diplomas. Poor peasants entered into conflicts with richer peasants, just as, in the cities, undocumented workers clashed with those benefiting from a protected status. The privileges and authority of the cadres and the authoritarianism of the bureaucracy were denounced. The socioeconomic contradictions culminated in massive street demonstrations, larger than at any time since 1949.

Student protests flared in mid-1966 as numerous groups attacked professors and teachers they considered to be "revisionists," protected by their pre-1949 bourgeois social status and still enjoying privileges. Eventually the "rebels" turned against the party itself, denouncing its "fascist" control. Some called for "big democracy" and "freedom." In August, Mao Zedong seized the occasion to launch the slogan "Bombard the Headquarters" – a declaration of war against the CCP's number two, Liu Shaoqi. Mao called for the creation of Red Guards' organizations and revolutionary committees. Seeking to limit the rebel movement to the cities, Mao used the Red Guard as a bulldozer to reestablish his position in the CCP leadership and reorient the party policy in the spirit of the Great Leap.

Nevertheless, the crisis went far beyond the limits initially foreseen. High-level cadres were thrown to the Red Guards, including Beijing's mayor, Peng Zhen. In November the movement reached the working class, which freed itself in various places from party control. From December 1966 to January 1967, the industrial metropolis of Shanghai was the scene of violent confrontations and a spontaneous general strike where unofficial workers played an important role. The troubles spread to the countryside, and in July and August 1967 spread to a growing number of localities, leading to the disintegration of the CCP and the administration. The party leadership was severely divided as local civil wars broke out. But the rebellion too sank into confusion, as democratic and social aspirations for the "Cultural Revolution" were going round in circles, lacking political direction and undermined by factional hyper-violence.

In the eyes of all the tendencies within the CCP leadership, the reconstruction of the party and administration was an urgent requirement, for which the army was the sole institution that could maintain coherence. But it would take time. In spring and summer 1968, violence increased in many areas across the country. In the midst of political confusion, certain groups were still formulating radical propositions, as in Hunan, where the treason of Mao was denounced and calls made for a generalized system of democratically elected "communes" to prevent the return of a "new class of red capitalists." Indeed, by then, Mao Zedong was calling unambiguously for a return to order and stability.

The Reconstruction of a Bureaucratic Order

In September 1968, in their tens of thousands, former students who had become Red Guards were sent to the countryside for reeducation and work. In some factories resistance continued, but only rear-guard opposition.

For months the “rebels” of the “Cultural Revolution” had lived the exhilarating experience of a rare freedom of action, traveling throughout China to propagate the call for revolt. For sure, they were manipulated by various factions of the CCP (in particular Mao). They engaged in blind violence and committed irreparable acts against the elderly, including numerous veterans of the revolutionary struggle, who were accused of being “revisionists,” beaten, sometimes tortured, and forced to make humiliating self-denunciations. But they gained a spirit of independence, radical aspirations, and political experience. If many old Red Guards withdrew from activism, some participated ten years later in the origin of the 1978 democratic movement.

The CCP was in ruins at the close of the 1966–8 period, with eight of the 11 members of the Politburo in prison or reeducation. Out of 63 members of the central committee, 43 disappeared and nine were severely criticized: a process that occurred at all levels of the party. In many places the CCP structure ceased to function. The apparatus of cadres was reconstituted through long seminars within the “May 7 Schools.” But years were needed to reconstruct the party throughout China.

In 1969, the ninth Congress of the CCP could not put an end to the crisis as a new conflict erupted between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, commander in chief of the army, previously considered the best of the Maoists. Lin Biao died in September 1971 while fleeing in an airplane to the USSR, and more than 100 generals were removed from office.

At the beginning of the 1970s, many historical leaders of the Chinese revolution were out of contention, including Liu Shaoqi (who died in exile in 1969), Peng Dehuai (tortured by the Red Guards), Lin Biao, and Deng Xiaoping. The way was open for the accession to power, after the tenth Congress in 1973, of the “Group of Shanghai,” also called by its adversaries the “Gang of Four,” who were centered around Mao’s last wife, Jiang Qing.

Paradoxical Legacy

After the death of Mao in 1976, it was the Gang of Four’s turn to be thrown from power. “Historical” Maoism had died a decade before, in the delirium of Mao’s personality cult and betrayal of the anti-bureaucratic aspirations expressed in the Cultural Revolution. No coherent “left turn” was available after 1969, and in 1971 Nixon traveled to Peking (while the US military was escalating the war in Vietnam), announcing normalization of the Sino-American relationship. The reign of Jiang Qing, an ossified dictatorship, finally discredited the “left,” paving the way for the return of Deng Xiaoping and other surviving “rightists.”

In the 1980s, counterrevolution took the form of a sustained and controlled transition to capitalism. A “reverse” social transformation occurred, as radical as the post-1949 era. The state sector of the economy was largely dismantled, privatized, or administered according to neoliberal capitalist criteria. A new class of entrepreneurs formed, composed of bureaucrats committed to personal enrichment and allied to Chinese transnational capital in Taiwan, Hong Kong, the United States, and elsewhere.

The protected status of the established working class was methodically dismantled, giving way to a layer of technicians and skilled workers and a new and young proletariat, a mass of unstable labor from rural regions, often denied any social or labor rights. After benefiting from decollectivization initiated in the early 1980s, the peasantry found itself faced with many of the same threats of dispossession as its counterparts in other countries of the Global South. Social inequality increased brutally: the poor were again ignored, and the rich honored.

Over the twentieth century, the growth of the Chinese bourgeoisie was hindered by the Guomindang dictatorship before being crushed by the revolution. But – through an irony of history – by the early twentieth century Chinese capitalism had reaped the benefits of Mao’s radicalism. Without it the country would have fallen under the exclusive dependency of Japan or, most probably, the grip of American imperialism. Without Maoism, as in many other “Third World” countries, China’s modern capital could not free itself from rural traditional landowning, a legacy of the past. It can be said that, thanks to the CCP-led revolution (and its

eventual failure), Chinese capitalism received a second historical chance. But the memory of the revolution can also serve as a political ferment for social resistance against the growing inequalities and uncertainties of life.

SEE ALSO: China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911; Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997); Lin Biao (1907–1971); Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969); Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Peng Dehuai (1898–1974); Zhou Enlai (1898–1976); Zhu De (1886–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- Benton, G. (1982) *Wild Lilies, Poisonous Weeds: Dissident Voices from People's China*. London: Pluto Press.
- Bergère, M.-C. (2007) *Capitalisme et capitalistes en Chine, XIXe–XXIe siècle*. Paris: Perrin.
- Bianco, L. & Chevrier, Y. (Eds.) (1985) *Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier international: la Chine*. Paris: Editions Ouvrières/Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.
- Chan, A. (1985) *Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation*. London: Macmillan.
- Chen, E. (1984) *China: Crossroads Socialism. An Unofficial Manifesto for Proletarian Democracy*. London: Verso.
- Croll, E. (1983) *Chinese Women since Mao*. London: Zed Books.
- Deng Xiaoping (1985–) *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, 3 vols. Beijing: People's Publishing House.
- Hinton, W. (1983) *Shenfan: The Continuing Revolution in a Chinese Village*. New York: Random House.
- Klein, D. & Clark, A. (1971) *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism 1921–1965*, 2 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Li, Y. (1977) Socialist Democracy and the Legal System. In A. Chan & J. Unger (Eds.), *Chinese Law and Government*, 10, 3 (Autumn).
- Liu, S. (1984) *Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi*, Vol. 10. Beijing: People's Publishing House.
- MacFarquhar, R. (1974, 1983, 1997) *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, Vol. 1: *Contradictions among the People, 1956–1957*; Vol. 2: *The Great Leap Forward, 1958–1960*; Vol. 3: *The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961–1966*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- MacFarquhar, R. & Fairbank, J. K. (Eds.) (1987–92) *The Cambridge History of China*, Vols. 14 & 15. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Maitan, L. (1976) *Party, Army and Masses in China: A Marxist Interpretation of the Cultural Revolution and its Aftermath*. London: New Left Books.
- Mao Zedong (1975) *Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks and Letters: 1956–1971*. Ed. S. Schram. New York: Pantheon.
- Mao Zedong (1977) *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Vol. 5. Beijing: People's Publishing House.
- Schram, S. (1969) *The Political Thought of Mao Tsetung*. New York: Praeger.
- Vogel, E. (1969) *Canton Under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949–1968*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Wolf, M. (1985) *Revolution Postponed: Women in Contemporary China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Zhou Enlai (1981) *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*. Beijing: People's Publishing House.

China, May 4th movement

Michael J. Thompson

The May 4th movement in China is generally considered to mark the inception of modern Chinese history. A movement of students and intellectuals, it sought to challenge the pre-modern nature of Chinese society, culture, and politics. The members of this movement were united by their insistence that Chinese society be reworked by democracy and modern science; that the older Confucian traditions and feudal institutions of the past be swept away by more enlightened, rational forms of life; and for an insistence on a new humanism which would be able to transform the “inner life” of Chinese people. It was also an explicitly nationalist movement in the sense that it was seen that corrupt officials and foreign domination (both by western powers and the Japanese) were corroding Chinese society and its future.

The initial thrusts of the May 4th movement concerned an opposition to the increasing imperial presence within China's borders, but they also concerned the increasing corruption within China itself. China's weakness can be traced to the late Qing Dynasty when it became increasingly difficult for the central government to provide military defense against bandits within the countryside. As a result, local lords began to organize their own militias. Over time, this led to the increasing power of local lords and the weakening of the central state. This loose connection of powerful lords would later become a system of warlords who would come to exert powerful influence on the country until the late 1940s. After the 1911 republican revolution, promises for a renewed, unified China were soon dashed once Sun Yat Sen lost power to the warlords. Sen had based his revolution on three

interdependent political principles: nationalism, democracy, and equalization, by which he meant not only equalization in terms of political rights, but of land distribution as well. These principles were also the aims of the new modern class of intelligentsia, many of whom had returned from teaching and studying in the West to remake China.

Sen's loss of power led to China having little power on the world political stage, and on April 28, 1919, at the Versailles Conference, Japan had won the rights to former German colonies in the East, including Jiaozhou Bay in Shandong Province. Once this news hit China, there were massive protests in Beijing, followed by a series of student strikes directed at the Beiyang government. These protests were remarkable for their level of organization, but also for the forcefulness of their demands. The students pushed specifically for the resignation of the diplomats Cao Rulin, Zhang Zhongxiang, and Lu Zongyu, deemed responsible for the handover of land to the Japanese and whom they accused as traitors. The government suppressed the demonstrations and arrested students.

Protests and strikes spread to Shanghai and there was a national boycott of Japanese goods. The strikes also spread to peasants, workers, and businessmen, creating a convulsive context for the Beiyang government. As a result of the enormous pressure exerted first by the students and then the rest of Chinese society, the Beiyang government released the students from prison and also dismissed the three diplomats from their posts; and as a further result the Chinese did not sign the Peace Treaty in Versailles.

But the movement was even more striking for the way that it pushed new intellectuals to emerge and the way it began to politicize them. Throughout Chinese history, intellectuals had traditionally been essentially apolitical. Despite the inherited Confucian moral tradition of trying to teach the political leader to do what was just for the people, their political activity was usually one of maintaining the status quo. This changed after 1919. For one thing, the May 4th movement created a push toward modernity and modernization. It also created the space for a new public sphere in China – one hitherto unknown – even as it showed that public political action could have positive outcomes.

New periodicals also began to emerge and a new cultural energy was produced. A culture

of critical discourse spread throughout the intelligentsia. These new intellectuals came mainly from the educated, emerging middle class in urban areas. Thinkers and writers like Lu Xun would begin to create a new literature which would call into question China's cultural backwardness and urge rational Enlightenment critique of these older forms of life. This was a part of the larger "new culture movement" which sought a reworking of Chinese culture along modern lines. Other philosophers such as Hu Shi worked on translating the work of American philosopher John Dewey into the Chinese context; and thinkers such as Chen Duxiu, the dean of humanities at Peking University, and Li Dazhao introduced Marxism to China.

The character of the May 4th movement's politics and intellectual perspective was uniquely cosmopolitan. Seeing Chinese culture as essentially backward, they looked to the West – most specifically western thought since the Enlightenment such as Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Dewey, among others – to try to forge a new path toward a new society. Less well-known figures of the movement such as Ye Shengtao, Zhu Ziqing, and Yu Pingbo among many others all wanted to bring western ideas into contact with Chinese realities without sacrificing what was distinct in Chinese culture and history. They believed in the unique nature of the Enlightenment (what they referred to as *qimeng*) – particularly Kant's notion of autonomy and his opposition to dogmatism – and they saw that this renewal had to emerge democratically, but more importantly that a democratic revolution which could save the nation had itself to be based on a populace which was freed from dogma and backward tradition.

As events within China became ever more turbulent, the democratic aspirations of the intellectuals of the May 4th movement began to splinter. Some saw that a liberal path was the best way to proceed, while others became more radical, embracing Marxism and communism. Nevertheless, the May 4th movement was central to the transformation of Chinese history and politics and was itself based on student and intellectual opposition to the state and the regressive nature of Chinese cultural life. It was a spirit that precipitated the Communist Revolution in 1949, which itself chose not to carry forward with the spirit of Enlightenment and open-minded critique that the May 4th movement and its intellectuals inaugurated in China.

SEE ALSO: Chen Duxiu (1879–1942); China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Lu Xun (1881–1936); Mao Zedong (1893–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bianco, L. (1971) *Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915–1949*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Chow, Tse-tung (1960) *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Schwarz, V. (1986) *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

China, peasant revolts in the empire

Leonard H. Lubitz

In premodern China the overwhelming majority of the population were peasants. Unlike their European counterparts, laws and traditions allowed this sector of society to lease or own land as well as to be mobile in choice of location in which to live. However, these rights did not alleviate the greater burden thrust upon peasants, which was the heavy and often intolerable burden of taxation. During the second half of this millennium, population grew at extraordinary rates. In response to the potential Malthusian quagmire that could have driven this populace toward massive starvation and the turmoil expected to accompany such social pressures, the peasant class responded with a stoic focus on survival through intensive labor. Agricultural output in this pre-industrial period also steadily increased. This was a result of the process of involution, whereby progress is realized through intensive physical labor rather than an increase in productivity or improved technology. This pressure, combined with the burden of taxation, made rebellion a reoccurring course of action over the centuries.

The Ming Dynasty was established in the fourteenth century as a result of peasant rebellion. In 1368 Zhu Yuanzhang became the imperial emperor of China, being the third and last peasant to rise to that auspicious position. Two hundred and sixty years later, the dynasty which was established with enlightened policies regarding China's massive population of workers would again fall to a peasant rebellion. More pre-

cisely, this involved numerous peasant revolts, many uncoordinated with each other, as this enormous social class lost any impetus to remain silent in the face of the widespread abuses. As the regime became enormously corrupt, various factions within the court, some centered around nobles and others around eunuchs, lost sight of the crumbling kingdom. A punishing famine hardened the already difficult plight of the peasants, while the empire also faced military pressures on its borders.

During the 1630s and 1640s, Zhang Xianzhong led peasant-based rebel forces to victory as they devastated Sichuan, emptying this fertile province of most of its population as those who escaped the massacre fled to outlying areas. Li Zicheng conquered the capital Beijing, under battle cries that included the call for the equalization of land (*jun tian*), triggering the suicide of the last Ming emperor. Though Zhang declared himself the head of the new Daxi Dynasty and Li similarly proclaimed himself at the helm of the Shun Dynasty, both of these proved to be little more than illusory, as the formidable Manchus filled the vacuum created by the seeming evaporation of the Ming Dynasty.

The Qing Dynasty would come to replace its predecessor, with the foreign Manchus taking over the rule of China. As part of their strategy to demonstrate their legitimacy, a state funeral was held in commemoration of the final Ming emperor, Chongzhen. More pointedly, the Confucian philosophical mode and civil service system were retained, giving the regime a sense of legitimacy as the conquerors offered the public impression that they were inheritors of the seat of power rather than usurpers.

Upon consolidation of their control of China, the Manchu rulers allowed and in fact encouraged peasants to migrate past the Great Wall and farm the great grasslands. This policy both increased the amount of land cultivated and offered Manchu and Mongol landlords greater potentials of rents as these new tenants migrated to these lands. However, this is not to imply a utopian situation simply because of this change in regime. The daily goal of the peasant was survival, and the ebbs and flows of agrarian culture, compounded by an empire ruled by an oligarchy whose objectives included not only power but an increase in its wealth, led to periodic occurrences of starvation. A great number of peasants worked as sharecroppers, with their rent being

set as high as 80 percent of their grain crops. Over time, with silver currency becoming more widespread, leases were shifted away from the demand for commodities such as rice and toward currency payments.

SEE ALSO: China, Protest and Revolution, 1800–1911; Ming Rebellions, 1600s

References and Suggested Readings

- Isett, C. M. (2007) *State, Peasant, and Merchant in Qing Manchuria, 1644–1862*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Little, D. (1989) *Understanding Peasant China: Case Studies in the Philosophy of Social Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Perry, E. J. (1980) When Peasants Speak: Sources for the Study of Chinese Rebellions. *Modern China* 6, 1 (January): 72–85

China, protest and revolution, 1800–1911

Leonard H. Lubitz

The nineteenth century would come to be defined in Chinese history as a particularly fervent period of rebellions. Some scholars surmise that this is a result of a confluence of various factors, the most important of which were the stresses of a regime attempting to remain in force over a growing population while also being engaged in various military actions such as the Opium Wars, the advent of foreign sovereign powers on Chinese soil, economic difficulties, and natural disasters, the latter portending the end of a regime according to the cultural beliefs of the Middle Kingdom.

Ethnic Uprisings

The artificial image of China as a monolithic society has been promoted by numerous regimes throughout its history. Within this scope, tolerance for religious and ethnic minorities who dare to identify with their own background rather than conforming are considered unacceptable. A vivid example is the Qing Dynasty's goal of forcing all of the peoples of the lands it enveloped obediently to submit to its absolute rule. A particular target were the Muslims of China. Originating from Persia, Central Asia, and Mongolia, this sizable minority had received favorable treatment from the Ming Dynasty that

encouraged their emigration to China, but they suffered losses estimated at 12 million people between 1648 and 1878 at the hands of the ruling Manchus. Numerous revolts ensued, their causes ranging from frustration at the refusal of the Qing Dynasty to elevate Muslims to high official office, to the desire of national determination.

Miao Revolt

The Miao Revolt, which began in 1797, was aptly named by an imperial government which sought to focus history from its own perspective, for while the Miao people were active in this movement, they made up less than half the activists in this series of actions. There were many ethnicities, including the Hans, involved in the activities which shook western Hunan for several years. There was neither a single movement nor organization that led the revolt. Rather, it was a popular uprising in response to the longtime suffering of the residents of this region, as their meager lives as subsistence farmers made revolt a calculated conclusion that offered no worse a possibility than the misery that defined their lives. Manchu government officials engaged in corruption and extorted the local populace without mercy. While the revolt was not centralized, various factions and militias were organized throughout the community. Weapons were stockpiled and even some government military units were infiltrated. When the revolt was waged, various ethnic factions, especially the Miao, Han, and Bouyei, cooperated as allies. The ethnic divisions which were often found throughout China were dispensed with by the peasants of this region as they attempted to throw off the yoke of the Qing Dynasty.

The rebellion was violently ended by the Qing government in 1806. The Qing troops relocated enormous numbers of civilians, land was confiscated from suspected rebels, Han civilians were brought in large numbers to alter the demographics of the region, and large military structures were erected throughout western Hunan in order to maintain control over the populace. The central government instituted self-policing regulations for this frontier region, whereby Miaos were required to enforce discipline on the most local level while Hans were appointed to all positions of regional power. Trade was allowed between Miaos and Hans only in specified locales, while all other interactions

between these communities were to be avoided. Ethnic abuses by the Hans would persist and in fact escalate, including the closing of Miao schools and the forbidding of their religious rituals and practices. The combination of these pressures, paired with the excessive rents charged to Maiois for use of lands that were confiscated by the imperial government, drove the local population to begin another popular revolt – the Panthay Rebellion.

Panthay Rebellion

The Panthay Rebellion, which began in 1855 and continued for 18 years, is an example of the fate of rebels in the Middle Kingdom. This struggle, which began with a workers' revolt against the conditions suffered in the silver mines, rose to a crescendo when the peasants of this region, primarily Hui and Uyghur Muslims, declared the territory an independent political entity. It concluded with the brutal military subjugation of the peasants, which consisted of an overt act of "ethnic cleansing" as 1 million Muslims were massacred on a wholesale basis, without the sparing of either women or children. The decapitation of the rebel leader Du Wenxiu, who called himself Sultan Suleiman (taking the name of the infamous sixteenth-century monarch also known as Suleiman the Magnificent), ended the short-lived Pingnan Guo (Kingdom of the Conquered South).

Dungan Revolt

The Dungan Revolt, which began in 1861 in the northwest region of China, was in fact a series of efforts to overthrow Qing domination of this Muslim-populated frontier. Initially stirred by rumors of impending massacres by government forces, the local population of Hui and Salar peoples engaged in a bloody struggle that would claim the lives of several million victims. It also led to the relocation of many others, as many Muslims were forced to move in order to reduce their concentration, while others fled to the Russian Empire. The complexity of this period can be seen in the fact that one of the rebel leaders, Yaqūb Beg, upon assuming what would be a fleeting victory, declared himself in 1870 to be a vassal of the Ottoman Sultan. Further, the rebels received material support from the British government, which was engaged in attempting to reduce the powers of the Qing Dynasty for decades prior to this interference.

Further Revolts

While the aforementioned ethnic revolts were significant in their length, loss of lives, and their toll on the Qing Dynasty, it is important to recognize that they did not have a direct effect on the rest of Chinese society. Scholars attribute this to the fact that the minority peoples involved in those struggles were essentially isolated from the mainstream population of China.

White Lotus Society

More significant were the various secretive societies known as triads which pervaded the country's society for centuries and which were often the impetus of anti-government revolts. Most noted was the White Lotus Society (*bailian jiao*), a group that would fracture into numerous independent sects over time. A Buddhist millenarian organization, it greatly appealed to the impoverished masses as it promised an imminent future when all of society would become bound into a single family in a world of enlightenment. Revolts fought by adherents to this philosophy occurred in 1622 in Shandong Province.

More significant was their revolt in 1796–1804 in the mountainous area that traverses the border region of Hubei, Sichuan, and Shaanxi. There, the Qing military forces and militias took a terrible toll on the civilian population in response to their frustration in being unable to identify members of the secret society among the local population, since the primary strategy was to use guerilla warfare, with the rebels remaining an invisible army. Interestingly, it is estimated that only 10 percent of the rebels were actually members of the White Lotus Society, with the majority being allies that included smugglers, bandits, and other social outcasts that believed they could profit from the social disruption as well as a change in local regime.

Eight Trigrams

In 1813 another offshoot of the White Lotus Society, known as the Eight Trigrams, attempted to overthrow the Manchu leadership in a glorious though ill-fated attack on the Forbidden City in Beijing. Like other White Lotus organizations, the Eight Trigrams was a teacher-student based institution which foresaw a mystical new society replacing the misery of their current existence.

Their leader, Lin Qing, is described as an individual more concerned with gaining personal power than with any sincere belief in his sect's religious mores. His background as a drifter and a gambler prior to his ascendancy foretold his failure to be present at the fatal attack on the Imperial Palace, though he was to be the leader of the assault. Li Wencheng was promoted by Lin Qing as the figurative head of the movement, proclaiming that he was a true heir to the Ming Dynasty, thus legitimizing the sect's attack upon the government. Though there were eunuchs and other members of the royal household who conspired with the Eight Trigrams, their attempts failed and government troops killed 20,000 members of the organization.

Nien Rebellion

The Nien Rebellion, which spanned the years 1851 to 1868, was neither a singular movement nor an organized revolt. The term *nien* literally means "band" and refers to the secretive gangs that roamed the southern tier of China's northern territory. Their method of operation was described by Qing officials as robbery, kidnapping of wealthy citizens, and plundering farms. However, these bands were in fact made up of members of various secret societies which some scholars surmise were also descended from the White Lotus Society. It is estimated that the rebel forces consisted of 50,000 men. The rebellion, located in the provinces of Shantung, Honan, Kiangsu, and Anhwe, had limited success as the rebel forces lacked the capacity to control the rural areas beyond the earthen city walls that they used for their defense. Its longevity can be attributed to the central government's forces being diverted to the Tai Ping Rebellion, though in 1868, 100,000 troops would eventually be dispatched to crush the rebels.

Tai Ping Rebellion

The Tai Ping Rebellion was the most significant revolt in the second half of the millennium. While western scholars often attribute its impetus to widespread poverty and hunger, Chinese scholars ascribe the force of the movement to its anti-Manchu ideology, as the proponents of this attempted revolution saw their mission as the destruction of idol worship in order to establish a "New Kingdom of God."

Its leader was Hong Xiuquan, the son of a poor farmer. After having failed the national

civil service examination several times, he converted to Christianity and soon announced that he had several mystical visions in which he saw God in the vision of the Father and as Jesus Christ, and most significantly, that he himself was the younger brother of Christ. Though he did not cite it as an inspiration, China's loss in the Opium War surely inspired Hong and many of his followers with the notion that the end of Manchu rule over China was near. No longer could the Qing Dynasty claim to be invincible and everlasting. The kingdom which he intended to establish would be one of Great Peace (*Tai Ping*) where class differences would not exist and all citizens would be regarded as brothers and sisters. In this egalitarian kingdom, wages would not exist and private property would not be allowed, as this contradicted the social vision. Vices such as opium use, gambling, and robbery would be punishable by summary execution.

The movement established a highly disciplined military organization whose soldiers gladly died for the holy cause they believed in. Its generals, too, fanatically believed in the mission of conquering the whole Middle Kingdom, and led their troops with the unquestioning confidence that God was guiding them to victory. In 1856 the Tai Ping army numbered 1 million troops. Administratively, however, the Tai Ping bureaucracy was not a competent organization. Its army conquered vast territories but failed to rule these lands in the aftermath of battle. The Qing rulers, recognizing the weakness of their army in defeating the Tai Ping forces, turned to an array of forces including a newly formed military organization, militias, and even one military unit financed by Shanghai merchants and led by an American adventurer, to defeat and eventually decimate the Tai Ping rebels. Their belief in martyrdom was exemplified during the third battle in Nanking when the New Kingdom of God was being destroyed. One hundred thousand died in three days in the city, as it was torched by the government-supported military forces. As one general noted, there was not a single individual who surrendered. The total number of casualties from this rebellion was 20 million people.

Boxer Rebellion

The Boxer Rebellion occurred in what would become known as the waning days of the Qing Dynasty. A religious sect linked by some

scholars to the White Lotus Society, called the Righteous and Harmonious Fists, practiced a Chinese form of boxing known as *mushu*. Their religious beliefs included the notion that they were impervious to either bullets or pain. Unlike the rebellions and revolts that preceded it, the target of the Boxers was what they defined as foreigners. This distinction was made to demonstrate the differentiation between the Manchu rulers, who were in fact also ethnically foreign to China, and westerners and Christians – both Chinese and foreign. Though the rebels initially included the government in their scope of adversaries, casualties suffered at the hands of the imperial army caused the Boxers to modify their outlook, a move which was positively responded to by the Qing Dynasty.

Most significant in their ability to raise the rebellion to a national level was the support given to the Boxers by the Empress Dowager Tzu-Hsi, who was the tacit ruler of the Qing government. Though the Boxers would be seen as serving the mutual interests of the Empress Dowager, they never came under the control of the government. The Boxers were furious that foreign states including Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia were establishing “spheres of influence” in China as these governments usurped China’s exclusive power within its territory. Christian churches were an early target of the Boxers. In 1898, when a court in rural Shandong ruled that an abandoned temple was properly possessed by Roman Catholic clergy, the Boxers took to the streets, rallying the public to attack the structure. Christians, both foreign and Chinese, became targets of the Boxers, as did foreign nationals and their properties. Beijing was a major site of Boxer action, where in 1900 a 55-day siege of the city left 230 foreign diplomats and civilians murdered.

A multinational military force responded to this uprising, eventually putting the rebellion down. Its units included the US cavalry riding through the Gate of Heavenly Peace and into the Imperial Palace. The Empress Dowager was forced to escape the palace in disguise in order to avoid arrest. In its aftermath, China was compelled to sign a treaty binding it to pay extraordinarily high reparations, to execute the leaders of the Boxers, and to allow the maintenance of foreign troops on its soil.

SEE ALSO: China, Peasant Revolts in the Empire; Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Jenks, R. D. (1994) *Insurgency and Social Disorder in Guizhou: The “Miao” Rebellion, 1854–1873*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Kissling, H. J., Spuler, B., Barbour, N. et al. (1969) *The Last Great Muslim Empires: Translation and Adaptations by F. R. C. Bagley*. Boston: Brill.
- Mao Tse-Tung (1961) *Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung*, Vol. 3. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
- Perry, E. J. (1980) When Peasants Speak: Sources for the Study of Chinese Rebellions. *Modern China* 6, 1 (January): 72–85.

China, student protests, 20th century

J. Megan Greene

Prior to the twentieth century, student protest was a relatively uncommon phenomenon in China. The only large academic institutions that existed were state-run academies populated by students who had performed exceptionally well in the civil service examinations. Most students were the sons of elites, and they were trained by private tutors or in very small village schools in the Confucian texts, so that they too would be able to pass the civil service examinations. In other words, student culture, to the extent that it existed, centered on the examinations and examination venues, where virtually all of the participants had been rigorously trained in the ideological orthodoxy that the state wished to perpetuate. By the early twentieth century, however, a new student culture arose, and it was one in which students took a leading role in calling for and shaping new political and social structures through protest. Throughout the twentieth century, Chinese students have used protest as a tool to try to accomplish political goals.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, especially in China’s “treaty ports” where western influence was fairly strong, the educational system and social structure were already beginning to change. Missionaries erected new schools that took in students of various social backgrounds, and over time some of these schools developed into China’s first universities. For a limited number of students, therefore, by 1900

the student experience was already not as it had been. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the declining Qing Dynasty, seeking to hold onto power, introduced a new education system, part of which entailed the creation of new schools and universities, and some of the missionary schools were eventually absorbed into this new system. At roughly the same time, the Qing court abolished the examination system, thereby liberating the curriculum from traditional constraints and facilitating the development of a wide array of new courses of study.

Although these and other reforms were by no means sufficient to resuscitate the dying dynasty, they did give Chinese youth access to a wider variety of educational opportunities than ever before, and at the same time they took away the old, clear path that students had followed in their quest to become members of China's elite. As the Qing weakened and the new republic that replaced it quickly faltered, there was no shortage of political, social, and international relations issues that concerned young Chinese. In this environment protest became an increasingly common strategy used by students to voice their discontent with China's political leadership, its social and economic backwardness, and its state of semi-colonization by western powers.

By the 1890s major political events were already motivating students to take political action. China's loss to Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5, in particular, led numerous young Chinese to seek out ways to strengthen China. Many traveled to Japan to study, partly because they were curious about Japan's own self-strengthening experience, and partly because Japan was the closest venue in which they could access western learning. These activist youths were, for the most part, inspired by nationalistic zeal and many of them wished to overthrow the Manchu Qing government so that China could be ruled by Chinese, who might, they reasoned, take more care to build and defend the nation. As these students began to return to China during the last decade of the Qing, some, such as Qiu Jin, undertook to instigate revolts against the Qing, and died as a consequence of their actions.

In the second decade of the twentieth century the Qing were finally overthrown and the new republic that followed rapidly deteriorated into warlordism. The weak state of Chinese government during this period gave students ample

reason to protest, and enabled them to do so with limited backlash from political authorities. At the same time, this was also a period during which China's educational system rapidly developed. Increasing numbers of schools at all levels were opened by both private and state actors, and many of the people who taught in them had studied abroad in Japan, Europe, or the United States. During this period it was not uncommon for teachers and professors to encourage, guide, and participate in student protests.

In the years that immediately followed the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, students increasingly took to the streets to protest political events and participate in boycotts. Students, for example, participated in boycotts and protests of the Twenty-One Demands that Japan made of China in 1915. These protests were not, by and large, terribly extensive, and although 1915 marked the beginning of a period of increased student political activity, it was not until May 1919 that China experienced its first major wave of student protests.

On May 4, 1919 a group of students representing a number of Beijing universities met and decided to launch a large-scale demonstration. They were protesting the unfair treatment that China received in the treaties that ended World War I. In spite of the fact that China had sent thousands of workers to assist the Allies in behind-the-lines factory and other work, China received no reward for its contributions to the Allied war effort. Instead, the Chinese territories in the Shandong peninsula that had until that time been German possessions were granted under the Treaty of Versailles to Japan. Students were enraged not only by the humiliation of these actions, but also by the weakness and ineffectiveness of China's government.

That afternoon, over 3,000 students gathered at the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen) in Beijing and marched to various sites in Beijing, including the house of Cao Rulin, one of the Chinese diplomats who had failed to defend China's interests in the treaty negotiations, which they burnt down. The following day Beijing's students went on strike, and in subsequent days students as well as workers in other cities such as Shanghai also went on strike. Although the government in Beijing suppressed the protest and arrested numerous students following the burning of Cao's house, it was

nonetheless compelled by the spreading protest to release the students, dismiss the diplomats negotiating the treaties, and refuse to sign the peace treaty. These actions yielded no change in the terms of the treaties, however. Nonetheless, the May 4th protests did have a significant impact on student protest throughout the twentieth century. As a part of the protest movement, students in Beijing and Shanghai established patterns of activity and organization that lasted throughout the century. They formed leagues, took oaths, called for and participated in student strikes, participated in boycotts, organized demonstrations and speeches, and started using slogans, banners, and songs to advertise their aims and their affiliations.

The May 4th protests not only set off a more intense period of student political and intellectual activity, they also developed over time into an icon of political protest that students of later generations would draw upon. In the immediate wake of the protests, urban China saw an intensification of student political activity, especially among leftist students. New political parties were formed, including the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and students and other young intellectuals intensified the print debates that had started around 1915 over the best way to build a new future for China.

Student unions helped to organize labor in China's urban areas and strikes and protests often involved both students and workers. China's youth also became actively involved as both producers and consumers in the construction of a new, modern literature that encouraged readers to transform and modernize Chinese society. Although the May 4th protest was not, as a protest, an event of great enormity, the activism that it generated transformed China, and the event inspired further student activism throughout the century.

Chinese anger at the continuing presence of foreign imperialists led to more protest later on. When, in May 1925, for example, a Japanese factory foreman killed a Chinese laborer, large numbers of students and workers marched together in protest. Police responded to the May 30 protest by opening fire on the crowds, killing at least ten people, including some students. These events set off a wave of further protests and a general strike by students and workers took place in Shanghai and elsewhere, including Guangzhou (Canton) and Hong Kong. The pat-

terns of organization and methods used by these protestors drew heavily upon those employed by the student protestors in 1919. Students continued to protest Japanese aggression against China in the 1930s and the Chinese civil war in the 1940s. China's single-party Guomindang state did not embrace student protest in the 1930s and 1940s, as it saw this sort of activism as having the potential to undermine its authority. The Guomindang preferred to orchestrate student activities by organizing them into fascistic groups that would demonstrate not against the government, but in support of its agenda.

In its early years the CCP encouraged student participation in protests in China's major cities. By the 1930s and 1940s many of the leaders of the CCP had participated in such student protests in their youth. Once the CCP attained power in 1949, however, it, like the Guomindang, viewed student protest as potentially disruptive. The CCP did see a role for student activism, however, and encouraged students to participate in state-orchestrated mass movements. As it did so, it utilized many of the same sorts of organizations and forms that students had constructed for themselves in 1919 and after. Students in the People's Republic of China (PRC) participated in student organizations and unions, marched in state-sanctioned marches carrying banners, sang student songs, and assisted in the party's political work with other sectors of society.

These patterns intensified with the creation of Red Guard units at the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966. The first Red Guard unit established itself at Tsinghua University. It was composed of a group of students who criticized the university administration for elitism and bourgeois thinking. When Mao Zedong showed his approval of the attitude of this student group, other Red Guard units began to form themselves in high schools and universities around the country. Until 1969 the CCP leadership permitted the Red Guards to disrupt academic activities, hold public struggle sessions to criticize teachers, bureaucrats, and others in positions of authority of bourgeois or capitalist thinking, destroy symbols of China's old culture, and recreate an environment of revolution.

Although loosely guided by Mao and the party leadership, and clearly seeking to help Mao achieve his goals of shaking up the party-state bureaucracy and reinvigorating the revolution,

the Red Guard nonetheless had a great deal of autonomy and followed many of the patterns established by students of the May 4th era. By 1969 China's Red Guard units were no longer useful to the party leadership, and they were disbanded as the student population was sent *en masse* to the Chinese countryside.

In 1976 the death of Mao signaled the end of the Cultural Revolution and the gradual return to normalcy of the Chinese educational system, which had been virtually suspended for much of the previous decade. In 1978 and 1979, as the new premier, Deng Xiaoping, called for changes in China's approach to economic development, some students participated in the Democracy Wall movement and called upon the CCP to implement political change as well. On the whole, however, Chinese students did not engage in political activism again until the spring of 1989, when, in response to the death of Hu Yaobang, a member of the CCP political leadership who had supported calls for political reform and who had been purged from the leadership in 1987, they began to organize themselves to call for Hu's rehabilitation and for a series of democratic reforms. As they did so, they consciously referred to the seventieth anniversary of the May 4th protests. On April 15, 1989 students marched from the campus of Beijing University to Tiananmen Square carrying a wreath to commemorate Hu.

A week later 70,000 students and 30,000 workers again went to Tiananmen Square to protest. They called upon the PRC government to implement a series of democratic reforms and to improve conditions for China's students. On May 4 another march of about 100,000 students and workers descended upon the square, and this time they began a sit-in that lasted for a month. As had happened in 1919, students and workers in cities around the country also participated in protests. By June 4 it had become apparent to the CCP leadership that the movement was getting out of hand, and it responded with a violent crackdown. Some students were killed or injured, others made their way out of China. Many of the leaders of the 1989 movement continued to agitate for democratization from outside of China.

Since 1989, Chinese students have protested on numerous occasions, but the targets of their activities have generally been foreign, and the protests have been sanctioned, if not organized, by the state. Students protested the United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in

Belgrade and the Japanese textbook treatments of the role played by Japan in Nanjing in 1937, for example, and in 2008 Chinese students abroad protested the demonstrations that followed the Olympic torch around the globe. All of these protests had a strong nationalistic dimension, and in that respect, they, too, resembled the protests of the early twentieth century.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, China; China, Maoism and Popular Power, 1949–1969; China, May 4th Movement; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Democracy Wall Movement, 1979; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Tiananmen Square Protests, 1989

References and Suggested Readings

- Calhoun, C. (1997) *Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Chiang, Wên-han (1948) *The Chinese Student Movement*. New York: King's Crown Press.
- Hartford, K., Sullivan, L., Ogden, S., & Zweig, D. (1992) *China's Search for Democracy: The Student and Mass Movement of 1989*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Wasserstrom, J. N. (1991) *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949

Pierre Rousset

Retrospectively, we know the importance of the period opened in China by the overthrow in 1911 of the Qing Dynasty: it concluded, nearly four decades later, with the victory of the Communist Revolution in 1949 – an event of historical scope. However, at the time, the future of the country looked very uncertain. Power was fragmenting in China, but the European states were not in a position to seize this opportunity to impose their colonial domination on the Middle Kingdom and were soon going to be at war with each other. The new imperialist powers (the United States and Japan) were not yet ready to replace them and claim for themselves the conquest of China. But it was only a matter of time. China seemed to be condemned to be dismembered into Nippo-western zones of influence.

Born amid the commotion of World War I, the Russian Revolution of 1917 showed that an alternative was possible: even in a country



Soldiers of the Red Army of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) march in retreat during the Chinese Civil War with the forces of the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party). The Long March is a common reference to the transfer of the Red Army from Yu Du in the province of Jiangxi to Yan'an in Shaanxi. It began on October 16, 1934 and continued until October 19, 1935. However, the retreat was not complete until October 22, 1936. (Private Collection / The Bridgeman Art Library)

deemed backward, communism could be the answer to the threat of imperialist domination and could at the same time save the oppressed classes and the nation. However, China was not Russia. It belonged to another cultural world and another social formation, the product of a very different historical past. Modern political movements like the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) were at the initial stage of formation and their characteristics had yet to be defined. The fact that the European revolution had started in Russia rather than Germany had been a great surprise for Marxists. That the torch would be passed to East Asia meant a leap into the unknown. Russian Marxism did offer a political paradigm for the first Chinese communists, as it had to conceptualize revolution in a country with a large pre-capitalist social structure. But Chinese communism still essentially remained to be invented.

To add to the uncertainties, during a few decades of civil and world wars, two new actors made their entrance on the world scene via the Chinese question. On the one hand, there was the USSR, which played an important role because of its influence on Chinese political movements. On the other hand, there was imperial Japan, which revealed its Asian ambitions in wanting to conquer China. Also, for the first time, at least from the 1940s, the United States affirmed its

superiority in the Asia-Pacific theater. The Great Powers game became more complex.

China and Modernization

The Manchu Dynasty in China was overturned before the start of the great revolutionary struggles of the 1920s. The First Chinese “republican” Revolution in 1911 only mobilized limited social forces, even if a great variety of political forces were involved. While it rapidly lost its dynamism, it did cause people to think about how China could be modernized. In the aftermath of the Second Chinese Revolution (1925–7), the Guomindang on one side and the Communist Party (CCP) on the other took form. After having allied against China’s warlords, they fought one another violently during a long civil war, confronting each other head on over the essential issue of modernization: whether in a backward country like China, modernity meant capitalism and subservience to the West.

The crisis of the Middle Kingdom obviously did not mean the disappearance of traditional social relationships, especially in the vast rural areas. The Guomindang willingly put up with this, but not the CCP. The revolution that the CCP carried out was social, spearheaded against the old order and the desire of hegemony asserted by the Chinese bourgeoisie. It was national and anti-imperialist, aimed at safeguarding the unity of the country and its independence. It also had a vision of modernity potentially opposed to the dominating conceptions of the time, for which the capitalist West incarnated the future of the world. The search for a “Chinese way” was, from the very beginning, a subject of continuous debate within the newly emerging revolutionary left.

In reaction to the 21 Demands of imperial Japan in 1915 and in the wake of World War I, this national mood was reinforced among traders, students and intellectuals, workers, and employees of foreign “settlements.” It was further strengthened when the Versailles Peace Conference rejected the claims of the Chinese delegation: the rights and privileges of Germany in Shandong were not cancelled to the advantage of China, but were transferred to Japan, which was starting to play the role of policeman in the Far East against the Bolsheviks in Siberia. The May 4th movement in 1919 was shaped within the new urban intelligentsia. It initiated a period of intense intellectual activity where everything

was subject to debate: nationalist ideals and the future of China; tradition and modernization; opening to the world and the protection of cultural heritage; the philosophy of the Enlightenment; anarchism and socialism.

Against the ancient dynastic order and the conservative grip of Confucianism, the radical intelligentsia was open to western thought, but the same movement set Chinese national identity against imperialism and western cultural pretensions. The Chinese revolutionary milieu was thus pluralist, with libertarian and anarchic currents, or non-Marxist socialists. Under the influence of the Russian Revolution, key personalities of the May 4th movement such as Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao helped with the foundation of the Communist Party, which held its first congress (it then had 57 members) in 1921. A decade of social and political commotion later, it was Marxism (itself plural) that imposed itself on the revolutionary side.

China is one of the countries of the “third world” where Marxism took hold early on. In doing so, it had to cease being an imported ideology and find new national, cultural, and political roots and “become Chinese.” This fundamental process of “sinisation” was facilitated by the existence in the Middle Kingdom of a state history more ancient than in Europe. The Chinese revolutionaries had to fight strong conservative traditions which their enemies made good use of. But the transplanting of Marxism proved successful.

Second Chinese Revolution

The First Chinese Revolution had started in 1911 in Wuhan (Hubei) on October 10, in the center of the country, with a military upheaval. The Second Revolution started in the South in 1925 amid increasing social and national struggles. Sun Yat-sen, a great figure of the national democratic movement, was at that time president of the revolutionary government of Canton – his power was only regional. A large part of the territory was under the military control of warlords. The goal of the Chinese revolutionaries was the reunification of the country in the framework of a republic. During the revolution of 1925–7 new social actors appeared on the scene. In addition to the rural classes, an important role came to be played by the urban bourgeoisie and the (semi-) proletariat. Thus, during the 1920s, the national

movement went through intense class conflicts. The First Revolution had closed a chapter of Chinese history: the imperial era. The Second opened the next chapter: that of the relationship between national war and social revolution.

Most waves of industrialization in China were very recent – the end of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth, and during the 1910s and 1920s. This was the golden age of Chinese capitalism, with modern rice and oil mills, a cotton industry and weaving looms, tobacco, silk, and the heavy metallurgy of the Yangtze valley and Manchuria. In 1915–20 the young working class was estimated at 650,000 all over China and 1.5 million by the beginning of the 1920s (there were at least 250 million peasants). Coming from urban plebeians and the rural poor, the new working class experienced the trauma of being uprooted and savage exploitation. It remained a very small minority in the country, and much of China’s textile and garment production remained a cottage industry. Capitalist expansion affected China in a very unequal manner. A large part of the semi-proletariat was composed of unskilled day laborers, the *coolies*. The industrial working class was often concentrated in big factories, which, like in Shanghai, employed more than 500–1,000 workers.

The trade union movement and the Chinese Communist Party both emerged at the same time. Hong Kong’s seamen led a victorious strike in January–March 1922. The first national All-China Labor Congress was held in Canton on May 1 that same year (it claimed 300,000 members). Communist militants, though very small in number, were already present in the metallurgical industries, docks, mines, and textile industries. Repression intensified in the North and center of the country, where the union movement retreated.

In the rural world, the crisis of central power contributed to unsettling the village’s traditional balance. A lack of arable land and the partition of properties heightened the tensions between the peasantry and landlords in many provinces, and within the peasantry itself, between richer and poorer. The vast hinterland evolved much more slowly than the coastal zones, the Yangtze valley, and Manchuria. However, in these regions the impact of the agrarian crisis still made itself felt, as the proletariat and the urban poor still maintained links with their families in the countryside. Then, after World War I, western capital and goods made a strong comeback,

directly competing with the Chinese industrial sector. Thus, conditions were such that, in some places at least, rural upheaval could link with urban struggle.

At the beginning of the 1920s underlying tensions were social, and in coastal China the political mood was largely anti-imperialist. The western powers, at the time of the Washington Conference in November 1921–February 1922, had forced Japan to return Shandong, but they were also taking advantage of the political fragmentation of the country and in 1923 demanded control over the railways. The weakness of China was obvious. The Communist Party was then too small to claim the leadership of the national movement. This role was incumbent upon the Guomindang, based in Canton, under the mobilizing theme of Northern Expedition: the reunification of the country via a military campaign against the warlords and the Beijing government, allied with the big powers.

The Guomindang benefited from the prestige of Sun Yat-sen, but was disorganized and divided. It turned to Moscow to strengthen its organization and for military training and aid. The offer of collaboration with China came at the right moment for the Soviet leadership: in 1923, after the failure of the German revolution, revolutionary expectations were postponed in Europe. As the western horizon was shut, the geopolitical importance of China in the East grew. In this context, on the advice (or rather orders) of envoys of the Komintern, members of the CPC, in spite of hesitations, integrated with the Guomindang. The Third Congress of the Communist Party ratified this unusual tactic of “united front from within” or “bloc within” in June 1923; it had then 420 members. The Guomindang did the same in January 1924. Alliance with Moscow was sealed. Three communists, one of whom was Li Dazhao, were elected to the Central Committee of the Guomindang; six others were alternates, one of them the young Mao Zedong. After disappointing beginnings, the alliance between the Guomindang of Sun Yat-sen, Moscow, and the CPC proved very dynamic. After the frustration of the 1911 revolution, it gave new life to the national movement.

On May 30, 1925 police under English leadership shot dead demonstrators in Shanghai’s International Settlement who were denouncing the assassination of a Chinese striker by a Japanese foreman. It was the beginning of a colossal move-

ment of protest against imperialism. Solidarity with Shanghai’s strikes spread to the North and the South. On June 23, 1925 it was the turn of Franco-English forces to shoot at a demonstration in Canton, killing 52 people and provoking the boycott-strike of Canton–Hong Kong, which lasted 15 months. A strike Central Committee was established and became an effective “second power” in the region. People’s military detachments guarded the coast. Nationalist in its goals, the movement was proletarian in form and popular in its roots, opening the possibility in some regions of the center and the South of an unprecedented convergence of urban and rural mobilizations. Peasant unions started to see the light of day under the Guomindang flag, with the help of some communist militants active in the countryside, like Peng Pai in the Guangdong. The Northern Expedition against the warlords actually began in July 1926: the army of the Canton government progressed rapidly thanks to the accompanying mass upheaval.

It is in this context that the trade unions, the peasant movement, and the CCP rapidly expanded. In May 1926 the third national Labor Congress (where the role of Liu Shaoqi was important) announced 1,240,000 members; in April 1927 it was 2,800,000. In March 1926 Mao Zedong published his *Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society*. The first National Congress of the peasant movement was held in April of that year and in 1927 some 10 million peasants would have been under the influence of the Communist Party, especially in the Guangdong and the Hunan. In 1925–6 CCP membership grew from 1,000 to 30,000, reaching 57,000 on the eve of the counterrevolution of 1927.

The nationalist May 30th movement had started in 1925 in the industrial metropolis of Shanghai as a vast inter-class mobilization, with the participation of workers’ unions, student organizations, associations of small traders, and the chamber of commerce (the big modern bourgeoisie). Chinese social elites soon became worried by the rapid rise of this popular movement and the increasing influence of the communists. Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925, leaving the way clear for the right wing of the Guomindang represented by Chiang Kai-shek, who rapidly took anti-communist measures: proclamation of martial law, disarmament of workers’ pickets, arrest of Communist Party members, and restriction of trade union activities.

It was clear that a decisive show-down was looming within the Guomindang and the national movement. Chen Duxiu informed the Communist International and requested that the CCP withdraw from the Guomindang in order to insure its organizational independence. The policy of the “bloc within” had been proposed (against Chen’s opinion) by the Dutch Henk Sneevliet (Maring) and later supported by Joffe (a friend of Trotsky), then the official delegate of the Communist International in China. Sneevliet was inspired by previous experience in Indonesia. In 1926, however, as the situation evolved, Trotsky and his comrades supported the position of Chen Duxiu. Two years after the death of Lenin, factional struggles were raging within the Soviet Communist Party. The “Chinese issue” became locked in the ongoing political conflicts of the USSR. On the orders of Stalin and Bukharin, the Communist International, at the plenary meeting of November–December 1926, rejected the constitution of left communist “factions” within the Guomindang and any perspective of getting out of it. At that time, the CCP was not in the political position to reject the discipline imposed by Moscow and the Communist International. It therefore lost the initiative while Chiang Kai-shek organized the counterrevolution. The defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution was played out in three bloody acts in 1927.

The first act began in Shanghai on March 21, 1927, when trade unions and the communists led a successful uprising. In conformity with the policy of the Communist International, they did not oppose the occupation of the town by Chiang Kai-shek’s military forces. On April 12 thousands of labor activists were massacred by the “National” army operating jointly with underworld gangs and bosses’ goons. On May 21 the Guomindang launched another massacre in Changsa. Some 10,000 communists were killed in Hunan province’s capital and its surroundings.

The second act played in Wuhan, the capital of the province of Hubei in the center of China. Wang Jinwei and the “left-wing” government of the Guomindang (its leadership split) were based there. Moscow and Stalin gave them their support. On May 11, 1927, however, Wuhan’s government turned against its communist ally and repressed it violently in order to reconcile with Chiang Kai-shek.

Finally, the third act played in Canton. Faced by the disastrous evolution of the situation,

Moscow abruptly decided to organize an insurrection in the South on December 11, 1927. Isolated, the “Canton Commune” could not hold out. Repression was again ferocious.

Civil War: 1928–1935

The CCP paid a high price for the counterrevolution. Throughout the country, numerous militants and some central leaders like Li Dazhao were killed. The CCP only retained its forces thanks to the insurrections of the summer of 1927. The right wing of the Guomindang controlled most of the nationalist armed forces, but communist influence was sometimes great, like in the Fourth Army, which rebelled on August 1, 1927 (celebrated afterwards as the founding date of the Red Army): this was the Nanchang Uprising, led by Zhou Enlai and pro-communist officers like He Long and Ye Ting. In September, a peasant insurrection erupted in Hunan, where Mao Zedong was then: this was the Autumn Harvest Uprising. Mao withdrew into the mountains of Jinggangshan, at the border of Hunan and Jiangxi, where Zhu De joined him. Further to the north, in the region of Wuhan, Peng Dehuai also commanded a significant military force.

In 1930 most of the communist military forces commanded by Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, and Peng Dehuai ended up grouping themselves in the new Soviet republic of Jiangxi. In spite of the series of defeats, the CCP still controlled some 300,000 soldiers in the whole country, which indicates the scope of radicalization in 1925–7. The Red Army was therefore born from mass upheavals, great social struggles, and military rebellions, not from small guerilla units. This explains its longevity: born within the Second Chinese Revolution, it became the spearhead of the Third Chinese Revolution and of the 1949 victory. The Red Army thus bridged the gaps between all the big revolutionary episodes from 1920 to 1940.

In the USSR the Stalinist faction consolidated its power. Instead of criticizing itself for the orientation it had imposed in China, it placed complete responsibility for the defeats on successive leaders of the CCP from 1927 to 1930: Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, etc. This was extremely unfair considering that the CCP was a young party in the midst of a revolutionary storm just a few years after its birth and which very naturally placed its trust in the Russian

comrades and envoys of the Communist International. The CCP was one of the first parties to have been directly confronted with the international consequences of the Stalinist victory in the USSR.

Chen Duxiu, one of the greatest surviving figures of Chinese Marxism, joined for a while the International Left Opposition (the Trotskyist movement) and its criticism of the process of bureaucratization of the revolution. Returning from Moscow officially to take the leadership of the Communist Party, Wang Ming remained faithful to the Stalinist faction. In Jiangxi, however, the new leadership constituting itself around Mao started more pragmatically to distance itself from the Soviets, convinced that from now on it was up to the Chinese to decide the orientation in China. The conflict between the Wang Ming and Mao factions marked the whole history of the party for the next two decades. It started early on in the Soviet republic of Jiangxi. Mao was elected president on November 7, 1931, but the members of his faction were kept from significant positions in 1933, and he himself was isolated. It was only two years later, during the Long March, that the Maoist leadership began to consolidate its authority. Meanwhile, the Red Army had to abandon its bases in South China.

From 1930 to 1934, Chiang Kai-shek led five big anti-communist extermination campaigns against the zones controlled by the CCP, mobilizing enormous military means. The bases in Henan, Hubei, and Anhui had to be rapidly evacuated, but the base in Jiangxi – where Mao remained – resisted. It was only in August 1934 that the abandonment of the base was decided on. The Red Army broke through the blockade: it was the beginning of the legendary Long March, a real epic but also a strategic retreat that ended only in October 1935, in Yan'an, in Shaanxi, in the Northwest of the country. When he started out on the Long March, Mao's army corps counted 86,000 soldiers. After a long and perilous journey of 10,000 kilometers, when it reached Shaanxi, they were less than 5,000. Thanks to the arrival of troops from other regions, the Red Army, finally based at Yan'an, increased to 40,000 fighters, a derisory figure for China.

The new Maoist leadership team was steeled through such trials, but was not yet unified (it divided again in the years that followed). Around Mao Zedong there were key politico-military

leaders like Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, Chen Yi or the “One-eyed Dragon” Liu Bocheng, as well as major political figures who previously often opposed Mao, like Zhou Enlai. Cadres operating in zones other than Jiangxi afterwards integrated into this leadership, especially Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi.

While revolution and counterrevolution confronted one another in the nationalist camp, imperial Japan reinforced its positions on the continent. In September 1931 it invaded Manchuria in the Northeast, where it created in the following year a protectorate: the state of Manchukuo. In January 1932 the Japanese attacked Shanghai, breaking resistance after three months of siege and an atrocious massacre. In 1933 it occupied Jehol and penetrated into Chabar. These were the early signs of World War II in Asia. During this period, Chiang Kai-shek made agreements with Japan to concentrate its army against the communist strongholds. For its part, the CCP symbolically declared war on Japan and presented the forced retreat of the Long March as instead a means of approaching the Japanese.

Thus, in the midst of the civil war, the national question remained at the heart of the Chinese political situation. In the early 1920s a large array of social forces had closed ranks in opposition to Japanese, British, or French rule. The political evolution of Sun Yat-sen's Guomindang seemed promising. The workers' movement itself was created within the national movement. However, as soon as the anti-imperialist fight gained strength – thanks to the workers and popular and peasant mobilizations – social contradictions sharpened and the unity of the nationalist movement was smashed. Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang became an instrument of the bourgeois counterrevolution. Class antagonisms prevailed over national unity.

Maoism did not yet exist in the mid-1920s. It took form as a distinct political current in the heat of the Second Chinese Revolution and the violent confrontations that followed. It then passed through a formidable experience of urban and rural struggle; a rich and complex political experience, especially as regards the relationship between the Guomindang, the CCP, and the USSR. It learnt at a very early stage from extensive military experience against the warlords, then in the civil war launched by Chiang Kai-shek. It experienced the intimate connections between national and social questions. It suffered the

merciless violence of the counterrevolution and was toughened by defeat.

Anti-Japanese Resistance: 1937–1945

At the end of the Long March the young Maoist leadership was socially and geographically marginalized and had fallen back on Yan'an. But, matured through the experience of the years 1925–35, it was able to take the political initiative as soon as the situation would allow it. This proved the case when, in July 1937, Japan launched the conquest of China. The old Middle Kingdom this time was running the risk of being integrated into the Japanese zone of influence. It was also a major turning point for the whole region: World War II had begun in the Far East. In some countries the pan-Asian nationalism promoted by Tokyo obtained temporary favorable interest from sectors of the national anti-colonial movement, but in China the imperial army was perceived as a brutal occupation force. The Rape of Nanking remained in the memory as the symbol of the atrocities committed by the occupants, after six weeks of massacres from December 1937 to January 1938. The nation looked to Chinese political parties to fight the invader. The issue of national alliance was again raised.

In 1937 Chiang Kai-shek had established his control over most of the Chinese territory. The warlords were defeated militarily or otherwise integrated into the new regime. In the towns the labor movement was crushed, both by the Japanese army and the Chinese bourgeoisie. Communist cadres were decimated and the main representatives of the left opposition incarcerated (Chen Duxiu, Peng Shutze). The Guomintang had built a dictatorial regime with fascist characteristics (its Blue Shirt thugs wreaking terror) around the slogan "One Doctrine, One Party, One Chief." Chiang Kai-shek did not want to leave any democratic space which would have allowed the social movements to make a comeback or a "third force" to exist. He did not succeed in crushing definitively the Communist Party under the Maoist leadership – a failure which proved fatal.

Thus, the Sino-Japanese conflict involved the Japanese army, the forces of the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and those of the Communist Party. The Guomintang and the CCP formed an Anti-Japanese Front in 1937, but this fragile

alliance did not end the class conflict that opposed the two parties.

Two wars were waged simultaneously from 1937 to 1945: a war of national defense against Japanese invasion and the civil war between the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces. Neither Chiang nor Mao was fooled by the alliance they built against Tokyo. Both of them knew that the question of power would be posed in China immediately the Japanese were defeated. Thus, in the midst of the "united front" period, violent battles sometimes opposed the "whites" against the "reds." In January 1941 the South Anhui Incident showed where this antagonism could lead: a communist army of 9,000 was decimated by the Guomintang. Chiang Kai-shek had to pay a heavy political price for this crushing military victory: in the eyes of the public, he had massacred nationalist fighters moving up to the front against Japanese occupying forces.

Chiang Kai-shek had a rational conception of the anti-Japanese resistance from what we might call his class point of view. He wanted to preserve his military forces as much as possible and weaken those of the CCP in order to be in a favorable position when the Japanese defeat left the two Chinese armies face to face. To this end he used the immensity of the Chinese territory, retreating gradually with the advance of Japanese troops: he was losing space but gaining time. This strategy was reinforced when the United States entered the war after Pearl Harbor in December 1941: Japan would be defeated in the Pacific by the Allies; all the more reason to economize forces in China. The Achilles' heel of the Generalissimo's strategy was political: his retreat left the population defenseless, while the communist guerillas stood firm and infiltrated enemy lines to organize resistance alongside the people. Nationalist opinion progressively tilted in favor of the CCP. Chiang Kai-shek also underestimated the efficiency of the alternative strategy implemented by the Maoist leadership: the protracted people's war.

In China the civil war preceded by many decades the conquest of power, while in Russia it succeeded it. The social structure of the two countries was moreover very different. To what extent, then, could the Chinese communists draw their inspiration from the Russian Red Army – or rather from the national traditions of peasants' wars? From 1932 the debates of the CCP leadership on the "Chinese road" took the form of a long military controversy between those

who held to “Russian orthodoxy” and those who followed the “Chinese archaism” of Mao Zedong. These debates were neither simple nor static – some critics of Mao later joined his leadership team – but the basic disagreements between the Wang Ming faction and the Maoists continued throughout the 1930s and 1940s, with the Wang Ming faction of the CCP advocating a more conventional military policy that relied more on the alliance with the Guomindang.

The Red Army arose from mass insurrections (urban and rural) and military upheavals. The retreat to Yan’an was not a free political choice, but an option imposed by defeat. Mao would have preferred to hold on to “red” zones in the South from which to launch anti-Japanese resistance. Therefore, in the mid-1930s and after a major defeat, he wondered how he could preserve the social and military forces that escaped the disaster, and how to take back the initiative. His answer was deeply political and expressed another class point of view to that of Chiang Kai-shek.

The redeployment of communist armies to the North is a clear example of Mao’s bold choices. At the end of the 1930s the Maoist leadership took a very daring decision to expand communist networks in the whole country, but to send a large part of the best military forces to the North, behind Japanese lines, even if it meant withdrawing troops from their traditional strongholds. This decision took into account military, political, and social factors. Recourse to the mobility of the partisans and the great operational flexibility of a guerilla war made it possible to confront a well-armed enemy. The Red Army would operate in the Northern provinces without getting into direct conflict with Chiang Kai-shek’s forces (which remained on the other side of Japanese lines) and take the opportunity to liquidate the residual power of the Guomindang. Faced with the brutality of Japanese occupation, it could easily gain a mass base even in the zones where it did not have any organization. By responding to peasants’ demands it transformed the war of national defense into a real people’s war, thus giving it considerable strength. In this way the CCP could create new liberated zones under its sole control.

The CCP took a big risk in redeploying its armies so radically: the Guomindang moved into the regions from where troops were withdrawn and could even (in 1947) capture Yan’an, the “war

capital” of the communists. But the Maoists gained a lot. Their conception of a protracted people’s war allowed them to accumulate important military, social, and political forces. In 1945, at the time of Japanese surrender, the liberated zones under their control had nearly 100 million inhabitants, or 20 percent of the population. It became an effective territorial form of dual power, an alternative to Chiang Kai-shek’s regime.

Third Chinese Revolution

The Japanese army was bogged down and exhausted in its attempt to conquer China. By emphasizing essentially the battle of the Pacific and the intervention of American forces (and British and Australian), western authors often underestimate the essential role of the Chinese resistance in Japan’s defeat. Nevertheless, the Japanese surrender was precipitated by the nuclear devastation (arguably, war crimes) of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Chinese general staffs were surprised by the rapidity of events, when all their forces were then engaged in a race to reinforce their positions in expectation of the Japanese crumbling.

On August 6, 1945 the first atomic bomb hit Hiroshima. On August 8 the USSR entered the war against Japan and penetrated into Manchuria. On August 9 Mao called for a general counter-offensive against Japan to seize its armaments. On August 14, Tokyo signed the surrender. Soon after the capitulation, the Allied command ordered Japanese troops stationed in China to surrender only to the Guomindang. Chiang Kai-shek’s forces were then positioned in the Southwest, enormous air resources were deployed by the United States to transfer them rapidly to the Central and Northern provinces, keeping the communists from conquering the principal urban centers. With such help, the Guomindang recuperated most of the spoils of war.

In spite of the American intervention, the Communist Party succeeded in extending its liberated zones. It concentrated forces in Manchuria. However, in Manchuria, the Soviets occupied the terrain up to 1946. It was Moscow that accepted the Japanese surrender and took the opportunity to bring back to Russia the industrial infrastructure of the region, rich in Japanese investment. Moscow also left the Guomindang to take control of the main towns, but the CCP reinforced its own bases and armaments.

In parallel with this race for advantage, the Guomintang and the CCP engaged in peace negotiations. Their forces had attained an unstable equilibrium. The population looked for peace and each political party had to show that the eventual resumption of the civil war was the responsibility of the other. The United States and The Soviet Union were also negotiating. Moscow took its time in leaving Manchuria, but fundamentally the Soviet leadership respected the Yalta Agreement in which China's buffer state became part of the western zone of influence (Stalin in fact did not believe that a communist victory was possible in China). The United States efficiently supported the Guomintang, but they were not in a position to involve themselves in a new war on the continent. Chiang Kai-shek was in control of formidable military might, but he needed time to redeploy its forces, and the first attacks made against CCP zones soon turned sour.

Retrospectively, the resumption of the civil war seems inevitable, despite peace negotiations. The battle for peace was for a while an essential terrain of political confrontation between the revolution and the counterrevolution. The negotiations were held under American aegis and rapidly bogged down. The return to civil war began in March–April 1946. Fighting spread throughout that summer. One year later, the Red Army (renamed the People's Liberation Army) (PLA) took the offensive in Manchuria. The national collapse of the Guomintang started at the end of 1948. Communist forces won Beijing in January 1949, Shanghai in May, Canton in October, and Nanning (at the border with Vietnam) in December. Severely defeated, the Guomintang retreated to Taiwan, to the great displeasure of the population of the island.

While battles were still being fought in the Southwest, the People's Republic was proclaimed on October 1, 1949. The victory of the PLA was remarkably quick, even though the military balance of power was very unfavorable. It was the evolution of social forces that allowed the communists to win in such a way: the Chinese civil war really became a social revolution.

There was not always agreement between the aspirations of peasant movements and the CCP's action program, which was more or less radical depending on fluctuating alliance policies. The party was sometimes bypassed by sudden spontaneous mobilizations of poor peasants,

while in other places or times it required intense efforts to free the most disadvantaged people in villages from subjection to clans. From the end of 1945 the question of agrarian reform (and not only the reduction of rents) became more and more important. In May 1946 the central slogan "The land to the tiller" was launched nationally. In September 1947 the CCP called a conference on land to adopt the principle of an agrarian law abolishing the system of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation. It advocated radical measures that later it had to moderate so as not to alienate itself from richer peasants.

The agrarian structure varied considerably in China, which did not help when it came to devising specific programs of reform. Where land was particularly scarce, poor peasants turned against richer peasants, not just the wealthy and the landlords. The CCP tried to moderate its policies in the course of 1948, but nevertheless a real agrarian revolution took place during the Third Chinese Revolution, and was generalized after the victory. In many cases, in villages, the change in power was radical, with the disintegration of the class of landlords and the marginalization of rich peasants.

In the aftermath of World War II, Chiang Kai-shek could still hope to stabilize his regime in the urban centers of the coastal areas. However, his authority rapidly dwindled. Corruption, malpractice, factionalism, and authoritarianism alienated democratic opinion. Students initiated a vast campaign against American occupation after two navy officers were accused of raping a young Chinese woman. Inflation reached gigantic proportions, crashing headlong into the middle class and civil servants. The working class entered into struggle, showing a combativeness that allowed it to obtain in 1946 a sliding scale of wages. Demonstrations and strikes multiplied in 1947–8. However, the urban proletariat was much less politicized than in the 1920s. The CCP retained a militant network in the workers' movement, but it was very weak. On the other hand, corporatist traditions were powerful.

The Chiang Kai-shek regime also alienated national opinion when it seemed ready to enter into a new international alliance with the United States and Japan. Looked down upon and hated, Chiang Kai-shek lost the war politically in the urban areas before any military battle. The final confrontation with communist forces began on the occasion of a great national crisis.

End of Four Decades of War and Revolution

Four decades after the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and the Russian Revolution of 1917, China changed sides: it was one of the first (with Yugoslavia) and worst failures of the Yalta conference. Without breaking with the Stalinist leadership of the Communist International, the CCP had gained its independence and elaborated its own strategic orientation. Somehow, Mao Zedong seemed personally to incarnate the formation of a “sinisied” Marxism. As a student, he had read a lot and worked on translations of European thinkers, comparing philosophical approaches and classical political theories, and only coming to know of Marxism when he was 26 years old. He devoured the press and followed world events with care. He was subject to numerous intellectual influences and was interested in many trends, especially anarchism. However, in spite of great effort, he never succeeded in mastering a foreign language. He never traveled out of China (except briefly to meet Stalin) and quoted more willingly Chinese philosophers than the fathers of western Marxism. In this way he was very different from the other main personalities of Asian Marxism like Ho Chi Minh, who incarnated to perfection the Vietnamese figure of “Uncle Ho,” but who also made his debut in France and in the Komintern. Nevertheless, there were other strong personalities in the Maoist leadership team, including those who knew the world well, like Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai.

The “sinisation” of Marxism was neither limited to Mao Zedong nor to Maoism. Other figures – like the founders of the CCP Li Dazhao (assassinated in 1927) and Chen Duxiu (who died in 1942) – and other currents (libertarian, left opposition, etc.) contributed to the diffusion of Marxism in China. But 25 years of war and repression suffocated the pluralism of the Chinese revolutionary movement. The CCP under Maoist leadership emerged as the only party to have passed through this ordeal. The pivotal role of Mao was undeniable.

The Maoist revolution possessed numerous authoritarian and repressive characteristics. The new leadership of the CCP was forged in a permanent, merciless, military fight and intense factional struggles. It retreated into remote regions, socially very conservative. It leant back

against an international “camp” dominated by Stalinism and built the personality cult of Mao as opposed to the cult of Stalin. Long before the conquest of power on a national scale, a politico-administrative bureaucratic structure was created in the vast liberated zones of the North.

The Maoist revolution was also the product of intense social struggles which raised the issue of modernization from the point of view of the dominated class. The fact that poor peasants spoke out and seized part of the power in villages represented a major democratic act. It was the same for the mobilization of women in the countryside. Maoist doctrine concerning women’s liberation varied through time: it was very libertarian at the time of the Soviet republic of Jiangxi, but much more conservative at the time of Yan’an. But the involvement of peasants in the struggles, the creation of women-communist structures in the villages, the multiplication of mass women’s organizations, and the famous “speak bitterness meetings” during which the poor and the women villagers reached a collective consciousness of their oppression and asserted their rights, shook the traditional oppressive relationships of domination. The criticisms (often justified) of Maoist authoritarianism should not hide this important dimension of the Chinese agrarian revolution. It was a democratic dimension sanctioned by the adoption of two important laws by the new regime: on land reform and on the family and women’s rights.

Under the dictatorial regime of the Guomindang, Chinese society also evolved, but confined essentially to urban society. The condition of rich or educated women changed, but the “national revolution” of Chiang Kai-shek could not challenge the oppression of the poor peasant or the female villager, as he had to depend on the traditional authority of the wealthy, the landlords, and the clans in the countryside. The bourgeoisie (Chinese or international) was not anti-feudal. In the towns and surrounding rural areas the development of capitalism dissolved traditional social relationships, but under such exploitative conditions that it prevented it from acquiring a democratic dimension.

During the civil war there were, in the towns, important changes of opinion that prepared the way for the revolution of 1949, including anti-imperialist mobilizations, evolution of intellectual and nationalist opinion in favor of the CCP, rejection of the Guomindang, and growing

student identification with the Red Army. The communists won the battle of legitimacy, but their networks were too weak in the urban metropolis to organize from within the popular classes. As much as the proletariat revealed itself pugnacious on social demands after World War II, it remained largely passive at the political level.

Scenting victory, the CCP took a major political turn. In March 1949 Mao Zedong announced that from then on the center of gravity of communist action had to again be in the urban centers, while, from 1927 to the beginning of 1949, it was in the countryside. The CCP declared in its March 5 report to the Central Committee: “The period ‘from the city to the village’ and of the city leading the village has begun.” This implied, as Liu Shaoqi emphasized on March 12, an enormous effort to organize the working class:

Our party used to have close ties with the working class, but later we were compelled to move to the countryside. The Guomindang has been operating among the workers for so many years that, through its influence, it has made the ranks of the workers more complicated. Moreover, our ties with the workers have been weakened and our cadres (including members of the Central Committee) do not know them very well and are no longer good at working among them. Hence, we must study assiduously.

The sociopolitical trajectory of the CPC is one of the most surprising characteristics of the Chinese Revolution: obliged to retreat to the countryside, it remained for more than twenty years immersed in the rural world. It depended on the peasants to continue a fight started in the towns. In spite of this, and contrary to prognostics, it did not become a peasant party. As soon as it resettled in urban centers, the town “commanded” again, to use Mao’s expression. This is what allowed the CCP to rebuild a state on the scale of China, opening a new chapter of the country’s history, that of Maoism in power.

SEE ALSO: China, Maoism and Popular Power, 1949–1969; Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911; Lu Xun (1881–1936); Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Peng Dehuai (1898–1974); Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925); Zhou Enlai (1898–1976); Zhu De (1886–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

Belden, J. (1970) *China Shakes the World*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

- Benton, G. (1996) *China’s Urban Revolutionaries: Explorations in the History of Chinese Trotskyism, 1921–1952*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
- Benton, G. (1999) *New Fourth Army: Communist Resistance Along the Yangtze and the Huai, 1938–1941*. Richmond: Curzon.
- Bergere, M.-C. (1986) *Sun Yat-sen*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bergere, M.-C. (1989) *The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911–1937*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bianco, L. (1971) *Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915–1949*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bianco, L. (2005) *Jacqueries et révolution dans la Chine du XX^e siècle*. Paris: La Martinière.
- Brand, C., Schwartz, B., & Fairbank, J. K. (1952) *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; New York: Atheneum.
- Broue, P. (documents presented by) (1976) *La Question chinoise dans l’Internationale communiste (1926–1927)* (The Chinese Question in the Communist International (1926–1927)). Paris: Etudes et documentation internationales (EDI).
- Carrere D’Encausse, H. & Schram, S. (1969) *Marxism and Asia*. London: Allen Lane.
- Chen, Y.-F. (1986) *Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937–1945*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Chesneaux, J. (1968) *The Chinese Labour Movement: 1919–27*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Chow Tse-tung (1960) *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
- Dirlik, A. (1991) *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Fairbank, J. K. (Ed.) (1983–6) *The Cambridge History of China*, Vols. 12 (with Twitchett, D.) & 13 (with Feuerwerker, A.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hinton, W. (1966) *Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Isaac, H. (1961) *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Johnson, C. A. L. (1962) *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937–1945*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Liu Shaoqi (1981) *Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi*. Vol. 1. Peking: People’s Publishing House.
- Mao Tsetung (1972) *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*. 4 vols. Peking: People’s Publishing House. (In this official publication, Mao’s writings have sometimes been modified. For the original versions, see in this bibliography Mao’s works as edited by S. Schram.)

- Mao Tsetung (1992–9) *Mao's Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings 1912–1949*. 5 vols. Ed. S. Schram. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Salisbury, H. (1985) *The Long March: The Untold Story*. New York: Harper & Row; London: Macmillan.
- Scalapino, R. A. & Yu, T. (1961) *The Chinese Anarchist Movement*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Schram, S. (1966–7) *Mao Tse-tung*. London: Pelican.
- Schram, S. (1969) *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*. London: Pall Mall; New York: Praeger.
- Short, P. (1999) *Mao: A Life*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
- Snow, E. (1938) *Red Star Over China*. New York: Random House.
- Wang, F.-H. (1991) *Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Zhou Enlai (1980) *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*. Vol. 1. Peking: People's Publishing House.
- Zhu De (1983) *Selected Works of Zhu De*. Peking: People's Publishing House.

Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911

Amit Bhattacharyya

The Revolution of 1911 in China signaled the end of the Manchu (also known as Ching/Qing) dynasty and the establishment of the republican form of government in China. It was also called the *Hsin-hai* revolution because 1911 is a Xinhai year in the sexagenary cycle of the Chinese lunar calendar. Three distinct phases are discernible in this revolution, as different social forces and political groups played their role in it – the new gentry, western-educated intellectuals, reformists, the later-Ching reformers, constitutionalists, secret societies, toiling people, overseas Chinese students and, above all, the revolutionaries who assembled under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen.

First Stage (1894–1904)

From the 1890s, reformist ideology had been gaining ground among the western-educated professional and commercial people who resided in China's partially westernized port cities. The national sentiment of the Chinese people was hurt at the aggressive war waged by the French imperialists during 1884–1885 and the humiliating treaty that China was compelled to sign. Sun Yat-sen, along with others, presented conventional proposals for reform, known as the "Petition to

Li Hung-chang," one of China's most influential exponents of modernization. Three measures were prescribed as essential means of bringing wealth to the nation and well-being to the people. They were: full utilization of the nation's talents, better use of land and natural resources, and complete free-flow of goods. Essentially, these proposals related to the newly emerging national bourgeoisie who were influenced by western ideas. However, Sun's attempts failed, impelling him to think in terms of the revolutionary overthrow of the Manchu rulers and the setting up of a republic.

With this end in view, Sun Yat-sen formed Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Society) in 1894 in Honolulu. It was China's first bourgeois revolutionary organization, formed initially with about 20 members, and the number increased to 120 sometime later. Meanwhile China was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and compelled to accept the humiliating treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, representing a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of China. Anti-Manchu popular outbreaks spread from one area to another. Sun Yat-sen first planned a revolutionary uprising in Canton. The Chien Heng Company in Hong Kong – ostensibly a commercial firm – acted as a legal cover for the Hong Kong branch of Hsing Chung Hui. H. Z. Schiffrin (1968) has written an account of how the rising in Canton was to take place.

However, the plot was exposed and Sun became a fugitive in China. He left China first for England and then went to other European countries, giving him firsthand experience of western societies. This foreign exposure also helped him to gain fame as the Chinese national leader. Meanwhile China's defeat in 1894–1895 proved the futility of the program of "westernization" and "learning from foreigners."

The reform movement got a stimulus from then on. The failure of the reform movement of 1898 made many people skeptical about the efficacy of such programs as long as the Ching remained in power, for within that structure no permanent solutions would be available for the ill China had been suffering. Meanwhile the situation in Japan turned out to be favorable for the Chinese revolutionaries. With the end of the privilege of extra-territoriality from July 1899 to all foreign nationals residing in Japan, the Chinese revolutionaries were in an advantageous position. Sun Yat-sen was now free to move

about openly and spread propaganda among the 10,000 overseas Chinese residents in Japan, convincing them of the need for revolution in China.

Meanwhile, events in China were moving towards a national crisis with unabashed imperial aggression. Railway and mining concessions were being lavishly given away. In 1896, Russia had obtained concessions in Manchuria for the Trans-Siberian railway. The Germans, the French, and the Belgians had railway projects in their pockets. These rapid developments of foreign enterprise played havoc with China's economy. The condition was ripe for a revolutionary uprising. The spark of the Boxer Rebellion, which started a prairie fire, raised the slogan "Exterminate the foreigners." It also failed. But failures did not mean the spirit of rebellion was dead.

Besides Hsing Chung Hui, there were other societies which played a positive role in the revolution. These included Kuang Fu Hui (Society for the Restoration of China) and Hua Hsing Hui (Society for the Revival of the Chinese Nation). The former was the outgrowth of Chun Kuo Min Chiao Yu Hui (Society for Military Education), set up by Chinese students in Japan in 1903. Before the establishment of this society, two intellectuals from Shanghai, Tsai Yuan-pei and Chang Tai-yen, set up Chun Kuo Min Chiao Yu Hui (Educational Society of China), which secretly sent people back to China to prepare for armed revolution. They spread revolutionary propaganda in the guise of education, collected funds and planned to set up their own college. Students in Nanyang College in Shanghai organized a strike against college authorities for suppressing their freedom of speech. The students in the Army College at Nanking went on strike, and some came to Shanghai to join Chun Kuo Min Chiao Yu Hui. In 1904 Tao Cheng-chang and others established contact with Lung Hua Hui (Dragon Flower Society) and other organizations in Chekiang. The regulations of Lung Hua Hui demanded the transfer of all land to public ownership and stopping its usurpation by wealthy, despotic landlords. The members of the secret societies in Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhwei welcomed this demand.

The three revolutionary organizations – Hsing Chung Hui, Kuang Fu Hui and Hua Hsing Hui – were in agreement about overthrowing the

Ching government by armed revolt. The regions embracing Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupei and the lower Yangtze valley region were the main centers of the movement. These areas, more advanced in industry and commerce, were in regular touch with the outside world and sent many students abroad for study. Here the conflict between the old and the new was particularly sharp. Moreover, secret societies, whose central slogan was "overthrow the Ching and restore the Ming," extended their active support to such revolutionary efforts.

Along with these developments, a number of periodicals containing revolutionary-democratic propaganda were gaining wider circulation. Books exposing the torture committed by the Ching nobility ever since they seized power by overthrowing the Ming in 1644 were reprinted. Two such books, namely *Ten Days at Yangchow* and *The Massacre at Chiating*, helped to stir nationalist feeling against the Manchu ruling clique.

Writings by gentry-intellectuals were published revealing the corruption of the Manchus and their subservience and "selling out" of the country to the imperialist powers. Tsou Jung's *The Revolutionary Army*, Chen Tien-hua's *Alarm Bell* and *Awakening*, and Chang Tai-yen's *Kang Yu-wei's Theory of Revolution Refuted* were a few of the writings among this anti-establishment literature which created the deepest impression on the public mind. Chen Tien-hua could write in very powerful, passionate language and his style was lively. His writings included a call for direct political action. His demands included the expulsion of the foreign invaders and the destruction of the native traitors and collaborators who served them, in order to nullify humiliating treaties, recover lost sovereign rights and achieve complete independence.

Western materials written during the bourgeois revolutions were compiled and translated to disseminate bourgeois democratic revolutionary ideas. Among the progressive periodicals, *Chung Kuo Jih Pao* (China Daily), founded by Hsing Chung Hui in Hong Kong, deserves special mention. The Chinese students settled in Japan published periodicals such as *The Compilation of Translations by Students Abroad*, *Mainland*, *Hupei Students News*, *Kiangsu*, *New Hunan* and the *Chekiang Tide*.

Like all repressive regimes, the Manchu government also resorted to state terror and repression to combat such political and ideological

attacks. When the *Kiangsi News* was banned, the revolutionaries brought out another paper called *Citizens' Daily*. As more and more papers faced the wrath of the Manchu police, people became increasingly interested to know what was being written in this proscribed literature.

Repression was not the only path adopted by the Manchu rulers to keep their rule intact. In fact, in the years after 1900, the already awakened intellectual movement showed a vigor that could not be denied. The reforms demanded in 1898, and rejected at the time, were now reconsidered. Empress Tzu-hsi had to take a more conciliatory attitude towards requests for the encouragement of western learning in order to protect her regime from impending disaster. The later-Ching reforms included investment by private capital in the railways. These reforms ultimately moved towards the demand for the establishment of a constitutional parliament.

Second Stage (1905–1908)

Japan's victory over Tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) partially removed the sting of China's own defeat at the hands of Japan in 1894–5. Russia's defeat instilled, in a different way, a spirit of confidence in the minds of Chinese people (Sharman 1934). Japan's victory was attributed to its modernization. Instead of moving along the road to modernization, the Ching government, after the signing of the Protocol of 1901, had surrendered the country to foreign powers. This, along with merciless plunder of the people, brought China to the brink of national collapse in the first decade of the twentieth century. China's position in world affairs had also deteriorated as US-Japanese conflict led to a realignment of forces in the East. In order to counter US imperialism Japan concluded a secret agreement with Russia in July 1910, under which the tsar's government let Japan annex Korea, while Japan promised to facilitate the tsar's thrust into Mongolia, thereby endangering Chinese imperial possessions.

The new situation demanded the rapid formation of a unified revolutionary party to lead the bourgeois-democratic revolution on a nationwide scale. The outcome was the founding of Tung Meng Hui (Revolutionary Brotherhood) on July 30, 1905 in Tokyo under Sun Yat-sen. This organization was different from all previous revolutionary bodies, which bore deep marks

of the old secret societies and were rather local in character and formed along the coastal zones and confined within the overseas groups. Tung Meng Hui, on the contrary, was the prototype of the modern political party. The new organization extended its network to the heart of China. In contrast to Hsing Chung Hui, which had been overwhelmingly Cantonese, the new organization was more broad-based and commanded multi-provincial, national support. This Revolutionary Brotherhood consisted of a loose alliance of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois revolutionaries plus anti-Manchu elements from the landlord class. There were also intellectuals, Chinese living abroad, members of secret societies and Chinese small businessmen, particularly from Shanghai. Its leadership adopted the "Program of Revolution," consisting of eight documents, including the "Manifesto of the Military Government" and "Manifesto to the World," and adopted policies for general administration, foreign affairs and particularly for armed uprisings in the various parts of the country.

From 1905 to 1911, numerous anti-tax riots and revolutionary outbreaks occurred in different parts of China, particularly in Chaochou, Huichou, Chinchou and Linchou in Kwangtung province. The uprising in Liuyang county in Hunan was led by Hung Fu Hui, and the revolt in Chennankuan in Kwangsi province was organized by Sun Yat-sen. The rebellion of the Anyuan coal miners and the mutiny of the soldiers in Anking, the capital of the province of Anhwei, under the leadership of Kuang Fu Hui, and the Canton rising under Ni Ying-tien were some of the remarkable stirrings, though many of them failed.

The essence of Sun Yat-sen's ideology lay in the slogan: "Drive out the Manchus, restore Chinese rule, establish a republic and equalize land-rights." From this slogan developed the "Three Principles of the People": People's Nationalism, People's Democracy and People's Livelihood.

Third Stage (1909–1911)

Alarmed at the growth of the revolutionary movement, the Ching rulers felt that certain constitutional concessions should be made to hold off revolutionary outbreaks. The Manchu state brought the provincial administration under central control to minimize corruption, extortion

and misrule, and also carried out some constitutional reforms. The plan was to move gradually towards a full-fledged parliament by first developing provincial assemblies, and then a national assembly. On August 27, 1908, a nine-year program of constitutional reform was promulgated.

In terms of constitutional changes, the Chinese people were moving in a direction favorable to revolution. Those who had experienced limited parliamentary power were now impatient to gain more. Another event proved helpful to the revolution. The provincial spirit encouraged in some areas considerable opposition to the Peking government's policy of nationalizing the railways and transferring their control to imperialist powers. The Rights Recovery Movement was directed both against the manner in which the loan was procured from the foreigners and the loan itself, which bartered away the country's independence. The government retaliated by arresting members of the league which, in turn, led to massive protest demonstrations all over Sichuan.

The Manchu crisis became more serious than ever before. On the one hand, the reformers had been putting pressure on the rulers to carry out reforms and opposing their pro-imperialist and anti-provincial measures. On the other hand, Tung Meng Hui led by Sun Yat-sen had been secretly preparing for the final showdown with the imperial army. In September 1911, a rising in Sichuan stimulated the revolutionary mood of the people. Events were precipitated by the accidental explosion of a bomb in a secret ammunition depot in Hankow on October 9, 1911, whereby a revolutionary plot was discovered. The imperial artillery of Wuchang openly mutinied and the viceroy fled. On October 11, Wuchang fell to the revolutionaries. Within a month, 13 provinces had been lost to the empire. After the revolution of 1911, the defeated Manchu rulers had stepped down and recalled Yuan Shikai, who had been a mainstay of Empress Tzu Hsi during her coup against the Hundred Days' Reform (1898), as the premier. Yuan favored a settlement by peace conference. Sun Yat-sen, as expected, took over as the president of the Republic on January 1, 1912, at Nanking. The republicans were in control of south China with Nanking as their capital, and Yuan Shikai and his forces were in control of north China with Peking as the capital.

Nature and Assessment of the Revolution

Bergere (1989) refers to Chinese historians like Li Shu, who have described this revolution as a bourgeois democratic revolution and the third revolutionary tide in the modern history of China, following the Taiping and Boxer uprisings. The bourgeoisie of Shanghai directly supported and participated in the uprising. The Shanghai chamber of commerce took part in coordinating the attack on the city arsenal. Li Ping-shu, civilian chief of Hu Army Government, sent members of the chamber of commerce to the Shanghai customs warehouse, where they removed by force 1,500 boxes of ammunition for the use of the insurgent troops, despite foreigners' protests. The industrial and commercial circles in the triple city of Wuhan firmly supported the revolution. A huge sum of money amounting to 4 million *taels*, which was needed by the Sichuan military government, was supplied by the Chungking chamber of commerce. The same role was played by the industrial and commercial concerns of the capitals in the provinces of Zhejiang, Fujian, Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Anhwei. Their demands for political reforms sprang from the need for political stability as a precondition for capitalist development.

The Revolution of 1911 was brought about by a conjunction of efforts. The imperialist penetration into China and the signing of a series of unequal treaties after the Opium War of 1840–2, peasant rebellions of varying magnitude against the feudal Manchu rule, failure of the reform movement of 1898, the part played by the secret societies, overseas Chinese, revolutionary intellectuals, the laboring poor, a section of the bourgeoisie – all combined to form the mass revolutionary wave. It is not that all wanted revolution; but even those opposed to violence were forced to join the tide because the later-Ching reforms left them with no other alternative. Of the revolutionary forces, it was Sun Yat-sen who set up Tung Meng Hui, placed a program before the people, organized the overseas Chinese, procured money, helped in the revival of secret societies, and inspired sections of the Chinese military students studying in Japan.

However, despite its progressive character, the revolution also suffered from major limitations. The Tung Meng Hui program recognized all the privileges of imperialist powers in China.

The revolution merely made the emperor step down without altering the class structure of the society vis-à-vis the state. China had no respite from imperialist and feudal domination. The content of the dictatorship set up by Yuan Shikai also did not change. Thus the bourgeois-led revolution failed in the end, and its revolutionary aims were achieved only through the revolution of 1949.

SEE ALSO: Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925); Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864; Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Bergere, M. C. (1989) *The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie 1911–1937*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Compilation Group for the History of Modern China Series (1976) *The Revolution of 1911*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.
- Epstein, I. (1956) *From Opium War to Liberation*. Beijing: New World Press.
- Lu Bowei & Wang Guoping (1991) *The Revolution of 1911: Turning Point in Modern Chinese History*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.
- Schiffirin, H. Z. (1968) *Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Sharman, L. (1934) *Sun Yat-sen: His Life and its Meaning: A Critical Biography*. New York: John Day.
- Sheng, H., Liu, D. et al. (1983) *The 1911 Revolution: A Retrospective After 70 Years*. Beijing: New World Press.
- Wilbur, C. M. (1976) *Sun Yat-sen: The Frustrated Patriot*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chipko movement

Michael Menser

The Chipko movement was an action of local peasants and villagers against state-contracted commercial forestry operations in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh from 1973 to 1981. Chipko achieved worldwide recognition thanks to the image of villagers non-violently preventing the cutting down of trees by claspings them in their arms. But more importantly, Chipko showed that peasants themselves were capable of successfully responding to the social dislocation caused by ecological degradation. Chipko has inspired other movements throughout the world.

Located in the hills of northern India in the central Himalayas, Uttar Pradesh had been the site of many social struggles and popular uprisings against the Indian department of forestry, both in colonial times and after independence. By the 1960s, deforestation had led to major ecological disasters, especially the Alakananda flood of 1970. The movement began in the Chamoli district in 1973 and spread throughout the Uttarakhand Himalayas by the end of the decade. In Tehri district, Chipko activists would go on to protest limestone mining in the Dehradun hills in the 1980s as well as the Tehri dam, before founding the Beej Bachao Andolan or Save the Seeds movement that continues to the present day. In the Kumaon region, Chipko joined the general movement for a separate Uttarakhand state, which was successful in 2000. Key figures in the movement include Gaura Devi, Sudesha Devi, Bachni Devi, Chandi Prasad Bhatt, Sundarlal Bahuguna, Govind Singh Rawat, Dhoom Singh Negi, and Shamsher Singh Bisht.

In the history of modern environmentalism and social movements, Chipko is noteworthy first because peasants themselves, rather than some elite or vanguard, were the principal agents in the struggle. In particular the local knowledge possessed by villagers with respect to soil, wildlife, and vegetation led to specific seasonal practices that enabled the local ecology to remain vibrant and stable. Also, both women and men played a prominent role. Finally, Chipko was not a single-issue environmentalism but one that integrated sociocultural, economic, and ecological issues in a manner that grounded politics outside of the state and in local communities. (The peasants themselves viewed it as an *andolan* or “popular movement.”) Indeed, Chipko is cited by ecofeminists, environmentalists, and practitioners of participatory democracy.

SEE ALSO: Eco-anarchism; Ecological Protest Movements; Environmental Protest, United States, 19th Century; Shiva, Vandana (b. 1952)

References and Suggested Readings

- Guha, R. (1994) *The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalayas*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Shiva, V. (1989) *Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development*. London: Zed Books.

Chirinos, José Leonardo (d. 1796)

Dario Azzellini

From the 1790s the Haitian Revolution and the ambition of freedom for all echoed throughout the Atlantic world, providing comfort and hope for the abolition of slavery to Africans seeking freedom, equality, and self-determination from European colonial rule. José Leonardo Chirinos, or Zambo Chirinos, was eyewitness to the Haitian Revolution as a free Afro-Venezuelan in the employ of an affluent merchant. As a first-hand observer of the Haitian liberation, Chirinos found the experience a foundation for leading the movement to advance Afro-Venezuelan rights and establish universal principles of equality while freeing Venezuela from Spanish colonial rule. The son of an Afro-Venezuelan father and indigenous mother, Chirinos was not born into servitude. As a worker for José Tellería, a rich merchant and attorney of Coro, Venezuela, Chirinos was brought on the voyage to Saint-Domingue (Haiti) in 1794 while African slaves in the colony were in open revolt against the French colonial slave system. During his visit, Chirinos was introduced to rebels fighting for the abolition of slavery, equality, and later, independence from France. Upon his return to Venezuela in March 1795, a highly politicized Chirinos sought to advance the goal of ending the slavery of Afro-Venezuelans and ending Spanish colonial rule, joining with fellow Afro-Venezuelan revolutionaries in Curimagua, Falcón, a farm in Macanillas, where they planned a major rebellion to abolish slavery.

Chirinos joined José Caridad González, a free African from Congo in Central Africa, fluent in French and Spanish as well as in his Bantu dialect. As a legal advocate for Africans from the Dutch Caribbean island of Curaçao, González earned great respect for establishing land rights for the migrants. Chirinos also met with Cocolfo, a Luango shaman or spiritual leader and traditional medicine man. Cocolfo agitated Afro-Venezuelans through spreading rumors that Spain had already abolished slavery by decree and that local government authorities were secretly withholding this knowledge from their slaves. The Luango formed a distinctively

large share of the rebel groups and were noted as an African ethnic group that frequently participated in slave rebellions throughout the Americas. Some 50 years earlier, in 1749, the Luango in Caracas participated in a major slave rebellion.

The conspirators organized and participated in a series of rebellions and insurrections, starting May 10, 1796. After socializing at a local dance, they stormed the El Socorro farm in Macanilla where Chirinos proclaimed the “Law of the French,” the abolition of slavery and white aristocracy, the establishment of a democratic republic, the elimination of duties and taxes on indigenous people, the abolition of all privileges, and total equality for all.

The rebels moved through the hills of Falcón, south of Coro, attacking and burning farms and killing slaveholders. Some insurrectionist followers joined the attacks and marched to Coro with González while Chirinos planned another route of attack and organized additional support along the way. But as González’s rebel force neared the lowlands south of Coro it was met by a militia wielding firearms. The rebels, armed poorly with machetes and clubs, were routed and all survivors decapitated. While Chirinos escaped he was arrested three months later in Baragua and brought to Caracas, where he was sentenced to death by hanging on December 10, 1796. His children were sold into slavery and his wife was tortured and killed.

Chirinos is recognized as a precursor of the struggle for independence and the abolition of slavery and a symbol for the African heritage of Venezuela. In 1995, Chirinos’s name was placed on a tablet in the National Pantheon of Venezuela and his historical relevance forms part of a shared history among those who espouse democracy and freedom throughout the country.

SEE ALSO: Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath; Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1801–1804; Venezuela, Negro Miguel Rebellion, 1552

References and Suggested Readings

- García, J. (1990) *Africa en Venezuela*. Caracas: Edición de Lujo.
- García, J. (1993) *Afrovenezuela: una visión desde adentro*. Caracas: Editorial Fundación Afroamérica.

Chissano, Joaquim (b. 1939)

Justin Corfield

Joaquim Alberto Chissano was the president of Mozambique from the death of Samora Machel in 1986 to 2005. He was one of the long-time members of the Mozambican nationalist movement, FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique), but became a more moderate statesman in his old age.

Born on October 22, 1939 at Chibuto village in Gaza Province in the southern part of Mozambique, Chissano decided to turn to the nationalist cause while at high school in Lourenço Marques (modern-day Maputo). Working with other secondary students, he was one of the early members of FRELIMO, trying to bridge the gap between the intellectual elite such as Eduardo Mondlane (1920–69) and the many illiterate “traditionalists.” Chissano was active from at least 1963, and soon became FRELIMO’s representative in Paris, France, before becoming an instructor at the FRELIMO camp at Kongwa, Tanzania. Working as secretary to Eduardo Mondlane, the president of FRELIMO between 1966 and 1969, he became FRELIMO’s representative in Dar-es-Salaam from 1969 to 1974.

When Mozambique moved toward independence, Chissano was appointed premier of the first government on September 20, 1974, a post he held until independence on June 25, 1975. With the rank of major general, he then became foreign minister, retaining that position until 1986. This saw him gain a significant international profile and considerable political experience.

With the death of Samora Machel in a plane crash on October 19, 1986, Chissano became president of Mozambique. More pragmatic than his predecessor, Chissano abandoned Marxism as a state ideology and one of his first acts as president was to visit the United States of America, where he met with US President Ronald Reagan to request assistance for Mozambique. Chissano was able to gain grants from the International Monetary Fund in 1987, a move that saw a dramatic devaluation of the Mozambican currency; he also introduced the free market economy in November 1990. Chissano tried to end the escalating civil war by seeking peace talks with

RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana), which led to a truce being signed on August 7, 1992, with the final peace accord being signed in Rome, Italy, on October 6, 1992.

In the presidential elections held in 1994, Chissano managed to defeat the RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama, with 53.3 percent to Dhlakama’s 33.7 percent, a victory that surprised the foreign observers for its small size, as few of them had credited Dhlakama with being able to muster many votes. In another presidential election in 1999, Joaquim Chissano managed 52.3 percent of the vote to Dhlakama’s 47.7 percent. It seemed possible that Chissano might lose another election, so he left office at the end of his term on February 2, 2005. FRELIMO’s candidate, Armando Guebuza, was able to convincingly defeat Dhlakama in that election.

During his time as president, Chissano was chairman of the African Union from July 2003 to July 2004. On December 4, 2006 he was appointed, by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, as his special envoy to Northern Uganda to try to end the civil war there between the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army.

SEE ALSO: FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique); Machel, Samora (1933–1986); Mondlane, Eduardo Chivambo (1920–1969); Mozambique, Worker Protests; Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974

References and Suggested Readings

- Azevedo, M. (1991) *Historical Dictionary of Mozambique*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.
Núñez, B. (1995) *Dictionary of Portuguese-African Civilization*. London: Hans Zell.

Chomsky, Noam (b. 1928)

Christian Garland

Noam Chomsky is a US political theorist and activist, and institute professor of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Besides his work in linguistics, Chomsky is internationally recognized as one of the most critically engaged public intellectuals alive today. Chomsky continues to be an unapologetic critic of both American foreign policy and its ambitions for geopolitical hegemony and the

neoliberal turn of global capitalism, which he identifies in terms of class warfare waged from above against the needs and interests of the great majority. Chomsky is also an incisive critic of the ideological role of the mainstream corporate mass media, which, he maintains, “manufactures consent” toward the desirability of capitalism and the political powers supportive of it.

Over the past five decades, Chomsky has offered a searing critical indictment of US foreign policy and its many military interventions across the globe, pointing out that the US’s continued support for undemocratic regimes, and hostility to popular or democratic movements, is at odds with its professed claim to be spreading democracy and freedom and support for tendencies aiming toward that end. Indeed, as Chomsky argues, the current concern from Washington with so-called “Rogue States,” as much as the stated goal of aiding democratic movements in other countries, is not supported by successive administrations’ support (either direct or indirect) for political and military dictatorships across Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia. As Chomsky stated: “As the most powerful state, the US makes its own laws, using force and conducting economic warfare at will.” It also threatens sanctions against countries that do not abide by its conveniently flexible notions of “free trade.”

On the role of the mass media, Chomsky argues that the vested corporate interests controlling newspapers, television, and radio, no less than the content of what these outlets offer, form what he and Edward Hermann in their seminal study *Manufacturing Consent* call a “propaganda model” supine in the service of power.

Chomsky has described his own politics variously as anarchist, anarchosyndicalist, and libertarian socialist, allying himself with both classical anarchism and the critical libertarian Marxist and left communist traditions equally hostile to orthodox Marxism and Leninism. Chomsky maintains that these currents represent the logical development of the Enlightenment precepts of rational and critical inquiry engaged with the social world of which they are part.

Chomsky’s position on achieving small victories in the short term which “expand the floor of the cage” – for example, struggles to defend universal public services from privatization – has not been without controversy, with some anarchists accusing him of reformism and in

some cases “statism.” Chomsky has countered such accusations with the response that short-term victories aimed at expanding the cage in which we are trapped by capital and state should be seen as “preliminaries to dismantling it.”

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchosyndicalism; Anti-Vietnam War Movement, United States

References and Suggested Readings


- Barsamian, D. & Chomsky, N. (1997) Expanding the Floor of the Cage: Noam Chomsky interviewed by David Barsamian. Available at www.chomsky.info/interviews/199704.htm.
- Chomsky, N. (1970) *Notes on Anarchism*. Available at www.zmag.org/Chomsky/other/notes-on-anarchism.html.
- Chomsky, N. (1998) The United States and the “Challenge of Relativity.” Available at www.chomsky.info/articles/199811.htm.
- Hermann, E. & Chomsky, N. (1994) *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. London: Vintage.
- www.chomsky.info/
www.zmag.org/chomsky/

Civil rights movement, United States, 1960–1965

Sven Dubie

In the winter of 1960 four African American students at the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College in Greensboro decided they had had enough. They had grown impatient with the lack of progress in dismantling the edifice of segregation since the Supreme Court’s *Brown* decision nearly six years earlier. After much deliberation, they felt the time had come to take matters into their own hands to try and hasten progress. After a night of informal planning, the four men – Ezell Blair, Jr., Franklin McCain, Joseph McNeill, and David Richmond – decided that the next day, February 1, they were going to go to the local Woolworth’s store, make a few purchases, and then demand service at the whites-only lunch counter. If they were refused, as was to be expected according to the South’s Jim Crow custom, they would remain seated until they eventually received service.

Events at the Woolworth’s counter unfolded largely as the four young men had anticipated



A young civil rights activist takes part in the Selma to Montgomery civil rights marches, which were staged to demand Alabama Governor George Wallace to protect black registrants. The march was attempted three times, including one dubbed "Bloody Sunday" because of the repression and violence visited on the marchers by state and local police before it was finally completed. (© Steve Schapiro/CORBIS)

and soon a crowd gathered, with some offering words of encouragement and others condemnation. They remained on their stools until the store closed and promised to resume their protest the next day. Word of this first "sit-in" spread quickly across the college campus and throughout Greensboro. The next day, Blair, McCain, McNeill, and Richmond were joined by nearly thirty other students. By the end of the week, the numbers of protesters had swelled to 300, white students had joined the movement, and the list of stores targeted with sit-ins was rapidly expanding. And that was just the beginning.

By April 1960 nearly 80 communities across the South witnessed similar direct action campaigns, and tens of thousands of students had joined the movement. Many of the student protesters were heckled and, in some cases, brutally attacked for their participation. Hundreds

would be arrested. And yet the students, drawing inspiration from Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., and other practitioners of non-violence, remained unfailingly polite, peaceful, and persistent. They also began to target other types of public accommodations such as pools, libraries, museums, parks, and beaches. Slowly over the course of the coming months and years – and only after tedious negotiations and many false starts – white leaders began to yield to the protesters and lift the Jim Crow restrictions. A bold new phase of the civil rights movement had begun.

In the heady early months of the sit-in movement, as it came to be called, several hundred students met at Shaw University in Raleigh, North Carolina, to build on their initial successes. The conference was organized by Ella Baker, the long-time activist and executive director of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). She counseled participants to establish their own organization independent of the SCLC and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which she deemed to be too cautious and self-serving. The students, flush with confidence and ambition, followed her advice. Thus was born one of the most dynamic and important civil rights organizations in the 1960s, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, or SNCC.

As its name indicates, the group took its lead from King and SCLC in that it was committed to the principle of non-violence. Yet, at the same time, SNCC clearly signaled a new path. It was much less institutionally rigid, lacked the clear top-to-bottom hierarchy, and was more devoted to the concept of participatory democracy – as an organization and as a strategy – than most civil rights organizations already in existence.

In light of the new wave of activism in early 1960, and with presidential elections slated for the fall, civil rights figured to be an increasingly important issue in the upcoming campaign. Republicans wanted to lure African Americans back to their party, but they realized they would have to do more to win over the black electorate. In reality the Civil Rights Act of 1957 had scarcely made an impact on the ability of blacks to vote, and the first report on the national status of civil rights, issued by the Civil Rights Commission in 1959, was sharply critical of the administration. These factors prompted the administration and its congressional allies to press successfully for passage of the Civil Rights Act of

1960, which provided for further modest enhancements of federal protection for voting rights.

At their respective presidential nominating conventions, Republican Richard M. Nixon and Democrat John F. Kennedy embraced relatively strong civil rights positions. The pivotal development in the campaign, however, came when Martin Luther King was arrested in October in Atlanta on a legal technicality. He was then sentenced to four months of hard labor at one of Georgia's maximum security facilities, traditionally reserved for hardened criminals. Civil rights leaders appealed to both the Kennedy and Nixon campaigns for a response. Nixon, wary of offending Southern whites, refused to weigh in on the case. However, several top staffers in the Kennedy campaign with an interest in civil rights – most notably, Harris Wofford and Sargent Shriver – devised a plan to have Kennedy call Coretta Scott King to express sympathy and concern for her husband's welfare. When they approached Kennedy with the idea, he consented and placed the call unbeknownst to his campaign manager and brother, Robert. When Bobby, as the younger Kennedy was sometimes called, learned of the call he was furious, fearing that if word about it leaked to the public, his brother's standing with Southern whites would be jeopardized. Ironically, Bobby would soon find himself involved in the case even more directly than his brother.

At the urging of Georgia Governor Ernest Vandiver, Robert Kennedy called the judge who had sentenced King and urged him to reconsider the civil rights leader's harsh sentence. The confluence of these phone calls would give the Kennedy campaign a critical boost among black voters. The Georgia judge reversed his earlier ruling and ordered King to be released. Meanwhile King's father, a highly influential minister in Atlanta's black community, responded to John Kennedy's phone call and the subsequent release of his son by promising to deliver the black vote for Kennedy. The Kennedy campaign shrewdly spread word of the senior King's sentiments to black neighborhoods across the country. On election day, Kennedy won nearly three-quarters of the black vote nationwide, a factor that helped him secure a whisker-thin victory over Nixon.

As the new administration prepared to take charge, African Americans understandably had high expectations. The pro-civil rights positions Kennedy had taken during the campaign com-

bined with the role blacks had played in the president-elect's victory led many to conclude that they stood on the threshold of a new era in the struggle for black equality. Unfortunately, Kennedy's razor-thin margin of victory caused the administration to proceed cautiously and to table for the time being any bold initiatives – especially in an area as controversial as civil rights. Moreover, Kennedy instinctively was more interested in foreign policy matters than the struggle for black equality. Consequently, his initial civil rights program was limited to a series of modest initiatives that would largely escape public scrutiny.

Soon after taking office, for instance, Kennedy established the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, which was charged with improving the federal government's record in the hiring of blacks for civil service and to encourage private sector businesses with federal contracts to do likewise. And his brother Robert, whom Kennedy had tapped to be attorney general, pressed lawyers in his department to pursue voting rights and school desegregation cases more vigorously. Beyond such steps, however, the administration early on failed to launch the second Reconstruction anticipated by many in the black community. Even his campaign pledge to ban discrimination in federal housing “with the stroke of a pen” took nearly two years to carry out, and was very narrowly tailored. The action also was carefully timed so as not to cause any significant political damage or even to attract much attention. The reform was unveiled the day before Thanksgiving in 1962, after the midterm congressional elections and when most Americans were focused on holiday gatherings, not politics. Such procrastination, not surprisingly, contributed to a growing sense of betrayal and disillusionment among civil rights leaders. As was so often the case in the past, however, direct action by black Americans would inevitably force the government to return its focus to the incipient civil rights struggle.

For the Kennedy administration, the first major confrontation came in May 1961, after just four months in office, when CORE proposed a series of interracial “freedom rides.” Modeled on the organization's 1947 Journey of Reconciliation, activists would ride through the South on public buses to test local compliance with court-ordered desegregation of bus terminals. The riders – many of whom had participated in the sit-in movement the previous year – would commence their journey

in Washington, DC and proceed to New Orleans, arriving there in time to mark the seventh anniversary of the *Brown* decision on May 17.

During the first week of the rides there were only a few scattered incidents of harassment or violence, but when the buses entered Anniston, Alabama, on May 14, the riders were confronted by an angry mob. The lead bus was pelted with rocks and its tires were slashed. Fearing for the riders' safety, the bus left Anniston, with part of the mob following in hot pursuit in cars. The bus was forced to pull to the side of the road when its slashed tires went flat, giving the mob another chance to attack the riders. An improvised incendiary bomb was tossed into the vehicle, forcing the riders out into the hands of the seething crowd of thugs. A major bloodbath was prevented only because of the intervention of a plainclothes policeman, who had been planted on the bus in Atlanta at the insistence of Alabama Governor John Patterson. The governor was no fan of desegregation, but he also did not want an ugly incident to tarnish the reputation of his state or administration. Meanwhile, the second bus, which had also been attacked in Anniston but escaped in better shape, made its scheduled stop in Birmingham. As the riders got off the bus, they were besieged by a group of young white men, many of whom it turned out were members of the Ku Klux Klan. They pummeled the riders with impunity since the city's commissioner for public safety, Eugene "Bull" Connor, had ordered his law officers to take the day off and promised the Klansmen they would have 15 minutes to inflict a savage beating on the group.

The Kennedy administration was appalled by the violence and called for law and order. But it also put pressure on the Freedom Riders to end what the administration deemed to be an unnecessarily provocative venture. The riders not only refused to heed the administration's request; they also found fresh recruits to take the place of those who had been wounded in the violence. This forced Attorney General Robert Kennedy to demand better police protection for the riders. But the riders were again attacked by a mob in Birmingham. This time, however, John Seigenthaler, a personal representative sent by Attorney General Kennedy to monitor developments, was beaten unconscious. The Seigenthaler incident brought the viciousness of the mob close to home for the attorney general. To avoid further violence and negative publicity that would

accompany it, he cut a deal with Mississippi authorities, who agreed to guarantee safe passage of the riders through Mississippi in exchange for being allowed to arrest and imprison the riders for violating segregation laws. Some languished for weeks without any federal intervention.

The deal brokered by Kennedy incensed the riders, as it effectively validated the Jim Crow regulations. Rather than dampening the spirits of the riders, however, the actions of the administration inspired new recruits to join the cause. By the early fall, Attorney General Kennedy relented and quietly ordered the Interstate Commerce Commission to enforce more rigorously prohibitions against segregation in bus terminals and other facilities related to interstate transportation. In the end, though they had been badly bloodied and partly betrayed by the administration, the freedom riders could now claim an important victory in the struggle for black equality.

Having witnessed the successful use of the direct action campaign of the freedom riders to spur the federal government to action, Martin Luther King was drawn to Albany, Georgia to participate in the desegregation campaign that local blacks and SNCC activists had launched there in the fall of 1961. The Albany movement, as the struggle came to be known, began with high hopes, as it brought together a unique blend of local and national civil rights organizations, including SNCC, King's SCLC, and the NAACP. It also set an ambitious agenda which, if successful, would lead to a comprehensive program of desegregation in Albany that could serve as a model for other Southern communities. This inspired hundreds of ordinary blacks in the Albany area to join the cause, even at the risk of going to jail, marking a heightened commitment to the struggle for equality among the very people who stood to benefit most directly.

Yet from the start the movement was beset with in-fighting among the major civil rights organizations. And they encountered a tenacious and wily opponent in the Albany city government, which refused to enter into negotiations with the activists, shutting down the city's bus lines, parks, and playgrounds rather than desegregating them, thereby preventing blacks from claiming any clear cut political or legal victories. Undoubtedly the best exemplar of this strategy was the city's police chief, Laurie Pritchett, who steadfastly refused to allow his force to be seen using heavy handed tactics against the

demonstrators which might elicit public sympathy for the movement. As Pritchett bragged, “We . . . met non-violence with non-violence.” Unable to win any concessions from Albany’s city leaders or to generate much public sympathy for their cause, the movement simply fizzled out by the late summer of 1962, dealing the national struggle a demoralizing blow.

Soon after the Albany movement had disintegrated, the Kennedy administration was again forced to enter into the civil rights fray in the most serious crisis since the Freedom Rides. On the day President Kennedy was inaugurated, James Meredith, a 28-year-old air force veteran, sought to transfer from an all-black college in Mississippi to the University of Mississippi – better known as Ole Miss – the crown jewel of the state’s higher educational system. After more than a year of wrangling with university officials over whether he could be admitted, during which time he had successfully appealed his case to the federal appeals court, Meredith formally attempted to register in late September 1962. He was turned away by the governor of Mississippi, Ross Barnett, who had assumed control over the university.

Barnett’s actions prompted Attorney General Robert Kennedy to intervene. He pressed the governor to comply with the Supreme Court’s school desegregation rulings and to provide assurances of Meredith’s safety. Barnett gave non-committal replies, however, and for several days the situation remained deadlocked. As the administration continued to negotiate with Barnett, hundreds of pro-segregationist troublemakers descended upon the idyllic university town of Oxford. Desperate to avoid its own Little Rock crisis, the administration struggled to reach an agreement with Barnett that would allow both sides to save face. As a precaution, however, it moved hundreds of federal marshals onto the campus. Additionally, thousands of troops stationed in nearby Memphis, Tennessee were placed on stand-by in case reinforcements were needed.

On the night of September 30, after Barnett had privately given his assurances that he would allow Meredith to enter the university, he publicly helped to whip up pro-segregationist sentiments in Oxford. Eventually a riot broke out when word came that Meredith was on the campus. The federal marshals were quickly overwhelmed as a crowd estimated at 3,000 began to hurl rocks,

bricks, and bottles, set cars aflame, and then began firing guns. President Kennedy ordered the federal troops in Memphis to be rushed to the scene. This use of overwhelming force quelled the riot by the next morning, but not before two civilians died, scores suffered serious injuries, and hundreds of thousands of dollars of property was damaged. For the Kennedy administration, the Ole Miss crisis was a black mark on its civil rights record, and the deadly riot in Oxford clearly overshadowed Meredith’s admission to the university. Nevertheless the event proved to be a turning point in the Kennedy brothers’ thinking about civil rights, as they slowly came to realize more forceful leadership would be needed on the issue.

An opportunity to demonstrate lessons learned presented itself to the Kennedy administration in the spring of 1963, when King and the SCLC targeted Birmingham, Alabama for its next major direct action campaign. Still smarting from its failed initiative in Albany, the leadership of SCLC deliberately selected Birmingham because it was confident that its ardently pro-segregationist public safety commissioner, Eugene “Bull” Connor, would react much differently than had Laurie Pritchett. Using Connor as a foil, the goal was to provoke a crisis that would draw national attention to the pervasive repression and inequality in Birmingham and elicit a federal response. The campaign began in early April and, initially, Connor remained composed and ordered his police force to refrain from using violence when arresting demonstrators. King himself was soon arrested for defying an injunction against the demonstrations. While imprisoned, a group of white religious leaders took out ads in local papers and prominent national editions such as the *New York Times* that were critical of the Birmingham campaign. King used the opportunity to write a lengthy reply to his critics in which he sought to identify precisely why he was in Birmingham and the transcendent moral issues that were at stake in the local campaign as well as the broader struggle for black equality. King’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” as the epistle came to be known, was circulated nationally and is widely recognized as one of the most comprehensive, eloquent statements of the aims of the civil rights movement and of that struggle’s broader meaning in the context of American democracy.

On April 20, a week after King issued his landmark letter, he was released from jail, only to find

the desegregation campaign losing momentum. Seeking to inject new energy into the movement, SCLC's leadership made a pivotal decision: they would seek the participation of black high school students, positing that young people would be less fearful of political and economic retribution than their parents. The use of teenagers – and in some instances, their younger siblings – was highly controversial, even among supporters of the desegregation campaign. But the decision proved to be the turning point in the Birmingham struggle. Thousands of young people gleefully heeded the call of SCLC and took to the streets in what came to be called the Children's Campaign. Despite their youth, Bull Connor ordered his officers to arrest them and some 900 were sent to jail on the first day of their participation. But the next day the youth turnout was just as strong. Far from a stigma, arrest at the hands of Connor's forces became a badge of honor and the Birmingham campaign took on new life. Sensing this, Connor cracked and resorted to using fire hoses, nightsticks, and dogs on adults and children alike. Ominously, some of the most despondent blacks in the city who were not under the authority of SCLC responded in kind, hurling rocks, bricks, and bottles at the police force. By early May Birmingham appeared to be teetering on the brink of a major racial conflagration. The Kennedy administration sent its point-man on civil rights, Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall, to Birmingham to try to head off the crisis. Marshall was eventually able to work out a tenuous compromise: in exchange for calling off the demonstrations, the city's businesses would begin to desegregate and hire more black employees. While the agreement had many critics – and very nearly came unraveled as violence and rioting sporadically erupted – there was no doubt that the Birmingham campaign had proven to be a success. Indeed, it would prove to be a major milestone in the modern civil rights movement.

Events in Birmingham, however, failed to dissuade the segregationist governor of Alabama, George Wallace, from pugnaciously defending the racial status quo. Sworn in as governor in January 1963, Wallace very publicly promised to preserve segregation now and forever. In June he demonstrated his intent to do just that. When two African American students announced their intention to register at the University of Alabama, Governor Wallace promised personally to inter-

vene to prevent them from doing so. When the prospective students tried to follow through with their plans on June 11, 1963, Wallace literally stood in the doorway of the admissions office to block their entry. The governor was subsequently ordered by federal officials to stand aside, which he did. But cameramen had captured Wallace's defiant "schoolhouse-door stand" on film and the message was not lost on Alabamians and others throughout the South: Wallace would contest any attempt to modify the racial status quo.

That same day, in response to the events of Birmingham and at the University of Alabama, President Kennedy at long last made good on his campaign rhetoric on civil rights. In a nationally televised address to the nation, the president spoke of the struggle for civil rights as "a moral issue" that was "as old as the scriptures and as clear as the American Constitution." He went on to state that at the "heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and equal opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be treated." He added that African Americans could no longer be expected patiently to endure their second-class citizenship and that he would urge Congress to pass a strong civil rights bill. Kennedy's speech marked a major milestone in the civil rights movement and in the long and difficult history of race relations in America. No American president had gone before a national audience and spoken that candidly about the fundamental racial inequalities in American society or associated himself so publicly with the struggle for civil rights.

Yet even as the president was enlisting himself in the battle for civil rights, one of the movement's rising stars was gunned down by an arch segregationist. Medgar Evers, a leader in the Mississippi branch of the NAACP, was returning home from a meeting just as the country was absorbing the president's civil rights message. Waiting in ambush was Byron De La Beckwith, who shot Evers to death as he stepped out of his car. De La Beckwith was prosecuted twice for the crime in 1964, but each prosecution ended in a mistrial. It would take 30 years before justice was finally served.

The cold-blooded killing of Evers and the demonstrations that it sparked heightened pressure on President Kennedy to move quickly on his civil rights legislation. Little more than a week after his national address, the president called on

Congress to pass a comprehensive civil rights bill that would guarantee blacks equal access to voting and public accommodations, as well as providing the federal government with stronger authority to promote school desegregation and end discrimination in federally supported programs. To build support for this initiative in the following weeks, Kennedy met at the White House with delegations of representatives from all facets of American society upon whom he tried to impress the urgent need for new civil rights legislation.

The strongest pressure for action, however, came from the civil rights movement itself. A new March on Washington movement was launched, headed as before by the veteran civil rights activist A. Philip Randolph, who took advantage of the momentum for significant civil rights reform that had been building since the 1950s. Randolph organized a massive, interracial demonstration on behalf of the civil rights bill scheduled to take place on the National Mall on August 28, 1963. All of the major civil rights organizations supported the endeavor. Initially, the Kennedy administration was staunchly opposed to the march, fearing that it could trigger a wave of conservative backlash and jeopardize the already tenuous support for the administration's civil rights bill. When it became clear, however, that the administration would not be able to stop the event, they had to settle for persuading the civil rights leadership to temper some of its rhetoric. Accordingly, the march was billed more as a rally for economic justice and freedom than as a demonstration demanding a far-reaching political transformation. Speakers such as SNCC leader John Lewis were pressured to modify their remarks, which, only after the personal intercession of Randolph, they reluctantly agreed to do.

It was Martin Luther King, with his "I Have a Dream" speech, who stole the show that day, delivering what is widely regarded as one of the greatest orations in American history. As with his "Letter from Birmingham Jail," King used his speech to place the civil rights movement in the context of the long struggle for greater liberty and social justice in the United States. Speaking on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, King recalled that a century earlier President Lincoln had given hope to slaves by issuing the Emancipation Proclamation, but that a hundred years hence blacks were "still sadly crippled by the manacles of segregation and the chains of dis-

crimination," trapped in poverty and relegated to the status of "exile" in their own land. Reflecting "the marvelous new militancy of the Negro community," King warned that this was "no time to engage in the luxury of cooling off or to take the tranquilizing drug of gradualism," and that African Americans would not cease in their struggle "until justice rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream." He then concluded by sharing his dream of a transformed America that would rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident – that all men are created equal." He challenged the entire country, insisting that "if America is to be a great nation, this must become true." And when that day arrived, King promised to thunderous applause, "all of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual, 'Free at last! Free at last! Thank God Almighty, we are free at last!'" The civil rights movement had reached its pinnacle. Fittingly, the following year, King was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Three weeks after the triumphal March on Washington, the hopeful mood created by the march was abruptly punctured by the savage bombing of Birmingham's Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, which resulted in the deaths of four young black girls attending Sunday school. Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration's civil rights legislation was stalled in Congress as Southerners fought a ferocious rearguard action to preserve the racial status quo. The president would not live to see the fate of this struggle, however, as he was felled by an assassin's bullet in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963.

Kennedy's martyrdom generated a surge of goodwill, which his successor, Lyndon Johnson, seized upon to make passage of the bill his top legislative priority. Johnson was the former Senate majority leader and, prior to joining the Kennedy ticket, one of the most powerful and influential individuals in the Congress. He was also determined quickly to move out from under the shadow of Kennedy's legacy by getting a civil rights bill passed that was even stronger than the version supported by Kennedy. In the more liberal House of Representatives the bill passed by a comfortable margin as early as February 1964. The real challenge would be in the Senate, where conservative Southern Democrats and their

allies made it clear they intended to try to kill the bill with a filibuster. Johnson coaxed, cajoled, and threatened his old friends in the Senate to end the filibuster and vote on the bill. Backed by the lobbying clout of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, an umbrella organization that represented dozens of labor, civil rights, and related groups, the longest filibuster in the history of the Senate – 57 days – was finally broken. This cleared the way for an up-or-down vote on the measure which, in the end, passed by a comfortable majority.

On July 2, 1964 Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was the most sweeping and comprehensive civil rights legislation ever passed in the United States. Included among its important provisions was a ban on discrimination in most areas of public accommodations, as well as in employment and union activities. It also gave the attorney general the power to initiate school desegregation suits and authorized the government to withhold federal funds from government programs where discrimination was practiced. Voting rights protections were further strengthened. Finally, the law established two agencies: an Equal Opportunity Employment Commission to curb discriminatory hiring practices; and a Community Relations Service to help resolve civil rights disputes at the grassroots level.

Despite important advancements such as these, there were some in the black community who scoffed at what they deemed to be the token legislative and symbolic victories of the mainstream movement. No individual had become more prominent in this regard than the spokesman for the Nation of Islam, Malcolm X. Although the activities of the NOI remained largely confined to the nation's black ghettos, the charismatic and articulate Malcolm X had helped elevate the profile of the group in the late 1950s and early 1960s. His fiery rhetoric, drawing from the teachings of Elijah Muhammad, blended militant black nationalist themes with ideas of economic and political self-sufficiency, and were often interwoven with bitterly frank condemnations of the white, blue-eyed devils. He flatly rejected any idea that there could be a reconciliation of the races or that integration would lead to equality. Indeed, he openly advocated black separatism as the only basis upon which a better society for black Americans could be constructed. Malcolm's ideas, and particularly the forthright manner in

which they were delivered, resonated with the urban poor, but they were clearly at odds with Martin Luther King's emphasis on non-violence and constructing an equal society through interracial brotherhood. This sharp contrast eventually attracted the attention of the national media to Malcolm, which regarded him with a kind of morbid fascination.

The growing prominence of Malcolm X was a troubling development, not simply to whites, who tended to be shocked, if not completely put off by his pronouncements, but also to mainstream civil rights leaders, who saw him as a threat to their credibility in both the white and black communities. For whites skeptical of the civil rights movement, especially segregationists, Malcolm provided plenty of opportunities to charge that whites were the victims of reverse discrimination and that the NOI preached hate, so why should they try to reach some accord with the black community? In the black community, particularly among the black bourgeois, Malcolm X was simply the most obnoxious of the "troublemakers" who threatened to arouse white anger and jeopardize their perilous status in society. And among young black activists, Malcolm's blunt depiction of racial realities and his refusal to compromise with the white establishment was winning growing respect, even with those formally committed to King's philosophy of reconciliation and non-violence. This trend would become more obvious as racial tensions escalated in the mid-1960s. Yet, at the same time, some civil rights leaders seized on this point in their negotiations with the white establishment as a way of warning, "If you don't deal with us, here's what is waiting outside the door."

The failure of the NOI to offer a roadmap out of despair – indeed, Elijah Muhammad's outright prohibition against political activism – caused Malcolm himself to begin to chafe under his mentor's leadership, but that relationship had already grown tense as Malcolm had risen in stature. Then, in late 1963, a rift erupted between the two when several paternity suits made clear to Malcolm that Elijah Muhammad was not living up to the moral code he espoused. The split was deepened when Malcolm described the assassination of John Kennedy as a case of "the chickens coming home to roost." Malcolm meant to suggest that those who perpetuate violence – as he believed the president had done in Vietnam and elsewhere – would have violence inflicted upon them. In the midst of the

national shock over Kennedy's death, however, Elijah Muhammad used the occasion to silence Malcolm for 90 days. Muhammad justified the action by asserting that Malcolm's remarks were insensitive to a nation in mourning. But observers familiar with the leadership dynamics within the NOI indicated that the real reason was to corral the young firebrand.

For his part, Malcolm seized the opportunity to reassess his relationship with the NOI as well as to re-examine the Islamic faith, which he increasingly believed had been twisted and distorted by Elijah Muhammad. In March 1964 he formally broke with the NOI and took the first step toward creating his own independent political and religious organization when he founded the Muslim Mosque, Inc. He made a pilgrimage to Mecca, Islam's holiest sight, and there he encountered Muslims of all colors worshipping harmoniously, prompting him to reevaluate his ideas about the intrinsic nature of whites. He also proclaimed that during his travels he had come to embrace traditional orthodox Islam as his faith. Upon his return to the United States he established the Organization for Afro-American Unity through which he hoped to develop closer ties to more mainstream civil rights organizations and to encourage greater black participation in the political system. In fact, in early February 1965, just weeks before he was assassinated, Malcolm would journey to Selma, Alabama at the invitation of the SNCC to rally activists who had launched a voting rights campaign in that city.

In mid-1964, as Malcolm X was transforming himself and the United States Congress was taking its historic step toward providing greater protection for civil rights, several movement organizations were busy in Mississippi with one of the most ambitious undertakings to date. The Council of Federated Organizations (COFO), an aggregation of local and national civil rights groups, launched what came to be known as Freedom Summer. The plan was to send some 800 black and white student volunteers into Mississippi to spend the summer canvassing the state, encouraging black Mississippians to become active in the electoral process and providing them with the training to register and then cast a ballot. The leader of the project, Robert Moses, also planned to have volunteers organize the interracial Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) that would stand as an alternative

to the traditional whites-only Mississippi state Democratic Party. Finally, volunteers would also set up Freedom Schools to teach black children basic reading and math skills, as well as black history and the core ideas behind the civil rights movement. Community clinics were also established so that indigent citizens could obtain basic legal and health services.

Almost immediately the Freedom Summer volunteers ran into trouble. On June 21, 1964 three young workers – James Chaney, who was black, and Andrew Goodman and Michael Schwerner, who were white – were briefly arrested near Philadelphia, Mississippi. They were subsequently released, only to disappear later that night. Following a massive search operation their corpses were discovered buried in an earthen dam six weeks later by the FBI. The subsequent investigation implicated a group of local officials and Klansmen in a plot to kill the three young men. While seven of the men were eventually convicted of conspiracy to murder the workers, no one was given a sentence longer than six years.

The murder of the civil rights workers sparked outrage and brought national attention and sympathy to the cause, but their deaths also fostered mistrust between blacks and whites in the movement. Because two of the three victims were white, black activists grumbled that the media focused on the deaths only because whites were involved. The murders also exposed fissures between the civil rights workers and the federal government that would only grow over time. COFO wanted greater federal protection for Freedom Summer workers, but the Johnson administration backed FBI Director Hoover's adamant refusal to allow the bureau's agents to be used as a national police force to uphold civil rights. Movement members were bitterly disappointed and found this position difficult to accept in light of the recent passage of the civil rights bill.

Divisions between the administration and COFO would deepen later that summer when Democrats met in Atlantic City to nominate President Johnson as their candidate in the upcoming 1964 election. Freedom Summer volunteers had succeeded in organizing the MFDP on an integrated basis, which now insisted it should represent the state at the Democratic National Convention since it was more reflective of the racial composition of the state. In an echo of the Dixiecrat revolt of 1948, members of the

all-white state Democratic Party threatened to walk out of the convention if the MFDP delegates were seated. The situation was increasingly awkward for Johnson and the party, torn between their desire to demonstrate support for civil rights, but not wanting the nomination of Johnson to be overshadowed by a racially charged intra-party squabble. The MFDP kept the pressure on the national party, however, and with public opinion building in their favor, they traveled to Atlantic City with the intention of representing the state during the convention. As spokeswoman Fannie Lou Hamer put it, "If the Freedom Democratic Party is not seated now, I question America. Is this America? The land of the free and the home of the brave?"

Eventually a compromise was worked out whereby the all-white regular delegates would be seated so long as they pledged loyalty to the party platform – including its strong civil rights planks. Two delegates from the MFDP would also be seated but as at-large delegates, rather than as representatives of Mississippi. And finally, future conventions would disqualify delegations like Mississippi's which advocated segregation. The compromise left both sides deeply dissatisfied: MFDP delegates charged the party with sacrificing moral principles on the altar of political expediency, and most of Mississippi's white delegates refused to pledge their loyalty to the party's platform and boycotted the convention. MFDP delegates, still hoping to make their presence felt, attempted to take the seats of the white delegates who were boycotting the convention. They were aided by some sympathetic delegates already on the floor, but the insurgents were forcibly ejected from the convention hall, a cruel reminder of the segregationist practices of the South that only served to intensify the sense of betrayal and disillusionment among the MFDP members.

Despite fears that the fight over seating the MFDP delegates could cause a crippling rift in the Democratic Party, Lyndon Johnson went on to win a resounding victory in 1964, although in a portent of shifting sands of political allegiance, the conservative Republican candidate Barry Goldwater won five traditionally Democratic states in the South. Freedom Summer and the Atlantic City debacle along with persistently low black registration rates in the Southern states, however, underscored the need for further reform in the area of voting rights. President

Johnson indicated a willingness to offer new legislation in this area once passions over the 1964 legislation had dissipated.

Once more the movement would not wait for the establishment to act. Civil rights leaders announced the start of a voting rights campaign that would center on Selma, Alabama. Nearly a century after the Fifteenth Amendment had prohibited denying persons the right to vote based on race, only 3 percent of the eligible black population in Selma was registered to vote. SNCC staff members had been working on voting rights in Selma since 1963, but their efforts had produced few results. This was partly because the county sheriff, Jim Clark, was cut from the same cloth as Birmingham's Bull Connor, and Clark was determined to crush any direct action campaign intended to empower the black community. The situation seemed to have reached a stalemate when, in the fall of 1964, Martin Luther King was invited to join the campaign. King agreed and, fresh from his triumphant trip to Oslo to claim his Nobel Peace Prize, the civil rights leader settled in Selma in early 1965 to help coordinate operations. At the outset of the campaign, those blacks who attempted to register were arrested without incident, but after several days of restraint, Sheriff Clark began to lose patience and to violently suppress the prospective registrants. As the police force violence escalated and the numbers of black protesters in the jails skyrocketed, national media attention began to turn to Selma and, eventually, so did the attention of President Johnson.

The president's hand was forced when, on March 7, 1965, John Lewis and one of King's deputies, Hosea Williams, led several hundred blacks on the first leg of a planned 50-mile march to the state capital in Montgomery, where they would call on Governor George Wallace to provide protection from the state for those attempting to register to vote. The marchers had just crossed the Edmund Pettus Bridge leaving town when they were brutally driven back into retreat by state and local officers, egged on by a large crowd of cheering whites. The saving grace of what came to be known as Bloody Sunday was that television cameras had caught the whole incident on tape. When the footage was broadcast on national television that evening and over the course of the next several days, the American public was outraged by what it saw. The viciousness of the police action proved to be a transform-

ative moment for many SNCC activists, who insisted the next time they were “gonna give as good as we git.” The ugly developments prompted President Johnson to go before a joint session of Congress to urge passage of the voting rights legislation he would soon be submitting. The president told legislators that what the Selma demonstrators sought was “part of a far larger movement . . . the effort of American Negroes to secure for themselves the full blessings of American life.” Universalizing the black struggle, Johnson insisted “their cause must be our cause too. Because it is not just Negroes, but really all of us who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice.” And then, invoking the great anthem of the civil rights movement, Johnson vowed – “And we shall overcome!”

Less than a week later, in what is generally deemed to be one of the last great events of the civil rights movement, a massive, peaceful, and diverse group of marchers made their way from Selma to Montgomery. Although they failed to secure an audience with Governor Wallace, the completion of the march, after its notably inauspicious beginning, was a major symbolic victory. And though Southern conservatives in the Senate again put up a fight, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed by solid majorities in both houses of Congress in early August. The legislation provided for significant increases in federal protection and oversight of voting rights. Within a matter of years, the numbers of blacks who registered and actually voted skyrocketed, demonstrating that the voting rights legislation provided one of the most important victories of the modern civil rights movement.

SEE ALSO: African American Resistance, Jim Crow Era; Baker, Ella Josephine (1903–1986); Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; CORE (Congress of Racial Equality); Freedom Rides; Freedom Summer; King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Malcolm X (1925–1965); Parks, Rosa (1913–2005) and the Montgomery Bus Boycott; Randolph, A. Philip (1889–1979); Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC); Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)

References and Suggested Readings

Branch, T. (1989) *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954–63*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Dittmer, J. (1995) *Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Fairclough, A. (2001) *To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King Jr.* Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Payne, C. (1995) *I've Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Shull, S. A. (2000) *American Civil Rights Policy from Truman to Clinton: The Role of Presidential Leadership*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Civil rights, United States, Black Power and backlash, 1965–1978

Sven Dubie

A week after President Johnson signed into law the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Los Angeles ghetto of Watts erupted into one of the worst urban conflagrations in the history of the country. Precipitated by a series of misunderstandings related to a routine traffic violation, longstanding resentment among blacks toward the Los Angeles Police Department – and fueled by lingering resentments over the mistreatment of voting rights marchers in Selma – the Watts riots lasted nearly a week and involved thousands of blacks over a large swath of the ghetto. Thirty-four people died and nearly a thousand were injured; thousands more were arrested for violence and looting; and hundreds of individuals, mostly black, lost their homes or businesses. It took more than 14,000 national guardsmen and thousands of local police to quell the unrest. To mainstream civil rights leaders it was a disheartening setback and a painful reminder of how much work remained in the struggle for equality.

Sadly, the unrest in Watts was but a harbinger of things to come. During the ensuing three summers, nearly three hundred race riots and disturbances occurred all across America and involved tens of thousands of urban blacks. An estimated 250 blacks died in the disturbances, thousands more were injured, and combined property losses were incalculable. The violence led to permanent and bitter divisions in the civil



Two cheerleaders give the Black Power salute during the national anthem at a Yale–Dartmouth football game in 1968. This was less than a month after Tommie Smith and John Carlos raised their fists, among several symbolic gestures, during the national anthem at the 1968 Summer Olympics in Mexico City. The two had won medals and used their place in the international public spotlight to show solidarity with oppressed blacks and working-class people. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

rights movement that would leave it noticeably weakened, as advocates of non-violence squared off against the growing influence of those not willing to rule out the use of violence in response to brutal oppression.

In response to the uprisings, President Johnson established the National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders – also known as the Kerner Commission, named for its chairman, Illinois Governor Otto Kerner – to explore the causes of the unrest. In 1968 the committee reported back that the disturbances were the result of the combined effects of “poverty, unemployment, slum housing, and segregated education.” Famously, it went on to warn that despite the apparent progress of recent years, the nation was “moving toward two societies, one black, one white – separate and unequal.” By contrast, conservative critics, reflecting growing impatience with the civil rights movement, contended that irresponsible hoodlums and liberal permissiveness were behind the disturbances. These divergent views indicated the general parameters of the debate over civil rights that would develop in the coming decades. Yet as one observer of the Northern riots concluded, “urban blacks chose to protest . . . because they had no other viable strategy of change and because the struggle for black equality in the South had changed the psychology of the Northern ghetto.” Increasingly, in

the North and the South, the militancy of the late Malcolm X was being embraced by those frustrated by the slow pace of change in the racial status quo all across America.

There was perhaps no better example of this than the emergence of the Black Power movement in the mid-1960s. The Black Power phenomenon was one of the more ironic developments in the modern civil rights movement, given that it burst onto the scene just as civil rights activists had secured their most important victories with the passage of civil rights legislation in 1964 and 1965. In spite of these triumphs, however, there was, especially among the younger members of the movement in the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), growing doubt about the prospects for achieving a truly equal and integrated society. Their struggles during the 1964 voter registration campaign known as Freedom Summer, as well as the initial violence and repression of the Selma campaign, caused some to question whether whites genuinely wanted to reconcile their differences with blacks. There was also a nagging sense that, with important legislative victories largely behind them, the mainstream civil rights movement was now adrift. For these reasons many young activists were increasingly drawn to the strident black nationalism of the late Malcolm X, who seemed much more attuned to the core economic and institutional obstacles hindering further advancements in black equality. As a result, a growing number of young black activists reached the conclusion that the next phase in their struggle would require greater self-determination and self-sufficiency by the black community if genuine change was going to occur. In turn, this might necessitate abandoning one of the cardinal principles of the mainstream movement: the policy of interracial cooperation.

Among those most prominently representative of this tendency was Stokely Carmichael, who had prevailed in a 1966 leadership struggle against John Lewis to become the newly elected head of SNCC. Carmichael was determined to chart a more militant course for SNCC, including breaking with its traditions of interracial cooperation and non-violence. Soon after assuming the helm of SNCC, Carmichael had taken a lead role in creating the all-black Lowndes County Freedom Organization (LCFO), an independent political party designed, like the Mississippi

Freedom Democratic Party, to break the lock that white Democrats had on the state. As Carmichael explained at one point, “We want power, that’s all we want.” As if to underscore this growing militancy, LCFO adopted as its symbol a black panther that looked as if it was stalking its prey.

Several months later, in June 1966, during a series of demonstrations in Greenwood, Mississippi, Carmichael was attempting to rally his fellow demonstrators. He raised a clenched fist in the air and shouted, “The only way we gonna stop them white men from whippin’ us is to take over. We’ve been saying freedom for six years and we ain’t got nothin’. What we gonna start saying now is Black Power!” And then, adopting a rhythmic call-and-response mode, Carmichael asked the crowd, “What do you want?” – to which the frenzied reply was “Black Power!” Later, Carmichael would echo Malcolm X by declaring: “Power is the only thing respected in this world and we must get it at any cost.” A dynamic and – depending on one’s perspective – frightening new insurgency had been born.

Carmichael’s embrace of Black Power – underscored by his subsequent adoption of the African name Kwame Turé – and his advocacy of black separatism had its costs, however. White participation in and support for the organization plummeted, leaving SNCC in dire financial straits. Even Martin Luther King, while sympathetic to the mounting frustration of the young activists, recoiled from the harsh rhetoric of the Black Power movement and counseled Carmichael to use less provocative language. The tide had turned, however, and by 1967 SNCC was bankrupt and Carmichael left the organization. His successor, H. Rap Brown, proved to be even more controversial. Among Brown’s most famous pronouncements was his insistence that violence is as American as cherry pie and because America would not reform itself, “we’re going to burn America down.” He repeatedly urged blacks to arm themselves for the coming race war with white America. When Detroit was consumed by rioting in the summer of 1967, Brown told his audience in Cambridge, Maryland, that it was time for their city to explode. Shortly thereafter it did, and the black ghetto was devastated by fire. The next year, Brown presided over the merger of SNCC with the newly formed Black Panther Party. Although they would work jointly on projects for

the next several years, for all practical purposes, SNCC was defunct.

The Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, as the organization was formally named, had been established by the black activists Huey Newton and Bobby Seale in Oakland, California, in the fall of 1966. The stated purpose of the organization was to monitor police action and combat brutality against the city’s black community. Toward this end, they prominently displayed the guns they carried, harassed those officers they believed were mistreating blacks, and advocated sweeping social and political reforms. Such behavior inevitably brought them into conflict with local police, as well as inviting scrutiny from such federal authorities as FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who immediately launched a campaign to infiltrate the group and to sow dissent which, he hoped, would disrupt its operations. Raids on Panther offices resulted in several armed confrontations and shootouts and in 1967, as a result of one such incident, Huey Newton was sentenced to 15 years in jail.

Meanwhile, Martin Luther King was trying to adapt to the rapidly changing political environment and to infuse the mainstream movement with a new sense of purpose. Taking a cue from the Watts riots, King shifted his campaign for black equality out of the Deep South. He announced a new anti-discrimination initiative in Chicago, hoping thereby to provide a more positive and constructive way for the urban poor to address their frustrations. When he arrived in Chicago in early 1966, however, he found a black populous more disheartened and disenfranchised than that of the South. And, much to his surprise, King found whites in the North every bit as hostile to his presence, if not more so. King said of the frosty reception he received in Chicago: “I’ve been in many demonstrations all across the South, but I can say that I have never seen – even in Mississippi and Alabama – mobs as hostile and hate-filled as I’ve seen in Chicago.” After the mayor of Chicago, Richard J. Daley, made some vague pledges to fight residential segregation, King concluded his Chicago initiative. Some observers did not shy away from pointing out that the Chicago Campaign was eerily reminiscent of the failed Albany Movement.

King’s efforts in Chicago were part of a broader shift in the focus of the civil rights leader’s actions during the last years of his life. Shaken by the unrest that erupted from

the nation's cities with disconcerting regularity, King increasingly emphasized issues of basic economic and social justice. He seemed to acknowledge a fundamental reality expressed by a civil rights worker who pondered aloud what good was it that blacks could now sit at a lunch counter with whites if they could not afford the cost of a hamburger. In this regard, King was playing catch-up. Malcolm X and the Black Muslims, of course, had always acknowledged the central importance of economic issues in the struggle for black equality. And even the Johnson administration, as part of its Great Society initiative, had declared "War on Poverty" in 1965.

As part of its efforts to advance the cause of civil rights and, more specifically, to address the problem of poverty in the black community, the administration hosted a conference in June 1966 under the banner "To Fulfill These Rights" – deliberately echoing the landmark Truman era report *To Secure These Rights*. Johnson named the elder statesman of the movement, A. Philip Randolph, honorary chairman of the gathering. Randolph used the platform to unveil his "Freedom Budget for All Americans," which proposed to end poverty in the United States within ten years. The Freedom Budget called for a massive expansion of federal investments – \$18.5 billion spread over ten years – in public works as well as education and job training. Under the plan, blacks would be the primary, though not exclusive, beneficiaries because they traditionally constituted the largest proportion of economically disadvantaged Americans.

Attempts to make economic justice the central rallying cry of the civil rights movement soon faltered in the face of the seemingly intractable challenges of the urban ghettos and ballooning military expenditures for the war in Vietnam. In turn, a growing number of black leaders began to question the sincerity and depth of the federal government's commitment to the struggle for black equality now that major civil rights legislation had been passed. Skepticism and mistrust deepened in the wake of the controversy stemming from the 1965 government study on urban poverty known as the Moynihan Report. Named for its author, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the study acknowledged that white racism was an important cause of chronic poverty in the black ghettos. However, to some, the report seemed to place greater emphasis on the lack of a strong male presence in many families, provoking howls of

angry protest from the black community. Charging that the government's anti-poverty programs were "fragmentary and spasmodic," and had done little to alleviate the suffering of those most in need, King began to contemplate another massive march on Washington to dramatize the problem. The initiative would be called the Poor People's Campaign and planning for the Washington march began in late 1967.

King simultaneously became more outspoken in his criticism of America's role in the Vietnam War, provoking the wrath of the administration and even eliciting criticism from some of his fellow civil rights leaders. But with his increasing emphasis on economic and social justice, King insisted that he could not in good conscience ignore the disparate impact the war was having on young black men who, because they lacked the means to continue schooling or pursue other activities that would exempt them from service, were being drafted to fight in the bloody conflict at disproportionately higher rates than whites. And although the days of segregated units had passed, blacks still were more likely to be given the most demeaning and dangerous jobs, and less likely to receive promotions or commendations, than were their white counterparts. In a speech delivered in New York on April 4, 1967 – a year to the day before he was assassinated – King formally declared his opposition to the war in a speech sharply critical of the administration for what he claimed was its practical abandonment of the War on Poverty in exchange for the war in Vietnam. And he pointedly faulted the administration for sending young black men to fight and die to protect the rights of a nation half-way around the world, when similar rights were still contested in black communities here at home.

In retribution, President Johnson unleashed King's longtime nemesis, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who had long suspected that King was doing the bidding of the global communist movement. The FBI had closely monitored King since his rise to prominence in the mid-1950s, but surveillance was intensified in 1963, when Hoover finally persuaded Attorney General Robert Kennedy to allow the Bureau to wiretap King's phone conversations. Although the tap failed to reveal any connection between King and the communist movement, evidence of indiscretions in his private life was gathered and used as part of an effort by Hoover to discredit King.

Despite the intense controversy that surrounded him, King pressed ahead with his struggle for justice. In the spring of 1968, as part of his Poor People's Campaign, he traveled to Memphis, Tennessee, to give his support to the predominantly black sanitation workers who were striking in support of a wage increase and better working conditions. King envisioned the demonstrations in Memphis as a kind of dry run for the march on Washington, planned for that summer. It was in the midst of the Memphis initiative that the civil rights movement lost its best-known leader to an assassin's bullet on April 4, 1968. As the nation's black ghettos were again overcome by paroxysms of rage, an intense manhunt was launched to find King's killer. A prime suspect in the killing, James Earl Ray, was eventually captured in London and, after pleading guilty to the crime, was sentenced to life in prison. Shortly thereafter, however, Ray recanted and insisted he was innocent. Given the breakdown in relations between King and the government, and the FBI efforts to discredit him, some people – including members of King's family – began to wonder whether the killing might have been part of a broader conspiracy to engineer the civil rights leader's downfall.

The outpouring of emotion in the wake of King's assassination helped to push forward the last of the major civil rights bills of the 1960s. Although the Johnson administration and King had parted ways, and Johnson had by this point withdrawn from the presidential race, the president remained keenly aware of the continued importance of the black vote to the fortunes of his party. Predictably, die-hard Southern segregationists attempted to kill the legislation, but the momentum from King's martyrdom was too great to resist. A week to the day after King's death, President Johnson signed into law the third major piece of civil rights legislation passed during his presidency – the Civil Rights Act of 1968, better known as the Fair Housing Act. This law banned discrimination in all forms of housing, though it was dramatically limited in its impact because there were no federal enforcement provisions.

Significantly, the day before Martin Luther King was killed, the Supreme Court heard arguments in one of the most important school desegregation cases since its *Brown* rulings in the mid-1950s. Though nearly a decade and a half had passed since the Court ruled that segregation

in public education was unconstitutional, only a handful of school districts in the South had made much headway in desegregating. Some states, like Virginia, sought to convey the impression of compliance without actually doing so by creating "freedom-of-choice plans," allowing students to choose whether they wanted to attend a traditionally all-white or all-black school. In rural New Kent County this approach had resulted in no white students attending the black school, and only 15 percent of black students electing to attend the white school. Blacks in New Kent County challenged the freedom-of-choice program, contending that it largely perpetuated the dual school system that had existed under Jim Crow. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the plaintiffs in *Green v. School Board of New Kent County*, stating that in the face of "massive resistance," simply removing the requirement that blacks and whites attend separate schools – which was, in essence, what the freedom-of-choice plans did – was unlikely to eradicate the legacy of the dual school system. The Court's decision implicitly laid the foundations for much more proactive court-ordered desegregation plans, including the extensive cross-district busing of students.

Just three years later the Court unanimously upheld a federal district court judge's plan to promote desegregation through cross-town busing in *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education*. By so ruling, the Court opened one of the most bitterly divisive chapters in the long struggle over racial equity in education. While many Southerners, perhaps even a majority, had by this time begrudgingly come to terms with the abolition of officially sanctioned segregation, mandated desegregation was an entirely different matter.

Opposition to the use of busing as a tool to achieve desegregation was not limited to the South. Some of the most ferocious and violent opposition to busing would occur in the cradle of liberty, Boston, Massachusetts. In the fall of 1974, residents of the city's South Boston neighborhood, predominantly white and fiercely protective of their working-class Irish Catholic community, fought a busing plan that would send some of their children to the predominantly-black Roxbury community and bring black children from Roxbury into South Boston. Although the depth of opposition to busing was perhaps nowhere stronger than in Boston, the city's

residents were hardly alone in expressing their displeasure with this means of promoting desegregation. In scores of communities across the country where busing was being used to promote desegregation, whites as well as blacks were unhappy sending their children to schools far from the neighborhood in which they lived and into an environment that was frequently hostile.

As resentment grew over what many whites perceived to be judicially imposed integration, even the Supreme Court started to draw limits. With four, generally more conservative, Nixon appointees sitting on the high bench by 1974, the Court narrowly overturned, in *Milliken v. Bradley*, a district court imitative to desegregate the mostly black Detroit school system by incorporating 85 neighboring and predominantly white school districts into the plan. The Court's majority opinion asserted that the suburbs could not be held accountable for the problems of the cities. By rejecting so-called interdistrict desegregation plans the Court sharply limited the desegregation options available to the nation's large urban school districts. It also helped to intensify white flight out of these cities, as parents who could afford it moved their children beyond the reach of urban desegregation efforts. Nevertheless, court-ordered busing would remain a divisive issue into the 1990s, by which point most busing schemes had been abandoned.

The controversy over busing fueled a growing white backlash in the 1970s, as sympathy for the civil rights movement began to wane. This trend had begun in the late 1960s, in response to several summers of urban rebellions, the growing militancy among certain factions of the movement, and Martin Luther King's public criticism of the war in Vietnam. It was also stimulated by the growing stature of such figures as Alabama Governor George Wallace, who tempered his overt racism and devotion to segregation to the times, but nevertheless rode the tide of white backlash to national prominence in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He combined his thinly veiled contempt for the growing radicalism of the civil rights movement with sharp criticism of the anti-war movement and a sweeping indictment of what he and his followers asserted was an increasingly intrusive federal government. Wallace surprised his critics by gaining a significant following outside the South, and made an impressive showing in the 1968 presidential election when he captured five states –

albeit all in the Deep South. He was poised to make another strong run in 1972, but a gunman's bullet left him paralyzed from the waist down and forced him to withdraw from the race.

Still another source of white resentment was the increasing use of affirmative action to redress the legacy of past discrimination against blacks. The term was first employed as early as 1961, when President Kennedy ordered firms with federal contracts to take "affirmative action" to recruit and hire larger numbers of qualified black employees. The original idea was to ensure that such hires be strictly merit based. But as the struggle for equality radicalized over the course of the ensuing years, seeking out potential black employees sometimes evolved into a system of racial preferences and, occasionally, racial quotas which, in the eyes of some, emphasized numbers rather than merit or qualifications. In a climate of white backlash it is not surprising that this led to the charge of reverse racism. The Supreme Court waded into these tempestuous waters for the first time in the late 1970s, when it agreed to hear the case of Allan Bakke, who contended that he had been rejected by the medical school at the University of California at Davis while less qualified black candidates were admitted. In 1978 a highly fragmented Court issued an ambiguous, multi-faceted ruling in *University of California Regents v. Bakke* by affirming Bakke's claim that he was the victim of a racial quota while still upholding the legitimacy of affirmative action. As with the controversy over busing, polarized debates over affirmative action would persist for decades to come.

During the last quarter of the twentieth century the civil rights movement struggled to press ahead with its agenda but did so in an environment that presented tremendous challenges. The movement itself was splintered, and much of the energy and momentum from previous decades had dissipated. White sympathy for the movement had been substantially eclipsed by white backlash, and an increasingly conservative political environment only served to reinforce this tendency. Nevertheless, civil rights issues and the struggle for black equality would remain important, if generally less prominent, throughout this period. Indeed, echoes of many of the important developments and controversies from the 1950s and 1960s would reverberate throughout this era and on into the twenty-first century.

SEE ALSO: Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Black Panthers; Brown H. Rap (b. 1943); Carmichael Stokely/Kwame Turé (1941–1998); Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; CORE (Congress of Racial Equality); King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Malcolm X (1925–1965); Student Non-Violent (Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

References and Suggested Readings

- Branch, T. (1988) *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954–1963*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Branch, T. (1998) *Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years, 1963–1965*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Branch, T. (2006) *At Cannon's Edge: America in the King Years, 1965–1968*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Fairclough, A. (2001) *Better Day Coming: Blacks and Equality, 1890–2000*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Hall, K. L. (Ed.) (1992) *The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kluger, R. (1977) *Simple Justice*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Lawson, S. F. (1991) *Running for Freedom: Civil Rights and Black Politics in America Since 1941*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Malcolm X (1965) *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*. New York: Grove Press.
- Sitkoff, H. (1993) *The Struggle for Black Equality, 1954–1992*. Rev. ed. New York: Hill & Wang.
- Weisbrot, R. (1991) *Freedom Bound: A History of America's Civil Rights Movement*. New York: Plume.

Civil rights, United States: overview

Stephen Eric Bronner

The US civil rights movement (ca. 1954–65) was one of the most significant social and political movements in the history of the American Republic. Over the course of little more than a decade, African Americans from all walks of life, joined by a small but increasing number of whites, mounted a successful challenge to the legal edifice of segregation that had confined blacks socially, politically, and economically to second-class status for the better part of a century. They did so by invoking the foundational principles of the United States – liberty, justice, and equality – and by insisting that the country live up to its own ideals and allow Americans to enjoy

their constitutional rights and privileges without regard to race. This revolution in race relations was conducted largely along principles of non-violence, though violence would be repeatedly used against the movement's activists to try to halt their progress. For these reasons, the American civil rights movement is remembered not only for its transformative impact, but also for reflecting the vitality and constructive possibilities of American democracy.

Black Equality in Slavery and Freedom

The civil rights movement is commonly associated with the developments of the 1950s and 1960s that led to the demise of legal segregation in the United States. However, the struggle for black equality in America predates the arrival of the Pilgrims in 1620. Since the arrival of the first Africans in Virginia in early 1619, blacks have been engaged in a seemingly endless fight to free themselves from the yoke of oppression. While some blacks did succeed in gaining a measure of freedom and equality in the North as well as the South – either through manumission or purchasing their own freedom – the vast majority of the black population in the United States experienced limitations on their freedom ranging from outright slavery to flagrant discrimination and oppression.

The Civil War stands as the dramatic turning point in the black freedom struggle. While many slaves took advantage of the chaos of the war to free themselves from bondage, President Lincoln's issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863 tied the cause of Union to the eventual abolition of slavery. However, the proclamation was notably limited in its scope, as it applied only to those slaves in Confederate territories held by the Union armies and excluded slaves in the border states that remained loyal to the Union. Nevertheless, within a year following the surrender of the Confederacy in April 1865, slavery was formally abolished throughout the United States with the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, an epochal turning point for African American freedom.

During the Reconstruction Era, further provisions were made for black equality with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, which granted citizenship and equal protection of

the laws, the Fifteenth Amendment, which gave black men the right to vote, and numerous supplemental congressional statutes aimed at further securing basic political and civil rights. In the mid-1870s, however, the abandonment of Reconstruction and subsequent restoration of white-supremacist state governments throughout the South, combined with a series of rulings by the Supreme Court during the last quarter of the nineteenth century that severely limited federal provisions for black civil rights, effectively wiped out whatever gains African Americans had made in the aftermath of the Civil War.

Among the most consequential of these was the Court's 1896 ruling in *Plessy v. Ferguson*, which gave sanction to formal segregation when it declared that states were not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equality guarantees if they established separate but equal facilities for members of different races. This decision led to a flurry of state and local legislative action, primarily, though not exclusively, in the South, to segregate whites from non-whites – and especially blacks – in all forms of public accommodations, schools, hospitals, transportation, and even cemeteries. Such laws requiring segregation were popularly referred to as Jim Crow laws. For much of the next 75 years most black Americans in the South were treated as second-class citizens – and oftentimes worse. Nor was this discrimination limited to the South. Although most states and localities in the North and West did not have *de jure* segregation, the reality was that the vast majority of African Americans in these areas experienced *de facto* segregation.

Nevertheless, in the last dark decades of the nineteenth century there remained a persistent undercurrent of struggle and resistance. For instance, in 1890 a short-lived but pioneering black advocacy organization, the National Afro-American League, was established by the journalist and writer T. Thomas Fortune to promote racial solidarity and equality. Better known are the efforts of one of the leading black educators of the period, Booker T. Washington. Although he aroused considerable controversy with his perceived willingness to trade away black aspirations for social and political equality in exchange for economic opportunity, behind the scenes Washington used his prestige and influence to try to pressure Southern officials to ease Jim Crow restrictions on African Americans.

One of those who became most critical of Washington's approach was W. E. B. Du Bois, a fellow black educator, scholar, and activist at Atlanta University. Since the mid-1890s Du Bois had hosted the annual Conference on Negro Problems in Atlanta, and by the first decade of the twentieth century he stood ready to challenge Washington's leadership strategy and, in particular, his public doctrine of racial accommodation. To this end, Du Bois helped launch the Niagara Movement in 1905, with the intent of organizing a vigorous drive for black equality. This initiative paved the way for a bi-racial group of black advocates, led by Du Bois, to establish the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1909. The NAACP would emerge as one of the preeminent organizations for black equality in the twentieth century. For the first decade or so of its existence, Du Bois served as the editor of the official newsletter of the NAACP, *The Crisis*, which made Du Bois the most prominent spokesman of the black community – a position he used to press his belief that African Americans should not have to truckle before whites and that full and immediate equality was their birthright.

Activism on behalf of African Americans was by no means limited to men or native-born Americans. Well before Du Bois and his colleagues created the NAACP, Ida B. Wells-Barnett began to explore the motivations behind the widespread lynching of African Americans in the South in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Wells-Barnett collected and published her findings in *A Red Record* (1895), which demonstrated that the most commonly cited justification for a lynching – that a black man had raped a white woman – was unfounded in most cases. Rather, lynching victims were perceived to have challenged, wittingly or not, the racial status quo. Wells-Barnett went on to be a leading figure in the National Association of Colored Women, which included among its foundational aims securing political and civil rights for African American women and men.

Another prominent and influential figure from the early twentieth century was Marcus Garvey, an activist and black nationalist who came to the United States from Jamaica in 1916. Through his black nationalist/pan-Africanist organization, the United Negro Improvement Organization, Garvey attracted tens of thousands of loyal followers, with his emphasis on the common

heritage of all black people and racial pride. The popularity of Garvey was without precedent in African American history, and even at the peak of their prominence, future black leaders such as Martin Luther King and Malcolm X were unable to draw a following that was as extensive or loyal as that of Garvey. Indeed, Garvey's ability to galvanize the black masses unsettled contemporaries like Du Bois, who became a fierce critic of Garvey. Yet, however much Garvey may have been criticized, his detractors could not deny his ability to mobilize people who otherwise tended to shun political activism.

Roots of the Movement: World War II Era, 1940–1945

It was upon such foundations that the modern civil rights movement was established. The first stirrings of the movement can be traced to the eve of the United States' entry into World War II. Beginning in 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt had begun to press Congress to increase military preparedness in response to the outbreak of war in Europe. The Selective Service Act, signed by the president in September 1940, left intact the armed forces' policies of segregation, triggering vociferous protests from civil rights organizations as well as from individuals. For the remainder of the war, African Americans would struggle to persuade the government to end its sanction of segregation. Their efforts, however, were largely in vain, as the government insisted it could not run the risk of jeopardizing troop morale by tinkering with the racial status quo.

In early 1941 President Roosevelt committed the United States to being the "arsenal of democracy" and commenced a substantial program of rearmament for purposes of self-defense and to provide war matériel for those fighting against Nazi Germany. As a result, there was a significant increase in industrial production in defense-related industries for the first time since the onset of the Great Depression. However, because many of the major industrial and labor organizations continued to discriminate against African Americans, few blacks had access to these burgeoning economic opportunities. In response, the prominent black labor leader, A. Philip Randolph, head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, proposed a massive march on Washington, DC for the summer of 1941.

Loath to see protests in the nation's capital, President Roosevelt finally agreed to issue Executive Order 8802, which prohibited discriminatory hiring practices in defense-related industries government employment. The order also created a Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), which was charged with the task of investigating allegations of discrimination and advising on corrective action if necessary. However, the FEPC lacked an enforcement clause, severely limiting its ability to curb employment discrimination. Nevertheless, Roosevelt's concession was significant: it marked the first time since the end of Reconstruction that the federal government had taken substantive action on behalf of racial equality. Building on this modest success, Randolph institutionalized his planned march by creating the March on Washington movement with the aim of being able to call thousands of blacks into the streets at a moment's notice to march, picket, boycott, or rally wherever circumstances necessitated such direct action. He also set specific civil rights goals for the movement such as eliminating obstacles to voting, as well as ending segregation in schools, housing, transportation, and other areas. Randolph's actions anticipated by several decades what would emerge as some of the central objectives of the civil rights movement.

Such new stirrings of activism were eclipsed by the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor and America's entry into World War II. But these grim developments offered new opportunities to link the struggle for black equality with the international struggle in which the United States was now engaged. Just over a month after Pearl Harbor, an African American man was brutally lynched in Sikeston, Missouri. The coincidence of the Japanese attack and the lynching prompted a young black man to write a letter to the editor of the *Pittsburgh Courier*, the city's black newspaper, asking whether it made sense for African Americans to put their lives on the line for a country that refused to treat them fairly. The man went on to urge African Americans to embrace the notion of a double victory: the first standing for victory against the country's enemies abroad; and the second standing for victory against the forces of oppression here at home. The editors at the *Courier* were quick to recognize the potency of this idea and launched the Double V Campaign to promote the spread of democracy abroad and at home. The initiative

proved to be a galvanizing slogan for African Americans through the remainder of the war and inspired continued demands for reform in the postwar era.

Not surprisingly, the new spirit of determination to gain equality reflected by Randolph's movement and the Double V Campaign spread among rank-and-file African Americans, reflected by a significant increase in NAACP membership during the war years. In 1940 the organization listed some 50,000 individuals on its membership rolls; by 1945 that number had swelled to 350,000. Unfortunately, other developments during the period clearly validated the concerns that had prompted the Double V Campaign. As thousands of blacks migrated from the rural South to the industrial North in hopes of finding work, they competed with whites for jobs and housing, heightening racial tensions and leading to scores of violent clashes – the worst of which occurred in Detroit in 1943, where nearly three dozen blacks were killed.

Nevertheless, there were other tangible and intangible developments during World War II critical to the transformation of American attitudes with respect to race relations. In the 1930s and 1940s the racial conscience of America had been pricked by the ugly spectacle of Nazi persecution of German Jews. When the United States went to war against Germany in 1941, criticism of the enemy's explicitly racist ideology forced white Americans to examine their own racial attitudes – particularly when the Nazis' systematic efforts to exterminate European Jews were revealed. As they examined their own attitudes, what increasing numbers of white Americans found, particularly with respect to African Americans, were sentiments uncomfortably similar to the anti-Semitic views rampant in Central Europe.

In response, a growing number of academics and commentators in America called for a shift in racial attitudes among white Americans. One of the first and most influential manifestations of this change came in 1944, when the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal published *An American Dilemma*. Myrdal's study was the culmination of six years of work funded by the Carnegie Corporation, which hoped to use his findings to better understand the needs of the African American community and thus target its grants more effectively. Myrdal's inquiries plainly revealed the moral schizoidness of a white America that preached freedom and equality

of opportunity for all, yet practiced systematic racism and discrimination toward blacks. *An American Dilemma* also reflected academe's growing skepticism toward theories of racial superiority. In turn, Myrdal also called into question widely held notions that the socio-economic differences between whites and blacks were a function of racially determined intelligence and abilities. Rather, Myrdal placed blame squarely on the hearts and minds of white Americans as well as the racism and discrimination that permeated the country's social, economic, and political institutions. The explosive conclusions of *An American Dilemma* attracted considerable attention in both academic and popular circles, and the book was serialized in many prominent black newspapers. Given the dissemination of such ideas among elite intellectuals, policymakers, and opinion shapers, as well as among common black folk, it is not surprising that Myrdal's study is frequently credited with helping to shape a new paradigm of thought with regard to race relations in the postwar era.

Nascent Civil Rights Movement, 1946–1954

As World War II drew to a close, the federal government focused its attention on making demobilization and the reversion to a peacetime economy as smooth as possible, but it did not take specific steps to reduce racial tensions. Once again, however, events would force the hand of the federal government. In 1946 there was a fresh outbreak of hostility targeted toward African Americans. Nearly a dozen blacks were lynched, including at least three veterans, and there were numerous other acts of racial violence. In response, President Harry Truman agreed to meet with a group representing the National Emergency Committee Against Mob Violence, formed by Walter White of the NAACP, as well as former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. Truman was shocked by the accounts of the vicious attacks and soon thereafter established the President's Committee on Civil Rights, a blue ribbon commission charged with the task of preparing a report that would assess the current status of civil rights and make recommendations to better secure and protect the rights of the people of the United States.

After nearly a year of work, the Truman Committee issued its landmark report, *To Secure These*

Rights. Among other things, the report noted that widespread prejudice and discrimination in such critical fields as education, employment, voting, and housing continued to have a detrimental effect on the daily lives of black Americans. The committee, citing urgent moral, economic, and international needs, recommended concerted federal and state action to combat these problems and, perhaps most significant, explicitly called for an end to formal segregation in all aspects of American society. This marked the first time since the end of Reconstruction that an agency of the federal government had not only called for an end to segregation, but also that it had publicly issued a comprehensive and systematic program of reform designed to ensure that the individual rights of African Americans were protected.

The following year, President Truman demonstrated that the civil rights issue was not just a passing fancy for his administration. First, at the 1948 Democratic National Convention, the president supported the inclusion in the party platform of the most far reaching civil rights plank ever adopted by either of the two major parties – even though this would provoke a troubling and portentous fissure in the party when many Southern Democrats bolted from the convention to form the pro-segregationist States' Rights or "Dixiecrat" Party. Several weeks later, Truman issued an executive order despite the opposition of top military leaders, directing the armed forces to desegregate, handing African Americans a major victory that they had actively pursued for nearly a decade.

Meanwhile, the federal courts had also begun to quietly reshape the civil rights landscape in America. As far back as the 1930s and 1940s, the NAACP, and in particular its Legal Defense and Education Fund, had laid the foundations of its legal challenge to Jim Crow segregation by focusing on the inequalities that the doctrine of separate but equal produced in education. However, rather than challenging the entire practice of school segregation at once, NAACP strategists began their attack at the pinnacle of the educational system – graduate and professional schools – where the numbers of black students were much smaller and where the idea of integration was perceived to be less threatening. The NAACP won its first major victory in this initiative in 1938 when the Supreme Court, in *Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada*, ordered the

University of Missouri to admit a black applicant to its all-white law school because no equal alternative existed for the state's African American population. Ten years later the Court reaffirmed this position in the case of *Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents*, stipulating that where educational facilities were not equally available to black students as well as to whites, then blacks must be admitted to the white schools. Finally, in a pair of rulings handed down in 1950 – *Sweatt v. Painter* and *McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education* – the Supreme Court held that if a state maintained separate educational facilities for black and white students, those facilities must be equal in both tangible and intangible ways. By so ruling, the Court quashed the notion that storefront professional schools for blacks were somehow equal to the prestigious, tradition-bound, well-established schools to which whites had exclusive access.

Outside the field of education, the Supreme Court also demonstrated an increasingly solicitous attitude toward the rights of African Americans. Beginning in 1941 the Court held, in *US v. Classic*, that Congress had the authority to regulate primary as well as general elections. This cleared the way for the NAACP's challenge to the whites-only primary, a tactic states across the South had increasingly employed as a means of denying the few blacks who had managed to register any meaningful participation in the electoral process. Given that this was the era of the one-party South, a victory in the primary election all but guaranteed victory in the general election. If blacks could be kept out of the primaries, they would have no ability to determine which candidates went on to the general election, where white majorities would always outnumber the black minority.

Civil rights activists had mounted several challenges to this means of exclusion. But for many years the Supreme Court had held that the all-white primary was beyond the reach of the Court because eligibility for participation in the primary election was determined by a private rather than a public or official organization (i.e., the Democratic Party) of the respective states. However, in 1944, expanding on its *Classic* precedent, the Court affirmed the NAACP's challenge to Texas's all-white primary system in *Smith v. Allwright*. The Court held that racially exclusive primaries were not beyond the reach of the judiciary and Congress – not only because

primary elections clearly were integral to the broader electoral process, but also because the extent of state involvement in the regulation of the primaries belied the contention that these were private functions.

In a similar fashion in matters relating to public transportation and housing, the Supreme Court issued rulings in the aftermath of World War II that called into question the legitimacy of segregation. In its 1946 decision *Morgan v. Virginia*, the Court invalidated a Virginia statute that required segregation on interstate passenger carriers, upholding the position of the NAACP that such laws constituted an unlawful infringement on interstate commerce. And in 1948 in the *Restrictive Covenant Cases* the Court upheld the NAACP's challenge to restrictive covenants or deeds which barred people from ownership or occupancy of property based on race or some other arbitrary classification. Although the Court acknowledged such covenants usually took the form of private party agreements, enforcement of such agreements required state action. Thus, the Court proclaimed that while restrictive covenants were not per se unconstitutional, they were judicially unenforceable because such action would violate the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. What made this case especially significant was that the United States attorney general signed an *amicus curiae* – or friend of the court – brief, formally endorsing this facet of the NAACP's attack on segregation. This marked the first time the federal government had officially backed a position of the NAACP in the nation's highest court.

The NAACP could point to the decade of the 1940s as one where its long and arduous struggle against Jim Crow segregation was at last producing tangible results. Yet its greatest and perhaps most controversial triumph was still to come. By the early 1950s the civil rights organization had launched a group of school desegregation cases that came to be known collectively as *Brown v. Board of Education* (of Topeka, Kansas) – or simply *Brown*. In taking on the *Brown* cases the NAACP had begun what it hoped would be its culminating attack on school segregation. No longer was it content simply to force state and local governments to live up to the idea of separate but equal. The rulings of the courts going back more than a decade had clearly demonstrated that segregation in education invariably resulted in inequality. Now the

NAACP wanted to undertake a frontal assault on segregation, arguing that separate was inherently unequal and therefore unconstitutional. After considerable internal debate during the waning months of the Truman administration, the decision was made that the attorney general should file an *amicus* brief, formally committing the federal government to supporting the NAACP's challenge to segregated schools.

When the Eisenhower administration came into office, it sustained Truman's position in support of the NAACP's suit at the insistence of Attorney General Herbert Brownell. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court proceeded cautiously, well aware that it was highly unusual to consider overturning a well-established precedent, particularly in such a traditionally sensitive area as public education. The Court twice heard arguments in the case: first in late 1952 on the general merits of the case; and then again in 1953 on specific issues pertaining to segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, on May 17, 1954, the Court issued its landmark ruling declaring that "in the field of education, separate but equal has no place." However, the Court was unclear just how desegregation should proceed, and thus postponed delivery of its order with respect to dismantling the Jim Crow educational system. Finally, in May 1955, the Court issued what is often referred to as its *Brown II* decision. Deferring to the tradition of local control over educational policy, the Court refused to hand down specific guidelines on how desegregation should unfold. Instead, it simply ordered the lower courts to assume the responsibility for overseeing desegregation plans, stipulating that they should be developed at the local level with "all deliberate speed."

Together, the *Brown* decisions were clearly among the most important judicial findings in the history of the United States. In particular, the initial *Brown* ruling represented a crucial milestone for African Americans, as it dealt a frontal blow to the legitimacy of segregation. Yet the Supreme Court's rulings provoked great controversy, and not just in the South.

Not surprisingly, many white Southerners were embittered by the Court's action. Indeed, they had the explicit support of many of the region's elected officials. This was revealed most famously in 1956 when virtually all of the South's senators and congressmen signed their names to the Southern Manifesto, in which

they repudiated the Court's decisions and committed themselves to resisting any change to the educational status quo. For their part, African Americans were disheartened by the Court's apparent back-tracking in *Brown II* – plainly due in part to the vociferous protests emanating from the South. And local officials, upon whose shoulders the burden of developing desegregation plans fell, found themselves caught between their duty to comply with the decisions of the Court and fealty to their constituents, many of whom were opposed to the ruling.

In time, however, the controversy over the implications of the *Brown* decisions would spread beyond the South, particularly as the courts were forced to resort to more drastic measures to promote desegregation across the country. Indeed, a growing number of legal scholars eventually began to question the quality of the legal reasoning in both parts of the *Brown* decision as well as the efficacy of judicial action as a means of changing the racial status quo.

Aftermath of *Brown*, 1954–1960

For all of its controversy and limitations, *Brown* proved to be a critical catalyst in the struggle for black equality. For this reason, many observers identify the case as the starting point for the civil rights movement. While it would be wrong to suggest that all subsequent milestones in the civil rights movement were a result of *Brown*, many African Americans drew inspiration from the victory and were determined to do their part to contribute to the struggle for black equality. Yet, as would often prove to be the case throughout the civil rights movement, tragedy followed fast on the heels of triumph. In the late summer of 1955, just a few months after the Supreme Court concluded its handling of the *Brown* cases, an African American teenager by the name of Emmett Till was visiting relatives who lived in the heart of the Mississippi Delta. Till had grown up in Chicago and was less accustomed to the Southern custom that strictly forbade a black male from making any sort of overture to a white female. Till was alleged to have either spoken suggestively to or whistled at a white woman in a grocery store. Several days later, the woman's husband, joined by his half-brother, abducted the boy from his relative's house and brutally lynched him. The two men then tied a cotton gin fan to his corpse and threw it into

the nearby Tallahatchie River. Till's badly mutilated body surfaced after a few days.

When Till's body was returned to Chicago for burial, his mother insisted that his casket be opened for the funeral so that all could see Till's grotesquely disfigured face. Her decision to have an open casket would prove to be far more important than she could have imagined. A photographer from *Jet* magazine snapped a picture of Till and soon the horrific image was disseminated around the country and the world, demonstrating for the first time the ability of modern media to project the sheer brutality of the racial oppression in the South. Tragically, the two men charged with Till's murder were summarily acquitted by the all-white male jury. No one was ever brought to justice for the crime, although the acquitted men would later brag about the killing. Nevertheless, the Till lynching and trial sent a chilling reminder to Americans that much work remained to be done in the struggle for black equality.

Later that same year, another watershed event in the early civil rights movement transpired in the neighboring state of Alabama. On December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks, a black seamstress with a long history of challenging Jim Crow ordinances in Montgomery, Alabama, refused to give up her seat on a bus to a white man. Parks was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct. In response, Jo Ann Robinson, the head of the black Women's Political Council in the city, organized what was intended to be a one-day boycott of the city's buses. The response was so overwhelming, however, that Robinson, along with the prominent local union organizer, E. D. Nixon, began to plan for a more extensive boycott. They created the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) and drafted the young new pastor of the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church, Martin Luther King, Jr., to assume the presidency of the organization. King was initially hesitant to accept the leadership role because he was busy establishing his new ministry. Once he committed himself to the boycott, however, he quickly put his own imprint on it.

As a theology student, King had become interested in developing links between spiritual values, social justice, and reform. He had been strongly influenced by the writings of the nineteenth-century American transcendentalist, Henry David Thoreau, on civil disobedience; by one of the most important American

proponents of the social gospel movement in the early twentieth-century, Walter Rauschenbusch; and by the writings and actions of Mohandas Gandhi, leader of the non-violent Indian independence movement. King synthesized these influences in formulating his approach to the Montgomery Bus Boycott and insisted that black Montgomerians base their challenge to bus segregation laws on the principle of non-violence.

King was by no means the first civil rights activist to advocate non-violence. Leaders of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) such as Bayard Rustin and James Farmer had, in the 1940s, embraced the ideas of Gandhi in their efforts to secure racial justice. In 1947 they launched the ultimately unsuccessful Journey of Reconciliation to test state compliance with the Supreme Court's ban on segregation in interstate transportation handed down the previous year in its *Morgan* ruling. Rustin assisted King as he formulated his strategy in Montgomery, helping to ensure that non-violent civil disobedience would become King's trademark approach to social protest and a seminal part of the struggle for black equality.

After nearly a year, during which blacks maintained virtually a complete boycott of Montgomery's buses, the NAACP joined with the MIA in asking the Supreme Court to invalidate the city's bus segregation laws. The Court complied, ordering that the city's black citizens be allowed to ride the buses as equals. It marked the first time during the modern civil rights era that African Americans in the South had resorted to mass action and dealt a successful blow to segregation. In that regard, the Montgomery Bus Boycott was as psychologically transformative as the *Brown* decision.

Hoping to sustain the momentum created by the success of the Montgomery effort, King and some sixty other black ministers and activists from across the South met in Atlanta in early 1957 and formed the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), with the express purpose of using non-violent direct action to eliminate Jim Crow in all its manifestations and to advance the cause of social justice. Led by King, the SCLC would become one of the most visible and influential counterparts to the NAACP, especially in the South, where the older civil rights organization was under strenuous attack from the white establishment.

Developments such as the *Brown* decisions, the lynching of Emmett Till, and the Montgomery Bus Boycott dramatically increased the pressure on the federal government to become more proactive with regard to civil rights. Yet other factors were also forcing the government's hand by the mid-1950s. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, the obvious limits to democracy experienced by black Americans in the South were becoming a growing source of international embarrassment for the United States. This disparity was glaring as the country was engaged in a massive propaganda struggle with the Soviet Union to try to persuade the rest of the world, and especially those people growing increasingly restive under the yoke of colonialism, that the American way of life was superior to that of its communist rivals.

Closer to home, the Republican Party hoped it might be able to lure black voters back into its fold in the 1956 elections by reminding African Americans that it was Democrats – albeit, mainly those in the South – who were the staunchest opponents to any change in the racial status quo. Accordingly, in 1956, the Eisenhower administration submitted to Congress the first civil rights bill since the end of Reconstruction. The legislation proposed modest enhancements to voting rights protections, would create a federal civil rights commission empowered to investigate allegations of civil rights violations, and would expand the executive branch's oversight of civil rights enforcement by establishing a civil rights division in the Justice Department. Segregationists in Congress were aghast at the proposed legislation and, as a result, the bill languished for over a year. It was finally passed in the late summer of 1957, largely due to the efforts of Democratic Senate Majority leader Lyndon Johnson, a Texan with a long history of loyalty to the segregationist cause. However, Johnson was considering a presidential run in 1960 and felt it imperative to establish his civil rights bona fides with Northern voters, especially in the African American community. Although it would be several years before the new civil rights law had any substantive impact, the bill's passage indicated that branches of the federal government other than the judiciary were at last awakening to the civil rights revolution that was beginning to unfold around them.

Before the Eisenhower administration could relish this legislative milestone, however, it faced

what would prove to be its most serious civil rights crisis. Even as Congress was passing civil rights legislation, the city of Little Rock, Arkansas, appeared poised to erupt into a major racial conflagration over a proposal to begin the desegregation of its public schools. Little Rock was the first large school system in the South to implement a desegregation plan, which the school board had carefully drafted through the spring and summer of 1957. The proposal called for a token group of nine black students to attend the all-white Central High School during the 1957–8 academic year. Then, during each subsequent year, a similar token group would integrate successively lower grade levels. The hope of the school board was that by taking this gradualist approach, they could comply with the Supreme Court's *Brown* decision, but also give whites time to adjust to the changes.

The school board's plans went awry, however, when determined segregationists from Little Rock and its environs, backed by scores of others from out of state, convened on the city as the first day of school drew near. Arkansas's governor, Orval Faubus, then interjected himself into the situation. In plain defiance of the federal courts and usurping the authority of local officials, the governor called out the state's National Guard forces and ordered them to prevent the students from entering the school, claiming that he was doing so to preserve the peace and protect property. In turn officials in Little Rock, as well as civil rights leaders across the South, solicited support from the Eisenhower administration. However, Eisenhower was wary of getting involved based on principle, preferring to allow state and local officials to defuse the crisis. Eventually, when progress stalled, Eisenhower agreed to summon Governor Faubus for a meeting, where they struggled awkwardly to resolve the impasse.

After the federal court overseeing the desegregation plan again ordered the students to be admitted and threatened Faubus with a contempt citation, the governor appeared to yield. He indicated he would allow the integration plans to proceed and that the Arkansas National Guard would be used to facilitate rather than prevent the process. But on the day the black students were to re-enter Central High, Faubus apparently had a change of heart. He unexpectedly demobilized the National Guard, leaving the overwhelmed local police with the task of getting

the students past an enormous and angry mob and into the school. They succeeded briefly, but the imminent threat of violence prompted the administration to spirit the students out of the school after just a few hours. In the face of such defiance and potential danger, President Eisenhower reluctantly sent over a thousand federal troops into Little Rock and placed the Arkansas National Guard under federal authority. Only in this manner were the African American students able to gain entry to the school. Federal troops would be required to remain at Central High School for the rest of the year to ensure the safety of the black students. The following summer Faubus ordered all the high schools in Little Rock to be closed to avoid having to comply with desegregation orders, setting an ominous precedent that would be followed elsewhere in the South in the coming years.

Meanwhile, as individual leaders such as Martin Luther King and organizations such as the NAACP were garnering a growing number of headlines, a much more militant group had been hard at work since the mid-1930s developing an alternative vision to the integrationist approach of the mainstream movement. Taking a page from the separatist, nationalist philosophy of Marcus Garvey, the Nation of Islam (NOI) – or Black Muslims as adherents were more commonly known – led by Elijah Muhammad, had developed a small but devoted following in predominantly black neighborhoods such as New York's Harlem, Chicago's South Side, and Boston's Roxbury. The ideology of the NOI blended threads of anti-white, anti-Christian beliefs with a strict moral code that forbade the use of drugs or alcohol, and stressed the importance of education, self-reliance, and above all, racial pride and separatism. It recruited heavily in these long-neglected and largely forgotten neighborhoods where crime, substance abuse, and prostitution ran rampant, and where hope for a better life was virtually non-existent. Like Garvey, the NOI did not believe that African Americans would ever be treated fairly or seen as equals in a white majority society. Thus it pointedly disparaged the integrationist message of mainstream activists and shunned participation in the political process altogether.

In the late 1940s, while serving time in a Massachusetts penitentiary for burglary, Malcolm Little, a street hustler from Roxbury, was converted to the Nation of Islam. Malcolm X, as he

took to calling himself following his release from prison – X symbolizing his lost African name and heritage – totally committed himself to the work of the Black Muslims. He worked tirelessly to recruit new members, raise funds, and build new temples for worship. Elijah Muhammad, impressed with X's organizational and oratorical gifts, made him the chief spokesman of the NOI and, in effect, his right-hand man. By the late 1950s, though almost completely unknown outside the urban black neighborhood, Malcolm X was well on his way to becoming the most prominent Black Muslim in America – a trajectory that would ultimately put him on a collision course with Elijah Muhammad.

SEE ALSO: African American Resistance, Jim Crow Era; African American Resistance, Reconstruction Era; Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963); King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Malcolm X (1925–1965); Parks, Rosa (1913–2005) and the Montgomery Bus Boycott; Randolph, A. Philip (1889–1979); Wells, Ida B. (1862–1931) and the Anti-Lynching Campaign

References and Suggested Readings

- Beals, M. P. (1995) *Warriors Don't Cry: Searing Memoir of Battle to Integrate Little Rock*. New York: Washington Square Press.
- Branch, T. (1998) *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954–1963*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Burk, R. F. (1984) *The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Fairclough, A. (2001) *To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King Jr.* New ed. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Foner, E. (1988) *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877*. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Garrow, D. (1986) *Bearing the Cross*. New York: William Morrow.
- Klarman, M. J. (2006) *From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McPherson, J. (1982) *Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Morris, A. D. (1984) *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement*. New York: Free Press.
- Payne, C. (1997) *I've Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Tushnet, M. (1994) *Making Civil Rights Law*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Whitfield, S. (1991) *A Death in the Delta*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Clarkson, Thomas (1760–1846)

Srividhya Swaminathan

Thomas Clarkson was one of only a few men who actively participated in both British campaigns for abolition: abolition of the slave trade and abolition of slavery. Born in Cambridgeshire, Clarkson attended the grammar school where his father was headmaster and later attended St. John's College in Cambridge. Though he was a good student, Clarkson's real academic accomplishment came when he won his second Latin essay prize for his *Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species, Particularly the African* (1785). In researching this work, Clarkson studied the writing of earlier anti-slavery writers like Anthony Benezet, and he conceived a genuine horror for the practice of slavery.

After completing his studies at Cambridge, Clarkson moved to London in order to pursue the anti-slavery cause. He became involved with the circle of Quaker abolitionists who had already submitted one petition for abolition of the slave trade in 1783. He also developed a strong friendship with Granville Sharp and through him would later become involved in the Sierra Leone project. The Quaker publisher James Phillips published his translated essay in 1786 and copies were distributed throughout London to sympathetic audiences. In 1787 he made the acquaintance of a dynamic MP named William Wilberforce and enlisted his aid in bringing the idea of abolition before Parliament.

In 1788 Clarkson published *An Essay on the Impolicy of the African Slave Trade*, after which he joined Sharp and the London Quakers to form the Society for the Abolition of the African Slave Trade. In addition to contributing several essays to the cause, Clarkson used his small personal fortune to travel the British Isles (totaling 35,000 miles) and then to France in 1789 in order to gain support for the campaign against the African slave trade.

Clarkson understood the enormous visual potential of his cause, so when he was sent a diagram of a Liverpool slaver called the *Brookes*, he swiftly adapted the diagram for publication. The image of 452 Africans packed into the hold of a slaver drew a great deal of sympathy from

Britons. In 1808 he published *A History of the Rise, Progress, and Accomplishment of the British Slave-Trade*, in which he included a series of drawings depicting slave manacles and implements of torture. Clarkson was also the first to recognize, in print, the death toll of British seamen engaged in the trade – at a far greater rate than any other form of maritime trade.

After both houses of Parliament passed the bill to abolish the trade, Clarkson almost immediately turned his attention to the abolition of slavery. After a brief rest, he returned to campaigning both on behalf of universal abolition of the African slave trade and of slavery. He advocated gradual abolition in order to allow time for slaves and plantation owners to become accustomed to their new status. The anti-slavery cause received a victory regarding gradual abolition in 1833 and then another victory for immediate abolition of slavery throughout British territories in 1838. Even after abolition, Clarkson remained committed to the anti-slavery cause and continued writing to aid American abolitionists. His efforts not only memorialized the struggle to end slavery but also attested to the enormous impact a dedicated and passionate individual can have on a powerful cause.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, Britain; Anti-Slavery Movement, British, and the Black Response to Colonization; Anti-Slavery Movement, British, and the Founding of Sierra Leone; Benezet, Anthony (1713–1784); Sharp, Granville (1735–1813); Wilberforce, William (1759–1833)

References and Suggested Readings

- Griggs, E. L. (1970) *Thomas Clarkson: The Friend of Slaves*. New York: Negro Universities Press.
- Hochschild, A. (2005) *Bury the Chains: Prophets and Rebels in the Fight to Free an Empire's Slaves*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- White, E. G. (1990) *Thomas Clarkson: A Biography*. New York: St. Martin's.

Class identity and protest

Paul Le Blanc

In seeking to understand the actualities and possibilities of social protest and revolution, scholars and activists have often sought to comprehend what force would be capable of bring-

ing about fundamental social change. This is related to notions of power, exploitation, and oppression in society. Revolutions are generally seen as bringing about, through the active participation of masses of people, the overturn of established ruling groups and the creation of a new political and social order. How people actually see or identify themselves as they engage in social struggles, and the identities they seek to build on or to foster in order to bring about social change, are of central importance for the unfolding of any revolutionary process. The examination of such matters of identity is important for those wishing to understand such processes.

Among the most potent identities in modern revolutionary movements has been that of class. The term “class” has had various meanings, but the modern usage often refers to differences of wealth and power in society. While the notion of class in this sense was highlighted by social theorists of the nineteenth century, most notably by Karl Marx and his co-thinkers, its usage has been traced back to the eighteenth century. Daniel Defoe, commenting on the evolving market economy in Britain, wrote in 1705 that “the dearthness of wages forms our people into more classes than other nations can show.” Referring to similar, though more advanced, developments in 1787, James Madison wrote in *The Federalist* that moneyed and manufacturing interests “grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.”

In certain stratified pre-capitalist societies the modern notion of class may be seen as roughly equivalent to the notions of social orders or ranks or estates. As Raymond Williams has noted, however, “the essential history of the introduction of *class*, as a word which would supersede older names for social divisions, relates to the increasing consciousness that social position is made rather than merely inherited.”

Marxist Conceptions and Evolving Realities

The *Communist Manifesto* (1848), by Marx and co-author Frederick Engels, has been seen by many as the primary revolutionary text of modern times, and in it the centrality of class is unmistakable. Since the rise of the civilizations that have post-dated the extended early period of primitive tribal communism, human history

has been “a history of class struggle,” they tell us. The rise of civilization has been dependent upon the technological development and consequent increase in productivity that results in the production of a social-economic surplus which, in turn, makes it possible for the labor of one person to support himself/herself as well as one or more others. This, in turn, makes possible the rise of the social-economic inequality that is essential to the modern concept of class.

Marx and Engels assert that since the rise of civilization there have been two primary classes: (1) the exploited majorities whose labor sustains all of society, and (2) the powerful minorities whose wealth depends on the exploitation of the majority’s labor.

The traditional Marxist schema of successive stages of class society, based on European history, has seen ancient slave-based civilizations (with slaves and slave-owners) superseded by feudal society (with peasant serfs and lords), which in turn has been replaced by capitalism (with the proletariat, or working class, and the bourgeoisie, or capitalist class). Based upon his studies of non-European societies, Marx also advanced the conception of an “Asiatic mode of production.” Recent theorists, such as anthropologist Eric Wolf, suggest the more general notion of a “tributary mode of production,” which they argue can be seen as more adequately describing various socioeconomic realities between the erosion of primitive communal society and capitalism.

Marx and Engels suggested, however, that with the rise of capitalism – an incredibly dynamic system based on the powerful, relentless process of capital accumulation, unlike more static forms of previous class society – a new kind of development has taken place, one involving “simplified class antagonisms.” Commenting on earlier forms, they asserted: “In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guildmasters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.” Under capitalism, in contrast, “society is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: bourgeoisie and proletariat.”

The important 1888 footnote to the *Manifesto* by Engels explains: “By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage-

labor. By proletariat, the class of modern wage-laborers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labor-power in order to live.” It is the class struggle between the working class and the capitalist class, according to Marx and Engels, that will define the trajectory of modern society – culminating in a victory of the working-class majority, leading in turn to a revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism.

Yet in Marx’s own writings one can find greater complexity than this. In an unfinished chapter for the third volume of *Capital*, Marx wrote: “The owners of mere labor-power, the owners of capital, and the landowners, whose respective sources of income are wages, profit, and rent of land, or in other words, wage laborers, capitalists, and landowners, form the three great classes of modern society based on the capitalist mode of production.” He almost immediately added: “intermediate and transitional strata obscure the class boundaries even in this case.” The fact that Marx’s analysis here remained only an initial fragment prevents us from following his thought further. Surveying the vast body of Marx’s writings, Edward Reiss has offered the following compilation of classes under capitalism:

- The big landowners, aristocracy, nobility, can be seen as a residual class from feudalism, increasingly supplanted by the bourgeoisie.
- The bourgeoisie, owners of the factories (means of production), the transport system (means of distribution), and the big shops (means of exchange). Marx distinguishes between industrial capitalists (for example, mill owners) and finance capitalists (the “bankocracy”).
- The petty bourgeoisie: small-scale businesses, shopkeepers, etc. In times of boom, they aspire to the bourgeoisie. In recession, they shift towards the proletariat.
- The proletariat: those who have nothing to sell but their labor-power. The worker “belongs not to this or that capitalist, but to the capitalist class, and it is his business to dispose of himself, that is to find a purchaser within this capitalist class.”
- The lumpen proletariat: “the ‘dangerous class, the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society.’ This is what is now called the underclass: criminals, beggars, etc.”

Nor is this complete. Missing from the list are the majority of laborers for most of the world (including Europe) when Marx wrote – the peasantry. In the *Communist Manifesto* peasants are lumped together with other social strata destined to pass out of existence: “the lower strata of the middle class – the small trades people, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants – all these gradually sink into the proletariat.” Yet this is a category deserving greater attention.

As Teodor Shanin (himself operating within a broadly Marxist framework) has insisted, peasants must be seen “as a class, i.e., as a social entity based on a community of economic interests, shaped by conflict with other classes, expressed in typical patterns of cognition and political consciousness and capable of united political action on a national level.” From the standpoint of many social scientists, peasants cannot be equated simply with people who are engaged in agriculture (such as existed among many of the tribes of Native American peoples, or “Indians,” before they were overwhelmed by European and US conquest). Nor are they like small-scale farmers engaged in commercial agriculture, treating their land as small business enterprises producing primarily for the market in order to maximize profits (which would make them “petty bourgeois”). According to Shanin, “the peasantry consists of small agricultural producers who, with the help of simple equipment and the labor of their families, produce mainly for their own consumption and for the fulfillment of obligations of political and economic power” (whether these be feudal lords, powerful monarchies, priestly castes, absolutist states, capitalistic landowners, or merchants or banks). In social organization, culture, and mentality, they are non-capitalist. As Hal Draper has noted, the common English translation of the *Manifesto* that seems to refer pejoratively to “the idiocy of rural life” (*dem Idiotismus des Landleibein*) is better understood as “the seclusion and ignorance of rural life,” referring descriptively to the fact that “the peasant population stood outside modern civilization within a nation.”

This “awkward class” (as Shanin has labeled it) has been the majority of the world’s laborers throughout much of human history. Far from being “petty bourgeois,” it has the potential for being profoundly hostile to capitalist economic development. In fact, Marx and Engels – as

well as Russian revolutionaries associated with the Bolshevik wing of the Marxist movement, and later the Communist International, such as Lenin, Trotsky, and Bukharin – saw the peasants as essential allies of the working class in anti-capitalist struggles in countries with substantial agricultural economies. This conception of worker-peasant alliance, and of peasants as a revolutionary class, was also taken up, often with dramatic emphasis and adaptation, by revolutionaries through Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

The Working Class

The fact remains that the analytical generalization made by the young Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto* has seemingly been borne out over the past century and a half – the peasantry has increasingly given way, on the one hand, to commercial farming interests that are part of the capitalist class (with the smaller farmers being wiped out, more and more, by large-scale “agribusiness”), and on the other hand being absorbed by the working class – either being converted into an agricultural proletariat or being driven into the labor forces of urban areas. A complication in economically “underdeveloped” areas has involved the question of the extent to which ex-peasants become relatively low-pay wage-laborers in industrial/service enterprises and the extent to which they become part of an “informal economy” of part-time workers/part-time petty entrepreneurs. But the decline of the peasantry and growth of the proletariat appears to be a fact of life as capitalism has continued to develop.

In Marxist terms, the working class (or proletariat) is commonly seen as that sector of society that subsists (makes its living) by selling its labor-power (ability to work). Capitalist employers purchase this labor-power as a commodity along with other commodities (raw materials, tools) in order to produce commodities of greater value to sell at a higher price than was originally invested. The wages or salaries paid to the workers allow them to support themselves and their families. But the amount of actual labor squeezed out of the workers necessarily produces more value than the capitalist originally invested – which is the basis both for exploitation and profits. The working class is commonly seen as consisting not only of those workers who are drawn into this relationship, but also of

family members who are dependent on the worker's income, as well as workers not actually working because they are unemployed (including those suffering from long-term structural unemployment) or retired.

The importance of the working class for Marx and Engels seems to consist in a combination of factors:

1. The working class is in the process of becoming the majority class in capitalist society.
2. The working class provides the creative energy, the labor, that is essential for sustaining all of society.
3. The working class is an essential ingredient in the functioning of the capitalist system (through the exploitation of its labor, which is the source of capitalist profits), yet its role transcends the framework of capitalism.
4. Regardless of differences in the conditions of various groups of workers at various times, all workers experience the capitalist labor process as essentially exploitative, degrading, and authoritarian.
5. The relative compactness, socialization, and education of the working class has facilitated efforts to organize it as an effective force for economic, social, and political change (through protest movements, trade unions, political parties, and sometimes revolutionary struggles).
6. The negative impact of capitalism on the working class – an impact which has fluctuated but periodically intensified – creates a class-wide interest to replace capitalism with a less socially destructive, less oppressive, more humane and more democratic economic system.

The orientation implied by this class-struggle perspective of Marxism was powerfully influential in labor movements, social protests, and revolutionary struggles throughout the world, especially from the period of 1850 to 1950. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, a number of complications developed that raised questions about the Marxist orientation to the working class.

Complications, Intermediate Layers, Recomposition

Regarding the anticipated “simplification” of the class structure into a growing confrontation

between shrinking bourgeoisie and swelling proletariat predicted by the *Communist Manifesto*, radical sociologist C. Wright Mills commented, in the early 1960s, that “in the course of capitalism’s history, the class structure has not been simplified . . . into two classes. On the contrary, the opposite trend has been general – and the more ‘advanced’ the capitalism, the more complex and diversified has the stratification become.” In fact, “the wage workers in advanced capitalist countries have leveled off as a proportion of the labor force” and “the intermediary or middle classes have not dwindled away” but have been increased by “salaried professionals, managers, office workers and sales personnel” into a growing non-proletarian stratum, the upper managerial levels of which “have joined the property owners and with them constitute a corporate rich of a sort Marx did not know.”

So committed a Marxist theorist as Ralph Miliband has similarly acknowledged that a substantial segment of this “white collar” sector constitutes an “army of ‘foremen’ and ‘overseers’ of every description” that stands as a genuine “intermediate” layer “quite distinct from the bourgeoisie on the one hand and from the working class on the other.” Yet it can be argued that the central thrust of Mills’s point about a declining proletariat and rising “middle class” has not been borne out as realities continued to evolve. Instead, there seems to have been a “recomposition” rather than a dwindling of the working class. By far the larger segment of the “white collar” work force has, according to perceptive analyst Harry Braverman, been “enlarged into a mass of working-class employment, and in the process divested of all its privileges and intermediate characteristics.” As Miliband’s study of classes under modern capitalism concludes, “the vast aggregate of people in advanced capitalist societies, amounting to something like two-thirds to three-quarters of their population, . . . constitute the working class: industrial workers, clerical, distributive, and service workers, skilled and unskilled, young and old, white and black and brown, men and women.” This includes others not working for wages or salaries – non-employed partners, spouses, family members (some of these future workers), as well as sick, unemployed, and retired workers; he adds that there is also much overlap between the most destitute segments of the working class and the so-called underclass,

which also accounts for a significant percentage of the population.

Past critics of Marx (including Mills) also commented on the relative affluence of substantial working-class sectors in the advanced capitalist countries, which was a striking feature of the decades following World War II, particularly from 1950 to 1980, resulting in an obvious decline in revolutionary inclinations among workers with access to a proliferation of consumer goods.

Yet this was actually reversed with the global expansion of capital (associated with a much-heralded “globalization” and in part fueled by the collapse of communism). While global working-class occupations doubled between 1975 and 1995 to a total of 2.5 billion, the developing technologies and job mobility (in the words of sociologist Ronaldo Munck) impacted quite negatively on “the industrial workers of the old smokestack industries” in the advanced capitalist countries, yielding declining wage levels combined with sweeping neoliberal/neo-conservative cuts in social programs that had been the norm in the earlier post-World War II decades.

The situation at the dawn of the twenty-first century seemed in some ways to reinforce much of the *Communist Manifesto*’s relevance, despite the so-called “long detour” of those previous decades. “Class struggle has certainly changed its format and its modalities since the early days of capitalism but there is nothing to indicate that struggle has vacated the contemporary workplace,” Munck asserts. Some analysts of late twentieth/early twenty-first-century labor have emphasized that the negative impacts of globalization will compel active forces seeking change, within the working-class majority, to look for radical alternatives. “If a convincing, democratic version of socialism as the rule of the working class can be put forth in the context of the real struggles and organizations of the working class,” in the words of veteran analyst Kim Moody, “it has a chance to take on a material force it has lacked for decades.” He added (in 1997): “Perhaps to a greater extent than in most of the twentieth century, the opportunity for this idea and movement to spread globally is also more inherent in today’s capitalist world than at any time in the past seventy years.”

And yet the fact that the working classes of most countries throughout most of the twentieth century had, by and large, not seemed to be in

a position or even a mindset to carry out the kind of proletarian revolution projected by the *Manifesto* gave credence to other critical observations and alternative orientations.

Some social scientists have followed C. Wright Mills in considering contributions of such non-Marxist theorists of the early twentieth century as Max Weber, the century’s foremost sociologist, in exploring the problems that seem to be associated with the Marxist approach. As Lewis Coser observes, “much of Weber’s work . . . can best be understood as a continued interchange with the ideas of Karl Marx.” While agreeing that economically determined classes were essential components of modern capitalist societies, Weber also emphasized the importance of what he labeled “status groups” – or might be termed strong group identities – constituting communities that might be based on lifestyles, a sense of “honor,” social esteem, or prestige. He commented that “class distinctions are linked in the most varied ways with status distinctions,” sometimes crossing class lines, sometimes fragmenting class cohesion. Coser remarks that often status-consciousness is manifest among people “who are fearful of losing their status or who bridle at not having been accorded a status they think is their due.” He has suggested that Weber’s twofold classification of social stratification – based on concepts similar to Marx’s notion of class but also on the notion of status – “lays the groundwork for an understanding of pluralistic forms of social conflict in modern society and helps to explain . . . why Marx’s exclusively class-centered scheme failed to predict correctly the shape of things to come.”

Consciousness and Class

Interesting disputes have arisen among Marxists over the role of consciousness in defining the term “class.” In his magisterial history *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963), E. P. Thompson emphasized that “the notion of class entails the motion of historical relationship” that

happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs. The class experience is

largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born – or enter involuntarily. Class-consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms.

He added:

There is today an ever-present temptation to suppose that class is a thing. This was not Marx's meaning, in his own historical writing, yet the error vitiates much latter-day "Marxist" writing. "It," the working class, is assumed to have a real existence, which can be defined almost mathematically – so many men who stand in a certain relation to the means of production.

Thompson dismissed this as "the crude notion of class."

In his highly acclaimed *Karl Marx's Theory of History* (1978), G. A. Cohen went out of his way to challenge Thompson's comments. He insisted that the appropriate way of understanding the concept "defines class with reference to the position of its members in the economic structure, their effective rights and duties within it. A person's class is established by nothing but his objective place in the network of ownership relations, however difficult it may be to identify such places neatly." He stressed that the person's "consciousness, culture, and politics do not enter the *definition* of his class position. Indeed, these exclusions are required to protect the substantive character of the Marxian thesis that class position strongly conditions consciousness, culture, and politics."

There is, however, a strong tendency within the Marxist tradition inclining in the direction suggested by Thompson. "*A class is born in the class struggle*," argued Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek in their exposition of Marx's thought. "Only through such struggle does it develop into a social and historical force." A key aspect of Marx's conception of class involves its dual character, what might be called an objective dimension and a subjective dimension, the distinction between what he called "a class-in-itself" and "a class-for-itself." The first means the actual role a social grouping plays in the economy and in society, the second means the consciousness members of that group have regarding their common situation, their common

interests and struggles. From this standpoint, Marx scholar David McLellan has stressed that, for Marx, "a class only existed when it was conscious of itself as such, and this always implied common hostility to another social group." He quotes Marx's comments on the French peasantry in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852):

In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local inter-connection among those small-holding peasants and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond, and no political organization among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name.

One could add (as have some critics of Marxism) that in the United States working class, "in the Marxist sense," has ceased to exist because most of its prospective "members" see themselves not as "proletarian" but instead as "middle class" (neither rich nor poor, but in the middle).

In response to this, Cohen points out that Marx himself, in the very same work cited by McLellan, writes that these peasant small-holders "were the most numerous *class* of French society." He comments: "It is precisely because a class need not be conscious of itself that the phrase 'class-in-itself' was introduced." Whether or not one accepts Cohen's lucid reasoning, however, his dispute with Thompson highlights a problematical development that arose during the twentieth century.

There was, in fact, a vibrant correspondence between the perspectives of the *Communist Manifesto's* program for the working class and the actual development of the European labor movement in the late nineteenth century: engage in militant struggles for reforms, build increasingly strong trade unions, build political parties of the working class that would project a socialist future. But there were also countervailing tendencies, as Marx and Engels more than once emphasized.

Others in the Marxist tradition also gave attention to this matter. For example, V. I. Lenin in *What Is To Be Done?* and Rosa Luxemburg

in *The Mass Strike, Trade Union, and Political Party* each stressed a sharp distinction between a narrow “trade union consciousness” and a more expansive class-consciousness as two very different mindsets that could lead workers into either a reconciliation with capitalism or into a revolutionary confrontation with it, and both thinkers during World War I emphasized the negative effects of a form of consciousness that Lenin labeled “social-patriotism” that drew workers to support and even sacrifice their lives to imperialism. Lenin, referring to characterizations by Engels of elements within the late nineteenth-century British working class, advanced a general notion of “labor aristocracy” to define a layer of more privileged workers (generally more highly skilled and more highly paid) inclined to separate themselves from the masses of less fortunate workers and to make their peace with the capitalist system – which could be seen as conceptually similar to Weber’s conception of status.

Georg Lukács contributed substantially to analyses of these and similar matters in his 1923 classic *History and Class Consciousness*, an exposition of Marxism profoundly influenced by the philosopher G. W. H. Hegel, sociologists Georg Simmel and Max Weber, and especially the revolutionary theorizations of Lenin – particularly in the essays “Class Consciousness” and “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat.” The term “false consciousness” gained currency among many Marxists in discussions about how some workers are drawn to outlooks and practices – including racism and various forms of chauvinism, support for conservative or reactionary political figures, selfish materialism or self-destructive behaviors, etc. – that were inconsistent with the insights and the working-class trajectory projected by Marx.

At the same time, a far-reaching critique of Marxism found powerful articulation in the twentieth century, based on the observation – expressed, for example, by sympathetic critic C. Wright Mills – that “wage-workers in advanced capitalism . . . have not become the agency for any revolutionary change of epoch,” but rather “to a very considerable extent they have been incorporated into nationalist capitalism – economically, politically, and psychologically. So incorporated, they constitute within capitalism a dependent rather than an independent variable. The same is true of labor unions and labor parties.” He

acknowledged “basic class conflicts of interest” but insisted “there is little class struggle.” According to Mills, Marx’s analysis captured realities of capitalism as it existed in the Victorian era (1837–1901), but missed crucial developments that became manifest afterward: “We must accuse him of dying, his work unfinished, in 1883.” The thrust of this argument found expression in numerous critiques, at various times, from the 1940s through the 1990s, perhaps most dramatically expressed in André Gorz’s phrase of the 1980s: “Farewell to the Working Class.”

While radical labor analyst Sheila Cohen has similarly noted “the lack of awareness of most workers, most of the time, of their collective class interests,” she has also pointed out that the impact of capitalist exploitation as well as inevitable shifts in the dynamic capitalist economy preclude “uninterrupted acceptance of the status quo.” Time after time, workers have been pushed into struggles – by the very nature of capitalism – that have periodically resulted in the expansion of radicalized class-consciousness.

Identity

To a very large extent in the late twentieth century, however, organized labor did not appear to play the militantly class-struggle role Marxists had expected of it. Labor’s radical left wing dramatically deteriorated in many capitalist countries in the decades following 1950, with a significant radicalizing reversal in the late 1960s giving way to even more dramatic decline in the century’s final decades. This took place even as capitalist reality had increasingly negative impact on various social groups. Commenting that such shifting realities mean that “new identities arise, [and] old ones pass away (at least temporarily),” social theorist Stanley Aronowitz observed that “new social and cultural formations – of nationality, race, gender, and sexuality, among others – have provided new bases of group and individual identities.” In the late twentieth century a specialized concept of identity was developed – particularly by theorists influenced by the philosophical current known as poststructuralism – which focused on the way in which specific groups in society have been culturally identified and/or self-identified, a means for defining relationships with those around them (similarities can be found between this concept and, once again, Weber’s notion of status).

One can begin an understanding of this conception by reflecting on the fact that each of us finds that we are conscious of having many different identities that are important to defining who we are. Among the variety of such identities – some of which seem more vibrant to us than others – are (in no particular order): our place within a particular family; our gender; our race and/or ethnicity; our nationality; our age; our religious orientation; our attitude toward specific political ideas; our sexual orientation and preferences; the foods we like; our musical preferences, the clothes we choose to wear, and other cultural inclinations; our favorite hobbies and pastimes; organizations that we happen to belong to; whether we live in a city, a small town, or a rural area; our income level; our particular economic occupation and skill level within that occupation; and the *socioeconomic class* that we happen to belong to (and our attitude, if any, to what that means).

It can be argued that for most people, there is not a natural inclination to “privilege” the final, italicized identity listed in the previous paragraph. The question can be raised as to why – if the critical points made by C. Wright Mills and others are valid – one’s class identity, particularly working-class identity, should be privileged. Many have argued that if one is concerned with revolutionary protest and change, a very different identity focus is far more relevant.

In the 1960s, for example, some African American radicals critically respectful of the Marxist tradition, yet intimately aware of harsh and complex realities, argued, in the words of James Boggs, that “white workers are by the very nature of US development and history a class above all blacks,” that “the blacks are an underclass which has developed despite the fact that they have been systematically damned by the system,” and that “blacks, and particularly young blacks, are the revolutionary force inside this country, the only social force in irreversible motion.” Some insisted with Harold Cruse that “white capitalist nations, including all the different classes within these nations, from upper bourgeoisie to lower proletariat, have become, in fact, bourgeois and relative middle-class strata vis-à-vis the non-white peoples who have become, in fact, the ‘world proletarians.’” Not long after, certain feminist theorists (most dramatically, Shulamith Firestone in *The Dialectic of Sex*, seeking “to take class analysis one step further to its roots in the biological division of the sexes,”

and Zillah Eisenstein in *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism* advancing a conceptualization of women as a class) advanced somewhat similar arguments, but in this case “privileging” the female identity, with a primary focus on women’s liberation.

Yet some have questioned the value of elevating any identity to the position of being *the* primary one in the struggle for social change. In the 1980s Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe generalized and elaborated the theoretical challenge to Marxism’s emphasis on class, drawing on perspectives of French poststructuralists Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, and on a specialized reading of Italian revolutionary Marxist Antonio Gramsci. Dismissing “the ontological centrality of the working class” and “the illusory prospects of a perfectly unitary and homogenous collective that will render pointless the moment of politics,” Laclau and Mouffe instead looked to a set of social movements representing various oppressed groups in society that would involve “a plurality of antagonisms and points of rupture.” Alliances among such forces, cohering around a variety of issues, would establish a diverse but hegemonic “collective will” that could bring advances in struggles for gender and racial equality, human rights, economic justice, peace, defense of the environment, etc. The consequent enrichment of democracy would be far more real and meaningful than “the role of Revolution with a capital ‘r,’ as the founding moment in the transition from the one type of society to another.”

Some Marxists have reacted with hostility to such challenges, arguing that “independent” social struggles around black rights and women’s rights – and/or “identity politics” as such – are actually either “bourgeois” or “petty-bourgeois” diversions from the class struggle and divisive of working-class unity. There have been other responses, however, from such diverse figures as Oliver Cox, C. L. R. James, George Breitman, Manning Marable, Lise Vogel, Sheila Rowbotham, and Nancy Holmstrom – all of whom have argued that the liberation struggles of oppressed groups (such as blacks and women) are absolutely essential for social progress and for human liberation, and that independent social movements (controlled by blacks and women, respectively) are indeed needed to advance such struggles. They have also argued, however, that the majority of the people in such mass

movements (regardless of how they consciously identify themselves) happen to be part of the working class, that such struggles are objectively in the interests of the working class as a whole, and that such movements and struggles can play a “vanguard” role in helping to radicalize the working class and lead it forward in the struggle against the capitalist status quo. Yet as historians such as David Roediger have demonstrated with such conceptualizations as “whiteness,” the US working class has in fact been deeply fractured – in its consciousness, culturally and organizationally, by racism, and also by the distorted “maleness” of gender oppression.

Nonetheless, the decisive capacities attributed to the social movements by such theorists as Laclau and Mouffe have been sharply questioned by some analysts. Noting that “new social movements have made significant advances in recent decades and [that] they may reasonably hope to make more in the years to come,” Ralph Miliband emphasized in 1989 that

what they cannot reasonably expect is that societies whose main dynamic is the pursuit of private profit and whose whole mode of being is suffused by deep inequalities of every kind can be made to do away with exploitation, discrimination, violence against vulnerable sections of the population, ecological vandalism, international strife, and all the other evils which have brought new social movements into being.

Adding that “organized labor does have a greater potential strength, cohesion, and capacity to act as a transformative force than any other force in society,” Miliband concluded:

So long as organized labor and its political agencies refuse to fulfill their transformative potential, so long will the existing social order remain safe from revolutionary challenge, whatever feminists, or black people, or gays and lesbians, or environmentalists, or peace activists, or any other group may choose to do, and even though their actions may well produce advances and reforms.

Uneven and Combined Development

The shifting and multi-faceted realities of class and other identities in the dynamic global system of the past three centuries can be seen as a com-

plex manifestation of uneven and combined development, to use a phrase popularized by Leon Trotsky. There have certainly been confusions and complexities in determining the class position of some sectors. As C. Wright Mills and others have noted, although some occupations involve people who are paid for their labor-power (making them working class according to Engels’ 1888 footnote to the *Manifesto*), they play managerial roles enhancing the exploitation of labor, sometimes receive a very high level of financial compensation, and are animated by a kind of consciousness all of which seem to place them much closer to the capitalist class – causing analysts such as Erik Olin Wright to develop conceptualizations of “mixed class locations.”

In many so-called third world countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, there are sometimes even greater complexities – often within the same family, even in the same individuals, we find those who may shift back and forth between being a peasant, an agricultural laborer, an urban petty entrepreneur, a beggar, a proletarian (causing some analysts, such as Carlos Vilas, to reach for more ambiguous formulations, such as “the working masses”). As Ronaldo Munck explains, the increasing prevalence of explosive urbanization in “peripheral” or “developing” societies has created what is often referred to as an “informal economy.” He notes: “The urban informal sector (the petty-bourgeois self-employed and the informal proletariat) is seen as a subsidy to capitalist accumulation given its high levels of self-exploitation.”

Harry Braverman’s comments have relevance for such varied examples: “These difficulties arise, in the last analysis, from the fact that classes, the class structure, the social structure as a whole, are not fixed entities but rather ongoing processes, rich in change, transition, variation, and incapable of being encapsulated in formulas, no matter how analytically proper such formulas may be.” This can be said to lend some credence to the comment of Thompson that “class is a relationship, not a thing.” It also corresponds to Ira Katznelson’s warning against seeing *class formation* (corresponding to the class-for-itself notion) simply as the logical outcome of *class structure* (class-in-itself) by maintaining a focus on theoretical formulas while “avoiding a direct engagement with the actual lives of working people.” He summarizes the insights of a number of labor historians:

Working-class formation as a process is not identical from country to country (or from place to place within countries). The histories of national working classes are composed not only of workplace relationships, trade unions, or the visible leadership of workers' movements and organizations. Inherited, pre-industrial, pre-capitalist traditions count. Non-class patterns of social division also affect class formation. Class, society, and politics cannot be conflated; their relationships are contingent. Class dispositions and behaviors are not fixed by interests but shaped by relationships.

Combining insights from the disciplines of political science, sociology, economics, and history, Manning Marable, Immanuel Ness, and Joseph Wilson (in light of the fact that in the United States "people of color" had shifted from minority to near-majority status within the US working class) commented in 2006 that "the relationship between race and labor in America is a perpetually evolving condition that is changed, challenged, modernized, and ultimately revolutionized in light of leadership, historical struggles, social analysis, and not least importantly, mass consciousness and direct action." Each generation in the United States, they emphasized, had faced "epochal labor and civil rights battles," but complex combinations of racial and class differences have created various "rigidly segmented and antagonistic groupings," with a likelihood of "a continuum of progress and reaction in race relations framed around antagonistic labor and race relations." They extrapolated: "This combative tension between race and labor is imbedded in the ever-changing division of labor in the United States and extends across the entire world as race and labor issues have been internationalized, borders having been eviscerated, and global race-dependent economic relations emerge." Factoring-in additional identities of gender, ethnicity, and religion – all of obvious and central importance to world realities at the beginning of the twenty-first century – would naturally bring additional "combative tensions" into relief.

Some scholars have reached for what might be called a conceptual blending of identities relevant to protest and revolution, boldly working toward the unified conceptualization of class, race, and gender, although David Roediger suggests that "discussing the triad of race, class, and gender would be difficult enough, but that is just

the tip of the iceberg." He explains: "Once we acknowledge the class identity of, say, an African American woman worker is influenced by social relationships with, say, Chinese males (and vice versa), we see the practical difficulties associated with treating race, class and gender in what Tera Hunter brilliantly terms their 'simultaneity.'"

Yet in an insightful study of the Nicaraguan Revolution which gives sustained attention to the identities of generation, gender, race, and class, anthropologist Roger Lancaster argues:

The class dimension is privileged, if only circumstantially and politically (not analytically), and by this index: class exploitation necessarily produces an exploiting minority and an exploited majority. The same cannot be said for any other dimensions of oppression. Whether one is seeking to reform or overthrow *any* system of exploitation, the dynamics of class and class resistance remain, in Marx's sense, strategic and paramount.

Even the most penetrating observation, however, can hardly be expected to resolve such matters, given the complexities of social protest and revolutionary change.

Conclusions

"Capitalism is probably the most resilient and hegemonic system of production and distribution ever devised," radical economist Michael Yates has commented, "and its supersession by an egalitarian mode of production is going to take a long time and will involve a variety of tactics." Many will certainly ask if capitalism can in fact be replaced by another social system, although if it is not, this will be the first social system in history that proved to be permanent. Until such revolutionary change is brought about, however, it is likely that questions and debates will continue to arise regarding what social force or forces can bring about that change.

Inherent in capitalism is the fundamental class divide highlighted by Marx and others, but in this most dynamic of economic systems, additional divisions are brought into being, sometimes intensified and sometimes diminished, with the shifting balances and combinations of reality. Such "current realities" unavoidably generate ongoing debates and questions which will, undoubtedly, offer both stimulation and insights for those

who wish to study revolutionary and protest movements of the past. It may also be the case that more profound explorations of the past will offer insights into future possibilities.

SEE ALSO: Class Poverty and Revolution; Class Struggle; Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, M. & Collins, P. H. (Eds.) (1995) *Race, Age, Class and Sex: An Anthology*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Aronowitz, S. (1994) *Dead Artists, Live Theories, and Other Cultural Problems*. New York: Routledge.
- Bottomore, T. & Goode, P. (Eds.) (1983) *Readings in Marxist Sociology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Braverman, H. (1974) *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Breitman, G. & Cruse, H. (2005) Marxism and the Negro Struggle. In *Malcolm X and the Third American Revolution: The Writings of George Breitman*. Ed. A. Marcus. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books.
- Cohen, G. A. (1978) *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cohen, S. (2006) *Ramparts of Resistance: Why Workers Lost Their Power and How to Get It Back*. London: Pluto Press.
- Coser, L. (2003) *Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in Historical and Social Context*, 2nd ed. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
- Cox, O. C. (1987) *Race, Class, and the World System: The Sociology of Oliver C. Cox*. Ed. H. M. Hunter & S. Y. Abraham. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Draper, H. (1978) *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, Vol. 2: The Politics of Social Classes*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Eisenstein, Z. (Ed.) (1978) *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Eley, G. (2002) *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Firestone, S. (1970) *The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution*. New York: William Morrow.
- Fischer, E. & Marek, F. (1970) *The Essential Marx*. New York: Herder & Herder.
- Gorz, A. (1982) *Farewell to the Working Class: An Essay in Post-Industrial Socialism*. London: Pluto Press.
- Holmstrom, N. (Ed.) (2002) *The Socialist Feminist Project: A Contemporary Reader in Theory and Politics*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- James, C. L. R. (1996) *C. L. R. James on the "Negro Question"*. Ed. S. McLemee. Jackson: University of Mississippi Press.
- Katznelson, I. & Zolberg, A. R. (Eds.) (1986) *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985) *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London: Verso.
- Lancaster, R. (1992) *Life is Hard: Machismo, Danger, and the Intimacy of Power in Nicaragua*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Le Blanc, P. (1996) *From Marx to Gramsci: A Reader in Revolutionary Marxist Politics*. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books.
- Lukács, G. (1971) *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- McLellan, D. (1971) *The Thought of Karl Marx: An Introduction*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Marable, M. (1992) *The Crisis of Color and Democracy: Essays on Race, Class and Power*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
- Marable, M., Ness, I., & Wilson, J. (Eds.) (2006) *Race and Labor Matters in the New US Economy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Miliband, R. (1991) *Divided Societies: Class Struggle in Contemporary Capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mills, C. W. (1962) *The Marxists*. New York: Dell.
- Moody, K. (1997) *Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy*. London: Verso.
- Munck, R. (2002) *Globalization and Labour: The New "Great Transformation"*. London: Zed Books.
- Panitch, L. & Leys, C. (Eds.) (2002) *Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and Ethno-Nationalism: Socialist Register 2003*. London: Merlin Press.
- Reiss, E. (1997) *Marx: A Clear Guide*. London: Pluto Press.
- Robinson, C. J. (1983) *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. London: Zed Books.
- Roediger, D. (1994) *Towards the Abolition of Whiteness: Essays on Race, Politics, and Working-Class History*. London: Verso.
- Rowbotham, S. (1999) *Threads Through Time: Writings on History and Autobiography*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Shanin, T. (Ed.) (1971) *Peasants and Peasant Societies*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Thompson, E. P. (1966) *The Making of the English Working Class*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Townsend, J. (1996) *The Politics of Marxism: The Critical Debates*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
- Vilas, C. (1986) *The Sandinista Revolution: National Liberation and Social Transformation in Central America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Vogel, L. (1983) *Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Weber, M. (1958) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Ed. H. Gerth & C. W. Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Williams, R. (1983) *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, rev. ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wolf, E. (1982) *Europe and the People Without History*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wright, E. O. (1978) *Class, Crisis, and the State*. London: Verso.
- Yates, M. (2003) *Naming the System: Inequality and Work in the Global Economy*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Class, poverty, and revolution

Paul Rubinson

Any analysis that examines poverty, class, and inequality faces the challenge of dealing with numerous misconceptions about the poor and working classes. While popular culture conjures up images of tumultuous masses eager to overthrow the oppressive shackles of capitalism, any serious observer quickly finds that poor people have little access to media, so that assumptions and generalizations often speak for them. In politics, conventional wisdom often labels poor people as angry: beneath the surface of poverty churns a volatile mixture of resentment and entitlement, as the poor classes stand ready to unleash their desires through crime, violence, and even revolution. Such an image is a twisted evolution of ancient ideas, as observers since the times of ancient Greece have theorized that economic inequality leads deprived classes to rebel. Most famously in the nineteenth century, Karl Marx posited a formula for revolution, and in the process exhorted the working classes to rebel. Ever since, political leaders and ruling elites have feared the revolutionary power of the underprivileged.

To a great extent, protests and revolutions are rooted in economic factors such as class, poverty, and inequality. Many of the most famous revolutions resulted in the dramatic redistribution of wealth. Upheavals like the French and Russian revolutions drastically overturned existing class hierarchies, while eruptions like the Iranian and Cuban revolutions overthrew colonial exploitation. Even protest movements that do not reach the revolutionary stage often have economic redistribution as a goal, including most labor protests as well as the American civil

rights movement. But grievances of poverty, class, or inequality are not the sole factors behind activism. Indeed, the oppressive nature of poverty and class hierarchy most often prevents activism by the poor rather than encouraging it.

Scholars and activists alike have found that assumptions about the poor are often based on misconceptions, especially the idea that poverty leads to violence and rebellion. Certainly, poverty acts as a significant grievance, but it does not spur collective action on its own. Any social movement requires some semblance of organization and opportunity to be successful. The poor, however, usually lack the resources necessary to organize and mobilize. Furthermore, a movement's success depends upon how other groups in society treat the movement. But other groups, including the middle and upper classes as well as governments, rarely see any need to either support or appease the poor. Further encouraging the image of the poor as inherently violent is the fact that when poor people do protest, they often do resort to disruptive tactics. This tendency springs not from any inherent violent characteristics, however, but because disruptive tactics are frequently the only tactics available to the underprivileged. Of all the obstacles that discourage social movements, poverty and inequality are among the toughest to overcome. Movements based around poverty, class, and inequality have had their moments in history, but scholars today see movements organizing around different issues.

Grievance Theory

During the twentieth century, scholars began to posit theories about the motivations and mechanisms that drive collective action. Scholars first sought to explain large and small-scale collective action by focusing on the aims of protestors. Since movements ostensibly aimed to meet a political or material need through collective action, analysts formulated a theory that explained movements as the result of specific grievances. Later scholars referred to the idea that a grievance inspires a social movement as "grievance theory."

Early proponents of grievance theory include Turner and Killian, and Smelser, who independently described the connections between grievances and collective action. In his *Theory of Collective Behavior*, Smelser theorizes that movements begin when a social strain or deprivation

is combined with new knowledge that conditions should not be as they are. "The history of social movements," he writes, "abounds with agitations on the part of groups who experience a real or apparent loss of wealth, power, or prestige." Smelser also argues that the triggering mechanism is "disharmony" between what is considered normal in society and the "actual social conditions." Often, a change in social conditions makes existing norms offensive. This discrepancy, Smelser argues, creates the basis for a movement.

Scholars have long allowed for a broad definition of grievances, the most common of which include class, poverty, and inequality. Grievance theory thus allows for a straightforward, cause-and-effect analysis of grievances and protest. As an example, grievance theory might explain the bread riots during the French Revolution as the result of a drastic rise in the cost of poor people's staple food and a subsequent decline in their economic standard of living. In more recent times, grievance theory might explain the race riots in US cities during the 1960s as the eruption of the grievances of ghetto-dwelling African Americans who remained poor as white Americans experienced rising prosperity.

From Aristotle to Marx

The grievance theorists formalized an idea that can be traced deep in the roots of Western intellectual thought. As outlined by Aristotle and Karl Marx, grievance theory dominated the study of social movements until the late twentieth century.

Aristotle and Inequality

In his *Politics* the Greek philosopher Aristotle explained revolution by the political context under which it occurs. Living under a democratic government, he argued, makes revolution even more likely because, although those who live under democracy desire equality, democracies often fail to live up to their promise of equality. Aristotle bluntly stated that "In every case, then, it is inequality which causes rebellion." When a democracy's citizens fail to receive what they think is just, they rebel in the name of equality. Aristotle believed that the demand for equality included status and rights, but most often wealth: "For those who aim at equality rebel whenever they think that, although equal, they possess less than those who possess more."

Inherent in Aristotle's ideas is the notion that a people's expectations of equality – and their concurrent willingness to rise up in order to get it – emerge from the basic dilemma of democracy, specifically the promise of equality and the difficulty of achieving it. Over time, however, Aristotle's explanation became obscured. Instead, the poor have become caricatured as prone toward violence and consumed by a sense of entitlement to wealth without work, embodied by the theory of a "culture of poverty." Most scholars, however, have attempted to understand poor people's movements not as the result of an inherent psychological flaw, but, in the spirit of Aristotle, as the product of political structures.

Marx and Class

Like Aristotle, Marx recognized that a society's political context created the conditions in which revolution occurred. But instead of democracy, Marx saw capitalism as the prime mover. Capitalism, Marx argued, pitted classes against each other. Marx further explained the revolutionary and reactionary capacity of distinct socioeconomic classes, indicating that within each class, people share interests and thus contain the capacity either to join together in revolt or to thwart each others' revolutionary goals by siding with reactionary conservatism.

Marx outlined his theory of revolution in the *Communist Manifesto*, written with Frederick Engels. Looking at contemporary European history, Marx and Engels described how capitalism creates conditions ripe for revolutions. By exacerbating the exploitation of the lower classes by the higher classes, capitalism encourages classes to band together and revolt against the upper orders. In the late eighteenth century the bourgeoisie, or middle class, empowered by the economic-productive might of the Industrial Revolution and emboldened by the liberal thought of the French Revolution, began to overthrow the aristocracy and reshape society according to their own interests, "a world after its own image." "The bourgeoisie," Marx and Engels wrote, "cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society." The bourgeoisie constantly fight other classes, including the aristocracy, rival bourgeoisie, and bourgeoisie in other countries. Society, according to Marx and Engels, is essentially a "more or less veiled civil war."

Marx and Engels then explained that the working class – the proletariat – lead an oppressed, deprived life dominated by the bourgeoisie’s crippling capitalist work system. Fundamentally, they argue, capitalism deprives the proletariat of its money, labor, and independence: “Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labor, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the working man.” Marx anticipated that the proletariat would revolt to redress this grievance: “With its [the proletariat’s] birth begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie.” The proletariat follows the bourgeoisie’s example, and overthrows it – or, as the *Communist Manifesto* states more dramatically, “What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is its own grave diggers.”

Many scholars have applied the Marxist vision of class struggle to revolutions throughout history, using class grievances to explain revolts from the French Revolution to the revolutions of 1848 to workers’ movements across the world. From a Marxist perspective, social conflict is class conflict. Thus, during the French Revolution the bourgeoisie successfully captured control of the French state from the reigning aristocrats. Critical to the bourgeoisie’s success was their alliance with the working class. Emboldened by a run of economic turbulence, the rural poor and the urban poor (the *sans-culottes*) demanded change. But once installed, the bourgeoisie had no desire for further change and abandoned the working class.

The great tide of revolution in 1848 provides further evidence of the connections between class grievances and revolution. Marx’s prediction of proletarian victory seemed about to come true in 1848 when economic depressions across Europe unleashed a wave of working-class insurrections modeled on the French Revolution. As food prices rose, jobs became scarce, and a loss of income ensued. According to Eric Hobsbawm, the leading nineteenth-century Marxist historian, an economic crash collided with the “visible corrosion of the old regimes.” Revolutions of the working poor broke out across Europe in a matter of months. But in nearly every case a reactionary segment of the bourgeoisie sided with their government against the proletariat. This reaction occurred because the bourgeoisie feared true social upheaval, preferring order above all. The bourgeoisie realized it could

get what it wanted without revolution, simply by making some minor concessions to the lower orders (universal suffrage, for example). Instead of completing a revolution, the proletariat was assimilated into the existing political structure.

Nevertheless, the revolts of 1848 left a lasting mark on how people view the lower classes. The continued presence of communists in European politics after 1848 kept the fear of the revolutionary proletariat alive, a fear that manifested itself after the Russian Revolution in 1917, when Vladimir Lenin dedicated the Soviet Union to communist principles. The new nation vowed to support and incite worker revolutions worldwide and, when China (1949) and Cuba (1959) also underwent communist revolutions, western politicians’ nightmares about uprisings of deprived people appeared to be coming true. Of course, the transformation of class from a grievance into an ideology suggests the inability of class to spur revolution on its own. Lenin’s support of a “vanguard” group to ignite the proletariat’s revolutionary power makes further evident the impotence of class as a primal force behind collective action. Decades of rivalry between capitalist and communist nations during the Cold War, however, kept alive western fears of class warfare and insurrection.

Scholars Confront Grievance Theory

Thus one can see the development of the idea that poor people stand poised to take to the streets at a moment’s notice for economic equality. But despite the usefulness of grievance theory, scholars of the late twentieth century began to question the theory’s basic assumptions. Fundamental to the critique of grievance theory is the fact that mobilization is inherently – often prohibitively – difficult. Furthermore, while grievances exist in infinite numbers, insurrections occur relatively rarely.

The poor, overall, are generally not aggressive. Tilly describes how a group’s socioeconomic status dictates whether its mobilization is defensive or offensive in nature. Common sense, Tilly writes, dictates that the rich mobilize defensively to protect their wealth, while poor people mobilize offensively for what they lack. But, Tilly argues, “Common sense is wrong.” Instead, the wealthy classes mobilize to seize new opportunities while the poor cannot afford to. Simply

put, mobilization comes with costs – primarily money and time. While the rich can mobilize and still maintain their standard of living, poor people must meet their needs first; only then can they mobilize. Most often, the struggle to meet daily needs overwhelms any impetus at rebellion or organization.

Tilly goes on to explain that wealthy activists can rely on other groups, such as the government, for support. The poor, however, go it alone, as few groups have any incentive to aid the poor. The poor mobilize only as a last resort, if their meager interests are threatened. But once mobilized, Tilly adds, the poor seek new claims and rights. At the same time, when poor people have more resources than normal, they find mobilization easier – for example, labor strikes are more frequent when wages are high because workers have more resources. The rich, in turn, have been known to mobilize defensively when workers mobilize for economic redistribution.

Plenty of grievance-based movements inspired by class interests have overcome the inherent difficulties of mobilization, from the Paris Commune to countless labor strikes. But if class warfare is constant, as Marx states, one would – following grievance theory – expect protest and revolution to be constant as well. In fact, protest and revolution occur relatively rarely. Likewise, poverty and inequality have persisted across the globe – the gap between the rich and poor widens every day. Were grievance theory true, revolution would rise along with the rate of inequality. But revolt does not occur so consistently. According to Buechler, the most severe grievances are placed on the least powerful people. Rather than seeing grievances as a spur to activism, scholars have recognized that, far from empowering the poor, grievances restrict and oppress those who suffer from them.

In the late 1970s scholars began to critique grievance theory. Starting with the observation that grievances persist, but protest and revolution are rare, scholars decided that grievances are necessary, but not sufficient, to spur collective action. Grievances, scholars found, are rarely concrete: they can be real, imagined, manipulated, coopted, and transformed. Furthermore, grievance theory focused more on the psychology of the individual protestor rather than the social context in which activism occurred. Social movement scholars thus shifted their focus away from grievances and toward mechanisms.

In *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*, McAdam tore down the “Classical Model” of social movements, of which grievance theory was a part. McAdam initially summarizes grievance theory as the idea that structural strain leads to a disruptive psychological state which results in an individual or group engaging in collective behavior. The more severe the strain, according to grievance theory, the more likely it is to lead to a movement. Under this paradigm, strain includes large-scale events like social change, industrialization, and economic upheaval. McAdam next identifies three problems with grievance theory. First, grievance theory makes movements seem as inevitable as “the process by which water boils.” Second, grievance theorists’ concern with the psychological effect of strain on individuals inadvertently portrays activists as disgruntled outcasts. Third, if psychological strain spurs activism, then collective action essentially acts as “therapy” for the activists by relieving their dissonant psychological strain. But, McAdam counters, social movements are political actions, not psychological ones. Grievance theory’s incorrect prediction that societal strain would lead to collective action could be explained by an overemphasis on “factors endemic to the aggrieved population.” McAdam observes that a movement is as much about opponents, allies, and bystanders as it is about the personal motivations of the activists. Finally, McAdam points out that most activists are overwhelmingly “better integrated into their communities than non-participants,” refuting the grievance theory portrait of disgruntled, marginal activists.

McCarthy and Zald also criticize grievance theory’s reliance on social psychology. They argue further that grievances fail to explain how vastly different groups of people come to find common cause when engaging in collective action. Grievance theory, they claim, ignores the viewpoints of actual activists, who emphasize mobilization, tactics, and the structure of society more than specific grievances such as class, poverty, and inequality. Evidence does not support Smelser and Turner and Killian’s arguments that shared grievances and beliefs are preconditions for social movements. Instead, society’s political processes, rather than individual psychological behavior, help social movements happen. After McCarthy and Zald’s critique of grievance theory, social movement scholars

began to focus on “resource mobilization” – the concrete processes in which social movement organizations interact with politics. While it takes collective action more seriously, this focus on mobilization and tactics only reinforces the inherent difficulty faced by movements aimed at redressing the ills of class, poverty, and inequality.

The Poor and Collective Action

When it comes to collective action, the poor have the heaviest grievances, but also face the most imposing barriers. Even so, history contains numerous examples of poor people mobilizing for their own interests. Thus scholars have attempted to understand restraints on social movements by looking at the ways in which the disadvantaged overcome these obstacles. The study of the poor has illuminated their plight as well as advanced knowledge about social movements in general. Scholars have focused on both obstacles to poor people’s protest as well as the instances in which protest succeeds.

Obstacles to Collective Action

A comparison of superficially disparate groups – Iranian migrants and African Americans – reveals the common problems endemic to poor people that inhibit collective action. In both cases each group has numerous grievances, but the prevailing sociopolitical structure inhibits protest.

In the late 1970s the Iranian people began to revolt against the ruling Shah, widely viewed as a puppet of western interests. The Shah was eventually replaced by the Ayatollah Khomeini. Kazemi studied the migrant poor in Iran within this revolutionary environment, an environment one would expect to facilitate collective action by the poor. Before the revolution, migrants from the rural countryside began to migrate to urban areas, finding themselves marginalized as a poor labor force. Rather than acting as a radical force, Kazemi found that the poor generally displayed little involvement in or awareness of politics. Although voluntary organizations and political parties served as sources of politicization in Iran at the time, none of these institutions found the poor a compelling constituency. The poor also lacked access to other traditional sources of politicization, including schools, jobs, and mass media.

Some exceptions existed. Although poor, the male children of the migrant poor generally

exhibited greater politicization and a tendency to engage in protest. Second generation male children, unlike second generation females, had access to schools and were encouraged to experience city life. When politicization did occur among the poor, they generally made modest, apolitical claims about issues such as housing, healthcare, street conditions, and transportation.

Kazemi’s study found that the Iranian bureaucracy never exhibited any responsiveness to or concern for the poor’s demands. Rather than turn frustration into protest, the migrant poor merely withdrew their demands, as they had not been socialized to see protest as useful. Although grievances were high, none of the resources needed for mobilization existed. Without politicization, the poor did not see the government as responsible for alleviating poverty. Instead, the poor blamed themselves for their plight. Lacking leaders and organizations, fearful of government reprisal, and busy trying to make ends meet, the poor remained outside of the protest sector. A poor Iranian squatter, witness to demonstrations against the Shah in 1979, put it succinctly: in order to participate, he said, “you have to have a full stomach.”

Swept up in their own internal migration, begun after the Civil War and boosted by incessant urbanization, millions of African Americans moved from rural to urban areas. But even as late as the 1960s, African Americans remained poor and disfranchised, outside of mainstream society.

Piven explains how the sociopolitical structure stifles activism among poor African Americans. Many scholars assume political influence is available to rich and poor alike, through polls, negotiation, and lobbying. With the promise of “one-person, one-vote,” citizens share equal influence. But, Piven asserts, office holders are subject to influence *besides* the vote, influence that tends to distribute political influence in the same ways that resources are distributed in society. Those without resources thus lack political influence as well; those without power begin to act powerless. Apathy, in Piven’s words, is “motivated inaction,” and after decades of oppression, “People who know they cannot win do not often try.” Traditional methods of collective action therefore do not apply to the poor. Social movement organizations can exert political influence, but poor people do not have the resources necessary to run organizations. And even if they did, an organization’s interests

do not coincide with the poor's. Because they lack jobs, the unemployed have no arena in which to create solidarity. Finally, the middle and upper classes tend to see the poor's interests as divisive or socialist in nature (for example, the so-called Robin Hood school funding programs, named in reference to the legendary figure who stole from the rich to give to the poor). These factors, Piven concludes, have oppressed African Americans and socialized them to see politics and collective action as futile.

Reasons Behind Collective Action

The same studies of Iran's migrant poor and African Americans also illuminate ways in which obstacles to activism can be overcome. Scholars have applied these findings to the study of social movements in general.

As Tilly notes, when the poor find their modest status threatened, they react. In her study, Kazemi found that poor migrants in Iran transformed themselves after becoming the victims of state-sponsored violence, including resettlement or the eradication of settlements. Such experiences made the poor bitter but also politicized them, encouraging them to mobilize against the Shah's government. Meanwhile, various organizations and leaders began to reach out to the poor, including Khomeini, who "linked pauperization of the masses to the wastefulness and corruption of the Shah's monarchy." A cognizance of the government's role in poverty as well as courting by other activists politicized the masses.

In the United States, observers often complain that poor people's activism consists of disruptive tactics – at best civil disobedience, and at worst riots. But, as Piven points out, disruption is their only option at influence. Rather than deny any connection between the poor and violence, scholars have recognized disruption as a legitimate tactic born of necessity and circumstance rather than any inherent tendency within the psyche of the poor.

With *Poor People's Movements* Piven and Cloward composed the most influential study of poor people's activism. Their main argument is that poor movements work when they are spontaneous and disruptive – grassroots manifestations of connected individuals with common purpose – and fail when bureaucratic organizations insinuate themselves into the movement. Piven and Cloward's work flew in the face of established wisdom about social movements, which argued

that mass-member, bureaucratic social movement organizations were essential for effective mobilization (as rooted in Marxist ideas of organization). In theory, the formal organization of an aggrieved population would result in sustained membership and participation, providing disciplined action and resources necessary for success. Piven and Cloward argue that this model has not worked. Organizations, they posit, do not create a movement – rather, they stifle it. When a movement is poised to do something big, they explain, organizations are overly concerned with sustaining *themselves*, rather than the movement (for example, unions collecting dues during a labor strike). "Organizations endure, in short," they write, "by abandoning their oppositional politics."

Piven and Cloward present an in-depth explanation of how poor protest movements successfully arise. Foremost, they state, a movement needs an opportunity in which to arise. In the United States (as in Iran), in the absence of politicization, the poor largely believe that they deserve their plight. Poor protests only occur when the larger society experiences a "major social dislocation," such as an economic upheaval. Because upheaval is rare, protest by the poor is rare. During a dislocation, however, opportunity arises because of concurrent political realignments. For a movement to arise, people must seize the opportunity, and successful mobilization then occurs in three steps: (1) the prevailing system loses legitimacy, (2) people assert their rights, and (3) people believe in their own agency.

Piven and Cloward devote much attention to the disruptive nature of poor protest. The poor do not haphazardly resort to violence because of the danger involved (though protests involving the poor often *turn* violent). Instead, societal institutions shape people and their manner of protest. People stage protests in settings where they can act collectively; jobs where people work collectively (in factories, for example) encourage solidarity. Institutional roles (such as "worker") determine a preferred form of defiance (such as strikes). The unemployed, however, cannot strike since they have no jobs; disfranchised and voiceless, the only way of drawing attention to their cause might be to riot. More conventional methods of collective action aim at halting the ordinary functions of an institution critical to the larger society – for example, a custodial strike or an economic boycott. But the success of disruption depends on others needing the

commodity that disruption withholds. That is, if janitors strike, the toilets overflow, or if customers boycott, a business folds. Since the poor and unemployed rarely have anything anybody wants, such as labor or money, they must turn to disruption.

Although disruption can turn public opinion against a movement, it has its benefits as a tactic. Piven and Cloward note that politicians face particular vulnerability when protest occurs during societal disruptions, since upheaval often results in political realignment. Elites thus find it hard to ignore protest when their constituents' identity is uncertain. Rather than risk alienating a potential constituency, elites sometimes agree to make concessions with protest groups.

Piven and Cloward qualify this by adding that any victories achieved by the poor rarely last for long. Elites often try to coopt the movement by channeling their protest into more legitimate actions (such as when the Johnson administration encouraged activists to take jobs in Great Society programs). The state also creates programs that appear to answer the moral claims of the movement, but really undermine support for the movement, such as the radical pension plan proposed in the 1930s by the Townsend movement, as compared to the moderate reform of the eventual Social Security Act. Furthermore, Piven and Cloward argue, a movement can assist in its own demise. Political concessions mute a movement by transforming protestors into political actors. Furthermore, government response changes the political climate that had allowed protests. If government has responded, however imperfectly, to a movement's demands, once-sympathetic observers may grow weary of protest, making defiance less acceptable. Finally, concessions won are often withdrawn – for example, black suffrage after Reconstruction – though they often remain if deemed compatible with elites' interests. These outcomes, Piven and Cloward argue, become more likely when organizations take over and blunt the effects of disruption. Thus, poor protestors only win what circumstances have deemed it possible to win.

The study of poor people's movements transformed the study of social movements in general. Piven and Cloward's three perceptual shifts necessary to make someone engage in activism (1) question legitimacy of social arrangements, (2) believe that change is possible, and (3) believe that personal activism will make a difference –

have been applied to movements in general, not just poor people's movements. The emphasis on the role of changing beliefs then gave rise to "frame alignment" theory, removing grievances even further from the spotlight.

Changes in Social Movements

As the wave of worldwide activism of the 1960s crested, scholars noted that social movements had changed. Activists at the end of the twentieth century no longer seemed to mobilize around longstanding issues like poverty, class, and inequality in favor of the "new social movements." Buechler explains these new movements as the result of a decline in working-class activism and an increase of activism "rooted in racial and gender identities." The transformation of US society into a post-industrial economy had consequences for social movements, Buechler argues. Under the mass-production factory system of the 1920s–1960s, working-class movements dominated in western nations. The organized labor movement thrived as workers with steady jobs and rising wages bred solidarity and rose above the struggle for daily needs. But deindustrialization undermined working-class movements, leaving little with which to encourage class solidarity. Class, according to Buechler, is now "alloyed" with other identities, especially race, gender, and ethnicity. The new economy has made it increasingly difficult to translate traditional grievances into collective action. For example, the targets of movements have become less palpable. Who, activists wonder, is the proper target of disruption? Corporations, the opaque enablers of unequal wealth, or the state, complicit in encouraging the pernicious effects of capitalism? Such diffusion has encouraged mobilization around new issues.

Conclusion

The study of the poor is fraught with misconceptions. For most of history, analysts have assumed that grievances spur collective action. In recent decades, scholars have increasingly emphasized the interaction of grievances with sociopolitical structures in the formation of movements. The disadvantages of poverty, class, and inequality more often hinder movements than help them, so any analysis that fails to account for the political context and tactics of a movement,

in addition to grievances, is doomed to failure. The study of poor people's movements has influenced the study of all movements in general. And finally, movements based on poverty, class, and inequality are being replaced by "identity" movements.

The future promises that social movements will continue; similarly, all factors indicate that poverty, class, and inequality will persist as issues, as evidenced by the universal living wage movement and concern over fair trade, to offer just two examples. At the same time, if movements increasingly rely on tactics and communication based on new technology, the poor will get left behind. As Tilly describes, the poor's inability to afford new technology – such as cell phones and computers, increasingly relied upon by movements for communication – will only erect new barriers to collective action.

SEE ALSO: Class Identity and Protest; Class Struggle; Marxism

References and Suggested Readings

- Apostle, H. G. & Gerson, L. P. (Eds.) (1986) *Aristotle's Politics*. Grinnell, IA: Peripatetic Press.
- Buechler, S. (2000) *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and Cultural Construction of Social Activism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Carmon, N. (1985) Poverty and Culture: Empirical Evidence and Implications for Public Policy. *Sociological Perspectives* 28, 4 (October): 403–17.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1996a) *The Age of Revolution*. New York: Vintage.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1996b) *The Age of Capital*. New York: Vintage.
- Kazemi, F. (1980) *Poverty and Revolution in Iran: The Migrant Poor, Urban Marginality and Politics*. New York: New York University Press.
- McAdam, D. (1982) *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McCarthy, J. D. & Zald, M. N. (1977) Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. *American Journal of Sociology* 82, 6 (May): 1212–41.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1998) *The Communist Manifesto: A Modern Edition*. London: Verso.
- Piven, F. F. (1963/1974) Low Income People and the Political Process. In F. F. Piven & R. A. Cloward (Eds.), *The Politics of Turmoil: Essays on Poverty, Race, and the Urban Crisis*. New York: Pantheon.
- Piven, F. F. & Cloward, R. A. (1979) *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New York: Pantheon.

- Smelser, N. J. (1963) *Theory of Collective Behavior*. New York: Free Press.
- Tarrow, S. G. (1998) *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, C. (1978) *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
- Tilly, C. (2004) *Social Movements, 1768–2004*. Boulder: Paradigm.
- Turner, R. H. & Killian, L. M. (1972) *Collective Behavior*, 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Class struggle

Kunal Chattopadhyay

Class struggle is a concept in socialist analysis, developed in particular by Karl Marx. For Marx, class is closely connected with his concept of the relations of production, the social relations into which humans enter in the process of production, which find legal expression to a large degree either as property relations or as labor relations. In a class society, one dominant group controls the conditions of production, and the classes there are defined in terms of their relationship to the means and the labor of production and to each other. However, Marx's writings also suggest that fully formed classes exist only in what he called the great historical epochs – like slavery, feudalism, and capitalism in Europe. In the period between the decline of one mode of production and the full articulation of the next, what exists is called a transitional society. The class struggle in such a situation actually determines the nature of the next mode of production. Thus, in the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism, the relative powers of nobles, peasants, and bourgeoisie in different countries led to different results, such as agrarian capitalism in England, and the absolutist monarchy in France, to protect the interests of nobles under a changed balance of force, so that it defended the benefits of the late feudal nobility, but deprived the nobles of direct political power.

In capitalism, the principal conflict is between the capitalist class and the working class. The working class includes all those who cannot survive other than through selling their labor power for wages. Capitalists are those who appropriate surplus value from the workers. The members

of each of these classes have shared interests. These collective or class interests are in conflict with the class interests of the members of the opposite class, and result in class struggle.

The very act of production in capitalist society involves the class struggle. Since the capitalist class exploits the working class through appropriation of surplus value, which is the excess value produced by the worker over the equivalent of the wage, there is a constant struggle between the two classes. The capitalist tries to increase the surplus value either by lengthening the working day or by introducing labor-saving devices. Workers would try to maximize wages and benefits and improvements in working conditions.

Though proletarian class struggle is carried out constantly, forms like strikes are relatively extreme manifestations. Less acute forms can be expression of alienation, of lack of interest in work; minor forms of resistance include small-scale sabotage or petty theft. Class struggle at the political plane involves support for socialists, or struggles for democratization and social justice.

Class struggle does not automatically mean struggle to overthrow capitalism. Narrow trade unionism, looking after the interests of one sector, can at times set workers against workers, as in trade union resistance to employment of migrant labor, or trade union support to one's owner in a contest between rival capitalists. But in course of the development of capitalism class struggle becomes more general, with craft unions giving way to broader industrial unions and the formation of proletarian parties. Marx felt that class struggle was built into the structure of capitalism and could only be abolished with social revolutions and the abolition of capitalism, through the establishment of the rule of the working class (the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat), and the establishment of a new transition period, from capitalism to communism. Even after revolution, the class struggle would remain, but would be regulated by the superior political power of the working class.

However, Marx was also aware that this two-class model was an abstraction. It is possible to mention other classes and strata, including the *petit bourgeoisie* – people who use their own labor to produce and market commodities and survive; the peasants, numerically the largest exploited class across the globe in Marx's time and for most of the twentieth century as well;

the white collar workers and other staff who also sell their labor power and are technically part of the working class, but due to historical origins, as well as social functions, often feel themselves to be superiors to the working class, and at their upper end (the managers) have ties with the ruling class; the lumpenproletariat, including the unemployed and the criminal elements among the poor. There were also remnants of the older classes, notably the landlords. The most significant was the peasantry.

Arguing that the peasants could support the working class out of self-interest, Trotsky elaborated his theory of permanent revolution, according to which it was possible to achieve a socialist revolution in a relatively backward country if the working class fought determinedly and mobilized the peasants behind them. After revolution, the workers would support the peasants by supplying them with machines, as well as by political means, eventually transforming individual peasants into collective producers. In the Soviet Union, however, what was done was a mockery of this, since a bureaucratic upper layer (Trotsky used the term "caste") carried out forcible and brutal collectivization and forced peasants to produce and supply food at low prices.

Socialist and Marxist feminism have sought to infuse a gender dimension into the concept. In fact, women workers are exploited in specific ways. Capitalism is historically linked with patriarchy, and this means on one hand the use of women's labor as "naturally" cheap (because assumed to be supplementary) and on the other hand the use of women's unpaid labor to reproduce the next generation of the working class. Consequently, the creation of more general class interests actually calls for a specific understanding of women's oppression and its integration into the agenda of class struggle as a central component. In a similar way, racism in the West, or casteism in South Asia, are dimensions of the social conflict that have to be reconfigured into an analysis of contemporary class struggle.

Some modern ideologies, including neo-liberalism and fascism, try to claim that class struggle does not exist or needs to be avoided. In practice, this means attacks on working-class organization and attempts to smash them.

SEE ALSO: *Class Identity and Protest*; *Class, Poverty, and Revolution*; *Dictatorship of the Proletariat*; *Socialism*

References and Suggested Readings

- Callinicos, A. & Harman, C. (1987) *The Changing Working Class*. London: Bookmarks.
- Draper, H. (1978) *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution*, Vol. 2. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Joyce, P. (Ed.) (1995) *Class*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sargent, L. (Ed.) (1981) *The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: A Debate on Class and Patriarchy*. London: Pluto Press.

Clayoquot Sound

Irina Ceric

In the summer of 1993, Clayoquot Sound, a mostly wilderness area of ancient temperate rainforest on Vancouver Island in British Columbia (BC), became the site of the largest civil disobedience campaign in Canadian history. Almost 900 people were arrested during four months of protests over the fate of Clayoquot Sound's rare ecology, resulting in a series of mass trials unique in Canadian law (Hatch 1994). Although there had been intermittent protests over logging and other resource development in the area for over two decades, particularly by the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nation and local environmentalists, a decision by the government of BC in April 1993 to allow clearcut logging in 62 percent of Clayoquot Sound catalyzed the rapid emergence of a preservation movement with both domestic and international dimensions.

The local protests were centered on the Clayoquot Peace Camp set up by the Friends of Clayoquot Sound on Canada Day, July 1, 1993, and eventually visited by over 12,000 people (Berman 1994). Operating on the basis of a Peaceful Direct Action Code predicated on Gandhian principles of non-violence and further influenced by emerging eco-feminist thought, the peace camp was the organizing site for the blockades which formed the centerpiece of the civil disobedience campaign. Beginning in early July, hundreds of people physically blocked road access to logging trucks in direct violation of a court injunction obtained by MacMillan Bloedel, the logging company (of which the BC government was a shareholder) holding the cutting license. By the time the peace camp closed in October of 1993, the first of eight mass trials of protesters was already underway (Hatch 1994).

The ongoing significance of this summer of protest lies in its resonance for contemporary social movements. A central challenge of the campaign was the disjuncture between aboriginal and non-native organizers at Clayoquot Sound, a cleavage shaped by a longstanding claim to the territory by the Nuu-chah-nulth, who had never signed a treaty ceding rights to their traditional lands. The Nuu-chah-nulth were not closely involved in the 1993 blockades, and their contentious role in the 1994 interim agreement on standards for harvesting in Clayoquot Sound demonstrates the extent to which land rights and stewardship decisions in Canada may be contested between First Nations and environmentalists, as well as states and the private sector (Ingram 1995). The tensions inherent in these complex relations have manifested in other similar battles over land, resources, and sovereignty throughout Canada, and present a continuing challenge to the development of diverse and inclusive social movements.

The legal framework of the Clayoquot campaign represents a similar touchstone for current environmental movements. Although the use of a common law criminal contempt power hinging on the logging company's injunction was unusual, given the general reliance on ordinary criminal offenses by police and the judicial system, the high number of arrests (300 in one day at the height of the protests) during the campaign and the mass trials which followed may be seen as particular forms of criminalization of dissent. Of the approximately 900 people arrested, about 860 were prosecuted in eight trials and all those prosecuted for criminal contempt were found guilty, with sentences ranging up to 45 days in jail and fines of \$3,000 (Hatch 1994).

The Clayoquot blockades and subsequent trials evoked earlier civil disobedience models in which courtrooms become political forums as well as prefiguring evolving protest tactics. Perhaps the strongest legacy of the 1993 campaign lies in the development of the activist networks, both domestic and international (protests against logging in Clayoquot Sound were held at Canadian consulates in Austria, Germany, England, Australia, and the United States), that would play a key role in the global justice movements of the late 1990s and early 2000s (Ingram 1995).

SEE ALSO: Ecological Protest Movements; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999

References and Suggested Readings

- Berman, T. (1994) *Takin' it Back*. In T. Berman et al., *Clayoquot and Dissent*. Vancouver: Ronsdale Press, pp. 1–7.
- Hatch, R. B. (1994) The Clayoquot Show Trials. In T. Berman et al., *Clayoquot and Dissent*. Vancouver: Ronsdale Press, pp. 105–53.
- Ingram, G. B. (1995) Landscapes of (Un)lawful Chaos: Conflicts Around Temperate Rainforest and Biological Diversity in Pacific Canada. *Review of European Community and International Environmental Law* 4 (3): 242–9.
- MacIsaac, R. & Champagne, A. (Eds.) (1994) *Clayoquot Mass Trials: Defending the Rainforest*. Philadelphia: New Society.
- MacKay, K. (2002) Solidarity and Symbolic Protest: Lessons for Labour from the Quebec City Summit of the Americas. *Labour/Le Travail* 50: 21–39.
- Magnusson, W. & Shaw K. (Eds.) (2003) *A Political Space: Reading the Global Through Clayoquot Sound*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Cobbett, William (1763–1835)

H. T. Dickinson

William Cobbett was an advocate of parliamentary reform and of England's poor. Born poor himself, he received almost no formal education, but read voraciously and learned to write. In 1783 he joined the British army, rising to the rank of sergeant major. On leaving the army, he wrote *The Soldier's Friend* (1792), a passionate indictment of the pay and treatment of the common soldier. Fearing retribution, he fled first to France and then to the United States, where he lived until 1800. In America Cobbett became a campaigning journalist, often writing as "Peter Porcupine." Faced with prosecution for libel, he returned to England and, from January 1802 until his death, published the weekly *Political Register*, in which he set out his political and social views and serialized most of his more substantial publications.

By 1804 Cobbett was becoming increasingly critical of political corruption and by 1807 was prominent among the London-based radicals who were reviving the campaign for parliamentary reform. *Political Register* became increasingly concerned about the plight of the rural poor and for many years was one of the bestselling radical publications in the country. When the government passed repressive legislation in 1817, Cobbett

again fled to America. While there, he published his *Grammar of the English Language*, which sold well for over a century.

When he returned to England in October 1819, he was soon in dispute with other leading radicals and in severe financial difficulties. His fortunes revived in 1820 when he took up the cause of Queen Caroline, and his writings in her defense proved very popular.

Throughout the 1820s Cobbett was preoccupied with the distressed state of the agricultural workers. Between 1821 and 1826 he traveled across southern England and published his celebrated *Rural Rides* from 1830. Even his bestselling *History of the English Reformation* (1824–7) accused the state of dispossessing the English poor. He often warned of the dangers of an agricultural revolt, and he was charged with inciting such a revolt in 1830–1. He defended himself and was acquitted. Throughout his campaigns for the rural poor he argued that the only solution was radical parliamentary reform. He campaigned vigorously for the Great Reform Act of 1832, even though it was more moderate than he desired. The general election of 1832 saw him elected for the new parliamentary borough of Oldham. In the House of Commons he still championed the cause of the rural poor. His heroic efforts and the enormous sales of his many works did not prevent him, however, from dying bankrupt.

SEE ALSO: Burdett, Sir Francis (1770–1844); Luddite Riots in Nottingham; Paine, Thomas (1737–1809); Reform Acts, Britain and Ireland, 1832

References and Suggested Readings

- Dyck, I. (1992) *William Cobbett and Rural Popular Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Osborne, J. (1982) *William Cobbett: His Thought and His Times*. London: Greenwood Press.
- Spater, G. (1982) *William Cobbett: The Poor Man's Friend*, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cocaleros peasant uprising

Dwight R. Hahn

The man proclaimed as Bolivia's first indigenous president, Juan Evo Morales Ayma, won the presidency with a stunning electoral victory in

December of 2005. That victory came on the heels of the two failed and incomplete presidential terms of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa Gisbert. The election of December 2005 marked a significant shift in the electoral politics of Bolivia as the parties that had formed the post-1952 National Revolution system lost their hold on significant sectors of the Bolivian electorate and a new political party captured those sectors with a call for “decolonization” and a new nationalism rooted in the indigenous cultures of Bolivia. The social shift revealed by that election had been decades in the making and was mostly brought about by the economic stresses related to the neoliberal economic policies that Bolivia had implemented, beginning with the “shock therapy” treatment prescribed by Decree 21060 of President Victor Paz Estenssoro in 1985. Those stresses, in turn, led to a coalition of various social movements under the banner of a new or reconstructed indigenous identity in opposition to the economic imperialism implicit in the adoption of the “Washington Consensus” and to the cultural imperialism implicit in the Washington effort to eradicate the coca leaf – a sacred symbol of the Andean indigenous population.

Neoliberal policies of the Paz and ensuing administrations opened Bolivian resources to foreign investment and resource extraction. These policies included the privatization of water and the sale of oil and natural gas to foreigners at tax and royalty rates that were perceived by opponents as a giveaway of the Bolivian national patrimony. Further, among the first major enactments of the Paz administration was the closure and privatization of the remaining state-owned tin mines. This meant that in the latter half of the 1980s thousands of former miners along with their families migrated into the tropical valleys of the Andes – especially the Chapare region in the department of Cochabamba – that were already sites for cultivation of the coca leaf. Relative to any other crop that might be realistically grown anywhere in Bolivia, the cultivation of coca was lucrative and therefore very attractive to the unemployed migrants seeking a new source of livelihood.

President Morales and his party, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), emerged directly from the resistance activities of the organized *cocaleros* to the US government effort to eradicate the cultivation of coca leaf in

Bolivia. The *cocaleros* presented the coca leaf as a sacred object and, as such, a salient symbol of the Andean indigenous peoples. The coca eradication efforts pushed by the United States in alliance with sometimes reluctant Bolivian political elites allowed the *cocaleros* to portray themselves as defenders of Andean indigenous peoples against the cultural oppression of the US imperialists and the complicit “white” Bolivian elite. The *cocaleros* tapped into a cultural awareness among the majority indigenous population in Bolivia of itself as a survivor of 500 years of colonial (and neocolonial) oppression. Within that context, the image of the coca leaf could be, and quite literally was, raised as a flag representing a new anti-imperialist, indigenous-rooted Bolivian nationalism. Evo Morales, as leader of the coca growers of the Chapare region of Bolivia, was well positioned to launch a new political party that served as an umbrella for various constituencies opposed to the neoliberal policies of the post-1985 period.

Any discussion of coca leaf should be prefaced by the fact that coca has been cultivated for centuries by the Andean indigenous population. As a leaf, chewed or prepared as a tea, it is little more than a stimulant on the order of a cup of coffee. The coca leaf is not a dangerous “drug”; it should not be confused with cocaine, which is derived from the processing of coca. That is, as Kevin Healy (1991) notes, the *cocaleros* are not harvesting a drug in the same way that, say, a marijuana farmer might be considered to be cultivating a drug. The traditional market within Bolivia for coca leaf was the Andean indigenous population itself. Clearly, though, the demand and price for coca leaf increased with the new popularity for the consumption of cocaine in the United States beginning in the 1970s. As such, coca leaf – or, rather, the paste it was refined into by drug traffickers – became a major export for Bolivia in the 1980s.

The Chapare region of Bolivia – one of the major regions for coca cultivation along with the Yungas of La Paz in which coca has been grown – had been a site of government-sponsored resettlement in the 1950s. Farmer *sindicatos* grouped into “federations” formed in the 1960s to organize and represent the growing population of the region. In the early 1980s, as described by Healy, even before the arrival of the former miners, the Chapare region had produced activist federations that aggressively claimed

underutilized private property for their members. In the latter half of the 1980s the original “colonizers” had their ranks supplemented by displaced miners looking for a new way to support their families, and, thus, coca cultivation took on increased economic importance. Further, the newcomers were, because of their history of militant resistance as miners, experienced in the tactics of presenting demands to the state via such tools as road blockades and protest marches. They were also versed in the political rhetoric of a radicalized, anti-imperialist, working-class union movement.

At the same time (the 1980s), the US government was increasing pressure on the Bolivian government to eradicate or, at least, contain coca cultivation as a tactic in the US government’s “War on Drugs.” That policy was bound to fail as any reduction in supply, without a reduction in demand, would of course result in an increase of price and thereby provide an increased incentive to produce. Given that it was a source of livelihood for an increasing population of some 40,000 families in the Chapare region and an additional short-term migrant population from 50,000 to 100,000 from the highlands by 1990, the competition over the construction of coca as a source of livelihood versus source of drug addiction in the United States became an intensive point of political confrontation. Because coca, as a mild stimulant, was in fact something that had been used for medicinal and ritual purposes for centuries, the *cocaleros* were able to present themselves as defenders of Andean indigenous culture. Thus, the struggle of the *cocaleros* for the source of their livelihood became the struggle to defend Andean indigenous culture against imperialism and, as such, a struggle over Bolivian national identity. Within this economic and cultural struggle, Evo Morales rose quickly to the leadership of the *cocalero* organization.

Born in 1959 in Oruro, Morales migrated with his family in 1982 to the Chapare. From his first position as secretary of sports for the local *sindicato* in 1983, Morales became executive secretary of the Tropical Federation in 1988, and was elected to be president of the new umbrella organization, the Coordinating Committee of the Six Federations of Cochabamba, in 1996. Beginning in the late 1980s, the *cocaleros* began an effort to gain representation in the national congress. This effort led, in conjunction with other *campesino* and indigenous groups, to the

founding of the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (ASP) in 1995. Unable to register its own party name for the 1995 and 1997 races, it ran its candidates under the name of the United Left Party (IU). Evo Morales won election to the national chamber of deputies in 1997 as a member of this party. In 1999 Morales led a splinter group from the ASP, the Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (IPSP), which formed a political party wing that adopted the name Movement Toward Socialism (MAS). In 2002 Morales entered the race for the presidency as the MAS candidate. In that race he gained 20.94 percent of the total vote, which put him within two percentage points of the first place candidate, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), who garnered 21.46 percent.

The roots of the MNR reach back to the 1952 National Revolution in Bolivia. Ousted from control of government in the 1960s by the military, it returned along with other parties of the “system” during the period of democratization beginning in 1982. However, with the return of electoral politics, it became clear that the MNR, along with the other major parties of the Bolivian mainstream, was unable to restore its ability to hold a clientelist lock on major blocs of voters – most significantly, the rural indigenous peasantry. Eduardo Gamarra (2003) describes the MNR as a corporatist party that had tied major post-1952 functional groups to its party structure. That system broke down in the 1980s and 1990s. Further, as Donna Lee Van Cott (2005) mentions, the 1990s saw increases in voter registration and efforts to mobilize more indigenous rural voters for elections and civic participation – efforts supported by all (or most) sides as a way of legitimizing electoral democracy even as neoliberal policies brought about economic hardship. As the MNR lost its grip on the electorate, other “system” parties (such as the National Democratic Action Party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left Party) were unable to harness the social groups once loyal to the MNR. These other mainstream parties, like the MNR, supported the Washington Consensus and compliance with coca eradication efforts. The one-time parties of the left, unable to hold any significant coherent constituency, had all but disappeared. Miners (those that remained), Aymara and Quechua peasantry as well as urban Aymara (i.e., residents of the

rapidly growing city of El Alto), and the *cocaleros* composed an alliance of voters that were ready to be mobilized in support of a truly oppositional party. Under Morales's leadership, MAS became that party.

In 2003, a year of significant street protests against a tax increase and a natural gas deal that appeared too generous to foreign companies, the administration of Sanchez de Lozada was broken in October. After winning a second, non-consecutive, term only the year before (with an electoral plurality and confirmed by the congress), the president vacated his office, leaving a letter of resignation behind as he took flight to the United States. In the final act that brought down the president, thousands of demonstrators from the largely Aymara city of El Alto – located at the rim of the valley containing the city of La Paz – poured onto the streets in response to the earlier shooting dead of demonstrators. This was followed by scores more casualties as the army sought to clear blockaded roads and contain the crowds of protesters. As reported in various newspaper accounts, residents from El Alto marched down and into the streets of La Paz shouting for the head of the “gringo” – Sanchez de Lozada's nickname resulting from his North American-accented Spanish. In the final days before his resignation, he lost the support of his vice-president and the chief of the armed forces.

Sanchez de Lozada was succeeded, in accordance with the constitution, by the vice-president, Carlos Mesa Gisbert. Mesa sought to appease the protesters by putting the question of how to dispose of Bolivia's gas and oil resources to a referendum. Further, he sought to win back the support of the rural indigenous population by promising to call for the creation of a constituent assembly to institute a new system for representing rural and indigenous groups. Nevertheless, Mesa still acted within the constraints of neoliberal economic policy and he was pressured by the US government to maintain the coca eradication effort. Over the next two years, Mesa came under a barrage of criticism as he tried to strike a compromise with the social movements that opposed the neoliberal economic policies and, from the other side, the pro-neoliberal parties in congress. Perhaps somewhat ironically, Evo Morales and MAS, with the second highest number of total seats in the congress (35 out of 157 total seats), became

key to the support of the Mesa government. Morales, in contrast to Felipe Quispe Huanca and the leader of the labor organization, Jaime Solares, supported the Mesa government up to nearly the middle of 2005. Battered by a protest over water privatization in El Alto in early 2005 (an echo of a major protest of 2000 over the same issue in Cochabamba) and countervailing pressure from elite-organized protesters in the eastern department of Santa Cruz, Mesa had turned back to policies that placated the neoliberal right. In turn, Morales and MAS withdrew their support of the Mesa government. With the return of street protests and the loss of support in congress, Mesa resigned from the presidency in June 2005 and the head of the supreme court, Eduardo Rodríguez Veltze, assumed the presidency as caretaker. New elections for the presidency and congress were set for December 2005.

To the astonishment of nearly all observers, Morales won the December election for the presidency with an outright majority of the vote – 54 percent. No candidate had obtained a majority of the electorate since the return of electoral democracy in 1982. (As such, previous presidents had been determined by the congress.) Further, MAS became the dominant party in the congress with 73 seats of 130 total seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 12 out of 27 seats in the Senate (second to the neoliberal opposition party PODEMOS – Democratic and Social Power Party – which took 13 seats). The stunning electoral results for Morales and MAS were indicative of a major realignment in Bolivian politics. The old-order political elite-maintained electoral dominance through clientelism and compliance of the key social groups – especially the indigenous peasantry – had been turned inside out.

Key to that realignment was the breakdown of the old clientelist party system of the MNR and its replacement by the mobilization capacity of the *sindicato* structures of the *cocalero* and indigenous peasantry organizations. Transcending those factors, however, was the successful assertion of a new Andean indigenous-based Bolivian nationalism honed from within the *cocalero* movement. (To be clear, the history of *indigenismo* stretches back to the beginning of the colonial period – perhaps most famously it was expressed in the rebellion of Túpac Katari in the early 1780s.) Morales, it appears, has taken the most recent wave of indigenous nationalism

from the fields of the coca grower to the Bolivian presidential palace.

The first 18 months of the Morales presidency, as evidenced by the political struggles within and outside of the constituent assembly that was elected with an MAS membership short of the two-thirds necessary to pass planks to the new constitution, have made clear that the creation of the new regime envisioned by the *cocaleros* and indigenous social movements will not be easy. Eduardo Gamarra, in a 2007 paper for the Council on Foreign Relations, “Bolivia on the Brink,” argues that Morales will likely feel forced to resort to a mobilization of his supporters through an increase in the rhetoric of indigenous nationalism. As might be expected, the non-indigenous elites and middle classes of the lowland regions of the north, east, and south of the Bolivian Andes – the so-called “half-moon” of Bolivia – have little interest in sacrificing their economic interest (control of the revenue resulting from the oil and natural gas found in that region) to the new Andean political elite. Neither, for that matter, do they find their identity reflected in that constructed around the ideal of “decolonization” as developed within the political struggle of the *cocalero* movement and used to mobilize national electoral victory for Morales and MAS in 2005.

SEE ALSO: Bolivia, Protest and Repression, 1964–2000; Bolivia, War of the Pacific to the National Revolution, 1879–1952; Bolivian Neoliberalism, Social Mobilization, and Revolution from Below, 2003 and 2005; Cochabamba Water Wars; Katarismo and Indigenous Popular Mobilization, Bolivia, 1970s–Present; Morales, Evo (b. 1959); Túpac Katari (ca. 1750–1781)

References and Suggested Readings

- Albo, X. (2007) El Alto: Mobilizing Block by Block. *NACLA Report on the Americas* (July/August): 34–8.
- Gamarra, E. A. (2003) Political Parties Since 1964: The Construction of Bolivia’s Multiparty System. In M. Grindle & P. Domingo (Eds.), *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective*. London and Cambridge, MA: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, and the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University, pp. 289–317.
- Healy, K. (1991) Political Ascent of Bolivia’s Peasant Coca Leaf Producers. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 33 (1): 87–121.

- Kohl, B. & Farthing, L. (2006) *Impasse in Bolivia*. London: Zed Books.
- Van Cott, D. L. (2005) *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cochabamba Water Wars

Luis A. Gómez


Recognized as the twenty-first century’s first anti-globalization victory, Cochabamba Bolivia’s Water War is also considered to be the beginning of a new revolutionary cycle, from 2000 to 2005, in Bolivia. Under the rallying cry “The Water Is Ours” this city’s (and surrounding countryside’s) citizens resisted the privatization of their potable water and basic services, enabled by the Hugo Banzer Suárez administration to Aguas del Tunari, a subsidiary of the Bechtel corporation.

Workers, homemakers, farmers, professionals, coca growers, and other social sectors united under the horizontally structured Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida (Coalition in Defense of Water and Life, or the Coordinadora). Founded on November 12, 1999, the Coordinadora was the political response of people’s frustration with an economic model that after almost 15 years of ransacking their resources and limiting their rights, had just privatized their water.

According to Law 2029 passed on October 29, 1999, all pre-privatization natural water sources and water-related infrastructure and services (including that which was communal and/or cooperative) were at risk of being placed under private control.

Access in Cochabamba was always problematic, and for decades the people had been organizing and using their own resources and technology – without state intervention – to dig their own community wells and construct communal sewage and water distribution systems. Additionally, others felt threatened by the contracts signed between the Banzer government, the mayor of Cochabamba Manfred Reyes Villa, and Bechtel. Many of the farming communities who used traditional water access and irrigation methods were also under Bechtel’s “areas of concession.”

Cochabamba wasn’t the only place handed over to the transnationals. And over the following months, there were blockades and deaths in



Some 20,000 people demonstrate on April 5, 2000 in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in support of a strike against the implementation of user fees for public water supplies. In 2000, the World Bank refused to renew a \$25 million loan unless Bolivia privatized the municipal water supply. (REUTERS/David Mercado)

the western Aymara highland region. However, Bechtel was met with the most resistance, triggered partially by the company's own actions. Not only did Aguas del Tunari attempt to control the streams, wells, and tanks, but also it began charging excessively (rate increases sometimes neared 1000 percent) and cutting off or suspending service for those who couldn't pay their bills.

In response, the Coordinadora combined diverse protest tactics such as road blockades and marches with concrete political questioning. At the same time, its first leaders not only encouraged but insisted on collective decision-making and open, transparent deliberation within the organization. These practices, as factory union leader Oscar Olivera put it, allowed the people to "recuperate their dignity and their voice."

Some of the best examples of this period's rebellious spirit are the Coordinadora's com-

muniqués and manifestos. More than a call to action, these documents became assembly debate guidelines and were clear demonstrations of a new way of doing politics.

On January 10, 2000, just before the first largescale blockade and general strike, the Coordinadora concluded its manifesto with this message: "Rights are not earned by begging. They are won by fighting. No one is going to fight for what is ours. We must therefore fight, or submit to humiliation by those who govern us."

During this time, the Water Warriors began appearing. They were people of all ages and social class who were the first line of defense in the hundreds of barricades during those months. These Warriors were the first to confront the police's tear gas, attack dogs, and bullets. Varying forms of solidarity were manifested.

Friday, February 4 marked the largest and most diverse peaceful march in Cochabamba's history. When the police offensive came, the people held their ground, forcing the government to concede several demands such as an end to rate hikes and the modification of Law 2029.

"The other great accomplishment of this mobilization," read the Coordinadora's comunicado 14,

is that we lost our fear. We left our houses and communities in order to speak to one another, to get to know each other, to learn how once again to trust one another. We took over the streets because they in fact belong to us. And we did it with our own strength. . . . For us – the working people of this city and countryside – this is the real meaning of democracy: we decide and we act, we discuss and we execute. We risk our lives in order to carry out that which we consider just. Democracy is people's sovereignty and that is what we have done.

By the beginning of April, the repression and mobilization reached a climax which the Coordinadora called the Final Battle. From April 4 on, the people fought in the streets, demanding the end to Aguas del Tunari's contract. The government of former-dictator Banzer began losing ground, above all when young Víctor Hugo Daza was killed by an army sniper.

On the afternoon of April 9 – with the city paralyzed and the main plaza inundated with calls for his resignation – President Banzer announced the revocation of Bechtel's contract.

In the days that followed Aguas del Tunari executives fled the city and the people took over the company's installations.

Over the five months of struggle for their water, the people of Cochabamba called into question not only the ownership of the world's most valuable resource, but also conventional forms of political representation, decision-making, and even the state's own structure. All of this would have a determining influence over future mobilizations concerning water in Bolivia and throughout the world.

SEE ALSO: Bolivia, Protest and Repression, 1964–2000; Bolivian Neoliberalism, Social Mobilization, and Revolution from Below, 2003 and 2005; *Cocaleros* Peasant Uprising; Katarismo and Indigenous Popular Mobilization, Bolivia, 1970s–Present; Morales, Evo (b. 1959)

References and Suggested Readings

- Crespo, C., Fernández, O., & Peredo, C. (2005) *Los regantes de Cochabamba en la Guerra del Agua*. Cochabamba: CESU-UMSS.
- García, A., Gutiérrez, R., Prada, R., & Tapia, L. (2000) *El retorno de la Bolivia plebeya*. La Paz: Muela del Diablo Editores.
- García, A., Gutiérrez, R., Prada, R., & Tapia, L. (2001) *Tiempos de rebelión*. La Paz: Muela del Diablo Editores.
- Olivera, O. (2004) *Cochabamba!*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.

Cohn-Bendit, Daniel (b. 1945)

James R. McIntyre

Daniel Cohn-Bendit is a journalist, radical politician, and member of the European Parliament who first achieved widespread notice in France in the spring of 1968 when he played a minor role in the massive student demonstrations that rocked Paris and many other French cities in protest against the government of Charles de Gaulle. The son of German Jews who fled to France on the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, he moved back to Germany in 1958 to live with his father. He returned to France in 1966 in order to attend university in Nanterre, a northern suburb of Paris, and by the mid-1960s was an anarchist and a communist. Both his politics and his hair color earned him the nickname “Danny the Red.”

While Cohn-Bendit's role in the 1968 protests was relatively minor, it gained him enough negative attention for authorities and his political rivals to have him sent back to Germany. Once back in Germany, he became involved in radical left-wing politics and is suspected by some to have interacted with terrorists, though evidence on this point is purely circumstantial. It is clear that over the course of the decade, his politics began a slow mellowing process.

The deradicalization of Cohn-Bendit's views is evidenced in the fact that in the later 1970s he joined the German Green Party. Through his involvement with this group, he actively campaigned against nuclear power and the expansion of the Frankfurt airport. In 1989, he became the deputy mayor of Frankfurt. This post became his springboard into European politics, and in 1994 he was elected to the European Parliament. Over the course of the 1990s, he moved to a more centrist political position, though he has remained very independent in his views. This political independent-mindedness has earned him criticism from both the political left and the right at different times in the 1990s and early 2000s. He has been a strong advocate of the European Constitution, advocating that any country that did not ratify the document should continue voting on it until it did so. He currently resides in Frankfurt am Main and serves as the co-president of the European Greens–European Free Alliance in the European Parliament, a post which he has held since 2004.

In addition to his political activities, Cohn-Bendit is a published author. His first work comprised a reflection on the events of spring 1968 entitled *Obsolete Communism: The Left-Wing Alternative*, which he co-authored with his brother, Gabriel Cohn-Bendit. The book is at once critical of Stalinism, the French Communist Party, and the trade unions. Since then, he has authored numerous other books and articles on political topics.

SEE ALSO: May 1968 French Uprisings

References and Suggested Readings

- Bourges, H. (1968) *The French Student Revolt: The Leaders Speak. Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Others*. New York: Hill & Wang.
- Cohn-Bendit, D. & Cohn-Bendit, G. (1968) *Obsolete Communism: The Left-Wing Alternative*. Trans. A. Pomerans. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Collins, Michael (1890–1922)

William H. Mulligan, Jr.

Michael Collins was among the most important Irish republican military and political leaders in the struggle to free Ireland from British rule. He played a major part in the creation of both the Irish Republican Army and the Irish Free State.

Collins was born at Woodfield, near Clonakilty, County Cork, Ireland on October 16, 1890. His father died when he was six and Collins was strongly influenced by Denis Lyons, his national school teacher, and James Santry, a local blacksmith, both of whom were active in the Fenian Brotherhood. At the age of 15 he emigrated to London where he worked in the Post Office and as an accounting clerk. During the nine years he lived in London, he was active in the Gaelic Athletic Association, the Gaelic League, and a revolutionary secret society, the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB).

In 1916 Collins returned to Ireland to participate in the Easter Rising. He served as a captain at the General Post Office under Joseph Mary Plunkett. Collins seems to have been very much in the realist wing of the movement, and little influenced by the romantic, visionary ideas of Pádraig Pearse. The British government did not see Collins as one of the leaders of the Rising and, after a brief period of imprisonment, he returned to Ireland in December 1916 when many of those involved in the Rising were paroled. While in prison, however, Collins had emerged as a leader of the IRB and as soon as he was back in Ireland he began rebuilding the IRB's organizational structure.

When the IRB gained control of Sinn Féin, a nationalist political party, in 1917, Collins was among its leaders. He was elected to Parliament in December 1918, but he and other Sinn Féin MPs met in Dublin as *Dáil Éireann* (Assembly of Ireland) early in 1919. Collins served as minister for home affairs while retaining his positions as director of operations and intelligence for the Irish Volunteers and member of the supreme council of the IRB. In 1919 he and Harry Boland organized the escape of Eamon de Valera, the highest-ranking survivor of the 1916 Rising, from a British prison. De Valera was elected president of the *Dáil* and soon thereafter

went to the United States to raise money for the Irish cause. Collins' energy and attention to detail, as well as the key positions he retained, put him at the center of events in Ireland.

He moved quickly to create an organization that could challenge British rule in Ireland. This included establishing a financial base for the IRB by means of two bond issues, one domestic and one focused on Irish Americans. He also put together an effective intelligence network, an arms-smuggling operation, and a squad of absolutely loyal associates known as the "twelve apostles" to carry out assassinations. The British government declared the *Dáil* an illegal assembly and increased troop levels in Ireland, reinforced the police, and created an auxiliary force known as the Black and Tans. In 1920 the Irish Volunteers pledged their allegiance to the *Dáil* in large part because Collins held central positions in both organizations.

By the summer of 1920 a full-scale guerrilla war was underway. Known variously as the Anglo-Irish War and the Irish War for Independence, the campaign Collins orchestrated was the prototype for asymmetrical warfare. Collins, more interested in success than in a glorious battle or martyrdom, avoided direct confrontations. He wreaked havoc, utilizing assassinations and flying columns to strike quickly at police stations, army barracks, and other government installations. The British responded with brutal repression and reprisals. World opinion and, more importantly, British public opinion swung behind the Irish effort for self-government. A truce was arranged on July 11, 1921, and a conference to work out a settlement began in London on September 14. Collins and Arthur Griffith led the Irish delegation.

The conference was difficult and filled with extremely contentious issues, not only between the Irish and British representatives, but between two Irish groups as well. De Valera and many in the *Dáil* foresaw Ireland as a republic completely separate from the British crown and incorporating all 32 counties. The Ulster Protestant community was stridently opposed to such a definition or any settlement that included them in a newly constituted Ireland and they had powerful allies in the Westminster Parliament.

Lloyd George, the British prime minister, needed to end the violence or risk losing office. By early December a treaty had been concluded that gave Ireland the same status as Canada and

Australia in the British Commonwealth. Ulster, however, was to be allowed to opt out of the new Irish Free State. Collins saw the treaty as a first step toward complete independence, but de Valera and his allies, understanding that it would lead to Ireland's partition, were unwilling to accept it. The delegates were sent back to renegotiate, but Lloyd George refused. The political situation had shifted in his favor and world opinion seemed to be on the side of the treaty. Collins, as the leader of the military campaign, came to the conclusion that the resources to continue the fight were not sufficient to succeed. He, Griffith, and the other delegates accepted the treaty and signed it. When one of the British delegates remarked that Collins might have signed his political death warrant, Collins replied that he had signed his actual death warrant.

The process of trying to get the treaty ratified by the Dáil brought the conflict between de Valera and Collins to a head. The treaty was ratified by a narrow margin, but de Valera and his supporters withdrew from the Dáil. Collins and the pro-treaty members formed a provisional government in January 1922 with Collins as chairman of the Dáil and minister of finance. He also continued as leader of the Irish Volunteers, now known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

In June a general election returned 94 pro-treaty members out of 128 for a new Dáil. The anti-treaty delegates, led by de Valera, refused to take the required oath of allegiance to the king of England, and IRA units began to choose between supporting Collins and the treaty and rejecting the treaty in favor of the Thirty-Two County Republic proclaimed by Pádraig Pearse in 1916. In this division de Valera played a very ambiguous role, never openly endorsing armed resistance to the treaty, but never opposing it. Collins moved quickly in an effort to close the breach between what he saw as comrades-in-arms, but anti-treaty actions against British officials led to pressure on Collins to take firmer action, which precipitated the Irish Civil War.

Collins' native County Cork was one of the most divided areas during the Civil War and it was there that he was killed in an ambush at Beal na Blath on August 22, 1922. He was buried with full honors at Glasnevin Cemetery in Dublin.

Collins' pragmatism brought a measure of success to the long struggle of the Irish people for self-government, but without resolving the

issue surrounding Ulster. He can be seen as the creator of modern asymmetrical warfare and terrorism, although he was prepared to accept far less than 100 percent of the Irish nationalists' demands to end the conflict. He died young, before he could be confronted with the challenge of turning independence into a viable society. He remains a much admired, even romanticized figure in Irish history, particularly when compared with his rival de Valera, who lived to a very old age and struggled with making the vision of an independent Ireland a reality.

A 1996 motion picture, *Michael Collins*, despite minor historical inaccuracies typical of the genre, was described in the *American Historical Review* as "a superior film that presents a legitimate interpretation of Collins's life and times."

SEE ALSO: De Valera, Eamon (1882–1975); Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War; Fenian Movement; Irish Nationalism; Irish Republican Army (IRA); Pearse, Patrick (Pádraig) (1879–1916); Sinn Féin

References and Suggested Readings

- Coogan, T. P. (1990) *Michael Collins: A Biography*. London: Hutchinson.
- Coogan, T. P. (1993) *Eamon de Valera: The Man Who Was Ireland*. London: Hutchinson.
- Hart, P. (2005) *Mick: The Real Michael Collins*. New York: Viking.
- Hopkinson, M. (2002) *The Irish War for Independence*. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.
- Moran, S. F. (1997) Michael Collins. *American Historical Review* 102, 1 (February): 248–9.
- O'Connor, U. (1996) *Michael Collins and the Troubles*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Colombia, Afro-Colombian movements and anti-racist protests

Raina Zimmering

The term Afro-Colombians refers to Colombians of African ancestry. Their presence dates back to the first decade of the sixteenth century when Africans were imported to replace the declining indigenous population. Africans worked as slaves in gold mines, in large haciendas, on sugar cane plantations, and on cattle ranches, mainly in the departments of Chocó, Antioquia, Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño in western Colombia. In eastern Colombia, near the cities of Vélez,

Cúcuta, Socorro, and Tunja, Africans manufactured textiles and worked in emerald mines outside Bogotá, and labored in tobacco and cotton fields as well as in artisan and domestic work. Today Afro-Colombians make up 21 percent (9,154,537) of the population according to the National Administration Department of Statistics (DANE) of 2002. Due to discrimination, only 4.4 million Afro-Colombians actively recognize their ancestry. They are concentrated on the northwest Caribbean coast and the Pacific coast in the department Chocó, in Cali, Cartagena, and Barranquilla. Indeed, Chocó began as a *palenque*, a town founded by escaped slaves known as *cimarrones*. Colombia has the third largest African-descended population in the western hemisphere, following Brazil and the United States.

Afro-Colombians played key roles in the independence struggle against Spain. Three of every five soldiers in Simón Bolívar's army were of African ancestry and participated at all levels of military and political life. Yet, even after emancipation in 1851, African Colombians' lives deteriorated. They were forced to live in jungle areas, where they shared the territory with indigenous communities. Since that time Afro-Colombians have been incorporated into the Colombian nation through systems of racial hierarchies and structural racism that have materially marginalized and legally silenced them.

In 1945 the department of Chocó was created as the first predominantly African political-administrative division. The territory should have given the African-Colombian people territorial identity and some autonomous decision-making power, but it was characterized by a constant pattern of displacement and natural resource exploitation.

In the decade of *La Violencia* (1948–58) displacement intensified; it peaked again in 1988–91, and then increased dramatically after 1996. Afro-Colombians make up 49 percent of the internally displaced population. One million Afro-Colombians (10 percent of their population) are displaced and are increasingly making up the urban poor and rural destitute populations in Colombia, especially in the big cities like Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali. Over 500,000 Afro-Colombians live in Medellín and over 1,000,000 in Bogotá.

Afro-Colombians have precarious claims to property rights, limited incorporation into the

political system, and live under threat of violence and/or dispossession. The Afro-Colombian population has some of the worst social indicators in Colombia, demonstrating extreme disparities between Afro-Colombians and the rest of the population. Their annual per capita income was between US\$500 and \$600, while the national average is \$1,500. Additionally, 74 percent of the Afro-Colombian population made less than minimum wage in 2002. The situation of Afro-Colombians has worsened through macroeconomic plans and the violent conflict between paramilitaries, guerillas, the state army, and drug traffickers.

Another threat to Afro-Colombians is the macroeconomic policy of "opening," which began in 1980. This policy promotes economic investment and development by "opening" the Pacific region to commercial interests and Colombia to the Pacific Rim economy. This resulted in the appearance of multiple extractive industries, Andean colonization to expand the agricultural frontier, state infrastructure development projects, and agro-industrial capitalism of banana and cattle plantations in the north and of African palm and shrimp aquaculture in the south. Between the 1960s and 1990s the development projects included a naval base, the completion of the Pan-American highway, the expansion of the ports of Buenaventura and Tumaco on the Pacific and Turbo on the Caribbean, a planned interoceanic canal to replace the Panama Canal, hydroelectric dams, and large forest and mineral commercial concessions. Afro-Colombians, especially those living on the Pacific coast or in the Andean region, are also heavily affected by the US military aid to the Colombian army that is escalating an already devastating conflict. To protect themselves, local indigenous and Afro-Colombian organizations demanded legal protection of their lands and began to organize social movements in defense of territory and culture. In 1986, they founded the ACIA (Farmers' Association of the Middle Atrato), the best-organized Afro-Colombian community-based organization in the Pacific area.

ACIA was formed through small neighborhood associations and came to claim collective territory in opposition to land and timber concessions in the Middle Atrato. In 1990 at the Meeting in Defense of Our Traditional Territory of the Pacific, ACIA claimed its territorial rights as a minority ethnic group, as part of the patrimony

it has earned historically and through labor, and as a responsibility of state duty. In 1998, ACIA was titled a territory of 695,254 hectares on either side of the Atrato River, as a collective territory for black communities in recognition of their ancestral occupation of the land as an ethnic group. Such ethnic territories are made possible by legislation arising from the new 1991 Colombian Constitution, in particular Law 70. But in 1999, many of the members of ACIA had to seek refuge in urban centers as paramilitary activities imposed control of their territory. This phenomenon is common. Shortly after the collective titles of the black communities of Dos Bocas, La Nueva, Taparal, Clavellino, and Chicao of the Lower Atrato River were issued in 1997, the populations were displaced by the paramilitary. Violence in the Rio Sucio area in 1997 caused over 20,000 people to escape.

In 1998 other displaced communities of the Lower Atrato River sent a petition to the World Bank, which had funded land titling, to form a high-level commission of the International Red Cross, the office of the High Commissioner for Refugees of the United Nations (UNHCR), and delegates from the dioceses of Apartado and Chocó to look into titling and violence. They demanded collective entitlement as part of their proposal for a dignified return to their territories.

In the same year, ACIA, together with other indigenous and Afro-Colombian organizations, proposed the declaration of the department of Chocó as a “Territory of Peace,” calling for armed groups and drug traffickers to leave their region in the Pacific and the Andes. They claim authority within their territories, over people as well as space and activities. The tragic result has been the assassination or displacement of community leaders and political organizers committed both by the FARC (Armed Revolutionary Forces and Popular Liberation Army) and by paramilitary groups, and most recently the displacement of communities from their territories. In 1999 the Afro-Colombian senator from Antioquia, Piedad Córdoba, was kidnapped by the United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) at a hospital in Medellín in reaction to her outspoken stance on human rights violations. Afro-Colombian groups and women’s groups marched in Bogotá in protest of her kidnapping. She was released a few months later but her life remained threatened. The former governor of Chocó, Luis Gilberto

Murillo, who declared the Chocó a neutral zone, was also kidnapped by the paramilitary and his family threatened. He fled into exile to the United States. Marino Córdoba, a community and national-level Afro-Colombian activist from Rio Sucio, one of the areas where immediately after community titling occurred the community was displaced, is also in exile in the United States. He founded the Association of Displaced Afro-Colombians (AFRODES).

Displacement for rural Afro-Colombians has profound effects on communities and individuals. Displacement breaks up social networks and governing forms internal to communities; disturbs economic life and traditional forms of work; breaks up traditional ways of managing nature, using natural resources, and defending ecosystems; and can often also break up families and generational and gender relationships. It also complicates the process of forming political units while setting up a system of constant terror and instability.

SEE ALSO: *Bogotazo* and *La Violencia*; Colombia, Indigenous Mobilization; FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army)

References and Suggested Readings

- Gilroy, P. (1993) *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Robinson, W. (1996) *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Uribe, M. V. & Restrepo, E. (Eds.) (1997) *Antropología en la modernidad: identidades, etnicidades y movimientos sociales en Colombia*. *American Ethnologist* 22 (2): 342–58.
- Wade, P. (1997) *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America*. London: Pluto Press.

Colombia, anti-war movements, 1990–2008

Tathiana Montaña Mestizo

The internal armed conflict in Colombia from 1964 to 2008 has caused more than 100,000 deaths and three to four million displacements. The main issues for the anti-war movement in Colombia have centered around paramilitarism and the US-sponsored military program, the

Colombia Plan, which started in 2000. The government anti-terrorism policy, including the paramilitary groups widely connected with governmental politics, the Colombian army, and transnational companies, produces rising human rights violations, especially in the rural areas. Presented in 2000 to the International Cooperation as a plan with a strong civil focus, the Colombia Plan very quickly turned out to be a mere military-based counterinsurgency program that safeguards the economic interest of multi- and transnational companies.

Colombia's peace movement arose in the mid-1990s, in the middle of the most violent period of the internal armed conflict. After Pablo Escobar was imprisoned in June of 1991, drug trafficking caused more than 4,000 deaths throughout the country between 1991 and 1995. In 1996 a break-in at the military base of Las Delicias in the Putumayo department by FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army) guerillas led to the detention of 60 soldiers, with 28 being killed and 16 injured. After that, rural protests in 1997 mobilized more than 100,000 coca peasants, who showed their non-compliance with the anti-drug policies of the national government articulated with those of the United States.

In 1997 assassinations all over the country by the paramilitary forces left more than 500 people dead. The murders of Jorge Christ Sahiun, Senator of the Republic, and Rodrigo Turbay Cote, Congressional Representative of the Department of Caquetá, were attributed to FARC-EP. Paramilitary groups murdered journalists Gerardo Bedoya Borrero, Alejandro Jaramillo, Jairo Elías Mark, and Francisco Castro. Center for Research and Popular Education (CINEP) investigators Mario Calderon and Elsa Alvarado were also murdered by the paramilitaries. A guerilla attack in the Patascoy municipality of the department of Nariño on December 21, 1997 left 11 soldiers dead, and 18 were retained by FARC-EP.

A number of organizations were created by groups such as indigenous peoples, peasants, women, students, and some union organizers to protest the political regime. The fundamental objective of this collective work was to demand the construction of democratic agendas of social justice, respect for human rights, and a political

negotiation of the armed conflict in Colombia. The basic mechanisms used by the peace movement included social mobilization, for example the "No Mas" (No More) march in October 1998, where more than 12 million people throughout the country protested kidnapping and fought to defend life and liberty. Also important was the construction of civil agendas for peace and agreements around structural issues such as agrarian reform, energy policies, development models, and respect for human rights.

Simultaneously in this period peace talks were being held between the FARC-EP guerillas and the Andrés Pastrana government. A round table of negotiations was installed in San Vicente del Cagúan in January of 1999. But in February 2000 the process ended because the parties of the round tables lacked real political will, especially since a significant part of the government was already negotiating the Colombia Plan, an imperialist project of the United States in the Andean region of Latin America. In this context of war, the peace movement decreased considerably and the negotiation alternative failed.

In July 2002 Álvaro Uribe Vélez was elected president (2002–6). He represented a political current opposed to dialogue and negotiations, joining the United States' "War on Terror." This situation blocked political actions by the peace movement in Colombia. Under Uribe's government program of *seguridad democrática* (democratic security), as it was called, fundamental rights, especially the right to oppose and protest, were severely curtailed.

By the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004, however, peace initiatives and social organizations revived their spaces of resistance. In September of 2004 in the city of Cali, a huge indigenous rights march was held. Known as the Popular and Indigenous Minga (indigenous mobilization), it included more than 100,000 indigenous peoples, peasants, women, and ordinary citizens. It was a demonstration of the possibilities of resistance and opposition to the government of Uribe Vélez. This allowed for the women's movement to mobilize across the country in 2004 and 2005 to accompany the indigenous communities in Cauca and Chocó, who were demanding justice for crimes against humanity. In January of 2005, social mobilization in Mico Ahumado, a small village in the south of the department of Bolívar, made possible the removal of landmines in a

rural zone. In October, a National Congress of Peace Initiatives brought together more than 1,000 peace initiatives from all over the country and presented a social agenda that included respect for human rights, political negotiation to end the armed conflict, and democracy as a way to achieve justice. The congress reaffirmed the need to maintain resistance and to seek democratic alternatives.

In May of 2006, Uribe Vélez was reelected president (2006–10). Peace and human rights organizations and other democratic sectors opted to support the National Movement of Victims led by Iván Cepeda, the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, a member of the Patriotic Union (UP) that had been created in 1985 after dialogues between FARC guerrillas and the Virgilio Barco government. The victims resoundingly reasserted their desire to work together on March 6, 2008 with a national memorial march in which more than one million people participated.

Social mobilizations in 2008 were concentrated against kidnapping and included serious criticisms of the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)/paramilitaries as well as radical questions about drug trafficking and the relationship between paramilitaries and state institutions. With no results in the short and medium terms, there were actually very few expectations of legitimizing the right to opposition in Colombia. Many peace and human rights activists have been threatened, displaced, or disappeared, and many have had to leave the country.

SEE ALSO: Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1970s–1990s; Colombia, Indigenous Mobilization; Colombia, Unions, Strikes, and Anti-Neoliberal Opposition, 1990–2005; FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army)

References and Suggested Readings

- Duncan, G. (2006) *Los señores de la Guerra*. Bogotá: Ed. Planeta.
- García-Durán, M. (2006) *Movimiento por la paz en Colombia 1978–2003*. Bogotá: Eds. Cinep, Colciencias, PNUD.
- Montaña, T. (2007) *Participación y Paz*. Bogotá: Indepaz.
- Nasi, C. (2005) *Colombia's Peace Processes 1982–2002: Conditions, Strategies and Outcomes*. Bogotá: Departamento de Ciencia Política, Universidad de los Andes.

Colombia, armed insurgency, peasant self-defense, and radical popular movements, 1960s–1970s

Hermann Ruiz

The 1960s in Colombia were marked by the aftermath of *La Violencia* (The Violence), a period of violent civil war. From the 1950s, the war saw fascist paramilitary groups on the conservative side and guerrillas and self-defense groups on the liberal side. The confrontation ended in most regions with an accord signed by liberals in which they agreed to share state administration and power by creating the Frente Nacional (National Front, FN, 1958–74). Upper- and middle-class liberals, whose properties were endangered, were no longer interested in the armed conflict after this pact.

Nevertheless, the cause led by the liberals did not take account of the needs of the landless peasants and the agrarian proletariat. Thus, the peasants organized land occupations. They argued that fallow lands should be distributed among landless peasants and that the legitimacy of existing land titles should be questioned. They also called for property rights and freedom of cultivation.

Peasant self-defense was not unknown in Colombia before this point. In the 1930s, peasant organizations had also used this strategy, united with legal actions supported by the Colombian Communist Party (PCC). These groups were known as Guardia Roja (Red Guard), Correo Rojo (Red Mail), Juntas de Colonos (Meetings of Colonies), and Comisión de Litigio (Litigation Commission).

The occupations were sometimes spontaneously organized by peasants and sometimes by the Communist Party. By the end of the 1950s, 16 organized peasant groups had occupied fallow land mainly in Marquetalia, Riochiquito, El Pato, Guayabero, Sumapaz, Viotá, Mote, Tequendama, Ariari, and Vichada. These territories were located in all regions of the country and especially in the Central Andes mountain range. The reaction by the landowners, as in

the 1930s, was to burn the peasants' houses and herd livestock onto their cultivations. At the same time, waste land adapted for agriculture by landless peasants as they escaped from *La Violencia* was also confiscated on the grounds that these lands were private property. These affirmations were supported by corrupt state officials who fraudulently provided titles to these lands. Soon the peasants armed themselves to protect their land and to survive.

As a result of the state's absence in these distant, recently colonized, and occupied areas, peasant organizations supplied services such as resource administration, infrastructure, and justice. Representatives of these organizations met at the first peasant self-defense national congress, which was celebrated in 1961. It was supported by the PCC, which approved the thesis of the "combination of all forms of struggle" that same year.

In the context of violent peasant exile, land occupations, and armed resistance, a new Colombian conflict began in the 1960s. It was launched in 1961 by a famous declaration by conservative senator Álvaro Gómez Hurtado (1919–95) that the peasant occupations were "*repúblicas independientes*" (independent republics). The intention was to legitimize military attacks upon the peasants, under the guise of guaranteeing Colombian state sovereignty. Also in 1961, Colombian president Alberto Lleras (1906–90) instigated a series of measures promoted by the US government that contemplated both development and military support to stop increasing communist influence. Lleras inaugurated his program as part of John F. Kennedy's Latin American agenda, named "Alliance for Progress."

On the one hand, this program included a great deal in the way of developmental assistance. Due to increasing pressure from peasant organizations, the Agrarian Reform Law (Law 135) was approved at the end of 1961. It created the Colombian Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA) to promote and support peasant enterprises and distribute state land with funds from the Interamerican Development Bank, World Bank, and USAID.

Contrary to the initial optimistic expectations, however, the program failed during the 1960s and 1970s for two main reasons. First, important decisions involving cultivation selection, seed variety, and technical support were made by technicians in a far-off, centralized location.

Thus, those making the important decisions were outside the areas involved and lacked local knowledge of the regions, climates, and agricultural practices. This resulted in the reproduction of the centralized agriculture of the old hacienda system and rising production costs. Second, fallow resources were distributed inefficiently by the state. For several years, these two failings discouraged peasant participation in INCORA. In short, the agrarian reform of this era was only partially implemented and lacked the political backing to effectively redistribute land. As a result, it tended to disarticulate peasant self-organization, delegitimize peasant occupations, and tacitly approve peasant displacement as a method of creating *latifundios* (large, single-family landholdings). A great opportunity to avoid a worse war was wasted.

At the same time, the Lleras government began the counterinsurgency strategy planned by the US for Latin America (Latin America Security Operation, LASO). A product of the Cold War and a result of the fears brought on by the Cuban Revolution, this policy was planned as a means of fighting communist influence throughout the region. The aid, consisting of equipment and strategy support, was materialized in massive attacks on peasants' self-defense territories, a low-intensity war that included selective assassination, and the creation of paramilitary groups.

The first aid-related massive attack was a historical event that opened a definitive guerrilla war. In 1964, the peasant self-defense organization that had occupied Marquetalia and had taken over the administrative functions there in the absence of a legitimate state was attacked in a massive onslaught by the Colombian armed forces. Some of the guerrilla leaders and some so-called bandits who were part of the Marquetalia process resisted the attack and conformed to a doctrine influenced by the PCC: they were called the Frente Sur (Southern Front), and two years later became the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC).

Another process was running simultaneously in the cities. Before the PCC's 1961 approval of the "combination of all forms of struggle" thesis, in 1956 the PCC had followed the line of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party (SUCP) in which democratic and peaceful means of obtaining state popular power were

approved and promoted. Two years later, the FN was established as a pacification measure between liberal and conservative parties by means of an alternation in the executive branch to exclude other forces. The goal was to shut out the Communist Party and popular initiatives by workers, peasants, women, and indigenous peoples.

In 1959 a new movement emerged. It was an urban, radical, communist-inspired guerrilla organization of students, workers, and peasants called *Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil Campesino* (Student, Peasant, and Worker Movement, MOEC). It was the first in a series of new radical movements, mainly composed of urban intellectuals associated with the FN. In 1962 the communist-led *Frente Unido de Acción Revolucionaria* (United Front of Revolutionary Action, FUAR) was founded as the radical fraction of the *Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal* (Revolutionary Liberal Movement, MRL, dissident from the Liberal Party). Other groups emerged: in 1963, the *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación* (Armed Liberation Forces, FAL); in 1964 the pro-Cuban and Guevarist *Ejército Nacional de Liberación* (National Liberation Army, ELN) and the Maoist *Ejército Popular de Liberación* (Popular Liberation Army, EPL); and in 1965 the *Frente Unido* (United Front), grouping thousands of students, peasants, and workers directly against the FN under the leadership of the legendary priest Camilo Torres (a militant of liberation theology, 1929–66).

The reaction of the Colombian army to these groups, which considered the armed insurgency as a resistance strategy that had a determinant communist revolutionary objective, was severe and quick. Supported by American cooperation in counterinsurgency action, the Colombian army came down hard on these organizations during the 1960s, leaving them almost annihilated.

A new hope of putting an end to the FN through democratic elections surfaced in 1970. General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1900–75), who organized a coup d'état in 1953, founded a new political movement: the *Alianza Nacional Popular* (Popular National Alliance, ANAPO). This initiative grouped various popular sectors, including the socialists. However, in a controversial move, Misael Pastrana Borrero (1923–97) was declared the FN candidate, and in 1972 the guerrilla organization *Movimiento 19 de Septiembre* (September 19 Movement, M-19) was created to commemorate the election day and

as a response to the electoral fraud. M-19 called for a continent-wide revolution inspired by its independence heritage and Bolívar's revolutionary legacy, directing its objectives to symbolic actions to gain popular support for concrete state reforms. One of its most memorable actions was the theft of Simón Bolívar's sword on January 17, 1974, which symbolized the retaking of Latin America from US imperialism and its supporters in the Colombian oligarchical government.

President Alfonso López Michelsen (1974–8) initiated a policy of peaceful dialogue with all armed groups. The Colombian army had dealt a tremendous blow to the ELN due to its increasing armed and territorial influence in 1973. Because of its military advantage, the Colombian army was not disposed to talk and these dialogues produced no significant results. The 1980s saw increasing guerrilla presence in the territories and many frustrated attempts at state reform.

SEE ALSO: *Bogotazo* and *La Violencia*; *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*, Colombia; *EPL Maoist Guerrilla Movement*; *Lame*, Manuel Quintín (1880–1967), Indian/Peasant Organization, and the Struggle for Land in Colombia, 1920s–1930s; *FARC* (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army); *M-19 of Colombia*; *Torres Restrepo*, Camilo (1929–1966); *Unión Patriótica*

References and Suggested Readings

- Fals Borda, O. (1979) *Historia de la cuestión agraria en Colombia*. Bogotá: Punta de Lanza.
- Galli, R. (1978) Rural Development as Social Control: International Agencies and Class Struggle in the Colombian Countryside. *Latin American Perspectives* 5, 4 (Autumn): 71–89.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1959) *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Machado Cartagena, A. (1994) *El agro y la cuestión social: Minagricultura 80 años*. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores.
- Medina, M. & Buenaventura, N. (1980). *Historia del PCC*. Bogotá: Colombia Nueva.
- Molano, A. (1989) *Siguiendo el corte: relatos de guerras y de tierras*. Bogotá: El Áncora Editores.
- Moncayo, V. M., González P. C., & Pizarro León-Gómez, E. (1987) *Entre la guerra y la paz: puntos de vista sobre la crisis colombiana de los años 80*. Bogotá: Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular.
- Oquist, P. (1978) *Violencia, conflicto y política en Colombia*. Bogotá: Instituto de Estudios Colombianos.

Colombia, armed insurgency, peasant self-defense, and radical popular movements, 1970s–1990s

Hermann Ruiz

The 1960s opened a dynamic era of communist-inspired guerilla movements in Colombia. The Colombian army, supported by the United States, reacted quickly and harshly, defeating some of the guerilla groups. Even so, these years saw the birth of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), and the Maoist Popular Army of Liberation (Ejército Popular de Liberación, EPL), the three most influential groups in the 1980s and 1990s. In this climate, the elections of 1970 brought hope for the end of the National Front (Frente Nacional), an agreement between liberals and conservatives to distribute the state administration and jobs in an undemocratic effort to stop the struggles that were known as *La Violencia*. General Alberto Rojas Pinilla (1900–75), who had organized a coup d'état in 1953, founded the Popular National Alliance (Alianza Nacional Popular, ANAPO) to orchestrate the National Front's defeat in elections and usher in real democracy. This initiative brought together various popular sectors, including socialists.

In a controversial outcome, the National Front candidate, Misael Pastrana Borrero (1923–97), was elected. Unhappy with the election results, the socialist faction of ANAPO created the September 19 movement (M-19) in 1972. Inspired by its independence heritage and Simón Bolívar's revolutionary legacy, the M-19 demanded concrete state reforms. It gained the support of the urban masses through such symbolic actions as stealing Bolívar's sword (January 17, 1974) and capturing the Dominican embassy (February 27, 1980) and the Palace of Justice (November 6, 1985). This was the beginning of an urban and political tendency that started to change the insurgency strategy.

The ELN was founded in 1964 by people who came from different groups and organizations,

some of them armed. The central figures had previously traveled to Cuba and were influenced by the Cuban Revolution. After leading guerilla operations for almost a decade, the group suffered a significant blow in 1973 as a result of the Colombian army's Anorí Operation. The political faction inside ELN that supported the tactic of a combination of all forms of struggle subsequently won influence, and the ELN began an armed strategy to influence the municipality's administration.

The development of the Marxist-Leninist Colombian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Colombiano Marxista Leninista, PCC-ML), founded in 1965, supplemented this new tendency. The competing dogmas of intellectual radicals within the group led to party fragmentation from the beginning. Attempting unity, the Movement of Revolutionary Integration-Free Fatherland (MIR-Patria Libre) was created in 1984 and merged with the ELN in 1987 to form the Camilist Union-National Liberation Army (UC-ELN) in honor of the mythical revolutionary priest Camilo Torres. The new group hoped to supplement military actions with political activities and mass organization.

Other new groups also emerged in the 1970s. In 1976 a new urban armed force composed of students and popular activists, the Workers' Self-Defense Group (ADO), was created. In 1978, FARC created its own offensive force, the Popular Army (Ejército Popular, EP), in an effort to obtain state power. At the same time, strikes helped force the government to open new spaces for dialogue. In 1977 and 1982, two huge national strikes erupted as a result of many smaller local ones.

In 1984, the Belisario Betancur government agreed to a truce with the FARC secretariat in pursuance of a series of measures to foster political debate. Toward this effort, a political party, the Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica, UP), was created in 1985, with FARC, some ELN fronts, and the ADO. The government agreed to guarantee free speech for its leaders and the option to participate in the next elections.

In 1985, the M-19 captured the Palace of Justice to illustrate its anger over unfulfilled agreements and in an attempt to stage a trial of President Betancur. Because of a lack of determination on the part of its executive members, the Colombian army retook the palace, bombing it and entering with tanks. In the process, 43

civilians (including 11 attorneys), 33 guerillas, and 11 soldiers and Security Administration Department (DAS) personnel were killed. Two guerillas and 11 civilians disappeared, and two students were tortured.

This process began simultaneously with the rise of the narcotraffic economy and reinforced the paramilitary strategy of the United States. As a result, a new period of violence began. After 1982, many paramilitary groups and private armies were created, including: Death to Kidnappers (*Muerte a Secuestradores*, MAS); Death Squad (*Escuadrón de la Muerte*); Death to Cattle Robbers (*Muerte a Abigeos*, MAOS); Punish Signatories or Intermediary Swindlers (*Castigo a Firmantes o Intermediarios Estafadores*, CAFIES); Embryo (*El Embrión*); Cleaning of Magdalena Valley (*Prolimpieza del Valle del Magdalena*); Colombian Anti-Communist Movement (*Movimiento Anticomunista Colombiano*); The Crickets (*Los Grillos*); and The Machete Squadron (*El Escuadrón Machete*).

From the beginning of the democratic process instituted by the 1984 peace agreements until 1993, when an international plea denouncing the persecution of UP members was made to the Interamerican Human Rights Court, close to 1,000 party members were assassinated, 123 were disappeared, hundreds more were menaced, and 40 survived attempts against their lives. All of these abuses occurred without serious investigation, and many of them were attributable to the military, paramilitaries, or narcotraffickers closely involved with politicians. By 2005, the number of victims had reached 6,000.

After the 1987 elections, Jaime Pardo Leal (1941–87), the UP presidential candidate, was assassinated. A series of huge protests erupted around the country against his murder and efforts to silence the movement. Because of the lack of security for FARC-related members of the party, it resumed the armed struggle in 1987. In 1990 the new UP presidential candidate, Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa (1956–90), was also murdered. During this bloody period two other political candidates were assassinated – Luis Carlos Galán (1943–89), a liberal leader, and Carlos Pizarro (1951–1990), a former M-19 guerilla leader.

In 1987 the Guerilla Coordination Simón Bolívar (*Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar*, CGSB) was founded, composed of the groups that had negotiated the first agreement. This time,

however, they were joined by M-19, the indigenous land rights group Quintín Lame Armed Movement (*Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame*, MAQL), the EPL, and the Maoist Workers' Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores*, PRT). The goal was to force the beginning of negotiations with the Colombian government. Talks eventually took place in Cravo Norte (department of Arauca), Caracas (Venezuela), and Tlaxcala (Mexico) between 1991 and 1992. In both Caracas and Tlaxcala, however, the dialogues failed.

Nevertheless, in 1991 a new political proposal was offered and the National Constitutional Assembly was created. For this process, the M-19 laid down its weapons in order to participate in the Assembly elections, forming a political party, the M-19 Democratic Alliance (*Alianza Democrática M-19*). Composed mainly of M-19 leaders, it was the Assembly's second force in terms of numbers, after the traditional Liberal Party. At the same time, the César Gaviria government launched a neoliberal policy known as *apertura económica* (economic opening) to open the country to new markets. The policy represented an enormous threat to small businesses, workers' rights, and national sovereignty.

The 1990s was a decade of growth for both FARC and ELN. In 1964, FARC had 48 members and in the 1980s, at least 7,800. This figure almost doubled during the decade to 12,500 combatants. In its beginnings, ELN members numbered 76. At the end of the 1980s it had 2,600 members, and in 2000, 4,500. By the end of the 1990s, then, the two groups had a combined membership of approximately 17,000. The groups' funding sources also changed. In the 1960s funding was partly based on the resources provided by socialist countries, especially Cuba and China. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, funding sources diversified to include both licit and illicit activities, such as mining, agriculture, transport, cattle theft, robbery, kidnapping, "taxes" on economic activities, municipality budget appropriation, and taxes on illicit cultivations. These activities provided them with significant economic independency.

From 1964 to 2003, some 89,991 people were killed as part of the unrest. Approximately 3.5 million people were displaced from 1985 to 2004 and their number is still increasing. Between 1977 and 2002, almost 30,000 persons were kidnapped. From 1966 to 2004, close to 8,500 people were

tortured. The brutal paramilitary operation during the 1980s created a complex social control system based on terror produced by extreme violence, the result of which was the silence of the masses. The period saw the consolidation of paramilitary power and US intervention under the Colombia Plan, justified up to the 1980s by fear of the communist menace, in the 1990s by the war on drugs, and after that by the war on terrorism.

SEE ALSO: *Bogotazo* and *La Violencia*; Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1960s–1970s; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; EPL Maoist Guerilla Movement; FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army); M-19 of Colombia; Quintín Lame, 1980s; Torres Restrepo, Camilo (1929–1966)

References and Suggested Readings

- Brittain, J. (2005) The FARC-EP in Colombia: A Revolutionary Exception in an Age of Imperialist Expansion. *Research Library Core Monthly Review* 57, 4 (September): 20–33.
- Campos, Y. (2003) *Memoria de los Silenciados: el Baile Rojo, Relatos*. Bogotá: Ceicos, MSD.
- Dudley, S. (2004) *Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia*. New York: Routledge.
- Lozano Guillén, C. (2006) *¿Guerra o paz en Colombia? cincuenta años de un conflicto sin solución*. Bogotá: Ediciones Izquierda Viva.
- Otero Prada, D. F. (2007) *Las cifras del conflicto colombiano*. Bogotá: Indepaz.
- Palacios, M. (2005) *Entre la legitimidad y la violencia Colombia 1875–1994*. Bogotá: Editorial Norma.
- Palacios, M. & Safford, F. (2002) *Colombia país fragmentado, sociedad dividida. Su historia*. Bogotá: Editorial Norma.
- Richani, N. (1997) The Political Economy of Violence: The War-System in Colombia. *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 39, 2 (Summer): 37–81.

Colombia, indigenous mobilization

Tathiana Montaña Mestizo

In Colombia there are approximately 85 indigenous communities who speak 64 different languages with a total population of 800,000 people, or 2 percent of the country's population. Historically, the struggles of indigenous

movements in Colombia have been based on the defense and liberation of “Mother Earth” from aggression by the government, multinational corporations, and mega projects. During the 1970s, the peasants' (*campesino*) movements called upon the indigenous communities to join their struggle for land rights. Though social and political organizational differences led the indigenous communities to form an autonomous and independent movement, they did unite efforts in many struggles.

The first indigenous mobilizations, giving origin to the actual movements, occurred at the beginning of the 1970s, especially in the southern departments of Cauca, Tolima, and Huila. As the movement spread across the country, it gave rise to the creation of indigenous organizations at regional and national levels. The Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC) formed in 1971, followed by the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC) in 1982. Between 1974 and 1978, the Indigenous Authorities of Colombia (AICO) formed on a national level.

The indigenous movement in Colombia is considered the pioneer of indigenous movements in Latin America. The CRIC supported the consolidation of the National Council of Coordination of Indigenous Nationalities (CONACNIE) in Ecuador in 1980. The organizational process of the indigenous communities of the south of the country arose from a context of adversity as the CRIC was formed in the most conservative and traditionalist departments of Colombia – Cauca and the Valle de Cauca – which also have the most unequal land distribution.

The movements emphasize that Mother Earth is the source of life, that it should be protected, and that it should be understood not only as a factor of production, but also as the origin of all life. They developed civil and political struggle against the large landowners and state institutions through mobilizations, marches, road blocks, and occupations of local institutions. Their goal was land recuperation and community agricultural production as an alternative to the global market. Perhaps the most important outcome was the formation of an ethnic *campesino* identity which linked the *campesino* sector in defense of the earth with the similar agenda of the indigenous communities.

Between the 1970s and 1980s the indigenous agenda broadened. One area of emphasis concentrated on internal work, educating and

propagating indigenous culture and its forms of struggle for the respect of indigenous rights. Another concern was the consolidation of the indigenous groups to gain a space of advocacy as political actors. Finally, a self-defense aspect emerged. Named the Quintín Lame Armed Movement (MAQL), this group took up arms in 1984 with the objective of supporting land recuperation from the large landowners in the south of the country.

Thus during the third ONIC congress in Bogotá in 1990, which also coincided with the convocation of the National Constituent Assembly promoted by many democratic and progressive sectors of the country, the indigenous groups publicly recognized that the country urgently required structural changes to make way for democracy. This resulted in the participation of Lorenzo Muelas, Francisco Rojas Birry, and the Paez indigenous Alfonso Pena Chepe from the recently demobilized indigenous guerilla group MAQL.

The processes of the National Constituent Assembly made visible the situation of the indigenous communities and led to the recognition of their property and traditional territories, as well as their political and administrative autonomy over those territories. It also opened the way for the election of two separate indigenous representatives to the Colombian Senate. But this institutionalization also led to a break in the unity of the indigenous movement as several representatives were proposed without reaching an agreement. Indigenous communities from the Cauca and Andean regions especially competed for leadership. Another group, politically close to the indigenous communities of Antioquia, Chocó, and Risaralda, promoted the creation of the Social Indigenous Alliance (ASI) in 1991 and managed to win a seat in the Senate after earning recognition as a political party. This situation created the first crisis in the movement due to the competing needs of restructuring the traditional indigenous organizations while fostering unity within the movement. This was the purpose of the first ASI assembly: to work toward an indigenous government program that was both pluralistic and inclusive in its democratic framework and able to consolidate a countrywide project with dignity.

During the following years at the National Constituent Assembly, the participation of indigenous movements and parties increased, but the

movement remained represented yet unheard. This is illustrated by the popular election of Floro Tunublá as the governor of Cauca in 2000, whose influence on political decisions was limited. In this context, the armed conflict in the country intensified for several reasons, such as the new war strategy of the state, the United States' intervention in the security of the country, and the "war on drugs." State-tolerated or even organized paramilitaries took up arms to exterminate the peasants and indigenous communities in the highly productive agricultural zones and natural reserves, to then plant coca, African palm, and poppy. As a result, the indigenous movement was persecuted, and the struggle in defense of the earth became related to terrorism and opposition to the state.

The indigenous movement also deals with a number of issues in addition to land reform. Racism and discrimination at the hands of the state are problems faced by indigenous people. Other problems include the right to water as a public good and the privatization process by multinational companies. The movement has also opposed the forestry law, which would further displace peasants, and the signing of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States.

In 2004, rooted in the intensification of the conflict, the indigenous movement of Colombia called for unity among all social sectors of the country, calling upon all indigenous movements and organizations on the continent to participate in a popular indigenous *Minga* – a march for life, justice, happiness, liberty, and autonomy. In September, more than 100,000 indigenous people and supporters from other social organizations came together in Cali, where an Indigenous Popular Mandate was given to the media, national and international organizations of human rights, and governments, especially the Colombian government. The indigenous communities declared a Permanent Indefinite Assembly until threats against life and integrity were overcome. The mobilization showed the existence of a strong indigenous movement as well as the need to maintain the political space and construct more decision-making arenas in which the indigenous population can defend its interests in a democratic framework. The need for this space to defend indigenous interests was shown in 2006 when members of the indigenous community were victims of 279 detentions without due process

and 10,800 death threats. The same year, 5,731 indigenous people were displaced and had to abandon their ancestral territories.

SEE ALSO: Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1960s–1970s; Lame, Manuel Quintín (1880–1967), Indian/Peasant Organization, and the Struggle for Land in Colombia, 1920s–1930s

References and Suggested Readings

- Escobar, A. (1996) *La invención del tercer mundo*. Bogotá: Ed. Norma.
- Gamboa, J. C. (1999) *Manuel Quintín Lame y los guerreros de Juan Tama*. Santafé de Bogotá: Ed. Madre Tierra.
- Vasco, L. G. (1990) El Indio y la tierra, Guión para una conferencia en la Semana del Medio Ambiente. Departamento de Geografía, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá.
- Vasco, L. G. (2006) El marxismo clásico y la caracterización de lo indígena en Colombia. *Revista de Humanidades* 5, Universidad Colegio Mayor de Cundinamarca, Bogotá.

Colombia, labor insurrection and the Socialist Revolutionary Party, 1920s–1930s

Raina Zimmering

Around 1900 Colombia began to industrialize, using compensation payments made by the United States for the separation of Panama. This process engendered huge social struggles as the Colombian economy grew, leading to tension between poor people from rural and urban areas and the oligarchy, which was getting richer and richer. In 1919, there were labor conflicts among urban artisans, textile workers, railroad workers, and petrol workers. In rural areas, the Indian peasant rebellion spread after 1914 under Quintín Lame. Organized labor then struck the capitalist enclaves in oil and bananas after 1925, and a wave of multi-ethnic peasant land takeovers swept across the coffee frontiers.

In 1926, the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR) was formed, unifying all these social movements under one banner. The PSR was an example of horizontal organization and managed to transcend the traditional division between

Conservatives and Liberals. The party was centered in communes in villages and little towns. Important leaders such as Thomas Uribe Márquez and María Cano built upon traditions of revolutionary party formation and mass action, leading the PSR in organizing proletarian protests along coffee frontiers and in the multinational export enclaves of the Caribbean.

In 1928, the protest wave culminated with the big month-long strike demanding better working conditions on the plantations of the United Fruit Company near Ciénaga in the department of Magdalena. The strikers demanded written contracts, the elimination of food coupons, eight-hour days, and six-day weeks. The strike turned into the largest labor movement ever witnessed in the country until then. Radical members of the Liberal Party, as well as members of the Socialist and Communist parties, participated. After the announcement of a meeting between a negotiating committee of the company and a reconciliation committee of the government, several hundred striking workers and their families went to the main square in Ciénaga to await the delegation. Instead, the government decided to send an army regiment from Bogotá to end the strike violently. The waiting workers were surprised by the heavily armed military forces that fired upon the masses. The troops set up their machine guns on the roofs of the low buildings at the corners of the main square, closed off the access streets, and after a five-minute warning opened fire into the dense Sunday crowd of workers and their wives and children, in a massacre described by Gabriel García Márquez in his novel *One Hundred Years of Solitude*. The exact number of casualties has never been confirmed, but estimates ranged from 47 to 2,000.

After the massacre, a wave of repression rolled through the whole state. Leaders of the PSR were assassinated and detained. The PSR dissolved and the rest affiliated to the Communist Party of Colombia in 1930. The revolutionary pressure of the Conservative government put the Liberals back in power in the same year. Later the condemnation of the massacre of the bananas workers of Ciénaga was an important theme for the famous Liberal politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in his election campaign in the 1940s. The Banana Massacre is one of the main events that preceded the *Bogotazo*, the subsequent era of violence known as *La Violencia*, the guerillas, and the ongoing Colombian armed conflict.

SEE ALSO: *Bogotazo* and *La Violencia*; Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1960s–1970s; Lame, Manuel Quintín (1880–1967), Indian/Peasant Organization, and the Struggle for Land in Colombia, 1920s–1930s

References and Suggested Readings

- Knight, A. (1990) Social Revolution: A Latin American Perspective. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 9 (2): 175–202.
- Ocampo Lopez, J. (1994) *Historia Básica de Colombia*. Bogotá: Plaza & Janés.
- Posada-Carbó, E. (1998) Fiction as History: The Bananeras and Gabriel García Márquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude*. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 30 (2): 395–414.
- Zelik, R. & Azzellini, D. (1999) *Kolumbien: Große Geschäfte, staatlicher Terror und Aufstandsbewegung*. Cologne: ISP.

Colombia, Thousand Days' War, 1899–1902

Andrés Bólvoro H.

Throughout the nineteenth century, liberal and conservative forces battled for power in Colombia, waging a number of civil wars in a struggle for control of the political institutions and territorial dominion. Between 1899 and 1902 they engaged in an especially cruel and prolonged conflict which would go down in history as the “Thousand Days’ War.”

In 1886 President Rafael Nuñez implemented a well-known and systematic nationwide project called “The Regeneration,” which benefited the conservatives and was accompanied by the issuing of a new constitution. Conservatism took control of the state, its financial resources, the electoral mechanisms, and the most coveted rural areas. In response to the centralist vision of the conservatives, the liberals were ready to fight for their own political project, “The Restoration,” and a geopolitical restructuring of the Colombian territory based on the principles of a federal system. Fiscal deficit, politically corrupted monopolies, and a socioeconomic crisis coincided in 1898 with a dramatic slump in the price of coffee, which was Colombia’s main export commodity at that time.

In 1898 liberalism was divided into two fronts. The first comprised the “pacifists” who wanted to achieve a peaceful agreement with the gov-

ernment. They proposed legal solutions in the search for constitutional reform, rearrangement of the electoral system, and a more balanced distribution of land and power. The second front included the “warmongers” who concluded that there was no possibility of negotiating with the conservative government. For them the only solution was an effective call to civil war.

Conservative forces were separated into two opposing groups as well – “nationals” and “historicals.” The first group formed part of the hegemonic body that controlled the state administration. The “historicals,” on the other hand, demanded considerable modifications within the Regeneration and agreed with the liberal pacifists in their desire to reach constitutional reform. Manuel Antonio Caro, the president of the Republic between 1894 and 1898, was one of the most radical nationalists, and his steadfast conviction made him embrace power without limits. He rejected any demand from either the liberals or the historicals.

In 1898, when his mandate was coming to an official end, Caro chose Manuel Antonio Sanclemente, an 84-year-old man with health problems, to succeed him as head of state. It was clear that this political move permitted Caro to maintain actual governmental power through the senile figure of his successor. The elections were fraudulent, and Sanclemente won, accompanied by Vice-President Manuel Marroquín. What Caro did not expect was that the second magistrate in charge would promote several constitutional reforms that allowed marginal political actors to gain some power and to participate more actively in electoral contests. Marroquín also supported the abolition of important taxes – especially the ones levied on the export of coffee. As a result he was forced to step down, and Caro resumed control, thanks to his deep experience in political affairs and the opportunities the puppet elected president offered him.

The war could have been prevented if the reforms of Marroquín had been successfully carried out, but they were all suppressed by Caro. Although the liberal leadership consisted mainly of pacifists, the course of events opened the gates to violent tendencies, and the war started on October 18, 1899. The historicals also voiced their dissatisfaction with the government and their firm rejection of the impositions of Caro and Sanclemente to the point that their movement decided to promote a coup on July 31, 1899,

which expelled the nationalists from power and returned the mandate to Marroquín. At the beginning there was an agreement between the historical and the liberal commanders to reject the nationalist hegemony and redefine the positions of power. But what really happened was that the dispute between the two traditional conservative fronts was settled and they joined forces in order to fight against the liberals.

The balance of power was tilted toward the conservatives, because the liberals had not counted on the military superiority of their enemy. The liberal troops did not have the necessary quantity or quality of weaponry at their disposal, although the governments of Venezuela, Ecuador, Honduras, and Nicaragua supported their cause with men and arms. The Thousand Days' War (which extended over the territories of Santander, Tolima, and the north of the country) was especially violent, and its cost in human lives was heavy. The battle of Palonegro, which lasted two weeks, is especially remembered for its cruelty and high death rate: nearly 2,500 soldiers died.

It is also important to analyze the real revolutionary character many chroniclers read into this war. A common opinion is that the liberals were the revolutionary force which fought against the conservative hegemony that used to rule Colombia at the end of the nineteenth century. There are some elements that serve to underpin this thesis, but there are others that argue against it. The liberal leadership was searching for constitutional reforms in order to achieve better conditions in electoral processes, gain the opportunity to occupy the most important bureaucratic positions, and obtain access to economically promising resources and estates. They did not advocate structural changes in Colombian society, nor did they show special concern for the necessities of the Colombian poor and rural inhabitants. This war did not endeavor to implement better conditions for the people: it was a war between two political parties based mainly on bureaucratic and territorial interests, in the middle of a profound socioeconomic crisis.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that there was a conspicuous revolutionary seed planted during this war. It determined the methods of fighting and also the strategy used by the liberals. At the end of the nineteenth century Colombia was a land full of *caudillos*, regional chiefs with great powers, extraordinary charisma, and loyal

personal armies under their command. There was in fact a profound atomization of power in the country and this characteristic permeated the war dynamics. Neither the liberals nor the government had a professional, permanent, and well organized army.

Instead, this war was fought by irregular factions, mainly the liberal factions that in fact took the form of a guerilla force. A lot of warriors could read and fiercely interiorized the lessons from the *Manual para el combatiente irregular* (Manual for the Irregular Fighter) – which had been introduced to Colombia by General Avelino Rosas from Cuba where he accompanied the rebels who won independence. This form of guerilla organization offered some potential but also weaknesses. On the one hand, it offered the liberals great opportunities in terms of versatility, mobility and “invisibility” in the enemy's eyes. But on the other, there were also clashes, envy, and struggles for power among the different liberal *caudillos* which hampered every attempt to establish solid unity in command and strategy. There was no strict compliance with discipline and no coherence among the liberal ranks, either, which meant repeated and unfortunate setbacks for their purpose in war.

With big losses on both sides and unbearable battle fatigue, liberal and conservative leaders decided to end the war formally in 1902. Nevertheless some liberal guerilla fighters prolonged the attacks until the next year. One could conclude that the war consolidated the basis for a new territorial structure in Colombia in which control was divided between the old-fashioned political landowners and a new oligarchy that included a good number of military commanders.

SEE ALSO: Colombia, Labor Insurrection and the Socialist Revolutionary Party, 1920s–1930s

References and Suggested Readings

- Campos, G., Falls Borda, O., & Luna, E. (2005) *La violencia en Colombia*, Vol. 1. Bogotá: Taurus.
- Espinosa, O., Varela, E., & Tirado M., A. (1990) *La Cultura de la Violencia en Colombia durante el Siglo XX. La Cábala* 11.
- Jaramillo, C. (1989) “Antecedentes generales de la Guerra de los Mil Días y Golpe de Estado del 31 de Julio de 1900” and “La Guerra de los Mil Días 1899–1902.” In A. Tirado (Ed.), *Nueva Historia de Colombia*. Bogotá: Editorial Planeta.
- Tirado M., A. (1976) *Aspectos Sociales de las Guerras Civiles en Colombia*. Bogotá: Colcultura.

Colombia, unions, strikes, and anti-neoliberal opposition, 1990–2005

Hermann Ruiz

After a decade of brutal repression, a peace process with the main guerilla groups in Colombia was reached in 1984, with the government committed to guaranteeing democratic participation. One year later the Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union, UP) was founded with this purpose. It did not take long to win popular support because its proposals included popular participation in state administration, the right of opposition, popular elections for local administrations, equal access to the media and information, land reform, and subsidies to small agricultural producers.

From the beginning of the UP's activities, persecutions, murders, threats, and many kinds of violent assault against UP members were daily occurrences, entailing no serious investigation. In 1986 the UP presidential candidate Jaime Pardo Leal was murdered. Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa took over the UP leadership in the presidential elections. He was killed in 1989, the same year that the presidential candidate for the Liberal Party, Luis Carlos Galán, who also represented popular causes, was murdered. In 1990, Carlos Pizarro, leader of the Movimiento 19 de Septiembre (September 19 Movement, M-19), an urban guerilla group that had signed a peace agreement and was willing to struggle by democratic means, was killed. In 1993, nearly 1,000 members of the UP were assassinated, and hundreds disappeared. Up to today, 6,000 UP militants have been killed. At the same time, the US counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the Colombian government and the expansion in narcotrafficking have caused a massive increase in paramilitary groups.

Nevertheless, in 1990 one of the most important manifestations of popular will in Colombian history aimed to change the political and economic structure of exclusion through democratic and institutional approaches. Through this movement, students, unions, social movements, new parties, and some ex-guerilla leaders grouped together to formulate the Séptima Papeleta (Seventh Paper) initiative, which included a proposal to carry out

a National Constituent Assembly in the elections for mayors and governors that year. The proposal was adopted, and in 1991 it reformulated the constitution to create more appropriate mechanisms and institutions for promotion and protection of political, economic, and social rights and for what was called "state modernization." This was a manifestation of mobilized citizenship in an atmosphere of violence and persecution that nevertheless fulfilled popular expectations for real change.

At the same time, however, the neoliberal policies of Washington, DC began to take shape. Several state companies were sold or restructured, social security was privatized, and tariffs were diminished. In this climate, unions began a new stage in their fight for workers' rights and, moreover, for economic and political sovereignty. On May 1, 1990 the unions organized a historic national strike in opposition to the César Gaviria (1990–4) government's neoliberal measures and against the economic and political crisis that included widespread corruption, the absence of results in the peace negotiations, the intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and crippling inflation. The protest had a national spirit beyond the particular interests of the workers.

In 1992, the fragmented union movement created the Confederación General de Trabajadores Democráticos (General Confederation of Democratic Workers, CGTD), in an attempt to unify a significant sector accompanied by the Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores (Latin American Central of Workers, CLAT) and the World Confederation of Labor (WCL). This unification was preceded by the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (Unitary Central of Workers, CUT), which was created in 1986 with communist unions, non-confederated unions, the teachers' union (FECODE), the national oil enterprise workers' union (USO), and fractions of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia (Colombian Confederation of Workers, CTC) and of the Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia (Colombian Union of Workers, UTC).

In 1995, the Ernesto Samper (1994–8) government and CUT signed a social pact on productivity, wages, and prices. In the context of sustained inflation, CUT looked to negotiation channels to develop an economic policy geared toward reducing the difference between the increase in wages and the increase in prices and

the implementation of macroeconomic measures for economic fairness. The main articles contained in the pact were unfulfilled, and in 1996 neoliberal measures went ahead. In opposition, workers of ECOPETROL and TELECOM organized one of the most important national strikes in Colombian history in 1997 against privatization of these public companies, interventions by the IMF and World Bank, and ever-rising inflation. The strike was supported by the federated unions (CGTD, CUT, and CTC) and by non-federated syndicalism.

Other large-scale strikes followed. In 1999, CUT, CTC, CGTD, and CPC (the state pensioners' union) organized another national strike, this time to manifest their disapproval of the forthcoming Plan Colombia (Colombia Plan), a program of massive reinforcement of the Colombian army supposedly to fight the "war on drugs," financed mainly by the US. In 2000 a national strike protested against the reform of labor and pension laws, wage decreases, massive dismissals from state institutions, violations of human rights, the exodus of union leaders, foreign debt, and, once again, the Colombia Plan military intervention. That same year, unionism headed by CUT began the process of organizing a new democratic left that grouped together disparate social movements and micropolitical parties, including the Frente Social y Político (Political and Social Front, FSP), which in 2005, after some divisions and alliances, became the most important left party in Colombian history, and the Polo Democrático Alternativo (Alternative Democratic Pole, PDA).

In 2003, the Alvaro Uribe government promoted a referendum to enlarge the presidential functions and to introduce several political reforms. The union movement called a national strike and, due to the demonstrations and the unions' communication strategy, the referendum did not gain enough votes for approval. Instead, the application of neoliberal policies was accelerated by the Uribe administration. In a process of state restructuring, several state institutions and joint ministries were closed and positions within municipalities (regional and local political administration entities inside the Colombian state) were suppressed, resulting in 50,000 job losses, all without union and civic participation or consultation. Following this attack, a national strike was called by the Comando Nacional Unitario (Unitary National

Command) for February 26, 2004. Participating in the strike were CUT, CTC, CGTD, CPC, and non-federated unions. The strike was also a protest against the never-ending tide of neoliberal policies led by the US and manifested in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

To gain support for the FTAA, the US began an atomized strategy, trying to negotiate separately with each of the South and Central American countries to approve bilateral Free Trade Agreements. In 2004, negotiations with Colombia started in Cartagena. Demonstrations at the opening ceremony by union leaders and representatives of the Polo Democrático (Democratic Pole) Party, the Liberal Party, and other social movements were violently suppressed by the police.

The fight to protect labor rights, despite tremendous state oppression, has been a heroic one in Colombia. Indeed, Guy Ryder from the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) has described Colombia as "the deadliest country in the world for trade unionists." The best known case of workers' rights violations in Colombia is that of the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria de Alimentos (National Union of Food Industry Workers, SINALTRAINAL), which represents Coca-Cola and Nestlé workers, among others. Murders of Coca-Cola workers began in 1994. In 2001, lawyers from the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) and the United Steel Workers (USW) initiated a legal process in the city of Miami, Florida, to represent Isidoro Gil and five other activists of SINALTRAINAL against Coca-Cola USA, Coca-Cola Colombia, and the bottling plant. The charges involve the company sponsoring paramilitary groups to murder several union members as a mechanism to break the union and to prevent collective negotiation. This case led to the world-renowned Stop Killer Coke movement.

Because of the uninterrupted murders, disappearances, threats against union members, and violations of International Labor Organization (ILO) treaties, and in accordance with accusations made by the federated unions CUT, CGT, and CTC since 1998, the ILO sent a Tripartite Commission to Colombia in 2005 that urged the government once again to protect the rights of union members. In 2006, as a result of the visit, ILO opened a permanent office in Colombia. According to the Escuela Nacional Sindical

(National Unionist School, ENS), between 1991 and 2006 in Colombia there were 2,245 homicides, 3,400 threats, and 138 forced disappearances of union leaders. Amnesty International has said that in more than 90 percent of cases, those responsible have not been brought to justice. Despite the high level of risk, 975 union activities were carried out during that same period, including strikes, stoppages, protests, hunger strikes, occupation of buildings, and other symbolic demonstrations.

Without a doubt, the terror exercised against the union movement has had convenient results for the neoliberal policies promoted by successive governments interested in US economic and military cooperation and for those economic agents who have not allowed the redistribution of wealth in Colombia.

SEE ALSO: *Bogotazo* and *La Violencia*; Ejército de Liberación Nacional, Colombia; EPL Maoist Guerilla Movement; Lame, Manuel Quintín (1880–1967), Indian/Peasant Organization, and the Struggle for Land in Colombia, 1920s–1930s; FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army); Torres Restrepo, Camilo (1929–1966); Unión Patriótica

References and Suggested Readings

- American Center for International Labor Solidarity (2006) *Justice for All: The Struggle for Workers' Rights in Colombia*. Washington: ACILS.
- Amnesty International (2007) *Colombia: Killings, Arbitrary Detentions, and Death Threats – The Reality of Trade Unionism in Colombia*. Available at www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/AMR23/001/2007/en/dom-AMR230012007en.html.
- Escuela Nacional Sindical (2008) *Las Libertades Sindicales en Colombia*. Available at www.ens.org.co/aa/img_upload/45bdec76fa6b8848acf029430d10bb5a/LAS_LIBERTADES_SINDICALES_EN_COLOMBIA.doc.
- Mesa Toro, E. C. (2005) *Coyuntura Económica, Laboral y Sindical de Colombia a Octubre de 2005*. Bogotá: Escuela Nacional Sindical.
- Otero Prada, D. F. (2007) *Las cifras del conflicto colombiano*. Bogotá: Indepaz.
- Rodríguez Garavito, C. (2005) La izquierda democrática en Colombia: orígenes, características y perspectivas. In P. Barrett, C. Rodríguez Garavito, & D. Chávez (Eds.), *La nueva izquierda en América Latina: sus orígenes y trayectoria futura*. Buenos Aires: Norma.
- Toro Zuleta, R. J., Cárdenas Quintero, D. P., & Vásquez Fernández, H. (2007) Dinámica laboral y sindical 1991/2006. *Revista Cultura y Trabajo* 73.

Color revolutions

Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese

The term “color revolutions” is used to describe as a single phenomenon a number of non-violent protests that succeeded in overthrowing authoritarian regimes between 1998 and 2005. In each of these protest movements, leaders adopted colored flags to rally under. Geographically, the term has tended to encompass only post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, though there is evidence that similar movements for change have been initiated in the Middle East (Lebanon, 2004) and Asia (Burma, 2007).

Historically, there are many precedents for the color revolution phenomenon in Europe. Protests aimed at advancing peaceful democratic change were regularly registered in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. These took the form of anti-state worker revolts (East Germany, 1953; Poland, 1956, 1970) or movements that included national communist leaders who favored weakening domestic authoritarianism and foreign, usually Moscow, domination (Hungary, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968).

The Polish *Solidarność* (Solidarity) movement, which grew out of the Gdańsk shipyards, broke new ground in the early 1980s, amassing 10 million members in a show of unity that forced the communist leadership to negotiate and offer reforms. General Jaruzelski's usurpation of the communist leadership in Poland, his introduction of martial law, and suppression of *Solidarność* highlighted the limitations of reform in the late Brezhnev years, but *Solidarność* reemerged to grasp the opportunities presented by Gorbachev's new thinking. Bereft of traditional Soviet military support and free from threats of invasion, the ruling communist regimes in Eastern Europe, one by one, entered into negotiations with democratic mass movements in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1989. Though the term was first used exclusively to apply to Czechoslovakia, the changes in Eastern Europe, all characterized by mass mobilization for non-violent regime change, are often described as the “Velvet Revolutions.”

Attempts to emulate these successes in the USSR were met with determined resistance by the Kremlin. Through a number of daring

and pioneering protests (of which the “Singing Revolution” was the most innovative), the Baltic peoples broke new ground in the science of peaceful anti-state protest. The most spectacular demonstration of collective will occurred on August 23, 1989, when two million people linked hands in a continuous chain from Vilnius in Lithuania through Latvia and on to the Estonian capital, Tallinn, in what was known as the “Baltic Chain.” In 1991 a general strike, gathering workers and students in Kiev, Ukraine, led to the resignation of Prime Minister Masol.

The implosion of the USSR was caused by many factors. Baltic mass resistance played a small part, but it left a powerful legacy and model for the peoples of other Soviet (soon to become post-Soviet) republics to follow should the need arise. Though each regime change in the communist empire between 1989 and 1991 included distinct national peculiarities, the number, similarities in technologies and methods employed, and the obvious cooperation between national movements have encouraged a consensus that they should be considered “revolutions” however much at odds this description might be with strict political terminology or historical precedent.

The term “color revolutions” does not refer only to those movements that have achieved a regime change but has also been applied to those attempting it, and in this respect a number of movements throughout Eurasia can be distinguished. First, there are the classic color revolutions such as Slovakia in 1998, Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 (although this latter is rather a hybrid revolution whose causes remain a main subject of academic debates) in which ruling regimes were peacefully removed with elections providing the catalyst for change. Then there are the failed color revolutions, including Belarus in 2003 and 2006, and Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in 2005, where opposition movements clearly tried to imitate the tactics of successful color movements but failed to dislodge the ruling regimes. Finally, there are what might be called hybrid color revolutions, those that have still to be conclusively gauged to ascertain the extent they possess the features of color revolutions. These include Uzbekistan in 2005, Nepal in 2006, and Burma in 2007.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 ushered in a new era in which a number of European coun-

tries left the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union and began a transition that necessitated the introduction of painful economic reforms, democratization, and the rule of law. Whereas the paths of these new democracies have sometimes diverged (in the early years Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia were initially less successful in discarding communist legacies than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic), all relatively quickly settled into the large families of the European Union (EU) and NATO.

Among the former Soviet republics, the Baltic States initiated a series of radical economic, social, and political reforms and installed sustainable democracies, while the remainder exerted a moderate authoritarianism, allowing western influence into the country but controlling, and sometimes even exploiting, it to crush domestic opposition.

As the 1990s progressed and a new century dawned, this latter group showed signs of breaking into two clearly identifiable ways of governing. One cluster of countries, having found their feet economically and politically after the free fall of the early transition years, boosted their authoritarian tendencies. These included Belarus, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Putin’s Russia. A second group, namely Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, retained a moderate form of authoritarian rule while keeping the door open to western influences and permitting some forms of non-state-controlled power to develop.

The basis of the “color revolution” movement is now generally acknowledged to have been established in Slovakia in 1998. The dominant party in the country, the People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, headed by the increasingly authoritarian and isolationist Vladimir Mečiar, risked diverting Slovakia from its pro-EU and pro-NATO path. Parliamentary elections in 1998 were seen as the last chance to regain international credibility. Though political activism in Slovakia was low during the 1990s, the non-governmental organization (NGO) sector had thrived since independence, and in February 1998, 35 NGOs initiated Civic Campaign 98 (Občianska kampaň OK 98) for free and fair elections. The campaign estimated that the current prime minister was highly unpopular but that only a massive turnout would succeed in giving victory to the opposition.

The OK 98 campaign actively sought to mobilize the largely untapped reservoir of youthful opposition to the Mečiar government. In 1994 less than 25 percent of eligible young voters had participated in elections and in 1998 young and first-time voters were a potentially powerful oppositional force. The anti-Mečiar campaign was based on monitoring government activities and the election itself, and an aggressive information campaign. Amongst the activities organized to increase awareness was a 14-day march, live performances, and public meetings. In major cities national artists emphasized the importance of electoral participation and delivered their message at numerous rock concerts organized during the campaign, while an election bus visited 17 cities in September 1998 to promote the value of voting.

As a result of these myriad activities, 84 percent of voters went to the polls (the 1994 elections had seen a 75.65 percent turnout) and Mečiar was replaced by Mikuláš Dzurinda, leader of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (gathering five opposition parties, the Christian Democratic Movement, the Democratic Party, the Democratic Union, the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia, and the Green Party of Slovakia). The country immediately resumed a productive dialogue with the EU and NATO, leading to membership of both organizations in 2004.

Similar modalities were in evidence when, in 2000, Slobodan Milošević, Serbia's dominant political figure since 1989, was ousted from the presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Disputed presidential elections held on September 24 provided the immediate catalyst for Milošević's overthrow. Milošević had called the elections after unilaterally altering the constitution in what opponents interpreted as an ill-disguised attempt to strengthen his power base.

Opposition victories in the 1996 municipal elections, which Milošević only recognized after three months of wrangling, had provided anti-Milošević parties access to institutional resources vital to mobilizing the population. For the 2000 election, the opposition rallied behind the popular Vojislav Koštunica and vigilant election monitoring and exit polling suggested that he had taken more than half of the vote in a five-man race. When official results did not tally, 10 days of protests followed. These included a general strike and reached a crescendo on October 5 when

hundreds of thousands of people converged on Belgrade to join existing demonstrations. Activists broke into and occupied the federal parliament and state television station while the police withdrew and the Yugoslav army stayed in barracks. Bowing to the inevitable, Milošević resigned on October 6, and Koštunica was sworn in as president the following day. In December, the party most associated with the demonstrations, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, received two-thirds of the parliamentary election vote.

Events in Slovakia and Serbia created a precedent for non-violent collective action against post-communist authoritarian regimes. Inspired by the activities of protest movements like OK 98 in Slovakia and OTPOR in Serbia, similar organizations were established elsewhere in the post-socialist sphere. Already basic features were beginning to emerge; an election campaign provided the climax of a campaign born of patient planning and mass mobilization against the state.

The strategy failed to work in Belarus in 2003, but that same year mass protests would play a decisive role in engineering the departure from office of veteran political operator Eduard Shevardnadze from the Georgian presidency. Parliamentary elections on November 2, 2003 provided the initial stimulus and Shevardnadze's attempt to falsify the results united opposition forces capable of bringing tens of thousands of Georgians onto the streets of the capital, Tbilisi.

A similar scenario was visible in Ukraine in November 2004, when electoral fraud ignited calls for mass mobilization and organized strikes throughout the country. As in Georgia, the national capital, in this case Kiev, became the epicenter of opposition protests. Activists occupied the city center and a number of public buildings. A large hardcore of demonstrators put up tents in the freezing Ukrainian winter and lived on the streets until the Supreme Court declared the elections invalid. A re-run saw opposition leading light Viktor Yushchenko emerge triumphant in what was dubbed the Orange Revolution, so-called after the color adopted by the opposition to symbolize change.

Coming so soon after the Rose Revolution in Georgia, on which it was clearly modeled, events in Ukraine sent shock waves throughout the former USSR. No longer could the color revolution phenomenon be dismissed as the isolated

work of passionate ungovernable Georgians living on the periphery of what was the Soviet empire. The sheer size of Ukraine – second only to Russia in terms of population – insured that Yushchenko's victory would send alarm bells ringing in presidential palaces in Russia and Central Asia.

As 2005 beckoned, those eager to identify where the next color revolution would take place cast their gaze toward the small Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan where parliamentary elections were due on February 28 and March 13. In the early 1990s, President Akaev, an accidental politician, had basked in western praise for his liberal reforms that set Kyrgyzstan apart from its neighbors. He did little, however, to alleviate the acute poverty that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet state, and his family's wealth, power, and disdain for the law ultimately made him part of the problem in Kyrgyzstan rather than a key to future prosperity. Kyrgyzstan seemed to offer many of the same basic ingredients that had facilitated a color revolution in Georgia and Ukraine; it had enjoyed a relatively liberal political system with independent media outlets and an active network of influential NGOs. In response to the increasingly repressive policies of Akaev, and the fear that the elections would be neither free nor fair, a number of small but vocal organizations emerged, clearly modeled on similar movements in Georgia and Ukraine. A color was selected (pink, though yellow was initially popular) and a flower (the tulip) that would identify Kyrgyzstan as part of the larger color revolution phenomenon.

The election results provoked widespread protests mainly in the south of Kyrgyzstan and, as President Akaev refused to countenance actions that might result in widespread killings, the presidential palace in Bishkek was stormed hours after Akaev and his family had fled the country. The opposition parties, united by little more than a common dislike of Akaev, quickly proclaimed the Tulip Revolution a new epoch in Kyrgyzstan's democratic development, though doubts remained as to whether Akaev's departure had been engineered by the masses or a small mob who effected a coup.

With all eyes on Akaev's unorthodox removal from power, most missed an equally newsworthy story. At exactly the same time as elections were taking place in Kyrgyzstan, a parliamentary contest took place in neighboring Tajikistan. There,

no color revolution occurred. Divided by civil war in the mid-1990s, Tajikistan labored under the iron grip of President Emomali Rahmanov who, though presiding over an economically weak, ethnically divided, and politically dependent state, tolerated little oppositional activity or expressions of dissent. As in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan's elections were unfree and unfair (as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe observers dutifully pointed out), but the opposition was sufficiently suppressed, demoralized, and disorganized to pose little threat to a president determined to consolidate his power base. The message for other regional dictators was clear: allowing an independent opposition to develop and prosper, while initially winning plaudits from the West, ultimately led to unceremonial dismissal by the people. The Kazakhstan president ordered the borders with Kyrgyzstan shut, but he knew the virus was more ideological than physical and saw to it that increased pressure was brought to bear on all potential manifestations of opposition in the media, among political parties, and by non-governmental organizations.

It was in Uzbekistan, the most populous of the Central Asian states, that the most spectacular and tragic efforts were made to stem the color revolution virus from infecting the body politic. President Karimov had wasted no time after the Rose and Orange Revolutions in shutting down key internationally funded NGOs and had berated President Akaev for being insufficiently tough with opposition forces. Though opposition parties were outlawed in Uzbekistan and organized resistance to the regime practically nonexistent, Karimov was determined to avoid becoming the next unpopular premier toppled in a color revolution.

Less than two months after the Tulip Revolution, a large crowd gathered in the Fergana city of Andijan to protest against the trial of local Islamic businessmen. Orders were given to disperse the crowd violently, and in the ensuing confrontation an estimated 700 civilians were killed (the government statistics were understandably lower, though their initial estimate of 70 was later bumped up to 166 in response to international incredulity). The Andijan massacre not only killed hundreds of Uzbeks but also shattered the increasingly romantic notions connected with collective protest in the former Soviet Union. Death was now the price of

protest in Uzbekistan and certainly President Karimov felt that he had done his bit to reassert authoritarian power in the region and stem the momentum of the color revolutions. Further attempts to effect color revolutions in post-Soviet republics since the Andijan massacre, for example Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in 2005 and Belarus in 2006, failed.

Technology of Color Revolutions

Although drawing lessons from previous protests, the color revolution phenomenon has some innovative features that are common to all the campaigns mentioned here. Immediately remarkable is that the majority of mass demonstrations have occurred during the course of an election. Elections are considered propitious occasions to inspire protesters, partially because they sometimes provide a rare opportunity to mobilize and protest with relative impunity as international observers are usually present. Elections provide a chance for a disenchanted population to offer a judgment, and when that right is taken from the electorate through vote rigging or other forms of manipulation, these transgressions can provide further stimuli for action. Another common element has been the total lack, at least in theory, of violent actions initiated by anti-regime agitators. Since the defeat of Slovak leader Vladimir Mečiar in 1998, the number of casualties has been minuscule. Even clashes with the security forces have been limited to those cases in which the authorities decided to disperse protests with force instead of negotiating. An additional element prevalent in the color revolutions has been the use of humor to deliver social or political messages. Ideas have been transmitted through many kinds of art (including eye-catching graffiti), musical performances, comics, stickers, badges, scarves, and gadgets.

The opposition's ability to unite behind a single candidate was a key element in the downfall of unpopular leaders, as it denied the president the opportunity to divide and rule his challengers. Critical to the success of the campaigns was the work of NGOs, and youth movements such as OK 98, OTPOR, Kmara, Pora, and Kel Kel had a particularly influential role. The ability of the opposition, in coordination with NGOs, to mobilize hundreds of thousands of citizens was astonishing. The domestic political environment should also not be underestimated;

millions of citizens were tired of low living standards and corrupt and unreliable politicians, and they took the chance to show their desire to challenge the government.

As getting visible popular support has been crucial for oppositional legitimacy, it has been imperative for the authoritarian regimes to sedate any manifestations of dissent, by co-optation or infiltration, or, if necessary by use of violent force. Central to opposition success has been adequate comprehension that only collective action encompassing different, even competing, anti-regime forces will produce results. Where the opposition was able to stay compact, they succeeded in currying favor with substantial portions of the electorate disaffected with the status quo. In contrast, where a unified opposition proved difficult to negotiate, popular attitudes toward change remained passive, even hostile, as citizens did not know who to trust and were repelled by opposition factionalism and impotence. A divided opposition has also been a much easier target for authoritarian regimes to manipulate and absorb as they eliminated the irreconcilable and rewarded the pliable.

Once the opposition created an organized common front, an additional decisive factor became the interaction of this oppositional alliance with the common people. This has entailed popular activism, often organized or harnessed by influential NGOs. In Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, there existed a network of NGOs working at the grassroots level and striving to arouse people from their inertia through imaginative slogans and short messages delivered through different channels. The most radical and influential NGOs opted for attractive names in the native language, which were easy to remember and contained a strong message. Prominent examples include OTPOR (Serbian: "Resistance"), Kmara (Georgian: "Enough!"), and Pora (Ukrainian: "It's time!").

The task of opposition groups has been a daunting one. They have been confronted with centralized regimes that usually enjoy dominant or exclusive control of the economy, media, and political power. Moreover, they have sought to mobilize and inject with ardor populations that are largely passive and fatalistic. Popular timidity can be attributed to a number of factors, and though the degree has differed from one state to the next, they can be summarized as media manipulation, fear of authorities, traditional

deference to authority, powerful vested interests supporting the regime, and little historical precedent for democracy or civic action. Thus a main task of the opposition has been to proselytize secretly, organize and activate all elements not indebted to the ruling order, and channel them into a viable alternative. Parallel to these efforts, the opposition movements have sought visible popular support to enhance their legitimacy. In cases of election falsification, when voters demonstrated in sufficiently large numbers that they did not endorse the official figures, the opposition discredited the authorities and revealed the real election winner. For this reason a central role has been given to holding parallel counts and ensuring independent exit polls. The production of completely discordant figures by respected international institutions has provided a solid basis on which to contest flagrant vote rigging.

Another factor common to successful color revolutions has been the ability of the people or opposition leaders to dissuade the state security services from using violence to disperse protesters. In Georgia, protesters entered parliament because the police were not determined to prevent them, and the security apparatus refused to implement Shevardnadze's subsequent state of emergency. In Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, it was clear from the beginning that the police were not seeking violent confrontation with demonstrators and did not wish to kill or maim. This undoubtedly emboldened those young activists who had taken to the streets.

In authoritarian regimes, information sources are usually state-controlled and censored, thus creating a barrier to effective intersocietal communication and civic awareness. As a result, political messages have to be delivered through non-traditional channels. An election campaign, when external observers devote more attention to the country, often guarantees slightly more channels of overt communication, but one innovation has been the use of humor to discredit the ruling regime. At first glance, the use of humor, satire, and irony against the government is difficult to quantify, but it remains an important method, as in communist times, to register opposition and create an anti-regime solidarity with an intimate audience. Humor succeeded in communicating directly to people, especially when delivered through symbols and memories common to the whole population (like video clips or sketches from old Soviet films) and helped

maintain morale during the darkest moments. Alternative channels of communication included the Internet, especially important during the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, and mobile phones, used extensively by protesters outside the Georgian parliament so that news of developments spread rapidly. These types of communication are less susceptible to state interference and have been employed particularly by the youngest strata of the population.

In terms of human resources and technology, protest strategies have been constantly refined, with movements digesting lessons from previous campaigns in other countries. From OK 98 in Slovakia, but especially after the Bulldozer revolution in Serbia, the number of trainings for activists working in democracy-oriented NGOs substantially increased. Initially, trainings were domestic, based on the ideology and strategies of non-violent protests. In his influential work *Politics of Nonviolent Action* and *The Theory of Power*, Gene Sharp enunciated 198 methods to show non-violent disagreement with a regime or a political decision. In a further development of his thoughts, Sharp issued *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, in which he combined his theoretical assumptions with practical ways of challenging unpopular regimes. The main assumption was that governing authority is based upon popular will, though dictatorial governments might survive through popular acquiescence and political passivity induced by fear of authorities. Once the opposition is able to cut the sources of power from the regime, Sharp argued, it has a good chance of dislodging it. *From Dictatorship to Democracy* was made available on the Internet in a number of languages (Serbian 1999, Ukrainian 2004, Kyrgyz 2005, Russian 2005) and trainings were subsequently organized for NGO activists at both domestic and international levels.

Since the organization and resources required to prosecute a successful color revolution have been formidable, and opposition funds are often meager, questions have been raised regarding the extent of foreign support for opposition forces. Foreign intervention in post-communist countries can be categorized into two ideologically opposed camps. On the one side there has been the "West," broadly defined as the United States, the European Union, and international organizations like the Soros Foundation, while on the other side has stood the former imperial power in the area, Russia, or the "East." Since interest

in the region from both sides is high, both have become increasingly engaged with the political outcome of the protest movements.

The OK 98 campaign did not raise many criticisms, but since the events of October 2000 in Belgrade the West has increasingly been accused of interfering in the domestic politics of post-communist states. The strongest accusations have lambasted western powers for financing anti-government forces in former Soviet countries, and this has led to the shutting down of a number of western-funded NGOs and harsher controls over capital inflows into countries like Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.

Accusations against the West have come from western sources as well. At regular intervals major newspapers have reported unfavorably how US taxpayers' money has been used to finance protests or independent media overseas. Anti-Kremlin accusations in Russia have been more difficult given the level of censorship and the reluctance of the EU and US to confront Moscow directly lest this might exacerbate East-West relations.

Both East and West have invested large amounts of money to back, or countervail, color revolutions. Resources have been pumped into post-communist states by the West through funding of election-monitoring NGOs, civic initiatives, and independent media outlets, while the Kremlin has supported friends of Moscow with favorable economic relations that simultaneously foster dependence, most notably by providing oil and gas at well below market prices.

A particularly important role has been played by the Soros Foundation, an American-based NGO established in 1993 by the billionaire George Soros. Officially known as the Open Society Institute in many post-communist countries, the Soros Foundation has been funding, since its inception, a number of programs targeting civic education and democratic engagement, and has established a university in Budapest to help mold the future elites of post-socialist societies. The European Union remains a relatively minor player though its efforts at promoting democracy in the post-communist space have been considerable, particularly in its immediate neighborhood of Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. Its role arouses less suspicion than that of the US and it is viewed as a more disinterested participant in regional politics.

Social Forces in Color Revolutions

Despite the important role played by external actors and political battles between organized elites, the color revolutions have also been symptomatic of important societal forces. Chief among these transformations has been the consolidation of a network of civic NGOs and the mobilization of societal forces for democratic change. In each color revolution scenario, NGOs patiently worked behind the scenes – documenting, informing, organizing – so that by the time mass protests were necessary, they were in a position to advise, coordinate, and provide logistical support for popular demonstrations.

A similar pattern of NGO development was identifiable in the early years of post-communist government. The end of the Cold War facilitated a substantial inflow of western investment and contacts with western organizations. Operating at the bottom of society, many of these new institutions were ignored by the political elites who assumed that they were insufficiently strong to be politically determinative.

While one of the main engines of social change, NGOs are not entirely new to post-communist countries and during the late Soviet period civic activism had already taken root among some sections of the population. The signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in 1975, which obliged its signatories – of which the USSR was one – to respect human rights, prompted some idealists to form Helsinki Watch groups, though most activists were subjected to constant surveillance and harassment by state security forces. A less controversial, though still hazardous, form of civic activism was conducted by diverting political energy into ecological issues. Movements formed to protest against Chernobyl in Ukraine, nuclear testing near Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan, and phosphorite mines in Estonia facilitated anti-state organization and collaboration with western supporters.

NGOs mushroomed during the 1990s, and civic participation substantially increased. Campaigners from the Soviet-era protests remained active in political or civil initiatives during the chaos of the times, when would-be autocrats were unable to assert state authority. Consequently, democratic ideas often found many adherents, as a section of the people had already developed independent

views and were receptive to external stimulation. In Ukraine one of the conditions of success for the Orange Revolution was the existence of a structure that could coordinate the efforts of a plethora of similarly minded NGOs. This ensured that a clear united message could be articulated and international donors and domestic support could channel their energies effectively so that contested elections could be professionally monitored. A pyramidal organizational structure maximized efficiency, simplified donor funding options, and obviated the danger of scattering the energies of anti-regime forces. However, while the presidents of Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan had allowed powerful NGOs to develop, countries like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan limited and controlled those forces, and were helped by a lower level of civic participation.

Future of Color Revolutions

Authoritarian regimes have adopted a myriad of repressive countermeasures to stymie color movements. One of the most impressive is the creation of counter-NGOs which endorse the ruling regime and defend state ideology against criticism from independent NGOs ("Putin Youth" in Russia is a good example). A peculiar version of this strategy was implemented in Akaev's Kyrgyzstan when, in response to the establishment of a vibrant youth movement (Kel Kel), which was clearly modeled on Kmara in Georgia and Pora in Ukraine, the state engineered the creation of a clone youth organization, with the same name but completely different (i.e., pro-regime) objectives. The primary aim was to sow confusion in the public mind and to somehow supplant the original movement with the clone organization (which was even given the web address previously owned by the original Kel Kel). These tactics complement a wider strategy of enfeebling NGOs by controlling their funding and activities and restricting their means of communicating anti-state ideas.

Despite numerous obstacles and ever-greater risks, attempts to carry out color revolutions have continued and there is a constant transfer of knowledge between countries. Some activists involved in color revolutions and civic NGOs have been regularly invited to a number of countries to train local leaders on techniques of mass protest.

It seems, however, that after an initial period during which new strategies and technologies caught regimes unprepared, the autocrats have consolidated their positions by adopting a series of countermeasures aimed at quelling movements that seek to mimic methods adopted elsewhere.

Patient organization, strategic thinking, and slow movements forward have been hallmarks of the work conducted by successful protest movements in the post-communist space. Inevitably, the color revolutions have lost much of their gloss amid unfulfilled expectations. The capacity to inspire has not dissipated entirely, however. The creation of an institute to export revolutions in Serbia, the detention of Ukrainian activists in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in 2005, and of Georgian activists in Belarus in 2006, and the subsequent mass protest movements employing non-violent methods like those in Nepal in 2006 and Burma in 2007 demonstrate that the color revolution movements active between 1998 and 2005 have provided valuable experience and knowledge that will be used, perhaps in other forms and contexts, for agitation in other parts of the globe.

SEE ALSO: April Revolution, Nepal, 2006; Serbian Revolution of October 2000; Sharp, Gene (b. 1928); Solidarność (Solidarity); Soviet Union, Fall of; Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan; Ukraine Orange Revolution, 2004–2005; Velvet Revolution, 1989

References and Suggested Readings

- Aslund, A. & McFaul, M. (Eds.) (2006) *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Avioutskaa, V. (2006) *Les Révolutions de velours*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Foran, J. (2005) *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Forbig, J. & Demeš, P. (Eds.) (2007) *Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe*. Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States.
- International Crisis Group (2005) *Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution*. Bishkek and Brussels: ICG.
- Karumidze, Z. & Wetsch, J. V. (2005) *Enough! The Rose Revolution in the Republic of Georgia 2003*. New York: Nova Science.
- McMann, K. M. (2006) *Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Marat, E. (2006) *The Tulip Revolution: Kyrgyzstan One Year After*. Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation.

- Sharp, G. (1993) *From Dictatorship to Democracy*. Boston: Albert Einstein Institute.
- Thompson, M. (2004) *Democratic Revolutions: Asia and Eastern Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Wilson, A. (2006) *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Columbia University civil rights protests

Nicole Frisone

The Columbia University Crisis of 1968 marked significant changes within the New Left movement and reflected the racial division that had been growing since the early 1960s among left-leaning activists. Columbia students from April 23 to April 30 occupied and “liberated” five buildings on Columbia University’s Morningside Heights campus. Students’ primary demands were to halt Columbia’s construction of a gymnasium in Morningside Park, and to sever the university’s ties with the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA). Within the initial hours of protest, the Columbia demonstrations became a strictly segregated affair with black students occupying Hamilton Hall while whites occupied Low Library and the subsequently occupied buildings. The student leaders at Columbia consisted primarily of Mark Rudd, from the Columbia chapter of Students for a Democratic Society, and Cicero Wilson, the leader of the Students Afro-American Society.

Tensions at Columbia had been building for over a year prior to the actual demonstration. The university’s expansion policy throughout Morningside Heights and towards Harlem (at the expense of lower-income residents), its failed attempt to generate income through the infamous Columbia filter cigarette, and the presence of CIA and Dow chemical recruiters on campus increased friction between students and the university. The February 1968 Tet offensive exacerbated tension over the Vietnam War, while the April 4 assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. and rise of the Black Power movement increased racial tensions between the university, students, and the surrounding black community. These factors coalesced to instigate the April 1968 demonstration, through which the students won most of their demands: the university never built the gymnasium and severed all ties with the IDA.

The Columbia students marked a significant change in American New Left activism. Younger students in the Columbia SDS chapters, as well as younger members in other chapters, reflected the growing generation gap between themselves and early 1960s activists such as the founders of SDS. The younger group was increasingly more radical and did not hold to the non-violent practices of their predecessors. A number of students, such as Mark Rudd and Ted Gold among others, went on from Columbia to form the basis for the Weather Underground in August 1968, effectively dividing SDS as an organization and contributing to the disintegration of the New Left as a movement.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Vietnam War Movement, United States; Berkeley Free Speech Movement; Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Student Movements; Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)

References and Suggested Readings

- Avorn, J. L. (1969) *Up Against the Ivy Wall*. New York: Atheneum.
- Cox Commission (1968) *Crisis at Columbia: Report of the Fact-Finding Commission Appointed to Investigate the Disturbances at Columbia University in April and May 1968*. New York: Vintage.
- Gitlin, T. (1987) *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage*. New York: Bantam.
- Kunen, J. S. (1968) *The Strawberry Statement*. New York: Avon.
- Wallerstein, I. & Starr, P. (Eds.) (1971) *The University Crisis Reader: The Liberal University Under Attack*, 2 vols. New York: Random House.

Combination Laws and revolutionary trade unionism

Todd Webb

Passed by the British parliament in 1799 and 1800, the Combination Laws were meant to curtail the early trade union movement in England and to stamp out what the government perceived as the danger of lower-class revolution. In the event, these laws had the opposite effect: increasing the danger of subversion in the short term and the level and effectiveness of English trade unionism in the long term.

The Combination Laws of 1799 and 1800 came out of the crisis of legitimacy that shook the

British state during its war against revolutionary France. The war effort was accompanied by episodes of scarcity and popular unrest, a naval mutiny in 1797, a rebellion in Ireland in 1798, and by what the Tory government of William Pitt the Younger believed was a rising tide of pro-Jacobin sentiment across England. Between 1792 and 1800 Pitt's government passed a series of draconian measures in an effort to clamp down on such political radicalism, suspending habeas corpus and severely limiting freedom of speech and association.

The Combination Laws were enacted just as this Reign of Terror, as some historians have called it, was coming to a head. In this context it is readily apparent that the 1799 law was aimed squarely at the lower class. It simplified a series of laws against workers' combinations that stretched back to the 1300s, allowing owners to move quickly against any attempts by their employees to regulate their own pay, hours and quantity of work, or the hiring and firing of personnel. Under the 1799 law workers suspected of forming a union could be brought before one judge, found guilty on the evidence of one witness, and sentenced to up to three months in prison with only limited rights of appeal. This first Combination Law passed easily through parliament, but its provisions sparked protests among workers in most of the major cities in England. In 1800 the Pitt government revisited the Combination Law. It attempted to make the law less blatant in its class antagonism: outlawing combinations among management as well as their employees and permitting binding arbitration over wages. The 1800 law also gave workers a better chance of receiving a fair trial if they were arrested under its provisions. However, trade union activity remained illegal.

In the short term the Combination Laws did not have the effect that William Pitt and his government intended. Immediately after parliament passed the 1799 law, England's trade unions experienced a period of rapid growth. According to E. P. Thompson (1968: 546), the Combination Laws also "jolted the Jacobins and trade unionists into a widespread secret combination, half political, half industrial, in emphasis." This was especially true in the West Riding of Yorkshire in the early 1800s, where irate workers formed a group known as the Black Lamp, administered secret oaths, held clandestine meetings in fields in the middle of the night, and may have aimed

to achieve both industrial and revolutionary goals. Thompson suggests that the Black Lamp had connections to wider efforts to overthrow the government organized by Edward Marcus Despard in England and Robert Emmet in Ireland. However, much of the evidence for this picture of revolutionary trade unionism comes from a government spy who was later discredited for sending alarmist reports to his superiors in London. This has led other historians to question how far English trade unionism was, in fact, a movement with revolutionary, as opposed to strictly industrial, aims.

The Combination Laws also proved a disappointment for both employers and the government over the long term. Most owners found that it was easier either to negotiate with the unofficial, but increasingly effective, combinations that the workers continued to form or, in extreme cases, to charge union members under older and harsher laws. At the same time, the government realized that prohibiting combinations actually increased the likelihood of revolutionary subversion among the lower class, forcing workers to organize in defiance of state authority. These developments explain why the efforts of the ex-tailor and political radical Francis Place to repeal the Combination Laws proved successful between 1814 and 1825. In 1825 trade unions secured permanent legal protection: they were no longer open to prosecution, as long as their demands only included wages and hours of work. Over the following decades Place's successful campaign against the Combination Laws provided the impetus for further union growth among the workers of England.

SEE ALSO: Britain, Trade Union Movement; Despard, Colonel Edward Marcus (1751–1803) and the Despard Conspiracy; Emmet, Robert (1778–1803) and Emmet's Rebellion; Luddism and Machine Breaking; Place, Francis (1771–1854); Thompson, Edward Palmer (E. P.) (1924–1993); United Englishmen/United Britons

References and Suggested Readings

- Dickinson, H. T. (1985) *British Radicalism and the French Revolution, 1789–1815*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Dinwiddie, J. R. (1974) The "Black Lamp" in Yorkshire 1801–1802. *Past and Present* 64 (August): 113–23.
- Goodwin, A. (1979) *The Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic Movement in the Age of the French Revolution*. London: Hutchinson.
- Moher, J. (1988) From Suppression to Containment: Roots of Trade Union Law to 1825. In J. Rule (Ed.),

British Trade Unionism, 1750–1850: The Formative Years. London: Longman.

Reid, A. J. (2004) *United We Stand: A History of Britain's Trade Unions.* London: Penguin.

Thompson, E. P. (1968) *The Making of the English Working Class.* London: Penguin.

Commoner, Barry (b. 1917)

Michael Egan

The biologist Barry Commoner was instrumental in the creation of the science information movement, a practice that sought to relay key scientific findings into a vernacular, accessible language so that the public could be involved in science policy decisions that influenced their health and welfare. The science information movement transformed the relationship between science and the public and played a critical role in reshaping American environmentalism after World War II. Commoner's stalwart criticism of industrial production practices also helped to highlight the hazards associated with the petrochemical industry.

Commoner was born May 28, 1917 in Brooklyn, New York to Russian immigrant Jews. He took an early interest in biology and continued his studies at Columbia University. At Columbia in the 1930s, Commoner immersed himself in biology and in radical politics, reading Friedrich Engels and J. D. Bernal. After service in the US Navy during World War II, Commoner took a position in the botany department at Washington University in St. Louis.

Central to Commoner's activism was the belief that citizens needed better access to scientific information and that scientists had a social responsibility to provide it. The danger, as he saw it, was that too often scientific expertise was called upon to make political decisions. While scientists possessed a technical knowledge that was relevant to assessing risks associated with nuclear fallout, they had no special moral authority to determine for the larger public what constituted acceptable levels of risk. Commoner's science information movement was pivotal in distributing the accessible information to a concerned public; in the expanding knowledge society, where access to information was a central form of power, Commoner recognized that access

to scientific information was a critical plank in building a more robust form of citizen activism.

A key example of this form of activism was present in Commoner's efforts to raise awareness about nuclear fallout. As concerns about the potential health hazards of radioactive fallout from aboveground nuclear weapons testing became palpable during the 1950s, Commoner and a small group of St. Louis scientists, doctors, and local activists mobilized to create the Greater St. Louis Committee for Nuclear Information. The Committee's work involved raising awareness of the risks inherent in aboveground nuclear testing, and providing the public with facts they could use in independently evaluating risk. After the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Committee for Nuclear Information expanded its focus to include myriad environmental concerns, concentrating particularly on the new synthetic products of the petrochemical industry: pesticides, fertilizers, plastics, and so on. The Committee for Nuclear Information became the Committee for Environmental Information, and Commoner also founded the Center for the Biology of Natural Systems, an interdisciplinary research center committed to addressing environmental problems.

By 1970, as a result of his regular public speeches and appearances, Commoner had emerged as one of the leaders of American environmentalism, appearing on the cover of *Time* magazine. His four laws of ecology, published in his book *The Closing Circle* (1971) – everything is connected to everything else; everything must go somewhere; nature knows best; and there is no such thing as a free lunch – became a centerpiece of the growing ecology movement after the first Earth Day (1970). During the 1970s, Commoner continued his environmental activism, drawing environment, energy, and economy together and suggesting their intimate relationship. In 1980, Commoner ran for president of the United States on the Citizens' Party ticket, before retiring from Washington University and moving his Center for the Biology of Natural Systems to Queens College in Flushing, New York. Through the 1980s and 1990s, Commoner turned his attention to urban waste and pollution problems. By the beginning of the new century, Commoner concentrated his efforts on what he interpreted as intrinsic flaws in the established understanding of genetic theory. Throughout his career as a scientist and public intellectual, Commoner stressed

the expert's obligation to his or her society; this notion transformed the practice and politics of post-World War II science.

SEE ALSO: Carson, Rachel (1907–1964); Ecological Protest Movements; Greenpeace

References and Suggested Readings

- Egan, M. (2007) *Barry Commoner and the Science of Survival: The Remaking of American Environmentalism*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Egan, M. (2008) Why Barry Commoner Matters. *Organization and Environment* 21 (3).
- Moore, K. (2008) *Disrupting Science: Social Movements, American Scientists, and the Politics of the Military, 1945–1975*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Communist Manifesto

Helen Bluemel

The *Communist Manifesto*, also published as the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, was written by Germans Karl Marx (1818–83) and Frederick Engels (1820–95), and was first printed in London in February 1848. In the previous year both were assigned to write a theoretical and practical party program for the League of the Communists. This association was an international, clandestine organization of workers.

This party program was meant to introduce the history, concepts, and plans of communism in a comprehensive manner. Part I, “Bourgeois and Proletariat,” is a historical overview of existing societies up until 1848. By “bourgeoisie,” Marx and Engels meant the social stratum of capitalists, the owners of the means of production (owning machines, factory buildings, and raw materials). The proletarians are the class of wage laborers, who do not own anything apart from the labor of their hands, which they have to sell to secure livelihoods.

The main premise is the notion that “all hitherto history is the history of class struggle.” This means that throughout humankind's development, each society was divided into classes of rulers and ruled (each category consisting of one or more subdivisions). The development from the ancient to feudal to the industrial age is explained in terms of historical materialism. This means a notion of history that bases any developments on the economic situation and the predominant mode of production. Any change in

society is brought about by a modification of the economy.

Marx and Engels describe the developmental tendencies of the industrial age. In its most simple terms, there are only two classes of importance in society, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which are involved in a class struggle. All other classes immerse into either of the two. The bourgeoisie is the ruling class, which, in its constant need for new markets for its products, forces all nations into civilization. The industrial era, however, does not only create the bourgeoisie, it also creates the proletariat. This class of workers then becomes aware of its political power through forced assemblage in the capitalist production process. It subsequently overthrows the bourgeoisie in revolution. This progression is inevitable.

Part II of the *Manifesto*, “Proletarians and Communists,” describes the aims of the communists, who perceive themselves as the only valid political representation of the proletarians. It highlights the political organization's revolutionary objectives, mainly the abolition of private property, social conventions, and national borders. Private possessions are to be converted into public ownership; the exploitative structure of the family is to be dissolved into a real community of equals. The notion of nation-states with restrictive borders is already redundant as the exploitation of workers takes the same form everywhere. Once the bourgeoisie is overthrown this common experience unites all workers internationally.

This part also includes a ten-point instruction for revolutionary measures. It identifies a dictatorship of the proletariat as a necessary step temporarily on the path to a truly free communist society.

Part III, “Socialist and Communist Literature,” is a critical review of prevailing socialist ideas and philosophies in Europe. The concluding remark states that all socialism is void and unpractical (utopian) as it falls short of demanding revolutionary change in society and seduces the proletariat to passivity.

The final part, Part IV, “Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties,” states that communists align themselves with any opposition party that furthers communist aims. This extends to the support of the bourgeoisie in Germany, as this class is revolutionary in the context of the events

of 1848. As the rule of the bourgeoisie is the precursor of proletarian rule, workers are helping historic development by supporting the attainment of bourgeois rule in Germany. It signs off with an open appeal for revolution: "Working men of all countries unite!"

The *Communist Manifesto* constitutes one of the main works of Marxist philosophy. It contains two of Marxism's key concepts: historical materialism and historical determinism. The former means that any change in history is linked to economic circumstances and that the economic circumstances are the basis of everything else in society (such as the state, culture, etc.). The latter means that history is following determined rules, which allow a forecast of the future. This explains the confidence of Marx and Engels in the imminent proletarian revolution.

SEE ALSO: Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism

References and Suggested Readings

- Cowling, M. (Ed.) (1998) *The Communist Manifesto: New Interpretations*. New York: New York University Press.
- Gaspar, P. (Ed.) (2005) *The Communist Manifesto: A Road Map to History's Most Important Political Document*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1998) *The Communist Manifesto*. London: Verso.

Communist Party of Australia

Peter Beilharz

Communism in Australia, as elsewhere, is a story that is both global and local; and as elsewhere, it combines exemplary behavior and work in the public sphere with tribalism and the dullness of left orthodoxy.

The history of socialism and radicalism in Australia before communism is rich and diverse, and equally influenced by British and American radical theory and practice and the local inflections of labor radicalism, enthusiastic but often racist. Socialism before communism in Australia is part of a broader new world network and culture. The year 1917 changed all that, though unevenly and slowly. The Communist Party of Australia (CPA) was established in 1920, which meant that it was promptly

Bolshevized under the 21 Conditions of the Comintern. At the same time, Australian communists had to guess and make up their own culture, which remained in many ways continuous with the local past, which into the twentieth century was tough, economic, masculinist, and racially exclusive.

The global experiences of the first half of the twentieth century were powerfully influential in Australia. The first coherent generation could be described as the Depression generation; the next, quickly following, as the generation of the war against fascism. The CPA prospered after the Soviet Union entered World War II. Its membership peaked at 23,000; it had branches in suburbs as well as in the larger cities, and the grinning visage of Marshal Stalin even featured on the cover of the *Women's Weekly*, for communism also exerted some influence on popular or mass culture.

The Cold War ruined the prospects of the CPA, as the polity split by the 1950s between communists and Catholics, whose numbers at this point were still extremely significant in the Australian Labor Party (ALP). The Labor Party split over this issue in 1955, which kept it from power till 1972. The CPA suffered significant exits after Khrushchev's Secret Speech in 1956; as in Britain, their numbers fueled the revival of humanism, for example via the journal *Arena* (b. 1963). The 1960s in Australia were turbulent and heady, and expanded the influence of Marxism and communism apace, at the same time sowing the seeds of later generational divergence. By the 1960s the Communist Party was a potentially explosive combination of old-style laborists and Stalinists and hippies, sexual libertarians, feminists, and Althusserians. This combination could not last. The tensions between the old left and the new left expanded the ranks and influence of the CPA, but also anticipated one cause of its decline. The CPA then split twice, in 1964, when the Maoists departed to form the CPA (ML), and again in 1971, when pro-Soviet members quit to form the Socialist Party of Australia. By the 1970s the CPA was down to 2,000 members. In 1984 the Communist Party was significantly derailed when the majority of the Central Committee in the Victorian branch resigned in order to join the center faction of the newly installed Victorian State Labor Party. The CPA thus began to wind down five years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, with

numerous variations on these themes being played out in different capital cities.

Communism in Australia was always tempted by popular frontism, and often viewed the Labor Party as its main point of reference. Its eventual liquidation follows this logic. Into the 1980s the ALP was pioneering a process that can now, in hindsight, be identified as the formation of New Labour *avant la lettre*. The effect of its younger intellectuals, in league with leading influences in the metalworkers' unions, was significant here. Australian capitalism followed the path of settler capitalist development, where primary export commodities ruled, organized labor was strong, and industrialization lagged, especially by northern standards. Into the 1970s the metalworkers' unions, associated with actors in the CPA and the newly formed Australian Political Economy Movement, argued vigorously for the development of an Alternative Economic Strategy, the core of which would be industry development policy. This was entirely consonant with the maxims of classical Marxism – Australia had a weak economic base, always risked dependency, and needed to export finished secondary commodities rather than raw primary commodities. This left-wing impulse, however, could find no sufficient carrier in the CPA. Its obvious vehicle was rather the Labor Party. These left-wing ideas and intellectuals were rechanneled through the ALP after its election in 1983, but any prospects of left victory were sadly pyrrhic: this was exactly the moment when the latest, most powerful wave of globalization opened, and the idea of following the Swedes, to develop a strong unitary national economic policy, was lost to global development.

As is apparent from this story, the actors in and around the CPA had significant historic and political influence. The cultural influence of the left in Australia was also disproportionate; until recently, the intelligentsia has been powerfully connected to the left. As a 1950s ex-communist then joked, the biggest party in Australia was the party of ex-communists. Writers, artists, and cultural critics were very often associated with the left and with the CPA in particular. The influence of Antonio Gramsci and subsequently of Eurocommunism in Australia were especially apparent in its Melbourne branch from 1968; the influence of Althusser and the revived political economy were especially evident in the journal *Intervention* (b. 1972), generated out of the

Melbourne Left Tendency. Many of Australia's leading critics and historians came out of this milieu. Australian communists had their blind spots, but they were also leading international activists and defenders of human rights, not least those of indigenous peoples. Australian communism, in short, has returned to the mainstream and is now dispersed across Australian culture, which has nevertheless been influenced by these actors, arguments, and traditions in more ways than are transparently evident.

SEE ALSO: Australia, Anti-War Movement; Australia, New Social Movements; Australian Labor Movement; Australian Left; Bolsheviks; Eurocommunism; Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Women's Movement, Australia

References and Suggested Readings

- Beilharz, P. (1989) *Elegies of Australian Communism. Australian Historical Studies* 23: 92.
- Beilharz, P. (2008) *Socialism and Modernity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Davidson, A. (1969) *The Communist Party of Australia*. Stanford: Hoover Institution.
- Macintyre, S. (1998) *The Reds – The Communist Party of Australia from Origins to Illegality*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Communist Party, France

R. O'Brian Carter

Although it only took its name in October of the following year, the French Communist Party (PCF, Parti communiste français) was effectively established with the Congress of Tours of December 1920. The Congress had been called to respond to the injunctions issued by the 1919 creation of the Third International (Comintern) in Moscow. Riding the success of his Bolshevik Party in the Russian Revolution of 1917, Vladimir Lenin's "Twenty-One Conditions" demanded, in short, that social revolutionaries everywhere look to Soviet Russia for guidance. Such demands further fractured a heterogeneous yet rich clustering of French socialist movements. Those that accepted the demands joined the PCF. The newspaper *L'Humanité* – created in 1904 by the single most important French socialist leader, Jean Jaurès (1859–1914) – became the PCF mouthpiece.

Marcel Cachin (1869–1958) was its dominant leader in the 1920s. Cachin had taken part in the 1905 foundation of the *Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière* (SFIO), the dominant body within French socialism, but now an organization from which he distanced himself.

The PCF was to suffer from the Red Scare that followed World War I. Although this initial panic dissipated somewhat, the fear of communism, perhaps innate to the advocates of liberal democracy given the radical nature of communist objectives against private property, blew hot and cold from this time forward, defining the parameters within which the PCF would and could work. Moscow-based Bolshevism regarded communist participation in “bourgeois” democracies as a reformist compromise to avoid. Such political participation, they reasoned, only served to allay wholesale revolution. The PCF, however, proved much more flexible in its approach, and Lenin’s understanding of this was implicit. Offering themselves up as candidates, party members, when successful in elections, used the French National Assembly to forward their interests.

Elected PCF members were often reduced to obstructionist tactics, voting in bloc against measures which either did not originate from their ranks or of which they did not approve. In many respects, this was a necessary reaction to the limited number of seats the PCF won. To take the example of the 1924 elections, which installed the *Cartel des Gauches*, a left-of-center coalition, the PCF garnered only 26 seats in a 581-seat Chamber of Deputies, the French lower legislative house. There were no PCF senators. This was a definite improvement over their previous margin, which had rendered only nine deputies, but still paled in comparison to the 104 members the SFIO forwarded in 1924.

The PCF presence was often blatantly adversarial. Through various legal means and devices, they sought to obstruct the day-to-day operation of governance, with filibusters and other time-consuming exploitations of parliamentary procedures. Their presence as deputies and, later, as senators did not lead to any willingness to be appointed as cabinet members. Quite naturally, their “bourgeois” opponents had few qualms about such refusals. They hardly wished to see PCF members serve in ministerial office. Offers of cabinet inclusion were not forthcoming.

PCF membership plummeted from 110,000 in 1921 to 30,000 by 1932. Arrests and the legal

harassment of PCF members were the norm during the latter half of the 1920s. By the early 1930s, PCF strategy revealed a more pronounced willingness to build coalitions. The SFIO was openly courted. A sifting was taking place within PCF leadership. Most significant was the emergence of Maurice Thorez (1900–64), a young man of working-class origins who became organizational secretary at the age of 24, and then secretary general of the Central Committee in 1930. His dominance within the PCF ended only with his death. Another important PCF member, Jacques Duclos (1896–1975), also began to exert his influence at this time. He would become a senator after World War II.

A financial scandal that finally broke in 1934, the Stavisky Affair, implicated several French public officials, if not the credibility of the Third Republic itself. The result was anti-parliamentarian street agitation on the part of right-wing groups, such as the *Croix de Feu* (Cross of Fire) and *Action Française*. This violence galvanized left-wing coalition building. The PCF, the SFIO, and the Radical Socialists joined forces. This “Popular Front” rode electoral success to power in 1936. The PCF nearly doubled its electoral base, rising from 12 seats in the 1932 Chamber of Deputies to 72 seats in that of 1936. The SFIO fared even better, becoming the single largest seated party. Socialist leader Léon Blum (1872–1950) was called upon to form a cabinet. A wave of unsolicited nationwide strikes suddenly gripped the country, breaking the momentum. Workers had interpreted the electoral results as justification for widespread change. Change was indeed afoot. With the country at a standstill, Blum brokered the groundbreaking reforms of the Matignon Agreement, June 7, 1936. This ended the standoff between labor and capital, instituting the 40-hour week and paid vacations, among other items.

International concerns soon overwhelmed the French horizon. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 sealed a non-aggression agreement between Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany and Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Russia. By extension of its close ties to the Soviet Union, a natural result of the “Twenty-One Conditions” accepted in 1920, the PCF found itself in a precarious position. The PCF suffered along with the rest of France when World War II broke out in September 1939, but especially when the Nazis occupied France from 1940 to 1944. Hitler’s 1941 invasion of Russia

rendered the PCF's situation both more and less ambiguous, for only now did party members take up armed resistance. The martial services their Patriotic Militias rendered were greatly rewarded in the immediate postwar world. But the fact that they had waited until Hitler betrayed Stalin to launch such an offensive furthered the belief that the PCF placed Moscow's interests over those of Paris. More incriminating still was the fact that Thorez himself fled to the Soviet Union as early as the 1940 invasion of France.

The postwar success of the PCF was clearly demonstrated in the 1945 Constituent Assembly elections. Garnering 5,024,174 votes, or 25 percent of the national vote, and 159 seats, the PCF was effectively the single largest party in France. Working closely with the SFIO on the drafting of a constitution for the Fourth Republic, a 1946 national referendum rejected their proposal for a more easily dominated unicameral assembly. This rejection was a harbinger.

With the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s, PCF popularity sank from this 1945 high. The party obtained only 20 percent of the national vote in 1947. Since no political party possessed an absolute majority, coalition building was the key to power brokerage. Taking a rightward shift, the Christian Democrat *Mouvement républicain populaire* (MRP), the Gaullist *Rassemblement du peuple français* (RPF), and even the SFIO worked to exclude the PCF. Changes in electoral laws further obviated and whittled away PCF capabilities. Party membership declined across the 1950s. Yet, the PCF share of the national vote held steady. Only Charles de Gaulle's 1958 assumption of power produced a relative drop in the PCF's share of the tally. Across the 1960s, that percentage hovered once more in the low 20s. But, again, the impact of these percentages was curtailed by electoral laws, which reduced the actual number of resulting seats. Equally if not more important was the reluctance of mainstream parties to work with elected PCF deputies.

If ever an opportunity presented itself for the PCF to eschew its "complicity" in "bourgeois" democracy and turn toward outright revolution, implementing its "dictatorship of the proletariat" – a party plank the PCF did not discard until the 1970s – it was the unforeseen Parisian avalanche of revolts and strikes of May 1968. Its leadership had perhaps resigned itself to a role similar to that of any other political party in participatory democracy. The PCF curiously,

and as much as was possible, halted the revolutionary potential of the moment. Left-wing leadership was clearly held by the SFIO, and it is debatable if it had ever been anything but.

At the 1971 Congress of Epinay, the SFIO was renamed the Socialist Party (PS, *Parti socialiste*). But the renovation went much deeper than any mere name change. Now under the leadership of François Mitterrand (1916–96), the PS signed a unity pact with the PCF in 1972. Mitterrand ascended to the French presidency in 1981, the first time a socialist had ever held that office. Despite the collapse of the unity pact in 1977, the PCF joined in Mitterrand's first government of 1981–4, when Pierre Mauroy was named prime minister. Georges Marchais (1920–97) was an instrumental PCF figure in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. A metal worker by trade, Marchais joined the party in 1946. He became secretary general in 1972, a position he held until 1994. He co-signed the unity pact of 1972, and was instrumental in its rupture. Consecutively elected as deputy to the National Assembly across this same period, Marchais's 1981 bid for the presidency of the French Fifth Republic, against Mitterrand, garnered nearly 15 percent of the national vote.

Although the decline of the Soviet Union greatly deflated an already decompressed PCF share of the electorate, especially when a post-World War II low of 8.2 percent was reached in 1993, the party clearly impacted twentieth-century French politics. First, from its inception, the PCF represented a force to be reckoned with. Mainstream parties were obliged to either ignore or possibly build coalitions with a PCF contingent that could easily swing a legislative package in the delicate balance of French parliamentary politics. Second, and demonstrating that balance, the success of the Popular Front in the 1930s hinged upon PCF participation, although the SFIO remained dominant. With Léon Blum's Matignon Agreement of 1936, the Popular Front introduced perhaps the most significant French labor reforms of the 1900s. Those initial electoral victories would not have been possible without PCF participation. In many respects, and going further still, the very formation of the Popular Front helped to save French democracy itself. France thus avoided any advent of extreme right-wing power, which was the fate of many European countries in the 1920s and 1930s. Third, the PCF rendered an incalculably valuable

service during the German Occupation of World War II. Whatever their true motives, that is, whether they served Moscow or Paris, they helped to galvanize French resistance. Gratitude for this was displayed in the PCF electoral successes that followed the war.

The post-1945 contributions of the PCF are, finally, more difficult to assess. In many ways they remained that idiosyncratic political force that had to be taken into account on some level. This was especially evident in the 1950s and 1960s, when mainstream parties worked to marginalize the PCF, via electoral laws that made light of representational democracy so as to obviate communist influence. With the events of 1968, remarkably, the PCF acted as a brake and not a catalyst to revolution. Perhaps the party had indeed “normalized,” accustoming itself to a role as oppositional backbenchers. Mitterrand’s presidential victories across the 1980s, like Blum’s Popular Front of the 1930s, demonstrated once again that native French socialism remained ascendant. The PCF, nominally oriented toward Moscow, proved a capable coalition partner, when called upon.

SEE ALSO: Dictatorship of the Proletariat; Internationals; Jaurès, Jean (1859–1914); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); May 1968 French Uprisings; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Syndicalism, France

References and Suggested Readings

- Adereth, M. (1984) *The French Communist Party: From Comintern to the Colors of France, 1920–1984*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Hazareesingh, S. (1992) *Intellectuals and the French Communist Party: Disillusion and Decline*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mortimer, E. (1984) *The Rise of the French Communist Party, 1920–1947*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Raymond, G. G. (2006) *The French Communist Party during the Fifth Republic: A Crisis of Leadership and Ideology*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tiersky, R. (1974) *French Communism, 1920–1972*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Communist Party, Germany

Ingo Schmidt

The Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, KPD) was founded

in the midst of the Revolution of 1918–19, which came at the end of World War I and swept away the German monarchy. Its founding members came from radical currents of the German Social Democratic Party (Sozial-demokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) that had opposed the leadership’s class collaboration and support of the war. After the revolutionary wave died down and the Weimar Republic was consolidated, the KPD organized workers and intellectuals who still sought revolutionary change. In its partly self-imposed isolation, the party’s impact on actual politics was rather limited. This lack of leverage became even more apparent during the Great Depression and the subsequent rise of Nazism. Paying an extremely high death toll, the KPD had been the most active organization in the anti-Nazi resistance. After the downfall of the Nazi regime the party was transformed into the ruling party of East Germany’s state socialism and was marginalized in capitalist West Germany. Some of the organizational roots of Germany’s new Left Party, founded in 2007, are in the KPD and its East German successor, the Socialist Unity Party.

Revolutionary Departure (1918–1923)

Opposition to the SPD’s integration into imperial Germany’s World War I efforts led to splits within the party, and the 1917 breakaway of the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany was the most significant. This party’s common denominator was opposition to the war. Beyond that it hosted very different ideas about socialist change. Inspired by the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the outbreak of the German Revolution of 1918–19, its radical wing, the Spartacist League (Spartakusbund), precipitously decided to forge a revolutionary party with other radical groups that had completely broken away from the two social democratic parties that existed since the 1917 split in Germany. However, when the KPD was founded at the end of December 1918, it was not able to get all radical currents behind its banner. In particular, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, whose ties with shopfloor workers were closer than those of any other socialist group, decided to remain in the Independent Social Democratic Party.

The KPD was a very small party – in March 1919 membership stood at 100,000 compared to a total of 1,400,000 members of the two social

democratic parties – so it had to decide whether to build a party of cadres or try to attract and mobilize a mass membership. The party was also faced with the question of which role political representation would play in relation to workers' direct action. At the founding party convention an anarchosyndicalist current had the chance to convince a majority of delegates not to participate in the upcoming elections for a national assembly, which would hammer out the constitution of the Weimar Republic. However, hopes that bourgeois revolution could be transformed into a socialist one through insurgency and mass strike were frustrated. The Spartacist Uprising in January 1919, which actually was mostly spontaneous and not initiated by the KPD, was not only crushed by a coalition of monarchist militias and right-wing social democrats, but also proved to be unable to mobilize support beyond a core of dedicated revolutionaries. In the aftermath of this insurgency, the anarchosyndicalist wing of the party was sidelined and eventually formed the 40,000-member-strong Communist Workers' Party of Germany in December.

In March 1920 a right-wing coup d'état against the Weimar Republic was easily defeated by a general strike, which united workers who were affiliated with any, or no, workers' party. Under the influence of this success, about half of the membership of the Independent Social Democratic Party turned left in December 1920 and joined the KPD, which became a member of the Communist International, as well as a mass party of more than 300,000. Party growth, suasion from the Soviet communists, and spreading discontent with economic and political conditions in the new republic encouraged the KPD leadership to prepare for revolutionary uprisings in response to any right-wing attack on the gains workers made after the downfall of German monarchy. As in the case of the spontaneous Spartacist Uprising, a series of local insurgencies in March 1921 did not spark a revolutionary prairie fire. However, runaway inflation, conflict over foreign or domestic control of the Ruhr district's heavy industries, and SPD–KPD coalition governments in the German states of Thuringia and Saxony prompted, under massive pressure from the Soviets, preparations for another insurgency in October 1923.

When party leaders felt that there would be insufficient support from non-communist

workers, they called off the uprising at the very last minute. Only in Hamburg was there a short-lived and isolated revolt. There was controversy and disagreement within the party as to whether last-minute recognition of its isolated position prevented the party from a self-destructive act or whether the KPD leadership betrayed workers and socialism. At certain times, this rift within the KPD would be as acrimonious as the notorious quarrels between social democrats and communists.

Splendid Isolation (1924–1929)

Monetary reform and an influx of foreign, mostly US, capital contributed to the revitalization of the German economy after 1924 and helped to stabilize the Weimar Republic's political system. Prospects for revolutionary change withered away. These developments, along with the KPD's failed vanguardism, led to a collapse of membership and a decline in electoral approval. Membership went down from 300,000 in 1923 to 95,000 in 1924. In two 1924 elections the party's share of the total vote went down from 12.6 percent to 9.0 percent. Unable to develop politics that might have improved the conditions of workers in non-revolutionary times, the KPD fostered revolutionary rhetoric and built a dense network of cultural, educational, and sports organizations, a radical move which offered its members and participants an alternative to, or at least escape from, the disappointments with the Weimar Republic's political and economic system. Since the SPD defended the republic more than any of the bourgeois parties, hostilities, which were running high between the labor movement's radical and moderate wings during the period of revolutionary upheaval, remained strong during the stabilization period of the Weimar Republic. Only on rare occasions, such as the 1926 referendum to expropriate feudal lands, did the KPD and SPD work together, which potentially could have pulled the former out of its isolation and moved the latter away from its association with the bourgeois parties. However, such collaborations were sporadic and short-lived because the SPD's right wing feared that a left turn of the party would undermine its reputation as a state-sustaining party in the eyes of the bourgeoisie.

The KPD came more and more under the influence of the Communist International and the Soviet communists. The latter labeled social

democrats as social fascists and communism's foremost enemy. In turn, such denunciations helped right-wing leaders of the SPD to portray the KPD as an offensive, unreliable, and Moscow-controlled party to its own followers. In this atmosphere, collaboration among both party leadership and the rank-and-file became almost impossible.

Opposition to the KPD's ultra-leftism led to the formation of the Communist Party Opposition in December 1928 after an increasing number of party members were expelled as right-wing deviants. Without effective internal opposition, the KPD moved even further to the left and announced the formation of communist-led unions in December 1929 as an alternative to the already existing unions with their close ties to the SPD. After that, not even unions could serve as a place for exchange between communist and social democratic workers.

The dominant influence of the Soviet communists on the KPD, as well as the marginal role of its oppositional currents and offsprings, can only be understood with a view to the party's social base. When the party was founded, its members reflected the composition of the working class, particularly the relation of skilled to unskilled workers, just as well as the SPD membership did. However, things changed after the KPD lost many of its original members during the stabilization period of the Weimar Republic. Though the party attracted new members, particularly after the onset of the Great Depression and its subsequent mass unemployment and impoverishment, for two reasons no basis for independent working-class politics that would reach out beyond its actual membership could be developed. First, internal debate and decision-making could easily be concentrated in leadership circles because the very high fluctuation of the membership base severely hampered rank-and-file participation. Second, the KPD attracted more and more unemployed workers who felt excluded and alienated from the existing political and economic system, whereas the SPD mostly appealed to workers who still had jobs but were in fear of losing them. No left current was able to develop a strategy that would appeal to unemployed and employed workers alike. During the stabilization period of the Weimar Republic the KPD had moved into a socially, politically, and culturally isolated position that was reminiscent of the SPD's status under the

German monarchy before World War I. Whereas the latter proved to be unable to stop the German ruling class's war effort in 1914, the former had no effective strategy to stop the Nazis' rise to power.

Ineffective Anti-Nazi Resistance (1930–1945)

In the 1930 elections, the first since the outbreak of the Great Depression, the Nazi vote exploded from 2.6 percent in 1928 to 18.3 percent, whereas the SPD decreased from 29.8 percent to 24.5 percent and the KPD moved up from 10.6 percent to 13.1 percent. Although the KPD gains did not even compensate the SPD losses and paled beside the Nazis' success, the party leadership steered its ultra-leftist course. Any increase in electoral approval and membership, the latter being far more significant than the former, was seen as validation of a strategy that attacked social democracy and neglected the Nazis. These policies were guided by the assumption that the crisis of world capitalism would not only radicalize more and more workers but also attract them to the KPD's slogan of building a Soviet Germany after the model of the Soviet Union, whose economic growth and industrialization were presented as viable and attractive alternatives to depression and impoverishment in the West. However, most workers considered Soviet successes as either illusory or disconnected from their own problems.

Last-minute attempts to join forces with the SPD against the Nazis came too late, were poorly prepared, and were hampered by continuing anti-social democratic rhetoric. This gave SPD leaders, who wanted to maintain their party's legal existence through political abstinence, an excuse to turn down KPD proposals for a united front. Under the Nazi regime, which had not met any serious resistance from a divided labor movement while it was striving for power, no meaningful resistance to Nazism could be organized. However, discussion within secret KPD circles as well as among its exiled activists influenced the way the party would try to go after World War II and the downfall of the Third Reich. The general direction tied in with the popular front against Nazism, which was announced at the 1935 congress of the Communist International. With this strategy, the communists had swiftly moved away from

denouncing social democrats as social fascists to an attempted embrace of everybody who had the slightest disagreement with the Nazis. To present itself as a respectable and reliable coalition partner to bourgeois parties and organizations, the KPD was advised to give up socialism as its intermediate goal. Instead of that it should aim at an anti-fascist democracy, which would expropriate only Nazi property and that of their collaborators. Beyond that, private property was considered part of the aspired economic system after Hitler.

Cold War and Beyond (1946–2007)

Although the KPD could not organize effective resistance against the Nazis, its underground activities won the party enormous respect because no other organization had worked so hard against the Nazis or lost as many members in those efforts as the communists. For that reason, the party played a significant role in rebuilding municipal administrations and unions in the short period between the downfall of the Nazi regime and the consolidation of the anti-Hitler coalition's occupying powers. However, the quick collapse of that coalition, along with the onset of the Cold War, buried all chances the KPD might have had to develop working-class politics that would reflect the economic, social, and political conditions in postwar Germany more appropriately than during the Weimar Republic.

In the Soviet occupational zone, after a merger with the SPD whose terms were largely determined by the Soviet communists, the KPD became the Socialist Unity Party, which eventually became the ruling party in the German Democratic Republic. Its lack of domestic legitimacy made the KPD's successor a perfect outpost for Soviet foreign policies during the ups and downs of the Cold War. The same reasons that turned East Germany's wing of the KPD into a ruling party contributed to its marginalization in West Germany. On the one hand the largely uncritical and unopposed support of Soviet policies, particularly in the case of Soviet reparation claims, was self-defeating. On the other hand, anti-Soviet sentiment in the SPD helped to build a far-reaching anti-communist consensus with liberal and conservative forces in West Germany. This consensus led to a KPD ban in 1956. However, by that time the party had already lost most of its members and attracted

only 2.2 percent of the total vote in the 1953 election. In 1968 the party was reestablished under a slightly different name but never played more than a marginal role in West German politics. After German unification in 1990, the Socialist Unity Party, now transformed into the Party of Democratic Socialism, won unexpected electoral approval in East Germany and merged into The Left (Die Linke) with West German SPD dissidents in 2007.

SEE ALSO: German Revolution, 1918–1923; Germany, Resistance to Nazism; Germany, Socialism and Nationalism; Social Democratic Party, Germany

References and Suggested Readings

- Bergmann, T. (1987) *Gegen den Strom – Die Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei-Opposition*. Hamburg: VSA.
- Flechtheim, O. K. (1976) *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik*. Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt.
- Fülberth, G. (1992) *KPD und DKP 1945–1990*. Heilbronn: Distel.
- Kinner, K. (1999) *Der deutsche Kommunismus – Selbstverständnis und Realität*. Berlin: Karl Dietz.
- Klönne, A. (1989) *Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung*. Munich: dtv Geschichte.
- Krause, H. (1975) *USPD – Zur Geschichte der Unabhängigen Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*. Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt.
- Weber, H. (Ed.) (1993) *Die Gründung der KPD – Protokoll des Gründungsparteitags der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands 1918/19*. Berlin: Karl Dietz.

Communist Party NZ and the New Zealand revolutionary left

Leonard H. Lubitz

Radical labor activism in New Zealand can be traced back to the nineteenth century. Various elements, including the Canterbury Working Men's Mutual Protection Society, formed in January 1871 at a gathering of approximately 600 in Christchurch's Cathedral Square to protest the high rate of unemployment, were exasperated by continued immigration into the virtually self-ruled British colony. On March 12, 1872 the society became a branch of Marx and Engels' London-based International Working Men's Association, otherwise known as the First International.

In the immediate years following, this movement failed to develop roots, as a combination of social conditions including an improved economic environment and the advent of a more centrist labor movement alleviated the attraction of a widespread radical movement. An example is the rise of Richard Seddon as leader of the Liberal Party. His political party was influenced by the Fabian Society, a British group that espoused some of Marx's ideas but preferred change through legislation rather than revolution. The Knights of Labour, founded in 1887, was another such progressive organization that was a casualty of the Liberal Party's successful appeal to the working class.

In 1901 the New Zealand Socialist Party was founded based upon some of the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Kautsky. This movement's creation was in part spurred on by the arrival of 200 English of the Clarion Fellowship, who immigrated to New Zealand with the hope of building a collective farming community. By 1916 this and other such groups including the Social Democrat Party amalgamated to become the New Zealand Labour Party. On October 21, 1912 the Petone Marxian Club held its first meeting in the same city where 72 years earlier Samuel Parnell initiated the acceptance by management of the 8-hour workday in New Zealand, a radical notion at the time that would spread as a demand by the working class and eventually become a normalized condition of the workplace. The organizers of the Petone Marxian Club declared that they would meet every Monday evening until the revolution.

Hostilities which would emerge as the War to End All Wars, later known as World War I, brought tremendous restrictions on the activities of leftist activists. Censorship was imposed on all news organs, but socialist and Marxist publications were especially curtailed by the government. In 1918, following the armistice, the New Zealand Marxian Association was formed, followed shortly by the creation of the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ), with which it merged. The CPNZ would quickly include DeLeonites and members of the International Workers of the World (IWW) as well. The IWW would prove itself to be the weakest of these factions in New Zealand's communist movement, contrary to its greater success in Australia.

The core of the CPNZ's membership was in the mining communities of the west coast of the

South Island, a fact attributed to the region's geographic and cultural proximity to Australia. Another center of support was among the seaman and dockworkers of Huntly, located in the western section of the North Island. Factionalism would continue to wrack the CPNZ throughout its history as its various members and leaders pulled in a variety of directions, eventually ranging from pro-Trotsky to pro-Lenin to pro-Mao to pro-Hoxha.

Initially, the CPNZ did not join the Comintern. Therefore, the Communist Party of Australia acted as a liaison between Moscow and New Zealand, and exercised some controlling influence over their smaller sibling-like neighbors. In the ensuing interwar years the CPNZ would find its attempts to influence worker issues eclipsed by factors including the rise of the Labour Party to national prominence, as well as the Pan-Pacific Trade Union, a far less militant organization that wielded a great deal of power in this realm. The signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR in 1939 saw the CPNZ demonstrate its militant loyalty to the Comintern. It declared its absolute objection to the war effort. In response, the government banned the party's publication, though membership itself was never outlawed.

When Hitler ordered his troops to attack the USSR, the CPNZ reversed its policy and feverishly supported the need for Allied victory. In the waning years of World War II the CPNZ would see its highest membership, as its numbers rose to 2,000. As the Cold War became a reality, and Soviet troops marched into Hungary, CPNZ membership dwindled to one-fourth of its best days. Later, during the split between the USSR and China, only New Zealand would see its communist party side with Mao, while the balance of the western members of this alliance stood with Moscow. This action would again reveal a split in the leadership of the Communist Party of New Zealand as its pro-Moscow members, including a former chairman, resigned. In the 1980s, with China's movement away from Mao's policies toward Deng Xiaoping's reforms, which he described as "a second revolution," the CPNZ proclaimed itself pro-Albanian until the demise of the Hoxha regime.

The various factions of New Zealand's communist parties include the Revolutionary Workers League (which was formed from the merger of Revolution, a pro-Trotsky group, and the

Anti-Capitalist Alliance, the latter comprised primarily of members of the Workers Party), the Communist Party of Aotearoa (a Maoist offshoot of the CPNZ), Communist Workers' Group of New Zealand/Aotearoa (Leninist-Trotskyist), the Organization for Marxist Unity (Marxist-Leninist), Permanent Revolution Group (Trotskyist), and the Wildcat Anarchist Collective, Workers Charter Movement.

Though the communist organizations in New Zealand never achieved any great political victory, their history has been exemplified by their sporadic successes in organizing workers' strikes and public protests. The most illustrious of events was their active participation in the infamous seamen's strike of 1925. Then, the workers' action began in Great Britain but spread to New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa as those workers began a protest that lasted over three months in an attempt to change labor conditions that included a 10 percent pay cut – made at the behest not of the employers, but of the union leaders (the National Amalgamated Sailors' and Firemen's Union), as well as the horrendous work and living conditions the seamen had to contend with at sea.

More contemporary actions include massive protests in 1981 against the Springbok Tour – a rugby team whose visit was opposed as they hailed from apartheid South Africa. Another more contentious issue is the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone Disarmament and Arms Control Act, which established the country as a nuclear free zone. While the Labour Party takes credit for passing this legislation, the various communist parties and groups vigilantly and energetically organized public protests, forces that pressed the parliament to pass this law.

SEE ALSO: Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); International Workers of the World, Marine Transport Workers; Internationals; Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Nuclear-Free New Zealand, 1987; Springbok Rugby Tour Protests, 1981; Utopian Intentional Communities

References and Suggested Readings

- Busky, D. F. (2002) *Communism in History and Theory*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Taylor, K. (2004) The Communist Party of New Zealand and the Third Period. In M. Worley (Ed.), *In Search of Revolution: International Communist Parties and the Third Period*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Trapeznik, A. & Fox, A. (Eds.) (2004) *Lenin's Legacy Down Under: New Zealand's Cold War*. Dunedin: Otago University Press.

Communist Party of South Africa, 1921–1950

Allison Drew

Launched on July 30, 1921 after almost a year of discussion involving more than ten small socialist groups, the Communist Party of South Africa (Section of the Communist International) used a class analysis that explained racial and national oppression by reference to South African political economy. Its politics can be understood in terms of its changing relationships with the Communist International (Comintern), with the black labor movement and African nationalism, and with other local socialists.

The Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) in the 1920s

Like communist parties around the world, the CPSA's formation was propelled firstly by the October 1917 Russian Revolution, which seemed to demonstrate the feasibility of the socialist project, and secondly by the March 1919 establishment of the Comintern, which granted recognition to one communist organization in each country. The left groups that did not join the CPSA faded into oblivion. Initially, therefore, the CPSA, overwhelmingly white and comprising approximately 175 members in a country of seven million, enjoyed a virtual monopoly on the left. The absence of a successful socialist revolution in Europe underscored the Soviet achievement and strengthened the increasingly dominant belief that the Bolsheviks had the right answer, a belief buttressed in South Africa by successive waves of immigration from Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, there was considerable disagreement in the early CPSA about the meaning and implications of Bolshevism.

The CPSA faced its first challenge in the 1922 Rand Revolt, an armed uprising in the Witwatersrand industrial hub by white workers, which started as a miners' strike. South Africa's working class was characterized by a deep division between an organized white minority that controlled access to skilled work, and a large but

slowly developing African proletariat, centered on male migrant laborers, that lacked political rights and strong unions. Immigrant white workers brought their union traditions with them, and in the first two decades of the twentieth century they reacted with increasing militancy to capitalist exploitation, state repression, and the threat of replacement by cheap African labor. This culminated in the Rand Revolt, which combined anti-capitalist rhetoric, Afrikaner nationalist sentiment, and demands for the job color bar, and was characterized by a series of pogroms against blacks.

African organizations like the African National Congress (ANC) were hostile to the Rand Revolt, and the CPSA balanced uneasily between its commitment to black rights and its sympathy for the white uprising. With some notable exceptions, like British-born communist Sidney P. Bunting, the Johannesburg CPSA headquarters virtually neglected black workers during the Rand Revolt, a position challenged by its Cape Town branch.

The Rand Revolt was brutally crushed by the state, with radical leaders like Percy Fisher killed, and the white unions were in a state of disarray. However, disaffected white workers helped elect the Pact government in the June 1924 national elections, which consisted of the segregationist South African Labor Party (SALP) and the Afrikaner nationalist National Party. The Pact government implemented preferential “civilized” labor policies for white workers, expanded secondary industry, and took other steps to co-opt white workers.

This challenged the CPSA’s initial focus on white labor and the SALP, and from 1924 the CPSA gave greater attention to the organization and recruitment of black, particularly African, workers, leading to an exodus of many white members. The party hoped to influence the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) that had been formed in 1919 in Cape Town by Clements Kadalie, and which was rapidly expanding across the country. Aside from its flirtation with the SALP between 1922 and 1924, this was the CPSA’s first attempt at alliance politics. But in December 1926 the ICU expelled communists from its national council, among them Johnny Gomas; other CPSA members in the ICU, like veteran activist T. W. Thibedi, also left.

The CPSA turned its hand directly to the organization of black workers. In 1927 Thibedi became the party’s first African organizer. Thibedi and Ben Weinbren formed a number of

industrial trade unions that became the nucleus of the Federation of Non-European Trade Unions (FNETU) launched in March 1928, which claimed 10,000 members. The party’s paper, *South African Worker*, began publishing African-language pages. That year the party claimed about 1,750 members, including 1,600 Africans. Notable African recruits included Moses Kotane (later party general secretary) and J. B. Marks.

Before the late 1920s the CPSA was relatively autonomous of the Comintern, which paid it little attention. As the Comintern began placing greater emphasis on colonialism and the “Negro question,” it sent the CPSA a draft resolution in September 1927 calling for “an independent Native republic, as a stage towards a workers’ and peasants’ government.” The party’s central executive rejected the idea of a “Native republic” as prioritizing rural struggles and as unduly alienating white workers, thus undermining CPSA’s stress on interracial class unity. Following prolonged and acrimonious discussion and the resolutions of the 1928 Comintern congress, the CPSA (now claiming 3,000 members) adopted the Native republic thesis in January 1929, with a rider promising protection for “national minorities.”

At the same time, the Comintern argued that the crisis of capitalism had reached its “third period,” characterized by imminent collapse and mass immiseration: communist parties had to combat social democratic and reformist policies that diverted the working class and Bolshevized their ranks. The “New Line” of “class against class” politics stressed a rejection of any cooperation with reformism, promoting the ideal Bolshevik as one who gave unquestioned loyalty to the party leadership.

As elsewhere, the CPSA’s growing isolation, and the economic downturn, gave the New Line credibility. In 1929 the National Party came to power again and quickly acted to crush collective black working-class protest. The ICU was, meanwhile, fragmenting, and the ANC moved sharply to the right. The New Line was formally introduced by Douglas Wolton at the CPSA’s ninth annual conference in December 1930. The great majority of first-generation communists were expelled, as were many of the new black recruits, on charges ranging from reformism to chauvinism and corruption. Bunting, ousted in September 1931, bore the brunt of this campaign, characterized by vicious personal attacks

and charges of “Buntingism.” The party’s union base was largely destroyed, with figures like W. H. “Bill” Andrews and Thibedi purged.

Trotskyism

Some of those expelled devoted themselves to union work; others, like Wilfred Harrison, withdrew from active politics. Others, critical of the Comintern’s intervention, came together under the banner of Trotskyism, mainly in Cape Town where the left was fluid and eclectic. A Fabian Society was formed in 1930. The next year saw the launch of the International Socialist Club, which circulated the *Militant*, organ of the Left Opposition in the United States, and set up a study group called the Marxist Educational League. In 1933 Yiddish-speaking communists expelled from a CPSA-linked organization launched a Lenin Club. The following year the Lenin Club was joined by the Marxist Educational League and members of the Independent Labor Party, a breakaway from the SALP.

But the Lenin Club soon split, a trait that typified Trotskyism in South Africa and internationally. One faction called itself the Workers’ Party of South Africa (WPSA), and published the *Spark* from March 1935. The other faction formed the Communist League of South Africa (CLSA), which produced the monthly *Workers’ Voice*. Their differences were theoretical: the WPSA stressed the peasant nature of the population, while the CLSA argued that the processes of proletarianization and urbanization were most important for socialist strategy.

The Johannesburg Trotskyists were more oriented toward union work than their Cape Town counterparts, but their influence was weaker. Fanny Klennerman’s bookshop, Vanguard Books, supplied Trotskyist and other left literature. Thibedi began corresponding with the Left Opposition in the United States, and with Leon Trotsky. In 1932 he formed the Communist League of Africa, unique in that all of its members were African. A few years later the tiny Johannesburg WPSA took tentative steps to organize African mineworkers. However, in the late 1930s, the most significant trade union work on the Rand was not that of organizations but of individuals – the Trotskyist Max Gordon and the expelled communist Gana Makabeni. Both revived and rebuilt the black union movement, which had been decimated by the CPSA’s New Line.

Opposition to the CPSA remained regionally and organizationally fragmented, and the Comintern’s scathing denunciation of Trotsky precluded any possibility of broader socialist unity. The experience of Scottish socialist William Ballinger, appointed advisor to the ICU in 1928, illustrated the virtual impossibility of working alliances on the left in this climate. A member of the Independent Labour Party in Scotland, Ballinger had worked there with local communists. The sectarian politics that consumed South African socialists in the 1930s precluded alliances, and Ballinger’s political allies were liberals.

The Popular Front and the Revived CPSA

In 1934, the Comintern adopted the Popular Front, now stressing the widest possible alliance of working-class and democratic forces to fight fascism, which effectively conceded the failure of the “class against class” policy. That December the National Party and the South African Party formed the Fusion Government, which accelerated the attack on black rights with the 1935 Representation of Natives Bill, and the Native Trust and Land Bill. The first bill curtailed the limited Cape African franchise and advocated a Natives’ Representative Council (NRC) with solely advisory status. The second reasserted the restrictions on African landholding rights codified with the 1913 Land Act.

In December 1935 black leaders came together in the All-African Convention (AAC) to discuss strategies for fighting the bills, but failed to prevent them becoming law in 1936. The CPSA remained plagued by factionalism. To resolve the situation, in March 1936 the Comintern convened a commission in Moscow which led to the ascendancy of Kotane, whose emphasis on building broad alliances dovetailed with the Popular Front strategy. The party managed to regain much of its strength and to win back key members like Andrews. Communists, aligning with the ANC, decided to use the NRC as a platform for propaganda; the Trotskyist factions argued that it should be boycotted, and a “boycottist” principle became a hallmark of local Trotskyism. Mainstream white labor steadfastly refused to support any movement for black rights, and the CPSA was unable to build a Popular Front across the racial divide.

The War Years

World War II intensified the left's polarization. Reflecting its position within the British empire, South Africa declared war against Germany in September 1939. This split the government, as it was opposed by Afrikaner nationalists and the radical right. Initially, both communists and Trotskyists opposed the war. Once the Soviet Union entered the war in June 1941, the CPSA declared its support for the war effort, which brought it new-found legitimacy and enabled it to make appreciable gains among white workers and soldiers.

The CPSA also made major gains in union activity on the Witwatersrand. The war accelerated black urbanization and industrial development, especially on the Witwatersrand. Consumed by the war in Europe, and subsequently dissolved, the Comintern no longer intervened directly in the CPSA. While the CPSA counseled against strike action, it supported the demands of African workers for better pay and working conditions.

By 1940, the Joint Committee of African Trade Unions, organized by the independent anti-war Trotskyist Max Gordon, was the largest African union federation. Gordon was arrested and interned, but the unions continued to thrive. The Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) was launched in November 1941, and soon claimed 100,000 members. The leadership included socialists of various types. The CPSA's Marks was elected CNETU president and then president of the African Mineworkers' Union (AMWU), the largest CNETU affiliate, and the party became a major force in African politics. It also had some influence in the South African Trades and Labor Council (SATLC), through figures such as Andrews and Ray Alexander Simons.

By contrast, Trotskyism became weaker during the war. Anticipating fascism, the WPSA went underground in 1939, functioning as a secretive discussion group; the minute CLSA collapsed. Cape Town Trotskyists regrouped as the Fourth International Club, later the Fourth International Organization of South Africa (FIOSA), which published the *Workers' Voice*. In Johannesburg the Workers' International League (WIL) was formed in 1943–4; while attempts to unite the FIOSA and the WIL came to nought, the WIL posed an important challenge in the unions to the CPSA.

Alongside the growing union movement were growing popular protests over housing, transport,

and food prices. This put pressure on the CPSA (which was reluctant to jeopardize the war effort), as well as on existing black political organizations, and catalyzed the formation of new organizations. The Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), to which the ANC affiliated, was launched in 1943; the underground WPSA, of which I. B. Tabata was the best-known member, played a crucial although secret role in this venture. The ANC Youth League was launched the following year. The CPSA engaged in open tactical alliances with the ANC during the 1940s, retaining its own identity.

Although pressures on wages and living conditions mounted during the 1940s, the war's end brought no amelioration. This was brutally signaled by the state's violent response to the African mineworkers' strike of August 1946, which was supported by the CPSA and CNETU. Fifty-two members of the African Mineworkers' Union, CNETU, the ANC, and the CPSA were charged with conspiracy, although the main charges were dropped and the defendants fined. The state then charged eight members of the CPSA central executive committee with sedition in November.

The squashing of the strike reverberated through the union movement and amongst socialists; the tiny WIL, demoralized, collapsed soon after the strike. CNETU was consumed by infighting and suffered a major split, and the SATLC began to fragment from 1947. Repression escalated after the National Party's election on an apartheid platform in May 1948.

The National Party had been elected on a slim electoral majority, and it tested its strength with the introduction of train segregation in the Western Cape. In August 1948 a range of organizations formed the Train Apartheid Resistance Committee. But this foundered, signaling the inability of the left to cooperate and the reluctance of NEUM leaders to undertake mass action. The Fourth International overseas advised the WPSA and the FIOSA to merge, but once again South African Trotskyists were unable to unite, and the FIOSA disbanded.

The CPSA was the only remaining above-ground socialist body, although Trotskyist ideas remained influential amongst Western Cape radicals. Despite the Comintern's disbanding, the CPSA remained steadfastly loyal to the Soviet Union and scathing of Trotskyists. The CPSA's national conference in January 1949 claimed 2,482 members, but only 992 were in good financial standing. Given such weakness, it is perhaps not surprising that

the leadership was unable to decide how to proceed under increasing repression, and made no attempt to set up an underground. In June 1950, the Suppression of Communism Act became law, effectively banning the CPSA and empowering the state to act against a wide range of critics. The CPSA's Central Committee disbanded the party without replacing it, leaving many party members confused and demoralized. It was only in 1953 that a successor, the South African Communist Party, was formed.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Apartheid Movement, South Africa; Hani, Chris (1942–1993); Internationals; Leninist Philosophy; Marks, J. B. (1903–1972); Marxism; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Simons, Ray Alexander (1913–2004); Slovo, Joe (1926–1995); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; South African Communist Party, 1953–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Bunting, B. (1975) *Moses Kotane: South African Revolutionary*. London: Inkululeko.
- Bunting, B. (Ed.) (1981) *South African Communists Speak: Documents from the History of the South African Communist Party 1915–1980*. London: Inkululeko.
- Drew, A. (Ed.) (1996) *South Africa's Radical Tradition: A Documentary History*, Vol. 1. Cape Town: Buchu, Mayibuye, and University of Cape Town.
- Drew, A. (2000) *Discordant Comrades: Identities and Loyalties on the South African Left*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Drew, A. (2007) *Between Empire and Revolution: A Life of Sidney Bunting, 1873–1936*. London: Pickering & Chatto.
- Harrison, W. H. (1948) *Memoirs of a Socialist in South Africa 1903–1947*. Cape Town: n.p.
- Hirson, B. (1993a) The Trotskyist Groups in South Africa. *Revolutionary History* 4 (4): 25–56.
- Hirson, B. (1993b) The Trotskyists and the Trade Unions. *Revolutionary History* 4 (4): 84–92.
- Hirson, B. (1993c) Profiles of Some South African Trotskyists. *Revolutionary History* 4 (4): 93–7.
- Johns, S. (1976) The Birth of the Communist Party of South Africa. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 9 (3): 371–400.
- Johns, S. (1995) *Raising the Red Flag: The International Socialist League and the Communist Party of South Africa, 1914–1932*. Bellville: Mayibuye.
- Lerumo, A. [M. Harmel] (1971) *Fifty Fighting Years: The Communist Party of South Africa 1921–1971*. London: Inkululeko.
- Roux, E. (1948/1964) *Time Longer than Rope*, 2nd ed. Madison: University of Wisconsin.
- Roux, E. (1944/1993) *S. P. Bunting: A Political Biography*. Bellville: Mayibuye.

Simons, J. & Simons, R. (1968) *Class and Colour in South Africa 1850–1950*. London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa.

Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA)

Michael Goldfield

The Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) is undoubtedly the most prominent and popular leftist party in US history. From the early 1930s to the early 1950s, it was an important influence in American society, not only in the labor movement and various protest movements, but also in cultural and artistic life, many state governments, and even for a short time in national politics. On the one hand, it was from the early 1920s to the late 1950s the dominant left-wing group in the United States, highly interracial and ethnically diverse, the most militant and successful of trade union organizers, the foremost fighter for equality for African Americans, women, and other minorities, as well as the leading proponent in the struggle of the unemployed, students, and others – laudatory credentials for many. It would also become the unabashed, uncritical apologist for the brutal crimes of the Stalin regime in the Soviet Union; it was the unrelenting, sometimes repressive, critic of those on the left, whether political opponents, writers, or artists, who did not agree with it completely on the Soviet Union and other matters. And these questions only scratch the surface of the controversies.

The Communist Party was born in 1919, out of the left wing of the Socialist Party (SP), when the entrenched SP leadership refused to allow the left-wing majority to take control democratically of the organization. Losing most of its more dynamic members, refusing to support the 1917 Russian Revolution led by V. I. Lenin and Leon Trotsky and the new Soviet government – both immensely popular with US socialists, intellectuals, and labor activists – and revealing a lack of commitment to democracy in its own organization, the SP virtually died at this time. With over 100,000 members in 1919, the SP had barely 12,000 in 1923. In September of 1919, two communist parties were formed, although they

had few substantive political differences. The largest, the Communist Party of America (CPA), had as its main leader Charles Ruthenberg, a socialist from Cleveland, Ohio, who had successfully led tens of thousands of workers in a May Day demonstration there earlier in the year. The CPA had approximately 24,000 members, the overwhelming majority of whom were non-English-speaking immigrants, most from the former Russian empire.

The other group, the Communist Labor Party (CLP), with approximately 10,000 members, had as its most prominent leader John Reed (the hero of Warren Beatty's film *Reds*), a journalist who observed the 1917 Revolution and wrote a popular book about it, *Ten Days that Shook the World*. While having more English-speaking members, the CLP too was majority non-English-speaking. In September 1920, the CLP and a minority split from the CPA led by Ruthenberg merged to form the United Communist Party (UCP). In 1921, the Communist International (CI) forced the CPA and the UCP to merge. Both parties, however, had only existed semi-legally, since the anti-radical Palmer raids (organized by US Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer) had begun on January 2, 1920.

The Palmer raids, aimed at undermining widespread radical support in the country, were followed by mass deportations and imprisonment, greatly diminishing the membership of the CP, as well as other radical groups. In December 1921, after the merger of the UCP and the CPA, a legal organization was organized, called the Workers' Party, which recruited many new individuals and groups. In 1925, the underground party emerged and was officially united with the legal party, renaming itself the Workers' (Communist) Party. In 1929, the party changed its title to its present name, the Communist Party USA.

The 1920s were difficult years for all radical groups, and the communists were no exception. Membership stabilized at around 10,000, reaching a low point of around 7,500 in 1930. Nevertheless, the 1920s was a period in which the CP engaged in numerous activities, where its members gained valuable experience, and where the party itself gained the prestige and roots that would allow it to make dramatic gains during the 1930s. Its most important sphere of activity was in the trade union arena. In 1921, the CP recruited William Z. Foster and his associates who led the Trade Union Education League

(TUEL). Foster, who would remain a leader of the CP until he died in the Soviet Union in 1961 at the age of 80, was in 1921 the best-known radical labor leader in the US. In 1919 and 1920, he had led, first, the massive packinghouse workers' organizing campaign, then a national strike of several hundred thousand steel workers. During the 1920s the TUEL gained the support of thousands of local, state, and national union bodies for its three main demands: defense of the Soviet Union, organizing the unorganized into industrial unions, and the formation of a farmer-labor party.

An open communist leadership led the struggle to drive the gangsters out of the fur workers' union, revitalized its organization by the late 1920s, and eventually established the Fur and Leather Workers' Union, whose highly politicized membership stood firm during the McCarthy period, refusing to disavow its elected CP leadership. Communists were also active in the opposition movement in the mine workers' union, and in several other unions. They led a large textile strike in Passaic, New Jersey, in 1926, and another in Gastonia, North Carolina, in 1929. At least as important, they established clandestine organizing committees, in automobile and dozens of other unorganized industries, clandestine of course because that was the only way any union organizers could work and organize without getting fired immediately. The communists, along with other radicals and liberals, were also involved in the key defense cases of the day, the most important of which were those of Tom Mooney and Sacco and Vanzetti. Mooney was a left-wing socialist, falsely accused in 1916 of bombing a World War I preparedness parade, who was eventually pardoned by the governor of California in 1939, while Sacco and Vanzetti were two Italian American anarchists who were executed in 1927 for supposedly committing a bank robbery and double murder.

The CP's activities allowed it to recruit leading radicals from virtually every left-wing milieu. Aside from the Foster group, many prominent Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) members joined the party, including "Big Bill" Haywood, the most prominent IWWer who went into exile in the Soviet Union, Bill Dunne and Vern Smith, and eventually Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, who had been a teenage leader of the famous 1912 Lawrence, Massachusetts, textile strike. The CP recruited several of the small number of black

socialists, most important of whom was Cyril Briggs, the leader of the African Blood Brotherhood, and his colleague Richard Moore. In addition, it recruited important activists from Marcus Garvey's United Negro Improvement Association, including Steve Kingston, Louis Campbell, and William Fitzgerald, who were taken aback at the commitment to black rights by many of the CP's white members. By the 1930s, prominent intellectuals flocked to the CP. Few gravitated toward the SP, for as John Dos Passos explained in 1932, "Becoming a Socialist right now would have just about the same effect on anybody as drinking a bottle of near-beer."

The CP also gained support from and even recruited important SP members, the most prominent of whom was undoubtedly Meta Berger, widow of Victor Berger, former Wisconsin congressman and leader of the SP right wing in 1919 when the split with the CP took place. Another SP activist who was secretly recruited – and would eventually become famous, all the while denying his former CP connections – was future United Auto Workers' President Walter Reuther. None of the attraction of the CP at this time was based on its support for liberal Democratic Party politicians or watered-down politics. The result of the activities of the CP during the 1920s is described by James Cannon, a cohort of Foster's and one of the party's leaders, until his 1928 expulsion for Trotskyism:

This Communist Party held the line of class struggle and revolutionary doctrine in that long, ten-year period of boom, prosperity and conservatism before the crash of 1929. It was in that period – fighting for revolutionary ideas against a conservative environment as we are trying to do today, refusing to compromise the principle of class independence – that the Communist Party gathered and prepared its cadres for the great upsurge of the thirties. (1971: 92)

Despite its reduced membership, the Communist Party entered the 1930s – the period of the greatest radical revival – as the dominating center of American radicalism. It had no serious contenders (Cannon 1971: 93–4). In the fall of 1929, the stock market crashed and the US economy ground to a halt, with many industries, including automobile, mining, and textile, virtually collapsing. Gross business investment dropped from \$16.2 billion in 1929 to \$0.8 billion in

1932. Official jobless estimates went from 492,000 in October of 1929 to over four million in January of 1930. CP mass activity and membership growth both skyrocketed.

The earliest mass activity took place among the unemployed. Protests of the unemployed in the beginning of the Depression were often massive and militant. The largest unemployed organization of the early 1930s was the CP-led Unemployed Councils, concentrated in large cities throughout the country. Also significant were the SP-led Workers' Alliance and A. J. Muste's Conference for Progressive Labor Action-inspired Unemployed Leagues.

Unemployed protests began immediately with the onset of the Depression. On March 6, 1930, well before the impact of the Depression was to be felt on local, state, or national politics, over one million people demonstrated across the country under CP leadership. Concerted unemployed activity seems to have touched virtually every part of the land. The South and the West, as well as the Northeast and Midwest, were all affected. In large cities, including Seattle, Milwaukee, Toledo, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, San Francisco, Minneapolis, Atlanta, and many more, much evidence exists to suggest large-scale unemployed activity and organization. Records show small and medium town activity in such places as Fairmont and Charlestown, West Virginia, Camden, New Jersey, Indianapolis and Terra Haute, Indiana, Lewiston, Maine, Racine, Wisconsin, Warren and Ashtabula, Ohio, and even in small towns in Mississippi.

Some of the activities of the unemployed organizations were large scale. In New York City, for example in late January 1930, 50,000 attended the funeral of a Communist Party activist killed by the police. A similar funeral in Detroit in 1932 for four party activists killed by the police at a protest march on Ford's River Rouge plant was attended by between 20,000 and 40,000 people: above the coffin was a large red banner with Lenin's picture. Perhaps the highpoint of such activity was in Chicago. In one incident in 1931, 500 people in a Chicago Southside African American neighborhood brought back furniture to the home of a recently evicted widow. The police returned, opened fire: three people lay dead. The coffins were viewed, again under an enormous portrait of Lenin. The funeral procession with 60,000 participants and 50,000 cheering onlookers was led by workers carrying communist

banners. Even in cities in the Deep South, including Atlanta, Birmingham, and New Orleans, racially integrated unemployed mobilizations took place. These protests, sometimes making the front page news, more often remaining unpublicized, did not fail to leave deep impressions on people in power, as well as on the more disadvantaged members of the population.

What most distinguished the CP during the 1930s from other radical groups was its position and commitment to the fight against black oppression. No previous largely white US radical group had focused attention on the plight of blacks. It was the CI with its 1928 resolution at its sixth world congress and its subsequent 1930 resolution which placed the "Negro Question" at the center of the CPUSA's work. The CI resolution argued that the roots of African American oppression lay in the historic black homeland of the cotton South. In that region there existed a Negro nation, which might potentially secede to form an independent country. The CI resolution also placed the struggles for racial equality in the North as well as the South at the center of CPUSA strategy.

The CP's efforts in the battle for black liberation even penetrated into its extensive immigrant membership. As Mark Naison notes: "Not only Jews felt moved by the Party's position: Finnish, Polish, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, and Slavic Communists became passionate exponents of the Party's position on the Negro Question" (1983: 43). One result of the CP position was to place special emphasis on organizing African Americans in the South, leading to industrial concentrations in Birmingham and the highly dangerous organizing of black sharecroppers. The CP attention to the South led it to publicize and fight against the lynching of blacks there. In 1931, the CP took the initiative in a case that was to gain it major political leadership among blacks throughout the whole country. This was the case of the Scottsboro boys, nine black youths seized on a freight train in rural Alabama, accused of raping two white girls who had been riding with them.

The CP's most massive successes, however, were undoubtedly within the labor movement, especially the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). Their persistent organizing in workplaces across the country during the 1920s made them the key rank-and-file labor activists in the land. They played leading roles in the early Depression strikes before 1933. They were at

the center of the revolts in mining, auto, steel, electrical, longshore, and dozens of other industries. By the time the CIO was formed in 1935, it was clear to John L. Lewis, the head of the mine workers' union and first president of the CIO, that successful industrial union organization would have to rely on the CP. Communists dominated the early leadership of the unions in electrical (third largest of the CIO unions), farm equipment, fur and leather, metal mining, food and tobacco, maritime, West Coast longshore, transport, government work, office and professional, and a number of smaller unions, including furniture. They were a significant force in the packinghouse workers' union and in auto, and originally led the woodworkers' union. If it were not for their conciliatory tactics toward more conservative CIO leaders, they would have had the early leadership of the auto union and greater influence in steel, oil, and rubber, industries in which they played leading roles in organizing.

In 1947 and 1948, the CP and its allies (including the majority of liberals who supported the CP's popular front policies) came under attack from the government and more conservative political forces. Part of this attack was related to the mobilization by the US ruling class of public opinion against the Soviet Union and in support of various anti-Soviet policies, including the Marshall Plan, aimed at rebuilding Western European economies, and the Truman Doctrine, designed to aid in stopping communist-led insurgencies in Greece and other parts of the world. The CP and its supporters not only opposed these doctrines, they also rallied to support the 1948 Progressive Party candidacy of former FDR vice-president and Truman secretary of commerce Henry Wallace, who opposed the new anti-Soviet foreign policy. Given expectations, Wallace's candidacy flopped, garnering barely over a million votes and having a negligible effect on the outcome of the election.

By 1949 and 1950, ten left-wing unions were expelled from the CIO. Communists were driven from the leadership of the auto workers' union with the ascendancy of the Reuther forces, and also from the NMU (National Maritime Union), the TWU (Transport Workers' Union), and the furniture workers, as top leadership in these latter unions abandoned their close ties to the CP. The electrical workers, food and tobacco workers, and public employee unions were raided and eventually decimated after the purges. In

other left-led unions, including Mine Mill (with the exception of the Birmingham, Alabama region), farm equipment, fur and leather, and the ILWU (International Longshore and Warehouse Union), the unions maintained their support, influence, and numbers intact, while in packinghouse, CP influence remained more or less as before the purges, although the UPWA (United Packinghouse Workers of America) was the one left-wing union that was able to remain within the CIO. In 1949, the top leaders of the CP, along with numerous secondary leaders, were tried under the Smith Act. Many were sent to prison. The CP was most weakened, however, by the 1956 Anti-Stalin speech of Soviet premier and party leader Nikita Khrushchev, delivered secretly at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union, February 24–5. In this speech, ostensibly directed against the “cult of the individual,” Khrushchev began the process of publicly exposing the crimes, repression, and dictatorial rule under Stalin.

By the time of the political upsurge of the 1960s, the CP was not only small in numbers but politically insignificant. Although some current and a number of former CP members had influence in virtually all the protest movements of the period, the CP itself was considered far too moderate for serious consideration by the more leftist, militant wings of the civil rights movement, the anti-war movement, the women’s movement, and the student movement.

The disputes about the CP legacy are legion. The questions are to a large degree intertwined, so they must be examined as such, not separately, rather as one peels off layers of an onion. In this respect new material from recently opened Soviet archives, along with numerous recent theses, books, and articles, are most helpful. Yet, many of the questions are ones of interpretation. It has been easy, for example, for most conservatives to have “seen through” the communists, since the conservatives held neither black rights nor union organization very highly. Yet, these same conservatives held similar opinions of civil rights activists and student radicals in the 1960s. Likewise, for those horrified by groups thought to be a threat to capitalist property, free enterprise, and the right to get very rich at the expense of others, it was easy to see the CP as illegitimate, just as it had been to similarly evaluate the IWW, the SP, and more recent radical groups. Thus, developing a reasonable set of criteria to evaluate the CP is to a certain

extent itself a matter of one’s political proclivities. Nevertheless, it is important to identify what was distinctive about the CP, which is largely an objective matter. Finally, however, removed from the conflicts, physical battles, arrests, blacklisting, and hounding of an earlier period, it is important for those interested in the success and failures of radical movements to make a relatively detached assessment of what was good and what was bad about the CP.

The vast majority of commentators on the CP share a common belief that the CP grew most and was most successful when it abandoned its revolutionary politics, acted more like liberals, supported the New Deal, Franklin Roosevelt, and other liberal politicians. This view is held by staunch anti-communists like Harvey Klehr, but also by those who approve of the CP, who like the policies of CP leader Earl Browder and the popular front, including Maurice Isserman, Fraser Ottanelli, and Edward Johanningsmeier. These authors tend to think that the CP declined when it abandoned these more liberal policies and became more sectarian.

The CP’s radical and revolutionary image, its uncompromising position in support of African American rights, its appearance as the US representative of the Russian Revolution, attracted those who wanted to fight the system. Thus, unemployed workers, African Americans, students without prospects, displaced intellectuals, and many others flocked to the party. People turned to what they thought was the most radical, militant movement: the communists. It was in this period that it recruited significant numbers of black members, that its working-class cadre became involved in large-scale struggles and demonstrations. Subsequent membership increases, whether from 1936 to 1939 (during the first popular front period) or during World War II, appear quite modest compared to the membership gains in the first half of the 1930s.

Regarding the controversial questions of the CP’s ties to the Soviet Union, it seemed that the CP was merely following a long tradition of working-class internationalism, as advocated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the *Communist Manifesto*, which called on “Workers of the World” to “Unite.” For some, international ties are themselves suspect, as attacks on world government, the Catholic Church, and advocates of the brotherhood of all humans indicate. The CP was vilified by elites for its strong

support of Spain's democratically elected Loyalist government which faced a fascist-supported insurrection by right-wing General Francisco Franco. Those who volunteered to fight in this noble cause were denounced and ostracized. The CP also defended the Soviet Union against attacks by capitalist countries and criticism by anyone. In return, the CPUSA received broad international support for a number of its campaigns, including the defense of the Scottsboro victims.

There is a further issue of control and subordination from abroad. In this respect, were their foreign ties similar to those of the Catholic Church, Scientologists, and Rev. Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church? Was their subordination voluntary or coerced? How extensive was the international control? Was the CP really mostly the unregistered agent of a foreign power? Were they in essence fifth columnists (like those in Europe who aided the rise of fascism from within) or spies?

There is a long anti-communist strain in the United States which attempts to portray the CP not as a legitimate organization of heretics, but largely as a conspiratorial ring of foreign agents. This tradition, largely discredited in the past, has been revived in recent books by Harvey Klehr, John Haynes, and others. In combing through recently opened Soviet archives, they have uncovered more cases of espionage, and confirmed several of which many had been skeptical – none of which should surprise those of us who believe John Le Carré's view of espionage during the Cold War. In order to buttress their case, the contemporary authors have also included many cases which are largely trivial, as when the editor of the CP paper, the *Daily Worker*, briefed Soviet diplomats about American politics and the intentions of US negotiators. Their view of the CP simply does not accord with the facts. Despite some small number of cases of CP members actually engaged in espionage, and a large amount of secret work by many CP leaders for the CI, the bottom line is well summarized by Bert Cochran, himself a stringent critic of the CP:

The party per se did not engage in espionage. Soviet agents recruited at times among the ranks of members and sympathizers. Once a member was taken in tow, he dropped out of the Party, and dropped his former associations, as

happened to Whittaker Chambers. Soviet espionage crews had to enforce a rigid separation for their own security reasons, even though they had no compunction in subjecting foreign parties to unwarranted risks with such raiding expeditions. (1977: 9)

While CI control of major CPUSA policy was clear, there were many instances where prominent leaders, in particular William Z. Foster, ignored advice and went about their own way. Likewise, instances abound where local communists did what they thought was right, even if it was in opposition to official policy, as with the many CP-led work stoppages during World War II. Nevertheless, these failures to follow CI direction always took place while giving lip service to following official policy. Sometimes CI directives did not work out the way they had intended. Much evidence, for example, abounds that the Duclos letter, written by the leader of the French Communist Party, was meant to warn Browder and change the direction of the CPUSA, not to have him expelled.

During periods of leftism as well as its lengthier periods of reformism, the CP, when it could, was marked by an unprincipled hounding of its opponents. When the SP organized a rally at Madison Square Garden in 1934 to commemorate the large number of Austrian socialists who had been slain in battle against the fascist Engelbert Dolfuss regime, several thousand CPers caused a riot and broke up the event. To their left-wing critics (even if general supporters) they were often ruthless, as when they attempted in 1938 to blacklist among leftists and liberals Edgar Snow's popular *Red Star Over China* because of certain mild, but accurate, criticisms of the CI and Stalin. Snow capitulated and made the necessary changes. And toward the Trotskyists, who they unfairly branded as fascist agents, there was hardly any limit to the degree of lying and brutality in which they were willing to engage. Trotskyism never developed much support around the world, except in a few places including Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Vietnam, at least in part because of the isolation and attacks engendered by the CPs. Yet Trotskyism represented the conscience of communists worldwide, their most trenchant critics, a reminder of the degree to which they had strayed from their original aims.

Trotsky brilliantly pointed out in advance the bankruptcy of CI sectarian tactics in Germany, in which it dramatically underestimated the Nazi danger. Trotskyists pinpointed problems with the CI policies in Spain and with the popular front. They played the leading role in exposing the political degeneration of the Stalin regime, the Gulags, and the lies of the late 1930s show trials. For these "crimes" they were physically assaulted, murdered, driven out of the labor movement, accused of being police agents, when it was the CP itself that collaborated with the government and supported the 1940 Smith Act prosecution of the leadership of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers' Party and aided the gangster-ridden teamster national leadership in dislodging the Trotskyists from the leadership of their stronghold in Minneapolis Teamster Local 574, one of the most militant and dynamic union organizations to emerge during the 1930s. So when repression finally came down on the CP during the early Cold War period, its ability to generate sympathy from anyone was quite low.

The Communist Party was not by and large an electoral party and should not be evaluated as such. Nevertheless, it did, at its height, have an important electoral impact. In Oregon, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Michigan, and Ohio, it was a significant force in the influential labor party politics there, as well as in later efforts within these state Democratic Parties. It also had substantial influence within the Democratic Parties of California and Wisconsin. In Minnesota, for a time, the CP and its popular front allies controlled the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party, the dominant political party in the state. In New York State, it had significant control of the American Labor Party, which controlled the swing vote between the Democrats and Republicans in the state. In New York City, it had two communist city councilmen, Benjamin Davis, Jr. and Pete Cacchione, along with other council political supporters. Its support in New York City was significant enough for it to have an alliance with Governor Herbert Lehman, who returned the favor by vetoing a legislature bill that would have banned the CP. It had two firm congressional supporters, Vito Marcantonio from New York and John Bernard from Minnesota, along with a close alliance with Harlem congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.

Among artists, entertainers, and intellectuals its support was widespread, from Hollywood to Doris Lessing, Harold Cruse, José Yglesias, Leonard Bernstein, Richard Wright, Langston Hughes, Ralph Ellison, Theodore Dreiser, Nelson Algren, Upton Sinclair, John Dos Passos, Granville Hicks, Josephine Herbst, Paul Robeson, W. E. B. Du Bois, Peter Seeger, and many more. Among sports figures, it not only obtained support from boxers Joe Louis and Henry Gibson, from Brooklyn Dodger second baseman Jackie Robinson, and from Negro League star Josh Gibson, but had regular sports columns in the *Daily Worker* by New York Yankees third baseman Red Rolfe and Chicago Cubs star Rip Collins. Many prominent African American entertainers and musicians attended or performed at its functions at one time or another. Among them were Lena Horne, Billy Holiday, Ella Fitzgerald, Duke Ellington, Count Basie, Leadbelly, Roy Eldridge, Josh White, Coleman Hawkins, W. C. Handy, Dizzy Gillespie, Miles Davis, Charlie Parker, Chick Webb, Art Tatum, Cab Calloway, Mary Lou Williams, Lionel Hampton, Teddy Wilson, and the list goes on.

This support was based on the work that the CPUSA had accomplished. It organized African Americans, exposed and fought against the many manifestations of white supremacy at a time when it was not popular to do so, and won large numbers of whites to support these struggles. The CP had a large number of talented black leaders and was, by all accounts, racially egalitarian in its own organization. According to enthusiastic reports in the black press, the CP was the main organization that forced these issues into the public consciousness. It and the African American workers whom it often organized were the impetus for making issues of race central to the perspective of the CIO. Finally, it was CP organizers that provided the main shock troops in the organizing of industrial unions. All these good deeds went along with its subordination to the foreign policy dictates of Moscow, its slavish submission on central issues, including its apologies for the crimes of Stalin, and its failure to maintain its original anti-capitalist perspective after the mid-1930s. Thus, the Communist Party of the United States of America provides key lessons for future radical movements of what to do as well as what not to do.

SEE ALSO: African Blood Brotherhood; Cannon, James P. (1890–1974) and American Trotskyism; Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963); Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley (1890–1964); Foster, William Z. (1881–1961); Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism; Haywood, Big Bill (1869–1928); Hollywood Ten; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Palmer Raids; Reed, John (1887–1920); Robeson, Paul (1898–1976); Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Sacco and Vanzetti Case; Scottsboro Resistance; Sinclair, Upton (1878–1968); Socialist Party, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Cannon, J. P. (1971) *Speeches for Socialism*. New York: Pathfinder.
- Cannon, J. P. (1973) *Speeches to the Party: The Revolutionary Perspective and the Revolutionary Party*. New York: Pathfinder.
- Cochran, B. (1977) *Labor and Communism: The Conflict that Shaped American Unions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Draper, T. (1957) *The Roots of American Communism*. New York: Viking.
- Draper, T. (1960) *American Communism and Soviet Russia*. New York: Viking.
- Glazer, N. (1961) *The Social Basis of American Communism*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Goldfield, M. (1980) The Decline of the Communist Party and the Black Question in the US: Harry Haywood's *Black Bolshevik*. *Review of Radical Political Economy* 12, 1 (Spring).
- Goldfield, M. (1985) Recent Historiography of the Communist Party USA. In M. Davis, F. Pfeil, & M. Sprinker (Eds.), *The Year Left*, Vol. 1. London: Verso.
- Horne, G. (1994) *Black Liberation/Red Scare: Ben Davis and the Communist Party*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Isserman, M. (1985) Three Generations: Historians View American Communism. *Labor History* 26, 4 (Fall).
- Johanningsmeier, E. P. (1994) *Forging American Communism: The Life of William Z. Foster*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Klehr, H., Haynes, J. E., & Anderson, K. M. (1998) *The Soviet World of American Communism*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Naison, M. (1983) *Communists in Harlem During the Depression*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Ottanelli, F. M. (1991) *The Communist Party of the United States: From the Depression to World War II*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Russian Institute, Columbia University (Ed.) (1956) *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism: A Selection of Documents*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Schrecker, E. (1998) *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Comte, Auguste (1798–1857)

Marcelline Block

Auguste Comte's place in the history of revolution and protest derives from his extensive contributions to social theory. He has been credited with being the first western sociologist and with coining the term "sociology" in 1838 to refer to the scientific study of society. He formulated and promulgated the philosophical doctrine known as positivism, and initiated the concept of altruism.

Comte was a major influence on nineteenth-century philosophers, historians, and social theorists attempting to create a "science of society," such as John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx. Mill's *Auguste Comte and Positivism* is among the most important expositions of Comte's philosophical ideas.

Comte was born into a Catholic and monarchist family in Montpellier, France, but as a young man he renounced the religious and political views of his upbringing. He attended the Université de Montpellier as well as the prestigious Ecole Polytechnique from 1814 to 1816, but was expelled from the latter during its royalist reorganization. He continued his studies on his own and was influenced by Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and, in particular, Condorcet's *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind*.

In 1817, Comte became Henri de Saint-Simon's secretary, a partnership that lasted until 1824 when they had a bitter falling out. Comte was unable to find an academic position and supported himself by tutoring. In 1824 Comte entered into a common-law marriage with Caroline Massin. In the 1830s Comte suffered a nervous breakdown, which Massin helped him through, but their unhappy union was dissolved in 1842. In 1844 Comte fell in love with Clothilde de Vaux, and although she died soon thereafter, the relationship affected him deeply and inspired his espousal of a "religion of humanity" based on reason rather than faith.

Following Saint-Simon's example, Comte attempted to establish a scientific methodology for the analysis of human behavior and society. It was Saint-Simon who first used the term "positivism" in his own discussions of scientific method as it relates to philosophical inquiry.

Comte's appropriation and development of positivism gave rise to an important Western European philosophical movement in the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries.

Comte's major work is the six-volume *Cours de philosophie positive* (Course of Positive Philosophy), which was derived from a group of lectures he delivered, starting in 1826, to a private audience of some of the foremost thinkers of the era, including Henri Marie de Blainville, Jean Etienne Esquirol, and Jean Baptiste Joseph de Fourier. The *Cours* outlines the fundamental aspects of Comte's notion of positivism, which he first described in 1822 in his *Plan de travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société* (Plan of Scientific Studies Necessary for the Reorganization of Society). Comte further expounded upon positivism in the four volumes of his *Système de politique positive* (The System of Positive Polity).

According to Comte, the "law of the three stages" (also known as the "law of three phases") accounts for the way the human mind progresses and seeks understanding of various phenomena, as well as how society evolves. The three stages he identified are the theological (supernatural), the metaphysical (abstract), and the positive (objective). According to Comte, these stages are inevitable and irreversible, and although positive knowledge can be ever more closely approached, it can never be fully obtained. The third stage is the most important, and seekers of knowledge should focus only on phenomena that have an "objective" and "positive" existence. The positive stage is characterized by the development and growth of science, which can predict phenomena so that they can be most effectively utilized.

Late in his life Comte made positivism into a new "religion of humanity" and crowned himself pope. This new religion had its own calendar, the *Calendrier positiviste*, with saints such as Dante, Adam Smith, and Shakespeare, and its own catechism, *Catéchisme positiviste*. In 1856 Comte outlined the religious trinity of the Great Being (humanity), the Great Fetish (the earth), and the Great Way (space) in his final work, *Philosophy of Mathematics*. Whereas Comte's philosophical ideas were highly influential upon political and social theorists and made a lasting impact in numerous areas including economics, evolution, and logic, his religious ideas were not as successful,

although they achieved short-lived popularity. The leading tenet of the religion of positivism was for its adherents to "live for others."

Comte's work is generally recognized as an advance upon the somewhat vague and unsystematic productions of his mentor, Saint-Simon. Comte, however, has been criticized for neglecting the science of psychology, and for making broad, unsupported claims about science, history, and religion. Despite the often-justified criticisms of Comte's work, its substantial impact on the development of the social sciences is undeniable. He helped give birth to a new social science, sociology, which is now among the best established and most rigorous of academic disciplines.

SEE ALSO: Condorcet, Marquis de (1743–1794); French Revolution, 1789–1794; Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Montesquieu, Baron de (1689–1755); Saint-Simon, Comte de (1760–1825); Smith, Adam (1723–1790)

References and Suggested Readings

- Comte, A. (1908) *A General View of Positivism*. Trans. J. H. Bridges. London: Routledge.
- Jones, H. S. (Ed.) (1998) *Comte: Early Political Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1903) *The Philosophy of Auguste Comte*. New York: Augustus M. Kelly.
- Mill, J. S. (1866) *Auguste Comte and Positivism*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott.
- Pickering, M. (1993) *Auguste Comte: An Intellectual Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Comunero movement

Rady Roldan-Figueroa

The Comunero movement (*movimiento de las comunidades*), or Comuneros' Revolt was the first and last major uprising against the Hapsburgs in the kingdom of Castile. In 1516 Charles of Ghent became king of Castile and Aragon, as Charles I of Spain. He inherited his Spanish crown after the death of his maternal grandfather, Ferdinand II of Aragon (r. 1479–1516). He arrived in Spain in 1517, but he was not prepared to assume control of his Spanish possessions. Charles was raised in the Netherlands and was surrounded by Flemish advisors. He was ignorant of the customary practices and languages spoken in his new possessions. Elected king of Germany soon after the death of his paternal

grandfather, Maximilian I (r. 1493–1519), Charles made arrangements to relocate his court to Germany, although he was not crowned until October 1520. The prospect of having an absentee king as well as resentment towards his foreign-born attachés fueled popular resentment.

The situation was complicated in April and May 1520 by new financial demands made by Charles on the Castilian Cortes. The Cortes was a medieval system of representation in which free municipalities (*comunidades*) negotiated additional financial subsidies for the crown and participated in deliberations on matters of interest to the realm. In 1520 the Castilian Cortes consisted of around eighteen municipalities. The demand for higher subsidies on the part of Charles was perceived by many of the *procuradores* (delegates) as an affront to the longstanding rights and privileges of the municipalities.

Charles finally left Spain for Germany in May 1520, leaving behind Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht (1459–1523) to deal with the mounting unrest. The revolt centered on the city of Toledo, where the city council under the leadership of the *regidor* Juan de Padilla declared the city independent of the central power. At the height of the conflict, 15 of the free municipalities with delegates in the Cortes had joined the uprising. The initial reaction of Cardinal Adrian was a failure, ending in the burning of the city of Medina del Campo and further consolidation of the anti-Hapsburg forces.

The revolt took organizational form during the month of July 1520. The *comuneros* formed a *Santa Junta* during a meeting in the city of Ávila at the behest of Juan de Padilla. Until this meeting in Ávila the movement had consisted mainly of members of urban patrician families and the lower nobility. However, the demands articulated by the delegates gathered in Ávila introduced a wedge into this feeble coalition. The nobility slowly steered away from the urban elites and returned their support to Charles. Members of the clergy were also prominently involved in the revolt. One of the leading figures of the revolt was the bishop of Zamora, Antonio de Acuña. Contemporary sources report that around three hundred armed friars defended the cause of the *comuneros*.

In spite of their lack of military training the *comuneros* scored some important victories early in the conflict. After receiving the demands of the *Santa Junta*, Charles sought to regain control

of the situation by appointing the admiral of Castile, Fadrique Enríquez, and the *condestable*, Íñigo de Velasco, as co-regents with Cardinal Adrian. But it took some time for royalist forces to gather an army that could halt the uprising. The *comuneros* boasted an army of 15,000 men that included infantry and light artillery. By September 1520 their temporary military advantage allowed the *comuneros* to take control of the city of Tordesillas, where Queen Joanna the Mad resided. They claimed the figure of the emotionally troubled queen for their cause and relocated the *Santa Junta* to Tordesillas.

The royalists then took the offensive. In October and November 1520 the nobility coalesced behind the king and gathered their forces in the city of Medina de Rioseco. On December 4, 1520 the royalists regained control of Tordesillas, which was defended by a small group of clerics loyal to the bishop of Zamora. The leadership of the *Santa Junta* escaped the assault, but it was fraught with strife and dissension. Especially important was the rivalry between Juan de Padilla and the noble Pedro Girón, appointed commander of the *comunero* forces by the *Santa Junta*. Girón deserted the *comuneros*, following the trend established by his fellow nobles who formerly supported the uprising. By February 1521 Padilla had resumed leadership of the *comuneros* alongside Bishop Antonio de Acuña. Padilla's last major victory was the takeover of the village of Torrelobatón, a possession of Admiral Enríquez, on February 28, 1521.

By March and April 1521 fatigue and unrest were rampant among the *comunero* forces, after almost a year of continuous fighting. The royalists kept building momentum and increasing the size of their forces. Finally, the *comuneros* were defeated on April 23 at the Battle of Villalar. The *comuneros* were so exhausted that their rudimentary formations dissolved under the light artillery fire of the royalists. Juan de Padilla and a few other leaders were captured after a Quixotic assault on the royalists in the open battlefield. Padilla was summarily sentenced to death and beheaded the next day.

Padilla's widow, María Pacheco, and Bishop Acuña then took control of Toledo and the revolt continued until February 1522, when the royalists finally took the city. María Pacheco escaped to Portugal where she remained until her death. After a few skirmishes, Antonio de Acuña

succumbed to royalist justice. Emperor Charles V returned to Spain in 1522, where he stayed until 1529 and later retired to the monastery of Yuste in 1557. It was the task of his son Philip II (r. 1556–98) to consolidate the Hapsburg hold on Spain and its possessions.

The historiography of the *comunidades* has been convulsed by the subsequent history of Spain, as liberals and traditionalists have seen fit to interpret the uprising according to their respective ideological interests. Nevertheless, the 1963 work of José Antonio Maravall, *Las comunidades de Castilla* (*The “Comunidades” of Castile*), stands as an important landmark due to the careful attention he gives to the documents and pronouncements of the *Santa Junta* and other contemporary sources. Another important work is Pérez (1977). One of the least studied episodes of the uprising is the revolt led by María Pacheco in Toledo, explored in María Teresa Álvarez’s historical novel *La comunera de Castilla* (2007).

SEE ALSO: Catalan Protests Against Centralism; Padilla, Juan de (ca. 1490–1521); Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Álvarez, M. T. (2007) *La comunera de Castilla*. Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros.
- Danvila y Collado, M. (1897) *Historia crítica y documentada de las Comunidades de Castilla*. Madrid: Viuda e Hijos de M. Tello.
- Haliczer, S. (1981) *The Comuneros of Castile: The Forging of a Revolution, 1475–1521*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Maravall, J. A. (1970) *Las comunidades de Castilla. Una primera revolución moderna*. Madrid: Revista de Occidente.
- Mexía, P. (1945) *Historia del Emperador Carlos V*. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe.
- Pérez, J. (1977) *La revolución de las comunidades de Castilla (1520–1521)*. Madrid: Siglo XXI de España.
- Sandoval, P. (1955) *Historia de la vida y hechos del Emperador Carlos V (Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, vols. 80–1)*. Madrid: Ediciones Atlas.

Concordia University student protests

Tom Keefer

Concordia University in Montreal, Quebec, has long been at the forefront of Canadian student

activism. On January 29, 1969, a group of students protesting what they alleged as institutional racism within the university occupied the ninth floor of the Henry F. Hall building until they were dislodged by riot police on February 11. The ensuing confrontation – the most serious student disturbance in Canadian history – saw most of the university’s student records destroyed as the computer lab went up in flames, resulting in the arrest of nearly 100 students. Some 30 years later, student activism at Concordia University was again in the headlines, this time for the prominent activity of anti-globalization and Palestinian solidarity activists.

Coinciding with a new wave of pan-Canadian student activism in the mid- to late 1990s, anti-capitalist activist Rob Green was elected president of the Concordia Student Union (CSU) in April 1999. His presidency ushered in a four-year period of political activity which saw a flurry of Concordia University student activities, many reported on by the mainstream media. From 1999 to 2001, the CSU organized a series of mass mobilizations on campus, including a two-day student strike which succeeded in lowering student fees by \$90 a year. Through the use of student referenda backed up by threats of direct action and protest, campus activists targeted university governance structures and successfully fought to remove corporations such as Sodexho-Marriott and Zoom Media from campus. The CSU also supported a wide variety of activist causes throughout Montreal, including mobilization efforts for the April 2001 protest against the Free Trade Area of the Americas in Quebec City.

With the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada in September 2000, the large Muslim and Arab student population at Concordia began mobilizing in support of the Palestinian liberation struggle. The group Solidarity for Palestinian Human Rights (SPHR) became a major player on campus through its educational and activist events and formed an alliance with the predominantly white anti-capitalist activists on the CSU executive. As a result of this alliance, both groups were targeted by Zionist groups such as the B’nai Brith’s, which erroneously suggested that SPHR was linked to terrorist groups in the Middle East and that the CSU’s 2001 student agenda book was a “blueprint for Osama bin Laden’s youth program in North America.”

Perhaps the most infamous moment in this cycle of student protest came on September 9,

2002 when over 2,000 pro-Palestinian protesters came out to protest the presence of former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on campus. Police used tear gas and pepper spray to try to clear the protesters from the university, but a *mêlée* broke out and Netanyahu was stopped from speaking. Fanned by Zionist organizations and the mainstream media, the backlash from the Netanyahu protests led to the election of a right-wing slate in the March 2003 CSU elections and a decided downturn in campus political activity.

SEE ALSO: Intifada I and Intifada II; Student Movements; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Quebec City, 2001

References and Suggested Readings

- Bernans, D. (2002) Rabble.ca. *Red Baiting Redux: The First Annual Concordia Student Union Red-Baiting Awards 2001–2002*. Available at www.rabble.ca/everyones_a_critic.shtml?sh_itm=597d846ca80787eafd378cdd0bac8a75&r=1 (downloaded April 22, 2008).
- Concordia Student Union (2000) *Concordia Student Union February 2000 Midterm Report*. Montreal: CSU Publications.
- Concordia Student Union (2001) *Concordia Student Union March 2001 Midterm Report*. Montreal: CSU Publications.
- Forsyth, D. (1971) *Let the Niggers Burn: The Sir George Williams Affair and Its Caribbean Aftermath*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Singh, J. (2002) Rabble.ca. *Netanyahu Speech Canceled* (September 9, 2002). Available at www.rabble.ca/news_full_story.shtml?x=15264&url= (downloaded April 22, 2008).

Condorcet, Marquis de (1743–1794)

Robert H. Blackman

Condorcet was known in his own life as a mathematician and political reformer. His lasting fame is as author of *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind), published in 1795, one of the best expressions of Enlightenment-era optimism. Condorcet felt that by using the mathematics of probability, one could create a science of human behavior much as Newton had made a science of astronomy and physics. Realizing that human behavior was not as susceptible to certainty as

the movements of the planets, Condorcet supported democratic and liberal politics and public education. He defended women's rights and campaigned against slavery. Saint-Simon, Comte, and the nineteenth-century sociologists owed much to Condorcet's work. In the latter half of the twentieth century Condorcet's treatment of voting methods drew scholarly interest.

Condorcet was born into an ancient noble family in Picardy. He showed promise as a mathematician while young and attracted the patronage of Jean Le Ronde d'Alembert, co-editor with Denis Diderot of the *Encyclopedie*. Though Condorcet's family wanted him to become an officer in the king's cavalry, he instead moved to Paris and studied mathematics. In time he became a member of the Academy of Sciences and of the French Academy. He corresponded with Voltaire, knew Franklin and Jefferson, and may have had, through Jefferson, an impact on the American Bill of Rights. He was also close to A. R. J. Turgot, a liberal economic thinker who was controller of finance for Louis XVI between 1774 and 1776. After Turgot's ministry fell, Condorcet remained active in reform efforts and used his position as permanent secretary of the Academy of Sciences to promote the scientific method as a means to solve France's social and fiscal problems.

Condorcet ran for but was not elected to the Estates General of 1789. Active in Parisian politics, he helped found the Society of 1789 and became a member of the Jacobin Club. After Louis XVI attempted to flee Paris in June 1791, Condorcet's politics became increasingly radical. He was elected to the Legislative Assembly in 1791 and supported the Girondins. Following the Revolution of August 10, 1792, Condorcet was elected to the National Convention and largely wrote the new republican constitution. This constitution was set aside in 1793 after the Jacobins came to dominate the Convention. Condorcet denounced the new Jacobin constitution and his arrest was ordered. He went into hiding in Paris, but was captured in March 1794 when he sought refuge outside the city. Tradition has it that he was arrested when he mistakenly ordered a 12-egg omelet. He died in captivity before he could be returned to Paris for trial.

SEE ALSO: Comte, Auguste (1797–1857); Enlightenment, France, 18th Century; French Revolution,

1789–1794; French Revolution, Radical Factions and Organizations; French Revolution, Women and; Paine, Thomas (1737–1809); Saint-Simon, Comte de (1760–1825); Sieyès, Abbé (1748–1836); Voltaire (1694–1778)

References and Suggested Readings

- Badinter, E. & Badinter, R. (1988) *Condorcet (1743–1794): Un Intellectuel en politique*. Paris: Fayard.
- Baker, K. M. (1974) *Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McLean, I. & Hewitt, F. (Trans. & Eds.) (1994) *Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
- Williams, D. (2004) *Condorcet and Modernity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT)

Eduardo Romanos

The CNT was an anarchosindicalist trade union in Spain which became a major labor organization and the beacon of international anarchism in the 1930s. It played a significant role during the Spanish Civil War, when its membership reached almost 2 million and engaged in the organization of a social revolution in the form of industrial and agrarian collectivization.

The CNT was founded at a congress organized in Barcelona between October 31 and November 1, 1910 by the Catalanian revolutionary syndicalist federation *Solidaridad Obrera* (Workers' Solidarity). The First Congress, held a year later in Barcelona, added local and provincial (*comarcal*) federations as well as regional confederations, expanding on the earlier idea of setting up national federations organized by craft, which probably indicated the influence of French syndicalist thinking on the need to form industrial unions. Soon after calling for a revolutionary general strike, the CNT was declared illegal, and the headquarters and unions were shut down, thus opening a period of underground activity that was to become normal throughout its history.

The movement did not begin to reconstruct itself until 1915, but a truly national organization had been built by 1918. The massive enrolment of anarchists increased resources and radicalized



This poster for the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (National Confederation of Labor, CNT) was printed during the Spanish Civil War. As a confederation of Spanish anarchosindicalist labor unions, the CNT played a leading role in the Spanish labor movement. The poster commemorates the day on which the civil war and the ensuing social revolution began. In 1936 the CNT joined with other Republican groups opposed to the Nationalists. (Political Poster Collection, SP 96, Hoover Institution Archives)

the CNT, which was able to mobilize some major protests, especially among peasants in Andalusia and industrial workers in Catalonia. In February 1919 the strike organized in Barcelona in the Anglo-Canadian electricity generating company *La Canadiense* was promptly supported by workers throughout the sector, paralyzing production. In December of the same year the Second Congress claimed to represent almost 800,000 affiliates – the other national trade union, the socialist labor confederation *Unión General de Trabajadores* (UGT), had between 100,000 and 200,000 affiliates at that time. Hence, the previous equilibrium between the predominant trends of revolutionary syndicalism and anarchosindicalism was now tipped towards the latter.

However, the arrest of many leaders and the armed offensive of the employers' federation, including bands of gunmen, against members of the CNT radicalized opposing positions and facilitated internal strife. It was during this confusion that the Zaragoza Conference of 1922 declared that participation in the political process was one of the aims of the organization. Coming after a period of harsh repression, this moderate stance was only an ephemeral afterthought that went little distance towards unifying the CNT. Under the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923–30), two groups confronted each other around the ideological definition of the union: on the one side, the more syndicalist-oriented group who wanted a period of recuperation that would allow the confederation to recover from persecution and to be transformed into a powerful bloc defending workers' rights; on the other, the more anarchist, opting to maintain the aim of libertarian communism adopted in 1919 and thus remaining illegal, a position that legitimized outright opposition and ultimately revolutionary insurrection.

In January 1928 Joan Peiró, the general secretary of the National Committee, intervened in the conflict and proposed a parallel structure of unions and revolutionary groups of action. However, pressure from the authorities to accept the official union structures led him to oppose legalization. Peiró and his successor Ángel Pestaña were in contact with other opposition forces in the search for means to overthrow the dictatorship and substitute a federal republic that would grant an amnesty to political prisoners as well as guarantee individual and collective liberties – prerequisites for the envisaged CNT growth. On the other side, anarchists around the Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI), a safeguard organization of the anarchist definition of the union set up in 1927, defined both regimes as corrupt and explicitly opted for social revolution destroying bourgeois institutions.

Two months after the advent of the Second Republic in Spain (April 14, 1931), the confederation held the Third Congress in Madrid with 418 delegates representing 511 unions and 535,566 affiliates. The more syndicalist faction achieved resolutions recognizing the new political opportunities for constructive action and the creation of national federations within industry, in an attempt to adapt methods of struggle to the ever-increasing intensification of capitalism.

Nevertheless, the end of the Congress meant a new period of radicalization. The main factors shaping the direction of the CNT during this period were the abuse of coercive means by the authorities in a context paradoxically more open to mobilization; the nature of post-repression dissent to be used by those in favor of revolutionary confrontation with the republic; and, finally, the existence of organizational structures with lots of committees, bureaucracy, and little participation that hindered control of the insurrectionary methods promoted by sectors close to the FAI between 1932 and 1933. All this generated an atmosphere of hostility, on some occasions even of armed hostility, between the anarchists and the republic, where the former saw in the latter a political structure blocking the path to social revolution, and the regime saw the anarchists as enemies.

Internal tension ended with rupture in the summer of 1931, when some moderates signed a manifesto criticizing the idealized and mystifying vision of revolution defended by members of the FAI as well as their intervention as the ideological vanguard of the CNT. The so-called *treintistas*, who were the followers of the thirty (*treinta*) leading anarchist signatories, were expelled from the confederation and they set up a new, parallel trade union, the Federación Sindicalista Libertaria. They were readmitted in the Fourth Congress held in Zaragoza in May 1936 that defined both the possibilist syndicalism and the revolutionary insurrections as tactical errors and established a new way to confront the state in the union with UGT, although the socialist trade union should have previously abandoned parliamentary and political collaboration.

The Spanish Civil War (July 17, 1936–April 1, 1939) represented the apogee of the CNT, but ended in severe and cruel repression. The anarchosyndicalist trade union and the anarchist federation, from then on under the joint title CNT-FAI, controlled different cities and regions after having defeated the military uprising that sparked the war, and promoted industrial and agrarian collectives, especially in Catalonia, eastern Aragon, and Valencia. This form of revolutionary production was based on the “concept of libertarian communism” approved in the Congress in Zaragoza. Aiming to combine Kropotkin's sense of equity and Bakunin's belief in spontaneity, this formula envisaged a free society where “voluntary duty” would guide

collective action towards a federation of workers' unions and free meeting of autonomous communes. However, early problems arose in the making of revolution during wartime. Members of the CNT-FAI joined the Catalonian government on September 26, 1936, and the Republican one a week later. They occupied these posts aiming to avoid "strangling the revolution," but power transformed them into instruments of liberal legalism and curbs on revolution, as Peiró indicated soon after leaving his post as minister of industry.

The famous May Days of 1937, when anarchists and members of the dissident communist party Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (Workers' Party of Marxist Unification) (POUM) fought on the streets of Barcelona against Catalan communists and the Republican police, signaled the distance between the leaders and the union rank and file, who accused them of giving in. As a result, a new government was appointed under the parliamentary socialist Juan Negrín and without the participation of the CNT-FAI. After this "civil war within the Civil War," state troops dismantled revolutionary collectivization as well as the local and regional organs of workers' power (e.g., the libertarian-controlled governing Council of Aragon). The new government's decrees militarized the libertarian militia and imposed central control on industry. The military, political, and social force of the CNT declined, along with the FAI and the Federación Ibérica de Juventudes Libertarias (FIJL), which in October 1938 came together to set up the Movimiento Libertario (ML).

With the end of the war the Francoist regime brutally repressed the members of the ML, rendering the member organizations illegal along with *Mujeres Libres*, the female branch of the movement. In addition, the libertarian *ateneos*, which up to this point had constituted a network of cultural and educative centers, were shut down. A new, tragic rupture came in 1945 when the official CNT-in-exile disavowed the decision to join the republican government-in-exile. In 1947 the maximalists in exile underwent a process of radicalization through which they came to define any republic as a mere "transfiguration of the authority principle," proposing traditional isolation from the political "game" and revolutionary insurrection as the sole revolutionary means, and aiming for libertarian communism without transitional stages. This ideological

paralysis was criticized by numerous affiliates, some of whom set up dissident platforms after being expelled, and finally distanced the youth from the trade union.

In Franco's Spain the member organizations of the ML regrouped around the remains of the CNT, which, contrary to the exiled organization, defended the replacement of social revolution with more concrete mobilization principles based on the defense of the personal and public liberties and rights denied by the dictatorship. The clandestine confederation transformed past anarcho-syndicalism into a more politically orientated one, and past revolutionary alliances into new ones with political opposition forces that aimed at national liberation. By opting for the search for diplomatic solutions to Franco, the committees disavowed the armed guerrilla, or at least did not support it. Without any strong support in Spain or abroad, and after the victorious nations of World War II refused to help overthrow the dictator, the organization's own failure to adapt to clandestine structures and recruitment paved the way for repression that finally devastated resources. By 1949 fourteen National Committees had fallen, dragging down regional and local counterparts with them.

From the late 1940s the CNT remained latent, and in the mid-1960s some veterans thought collaboration with dissident *falangistas* could transform the official trade union into an autonomous, independent, and eventually anti-Francoist force. They reformulated anarchosyndicalism into a kind of "humanistic syndicalism," attempting to attract a new generation of workers. Nevertheless, the libertarian youth disapproved of the ideological direction taken by the elders towards moderate positions regarding formal democracy and the state, as well as the radical but obsolete discourse of the official CNT-in-exile. Some tried to convene meetings at which unified criteria would bring together those who had fought in the Civil War and those who had grown up under the influence of the international protest mobilization of 1968, but these failed to yield results.

After Franco's death in 1975 the transition to democracy saw a quick recovery of the CNT's affiliates and unions, especially in Catalonia, but again internal strife defused energies. From 1979, and after other minor splits in the 1990s, the official CNT attracted more orthodox members and became a sort of association focused

on preserving its cultural legacy, while the more reformist elements were forced to change title in 1989, becoming the Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT), which chose to take part in trade union ballots and industrial committees. Both the CNT and the CGT have set up cultural foundations which hold documentary archives and publish texts on the history of anarchism and anarcho-sindicalism in Spain. Another important documentary institution is the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, which holds the official archives of the CNT and the FAI during the Spanish Civil War, as well as personal papers given by militants.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Spain; Anarcho-sindicalism; Anti-Franco Worker Struggles, 1939–1975; Barcelona General Strike, 1919; Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI); Mujeres Libres; Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Bar, A. (1981) *La CNT en los Años Rojos. Del Sindicalismo Revolucionario al Anarcosindicalismo (1910–1926)*. Madrid: Akal.
- Casanova, J. (2004) *Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain: 1931–1939*. London: Routledge. Original version in Spanish (1997) *De la Calle al Frente. El Anarcosindicalismo en España*. Barcelona: Crítica.
- Herrerín, A. (2004) *La CNT durante el Franquismo. Clandestinidad y Exilio (1939–1975)*. Madrid: Siglo XXI.
- Peirats, J. (2001) *The CNT in the Spanish Revolution*. Hastings: Meltzer Press. Original version in Spanish (1971) *La CNT en la revolución española*. 3 vols. Paris: Ruedo Ibérico.
- Smith, A. (2007) *Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction: Catalan Labour and the Crisis of the Spanish State, 1898–1923*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Confédération Générale du Travail and Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire

Jean-Philippe Zanco

After the Waldeck-Rousseau Act of March 21, 1884 legalized the *syndicats* (labor unions), a Fédération Nationale des Syndicats (National Federation of Unions) (FNS) was created in Lyon in October 1886, the first to try to unify

the unions in a single movement. It quickly went through internal struggles: laborers, in fact, still lacked a clear ideology. Soon, however, the rise of anarchist ideas smoothed out ideological oppositions. The principle of the general strike, first proposed by the construction workers at the Congress of the FNS in Montluçon (1887), was massively endorsed at the Congress of Nantes (1894). A meeting called by the FNS and its rival the Fédération des Bourses du Travail (the Federation of Labor Exchanges, or FBT, run by the anarchists), about 30 local federations, 10 national professional federations, 20 labor exchanges, and 126 local craft chambers or union branches, met in Limoges on September 23–28, 1895. The Congress decided: “Among the various labor and professional associations of workers and clerks . . . is established a united and collective organization which will be called the Confédération Générale du Travail [CGT].”

But unity was far from absolute, and the first years of the young union were stormy; the FBT and its charismatic leader, Fernand Pelloutier, remained in the light of the CGT and its ephemeral secretaries (four in three years). In 1901 Pelloutier died and some new figures emerged at the CGT, like Emile Pouget and Victor Griffuelhes (secretary general from 1901 to 1909), both anarchists. The FBT soon decayed and the Bourses du Travail finally merged in the CGT, at the Congress of Montpellier (September 1902).

Neither the Congress of Limoges nor the Congress of Montpellier had defined the program of the CGT. From 1902 to 1906 Griffuelhes defined some main points, so as to write down the ideology of the CGT: the blame of capitalism, but also strong opposition to state and to political action (which was leading syndicalism away from Marxism and from parliamentary socialism); definition of specific means of struggle; anti-militarism. As can be read in the CGT’s founding document, the *Charte d’Amiens* (October 1906), the CGT’s syndicalism aimed at a deep transformation of the social order: “On one side, it prepares for complete emancipation, which cannot be realized without the expropriation of the capitalists, and on the other side, it recommends the general strike as a mode of action and it regards that labor unions, from resistance movements they are nowadays, will become in the future production and distribution groups, bases of a social reorganization.”

The first general strike was planned for May 1, 1906, to call for an 8-hour day, but an accident in Courrières on March 10 which killed 1,200 miners rushed the movement: 40,000 miners refused to go back to work, and they rapidly were joined by 200,000 strikers in all industrial branches. For the first time in its history, the CGT, which counted up to 400,000 members, was showing its capacity for actions of broad scope. The government feared a civil war, and the home secretary, Georges Clemenceau, used rough tactics: Griffuelhes was arrested, the army stopped the miners' strike, and minor union officials (clerks, postmen, schoolmasters) were fired. The years 1906–9 can be called the climax of anarchosyndicalism in France, which saw strikes and demonstrations across the country, rebellions in the army, spectacular actions from union workers such as the electricians led by anarchosyndicalist Emile Pataud, who switched off the current in Paris in March 1907, as well as violent government reactions and police brutality. In 1908, 667 workers were wounded, 20 killed, and 392 fired.

Nonetheless, after 1909, the movement declined. With the evolution of labor laws (Workers Pensions Act in 1910), the workers gradually accepted parliamentary rules and got closer to the political parties, particularly the French Communist Party and the SFIO (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière, the French Section of the Workers' International, founded in 1905), while the rate of registrations at the CGT was slowing down. In 1913 the CGT failed to stop the law dictating three years' military service; a few months later, the SFIO won the elections.

The meaning of revolutionary action was becoming confused, and World War I and the Russian Revolution enlarged the fractures. Léon Jouhaux, who had managed the CGT since 1909, joined the Union sacrée supporting the war, but met with internal resistance from some factions which refused to renounce revolution. In 1909 Pierre Monatte published a new journal, *La Vie ouvrière* (*Worker's Life*), hoping to represent the CGT more accurately by showing its syndicalist revolutionary aims. In 1919 he created the *Comités syndicalistes révolutionnaires* (Revolutionary Syndicalist Committees) (CSRs), which would move the dissident militants away from the CGT at the Congress of Tours (1922), founding the Confédération Générale du Travail

Unitaire (Unitary General Confederation of Labor) (CGTU). But the CGTU, soon captured by the Leninists, joined the Red International and submitted to the Communist Party. The anarchists, in a minority, left the movement, and founded in 1924 the Confédération Générale du Travail Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Syndicalist General Confederation of Labor) (CGT-SR), led by Pierre Besnard.

The CGT-SR militants never numbered more than a few, but the organization had some influence. They engaged in syndicalist action, especially through the strikes of June 1936, but also in anti-colonialist action, with some limited demonstrations (during the Exposition Coloniale Internationale in 1931 and the centenary of French Algeria in 1930). They were particularly active in the area of Toulouse, where many Spanish workers had taken refuge, some coming from the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (National Confederation of Labor) (CNT); some French militants went to Spain to fight in the International Brigades. Above all, the CGT-SR had some ideological influence. While the CGT and the CGTU went on to refer to the Charte d'Amiens, the CGT-SR tried to define, in the Charte de Lyon (November 1–2, 1926), some new purposes for syndicalist action, closer to the anarchist ideology, that would directly influence the founders of the CNT in 1946.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, France; Anarchosyndicalism; Bourses du Travail; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Pelloutier, Fernand (1867–1901) and the Bourses du Travail; Syndicalism, France

References and Suggested Readings

- Berthuin, J. (2000) *La CGT-SR et la révolution espagnole: de l'espoir à la désillusion*. Paris: CNT-RP.
- Dolléans, E. (1939) *Histoire du mouvement ouvrier*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Dreyfus, M. (1995) *Histoire de la CGT*. Brussels: Complexe.
- Dubief, H. (1969) *Le Syndicalisme révolutionnaire*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Gambone, L. (1995) *Revolution and Reformism: The Split between "Moderates" and "Revolutionaries" in French Anarcho-Syndicalism*. Montréal: Red Lion Press.
- Mouriaux, R. (1982) *La CGT*. Paris: Seuil.
- Tucker, K. H. (1996) *French Revolutionary Syndicalism and the Public Sphere*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Congo armed insurgency, Mobutu decamps

Adebusuyi I. Adeniran

The Democratic Republic of Congo gained full independence from Belgium in June 1960 as the Republic of the Congo. After a series of political upheavals, Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu took control of the country in 1965. He eventually institutionalized a presidential system of government in 1970 when he was old enough to become the nation's president. To further his hold on power, President Mobutu changed the name of the country from Congo to Zaire (*Zadi*, "big water"), and his own name to Mobutu Sese Seko in 1972. Also in 1972, Mobutu's Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) became the only legal political party in Zaire.

Upon reelection for a second term of seven years in 1977, President Mobutu provided the platform for tangible sociopolitical reforms, having to contend with two potent revolts from the Shaba region of the country between 1977 and 1978. These uprisings were instigated by the Congolese National Liberation Front (FNLC) from their base in Angola. However, with the support of Morocco and other western allies (France and Belgium), the revolts were successfully crushed. In 1984, "Marshal" Mobutu won another (third) term of seven years as president.

In the context of mounting international condemnation of most of Mobutu's policies, disgruntled soldiers and protesters unleashed havoc on settlements in Zaire in September 1991. Mobutu thereafter agreed to incorporate the opposition into an emergency governmental arrangement. Opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi of the Democratic Union for Social Progress was appointed prime minister by Mobutu in September 1991. Barely a month later, Mobutu dismissed Tshisekedi over irreconcilable differences. Tshisekedi subsequently set up an alternative opposition government to Mobutu's.

Amidst intensified local and international pressure to relinquish power, Mobutu declared his intention to remain as president after the end of his third term in office in December 1991. In spite of his reluctance, Tshisekedi was

reinstated as prime minister in August 1992. Just two months later, a massive insurrection erupted following Mobutu's disapproval of political restructuring. A makeshift parliament – the High Council of the Republic (HCR) – was established in December 1992. However, Mobutu's failure to recognize the HCR led to the emergence of a parallel government under the HCR's firm grip. A truce was eventually struck between Mobutu and the HCR in June 1994, with Kengo Wa Dondo emerging as the new prime minister.

A conceptual impetus for the intensification of social struggles in the Congo was the massive exodus of well over two million Rwandan nationals (Tutsis), who were escaping genocide at the hands of the Hutu majority into the Congo in 1994. Other factors that contributed to the country's steady drift towards anarchy included the outbreak of the deadly Ebola virus in parts of the country in 1995, and persistent ethnic skirmishes and secessionist agitations. However, when the new Rwandan regime dislodged the Hutu militiamen, an estimated 500,000 refugees moved back to Rwanda in 1996 after two years in exile in Congolese refugee camps.

A rebellion instigated by Tutsi rebels among the Banyamulenge ethnic group of eastern Congo in October 1996 was fiercely resisted by the military on the orders of Mobutu, whose power was already beginning to wane. As a consequence, all Tutsi refugees were forced to vacate their camps and civilians had to flee their homes hurriedly or face the death penalty. This act was to be Mobutu's undoing in his bid to perpetuate himself in power. The Tutsis were bitter at Mobutu's open support for the Rwandan Hutu extremists who were responsible for the genocide in 1994. Another rebellion was to occur among the Banyamulenge at Southern Kivu. In addition, insurrections were being instigated by other disgruntled ethnic groups. Although an interim ceasefire was secured in November 1996, tensions were obviously mounting all over the country. The planned deployment of an international United Nations peacekeeping force in the country was suspended.

With the support of President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Rwandan minister of defense Paul Kagame, the Tutsis made a final attempt to oust Mobutu in November 1996, joining forces with locals opposed to a

continuation of Mobutu's despotic rule. In late 1996, an insurgency targeted at ousting Mobutu was launched by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who led the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL). By March 1997, the strategic city of Kisangani and many other parts of the Congo were already under the control of the rebels. By April 1997, both Mbuji-Mayi, the country's diamond headquarters, and Lubumbashi, its second largest city, had also fallen to the rebels. All attempts by Mobutu to continue in power – even the imposition of a state of emergency – were futile in the face of the rebels' advance. In April 1997, an interim assembly returned the former prime minister, Tshisekedi, to his post.

These multiple upheavals eventually led to the ousting of Mobutu in 1997 by the rebel forces under the control of Kabila, who seized power and rechristened the country the Democratic Republic of Congo. Despite Mobutu's overthrow, hostilities remained, particularly in the eastern part of the country. Natural resources, especially diamonds, continue to be a source of contention among various countries, private companies, and liberation forces.

SEE ALSO: Congo, Brazzaville Protest and Revolt; Congo Crisis, 1960–1965; Congo, Kinshasa Protest and Revolt; Congo, Protest and Uprisings, 1998–2002; Lumumba, Patrice (1925–1961)

References and Suggested Readings

- Little, A. (1997) *From Our Own Correspondent*. London: BBC News, May 24.
- Mwakikagile, G. (2006a) *Africa in a Mess: What Went Wrong and What Should Be Done*. South Africa: New Africa Press.
- Mwakikagile, G. (2006b) *Congo in the Sixties: Bleeding Heart of Africa*. South Africa: New Africa Press.
- Sandbrook, R. (1985) *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Congo, Brazzaville protest and revolt

Ayokunle Olumuyiwa Omobowale

Congo Brazzaville was part of the pre-colonial kingdom of Congo, which came under French rule during colonization. Principally, anti-colonial protests in Congo Brazzaville were centered

on the activities of charismatic leader Andre Matswa and the protests and ideology that followed his incarceration and eventual death.

Andre Matswa and the Pan-African Amicalist Movement

Andre Matswa was born in 1899 and received primary education from a Christian missionary school at Brazzaville. He departed for France in 1921, where he was conscripted to serve in the French army. He was consequently deployed to Morocco where he served as a soldier in the War of the Rif against Moroccan insurgents. It was while serving in Morocco that Matswa developed strong anti-colonial sentiments based on his experience at the war front.

After honorable discharge in 1926, Matswa founded the Association amicable des originaires de l'AEF, also known as the L'Amicale, in Paris with an objective of assisting underprivileged Congolese. The organization was also supported by the French Communist Party and gradually evolved from a humanitarian organization into a nationalist movement, with Matswa calling for reforms and the abrogation of inhumane colonial laws. Within a period of three years, L'Amicale garnered a large membership and spread across France and Africa, with about 13,000 members in French Equatorial Africa alone.

With anti-colonial consciousness growing among the Congolese population and Matswa's increasing popularity, French authorities began to get nervous and arrested Matswa in France in 1928, sentencing him to three years imprisonment in 1929. His incarceration resulted in widespread anti-colonial protests in the Congo among his followers, with local chiefs calling for civil disobedience. The protests were brutally suppressed by French forces, resulting in many deaths. Local chiefs who were arrested were publicly executed at the town square in 1940 on the orders of Felix Eboué, the colonial governor. Other followers were sentenced to manual labor and used in the construction of Congo-Ocean railroad, where tens of thousands died. Matswa, along with some of his lieutenants, served part of his prison term in Chad but managed to escape. He relocated to France and once again joined the army. He was subsequently rearrested and repatriated to the Congo. He was again tried and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1940 and was killed in prison in 1942.

The death of Matswa made him a messianic martyr. His anti-colonial belief system became a radical ideology attracting many converts who carried on his legacy clandestinely. It was utilized most especially to campaign against and resist the conscription of the Congolese into the French military during World War II.

Post-Matswa Protest and Independence

As the country moved towards independence in the 1950s, a young Catholic priest, Abbe Fulbert Youlou, emerged with the ideology of Matswa, gaining prominence as his successor. He formed the Union Democratique Pour la Defence des Interests Africains (UDDIA) in 1956. The UDDIA secured a strong representation in the Congolese parliament from 1956. Youlou eventually became the first president of Congo at independence in 1960.

SEE ALSO: Charismatic Leadership and Revolution; Congo Armed Insurgency, Mobutu Decamps; Congo Crisis, 1960–1965; Congo, Kinshasa Protest and Revolt

References and Suggested Readings

- Clark, P. (2000) *Passionate Engagements: A Reading of Sony Labou Tansi's Private Ancestral Shrine. Research in African Literatures* 31 (3): 39–68.
- Hallet, R. (1974) *Africa Since 1875*. London: Heinemann.
- Taoua, P. (2000) The Anti-Colonial Archive: France and Africa's Unfinished Business. *SubStance* 32 (3): 146–64.
- Uwechue, R. (1991) *Africa Today*. London: Africa Books.

Congo Crisis, 1960–1965

Ayokunle Olumuyiwa Omobowale

Just like many other countries in Africa, Congo's independence came in 1960. It was a time of joy and high expectations among the citizenry, who felt it to be the dawn of a new era. It was supposed to usher in a period of progress for the Congolese and in particular the military non-commissioned officers and junior civil servants who had hoped for the attainment of senior positions. Indeed, this was part of the campaign promises of the main political parties, particularly Patrice Lumumba. A frontline politician with only primary education, Lumumba,

as leader of the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), had promised equality with the whites upon independence. After he became prime minister, he faced a number of challenges to keeping his promise.

Calamitous Independence: Mutiny, Secession, and Lumumba's Struggles

Right from the independence ceremony, the conflictual nature of the relationship between the new government led by Lumumba and Belgium played itself out. After Belgian King Baudouin delivered a speech celebrating the achievements of his country in Congo, Lumumba climbed the podium to debunk the king's claims, instead discussing the debilitating effect of colonial rule. This shocked the king and presented Lumumba as an anti-Belgium leader who could not be trusted.

On July 5, 1960, barely five days after independence, Congolese soldiers mutinied against their Belgian officers after the head of the army, General Emile Janssens, reportedly addressed soldiers by informing them that for the army, the status quo would remain, irrespective of independence. Holding to the status quo was not a situation the soldiers could endure, for they had hoped for promotion and improvement in their socioeconomic status with independence. The mutiny started at a military establishment in Thysville and quickly spread to other bases, with disgruntled soldiers attacking their officers and members of the European community, who they perceived as would-be masters unwilling to let go and accept Congolese freedom.

Lumumba's response was the sack of General Janssens on July 6 and an order for the Africanization of the officer corps on July 8. The ensuing pandemonium sent shock waves throughout the Belgian community, who realized they were no longer safe in the hands of erstwhile obedient subjects. Thus, the Europeans embarked on a mass exodus, except in Katanga, the area that accommodated the bulk of Belgian economic investments. The province of Katanga thus largely created a safe haven for the Belgians as they retained their positions in both the military and civil service. Subsequently, Katanga province, under the leadership of Moise Tshombe, declared its secession on July 11, with Tshombe appealing to Belgium for technical and financial

assistance. Of course, Belgium quickly dispatched troops to Katanga to secure its population and economic interests and to prop up the only provincial government whose support it enjoyed.

For Lumumba, the presence of Belgian troops in Katanga indicated a renewed effort at colonization, with the Europeans clearly planning to keep and exploit the resource-rich province, which provided about half of the country's income. Lumumba and Joseph Kasavubu, the president, appealed for the intervention of the United Nations (UN), which on July 14 condemned Belgian intervention in Congo and called for an immediate replacement of its troops with UN forces. On July 15 the first contingent of the United Nations Organization in the Congo (UNOC) troops landed in the Congo, and Belgium withdrew its soldiers from much of the country but retained its strong presence in Katanga, insisting that it was its right to protect its citizens and their interests.

Prime Minister Lumumba seemed to think that UNOC troops were around to subject Katanga to central authority and bring the whole country under its control. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld soon made him realize that the troops were not there to do his bidding and would not force any province into subjection to central authority. When UNOC troops eventually marched into Katanga on August 12, many Belgian soldiers did not actually leave. They only changed their uniform for that of the former colonial army, while the Belgian-trained Katanga army also remained in force. Hence, Katanga secession was not terminated, while it also continued to enjoy support from the Belgian government and business organizations. In particular, a UN report actually indicated in 1963 that a major Belgian conglomerate, Union Minière, financed the Katanga government to the tune of about \$40,000,000 per year, with the bulk of the funds expended on "hiring mercenaries and equipping them" (Gibbs 2000: 369). With Katanga's secession sustained in spite of the presence of UNOC troops, South Kasai province, which accommodated a major Belgian diamond mining company, also opted to secede in August 1960.

As Lumumba lost grip of the economic nerve centers of Congo and failed to gain UNOC and western support in terms of equipment and personnel to suppress the secession, he opted to seek help from the Soviet Union, the main rival

of the United States and other western powers during the Cold War. Of course, Soviet assistance came in the form of military hardware and personnel. This, however, earned Lumumba the displeasure of the western powers and he was seen as a communist agent in Africa who had to be divested of power. At first, this came via a proclamation of President Kasavubu, who sacked Lumumba on September 5 and replaced him with Senator Joseph Ileo. Lumumba's spirited efforts to ensure a reinstatement seemed to be working, as he successfully defended his decision to employ Soviet assistance before Parliament on September 7. He won the support of Parliament, which also overturned his dismissal. As the ensuing stalemate continued, Lumumba's supporters set up a rival government in Stanleyville in November, with a part of the national army offering its allegiance.

Subsequently, Lumumba tried to move from Leopoldville, where he was protected by UNOC troops, but was captured by the Congolese army in November. On January 17, 1961 Lumumba was murdered under circumstances that were described then as mysterious, but which recently declassified documents show was highly influenced by western powers, who were uncomfortable with Lumumba's association with the communists and his popularity both domestically and internationally.

Post-Lumumba Congo, 1961–1965

The death of Lumumba did not bring an end to the Congo imbroglio. Rather, it caused widespread international and local condemnation. To an extent, the Lumumbists retained their stronghold in Stanleyville, and the UN tried to resolve the conflict by requesting Congolese politicians to return to government and deal with foreign intervention in the country. After numerous negotiations, political leaders in both Leopoldville and Stanleyville formed a coalition government and conceded the position of prime minister to moderate Cyrille Adoula.

The two seceding provinces remained outside the authority of the central government until 1962 and 1963, when South Kasai and Katanga discontinued their secession, and Katanga leader Tshombe went into exile to Spain. However, by 1964, with UNOC troops preparing to withdraw by June 30, the country was again threatened with civil war, as the political leaders in Leopoldville

and Stanleyville took up arms. Tshombe, who had proved his worth as a strong leader with effective military force, was invited from exile to head a new government as prime minister. With the aid of military assistance from the United States and the use of mercenaries, Tshombe once again engaged the Lumumbists and effectively defeated them despite the support they got from African governments.

By 1965 Tshombe, overwhelmed by the victory, sought to occupy the presidential seat Kasavubu was still holding. Kasavubu sacked Tshombe, just as he had sacked Lumumba. This led to the kind of crisis that followed Lumumba's sack. In the midst of this confusion, Colonel Mobutu, the head of the army, staged a coup that brought him to power on November 24, 1965.

SEE ALSO: Congo Armed Insurgency, Mobutu Decamps; Congo, Brazzaville Protest and Revolt; Congo, Kinshasa Protest and Revolt; Lumumba, Patrice (1925–1961)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bustin, E. (2000) Remembrance of Sins Past: Unravelling the Murder of Patrice Lumumba. *Review of African Political Economy* 29 (93/94): 537–60.
- Fetter, B. (2002) Review: Who Murdered Lumumba. *Journal of African History* 43 (2): 358–9.
- Gibbs, D. N. (2000) The United Nations, International Peacekeeping and the Question of “Impartiality”: Revisiting the Congo Operation of 1960. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 38 (3): 359–82.
- Hallet, R. (1974) *Africa Since 1875*. London: Heinemann.
- Kaplan, L. S. (1967) The United States, Belgium, and the Congo Crisis of 1960. *Review of Politics* 29 (2): 239–59.
- Nzongola-Ntalaja (1979) The Continuing Struggle for National Liberation in Zaire. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17 (4): 595–614.
- Young, C. M. (1966) Post-Independence Politics in the Congo. *Transition* 26: 34–41.
- Young, C. M. (1994) Zaire: The Scattered Illusion of the Integral State. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 32 (2): 247–63.

Congo, Kinshasa protest and revolt

Ayokunle Olumuyima Omobowale

Congo had been in contact with Europe, especially the Portuguese, as far back as the fifteenth century, but it remained an independent kingdom

until it officially came under French and Belgian rule in 1885. At that point the Congo, which was 80 times the size of Belgium and extended over 9,000,000 square miles, came under the rule of the Belgian king, Leopold II. Christened Congo Free State, the territory was treated as a private estate of the king until it was taken over by the Belgian parliament for direct administration after the atrocities committed by officials of the king, which generated widespread international and domestic criticism. Due to the Belgians' particularly brutal and oppressive rule in the Congo, major popular protest did not emerge until late in the 1950s.

Political Awareness and Agitation for Independence

From the beginning of its colonial administration in the Congo, the Belgian government had a policy that favored the provision of amenities and possible reform of the ways of life of the local population without exposing them to ideas that would encourage agitation for “liberty or self-determination” (Hallet 1974: 454). Thus, though primary and secondary education in the local languages were emphasized, the Congolese were not allowed to proceed to university education in Belgium, where they could have been exposed to liberal thought, until 1952, and independent newspapers were not allowed until 1957. Of course, this meant the Congo could hardly produce qualified personnel to take over from Belgian officials, and pro-independence agitation was uncommon.

Agitation for independence did not commence until 1956. It was pioneered by the Alliance des Ba-Kongo (ABAKO). ABAKO was established in 1951 as a sociocultural organization. It remained largely that until August 1956, when it transformed into a political party and publicly clamored for immediate independence under the leadership of Joseph Kasavubu. Kasavubu's popularity and victory in local elections in 1957 attested to the people's desire for self-determination and independence. Subsequently, a plethora of largely ethnic-based political parties sprang up. Two of the major ones, both founded in October 1958, were the Confederation des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) with Moïse Tshombe as leader and Patrice Lumumba's Mouvement National Congolais (MNC). Of the three main parties only

Lumumba's MNC reflected the form of a national party, as the other two enjoyed popularity more from the political bases of the leaders. Nevertheless, the stage was set for greater political agitation by the Congolese.

Upon returning from the All-African Peoples' Conference held at Accra in December 1958, Lumumba addressed a crowd of faithful in Leopoldville where he declared that independence was the fundamental right of the Congolese and not a mere gift. This declaration attracted a shout of support from the audience, whose mind and consciousness henceforth tuned more progressively towards self-determination and independence. Within two months (December 1958 to January 1959) there were mass protests against the colonial authorities in Congo, as well as international pressure on Belgium. On January 13, 1959 Belgium finally announced its resolve to grant independence.

In the parliamentary election held in May 1960 no party won a clear-cut majority, even though Lumumba's MNC won the highest number of seats in the National Assembly – 33 out of the 137. This lack of an outright winner meant a coalition had to be formed. The ABAKO and the MNC formed a coalition government with Kasavubu as president and Lumumba as prime minister and head of government. Just a week after the government was formed, Belgium formally granted independence to Congo on June 30, 1960.

Post-Independence Anti-Colonial Protest

Unlike other colonial territories in Africa, Congo's major anti-colonial protest actually commenced just five days after independence. It plunged the country into widespread violence, killings, and attempts at secession. Apparently due to the sudden transition which Belgium had to embark on, the option adopted was the quick election of political officials who would take up positions in parliament and government. However, the other major arms of governance, including the military and the public service, remained under the firm control of Belgians.

Out of the 10,000 top positions in the public service, only three were held by Congolese. Likewise, among the country's 25,000 troops, all the 1,000 commissioned officers were Belgians, while all the non-commissioned officers were

Congolese. Aside from their perceived lowly positions in a country they viewed thenceforth as theirs, and from which they should enjoy the "dividends" of independence, their salaries remained low, with little hope of an immediate promotion into the senior officers' cadre. The argument against their promotion was that they did not have the requisite qualifications. This was inevitable, however, given the Belgian educational policy of exclusion. Thus, by independence, Congolese university degree holders numbered about thirty. For this small number of Congolese, the argument was not tenable. They had seen politicians who hitherto shared the same educational and social statuses with them experience upward social mobility as they clinched elective posts.

Thus, on July 5, 1960, after noticing some acts of insubordination among the rank and file, the Belgian head of the Congolese National Army, General Emile Janssens, summoned a meeting of military personnel, during which according to Young (1966: 34) he wrote: "AFTER INDEPENDENCE = BEFORE INDEPENDENCE." Apparently, this was meant to emphasize that command and control in the military had to be upheld in spite of independence. It seemed to have conveyed the meaning of a continuation of colonial rule irrespective of independence to the Congolese non-commissioned officers. Such a continuation would then mean retention of non-commissioned ranks among junior officers. Later that day, soldiers at a military garrison in the capital refused to carry out orders from European officers and arrested them instead. The mutiny subsequently spread to other barracks as the insurrectionary soldiers demanded to be promoted, even as they participated in attacks targeted against Europeans.

On July 6, General Janssens was sacked, then a total Africanization of the officer corps was ordered on July 8 by the Lumumba government. These actions did not bring an immediate peace, however. Ensuing events eventually resulted in attempted secession by Katanga and Kasai provinces, the deployment of Belgians to shore up Katanga's pro-Belgium government, the mass exodus of European civil servants, the deployment of the United Nations' Peacekeeping troops, the sacking of Lumumba on September 5, 1960, and his capture in November 1960 and subsequent killing on January 17, 1961. The conflict continued until 1965.

SEE ALSO: Congo Armed Insurgency, Mobutu Decamps; Congo, Brazzaville Protest and Revolt; Congo Crisis, 1960–1965; Lumumba, Patrice (1925–1961)

References and Suggested Readings

- Hallet, R. (1974) *Africa Since 1875*. London: Heinemann.
- Jesman, C. (1961) Background to Events in the Congo. *African Affairs* 60 (240): 382–91.
- Kanza, T. R. (1968) The Problems of the Congo. *African Affairs* 67 (266): 55–62.
- Nzongola, G. N. (1970) The Bourgeoisie and Revolution in the Congo. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 8 (4): 511–30.
- Young, C. M. (1966) Post-Independence Politics in the Congo. *Transition* 26: 34–41.

Congo, protest and uprisings, 1998–2002

Adebusuyi I. Adeniran

With the exit of “Marshal” Mobutu Sese Seko from the presidency of former-Zaire in May 1997, and the immediate ascendancy of the leader of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFLC), Joseph-Desire Kabila, the social and political instability that marked Congo’s independence era from Belgium in June 1960 persisted even more intensely. Various protests and uprisings in the Congo between 1998 and 2002 have been called the Second Congo War or Africa’s World War. Eight African nations (Angola, Burundi, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) were directly involved, with an estimated 30 armed groups at war in the Congo. The number of recorded casualties made the conflict the deadliest global altercation since World War II. Although the conflict officially ended with the signing of the Sun City Agreement in South Africa in April 2002, avoidable cases of malnutrition and disease arising from intermittent clashes have often led to the deaths of hundreds of Congolese daily. The post-Mobutu altercations in the Congo are estimated to have cost well over 5 million human lives.

On August 2, 1998 an insurgency targeted at the overthrow of President Kabila was championed by the Banyamulenge from eastern Congo. From mid-August 1998 the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) emerged as the platform for

advancement of further rebellions. The RCD quickly assumed control of major resources in the eastern region of the Congo, a part of which was occupied by Rwandan forces. President Kabila, reacting to this occupation and having secured the support of Hutu militiamen from eastern Congo, launched a campaign of extermination against the Tutsis.

While Rwanda claimed that portions of eastern Congo “traditionally” belonged to it and justified its involvement in the rebellion, the Congolese alerted citizens to the need to arm themselves “in order to kill the Rwandan Tutsis.” Within a month of its formation, RCD mutineers successfully hijacked a plane and terminated the operation of the crucial Inga hydropower station supplying electricity to the Congo capital city of Kinshasa and port of Matadi, where which food arrived for the city. Also, in the key city of Kisangani, diamond-industry headquarters were captured by the rebels in quick succession. By late August the rebel army had advanced appreciably on Kinshasa.

The increasing likelihood of Kabila’s overthrow kept him clamoring desperately for support from other African countries. Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe – member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – were the first to heed his call. Chad, Libya, and Sudan offered support. In September 1998 Zimbabwean forces assisted in repelling the invasion of Kinshasa by advancing mutineers. Angolan troops were to lay siege to the rebels’ stronghold from northeastern Angola. These counterinsurgencies warded off rebel advances on Kinshasa and granted Kabila’s government interim stability, but failed to end rebel incursions.

The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) emerged in November 1998 as a new rebel group on the northern flank of the Congo, backed by the Ugandan government. Despite a ceasefire agreed among Angola, Uganda, Rwanda, Namibia, and Zimbabwe at a meeting held at Windhoek, Namibia in January 1999, insurgencies intensified, especially from the RCD members who were conspicuously absent from the meeting. The self-interested concern of non-African countries such as the United States, Canada, and Japan for Congo’s diamond industry also worsened the crisis.

Irreconcilable differences within the RCD led to the disintegration of the group in April 1999, and of course, the proliferation of crises.

Subsequent fights among the rebellious factions for the control of the critical city of Kisangani led to the deaths of many people. Equally, the strategic creation of the Ituri province by President Museveni in Uganda intensified the conflagration.

A ceasefire attempt – the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement – was facilitated in July 1999 by six of the warring nations: Angola, Congo DR, Uganda, Rwanda, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. While the RCD refused to be a party to the agreement, the MLC eventually gave its consent on August 1, 1999. The United Nations' Security Council immediately deployed essential personnel to help hold the ceasefire. However, by September 1999 all parties to the agreement had begun accusing one another of flagrant contravention of the agreement. It was apparent that fighting would resume at any moment.

More altercations had erupted in early August consequent upon mounting tensions between the Uganda People's Defense Force and the Rwanda Patriotic Army. In November 1999 a massive attack was launched towards Kinshasa by the Rwandan insurgents, quickly repulsed by government forces in collaboration with Ugandan troops. The approval and subsequent deployment of more than five thousand troops by the United Nations on February 24, 2000 could not curtail the fighting between the Ugandan and Rwandan troops on one side, and the rebels and government troops on the other.

In mid-2000 there were several uprisings and offensives, particularly between Rwandan and Ugandan forces in and around Kisangani. On August 9, 2000 the MLC rebels violently repelled an offensive instigated by government troops in the province of Equateur, along the Ubangui River. All efforts to resolve the crisis failed throughout 2000.

On January 16, 2001 President Kabila was shot by an assassin from among his own aides and died two days later after flying to Zimbabwe. The killing was thought to be instigated by disgruntled allies. Laurent Kabila's son, Joseph, was unanimously elected by the Congolese parliament as the next president. In February 2001 the new president and Rwanda president Paul Kagame met in the United States. Thereafter, Ugandan and Rwandan authorities began withdrawing troops from the front line.

The Sun City Agreement put in place in April 2002 provided for a multiparty democracy

in the Congo. Roundly criticized for failing to provide for the amalgamation of various armed groups, the agreement nevertheless facilitated a substantial reduction in armed hostilities. A peace accord – the Pretoria Agreement – was reached between Rwanda and Congo DR in Pretoria, South Africa on July 30, 2002. This settlement led to the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese soil. On October 21, 2002 the Luanda Agreement reached by Congo DR and Uganda facilitated the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the Congo.

The Global and All-inclusive Agreement which was projected to result in the formation of a transitional government, and indeed, in general elections within two years of its signing was agreed upon by all parties on December 17, 2002.

SEE ALSO: Congo Armed Insurgency, Mobutu Decamps; Congo Crisis, 1960–1965; Congo, Kinshasa Protest and Revolt; Lumumba, Patrice (1925–1961)

References and Suggested Readings

- Clark, J. F. (2002) *The African Stakes in the Congo War*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Renton, D., Seddon, D., & Zeilig, L. (2007) *The Congo: Plunder and Resistance*. New York: Zed Books.
- Turner, T. (2007) *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality*. New York: Zed Books.

Connolly, James (1868–1916)

William H. Mulligan, Jr.

James Connolly was an Irish labor organizer and socialist, and a leader of the 1916 Easter Rising. Connolly was the most ideologically sophisticated of the insurrection's leaders and the most sensitive to the needs and concerns of the Irish working class, which he saw in an international, rather than purely Irish, context.

James Connolly was born in the Cowgate section of Edinburgh, Scotland, on June 5, 1868. His parents had emigrated from County Monaghan, Ireland, to Scotland in the 1850s. He attended St. Patrick's School but left school at an early age to work as a "printer's devil" at one of Edinburgh's newspapers. He joined the British army in 1882 and served in Ireland for most of his seven years in the military, which gave him a close look at how the British domination of Ireland operated

in practice. Connolly was largely self-educated. He read Marx and Engels carefully and used their work as the basis of his own critique of British and Irish society. Connolly blended socialism, Irish nationalism, and Catholicism into his own program for revolutionary change in Ireland.

In 1889 he returned to Scotland, having (as one writer put it) “discharged himself” from the army, and became active in Scottish socialist politics and Keir Hardie’s Independent Labour Party. Like his father and brother, he took a job as a casual laborer, working for the Edinburgh Corporation cleaning manure from the streets. He replaced his older brother as secretary of the Scottish Socialist League in 1895 and moved to Dublin the following year, where he established the Irish Socialist Republican Party (ISRP). The ISRP was never a significant political force in Ireland, but its program represented a major innovation. It pointed toward the creation of an entirely new Ireland, not simply free of British rule but with the Irish people owning the land and the economy of Ireland, and reshaping society to serve the people. In 1898 Connolly also established a newspaper to disseminate his ideas, *The Workers’ Republic*. The ISRP, however, struggled to recruit members and Connolly had difficulty supporting his family.

In 1903 he emigrated to the United States, where he remained active in socialist and radical politics, being a member at various times of the Socialist Labor Party and the Socialist Party, and an organizer for the Industrial Workers of the World. Connolly was a highly effective speaker, as well as a writer, and was much in demand as a lecturer. While in the United States he embraced syndicalism. He published a newspaper, *The Harp*, and founded the Irish Socialist Federation in New York City in 1907.

In 1910 Connolly published one of his major works, *Labour in Irish History*, and returned to Ireland where he became involved in organizing the Irish Transport and General Workers Union with James Larkin. In October 1911 he led the Belfast textile workers strike, in which Catholic and Protestant workers fought side by side. In 1912 he founded the Irish Labour Party and served on its executive board until his execution in 1916. He also organized the Irish Citizen Army to protect workers from reprisals and violence by the Dublin Metropolitan Police during the Dublin General Strike (also known as the Dublin Lock Out) of 1913, and was its com-

mandant. Although the Citizen Army was small, it was disciplined and highly politicized. Connolly did not disband the Citizen Army after the lockout ended but continued to drill it and recruit to it.

He opposed all Irish participation in World War I and the partition of Ireland as part of Home Rule. This, and his leadership of the Citizen Army, brought him into contact with the Irish Volunteers and the faction led by Thomas Clarke and Patrick Pearse that saw the war as an opportunity for Ireland to throw off British rule. He became part of the inner circle that planned the 1916 Rising despite his perception of the other leaders as bourgeois and insufficiently concerned about the economics of Irish independence. Connolly believed in a fundamental reorganization of Irish society to create a workers’ republic. His alliance with the Irish volunteers and Sinn Féin was pragmatic rather than ideological.

Connolly brought a large, working-class constituency to what had been a very middle-class, conservative movement. He overlooked what he saw as the bourgeois shortcomings of his colleagues and they did the same with regard to his socialist views. Connolly thought of himself as Irish throughout his life, despite having lived most of it outside Ireland, and was deeply concerned about the future of the Irish nation. But his sense of class interest, drawn from his wider frame of reference, set him apart from the other leaders of the 1916 Rising and Irish nationalism generally.

During the 1916 Rising, Connolly commanded the Dublin Brigade, which played a central role in the fighting, and was seriously wounded during the fighting. In the aftermath of the defeat, he was held first at Dublin Castle and then at the Royal Hospital Kilmainham rather than in prison due to the severity of his wounds. Despite doctors giving him at most only a day or two to live because gangrene had set in, he was taken by ambulance to Kilmainham Gaol, where he was tied to a chair, propped against a wall, and shot dead by firing squad on May 12, 1916. The vindictiveness of this act, and other similarly outrageous executions, turned worldwide public opinion against the British repression and set the stage for a major resurgence of Irish republican opposition. Connolly was buried with the other executed leaders of the Easter Rising at Arbour Hill in Dublin.

SEE ALSO: Dublin General Strike, 1913; Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Irish Nationalism; Pearse, Patrick (Pádraig) (1879–1916); Sinn Féin; Socialist Party, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Edwards, O. D. & Ransom, B. (Eds.) (1974) *Selected Political Writings of James Connolly*. New York: Grove Press.
- Greaves, C. D. (1971) *The Life and Times of James Connolly*. New York: International Publishers.
- Lynch, D. (2005) *Radical Politics in Modern Ireland: The Irish Socialist Republican Party*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.
- Morgan, A. (1988) *James Connolly: A Political Biography*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Nevin, D. (2006) *James Connolly: A Full Life*. London: Gill & Macmillan.

Cooperative Commonwealth

Richard Goff

The era of Civil War and Reconstruction marked a decline in utopian experimentation, but with the Panic of 1873 and the labor upheavals of 1877, a renewed interest in socialist and communal experimentation emerged. Two major works contributed to the cooperative movement in the Gilded Age: Lawrence Gronlund's *Cooperative Commonwealth* (1884) and Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* (1888). Gronlund, a Danish immigrant credited with bringing German socialism to the United States, imagined an ideal community where workers control production and the economy is under rational management. Similarly, Bellamy's *Looking Backward* imagined a future where capitalism no longer exists and the United States functions along cooperative lines and in social equality. Following the sale of the book, Bellamy started the magazine the *Nationalist*, which advocated cooperative values and national unity. The book's success led to the establishment of "Nationalist Clubs" throughout the country.

Inspired by these ideas, social reformers and labor leaders attempted to make real the idea of the "cooperative commonwealth." Burnett Haskell, John Redstone, and James Martin, San Francisco labor organizers, set up the most ambitious of these socialist cooperatives. After

a search of the entire Pacific Coast and parts of Mexico, the leaders settled on a tract of land near the Kaweah River in California.

The Kaweah colony attracted a variety of members, including "cranks of many creeds" as well as skilled laborers. Most of the residents were "Nationalists," that is followers of Bellamy. Initially, the community struggled to establish a cohesive organization. The group hoped to make a viable living supplying timber to the growing San Joaquin Valley and members devoted much of their early time constructing a road from the valley to the mountains. The community did not tolerate organized religion, but private religious practice was acceptable. Kaweah organized entertainment and recreational activities and published its own newspaper, *The Commonwealth*.

Internal disputes and external difficulties proved to be problematic for the community. Haskell, a pugnacious and surly leader, alienated community members and outsiders with his authoritarian ways. Also, surrounding timber and rail businesses attacked the community in the press. Ultimately, the United States government withdrew its land grant in order to construct the Sequoia National Park. By 1892 the community had disbanded. Similar cooperative communities were set up in Puget Sound, but by the early 1900s the communities had fragmented and dissolved. With the defeat of the Populists, the emergence of the socialist labor movement, and the advent of Progressive Reform, the idea of the cooperative commonwealth receded.

SEE ALSO: Amana Inspirationist Utopians; Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony; Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians; Icaria Utopian Community; New Harmony; Oneida Perfectionist Utopians; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Shakers Utopian Community; Utopian Communities, United States; Utopian Intentional Communities; Wright, Frances "Fanny" (1795–1852)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bellamy, E. (2000) *Looking Backward*. New York: Signet.
- Gronlund, L. (2008). *The Cooperative Commonwealth*. New York: Cosimo Classics.
- Hayden, D. (1976) *Seven American Utopias: The Architecture of Communitarian Socialism, 1790–1975*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Jacoby, R. (1999) *The End of Utopia*. New York: Basic Books.
- Pitzer, D. E. (1997) *America's Communal Utopias*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Cop Watch Los Angeles

Joaquin Cienfuegos

Cop Watch is a North American activist network dedicated to monitoring and documenting police brutality and harassment in various cities. Although the first group to call itself “Copwatch” emerged in Berkeley, California in 1990, the tactic of using citizen patrols to observe the conduct of the police can be traced to the Black Panthers, the Brown Berets, the Los Angeles Chapter of the SNCC (Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee), and the Deacons for Defense and Justice in the South. The activities of Cop Watch chapters range from photographing, videotaping, and publicizing instances of police abuse and harassment, to holding “Know Your Rights” workshops and other events to arm people with information about their own communities, as well as to develop alternatives to policing and prisons. While some chapters have non-interference policies when it comes to police and are largely focused on the *watching* part, other Cop Watch groups have taken a more militant stance.

Cop Watch LA (CWLA) is one such group that extends its activities beyond passive observation. According to its mission statement:

CWLA is a program dedicated to the struggle that will end police terrorism through collecting information on and observing police activity, by offering support to those caught in the criminal injustice system, fighting for change without a reformist consciousness, and working side-by-side with oppressed communities to create revolutionary alternatives to policing, prisons, and all systems of domination, oppression, and exploitation.

On July 11, 2005 the Los Angeles Police Department murdered 19-month-old Suzie Lopez Pena in Watts, California. At the time the Los Angeles Chapter of the Southern California Anarchist Federation (SCAF-LA) was organizing and holding meetings in South Central Los Angeles at Chuco’s Justice Center, a community center that houses the offices of the Youth Justice Coalition, Critical Resistance, and the October 22nd Coalition to Stop Police Brutality.

In response to the Pena murder and the recent LAPD murders of Devin Brown, Deandre Brunston, and Gonzalo Martinez, SCAF-LA joined the Stop Terrorism and Oppression by the Police Coalition, out of which Cop Watch LA was born.

After SCAF-LA disbanded, the working-class youth-of-color members of SCAF-LA created the Revolutionary Autonomous Communities (RAC), whose aim is to define and organize around principles of autonomy, self-determination, self-organization, mutual aid, revolution, and self-defense. The alliance of RAC and CWLA created a more revolutionary type of police monitoring group because it upheld the idea that the community itself had to take up the tactics and strategy of organizing and defending itself from the occupying force – police and all law enforcement agencies of the state.

Heavily influenced by the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, the Ejercito Zapatista por Liberacion Nacional (EZLN), the Magonista movement, the Horizontalist movement in Argentina, the *Especifista* anarchist tendency, and other revolutionary indigenous movements throughout the world, RAC and CWLA presented their guidelines, goals, and mission to the community. One of the central organizing principles of CWLA – that members couldn’t patrol in a community they didn’t live in or weren’t invited to by the people who live there – led to CWLA local chapters in South Central Los Angeles and Long Beach, Boyle Heights and East Los Angeles, Watts, Santa Ana, and other parts of the city. They also built alliances and strong communication ties with organizations doing similar work in Los Angeles (e.g., the Los Angeles Community Action Network, the Black Riders Liberation Party, the Youth Justice Coalition, Frente Contra las Redadas), and the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement in New York and the Move Organization in Philadelphia.

CWLA has participated in the defense of the South Central Farm, supported the Cardenas family who filmed their relative being beaten by two Hollywood cops while choking him, observed the police at the May 1, 2007 immigrant rights march (which was brutally attacked by the police), and initiated a learning process to deal with internal conflict by holding talking circles to heal the community while maintaining the struggle.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism in the United States, 1946–Present; Argentina, Social and Political Protest, 2001–2007; Black Panthers; Latin American Punk Rock and Protest; Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC); Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Cop Watch LA (2005) Cop Watch LA. Available at www.copwatchla.org. Accessed June 1, 2008.
- Greene, H. T. (2000) Understanding the Connections Between Race and Police Violence. In M. W. Markowitz & D. D. Jones-Brown (Eds.), *The System in Black and White: Exploring the Connections Between Race, Crime, and Justice*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- October 22 Coalition (1999) *Stolen Lives: Killed by Law Enforcement*. New York: October 22 Coalition.
- Walker, S. (2005) *The New World of Police Accountability*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Cordobazo and Rosariazo Uprising, 1969

Guillermina S. Seri

Cordobazo and Rosariazo were major protests held between May and September 1969 in Argentina against the military dictatorship of Juan Carlos Onganía. Twice that year, on May 21 and September 16 and 17, protesters flooded the streets of Rosario. In Córdoba, the protests resulted in the complete suspension of activities between May 29 and 30. The demonstrations followed a common pattern: initially peaceful marchers in the city's central district were met with violent repression by the police, which then escalated into fires, barricades, and street fighting. For many hours, both Rosario and Córdoba were taken over by tens of thousands of protesters, as the police abandoned their posts. Only through military occupation could the federal government regain control of the cities. Protesters, a mix of industrial workers and university students supported by white-collar workers, middle-class professionals, radicalized Catholic activists, and people from humble neighborhoods, recognized student and anti-bureaucratic labor union leadership. In September, a similar insurrection took place again in Rosario. Cordobazo and Rosariazo were the most salient events in a larger wave of protests and mass

mobilizations that were erupting in cities such as Tucumán, Mendoza, Cipoletti, in the Río Negro province, and Catamarca during the same time.

A context of increasing political and economic exclusion was conducive to these mass protests. General Onganía's Revolución Argentina, originating in a coup d'état against President Illia on June 28, 1966, had shut down republican institutions, outlawed political parties, imposed widespread censorship, and intervened with non-docile labor unions, stripping them of legal status. Right-wing Catholic and neo-corporative principles gave ideological inspiration to the coup. Differently from previous military dictators, Onganía set no timeline for elections, appealing instead to vague economic, social, and political "times" or phases of reconstruction. The regime sought to replace political parties with technocratic and military tutelage of big business and collaborationist unions.

Peronism, by then Argentina's largest political force, had been proscribed by the military Revolución Libertadora that deposed Perón in 1955, forcing its leader Juan Domingo Perón into exile. With Peronism banned, labor unions became the sole channel of expression for millions of Argentines. The Confederación General del Trabajo (Labor General Confederation) (CGT) not only embodied workers' considerable bargaining power but was also referred to as the "spine" of the Peronist movement since the mid-1940s. Besides calling for elections in which peronism was banned, a form of military tutelage of the political system that made for the weak governments of Arturo Frondizi (1958–62) and Arturo Illia (1963–6), hegemonic attempts to *desperonizar* ("de-Peronize") the working class included intervening in unions. After an initially tight intervention in the CGT by the military after 1955, however, persistent popular opposition forced the government to open up some channels for negotiation and the return of labor unions to workers' hands. For the violence of the Revolución Libertadora, which had carried dozens of executions of Peronist leaders and viciously persecuted Peronists, making illegal by decree 4161 even the utterance of words such as "Peronism," "Perón," or "Evita," consolidated brave resistance. Forged through years of political persecution, *resistencia peronista* was a loose and extended grassroots network of underground activism. In its light, a new generation grew familiar with clandestine politics and



In the course of the 1969 Cordobazo labor insurrection in Rosario, Argentina, riot police take up positions near a burned-out train at Granaderos Junction. The army regained control of Rosario on September 17, 1969 on the second day of rioting, touched off by a general strike in support of a walk-out by railway workers. In the mass uprisings, four rail stations, three factories, and dozens of railroad cars, buses, and private vehicles were burned. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

spontaneous acts of sabotage in factories and railways, or power lines.

Despite tricks and electoral manipulation, military union intermediaries could not impede the election of Peronist delegates across the board. In 1957 a CGT normalizing meeting failed to win the government a non-peronist victory and was declared void. Yet it allowed a group of mostly Peronist unions, 62 Organizaciones Peronistas, to achieve formal recognition and eventually to become a major actor in Argentina's political life.

Perón's exile inspired competition in invoking his name; the consolidation of "bureaucratic" union leaders was eager to negotiate and lobby the existing authorities, frequently disregarding their bases and Perón himself. Augusto T. Vandor, from the Unión Obrera Metalúrgica (UOM), was one such leader. Through the years, Vandor concentrated power by bargaining with all major political groups while disempowering the rank and file. Besides the leading hierarchy of the old CGT represented by Vandor, José Alonso, and others, the normalization of unions made visible a new generation of factory delegates emerging directly from the workplace. This new group, who had gained peer recognition for their ability and consistency to confront managers, kept an inflexible commitment to their bases and to mandates arising from democratic practices. These delegates brought their experience in the *resistencia peronista*, privileging rank-and-file debate

and resolutions through direct democracy, and tacitly accepting the possibility of clandestine actions.

In Córdoba such a militant tradition was favored as the new labor unions organized around the expanding transnational automobile industry. Prefiguring a trend that would develop nationally after 1958 with Frondizi's *Desarrollismo* (developmentalism), both Fiat and Kaiser (IKA) opened car factories between 1954 and 1955. Córdoba's previous industrial tradition, based on aircraft and railway manufacturing, textiles, chemical plants, and surrounding 14,000 industrial firms in 1954, received a boost with the arrival of the transnational car industry. The city became the pivot of the auto industry in Argentina, receiving hundreds of thousands of immigrants. With state support, the management of big factories recognized the right of workers to unionize locally, by plant only. In the case of the workers at Fiat, the strategy gave birth to SITRAC-SITRAM (Sindicato de Trabajadores Concord – Sindicato de Trabajadores Materfer; radical left-wing unions organized in individual factories). Although debilitating in the short run, with the passing of time the decentralization of labor unions would strengthen the new generation of union leaders. In addition, Córdoba's increasing weight favored the growth of autonomous union leadership. Luz y Fuerza, the union of electricity workers, was paradigmatic. The union was tied to a utility company run by the provincial state, and its workers were fully aware of their key role in providing energy for the expansion of Córdoba's industry. Luz y Fuerza had historically enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy. Different from industrial workers, its affiliates had achieved job stability, which gave them more leverage. Having witnessed the federal government's attempts to direct the construction of a nuclear plant, and concerned about its plans to privatize the provision of electricity, Luz y Fuerza workers were weary of orders coming from Buenos Aires. As were the members of SMATA Córdoba (Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor; the metal and transportation workers union), who despite their privileged position within Argentina's industrial landscape, had to fight with the union's national headquarters over the control of their financial resources. Hence, claims for autonomy dominated among Córdoba's workers, even in the case of local chapters of

unions with powerful directorates in Buenos Aires such as SMATA or UOM, whose national bureaucracies administered the union's finances and set agreements over salaries. As a result, in Córdoba SMATA eventually developed a tradition of local bargaining.

After 1966, Onganía made an oppressive situation intolerable. Embracing the Cold War struggle against communism, the regime passed the Decree-Law 16970, which introduced the figure of the "subversive," or internal enemy, and authorized war councils to judge civilians. The regime's obsession with communism soon escalated into a witch hunt and a violation of the autonomy of Argentina's cherished university. After the 1918 *Reforma Universitaria* was passed, a student movement became centered in Córdoba, where previously the Argentine academic community had enjoyed self-government, intellectual autonomy, and prestige. As opposed to universities that were only accessible to patrician families, the 1918 *Reforma* brought substantive democratization, with the designation of professors through open, competitive, and transparent selection, and university co-government by delegates of the faculty, students, and graduates. Together with this movement, the Federación Universitaria Argentina (FUA) was born. FUA became the federal coordinator of university student federations, in turn representing student governments from each school across the country. Whereas reformists opened Argentinean universities to the middle class, after 1946 peronism attempted to make them accessible to everyone; however, Perón's relation with the university was ambiguous. On the one hand, during his first presidency (in 1950), he ordered the elimination of fees and made university education free. His initiative was also decisive in laying the foundation for the Universidad Tecnológica Nacional (UTN) in 1952. Yet Perón also frequently hurt the academic community's liberal sensibilities, undermining basic freedoms that are key to intellectual life, such as the possibility to freely express and debate political ideas. Within universities, the anti-liberal core of Peronism generated opposition on both left and right. Many professors were fired and went into exile. Indeed, *universitarios* were among the most salient actors supporting the 1955 Revolución Libertadora military coup that overthrew Perón. Yet it was not simply that the military did not really honor liberal intellectual

traditions, but that they undermined the principles set by the 1918 *Reforma* by authorizing the creation of private universities in Argentina, specifically by passing a law in 1958 that authorized and regulated the creation of the first group of private universities in Argentina.

If the military in 1955 did not respect individual liberties as anti-peronist academics had expected, the Onganía regime openly attacked liberalism. With the belief that public universities were a nest of communist infiltration, the regime intervened and closed schools, carrying out arrests in La Plata, Rosario, Tucumán, Santa Fé, Corrientes, and Chaco. On July 29, 1966 the police violently entered several schools of the University of Buenos Aires. In the episode known as *La Noche de los Bastones Largos* (night of the billy clubs), students and professors were beaten up, part of the facilities were destroyed, and hundreds of scientists and professors were fired or forced into exile.

Throughout Argentina, students decided to resist. Córdoba, especially, had a long tradition of student activism, with a strong presence in two neighborhoods – Alberdi and Clínicas. A student strike was held for more than a month. While assembling in Plaza Colón, on September 7, 1966, Santiago Pampillon, an engineering student, IKA motor worker, and SMATA member, was shot dead by the police, in the first of several similar cold-blooded murders by the regime.

Revolución Argentina's strict measures also reached the economy. As part of a strategy of "rationalization," most sugar mills were closed in the province of Tucumán, while thousands of state employees were fired. Vandor and other CGT leaders announced a *Plan de Acción* in February 1967, but soon abandoned it after new arrests and the regime's threat of more firings and union interventions. The designation of Adalbert Krieger Vasena as minister of economy, in March 1967, marked the government's clear shift toward pro-market policies favorable to corporations but damaging to the middle and working classes. With the choice of Krieger Vasena, the alliance with big businesses and foreign investment displaced Onganía's original Catholic and nationalist allegiances. The regime also tightened up its strategy of "rationalization," eliminating state subsidies, devaluing the currency, and reducing wages and benefits. Applied to railways, "rationalization" brought increasing work hours and a reduction of salaries,

making railway workers the worst paid among state employees. These measures were implemented through military intervention into the rail workers' union and the designation of a colonel as their head.

The increasing duality of Argentinean labor union politics acquired institutional expression a year later, in March 1968, with the split of the CGT into two unions – CGT-Azopardo, led by the group of Vandor and his “participationist” allies; and CGT-Argentinos, led by print worker Raimundo Ongaro, representing militant “anti-bureaucratic” and intransigent unions. CGT-Argentinos drew on the confluence of workers from the tradition of *resistencia peronista*, who objected to *Vandorismo*'s eagerness to negotiate with the military, as well as groups concerned with making union life more democratic. Córdoba's independent secretary general of Luz y Fuerza, Agustín Tosco, and radicalized Peronist Atilio López from UTA (transportation workers), epitomized the project of CGT-Argentinos, and became some of its most important supporters. Tosco, who started his career in a workshop and at 27 was already Córdoba's Luz y Fuerza leader, stood out as an incorruptible democratic man with an iron commitment to the decisions made by the rank and file. Despite not being a Peronist, Tosco was respected and reelected by workers of all political persuasions. During the rest of 1968, despite governmental repression and Perón's order to strengthen traditionalist unions, CGT-Argentinos sponsored strikes such as those of sugar cane workers in Tucumán, and oil and metal workers in the Buenos Aires province. Both the government and companies responded harshly, with suspensions, firings, and arrests.

The first months of 1969 were no better. In addition to 11 percent regional salary reductions in *quitas zonales* (regions where business were permitted to pay workers less than the minimum wage) that were already affecting workers in Córdoba, Mendoza, San Juan, Tucumán, and Santiago del Estero, on May 12 the federal government abolished the “English Saturday” (a curb on Saturday afternoon labor, enacted in the 1930s). Córdoba's metal workers, belonging to the most dynamic sector of the auto industry, decided to go on strike for 48 hours on May 14 and 15. Confronted with violence, the workers defended themselves, forcing the police to fight for hours before regaining control of the situ-

ation. Meanwhile, in Rosario, hundreds of rail car and metal workers were laid off. With flooding affecting the city's poor neighborhoods, Krieger Vasena announced a tariff increase which would further undermine the purchasing power of frozen salaries. UOM Rosario called a 24-hour strike for May 23 – mail, railway, communication, utility workers, and other unions adhered.

The brutality of Onganía's regime precipitated the coming together of workers and university students. Through the years, the working class had gained access to a university education. Not only did Onganía's government attack university autonomy, but it also imposed restrictive admission exams, while at the same time privatizing key services such as the provision of student meals in cafeterias. These policies triggered demonstrations in all major university districts. At the Universidad del Noreste in Corrientes and Resistencia, students protesting the 500 percent increase in meal prices were joined by unions, small businesses, and families. The assassination of medical student Juan José Cabral by the police on May 15 while he was peacefully protesting the increased cost of cafeteria tickets in Corrientes sparked indignation and more protests.

In Rosario, students announced a strike for May 20, followed by professors and staff. On May 17 a meeting at the downtown university's cafeteria to protest the murder of Cabral was followed with the assassination of economics student Adolfo Ramón Bello, shot in the head by a police officer. The crime angered the people from Rosario. CGT-Argentinos declared a “state of alert,” offered students its headquarters, and called a general strike for May 23, while several thousand people attended Bello's funeral. The city delegation of CGT-Azopardo, as well as a number of other labor unions, made public their solidarity with the *universitarios*. Student organizations convoked a “march of silence” for May 21, 1969 to protest the murder of Bello. Academic communities of both state and Catholic universities, high school students and union leaders, business organizations, the press, and people who until then were not politicized, supported the measure. Four thousand people joined students on May 21 in Rosario, in what was the first mass demonstration against Onganía's dictatorship. Anticipating the confluence of workers and students, the regime had declared the city in a state of emergency and sent militarized forces. The protest, a march of silence and sit-in, was

attacked with tear gas and beatings by the police. Protesters responded with stones. To resist the effects of tear gas, they organized bonfires with papers, books, and other objects provided by neighbors from buildings and lawyers from their offices. The character of the event escalated; barricades were built at hundreds of street corners with rocks, pieces of wood, and even buses.

Walking with other demonstrators outside a radio station, Luis Blanco, a 15-year-old high school student and metal worker, was shot in the back and killed by the Rosario police. This new death infuriated the people. Thousands of citizens came in support of protesters. After hours of heated confrontation, police forces abandoned the area. That night, a mix of university students, industrial workers, middle-class state employees, and the poor celebrated in the streets, cheered on from balconies by middle- and upper-middle-class supporters. The federal government declared Rosario a zone of emergency, sent military forces, imposed martial law, and put a general in charge of the city. Despite the military occupation of Rosario, the May 23 strike called by the CGT was massively observed, while 7,000 people attended the funeral of Blanco.

During the preceding weeks, the police had severely repressed student protests in Córdoba, most of which had taken place in the Clínicas neighborhood. Responding to police violence, students occupied the area on May 26. But not even the suspension of activities by the president of the university in support of students sufficed to stop the police repression that followed. While dozens of "Third World Priests," a group that emerged in 1967 advocating commitment to the poor and social reform, voiced their solidarity with popular demands, the national general strike that had been planned for May 30 began in Córdoba a day earlier. After Tosco's initiative, the strike was "active," with attendance at the workplace and mobilization. Thus, in the mid-morning of May 29, thousands of workers from factories such as IKA-Renault, Fiat, and ILASA abandoned their plants, walking in columns several miles downtown, where they were joined by student organizations. Workers from smaller factories and workshops, as well as hundreds of neighbors, spontaneously fused with the crowd.

Police repression started right after the columns entered the central district. In some cases, as happened to the Luz y Fuerza column, protesters

were attacked with tear gas outside their factories. Two concentric circles of police troops and special horse divisions of the federal police were set to prevent demonstrators reaching downtown. But the strategy failed. After being assaulted with tear gas, rubber bullets, clubs, and firearms, the protesters defended themselves with whatever they could find – sticks, fruits, stones, bottles, bricks, and other objects eagerly provided by neighbors.

Near noon, the police shot and killed metal worker Máximo Mena. The news of the death enraged the people. Throughout the city, whether downtown or in neighborhoods such as San Vicente, Talleres, Alberdi, Alto Alberdi, and Clínicas, tens of thousands crowded the streets. A multitude, with no unified affiliation or leadership, took over the city. Barricades and fires consolidated the protesters' positions, which in the early afternoon comprised 150 city center blocks and a few neighborhoods. After several hours of street fighting, the police retreated. In the mid-afternoon the government announced the military occupation of the city and the installation of war councils.

Toward the evening the core of the protest moved to the Clínicas neighborhood, with the presence of Tosco and the coordination of students, workers, and neighbors. In the downtown area, sites symbolically tied to social privilege, corrupt politics, and imperialism were destroyed. The Jockey Club, a car dealership, the Xerox headquarters, and the bus station, then under construction, were all set on fire. A number of police stations were taken over, and a few of them burned, but no cases of looting were reported. During the night, in a city left in the dark, snipers confronted the military forces who had entered the city with tanks and trucks. There were dozens of deaths. The next day, despite the presence of the army, thousands of protesters participated in the scheduled mobilizations. The government set a curfew, and military forces arrested Agustín Tosco, Elpidio Torres, and other leaders, tracking people house by house. A war tribunal sentenced Tosco to eight years in prison.

Different accounts describe the intense preparations preceding the Cordobazo. Despite the regime's repressiveness, a large number of assemblies held in factories, university classrooms, and neighborhoods had organized the protest. With plaza Vélez Sársfield as final announced destination, organizers had planned

secret alternative locations to congregate in case of being stopped by the police. Anticipating confrontations, some metal workers carried bolts, screws, and pieces of metal. The May 29 and 30 mobilizations benefited from the confluence of Córdoba's independent labor unions and university organizations, with the leadership of Tosco, Elpidio Torres from SMATA, Atilio López from UTA, as well as widespread support from Alejo Simó from UOM, other unions, and workers. The Cordobazo exposed how the state strategy of decentralizing unions had backfired, giving rise to a more democratic, autonomous, grassroots, and incorruptible union leadership that proved impossible for the military either to coopt or control in the way they did traditional CGT leaders.

Right after the May protests, Onganía announced Krieger Vasena's resignation. In the following months, the military invoked the beginning of a "Social Time" devoted to addressing issues of equality and income distribution. Yet the regime continued to punish severely the hundreds of thousands of workers who participated in the May protests; this eventually led both CGTs (Argentinos and Azopardo) to call a new national strike for July 1 and 2. On June 30, however, Augusto Vandor was murdered. The government declared a state of siege and rounded up most members of CGT-Argentinos, arresting Raimundo Ongaro and hundreds of others. Railway workers, especially strong in Rosario, saw their organizations taken over by the military, their leaders arrested, and their salaries reduced. In July, more than thirty Third World Priests resigned in dissidence with the Church hierarchy's endorsement of the regime's positions.

On September 7, the third anniversary of the assassination of Santiago Pampillon, Rosario students started a week of protests commemorating students murdered by the police. Unified in Rosario, the CGT launched a strike. On September 8 the local railway union, despite the intervention and the sanctions suffered by more than a hundred thousand workers, began a 72-hour strike protesting the penalties imposed on Mario Horat, a rail worker, for his participation in the May strike. Two days later, while the Buenos Aires federal government sent special police forces, railway unions from the vicinity and white-collar workers joined the strike. In turn, on September 12, the strike extended through-

out Argentina, adopting an "indeterminate" extension. While several factories were taken over by workers in Córdoba, a popular insurrection erupted in Cipoletti. The government mobilized military forces.

Yet on September 15, in Rosario, a unified CGT called a new strike for 38 hours. During the next two days, people again flooded the streets of Rosario's central districts. A mass of approximately 200,000 workers, students, and neighbors resisted the combined attacks of police and military forces, under martial law and a state of emergency. Whereas the mobilizations of May 29–30 in Córdoba were thoroughly planned (at least at the beginning) by labor unions and student organizations, popular insurrections in Rosario seem to have followed a more spontaneous pattern. As before in Córdoba, the protest was suffocated through the occupation of the city by the military, followed by hundreds of arrests and protesters being brought to war councils.

The 1969 popular insurrections, especially Cordobazo and both Rosariazos, corroded Onganía's power and led the military to replace him with Alejandro Agustín Lanusse in June 1970. In all these insurrections, there were protesters bearing guns. Protagonists, scholars, and activists still debate about the exact political significance of Cordobazo and Rosariazo in light of the radicalization, violence, and terror of the 1970s. What nobody can question, however, is the key role played by common people in the events. Unprecedented for their scope in the nation's history, the events of May 1969 in Rosario and Córdoba marked the beginning of a dynamics of rising popular power in Argentina, which would reach its peak in 1973. Yet the ruthless repression in both Rosario and Córdoba also prefigured the practices of state terror with which people's power would be eventually curtailed in the following years.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Armed Struggle and Guerilla Organizations, 1960s–1970s; Argentina, Labor Unions and Protests of the Unemployed, 1990s; Argentina, Social and Political Protest, 2001–2007

References and Suggested Readings

- Balvé, B. C. & Balvé, B. S. (1989) *El '69. Huelga Política de Masas. Rosariazo. Cordobazo. Rosariazo*. Buenos Aires: Contrapunto.
- Balvé, B., Murmis, M., Marín, J. C., Aufgang, L., Bar, T. J., Balvé, B., & Jacoby, R. (2006) *Lucha de calles, lucha de clases. Elementos para su análisis: Córdoba*

- 1971–1969. Razón y Revolución/CICSO. Buenos Aires: Ist reimpression.
- Bou, L. C. (2002) El espontaneísmo en los movimientos de masas: El caso de Rosario en 1969. *Rebelión*. Available at www.rebellion.org.
- Brennan, J. P. & Gordillo, M. B. (1994) Working Class Protest, Popular Revolt, and Urban Insurrection in Argentina: The 1969 Cordobazo. *Journal of Social History*, Spring: 477–98.
- Cena, J. C. (Ed.) (2000) *El Cordobazo. Una rebelión popular*. Buenos Aires: La Rosa Blindada.
- Ceruti, L. & Sellares, M. (n/d) Día por Día. Entre Mayo y Septiembre. *Política, Cultura y Sociedad en Los '70*, Vol. 4. Available at www.los70.org.ar/n04/diadia.htm [accessed November 20, 2006].
- Ceruti, L. & Sellares, M. (n.d.) La Rosa Crispada. *Política, Cultura y Sociedad en Los '70*, Vol. 4. Available at www.rebellion.org/sociales/bou160102.htm. [accessed November 20, 2006].
- Fierro, R. (2006) “El Cordobazo.” La Trama de una Argentina Antagónica. In O. Vargas et al. (Eds.), *Del Cordobazo al fin de la dictadura*. Buenos Aires: Agora.
- Gordillo, M. (1991) Los Prolegómenos del Cordobazo: Los Sindicatos Líderes de Córdoba Dentro de la Estructura del Poder Sindical. *Desarrollo Económico* 21 (122).
- Horowicz, A. (1986) *Los Cuatro Peronismos*. Buenos Aires: Hyspamérica.
- James, D. (1988) *Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946–1976*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Romero, L. A. (2002) *A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

CORE (Congress of Racial Equality)

Amy Hatmaker

The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) was one of the first groups that practiced non-violent resistance in the civil rights struggle. Formed in 1942, CORE would be instrumental in the fight to secure desegregation of public spaces.

The idea for CORE was originally conceived by James Farmer, race relations secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), a Quaker group that denounced all violence. Inspired by Gandhi, Farmer and an interracial group of friends, including Bernice Fisher, James R. Robinson, Joe Guinn, George Houser, and Homer Jack, founded CORE (originally called the Committee on Racial Equality). CORE members instigated sit-ins at segregated restaurants and

entertainment facilities and moved into fringe neighborhoods in mixed groups to battle restrictive access to housing beginning in 1942.

In 1946 the Supreme Court ruled in *Morgan v. Virginia* that segregation of seating in interstate transportation was unconstitutional. CORE and FOR decided to test this case by attempting a Journey of Reconciliation. Mixed groups of blacks and whites would attempt to ride buses through parts of the upper South. In North Carolina, a group of the riders was arrested. The incident brought CORE into the national spotlight. Additionally, it achieved a great measure of success in integrating facilities in the North. Volunteers had kept the organization moving forward; Farmer became the first national director in 1953.

The South became the focus of action for CORE in the 1950s, and it established local chapters in the segregated South. On February 1, 1960, four freshmen from North Carolina AT&T College, inspired by a CORE pamphlet, staged a sit-in protest at a Woolworth store in Greensboro. CORE responded by immediately sending representatives to train the student groups in non-violent protest and offer its support. It was also active in coordinating additional sit-ins throughout the South.

The most noted of CORE activities would begin with the Freedom Rides initiated in May of 1961. Well-trained interracial groups boarded interstate buses in an attempt to desegregate the bus terminals. Anticipating violent reactions, Farmer informed federal officials of the agency's intent prior to departure. Volunteers were arrested and assaulted throughout the South. Despite the continued violence, CORE continued the Freedom Rides and was joined by the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).

As the civil rights movement accelerated, CORE stayed actively involved. Members participated in the March on Washington and organized Freedom Summer in 1964 to register black voters. Volunteers, mostly white, agreed to go through the South on this campaign. Near Philadelphia, Mississippi, two white and one black activist were killed. The murders called attention to the growing violence of the civil rights movement, leading to public outcry and pressuring the government to act.

Rising black nationalism resulted in a change in CORE make-up. The more militant Floyd McKissick replaced Farmer as national director

in 1966, and whites in leadership positions were replaced with blacks. McKissick retired in 1968, and the moderate Roy Innis took over. CORE continued fighting against discriminatory causes and is still active on an international level, supporting black economic development and community improvement.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; Freedom Rides; Freedom Summer; Non-Violent Movements: Struggles for Rights, Justice, and Identities; Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

References and Suggested Readings

- Farmer, J. (1985) *Lay Bare the Heart: An Autobiography of the Civil Rights Movement*. New York: Arbor House.
- Graham, H. D. (1990) *The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960–1972*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- McAdam, D. (1986) Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer. *American Journal of Sociology* 92, 1 (July): 64–90.
- Morris, A. D. (1999) A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political and Intellectual Landmarks. *Annual Review of Sociology* 25: 517–39.

Cornelissen, Christianus Gerardus (1864–1942)

Homme Wedman

Christianus Cornelissen, a leading Dutch organizer and theorist of international revolutionary syndicalism, socialism, and anarchism, was born in Hertogenbosch, the son of a impoverished master carpenter. Aided by a state scholarship, he was educated to become a primary school teacher in Middelburg (1888–91). There, he became involved in the the movement for universal suffrage. While engaged politically in the electoral struggle, he became editor of local socialist periodicals and contributed to the socialist paper *Recht voor Allen*. In January 1892 he became second editor of this paper of the Dutch Social-Democratic Federereration directed by Domela Nieuwenhuis. Cornelissen was a Marxist and in 1892 he published the first Dutch translation of *The Communist Manifesto*.

His interpretation of Marxism was syndicalistic in 1891. In a letter to Nieuwenhuis he stated that because class struggle is economic, the unions must be the troops of the proletariat.

In conflicts within Dutch socialism he backed Nieuwenhuis and vehemently opposed the new parliamentary Dutch Social Democratic Labour Party (1894). In 1893 Cornelissen federated several trade unions in the syndicalist Nationaal Arbeids Secretariaat. At the end of 1897 he resigned his posts when Domela Nieuwenhuis left the Socialist Federation and moved with his followers in the direction of individual anarchism.

Cornelissen had set his hopes on a collaboration between libertarian communists and revolutionary socialists, as stated in *Le Communisme révolutionnaire*, published in 1896 on the eve of the London Congress of the Second International. He was present there, as he had been in Brussels in 1891 and Zürich in 1893.

In 1898 he emigrated to Paris, but kept in contact with social anarchist and syndicalist organizations in the Netherlands. In France, Cornelissen became a contributor to the newspaper of the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), *La Voix du Peuple*, and from 1911 to 1918 he wrote for the CGT's daily, *La Bataille Syndicaliste*. In 1900 he published his revolutionary syndicalist program *En marche vers la société nouvelle*. Cornelissen was the organizer of an international syndicalist meeting during the anarchist conference in Amsterdam in 1907. Following the conference, from 1907 to 1914, Cornelissen edited the *Bulletin International du Mouvement Syndicaliste*. The *Bulletin* was the nucleus for the Congress of London in 1913 where the Syndicalist International was created. During World War I he was one of the authors of the pro-Allied manifesto, *La Déclaration des seize*. This undermined his position among anarchists and syndicalists.

After 1918 he concentrated on his work as an economist. He completed the five volumes of his *Traité générale de science économique*. In 1935 appeared *Les Générations nouvelles: essai d'une éthique moderne*, completing Kropotkin's ethical work. Cornelissen died in Domme, France, on January 21, 1942.

SEE ALSO: Anarchosyndicalism; Confédération Générale du Travail and Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921)

References and Suggested Readings

- Archief Christiaan Cornelissen. Amsterdam: International Institute of Social History.
- Cornelissen, C. (1935) *Libertarian Communism in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Vanguard.
- Stein, J. (2000) Freedom and Industry: The Syndicalism of Christian Cornelissen. *Anarcho-Syndicalist Review*, 28: 13–19.
- Wedman, H. (1992) Christiaan Cornelissen: Marxism and Revolutionary Syndicalism. In M. van der Linden (Ed.), *Die Rezeption der Marxschen Theorie in den Niederlanden*. Trier: Karl-Marx-Haus.

Correa, Rafael (b. 1963)

Natalie Mutlak

Rafael Correa, a leftist economist, was elected president of Ecuador in November 2006. Correa, a self-appointed “Christian Socialist,” postulates in line with Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia a twenty-first-century socialism. The first measures of his administration, such as the initiation of a constitutional reform and the rejection of economic control through the IMF, indicate a serious intent to promote political change in Ecuador.

Correa was born on April 6, 1963 in Guayaquil, Ecuador. He studied economics and obtained a PhD at the University of Illinois in 2001. His professional experience ranges from professorship in Ecuadorian and US American universities to acting as CEO of the Inter-American Development Bank in Ecuador. Correa’s political career started in 2005 when he served as Ecuador’s minister of economy under President Alfredo Palacio. His four months in office were characterized by rejection of IMF and World Bank policies. His project to use half of the petroleum benefits, originally intended to pay off the external debt, for social purposes brought the World Bank to withhold a credit. As a consequence, Correa resigned from office.

In 2006 Correa founded the party Alianza PAIS and started his presidential campaign. Promoting sovereignty, regional integration, and a constituent assembly to rewrite Ecuador’s constitution, he won the presidential elections and took office on January 15, 2007. On January 16 a step towards integration of South American economies was made when Ecuador signed an energy agreement with Venezuela to refine Ecuadorian crude oil. The new petro-policy is also shown by the

fact that new contracts will exclusively be closed with state-run petro-companies and in case of dispute, no international tribunal of arbitration will be accepted. Moreover, Correa actively advanced the UNASUR (Union of South American Nations), which is intended to merge MERCOSUR, a regional trade agreement between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay founded in 1991, and an Andean Community of Nations. Ecuador also joined the Bank of the South founded in December 2007 as an alternative to the IMF and World Bank.

The new political line enforced since Correa’s presidency also becomes apparent through his clear statements against the neoliberal policies of former Ecuadorian presidents, for example the draft free trade agreement with the United States. Another priority for Correa, who has suggested that at least part of the debt may be illegitimate, is the renegotiation of Ecuador’s foreign debt. With regard to foreign affairs, Correa plans not to renew the contract of the US military base in Manta, Ecuador, which is set to expire in 2009.

Initiated in April 2007, Correa’s biggest project so far has been to convene a Constituent Assembly, which was approved in a subsequent national referendum. In the elections to the Constituent Assembly in October 2007, Correa’s party received almost 70 percent of the vote. The Constituent Assembly started its work to rewrite the constitution in a participatory process in December 2007. Having only been in office one year, under Correa federal social expenditures exceeded expenditures to refund the foreign debt for the first time in the country’s history: governmental welfare doubled, the national minimum wage was increased, and investment in public education and the health system rose considerably.

SEE ALSO: Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954); Morales, Evo (b. 1959)

References and Suggested Readings

- Anonymous (2005) La Renuncia de Rafael Correa, Ministro de Economía de Ecuador: ¿Un Ejemplo de la Influencia de las IFIs? *IFIS Latinamerica Monitor* 16/08/2005. Available at www.ifis.choike.org/esp/informes/134.html (accessed April 2008).
- Azzellini, D. (2008) Lateinamerikanischer Petro-Sozialismus. *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* May: 25–8.
- Burbach, R. (2007) Ecuador’s Government Cautiously Takes its First Steps. *North American Congress*

on Latin America, 19/02/2007. Available at www.nacla.org/node/1444 (accessed April 2008).

Fertl, D. (2007) Ecuador's President Calls for Socialist Latin America. Center for Research on Globalization, 30/01/2007. Available at www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4633 (accessed April 2008).

Fuhrmann, L. (2008) Ecuador: Hasta la Victoria siempre! *Telepolis* 01/02/2008. Available at www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/27/27141/1.html (accessed April 2008).

Corsican independence movement

Justin Corfield

Throughout the history of Corsica there have been a number of attempts to turn the island into an independent country. In ancient times it was settled by Phoenicians, Carthaginians, and Etruscans before being conquered by the Romans in 160 BCE. The collapse of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century witnessed Corsica attacked by the Goths and Vandals, and later the Arabs.

Gradually, the rise in power of northern Italian city-states led to Pisa and then Genoa exerting sway over Corsica. In 1133 Corsica was divided between the two states, but from 1284 until 1768 Genoa ruled the island. During this period there were constant attempts to create an independent Corsica. One of these was led by Sampiero Corso, "the Fiery" (1498–1567), who had served in the French army and tried to get French support for his plans for the island of his birth. Without help from any other powers, in 1564 he and some supporters landed on the island and attacked the Genoese. They waged a guerrilla war, but three years later Corso was assassinated.

In 1730 a sustained attempt to create an independent Corsica began when some Corsicans refused to pay taxes to the Genoese. This led to what became known as the Corsican Revolution. When Corsican guerrillas defeated the Genoese at the Battle of Calenzana in 1732, the Corsican nationalists realized that victory was possible. Three years later, in the inland city of Corte, they drew up plans to introduce a constitution if their struggle was successful. In 1736 Theodore de Neuhoff (1694–1756), a German aristocrat, landed at Aleria on the east coast of Corsica. Proclaiming

himself Theodore I, King of Corsica, he managed to reinvigorate the Corsican rebel movement. However, in 1738 French help for the Genoese turned the tide against Theodore, who was forced to flee the country.

French forces were pulled out in 1741, but seven years later they were needed again to try to prevent the rebels from taking over. In 1755 Pasquale Paoli (1725–1807), a military commander and Corsican patriot, staged a revolt. Paoli's father, Giacinto Paoli, had previously led Corsican rebels against Genoese control in the 1730s. Paoli accompanied his father into exile in 1739, later serving in the Neapolitan army before returning to Corsica in 1755. Paoli became commander-in-chief of the Corsican nationalist rebels and declared Corsica's independence later that year. He succeeded in driving the Genoese almost completely out of Corsica. From 1755 until the late 1760s Paoli's forces controlled most of Corsica.

During the 14 years of his rule, Paoli, influenced by the French *philosophes* of the Enlightenment, introduced a democratic constitution, moving the capital to Corte, in the geographical center of Corsica. Under the principles of enlightened despotism, Paoli worked to transform Corsica. He established a stronger navy, encouraged mining, and sought to suppress the Corsican practice of vendetta. He also established a university, minted his own coins, and made the Moor's head the emblem of the island. He also established the town of Île Rousse to compete with the port of Calvi, still controlled by the Genoese. Finally, in 1764, Genoa, having lost control of Corsica, decided to allow the French to establish military garrisons at Ajaccio, Bastia, Calvi, and Saint Florent. In 1767 Paoli captured the island of Capraia from the Genoese. Soon, France turned from mediating in the dispute to becoming the occupying power with the Treaty of Compiègne, followed by the Treaty of Versailles in 1768, in which Corsica was sold to France. The French government was determined to end the struggle for independence, and French forces defeated the Corsican nationalists of Paoli at the Battle of Ponte Novo on May 8, 1769, ending Corsica's brief experience of independence. Paoli was forced to flee to England.

Many Corsicans supported the French Revolution and, no doubt, hoped they would achieve some form of autonomy. An amnesty for supporters of Paoli further reinvigorated the nationalist movement, as did Paoli's return. In 1789

he went to Paris under the permission of the Assembly and soon returned to Corsica as lieutenant-general in 1790. Paoli clashed with the excesses of the French Revolution, resulting in the Convention accusing him of treason. In 1793 Paoli summoned a consulta, or assembly, at Corte, with himself as president, and Corsica formally seceded from France. The British realized the strategic importance of Corsica and in 1794 captured Saint Florent, Bastia, and also Calvi – at the latter engagement, the famous British Admiral Horatio Nelson lost an eye. With British naval support, Paoli expelled the French in 1794. He then offered the sovereignty of Corsica to Britain, which sent Sir Gilbert Elliot as a viceroy. Elliot selected Pozzo di Borgo as chief advisor, rather than Paoli, who returned to exile in England. The British abandoned Corsica in 1796, allowing the French to take back the island.

Corsica developed significantly during the nineteenth century and later contributed thousands of men for the French forces on the Western Front in World War I. After the fall of France in 1940 during World War II, Corsica was occupied by Italy in November 1942 and then by Germany in September 1943. Neither army was able to control events on the island, as Free French supporters and others fought the Axis soldiers, earning the name the *maquis*, which was later used for the resistance in mainland France. After World War II, Corsica became a major army base for the war in Algeria, and the French Foreign Legion still maintains large bases on the island.

In modern Corsica there are several movements calling for degrees of autonomy or independence from France. In general, movements advocating autonomy promote the Corsican language, certain national tax exemptions in addition to those already applying to Corsica, and more power to local governments. The French government opposes full independence, but at times has demonstrated sympathy to movements for increased autonomy. Modern polls indicate that the Corsican population, as a whole, also opposes independence while favoring increased autonomy. Some nationalist groups claiming to support Corsican independence have conducted campaigns of violence since the 1970s, including bombings and assassination attempts (usually targeting *pieds-noirs*, non-Corsicans, and officials of the French government).

The peaceful occupation of a *pied-noir* vineyard in Aleria in 1975 was met with overwhelming force from the French government, thereby gaining sympathy for Corsican independence groups. Yet events such as the assassination of prefect Claude Erignac in 1998 have led many to be distrustful of Corsican nationalism. Recent attacks on Muslims have also confirmed this perception. Some clandestine independence groups use extortion and other intimidatory tactics to achieve their goals. Some journalists writing articles critical of such groups have been threatened and prosecution has been made difficult through a pervasive pact of silence among members. Some have suggested that such behavior is rooted in the longstanding cultural traditions of the island, which include banditry in the mountainous interior. Nationalist independence organizations in Corsica have had frequent internal disputes, which have turned violent at times.

In the 1970s violence erupted, and in 1976 there were numerous bomb attacks throughout the island, mainly against buildings and infrastructure rather than people. The Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse (National Front for the Liberation of Corsica) (FLNC) formed in 1976 as a merger of the Ghjustizia Paolina and the Fronte Paesanu Corsu di Liberazione. It is an off-shoot of the political party A Cuncolta Independentista. As a result, the French government was forced to grant many concessions. These included the opening of the University of Corte in 1981, and a separate regional assembly for Corsica in the following year, when Corsica was detached from Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, of which it had been made an administrative part.

During the 1980s the FLNC split to form the Canal Historique (Historical Faction) and the Canal Habituel (Usual Faction). It escalated its bombing campaign during the 1990s, and several people were killed, including some mayors and policemen. In 1998 the prefect, Claude Erignac, was assassinated.

In 2000 Prime Minister Lionel Jospin granted increased autonomy to Corsica in exchange for an end to the violence. The proposed autonomy would have included greater protection for the Corsican language, Corsu. However, Gaullists in the French Assembly opposed the plan, fearing that other regions in France might be inspired to petition for increased autonomy and thus threaten French unity.

Nationalist sentiments still remain strong in Corsica, and many children still learn the Corsican language, which only received official status from the French government in 1974. Most road signs in Corsica are in both Corsican and French, although nationalists often deface the French words. Politically, the *A Cuncolta Indipendentista*, a Corsican nationalist party, has seats in the Corsican Assembly and some support from the Corsican people. However, in a 2003 referendum, Corsican voters narrowly voted against a project that would have granted greater autonomy to the territorial collectivity of Corsica.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); France, Resistance to Nazism

References and Suggested Readings

Loughlin, J. (1989) *Regionalism and Ethnic Nationalism in France: A Case-study of Corsica*. Florence: European University Institute.

Ramsay, R. (1983) *The Corsican Time-Bomb*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions)

Franco Barchiesi

Origins

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was launched in Durban on November 30, 1985 with approximately 450,000 members in 33 affiliated unions. It is South Africa's largest union federation, with a membership of 1.7 million in 2007 and 21 industrial affiliates.

The birth of COSATU took place in a context of growing black working-class militancy, which, starting in the early 1970s, ended a decade characterized by the repression of anti-apartheid political movements and the decline of labor organizations. The 1973 strikes in the Durban industrial area led to the formation of black workers' unions independent of the racially segregated system of labor representation. Independent unions rapidly spread to the country's main manufacturing concentrations, largely organizing African migrant workers, and by the late 1970s they had started various national federations, most

notably the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), launched in 1979.

FOSATU combined a socialist orientation, an analysis of the South African society centered on class exploitation rather than racial oppression, and a focus on workplace organizing. It emphasized non-racialism, industrial unionism, rank-and-file workers' leadership, and political independence from liberation movements like the African National Congress (ANC) and the United Democratic Front (UDF). The government's initial repression of the independent unions was followed by an attempt at reforming the industrial relations system, and the 1979 report of the Wiehahn Commission recognized for the first time collective bargaining rights for African workers.

The state intended to use reforms to contain and defuse independent unionism. Black workers' militancy, however, soared in a context of deepening socioeconomic crisis. In the first half of the 1980s FOSATU unions mobilized beyond the workplace, becoming involved in community alliances and struggles over basic services, a tactic often discussed as "social movement unionism." FOSATU's participation in community politics did not involve, however, direct political affiliations. Conversely, some "community unions" outside FOSATU organized through mass meetings in black townships and politically opposed apartheid. Most community unions endorsed the banned ANC and joined the UDF. Black townships' insurgency and the expansion of independent unions in the mining industry with the launch in 1982 of the non-FOSATU National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) further encouraged black workers' mobilization and led to discussions on merging the country's various union bodies into a larger labor congress.

The unification talks that started in August 1981 eventually led to the birth of COSATU, in which FOSATU and other unions merged, in 1985. The new federation was numerically dominated by the FOSATU tradition – called "workerist" in internal debates – of shopfloor unionism, class-based analysis, and political non-alignment. The NUM and many community unions, which also became part of COSATU, however, maintained a political orientation defined as "populist," prioritizing opposition to racial domination, advocating an alliance with the ANC-led liberation movement, and envisaging a trade union role focused on political change

and democratization, as well as on confronting capitalist exploitation in the workplace.

COSATU and the Fall of Apartheid (1985–1994)

According to Jeremy Baskin's definitive account, the launch of COSATU represented a political and ideological compromise, which allowed the federation to transcend the workerist–populist divide. COSATU retained FOSATU's emphasis on worker control and elected workers' leadership, and adopted the principle of industrial unionism rather than the general unionism approach more popular among "community unions." Departing from FOSATU's tradition, however, the new federation soon abandoned political non-alignment to define itself as a non-racial socialist organization within the broader anti-apartheid movement for democracy and national liberation.

In the atmosphere of repression and recurring states of emergency declared by the government in the second half of the 1980s, COSATU could still operate legally as a union organization. With social movements like the UDF banned or severely disrupted, the union federation played an increasingly political role, becoming an authoritative voice of the domestic opposition to the regime. It also survived governmental intimidation and state-sponsored violence in which COSATU members in Natal and the Transvaal were often attacked by supporters of the right-wing Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). Eventually COSATU adopted the ANC's political manifesto, the Freedom Charter, at its second national congress in 1987. On May 9, 1990, COSATU and the newly legalized ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP) formally constituted a "tripartite alliance," of which the ANC was recognized as the leading organization. Under alliance arrangements, COSATU representatives participated in the negotiations leading to the 1994 first democratic elections as members of the ANC and the SACP delegations. Since 1994 COSATU candidates have been included in the ANC's election lists.

Even as a member of the alliance, COSATU retained significant autonomous influence in policymaking processes. The federation's mobilization against apartheid repressive labor laws led in September 1990 to an agreement with the government and organized business entrenching the principle of labor's consent for all future changes in industrial relations legislation. Finally,

COSATU's opposition to a new value-added tax in 1991 was decisive for the establishment of a National Economic Forum, which eventually led to the National Economic Development and Labor Council (NEDLAC), founded in 1995 to negotiate socioeconomic policies among representatives of government, business, labor, and community constituencies.

COSATU and Post-Apartheid Democratization (1994–2000s)

COSATU's influence and mobilizing capacity also shaped legislative and constitutional frameworks after the 1994 democratic election of an ANC-led government. The 1995 amendment to the Labor Relations Act supported for the first time the principle of collective bargaining and extended to new categories of workers the right to unionize; the 1996 Constitution recognized the unions' right to strike and organize; new laws were passed to protect basic conditions of employment and advance employment equity.

Under the democratic government, COSATU focused on the protection and expansion of workers' rights while using its newly found institutional influence to push for progressive policies aimed to benefit the most vulnerable sectors of society, including non-union workers and the unemployed. Retaining complete trade union independence or forming a separate working-class party were discarded as options in favor of "strategic unionism," an approach based on engaging the new government through a sustained and autonomous participation in ruling coalitions and public institutions.

COSATU provided a crucial contribution to the framing of the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), adopted in 1994 by the ANC as its electoral and policy manifesto. The RDP steered COSATU's socialist orientation in a developmental direction, which combined a mixed economy and a decisive role for the state in linking growth to redistribution, encouraging investment in job-creating sectors, stimulating domestic demand, and regulating private economic activity.

The RDP entered, however, an uneasy relationship with the macroeconomic policy framework the ANC government adopted in 1996, the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. Due to its praise of private investors' initiative, trade liberalization, public

spending thrift, and fiscal discipline, GEAR was denounced by COSATU as “neoliberal.” The federation mounted against it a vocal and sustained opposition, which often strained its relations with the ruling ANC, even leading a few affiliates to demand the end of the alliance. COSATU’s criticism was particularly aimed at the privatization of state-owned enterprises and municipal utilities, and at policies of industrial restructuring that underpinned vast layoffs and the erosion of established union constituencies.

In fact GEAR, adopted by the government without previous consultation with the unions and the ANC’s alliance partners, showed the limitations of COSATU’s mode of engaging the policy dynamics of the democratic transition. The 1997 report of the federation’s September Commission emphasized the dangers of marginalization labor faced in a context in which economic globalization hampered union organizing, the proliferation of casual and informal occupations created new difficulties for stable unionization, and the ANC was becoming aligned with macroeconomic conservatism. The party was, moreover, seen as increasingly controlled by new layers of black corporate bourgeoisie boosted by the government’s “black economic empowerment” policies.

Dynamics internal to the federation also contributed to the uncertainties it faced. COSATU’s new institutional functions, the professionalization of its officialdom, the weakening of identities rooted in the anti-apartheid struggle, and the growing complexity of collective bargaining carried a risk of bureaucratization. The move of many union officials to ANC and government positions envisaged, moreover, the possibility of labor’s co-option in the patronage networks of the ruling party. Finally, many unions have become powerful economic actors as their growing investment funds largely operate in the private corporate sector, often as partners in downsizing companies. While union members may benefit from the funds’ dividends, the impacts of their activities on COSATU’s stated aims of social transformation and equitable growth are surely more problematic. COSATU’s progressive influence has been much more evident in its ability to shape social policies – for example in relation to social security or access to treatment for the escalating HIV-AIDS epidemics – than in its successes to contest macroeconomic orientations.

The government of Thabo Mbeki, an ardent advocate of GEAR elected president in 1999,

further complicated the relations between COSATU and the ANC, which have since repeatedly approached a breaking point. Particularly militant in their opposition to the government’s policies have been COSATU’s public sector affiliates, whose impressive growth from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s has largely sustained the federation’s numerical expansion. The public sector strikes of 1999 and 2007 have been among the most militant and prolonged workers’ mobilizations since the end of apartheid. In the 2000s, rising labor conflicts have underscored enduring social inequality, poverty, and mass unemployment despite rapid economic growth. Under general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi, elected in 1999, COSATU has sought to contest power relations inside the ruling party. The federation was especially instrumental in the rank-and-file insurgency that, in December 2007, led to the replacement of Thabo Mbeki by Jacob Zuma as the president of the ANC.

Current Problems and Further Research Directions

COSATU expects from the new ANC leadership radical policy changes toward the “developmental state” approach of the RDP, if not a return to overtly socialist aspirations. Many problems continue, however, to bother the union federation in the second decade of democracy. COSATU’s institutionalization has not enhanced its ability to shape policy outcomes, and does not necessarily address problems experienced by grassroots working-class communities. Persisting high unemployment is accompanied by the informalization and casualization of most jobs created in the wake of economic growth, adversely affecting union identities and solidarity. The federation’s growing dependence on access to ANC leadership circles and networks may further undermine its autonomy and radicalism in confronting economic policies detrimental to the working class.

COSATU’s renewed effort to influence ANC dynamics from within has reduced the importance of internal voices demanding the end of the alliance, but it also questions the unions’ relationships to broad dynamics of social conflict. Since the early 2000s, in fact, community movements have organized in many urban and rural areas to oppose privatization policies and the enforcement of market mechanisms for the provision of basic services. Usually critical of the ANC and directly antagonistic toward the government

and local institutions, left-wing social movements have often been in an uncomfortable relationship with COSATU. Recent research has emphasized the need for COSATU to address current challenges of poverty and labor market inequality with a strategy of social unionism combining struggles over production and reproduction and expanding efforts to organize informal and casual workers. The viability of this approach in South Africa's evolving social conflict scenarios remains a matter of intense activist and scholarly debate.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Apartheid Movement, South Africa; Barayi, Elijah (1930–1994); Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; South Africa, Labor Movement; South Africa, Water Struggles

References and Suggested Readings

- Adler, G. & Webster, E. (Eds.) (2000) *Trade Unions and Democratization in South Africa, 1985–1997*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Barchiesi, F. & Bramble, T. (Eds.) (2003) *Rethinking the Labour Movement in the "New South Africa."* London: Ashgate.
- Baskin, J. (1991) *Striking Back: A History of COSATU*. London: Verso.
- Buhlungu, S. (Ed.) (2006) *Trade Unions and Democracy: COSATU Workers' Political Attitudes in South Africa*. Pretoria: HSRC Press.
- Friedman, S. (1987) *Building Tomorrow Today: African Workers in Trade Unions, 1970–1984*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- Seidman, G. W. (1994) *Manufacturing Militance: Workers' Movements in Brazil and South Africa, 1970–1985*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Webster, E. (1985) *Cast in a Racial Mould: Labour Process and Trade Unionism in the Foundries*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Costa, Afonso Augusto da (1871–1937)

Sam Hitchmough

A lawyer and politician, Afonso Augusto da Costa was an important political figure in Portugal's revolutionary transition from monarchy to republic. He was leader of the Portuguese Republican Party (PRP), later becoming the Partido Democrático (Democratic Party), and went on to become a prime minister in the Portuguese First Republic.

During the final stages of the monarchy Costa served as republican deputy in the Chamber of Deputies. After the republic was declared he served as justice minister in Terfilo Braga's provisional government (October 1910–September 1911), becoming prime minister and finance minister in 1913 (January 9–February 9, 1914). He held both offices on two subsequent occasions, from November 29, 1915 to March 16, 1916 and from April 25, 1917 to December 8, 1917, as leader of the national unity government, the Sacred Union. An influential and skillful politician, and an effective political organizer, he was idolized by followers as an idealistic radical and despised by opponents who regarded him as a ruthless sectarian dictator.

Costa operated in a highly volatile and unstable context when the young republic of Portugal struggled to forge a new identity, contended with deep divisions among new political factions, and faced uprisings from monarchists seeking to restore the crown. Political instability was further set against the outbreak of World War I, with significant consequences for Portugal, which endured rampant inflation, strikes, and mob violence. Reflecting the political whirlwind, the country experienced 45 governments in a 16-year period (1910–26). Costa is principally known for his secularization of the Catholic Church as the all-encompassing religious force, his radical republicanism, and his unpopular engagement of Portugal in World War I, which ultimately brought his government down.

Costa secularized the state, enacting the separation of church and state in April 1911 through signing laws expelling Jesuits from Portugal, eliminating religious orders, confiscating property, and banning religious instruction in public schools in the belief that the church represented a threat to middle-class radicalism.

After the election for the first president, the PRP fragmented and Costa led one of the three groups that emerged, the Democrats, committed to radical republicanism, gaining power for the first time in early 1913. As a Portuguese political official, and prime minister, Costa gave workers the right to strike, abolished landed titles, and pursued tax and voting reform. He appointed civil service positions on merit, and balanced the national budget in his first year as prime minister, a significant achievement given the era's instability.

Broadly, Costa regarded the onset of World War I in two ways. First, he thought war might

galvanize popular support for his regime and, second, he believed that Portugal needed to act to protect its colonies. He became increasingly concerned that German victory would lead to the loss of Portugal's African colonies of Mozambique and Angola and sent an initial force of some 30,000 to fight with the Allies in both Western Europe and Africa. Portuguese troops experienced significant losses in the pursuit of the country's imperialist and national interests. Costa would go on to head the Portuguese delegation at Versailles.

The effects of war on the home front led to food shortages, debt and inflation, violence, and renewed agitation from monarchists. The war also discredited many radical and republican ideals. Costa's resumption of power in wartime led to his becoming a hugely unpopular figure, plagued by accusations of corruption.

Costa's administration was overthrown by Sidonio Pais's military coup d'état in December 1917 and the establishment of the Estado Nova (New State). Costa left the country to reside in Paris. Pais's subsequent assassination in December 1918 prompted a limited civil war between monarchists and republicans and Costa was asked to return to Portuguese politics by Democrats at various points, particularly after the decline of Antonio da Silva's administration in 1923, but he refused, remaining in Paris until his death in 1937.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Monarchy Protests, Portugal; Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974; Portugal, Protest and Revolution, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, J. M. (2000) *The History of Portugal*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Birmingham, D. (2003) *A Concise History of Portugal*, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wheeler, D. L. (1999) *Republican Portugal: A Political History 1910–1926*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Costa Rican Civil War and Uprising, 1948

Jan Ullrich

The Costa Rican Civil War in 1948 and the struggle for political and social reforms in the 1940s are central events in the country's contem-

porary history. In the 44-day armed confrontation between a pro-government workers' militia and the oppositional National Liberation Army, more than 4,000 people lost their lives. The uprising led to the establishment of an interim Junta by José Figueres Ferrer, and the constitutional foundation of the Costa Rican Second Republic.

On March 12, 1948 José Figueres Ferrer, the later founder of the social democratic Partido de Liberación Nacional (PLN), led a rebellion against the government of Teodoro Picado. It was the immediate reaction to a March 1, 1948 congressional decision to annul the presidential elections of February, in which the victory of opposition candidate Otilio Ulate Blanco had been declared by the National Election Tribunal. The Communist Party Vanguardia Popular, which supported the candidacy of Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia, reacted by organizing workers' militias, blaming the opposition for having manipulated the elections by denying Calderón's supporters access to the polling booths.

While Costa Rican armed forces fell apart and were quickly defeated by the troops of Figueres, the workers' militias occupied San José. After the victory of Figueres in the famous Battle of Tejar, near Cartago, on April 13, both sides agreed to negotiate under mediation of international diplomats. In the Pact of the Mexican Embassy, former elected president Otilio Ulate Blanco agreed to an interim junta with Figueres at its head that would govern the country for 18 months before power would be handed to him. Figueres promised to maintain the legality of the Communist Party and respect the social reforms made under Calderón's government (1940–4).

When Figueres came to power on May 8, 1948, however, he broke the agreements. He outlawed the Communist Party and ejected Calderón's adherents from public institutions. Thousands of communists, unionists, and calderonistas went into exile. Instead of promoting the anti-reform politics of Ulate, Figueres implemented a progressive institutional transformation. He nationalized the banks and abolished the rest of the national army to annihilate them as a political force. In Costa Rica's Second Republic Constitution, written by a national convention, women's right to vote was set up, as well as full rights of citizenship for the Afrocaribbean population. The new Supreme Election Tribunal was founded as an independent institution to

guarantee the convocation of the new legislative Congress and the handing over of executive power to Ulate, who became the first president of the Second Republic in 1949.

The most onerous eruption of political violence of the twentieth century in Costa Rica arose from profound social and economic changes and increasing ideological confrontation. During the nineteenth century Costa Rican political elites, merchants, and affluent coffee producers followed the ideology of progress by liberalizing markets and expanding agricultural exports. With a fall in coffee and banana prices in 1928, Costa Rica was significantly affected by international economic crisis. The most afflicted social groups were urban craft workers and the laborers in the banana plantations on the Caribbean coast. Together, they formed the political basis of the emerging Costa Rican Communist Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos (BOC) founded in 1931.

With the growth of social and political polarization, the ruling Partido Republicano Nacional (PRN) began to orientate toward politics of state regulation and social reforms, nominating the popular Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia for the presidential elections in 1940. He won 86 percent of the votes. His enthusiasm for the allies in World War II and his Christian-motivated emphasis on the construction of a welfare state led to the division of his party into reformist calderonistas and conservative cortesistas. Hence, former president León Cortés Castro became his rival.

With the division of his political base, Calderón searched for new allies and formed a coalition with BOC, led by Manuel Mora in 1942, to implement an ambitious program of social reforms: the creation of social security, establishment of the labor code, and a chapter in the constitution on social guarantees. BOC was reorganized as the Vanguardia Popular in 1943 and committed itself to a democratic route to socialism; thus, even the reformist archbishop of San José, Víctor Manuel Sanabria, could support the widespread political coalition.

Decreasing export incomes caused by the closed markets in Europe during the war, high inflation, and a political culture of favoritism and patronage by the Calderón regime led to growing opposition from upper- and middle-class sectors of Costa Rican society, which supported the new Democratic Party of Cortés. In the elections of 1944 the candidate of the Partido Republicano Nacional, Teodoro Picado,

won against Cortés but under the suspicion of fraud. The political conflict about the election results strengthened the opposition and weakened the legitimacy of the democratic system. Another opposition group was founded around José Figueres Ferrer, who returned from Mexican exile and began working with the intellectuals Rodrigo Facio Brenes and Carlos Monge Alfaro, from the Center of Studies about National Problems, on the foundation of a new reform-orientated, anti-communist Social Democratic Party. In contrast to the anti-reform party of Cortés, Figueres remained with little electoral support and emphasized a military option to overthrow the patronage-steeped government of Calderón.

During the political and ideological confrontation between 1945 and 1948 the opposition strengthened its agitation against the participation of the communists in the government by creating fear of a rising red totalitarian regime in Costa Rica. The political conflict became violent, and bombs in the largest cities of the country became normal events. For the election of 1948 the opposition nominated the conservative Otilio Ulate Blanco, editor of the newspaper *Diario de Costa Rica*, to oppose a second presidency of Calderón. In the atmosphere of growing political violence both groups were blaming each other for planning the manipulation of the elections. In preparation for a predictable confrontation, Figueres began the training of a rebel army with the support of other Central American exile groups to bring down all dictatorships in the region, committed to the Pact of the Caribbean.

Due to the exceptionally low participation of the rural population in the election, the opposition candidate Ulate was declared the winner by the new National Election Tribunal. The accusations of Calderón supporters that the opposition prevented them from entering the polling booths is supported by historical evidence. Certainly, Figueres' victory was enabled by the lack of awareness among the political elites about his mutinous preparations and hence the initial underestimation of the military capacity of his campaign. While Picado and Ulate were negotiating during the armed confrontation about a political solution of a compromise candidate, they never took seriously the threat posed to them by Figueres. This chapter of political instability in Costa Rica was closed in 1958 when the PLN, under the presidency of Figueres (1953–8),

accepted defeat in elections by the conservative candidate Mario Echandi.

SEE ALSO: Bolivia, Protest and Repression, 1964–2000; Brazil, Workers and the Left: Partido dos Trabalhadores and Central Única dos Trabalhadores; Caste War of Yucatan (Guerra de Castas en Yucatán); Chile, Protests and Military Coup, 1973; Guatemala, Popular Rebellion and Civil War

References and Suggested Readings

- Acuña Ortega, V. H. (1991) *Historia Económica y Social de Costa Rica (1750–1950)* San José: Editorial Porvenir.
- Bell, J. P. (1971) *Crisis in Costa Rica: The 1948 Revolution*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Molina Jiménez, I. (2002) El resultado de las elecciones de 1948 en Costa Rica: una revisión a la luz de nuevos datos. *Revista de historia de América* 130: 57–96.
- Molina Jiménez, I. & Palmer, S. (Eds.) (2004) *The Costa Rica Reader: History, Culture, Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Molina Jiménez, I. & Palmer, S. (2005) *Costa Rica. Del siglo XX al XXI*. San José: Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia.
- Solis Avendaño, M. (2006) *La Institucionalidad Ajena. Los años cuarenta y el fin de siglo*. San José: Editorial UCR.

Côte d'Ivoire, post-independence protest

Naminata Diabate

Côte d'Ivoire gained political independence from France, the former colonial power, in 1960. For more than three decades to 1993, the Ivorian nation was ruled by President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, who termed the era “la démocratie à l'ivoirienne” (democracy Ivorian style). Côte d'Ivoire enjoyed political stability and relative socioeconomic prosperity. However, with Houphouët-Boigny's death in 1993, Côte d'Ivoire faced political instability typified by ethnicization of politics, social protests, military coups, and civil conflict with secessionist undertones. The instability was accentuated if not caused by poor economic conditions precipitated by the drop in cocoa and coffee prices on international markets and the imposition of austerity measures by multilateral agencies.

Under Houphouët-Boigny's rule, Côte d'Ivoire experienced its first post-independence violent protests in a series of demonstrations by students,

civil servants, and other segments of organized society from February to April 1990. The demonstrators protested a myriad of policies perpetuated by the government: rising inflation, retrenchment, and the deterioration in the quality of life. The unrest was also caused by privatization of national companies, viewed as instigated by western governments through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). During a protest on April 19, 1990, angry students demonstrated against the lack of transparency in examinations; the flag of the nation's single ruling party, the Côte d'Ivoire Democratic Party (Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire, PDCI), was torn and burned and anti-Houphouët-Boigny slogans were expressed.

The violent confrontations between police and students were the culmination of a series of protests. On April 6, 1990, Ivorian civil servants, through the general workers' union UGTCI (Union Générale des Travailleurs de Côte d'Ivoire), took to the streets to protest the austerity prescriptions of the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the IMF and World Bank which consisted in reducing the civil service and salaries. Unions of university professors and of medical doctors and personnel joined the demonstrations and strikes. These demonstrations revealed latent opposition to single-party rule and the precarious and explosive nature of the country. On March 2, 1990, 6,000 high school students staged an uprising in Cocody, an affluent neighborhood of the capital city Abidjan, which was violently suppressed by state security and military forces, injuring hundreds of students.

The demands of different protesters shifted from social and economic to overtly political demands for the implementation of a democratic system. The change reflected the recommendations of French President François Mitterrand on June 21, 1990, expressed during the historic 16th conference of African and French statesmen in what became known as “le discours de la Baule” (La Baule address). Underground political party leaders such as Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivorian Popular Front (Front Populaire Ivoirien, FPI), created in 1982, and Francis Wodié of the Ivorian Labor Party (Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs, PIT), founded in April 1990, appeared clandestinely and demanded a return to multiparty democracy. While political parties were to be legalized, the manipulation of ethnic sentiment blocked the development of

ideological discussions and accentuated ethnic divisions, fomenting larger protests.

Under domestic and international pressure, Houphouët-Boigny held general elections in November and December 1990, which he won against Laurent Gbagbo. Eager to redeem his image and legacy, he subsequently appointed Alassane Dramane Ouattara as prime minister. Ouattara was a technocrat and economist who had previously worked for the IMF and Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). In response to Ouattara's unpopular social and economic measures, leaders such as Gbagbo, René Degni Ségui of the Ivorian Human Rights League (*Ligue Ivoirienne des Droits de l'Homme*, LIDHO), and others organized a historic demonstration on February 18, 1992, which gathered 30,000 supporters of democracy. Several official buildings were ransacked and Gbagbo narrowly escaped death, but was later arrested, charged, and condemned in an infamous trial with 200 other demonstrators.

The protests escalated in number and intensity following the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 and the devaluation of the Ivorian currency, the CFA, in 1994. Amid the opposition, a power struggle emerged between Ouattara and National Assembly President Henri Konan Bédié over the presidential succession. Following Bédié's self-appointment as president of Côte d'Ivoire, Ouattara returned to the IMF to serve as its deputy managing director.

Preparations for the general elections of 1995 exposed hostilities within the PDCI and resulted in the creation of the Republican Rally (*Rassemblement des Républicains*, RDR) in 1994. The RDR dramatically expanded ethnic hostility in Côte d'Ivoire. The erstwhile prime minister, Ouattara, expressed his intention to seek the presidency in Côte d'Ivoire. However, to prevent Ouattara's candidacy, the ruling PDCI party and the National Assembly of Côte d'Ivoire passed an electoral code stipulating that presidential candidates should live in Côte d'Ivoire for five years preceding their candidacy and be born to parents of Ivorian nationality. The opposition saw the laws as retrogressive and reactionary, contending that they were designed to preclude the eligibility of their candidates. Following the ruling party's adamant support of the electoral code that would bar Ouattara, the RDR boycotted the elections. Laurent Gbagbo and his party boycotted the elections as

well to protest against the massive and suspicious mechanisms of widespread vote-catching and the unfair use of national audiovisual media to ensure Bédié's victory. Bédié won the presidency of Côte d'Ivoire in 1995 but was ousted in 1999 in a military coup d'état led by General Robert Guéi.

In addition to the military intervention, Côte d'Ivoire suffered from ethnic conflict and secessionism. Several precipitants explain the outbreak of ethnic conflict: general pauperization, the embezzlement of public funds by ruling officials, and the demonization of opposition parties.

In December 1999, Ivorians expressed their joy at the military coup d'état in which General Robert Guéi overthrew Bédié, ending the PDCI's 30-year rule. Yet in October 2000, to secure his position as president of Côte d'Ivoire, Guéi and his newly created party, the Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte d'Ivoire (*Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte d'Ivoire*, UDPCI), demonized the RDR and its partisans, disqualifying their candidates from the forthcoming elections. The action culminated in overt violence in October 2000 after rigged presidential elections between long-time political opponents Gbagbo and Guéi. During the counting of ballots that gave the lead to Gbagbo, Guéi proclaimed himself president of Côte d'Ivoire.

On October 23, 2000, Gbagbo called his partisans to contest the results of the elections in the streets. The death toll of the violent confrontations between FPI partisans and state military forces was estimated to be over 50, and hundreds more were injured in the process. Following the clashes, the Supreme Court declared Gbagbo president of Côte d'Ivoire on October 26, 2000. But on that day, the RDR called for a popular revolt against the legitimacy of Gbagbo. Violent clashes between RDR supporters on one hand and state security and military forces and FPI partisans on the other claimed the lives of 57 young men, whose bullet-ridden bodies were discovered in a mass grave in the Abidjan suburb of Yopougon. The number of casualties resulting from the bloody events of October 26, 2000 has not been independently established.

The events of October 2000 left the country in a state of heightened ethnic tension, culminating in a coup d'état on September 19, 2002 that overthrew President Gbagbo. Eight hundred

soldiers simultaneously attacked Abidjan, Bouaké, the second largest city, and the northern city of Korhogo to protest against their planned demobilization in 2003. The Secretary General of the United Nations on Côte d'Ivoire noted that most of those soldiers had been recruited during the military regime of General Guéi. State military forces succeeded in dislodging the insurgents from Abidjan, but failed to do so in Bouaké and Korhogo. The rebel soldiers consolidated their occupation of the northern half of Côte d'Ivoire and framed their motivations for the coup as political and social. A new political movement surfaced on the Ivorian political scene: the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire, MPCCI), led by former student leader Soro Guillaume, which emerged from the rebel-occupied half of the country.

The MPCCI was followed by two other armed groups and political movements: the Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest, MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix, MPJ) in November 2002. The emergence of these movements and their holds on the west (MPIGO and MPJ) and north (MPCCI) further crystallized the ethnic divisions in Côte d'Ivoire. The MPCCI, MPIGO, and MPJ unanimously contested the legitimacy of Gbagbo's presidency and demanded his resignation as well as the organization of new general elections. The MPCCI demanded a revision of the constitution and an end to the exclusion of northerners from the political life of the country.

Regional and international instruments such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the former colonial power France took several steps to reach a peaceful solution to the military and civil crises in Côte d'Ivoire. Among multiple peace talks in Lomé, Accra, and Yamoussoukro, the agreements of Linas-Marcoussis (January 15–26, 2003) figure prominently given the unprecedented nature of the street demonstrations they caused in Côte d'Ivoire. At the invitation of France, all participants in the Ivorian conflict convened in France in January 2003. The resolutions of the round table stipulated the creation of a government of reconciliation, the appointment of a prime minister in consultation with opposition parties, and the organization of new, transparent, and

credible presidential elections in 2005. More importantly, the round table made provisions for the Ivorian political class to resolve the root causes of the crises: the question of citizenship, the eligibility of presidential candidates, xenophobia, and the state exclusionary practices against northern Malinkés.

Even though all participants to the round table signed the final document, FPI and its partisans organized unprecedented street demonstrations to protest against the provisions of Linas-Marcoussis. The FPI rejected the admission of rebels into the government of reconciliation, and the Ivorian first lady, indefatigable political activist and member of parliament Simone Ehivet Gbagbo, criticized Ivorian male political leaders on national television for giving in to the neocolonial power in signing the documents. The street demonstrations targeted and attacked French economic and diplomatic interests in Côte d'Ivoire. The radical wing of FPI and former student leader Charles Blé Goudé served as the masterminds behind the demonstrations and articulated the internal political attacks against the FPI as an attempt by France to recolonize Côte d'Ivoire.

Politicians in Côte d'Ivoire are still searching for remedies to the political, social, and ethnic crises that erupted in 1990. The elections scheduled for 2005 failed to take place because of the rebels' hold on the northern half of the country. Even though at the time of writing Côte d'Ivoire has not yet conducted completely transparent and fair elections (presidential elections were announced for November 30, 2008), it has however registered an increased participation of the civil society through demonstration and protest on the political scene.

SEE ALSO: Burkina Faso, Revolution, 1983; Côte d'Ivoire, Pre-Independence Protest and Liberation; Ghana, Nationalism and Socialist Transition; Senegal, Anti-Neoliberal Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Akindès, F. (2004) *The Roots of the Military-Political Crises in Côte d'Ivoire*. Research Report 128 (NAI Research Reports).
- Bailly, D. (1995) *La Réinstauration du multipartisme en Côte d'Ivoire*. Paris: Harmattan.
- Barbey, F. (2007) *Chemin d'avenir: Côte d'Ivoire, la paix soit avec toi*. Paris: Harmattan.
- Coulibaly, M. (2003) *La Guerre de la France contre la Côte d'Ivoire*. Paris: Harmattan.

- Daniel, S. (2005) *Guillaume Soro: Pourquoi je suis devenu un rebelle – La Côte d'Ivoire au bord du gouffre*. Paris: Hachette.
- Ehivet Gbagbo, S. (2007) *Paroles d'honneur: un devoir de Parole*. Paris: Pharos.
- Hofnung, T. (2005) *La Crise en Côte d'Ivoire: Dix clés pour comprendre*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Kipré, P. (2005) *Côte d'Ivoire: la formation d'un peuple*. Paris: SIDES-IMA.
- Konaté, Y. (n.d.) Elections générales en Côte-d'Ivoire: Grandeur et misère de l'opposition. Available at www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/064122.pdf.
- Kouakou-Gbahi, K. (2006) *Le Peuple n'aime pas le peuple: La Côte d'Ivoire dans la guerre civile*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Rueff, J. (2004) *Côte d'Ivoire: Le feu au pré carré*. Paris: Autrement.

Côte d'Ivoire, pre-independence protest and liberation

Naminata Diabate

Côte d'Ivoire became a French colony at the end of the nineteenth century through the French decree of March 10, 1893. The country is an arbitrary construction of French colonialism, which lumped together diverse populations living in territories still unknown to the French. The history of protest and resistance in Côte d'Ivoire started with the contact with French colonialists in 1840, and continued throughout the early twentieth century, until independence was achieved in 1960.

Located in the western part of Africa, Côte d'Ivoire is surrounded in the northwest by Mali and Guinea, in the northeast by Burkina Faso, in the southeast by Ghana, and in the southwest by Liberia. The peopling of Côte d'Ivoire coalesced in the fourteenth century, although very little is known about that period. The major migratory movements of people, however, occurred between the fourteenth and eighteen centuries with the decline of the Mali Empire, among other defining historical events.

Initial conflicts involved populations from the south opposing French colonialism, followed by conflict between French colonials and populations of the center. The first recorded act of resistance by the populations of Côte d'Ivoire against French colonials took place in 1849 (five years after a treaty made Côte d'Ivoire a French

protectorate). The 1849 resistance represented the second defeat for French colonials after their aborted expedition in the region of Assinie in 1701–3. The clash between the Abourés of the South and the French resulted in the French bombardment of Yaou. The specific cause of the conflict still remains unknown. A second more violent conflict later opposed the coalition of Abourés and Ebriés against the French in 1853. The Abourés and the Ebriés erected a blockade on the lagoon of Ebrié and took siege of the French Nemours Fort. A battalion from Sénégal crushed the resistance and took control of the lagoon; the lagoon represented a vital route for French commerce with the populations of Côte d'Ivoire. As a warning to the Adioukrous, a neighboring people to the Ebriés, the French built Dabou Fort in 1854.

After the Berlin Conference of 1884–5, also known as the Scramble for Africa, relations between the Ebrié populations and the French colonials remained tense. In 1886 the Ebriés once again protested by closing the Ebrié lagoon to French commerce. The closure of the lagoon was immediately followed by a punitive expedition of French colonials.

Following hostilities between the French colonials and the southern populations, the center populations engaged in a series of revolts against the French. In 1891 the Baoulés (of Tiassalé) killed two French businessmen to protest their suspicious trade practices. The troops sent to punish the murderers were decimated by the Baoulés. In retaliation the French Captain Marchand and his troops overpowered the insurrectionary clan. Invigorated by the success against the Baoulés, Marchand attempted an expansion towards the North, but Samory Touré arrested Marchand on the way. Touré, known as the Black Napoleon of Sudan, was a fierce opponent of French expansion.

From 1891 to 1898 Touré, with his own expansionist aspirations for his Wassoulou Empire, fought against French colonial troops for the control of several regions: Kabassarana, Horodougou, du KénéDougou, Djamala, Djimini, and Tagbana – all regions located in the north of current Côte d'Ivoire. Although Touré succeeded in delaying the French in their conquest of the North of Côte d'Ivoire for years, he was ultimately defeated due to a convergence of circumstances, ranging from the disillusionment of his subjects, to the famine brought about by the war with the French troops. Touré was captured in September 1898 and

died in captivity in 1900. His defeat accelerated the expansion of French colonial rule in Côte d'Ivoire: the French absorbed the Wassoulou Empire into their colonial territories. Soon after, the French colonial troops prevailed in the war of Bouboury in 1890 and the wars of Bonoua in 1894–5.

The French colonial administration was resisted from its inception; however, acts of protest often-times resulted in adverse effects for the local populations, including the imposition of taxes and fines. According to the Ivorian historian Pierre Kipré (2005), the root causes of the protests included a price increase in French manufactured products, the implementation of customs posts by the colonial administration (1889), and the disruption of former trading practices between local populations. For example, the Tepos of the Cavally valley fought against the French from 1893 to 1914 because of imposed customs and fees. The Gouros and Baoulés (of the center) protested against the French because their customs posts undermined the Gouros' and Baoulés' trade with the Malinkés (of the north). In 1902 the Baoulé-Nanafoués protested French rule by destroying a new administration post and killing the head of the post, resulting in the massacre of 20 collaborators. The French administration sent 220 troops in response, only to have them overpowered. As a consequence of the defeat, the colonial administration left the region.

The 1908 appointment of Governor Gabriel Angoulvant inaugurated a new era of crushing local resistance through the use of heavy and sophisticated armaments. From 1908 to 1919 multiple revolts were smothered and heavy human losses resulted. In 1916 historians of Côte d'Ivoire estimated the number of deaths among the indigenous population to be between 225,000 and 260,000 – of a population estimated roughly at 650,000 at the beginning of the century. In addition, 15–45 percent of villages were destroyed between 1900 and 1916.

Eventually armed resistance was replaced with passive resistance, such as rejection of tax payments and colonial education. Ironically, the colonial education, aimed primarily to train locals as a backup to the limited number of French serving in Côte d'Ivoire, would be the very system that created the indigenous elite who demanded decolonization in the years after World War II.

The corollary of both world wars was a shift towards nationalist and pro-independence aspira-

tions, which effectuated several colonial reforms beginning in 1944. The most remarkable of these reforms was the 1956 *la loi cadre* (Overseas Reform Act; French constitutional reform that granted West African colonies semi-autonomous status). The historical factors leading to the independence of Côte d'Ivoire in 1960 include the emergence of a local elite educated both in France and Côte d'Ivoire, massive rural migration, growth of urban centers, the extension of market infrastructure, the formation of ethnic and regional consciousness through clubs and associations, and the return of the *tirailleurs sénégalais* (West African infantrymen recruited in the French army that served as cannon fodder during the two world wars).

Nationalist aspirations led to the creation of regional and transnational organizations, clubs, and trade unions, and their eventual conversion into political parties: PDCI-RDA (Parti Démocratique de Côte D'Ivoire; Ivorian section of the transnational RDA; Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, created in 1946), PPCI (Parti Progressiste de Côte D'Ivoire; Progressive Party of Côte d'Ivoire, formed in 1949), and Le Bloc Démocratique (Democratic Bloc). With the support of the PDCI-RDA, Felix Houphouët-Boigny became the first African to enter the French parliament in 1946, and later held a ministerial portfolio in the French Fifth Republic.

During the legislative and territorial elections of 1946, 1947, and 1951, Côte d'Ivoire experienced a series of protests and incidents among different political parties, as well as between partisans and the French colonial administration. The colonial authority's incarceration of PDCI-RDA members in Grand-Bassam facilitated the participation of Ivorian women in political movements, with the historic women's march to Grand-Bassam to liberate their husbands and brothers. Women such as Anne-Marie Raggi, Marie Gallo, and Margueritte Sackoum later became active members in the quest for independence. In 1957 the PDCI-RDA won 58 out of 60 seats in the election, but remained reluctant to demand independence.

Due to the pressures and the setbacks of the Algerian War (1954–62), French President De Gaulle consented to grant independence to Côte d'Ivoire in July 1960. In August 1960 Houphouët-Boigny declared the independence of Côte d'Ivoire. But as Timothy Weiskel argues in his article "Independence and the *Longue Durée*: The Ivory Coast 'Miracle' Reconsidered" (1988), "the transfer of power is perhaps more accurately understood

as a ‘transfer of powerlessness,’ for independence did little to reverse the trends in these phenomena; indeed, it may have done much to accelerate their crippling evolution.” This “transfer of powerlessness” foreshadowed the series of post-independence protests that nearly undermined the survival of the Ivorian nation.

SEE ALSO: Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962; Cote d’Ivoire, Post-Independence Protest

References and Suggested Readings

- Diabaté, H. (1975) *La Marche des femmes sur Grand-Bassam*. Abidjan: Nouvelles Éditions Africaines.
- Ginio, R. (2006) *French Colonialism Unmasked: The Vichy Years in French West Africa*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Kipré, P. (2005) *Côte d’Ivoire: la formation d’un peuple*. Paris: SIDES-IMA.
- Wallerstein, I. (1964) *The Road to Independence: Ghana and the Ivory Coast*. Paris: Mouton.

Counterrecruitment

Benjamin J. Pauli

With the end of conscription in 1973, counterrecruitment replaced draft resistance as a means of opposing war and militarism in the United States by cutting off the supply of military personnel at the source. One of the main tactics of counterrecruiters has been to educate students, parents, and the public at large about the realities of war, the abuses of military recruiters, the truth about military benefits, alternatives to military service, and the unique character of commitment to the military that distinguishes it from other careers.

Counterrecruitment activists have expressed concerns about student privacy, the coercive and deceptive tactics sometimes used by military recruiters, the military’s targeting of students with low socioeconomic status, and the militarization of youth through the Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps (JROTC) program. With the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002, which requires schools to divulge personal information about students to the military or risk losing federal funding, the movement took on a new salience, carving out a secure place for itself within the anti-war movement. To this end, counterrecruitment organizations have sought, occasionally by taking legal action, “equal access”

to students that allows them to set up tables, distribute leaflets, and make presentations in classrooms on days when military recruiters are active in schools. Counterrecruitment activists have also encouraged students to “opt-out” – to exercise their right to have their personal information withheld from the military. In addition, pressure has been placed on school boards to address growing concerns about military recruitment, including requests that recruiters be banned from school campuses entirely.

Counterrecruitment organizations have generally focused their efforts on local schools, resulting in a widespread but targeted movement with a focus on particular communities and little national coordination. These activists have often, however, linked their activities to broader concerns about national priorities – the vast discrepancy between the amount of resources expended on the military relative to those expended on education, for example – and many counterrecruiters see their actions as part of a wider effort to hinder the government’s ability to wage ongoing and future wars. Groups that have been particularly active within the movement include the American Friends Service Committee, the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, the Campus Anti-War Network, Leave My Child Alone, the Coalition against Militarism in Our Schools, Youth against War and Racism, Project YANO, and the National Network Opposing Militarization of Youth. The counterrecruitment message is also spread through the activist punk rock scene, most notably through the music of the band Anti-Flag.

SEE ALSO: Anti-War Movement, Iraq

References and Suggested Readings

- Allison, A. & Solnit, D. (2007) *Army of None: Strategies to Counter Military Recruitment, End War, and Build a Better World*. New York: Seven Stories Press.

Counterrevolution

Stephen Eric Bronner

Counterrevolution and revolution are both products of modernity. To be sure, the reaction against calls for change, no less than the demand for change, reaches back to the beginnings of political history. But the concept “counterrevolution”

is a product of modernity as surely as the integrated economic, political, and ideological attempt to transform society that is now understood as “revolution.” For a bit more than a hundred years, throughout Europe and beyond, a burgeoning bourgeoisie with coalitional support from other classes began an attack upon the *ancien régime*. Partisans of this undertaking sought to substitute capitalism for feudal social relations, a republic for the monarchical state, and a new secular ideology for religious dogma. With its insistence upon individual enterprise and scientific innovation, the liberal rule of law and the assault upon traditional authority, scientific reason and moral autonomy, the Enlightenment crystallized what became known as the age of democratic revolution.

The crowning achievements of this enterprise were the three great democratic revolutions that occurred in England (1688), the United States (1776), and France (1789). All of them were predicated on the vision of a new constitutional order in which equal citizens of diverse background and different interests might determine their fate together peacefully under the liberal rule of law. Constitutionalism and suffrage rejected – in principle – the idea of individuals living without explicit human rights in a “community” bound together by land and custom. The principle, of course, did not instantly translate into fact; thus, there began the long struggle for suffrage by excluded groups whose most important representatives, from Mary Wollstonecraft to Martin Luther King, Jr., pointed to the contradiction between universal ideals and the prejudiced society that denied them. It only makes sense that the formation of a liberal and secular order should have been welcomed not only by those Jews seeking entry into Gentile society, but – what is so often forgotten – also by those seeking freedom from the theocracy of the provincial ghetto. Eighteenth-century constitutional revolutions tore down the walls of the ghetto, opened society, and – finally – enabled Jews to claim their rights as equal citizens. The failings of these revolutions with respect to implementing equality among citizens, it should be noted, were due less to the inadequacies of their Enlightenment supporters than the unrelenting assault upon their most basic political values by those who would form the counterrevolution.

Counterrevolutionary defenders of “throne and altar” trembled. Edmund Burke warned

against severing the bonds “between the dead, the dying, and the yet unborn”; Gustav le Bon identified democracy with the “mob”; Johann Georg Hamann lauded irrationalism; Joseph de Maistre and other traditionalists decried the new tolerance accorded women and “alien” groups like the Jews. Critics of the new age felt themselves justified by the instability and terror generated through the French Revolution, and the years following the Napoleonic Wars were dominated by attempts to introduce a “restoration” of the past. Authoritarianism blossomed with the sanctification of tradition, established forms of hierarchy, and fear of both the “masses” and the “Other.” Experience, intuition, and especially “myth” were given philosophical primacy over reason. Christianity was resurrected, so to speak, in the assault upon secularism and German nationalists introduced policies based on the “purity of race.” Everything associated with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, in short, came under suspicion. Stendhal appropriately called the period stretching from 1815 to 1848 a “swamp.” It was, indeed, dominated by the army and the church or, using the title of his most famous novel, “the red and the black.”

Integral nationalism and absolutist understandings of religious faith have always intoxicated the advocates of counterrevolution. Herein lies the basis for their contempt of liberal notions of toleration and individualism as well as what would become socialist ideals of equality and an extended understanding of “rights.” With the attack upon the republican ideal of the citizen came the attack on the rights of the Other. Rejection of all ideas concerning natural rights and human dignity, which the Enlightenment inherited from the Renaissance, enabled counterrevolutionaries to dispense with cosmopolitan values and embrace explicit doctrines justifying racism, sexism, and the like. Tensions between these two outlooks would simmer for the next three decades following the fall of Napoleon in 1815. They exploded with the demands for republics that, especially in France, would prove both “democratic” and committed to the “social” good in the revolutions of 1848.

Liberals in the United States would fuse these two strands of the Enlightenment into a philosophy capable of gripping the masses, first in the form of Progressivism at the beginning of the twentieth century, then in the New Deal

of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, next in the civil rights movement, and the poor people's movement of the 1960s. But the defeat of the revolutions of 1848 by reactionary forces, fighting against republicanism and socialism in the name of values inherited from the Counter-Enlightenment, led continental liberalism to surrender its radical impulse. European liberals wound up exchanging the original cosmopolitanism associated with the Enlightenment for new imperialist aspirations, the old emphasis upon republicanism and civil liberties for support of existing monarchical regimes, and the spirit of social reform for an almost unqualified belief in the market. Thus, in contrast to its Anglo-American variant, continental liberalism ultimately served as little more than the political philosophy of the bourgeois gentleman. Its advocates throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, and well into the twentieth century, would essentially act as brokers between the authoritarian movements of the right and the socialist movements of the left. Until the anti-communist rebellions of 1989, in fact, continental liberal parties were never able to secure a mass base for their worldview – and, even today, they still have their problems. Nevertheless, from 1848 until the present, both political democracy and social equality would serve as targets for the counterrevolution.

This ongoing battle of differing value systems was generated less by some abstract “dialectic” than a concrete and empirical conflict between the partisans of revolution and counterrevolution. That becomes apparent not so much in *The Communist Manifesto*, which can be understood as a testament to the revolutions of 1848, but in the stunning set of historical works that chronicled the events like *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany* by Friedrich Engels and *The Class Struggles in France* as well as the classic *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* by Karl Marx. Rarely noted is that here, for the first time, a general theory of the counterrevolution is articulated. Marx insisted that the issue is not merely one of reactionary ideas, or the attempt to transfer symbols and myths from an earlier time into the present, but rather a set of ideas directed at the two most progressive ideologies held by the two dominant classes of the modern production process: the liberalism of the revolutionary bourgeoisie and the socialism of the working class.

According to this logic, pre-capitalist values and ideologies should hold a particular affinity for pre-capitalist classes like the aristocracy, petty bourgeoisie (or, in German, the *Mittelstand*), the peasantry, and even the *Lumpenproletariat*, who are rooted in a community bolstered by religious and traditional values. These premodern classes feel themselves threatened by the urban character, the cosmopolitan quality, and the scientific character of the modern production process. Just as they all resent the exploitative hegemony exercised by the bourgeoisie, and they all fear being reduced to an anonymous mass proletariat, they cannot embrace either liberalism or socialism without existentially denying themselves. Marx and Engels maintained that counterrevolution is embraced by the losers or those who feel they might become losers in dealing with the economic, political, and social forces comprising modernity. With its authoritarian nationalism, its preoccupation with prejudice and inequality, counterrevolution thus becomes the underside of the revolutionary struggle for cosmopolitanism, political liberty, and social equality.

Perhaps it was because 1848 solidified the linkage between political democracy and social equality, and because the reaction to these values was so clear cut, that Marx and Engels were able to elucidate their theory of counterrevolution when they did. It would remain a staple for concretely analyzing every form of counterrevolution that has emerged since Napoleon III and Bismarck propagated an even more intensified commitment to integral nationalism and the organic community following the defeat of the international revolutions of 1848. Counterrevolutionary ideas of this sort inspired the rise of anti-Semitic and populist movements in the last decades of the nineteenth century led by Adolf Stoecker, the court chaplain of Kaiser Wilhelm I in Berlin, as well as Austrians like Karl Lueger and Georg Ritter von Schoenerer – both of whom were admired by the young Hitler – who were already successfully employing slogans like “Germany for the Germans” and “From Purity to Unity.”

But nowhere was this more the case than in France during the sensational Dreyfus Affair of the 1890s that surrounded the trumped-up conviction for treason of the only Jew on the General Staff by a military tribunal. Heirs of the Enlightenment and 1789 like Emile Zola and Jean Jaures, the great socialist leader, took up the cause of Captain Alfred Dreyfus and decried

the verdict. But their defense was predicated on placing reason above experience, evidentiary truth above tradition, and a universal sense of justice above the needs of the national "community." Reactionaries analyzed the matter differently. Literary figures like Maurice Barres, crackpot thinkers like Charles Maurras, and journalists like Paul Bourget insisted that bringing universal standards of justice to bear on the case would result in a denigration of the national interest. Equal treatment for a Jew as a "citizen" of France would, they believed, result in further "deracination" of the country and the erosion of its Christian heritage by an elitist group of "intellectuals."

Advocates of the counterrevolution maintained that their rejection of universal "abstractions" like the rule of law and their willingness to privilege intuition over reason allowed them – as against their liberal opponents – to remain "rooted" in their community and stand in a genuine experiential, or "organic," relation to the "people." Little wonder then that the Dreyfus Affair should have solidified the connection between republicans and socialists even as it generated a movement, *Action française*, whose ideology basically anticipated that of fascism.

Movements such as these prevented Enlightenment ideals and proponents of the democratic revolution from achieving ideological hegemony over Europe until after World War II. All of them had their mass base in some combination of pre-capitalist classes and in the least economically advanced areas of the nation. Fascism and Nazism were no different. They, too, were conscious responses to the Enlightenment and its two progressive political offspring, liberalism and socialism. In Germany most of the bourgeoisie identified with an increasingly impotent set of parties embracing a continental variant of liberalism, while the majority of the working class voted until the end for their social democratic parties. All these political organizations supported the Weimar Republic and all were avowed enemies of the Nazis who made war on them in word and deed.

What was true in Germany, moreover, was true for Europe in general. Social democracy maintained the loyalty of the great majority of the working class throughout the twentieth century; it introduced the first democratic parties to Europe; and, still officially clinging to the ideology

of "orthodox Marxism," it served as the mass base for the republics that sprung up all over Europe in the 1920s. Indeed, beginning during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the European socialist movement shouldered a "dual burden" that involved defending the universal liberal political values inherited from the bourgeoisie while, simultaneously, furthering its own particular economic interests. Or, to put it another way, social democrats attempted to link what today we call "negative liberty" with "positive rights." Thus, it only made sense that the socialist movement should have been the most consistent opponent of totalitarianism.

Fear of communism helped produce the new fascist movements that arose in Italy, Hungary, Germany, Romania, Spain, and elsewhere. But the expression "the extremes meet" (*les extremes se touchent*) is apt with regard to fascism and communism. While the two movements fought bitterly, other than from 1939 to 1941, Mussolini and Hitler privately expressed admiration for Lenin and Stalin. Yet there is much debate concerning whether – or, better, to what extent – communism fits the counterrevolutionary paradigm.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was clearly committed to furthering social equality, a radical "soviet" version of democracy and an internationalist ideology. With the rise of Stalin, however, meaningful social equality was decimated by terror, iron dictatorship supplanted democracy, and internationalism gave way to the crudest nationalism. It is also the case that the revolution occurred at what Lenin called "the weakest link in the chain," that is to say in the most underdeveloped "capitalist" nation, and that increasing fear of losing the battle for modernity helped propel the most terrible crimes of the communist regime. Thus, there is something legitimate in speaking about "red fascism" and, thus, the "red" counterrevolution.

Both fascism and communism explicitly opposed liberal republicanism. Communism first gained its political identity, in fact, when Lenin sought to differentiate his movement, with its new commitment to a party dictatorship, from social democracy with its republican ideals. By the early 1920s, moreover, the Communist International had already passed resolutions stating its refusal to support parliamentary democracies and Stalin's famous refusal of 1928

to form a common front with the socialists against the Nazis hurt the anti-fascist cause far more than its enemies. With the same venom, movements of the far right despised liberals and social democrats everywhere in Europe. Germany was only the most notorious instance: its fascists condemned the “traitors” – especially the social democrats – who supposedly provided their nation with a “stab in the back” during World War I as well as the “November criminals” who signed the humiliating Treaty of Versailles and brought about the Weimar Republic. Both communism and fascism embraced a military vision of the political party, identified their party with the state, relied upon a “cult of the personality,” and ruled through a mixture of propaganda and terror. Both considered terror a means and an end, ultimately embraced anti-Semitism (though in dramatically varying degrees), and participated in the creation of what has justly been called a “concentration camp universe.”

In the wake of Auschwitz and the Gulag, and the disclaiming of responsibility by the criminals during the Nuremberg Trials, totalitarian ideologies lost their appeal and legitimacy. Liberal ideals and the dignity of the individual were accorded a new standing as calls arose for extending democratic rights to people of color, gays, and women. The civil rights movement led by Dr. Martin Luther King initiated what would become a general challenge to racist, patriarchal, and homophobic prejudices that had become ingrained elements in the mainstream understanding of how society was organized and the character of the national “community.” These concerns blended into a rejection of imperialism and colonialism, which was expressed in the opposition to the Vietnam War in the United States, and a general call to “work through the past” in Europe. Sexual relations became less rigid, new experiences were sought, egalitarian educational experiments were attempted, and a new sympathy emerged for the Other.

But “the sixties” was not merely about “sex, drugs, and rock ‘n’ roll” any more than it was simply about culture and morality. With the “new social movements” in the United States came a slew of new and transformational economic and social programs known as the Great Society and an attack on inequality more expansive even than the New Deal of FDR. In tandem with this

came legislation that enabled people of color to vote, overturned racist electoral laws carried over from the collapse of Reconstruction in the 1870s, and thus produce the most radical extension of the franchise since women won the right to vote in 1919. Finally, with respect to the struggle to end the Vietnam War, there emerged an assault upon the traditional insularity and formation of foreign policy by the political establishment.

In short, “the sixties” shook the economic, political, and social foundations of the United States along with its ability to conduct foreign policy. Conservatives and liberals, too, were outraged. By the middle of the 1970s, the United States was experiencing what President Jimmy Carter called a “malaise.” Respect for traditional values seemed to have plummeted. Business elites claimed that the United States had lost its competitive edge in the world economy. Thinkers like Samuel Huntington insisted that there was too much democracy and it was becoming ever more difficult for governments to rule. With the Iranian Revolution of 1979 led by the Ayatollah Khomeini, moreover, it appeared that the United States had lost its standing in the world. Ronald Reagan was elected president in that same year and the foundations were laid for what – twenty years later – would become known as neo-conservatism: the assault on the cultural legacy of the new social movements, the rollback of the welfare state, the constriction of political democracy, and the reassertion of American military dominance.

Neo-conservatism is more than the ideology of some small yet influential set of government advisors and politicians. It is rather a counter-revolutionary response to what its proponents termed the “adversary culture” of the 1960s. Comprised of reactionary business and intellectual elites threatened by the new global economy, and supported by anti-urban elements disgusted with the decline of tradition and cultural mores, the new movement sought vengeance. Neo-conservatives called for the return of religion, “family values,” and the values of the capitalist entrepreneur. They began an unremitting campaign to redistribute wealth upwards and dismantle the welfare programs associated with the New Deal and the Great Society. With the tragedy of 9/11, moreover, the excuse emerged for the use of “preemptive strikes” and a “war on terror” that

resulted in the ill-fated invasion of Iraq along with a new national security state built on legislation intent upon curbing civil liberties and insulating the executive from accountability either to the public or the other branches of government.

Neo-conservatism is as opposed to the egalitarian, democratic, and cosmopolitan trends of modernity as those Islamic “fundamentalist” forces it is struggling against. But then fanatical and “fundamentalist” elements are evident in all faiths and in what has become a worldwide counterrevolutionary resurgence of religion. All fundamentalists look backward for their inspiration. All of them privilege authority over liberty, unquestioning faith over critical reflection, and the community over the individual. All of them have their problems with the rights of women and gays, abortion and patriarchy, censorship and democracy. Each rejects the separation of church from state and the critique of patriarchal hierarchies. Each insists upon the legitimacy of traditions simply because they exist. Intolerance and dogmatism are built into this mode of thinking if only because discussion is limited by the holy words of an inerrant Bible, an infallible pope, the Islamic Shari’a, or the Jewish Halacha.

Advocates of political democracy and social equality were not for the most part advocates of abolishing religion. Their concern was with curtailing the political ambitions of religious institutions with absolutist claims. Or, to put it a different way, the issue for liberal secularists was less belief than conduct. Both in the Occident and the Orient, whatever the differences of social context, the battle is still over whether a single religion, or a single interpretation of that religion, should dominate public life or, instead, whether every religion should be seen as just another private interest in an open society. Rejecting this latter view is not simply a matter of the church, mosque, and the synagogue acting in accordance with divine law against the incursions of the profane, although it can be turned into that, but of ideological primacy and institutional self-preservation. Thus, the more dramatic the demand for reciprocity, the more fundamental will be the response.

Rabid nationalists, religious fanatics, and bigots inspire the counterrevolution of our time. All of them resist the intrusion of political democracy and social equality into their societies. That is because these values inherited from the Enlightenment threaten their power and a set

of outmoded legitimating traditions that are sanctified simply because they exist. Freedom is never a problem for the powerful. They already possess it. The “problem” arises only when freedom is demanded by the disenfranchised, the exploited, and the excluded. Reactionaries still fear – above all – the emergence of an individual insistent upon respect and equality who is intent upon knowing more, earning more, consuming more, and living life as he or she chooses. The counterrevolution knows its enemy, the same enemy it has always had, namely, the idea that things can be different.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776; Dreyfus Affair; English Revolution, 17th Century; European Revolutions of 1848; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Jews and Revolution in Europe, 1789–1919; King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); May 1968 French Uprisings; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–1797)

References and Suggested Readings

- Berlin, I. (1982) *The Counter Enlightenment*. In Henry Hardy (Ed.), *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas*. New York: Penguin.
- Berlin, I. (1993) *The Magus of the North: J. G. Hamann and the Origins of Modern Irrationalism*. London: John Murray.
- Bloch, E. (1990) *Heritage of Our Times*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bronner, S. E. (2001) *Socialism Unbound*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Bronner, S. E. (2006) *Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Towards a Politics of Radical Engagement*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bullock, A. (1993) *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives*. New York: Knopf.
- Ishay, M. R. (1995) *Internationalism and Its Betrayal*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Korsch, K. (1977) *Fascism and Counter Revolution*. In K. Korsch & D. Kellner (Eds.), *Revolutionary Theory*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- McMahon, D. M. (2001) *Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Moore, B. (1966) *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Steger, M. B. (1997) *The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism: Eduard Bernstein and Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zola, E. (1998) *The Dreyfus Affair: “J’Accuse” and other Writings*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Counterrevolution, France, 1789–1830

Soma Marik

The Aristocratic Counterrevolution

Counterrevolution was an integral part of the French Revolution, as soon as there was a revolution to counter. When the deputies of the Third Estate resolved to establish a Constituent National Assembly, and not to disperse before the creation of a constitution, the king's brother, the Comte d'Artois, organized aristocratic and upper clerical resistance. At the Royal Session of June 23, 1789, the king outlined a program of extremely moderate reforms, such as no taxation without consent, regular meetings of the Estates General, abrogation of binding mandates (so that deputies could take initiatives on their own), individual and press freedom, and a set of legal and fiscal reforms. This was a whittling down of the Comptroller General Necker's proposal. For the next decade, this was as far as the leaders of the counterrevolution were willing to go, while some of their followers thought even this went too far. The queen's party, or the grouping around her and Artois, engineered the removal of Necker when they failed to arrest the Revolution through the Royal Session of June 23. This of course resulted in the uprising that caused the fall of the Bastille.

By the end of May 1789, bishops were meeting regularly in the Church of Notre-Dame in Versailles. Some 40 percent of the nobles, actually residents of Paris, had gone to the provinces to seek election. At least 78 percent of the nobles had been militarily educated or had previously been commissioned officers in the army or navy. Close to two-thirds could trace their lineage back to the sixteenth century. They belonged to the great families of France. A "club" of conservative noblemen, supported by the Comte d'Artois, succeeded in maintaining the intransigence of the great majority of noble deputies. A majority of nobles had refused to join the united Assembly even after the king's request. They unhappily acquiesced to joining the National Assembly only after a warning from the Comte d'Artois that the king's life was in danger and particularly after the mid-July Parisian insurrection. They formed the ultra-right *noir* faction. There

had also emerged a moderate right wing, the "*monarchien*" faction, which did not want a return to the old regime but sought to ensure that ultimate sovereignty should remain in the hands of the king, as a buttress against the dangers of popular violence. Organized as a tightly knit network with a central committee, the *monarchiens* forged a coalition with the extreme right by early September. After the middle of August, they won four successive presidential elections and also dominated the posts of secretaries. The *noirs* formed the Capuchin society in April 1790 and drew up a declaration. Their coordination with the *monarchiens*' Club des Impartiaux showed that the coalition of the two right-wing groups had not broken down. A comparative study between the Capuchins and the Jacobins shows that while over eight out of ten Jacobins were deputies of the Third Estate, more than nine out of ten Capuchins represented the two privileged orders. Revisionist historians (e.g., Schama 1990) have argued that counterrevolution and conspiracy were imaginations by the Jacobins and the revolutionaries in general. But the intransigence of the nobles was the key reason why the French Revolution did not see the development of a concept of a "loyal opposition." By August many more courtiers had left following Artois, who rode out of France on July 17, refusing to tolerate reforms. As the efforts to halt the Revolution's progress foundered, emigration increased in a big way. Committees of the French émigrés were set up in Brussels, Trier, Mainz, Basel, Geneva, and Nice. Artois, more or less rebuffed by Joseph II, moved to Turin, ruled by his father-in-law. There he was joined in November 1790 by Calonne, a former minister who was willing to offer his services.

Moderates and the Counterrevolution

The counterrevolution would have remained a very marginal force, entirely dependent on foreign support had the Revolution not deepened. The fiscal crisis of the state could not be stemmed by the early efforts of Necker, or of the Assembly. At the same time, in August 1789, the so-called voluntary surrender of feudal (or seigneurial) rights was in fact hedged with compensations. Payment of compensations, repayment of state debts, and the running of the state all necessitated money. The solution found was to nationalize church land and issue bonds against

it, named *assignats*. A large part of church property was held, not by the secular clergy but by monasteries. As a result, the lower clergy had not been opposed to many of the steps of the Revolution, including the nationalization of church property. But the nationalization brought into question state responsibility for payment of the clergy, leading to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (July 1790). Unlike the ordinary priests, the bishops' stipends were dramatically reduced. By redrawing the parish boundaries, the Assembly affected community life, and this, rather than religious doctrine, created popular resistance. The principle of popular sovereignty to the appointment of priests also brought the Assembly into conflict with many clerics. Doyle (1989) sees this constitution as the moment which fatally fractured the Revolution. The Assembly obliterated the monolithism and the church hierarchy of Roman Catholicism. But by applying the practice of "active" citizenship to the choice of clergy, it excluded all women as well as poorer men from the process, and thereby created the possibility of providing a social base to clerical opposition. The Assembly's insistence that the elected clergy should swear an oath of loyalty to the law, the nation, and the king posed the parish priests everywhere with an acute choice of conscience. The oath went against the loyalty to the pope and tradition. Many took the oath in a conditional form. Only a handful of bishops and just about half the parish clergy took the oath. When, in April 1791, the pope, doubly antagonized as the result of the French takeover of the papal enclave of Avignon, condemned the Civil Constitution and the Declaration of Rights as inimical to a Christian way of life, many retracted even this. By mid-1791, the west, southwest, east, and the southern Massif Central had emerged as "refractory" areas.

Factors other than the Civil Constitution were also at work. In December 1789, the Marquis de Favras, who had links with the king's brother, the Comte de Provence, conspired to rescue Louis XVI from Paris with an armed band who would take him to the frontier. Favras was arrested, and hanged as a traitor in February 1790. But not only were open counterrevolutionaries plotting secretly. Mirabeau and Mounier, leading radicals in the early days of the Revolution, either kept secret contacts with the royal family or went into emigration. Catholic conservatism was also driven to the counterrevolution, as when Froment at

Nîmes kept in touch with Artois, and recruited followers who openly wore the Bourbon white cockade and attacked pro-revolution forces. In August, a camp of the National Guard, dominated by leaders of the Nîmes Catholics, met in the northern Gard, at Jales. Treating this as evidence of mass support for counterrevolution, the émigré princes wanted Louis XVI to take over Lyons and stage an uprising through the entire Midi by coordinating the counterrevolutionary forces within and in Switzerland.

This plan collapsed, partly because Louis XVI was not willing, partly because the plan became known in France. But then Louis fled to Varennes, was apprehended, and eventually sent back. Though the moderates tried to pretend that the king had been abducted, he had left behind a strong denunciation of the Revolution. Popular anger at him was silenced for a while by the Champs de Mars massacre (July 1791). But the incident also made it impossible for European powers to argue any longer that the king was giving his free consent to the changes taking place in France. Artois had by this time set up his court in Koblenz, where Provence joined him shortly after the king's abortive flight, and put pressure on European powers.

Their first success came with the Pillnitz declaration (August 27, 1791), issued by Emperor Leopold of Austria and the king of Prussia, which clearly stated that the sovereigns were willing to take action if other émigré princes joined them. The situation of the king of France was portrayed as an object of common interest to all the European sovereigns. In an open letter to Louis XVI, the princes rejected the legitimacy of the constitution, since it was not the work of the Estates General. They also declared illegitimate all the policies of the Assembly. Their program thus appeared to be a flat restoration of the old regime.

The émigrés were trying to organize their own armed forces in the hope that these would serve as adjuncts to invading armies of foreign powers. They also provided encouragement to counterrevolutionaries inside France, like the Marquis de la Rouerie, who represented royalist Bretons. By early 1792, his adherents had a considerable stock of arms.

In 1792 war began. Louis XVI wanted war, hoping that defeat would cause a rollback of the Revolution. Though he had the option of appointing a ministry of his own choice, he appointed a

pro-war Brissotin ministry. Counterrevolutionary threats intensified with the early military defeats of France. The Prussian commander, the Duke of Brunswick, issued a ferocious manifesto, threatening to destroy Paris and execute Parisians as exemplary punishment if Louis and his family were harmed. This was what provoked the insurrection of August 10.

The summer of 1792 also confronted priests with the question of their loyalty. Non-jurors (clergy who had refused to take the oath of allegiance to the constitution) now found that loyalty to the state became a burning issue with war and early defeats. On August 23 the Legislative Assembly required all non-juring clergy to leave the kingdom within seven days. Then on September 2 word reached Paris that the great fortress at Verdun, just 250 kilometers from Paris, and the last obstacle to invading armies, had fallen. This provoked the “September massacres.” The monarchist press had been issuing bloodcurdling threats and publishing lists of patriots who would be executed once victory was won by the right. Plagued by the fear of what might happen to their families in their absence, patriots volunteered for war and demanded stern steps. And so, most of the prisons were broken into, and makeshift tribunals heard the cases of the arrested. Between 1,100 and 1,400 people were executed, though about as many were liberated. In the face of grim threats by the enemy, justice could only be in black and white, felt the people. Andress (2006) has argued that the massacre cannot be separated from the insurrection of August 10. This rising had led to the death of about 600 of the king’s troops, but also of nearly 400 revolutionaries – Parisians and their *fédéré* (provincial) allies. These massacres, moreover, have to be set against counterrevolutionary and royalist violence. The people felt that the execution of a sizable group of identified counterrevolutionaries was the only way they could hope to keep the potential counterrevolutionaries constantly threatening violence at bay. And the rout of émigré counterrevolution came in mid-September, after the battle of Valmy. Apart from one military unit under the Prince de Condé, the rest were eventually disbanded. Then came the trial and execution of Louis XVI. He was clearly guilty of treason, having signed the constitution and then plotted against it.

After the execution of Louis, the Comte de Provence proclaimed Louis’s son as Louis XVII,

and declared himself regent. But only Catherine II of Russia recognized the regency immediately. However, the success of French arms created a realignment of forces and brought Great Britain into the war against France.

Vendée and Federalism

The revolutionaries could not imagine something like a popular base for counterrevolution. So when mass struggles against the Revolution broke out among the peasantry, in the Vendée, or in Brittany, these were ascribed to manipulations by émigré counterrevolution. Studies on popular dimensions of counterrevolution (Le Goff & Sutherland 1983; Pettifre 1988) do not simply relate peasant support to counterrevolution to their attachment to religion, though there were links. The area from which most rebels came was the *bocage*, an area of poor urbanization: 62.8 percent of the rebel army was peasant in composition. But there were also significant portions of artisans and shopkeepers (34.5 percent). Only 20 percent of the volunteers to the military levée of the Revolution in this area came from peasants; 65 percent were artisans and shopkeepers, while 12 percent were bourgeois, a category almost totally absent in the rebel army. This strongly indicates a class conflict behind the ideological conflict. However, ideology also played a role. The Revolution appeared to have been imposed on the peasants by bourgeois administrators. In the Vendée, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy had special significance. The scattered villages had traditionally seen the church as the main area of peasant sociability and the point of self-definition of the rural community. The elimination of many parish churches, viewed as a cost-cutting measure from Paris, was seen as a blow against the rural identity. Moreover, in the Vendée, nearly 90 percent of the priests were non-juring. So the attachment was not so much to the dogmas of Catholic religion as to familiar personnel and a cultural identity.

Peasant hostility occasionally stemmed from the fact that in some areas peasants were often tenants, while legislation and administrative action favored the bourgeois landowner. In Cholet, a major center of the Vendée uprising, peasants got no more than 9 percent of all the land sold. Weavers from Cholet who participated likewise did so partly due to the economic hardships caused by the Revolution. Finally, there is a need to look

at the specific peasant form of religion, rather than dismissing it as superstition, to understand why peasants were so hostile to the religious reforms sought to be imposed by the heirs of the Enlightenment from the various Assemblies of the Revolution.

Ultimately, the civil war in this region was bloody, and victory was followed up by bloody terror. An estimated 200,000 people died on the two sides combined. The immediate spark for the civil war came at the end of February 1793, when the levy for 300,000 men was decreed. On March 14, armed rebels attacked Cholet. A column led by General Marce was defeated. The peasants' aggressive drive was finally thwarted by the successful defense of Nantes in June, against the forces led by Vendean leader Charette. On August 1, 1793, the National Convention voted a ruthless decree declaring total war against the Vendée. It took December to outmaneuver the rebels ruthlessly by General Westermann's army.

Another development was the provincial or federalist revolt, which also became counter-revolutionary. The Girondins opposed the centralizing tendency of the Jacobins (early to mid-1793), even though dictated by military exigencies, because in opposing Parisian radicals, they tried to mobilize support from the regions. In Marseilles, economic dislocations threatened port workers and others, who turned against the hitherto dominant Jacobins and joined forces with the Girondins, supported by the local bourgeoisie. News of the fall of the Marseilles Jacobins sparked off anti-Jacobin unrest elsewhere in France, particularly in the south. Lyons rose in revolt due to economic crisis and the fear that the local Jacobins would use force. The arrest of the Girondin leaders on June 2, 1793, in turn, had an impact on Bordeaux, from which many of them came. Members of the pro-Girondin club Friends of Liberty dominated most of the city's 28 sections. On June 7, a Popular Commission of Public Safety was set up. Marseilles, Lyon, and Bordeaux sought to coordinate their actions. Like the Girondin leaders in Paris, the Girondins in the provinces slid toward counterrevolution, allying with royalists, nobles, and priests. On August 29, the key Mediterranean naval arsenal of Toulon was handed over by its officers to the English navy blockading the coast. Nor was the federalist revolt confined to the south. It also spread in Normandy, based on Caen. At the heart of federalism was the anger of the upper

bourgeoisie, especially those of the commercial towns, at the radical direction the Revolution had taken, the purging of the elected representatives on June 2 being the last straw. The fact that the immediate targets were the Jacobins and local militants reveals the class-based nature of local divisions, though in some cases obscured by lower-class support to the rebels. In the long run, the federalists could not mobilize military forces strong enough to pose a serious threat to the armies of the Revolution.

Counterrevolution also struck into the heart of the Convention, when on June 13 Charlotte Corday stabbed Marat to death. Such incidents convinced the Jacobins that ruthless measures were essential. Fighting the counterrevolution seemed to call for revolutionary terror by the Committee of Public Safety.

Thermidor to Bonaparte

The period of the Reign of Terror saw a determined attempt to stamp out counterrevolution, but increasingly also a narrow coterie rule dominated by Robespierre, which alienated the *sans-culotte* masses, and even many Jacobins. As a result, a reaction set in, and an anti-Robespierre alliance developed. The Committee of General Security, losing power, was upset. Members of the Committee of Public Safety, like Carnot and Lindet, wanted to pull back, and saw in Robespierre a key figure on whom all the blame could be placed. Collot d'Herbois and Billaud Varenne, former radical Jacobins, were afraid that Robespierre was denouncing them for excesses, and turned against him. Other members of the Convention rallied, desiring an end to an emerging "personal dictatorship" of Robespierre, or to the triumvirate of Robespierre, Couthon, and Saint-Just. And so, on Thermidor 9 (July 27, 1794), a concerted attack was launched. An attempt to rally the Paris Commune failed because a recently promulgated ordinance had lowered wages and increased prices, alienating the *sans-culottes*. So Robespierre and his immediate supporters were easily captured and executed. The Terror was over, and bourgeois normalcy needed to be restored. But the effect of the overthrow of Robespierre was to release forces much to the right. *Sans-culotte* radicals like Babeuf imagined that the end of the Terror would mean a restoration of popular freedom, but the bourgeoisie did not want that. A bitter social reaction was unleashed. Active Jacobins and

sans-culottes in Paris were arrested, while Jacobins in the provinces were often assassinated. The *jeunesse dorée* (gilded youth) often wore the royalist white cockade and attacked *sans-culottes*. An attack on the Jacobin club by them on Brumaire 22 (November 12, 1794) was the excuse the Convention used to close down the club. Economic controls, established under the Terror and geared to protect the rights of the poor, were removed. The long-delayed trial of the city council of Nantes, accused of counter-revolution by the representative Carrier, revealed the excesses and abuses of power during the Terror. This was used to create an image of the Terror as a regime of monstrous wickedness. By 1795, the last *sans-culotte* uprisings had been smashed, paving the way for a marked royalist revival.

A more direct royalist counterrevolution was also attempted. Count Puisaye from Brittany arrived in London in September 1794, claiming to speak for 30,000 organized *chouan* guerillas. An émigré contingent landed in France. But by July 1795, General Hoche counterattacked to suppress these forces of *chouans* and the émigrés; 6,000 were imprisoned; 640 émigrés and 108 *chouans* were shot. Another Vendean revolt was similarly tackled, and by 1796 counterrevolutionary leaders like Stofflet and Charette had been caught and executed. By then, following the death of Louis XVII, the Comte de Provence proclaimed himself Louis XVIII, though recognized only by Russia and Sweden.

Meanwhile, a new constitution was drafted by the Thermidorean Convention. Indirect elections by secret ballot were restored, with a taxpayer franchise. Representatives would have to be fairly large owners. Two chambers were created for the legislature: the Council of Five Hundred and the Council of Ancients (250 in number, all aged 40 or above). All of these representatives were to be subject to reelection every three years, with one-third elected each year. No government minister or agent could be a member of the councils. A five-member Directory was set up as the executive authority, to be elected by the Ancients from shortlists proposed by the Five Hundred. Ministers were appointed by the Directory, but were also responsible to the councils. Fearful of a full-blown royalist takeover, the Convention proposed that two-thirds of the first councils would be chosen by the Convention from amongst its own members. The constitution was

approved by a low-voting referendum, but there was widespread opposition to the two-thirds law. This led to a royalist rising on Vendémiaire 13 (October 5, 1795), which was defeated by troops under the command of the young General Bonaparte. Elections showed a royalist trend, though only one-third seats were up. Elections of 1797 returned a further substantial royalist group. When the royalists moved to what seemed a constitutional coup in order to bring back the king, the majority of Directors carried out a military-backed coup to purge the councils. On August 5, 1799, yet another royalist insurrection broke out at Toulouse, with 10,000 men flocking to the Bourbon flag. For a month civil war raged along the upper Garonne.

Abbé Sieyès, one of the Directors, wanted to end the instability of the Directorate by establishing a strong and stable government, with the help of General Bonaparte. In 1799, Bonaparte was already the most important general, with the Treaty of Campo Formio in Italy signed due to his victories over Austria. By playing on the fears of a Terrorist plot, Sieyès, the ex-Terrorist Fouché, and Talleyrand persuaded the councils to meet on Brumaire 18 (November 9, 1799) outside Paris at Saint-Cloud, under the protection of Napoleon's grenadiers. The Council of Five Hundred, however, put up resistance, and Napoleon was attacked both verbally and physically. But his brother Lucien, who was conveniently in the chair, called in the guards. The Five Hundred were driven out, the Directory was dissolved, and full authority was vested in a provisional Consulate of three – Sieyès, Roger-Ducos, and Bonaparte. Three weeks later, a new Cesarist constitution was drafted and offered to the assemblies. The plebiscite was won with over three million votes.

But Napoleon was not willing to be a mute agent for Sieyès and his fellow conspirators. Within a short while, he had consolidated his position. The Napoleonic Consulate, followed by the Napoleonic Empire, seemed the negation of the Revolution. Yet when the Comte de Provence wrote to him, asking him to be the General Monck of the French Revolution, Napoleon categorically told the latter to sacrifice his interests for the interests of France. Moreover, after a failed royalist attempt to assassinate him, Bonaparte had the Duc d'Enghien, son of the Prince de Condé, arrested from Baden (outside his domains) and executed, thus having Bourbon blood on his hands.

Bonapartism nonetheless represented an admixture of revolution and counterrevolution. On one hand, by settling the rights of the peasantry, by finally getting the proposed Civil Code passed, and by trying to get the “natural frontiers” of France accepted, he proved to be, in many ways, the heir to the Revolution. On the other hand, he curbed all democratic efforts, turning them when possible into a plebiscitary model, and repressing them otherwise. When royalists planned to murder him, he used the occasion to purge the Jacobins first. He also cleared away many of the remaining radical legislations. He imposed a centralized administration with departments getting prefects, recalling the pre-Revolution *intendants*. He stabilized the state finances and established the Bank of France, giving an impetus to the bourgeois economy. He pursued a dynastic policy, even though all the way to the end he remained an outsider to the royal and imperial courts of Europe. To revolutionaries in France and elsewhere, on the other hand, he seemed a traitor who had destroyed the principles of the Revolution. Beethoven, who admired the consul as a revolutionary, tore up his dedication of the *Eroica* (Symphony No. 3) when Napoleon was crowned. Yet, as Shelley recognized after the fall of Napoleon, he represented, not the ultimate counterrevolution, but a contradiction. While he was an “unambitious slave” who danced and reveled on the grave of liberty, his defeat brought about, not liberty, but the return of the more eternal foes, “old Custom, legal Crime, / And bloody Faith.”

Bourbon Restoration and Counterrevolution

In 1814, Napoleon Bonaparte was defeated. The forces opposing him had diverse aims, but the purse-strings were held by Castlereagh, the English foreign secretary. While Metternich, the Austrian leader, had offered Napoleon the Frankfurt proposals, whereby France would retain her “natural frontiers” and he would remain emperor, England insisted on pushing the French frontiers back to the 1792 level and defeating Napoleon at any cost to enthrone the pretender, Louis XVIII. Napoleon, finding even his marshals deserting him, surrendered. He had no option, since he himself had derided the people, and could not now bank on popular revolutionary will as France had done during the revolutionary wars. But

Napoleon returned from his island-kingdom of Elba, and tried to win a rapid victory. His defeat meant the final return of Louis XVIII. This time the allies were determined on sterner measures. France’s frontiers were pushed back to the 1790 level, and she was subjected to a military occupation of three to five years and made to pay an indemnity of 700 million francs.

Louis XVIII issued a Charter for his subjects. Despite all wishes of the émigré counterrevolution, there was to be no return to the pre-1789 era. Certain fundamental rights had to be recognized, such as freedom from arbitrary arrest, equality before the law, freedom of conscience, and above all recognition of all property rights including of land acquired during the Revolution. But Louis declared 1814 as the nineteenth year of his reign, thereby symbolically expressing the desire to wipe out the memory of the Revolution. More significantly, the preamble to the constitution stated that the king had given the constitution willingly to his subjects. From this it could be possible to claim later that the king could also take it back at will. A very limited suffrage electorate of about 90,000 was created. The Chamber of Deputies had a very strong right-wing component, led by the Comte d’Artois, who in alliance with the Baron de Vitrolles, Jules de Polignac, and others virtually set up a parallel government. Secret societies supporting the monarchy also became strong, like the Chevaliers de La Foi. For these groups, the Charter was an evil influence. The Second Restoration (after Waterloo) saw the atrocities of a white terror, largely in the south, when supporters of the monarchy murdered many who had supported Napoleon’s return. The domination of the counterrevolutionaries led to the title *Chambre Introuvable* (incomparable chamber) being accorded to the first chamber of deputies of the reign. Even the king had to get rid of it, and manipulated elections to create a more pliant chamber in 1816. Semi-military courts were set up, and civil liberties were mostly suppressed. Education was restored to episcopal control. Though Louis XVIII did not like his brother’s extremist policies, he was unable to ignore his views. The election of Grégoire, a former revolutionary, in 1819, and the assassination of the heir to the throne, the Duc de Berry (son of the Comte d’Artois), in February 1820, caused the king to turn to the extreme right. Freedom of the press and personal freedom were further reduced.

The government of Villele abolished the jury system. As a result of these repressive measures, secret revolutionary societies began to develop. In September 1824 Louis XVIII died, and the Comte d'Artois became king, as Charles X. He immediately tried to increase the powers of the clergy and the nobility, and introduced strong pro-Catholic measures. Compensation was decreed for nobles who had lost their land during the Revolution. In order to get the funds, interest rates on national debt papers were reduced. Ignoring all popular discontent, Charles appointed his friend Polignac as the third of his prime ministers. When liberals wanted him to remove Polignac, he dissolved the Chamber of Deputies and called for new elections, in which liberals won a larger majority. The king reacted by issuing four ordinances on July 26, 1830, canceling freedom of the press, dissolving the newly elected assembly, reducing the electorate to 25,000, and calling for new elections. A liberal revolution was organized in response, led by the paper *Le National*, controlled by Thiers, Mignet, and Carrel, but supported also by more radical masses, who actually threw up the barricades and fought the soldiers. Fearful of the return of republicanism, moderates united to install Louis Philippe, son of Philip "Egalité," Duke of Orleans, as the new king. Though this was by no means the return of revolutionary politics, it did mean the final defeat of counterrevolution, though legitimist pretenders and their supporters continued to play an important role in French politics.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); Directory, France, 1795–1799; France, 1830 Revolution; French Revolution, Radical Factions and Organizations; Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794); Sieyès, Abbé (1748–1836)

References and Suggested Readings

- Andress, D. (2006) *The Terror: The Merciless War for Freedom in Revolutionary France*. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.
- Cobb, R. (1972) *Reactions to the French Revolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Crook, M. (1998) *Napoleon Comes to Power: Democracy and Dictatorship in Revolutionary France, 1795–1804*. Cardiff: University of Wales.
- Doyle W. (1989) *The Oxford History of the French Revolution*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hutt, M. G. (1983) *Chouannerie and Counter-Revolution: Puisaye, The Princes and the British Government in the 1790s*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Jardin, A. & Tudesq, A. J. (1988) *Restoration and Reaction, 1815–1848*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lefebvre, G. (1989) *The French Revolution 1787–1799*. London: Routledge.
- Le Goff, T. J. A. & Sutherland, D. M. G. (1983) The Social Origins of Counter-Revolution in Western France. *Past and Present* 99 (May): 65–87.
- Lyons, M. (1975) *France Under the Directory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mayer, A. J. (2000) *The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Petitfrere, C. (1988) The Origins of the Civil War in the Vendée. *French History* 2: 187–207.
- Schama, S. (1990) *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*. New York: Vintage.
- Tackett, T. (1989) Nobles and the Third Estate in the Revolutionary Dynamic of the National Assembly, 1789–1790. *American Historical Review* 94: 271–301.

Courbet, Gustave (1819–1877)

Walter R. Herscher

Gustave Courbet was a nineteenth-century French Realist who countered the prevailing method of painting that idealized subjects. Courbet pledged to paint only what he saw. His art was revolutionary in style but not necessarily in political themes. Courbet's controversial paintings gained him notoriety and publicity at a time when conservatives equated Realist painters with political radicals. A general tenet of nineteenth-century painting was that only important events should be painted on large canvases; however, Courbet intentionally painted everyday scenes on them, possibly suggesting that the common people were as important as the upper classes. During the February 1848 revolution that overthrew the July Monarchy, Courbet sketched an image of a man brandishing a rifle on a barricade for publication in a newspaper; however, he refused to fight in the revolution or the June insurrection.

Courbet first received major attention at the 1849 Salon for his painting *After Dinner at Ornans*, a painting portraying rural bourgeoisie ladies not dressed in the expected Parisian bourgeois fashion. Courbet's failure to follow the clothing dictates of Paris and the imperial fashions of Napoléon III was viewed as a political statement.

In the combined 1850–1 Salon he displayed three major paintings: *Funeral at Ornans*, which depicted

a rural funeral attended by the local bourgeoisie; *Peasants of Flagey Returning from the Fair*, which portrayed rural bourgeoisie and included a lowly pig; and *The Stonebreakers*, which aroused the most criticism because it was interpreted as a social comment on the anonymous, repetitive, and miserable nature of lower-class work. Courbet had not intended any socialist revolutionary theme, but accepted the public's conclusion because of the publicity engendered.

Fearing revolt, Paris was injecting revolutionary allegories that probably did not exist into Courbet's paintings. During the period of 1849–54 Courbet purposely submitted paintings to the Salon that would be interpreted as being controversial or subversive in hopes of gaining publicity. In the late 1850s and 1860s he discussed creating obvious anti-establishment paintings; however, he never completed any of these projects, possibly not wanting to sever ties with the government and have his paintings banned.

The 1862 Salon rejected Courbet's painting that showed a group of drunken priests and thus might be attacking the Catholic Church. The government hoped to influence Courbet's painting by naming him a Chevalier of the Legion of Honor in June 1870, an honor which he refused and thereby gained himself further notoriety.

After the Franco-Prussian War broke out, Courbet applauded the overthrow of Napoléon III on September 4, 1870. After being elected president of a commission designed to safeguard cultural artifacts, he soon petitioned for the removal of the Vendôme Column and for the construction of a Peace Monument in its place, arguing that the column was a militaristic memento. He argued against a proposal to raise a new monument to Strasbourg, a city besieged by the Prussians, by melting down a statue of Napoléon. He feared this would increase popular hatred of the Prussians, perpetuate hatred and conservatism, and thus hinder any movement to universal socialism.

During the Prussian siege of Paris, Courbet wrote an open letter thanking Germany for its part in Napoléon III's overthrow. He deplored the siege and argued that the two countries should form a Franco-German federation.

When the Commune took control in 1871, Courbet was elected in April as a member of the new government. On May 16, when the Vendôme Column was pulled down and destroyed, the public blamed Courbet for the act. After the

Versailles government crushed the Commune in May, Courbet was arrested, jailed, and fined. His public career in France was effectively finished, and the 1872 Salon rejected his paintings. In 1873 Courbet was ordered to pay the costs of rebuilding the Vendôme Column. Expecting arrest for inability to pay the debts, he moved to Switzerland. He died on December 31, 1877, after suffering from various diseases.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873); Paris Commune, 1871

References and Suggested Readings

- Chu, P. D. (2007) *The Most Arrogant Man in France: Gustave Courbet and the Nineteenth-Century Media Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Clayson, H. (2002) *Paris in Despair: Art and Everyday Life under Siege (1870–71)*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Herding, K. (1991) *Courbet: To Venture Independence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Coxey's Army and the unemployed movement

Stacy Warner Maddern

By 1894, political demonstrations in the United States were perceived as a threat to American cities. This was largely due to the events that occurred at Chicago's Haymarket Square in 1888. However, this did not dissuade Jacob Coxey and Carl Browne from organizing a "petition in boots" that would serve as a precedent for a new type of national public protest in the United States. The nation was in the grip of a depression much like the Great Depression of the 1930s, and Coxey and his supporters had grown frustrated with government inaction. To alleviate the suffering of the working class, Coxey, a businessman from Ohio, proposed a number of programs that, though popular in the 1930s, were seen as too radical for the 1890s. He wanted the government to create jobs by hiring the unemployed to perform public works, specifically road improvements.

By marching on Washington, "Coxey's Army" hoped to attract considerable attention from both Congress and the press. The march, centered on delivering to Congress Coxey's Good Roads

Bill, was criticized in the press as a hostile measure, “at war with the fundamental principle upon which free institutions rest.” In response, Coxe’s Army held that they were merely meeting their obligation as citizens to improve the country; however, Congress had a different opinion. While the march did gain congressional support in populist Senator William Peffer, who agreed to introduce the bill in the Senate, most mainstream politicians were united in describing Coxe’s demands of assistance for the unemployed as paternalistic.

In preparation, District officials, led by Metro Police Superintendent William Moore, searched for any law that would allow them to control the demonstration. They discovered an 1882 Act that strictly prohibited speeches, parades, and carrying of banners on Capitol grounds, which they used as the legal basis to arrest both Coxe and Browne, sentencing each to serve 20 days in jail.

In the aftermath, a call for hearings on the arrests by another populist senator, William Allen, only fueled senators from the two major parties over the legitimacy of the campaign. In response the House Labor Committee decided to hear testimony on the causes of economic depression, but its motivation seemed rather to create a vehicle by which they could establish that Coxe’s Army did not represent any legitimate group. At the hearings Coxe was given the opportunity to present his bill, which in turn gave Congress its opportunity to scrutinize his cause. While questioning Coxe, Speaker Charles Crisp charged him with not having the “authority . . . to represent the 65,000,000 people of this country,” while reminding him that those who did were “the 356 representatives elected to Congress.”

In their contention over the people’s right “peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances,” Coxe’s Army was met with resistance. District officials maintained that the First Amendment did not give all citizens the right to protest on spaces they considered official. While on the surface the march of Coxe’s Army may have seemed a failure, it was not without a lasting impression. As Senator Joseph Hawley predicted, the march set a precedent for protesters to “make pilgrimages . . . to Washington and endeavor to dominate Congress by the physical presence of the people.”

SEE ALSO: Bonus Army Unemployed Movement, 1932; Unemployed Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Barber, L. G. (2002) *Marching on Washington: The Forging of An American Political Tradition*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- McMurry, D. L. (1968) *Coxe’s Army: A Study of the Industrial Army Movement of 1894*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Schwantes, C. A. (1994). *Coxe’s Army: An American Odyssey*. Caldwell: University of Idaho Press.

Crazy Horse (1849–1877), Sitting Bull (1831–1890), and Native American resistance at the Battle of Little Bighorn

Stacy Warner Maddern

The significance of the Battle of Little Bighorn lies more in the stand made by two fearless American Indian leaders than in the defeat of General George Armstrong Custer. Both Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull found their peak as revolutionaries on the Little Bighorn River in Montana in the summer of 1876, in a battle that would both add to their legends and seal their fate. The contribution made by Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull to the defense of the American Indian lies not just in this epic battle, but in a fearless commitment to lead their people against an oppressive United States government.

Tashunke Witko (1849–77) or Crazy Horse emerged as a military leader of the Ogeala Sioux tribe while still a young man in his mid-twenties. He was courageous and daring, having mastered the techniques of Indian warfare. Crazy Horse was relentless in his hatred for the white man, clearly opposed to abandoning hunting lands sacred to his people in exchange for a quiet reservation existence.

Tatanka Iyotake (1831–90), known all over the world as Sitting Bull, would become the most revered chief of the Teton or Western Sioux, often referred to as the Sioux of Sioux. As the leader of history’s largest assembly of Plains Warriors, Sitting Bull was a visionary band chief and practicing shaman whose strength lay in a natural ability to plan and organize. Sitting Bull lived his life in the service of loyalty to tribal ideals and exemplified the highest Sioux virtues of courage and generosity.



Tatanka Iyotake, known worldwide as Sitting Bull, became the most revered chief of the Teton or Western Sioux. As the leader of history's largest assembly of Plains warriors, Sitting Bull was a visionary band chief and practicing shaman whose strength was rooted in a natural ability to plan and organize. Sitting Bull lived his life in the service of loyalty to tribal ideas and exemplified the highest Sioux virtues of courage and generosity. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

In the 1850s, as the American frontier began to expand, contact between whites and Indians led to cultural conflicts and increased violence. Treaties were broken as quickly as they were made. Sioux bands in Minnesota began to rise up against the whites, but were overwhelmed and later retreated into the plains where they would join with the Hunkpapas who were the indigenous Sioux of the area. When the United States army showed little distinction in its treatment of these two bands, warfare between the whites and Sioux became a general affair. In 1863 Sitting Bull had his first fights with the US army. In 1864 he participated in the Battle of Killdeer Mountain and the following year tried but failed to overtake Fort Rice. But 1866 would yield the greatest Sioux victory to date with the attack on Fort Phil Kearny, also known as the Fetterman

Fight, for the Army officer, William Judd Fetterman, who led his troops into battle against the Sioux. Crazy Horse was chosen to lead an attack on the woodchoppers as a strategic ploy to draw the soldiers out of the fort, where nearly 600 warriors fell upon them. By the time the battle ended, 100 US troops were dead.

In an effort to quell the tensions and put an end to violent uprisings, the US government negotiated the Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Plains Indians. It was signed in 1868 at Fort Laramie in the Wyoming Territory and guaranteed full ownership of the Black Hills to the Sioux Nation, along with unrestricted land and hunting rights in South Dakota, Wyoming, and Montana. The area known as the Powder River Country was therein established as Indian land and was closed off to all whites.

In 1874 Custer would lead an expedition that included reporters and geologists into the Black Hills of South Dakota where he declared that there was "gold in the grass roots." His claim would encourage an onslaught of prospectors and miners to invade the Black Hills territory, thus violating the terms of the Treaty of Fort Laramie. Any hope of resolving this conflict by peaceful means ended on July 30, 1874 when Horatio Nelson Ross, a member of Custer's expedition, discovered gold in the Black Hills. The timing of Custer's expedition and subsequent invasion of Sioux lands would set off a period of conflict between the US and Plains Indians. Because whites had continually broken treaty agreements in their westward advance, Indian tribes such as the Sioux and Cheyenne decided to retaliate, and the result was what became known as the Black Hills War.

In order to take possession of the Black Hills and subsequently the gold deposits, the US government was again faced with quelling Indian attacks. Its solution was to corral all remaining free Plains Indians and sequester them on reservations. In December of 1875 the commissioner of Indian affairs, following orders from President Ulysses S. Grant, directed all Sioux bands to come onto reservations by the end of January, or be declared hostile.

When certain tribes failed to meet this impossible deadline, General George Crook was ordered to attack their winter settlements. Crazy Horse eluded Crook by leading his people to the Rosebud River to join Sitting Bull's camp in the Valley of Little Bighorn. By the spring

of 1876, 3,000 Teton Sioux and Northern Cheyenne warriors had assembled at Sitting Bull's camp and chosen him as their supreme commander. Sitting Bull, who was scarcely 10 years old when he went on his first buffalo hunt and 14 when he joined his first war party, believed that he had been divinely chosen to lead and protect his people. Sitting Bull was on the warpath with his followers almost continuously in the years after 1866, and although other tribes of the northern Plains increasingly resigned themselves to reservation life, he remained with his people in the buffalo country, uncompromising, and quick to challenge white invaders. Although few whites realized the strength of his army, the efficiency of his fighters was well recognized. The Sioux, said General Frederick W. Benteen, were "good shots, good riders, and the best fighters the sun ever shone on."

Sitting Bull, whose insight and political judgment were as remarkable as his military skill, realized that the Sioux and other Plains tribes were about to face a battle for their very existence. In June of 1876 he vowed to perform the Sun Dance, a ritualistic dance that included elements of self-inflicted torture as a means to symbolize rebirth. Sitting Bull held that the Sun Dance would give him a vision of what lay ahead for his people. He had often performed this dance, the Plains Indians' greatest and most important religious ceremony, and his chest and back were scarred by its torture. His vision from this particular dance revealed many white soldiers falling upside down from the sky and making war upon his people, but the Great Spirit protecting them.

Sitting Bull's vision was quickly fulfilled. On June 16 Crook came to take Crazy Horse. This time Crook had a new strategy that included 15 divisions of cavalry and 5 of infantry, some 1,300 armed men in all. After marching his troops up the Bozeman Trail of the Tongue River, Crook ran headlong into 1,200 Sioux and Cheyenne warriors under Crazy Horse at the Rosebud River. Although tired from the Sun Dance, Sitting Bull was there to urge the Indians on. At the end of an all-day fight, Crook was forced to retreat, with heavy losses.

Despite this victory, Sitting Bull knew that his vision had not yet been fulfilled, for it had shown many white soldiers. One week later, however, on June 25, his vision would be realized when some of Custer's scouts discovered

what they thought was a retreating Indian village along the Little Bighorn River. Custer was confident, especially considering his experience of staging a surprise, early morning attack on the camp of a southern Cheyenne Chief, Black Kettle, just two years earlier when he orchestrated the murder of 103 Indians, most of whom were women, children, and elderly, along the banks of Oklahoma's Washita River. Given this experience he knew that a small village of Plains Indians would scatter if attacked. Because the village was 3 miles long and half a mile wide, Custer estimated its population as not exceeding 1,500 and thus divided his command of 645 soldiers into three columns.

Custer first sent a detachment led by Major Marcus Reno to approach from the southeast of the village. Here Reno would be met by Indians led by Sitting Bull, who would immediately cut down a third of his men. The rest of the detachment would retreat to a nearby ridge, where they were under attack for the next two days.

Custer's counter-attack also failed as he led his men along the bluffs overlooking the Little Big Horn some 4 miles away. There Crazy Horse and his braves concentrated their entire force on Custer and his men. In little more than an hour, the Sioux and Cheyenne had overrun Custer and his 224 men, slaughtering every one. His men were lacking cover, armed with single-shot rifles and in most cases raw and ill-prepared for battle. At battle's end, the losses sustained by Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull were less than a hundred. No trap had been laid for Custer and his forces, and no strategy planned ahead of time. The battle was a sudden defensive action.

After their victory at the Battle of Little Bighorn the Indian bands dispersed. One by one, as more and more soldiers poured into their country, they surrendered. Some ten years later in January of 1877, General Nelson A. Miles, surprising Crazy Horse's winter camp, scattered the Indians without food or adequate clothing on the frozen plains. The following May, Crazy Horse and about 1,000 men, women, and children surrendered to the Sioux chief's old adversary, General Crook, at the Red Cloud agency in Nebraska, but the young warrior could not stand reservation life. Rumors flew that he was plotting escape, and on September 5, 1877, he was placed under arrest. When he realized that he was about to be locked up, Crazy Horse, desperate, drew his knife and tried to cut his

way to freedom. He was bayoneted in the back by a white sentry and died several hours later.

The hostile Sioux and Cheyenne were constantly harassed by troops under Miles in the years after the Battle of Little Bighorn, and in the winter following their great victory, many of Sitting Bull's followers surrendered. Pursued by the army and failing in his attempt to prevent the loss of hunting ground in the Black Hills and Powder River Country, Sitting Bull and his followers escaped to Canada. Across the border, Sitting Bull pleaded with Canadians for a reservation, but without success. US commissioners came to Canada to persuade him to return. Sitting Bull resisted, but when there was nothing left to eat, he led his followers south, and surrendered at Fort Buford, Montana on July 19, 1881. Horses and arms were replenished in exchange for a "pardon" for Sitting Bull's past.

For two years, the Sioux chief was a prisoner of war at Fort Randall. He had become a legend of his own time, and was deluged by fan mail. Lieutenant-Colonel G. P. Ahern, who handled Sitting Bull's letters, described him as "a very remarkable man – such a vivid personality . . . square-shouldered, deep chested, a fine head, and the manner of a man who knew his ground."

Placed on Standing Rock Reservation in 1883, Sitting Bull continued to regard himself as the chief of his people, arousing the animosity and jealousy of other rival chiefs. For a year, he went on tour with Buffalo Bill's wild-west show, but most of the 1880s were spent feuding with Major James McLaughlin. When the Ghost Dance, a religious movement that incorporated numerous American Indian belief systems, hit Dakota reservations in 1890, tensions between McLaughlin and Sitting Bull were accented. The Sioux chief had endorsed – although without enthusiasm – the new movement, and in December of that year had been invited to visit Pine Ridge Agency to "greet the Messiah." McLaughlin and his superiors held that it might be better to arrest Sitting Bull rather than to have him lend his support to the Ghost Dance movement. On December 15 McLaughlin sent a detachment of Indian police to arrest him, and a skirmish unfolded. Even though some of his faithful friends tried to prevent Sitting Bull's seizure, he was killed by Sergeants Red Tomahawk and Bullhead.

SEE ALSO: Native American Protest, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Adams, A. (1973) *Sitting Bull: An Epic of the Plains*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Ambrose, S. (1996) *Crazy Horse and Custer: The Parallel Lives of Two American Warriors*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Brown, D. (1970) *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.
- Gray, J. (1991) *Custer's Last Campaign: Mitch Bouyer and the Little Bighorn Reconstructed*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Greene, J. (Ed.) (1994) *Lakota and Cheyenne: Indian Views of the Great Sioux War, 1876–1877*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Marshall, J. (2005) *Journey of Crazy Horse: A Lakota History*. New York: Penguin.
- Michno, G. (1997) *Lakota Noon: The Indian Narratives of Custer's Defeat*. Missoula, MT: Mountain Press.
- Sklenar, L. (2000) *To Hell with Honor, Custer and the Little Bighorn*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Utley, R. M. (1963) *The Last Days of the Sioux Nation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Vestal, S. (1932) *Sitting Bull: Champion of the Sioux, a Biography*. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Cristero uprising, Mexico, 1928

Raina Zimmering

The Cristero uprising, also known as the Cristero war, or the Cristiada, was a religious armed uprising in Central Mexico from 1926 to 1929. With the Mexican revolutionary Constitution of 1917, all religious communities lost their legal status: Article 3 mandated secular education in schools, Article 5 outlawed monastic religious orders, Article 24 forbade public religious worship outside temples, Article 27 restricted religious organizations' rights to own property, and Article 130 took away the basic civil rights of members of the clergy. President Plutarco Elias Calles adopted equivalent laws. He signed the Law for Reforming the Penal Code, known as the Calles Law. Calles seized church property, expelled all foreign priests, and closed the monasteries, convents, and religious schools. The Catholic Church hierarchy reacted with the closing of churches and schools and an economic boycott, but this had no political effect.

In August 1926 tensions turned into armed conflicts between demonstrators and police.

In Guadalajara (Jalisco), 400 armed Catholics committed suicide after locking themselves in the Church of Our Lady of Guadalupe. In Durango, Trinidad Mora led an uprising, and in southern Guanajuato another rebellion, led by former general Rodolfo Gallegos, took place. The Jalisco region became the main focal point of the rebellion led by 27-year-old René Capistrán Garza, leader of the Mexican Association of Catholic Youth.

The formal rebellion began on January 1, 1927, extending especially to Bajío, Jalisco, and Michoacán. Under the battle cry “Long Live Christ the King! Long Live the Virgin of Guadalupe!” the insurgents conducted a guerrilla war against government troops. Provoked not only by religious motivations but also by frustration over the loss of their land titles, most *Cristeros* came from rural communities that had suffered the government’s land reform since 1920.

On February 23, 1927, the *Cristeros* defeated federal troops for the first time at San Francisco del Rincón (Guanajuato), followed by another victory at San Julián (Jalisco). Father Vega led a raid against a train thought to be carrying a shipment of money. The bishops were expelled from Mexico after Father Vega’s attack on the train, but they continued to try to exert their influence from outside the country. On December 1, 1927, the newly elected president, Alvaro Obregón, was assassinated by a Catholic radical two weeks after his election. All in all, 100,000 people, mainly civilians, were killed in the war.

After a tacit arrangement between the Catholic Church and the Mexican government to retain the pre-1924 conditions, the uprising lost momentum during 1929. The diplomatic intervention of US Ambassador Dwight Whitney also helped to end the uprising. However, the anti-clerical terms in the constitution remained in force. The agreement between church and state (called *Arreglos*) established that the church’s former property remain in the hands of the state, but the church was given control of their institutions. The anti-clerical clauses were attenuated in the constitutional reform of 1988. In 2005, the church in Guadalajara canonized as martyrs 30 priests and laymen killed in the uprising.

SEE ALSO: Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Obregón, Alvaro (1880–1928) and the Sonoran Generation

References and Suggested Readings

- Purnell, J. (1999) *Popular Movements and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico: The Agraristas and Cristeros of Michoacán*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Tuck, J. (1982) *The Holy War in Los Altos: A Regional Analysis of Mexico’s Cristero Rebellion*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

Critical Mass

Iain A. Boal and Chris Carlsson

Critical Mass is the name given to the modern phenomenon of self-organized, mass bike rides with a contrarian spirit. The history of cycling *en masse* stretches back to the late nineteenth century. In 1896 thousands of cyclists rode through San Francisco agitating for better roads; in Weimar Germany the workers’ cycling association, Solidarity, was able to mobilize hundreds of thousands of demonstrators on wheels; in the early 1970s the new ecological sensibility prompted large rallies of cyclists with a green agenda in New York, Berlin, and elsewhere. The first Critical Mass ride took place in San Francisco in 1992 with just a few dozen cyclists. Within a year the number had reached a thousand, and since the mid-1990s the monthly “organized coincidence” attracts on occasion over 5,000 self-propelled celebrants – as much street theater as (semi)functional commute. The idea spread rapidly by word of mouth and later through the Internet. Critical Mass rides have been recorded in over 400 cities around the world, including Chicago, São Paulo, Milan, Budapest, Tokyo, Santiago, and Toronto.

Critical Mass can be seen as a new kind of “assertive desertion” by city dwellers attempting to erode the domination of modern life by automobilism and the interlocking interests of big oil, real estate developers, and the immense auto-industrial complex. By taking back the streets – albeit temporarily – in metropolitan centers and by the use of antinomian slogans, chants, and banners (famously, “We Are Not Blocking Traffic, We Are Traffic”), Critical Mass evinces the autonomist, networking style familiar in contemporary anti-systemic struggles, and echoes the direct action road-disrupting tactics that have emerged among Argentinean *piqueteros*, Bolivian *ambulantes*, and movements against neoliberalism worldwide. But there is an evident

particularity to the Bay Area origins of this resurgence of cycling *en masse*, which is infused with the traditions of postwar bohemia, the openair festivities of the counterculture, the horizontalism of anti-nuclear protests, and the satirical disdain for authority that characterizes San Francisco's political culture.

Critical Mass has arguably opened a new kind of political space, less about protest than an alternative vision of city life. However, the ongoing efforts by bureaucrats and police forces to harass and criminalize not only the carnivalesque Critical Mass rides in cities of the North, notably in New York and London, but also the cycle rickshaw pullers and two-wheeled commuters of Delhi and Beijing, suggest that authorities everywhere recognize a deeper threat posed by this mode of mobility in the arteries of capitalist modernity. Critical Mass, by its form, its rhythms, its conviviality and the kinds of encounter engendered, its use of public space, its suspension of the normal rules of circulation, is understood to be more than merely an affront to SUV drivers trapped for a few extra minutes in a traffic jam of their own making.

Although the techniques of automobility and the doctrine of the "freedom of the road" owe much to the bicycle, in the cities of the new millennium (Amsterdam notwithstanding) the decision to be an urban cyclist amounts to an act of refusal, an implicit protest against costly and lethal transit systems built on private cars. Unlike their forerunners in Solidarity and the proletarian cycling clubs of the last century, the enthusiasts of Critical Mass may no longer proclaim, in the words of José Antonio Viera Gallo, that "socialism can only arrive by bicycle" (Illich 1974: 11) – but they insist that urban life of the future will take the bicycle to its heart, or there will be no future.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Reclaim the Streets

References and Suggested Readings

- Boal, I. (2002) *The World of the Bicycle*. In C. Carlsson (Ed.), *Critical Mass: Bicycling's Defiant Celebration*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Carlsson, C. (Ed.) (2002) *Critical Mass: Bicycling's Defiant Celebration*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Chapot, H. (2002) *The Great Bicycle Protest of 1896*. In C. Carlsson (Ed.), *Critical Mass: Bicycling's Defiant Celebration*. Edinburgh: AK Press.

Illich, I. (1974) *Energy and Equity*. New York: Harper & Row.

Rabenstein, R. (2001) *The History of the German Workers' Cycling Association, Solidarity*. In A. Ritchie & R. van der Plas (Eds.), *Cycle History*, Vol. 11. San Francisco: Van der Plas, pp. 160–8. www.critical-mass.info.

Critical theory

Stephen Eric Bronner

Critical theory as a philosophical tendency was formed within German culture, but the term was actually coined in the United States. It was in the Institute for Social Research, founded in 1923 in Frankfurt, that the "critical" project took shape. The first director of the institute, Carl Grunberg, and many of its early members – like Henryk Grossman, Fritz Sternberg, and Felix Weill – were primarily interested in the study of political economy, imperialism, and the history of the socialist labor movement. Max Horkheimer, who took over as the new director in 1930, changed this orientation. Seminars of an interdisciplinary sort were organized among the members of his "inner circle" and, ultimately, they would produce the major works of "critical theory" normally associated with the "Frankfurt School" after the institute moved to Columbia University in 1934 following the Nazi seizure of power. That circle was comprised of Leo Lowenthal – an expert in literary criticism – who joined the institute in 1926; and Theodor W. Adorno – who was considered valuable for his knowledge of music – and who began his collaboration with the institute in 1928, but only became an official member ten years later. Then there was Erich Fromm, a gifted psychologist, who started his nine-year collaboration in 1930; Herbert Marcuse, a philosopher and former student of Martin Heidegger, who joined in 1933; and Walter Benjamin, the most unique of these thinkers, who never officially was a member at all.

Walter Benjamin was completely unknown in the United States until the preeminent political theorist Hannah Arendt edited a collection of his essays, *Illuminations* (1969). He thereafter became celebrated as an iconoclastic thinker involved with investigating and meshing traditions as diverse as Jewish Messianism, the Baroque, Modernism, and Marxism. With the new popularity of the radically subjective postmodern movement during

the 1980s, however, his fame reached extraordinary proportions: a library of secondary works has appeared and almost every volume of Benjamin's *Selected Writings* has become an academic best-seller. His critique of progress and optimistic illusions, his attempt to reconstruct theory through the assimilation of seemingly mutually exclusive traditions, his skepticism concerning traditional foundations and universal claims, and his preoccupation with subjectivity, produced a transformation of the entire critical project. Benjamin's work spoke directly to many on the left who, following the collapse of the social and cultural movements associated with the 1960s, felt they were living in an age of "ruins." Above all, however, his inability to decide whether to emigrate to Israel or the United States and his subsequent tragic death in 1940, while attempting to flee the Nazi invasion of France, put a particularly dramatic stamp on his life and the experience of exile.

Exile marked the work of the institute. Horkheimer, in fact, only coined the term "critical theory" in 1937, after having fled to the United States. His seminal essay on the subject, "Traditional and Critical Theory," treated it as an approach qualitatively different from "vulgar" materialism – that is to say positivism or behaviorism – and metaphysical idealism. Following the approach developed in the classic works of unorthodox "western Marxists" like *Marxism and Philosophy* by Karl Korsch and *History and Class Consciousness* by Georg Lukács, Horkheimer insisted that critical theory should be understood neither as a philosophical system nor a fixed set of proscriptions. He instead viewed it as a method of liberation, a cluster of themes or concerns that would express an explicit interest in the abolition of social injustice and the psychological, cultural, and political reasons why the international proletarian revolution failed following the events of 1917 in Russia. With the publication of "Authority and the Family" (1934), for example, Horkheimer sought to analyze how a patriarchal familial structure inhibited the development of revolutionary consciousness among workers. "The Jews and Europe" (1938) insisted that confronting bigotry called for confronting economic exploitation; or, as Horkheimer put the matter in his essay, "he who wishes to speak of anti-Semitism must also speak of capitalism." Works like these set the stage for a new mode of "dialectical" thinking – a version

of Marxism – that went beyond the economic interests of classes and elites as well as the institutional dynamics of the state.

Reactionary sexual mores, mass culture, the division of labor, and the need to grasp the universal through the particular would prove essential themes for the institute. Deeper issues mired in the anthropology of human existence also became matters of concern for critical theory. Indeed, the need for a response to them turned critical theory into an ongoing threat to the stultifying dogma and collectivism of "actually existing socialism." In the spirit of Marxism, critical theory leveled an attack on all ideological and institutional forms of oppression, including those justified by Marxism itself. Critical theory was – from the first – intended to foster critical reflection, a capacity for fantasy, and new forms of political action in an increasingly bureaucratized world.

Most members of the institute remained suspicious of the different ways in which supposedly neutral formulations of science veiled repressive social interests. That is why they employed a methodological approach indebted to both the "critique of ideology" (*Ideologiekritik*) that derived from German idealism and the sociology of knowledge whose actual source is Marx. Ideals of freedom and liberation thus provided the basis for the social critique of the existing order. In the United States, however, the character of this engagement changed dramatically from that of the early days. The most compelling reasons were connected with the failure of the proletarian revolution, the increasingly stark reality of totalitarianism, and the looming shadow of McCarthyism.

Major scholars associated with the institute – albeit often at the fringes – added much to an understanding of the ideological forces behind the new totalitarian phenomenon and its structure. Its emergence in Germany was analyzed in diverse works of an interdisciplinary character. *Escape from Freedom* (1941) by Erich Fromm, which proved enormously popular, analyzed the psychological appeal of Nazi totalitarianism. Siegfried Kracauer, who was close to Adorno and Benjamin, offered what became a classic examination of German film in the Weimar Republic entitled *From Caligari to Hitler* (1947). In a more social scientific vein, Otto Kirchheimer contributed *Political Justice* (1961) and Franz Neumann *Behemoth* (1942), the first

significant work that analyzed the structure of the Nazi state. Horkheimer himself edited a five-volume work, *Studies in Prejudice* (1949), for the American Jewish Committee, while Adorno led a team of researchers in producing the classic *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950). In the context of the United States, both looking backward to the 1930s and forward to McCarthyism, it is also useful to consider *Prophets of Deceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator* (1948) by Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman, as well as Lowenthal's work on American anti-Semitism, *Images of Prejudice* (1945).

Following the Hitler-Stalin Pact that unleashed World War II, the proletarian revolution ceased to serve as the ultimate aim of the critical enterprise. The working class lost its standing as "the revolutionary subject" of history and the Frankfurt School no longer saw its interests as sufficient for generating a critique of the status quo. A new phase in the development of critical theory began with the completion of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944), including a sensational last chapter "Elements of Anti-Semitism," in 1947. Horkheimer and Adorno, its authors, called into question the old belief in progress, science, and the benefits of modernity. They insisted that by privileging mathematical reason, the Enlightenment not only assaulted reactionary forms of religious dogma, but also, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the more progressive normative ways of thinking. Scientific rationality divorced from ethical concerns was indeed seen as culminating in the number tattooed on the arm of the concentration camp inmate.

Dialectic of Enlightenment offers less the vision of a better world emerging from the Enlightenment than one increasingly defined by the "commodity form" and bureaucratic rationality, in which the individual is stripped of conscience and spontaneity. Stalinism on the left, Nazism on the right, and an increasingly bureaucratic and robotic mass society emerging in the United States: mass society, the horror of war, and – perhaps above all – the concentration camp universe inspired this book. The new reality demanded a significant revision in the more traditional understandings of critical and radical theory.

Communism had turned into a nightmare, Nazism was even worse, social democracy had been integrated into the status quo, and liberalism – with its emphasis upon the abstract individual

of the social contract – had seemingly become anachronistic. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the possibility of revolutionary transformation faded in the face of an apparently seamless bureaucratic order buttressed by the "culture industry" intent on eliminating subjectivity and any genuinely critical opposition to the status quo. This development is what required a rethinking of the usually positive view that progressives had traditionally accorded the Enlightenment. Not the *philosophe* or the political critic but the bohemian intellectual, who challenged society in its entirety, was seen as embodying whatever emancipatory hope existed for the future. Thus, for the proponents of critical theory, it had become necessary to supplement the dialectical framework of Hegel and Marx with the more modernist and subjectivist tenets of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in combating the collectivist strains within advanced industrial society.

To put it another way, it was now incumbent upon a genuinely critical theory to draw the consequences of the ways in which civilization in general, and modernity in particular, were flawed from the beginning. The critical theory of society would thus require a more directly anthropological form of inquiry. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, indeed, it was now necessary to highlight not the needs of some class-bound and collectivist "revolutionary subject" like the proletariat, but the ways in which individual subjectivity might resist the conformity generated by an increasingly administered and culturally barbaric universe. Political resistance thus made way for a philosophico-aesthetic assertion of subjectivity in *Negative Dialectics* (1966) and *Aesthetic Theory* (1970), two monumental works by Theodor Adorno, while Max Horkheimer emphasized a philosophico-religious understanding of resistance in *The Longing for the Totally Other* (1970).

Theodor Adorno was probably the most talented proponent of this new turn in critical theory. His interests extended from musicology and literary analysis to sociology, meta-psychology, and philosophy. The only real disciple of Benjamin, the inventor of "negative dialectics," Adorno's work shows a rare standard of intellectual brilliance, including extraordinary studies on modern music, a masterpiece that transformed aesthetic theory, and *Minima Moralia: Reflections of a Damaged Life* (1947). Adorno's work exemplifies

the abstruse style that has become identified with the Frankfurt School.

The heritage of dialectical philosophy surely had an impact on its formation, and the use of complex concepts employed often demanded a complex articulation. Especially in the ideologically charged context of the war and its aftermath, however, members of the institute also self-consciously employed an "Aesopian" form of writing. As exiles living in the United States, they sought to hide their indebtedness to Marx by substituting the highly abstract language of Hegel. But there is something else that needs to be taken seriously when thinking about the style of Adorno and Horkheimer. Their famous analysis of the culture industry developed in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, written while they were living in Los Angeles, implied that popularity would necessarily "neutralize" whatever critical or emancipatory messages a work might retain. Nevertheless, there was nothing ambivalent about the willingness of Erich Fromm – or Herbert Marcuse – to engage the public in a radical fashion.

Fromm was surely the most lucid stylist to emerge from the institute. He was also the most popular and, arguably, the most loyal to its original purpose insofar as he always sought to link theory with the practical demands of social change and individual transformation. Fromm grew up orthodox and he studied with some of the leading rabbis in Europe. His dissertation dealt with the Jewish Diaspora and another of his early works with the Sabbath. The psychoanalytic institute he founded in Berlin with his first wife, Frieda Reichmann, soon became known as the Torah-peutikum. His interest in the psychological appeal and ethical impulse provided by religion, indeed, never fully disappeared.

Erich Fromm was initially one of the most influential members of the institute and a close friend of Horkheimer. His concern was with how psychological attitudes mediated the relation between the individual and society. Even during the 1920s he was intent upon linking Freud with Marx. For this reason, when Adorno first insisted on developing an anthropological critique of civilization from the standpoint of Freud's instinct theory, he clashed with Fromm. The dazzling newcomer won the battle. Fromm divorced himself from the institute by 1940 and he proceeded to write a number of bestsellers, including *Escape from Freedom*. Quickly enough,

his former colleagues condemned him for the "superficial" quality of his writings even while his influence soared among left-wing intellectuals and a broader public from the 1950s to the 1970s.

As for Herbert Marcuse, while in the United States he not only worked with the Office of Strategic Services as an expert on West European politics, but also wrote papers on totalitarianism and, in 1958, published a highly respected study entitled *Soviet Marxism*. In spite of his penchant for utopian thought, so prominent in *Eros and Civilization* (1955), Marcuse also remained faithful to the original practical impulse of critical theory. His most influential work, *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), actually anticipated the seminal role of the new social movements and a radical cultural politics in responding to the bureaucracy, commodification, and conformism of advanced industrial society. Pessimism concerning the future of a society in which all radical alternatives were being absorbed, and all ideological contradictions were being flattened out, combined with a utopian vision built upon the radical humanism of the young Marx, the "play" principle of Schiller, and the meta-psychology of Freud. This tension, indeed, permeated all of Marcuse's writings.

The popularity of Fromm and Marcuse in the United States contrasted strikingly with a virtually total ignorance of the work produced by the rest of the Frankfurt School. The legend that critical theory inspired the movement of the 1960s is, certainly in America, misleading; its major works were translated only in the 1970s. During that decade journals like *Telos* and *New German Critique* helped in publicizing its ideas and the works of its most important representatives. In Europe, however, the influence of the Frankfurt School on the partisans of 1968 was strong. Its emphasis upon alienation, the domination of nature, the regressive components of progress, the mutability of human nature, and the stultifying effects of the culture industry and advanced industrial society made the enterprise relevant for young intellectuals who had come of age through "the movement" of the 1960s.

Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, however, were appalled by what they had helped inspire. Following their return to Germany, the former became rector and the latter, somewhat later, a dean at the University of Frankfurt. It is somewhat ironic that these new stalwarts of the establishment should have anticipated the

movement's concern with a "cultural revolution" and the transformation of everyday life demanded by so many of their students. These themes were as real for many activists of the 1960s, both in Europe and the United States, as the quest for racial justice and the anti-imperialist opposition to the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, these themes lost their salience in the general malaise that followed the collapse of the movement and the emergence of a neo-conservative assault upon what has been called the "adversary culture."

A new set of academic radicals embraced instead the "deconstructive" and radically subjectivist elements in the thinking of the Frankfurt School in general and in the work of Adorno and Benjamin in particular, with their emphasis upon the fragmentary character of reality, the illusion of progress, and the need to substitute experimental cultural for political resistance. All this fit the time in which radicalism retreated from the streets into the university. Critical theory of this new "deconstructive" or "poststructuralist" sort invaded the most prestigious journals and disciplines, ranging from anthropology and film to religion, linguistics, and political science. Elements of it have, indeed, become features of the very society that the Frankfurt School ostensibly wished to challenge.

But if it is to remain relevant, especially in the United States, critical theory must begin taming its metaphysical excesses, mitigating its subjectivism, and affirming its repressed political character. These concerns inform much of the work undertaken by Jürgen Habermas, the brilliant student of Horkheimer and Adorno, who came to maturity in the aftermath of World War II. Of particular interest, in this vein, is his *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (1985). Habermas was never in exile: he experienced the impact of totalitarianism directly in his youth and it left him with a profound respect for the liberal political legacy, the "public sphere," and the repressed possibilities of "communicative action." Habermas has also gained a large academic following in the United States. Nevertheless, his work provides an important beginning for resurrecting the critical undertaking.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W. (1903–1969); Arendt, Hannah (1906–1975); Benjamin, Walter (1892–1940); Frankfurt School (Jewish Emigrés); Fromm, Erich (1900–1980); Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831); Lukács, Georg (1885–1971); Marcuse, Herbert (1898–1979); Marx, Karl (1818–1883)

References and Suggested Readings

- Adorno, T., Lukács, G., Brecht, B., Benjamin, W., & Bloch, E. (2007) *Aesthetics and Politics*. London: Verso.
- Bokina, J. & Lukes, T. J. (Eds.) (1984) *Marcuse: From the New Left to the Next Left*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Bronner, S. E. (1994) *Of Critical Theory and Its Theorists*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Held, D. (1980) *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jay, M. (1996) *Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658)

Annette Richardson

Oliver Cromwell was a Puritan member of parliament and leader of the forces that overthrew the monarchy during the English Civil War. Following the king's execution, Cromwell became Lord Protector of England from 1652 until his death in 1658.

Oliver Cromwell was born on April 25, 1599 in Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire to Robert and Catherine Cromwell. He attended the Puritan-oriented Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, but did not obtain a degree, for he was called home following his father's death. Cromwell married Elizabeth Bourchier in 1620 and had nine children. After struggling financially, he became wealthy in 1636 by inheriting his uncle's sizable estate and two positions as tax collector at Holy Trinity and St. Mary's parishes. In 1628 he was elected to parliament for Cambridge City and soon gained notoriety for his radicalism. Following numerous disputes over authority, King Charles I dissolved parliament in March 1629, and Cromwell suffered a nervous breakdown in 1630, emerging from it with a strong Puritan radicalism.

The long-term causes for the English Civil War were political, economic, and religious. The short-term cause was King Charles I's recall of parliament in April 1640, after an 11-year hiatus, to raise taxes to fight the Scots, who vigorously opposed the Anglican High Church policies imposed by Archbishop of Canterbury William Laud. Members of parliament saw their chance for retribution against the king's abuse of power.



Cromwell is depicted leading a charge after being wounded in his right arm at the Battle of Marston Moor, July 2, 1644. Cromwell is a controversial figure, admired as a hero of liberty by some and decried as a dictator by others. His particularly bloody Irish campaign from 1649 to 1650 made him a hated figure in Ireland. From Illustrations of English and Scottish History, Volume 1, engraving by Abraham Cooper. (Private Collection, Ken Welsh/ The Bridgeman Art Library)

The “Long Parliament” was convened in November 1640. Members of parliament were not seeking a revolution, but rather a king who reigned with parliament’s consent. Charles I, however, believed in the divine right of kings and unsuccessfully tried to have five members of parliament arrested on August 22, 1642. Religious differences divided the Parliamentarians and Civil War began in August 1642. Cromwell zealously supported parliament, strongly opposing the Anglican High Church and the restrictions it placed on non-followers and radical Puritans like himself. He believed in liberty of conscience and tolerance in religious observance.

Armed conflict emerged between the Royalists (or Cavaliers) supporting Charles I, particularly popular in Wales and the West Country, and the Parliamentarians (or Roundheads), who received support in London, the Midlands, and the Southeast. Cromwell quickly realized the Parliamentarians lacked a strong organized army. At age 43 he had neither military training nor experience, but soon found he was an innate soldier with natural leadership qualities. He trained his cavalry forces rigidly and his troops, mostly farmers, carried body armor, a pistol, and a sword. Cromwell insisted the Parliamentarian New Model Army had adequate supplies and were paid monthly through a levy on farmers under parliament’s control. The New Model Army soon excelled among the armies on the European continent.

Cromwell was appointed Lieutenant General in June 1644, and the Parliamentarians won the decisive Battle of Marston Moor on July 2, 1644, thereafter controlling northern England. Marston Moor established Cromwell’s military reputation. Cromwell was exempted from the Self Denying Ordinance, which denied members of parliament command in the army or navy in 1645 and repeatedly had his 40-day commissions renewed. The three largest parliamentary armies were united, and Cromwell became temporary commander. The New Model Army decisively won the Battle of Naseby, Northampton on June 14, 1645 against Charles I’s nephew, Prince Rupert of the Palatinate. The Royalists were never able to recuperate. Charles I surrendered at Oxford and was made a prisoner of parliament until his escape on November 11, 1647.

In 1647 Cromwell, who had become more radical, sided with the Parliamentarians against Charles I, who urged the Scots to rise against the Parliamentarians. In December 1647 Thomas Pride, establishing what became known as the Rump Parliament, removed the majority of Royalists from parliament and retained those loyal to the radicals. Cromwell was lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief of the New Model Army when the Second Civil War began in May 1648. Cromwell soundly defeated the Royalists at Preston in August 1648.

Following the Second Civil War, Cromwell’s role in the trial and execution of Charles I was paramount. Cromwell had hoped unsuccessfully for an abdication and that one of Charles I’s sons would take the throne. After being found guilty at a trial for treason against the nation, with a parliamentary vote of 59 to 1, Charles was beheaded at the Palace of Whitehall in London on January 30, 1649. A Commonwealth of England was declared with a council of state.

In 1649 Cromwell soundly defeated parliament’s enemies in Ireland when he and his 12,000 men besieged Drogheda, near Dublin, in September 1649, massacring 3,000 people in revenge for the killing of Protestants in Ulster during the 1641 Irish Rebellion. Some 2,000 Irish people were then mercilessly murdered at Wexford in October, and Cromwell banned Catholicism in Ireland. He confiscated 40 percent of the Catholic-owned land, redistributing it to Englishmen through the Act of Settlement of Ireland of 1652. He then invaded Scotland in 1650, shortly after 20-year-old Charles, eldest son of Charles I, was

proclaimed king of Scotland. Cromwell defeated Charles at Dunbar and at Worcester, forcing the prince to flee to the European mainland.

The disparate interest groups no longer had a common enemy once Charles I was removed. Consequently, Cromwell lost the unanimous support he had enjoyed. The Rump Parliament and the 41-member council of state had stagnated. Cromwell dissolved it in April 1653 by military force. He then summoned the Nominated Parliament of some 140 persons (also known as the Barebones Parliament) that sat from July to December 1653.

Cromwell was appointed Lord Protector in December 1653, refusing to take the title of king. As Lord Protector he was served by a council of state and parliament. England was accorded a written constitution known as the Instrument of Government. In 1657 Cromwell's powers were redefined with the Humble Petition and Advice, which gave him more power than Charles I ever enjoyed. While Lord Protector, Cromwell practiced intolerance toward the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church. However, recognizing Jewish contributions to the economic success of Holland, Cromwell encouraged the return of Jews to England.

Cromwell died on September 3, 1658 of malarial fever and was initially buried in Westminster Abbey. Cromwell's son Richard succeeded him briefly until he was forced to resign in 1659. The following year, parliament recalled Charles II as king, ending the period known as the Interregnum. In 1661, after the Restoration, Cromwell's body was exhumed and suffered a posthumous execution. His body was mutilated and his severed head was displayed on a pike outside Westminster Abbey until 1685. Cromwell's head was eventually buried in the grounds of Sidney Sussex College in Cambridge.

SEE ALSO: English Revolution, 17th Century; English Revolution, Radical Sects

References and Suggested Readings

- Ashley, M. (1958) *The Greatness of Oliver Cromwell*. New York: Macmillan.
- Firth, C. (1901) *Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of the Puritans in England*. London: Putnam.
- Fraser, A. (2002) *Cromwell: Our Chief of Men*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Hill, C. (1970) *God's Englishman*. London: Penguin.
- McMains, H. F. (1999) *The Death of Oliver Cromwell*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

Cuauhtémoc (1502–1525)

Leticia Pacheco Espejel

Cuauhtémoc was the son of Ahuizol and an unknown mother. When Ahuizol died in 1502, Cuauhtémoc's mother oversaw his education until he entered Calmécac, the school of the nobles, at the age of 15. At Calmécac he was educated in military matters and religion under strict discipline in order to prepare him for assuming power as governor of Tenochtitlán.

As governor in 1520, Cuauhtémoc had to defend himself and his people against the Spaniards, who had been welcomed by Moctezuma that same year. In accordance with the prophecies, Moctezuma insisted on awaiting the arrival of Quetzalcóatl, the plumed snake. As he hoped to face Quetzalcóatl, Moctezuma and his men handed over the city to Hernán Cortés without any resistance. The Spaniards arrested Moctezuma and set Tenochtitlán ablaze, destroying the idols and pillaging the temples. Cuauhtémoc was left to lead the defense of Tenochtitlán, and his strong resistance against the domination of the Spaniards made history.

When Cortés returned to Cempoála in 1520 he sent Pánfilo der Narváez to confront Cuauhtémoc's troops. Realizing he was facing inevitable disaster, he pressed the imprisoned Moctezuma to go to Cuauhtémoc and his allies to order them to divest themselves of arms. All attempts to stop the rebellion were, however, futile. Finally, Cortés decided to leave Tenochtitlán for Tlaxcala. During the night of June 30, 1520, he was defeated at Popotla, together with a small group of Tlaxcaltecas who fought with him. This incident has become known as the sad night. Cortés, however, succeeded in arriving at Tlaxcala, where he found shelter. In the meantime, Moctezuma had died in Tenochtitlán and was replaced by Cuitláhuac, whose rule was cut short by an epidemic of smallpox, a disease that was completely unknown in the region before the arrival of the Spaniards.

On November 25, 1520, Cuauhtémoc decided to prepare for the Spaniards' possible return. Consequently, he reorganized the army and worked to gain the loyalty of prisoners by reducing the tributes they had to pay during war. One year later Cortés came back to Tenochtitlán with a heavily armed and well-trained army

composed of Tlaxcaltecas, indigenous enemies of the Mexicas, who succeeded in conquering Tenochtitlán after fighting against Cuauhtémoc and his army for 75–80 days.

On August 13, 1521, Cuauhtémoc was arrested and tortured in Tlatelolco. Cortés wanted to find Moctezuma's treasure and ordered Cuauhtémoc's feet to be set on fire. The location of the treasure had always been a matter of discussion, and it is still unknown whether it ever existed or is just a myth. But there is no doubt that Cuauhtémoc survived these tortures, mainly due to the discipline and training he had received at Calmécac.

In 1524 Cortés learned that one of his captains, Christobal de Olid, who had remained in Honduras, was conspiring against him, together with Diego de Velazques, to conquer the south of the new continent and take possession of the region's wealth. Cortés decided to hunt down de Olid and take him prisoner. The year-long expedition to Honduras included not only Spaniards but also Mexicas, with Cuauhtémoc among them, since his diplomacy was needed to prevent conflicts with other tribes on the way to Honduras. Nevertheless, Cortés was consumed by fear that Cuauhtémoc would kill him and resume power in Tenochtitlán and other capitals before they found de Olid. Thus, on February 28, 1525, in Campeche, Cortés ordered the death by strangulation of Cuauhtémoc and his presumed accomplices.

SEE ALSO: Imperialism, Historical Evolution; Mexico, Indigenous and Peasant Struggles, 1980s–Present

References and Suggested Readings

Diccionario Porrúa (1976) Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa.
Enciclopedia de México (1987) Vol. 4. Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación Pública.

Cuba, anti-racist movement and the Partido Independiente de Color

Aline Helg

Cuba's Partido Independiente de Color (Independent Party of Color, 1908–12) stands out as

the first black political party in the western hemisphere. Formed by Afro-Cuban veterans of Cuba's war of independence to struggle for full racial integration in the republic, it rapidly gained thousands of supporters, threatening the white-dominated two-party political system. As a result, Cuban Congress outlawed the black party in 1910 and, as its members protested to regain legality in 1912, the Cuban army launched the racist massacre of 1912 that left thousands of Afro-Cubans dead and put an end to the party.

The Partido Independiente de Color continued a long tradition of anti-racist struggles in Cuba, linked to the rapid development of racial slavery after 1770, in a hemispheric context of rising abolitionism and equal rights. As shown by the 1812 Aponte rebellion and the 1844 Conspiracy of La Escalera, numerous Afro-Cubans then formed associations and planned rebellions against slavery and Spanish colonialism that united the free and the enslaved, mulattos and blacks, the Cuban and the African born.

Following the terrible repression of La Escalera, many Afro-Cubans joined Cuba's first independence war initiated by planters in the eastern province of Oriente in 1868. Free blacks and mulattos as well as fugitive slaves rapidly made up the majority of the patriot troops, some of them, such as mulatto leader Antonio Maceo, becoming outstanding leaders and pressuring for abolition as much as for independence. After the failure of the Ten Year War in 1878, many slaves and free persons of color continued the struggle against slavery and racial inequality using legal means such as the purchase of freedom and lawsuits. Although Spain finally abolished slavery in 1886, Cuban society remained deeply divided along racial lines, with no public policy helping the former slaves. Thus, Afro-Cubans renewed their struggle for equal rights and against racial segregation, taking some cases up to the Royal Supreme Court in Madrid. The Directorio Central de Sociedades de la Raza de Color, under mulatto journalist Juan Gualberto Gómez, guided the movement. In addition, Gómez and others published newspapers that challenged racism.

When Cuban insurgents launched a new War for Independence in 1895, the rebellion fully succeeded only in Oriente, the region with a significant population of African descent and a tradition of struggle against Spain. Again, blacks joined the insurgency *en masse* from its

beginning, galvanized by the leadership of Maceo and attracted by José Martí's anti-racist social agenda. In the process, many of them increased their expectations regarding their position once independence would be achieved, despite the fact that, not surprisingly, racism did not vanish from social relations among rebels. After Maceo's death in late 1896, Afro-Cuban officers were increasingly marginalized. The US 1898 military intervention and occupation until 1902 further discriminated against Afro-Cubans, who kept a low profile while expecting better times after independence.

By then, Afro-Cubans made up approximately one-third of Cuba's population. The first Cuban government of the Moderate Tomás Estrada Palma, from 1902 to 1906, continued to show prejudice against them in public employment and the armed forces. As under Spain, entertainment, transportation, hotels, restaurants, prisons, and hospitals were segregated. Although blacks and mulattos had access to public elementary schools, most secondary schools were private and refused students of color, making their entrance to the university exceptional. The Spanish criminal code, which considered African ancestry as an aggravating circumstance, remained in force. Although a small lower-middle class of skilled people of color subsisted, particularly in some manual trades or as musicians and artists, distinguished professions, such as lawyer or medical doctor, counted hardly any Afro-Cuban practitioner. Positions in commerce generally remained in the hands of Spaniards. Conversely, black and mulatto men were overrepresented in subordinate occupations, such as day laborer and servant, in construction, and in the seasonal work of cane cutting. In the countryside, fewer Afro-Cuban peasants were able to own or rent land than whites. Afro-Cuban women dominated female wage labor, because the survival of many Afro-Cuban families depended on women's work (Fuente 2001: 116).

To make things worse, at a time when social Darwinism and pseudoscientific racism were almost hegemonic, the Estrada Palma government decided to subsidize Spanish immigration in order to whiten the Cuban population. This policy brought tens of thousands of young Spanish men into Cuba, who pushed black and mulatto men further on the sidelines of the labor market. Moreover, the government launched a campaign of repression against Afro-Cuban

religions (*santería* and *palo monte*) under the label of witchcraft and cannibalism, which promoted the fearful stereotype of the African sorcerer. Simultaneously, it declared that the 1901 Cuban Constitution, by declaring all Cubans equal and granting universal male suffrage, had solved the "racial question." Thus, if Afro-Cubans were still marginalized it was due to their lack of "merits." Some black politicians, such as Rafael Serra, began to criticize state policies and racism in their newspapers (Helg 1995: 103–37).

In 1906 the Moderate Party attempted to remain in power unconstitutionally through violence and fraud. In protest, the Liberals launched the August Revolution, which rapidly rallied 25,000 followers, mostly veterans and Afro-Cubans, organized in a Constitutional Army. This rebellion prompted the second US military occupation (1906–9), during which every faction lobbied in order to secure power after the US withdrawal.

Increasingly frustrated since 1898, many Afro-Cubans then began to protest by issuing pamphlets, forming "committees of veterans of color," and publicly demonstrating. They claimed that, because they had been overrepresented in the independence wars and had died for the nation's freedom in much larger numbers than whites, they could no longer accept discrimination in the republic they had largely contributed to create. Moreover, it was intolerable for them to see white Cubans who had not taken part in the liberation struggle or, worse, Spanish immigrants, take most jobs. In 1908, in the midst of this wave of anti-racist protest, a group of Afro-Cuban veterans, led by Liberal contractor Evaristo Estenoz and Moderate veterinarian Pedro Ivonnet, founded the Partido Independiente de Color (Helg 1995: 142–7).

Despite its name, the Partido Independiente de Color sought, through the election of its candidates in democratic elections, the integration of Afro-Cubans in society and their participation in government "in order to be well governed." Its political program addressed only a few issues directly related to race: it demanded an end to segregation and racial discrimination, equal access for Afro-Cubans to positions in public service and the diplomatic corps, and an end to the ban on "non-white" immigration. Most of the other demands aimed at improving the conditions of the popular classes regardless of race: increasing compulsory free education from eight to

fourteen years; free technical, secondary, and university education; state control of private schools; abolition of the death penalty; reform of the judicial and penitentiary systems; the eight-hour work day; priority for Cubans in employment; and the distribution of national lands to Cubans. As *Previsión*, the party's newspaper, summarized, "Our motto for the time being is 'Cuba for the Cubans,' our profession of faith, state liberalism" (Portuondo 2002: 37–52).

After the end of the second US occupation in 1909, the Liberals gained power, with their white leader José Miguel Gómez as Cuba's new president, raising the expectations of social policies and a share in public jobs among the Afro-Cuban followers of the August Revolution. The Partido Independiente de Color formed committees throughout the island and saw its membership grow accordingly. By early 1910 it claimed a total of 60,000 members, among whom were 15,000 veterans, no doubt inflated figures as they would have constituted 44 percent of all Afro-Cuban voters. Nevertheless, historical research has shown that the party then counted between 10,000 and 20,000 supporters, blacks and mulattos alike and mostly from the peasantry and the working class – an impressive score for an organization in existence less than two years (Fernández Robaina 1990: 96–100; Helg 1995: 155–7). This success immediately worried the leaders of Cuba's main political parties, above all the Liberal Party of President Gómez, which had a large Afro-Cuban constituency. By early 1910, a year of congressional elections in which control of the black vote was crucial, Liberal and Moderate bosses moved from mockery to false accusations and repression. The Independent leaders themselves contributed to the escalation by mixing conciliatory messages to the political establishment with inflammatory calls to their supporters to respond with violence to racist provocations. In February 1910 *Previsión* was seized and Estenoz sentenced to prison but quickly released. Simultaneously, the Liberals proposed an amendment to the electoral law, astutely presented by the only senator who was Afro-Cuban, banning the Partido Independiente de Color on the grounds that, in representing only the interests of the Afro-Cubans, it discriminated against whites and thus violated the equality guaranteed by the Constitution.

In order to secure the approval of this amendment, the Liberals spread the rumor that the

Independientes were plotting a conspiracy to massacre whites and transform Cuba into a black republic, like Haïti. Hundreds of Afro-Cubans, among them the leaders of the Partido Independiente de Color, were arrested and jailed across the island, and 220 of them transferred to the central prison in Havana. When alleged conspirators filled the prisons, the Cuban Congress approved the amendment banning the Partido Independiente de Color. Although the defendants won a verdict of not guilty in late 1910, they could not erase from public opinion the false accusations launched against them. And their party was now illegal. Discouraged and impoverished after months in custody, some Independientes gave up their membership. A majority, nevertheless, decided to mobilize for the relegalization of their party in view of the November 1912 general elections. They attempted to negotiate a compromise with President Gómez, to gain the support of the Moderates, and even to obtain US assistance, but with no avail (Helg 1995: 164–91).

Finally, on May 20, 1912, the Partido Independiente de Color launched an armed protest in Oriente so that the president would pressure Congress to relegalize their party. In Cuba under the Platt Amendment, the *protesta armada*, or show of force, had been used as a political tactic by several interest groups. In effect, by providing the ground for a US intervention to protect foreign life and property, armed demonstrations usually attracted the attention of the US State Department and forced the Cuban government to make concessions (Pérez 1986: 97, 147). However, despite their experience of racist repression in 1910, the Independientes did not anticipate that, in their case, such a tactic would prompt a racist massacre.

Indeed, the Cuban political elite immediately branded the protest as a "race war" launched by the Partido Independiente de Color against the island's whites. Instead of negotiating, President Gómez sent the army and the rural guard as well as hundreds of white volunteers to exterminate the Independientes in the name of civilization. The United States disembarked 450 Marines to protect US-owned plantations. The Cuban Congress suspended constitutional guarantees. Although the Independientes had not committed any violence, the army and the volunteers began massive killings on May 26. With the party members escaping to Oriente's mountains, they increasingly gunned or chopped down

Afro-Cuban peasant women, men, and children. In addition, racist propaganda reached the extremes of virulence and scale, with the theme of the defense of white civilization against black or African barbarism dominating the press. The misrepresentation of the armed protest as a race war allowed for the indiscriminate use of racist and dehumanizing stereotypes, such as those of the bloodthirsty black beast, the black rapist of white women, and the black fanatic sorcerer. The slaughter lasted two months. The exact number of Afro-Cuban dead will never be known: over 2,000 according to the army, 5,000 in the eyes of an Independiente survivor, and 6,000 in those of a US observer. Among them were Estenoz and Ivonnet, captured and shot at point-blank range, their corpses then publicly displayed. Repression was not limited to Oriente, but spread to the whole island. Everywhere, men of African origin became suspects as a result of the conversion of the armed protest into a race war. Many were arrested, others lost their jobs, some died victims of white posses or riots. Most foreign witnesses supported the killings, except the French consul in Santiago de Cuba who lamented “the St Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of black people” in Cuba and was expelled for his criticism. In Congress the few Afro-Cuban representatives who expressed concern were accused of complicity with the Independientes and rapidly silenced. Some social essayists celebrated the slaughter as the triumph of white Cubans over an inferior race doomed to vanish (Helg 1995: 194–248).

Indeed, the massacre of 1912 signified the end of the Partido Independiente de Color and dealt a long-lasting blow to Afro-Cubans, who subsequently struggled within existing political parties and labor unions rather than in their own organizations.

After Portuondo’s study in 1950, as Fidel Castro’s Revolution claimed that socialism and the end of US imperialism had brought “the definitive solution to the black problem in Cuba” (Serviat 1986), the Partido Independiente de Color attracted only a few historians who neglected the development of the party in 1910–12 and tended to present it as group of disgruntled middle-class veterans. They also ignored the tragic racist massacre of 1912, minimized under the name of “the little war of 1912,” because it questioned Cuban racial democracy. Since 1990, in line with new interest in Afro-Latin America,

historians have begun to stress the rapid growth of the party and the political significance of its socioeconomic agenda, as well as the magnitude of the 1912 wave of anti-black violence. More recently, some studies have examined the process in regions other than Oriente. The party and the massacre have also become the focus of unprecedented historical interest in Cuba itself.

SEE ALSO: Cuba, Struggle for Independence from Spain, 1868–1898; Martí, José (1853–1895) and the Partido Revolucionario Cubano

References and Suggested Readings

- Childs, M. D. (2006) *The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the Struggle Against Atlantic Slavery*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Fernández Robaina, T. (1990) *El negro en Cuba, 1902–1958. Apuntes para la historia de la lucha contra la discriminación racial*. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
- Ferrer, A. (1999) *Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868–1898*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Fuente, A. de la (2001) *A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Helg, A. (1995) *Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality, 1886–1912*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Paquette, R. L. (1988) *Sugar Is Made with Blood: The Conspiracy of La Escalera and the Conflict between Empires over Slavery in Cuba*. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.
- Pérez, L. A., Jr. (1986) *Cuba under the Platt Amendment, 1902–1934*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Portuondo Linares, S. (1950/2002) *Los Independientes de Color. Historia del Partido Independiente de Color*. Havana: Editorial Caminos.
- Serviat, P. (1986) *El problema negro en Cuba y su solución definitiva*. Havana: Empresa Poligráfica del CC del PCC.

Cuba, general strikes under Batista regime, 1952–1958

Mike Gonzalez

Fulgencio Batista, who led the sergeants’ revolt of 1933, had become the dominant presence in Cuban political life by the following year. He was not himself elected to office until 1940, but

he largely controlled and shaped events in the intervening years through others. Thus he supported the government of Guiteras and Grau San Martín which took power (so to speak) in September 1933 with the express intention of realizing the radical demands of the movements of that year. Batista's sights were set on a future relationship with the United States, which was resolutely opposed to the Guiteras–Grau coalition – though the US ambassador had been happy enough to sit on his hands while Machado fell. Batista knew that his project would not prosper while the radicals were in power, so he engineered the situation to have them replaced by Colonel Mendieta, head of the right-wing Unión Nacionalista (Nationalist Union).

Guiteras called for a general strike in defense of the short-lived administration, but there was virtually no response. On January 18, Mendieta was installed in the presidency; Batista for his part had survived his first general strike and could now conduct Cuban affairs from behind a throne whose occupant was entirely beholden to him. The four months of a populist government had given Batista the time to assert his power within the army and to forge an alliance with the US embassy. The abrogation of the Platt Amendment in May 1934 won Mendieta popular support, though the US refused (and still refuses) to surrender their base at Guantánamo.

“In spite of Batista's coup, however, the country was still in revolutionary mood” in 1934 (Gott 2004: 142). Guiteras, its most visible and radical representative, resumed the activities he had been involved in before his brief sojourn in government. *Joven Cuba* returned to the methods of the Directorio, of urban guerilla war and direct action. In March 1935 Guiteras called another general strike. This time a more confident Batista and Mendieta launched a wave of repression, making unions illegal, closing the university, and persecuting the political opposition. It was as if Cuba had returned to the days of Machado. Guiteras, meanwhile, prepared to leave Cuba and instal himself in Mexico, where he would train with others for a future guerilla war. But he was murdered in Matanzas in May 1935, and it would be over 20 years before his plans found another interpreter.

Mendieta fell, to be replaced by new politicians from Batista's stable, but in reality the ex-sergeant's grip was tightening. As the political atmosphere eased, Grau San Martín returned with

a new party, the Auténticos; and the Communist Party reemerged under a new name. It must have seemed at first surprising that the communists should seek alliance with Batista, who had so obviously concentrated power in his own hands and repressed workers' organizations shortly before. But there were two sets of factors at work. First, the communists would have no truck with the nationalist Auténticos, after the recent experience of 1933, but were anxious to gain a political foothold. Second, the international policies of the Comintern, the Communist International, had turned away from the sectarian isolation of the early 1930s towards a policy of seeking alliances with other forces. Batista represented those forces, and the Communist Party was happy enough to support him in exchange for legalization, the publication of their own party newspaper, *Hoy*, and eventually – and crucially – control of the newly formed National Workers' Confederation (*Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba, CTC*).

The unprincipled alliance between the communists and Batista appalled the nationalists and radicals of the movements of 1933, and it would shape the relationship between these political forces throughout the subsequent decades, into and beyond the 1959 revolution. For Batista the purposes of the alliance were clear. In the aftermath of the ferocious repression following the 1935 general strike, and having broken both the trade unions and the left, Batista now moved to reconstruct, from above, a new consensus firmly under his control. The radical nationalists were a spent force after failing in their insurrectionary ambitions, the Cuban ruling classes had exhausted their available representatives and for the moment had no political alternative to offer, and the communists had already placed themselves under his control for entirely opportunistic reasons. Batista could thus move to represent himself as a leader seeking consensus and reconciliation on the model of the New Deal.

The 1940 Constitution was the expression of the new circumstances, and a skillful instrument with which to reinforce and confirm Batista's hegemony. It is a progressive document, providing for a limited working day, pensions and paid holidays, laying the basis for a welfare state, guaranteeing the freedom of association and extending the right to vote to women and all adults over the age of 20. Later movements

would continually refer back to the 1940 Constitution as a democratic point of reference. When Batista attained the presidency in 1940, therefore, it was as a defender of the Constitution and a consensual democrat.

Sugar production and prices rose continuously through the period of World War II, guaranteeing the resources to enable Batista to fulfill his promises to the working-class movement – and ensuring the continuing support of a communist party which was also its beneficiary. But the benefits were not equally distributed and the period also saw a series of strikes, in the sugar industry and on the railways for example, which defied the government and challenged its communist minister of labor. Within the trade unions too there was sustained resistance to communist domination, from the Trotskyist and anarchist left on the one hand, and from the nationalists on the other; they would often find common cause in grassroots trade union committees and local organizations (Tennant 2000).

Batista's expectation that his candidate would, as usual, be elected to the presidency in 1944 was frustrated when Grau San Martín was returned with a sweeping majority, evidence that the spirit of 1933 had not entirely disappeared and that Batista did not hold absolute sway over Cuban political life. The Cuban communists (PSP) were quick to establish new alliances with Grau. Once in power, however, Grau's administration did not differ from the previous regime, continuing both its policies and its corrupt systems of patronage and reward. This prepared the way for his successor, Carlos Prío Socarrás, whose four-year term (1944–8) was characterized by extravagant corruption and the continuation of the often violent repression of the communists in the trade union movement which he had initiated as Grau's minister of labor.

The general disillusionment with Grau and the *Auténticos* was expressed in the popularity of one of the few nationalist political leaders not begrimed by corruption – Eduardo Chibás. His suicide in August 1951 removed the most plausible candidate for the 1952 elections from the scene, leaving Grau as the only available alternative. But in the event, Batista – calculating that he might lose again – took power in a coup which enjoyed fairly wide popular support. After all, he was removing the corrupt and brutal Prío, and he still benefited from an association in the public mind with the progressive Constitution of

1940. Public support, however, was short-lived, as it very quickly became clear that Batista did not represent any real break with the past.

The radical nationalists, the inheritors of Guiteras, moved once again to the center of political opposition. The failed attack on the Moncada barracks in July 1953, led by Fidel Castro, was a sign of things to come. Batista's response to a mounting movement of resistance – embracing armed actions in both the city (including an attempt to assassinate him) and the country, growing working-class activity, and discontent within the armed forces which exploded in the revolt beginning in Cienfuegos in 1957 – was repression. By early 1958 the combination of government corruption, rising prices and repression provoked widespread resentment, culminating in a call for civic resistance issued by the Cuban bishops. From the mountains, and in response to the increasingly radical mood, Fidel Castro issued his "Manifiesto for a total war against tyranny" which included a call for a general strike in early April.

In the event, the strike was a failure. The 26th of July Movement, while it enjoyed support in the cities, had only recently set up its own workers' organization (the FON) and could not claim to have roots within the working-class movement. The Communist Party, by contrast, for all its chequered history, was still strongly based in the trade unions, and still extremely suspicious of Castro movements and all the other radical nationalist groups with which its relationship had been historically so ambivalent and difficult. It was certainly unwilling to allow the 26th of July Movement to take control over the trade unions, and therefore did not support the April strike call. And the movement's members, for their part, were equally hostile to the Communist Party, as Guevara noted with some perplexity.

In a sense this was a general strike based not on mass action from below but on a call from above. While Frank País and the other members of the urban wing of Castro's movement had worked hard, they were essentially subordinate to the demands of the guerillas in the mountains, and it was the mountains that determined the rhythm of events. The failure of the general strike, and the death of País, consolidated that division and that hierarchy. In the few months that remained to Batista, as his support both internal and external began to ebb away, the Communist

Party moved to support Castro's rebel army. The historical suspicions between Castro, the inheritor of the radical nationalism of the 1930s, and the communists remained, however, until their fusion under Castro's control in 1961.

SEE ALSO: Cuba, Struggle for Independence from Spain, 1868–1898; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Machado, Popular Cuban Anti-Government Struggle, 1930s

References and Suggested Readings

- Gott, R. (2004) *Cuba, a New History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Perez, L. (1988) *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Swieg, J. (2002) *Inside the Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tennant, G. (2000) The Hidden Pearl of the Caribbean: Trotskyism in Cuba. *Revolutionary History* 7 (3): 3–277.

Cuba, struggle for independence from Spain, 1868–1898

Diana Espirito Santo

Ten Years' War of 1868–1878: Context, Revolution, and Aftermath

Cuba's first war of independence from Spain, known as the Ten Years' War, lasted from 1868 to 1878, and is understood by historians largely in the context of the Creole islanders' concerns with slavery and the viability of the island's continuity as an economic and social system. For the sugar and coffee plantation elites, slavery constituted the primary vehicle for the production of wealth, but was also to be the system that provoked its eventual crisis and ultimate downfall.

For the first half of the nineteenth century, the educated Cuban Creole elite pursued fervent opposition to independence, but by the 1860s this sentiment began to shift, as Cuba's own social and economic conditions also dramatically changed. Spain was under pressure by British abolitionist policies from the beginning of the century, but not completely acquiesced in practice, despite

the enactment in 1845 of the Law of Abolition and Repression of the Slave Trade in Madrid. Between 1821 and 1831 it is estimated that 60,000 slaves landed in Cuba, while between 1830 and 1850 the average is thought to have been 10,000 a year. Illicit trade was difficult to control, and the colonial authorities could not risk alienating their Creole support base by pursuing its perpetrators or consumers. But the conditions of the treaty did mean that the acquisition of slaves became a more risky, and most importantly, costly business. Slave mortality was appallingly high, and plantation owners were faced with new slave health and maintenance expenses, in part due to Spain's increasing compliance with British decrees. Plantations in the Oriente, the eastern provinces, were particularly ill-equipped technologically, but lacked the funds to purchase more slaves, and in the 1860s revolution, independence, and slave emancipation were less a threat than for those in the west, who sought to continue the system. It was no coincidence that the war began in the east. In 1860, for instance, the 284 sugar mills of the Oriente yielded a meager 9 percent of Cuba's total sugar produce; by scholarly accounts, two thirds of the sugar mills were obsolete for the era, powered by oxen and 20 percent were in the west of the island.

Several factors must be considered as significant sociopolitical backdrops to the Cuban rebellion. One of these was the failure on the part of Spain to appease the Reformers, whose interest was in some form of controlled abolition, or indeed in delaying the end of slavery until owners could be indemnified when it was no longer economically justifiable. Instead, the colonial authorities manipulated Cuban fears that the US planned to annex the island owing to increased economic and cultural influence. They argued if Spanish authority were challenged, slaves would be freed immediately, likely without indemnification.

This placed the elites in a difficult position. But it was clear to most Creoles during the late 1860s that Spain would not manage to hold out much longer against British abolitionist pressures. Slavery in Cuba was coming to an end swiftly. Moreover, the economic crisis that befell planters in the 1850s served to highlight the redundancy of slave labor, for as sugar and coffee farms declined in staggering numbers, so did the need for the enslaved. That European and Chinese mass immigration to the colony ensured

an alternative labor source just added leverage to an already changing labor system. Rising interest rates and soaring debt in the 1860s meant that many previously prosperous slave owners were no longer the proprietors of their own farms or sugar mills, but the *peninsulares* themselves; many were resentful. The final outcome of the American Civil War simply confirmed the inevitable annihilation of this system, adding to it the realization that annexation was not a possible way out after all, unless it came with abolition itself.

Another factor was the instability of Spanish politics, the climate generated by its colonial wars elsewhere, and subsequent reaffirmation of Madrid's conservative policies towards Cuba at a politically crucial moment. In 1865, hoping to avert revolution, the Reformists lobbied for key measures coinciding fortuitously with the rise of a new liberal government in the peninsula, including Cuban political representation in the Spanish parliament, judicial equality with *peninsulares*, and suppression of the slave trade. A Junta de Informacion was organized to provide representation for Cuban Creoles. But with the fall of the O'Donnell ministry in Spain by 1868 these appeals were ignored. General Lersundi introduced a host of repressive measures wreaking havoc on the Cuban populace, including arrests and the closure of the opposition press. The rebels began to conspire with greater determination, gathering in the Masonic lodges of the eastern provinces of Bayamo, Holguin, and Santiago de Cuba. While no unanimous decision was reached within the conspirator camp regarding the fate of slavery, it was Lersundi's aggressive anti-reactionary tactics that ultimately forced them out of hiding and into action.

October 10, 1868 saw the proclamation of Cuban independence, and with it, the establishment of a provisional government, led by the rebels. The revolution began as an act of defiance by the sugar planter and independence leader Carlos Manuel Cespedes – the “Grito de Yara” – at his plantation, the Demajagua, a debt-ridden *ingenio* in Bayamo whose economic obsolescence was a symbol of the precariousness of Cuban society. Cespedes first freed all his slaves and then proceeded to rally them into his newly founded rebel army. His proclamation called for a free Cuba, the end of Spanish institutions, and most importantly the abolition of slavery, which he

saw as incompatible with true freedom. He was named president of the new republic, and the Dominican General Maximo Gomez was appointed as leader of the rebel military forces. In turn, Spain's General Blas Villate and Brigadier Valierano Weyler were charged with crushing the rebellion.

During the first two years of revolution the rebels expanded their support base across the Oriente, into Camaguey and Las Villas. By the early 1870s, historians note, the movement was 40,000-strong throughout Cuba, including members of all social classes and races. Antonio Maceo, the visionary and charismatic mulatto commander, was seen by many to epitomize this new movement. From elite beginnings, the rebellion was transformed into a nationalist struggle. But the fact was that the rebels were still divided on slavery and bringing it to an end. Cespedes was ambiguous on slavery from the start, recognizing that the rebels seeking independence relied on financial and social support of the wealthy planters in the west, many supporting independence without abolition. Getting to the west, however, was to be problematic for the rebels, as the Spanish authorities dug a large trench through Camaguey to prevent access.

Meanwhile, fierce resistance to the rebellion was mounting through “volunteer brigades,” pro-Spanish loyalists and ex-soldiers, described by the historian Hugh Thomas as “middle-class mobs of young men” who would pose just as much a problem for the rebels as they would for the new, more moderate general brought in to replace Lersundi – Domingo Dulce. The *voluntarios* instilled a reign of terror and social upheaval where, together with the colonial commanders, they employed a strategy of mobilizing and evacuating the rural population so as to prevent their complicity with the rebellion. As the war progressed and little was achieved on either side, however, a greater schism in the rebels' leadership and strategy became obvious. Cespedes was removed from office (and later killed by the Spanish in 1874) and replaced by Tomas Estrada Palma, whose government seemed largely to comprise conservative landowners. Gomez and Maceo's primary war device, consisting of setting fire to plantations and freeing slaves, came to be seen as radical and even threatening to these conservatives, who would now settle for reformation rather than independence at great cost.

In 1877 General Arsenio Martínez Campos arrived in Spain with the intention of ending the costly war through force, negotiation, or both. He brought with him military reinforcements and the promise of administrative and political reforms. Amnesty was granted immediately to all those surrendering, and freedom given to the black men participating in the separatist or loyalist armies. Gómez and Maceo refused to surrender, publicly denouncing these terms, as did the more intransigent separatists, but morale was low. A peace agreement was drawn up at Zanjón in February of 1878, proposing a truce. General Maceo mounted one last campaign, known as the Protest of Baragua, renewing the conflict for a further ten weeks. Confined to the eastern interior, and weakened by desertion and death, armed protesters finally agreed to peace with Spain and went into exile. General Calixto García's uprising in the summer of 1879, known as La Guerra Chiquita, ended in failure.

Second War of Independence and the Seed of US Occupation, 1895–1898

The Ten Years' War left thousands of Cuban and Spanish dead and the country in a state of destitution. The world sugar price crisis of the 1880s aggravated this situation for planters, and coffee production spiraled down dramatically. As the plantation aristocracies vanished, North American economic and infrastructural influence in Cuba increased. The US found a way into the Cuban market through generous trade agreements and industrial investment. The sugar mills of many small planters were assimilated with or dependent on the larger *cafetales*, plantations that benefited from American-led railway expansions. Productivity increased substantially. By 1894 official Cuban exports accounted for three quarters of all South and Central American exports to the United States, and Cuban imports from the US more than half of all Latin American imports from the US. A consequence of this was that Cubans were becoming less reliant on Spain for food or machinery. The McKinley Act of 1890 ended US import duties on Cuban sugar and molasses, although it was to be replaced in 1894 by the Wilson tariff, which imposed stiffer duties. While the United States may have been reticent to intervene in the Ten Years' War over the issue of slavery, it now seemed to be closing

in on the Cuban opportunity. When in 1895 the economy showed to be declining further, in part due to severe Spanish tariffs, many Cubans again saw annexation as a viable course of action.

The Guerra Grande of 1895 must be seen in an entirely different light to that of 1868. Cuba's national character was steadily transforming, not least due to decades of powerful European and Asian immigration, as well as a new generation of Spanish settlers, ex-soldiers and civilians alike, who sought to redefine their identity on the island. A working-class movement was born. The racial composition of Cuban society was also modified. General Martínez Campos, now prime minister of Spain, provided a legal framework in 1880 for the gradual abolition of slavery, but decreed that a system of eight years of *patronato*, apprenticeship, was to be implemented as a necessary transition to full emancipation. Those in patronage were quick to demand freedom, however, and they got it, in 1886, two years ahead of Martínez Campos' schedule. By this time fewer than 30,000 slaves were compulsory laborers, and most others integrated into the Cuban labor market, even if they continued under harsh economic and social oppression.

On the eve of the revolution, Spain once more failed to appease Cuban moderates. The Liberal Autonomist Party, created in 1878, was increasingly frustrated by the empire's failure to deliver on its promises, particularly those relating to political representation, which they felt swindled on. The historian Fernando Portuondo argues that while Cuban representation was conceded at Court, the voting system in Cuba was inherently rigged in order to favor peninsular interests, and this did not go unnoticed. From New York City, Cuban exiles began skillfully to plan another insurrection. They found a leader and strategist in the young poet and revolutionary José Martí. Martí sought refuge in the US following the first war, and, like many others, saw the Pact of Zanjón as a temporary truce: the war, for him, began in 1868. In 1892 he created the institutional means to prepare for this new stage in the fight for independence – the Revolutionary Cuban Party – an institution used as a liaison with rebels, intellectuals, and supporters to ensure its popular success. Moreno Fraguinals argues that one of Spain's political weaknesses at this time was to underestimate the military potential of the black-Creole sectors of Cuban society. Moreover, it would turn out to be another costly mistake to

have relied on the stability of the PLA's intelligentsia and the numeric superiority of Spanish white man over the Cuban white man. In the end the campaigns of those in exile, led by Martí, would succeed in attracting just this much-needed black-Creole population, and through this, succeed in converting the revolution into a nationalist struggle.

In 1892 Martí sought out Maximo Gomez as military leader. By February 1895, with the Cuban economy in disarray and spreading political discontent, the war finally broke out for a *Cuba Libre*. Martí, Gomez, and Maceo and his brother Jose, among other important rebels, landed in Cuba shortly afterwards, leaving Tomas Estrada Palma to gather public support and funding in the United States. In March, Martí and Gomez issued a manifesto pledging a "civilized" war, which they would see through into the creation of a free and just nation. The Spanish quickly retaliated to the immediate uprisings and within a short time arrested several rebel commanders in the west. In May, Martí was killed in Bayamo by the Spanish, in what constituted a serious blow to revolutionary morale. At the end of 1896 it was Antonio Maceo's fateful turn. Nonetheless, the movement retained strong support from virtually all sectors of Cuban society: unemployed skilled workers, poor farmers, foreign workers, free slaves, destitute peasants, and indigent black and white Cubans. Thousands of Cubans throughout Cuba and those living abroad joined the rebellion supported by hosts, caregivers, messengers, and intelligence gatherers.

Reports of Spanish atrocities soon filed into the American media. General Weyler's cruel method of relocating and interning much of the peasant population so as to isolate the rebels effectively led to the creation of disease-infested concentration camps, where many thousands perished. Weyler destroyed anyone and anything that could help the insurrectionists. In turn, Gomez and Maceo waged an aggressive war against the economic infrastructure of the country; more specifically, against the large plantation owners who refused to cooperate with the liberation cause. The war became a class battle aimed at the local puppets of colonialism. The economy came to a standstill as the rebels torched the bourgeoisie's sugar mills and plantations and the Spanish razed the peasants' villages and plundered their food supplies. But the rebels avoided direct confrontation and succeeded.

Before its end, the war devastated the island, leading to scarcity of food and basic goods, spiraling inflation, increased repression, and a large segment of the upper classes left the island in the wake of the collapse of sugar production. The Spanish forces were unable to confine the rebel armies to the east, and could not expel them from the west. In a protracted impasse in the war, the insurrection was costing the Spanish more than men and money as the political credibility of the peninsular government was declining among propertied Creoles, now petitioning the United States for help. Fearing US intervention, by 1897 Spain sought to negotiate with the rebel leaders, proposing limited autonomy and self-government with the empire, an offer rejected by the Cubans, who also declined to pay \$200 million for their independence. The US government pressed Spain for a settlement, but an end did not occur until February 1898 when the battleship USS *Maine* inexplicably exploded in Havana harbor, killing 260 men. The American public blamed the Spanish, who in turn accused the Americans of opportunistic self-sabotage. Nonetheless, President William McKinley requested permission from Congress to intervene militarily under the condition that the US forfeit any intention of exercising sovereignty in Cuba, formalized in the Teller Amendment.

The US government did not recognize the accomplishments of the Cubans rebels themselves, and considered them unfit to self-govern. While the Cuban delegation persuaded the US to intervene in the war, and some rebel leaders collaborated with this effort through surrendering arms, in 1898 those fighting on the ground in Cuba were excluded from the peace talks with Spain at the Paris Treaty. This exclusion was deliberate and symbolic, as they were deprived of their successes and subsequently left without a political voice. The Cuban-Spanish war was then historically reconstituted as the Spanish-American war, setting the stage for the US occupation of Cuba in 1899.

SEE ALSO: Martí, José (1853–1895) and the Partido Revolucionario Cubano

References and Suggested Readings

- Ferrer, A. (1999) *Ambivalent Revolution: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868–1898*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Gott, R. (2004) *Cuba: A New History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Marti, J. (1977) *Our America: Writings on Latin America and the Struggle for Cuban Independence*. Trans. E. Randall. Ed. P. S. Foner. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Moreno Friginals, M. (1995) *Cuba/España, España/Cuba, historia común*. Barcelona: Editorial crítica.
- Offner, J. L. (1992) *An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba 1895–1898*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Perez, Jr., L. A. (1988/1995) *Cuba, Between Reform and Revolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Perez, Jr., L. A. (1998) *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Portuondo, F. (1973) *Estudios de Historia de Cuba*. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
- Thomas, H. (1971) *Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom*. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.
- Torres Cuevas, E. & Reyes, E. (1986) *Esclavitud y Sociedad*. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
- Zanetti, O. & Garcia, A. (1998) *Sugar and Railroads: A Cuban History, 1837–1959*, trans. F. W. Knight & M. Todd. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Cuba, transition to socialism and government

Peter Roman

The Cuban Revolution triumphed in January 1959. From that point in time until the Organs of People's Power (Organos del Poder Popular, OPP) were established with the passage of the 1976 Constitution, Cuba experimented with a series of provisional governments. The Cuban Constitution was not a radical break in the political course of the Cuban Revolution, but a formalization, revitalization, and strengthening of past practices, with a new emphasis on decentralization and defining the roles of the Cuban Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Cuba, PCC) and the government.

Fidel Castro Ruz (b. 1926) and his adherents encountered an institutional vacuum when they defeated the Batista regime in 1959. Nothing in the political and governmental spheres remained undenigrated. The need for quick action to make profound changes, in the face of internal and external threats, made representative government untenable for the leaders of the revolution.

Laws were enacted by decree. A type of direct democracy developed where citizen political participation was defined as mobilization in support of carrying out government policies.

The first attempt at local government, the Coordination, Operation, and Inspection Boards (Juntas de Coordinación, Ejecución e Inspección, JUCEI), was comprised of representatives of political and mass organizations, and lasted from 1961 to 1965. These boards proved to be ineffective as they lacked structure, and were replaced by Local Power (Poder Local), whose objective was to systematize and increase citizen input and participation in local affairs. Delegates, who were unpaid volunteers, were nominated and elected by voters from neighborhoods and work centers, by a show of hands, without interference from the PCC. Every municipality had ten delegates, and the president was elected by the local nucleus of the PCC. Anticipating the Local Organs of People's Power (Organos Locales del Poder Popular, OLPP), delegates met every six months with constituents to report their activities and hear citizen suggestions and complaints (*planteamientos*). Local Power's National Coordinating Board lacked legislative power, which remained with the cabinet.

Local Power lasted in name until the passage of the 1976 Constitution, but in fact had ceased to function effectively by 1970, as the country became totally absorbed with the effort to achieve a 10-million ton sugar harvest. Elections and meetings with constituents were abandoned.

With the failure to achieve the 10 million-ton goal, along with the economic and political disruptions and distortions that resulted, the Cuban leadership went through a period of self-examination. Excessive bureaucratic centralization, lack of adequate channels for citizen input, lack of effective local control and administration, high absenteeism, and the excessive involvement of the PCC in government affairs were among the problems identified.

The unions and mass organizations had been weakened, including the Federation of Cuban Workers (Central de Trabajadores de Cuba, CTC), the Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas, FMC), the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de la Defensa de la Revolución, CDR), and the National Association of Small Farmers (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños, ANAP). All were revitalized and strengthened

as part of the transition process from 1970 to 1976 leading to the OPP.

In 1974 a pilot project for the OPP was initiated in the municipality of Cárdenas in Matanzas province, and subsequently applied to the whole province of Matanzas. The basic characteristics of what was to become the OLPP were present regarding elections, the role of the PCC, and the *mandat impératif* (instructed delegate model). In February 1975 a constitutional commission submitted a draft constitution which included the OPP. It was discussed throughout the country in unions, mass organizations, work places, high schools, and university student groups, resulting in changes.

The First Party Congress approved the new constitution in December 1975, and 95 percent of the Cuban voters approved it in a referendum held in February 1976. On October 10, 1976 elections for municipal assembly delegates were held. The municipal assemblies then met and elected provincial assembly delegates and National Assembly deputies. The National Assembly was constituted on December 2, 1976.

SEE ALSO: Castro, Fidel (b. 1926); Cuba, General Strikes under Batista Regime, 1952–1958; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Cuban Revolutionary Government

References and Suggested Readings

- Guevara, E. (1998) *Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
 Rosendahl, M. (1997) *Inside the Revolution: Everyday Life in Socialist Cuba*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
 Thomas, H. (2001) *Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom*. London: Da Capo Press.

Cuban post-revolutionary protests

Mike Gonzalez

The Cuban Revolution of 1959 removed a corrupt and increasingly violent dictatorship and set out a program for social transformation and economic development that would favor the working poor of Cuba. While this won the support of that majority, there were clearly those for whom this change was unacceptable. The Batista regime of 1952–8 was notorious for its corruption, disregard for democratic institu-

tions, and close relationship (at least until its final months) with the United States. Initial resistance to the Cuban Revolution came therefore from those who had benefited under Batista. There were those immediately responsible for maintaining the previous regime – the secret police, the torturers, the representatives of US-based organized crime who controlled much of the tourist industry. And there was a broader layer, particularly among the professional classes, who feared the loss of their privileged social position – lawyers, doctors, those in the financial sector, and so on. Privilege in Cuba was also associated with racial stratification and the domination of white Cubans over those with darker skin. Beyond Cuba, initial reactions to the Cuban Revolution were mixed; ironically, the CIA was among those US institutions advocating a rapprochement with Fidel Castro in the early months (Szulc 1986: 336; Farber 2006: 76). But by the time Castro arrived in the US in April 1959, it was clear that the Eisenhower administration, and its successors, would adopt a relentlessly aggressive stand towards the revolution.

The first months of the Cuban Revolution created some confusion as to the intentions of the new regime. The first president of post-Batista Cuba, Manuel Urrutia, was a respected high court judge, and many members of the government he presided over belonged to the old bourgeoisie; Castro limited his own role to that of head of the army. The agrarian reform of May 1959, while it did initiate land redistribution, was relatively mild and did not affect US interests in a major way. The nationalization of electricity and telephone services, however, directly attacked their American owners.

It was quickly clear, in any event, that for reasons as much ideological as economic, the most intransigent conservatives would dominate US policy towards Cuba. This expressed itself in an economic boycott imposed officially in early 1960 but effective from mid-1959. This was reinforced when the Cuban government responded to the boycott by signing a trade agreement with the Soviet Union which would now purchase Cuban sugar in exchange for Eastern European consumer goods.

The attack on Cuba moved into the political arena, as preparations for direct military aggression began with the complicity of the Kennedy administration. There was a large Cuban community in Miami (as well as others in New York

and elsewhere), some but by no means all of whom were certainly hostile to the Cuban Revolution – after all, historically much of the financial support for José Martí's revolutionary project had come from Cuban workers in Miami and Castro had been well received on a speaking tour there in 1956. Undoubtedly the connections with organized crime that fueled and financed much of Cuba's tourist industry came through Miami – and it is well established that the Cuban lobby had considerable influence over a number of right-wing US politicians. It was logical, therefore, that those fleeing the revolution should have gone to Miami and swollen the ranks of the right, and that the forces opposed to the revolution should set up their camp 90 miles away from the Cuban coast. They were, for the most part, people who had been complicit in the previous regime's repression – and some of their fellows had been executed in the early months of 1959.

In 1960 the Cuban population of Miami dramatically expanded with the arrival of half a million Cubans, mainly from the professional and business classes. By the second year of the revolution the pace of change was quickening, with further expropriations and nationalizations, and new literacy and health programs. At the same time, the role of the communists – and thus the political character of the revolution – was becoming more clearly defined. Castro had also invited opponents of the revolution to leave. Many of the exiles then added their weight to the Miami opposition.

The April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, organized and financed by the US government, made it abundantly clear that reconciliation with the US was impossible and that the relationship with the Soviets would henceforth be determinant. The consequences of that strategic shift would become clear with the October Missile Crisis of 1962, when Cuba became a very junior partner in a major Cold War confrontation. Within Cuba itself, by contrast, the sudden severance of the historic relationship with the US caused severe problems. By late 1961 rationing was imposed to address serious shortages, particularly of food. Ernesto Ché Guevara, the Argentine revolutionist, in particular argued forcefully that diversification of the economy and the development of alternatives to sugar, on which the economy depended, would be crucial in guaranteeing Cuban independence.

The Soviet advisors, who were increasingly influential, through the Communist Party, took a different view, emphasizing efficiency and profitability as the criteria for making economic judgments. This also had ideological consequences; Guevara argued for a “new man” for whom moral rather than material incentives would be significant. The alternative of efficient profitable enterprises also implied tight labor discipline.

Each of these separate developments produced resistances. In 1960–1 the Castro regime took an increasingly hard line on cultural questions, as exemplified in the closure of the Monday cultural supplement of the newspaper *Revolución* after the presentation of a half-hour documentary about Havana called *PM*. Castro's declaration that within the revolution everything would be tolerated, but outside it nothing, sounded at first like a promise of creative freedom, but proved to be something quite different as the decade unfolded. The 1971 Cultural Congress set out precise requirements for what would be acceptable in art, rather than simply recommending support for the revolution, recalling the imposition of a “socialist realist” orthodoxy in the Soviet Union some ten years after the revolution. The public disparagement of poet Heberto Padilla and playwright Anton Arrufat a year earlier confirmed that state policy was hardening towards the arts.

Writers and artists were at times critical of what they considered an authoritarian character of the new state, but criticism was often veiled or oblique. Early collaborators, like Carlos Franqui (previously editor of *Revolución*), became fierce critics of the state. Other writers, who had been prominent in the pre-revolutionary period, maintained a judicious silence, while a new artistic establishment based in the Casa de las Américas developed and established cultural policies then represented at the 1971 Congress. The most shocking critique of those policies and the limitations on artistic freedom which some considered they represented came from the writer Guillermo Cabrera Infante, who became Fidel Castro's most forthright critic, and Reynaldo Arenas, a gay writer whose autobiography, *Before Night Falls*, exposed growing opposition among artists and an emergent gay protest movement against the Cuban state.

Caught between the ever deepening hostility of the United States and the control of Cuban

society by a small ruling group around Fidel, public demonstrations of discontent were rare and were rapidly contained when they did occur. Very few Cubans in the early twenty-first century will have wished for the return of Cuba as it was before the revolution – most of those who had benefited from the old order had left – but the US siege now meant that some critical expressions were defined as counterrevolutionary. Thus protest is limited, largely individual, and clandestine. The jailing of old guard communists like Anibal Escalante or pre-revolutionary members of the July 26th movement like Huber Matos were largely internal conflicts within the controlling group. Yet by the end of the 1960s there were widespread reports of sabotage in workplaces, slow working, and absenteeism which can be taken as a sign of growing discontent. New draconian laws on absenteeism and the creation of a category of advanced workers who were the beneficiaries of certain privileges in pay and conditions pointed to tensions within the working class and a negative reaction to the increasing emphasis on labor discipline, particularly the individual work record that each worker had to carry.

Social provisions in Cuba – education and health for example – maintained a high standard, but beyond the basic necessities consumer goods and other services were hard to obtain. Yet it was clear that a certain privileged layer in Cuban society did have easier access to them – another source of discontent.

The Cuban involvement in Africa has been and remains a matter of debate; there seems to be agreement that the Cuban presence in the Horn of Africa arose from Soviet bloc priorities, but that the Cuban role in Angola in holding off South African attacks was an act of solidarity. What is certainly true is that Cuba paid a heavy price for its involvement through the 1970s and 1980s, with 2,300 dead, but, equally significantly, a high number of war wounded, many of whom returned traumatized and alienated. Their anger may also have been fueled by the corruption that came with foreign involvement (Eckstein 1994: 202), that was destructive to the socialist experiment, and crushed by the government, most dramatically illustrated by the summary execution of Cuban war hero General Ochoa in 1989 for his involvement in illegal trading on a massive scale. The speed with which judgment was passed and executed suggested that the government wanted

to prevent any growth in corruption and black market trading among Cubans with foreign connections. Later desertions by significant figures who proved to have bank accounts outside Cuba demonstrated the government's determination to crack down on corruption.

As in the US and Western Europe, a gay rights movement materialized in the 1960s to demand an end to discrimination and expand democratic expression. Early in the 1960s gay people, together with anti-revolutionary dissenters, were sent to UMAPs, military reeducation centers which were prisons by any other name. But homophobia was a societal issue, as dramatically illustrated with the onset of the HIV-AIDS crisis, when in the early 1980s medical research had not yet understood its course and communicative transmission. The Cuban response was considered draconian by many in the gay rights movement and beyond. People with AIDS, among whom many were not gay, were placed in medical quarantine centers. Beyond individual expressions of resentment, the high rate of suicides to which Arenas points, it is difficult to identify specific protests, aside from US gay rights opposition, perhaps due to lack of publicity.

The Mariel boatlift of 1981 illustrated a level of economic difficulty and social restlessness in Cuban society and the use of the method of exile to channel discontent. As is the case with other Caribbean states, a regular traffic of small boats and improvised craft is common across the extremely dangerous Straits of Florida by many in the region anxious to leave for the more prosperous US. Some are fleeing persecution; many are drawn by economic and financial assistance such as welfare, education, and employment, and the attraction of a hope of a life in wealth, rarely fulfilled even in the US, but understandable among Cubans, given the level of political and commercial propaganda reaching the island through the US government and Cuban-American opponents of the government. Some may indeed belong to the criminal classes that Castro suggests are the bulk of those who leave. Lynn Geldof's (1991) interviews with Cubans suggest that many of those leaving are a representative sample of Cuban society and not the *escoria* (the scum of the earth) that official demonstrations regularly denounce.

That 80,000 people chose the difficult and often dangerous route to Florida, and the social opprobrium and denunciation which were the

lot of anyone who applied to leave, suggests that their unhappiness was profound. The US government policy providing special treatment for Cuban refugees certainly encourages migration north. While Haitian and other Caribbean refugees fleeing oppression have been imprisoned and summarily returned, Cubans leaving for any reason are welcomed by the US government.

One of the main sources of protest has become extremely clear since the end of the Soviet Union and the consequent period of austerity in Cuba (known as the “special period in time of peace”). The internal differentiation that already existed in Cuba, and which itself provoked protests and complaint, was exacerbated to an enormous degree by the growth of tourism in the 1990s. There were always special shops where Cubans with access to dollars could buy goods unavailable to the general populace. The isolation caused by the US economic blockade forced Cuba to expand all sources of foreign exchange to address public needs. Tourism offered the opportunity for Cubans unable to travel to the capitalist West, and much of the former Soviet world, to service the tourist sector in exchange for dollars which they could then spend at the dollar shops; social tensions have been intensified through creating a new layer of people with money and goods, as manifested in the Cuban convertible currency, which could be exchanged with international currencies. For the majority of Cubans, life was austere; health and education were good and universally available and basic needs were met. But beyond that there was little for Cubans earning their wages in non-convertible pesos to look forward to.

This exploded in 1993 when public protests in Havana were harshly put down by the Rapid Response Brigades of the state. These have frequently been in action to disperse demonstrations. In more recent years a number of western human rights groups and campaigners operating within Cuba have been suppressed. There are probably some 300–400 political prisoners in Cuba, some of them religious, others campaigners for human rights and freedom of expression. The Cuban government claims the number of political prisoners to be in the low 200 range, mainly those alleged to have received support from the CIA. Ironically, in National Assembly, popular religious leaders have been elected and are not members of the Cuban Communist Party.

There are many more political prisoners in other Latin American states of course, but Cuba is the only one that describes itself as socialist, which should suggest a different attitude to dissent and public debate. There is a difference, of course, between those enemies of the Cuban Revolution who have unceasingly looked for ways to destroy the process; they will rightly receive the full weight of judicial sanction. But the government also is challenged by more justifiable opposition to the regime on political grounds, or on the basis of a call for artistic freedom or liberty of expression, though at times manipulated by the US. The government responds to any challenge to the small group who have held power since the revolution without western-oriented democratic elections that it is a concession to imperialism and the counterrevolution, a concern to many foreign critics. Paradoxically, the National Art Museum in Havana reflects a wide range of art, including religious art, art depicting homosexuality, and art by expatriots that was considered counter-revolutionary in an earlier period.

That the proximity to the United States and its consumer society creates, especially among younger generations, a sense of privation and alienation is certainly one element in their discontent. It has expressed itself, for example, in an enthusiasm for the heavy metal and rap music of which the cultural arbiters of the regime deeply disapprove, although this too is changing.

Were there to exist a genuine transparency in political life and an opportunity for all Cubans, this might offer a different means of resolving the deeper disquiets, though the US blockade and threat of invasion has always created the basis for rallying around nationalist interests first. Fidel Castro has relinquished power to his brother Raúl and there is strong evidence to suggest that Cuba will open itself to the market to make consumer goods available to its citizens. Cuba does engage in joint ventures with private corporations in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, especially in the hotel, tourist, energy, and other sectors. The challenge for the Cuban government is advancing democracy and the provision of affordable goods on the island at a time when they are unaffordable to many. It is a tacit acknowledgment that in the post-Soviet era, maintaining equality is a challenge for a Cuban society that remains socialist and has faced a five-decade blockade. In

the post-Soviet era, the Cubans have contended with growing inequality, potentially producing increased and perhaps more radical expressions of protest.

SEE ALSO: Castro, Fidel (b. 1926); Cuba, Transition to Socialism and Government; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Cuban Revolutionary Government; Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967)

References and Suggested Readings

- Eckstein, S. J. (1994) *Back from the Future: Cuba under Castro*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Farber, S. (2006) *The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Geldoff, L. (1991) *Cubans*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Gott, R. (2004) *Cuba: A New History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Habel, J. (1989) *Ruptures a Cuba*. Paris: La Breche.
- Szulec, T. (1986) *Fidel: A Critical Portrait*. London: Hutchinson.

Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959

Mike Gonzalez

In one sense, the Cuban Revolution is an event – the moment (on January 1, 1959) at which Fulgencio Batista, Cuba’s dictatorial ruler, fled the country and a column of bearded young guerilla fighters took power in the capital, Havana. Yet a revolution is more than a seizure of power. It is that process, through time, in the course of which power is transferred from one social class to another. And that process is a continuum whose history begins with the stirring of new social forces and the earliest and perhaps unsuccessful challenges to the structures of the existing society.

First Steps to Revolution

The origins of the Cuban Revolution lie in the colonial past. While most of Latin America registered its struggle for political independence from imperial Spain (and Portugal) in the period 1810–25, Cuba remained a Spanish colony until 1898, the last on the American continent. The second independence war (1895–8) broke the chains; the “hour of the furnaces” announced by its main political leader, José Martí, finally came. Yet victory was snatched from Cuba’s

independence fighters by a northern neighbor in full process of expansion, and anxious to establish a bridgehead across the Caribbean to mount a vigil on the southern continent. The United States was also interested in a Cuban sugar industry in which it had invested quite heavily in the wake of the American Civil War.

For succeeding generations of Cuban revolutionary nationalists, Martí was the reference point, both as a thinker and a political leader. Yet his early death at the very beginning of the Second War of Independence was somehow significant. The process of Cuban independence would be effectively blocked with US intervention and the Platt Amendment, which in real terms exchanged one colonial master for another.

Thus the movement for Cuban national emancipation became necessarily a struggle against US influence and control.

The great movement of 1933 should be seen as the next chapter in the development of the Cuban revolution, signaling as it did a new phase in the struggle for independence. More importantly, the movement defined itself in terms of working-class organization and a socialist tradition, creating soviet-style brief duration in recognition of the Russian Revolution of 1917. If the outcome of 1933 was the establishment of a briefly more progressive government, it also brought onto the stage of Cuban history Fulgencio Batista, whose political trajectory would define the reintegration of Cuba into the economic and political ambit of the United States. The hour of the furnaces, it seemed, was yet to come.

The components of the Cuban Revolution, its chief actors and impulses, had their roots in these two defining moments. The betrayals of the Auténticos, the party of Grau San Martín, produced a new nationalist current – the Ortodoxos – making constant reference to the tradition of Martí. The Directorio Revolucionario, for its part, saw its origins in the movement of 1933 and the influence of Antonio Guiteras, its leader killed during that year. Their political philosophy emphasized direct and violent action against a repressive state. It was they who launched the abortive invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1947, with which Fidel Castro became involved. And it was they who in 1957 made the failed attempt on the life of Batista, during which their leader, José Antonio Echeverría, was killed.

The revolutionaries of 1933 were predominantly nationalists, whose more radical student

wing found expression in the Directorio. But the resistance to the Machado dictatorship of that year embraced a general strike as well as militant occupations by trade unionists, many of whom were influenced by the recently formed (1925) Communist Party. Yet the international line of the Communist International, then entering its sectarian “third period,” influenced the Cuban communists in their turn and generated a suspicion and distance between the two wings of the movement which would have a major influence on subsequent political developments and on the political character of the Cuban Revolution.

By 1935 Batista and his “sergeant’s movement” had come to control national political life and the Communist Party, in the spirit of Moscow’s shifting line, now moved into a phase of collaboration with him. For the radicals of 1933 this and the subsequent deals between the communists and Batista were a clear betrayal of the spirit of the resistance. The generation of Fidel Castro therefore grew up with a suspicion of the communist tradition and imbued with a politics of revolutionary nationalism. Post-Machado Cuba was permeated by corruption and the high ideals of 1933 all too easily became the legitimizing discourse of political gangsterism, particularly in the universities. The revolutionary idealism of Martí remained a reference point, however, for a new generation of radical nationalists that included Fidel Castro, who began to see new hope in the organization set up by Eddy Chibás, the Ortodoxos, with the explicit purpose of rescuing the nationalist tradition.

The Parliamentary Road Abandoned

Chibás’s suicide (if that is what it was) and Batista’s assumption of power by coup d’état in 1952 in advance of a general election determined once and for all the direction the revolution would take. The militant nationalism of the Directorio would command the process, though it would be Castro’s own movement that would assume leadership of it. Though the two groups were, and remained, rivals for that leadership, they shared their political roots in the struggles of 1933. The significance of that point of origin is in who was seen as the subject of revolution. The discredited Communist Party had little political influence on the revolutionaries. “This populist tradition approached the social question

from the perspective of a nationalism that, in the spirit of Martí, aspired to have broad popular appeal among those lacking advantages and privileges rather than to develop a class-based point of departure” (Farber 2006: 39).

Elements of the Ortodoxo youth and others then began to organize for armed action against Batista’s dictatorship. Castro himself claims that he was the only professional revolutionary present, and although he subsequently claimed to have considered the possibility of Communist Party membership, others who were involved deny that socialism was a topic of discussion at the time (Szulc 1986: 227).

The group began to prepare for an assault on the Moncada barracks in Santiago. On July 24, 1953, 162 people assembled at a rented farm at Siboney. In the early morning of July 26 the majority moved toward Moncada with a small group of just over 20 mounting a diversionary attack at Bayamo to the west (Skierka 2004: 34–5). There were over 700 troops present that Sunday morning, but the prize was the arsenal. Castro clearly anticipated that the army would be unprepared, given that it was carnival; in fact, they were met with relentless gunfire, and the defeat was compounded by the disarray of the revolutionaries themselves, many of whom were unable even to enter the barracks: 19 soldiers died, just under half that number of guerillas. But most of the rebels were captured, Castro himself escaping to the hills where he was caught and arrested a few days later.

Batista’s response to the raid was characteristically brutal; he ordered the torture and execution of just over 60 of the guerillas. In September that year Fidel Castro, with 28 others, was put on trial. His speech at the trial became a manifesto for the Cuban Revolution. “History will absolve me,” the final ringing phrase of his two-hour defense, set out a program for an independent Cuba. It attacked corruption and argued for the reinstatement of the liberal Constitution of 1940; it promised title to small farmers and nationalization of the large foreign-owned estates together with benefits to workers in externally controlled industry. In addition it proposed the nationalization of public utilities, a reduction in rents, and improvements in education.

It would be the first of several manifestos setting out the policy directions of a new government. What was clear in each, however, was the emphasis on Cuban independence and honest

government, and while there was no explicit anti-imperialist content, the emphasis on creating relationships with democratic forces in the Americas was easily understood as a reference to the role and influence of the United States (Gott 2004: 150). Castro was sentenced to 15 years on the Isle of Pines.

It was clear that the rebels spoke to a general dissatisfaction with Batista that would grow rapidly in the years that followed. The appalling treatment of the prisoners in the aftermath of Moncada generated popular revulsion. More importantly, perhaps, Batista's arrival in power coincided with the beginning of a slowdown in the Cuban economy. The postwar years had been a boom time for sugar, still Cuba's main product, with the international market price reaching its peak in 1952. Thereafter prices began to fall with immediate impact; unemployment rose in a sector already characterized by a seasonal labor market and per capita income fell. For the unionized working class, Batista's coup did not bring a direct attack on the union rights enshrined in the Cuban Constitution. Instead, Batista corrupted labor leaders and undermined labor rights in smaller, more subtle ways; between 1952 and 1955, real wages declined and labor's share of national income fell from 70.5 percent to 66.4 percent (Farber 2006: 30). At the same time, Batista implemented measures to encourage foreign investment as well as a series of programs of public works which did little to reactivate the economy but provided ample opportunities for corruption. What growth there was occurred in those industries (mining, tourism, public utilities) that attracted foreign capital – but unemployment remained high (at over 16 percent), repression fierce, and corruption the oil that kept government's wheels turning.

Ironically, Batista held presidential elections in 1954, which as the sole candidate he naturally won. He then declared an amnesty of which the two Castro brothers were beneficiaries. Both Fidel and Raúl went to Mexico, both the nearest point to Cuba and a traditional center for exiled Cuban politicians, along with Miami where most of Batista's more conservative opponents were to be found.

The *Granma* Years

The Amnesty Law of July 1955 was a victory for the protest movement despite Batista's intention

that it be seen as an act of personal generosity. In March the offer of an amnesty conditional upon an undertaking not to launch an armed insurrection was angrily rejected by Fidel in an article published in a mass circulation daily. Demonstrations and protests followed and the prisoners were released without conditions. Six weeks later, Fidel left for Mexico promising to return to continue the struggle. He left behind an organization that would be named within weeks as the 26th of July Movement, in commemoration of the Moncada attack.

Fidel's intentions were clear – to prepare a new armed insurrection, in the belief that the actions of the revolutionaries would spark mass resistance. It was an excessively optimistic assessment, though the discontents in Batista's Cuba were increasing by the day. In fact, the movement against the dictatorship was developing on a number of fronts within the island; the Directorio Revolucionario was active in the cities as well as among students, and there was significant trade union activity particularly among the sugar workers. Supporters of the 26th of July Movement and the Directorio as well as other militants and socialists were actively engaged in the workers' movement and within the armed forces, as the failed military risings of 1957 and the general strikes of 1957 and 1958 would show. The Communist Party, on the other hand, while dominant within the trade unions, was extremely suspicious of the radical nationalists.

Thus the political divisions and tensions that arose out of the experience of 1933 continued to be reflected in the different political currents that shaped political events in Cuba in the mid-1950s. The history of those struggles has to some extent been rewritten since the 1959 revolution, and their contribution underestimated (Sweig 2002).

In Mexico meanwhile, Fidel Castro was actively organizing his armed incursion into Cuba, and preparing his small guerilla force; at the same time he was, as always, tirelessly building political alliances, sometimes in order to accumulate forces, sometimes in order to neutralize potential rivals. But it was his meeting with a young Ernesto Guevara which may in the end prove to have been the most significant event in his Mexican period. The two men were drawn to each other immediately, sharing a political vision and a conception of revolution as guerilla warfare; together they trained with the Spanish Civil

War veteran Alberto Bayo at a newly acquired farm at Chalco in Mexico. The date for the return was set for December 1956; the motor vessel *Granma*, bought with money collected by the supporters of the previous president, Prío Socarrás, was to carry 82 guerrillas to Cuba.

The decision to sail in late November 1956 was not universally supported. A delegate from the Cuban Communist Party was sent to Mexico to argue for delay. And the 26th of July Movement's most talented internal leader, Frank País, spent several days in often heated argument with Fidel over the date of return. Fidel was adamant, however; in a speech in New York in October 1955, he had made his famous announcement that "in 1956 we will be free or we will be martyrs" (Szulc 1986: 263), and that had now become the test of his credibility. That was his reply to Frank País's doubts about the readiness of the urban and rural movements, and it was the explanation he gave to the communist representative who argued that the general conditions were not right. Castro was also aware of the Directorio's disposition to launch provocative armed actions, and the threat that that might pose to his leadership of the revolution.

There was no doubt about the rising level of opposition to Batista, nor of the impact of his economic policies on the working class, the poor, and indeed the middle classes. What was in question in these discussions was the level of organizational preparedness of the revolutionary forces, and above all their capacity to coordinate actions. For País that was still in doubt; for Castro, however, delay would have called his leadership into question; he was rarely swayed by arguments about objective conditions, and in any event his assessment was clearly that the potential for a general rising against Batista was considerable. Thus he sent the message to the Movement's organizers in Cuba to prepare for the landing of the *Granma* on November 30.

The journey was terrible; rough seas and the inexperience of those aboard the overcrowded motor yacht meant that they arrived at the appointed spot nearly three days late, on December 3. Celia Sánchez, who had been designated to receive them, left the agreed spot before their arrival. The guerrilla progress had been followed, however, and they were met by Batista's troops. In the firefight that followed only 19 survived from the original 82 who had boarded the *Granma*. The Castro brothers and

Che Guevara were among those who escaped, although they were separated for the next few days. It was an inauspicious beginning to the guerilla war.

For several days Castro and two companions lay prone in a sugar cane field with "two men and two rifles" while Batista's troops pursued them relentlessly. Three days after the landing Che Guevara was wounded in a very one-sided encounter at Alegría del Pío. But eventually both groups reached the dense vegetation of the Sierra Maestra where they established their first camp and made contact again with the Movement members in the city. December and January were months of constant movement through the mountains in anticipation of the addition of new recruits. While the area had a long history of confrontations between local poor peasants and the stewards acting on behalf of wealthy absentee landlords, this had been expressed rather in local banditry than in political organization. Some of these "primitive rebels" were prepared to join the rebel army, but they would just as easily abandon their posts or sell information to the other side. It was an issue that concerned Che Guevara, whose response was to insist on a fierce and unforgiving discipline. Che himself "was now at *war*, trying to create a revolution, the result of a conscious leap of faith" (Anderson 1997: 233). Fidel too, even in the face of his tenuous and uncertain relationship with the local *guajiro* peasants and the low level of the guerrillas' military preparedness, was characteristically assertive and optimistic about the prospects for revolution.

His optimism was not necessarily shared by the members of the National Directorate of the 26th of July Movement who gathered at Castro's mountain camp late in February 1937. The group included Frank País, Armando Hart, Celia Sánchez, and Haydée Santamaría; they were "mostly upper-middle-class urbanites" (Anderson 1997: 234), who since the *Granma* landing had been actively involved in sabotage and protest operations in Santiago and Havana in particular, since they were operating underground. But the 26th of July Movement was not the only group working actively against Batista. The Directorio, for example, which had also expressed its disagreement with Castro's plans during the previous year, and which would itself later establish small armed encampments elsewhere in Cuba (in the Sierra de Escambray

and Cristal, for example), was allied to Castro's group but was also competing with it. In March 150 members of the Directorio launched a daring but ultimately catastrophic assassination attempt against Batista in the presidential palace. The attack was a failure and many of the attackers died. The charismatic and influential leader of the group, José Antonio Echeverría, was also killed in a separate attack.

The first official battle of the revolutionary war, at La Plata in mid-January 1957, was brief and successful; sufficient weapons were captured for all the fighters and two soldiers were killed and five wounded. Two weeks later, a surprise attack by Batista's newly acquired bombers almost eliminated the guerillas and for several days the rebels fled from Batista's troops in the worst of conditions. When they arrived at Epifanio Díaz's farm on February 16 for the meeting with the Directorate, they were hungry and exhausted; there were 18 in the party.

Batista had already declared Castro and most of his guerilla force dead, killed by his troops. Things at this point were not going well. The tide turned, however, with the arrival of *New York Times* correspondent Herbert Matthews. Fidel deftly worked to give the impression that his force was larger than its 18 actual fighters and that its level of military preparedness was also markedly higher than it actually was. Castro was acutely aware, now as always, of the value of publicity; in this case its impact was incalculable. Matthews, an experienced and able journalist, was convinced by what he saw and his enthusiastic report. "Fidel Castro, the rebel leader of Cuba's youth, is alive and fighting hard and successfully in the rugged almost impenetrable vastness of the Sierra Maestra," he wrote (Szulc 1986: 324). The publication of his report also coincided with the lifting of censorship, so that it was reproduced in a number of national newspapers, as well as the 26th of July Movement's own newspaper, *Revolución*. Castro was manifestly alive and his profile high. Within the radical nationalist ambit, this clearly posed a challenge to the Directorio and others; the March attack can only be understood against that background, although it is likely that other factions, in particular those exiled Cuban politicians resident in the US, actively encouraged the Directorio.

After the attack on Batista Castro launched a withering attack on what he called "terrorist methods," calling instead on all those wanted

to fight Batista to join the rebel army in the Sierra Maestra. The Communist Party (PSP), for its part, was equally dismissive of the Directorio and of Castro, arguing that this was not the moment for the "popular insurrection" that Castro had called for in his Sierra Maestra Declaration of February but rather a time to press for democratic elections (Szulc 1986: 328). Their view of Castro had clearly changed little over the years.

The battle of Uvero in May 1957 cost the lives of eight guerillas and was hard fought. Nevertheless it served as an affirmation of Castro's military presence at a time when debates were emerging within the 26th of July Movement itself, voiced in particular by the talented young Santiago organizer, Frank País. The question was essentially one of leadership, not simply in terms of personnel but more significantly regarding the political direction of the revolution. After the February meeting in the mountains, Castro launched a Manifesto to the Cuban People, essentially a call for action against Batista rather than a strategic document. In May and June, he was actively in contact with other actors in the Cuban political theater, including the CIA, though he never actually met their people. More importantly, in drafting his Sierra Maestra Declaration, he had turned to moderate opponents of Batista to produce a policy for the formation of a "national united front."

The background to these negotiations was the increasingly repressive response of Batista to both the guerillas and the movement of urban resistance, to the extent that even Earl T. Smith, the American ambassador and a vocal supporter of the regime, was moved to protest at his suppression of popular disturbances in Santiago.

Smith was also disturbed, however, by what he believed was a softening of US policy on the anti-Batista movement in the wake of the Matthews article. And there were many signs of deepening and expanding resistance. Although the rebel army was effectively pinned down for several months between February and June, in the cities other expressions of protest were emerging. In the armed forces a layer of young officers were preparing a full-scale rising across the island, while survivors of the March attack by the Directorio had moved into the Sierra de Cristal to create a focus for armed resistance. The urban 26th of July Movement, led by Frank País, had responsibility for continuing direct action, but also for supplying the guerillas and building an alternative

labor front. To País, as well as other Movement leaders recently released from jail, this would only be possible through a broad front which embraced other elements of the opposition. At the same time, he proposed a reorganization of the Movement's leadership that would clearly subordinate the mountains to the broader, urban political leadership. At the heart of this discussion was the conception of the revolution itself, as the act of a mass movement and a working class taking center stage, or alternatively as a seizure of power by a rebel army.

Frank País was murdered on July 30, shortly after Castro had published the Sierra Maestra Declaration, a manifesto that was in some ways a reply to País's concerns and his declared intention to draw up a manifesto for the movement without Castro's initial approval. The concern over Fidel's desire for uncontested leadership embraced a number of the other Movement leaders too, for it would undoubtedly shape a post-Batista society as much as it would determine the course of the revolutionary war.

The End of the Beginning

On September 5, military rebels seized the naval base at Cienfuegos; this was intended to coincide with similar attacks in Havana and Santiago. But these did not take place and the fire power of the Batista regime soon brought the rebellion to an end. The repression was bloody – some 300 of the 400 people involved were murdered then or later. The rising had involved conspirators from a number of organizations, including the 26th of July Movement; while Castro knew of the conspiracy and supported it, he was wary of any attempt to create an alternative military government out of the rebellion. The failure of the movement, however, created new tensions within the 26th of July Movement and seemed to tip the balance back toward the Sierra. Just five days after the rebellion, the ambush at Pino del Agua announced the continuing presence of the rebel army.

Batista's response to the Cienfuegos rebellion, and his brutal repression, renewed popular hostility and alienated even further his erstwhile supporters in Washington (much to Ambassador Smith's disgust); even the Catholic Church made its protests heard. Politically, the pressure was mounting for the creation of some kind of united front, which was effectively built with ele-

ments of the bourgeois opposition and expressed in the Miami Pact. Although it had been supported by elements of the 26th of July Movement, the Pact delivered the leadership of the movement against Batista into the hands of the old moderate politicians. To Fidel this was wholly unacceptable, especially since it gave no role in a future Cuban state to Fidel or the rebel army; encouraged by Che Guevara, he denounced the Pact.

In the Sierra the rebels now controlled some 2,000 square kilometers, though their numbers had not risen above 300. The decision to consolidate the guerilla presence and to treat the area as a liberated zone clearly had an exemplary purpose. The first revolutionary agrarian reform law redistributed livestock from the big farms among the small peasants. At the same time, a first revolutionary legal code was drafted for the region and a training school under Che's direction was inaugurated at his camp at Minas del Frío. This coincided too with a new attack on the lumber camp at Pino del Agua in Oriente province, a direct challenge to Batista's continuing repression and state of emergency in the province which had been at the center of the Civic Resistance Movement. Che described this as "the rediscovery by the Cuban peasant of his own happiness, within the liberated zones" (Anderson 1997: 299), given his new self-confidence and self-awareness. Yet at the same time, Che and others were keenly aware of the lack of political education among the recruits. His words, however, reflect more directly the perception of the revolution as essentially directed from the countryside and based on the rural poor, a theme often reiterated by Castro. The revolutionaries, then, were the rebel army supported by the peasant masses; the structures of the revolutionary war were in essence organs of command. It was a very different conception from that of the urban cadres of the 26th of July Movement, and very different too from the ideas of the Communist Party, however distant those may have been from their practice.

The tensions persisted. By late 1957 the Directorio had established its armed camps in the Escambray mountains and the political arguments between the distinct currents within the 26th of July Movement were becoming increasingly clear. Yet revulsion against Batista's regime was also growing, so much so that in March 1958 the Cuban bishops proposed the

formation of a national front of opposition. Living standards were falling and by now the US government was expressing growing unease with Batista's response to the opposition. Against that background Fidel Castro launched his "Total War Manifesto" and agreed to the call for a general strike across the island in April 1958.

The April general strike was a failure for many reasons; the organization on the ground was poorly coordinated, the response from the mass movement was very limited, and the working-class movement remained marginal to the actions. The 26th of July Movement had established its own workers' organization, but its longstanding hostility to the Communist Party-led national unions meant that the strike was neither organized nor agreed with them. And the Communist Party itself, even though it had a representative permanently based with Castro in the Sierra, distanced itself from the action. Perhaps the population was also affected by the visible and overwhelming military preparations being made by the state in anticipation of the strike, and in response to the multiple acts of sabotage that had taken place in the weeks before. Most importantly, a general strike is mass action by an organized class; it cannot be launched by decree or declaration from above.

The political impact of April was to shift the political balance definitively toward Fidel Castro. While it was clear that Batista was preparing a major assault on the guerrillas, and pursuing his persecution of the resistance in the cities, the key political decisions were being made at a meeting of the National Directorate in the Sierra on May 1. The urban leadership was dismissed after bitter criticism from both Che and Fidel, accusing them of political sectarianism, particularly toward the Communist Party, which had begun to express cautious support for the rebels. The new National Directorate was headed by Castro and based in the Sierra. In Guevara's words, "The guerilla conception would emerge triumphant from that meeting. Fidel's standing and authority were consolidated" (Anderson 1997: 319).

Batista too saw the failure of the general strike as an opportunity to reinforce his authority by force. Late in May, Batista launched what was to prove his final military offensive against the guerilla army; 10,000 men were mobilized for an operation called "fin de Fidel" (the end of Fidel). Castro had 321 men at his disposal, plus

the 150 or so who had opened a second front under Raúl in the Sierra de Cristal in March.

The territory under rebel control was actually no more than a few square miles – the distance between Fidel's headquarters at Las Mercedes and Che's command at Minas del Frio a few kilometers. Batista's tactics were to surround the rebels and squeeze them in a tightening noose. Fidel and Che were both privately concerned as to their ability to survive the assault. The one advantage they had was their knowledge of the geography of the area, where woods and ravines made Batista's tactics far more difficult than they may have appeared on paper. Over the next three months, as the assault continued, the rebels were able to isolate and then expel several of Batista's units. There were casualties on both sides, but by late July it seemed that the rebels were holding out, and that the failure to defeat them was beginning to have serious consequences for the Cuban state. Batista's men were increasingly demoralized by the failure to gain the advantage, and the United States, although continuing to supply him with arms, were becoming seriously concerned at the unpopularity of Batista's corrupt and incompetent regime.

On July 20, Castro broadcast his "Unity Manifesto" on Radio Rebelde; the manifesto was signed by eight organizations including the Directorio and the 26th of July Movement at a meeting in Caracas, the Venezuelan capital. The notable absence from the list of signatories was the Cuban Communist Party, and this despite the fact that a leading member of the party, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, was with Castro in the Sierra Maestra at the time, a sign of the rapprochement that was developing between Castro and the PSP. The Manifesto presented a full program of democratic and constitutional rights, proposed the formation of a provisional government under Castro's nominee Manuel Urrutia, and called on the United States to suspend all aid to the dictatorship. The absence of the communists has been explained in various ways (Szulc 1986: 359–60); it is possible that it was a condition for the broad agreement achieved in Caracas, or that the communists themselves were still reluctant to identify too closely with a movement they had quite recently denounced as "adventurist." A third explanation might point to Fidel's skillful moves to both win the support of the communists and at the same time keep them well away from control of the process. In the event, all

parties to the Pact recognized Fidel as the supreme commander of the Rebel Army.

Batista's forces withdrew on August 7, 1958. Three weeks later, Che embarked on his painfully slow expedition to the center of the island, the Escambray mountains, to establish a third revolutionary column to reinforce Camilo Cienfuegos's already active guerilla front. There was another purpose to his move, other than opening a further front to divide and demoralize the enemy. There were a number of other armed groups in the region, organized by the Directorio and by the PSP; it was urgent to unite them under the command of the 26th of July Movement, using Che's undeniable authority as a lever. This enabled the rebels to cut the island in two and to mount a further series of attacks on army positions. Castro, meanwhile, issued the first Revolutionary Agrarian Reform Law in October; it was significantly more moderate than Che Guevara's vision of what should be done, limiting itself to allowing small farmers and tenants to buy their own land but making no reference to the large landholdings. Che at the time was privately discussing a much more radical redistribution of land (Anderson 1997: 347–8). In November, as the Batista regime slowly collapsed, elections were held; they were laughably rigged and their results largely ignored.

The final push came at Santa Clara on December 28 and 29, when Che's column held off Batista's attempt at a final assault. Late on December 31, Batista abandoned his party guests and fled to the arms of his fellow dictator Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. On January 1, 1959, the columns of *barbudos* (the men with beards), led by Camilo Cienfuegos, entered Havana to popular acclaim. Che Guevara had entered the city earlier, under cover of night, to prepare to organize revolutionary justice and oversee the security of the new regime. Castro himself moved quickly to Santiago, in the east of the island, which on the following day was proclaimed capital of the revolution.

Year One of the Revolution

“The struggle against Batista had a denouement that neither the United States nor the rebels had anticipated: the complete collapse of the dictatorship, the Cuban armed forces and consequently the key structures of the Cuban state” (Farber 2006: 75). There are other explanations for the

victory which center on the military achievements of the Rebel Army, which were significant of course. The reality, nonetheless, is that the rebel forces numbered between 2,000 and 3,000 in the days before the victory; six months earlier they had probably been little more than 500 strong, while Batista had 10,000 troops at his disposal for his May offensive. The revolutionary victory can only have been the result of a combination of circumstances, key among them the collapse of the regime and the extreme unpopularity of Batista among every class of Cuban society and the consequent support for the rebel forces. The general strike that accompanied the victory celebrations was the clearest expression of that popularity, but no one could claim that it was a factor in the collapse of Batista, though it certainly demonstrated the fact that the Communist Party (the dominant force within the trade unions) had now decided to throw its weight fully behind Castro.

Perhaps the unsung heroes of the revolutionary overthrow of Batista were the urban movements, not just the 26th of July but also the Directorio, anarchist groups, and others who had contributed significantly to the instability of the regime through constant acts of attrition and sabotage (Dolgov 1976; Sweig 2002). In the end, the roll call of the dead contained a far greater number of urban resisters than rebel fighters. Politically, however, the dominance of Fidel Castro and the guerilla fighters in the aftermath of Batista's fall was incontestable. Their level of organization and their internal discipline was unmatched, and Castro's hegemony in the political arena was evidenced in the Caracas Pact. The emphasis on agrarian reform (Che had said that the guerillas were fundamentally rural revolutionaries) as a key topic, the promise in Fidel's first victory speech in Santiago that “for the first time the republic will be free” (from imperialist control), and the swift assertion of the political dominance of the 26th of July Movement left little doubt as to where the political leadership in the new state would come from. The attempt by the Directorio to hold on to its arms and occupy the presidential palace was brief and unsuccessful. And Che Guevara's administration of revolutionary justice in the early days confirmed the dominance of “fidelismo.”

The swift executions of the hated torturers and satraps of the Batista regime were extremely popular. So too were the rapid nationalizations

of the US-owned electricity and telephone companies, whose charges had risen constantly in the previous two years with Batista's approval. The announcement of the literacy campaign resonated particularly with a rural population whose levels of illiteracy were around 44 percent (the national average was around 28 percent). These were the same social sectors that would benefit directly from the continuation of the agrarian reform program first announced from the Sierra Maestra in mid-1958.

The political shape of the new state lay without question in Fidel's hands. The old structures had virtually collapsed, and the remnants of Batista's regime who had tried to plan for the period after the dictatorship had failed. An attempted military coup late in 1958 collapsed, and the strategies pursued by the bourgeois opposition to impose their own provisional government did not prosper; instead they were forced to accept Castro's presidential nominee, the high court judge Manuel Urrutia. The only serious organized political force in Cuba, the Communist Party, had lost credibility in the previous decades and had remained hesitant about its support for the 26th of July Movement until a very late stage. While it was now clearly working with Castro, it was at a disadvantage in the early stages, and would be reminded several times in the future where power really lay (for example with the arrest of Anibal Escalante and the "micro-faction" in 1960). The urban section of the 26th of July Movement, for its part, was now definitively marginalized; and while one of its members, David Salvador, was nominated to lead the new Cuban Labor Federation (the CTC), he was replaced at its first congress at the end of the year by a communist.

Year One of the Revolution, therefore, witnessed the creation of a new state built on the command model of the Rebel Army. The imagery of the new Cuba – the beards and olive green uniforms, the central symbolic significance of Che Guevara – reaffirmed its structures of authority. The new institutions were headed by guerilla commanders, and the mass organizations were shaped and controlled from the state.

The huge rallies at which Castro and others spoke were indisputable evidence of the popularity of the revolution, but not of its democratic character. Indeed, strikes were discouraged and spontaneous land seizures sternly rebuked; part

of the criticism of the revolution by the French agronomist René Dumont stemmed from his belief that the reform was too highly directed and insufficiently democratic.

In April 1959 Castro visited the United States, where he was very publicly cold-shouldered by Eisenhower. In the last year of Batista's regime there had been a clear split within the US administration over how to respond to his imminent fall, with the CIA curiously enough taking a more pragmatic position in regard to Castro. But by early 1959, it was the extreme conservative wing that dominated US government thinking, fueled by the conviction that Castro was "run" by the Communist Party combined with his refusal to relinquish power in any shape or form to the old political class. While Che and Raúl Castro expressed some concern that Fidel was courting the old Cuban bourgeoisie or seeking allies in Washington, it was Washington itself that closed that door, despite appeals from a number of US liberals not to sever relations with the new regime. The nationalizations of US utility companies followed a month later, as did the first agrarian reform. From then on US hostility toward the Cuban Revolution was, and remains, implacable.

The political shifts within the revolution became more marked as Year One drew to its end. Several members of the urban wing of the 26th of July Movement were removed from their posts and replaced by others more sympathetic to the developing relationship between Fidel and the Communist Party. Huber Matos, who had fought beside Fidel, was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for betraying the revolution. At the same time, and in parallel, Cuba's relationship with the Soviet bloc was beginning to take shape. A visit by Vice-Premier Mikoyan in January 1960 was followed by the first Cuban–Soviet trade agreement in February. The blockade imposed by a US regime convinced that it could destroy the Cuban economy by refusing to continue to buy the bulk of its sugar crop had now determined the future direction of the Cuban Revolution. Its survival was now dependent on a new unequal trade relationship, this time with the Soviets. One effect was to slow down economic diversification and the industrial development that had recently begun. Indeed in these first years, the central debate within the revolution centered on how Cuba could escape from

monoculture and dependency on sugar. But it remained unresolved.

The Cuban Revolution brought important improvements in the lives of the Cuban majority, especially in the areas of health and education. It replaced a deeply unpopular, brutal, and subservient regime. But it remained a revolutionary process controlled and dominated from above by those who had commanded the brief guerilla war; many of the problems it would later face stemmed from the lack of genuine grassroots democracy. Sadly, the debate on this issue, which is crucial to any political strategy that describes itself as socialist, was always subsumed into a simpler issue of anti-imperialism. In 1960, Cuba's political and professional classes abandoned the island for Miami; internal dissent became increasingly difficult, which also meant that the real difficulties and contradictions within the regime remained unexplored.

SEE ALSO: Castro, Fidel (b. 1926); Cuba, General Strikes under Batista Regime, 1952–1958; Cuba, Struggle for Independence from Spain, 1868–1898; Cuba, Transition to Socialism and Government; Cuban Post-Revolutionary Protests; Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967); Machado, Popular Cuban Anti-Government Struggle, 1930s; Martí, José (1853–1895) and the Partido Revolucionario Cubano

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, J. L. (1997) *Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life*. London: Bantam.
- Dolgoff, S. (1976) *La revolución cubana: un enfoque crítico*. Madrid: Campo Abierto.
- Farber, S. (2006) *The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Gott, R. (2004) *Cuba: A New History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Guevara, E. (1998) *Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Habel, J. (1989) *Ruptures à Cuba*. Paris: La Brèche.
- Karol, K. S. (1971) *Guerrillas in Power*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Skierka, V. (2004) *Fidel Castro*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Sweig, J. (2002) *Inside the Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Szulc, T. (1986) *Fidel: A Critical Portrait*. London: Hutchison.
- Thomas, H. (2001) *Cuba or the pursuit of freedom* (London).

Cuban revolutionary government

Peter Roman

Cuba's system of representative government, the Organs of People's Power (Organos del Poder Popular, OPP), established in the 1976 Constitution, includes the Local Organs of People's Power (Organos Locales del Poder Popular, OLPP), consisting of 169 municipal assemblies and the nine provincial assemblies, and the National Assembly (Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, ANPP), which alone has legislative powers. Cuban representative government operates on the basis of consultation, oversight, conflict resolution, and consensus building.

Background

The theoretical and historical background of the “socialist representative government” derives from theories based on the convergence of civil and political societies, and the instructed delegate model (*mandat impératif*) found in Rousseau, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Hans Kelsen; as well as the historical precedents set by the 1871 Paris Commune, the soviets of 1905 and 1917, the first constitution of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union in the post-Stalin era. Among the themes which influenced socialist practice in general, and Cuban socialism in particular, were the following: economic and political equality, unity and consensus (general will) above partial and private interests, close identification of constituents with their elected representatives who are legally bound to follow constituents' mandates, non-professional politicians, a unitary form of government, and the need to overthrow the old order.

The instructed delegate model has been applied during popular movements and government uprisings, beginning with the Jacobean Revolutionary Commune in Paris in 1792. Marx identified this and other of the above mentioned traits as characterizing the 1871 Paris Commune, and the presence of these traits in the 1905 and 1917 soviets in Russia led to their inclusion in the first constitution of the Soviet Union. Lenin identified the Paris Commune as the model for working-class government as embodied in the soviets. Historical advances are not created in a

vacuum or invented on the spot, but based on concrete models which are then altered and improved. The immediate precedent for the Cuban system of representative government was the Soviet Union in the 1970s, but the Cubans introduced important changes. In Cuba the Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Cuba, PCC) does not choose candidates for any of the People's Power assemblies. Its representatives do not preside over the assemblies at any level. With regard to the National Assembly the PCC has no legislative prerogative. By law the elections for the municipal assembly must be competitive.

Elections

In no governmental elections in Cuba does money play a role in determining who will be the candidates and who will win the elections. Voting is by secret ballot and is voluntary. No penalties are placed on those who do not vote. The PCC does not participate in candidate selection, which is a change from the practice in the former Soviet Union.

Elections for the municipal assembly delegates are competitive and are held every two and a half years. They represent electoral districts (*circunscripciones*) of approximately 1,500 voters within municipalities. By law there must be between two and eight candidates for each *circunscripción*. Also differentiated from the Soviet model, delegates must reside within their *circunscripciones*. Candidates are chosen at neighborhood meetings within the *circunscripciones*. A temporary president and secretary are elected by those present to conduct the meeting. Individuals, not parties or organizations, propose candidates, who are then selected by a show of hands. Electoral campaigns consist mainly of posting candidates' biographies in neighborhood offices and store windows. Most constituents personally know or are familiar with the candidates. To be elected a candidate must win a majority of the votes cast. If no candidate wins a majority a runoff election is held between the top two. There are no term limits.

The 609 National Assembly deputies and the provincial assembly delegates in the nine provinces serve five-year terms without term limits and are nominated and elected together during the same electoral process. The elections are not competitive. Similar to other aspects of how the ANPP operates, consultation and consensus

underlie the process of candidate selection. Candidates are proposed by plenary sessions of official mass and student organizations and unions held at the municipal, provincial and national levels: the Federation of Cuban Workers (Central de Trabajadores de Cuba, CTC), the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de la Defensa de la Revolución, CDR), the Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas, FMC), the National Association of Small Farmers (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños, ANAP), the Federation of University Students (Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios, FEU), and the Federation of High School Students (Federación de Estudiantes de Estudios Medios, FEEM). Individual citizens, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the PCC, and the Union of Young Communists (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas, UJC) cannot propose candidates.

From these proposals, candidacy commissions at the national, provincial and municipal levels – composed of representatives chosen by the mass organizations and presided over by a CTC representative, again without representation from the PCC or UJC – compile lists of candidates. The candidacy commissions select candidates through a process of consultation with professional groups such as lawyers, doctors, teachers and economists, work centers, mass organizations (on the neighborhood as well as municipal level), and individual municipal delegates, and then make up preliminary lists which they take back to these groups and delegates for comments and opinions.

Municipal delegates may also be elected as National Assembly deputies or provincial assembly delegates, and constitute up to 50 percent of the deputies and delegates in these bodies (they are referred to as *de base*), a unique characteristic creating conditions for close contact and connection with the population. They are also represented on the Council of State. The other deputies are referred to as *directos*, and they encompass the country and provincial leadership as well as those selected to ensure representation from various sectors of society (women, youth, religious leaders, workers, doctors, farmers, athletes, teachers, soldiers, retired people). A provincial delegate may also be a deputy. The candidates representing leadership ranks are chosen by the national and provincial candidacy commissions. The municipal candidacy commissions

choose the *de base* candidates and most of the other *directos* candidates in consultation with the provincial candidacy commissions.

ANPP deputies and provincial delegates are elected by voters who reside in municipalities. Large municipalities are divided into districts within which voters elect their representatives. Deputies and delegates represent municipalities, but do not have to reside in the municipalities they represent. Many are national figures and reside in Havana but are elected by municipalities in other provinces. If all deputies and delegates who reside in Havana had to represent only Havana, there would not be enough National Assembly seats from the municipalities within the City of Havana to accommodate all of the national leadership, especially since the *de base* deputies from Havana do have residency requirements, and therefore must live in the city.

In the final list of all the candidates from a municipality, presented by the municipal candidacy commission to the municipal assembly for approval, the number of candidates is equal to the number of seats to be filled. Municipal delegates may raise objections to a particular candidate, and, if that candidate is voted down, then a substitute candidate is presented to the municipal assembly by the candidacy commission.

The electoral campaigns consist of candidates traveling in groups to neighborhoods and work centers. During the encounters constituents ask the candidates questions and one candidate speaks extolling the virtues of all the candidates and urging everyone to vote for the entire slate (*voto unido*), which is possible by checking the slate box at the top of the ballot. National Assembly President Alarcón explained the system of the *voto unido* and the non-competitive elections as essential to assure that the candidates who are also municipal delegates, and thus unknown outside of their *circunscripciones*, have a chance to be elected. A candidate in Cuba must win a majority of the votes cast to be elected.

The municipal assembly leadership consists of the president and vice-president, who are elected by the delegates and must be municipal assembly delegates. The municipal candidacy commission selects two candidates presented for approval to the municipal assembly delegates. In the subsequent secret election, the candidate with the highest vote total is elected assembly president, and the other is elected vice-president. The assembly secretary, who does not need to

be a delegate, is proposed by the president and ratified by the delegates. Candidates for provincial assembly president and vice-president are selected by the provincial candidacy commission and elected by the provincial assembly delegates. The national candidacy commission, after consultation with all the deputies, selects the assembly leadership and the membership of the Council of State, all ratified by the ANPP deputies.

The Local Organs of People's Power

The OLPP consist of the 169 municipal assemblies and 14 provincial assemblies. While not possessing legislative powers, according to articles 102 and 103 of the 1992 Cuban Constitution, "they are invested with the highest authority for the exercise of their state functions within their respective boundaries. To this effect they govern all that is under their jurisdiction and the law."

The municipality is depicted as "a surface area that is determined by necessary economic and social relations of the population, and with the capacity to satisfy the minimum local needs."

The municipal assembly analyzes, discusses, supervises, monitors, inspects, and controls the social, economic, judicial, and political affairs of the municipality. It ratifies administrators for locally run entities and enterprises, such as stores and polyclinics, and local judges, and approves candidates for National Assembly deputies and provincial assembly delegates. It monitors the performance of the provincial and national level enterprises within its territory; and it participates in formulating the municipal budget and plan. It attempts to resolve problems and crises occurring within its jurisdiction; and it assists and monitors the performance of municipal assembly delegates. It meets in regular sessions approximately four times a year.

The municipal government is characterized by (1) representation of the population by municipal assembly delegates who are socially and economically indistinguishable from the electorate; (2) an electorate that closely identifies with, and has personal contact with, its municipal delegates; (3) municipal delegates who are directly accountable to their constituents, their main functions being to resolve community problems and to serve as a conduit for constituents' concerns; and (4) an important role for the electorate through its elected representatives

in forming, determining, developing, and monitoring municipal, provincial, and national economic plans and budgets, and in checking all economic activity located in the municipality.

Municipal assembly delegates attend assembly sessions, participate in assembly commissions, and attend to the needs and concerns expressed by their constituents in biannual accountability sessions and weekly office hours. In the tradition of the Paris Commune, and the Soviet model, except for assembly officers, municipal assembly delegates are not professional politicians – they receive no salary for their work as municipal delegates and continue to work and be paid in their work centers (the same is true for provincial assembly delegates and National Assembly deputies). Following Marx's theory, the purpose is to avoid forming a caste separated from the rest of the population.

At a regular session of the municipal assembly of Playa (a municipality within the City of Havana), held in 2001, the following topics were discussed: street lighting, public health services, mobilizations to eradicate mosquitoes, cultural activities, and resolving citizen complaints (including an analysis of the recent round of accountability sessions held by delegates with their constituents). Next came reports by the Science and Environmental Commission, the Tourism and Industry Commission (dollar stores), and the Health and Hygiene Commission (garbage collection).

The administrative councils attached to municipal assemblies, according to the Cuban Constitution, "direct the economic, production and service entities locally subordinated to them." In contrast to the oversight function of the municipal assembly delegates, members of the administrative council, who usually are not delegates, are in charge of managing specific areas, such as education, commerce, production, and public health, under the purview of the assembly. Members of the administrative council are proposed by the president and ratified by the assembly delegates. The municipal assembly president, vice-president, and secretary are also members of the administrative councils.

The people's councils (*consejos populares*) are groupings of a minimum of five delegates (up to 15 in urban areas) from contiguous *circumscripciones*, together with representatives from mass organizations, government agencies, and economic entities located within the council's

territory. The council's officers must be assembly delegates and are elected by the delegates in the council. Council presidents and vice-presidents are assembly professionals, and their constant presence at the neighborhood level strengthens the role of the assembly and the delegates. The people's councils support the activities of the delegates, especially regarding resolving citizen *planteamientos*, mobilize the population to solve local problems, monitor economic activities as well as public health and education, and provide on-the-spot vigilance to control fraud and crime. They are consulted during the selection process for candidates for provincial assembly delegates and National Assembly deputies.

The following points were included in the resolution entitled "the responsibilities and work of municipal assembly delegates" passed by the National Assembly commission on OLPP in 1999: transmit to the municipal assembly the needs, difficulties, and concerns of the constituents; inform constituents regarding policies of the municipal assembly; find solutions with the participation of the constituents; hold biannual accountability sessions with constituents; inform and work with the municipal assembly to resolve constituents' *planteamientos*; meet periodically with representatives of the PCC, mass organizations, and professional groups; look after the unemployed, elderly, single mothers, other vulnerable groups, families in need, criminals, prostitutes, and those involved in negative conduct; make rounds within the electoral district, visit homes, work centers, and organizations, conversing with workers, students, neighbors, and retired people; participate in the people's councils; participate in municipal assembly sessions and commissions; oversee production and service centers; participate in the municipal assembly decisions controlling violations regarding the distributions of construction materials, telephones, housing, building lots, consumer products, and the right to eat in certain restaurants.

Most delegates are strongly representative of their constituencies. Residents usually know who their delegates are, and many are personally acquainted with them. At any moment, citizens discuss problems with their delegates, whether in chance encounters in the street or by going to the delegates' homes. In the tradition of the *mandat impératif* delegates hold accountability sessions with constituents twice a year in designated areas within the *circumscripciones*. The sessions include

reports on the activities of the assemblies, people's councils, delegates, and the neighborhood police. Delegates respond to *planteamientos* raised during the previous sessions, and hear new *planteamientos*. These usually concern neighborhood problems such as public health, transportation, quality and availability of bread and other food, housing, and sanitation. During the period between sessions delegates must seek to resolve citizen *planteamientos*. Delegates also hold weekly office hours to meet with constituents regarding issues of a more individual nature.

Delegates are members of assembly commissions that oversee areas such as public health, education, commerce, budget, and production. Commissions investigate, conduct on-site inspections, hold public hearings, and write reports.

There are nine provinces in Cuba, including the City of Havana province. The provincial assembly oversees economic enterprises and social entities under provincial control, and monitors those under national control located in its territory. It formulates provincial economic budgets and plans, and assists, coordinates and monitors the municipal assemblies located in the province. It holds four regular sessions per year. The president, vice-president, and secretary belong to the assembly's administrative council, whose membership includes those in charge of specific areas under provincial control, but are not required to be provincial assembly delegates.

Besides attending assembly sessions, most delegates also serve on assembly commissions which monitor provincial enterprises and entities under their purview. They also work with corresponding municipal assembly commissions. For example, the commission on the OLPP assists the municipal assemblies to resolve those citizen *planteamientos* whose solution can be found at the provincial level.

The National Assembly

The Cuban Constitution defines the ANPP as the "supreme organ of state power." Only the National Assembly has prerogative to pass laws and amend the constitution. This includes approving the economic plan and budget each year. It also oversees all national government ministries and agencies. It meets in regular plenary sessions twice a year for approximately two days each time. Extraordinary sessions may be called at any time. Most of the work is done

by the Assembly commissions between sessions. The Council of State stands in for the National Assembly between sessions.

There are ten permanent commissions with about 25 deputies on each: Constitutional and Judicial Affairs; Productive Activities; Local Organs of People's Power; Education, Culture, Science and Technology; Economic Affairs; Health, Sports and Environment; National Defense; Services; Youth, Child Care and Women's Rights; and Foreign Relations. During the year the commissions (and sub-commissions) hold meetings, usually with high government officials present, draft legislation, review pending legislation, carry out inspections, do studies, respond to citizen complaints, conduct public hearings, and periodically report to the National Assembly plenary regarding their audits of government organs and ministries. Not all deputies are members of commissions (for example, those in national leadership positions are usually excluded). The commissions meet prior to each regular session of the National Assembly, followed by two days during which ministers report to the deputies regarding the activities of their ministries, and then are subject to questions posed by the deputies.

Legislative initiative is held, according to Article 88 of the Cuban Constitution, by deputies, the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, National Assembly commissions, the CTC and other mass organizations, the People's Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and by petition of at least 10,000 citizens who are eligible to vote. The PCC does not have the right to propose laws, although resolutions passed at party congresses have served as the basis for future legislation. In some cases the National Assembly conducts public opinion surveys to determine public attitudes towards the need and premises of proposed legislation. In cases when it has been determined that the public was opposed or not ready, new legislation has been held up. After the first version is written, the process of consultation and revision is directed by the relevant Assembly commission, together with the Constitutional and Juridical Affairs Commission, whose role is to check its legality and constitutionality. For example, the trajectory for the proposed law on the environment was directed by the Health, Sports and Environment Commission; the bills on foreign investments and on taxes were led by the Economic Affairs Commission.

Whatever its origin, proposed legislation goes through a lengthy process of preparation: public opinion consultation in Havana and in all the provinces with government officials, experts, the PCC and UJC, mass organizations, the CTC, student organizations, citizens who would be affected, deputies, and other National Assembly commissions. Based on these consultations, extensive changes are incorporated and the bill usually goes through many drafts. A bill will not be presented before the National Assembly until consensus has been reached. Failing this, it will either be withdrawn or sent out for more consultations to iron out the differences. Once it is presented to the National Assembly plenary it is subject to extensive floor debates where important changes are made. After a law is passed, the Council of Ministers draws up regulations for implementing the new law, which are approved by the Council of State.

The proposed legislation on agricultural cooperatives was subject to extensive consultations with deputies in the provinces. However, consensus had not been reached by December 2001 when it was scheduled to be presented to the National Assembly plenary session. Areas of disagreement included housing, distribution of profits, and relations with the state. The differences were ironed out and consensus was reached after it was debated in the provinces with cooperative farmers and ANPP deputies. It was then debated and passed by the National Assembly in November 2002.

The Communist Party

Probably the greatest difference between the OPP and the soviets in the former Soviet Union is the role of the Communist Party, which in the Soviet Union was not separated from the government. It picked the candidates, and party officials assumed leadership roles in the soviets. The party also dominated the legislative process. In Cuba there is more of a separation between the PCC and the OPP. The PCC is not an electoral party and does not select candidates. It does step in if there are procedural irregularities in the nomination and election processes. The OPP leadership cadre has always been close to 100 percent party members. Since 2002 around 95 percent of ANPP deputies have been party members (prior to 1993 it was always 100 percent), and about 70 percent of municipal assembly delegates.

However, it would be very difficult to tell the difference between a deputy or delegate who is a party member and one who is not, and the party does not tell the elected representatives how to vote. Especially in the municipal assembly nomination process, where a high percentage of those nominated by their neighbors are party militants, there is no pressure by the PCC or others to pick them. It is not a legislative party, but is consulted regarding proposed bills, and party resolutions have served as bases for future legislation.

This is not to deny the leadership role of the PCC. This becomes slightly confusing, because the national government leadership and the party leadership are practically identical. The president of the ANPP also sits on the Political Bureau of the PCC, and the first secretary of the PCC heads the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. Thus, at the highest levels it becomes artificial to distinguish between the two. However, as discussed above, taken as a whole, in practice the OPP are clearly demarcated and distinguished from the PCC.

SEE ALSO: Castro, Fidel (b. 1926); Cuba, Transition to Socialism and Government; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959

References and Suggested Readings

- Brigos, G. & Pastor, J. (2001) People's Power in the Organization of the Cuban Socialist State. *Socialism and Democracy* 29: 113–36.
- Constitution of the Republic of Cuba* (1992) Havana: Editora Política.
- Roman, P. (2003) *People's Power: Cuba's Experience with Representative Government*, updated ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Roman, P. (2004) The National Assembly and Political Representation. In M. Azicri & E. Deal (Eds.), *Cuban Socialism in a New Century: Adversity, Survival, and Renewal*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Roman, P. (2005) The Lawmaking Process in Cuba: Debating the Bill on Agricultural Cooperatives. *Socialism and Democracy* 38, 19 (2): 37–56.
- Roman, P. (2007) Electing Cuba's National Assembly Deputies: Proposals, Selections, Nominations, and Campaigns. *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 82: 69–87.
- Uriarte, M. (2002) *Cuba, Social Policy at the Crossroads: Maintaining Priorities, Transforming Practice*. Boston: Oxfam.
- Valdés Paz, J. (2001) The Cuban Political System in the 1990s: Continuity and Change. *Socialism and Democracy* 29: 97–111.

Cuffe, Paul (1759–1817)

Beverly Tomek

Paul Cuffe, a wealthy black Quaker entrepreneur, shipowner, and captain from Westport, Massachusetts, was born to an African father and a Native American mother. He became one of the most successful blacks in the United States, owning with his family and other business partners at least two ships, a shipyard, a 200-acre farm, a windmill, and a gristmill. He began his struggle for civil rights in 1777, when he pointed to the hypocrisy of the American colonists calling for “no taxation without representation” even while they taxed blacks yet denied them the right to vote. He was also known for his efforts at black education, but is best remembered for his involvement with African colonization through the British venture at Sierra Leone.

British abolitionists had played a role in the colony from the beginning, helping to recruit settlers and offering advice to the colonial government. In 1807 some of these same philanthropists who had fought to end the slave trade had founded the African Institution. Through this society they hoped to carry on the philanthropic aspect by overseeing settlers’ morals, protecting them from African and European dishonesty, and using the colony to combat the slave trade. Familiar with Cuffe’s reputation, they desperately wanted his support. Sierra Leone needed settlers with important agricultural and mechanical skills, and the directors of the Institution wanted free blacks to fill these roles. Not only did Cuffe fit the description, they also hoped he could recruit more men like himself.

Cuffe’s vision for Sierra Leone included economic development that would replace the slave trade while also providing a civilizing force and leading Africans to a respectable position in the Atlantic World. American blacks would emigrate temporarily and help Africans build the necessary agricultural and economic infrastructures. Opposed to mass exodus, Cuffe hoped that carefully selected African Americans would go and set an example which would encourage “Sobriety and industry” while introducing legitimate commerce. Since the Institution’s directors had sought his input and assistance, Cuffe assumed that blacks would enjoy equal leadership and trade opportunities in the colony, and he dreamed of creating an exchange network

between the United States, Africa, and England in which legitimate trade goods would replace slaves. Though deeply connected with the Quakers, Cuffe’s first goal was to promote commerce.

Success in Sierra Leone, Cuffe believed, would lead to equality at home. The quality of the settlers would determine success or failure, so Cuffe screened applicants very carefully, worrying that until blacks showed their capabilities, even the most talented and industrious African Americans would face white prejudice. Thriving black businesses and effective self-government would challenge stereotypes, and once whites saw that blacks were equally qualified in these areas, white Americans would accept the idea of a biracial society.

A crucial part of Cuffe’s plan for transatlantic trade and racial uplift involved a network of black and white philanthropists and leaders on three continents working together to make the colony successful. In 1810 the English government granted him a six-month trading license to carry goods between England and the colony, and in 1812 he founded the Friendly Society of Sierra Leone, a mutual aid society which sought to protect the interests of black merchants. Finally, he worked to establish a network of African Institution auxiliary societies in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston to draw in the support of African American leaders.

Cuffe sought, but never got, support from the US Congress for his venture, and enthusiasm for his endeavor began to wane among blacks by 1816. At that point, white colonizationists began to offer Cuffe their support for what they mistakenly viewed as an effort to introduce Christianity to Africa. Cuffe remained certain that black achievement in the US and Africa would end slavery by awakening whites to black equality, but white interest offered him hope for interracial cooperation.

Cuffe began to understand the limitations of black leadership opportunity once he saw that white settlers, though less than 1 percent of the population, controlled 60 percent of the property. Furthermore, white merchants sought to restrict black business efforts by dictating trade terms. Disheartened that European interference and greed jeopardized the experiment and hampered black independence, he continued to work through the Friendly Society to help black settlers. Despite his efforts, tension between the black quest for independence and white leadership

was never resolved. The African Institution began to ignore Cuffe's civilizing mission once it became apparent that he had goals of his own and could not simply be manipulated and used as a tool of white propaganda.

By the summer of 1816, slave revolts and the brutal tactics whites used to suppress them began to convince Cuffe of the merits of mass migration as a necessary corollary to emancipation. In communication with men who would soon form the American Colonization Society, he had arrived at the sad conclusion that American slaves faced death or perpetual servitude on the one hand, and freedom qualified by racial separation on the other.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, Britain; Anti-Slavery Movement, British, and the Black Response to Colonization; Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries

References and Suggested Readings

- Thomas, L. D. (1986) *Paul Cuffe: Black Entrepreneur and Pan-Africanist*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Wiggins, R. C. (1996) *Captain Paul Cuffe's Logs and Letters, 1807–1817: A Black Quaker's "Voice from Within the Veil."* Washington: Howard University Press.

Curaçao, 1969 uprising

Michael Orlando Sharpe

The events sparking the May 30, 1969 uprising known in Papiamentu as the "trinta di mei," in Willemstad, the capital of Curaçao, Netherlands Antilles, resulted from a labor dispute between workers and management couched within a racialized class hierarchy, with remnants that persist today. The uprising, causing loss of life, injuries, and millions of dollars in property damage, was a manifestation of the May Movement that crystallized in 1969 through mobilizing striking workers. The May Movement was led by Wilson "Papa" Godett and Amador Nita of the Frente Obrero Liberashon (FOL). The Curaçao uprising and threat of a general strike caused the government to resign and call new elections, and marked a significant transition from a mostly non-black minority ruling elite to a majority black populist politics.

Curaçao, the largest island and administrative capital of the Netherlands Antilles, composed of five islands in the Caribbean, is located 35 miles north of Venezuela, with a population of about 130,600 in 2005. The Netherlands Antilles began as a Dutch colony in 1634 under the government authority of the West India Company, and Curaçao was initially a center of trade and commerce used as a transshipment point and depot for African slaves bound for the Caribbean and the Americas. Curaçao has long been plagued by the unresolved issues of colonialism and slavery that continued into the twentieth century through racial segregation and class segmentation.

A Shell oil refinery was opened on the island in the early twentieth century due to its proximity to Venezuelan petroleum reserves and its perception as a safe harbor due to its legal ties to the Netherlands. The oil refinery subsequently became the largest employer on the island. The 1954 Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands officially ended formal colonial relations, granting Curaçao status as an equal and semi-autonomous partner, with the Dutch remaining responsible for defense and foreign affairs. But after the 1954 Charter was implemented, the Curaçao economy experienced a period of declining oil revenues and increasing unemployment, particularly among the black majority, who comprised the majority of all workers. Curaçao remained dominated by a white Protestant Democratic Party that was perceived by the majority of workers as semi-authoritarian. Popular dissent among the black majority culminated in the May 30, 1969 Curaçao uprising, and military intervention by the Netherlands under the Charter.

The Curaçao uprising was the culmination of a labor dispute between the Curaçao Federation of Workers (CFW) and Werkspoor Caribbean (WESCAR), the primary contractor of Royal Dutch Shell. The CFW sought a wage agreement similar to that negotiated for Shell employees by the Petroleum Workers' Federation of Curaçao. Failing to reach an agreement, on May 9, 1969, CFW workers went on strike against WESCAR. They were joined in a sympathy strike against Shell by the Petroleum Workers' Federation of Curaçao, other unions, and even Shell's own employees. Wilson "Papa" Godett, a popular unionist, and several other leaders organized a gathering and a march of thousands of workers

and sympathizers from Shell headquarters to Fort Amsterdam, the seat of government. The protesters called for the resignation of the government, which they saw as siding with Shell against workers. As the march proceeded, the police intervened and Godett was shot and wounded. The crowd then broke into smaller groups and spread through downtown, setting fire to buildings, overturning cars, breaking windows, and looting stores. On May 30, the government imposed a curfew for the weekend and on June 1 the Dutch military arrived in Curaçao from the Netherlands to assist the police.

Although the Black Power movement retained influence, the Antillean government report concerning the causes of the uprising suggests that although the labor dispute with WESCAR and Shell was the immediate cause of the rebellion, the upheaval had to be understood within the larger context of several preceding labor disputes and underlying disparities in society such as wage differentials, structural unemployment, inadequate social provisions, dissatisfaction among young intellectuals, poor police work, and the premature involvement of the Dutch military. While some historians view the Curaçao uprising as a labor revolt, most consider it also a revolt against racism and oppression. The 1969 uprising culminated in the transition to majority black rule on the islands. However, the Netherlands Antilles, which include the islands of Curaçao, Bonaire, Saba, Sint Eustatius, and Sint Maarten, remain a dependency under Dutch control.

SEE ALSO: Caribbean Islands, Protests against IMF; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Class Struggle; Colombia, Afro-Colombian Movements and Anti-Racist Protests; Color Revolutions; Netherlands, Protests, 1800–2000; New Jewel Movement; Trinidad, Labor Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Algemeen Dagblad* (Caribbean Edition) (2002) Dit is Onze Bevrijdingsdag (This is Our Day of Liberation). Willemstad, Curaçao, July 2.
- Blakely, A. (1993) *Blacks in the Dutch World*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands Antilles (2005) *Census 2001 Publications. Demography of the Netherlands Antilles: An Analysis of Demographic Variables*. Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands Antilles.

Oostindie, G. & Klinkers, I. (2003) *Decolonising the Caribbean: Dutch Policies in a Comparative Perspective*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Postma, J. M. (1990) *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1815*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cyprus, protest and revolt

Anastasia Yiangou

The main form of protest in Cyprus during modern times was the national anti-colonial struggle (1955–9) led by the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosi Kiprion Agoniston, EOKA). The leading figures of this national movement were a former colonel of the Greek army, Georgios Grivas (of Cypriot descent), serving as its military leader, and Archbishop Makarios III, who held political responsibility. The movement was entrenched in the concept of *Enosis* (union with Greece), supported by Greek Cypriots. The strategic considerations of the powers involved and safeguarding the Turkish Cypriot minority's interests (18 percent of the total population as opposed to 78 percent Greek Cypriots; the remaining 4 percent were Armenians, Maronites, and Latins) significantly influenced the future of the Cyprus question during the 1950s and eventually led to the formation of a self-standing, independent Cypriot state in 1960. In 2004, Cyprus became a member of the European Union (EU).

The *Enosis* movement was essentially related to the Orthodox Church of Cyprus (autonomous since AD 488). The role of the archbishop as leader of the nation (*Ethnarch*) was shaped by the various occupations that the island had suffered over many decades. During the Ottoman years, the *millet* system had allowed for the archbishop to be the civil as well as religious leader of his community. The hanging of Archbishop Kyprianos on July 9, 1821, along with many other members of the island's Greek Christian intelligentsia and clergy on the pretext of an intention to join the revolution then sweeping other Greek lands in the Ottoman empire, gave the archbishop's role an iconic significance for Greek Cypriots which continued to evolve during British rule. Alongside *Enosis*, the issue of the tribute was a long-simmering cause of resentment

toward the British. This concerned a sum of £92,000 that was agreed under the Cyprus Convention of 1878 to be paid annually to the Porte. This amount never went to the sultan because his government had defaulted on servicing the 1855 Crimean War loan. The money was instead siphoned off by the British to their own bondholders. Cypriots therefore found themselves paying a debt with which they had no connection and which further impoverished the state of their economy.

The question of *Enosis* arose even at the outset of the British occupation of the island in July 1878. According to Cypriot folk tradition, the first high commissioner to be appointed in Cyprus, Sir Garnet Wolseley, was welcomed by the bishop of Kitium with a direct plea to Britain to cede Cyprus to Greece. During the early years of British rule, the movement existed in a comparatively quieter form than its later incarnation. Furthermore, the occupation of Egypt in 1882 undermined the strategic utility of the island for the British, leaving open the prospect of handing Cyprus back to Turkey. However, the violence of the Ottoman Hamidian regime against British forces in Crete in 1898, and the distressed state of affairs in Macedonia after 1900, left no room for such an alternative.

In 1912, against the background of the Turkish–Italian war, the first disturbances between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia and Limassol took place, resulting in five deaths and several casualties. The entry of Turkey in World War I on November 5, 1914 on the side of Germany automatically led to the cancellation of the Cyprus Convention of 1878 and to the formal annexation of the island by Britain. Turkish Cypriots did not protest this development; instead, they clung as tightly as possible to their new status as British subjects. On the other hand, the inherent Greek Cypriot belief that Britain would eventually repeat the example of the cession of the Ionian Islands in Greece in 1868 now became more forceful. In 1915, Britain offered Cyprus to Greece in exchange for the latter's entry in the war on the Allied side. Fearing that such a development would risk all that Greece had gained during the Balkan Wars (1912–13), the short-lived government of Premier Alexandros Zaimis sought to keep a neutral stance and consequently refused the offer.

At the end of the war, a Greek Cypriot delegation joined the Paris Peace Conference in order

to promote – unsuccessfully – their national demands. The fate of Cyprus was sealed during the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, according to which Turkey recognized the abrogation of its rights on the island, and in 1925 Cyprus was officially declared a Crown Colony. Nevertheless, it was during the 1920s that the *Enosis* movement acquired a more dynamic presence under the leadership of the Orthodox Church. Continuous disappointments combined with the realization that, after the catastrophe of the Asia Minor campaign in 1922, the Greek governments were in no position to assist in that cause enforced a notion that in their quest for *Enosis*, Cypriots were on their own. Indeed, the foundation of a National Council in 1921 was initiated for that reason.

Friction between Cypriots and the government was also discernible in the field of education. Traditionally, Greek Cypriot education had been under church control. A 1929 Educational Bill transferred control over the appointment, promotion, and discipline of elementary teachers to government authority. Although the tribute was finally abolished in 1927, the imposition of stringent economic measures and the general context of world economic crisis in the late 1920s only made the situation worse. All these factors led to the first form of open protest against the British.

The disturbances of 1931 constitute a turning point in the history of modern Cyprus. It is now generally accepted that the disturbances were spontaneous and by no means preplanned. Two organizations led by nationalists – the National Organization of Cyprus (Ethniki Organosis Kiprou, EOK) and the National Radical Union of Cyprus (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis Kiprou, EREK) – brought to a head the general discontent prevailing on the island. The introduction of a new custom tariff was the starting point of a series of events that led to widespread riots. The bishop of Kitium, Nicodemos Mylonas, proclaimed disobedience to British rule and resigned from the Legislative Council, to be followed by the remaining Greek Cypriot members. On October 20, in Limassol, the bishop declared the union of Cyprus with Greece, and on the following day disturbances broke out in Nicosia during which Government House was burned down. British troops and warships came from Egypt and Malta, soldiers were summoned from the Troodos mountains, and air reinforcements were deployed to quickly suppress the turmoil.

There were seven Greek Cypriot fatalities and many casualties.

The consequences of this first open protest against British rule on the island were long term. The British, seizing a long-awaited opportunity, pointed to the Orthodox Church as the main instigator of the riots. Ten Greek Cypriots were immediately deported, among them the bishops of Kitium and Kyrenia. The colonial authorities also deported two leading communists. The Communist Party of Cyprus was founded in 1926 but initially failed to gain support within the essentially conservative Greek Cypriot society. During the first days of the October events, the communist leadership of Cyprus refused to take part in the upheavals, condemning them as expressions of the church and bourgeois class and therefore opposed to the interests of the working class. Nevertheless, criticism from Comintern prompted the Communist Party to alter its position and join the outcry. While its leaders were deported, the party was also proscribed in 1933. Further consequences for Cypriot life included the abolition of the Legislative Council (introduced in 1882) and strict censorship of the press. Authority was vested in the governor, who governed with Orders in Council assisted by an Executive Council, consisting of four nominated members and three non-official members nominated by the governor. In 1933 an Advisory Council was also introduced. Elections were canceled and municipal and local authorities were henceforth appointed by the governor. Additionally, a series of laws was implemented that seriously undermined the liberty of Cypriots. All in all, during the 1930s an authoritarian regime was established on the island, described by British officials as one of "benevolent autocracy."

Nevertheless, the *Enosis* movement managed to survive underground, surfacing with all its former vigor during World War II, particularly after Greece's entry in October 1940. Cyprus's overwhelming contribution during the war heightened Cypriot expectations for post-war *Enosis*. On April 14, 1941, a party of the left, the Progressive Party of Working People (Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou, AKEL), was formed and by the late 1940s would take the lead in *Enosis* politics.

The end of the war nevertheless unveiled new strategic pressures regarding the British position in the Middle East in general, and in Cyprus in particular. The British retreat from

India and Palestine in 1947–8 signaled a gradual elevation of Cyprus's importance as a base. In Cyprus, these years also witnessed an intense confrontation between the local right and left – largely influenced by the civil war on the Greek mainland – that led ultimately to the failure of the Consultative Assembly between November 1947 and August 1948. At this juncture Makarios, later archbishop, was called back from Boston where he was studying to assume duties as the bishop of Kitium. He took over the leadership of the *Enosis* campaign as organized by the church. A plebiscite on January 15, 1950 showed that 95.7 percent of voters opted for the exercise of their right to self-determination. On October 18, 1950, Makarios was elected archbishop. In 1954, the Greek government of General Papagos internationalized the question by taking it to the United Nations for the first time. Nevertheless, the British were adamant in ruling out any discussion on the island's sovereignty. A statement made on July 28, 1954 by colonial official Henry Hopkinson that Cyprus could "never" expect to be fully independent, accompanied by "anti-secession" warnings back in Nicosia, demonstrated their intentions even more clearly. It was at this stage that colonial deliberations on the deportation of Archbishop Makarios started to emerge.

The origins of the rebellion in Cyprus are crucial to this account. As exemplified by the history of the *Enosis* movement on the island, the conflict was triggered by a long-standing confrontation between the colonial government and Greek Cypriots. By closely following the narrative of Greek Cypriot national expectations and their continual disappointment, it is easier to understand the depths of polarization and "the crisis of mistrust" between the British and Greek Cypriots in 1955. The anti-colonial mood prevailing in other parts of the empire also assisted that outcome. It may be argued that the onset of violence in Cyprus was always a possibility, since colonial fears concerning this eventuality had often been expressed from the early years of British rule.

April 1, 1955 signaled the beginning of the Cypriot national movement under EOKA that aimed primarily at the union of Cyprus with Greece. At the outset of the struggle, the strategic aim of the movement was to demonstrate the Cypriot longing for freedom and thereby exert pressure on Britain to abandon its intransigent policy regarding the political future of the

island. Despite the fact that EOKA had no more than 300 armed fighters, its military success was eventually ensured by the support it received from the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots. Indeed, while the movement was eulogized by the church and espoused by the Cypriot right, its anti-colonial appeal also won over the support of Greek Cypriots belonging to a wider social spectrum, making the struggle of EOKA a genuinely mass movement. The leadership of AKEL denounced the onset of violence and this remained a source of friction between the party and the organization, though it was not openly expressed until 1958.

EOKA operated at multiple levels. For example, there were guerilla groups in the mountains and sabotage groups in the towns. The role of students and of youth in general in assisting the struggle was of crucial importance. The youth were organized under the ANE (Alkimos Neolea EOKA, Vigor Youth of EOKA) and were responsible for many tasks, including the formation of sabotage groups and organizing demonstrations.

The political responsibility of the organization was vested in the Political Committee of Cypriot Struggle (Politiki Epitropi Kipriakou Agonos, PEKA), whose members were responsible for hiding guerillas, watching important governmental institutions, and organizing passive resistance – a very important means of protest which enforced Greek Cypriot solidarity, especially during the critical year of 1958. In general the EOKA struggle was not a continuous armed conflict – it could not have been because of the island's geography – but a mixture of armed actions and popular protest which made British rule in the island impossible and often embarrassing. EOKA would also declare truces when important diplomatic developments took place to facilitate their implementation – in all, four truces were declared during 1955–9. This tactic also provided EOKA with the opportunity to reorganize.

The appointment of Field Marshal Sir John Harding as the new governor of the island in October 1955 emphasized the urgency of the situation. Harding was given extensive powers in relation to security. The police – which EOKA had managed to infiltrate by creating a small but highly effective network of police informers – were reorganized and an auxiliary police force consisting of Turkish Cypriots was formed. This step created extensive mistrust and suspicion

between the two communities. On November 26, 1955, a state of emergency was declared and in December AKEL was proscribed.

From October 1955 to February 1956, Harding and Makarios were engaged in a series of meetings which, despite offering the potential for a settlement, nevertheless ended in failure. The British deported Makarios and three other prominent persons of the Ethnarchy, hoping to exert pressure on the Greek Cypriot side. At this point the struggle was assisted by popular protests and demonstrations not only in Cyprus, but also in Greece. The British authorities reacted by adopting a string of severely repressive measures such as collective punishments, curfews, house searches, and the creation of military camps where Greek Cypriot suspects were held and often brutally treated. It was also during 1956, on May 10, that the first EOKA fighters were hanged (Andreas Demetriou aged 22 and Michail Karaolis aged 23), arousing bitter criticism of British methods in dealing with the crisis. In total nine members of EOKA were hanged during 1955–9.

By the end of the year the Suez crisis had made the Turkish position in the Middle East significantly more important for British interests. A new British statement made on December 19, 1956 by the secretary of state for the colonies, Lennox Boyd, on the lines of “double self-determination,” introduced the possibility of *partition* for the first time. These developments encouraged both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot minority to demand greater constitutional concessions. In March 1957, while Makarios was allowed to return from exile, though only to establish himself in Athens, Turkish Cypriot municipal councilors asked for separate municipalities. When the British refused, they resigned *en masse*. The proposition of a new plan by the new governor, Sir Hugh Foot, excluding the unilateral imposition of double self-determination angered the Turkish Cypriot community. In January 1958 Turkish Cypriots rioted against the British police, and in the following June–July attacks by the Turkish Resistance Organization (Turk Mukavemet Teskilati, TMT) – a paramilitary Turkish Cypriot organization formed to counteract EOKA – were extended against Greek Cypriots, making the situation extremely critical.

In the diplomatic field, the prospect of partition and the unilateral implementation of the

Macmillan plan as presented on June 19, 1958 made both Makarios and the Greek government more eager to seek urgently some kind of settlement. On the other hand, new regional developments also made Turkey willing to accept a compromise. The result was the Zurich (February 5–11, 1959)–London (February 17–19, 1959) agreements. The Greek Cypriot side abandoned the concept of *Enosis* and agreed to the formation of an independent Cyprus. The constitution nevertheless proved to be extremely complicated and inflexible as it was designed according to the international milieu rather than the needs of Cypriots.

The EOKA revolt constitutes the last “national” Greek Cypriot struggle. From a military point of view, EOKA was successful since the British forces failed to bring about its dissolution. EOKA further succeeded in acting as a lever of pressure in getting Britain engaged in negotiations. Greek Cypriots, however, miscalculated the Turkish Cypriot factor by believing that Turkish Cypriots would not oppose the development of open violence for the cause of *Enosis*. Still, this miscalculation was understandable. Until the onset of the conflict, Turkish Cypriots had shown no signs of developed nationalism as compared to their Greek Cypriot counterparts. It has also been argued that Greek Cypriots did not seize the opportunity to end the conflict with a favorable compromise. The Makarios–Harding talks have been described as a missed opportunity when, for the one and only time, the British negotiated exclusively with Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot side believed that the decline of Western European authority in the Mediterranean and the Middle East facilitated such an outcome in their own case. However, it was because Britain had lost its other territories that it was particularly determined to hold on to Cyprus. When Archbishop Makarios finally decided to compromise in 1958, regional developments had largely influenced the fate of Cyprus. By then, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots were an inseparable part of the puzzle. Consequently, *Enosis* had to be sacrificed to avoid partition. Still, the outcome of the agreements was the formation – however complex in its synthesis – of a self-standing Cypriot state in which Cypriots had for the first time the ability to run their own affairs. Archbishop Makarios was elected as the first president of Cyprus on December 13, 1959.

The infant republic nevertheless soon faced fresh challenges. In late November 1963, Makarios promoted a constitutional revision which caused a major crisis. On the night of December 21, 1963, an incident in Nicosia between Greek Cypriot police officers and Turkish Cypriots signaled the beginning of bicomunal disturbances. Turkish representatives withdrew from their posts and Turkish Cypriots regrouped in consolidated enclaves. It was at this time that the “Green Line” was established in Nicosia. Additionally, in 1964, United Nations peace forces (UNFICYP) arrived on the island and plans for a Turkish invasion that year were averted after intervention by the United States. The colonels’ coup of April 21, 1967 in Greece significantly influenced future developments in Cyprus. Grivas’s unsuccessful operation against the Turkish Cypriot village of Kofinou on November 15, 1967 gave Ankara the opportunity to press the situation to its own advantage. Greek troops were therefore forced to withdraw from the island – this, however, excluded the Greek Force of Cyprus (Elliniki Dinami Kiprou, ELDIK). In the meantime, Makarios faced increasing opposition from intransigent *Enosis*ists. An underground organization, the National Front (Ethnikon Metopon), appeared in March 1969 accusing Makarios of betraying *Enosis*. On March 8, 1970, an unsuccessful effort to assassinate Archbishop Makarios took place. A few days later, the former minister of the interior and defense, Polikarpos Georkadjis, was found dead; he was thus considered by many as the instigator of the plot against the archbishop. In 1971, Grivas – who had been expelled from the island in 1967 – returned in secret and organized EOKA-B, bringing further turbulence to Greek Cypriot politics. Meanwhile, the Greek colonels’ regime in Athens ostensibly supported Makarios but in reality promoted opposition against him. Consequently, on October 7, 1973, a new effort to kill Makarios took place, but again without success.

The new dictatorial regime of Dimitrios Ioannides (established November 25, 1973) contained the seeds of the Cypriot tragedy. The death of Grivas in January 1974 left the leadership of EOKA-B in the hands of members who were under the influence of the Greek dictators. On July 15, 1974, a coup to overthrow Makarios – clearly designed by the Greek junta – took place. The officers of ELDIK and the National Guard initially met with some resistance from Makarios’s

supporters – especially the Presidential Guard. The archbishop managed to escape to Paphos, where he called on Greek Cypriots to resist. But any form of resistance was bound to be futile since a new government had already been established under Nicos Sampson. From the British base at Akrotiri, Makarios flew to Malta and then to London. He finally arrived in New York on July 18, 1974 and spoke out against the policy of the Athens' regime at the Security Council of the United Nations. Turkey, meanwhile, had already decided to seize a long-awaited opportunity. Its role as one of the three guarantor powers, as dictated by the agreements of 1960, and the claim to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority provided the pretext to intervene. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus took place in two phases (July 20–2 and August 14–16, 1974) and occupied 37 percent of the island, violating the human rights of thousands of people who died, went missing, or were expelled from their homes. These critical Cypriot developments led to the collapse of the dictatorial regime in Greece and on July 24, democracy returned to its birthplace. In Cyprus, Sampson resigned on July 23, 1974 and was replaced by Glafkos Klerides until the return of Makarios in December 1974, who resumed his duties as president of Cyprus until his death on August 3, 1977. Despite the international criticism the Turkish invasion received, negotiations for a just settlement have since remained unsuccessful.

The invasion naturally had negative repercussions for many aspects of Greek Cypriot life. Nevertheless, the measures adopted in the island during 1975–86 (the Emergency Action Plan) resulted in an economic upsurge which has often been described as an “economic miracle.” On the political scene, especially after 1980, the island witnessed a political bipolarity between the right and the left. Indeed, while AKEL demonstrated open sympathy for the Soviet Union, it still managed to influence a large percentage of Greek Cypriot society, partly due to the fact that despite its progressive rhetoric, it acted with a cautious, moderate, and flexible approach. On April 24, 2004, the proposition of the Anan Plan was rejected by Greek Cypriots and on May 1, Cyprus joined the European Union. Finally, in February 2008, the first AKEL president was elected and fresh efforts for a just solution emerged.

SEE ALSO: Greece, Anti-Dictatorship Protests; Greece, Partisan Resistance; Greece, Socialism, Communism, and the Left, 1850–1974; Greek Nationalism

References and Suggested Readings

- Averoff-Tossizza, E. (1985) *Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question 1950–1963*. New Rochelle, NY: A. D. Karatzas.
- Darwin, J. (1988) *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Hatzivassiliou, E. (2005) *Strategies of the Cyprus Question, the Decade of the 1950s*. Athens: Patakis (in Greek).
- Holland, R. (1998) *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954–1959*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Holland, R. & Markides, D. (2006) *The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850–1960*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Panteli, S. (2005) *The History of Modern Cyprus*. New Barnet, Herts: Topline.
- Tzermias, P. (2001) *History of the Republic of Cyprus*. Athens: Libro (in Greek).

Czechoslovakia, resistance to Soviet political and economic rule

Michael Rossi

General resistance to both the Soviet-supported Czechoslovak Communist Party and communism as a form of government in Czechoslovakia was noticeably different from the organized protests and everyday forms of passive resistance in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. This can be attributed to a number of factors present as early as 1946. First, Czechoslovakia enjoyed relative political freedom for a few years following the end of World War II. Unlike most states of Central and Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia did not fall under the direct control of Moscow until 1948. Second, Czechoslovakia was one of the few countries in the immediate postwar period in which communists secured a sizable percentage of votes in the free elections of May 1946, winning 38 percent of the national vote and 40 percent in the Czech lands.

The party's initial leverage stemmed from its association with prewar socialist parties that had

formed governing coalitions with other parties, as well as its critical role in resistance movements during the war. In this regard, the communist monopoly over political and economic life in Czechoslovakia was less an outright Soviet takeover than a grafting of existing, politically legitimate institutions into the larger Soviet communist network (Suda 1989: 178–201). Consequently, Czechoslovakia retained a government that reflected a national character and degree of support by the working class far greater than that of other Soviet satellite states in the region.

Third, resistance throughout the communist period in Czechoslovakia began, and largely remained, within intellectual circles. There were no mass demonstrations of workers like those organized by Solidarity in Poland. Nor was there anything resembling the spontaneous uprisings and establishment of workers' councils in Hungary of 1956. The primary challengers to the communist power monopoly in Czechoslovakia were writers, teachers, filmmakers, and philosophers. The now familiar term Velvet Revolution that is used to describe the relatively peaceful dismantling of the communist regime in 1989 is a testament to the understanding that political dissidence and ultimate state transition was an elite-driven enterprise.

The one notable example of workers' protests occurred relatively early in Czechoslovakia's communist history. In response to the "currency reform" of May 31, 1953, which effectively cut industrial wages by 12 percent, about 20,000 workers staged mass demonstrations at the Škoda plant in Plzeň, a major industrial center in western Bohemia. The following day thousands of workers marched on the city hall carrying portraits of prewar presidents Edvard Beneš and Tomáš Masaryk. These demonstrations were largely confined to one city and the protests quickly fizzled out.

The most significant resistance in communist Czechoslovakia occurred between January and August 1968, in the events leading up to and surrounding the brief period of political and economic liberalization popularly known as the Prague Spring. By the mid-1960s Czechoslovakia had still not undergone the de-Stalinization reforms seen in Poland and Hungary. Stalinist elites were indeed put on trial, some were even imprisoned, but nearly all were quickly released and rehabilitated into political life – in many

instances by the same politicians, judges, and prosecutors that had indicted them in the first place. There was an official denunciation of the regime's criminal past during the 1950s, but political and economic reforms did not occur until 1963 when economic stagnation reached a degree that even hardliners could not ignore.

The first signs of liberalization occurred in 1963 with a writers' conference in Liblice devoted to the works of Franz Kafka. Previously, Kafka's writings had been taboo not only because he was a Prague Jew who wrote in German – a reminder of prewar cosmopolitan Bohemia – but also because many of his writings had focused on the absurdity of totalitarian rule. The authorization to discuss Kafka opened public discussion to include other forbidden writers, and even murdered leaders anathematized by the state. Official criticism of the Stalinist period provided a framework within which people could speak freely about the past without overtly challenging the party's control over social life.

The next few years also witnessed a series of films that used criticism of the Stalinist period as a veiled attack on current party leadership. Jiří Menzel's *Closely Observed Trains* (1968) questioned the official narrative that wartime anti-Nazi resistance was actively tied to Marxist ideology. Ludvík Vaculík's semi-autobiographical *The Axe* (1966) juxtaposed his own apathy and disillusionment with communist ideals with his father's deeply held belief in communism. In 1967 Ladislav Mňačko issued a strong critique of then Czech President Antonín Novotný and the party *nomenklatura* in his novel *The Taste for Power*. Milan Kundera published *The Joke*, an autobiographical novel of the Stalinist generation in Czechoslovakia, the same year. By the Fourth Czechoslovak Writers' Conference in 1967, writers, poets, and playwrights, including Václav Havel, openly criticized the current communist leadership in Prague for the perceived material and moral devastation wrought since 1948. They called for a return of the literary and cultural heritage of Czechoslovakia, and for the country to resume its rightful place in the center of a free Europe (Judt 2005; Golan 1973).

During this period of literary and artistic renaissance the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party elected Alexander Dubček, a Slovak, as First Secretary on January 5, 1968 in response to growing pressure for

reform and modernization. Dubček immediately relaxed enforcement of state censorship and initiated a purge of old Stalinist hardliners such as Novotný. The Central Committee adopted the so-called Action Program calling for equal status and federated autonomy for Slovakia, and “democratization” of the political and economic system. The Action Plan, widely known as “Socialism with a human face,” called, for gradual facilitation of a pluralist political system over a ten-year period of transition. These events, along with the growing sense of literary and cultural freedoms, laid the foundation for what became one of the most liberalizing periods of any socialist country within the Soviet sphere.

The Prague Spring was characterized by the official abolishment of all forms of censorship and a degree of free expression not seen since before 1948. Government elites like Dubček sought a balance between genuine political rights and civil liberties and one-party socialism, while intellectual elites looked to redefine the role of the Communist Party, give renewed attention to Slovak grievances, and restructure the socialist system to better meet the needs and interests of Czechoslovakia as a federal state in Central Europe. While “Socialism with a human face” never fully succeeded in achieving the status of Tito’s “Third Way” socialism in Yugoslavia, the proposed reforms and the philosophical support they received from Czechoslovakia’s academic and artistic elite inspired like-minded groups in neighboring communist countries, raising alarms within the Kremlin.

The course of events that characterized the rise, popularity, and eventual suppression of the Prague Spring can largely be attributed to the personality and strategic choices of Dubček. First, Dubček was widely accepted by both state and society as a proponent of reform and modernization. As such, the Czechoslovak Communist Party had gained considerable popularity and legitimacy by the citizenry, and this acceptance gave Dubček the understanding that all reform was being done through official party channels.

Second, because Dubček was a committed and lifelong communist, he believed he could convince skeptical observers in Moscow that ongoing liberalizations and reforms in Prague were nothing to fear, but rather something to embrace and support. For him and his supporters, the party was the only appropriate and legit-

imate vehicle for change if the socialist system was to be preserved. Unlike their Hungarian counterparts of 1956 who made a clear break from the Warsaw Pact in a declaration of Hungary’s neutrality, Czechoslovak officials were committed to remaining firmly allied with Moscow; as long as this alliance was not jeopardized, it was assumed the Soviet Union would accept such internal changes.

Third and finally, Dubček’s pragmatic model of reform was, ironically, the greatest threat to Soviet control for its potential to motivate neighboring states to pursue like-minded policies. Hardline leaders in neighboring states had every reason to fear their own power bases being threatened, and petitioned Moscow to reign in Prague.

Caught between the increasing demands for further political freedoms through an uncensored press at home, and the growing warnings from Moscow and other capitals to contain perceived counterrevolutionary activities, Dubček had little choice but to continue emphasizing that the party had everything under control, and that it was strengthening popular support by channeling public demands through party organs. Unconvinced, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev ordered 500,000 Warsaw Pact troops from Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany, and the Soviet Union to enter Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968.

The invasion and suppression of the Dubček government was quick and relatively unopposed despite numerous street protests in Prague and other Czech cities. Dubček and his colleagues were summarily arrested and flown to Moscow where they were forced to sign a document renouncing large parts of their program and accepting Soviet occupation. A period of “normalization” as it was termed by Soviet officials began almost immediately. State-controlled censorship was reinstated and the Action Plan nullified. One provision, however, the federalization of the country into Czech and Slovak parts, was retained. This was less due to addressing Slovak minority grievances than it was exploiting expected ethnic differences and further isolation of the reform-oriented Czechs. Dubček was allowed to remain in power and continued to be a symbol of national pride.

Passive resistance continued sporadically in the form of short-lived workers’ councils within the industrial towns of Bohemia and Moravia.

The self-immolation of Jan Palach, a 20-year-old student at Charles University, on the steps of the National Museum in Prague on January 19, 1969 was the most notable protest against the Soviet invasion and its aftermath. His funeral one week later became a date of national mourning as his death symbolized the death of democratic freedoms in Czechoslovakia. The following month, Jan Zajíc, another student, burned himself to death in the same place.

Dubček was finally removed from power on April 17, 1969 following a pro-democracy demonstration in the wake of Czechoslovakia's victory over the Soviet Union in an ice-hockey match. Over the next two years the Czechoslovak Communist Party was purged of nearly all reformists, 90 percent of whom were Czech. The journalists, playwrights, artists, writers, and professors who formed the intellectual core of the Prague Spring were also purged from their jobs, or forced to sign statements renouncing their actions. However, despite Moscow's apparently decisive victory, the suppression of the Prague Spring laid bare the sobering realities that communism could not be reformed, and that its power ultimately rested on the whims of the Politburo in Moscow and not on popular consent. Never again would there be an attempt to reform socialism through established party channels. As Judt aptly notes, communism's carcass might have been carried away in 1989, but its soul and vitality died 20 years earlier in Prague (Judt 2005: 447; Mlynár 1980).

Open resistance in post-1968 Czechoslovakia was almost non-existent until the emergence of Charter 77 in January 1977. Established by 1968 reformers and dissidents from several smaller organizations, the Charter served as a symbolic focus for a "second" culture and an alternative to official state information organs. Persistent threats of arrest for participating in its activities limited the Charter's influence to small groups of academics: little more than 2,000 in a country of 15 million. Moreover, unlike the cross-class alliances formed in Poland during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Charter's membership did not pose a direct threat to the state until 1989.

Throughout most of 1989, sporadic demonstrations took place on the streets of Prague, the most notable a commemoration of the 20th anniversary of Palach's suicide, which led to the arrest of 14 members of Charter 77, including Václav Havel. On November 17, 1989 a state-

approved student march through Prague to commemorate the 50th anniversary of a Czech student's death at the hands of the Nazis turned into an anti-communist rally. The resulting suppression of the rally, and the isolation and beating of dozens of students, galvanized the larger Prague student body to organize rallies and protests – this time directly geared against the state.

Within a week of the November 17 demonstration the ensuing protests compelled the entire Czechoslovak Presidium to resign, ending its two decades of control over the country's social and political life. On November 19 Václav Havel, who had been under house arrest in rural Bohemia, returned to Prague and, with colleagues from Charter 77, formed Občanské Fórum (Civic Forum). Within days, spurred by the events on the streets and the rapid crumbling of the government, the Civic Forum evolved from an informal academic discussion group into a virtual shadow government. One of its first official proclamations demanded the resignation of those responsible for the "normalization" period following the 1968 Soviet invasion.

On November 24 party leaders resigned *en masse*. Two days later, Havel addressed a crowd of 250,000 in Wenceslas Square, sharing a platform with Alexander Dubček. The Communist Assembly elected Havel president on December 28 and on New Year's Day Havel ordered the amnesty of 16,000 political prisoners. The secret police was disbanded the following day. Roughly within one and a half months, communist Czechoslovakia ceased to exist.

SEE ALSO: Charter 77; Dubček, Alexander (1921–1992); Havel, Václav (b. 1936); Hungary, Anti-Communist Protests, 1945–1989; Hungary, Revolution of 1956; Prague Spring; Slovakia, Dissidence in the 1970s; Solidarność (Solidarity); Velvet Revolution, 1989

References and Suggested Readings

- Golan, G. (1973) *Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubček Era 1968–1969*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Judt, T. (2005) *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*. New York: Penguin.
- Kun, M. (1999) *Prague Spring – Prague Fall: Blank Spots of 1968*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
- Kusin, V. V. (1978) *From Dubček to Charter 77: A Study of "Normalization" in Czechoslovakia 1968–1978*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

- Mlynár, Z. (1980) *Night Frost in Prague: The End of Humane Socialism*. New York: Karz Publishers.
- Pelikan, J. (1976) *Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe: The Czechoslovakian Example*. London: Allison & Bussy.
- Suda, Z. (1989) *Zealots and Rebels: A History of the Ruling Communist Party of Czechoslovakia*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
- Wolchik, S. (1992) Czechoslovakia. In J. Held (Ed.), *The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 119–63.

D

Dada

Stacy Warner Maddern

Coinciding with the outbreak of World War I, Dada was originally perceived as a protest against bourgeois nationalism and colonialism in Europe and North America. Dadaists accused the interests of these groups of fueling the war through their influence on cultural and intellectual conformity. Dada, in its essence, was a form of artistic expression that sought to exist outside of those barriers. As artists, Dadaists sought to reject reason and logic and embrace irrationality and chaos. This was in direct protest to the natural order of capitalist societies which they considered representative of bourgeois culture and repression.

In French, Dada is a child's phrase that means "hobby-horse" and was adopted because of its more common usage in French nomenclature to mean "it's my hobby." The precursor of the movement was a 1913 creation by Marcel Duchamp known as the "Bicycle Wheel," consisting of a wheel mounted on the seat of a stool. By 1915, Duchamp was impacting artistic circles with his conception of "ready-mades," found objects that he presented as art, the most known of which was a urinal that he called *The Fountain*. Duchamp's "ready-mades" offered the least amount of interaction between artist and art, an extreme form of minimalism in artistic expression.

In the early twentieth century the movement flourished primarily in Zurich, New York City, Berlin, Cologne, Paris, and Hanover. In 1916, the name was adopted at Hugo Ball's Cabaret (Café) Voltaire, in Zurich by a group of young artists opposed to the war. The group included Jean Arp, Richard Hülsenbeck, Tristan Tzara, Marcel Janco, and Emmy Hennings. At this meeting a paper knife was inserted into a French-German dictionary and pointed to the word Dada. The

word was seized upon by the group as appropriate because of their anti-aesthetic creations and protest activities, representative of their disgust for bourgeois values and despair over World War I.

In their response to the violence and trauma of World War I, Dadaists developed shock tactics of their own by scoffing at the conventions of artistic media. They expanded the limits of traditional art by using fragments of modern life including newspapers, magazines, ticket stubs, mechanical parts, food wrappers, pipes, advertisements, and light bulbs in their work. Dadaists were known for their performances, publicity stunts, and efforts to manipulate mass media. Their vision stood on the foundations of altering highbrow perceptions of art by blurring the boundaries between it and life.

Critics of the movement deemed Dada as "anti-art," a term that Dadaists embraced because it separated them from the masses. Dadaists turned away from the conventional understandings of art because of its illusionary tactics, something they considered to be manipulative. Art, they believed, was not intended as an escape, but rather as a reminder of life, a reminder of the daily activities, experiences, and obstacles everyone had to live through. They were not afraid to emulate violence and chaos as a means of illustrating the hypocrisies of contemporary life.

Dadaists made ordinary things beautiful by calling them art. In doing so, they drew attention to the very fabric of life that was at times avoided or taken for granted. Their art form was revolutionary in that it did not attempt to manipulate but simply to recognize what is truly authentic and as such beautiful. As the Dadaist Hugo Ball wrote, "For us, art is not an end in itself . . . but it is an opportunity for the true perception and criticism of the times we live in."

SEE ALSO: Guerilla Theater; Modernismo; Muralista Movement; Punk Movement; Situationists

References and Suggested Readings

- Dachy, M. (2006) *Dada: The Revolt of Art*. New York: Harry N. Abrams.
- De L'Ecotais, E. (2003) *The Dada Spirit*. New York: Assouline.
- Masheck, J. (2002) *Marcel Duchamp in Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press.
- Richter, H. (1997) *Dada: Art and Anti-Art*. London: Thames & Hudson.

Dahomey Women's Army

Nada Halloway

War is generally seen as a masculine activity, and the historical assumption has been that women could not mentally endure the front lines of battle. However, the women of Dahomey have proven this assumption untrue for centuries. The "Amazons" of Dahomey – they were given this name by western observers who thought they resembled the Amazons of ancient Greece – began as bodyguards in the royal palace but evolved into a fighting unit in the late 1800s. The king trusted these women because they came from non-Dahomean slaves who had no ties to any groups in any of the surrounding areas. In 1850, King Gezo changed the selection process by conscripting Dahomean women into the ranks. In 1840, they fought alongside the Dahomean male soldiers and gained notoriety for fierceness in battle. They did not flinch against Abeokuta's advancing army, even when their male counterparts fled the battlefield. Similarly, as France fought to colonize their nation during the Franco-Dahomean War (1892–4), they took on the French army and the French, even with superior weaponry and the support of the Foreign Legion, suffered many casualties.

The history of the warrior women of Dahomey has been largely ignored because of the notion that war is primarily a masculine activity but also because it serves to delineate the spaces that men and women occupy. To ignore the role of women in warfare is to guarantee the continuation of the idea that women can only occupy the domestic sphere. War solidifies the roles that women assume in societies and as such, naturalizes certain privileges for one group while disenfranchising another.

SEE ALSO: Women's War of 1929

References and Suggested Readings

- Keegan, J. (1993) *A History of Warfare*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Ross, D. (1971) Dahomey. In *West African Resistance: The Military Response to Colonial Occupation*. New York: Africana.

Dalit liberation struggles

Debi Chatterjee

Caste, Untouchability, and Indian Society

Hindu society is marked by caste stratification. Etymologically, the term caste derives from the Portuguese word *casta*, which means "breed" or "race." Originating probably as four *varnas* (divisions based on social functions), the Brahmins (priests and scholars specializing on scriptures), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (merchants), and Sudras (laborers serving the above three), today some 3,000 social groups claim caste status. G. S. Ghurye (1993) identified six outstanding features of caste-ruled Hindu society, namely, segmental division of society, hierarchy, restrictions on feeding and social intercourse, civil and religious disabilities and privileges of the different sections, lack of unrestricted choice of occupation, and restrictions on marriage. Central to caste ideology has been the notion of "purity" and "pollution" of the castes.

The practice of untouchability remains integral to the caste order. Persons belonging to the castes lowest in terms of the hierarchy and considered as the most polluting are stigmatized as untouchables. Untouchable castes have been variously referred to as *panchamas*, *antyajas*, *atishudras*, *avarna*, depressed classes, Harijans, scheduled castes, and Dalits. In 2001, they comprised around 16 percent of India's population: 36 percent are workers, amongst whom 48 percent are agricultural laborers. Many are engaged in traditional occupations such as flaying and scavenging.

India's constitution guarantees equality to its citizens, and the practice of untouchability, constitutionally speaking, stands abolished. Nonetheless, the practice is still widespread in different parts of the country. Amongst the untouchable castes, illiteracy and poverty are much greater than amongst the general population. They are victims

of social exclusion and marginalization, despite the government's professed concerns for formulation of policies for their inclusion.

Early Anti-Caste Struggles

History abounds with tales of these people's struggles. Dalit struggles for social justice are almost as old as the caste system itself. The early struggles were largely articulated in terms of religious discourse and debates, challenging the basics of the Brahminical order and positing more democratic and egalitarian alternatives. Indian historicity has been depicted by the well-known historian Romila Thapar (1989) as characterized by Brahmin–Sramana (ascetics belonging to non-Brahminical sects) contestation. Shah (1980) broadly classifies the Dalit movements into reformative and alternative movements, the former seeking to reform the caste system in order to solve the untouchability problem, the latter attempting to create an alternative socio-cultural structure.

In the nineteenth century, western education, Christian proselytizing, and technological changes acted as catalysts in inspiring a variety of reform movements in different parts of India. Several organizations like the Paramhansa Sabha, Prarthana Samaj, Brahmo Samaj, and Arya Samaj questioned the prejudices and ignorance of orthodox Hindus without questioning the religious roots of the caste structure. Moreover, they were not movements by the Dalits, nor were they strictly speaking for the Dalits.

Protesting the exclusion perpetrated by the Brahminical tradition, many low-caste groups have developed their own alternative religious space within the Hindu fold. Such religious tradition tends to reveal an admixture of elements of orthodox Hinduism and survivals of animism and nature worship. From ancient times till today in villages across the length and breadth of the country, such folk expression of protest articulated in their own language and in their own style is manifested widely in the worshipping of village deities. Before the village gods all are equal, there being no caste discrimination or untouchability, with priests too coming from low-caste categories. In Bengal, the worship of the goddess of serpents, Manasa Devi, throughout the monsoon month of Sravan (July–August) or the boat-worshipping by the untouchable Chandals in what is called the *Chandal Kudni* are but two examples.

In efforts to liberate themselves from the humiliation of Brahminical oppression, oppressed caste groups have undertaken attempts at what Srinivas (1966) refers to as “Sanskritization.” By this process, low-caste Hindus attempt to change their customs, rituals, ideology, and way of life in the direction of high castes. It may be noted that Sanskritization aims at an upward mobility in terms of the caste hierarchy, but does not challenge the hierarchy *per se*.

Jyotirao Govindrao Phule

Born to a low-caste Kshatriya Mali, Kunbi sub-caste family in the Satara district of Maharashtra in 1827, Jyotirao Phule pioneered the non-Brahmin movement in Maharashtra. Rejecting and scathingly critical of the Brahminical scriptures and the caste system, Phule held them responsible for the ideological suppression and poverty of the low castes. He founded the Satyasodhak Samaj in Maharashtra in 1873 to combat Brahminism and the sanctity of the *Vedas* (the earliest texts of the Aryans, designated as the most authentic expressions of Hinduism from the nineteenth century). His emphasis was on education and organization aimed at countering the Brahminical ideology. He had close links with the Paramhansa Sabha, but was extremely critical of both the Brahmo Samaj and Prarthana Samaj. Over the years he wrote several books and monographs to highlight his views. These included *Brahmanance Kasab* (Priestcraft Exposed) and *Shetkarayacha Aasud* (Cultivator's Whipcord). In 1871, he started the paper *Dinabandhu*.

After Phule's death in 1889, the center of the non-Brahmin movement shifted from Pune to Kolhapur, with Sahu Maharaj (1884–1922) as an active sponsor. Phule is considered to be the first modern spokesman of the oppressed castes to have emerged from amongst their ranks. His opposition to Brahminism was uncompromising. His establishment of the first school for untouchables and for women significantly contributed toward generating low-caste consciousness and mobility. A perfect product of that consciousness was B. R. Ambedkar.

Narayana Guru

In Kerala, the Ezhavas, who were amongst the most backward and oppressed section of the Hindu population, comprising in 1891 some

16.20 percent of the region's population, were the first to lead bitter struggles for social emancipation, later emulated by other low castes including the Pulayas. Narayana, who was later to become Sri Narayana Guru, was born in an Ezhava middle-class agricultural family in Chempazhanthi near Trivandrum in 1855. A believer in the Adwaita (Monistic) philosophy and a follower of Swami Vivekananda, Sri Narayana Guru concentrated on setting up temples for the low-caste Ezhavas. The first such temple dedicated to Lord Siva (one of the three most important Hindu deities) was set up in 1887 at Aruvipuram; since it was consecrated by a member of the untouchable community, it came as a direct challenge to the Brahminical order. After this initial success he set up several other temples, and over time emerged as a popular leader of the poor low castes in the region. In 1898–9 Narayana Guru registered a *Yogam* (association) to manage the affairs of the temples. In 1903 at a special session of the *Yogam* it was decided to transform it into the Sri Narayana Guru Dharma Paripalana Yogam (SNDP), with the aim and object of developing spiritual and secular education and helping in the economic advancement of the Ezhavas. It is not surprising that as the temple-entry movement gained momentum, Sri Narayana Guru emerged as one of its earliest pioneers. He was both a spiritual leader and a social reformer. As a result of the Narayana Guru movement, the Ezhavas developed a sense of their own worth. They were transformed from passive underlings into a community which, after the nineteenth century, took the lead in various radical movements for the emancipation of the downtrodden. The SNDP movement had an overall liberating influence on Kerala's society of the period. Its success, moral and social legitimacy, and principles of equity, some of which were rooted in or sanctioned by Narayana Guru's teachings, were carried over to the field of radical politics and contributed to the process of radicalization of politics in the region.

Motua Movement

Amongst the low-caste people of Bengal, including the Namasudras, Poundras, Goalas, Malos, and Muchis, the Motua movement became extremely popular around the middle of the nineteenth century. Its main base was amongst the Namasudras. Initially launched by Harichand

Thakur, who was born to a Namasudra family of Faridpur in 1812, the movement was expanded and popularized by his son Guruchand Thakur, who led the movement after his father's death in 1878. Apparently the movement was of a religious nature, organized around the name of "Hari" (one of the three most important Hindu deities) with an emphasis on collective singing and dancing of the devotees in a demonstration of spiritual ecstasy. However, beyond that religiosity, the thrust of the movement was secular: its primary targets were to establish ways and means of attaining perfect peace of mind within the parameters of family life and to eradicate social inequality and ensure uplift of the downtrodden. In 1881, at the initiative of Guruchand Thakur, the first Namasudra Mahasammelan (Congress) was held at Dattadanga at Khulna, attended by an estimated 5,000 devotees. In his presidential address he emphasized education, decency of behavior, cleanliness, health, and strength of character as prerequisites for advancement. Guruchand can justly be described as the father of the Namasudra renaissance. He took the initiative in establishing educational institutions for the weaker castes and provided overall leadership to the Namasudra movement in changing their earlier derogatory nomenclature of Chandal to Namasudra. (The traditional term Chandal is historically a pejorative term, often referring to people who dealt with dead bodies. Thus, any action extending even to the lowliest is designated as *achandal*, "up to the Chandal.") Replacing this term by a relatively neutral one was itself a battle for cultural rights.

E. V. Ramasami

E. V. Ramasami, better known as EVR or Periyar (The Great One), was born in Erode in southern India in 1879. EVR held the Brahmins and their Sanskritic culture to be responsible for the social, economic, political, and cultural backwardness of the non-Brahmins in Tamilnadu. As such, he sought to smash the edifice of that culture and root it out lock, stock, and barrel, replacing indignity with dignity and inequality with egalitarianism. EVR structured his alternative in terms of the Self-Respect movement. He raised the slogan of *Cuya Mariyadai* (Self-Respect). The Tamil weekly, *Kudi Arasu*, became the principal organ of the movement. EVR's passionate speeches delivered in simple,

straightforward fashion succeeded in drawing a sizable following for the Self-Respect movement. The first Self-Respect conference was held at Chengalpattu in 1929.

Some of the most sustained struggles that came to be launched by EVR and the Self-Respect movement were in relation to temple entry, access to public spaces and institutions, gender equality, abolition of untouchability, Brahminism, caste, and religion. EVR was extremely outspoken in his atheistic beliefs. He strongly expressed his rejection of the idea of God, as well as idol worship, and used sharp language and agitational methods for expressing that opposition. Periyar's and the Self-Respecter's views on religion revolved around critiques of the Brahmin priest and Brahminism, the scriptures, religion as a worldview, religious practices, festivals, and rituals.

Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar

With Ambedkar, the greatest leader of the untouchables that modern India has produced to date, the protest against caste, casteism, and the Brahminical order reached its peak. Religious and social struggles of the early phase were followed by the articulation of Dalit demands in terms of the modern language of politics under the able leadership of Ambedkar from the first half of the twentieth century. Through a sustained process of political mobilization on the one hand and hard political bargaining on the other, Ambedkar succeeded in establishing the untouchables as scheduled castes and as a politically relevant category both to themselves and to others, thus bringing the untouchables from invisibility to visibility, from silence to articulated protest. By the early twentieth century, armed with his intellectual sophistry and personal sense of pain, Ambedkar became the most formidable critic and opponent of the caste order on India's national scene, articulating the demands of the untouchables and carrying the message of their agony to the highest corridors of power.

Ambedkar was simultaneously a leader of the Mahars, a spokesman of the untouchables, and a statesman of national stature. Born in 1891 in a Mahar family as the fourteenth offspring of a Kabir-panthi (a sect following Kabir, a fifteenth-century preacher of syncretism and social equality) father, Subedar (sergeant) Ramji Sakpal, and mother Bhimabai at the Military Headquarters of War near Indore, Ambedkar experienced from

childhood much of the social ostracism that goes with low birth in a Hindu family. However, financial assistance from Maharaja Sayajirao of Baroda enabled him to undertake higher studies abroad. He obtained a DSc and in 1923 was called to the Bar.

His ideas developed as a clear synthesis of western liberal thinking on the one hand and Indian philosophical inquiries on the other, rendering his understanding of Indian society much more than merely superficial. His in-depth knowledge of Hindu philosophy, accumulated over years starting from his daily childhood routine of compulsory recitation of the Hindu scriptures and exposure to the light of Kabir and Buddha's dicta, revealed to him the many and diverse facets of Indian society. Impressed by western intellectual stalwarts like John Dewey, Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman, Edwin Cannan, John Maynard Keynes, Bertrand Russell, and others, western liberal thought seemed to hold out to him the panacea for the ills of his own caste-ridden society, of which he himself was so much a victim. With a combination of both theoretical exposition and sociopolitical activism, Ambedkar devoted his energies throughout his life to the goal of social justice.

Ambedkar's maiden entry into India's political scene came about in 1919 as he testified before the Franchise Committee, better known as the Southborough Committee. There he described the untouchables as slaves, dehumanized and socialized never to complain. He demanded their special representation, since he felt that untouchability constituted a definite set of interests which the untouchable alone could speak for.

Dr. Ambedkar's able leadership was reflected in his presentations before the Simon Commission (1928), at the Round Table Conferences (1930–2), and in the Constituent Assembly debates where he was the chairman of the Drafting Committee. At every level he did his utmost to ensure that the depressed classes were guaranteed certain minimum safeguards that he felt were essential for their security under the new constitutional system, since on transfer of power, authority would almost certainly go to the upper castes, who would be ill disposed toward the depressed classes. Amongst the safeguards, Ambedkar had demanded the introduction of a system of separate electorates for the depressed classes, a demand he had strongly asserted at the Round Table Conferences and which had generated perhaps

the bitterest conflicts between Ambedkar and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, as evidenced by the latter's launching of his much publicized fast to death. By the early 1930s Ambedkar had lost all faith in Gandhi and the Indian National Congress's likelihood of standing up for the depressed classes against the caste system. While his own performance won him widespread acclaim as an astute statesman and leader of the untouchables, Gandhi's opposition to the demand for separate electorates for the untouchables and his threatened fast to death drove a permanent wedge between Ambedkar and the Congress.

Over the years, Ambedkar developed an elaborate theoretical critique of the caste system alongside his activism. He wrote extensively on the roots of the caste system, Hinduism *per se*, the ill effects of the caste order, the minority question, the vision of a caste-free society, contemporary politics, the role of the Indian National Congress, issues arising in the context of constitution-making, and much more. One of Ambedkar's most lucid critiques of the caste system came in his booklet on *Annihilation of Caste*. It was originally written as the presidential address for a meeting of the Jat-Pat-Todak Mandal of Lahore in 1936, but he was not permitted to deliver the address because of its rather too radical tone.

In his efforts at politically organizing the untouchables, Ambedkar set up first the Independent Labour Party (1936), later the Scheduled Castes' Federation (1942), and finally visualized the formation of the Republican Party in 1956. In the initial years as he critiqued Hinduism, Ambedkar had hoped to reform the religion rather than to reject it. But gradually he equated Hinduism with Brahminism and with social exploitation in its most prevalent and dominant form in India. At every depressed classes conference since the Mahad Conference in 1927, resolutions renouncing Hinduism were passed. At the Jalgaon Conference in May 1929, a resolution was passed calling upon members of the scheduled castes to embrace any religion other than Hinduism. In 1935, at the Yeola Conference, Ambedkar's theoretical rejection of Hinduism was firmly established as he declared that he would not die a Hindu.

Believing in the importance of religion *per se*, Ambedkar could not opt for an atheistic solution as the obvious corollary to the rejection of Hinduism. Hence came the question of con-

version to some other religion. For a time Ambedkar seems to have contemplated choosing between Islam, Sikhism, or Christianity. Finally, he chose Buddhism. The background and his reasons for doing so are explicitly laid bare in his magnum opus, *The Buddha and His Dhamma*. Accompanied by thousands of followers, Ambedkar embraced Buddhism shortly before his death in 1956.

From early times, conversion has been one of the strategies adopted by Dalits in seeking to counter their humiliation. Such religious challenge to Hindu Brahminism has largely come from Islam and Christianity, both these institutionalized religions having made an early entry into the region. Contrary to Brahminical Hinduism, neither religion believed in hereditary stratification. Thus, to Hindus who craved for social transformation and for those who wished to shake off their caste burden, either of these religions appeared to offer an attractive alternative.

Moreover, the symbiotic existence of Hindus, Muslims, and Christians necessitated by historical and socioeconomic conditions led to the emergence of several syncretic religious denominations based on the preaching of persons such as Kabir, Nanak, Chaitanya, and others who were proponents of social equality in the eyes of God, thereby challenging the social basis of Brahminism. Conversions to these religions too were forthcoming.

Post-Ambedkarite Political Strategies of the Dalits

In the early 1970s, the Dalit Panthers emerged in Maharashtra as part of the countrywide wave of radical politics. Established as a political organization in 1972, ideologically the Panthers leaned on Ambedkar's thought, relied on urban youth and students, and spoke of revolution. They sought to wage a grand war against the *varna-jati* system (from the Middle Ages the *varna* was replaced by a multiple occupation-linked caste system, or the *jati* system). With the birth of the Dalit Panthers there came about a major paradigm shift in the hitherto structured language of Dalit politics.

The earliest Ambedkarite party, envisaged by Ambedkar himself, to make its presence felt in post-independence politics was the Republican Party. It has remained largely confined to western India, with only pockets of influence elsewhere.

In fact, repeated splits badly affected the party.

The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), another important Ambedkarite party, was established in 1984. In the mid-1980s, during the early years of its formation, the social base of the BSP was narrow and confined to the upwardly mobile and educated, mainly government employees, but by the 1990s it had broadened to include poorer sections of the community. The party was established by Kanshi Ram, a well-educated Ramdasi (low-caste) Punjabi who had formerly been a high-level government servant. He envisaged a two-stage transformation of society. First, political power was to be captured from the Brahmins. Later, the movement would penetrate deeper into society and transform it. But how this would be done remained unexplained. As it stands now, capturing political power appears to be the agenda of the day and, like other political parties treading the constitutional path, its attention appears confined to the maneuvers of electoral politics under the leadership of Kumari Mayawati, the Dalit successor of Kanshi Ram.

Dalit Liberation Struggles in a Globalizing World

Globalization has placed the Dalit population in India under a dual pressure. On the one hand, the age-old pressure of Brahminical societal structuring persists unabated. On the other hand, there is the pressure from the new wave of imperialism which capitalism in the present world is generating in the name of "globalization." In the Dalits, imperialism has found a ready source of cheap labor and in their common property resources a mine of wealth ready for extraction. Against the backdrop of globalization, efforts are being made by the Dalits to bring new issues into focus in the course of their struggles, to develop new tools and techniques of protest to supplement existing ones, and to explore new support bases in combating their marginality. In terms of issues, Dalit struggles prior to the 1990s largely concentrated on the implementation of reservations in education and jobs in the public sector. In the post-1990s, in the realities of a shrinking public sector and expanding private sector, private sector reservation demands have increasingly come into the limelight, alongside the earlier articulated demands.

Major developments in the field of Dalit liberation struggles after the 1990s have involved

setting up a National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR). NCDHR was launched in India in December 1998 to act as a non-political secular forum comprising Dalit scholars and activists. Its purpose is to promote solidarity, cooperation, and collective action at the national level for the promotion of Dalit human rights. The move came against the backdrop of worldwide activities centering around the completion of 50 years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It has brought together Dalit activists from different states and union territories in India and abroad, thereby playing an important role in mobilizing opinion on the Dalit question in connection with the Durban Conference on Racism (2001), the Asian Social Forum meeting at Hyderabad (2003), and the World Social Forum at Bombay (2004).

Up to the 1990s Dalits living outside India had demonstrated little interest in matters regarding the struggles of their communities in India. However, the scenario changed significantly from the 1990s, with the Dalit diaspora taking an active interest in the articulation of demands for Dalit human rights. From the late 1990s Dalit Solidarity Networks (DSN) were set up in different countries to carry forward the struggle for Dalit human rights, bringing within their folds individuals as well as groups. The DSN organized seminars and workshops, undertook signature campaigns, submitted petitions, put up websites, and linked up with international human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. In March 2000, the International Dalit Solidarity Network was established for the networking of national solidarity networks, groups from affected countries, and international bodies concerned about caste discrimination. From 1998 onwards several Dalit conferences were organized in different countries. The First World Dalit Convention, organized by the Dalit International Organization and sponsored by the Indian Progressive Front (Malaysia), was held in Kuala Lumpur. In 2000, the International Conference on Dalit Human Rights was organized by the Voice of Dalits International (VODI) in association with the Dalit Solidarity Network in London. In 2003 an International Dalit Conference was held in Vancouver. In Kathmandu in 2004, the International Dalit Solidarity Network and the Dalit NGO Federation of Nepal organized an International

Consultation on Caste-Based Discrimination entitled *Establishing Dalit Rights in the Contemporary World: The Role of Governments, the United Nations and the Private Sector*.

Given the importance attached by the government of India to international approval, one strand of Dalit strategy has been to raise the issue of Dalit human rights in diverse international fora. From the 1990s the Dalit struggle moved to the international arena. The caste question was discussed for the first time at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. Thereafter, it was raised at the World Summit on Social Development held at Copenhagen in 1995. A detailed critical examination of the system by the UN took place in 1996. Thereafter, the debate continued in different treaty-based bodies. An important effort was made to bring the issue of violation of Dalits' human rights onto the agenda of the UN at the Durban Conference on Racism in 2001. At the Durban conference, Dalit groups from across the world mobilized support from several international human rights organizations and fought a tough battle for the inclusion of caste in the official charter on race as a form of descent-based discrimination. They lost the battle, but they did succeed in drawing worldwide attention to the plight of the Dalits.

In December 2002, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in concluding its discussions on descent-based discrimination, strongly condemned caste practices as violations of the International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In April 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted by consensus a decision to appoint two special rapporteurs to tackle the entrenched problem of caste-based discrimination. The Commission was endorsing an earlier decision taken by its Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the problem and find solutions for its eradication.

Weaknesses remain in the Dalit liberation struggles, due to differences in perspectives, targets, strategies, leadership, and coordination. At the grassroots level, struggles are still largely focused on questions of untouchability, identity, reservations, education, land rights, displacement, and citizenship rights (where relevant). In the course of such struggles, what appears to be in focus is a fragmented rights approach rather

than a holistic human rights perspective. This is the general observable pattern so far as the functioning of the Dalit political parties, pressure lobbies, and Ambedkarite movements is concerned.

Dalit women have been particularly vulnerable, yet over the years their vulnerability has remained less noticed and less protested. Even as Dalit women have since the 1990s begun contesting their marginality and Dalit feminism has entered the academic discourse, their concerns hardly figure in the mainstream of Dalit struggles. The most marginalized amongst the Dalits are perhaps the teeming numbers of child laborers, the vast majority of whom are drawn from these communities. Even as illiteracy and school dropout statistics draw attention, the plight of these children hardly figures in terms of either the traditional rights perspective or the more contemporary Dalit human rights discourse. Such child labor is rampant in carpet weaving, firework and match manufacture, *bidi*-making (hand-rolled indigenous smoking material), glass and bangle manufacture, construction work, and rag-picking, not to mention child prostitution. Yet, on the agenda of Dalit liberation struggles, the question of Dalit child rights remains neglected to say the least.

Despite these limitations, a small but highly articulate Dalit elite, conscious of its rights, began to emerge in India from the first half of the twentieth century – thanks to Ambedkar's persistent efforts. Independence and subsequent legal, administrative, and political developments all acted as boosters in their own way. Today, it is this Dalit elite that has come forth to assert that Dalit rights are human rights. Internationalization of the Dalit issue, agitation by the Dalit diaspora, and emphasis on collective identity as projected through the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights and the Solidarity Networks add new dimensions to the ongoing Dalit struggles.

SEE ALSO: Ambedkar, B. R. (1891–1956); Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); India, Hindutva and Fascist Mobilizations, 1989–2002; Rampa Rebellions in Andhra Pradesh; Women's Movement, India

References and Suggested Readings

- Chatterjee, D. (1998) *Ideas and Movements Against Caste in India: Ancient to Modern Times*. Calcutta: Print-o-Graph.
- Chatterjee, D. (2004) *Up Against Caste: Comparative Study of Ambedkar and Periyar*. Jaipur: Rawat.

- Das Gupta, S. (1969) *Obscure Religious Cults*. Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya.
- Geetha, V. & Rajadurai, S. V. (1998) *Towards a Non-Brahmin Millennium: From Iyothee Thass to Periyar*. Calcutta: Samya.
- Ghurye, G. S. (1993) *Caste and Race in India*. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.
- O'Hanlon, R. (1985) *Caste Conflict and Ideology: Mahatma Jotirao Phule and Low-Caste Protest in Nineteenth-Century Western India*. Hyderabad: Orient Longman.
- Omvedt, G. (1995) *Dalit Visions*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
- Shah, G. (1980) Anti-Untouchability Movements. In V. Shah (Ed.), *Removal of Untouchability*. Ahmedabad: Gujarat University Press.
- Srinivas, M. N. (1966) *Social Change in Modern India*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Thapar, R. (1989) Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the Modern Search for a Hindu Identity. *Modern Asian Studies* 23 (2): 209–31.
- Zelliot, E. & Mokashi-Punekar, R. (Eds.) (2005) *Untouchable Saint: An Indian Phenomenon*. New Delhi: Manohar.

Dange, S. A. (1899–1991)

Shatarupa Sen Gupta

Born in Nasik, Maharashtra, and inspired by the extremist ideas of Tilak, Shripat Amrit Dange's political career began when he was expelled from Bombay University for revolutionary activities. He participated in Gandhi's non-cooperation movement, but the Russian Revolution (1917) moved him towards Marxism. Dange's pamphlet, *Gandhi Versus Lenin* (1921), was much appreciated by M. N. Roy and the Communist International. Also impressed was R. B. Lotvala, a Bombay flour-mill owner, who financed Dange's study of Marxism and also helped him build a library of Marxist literature. By 1922 he had started publishing the *Socialist*, the first Marxist English weekly in India.

In 1924 Dange, along with Muzaffar Ahmed, Shaikat Usmani, and Nalini Gupta, was convicted for a four-year term in the notorious Kanpur Bolshevik Conspiracy Case. From jail they assisted the Conference at Kanpur (December 1925) in forming the Communist Party of India (CPI). After his release Dange immediately began mobilizing the Bombay textile workers through the Girni Kamgar Union as the general secretary, and embarked on a four and half year-long strike

in 1928. Dange edited the official organ of this union, *Krant*.

On March 20, 1929 Dange and 32 others were arrested in the Meerut Conspiracy Case on charges of establishing a branch of Comintern in India. They decided to use their trial as a platform to expose the nature of British imperialism; however, Dange did not sign the common text because it was influenced by the sectarianism of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, and had rejected the civil disobedience movement – Dange held it important for the working class to give critical support to such a mass struggle. He was released in 1935. On October 2, 1939 Dange organized a one-day protest strike of the Bombay textile workers against World War II. Two more strikes followed in March 1940, for which he was arrested and released in 1943 when he was elected to the central committee of the CPI. In 1944 he became the chairman of the All India Trade Unions Congress.

In the period 1946–51 the CPI saw repeated changes in line, including two left lines, an insurrectionist line led by B. T. Ranadive, and a Chinese-style or Andhra line led by C. Rajeswara Rao. Dange was arrested after the illegalization of the CPI and remained in jail until 1950, when he was elected to the Politburo and opposed the advocates of the Andhra line. In the 1950s he was a leader of the struggle to form a unified Marathi-speaking province. In the 1957 elections he was returned to parliament with the biggest vote in India from a constituency in Bombay.

The Sino-Indian border dispute of the 1960s drove a wedge within the CPI. Dange held China responsible for the border incident and took a nationalist position, whereas many other leaders took a pro-Chinese position and condemned the Nehru regime. This, along with the debate on the nature of the Indian state and correct assessment of the Congress, led to a split in 1964, and formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). Dange remained with the CPI and advocated supporting the Congress.

In 1975 Dange supported the state of emergency declared by the Congress government, for which he was severely criticized. Later in the 11th Party Congress the majority of the CPI under the leadership of Chandra Rajeswara Rao opted for left democratic unity, which reduced Dange's group to a minority. In 1980 he was expelled from the National Council of the CPI. He then formed the All India Communist

Party, which soon merged with another small faction, the Indian Communist Party, to form the United Communist Party of India. Dange died on May 22, 1991.

SEE ALSO: India, Non-Violent Non-Cooperation Movement, 1918–1929; Roy, Manabendra Nath (1887–1954)

References and Suggested Readings

- Banerjee, G. (Ed) (2002) *S. A. Dange: A Fruitful Life*. Calcutta: Progressive.
- Overstreet, G. D. & Windmiller, M. (1960) *Communism in India*. Bombay: Perennial Press.

Danton, Georges Jacques (1759–1794)

Junko Takeda

Georges Jacques Danton was a lawyer, a gifted orator, and an influential revolutionary leader during the French Revolution. He was a controversial figure, both revered as a charismatic statesman by his supporters and despised as a corrupt politician by those who opposed him.

Danton was born in 1759 in Arcis-sur-Aube, near Troyes, and followed his father into the legal profession. After studying at Troyes and Reims, he married Gabrielle Charpentier, the daughter of a restaurant owner, and bought the office of *avocat* (lawyer) in the Conseil du Roi in 1774. Through his legal connections he made the acquaintance of another lawyer, the young Camille Desmoulins, who would rise to prominence as a fellow Jacobin and ally throughout the French Revolution. Although he was neither a deputy to the Estates General nor the National Assembly, Danton demonstrated his early enthusiasm for the French Revolution by joining the *Garde Bourgeoise* (Civic Guard) in his Parisian district, where his skill as an orator won him a significant following. In May 1790 he founded the Cordeliers Club, a political organization that would become a center of revolutionary radicalism.

Danton was a principal organizer of the Tuileries uprising of August 10, 1792 that overthrew the monarchy, and his political influence increased significantly thereafter. The following month, when militant bands of Parisian *sans-culottes* invaded the prisons and slaughtered many prisoners, Danton defended their actions

– known to history as the notorious September Massacres – as justified in the context of the military emergency menacing revolutionary Paris. Many of the slain prisoners were belligerent counterrevolutionaries who posed a genuine threat, but many more were undoubtedly innocent of any counterrevolutionary intent.

Subsequently, Danton was elected minister of justice, and then was elected to the National Convention. He was among the majority of Convention delegates who voted for the execution of the king in January 1793. The following April he helped form the Revolutionary Tribunal and was one of the founding members of the first Committee of Public Safety.

Despite his radicalism, which led him to join Robespierre and Marat in the Montagnard faction of the Convention to defeat the moderate Girondins, by the summer of 1793 Danton had begun to differentiate himself from the most radical of the Jacobins, increasingly advocating conciliatory measures in an effort to rein in the Revolution's excesses. He supported the reduction of emergency revolutionary measures, and critiqued Robespierre's growing hold over the Committee of Public Safety. The rift between Robespierre and Danton became even more apparent in debates regarding the continuation of the Terror. Danton and his close comrade Camille Desmoulins used the *Vieux Cordelier* newspaper to express their growing opposition to the left-wing *Enragé* and *Hebertiste* factions.

Robespierre's rise to power in 1793 and 1794 heralded Danton's downfall. Robespierre progressively eliminated his enemies as he successfully steered the revolutionary government between the extremist factions and the moderate "Indulgents," led by Danton. After the Committee of Public Safety, with Danton's collaboration, eliminated the *Hebertistes* and *Enragés*, Robespierre turned on Danton and the Indulgents. Two weeks after the fall of the left-wingers, on March 30, 1794, Danton and Desmoulins were accused of plotting a conspiracy against the Revolution and sentenced to death. After prophetically proclaiming that Robespierre would soon follow him to the grave, and uttering his famed final words to the executioner, "Don't forget to show my head to the people; it's well worth seeing," Danton was guillotined on April 5, 1794.

SEE ALSO: Brissot, Jacques Pierre (1754–1793); French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution,

Radical Factions and Organizations; Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–1793); Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794); *Sans-Culottes*

References and Suggested Readings

- Baker, K. M. (Ed.) (1986) *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Christophe, R. (1967) *Danton: A Biography*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Hampson, N. (1978) *Danton*. London: Duckworth.
- Wendel, H. (1935) *Danton*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Daquilema, Fernando (d. 1872) and the 1871 Uprising, Ecuador

Natalie Mutlak

Fernando Daquilema, a peasant from Cacha, Ecuador, led an indigenous uprising in December 1871 that is considered to be one of the most important in nineteenth-century Ecuador. The uprising expressed indigenous resistance against Ecuadorian nation-state building and was caused by high church taxes and forced labor for national roadworks.

Daquilema was an Indian living in the community of Yaruquies, in the province of Chimborazo, Ecuador. Personal data such as his date of birth are sparse and difficult to confirm. The uprising he led occurred during the presidency of Gabriel García Moreno (1859–65 and 1869–75), whose political project was the introduction of Ecuador to the international capitalist system and the integration of the country through the construction of national roads connecting coast and highlands.

In this context, two mechanisms were of special significance. On one hand, the payment of the “tithe” was established in 1866. Under this system, the tenth part of harvest and cattle had to be paid to the church. Tithe collectors were usually part of the local oligarchy, who often abused their power by multiplying the tax. On the other hand, the “law of subsidiary work for national roadworks,” passed on August, 3, 1869, particularly affected indigenous people by creating a system of forced labor. Both mechanisms provoked demographic decline and impoverishment and were met with strong indigenous

resistance. The community of Yaruquies, where the 1871 uprising was launched, was one of the hardest hit.

On December 12, 1871, the tithe collector Rudecindo Rivera was stopped and killed by a crowd of indigenous people when he was leaving Yaruquies. Approximately 3,000 insurgents gathered the same night and named Daquilema, who had been one of the leaders of the incident, king of Cacha. The next morning the crowd unsuccessfully attacked the community of Yaruquies. After this defeat, 20,000 people attacked the communities of Gajabamba and then Punin, where the indigenous peoples took over the town until the troops of Riobamba intervened. Communities from Cuenca, Ecuador in the south up to Pasto, Colombia in the north joined the uprising, so that President Moreno was forced to declare a state of emergency on December 21, 1871 and send in armed government forces. On December 23, the insurgents pleaded for a general reprieve, and Daquilema surrendered a few days later. Daquilema’s trial opened on March, 23, 1872, and he was sentenced to death and executed on April, 8 1872.

As a consequence of the uprising, the tithe decree was reformed and its abuse was prohibited. Acts of indigenous resistance in the province of Chimborazo were numerous, but the revolt led by Daquilema is a particularly essential part of the collective memory. During the 1990 national uprising in Ecuador, reference was made to Daquilema as part of the history of indigenous struggle against the dominant culture.

SEE ALSO: Ecuador, Indigenous and Popular Struggles

References and Suggested Readings

- Costales Samaniego, A. (1963) *Fernando Daquilema: Ultimo Guaminga*. Quito: Instituto Ecuatoriano de Antropología y Geografía.
- López Ocón Cabrera, L. (1987) Etnogénesis y Rebeldía Andina: La Sublevación de Fernando Daquilema en la Provincia del Chimborazo en 1871. *Boletín americanista* 28 (36): 113–33. Barcelona.

Davis, Angela (b. 1944)

Yusuf Nuruddin

Angela Davis is a political activist and Marxist philosopher. In 1970 this African American

woman, a unique product of varied experiences – the Jim Crow South, left-leaning activist parents, an elite and international education, a faculty appointment at UCLA, membership in the Communist Party of America (CPUSA), and solidarity with the black liberation movement – became a celebrated political prisoner and an internationally recognized revolutionary and symbol of black resistance.

Davis was born and raised in the racially segregated city of Birmingham, Alabama. Her parents were college graduates and educators. Her mother was an elementary school teacher; her father, initially a high school history teacher, eventually left the low-paying field of education to become a small businessman and became the proprietor of a service station in the black section of Birmingham. From an early age, Davis was acutely aware of, and often subjected to, the indignities, hostilities, and terror of segregation. Violence was not uncommon; her family's modest middle-class dwelling was at the very edge of a contested residential demarcation line separating black and white neighborhoods. The continuing black influx which traversed that line of demarcation was met by white flight and armed resistance. The tense area became known as Dynamite Hill, so frequent were the bombings to frighten away encroaching blacks who purchased property on the white side of the street.

Davis's parents were politically active, left-leaning opponents of segregation, with membership in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and friends in the CPUSA. As educators and activists they provided a culturally enriched and politically conscious environment, using their left social network to ensure that Davis would receive a first-class education. Through the auspices of a Quaker-administrated experimental program seeking to integrate black Southern students into white Northern prep schools, Davis spent her high school years at Elizabeth Irwin, a private K thru 12 school located in Greenwich Village in New York City and staffed by radical teachers who had been blacklisted by the public school system. In the classroom she was introduced to the *Communist Manifesto*, which had a striking impact upon her. As she warmed to this philosophy, classmates invited her to join Advance, a Marxist-Leninist youth organization affiliated with the CPUSA, which met at the home of Herbert Aptheker. Her young comrades

in Advance included the sons and daughters of several prominent Communist Party leaders.

Davis spent her undergraduate years at Brandeis University in Waltham, MA. As one of the few black students at the Jewish-sponsored university, Davis deeply appreciated the rare occasions on campus when guest speakers such as James Baldwin and Malcolm X addressed the black experience. Davis forged friendships with international students, including people of color, and deepened her internationalism through travel throughout Europe during summers and a junior year spent studying abroad in France. It was at Brandeis that Davis first came under the influence of the Frankfurt School philosopher, Herbert Marcuse. When Marcuse accepted an appointment at the University of California at San Diego, Davis followed him there to pursue graduate studies. Before doing so, she traveled to Germany where she spent two years studying under Theodore Adorno and other Frankfurt School philosophers.

While completing her doctorate, Davis traveled to Cuba to witness socialism firsthand and participate in productive labor in the sugar cane fields. In California her commitment to the black liberation movement deepened as she allied herself with the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Black Panther Party, and the Che-Lumumba Club, a black cell of the Communist Party. She first drew national attention in 1969 as a new yet embattled faculty appointee in the philosophy department at UCLA. Her radical political activism was controversial and drew the ire – and hate mail – of many conservatives who sought to fire her. When her contract was not renewed, Davis waged a fierce struggle to defend herself against political repression. Her enemies included Governor Ronald Reagan who vowed, upon her initial dismissal, that she would never work in the California university system again.

While fighting for her own rights, Davis continued to be drawn into political campaigns to aid other blacks facing racial injustice. One such prominent campaign was that of the Soledad Brothers. During a prison yard melee between black and white inmates in Soledad Prison, a marksman guard in the tower took careful aim and killed three black prisoners. In retaliation for the murder of the three black inmates, a guard was killed by a group of black inmates during a second Soledad prison rebellion. George Jackson,

John Cluchette, and Fleeta Drumgo, three vocal and politically militant inmates, were singled out because of their radical politics and framed for the prison guard's murder, though there was no evidence connecting them to the crime. Davis became increasingly involved with the community campaign to exonerate the Soledad Brothers – Jackson, Cluchette, and Drumgo – shrewdly using the publicity of her own struggle with the University of California to draw attention to the case, meeting with members of their families, and eventually meeting the Soledad Brothers in person. This meeting was eventful because Jackson and Davis were emotionally attracted to one another and the relationship between the two deepened through prison visits and an exchange of letters. Initially framed for a \$70 gas station holdup, Jackson spent over a decade in the penitentiary. Davis worked closely with George Jackson's younger brother, Jonathan Jackson, to free the Soledad Brothers and to publish the ten-years' worth of voluminous correspondence between the Jackson brothers, which documented their increasing political radicalization.

On August 7, 1970 Jonathan Jackson smuggled a carbine rifle into a Marin County Courthouse during the trial of three San Quentin prisoners, Ruchell Magee, James McClain, and William Christmas, freeing the prisoners and taking the trial judge and prosecuting attorney as hostages as the four demanded freedom for the Soledad Brothers and for all political prisoners. Officers fired upon their escape vehicle, and the aborted Marin County Courthouse revolt resulted in the deaths of Jonathan Jackson, McClain, Christmas, and trial judge Harold Haley, and the paralysis of the prosecuting attorney Gary Thomas. As a result of these events Angela Davis was catapulted to worldwide fame. She was implicated in the Marin County Courthouse plot because a shotgun used in the revolt was registered to her. She became the subject of a nationwide manhunt as one of the FBI's Ten Most-Wanted criminals, an underground fugitive, and upon her capture, a feted political prisoner. The Free Angela Davis campaign engendered enthusiastic mass support from both the white left, the general African American community, socialist countries, and the broad international community. Students in particular were drawn to her cause and media attention – both sympathetic and hostile – was riveted upon her. A *Newsweek* cover story

with the photograph of a manacled but proud and unbowed Davis was simply captioned “Angela Davis: Black Revolutionary” – a phrase which summarized her living legend, a legend which invoked awe and fear in some but awe, respect, and admiration in others. In June 1972 an all-white jury acquitted Davis of all charges.

After her acquittal, Davis continued her political activism. She was the founder of the National Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression. She ran as vice presidential candidate on the Communist Party ticket in 1980 and 1984, but broke with the party in 1991 to help found the Committees of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism. Incarcerated over a year herself as she awaited trial, Davis has become an advocate not for “prison reform” but for the abolition of the entire prison-industrial complex. She is also a vigorous opponent of the death penalty and a member of the Advisory Board of the Prison Activist Resource Center. Davis is an ardent supporter of women's rights and a critic of the masculinist and misogynist tendencies in the black liberation movement. She spoke out against the chauvinist implications of the Million Man March and continues to lecture nationally and is author of several books. The focus of much of her work is on the nexus of race, class, and gender. Despite Ronald Reagan's vows, Angela Davis currently holds the Presidential Chair Professorship in the department of history and consciousness at the University of California at Santa Cruz, where she is also director of the feminist studies department.

SEE ALSO: Black Panthers; Brown, H. Rap (b. 1943); Carmichael, Stokely/Kwame Turé (1941–1998); *Communist Manifesto*; Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA); Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

References and Suggested Readings

- Aptheker, B. (1997) *The Morning Breaks: The Trial of Angela Davis*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Davis, A. (1983) *Women, Race and Class*. New York: Vintage.
- Davis, A. (1989) *Angela Davis: An Autobiography*. New York: International Publishers.
- Jackson, G. (1994) *Soledad Brother: The Prison Letters of George Jackson*. Chicago: Lawrence Hill.
- James, J. (1998) *The Angela Y. Davis Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Davitt, Michael (1846–1906)

William H. Mulligan, Jr.

Michael Davitt was a revolutionary and politician active in several Irish nationalist organizations. He first joined the Fenian movement – the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) – but was expelled after announcing his commitment to achieve Irish independence through means other than physical force. Davitt then joined with Charles Stewart Parnell to create the Land League of Ireland, and continued throughout his career to advocate Irish land reform.

Davitt was born March 25, 1846 at Straide, County Mayo, Ireland. In 1852 his family was evicted from their land and settled in Haslingden, Lancashire, England. Davitt went to work at an early age in a local cotton mill. When he was 11 he lost his right arm in an industrial accident. He was able to attend school for a few years before going to work for a printer in 1861.

Soon after joining the Fenians in 1865 Davitt rose to the leadership of his circle. During an attempted uprising in 1867 he led a contingent in an attempt to seize a large cache of weapons at Chester Castle in the northwest of England. The attack failed, but Davitt and his men managed to avoid capture. For several years he was organizing secretary for the IRB in England and Scotland, during which time he worked as a traveling firearms salesman. In 1870 Davitt was convicted of felony treason and sentenced to 15 years in prison, but – through the efforts of Isaac Butt and the Amnesty Association – he was freed after 7 years.

His first publication was a pamphlet describing prison conditions and his own mistreatment. While in prison, Davitt began to rethink his political principles, eventually rejecting the Fenians' reliance on secret organization and the use of physical force to gain Irish independence. Instead, he began to favor an approach that sought change through aggressive advocacy and constitutional means. Davitt also came to see agrarian reform as central to the solution of Ireland's political problems.

Davitt's family had emigrated to the United States, and in 1878 he traveled there to visit them. While in the United States he met reformer Henry George, and the two men found a great

deal of ideological common ground. Before returning to Ireland, Davitt made a major speech in Boston in which he outlined his ideas about Ireland's future, discussing both agrarian reform and independence, and how they should be sought.

Shortly after his return, the supreme council of the IRB rejected Davitt's new approach, reaffirming its commitment to physical force and its focus on independence rather than a wider range of reforms. Davitt returned to his native Mayo and began recruiting support for his ideas. By August 1879 he had organized the Land League of Mayo, and a few months later, the Land League of Ireland, in alliance with Charles Stewart Parnell. When Davitt worked openly to elect Parnell and his allies in the 1880 election, the supreme council of the IRB expelled him, thus officially ending his ties to the Fenian movement.

Davitt's alliance with Parnell was pragmatic. The two men differed in temperament and tactical approach, and their goals and priorities were not the same. When Parnell was arrested in October 1881 and incarcerated in Kilmainham Gaol, he reached an agreement on land issues with the government, "the Treaty of Kilmainham," that led to his release on May 2, 1882. But four days later the Phoenix Park murders (the assassination of two high-ranking government officials in Dublin by Fenians) brought the entire reform movement under heavy attack. Davitt did not support the Treaty of Kilmainham, but in the interests of solidarity he kept his differences with Parnell private. Toward the end of the decade, however, the two men parted ways once and for all when Parnell's personal life erupted in a controversy (the Kitty O'Shea scandal) that ended his political career, and Davitt was among his harshest critics.

Parnell's fall brought reform efforts in Ireland to a temporary halt. Davitt went on a lecture tour to Australia in 1895 and while abroad was elected to Parliament. On previous occasions he had been disqualified after being elected, but this time he was allowed to take his seat. In 1898 he collaborated with William O'Brien to form the United Irish League, which brought the Parnellite and anti-Parnellite factions of the reform movement together.

Like many Irish nationalists, Davitt supported the Boers during their war against British domination. He resigned from Parliament in 1899 and worked unsuccessfully at organizing European

support for the Boers. Meanwhile, he continued to be a forceful advocate of land reform in Ireland. He opposed both the Dunraven Conference report on the Land Question in 1903 and the resulting Wyndham Land Purchase Act, which he perceived as major steps backward because their terms undid much of the work of the Land League and its successor organizations.

Throughout his political career Davitt supported himself working as a journalist. He regularly refused a salary or gifts from supporters. He married Mary Yore of Michigan in 1886 and they had six children. In 1906, shortly after helping the Labour Party in an election, Davitt became ill and died on May 31. He was buried in his native Straide, County Mayo.

SEE ALSO: Fenian Movement; Irish Nationalism; Parnell, Charles Stewart (1846–1891)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bew, P. (1979) *Land and the National Question in Ireland, 1858–1921*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
- Bull, P. (1996) *Land, Politics, and Nationalism: A Study of the Irish Land Question*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Campbell, F. (2005) *Land and Revolution: Nationalist Politics in the West of Ireland, 1891–1921*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- King, C. (1999) *Michael Davitt*. Dundalk: Historical Association of Ireland.
- Moody, T. W. (1981) *Davitt and Irish Revolution, 1846–1882*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Day, Dorothy (1897–1980)

Benjamin J. Pauli

As a writer, activist, and matriarch of the Catholic Worker movement, Dorothy Day helped to redefine the way Catholic religious teaching related to social engagement. Day was born in Brooklyn in 1897 but spent the bulk of her formative years in Chicago, where exposure to urban poverty initiated what would become a lifelong concern with social ills. When she first came into contact with radicalism as a student at the University of Illinois, the groundwork of righteous indignation that had been laid during her explorations of Chicago's slums was channeled into political activism. She joined the Socialist

Party and began working for the Socialist newspaper the *Call* in 1916 upon moving to New York City. This was the first of several newspaper positions, and her journalism brought her into contact with protests, marches, and meetings, as well as the crowd of bohemian leftist intellectuals that became her chosen coterie.

Day was about to undergo a religious transformation, however, which would put this period of her life – which included multiple partners, a divorce, and an abortion – in a significantly different perspective. While Day had felt a vague spirituality all her life, as a young woman she had been hostile toward religion on account of its role in fostering complacency and conservatism. Yet her interest in Catholicism grew during these years, and was bolstered by the birth of her daughter in 1927, whom she promptly baptized a Catholic. Day's conversion followed shortly thereafter, resulting in the alienation of her radical friends and the end of her common-law marriage to the father of her child. It was, at first, not at all obvious to Day that she would be able to harmonize her new-found faith with the radical social and political ideas that had stayed with her since her college years, and she suffered debilitating internal conflict for the next five years as she struggled to reconcile these priorities. In December 1932, her prayers were answered in the person of Peter Maurin, a French peasant who cheerfully combined Old World Catholic faith with a radical social program. The paper they started the following year, the *Catholic Worker*, represented the inception of the movement that would claim the rest of her life.

Day was at the forefront of all of the Catholic Worker movement's activities during her lifetime, and she edited the New York *Catholic Worker* until 1940, thereafter contributing as a reporter and columnist. While she tended to characterize her role as the logistical facilitator of the agenda originally laid down by Maurin, the spiritual authority she wielded within the movement ensured that her perspectives and priorities remained dominant. In relation to the theological teaching and hierarchy of the church, she would consistently display both the meekness of a guest in an adopted spiritual community and the deference of a sinner atoning for past transgressions. As a result, her social radicalism was paradoxically mixed with a theological conservatism that often set her at odds with other members of the movement, especially as the *Catholic Worker* carved out

a place for itself within the intensifying current of activism in the 1960s.

Though Day's staunch commitment to pacifism, moral integrity, and humble service up to the day of her death in 1980 cemented her standing as a source of inspiration for untold activists, her reputation was further bolstered in 2000 when she was designated a Servant of God.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchism in the United States to 1945; Anarchism in the United States, 1946–Present; Catholic Worker Movement; Socialist Party, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Day, D. (1997) *The Long Loneliness*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Elie, P. (2004) *The Life You Save May Be Your Own: An American Pilgrimage*. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.
- Miller, W. D. (2000) *A Harsh and Dreadful Love: Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker Movement*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

De Silva, Colvin Reginald (1907–1989)

Charles Wesley Ervin

Born in Randombe, a village near Balapitiya, Ceylon, Colvin de Silva was a leading political activist, labor leader, Trotskyist theoretician, and popular orator in Sri Lanka. He went to England to pursue higher studies and was the youngest student ever to receive a doctorate from London University. While active in the Ceylon Students' Association in London, he met pro-communist students and was recruited by the young communist firebrand, Philip Gunawardena, to a circle of Trotskyists in London.

Returning to Ceylon, de Silva joined the South Colombo Youth League, affiliated to the All-Ceylon Youth Congress. With Gunawardena he led a successful strike at the Wellawatte Spinning and Weaving Mills, providing the Marxist group with its first trade union base. In December 1935 he participated in the founding conference of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), serving as the party's president for the next four years. He used his legal skills to combat colonial repression, notably the attempt to deport a young Australian party sympathizer, Mark Bracegirdle,

for the shooting of a Tamil worker during a strike on the Mooloya Estate in 1940.

On June 17, 1940 the colonial government, rattled by LSSP's anti-war and labor agitation, banned the party, jailing de Silva and three party leaders. In April 1942 the imprisoned Trotskyists escaped and fled to India. In Bombay, de Silva actively participated in the historic Quit India revolt as an activist of the newly formed Bolshevik Leninist Party of India (BLPI), the Indo-Ceylonese section of the Fourth International. Colvin escaped police raids in July 1943, and with several other Ceylonese fugitives relocated to Calcutta, where a BLPI branch was functioning clandestinely. During this period de Silva was BLPI secretary and a leading theoretician of the party. Using the pen names "C. R. Govindan" and "Lily Roy," he wrote pamphlets such as *The Dissolution of the Comintern* (1944) and *First Round of European Socialist Revolution* (1945). He also maintained contact with the international leadership of the Fourth International, an international Trotskyist organization in opposition to the Soviets and mainstream socialist parties.

In 1947 de Silva was elected to Ceylon's first parliament. When the British exited in 1948, de Silva developed the thesis that independence was "fake," a shift from direct to indirect rule. He became a principal LSSP leader after ending a divisive split. De Silva planned the August 1953 mass one-day *hartal* (general shutdown), led by the LSSP and left parties, forcing the government to restore rice subsidies.

Philip Gunawardena formed a rival party after leaving the LSSP, and in 1950 joined a liberal coalition government. When this government proposed making Sinhala the official state language, de Silva eloquently demanded in parliament for Sinhala–Tamil parity, warning of the dangers if the Tamil were relegated to second-class status: "Two languages: one nation. One language: two nations."

From 1960 to 1962, N. M. Perera, the popular LSSP leader, urged his party members to abandon their purist Trotskyism and engage in coalition politics, a position de Silva opposed. But by 1964 a majority of the LSSP supported Perera on this issue and the party formed a coalition government with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. Colvin de Silva refused to accept a portfolio in the coalition government, but did not join a new ultra-left faction that split with the party. In 1970 de Silva became the minister of plantation

industries and constitutional affairs in Sirimavo Bandaranaike's coalition government. He helped draft the new republican constitution of Sri Lanka and did not oppose state repression of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front) uprising in 1971, led by the radical Sinhalese nationalist youth group. In 1982 de Silva ran for president on the LSSP ticket, receiving only 1 percent of the vote.

SEE ALSO: Gunawardena, Don Philip Rupasinghe (1901–1972); Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and Sri Lankan Radicalism; People's Liberation Front of Sri Lanka (JVP); Tamil Nationalist Struggle for Eelam

References and Suggested Readings

Muthiah, W. S. & Wanasinghe, S. (Eds.) (2002) *We Were Making History: The Hartal of 1953*. Colombo: Young Socialist Publications.

Peiris, G. L. (1991) *Some Themes in the Life and Work of Dr. Colvin R. de Silva*. Colombo: Star Press.

De Valera, Eamon (1882–1975)

William H. Mulligan, Jr.

Eamon de Valera, the highest-ranking survivor of the 1916 Easter Rising in Ireland, played a leading role in Irish political life from 1916 through 1959. More than any other figure, he shaped



De Valera was arrested in 1916 for his involvement in the Irish Easter Rising. He was tried and sentenced to death, but the sentence was quickly commuted, mainly because of the fact that de Valera was born in America. A year later an amnesty was passed and de Valera and the others arrested in connection with the Easter Rising were freed. (Irish Embassy, Paris, France, Archives Charmet/The Bridgeman Art Library)

the nature of independent Ireland's social and economic life.

Eamon de Valera was born in New York City on October 14, 1882. His father, Juan Vivion de Valera, of Spanish ancestry, played little if any role in his life. His mother, Kate Coll, sent him home to Ireland in 1885 where he was raised by an uncle in Bruree, County Limerick. Little is known with certainty about his brief time in New York, his father, or his parents' exact relationship. During his political career much innuendo and speculation circulated about his early life – little of which was based on documented facts – and that has continued after his death as historians assess his life and contribution to Ireland.

De Valera was educated at the Bruree National School and then, as a scholarship student, first at Blackrock College and then at University College Dublin. He taught mathematics at a number of schools in Dublin and then at Carysfort College, Blackrock, a training school for female National School teachers. An attempt to obtain a professorship in mathematics at the National University of Ireland was unsuccessful. In 1908 he joined the Gaelic League, where he met his future wife, Sinéad, a National School and Irish language teacher, whom he married in 1910.

In 1913 de Valera joined the Irish Volunteers, which had been organized to counter paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland that were opposed to Home Rule. He also joined the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). The IRB was a secret society that was opposed by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, of which de Valera was a devout member throughout his life. This is but one of a number of enigmas concerning de Valera and his actions during a long career in public life.

During the 1916 Easter Rising de Valera commanded the defense of the southeastern approaches to Dublin. There was heavy fighting in the area he commanded, but he was not directly involved. After the failure of the rising, he was among the leaders sentenced to death by a British military tribunal. A public outcry against the executions, however, resulted in his sentence being commuted to life in prison. He was the highest-ranking participant in the rising to survive. By June 1917 he had been released from prison as the British government sought to gain peace in Ireland and support there and in the United States for its war effort. Passage of a law to conscript Irish youth into the British

army generated strong opposition in Ireland. A sharp increase in nationalist sentiment led to the election of 73 Sinn Féin (Ourselves Alone) candidates, including de Valera, who won seats in Parliament in the 1918 general election.

In January 1919 the successful Sinn Féin candidates, rather than taking their parliamentary seats in London, met in Dublin and constituted themselves as Dáil Éireann (Irish Parliament), and elected de Valera its president. He soon left Ireland for the United States, seeking financial and political support for the nascent republic. Arthur Griffith, the founder of Sinn Féin, replaced him as president. His trip to the United States was a mixed success. He raised a substantial amount of money, but did not obtain US government recognition of the Irish Republic and had a number of conflicts with Irish American leaders, especially Judge Daniel Cohalan of New York. When he returned to Ireland the guerrilla war for Irish independence was well underway and Michael Collins had emerged as the principal Irish republican leader. However, de Valera, due to his connection to 1916, resumed the presidency of the Dáil.

In the aftermath of the Versailles Peace Conference and its rhetoric about the self-determination of nations, world opinion and British public opinion supported the Irish in their war for independence. Although he initially discussed terms of a settlement with British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, after the truce of July 11, 1921, and after the Dáil rejected the first version, de Valera sent a delegation to London headed by Collins and Griffith to resolve remaining disagreements and complete the negotiations. He opposed the final treaty, which gave Ireland dominion status within the British Commonwealth, without clearly stating an alternative to acceptance and addressing the consequences of rejection. A major obstacle for de Valera was an oath of allegiance to the British monarch as head of state that the treaty required of members of the Dáil.

When the Dáil approved the revised treaty he led his faction out in protest. He allowed himself to be named president of the putative Irish republic founded by the 1916 Easter Rising, which he and other opponents of the treaty claimed it dishonored. This split led to the Irish Civil War. His position in that conflict, however, remains very ambiguous. He appears to have been more of a figurehead with the title of president

than the actual anti-treaty leader, having lost effective control to Liam Lynch, among others. Former comrades-in-arms during the War for Independence waged a brief but very violent struggle for control of the new Saorstát Éireann (Irish Free State). Atrocities on both sides weakened the fledgling state and undermined its legitimacy. After Lynch's death in April 1923, de Valera regained control and quickly sought a cease-fire from the Free State government led by William Cosgrave. When he failed to get one, he unilaterally declared the war over. He was imprisoned by the Free State government, but elected to the Dáil while still in Kilmainham Gaol. He again refused to take the oath, as did his supporters, and they were denied their seats. His purpose was, and remains, unclear.

His leadership of Sinn Féin was challenged at its 1926 Ard Fheis (annual convention) and he lost his position as president of the alternative Irish Republic. He quickly formed a new political party, Fianna Fáil (Soldiers of Ireland). In 1927 the Dáil passed a law requiring candidates to agree to take the oath before running for office. Faced with political irrelevance, he and his followers took the oath he had resisted for so long and took their seats in Dáil Éireann. Fianna Fáil won the general election in 1932 and de Valera became president of the executive council of the Irish Free State. He would be the central figure in Irish political life until 1959, and then served as president of Ireland under the 1937 Constitution, which he wrote, from 1959 to 1973.

As soon as he gained power, he began dismantling the apparatus of the Free State's dominion status under the Treaty of 1921. In 1937 the new Constitution he wrote severed all ties to Great Britain, asserted Irish sovereignty over all 32 counties, and expressed Ireland's intention to become economically self-sufficient. The constitution also reflected de Valera's social conservatism, especially in its recognition of the Roman Catholic Church's "special place" in Irish society.

During World War II, known in Ireland as the Emergency, de Valera declared the nation neutral rather than allying it with Britain, the "ancient enemy." In large part this was a pragmatic recognition of the after-effects of the Irish Civil War. Ireland was far from completely neutral, however, and in fact favored the Allies against the Central Powers in many ways. De Valera sparked controversy by signing the

condolence book at the German embassy after Hitler's death. His explanation that neutrality required it because he had signed the condolence book at the United States' embassy after Roosevelt's death is consistent with the literalism inherent in his long opposition to an oath of loyalty to the British king (although most people viewed the oath as meaningless).

While not among the top leaders of the 1916 Easter Rising, de Valera was the person most responsible for implementing its vision of an independent Ireland. The principal leaders had been executed, and neither of his two main rivals, Griffith and Collins, survived the Civil War. William Cosgrave, head of government from 1922 to 1932, had to first deal with the Civil War that de Valera's intransigence triggered, and then to establish a government for a new state whose legitimacy was questioned, all the while burdened by the ambiguity that de Valera's conduct imposed on Irish political life.

De Valera's Ireland was socially conservative – largely deferring to the Roman Catholic hierarchy on social questions, most famously on the issue of healthcare for women and children – and committed to ineffective economic policies promoting self-sufficiency. Under de Valera, Ireland remained a poor country characterized by large-scale emigration of its youth. He spoke on many occasions of the spiritual nature of the Irish people, whom he presented as uninterested in materialism. Characteristic of his influence was the remarkable fact that television did not arrive in Ireland until after his retirement from active politics.

De Valera died in 1975 and is buried in Dublin's Glasnevin cemetery in a simple grave, neither in the Republican Plot nor in an elaborate site like those of O'Connell, Parnell, and Collins.

SEE ALSO: Collins, Michael (1890–1922); Easter Rising and Irish Civil War; Irish Nationalism; O'Connell, Daniel (1775–1847); Parnell, Charles Stewart (1846–1891); Sinn Féin

References and Suggested Readings

- Brennan, R. (2002) *Eamon de Valera: A Memoir*. Dublin: University College Dublin Press.
- Coogan, T. P. (1993) *Eamon de Valera: The Man Who Was Ireland*. New York: Harper Collins.
- De Valera, E. (1980) *Speeches and Statements by Eamon de Valera, 1917–1973*. Ed. M. Moynihan. New York: St. Martin's Press.

- De Valera, T. (2004) *A Memoir*. Dublin: Currach Press.
- Edwards, O. D. (1987) *Eamon de Valera*. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.

Debord, Guy (1931–1994) and the spectacle

Dimitrios K. Dalakoglou

Guy Ernest Debord was a self-described filmmaker, agitator, activist, author, artist, and the most famous member of avant-garde movements Lettrism International and Situationist International (SI). Together with the rest of the Situationists, he was involved in – and to a certain degree influenced – the May 1968 rebellion in France. In theoretical terms he was part of the poststructuralist Marxist trend of the 1960s and was engaged in an aesthetic-oriented direct action activism until the early 1970s, when he abandoned such activities “for the construction of situations.” Debord co-edited the journal *Internationale Situationiste*, to which he contributed eight articles, and is the author of numerous pamphlets, books, and articles written between 1952 and 1994. His most famous and comprehensive book is *The Society of the Spectacle* (1967), upon which his 1973 film of the same title is based.

The Society of the Spectacle was published in French in November 1967, and in English in 1970. The book is divided into nine parts and includes 221 theses (indicated by the symbol #). Its layout, in combination with the lack of page numbers, provides a dynamic “manifesto” style.

The book is illustrated with *détournements*: images “hijacked” from other sources, transformed from their original meaning and rerouted to facilitate situationist political purposes. This was also the technique of situationist filmmaking. Generally, Situationists suggested the “hijacking” of preexisting dominant discourses in an attempt to subvert and reclaim them. Examples include the rewording of preexisting texts, film scenes with replaced dialogue, or popular political and commercial images subverted into ironic collages. Such visual *détournements* were part of a broader political SI agenda.

The Society of the Spectacle was critically based on political philosophy such as works by Hegel, Georg Lukács, and especially Marx and Engels. It was also influenced by the writings of anarchists such as Mikhail Bakunin and Max Stirner, socialist thinkers such as Charles Fourier, Rosa Luxemburg, Bruno Rizzi, Eduard Bernstein, and Anton Pannekoek, historians such as Lewis Mumford and Daniel Boorstin, and other thinkers such as William Whyte, Sigmund Freud, and Søren Kierkegaard.

According to Marx's theory of commodity fetishism, social relationships amongst people and the relationship between the producer and his/her own product are masked within the market economy. The social relationships of capitalism alienate individuals from other people, their own labor and production, and from their own everyday experience. Capitalism of *both* types (Debord considered socialist countries to be under a "bureaucratic capitalism"), but especially modern market capitalism, reduced commodities and consumption to the most significant elements of society. This commodity-centered system of reference was causing a more advanced alienation.

The society of the spectacle is a stage of modern capitalist society which emerges with the broader usage of technology, especially that of mass media and the moving image. In the society of the spectacle, sight and visual representations dominate everyday experience. Debord argued that in an earlier stage of the economy's domination over society, "being" was degraded into "having," while during a subsequent stage "being" is further degraded from "having" into "appearing." Commodities, which were once actual material objects, are gradually being replaced by visual representations, images. For example, people consume not the actual commodity but its branding, which is a fundamentally visual element. However, the alienating properties of the system remain, hence this consumption of commodities-images mediates the latest type of human alienation.

The spectacle becomes the major system of reference, colonizes everyday life, and attributes to people the role of image-consumers and thus of passive spectators, not that of active agents. Consequently, people are transformed into spectators of their own lives. Control of these visual representations, for example within television,

is monopolized by a dominant system which empowers and maintains the reproduction of the sovereign sociopolitical and cultural regime. Within this system of powerful but controlled representations, authentic situations are being created anew in a sphere of visual representations; thus, a non-real perception of everyday life, space, time, and history dominates the human experience. Debord argued that appropriate revolutionary praxis should be an aesthetic image-centered one that uses the "spectacular" mechanisms of the dominant regime. This is the essential Situationist principle of the construction of situations: a direct action where people create the situations of their own experiences and do not accept the representations-situations constructed by others within the spectacle.

Besides the concept of the "spectacle" *per se*, the book also emphasizes the themes of aesthetics, consumption, social class, space, time, city, media, art, and culture. In 1988 Debord published *Comments on The Society of the Spectacle*, which was a retrospective added to the 1967 book. There he defended his theses against various critiques and claimed that the contemporary society was/is an advanced phase of the society of the spectacle, where resistance and change were/are even more difficult than in the 1960s.

Debord was a notoriously contradictory figure. Henri Lefebvre, who was involved with the Situationists before coming into conflict with Debord, was subsequently concerned with what he thought to be Debord's over-critical attitude, especially against other contemporary Marxists. He also claimed that Debord had created tensions as a result of his often authoritarian stance within the Situationist International. Debord's work has been criticized for what was considered an unnecessarily affected style of prose, while some authors doubt its originality. Nonetheless, Guy Debord remains one of the most significant radical authors of the 1960s who represents the great paradigmatic shift in the political discourse.

In 1994 Debord shot himself dead. The theoretical legacy of his spectacle theory today is well established in the critical analysis of modernity, media, and visual and material culture within academic discourses. More important, however, are his political propositions, which inspire and remain relevant within contemporary radical activism around the world.

SEE ALSO: Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932); Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831); Lukács, Georg (1885–1971); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; May 1968 French Uprisings; Situationists

References and Suggested Readings

- Debord, G. (1967/2004) *The Society of the Spectacle*. 2nd ed. Trans. K. Knabb. London: Rebel Press. (See also translation by D. Nicholson-Smith, published New York: Zone Books, 1995.)
- Debord, G. (1973) *La Société du spectacle*. Paris: Simar Films. (Film)
- Debord, G. (1988/1990) *Comments on the Society of the Spectacle*. London: Verso.
- Debord, G. & Wolman, G. (1956) A User's Guide to Détournement. *Les Lèvres Nues* 8 (May) (in French).
- Jappe, A. (1999) *Guy Debord*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Knabb, K. (Ed.) (2006) *Situationist International Anthology*. Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets. Available at www.bopsecrets.org/SI/index.htm.
- Lefebvre, H. & Ross, K. (1997) Lefebvre on the Situationists: An Interview. Special issue on "Guy Debord and the Internationale Situationniste," *Internationale Situationniste* 79 (October): 69–83.

Debs, Eugene (1855–1926)

Stacy Warner Maddern

Few individuals have ever conformed to the tradition of American radicalism quite like Eugene V. Debs. Both politician and agitator, Debs led the Socialist Party in America from its inception in 1901 to his death in 1926. From 1900 to 1920 he conducted five presidential campaigns as the socialist candidate, polling nearly 6 percent of the national vote in 1912. Born in 1855 at Terre Haute, Indiana, Debs dropped out of high school at age 14 and became a painter for the railways. By 1870 he was working as a fireman on the railroad and attending night classes at a local business college. It was on the railroads that Debs would first be exposed to organized labor as a member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, an organization that would later name him "grand secretary" in 1875.

In 1893 Debs helped found the American Railway Union (ARU), organizing all ranks of railroad workers together. Organized in Chicago, the ARU was the first industrial union in the

United States, and Debs' experience with the group helped lead him to cooperative socialism. It also led him to jail for the first time as a result of the 1894 Pullman Strike. Reacting to a 28 percent wage decrease, 4,000 Pullman Palace Car Company workers took to a wildcat strike throughout Illinois on May 11, shutting down the railways west of Chicago. Many of these workers were members of the ARU, who under Debs wanted a peaceful, non-violent strike. The solution was an organized boycott by union members of running trains containing Pullman cars. However, when the Pullman Company brought in strike-breakers, violence erupted and US marshalls were brought in to end the strike. For his involvement Debs was sent to jail for "obstructing the mails" and contempt of court, but he refused to believe that the strike had not been a success.

The Pullman Strike had given the federal government an opportunity to break the unions, and for the ARU the results were devastating. Its reign as a union was over and its members black-listed. Debs, however, held the strike as a success since strikers had held strong together for a common cause, buckling only by the hand of the state. He emerged from jail a more committed socialist since the Pullman Strike had convinced him that capital had no interest in negotiating with labor but was intent on crushing it. Herein he attacked the capitalist structure with a vigor that would last the remainder of his life.

In 1898 Debs helped form the Social Democratic Party, and in 1900 ran as its first presidential candidate. In 1901 he helped found the Socialist Party of America and in 1904 ran as its presidential candidate, quadrupling his vote from 1900 and assuming his role as the evangelist of socialism. Central to the socialist mission was the labor question, and Debs believed the most efficient way of communicating their doctrine was through the labor unions. He lent his name and support to the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) in 1905 but later allowed his membership to lapse due to the group's use of violence. His serious distaste for violence had only increased since the Pullman Strike, and he insisted that revolution could be reached by peaceful means. His firm commitment to political action was far too astute to subscribe to any beliefs that would destroy the party's hopes of political success. He rejected any Bolshevik or Marxist doctrine that cited the use of violence or bloodshed as necessary.

Debs appealed to the common, uneducated people working in factories, digging mines, or tilling soil for their livelihood. He reached out to blacks as well as whites. He believed that if blacks were allowed equal opportunities, they would no longer be compelled to work for lower wages. Only through socialism could the African American free himself from bondage. He sought to create a utopia in which all men were legally and intrinsically equal.

On June 16, 1918 Debs gave an anti-war speech in Canton, Ohio protesting America's involvement in World War I. The speech led to his arrest for violating the Espionage Act, which was used to prosecute radicals everywhere. Convicted in federal court and sentenced to 10 years in prison and disenfranchisement for life, Debs lost his citizenship.

In what was perceived by many as a feeble attempt to rally the Socialist Party, Debs was nominated for president for the last time in 1920. Conducting a prison campaign, Debs received 913,664 votes, 3.4 percent of the national vote, and the highest number for a Socialist Party presidential candidate in the US. The following year newly elected President Warren G. Harding commuted his sentence to time served and released him from prison on Christmas Day, 1921.

In his final years Debs continued to give speeches and wrote several articles to rally the socialist cause. In 1924 he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize by Finnish communist Karl H. Wiik, who claimed that Debs had worked "actively for peace during World War I, mainly because he considered the war to be in the interest of capitalism." By 1926, largely due to prison confinement, his health had deteriorated, causing him to enter the Lindlaur sanitarium just outside of Chicago, where he died at the age of 70.

SEE ALSO: Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 20th Century; Socialism; Socialist Party, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Chace, J. (2005) *1912: Wilson, Roosevelt, Taft and Debs – The Election that Changed the Country*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Constantine, J. R. (Ed.) (1995) *Gentle Rebel: Letters of Eugene V. Debs*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Debs, E. (1983) *Walls and Bars: Prisons and Prison Life in the "Land of the Free"*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.

Salvatore, N. (1984) *Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism

Lars T. Lih

The Russian revolutionary tradition of the nineteenth century was always heavily influenced by western models, coupled with a deep awareness of the need for modifications in order to fit local conditions. The model that eventually won out was European social democracy, particularly as exemplified by the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). By 1900 the centrality of the SPD model was accepted by both Russian socialist parties, that is, not only the Russian Worker Social Democratic Party (RWSDP) but also the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR), the party that claimed a direct lineage to the early Russian revolutionary tradition.

The story of the Russian revolutionary tradition is thus in large part the rise to dominance of the social democratic model. This model can be defined as follows: a nationwide party that uses constitutionally guaranteed political freedom in order to assert leadership over the class struggle of the workers, to conduct wide-scale agitation for socialism, and to use opportunities for non-revolutionary political action as a means of preparing for a revolutionary takeover of state power by the workers. At the heart of the social democratic model is Marx's idea of the world-historical mission of the proletariat to introduce socialism. This core idea took on institutional embodiment through decades of political innovation by social democratic activists.

Many obstacles stood in the way of the acceptance of the model by Russian revolutionaries. First of all, the social democratic model implied acceptance of capitalism as the dominant economic mode of production. For many years, Russian revolutionaries demanded that the Russian revolution avoid capitalism by ushering in an immediate transition to socialism. The social base for this revolutionary transition was supposed to be the peasantry and its communal traditions. The revolutionary transition was visualized in different ways. Some, such as Mikhail Bakunin,

looked for widespread local riots (*bunt*), followed by a collapse of the state and its replacement by a free federation of communes. The utter unreality of this scenario was quickly detected by revolutionaries such as Pëtr Tkachev, who called for a dictatorship by an advanced minority that would guide the transition to socialism. Tkachev's highly undemocratic scenario was rejected by the People's Will Party (*Narodnaja volja*), who called for a democratically elected constitutional convention which (so it was fervently assumed) would establish a socialist regime.

An essential precondition for the social democratic model was political freedom, that is, constitutionally guaranteed right to free speech, assembly, and the like. But not only was there no political freedom in Russia, the Russian revolutionaries of the 1860s and 1870s did not want it. Political freedom, the goal of the scorned liberals, would serve only to consolidate middle-class rule and befuddle the masses. At best, freedom of speech was an irrelevant luxury for the largely illiterate peasantry.

The demand for immediate socialism and the fear of a liberal constitution were two sides of the same coin. One prominent spokesman for Russian socialism, Pëtr Lavrov, wrote in the 1870s against mere "political revolution" that would install "nothing but liberal checks and guarantees . . . The revolution we look for must be popular [*narodnyi*] and social; it must be directed not only against the government, and its aim must be not only to deposit the power in some other hands, but it must at once overthrow the economic foundations of the present social order" (Miliukov 1962: 289). The logic of this position was summed up in the slogan "now or never" – that is, if we don't have a socialist revolution soon, capitalist development will lead to bourgeois class dominance and perversion of the proto-socialist consciousness of the peasantry. But as time went on and the "now" receded into the past, the revolutionaries' own logic led either to the despair of "never" or to a second look at the social democratic model.

Starting with People's Will in the late 1870s, the Russian revolutionaries accepted more and more wholeheartedly political freedom as an immediate goal for Russia in order to apply the social democratic model. One of the "populist" revolutionaries of the 1870s, Stepniak (Stepan Kravchinsky), wrote in 1890 that "we acknowledge without equivocation that, as regards the

political question . . . our program is precisely that of the advanced section of Russian liberals." Political freedom was now an acceptable, even a necessary, goal because "if we look at the West, we see clearly to what brilliant results our comrades have attained by using those weapons of propaganda and agitation which constitutional freedom has placed in their hands . . . The German Socialist Party, which has astonished the world with its titanic growth, presents the most brilliant example of political discretion and self-control" (Miliukov 1962: 235–6).

The SPD model was thus accepted as a goal that determined the content of the upcoming political revolution – namely, the replacement of tsarist absolutism with political freedom. But the revolutionaries still assumed that the tsarist repression meant that direct application of the SPD model was impossible. In the same 1890 article in which he endorsed the SPD model, Stepniak argued that the anti-tsarist revolution required "not only popular insurrections, but military plots, nocturnal attacks upon the palace, bombs and dynamite" (Miliukov 1962: 235). Thus terrorism remained an acceptable and even mandatory means for achieving the political preconditions of the SPD model. This insistence on terrorism was not incompatible with acceptance of the SPD model – in fact, as we shall see, the adoption of terrorism in the late 1870s was an important step toward accepting the necessity of a strictly political revolution. The Russian revolutionaries felt that terror was justified by tsarist repression. They therefore decisively rejected anarchistic "propaganda by deed" in constitutional countries. When the American President James Garfield was assassinated by Charles Guiteau in 1881, the People's Will Party – fresh from their own assassination of the Russian tsar – issued a protest "against such violent acts as the assault of Guiteau [i]n a country where the liberty of the individual makes an honest struggle of opinions possible" (Miliukov 1962: 304).

One final stumbling block to the acceptance of the social democratic model was its seemingly exclusive focus on the industrial working class. This exclusivity was obviously inappropriate to Russia where both the radical intelligentsia and the peasantry had indispensable roles to play in any successful revolution. Ways had to be worked out to adjust the Marxist insistence on the centrality of the workers with Russian class realities.

The first serious manifestation of the revolutionary spirit in Russia was the attempted coup in December 1825 by high-born officers who tried to take advantage of the interregnum after the death of Alexander I and before the accession of his brother Nicolas I. The so-called Decembrists were strongly influenced by the intellectual currents from the West that they had experienced during the Napoleonic War. The plotters had no social base of any kind and were easily crushed.

The revolutionary spirit began to revive with “the people of the forties” such as Aleksandr Herzen and Mikhail Bakunin. These men came from the gentry, were strongly influenced by the most advanced currents of radical western opinion, and eventually ended up in permanent exile. Herzen started off with the same observation about the European revolution of 1848 as Marx: the workers were not a serious force for socialism so long as they accepted the leadership of radical middle-class democrats. As opposed to Marx, Herzen proceeded to write off the possibility of European socialist revolution and turned to Russia, where (in an entirely bookish way) he discovered the socialist potential of the peasant commune.

Meanwhile, a cohort of revolutionary thinkers had come to prominence in Russia itself: the “people of the sixties,” such as Nikolai Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Dobroliubov, and Dmitri Pisarev. These men continued the amalgamation of advanced western ideas with theories about Russian uniqueness. Chernyshevsky’s famous novel *What Is to Be Done?* (1863) not only popularized the projects of western “utopian socialism” but painted a portrait of the dedicated revolutionary that was lastingly influential.

From the 1820s to the 1840s there was a steady democratization of the revolutionary cohort, from high-born officers to the wider gentry to *raznochintsy* (literally, “men of mixed [that is, low] ranks”) such as the priest’s son Chernyshevsky. Nevertheless, the Russian revolutionary tradition was still confined almost exclusively to talk among the educated classes. There were notions of assassinating the tsar and other repressive figures, linking this to the idea of sparking upsurges especially among the vast rural masses. But the only assassination carried out by Russian revolutionaries was of a fellow revolutionary. This was the notorious Nechaev affair of 1869, in which a key follower of Bakunin – Sergei Nechaev – had a dissident member of a conspir-

atorial group in Petersburg killed for challenging his leadership.

Of course, at this time (the 1860s) the western Marxist tradition was itself mainly talk and the SPD model was still only in an embryonic stage. The idea that the workers themselves would organize on a mass scale in order to introduce socialism via political power was still barely understood by most western socialists and revolutionaries. Marx’s economic writings were already highly influential in Russia, but they were used to reject the desirability of anything like the SPD model. Marx’s analysis of the relentless logic of capitalist development confirmed the “now or never” strategy of strangling capitalism in its cradle.

The prehistory of Russian socialism came to an end with the remarkable “to the people” movement of 1874. In an almost spontaneous way, thousands of young intellectuals went out to the village to make contact with the people: to learn about them and to stir them up to revolution. This experiment ran up against the incomprehension of the peasantry and was quickly destroyed by police repression. Yet for all its ridiculousness and extravagant features, the episode started a search for viable revolutionary political institutions that would combine the revolutionary energies of the intelligentsia and of the people – a search that went through many painful false starts but persevered throughout the rest of the century.

The “to the people” episode taught the revolutionaries that propagating the revolutionary message required careful attention to the actual outlook of the people. For this reason, the revolutionaries now called themselves *narodniki* or populists (from *narod*, the people). Strictly speaking, the term “populist” applies only to the stage in Russian revolutionary development from the “to the people” movement in 1874 to the rise of People’s Will in 1879–81. Perhaps paradoxically, this “populist” stage marks an important step in the evolution toward the SPD model, since the revolutionaries now seriously set themselves the task of propagandizing the potentially revolutionary class.

The practical experience of this stage led the Russian “populists” to an appreciation of two factors: first, tsarist police repression would cripple any attempt at large-scale agitation, and second, urban workers were a more easily available and more receptive audience than the scattered peasants. Both factors led to a greater

stress on the need for political freedom, especially since the workers themselves insisted on it in their own programs.

In turn, the goal of political freedom led to the adoption of terror as a method. Since a mass movement was not yet possible, a “handful of daring people” (the self-description of the terrorists) would force the autocratic government to make the necessary concessions. Not terrorism per se but rather the acceptance of political freedom as an interim goal was rejected by other “populists” as heretical. The resulting dispute led to the disintegration of the previous “populist” organization Land and Liberty (*Zemlia i volia*) and its *de facto* replacement by People’s Will in 1879. In 1881 People’s Will carried out the assassination of the tsar Alexander II: a triumph of terror that resounded throughout Europe. But this triumph also exposed the unrealism of many other fundamental assumptions of People’s Will about the shakiness and lack of social roots of the tsarist government. The “handful of daring people” was also not as elusive as they thought, but their execution did give them long-lasting heroic martyr status.

In the 1880s the Russian revolutionary tradition seemed at a dead end. There was little revolutionary ferment either among the intellectuals, the workers, or the peasants. Terrorism still seemed both necessary (even the newly-fledged Russian Social Democrats led by Georgii Plekhanov still allowed a role for terror) and ineffective. The only notable assassination plot of the decade was in 1887, when a small group of students, outraged by government repression of even the most innocent student organizations, improvised a plan to kill the tsar. The plot was exposed before any action was taken. One of the leaders of this group – which called itself the Terrorist Fraction of People’s Will – was Aleksandr Ulyanov, Lenin’s older brother. Ulyanov and others were hanged.

And yet energy continued to be put into both institutional innovation and theoretical reflection. Institutional innovation revealed itself in the patient attempt by isolated activists in various towns to create underground organizations that would square the circle of maintaining links with wide layers of the workers and eluding police repression. The stage reached in theory is shown by the 1887 manifesto of the Terrorist Fraction, penned by Aleksandr Ulyanov. Here we see almost a complete acceptance of the logic of

the SPD model, including a primary focus on the workers instead of the peasants. Nevertheless terrorism was still seen as the primary weapon of the anti-tsarist revolution.

Meanwhile, major new developments at the beginning of the 1890s prepared the ground for the final acceptance of the SPD model. Abroad, the SPD attained new heights of prestige when the stubborn loyalty of its worker constituents forced the mighty German government to repeal Bismarck’s anti-socialist laws (1890). In 1892 a concise and highly influential exposition of the SPD model, *The Erfurt Program*, was penned by the young Karl Kautsky. Kautsky’s version of the model was particularly Russia-friendly, since it stressed just those themes that made most sense to Russian revolutionary activists: the primordial importance of political freedom and the proletariat’s role as leader of the whole people. Kautsky’s *Erfurt Program* had a long-lasting influence on Russian social democracy that far outweighed any book by a Russian author.

In Russia itself the famine of 1891, coupled with what was seen as the government’s bungled response, marked the beginning of a new era of dissatisfaction and unrest throughout society. The famine also brought home to public opinion that Russia was now in a stage of irreversible capitalist development. In 1896 worker strikes in Petersburg amazed public opinion by their militancy, discipline, and relatively successful outcome (the government promulgated legislation limiting working hours). For advocates of the SPD model, these strikes were a stunning confirmation of their wager on the existence of a genuine worker movement.

The early Russian social democrats in the 1880s and 1890s had shown that a version of the SPD model could be applied even in tsarist Russia. But even many of the social democrats accepted the idea that the SPD model was revolutionary only in regard to achieving socialism, but not political freedom. They therefore saw their own task as carrying out propaganda for socialism and leading the economic struggle, rather than overthrowing the tsar. Only after an internal struggle within social democracy did the idea win out that the most urgent goal for the movement was the political revolution.

By the beginning of the new century, Russia had two socialist and revolutionary political parties, each based squarely on the SPD model (as shown by their membership in the Second

International). By the time of the second congress of the RWSDP in 1903, those currents within the party who had wagered on the political militancy of the workers – figures such as Plekhanov and Pavel Axelrod in the older generation, Lenin and Iulii Martov in the younger generation – had assumed leadership. Their basic strategy can be summed up as follows: let us build an underground party as much like the SPD as possible, so that we can overthrow the tsar and build a party even more like the SPD.

The Party of Socialist Revolutionaries that took shape around 1900 is often called “neo-populist,” but it could equally well be called eclectic or non-dogmatic social democracy. The SRs had learned from the Russian social democrats that an underground organization with a mass base was possible. This underground of a new type meant that terrorism was no longer the only conceivable effective weapon against tsarism – but paradoxically, it also gave the terror tactic a new lease on life. Theorists of the party such as Victor Chernov justified terror as an effective complement to the mass movement – and indeed, a series of high-profile assassinations right after the turn of the century did help spark off the 1905 revolution. In doctrinal terms, the SRs focused less exclusively on the workers than did the social democrats. The contrast between the parties was greater in doctrine than in practice, since each concentrated on the urban workers, welcomed intelligentsia support, and responded as best they could to growing peasant militancy.

SEE ALSO: Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Chernov, Victor (1873–1952); Chernyshevsky, Nikolai G. (1828–1889); Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich (1812–1870); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Nechaev, Sergei (1847–1882); Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918)

References and Suggested Readings

- Budnitskii, O. V. (2000) *Terrorizm v rossiiskom osvoboditel'nom dvizhenii: ideologiya, etika, psikhologiya (vtoraya polovina XIX–nachalo XX v.)* (Terrorism in the Russian Liberation Movement: Ideology, Ethics, Psychology [End of 19th and Beginning of 20th Century]). Moscow: ROSSPEN.
- Footman, D. (1945) *Red Prelude: The Life of the Russian Terrorist Zhelyabov* (also published as *The Alexander Conspiracy: A Life of A. I. Zhelyabov*). New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Miliukov, P. (1905/1962) *Russia and Its Crisis*. London: Collier Books.

- Naimark, N. (1983) *Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement under Alexander III*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Venturi, F. (1952/1960) *Roots of Revolution*. New York: Grosset & Dunlap.
- Walicki, A. (1969) *The Controversy over Capitalism: Studies in the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Wortman, R. (1967) *The Crisis of Russian Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Deleuze, Gilles (1925–1995), Guattari, Félix (1930–1992), and the global justice movement

Simon Tormey

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari were French thinkers whose work, though once obscure, has come to be regarded as an important resource for the development of the theory and practice of the global justice movement (GJM), particularly the libertarian, horizontal, disaffiliated part of it. While their work is dense and difficult to digest for those uninitiated in the arcane world of contemporary French theory, many of the concepts they developed in their joint work have nonetheless passed into the lexicon of the GJM. These include most notably the concepts of the “rhizome,” “minoritarianism,” “deterritorialization,” “multiplicity,” and “nomadic” thought and practice. Deleuzo-Guattarian themes have been picked up by a range of contemporary authors and activists, most notably Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, whose joint works *Empire* (2001) and *Multitude* (2004) are replete with terms borrowed from Deleuze and Guattari. The latter’s work has informed the development of a variety of heterodox leftist currents, including primitivism (Feral Faun, John Zerzan), immediatism (Hakim Bey), insurrectionary anarchism (Alfredo Bonanno), and postanarchism (Todd May, Saul Newman) – all of which have adherents in the GJM.

Deleuze and Guattari were very different characters with very different training. Deleuze built his reputation as an iconoclastic academic philosopher in the 1950s and 1960s producing a stream of highly original readings of various

thinkers within and beyond the philosophical canon (Hume, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Bacon, Proust, and Sacher-Masoch), as well as a number of keynote works, most notably *Difference and Repetition* (1994) and *Logic of Sense* (1990). Guattari was a trained psychoanalyst as well as a political activist, helping to set up the Clinique de la Borde at Courcheverny, which was to become a center of the French anti-psychiatry movement. He wrote many original shorter pieces examining the nature of subjectivity, group psychology, and the possibility for non-hierarchical or “transversal” social transformation, drawing heavily on the work of Jean-Paul Sartre in particular: *Molecular Revolution* (1994); *Soft Subversions* (1996).

These two intellectuals came together in the aftermath of the Paris uprising of 1968 to produce a series of contentious, provocative, and imaginative works, the best known of which is the two-volume *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* written in the 1970s. The *Anti-Oedipus* (1984) offered a critique of mainstream and heterodox Freudian theory. The second volume *A Thousand Plateaus* (1988) develops a critique of statism, using data gathered from every avenue of human enquiry from anthropology to musical composition. Other works followed, including most notably, *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature* (1986) and *What is Philosophy?* (1994), their last joint work before the death of Guattari in 1992. Deleuze committed suicide in 1995 after a long illness.

Transcendence/Immanence – Verticals/Horizontalis

Given the enormous volume of materials, commentators have in general fought shy of trying to condense their work into a number of key points or arguments. It is certainly true that their work defies compression or easy summary. On the other hand, as far as activists are concerned there are certain concepts that resonate through their work. In terms of a uniting theme, what stands out is what may be called a critique of “transcendence,” in turn contrasted with what they term “immanence.”

Transcendence here equates to the idea that any given aspect of life is governed by some form of ordering principle. Thinking about social life, this might be in terms of a belief in God, or the necessity for the market, or class struggle,

or natural law. Such themes operate in political and social thought as anchor points that offer a certain basis from which to criticize the past and present, and offer recipes for future happiness.

As the term transcendence implies, these notions are seen by those advocating them as immune to challenge and thus enjoy what they term “royal” status. They are unquestionable and thus offer the basis for certainty, authority, and sovereignty over an area of human activity, whether that be art, literary theory, or political governance. *Anti-Oedipus* offers a critique of the domination of one such position, namely Freudian and post-Freudian theory and its obsession with the Oedipal triangle between Mother, Father, and Child. *A Thousand Plateaus* offers an analysis of the manner by which royal science operates more generally to “striate” or “overcode” fields of human activity so as to make them conform to an overarching principle. It demonstrates how space that would previously have been “smooth” or open is conquered by a governing logic, which organizes everything within.

Thus, in their terms, the past should be read less as the history of class struggles (Marx) than of progressive “territorializations” and “deterritorializations,” as one principle or logic supplants another. On the other hand, Marx’s description of the force of the market unleashed under mercantilism demonstrates how this works very clearly. Feudalism, a logic of kingship underwritten by religious conviction, is progressively swept away by the force of mercantilism which implants a new logic: that of the market and “value.” Deterritorialization is, as they put it, immediately followed by reterritorialization by capitalism.

Mention of Marx illustrates both what is common in Deleuze and Guattari to Marx’s enterprise and also what is different, giving a sense of their importance for today’s social movements. A key point is the relationship between ideas and the economy, and by extension between governing principles and governing imperatives brought about by changes in production. It is noticeable that for Deleuze and Guattari, states and statism do arise as a result of economic necessity but are better understood as the response of given groups and societies to the uncertainty of “nomadism,” a form of life

that resists implantation, territorialization, and certainty of tenure. Nomadism is from this point of view the “outside” of *any* settled system and is implicitly a threat to it. This is why in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms any kind of individual or collective behavior that “escapes” social regulations or norms is opposed by “sedentary” authority, sometimes violently so. Nomadic groups (barbarians, gypsies, Hells Angels, skater gangs, “anti-social” street kids) thus appear as “war machines” to the sedentary majority whose existence threatens the status quo.

The “nomadic war machine” (NWM) is a key motif in *A Thousand Plateaus*, serving to inspire the idea that there are forms of interaction that escape “royal” ways and which can be regarded figuratively as “immanent” and unmediated by force of law. The NWM in turn illustrates in organizational terms the nature and form of *rhizomatic* thought and action, also a key term in Deleuze and Guattari’s lexicon. By contrast with arborescent or tree-like structures, rhizomes spread “underground.” They shoot out roots in a random tangle, as opposed to being connected to a single “trunk” that provides shape and sustenance for all the constituent branches. Now while Deleuze and Guattari use the concepts of rhizome and arborescence to explore all manner of phenomena, social theorists have been quick to seize on the distinction as a way of exploring the different dynamics of social movements and the different trajectories that movements can take in terms of both of their internal dynamic and in terms of the potential they offer as prefigurative agents of social transformation.

Towards a Minor (Global) Politics?

Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis maps onto current debates about whether the GJM is horizontal, immanent, nomadic, and anti-statist, or conversely whether it is (or should be) vertical, that is organized by reference to an overarching program or ideology with leaders and led. It also maps onto the debate concerning what the end or goal of the GJM is. Anti-Leninists such as John Holloway stress that the point is not to “take power,” which is the goal of traditional revolutionary activity, but to develop forms of “anti-power” that diffuse vertical structures while enabling groups and communities to empower themselves.

In truth this is a rather simplistic rendering of what is a very complex analysis, and what is left out is almost as important as what is left in. In particular, the analysis presented in *A Thousand Plateaus* suggests an end to governance as such, along with all forms of fixed and known identities of the kind associated with concepts such as “nation” and “community.” The underlying concern, inherited from Deleuze’s suspicion towards all forms of “identity,” is the preservation and enhancement of “difference” and “singularity.” This in turn explains the preoccupation in their joint work with the concept of the “minority” and “minoritarian.” Social organization is on their terms a process of integrating singularities into larger “aggregates” and ultimately into the “majority.”

It is not for nothing that the discourse of politics rotates around the needs, wants, and desires of “the majority” and even more so “the people.” The majority stands for what we should want, and – by extension – for what others want us to want. So the figure of the majority is not, as they make clear, a numerical concept, so much as an impositional one: “the majority” is a figure constructed to discipline that which threatens social order, which in turn may be the vast majority in numerical terms. So when in *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari refer to the proletariat as bearing the “power of the minority,” it is from the point of view of emphasizing that the proletariat is less a concrete identity, so much as a project or “becoming” that confronts and overturns the majority which might itself be proletarian.

Thus there is a process of submission in political discourses, a setting to one side of what the singular wants or needs in favor of forms of consumption, behavior, and action that sustain the social. In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms such an operation represents the channeling and repressing of desire into socially acceptable forms of behavior that is deeply corrosive of singularity. A genuinely revolutionary politics dedicated to unleashing the creativity of singularities confronts “majoritarianism” in all its forms. A “minor” politics value the different, the idiosyncratic, the abnormal, and disruptive, as opposed to forms of thought and action that conform to the majority – or rather what is constructed as in the needs or interests of the majority by dominant powers. However, this is

never regarded as a “micro-political” gesture of non-conformity and resistance by individuals.

In their work and particularly in the work of Guattari the task is posed as one of combining micro-politics with macro-politics and vice versa. Thus the question of the form of organization that brings together these aspects is absolutely central and helps explain Guattari’s interest in the idea of the “crystallization” of political action in what he terms “transversal” forms of organization, by which he meant forms of political collectivity that are reflexive, responsive, and transparent to participating individuals and groups (*Molecular Revolution*). Here of course is the suspicion of orthodox communist politics with their vanguards, central committees, and divisions of labor designed to foster fealty to the party line. Here too the seed of an interest in contemporary forms of politics that appeared to break from this tradition, such as the Brazilian Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores), which – as he read it – sought to generate active alliances and affinities under a “party” umbrella while recognizing the need to cherish and preserve difference and differences (*The Party Without Bosses*).

Minoritarian Contemporary Activism

Again, the concept of minoritarian resistance is one that resonates with contemporary activism and with the efforts of theorists such as Hardt and Negri to make sense of recent developments. Thus the latter’s account of the centrality of “refusal,” exodus, and escape from Empire is one that echoes Deleuze and Guattari’s rejection of the methods and arguments of “official” politics in favor of forms of activity that query the logic of majoritarianism. Of course, this can sound like a defense of “lifestyle” politics with its accent on “dropping out” and engaging in ineffectual or mild forms of resistance that leave systems of oppression untouched. In reality a minor politics is *itself* implicitly critical of lifestyle politics, and is closer in this regard to the situationist intolerance with forms of behavior that remain firmly within the “spectacle.” Wearing a Che Guevara T-shirt is not a “minor” gesture given the mass production of such items; nor is spending the summer moving around highly profitable rock festivals. Minor means challenging the majority,

and this can include “petty resistances” of the kind routinely termed “anti-social behavior,” “lack of cooperation,” “slacking,” “idleness,” and so on. It also includes artistic creation written off as “vulgar,” “in bad taste,” “dangerous,” “upsetting,” and so forth. More generally it is an attempt to shrug off the imperative lurking in society to behave “normally,” “properly,” and cooperatively and to do what one is told.

On the other hand, what should not be lost sight of is that minoritarian resistance means joining with others in *collective* acts of defiance and resistance that challenge embedded power so that refusal and exodus develop into forms of interaction that challenge the governing logic of the system. However, it is resistance without threatening to erect a new order or implant a new “royal science” that merely repeats the exclusions and oppressions being challenged.

Again, this suggests an affinity between the idea of minoritarian resistance and a range of contemporary initiatives. Chief among these would be the Zapatista insurgency, which self-consciously rejected traditional revolutionary rhetoric in favor of practices of immanent self-constitution, dialogical practices of “govern-obeying,” and the safeguarding of an autonomous zone or “smooth space” beyond the striated world of Mexican deferral forces. Also the social forums, for all their faults and exclusions, can be regarded as developments of a “minor” kind, particularly when they are accompanied – as they often are – with autonomous initiatives and spaces. The Charter of the World Social Forum (WSF) has an almost explicitly Deleuzo-Guattarian agenda of preserving an “open meeting place” of a “non-party” kind that does not seek power or forms of representation of existing social struggles.

The stress on collective agency as articulated in the idea of the NWM is underpinned by the idea of the agent as a “multiplicity” and ultimately as a “multitude” – a collection of singular agents united in their desire to negate the existing order. This is a “molecular” or “micro” politics that nonetheless as Deleuze and Guattari argue has a “macro-political” aspect. The NWM, for example, is a crystallization of singularities, but it is still a crystallization that can create and achieve larger ambitions. Its effectiveness and energy derive from this sense of shared undertaking or purpose, but also from the shared sense of the contingency and temporary nature of any alliance.

Collective action is action for some particular purpose or end, whether it be unblocking desire or generating forms of living together that do not create some artificial “community” of permanent interests. But the terms and conditions of this multiplicity are immanent – not transcendent. No one speaks for those within such a collectivity.

It has no interests, needs, or presence that can be represented or made present except by those who themselves compose the collective.

So in summary Deleuze and Guattari are not anarchists, nor for that matter are they any other kind of “ist.” They do not, that is, counterpose one image of society to another; they have no answers and no overall perspective that they propose as “true” in some relative or absolute sense – merely concepts that “resonate” as tools of analysis – or not. This, it would seem, is the attractiveness of their work for a generation of activists wearied by the sectarianism of their forebears. Deleuze and Guattari steer clear of labels, pigeonholing, and the “carving of the field” in the manner of today’s firebrand theorists such as Slavoj Žižek and Ernesto Laclau. It is a politics that in their terms “stutters,” offering little in the way of certainty, but a great deal in the way of a suggestive repertoire of concepts and ideas that “resonate” with at least one part of today’s movement of movements.

SEE ALSO: Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Multitude; Negri, Antonio (b. 1933); Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula da (b. 1945); World Social Forums; Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Chesters, G. & Welsh, I. (2006) *Complexity and Social Movements: Multitudes at the Edge of Chaos*. London: Routledge.
- Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1980). *Anti-Oedipus*. London: Athlone Press.
- Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1988) *A Thousand Plateaus*. London: Athlone Press.
- Guattari, F. & Inácio “Lula” da Silva, L. (2003). *The Party without Bosses*. Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring.
- Guattari, F. & Negri, T. (1990) *Communists like Us: New Spaces of Liberty, New Lines of Alliance*. New York: Semiotext(e).
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2000) *Empire*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Patton, P. (2000) *Deleuze and the Political*. London: Routledge.
- Thoburn, N. (2003) *Deleuze, Marx and Politics*. London: Routledge.
- Tormey, S. (2004) *Anti-Capitalism: A Beginner’s Guide*. Oxford: Oneworld.

Demerara Slave Rebellion, 1823

Thomas Muhr

The Demerara Slave Rebellion was one of several revolts that erupted in the Caribbean in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Founded as a Dutch colony in 1746, Demerara stretched for about 25 miles along the Caribbean coast east of the Demerara River (the “East Coast”), between the colonies of Berbice to the east and Essequibo to the west. The three colonies changed hands several times between the Dutch, French, and English, and all three became British in 1814. At the time of the rising, about 75,000 slaves lived in Demerara-Essequibo, which were under a single Court of Policy. The colonies became Guyana’s three provinces of the same names, and Demerara accommodates today’s capital, Georgetown.

The Demerara rising was inextricably related to the abolitionist movement and the respective discussions in the British parliament, as well as to the work of the evangelical missionaries from the London Missionary Society (LMS) in the colonies: Reverend John Wray, who set up the Demerara mission station at Plantation Le Resouvenir in 1808, and his successor Reverend John Smith, an abolitionist from a modest lower-class family who arrived in Demerara in 1817. Their arrival complicated a tense situation, as Demerara society was already undergoing changes from within, reflected in increasing confrontations between slaves and whites. Smith’s services became very popular with the slaves, whom he also taught literacy. Tensions grew between planters and missionaries, whose evangelical rhetoric of “equality” and “universal brotherhood” came to be viewed as subverting the social order, which in turn increased the slaves’ determination to attend church. Nevertheless, Christianity, as Daly (1975) remarks, had not only a “revolutionary” but also a “stabilizing and conservative” effect in the colony, as was certainly the official mission of the LMS.

A combination of the missionaries’ discourses, landing sailors that mixed with the slaves, and house slaves overhearing discussions in the homes, created the rumor among the slaves that England had abolished slavery and that the local masters were denying them their rights.

The “new laws” approved in London, however, were merely new standards in the treatment of slaves. The rumors were further nourished by Governor Murray not publicly announcing the new guidelines, probably in fear of resistance on part of the planters.

The rising started in the evening of Monday, August 18, 1823. Under the leadership of Jack Gladstone, it spread from Plantation Success to about 60 plantations (out of 71) on the East Coast. A second principal insurgent was Jack’s father Quamina Gladstone, who was the chief deacon at Smith’s Bethel Chapel on Plantation Le Resouvenir. Under the influence of the Christian faith, the rebels did not seem inclined to commit acts of violence against the whites. Rather, they seized arms and confined managers and overseers in the slave stocks for the night with the intention to send them to Georgetown the next morning to fetch the “New Law.” However, a house slave, Joseph Simpson (or Packard), in loyalty to his master, had betrayed the plot in the morning of that same day. When the governor and soldiers arrived at Le Resouvenir to negotiate, the slaves insisted on their “rights” to equality and freedom and, outnumbered, governor and troops withdrew, and the rebels resumed action.

Despite some minor incidents of violence, the uprising proceeded in a disciplined way as planned, with murder, large-scale looting, and destruction being largely absent. The few deaths among the whites were the result of fighting related to resistance. Daly (1975: 165) suggests that the resistance resembled more a “strike” than an outright rebellion and, as can be concluded, the slaves paid a high price for their leniency with their oppressors: martial law was declared, and the resistance was brutally suppressed within a few days to keep it from spreading to the other colonies. The punishment that followed was extremely harsh: between August 22 and 27, over 200 insurgents were killed on the spot and over 30 became victims of indiscriminate and ritualized summary executions, partly after mock trials.

Jack and Quamina Gladstone and some other ringleaders fled, but were caught within the following 2–3 weeks. At his arrest, Quamina was shot by Indians as a runaway. Some accounts state that Jack Gladstone was hanged, but others say he was banished to Saint Lucia, presumably to prevent him from turning into a hero after

execution. Smith was blamed for instigating the rebellion and was condemned to death, but he died in prison before the expected reprieve arrived from England.

When compared with the Berbice great slave rising of 1763–4, during which the slaves controlled almost the whole of Berbice for nearly a year, the Demerara rebellion appears almost insignificant. However, with 10,000–12,000 slaves involved, it was one of the greatest slave uprisings in the history of the New World. At least equally important is the impact the rebellion had on the emancipatory cause generally and on the portrayal of slaves as subjects. While explanations for the abolition of slavery comprise the interrelated dimensions of the economic (capitalist), political, social, and ethical-humanitarian, the historical role of slave agency has often been downplayed, ignored, or even perceived as a mere nuisance to the emancipation cause in the respective literature, as well as by the conservative abolitionist movement at the time. The Demerara Rebellion, however, demonstrates the mutual reinforcement of slave agency and the British abolitionist movement. In fact, rebellious activity appears to have shifted abolitionists’ conservative policy to the left as well as given it a significant boost.

SEE ALSO: American Slave Rebellions; Anti-Slavery Movement, Britain; Guyana, Protests and Revolts; Jamaica, Rebellion and Resistance, 1760–1834

References and Suggested Readings

- Costa, E. V. da (1994) *Crowns of Glory, Tears of Blood: The Demerara Slave Rebellion of 1823*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Daly, V. T. (1975) *A Short History of the Guyanese People*. London: Macmillan.
- Matthews, G. (2006) *Caribbean Slave Revolts and the British Abolitionist Movement*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Democracy Wall movement, 1979

J. Megan Greene

When, in 1976, Mao Zedong, leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and head of the People’s Republic of China, died, an era of radical revolutionary activity that had affected virtually the entire population of China came

to a close. Mao's death brought to an end the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–76) and the subsequent arrest of the Gang of Four (leaders of the Cultural Revolution) signaled that the Chinese political sphere was opening up to a greater diversity of perspectives than had been possible under Chairman Mao's leadership. The Cultural Revolution, although in many respects anarchic, provided the CCP with an opportunity to achieve a high degree of control over the public expression of ideas about China's political, economic, and social sphere. As its leaders were condemned and its victims rehabilitated in the years immediately following Mao's death, many intellectuals were emboldened to express their views once again. The Democracy Wall movement of 1979 was the boldest manifestation of this process.

New CCP policies in conjunction with an atmosphere of open criticism of past actions of party leaders were encouraging to intellectuals who, in spite of having suffered decades of repression for expressing ideas contrary to those of the party, nonetheless began to speak out again in 1978 and 1979. In 1978 China's Premier, Deng Xiaoping, opened the door to reform by calling upon the nation to follow a new path, one that veered significantly from the course that had been laid out by Mao Zedong. Deng sought to implement a more rational and less politicized approach to nation-building that focused on economic development above all. Deng's new policy, known as the Four Modernizations, called for the state-led modernization of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense. China's new ten-year plan of the same year made clear that scientific inquiry would be an important foundation for this development and that the party would thenceforth embrace a policy of letting 100 flowers bloom and 1,000 schools of thought contend, a policy with which the CCP had briefly experimented in 1956, but that had ended in a political repression of critics of party policy, many of whom were intellectuals. Whereas in 1956 Mao had not initially constrained the type of criticism that would be welcome, this time around the party made it clear that any free expression of ideas had to conform to socialist ideals.

Deng's new policies, though clearly signaling that the focus of intellectual activity should be the question of how to foster economic develop-

ment, nonetheless encouraged Chinese intellectuals, who had been victimized and silenced by Maoist policies from 1957 on, to convene in small groups and talk through their own ideas for China's way forward. Throughout late 1978 and the spring of 1979 there was an outpouring of new magazines, study groups, essays, and poems, many of which were dedicated to exploring the question of why China had not developed more quickly. For many, however, the answer lay in the tendency toward authoritarianism of China's leadership. The best environment for national development, they concluded, would be a democracy.

In part because publication materials were scarce, much of the written work of these intellectuals was written in big character posters and posted on public notice boards and walls in Beijing. The main such wall, located in central Beijing near Tiananmen Square, became a particularly popular venue for the posting of works advocating democracy, and thus became known as Democracy Wall. By late 1978, Democracy Wall was attracting large crowds who were organizing public discussions on the rehabilitation of purged party leaders and criticism of Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four. Much of this early discussion was, in fact, useful to Deng Xiaoping, because it demonstrated that there was broad mass support for precisely the sorts of reforms that he was attempting to push the party leadership into enacting. By early December of 1978, however, the tone of the discussion had begun to shift as new posters were put up that were more directly critical of the current government and that called in a more overt way for political change.

The author of some of the most scathing attacks on Deng Xiaoping's government was Wei Jingsheng, a former Red Guard who was employed as an electrician at the Beijing Zoo. On December 5 Wei posted an essay that chastised Deng for failing to reform the political system, and called upon him to implement a fifth modernization by allowing China to democratize. Wei's essay attracted a great deal of attention, and the activity surrounding Democracy Wall increased as a consequence.

At roughly the same time activists including Wei began to produce several new, mimeographed journals that they sold to the crowds of students, workers, and low-level bureaucrats who were drawn to Democracy Wall. These journals, known by their publishers as "people's

publications,” included such titles as *April Fifth Forum*, *Beijing Spring*, *Enlightenment*, and *People’s Voice*. In all, 55 such journals were published in Beijing by Democracy Wall activists during the fall of 1978 and the spring of 1979. Inspired by the activities in Beijing, other democracy walls spontaneously came into being in other cities as well, and numerous other publications associated with the movement also sprang up.

Although most of these activists saw themselves as working not against the state, but with it, or at least with a reform minded faction within it, by the late autumn of 1978 even Deng Xiaoping’s reformist faction no longer saw any advantage to tolerating these activities. The government began discouraging demonstrations and large gatherings, used work units, neighborhood groups, and family members to pressure participants to cease their activities, and posted plain clothes policemen at the wall to keep records on activists. Over the course of the spring of 1979 numerous activists were arrested, including, in late March, Wei Jingsheng and the rest of the staff of his publication *Explorations*, as well as the publishers of many other journals. Many of these activists were later sentenced to lengthy prison terms for their outspokenness. By December 1979 Democracy Wall itself had been relocated to Moon Altar Park, some distance from the center of Beijing, and the original Democracy Wall had been shut down.

SEE ALSO: China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997); Wei Jingsheng (b. 1950)

References and Suggested Readings

Nathan, A. (1985) *Chinese Democracy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997)

Leonard H. Lubitz

Born in Sichuan, Deng Xiaoping was the son of a rural sheriff. At the age of 15, upon graduation from preparatory school, he traveled to France where approximately 1,500 young Chinese were participating in a program known as *Qingong jianxue* (diligent work, thrifty study). It was in these ranks that Deng became a student of Marxism along with older classmates including

Zhou Enlai and Zhou Shiyan, while supporting themselves by laboring in manual positions including at the Schneider-Creusot armaments factory, the Hutchinson rubber goods factory, and restaurant kitchens.

After several years of studies in rudimentary French, Deng abandoned his formal studies in order to focus on his activities as a member of the Communist Youth League of Europe. He achieved both success and notoriety as a leader while working for the journal *The Red Light* under its founder and editor, Zhou Enlai. However, in January 1926, with a police raid impending due to the expected violence rising between two communist factions in Paris, Deng and 20 of his comrades left by night for Moscow. In the Soviet capital, Deng would receive practical training in areas of revolution.

In 1929, after returning to China, Deng helped lead the ill-fated Baise Uprising against the Kuomintang. In the ensuing Long March he would rise to the rank of Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, bringing him inside the inner circle of Mao Zedong. During the struggles both against the occupying Japanese military and the Kuomintang, Deng served at the forefront of various battles in both political and military capacities. After the formation of the People’s Republic of China, he was appointed Secretary General of the Communist Party. In 1956 Deng was designated as one of Mao’s 12 deputy premiers. The anti-rightists purge of that decade saw Deng overseeing the roundup of approximately half a million Chinese citizens accused of being ideological enemies of the regime.

Though Deng was initially supportive of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, its failure prompted him to support reforms, as he famously declared in 1961 that “It doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.” In 1967 Deng was publicly prosecuted and declared “a capitalist roader,” “a Fascist,” and “a traitor” by cadres of the Red Guards. He and his wife were sentenced to two years under house arrest followed by internal exile in southern China, where they were forced to work as laborers in a factory.

In 1973, with changes in the political climate, Mao summoned Deng back to Beijing and restored him to the post of deputy premier. His integral connection to Zhou’s Four Modernizations marked Deng’s vision of a reformed system in China where practicality trumped strict

ideology. His demonstration of such independence was answered by his being attacked by Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four, resulting in his being purged again. The death of Mao in 1976 was followed by both the public trial of the Gang of Four as well as the reestablishment of Deng as a power within Beijing. In time, he would consolidate his power within the government. Though he allowed others to assume the titles of president, Deng retained the official position of chairman of the Communist Party's Central Military Commission, which gave him control of the People's Liberation Army.

Deng's reforms of Mao's rigid centralized systems brought about extraordinary changes in China, ranging from the allowance of family farms to the eventual establishment of private businesses and investments. He saw this not as a rejection of the Communist Party's ideology but rather as he foresaw in the Four Modernizations, his country needed "socialism with Chinese characteristics" in order to become a modern state. "By following the concept of 'one country, two systems,' you don't swallow me up nor I you," Deng proclaimed, explaining his unique approach.

In 1989 Deng relinquished his official title, ironically only maintaining the single position of chairman of the Chinese Bridge Association, but his supremacy over the government of the People's Republic of China was unquestioned by the president, the premier, and the National People's Congress. Deng's reforms led to an economic revolution, with the rapid acceleration of foreign trade as well as the creation of special economic zones where foreign investment was encouraged. Political activism also followed, exemplified by the Tiananmen Square protests of June 1989. Conservative elements in the government responded by violently breaking up these demonstrations and purging sympathetic government officials, including Zhao Ziyang, general secretary of the Communist Party.

In the spring of 1992, seeing the central government's movement toward more traditional policies, Deng actively traveled throughout southern China. Visiting cities and sites that profited from his reform policies, he gave public speeches endorsing the furtherance of his market strategy. President Jiang Zemin, among the many in Beijing who were attempting to slow the massive wave of change that Deng had inspired, reversed his resistance and came openly to sup-

port them in the following spring, thus cementing his own position as heir apparent to what some have dubbed Deng "the last emperor." In the Chinese government's official obituary, this tour of southern China was described as having "profoundly answered many key questions for understanding, which had been perplexing and binding people's minds for a long time, especially the questions concerning the relationship between socialism and market economy."

SEE ALSO: China, Maoism and Popular Power, 1949–1969; China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Marxism; Neoliberalism and Protest; Tiananmen Square Protests, 1989; Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- Chang Kuo-t'ao, F. (1971) *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party: 1921–1927*, 2 Vols. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Deng Xiaoping et al. (1984) *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1982)*. Beijing; Foreign Language Press.
- Evans, R. (1997). *Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China*. New York: Penguin.
- Liao Gailong et al. (Eds.) (2001) *Zhongguo gongchandang lishi dacidian. Zonglun. Renwu* (Big Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party. General Part. Personalities). Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe.

Denmark, insurrection and revolt

J. Laurence Hare

The history of protest in Denmark has largely been characterized by moderation and compromise, which has allowed the country to remain among the most stable nation-states in Europe. The desire for reform, however, has been a common theme in the country's rural sector, where Danish farmers have long struggled for greater independence, both from the landed elite and the state. More revolutionary impulses, however, have resulted from the gradual transformation of Denmark from a multinational dynastic empire to a more modest modern nation. While mostly peaceful, this process was occasionally marked by tensions in some border regions that in turn disrupted the tenor of domestic politics.



Illustration of the fleet of Christian II off Stockholm Castle in 1521. Under King Christian II (1481–1559), the execution of prominent Swedes during the Stockholm Bloodbath of 1520 contributed to the outbreak of insurrection within Denmark. In the face of open revolt, the king was forced into exile in the Netherlands until he was imprisoned by his successor, King Fredrik I, in 1532. (Royal Danish Naval Museum)

Denmark reached its largest territorial extent during the period of the Kalmar Union, which from 1397 brought Norway and much of Sweden under the control of the Danish monarchy. The Union produced much conflict between Danes and Swedes, particularly during the reign of Christian II (1481–1559), who earned notoriety for executing 82 leading Swedes during the so-called Stockholm Bloodbath of 1520. The massacre intensified the revolt and contributed to the outbreak of insurrection within Denmark, where Jutland nobles took advantage of the weak position of the king. Christian was unable to defeat the rebels and was ultimately forced from the throne by his uncle, who became King Frederik I (1471–1533). The victory temporarily secured the position of the landed nobility but in the long term worsened conditions for Danish peasants and set the stage for later protests.

The conflict also coincided with the Protestant Reformation in Denmark, which brought confession into the complex matrix of royal

power and popular revolt. Until his death in 1533, Frederik I attempted to preserve order by maintaining a neutral policy, but he faced a sharp challenge once again from Christian II, who supported the Catholic Church and used the religious question to make a new bid for the throne. In 1532 Christian II was captured in Norway and imprisoned, but he nevertheless received a great deal of support from the peasantry, which longed for relief from frequent land seizures and oppressive feudal obligations. In North Jutland the renowned peasant leader Skipper Klement (1485–1536) led an uprising near Aalborg that blended anti-elite and anti-Catholic sentiments. When Christian III (1503–59) ascended the throne in 1536 he declared Lutheranism the official faith of the realm, but nevertheless took the side of the hereditary nobility, suppressed the revolt, and executed Skipper Klement.

The wars within Scandinavia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries reduced Denmark to a Composite State (*Helstat*) made

up of Norway and the southern duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The position of the king, however, was strengthened at the expense of the hereditary nobility, and the emergence of absolute monarchy in 1665 fostered a cohort of new nobles who used archaic feudal traditions to maximize profit, which worsened the condition of the peasantry and encouraged further acts of resistance. As Lorenzen-Schmidt (1995) has shown, the uneven course of manorial development on the western coasts of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein made this region a center of nationwide resistance to the expansion of noble estates. Acts of violence, however, declined during the same period in favor of legal protests and petitions to the king, which proved effective in checking manorial power.

Concern for the plight of farmers was also a feature of the Danish Enlightenment, which united humanitarian concerns with a rational view of feudal obligations as unfit for the changing needs of the Danish economy. In 1786 the government established a commission that ended the practice of the *stavnsbånd*, which bound peasants to the land in the interests of prospective military service. At the same time, a number of large landowners abandoned labor requirements in favor of monetary rents, allowing many farmers to purchase the lands on which they worked. As a result, more than half of Danish farmers had achieved independent status by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Agrarian interests subsequently became a feature of the nineteenth-century liberal movement, as independent farmers and the urban middle class continued to find common cause on issues such as conscription reform.

The process of agricultural reform was exemplary of a reformist attitude that dominated Danish politics in the late eighteenth century. As a result, the impact of the French Revolution was modest in Denmark, and the relationship between the monarchy and liberals fairly harmonious in the early 1790s. At first, Danes enjoyed a reasonably free press, which allowed them space to reflect upon the ramifications of the French Revolution for Denmark. Most maintained a discreet balance between the desire for civil liberties and the utility of absolute monarchy. It was thus possible, for example, for writers such as N. D. Riegel (1755–1802) to call for a parliamentary body (*Rigsdag*) to advise the monarch. Only after the execution of Louis XVI

in 1793 did the government grow more conservative, leading it to banish the famed writer Peter Andreas Heiberg (1758–1841) in 1799 for allegedly spreading Jacobinism and calling for a republic.

The conservative turn in Danish politics, however, did not temper the growth of the liberal movement. The greater challenge lay with the emergence of national-liberalism in Schleswig-Holstein after the Napoleonic Wars. Denmark's decision to side with Napoleon not only cost the country its Norwegian territory, but alienated its German-speaking population in Holstein and southern Schleswig. The growing divisions between Danish and German liberals worsened in 1830, following Uwe Jens Lornsen's (1793–1838) call for a constitution granting Schleswig-Holstein autonomy within the *Helstat*. Danish liberals such as Christian Flor (1792–1875) and Christian Paulsen (1798–1854) grew concerned that Lornsen's agitation would isolate Danes living in the duchies, and they began seeking reforms protecting the language and culture of the Danish majority in northern Schleswig.

In an attempt at compromise the Danish government created four estate assemblies (*Stænderforsamlingen*), including one for each of the duchies. A third met in Viborg to represent Jutland, while a fourth in Roskilde represented the Danish Islands, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands. By the early 1840s the two assemblies in the duchies deteriorated into sites of contest between Germans and Danes. The increasingly intransigent positions of both sides had a profound influence on the liberal movement in Copenhagen, where the more radical Orla Lehmann (1810–70) took the lead of the National Liberal Party by supporting the so-called Eiderdane position, which called for Denmark to annex Schleswig to the Eider River and thus separate the majority Danish region from Holstein.

The crisis finally erupted into revolution in 1848. On March 21 a delegation from Kiel demanded a common constitution for Schleswig and Holstein, which prompted Orla Lehmann to lead a delegation of Danish national-liberals from the Casino Theater in Copenhagen to petition the king for a constitutional monarchy. King Frederik VII (1808–63) had already agreed in principle to a constitution as early as January, so the course of revolution proceeded without bloodshed in the capital. The king's decision,

however, to create a Cabinet with Eiderdane ministers angered Schleswig-Holsteiners and led them to declare independence. In the resulting war (1848–51) the Danes managed to suppress the uprising.

Denmark did not retain Schleswig-Holstein for long. In 1864 Prussia and Austria invaded and seized Schleswig-Holstein on the pretext of a succession crisis following the death of Frederik VII in 1863. The resulting victory left Prussia with a sizable Danish minority in northern Schleswig. By the terms of the 1867 Treaty of Prague, the Prussians pledged to guarantee a final border settlement based on popular plebiscite. After the unification of Germany in 1871, however, the German government pursued a policy of integration by mandating German as the language of both administration and education. The Danes initially responded with strident political protest. During the 1870s, for example, Nicolai Ahlman (1809–90) and Hans Andersen Krüger (1816–81), who represented the region in the Prussian Landtag, led a protest in which Danes refused to swear the oath to the Prussian king without the fulfillment of the promise made in the Treaty of Prague. By the time of Krüger's death in 1881, however, many Danes recognized that direct opposition was doomed to failure and instead worked to preserve Danish language and culture in the province. The Danish minority was thus split between those favoring hardline protests and those emphasizing compromise.

For Denmark itself, the defeat in the 1864 war led to the fall of the National Liberals and the introduction of a much less democratic constitution in 1866. It eliminated secret ballots for elections to the lower house of the Rigsdag (*Folketing*), and favored landed elites in the upper house (*Landting*). These electoral changes occurred alongside the most explosive phase of Danish industrial development and the emergence of an urban labor movement. Socialist ideology thus took hold in Copenhagen in 1871, as part of a protest against worker disenfranchisement. Its leading figure was Louis Pio (1841–94), who in the early 1870s circulated the pamphlet series *Socialistiske Blade* to promote striking tactics. Although Pio's movement made only modest gains, the conservative government reacted strongly, jailing Pio and his associates Harald Brix (1814–81) and Poul Getleff (1842–1928),

and dismantling the International Workers' Association of Denmark in 1873. For the next few years the labor movement lacked an ideological center and leadership fell to the more moderate Copenhagen trade unions.

Louis Pio's return from prison in 1875 led to a struggle between moderate and radical elements of the socialist movement. In Pio's absence, Danish socialists had been closely affiliated with the German Social Democratic Party, which introduced Lassallean influences into the movement. While the extent of Lassallean influence in the Copenhagen unions remains a matter of dispute, the movement nevertheless became less receptive to Pio's more radical, Marxist perspective. The issue was temporarily resolved when Pio immigrated to the United States under pressure from the government in 1877, leaving the moderate leadership to establish a new political organization known as the Social Democratic Confederation.

A more serious crisis erupted in the late 1880s over a proposed political alliance with the left-wing agrarian *Venstre* party. Opposition to the 1866 constitution produced fears of insurrection in Copenhagen and a failed assassination attempt on Prime Minister J. B. S. Estrup (1825–1913) in 1885. In the face of a heavy-handed government response, social democrats such as Peter Knudsen (1848–1910) favored a parliamentary struggle in the *Folketing*. More revolutionary minded members, led by Gerson Trier (1851–1918) and Nicolaj Petersen (1854–1916), rejected the notion as a compromise with bourgeois interests and a violation of socialist principles. In 1889 Trier and Petersen began publishing their own journal, *The Worker (Arbejderen)*, in which they criticized social democratic leaders. As a result, leading social democrats voted to force the editors of *Arbejderen* from the party. Knudsen and his colleagues faced harsh criticism from international socialist parties, but the alliance nevertheless helped them make impressive showings in the parliamentary elections of 1890.

The growing space for cooperation permitted the Danish left to maintain a reformist stance even as the growing trade unions came into increasing conflict with employers in the 1890s. Both sides formed cooperative associations after 1895 (*Arbejdsgiverforeningen* and *Det Samvirkende Fagforbund*, respectively), which served to increase the scope and intensity of labor disputes,

but ultimately provided a means of resolving them peacefully. In 1899 a massive strike led to a lockout of 40,000 workers for a period of almost five months that crippled the economy and finally encouraged both sides to accept state intervention. The result was the September Agreement, which legitimized the unions nationwide and laid down rules regulating relations between workers and employers.

The left-wing political alliance came to power in 1901 and set about creating a more democratic constitution, which was completed in 1915. In 1903, however, the alliance fractured over the question of military expenditures, with the *Venstre* delegate Viggo Hørup creating the anti-militarist Radical Party. The social democrats also faced new stirrings of radicalism from 1903 to 1920, as young socialists increasingly identified with the goals of the Radical Party, and a segment of urban workers gravitated towards syndicalism as an expression of dissatisfaction with the limits of their moderate parliamentary leaders in the economically troubled first quarter of the twentieth century. The syndicalists reached their greatest strength during World War I, when rising unemployment and an unpopular government policy of conciliation towards the Germans brought a minority coalition of Social Democrats and Radicals into power in 1918, but also increased worker sympathies for the communist revolutions in Germany and Russia.

Such tensions nearly sparked revolution during the Easter Crisis of 1920, which had its roots in the question of North Schleswig. The Allied victory allowed the Danes to hold a plebiscite in the region, but a political impasse in Copenhagen over the future shape of the German-Danish border led King Christian X (1870–1947) on March 29, 1920 to dismiss the government of Prime Minister Carl Theodor Zahle (1866–1946) and replace it with a caretaker government – a move that the Social Democrats and Radicals viewed as unconstitutional. The Social Democrats and the syndicalists began preparing for a general strike. On March 30 the syndicalists gathered 100,000 protesters for a demonstration in Fælled Park, but their participation in the strike ultimately depleted their resources and revealed their relative weakness. Thereafter, the king achieved a compromise with the leading political parties, and the crisis ended with only sporadic violence.

Two decades later, Danes from across the political spectrum found themselves cooperating in resistance to the German occupation during World War II. As in World War I, a government policy of neutrality and conciliation did not reflect the widespread anti-German mood of the Danish public. While such a philosophy helped Denmark maintain a high degree of autonomy under German rule, it left Danes torn over how to respond to the occupation. The split has survived in wartime historiography, which criticizes on the one hand the alleged collaboration of the government of Erik Scavenius (1877–1962) and celebrates on the other Danish solidarity against the occupation. In the latter narrative, historians have highlighted mass demonstrations such as the *Alsang* gatherings, in which tens of thousands of Danes managed to circumvent bans on public protests by gathering to sing patriotic songs at appointed times. Other tactics included strikes, which grew increasingly organized by the summer of 1943. In response, the Germans imposed much tighter restrictions in August, which forced the resistance movement underground. Yet the new regime proved unable to stop the Danes from evacuating nearly all of the country's 7,000 Jews to Sweden in October 1943. According to Andersen (2003), the action required a great deal of planning and organization and marked a moment of unity among the resistance factions. As the war progressed the Danish resistance, aided by the British, carried out sabotage and attacks on Danish collaborators. The Germans, in turn, assassinated prominent protest leaders, including the outspoken playwright Kai Munk (1898–1944). Violence, however, remained low in Denmark compared to the rest of occupied Europe, and the Danes managed to use strike tactics effectively until the end of the war.

The most significant period of protest in the postwar period occurred in response to the international student movements during the late 1960s. In the latter half of the twentieth century Danish protests followed a political turn to the right, the weakening of the Social Democratic Party, and a severe economic downturn. Students protested not only the conditions at Denmark's universities, but also revived the country's deep-rooted anti-militarism, founding the Never Again War (*Aldrig mere Krig*) movement and pushing for the liberalization of the country's

policies toward conscientious objectors. The academic protests also took aim at the chronic housing shortage in Copenhagen. Indeed, these two motives came together in 1971, when youth squatters transformed an abandoned military base in the Christianshavn section of Copenhagen into the autonomous “Freetown of Christiania.” The settlers of Christiania later influenced the BZ squatter movement of the 1980s. While the Christianites succeeded by adhering to non-violence, the BZ squatters drew a harsher police response through their greater propensity for violent action, which produced the Ryesgade revolt in September 1986 and the Youth House (*Ungdomshuset*) riots of 2007.

In the early twenty-first century protests have largely centered on Denmark’s relationship with its growing immigrant population. In September 2005 the conservative newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* caused a controversy by publishing 12 cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammed, which many Muslims found offensive. Muslims in Denmark responded with limited protests against the newspaper and its cultural editor, Flemming Rose. Rose defended his decision to publish the cartoons by claiming that it was itself a protest against acts of self-censorship related to Islam. Following the initial controversy, Abu Laban and Raed Hlayhel, the leaders of the outcry against the cartoons, sought the attention of the international Muslim community, which generated a more vociferous reaction in early 2006. In February 2008 the foiling of an alleged assassination plot against the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard prompted newspapers across Europe to reprint the cartoons, which reignited international outrage and sparked a terrorist attack against the Danish embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan on June 2, 2008.

SEE ALSO: European Revolutions of 1848; Nordic Revolts and Popular Protests, 1500–Present; Reformation; Schleswig-Holstein Uprisings

References and Suggested Readings

- Andersen, P. (2003) Det moralske dilemma: den Tyske Jødeaktion I Danmark Oktober 1943. *Historie* 1: 158–95.
- Ammitzboll, P. & Vidino, L. (2007) After the Danish Cartoon Controversy: Worldwide Protests over Muhammed Caricatures. *Middle East Quarterly* 14, 1: 3–11.

- Barton, H. A. (1986) *Scandinavia in the Revolutionary Era, 1760–1815*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Callesen, G. (1990) Denmark. In M. van der Linden & J. Rojahn (Eds.), *The Formation of Labour Movements, 1870–1914*. Leiden: Brill.
- Horstboll, H. & Ostergård, U. (1990) Reform and Revolution: The French Revolution and the Case of Denmark. *Scandinavian Journal of History* 15, 3: 155–79.
- Jones, W. G. (1986) *Denmark: A Modern History*. London: Croom Helm.
- Kaarsted, T. (1973) *Påskekrisen 1920*. Aarhus: Universitetsforlag.
- Lorenzen-Schmidt, K. (1995) Gutsherrschaft über reiche Bauern: Übersicht über bäuerliche Widerständigkeit in den Marschgütern an der Westküste Schleswig-Holsteins und Jütlands. In J. Peters (Ed.), *Gutsherrschaft als soziales Modell*. Munich: Oldenbourg.
- Pedersen, K. & Stræde T. (Eds.) (1985) *Anarki og Arbejderhistorie*. Viborg: Tiderne.
- Sørensen, N. A. (2005) Narrating the Second World War in Denmark since 1945. *Contemporary European History* 14, 3: 295–315.
- Stræde, T. (1978) Syndakilsmen blandt Lager- og Pakhusarbejderne I København. *Årbog for arbejderbevægelsens historie* 8: 55–96.
- Thaler, P. (2007) A Tale of Three Communities: National Identification in the German-Danish Borderlands. *Scandinavian Journal of History* 32, 2: 141–66.

Despard, Colonel Edward Marcus (1751–1803) and the Despard Conspiracy

Clifford D. Conner

Edward Marcus Despard was hanged in 1803 for plotting to assassinate George III of England. He was an Irishman and he was a revolutionary, but was he an Irish revolutionary? The answer is not as obvious as it might seem.

The public record of his life would indicate that he had little interest in Ireland. He was born into a well-to-do Irish Protestant family, but left Ireland in his early teens to join the English army and rapidly rose to the rank of colonel. He fought for England against Spain in Central America side by side with his close comrade-

in-arms Horatio Nelson. Despard then served as the first colonial administrator of what was to become British Honduras and later Belize. When he left the tropics he returned not to Ireland but to London, where he did indeed gain notoriety in the late eighteenth century as a revolutionary, but in affiliation with the United Englishmen, not the United Irishmen.

It would appear, then, that Colonel Despard should be remembered as an English revolutionary – an “English Jacobin” – rather than an Irish rebel. Appearances are often deceptive in the shadowy world of revolutionary politics, however, as Despard’s career magnificently illustrates. A careful examination of the secret files compiled by the English and Irish governments’ political police reveals that Despard’s primary loyalty was to the cause of Irish separation from England, that his role in the United Englishmen was as a high-level agent of the United Irishmen, that he served as a liaison between the United Irish Society and the French government in secret negotiations to bring about a French invasion to liberate Ireland, and that he was deeply involved in the international conspiracy that culminated in Emmett’s rebellion of 1803.

Despard in Central America

Despard’s earlier career as soldier and colonial administrator was not unrelated to his revolutionary activities in England. For one thing, English newspapers had portrayed him as a war hero, giving him instant leadership credentials among disaffected and radicalizing Londoners.

The military campaigns led by young Despard and Horatio Nelson in Central America contributed to shaping the destiny of that region. In 1782 a defeat inflicted by Despard on Spanish forces at Black River on the Mosquito Shore gave Britain a colonial foothold in Central America that endured until 1881. Despard was appointed the first official British superintendent of the Bay of Honduras Settlement in 1784, a post he held until 1790. More than seven decades later the Settlement would be formally colonized and renamed British Honduras; it would become Belize upon gaining independence in 1981.

But his tenure as superintendent was marred by disputes between elite and plebeian settlers. Despard’s attempt to redress injustices perpetrated by corrupt elite settlers angered the latter,

who vilified Despard and, through the intercession of their powerful merchant friends in London, managed to have him dismissed from his post. Despard returned to London and spent years petitioning the authorities for vindication, but his entreaties were ignored. The frustration of his attempts to further the cause of social justice in Central America undoubtedly fueled his radicalization.

Colonel Despard and the Historians

Despard’s tragic end was the main reason he came to be remembered as “the unfortunate Colonel Despard.” He was arrested, tried, and convicted on charges of high treason and was hanged in London, together with six plebeian co-conspirators, on February 21, 1803. But his historical reputation has also been unfortunate. For more than a century and a half following his execution, historians tended to dismiss Despard as of marginal interest – as a small-time revolutionary or a lunatic conspirator. When mentioned at all, he was portrayed as the leader of a quixotic putsch against an invincible British government.

In 1963, however, E. P. Thompson brought a fresh perspective to the Despard story in his classic *The Making of the English Working Class*, in which he concluded that the “Despard affair must be seen as an incident of real significance in British political history.” In light of Thompson’s seminal insight, other authors have perceived in the Despard conspiracy the seeds of the earliest trade unions, the revolutionary Chartist movement, and working-class socialism. The key to understanding Despard’s activities, however, was provided by Marianne Elliott, who uncovered his connections with the Irish and French revolutionary movements in the late 1790s.

In the waning years of the eighteenth century, intense governmental repression (“Pitt’s reign of terror”) had intimidated most prominent radical reformers in England into silence, but a deep social polarization was still evident. Food riots in the cities, rural uprisings, and the proliferation of secret workers’ societies were all manifestations of the ongoing warfare between the upper and lower classes.

In the context of war with revolutionary France and massive rebellion in Ireland, the British government felt particularly threatened

by dissension in its military forces. A series of naval mutinies at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and the Nore jolted the British fleets in 1797; another occurred at Bantry Bay late in 1801. Official apprehension over Despard's activities arose most of all from the fear that he was utilizing his prestige as a high-ranking military officer to create an organized movement of rank-and-file soldiers, who were no less receptive to democratic agitation than were the sailors.

Although Despard no doubt felt morally justified in considering his loyalty to the British crown superseded by a higher loyalty to the cause of Irish freedom, the laws of England did not recognize that option. In the context of British legality, Despard's conspiratorial activities on behalf of the United Irish Society certainly constituted treason. In spite of his extreme caution in avoiding the commission of overt illegal acts that could be attributed to him, he was eventually caught in a compromising situation in the company of others who had been less cautious.

The ministry, however, felt unsure of its ability to win a conviction against Despard merely on the grounds of his having participated in a treasonous conspiracy, so it concocted a false case accusing him of fomenting a lurid plot to overthrow the British monarchy and assassinate the reigning monarch, George III. The evidence suggests that such a plot really existed, but the government's own intelligence sources reveal that Despard's only connection with it was his effort to dissuade its authors from carrying it out. By selectively presenting evidence and manipulating the selection of jurors, government prosecutors succeeded in convicting him. The celebrated Lord Nelson testified as a character witness on Despard's behalf, but to no avail.

The co-conspirators who joined Colonel Despard on the scaffold were carpenters, shoemakers, and laborers. To many of his peers his most incomprehensible offense was not treason to king or country, but to class. In their eyes Despard was a "gentleman" who inexplicably chose to consort with the "rabble." His social standing with the upper classes was not enhanced by the fact that his beloved wife Catherine, whom he had met in Jamaica, was of African descent.

Colonel Despard could have defended himself in court and perhaps saved his life if he had been willing to betray the United Irishmen's plans for an uprising, but he maintained his silence and went to his death in heroic fashion. The

courage he exhibited during his trial and execution should qualify him for the pantheon of Irish martyrs of his generation.

SEE ALSO: Bread Riots, Britain, 1795; Chartists; Emmet, Robert (1778–1803) and Emmet's Rebellion; London Corresponding Society; O'Connor, Arthur (1763–1852); Spithead and Nore Mutinies, Britain, 1797; United Englishmen/United Britons; United Irishmen

References and Suggested Readings

- Bolland, O. N. (1977) *The Formation of a Colonial Society: Belize, from Conquest to Crown Colony*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Conner, C. D. (2000) *Colonel Despard: The Life and Times of an Anglo-Irish Rebel*. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing.
- Elliott, M. (1977) The "Despard Conspiracy" Reconsidered. *Past and Present* 75 (May).
- Elliott, M. (1982) *Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Jay, M. (2004) *The Unfortunate Colonel Despard*. London: Bantam/Doubleday.
- Linebaugh, P. & Rediker, M. (2000) The Conspiracy of Edward and Catherine Despard. In P. Linebaugh & M. Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Smith, A. W. (1955) Irish Rebels and English Radicals, 1798–1820. *Past and Present* 7 (April).
- Thompson, E. P. (1963) *The Making of the English Working Class*. New York: Vintage.
- Wells, R. (1983) *Insurrection: The British Experience 1795–1803*. Gloucester: Alan Sutton.

Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806)

Stewart R. King

Jean-Jacques Dessalines was probably born a slave on the Cormier plantation in Grande-Rivière du Nord in the Northern Province of what is now Haiti. Haiti, then called Saint-Domingue, was the Saudi Arabia of its day; the wealthiest place in the world. The wealth of sugar, coffee, indigo, and cotton was produced by half a million slaves laboring under the direction of about 50,000 free people, half of whom were white and half of African ancestry. Jean-Jacques worked as a field hand and foreman on a large white-owned plantation as a young man, and then at the age of 30 was sold to a free black man

named Dessalines. Dessalines the master was apparently a small-scale planter with a dozen or so slaves, and Jean-Jacques, who took his last name as was customary for slaves, was a *commandeur*, or leading slave on his farm. In 1791 the Haitian Revolution broke out and Jean-Jacques left his master to join the rebels.

At first he served under Jean-François, one of the early leaders of the rebel slaves in the Northern Province. Jean-François' forces based themselves in the Spanish colony (today's Dominican Republic) and the leaders held Spanish officers' commissions. There, Jean-Jacques Dessalines became the chief lieutenant of Toussaint Louverture, the most professional and charismatic of the rebel leaders. The slave rebels said they were fighting for the legitimate kings of France and Spain against the French Revolution, and they spread the story that the king had been trying to end slavery, or at least improve conditions for slaves, but had been prevented by the planters and the revolutionaries. However, when the French revolutionary government finally abolished slavery in 1794, Dessalines, along with Toussaint Louverture and several of the other rebel slave leaders changed sides.

Together, Toussaint, Dessalines, and the other black leaders drove the Spanish and English invaders from the colony and defeated a variety of counterrevolutionary movements, uniting the colony under their rule in 1799. Dessalines took a leading role in many of these campaigns, especially what was called the War of the Knives in the Southern Province in 1799 against the forces of the mixed-race General Rigaud. Dessalines was accused of having carried out several massacres of Rigaud's supporters during this campaign. Toussaint wanted to recreate the colony's wealthy plantations without slavery. Former slaves were required to serve on their plantations or in the military, and the government regulated their treatment and wages. The former slaves resisted and the colony's armed forces were faced with many uprisings. Once again, Dessalines took a leading role in crushing these uprisings and forcing the former slaves back to the plantations. The system was beginning to produce results in the form of rising production when the French government, under Napoleon, invaded the colony with thousands of soldiers.

Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Toussaint Louverture and their supporters fought bitterly.

Dessalines and the other commanders loyal to Toussaint carried out many massacres of white civilians and prisoners during this struggle, blaming the white colonists for encouraging Napoleon to attack the colony. Dessalines' forces were besieged at La Crête à Pierrot near Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite in March 1802, where they managed to kill hundreds of French soldiers in a desperate struggle.

After the French captured La Crête à Pierrot, Dessalines and Toussaint continued the struggle for a few months but finally gave in and signed a ceasefire with the French expedition in May. Toussaint was arrested shortly thereafter, despite the promised amnesty, and shipped to France, where he died in prison. Dessalines was confirmed as a general by the French and assigned to keep the West and South Provinces in submission. He fought for the French as he had for Toussaint, destroying rebel encampments and harrying runaway workers back to their plantations. However, he kept the stocks of weapons and ammunition he captured, distributing them in hidden depots around the country.

When disease began to ravage the French expeditionary force, and especially when war broke out again between Britain and France, cutting the French supply line, Dessalines began to think again about rebellion against the French. He switched sides in October 1802. He waged a quick and brutal campaign to bring the various rebel factions under his control, destroying those rebel groups that would not acknowledge his leadership. Then he turned on the French. At the same time, the French were experiencing a leadership crisis as their original commander, Charles Leclerc, Napoleon's brother-in-law, died in November 1802 and was replaced by the brutal Donatien de Rochambeau. Rochambeau fought a war of extermination against the Haitian rebels, killing almost every black he captured regardless of age, sex, or connection with the resistance. In addition, it was clear by this time that the expedition had come with secret orders to wipe out the black ruling class and restore slavery. All these factors made it much easier for Dessalines to argue that the alternative to unity was genocide.

Dessalines' forces swept the western part of the island clear of French garrisons in a campaign that took about one year. The final battle was fought at Vertières, just outside the walls of Cap

Français, on November 1, 1803. On January 1, 1804 Dessalines proclaimed Haiti's independence in a declaration written, as his secretary famously put it, "with a bayonet as a pen, the blood of a white man as the ink, and his skull as the inkwell." Most whites fled the colony with the defeated French soldiers, and Dessalines massacred the remainder, sparing only a few of whom he said "li neg," which can mean either "he is black" or "he is a man" (the word *neg* in Haitian Kweyol is derived from the French *nègre* or "negro" but means just "man" or "person" in Kweyol).

As Jacques I, emperor of the newly independent nation, Dessalines tried to implement Toussaint's policy of forcing the former slaves to work on the plantations, but was mostly unsuccessful. He controlled foreign trade with great care, trying to develop trade with the United States and Britain. Toussaint had had good relations with the United States under President John Adams of Massachusetts, but by the time Dessalines came to power the American president was the southerner Thomas Jefferson, who had offered supplies to General Rochambeau. The attempt to develop good relations with the United States was unsuccessful and Haiti was isolated internationally. Dessalines' officers finally rebelled against him in 1806, killing him at the northern gate of Port-au-Prince.

Dessalines was reviled by the Haitian ruling class after his death but has remained a heroic figure to ordinary people. Haiti's national anthem, the *Dessaliniene*, is named after him. The principal avenue of Port-au-Prince bears his name. Populist politicians and rebels, including most notably François Duvalier, "Papa Doc," have claimed to be inspired by his example of unbending devotion to national independence and freedom and equality for black people.

SEE ALSO: Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath; Haiti, Saint-Domingue and Revolutionary France; Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1801–1804; Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution, 1796–1799

References and Suggested Readings

- American Missionary Register* (1825) A Brief History of Dessalines. *American Missionary Register* 6, 10. Available online: www.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti/history/earlyhaiti/dessalines.htm.
- Dubois, L. (2005) *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution*. New York: Belknap.

Deutscher, Isaac (1907–1967)

Kunal Chattopadhyay

Isaac Deutscher, a Polish Jew, was a leading leftist critic of the Soviet Union under Stalinism. At the age of 16 he attracted attention as a poet. In 1926 he joined the underground Polish Communist Party and soon became the editor of its press. His 1933 essay on fascism, urging the relevance of a united front, caused his expulsion, as the line of the Comintern was to call social democrats fascists. From then, he was part of the international Trotskyist movement. According to his own testimony, he was the main author of the argument against founding the Fourth International in 1938.

In 1939, when Hitler invaded Poland, Deutscher was in England, where he joined for a brief while the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers' League. In the same period he learned English, which became his chief language of writing thereafter.

Deutscher wrote a series of extremely influential books and essays. His *Stalin: A Political Biography* (1949) presented Stalin as a socialist, however brutal, and argued that in whatever distorted manner, socialism was being built in the USSR. The book appeared as a sophisticated left-wing rebuttal of Cold War hysteria. It made Deutscher a leading left-wing interpreter of the Russian Revolution. His *Russia After Stalin* (1953) foresaw a period of thaw and argued that reform from above alone could be the future for socialism and democracy in the USSR. This attitude led him to characterize the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 as counter-revolution trying to put the clock back.

Deutscher's greatest work was his 3-volume biography of Trotsky. Having been given access to the closed section of the Trotsky Archives in Harvard, he had access to a mass of material. The biography was successful in refuting the slanders spread about Trotsky by Stalinism. But the third volume reflected Deutscher's differences with Trotsky, so that Trotsky's party-building work was given much less importance than his literary work.

Deutscher became a popular figure on the left with the new wave of radicalization in the 1960s. In 1965 he took part in a "teach-in" in the University of California, Berkeley. His 1967 G. M. Trevelyan Memorial Lectures at Cambridge

University (*The Unfinished Revolution: Russia 1917–1967*) highlighted the achievements and shortcomings of Soviet society, and reposed his faith in a peaceful development towards socialist democracy, through the agency of the CPSU, and due to objective changes like industrialization and the spread of education. Deutscher died on August 19, 1967.

SEE ALSO: Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- Cliff, T. (1982) *The End of the Road: Deutscher's Capitulation to Stalinism*. In *Neither Washington nor Moscow: Essays on Revolutionary Socialism*. London: Bookmarks.
- Deutscher, I. (1949) *Stalin: A Political Biography*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Deutscher, I. (1954) *The Prophet Armed: Trotsky 1879–1921*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Deutscher, I. (1959) *The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky 1921–1929*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Deutscher, I. (1963) *The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky 1929–1940*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Horowitz, D. (1971) *Isaac Deutscher: The Man and His Work*. London: Macdonald.

Di Vittorio, Giuseppe (1892–1957)

Maurizio Antonioli

Giuseppe Di Vittorio was among the most influential union leaders in modern Italian labor history, leading the Confederazione Generale Italiana dei Lavoratori (CGIL) in its refounding after Fascism. Born in Cerignola, a rural town in Apulia on August 11, 1892 to a family of peasant workers, after his father's death Di Vittorio was forced to leave school and work as a day laborer. He joined the May 1904 general strike, an event during which five workers were killed by troops in Cerignola.

Di Vittorio was strongly influenced by the growth of peasants' organizations and the spread of socialist ideas, giving rise to his participation in the local young socialist organization in Cerignola. He was radicalized by affiliating with the national Federazione Giovanile Socialista (Federation of Young Socialists), an organization led by syndicalists in opposition to the official

Socialist Party Youth Federation. In 1912 Di Vittorio joined the newly founded USI, a nationwide union led by syndicalists, serving on its central committee. He was appointed secretary to the syndicalist Chamber of Labor in Minervino Murge, and was instrumental to the dissemination of radical syndicalist ideas, organizations, and actions throughout Apulia. In 1914 after Red Week, Di Vittorio fled to Lugano in Switzerland, returning to Italy after the amnesty to serve as a soldier in May 1915 after Italy joined World War I. Wounded in combat, Di Vittorio, considered a “dangerous subversive,” was imprisoned in Libya.

Released after World War I, in 1919 he was appointed secretary to the Cerignola Chamber of Labor, affiliated with the USI. He was arrested in April 1921 as an organizer of the “anti-fascist strike” in Apulia against Fascist violence. He ran as a candidate for the Socialist Party in the May 21 general election and was elected as deputy and released from prison. He served as a secretary to the Bari Chamber of Labor of the USI, a period where he moved closer to the new Communist Party, advocating the merger of the USI and the socialist-influenced CGdL union federations. His election as deputy and support for the International of Red Unions in Moscow put him in opposition with the leadership of the mainly anarchist USI. In May 1922 Di Vittorio broke with USI, but continued organizing a united resistance to Fascism with socialists, communists, anarchists, and revolutionary syndicalists. Upon Mussolini's rise to power in 1922, Di Vittorio was banished from Apulia and moved to Rome, joining the Socialist Party and Third Internationalist faction advocating merger with the Communist Party, which he joined in 1924. Following a suggestion from communist philosopher Antonio Gramsci, Di Vittorio founded and became secretary of the Associazione per la Difesa dei Contadini (Association for the Defense of Peasants). He was arrested in October 1925 and fled to France on his release. In 1927 the Tribunale Speciale condemned Di Vittorio *in absentia* to 15 years imprisonment.

Di Vittorio was recruited by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and from 1928 to 1930 lived in Moscow as the Italian representative of the Peasants' International. Upon his return to Paris Di Vittorio joined the Executive of the Communist Party to lead the underground communist-influenced CGdL. Di

Vittorio traveled to Spain in 1936 in the wake of the revolution and was an organizer of the international brigades and a political commissar of the XI Brigade during the civil war. The following year he returned to Paris and edited *La voce degli italiani*, the organ of anti-Fascist Italian émigrés in France. Arrested by the Gestapo in German-occupied France in 1941, Di Vittorio was taken to Italy to serve a five-year sentence on Ventotente Island. Released in August 1943 after the fall of Mussolini, he went underground in German-occupied Rome, where, with socialist union leader Buozzi and Catholic Achille Grandi, paved the way for the foundation of the united Confederazione Generale Italiana dei Lavoratori (CGIL), foreseen in the “pact for union unity” made public as soon as Rome was liberated in June 1944.

The CGIL was the first unified general union in Italian labor history. Di Vittorio was appointed general secretary, along with Grandi and socialist Oreste Lizzadri. The unitarian stance of Di Vittorio would be frustrated by the split of Christian democratic union members into the Confederazione Italiana Sindacati dei Lavoratori (CISL) and republican and social democrat union members into the Unione Italiana del Lavoro (UIL) after 1948.

Giuseppe Di Vittorio was elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1946 and as senator in 1948 (joining as deputy in the second legislature, 1953–7). In 1949 he was elected president of the Federazione Sindacale Mondiale (World Federation of Trade Unions), the labor federation of the Soviet Third International. In the same year Di Vittorio proposed at the CGIL Congress in Genoa the Piano del Lavoro (Labor Plan), a program of economic policies to be negotiated with government. At the Naples Congress in 1952 he proposed a *Statuto dei diritti dei lavoratori*, designating worker rights that greatly influenced union policies for decades.

Giuseppe Di Vittorio was on the whole critical of the Soviet repression of Hungary in 1956, but never broke with the PCI. His fame, authoritative personality, and consensus among Italian workers allowed him to stand firmly even against communist secretary Palmiro Togliatti, never giving up the hope for unity of all workers in a united general union. On November 3, 1957, after a union meeting, Di Vittorio died of a heart attack in Lecco.

SEE ALSO: Italian Communist Party; Italian Socialist Party

References and Suggested Readings

- Carioti, A. (2004) *Di Vittorio*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Pistillo, M. (1973) *Giuseppe di Vittorio 1907–1924*. Rome: Editori Riuniti.
- Pistillo, M. (1975) *Giuseppe di Vittorio 1924–1944*. Rome: Editori Riuniti.
- Pistillo, M. (1977) *Giuseppe di Vittorio 1944–1957*. Rome: Editori Riuniti.
- Tatò, A. (1968–70), *Di Vittorio: l'uomo, il dirigente*, 3 Vols. Rome: Esi.
- WFTU (1967) *Giuseppe Di Vittorio and the World Federation of Trade Unions*. Prague: Weltgewerkschaftsbund.

Díaz Soto y Gama, Antonio (1880–1967)

Vittorio Sergi

Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama was a journalist, politician, and agrarian leader. He was an active member of the radical opposition to the government of General Porfirio Díaz during the Mexican Revolution. After the civil war he followed the trajectory of the ruling classes from populism to more conservative and anti-communist positions.

He was born January 23, 1880, in San Luis Potosí into an educated middle-class family. When he was 19 he was a member of the anti-clerical Jacobin Club Liberal Ponciano Arriaga, along with brothers Ricardo and Julio Flores Magón, Juan Sarabia, and Camilo Arriaga. The militant attitude of this club generated many more clubs in various states of Mexico. Club Liberal Ponciano Arriaga participated in the founding congress of the Liberal Mexican Party (PLM), which can be considered as the starting point of an organized political opposition to the government of Porfirio Díaz.

In 1903 Díaz Soto y Gama fled Mexico to avoid arrest and settled in Texas. After coming to an agreement with Díaz not to criticize the government in public, he returned in the spring of 1904 to help his financially struggling father. When Díaz died, Díaz Soto y Gama returned to political life in opposition to Francisco Madero.

In 1912, influenced by the Catalan anarchist Francisco Moncaleano, he became one of the

founders of the radical labor organization Casa del Obrero Mundial in Mexico City. He fled Mexico City in 1914 to avoid arrest by the government of Victoriano Huerta, which had removed Madero from power in a military coup. From then until mid-1919, Díaz Soto y Gama served as a colonel with Emiliano Zapata and his peasant army, which was based in Morelos until Zapata's assassination in 1919.

On June 13, 1920, Díaz Soto y Gama, together with Rodrigo Gómez and Felipe Santibañez, founded the National Agrarian Party (PNA), whose main political aim was to achieve land reform by reformist means in support of the Obregón government. In the same year, Díaz Soto y Gama won election to the Chamber of Deputies. On May 1, 1923, he led the first National Agrarian Congress, during which he promoted land reform as part of the Christian social doctrine and defended the right of peasants to carry arms in self-defense. In 1929, he and the majority of the party refused to support Plutarco Elías Calles and to merge their party into the new National Revolutionary Party (PNR).

Having been forced violently to abandon his party and the Chamber of Deputies, Díaz Soto y Gama distanced himself from the militant and libertarian attitudes of the previous years and continued his activities as a journalist and professor. His influence was crucial in the foundation of the conservative National Action Party (PAN) in 1939. After World War II, he became an influential conservative and anti-communist intellectual. He died in Mexico City on March 14, 1967.

SEE ALSO: Casa del Obrero Mundial; Madero, Francisco (1873–1913); Magón, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922) and the Magonistas; Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Obregón, Alvaro (1880–1928) and the Sonoran Generation; Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919) and the Comuna Morelense

References and Suggested Readings

- Castro, P. (2002) *Soto y Gama: Genio y Figura*. Mexico City: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana.
- Cordoba Perez, F. (1971) *El movimiento agrarista en México, 1911–1924*. Mexico City: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana.
- Díaz Soto y Gama, A. (1987) *La Revolución Agraria del Sur y Emiliano Zapata, su caudillo*. Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana.

Dictatorship of the proletariat

Soma Marik

The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat (DOP) has occupied for a century a central position in discussions of Marx's theory of politics. The writings of Marx and Engels during the revolution of 1848 show that they considered the democratic movement to be formed by workers, petty bourgeoisie, and peasants, and desired energetic use of force to ensure the triumph of these classes, a political strategy they sometimes described as "dictatorship," referring to use of force, not rule. Eventually, the concept of permanent revolution indicated that if the proletariat was to be the leading class in winning the battle of democracy, then in essence the rule established would be the rule of the proletariat. So, by 1850, Marx started using the term dictatorship of the proletariat to designate the rule of the working class. His writings about the DOP contrasted bourgeois class rule (dictatorship of the bourgeoisie) with working-class rule. As Marx described in a passage discussing the condition of the peasantry: "Only the fall of Capital can raise the peasant; only an anti-capitalist, a proletarian government can break his economic misery, his social degradation. The *constitutional republic* is the dictatorship of his united exploiters; the *social democratic republic*, the *Red republic* is the dictatorship of his allies" (Marx and Engels 1978: 122).

In 1852 Marx's friend Joseph Weydemeyer published an article in the *New York Turn-Zeitung* entitled "Dictatorship of the Proletariat." Partly responding to that article, Marx wrote him a letter commenting that class struggle necessarily leads to the DOP, and that the DOP only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and a classless society. This point was reaffirmed in Marx's critical comments on the draft program of the German Workers' Party in 1876. There he wrote that the political transition period corresponding to the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into communist society "can be nothing but the *revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*" (Marx and Engels 1989: 95). This statement rejects the liberal argument about democracy as a form that superseded all class content.

This opens Marx to the charge that he was actually an advocate of authoritarianism, a charge made believable by twentieth-century dictators in the name of the proletariat from Stalin onwards. But Marx and Engels were committed to democracy in the DOP. Most categorically, Engels endorsed the Paris Commune as an instance of the dictatorship, in his 1891 preface (Marx and Engels 1977: 189) to Marx's *The Civil War in France* (Marx and Engels 1986). Scholars like Avineri (1977) have claimed that Marx did not consider the commune to be a working-class affair. But a speech of Marx in late September 1871 to celebrate the seventh anniversary of the International Workingmen's Association shows, as reported by a newspaper, that he described the Commune as the conquest of the political power of the working classes, and went on to argue that before one could move from that to a classless society, a proletarian "dictature" would become necessary and the first condition of that was a proletarian army. In the aftermath of the Commune, the lesson was driven home forcefully that when basic property rights were under threat, the bourgeoisie would not go by democratic rules but would use utmost force. That was why working-class rule could only be secured, under all circumstances, by a working class that was armed.

The brutal crushing of the Commune made it clear to Marx that the first condition of the rule of the proletariat had to be the creation of a proletarian army. He made it quite clear that unless the working class provided the core of the personnel for the coercive apparatus, simply having workers in ministerial positions would not mean having the rule of the proletariat. In addition, from the experience of the Commune, Marx and Engels drew the conclusion that the form of working-class democracy would be distinct from the form of bourgeois democracy, a conclusion Draper (1988) does not accept.

If the proletariat, in order to rule, had to represent its interests as the general interests of society, then its interests had to be sufficiently broadly defined to incorporate the essential interests of the other major oppressed classes and social groups. So the DOP had to mean majority rule. Marx's analysis of the Paris Commune highlighted some of its basic features: a workers' army, a democratically elected regime where executive and legislative functions were combined, so that the executive did not remain outside popular control;

abolition of the political functions of the police and the subordination of the police to the elected representatives; the right of the electors to recall their delegate at any time; and finally, pay for elected representatives at rates similar to what working people received.

The term DOP has been controversial. In Germany, opponents of the Social Democrats accused them of desiring dictatorship, a charge to which right-wing socialists responded by saying the term had been Marx's alone, and the party had not accepted it. But in the Russian Social Democratic movement the term was adopted as part of the party programme in 1903. Discussing the possibility of permanent revolution, Trotsky talked about transforming temporary workers' hegemony into lasting socialist dictatorship, suggesting a continuing link between the dictatorship and the transition to communism.

A major revival of the term came in 1917, when Lenin wrote *The State and Revolution*. This book was a major effort at actually explaining what Marx and Engels had said about the DOP, and in it, Lenin linked the Commune to the Soviets, as class self-organizations that had developed in Russia in 1905 and again in 1917. It is also worth noting that the entire book is silent about the role of the vanguard party.

However, the concept changed in the course of the murderous civil war waged by internal and international counter-revolution from 1918 to 1921. Steps made necessary by the exigencies of the war, such as bans on parties that were supporting the White Guards in the civil war, bans on newspapers supporting the counter-revolution, tremendous centralization of administration and production, destruction of the autonomy of the soviets and trade unions, the creation of special apparatus of repression under emergencies, like the Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution (Cheka), began to be justified as examples of what the DOP should be. The major Marxist critique of this came from Rosa Luxemburg. By 1921 all opposition parties were banned, as were factions inside the Communist Party. The party came to be identified with the class because of its historic origins, rather than its present position, where a layer of bureaucrats was beginning to exert influence and use brutal repression to retain bureaucratic privileges, justifying its actions in the name of waging class struggle under the DOP.

In the 1930s Trotsky admitted that the ban on opposition parties and on factions in the party had been a wrong step (Trotsky 1987). Subsequently, sections of the Trotskyist movement put forward a more rounded concept of the DOP, including on one hand a reaffirmation of the idea that there can be no simple democratic transition from capitalism to communism, without a forcible rupture with the bourgeois state; and on the other hand, the extension of both representative and direct democracy, and the recognition of civil liberties for all those who do not wage armed struggle against the DOP (Desai 1990).

SEE ALSO: Class Struggle; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Socialism; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- Avineri, S. (1977) *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*. New Delhi: S. Chand.
- Desai, A. R. (Ed.) (1990) *Communism and Democracy*. Bombay: Inquilabi Communist Sangathan.
- Draper, H. (1988) *The “Dictatorship of the Proletariat” from Marx to Lenin*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Lenin, V. I. (1992) *The State and Revolution*. London: Penguin Books.
- Lovell, D. W. (1984) *From Marx to Lenin*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Marik, S. (2008) *Reinterrogating the Classical Marxist Discourses of Revolutionary Democracy*. New Delhi: Aakar Books.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1977) *Selected Works*, Vol. 2. Moscow: Progress.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1978–89) *Collected Works*. Moscow: Progress.
- Trotsky, L. (1987) *The Revolution Betrayed*. New York: Pathfinder Press.

Diderot, Denis (1713–1784)

Yves Laberge

Denis Diderot, a central figure of the great ideological revolution known as the Enlightenment, was a French author, philosopher, critic, and encyclopedist. As a radical freethinker, he was often embroiled in controversy. He is remembered above all for his pioneering attempt to synthesize all knowledge currently available in the eighteenth

century: the *Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers* (co-edited with Jean D’Alembert). Among some 200 contributors to the *Encyclopédie* were the most important *philosophes* of the Enlightenment: Condorcet, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Voltaire. The *Encyclopédie* was published between 1751 and 1772, but some of its 28 volumes and supplements were condemned as impious, or for propagating unorthodox ideas, by Pope Clément XIII and the French *Conseil d’état* in 1759, after which the royal privilege was withdrawn and subsequent volumes were relatively ignored by contemporaries.

Diderot was born to a bourgeois family in Champagne in 1713. Frustrated by the slow pace of his studies, Diderot briefly joined his father’s cutlery business, but after only a few days he decided to become an Abbé. He inherited his uncle’s position as canon at the local church when he was 15 years old. However, the cathedral chapter, objecting to such a young man assuming the position, blocked the appointment, so Diderot left for Paris to resume his studies. Frequently strapped for money, he performed a variety of jobs to survive.

In 1732 he earned a masters of arts in philosophy and embarked on the study of law. In 1734, however, he decided to become a writer, which angered his father, who promptly disowned him. Diderot’s father also objected to his marriage to Antoinette Champion in 1743 because she was of low social status, poorly educated, lacked a dowry, and was four years older than Diderot. It did not prove to be a happy marriage, but it produced three children, only one of whom, a daughter named Angelique, survived to adulthood.

Diderot often had problems with censorship, since his writings were considered subversive and anti-clerical. His *Pensées philosophiques*, published anonymously in 1746, was condemned by the Parlement of Paris due to its criticism of Catholicism. After the publication of *Lettre sur les aveugles à l’usage de ceux qui voient* in 1749, in which he expressed skepticism about the Catholic Church and the monarchy, Diderot was imprisoned for three months. The main point of *Lettre sur les aveugles* was to show how ideas are dependent on the five senses, and it examined how the human intellect is affected by the loss of one of the senses. What was most striking to Diderot’s contemporaries, however, was the book’s relativism with respect to the concept

of God. Also of interest to historians of ideas is that *Lettre sur les aveugles* presented, although in undeveloped form, a pre-Darwinian version of the theory of variation and natural selection.

Diderot's foremost accomplishment was the creation of the *Encyclopédie*, the central literary work of the Enlightenment. He convinced a publisher, Le Breton, to sponsor the project, which entailed collecting all of the new ideas of all active writers in an attempt to centralize the immense amount of scattered knowledge that the Enlightenment was producing. Capital was raised, government permission for the project was secured, and the first volume appeared in 1751.

Not surprisingly, the innovative *Encyclopédie* met with opposition. The ecclesiastical party opposed it, perceiving that the work promoted philosophies contrary to Church doctrine. Important members of the aristocracy also opposed its advocacy of ideas that they felt threatened the social status quo, such as religious tolerance, freedom of thought, and democratic doctrines. Consequently, in 1759, the *Encyclopédie* was formally suppressed. D'Alembert and other *philosophes* withdrew from the project, leaving Diderot with the arduous task of clandestinely completing the work almost singlehandedly. He wrote several hundred articles and saw the project through to completion, with its final volume appearing in 1772.

Meanwhile, Diderot was also a prolific playwright, novelist, and theoretician. His *Lettre sur le commerce de la librairie* (1763) is seen as a manifesto for the freedom of the press and a plea against censorship. He wrote it as a letter to the chief of police in Paris after being shocked to find that some of the articles in the *Encyclopédie* had been secretly edited and fundamentally altered by his publisher in order to avoid troubles with censorship and the authorities.

Diderot's novel *La Religieuse* (1758) was a satirical story of a young woman who becomes a nun because her parents want to earn the rent given to nuns' families. But when she later tries to leave the convent, explaining that she had been forced into it by her parents, she is foiled by the lack of all logic and common sense on the part of the officialdom she must confront. Diderot's enduring power to stir controversy was demonstrated in 1966 when, more than two centuries after it was written, that novel was made into a feature film. After a scandalous première at the Cannes Film Festival, the film was banned in

France for a year before finally being released, restricted to "mature audiences."

Diderot's work did not acquire him great wealth. He never secured any of the prominent posts frequently given to men of letters, nor was he awarded membership in the Académie Française. He even had to sell his library in order to provide his daughter's dowry. His international renown had become such, however, that an "enlightened" monarch, Catherine II of Russia, purchased his collection and commissioned him to retain the books in Paris and serve as her salaried librarian. After his death the books were shipped to Russia where they were placed in the National Library.

Diderot died in Paris in 1784. Some of his most radical works, containing, for example, harsh critiques of slavery and colonialism, had been suppressed during his lifetime but were published posthumously. His reputation as one of the revolutionary thinkers who, together with Voltaire and Rousseau, most inspired the Enlightenment is richly deserved.

SEE ALSO: Enlightenment, France, 18th Century; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778); Voltaire (1694–1778)

References and Suggested Readings

- Crocker, L. (Ed.) (1966) *Diderot's Selected Writings*. New York: Macmillan.
- Diderot, D. (1974) *The Nun (La Religieuse)*. Trans. L. Tancock. New York: Penguin.
- Diderot, D. (1992) *Political Writings*. Ed. J. H. Mason & R. Wokler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- The Encyclopedia of Diderot and d'Alembert Collaborative Translation Project*. Scholarly Publishing Office of the University of Michigan Library and Digital Library Extension Service. Available at www.hti.umich.edu/d/did/.

Dimitrov, Georgi (1882–1949)

Liliana Deyanova

Georgi Dimitrov was a Bulgarian activist in the international communist movement, a trade union leader, professional revolutionary, secretary general of the Comintern (Communist International), and prime minister of Bulgaria from late

1946 to his death in 1949. Dimitrov's diary, from 1933 to 1949, held secret in Bulgarian Communist Party archives until its publication in 1997, catalyzed questions on the contradictory and contested history of communism and the clash of two opposing types of memory. Some view Dimitrov as an iconic figure who unrelentingly opposed fascism and advanced the Bulgarian and Slavic working class as well as socialist internationalism. Detractors view Dimitrov as a pawn of the Soviet Union and Stalin.

Born in the Bulgarian village of Kovachevtsi, Dimitrov was forced to leave school at age 12 to support his family. As a compositor, Dimitrov joined the Union of Printing Workers, and in 1902, he joined the Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party. After the party split in 1903, Dimitrov joined the Bulgarian Communist Party fraction that joined the Third Communist International in 1919.

Dimitrov was a labor activist. In 1906 he led a miners' strike in Pernik, and from 1909 joined the Central Committee of the party and became secretary of the Trade Union Federation. Elected to the National Assembly in 1913, Dimitrov remained a member of parliament until 1923, organizing anti-war protests and, as a union leader, seeking to coordinate the activities of Balkan trade unions. Dimitrov met Lenin and contributed to the constitution of the Red International of Labor Unions (the Profintern).

From 1920 on, Dimitrov was a delegate at Comintern congresses in Moscow, and advanced to the position of secretary general of the Comintern at the 7th Congress in 1935, a post he held until the organization's dissolution in 1943.

Dimitrov was an organizer of the September uprising of 1923 (an event that divides Bulgarians, being interpreted either as "the first anti-fascist uprising in the world" or as "a communist crime"). After the uprising's failure, Dimitrov fled to Vienna and organized the leading body in exile of the Bulgarian Workers' Party, presiding over the West European Bureau of the Comintern, an "auxiliary" body (or "secret apparatus") that moved to Berlin in 1929. On March 3, 1933, Dimitrov was arrested for alleged complicity in setting the Reichstag fire.

The Reichstag fire trial, held in Leipzig, evoked mass protest movements and consolidated anti-fascist forces. The Committee for Aiding the Struggles Against Hitler's Fascism alleged that the fire was organized by the Nazis themselves.

In his speech before the court, Dimitrov stressed the valuable documentary support produced by the Committee as the source of his self-defense. Dimitrov was released from prison for lack of proof, left for Moscow, and was granted Soviet citizenship on February 15, 1934.

Dimitrov's battle for a new Comintern – the anti-fascist People's Front – culminated in his report to the 7th Congress. The "popular front" strategy broke with the long-held view among Bolsheviks that social democratic parties were fascists in holding that class was not essential to all popular struggles. The position, supported by Léon Blum, socialist prime minister of France, was condemned by Trotskyists as "shameful theories of social harmony."

In World War II, Comintern activities were aligned with Soviet foreign policy, during a time when Dimitrov was organizing the Bulgarian anti-fascist movement and helping to form the Fatherland Front, a leftist coalition that took power on September 9, 1944. Depending on political perspective, the events are seen either as a "popular uprising" or as "a coup with the help of the Soviet Army which had occupied the country." Dimitrov returned to Bulgaria in November 1945, and a year later was elected prime minister, in a government that was increasingly dominated by communists. He also became secretary general of the Bulgarian Workers' (Communist) Party. While historians are divided on Dimitrov's legacy, it is clear that his policies increased Bulgaria's dependency on Soviet support.

As prime minister, Dimitrov advanced the notion of creating a South Slav (Balkan) Federation, and sought to advance the idea of "people's democracy" as a path to communism, challenging the universal Soviet model of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The Fatherland Front as a system of multiparty rule from September 1944 concentrated power in the hands of the communists, ultimately merging operations with the state.

Dimitrov died in the government sanatorium near Moscow. His body was returned to Bulgaria and placed on display in a mausoleum until August 1999.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Fascist People's Front; Bulgaria, 20th-Century Leftist and Workers' Movements; Dictatorship of the Proletariat; Internationals; Reichstag Fire of 1933; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and "Revolution from Above"

References and Suggested Readings

- Dallin, A. & Firsov, F. (Eds.) (2001) *Dimitrov and Stalin 1934–1943: Letters from the Soviet Archives*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dimitrov, G. (1997) *Diary. 9 March 1933–6 February 1949*. Sofia: St. Kliment Ohridski University Publishing House. With preface and notes by D. Sirkov, P. Boev, N. Avreyski, & E. Kabaktchieva (in Bulgarian). English edition: I. Banac (Ed.) (2003) *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov 1933–1949*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gotovitch, J. & Narinski, M. (2001) *Komintern: l'histoire et les hommes*. Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier.
- Kalinova, E. & Baeva, I. (2001) *La Bulgarie contemporaine entre l'Est et l'Ouest*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Lazitch, B. with Drachkovitch, M. (1986) *Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern*. Stanford: Hoover Institution, Stanford University Press.

Directory, France, 1795–1799

Eric F. Johnson

The Directory was the executive branch of the government of France between November 2, 1795 and November 10, 1799. It was formed after the fall of Robespierre and the National Convention, and was overthrown by Napoleon Bonaparte. The period of its existence was a transitional one, and the Directory reflected the contradictory nature of the era. Although bearing the authority of one of history's most inspiring social transformations, its rule was characterized by bureaucratic maneuvering and the petty politics of narrow self-interest.

In retrospect it is evident that Robespierre's fall marked the beginning of the end of the French Revolution, but that was not apparent to those who lived through the experience. The Thermidorians who overthrew Robespierre masked their profoundly conservative aims, for a time, with revolutionary rhetoric, and when their actions revealed their fundamentally counter-revolutionary nature, it sparked a political resurgence of radical Jacobinism. Furthermore, the Conspiracy of Equals led by "Gracchus" Babeuf showed that the flame of the Revolution had not been completely extinguished in the era of the Directory.

The Directory coexisted with a legislative branch of government. The legislature was bicameral, with a Council of Five Hundred (the

"lower" house) and a 250-member Council of Elders (the "upper" house). Members of the Council of Five Hundred had to be at least 30 years of age, and the Council of Elders had a minimum age requirement of 40. The legislature was elected indirectly and the universal suffrage of the previous constitution was abandoned. One-third of the membership was renewed each year. The Elders had a suspensory veto, but could not initiate legislation. The five Directors of the executive branch were chosen by the Elders from a list created by the Council of Five Hundred. The Directors were assisted in their duties by ministers for the various departments of state, and they had no role in legislation or taxation. One Director was renewed each year.

From the onset, the Directory faced many challenges. The new constitution did little to resolve the political and social problems that had arisen during the Reign of Terror, and many of the deputies from the politically compromised National Convention sat in the new legislature. A major counterrevolutionary revolt in the Vendée, which had begun in 1793, had not been suppressed, and the state faced a fiscal crisis. Although the war with Austria and Prussia had subsided, the government was reluctant to demobilize the army and release such a large number of unemployed veterans into the general population. Continuing the war in Europe was thus seen by some as a condition of political survival.

The Directory fell as a result of the machinations of the Abbé Sieyès, one of the Directors in 1799 who had risen to national prominence ten years earlier as author of a seminal political tract, *What Is the Third Estate?* A new war coalition consisting of England, Russia, Turkey, Naples, and Austria had formed against France, and domestic stability had become tenuous. Sieyès sought to use the situation to consolidate his own power by replacing his colleagues in the Directory with men he could control, and by enlisting the support of a popular general, Napoleon Bonaparte. Sieyès organized a coup d'état that occurred on the French Revolutionary calendar's date of Eighteenth Brumaire (November 9, 1799), but Bonaparte double-crossed him. Rather than consolidating Sieyès' power within the Directory, Bonaparte abolished the Directory altogether and replaced it with a three-man Consulate, naming himself as First Consul. Sieyès remained briefly as one of the two junior consuls, but Bonaparte had in

effect set the stage for his own rise to absolute power.

Although the Directory is remembered more for venality and corruption than for effective governance, historians have credited it with some limited accomplishments. The Vendée region was finally pacified during its tenure, and France's armies achieved a number of successes on the battlefield, conquering parts of northern Italy and the Austrian Netherlands. On the domestic front, the Directory granted freedom of worship, which partly resolved the religious issues that had plagued the First Republic. Despite its brief existence, it was the longest-lasting government France had experienced since the beginning of the Revolution.

SEE ALSO: Babeuf, François-Noël (1760–1797) and the Conspiracy of Equals; Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873); Counterrevolution, France, 1789–1830; Eighteenth Brumaire; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794); Sieyès, Abbé (1748–1836)

References and Suggested Readings

- Lefebvre, G. (1964) *The Thermidorians and the Directory: Two Phases of the French Revolution*. Trans. R. Baldick. New York: Random House.
- Lyons, M. (1975) *France under the Directory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Woloch, I. (1970) *Jacobin Legacy: The Democratic Movement under the Directory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Diriangén (1496 or 1497–1530s)

Kerstin Ewald

As a cacique, or ruler, of the native Chorotega group, Diriangén opposed Spanish conqueror Gil González Dávila from 1523 to 1529 and is a symbol of Nicaraguan indigenous resistance. He is celebrated in the song “Nicaragua, Nicaragüita” composed by C. M. Godoy, often mentioned as the secret national anthem of Nicaragua.

When Dávila started to explore the region of Gran Nicoya (modern Nicaragua) in 1522 or 1523, he found a populated territory that was divided into provinces known as *cacicazgos*. The single *cacicazgo* showed a quite complex society with a remarkable stratification of the population regarding access to power and property. By

the time the Spanish arrived, power had been centralized and there were constant wars and competition between the regional *cacicazgos*.

Diriangén was a cacique of the Chorotegas ethnicity, which originated in today's Mexico. It is assumed that he was taught his people's history by his mother, as was typical in Chorotega culture. As a very young man he was instructed in the art of warfare and was admired by his enemies, the Maribios, the Miskitos, the Matagalpas, and the Nahuas. He fought and won many fierce battles with the Nahuas, who gave him the name Diriangén, or “Master of the Dirianes, people from the mountains.”

Dávila arrived in Gran Nicoya in search of gold, precious stones, and other riches, as well as an intercontinental passage between the Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean. He was forced to retreat on his first attempts in the face of resistance from the caciques Diriangén and Tenderi (cacique of the Nindirí). After this conflict, Diriangén gave the Spanish a strong impression of his importance when he paraded with a delegation to salute the Spanish conquerors. He appeared in the middle of a magnificent adorned entourage of 500 young warriors carrying one or two (ocellated) turkeys each, ten flagbearers with white flags, flautists, and 17 beautiful women covered with little plates of gold and wearing golden hatchets. They presented the Spanish with golden hatchets and other gifts. At the same time the Chorotegas wanted to find out who the bearded men were and what they wanted. Before Diriangén's delegation retired for deliberation, he announced that he and his people would agree to be baptized, and that they would return three days later.

Instead, on Saturday April 17, Diriangén confronted Dávila with 3,000 warriors, forcing the Spanish to a temporary retreat. This was the beginning of a merciless fight, in which other indigenous groups later became involved, and which lasted from 1524 to 1545. The army of Diriangén, which was estimated at its peak to include 70,000 men, was finally beaten by the Spanish supposedly near the hill of Apastepe, in today's department of Chinandega. Diriangén died shortly after his defeat in 1529.

SEE ALSO: Agüeybaná I (d. 1510) and Agüeybaná II (d. 1511); Aracaré (d. 1542); Caonabo (d. 1496); Cuauhtémoc (1502–1525); Hatuey (ca. 1400s–1512); Jumandi (d. 1578); Lautaro (d. 1557); Lemba, Sebastian (d. 1547); Lempira (d. 1537); Rumiñahui

(d. 1535); Sepé Tiarajú (1722/3–1756); Tecún Umán (d. 1524); Tisquesuza (d. 1537); Túpac Amaru (ca. 1540–1572)

References and Suggested Readings

- De las Casas, B. (1999) *Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies*. New York: Penguin.
- Tous, M. & Martin, J. (1994) *El Mundo Precolombino en la Memoria Histórica de la Baja América Central*. In P. García Jordán, M. Izard, & J. Laviña, *Memoria, Creación e Historia: Luchar Contra el Olvido*. Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona.

Disobbedienti/Tute Bianche

Dario Azzellini

The Disobbedienti were a group in Italy who had their greatest visibility around the G8 (most industrialized nations) summit in Genoa in 2001. The movement understood itself as explicitly extra-parliamentary and basis-democratic. The Disobbedienti, who were strongly rooted in the counter-globalization movement, regarded themselves as anti-capitalist and anti-racist, as well as a transformatory and revolutionary current. At the same time, they regarded a redefinition of many of the left's categories and forms of struggle as necessary for today's social reality.

Their roots lie in the Italian Marxist tradition of Operaismo – or post-Operaismo – which turned traditional Marxism on its head, arguing workers not to be merely passive, reactive victims of capitalist development, but a powerful social force whose struggles drive it forward. They propagated first of all “civil” and then “social disobedience” as a form of action, and drew heavily upon the philosophy of Zapatismo propagated by the Zapatista (EZLN) rebels in Chiapas, Mexico. Their immediate predecessors, up until the summit in Genoa, were the Tute Bianche (White Overall) movement. Ya Basta, a network set up in 1996 to support the Zapatistas and spread the struggle against neoliberalism, played an important role within both Tute Bianche and the Disobbedienti. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's concept of the multitude, analyses of post-Fordism, and various conceptions of what Michael Foucault and Hardt and Negri have variously described as “biopolitics” had a strong influence upon the Tute Bianche and Dis-

obbedienti. However, neither the Disobbedienti nor their predecessors ever had a program or a clear, concrete structure. They rejected the mechanisms of representative democracy and practiced direct democracy. Instead of representatives, they had spokespeople. The best-known Tute Bianche/Disobbedienti spokesperson was Luca Casarini from Padua. During the G8 in Genoa, he was also the spokesperson of the Genoa Social Forum. It was argued by some on the left, however, that the absence of clear structures has also led to spokespeople emerging from informal hierarchies rather than a democratic process. The Disobbedienti were a form of movement-network with common thematic foci and a generally shared political practice. As such, however, these theoretical points of reference cannot entirely be generalized to all component parts of the movement.

The first time white overalls were used was in Milan on September 10, 1994, during a demonstration against the eviction of the squatted social center, Leoncavallo, after the city's mayor had proclaimed that the squatters would become ghosts in the streets. With white overalls, the demonstration sought to evoke a ghostly image. It ended in clashes with the police. From this moment, the reoccupied Leoncavallo social center used the White Overalls as their own stewards on demonstrations.

White Overalls to Make the Invisible Visible

In 1997 and 1998 the white overalls began to be theorized as a symbol for the removal of rights, as well as precarious working and living conditions. In Rome, Milan, Bologna, and north-eastern Italy (Padua and Venice, for example), the overalls were worn during actions against temporary employment agencies. Activists from various squatted social centers in Rome used them during public actions in busses and metros, distributing fake tickets demanding free transport for the unemployed, precariously employed, migrants, and everyone without a regular or sufficient income. The social centers were among those who signed the Declaration of Milan, which put the struggle against precariousness and for a basic income at the center of public agitation.

The white overalls were intended to “make the invisible visible.” In other words, through mass

action, all of those rendered invisible by society – those without work, without legal documents, without citizenship, without rights, without a secure income, without social security and so on – should be made visible again.

The choice of the color white was also connected to an analysis of the changes in the system of production ushered in by the move from Fordism to post-Fordism. In the 1960s and 1970s, during the highpoint of Fordism (in other words, mass production on conveyor belts with an advanced division of labor), the unskilled mass worker, with his blue overalls, was formative of many protests and movements in Italy. With the shift to a system of production where the fixed location of the factory lost its centrality, the atomization of the mass worker was no more. Production began to be organized in more flexible networks, assuming a great variety of social and legal forms of labor, and with atypical and self-employment growing. In the process, living and working realities experienced a broad differentiation and the factory lost its privileged role as the central location of conflict and struggles. White – physically, the sum of all colors – serves to represent the diversity of realities of work and life in society, which became the new center of the world of work and the place in which struggles were to be developed.

The actions of Tute Bianche were geared toward achieving media coverage, which they certainly achieved. The particular forms of action and often-risky modes of protest (e.g., occupying cranes) attracted much attention. The Tute Bianche appeared in live television broadcasts, on stage in theaters and at concerts, or at other events that attracted the media, in order to highlight grievances, declare solidarity, or announce new struggles. Alongside the demand for a basic income and actions for the free use of city infrastructure, migration, the right to existence of the Zapatista communities in Mexico, and the right to free education were central issues. The openness of the actions gave individuals the opportunity – be it just for one demonstration – to join the movement.

A major campaign and many of the actions developed by Tute Bianche were directed against immigration detention centers. For example, hundreds of Tute Bianche succeeded, on January 19, 2000, in breaking through lines of police in front of the Via Correlli detention center in Milan, following a demonstration of

10,000 people. The victory was in no sense military. They were armed only with inflated truck innertubes, helmets, and foam cushioning under their overalls, allowing them to push the police to the side. Because of the large media presence, a visit to the detention center accompanied by journalists was able to be negotiated with the police. Only a few days later, the minister of the interior had to close the detention center on the basis of its catastrophic hygiene and health conditions and the disregard for basic human rights that had been revealed.

Defensive-Offensive Strategy and Its Widening Out

The defensive-offensive strategy developed in the course of actions was called “civil disobedience” by the Tute Bianche. In contrast to traditional civil disobedience, they claimed the right to self-defense. As such, they defended themselves from attacks by police with foam, shields, inflated innertubes, helmets, arm and shin pads, gloves, gas masks, and gas-goggles. This practice did not produce a simulation of war, but rather highlighted the political dimension of the conflict and its radical nature. It was immanently political in the sense that conflict with the security forces was desired, yet the protection allowed for the minimization of fear and injury, and it kept the group together. In general, the protection that would be used was announced in advance so as to remove the discourse of danger. The right to rebellion was deployed against the right of the dominant as a means of justifying the protective measures being used. Because attack and direct violence against the police were not part of the practice of the Tute Bianche (although defense against attack was often branded as such), it was often difficult for the police and politicians to legitimize a repressive approach to the Tute Bianche, who had broad support.

Their practice was described by the movement as “Conflict and Consensus.” The constitution of conflict, or rather, the making visible of already existing conflict, was central. At the same time, the construction of consensus among all those taking part as to the form of the conflict was never to be forgotten, so that possibilities for participation and the size of the mobilization could grow.

The strategy of self-defense on demonstrations became evermore refined, with the introduction

of Plexiglas shields and other fantastical armaments. In the process the boundaries for possible action were expanded, pushing illegality into legality – or at least generating their own legitimacy, while reducing support for their opponents. At the same time, there was an attempt to minimize the entering of a military logic of conflict, which is unwinnable against the superiority of the repressive state apparatus.

Alongside those already described, the best-known actions of the Tute Bianche were the attempted storming of a NATO airport in Aviano, Italy, during the Kosovo war (April 1999) and a demonstration in Bologna against a neo-Nazi meeting, which was successfully disrupted (May 2000). In their early years at least, the group was able to achieve a number of concrete (rather than simply symbolic) goals. Following demonstrations and confrontations with the police against genetically modified food, in Genoa from May 24–26, 2000, the Italian government declared a moratorium on GM food.

The Tute Bianche/Disobbedienti traveled in relatively large groups throughout Europe and the rest of the world to take part in demonstrations and protests. Particular attention was won in Prague during the protests against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in September 2000, where as a well-protected and well-organized phalanx, they tried to break through the lines of police. In March and April 2001, more than 100 Tute Bianche accompanied the Zapatista march from Chiapas through Mexico to the capital, which simultaneously involved breaking the ban on political activity by foreign nationals in Mexico. Due to the relative isolation of the Tute Bianche in the whole demonstration, as well as the lack of communication, the mission was criticized both in Mexico and within the Tute Bianche themselves. Hundreds of activists from Italy have consistently taken part in anti-racist activities and summit protests in Europe and, in 2002, organized a peace convoy in Israel/Palestine.

The practice and the approach of the Tute Bianche/Disobbedienti have spread to many other countries. Across Europe and also in the USA, groups have made concrete reference to them. In Finland, Sweden, Norway, Spain, Germany, Slovenia, Greece, and other countries, the concept of civil and social disobedience has been adopted and similar forms of action experimented with.

From Civil to Social Disobedience

During the mobilization against the G8 summit in July 2001, the Tute Bianche took part in the broad Genoa Social Forum (GSF) coalition where they worked together with the entire spectrum of left-wing counter-globalization organizations and movements. The goal of the strategy was to avoid a split between the protesters and at the same time widen the acceptance of forms of action within the coalition. The Tute Bianche distanced itself from direct attacks on people, while the coalition spoke out for an acceptance of self-defense in the event of attacks by the police, where the use of material barricades was explicitly condoned. The Tute Bianche decided to restrict their own actions to the wall around the “Red Zone” (the exclusion zone surrounding the summit) in order to communicate a politically directed offensive course of action to a broad audience and not to endanger the coalition. The decision to renounce direct attacks, however, remained a strategy.

Around the G8, many other groups and networks joined together with the Tute Bianche for a common action. Among these were already existing anti-globalization networks from southern Italy (such as Sud Ribelle), diverse groups and social centers from throughout Italy who had not previously belonged to the Tute Bianche, and the *Giovani Comunisti/e* (Young Communists, GC), the youth organization of the Refounded Communist Party (Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, PRC). A number of those belonging to GC had already taken part in the Tute Bianche, but with the G8 in Genoa, GC as such attached itself to the Disobbedienti. This was largely a consequence of the fact that, between 2001 and the end of 2003, the PRC, which was politically directed towards the social movements, opened itself to them and primarily agitated on the streets. In some regions, however, such as Italy’s northeast and in Bologna, there was far stronger cooperation with the left-oriented Green Party.

In light of their great popularity, the Tute Bianche decided to take off their white overalls so as not to appear as a kind of uniformed army. They did not want to be seen as an avant-garde in relation to the rest of the demonstration – for whom there were not enough overalls – but rather to dissolve themselves within the “multi-

tude,” rejecting the name Tute Bianche and adopting that of the Disobbedienti.

The “attack” on the G8’s sealed-off Red Zone was comprehensively prepared, yet the demonstration of over 10,000 people was attacked by the police and Carabinieri (military police) with huge amounts of teargas, batons, and stones for hours. Firearms were also used. A youth named Carlo Giuliani was killed by a shot to the head from a Carabinieri. In light of the massive attack by the police, the demonstrators began to actively resist. The Tute Bianche’s concept for action was aborted. While on the one hand Genoa illustrated a new breadth and quality to the movement, on the other it showed a massive engagement by different levels of the population and professions in the service of the movement. The Disobbedienti began, on this basis, to propagate a move from “civil” to “social disobedience.”

Radicalization of the Movement and Its End

The period from 2001 to 2003 was one in which social struggles were broadened and radicalized in Italy. Alongside the Disobbedienti, reformist left and trade union movements developed forms of mass protest. The cooperation between the Disobbedienti and GC and parts of PRC gave the movement a massive boost. The results of the participation was not just visible in a quantitative sense, but also in a financial one, in that GC and PRC possessed considerable financial means which they partly made available for the Disobbedienti. For example, the *Global* magazine, which came from Disobbedienti’s area of the movement, was financed this way. It was published in Italian, with a Portuguese-language version for the World Social Forum in Brazil. By means of this the attempt was made to set up a radical left-wing magazine available at mainstream newsagents.

Alongside a range of local radio stations (best-known of which was Radio Sherwood from the area around Padua) which were part of the Disobbedienti movement, they also experimented with direct TV broadcasting via satellite from various events and demonstrations under the label Global TV. A satellite frequency was rented, for example, for three days during the first European Social Forum (ESF) in Florence in November 2002. Programs were broadcast via

satellite and partly re-broadcast by local and regional stations. The high costs were largely carried by the PRC.

The focus of the mobilizations and protests of the Disobbedienti were, among others, temporary employment agencies, detention centers, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, various summits, intellectual property, and the TAV high-speed train in Piedmont. In addition, the Disobbedienti strengthened their roots and mobilizations within a local context. Among the most spectacular of the Disobbedienti’s actions was the partial dismantling of a detention center for illegalized migrants in Bologna on January 25, 2002. Around 100 Disobbedienti stormed the building site which was to become the detention center and dismantled everything removable, causing estimated damage of 300,000 Euros and delaying the opening of the center by four months. On April 16, 2002 the Disobbedienti took part in a general strike called for by the general association of trade unions against the relaxing of employment rights. They supported the strike with their own actions, occupations, and blockades and the demand for “Equal Rights for Everyone.” The strike sought to become “social disobedience” which reached beyond the workplace and spread throughout the whole of society. In February 2003, as part of a broad coalition, the Disobbedienti organized a demonstration in Rome with over 2 million participants. At the same time, they developed numerous forms of direct action against the war in Iraq, like the blockading of railway lines and docks to prevent the transportation of weapons to Iraq.

The unity of the Disobbedienti movement continued until October 2003. In view of the forthcoming election, as the PRC reconcentrated upon participation in a center-left coalition to replace the Berlusconi government, the relationship between the Disobbedienti and PRC/GC changed. The financing for *Global* magazine and Global TV projects was withdrawn. During the preparation of a demonstration against the EU summit in Rome in October 2003, a conflict developed between the GC and the members of Disobbedienti who came from the Tute Bianche. Each accused one another of not sticking to prior agreements. At the same time, there was growing unease on the part of PRC, who were preparing to take power, in relation to the growing radical nature of the movement.

There were more frequent confrontations with the police at demonstrations, with direct action taken against banks, transnational corporations, and other symbols of globalized capitalism, as well as a number of “reappropriations” in big book stores and supermarkets.

The leader of the PRC, Fausto Bertinotti, demanded that the movement distance itself from all forms of violence, making a large number of accusations against the Disobbedienti and the movement. In January 2004 the PRC organized a large gathering on non-violence, marking a further break with the Disobbedienti. At the same time, the PRC offered a number of well-known Disobbedienti spokespeople the opportunity to stand as PRC candidates in the European Union parliamentary elections. The Disobbedienti collapsed. Some groups and individuals left GC for the movement, while some of the movement joined the party. Several social centers in Milan, including the well-known Leoncavallo, moved over to Rifondazione. Several individuals who had been Disobbedienti spokespeople or activists decided to run as electoral candidates, breaking with the Disobbedienti, while many groups and individuals completely withdrew in disappointment. The former Disobbedienti from northeast Italy, a few groups from Rome, Emilia Romagna, Naples, Bologna, and the area around Turin, organized themselves within the “Global Network.”

Beyond the conflicts described, the end of this most vital period of movement is attributable to the fact that the whole of the parliamentary left in Italy, as well as the network of civil organizations heavily connected to them, which for many years constituted an important part of social mobilizations, have concentrated once more on parliamentary politics.

SEE ALSO: G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; Global Day of Action Against the IMF and World Bank, Prague, September 26 (S26), 2000; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Multitude; World Social Forums; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Azellini, D. & Ressler, O. (2005) *Disobbedienti*. DVD, 54 min.
- Fumagalli, A. & Lazzarato, M. (1999) *Tute bianche: Disoccupazione di massa e reddito di cittadinanza*. Rome: Derive Approdi.
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2004) *White Overalls. In Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. New York: Penguin, pp. 264–7.

Milburn, K. (2004) *The Return of the Tortoise: Italy's Anti-Empire Multitudes*. In D. Solnit, *Globalize Liberation: How to Uproot the System and Build a Better World*. San Francisco: City Lights Books, pp. 469–80.

n.a. (2005) *Disobbedienti, Ciao. Mute 29* (Winter/Spring): 36–8. www.globalproject.info.

Dix, Dorothea (1802–1887)

Le'Ann L. Solmonson

Dorothea Dix is considered to be one of the most influential reformists of the nineteenth century, yet she is also one of the most unrecognized. Dix devoted a significant portion of her adult life to advocating for those who were unable to speak up for themselves. Her persistence resulted in successful advances in the treatment of prisoners, the indigent, and the mentally ill.

There are conflicting reports of Dix's childhood and early adult life. This is most likely a result of her reluctance to discuss the events of her harsh early years. Her father was an alcoholic and her mother suffered from depression. This left Dix to take care of the household and her two younger brothers.

In 1841 Dix volunteered to teach a Sunday School class for a group of female inmates in a Cambridge, Massachusetts jail and was appalled at the conditions she discovered there. Inmates were all housed together, regardless of the reason for their incarceration. Criminals, indigents, the mentally retarded, and the mentally ill were living in filthy, unsanitary conditions. Upon inquiry as to why there was no heat, the jailors told Dix that the insane did not feel cold or heat. Dix successfully advocated in the court system for more humane conditions in the Cambridge jail.

This experience prompted Dix to begin an investigation of other jails, prisons, and almshouses in the state. She traveled throughout the state and wrote extensive reports that documented the horrific conditions in which people were housed. These memorials were so detailed and infused with reprimands of administrators who had allowed such human indignity to exist that they immediately garnered a significant amount of attention. She used her memorials as evidence to present to the Massachusetts legislature and was responsible for legislation that funded an expansion of the Worcester State Hospital

in order to provide facilities and treatment for the mentally ill.

Dix went on to use the same advocacy tactics to enact reform in every state east of the Mississippi River and was instrumental in the establishment of 32 hospitals, 15 schools for the mentally retarded, and a school for the blind. With the success of her efforts, Dix was motivated to lobby for the designation of 5 million acres of land to be set aside in order to provide for the care of the mentally ill. This was the first attempt to involve the national government in the care and treatment of those who were unable to provide for their own care. She was successful in getting the legislation passed through the House and Senate in 1854, but President Franklin Pierce vetoed the bill.

Dix's tireless efforts took a toll on her health, so she went to Europe to recuperate. In the two years that she spent in Europe, she traveled to 13 countries and successfully enacted reform similar to her work in the United States. She returned to the United States as the Civil War broke out and accepted a position as the Superintendent of Union Army Nurses. In this role she advocated for a woman's ability to provide medical care during war conditions, the welfare of nurses, abstinence from alcohol by on-duty physicians, and sanitary conditions in medical areas.

SEE ALSO: American Civil War (1861–1864)

References and Suggested Readings

- Cimbala, P. A. & Miller, R. M. (Eds.) (1997) *Against the Tide: Women Reformers in American Society*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Dix, D. L. (1971) *On Behalf of the Insane Poor*. New York: Arno Press & New York Times.
- Gollaher, D. (1995) *Voice for the Mad: The Life of Dorothea Dix*. New York: Free Press.
- Schlaifer, C. & Freeman, L. (1991) *Heart's Work: Civil War Heroine and Champion of the Mentally Ill, Dorothea Lynde Dix*. New York: Paragon.
- Wilson, D. C. (1975) *Stranger and Traveler: The Story of Dorothea Dix, American Reformer*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Djilas, Milovan (1911–1995)

Boris Kanzleiter

Milovan Djilas was one of the leading communist partisan commanders who led the successful

anti-fascist People's Liberation War against the German and Italian occupation of Yugoslavia during World War II. He was also the internationally best-known Yugoslav dissident after World War II and a notable theorist and author.

Djilas was born in the village of Podbisce in the Kingdom of Montenegro, which joined Yugoslavia after World War I. In his youth he became involved in political struggle. A student of Belgrade University, he joined the illegal Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) in 1932. He was imprisoned for his political activities from 1933 to 1936. In 1938 he was elected to the Central Committee of the CPY. Two years later he was appointed a member of the Politburo, the highest leadership organ of the clandestine party.

World War II was a decisive period in Djilas' life. Following the occupation of Yugoslavia in April 1941 by the Wehrmacht, the CPY started a campaign of armed resistance. Djilas was first sent into his native Montenegro to organize the partisan struggle against the occupying Italian forces in the summer of 1941. Later in the same year he joined the head of CPY Josip Broz Tito in the partisan stronghold of Uzice in Western Serbia. Djilas started to work for the paper *Borba* (Struggle), the CPY's main propaganda organ.

After World War II Djilas was one of the most popular leaders of the CPY. In 1948 he was sent by Tito as an emissary to meet Stalin and symbolically break with the subservient relationship of the Yugoslav Communist Party to the Soviet Communist Party. In the aftermath he became one of the most outspoken critics of Stalin within the CPY. In 1950 he was one of the architects of the development of workers' self-management in Yugoslavia, a form of control originating in nineteenth-century Spain and continuing into the Spanish Revolution of 1936. Workers self-management was the foundation of Yugoslavia's "third way" socialism that was independent of the Soviet Union.

Djilas was considered one of Tito's eventual successors. In January 1954, however, a new chapter in his life began when he was expelled from all government and party positions, due to his growing criticism of the elitist behavior of the new communist power group in Yugoslavia. In a series of articles in *Borba* he demanded more democracy within the party and generally the country, attacking the arrogance of leading

functionaries. In the coming years Djilas elaborated his critique. In 1957 he published his best-known book, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*, in which he argued that communism in Eastern Europe was not as democratic a system as it pretended to be. He accused the communist functionaries of having established a new class of privileged party bureaucrats who enjoyed material benefits from their positions. During the Cold War Djilas' writings were published in the West and often used for anti-communist purposes. However, Djilas defined himself as a "democratic socialist" and never regretted his role in the partisan movement.

The price Djilas had to pay for his outspokenness was political isolation in Yugoslavia. He was arrested for the first time in January 1955 and stayed in prison until 1961. After his release he published his work *Conversations with Stalin* (1962) and was imprisoned once again, until the end of 1966. He was released after the Yugoslav communists adopted a liberal reform program in the mid-1960s. In 1968 Djilas supported student protests in Belgrade. During the 1970s and 1980s his flat in the center of Belgrade was frequented by political dissidents. In the beginning of the 1990s he opposed the breakup of Yugoslavia and nationalism. Djilas remained politically active until his death in 1995. Besides his political analyses and autobiographical writings he also published works of fiction.

SEE ALSO: Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Workers' Self-Management, Yugoslavia; Yugoslavia, Anti-Fascist "People's Liberation War" and Revolution, 1941–1945; Yugoslavia, Marxist Humanism, *Praxis* Group, and Korčula Summer School, 1964–1974; Yugoslavia, Resistance to Cominform, 1948; Yugoslavia, Student Protests, 1966–1974

References and Suggested Readings

- Clissold, S. (1983) *Djilas: The Progress of a Revolutionary*. New York: Universe Books.
- Djilas, M. (1957) *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*. New York: Praeger.
- Djilas, M. (1962) *Conversations with Stalin*. Fort Washington, PA: Harvest Books.
- Djilas, M. (1980) *Wartime*. Fort Washington, PA: Harvest Books.
- Tošić, D. (2003) *Ko je Milovan Djilas. Disidentsvo 1953–1995*. Belgrade: Otkrovenje.

Dominican Republic, protest and resistance to US imperialism, 1916–1962

María Ximena Alvarez Martínez

The history of the Dominican Republic's protest movements in the first half of the twentieth century can be divided between those that followed the US military occupation, which lasted from 1916 to 1924, and those associated with Trujillo's dictatorship, from 1930 to 1961.

The US Marines invasion of the island in 1916 followed years of intervention. In 1907, the Dominican–American Convention established the United States' control over the country's financial affairs and gave the US the right to intervene in Dominican political life whenever it deemed it necessary. The military occupation was carried out in the pretext of restoring political order, providing an incentive to economic growth, and protecting the lives and property of US citizens. With the resignation of President Juan Isidro Jimenes, his successor Francisco Henríquez Carvajal was forced to negotiate with the US over the dissolution of the Dominican armed forces and their transformation into a constabulary organized and directed by US citizens. The elimination of the Dominican armed forces elicited strong protest, led by the secretary of the army, Desiderio Arias. Arias and his supporters confronted the Marines between May and July of 1916 in Puerto Plata and Mao, but were quickly defeated and forced into exile.

One of the first measures of the military occupation, declared on November 26, 1916, was the disarmament of the population with the intention of suppressing the rebellions that had been organized in rural and urban areas. One of the first resistance movements of any significance arose in La Barranquita, where 45 Dominican soldiers faced 600 Marines. Given the obvious military disadvantage, this revolt was easily defeated, but such was not the case in other provinces, including El Seibo and San Pedro de Macorís. The armed resistance of the peasants, disdainfully termed *Gavilleros* (rural bandits), put up a hard fight from 1916. Its main leaders were former soldiers such as Vicente Evangelista Chacha

Goicochea, Ramón Natera, and Martín Peguero. Their knowledge of the geographical area and experience with firearms, as well as the support of the region's people, forced the US to redouble its military efforts to defeat them. A request was made by the military governor Thomas Snowden to increase the Marine presence from 1,998 to 2,900, claiming that the actions of the guerillas threatened the lives of the US soldiers and that the entire Dominican territory had to be covered with troops.

The disintegration of the guerillas in 1922 was caused by different factors. The new military governor, Rear Admiral Samuel S. Robinson, arrived in 1921 and implemented a forceful anti-guerilla offensive. He also promised amnesty for all the rebels, as well as gradual evacuation of the territories.

Urban nationalist movements played a crucial role in opposing the US military occupation. One of these was the Patriotic Ladies' Committee (Junta Patriótica de Damas), founded in March of 1920 to oppose the military occupation. This organization as well as other social movements gathered together to protest in June of 1920 during Patriotic Week. The Patriotic Ladies' Committee handed out hundreds of Dominican flags as a symbol of the national struggle, gathered resources to promote propaganda against the occupation in other countries, and sent a letter to the US Senate signed by hundreds of women demanding the evacuation of all US troops. Middle-class intellectuals also came together to oppose the occupation, forming the Dominican Nationalist Union (UND), which included among its leaders Américo Lugo, Fabio Fiallo, Federico García Godoy, Enrique Henríquez, and the history teacher Fidel Ferrer. Because of press censorship and repression, UND representatives took their campaign to other Latin American countries as well as Europe and the US, where they held talks to describe the country's situation, denouncing the abuses of the US army against the Dominican population and trying to obtain international solidarity.

Opposition to the occupation was also visible in artistic and musical circles, as writers, singers, and authors appealed through their work to the people's sense of nationalism. The merengue became the rhythm of the resistance, and later would be used by Trujillo as a propaganda mechanism for his dictatorial regime.

The propaganda within and outside the country, along with the armed resistance, led to the removal of the troops in 1924. Another important factor was the change of leadership in the United States. The new president, Warren G. Harding, was a critic of Wilson's intervention policy in Latin America. He proposed a removal plan calling for the gradual withdrawal of the Marines, new elections under the supervision of the military government, and the continuation in the country of US officials. The proposal was opposed by nationalist organizations, which demanded the total evacuation of the territory. The Hughes-Peynado plan was then proposed in September of 1922 guaranteeing that the Marines would leave the country permanently and that a provisional government would be created.

One consequence of the US occupation, and an element of its continuity, was the dictatorship of General Rafael Leónidas Trujillo, who had been trained by the Americans. After his military coup in 1930, he resorted to cruel means to repress opposition, and thousands of Dominicans lost their lives, were arrested, or went into exile. He was also responsible for the genocide of 18,000 Haitian immigrants in the so-called "Parsley Massacre" of 1937.

Since the nineteenth century, Haitians had lived on Dominican land on the border between the two countries. The purpose of the massacre ordered by the central government was to "solve" the border conflict by exterminating the Haitians. Since they spoke French, it was easier to single them out because they were unable to pronounce the "r" of *perejil*, which means "parsley" in Spanish. Those who mispronounced the word were brutally killed with machetes and knives.

Control over the country's sources of wealth and the corruption of Trujillo's regime made him the richest man in the country; by the end of his life in 1961, he controlled 80 percent of the country's industrial production, employing 45 percent of the active population. Despite the harsh repression of the regime, the resistance grew stronger, not only within the country but outside as well.

On several occasions, many of those who had gone into exile gathered to organize invasions to liberate the country and overthrow the tyrant, but their attempts failed for many reasons. The first was organized from Cuba in the 1930s and was aborted by General Fulgencio Batista, the new

strong man of the Cuban government. In 1947 another attempt, the Cayo Confite Invasion, was made from Cuba with the approval of Cuban President Ramón Grau San Martín and the rich Dominican landowner Juan Rodríguez. The expedition members had the support of Cubans, including the young Fidel Castro, and people from Nicaragua and Honduras, who were also in exile. Their hope was to overthrow their own countries' dictatorships after succeeding in the Dominican Republic. However, their plans were detected by Trujillo, and the Cuban army's chief, Genoveno Pérez Dámera, captured the expedition members. Another failed expedition, also organized by Juan Rodríguez, took place in 1949 from Guatemala with the support of President Juan José de Arévalo. Despite being able to get into the country through the Bay of Luperón, which gave the expedition its name, it failed for different reasons, including lack of coordination and bad luck. One of the hydroplanes had to land in Costa Rica instead of the Dominican Republic because of a storm. The other group landed in Cozumel and was caught by the Mexican military authorities. The last invasion attempts by exiles were made at the end of the 1950s.

One of the first underground movements within the country's borders was the plot of Santiago, organized by young people between 1931 and 1934 with the goal of overthrowing and killing Trujillo to facilitate the establishment of a democratic government. The assassination attempt was planned for March 30, 1934, when the dictator would be in Santiago celebrating Commemoration Day. The assassination did not take place, and in the following weeks a campaign of agitation was brutally suppressed by the government. Several members of the rebel group were tortured and killed; others went into exile and were accused of treason, such as Juan Isidro Jimenes Grullón, Daniel Ariza, and Ramón Vila Piola.

Several workers' strikes took place in the 1940s, such as those in the sugar cane fields of La Romana and San Pedro de Macoris in 1942. The strikes spread to the industrial sector with calls for improved wages. The government's response was to ban strikes. With the First Workers' Congress in September 1946, the persecution of workers and political opposition began.

After the defeat of internal and external opposition in the 1940s, the 1950s was a relatively peaceful decade for the regime. In 1957 the

Military Intelligence Service (SIM) was created and became an even more effective means of repressing and controlling the frightened population. The success of the Cuban Revolution against Batista's dictatorship in 1959 had consequences for Trujillo's regime. On one hand, the anti-Trujillo movements in exile were given a purpose to continue their struggle, and on the other, the US modified its foreign policy toward the Trujillo dictatorship. Fear of the rise of a new revolution on Dominican territory, inspired by the one in Sierra Maestra, led to further tensions between Trujillo's regime and the United States government and caused a rupture in their relations in 1960. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower then began to support and finance opposition movements of the regime.

One of the anti-Trujillo movements that went into exile was the Dominican Patriotic Union in Venezuela. Its members went to Cuba to reorganize after the flight of Batista and created the Dominican Liberation Movement (MLD). They made arrangements for new invasions: Constanza, Maimón, and Estero Hondo on June 14 and 19, 1959. Trujillo knew about the plans and prepared a counterattack. Justifying his declaration of a state of emergency, he announced that the country was under threat of a Cuban communist invasion. All 191 members of the expedition were brutally defeated and tortured, and all but six were killed.

Their heroic efforts encouraged resistance within the country and led to the underground Movement of June 14. This movement was created in January of 1960 by young Dominicans in memory of the heroes defeated during the expedition of June 14, 1959. The mission was to continue the ideals of the MLD and the leaders of the 1959 expedition, and also to overthrow Trujillo's regime. Among the movement's leaders were Manuel A. Tavárez Justo, Juan Miguel Román, and Minerva Mirabal. Once the movement became public, new waves of bloody repression took place all across the country. However, mass arrests and killings could not hide the obvious weakening of the regime.

The November 1960 assassination of sisters Minerva, Patria, and María Mirabal, who were prominent in the June 14 movement, gained national and international attention. These women's stories appealed to the population, and they were thought of as heroes for the cause of Dominican freedom. Opposition grew among

other sectors of the population and new underground circles were created.

In addition, sanctions were brought against the dictator by the Organization of American States (OEA) for his attempt to assassinate Venezuela's president Rómulo Betancourt in 1960. Betancourt supported the anti-Trujillo group exiled in Venezuela and in 1959 had proposed the expulsion of all dictators before the OEA. Because of this, in June of 1960 a plan was hatched by the Dominican government to assassinate him; in spite of all the precautions taken, however, the attempt did not succeed and Betancourt survived. The *Dominican Voice*, the official radio and television of the regime, joyfully announced the death of the president, revealing Trujillo's implication in the planning of the bombing.

Plans to bring Trujillo to justice also emerged within his regime. One example was the Sergeants' Conspiracy of September 1959. In this attempt, sergeants of the Dominican military aviation made plans to assassinate Trujillo but were detected by the regime's intelligence service. The conspirators were brutally killed. After so many frustrated attempts, Trujillo was finally killed on May 30, 1961, bringing an end to the dictatorship.

SEE ALSO: Dominican Republic, Protests, 1844–1915; Dominican Republic, Resistance to Military and US Invasion, 1963–1965

References and Suggested Readings

- Arvelo, T. H. (2005) *Nuestras luchas civiles 1844–65*. Santo Domingo: Editora Universitaria.
- Despradel, F. (2005) *Abril, Historia gráfica de la guerra de Abril*. Santo Domingo: Buho.
- Peguero, V. (2004) *The Militarization of Culture in the Dominican Republic, from the Captains General to General Trujillo*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Rodríguez de León, F. (2004) *Trujillo y Balaguer (1930–1962)*. Santo Domingo: Nostrum.
- Sánchez Javier, L. (2004) *La historia Dominicana en síntesis*. Santo Domingo: COOPROUNI.

Dominican Republic, protests, 1844–1915

Leticia Pacheco Espejel

On February 28, 1844, the independence of the ancient Spanish island of Santo Domingo (now the Dominican Republic) from Haiti was pro-

claimed. It came about as a result of protests by three important independence movements of the nineteenth century. One was the Trinitario movement, which can be attributed to Juan Pablo Duarte and consisted mainly of liberal party supporters of European origin. The second movement was headed by the Society of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, founded by opposition groups from the west of the country, who contested the government of Jean-Pierre Boyer. Its manifesto included a public call for rebellion, independence from Haiti, and a demand for constitutional reform. The third independence movement, led by Buenaventura Báez, emanated from a conservative group that wanted independence from Haiti, but as the protectorate of a foreign power. The Declaration of Independence also ended slavery in the Dominican Republic.

Santana, Báez, and the Annexation

The supporters of a protectorate did not agree with the Declaration of Independence. They wanted separation from Haiti and the Dominican Republic as an English, French, or US protectorate. Pedro Santana was the protagonist of this movement. In 1844 he was declared president of the Dominican Republic for two consecutive periods of four years each, which were characterized as the era of the dictatorship of Santana. During this time, an autonomous military committee was created to ensure public security. Military passports were issued, without which no citizen was allowed to circulate within the country. Any Dominican citizen or stranger who protested against the government had his or her goods seized, and those found guilty of such activity were banished.

The two presidential periods of Santana and Buenaventura Báez were accompanied by several armed insurrections against their politics and the disastrous economic situation. In 1855, a protest against Santana emerged from the army. The takeover attempt failed, however, and the group was arrested. Santana established the Military Commission, which was authorized to carry out the death penalty on any military personnel who acted against the government. Later, this measure was extended to all citizens.

The movements supporting independence achieved a revision of the 1844 Constitution in 1857. However, it was Santana himself who

revised 72 constitutional articles, provoking protests by the independence movements. They founded the newspaper *El Porvenir*, which became the voice of the opposition.

On March 18, 1861, the Dominican Republic was officially annexed by the Spanish crown after secret negotiations between Santana and Queen Isabel II. In the region of Moca opponents carried out an armed insurrection, which was suppressed after intense fighting and the protagonists arrested. In May 1861, opposition generals Francisco del Rosario Sanchez and José María Cabral, together with 500 soldiers, entered the city of Santo Domingo to confront the Spaniards. They were arrested and most were sentenced to death and shot. In remembrance, July 4, 1861 became the day of the Martyrs of Cercado.

The War of Restoration

Disagreement with the politics of the Spanish crown extended to various sectors of society, such as the church. Taxes on goods were raised to 4 percent. In February 1863, various insurrections against the Spanish crown and in favor of the restoration of the republic took place. The first, led by Cayetano Velásquez and Manuel Chiquito, occurred in Neyba. At the same time in the northwest province of Sabaneta, the mayor declared the annexation void and the people supported him. After that, rebels took the province of Guayubin.

Another insurrection occurred in the province of Santiago. A commission headed by Ramón Almonte published a document declaring that the municipal council of Santiago should be free of the Spanish crown, followed by a request to all to fight for the independence of the country. The Spanish army suppressed this movement, establishing a state of siege, and the leaders were arrested and killed.

With arms from Haiti and support from the United States, the Restoration movement triumphed in the provinces of Guayubin, Sabaneta, Las Matas, Guayacanes, and Santiago, where it was decided to constitute a government that would organize all the opposing powers from there. On September 14, 1863, the act of independence had been composed and a restoration government declared, with Antonio Salcedo as its president and Benigno Filomeno de Rojas as its vice-president. The restoration government passed a death sentence on General Santana.

Santana and the Spanish army fought the movement in a battle that lasted for months and exhausted both armies. Santana eventually died of fever on June 14, 1864.

The Second Republic

Between 1865 and 1915, the Dominican Republic was politically unstable. The members of General Báez's Partido Rojo (Red Party), who controlled the northwest and the south of the country, installed a junta in government in 1867. In January 1868, the opposition had split. One group was headed by José María Cabral, who went into exile in 1868. Another group was the liberal Partido Azul (Blue Party) of General Luperón, formed by tobacco planters and merchants of Cibao and Puerto Plata. They opposed the politics of General Báez, who continued to seek annexation by a foreign power. General Báez's conservative Partido Rojo was formed of mahogany-exporting interests and cattle-ranching *latifundistas* (large landowners).

The parties signed an agreement in 1869 in San Marcos to bring to an end the permanent struggle among them, agreeing upon the return of General Cabral from his Haitian exile. Báez supporter General Antonio Pimentel continued to defend the border in the north, while General Luperón concentrated on Cibao and on the population on the coast. They all opposed the annexation plans of General Báez, who had already begun to negotiate with the United States about annexing the republic.

The unrest continued. After a short period in government by General Ignacio María González (1876), General Buenaventura Báez returned to power. Under his government (1876–8) the opposition suffered persecution and murder but managed to take the provinces of Cibo and Santiago. In response to the civil disorder, General Báez stepped up the repression and declared a country-wide state of siege. He was forced to leave the country in 1878, however, and the opposition retook the country's principal cities. Between 1889 and 1892, six important insurrections against the dictatorial government of Ulises Heureaux took place – in Santiago under Francisco Gómez, in Dajabón under Pablo Reyes, and in Montecristi and La Vega under General Perico Lozada.

In 1903, the presidency was assumed by General Alejandro Woss y Gil. At the same

time, a new Unionist movement emerged. Woss y Gil felt obliged to accept a protocol signed with the United States under the previous government of Juan Isidro Jimenes, which gave the United States the right to rent the bay of Samaná for use as a naval base. Unionist troops besieged the city and Woss y Gil capitulated on November 24, 1903.

The new president, Manuel Altagracia Cáceres, concentrated on breaking down public insurrections by ordering the relocation of rebellious citizens, the destruction of their cultivated fields, and the slaughter of their cattle. This undoubtedly caused a serious decline in the opposition's political activities. It also led to a crackdown on the press and a worsening economic situation.

Problems were exacerbated after an agreement with the United States in May 1907. In January 1905, the United States had assumed administration of the Dominican Republic's customs. Under the terms of this agreement, a Receiver-General, appointed by the US President, kept 55 percent of total revenues to pay off foreign claimants, while remitting 45 percent to the Dominican government. In 1907, this agreement was converted into a treaty, transferring control over customs receivership to the US Bureau of Insular Affairs. One of the most effective stipulations of the convention was a \$20 million loan, for which the Dominican Republic had to pay 50 percent of its national income to a bank in New York. Many farmers were displaced so that their land could be handed out to foreign investors, and discord arose among influential groups, who provoked serious uprisings in the north of the country. By 1909 the unrest had extended to ministers, who resigned their functions. On November 19, 1911, Cáceres was ambushed by the insurrectionists.

In 1914, a year after the United States had helped José Bordas Valdez to assume the presidency, the Valdez government lost control of the principal cities in the country. This unstable situation, together with Bordas's inability to handle the conflict, forced the United States to publish a declaration in which it ordered the insurrectionists to lay down their arms and establish a government by elections under the supervision of the United States. The US also forced Bordas to resign from office. Ramón Báez, the son of Buenaventura Báez, was nominated as the internal successor. Elections were won in October 1914 by Isidro Jimenes, who had

already been president from 1886 to 1889, but he failed to bring stability to the country. As a result, the United States installed a military dictatorship, which lasted from 1916 until 1924.

SEE ALSO: Dominican Republic, Protest and Resistance to US Imperialism, 1916–1962; Dominican Republic, Resistance to Military and US Invasion, 1963–1965

References and Suggested Readings

- Alvarez, L. (1986) *Dominación colonial y Guerra popular 1861–1865*. Santo Domingo: Editora Universitaria.
Pichardo, F. F. (1993) *Historia del pueblo dominicano*. Santo Domingo: Sociedad Editorial Dominicana.

Dominican Republic, resistance to military and US invasion, 1963–1965

Fernando Artavia Araya

On May 30, 1961, after 30 years of one of the cruelest dictatorships in Latin American history, Rafael Leónidas Trujillo was murdered. But even if the *caudillo* had died, his heritage, *trujillismo*, was carried on by family members and his closest friends, especially Joaquín Balaguer, whom Trujillo himself had led to the president's chair. Pressured by opposition from the National Civic Union (NCU) and the 14 of June Movement, Balaguer agreed to form a provisional government, the Council of State, led by him but with the presence of the private sector, the Catholic Church, and the two surviving assassins of Trujillo – Luis Amiana Tió and Antonio Imbert Barrera.

The seven-member council had legislative and government powers and was in charge of calling for democratic elections. Nonetheless, old trujillist sectors were unwilling to share power, and in January 1962, they led a coup against the newly founded council, headed by General Echevarría. After popular mobilizations and pressure from the John F. Kennedy administration, the main authors of the coup were arrested and forced into exile. A second Council of State was constituted, this time led by Rafael F. Bonnelly.

In an atmosphere ripe with anti-communist persecution and accusations, the new council

called for elections in December 1962. Juan Bosch, leader of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), returned after 25 years of exile and won the presidential elections with 648,000 out of roughly one million votes, beating his closest competitor, Viriato Fiallo of the NCU, by a two-to-one margin. The PRD also won 22 out of 27 seats in the senate and 48 out of 74 seats in the parliament. On February 27, 1963, Bosch assumed his role as constitutionally elected president. From the beginning he knew that his government needed a legal instrument to promote his reformist program and solve the main economic and social problems of the Dominican Republic.

In April 1963, the National Assembly approved a new constitution, which later became the *leitmotiv* for the Constitutionalist movement. The new constitution was highly progressive by Dominican standards. It settled a whole set of liberal political rights and guarantees to promote social justice in the fields of education, health, work, land, and housing. Some of the articles affected important oligarchic and US interests like the prohibition of large landholdings, the impossibility for non-Dominicans to own national land, the prohibition of monopolies, and idea of nationalization of the mines. Bosch also took some unforgivable decisions that irritated the trujillist sectors and their American partners. For example, the government did not accept some contracts with American companies and established a new tax for already overpriced sugar, with proceeds destined to build public housing.

The trujillist groups rejected the new constitution as subversive, and the US Department of State accused Bosch of favoring the infiltration of communist elements and ideas into the country. The main fear of the US government was to have “another Cuba.” And so, after only seven months of democratic government, on September 25, 1963, a group of officers from the Dominican army headed by General Wessin y Wessin led a coup against Bosch. The coup leaders immediately declared Bosch’s 1963 Constitution “nonexistent,” promised to hold free elections, and formed a new provisional government known as the Triumvirate.

The Triumvirate was originally formed by three civilians (Manuel Tavares Espaillat, Ramón Tapia Espinal, and Emilio de los Santos), but ended with only two. The Triumvirate government was characterized by corruption, adminis-

trative incompetence, and political intolerance behind an anti-communist discourse. The 14 of June Movement, a leftist group inspired by the Cuban Revolution, started an armed guerilla struggle in the mountains, but it was soon controlled by the army. Even though the rebels had surrendered and the government promised to respect their lives, their leader, Manuel Aurelio Tavárez Justo, and 15 other members were shot in December 1963. After this event, Emilio de los Santos stepped down as head of the Triumvirate and was substituted by Donald Reid Cabral. In the midst of a serious economic recession, general discontent was exacerbated. Reid Cabral implemented International Monetary Fund (IMF)-supported economic austerity measures, which were opposed by large sectors of the Dominican population.

The Triumvirate government was rejected not only by the left but also by liberal and moderate political sectors. Members of the Social Christian Party and even Joaquín Balaguer tried to establish an alliance with Bosch’s PRD against the Triumvirate, whose initial intentions were to govern until the political situation had stabilized and then call for presidential elections, but which was announcing in 1964 that the scheduled elections would be postponed until September 1965. Few Dominicans believed that the Triumvirate would ever allow democratic elections.

In an effort to reduce the military budget, Reid Cabral cut fringe benefits to officers and shut down smuggling rings. Many officers, already disappointed after the coup, felt threatened by these moves and began devising coup plots to remove Reid Cabral and his illegitimate government. Headed by Colonel Rafael Tomás Fernández and Captain Mario Peña Taveras, young army officers arrested General Marcos Rivera Cuesta, beginning a revolt against the army and the Triumvirate government on April 24, 1965. The PRD, the 14 of June Movement, the Popular Dominican Movement, and many other groups opposing the Triumvirate supported the coup. The so-called Constitutionalist movement had begun.

The Constitutionlists, led by Colonel Francisco Alberto Caamaño Deñó, fought for the eventual return of the elected president, Juan Bosch, and the restoration of parliament and the 1963 Constitution. In the next few days Constitutionlists took control of Santo Domingo, the capital city. Defeating the Loyalist forces,

they besieged the Police Palace and captured Fort Ozama and the National Palace, where they announced their support of José Molina Ureña as the new provisional president.

The country divided into two opposing forces and the threat of a cruel civil war appeared very real since the Constitutionals had provided arms to civilians. The Loyalists, headed by De los Santos and General Wessin y Wessin, ordered Dominican air force F-51 planes to strafe the presidential palace; then they left the San Isidro base to cross the key Duarte Bridge and advanced into the city to take part in what became the bloodiest battle in Dominican history. Shocked by the deteriorating situation and afraid of a “communist takeover,” the Loyalists asked for assistance from US troops.

On April 28, 1965, the first American troops arrived on Haina Beach. Within ten days, the US military buildup reached 23,000 men. The belligerent superiority of the invading troops changed the course of events, which until that moment had been favorable to the popular Constitutionalist insurrection. On April 30, John B. Martin arrived in Santo Domingo, sent by President Lyndon Johnson to establish contact with both sides of the conflict and look for an agreement. The negotiations did not end well, and Martin declared in a press conference that the popular revolt was being controlled by communist elements.

Once the Marines and 82nd Airborne paratroopers were in place, the Marines moved out from around the hotel areas and took control of 9 square miles in the western part of Santo Domingo to set up the Organization of American States (OAS)-sanctioned International Security Zone (ISZ), a perimeter that ran along the ocean from near the Hotel Embajador and into the old part of the city. Finally, the US forces established a corridor that stretched across the city, which served to isolate the Constitutionals and “quarantine” the rebels so that the revolt would not spread. Thus at the beginning of May 1963, Santo Domingo was completely divided, not only by a security corridor but also between two different groups and governments that opposed each other: the Constitutionals headed by Colonel Caamaño, who had just been elected by the 1963 parliament as the new president, and the Loyalists with their five-member junta headed by General Antonio Imbert, with whom Caamaño refused to negotiate.

Meanwhile, the OAS sanctioned a US resolution to constitute an “international peace force” that would restore order in the Dominican Republic. Many critics arose against the OAS, which was seen as an instrument of American interventionism. Given the difficult situation into which the invading troops had pushed the Constitutionals, Colonel Caamaño appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations. General Secretary U-Thant sent a special commission to the island. In addition, US President Lyndon Johnson sent another commission, whose specific duty was to find a solution to the Dominican crisis while also keeping at bay the feared “communist threat.” This new commission made progress in negotiations, but when everything seemed to be going well and the Constitutionals had accepted rich landlord and Bosch’s former agriculture minister Antonio Guzmán as the new provisional president, General Imbert and the Loyalists balked at the so-called “Guzman formula.”

While the different parties searched for a political solution, violence in the city escalated, although a ceasefire had been agreed upon. At the end of June 1965, a new three-person mission created by the OAS, known as the “Ad Hoc Committee” (AHC) with representatives from the United States, Brazil, and El Salvador, was able to iron out a lasting agreement between the two sides. Colonel Caamaño and the Constitutionals had five demands: reinstatement of the 1963 Constitution, restoration of the 1963 Congress, continuation of Constitutionalist forces in the military, formation of a democratic government, and the immediate withdrawal of the US and OAS troops. By contrast, General Imbert demanded that his government be recognized as the only legitimate government and for it to remain in power even in any future transitional period. Under pressure from the US representatives, General Imbert had to cede his claims.

On August 31, an Act of Reconciliation was signed by the Constitutionals and the military, which signed on behalf of the Loyalist side after Imbert had resigned the day before. The agreement drafted by the AHC set out the specifics of the transitional government, the key element of which was the naming of Dr. Héctor García Godoy as provisional president. García Godoy had served as foreign minister under Bosch and as vice-president of Balaguer’s Reformist Party.

The Act also established a general amnesty, measures to release political prisoners, guarantees of civil liberties, and military reform, and stipulated that elections of local and national leaders were to be held six to nine months after the establishment of the provisional government.

García Godoy took over as head of the provisional government on September 3, 1965. After a turbulent period in which troops loyal to Wessin y Wessin armed with tanks tried to kill Constitutionalist leaders meeting in the Hotel Matum in Santiago, presidential elections took place in June 1966. The Reformist Party's Balaguer won with 57 percent of the vote, and the PRD's Bosch came in second with 39 percent. Because the Johnson administration had provided secret funds to the Balaguer campaign, many saw this as a fraudulent election. Bosch called for a "constructive opposition" and went back into exile. So began the 12-year regime of Balaguer.

SEE ALSO: Dominican Republic, Protest and Resistance to US Imperialism, 1916–1962; Dominican Republic, Protests, 1844–1915

References and Suggested Readings

- Crandall, R. (2006) *Gunboat Democracy: US Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Gleijeses, P. (1978) *The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt and American Intervention*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Kurzman, D. (1966) *Santo Domingo, la revuelta de los condenados*. Barcelona: Ediciones Martínez Roca.
- Moreno, J. (1973) *El Pueblo en Armas: Revolución en Santo Domingo*. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos.

Douglass, Frederick (1817–1895)

Yvonne D. Sims

Frederick Douglass, former slave, prominent abolitionist, and one of the first black intellectuals of the nineteenth century, was born in Talbot County, Maryland. His autobiography is one of the most important historical references pertaining to the impact of slavery on both African Americans and the political, social, and cultural arenas in America. Three crucial moments define Douglass's impact on American culture: his beginnings as a slave and the

recounting of his experiences in *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave, Written by Himself*; his work in the abolitionist movement; and his emergence as one of the most prominent voices articulating the black experience in slavery.

When describing his early years in bondage, Douglass recounts the lack of an identity, common during slavery: "I have no accurate knowledge of my age, never having seen any authentic record containing it. . . . My mother was named Harriet Bailey. . . . My father was a white man. He was admitted to be such by all I ever heard speak of my parentage" (Douglass 2001: 13). He carefully records his experiences and encounters with brutal slave masters, from witnessing the graphic beating of his Aunt Hester when he was a very young child to other equally powerful incidents that shaped Douglass and further underscored his desire to escape and become part of the abolitionist movement. At one point in the narrative, Douglass describes how his grandmother nursed many children over the course of her long life, and when she was no longer deemed useful on the plantation, she was removed to live out her final years in the woods alone. Like an artist painting on canvas, Douglass draws many examples to illustrate the degradation of humanity in his autobiography. Two examples that serve as the impetus needed to escape center on how he learned to read and write and his final physical battle with a vicious slave-breaker.

Douglass learned to read and write from the wife of one of his masters. She taught him the alphabet before her husband discovered what she was doing and ordered her to stop. This increased his curiosity and, through bartering with indigent servants he met on various errand runs, he completed his quest for literacy. In gaining knowledge, Douglass came fully to understand his plight as a slave, and this gave him "a view of my wretched condition, without the remedy" (Douglass 2001: 35).

The second incident that cemented Douglass's destiny involved Mr. Covey, a person to whom many slaveholders sent their slaves when they were disorderly. After several disagreements with his master, Douglass was sent to Covey to be taught a lesson. After a particularly brutal beating that resulted in Douglass imploring his master to help him, he took matters into his own hands. In a fight that lasted "for nearly two

hours . . . Covey at length let me go, puffing and blowing at a great rate.” Proudly, he added that Covey got the “worse end of the bargain; for he had drawn no blood from me, but I had from him.” The battle led Douglass to a “revived . . . sense of my own manhood” and left him determined to gain his freedom (Douglass 2001: 54).

Four years later Douglass escaped to New York and then moved on to New Bedford where he married a freed slave named Anna Murray. Upon settling in New Bedford, he changed his name from Frederick Augustus Washington Bailey to Frederick Douglass and commenced a new life. The second phase of Douglass’s life began with an introduction to an anti-abolitionist paper entitled *The Liberator* published by William Lloyd Garrison. Reading this paper spurred Douglass to become actively involved in the abolitionist movement, and here he found an outlet for his voice.

Douglass had a long association with William Lloyd Garrison, traveling extensively abroad to give lectures on the inhumanity of a system that oppressed other human beings. While Garrison wrote about the atrocities of slavery, Douglass provided audiences with a *face* of slavery. After the publication of his autobiography, his career and personal life came full circle. By this time, Douglass had been married for many years, had children, and had traveled the country giving moving accounts of the racial injustice he had encountered. Additionally, he joined forces with another black abolitionist, Martin R. Delany, to found the newspaper entitled the *North Star* as a voice for African Americans. This paper was a symbol to black people of what could be done in the way of self-improvement and achievement, and to white people of the wealth of talent and ability blacks had to offer the national culture if freed. Douglass earned such a formidable presence in public discourse concerning slavery, the treatment of black Americans, and the failure of the government to properly address continued racial injustices that he commanded an audience with President Lincoln.

On February 20, 1895, Frederick Douglass died. He lived to see the debate on slavery become international in scope, a civil war that divided national discourse on states’ rights, and the ultimate abolition of slavery. At the time of his death, Douglass had established himself as one of the prominent black intelligentsia. Today, much attention is centered on his autobiography

as one of the first extensive narratives written by a former slave that encapsulates the struggles of slaves. However, Douglass was also one of the first African American intellectuals to devote his entire public and private persona to eradicating racial inequities, beginning with slavery and continuing after the emancipation proclamation. He also participated in the struggle for women’s rights in the United States.

SEE ALSO: American Civil War and Slavery; Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Garrison, William Lloyd (1805–1879); Seneca Falls Convention; Women’s Movement, United States, 19th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Douglass, F. (1845/2001) *The Narrative Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave, Written by Himself*. Ed. J. Blassingame, J. McKivigan, & P. Hinks. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Foner, P. S. (1969) *Frederick Douglass: A Biography*. New York: Citadel Press.
- Levine, R. S. (1997) *Martin Delany, Frederick Douglass and the Politics of Representative Identity*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Stephens, G. (1999) *On Racial Frontiers: The New Culture on Frederick Douglass, Ralph Ellison and Bob Marley*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dreyfus Affair

Andrew J. Waskey

Captain Alfred Dreyfus was a French artillery officer who, in the 1890s, was the victim of anti-Semitism on the part of the French general staff. The case sparked a political scandal, known as the Dreyfus Affair, that caused bitter divisions in France for decades. The affair first brought to light a putrid and malodorous underside of French society that sought to base the honor of its military forces on an explicit and notorious act of injustice. At the same time, it gave rise to one of history’s most influential protest movements in defense of the principles of human rights.

Alfred Dreyfus was born at Mulhouse, Alsace, on October 19, 1859, into a wealthy Jewish textile-manufacturing family. By the early 1890s he had become an artillery officer seconded to the War Office in Paris, where he lived in a prosperous home with his wife and children.

In 1894 the French counterintelligence service discovered in the trash from the German embassy in Paris a list of secret French artillery documents that someone had given to the Germans. The discovery led to a search for the spy. Dreyfus became a target of the investigation because he was an artillery officer on the French general staff and because he was Jewish. An examination of his finances and a search for a possible mistress yielded nothing. Nor was there anything to connect him with the recovered list, because it was not written in his hand.

Nevertheless, on October 15, 1894, Dreyfus was arrested on suspicion of spying. He refused to confess or to commit suicide. After a secret court martial that violated French legal procedures and used documents later found to have been forged by counterintelligence agent Major Hubert Joseph Henry, Dreyfus was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment on Devil's Island.

Dreyfus's family and friends began a campaign to win his freedom. Many prominent people rallied to Dreyfus's cause and before long France was divided into Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards. The Dreyfusards argued that Dreyfus was innocent and that he should be exonerated. The anti-Dreyfusards argued that his conviction must stand because the honor of the French army depended upon it. The intense dispute revealed deep social fractures in French society and its institutions.

In 1896 Lieutenant Colonel Georges Picquart, then head of the counterintelligence service, obtained new documents from the German embassy that convinced him Dreyfus was innocent. When he reported his discovery to his superiors he was ordered to keep silent. The new documents, which matched the original list of secret artillery documents, were found to be in the handwriting of Major C. F. Esterhazy, an officer with uncertain credentials and a lackluster career stained by personal debauchery. For talking to Dreyfus's lawyers, Picquart was posted to a dangerous Tunisian frontier region and Esterhazy was protected by officers on the French general staff.

Dreyfus's lawyers were unable to effectively challenge the military's actions or its cover-up. Ultimately Dreyfus's wife appealed to Emile Zola, whose fame as a contemporary French social critic made him a powerful voice for Dreyfus. Zola wrote an open letter, *J'accuse*, which was to become one of the most renowned

of all protest statements. Published on January 13, 1898, it accused the War Office of criminality in convicting an innocent man because of anti-Semitic prejudice. Charges were brought against Zola for libel. The trial gave him an opportunity to retry the Dreyfus case in a public forum. However, judicial manipulation by the military led to Zola being convicted, and provided no relief for Dreyfus who was languishing on Devil's Island.

Rather than go to prison, Zola fled to England where he was hailed by public opinion and sympathetically ignored by the officials. He continued his campaign to win release for Dreyfus. The case only began to move in Dreyfus's favor, however, after Major Henry confessed to having forged a document that would make Dreyfus look guilty, and then committed suicide.

On the basis of Henry's confession and other evidence, Dreyfus was given a new military trial by a court in Rennes in 1899. The anti-Semitism in the French army was so pervasive that the bitter feelings surrounding Dreyfus's trial continued unabated. During the trial, testimony favorable to Dreyfus was barred. He was once again found guilty and sentenced to ten years in prison. However, the president of France, Emile Loubet, pardoned Dreyfus after he had served only ten days. In 1906 a civilian appeals court found Dreyfus innocent and reversed the original verdict.

Dreyfus returned to the army. In World War I he commanded one of the forts defending Paris. In 1918 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and enrolled in the Legion of Honor. He died on July 12, 1935, in Paris. Meanwhile, the poisonous after-effects of the Dreyfus Affair continued to linger in France. The same social forces that supported the victimization of Dreyfus manifested themselves as a base for Nazi collaborationism during World War II, and then later encouraged the French military's extensive use of torture to repress Algerian freedom fighters.

SEE ALSO: Jaurès, Jean (1859–1914); Zola, Emile (1840–1902)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bredin, J.-D. (1983) *The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus*. New York: George Braziller.
- Burns, M. (1999) *France and the Dreyfus Affair: A Documentary History*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Zola, E. (1996) *The Dreyfus Affair: "J'accuse" and Other Writings*. Ed. A. Pages. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963)

Michael Zeitler

Sociologist, historian, philosopher, educator, novelist, critic, editor, civil rights activist, and organizer for over half a century, William Edward Burghardt Du Bois was among the most powerful voices in the international struggle for freedom, social justice, and equality. As a scholar, Du Bois challenged the accepted historical accounts of the Atlantic slave trade and Reconstruction and was the first to apply modern sociological theory to the problems of urban African Americans. As an educator, he advocated what would later become black and African studies. As a critic, editor, and novelist, he helped to define a black aesthetic and usher in the Harlem Renaissance. As an activist and organizer, he played a key role in the Niagara Movement, which in 1909 led to the founding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). As editor of the NAACP's journal, *The Crisis*, for a quarter of a century, he used that venue to speak out against lynching, discrimination, and segregation in the United States and western colonialism in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Disillusioned with the prospect of achieving full racial equality in the United States, Du Bois became a naturalized citizen of Ghana before his death in 1963, at the age of 95.

Du Bois was born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, on February 23, 1868. He faced relatively little discrimination in his youth, graduating with honors from the local high school and earning a modest scholarship to Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee. His experiences at Fisk had a life-altering impact on the young scholar. It was at Fisk, while teaching each summer in the segregated schoolrooms of rural Tennessee, that Du Bois first encountered the resilient strength of Southern black culture; he also witnessed first-hand the harsh racial realities of post-Reconstruction America against which he was to struggle for the rest of his life. Upon graduation from Fisk in 1888, Du Bois con-

tinued his studies at Harvard University (where he studied under William James, George Santayana, and Josiah Royce) and the University of Berlin, earning a doctorate in history from Harvard in 1895 with his dissertation "The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States."

After two years teaching at Wilberforce University in Ohio, Du Bois spent the next 13 years pioneering the sociological study of the African American community, first at the University of Pennsylvania, then at Atlanta University. His efforts resulted in the 1899 publication of *The Philadelphia Negro*, in addition to a series of groundbreaking academic conferences and journal articles on the condition of black America, its family structures, economic and employment status, patterns of urbanization and migration, religion, and cultural institutions.

His experiences living in segregated turn-of-the-century Atlanta, in an era of increased lynching and anti-black terrorism, convinced Du Bois to move beyond scholarly research and analysis to direct, confrontational political advocacy. To do so meant challenging the most powerful black leader of his generation, Booker T. Washington, founder of the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama. Washington had argued in his 1895 Atlanta Exposition speech that black people must expediently postpone the pursuit of political power, insistence on their civil rights, and access to the nation's centers of higher learning, concentrating, instead, on personal thrift and industrial skill training. For Du Bois, this was exactly the unthreatening message whites wanted to hear. Instead, he advocated for increased educational and political opportunities of a "Talented Tenth" vanguard that could effectively wage the battle for economic and political justice. His response initiated a lengthy personal and political conflict with Washington that would lead in 1903 to the publication of his most famous work, *The Souls of Black Folk*, and indirectly, in 1909, to the formation of the NAACP.

David Levering Lewis, in his 1993 biography of Du Bois, underscores the influence of *The Souls of Black Folk* in redefining black identity, declaring its publication "one of those events epochally dividing history into a before and after" (1993: 277). Part sociological study and part lyrical autobiography, *Souls* prophetically proclaims "the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line." Politically, Du Bois thus contextualizes the domestic struggle for

civil rights within the framework of both a pan-African ideology and the nascent worldwide anti-colonialism movement. Psychologically, through his conceptualization of “double consciousness,” a “two-ness, an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder,” Du Bois empowers black subjectivity as an agent capable of transforming America and the world. The black man, Du Bois writes, “would not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world.”

By 1905, his uncompromising opposition to racial injustice in the face of Washington’s overly accommodating and conservative leadership impelled Du Bois to oppose Washington’s “present methods of strangling honest criticism” and call instead for an “organized determination and aggressive action on the part of men who believe in Negro freedom and growth” (Lewis 1993: 316). Twenty-nine activists answered the call in Buffalo, New York, and the Niagara Movement was born. Their “Declaration of Principles,” largely written by Du Bois, emphasized civil liberties for all Americans, women’s suffrage, and equal economic, housing, and educational opportunities. In 1909, the members of the Niagara Movement merged with liberal white supporters to form the NAACP.

As director of publications and research and editor of the NAACP monthly journal, *The Crisis*, Du Bois became the new organization’s chief spokesman, a position he would hold for the next 24 years. Largely independent of the NAACP’s board of directors, Du Bois set a militant, combative tone for *The Crisis*, attacking all forms of social injustice – from lynching and the rise of the Ku Klux Klan to voting rights and Jim Crow segregation – while educating its readers on cultural currents, the arts, pan-African ideology, and African history. Although controversial and often at odds with the NAACP leadership, Du Bois made *The Crisis* the nation’s most influential African American journal. From a monthly readership of several thousand in 1911, circulation grew to over 100,000 by 1919.

Although Washington died in 1915, Du Bois and the NAACP soon had another rival for African American political leadership. By 1920,

Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), with its emphasis on race pride, African repatriation, and self-reliance, had successfully acquired a wide variety of businesses, including real estate, grocery stores, hotels, laundries, and the Black Star steamship line, whose goal was to connect people of African descent throughout the world. The UNIA soon had 1,100 branches in 40 countries. Although the Du Bois–Garvey conflict is often seen as integrationist vs. separatist, the two leaders in fact agreed on the essential importance of black economic nationalism and an international commitment to pan-African principles. Nevertheless, Du Bois personally distrusted and publicly attacked Garvey’s grandiose economic and repatriation schemes, his association with the Klan, his critique of the NAACP’s “mulatto” leadership, and his belief in black racial purity.

As editor of *The Crisis*, Du Bois was also an important influence on the writers of the Harlem Renaissance, helping to launch the careers of Zora Neale Hurston, Countee Cullen, Langston Hughes, and Jessie Fauset. Yet excited as he was about the emergence of this new intellectual vanguard, Du Bois expressed concern that their agenda was more cultural than explicitly political, that it was too dependent on white patronage and readership, too reinforcing of white racial stereotypes. “I do not care for any art that is not used for propaganda,” he wrote in “Criteria of Negro Art.” Years later, he would argue that the Harlem Renaissance had “never taken real and lasting root” because it was largely addressed to white America (Lewis 2000: 314).

By the 1930s, Du Bois was increasingly disillusioned with the NAACP’s integrationist tactics. Positively impressed during his 1927 visit to the Soviet Union, and putting aside his distrust of the American labor movement’s historical racism, Du Bois’s *Crisis* editorials began to focus as much on class and economics as on race. The growing worldwide economic depression of the 1930s only further convinced him of the necessity of envisioning change through a Marxist lens. In 1934, Du Bois resigned his editorial control of *The Crisis* to return to Atlanta University as Chairman of the Department of Sociology, a position he held until 1944. While at Atlanta, he published his groundbreaking study *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860–1880* (1935), challenging the conventional accounts

of Reconstruction as a monumental failure and instead giving agency to the courageous struggle of the freed ex-slaves to make America a true democracy. He also published *Dusk of Dawn: An Autobiography of a Concept of Race* (1940), in which he traced the evolution of his ideas on race, democracy, and social justice in their full international context.

After World War II, Du Bois's growing radicalism amid the anti-communist political climate of the Cold War isolated him more and more from the mainstream of American civil rights activism and forced his retirement from Atlanta University. Nevertheless, in spite of his advancing age, Du Bois continued his attacks on imperialism, especially in Africa. As an associate consultant to the American delegation at the founding of the United Nations in 1945, he argued for the rights of colonized peoples in the postwar era and against their continued subjugation by the imperial powers that dominated the UN conference. That same year, the fifth Pan-African Congress meeting in Manchester, England, with Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, and George Padmore in attendance, elected Du Bois as its president. In 1951, at the height of the McCarthy era, he was indicted by the United States government under the Foreign Agents Registration Act for his work as Chairman of the Peace Information Center. Although tried and acquitted, he was stripped of his passport and barred from foreign travel until 1958. During 1958–60, Du Bois traveled widely, visiting the Soviet Union, China, and Africa, and, in 1960, attending his friend Kwame Nkrumah's inauguration as the first president of an independent Ghana. The next year, at Nkrumah's invitation, Du Bois left the United States for Ghana to begin work on his planned multi-volume *Encyclopaedia Africana*. On his departure, he joined the Communist Party. In 1963, he renounced his American citizenship and became a Ghanaian citizen. He died in Accra on August 26, 1963 at the age of 95, as thousands gathered in Washington, DC for what would be the largest march for civil rights in American history.

SEE ALSO: African American Resistance, Jim Crow Era; Aptheker, Herbert (1915–2003); Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism; Harlem Renaissance; Kenyatta, Jomo (1893–1978); Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972); Robeson, Paul (1898–1976); Wells, Ida B. (1862–1931) and the Anti-Lynching Campaign

References and Suggested Readings

- Aptheker, H. (1989) *The Literary Legacy of W. E. B. Du Bois*. White Plains: Kraus.
- Bell, B., Grosholtz, E., & Stewart, J. B. (Eds.) (1996) *W. E. B. Du Bois on Race and Culture*. New York: Routledge.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. (1986) *W. E. B. Du Bois: Writings*. Ed. N. Huggins. New York: Library of America.
- Lewis, D. L. (1993) *W. E. B. Du Bois: Biography of a Race, 1868–1919*. New York: Holt.
- Lewis, D. L. (2000) *W. E. B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and the American Century, 1919–1963*. New York: Holt.

Dubček, Alexander (1921–1992)

Joseph C. Santora

Alexander Dubček, a one-time member of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party, was a reformer who served as prime minister of the country in 1968. Born in 1921, Dubček became a member of the Communist Party of Slovakia in the late 1930s. By 1955, he was a member of the Central Committee, attended Moscow Political College, and graduated in 1958. In 1960 he moved to Prague from Bratislava, and was appointed secretary of the Czechoslovak Central Committee. Two years later, in 1962, he was chosen to serve on the party presidium. Shortly thereafter, he was appointed to the highest post in the Slovak Communist Party.

Dubček and democratic reform seemed synonymous. As leader of the Slovak Party, he negotiated a deal with Slovak writers and intellectuals that granted them greater freedom of expression, embraced new economic theories, and expressed his vocal criticism of the administration and policies of Antonín Novotný, a hardline party boss and president of Czechoslovakia. Sporting the theme of nationalism for Slovakia, Dubček galvanized dissidents and the intelligentsia, who wanted more freedom from their repressed status. Their alliance forced Novotný's resignation in January 1968, and Dubček was voted to serve as his replacement as party secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

As the Communist Party leader of Czechoslovakia, Dubček took several bold and unprecedented actions by instituting a series of sweeping political reforms to inaugurate a period of

liberalization, which Dubček called “socialism with a human face.” In what was known as the Prague Spring, censorship was abolished and citizens were granted the right to criticize their government. Due to Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe, the political reforms initiated in March came to an end in August 1968. On August 21, Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR, sent Soviet troops and the Soviet Union’s Warsaw Pact allies to Czechoslovakia. The aim of the bloodless military invasion was to abolish the political reforms and other liberal gains made during the Prague Spring and to restore a doctrinaire state loyal to the USSR. Dubček and other reformers were taken to Moscow and compelled to yield to the demands of the Kremlin. Several days later, on August 27, Dubček returned to Prague as party secretary. Nine months later, in April 1969, he lost this position to Gustav Husak and was appointed ambassador to Turkey, serving in that capacity until 1970. Shortly thereafter, he was ejected from the Communist Party and went into exile in Slovakia, where he worked in a lumberyard as a clerk.

Some 19 years later, in 1989, he resurfaced in Prague to support the activities of dissident writer Václav Havel and the so-called Velvet Revolution, initiating the shift of Czechoslovakia from eastern domination to a western market economy and military occupation. In December 1989, the ever-popular Dubček was elected chairman of the newly formed administration as speaker of the federal parliament, continuing to serve as a link between the government and reforms enacted during the Prague Spring some 21 years earlier. He held this position until 1992, when he became president of the Slovak Social Democratic Party (SSDS). He continued in that post until his death on November 7, 1992, caused by injuries sustained in a car accident. Dubček died two months prior to Czechoslovakia’s split into two separate countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, on January 1, 1993.

SEE ALSO: Czechoslovakia, Resistance to Soviet Political and Economic Rule; Havel, Václav (b. 1936); Prague Spring; Velvet Revolution, 1989

References and Suggested Readings

Dubček, A. (1993). *Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubček*. Trans. Jiri Hochman. New York: Kodansha America.

Keane, J. (2000). *Vaclav Havel: A Political Tragedy in Six Acts*. New York: Basic Books.

Williams, K. (1997). *The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, Czechoslovak Politics, 1968–1970*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dublin General Strike, 1913

Claire Fitzpatrick

The Dublin Lock Out, or General Strike, of 1913 has been described as one of the most important events in both Irish and British labor history. Lasting six months, it was a battle between labor and all the forces of the state of such a scale that it looked like the significant issue of the twentieth century would involve not the national question, but the relationship between capital and labor. It occurred at a critical juncture in development of the national question and has been seen in retrospect as a dress rehearsal for Easter 1916.

Dire economic and social conditions which produced abject poverty and febrile industrial activity form the backdrop. Trade unionist activist James Larkin established the Irish Transport General Workers Union in 1909 to organize Dublin’s unskilled workers. With James Connolly, Larkin aimed to use the syndicalist idea of one big union and tactics of mass sympathetic action. While Larkin had some success, he amassed many enemies from employers and nationalists who argued his activity detracted from the national struggle. His efforts to organize Dublin tramworkers faced opposition from William Martin Murphy who controlled the Dublin Tramway Company. A former Home Rule MP, Murphy refused to recognize the union. His subsequent sacking of unionized members led to strike action. This was accompanied by violent confrontations between police and strikers. Murphy had been given assurances of help from government, and the Royal Irish Constabulary attacked trams and ransacked homes. The lockout which followed ended in defeat for the union. Although it provided financial assistance, the British Trades Union Congress refused to sanction sympathetic strike action at a critical point in the struggle.

Much work on 1913 has focused on Larkin and Connolly and placed events in the context of Ireland’s national struggle. O’Connor (2002) has shown the national question was a labor one.

Larkin identified the ITGWU with the Irish-Ireland movement, and the establishment of the Irish Citizens Army formed a link between 1913 and 1916. The events of 1913 also revealed the structural weakness of labor in Ireland as the ITUC played no part in the struggle.

Others have addressed the nature of the industrial action. Newsinger (2004) sees 1913 as part of the first wave of Irish syndicalism and Larkin (1989) argues conditions were ripe for syndicalism to flourish but suggests that it was adapted to conditions. Placing it within an international context, Brown (in Nevin 2006) claims it does not fit into the wave of syndicalist agitation but is symptomatic of a trend of workers responding to charismatic figures. He sees 1913 as part of a more widespread conflict of old-new values of the prewar world.

SEE ALSO: Connolly, James (1868–1916); Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War

References and Suggested Readings

- Larkin, E. (1989) *James Larkin, Lost Labour Leader*. London: Pluto Press.
- Nevin, D. (2006) *James Larkin: Lion of the Fold*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.
- Newsinger, J. (2004) *City in Revolt*. London: Merlin Press.
- O'Connor, E. (2002) *James Larkin*. Cork: Cork University Press.
- Yeates, P. (2001) *Lockout 1913*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.

Dunayevskaya, Raya (1910–1987)

Jim H. Han

Raya Dunayevskaya devoted her life to the philosophical study of Karl Marx and others, including G. W. F. Hegel, Rosa Luxemburg, and Mao Zedong. Commonly described as a Marxist humanist, she was one of the most consistent twentieth-century interpreters of Marxism and her work was quite influential in numerous major protest and social movements. Her life centered on philosophy and revolution.

In the 1930s, Dunayevskaya was Trotsky's secretary during his exile in Mexico. During that time, along with C. L. R. James, a Marxist philosopher from Trinidad, she led the Johnson-Forest Tendency, which redefined the Soviet

Union as a form of capitalism run by the state. She perceived Stalinist Russia as a subverted form of the communist revolution in which the mode of production was owned not by the people but by the Communist Party. In contrast to Marxism as “a theory of liberation,” she argued that “Russian Communism . . . is the practice of enslavement” (1956). She founded the News and Letters Committees and continued to publish her ideas through its newspaper, *News & Letters* (currently online at www.newsandletters.org).

In *Marxism and Freedom* (1958), she expounded the genesis and history of Marx's philosophy that emerged from Hegel's dialectic. She outlined Marxism as a force of political movement formulated by Marx and further developed by Leon Trotsky. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin modified it into a bureaucratic system. Marx's dream of “total revolution” of a workers' state with equality of labor was “totally perverted” by Stalin, who formed a totalitarian state governed by the Communist Party. Her critique of these later manifestations of Marxism focused on the question of how the revolution, as envisioned by Marx, could be sustained.

Dunayevskaya's thought and practice were instrumental in a number of major protest movements, including the US civil rights movement, women's liberation, and youth revolts of the twentieth century. In *Marxism and Freedom*, she praised the Montgomery bus boycott as “a spontaneous movement kept within the hands of the Blacks.” Her most systematic work, *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973), included an analysis of the Cuban Revolution of the 1950s and the youth revolts of the 1960s. In *Women's Liberation* (1985), the third of her “trilogy of revolution,” she described the manner in which the miners' wives of West Virginia organized anti-automation strikes in 1949–50. In this book and other writings, she called attention to “the woman dimension,” characterizing women not merely in the role of support but as the formative forces of revolution. In *Rosa Luxemburg* (1982), she observed that the historic nature of the women's liberation movement of the 1960s arose from left-wing philosophy. She cautioned against the women's movement shying away from Marx's philosophy for the reason of gender.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; James,

C. L. R. (1901–1989); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Women’s Movement, United States, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Dunayevskaya, R. (1944) A New Revision of Marxian Economics. *American Economic Review* 34, 3 (September): 531–7.
- Dunayevskaya, R. (1956) Letter to Editor. *Political Science* 23 (July): 266.
- Dunayevskaya, R. (1958) *Marxism and Freedom from 1776 until Today*. New York: Bookman.
- Dunayevskaya, R. (1973) *Philosophy and Revolution: From Hegel to Sartre, and from Marx to Mao*. New York: Delacorte Press.
- Dunayevskaya, R. (1982) *Rosa Luxemburg, Women’s Liberation, and Marx’s Philosophy of Revolution*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Dunayevskaya, R. (1984) Marx’s “New Humanism” and the Dialectics of Women’s Liberation in Primitive and Modern Societies. *Praxis International* 3, 4 (January): 369–81.
- Dunayevskaya, R. (1985) *Women’s Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution: Reaching for the Future*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Dunbar, Andrew (1879–1964)

Lucien van der Walt

Andrew B. Dunbar was a South African trade union leader and syndicalist in the early twentieth century. Born in Scotland in 1879, and trained as a blacksmith, Dunbar arrived in South Africa in 1906, where he worked on the Natal railways. A giant of a man, with strongly held views, Dunbar first gained prominence for his role in leading a strike by 2,500 railway workers: the strike was defeated after two weeks, and Dunbar was dismissed. Moving to Johannesburg, he worked on the tramways, was briefly involved in the South African Labor Party (SALP), joined the Johannesburg Socialist Society, and moved to a revolutionary syndicalist position along the lines of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). In June 1910, with the help of fellow tramway worker Thomas Glynn, Dunbar managed to take control of the newly formed Industrial Workers’ Union, sponsored by the Witwatersrand Trades and Labor Council, and transform it into a local IWW. The local IWW was prominent in leading two strikes

on the tramways in 1911, and subsequently spread to Durban and Pretoria, but in 1912 Dunbar was ousted from his position as IWW general secretary by his rival, Archie Crawford, a state socialist, and expelled; the union collapsed the following year.

Dunbar remained active in socialist circles and was a founder member of the revolutionary syndicalist International Socialist League formed in 1915, where he maintained a strictly anti-parliamentarian position. He was active in establishing the revolutionary syndicalist Industrial Workers of Africa, the first union for African workers in British southern Africa, in 1917. In 1919 Dunbar helped form a Johannesburg branch of the Industrial Socialist League (a separate revolutionary syndicalist group based in the Cape) and was expelled from the International Socialist League.

Moves to form a local communist party gathered speed in 1920 and 1921: Dunbar headed the faction that wanted a syndicalist party, and in October 1920 the Industrial Socialist League became Africa’s first communist party, on a largely revolutionary syndicalist platform, with Dunbar as general secretary. The syndicalist Communist Party subsequently emerged as the official Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), formed in 1921, and Dunbar remained a prominent CPSA figure until 1928, heading a revolutionary syndicalist faction with links to the Sylvia Pankhurst group in England. In 1928 the CPSA adopted a two-stage “Native Republic” strategy under Communist International pressure; this was followed by a series of purges in the “New Line” period. Dunbar did not agree with the Native Republic thesis, arguing that One Big Union could simultaneously defeat capitalism and national oppression, and was forced out of the CPSA, and subsequently abandoned public political work. He faded from union and socialist work in subsequent years.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Syndicalism, Southern Africa; Communist Party of South Africa, 1921–1950; Sachs, Solly (1900–1976); Sigamoney, Bernard L. E. (1888–1963); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; South Africa, Labor Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Cope, R. K. (1943) *Comrade Bill: The Life and Times of W. H. Andrews, Workers’ Leader*. Cape Town: Stewart Printing.
- Gitsham, E. & Trembath, J. F. (1926) *A First Account of Labour Organization in South Africa*. Durban: E. P. & Commercial Printing.

Walker, I. L. & Weinbren, B. (1961/2000) *Casualties: A History of the Trade Unions and the Labour Movement in the Union of South Africa*. Johannesburg: South African Trade Union Council.

Durrani empire, popular protests, 1747–1823

Yury V. Bosin

The Durrani empire emerged in 1747 as fundamentally a military confederation of Pashtun ethnic groups in the Central Asian region of modern-day Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. While not a centralized state, at its peak of expansion the Durrani empire covered an area of 780,000 square miles (2,000,000 square kilometers). The empire stretched from Afghanistan across Pakistan to within 60 miles of Delhi. As a privileged ethnicity, the Pashtun dominated the royal court, bureaucracy, and army and gained most of the perquisites of the confederation. As the Durrani empire expanded its military reach, non-Pashtun nationalities were overpowered and suppressed by the Pashtun. Those who were not members of the dominant Pashtun were subjected to higher taxation and forced into compulsory military duty, while the local land and water resources of many were expropriated by the colonial empire. Swelling tensions between newcomers and the indigenous non-Pashtun population sparked open clashes and revolts against the colonial empire.

The massive Baluch Rebellion of 1758 in the region is a notable example of uprisings during the Durrani empire. Due to the overwhelming military and economic power of the empire, the insurrection was crushed, with military forces laying siege to the Baluch center of Kalat for 40 days before the protests were quelled and an agreement was achieved between the warring parties that was highly favorable to the Pashtun.

So too, in the 1780s, Southern Turkestan was a highly explosive part of the Durrani empire. Home to the autonomous Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek, the region became a center of resistance to Durrani military, political, and economic hegemony. The emir of Bukhara challenged the Durrani empire for control over the region and rallied local partisans living in communities in Central Asia to defy efforts to comply with

the demands of the Pashtun. This resistance continued through 1789, when the Durrani ruler Timur Shah succeeded in suppressing the rebellion and establishing control in Southern Turkestan.

However, while the Durrani leaders, known as shahs, were continuously striving to control and restrain the non-Pashtun, these efforts were complicated by internecine conflict among the Pashtun, as various regions sought autonomy from the empire, especially when they perceived the central power to be overly domineering. Support for the Durrani empire was only achieved when regional Pashtun perceived the central government as a beneficial source of economic and military protection. However, when the Durrani sought local tribute, some sought regional autonomy. Some of the largest uprisings occurred in 1801 when the Ghilzai rebelled against Shah Mahmud. The uprisings were a first sign of growing ethnic separatism which, accompanied by non-Pashtun movements, undermined the Durrani empire and led to its disintegration in 1823.

SEE ALSO: Afghanistan, 1978 Revolution and Islamic Civil War; Afghanistan, Resistance to 19th-Century British Invasion; Bacha-i Sakkao's Movement; Bin Laden, Osama (b. 1957) and al-Qaeda; Taliban, 1996–2007

References and Suggested Readings

- Briant, P. (2002) *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*. Trans. P. T. Daniels. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Gregorian, V. (1969) *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Masson, V. & Romodon, V. (1964) *A History of Afghanistan*, Vols. 1–2. Moscow: Nauka (in Russian).
- Montgomery, J. D. & Rondinelli, D. A. (Eds.) (2004) *Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Lessons from Development Experience*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sykes, P. (1940) *A History of Afghanistan*. London: Macmillan.

Durruti, Buenaventura (1896–1936)

Jeff Shantz

Born in León in northwestern Spain to a poor family, Buenaventura Durruti emerged as one of the most prominent anarchist militants in Spain

prior to and during the Spanish Revolution. In death he would become a symbol of commitment to anarchist principles in opposition to compromise and reformism.

Durruti stressed libertarian communist principles as an organizational priority, advocating the development of cores of dedicated anarchists within a revolutionary movement, even if their numbers were small, rather than a mass movement of workers only minimally influenced or committed to anarchist ideals. This position has influenced generations of anarchocommunists, including present-day advocates of platformist anarchism and *especificismo*.

Durruti was a leading militant within the Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI), a semi-secret organization of anarchocommunists within the anarcho-syndicalist Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT). The FAI formed on affinity group structure consisting of small nuclei of about a dozen friends who met to develop theoretical and tactical positions to maintain and pursue anarchist principles. The FAI is credited as highly influential in developing the CNT as a revolutionary organization.

Durruti was a fierce advocate of direct action protest tactics and understood the violence of popular insurrections as a necessary element of the radical overthrow of capitalist and centralized state regimes. As an active participant in anarchist militias he asserted that the creation of a new world required the violent destruction of the old world and defense of the new. A skilled militia member, Durruti organized nearly 4,000 armed anarchists, the celebrated Durruti Column, in a series of successful battles against Franco's forces. He included what some anarchists criticized as terrorism within his definition of direct action. Expropriations at gunpoint were routine practice for Durruti and his comrades. During the Spanish Civil War Durruti defended the execution of rapacious landowners and capitalist managers, bank robberies, and other forms of armed struggle in which he himself engaged.

In the face of opposition from the Generalidad, the semi-autonomous government of Catalonia, Durruti proposed that unified armed militias of the CNT-FAI fight against fascism and in defense of Barcelona. Ultimately, FAI anarchists were attacked and arrested by the Generalidad police.

Following the Spanish Revolution of July 19, 1936, Durruti was killed in action at the Madrid

front on November 20, 1936. A number of his supporters formed the Friends of Durruti, presenting a unified militant opposition to the CNT's disastrous association in the provisional Republican Government and upholding anarchist principles in the battle against fascism.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Spain; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI); Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Bookchin, M. (1978) *Spanish Anarchists*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Paz, A. (1976) *Durruti: The People Armed*. Trans. N. McDonald. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Paz, A. & Molina, J. L. (2006) *Durruti in the Spanish Revolution*. Trans. C. Morse. Oakland, CA: AK Press.

Dutch Caribbean, protest and revolution, 1815–2000

Gert J. Oostindie

From the mid-seventeenth century, the Dutch Caribbean (which initially consisted of Suriname and the adjacent colonies of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, as well as six tiny islands in the Caribbean Sea) was the site of major revolts against colonial repression and slavery. During the Napoleonic Wars, the British captured the Dutch colonies, later ceding Suriname and the Antillean Islands while retaining Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo (contemporary Guyana). After 1815 protest was more muted, but by the late 1800s resistance grew more militant and involved anti-colonial and anti-imperialist revolts as well as labor riots and political demonstrations. Because of the violent reaction by the Dutch state to these manifestations, contemporary cultural opposition to Dutch “recolonization” has become the dominant form of resistance, rather than the militant pro-independence or revolutionary movements of the late twentieth century.

Rebellion against Colonial Rule and Slavery

In the early period, the Dutch Guianas were plantation economies while the Antilles mainly served as commercial centers; the Dutch Carib-

bean was an unsought-for home for overwhelming first- or later-generation African majorities. As colonization, marginalization of the Amerindian inhabitants, and particularly African slavery characterized these territories, structural violence was a fact of life. This resulted in early fighting with Amerindians, massive marronage, and guerilla warfare in Suriname, and major slave revolts in Berbice (1763) and Curaçao (1750, 1795, 1800), all of which brought colonial rule, and with it slavery itself, to the brink of collapse. But in the end, and in spite of massive African American majorities everywhere, colonial rule was always restored.

In comparison, the period from 1815 to the final emancipation of slavery was calm. Incidental slave protest continued, as did marronage, strikes, and upheavals on individual plantations, and even major arson in Paramaribo, the capital of Suriname, but no massive revolts were recorded. One part of the explanation for this lies with continued colonial repression. But this was nothing new and had not been able to prevent serious revolts in preceding centuries.

The abolition of the slave trade, imposed by the British in 1807, was linked to amelioration policies, increase of manumission rates, Christianization, and finally emancipation in 1863. This is particularly relevant to Suriname, the most populous Dutch Caribbean colony. The abolition of the slave trade implied progressive creolization of the enslaved population. While first-generation Africans were regarded as more prone to overt rebellion, enslaved Creoles developed a variety of modes of resistance within the system, negotiating better treatment and some economic and social autonomy at the margins of their plantation routines. While escape to the interior had not been completely severed, the number of run-aways diminished; the Maroon communities in the interior were acknowledged but also pacified by peace treaties.

Slave communities had long since developed African American cultures, with Creole languages (Sranantongo in Suriname; Papiamentu in Curaçao, the major Antillean Island), oral and musical traditions, as well as other cultural forms. These slave cultures may be understood as both adoptive strategies and modes of resistance. Their revolutionary potential was most likely affected by concerted colonial policies aiming at Christianization. Conversion of the African Americans was explicitly seen as a vehicle not only to

eradicate “African superstitions,” but also as a package deal of the true faith with a commitment to a strong work ethic and compliance with the given social order.

This nominally encompassing Christianization of the great majority of the Dutch Caribbean colonies seems to have had the desired effects. Even after the ending of slavery in the British and French Caribbean (1834, 1848), the enslaved populations in the Dutch Caribbean did not engage in massive revolt to hasten their own emancipation, which came only in 1863. In Suriname freedom was postponed by ten years through the establishment of an “apprenticeship” period. One exception to this is the island of St. Martin, split into a French and a Dutch part. When the slaves in the Dutch section learned that slavery had been abolished in the French division, they themselves refused to be treated like slaves any more. Their owners in the end had to recognize this *de facto* early emancipation.

The post-emancipation development of the territories was highly divergent. In order to support the plantation sector of the economy, the Dutch government organized indentured labor migrations from British India and Java to Suriname. From the late nineteenth century, the economy moved away from a plantation economy, witnessed the emergence of a peasant agriculture as well as large-scale rice production, the emergence of a bauxite industry, and, post-World War II, a rapidly growing services sector and inflated public sector. Full sovereignty came in 1975, and entailed massive migration to the Netherlands and continued dependence on the former metropolis – this time also because of remittances from the Surinamese community, which in the first decade of the twenty-first century numbered some 335,000 against 475,000 in the young republic itself.

Postcolonial Resistance and Revolution

There has been a long series of labor conflicts from 1863 to the present. Few of these had long-term political consequences. Occasional militant protest countered by aggressive colonial repression effectively silenced these movements. All through the period of indenture, there were often violent labor disputes, which sometimes involved killings and colonial retaliation. The

most dramatic such conflict occurred at the Mariënborg plantation in 1902, and was suppressed at the cost of over 20 casualties, mainly Hindustani.

Widespread urban labor unrest in the 1920s and early 1930s culminated in the riots around Anton de Kom, an Afro-Surinamese militant with communist connections and a strong anti-colonial ideology, who returned from the Netherlands to his native Suriname in 1933. Accused of conspiracy, de Kom was detained in Paramaribo. In the ensuing riots, two people were killed. De Kom was subsequently expelled from the colony and returned to the Netherlands, where he would continue his engagement with international anti-imperialism and write his seminal anti-colonial book, *Wij slaven van Suriname* (We Slaves of Suriname, 1934). Having joined the Dutch resistance during the Nazi occupation, he was arrested and deported, and finally died in a German concentration camp. Anton de Kom became the key symbol of Surinamese nationalism.

World War II brought a preemptive allied intervention, local resistance to the authoritarian Dutch governor, the internment of suspected locals (Germans as well as possible anti-colonial colonial subjects), and the emergence of a proto-nationalist movement. After the war, a new postcolonial status was negotiated in which, according to the 1954 *Statuut* (Charter), Suriname attained an autonomous position in a semi-federal tripartite kingdom, the other members being the still dominant Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles. In 1975 Suriname opted for full sovereignty, a move applauded and facilitated with substantial development aid by the Dutch and accompanied by an exodus to the Netherlands.

After 1954 and particularly after 1975, Suriname witnessed some violent episodes. These were less of an anti-colonial nature, involving domestic conflicts and, post-independence, bloodshed. Labor riots in the early 1970s led to the fall of the serving cabinet, new elections, and eventually to the first ever pro-independence coalition. Its early 1974 decision to accomplish independence by the end of the next year sparked demonstrations, occasional riots, and arson. Of more lasting significance, independence would trigger an exodus. In all of this, ethnic division was inescapable and left the republic with a bitter legacy: the Hindustani population and its leadership had strongly opposed independence.

After less than five years of independence, a self-proclaimed “revolutionary” military coup led by Sergeant Desi Bouterse initiated the most violent period in the country’s post-slavery history. The coup itself involved some bloodshed, but escalated with the December killings of 1982, in which the regime, now flirting with radical left regimes in the Caribbean (Cuba, Grenada), summarily executed some 15 of its political opponents, hence breaking the myth of *sviti Sranan*, and instilling widespread fear in the population. Armed resistance to the military involved, once more, the Maroon communities. In the next years the military grip on the country hardened, leading to the most violent excess in Suriname’s history, the 1986 attack by the military on the Maroon village of Moiwana, killing possibly 50 civilians and wounding many more.

A return to democracy was negotiated in 1987 and, after a brief second military intervention, consolidated in 1990. The corrupting legacy of this seminal period is not so easily shed and in spite of consistent demonstrations and lawsuits, the leaders responsible for “revolutionary” violence had not been detained by 2008.

After emancipation, all six Antillean islands experienced economic and demographic stagnation well into the twentieth century. A turnabout was accomplished with the establishment of oil refineries in the late 1920s in Aruba and Curaçao, and postwar with the emergence of mass tourism. Industrialization, followed by tourism, triggered large-scale migrations from elsewhere in the region. From the 1980s onwards, massive migration to the Netherlands followed suit: at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, 280,000 Antilleans live on the islands, while 130,000 live in the Netherlands. The Antilles also subscribed to the 1954 *Statuut*, but in contrast to Suriname, refused to comply with Dutch encouragement to attain full sovereignty. The major constitutional change of the last decades has been the progressive dismantlement of the Antilles-of-six.

Twentieth-Century Labor Struggles

There have been many strikes over the century, the Curaçao harbor strike of 1922 possibly being the first modern industrial one. One exceptional case occurred during World War II, under Dutch rule backed up by Allied military support and accompanied by the same detention policies as enacted in Suriname. A strike of Chinese laborers

in Curaçao was brutally suppressed, killing 15 – an excess not seriously accounted for by the authorities until the present, and nonexistent in local nationalist narratives.

The most violent episode in the post-1954 period of restricted autonomy occurred with the May 30, 1969 revolt. Spurred by a labor conflict in the oil industry, a massive demonstration soon included protest against the dominant local political parties and resentment over race issues, resulting in the burning of sections of the inner city of Willemstad. The local government demanded and received Dutch military assistance to quell the riots. The next day, order was restored at the cost of two casualties, and the old center was ruined.

“May 1969” is a central trope in the Curaçaoan narrative of the nation. Its leadership did think of itself as revolutionary, but its objectives were mainly directed to local issues. Indeed, the revolt did spark Afro-Curaçaoan emancipation. Ironically, while the Curaçao uprising brought about a Dutch resolve to withdraw from the Caribbean at short notice, and indeed did help accomplish the independence of Suriname, the Antilles have remained firmly within the Dutch fold – plebiscites and opinion polls demonstrate that only tiny majorities opt for independence.

In fact, the majority of political demonstrations and occasional strikes of the past decades did not call for sovereignty, but rather for the dismantlement of the Antilles-of-six and the establishment of separate bilateral relations with the Netherlands. The first such series of political manifestations originated in Aruba in the 1970s. After Aruba’s hard-won independent status, St. Martin followed with the same manifestations and demands in the 1990s, and was eventually successful.

Since the late 1990s, the Netherlands has not withdrawn from the last remnants of empire, opting for strong reengagement instead. The reassertion of Dutch control has elicited protests against “recolonization,” but without violent protest or the reemergence of a strong pro-independence movement. Cultural resistance to “Dutchification” remains in place, though. Thus Antilleans continue to speak Papiamentu or Creole English as their first language, with no intention whatsoever to make Dutch the vernacular on the islands.

SEE ALSO: Caribbean Islands, Protests against IMF; Caribbean Protest Music; Curaçao, 1969 Uprising; Haiti, Democratic Uprising, 1980s–1991; James, C. L. R. (1901–1989)

References and Suggested Readings

- De Kom, A. (1934) *Wij slaven van Suriname*. Amsterdam: Contact.
- Hira, S. (1983) *Van Priary tot en met De Kom. De geschiedenis van het verzet in Suriname 1630–1940*. Rotterdam: Futile.
- Hoefte, R. (1998) *In Place of Slavery: A Social History of British Indian and Javanese Laborers in Suriname*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Hoefte, R. & Meel, P. (Eds.) (2001) *20th-Century Suriname: Continuities and Discontinuities in a New World Society*. Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Oostindie, G. (2005) *Paradise Overseas: The Dutch Caribbean, Colonialism and its Transatlantic Legacies*. Oxford: Macmillan.
- Van Stipriaan, A. (1993) *Surinaams contrast. Roofbouw en overleven in een Caraïbische plantagekolonie 1750–1863*. Leiden: KITLV Press.

Dutch Revolt, 1568–1648

Michael F. Gretz

The Dutch Revolt, also known in the Netherlands as the Eighty Years’ War, was one of the most important moments of protest and rebellion of the early modern era. In the late sixteenth century, motivated by religion, economics, and nationalist sentiment, the Dutch began a long period of armed revolt against the domination of the Spanish Hapsburg empire. The Netherlands, a relatively small country, had emerged from the feudal era under the control of the



During the Dutch War of Independence against the Spanish in 1566, Calvinists throughout the Netherlands stormed Catholic churches and desecrated other religious buildings, protesting against what they deemed the worship of idols. (akg-images)

Hapsburg empire. However, the nature of Dutch society was rapidly changing as urban areas in the Netherlands began to dominate trade in the emerging Atlantic and global economy of the early modern period. Moreover, many parts of the Netherlands, particularly in the north, had converted to Calvinism, which produced much conflict with the Catholic Hapsburg authorities.

In 1566, the first salvos of the revolt were launched, beginning a war that would last for most of the next six decades. The Dutch Revolt was marked by the development of total warfare, in which the civilian population on both sides was heavily targeted. Eventually, the Dutch Revolt was integrated into a wider pan-European war, the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), the resolution of which most historians recognize as the origin of the modern nation-state system. Moreover, as part of the Dutch Revolt, Dutch intellectuals authored some key texts of liberal political theory, many of which would influence the later American and French revolutions. The Dutch Revolt led to the emergence of an independent, predominantly Protestant, republic in the north – the United Provinces of the Netherlands – while the south (modern-day Belgium) remained under Hapsburg control. The emergence of a self-governed republic was an important moment in the development of the modern democratic state even if the United Provinces remained heavily influenced by the aristocracy. The formation of the United Provinces was an important moment in consolidating the Dutch merchant class that was rapidly expanding its dominance of international trade and finance during this period. As such, the Dutch Revolt was also a key moment in the development of international capitalism.

The territory of the Netherlands was united by the Burgundians in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. When Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, died in battle in 1477, the Netherlands rebelled against his daughter, Mary, who had inherited the territory. This revolt was animated by growing distrust of the Burgundian efforts to centralize political power at the expense of the various provinces and growing resentment over the use of French as the language of government in the northern regions rather than the native Dutch. As a result of this revolt, Mary was obliged to issue charters to various provinces curbing the central ruler's ability to levy taxes and impose other requirements without provincial permission.

Following Mary's death in 1482, her husband, Maximilian of Hapsburg, ruled the Netherlands as a regent for their son, Phillip I. During this early Hapsburg period, hostilities expanded in the region. A revolt in the towns of Ghent and Bruges, joined by the provinces of Brabant and Holland, devastated the Hapsburg Netherlands and Maximilian had to request that his father, Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II, send German troops to crush the rebels. Sporadic resistance to Hapsburg rule continued, especially in northern Netherlands, with the provinces of Gelderland, Groningen, and Friesland effectively resisting Phillip I's subsequent attempts to reintegrate them into the Hapsburg fold.

When Charles V became the Hapsburg Holy Roman Emperor in 1515, restlessness prevailed in the Netherlands, with the province of Utrecht joining the insurgency against the Hapsburgs and their allies in Holland. In 1516, Charles V also inherited the Spanish throne, making him the ruler of vast territories stretching from the Iberian Peninsula to the Hapsburg's ancestral territory in Austria, the Netherlands, and much of the newly discovered Americas. With a vast territory to rule, Charles V left the administration of the Netherlands to surrogates. However, in 1531, Charles V returned to Brussels, seeking to implement a series of administrative reforms to bring greater governmental centralization to the Netherlands.

Still, no event affected the Netherlands as deeply during this period as the Protestant Reformation. When the German priest Martin Luther nailed his 95 Theses to the door of the Wittenberg Castle Church protesting what he considered the growing decadence of the Catholic Church, he sparked the social, political, and religious movement known as the Protestant Reformation. Across the continent, but particularly in the north, many Europeans of all social classes took Luther's criticism of the Catholic Church seriously, seeking to develop a new interpretation of the Bible conceptualizing the believer's personal relationship with God outside of the church hierarchy and bureaucracy. Luther's actions led directly to the outbreak of a long period of Wars of Religion throughout Europe, centered in the German territories of the Hapsburg Holy Roman Empire.

By the middle of the sixteenth century, Protestantism, particularly Calvinism, gained a strong foothold throughout much of the Netherlands,

sharpening the sporadic rebellion of the Dutch against its Hapsburg rulers. The Netherlands had already become one of Europe's most prosperous, urban, and literate regions. The theology of Calvinism, based on earning God's favor through good works in this world, appealed to the rising commercial classes in the Netherlands. Accepting Protestantism challenged Hapsburg authority to tax the profits of the Dutch merchant class's enterprise.

The religious, economic, and political developments in the Netherlands under Charles V contributed to a growing Dutch national identity and alienation from Hapsburg authority. However, with nearly the entire continent embroiled in turmoil, much of Charles V's focus remained elsewhere. Not until 1566, after Charles passed his crown to his son, Phillip II of Spain, who retained title to the Netherlands, did open revolt break out.

The revolt began when Calvinists, angered by an incident outside the Antwerp Cathedral, stormed Catholic churches across the Netherlands and destroyed icons of Catholic saints. Phillip II responded by sending an imperial army under the Duke of Alba to crush the revolt. In 1567, Alba led his army into Brussels and began a harsh campaign against Protestants and those accused of harboring Protestant sympathies. In a special court, Alba presided over a series of trials that resulted in the executions of thousands, including the Counts of Egmont and Horne, accused of being too tolerant of Protestants.

However, William I of Orange, the Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht in the northern Netherlands, escaped Alba's wrath by fleeing to Protestant-controlled territories in Germany. In 1568, William I returned to the Netherlands to drive Alba out. William's campaign was initially successful. However, once the Spanish defeated the Turks, with whom they were also at war, they were able to send additional troops to crush the rebellion in the Netherlands.

Following the arrival of Spanish reinforcements, Alba was able to reconquer much of the lost territory, and the rebellion largely subsided. However, William of Orange remained at large and Alba's decision to impose a new tax in 1572 angered both Dutch Protestants and Catholics, sparking renewed fighting. In that same year, Dutch rebels captured the port of Brill and support for the rebellion grew in the northern regions.

In 1573, failing to suppress the revolt, Alba was replaced; but attempts by his successors to broker a peace failed. In 1576, with the Spanish monarchy unable to pay its troops, Spanish garrisons in the Netherlands mutinied and began pillaging Dutch cities. In 1576, the various provinces of the Netherlands negotiated the so-called Pacification of Ghent, aimed at quelling the internal unrest, establishing religious toleration, and pressuring the Spanish to retreat.

However, many Dutch Calvinists did not respect the treaty, angering Dutch Catholics. In 1579, the largely Catholic southern provinces unified in the Union of Atrecht (Arras), professing loyalty to the Spanish crown. William of Orange responded by unifying the northern provinces in the Union of Utrecht, marking the definitive division of the Netherlands into an increasingly Protestant and rebellious north, and a predominantly Catholic and loyalist south.

In the north, having repudiated the Spanish throne, the States General, the legislative body in which formal sovereignty now rested, looked for another royal power to assume sovereignty of the land. However, after Queen Elizabeth I of England declined and the French Duke of Anjou proved too unpopular, the States General decided to rule the now *de facto* independent northern Netherlands as a republic, under the name United Provinces of the Netherlands.

However, the Spanish did not recognize this independence and sent a new army under the Duke of Parma to recapture the United Provinces. Parma's expedition was marked by heavy violence against the Dutch population, and he was successful in recapturing the provinces of Flanders and Brabant and a good deal of the northeastern part of the country. In 1584, William of Orange was assassinated by a Spanish sympathizer, dealing the insurgency an important psychological blow. However, leadership of the revolt soon passed to William of Orange's son, Maurice of Nassau. During the next two decades, Maurice led the rebels to a series of victories, pushing the borders of the United Provinces close to those of the present-day Netherlands. While the fighting was often severe and civilians were often targeted, the main provinces on the coast, Holland and Zeeland, were generally spared the worst of the fighting, allowing the Dutch Golden Age of global trade and commerce to take hold. In 1600, the Dutch, under Maurice of Nassau, made one last attempt to break Spanish control of the south. At

the battle of Nieuwpoort, Maurice's armies were victorious, but ultimately unable to reconquer the south, sealing the future division of the country along the line that separates the modern-day Netherlands from Belgium.

In 1609, the Dutch and Spanish signed a 12-year truce during which hostilities were limited. Dutch society grew increasingly prosperous as merchants developed their fleet and Amsterdam became a financial capital of Europe. However, antagonism among the leadership of Dutch Calvinist factions expanded in hostility, reaching a crescendo in 1617, when Maurice of Nassau had Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, a republican leader, arrested and executed for treason.

In 1618, the Thirty Years' War began in the Holy Roman Empire, growing into a European-wide conflict pitting the Hapsburgs against its rebellious Protestant provinces, Denmark, Sweden, and eventually Catholic France. In 1622, with the expiration of the 12 years' truce between Spain and the United Provinces, the Netherlands once again became a center of warfare. The Spanish attacked the country and captured the city of Breda. However, the situation reversed in favor of the Dutch, with Frederick Henry of Orange capturing Maastricht in 1632, and the Dutch navy defeating the Spanish fleet in 1639.

In 1648, the Eighty Years' War finally ended with the treaty of Munster, with the Spanish officially recognizing the independence of the United Provinces. The treaty was part of the larger series of peace negotiations that brought the wider Thirty Years' War to a conclusion. The Eighty Years' War, or the Dutch Revolt, is remembered for both its ferocity and duration, but also for its results. Civilians were frequently targeted by both sides, in what many historians regard as one of the first modern, or total, wars. While classical infantry, cavalry, and naval battles between professional armies were crucial in the war, Dutch rebels often engaged in guerilla insurgencies where combatants blended into the civilian population.

The Eighty Years' War paved the way for the emergence of an independent territorial state, governed not by hereditary monarchy but by a council of mostly bourgeois or merchant citizens. While the governmental structure of the United Provinces was complex, and the old military nobility retained an important role, the Eighty Years' War posed the question of sovereignty and political legitimacy in a particularly modern

way that anticipated the great upheavals of the American and French revolutions of the following century. The Eighty Years' War, and later, to a broader extent, the Thirty Years' War, marked the decline of the medieval phenomenon of overlapping sovereignty where several leaders and institutions claimed legitimate sovereign power over the same territory. The Dutch Revolt also denoted the rise of the modern international system, in which clearly defined, territorially bounded nation-states compete for strategic position in an international system.

The rise of the merchant class, already in progress by the early sixteenth century, was accelerated by the outbreak of the Dutch Revolt, and was a vital historic factor in the development of global capitalism. The Dutch mercantile and colonial expansion of the period was critical to the development of both international trade and global finance.

SEE ALSO: Luther, Martin (1483–1546); Netherlands, Protests, 1650–1800; Netherlands Protests, 1800–2000

References and Suggested Readings

- Asch, R. G. (1997) *The Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648*. New York: Palgrave.
- Duke, A. (1990) *Reformation and Revolt in the Low Countries*. London: Hambledon Press.
- Israel, J. I. (1995) *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Prak, M. (2005) *The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: The Golden Age*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- T'Hart, M. (1993) *The Making of a Bourgeois State: War, Politics and Finance During the Dutch Revolt*. New York: Manchester University Press.
- Tilly, C. (1995) *European Revolutions, 1492–1992*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Van der Wee, H. (1993) *The Low Countries in the Early Modern World*. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate.
- Van Gelderen, M. (1992) *The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt, 1555–1590*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Dutschke, Rudi (1940–1979)

Carrie Collenberg

Rudi Dutschke was the most prominent activist of the left-wing student movement of West

Germany in the 1960s and 1970s. His ideas inspired both violent and non-violent groups of the movement and he supported the newly developing Green Party.

Born on March 7, 1940 in Schönefeld, Brandenburg, Alfred Willi Rudi Dutschke became critical of East German socialism early on and his refusal to participate in compulsory military service made him a dissident. On August 10, 1961, three days before the Berlin Wall went up, he fled to West Berlin where he studied sociology at the Free University.

In West Berlin, Dutschke established his reputation as a shrewd and charismatic anti-authoritarian and anti-fascist socialist revolutionary interested in international politics. In 1964 he helped found the West Berlin cell of Subversive Aktion (SA) and in 1965 its members joined the Socialist German Student Union (SDS) and Dutschke was elected to the board. Amid increasing national and international tension, Dutschke mobilized the SDS and established the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (APO). Dutschke's ideas for revolution were inspired by critical theorists and the history of socialist revolutions but were firmly grounded in Christianity and not utopian. He called on people to begin the process or "long march" to provoke and subvert the system from within in order to promote reform and democracy.

After a demonstration on June 2, 1967, when student protestor Benno Ohnesorg was shot by police officer Karl-Heinz Kurras, Dutschke led mass demonstrations against the Axel Springer publishing house and organized the International Vietnam Congress. As the chief agitator of the student movement, the media and author-

ities considered him a threat to the existing order and called on the public to stop Dutschke and the new left. The media campaign inspired Josef Bachmann's attempted assassination of Dutschke on April 11, 1968, an event that prompted mass demonstrations in Germany and abroad and can be understood as a turning point towards more violence and government suppression.

After Dutschke recovered he moved to Great Britain and then to Denmark. In 1973 he received his doctorate from the Free University of Berlin. Afterwards, he became politically active in West Germany, again with speeches on human rights, publications in left-wing newspapers, demonstrations against nuclear power, and a critique of Soviet communism. Promoting the Green Party platform, he inspired many student activists to join. He died in 1979 from a seizure resulting from the attempted assassination. He was married to American-born Gretchen Klotz Dutschke and they had three children, Hosea-Ché (1968), Polly-Nicole (1969), and Rudi-Marek Dutschke (1980).

SEE ALSO: Germany, Green Movement; Germany, Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Group); West German "New Left"

References and Suggested Readings

- Dutschke, G. (1996) *Wir hatten ein barbarisches, schönes Leben. Rudi Dutschke: Eine Biographie*. Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch.
- Dutschke, R. (2003) *Jeder hat sein Leben ganz zu leben: Die Tagebücher 1963–1979*. Ed. G. Dutschke. Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch.
- Karl, M. (2003) *Rudi Dutschke: Revolutionär ohne Revolution*. Frankfurt am Main: Neue Kritik.

E

Earth First!

Derek Wall

During the 1990s British environmental activists used direct action in an attempt to halt road construction. A loose network of radical environmentalists, Earth First! (EF!) was central to the anti-roads campaign. Originally founded in the United States, Earth First! projected a philosophy of deep ecology combined with direct action using the slogan “No compromise in defense of Mother Earth.” Particularly in the 1980s when it was first established, Earth First! often advocated ecologically motivated sabotage, including the highly controversial tactic of tree spiking (Lee 1995). In Britain it was far less interested in projecting a philosophy and focused instead simply on the need to use direct action, based usually on mass mobilization, to tackle environmental and other ills (Wall 1999).

Protest against road building predates the upsurge of activity in the 1990s. During the early 1970s, Homes not Roads campaigned against motorway construction in London by squatting buildings and running anti-road candidates for the Greater London Assembly (Charlesworth 1984). A variety of local conservation societies and environmental groups have opposed and continue to oppose road construction on environmental grounds. Since the 1990s concern over climate change has fed into the sentiments of anti-roads protesters. Militant non-violent direct action surged in the 1990s both because of the inspiration of Earth First! and because of an upsurge in road construction by Prime Minister John Major’s government.

Birth of Earth First! UK

While there had been several abortive attempts to create an Earth First! movement in the UK modeled on the US movement, two Hastings-

based students, Jason Torrence and Jake Burbidge, set up an Earth First! group in 1991. Their first action was a blockade of the Dungeness nuclear power station in Kent. Torrence and Burbidge were able to tap into local peace networks to carry out the action. George Marshall, a British activist, who had been involved with the Australian rainforest movement, joined them in the early 1990s. Earth First! focused its early efforts on rainforest protest, attempting to block the import of rainforest timber. In 1992 an action at Liverpool docks attracted over 200 activists, including members of the Green Student Network. Another early Earth First! action saw the occupation of a timber depot outside Oxford by several hundred activists

Torrence and Burbidge had been active in Greenpeace, the Green Party, and Friends of the Earth, but had become disillusioned with all three and wanted to create a more participatory and direct-action oriented movement. They quickly recruited activists from these groups, the Green Student Network, the peace movement, and the animal rights movement. In 1992 US activists toured Britain to pick up new recruits, creating an Earth First! roadshow.

Earth First! in the UK has never had a formal membership. It remains an almost invisible network with little or no national organization. Although local groups continue to exist, there is no established constitution or set pattern. Earth First! has two enduring features, the Earth First! Action Update, a newsletter which contains details of direct action, and a national Summer Gathering. Earth First! spends little time debating philosophy or constructing a formal ideology. Its key feature is direct action together with organizational informality. It has been and remains part of a wider network of green activism.

During its early years some attempts were made to formalize the network and an often-divisive debate continued between advocates of non-violent mass action and those who supported

ecologically motivated sabotage. During the Earth First! gathering in Sussex in 1991, more militant activists sympathetic to Earth First! (US), anarchism, and the animal rights movement came up with the name Earth Liberation Front. Acts of ecologically motivated sabotage have been carried out under this banner. Earth First! (UK) does not condone or condemn criminal damage.

Anti-car actions became important with the creation of an Armageddon campaign and the first “reclaim the streets” action, which saw the blocking of Waterloo Bridge in London. After being contacted by activists at Twyford Down, Earth First!ers became involved in the campaign to prevent the M3 from cutting through downland near the city of Winchester. The Twyford Down campaigners had been active for several decades fighting the motorway through the planning process. Prior to the arrival of Earth First!ers, both Friends of the Earth and new age travelers had camped on Twyford Down in protest at the motorway.

Earth First!’s involvement helped accelerate the creation of dozens of anti-road camps across Britain. In East London the M11 campaign saw an impressive urban occupation of Claremont Road, and despite defeat, activists created Reclaim the Streets, which carried out an increasingly ambitious series of road occupations. One street party in 1996 saw 7,000 participants occupy the M41 motorway in west London (Wall 1999: 87). In Scotland, protest against an urban motorway in Glasgow brought in socialists and community activists who had previously fought against Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s poll tax. Major road protests continued in Preston.

Earth First! activists have also been involved in anti-GM (genetically modified food) protests, against peat digging, in defense of migrants and asylum seekers, and against war. The group was centrally involved in the 2007 Climate Camp, which was created to resist the expansion of Heathrow Airport and to protest against the contribution of flying to climate change. It has strongly influenced the wider Green movement, the Green Party, environmental non-government organizations (NGOs), socialists, and anarchists in the UK. Its emphasis on direct action encouraged the Green Party to renew its own commitment to non-violent direct action, with party members supporting anti-roads protest. Friends of the Earth, partly due to the influence of EF!, became more committed to social justice issues

and urban ecology under director Charles Secrett (Wall 1999: 90). Greenpeace created a network for its previously passive members to contribute to direct action, and this wing was headed for a time by Earth First! co-founder Jason Torrence. Socialist and anarchist groups including the Scottish Socialist Party were encouraged to become more conscious of ecological issues by the creation of Earth First! and the wider roads movement.

Earth First! remains both an unusually loose and invisible social movement network and one which is of enduring importance. Roads protest using non-violent direct action has become less frequent since the 1990s. Although the protest movement can only be said to have directly prevented the construction of two road projects – the Thames Crossing and a bypass near Guildford – it contributed to the cancellation of new construction projects in the 1990s. Earth First! and the British anti-roads movement is an interesting example of a protest mobilization organized on highly informal and temporary lines, one that largely rejected the production of a detailed philosophy or political program but focused instead on activism.

SEE ALSO: Ecological Protest Movements; Greenpeace; Reclaim the Streets

References and Suggested Readings

- Charlesworth, G. (1984) *A History of British Motorways*. London: Thomas Telford.
- Klein, N. (2000) Reclaim the Streets. In *No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies*. New York: Picador, pp. 311–23.
- Lee, M. (1995) *Earth First! Environmental Apocalypse*. New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Mckay, G. (Ed.) (1998) *DIY Culture: Party and Protest in Nineties Britain*. London: Verso.
- Wall, D. (1999) *Earth First! and Anti-Roads Movement*. London: Routledge.

East Anglian Wheat County Riots, 1816

Carl J. Griffin

Starting in mid-April 1816 the so-called Bread or Blood riots represented the first of a series of three English rural collective disturbances in the period of the post-Napoleonic Wars depression. Unlike the 1822 East Anglian laborers’ protests

or the Swing Riots of 1830, the events of 1816 were remarkable for their heterogeneous set of causes, protest techniques, and activists. Here field and fen workers, petty landowners and small farmers, workers in the decaying local textile industries, artisans, and urban tradesmen united. The protests of 1816 effectively combined both traditional market town-based food rioting and anti-enclosure riots with more novel attacks on industrial and agricultural machinery.

The initial protests occurred simultaneously and quite unconnectedly on April 17 at Mile End Heath in Essex, where threshing tackle was destroyed, and at Gedding in Suffolk, where threshing machines and the mole ploughs used to create field drainage on the heavy lands of Essex and Suffolk were destroyed. Whereas the Essex protest apparently inspired no further protests, the Gedding disturbances were instrumental in motivating machine-breaking at neighboring Rattlesden and riots for higher wages at nearby Wattisham and Hitcham. Notwithstanding a proclamation issued by the magistrates at the Bury Quarter Sessions, this localized intensification acted as the trigger for more widespread and, in terms of techniques, diffuse protests. A series of incendiary fires in north Essex and south Suffolk and machine-breaking at Stoke-by-Clare were followed by a shift to demonstrations in the market towns of East Anglia. Initially, these urban protests were self-contained. On May 7 a mob of 100 attacked a flour mill at Needham Market but were persuaded to disperse after having only broken a few windows. Similarly, at Swaffham Bulbeck in Cambridgeshire an attempt by 50 men to force an increase in their wages occurred in local isolation.

The next series of protests was both more persistent and determined. The attack on spinning jennies on May 15 represented the culmination of two days of "riotous assemblies" in the streets of Bury. On the following day, protestors took to the streets of both Norwich and Brandon. Both places witnessed something akin to traditional food riots, though "country people" were heavily involved at the latter and made further demands relating to poor law allowances. Indeed, whereas at Norwich military intervention ultimately diffused the protestors, at Brandon their demands – infamously expressed through a banner baring the slogan "Bread or Blood in Brandon this day" – were acceded to at a series of meetings between the principal inhabitants

of the town and a delegation of the protestors. From Brandon protests spread over the Norfolk border to the villages of Hockwold-cum-Wilton, Mundford, Feltwell, and Southery.

Through the physical movement of protestors, the movement then diffused into the fenlands and to the towns of Downham Market (May 20), Littleport (May 22), and Ely (May 23). At Littleport attacks on property and thefts from food sellers reached new heights. According to a brief prepared for the Treasury Solicitor, some 73 offenses were committed that day. The same group then marched to Ely where, on May 23 and 24, the protests assumed an even greater intensity with much property destroyed and several acts of violence committed.

This was, though, both the peak and the nadir of the 1816 protests. Troops were stationed throughout Norfolk and Suffolk, yet several other protests occurred, most notably at Upwell and Outwell near Downham, at Ramsey in Huntingdonshire, in the vicinity of Sporle to the northeast of Downham, and in the vicinity of Sible Hedingham in Essex. But these were isolated incidents and soon fizzled out. To reinforce the deterrent though, a Special Commission of Assize was held to try the Littleport and Ely protestors. The trials opened on June 17 and closed four days later, with 24 men sentenced to death. Nineteen of these men were reprieved, nine of whom were subsequently transported. The five who were not reprieved were executed on June 28. Two men, tried at the Norwich Assizes, were also executed on August 31 for their part in the Downham riots.

In total, eight men lost their lives for attempting to escape their custody – including Thomas Sindall who was shot in the head by a Dragoon at Littleport – while a total of 14 men were transported to Australia for their involvement at Downham, Littleport, and Ely. Despite this heavy toll, at no point did the protestors' calls ever exceed very modest demands, a feature of both the later 1822 protests and Swing. That neither the 1822 protests nor Swing so strongly embraced urban workers and traditional eighteenth-century forms of collective protest is indicative of the fact that 1816 represented a genuine pivot in the make-up of the repertoire of rural resistance.

SEE ALSO: Enclosure Movement, Protests Against; Luddism and Machine Breaking; Peterloo Massacre, 1819

References and Suggested Readings

- Charlesworth, A. (Ed.) (1983) *An Atlas of Rural Protest in Britain 1548–1900*. London: Croom Helm.
- Peacock, A. J. (1965) *Bread or Blood*. London: Victor Gollancz.

East Timor, anti-colonial struggle, 1974 to independence

Henri Myrntinen

Located at the eastern end of the Lesser Sunda island chain of the Indonesian Archipelago and occupying half of the island of Timor, East Timor has been marginalized and occupied for most of its recent history. Notwithstanding intermittent revolts against the Portuguese colonial presence, the largest, the Manufahi War of 1910–13, and the Viqueque Revolt in 1959, Portuguese Timor, unlike Portugal's African colonies, had no systematic or sustained opposition movement to the 450 years of Portuguese rule. The Carnation Revolution of April 25, 1974 and subsequent decolonization process started by the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças Armadas) (MFA) thrust East Timorese society into an unexpected era of insurrection against occupation.

In the 1970s a majority in the new Portuguese leadership and a majority of the tiny educated elite of East Timor, which soon formed the nascent political leadership, were disinclined to grant or demand full independence for the territory. Many in the left-leaning MFA government supported integrating East Timor with Indonesia, while a significant share of the East Timorese political elite supported some form of continued federation with Portugal. In the aftermath of the Portuguese military coup of April 1974 known as the Carnation Revolution, several new political parties emerged in East Timor, notably Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente), UDT (União Democrática Timorense), and Apodeti (Associação Popular Democrática Timorense). Of the new political parties, Fretilin, originally named the ASDT (Associação Social Democrática Timorense), emerged as most radical, calling for far-reaching social, economic, and political changes. After initially supporting a loose federation with Portugal, Fretilin began demanding full independence for East Timor.

While embracing “the universal doctrines of socialism,” Fretilin was more nationalist than a socialist or Marxist movement. Fretilin was influenced by the independence movements in the other Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique and the writings of Amílcar Cabral and Samora Machel and other leaders. Also, the handful of East Timorese students permitted to study in Portugal brought Maoist and Marxist-Leninist influences to Fretilin. A further source of political inspiration was Paulo Freire, the Brazilian exponent of popular education.

Key among Fretilin's own political concepts was “*maubere*-ism,” derived from a pejorative term used by Portuguese colonial officials and more “cosmopolitan” *asimilados* to denote backward peasants. Fretilin reclaimed this term in its grassroots mobilization campaigns to signify, according to José Ramos-Horta, “a philosophy which seeks to consider how to get the common people to be literate and free from poverty and other social injustices.” Unlike other political parties, Fretilin sought to build its support network outside of the narrow social and political elite by engaging directly with peasant communities rather than relying on traditional patron-client networks. As a part of its agricultural program, Fretilin established model cooperatives and literacy programs in the countryside by its Revolutionary Brigades.

The key people involved in formulating the economic and agricultural policies of Fretilin at the time were the charismatic leaders Vicente Sa'he and Nicolau Lobato. In addition to directly engaging peasant communities, Fretilin sought to politicize women, who were traditionally marginalized in society. Rosa Muki Bonaparte, the first East Timorese woman to study abroad, became a member of the Central Committee of Fretilin and the driving force behind the party's women's organization OPMT. Crucially, in terms of future events, Fretilin was also active in mobilizing East Timorese serving in the Portuguese armed forces.

The UDT, representing mostly the land-owning as well as *mestiço*- and *asimilado*-oligarchy and the economic elite, was more conservative than Fretilin and strongly in favor of maintaining a link to Portugal through a political union. The third influential party after the Portuguese Carnation Revolution of 1974 was Apodeti, also among the smallest. Apodeti was practically the only

political movement calling for integration of the former colony with neighboring Indonesia, later facilitating efforts to legitimize the Indonesian invasion.

Coup Attempt and Civil War

Convinced that Fretilin's increasingly left-wing rhetoric would prompt Indonesian invasion, the UDT launched a coup attempt on August 11, 1975, leading to civil war. Fretilin benefited from its effort to build broad political support in the countryside and among Timorese soldiers in the Portuguese armed forces. In reaction to the coup, Fretilin formed the Falintil (*Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste*) as the armed wing of the party, relying heavily on Portuguese-trained Timorese ex-soldiers and weaponry. In the civil war precipitated by the attempted coup, several hundred were killed and seeds were sown for future internecine conflicts. The civil war also prompted the Portuguese administrators and troops remaining on the island of Atauro off the coast of Dili, East Timor's capital, later to be repatriated to Portugal.

Independence Declaration and Indonesian Invasion

Following their defeat, the leadership of the UDT, the pro-Indonesian Apodeti, and minor parties retreated to Indonesian West Timor, where they signed the Indonesian-orchestrated Balibo Accord which "requested" Indonesian intervention in the territory. Indonesia, ruled by the pro-western military dictator Suharto, had already engaged in low-level incursions and destabilization measures in East Timor for several months, including killing five western journalists in Balibo by Indonesian Special Forces and Timorese proxies in October 1975.

Fearing an impending Indonesian invasion, the Fretilin government unilaterally announced the independence of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste on November 28, 1975, with Francisco Xavier do Amaral as president. Ten days later, Indonesia responded in an all-out military invasion. Apprehensive of a left-leaning government in East Timor but reluctant to immediately antagonize his western backers, Suharto waited for a state visit by US President Gerald Ford to receive approval for the invasion. The invasion was launched within hours of the

departure of the US delegation from Jakarta, Indonesia's capital.

In response to the initial Indonesian assault on Dili, the East Timorese military response was more intense than Indonesian forces expected. The Indonesian armed forces also immediately began massacring civilians, targeting especially members of the Chinese minority and other suspected "communists," in what was essentially a replay of the anti-PKI communist massacres in Indonesia in 1965–6. Within the first few days of the invasion several thousand civilians were killed, among them high-ranking members of Fretilin, including Rosa Muki Bonaparte.

Indonesian armed forces progressed relatively slowly into the territory, but by 1978 most Timorese armed resistance, along with the majority of its population, was confined to the mountain range of Mount Matebian in the east of the country. After relentless airborne and naval bombardment and ground operations, the Indonesian armed forces defeated the East Timorese military resistance and killed the nominal president of the territory, Nicolau Lobato, in a fire-fight on December 31, 1978, and several months later, Vicente Sa'he.

During the first years of the independence war, much of the East Timorese population remained in areas controlled by the Fretilin/Falintil, where as far as possible political and social reforms aimed at reorganizing the old feudal and patriarchal models of society and improving the position of women were carried out. This initial period also saw several purges within the Fretilin movement, including the ouster of the first president, do Amaral, who was seeking ceasefire negotiations with the Indonesian government.

Occupation and Consolidation

Following the end of the last major battles around Mount Matebian, the Indonesian armed forces relocated a majority of East Timorese into "strategic hamlets" while the remaining several hundred Falintil guerrillas slowly regrouped and recuperated from their losses. Though small in number, until 1999 the Falintil force sustained a low-intensity guerrilla war and the Indonesian forces responded with a counterinsurgency campaign, often drawing on "lessons learned" in similar efforts in Latin America and Southeast Asia. In total an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 East Timorese lost their lives in the

independence struggle, the vast majority civilians. The Indonesian military losses in the East Timorese expedition are estimated at approximately 2,000.

As the Falintil insurgency continued, the independence movement added a “civilian front” and a “diplomatic front” to Falintil’s military campaign. The clandestine civilian support network supplied the guerrillas with arms, ammunition, food, and medicine, and served as messengers and intelligence gatherers. Furthermore, they organized demonstrations for independence in East Timor and around Indonesia, often liaising with Indonesian pro-democracy activists. Outside Indonesia, East Timorese in exile, most prominently José Ramos-Horta, maintained diplomatic pressure on Indonesia and kept the struggle on the international agenda. The advantage the East Timorese had over other similar cases of “post-colonial colonialism” was that Portugal had not officially decolonized the territory, leaving East Timor *de jure* as a non-self-governed territory under Portuguese stewardship although it was *de facto* under Indonesian occupation. The efforts outside of East Timor were supported to a large extent by Portugal’s former African colonies and a small but vociferous international solidarity campaign.

Internationally, the almost-forgotten conflict in East Timor gained unexpected prominence on November 12, 1991 when Indonesian military forces opened fire on a funeral procession in the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, killing an estimated 250 to 400 civilians. Unlike previous massacres, the carnage was caught on film by foreign journalists, leading to an international outcry among the solidarity movement, and even Suharto’s western backers. The awarding of José Ramos-Horta and Bishop Belo with the Nobel Prize in 1996 cast further light on the East Timorese struggle for independence.

Meanwhile, from the late 1980s to early 1990s, political alignments in occupied East Timor broadened the movement. In 1988 Falintil commander Xanana Gusmão ended Fretilin’s quasi-monopoly on the East Timorese independence cause by forming the CNRM (Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere), an umbrella organization unifying the UDT and other East Timorese political parties to mend the rifts of the 1975 civil war. In 1998 the CNRM was renamed the CNRT (Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorese), as the term “maubere” was seen by

the other political parties as too closely linked with Fretilin’s left-leaning politics.

Within Indonesia, East Timorese activists, especially students, formed alliances with Indonesian pro-democracy and human rights groups, as well as with Acehnese and West Papuan independence activists.

Referendum and Aftermath

With international public pressure growing on the Indonesian government, internal pressures against the Suharto dictatorship were also mounting, especially in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Student protests forced Suharto to resign in 1998, and in a surprise, his successor B. J. Habibie announced plans for a UN-organized referendum to give the East Timorese a chance to determine their future status, choosing between full independence and special autonomy inside Indonesia. In the run-up to the August 30, 1999 referendum, the Indonesian armed forces, now in charge of providing security for the vote, established militia groups to act as their proxies. The nominally East Timorese militia groups were armed, trained, and in part directed by the Indonesian military and police, who were supported by the Indonesian government. The militias initiated a violent campaign of intimidation against independence supporters, including several massacres of civilians.

In spite of the intimidation, 78.5 percent of the East Timorese cast their vote for independence. Following announcement of the election results, renewed militia violence and destruction followed immediately as the retreating Indonesian security forces and militia proxies killed approximately 1,500 civilians. The systematic armed assault displaced 250,000 to 300,000 East Timorese civilians to West Timor and other parts of Indonesia and destroyed about 80 percent of the territory’s infrastructure.

United Nations Administration and Independence

The international outcry over the rampage by the Indonesian armed forces forced the government in Jakarta to accept deployment of an international peacekeeping force (INTERFET) in the territory. In addition, the United Nations gained control over the administration of East Timor by form-

ing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Though not without its critics inside and outside of East Timor, UNTAET established basic administrative structures for the country for transfer to the independent Democratic Republic of Timor Leste on May 20, 2002, under Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and a Fretilin-led government.

SEE ALSO: Angolan National Liberation, 1961–1974; Cabral, Amílcar (1924–1973); Freire, Paulo (1921–1997); FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique); Marxism; Portugal, Protest and Revolution, 20th Century; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Aditjondro, G. (2000) *Ninjas, Nanggalas, Monuments and Mossad Manuals: An Anthropology of Indonesian State Terror in East Timor*. In J. Sluka (Ed.), *Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- CAVR (2006) *Chega! Relatório da Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste*. Dili: CAVR.
- Conboy, K. (2002) *Kopassus – Inside the Indonesian Special Forces*. Sydney: Equinox.
- Cristalis, I. & Scott, C. (2005) *Independent Women – The Story of Women’s Activism in East Timor*. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations.
- Dunn, J. (1996) *Timor, A People Betrayed*. Sydney: ABC Books.
- Myrntinen, H. (2007) *Up in Flames – Impoverishment and Instability in Post-Independence Timor Leste*. Kepa Working Papers No. 11. Helsinki: Finnish Service Center for Development Cooperation.
- Pinto, C. & Jardine, M. (1997) *East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle – Inside the Timorese Resistance*. Boston: South End Press.

Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War

William H. Mulligan, Jr.

The Easter Rising in 1916 began a period of conflict and turmoil in Ireland that did not end until 1923, and even then it was not clear for some time that active conflict had ended. The period encompasses the Easter Rising and its immediate aftermath as well as the Irish War for Independence and the Irish Civil War – three discrete, if closely connected, historical events.

The roots of the Easter Rising may be said to reach back to the arrival of the Normans in

Ireland in 1169. In a real sense, the 1916 Rising and subsequent events are results of the centuries-long domination of the English over Ireland that began when the Normans landed. Pádraig Pearse and other leaders of the Rising certainly saw it that way. More immediately, the complex maneuvering surrounding the Third Home Rule Bill, and the Home Rule issue itself, created the environment for the 1916 Rising.

The reunification of the Irish Parliamentary Party under John Redmond and Redmond’s alliance with Michael Davitt in 1900 gave the supporters of a constitutional approach to Irish independence the upper hand. When the closeness of the 1910 British general election gave them the balance of power in Parliament, they extracted the Third Home Rule Bill in 1912 as the price of their support of the government. Prior to 1909, the House of Lords, strongly opposed to Home Rule for Ireland, would have been able to block Home Rule. But due to constitutional changes unrelated to Irish issues, the Lords were only able to delay legislation that they had objected to for two years. Ireland would have Home Rule in 1914; the century-long struggle to repeal the Act of Union forcing Ireland into Great Britain had succeeded, it seemed. Irish politics entered an unknown landscape.

In 1912 Home Rule, while broadly popular, was a middle position. On both sides of the middle there were significant minorities that were not prepared to compromise. The Protestants of Ulster, especially the Presbyterians, opposed Home Rule and had relied on the House of Lords to block it, thus preserving their privileged position. Now, however, they saw that a different strategy and new tactics were necessary. On the other side, a sizable number of nationalists saw Home Rule as an unacceptable substitute for full independence. They, too, faced a major change in the political environment.

As events moved forward, the situation became more, rather than less, complicated. In Ulster, opponents of Home Rule began organizing armed resistance. The Ulster Unionist Covenant circulated in 1912, and an armed Unionist volunteer force was established in 1913. Led by Sir Edward Carson (later Baron Carson of Duncairn) and James Craig (later Viscount Craigavon of Stormont), Protestant opponents of Home Rule in Ulster organized political and military opposition. In the south, the Irish Volunteers organized as a counterforce. They were joined by the Irish

Citizen Army, which James Connolly had organized to protect strikers in the Dublin Transit Strike of 1913.

It was widely known in 1914 that Unionist forces were smuggling large quantities of weapons into Ireland at Larne, but no government action was taken to stop it. The most dramatic event of the Tory Rebellion was the Curragh Mutiny of March 1914. The Curragh, in County Kildare, was a major British military post. More than sixty officers, including a brigadier general, announced that they would resign rather than obey orders to enforce Home Rule in Ulster. While the minister for war and Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson, chief of the imperial staff, were forced to resign, it was clear that the British army in Ireland could not be counted on to enforce Home Rule. This raised serious concerns among supporters of Home Rule. It also strengthened the conviction among nationalists who saw physical force as the only means of gaining Irish freedom that Britain would never voluntarily grant Ireland even limited independence.

When World War I broke out the issue of whether to press forward with Home Rule during wartime arose. John Redmond, leader of the Irish Party at Westminster, agreed to defer Home Rule until after the war and encouraged Irishmen to enlist in the British army. His rationale was that by sharing in the hardships of the war the Irish could begin to break down the divisions between Catholics and Protestants. In Ulster, opponents of Home Rule continued to arm and drill and enlisted in the British army in large numbers, forming entire regiments.

Meanwhile, planning began within the leadership of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) to use the war as an opportunity to strike for Irish freedom. Sir Roger Casement, a member of the Anglo-Irish elite who had embraced the cause of Irish nationalism, went to Germany to obtain arms and financial support for a rising. The IRB's American arm also raised substantial funds. The plan began to miscarry, however, and it became clear there was little realistic chance of success. The arms shipment from Germany was intercepted and both Casement and Austin Stack, a key IRB leader in County Kerry, were arrested. Eoin MacNeil, commander-in-chief of the Irish Volunteers, tried to stop the plan, but he had lost effective control to a faction led by Pádraig Pearse that was determined to rise in revolt.

Pearse's nationalism was rooted in a deeply romantic vision of the Irish nation and he saw martyrdom as no less valuable in the long term than a successful rising. Working around MacNeil and others within the IRB who preferred to wait for a more auspicious time, Pearse and his faction, with 1,200 men, seized the General Post Office (GPO) on Sackville Street in Dublin while other IRB units took a number of key positions in the city.

On Easter Monday, April 24, 1916, Pearse read the proclamation of the Irish Republic signed by himself and the other leaders – Thomas Clarke, Sean Mac Diarmada, Eamonn Ceant, Thomas MacDonagh, Joseph Mary Plunkett, and James Connolly. Supporting actions took place in Wexford, Galway, and elsewhere in County Dublin, but a planned action in Cork never materialized. The focus was on Dublin and the GPO throughout the rising.

The British responded quickly and with substantial force, including artillery. The fighting, especially the artillery, was concentrated around the GPO in the heart of Dublin and tremendous damage was done to the area. British troops quickly surrounded the GPO, which they shelled heavily and set afire. A women's brigade aided the insurgents by moving supplies into the GPO under fire during the siege. Countess Markievicz (born Constance Gore-Booth) was the rebels' second in command during the fighting at Stephens Green. The failure of the country generally to rise in support, civilian casualties resulting from the heavy use of artillery, and the fierce fighting in the streets led Pearse to surrender on April 29. Civilians had borne the brunt of the casualties (230 killed), with the British losing 132 troops. The rebels suffered 64 fatalities.

At the time of their surrender, the rebels were reviled and unpopular throughout Ireland. The crowds in Dublin hooted them and pelted them with refuse and offal as they were led out of the GPO. Newspaper editorials denounced them as misguided. Irishmen, Protestant and Catholic, were risking their lives fighting on the Continent; civilians had been killed and injured; the cause was futile – editorial writers found little if anything to say in their defense. The rising seemed as complete a failure as was possible. Not only had the Irish people not risen in support, they now denounced those who had as fools.

And then the British military, under General Sir John Maxwell, snatched defeat from the jaws

of victory. Military tribunals quickly convened and sentenced 90 people to death. Executions began without opportunity for appeal. Pádraig Pearse was among the first to die and his brother Willie was executed soon after. Joseph Mary Plunkett was allowed to marry and spend the night with his new wife (with the cell door open and guards outside), and then was shot at dawn. James Connolly, severely wounded in the fighting, was taken from the hospital to Kilmainham Gaol, tied to a chair, and shot dead. Francis Sheehy Skeffington, a well-known pacifist, was summarily executed in an army barracks. Public opinion in Ireland changed quickly and decisively. The “fools” had been transformed into martyrs for Ireland, new victims of the continuing brutality of British rule. World opinion followed shortly, repulsed by the disproportionate British response and the wrenching stories of the Pearse brothers, Plunkett, and Sheehy Skeffington, among others. Finally, British public opinion changed as well, unwilling to further condone what their government had done.

Herbert Asquith, the prime minister, assigned David Lloyd George to pacify the situation in Ireland. In separate meetings, Lloyd George offered Redmond immediate Home Rule for Ireland with Ulster only temporarily excluded, while assuring Carson that partition would be permanent. This, he hoped, would buy peace in Ireland for the duration of the war. Redmond, however, learned of the deception and went public, sparking a new wave of public outrage. To calm the new situation the government released most of those imprisoned or interned following the 1916 Rising. The latter returned to a very different Ireland. Lloyd George’s duplicity following Maxwell’s harsh response to the rising had all but destroyed Redmond, the Irish Party, and those who wanted to avoid violence to gain Irish freedom.

In 1917 the Irish Volunteers gained control of Sinn Féin and used it to oppose Redmond and the remnants of the Irish Party in Westminster at the polls. They quickly won six by-elections and then refused to take the oath of allegiance to the king. They also actively opposed British efforts to recruit troops in Ireland. In April 1917 the United States entered the war and put pressure on Lloyd George, now prime minister, to address the demands of Ireland. He offered Redmond immediate Home Rule without six Ulster counties, an offer Redmond could not

accept. To do so would completely destroy any chance for a peaceful resolution of the situation as well as his role in Irish political life. Ulster Unionists Carson and Craig rejected Redmond’s counter-offer. In a final effort to find a peaceful solution to the crisis Redmond suggested an Irish Convention to work out a solution to the impasse.

The Convention convened in July 1917 and met until April 1918. Sinn Féin, the political face of the Irish Volunteers, refused to attend, and the Ulster Unionists blocked every effort to develop a compromise. Only the Protestant representatives who were not Unionists seemed willing to work with Redmond to find middle ground. Neither group had much of a constituency. Redmond accepted their plan: Home Rule with control of customs, excise, and the military remaining with Westminster. He was quickly even further isolated as Irish nationalists and the Catholic bishops rejected the plan, as, of course, did the Ulster Unionists. The Irish Party at Westminster was an empty shell. Redmond’s death in March 1918 ended any hope, however faint, of a peaceful, political solution.

In April 1918 the British Parliament authorized conscription to begin in Ireland. The remnants of the Irish Party withdrew from Westminster in protest and allied with Sinn Féin. The Irish trade unions and the Catholic bishops, not natural allies, joined in opposing conscription. In response, the government arrested and interned members of Sinn Féin and shut down newspapers that opposed conscription. However – and it is a very important fact – no one in Ireland was conscripted into the British army.

In December 1918 Lloyd George faced a general election, the first since the Representation of the People Act of the same year had tripled the number of eligible voters in Ireland. The results revealed that a dramatic shift in Irish opinion had taken place. Sinn Féin won 73 of 81 seats outside the six counties of Ulster. The Irish Party won six of the others. Only two, those from Trinity College, bastion of the Protestant elite, went to Unionists. Most of the 24 seats representing the six counties of Ulster went to Unionist candidates. In East Mayo the leader of the Irish Party, John Dillon, went head-to-head with Sinn Féin leader Eamon de Valera. Despite being in prison in England (or perhaps aided by his prisoner status) de Valera won two-thirds of the votes. The political landscape of

Ireland had changed dramatically in a very short time.

The Sinn Féin MPs refused to take either the oath of allegiance or their seats in Westminster. Instead, they met in Dublin and constituted themselves as Dáil Eireann, an Irish parliament. They began immediately to act as a government, electing Sinn Féin founder Arthur Griffith president, issuing bonds, and establishing arbitration courts, industrial dispute boards, and a land bank. The Dáil sent a delegation to the Versailles peace conference to present their case to the world, but Lloyd George blocked the Irish delegation from being received and heard. That was the end of efforts to achieve Irish self-rule peacefully.

Dáil Eireann continued to act as an independent Irish government. In February 1919 Michael Collins, who had emerged as a leading figure in the Dáil, and Harry Boland orchestrated de Valera's escape from prison in England. De Valera was immediately elected president of the Dáil and left for the United States to raise money. Collins emerged as the leader of Irish efforts toward independence in Ireland.

Collins was head of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, adjutant general of the Irish Volunteers (now renamed the Irish Republican Army (IRA)), and minister of finance in the Dáil. He successfully resisted efforts to bring the Irish Volunteers under the control of Cathal Brugha, the Dáil's minister of defense.

Collins' multiple positions made him a central figure; his great personal charisma made him the dominant personality in the movement for Irish independence. He was a very pragmatic revolutionary, with no romantic, idealized view of Ireland or Irishness as Pádraig Pearse had. He was committed to success by whatever means necessary rather than to making a heroic statement through martyrdom. In 1919 he began to implement his plan, the prototype of modern asymmetrical warfare. The IRA did not attack British military forces directly or allow itself to be drawn into traditional battles. Flying columns ambushed British convoys and raided police stations, barracks, and other outposts of British authority. They would strike and be gone before a large force could deploy against them. Collins' inner circle, known as the Twelve Apostles, assassinated spies and informers, whose treachery had undermined previous Irish efforts to overthrow British domination. They also targeted individual soldiers and members of the

Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), which prompted many resignations from the RIC as service became increasingly dangerous. The IRA and the Dáil's alternative government came to control large areas of Ireland. It waged a brutal assault on anyone who supported or abetted continued British domination of Ireland.

The British responded in kind. Unemployed World War I veterans were recruited into auxiliary units of the RIC. Known as the Black and Tans – in part due to the color of their uniforms and in part as a reference to a breed of dog known by that name – these irregular troops engaged in a campaign of brutality that included torture and murder of people in custody. Towns were burned and looted in reprisal for IRA activities and part of the city of Cork was destroyed. World opinion rallied in support of Ireland as a small nation standing up to a powerful oppressor. Within Britain, the use of torture and reprisal killings shocked popular sentiment, and within the emergent British Commonwealth increasing pressure was brought against the use of such tactics, especially from Australia, where there was a significant Irish element in the population.

In 1920 Lloyd George offered Home Rule along identical lines of the offer he had made to Redmond in 1916: one parliament for the six counties in Ulster and a second parliament for the rest of Ireland. Ulster accepted the proposal – Craig characterized it as “a Protestant parliament for a Protestant people.” The Dáil rejected Lloyd George's offer, however, and after a general election in 1921 the winning candidates again refused to sit in the Westminster Parliament. The conflict resumed, with the added element of hunger strikes by those interned by the British government. The death of Terence MacSwiney, Lord Mayor of Cork, after a 74-day hunger strike in October 1920 led to a surge in world and British public opinion against British activities in Ireland. On July 11, 1921 the British government and the Irish Republican Army agreed to a truce. Lloyd George and de Valera met to work out an end to the fighting.

Lloyd George made an initial offer and never moved from it. He offered Ireland Dominion status with permanent partition of the six Ulster counties. The size of the Irish army was limited and Britain would keep air and naval bases in Ireland as well as the right to recruit there for its military. Finally, Ireland would assist in the

payment of Britain's debt from the world war. De Valera rejected the terms offered, but presented it to the Dáil, which also rejected it as humiliating to Ireland.

In October 1921 a second peace conference began in London. De Valera chose not to attend, but sent an Irish delegation headed by Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins. Lloyd George was still unwilling to negotiate the major issues, so only minor changes were made. One involved the wording of the oath of allegiance to the king and another established a boundary commission to work out the final border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. The delegation returned to Dublin at the beginning of December and the Dáil again rejected the treaty. The delegates were instructed to obtain "external associate" status for Ireland that would separate the nation from the British crown.

The period of calm during the negotiations had reduced world and British pressure on Lloyd George, who refused to discuss any further changes and threatened to resume the war if the treaty was not accepted. On December 6, 1921 the two delegations signed.

In January the Dáil debated the treaty. De Valera remained opposed and led the opposition; Collins led the supporters of the treaty. De Valera and his allies considered the treaty, which maintained a relationship between Ireland and Britain, to be a betrayal of the Republic proclaimed in 1916. Collins conceded that the treaty was imperfect and did not provide full independence. He argued, however, that it offered more than Home Rule and provided the framework to work toward full freedom and complete independence. What he did not say was that he believed the military conflict could not be sustained long enough to defeat Britain. The Dáil ratified the treaty by a close vote, 64 to 57. De Valera immediately resigned as president and led the opponents of the treaty out of the Dáil. Griffith was elected president in his place and within days the British began turning over government offices to the new provisional government established by the treaty. The Dáil and the provisional government coexisted, but there was a deep split dividing those who had fought for Ireland's independence.

As British troops withdrew from Ireland, local IRA units moved in and occupied the barracks without any central direction. Their loyalty was an open question, but the provisional

government had no force of its own and no time to develop one. Would the various units support the treaty and the provisional government, or would they side with de Valera and the anti-treaty forces? Collins had a strong following among the IRA rank and file, but influential local leaders – and the IRA was a very decentralized organization – opposed the treaty. Liam Lynch, Ernie O'Malley, and Sean Moylan led roughly half of the IRA, mainly from the south and west. They were opposed to the treaty and supported de Valera as president of the Republic. Pearse had proclaimed in 1916. They saw the Dáil and those who supported the treaty as traitors. The remainder of the IRA followed Collins and supported the treaty. Collins appointed Richard Mulcahy as commander of what was to become the Free State Army.

Collins was not anxious to force armed conflict, seeing the situation as a difference of opinion among former comrades-in-arms. Localized conflict occurred as local IRA units occupied abandoned British barracks. Tensions rose substantially when anti-treaty forces occupied the Four Courts in Dublin on April 14, 1922. Collins still hoped to avoid large-scale violence and an armed stand-off kept tensions high in Dublin and elsewhere. The rapidity of the British withdrawal made it necessary for the provisional government to take over a wide range of governmental functions while developing a plan for a permanent government and simultaneously dealing with the potentially violent split over the treaty.

On June 22 Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson, former chief of the imperial staff, was assassinated in London. Wilson was serving as military advisor to the Northern Irish Parliament. Earlier, he had been a covert supporter of the Curragh mutineers. While his killers were caught, it remains unclear who ordered his assassination. Many suspect it was Collins, but Lloyd George publicly blamed the anti-treaty faction and demanded Collins move against them – or else the British army would. Collins was in a difficult position. If he allowed the British army to move against the anti-treaty forces at the Four Courts his government would lose all public support, a full-blown civil war would be all but certain, and a renewal of warfare between Britain and Ireland would threaten all that had been gained. Nevertheless, with artillery borrowed from the British army, Collins forced the

anti-treaty forces in the Four Courts and other public buildings in Dublin to surrender. The shelling destroyed the Four Courts, along with a large body of Irish historical records. As Collins had feared, a full-scale guerilla war began almost immediately. Men and women who had fought side by side since 1916 now turned on one another. Liam Lynch emerged as the military leader of the anti-treaty forces; Cathal Brugha, Austin Stack, and the Countess Markievicz, leaders in the 1916 Rising, now played prominent roles on the anti-treaty side. The titular leader of the anti-treaty forces was Eamon de Valera, but he did not play a prominent or visible part during the guerilla war.

Collins still saw the conflict as one between former allies and was conciliatory for the most part toward those captured. Lynch, for example, was released after he was captured at the Four Courts on his promise to work to end the violence. On August 12 Arthur Griffith, president of the Dáil, died of a cerebral hemorrhage. Collins then became the political as well as the military leader of the new government. Ten days later Collins was killed in an ambush at Beal na Blath in County Cork, not far from his birthplace. William Cosgrave became president and Richard Mulcahy minister of defense.

Cosgrave took a very different approach to the conflict than Collins had. He saw it as a showdown between law and anarchy and prosecuted the war aggressively. He obtained emergency powers from the Dáil that established military courts to try those captured. Some 12,000 people were interned without trial and 77 were executed, including a number of heroes of the War for Independence. The execution of Erskine Childers, a leader on the anti-treaty side, led to the assassination of government minister Kevin O'Higgins' father in retaliation, setting in motion a series of atrocities, including the large number of executions by the government. On April 10, 1923 Liam Lynch was killed in a skirmish in County Tipperary.

Following Lynch's death, de Valera emerged and offered a ceasefire that the government refused. On April 30 Frank Aiken, Lynch's successor as IRA chief of staff, ordered a ceasefire, and he and de Valera declared a unilateral end to the fighting on May 24. Many of the anti-treaty troops went to the United States or underground in Ireland because of the uncertainty surrounding the end of the Civil War.

De Valera was briefly imprisoned in Kilmainham Gaol, the same jail in which the British had held him on several occasions. Cosgrave's government continued to function. It organized itself as Cumann na nGaedheal (in 1933 renamed Fine Gael). The anti-treaty forces' political party continued as Sinn Féin; although they contested elections, they refused to take the oath required of members of the Dáil and were somewhat marginalized politically. On December 7, 1922 the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann) formally replaced the provisional government.

Cosgrave established an effective, efficient government despite uncertainties as to what course the anti-treaty forces might take. Civilian control of the military was established during a mutiny among army officers sparked by a great reduction in the size of the army. In 1926 de Valera split with Sinn Féin and he organized a new party, Fianna Fáil, bringing him and a large part of the anti-treaty faction into politics. In 1932 Fianna Fáil won the largest number of seats in the Dáil and formed a government with the support of the Labour Party. Cosgrave transferred power to de Valera smoothly and without incident.

SEE ALSO: Casement, Roger (1864–1916); Collins, Michael (1890–1922); Connolly, James (1868–1916); Davitt, Michael (1846–1906); De Valera, Eamon (1882–1975); Dublin General Strike, 1913; Gonne, Maud (1866–1953); Irish Nationalism; Irish Republican Army (IRA); Pearse, Patrick (Pádraig) (1879–1916); Sinn Féin

References and Suggested Readings

- Coogan, T. P. (2001) *1916: The Easter Rising*. London: Cassell.
- Hopkinson, M. (1998) *Green against Green: A History of the Irish Civil War*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Hopkinson, M. (2002) *The Irish War for Independence*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Moran, S. F. (1994) *Patrick Pearse and the Politics of Redemption: The Mind of the Easter Rising, 1916*. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.
- Ward, A. J. (2003) *The Easter Rising: Revolution and Irish Nationalism*. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson.

Eastman, Max (1883–1969)

Jill Silos

Max Eastman was a prolific American writer, collaborating on several radical journals and

publishing several books throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Radicalized from an early age, Eastman was a supporter of Trotsky until the 1940s when he went on to disavow communism and support Joseph McCarthy.

Max Eastman was born in upstate New York on January 4, 1883. His mother, an influential female minister, shaped his belief in individual liberty. Eastman attended Williams College and then studied for a doctorate under the tutelage of John Dewey at Columbia University. With his impressive literary and oratorical skills, Eastman was respected as a critical journalist and soon became popular within the rebellious culture of Greenwich Village.

Feminism was among the first of Eastman's radical commitments. He founded the Men's League for Women's Suffrage in 1909, arguing that "the question of sex equality, the economic, social, political independence of woman stands by itself, parallel and equal in importance to any other question of the day." His belief in free love and criticism of middle-class values were equally important to his support of feminism and he also attacked the sanctity of marriage, birth control restrictions, and rigid divorce laws.

In 1912 Eastman brought his interest in socialism to *The Masses*, a foundering journal of radical politics and arts. He resurrected the dying journal and edited it as a cooperative of artists and writers. His tenure there led to the emergence of the magazine as the preeminent creative outlet for the leading intellectuals of the era. *The Masses* soon began to side with more radical socialists, such as the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) labor union, and openly opposed America's entry into World War I.

This opposition ushered in the most dramatic era of Eastman's life. In 1918 the US government charged Eastman and other contributors to *The Masses* under the Espionage Act and forced the magazine to close. Thereafter, he left for Russia to witness the results of socialist revolution. He was disillusioned by the struggle for power that ensued following Lenin's death, and his concern for democratic individualism led him to condemn the incipient totalitarianism of the emergent Stalinist regime in his controversial book, *Since Lenin Died* (1924).

When he returned to the United States, he published many books and articles, especially focusing on the failure of Marxism. In the 1950s he also notoriously defended McCarthyism and

wrote many anti-communist articles for popular magazines, including *Readers' Digest* and *National Review*. Though by the time he died in 1969 Eastman was regarded as a turncoat to the radical cause, his works demonstrate his unwavering interest in individual liberty and exemplify the most divergent aspects of American intellectual life in the twentieth century.

SEE ALSO: Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); *Masses, The*; Reed, John (1887–1920); Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Sanger, Margaret (1879–1966) and the American Birth Control Movement; Socialism; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- Cantor, M. (1970) *Max Eastman*. New York: Twayne Publishers.
- Diggins, J. P. (1974) Getting Hegel out of History: Max Eastman's Quarrel with Marxism. *American Historical Review* 79, 1 (February): 38–71.
- Eastman, M. (1948) *Enjoyment of Living*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Stansell, C. (2000) *American Moderns: Bohemian New York and the Creation of a New Century*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Wetzsteon, R. (2002) *Republic of Dreams: Greenwich Village, the American Bohemia, 1910–1960*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Zurier, R. (1988) *Art for the Masses: A Radical Magazine and Its Graphics, 1911–1917*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Eco-anarchism

Uri Gordon

Environmental direct action has been a major site for the revival of anarchist political culture since the 1970s. In tandem, a diverse body of eco-anarchist thought has emerged in response to the environmental crisis.

In Germany and France, mobilizations against nuclear energy in the 1970s provided the major vehicle of continuity for the radical surge of 1968, and formed a laboratory for direct action tactics and autonomous organization. In the United States, anti-nuclear campaigns turned toward direct action in 1976 with the Clamshell Alliance's occupations of the planned site of the Seabrook reactor in New Hampshire. The occupation inspired similar direct action groups

nationwide, including the Abalone Alliance in California, where anarchist eco-feminists including Starhawk (Miriam Simos, b. 1951) had a prominent role in imbuing its political culture with direct democracy, non-violence, and an earth-based spirituality.

Eco-feminism was also influential in the European and American anti-militarist movements of the 1980s (at Greenham Common, Seneca Falls, Pantex), where connections were made between a militarized culture, poverty, and environmental destruction as manifestations of patriarchal contempt for life. Ecological, feminist anti-militarism expressed an anarchist critique of domination as such, stressing an inexorable connection between the domination of nature and domination of humans (with patriarchy as the prototype of both).

Throughout the 1990s, a new cycle of environmental direct action emerged with distinctly anarchist cultures, including British and Israeli anti-roads movements, North American forest defense campaigns, and, to some extent, the animal liberation movement. The Earth First! network (especially in Europe) is broadly considered to be anarchist, as are the action-banners Earth Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front.

Eco-anarchism as a body of writing represents diverse engagements with the connection between environmental crisis, capitalism, hierarchy, and the ideology of economic growth and technological progress – stressing the social critiques deemphasized in the holistic, consciousness-transformational message of deep ecology. At the same time, the anarchist emphasis on decentralization and worker/community ownership strongly coheres with the requirements of a low-throughput economy, leading to visions of communistic localism and bio-regionalism.

Murray Bookchin was among the first to address environmental problems in decentralist anti-capitalist terms. His dialectical and evolutionary theory of social ecology argued that humans belong to a natural continuum but that their second, sociocultural nature has been disfigured by the rise of hierarchy – initially from gerontocracy in stateless societies. Bookchin's vituperative claims to theoretical exclusivity and his promotion of electoral democracy, however, drew harsh criticism from anarchists.

Since the mid-1980s, a major current of eco-anarchist expression has been anarchoprimitivism. First articulated in the Detroit magazine

Fifth Estate, the current was developed by authors including Fredy Perlman, John Zerzan, and David Watson and in publications such as *Green Anarchy* (US) and *Green Anarchist* (UK). Strongly antagonistic to industrial society, technology, and modernity, primitivist critiques reject civilization as essentially hierarchical, posit hunter-gatherer communities as sites of primitive anarchy, and promote a reconnection to the wild as part of anarchist revolutionary struggles.

SEE ALSO: Abalone Alliance; Anarchism; Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Earth First!; Ecological Protest Movements; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Reclaim the Streets; Reclus, Elisée (1830–1905)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bookchin, M. (1982) *The Ecology of Freedom*. Palo Alto: Cheshire.
- Epstein, B. (1991) *Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in the 1970s and 1980s*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Perlman, F. (1983) *Against His-Story, Against Leviathan!* Detroit: Black & Red.
- Purchase, G. (1992) *Anarchism and Ecology*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Seel, B. et al. (Eds.) (2000) *Direct Action in British Environmentalism*. London: Routledge.
- Watson, D. (1998) *Against the Megamachine: Essays on Empire and its Enemies*. Brooklyn: Autonomedia.
- Zerzan, J. (1994) *Future Primitive*. Brooklyn: Autonomedia.

Ecological protest movements

Paul Rubinson

Observers and activists often describe environmentalism as the world's largest social movement. Part of the movement's popularity comes from its fairly mainstream goals, as politicians and voters alike easily approve of the notion of keeping the planet sustainable for future generations. At the same time, much support for environmentalism takes the form of vague statements of principle, with little actual restriction of industrial and public destruction of the environment and its ecosystems. Typically, mainstream environmentalists in the West push for legislation protecting certain areas and species, incremental measures that seem small compared to the ecological crisis that confronts the planet.

A different segment of protesters put the environment at the direct center of human concerns. Adherents of the environmental justice movement (EJM) see the state of the environment as central to human well-being, as important as civil rights or equal protection under the law. Meanwhile, on the fringes of the environmental movement are those activists who see humans as responsible for the ecological crisis that threatens the well-being of humans, animals, and plant life on earth. These protesters embrace radical activism to overthrow human exploitation of the planet. Both approaches have redefined the environment as central to human existence, rather than merely one issue among many. But they differ in one essential manner: the environmental justice movement sees the positive and negative aspects of the environment as being distributed unequally according to variables of race and class and seeks to redress this imbalance. The ecological resistance movement, in contrast, believes that humans have no right to distribute the environment at all, and has taken it upon itself to usurp humans from their dominant position over nature.

The environmental justice movement offers the notion that the environment is inextricably connected to human rights and social justice. Such a view results from the fact that the worst forms of pollution, such as toxic waste and proximity to pesticides, is suffered overwhelmingly by the poor, the disadvantaged, and the disenfranchised, as well as racial and ethnic minorities. Meanwhile, the wealthy classes benefit from this environmental degradation of poor classes and regions; as an example, scholars have described how expressways run through poor neighborhoods in order to transport goods to the wealthy.

The first North American protest to express this critique occurred during the 1970s in the state of New York. The working-class residents of Love Canal began to suffer illnesses, and soon discovered that their homes and schools had been built upon the site of a chemical plant and dump, resulting in the seepage of toxic and chemical waste into the community's land. Love Canal residents made the point that their community had been targeted because of its socio-economic status. In seeking redress for the damage done to them, the protesters revealed that in the United States, sites of toxic chemical disposal were chosen based on an anticipated lack of local resistance rather than on scientific factors.

In recent years, the United States has continued to see an increasing alliance between civil and human rights activists with environmentalists. Central to the EJM are legislation and lawsuits that allow citizens to reap the benefits of nature, as well as avoid the toxic byproducts of industrialization, regardless of socioeconomic status. The EJM credo has declared "the right of all people to share equally in the benefits bestowed by a healthy environment."

Such an approach has spread to encompass a variety of activists and protests. Scholars have seen the 1994 protests by Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico, against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which favored agribusiness over small farmers, as part of the EJM. In addition, the claims of "environmental racism" against Royal/Dutch Shell on behalf of the Ogoni people in Nigeria have emphasized the international reach of the EJM. The Ogoni, a minority population in Nigeria, disproportionately suffered the harmful effects of more than 4,000 oil spills that occurred in the Niger Delta between 1961 and 2001. Royal/Dutch Shell and other oil companies, in collusion with the Nigerian government, profited from this environmental devastation, while the Ogoni land and people received none of the economic benefits of the region's oil reserves. Ogoni activist Ken Saro-Wiwa mobilized local protest against the disregard of the Ogoni people, drawing the attention of the United Nations and several non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but in 1995 Saro-Wiwa was hanged for treason by the Nigerian government.

The plight of the Ogoni people reveals how much is at stake in conflicts over the environment. As the environment continues to decline, the instances of social conflict will undoubtedly increase. While much of this conflict might take the form of nation-state contests over environmental resources, movements in defense of the environment have also pushed the boundaries of environmental dissent.

Many of these environmental uprisings have drawn upon anti-colonial, anti-nuclear, feminist, Marxist, and anarchic thought, though new ideologies have been formulated as well, primarily the radical ecological ideas of deep ecology, social ecology, and ecofeminism. Deep ecology interprets the ecological crisis as the outcome of the anthropocentric humanism characteristic of modern ideologies, political-economic systems,

and religions. Furthermore, the establishment of technological control over nature has proceeded in step with control of humans, resulting in the degradation of both nature and humanity. Social ecology similarly explains the ecological crisis as the inevitable result of "authoritarian social structures" present in both socialism and capitalism. In this mindset, the destruction and plunder of nature for profit reflect and encourage the larger social structures that promote the oppression of humans for profit. Likewise, ecofeminists see the ecological crisis as the outcome of the dominating patriarchy of western society, which has created a system that suppresses humanity's and nature's fulfillment.

Although the EJM recognizes the environment as a tool in social and economic oppression, it falls short of the goals of the ecological resistance movement. In the view of these activists, even an equitable sharing of the benefits of nature does nothing to improve the imbalance between human beings and the environment. Thus ecological protesters have embraced combative measures to overturn human domination of the planet.

The groups Earth First!, the Earth Liberation Front, and the Animal Liberation Front have sought to live out the ideology of deep ecology. Earth First! was founded in 1980 by a small band of Americans determined to halt the exploitation and destruction of nature by the industrial West. Inspired by the writer and eco-sabotage pioneer Edward Abbey, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and the Black Power movement's spirit of resistance, Earth First!'s initial protest occurred in March 1981 at Glen Canyon Dam in Arizona. There, Earth First!ers unfurled a 100-meter plastic sheet crafted to make the dam appear cracked. Earth First! efforts soon transcended this initial symbolic act, as the protesters unleashed a broad civil disobedience campaign. In a variety of locales, Earth First!ers set up blockades of logging roads, chained themselves to logging machinery, and engaged in "tree sits" to prevent the felling of trees. Their most notorious form of protest was "ecotage," essentially the sabotage of construction equipment, but explained by radical environmentalists as "ecological warfare against those who would destroy wilderness areas."

Early Earth First! efforts concentrated on activism designed to save rainforest ecosystems.

Boycotts, such as those against Burger King and other fast-food corporations accused of transforming rainforests into cattle grazing land, protested the destruction of rainforests and attempted to force industrialists into submission. Meanwhile, other Earth First! activists pulled up survey stakes, put sugar in construction vehicle gas tanks, and embedded spikes in trees to destroy saws and deter logging in a practice known as "tree spiking."

The goal of such protest was to make the destruction of the environment unprofitable. Like other civil disobedience campaigns, Earth First! hoped that the combination of lawsuits, public demonstrations, and non-violent resistance would drive oppressors of the environment out of business. But Earth First! also embraced a new way of life, in tune with nature but removed from typical western conceptions of nature and humanity. One member declared: "I am the rainforest, recently emerged into consciousness, defending myself." Inherent in Earth First!'s approach was the notion that non-human life is valuable, completely apart from its usefulness to humans. Humans consequently are no more valuable than other species. The ecocentric approach of deep ecology mandated that ecosystems should flourish, and that humans should not stop this flourishing but should restore nature where possible. Because religions and governments encouraged anthropocentrism, breaking the law in defense of earth was deemed acceptable to members of Earth First!

Earth First! spread to the United Kingdom in 1991, where early protests took the form of attempts to block the docking of shipments of rainforest timber. In the mid-1990s Earth First!'s British activists began an anti-roads campaign to demonstrate the environmental and social costs of increasing traffic. Earth First!ers pointed out that automobiles contributed to the greenhouse effect that threatened the future of human civilization, while the Gulf War, waged to protect western access to oil, provided evidence that only violence could sustain the automobile lifestyle. Twyford Down, in Hampshire, England, proposed as a route for the M3 motorway, served as the initial site of protest for the anti-roads campaign. In 1992 activists attempted to establish permanent anti-road protest camps at Twyford Down, though they were eventually destroyed and their residents forcibly evicted. But the anti-roads campaign sparked a similar

movement in Ireland, while Earth First! also spread to Canada, Germany, and Mexico. In Australia, Earth Firsters blockaded dam construction sites in 1982 by burying activists up to their necks in dirt roads used to transport construction equipment.

The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) have taken the defense of earth to even greater extremes. Scholars have described the ELF as a radical spinoff of Earth First! that has adopted a “by any means necessary” approach to environmentalism. Since the late 1970s these activists have engaged in criminal acts and violence to defend the environment and animals from destruction caused by humans. The ELF has primarily targeted property that either harms the environment itself or houses those that plot the destruction of nature. Meanwhile, the ALF has undertaken the harassment of workers whose employees do harm to animals, including subjecting the employees of one pharmaceutical company that tests on animals to death threats, vandalizing of homes, beatings, and even the throwing of acid.

Some of the ELF’s more notable acts include the destruction of power lines feeding Arizona ski resorts in 1987, and the severing of power lines to uranium mines in 1988. One scholar has estimated that between 1997 and 2006, ELF caused \$100 million in property damage. In 2001 the ELF and the ALF conducted a joint vandalizing of Bank of New York buildings and automated teller machines as retaliation for the bank’s connections to an animal-testing pharmaceutical company. ALF members have also resorted to arson to destroy the offices and experiments of biological engineers; in 2003 the group destroyed a condominium complex under construction in San Diego, causing \$50 million in damage.

These most radical of groups appear to vacillate between advocating the equal treatment of all forms of life on earth and punishing humans for their callous treatment of nature. One official with the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals has declared that “humans have grown like a cancer. We’re the biggest blight on the face of the earth.” Observers and mainstream environmentalists have made the claim that these radical activists devalue human life. The ideology of deep ecology sits at the heart of these movements, and thus emphasizes the inherent value of non-humans, as well as the

concurrent devaluing of humans. But description of their efforts as “terrorism” is simply inaccurate since they overwhelmingly commit crimes against property and rarely against people. Defining their efforts as “eco-terrorism” has, however, resulted in a heavy crackdown against such groups that has drastically curtailed their efforts, especially in the years since September 11, 2001.

Scholars have argued that radical activist groups such as the ALF, the ELF, and Earth First! have made the efforts and demands of Greenpeace and other more mainstream environmentalists seem more moderate. As a consequence, the goals and results of environmentalism will drift slowly to the left. Such an outcome is indeed a positive result, but these activists have also made it clear that when the future of the earth was uncertain, not everyone stood idly by.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Campaign, Britain; Anti-Nuclear Movement, Japan; Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Anti-Nuclear Protests, Marshall Islands; Carson, Rachel (1907–1964); Earth First!; Eco-anarchism; Environmental Protest, United States, 19th Century; Food Not Bombs, United States; Food Sovereignty and Protest; French Guiana, Ecological Movements against the Guiana Space Center in Kourou; Greenpeace; Japan, Resistance to Construction of Narita Airport; Maori Indigenous Resistance; Niger Delta, Protest Movements; Nuclear-Free New Zealand, 1987; Reclaim the Streets; Saro-Wiwa, Ken (1941–1995); Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Adamson, J., Evans, M. M., & Stein, R. (Eds.) (2002) *The Environmental Justice Reader: Politics, Protest, and Pedagogy*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Bullard, R. D. (Ed.) (2005) *The Quest for Environmental Justice: Human Rights and the Politics of Pollution*. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.
- Liddick, D. R. (2006) *Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Taylor, B. R. (Ed.) (1995) *Ecological Resistance Movements: The Global Emergence of Radical and Popular Environmentalism*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Wall, D. (1999) *Earth First! and the Anti-Roads Movement: Radical Environmentalism and Comparative Social Movements*. London: Routledge.
- Zimmerman, M. E. (1994) *Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ecuador, indigenous and popular struggles

Marc Becker

Indigenous organizations in Ecuador have long provided the foundation for popular struggles in the twentieth century and a model to the rest of Latin America for organizing social movements. In the 1920s Jesús Gualavisi, a leader in the municipality of Cayambe, led a community protest against a neighboring hacienda that expropriated their lands. Gualavisi searched for urban allies to support his fight, and attended the founding of the Ecuadorian Socialist Party in the capital city of Quito in May 1926. Subsequently, urban socialists and communists became strong supporters of rural indigenous struggles.

In 1930 indigenous workers on the Pesillo hacienda in Cayambe went on strike for higher wages and improved working conditions. For the next several decades, Pesillo became a zone of fierce indigenous protest. Dolores Cacuango, one of the strike leaders, became known as a leading Ecuadorian indigenous rights activist. In February 1931 Cayambe activists organized a national conference for peasant and indigenous rights. The specter of thousands of marginalized people congregating to fight for their rights unsettled the government, which quickly sent police to end the protest. The indigenous movements have promoted their cause with help from educated urban communists, publishing a newsletter called *Ñucanchic Allpa* (Our Land) that appeared occasionally from the 1930s to the 1960s.

On May 28, 1944 (“May Glorious Revolution”) a mass uprising overthrew an unpopular government. Taking advantage of this political opening, Gualavisi and Cacuango founded the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians (FEI). For the next several decades the FEI led struggles for agrarian reform and greater political representation for indigenous peoples.

The triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 led to a dramatic increase in political mobilization for social change. Popular pressure finally forced elites in 1964 to implement modest land reforms to undercut calls for more radical changes. Concurrently, progressive sectors of the Catholic Church organized alternatives to the communist-affiliated FEI. The first such local organization was the Salesian-affiliated Shuar Federation that

subsequently provided important leadership to national indigenous struggles.

In 1968 a conservative Catholic labor union founded the National Federation of Peasant Organizations (FENOC) with the goal of assisting hacienda workers in their transition to a new land tenure system following the country’s agrarian reform program. Although initially organized as a bulwark against the leftist FEI, rural activists quickly gained control of FENOC, converting the organization into a force for revolutionary change. In the 1980s and 1990s the federation explicitly incorporated indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorans into its mission, changing its name to the National Federation of Indigenous, Peasant, and Black Organizations (FENOCIN).

Struggles within the Catholic Church for control of FENOC led progressives to found an alternative, more “ethnic” organization named Ecuaurunari, from a Kichwa phrase “Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui,” meaning “awakening of indigenous peoples.” Similar to FENOC, Ecuaurunari was quickly radicalized as indigenous activists gained control over the organization.

Parallel to FENOC and Ecuaurunari located in the Andes highlands, Catholic missionaries formed ethnic organizations in the eastern Amazon basin. Most significant were the Federation of Indigenous Organizations of Napo (FOIN) and the Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza (OPIP). Together with the Shuar Federation, in 1980 these local organizations founded the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE). CONFENIAE and Ecuaurunari quickly joined forces into the National Coordinating Council of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONACNIE). In 1986 this body was reconstituted as the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE). The new organization’s goal was to combine all indigenous peoples from throughout the country into one large pan-Indian movement dedicated to defending indigenous concerns and agitating for social, political, and educational reforms.

In the 1980s evangelical Christians founded the Ecuadorian Federation of Evangelical Indians (FEINE) with its base in Chimborzo as an alternative to the more “leftist” FENOCIN and more “Catholic” CONAIE. Sometimes these organizations, along with FEI, now only a shadow of its former self, coordinated protest

actions and at other times desperately competed for the allegiance of the same people.

In June 1990 CONAIE led a powerful indigenous uprising that shook the country's white elite power base. It placed CONAIE firmly on the map of social movements, providing a model for how civil society should organize itself. The June uprising introduced a remarkable decade of intense and greatly heightened indigenous activism. In 1992 OPIP led a march from the Amazon to the capital city of Quito to demand land titles and the definition of Ecuador as a plurinational state. Two years later, indigenous activists took to the streets in a Mobilization for Life in protest of a new agrarian law. In 1995 diverse sectors of civil society formed the indigenous-oriented political movement Pachakutik to compete for political office. In 1997 and again in 2000, indigenous activists played key roles in ousting presidents who had implemented unpopular neoliberal measures.

SEE ALSO: Ecuador, Left and Popular Movements, 1940s to Present; Ecuador, Popular and Indigenous Uprisings under the Correa Government; Ecuador, Protest and Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Albornoz Peralta, O. (1971) *Las luchas indígenas en el Ecuador*. Guayaquil: Editorial Claridad.
- Becker, M. (2008) *Indians and Leftists in the Making of Ecuador's Modern Indigenous Movements*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Clark, A. K. & Becker, M. (Eds.) (2007) *Highland Indians and the State in Modern Ecuador*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Pallares, A. (2002) *From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance: The Ecuadorian Andes in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Ecuador, left and popular movements, 1940s to present

Marc Becker

Ecuador's political left is a broad front of progressive organizations that has experienced brief moments of success, most notably the "Glorious May Revolution" of 1944 unifying workers, students, peasants, indigenous peoples, women, and junior military personnel into a broad

movement. However, with internal divisions, government repression, and a failure to offset the strong military, Ecuador's left historically failed to consolidate opposition to the conservative state. The left has also succumbed to the appeal of populist movements using progressive rhetoric, but once in power defending the country's oligarchic upper class.

Ecuador's political left represents multiple historic movements of utopian socialism, radical liberalism, anarchism, revolutionary Marxism, and an indigenous tradition of millenarian struggles. In May 1925 these currents converged in the founding of the Ecuadorian Socialist Party (PSE). With the establishment of the Third or Communist International (Comintern) the party became the Ecuadorian Communist Party (PCE), and the left alliance fractured.

Another group of socialist soldiers formed the Ecuadorian Revolutionary Socialist Vanguard (VSRE), which gained strength in the 1940s. These three parties sometimes collaborated in popular fronts, and at different historic periods clashed. The PSE was the most successful of the three groups in elections, becoming in the 1930s the third significant political force in the country behind the liberals and conservatives. The PSE was instrumental in drafting social legislation, yet remained largely an urban middle-class party with most members belonging to professional classes. The political base of the communists, a smaller party, has been among the laboring classes and in indigenous communities.

Ecuador's limited industrial base hindered the development of strong labor unions based in manufacturing. Instead, in the late nineteenth century, artisans in the urban centers of Guayaquil and Quito organized mutual-aid societies. Many early working-class organizations were affiliated with the Catholic Church and a conservative political party that emphasized issues of individual morality rather than structural issues of class struggle. National Worker Congresses in 1909 and 1920, and the 1938 founding of the Ecuadorian Confederation of Catholic Workers (CEDOC), followed traditional patterns of mutual aid and individual organization. In the early twentieth century, anarchists organized strikes that culminated in a 1922 general strike in Guayaquil that the military brutally suppressed.

On May 28, 1944 a broad array of workers, students, peasants, indigenous peoples, women, and lower-ranking military personnel unified

in a broad front, known as the Glorious May Revolution. The unification of movements created euphoric optimism and seemed to signal the emergence of new social relations and the end of exclusionary state structures. Popular movements created the leftist Ecuadorian Confederation of Workers (CTE) that became a dominant force for labor rights. Socialists and communists dominated a Constituent Assembly and wrote the most progressive constitution in Ecuador's history. The perennial populist military caudillo José María Velasco Ibarra transformed the wave of discontent to power, and once elected, excluded leftists from power and abrogated the progressive constitution.

The 1959 Cuban Revolution triggered an intensification of activism in Ecuador. At the same time, the Ecuadorian left splintered into pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, and pro-Cuban camps. In 1963 a radical pro-Cuba wing split with the PSE to form the Revolutionary Socialist Party of Ecuador (PSRE). Under military governments in the 1960s and 1970s, the PSRE faced severe repression. In 1964 Maoists formed the Ecuadorian Marxist Leninist Communist Party (PCMLE). The PCMLE operated largely as an illegal and clandestine party, but in 1977 formed the Popular Democratic Movement (MPD) as a legal electoral front. The MPD secured significant support from among university students and school teachers, and controlled the powerful National Educators' Union (UNE). In the 1970s and 1980s additional smaller leftist groupings emerged, including the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers Movement (MRT) and the Left Revolutionary Movement (MIR). When Ecuador returned to civilian government in 1979, many of these groups unified their electoral efforts within the Broad Left Front (FADI).

In the 1960s, in the context of the Cold War, the United States helped establish the Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Trade Union Organizations (CEOSL) as a bulwark against leftist movements. In the 1970s both CEDOC and CEOSL moved leftward and joined the socialist CTE in an umbrella Workers' United Front (FUT), taking a leading role in organizing general strikes. In the 1990s indigenous movements more commonly organized street protests that led to the removal of several unpopular presidents.

Guerilla movements in Ecuador have not flourished and have been quickly crushed by the military. In 1962 the Revolutionary Union

of Ecuadorian Youth (URJE) organized guerilla cells, but the government quickly overpowered the group. Following the 1963 Ecuadorian coup, a small and disorganized guerilla group comprised mostly of students formed near Santo Domingo de los Colorados on the western slopes of the Andes and was quickly defeated by the military. In the 1980s two guerilla groups emerged, Alfaro Lives, Dammit! (AVC) and the Free Homeland Montoneros (MPL). As with 1960s movements, the new organizations were dominated by urban student leaders and others breaking from legal leftist parties. Another small and marginal group called Red Sun emerged in 1992 with close ties to Peru's Shining Path guerillas, apparently as a radical break from the PCMLE.

SEE ALSO: Ecuador, Indigenous and Popular Struggles; Ecuador, Popular and Indigenous Uprisings under the Correa Government; Ecuador, Protest and Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Durán Barba, J. (Ed.) (1981) *Pensamiento popular ecuatoriano*. Quito: Banco Central del Ecuador. Corporacion Editora Nacional.
- Milk Ch., R. L. (1997) *Movimiento obrero ecuatoriano el desafio de la integración*. Quito: Ediciones Abya-Yala.
- Striffler, S. (2002) *In the Shadows of State and Capital: The United Fruit Company, Popular Struggle, and Agrarian Restructuring in Ecuador, 1900–1995*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Ycaza, P. (1991) *Historia del movimiento obrero ecuatoriano: De la influencia de la táctica del frente popular a las luchas del FUT*. Quito: Centro de Documentación e Información Sociales del Ecuador (CEDIME).

Ecuador, popular and indigenous uprisings under the Correa government

Marc Becker

When Rafael Vicente Correa Delgado assumed the presidency of Ecuador on January 15, 2007, he became the eighth president of the small South American country in ten years. He campaigned on the promise of calling a constituent assembly

to write a new and more inclusive constitution. This would be Ecuador's twentieth constitution since becoming an independent republic in 1830, replacing the current constitution that was only drafted a decade earlier in 1998. Social movements repeatedly called for a new constitution in order to remake the country's social, political, and economic landscape.

Observers questioned whether Correa could complete his four-year term, especially since no government had survived a full term in more than a decade. Three of those presidents had been removed through massive street protests. The young and charismatic economist and college professor first gained national attention during a short stint as finance minister under his predecessor, President Alfredo Palacio. Correa has a PhD in economics from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and wrote a dissertation attacking the Washington Consensus of neoliberal free-market reform, dominated by US imperialism. As minister, he advocated poverty reduction programs and closer relations with Hugo Chavez's left-populist government in Venezuela. When after four months Correa resigned under pressure from the United States, he enjoyed the highest approval ratings of any official in the administration.

Once out of Palacio's government, Correa was commonly put forward as a prospective candidate in the 2006 presidential elections. Correa ran on a nationalistic economic platform, criticizing foreign oil corporations for extracting the majority of petroleum rents from Ecuador, and condemned neoliberal economic policies, including free trade agreements with the US.

Correa's candidacy raised questions among social movement activists on who to support for president. Particularly for the strong and well-organized indigenous movements instrumental in toppling presidents over the previous decade, Correa was a controversial and divisive choice. A devout Catholic, he worked for a year in a Salesian Catholic mission in Zumbahua, Cotopaxi, and spoke the indigenous Kichwa language. But he was not an indigenous, nor was he involved in organizing indigenous movements. In particular, the indigenous political party Pachakutik mistrusted Correa and others outside of their movement. In 2003 indigenous activists allied with the populist presidency of Lucio Gutiérrez who, once elected to office, neglected his former allies in favor of the elite. Even more

damaging, he divided the indigenous networks through providing patronage to supporters, deeply dividing indigenous movements in Ecuador. Activists feared that Correa would have a similar impact.

Leading up to the 2006 elections, Correa and Pachakutik discussed forming an alliance. Some observers dreamed of a shared ticket between Correa and Luis Macas, a celebrated indigenous leader. Indigenous activists wanted an indigenous president, but Correa refused to consider running as vice president. While activists questioned whether Correa was ideologically committed to Pachakutik's center-left agenda, he was elected with the indigenous organization's support. He promised supporters a radical restructuring of government as a solution to problems of social exclusion and economic injustice. Even militant indigenous activists cheered Correa's victory, embracing his triumph as a blow against neoliberalism and hoping that it would create a stronger democracy.

Correa's first act as president was an executive decree calling for a referendum on whether to convene a constituent assembly to write a new constitution. Even though three-fourths of the population favored a new constitution, changing government structures went against the institutional interests of the established political parties. To gain congressional approval for a constituent assembly, he engaged in delicate negotiations with the same political parties in Congress he had denounced as part of the corrupt political establishment.

Correa won an April 15, 2007 referendum to hold an assembly by an overwhelming margin, with more than 80 percent of the electorate approving the measure. The referendum won in great measure due to the support of indigenous popular movements. In September 30, 2007 elections for assembly seats, Correa consolidated control by winning a majority of seats in the assembly, assuring meaningful changes in a new constitution. While the victories were major personal triumphs for Correa, social movements were marginalized from the formal political changes sweeping the country. From the perspective of social movements, the consolidation of power in the hands of a strong and seemingly egotistical executive meant that they would lose space to press their own agendas.

The constituent assembly began its work on drafting the country's twentieth constitution

on November 29, 2007. The assembly had six months to draft the constitution, with a possibility of extending its mandate by two more months. The new constitution would be submitted to a public referendum. If approved, Correa would call for congressional and presidential elections under the new constitution.

In tune with the goals of the executive branch, one of the constituent assembly's first acts was to declare the national congress, commonly perceived as being corrupt and inefficient, as in indefinite recess until the new constitution was drafted. The assembly then assumed full legislative powers. The traditional political parties controlling the congress complained that their concerns would be marginalized in the new assembly, and denounced the move as unconstitutional. The assembly asserted that it acted within its mandate, and represented the popular sovereignty of the Ecuadorian people.

The constituent assembly provided a critical juncture for indigenous activists longing for a constituent assembly to create a more inclusionary and participatory political system. Since a 1990 indigenous uprising, activists complained that the current constitution benefitted the dominant sectors of society to the exclusion of the popular majority. A primary and constant demand was to rewrite the first article of Ecuador's constitution to declare the "plurinational" nature of the country, recognizing 14 indigenous nationalities and acknowledging that their systems of life, education, and economy were uniquely different from the dominant white society. As a nationality, indigenous peoples would have their own territory, language, history, and culture. Correa had a historic opportunity to decolonize the country's political structures.

Despite his leftist credentials and broad popular support, some social movement activists were concerned that the young charismatic Correa was occupying spaces that they had previously held. This was a citizens' revolution, Correa declared, not one built by social movements. His "citizen's revolution" marginalized social movements that for the past two decades led powerful protests against neoliberal economic policies. Organized social movements often took more radical positions than Correa.

Activists found themselves walking a fine line between defending the assembly from conservative attacks and pressing it to take more radical positions. Returning to their traditional tactics,

indigenous movements mobilized their bases in street demonstrations to defend the assembly while at the same time pushing for greater recognition of their needs.

SEE ALSO: Ecuador, Indigenous and Popular Struggles; Ecuador, Left and Popular Movements, 1940s to Present; Ecuador, Protest and Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Becker, M. (2008) Pachakutik and Indigenous Political Party Politics in Ecuador. In R. Stahler-Sholk, H. Vanden, & G. Kuecker (Ed.), *Latin American Social Movements in the Twenty-First Century: Resistance, Power, and Democracy*. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Conaghan, C. M. (2007) Ecuador's Gamble: Can Correa Govern? *Current History* 106 (697): 77–82.
- Lucas, K. (2007) *Rafael Correa un extraño en Carondelet*. Quito: Planteta.
- Navarro Jiménez, G. (2006) "Candidatura autónoma" *opción histórica de la izquierda ecuatoriana*. Quito: Ediciones Zitra.
- Van Cott, D. L. (Forthcoming) *Radical Democracy in the Andes? Institutional Innovation and Local Governance*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ecuador, protest and revolution

Bruce E. Stewart

South America's second smallest republic, Ecuador has a rich, but also troubled history. Regionalism, racism, and economic dependency have plagued the country, often sparking political and social upheaval. Throughout the nineteenth century, most protest movements pitted the elite, whose economic and political power had been solidified in the wars for independence, against one another. Meanwhile, Ecuadorian Indians remained largely barred from the political process, forced to pay tribute to the central government and labor on haciendas or in mines. During the twentieth century, however, the indigenous population mobilized by creating grassroots organizations that promoted not only socioeconomic rights, but also Indian self-determination and cultural recuperation. At the turn of the twenty-first century, these new Indian organizations played an important role in shaping national electoral politics and forcing the government to acquiesce to some of their demands.

Ecuadorian Independence from Spain (1809–1822)

In 1532 Spanish conquistadors under the command of Sebastián de Benalcázar conquered Ecuador, defeating Inca Emperor Atahualpa and his army at the Battle of Cajamarca. For the next two and a half centuries Ecuador's development resembled that of any other Spanish American colony. The Crown quickly established a colonial system with a small Hispanic elite and a large Indian underclass. Native-born Spaniards who had migrated to Ecuador, or *peninsulares*, and *criollos*, those of Spanish descent who were born in the New World, became the region's elite, occupying large tracts of fertile land and monopolizing high offices in the ecclesiastical and civil bureaucracies. Colonial Ecuadorians of Spanish and Indian heritage, or *mestizos*, comprised a second social group that often occupied artisan and service positions. At the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder were Indians and slaves, both of whom labored in the mines and estates (or haciendas) of the elite. Indians, considered by many Spanish migrants as mendacious and indolent, were forced to pay a tribute to the Crown in exchange for protection and religious instruction.

Although local Indian uprisings occurred during the colonial period, conflicts between *peninsulares* and *criollos* set the stage for Ecuadorian independence from Spain in 1822. As early as 1544 the *criollo* elite had launched an uprising in Quito, located in the Sierra, demanding that Spanish-born authorities continue to permit the hereditary transfer of haciendas. Resentment among *criollos* toward *peninsulares* increased during the next two centuries, culminating in a successful but short-lived coup against Spanish-born authorities in Quito in 1809. Since the late 1700s the *criollo* elite in Quito had been experiencing economic decline, largely due to the collapse of the textile industry. To make matters worse, the Crown, in 1785, had initiated fiscal reforms aimed at collecting back-taxes. Faced with increased taxation and declining textile productivity, *criollo* elites also protested *peninsulares'* disproportional share of power in the Catholic Church. On August 10, 1809 a group of *criollo* estate owners ousted the *peninsulares* and seized control of Quito. Unable to gain the support of elites elsewhere in Ecuador, however, the Quito patriots remained in power for less than a year.

The first Ecuadorian city to achieve independence from Spain was Guayaquil. Located on the coast, Guayaquil emerged as the colony's leading commercial center by the early 1800s. Unlike Quito, it had witnessed an economic boom, benefiting from the expansion of cacao production in the coastal region. In 1809 *criollos* there remained hesitant to support the Quito Revolt, largely because the Crown had removed restrictions on the export of cacao from the city. But economic and political forces soon encouraged many Guayaquil *criollos* to want independence. By the late 1810s Guayaquil confronted economic stagnation as a result of declining cacao exports. Protesting Spanish laws that inhibited free trade, many *criollos* from the port city began to favor independence. Moreover, Spanish authorities, confronting revolutionaries elsewhere in South America, lacked the ability successfully to quell any uprising in Guayaquil. Aided by Antonio José de Sucre, a lieutenant fighting for republican forces under Simón Bolívar in neighboring Venezuela, *criollos*, wanting free trade and more opportunities for economic advancement, declared Guayaquil's independence from Spain on October 9, 1820. A year later, Quito and other regions in Ecuador followed suit. After the defeat of royalist forces in the Battle of Pichincha in 1822, the liberated colony entered Bolívar's Gran Colombia, a republic consisting of present-day Ecuador, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela.

Bolívarian Struggle for Autonomy (1822–1830)

Ecuador remained part of the Republic of Gran Colombia for eight tumultuous years. From the beginning, many Ecuadorian patriots protested Bolívar's confederation, arguing that it was another form of despotism. As one Quito *criollo* complained shortly after the city officially joined Gran Colombia on May 29, 1822: "The last day of despotism, and the first of the same." Events over the next eight years would heighten autonomists' fear of Bolívarian despotism. Confronting uprisings in Venezuela in 1828, Bolívar attempted to implement a new constitution that would have made him president for life and increased the powers of the central government. When constitutional delegates from Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia rejected the plan on August 27, Bolívar declared himself dictator, thereby intensifying dissident feelings throughout the confederation.

Economic forces also encouraged Ecuadorians to desire independence from the Republic of Gran Colombia. In Guayaquil *criollos* protested a 30 percent tax levied on cacao exports to finance Bolívar's campaigns against the Spanish in Bolivia and Peru during the mid-1820s. Elsewhere in Ecuador, elites resented "outsiders" holding most of the top government and military positions. To make matters worse, Ecuador paid a disproportionate 21.5 percent share of the confederation's war debt. Fear of despotism, discontent over high taxation, and resentment over "foreign" rule, along with Venezuela's withdrawal from Gran Colombia in 1829, combined to force Ecuadorian elites to declare independence on May 13, 1830.

For the indigenous population of Ecuador, however, "independence" was a cruel misnomer. As Osvaldo Hurtado explained in *Political Power in Ecuador*, "The only truly liberated group was the ruling class, composed of Ecuadorians of Spanish origin, either of pure or mixed blood." Indians remained at the bottom of society, viewed by elites as racially inferior and forced to pay tribute to the central government. When Juan José Flores, a Venezuelan-born general who had supported Ecuador's break with Gran Colombia, became the republic's first president in 1830, he wrote a constitution that assured power to a small group of landowners. The constitution, for instance, excluded men with property worth less than 300 pesos from casting ballots, while forbidding women from voting and holding office. Congressmen also had to own property worth at least 4,000 pesos. Ecuador's government remained in the hands of the wealthy few.

Political Polarization and the Liberal Anti-Clerical Movement (1845–1920)

Following the overthrow of Flores in 1845, Ecuador witnessed a period of political unrest and economic recession. Between 1845 and 1860 the country had ten governments and three constitutions. Regionalism played an important role in hindering a sense of national unity. Elites from Quito and Guayaquil, having little economic incentive to cooperate with the national government, battled one another for political supremacy. Moreover, the country remained in debt, largely due to the high cost of maintaining its military. According to Allen Gerlach in *Indians, Oil, and Politics*, military expenditures "took over a huge

portion of the budget, consuming 200,000 of the 387,973 pesos expended in 1831, and 530,007 of the 847,657 pesos spent in 1843." Ecuador's political and economic problems would abate, however, when Gabriel García Moreno assumed power in 1861.

Born in 1821 in Guayaquil, García Moreno was the son of an unsuccessful businessman. In 1844 he received a doctorate of law and shortly thereafter married into one of the wealthiest families in Quito. As editor of several small political periodicals during the 1850s, García Moreno emerged as an outspoken proponent of conservatism, calling for centralized government and opposing the liberal policies of presidents José María Urbina (1851–6) and Francisco Robles (1856–9). In September 1860 García Moreno, under the direction of former president Flores, launched a coup that ousted Robles from the presidency. The following year he was elected president, ushering in the beginning of the García Age (1860–75).

From the outset García Moreno attempted to modernize the nation, initiating a program of infrastructural development, expanding educational facilities, and issuing the country's first national currency. He also sought to unify Ecuador, which remained divided along ethnic, geographic, and class lines. Although often turning to authoritarianism, García Moreno relied heavily upon Catholicism to promote order and a sense of national identity. Catholicism, he believed, provided Ecuadorians with a unifying set of values. According to David W. Schodt in *Ecuador: An Andean Enigma*, "pragmatic concerns" also encouraged García Moreno to ally with the Catholic Church. "As a civilian president," Schodt explained, García Moreno "needed to establish a base of political support outside the armed forces." The 1861 constitution, written under García Moreno's guidance, established Catholicism as the state-sanctioned religion. The following year, he willingly conceded more control to the Vatican, and in 1869 endorsed a constitutional amendment that granted citizenship to only those who practiced Catholicism.

Following García Moreno's assassination in 1875, three formal political parties emerged in Ecuador. Founded in 1878, the Liberal Party rejected García conservatism, demanding freedom of the press, condemning centralism, and, above all, calling for the end of the theocratic state and clericalism. Liberals would garner widespread

support in Guayaquil and other coastal towns that were becoming more linked with the world market and capitalism, largely due to a boom in cacao exports during the late nineteenth century. In Quito and elsewhere in the Sierra, Conservatives gained popularity. Founded in 1883, the Conservative Party wanted to increase the Catholic Church's influence in secular affairs. In 1888 Cuenca conservatives opposed to García Moreno's authoritarianism and intolerance, formed the Progresista Party. Because of its centralist ideology, the Progresista Party often received support from both moderate Conservatives and Liberals. During the late 1880s and early 1890s these three organizations competed for national supremacy. At first, the Progresistas gained the upper hand with the election of its presidential candidate, Luis Cordero, in 1892. Cordero, however, quickly lost the support of liberals in 1892 when, hoping to pacify the clergy, he announced that the church would always take precedence over the state. Conservatives and Liberals momentarily united against the president, forcing Cordero to resign in 1894. Although Vicente Lucio Salazar replaced Cordero, Conservatives would remain in power for less than a year. By 1895 the party had lost its hegemony in the Sierra region, thereby opening the way for liberals on the coast to assume political power. These liberals would be led by Eloy Alfaro, known as the Old Battler.

Born in the coastal province of Manabí in 1842, Alfaro was the son of a Spanish merchant. At an early age he became an opponent of the Garcian administration, leading uprisings against the federal government in 1865 and 1871. During the early 1870s Alfaro lived in Panama, where he became a successful businessman and married into a wealthy family. In 1884 Alfaro, by now the leader of a radical faction within the Liberal Party, once again launched a failed uprising against the Conservative-led national government. Forced into exile, he traveled extensively throughout Latin America during the early 1890s, winning recognition as one of the region's foremost proponents of liberalism. When Liberals launched a coup against the Salazar administration in 1895, Alfaro emerged as the group's most qualified (and popular) leader, having military experience and the support of Guayaquil elites.

Following the overthrow of Salazar in 1895, Alfaro became president of Ecuador. He quickly set out to modernize the country, expanding educational facilities, building roads, and com-

pleting the Guayaquil–Quito Railway. Alfaro also attempted to weaken the Catholic Church, whose close relationship with previous administrations had sparked the so-called liberal anti-clerical movement of the early 1890s. The constitution of 1897, written under the guidance of Alfaro, declared religious freedom, eliminated clerical participation on the council of state, and prohibited the establishment of new Catholic religious orders. However, this constitution, as Osvaldo Hurtado has explained, was also moderate, retaining “Catholicism as the official religion and ordering the state to protect and guarantee respect for the national faith.” Liberal principles were more firmly defined in the constitution of 1906. “The new document eliminated the classical declaration concerning Catholicism as the state religion; guaranteed free public education; declared the separation of church and state; and forbade the election of clerics to the legislature.” Under the leadership of Alfaro and his successors, the Liberal Party would retain its hegemony in Ecuador until the 1920s, when a series of economic crises led to political realignment.

Rise of Campesinismo (1920–1964)

Throughout the nineteenth century most protest movements in Ecuador pitted elites against one another. Indigenous peoples, denouncing poor working conditions, the loss of land, sexual abuse, and high tribute payments, sometimes staged local revolts against landlords, but these uprisings were isolated and quickly suppressed by white authorities. In 1872, for instance, Fernando Daquilema, after leading a failed indigenous revolt in Chimborazo province, was captured and executed. Moreover, geography and cultural differences conspired to prevent indigenous communities from forging a common identity. Although able to preserve their culture, the indigenous population remained at the mercy of the elite, whose economic and political power had been solidified in the wars for independence and the liberal anti-clerical movement. During the twentieth century, however, the indigenous peoples of Ecuador would unite and force the national government to acquiesce to some of their demands.

During the 1920s Indians, most of whom labored as tenant farmers on haciendas, forged a common class-based identity as peasants, or campesinos, thereby downplaying their ethnic differences. Aided by leftist activists from the

urban middle class, indigenous farmers and workers formed campesino organizations, which advocated for land reform, higher wages, and better working conditions. Ecuador's first major labor uprising occurred in Tungurahua province in 1923, when hundreds of campesinos went on strike for a wage increase. Three years later, Indians seized control of a hacienda in Cayambe in the northern Pichincha province, insisting that they were the rightful heirs to the land. This revolt helped to spark the founding of the Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano (PSE), an organization that further promoted class-based identities among the Indian populace. As Amalia Pallares has explained in *From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance*, "The 1940s and 1950s witnessed greater institutionalization of indigenous resistance, from local cooperatives and unions to the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios (FEI), founded by the Communist Party." On December 16, 1961 the FEI, with the support of other leftist groups, organized a massive indigenous march on Quito, demanding land reform. Three years later, campesinos once again seized control of a hacienda in Cayambe.

From Campesinismo to Indianismo (1964–1986)

Confronting Indian discontent and wanting to modernize the rural countryside, the national government enacted agrarian reform legislation in 1964 and 1973. These laws, which abolished the *huasipungo* and attempted to expropriate unproductive haciendas, quickly changed the relationship between the state and indigenous communities. Through land reform, the national government, for the first time, became a permanent and direct presence in the lives of Indians. It created offices such as the ministry of agriculture that helped indigenous communities to gain hands-on expertise in rural policy development and knowledge of the national government's functions. These newly acquired skills proved beneficial for future activists attempting to form grassroots Indian organizations. Agrarian reform legislation also led to the migration of indigenous workers to urban areas. Hoping to avoid expropriation, hacienda owners had evicted *huasipungos* or tenant farmers, many of whom moved to towns. There, these Indian newcomers, perceived by the predominantly mestizo population as inferior, were excluded from employment

opportunities. Faced with racial discrimination, indigenous workers began to organize, forging a common identity that stressed Indian/mestizo differences over class polarities.

External forces further encouraged Indians to mobilize politically during the 1970s. Beginning in the 1950s, the decline of banana prices and discovery of vast amounts of crude oil forced Ecuador to become dependent on oil exports for its economic survival. Unlike the earlier cacao and banana booms, the petroleum surge impacted the Oriente, a region in the Amazon rain forest where its indigenous inhabitants, called the Huaorani, had lived relatively undisturbed. Aided by the Ecuadorian government, foreign companies began to drill for oil in the Oriente, forcing the Huaorani and other indigenous groups off their ancestral lands. Moreover, increased colonization from the highlands led to deforestation. In response, the Shuar, an indigenous group residing in the Oriente, organized the Federation of Shuar Centers in 1964. This federation, which worked to protect native lands from oil developers and colonists, soon served as a model for future indigenous organizations.

The 1970s witnessed the founding of several grassroots Indian confederations. In the Quichua highlands of Ecuador, indigenous activists organized the Ecuador Indians Awaken (ECUARUNARI) in 1972. Eight years later, several nationalities of Oriente Indians formed the Confederation of the Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE). Shortly thereafter, Indians on the coast organized the Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Coast of Ecuador (COICE). In 1986 these three groups allied to form the Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador (CONAIE), which would quickly become Ecuador's most important indigenous organization, uniting Indians from all three parts of the country.

Unlike campesinismo organizations, CONAIE and its predecessors unified under the banner of indianismo, an ideology that celebrates Indian culture. Largely the result of economic forces and government programs that heightened tensions between Indians and mestizos during the 1960s and 1970s, indianismo stresses racial polarities over class differences. Thus, CONAIE and other indigenous groups demand not only socioeconomic rights, but also Indian self-determination and a multicultural state. These organizations, according to Amalia Pallares, assign "Indian" as

a positive value, “a source of pride and a basis for political mobilization.” Moreover, in contrast to campesinismo unions, CONAIE and other indianista organizations were not founded by the left. Supported by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), environmental groups, and human rights activists, they were the product of grassroots Indian activism. Indianista groups also benefited from the 1979 constitution, which allowed illiterates to vote, thereby expanding citizenship to many Indian peasants who had previously been excluded. After centuries of neglect and abuse, this new cross-ethnic and cross-regional movement, led by CONAIE, promised to give the indigenous people of Ecuador a political voice.

Economic Decline and Its Consequences (1986–1996)

While Indians were forming protest organizations during the 1980s, the Ecuadorian economy plunged into a recession. Throughout its history Ecuador has always remained highly dependent on exports, making its economy prone to volatility associated with price changes in the international market. During the late nineteenth century cacao exports helped Guayaquil and other coastal towns to achieve prosperity. By the 1920s, however, the price of cacao plunged, sending the country into a depression and ending the Liberal Party’s political hegemony. The economy rebounded in the 1940s when the United Fruit Company, owned by US investors, began planting bananas in Ecuador. Between 1947 and 1957 Ecuador’s economy grew at an average annual rate of 5.3 percent. The banana boom proved short-lived. By the late 1950s the price of bananas on the world market had stabilized, making it difficult for the Ecuadorian economy to sustain economic growth.

Ecuador was saved once again in the 1960s, when oil investors discovered vast amounts of crude in the Oriente. In June 1972 the national government completed the 312-mile-long Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline (SOTE), ushering in the beginnings of the oil boom. The following year Ecuador joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and shortly thereafter benefited from the cartel’s successful attempt to raise the price of crude by reducing oil exports to non-OPEC nations. In 1972, for instance, the cost of one barrel of Ecuadorian crude was \$2.50. In 1980 the price per barrel reached its

apex at \$35.26. Subsequently, the country experienced a decade-long period of economic growth, its rate doubling that of the 1960s. As Allen Gerlach has explained, “In the 1970s, Ecuador’s economic output rose from \$4,347 million to \$10,155 million, a stupendous 233 percent increase when compared in constant 1990 dollars adjusted for inflation.”

Military authorities, who controlled the Ecuadorian government during the 1970s, believed that this oil bonanza would last forever. Hoping to stimulate the economy, they lowered taxes and financed several modernization programs. Manufacturing operatives quickly mushroomed around Guayaquil, Quito, and other cities. In fact, industry expanded at an average rate of 10.5 percent during the 1970s and, according to Allen Gerlach, “by 1980, accounted for 19 percent of the gross national product.” Thousands of public service jobs were also created, encouraging migration to urban centers and providing middle-class Ecuadorians with more economic opportunities. Meanwhile, the public and private sector began to borrow heavily from foreign banks.

During the mid-1980s, however, oil prices plunged, sending the economy into a recession. Whereas in 1980 the cost per barrel of Ecuadorian crude was \$35.26, it had dropped to \$12.70 in 1986. Interest rates soared, making it more difficult for the public and private sector to pay back foreign loans. Meanwhile, technological changes and globalization heightened worldwide competition and hampered the growth of new businesses in Ecuador. Purchasing power fell 29 percent between 1980 and 1985, and a further 8 percent annually from 1986 to 1990. To make matters worse, the price of consumer goods rose 63.4 percent during the late 1980s. The result was increased poverty. In 1975, for instance, 47 percent of Ecuador’s population lived in poverty. Twelve years later, that number had reached 57 percent. At the same time, however, wealth became more concentrated. “In 1988,” according to Allen Gerlach, “the wealthiest 10 percent of the Ecuadorian population had 47 percent of the income.” Six years later, they had 54.7 percent.

As poverty increased, the economy declined, services waned, and social unrest in Ecuador multiplied, culminating in the June 1990 *Levantamiento Indígena* (Indian uprising). The *Levantamiento*, which would become the largest indigenous uprising in twentieth-century

Ecuador, was sparked by events in the Oriente. During the late 1980s Ecuadorian President Rodrigo Borja, hoping to stabilize the economy, allowed foreign companies to drill in 3.5 million acres in the Amazon, which was the homeland of the Huaorani. Outraged, the Huaorani staged a march on Quito, backed by environmental groups and NGOs. CONAIE also supported the demonstration, sending thousands of its members to Quito on June 4, 5, and 6. There they descended on El Arbolito Park, peacefully captured Santo Domingo Church, and blocked the Pan American Highway, an important transportation artery linking the northern parts of the Sierra with those in the south. CONAIE leaders then presented 16 demands, including an end to the exploitation of indigenous Ecuadorians, the resolution of land disputes, a decrease in the cost of living, and Indian self-determination. The uprising ended on June 6 when the federal government agreed to meet with national indigenous leaders.

The June 1990 Levantamiento Indígena propelled CONAIE to the forefront of the Indian movement. According to James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer in *Social Movements and State Power*, CONAIE, with its 16 demands, succeeded in joining the “two discrete dimensions of the movement, namely the ‘land question’ and the struggle for cultural and political unity.” The majority of Ecuadorian Indians, facing economic, political, and racial discrimination, embraced CONAIE, and for good reason. The organization had forced the government to address (if not resolve) some major land conflicts and inequalities in local power relations. This was a significant gain. Nonetheless, the war was far from over. Although changing the political discourse, CONAIE and other indigenous organizations had failed to defeat racism, poverty, and political neglect.

Following the 1990 uprising, Ecuadorian Indians staged several non-violent demonstrations. On Columbus Day, 1992, 20,000 Indians descended once again on Quito, demanding that the federal government prohibit oil companies from intruding into the lands of the Huaorani. Led by the Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza (OPIP), an Amazonian member of CONAIE, this demonstration forced the federal government to give 138 indigenous communities over 2.75 million acres of land. Two years later CONAIE mobilized against President Durant

Ballén’s proposal to amend a law that permitted the sale of unused and communal Indian land. Although the demonstration forced Ballén to backtrack on the legislation, which had been pushed through Congress without input from indigenous farmers, violence erupted as police clubbed and tear-gassed protestors marching on the streets of Quito.

The year 1996 marked another momentous event in the history of the Indian movement. In January CONAIE, along with environmental, human rights, and other social groups, joined an independent multi-ethnic alliance, the Movement of Plurinational Unity – Pachakutik (MUPP). Before, indigenous activists had operated through the party structure of the Ecuadorian left, cooperating with socialist and communist organizations. MUPP, however, would run its own candidates for office, thereby ending the indigenous movement’s reliance on the left. Although not formally allied with CONAIE, MUPP also embraced indianismo, advocating for Indian self-determination, socio-economic rights, and a multinational state. In 1996 it captured eight of the 82 congressional seats. At the local level, MUPP was even more successful, winning seven of every ten races it entered that year. With its growing popularity among Indians and several non-indigenous groups, MUPP quickly emerged as the most successful movement-based party in the Andean region.

Economic Decline, Dollarization, and Political Unrest (1996–Present)

During the 1990s Ecuador continued to experience economic decline. Oil export prices once again dropped, making it difficult for the federal government to pay back foreign creditors. A series of droughts, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions further disrupted economic activity. Meanwhile, party fragmentation inhibited the government’s ability to pass emergency legislation. Politicians from Quito and Guayaquil, for instance, remained hesitant to enact tax reform and other measures to stabilize the economy, fearing it would disturb regional balance. Banks also teetered on collapse as depositors began withdrawing their money. In late 1998, as Paul Beckerman has explained in *Crisis and Dollarization in Ecuador*, the government tried to stabilize the banking crisis “by fully guaranteeing all bank

deposits, and then, in March 1999, by freezing deposits," but to no avail. To make matters worse, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) withheld a "crucial loan to support the balance of payments," thereby forcing the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to postpone lending money to Ecuador. As a result, the country was on "the verge of hyperinflation in late 1999 with the price level increasing at a rate of near 30 percent per month." The national currency, the sucre, was in a free fall, losing two-thirds of its US-dollar value in 1999 alone.

The economic recession, along with President Jamil Mahuad's response to it, triggered a wave of indigenous and non-indigenous uprisings in 1999. Opposing a tax increase in fuel and electricity prices and the freezing of bank accounts, bus and taxi drivers, with the help of thousands of Indians, erected roadblocks in the country's major cities in March. Ending on July 14, when Mahuad agreed to reduce gas prices, this demonstration resulted in 578 arrests and three deaths. Meanwhile, indigenous workers staged a nationwide strike. CONAIE once again emerged as the movement's leading organization, demanding Mahuad's resignation and advocating for a more progressive tax system. In response, Mahuad, on January 9, 2000, announced that Ecuador would adopt the US dollar. Dollarization, he argued, would allow Ecuadorians to protect themselves by converting their sucre incomes to stable US dollars. Public response to dollarization was favorable. A poll taken on January 10 showed that 59 percent of the public favored adopting the US dollar. That same day the Central Bank of Ecuador approved the plan, and Mahuad was expected to present it to Congress on January 21.

Nonetheless, CONAIE and other indigenous groups continued to denounce Mahuad, fearing that dollarization would further reduce the wages and incomes of the majority population. On January 11 CONAIE's Parliament of the People convened in Quito, where its delegates demanded Mahuad's resignation. Four days later an estimated 20,000 Indians, led by CONAIE president Antonio Vargas, converged on Quito. The situation further deteriorated for Mahuad on January 17, when employees from the state oil company, Petroecuador, went on strike. To make matters worse, Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez and other junior officers in the military, wanting more pay and disillusioned with Mahuad's peace concessions to Peru in 1998, forged a secret

alliance with CONAIE and other indigenous activists.

In the early hours of January 20, Indian protestors surrounded the Supreme Court and National Congress in Quito. "At about 9:45 am," according to Allen Gerlach, "troops guarding the buildings mistakenly welcomed three buses filled with junior officers and their men from the Military Polytechnic School. However, the captains and lieutenants of the 195-man group used the buses to open a passageway in the circles of police and soldiers surrounding Congress." Protestors quickly filled the gap, rushing into Congress and taking control of the legislature. The next day, on January 21, the Mahuad regime was overthrown, replaced by a three-member Junta of National Salvation that included Gutiérrez, Vargas, and Carlos Solórzano, a former Supreme Court president from Guayaquil. This junta, however, lasted for only 24 hours before Vice President Gustavo Noboa, backed by the US government, the Organization of American States (OAS), Ecuador's elite, and several indigenous groups, assumed the presidency. The Noboa regime, seeing no alternative, quickly approved dollarization, making Ecuador the first country to adopt the US dollar in the twenty-first century.

Although not resulting in a revolutionary change in government, the January 21 uprising boosted the political power of the Indian movement. In the May 2000 elections MUPP emerged as Ecuador's most powerful new electoral force, winning over 12 percent of the nation's mayoralties and five of the 22 prefectures. In 2002 MUPP also allied with Gutiérrez's January 21 Patriotic Society Party (PSP). Running for president that year, Gutiérrez won 55 percent of the popular vote, ousting Noboa from office. CONAIE, MUPP, and urban-based leftist groups celebrated Gutiérrez's election as a victory for the majority Indian population. But enthusiasm for Gutiérrez quickly waned. He angered indigenous and leftist groups by supporting the IMF and the privatization of key public enterprises such as oil production. Feeling betrayed and unable to implement alternative politics, CONAIE and MUPP denounced the president, while left-wing supporters joined the Social Christian Party.

As demonstrations against the regime intensified in Quito, Gutiérrez, on April 15, 2005, declared a state of emergency and revoked the newly appointed Supreme Court of Justice,

whom he claimed was biased in favor of the Social Christian Party. Five days later the Congress of Ecuador, claiming that he had abused his constitutional power, voted 60–2 to remove Gutiérrez from office. After traveling to the United States, Brazil, and other Latin American countries, Gutiérrez returned to Ecuador on October 15, claiming that he was still the country's legitimate president. Authorities quickly arrested him on charges of attempting to subvert internal security. On March 3, 2006 the government dropped these charges and released Gutiérrez from jail. Upon his release, Gutiérrez vowed that he would run for president in the October 2006 elections.

SEE ALSO: Ecuador, Indigenous and Popular Struggles; Ecuador, Left and Popular Movements, 1940s to Present; Ecuador, Popular and Indigenous Uprisings Under the Correa Government

References and Suggested Readings

- Andrien, K. J. (1995) *The Kingdom of Quito, 1690–1830: The State and Regional Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Beckerman, P. & Solimano, A. (Eds.) (2002) *Crisis and Dollarization in Ecuador: Stability, Growth, and Social Equity*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Bethell, L. (Ed.) (1987) *Spanish America after Independence, c. 1820–c. 1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Burt, J.-M. & Mauceri, P. (Eds.) (2004) *Politics in the Andes: Identity, Conflict, Reform*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Clayton, L. A. (1984) *The Bolivarian Nations of Latin America*. Arlington Heights: Forum Press.
- Conniff, M. L. (Ed.) (1999) *Populism in Latin America*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Gerlach, A. (2003) *Indians, Oil, and Politics: A Recent History of Ecuador*. Wilmington, DE: SR Books.
- Hurtado, O. (1980) *Political Power in Ecuador*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Kinsbruner, J. (1994) *Independence in Spanish America: Civil Wars, Revolutions, and Underdevelopment*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Linke, L. (1960) *Ecuador: Country of Contrasts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pallares, A. (2002) *From Peasant Struggles to Indian Resistance: The Ecuadorian Andes in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Petras, J. & Veltmeyer, H. (2005) *Social Movements and State Power: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador*. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press.
- Schodt, D. W. (1987) *Ecuador: An Andean Enigma*. London: Westview Press.
- Spindler, F. M. (1987) *Nineteenth Century Ecuador: An Historical Introduction*. Fairfax: George Mason University Press.
- Striffler, Steve. In *The Shadows of State and Capital: The United Fruit Company, Popular Struggle, and Agrarian Restructuring in Ecuador, 1900–1995*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2002.

Edict of Nantes

Michel De Waele

The Edict of Nantes, dated April 30, 1598, was the legislative act that marked the end of the Wars of Religion that had rocked France since 1562. Often portrayed as an act of religious tolerance – perhaps even a first step in the development of modern human rights legislation – its reach was in fact much more limited, as it was aimed only at ensuring civil peace across the kingdom. The act's guarantee of a certain level of freedom to Protestants was motivated by hopes that they would ultimately return to the Catholic faith. It was, therefore, an act of concord aimed at ultimately uniting the French under the same religion, rather than an act of genuine tolerance.

The monarch who promulgated the Edict had himself traversed the path from Protestant to Catholic. As Henry of Navarre, he had been a political and military leader of the Huguenot (Protestant) party during the Wars of Religion. But when France's Catholic king, Henri III, was assassinated on August 1, 1589, the legal heir to the crown happened to be none other than Henry of Navarre, who then became King Henri IV. As a Protestant monarch of a Catholic country, he found himself in an extremely complicated situation. In fact, he found himself obliged to fight to assert his kingship, as a resurgent Catholic League, with Spanish backing, attempted militarily to block his accession. In the ensuing civil warfare Henri IV's forces were able to take control of most of France, but Paris remained beyond his grasp. As a supremely pragmatic politician, however, Henri disarmed his enemies in July 1593 by announcing his conversion to Catholicism. The famous phrase attributed to him – “Paris is worth a mass” – is probably apocryphal, but it beautifully expresses the essence of his political maneuver. The Catholic cities, including Paris, then recognized him as their king.

The Huguenots of France, of course, were shocked by Henri's abjuration of Protestantism, but he took steps to retain their loyalty. He guaranteed the right of Calvinists to practice

their religion in the cities that were loyal to him at the time of his conversion, agreed to ensure that their ministers were properly financed, and permitted their colleges to be opened. These *ad hoc* measures failed to reassure the Huguenots of their place in French society, however, so in 1598 Henri IV concluded a formal agreement between himself and his Protestant subjects.

The Edict of Nantes officially granted freedom of conscience to the Huguenots, as well as the freedom to practice their religion in the cities they controlled as of August 1597. It also guaranteed Protestants the right to hold political office, and it established special courts charged with settling differences that could arise between Catholics and Protestants. At the same time, the Edict reaffirmed Catholicism as the established religion of France. Those parts of the Edict were sufficiently uncontroversial to be ratified by the kingdom's principal judicial court, the Parlement of Paris.

Other parts, however, which Henri did not believe the Parlement would ratify, provided for the financing of Protestant churches and granted the Huguenots the right to fortify their cities. Those provisions would only remain in force during the course of Henri IV's lifetime. When he was assassinated in 1610, the social peace that the Edict had brought about was once again shattered and fighting began anew. The Huguenots were defeated by Louis XIII, and the peace of Alais in 1629 stripped them of their military and financial independence, while recognizing their right to practice their religion where it was already established. They ultimately lost that right in 1685 when Louis XIV officially revoked the Edict of Nantes (on the false premise that most Huguenots had already converted to Catholicism, and that therefore the Edict was no longer necessary). An upsurge of persecution followed, prompting large numbers of French Protestants to emigrate to England, Holland, Germany, and North America. They did not recover their rights until 1787, at which point the French Revolution was already on the horizon.

SEE ALSO: St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre

References and Suggested Readings

- Stankiewicz, W. J. (1960) *Politics and Religion in Seventeenth Century France*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wanegffelen, T. (1998) *L'Édit de Nantes: une histoire européenne de la tolérance*. Paris: Librairie générale française.

Egypt and Arab socialism

Steven Isaac

It is a commonplace of studies that compare Baath socialism with Nasser's version of Arab socialism to state that Baathism was more idealistic, and Nasser more pragmatic. The claim is hard to dispute. Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970) emerged to power precipitously, and like the Baath, moved from opposition rhetoric to creative policymaking while simultaneously discovering Arab socialism's meaning to himself and his base. The first, hesitant decisions of the Free Officers movement seemed in fact inclined to conciliate western and capitalist interests. In part thanks to Egypt's tradition of centralized control, Nasser and his associates were able actually to implement socialist programs (and amend them if needed) that were impossible in the more fractious political landscapes of Syria and Iraq. Developments in Egypt were further influenced by Nasser's charisma, which could smooth over the ideological potholes that often occupied a theorist like Michel Aflaq, founder of the Baathist movement.

During and just after World War II, quasi-independent/quasi-colonized Egypt was a buffet of discontented groups with agendas ranging from preserving the British presence and the inept rule of King Farouk to the compromises of the dominant Wafd political party, as well as rival groups unhappy with the major trio above. Resentment against the king and Wafd party derived from their inability genuinely to free Egypt from British control; the chief groups seeking to unseat the status quo were the Muslim Brotherhood, emphasizing a theocratic revival of Egypt, the communists, who viewed class struggle and closer ties to Moscow as a means to removing British imperialism, and the Free Officers, who began less with an agenda and more with conviction that they were the vanguard of suppressed popular energies. When this hoped-for resurgence did not materialize, Nasser and the Free Officers reinvented themselves as caretakers of a revolution still in incubation. Arab socialism thus became a sort of midwife to a promised improvement in the lives of all Egyptians, and by extension, all Arabs.

The Free Officers, during their clandestine period, were marked by a high degree of

organization and careful secrecy. It is thus difficult to describe the movement's origins with precision: Anwar Sadat claimed in his memoirs to have started the group at the onset of World War II, while Nasser's own writings do not make his involvement at that time clear. Perhaps by the war's end, and most certainly by the time of Egypt's defeats in 1948 against Israel, Nasser moved to a central leadership position, being one of two men on the central committee aware of the full extent of the movement's membership and activities. The Officers were organized in cells of five members, with each member therein seeking to form another cell. A combination of "secrecy and widespread links" thus mitigated infiltration by Farouk's informers and secret police while spreading the Free Officers' influence across the armed forces. One estimate places the active membership at perhaps 1,000 by the time of their successful coup; another posits only 300 truly active plotters. By contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood counted 500,000 Egyptian members.

Early in 1952, the Free Officers tried assassination as a tool, but that particular attempt on a general failed; Nasser later wrote of relief that such methods were abandoned under his direction, but his qualms appear odd in light of later, forceful methods to retain power. In the meantime, feelers were kept open to the Muslim Brotherhood through Sadat's connections, but no real link was ever truly envisaged. On the other hand, a group with fascist sympathies during World War II, Young Egypt, renamed itself after the war the Islamic Socialist Party, and its activism gained support in the armed forces, trade unions, and among student groups. The communists, though, were never really an option for combined efforts since the Free Officers feared tethering to a Soviet agenda, and seeking to retain Arab socialist theory, Nasser refused to operate on a supposition of necessary class conflict.

On the night of July 22, 1952, the Free Officers staged their coup, striking ahead of even their own projected timetable. Events in January, especially "Black Saturday," when Cairo erupted in anti-British violence that the king's government did not even try to suppress to avoid showing powerlessness, led Nasser and his coterie to recognize a window of opportunity. As their plans solidified, the Free Officers, mostly young, and at the rank of colonel or below, brought General Muhammad Naguib into their plans as a popular public figure. In the summer, the group finally

picked August 5 as their target date, but Nasser pushed things forward after learning that their plans had become known to Farouk.

In a nearly bloodless series of maneuvers, the Free Officers and their troops arrested most senior officers and seized key military installations and critical civil institutions, including the telephone exchange and radio stations. Farouk called for international help to end the takeover, but the British and US governments both demurred, and the king was forced to abdicate. Some Free Officers advocated a quick trial and execution of Farouk, but Nasser espoused his exile. The latter route was chosen and proved a public relations bonanza as Farouk's playboy decline gave the new rulers plenty of camera-fodder to justify the coup.

Once in power, the Free Officers declared their intention to remove the corruption embarrassing Egypt socially and militarily, and then to return the reins of power. Naguib in repeated announcements stated the Officers' allegiance to the right or the left. Various spokesmen of the Free Officers declared: "We have fixed a date of six months ahead for returning to our barracks, after having restored to our country the right to dispose of itself as it will." This may well have been the intent of the Free Officers, especially as seen by Naguib; the former prime minister Ali Maher was invited to oversee the civil administration in the meantime.

Nasser later wrote in *The Philosophy of the Revolution* that the events of July 22-3 were more than a coup: the aim was "to liberate the slaves, namely the people, and put them, in place of their masters, in the government of the country." Although his vision was grander than Naguib's, he also originally saw his role as transitional. "I believed that the whole nation was waiting and watching, before July 23, to see the first sparks fly," he said in his apology. "I believed, no less firmly, that our own part, which was to command, would be played out in a few hours, after which the majestic masses would join in the hallowed march towards the same great end. . . . But it turned out quite otherwise. . . . Crowds without end were flocking around. But how different was the reality from our illusions! The masses were divided and disordered."

Perhaps this disillusionment was real, and thus explains the firmer line that the Free Officers took with the different actors in Egypt's political

arena. A call went out for Egypt's political parties to purge "corrupt" elements, but generated little change. In August, workers in Alexandria's textile factories revolted in the name of "the people's revolution," only to see a brutal crackdown that alienated the political left and the Muslim Brotherhood, which declared the Qur'an to be Egypt's only legitimate constitution, a position Nasser never accepted. Ali Maher was dismissed and a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) established among the Free Officers' leadership to oversee the interim. But a sign of future directions came with the September 1952 land reform law, limiting landed property of individual Egyptians to 200 *feddans* (just over 200 acres). The Free Officers' long-announced opposition to "feudalism" and this law struck hard at the largest landowners, although they were compensated. More importantly, the law established the *bona fides* of the Free Officers with rank-and-file Egyptian peasants and the urban working class. In reality, the rural middle class benefited most, since many moved into local leadership.

From the coup until April 1954, the Free Officers were struggling over their future direction within the context of a personal and ideological struggle between Nasser and Naguib. One key issue was whether Free Officers, operating through the RCC, would relinquish power. The related, and more deep-seated, issue was whether the coup was a constitutional restructuring and entailed a return to parliamentary rule after "reforms," or instead a revolution intended to reshape Egyptian politics and life. Nasser, as he came to the fore, was of the latter camp. With the masses remaining demobilized as he had expected, Nasser saw the need of further leadership, not of retirement back to the barracks. As he later explained, "in this region, where we live, an important drama is to be played which awaits its hero. I know not why, but it seems to me that this role cries continually throughout the vast region around us, to be filled by a valiant soul." As with others in a messianic role, Nasser viewed his mission as servant, first to fulfill the potential of Egypt, and then to fulfill that of Arabs. He mapped out the stepping stones in a program to eventually guide the world toward social and spiritual betterment. Naguib followed the early pronouncements of the Free Officers more to the letter with the goal of establishing a parliamentary republic.

Naguib appeared to win the contest in February 1954 by proposing to resign as president in a maneuver forcing Nasser's hand; the general's popularity ensured his comeback, and Nasser had to promise to disband the RCC soon and hold long-promised elections. By April, however, Nasser reestablished his position by turning the trade unions against Naguib and gaining the support of the domestic security apparatus. He had also resigned the post of prime minister in March, leaving the appearance that Naguib was in charge. These actions permitted Nasser within weeks to build his own power base while creating an image of a devolving revolution that would soon permit the old political order to return to business as usual.

By April, Nasser could move with army support, returning to the premiership and purging the cabinet of Naguib's supporters. Naguib retained the presidency as a figurehead, a post which he relinquished seven months later under further pressure. Promised elections were suspended indefinitely, and even the RCC eventually was disbanded as Nasser's capacity to communicate his vision to Egyptians gave him unprecedented popularity. Such too was his charisma that the repressive measures taken in the name of internal security rarely managed to raise noticeable discontent. The greatest potential opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood, was driven underground after one of its members tried to assassinate Nasser in October 1954, its leadership being either jailed or executed.

No small part of Nasser's domestic popularity rested on his ability to appear to the "man on the streets" of Cairo as an international actor to be reckoned with. By June of 1954 he had gotten Britain to agree to a closure of its Suez Canal military bases within 20 months. Even though the British maintained the right to return in case of invasion, Nasser presented the treaty as an anti-imperialist victory, providing momentum to appear a leading player while attending the April 1955 meeting of non-aligned states in Bandung, Indonesia. In September 1955 he signed the "Czech" arms deal, purchasing \$200 million in weapons from the Soviet Union, angering western nations who had crafted the Baghdad Pact to contain the USSR. For Nasser, the arms deal was regional, not international, enabling him to gain more popularity through tougher stances *vis-à-vis* Israel.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 cemented Nasser's position and his evolving synthesis of Arab nationalism and social justice. As part of a program to give Egypt's economy and agricultural needs an internal boost, Nasser quickly moved the long-proposed Aswan High Dam to a priority. When western financing for the project failed to materialize, Nasser seized and nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, intending that the profits would go to the Aswan project rather than British and French shareholders. A reaction from Britain and France was doubtless anticipated, but probably not the actual response of a three-way attack by the two western powers and Israel. France, however, sought to stymie Nasser's support for the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria, and was among Israel's largest military suppliers. Israel struck on October 29 and France and Britain began landing troops under the clauses of the 1954 treaty.

The British and French gave Egypt an ultimatum to withdraw from the Canal Zone in the name of international stability. Nasser boldly refused, and although Egypt's armed forces suffered heavy short-term losses, the resistance made him a *force majeure* in Egypt and the wider Arab world after the Soviet Union and US both intervened to stop Anglo-French-Israeli collusion. Henceforth, Nasser was the face of Arab nationalism, leaving him unassailable within Egypt and resented in neighboring capitals.

The Suez Crisis and Aswan moved Nasser's economic policies further toward a socialist model. The operation alone of the two structures, and the coordination needed for the dam's construction and financing, entailed the state's entry into more economic sectors. In the fallout from the 1956 crisis, the state gained control over many businesses sequestered from French and British control, including the local banking interests of giants like Barclays and Crédit Lyonnais. The constitution, finally promulgated in 1956, stated that the government would strive for social justice, in part by establishing old-age pensions, socialized health care, and working to raise living standards. Private enterprise retained safeguards, but it was clear Nasser preferred public control where possible to forestall exploitation. In 1960, Nasser's protégé Aziz Sidqi produced Egypt's first (but only) Five-Year Plan. In other contexts, nationalization served other purposes than restoring national dignity or redistributing wealth: the state eventually took over cinemas, and

in 1960, most Egyptian newspapers and publishing houses were nationalized.

The real advent of Arab socialism under Nasser came in July 1961, described as the real July Revolution, unlike its 1952 forebear. For the three preceding years, Egypt joined with Syria as the United Arab Republic (UAR), and scholars are divided as to whether the Baath deserve credit for the July laws. Certainly, as described above, Nasser's new push for Arab socialism further alienated conservative elements in Syria, leading to the September coup in Damascus splitting the UAR. The 1952 expropriations compensated landowners for their losses, but not the 1961 seizures, where at least 167 "reactionary capitalists" were arrested while over 300 new industries came under state control. Most government nationalization occurred in major industries, such as textiles, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, shipping, and insurance. Those industries not under direct state control came under intense regulation. The most vivid program was income redistribution: annual salaries were supposed to be capped henceforth at £E5,000 (roughly US\$11,500), and anything over £E10,000 had a tax rate of 90 percent. Individual landholdings were further reduced from 200 to 100 *feddans*. Peasants needing loans were to receive them free of interest. Subsidies were enacted to reduce the cost of basic necessities, and to cut rents, fares, and educational expenses. Nasser, echoing a long tradition in Egypt's intellectual circles, declared that socialism should not entail class conflict, but rather the effort to obviate such division. The National Charter of 1962 enshrined many of these principles.

The immediate effect of this socialist turn was to break the power of the traditional large landowners and much of the bourgeoisie; the long-term results were harder to gauge. Industrial workers did see some improvement, helped in part by the new minimum wage (which was always too low), but more so by safety nets like health care and disability insurance. Some peasants became landowners, but had difficulty making payments for their new property. Public education, perhaps the greatest barometer of change, expanded rapidly in the 1960s. Many more Egyptians attended schools, quickly outgrowing the facilities' and teaching staff's capabilities. As a result, overall educational standards began to decline. In 1962, Nasser guaranteed government jobs to all university graduates, a policy which swelled

the bureaucracy. At first, with so many new state-controlled industries, people were needed, but in time, applicants outstripped the need. Salaries then fell, as did productivity, as many government employees moonlighted.

One summation of Nasser's policies sees his socialism less as a coherent program than a series of measures to eliminate the last bastions of old authorities. Nasser's was undeniably an evolving policy, meeting his criterion of finding a socialism for Arab needs, not the programmatic socialism birthed in the specific industrial conditions of Europe. Nasser wanted the revolution's social and economic policies to propel Egypt forward as a model for all Arabs. Before the 1967 war with Israel and ensuing defeat, his policies appeared to be working. The conservative monarchies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia feared his influence, while no political upset occurred in the Middle East (witness Iraq, Syria, and Yemen) without looking to Egypt for support or inspiration. Arab socialism, as authored by Nasser, defined not only Egyptian society but that of its kindred states as well.

The 1967 debacle rewrote these dynamics. Nasser was treasured by Egyptians, but criticism of the regime, if not of the leader himself, was rife through 1968. Some criticism was blunted by directing it toward shadowy "centers of power" which, it was claimed, were enfeebling the revolution. Nasser's charisma served to keep his policies alive, but after his death in 1970, the real verdict was perhaps delivered by his successor and fellow Free Officer Anwar Sadat. He turned Egypt back toward a private enterprise orientation with his *infitah* or "open-door" rapprochement with the western powers' economies. Egypt assumed some of the trappings of a pluralistic, capitalistic economy, but centralized control and a police apparatus showed continuity with Nasser's days.

SEE ALSO: Arab Left and Socialist Movements, 1861–1930; Egypt, Revolution of 1952; Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and the Muslim Brotherhood; Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970); Syria and Iraq, Baathists

References and Suggested Readings

- Dawn, C. E. (1988) The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 20, 1 (February): 67–91.
- Goldschmidt, A. (1988) *Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation State*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

- Hanna, S. (1967) Al-Afghani: A Pioneer of Islamic Socialism. *Muslim World* 57: 24–32.
- Hanna, S. & Gardner, G. (1969) *Arab Socialism: A Documentary Survey*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Hopwood, D. (1982) *Egypt: Politics and Society, 1945–1981*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Kerr, M. (1968) Notes on the Background of Arab Socialist Thought. *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, 3 (July): 145–59.
- Nasser, G. A. (1959) *The Philosophy of the Revolution*. Buffalo: Smith, Keynes, & Marshall.
- Tibi, B. (1986) Islam and Modern European Ideologies. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 18, 1 (February): 15–29.
- Woodward, P. (1992) *Nasser*. London: Longman.

Egypt, Peasant Rebellion of 1824

Nicole B. Hansen

The Peasant Rebellion of 1824 in Egypt has been little studied and seriously muddled by authors and scholars who have engaged in plagiarism, fabrication, and confusion of individuals, events, and dates.

Many scholars who wrote about the rebellion relied heavily on the "eyewitness" account of James St. John (1845). However, St. John did not even visit Egypt until nearly a decade after the events took place and it is clear that he simply plagiarized the work of British traveler John Madox (1834), embellishing it with a lot of color and dramatic touches. This makes it an unreliable secondhand version that should not be used as a source. On the other hand, Madox's account, penned in 1824 while he was staying in the village of Qurna as the events transpired, is a daily journal of what he witnessed himself or heard about directly from participants and provides an excellent source of information about what really happened.

Several scholars have also believed there were two different revolts led by two different men named Ahmed, one in 1822–3 and another in 1824 (Lawson 1981: 144–5; Sayyid-Marsot 1984: 133). The 1822–3 date of the revolt is taken from the work of Ali Mubarak (1886–9: 14–86), who wrote of a revolt taking place in AH 1238 (corresponding to 1822–3). However, his description of the revolt is so close to that of Madox that it seems highly probable that the two revolts are one.

Mubarak's work has many obvious inaccuracies, especially regarding numbers (Baer 1969: 240–2), and he most likely simply got the date wrong.

Madox first became aware of a disturbance on March 14, 1824. The man who led the rebellion was of unclear origins. He is known from the various sources by a number of names: Ahmed the Vizier (Madox 1834), Ahmed the Prophet (Madox 1834; Mubarak 1886–9), Ahmed the Moroccan (Mengin & Jomard 1839: 5; Driault 1930: 13), and Ahmed son of Idris (Mengin & Jomard 1839: 5; Weygand 1936: 143). It was said by some that he came from the village of Hijaza (to the north of Luxor), the Hijaz in Arabia, or from Mecca (Madox 1834). According to Mubarak (1886–9), he was from Upper Egypt but escaped to the Hijaz at the end of the uprising, never to be heard from again.

Ahmed had organized 300–400 men from al-Ba'irat and led them in an attack on Gamola, a village to the north, in order to attack the new district administrator stationed there. (Except where indicated, the following account comes from Madox 1834). The men were soon joined by residents of Luxor and Karnak on the other side of the river and their numbers reputedly swelled to 3,000 by March 17. However, they were met by 200–300 government troops sent from Gamola and Qena in the north. These troops were ordered to destroy al-Ba'irat. However, the rebellion grew, as the government troops suddenly withdrew, with villagers from Qurna and Armant joining the rebels. Local estimates of the number of insurgents place them anywhere between 7,000 and 19,000 men.

A harsh fight took place at Gamola on the night of March 19. In the following weeks battles took place further south at Esna, where the rebels were met by four battalions of 800 men each from the First Regiment (Weygand 1936: 143). Word reached Madox on March 29 that the battles waged there killed hundreds of rebels. In one battle the French officers of the Egyptian army tricked the rebels and their cavalry into meeting their infantry on an island in the Nile. Using European battle tactics previously unknown in Egypt, the Egyptian army was successful.

More villages were sacked by government troops, including Armant, where the leader of the rebellion, Ahmed, had been staying, on the evening of April 2. The field of battle moved further north to Qena. Here, on April 4, French and Piedmontese officers used another ruse to

decimate the rebels, killing more than 500 in short order. This battle also seems to have been referred to in Mubarak's (1886–9) account.

Many of the insurgents took refuge in the mountains. The government made them an offer on April 7: come down from the mountains, return to your villages peacefully, and you will not be harmed. The government representative delivering the message was accompanied by a rebel sheikh from Armant who had surrendered to the government. The intended recipients of this offer were having none of it; they promptly bastinadoed both men. The government ratcheted up its demands two days later, threatening to set all the villages on fire if they did not cooperate. While a new battle broke out in Girga, the government switched its strategy to offering a bounty to Bedouin mercenaries to capture the rebels. Large numbers were rounded up and they began to be executed by gun and sword on April 20.

Madox departed from Luxor on May 4, and his detailed account of events also ends then. At the time of the revolt, Bernardino Drovetti, the consul-general for France in Egypt, was residing in Alexandria. Word of the revolt reached him, and he relayed this information back to his superior in France, the minister of foreign affairs Chateaubriand, in three letters dated April 10, April 17, and May 16 (Driault 1930: 13–14, 17).

According to Drovetti, Egypt's ruler Muhammad 'Ali did not feel the events in Upper Egypt were a serious threat when the two men met on April 15. The ruler had received word that his troops had killed thousands of peasants, which troubled him some, but he was buoyed by reports that his troops had remained faithful to him, even though they too largely consisted of peasants (Driault 1930: 14). However, the truth was that 700 troops from the First Regiment deserted the first night and the 5th battalion and its escort that had been left behind in Aswan revolted. A French military instructor quickly brought the battalion back in line and after a fierce fight the escort allegedly submitted. The battalion rejoined the remainder of the regiment in Esna, where they had been brought back to discipline. However, two battalions of the Sixth Regiment had to be brought in as well (Clot-Bey 1840; Weygand 1936: 143–4). At the end of April, revenge was extracted on the deserters when Tartar cavalry were brought in, killing

all but 60 of them, who were taken alive (Madox 1834).

We learn from Drovetti's correspondence of May 16 that the troubles had not died down completely. The Ababda and Bisharin tribes of the Eastern Desert had taken advantage of the chaos resulting from the insurrection to break a treaty they had made with Muhammad 'Ali (Driault 1930: 13). According to the British consul-general in Egypt, Henry Salt, it was not until June 10 that the revolt was completely put down and the First Regiment could continue on its mission to the Sudan (Baer 1969: 98n12).

It is not clear what actually prompted the revolt and what the rebels hoped to achieve. Lawson argued that the revolts were by craftsmen resentful of supervisors and merchants. However, his arguments are based on twisting St. John's imaginary account to read things that support his view, even though those things are absent in both St. John's and Madox's versions. He suggested that the plotters of the rebellion wished to attack "European trading representatives operating within the region" (Lawson 1981: 145). In fact, there was no mention of any such trading representatives and all Europeans in the area mentioned in Madox's account were either travelers or antiquities collectors and dealers, both groups of people whose presence was beginning to contribute to the local economy. Ahmed also made a special effort to reach out to the foreigners in Luxor, letting them know he had no intention of attacking them (Madox 1834). Nonetheless, rumors did reach the traveler Westcar at Kalabsha to the south that foreigners were being slaughtered by the rebels (Manley & Ree 2002: 221).

The contemporary sources give little firm indication as to what truly motivated so many people to revolt against the government. Unhappiness with taxes is one possible motive. Madox himself made allusion to the role resistance to paying taxes played in the revolt. In an effort to stop the peasants of Gurna, the traditional arch-enemies of al-Ba'irat, from joining the rebels, the government exempted them from the taxes for the year on March 17. Nevertheless, emboldened by the retreat of the troops that night, they decided to join in the rebellion the next day. Mubarak's account (1886–9) detailed how Ahmed encouraged his followers to plunder and ransack government storehouses, possibly suggesting economic motives. Mengin (Mengin &

Jomard 1839: 5–6) suggested that Ahmed was a Moroccan who felt the customs duties imposed on him at Quseir on his arrival in Egypt from Mecca were too high. However, this would have been of no consequence to his followers, and in fact Mengin suggests the peasants were inspired to revolt due to their unwillingness to be conscripted into Muhammad 'Ali's new army, a suggestion seconded by Clot-Bey (1840).

Ahmed's own followers regarded him as a prophet. Ahmed told them he had orders from God and the Ottoman sultan to dethrone Egypt's ruler, Muhammad 'Ali (Madox 1834). Mubarak (1886–9) said that he called himself al-Mahdi, a redeemer that is prophesized by some Muslims to appear to restore righteousness in the world before the Day of Judgment. According to Drovetti, Ahmed intended to end the vexations that Muhammad 'Ali had brought to them, along with the western-inspired innovations he is well known for having introduced into Egypt contrary to the rules of Islam (Driault 1930: 13).

Moreover, Ahmed was reputed to have supernatural powers. It was said that he once took a small amount of bread, and upon dividing it it became more than enough to satisfy the hunger of his followers, and at one point he allegedly blessed a small quantity of gunpowder and it became a much larger amount. If he was fired upon, it was said he would not be harmed (Madox 1834). It is possible that the popularity of the revolt may have been due largely to his charismatic appeal among the populace who believed him to be genuine. Indeed, he was but one of several men who claimed to be the Mahdi during the nineteenth century in Egypt and the Sudan (Berque 1972: 137–8).

SEE ALSO: Egypt, Revolution of 1952; Muhammad 'Ali (1769–1849); Sudanese Protest in the Turko-Egyptian Era; Sudanese Protest Under Anglo-Egyptian Rule; Urabi Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Baer, G. (1969) *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Berque, J. (1972) *Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution*. New York: Praeger.
- Clot-Bey, A.-B. (1840) *Aperçu général sur l'Égypte*. Paris: Fortin, Masson.
- Driault, É. (1930) *L'expédition de Crète*. Cairo: Société Royale de Géographie d'Égypte.
- Kalfatovic, M. R. (1992) *Nile Notes of a Howadji: A Bibliography of Travelers' Tales from Egypt*,

- from the Earliest time to 1918. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow.
- Lawson, F. (1981) Rural Revolt and Provincial Society in Egypt, 1820–1824. *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 13: 131–53.
- Madox, J. (1834) *Excursions in the Holy Land, Egypt, Nubia, Syria &c. Including a Visit to the Unfrequented District of the Haoran*. London: Richard Bentley.
- Manley, D. & Ree, P. (2002) *Henry Salt: Artist, Traveller, Diplomat, Egyptologist*. London: Libri.
- Mengin, F. & Jomard, E. F. (1839) *Histoire sommaire de l'Égypte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed-Aly precede d'une introduction et suivie d'études et historiques sur l'Arabie*. Paris: Didot Frères.
- Mubarak, A. (1886–9) *al-Khitat, al-tamfīṭiyah al-jadīdah li-Misr al-Qāhīrah wa-mudunihā wa-bilādihā al-qadīmah wa-al-shahīrah*. Bulaq, Egypt.
- St. John, J. A. (1845) *Egypt and Nubia*. London: Chapman & Hall.
- Sayyid-Marsot, A. L. (1984) *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weygand, M. (1936) *Histoire militaire de Mohammed Aly et de ses fis*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale.

Egypt, Revolution of 1952

Emin Poljarevic

The Egyptian Revolution of 1952 was staged during the night of July 22 to the 23, 1952. This bloodless overthrow of the Egyptian government and King Farouk marked the end of direct British influence in state affairs and the beginning of a new era in Egyptian history. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–70), the leader of the “Free Officers,” justified the army’s overthrow of civilian government by referring to the Urabi revolution that took place 70 years earlier. The revolution of 1919 was another episode in Egyptian history that greatly changed the course of history leading up to the 1952 revolution. Other significant historical elements include the continuous opposition to British influence, the volatility of liberal politics, the growth of national mass movements, the deteriorated economic situation, and the king’s continuous involvement in affairs of the government.

Abdel Nasser initially referred to the Urabi revolution of 1881–2, through which the increasingly dissatisfied segment of Egyptian low-ranking officers of *fellahin* (peasant) origin voiced a desire for change of the discriminatory restrictions which

prevented indigenous soldiers from advancing to higher ranks. On September 8, 1881 a military demonstration in front of the royal palace sparked the revolution that lasted a little over a year. The Egyptian army Colonel Ahmad Urabi (1841–1911), together with several of his officer colleagues, organized a revolt against *Khedive* (Lord) Tawfiq’s authority. Tawfiq was a monarchic heir of Muhammad ‘Ali, a cohort of the Turco-Circassian monopoly on military and political leadership, and through whom the British and French held *de facto* control of Egypt’s finances and state affairs. The revolt soon developed into popular protests and displays of discontent under the slogan “Egypt for the Egyptians.” After a series of violent clashes with the *Khedive* government, the Urabi revolution exploded in June of 1882. A violent riot in Alexandria caused nearly 200 deaths and ended all political negotiations between the contending parties. This resulted in British military aid to Tawfiq’s weak authority. On September 13 the British launched an outright attack, killing the majority of the Urabi troops and forcing their leaders to surrender. Despite its failure, the Urabi revolution has ever since represented an unsettling precedent for later popular movements.

Three decades later, nationalist movements had grown stronger, British authority had weakened, and the economic situation had deteriorated in an already fragile system. Encouraged by these conditions, Sa’d Zaghloul (1859–1927), a former minister of education and a charismatic nationalist leader, formed a delegation (*Wafd*) which, in November 1918, demanded full Egyptian independence. The British Foreign Office in London declared the *Wafd* a threat to Egypt’s stability and exiled its leadership to Malta. This decision sparked the second Egyptian revolution, that of 1919. The revolution started as a series of strikes in March among Egyptian workers, and culminated in an outburst of popular protests in the wake of the news of the exile of the *Wafd* leadership. Zaghloul was allowed back to Egypt soon thereafter, followed by an enthusiastic public reception. The British leadership, realizing they had lost popular support, decided to start negotiations for Egyptian independence. The country declared its independence as a constitutional monarchy on February 28, 1922, with King Fuad I (1869–1936) as its head of state.

The period from 1922 to 1952 can be characterized as a liberal era, both politically and

economically. While Egypt was officially an independent state, the British encroached upon this independence primarily through the relationship with the king. Continuous political pressure from the British leadership compelled the *Wafd* government to formalize their relationship. The outcome was called the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 which, among other things, allowed for soldiers from indigenous and non-aristocratic families to be admitted to the Military Academy. This would later prove critical in bringing about the Free Officers' revolution.

Several other elements are also important to keep in mind. During the 1940s liberal politics were on the decline and several national movements garnered massive support, thus weakening the political monopoly of the *Wafd*. This was mainly due to the lack of political responsiveness of the political elites. The deteriorated economic situation, due to the Great Depression and World War II, continued to aggravate the masses, who in turn responded with numerous demonstrations and strikes. Moreover, unambiguous British involvement in Egyptian affairs and Britain's role in the creation of the State of Israel gave more fervor to the nationalists, who opposed all foreign involvement and the occupation of Palestine. Egyptian troops, together with other Arab armies, engaged with Jewish troops in Palestine in 1949, whereupon they suffered a crushing defeat.

The unstable political situation of 1944 to 1950 resulted in the rotation of no less than eight minority governments. This political turbulence and the popular movements' inability to take power demonstrated the volatile and fragile nature of the Egyptian political system. Tired of the political precariousness, the public once again overwhelmingly voted for the *Wafd* in the election of January 1950; both the rural middle class and urban elites wanted stability. However, the *Wafd* soon lost all popular support for two main reasons: the *Wafd* leadership's forceful purge of political opponents and their alliance allied with the unpopular king (who was seen as a puppet of the British). In December 1951 mass demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandria turned into violent riots throughout the country. The protests grew and finally coalesced on January 26, 1952, commonly known as Black Saturday, when downtown Cairo was set on fire, killing over thirty people and injuring hundreds. Rioting against the

state authorities and symbols of western presence continued throughout the first half of 1952.

At the same time, the Egyptian army, incensed by defeat in Palestine, underwent a fundamental reorganization to render it more effective. Army officers indignantly recalled their failure, which they attributed to the political leadership and the king's incompetence. In mid-1949 the young and charismatic Colonel Nasser organized a covert 11-man assembly named the Free Officers. Initially, the assembly was formed in order to protect the interests of the army, but later it would overthrow the *Wafd* government. Some historical accounts suggest that the group organized as an informal fraternity as early as 1941, consisting of low-level officers who later formed the nucleus of the Free Officers. All of the core members of the leadership were sons either of middle-class notables or *fellahin* entering the Military Academy in either 1938 or 1939. Major Abdel Hakim Amer, Wing Commander Abdel Latif Al Baghdadi, Major Kamal Ad Deen Husein, Squadron Leader Ibrahim, Major Khaled Muhieddin, Lieutenant Colonel Zakariyya Muhieddin, Lieutenant Gamal Abdel Nasser, Lieutenant Colonel Anwar Sadat, Wing Commander Gamal Salem, Major Salah Salem, and Lieutenant Colonel Husein Shafer, the original members of the group, all shared similar family backgrounds and experiences within the military system. In late 1949 Major General Muhammad Naguib (1901–84), a senior officer and a celebrated hero of the Palestine war, joined the organization and became an invaluable asset which added to the group's authority and weight among the members of the army. The Free Officers were an amalgamated group due to their longlasting ties and friendships, and thus they remained independent from any particular ideological affiliation or particular leader outside their narrow circle.

Constitutionally, the army was directly placed under the king, who traditionally enjoyed wide support among military officers. However, a series of royal blunders during the Palestine war and the increased politicization of the young officers undermined their respect for the crown. Aware of their intentions, King Farouk attempted to retain control over the army through involvement in the elections of the Army Officers Club leadership between December 1951 and January 1952. The king was always careful to observe the elections and assure the army's loyalty by selecting royal-friendly officers for the army leadership;

however, this time the Free Officers made an organized effort to put forward their independent candidates. Farouk's attempts to obstruct the unfavorable outcome failed and the Free Officers won five seats in the leadership; they also succeeded in appointing Major General Naguib as the leader of the Club. This episode further distanced the palace from the army leadership, causing irreparable damage to the relationship.

The political situation deteriorated rapidly. In October 1951 the *Wafî* government's unilateral cancellation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty caused a massive strike in the Suez Canal Company where nearly 100,000 Egyptian workers walked out from their jobs. Shortly thereafter, the police recruits and guerilla squadrons formed by the popular movements fought the British troops for nearly three months. The Free Officers decided not to engage in the conflict, thus retaining a good relationship with the British.

It was in March 1952 that The Free Officers first became serious contenders for political power. After realizing that no other non-parliamentary organization had any chance of leading the country and declaring the incompetence of the senior leadership, the Officers declared their participation in the contest for political power. The Officers did not have a clear political or ideological agenda. They viewed their actions to be in accordance with their sense of duty towards the Egyptian nation. When the news of a premeditated coup d'état reached King Farouk, he immediately ordered the disbandment of the governing board of the Officers Club. Fearing punitive measures, the Officers reacted instantly.

During the night of July 22 the culmination of a nearly three-decade long reorientation of the army and the political system resulted in an overthrow of the corrupt *ancien régime* and abolishment of the monarchy. The Officers supported by loyal troops occupied the Army Headquarters in Cairo and, on July 23 at 7 a.m., Lieutenant Colonel Anwar Sadat (1918–81), who would later become the third president of Egypt, proclaimed via national radio that the revolution had started, and that the government had been dissolved. The Egyptian public filled the streets rejoicing with the news. The leadership of the mass movement already held close ties with the Officers and subsequently supported the coup, all in the hope of political gains; however, the initially friendly relationship would soon turn

into political antagonism and persecution. The Officers assembled some trusted political actors from the old *Wafî* regime in order to form a civil government which would run the affairs of the state. They selected Ali Mahir (1882–1960), a former prime minister and a political veteran, to head the new government, while the Officers maintained real political power through the newly formed Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

On July 26 King Farouk abdicated and sailed to Italy on the same yacht that his grandfather *Khedive* Isma'il used 73 years earlier for the same reason. Immediately after the overthrow, the RCC appointed a trusted and popular army officer and popular hero of the 1948 Palestine war, senior Major General Naguib, as the president and commander in chief. With this act, the loyalty of the army was secured. Soon after the inauguration, the RCC-selected government started negotiating with the British authorities on both the Sudan and the Suez Canal. Domestically, one of the first policies to be implemented was an agrarian reform through which the RCC attempted to gain the people's support, avert counterrevolutionary activities, and demonstrate its political capacity. Later, due to a political disagreement between the RCC and Prime Minister Mahir, the latter resigned in September. The Officers replaced him with General Naguib, who thereafter headed the government and the army.

Soon the Officers purged the old "wafdist" elite and "royalist" elements within the system. In January 1953 the RCC cancelled the constitution and declared all political parties illegal. On June 18 the Officers proclaimed Egypt a republic and appointed Prime Minister Naguib as its first president. Abdel Nasser, minister of the interior and vice prime minister, also became the leader of the RCC. However, seven months later, mounting differences between Naguib and Abdel Nasser culminated in the former's house arrest and the latter's ascension, initially to the post of prime minister and later as the second president.

In October 1954 Abdel Nasser signed a treaty with the British in which British troops were obliged to evacuate the Suez Canal zone in 20 months. In 1956 Nasser decided to nationalize all foreign assets in the country, including the Suez Canal Company. In October a tripartite invasion by Britain, France, and Israel followed this decision. Despite military defeat, Abdel Nasser

succeeded in winning the diplomatic victory and subsequent withdrawal of foreign troops in December, thanks to the diplomatic intervention of the Soviet Union and the USA. The Egyptian masses hoped that political stability, as well as economic and agrarian reform, would transform old social structures and provide a means of societal development. The achievements of the revolution of 1952 continue to be historically disputed.

SEE ALSO: Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970); Sudanese Protest under Anglo-Egyptian Rule; Urabi Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Ahmed, J. M. (1968) *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Binder, L. (1978) *In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Daly M. W. (Ed.) (1998) *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gordon, J. (1992) *Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mansfield, P. (1973) *The British in Egypt*. Trowbridge: Redwood Press.
- Vatikiotis, P. J. (1975) *The Egyptian Army in Politics*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Eighteenth Brumaire

Annette Richardson

The Eighteenth Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte was a coup d'état that overthrew the five-man governing council, the Directory, in France on November 9, 1799, and replaced it with a three-man Consulate, of which Bonaparte was First Consul. Eighteenth Brumaire was the date on the French Revolutionary calendar on which the incident occurred.

The corrupt and unpopular Directory had governed France since 1795. One of the five Directors, the cunning Abbé Sieyès, planned and organized the coup of Eighteenth Brumaire, ostensibly to prevent a restoration of radical Jacobin influence and power. Sieyès' real objective, however – having already gained effective control of the Directory, the executive branch of government – was to minimize or eliminate the annoying interference of the legislative bodies (the Council of Elders and the Council

of Five Hundred). Sieyès looked to the young General Napoleon Bonaparte, who had bedazzled the French with his military skills, as the perfect man to do his bidding. He was unaware that Bonaparte had ambitions of his own and intended to overthrow the Directory, accomplishing a coup within the coup.

On Eighteenth Brumaire, Year VIII of the Revolution (November 9, 1799), Bonaparte barged into the room in the palace of Saint-Cloud where the Council of Elders was meeting and was initially met with heckling. Addressing the Council, he decried their earlier violations of the Constitution and demanded a new Constitution. The Council was intimidated into agreeing. Bonaparte then moved on to the nearby Orangerie, where the Council of Five Hundred was meeting, with Bonaparte's brother Lucien in the chair. The hostility of the delegates was so palpable that Bonaparte panicked and left the room. Lucien Bonaparte, however, mobilized the armed guards outside, telling them that weapons were being drawn inside the meeting. The guards entered and forced the "violent" Council members into the courtyard at bayonet point.

Meanwhile, three of the five Directors – Pierre Roger Ducos, Paul Barras, and Sieyès – resigned, but the two Jacobin-oriented Directors, Louis Jérôme Gohier and Jean François August Moulin, refused to resign. Moulin escaped, and Gohier was captured and imprisoned. The Councils were disbanded and the Directory was dissolved. Bonaparte recognized a great opportunity for advancement and took advantage of it.

Twenty-five members of each of the two disbanded councils created a new rump council that immediately adjourned itself. Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Ducos were named as provisional Consuls with ten-year appointments. The new Constitution gave Bonaparte, as First Consul, the balance of power over the other two Consuls. Bonaparte held responsibility for legislation, war and peace declarations, and official appointments. The other two Consuls could only consult and advise. In other words, no real restrictions were placed on Bonaparte's ability to rule by decree as a military dictator. The Eighteenth Brumaire was the first step in his rise to absolute political power.

An echo of the Eighteenth Brumaire occurred more than a half-century later, in 1851, when a nephew of Napoleon's, Louis Bonaparte, staged another military coup in France to overthrow

a constitutional regime and seize dictatorial powers. Karl Marx, in a famous pamphlet entitled *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, compared the two events by remarking that if history repeats itself, it does so “the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.”

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); Directory, France, 1795–1799; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Sieyès, Abbé (1748–1836)

References and Suggested Readings

- Barnett, C. (1978) *Bonaparte*. London: Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux.
- De Leon, D. (1907) *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Trans. K. Marx. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.
- Eglund, S. (2005) *Napoleon: A Political Life*. New York: Scribner.
- Johnson, P. (2002) *Napoleon*. New York: Penguin.

Eisenstein, Sergei (1898–1948)

Gal Kirn

Sergei Eisenstein was a revolutionary Soviet film director and revolutionary filmmaker born in 1898 to a well-off family. Eisenstein’s father, Mikhail Osipovich Eisenstein, was an architect of Jewish descent, who converted to Orthodox Christianity. His mother, Julia Ivanovna Konetskaya, the daughter of a wealthy contractor, came from a Russian Orthodox Christian family. In 1915 Sergei started studying engineering. His studies were interrupted in 1917 when he was drafted into the army and left for the front. There he started drawing caricatures, costumes, and gestures for *commedia dell’arte*.

There is little record of how Eisenstein was affected by the events of October 1917; however, in the spring of 1918 he volunteered for the Red Army, whereas his father joined the Whites and subsequently immigrated to Germany. While in the military, Eisenstein again managed to combine his service as a technician with study of theater, philosophy, psychology, and linguistics. He staged and performed in several productions, but most importantly he wrote texts for the “agitation train,” where his future cameraman Edouard Tisse worked and Dziga Vertov edited material. In the same year he became a head of

the mise-en-scene in the Proletkult Theater in Moscow.

In 1923 he directed a sketch of Sergei Tretyakov, *Gas Mask*, that was staged in the gas factory. In the same year, Eisenstein’s first short film *Diary of Gloumov* debuted, with another film projected the same year. American films had already used the montage technique, but it was with Soviet cineastes that this invention was discovered theoretically and recognized as a constitutive procedure which transformed film into a specific expressive medium. In addition to film practice, Eisenstein’s influence reached the realm of film theory, and was first elaborated in *Montage of Attractions*.

Within the montage technique, arbitrarily chosen images, independent from the action, are presented in a non-chronological sequence in order to create the maximum psychological impact. The famous example from *Strike* (1924) recounts the repression of a strike by the soldiers of the tsar. Eisenstein juxtaposed shots of workers being mowed down by machine guns with shots of cattle being butchered in a slaughterhouse. These juxtaposed fragments were then reconstructed by the viewer, who saw the relationship between the cattle and the workers. Eisenstein’s mastery of the montage, the close-up, and film technique in general still echoes in the famous Odessa Staircase sequence in *Battleship Potemkin* (1925).

Eisenstein focused his attention on film’s impact on the viewer as evidenced by his famous tractor metaphor, in which film plows over the psyche of the spectator from a given class position. Here, there are two theoretical emphases. On the one hand, Eisenstein focused on the psyche of the spectator and its theoretical linkages to Pavlovian reflexology; on the other hand, his film engagement cannot be understood without attention to class position. His reference to dialectical materialism is continual and can be located in the axiom “art is struggle.” Thus, his main emphasis is on film as not merely a representation, but rather a transformation of the content via montage that ultimately transforms the spectator’s relation to the content. Eisenstein’s revolutionary position within film theory/practice is characterized by this point, whereas the old aesthetical/philosophical distinction between form and content is suspended. Further, for Eisenstein, the hero in his film was not the individual, but the mass. These important

contributions had immense effects on twentieth-century film as a whole.

Indeed, Eisenstein's avant-garde genius first encountered problems with Stalin. For the tenth jubilee of the October Revolution he was commissioned to direct the film *October*, but its screening had to be postponed to 1928 in order for Eisenstein to delete images of Trotsky. With the film *General Line* (1929) he was attacked in critiques of the film's formalism. Soon new aesthetic principles of socialist realism were introduced into all the arts, while the avant-garde movement started to fade under the pressure of bureaucratic interventions and repression. In that time Eisenstein traveled across Europe and to the US, where he held film lectures at various universities. In the US he undertook a film project called *Que Viva México!* that remained unfinished thanks to the economic crisis and political problems at that time. With his return to the USSR he started to work on more monumental films that centered on important historical figures in Russian history, such as *Alexander Nevski* (1938) and *Ivan the Terrible* (1945). This reorientation can surely be attributed to Stalinist pressures.

SEE ALSO: Agitprop; Russia, Revolutions: Sources and Contexts

References and Suggested Readings

- Aumont, J. (Ed.) (1979) *Montage Eisenstein*. Paris: Albatros.
- Bordwell, D. (1994) *The Cinema of Eisenstein*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Christie, I. & Taylor, R. (Eds.) (1993) *Eisenstein Revisited*. New York: Routledge.
- Leyda, J. (Ed.) (1949) Sergei M. Eisenstein. In *Film Form: Essays in Film Theory*. New York: Harcourt Brace.

Ejército de Liberación Nacional, Colombia

Dario Azzellini

The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) is a Marxist guerilla group founded in 1964 as a military-political organization. It has been strongly influenced by the Cuban Revolution, Che Guevara, and liberation theology and was founded to use revolutionary violence to seize power. It later changed to a vision in which

power seizure is not a simple takeover but the result of a revolutionary process of construction of alternatives and attacks on the existing order. The ELN is the second largest Colombian guerilla group after the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Government sources estimate its membership since the beginning of the 1990s as constantly around 5,000. The ELN does not offer numbers and its structure, with a strong focus on political work, makes it difficult to count its membership.

The ELN's founding nucleus came from a Colombian student delegation of leftist youth organizations which traveled to Cuba in 1962. While in Cuba, some decided to pick up the armed struggle for a socialist revolution in Colombia, and seven undertook military training. Among them were Fabio Vásquez Castaño, who was elected leader of the new Liberation Brigade, and José Antonio Galán. Back in Colombia at the end of 1963 the group established urban and rural structures. The main focuses were in the Department of Santander, an important petrol region with a strong rebellious tradition. Local peasants, former liberal guerillas, joined the ELN, bringing their weapons with them.

The era between 1963 and 1966 was marked by a strong rise of mass movements in Colombia. Strikes paralyzed the country and a radical student movement emerged. A main grassroots force behind the mobilizations was the United Front (FU) led by charismatic priest Camilo Torres Restrepo. Urban ELN militants were active in workers' unions and student organizations and set up urban units executing military operations. The first was a bomb attack on June 4, 1964, even before the first official appearance as ELN.

The creation of the first rural guerilla column of 17 people on July 4, 1964 is considered the ELN's birth. After a two-week march, on January 7, 1965 the column took the small town Simacota, killing four policemen and two soldiers. The ELN declared the beginning of a revolutionary war. The event had great repercussions. During the following months the ELN carried out bombings and attacks on police and army forces while gathering funds and arms. The discourse of the ELN was directed against social injustice and the oligarchy, had elements of nationalism, and was strongly anti-imperialist. It connected somehow to the radical liberal discourse.

Camilo Torres' FU started supporting the ELN's urban structures. On October 1, 1965 he joined the ELN column as combatant and was killed in his first battle on February 15, 1966. Torres claimed the compatibility of Marxism and Christianity and strongly influenced the ELN and revolutionary Christians in Latin America. Because of Torres, priests, monks, and nuns provided important support for the ELN. Among others, the Spanish priests Manuel Pérez and Domingo Laín Sáenz joined the ELN in 1969. Pérez became the ELN's highest military commander and died February 14, 1998 of terminal hepatitis C. Laín died in 1974 in combat.

The ELN faced a number of problems. For one, Fabio Vázquez's central role in the ELN's construction led to an authoritarian leadership. Moreover, the ELN insisted that a prolonged guerilla war would lead to an uprising. Also, the militarist idea of revolution did not offer movements any space to insert their struggles. So the ELN did not profit much from its popularity. Nevertheless, between 1969 and 1972 the ELN expanded its military presence and could appropriate sufficient military and economic resources. But it also suffered serious setbacks and political deviations, leading to a severe crisis in the 1970s. In June 1972 during an army attack 210 urban militants were arrested.

In October 1973 the army carried out Operation Anorí to wipe out the ELN, and 33,000 soldiers, with air support and US military advisors, were deployed to a region of Antioquia where an ELN column had been very active in 1972–3 and had grown to 110 guerillas. The army spread terror among the rural population. The ELN engaged in 39 battles, killing 178 troops and losing 27 guerillas in combat and more to arrests and desertions. Only a few managed to escape the surrounding army.

On November 15, 1973 the second in command, Ricardo Lara Parada, started collaborating with the police, causing more arrests. The persecution led many militants to give up, and most ELN structures were dismantled. Of 250 guerillas in rural columns, only 70 were left. Remaining urban structures were isolated with no contacts between them or with rural columns. The only survivor of the leadership was Fabio Vazquez. He started reconnecting militants and called for a National Assembly in July 1974. He turned the assembly into a series of trials against those supposedly responsible for the

crisis, leading to six executions. He left Colombia in August 1974 to seek support in Cuba. The ELN initiated a self-critical debate in which Vazquez' historical contribution and his recent political deviations were recognized. He was expelled from the leadership and no longer authorized to speak for the ELN. He lives now as a professor in Cuba.

The organization was reconstructed under Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, the highest military commander today. It recommenced military operations at the beginning of 1975, and new structures were built mainly in urban areas with workers and unions, leading in 1976 to the birth of Independent Class Syndicalism (SIC), the ELN Collectives of Unions Work, and the Workers' Commandos. In October 1976 the ELN split in two but reunited in March 1979. At the first ELN National Reunion – December 1977 to March 1978 – the whole leadership was renounced. A group of urban activists seized provisional leadership and started a demobilization, which was stopped by the commanders. At that point the rural structures had just 36 guerillas left.

At the end of 1978 the ELN started to expand again. The historical project was revalidated, work was reorganized in areas, and direct work with communities began. This methodology was borrowed from liberation theology, which showed important results with the creation of the Front Domingo Laín and the Front Capitán Parmeño, based on peasant movements. A rotating provisional national leadership was installed, which consolidated the work but failed in centralizing structures and organizing an urgently needed larger reunion. In August 1982 a new national leadership was installed with equal representation of all fronts. A National Reunion in September 1983 was attended by several hundred ELN militants. Here a new revolutionary program which gave more importance to social struggles was launched, and a nine-member collective leadership was chosen, headed by Manuel Pérez. A period of rapid growth followed. When the guerillas M-19, EPL, and FARC signed ceasefire agreements with the government in 1984, the ELN opposed it.

In February 1985 ELN and the smaller Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT) and MIR-Patria Libre built the Trilateral, but it was dissolved in May 1985 in favor of the National Guerilla Coordination (CNG) with M-19,

EPL, and Quintín Lame. MIR-PL merged with the ELN in June 1987, forming the Camilista Union-ELN (UCELN). The unification evidenced the opening up of the previously rather sectarian ELN. In September 1987 the CGN groups and the FARC founded the Guerilla Coordination Simón Bolívar (CGSB), which was made up of FARC, UCELN, and EPL. It advocated global peace negotiations, including popular organizations and international observation. After a powerful guerilla campaign, President César Gaviria and the CGSB held talks with no result (1991 and 1992). In October 1993 the CGSB was dissolved by the FARC.

From 1986 to 1993 the ELN experienced its strongest growth. It set up new guerilla units, mobile columns, and urban militias, extended its presence to almost all national territory, and modernized its arms. In August 1991 hundreds of mainly urban militants and one guerilla front formed the Current of Socialist Renewal (CRS) and disarmed in 1994. In 1993 the Guevarist Revolutionary Army (ERG) split off, and in 1996 part of one guerilla front built the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), which demobilized in 2007.

The ELN directed its main efforts from 1986 to support movements, local forms of self-government, and collective economy and property. At its first regular National Assembly in January 1986 it approved the prolonged people's war as a military strategy, recognizing a rural guerilla group alone could not provoke an insurrection and that they had to combine rural and urban military activities. It entered a new phase of revolutionary war by creating five War Fronts and First Army units. The people's war was also fought on a political ground. Therefore, the ELN decided to support the construction of forms of people's power, gaining autonomy and transforming themselves during the revolutionary process into alternatives to existing institutions and practices. As further democratization in 1989, a new collective national leadership of 17 members, six as a central command, was elected. Manuel Pérez was named highest military commander and Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista second. For the first time, negotiations were discussed as a tactical element.

The ELN refuses any links with narcotraffic and is mainly financed by imposing so-called war taxes on entrepreneurs and transnational companies, kidnapping wealthy Colombians, and

trading some natural resources (mainly gold) of regions under its control. As a mechanism of pressure on corporations and to protest the sellout of national resources, the ELN started in the 1980s with attacks on energy infrastructure, especially oil pipelines. These have been criticized for their environmental impact and risks for the population. The ELN reduced the attacks drastically after 80 civilians were killed by accident on October 18, 1998, when the ELN blew up an oil pipeline in Antioquia, causing fire in a nearby town. In 1995 the ELN agreed to stick to all the recommendations of Amnesty International concerning warfare in Colombia, but it is still accused of human rights violations.

In 1996 the ELN Congress reconfirmed the prolonged people's war and validity of Marxism-Leninism, declaring a classless society as its goal. But the construction of a new society with a renewed socialist, human, popular, and democratic orientation was not to be postponed until after revolutionary war and had to take place inside existing institutions and as alternative to them. The ELN started to influence regional elections by forcing candidates to accomplish their programs and handle public finances transparently. Direct references to Christian Marxism disappeared, and the name UCELN changed back to ELN.

The ELN started its tactical handling of talks with the government in mid-1997. The ELN's central proposals in talks up to now are agreements for the "humanization of war" and a National Convention with participation of all popular sectors to define necessary changes in Colombia and build a base for future negotiations. On July 12–15, 1998 the ELN met with civil organizations in Mainz, Germany to prepare a possible convention. The national convention was accepted by several governments, but no government stuck to the agreements, insisting on the ELN's demobilization.

On April 12, 1999 the ELN sought to pressure the government by hijacking a regular Avianca flight with 46 passengers. On May 30 it kidnapped 170 people, mainly of regional oligarchic families, during a church service near Cali. All were liberated in the following months. Talks were resumed after an ELN offensive in April 2000, and in January 2001 a pre-agreement accepting demilitarization of three municipalities for the convention was signed. But paramilitary mobilization supported by the army made it

impossible. During talks in January 2002 in Cuba the government agreed to stop destroying supposed Coca cultivation, while the ELN agreed to stop attacks on energy infrastructure. Shortly after, the agreement was suspended by both. After three years of refusal, the ELN started exploratory talks with the government of Álvaro Uribe in December 2005 in Cuba, but nothing came of it.

The FARC criticized the ELN's participation in talks. Their relationship has been complicated because of their different political backgrounds, strategies, and practices. In some regions they join forces in combat, and in 2003, after the FARC and ELN leadership met for talks, they even launched a huge joint military campaign against paramilitaries. But in other regions they are in armed confrontation, for example in Arauca, near the Venezuelan border, where they have been engaged in a war against each other since 2006, when the FARC started to dispute the ELN's historical influence in the region.

In 2002 the ELN had 90 urban and rural fronts and companies. By 2004 it had lost much of its urban work through killings, arrests, and even military attacks and air strikes, such as the 2001 attack upon the Comuna XIII, a shantytown of Medellín which had a strong presence of ELN militias. In rural zones the army strategy is combined with paramilitaries conducting brutal massacres and terror against the population, affecting especially ELN zones, in which up to 40 percent of the population have been displaced. Nevertheless this did not seriously weaken ELN's combatant force, which in 2006 still had nearly 90 guerilla fronts.

The mainly US-financed rearming of the army, known as Plan Colombia, and the intensified war carried out by President Álvaro Uribe (2002) transferred offensive capacity from the guerillas to government troops. Many analysts agree that it is more a tactical withdrawal than a military defeat. A far more important problem centers on the great difficulties of rural and urban political work due to widespread repression.

The ELN has been declared "defeated" or "ready to be absorbed by the FARC" by analysts and governments since 1965. But ideological compromise and the capacity for autonomous operations by many ELN militants and structures make the ELN's disintegration improbable. Much more than a guerilla group, the ELN is a mixture of armed and political movement.

Its Fourth Congress in July 2006 described the organization's situation as strengthened and unified. It reaffirmed the search for a political solution, but also to continue armed struggle until political, social, cultural, and economic transformation is accomplished.

SEE ALSO: Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1960s–1970s; Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1970s–1990s; FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army)

References and Suggested Readings

- Aguilera Peña, M. (2006) ELN: entre las armas y la política. In Gutiérrez, S. F. & Sánchez Gómez, G. (Eds.), *Nuestra Guerra sin nombre. Transformaciones del conflicto en Colombia*. Bogotá: Editorial Norma, pp. 209–66.
- Arenas Reyes, J. (1971) *La guerrilla por dentro*. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo editores.
- Dudley, S. S. (2004) *Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia*. New York: Routledge.
- Hernández, M. (2006) *Rojo y negro. Historia del ELN*. Tafalla: Txalaparta.
- López Vigil, M. (1989) *Camilo camina en Colombia*. Mexico City: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo.
- Murillo, M. A. & Avirama, J. R. (2003) *Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest, and Destabilization*. New York: Seven Stories Press.
- Stokes, D. (2005) *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*. London: Zed Books.
- Yepez, F. (1999) *El ELN y la paz en Colombia*. Bogotá: Editorial La Calle.

El Argentinazo, December 19 and 20, 2001

Marina Sitrin

The popular rebellion that began in Argentina on December 19 and 20, 2001, often referred to as the "19th and 20th," was a break in Argentine history. It was a moment when millions spontaneously took to the streets across Argentina and, without leaders or hierarchical orders, forced the government to resign. Through continuous mobilizations, the people proceeded to expel four more governments in less than two weeks. The initial catalyst of the mobilizations was the government's freeze on personal bank accounts

and the conversion of currency, once pegged to the dollar, into a financial asset that would be held by the banks and used to secure payments to foreign investors, but could not be accessed by those who had deposited the money.

Though this move on the part of the government instigated the popular unrest, public contempt for Argentine economic policy was longstanding. The government of Argentina had taken out huge loans with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1990s, and in the late 1990s began to repay these loans through privatization and severe austerity measures. Thousands of people were laid off, wages and pensions were cut, and social services degraded. These measures emanated from the IMF as part of the contract for yet another multibillion dollar loan. As with most of Latin America – and the world – the results were disastrous for the majority of people. Working and middle-class Argentines experienced no direct relief from the new loans. By 2001, industrial production had fallen by over 25 percent, the official poverty level grew to 44 percent, and the unofficial level of poverty was substantially higher. For many Argentines the popular rebellion was no surprise.

The rebellion of the 19th and 20th was one of direct democracy combined with direct action. The popular rebellion began with just a sound – the sound of someone banging a pot. That sound became many sounds as neighbors joined in one after another. These sounds were followed by bodies, and the bodies began to move together – without a single direction, but together. Eventually, in each neighborhood, the movement of bodies merged into the main streets and then into the main plaza. Once in the plaza they made their collective voice heard, not through speeches or party placards but with simple words in unison: “*Que se Vayan Todos*” (“They All Must Go”).

There are countless beautiful and powerful descriptions of these days and weeks in the street. Ezequiel, a participant in the soon-to-be created neighborhood assembly of Cid Campeador, described them as euphoric, despite the dangers and difficulties of the situation. With so many people out in the streets, there was a sense of satisfaction in ordinary Argentines taking the popular response to the crisis into their own hands.

Still, the national government quickly responded by declaring a state of emergency, ordering citizens to stay at home and attempting

to disperse the people in the street. In response to this repression by the state, which killed dozens and wounded many hundreds of others, hundreds of thousands poured onto the streets of Buenos Aires. Paula, a participant in the neighborhood assemblies as well as in feminist collectives, recalled that the events of *el Argentinazo* emboldened her with the courage to face repressive police forces who were attacking the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. Though protesters had been killed only the night before, she felt she needed to be there to face the police in solidarity with the Mothers.

Many refer to these moments and days as a rupture with the past, a break from the deeply instilled fear and silence that was a legacy of the brutal Argentinian dictatorship that tortured and disappeared over 30,000 people. Carina, a participant in the *cacerolazo* (a form of protest in which participants bang on pots, pans, or other utensils) and subsequent organizing, described an unlikely but pleasing sense of solidarity that resulted from joining in with others in the *cacerolazo*. For her, banging pots and pans with neighbors, with whom she generally rarely spoke, or with the local butcher or pharmacist, symbolized a reaffirmation of a sense of kinship that she thought she had lost. For many, what was gained on the 19th and 20th was community.

Neighborhood Assemblies

The popular rebellion was comprised of workers and the unemployed, the middle class, and those recently declassed. It was a rebellion without leadership, either from established parties or from a newly emerged elite. Its strength was measured in the fall of five consecutive national governments in two weeks. It precipitated the birth of hundreds of neighborhood assemblies involving many tens of thousands of active participants.

People in the neighborhood assemblies at first met in order to try to discover new ways to support one another and new ways to meet their basic necessities. Many explain the organization of the first assemblies as an encountering, or a sort of finding, of one another. People were in the streets, they began talking to one another, and they saw the need to gather. Then they gathered, street corner by street corner, park by park. In many cases someone would write on a wall or street, “Neighbors, let’s meet Tuesday at 9 p.m.,” and an assembly would begin. At its peak, there

were over 200 neighborhood assemblies with between 200 and 300 people considering themselves participants of each.

Each neighborhood assembly worked on a variety of projects, from facilitating barter networks, creating popular kitchens, planting organic gardens, and sometimes taking over abandoned buildings (including the highly symbolic takeover of abandoned banks) and creating community centers in their place. These occupied spaces housed any number of things, including kitchens, print shops, day cares, after-school programs, computers with free Internet access, and even one small movie theater.

Something common among almost all neighborhood assemblies was participants' ability to relate to one another within the assembly. As with the popular rebellion, the assemblies were not organized with a political party or on the premise that a few people would be responsible for organizing them. The desire and reality was that people together would organize for themselves. Assemblies were forums for the face-to-face interactions where neighbors got to know one another and made decisions about what they would do in their neighborhood.

After a time people began to call this new social relationship *horizontalidad*. *Horizontalidad* is a word that has come to embody the new social arrangements and principles of organization in many of the new movements in Argentina, from the neighborhood assemblies to the recuperated workplaces and *piquetero* groups. As its name suggests, it implies a flat plane upon which to communicate and organize. It entails the use of direct democracy and involves, or at least intentionally strives toward, non-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian creation rather than reaction. It is a break with vertical ways of organizing and relating. *Horizontalidad* has often been translated as horizontalism or horizontality, but most accurate is *horizontalidad*. New social and political relationships often require new language, especially when the language that exists does not have an accurate way of reflecting new experiences. *Horizontalidad* is one such case. It is not so much a thing as "horizontality" might imply, but rather a process; it reflects new relationships as well as the desire for new organizational models. Emilio, a participant in the movements in Argentina, has called *horizontalidad* a "tool and a goal." Another participant, Paula, described the importance of *horizontalidad* as a medium

for changing subjectivities, "based on the acceptance of 'the other' . . . in a democratic context." According to Paula, *horizontalidad*, as a way of doing politics, requires "an emancipatory base." Even if the assemblies were to disappear, they would leave behind a legacy of a fundamental shift in subjectivity resulting from the empowerment experienced by virtue of ridding one's self of notions concerning the limitations of political action. In a society that champions individuality and denigrates the possibilities of collectivity, such a faith in the potential of collective action is quite a profound and important change.

The Assemblies Change Form

The years after the rebellion witnessed a significant decrease in the organization of, and participation in, neighborhood assemblies. Many dozens are still active, but this is a significant decrease from the hundreds that emerged in the months after the rebellion. Many explanations exist for this, from the intrusion of leftist political parties to a lack of concreteness in activity and interference from the state.

After the first months of self-organizing, a number of political parties saw an opportunity for recruitment and domination. Party members entered the assemblies and attempted to dominate them. When domination was impossible, as it almost always was, they often initiated what some refer to as disruption campaigns, causing many frustrated participants to leave assemblies.

Many of the assemblies lacked concrete projects and ended up talking a great deal more than doing. While one of the lasting aspects of the assembly movement is the effect the process had on participants' sense of self, community, and collectivity (a process also referred to as the creation of new subjectivities), without concrete projects to ground the assemblies, many people drifted away. Of the assemblies that continue to exist, almost all are involved in many neighborhood-based projects, and some continue to function in occupied buildings, such as banks, that are used as community centers.

The neighborhood assemblies became one of the focal points of the government's attempts to regain control of society. These efforts generally involved, on one hand, overt and covert repression, and on the other, attempts to regain legitimacy. One type of attempt that was made, which sometimes succeeded, was the offering

of services, goods, and sometimes even physical space for the neighborhood assemblies. Most assemblies self-organized all of their popular kitchens and projects, including the occupation of buildings, for the use of the community. The government saw this as an opening for the attainment of potential credibility, and began to offer assemblies boxes of food, and even buildings in which they could hold the assemblies. These offers were sometimes debated for months in the various assemblies, and created huge distractions from the projects that were already underway.

Many participants in the neighborhood assemblies foresaw a decline in participation in the assemblies, and even felt it would not be that significant a loss. They explained this by saying that something had changed in them as people and how they relate to one another, and that this change would not go away even if the structures of organization changed. They focused instead on the importance of changing subjectivities and the creation of new social relationships. They felt that once they had changed how they related to one another as people, the assemblies had fulfilled their role. This change would then infuse new organizations and activities.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Labor Unions and Protests of the Unemployed, 1990s; Argentina, *Piquetero* Movement; Argentina, Social and Political Protest, 2001–2007; Madres de la Plaza de Mayo; Movement of Recuperated Factories, Argentina

References and Suggested Readings

- Huber, U. & North, P. (2004) Alternate Spaces of the "Argentinazo." *Antipode* 36 (5): 963–84.
- La Vaca Collective (2007) *Sin Patrón: Stories from Argentina's Worker-Run Factories*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Sitrin, M. (Ed.) (2006) *Horizontalism: Voices of Popular Power in Argentina*. Oakland: AK Press.

Ellis, Daniel Edward "Daan" (1904–1963)

Wessel P. Visser

Ellis was born in 1904 in Swellendam in the Cape, South Africa, and completed his high school education in Ladysmith, Natal. He obtained a teacher's diploma at the Paarl Teachers' College, and was a teacher for a number of years. From

1930 he farmed in the district of Calvinia, and moved to the Witwatersrand in 1938 to begin work in the Nigel and Marievale goldmines on the east Witwatersrand. In 1943 Ellis was elected as a National Party (NP) city councilor of Nigel, serving in that capacity until 1949. He also served as mayor from 1945 to 1946. In addition, he was a member of the Hospital Board of Nigel, and chairman of the executive of the NP's Nigel division.

There was, from the 1930s, an ongoing struggle between Afrikaner nationalists and supporters of Charles Harris for control of the South African Mineworkers' Union (SAMWU). There was widespread dissatisfaction in the SAMWU over the autocracy and corruption of the Harris administration, as well as its failure to defend wages or challenge the Chamber of Mines. This struggle continued after Harris was assassinated in 1939 and replaced by Bertie Broderick, and it was only in November 1948 – six months after the NP won the general elections and installed apartheid – that the nationalist *Hervormingsorganisasie* (Reformers' Organization) managed to secure control.

Ellis was the Reformers' candidate in SAMWU, and became the union's general secretary. The union, one of the most important in the country, promoted the strict enforcement of job color bars, support for the NP and anti-communism, and established a press in 1950 to produce not only its own *Die Mynwerker* (The Mine Worker), but also *Die Bouwerker* (The Building Worker) and *Die Klerewerkeersnuus* (The Garment Workers' News). The labor movement was in a state of flux by this time, and the South African Trades and Labor Council (SATLC) split into three. In 1957 Ellis became the president of the new South African Confederation of Labor (SACL), the pro-apartheid union federation formed by the SATLC right wing.

During Ellis's 15-year tenure, SAMWU enjoyed one of its politically stable and influential periods. As a former Reformer and member of the ruling NP, Ellis had unrivaled and unprecedented access to ministerial and prime ministerial offices to promote the interests of white workers on the mines. Whereas Harris and Broderick had largely ignored the concerns of union members around health, Ellis managed to improve the functioning of the Medical Silicosis Bureau, and have the Silicosis Act (1956) revised. He had a friendly working relationship with Dr. A. J. R. van Rhyen, minister

of mining and health, and SAMWU, in general, had a very close relationship with the NP government.

However, as had been the case with his predecessors, Ellis's tenure was marred by controversy. While hailed as one of the greatest heroes of SAMWU, he probably endured more vilification, smear campaigns, investigations, motions of no-confidence, and lawsuits than any other general secretary in the history of the union. Like Harris, his administration was dogged by allegations of corruption.

Soon after his appointment, rumors of gross misconduct surfaced in connection with the purchase of Transafrika House as SAMWU head office. Ellis was accused of paying too much for the building, benefiting thereby Dr. F. J. Kritzing, a controversial Johannesburg estate agent, through an exorbitant commission. In exchange, it was alleged, Ellis had received shares in a liquor store owned by Kritzing.

The findings of the unofficial SAMWU, and official government, commissions of inquiry were inconclusive, but relations between Ellis and Dr. Albert Hertzog, the original driving force behind the Reformers, soured. Subsequently, Paul Visser, the SAMWU president, initiated a private law suit against Ellis in 1953 for fraud and falsehood in connection with the Transafrika House purchase. Ellis was found guilty of fraud, and sentenced to 18 months in jail, but an appeal against the sentence succeeded on a technical point.

Towards the end of his tenure, dissatisfaction within SAMWU ranks with Ellis's management style and managerial abilities came to a head. He was accused of dictatorial behavior and there were allegations of alcohol abuse. Eventually, the union executive convinced him to resign rather than face summary dismissal. Ellis, a heavy smoker, died on July 8, 1963 at the age of 59, due to pneumonia.

SEE ALSO: COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions); South Africa, Labor Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Hepple, A. (1953) *Trade Unions in Travail*. Johannesburg: Prompt Printing.
- Horrel, M. (1969) *South African Workers: Their Organizations and Patterns of Employment*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.
- Lang, J. (1986) *Bullion Johannesburg: Men, Mines and the Challenge of Conflict*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.

- Lewis, J. (1984) *Industrialization and Trade Union Organization in South Africa 1924–55: The Rise and Fall of the South African Trades and Labour Council*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Naudé, L. (1969) *Dr. A. Hertzog, die Nasionale Party en die Mynwerkers*. Pretoria: NRT.
- O'Meara, D. (1983) *Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital, and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934–1948*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- Patterson, S. (1957) *The Last Trek: A Study of the Boer People and the Afrikaner Nation*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Simons, J. & Simons, R. (1969/1983) *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850–1950*. London: International Defense and Aid Fund.
- Stals, E. (Ed.) (1986) *Afrikaners in die Goudstad: deel 2 1924–1961*. Pretoria: HAUM.
- Walker, I. L. & Weinbren, B. (1961) *2000 Casualties: A History of the Trade Unions and the Labour Movement in the Union of South Africa*. Johannesburg: South African Trade Union Council.

Emmet, Robert (1778–1803) and Emmet's Rebellion

Karen Sonnelitter

Robert Emmet was born in Dublin in 1778, into a family that was a solid pillar of the Dublin elite. Young Robert grew up surrounded by leaders of the United Irishmen, including his older brother, Thomas Addis Emmet. Theobald Wolfe Tone was a regular visitor to the Emmet home. Not surprisingly, Robert was attracted to their revolutionary republican politics. He entered Trinity College in 1793 and while there became secretary to one of four United Irish societies at the college. In the aftermath of the failed 1798 Rebellion the college purged republican sympathizers and he was expelled. Meanwhile, his brother, deeply implicated in the uprising, had fled to France to escape prosecution. After the 1798 defeat the younger Emmet became involved in the dangerous and highly conspiratorial work of reorganizing the United Irish Society. He helped to devise a secretive military structure that would provide the basis for a renewed attempt at insurrection in 1803.

In 1802 Robert Emmet joined his brother in France, and together with other United Irish representatives they approached Napoleon Bonaparte to request military support for another

Irish challenge to British rule. Those negotiations failed and Robert returned home determined to launch a new rebellion with or without French assistance. He and his comrades began to manufacture weapons and explosives at various sites around Dublin; their headquarters were at Butterfield Lane, south of the city. The rebels planned to seize the main government buildings in Dublin and from there to mobilize the surrounding counties. They would depend upon seasoned local United Irish leaders who had escaped to Dublin after 1798 to bring out their home counties. Emmet and his associates bought houses at strategic locations in Dublin and stockpiled them with weapons, hidden behind false walls. They were able successfully to conceal the plot from authorities, but an accident upset their plans. An explosion at one of the Dublin depots raised the authorities' suspicions and caused the conspirators to move forward the date that had been set for the rising.

The insurrection was launched on July 23, 1803, when the rebels attacked Dublin Castle from their depot on Thomas Street. They failed to capture the castle and in the confusion the rebellion transformed into a riot. Emmet abandoned his plans and fled to the hills of Wicklow. However, he was captured in Dublin on August 25 when he returned to the city to see Sarah Curran, the daughter of a family friend with whom he was romantically involved. Sarah's father, Philpot Curran, was a prominent radical barrister who had defended many other United Irishmen, but he refused to defend Emmet after learning of the tryst with his daughter.

Emmet was tried and convicted on September 19 and executed the next day by hanging and beheading. In practical terms, Emmet's Rebellion can only be described as a debacle, but Irish nationalists count it among the most revered episodes in their chronicles of heroism, patriotism, and martyrdom. Robert Emmet himself is best remembered for his moving speech from the dock, no definitive version of which exists, but he certainly uttered some version of a now-famous line: "Let no man write my epitaph. . . . When my country takes her place among the nations of the earth, then shall my character be vindicated, then may my epitaph be written."

His brother, Thomas Addis Emmet, later left France and emigrated to the United States, where he became attorney general of the state of New York.

SEE ALSO: Ireland, Age of Revolutions, 1775–1803; Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798; Tone, Theobald Wolfe (1763–1798); United Irishmen

References and Suggested Readings

- Elliott, M. (2003) *Robert Emmet: The Making of a Legend*. London: Profile.
- Geoghegan, P. M. (2002) *Robert Emmet: A life*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Knox, O. (1997) *Rebels and Informers: Stirrings of Irish Independence*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- O'Donnell, R. (2003) *Robert Emmet and the Rising of 1803*. Portland: Irish Academic Press.

Enclosure movement, protests against

Brian Unger

Enclosure in England (ca. 1750–1860) was a parliamentary system of property redistribution whereby common lands for farming, grazing, and hunting, freely enjoyed by small tenant farmers, peasant villagers, cottagers, and farm laborers since the middle ages, were measured, surveyed, and privatized, with ownership largely reassigned to the landed gentry and aristocracy who controlled the machinery of government. "Enclosure" refers specifically to a closing-off of rural lands with fences, ditching, and other techniques, accompanied by extremely punitive new laws for trespassing, poaching, and hunting. The grand estates and farms of the aristocracy were often clearly demarcated with fences and walls, but ownership of millions of acres of English land formerly held in common for the people, and managed under a complex and customary scheme of public use applied over centuries, was transferred to the politically powerful landed classes. Enclosure changed the entire socioeconomic fabric of wide swaths of rural England and Scotland. What had been an ample inventory of open fields, forests, and fens available to the peasantry for growing food and raising livestock since medieval times were now severely narrowed and, in large sections of the rural countryside, eliminated altogether.

In all, during this time nearly 4,000 Acts of Parliament transferred more than 6 million acres of land – one-fourth of all of England's tillable acreage – to the politically dominant classes. Landlords then destroyed cottages to force farm workers into urban migration, turning

commoners into laborers. Of the relatively few middle-class peasant farmers who were able to retain land in the redistribution process, even fewer could sustain the subsequent legal, financial, and material infrastructure costs incurred by privatization, such as lawyer fees, surveyor fees, and fencing. Many smallholders sold cheap or were bought out for a pittance at foreclosure auctions as the large landowners built parliamentary suffrage on the backs of the weak. Tens of thousands of English families lost their economic independence and were forced to work on the great estates for subsistence wages, or to migrate to distant urban slums to earn a living in the booming factories of the Industrial Revolution.

In earlier times the English crown intervened when aristocratic pressure threatened the rights of the peasantry; however, a deeply reactionary mode to revolutionary developments in France, the labor violence among the peasantry, and intellectual unrest in London made it easier for the aristocracy to convince Parliament that the centuries-old social contract with the rural peasantry was no longer economically viable. They argued that Britain's old commons farming structure had depressed agricultural productivity and driven up agricultural wages to unsustainable levels. Parliament was in the pocket of the aristocracy, and the crown would not intervene again.

It was difficult for rural villagers to maintain the energy and resources for an effective protest movement when the implementation of many enclosures crept along over a period of decades, not months. There was no visible threat to their livelihood for years at a stretch, as it was not unusual for a bill to take from 5 to 17 years before enclosure was actually implemented. For a class of individuals tied to a grueling work schedule and isolated from natural allies in London, under-educated and unsophisticated, ultimate political defeat was all but inevitable.

Even so, opposition was so deep and abiding that people's anger was strong enough to drive them to attack their own country's soldiers. The numbers are telling – 300 rioters had to be dispersed at the Willbarston, Northamptonshire enclosure riots of 1799. They tore down fences and burned ricks of hay. By 1830 the pro-labor, anti-threshing machine Swing riots were widespread throughout south and east England, the result of the progressive impoverishment and dispossession of the agricultural workforce. Parliamentary enclosure had eradicated subsist-

ence farming in the commons that sustained poor farm families with food and fuel through the direst economic times. Thousands of agricultural laborers became dependent for the first time on whatever cash wages the local lords were willing to remit. Many opted for indentured servitude in the United States, or for factory wage conditions in Liverpool or Manchester. While farm income had been tolerable during the Napoleonic wars, peace in 1815 brought plunging grain prices and an oversupply of labor. The most marginal peasants were frequently the angriest and most violent because they had the most to lose when grazing, hunting, and poaching rights and the gathering of food and fuel on the commons was curtailed.

Without a strategic alliance with the middling, landowning peasants one rung up the class ladder – smallholders, small owners, the “middle peasantry” – those least able to resist the gentry and prevail in a pitched political battle – the landless workers – were doomed to defeat. The landed farmer's economic interest was anathema to the cottager and poor worker, and thus no powerful political front was set against the aristocracy and their corrupt parliament in London. This intra-class dialectic was driven by the market forces unleashed by agrarian capitalism. Only a peasantry with control over key resources could have secured any meaningful political leverage in this scenario.

SEE ALSO: Luddite Riots in Nottingham; Swing Riots

References and Suggested Readings

- Hammond, J. L. & Hammond, B. (1913/1967) *The Village Labourer*. New York: Augustus M. Kelley.
- Neeson, J. M. (1993) *Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure and Social Change in England, 1700–1820*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Polanyi, K. (1944) *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. New York: Farrar & Rinehart.
- Slater, G. (1907/2005) *The English Peasantry and the Enclosure of Common Fields*. Chestnut Hill, MA: Elibron Classics.
- Tate, W. E. (1945) Opposition to Parliamentary Enclosure in 18th Century England. *Agricultural History* 19: 137–42.
- Thompson, E. P. (1964) *The Making of the English Working Class*. New York: Random House.
- Thompson, E. P. (1993) *Customs in Common*. New York: New Press.
- Williams, R. (1973) *The Country and the City*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895)

Heidi M. Rimke

Friedrich Engels was a nineteenth-century revolutionary who, along with collaborator Karl Marx, articulated the theory of communism in their 1848 work, *The Communist Manifesto*. To Engels, the capitalist system needed to be overturned by a revolution from the proletariat, which would subsequently establish a classless society, thereby ending exploitation and misery.

Engels was born in 1820 in Barmen-Elberfeld, in the Rhine province of Prussia (now Germany), the eldest son of a prosperous textile family. He was raised in a pious Protestant environment both at home and in school, but he rejected religion as a teenager. In 1838, without finishing school, Engels was sent to Bremen for business training as an unsalaried clerk. From 1841 to 1842 he served in the Household Artillery of the Prussian army and attended lectures at the University of Berlin. Engels joined a group of young Hegelian radicals called “The Free,” where he first met Karl Marx. He became involved in radical journalism, and wrote belles-lettres, philosophy, and politics under the *nom-de-plume* of Oswald.

At the age of 22 he left Germany to take a management position at his father’s cotton factory in Manchester, England, where he learned about laissez-faire economics. Witnessing the rampant poverty and misery of the workers prompted Engels to produce *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (1845). In 1845 he met Mary Barnes, a factory worker involved in organizing the English workers’ movement. From her, Engels learned about the necessity of class solidarity and the growing working-class movement. Engels also joined the Chartist movement, published in the Owenite paper *The New Moral World*, and wrote *Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy*.

While visiting Paris in 1844 Engels re-encountered Karl Marx, starting their life-long friendship, scholarly collaborations, and political activities. He spent 1845–50 in France, Belgium, and Germany organizing underground revolutionary groups such as the secret German Communist League, which worked out the main principles of socialism and the revolutionary program of the working class. Thus emerged

The Communist Manifesto, the classical treatise on communism, which argues that the state acts as an executive committee of the ruling class, serving the interests of the bourgeoisie at the expense of the proletariat, and that all recorded history hitherto had been a history of class struggle.

Engels’ view on the history and nature of the state is expounded in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884). This text is based on Henry Lewis Morgan’s *Ancient Society* (1877) and on Marx’s notes, comments, and criticisms. It substitutes the classical anthropological theory of evolution with the science of historical materialism, demonstrating that class interests lie at the foundation of the patriarchal family and the institution of private property, which are central to capitalist social relations.

In 1849 Engels took an active role in the republican insurrection in Baden, Germany. After 1850 his hope for an immediate proletarian revolution waned, and he reluctantly returned to England in order to work and provide an income, which served to sustain Marx and his family while the latter researched and wrote the first of four volumes of *Capital*. Engels retired in 1869 and devoted the remainder of his life to research, writing, and practical revolutionary activity. As he became more prosperous, he provided Marx with an annuity, allowing him to live in some comfort during his later years.

With Marx, he formed the Communist Correspondence Committee, which served as a model for the future International Association. Engels was a member of the General Council of the First International, and also played an important role in the establishment of the Second International. During this period he developed the philosophy and sociology of scientific socialism and communist theory.

Engels rejected the traditional model of the nuclear family and lived in a common law relationship that bore no children. However, he did assume responsibility for a child Karl Marx secretly fathered with a family servant. After Marx’s death in 1883, Engels set out to complete several of his unfinished projects that kept him researching and writing until his death in London in 1895.

The consequences of Engels’ revolutionary struggles, his disillusionment with bourgeois democracy, and his insistence on the necessity of a proletarian dictatorship, convinced him that only the overthrow of industrial capitalism could

result in a truly human and classless society where exploitation and oppression would be eradicated for the good of all.

Other important works of Engels include *Principles of Communism* (1847), *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (1877), *Anti-Durhing* (1878), and *Dialectics of Nature* (1883).

SEE ALSO: *Communist Manifesto*; Marx, Karl (1818–1883)

References and Suggested Readings

- Carver, T. (2003) *Engels: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Engels, F. (1972) *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, new ed. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Engels, F. (1993) *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. Ed. D. McLellan. New York: Oxford World Classics.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1998) *The Communist Manifesto: A Modern Edition*. New York: Verso.
- Stepanova, Y. (1988) *Frederick Engels: A Short Biography*. Moscow: Progress.
- Tucker, R. C. (Ed.) (1978) *The Marx–Engels Reader*, 2nd Ed. New York: W. W. Norton.

English Reformation

Jason Jewell

The English Reformation is a process or period sometimes difficult to define. All scholars agree that the Church of England's break with Rome under King Henry VIII is part of the story, but there is disagreement over where the process ends. Is it with the Elizabethan settlement of the late 1550s, the ultimate failure of Puritan government in 1660, or the moral reforms of the Methodists in the eighteenth century? The most sound of the historical accounts follow the traditional dating found in authors such as Elton (1977) and Dickens (1964). According to this understanding, the story of the Reformation begins with the growth of Protestant influence in England in the 1520s and ends with the settlement reached in the early reign of Elizabeth I, consisting chiefly of the Act of Uniformity, the Act of Supremacy, and the Thirty-Nine Articles.

Background

Conventional popular religion in England in the early sixteenth century differed little from that

of the High Middle Ages, with its emphasis on devout observances as meritorious acts and its stress on saints, relics, and pilgrimages. The Church of England's bishops were mostly lawyers rather than theologians and not the best candidates for spiritual leadership. Much of the church's wealth was concentrated in its well-endowed monastic houses which contained 10,000–15,000 clergy in total. The parish clergy were less well off and often worked in the fields to support themselves, although they were entitled to the tithes of their neighbors. Despite the apparent sincerity of the majority of the clergy, some notorious and highly publicized abuses of authority and ostentatious displays of wealth had given rise to a popular anti-clerical sentiment in many areas.

The fourteenth-century theologian John Wycliffe (d. 1384) had anticipated many key Protestant beliefs in his teachings – acceptance of the Bible as the only sure source of doctrine, placing of the Bible into the hands of the common people, rejection of transubstantiation, advocacy of clerical marriage, denunciation of monasticism, faith in the capacity of the civil magistrate to reform the church – but his spiritual descendants, the Lollards, remained a tiny heretical minority into the sixteenth century. In the 1520s, as Lutheran ideas began to filter into England from the Continent, particularly through Tyndale's English translation of the New Testament (1526), areas with Lollard influence showed particular receptivity to Protestant teachings. The English church condemned Luther's teachings; his books were publicly burned, and Henry VIII himself published a refutation of his thought that earned him the pope's gratitude and the title "Defender of the Faith." A few suffered burning at the stake in the 1520s and early 1530s for their support of Lutheran doctrine, but the English population in general was not especially attracted to Protestant teaching.

What proved more dangerous to the settled order was Henry VIII's incessant search for a divorce from Queen Catherine of Aragon from at least 1527. Catherine was past the age of childbearing by the mid-1520s, and the only surviving child from her union with Henry was a daughter, Mary. For Henry's sole heir to be female was, "given patriarchal and feudal concepts of competence and authority, a national nightmare" (Haigh 1993: 89). With the Wars of the

Roses still in living memory, Henry believed it essential to have an undisputed male heir to avoid a potential civil war. This desire coincided with his infatuation with Anne Boleyn, a young lady-in-waiting at the court, and he determined to divorce Catherine in order to marry Anne. From the spring of 1527 until the summer of 1530, Henry and his agents pursued various strategies to secure a dispensation for an annulment or divorce from Pope Clement VII. These efforts failed, primarily because Holy Emperor Charles V, who also happened to be Catherine's nephew, was putting tremendous political pressure on Clement, and Clement could not afford to alienate him.

Henrician Reformation

Henry and his advisors, the most important of whom were lawyer Thomas Cromwell and clergyman Thomas Cranmer, concluded that the only way to secure the divorce was to establish royal control over the English church and ensure the case was decided there rather than in Rome. Lawyers in Henry's pay had developed a theory that the English church historically was an independent jurisdiction over which the English king had sovereignty; they compiled for Henry the *Collectanea satis copiosa*, a collection of documents and precedents supporting this claim, by the fall of 1530. On the basis of this argument Henry proceeded to charge the entire English clergy with *praemunire*, or appealing to an authority outside the realm for resolution of an issue over which the crown had jurisdiction. Negotiations ensued, at the end of which the English clergy acknowledged Henry to be head of the English church in the "Submission of the Clergy" of May 15, 1532.

Over the next two years the parliament then in session (known to history as the Reformation Parliament) passed several laws formalizing the English church's break with Rome. The Act for Submission of the Clergy gave the aforementioned "Submission" the force of statute; the Act in Restraint of Appeals prohibited appeals to any jurisdiction outside England in any case involving matrimony, tithes, or testaments; the Act in Restraint of Annates forbade the English church from sending payments to Rome and gave the crown authority over appointment of bishops; the Act of Supremacy declared the English king to be the only head of the English church; and

the Succession Act vested succession to the crown in the children of Henry and Anne, who secretly married in January 1533, months before Cranmer, now Archbishop of Canterbury, formally annulled the marriage with Catherine. In passing this legislation Henry and Cromwell, now Henry's chief minister, were able to manipulate popular anti-clerical sentiment in the House of Commons despite the overall religious conservatism of the English populace. The same was true in the later 1530s when Cromwell succeeded in pushing through legislation to suppress England's monastic establishments (the Dissolution of the Monasteries), although this process sparked a major uprising, the Pilgrimage of Grace, in northern England.

The legal separation from Rome by itself did little to change the doctrine and practice of the English church, but Cromwell, Cranmer, and some of Henry's allies in the process sympathized with some Protestant positions, and in the 1530s they formulated official church positions that moved away from Roman Catholicism. The Ten Articles, published in 1536, mentioned only three sacraments (baptism, the Eucharist, and penance) instead of the traditional seven. Cromwell also banned some traditional holy days and saints' days and made moderate injunctions against pilgrimages and images in churches. Most importantly, Cromwell sponsored the first complete English translation of the Bible, performed by Miles Coverdale and published in 1535. A revised "Great Bible," also by Coverdale and published with a famous preface by Cranmer in its second edition, appeared in 1539. The English Bible, along with the reduction in power and wealth of the clergy, was the most revolutionary development of the English Reformation in the 1530s.

The 1540s was a period of reaction, ushered in by Cromwell's fall from favor and execution. The backtracking toward traditional orthodoxy began in 1539 with the passage of the Act of the Six Articles, which reaffirmed the doctrine of transubstantiation and the requirement of clerical celibacy, as well as making heresy a felony. The traditional Catholic mass was upheld. Henry also took steps to restrict the availability of the English Bible to subjects of noble birth. When Henry died in 1547 the English church's doctrine was essentially Roman, with the exception that he, not the pope, was its head.

Edwardian Reformation

Henry's immediate successor was Edward VI (r. 1547–53), his son by his third wife, Jane Seymour. Edward, who had been raised a Protestant, was only 9 years old at his accession; his mother's brother, Edward Seymour, now Duke of Somerset, headed the regency government. After some initial hesitation Somerset used his broad powers to alter the ceremony and appearance of the English church in a Protestant direction – more specifically, in a Calvinistic or Zwinglian direction as opposed to a Lutheran one. Indeed, Calvin himself corresponded with both Edward and Somerset, offering advice on reforms. Somerset repealed the Six Articles and restrictions on dissemination and reading of the Bible. The injunctions against images from the 1530s were renewed and more tightly enforced, leading to the removal of stained glass, statues, roods, church plate, and shrines from many churches. Clergy were allowed to marry and some traditional practices were abolished. The Chantries Act of 1547 transferred much of the church's endowment to the crown.

Scholars disagree on how the English people viewed these reforms outside of London, where they were clearly welcomed. Dickens (1964: 211) argues, for example, that the English people by and large had ceased to believe in the efficacy of masses for the dead, and that therefore there was no major protest against the abolition of chantries; however, he does concede that the pace of the reforms outpaced public opinion. Duffy (2005) contends that the reforms were a major blow to the communal fabric of English life and that they deprived towns and villages of important social services; localities passively resisted the reforms until royal visitors required action.

Whatever the case, there is no question that Somerset's next major reform, the introduction of an English liturgy in 1549, provoked serious resistance. The Book of Common Prayer is without question one of the greatest legacies of the English Reformation. Its first incarnation, compiled by Thomas Cranmer, was conservative, with many ambiguous phrases that could be interpreted in both a Protestant and a Roman Catholic sense. It retained a formula for (voluntary) confession, as well as ceremonies for confirmation and last rites. The visual aspects of public worship remained unchanged. Even

Bishop Stephen Gardiner, one of the chief opponents of Protestant reform in England, agreed to use the book. Nevertheless, its introduction led to a major uprising in Cornwall and Devon known as the Western Rebellion (1549).

Somerset's poor handling of the Western Rebellion and another revolt in East Anglia the same year led to his downfall; the leader of the group that ousted him, John Dudley, Earl of Warwick (later the first Duke of Northumberland), took his place. Northumberland was not a sincere Protestant himself, but he allowed further changes in religion to satisfy the Protestant constituency that put him into power. Cranmer and the continental reformer Martin Bucer made extensive revisions to the Book of Common Prayer and issued a second edition of it in 1552. This version made significant visual changes to the worship service. Ministers now wore simpler vestments and faced the congregation during the consecration of the bread and wine in the Eucharist, the altar (now a "communion table") moved from the east end of the church to the center, and group confession replaced individual confession. Under Cranmer's direction the English church also issued in 1553 the Forty-Two Articles, a summary of key doctrines that was completely Protestant in character. However, Cranmer's revision of canon law, the *Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum*, was never ratified by parliament, which in all probability had no wish to see a revitalized canon law compete with the new secular supremacy in the legal system.

Marian Restoration

The religious pendulum in England swung back the other way when Mary Tudor, the daughter of Henry VIII and Katherine of Aragon, ascended to the throne two weeks after Edward's death in July 1553, following Northumberland's abortive attempt to have Lady Jane Grey proclaimed queen. Throughout the 1530s and 1540s Mary had remained a devout Roman Catholic, and restoring Catholicism in England was her foremost concern. She refused to call herself head of the English church, but she used that power to sack Protestant bishops such as Miles Coverdale and Nicholas Ridley and to eject continental reformers such as Martin Bucer from England. She attempted to restore Catho-

licism in the first parliament she summoned, but although it was willing to retreat on the Protestant reforms of Edward's reign, for the most part it refused to repeal the Reformation Parliament's legislation of the 1530s.

Mary's efforts were rejuvenated in the aftermath of Wyatt's Rebellion (1554), which aimed to prevent Mary's marriage to Philip Habsburg, the crown prince of Spain, Europe's most powerful and staunchly Roman Catholic country. The rebels probably had religious as well as nationalistic motives, and the parliament elected after the uprising's failure reflected a conservative religious backlash against Protestantism. It approved, on Mary's request, a return to communion with Rome, but it refused to restore church lands taken by the crown in the 1530s and 1540s. It repealed the major legislation of the Reformation Parliament and revived the act for the prosecution of heretics, which had been repealed under Somerset.

Mary proceeded to enforce the heresy legislation vigorously, and over the next few years 287 Protestants were burned at the stake in the so-called "fires of Smithfield." Most of the victims were from the Southeast of England, the country's most heavily Protestant region; among them were Protestant bishops Nicholas Ridley, Hugh Latimer, and Thomas Cranmer. These executions earned the queen the epithet "Bloody Mary" among Protestants, 800 of whom fled England for the Continent in the mid-1550s, going to areas friendly to Protestants such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the northern German states. These "Marian exiles" included John Knox, who studied in Geneva with John Calvin and later led the Protestant Reformation in Scotland. Another exile, John Foxe, began work on the immensely influential *Foxe's Book of Martyrs* during this period, completing the book during Elizabeth I's reign.

Elizabethan Settlement

Although the overwhelming majority of English subjects conformed to the Roman Catholic faith after 1554, Protestantism survived in England into the late 1550s, primarily in the form of underground congregations. Many who would not risk secret meetings still refused to attend Mass. Particularly in London and the Southeast, there remained a favorable attitude towards Reformed ideas and sympathy for the victims of Mary's

persecutions. When Mary died childless in 1558 (followed in death less than 12 hours later by her chief clerical ally, Cardinal Reginald Pole), her half-sister Elizabeth Tudor, the daughter of Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn, became queen.

Elizabeth's personal religious views in some areas remain murky. While she clearly favored traditional visual aspects of English worship such as candles and the crucifix, she frowned on some Roman Catholic practices such as the raising of the chalice during the Mass. It may be reasonably assumed that she favored a conservative Protestantism personally, for in working as she did to separate the English church from Rome once more she sacrificed certain advantages that would have accrued from continued union, such as an alliance with Spain and a papal declaration of her legitimacy, the latter of which would have nullified the claims to the throne of Mary, Queen of Scots, Elizabeth's closest relative and a staunch Roman Catholic.

The alterations to the English church over the next two years were intended to comprehend the largest number of English subjects (and their consciences) possible within a framework conducive to state stability. The Marian exiles dominated her early appointments to vacant sees, soon bringing a rough parity between reformers and traditionalists. Elizabeth's first parliament consisted of roughly equal contingents of devout Catholics, committed Protestants, and flexible members comfortable with the Henrician settlement of 25 years earlier. After lengthy debate in the spring of 1559, parliament passed a new Act of Uniformity which reinstated a revised Book of Common Prayer in which the Protestant language of Cranmer's 1552 edition was muted to the extent that many Catholics could worship with it in good conscience. The monarch was now the "Supreme Governor" of the church, a less controversial title than "Supreme Head." The same year parliament passed a new Act of Supremacy, which essentially repealed all the Marian religious legislation and reinstated the legislation of the Reformation Parliament. Elizabeth imposed an oath of allegiance to the act on all clerical officeholders. The vast majority of parish priests and other lower clergy accepted it, but all 16 Catholic bishops rejected it; Elizabeth quickly purged all but one of them. A further concession to Protestantism

was the reinstatement of clerical marriage, which Elizabeth disliked but reluctantly allowed.

The only major element of the Elizabethan settlement to follow was the reissuing in 1563 of Cranmer's articles of faith. Elizabeth reduced their number from 42 to 39 and issued them on her own authority. The Thirty-Nine Articles remain to this day, along with the Book of Common Prayer, the foundational statements of Anglican doctrine and practice.

The English Church from the 1560s was thus conservatively Protestant, attempting to chart a *via media* between Roman Catholicism and the Protestantism of Geneva. It was no longer an independent force, having come firmly under the control of the state. The overwhelming majority of the English population conformed to the settlement, with the exception of a small minority of committed Roman Catholics and a handful of radical Protestants. However, the settlement was precarious; tensions between those satisfied with the status quo and the Puritans, who wanted further reforms at the earliest possible date, soon arose, not to be resolved until the following century.

SEE ALSO: Britain, Peasant Uprisings, 16th Century; Calvin, John (1509–1564); English Revolution, 17th Century; Fawkes, Guy (1570–1606) and the Gunpowder Plot; Glorious Revolution, Britain, 1688; Luther, Martin (1483–1546); Netherlands, Protests, 1650–1800; Reformation; Scottish Reformation

References and Suggested Readings

- Bray, G. L. (2004) *Documents of the English Reformation, 1526–1701*. Cambridge: James Clark.
- Dickens, A. G. (1964) *The English Reformation*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Duffy, E. (2005) *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England c. 1400–c. 1580*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Elton, G. R. (1977) *Reform and Reformation: England, 1509–1558*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Haigh, C. (1993) *English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society under the Tudors*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- MacCulloch, D. (1996) *Thomas Cranmer: A Life*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- O'Day, R. (1986) *The Debate on the English Reformation*. London: Methuen.
- Scarlsbrick, J. J. (1984) *The Reformation and the English People*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Tyacke, N. (Ed.) (2003) *England's Long Reformation, 1500–1800*. London: UCL Press.

English Revolution, 17th century

R. Scott Spurlock

The English Revolution refers to events in England between 1640 and 1660, which are now more generally referred to in their wider British and Irish context as the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. Any discussion of this period must look beyond the borders of England. Although pressures began to build in England from the inception of Charles I's reign in 1625, the trigger enabling a revolution to take place occurred in Scotland in 1638, while the 1641 Rising in Ireland had significant repercussions as well. Moreover, the turbulent period cannot be removed from its wider European context, and as such the English civil wars represent the last and greatest of Europe's wars of religion. For this reason the English Revolution can only be understood in the context of polity, nationalism, and religious confessional identities within the three kingdoms and the wider European context.



In the engraving for the title page of his pamphlet, The World Turn'd Upside Down: A Brief Description of the Ridiculous Fashions of These Distracted Times (1647), as well as the writing within, John Taylor (1580–1653), an apologist for the crown, uses nonsense to depict the cultural and political shifts of the English Revolution. (British Library, London, UK / The Bridgeman Art Library)

Personal Rule of Charles I

The actual outbreak of civil unrest came at a rather surprising time. While population growth, rising inflation, unemployment, and a shortage of available land caused significant concerns from the 1590s through the 1620s, a greater sense of stability came to the fore in the 1630s. This coincided with a belief in both the state Episcopal Church and Puritanism that regulating social practice and enforcing godly society were imperative, although the former advocated traditional festivities and practices, the latter austere Calvinism.

Against this yearning for stability Charles I appeared to make marked departures from his predecessors with innovations in the established religion. During an 11-year personal rule later termed by his opponents the Eleven Years' Tyranny (1629–40) he refused to call a parliament, imposed taxes without the traditional parliamentary channels (in particular Ship Money), and suppressed protest. The show trials of John Elphinstone, Lord Balmerino, in Scotland (1635) and of John Hamden in England (1636) demonstrated a willingness to use high-handed tactics and an interpretation of absolute monarchy which departed significantly from the reigns of both his father and Elizabeth I.

Trouble initially broke out in the form of riots when Charles introduced a new book of prayer in Scotland in 1637 as an attempt to bring worship in the Kirk closer in line with the Episcopal Church in England. Scotland's general assembly and parliament rejected the move as an encroachment on the rights of Scotland's state church. In response, Scotland produced the National Covenant (1638) which pledged to defend the king, Presbyterian religion, and Scotland's sovereignty.

Two brief conflicts ensued in 1639 and 1640 known as the Bishops' Wars. Scottish armies, composed primarily of Scots mercenaries returning from Swedish service, confronted English armies assembled by Charles in the absence of an English parliament. Scotland's superior forces in 1639 and 1640 forced quick capitulations by the king, but in 1640 Scottish forces had already pushed south and occupied most of Northern England, including London's primary source of coal, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. At the conclusion of the second Bishops' War Scotland demanded that reparations for the cost of their "defensive"

campaign be guaranteed by an English parliament. This served as the major turning point in English politics. In order to settle affairs with the Scots, Charles had to call his second parliament in 1640. The king had summoned a parliament in April to raise funds for an invasion of Scotland, but dissolved it only a month later. Having witnessed the plight of their predecessors, the second parliament, called in 1640, refused to sit unless given the right to convene until they chose to close their business. Charles had little choice but to acquiesce to their demand.

The Long Parliament quickly became a forum for voicing unrest. In its first month a petition appeared to remove Episcopacy "root and branch," while proceedings began for the impeachment of Strafford, former lord deputy of Ireland, and William Laud, the archbishop of Canterbury. By late 1641 tensions between parliament and the king began to come to a head with parliament passing a list of grievances against the monarch in the form of the Grand Remonstrance. In February 1642 parliament passed the Triennial Act which demanded that the monarch call a parliament at least every three years. By July anti-Episcopal fervor saw the inquisitorial Star Chamber abolished. After a failed attempt by the king in January 1642 to arrest five leading MPs, Charles fled the capital and by June began to raise an army. On August 22, 1642 the king raised the royal standard in Nottingham and declared war against the parliament.

A number of factors contributed to the formation of party lines and individual allegiances, including legal, constitutional, and religious issues. In general, however, those who supported the king upheld the established Church of England and the divine right of monarchy and became known as Cavaliers, while those adhering to the parliamentary cause, known as Roundheads, sought greater liberties and further reformation. Many remained neutral, often for local reasons.

By 1645 large portions of the population yearned for peace and cared little who won. Clubmen Associations formed that year in Shropshire, Worcestershire, Herefordshire, Wiltshire, Dorset, Somerset, Hampshire, Berkshire, Sussex, and South Wales in order to force parliamentary and royalist armies out of their communities in an effort to protect their homes and livelihoods. These associations comprised farmers and craftsmen and excluded any who had

ties to the main warring factions. For those who did take up arms against the king at the beginning of the first civil war, the motivation was not anti-monarchical. Generally it was held that the king was acting out of line with the established traditions of monarchy or that he had fallen under evil influences. Thus military action sought to protect the king from his previous excesses or from dark influences (most likely Catholic) which deluded him.

Civil Wars

After a series of indecisive altercations, including the first battle of the war (Edgehill, October 23, 1642), the king's forces gained the upper hand. Failing military endeavors and a treaty between the king and Irish Catholic Confederates, which exacerbated fears of a Catholic plot (already rife as Charles' funding for the war overwhelmingly originated in Madrid and Rome), forced parliament to seek help from Scotland. Rather than enter into a civil league, the Scots held out for a covenant which promised the establishment of a uniform Protestant church in government and worship throughout the three kingdoms after the war. The Scots assumed this would be Presbyterianism and thus the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant in 1643 ensured Scottish intervention in English politics for the rest of the decade. The entrance of the Scots (although of little significance in the field) marked the turning point of the war. Royalist forces suffered major defeats at Marston Moor (July 2, 1644) and at the Battle of Naseby (June 14, 1645). In May 1646 Charles surrendered to the Scots at Newark before being handed over to the English parliament in June.

In the wake of the first civil war disparities in parliament's cause began to appear between those who desired a moderate settlement (a degree of religious toleration, but overall a maintenance of the status quo) and those who wanted further radical reforms. Presbyterians who favored a moderate settlement dominated in parliament, while the army contained a heterogeneous mix of sects and factions. These factions within the army became discontented with the leniency of parliament's negotiations with the king. Early in 1647 the growing unrest prompted parliament to make plans for drastically reducing the size of the army. Fueled by discontent, mounting arrears in pay, and parliament's call for the army to disband,

the army seized the king in June and began to negotiate with him directly. By October restlessness within the army, stirred up by elected "agitators," prompted internal discourse about the desired settlement. The Putney Debates, as they have become known, provided the malcontent elements in the army an opportunity to advocate fundamental constitutional changes.

Primary among these voices were the Levelers. They argued for the dissolution of both the monarchy and the House of Lords and called for them to be replaced by biennial parliaments elected by a much broader electorate with every Englishman getting one vote. Colonel Thomas Rainsborough represented the highest ranking Leveler, while Oliver Cromwell and Henry Ireton argued for a moderate settlement based on Ireton's *Heads of the Proposals*. This called for increased powers for parliament to make state, army, and naval appointments; parliament's right to set its own date for adjourning; reduced power for bishops; the Book of Common Prayer to be made optional; and a 5-year moratorium on Royalists holding offices or serving in parliament. Having reached an impasse, Cromwell suspended the debates in November, but those still dissatisfied arranged a series of subsequent meetings. On November 15, 1647 one such meeting nearly erupted into a mutiny at Corn-bush Field. The bulk of the army, loyal to Cromwell, put down the potential rebellion and the radical elements began to be closely watched. What tensions were forming in the army quickly melted into the background by the end of the month as Charles I escaped from his imprisonment, and, with Scottish intervention, a second civil war broke out.

Failing to see the fruition of a Presbyterian Church settlement in England, some prominent Scots entered into an Engagement with Charles in the closing weeks of 1647. They pledged military support for the king in a second civil war on the condition that he implement a 3-year trial period of Presbyterianism in England. Scottish forces entered England in July 1648, but parliament defeated the Royalist forces at Preston on August 19, and by August 22 the war was essentially over. Charles sought protection from the Scots army, but they ransomed the king to parliament for the sum of £400,000.

In the wake of their victory over the Royalists the army purged parliament of over 140 MPs, including its Presbyterian members, on

December 6, 1648, leaving behind those deemed most godly and in line with the army's aims. The purged "Rump Parliament" proceeded to appoint a commission for trying the king. Charles I was found guilty of treason against the people of England for having caused so much innocent blood to be shed and was beheaded on January 30, 1649.

After abolishing the House of Lords and monarchy, the Rump Parliament declared England to be a Commonwealth. This outcome was by no means a foregone conclusion at the outset of the first civil war. In fact, regicide probably did not enter into the wider collective discourse of the New Model Army until the Putney Debates in October 1647.

The Commonwealth

The death of Charles I did not bring about order; instead, it increased the difficulty of establishing a settled government. For those involved in the burgeoning Commonwealth, events were interpreted in terms of Providence or God's divinely revealed will. The overwhelming belief guiding most of the Rump Parliament and the army was that a new era of human history was unfolding before them. However, different groups interpreted the intended ends differently. For some, the progression and way forward were rooted deeply in democratic principles. The Levelers, not necessarily as motivated by religion as many of their fellows, sought the removal of monarchy and the House of Lords to be replaced by a House of Commons selected by a much expanded electorate. For others, like Gerrard Winstanley and the Diggers, the fall of monarchy represented an opportunity to remodel the wider social order. They established communitarian settlements on common lands in Surrey, Kent, Northamptonshire, Hertfordshire, Middlesex, Bedfordshire, Leicestershire, Gloucestershire, and Buckinghamshire between 1649 and 1651. The Diggers, so called for their cultivation of the land, denounced private landownership as a "Norman" innovation and grew crops, corporately sharing them equally among members. Based on Acts 2:44–45 they advocated fundamental social reconstruction and sought radical class transformation. Hence they termed themselves the "Real Levelers." Fifth Monarchists represented an even more radical position, in terms of national politics, based

on the apocalyptic biblical books of Revelation and Daniel. They believed Christ's kingdom would imminently be established as the fifth great empire of human history (Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome). In order to facilitate the coming of the new kingdom the ungodly should be purged from positions of trust and replaced by "saints." This apocalyptic vision meant any settlement short of establishing Christ's kingdom on earth risked divine retribution. Yet despite these radical elements in the army, the bulk of those who fought for the parliament were either Independents or English Presbyterians who certainly did not set out to undermine the whole established social order of England or to bring about the apocalypse.

The purge of parliament in December 1649 brought about a military settlement. This worked initially as the newly established Commonwealth's immediate aims required putting down the rebellion in Ireland where the Irish Catholic Confederacy, under the leadership of a papal nuncio, continued to uphold the Stuart cause, and in dealing with Scotland, which declared Charles II the lawful king of all three nations on February 5, 1650. The fall of Limerick in October 1651 marked the end of any significant resistance in Ireland, while the crushing defeats of the Scots at Dunbar (September 3, 1650) and Worcester (September 3, 1651) marked the success of the Commonwealth's invasion of Scotland.

As a war machine the Commonwealth was successful in incorporating Ireland and Scotland, but the real challenge came in peace. Separate councils were established for the governance of Scotland and Ireland, but they never received adequate powers to function efficiently. Moreover they became equally susceptible to the internal rivalries within the administration. Radical elements, such as those mentioned above, were discontented with the stagnancy of the Commonwealth's political aims. In April 1653 Cromwell dissolved the Rump Parliament for failing to make progress in the establishment of a settled government, particularly in relation to religious reforms and the implementation of toleration for radical sects. It was replaced by an equally unproductive Nominated Assembly on July 4, 1653, comprising individuals put forward for their godly reputations.

The importance of Cromwell as a moderating force between government and the army became increasingly clear throughout 1653 and

on December 16 he became Lord Protector. His role provided the strong leadership necessary for the stability of the regime but at the same time became a divisive factor for the support base in the army. Radical sects, particularly the Fifth Monarchists, saw his assumption of the title as paramount to the restoration of the monarchy. They heralded the Protectorate as contrary to their earlier cries of “No king but Christ.” Several aborted coups were attempted by the Fifth Monarchists, which not only cast a shadow on them but also on the Baptists with whom many were associated. The Baptists came to be viewed as liabilities in Ireland and Scotland, where Cromwell ordered the Scottish council to bar Baptists from officeholding, practicing law, or teaching school.

Cromwell’s personal influence played a large role in fostering the smooth running of the Protectoral government, and his death on September 3, 1658 returned the nation to turmoil. After his son Richard’s brief stint as Protector Major-General, George Monck, commander of the army in Scotland, marched south in early December 1659 to oppose Major-General John Lambert and the army dominated by radicals in England. On December 26, 1659 the Rump Parliament was recalled after a week of England having no functioning government, and Charles II was declared king on May 14, 1660, bringing the English Revolution to a close.

Historiography has debated whether the period represents a bourgeois revolution, a coalescence of provincial revolts, or a short-term governmental breakdown. The great irony is that those radical groups which were fundamental to the overthrow of Charles I and the establishment of the Commonwealth became a liability to the Protectorate and ultimately brought about its downfall. The religious fervor that fueled the English Revolution left a very bad taste after Restoration. As a result, according to John Morrill (1993), England’s wars of religion resulted in the birth of a modern secular state.

SEE ALSO: Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658); English Revolution, Radical Sects; English Revolution, Women and; Fifth Monarchist Women; Irish Revolts, 1400–1790; Lilburne, John (1615–1657); Winstanley, Gerrard (1609–1676)

References and Suggested Readings

Gaunt, P. (2000) *The English Civil War: The Essential Readings*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- Haller, W. (1967) *Liberty and the Reformation in the Puritan Revolution*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hill, C. (1991) *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution*. London: Penguin.
- Hughes, A. (1998) *The Causes of the English Civil War*. Houndmills: Macmillan.
- Little, P. (Ed.) (2007) *The Cromwellian Protectorate*. Woodbridge: Boydell.
- Macinnes, A. I. (2005) *The British Revolution, 1629–1660*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Morrill, J. M. (1993) *The Nature of the English Revolution*. London: Longman.
- Purkiss, D. (2006) *The English Civil War*. London: Harper Press.
- Smith, D. L. (1991) *Oliver Cromwell: Politics and Religion in the English Revolution, 1640–1658*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Woolrych, A. (2004) *Britain in Revolution, 1625–1660*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

English Revolution, radical sects

Soma Marik

Even after the victory of the New Model Army in the English Civil War (1642–6), radicalism continued to flourish. The demand for democracy arose substantially out of the struggle for religious freedom, but in 1646–9 it took on a firm secular political color. A number of important groups played a role in the radical movement.

Levelers

By 1647 army and civilian democrats, called Levelers by their opponents, had fused, and a democratic political movement was born. Principal civilian leaders were John Lilburne, William Walwyn, Richard Overton, and John Wildman. The movement they developed emerged out of popular struggles, forming the left wing of the supporters of parliament, with Walwyn’s *England’s Lamentable Slaveries* (October 1645) stating the case for sovereignty of the people. The London poor, as well as small owners in the counties, contributed to the growth of this party. Small property owners, who formed a part of the army, were similarly influenced by Leveler ideas.

The significant feature of the army Leveler movement was that it replaced hierarchical considerations of leaders and led by an associative model. The emergence of the elected spokesmen

came from the cavalry troops first but then spread to the foot soldiers. The Councils of War called by General Sir Thomas Fairfax fostered the habits of dialogue and debate, and the gathered congregations engendered a sense of solidarity among the soldiers. With the coming of peace in 1646, the army became the most democratic political public sphere in England. Long unpaid arrears, fear of prosecution for acts committed during the First Civil War (soldiers had been arrested even in 1645–6 for speaking out against the king), and their resistance to army transportation to Ireland to embark in a war of reconquest radicalized the soldiers. Thus the army was transformed from parliamentary instrument to revolutionary subject.

In addition to the military aspect, the Leveller movement spread among the general population. Several thousand people signed the “Large Petition,” which outlined the Leveller program by raising a series of reform demands to the House of Commons. The Commons rejected the petition and arrested the presenters, including Lilburne and Overton. The soldiers expressed solidarity with Lilburne and Overton and started electing representatives called Agitators, who pushed for political rights while working to block parliamentary efforts to disband the army.

On June 4, 1647, Cornet George Joyce’s forces removed King Charles from parliamentary custody to army custody. In this charged situation, in a general meeting near Newmarket, the army hooted their more conservative officers off, and forced the writing of *A Solemn Engagement of the Army*, which called for the creation of an Army General Council by adding two junior officers and two other ranks from each regiment to the Council of War. The army pledged not to disband or divide until all its demands had been met.

On October 20, Oliver Cromwell defended the monarchical system in the House of Commons following the republican Henry Marten’s proposal that all relations with the king be severed. Lilburne suggested firmer action. *The Case of the Armie Truly Stated*, a soldiers’ pamphlet, claimed that in the new democratic army, all, regardless of rank, had just one voice and vote. It demanded a constitutional law, unalterable by parliaments. Then the Leveller constitutional proposal, *Agreement of the People*, was presented to the Council of the Army at Putney on October 29, 1647. General Henry Ireton challenged the Levelers on behalf

of the high-ranking officers, or Grandees. He was willing to accept that certain civil rights should be given to all, but unwilling to grant political rights, such as the right to vote or be elected. For the Levelers, defense of the person, not the property of the rich, was paramount. Agitators sought the franchise for all but servants and beggars. The *Agreement* was to be submitted to the army for approval in a general rendezvous, but the council, pressured by Fairfax, passed a series of resolutions effectively nullifying the previous resolutions and suspended itself.

The Agitators agreed to the disbanding, probably hoping to go back to their regiments, present further arguments, and further consolidate their gains. Meanwhile the king escaped, so most regiments were pulled by the call to discipline. However, regiments led by Robert Lilburne and Colonel Thomas Harrison rebelled. Copies of the *Agreement* were distributed and an attempt was made to resist Fairfax, but Cromwell and Fairfax succeeded in bringing the rebel regiments back under control. The hope of using the army to establish democracy was defeated, even though this was perhaps not immediately clear. In order to regain full command, the generals agreed to general amnesty and to having no more negotiations with the king. But the military hierarchy was restored.

The civilians went back to mass petitioning, constructing the world’s first modern democratic party, with a central leadership, a dues-paying membership, a countrywide network of branches, and a newspaper, *The Moderate*. Pamphlets by different Leveller groups as well as essays in the newspaper show the existence of a social orientation going beyond just the demand for democracy. A Petition of January 1648 endorsed the position of the first *Agreement* and called for election not only of members of parliament (MPs) but also of magistrates and other officials, as well as annual parliaments. The Levelers drew up a Petition in September during the Second Civil War in 1648. Demanding the punishment of the king, along with a political settlement, the Petition received over 40,000 signatures in a few days. The army’s march on London ended with the occupation of Westminster and Whitehall in December 1648.

Once the monarchy and House of Lords were abolished and the English republic established, Cromwell and his fellow Grandees, who carried out the military coup d’état, negotiated with the

Levelers for a revised version of the *Agreement of the People*. Two versions were produced – the Leveler version and the officers’ version. The Leveler version restricted votes to ratepayers and householders – their maximum compromise. The officers’ version also extended the vote, but to a lesser extent, and promised religious toleration. On January 20, 1649, the officers’ version was presented to parliament for its consideration and approval. Lilburne wanted this draft constitution to be ratified by the people, not by parliament. In any case, parliament did not move promptly to consider it. Yet the officers kept quiet. This suggests that the new regime was not really interested in implementing these constitutional proposals. Discontent reappeared among the rank-and-file of the army, and the Levelers revived. Lilburne returned to active politics, suspecting that Cromwell was trying to set up a military dictatorship. Troops were forbidden to petition, and several were court-martialed. In response, Levelers issued pamphlets attacking the new regime.

Meanwhile the Levelers had suffered a major blow with the death of Thomas Rainborough at the hands of royalists in October 1648, for he was the one officer with standing and ability to rival Cromwell. In March 1649, when their campaign was renewed, pamphlets like *The Hunting of the Foxes* by Overton and *The Second Part of Englands New-Chaines Discovered* by Lilburne, hit hard. Lilburne, Walwyn, and Overton were arrested and put on trial.

By this point, a fundamental difference existed between those revolutionaries who wanted a strong government to defend gains already made and the far left, both among the civilians and the soldiers, who wanted to deepen the revolution. Their demands included land reform, negation of enclosures, greater civil rights, concern for the poor, democratization, and decentralization of public authority. Some Levelers, notably Walwyn, were absolutely committed to peaceful means. Yet the militants, especially in the army, were planning armed revolts.

There was a series of mutinies in the army in March–April 1649. The Burford Mutiny (May 1649) was caused by the decision to send the army to Ireland to reconquer it. Troops elected agitators in defiance of a prohibition on so doing and rebelled. Several hundred were captured, and three were executed in sight of their comrades. Corporal William Thompson led another rising

that met a similar fate at Banbury. Thompson escaped to Northampton and took the town over for nearly two days. Eventually, he was hunted down and clubbed to death. The trial of the civilian Levelers opened in September 1649. Though the London jury found them not guilty, the Leveler party was broken through repression.

The Fifth Monarchists

The defeat of Leveler democracy with its commitment to social justice, secularism, and civil rights meant a collapse of hopes among the toiling people of winning by secular political struggles. Religious idiom and aspirations permeated further activism. In this climate, a semi-religious, semi-political movement, the Fifth Monarchists, arose between 1649 and 1660–1. The “Fifth Monarchy” or the “Fifth Kingdom” is a biblical reference, with the claim that after four earthly monarchies the Fifth Kingdom would be the Kingdom of God. Millenarist views were strong in the Commonwealth, and the Fifth Monarchy men wanted the rule of a religious community of saints. Their membership can be divided broadly into two groups – those who relied on the power of prayer and by setting an example for others to follow, and those who argued for change through force and political action.

Many Fifth Monarchist ideas were socialist in nature. Mary Cary, a Fifth Monarchist woman, in her description of New Jerusalem, pictured it as a commonwealth of small producers and tradesmen, with moderate labor and no taxes. She wanted the abolition of tithes, the nurturing of voluntary religion, the simplification of law codes, decentralization and local government autonomy, and poor relief by the state rather than the parish. Peter Chamberlain, who would become a Fifth Monarchist, said in 1649 that estates should be confiscated to pay the army, relieve the poor, and develop trades and schools.

The movement itself emerged in 1651, when a group of radical independent and Baptist preachers and military men, including Thomas Brookes, Christopher Feake, William Greenhill, Thomas Harrison, Henry Jesse, Hanserd Knollys, and John Simpson, began meeting and discussing a Godly Reformation of England. They called for a government encouraging the election of the Godly, but their definition avoided narrow sectarianism, excluding only communists, Ranters, and polygamists. Preaching in separate churches,

their radical doctrine emphasized preparation for the Second Kingdom, reform of the government for Christ's rule, replacement of greed and power by brotherly love, abolition of tithes and taxes, care for the poor, the release of debtors from prison, and payment of salaries due the New Model Army.

In April 1653, Cromwell called the Nominated Assembly (Barebone's Parliament), having 139 persons nominated by different congregations and selected by the Army Council. There were at least 12 Fifth Monarchists in the parliament. But in December this parliament was dissolved by the moderates while the more radical were at prayer. Within three days the Army Council adopted a written constitution, the Instrument of Government, that led to a new parliament, making Cromwell Lord Protector. Feake and Vavasour Powell attacked Cromwell. The duo was soon arrested, but Fifth Monarchist preaching continued. In January 1657, Feake, released from prison, addressed a meeting in extremely militant tones.

Militancy also grew under the leadership of men like Thomas Venner. He was associated with Praisegod Barebone (after whom Barebone's Parliament has often been named). By 1656, he was minister to a growing London congregation with Fifth Monarchist leanings. During 1656–7, Venner and members of his congregation were making plans to overthrow the Cromwell government. *A Standard Set Up* written by Venner's son-in-law outlined their aims. It was distributed by many followers, including a considerable number of women, who were quite prominent in all currents within this movement. In this manifesto, Venner proposed to abolish tithes, the excise, the standing army, arbitrary imprisonment, and impressments of soldiers. He also wanted to replace insecure tenure by copyhold and abolish legal privilege based on class or status. In April 1657, he organized a revolt, hoping to establish a regime much more oriented to the common people, one that would take a stance for deepening the revolution through widening its social base, by bringing the poorer people into the body of citizens, and by extending radical land reforms. Before the plan could be put into action, however, many individuals were arrested by the government but not put on trial. Venner and two of his associates were confined in the Tower of London on Cromwell's order until 1659.

The death of Cromwell and the unsettled conditions of 1658–60 saw new attempts at electing

Agitators in the army, and the revival of many of the radical sects' projects. Fifth Monarchists continued their radical activities through this period until the Stuart restoration. Major General Harrison, the first of those executed as regicides, was hanged, drawn, and quartered. In 1661, Venner led a second attempt at revolt. In *A Door of Hope*, the 1661 uprising's manifesto, the Fifth Monarchists combined millenarian theology with a call for a saintly republic and a call to arms. After throwing London into panic, though only a small number had actually participated in the rising, the rebels were vanquished by the London trained bands. Venner and Roger Hodgkin were hanged, drawn, and quartered in Swan Alley, and hung in pieces on the city gates and London Bridge. Many suspected radical Fifth Monarchist leaders were imprisoned for long durations by the crown.

The Diggers

The Diggers were socially the most radical wing of the radical sects, being clear-cut communists. The movement emerged in 1648–50 and can be located in three kinds of time – long term, middle term and short term (Holstun 2000). The first was a product of the fundamental transformation of early modern English agriculture from semi-feudal to capitalist through enclosures, which involved the large-scale transformation of common property into absolute private property controlled by big landowners. The medium-term cycle was a period of bad harvests that deepened the crisis of the poor. Finally, the short-term crisis was the execution of the king, followed by first rising hopes, then oppression and fear of betrayal – a prescription for a revolutionary situation. For some of the English poor, the revolution meant the removal not only of the king, but also of the lords of the land, the class-biased courts, and the tithe-collecting church. Attacks on enclosures occurred in 26 counties. The Digger movement's struggle against capitalist "improvement" did not lead to a slide-back to a romanticized past, but to an egalitarian future.

Gerrard Winstanley, the key Digger leader and theorist, had a millenarist idea of the Second Coming of Christ, which implied the rising of Christ in all men and women. In this case, salvation had no meaning outside nature itself. As God is Reason, understanding the natural processes rationally, that is, materialistically, is the

ultimate conclusion that may be derived from Winstanley's *The New Law of Righteousness* (1649). Here Reason and Righteousness were shown as completely manifest in the common ownership of the earth, and evil and covetousness had their beginning in private property.

On April 1, 1649, Winstanley and the Leveller William Everard led a group of activists in taking up a piece of land in St. George's Hill, in the county of Surrey, to cultivate it in common. They would call themselves "True Levelers," and would be called Diggers. Despite repeated harassments and fines by local landowners, the Digger colony grew, moving from St. George's Hill to nearby Cobham Heath, presumably in the hope of being left alone. By December 1649, Fairfax was pressured by Francis Drake (lord of the manor at St. George's Hill and a member of parliament purged by Colonel Pride) and Parson Platt (lord of the manor at Cobham) to call in his troops, and although by and large they did not intervene physically, their presence emboldened the locals to destroy houses and corn and harass the Diggers. Even so, by early April 1650, the colony at Cobham could boast of 11 acres planted, six or seven houses built, and the beginnings of a national Digger network. By the end of that month, however, the colony was destroyed irrevocably, but not before Diggers had appeared in a number of other places, like Northamptonshire, Kent, Buckinghamshire, Hertfordshire, Middlesex, and Leicestershire.

Without a clear political strategy for revolution this group eschewed physical force, yet they still threatened the landed ruling class because they inserted local knowledge into a national revolutionary project of coordinating disaffected tenants and wage-laborers, army members, and even university students. They forged links among the large number of Digger communities and sought to transform production relations at the local level, calling for a radical reordering of society. Winstanley, for example, developed a natural rights theory, calling for association and resistance to tyrannical power. At the same time, the Digger utopia was neither a reactionary call to turn back time nor an anti-urbanist attitude. Their conception of the future society was striking for the combination of support for Baconian attitudes to science tempered by the integration of science and artisanry. In the pamphlet *Fire in the Bush* (1650), Winstanley argued that the English people demanded freedom of the

commons in return for the support they had given to parliament. No real freedom could be enjoyed as long as land was appropriated privately. To make this statement, Winstanley tried to call in enough tenants to leave the land of the landlords, in effect calling for an agrarian general strike.

The Ranters

The Ranters movement emerged after the collapse of hopes of Leveller democracy, though many of the principal ideas were present from an earlier period. Forming part of the extreme left of the revolution, Ranters at the same time represented the least organized of the radical sects.

Ranter activity centered primarily on London, but did manage to spread throughout England. Ranters have been characterized as being quasi-millennial in outlook. At the same time, their belief that God existed only in material objects and humans led them simultaneously to pantheism and plebeian materialism. Since God existed in everyone, the poorest and the richest were equals. For them, God was the great Leveller.

Ranter ideology goes back to Joachim of Fiore's doctrine of the three ages – the age of the Father, the age of the Son, and the age of the Spirit, when God would fully reveal himself (the concept of the Everlasting Gospel). Whatever the "indwelling spirit" directed to do was justifiable to a Ranter. Humans were free of sin and the law if only they believed themselves to be (antinomianism). The excesses of the Ranters became the subject of several pamphlets and newspaper reports from 1650 onwards, prompting a wave of moral panic amongst clergymen, magistrates, and MPs. Ranters were frequently accused of sexual immorality and associated with nudity.

Parliament feared the group's potential power. Many leading Ranters, such as Lawrence Clarkson, Joseph Salmon, and Jacob Bauthumley, had been soldiers in the New Model Army. Abiezer Coppe had been an army chaplain. They all shared a sense of disillusionment at the betrayal of the Levelers' political and social aims. The publication of the works of Clarkson and Coppe in 1649–50 sent a stir throughout the parliament. The potential rise of a Ranter antinomian movement clearly frightened many members. The Adultery Act of May 10, 1650 and the Blasphemy Act of August 9, 1650 were directed against the Ranters and any who held their views. The most infamous Ranters were arrested and brought to

trial. Jacob Bauthumley was bored through the tongue as punishment for writing a blasphemous book; Clarkson, Salmon, and Coppe wrote recantations and were released after short spells in prison. Not very numerous, the Ranters did not really represent a revolutionary threat, but the existence of a kind of diffused anarchist current testifies to radical conceptions among the urban working people. The savage persecution of the movement reflects the deep hostility to their views on the part of the gentry and bourgeoisie.

Quakers

The first Quakers (Society of Friends) had close connections with the earlier radical movements. Like the Levelers, most of them came from the class of petty traders and handicraftsmen, although the movement made more headway among the peasantry than the Levelers had. Over half the early Quaker leaders were directly connected with the land, and throughout the century the movement remained strong in the rural districts of the north and west. At least 90 of them served the New Model Army and some had played an active part in the political events of 1647–53.

The north of England had been a royalist stronghold, brought under military control, and Quakers entered the area in 1651–3 as a wing of the government party. But while the authorities wanted to use the Quakers as lesser evils, the latter made sharp attacks on tithes and sanctities of ecclesiastical buildings. In 1654, George Fox was arrested on suspicion of plotting against the government. But it was not Cromwell so much as the parliament of the Protectorate that was hostile to the Quakers.

The Quakers stood aloof from the Fifth Monarchist rising, but this did not mean they were as opposed to war then as later. Following the epistle of St. James, Quakers held that warfare arose from the lusts of men, and they looked forward to a time when war and the need for coercion would cease to exist. But, at the same time, they recognized the necessity for a just state founded upon equal respect for men's persons and estates, in a "fallen" world. Moreover, in the Commonwealth period, the Quakers consistently upheld the justice of the parliamentary cause in the Civil Wars and warned the Protectorate that if it ruled tyrannically, it too might be brought down. It was the recognition of the

class positions of the Grandees, and not their pacifism, that explains why so many Quakers found it difficult to remain in the army. The earliest Quaker declarations were in favor of annual parliaments, much in the style of Levelers. Some of their early writings also criticized plural voting, the class-based nature of justice, and limitations of the franchise.

The Quaker attack on tithes was an attack on the concept of the state-church. But in the context of the backlash since Burford, it represented a bid to draw away from the imposition of the rulers rather than an attempt to democratize the entire state. The conditions for a mass popular movement no longer existed, with the yeomen and the artisans defeated, and a modern working class yet to develop. Quaker stress on toleration reflected this condition. However, they were not passive bystanders in the political struggle. In the five years of the Protectorate alone, nearly 2,000 Friends suffered imprisonment, and 21 of them died in jail.

The most important leaders of the Quakers included George Fox and James Nayler. With Fox getting full control of the movement later on, he rewrote its early history and relegated Nayler to the footnotes. But the incident which brought most hostility to the Quakers was Nayler's riding into Bristol in 1656 on a donkey with women strewing palms before him, in imitation of the entrance of Jesus into Jerusalem. For this he was tried by parliament, illegally, and punished savagely. Parliament's concern stemmed from the fact that the movement had swept rapidly over the southern counties, and was recruiting former Levelers and Ranters. Above all, conservatives wanted to end toleration, so they tried to put the whole Quaker movement on trial. Nayler's case also pushed a sizable part of the Quakers in the direction of discipline and order, enabling George Fox to establish full hegemony.

Since Quakers drew much of their early adherents from a Ranter milieu, disciplining them was a difficult but necessary task. This meant that the absolute individualism of the appeal to Christ within everyone had to be curbed. Splits occurred, as with the Proud Quakers, who showed clear ranting tendencies, using profane language. After the Restoration, John Perrot led another tendency, denounced by Fox, as preaching the principles of the old Ranters. The Ranters were ready to compromise, to recant, and yet retain their old opinion, whereas the Quaker principle

of truth led them to bear witness in public, and in that sense made them less dangerous.

Like all the radical sects, Quakers had a considerable number of women followers. The Quaker women had their own meetings. They not only preached, they also stood up in orthodox churches to challenge male ministers, consequently suffering punishment. The most well known of the early Quaker women was Margaret Fell, who married Fox after the death of her husband. In 1659, the Quaker women submitted to the parliament a 70-page petition, calling for the abolition of tithes, signed by 7,000 women. This document started with an affirmation of their power as women. Many Quaker women went on tours, like the Quaker men, taking their vision to distant parts, often beyond England.

The Restoration tried repressing the Quakers through the Quaker Act of 1662 and the Conventicle Act of 1664. Many migrated to the New World, and Pennsylvania became a Quaker colony (well known, among other things, for an honestly kept treaty with the Native Americans). The overthrow of James II in 1688 brought toleration, while Fox's disciplining turned Quakers into a much more respectable community, decent, sober, hard-working, bourgeois in character, but bereft of their early radicalism.

SEE ALSO: Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658); English Revolution, 17th Century; English Revolution, Women and; Fell, Margaret (1614–1702); Fifth Monarchist Women; Fox, George (1624–1691); Lilburne, John (1615–1657); Winstanley, Gerrard (1609–1676)

References and Suggested Readings

- Barg, M. A. (1990) *The English Revolution of the 17th Century through Portraits of its Leading Figures*. Moscow: Progress.
- Capp, B. S. (1972) *The Fifth Monarchy Men: A Study in Seventeenth-Century English Millenarianism*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Hill, C. (1985) *The World Turned Upside Down*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Holstun, J. (2000) *Ehud's Dagger: Class Struggle in the English Revolution*. London: Verso.
- Manning, B. (1992) *1649: The Crisis of the English Revolution*. London, Chicago, and Melbourne: Bookmarks.
- Morton, A. L. (1970) *The World of the Ranters*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Morton, A. L. (Ed.) (1975) *Freedom in Arms: A Selection of Leveller Writings*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Wood, N. & Wood, E. M. (1997) *A Trumpet of Sedition*. London: Pluto.

English Revolution, women and

Soma Marik

In 1640–1, England was shaking as the old order collapsed. With the destruction of the instruments of royal absolutist control, there came a freeing of the mind. Even though in origin parliament's struggle against King Charles had been a struggle by the elite, common people took part as time went on, and many of these were women, who saw in the war primarily injuries, the loss of close male relatives, and the difficulties in keeping the family fed while the men were at war.

Yet, by the end of the war, some women began to see opportunity. The collapse of the old order and breaking down of censorship and elite control led to the emergence of radical voices, including those of a significant number of women of all sorts. A flood of pamphlets appeared in an age hostile to manifestations of women's rights. Though only 11 percent of women of all classes were reportedly literate, women too took part in the pamphlet wars.

Women also played roles in the larger struggle for freedom of the press. Between 1640 and 1660, the total number of publications exceeded the total printed in England in the previous 150 years, and 34 printers were women who provided access to publication for female writers. Out of 650 Quaker authors, 82 were women, writing 220 tracts out of 3,853, with Margaret Fell contributing about 50. The parliamentary newspaper *A Perfect Diurnall*, with a circulation of 3,000, seems to have employed a woman reporter.

The trial and execution of King Charles I, on January 30, 1649, prompted some of these women to speak out. At the time of the trial, Lady Anne Fairfax denounced the Lord President John Bradshaw for claiming that the trial was conducted in the name of the people of England. Mary Pope, a moderate Puritan and a propertied businesswoman, believed in the necessity of curbing the king and his "wicked counsellors," but she spoke out against the bloodshed.

A few women, like the Fifth Monarchist prophet Mary Cary, wrote in support of the regicide. In her *A New and More Exact Mappe or Description of New Jerusalems Glory and The Little Horns Doom and Downfall* (1651), she assumed that the death of Charles Stuart was a sign of the Last

Days and the coming of Christ, paving the way for a world that would be much better for all the oppressed, including women. No person would be homeless, hungry, or unemployed. No infant or young child would die – a thing that all mothers, but particularly mothers of lower-class background, wanted desperately. In 1653, she wrote further pamphlets urging the abolition of tithes, liberty of conscience, reform of universities, poor relief, equal justice for poor and rich, and a wage limit for government employees.

At the same time, some religious dissident groups were founded or co-founded by women. Katherine Chidley, a remarkable woman who played many roles, was a key figure in the founding of the church at Bury St. Edmunds. The Bedford church was created by a group that included four men and five women. Women and the lower classes dominated the Fifth Monarchist congregations, who believed in the imminent coming of the Kingdom of Jesus. In 1648, Mary Cary declared herself a Protestant preacher. In *A New and More Exact Mappe* she assured her readers that a time was coming when not only university-educated men but also women, even servants and handmaids, would prophesy.

This open questioning of class and gender structures of power asserted that salvation through divine light and mercy had been distributed equally to all. Many radicals, including the Quakers, believed that after the preacher had spoken, all participants had the right to ask questions and to debate. Thomas Edwards, a conservative Presbyterian who has left for posterity an account of heresies of the age in his book *Gangraena* (1646), expressed horror at the view that women were within their rights to preach. A female preacher named “Mrs. Attaway” appears quite a few times in his rather vicious writings. She not only preached, she also left her husband for another man named William Jenny. Her argument, as of many women of the radical sects, was that unequal marriages were anti-Christian yokes, and a wife could leave an un-Christian husband.

Behind the religious formulations, there was a clear struggle for the retention of control over women’s sexuality, and an equally determined struggle by women to use the rupture in social control mechanisms generally to overthrow centuries of patriarchal domination and regain sexual freedom. In this short period, when the oppressed sex found a voice, they seemed to have challenged both private property and family strongly.

Katherine Chidley asserted in 1641 that a husband had no more right to control his wife’s conscience than a magistrate had the right to control his. The Quakers believed that marriage required no religious ceremony, and wives were not required to make a promise to obey husbands, since man and wife were as equals in the new life as they had been before the Fall. George Fox, the Quaker leader, on marrying wealthy Margaret Fell, engaged not to interfere with her estate.

Women joined sects, including the Ranters, for whom freedom of choice also meant there was no “sin” in having sexual relations outside marriage. But in an age when abstinence was the sole safeguard against unwanted pregnancy, such freedom was freedom for men only. However, Ranter ideology also replaced church marriages by unions between two consenting adults.

There was also a political element to women’s protest. On January 30, 1642, several hundred women submitted a petition to parliament seeking relief and forced the body to give them a hearing. So far women’s exchanges with the parliament had been amicable. But the outbreak of the civil war changed that. Women did not often fight directly in battles. For most women, war meant acute violence, tending the injured, losing near ones, coping with fragmented families and looting by the victorious side, rising taxes and rising prices. The feelings generated by these experiences were probably the ones that led women to come out demanding peace and an end to the civil war in 1643. Lamenting their dead and imprisoned husbands, they rejected bland assurances and turned violent. In January 1642, for two hours they held the doors and the staircase, allowing MPs to go neither in nor out. Eventually, Waller’s horsemen charged them, beating them up with swords, leading to the death of at least one woman. The unprecedented act of women organizing a public demonstration in their own name and making political their class- and gender-linked demands was made possible only by the revolution. Also, repeatedly in the revolutionary decades, women fought against tithes, demanded equal right of inheritance, price reduction, an end to enclosures, and the abolition of imprisonment for debt default. Time and again, women took to the streets to demand the release of political prisoners.

The most sustained political activism came from Leveler women. Between 1646 and 1653, Leveler women appeared repeatedly on the political

scene along with men – collecting signatures for mass petitions of women, taking deputations to parliament, participating in demonstrations. On April 29, 1649, the funeral of the military Leveler leader Robert Lockier was turned into a political demonstration by large numbers of women wearing sea-green dresses and green and black ribbons. Similarly, around 10,000 women signed the petition of April 23 to April 25, drawn up to demand the release of Leveler leaders. The government responded by telling the women that they possessed no political sense of their own, and the government had already answered their husbands. Reacting sharply, a petition of May 5, drafted by either Katherine Chidley or Elizabeth Lilburne, stated that since women as well as men had an interest in Christ and his redeeming powers, they were worthy to petition and represent their grievances to the House of Commons. They asserted an equal interest with the men to the liberties enshrined in the Petition of Rights and affirmed that while staunch democrats like Lilburne, Overton, and others were incarcerated, they would not just go back to their pots and pans. Despite seemingly accepting the gender division of labor, the women's demonstrations broke the masculine norm of politics.

These women had earned their political experience at immense personal cost. For their leaders, like Elizabeth Lilburne or Mary Overton, personal life was wholly sacrificed, even though, unlike the men, they were also compelled to look after the domestic situation and count up the costs of repeated police raids, seizure of property, and the death of children. Elizabeth had fought for John Lilburne's freedom, both from the royalists (1645) and from the parliament (1647 and 1648), even in an advanced stage of pregnancy. Similarly, Mary Overton had to face armed soldiers breaking in and arresting her husband, seizing their printing press, and subsequently arresting her. For rejecting the authority of the House of Lords, she was removed to Maiden Lane prison with her 6-month-old baby. From there she was removed to Bridewell by jailers and servants, after she had refused to go on her own. This torture on her in the prison revealed what awaited women who had the courage to defy the state machine.

It was the distillation of such bitter experiences that came out in the angry riposte of Elizabeth Lilburne. The anger is all the more pronounced because they felt that after all their sacrifices, the

new incumbents in power were setting up a fresh despotism. And within this general struggle for civil liberties the gendered arguments and notions of equality came out repeatedly. The voiceless condition of women is openly challenged, not by demanding the vote, but in the name of Christianity. Despite this, they found less than full equality even within the movement of which they were such eloquent defenders. Even at the most radical phase of the revolution, women's voting rights did not figure in the debates on universal suffrage at Putney Church in October–November 1647.

The women's struggles began over practical and general democratic issues, and insofar as they did not ever demand the franchise for themselves, it might be argued that they possessed no feminist consciousness. However, they pushed their way into the wholly male preserve of politics. When a member of parliament said that it was strange that women were petitioning, the reply was that it was strange that parliament would cut off the head of the king, yet that had been done. They displayed considerable anti-patriarchal radicalism in refusing to accept that an answer given to their husbands included them, asserting that wives had the right to act independently of husbands. In 1653, when the movement was already waning, they adopted a less militant argument, saying that since not all of them were wives, they needed a separate hearing.

Quaker women presented their own challenges. Quaker women were at one with the Leveler women over the question of abolition of tithes. In 1659, they submitted a 70-page petition, signed by 7,000 women, to the parliament. This document started with an affirmation of their power as women. The Quaker movement had a considerable number of women and accepted women's meetings. In the first generation especially, women not only preached but stood up in church and challenged ordained ministers, facing magistrates and punishments with great courage. Indeed, in the broader English society, women breaking the boundaries set forth by patriarchy were likely to face three charges – of being a whore, being a scold, and being a witch. Scolds were severely punished. And since Quakers were outspoken, there were attempts to punish them repeatedly as scolds. This involved public humiliation and torture. Quaker women not only took pride in the punishment but also remained unrepentant. Many were also accused of being

witches, and between 1645 and 1647, some 200 witches were hanged or burned.

The triumph of Cromwell and the defeat of Leveler democracy ultimately meant an end to radical aspirations for women. A military dictatorship enforced bourgeois transformation from above but ignored claims to rights made by the lower orders. After the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, they tried to return to underground plotting. Ursula Adman was arrested in 1669 for holding Fifth Monarchist meetings in her house. Quakers were persecuted after the Fifth Monarchist uprising. For the moment, most women's voices were silenced. But some still sought to continue the struggle.

SEE ALSO: English Revolution, 17th Century; English Revolution, Radical Sects; Fell, Margaret (1614–1702); Fifth Monarchist Women; Fox, George (1624–1691); Lilburne, John (1615–1657)

References and Suggested Readings

- Davis, S. (1999) *Unbridled Spirits: Women of the English Revolution, 1640–1660*. London: Women's Press.
- Feroli, T. (2006) *Political Speaking Justified: Women Prophets and the English Revolution*. Delaware: University of Delaware Press.
- Higgins, P. (1974) The Reactions of Women, with Special Reference to Women Petitioners. In B. Manning (Ed.), *Politics, Religion and the English Civil War*. London: St. Martin's Press.
- Hill, C. (1985) *The World Turned Upside Down*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Manning, B. (1992) *1649: The Crisis of the English Revolution*. London, Chicago, and Melbourne: Bookmarks.
- Marik, S. (2004) Remembering Christopher Hill: Women Turning the World Upside Down. *Social Scientist* 32, 3–4 (March–April): 50–70.
- Nevitt, M. (2006) *Women and the Pamphlet Culture of Revolutionary England, 1640–1660*. London: Ashgate.

Enlightenment, France, 18th century

William E. Burns

Ideas associated with the eighteenth-century Enlightenment – secularism and anti-clericalism, turning a skeptical eye toward tradition and custom in favor of the application of reason and expertise to public affairs, and, to a lesser extent, democracy – have played a prominent role in the history of revolutions and popular movements

both in the eighteenth century and later. This was not the intention of many of the European Enlightenment philosophers themselves, who benefited from the existing political and social system and wished to see it reformed, not overthrown.

Enlightenment philosophers, or *philosophes*, had diverse political views. Political reforms that found broad support included religious tolerance and the abolition of laws that infringed on personal liberty for religious reasons. *Philosophes* also usually favored a more equitable legal system, the abolition of “unreasonable” privileges, the creation of a freer economic market, a reorientation of monarchical culture toward care for the people rather than military glory or conspicuous piety, and the abolition of slavery.

The voluminous French *Encyclopédie*, published from 1751 to 1772, was the most characteristic work of the Enlightenment and set forth many of its principles. Conceived by its editors, the French *philosophes* Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, not as a mere reference book but as a major contribution to the progress of human society, it propounded a universal mission of Enlightenment to a predominantly French audience. The contributors, who included virtually all of the major intellectual figures of the day, were of varying political and religious opinions – some were quite conservative – but the dominant voice of the *Encyclopédie* was opposed to the existing order in church and state. In religion it was anti-clerical, strongly in favor of religious toleration, and in places anti-Christian, deistic, and even atheistic. In politics it supported the idea that governments and rulers should be evaluated by the degree to which they provide a better life for their people. Although some monarchs were praised, they were usually not praised for their victories in battle or their religious devotion, but for justice and concern for their subjects. Aristocrats were frequently contrasted unfavorably with the common people, as in the entry entitled “People.” Even cross-references were used to make political points – at the end of a short article on France which emphasized the country's flaws, readers were directed to articles on “Taxes” and “Toleration,” suggesting that high taxes and lack of religious toleration were harming the country.

Enlightenment Anti-Clericalism

The enlightened *philosophes* did not initiate anti-clericalism, which had a long history in Europe.

However, they elevated dislike and distrust of religious institutions into a political program. (Although the *philosophes* had some harsh words for priests and clerics, Enlightenment anticlericalism's chief targets were institutions, not individuals. Many *philosophes* themselves were Catholic priests or Protestant ministers.) Anticlericalism had revolutionary implications, given the strong and deep alliance between political and religious authority in eighteenth-century Europe and its colonies.

The ways in which the institutional power of churches, both Catholic and Protestant, made itself felt in people's lives and offended *philosophes* were legion, and extended from the cradle to the grave. Kings and other rulers claimed to derive their power from God, and all states were allied with official or "established" churches, although there was great variation in the amount of toleration different governments allowed to religious dissenters. Even in an "Enlightened" and tolerant country like England, which many *philosophes* admired for allowing different religious bodies to operate freely, political power was reserved for members of the Church of England. Churches dominated education throughout Europe, and many believed they filled students' minds with superstition rather than useful knowledge (although several French *philosophes*, including the arch-anticlerical Voltaire, benefited from the excellent schools run by the Jesuit order).

Marriage remained under the control of state churches, as did many other aspects of sexual life. For Continental European writers whose works even marginally challenged religion, censorship was a constant nuisance, and sometimes a great deal more than a nuisance. For taxpaying *philosophes*, Church tax exemptions were difficult to justify. Many *philosophes* were dramatists or lovers of the theater, and religious opposition to the drama prevented theaters from being established in some places. In Catholic countries actors had to be stigmatized even posthumously by being buried in unconsecrated ground. After struggling with clerical power all of his life, a *philosophe* could find even his deathbed was not safe from well-meaning Christians, clerical or lay, pressuring him for a last-minute repentance.

Religious toleration was central to the Enlightenment program. The killing or jailing of people for their religious views, whether in wars of religion or in persecution of dissidents, was

universally reprobated by Enlightenment thinkers. *Philosophes* attacked religious intolerance not only as an immoral assault on the freedom of the individual, but as socially and economically unproductive. Tolerant societies like Britain and the Dutch Republic, they pointed out, were also more prosperous, and France had never recovered from the loss of Protestant skilled workers and entrepreneurs following the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685.

By the time of the Enlightenment, large-scale religious violence was less of a problem than everyday discrimination throughout most of Europe. The last major European religious war was the Thirty Years War from 1618 to 1648, and violent persecutions were waning, although the brutal suppression of Protestantism in France was still in living memory in the first half of the eighteenth century. But despite the rise of *de facto* toleration in many countries and *de jure* in a few, no European state before the French Revolution renounced its alliance with a church or went beyond toleration to institute full religious equality.

In addition to intolerance and discrimination, many other aspects of clerical power, such as censorship, the repression of sexuality, and hostility to the theater, were targets of Enlightened wrath. Clerical control over sexuality in eighteenth-century Europe was not just a matter of ideology but was also institutional – church courts exerted authority over many sexual matters, such as marriage and "illicit" sex. Rejecting the traditional Christian suspicion of sex, Enlightenment thought challenged the prevailing sexual order in its secularity and emphasis on the positive aspects of sex.

Philosophes thought sexual and family life should be regulated, not by the precepts of the Bible or the Church, but by the laws of nature. Medicine and science were often invoked in place of religion as the proper guides in sexual matters. Sexual desire was treated as a natural phenomenon, and sex, particularly procreative sex, was innately praiseworthy. Refraining from sex was "unnatural," not spiritual. The hordes of celibate Catholic monks, nuns, and priests contributed to the crisis of underpopulation which many *philosophes* saw afflicting Europe. Celibates, male or female, were parasites on society in their refusal to participate in the creation of the next generation. To challenge wrong-headed ideas about sex, sexual matters had to

be openly discussed, but the writings of many Enlightenment philosophers were sometimes censored for their sexual content. (The ultimate extension of this was the euphemism by which pornographic works were called “philosophical books.”)

Male *philosophes* were more in agreement with religious authorities in their shared support for male domination and emphasis on procreation in marriage, but even in these areas the Enlightenment at least found new ways to express and uphold old ideas. *Philosophes* did not root male dominance in divine law but in the “naturally” different functions of the sexes. Woman’s natural function was domestic, as a wife and mother, while man’s was public. Sexual desire was as natural and praiseworthy for women as it was for men, particularly since sex led to motherhood, but though many male Enlightenment thinkers had affairs with married women and showed some sympathy for women trapped in unhappy marriages, few questioned the double standard – the idea that oaths of marital fidelity are more binding on women.

The cultural control exerted by Christian churches can be seen in their suppression of the theater in some areas – *philosophes* were involved in campaigns to establish theaters in the Calvinist strongholds of Edinburgh and Geneva – and the institutional censorship that prevented anti-clerical and anti-Christian ideas from open publication. The Catholic Church maintained an Index of Forbidden Books, which Catholics were supposedly allowed neither to read nor to own without permission of Church authorities. Although a few countries, like Britain, had abolished the most blatant forms of censorship, publishers of anti-Christian works were still vulnerable to attack under blasphemy laws.

The Attack on Christianity

Many Enlightened thinkers went beyond criticizing the actions of churches to challenging the philosophical basis of religion itself, particularly those religions they were most familiar with, Christianity and Judaism. The exact meaning of Voltaire’s famous slogan *écrasez l’infâme* or “crush the evil” is still debated, but it is most likely that the evil was Christianity. The radical phases of the Enlightenment represented the first open attack on the premises and institutions

of Christianity to emerge within a Christian culture. Unlike Martin Luther and his sixteenth-century contemporaries, the radical *philosophes* had come not to reform Christianity but to destroy it, whether they were Deists like Voltaire who believed in God but not revealed religion, or atheists like the baron d’Holbach who denied the existence of God.

Their attack was informed by a belief in science and the progress of knowledge. The Bible, they thought, was the superstitious work of ancient savages, far inferior to modern writings as well as to the works of the pagan Greeks and Romans. *Philosophes* emphasized the cruelty and barbarism of the tales of the Hebrew Bible – the Christian Old Testament – sometimes extending their condemnation of the barbarian Jews of antiquity to Europe’s contemporary Jewish population. However, the attack on the Old Testament was directed at Christians even more than religious Jews. Rather than being a source of morality, *philosophes* argued, traditional Christianity was its greatest enemy, substituting hatred of those of a different religion for the social bonds that should tie communities together, and through its encouragement of asceticism and celibacy, “unnaturally” depriving people of sexual pleasure and diminishing a kingdom’s natural rate of population increase.

Given the ideological role of Christianity in European regimes, monarchical or republican, the radical *philosophes’* attack on it was revolutionary in itself. If Christianity was not the foundation of modern regimes, then they had to seek support elsewhere, and justify themselves on the grounds of the good they did the people in this world. However, the Enlightenment critique of Christianity was limited by the Christian religious commitments of some *philosophes*, particularly in England, and by concerns of maintaining public order. Many anti-religious works were elitist, not intended to influence behavior beyond the literate upper and middle classes. No one expected ordinary workers and peasants to abandon Christianity. Some irreligious Enlightenment philosophers even explicitly endorsed religion as a way to regulate the behavior of the lower classes or women. They idealized purportedly nonreligious civilizations such as contemporary China or ancient Greece and Rome, whose governing elites did not share in the superstition of the people while not attempting to suppress it.

“Reason” and the Attack on Custom, Tradition, and Privilege

Eighteenth-century Europe was a complex structure of groups and classes claiming privileges on the basis of custom and tradition. The nobility possessed an enormous variety of social and legal privileges on the European continent, and even the vaunted British parliament was elected on a crazy quilt of franchises based on historic traditions rather than on abstract political logic. *Philosophes*, many of middle-class origin, attacked local traditions and privileges in the name of the universal values of reason and justice.

Aristocrats had many tax exemptions and formal and informal privileges in law. Vast areas of employment in the military, the church, and state administration were reserved for aristocratic men even in such “enlightened” states as Prussia. Although several *philosophes* themselves were members of the noble class, they pointed out the fundamental irrationality of a system whereby essential responsibilities were distributed on the basis of birth rather than ability. *Philosophes* also sometimes satirized aristocrats as know-nothings, as in Voltaire’s novel *Candide*.

Many *philosophes* supported radical reform of the judicial system, which in addition to upholding aristocratic privilege in many European states still admitted – and in some cases, relied on – evidence obtained by torture. *Philosophes*, including Montesquieu, Voltaire, and the Italian criminologist Cesare Beccaria, pressed – with some success – for the abolition of torture and moderation in the use of the death penalty. The protracted nature of legal proceedings was another favorite target. Many French *philosophes*, including Voltaire, attacked France’s hereditary magistrate class for being more concerned with its own privileges than with the administration of justice.

Despite their skepticism over the ability of the judiciary to produce justice, *philosophes* still preferred due process of law to arbitrary actions, such as the French king’s power arbitrarily to imprison subjects through *lettres de cachet*. Persons living under such arbitrary rule, whether or not they were personally affected by it, could not be free. Like their contemporaries, the thinkers of the Enlightenment employed a broader definition of “slavery” than that of chattel slavery. It was routine to refer to all that lived under arbitrary and despotic regimes as

slaves. Slavery in this general sense was the condition of most people, both in the eighteenth century and throughout history.

In the realm of economics, *philosophes* usually favored freedom and the abolition of those monopolies and privileges characteristic of early modern capitalism. The classic work of free-market economics, Adam Smith’s *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), argued that greater economic freedom would lead to more prosperity. The French school of economists known as the physiocrats also supported the removal of restrictions on trade. France at this time did not only present barriers to foreign trade, but even to domestic trade between different regions.

The most obvious example of entrenched traditional privilege, of course, was monarchy itself. *Philosophes* were split on their opinion. Given the omnipresence of monarchy, and the ineffectuality of Europe’s few remaining republics, it often seemed pragmatically best to accept kingship as an institution and work with monarchical reformers like Catherine the Great of Russia or Leopold of Tuscany. Monarchy was conceived of by reformers as the calling of an individual to work for the good of the people. However, there was also a strong republican strain in the Enlightenment, particularly conspicuous in the work of Rousseau. The ancient republics of Greece and Rome were admired, and the decline of the Roman republic in favor of the Empire was widely viewed as a political tragedy. The success of the American Revolution and the ability of the Americans to form a politically stable republic covering a large territory increased awareness of alternatives to monarchy in the late Enlightenment.

Enlightenment and Abolition

The *philosophes* participated in the creation of an ideological opposition to chattel slavery in the eighteenth century. Attacks on the misery of slaves and the hypocrisy and cruelty of those who exploited them or defended slavery were commonplaces of Enlightenment rhetoric from as early as 1721, when the French lawyer and *philosophe* Montesquieu published his *Persian Letters*. Some articles in the *Encyclopédie* denounced contemporary slavery, although others accepted it as a fact of life. *Philosophes* combined horror at slavery’s cruelty with the assertion that it violated the natural and inalienable rights which

slaves, like all human beings, possessed – the same rights that would be asserted in classic Enlightenment-influenced political documents, such as the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. However, the *philosophes* of Europe never campaigned against slavery as vigorously as they did against evils which struck them as closer to home, such as religious intolerance or judicial torture. The American *philosophe* Benjamin Franklin, toward the end of his life, was an exception. Another American exception, in a different way, was Thomas Jefferson, who combined sympathy for the Enlightenment with owning slaves.

Although *philosophes* frequently attacked the enslavement of Africans in the Atlantic trade, denunciation of slavery was not always correlated with egalitarian ideas about race. The Scottish philosopher David Hume, among others, combined opposition to slavery with extreme views on black intellectual inferiority, comparing blacks who had acquired proficiency in European intellectual disciplines to trained parrots. Consistent with secularity, Enlightenment racists avoided biblical justifications for slavery or belief in black inferiority in favor of “scientific racism.” Thomas Jefferson’s assertion of black racial inferiority in *Notes on Virginia* (1785) rested wholly on secular, scientific arguments rather than appeals to biblical authority. Hume and other late eighteenth-century *philosophes* (particularly in Scotland) also laid greater emphasis on the pragmatic than the moral argument against slavery, claiming that it was economically harmful and that slave societies would not be as wealthy or productive as ones based on free labor. In *The Wealth of Nations* Adam Smith argued that slavery was a bad bargain for masters, as free labor, requiring less supervision, was ultimately cheaper.

Democratic Elements of Enlightened Thought

The Enlightenment as a whole did not look favorably on democracy. The uneducated masses could not be trusted with control of the state, particularly as they were under the influence of Christian churches. However, some Enlightenment thinkers, particularly Jean-Jacques Rousseau, had a more favorable impression of democracy, and many were willing to use democratic argu-

ments in their struggle against the traditional order.

Rousseau’s *The Social Contract* (1762) and some other Enlightenment books and pamphlets endorsed a democratic theory of authority that had revolutionary implications. *The Social Contract* dealt a blow at the hierarchically stratified class society of eighteenth-century Europe simply by explaining how people could live in society in an equal way. Rousseau argued that society is founded on an implicit contract between equal individuals, not between the people and a sovereign as earlier contractarian theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke had argued. The ideal society he presents is based on equality of rights among its citizens (although Rousseau strongly distinguished between the rights and functions of men and women) and obedience to what he defined as “the general will,” which is not always the will of the majority. Jean Meslier was another who distrusted the authoritarian monarchies of eighteenth-century Europe. His famous statement “Let us strangle the last king with the guts of the last priest” would be quoted many times by revolutionaries and atheists (and incorrectly attributed to Diderot).

The potential alliance of Enlightened ideas and democratic politics was first made clear in the class struggles of the independent republic of Geneva, which attracted the attention of Rousseau, a Genevan himself, and Voltaire. As in many of the republics of early modern Europe, political participation in Geneva was reserved to a hereditary class. A small minority of Citizens and Burghers monopolized the right to vote, an even smaller hereditary minority of Citizens monopolized political office, and in practice the town was dominated by a small oligarchy of allied and intermarried Citizen families. Voltaire and Rousseau were initially involved in Genevan politics on behalf of the Citizens and Burghers excluded from power by the oligarchy, and Rousseau’s *Social Contract* was banned by the Genevan oligarchs. Voltaire eventually took the side of the third group in Genevan politics, the vast and unenfranchised majority of the population known as Natives, and in doing so suggested that the broad range of men, at least in a Protestant city like Geneva, could be entrusted with the right to participate in politics. Although the class struggle in Geneva was eventually resolved in 1770 by a compromise between the oligarchs and the remaining Citizens and

Burgers against the Natives, the Genevan events pointed the way to more successful democratic revolutions in America and France.

Enlightenment Philosophers, Political Reform, and Revolution

Enlightenment philosophers endorsed different methods for achieving reforms depending on their political context. In the early eighteenth century, Enlightenment philosophers in the Anglo-American world usually supported reformism, working through the existing institutions of the British Parliament, although they recognized that the eighteenth-century British parliamentary system was itself a product of the Revolution of 1688.

Most continental European states lacked an equivalent of the British Parliament. Continental *philosophes* often put their faith in a strong, reforming monarch. Many French *philosophes*, including Voltaire, were believers in the *thèse royale* in French history, which emphasized the power of the monarch over other institutions and interests. Voltaire hoped that the monarchy could reform France against the entrenched interest of the nobility, the corporations, and above all the Church. (Others, such as Montesquieu, a hereditary magistrate himself, were more wary of monarchical power and hoped that other institutions like the Church and magistracy could be a check on it.) However, France, the center of the Enlightenment on the European continent, never had such a monarch in the eighteenth century. The minister Turgot attempted to put some Enlightened reforms, such as freer trade, into practice, but failed as a politician and was soon driven from office. “Enlightened despots” in other parts of Europe, including Frederick II of Prussia, Joseph II of Austria, and Catherine II of Russia, all received adulation from some Enlightenment philosophers, despite their incomplete adherence to the Enlightened program.

The position of Enlightenment philosophers toward the revolutionary alternative to a reforming monarch, minister, or parliament was fundamentally pragmatic, evaluating revolutions and movements on a case-by-case basis. The most extreme conservative position, denying the legitimacy of revolution under any circumstance, was not defended by *philosophes*, particularly since it was associated with conservative

churchmen. Nearly all endorsed the limited English revolution of 1688, which French “anglophiles” such as Voltaire and Montesquieu believed had helped usher in an age of personal liberty and freedom of expression and conscience in Britain. John Locke, whose *Two Treatises on Government* (1689) was commonly believed to be a theoretical justification of the Revolution of 1688, was widely admired as a political philosopher for deriving power from consent, rather than from the authority given by God. However, *philosophes* did not value revolution for its own sake nor did they believe it preferable to other methods of bringing about social change. They often condemned revolutionary movements, particularly when revolutions seemed to be driven by traditionalism and religion, like Pugachev’s rebellion in Russia. Other eighteenth-century revolutions, however, won Enlightened approbation.

The Enlightenment and the American Revolution

The paradigmatic “Enlightened revolution” was the American Revolution. Intellectually, the American revolutionaries were particularly influenced by Locke, the Scottish Enlightenment, and Montesquieu. The revolution was greeted with enthusiasm in Enlightened circles in France, an enthusiasm reinforced by the reputation of the rebellious colonists’ ambassador to France, Benjamin Franklin. Franklin already had a greater standing in Europe than any other American, and leading *philosophes* such as Voltaire accepted him as one of themselves.

American propagandists had begun their advocacy of the colonists’ cause by arguing in terms of the rights they were guaranteed under the “British constitution,” but the development of the Revolution in the direction of independence from Britain led to Enlightenment-influenced arguments about universal rights. The Declaration of Independence made universal statements about equality and rights that drew from the Deistic strain of the Enlightenment, referring to God by the non-Christian title of “Creator.”

As architects of a new form of government, the American founders drew on the Enlightenment belief in overcoming superstition and ignorance through reason and virtue. The influence of the Enlightenment on the American *naissance* can be particularly seen in the provisions of the

Constitution and Bill of Rights, which forbade religious tests for political participation at the federal level, ensured religious toleration, and proclaimed that America would not have a national established church. Although the new American society was far from egalitarian, it lacked the hereditary aristocracy and structure of inherited privilege characteristic of European states. The idea of the separation of powers and checks and balances in the American Constitution drew heavily from Montesquieu's *The Spirit of the Laws*, which had a particularly pronounced influence on the Federalist Papers.

The Enlightenment and the French Revolution

The relationship of the Enlightenment to the French Revolution is among the most vigorously disputed historical questions. Much of the Enlightenment program was put into place by the royal government either in the years preceding the Revolution or early in the Revolution itself. Enlightened reforms in the last days of the monarchy included toleration for French Protestants, greater freedom of the press, and moves to relax restrictions on internal trade.

The French Revolution, particularly in its radical Jacobin phase, carried Enlightenment ideas to a pitch that would in some ways never be matched – and most likely would have been viewed with skepticism by the *philosophes* themselves. The Declaration of the Rights of Man drew heavily on the Enlightenment in its universalism and for such specific ideas as “opening careers to talent,” religious toleration, and secularism. The remaining legal disabilities of Protestants and Jews were lifted and *lettres de cachet* abolished. Marriage was secularized, and divorce, forbidden by the Catholic Church, was legalized. Voltaire, and even more so Rousseau, were venerated by the revolutionaries. The privileges of the nobility and corporations were abolished. As the Revolution grew more radical, the old fantasy of the destruction of Christianity was for the first time made the goal of an official policy with “dechristianization” and the creation of new cults such as that of the Supreme Being and the goddess of reason. Monarchy was abolished in favor of an increasingly democratic republic, and slavery was also abolished.

The French revolutionaries made a far more thorough-going assault on tradition in the name

of reason than the Americans had ever considered. Weights, measures, and even the passage of time were rationalized with the creation of the metric system and a short-lived attempt to impose a decimal system of time reckoning. Space was rationalized, with the abolition of the historic provinces, with their different histories, traditions, and privileges, in favor of the new *départements*, made as geographically similar as possible and lacking any separate institutional history.

However, the French Revolution was also in part a revolution against the Enlightenment, against the privileged position of Enlightenment philosophers and institutions. Elitist institutions such as the French Academy, the Royal Academy of Sciences, and even the Freemasons were abolished as “aristocratic.” The revolutionaries did something that the Old Regime had never done, which was to persecute a major Enlightenment *philosophe*, the Marquis de Condorcet, to the point of death.

The Enlightenment's Legacy of Reform and Revolution

The political legacy of the Enlightenment, particularly in France, was shaped by the reception of the French Revolution. Enlightenment secularism and rejection of tradition were associated with the legacy of the Revolution, despite the historical fact that the *philosophes* had foreseen peaceable reform through rational dialogue rather than violent confrontation. The link between the Enlightenment and the French Revolution was also drawn in a negative sense, by the opponents of both. This connection was made by Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790). Burke, a sympathizer with the Enlightenment in its British version, linked the Revolution to the irresponsibility of French Enlightenment intellectuals, “the political men of letters,” and the folly of Enlightenment attacks on tradition and established institutions. Even in America, the reaction to the French Revolution led to the expression of hostility to many leaders of the Enlightenment, particularly those associated with the attack on Christianity.

The success of the American and French revolutions, and the conservative reaction to them in Britain itself, helped radicalize much of the British Enlightenment, particularly in England. The American revolutionaries' rejection

of the vaunted British constitution helped shatter political complacency. There was a new awareness of the constitution's potential for corruption and tyranny. The French Revolution showed the potential for revolutionary change, even in a reactionary monarchy, and inspired some, including the Enlightened Dissenting Protestant ministers Joseph Priestley and Richard Price, to suspect that the Second Coming was at hand. (The combination of millenarian and Enlightened ideas was not unusual in England.) Priestley, Price, and their fellow Enlightened Dissenters rejected the many ways in which they were discriminated against in favor of Anglicans. They increasingly linked equality for Dissenters with parliamentary reform. The association between the Enlightenment and revolutionary or reformist movements led to the conservative reaction against the French Revolution in Britain also becoming a reaction against the Enlightenment. Mob violence and increasing repression forced Priestley into exile in the United States. A massive "English Jacobin" movement inspired by Thomas Paine was unable to accomplish a genuine social revolution in Britain, but Enlightened intellectuals like William Godwin called for revolutionary changes along French lines and even beyond. Godwin called for the abolition, rather than the reform, of established institutions in the name of a social order of perfect rationality.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Enlightenment revolutionary concepts merged into broader revolutionary and progressive traditions. Religious toleration and the "career open to talent" were shibboleths of nineteenth-century liberalism. Religious "freethinking," a common characteristic of many reformers and revolutionaries in the nineteenth century, drew on the Enlightenment critique of religious authority and Christianity. Enlightenment materialism, social science, and "political economy" were constituent elements of Marxism. Distinctively Enlightenment inspiration can be discerned in a variety of revolutionary movements and regimes. Militant secularism has been found not only in Marxist revolutionary societies like the USSR and the People's Republic of China, but in non-Marxist states ranging from Kemal Atatürk's "revolution from above" in the Turkish Republic, to the "Cristero wars" of early twentieth-century Mexico, and in revolutionary cultural movements like China's May 4th movement. Rationaliza-

tion and standardization are also Enlightenment bequests to the revolutionary tradition.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776; Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938); China, May 4th Movement; Diderot, Denis (1713–1784); Edict of Nantes; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Glorious Revolution, Britain, 1688; Godwin, William (1756–1836); Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679); Holbach, Baron d' (1723–1789); Locke, John (1632–1704); Montesquieu, Baron de (1689–1755); Paine, Thomas (1737–1809); Pugachev's Rebellion, 1773–1775; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778); Voltaire (1694–1778)

References and Suggested Readings

- Baker, K. M. (1990) *Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cranston, M. (1986) *Philosophers and Pamphleteers: Political Theorists of the Enlightenment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Darnton, R. (1982) *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Dupre, L. (2004) *The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gay, P. (1969) *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Israel, J. (2001) *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650–1750*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lough, J. (1982) *The Philosophes and Post-Revolutionary France*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Outram, D. (2005) *The Enlightenment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Porter, R. (2001) *The Enlightenment*. New York: Palgrave.

Enriquillo and the Taíno revolt (1519–1533)

Viviana Uriona

Enriquillo was also known as Chieftain Guarocuya. His father died in a Spanish raid against a peaceful protest by indigenous people in Jaragua, Santo Domingo, ordered by Governor Nicolás de Ovando in 1503 while the Indians were celebrating a peace agreement. The orphan was raised in a monastery in Santo Domingo, where he was given the name of Enrico. One of his mentors was Bartolomé de Las Casas. Enriquillo rebelled against the Spaniards from 1519 to 1533.

Enriquillo, born approximately in the year 1496, was heir to the Nitainato of Bahoruco, one of the five major kingdoms that existed on the island at the time of Columbus's arrival. The friars taught him to read and write and to use grammar. He spoke good Spanish. According to the custom of the spiritual monastery, Enriquillo married his cousin, Taina Mencía. She was the daughter of Princess Higuemota, daughter of Queen Anacaona and Cacique Caonabo. The Taíno people, native to Hispaniola Island, were abused as slaves on sugar plantations beginning soon after the arrival of Christopher Columbus.

In 1519, Enriquillo became tired of the system of slavery and the injustice toward his people. In addition, a dispute over whether their "owner" abused Mencía escalated, and the couple decided to leave in rebellion for the rugged mountains of Bahoruco. In the first half of the sixteenth century several revolts took place, the most famous one in 1522. Enriquillo (Guarocuya) remained at war against the Spaniards on either side of the mountains of Bahoruco, jumping the estates of the settlers, capturing their weapons, and repelling their attacks.

After fighting for 14 years, he signed a peace agreement with the envoy of the king of Spain, General Francisco Barrionuevo, in 1533. The agreement called for freedom and a free territory for the Taíno people, the elimination of the *encomienda* system, and non-payment of taxes to the crown. Cacique Enriquillo settled in the area of Yucateque von Boya, known today as the province of Monte Plata. The indiscriminate killing and mistreatment of Indians by the Spaniards, as well as diseases brought from Europe and the agreement signed with the indigenous Taínos, forced the settlers to "import" and enslave people from Africa to continue with the construction of the colony. It is alleged that the cacique died from tuberculosis in 1533 at about the age of 40. The tribe became extinct because of epidemics and diseases introduced at the end of the sixteenth century.

SEE ALSO: Cuauhtémoc (1502–1525); Mapuche Indian Resistance; Urabi Movement

References and Suggested Readings

Estella, J. R. (2008) *Enriquillo, loosely translated from Historica Grafica de la Republica Dominicana*. Available at www.stjohnbeachguide.com/Enriquillo.htm (accessed May 28, 2008).

Galván, M. (1882) *Enriquillo*. Santo Domingo: Imprenta García Hermanos.

Peña Batlle, M. A. (1948) *La Rebelión del Bahoruco*. Santo Domingo: Impresora Dominicana.

Environmental protest, United States, 19th century

John Robert Henris

During much of the nineteenth century, rural communities resisted new emerging discourses of wilderness, conservation, and preservation enacted upon them by corporate, municipal, state, or federal authority, as well as by intellectuals and other elites. Such protest to changing perceptions and management of the environment manifested itself most ubiquitously in the form of resistance to conservation law through legal challenges or by more subversive means like trespass, poaching, and timber theft. Less commonly, municipal, corporate, state, or federal challenges to traditional use of natural resources among local communities manifested itself in more violent interactions including sabotage, rioting, assault, arson, and even murder. Nineteenth-century environmental protest dealt less with ecological degradation, though there was protest against such instances, and more commonly with questions concerning which individuals or entities had the right to incorporate natural resources, manage, or limit access to nature.

An emerging consciousness of a conservation ethic among farmers, intellectuals, sportsmen, and business elites emanated from transformative social, agro-ecological, and economic change in New England and neighboring states between 1820 and 1860. Soil exhaustion, industrial growth, and urban expansion, particularly in New England, led to a growing awareness that nature's bounty was finite and natural resources would need to be conserved or managed. The emerging conservation ethic thought this could only be done through scientific management and, consequently, that local communities were incapable of managing their own interactions with nature or conserving natural resources for the common good. Similarly, a growing sense of nationalism agitated cultural exploration for a singularly American expression of identity rivaling the long histories

of European nations. Consequently, Americans began to perceive the wilderness areas as natural monuments rivaling the historic architectural accomplishments of Europe. Tragically, this emerging discourse of wilderness created perceptions among elites of nature as untouched by human interaction regardless of the fact that all such landscapes had been managed by Native Americans or communities of European heritage under traditional subsistence regimes or ideals of common right for generations. An emerging conservation ideology that marginalized pre-existing communities and their traditional interactions with nature led to various forms of protest among local communities from New England to the Pacific Northwest between 1830 and 1900.

During the 1830s, rural landowners challenged municipal authority to control natural resources as New York City sought clean water through the construction of the Croton reservoir and aqueduct system north of the city. Although only a handful of Westchester farmers' lands were directly affected by the Croton water project, a number of residents resisted selling their lands, petitioned Albany for redress, or threatened legal action. Though anxiety in Westchester never culminated in more visible signs of protest, there was, nevertheless, a burgeoning conservation ethic over what entities would control water inherent in the reluctance of residents to embrace the Croton project. In challenging, even tentatively, the municipal authority of New York City to incorporate water at the expense of local communities, Westchester residents were invariably grappling with issues of sustainability. The incorporation of water for industrial and urban use brought more pronounced forms of protest against the commodification of nature in nineteenth-century New England.

In New England, protest over the incorporation of water rights at the expense of traditional local ideals of common use became particularly virulent between 1830 and 1850. The incorporation of water under the Waltham-Lowell system for the running of textile mills fomented resistance among rural communities and farmers in the Merrimack Valley and Winnepesaukee Lakes region of New Hampshire. Like the Croton project in neighboring New York, rural residents in New Hampshire became increasingly hostile toward the incorporation of water, a natural resource they perceived as being harnessed

for the economic benefit of Massachusetts textile mills at the expense of their own common right. Unlike the Croton project, however, the Waltham-Lowell system created much more substantive environmental and ecological disruptions as well.

Water control infrastructure, most notably dams, damaged fish habitat, disrupted traditional waterborne routes of transportation or commerce, and, most significantly, resulted in the flooding of farmers' fields. Of all these offenses, the raising and lowering of water levels, and corresponding submerging of neighboring hay fields, elicited the most virulent protest. During the first half of the nineteenth century, natural river hay still provided the agricultural foundation for yeoman farming, and the potential destruction of such mowing fields brought increasing resistance to the water companies. Although instances of legal action and isolated occurrences of vandalism abounded in the 1830s and 1840s, increasing tensions between corporate water monopolies and rural communities culminated in protest in September of 1859 when local residents attempted to destroy the dam at Lake Village, New Hampshire. Such militant forms of protest were fairly isolated; however, they were indicative of increasing conflict over the gradual erosion of common right and challenged whether outside authority had the right to control or monopolize natural resources like water in nineteenth-century New England.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, competing ideologies of conservation and preservation increasingly found common ground in constructing legal boundaries constraining how local rural communities used nature as well as physical boundaries, of which the creation of state forest reserves and national parks became the principal enduring manifestations. Particularly in northern New England, new fish and game laws came into being and were meant to reign in perceived environmental depredations by local communities while encouraging the development of sport fishing, hunting, and tourism for outside elites. One fundamental enduring belief of nineteenth-century conservationists and preservationists was that locals, be they farmers, trappers, woodsmen, Hispanic ranchers, or Native Americans, were incapable of managing nature in their own communities. Local communities for their part viewed the proliferation of game and fish laws and the creation of forest

preserves and national parks as an assault upon traditional subsistence practices or communal ideals of common right. In the Northeast, resentment became outright protest during the formation of the Adirondack Forest Preserve during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

Initially organized in 1885, Adirondack attained new status as a state park in 1892, subsequently leading to a number of oppressive conservation laws restricting the use of timber, fish, and game located on public lands. As in northern New England, local residents thought outside legislation of lands traditionally managed by common right to be an impediment to traditional subsistence activities and engaged in forms of protest, most notably poaching and timber theft. Trespass became an increasingly common form of protest, as private parks owned by wealthy outsiders sprung up in the Adirondacks, limiting traditional public access to game and fishing locales. In 1899, arson became an expression of protest against conservation laws limiting local access to game, timber, or the right to burn fallow agricultural fields for the coming planting season. Such spectacular displays of protest against those who had the authority to manage nature or infringe upon communal ideals of common right continued into the first decade of the twentieth century. Local protest to conservation laws limiting access to nature was by no means unique to Adirondack Park. Similar cycles of trespass, timber theft, and poaching challenged outside authority by communities that found themselves enclosed within the boundaries of the Superior National Forest during the first decade of the twentieth century.

Just as the incorporation of water in New England for industrial usage inundated river meadows and upset traditional agro-ecological cycles for many New England farmers living along the Merrimack River, the incorporation of forests in the Pacific Northwest upset traditional Native American subsistence patterns. During the second half of the nineteenth century the Sinkyone people of Northern California resisted the incorporation of redwood forests by private lumber companies. The destruction of traditional means of subsistence in the forests and the fouling of salmon runs forced the Sinkyone to raid the neighboring cattle herds of European settlers to compensate for the destruction visited upon their streams and forests by large-scale lumbering. Similarly, the rapid spread of mining in

California following the discovery of gold in 1849 led to widespread ecological damage in the following decades. Objection to such rampant environmental degradation in the form of injunctions against the disposal of mining debris in streams came only in 1884, when the accumulation of mine tailings and eroded topsoil washed downstream into San Francisco Bay and threatened to impair navigation.

West of San Francisco, and decades before Yosemite National Park became renowned for its early twentieth-century conflict between John Muir and Gifford Pinchot concerning the Hetch Hetchy Dam, indigenous people protested ecological change and infringement upon their perceptions of common right in the 1880s. Citing instances of destruction of roots, berries, and nuts by cattle and horses brought within park boundaries, the Yosemite people contended they could not subsist themselves as outsiders invariably destroyed the foundations of traditional food-gathering regimes. In the late 1880s the Yosemite petitioned Congress addressing such concerns; however, depredations continued and Yosemite became a National Park in 1890. After 1890, the Yosemite people continued to resist the incorporation of their lands, under the guise of the conservation movement, by illegally hunting deer in the Merced and Tuolumne watersheds within park boundaries. Under federal authority park officials vigorously resisted challenges to their management of wilderness by bringing in the US cavalry to police park boundaries and protect game. Despite such measures, park officials complained of rampant poaching by the Yosemite people as late as 1897.

Of all the parks and reserves created by nineteenth-century state or federal legislation, the incorporation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872 created the most varied protest from a culturally diverse group of rural communities challenged by outside regulation of nature within its boundaries. Native Americans, townspeople, ranchers, and frontiersmen all felt traditional subsistence practices or common right to natural resources were challenged by the increasingly militant enforcement of park game and timber laws. Despite increased enforcement of game and timber laws, with the assistance of US cavalry, Native American groups continued to exert their traditional hunting rights within the park's boundaries, at least seasonally, into the 1890s. On more than one occasion, such challenges to

federal authority over who controlled nature led to potential conflict, and settlers killed several members of a Bannock hunting party attempting to exert their traditional hunting rights in July of 1895 near Jackson Hole, Wyoming.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, settlers residing in new communities surrounding Yellowstone National Park increasingly found their traditional perceptions of common right and access to nature within park boundaries challenged by federal authority as well. Like the Native American communities they displaced, local townspeople, frontiersmen, trappers, and hunters challenged park laws by means of poaching, timber theft, and occasional instances of violent confrontation with park officials. By the final decade of the nineteenth century, Yellowstone National Park became the principal expression of conservation ideology. As a park founded upon the emerging discourse of wilderness, there was no place for human activity within park boundaries, except of course for tourism, an activity that favored upper-class elites at the expense of local communities and Native Americans. Furthermore, park policies designed to limit access to nature confirmed another fundamental tenet of nineteenth-century conservation ideology, namely that local communities were inherently incapable of managing nature and, in fact, posed a threat to the preservation of wilderness as well as the management and conservation of natural resources. As in other regions of the United States, marginalized communities responded to the loss of traditional conceptions of common right with what can only be construed as a particularly local form of environmental protest toward nineteenth-century conservation ideology.

SEE ALSO: Earth First!; Ecological Protest Movements; Reclaim the Streets

References and Suggested Readings

- Jacoby, C. (2001) *Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American Conservation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Judd, R. (1997) *Common Lands, Common People: The Origins of Conservation in Northern New England*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Spence, M. (1999) *Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making of National Parks*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Steinberg, T. (1991) *Nature Incorporated: Industrialization and the Waters of New England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

EPL Maoist guerilla movement

Raina Zimmering

The Popular Army of Liberation (EPL) was formed by a group of students in 1967 as an armed branch of the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Colombia (PCC-ML). A Maoist splinter group of the Communist Party of Colombia, it was born out of the differences between the pro-Soviet and the pro-China groups. Espousing a Maoist political ideology, it endorsed the concept of a prolonged popular war, with the aim of disposing of the Colombian government and erecting a socialist state.

The first operations of EPL, including sabotage and armed actions, took place in the region of Córdoba and the Caribbean coast at the end of the 1960s. At the International Conference of Marxist and Leninist Parties in 1975, the EPL followed the line of the Labour Party of Albania. Internal dissent and the death of some of its key leaders during the 1970s weakened the EPL's operational capabilities. In 1979, continuing dissent within the EPL led to the formation of the Pedro León Arboleda Movement, a splinter group named for an EPL leader slain in 1975. This group remained active as an independent organization into the 1980s. In 1984 the EPL, along with the guerrillas FARC-EP and M-19, signed the "Acuerdo de Uribe" under President Belisario Betancur. Nevertheless, all attempts at legal organization were destroyed in the brutal war waged by the army and paramilitary groups formed by right-wing sectors of the government and major political parties, parts of the army, drug traffickers, and large landowners. Among the victims was EPL leader Ernesto Rojas, killed in 1986.

In response the guerilla groups decided, in association with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and some smaller groups, to build the Simón Bolívar Guerilla Coordination (CGSB) group and reinforce the armed struggle. In 1987 the EPL had 3,500 militants and four military fronts. Its principal area of operations was in the rural regions of the departments of Antioquia, Córdoba, and Risaralda. It also maintained urban support networks in big cities.

In 1991 President César Gaviera concluded a peace agreement with the EPL, who demobil-

ized 2,000 armed and unarmed members. They founded the Esperanza, Paz y Libertad (Hope, Peace, and Liberty) party and some EPL leaders became members of parliament. Some of the EPL's demobilizing members joined the DAS Rural (Rural Administrative Security Department) and paramilitary groups that were responsible for a series of homicides against the civil population and members of the Communist Party and the Unión Patriótica (UP), especially in Urabá in the province of Antioquia. The splinter group Dissident Line (Línea Disidente) declined the agreement and continued the armed struggle. The leader of the EPL, Francisco Caraballo, was detained in 1994 and condemned to 29 years in detention. At the age of 71 and in poor health, he was released in April 2008.

The EPL declined in numbers and presence. It faced attacks by the military and paramilitary as well as the FARC. In 2008, the number of EPL armed troops was probably lower than 300.

SEE ALSO: Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1960s–1970s; Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1970s–1990s; Ejército de Liberación Nacional, Colombia; FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army); M-19 of Colombia

References and Suggested Readings

- Azzellini, D. & Zelik, R. (1999) *Kolumbien – Große Geschäfte, staatlicher Terror und Aufstandsbewegung*. Cologne: ISP.
- Calvo, F. (1987) *Colombia: EPL, una historia armada*, 1st ed. Madrid: Vosa.
- Ocampo Lopez, J. (1994) *Historia Básica de Colombia*. Bogotá: Plaza & Janés.
- Palacios, M. (2006) *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia (1875–2002)*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Stokes, D. (2005) *America's Other War: Terrorizing Colombia*. London: Zed Books.
- Welna, C. & Gallon, G. (2007) *Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights in Colombia*: Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

EPR (Ejército Popular Revolucionario)

Sophie Sarah Esch

The Popular Revolutionary Army (Ejército Popular Revolucionario, EPR) is a Marxist-

Leninist guerilla force operating in various federal states of Mexico, predominantly in the marginalized south and center. Since its appearance in 1996, the EPR has drawn attention with coordinated, violent attacks on state officials and institutions, the latest reportedly in July and September 2007, when pipelines of the national oil company PEMEX were blown up. Scholarly interest in the EPR has remained very low, however, and the EPR has been viewed with mistrust even by leftist sectors of Mexican society.

The EPR: Emergence and Development

The EPR made its first public appearance on June 28, 1996 at the commemoration of the Aguas Blancas massacre in the state of Guerrero, Mexico. During the ceremony, which mourned 17 peasants killed a year earlier by the police, uniformed, hooded women and men with assault rifles appeared, read a manifesto in Spanish and Nahuatl, and fired 17 shots into the air for the murdered peasants.

The EPR was subsequently dismissed as a “pantomime” across the board, and then perplexed the public with simultaneous attacks in several states on August 28 and 29, 1996, which left over 15 people (mainly soldiers and policemen) dead. Their armory and strikes in various provinces at once changed the public's conception of the EPR, and the government responded with a massive deployment of troops and roadblocks, as well as with the intimidation, torture, and detention of supposed EPR members or sympathizers.

In the following years the EPR continued to engage in a few armed encounters with the military, and various splinter groups emerged. The Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People (ERPI), which concentrates its activities on the rural regions of Guerrero, appeared in 1998, the Popular Villista Revolutionary Army (EVRP) in 1999, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (FARP) in 2000.

In 2006 the EPR was alleged to have been involved in the Oaxaca conflict, which the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO) denies. Nevertheless, on May 25, 2007, two EPR members disappeared in Oaxaca City: Gabriel Alberto Cruz Sánchez (also called Raymundo Rivera Bravo) and Edmundo Reyes

Amaya. The EPR is convinced that they were abducted by federal and Oaxaca state security forces and has demanded ever since that they be returned alive. On July 5 and 10, 2007, PEMEX pipelines exploded in the states of Guanajuato and Querétaro, and then on September 10, 2007 in Veracruz and Tlaxcala, attacks for all of which the EPR claimed responsibility, demanding the return of their disappeared. The explosions caused considerable economic damage, as over 2,000 businesses were left without oil and gas supplies. Meanwhile, the government of President Calderón denied that there were any forced disappearances under its administration. However, since April 2008, the EPR and the government have been considering negotiations and in June 2008 a mediating commission started work (Fazio 2008; Montemayor 2007).

No reliable current information can be found about the possible social basis of groups of the EPR (the rural Loxicha region in Oaxaca and the Huasteca region in the states of Hidalgo and Veracruz are mentioned sometimes; Guerrero used to be mentioned before the ERPI emerged), nor about its current number of members. In 1996 the EPR proclaimed that it financed itself through kidnappings and bank robberies, a practice which it asserts to have abolished since 2000 (Bruhn 1999: 32; Gil Olmos 2008).

EPR's Origins and Political Scope

In its *Aguas Blancas Manifiesto* (1996), the EPR declared that the political and social situation in Mexico had not changed since Genaro Vázquez and Lucio Cabañas had taken up arms in the 1960s in Guerrero. It called for the overthrow of the “anti-democratic government,” claiming the armed fight to be a “legitimate and necessary resource” against the “institutionalized violence” of the Mexican state. Concerning its origins, the EPR related that it “emerged from the sadness of orphans and widows, from the absence of loved ones who have disappeared, from the pain of the tortured” as well as “from the social situation which kills daily through repression, misery, hunger, and illness.” According to the EPR and its political arm, the Popular Revolutionary Democratic Party (PDPR), the group emerged from two organizations dating back to the 1960s: the Revolutionary Clandestine Workers’ Party–People’s Union (PROCUP) and parts of Lucio Cabañas’s Party of the Poor (PDLP).

On its webpage the EPR–PDPR explains that its historical objectives are to take over political power and to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. Although the EPR intends to overthrow the government, it often refers to elections and voting – this simultaneity of armed and unarmed action has caused confusion about its political program. The EPR tried to reach out to the public by means of a webpage and a smoother, less radical discourse, including poems. However, according to Bruhn (1999: 29–31), it is due to the EPR’s poor understanding of the media and its frequent resort to violent action that it has failed to gain either greater media coverage or public moral or material support.

The EPR and EZLN

The EPR has never managed to attain broad public support, as the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, EZLN) was able to do at certain times. In 1996 the EPR offered its support for the EZLN, which the EZLN resolutely rejected. The Zapatistas disapproved of the EPR’s presence in Chiapas and its emergence during a delicate phase of peace talks between the EZLN and the Zedillo government. In a communiqué addressed to the EPR on August 29, 1996, Subcomandante Marcos declared that the EZLN was not going to fall into the trap of being divided into a “good” and “bad” guerilla, but stated that the EZLN was struggling for democracy, liberty, and justice, not, as the EPR was, for power. In all the years of their existence, the EPR and the EZLN, to a large degree, have remained aloof from each other.

SEE ALSO: Cabañas, Lucio (1938–1974); Marcos, Subcomandante (b. ?); Mexico, Armed Political Movements, 1960s–Present; Mexico, Indigenous and Peasant Struggles, 1980s–Present; Oaxaca Uprising, 2006; Vázquez, Genaro (1931–1972); Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Bob, C. (2005) *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bruhn, K. (1999) Antonio Gramsci and the Palabra Verdadera: The Political Discourse of Mexico’s Guerrilla Forces. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 41 (2): 29–55.
- De Witt, A. (2001) Mexico’s Other Rebels. *New Leader* 84, 3 (May, June): 6–8.


- Fazio, C. (2007) Confusiones. *La Jornada*, July 16.
- Fazio, C. (2008) Un enigma llamado EPR. *La Jornada*, May 19.
- Gil Olmos, J. (2008) Advierte el EPR: Continuará su campaña de hostigamiento militar. *Proceso*. Available at www.proceso.com.mx/noticia.html?sec=0&nta=58760 (downloaded June 13, 2008).
- Gutiérrez, M. (1998) *Violencia en Guerrero*. Prólogo de Carlos Monetmayor. Mexico City: La Jornada Ediciones.
- Hirales, M. G. (2008) Para leer al EPR. *Nexos On Line* 366 (June). Available at www.nexos.com.mx/articulos.php?id_articulo=1546&id_rubrique=684 (downloaded June 13, 2008).
- Lofredo, J. (2004) La otra guerrilla. Una realidad oculta pero urgente: aproximación bibliográfica a la “otra” guerrilla mexicana (primera de cuatro partes). *Enfoque Veracruz*, June 14. Available at www.enfoqueveracruz.com/analisis/seguridad/guerrilla1.htm.
- Montemayor, C. (2007) EPR. *La Jornada*, July 14.
- Pavón Cuellar, D. & Vega, M. L. (2005) *Lucha eperrista*. Centro de Documentación de los Movimientos Armados (CEDEMA). Available at www.cedema.org/ver.php?id=80 (downloaded June 10, 2008).

Equiano, Olaudah (1745–1797)

Srividhya Swaminathan

The publication of *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African* in 1789 created an instant sensation in London and contributed significantly to the movement to abolish the British slave trade. Though not the first of its kind, the narrative of Equiano’s experiences of being captured and sold into slavery, along with the eloquence of the expression, provided definitive proof of the intellectual capacity of the African. Equiano embarked on an extensive book tour throughout the British Isles that both established his personal fortune and brought awareness of the movement to abolish the slave trade to the remote parts of the kingdom.

According to his narrative, Equiano spent the early part of his life in Guinea in an area he called the “Eboe.” At the age of 11, he and his sister were captured and sold into slavery. The harrowing description of the march to the coast and the middle passage aimed “to excite . . . a sense of compassion for the miseries which the slave trade has entailed” (Equiano 2003) and



This 2007 British postage stamp attests to the importance of Olaudah Equiano in the history of anti-slavery protest. Thanks to the efforts of men like Equiano, Anthony Benezet, Thomas Clarkson, and William Wilberforce, the slave trade was abolished in Britain in 1807. (Stamp designs © Royal Mail Group Ltd. Reproduced by kind permission of Royal Mail Group Ltd. All rights reserved)

may or may not have been true. Recent scholarship has called into question the validity of Equiano’s recounting of his African childhood based on a baptismal record and a naval roll muster that state his place of birth as Carolina (Carretta 2005). The details he recounts could have been garnered from his own participation in the slave trade and from conversations he would have had with other slaves coming from Africa.

Regardless of this early uncertainty, readers in the eighteenth century and today cannot contest the validity of his experience with slavery. Equiano’s horror at plantation slavery and the cruel instruments used to “muzzle” slaves provides a strong counterpoint to the idyllic childhood he describes. He was sold to a Lieutenant Michael Pascal who renamed him Gustavus Vassa, a tongue-in-cheek moniker first belonging to a Swedish king who liberated his people from the oppression of the Danes. During the seven years of service to Pascal, Equiano witnessed

many naval engagements in the Seven Years' War, learned to read and write, and converted to Christianity, which he thought the only positive event in his experience with slavery. He believed his loyal service to Pascal would be rewarded with manumission; instead, he was seized and put on a West India trader and eventually sold to the Quaker merchant Robert King. Through his own canny business sense, Equiano was able to parley his trading voyages for King into a profitable side venture that netted him enough money to buy his own freedom. In 1766, as a free-man, Equiano journeyed to London to try and establish himself in a trade. Over the next 20 years he had several positions in London and continually returned to the sea, which enabled him to make important contacts with abolitionists in England and the United States. Equiano's experiences with slaving made him acutely conscious of the position of both the enslaved and the black poor in London. He made the acquaintance of Granville Sharp and became involved in the Sierra Leone scheme intended to repatriate London's poor blacks to territory in Africa. Unfortunately, poor management and unscrupulous investors doomed the scheme to failure and Equiano became one of its most vocal critics. Next, he focused his energies on critiquing the slave trade, calling on his past experience as a slave and as a sailor on a slaving vessel. His autobiography became a staple of abolitionist propaganda in England and the United States and remains an important exemplar of the African slave narrative.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, Britain; Anti-Slavery Movement, British, and the Black Response to Colonization; Anti-Slavery Movement, British, and the Founding of Sierra Leone; Sharp, Granville (1735–1813)

References and Suggested Readings

- Arvamudan, S. (1999) *Tropicopolitans: Colonialism and Agency, 1688–1804*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Carretta, V. (2005) *Equiano the African: Biography of a Self-Made Man*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Dabydeen, D. (1985) *The Black Presence in English Literature*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Equiano, O. (1789/2003) *The Interesting Narrative and Other Writings*. Ed. V. Carretta. London: Penguin.

Escuela Moderna movement (The Modern School)

Stephen Leberstein

Model schools for working-class children, embodying principles of rationalism, co-education, and “moral” upbringing, were an important project of the anarchist and anarchosyndicalist movement in the two decades leading up to World War I. At the time secular public education was not yet secure in much of Western Europe, and many on the left saw public schools as training grounds for nationalism and the barracks. The model schools would demonstrate the superiority of a “rational” education, provide a much-needed resource for working-class families, and produce “new people,” the cadres of a future libertarian society.

One of the first such model schools was La Escuela Moderna, or the Modern School, which opened its doors in Barcelona, Spain in 1901. Its founder, Francisco Ferrer y Guardia (1859–1909), was a libertarian who lived in exile most of his adult life in Paris. Implicated in a republican plot in 1886, Ferrer fled Catalonia for France and soon became involved with free thinkers and such working-class radicals as Charles Malato, Sébastien Faure, Jean Grave, and others. Though he participated in the 1896 London Congress of the Second International as a delegate of the Parti ouvrier français, he sided with anarchists in decisive votes.

The idea for the model school grew out of the anarchist ferment of the 1890s. In 1897, Jean Grave, editor of the anarchist weekly *Les Temps nouveaux*, organized a committee to raise funds for a model school embodying libertarian principles. Soon thereafter, the Ligue d'enseignement libertain, or the Libertarian Education League, was created specifically to found such a school. Two of Ferrer's collaborators, Manuel Degalvès and Emile Janvion, explained the school's philosophy as the opposite of that of the state schools, which offered “the ultimate training for servility.” An anarchist school, organized around rationalist principles, would teach the example of the oppressed struggling for their freedom (Degalvès & Janvion 1897: 1–2).

Ferrer, who earned his living in Paris as a teacher and tutor of Spanish, came into a small

fortune when one of his wealthy students died suddenly in 1901. He lost no time in returning to Barcelona and organizing the school, which opened its doors in October 1901 to welcome 12 girls and 18 boys in its first class. As Ferrer later explained, “the most promising form of revolutionary action consist[s] in giving the oppressed, the disinherited, and all who are conscious of a demand for justice, as much truth as they can receive, trusting that it will direct their energies in the great work of regenerating society” (Ferrer 1913: 20).

When one of the school’s workers was arrested in a plot to assassinate the Spanish prime minister in 1906, the authorities closed the school temporarily. By that time, La Escuela Moderna had enrolled only about 300 pupils. But if Ferrer’s anarchist colleagues were right, 147 similar “rational” schools had opened in the Spanish provinces by 1905, and Barcelona alone in 1908 counted ten such schools with 1,000 pupils. Similar model schools were operating by that time in France and elsewhere, notably Sébastien Faure’s La Ruche at Rambouillet near Paris.

Whether or not the Modern Schools actually threatened the Spanish state, the authorities believed that they did, as their anarchist proponents claimed. Following the call-up of reservists to suppress a Riff rebellion in Morocco in July 1909, Barcelona workers soon revolted and a full-scale insurrection resulted. Government troops fought to suppress the uprising during the “Tragic Week,” the last week of July 1909.

Although Ferrer was abroad most of the spring and returned to Barcelona in June only to care for a dying relative, and in fact stayed at his farm well outside the capital during the insurrection, he was nevertheless arrested on charges of instigating the events there. Clerical authorities pressed the military to make an example of him, and he was court-martialed, summarily convicted, and sentenced to death in August. In October 1909 he was executed by firing squad at Montjuich Prison overlooking Barcelona.

Ferrer’s execution made him a martyr throughout the West. Major demonstrations against the Spanish government broke out in European capitals as well as in New York. The Paris police estimated that more than 100,000 demonstrators besieged the Spanish embassy and a number of fatalities were reported.

Modern Schools based on Ferrer’s Barcelona experiment sprung up in other countries in the

wake of his execution. The Ligue internationale pour l’éducation rationnelle de l’enfance (International League for the Rational Education of Children) had already been established in 1908 to promote Modern School methods. A Francisco Ferrer School opened on St. Mark’s Place in New York City in summer 1910, and after several moves finally settled in Stelton, New Jersey, where it survived as a school and anarchist colony until 1958 (Boyeson n.d.; Zigrosser 1918). In 1910 Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman founded a Francisco Ferrer Association to promote the movement of Modern Schools. The one in New York was a gathering place for Goldman, Berkman, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Upton Sinclair, and artists such as George Bellows, John Sloan among other Ash Can School artists, as well as Man Ray and other Bohemian artists, writers, and followers. About 20 other Modern Schools and related anarchist colonies were scattered around the US, in California, Utah, Michigan, New York, and elsewhere (Avrich 1980/2005).

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Education; Berkman, Alexander (1870–1936); Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley (1890–1964); Goldman, Emma (1869–1940); Mujeres Libres; Sinclair, Upton (1878–1968)

References and Suggested Readings

- Archer, W. (1911) *The Life, Trial and Death of Francisco Ferrer*. London: Chapman Hall.
- Avrich, P. (1980/2005) *The Modern School Movement: Anarchism and Education in the United States*, new ed. San Francisco: AK Press.
- Bookchin, M. (1997) *The Spanish Anarchists*. San Francisco: AK Press.
- Boyeson, B. (n.d.) *The Modern School in New York*. New York: Francisco Ferrer Association.
- Degalvès, M. & Janvion, E. (1897) L’Ecole libertaire. *Les Temps nouveaux* 3, 3 (May 15–21).
- Ferrer, F. (1913) *The Origins and Ideals of the Modern School*. London: Watts.
- Zigrosser, C. (1918) *The Modern School*. Stelton, NJ: Ferrer Colony.

Estates General, France

Mark Anthony Phelps

The Estates General was a French parliamentary body created in 1302 that served primarily

to approve royal taxation. It was composed of representatives from three elements of society, the clergy (the First Estate), the nobility (the Second Estate), and the rest of society (the Third Estate). Prior to 1789, the last Estates General was called in 1614.

The financial crisis facing France in 1789 was enormous. Interest on loans to cover the expenses of the Seven Years War and the War of the Austrian Succession was still being paid, and then there were yet more loans as France financed the Americans in their War of Independence. An estimated 50 percent or more of the government's budget was devoted to paying war debt. A disastrous harvest in 1788 further reduced royal income and led to widespread unrest among the people. After failing to win approval from the elite for taxation upon their wealth in the course of meetings of the Assemblies of Notables in February 1787 and November 1788, Louis XVI called for convening the Estates General. The conventions that met to choose representatives to the Estates General were also permitted to submit lists of grievances, the *cahiers de doléances*, which the king pledged to address in his perceived political role as the father of the nation.

The official opening of the Estates General was on May 5, 1789. The total number of representatives was 1,139, with 291 belonging to the First Estate, 270 to the Second, and 578 to the Third. During the course of the conventions, the *cahiers* drawn up by the regional committees called for serious changes. Most significant were nearly universal demands for creating a constitutional monarchy to replace France's absolute monarchy. The Enlightenment ideas of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau permeated the suggested solutions to problems.

In the conventions, representatives of all three Estates, spurred on to some extent by riots triggered by food shortages in 1788, agreed to a reduction of the king's powers, but the extent of proposed limitations of royal power varied considerably. Initially, many of the more liberal ideas were espoused by aristocratic delegates. As the food-shortage riots spread, however, some of the aristocrats began to fear that the violence would affect all members of their class, causing them to strengthen their allegiance to the king. The First Estate, the clergy, was the least cohesive of the orders, because there was a large social

gap separating the wealthy high-level members of the church hierarchy from the impoverished parish priests. The members of the Third Estate comprised a wide variety of backgrounds and interests, but most were aware that they could seize this moment to erase the privileges of the other two Estates and bring social justice to the members of their class. In some exceptional cases, members of the first two orders were elected as representatives of the Third Estate, most notably the clergyman Sieyès and the nobleman Mirabeau.

A sense of destiny expressed itself in a flood of literature produced between the calling of the Estates General and its actual opening, as authors attempted to influence public opinion and the opinion of the representatives with regard to a wide variety of political ideals and practical needs. Because it was an institution rarely called, the protocol of the Estates General was not solidly established. Traditionally, the members had voted by Estate, meaning that there were three votes, with the First and Second Estates combining to trump the vote of the Third. Debate prior to the convention centered upon the possibility of a one-vote-per-delegate system, thus giving the Third Estate a weight in the assembly more commensurate with the numbers of people it represented.

After enduring ceremonial slights at the opening of the Estates General, the Third Estate's delegates declared that they would not be credentialed (meaning the Estates General was not in session) until the other two Estates agreed to allow each individual one vote. Because the three orders were meeting separately, the Estates General was in limbo.

Meanwhile, agitation in Paris for the cause of the Third Estate grew, thanks in great part to Mirabeau's widely circulated daily reports. On June 17 the Third Estate, with some representatives from the impoverished segment of the politically fragmented Second Estate, met and voted to establish themselves as an independent body of the true representatives of the nation. (It would later name itself the National Assembly.) A separation of powers had been declared, as a legislative body came into existence.

Three days later delegates to the Third Estate, finding themselves locked out of their meeting place, assumed that it was an attempt

by the king to silence them. They went to a nearby tennis court and swore an oath to the people alone, and swore not to adjourn until a new national constitution had been created. This event, enshrined in the annals of French national tradition as the Tennis Court Oath, is, together with the storming of the Bastille, one of the great symbolic acts that initiated the French Revolution.

The stalemate was soon broken, as the Third Estate delegates were joined by most of the clerical delegates as well as some of the more liberal of the aristocratic delegates. The full Estates General met on June 23 and began to formulate the legal basis of a new state. The production of a new constitution, together with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, remade French society into one without class distinctions sanctioned by law, and a society in which law stemming from the will of the people was equally supreme over all its inhabitants.

Rather than solving the short-term financial crisis for which it was called, the representatives of the three Estates tackled, and began the process of resolving, an age-old social, legal, and political problem. A constitutional monarchy representing a classless population replaced institutions rooted in medieval privilege and responsibility. But the Revolution had only begun to unfold.

SEE ALSO: Bastille; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Locke, John (1632–1704); Mirabeau, Comte de (1749–1791); Montesquieu, Baron de (1689–1755); Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778); Sieyès, Abbé (1748–1836); Tennis Court Oath, France, 1789

References and Suggested Readings

- Doyle, W. (2003) *The Oxford History of the French Revolution*, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Egret, J. (1978) *The French Pre-Revolution, 1787–88*. Trans. W. Camp. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Kennedy, R. E., Jr. (1989) *A Cultural History of the French Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lefebvre, G. (1962–4) *The French Revolution*. Trans. E. M. Evanson, J. H. Stewart, & J. Friguglietti. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Schama, S. (1989) *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Tackett, T. (1996) *Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789–1790)*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

ETA Liberation Front (*Euzkadi ta Askatasuna*) and Basque nationalism

Andrew Dowling

The lands that form the Basque territory, known in the Basque language as Euskal Herria, have been, since the 1950s, the location of Europe's longest lasting violent conflict. In spite of periodic ceasefires, the radical Basque organization Euzkadi ta Askatasuna, more widely known as ETA, is Europe's last active home-grown terrorist organization. For its supporters, ETA is the latest in a long line of expressions of resistance to centralizing and homogenizing trends that have been led by Madrid. The historically formed discourse of resistance that prevails within the Basque nationalist movement evokes an ancient culture that has been preserved through the ages, citing the apparent failure of Roman, Visigoth, Arab, and other invaders to overcome them. The Basque people speak a language that is non-Indo European and are almost certainly the longest continuously remaining linguistic community on European soil. By the early modern period, the territory had come to form part of both the French and Spanish states, though the Basques managed to maintain a relative autonomy until the nineteenth century, though concomitant developments brought about by modernity became a major challenge. Basque alienation from Spanish liberalism, with its increasing centralizing trends, was expressed through support for the ultra-conservative and Catholic movement known as Carlism. Basque Carlism fought in two Spanish civil wars in the nineteenth century and their ultimate defeat in 1876 led to the abolition of the historic local rights and charters of the Basques, recognized by successive Spanish kings, known as the *fueros*. The abolition of these *fueros* would remain a major grievance in the twenty-first century as they are considered to be the early political expression of Basque autonomy.

The emergence of heavy industry in the Basque Country in the late 1870s, centered around iron, steel, and ship-building, led to large-scale Spanish-speaking immigration and the formation of a Basque nationalist movement.

This movement appealed to small farmers and urban middle-class sectors who felt that industrialization and immigration were direct challenges to their way of life. The Partido Nacionalista Vasco, the PNV, was formed in 1894, and combined hostility to Spanish immigrants with the defense of Basque identity and Catholicism. The PNV slowly expanded in influence in the following decades. Moderate and pro-independence wings also emerged in the party and hostility towards Spanish immigrants became less pronounced within the PNV by the time of the Second Spanish Republic in the 1930s. Though remaining conservative and Catholic, Basque nationalism sided with the secular Spanish Republic (1931–9) as it promised autonomy to Basque territory. This was finally achieved in October 1936, with the Spanish Civil War (1936–9) already underway. However, the territory of Navarre narrowly rejected joining this Basque autonomy, where Basque nationalism remained weak and loyalty to Carlism found its last redoubt. This fracture in what Basque nationalists saw as the national homeland would continue throughout the twentieth century and beyond.

The defeat of the Spanish Republic in the Spanish Civil War and the victory of ultra-right wing Spanish nationalism led by General Franco would see an attempt to eliminate Basque cultural and linguistic identity. For the Basque populace, this represented a cultural genocide. The Franco regime prohibited all public manifestations of Basque culture, including the language, and proscribed all Basque organizations, whether trade unions, party political or cultural. The Basque Country, like the rest of Spain, was subject to a ruthless repression in the 1940s. The longevity of the Franco dictatorship (1939–75) had a profound effect on Basque nationalism, in particular with the PNV unable to mount a major challenge. Driven underground or working in exile, oppositional activists in the Basque Country had little real effect until the 1950s. In 1952 a grouping of middle-class nationalist students, without adult experience of the Civil War, founded a clandestine cultural organization called EKIN. EKIN briefly formed part of the PNV's youth section called EGI, but in 1959 EKIN split with the PNV and formed a new organization, Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), meaning "Basque Homeland and Freedom." In its early years, ETA simply continued the cultural work of EKIN. However, an ever-growing anxiety at

the continued repression of Basque identity saw its rapid radicalization as the 1960s progressed. ETA became the inheritors of pre-Civil War radical nationalism, including groupings from the 1920s such as Aberri and Jagi-Jagi. In its earliest stages, a strong Catholic and anti-communist component was found in ETA and it was not until 1962 and the organization's first assembly that a shift to the left could be discerned.

Between 1900 and 1975 a tripling of the Basque population took place and this demographic change directly impacted on the politics of the country. The late 1950s and the 1960s saw profound transformations in the economy of the Basque Country and led to a new wave of Spanish-speaking immigration. This renewed pattern of immigration led to an intensification of social conflict, as the newly arrived workers often faced appalling living and working conditions. A growing discontent led to increased strike activity and one of the largest major strikes which took place in the post-1939 period in the Basque Country was that of 1963. The first group of ETA leaders came from within the Basque urban middle classes and remained ambivalent towards this Spanish immigration, fearing a further dilution of Basque identity. However, it was this second wave of industrialization, and the emergence of new clandestine organizations representing organized labor, that produced a new sociology of opposition. Francoist repression led to a commonality of experience among Spanish workers and rural and urban Basques. ETA would be transformed by these developments, both strategically and ideologically. From the late 1960s until the late 1970s, the Basque Country became the terrain of opposition to the dictatorship. At certain points in these years, half of all labor protest throughout Spain was Basque in origin.

As ETA evolved and grew over the course of the 1960s, the organization became increasingly influenced by the international discourse of protest that emerged from Algeria to Cuba. The organization argued that the Basque Country was an occupied country and that Spain was the colonial power and that a strategy of revolutionary war should be adopted. For many, the response of the Franco regime confirmed this "colonial" analysis. The Franco regime was a highly effective though unintended promoter of Basque nationalism. In 1965, in ETA's Fourth Assembly, it declared itself to be socialist, and a

movement of “revolutionary nationalism.” ETA became increasingly subject to ideological dispute over the relationship between laborism, Third Worldism, and nationalism. The wider European context and the ever growing prominence of Vietnam saw increasingly fractious conflict over revolutionary socialism and nationalism, while others argued that a Third Worldist anti-colonial position could be not be applied to an industrialized country in Western Europe. These theoretical disputes often overlapped with the question of the use of armed struggle. Advocates of the prioritizing of class struggle usually gave greater importance to non-military, political programs. Those who advocated these “political” strategies would ultimately leave the organization, and ETA became more ideologically rigid and uncompromising. As would be repeated throughout ETA’s history, moderate voices left or were expelled and advocates of armed struggle emerged strengthened.

It would not be until the early 1970s that ETA would embark on a full-scale strategy of urban and rural guerrilla warfare against the dictatorship. The 1960s saw the organization adopt an incremental use of violent acts until ETA became fully committed to armed struggle against the regime. ETA’s first major use of violent direct action was in 1961 when it derailed a train carrying Francoist veterans of the Spanish Civil War. This event and the regime response to what it termed an act of sacrilege would see the organization increasingly use direct action against the Spanish police and military, termed the “forces of occupation.” The Franco regime’s disproportionate repressive response to ETA actions, with widespread arrests and often savage police brutality against those arrested, became an effective recruiting sergeant for the organization. ETA equally thrived on a culture of martyrdom and the dictatorship continued to be willing to provide Basque nationalist martyrs until its very end. Though not yet engaged in guerilla war, ETA increasingly engaged in bombings of symbolic targets, from Francoist monuments to buildings seen to represent regime dominance. Once violence as strategy was adopted, ETA would go on to kill over 800 people, mostly police and military figures, though since the 1990s, ETA’s range of “legitimate” targets expanded considerably. Significantly, 80 percent of ETA’s victims took place after the death of Franco in 1975.

ETA’s first killing was not premeditated. Rather, an attempted arrest of a leading ETA activist, Txabi Etxebarrieta, in June 1968 led to the shooting dead of a Spanish police officer. The ETA member himself was later shot by police and he became ETA’s first martyr. A before and after in the trajectory of ETA had begun. Thus ETA began to apply the “action-reaction-action” formula, inspired from other colonial struggles, in which it was argued that provocative assaults on state representatives of coercion would cause the Franco regime to increase repression. This increased repression would in turn create a new spiral which would ultimately cause a mass uprising of both workers and nationalists in the Basque Country. The organization, which had been preparing for some time a military escalation in the conflict, put into practice this strategy in a carefully planned operation in August 1968 when it shot dead a senior police chief in San Sebastian, a figure widely believed to be closely implicated in the use of torture on Basque suspects. This killing led parts of the Basque Country being declared in a state of emergency and there were hundreds of arrests, a by-product being a further growth in the organization. The turn to armed struggle also led to renewed internal debate in ETA’s leadership over future strategy and whether the organization should continue with violence. This heightened already existing factionalism in the organization around the axes of labor and nationalism. A wave of arrests of ETA members in 1969 only accentuated these disputes. The vehemence of the Francoist response where even the small numbers of liberties permitted under the dictatorship were suspended only aided the growth of the organization. ETA increasingly attained both national and international prominence as the symbol of opposition to the Franco regime.

The Burgos trial of December 1970, in which 16 leading ETA activists were charged with murder and sedition, brought opprobrium on the dictatorship, as international attention revealed how the event bore all the hallmarks of a show trial. The Franco regime, unusually, was forced to respond to the international protest and the six death sentences meted out were commuted. ETA scored an important propaganda victory, though regime leniency was not repeated. ETA’s most dramatic moment came with its assassination in December 1973 of Franco’s chosen successor and prime minister, Admiral Luis

Carrero Blanco. ETA not only demonstrated great organizational capacity but shook the Franco regime to its core.

While ETA escalated its violence, the organization remained subject to fissiparous tendencies. For periods in the 1970s, two and at times three organizations used the ETA name. By the early 1970s all ETA factions were firmly wedded to versions of socialism, and dispute within the organization centered on the relationship between political activity and the military wing. This mostly tactical division led in October 1974 to the largest split in ETA's history and to the formation of two organizations, ETA-Militar and ETA Político-Militar, the latter initially being the much larger organization. Police, military, and security service frustration at ETA's continued activity led to increased shoot-to-kill policies and rogue elements within the security services assassinating ETA members as the action-reaction-action spiral reached new heights. What became known as the dirty war continued into democracy and had long-lasting implications for the continuation of ETA's campaign of violence. The final year of the Franco regime saw a renewed spiral of violence and ever-fiercer repression, culminating in September 1975 with the execution of two ETA members, and three from another violent group, which produced massive protests outside Spanish embassies throughout Europe. In what has been termed the agony of Francoism, all was testament to the isolation and widespread revulsion at the dictatorship.

In the post-1975 period, as Spain moved from dictatorial regime to liberal democracy, ETA's violence escalated. The Basque Country remained the location of major contestation with ever-increasing numbers of strikes. In March 1976 police shot dead five workers in Vitoria, which led to a one-day general strike. This was followed by the biggest strike ever seen in the Basque Country in September 1976. The years 1977-8 saw the largest cycle of violence since the Civil War. While Spain was engaged in the construction of a new democratic polity, ETA violence reached ever greater heights, with police and the military barely subject to democratic control. Extra-judicial killings of protesters and suspected ETA members enabled ETA to argue that nothing had changed in its fundamentals and that Spain continued to be the source of Basque oppression. Strikes, protests, and ETA attacks dramatically increased in this spiral. The ever-

powerful Spanish military, whose self-image was that of the guardians of Spanish national unity, became subject to more numerous attacks. Furthermore, Basque alienation during the Spanish transition went beyond ETA supporters, with the referendum on the new Spanish Constitution of 1978 not being supported by a revived PNV that advocated abstention. While electoral politics and amnesties for political prisoners seemed to satisfy the wider Spanish opposition in the transition years, the Basque Country remained beyond pacification.

Between 1975 and 1980, 38 people were killed by police and mercenaries. In these years the Basque Country was the most violent territory in Western Europe after Northern Ireland. ETA's continued violence against the security forces post-Franco caused the threat of military coups to loom large and threatened the consolidation of the democratic system in Spain. Provocative killings by ETA of senior military figures culminated in the coup attempt against Spanish democracy in February 1981. In January 1979 over 3,000 extra police had been sent to Basque territory as the situation continued to spiral out of control. The following year was the most violent yet, with ETA killing over 90 and the organization also demonstrating a higher level of technical competence as a smaller number of military actions were carried out than in previous years. The wider deterioration was made worse by the growing economic crisis that hit Basque territory as deindustrialization and rocketing unemployment, including very high youth unemployment, accentuated social conflict. While both ETA organizations continued with their violence, ETA Político-Militar experienced increasing political pressure from its own political organization to abandon the armed struggle. This led to a rupture in the organization with many members joining ETA-Militar, which by this period had become known simply as ETA. Shortly afterwards, ETA Político-Militar abandoned armed struggle and gradually incorporated itself into the mainstream political system.

The Partido Nacionalista Vasco had reemerged post-Franco as the dominant political force and came to dominate Basque autonomous institutions. The restoration of a Basque autonomous parliament in 1979 did little to stem the tide of violence and was a further demonstration that the Basque political situation was more fraught than anywhere else in Spain. The question of

Navarre and its exclusion from the process was a major source of grievance in radical nationalist sectors. Ill-treatment and torture of detainees has been a continuing feature in the Basque landscape and Amnesty International has repeatedly condemned these practices. Since the early 1980s the Basque Country has experienced low-intensity conflict, with ETA unable to demonstrate militarily the capacity it showed between 1977 and 1980. Rather, ETA extended its range of targets to non-military sectors, including the regular assassination of drug dealers. The organization also targeted a nuclear power station in Basque territory, which led to its closure in the summer of 1982. By the 1990s, political representatives of both major Spanish parties, the PSOE and the PP, were also increasingly killed. While a markedly smaller organization, ETA and the Basque question remained a constant feature for Spanish governments of all hues in the post-Franco era.

In the autumn of 1982 the landslide victory of the PSOE seemed to offer a brief opportunity for peace. However, failure to end ETA's campaign led to a renewal in the dirty war under the socialists between 1983 and 1986, with the emergence of the shadowy GAL organization, which killed 27 suspected members of the organization and others which bore no relation to it. Once again, the Spanish state seemed to confirm the worst fears of important sectors of Basque society. Though significantly reduced, a hardened and battle-scarred ETA remained. As a consequence of its reduced military capacity, ETA increasingly came to use car bombs from the mid-1980s, often leading to civilian casualties through garbled or unheeded warnings. A turning point in this campaign was the Hipercor bombing in Barcelona which killed 21 civilians, the largest number of such deaths the organization has ever caused. The Spanish tourist industry has also been repeatedly attacked. The increasing number of attacks outside of the Basque Country proper was part of a deliberate strategy to take the war to "the enemy," as well as a belief that violence in Basque territory had less media impact.

ETA's post-1980 peak in killing was in 1991 when it killed 45. Since then, rocked by ever more frequent arrests of members and its leadership, in most years ETA has been unable to reach double figures in terms of those it has killed. However, ETA, through the assassination of

soft targets such as politicians, has remained a central actor in the politics of Spain. Its base of support has also markedly declined, though a significant sector of Basque society of between 10–15 percent is prepared to support political organizations which justify the armed struggle. Radical sectors in Basque society have also taken the struggle into the street, in what is known as *kale borroka*, in part inspired by the Intifada. As peace negotiations faltered in the 1990s, Spanish judicial authorities extended their prosecutions to radical political sectors and have closed newspapers, cultural organizations, and any believed to be part of the "ETA world." This process culminated in the banning of political organizations that do not explicitly condemn violence. In 2002 the main radical Basque political party, Batasuna, was proscribed. These proscriptions, arrests, and imprisonments have partly contributed to the continuation of ETA in the first decade of the twenty-first century, with radical Basque political culture feeling itself to be under assault. The status of Basque prisoners has been an ongoing source of grievance. In mid-2008 there were over 700 ETA prisoners in Spanish jails and Spain's policy of dispersing prisoners throughout the country and not allowing them to serve their sentences in Basque territory has been a continued source of discontent to wide sectors of Basque society.

Since the death of Franco in 1975, attempts to bring an end to the violence have been made. Phases of informal negotiations led by the UCD, the PNV, and the PSOE have failed due to the unbridgeable gap between the demands of ETA on the question of Basque self-determination and the unwillingness of Madrid to countenance such measures. ETA first declared a short ceasefire in January 1989, which permitted negotiations in Algeria with representatives of the Spanish government. The failure of this process led to the ceasefire being broken three months later. In part influenced by the Irish peace process of the early 1990s and the position of the IRA, ETA declared an end to military hostilities in September 1998. This led to negotiations with representatives of the conservative Spanish government in May 1999. However, positions on both sides remained beyond compromise and ETA returned to violence in November of the same year. ETA then embarked on its biggest offensive for ten years and between January 2000 and August 2002 it killed over forty individuals,

including politicians. ETA subsequently suffered a series of arrests of major figures within the organization and was seriously weakened. Furthermore, in the post-9/11 period, ETA increasingly resorted to non-fatal attacks: fatalities caused by the organization since 2002 amount to a total of 12. In an increasingly unpropitious climate for political violence, ETA declared a “permanent ceasefire” in March 2006 and began negotiations anew with the socialist government. However, the continued arrests of Basque activists during this period led ETA to explode its biggest ever bomb at Madrid airport in late December 2006. In spite of two civilian deaths as a direct result of this action, the organization declared its ceasefire to be in place and for a short period negotiations resumed with Spanish government representatives. In early June 2007 ETA announced its ceasefire was over and that its campaign of violence would resume “on all fronts.”

SEE ALSO: Anti-Franco Worker Struggles, 1939–1975; Barcelona General Strike, 1919; Catalan Protests Against Centralism; Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Clark, R. P. (2003) *The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.
- Heiberg, M. (2007) *The Making of the Basque Nation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kurlansky, M. (2001) *The Basque History of the World: The Story of a Nation*. New York: Penguin.
- Roach, S. C. (2005) *Cultural Autonomy, Minority Rights, and Globalization*. London: Ashgate.
- Uranga, M. G., Burrutia, X., & Borja, A. (2004) *Basque Economy: From Industrialization to Globalization*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.
- Watson, C. (2003) *Modern Basque History, Eighteenth Century to the Present*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Ethiopia, Revolution of 1974

Aaron Tesfaye

Ethiopia is an ancient polity. The modern Ethiopian state, unlike most African states, is an indigenous institution that goes back centuries. This institution, after emerging in the highlands of Axum, disintegrated into a dark-age period (1769–1855) known as *Zemene Mesafint*, or the era

of the Princes. In the late nineteenth century, efforts to reconstruct the state were made by a series of emperors, Tewodros I, Yohannes IV, and Menelik II, culminating in the modern state and consolidation of power under Emperor Haile Selassie (1930–74), who was overthrown during the Ethiopian Revolution (1974–7). However, state power was usurped by the military, which allied itself with the Soviet Union and ruled Ethiopia with an iron fist (1977–91). This regime did not solve Ethiopia’s multifaceted economic, national, and regional problems but exacerbated them. In 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF), an umbrella group composed of many nationalities, and its ally, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), defeated the regime. Eritrea subsequently declared its independence in 1993, and in 1995 the EPDRF established in Ethiopia a federal form of governance based on ethnicity.

The modern nation-state of Ethiopia was partly realized by Emperor Menelik (1889–1913) at substantial cost to the inhabitants of contemporary Ethiopia. This included the colonization of Eritrea by the Italians in around 1882 and subsequent forays into the empire, as well as the conquest or reconquest of the southern and western parts of the country. The penetration of state power into the conquered regions was facilitated by three instruments. The first was the *rist*, a lineage system of land ownership that allowed highland Abyssinian soldiers to settle on land grants. The second was the Amharic language, *Lisane Negus* (the king’s language), which was adopted by indigenous peoples because it afforded protection in claiming rights that others enjoyed in core areas. The third was Christianity, which was spread throughout the country by the Coptic Church, which ministered to the needs of the settlers and converted the indigenous peoples. In the nineteenth century, with the introduction of firearms, the balance of forces favored Menelik, who emerged victorious and proceeded to assimilate various cultural groups – often by force or through intermarriage – creating in the process a multi-ethnic nation. Menelik was the architect of the centralized Ethiopian state. He ended the tradition of roving capitals favored by past emperors and founded a center in Addis Ababa. To consolidate state power, a strong monarchical administrative system was created by the appointment of governors who were mostly, but not always, highland Shoan Amhara. Thus,

by the time Emperor Haile Selassie arrived on the scene, cultural categories had gelled, more or less, and the empire had been centralized.

The *Ancien Régime* and Modernity

Normative scholarship on state–society relations in Ethiopia during the *ancien régime* of Haile Selassie has tended to inflate the monarch at the expense of the people of Ethiopia, depicting him at the center attempting to modernize an ancient society. This fusion of the monarch with the state has made objective distinctions difficult. Yet discrimination is important because it contributes to our understanding of state power and its relationship to the ancient class system and, by extension, to the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974–7. In Ethiopia, the major contradiction in state–society relations arose because of the grafting of a relatively advanced modernizing political structure – a modern state, a standing army, a uniform fiscal and tax system that laid the groundwork for the rationalization of the economy, the setting up of similar administrative and judicial practices throughout the country – upon an ancient class system with a backward economy. Thus while Ethiopia, under Emperor Haile Selassie, did not exactly resemble the absolutist states of Europe during their transition from feudalism to capitalism, the state grew under the shadow and influence of imperialism and shared broad contours with its European counterparts. This contradiction between old society and new state and the insertion into a global economy were to prove fatal to the *ancien régime*.

The foundation of Haile Selassie's political power was the ancient Ethiopian class system, which was rural and based on the Ethiopian aristocracy and landed gentry. However, this foundation, although firm, was by no means solid and varied over time as hereditary rulers in various regions overtly or covertly contested the emperor's rule. Therefore, soon after his coronation, in 1930, the monarch began to consolidate state power by strengthening central rule and expanding an independent source of revenue, which was achieved through the 1931 Ethiopian Constitution that provided the legal and ideological framework for countering several centrifugal regional forces. The constitution aimed at eliminating the personal power base of the nobles by tightening the legal reins on hereditary rule. It provided a statutory basis for what was

to become a *de facto* situation: all power emanated from the center in the form of temporary and revocable delegation.

Thus the constitution served to facilitate increased centralization of political power. In addition, Haile Selassie implemented and effectively established the beginnings of a modern bureaucracy with the division of the country into 32 *ghizats*, or provinces. Although the emperor's political and economic policy was interrupted by the Italian occupation of Ethiopia (1935–41), it was to prove somewhat beneficial to the state as it weakened regional bosses and laid the groundwork for communication and transport between the regions and the outside world. In turn, this link of the ancient polity with the global economy in the postwar years had two consequences. First, as a result of the Addis–Djibouti railway, built in the 1920s, the highland region experienced a boom in development at the expense of other regions and ethnic groups. Second, whereas connection with the world economy helped to modernize the state apparatus and had an influence on social formation – i.e., the evolution of a nascent bourgeoisie – regional disparities in endowments began to emerge, exacerbated by the discrimination of the state against some regions leading to constant strife and to open peasant revolts.

The Empire Strikes Back

The postwar years in Ethiopia were marked by resistance to central authority. Taking advantage of the fact that the state was in transition, several regional groups, particularly the Tigrayans in 1943, rebelled against centralism, but unrest was also acute in Bale Harar and Sidamo. The grievances of Tigray had a long precedent: it was not only a center of the ancient Abyssinian kingdom of Axum, but was also, early in its modern history, an important region. Ever since 1889, the relationship between the state and Tigray had been antagonistic, with the former attempting social control and the latter seeking autonomy. The outcome of this strong opposition to the state under Haile Selassie was the Woyane Rebellion of 1943, led by the Tigrayan aristocracy, which was crushed by a coalition of the central government and British forces. The Tigray and other revolts of the period resulted from the abuse of state power by the central authority: most regions were ruled by loyal appointees, mainly

though not always outsiders, who could be counted on to bring law and order and collect taxes. In 1955, the Ethiopian constitution was revised. It proclaimed several civil rights, instituted elections, established a parliament, and made other reforms. But the constitution had no teeth. It was hobbled by several procedures and appeared to preserve the initiative and absolute authority of the emperor. It is conceivable that the constitution was prepared to ameliorate the coming federalism with Eritrea. But the arrangement was doomed from the start because of a mismatch between the emperor's plans for a unitary Ethiopia and Eritrean ambitions for independence, which began in 1961.

During this period the province of Gojjam also rebelled against central authority. The rebellion has roots in the postwar years when the province was rocked by agitation because of its marginalization. Gojjam had a strong group identity, partly formed through its contribution of strong resistance leaders during the Italian–Ethiopian War. But the spark igniting the rebellion was the 1968 Agriculture Income Tax, whose collection was implemented ruthlessly. Also during this period, Oromo nationalism was on the rise. The Oromo, among the largest ethnic groups in the country, populated a large region in Ethiopia producing most of the nation's commercial crops and containing most of its industrial establishments. At the turn of the century, traditional Oromo leaders held power under the highland Abyssinian system of indirect rule. Some had become able Ethiopian generals under Menelik, helping expand the empire. Eventual intermarriage between prominent Oromo families and the Abyssinian aristocracy and royalty began a trend toward assimilation among the leaders. However, for the majority of the Oromo, the situation was different. Land belonging to peasants and pastoralists was appropriated by political elites. As a result, the Oromo were relegated to positions as wage earners in the industrial belt of the highlands. In addition, Oromo representation in educational establishments was minimal and upward mobility was curtailed. Thus proletarianization and discrimination contributed to class as well as ethnic consciousness among the Oromo, leading to nationalism and the emergence of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).

In 1963 the southern region of Bale too was in open rebellion. This region, ethnically composed of Somali and Oromo, is mostly Muslim,

bordering on Somalia and the contested region of the Ogaden. The inhabitants of this region felt discriminated against due to land grabs by the highland nobility that were condoned by the state. The rise of towns and commercial farming removed peasants from their plots and displaced pastoralists and livestock along the Awash River. The Bale revolt soon connected to Somali irredentism and the Ogaden question. It progressed through a myriad of intricate ethnic alliances and long periods of unrest in the 1970s, until it was finally quelled by the state through a combination of co-optation and force.

The Ethiopian Revolution: An Urban Breakthrough

The Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 was essentially an urban breakthrough and a reaction by the masses to the ancient class system. The nascent Ethiopian bourgeoisie, which had attempted to take up commercial agriculture, and the peasantry did not prove to be a force for change. The task was undertaken by the urban petty bourgeoisie and the rising militancy of the working classes. In the mid-1960s students at Haile Selassie I University formed the most radicalized sector of society in Ethiopia. While the class background of students is by and large difficult to determine, it is safe to say that they came mostly from the Ethiopian petty bourgeoisie, that is, from urban families – traders, clerks, policemen, or low-level government employees. Previous generations of university students were for the most part reactionary. Their room and board was paid for by the state, and upon graduation they were guaranteed job security as the economy could still absorb them. While some from this generation supported the brief 1961 palace coup by the imperial bodyguards against the emperor, they were for the most part reformist. But the new generation were firebrands. They were highly conscious of the conditions of the masses and were connected with the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles of African, Latin American, and Asian peoples. They were in solidarity with radical African students who had come from the colonies and were attending classes at the university – some under Haile Selassie scholarships. They were well versed in the works of Marx, Lenin, Mao, Fanon, and Guevara. They formed a university-wide student union, then a national union of university students.

On several occasions in the late 1960s they organized student marches with the slogan "Land to the Tiller," leading to pitched battles with the police, arrests, and at times outright murder of student leaders. After the "Christmas Massacre" when the imperial army stormed the university and killed many, some student leaders were forced into exile while others went underground. The movement reorganized itself and waited for a *causa belli*, which arrived in the form of high oil prices. Externally, the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries) oil crisis of the early 1970s raised gasoline prices in urban centers in Ethiopia and precipitated strikes by Addis Ababa taxi drivers. The discontent spread to involve students, trade unionists, and the military. Internally, the realities of the great famine of 1973 were exposed. The government's inability to cope with the famine and its attempt to hide the truth sealed the crown's fate. However, even before the oil crisis and the famine, discontent among the urban middle class and petty bourgeoisie was rife, particularly among the latter, as it could no longer be absorbed into the backward economy. In 1973 the beleaguered crown announced the formation of a caretaker government, led by Prime Minister Aklilu Habte Wolde. This quickly gave way to another government led by Endalkachew Makonen, who resigned in August 1974. In September of the same year the military, as the only well-organized force in the nation, calling itself the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), ascended to power and arrested the emperor, who was later to die in prison in mysterious circumstances.

The Ethiopian Revolution was swift and, at the same time, a slow process. It was swift in that the mass uprising caught out the *ancien régime*, the military, and the various clandestine revolutionary organizations such as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON, its Amharic acronym). At the same time, the revolution took a long time: although it erupted in 1974, the actual seizure of power by the military did not occur until about 1977. The creeping coup to dispose of Haile Selassie went through a series of alliances with a variety of civilian revolutionary organizations, resulting in subterfuge and competition for power. The revolution began in 1974 with a series of mutinies by the military stationed at Nagale in the south, and

later by other military divisions in Eritrea and elsewhere with demands for salary increases. The military were joined by teachers and students, who went on strike demanding higher pay, land reform, and the scrapping of the World Bank-inspired structural adjustment program of Ethiopia's education system. This was soon followed by demonstrations by urban Muslims to demand their democratic rights, including the right to own land. But the final straw was the strike called by the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU), which threw the country into turmoil.

The Ethiopian Revolution can be divided into three broad periods: a period of euphoria and populism; a period of political confrontations and struggle for power; and a period of consolidation and institutionalization of power.

The First Period (1974–1975)

The first period of the revolution (1974–5) was populist, characterized by euphoria. The PMAC courted the general public by touting *Ethiopia Tikdem* (Ethiopia First) and *Hibbretesebawint*, described as involving selflessness, a degree of equality, and the supremacy of the common good. The PMAC also announced that it was committed to Ethiopian territorial integrity. Thus, soon after assuming power, the PMAC stepped up the war in Eritrea under the slogan of Ethiopian unity. During this period the PMAC arrested, prosecuted, and executed leading members of the nobility and the bourgeoisie, numbering between 22 and 24 persons. While the Ethiopian left, including the EPRP and MEISON, welcomed the demise of the *ancien régime*, it split over whether to support the military as a progressive force that would deepen the march to socialism, or to oppose it as a reactionary force and an enemy of the Ethiopian masses.

The PMAC soon announced its National Campaign for Development through Cooperation (*Zamacha*), which involved some 60,000 university and other students being sent to the rural areas of Ethiopia to spread the objectives of the revolution. In March 1975, the PMAC proclaimed the long-awaited program of land reform. Henceforth all rural land was nationalized by the state, and the size of landholdings and their use were set by guidelines. Tenancy and wage labor, except on state farms, were abolished. Thus in one stroke the PMAC destroyed the power base of the feudal landowning classes. One aspect of land reform was the creation of

peasant associations, which were each allotted holdings of between 200 and 500 hectares. But there was no vanguard party to lead the way and state capacity to implement the reform was absent. The PMAC had inherited Haile Selassie's bureaucracy and there was much foot dragging. In some rural areas, conservative and cautious Ethiopian peasants did not know what to make of the *Zamacha* students, who were attempting to organize them according to Marxist and Maoist theories.

The Second Period (1975–1977)

The second period (1975–7) was characterized by political confrontations and struggles for power. In this period the country descended into total chaos. The military regime, now calling itself the Derg (Committee), was threatened both by internal forces – the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), adherents of the *ancien régime*, mostly in rural areas, the EPRP and MEISON, and the Eritrean liberation fronts – and by external enemies. Somalia, which had invaded Ethiopia, fought for its own survival. Ultimately the military regime, with Cuban and Soviet assistance, emerged victorious from the Ogaden War with Somalia and ruthlessly quelled the rebellion in Eritrea. But victory came at a tremendous cost, and there was a deep rupture in state–society relations. In this crucial period the course of future events was determined. The urban left, mainly the EPRP and MEISON, entered into a protracted struggle for power. The EPRP held the view that only a vanguard party could deepen the Ethiopian Revolution and that the military was by nature a reactionary force. It began to infiltrate the *Zamacha* organization, CELU, and the Provisional Office of Mass Organizational Affairs (POMOA), established by the military in 1976 to spread its ideology. MEISON, on the other hand, held the view that the military could be used as a vehicle to further the revolution and began to critically support it. The debate between the EPRP and MEISON was carried on in their official newspapers and pamphlets and revealed key fundamental differences in their definitions of democracy and the way to achieve socialism.

In February 1975, the Derg announced the nationalization of the nation's industries and appointed military participation in management, declaring a wage freeze in order to fight inflation and finance regional wars. In this process it

neglected the interests of the CELU, which went on strike to demand higher wages and democratic rights. The Derg's response was vicious: union leaders were killed or imprisoned, the organization was dismantled, and a parallel organization, the All-Ethiopian Trade Union (AETU), was created. But radicals who had infiltrated the CELU struck back, assassinating AETU's leaders in protest against the military's policy. The radical intelligentsia were becoming a major thorn in the side of the new regime.

Late in 1975, faced with tremendous problems in implementing the land reform, the Derg issued additional directives on the legal standing of peasant associations, their duties and responsibilities, and the establishment of future agricultural cooperatives. This was quickly followed by the nationalization of urban land and an estimated half a million urban houses and apartments, with the establishment of *Kebelles* or urban dwellers' associations. These urban and rural organizations were to serve as organs of state power and used to increase the capacity of the state to penetrate and control Ethiopian society. In addition, the nationalization of urban land and rental houses was designed to eliminate the opposition, mainly the landed element, gain legitimacy, consolidate power, and placate and win the support of the politically active population in the urban areas.

During this period the Derg, wedged between powerful left organizations, the EPRP and MEISON, had no choice but to abandon its reformist agenda and commit itself, at least in theory, to socialist ideology. It announced a Program of National Democratic Revolution (NDR), which outlined the path to socialist transformation. Radicals from the Yekatit 66 ideological school and POMOA as well as the Politburo, which included the left, had been established as an advisory political body to formulate and flesh out the vision of the revolution. The NDR pointed to the primacy of class struggle. It extolled the masses, and their allies the military and the progressive petty bourgeoisie. The military thus sidelined the left and foisted on the ancient polity a Soviet-style scientific socialism as a panacea for what ailed the nation. But there was no official vanguard party to implement the NDR and competition to influence its direction led to bitter ideological strife within the Politburo between the EPRP and MEISON.

Popular conceptions of the EPRP and MEISON saw the former as Maoist, mainly composed of Ethiopians educated in the US, while the latter was seen as pro-Moscow and mostly educated in Europe. There may be some truth in that, at least as far as ideology is concerned. The major differences were that the EPRP wanted an immediate revolution based on people's democracy, while MEISON advocated a guided revolution – critically by supporting the military – as the masses lacked the organizational and political sophistication to consolidate it. In other words, MEISON believed it could transform the military regime into a progressive force, deepen the revolution, and eventually persuade the men in uniform to return to their barracks, leaving Ethiopia under civilian control. This was to prove a costly mistake. Other minor left organizations during this period were the Waz (Labor) League, Revolutionary Struggle for the Ethiopian Masses (ECHAAT), and Abiyot Seded (Revolutionary Flame), the last-named organization established by the head of PMAC, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam.

It became clear that the EPRP and MEISON were not on the same wavelength regarding the trajectory of the revolution and open warfare soon broke out between them. MEISON allied with the military and began systematically to purge EPRP members from POMOA, bureaucratic organizations, and labor unions and to kill its top leaders. The EPRP responded in kind, assassinating MEISON leaders and even ambushing, without success, the leader of the Derg. In turn, the military launched what it called the “Red Terror.” The EPRP, with most of its leadership murdered or arrested and its membership decimated, abandoned Addis Ababa and most urban areas and found refuge in the mountains of northern Ethiopia. After defeating the EPRP, the military turned ferociously on its erstwhile ally, MEISON, wiping it out within a few months because it feared its growing influence. Thus in one year, 1976–7, an entire generation of educated Ethiopians was annihilated. In the same period the Derg allied itself with the Soviet Union and entered an alliance with the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

The Third Period (1978–1989)

The third period (1978–89) was a time of consolidation and institutionalization of power. The military became the supreme authority in the

land. It adopted Marxism-Leninism as a guiding principle under the leadership of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam and established the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE). In 1987, under Soviet advice, the government began to organize for the establishment of a civilian vanguard party. Soon a commission was established, with Colonel Mengistu as its head. It included members of the Waz League, Abiyot Seded, and others, and began to call itself the Union of Marxist-Leninist Organizations. After a year's work, in 1979 the commission announced the formation of the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE). Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam became the party's secretary general, president of the nation, and head of the military. The party was envisioned to guide and deepen the revolution, to oversee the transition of Ethiopia from a backwater of feudalism to a socialist African nation.

After the military created the party and consolidated power, decision-making was centralized in order to transform the country into a socialist state. The first of these linkages were the urban dwellers' associations (*Kebeles*), the All-Ethiopia Peasant Associations (AEPA), and producers' cooperatives. The urban dwellers' associations, a variant of local self-administration, were designed to manage urban dwellings and the AEPA to implement land reforms. These entities provided a direct link between the center and local areas. A centralized party apparatus emanated from the center and spread to the village level, maintaining coercive control over the population. It was used to control production as well as restrict political freedoms, movement, and access to resources. The Derg also created the Revolutionary Ethiopia Women's Association (REWA) and the Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association (REYA), mobilizing the majority of Ethiopia's population. Indeed, by the time it had consolidated power, the Derg had created a complex set of institutions. The problem, however, was that these imposing political structures were not buttressed by a correspondingly strong economic foundation able to counter fierce opposition by the Eritrean, and later the Tigrayan and Oromo, liberation fronts.

Renewed Ethnic and Regional Nationalisms

In short, the increased monopoly of state power and the selective political representation based

solely on ideology shut out a variety of groups. In addition, the pan-Ethiopian ideology of the regime was not accepted by Eritrea, which was seeking independence, and it came into conflict with other group nationalisms that were in formation. The dominant ones were those espoused by the Tigray, the Oromo, and the Afar. Group nationalisms were strengthened by brutal state repression. Although the regime adopted the Soviet model of the state, it did not adhere to the principle of self-determination for Ethiopia's ethnic regions. During the heyday of Ethiopian Marxism, the Derg established the Institute of Nationalities, which was entrusted with the responsibility of formulating administrative structures that would fit the country's nationality configuration. The institute was created because a critical bone of contention among the left was the "national question." The issue had its genesis among intellectuals at Addis Ababa University and abroad in the early 1960s and had produced factions and cleavages around its application in Ethiopia. Many groups accepted the Marxist, or rather Leninist, interpretation of self-determination of nations up to and including session of Ethiopian nationalities. During those heady years, the acceptance of such a principle was considered a measure of one's progressive convictions, and the question of whether nationalities could be answered by the guarantee of individual democratic rights was not even entertained. This strict line prohibited good faith negotiations on matters that concerned all Ethiopians. In any case, the recommendation of the institute was that administrative divisions based on ethnic groups would not serve the objectives of administrative efficiency and economic development. Thus the new 1987 Constitution of Ethiopia created 22 administrative and five autonomous regions. This new constitution, while affirming the principles of equality of nationalities under a unitary state, foreclosed the right of secession. However, this official decision did not prevent any regional or ethnic group in Ethiopia from defining itself as a nation.

The most important regional movement was that of Eritrea. The Eritrean independence movement started under Haile Selassie, with Eritrea claiming to be an independent country based on historical grounds. In the 1960s Eritrean resistance to the central government produced two groups: the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF).

The factional struggle between the two fronts was long and bitter, involving many issues and lasting for years until the EPLF emerged in the 1970s as the most important and formidable movement. Its source of strength lay in its organizational skills, discipline, and self-reliance. It was able to offer stiff resistance to the military regime and to overcome two huge campaigns, directed by Soviet and Cuban advisors, launched to destroy it. The stalemate between Eritrea and the central power was broken when the Tigray region entered the war.

Tigray was a quiet region in the early 1970s, until its educated youth began to organize in order to resist the central government. The region, under both the *ancien régime* and military rule, was simply a forgotten zone. It was famine-prone due to thousands of years of agricultural practices that degraded the ecology. It had little industry even by Ethiopian standards, and no investments to speak of. It was an impoverished region, so Tigrayans migrated to other places in search of livelihood. This combination of famine and poverty, together with the imposition of the Amharic language, gradually led to simmering resentment. Tigrayans felt it curtailed their ability to attend the university, while those at the top of their profession felt pessimistic about their prospects in the service of the state, since most of the senior officials were from Shoa. Thus, when political upheaval overthrew the old regime, in 1974–5, Tigrayan nationalists were already laying the foundations for a regional movement, later known as the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). It clashed with the remnants of the EPRP Army in Tigray. There were ideological differences between the two organizations. EPRP saw the problem of Ethiopian society as one of class rule, while the TPLF viewed the issue as one of antagonistic national sentiments that had submerged class consciousness. Thus the TPLF drove the EPRP out of Tigray in order to prove to Tigrayan peasants that it was a creditable force. But most importantly, it was TPLF military solidarity with the Eritrean liberation fronts that sealed the fate of the Derg at the center.

Meanwhile, in the south and west of the country, Oromo nationalism was stirring forcefully once again, organized by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The OLF viewed the Oromo issue as a colonial question. The group's objective was to gain an independent state. How-

ever, Oromo lived dispersed throughout most regions of the country, and a unified resistance to authoritarian rule was to prove elusive for some time. This dispersal of the Oromo population was to pose problems for the OLF in widening its base. In 1977, for example, it attempted to reach out to the Oromo of Bale and Harar. This effort was complicated by the fact that the region was claimed by the Western Somali Liberation Front and the Somali Abo Liberation Front. The OLF was more successful in other areas, however, particularly in Wollega. In 1978 it opened offices in Khartoum, making direct contact with the Eritreans. But the OLF's efforts to rally urban Oromo to its avowed goal of an independent Oromo state were hampered by the considerable extent to which the urban Oromo had integrated into the national economy.

In the case of Eritrea, lowland Muslims who hailed from Karen and Sahel sowed the seeds for the independence movement in the late 1950s. These groups had been emasculated politically and had no economic stake in the Ethiopian state. Because of increased repression by the state, the movement was later able to attract highland Christians, among whom were workers, soldiers, and students. Moreover, in later years, increased nationalism and tenacity coupled with demographic concentration seem to have prevented state consolidation. Various military governors sent from Addis Ababa administered Eritrea, but only tenuously.

Tigray, too, shared a peculiar history of nationalism along with a deep memory of the failed Woyane Rebellion of 1943. Moreover, its close proximity to Eritrea not only made it a target, but also led to increased solidarity with Eritrea. In time, the TPLF created an umbrella organization, the Ethiopian People's Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF), which was mainly composed of the Ethiopian People's Democratic Forces (EPDM) operating in Gondar and Wollo and included the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO) and the Afar Liberation Front (ALF). Eventually, the EPDRF managed to defeat the military regime in Addis Ababa. The decline and collapse of the state at the hands of regional forces may be explained as follows. First, the state's abysmal record on human rights had alienated it from the population, fundamentally weakening it. Second, although the regime had built structures for consolidating political power, these structures rested on a

fragile economic base. The result was economic crisis brought on by the colossal cost of war and the regime's economic policy of villagization, which undermined agricultural production. This policy led to the famine of 1984–5 and was used in the north as an instrument of counterinsurgency. Third, the results of the land reform were mixed as the peasantry ended up by paying various taxes and fees to state functionaries and organizations. Fourth, a crisis occurred within the regime, as evidenced by the aborted coup of 1989. The crisis was partly created by increased conscription and mobilization into the military, as well as by the tenacity of the Eritrean, Tigrayan, and Oromo groups and the resultant military defeats. Finally, international alliances crumbled. The demise of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which had supported the regime ideologically and militarily, bankrupted the regime's legitimacy.

In May 1991, the combined forces of the EPDRF and the EPLF overthrew the government of the People's Republic of Ethiopia. The EPLF immediately established a provisional government in Eritrea, ending decades of incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia. In July 1991, 28 political organizations plus a representative of Addis Ababa University met in Addis Ababa to draft a new national charter. Marxist and other groups mostly opposed to the EPDRF's leadership role were excluded. These were the EPRP, MEISON, and the Coalition of Democratic Ethiopian Forces (CODEF). MEISON was excluded because it was allied to the former military regime and did not recognize the legitimacy of the Eritrean liberation fronts, while CODEF was sidelined because its leadership had served in the military regime, espoused a unitary state, and rejected the transitional process. The National Period Charter that came out of the national conference emphasized ethnic group rights and ushered in two types of nationalism: ethnic and pan-Ethiopian. The first was the assertion of ethnic rights and nationalism based on cultural manifestations, while the second was that of the older Ethiopian identity adhered to by various groups.

The National Period Charter founded the transitional government, which was made up of a president, a prime minister, and an ethnically mixed 87-member Council of Representatives, the supreme legislative and executive authority during the interim period. The TPLF, which helped found the EPDRF, and its two

partners, the OPDO and EPDM, took 32 of the 87 seats. The OLF, which later withdrew, took 12 seats. The ALF, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromo, and the Workers' Representatives received three seats each, while three pan-Ethiopian groups and many other smaller ethnic groups received one seat each. The Charter legalized self-determination for all of Ethiopia's ethnic communities and the preservation of national identities within a federated format and established national/regional self-government. Further legislation set up 14 regions. Five of the regions subsequently merged to become the Southern Region, thus creating ten regions for the country in all. Those self-governing regions, including the chartered cities, were vested with powers over all matters except defense, foreign affairs, economic policy, granting citizenship, declaring a state of emergency, printing currency, and overseeing major development projects and infrastructure. The regions constitute 56 zones and 676 districts or *woredas*.

The second reordering of state-society relations was the change from a command economy to a market economy. The transitional government adopted a new economic policy aimed at liberalizing all sectors and passed a new law on investment. Exceptions were areas exclusively under central control, such as defense industries, banking and insurance, and import-export trade in selected products. The investment law provided considerable opportunities and privileges for foreign investors, including repatriation of profits. In order to stimulate investment the government also passed a new labor law, which would take into account the interests of private investors as well as workers. It confirmed the right of employers and employees to engage in collective bargaining and set out provisions for the settlement of disputes.

A major highlight of Ethiopia's transitional process was the making of a new constitution. The Council of Representatives was mandated to constitute the Constitutional Commission, whose duty was to draw up a draft constitution. The commission submitted the draft to the Council of Representatives for adoption and eventually discussion by the people. The draft was presented to the Constituent Assembly and elected pursuant to the final draft for adoption. According to the Charter, elections for the National Assembly, to which the transitional government was to hand over power, had to be held within two

years. In practice it took longer as national elections occurred in June 1995. The drafting of the federal constitution was a protracted process that took three years. It reflected cleavages among pan-Ethiopian and ethnic nationalists as well as Marxists within the commission. In the end, the commission prepared an "Issue Paper" for national debate containing several precepts of constitutional government, including the right of nations to self-determination, which according to the transitional government was approved by the majority of people. In 1994-5, the draft constitution was approved by the Council of Representatives and, after modification, was adopted by a newly elected Constituent Assembly, paving the way for the formation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

Conclusion

The relationship between state and society in Ethiopia has undergone three transformations, from the imperial era to military rule to the beginning of a democratic state. Each stage has involved unique state-society struggles. However, all three stages share a basic common denominator: an attempt to solve the crisis in state-society relations. The basis of political power under the *ancien régime* was rural and political power was centralized. A half-hearted imperial attempt at decentralization and, later, representative government failed, ushering in an urban breakthrough that became known as the Ethiopian Revolution. The regime that followed proved to be even more authoritarian and sought to solve the crisis by greater centralization, which led to increased societal resistance. Both regimes dealt with societal problems through centralization and undemocratic rule. They shared a pan-Ethiopian conception of the state and failed to address regional aspirations.

The new state leaders of the transition undertook to solve the state-society crisis through democratization, or territorial decentralization. The original objective of the TPLF was secession from Ethiopia and independence for Tigray. Later, the TPLF proclaimed its intention to remain within a democratic, pluralistic, decentralized Ethiopian state if such an objective could be attained. The TPLF formed a political organization, the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray, in the hope of forming alliances with

other ethnic and regional groups. This strategy eventually culminated in the formation of the EPRDF, which claimed it represented rural interests and was organized on the basis of ethnic group nationalism. It sought autonomy or territorial decentralization that would allow ethnic groups to choose how they were governed and represented. The EPRDF thought to resolve the crisis by decreasing the power of the Shoan Amahars at the center, increasing that of other ethnic groups in the periphery, and bringing them into a transitional government.

This overview of the road to transformation in Ethiopia has demonstrated the following. First, the transition from the emperorship of Menelik II to the later period of consolidated centralized rule under Haile Selassie may be characterized as a transition from patrimonial to bureaucratic autocracy. In other words, the modern political history of Ethiopia is the story of a transition from a decentralized form of patrimonial rule to bureaucratic centralism, with Emperor Haile Selassie at the center. This bureaucratic centralism was followed by the military regime, which monopolized political power through a tightly centralized party apparatus and instituted authoritarian rule. However, this brutal military rule under the guise of Marxism-Leninism did not sit well with Eritrea, which was already in full revolt under the *ancien régime*, and other strong ethnic groups who sought either independence or autonomy. The EPRDF, which defeated the military regime with the active support of the Eritrean liberation fronts, reordered society based on ethnic federalism and territorial decentralization. Thus the Ethiopian experience is like that of other African states that gained independence and proceeded to consolidate and centralize power under undemocratic regimes. One reason for centralization in other African countries is the inheritance of authoritarian state colonial structures. Many countries attempted to decentralize power, but this objective has proven elusive. Ethiopian centralizing and autocratic regimes have failed to solve the problems of its society. The EPRDF in Ethiopia decentralized the government by creating federal structures based on ethnicity. The issue of federalism in Africa is a thorny one. By and large, except for Nigeria and the confederation of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, federalism has not worked in Africa because most nations have not developed strong middle classes that submerge ethnicity in a

federal compact. Nigerian federalism is sustained partly by increasing the number of states, in order to give smaller ethnic groups a voice in the center, and partly by oil wealth. In most of Africa the preference for a centralized unitary state soon after independence has been due to national integration and economic development. The Ethiopian experiment is unique because it seems to have gone in the other direction: that is, territorial decentralization based on ethnicity, albeit under tight fiscal control at the center. Whether such an arrangement will hold – increasingly under conditions of scarcity and environmental degradation – and augur peace and development is a challenge for all Ethiopians.

SEE ALSO: Mahdist Revolt; Sudanese Protest in the Turko-Egyptian Era; Yemen Socialist Revolution of 1962

References and Suggested Readings

- Chege, M. (1979) The Revolution Betrayed: Ethiopia, 1974–9. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17 (3): 359–80.
- Chole, E. (1993) Towards a History of the Fiscal Policy of the Pre-Revolutionary Ethiopian State. *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 15 (1): 90–1.
- Clapham, C. (1991) State-Society Institutions in Revolutionary Ethiopia. In J. Manor (Ed.), *Rethinking Third World Politics*. London: Longman.
- Denham, D. (1986) Old Abyssinia and the New Ethiopian Empire. In D. Denham & W. James (Eds.), *The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Garreston, P. P. (1986) Vicious Cycles: Ivory, Slaves and Arms on the New Maji Frontier. In D. Denham & W. James (Eds.), *The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hassan, M. (1990) *The Oromos of Ethiopia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jalata, A. (1993) *Oromia and Ethiopia: State Formation and Ethnonational Conflict: 1868–1992*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Keller, E. J. (1992) *Revolutionary Ethiopia*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Markakis, J. (1975) *Ethiopia: Anatomy of A Traditional Polity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nega, B. (1991) Democracy, Ethnicity and Economic Development in Africa: Lessons from the Ethiopian Experience. *Imbylta* 2 (3 & 4): 26.
- Ottaway, M. (1976) Social Classes and Corporate Interests in the Ethiopian Revolution. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 14 (3): 469–86.
- Rahmato, D. (1988) Political Order and Social Formation in Ethiopia under the Old Regime: Notes on

- Marxist Theory. *Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies* 1 (2): 466–7.
- Tareke, G. (1991) *Ethiopia: Power and Protest*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tesfaye, A. (2002) *Political Power and Ethnic Federalism: The Struggle for Democracy in Ethiopia*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Tiruneh, A. (1993) *The Ethiopian Revolution 1974–1987*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zewde, B. (1991) *A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855–1974*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.

Ethnic and nationalist revolts in the Hapsburg Empire, 1500–1848

Matthew McMurray

The Hapsburg Empire emerging in 1526 with the acceptance of Hapsburg rule by the Bohemian and Hungarian estates and by the Croatian estates the following year was a collection of territories formed in a piecemeal fashion rather than as an integrated state. At no time in its nearly 400-year history was this far-flung Empire united ethnically, culturally, economically, or linguistically. The Empire was the only multinational state in the early modern era and by far the most diverse. None of the ethnic groups represented a majority and some territories had nearly a half-dozen languages. Although unifying forces existed throughout this period, such as the military, the Church, and the bureaucracy, the forces of disintegration were stronger. One of the most powerful of these was ethnic jealousy, a constant theme in the history of the Empire. Bohemians' efforts to throw off German domination in the eighteenth century and Hungarian attempts to make Magyar the official language of the territories in the Danube Basin in the nineteenth century are only two of the dozens of examples that might be cited. Another was economic conflict between the various parts of the Empire, such as the efforts of both Croatia and Hungary to obtain access to the Adriatic.

The heart of the Empire was the House of Austria. The Austrians and the Magyars of Hungary were the Empire's two privileged ethnic groups. Thanks largely to their military victories over the Turks in the early modern era the Austrians became the more powerful of the two. The Austro-Hungarian relationship was a strained one and they went to war several

times in this period. In 1703 Prince Franciscus Rakoczi attempted to end Hapsburg domination in Hungary by the sword. Both guarded their privileges jealously and ruthlessly. For example, Vienna insisted that Austrian officers lead the Hungarian military and in the nineteenth century the Magyars attempted to wipe out the language of the Croats, one of the Slav peoples they dominated. The Hungarians, the most feudalized of all of the Danubian states, had already proven themselves incapable of achieving this at the Battle of Mohacs (1526), in which they suffered a devastating defeat at the hands of the Turks.

Although the Empire boasted pockets of industrialism such as Cisleithanian Austria and Bohemia, agriculture was by far the major industry. The southern and eastern sections of the Empire were economically and culturally backward – illiteracy was widespread, transport was poor, and there was only a small middle class. These factors served as a disincentive for the Hapsburgs to promote more equitable social and economic policies. In addition, Christianity taught the Slavs to accept their station and expect a better existence in the next life. As Enlightenment ideas gradually spread to the Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, an increasing number of peasants questioned basic assumptions about their society, economy, government, and faith. For instance, *laissez-faire* and, later, socialism taught them to question feudalist traditions. Economic growth in the Empire rose rapidly in the nineteenth century and led not only to a growth in the exchange of goods, but also in ideas. As the Slavs became better informed about conditions in other lands, more became convinced that sweeping social, political, and economic changes were necessary.

The rise of vernacular languages beginning in the sixteenth century, a source of pride to the intelligentsia and common folk alike, also fueled nationalism. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), a German philosopher and theologian, taught that language was a glue that held nationalities together. Conflicts between peoples were natural because each had their own unique language. The Slavs, he asserted, had a bright future. In 1840 the Magyars, fearing that they would be overwhelmed by the more populous Slavs in their own territories, made Latin the official language in Hungary.

Another centrifugal force was the Reformation. With the rise of Protestantism, wars would

now be fought not only between differing nationalities but different religions. Emperor Ferdinand II's successful military campaign in the 1620s against Bohemian Protestants is a case in point. Although the Empire remained devoted to Catholicism during the Reformation, Protestant sects flourished in Bohemia, Transylvania, and other areas.

Romanticism, which flourished in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, also energized nationalist movements with its celebration of heroism, emotion, and the irrational. Artists such as Mickiewicz in Poland and Novalis in Germany urged men to live passionately and freely; restrictive laws and customs diminished man's powers, while freedom and liberty were ennobling. The Hapsburgs had no answer for these forces of dissolution, could offer no unifying force to counter-balance them. One of the pivotal questions with which Hapsburg rulers wrestled was should the Empire be centralized or federalized. A compromise between these two forces offered the only real solution to the ethnic conflict that threatened to tear the Empire apart, as R. W. Seton-Watson and other scholars have noted. Although many short-term compromises were found, such as the decision of Croatian nobles to surrender some of their political power to the Magyars in 1790, a permanent solution was never discovered.

Under Empress Maria Theresa (1740–80) and to a greater extent her son and co-regent Joseph II (1780–90), the forces of centralization grew. Joseph II, who was given to impractical schemes, was primarily concerned with improving the lives of his subjects. He seized Church lands, eliminated some of the privileges the Catholic Church enjoyed, cut labor obligations for some serfs, attempted to make German the official language of the Empire, and eased restrictions on non-Christians. His ambitious but short-lived programs raised ordinary citizens' expectations for themselves and their society. But when conservatives such as Prince Klaus von Metternich (1773–1859), who dominated Empire politics from the early to mid-nineteenth century, overturned these programs in the first decades of the century, there was widespread discontent and frustration, particularly among the lower and middle classes. Frustrated by the high-handed policies of the Austrians, Pan-Slavist and Magyar nationalists became more

influential, especially after they recognized that if the Slavs became unified they would prevent Hungary from dominating the Balkans, one of the Magyar's prime goals. Metternich sought to weaken the South Slavs before they grew stronger.

Nationalist pamphlets and newspapers enjoyed a wide audience in the South Slav states in the nineteenth century. For instance, an anti-Magyar pamphlet by the Croatian Antony Vakanovic entitled *Sollen wir Magyarren weren?* (Are We to Become Magyars?) (1832) was banned by the Hungarian authorities after three editions. At the Diet of 1847–8, Kossuth refused to recognize the Croatian language. The South Slavs, he asserted, must learn Magyar. For many years the Magyars had attempted to buy off discontented nationalist leaders with offices and titles. The effort failed. Istvan Szechenyi (1791–1860) was a prominent Hungarian nationalist and member of the Hungarian Diet in the 1820s. In a series of books he outlined the leading problems that plagued his country, such as the lack of credit available to farmers – the majority of the population – and offered solutions to them. Like many prominent Magyars, he admired Austria and insisted that a partnership with Austria served Hungary's interests more than an independent state. Unlike Kossuth, he fought for the rights of non-Magyar peoples.

Industrialization was another disintegrating factor. Although its effects were weaker and did not take full effect until the second half of the nineteenth century, by the middle part of the century it had already helped push the Empire from a paternalistic, Austrian-dominated Empire to a more fluid, urbanized, and heterogeneous one. Its effects were most pronounced in Bohemia and Silesia. Ethnic and nationalist rivalries came to a head in the 1840s. In 1846 peasants revolted in Galicia. Two years later revolutions broke out across Europe. Vienna, the Austrian capital, was the site of one of the largest revolutions. Many Czechs, disgusted that they still did not enjoy the same political rights as the Austrians and Magyars, played a major role in the disorder. In March Metternich was forced to resign and fled to England. He returned several years later after conservatives regained power. In May Slavs from across the Empire met in Vienna. The Slav Congress demanded that the Empire become a federation of nationalities and that Slavs be granted the same political rights as Austrians

and Magyars. Although this demand was not accepted, *robot*, a feudal obligation which required serfs to work at various times of the year for their masters, was rescinded.

The revolutions of 1848 did not solve the deep-rooted problems that had led to them in the first place. Ethnic jealousies, competing languages, and economic rivalries would continue to plague the Empire until its dissolution at the end of World War I.

SEE ALSO: European Revolutions of 1848; Hungary, Protests, 1815–1920; Hungary, Revolution of 1848; Hungary, Women Radicals, 1848–1849; Jews and Revolution in Europe, 1789–1919; Reformation

References and Suggested Readings

- Despalatovic, E. M. (1975) *Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement*. Boulder: East European Quarterly.
- Jaszi, O. (1929) *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kann, R. A. (1973) *The Habsburg Empire: A Study in Integration and Disintegration*. New York: Octagon Books.
- Kann, R. A. (1974) *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Seton-Watson, R. W. (1908) *Racial Problems in Hungary*. London: Archibald Constable.
- Sked, A. (2001) *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815–1918*. London: Penguin.
- Skurnowicz, J. S. (1981) *Romantic Nationalism and Liberalism: Joachim Lelewel and the Polish National Ideal*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Tapie, V. L. (1971) *The Rise and Fall of the Habsburg Monarchy*. New York: Praeger.
- Taylor, A. J. P. (1948) *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1815–1918*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eureka Stockade

Anne Beggs-Sunter

Ballarat, in the British colony of Victoria, Australia, burst into life as an instant city in 1851, following the discovery of gold. Adventurous men and women from all over the world descended on Ballarat in the 1850s, feverishly attacking the sticky clay at Golden Point. The diggers followed the gold underground, along the course of the ancient rivers, buried by the volcanic eruptions of Mounts Warrenheip and Buninyong. On the flat, 30,000 diggers collected into small cooperatives of “mates” and desperately searched for their personal Eldorado.

From the first discoveries in 1851, relations between the miners and the police sent to administer the goldfields were uneasy. The government attempted to collect a monthly license fee for the right to search for gold, but the tax conferred no rights, and licenses were inspected at the point of a bayonet. The more outspoken miners, schooled in the ways of the 1848 revolutions in Europe, led a movement to protest against the gold license. The cry of “No taxation without representation” was raised, echoing the rhetoric of the American Revolution and the Chartist movement for democratic rights in Britain. At Bendigo in the winter of 1853 protesting diggers wore red ribbons, refused to pay their licenses, and collected a monster petition which was presented to the governor, seeking immediate reform of government administration, the right to vote for the unrepresented diggers, and land reform. The petition contained 23,000 signatures collected throughout the Victorian goldfields and was couched in Chartist terms. The governor and his advisors made some slight concessions, but the central grievances remained a festering sore on the diggings.

In November 1854 the diggers at Ballarat established a Chartist-inspired organization, the Ballarat Reform League, whose secretary was the Welsh lawyer John Basson Humffray. The League called a series of mass meetings on Bakery Hill, where it raised a new flag of the Southern Cross, featuring five white stars on a blue background, a potent symbol of independence from British authority. It proved a precursor for republican movements in Australia. The diggers swore an oath by the flag “to fight to defend our rights and liberties” and they sent a charter of demands for political rights to the governor. The charter contained five of the six basic Chartist demands – full and fair parliamentary representation, manhood suffrage, no property qualifications for members of parliament, payment of members of parliament, and short-term parliaments. Its immediate demands were abolition of the Gold Commission system of administration and abolition of the license tax. It began with the words “That it is the inalienable right of every citizen to have a choice in the laws he is called on to obey, and that taxation without representation is tyranny.” These were direct echoes of the American Declaration of Independence and the charter contained a strong threat if its demands were not won: “the Reform League will endeavour to supersede such Royal prerogative by asserting that of the people,

which is the most royal of all prerogatives, as the people are the only legitimate source of all political power.” The governor angrily rejected the demands of the diggers. Many defiantly burnt their gold licenses and marched away to the Eureka lead (where the diggers had been mining) to form a defensive stockade and plan their next steps toward gaining political representation.

The multicultural nature of the protest was evident – at least 17 nationalities were represented – and a Declaration of Independence was drafted and recited to the defenders, who approved it with a cheer. On Saturday, December 2 there were an estimated 1,500 men behind the stockade, and military discipline had been enforced. A contingent of Californians were well armed, while the large number of Irish set a blacksmith to making pikes, the traditional Irish weapon of revolution. The British governor, Sir Charles Hotham, feared he was facing republican revolution. He conferred with his commandant at Ballarat and ordered the police force and two regiments of the British army to attack the protesting diggers.

The attack was carefully planned and secretly executed. A force of 276 soldiers and mounted police marched under the cover of darkness to surround the diggers’ stockade before dawn on Sunday, December 3, 1854. Many of the diggers had left the stockade during the night, preparing to “keep holy the Sabbath” by attending morning church services. Only about 150 men were left asleep within the stockade, and the well-armed Californians had departed either to cut off cannons being sent from the coast, or else were warned by their consul to keep out of the protest.

The government caused blood to flow as first the diggers, then innocent bystanders, were mown down by the trained soldiers and a disorderly mounted police force. At least 22 stockaders were killed, and five soldiers died. Unofficial estimates put the death toll higher, and many were injured, including the leader Peter Lalor (1827–89), who lost his arm in the battle. The battle was over in 20 minutes, with 113 rebels rounded up and taken prisoner. Martial law was declared, and rewards offered for the capture of Peter Lalor and other leaders of the rebellion; but within days public meetings in all the towns of the colony came out in support of the stockaders, and in criticism of the government.

In early 1855 thirteen stockaders stood trial for the capital offense of treason. By that time

the popular imagination of Melbourne had been gripped by the diggers’ cause. The best lawyers in Melbourne gave their services to defend the prisoners, and no jury would convict these men who were now vaunted as heroes.

Within weeks of its occurrence, Eureka had begun to take on legendary status. It began to be incorporated into the national myth of democracy, equality, and mateship. At a practical level, a series of reforms introduced in 1855 gave the diggers representation in parliament, abolished the hated gold license, introduced the Miners’ Right which carried the right to mine in any part of the colony, to vote for parliament, and the right to occupy a small portion of land and build a home; a new and completely democratic system of administering the goldfields was introduced. In a crowning victory, Peter Lalor and J. B. Humffray, the diggers’ champions, were elected to parliament.

The British government very successfully defused the revolutionary situation, so much so that Ballarat soon became a loyal stronghold of the Empire. By the time of the Federation of the Australian colonies in 1901, the city viewed itself as boasting the best of British and the best of Australian traditions.

The memory of Eureka was for many years a troublesome one, best forgotten. It took 30 years for a monument to be erected on the site of the stockade, and it was reticent in its recollection – a simple stone plinth surrounded by four cannons, the unlikely and inappropriate gift of the Victorian government. The Eureka flag was lost from public memory too, until it was acquired by the Ballarat Fine Art Gallery in 1895. But the legend took root in oral tradition. Radical nationalists of the 1880s took up the tradition and related it publicly through the poems, stories, and illustrations of journals like the *Bulletin* and the *Boomerang*.

At different times, to support different causes, men and women chose symbols from Eureka to illustrate their ideological cause. The flag became a metaphor for radical action – used by nationalists wanting to exclude Asian races, trade unionists wanting to defeat capitalists, civil libertarians opposing military conscription, republicans wanting to remove the queen as head of state. All have found some spiritual nourishment in the “Stockade everlasting.”

SEE ALSO: Australian Labor Movement; Lalor, Peter (1827–1889)

References and Suggested Readings

- Beggs-Sunter, A. (2001) Remembering Eureka. *Journal of Australian Studies* 70: 49–56.
- MacFarlane, I. (1995) *Eureka From the Official Records*. Melbourne: Public Records Office of Victoria.
- Molony, J. (2001) *Eureka*. Carlton: Melbourne University Press.
- Raffaello, C. (1855/2002) *The Eureka Stockade*. Melbourne: Project Gutenberg.

Eurocommunism

Mauro Stampacchia

In the 1970s the communist parties of Italy, Spain, and France seemed to shift toward a looser relation with the Communist Party of the USSR and to differentiate their political strategies from the model offered by Soviet communism. They united their efforts in trying to develop a common strategy and a polarization in the international communist movement, and to balance Soviet influence and elaborate political strategies that would be more suitable to European countries. All this fell within the formula of “Eurocommunism.”

In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution and the foundation of the Soviet-dominated Third International, some European Marxists, including Rosa Luxemburg, foresaw the risk that the Russian model of a proletarian state could unbalance the rising communist movement. Antonio Gramsci’s prison writings drew a distinctive line between the societies of Western and Eastern Europe. After World War II the USSR heavily influenced Eastern European socialist countries, and the invasion by Soviet troops of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 was seen as a means of hindering any evolution of the two countries away from strict, USSR-style communism.

Fierce criticism of Soviet politics was also voiced by growing new left movements, from the viewpoint of workers’ control over the state and the economy. The Italian Communist Party under Togliatti formulated the idea of a “national road to socialism,” but maintained strong links with the Communist Party of Moscow. So did most European communist parties. The path toward national autonomy was therefore not easy to practice. The new party secretary, Enrico Berlinguer, seemed to take a more autonomous stance. In 1974 he organized the first Conference

of Western Communist Parties in Brussels, which was followed by meetings between Berlinguer and the Spanish party secretary Carrillo in July 1975, and with French party secretary Marchais in November the same year. The formula of “Eurocommunism” was then used in the International Communist Conference in Berlin in 1976. Berlinguer was extremely careful not to present the new formula as an internal split of the international communist movement, only as a set of common political principles and a common political agenda for the Western European communist parties. Eurocommunism was not, in this context, a form of outward criticism of Soviet communism, but Soviet leaders regarded it as a threat to their control over the international communist movement and as an incentive if not a help to Russian and Eastern European dissidents.

Eurocommunism suffered from this fact and it also proved to be difficult to find a common platform among the three communist parties. French and Italian parties had a strong hold on their electorate, but the former did not share the growing commitment of the Italian party to the European integration process. The Spanish Communist Party seemed to share Berlinguer’s views but it did not have a similar presence in the Spanish electorate and had to face the difficult political transition from the Franco regime to a full democracy. Dissidents in Eastern Europe looked with great interest to Eurocommunism and this made it even more mandatory for the Soviet leadership to oppose it. In the international relations arena, Eurocommunism was not judged positively by US foreign policy: Kissinger, who loosely favored western communist parties’ quest for autonomy from Moscow, strongly opposed communists in government leadership (in Italy, for example) as a threat to NATO and to the balance of power between the US and USSR.

Despite this, Eurocommunism declined due to internal weakness rather than as a result of external causes. The French party soon changed its position and returned to supporting Soviet policies, approving the Afghanistan invasion and also encountering a severe decline in the polls. The Spanish party had to face the split of a pro-Soviet faction and a strong internal clash that ejected Carrillo from office. Only the Italian party under Berlinguer, back in opposition after 1979, took a now lonely stance for

Eurocommunism, condemning the Afghanistan invasion, the repression of dissidents in Poland and Jaruzelski's coup, and calling for a "third way" distinguished from both Soviet socialism and the social democratic variety. The shift of the center of communism from Eastern to Western Europe did not occur.

The problem posed by Eurocommunism remains. Western Europe was the birthplace of labor and socialist movements throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which shaped political systems and determined welfare policies in the old continent. The fall of Soviet communism now puts the problem in a significantly different context. The process of European integration, while creating a new and assertive actor in world politics, has not so far been influenced by socially oriented policies. This could lead to the growth of a new European left in the political arena of the European Union.

SEE ALSO: Berlinguer, Enrico (1922–1984); Communist Party, France; Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Hungary, Revolution of 1956; Internationals; Italian Communist Party; Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919)

References and Suggested Readings

- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1977) *The Italian Road to Socialism: An Interview by E. J. Hobsbawm with Giorgio Napolitano of the Italian Communist Party*. Trans. J. Cammett & V. De Grazia. Westport: L. Hill.
- Sassoon, D. (1996) *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the 20th Century*. New York: New Press.
- Timmermann, H. (1987) *The Decline of the World Communist Movement: Moscow, Beijing, and Communist Parties in the West*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Valli, B. (1976) *Gli eurocomunisti*. Milan: Bompiani.

EuroMayDay

Alex Foti

Emerging out of the "anti-globalization" movement, EuroMayDay is a transnational protest event held since 2005 on May 1 in a dozen or more European cities, including Berlin, Paris, Hamburg, Helsinki, Seville-Málaga, Vienna, Naples, Maribor, Copenhagen, and Liège. It is also a cross-European network for social agitation and labor organizing among workers to fight for economic redistribution and free movement of people across borders. It was born with the

Middlesex Declaration of October 2004, when labor and media collectives from several European countries gathered in London at Beyond ESF, an autonomous event coinciding with the European Social Forum (ESF). It sought to give rise to a unified May Day of precarious and migrant workers. Since 2005 the EuroMayDay network has held political assemblies in Berlin, Paris, Hamburg, and Milan.

The whole process originated in 2001 out of Milan, where the activists and "subverters" of ChainWorkers, supported by Milanese and Roman squats (*centri sociali*), made an action pact with CUB (Confederazione Unitaria di Base, or the Unitary Rank-and-File Confederation), a militant union, to create a May Day parade that would give voice and visibility to temporary workers, part-timers, freelancers, and other service laborers belonging to the "precarious generation." They meant to reclaim the international holiday of workers by bringing it back to its anarchosyndicalist roots, considering that the end of the Cold War had diminished the relevance and appeal of social democratic and communist celebrations. In the following years, local strikes by supermarket cashiers, call center operators, airport workers, journalists, and other job categories started to gravitate around Milan's MayDay network. Since 2001, attendance at the parade has grown from a few thousand to about 100,000, dwarfing the morning's official demonstration held by mainstream unions. In 2004 a twin MayDay Parade was simultaneously held in Milan and Barcelona, thanks to the alliance forged between the YoMango media and action collective, ChainWorkers, and the Parisian coordination of *Intermittents* (the French term for stage hands and cultural workers with temporary contracts).

EuroMayDay mobilizes against the welfare and labor (counter) reforms of neoliberalism, resists corporate abuse and state authoritarianism, and formulates strategies of liberation from oppressive work and living conditions, grouped under the concept of "precarity." In France, Italy, and Spain, EuroMayDay's initial area of diffusion, *précarité*, *precarietà* or *precariedad* are familiar terms to refer to the spreading condition of being subjected to temporary, flexible, contingent, casual, intermittent work arrangements, leading to income insecurity and social uncertainty.

By the autumn of 2004, San Precario was on the verge of making wide sections of the Italian

movement coalesce around the struggle against precarity, from communists to autonomists and anarchists. But at the Milan MayDay of 2005, scuffles broke out between competing factions during and after the parade, and the national MayDay network suffered a setback from which it has yet to recover. A positive note was instead struck in the spring of 2006, in conjunction with the successful upheaval of French students and unions against *Contrat Première Embauche* (First Employment Contract), a piece of legislation proposed by the government that would have institutionalized juvenile precarity. On Good Friday, the EuroMayDay process was launched in Brussels, as a few hundred activists from Belgium, France, Italy, Germany and pink samba bands dressed as Easter bunnies raided the offices and defaced the buildings of pro-business lobbies in the European Quarter, while shouting: “No borders, no precarity: fuck the new inequality!” In June 2007 in Rostock, Germany, and ahead of the G8 Summit in nearby Heiligendamm, hundreds of caped and masked “precarious superheroes,” from Germany and other EU countries, marched behind a pink EuroMayDay banner expressing their collective will to “Make the G8 Precarious.”

Indeed, EuroMayDay has been a vector of media and visual experimentation, as shown by its colorful posters and online “net parades,” or the creation of the popular icon of San Precario, patron saint of the “fexploited.” EuroMayDay plays with radical iconography and propaganda by echoing the tactics of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW, also known as “Wobblies”) in pre-1917 America, and embodying the revolutionary spirit of the carnivalesque first described by Michael Bakhtin. Much like the gay pride demonstrations or the love parade, MayDay parades have been free and queer, scandalous and energizing.

The EuroMayDay has tried to create a European public space from below. It has attempted to distill a common political platform and articulate the concept of precarity across diverse national contexts, varying in radical political cultures and in standards of welfare provision and union protection, as well as in the engagement with European integration. In fact, a few nodes in the network question the viability or desirability of an explicitly European political dimension and prefer to simply refer to “MayDay,” without the *Euro-* prefix.

SEE ALSO: G8 Protests, Heiligendamm, June 2007; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; World Social Forums

References and Suggested Readings

- Buhle, P. & Schulman, N. (2005) *Wobblies! A Graphic History of the Industrial Workers of the World*. London: Verso.
- Dorr, N. & Mattoni, A. (2007) The EuroMayDay Parade against Precarity: Cross-National Diffusion and Transformation of the European Space “From Below.” Paper presented to the workshop “Campaign Analysis in a Globalizing World,” Ludwig-Maximilian-University, Munich, April 27–8.
- www.chainworkers.org/
- www.cip-idf.org
- www.eipep.net/transversal/0704
- www.euromayday.org/
- www.greenpeppermagazine.org/process/tiki-index.php?page=Precarity+Issue
- www.journal.fibreculture.org/issue5/issue5_abstracts.html
- www.metamute.org/en/node/415
- www.yomango.net

European revolutions of 1848

Richard Schaefer

Discontent over economic issues and calls for political reform boiled over in a series of revolutions that swept across most of Europe in 1848. Though rooted in very different national contexts, the revolutions were a pan-European movement that effectively toppled the repressive political order laid down by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The failure of so many of the revolutionaries’ immediate objectives, and the reassertion of dynastic authority, should not obscure the significance of these revolutions for European society. Ending the last remnants of feudalism across central Europe, the revolutions promoted nationalism, reinforced class divisions, and both inspired and frightened Europeans with the potential of mass politics. It is in this context that the *Communist Manifesto* can be read as a programmatic text and not an objective description of events. It is also in this context that nationalism emerged post-1848 as the single strongest and broadest ideological force for shaping the European future.

Triggered by bad harvests and food shortages in 1845 and 1846, scattered riots broke out in

many regions in 1846 and 1847. Aggravating existing tensions over customary land-use and other issues, the agricultural crisis was compounded by a financial slump and contracting international markets. In combination, these factors had an especially powerful effect on artisans and craft workers, two groups already struggling to accommodate the new demands of industrial production, and in turn these groups made up the largest number of revolutionaries. Another large share of revolutionaries came from the professional middle classes, partisans of the “movement,” who felt their expertise justified them in calling on dynastic rulers to yield power in the name of change. Motivated by diverse ideologies, these men shared a faith in politics that was perhaps naively out of step with workers’ demands, but which profoundly shaped both the idealistic tenor of their reform efforts and the pessimistic frustration that accompanied their eventual failure.

The 1848 revolutions began in January when uprisings forced the King of Naples and Grand Duke of Tuscany to grant constitutions. In France a simmering conflict over whether to extend the franchise turned into a crisis on February 22, when the government forbade a meeting dedicated to reform issues. When angry workingmen protested the decision, authorities responded with force and the situation escalated. Barricades soon filled the streets and on February 24, King Louis Philippe fled to England, ceding power to a provisional government headed by Alexandre Auguste Ledru-Rollin, Alphonse de Lamartine, Louis Blanc, and others. Committed to the republican cause, the government made plans for elections based on universal manhood suffrage. Inspired by the popular call for a constitutional guarantee of the “right to work,” and conscious of its debt to the working classes, the government also responded to the plight of workers by creating a program of “national workshops” for the unemployed.

The birth of the second republic in France on April 23 had a galvanizing effect across Europe. For some, the apparent continuity with earlier revolutionary ideals lent events an almost romantic halo, while others were deeply frightened by the prospect of reliving the excesses of the French Revolution. As news of the French revolt spread, uprisings broke out in the Austrian empire, northern Italy, and Prussia. On March 3 Louis Kossuth made a passionate plea for

constitutional reform in the Hungarian general assembly that inspired liberals throughout Europe. On March 13 Viennese students began a series of violent protests that led to Metternich’s resignation and a set of political reforms that included a new constitution and universal male suffrage. The Habsburgs’ readiness to capitulate mirrored a widespread mood of resignation to the forces of change among European monarchs, but also stemmed from the fact that their position was complicated by growing nationalism throughout their realm.

Kossuth’s plea aimed at liberal reform but also roused nationalists throughout the multi-ethnic empire during this “springtime of the peoples.” Nationalism redounded against Hungarian unity itself when the Croats, led by Joseph Jellačić, challenged Magyar rule. It also marred the Congress of Slavs, organized on June 2 to discuss the possibility of a Slav federation within the Empire. Conceived as an alternative to German and Magyar political dominance, Austro-Slavism was promoted by Czechs who tended to overshadow smaller Slav minorities.

Turmoil in the Austrian Empire fueled Italian nationalism, as Italians vied to seize the moment and eject the Austrians from northern Italy. When the Austrians were ejected by rebel forces from Milan and the Venetians declared a republic on March 22, the Piedmontese King Charles Albert, a recent convert to the liberal cause, lent his support to the struggle by declaring war on Austria. The Piedmontese were joined by passionate volunteers from across the peninsula as well as by troops from Naples and from the Papal States in what many Italians felt was a liberation struggle. Having initiated a series of reforms since his election in 1846, Pope Pius IX was even seen by some as a viable candidate for presiding over a united Italy. This hope vanished, however, when he issued an allocution against the war on April 19. The pope’s reluctance to support war against the Catholic Habsburgs cost him his temporal power when citizens of the Papal States rose up and supported the creation of a republic under Mazzini in February 1849.

In the German territories, fear of the spreading revolutionary movement, combined with no clear support from either the Austrians or the Prussians, led many princes to capitulate before the outbreak of serious violence. In some southern German states earlier reforms had already led

to the creation of constitutional monarchies. In Bavaria revolutionary fervor provided an outlet for criticism of the king's affair with Lola Montez as much as for criticism of government policy. In Prussia King Frederick William IV sought to stem the tide of revolution by political compromise, but events had their own momentum. His efforts to appease his critics notwithstanding, Berlin erupted in violence on March 18 as citizens and soldiers clashed in the streets. When mounting casualties forced the king to withdraw his troops on the next day, a humbled Frederick William was forced to view the victims of the uprising wearing the liberal colors. Though hardly converted to the cause, the Prussian king thus became the *de facto* champion of liberal reform and German national unity. Seizing the moment, nationalists from across the German territories assembled at St. Paul's Church in Frankfurt to lay the foundation for German unification.

Throughout the summer of 1848, as new liberal governments labored over constitutions and other reforms, popular support for their initiatives ebbed and a distinct radicalization among workers led to new violence. Once again, events in France set the tone for similar patterns across Europe. Elections on April 23 returned a majority of moderate republican deputies to the legislature. Fearful both of radicals in Paris and the peasantry, who were angry over the new tax levied to support the national workshops, the government placed a high priority on maintaining public order, often exaggerating real threats. Afraid of the crowds flocking to the national workshops in Paris, and increasingly convinced that the program was an inefficient solution to the employment problem, the government announced plans to close the workshops on June 20. When workers' protests against the plan spiraled out of control, Paris erupted in violence. The fighting known as the June days lasted between June 22 and 26 and cost upwards of 1,500 lives. Brutal reprisals against rebels after their surrender led to a further 3,000 deaths and underscored the deeper class hatred accompanying the violence. The election of Louis Napoleon, nephew of the former emperor, on December 10 signaled the beginning of a steady conservative reversal of the revolution until the dissolution of the republic and a return to empire in 1852.

Similar reversals occurred everywhere throughout Europe. In the Austrian Empire, as the

newly elected national assembly worked at sweeping away the last remnants of feudalism, military successes against the Piedmontese and a show of force on the last day of the Slav Congress signaled that the forces of reaction were regaining strength. In Vienna threats to cancel a program similar to the French national workshops met with stiff resistance, as did the emperor's decision to support the Croats against the Hungarians. After months of sometimes intense fighting, rebellious Vienna was subdued by a combined Austrian-Croat army. The abdication of Emperor Ferdinand in favor of his nephew Franz Joseph on December 2 effectively annulled many previous reforms. His accession to the throne also angered the Hungarians and sparked the Austro-Hungarian War, a war that was only concluded when the emperor enlisted the aid of Russian reinforcements in the summer of 1849.

Beginning in the spring of 1849, Italians seeking to unify the peninsula suffered a series of crushing setbacks. In March General Radetsky's victory over the Piedmontese forced Charles Albert to abdicate in favor of his more conciliatory son, Victor Emmanuel II, and Austrian support for Duke Leopold crushed the Tuscan republic in July. In the Papal States, Pius IX was restored to power by the French army in the early summer of 1849. The ordeal cemented his commitment to fighting "modern," liberal tendencies throughout the remainder of his life, and placed Rome squarely in the way of Italian nationalist aspirations. Louis Napoleon's intercession on behalf of the pope helped win him favor from Catholic supporters and began a decades-long policy of French support of an embattled pope.

In the German territories the alliance between workers and middle-class reformers deteriorated throughout the summer months. Anxious to remove economic restrictions, liberals could not abide the working-class desire to seek job security through a restoration of the guilds. This alienated the two classes and proved fertile ground for aristocratic landowners to frame their conservatism in a way that was appealing to workers seeking security. Drawing courage from the Habsburg victory over the Viennese rebels in autumn 1848, Frederick William IV approved the occupation of Berlin by troops in November, and the removal of parliament to Brandenburg where it was dissolved on December 1. In

Frankfurt delegates to the all-German parliament were frustrated in their efforts to forge national unity by the lukewarm support of territorial monarchs, and by their inability to contain the restiveness of the crowds, whose growing nationalism threatened to overwhelm the assembly's mandate. When, after much debate, the assembly decided in favor of a "small Germany" led by the Prussian king, they were thwarted when Frederick William IV refused.

SEE ALSO: Blanc, Louis (1811–1882); Blanqui, Louis Auguste (1805–1881); France, June Days, 1848; France, Revolution of 1848; Hungary, Women Radicals, 1848–1849; Lamartine, Alphonse de (1790–1869); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Poland, Revolutions, 1846–1863

References and Suggested Readings

- Agulhon, M. (1983) *The Republican Experiment, 1848–1852*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hamerow, T. S. (1958) *Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in Germany, 1815–1871*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Langewiesche, D. (Ed.) (1998) *Die Revolutionen von 1848 in der europäischen Geschichte: Ergebnisse und Nachwirkungen*. Munich: Oldenburg.
- Price, R. (1988) *The Revolutions of 1848*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sperber, J. (1994) *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stearns, P. N. (1974) *1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe*. New York: Norton.

European Union summit protests, Gothenburg, 2001

Tadzio Müller

In the alter-globalization movement, *Göteborgskeravallerna*, the riots that erupted around the EU summit in Gothenburg, Sweden, in June 2001, are mostly remembered as part of a canon of protests that defined the movement's heroic phase in the global North: Seattle, Prague, Quebec City, Gothenburg, Genoa. And yet the events in Gothenburg, usually overshadowed by the far bigger and more explosive protests that rocked Genoa only six weeks later, were important in their own right. Some 50,000 people took part in a number of demonstrations, workshops, parties, and indeed riots, facing around 2,500

police officers. Three demonstrators were shot with live ammunition, one critically, and over 1,000 demonstrators were arrested, with many receiving prison sentences on average 12 times longer than precedent would have dictated. As significant as the figures were in the context of Swedish politics, it was ultimately not for mere strength in numbers that the protests in Gothenburg would be remembered, but rather for their political impacts: they shook Swedish society to the core, thus revealing the political power of militant protest in the alter-globalization movement.

The "End of History" in Sweden

Because of the amount of publicity they generate, summit protests have been credited with playing a part in ending the "end of history," that is, the triumphant phase of the neoliberal project whose beginning coincided with the fall of the Eastern bloc. Such a view of summit protests understands them as taking place in a global space, as having global histories and global effects. While this is certainly the case to some extent, research on transnational social movements and the experience of summit protests affirm that such events are also very strongly determined by the national political culture within which they occur: much as Paris 1968 was a world-historical event that could not be understood outside of the wider crisis of Fordism, it would also have been unimaginable outside of the specifically French revolutionary tradition and what Zolberg in *Moments of Madness* (1972), his seminal study of ruptural politics, described as "the dullness of routinized Gaullism."

In order then to understand the political history of the Gothenburg riots they need to be located in the peculiarities of Swedish political culture, and the particular shape that the neoliberal offensive took there. In Sweden, history can be said to have ended in 1992, in what was, true to the country's political culture, very much a consensual affair between the relevant social elites. Since the 1930s, Swedish political culture had been shaped by the hegemony of social democracy, a hegemony that extended into all spheres of life, and was represented as a conflict-free social totality known as "the people's home" (*folkhemmet*). It was largely on the basis of this social democratic common sense – and partly due to its geographical proximity to the Soviet

Union – that Sweden was very late in joining the European Union, which was rejected by many Swedes as a transmission belt for neoliberal social and economic policies.

As more and more countries fell to the neoliberal offensive that had begun in 1979, Swedish social democracy remained (relatively) firm until a currency crisis hit the country in 1992, when speculators attacked the Swedish Krona, forcing the central bank to raise interest rates overnight to a stunning 500 percent, in turn inducing a deep recession. In the aftermath of the crisis the major parties met and agreed to restructure the “Swedish model” along neoliberal lines. In 1994 the government succeeded in cajoling the country into voting to join the EU, although strong popular suspicion remained against such a move. However, in the absence of obvious histories of resistance as well as politically relevant bearers of such a critique, this suspicion remained politically unorganized, and the neoliberal project marched along more or less unchallenged.

And then the end of history ended – somewhere else. In a story that has by now achieved almost canonical status in progressive circles, the first organized political force to challenge the neoliberal project emerged with the Zapatista National Liberation Army deep in the jungles of Southern Mexico in 1994. And yet, like the “old mole” invoked by Karl Marx in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852) to describe the circulation of social struggles, it took this challenger another five years to burrow its way into the global North, where it raised its head in the “J18” (June 18, 1999) riots that shook the City of London financial center, to emerge finally into the global spotlight in the alter-globalization movement’s “coming out party” at the protests against the World Trade Organization’s ministerial summit in Seattle in November 1999.

Thus began the time when, at least, but not only, in the global North, every major transnational summit became the target of demonstrations organized by a movement that saw its diversity – from global social democrat to libertarian anti-capitalist – as a strength rather than a weakness. When the Swedish EU presidency in the first half of 2001 announced that one of the main themes of its concluding summit in Gothenburg in June would be the Union’s eastward enlargement, the preconditions for a successful and powerful counter-summit event

seemed to be given. First, after years of political quiescence in the face of the neoliberal advance, a transnational movement had emerged to challenge it, and – not only, but partly due to the actions of this movement – in early 2001, neoliberalism indeed seemed to be on the defensive. Second, the country could relatively easily be mobilized to support resistance against the European project, which had always been viewed critically, while at the same time expressing a fundamentally social democratic critique of the social democratic government. Third, in March 2001 US President George W. Bush had announced that his first state visit to Europe would be to Sweden on the eve of the EU summit, allowing the mobilization for the counter-summit to capitalize on widespread anti-American sentiment as well as a more specific dislike of the president.

Goteborgshändelserna: The Events of Gothenburg

The two main networks organizing the protest events were the Network Gothenburg 2001 (*Nätverket Göteborg 2001*) and the larger, and politically more diverse Gothenburg Action (*Göteborgsaktionen*), which were joined by a number of smaller networks and freestanding organizations and groups that together organized a complex choreography of protest that was to stretch over three days. For Thursday, June 14, an anti-Bush demonstration was planned to coincide with Bush’s arrival in Gothenburg. On Friday the 15th, the day on which the actual summit was to start, groups and networks belonging to the more radical wing of the alter-globalization movement were planning a raft of actions intended to disturb the smooth functioning of the summit – some, like the White Overalls (*Vita Overallerna*), were indeed planning to “storm” the convention center grounds in which the summit was to be held. More moderate groups like ATTAC, originally French but by then a global social democratic network advocating, among other proposals, a tax on transnational financial speculation, had organized the Free Forum (*Fritt Forum*), a space for lectures, workshops, and discussions. Finally, Saturday the 16th was to see a massive concluding demonstration for which all organizations and networks were mobilizing. On the other side, the Gothenburg police force under the command of

Håkan Jaldung had drawn together some 2,500 police officers from all over the country to protect the summit, making this one of the largest police actions in Swedish history, while the US secret service had in advance dispatched officers to work with the Swedish police to ensure the safety of their president.

In the event, things turned out differently than most participating actors had anticipated. On Thursday morning the police surrounded the school that many out-of-town activists were using as sleeping space and convergence center with a ring of sand-filled containers, thus triggering the first bout of rioting in the afternoon, as activists tried to come to their surrounded comrades' assistance. Around 6:00 p.m., some 12–15,000 people gathered for an anti-Bush demonstration, while at the same time the police stormed the school, arresting nearly all of the remaining 500 or so activists still inside. As the riots continued throughout the evening, the police continued their strategy of destroying activists' channels of communication, when, about 2 hours after they had managed finally to occupy all of Hvitfeldtska high school, they stormed the supposedly secret *sambandscentralen* (communications headquarters) set up by some activists in a flat in downtown Gothenburg to coordinate actions throughout the summit.

Having thus suffered a major defeat on Thursday, activists met again on Friday morning, as the summit began in the nearby convention center, at a legal anti-summit rally in downtown Gothenburg organized by *Göteborgsaktionerna*. At 10:30 a.m. an illegal "anti-capitalist march" began to move from the rally toward the conference center. Soon afterward fights between police and protesters broke out close to the barriers, after the police tried and failed to separate the militant "black bloc" from the rest of the march. The march broke up, and the police chased groups of protesters onto Gothenburg's main shopping street Avenyn, where some of them began smashing windows and burning barricades. Later, the tabloid *Expressen* reflected on this event as activists having "raped" Gothenburg.

At 6:00 p.m., 15–16,000 people gathered on downtown Järntorget square for a demonstration, arranged by *Nätverket Göteborg*, under the slogan "Sweden out of the EU – No to the EMU." The demonstration passed without incident. Two hours later, the radical network Reclaim the City organized a party on another

square in downtown Vasaplatsen. Fascists attempted to provoke fights, and the police surrounded the dancing crowd. Around 9:00 p.m., fights broke out between youth and police. For the first time in the history of the alter-globalization movement in the global North, and for the first time in Sweden since 1931, live ammunition was used against protesters, with three being injured, one almost fatally.

On the second and final day of the summit, people gathered for the concluding demonstration, organized by *Göteborgsaktionerna* under the slogans "No to the militarization of the EU – No to racism and the development of 'fortress Europe' – No to the constitutionalization of neoliberal policies in the EU – The environment and the public sector are not for sale." Estimates as to the number of participants vary from 9,000 to 20,000. The demonstration was peaceful.

At about 7:00 p.m., people gathered in downtown Gothenburg for a spontaneous protest against police violence. The police surrounded the demonstrators and anyone else who happened to be on the square, keeping them there until midnight and detaining many. During this time the national SWAT team stormed Schillerska high school (another sleeping space for activists) with automatic weapons, ostensibly searching for an armed German terrorist who was purported to have sworn revenge against the police. Seventy-eight activists were forced to lie on the cold, wet school yard for hours. The "German terrorist" was never found.

Aftermath

Riotous politics have been described as "moments of excess" by the Free Association (2004), or as "moments of madness" by Zolberg (1972). If the latter description is accurate, then the Gothenburg riots were, for standards prevailing in Sweden at the time, full-fledged insanity, transforming not only the individuals involved in the events, but shaking to the core the very foundations of Swedish social democracy. Gothenburg changed the way Swedish society understood itself: before, in the words of Anders Svensson, a local organizer of the protests, the hegemonic mainstream of Swedish society liked to represent itself as a consensual "people's home" "where people never quarrel, never engage in violence and never, never demonstrate." This narrative now had to be rewritten. After

Gothenburg, many writers – from the daily press to academics, from the governmental Committee for Psychological Defense to novelists – pointed out that the country was not “itself” anymore, that the dominant representation of a society at peace with itself had been ruptured by the events of Gothenburg, that Gothenburg constituted a national trauma.

Had it been only for the riots, *Göteborgshändelserna* might not have had this much of an impact. The mainstream of Swedish society might have been able to content itself with the idea that the riots were merely the work of hooligans, drunkards, and foreigners belonging to the “traveling anarchist circus” that parts of the alter-globalization movement were being represented as at the time. However, in the months following the riots, media images began to emerge that proved that the police, who had shot and nearly killed a demonstrator, had not acted in self-defense. The High Court then ruled that it was the actions of the police on Thursday that triggered the riots, and the local police commander was indicted for violations of demonstrators’ basic rights. Indeed, in the legal aftermath of the riots, more and more evidence emerged of wrongdoing on the part of the Swedish police, and questions arose about the degree of influence that the US secret service had on the strategy of the Swedish police. With all of that it became clear that Sweden had lost some of its innocence. Sweden, like all other societies, was beset by internal conflicts that at times could turn violent, and the state, so often seen as the benevolent father in the “people’s home,” was capable of doing wrong.

To be sure, the riots in Gothenburg were events whose impact was also felt outside of Sweden. A few weeks afterwards, a conference of European interior ministers met to draw lessons from the policing of Gothenburg, lessons that were then applied to great effect by the Italian police at the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa. In that sense, Gothenburg can be seen as a trial run for the attack on the social body of the movement that was executed in Genoa. It has also become an important reference point for activists in the alter-globalization movement in Scandinavia and beyond (though primarily in Northern Europe), where it has become part of a chain of events that is invoked to refer to the heroic phase of the movement. Nonetheless, the riots had their main impacts in Sweden, where they can

be said to have contributed, like all the major summit protests, to the end of the end of history, not only that neoliberal end of history declared with much fanfare by Francis Fukuyama in 1989, but also the much more subtle end of history imposed by the corporatist hegemony of Swedish social democracy.

SEE ALSO: G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; Global Day of Action Against Capitalism, June 18 (J18), 1999; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999

References and Suggested Readings

- Free Association (2004) *Moments of Excess*. Leeds: Leeds Mayday Group. Available at www.nadir.org.uk/Resources/Moments_of_Excess.pdf (downloaded April 15, 2005).
- Fukuyama, F. (n.d.) The End of History? *The National Interest* 16. Available at www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm (downloaded September 19, 2006).
- Joseffson, D. & Quistbergh, F. (2001) Dagarna som skakade Sverige. *Ordfront* 9.
- Mueller, T. (2004) What’s Really Under Those Cobblestones? Riots as Political Tools, and the Case of Gothenburg 2001. *Ephemera* 4 (2): 135–51.
- Ryner, M. (2002) *Capitalist Restructuring, Globalization and the Third Way: Lessons from the Swedish Model*. London: Routledge.
- Wijk, E. (Ed.) (2002) *Göteborgskravallerna och Processerna*. Stockholm: Manifest.
- Zolberg, A. (1972) Moments of Madness. *Politics and Society* 2 (2).

Evers, Medgar (1925–1963)

Thomas Edge

Medgar Wiley Evers typified the black grassroots leadership that made the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s possible. He was born on July 2, 1925, in Decatur, Mississippi. In 1943, Evers dropped out of high school and, lying about his age, joined his older brother Charles in the United States Army. After serving a tour in Europe, he returned to Mississippi, finished high school, and enrolled in Alcorn College. Evers faced harsh opposition when he attempted to vote on his twenty-first birthday; he and his brother were met with armed resistance at the courthouse. This episode, along with his experiences in college, strengthened Evers’s desire to challenge Mississippi’s segregated society.

Evers married Myrlie Beasley, an Alcorn student, on Christmas Eve, 1951. The following year, Evers completed his work at Alcorn College and became an insurance salesman. He was also a founding member of the Regional Council of Negro Leadership (RCNL), a local civil rights organization that challenged segregation and voter disenfranchisement in Mississippi. Evers briefly contemplated whether such non-violent tactics could work in his home state and considered armed resistance modeled on the Mau Mau in Kenya. He decided to pursue a non-violent solution to Mississippi's racial problems, but he also upheld the idea of self-defense and prepared for the possibility of violence against himself and his family.

In 1954, Evers applied to the University of Mississippi Law School, unsuccessfully attempting to become the first black student to matriculate there. Nonplussed, Evers became more active in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), serving as the group's first field secretary for the state of Mississippi, beginning in 1954. The following year, Evers helped make the murder of 14-year-old Emmett Till a national *cause célèbre*. Between 1955 and 1963, Evers developed a growing national reputation for his investigations of racial violence, his work to expose the physical and economic threats to members of the Mississippi NAACP, and his role in securing the admission of James Meredith to the University of Mississippi in 1962.

This increased visibility brought several attempts on his life in 1963, including the firebombing of his home on May 28. In the early morning of June 12, 1963, Evers was shot and killed in his driveway by a white supremacist, Byron De La Beckwith. He was buried in Arlington National Cemetery with full military honors and posthumously received the Spingarn Medal, the NAACP's highest honor. His assassin was tried twice in 1964; both trials ended with deadlocked juries. Beckwith was retried in the 1990s and found guilty of murder on February 5, 1994.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States: Overview

References and Suggested Readings

Dittmer, J. (1995) *Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Evers, M., with Peters, W. (1967) *For Us, the Living*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Evers-Williams, M. & Marable, M. (Eds.) (2005) *The Autobiography of Medgar Evers: A Hero's Life and Legacy Revealed Through His Writings, Letters, and Speeches*. New York: Basic Civitas Books.

Ezeiza Protest and Massacre, 1973

Alejandro Horowicz

The Ezeiza Protest and Massacre occurred on June 20, 1973, when Argentine anti-communist terrorist snipers attacked a crowd of over 2 million people who had assembled near the Buenos Aires airport as Juan Perón returned from nearly two decades in exile in Spain. The attacks, according to official figures, resulted in 13 deaths and more than 300 wounded, but those who were present at the massacre and prominent newspaper sources claim that the number was much higher. The event marked the bloody and tragic downturn of Juan Perón's politically bifurcated but devoted party (comprised largely of an unlikely alliance of leftist and right-wing Peronistas), as well as the beginning of what became known as Argentina's Dirty War.

The snipers who committed the atrocity belonged to a right-wing terrorist group called the Triple A, which stood for the Argentine Anti-communist Alliance, of which José López Rega, Juan Perón's personal secretary, was a founder. The Triple A snipers, standing alongside members of various ultra-right wing associations on a tribune prepared for Juan Perón, fired into the predominantly left-wing crowd assembled to celebrate Perón's return. Among those present, and of course targeted by the Triple A, were members of the Montoneros, a left-wing Peronist guerilla group, and the Peronist Youth. The attack was intended to facilitate the removal of President Héctor Cámpora, a center-left Peronist deemed a threat to the right-wing Peronist groups; during his time in power large numbers of workers' struggles, strikes, and factory occupations had moved public opinion in the workers' favor and resulted in some granting of workers' demands. Less than one month after the massacre, Cámpora resigned and Perón once again took power.

The leadership of the movement that congregated in the woods surrounding the Ezeiza

airport remains in dispute. The events in Ezeiza staged a confrontation between the weakened, bureaucratic trade-unionist Peronism – captured by TV cameras in the official platform through the images of older men wearing dark glasses and combat firearms, shouting vociferously into the crowd – and a new, protean third Peronism that was maturing in 1973. Disastrous leadership errors produced a disastrous outcome for the popular movement. The Montonero movement envisioned June 20 as a celebration previously denied to them by the repressive Lanusse regime; they had envisioned a jubilee day instead of a decisive moment of confrontation.

In the months leading up to the Ezeiza Massacre, several intertwining events and political influences gave rise to this political situation. First, President General Lanusse failed to unify growing opposition to Juan Perón, losing the opportunity to coordinate efforts to prevent his return from exile. Second, General Domingo Perón realigned his own political forces with the goal of displacing Lanusse from presidential power with the return of Juan Perón, setting into motion potentially destructive political forces. Through supplanting Lanusse, and orchestrating the electoral victory of the pro-Peronist FREJULI coalition on March 11, 1973, the third factor not only slowed progress in developing a unified political opposition to the growing presence of the Argentine military, but also strengthened the power of advocates of government repression over the radicalizing working class. The night after Peronist President Héctor J. Cámpora assumed office, on May 25 a popular mobilization demonstrated the influence of the leftist Movement Peronista Montonero, which advocated a populist government oriented toward the working class. Cámpora's government, pressured by popular forces, was compelled to release political prisoners incarcerated in Villa Devoto before Congress could pass an amnesty law.

Finally, in a single movement, that night, all militants were set free, followed by a rushed agreement of the new parliament. The political repression under Lanusse further intensified political dissent. The Montonero movement and those on the political left who considered a Peronist victory as the basis for expanded working-class power were extraordinarily disappointed with the emergence of a new regime with a sharply expanded military that was wielded against supporters of democracy and equality. At no time in

modern Argentinean history prior to 1973 had popular forces achieved so great an influence over society.

The true question was if a popular mobilization of proportions never seen before in Argentine history could break the narrow limits of the political proscription set by the 1955 Argentinean *Revolución Libertadora*, or whether the masses would be pushed out of the scene of history, reducing the confrontation to formal political machinations inside the walls of Congress. It is a matter of deciding whether Perón would access the presidency through a victorious political revolution, overcoming democratically insufficient elections, or if he would distance himself from the dynamics of political and social struggles to avoid collective antagonism.

Perón believed in his chances to reconstitute the kind of authoritarian power that he knew well, through which he had governed Argentina during his first two terms from 1946 to 1955. That was also the view of President Lanusse, as well as the anti-Peronist military. Otherwise, he would have to become the bourgeois leader of radically mobilized popular sectors of Argentine society.

The spontaneous dynamics of the movement in support of socialism and popular democracy, triggered by the logic of previous confrontations, pushed for a radical path. Montoneros supported that dynamic without taking into account the repressive character of Perón's leadership and the despotic character of the political and military coterie seeking to reestablish that leadership. Therefore, the Montoneros failed to recognize that spontaneous popular mobilization could single-handedly resolve the crisis. While Perón was prohibited from running for office on March 11, 1973, the election of Héctor Cámpora, his putative leftist surrogate, emboldened popular forces to mobilize for greater democratic rights. When Juan Perón returned from 18 years of exile in Spain on June 20, 1973, the Montoneros renounced Argentina's political leadership without explicitly demanding their resignation. From their perspective, Perón himself would honor the (radical) project through supporting Cámpora. For Montoneros, the project was still "*Cámpora al gobierno, Perón al Poder*" (Cámpora to the government, Perón to power), the political slogan of the March 1973 electoral campaign. The Montoneros seemed to suggest "Perón to the government, the masses to power." But they

did not recognize the constellation of political opposition to the socialist left that was willing to prevent the rise of a democratic Argentina.

The logic of a disarmed, peaceful mobilization demanded the absence of an armed antagonistic opponent. Their physical coincidence in the woods of Ezeiza on June 20 could only mean violent confrontation. The failure to anticipate these political-military dimensions meant that Montenoros could not comprehend the scope of opposition. The result was massacre and disappearances by the grouping of antagonistic Peronist factions.

Only by acknowledging the proscriptive character of the March 11, 2003 elections and upholding the democratic right of the majority to designate candidates of their choice, only breaking Lanusse's proscription of not allowing Perón to run and promoting a superior political solution – Perón emerging as president by direct popular mobilization – could the spontaneous dynamics of the popular movement have established adequate political limits between those representing the second and third Peronism.

The government unavoidably fell on March 11; the only question was whether the new regime would serve as a step in the revolutionary rise

of the masses or represent the unsurpassable limit. It was not just a question of defending an abstract "Socialist Motherland," but of reorganizing to assure effective popular sovereignty and a democratic form of revolutionary socialism. The permanent struggle for direct democracy reorganized the highly popular field from the inside; the nature of the new government was determined by the political machinations within its organization. No one considered that June 20, 1973 would represent the foundation of historical defeat through the massacre in the woods near Ezeiza Airport.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Armed Struggle and Guerilla Organizations, 1960s–1970s; Argentina, General Strike, 1975; Argentina, Grassroots Workers' Movement: Villa Constitución, 1975; Peronist Resistance

References and Suggested Readings

- Hodges, D. C. (1976) *Argentina 1943–1976: The National Revolution and Resistance*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Moyano, M. J. (1995) *Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle 1969–1979*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Verbitsky, H. (1985) *Ezeiza*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Contrapunto.

F

Fahd, Yusuf Salman Yusuf (1901–1949)

Johan Franzén

Fahd, whose real name was Yusuf Salman Yusuf, led the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) from 1941 until his death in 1949. Fahd devoted his life to the Iraqi national movement and has generally been credited with transforming the ICP from a small party of urban intellectuals in the beginning of the 1940s to a well-oiled oppositional party. He was born in Baghdad on June 19, 1901, but when he was 7 years old, the family moved to Basra. He enrolled at the American Mission School at al-'Ashshar at age 13, but was unable to finish because his father became ill and was unable to pay his tuition. Fahd then had to take up employment to support the family, working as a clerk with the British occupational forces at Basra.

After the 1920 revolt against the British, Fahd began to feel a sense of nationalism. In 1927, Fahd met Pyotr Vasili, an Assyrian from Tiflis (Tbilisi) in Georgia, who two years earlier secretly entered Iraq to travel around the country spreading revolutionary ideas. Vasili was also an undercover emissary for the Communist International (Comintern). The meeting proved decisive in Fahd's life. Soon after he traveled to Khuzestan, Kuwait, Syria, and Palestine. In June 1930, he returned to Iraq after hearing that an Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was to be signed, and a year later he became involved in strikes protesting new municipal taxes that resulted from the treaty.

Simultaneously, communist ideas had been spreading in Baghdad and through the independent south. By November 1933, after Ja'far Abu al-Timman and his al-Hizb al-Watani (National Party) decided to withdraw from public life, the communists, who had used his party as a legal vehicle for their ideas, were suddenly without

a platform. From 1933 to 1935 a current of Iraqi communism in Baghdad and the south produced the Iraqi Communist Party.

In February 1935, Fahd left for the Soviet Union to receive training in revolutionary theory and practice at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV) in Moscow. Little is known about his time in the Soviet Union, which lasted until the summer of 1937. However, there is some speculation that before returning to Iraq at the end of January 1938, Fahd may have served as an emissary for the Comintern in Western Europe.

When he returned to Iraq, Fahd found the new Communist Party in a shambles, ruined by an extensive police operation. The party had been taken over by 'Abdullah Mas'ud. Fahd and Mas'ud differed in opinion as to how the party should be run. In 1941, Mas'ud was arrested and the leadership fell to Fahd. From 1941 to 1946, Fahd transformed the small party of bickering intellectuals into a party with a mass base. Under Fahd's leadership the party began leading peasant rebellions, workers' strikes, and popular demonstrations. It soon became the most significant political force in the country.

On January 18, 1947, Fahd was arrested and sentenced to death. The sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment, but authorities learned that Fahd was controlling the ICP from prison. He was again sentenced to death on February 10, 1949. This time the sentence was carried out. Fahd and his close associates were hanged in public squares in Baghdad four days later.

SEE ALSO: Iraq, Protest, Rebellion, and Revolution: Overview; Iraq, Revolt of 1920; Salam 'Adel (1924–1963) and the Communist Party, Iraq; *Wathbah* of 1948

References and Suggested Readings

Elliot, M. (1996) *Independent Iraq: British Influence from 1941–1958*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Ismael, T. (2007) *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Iraq*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1911–1984)

Farooq Sulehria

Faiz Ahmed Faiz is to Pakistan what Pablo Neruda is to Chile. Considered one of the greatest Urdu-language poets, Faiz Ahmed Faiz was an avowed Marxist, trade unionist, journalist, and thinker. He never held formal membership in the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP), yet he played an active role in the Progressive Writers Movement, the Progressive Papers Limited, and the Pakistan Trade Union Federation, and was incarcerated for his alleged role in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case.

Faiz was born on February 13, 1911 in the village Kala Qadir, in the district of Sialkot in the Punjab. He was educated at Murray College, Sialkot, and Government College, Lahore, receiving his master's degree in English literature from Government College in 1932, and a master's degree in Arabic from Oriental College, Lahore the next year. He took up a job at Muhammedan Anglo Oriental College, Amritsar in 1935 and moved to Hailey College of Commerce in 1940. A year later he married British-born Alys George, who was also a poet and human rights activist. In 1942 their first daughter Salima was born, and in 1945 their other daughter Moneeza. During this time Faiz became active in the Progressive Writers Movement, which was founded in 1936.

As Moscow supported the Allies during World War II, the Communist Party of India also extended cooperation to British rule. Faiz joined the army as a captain in 1942, and worked in the Department of Public Relations. He was subsequently promoted to the rank of colonel. In 1947 he moved to Lahore and took over as the editor of the *Pakistan Times*, a periodical that would play an important role in agitating for the independence of India-Pakistan. Later, he became chief editor for *Imroz* and *Lail-o-Nehar*, and worked in this capacity until 1958.

Faiz was elected vice president of the Pakistan Trade Union Movement in 1951, and was president of the Postal Employees Union. He was

also on the Labor Advisory Committee of the Punjab provincial government from 1947 until 1951, when he was arrested in connection with Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case and sentenced to four years imprisonment. It was during this time that Faiz wrote some of his most famous poetry. When the first military dictatorship was imposed in 1958, he was again arrested and imprisoned for several months. On his release he was appointed secretary of the Pakistan Arts Council. In 1962 Faiz went to Moscow to receive the Lenin Peace Prize. In 1964 he joined a private college as the principal and stayed in Karachi until 1972 working with the college and the Karachi Arts Council.

During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, controversy over his anti-war poems such as "The Festival of Bloodshed" and "The Dust of Hatred in My Eyes" forced him to go into hiding. When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan Peoples Party took over as the first elected prime minister, he invited Faiz to join his government. Faiz became an advisor on cultural affairs and founded the Pakistan National Council of Arts and Folk Arts (renamed as National Institute of Folk Heritage). In 1977, when military forces removed Bhutto and a new dictatorship was imposed, Faiz went into exile in Beirut and became the editor of the Afro-Asian literary quarterly *Lotus*. Faiz ended his exile and returned to Lahore in 1984, and died the same year on November 19.

His poetry collections were published as collected works, first in London as *Saarey Sukhan Hamare* (1982) and later in Lahore as *Nuskha Haiye Wafa* (1984). His prose writing includes *Meezan* (literary essays), *Saleebain Mere Dareeche Main* (letters), *Muta e Loh-o-Qalam* (editorials), *Mah-o-saal-e-Ashnai* (travelogue), *Safarnama Cuba* (Cuban travelogue), and *Culture and Identity* (posthumous compilation of his English-language selected writings). Faiz's lyrical poems of love and revolution have been translated into many languages and have been performed by renowned singers. Playing his songs and reciting his poems at political, cultural, and trade union meetings is part of the political culture in Pakistan. Faiz's verses are part and parcel of political literature, from journalistic pieces to leaflets and posters.

SEE ALSO: Jalib, Habib (1928–1993); Pakistan, Protest and Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Faiz, F. A. (1984) *Nuskha Haiye Wafa*. Lahore: Maktba e Karwan.
- Majeed, S. (Ed.) (2005) *Culture and Identity: Selected English Writings of Faiz*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Fanelli, Giuseppe (1826–1877)

Niall Whelehan

Giuseppe Fanelli was an Italian revolutionary born in Naples. He is best remembered for introducing Mikhail Bakunin's anarchistic ideas to Spain in 1868. His life was one of constant revolutionary agitation that passed through nationalist, republican, and anarchist stages.

Fanelli's revolutionary career began with membership of Mazzini's *Young Italy* and involvement in the 1848 revolutions, when he fought in the Milan insurrection. After the defeat of the 1849 Roman Republic, he became friends with fellow Neapolitan Carlo Pisacane, who proved to be an important influence on Fanelli's ideological development. In 1857 they collaborated on the ill-fated expedition to Sapri. Convinced that a social, as well as national, revolution was necessary to liberate Italy, Pisacane sought to provoke an uprising in the *Mezzogiorno* by providing a revolutionary "spark" that would ignite popular unrest. Fanelli, Pisacane, and a small group of poorly armed volunteers landed at Sapri, Campania but failed to stir up revolt. Fanelli escaped only with difficulty while Pisacane, along with several of the volunteers, died at the scene. However, this episode did not dampen Fanelli's commitment to revolutionary action: three years later he was again involved in an attempt to stir revolt, this time with Garibaldi and the Thousand in Sicily. In 1863 he fought with nationalist insurgents in Poland against the Tsar.

Fanelli was a mason and collaborated with Mazzini but their relationship soon became strained due to the arrival of Bakunin in Italy in 1864. Fanelli found that he shared the Russian's ideas on revolutionary action and the social question, and sympathized with his internationalism. The men became firm friends. By the late 1860s Fanelli had become estranged from

Mazzini and displayed increasingly anarchistic leanings; nonetheless, his ideological position remained ambiguous. Fanelli sat as a deputy for Monopoli, Puglia in the Italian parliament from 1865 to 1874, and fought with Garibaldi in the Austrian War of 1866 and again during the following year.

The failure to capture Rome in 1867 concluded Fanelli's faith in national revolution. He became a key figure in a new libertarian movement and agitated through the *Alleanza della Democrazia Socialista*, which embraced Bakunin's collectivism over communism, spontaneous organization, and demanded the abolition of the state. In keeping with the organization's internationalism, it was decided to send an agent to Spain in order to capitalize on Isabel II's fall from power. In November 1868 Fanelli arrived in Spain and began the work of organizing sections of the IWA along Bakuninist lines. Despite the presence of Marx's agent Lafargue in Spain at the time, Fanelli's trip was successful and he undoubtedly played a crucial role in the birth of Spanish anarchism.

Although often in the shadow of Bakunin, Fanelli's activities were instrumental to the emergence of Italian anarchism. Carlo Cafiero, who had been Engels' agent in Italy, became an anarchist in large part due to his conversations with Fanelli. The *Federazione Operaia Napoletana*, organized by Fanelli, introduced a new generation of radicals, among them Cafiero, Errico Malatesta, and Carmelo Palladino, to anarchism, while his presence was an inspiration to the 1874 anarchist uprising. His life provided a bridge between the Risorgimento idealism of Pisacane and the anarchism of the IWA, while his belief that revolution should destroy and not seize power has always remained a central tenet of both Italian and Spanish anarchism.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Italy; Anarchism, Spain; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Italian Risorgimento; Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–1872)

References and Suggested Readings

- Drake, R. (2003) *Apostles and Agitators: Italy's Marxist Revolutionary Tradition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Guérin, D. (1999) *Ni diu ni maître, anthologie de l'anarchisme*, Vol. 1. Paris: La Découverte.

Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961)

Rhayn Garrick Jooste

Frantz Fanon was a radical psychologist and revolutionary writer whose books exposed European imperialism, elucidated the psychopathology of colonization, and influenced radical social movements throughout the world from the 1960s on. He advocated for decolonization, Pan-African unity, and revolutionary transformation of colonial societies. In his most popular and influential book, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon famously argued that “Violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.”

Fanon was born in Martinique, a French colony in the Caribbean, in 1925. Although he was the fifth of eight children born to a lower-middle-class family, he was able to attend the Lycée Schoelcher, a prestigious high school that was at the same time typical of the colonial school system: students were taught European values at odds with the social reality of Martinique, which entailed a colonial class structure based on a hierarchy of skin color. At the Lycée, Fanon was a student of Aimé Césaire (1913–2008), architect of the concept of Négritude (black consciousness), which he would later in life reject due to its non-economic analysis of the social position of blacks and its acquiescence to colonial repression: the idea that it was possible to be black and proud in the social structure of the day, as opposed to the idea that revolution was necessary to free blacks from colonial repression.

During World War II, Martinique was occupied by pro-Nazi Vichy French naval troops. Angered by the racist abuse of the Martiniquan people at the hands of the troops, Fanon escaped to join the Free French Forces (French soldiers who continued to fight the Axis Powers after the fall of France to the Nazis), and eventually volunteered to fight for the Allied Powers in Europe.

In 1946 Fanon took advantage of a veteran’s scholarship and decided to study psychiatry in Lyons, where he was further exposed to the institutional racism of French society, as well

as white elitism. These experiences influenced *Peau noire, masques blancs* (1952; *Black Skin, White Masks*), in which he drew upon phenomenology, Négritude, psychiatry, and his own disorienting experiences as a French black man to explore the modern experience of living within society, yet on its fringes; it is an idiosyncratic work that combines biography and philosophy, functioning as both an analysis and a manifesto.

In 1953 Fanon accepted a *médecin-chef* post at Blida-Joinville Hospital in Algiers where he desegregated the wards and co-authored six papers that outlined a more humanistic approach to psychiatric medicine – an outlook that significantly changed with his experiences in the French–Algerian War (1954–62). Although a champion of the Algerian cause at the onset of the war, Fanon formally resigned from the Blida-Joinville Hospital in 1956 to fully devote himself to the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). Before his departure from the hospital, Fanon trained FLN *guerilleros* in battlefield medicine, as well as psychological defense against torture. Drawing upon his experiences in World War II and at the Blida-Joinville Hospital, Fanon helped victims and torturers alike; his notes on these cases are invaluable for understanding the effect of war on the human psyche. Soon after his resignation, Fanon was forced into exile in Tunisia, where he worked more openly with the FLN and published several articles on the FLN for various newspapers and journals. In Tunisia, he continued to work as a psychiatrist and lecturer, as well as contributing to the FLN paper *El Moudjahid*. Fanon became the chief theoretician for the struggle after publishing his damning account, *L’An V de la révolution algérienne* (1959; *Year 5 of the Algerian Revolution*), a study of the Algerian revolution, including his thoughts on nationalism, which he articulated as a will to be Algerian, not just a birthright. The book was banned in France and Fanon became the target of various assassination attempts, one of which left him permanently injured. Despite this, he championed the Pan-African revolutionary cause at conferences and in papers, becoming the Algerian ambassador to Ghana and using his position to support the FLN.

During his time in Ghana, Fanon developed leukemia. Even though his health was failing he set about writing his most publicized work, *Les*

Damnés de la Terre (1961; *The Wretched of the Earth*), an iconic indictment of colonialism that influenced revolutionaries as diverse as Steve Biko (1946–77) and Che Guevara (1928–67). Using a Marxist framework, *The Wretched of the Earth* meditates on the power of colonized peoples living on the margins of industrial society to make a revolution, and, more controversially, discusses the importance of violence in achieving liberation – as expounded by Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80) in the book’s introduction. Fanon died of double pneumonia on December 6, 1961. His body was returned, not to Martinique, but to Algeria, where he was buried with full honors.

SEE ALSO: Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962; Césaire, Aimé (1913–2008); Francophone Africa, Protest and Independence; Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967); Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–1980)

References and Suggested Readings

- Adi, H. & Sherwood, M. (2003) *Pan-African History: Political Figures and the Diaspora since 1787*. New York: Routledge.
- Bulhan, H. A. (1985) *Frantz Fanon and the Psychology of Oppression*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Fanon, F. (1986) *Black Skin, White Masks*. London: Pluto Press.
- Fanon, F. (2004) *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Atlantic.
- Gordon, L. R., Sharpley-Whiting, T. D., & White, R. T. (1996) *Fanon: A Critical Reader*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Macey, D. (2000) *Frantz Fanon: A Life*. London: Granta.

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)

Joaquín M. Chávez

The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) was founded in October 1980 by the Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces (FPL–Farabundo Martí), the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), the National Resistance (RN), the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC), and the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS). Between 1980 and 1991 the FMLN fought a revolutionary war against counterinsurgent regimes firmly backed

by two consecutive US administrations under Ronald Reagan. On January 16, 1992 the FMLN and the government of Alfredo F. Cristiani, a leader of the right-wing party ARENA, signed a peace accord that put an end to the civil war. As a result of the peace process the FMLN became a legal political party in 1993 and remains to this day the main opposition party in El Salvador.

The FMLN is named after Agustín Farabundo Martí (1893–1932), a leading founder of the Salvadoran Communist Party, who in 1932 was a strategist in a mass peasant insurgency. The Salvadoran military captured and executed Martí in January 1932 as it crushed the rebellion, popularly known as *La Matanza* (the Massacre). An estimated 30,000 Salvadoran peasants, primarily of indigenous descent, were massacred by government forces in retribution for the uprising.

The historical roots of the Salvadoran civil war can be traced to four decades of oligarchic-military rule (1932–79) and to the abysmal social inequalities that characterized Salvadoran society at this time. The immediate causes of the conflict are often linked to the escalating levels of state repression and electoral frauds perpetrated by the military dictatorship during the presidential elections of 1972 and 1977, which mobilized and united a wide array of social and political forces, including large segments of the Catholic Church that formed the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) in 1980. The FDR was the main political ally of the FMLN during the civil war. The FDR-FMLN alliance formulated a joint political program that embodied the political and diplomatic representation of the Salvadoran revolution.

In the 1960s the Salvadoran left made several fleeting attempts to initiate armed struggle against the military-oligarchic regimes headed by the Party of National Conciliation (PCN). The PCS created the United Front of Revolutionary Action (FUAR) between 1961 and 1963, a militant semi-clandestine organization, in the aftermath of a massacre perpetrated by the National Guard in downtown San Salvador on January 25, 1961 during the coup that overthrew the Civic-Military Junta that ousted dictator José María Lemus in October 1960. In the late 1960s university students also formed a short-lived armed organization named *Acción Revolucionaria Salvadoreña* (Salvadoran Revolutionary Action) (ARS). However, the direct predecessors of the FMLN were the FPL–Farabundo Martí, founded in 1970 by

a dissident faction of the PCS led by Salvador Cayetano Carpio and university intellectuals; and the ERP, formed in 1972 by youth from the Christian Democrat Party, members of the Juventud Comunista (Young Communists), members of a left university student organization known as El Grupo (the Group). A splinter group of the ERP founded the RN in 1975 after a militaristic faction of the ERP assassinated Salvadoran poet Roque Dalton in May of that same year. The PRTC was formed in 1976 by ex-members of the initial nuclei of the ERP that constituted the Organización Revolucionaria de los Trabajadores (Revolutionary Workers' Organization) (ORT) between 1973 and 1974 and members of unions influenced by the PCS. The PCS pursued reformist politics during most of the 1970s by participating in electoral processes through its legal front the Unión Democrática Nacionalista (Democratic Nationalist Union) (UDN), which along with the Christian Democrat Party (PDC) and the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), a social democrat party, formed the National Opposition Union (UNO) in 1972. UNO was the only coalition of communists, Christian democrats, and social democrats that emerged during the Cold War years in Latin America which actually won two consecutive presidential elections (in 1972 and 1977). The PCS withdrew from electoral politics and engaged in armed struggle after the government of Arturo A. Molina rigged the presidential election of 1977 and massacred UNO supporters in downtown San Salvador on February 28, 1977.

University students and former members of the PCS and the PDC made up most of the initial cadre of the Salvadoran guerillas in the early 1970s. However, during the 1970s the politico-military organizations gained substantial support among peasants, high school and university students, teachers, workers, and other marginalized urban sectors. A new approach on the role of religion and politics adopted by the politico-military organizations, particularly by the FPL and the ERP, allowed the confluence between the new armed left and sectors of the Catholic Church influenced by liberation theology. During the 1970s, potent social organizations influenced by the politico-military organizations emerged in El Salvador to pose an unprecedented challenge to the Salvadoran regime. The United Popular Action Front (FAPU) was founded in 1974 under the influence of the RN; the Popular Revolu-

tionary Bloc (BPR) was formed in 1975 by FPL sympathizers; the ERP formed the February 28 Popular Leagues in 1977; and the PRTC founded the Popular Liberation Movement (MLP) in 1979. The PCS transformed its electoral party, the UDN, into a mass popular organization in the late 1970s.

The Salvadoran left remained acutely divided during most of the 1970s. Political, ideological, strategic, and tactical differences were often aired in heated debates among leaders and activists of the popular organizations in the city and the countryside. While the ERP and the RN advocated an insurrectionary strategy, the FPL formulated a Vietnamese-inspired prolonged people's war strategy, and the PRTC articulated a Central American revolutionary strategy. Politico-military organizations were also critical of the PCS's continued adherence to reformism and electoral politics in the 1970s. In turn, the PCS deemed the politico-military organizations' strategies and tactics an expression of leftist petit-bourgeois extremism.

The left sought to unify its strategy and program between 1979 and 1980 to gain coherence and strength in view of the rapid pace of political events both in El Salvador and in the region. In July 1979 the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) ousted dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua and formed a revolutionary government. In October 1979 a group of reformist military known as the Military Youth staged a coup against President Carlos H. Romero with the tacit support of the Jimmy Carter administration and formed a short-lived Junta, in a last-ditch attempt to avert revolution in El Salvador. The left response to the coup was non-consensual. While progressive Christian Democrats and social democrats joined the Junta, the ERP launched a failed insurrection in San Salvador and the FPL denounced the coup as an imperialist plot to contain revolution. Within months, right-wing military displaced the reformist members of the Junta and intensified state terror as the security forces, the army, and state agents operating as death squads massacred approximately 30,000 civilians, purported members or supporters of the left, between 1979 and 1983. *The Truth Commission Report for El Salvador* signals that 75 percent of reported human rights violations perpetrated during the Salvadoran conflict actually occurred between 1980 and 1984. In this political climate

top commanders of the politico-military organizations created the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) on May 22, 1980, which was the immediate precursor of the FMLN. In January 1980 the left social movements funded the Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses (CRM). The CRM joined a large coalition named Democratic Front (FD) founded in April 1980, by the MNR, the Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC), a splinter faction of the PDC, professionals and technicians, small business organizations, six unions and union federations, and a student association, the University of El Salvador, with the Central American University (UCA) and the Catholic Church as observers. The alliance between the CRM and the FD constituted the FDR.

The FDR-FMLN's first political program was the Democratic Revolutionary Government (GDR) platform. The GDR advocated full respect for human rights, prosecutions against state agents responsible for human rights violations, and the creation of a new popular army with the participation of patriotic military. It also proposed agrarian and urban reform, nationalization of the banking system and foreign trade, tax reform, and a host of measures to redistribute wealth. The GDR platform also included measures to reduce unemployment and promote major reforms in housing, health, education, and culture.

In the early 1980s the FMLN formed a guerilla army made up of regular guerilla battalions, guerilla columns, and militias. FMLN forces operated under a single strategic command, the General Command of the FMLN. In January 1981 the FMLN launched its first strategic offensive of the war that included coordinated attacks on army barracks and the occupation of major cities. Between 1981 and 1983 the FMLN formed large military units, notably the Rafael Arce Zablah Brigade (BRAZ), the Felipe Peña Mendoza Brigade, the Rafael Aguiñada Carranza Battalion, the Luiz Díaz Detachment, and several battalions of the Armed Forces of the National Resistance (FARN). At this time, FMLN forces overran numerous army and security force garrisons across the country and consolidated rearguards in rural areas in the departments of Santa Ana, San Salvador, Chalatenango, Cabañas, Cuscatlán, San Vicente, Usulután, Morazán, San Miguel, and La Unión. Between 1984 and 1988 FMLN guerillas operated in small self-sufficient units to counter the intensification of air war

and the increasing mobility of the SAF. This strategic and tactical adjustment also allowed the expansion of the FMLN's political organization in the countryside.

The FMLN-FDR consistently advocated for a negotiated political solution to the civil war. The FMLN-FDR's Politico-Diplomatic Commission articulated the movement's foreign policy throughout the 1980s and coordinated FMLN-FDR representations in Europe, Latin America, the US, Canada, and elsewhere. The FMLN-FDR produced ten proposals to reach a negotiated solution to the conflict, which were plainly rejected by the military-Christian Democrat government headed by José Napoleón Duarte and by the Reagan administration. Notwithstanding, the Duarte government and the FMLN-FDR conducted a series of meetings in 1984 and 1987 with the mediation of the Salvadoran Catholic Church, which failed to reach a negotiated solution to the war.

Latin American and European governments actively promoted a negotiated settlement to the Central American crisis throughout the 1980s. In August 1981 the governments of Mexico and France first recognized the FDR-FMLN alliance as a legitimate political representative of the Salvadoran people and called for a negotiated settlement of the civil war. After 1981 the FDR-FMLN received official and unofficial recognition from numerous governments, political parties, social movements, and international organizations, including the United Nations, as a legitimate counterpart in the Salvadoran conflict. In 1983 Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, and Colombia promoted a regional negotiated settlement to the Central American crisis through a joint politico-diplomatic initiative known as Contadora. Between 1983 and 1987 Contadora produced several proposals to halt foreign intervention and militarization and to reach a comprehensive political solution to the conflicts in the region.

Drawing on the legacy of Contadora, the Central American Presidents signed the Esquipulas II accord or "The Procedure to Establish a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America" in 1987. President Oscar Arias from Costa Rica is generally credited as the initiator of the Esquipulas II process, which set in motion the pacification of the region. Esquipulas II called for democratization and national dialogue to bring about ceasefires and free and fair elections in Nicaragua,

Guatemala, and El Salvador. It also called on insurgents to lay down arms and to join existing legal frameworks without considering the actual political demands of the revolutionary movements in Guatemala and El Salvador.

In the late 1980s the FMLN gradually modified its initial revolutionary program and accepted the basic principles of liberal democracy. A meeting of the General Command of the FMLN held in May 1988 started a major political-ideological transformation, which resulted in the formulation of a new FMLN doctrine called the Democratic Revolution. The FMLN's revolutionary ideology was reshaped by the dynamics of the negotiation to end the conflict, the electoral participation of its former FDR allies, which formed the Democratic Convergence (CD) in 1987, and by the collapse of the socialist bloc. The program of the democratic revolution contained in different FMLN documents, particularly in the September 4, 1990 *Proclama del FMLN a la Nación* (Manifesto of the FMLN to the Nation), stated the FMLN's willingness to participate in elections, to accept liberal democracy and the market economy, and to end the confrontation with the US government.

The Cristiani government and the FMLN agreed to reinstate negotiation with UN mediation in 1989. Alfredo Cristiani, who was elected president in March 1989, was the first leader of the Salvadoran right who formally called for dialogue and negotiation with the FMLN. Representatives of the Cristiani government and the FMLN first met in Mexico in September 1989 and Costa Rica in October 1989 to discuss possible UN or OAS mediation in the Salvadoran conflict. Notwithstanding, the FMLN closed down the dialogue with Cristiani and launched a major military offensive in November 1989 in response to a surge in death squad attacks against social activists and opposition leaders, particularly the bombing of the headquarters of the National Federation of Unions of the Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS) on October 31. During the November offensive the FMLN occupied major cities, including large segments of San Salvador, and attacked military garrisons throughout the country. Although the FMLN offensive failed to unleash a popular insurrection in San Salvador, largely due to massive aerial attacks against highly populated areas by the Salvadoran air force, it persuaded all actors involved in the Salvadoran conflict of the non-

viability of a military solution and the need to engage in serious negotiation. In December 1989 the FMLN and the Cristiani government formally requested the participation of the secretary general of the UN, Javier Pérez de Cuellar, in a definitive negotiation to end the war. The negotiation between the FMLN and the Cristiani government under the auspices of the UN focused on issues of demilitarization and democratization of society. During the two-year negotiation the parties reached the following partial agreements:

- The Geneva accord (April 1990) established the character and purpose of the negotiation. The purpose of the negotiation was to “end the armed conflict by political means as speedily as possible, promote the democratization of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect of human rights, and reunify Salvadoran society.”
- The Caracas accord (May 1990) set the agenda and the calendar for negotiations.
- The San José I accord (July 1990) was on the protection of human rights and the establishment of a UN human rights mission in El Salvador prior to the end of the conflict.
- The Mexico accord (April 1991) was on demilitarization and constitutional reforms.
- The New York accord (September 1991) was on the integration of FMLN combatants into the National Civilian Police, the formation of the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), a body in charge of monitoring the implementation of the accords, and a “compressed negotiation” to deal with the remaining themes of the negotiation.
- The New York accord Act I (December 1991) was on the cessation of the armed conflict.
- The New York accord Act II (January 1992) announced the finalization of the negotiation agenda, the signing of the official peace accords that same month, and the start of the definitive ceasefire on February 1, 1992.

The peace accords signed in Mexico City on January 16, 1992 aimed at the demilitarization and democratization of Salvadoran society and did not address structural reform of the economy. The peace agreements comprised the following themes: military reform; the creation of a new public security sector; judicial reform; electoral

reform; socioeconomic measures, including a land transfer program and a national reconstruction plan; the political participation of the FMLN; and the cessation of the armed conflict. The FMLN guerrilla army, officially named the National Army for Democracy, was demobilized in 1992 while the government simultaneously demobilized the old security forces and paramilitary forces, reduced the army from 65,000 to 12,000, purged human rights violators from the ranks of the military, and started the implementation of the political reforms. The FMLN transformed into a legal political party in 1993 and participated for the first time in national elections in 1994.

The success of the FMLN insurgency was dependent on its efficacy in bringing together factions into a unified organization. However, internecine conflict caused the various groups to take independent action. By 1994 the factions split to form the coalition Partido Demócrata (PD) – a party that disbanded and realigned with the FMLN in 1995. While the FMLN remains a viable party of leftist political forces, internal conflicts triggered yet another split in 2005 with the formation of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR). While the FMLN has gained control of the legislative assembly since the end of the civil war, the party has failed to win political power in presidential elections.

SEE ALSO: Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS); *La Matanza* 1932 Peasant Revolt; Martí, Farabundo (1893–1932); Romero, Óscar (1917–1980), Archbishop; Salvadoran Civil War, 1980–1991

References and Suggested Readings

- Handal, S. (2006) *Una Guerra para Construir la Paz*. New York: Ocean Sur.
- Montgomery, T. S. (1995) *Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Montobbio, M. (1999) *La Metaformosis del Pulgarcito: Transición Política y Proceso de Paz en El Salvador*. Barcelona: Icaria Antrazyt-FLACSO.
- Samayoa, S. (2002) *El Salvador: La Reforma Pactada*. San Salvador: UCA Editores.
- Wickham-Crowley, T. (1992) *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wood, E. J. (2003) *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army)

Raina Zimmering

FARC, or FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army), is a Colombian Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group which has been working since 1964 to construct a socialist society through armed struggle against the Colombian government. It is Latin America's oldest, largest, and best-equipped guerrilla organization. The main ideological differences between FARC and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), the other major Colombian guerrilla group, are that while FARC has a traditional understanding of taking power and of organizational hegemony and structure, the ELN is more orientated toward people's power and movements. Because of the focus on forceful direct action, 31 states in the world have declared FARC a terrorist organization.

FARC emerged during the period of *La Violencia* that followed the assassination of the charismatic liberal presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948. The period from 1948 to 1963 was marked by violent conflict between the Liberals and Conservatives and between the economic and political elites and the masses. During the violent battles between militias, Liberal and Communist Party followers and independent peasants formed autonomous and independent communities with local self-administration in the border regions south of Bogotá. In the context of attacks by the army, large landowners, and paramilitary groups against these autonomous communities, the first guerrilla organizations were formed.

After the Liberal and Conservative parties joined to create a power bloc known as the National Front in 1957, the guerrillas and autonomous communities took over the role of the opposition. They began by creating a "Southern Bloc" (*Bloque Sur*) in 1964 after the massacre that occurred in Marquetalia in the province of Huila, during which an army of 16,000 soldiers under the direction of US military advisors

fought against 42 peasants, destroying the whole community and displacing the population. The self-defense movement that began as the "Southern Bloc" turned into FARC in 1966. FARC's most famous founder, and its leader until his death in March 2008, was Pedro Antonio Marín, known as Manuel Marulanda or Tirofino (also known as Tirofijo, "sureshot"). In 1982, under the influence of the Nicaraguan Revolution, FARC renamed itself as FARC-EP.

FARC differs from other guerilla organizations in Latin America in that it was founded not to take over state power, but as a self-defense organization. Until the collapse of the socialist countries after 1990, FARC was politically oriented toward Moscow and the Colombian Communist Party and worked to undermine the position of the United States in Colombia. To achieve this aim, it relied upon a combination of military force and parliamentary and governmental negotiations. FARC's long-term goal is the construction of socialism once the appropriate conditions have been achieved.

The organization's structure consists of fronts, each with 60 to 300 militants and covering certain political and military aspects. The fronts have companies with military duties. At the beginning of the 1990s, FARC had 65 different structures. The General Secretary is the highest structure and consists of seven members. After Marulanda's death, Alonso Cano assumed the leadership.

In 1984 FARC, the Maoist Popular Army of Liberation (EPL), and M-19 initiated talks with the government of Belisario Betancur, while the ELN refused to take part in negotiations. FARC and activists in the Communist Party then founded the Patriotic Union (UP) in 1985 to fight for agrarian reform, the annihilation of the national security doctrine, and fundamental democratization. At a time when social movements were proliferating all over the country in the 1980s, UP's presidential candidate, Jaime Pardo Leal, was ranked third in the presidential elections of 1986.

In parallel with its official policy of reconciliation, the Colombian oligarchy engaged in a low-intensity war of systematic extermination of social movements, demobilized guerillas, and the UP, using paramilitary groups and death squads against them. When negotiations with all guerillas failed, new guerilla organizations appeared and FARC resumed armed struggle as the only alternative. In 1987 it joined the National Guerilla Coordination, which consisted mostly of

the M-19, the EPL, and the ELN, and the organization was renamed the Guerilla Coordination Simón Bolívar (CGSB).

The main support for the paramilitaries came from the army, especially Army Intelligence Corps B-2 and the Battalion of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (BINCI, also referred to as the Charry Solano battalion), as well as from the Medellín Cartel, large land and cattle owners, transnational companies, and local politicians. The paramilitaries assassinated 5,000 demobilized guerillas and UP members, including almost all UP functionaries and elected representatives, among them Pardo Leal and Bernardo Jaramillo, the UP's presidential candidates in 1991.

After the Colombian army launched a major offensive known as "Destructor I" against FARC's General Secretary in December 1990, the General Secretary split into various groups and undertook its own major offensive in February 1991, even entering the suburbs of Bogotá, principally in Ciudad Bolívar, where guerilla militias patrolled. FARC also moved its headquarters nearer to Bogotá.

With the taking of the Venezuelan embassy in April 1991, the CGSB (at that time made up of FARC, ELN, and a part of the EPL that had not demobilized) forced the beginning of negotiations with the Colombian government, which took place in Cravo Norte (Dep. Arauca), Caracas (Venezuela), and Tlaxcala (Mexico) between 1991 and 1992. The negotiations led only to vague declarations, since the government sought the complete disarming of the guerillas while the CGSB wanted to find a solution to the social causes of the conflict without demobilizing. In 1993 FARC proposed its "Platform for a Government of Reconstruction and National Reconciliation" as a political solution to the conflict, advocating the abolition of the national security doctrine, an independent judiciary not under government control, a development plan to ensure the protection of national industries, new negotiations with transnational companies concerning the exploration of natural resources, and the rejection of any military solution to the drug problem.

The 1990s represented a period of growth for the guerillas. FARC's military strength was undeniable when it attacked the Colombian military camp in Las Delicias north of the Brazilian border in 1996, inflicting a heavy defeat on the army: the camp was totally destroyed, 70 army personnel were killed, and 70 more captured. The

operation caused a deep political crisis in the Colombian government under President Ernesto Samper. In 1997 FARC managed to force the government to create a demilitarized zone that was used to hand over the prisoners to the International Red Cross.

Other important military operations in the 1990s included the destruction of the army's communication point at Patascoy, the military base of Pavarondo in Urabá, and the elite units near El Billar. FARC took the cities of Miraflores, La Uribe, and Mitú and captured more than 300 soldiers. Strategically, this meant a transformation to a policy of mobile warfare with artillery and troop concentrations like a regular army. In many regions of Colombia, FARC was a political power. More political appreciation for FARC came through the high-level talks between the Conservative candidate Andrés Pastrana Arango and the FARC leaders during the 1998 presidential elections, which aroused popular hopes for peace. FARC affirmed that it intended to transform itself into a political party at some later date, but also declared the possibility of an armed overthrow. At that time FARC included 15,000 to 20,000 combatants, 40 percent of whom were women.

After FARC lost the support of socialist countries after 1990, it had to reorganize its financial base. Its main sources of revenue came from abductions, taxes on coca cultivation, and appropriation of the public budget. In 1998 it carried out more than 2,500 abductions. In the regions it holds, FARC taxes coca cultivation, regulates the market, and protects the coca-producing peasants against the spraying of their fields by the military. The practice of kidnapping and imposing taxes on coca plantations has led to FARC being condemned for human rights violations. It has also been criticized by the revolutionary left for several of its operations. One of the most questionable occurred in March 1999 when a FARC column executed three US Indian rights activists who were falsely accused of being CIA spies.

After the collapse of the peace talks between Pastrana's government and FARC in May 2002, President Álvaro Uribe Velez, elected in August 2002, pursued a strategy of wholesale military attacks against important strategic regions held by FARC. The Plan Colombia and the Policy of National Security financed by the United States to the tune of more than US\$9 billion gave the Colombian army a vast military supremacy,

which it used in massive air attacks against whole regions. FARC turned back to a strategy of guerilla warfare, operating once more in smaller units. In 2003, FARC conducted several violent attacks, including the car bombing of a famous club in Bogotá that killed more than 30 people and wounded another 160.

The Uribe government focused its attention on the military defeat of the guerillas, a policy that has been heavily criticized given the violations of human rights it has led to, and also because a military solution to the conflict is considered impossible by most experts. In March 2008, the Colombian army attacked a FARC camp in neighboring Ecuador with rockets, bombs, and troops. After the bombing Colombian military units entered Ecuadorian territory and assassinated all identified survivors. The attack aimed to kill Raúl Reyes, the FARC leader with responsibility for external relations who was also the contact person for the French and Venezuelan governments in negotiations for the release of hostages. The attack provoked a deep crisis in relations between Colombia and its neighbors, while Colombia's disrespect for international laws was condemned by all Latin American countries.

One month before Reyes was killed, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez had achieved the unconditional release of four FARC hostages. FARC agreed with the Colombian government on a humanitarian exchange of 57 hostages in exchange for 500 FARC members imprisoned in Colombia as a first step to national reconciliation.

SEE ALSO: *Bogotazo* and *La Violencia*; EPL Maoist Guerilla Movement; Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer (1898–1948), UNIR, and Revolutionary Populism in Colombia; M-19 of Colombia; Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s

References and Suggested Readings

- Azzellini, D. & Zelik, R. (1999) *Kolumbien: Große Geschäfte, staatlicher Terror und Aufstandsbewegung*. Cologne: ISP.
- Cadena Montenegro, J. L. (2004) La geografía y el poder. Territorialización del poder en Colombia – el caso de las FARC – de Marquetalia al Caguan. *Estudios Políticos*, January 1.
- Molano, A. & Chomsky, A. (2005) *The Dispossessed: Chronicles of the Desterrados of Colombia*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Ocampo Lopez, J. (1994) *Historia Básica de Colombia*. Bogotá: Plaza & Janés.
- Palacios, M. (2006) *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875–2002*. Raleigh, NC: Duke University Press.

Palacios, M. & Safford, F. (2001) *Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Farm Labor Organizing Committee

Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh

Among the many farm-worker organizations that appeared in the wake of the achievements of the United Farm Workers (UFW), the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC) stands out because of its remarkable longevity and effectiveness. Founded in 1967, the FLOC attempted to organize migrant farm workers in the Midwest. Farms in Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan relied on seasonal farmhands to harvest crops that then were purchased by large processing companies, such as Heinz USA, Vlasic Foods, and the Campbell Soup Company. Most farmhands were Mexican Americans and legal Mexican immigrants who over a year traveled from southern states, especially Florida and Texas, to the Midwest and then back to the South. In the 1980s government investigators in the Midwest reported that migrant farm workers were often housed in rooms without heating and indoor plumbing, and were provided with water contaminated by pesticide runoff.

The FLOC, at first adopting extra-strike tactics pioneered by the UFW, attempted to impose economic pressure on growers through consumer boycotts of growers' produce. The peculiar difficulty the Midwest laborers faced was that growers could not sign contracts for better pay and improved working conditions without incurring wrath from the large processors, who viewed unionization as a blight on productivity. The big processors, citing the danger of unpredictable crop deliveries, refused to sign purchasing contracts with local farms that negotiated with labor unions. The corporations also ordered contracted farmers to mechanize production immediately in order to minimize their reliance on disruptive human beings.

To offset the power of the corporations, the FLOC modified the UFW's standard boycott strategy. The FLOC asked powerful religious and civic organizations, such as the National Conference of Catholic Charities and the American Friends Service Committee, to denounce the

behavior of the processors and to refuse to purchase the processors' products at institutions, such as hospitals and schools, which the religious and civic groups financed. Fears of negative publicity, such as the 1985 press release by the Ohio Catholic Bishops endorsing the FLOC, compelled the processors to allow local growers to sign contracts with the FLOC, with the processors being involved as third parties.

The FLOC's three-party agreements (between the corporate processors, the mid-sized farmers, and the farm laborers) were relatively unique in US farm politics. The agreements may have promoted a modicum of social harmony in the rural Midwest, as independent farmers (in exchange for stable crop contracts from processors) have improved housing, raised wages, and established grievance procedures. In turn, the FLOC has sided with the farmers during the three-way negotiations with processors over the terms of crop purchases. As is true with any union arrangement, the amount of good will and honesty in the negotiation and enforcement of contracts varies from year to year and from locale to locale. Nonetheless, during the last two decades of the twentieth century, the FLOC was arguably the most effective of all farm-worker organizations in defending the interests of migrant laborers.

SEE ALSO: Chávez, César (1927–1993) and the United Farm Workers

References and Suggested Readings

- Barger, W. K. & Rez, E. M. (1994) *The Farm Labor Movement in the Midwest: Social Change and Adaptation among Migrant Farmworkers*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Mooney, P. H. & Majka, T. J. (1995) *Farmers' and Farm Workers' Movements: Social Protest in American Agriculture*. New York: Twayne.

Fascism, protest and revolution

Jeff Rutherford

In a speech given on October 25, 1932, the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, leader of the first fascist state in Europe, proclaimed "the present century is the century of authority, a century of the Right, a Fascist century" (Mazower 1998:

16). With some seventy years of hindsight, this assertion seems merely another example of Mussolini's bombastic rhetoric. To the dictator's contemporaries, however, such pronouncements appeared as statements of truth. Europe, wracked by the material and psychological damage of World War I and the crippling effects of the Great Depression, experienced a fundamental transformation of its political and social landscape during the interwar years. In response to both the failure of liberal democracy to manage effectively the crises of the postwar period and to the rise of communism in the form of the Soviet Union, a third political force arose: fascism.

Declared a "Third Way" between liberalism and socialism by its supporters, fascism was a mass political movement, headed by a strong, charismatic leader, which forcefully advocated violence both to purify its own nation and to claim an empire in the wider world. At its core was an emphasis on integral nationalism: everyone deemed by the state to be either culturally or racially valuable needed to be remolded into individuals who served the collective good of the nation. Those deemed to threaten or harm the community in any way faced banishment or even physical liquidation.

In their attempt to create a "new man," fascists wanted to break down the barriers separating the public from the private, creating a "total" sphere of activism. This alternative program of modernity promised to solve the crises that troubled Europe in the interwar period. By the early 1930s, unabashedly fascist governments ruled in Rome and Berlin while fascist parties sprang up in numerous other European countries, ranging from Iceland to Spain, Romania, France, Great Britain, and Hungary, in hopes of emulating the German and Italian fascists. The diplomatic and military triumphs of the fascist powers, in particular those of Germany, during the late 1930s and early 1940s, seemed to confirm that fascism was indeed the wave of the future.

The strains of war tore apart Fascist Italy and the regime's claim to have implemented a thoroughgoing fascist revolution proved illusory. In the case of Germany, however, the Nazi variant of fascism acted as a much more cohesive force for the German people and provided the necessary motivation to fight to the end. In the end, the eventual triumph of the Western Allies and Soviet Russia exposed

Nazism as a morally bankrupt system predicated on authoritarianism, terror, and genocide. While neo-fascists occasionally emerged in postwar politics, fascism no longer inflamed the passions of Europeans: as a mobilizing ideology, it was a spent force.

During the 1920s and 1930s fascist parties functioned as catch-all organizations, appealing to those disaffected liberals, workers, peasants, and members of the nobility who viewed post-World War I society as a bewildering and alien place. In this respect fascism followed in a long line of European protest movements. Fascism had another side, however, which proved attractive to those who found bourgeois society fundamentally unfit to solve the various crises of modernity plaguing Europe. This revolutionary aspect of fascism promised more radical solutions to these problems and it was this facet of the fascist paradigm that provided the movement with such destructive force during World War II.

Fascism as Protest and Revolution

The Europe that emerged from World War I was in many respects unrecognizable from the continent that entered the conflict. The three venerable monarchies that had dominated Central and Eastern Europe in the form of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires had vanished. Carved out of these multinational states were numerous smaller countries, which, while created on the basis of the dominant national group, still contained significant numbers of ethnic minorities. The Russian Empire was succeeded by the Soviet Union, an initially loose confederation of national states headed by the Bolshevik regime. In a dramatic reversal of thousands of years of European history, the Bolsheviks proclaimed their state to be governed not by the traditional ruling classes of the nobility and the bourgeoisie, but rather by the dictatorship of the proletariat. Seizing power in a *coup d'état* in October 1917 and securing their victory in a bloody four-year civil war, the Bolshevik call for world revolution shook a war-weary Europe to the bones. Bolshevik regimes in Hungary and Munich, despite being short-lived and bloodily repressed, further fueled the fear of the Red Specter.

The dread of a Red Europe manifested itself closer to home as the previously ghettoized socialist parties of pre-1914 Europe now became

important blocs in both the newly established democratic republics of Central and Eastern Europe and in the more stable countries of Western Europe. These parties, while never publicly renouncing their desire for the overthrow of the capitalist system, nevertheless viewed their survival as tied to that of their republic's success, a view shared by much of the general population. Many citizens opposed these parties, both due to their fear of creeping "Bolshevization" as well as due to the association in popular opinion between the socialist parties and defeat in the world war.

World War I's legacy also lingered in the economic sphere. Prior to the war, the primary economic trend in Europe centered on laissez-faire capitalism. States generally allowed business and industry to develop without governmental interference, though some governments, such as the German and Russian, were more intimately involved in the creation of industrial power and commercial wealth. The strains of World War I changed this. Private industry proved unable to produce the necessary material of modern warfare and states became extremely interventionist in determining production schedules, regulating labor relations, and providing for the welfare of their citizens. With the conclusion of the war, states attempted to return to the prewar style of hands-off economic policymaking. In war-ravaged Europe, however, this was no longer possible, neither from a purely economic standpoint nor from the point of view of the common citizen.

Individuals who survived the Great War found many aspects of postwar Europe mystifying. In addition to the numerous political and economic changes caused by the war, the social sphere had also been revolutionized. The gender balance had been decisively altered by fighting. To replace the millions of men who left the factories and fields for the front, women were increasingly drawn into the labor force. As the home fronts became increasingly female, women began exercising their new-found power, whether it was in leading bread riots in Berlin and Petrograd or in challenging the moral standards accepted by polite society. The latter phenomenon only increased in the postwar years, as the millions of dead and mutilated war veterans led to further blurring of gender roles; amputees and shell-shocked men no longer seemed to possess masculine strength that formed the basis of male identity.

All of these changes were grouped under the overarching term "Versailles System." Named after the peace treaty which ended the war between the Western Allies and Germany, the Versailles System included the creation of new national states at the expense of the former monarchies, the establishment of democratic republics with socialist parties enjoying a special prominence, the return to economic laissez faire and a general hands-off attitude to society, tolerance and protection of ethnic minorities, and the social emancipation of women. Tied together by various treaties, economic reparation plans, and the League of Nations, it was this system that engendered the birth of fascism.

Liberalism was linked to the Versailles System and, as such, drew the ire of fascist parties. Fascists viewed liberalism as a tired, worn-out doctrine more suited to the nineteenth century than to dealing with the crises of modernity facing postwar Europe. The enormous sacrifices made by soldiers, workers, and ordinary citizens during the war led these same people to now believe that they had earned the right to participate much more directly in the affairs of their state.

Filled with anger and scorn for the older bourgeois and noble politicians who had sent them to fight and die for no apparent reason, this front-generation believed that their time had now arrived: the bourgeois top-hat of privilege was to be swept aside by the steel helmet of the trenches. This found expression in the various paramilitary units that roamed the streets and the countryside, terrorizing the fascists' anointed enemies. The *squadristi* and the *Sturm Abteilung* (or SA) functioned as the strong-arms of the Italian National Fascist Party (PNF) and the National Socialist German Worker's Party (NSDAP), respectively, brawling with political opponents and generally acting as a disruptive force in the affairs of the state. The younger generation, full of vigor and willing and able for action, constituted the primary support for fascist parties, especially in the years before these parties participated in government.

Such generational thinking also pervaded foreign affairs. London and Paris symbolized the rule of the older liberal ideas. As the British and French states emerged as the prime beneficiaries of the postwar settlement in both political and economic terms, they quickly became the targets of fascist parties. The prevailing liberal view of war

as embodied in the League of Nations Charter also struck fascists as promoting the British and French agenda. For many liberal statesmen, World War I was indeed the war to end all wars. Such a view was reinforced by the 1925 Locarno Treaty, which guaranteed the borders of Western Europe, and the 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact, which renounced war as a possibility to solving international problems.

Though some liberals and many conservatives in Europe did view war as a possibility to revise the peace treaties in their favor, only the fascist parties elevated war to a necessity. The fascists deemed war absolutely imperative for the younger, more vital fascist states to carve out their own empire at the expense of the decadent liberal powers; war was viewed as the necessary lubricant for the wheels of history.

This glorification of violence also found an expression in domestic affairs. Violence was considered not only acceptable but also necessary in purging the national community of outsiders looking to infiltrate it. While the desire for action and camaraderie found numerous adherents in those who had experienced the trenches themselves, it also appealed to those age groups who believed they had “missed out” on joining the fighting due to their young age. This celebration of violence also attracted a not insignificant number of intellectuals who viewed modern war as the proving ground for the “new man.” Here, amid the carnage caused by industrial warfare, a steeled, iron-willed killing machine arose from the trenches, ready to remake bourgeois society.

If violence constituted one major characteristic of fascism, radical nationalism formed a second pillar of the ideology. Here again the results of the war played a decisive role in the formation of fascist thinking. The fact that fascism was most successful in countries that had either lost the war, such as Germany, Austria, and Hungary, or who felt cheated out of their rightful spoils by the British and French, most notably Italy, is certainly of prime importance in explaining the rise of fascism. While nationalists of all political hues, from liberals to conservatives, struggled against the loss of national power in these countries, fascism raised the nation to a much higher pinnacle than any of their political competitors. The nation, much as class operated for the political left, was the prism through which fascists viewed their surroundings. Worshipping at the altar of nationalism, fascists

attempted to construct a new strong state, or in the case of Germany, a racial community, along strict ethnic lines that discarded previous “liberal” notions of individualism, parliamentary procedure, and laissez-faire economics.

In its attempt to create an idealized national community, fascists first needed to purify their states. Anyone deemed an outsider, either ethnically, culturally, or politically, was deemed superfluous and even dangerous to the nation. Here the different cultural and historical trajectories of nations played a major role in the development of the various fascist movements. In general, the “enemy” or “outsider” provided all fascist movements with a bogeyman whose defeat demanded the continual mobilization of the state and its citizens.

In Italy, race was less important than politics, at least up until the invasion of Ethiopia, when the racial superiority of the new Roman Empire was emphasized. Communists and social democrats were the general targets of harassment, beatings, and even death within Fascist Italy. For the National Socialists in Germany, race and politics were frequently intertwined, especially since Bolshevism was equated with Jewry. This more radical variant of fascism called for the purification of Germany by eliminating both the dangerous and lesser foreign “races” in Germany as well as those of the “Aryan race” who were physically or mentally handicapped, who failed to conform to the parameters of the new society, or who actively opposed the fascist state.

In Eastern Europe religion played a much greater role, as highlighted by the Romanian Legion of the Archangel Michael, which integrated the Romanian Orthodox Church into its worldview, and the Croatian Ustaši movement, which paraded its Catholicism against the dominant Orthodox Serbian population in the Yugoslav state. For both of these movements, religion formed the basis of their Manichean outlook and permeated their policies up through World War II.

Individualism was a central component of liberalism: the individual had a value unto himself and his rights were inviolable with the backing of law. Fascism, however, viewed individualism as a threat to the collective nation. Individuals needed to be shorn of the selfishness inherent in the liberal-democratic state and remolded into subjects who viewed their service to the collective as their highest priority. The

law, which formed the basis of liberal bourgeois states, necessitated reformulation so that it emphasized the duties, not the rights, of individuals to the nation. Complementing the sculpting of the “new man” (a topic which will be further addressed below), fascists offered an alternative political system to the democratic republic.

Parliamentary government appeared to fascists as symptomatic of the ills of decadent liberalism. In their view, special interest parties engaged in political horse-trading, concerned only with representing their narrow constituencies at the expense of the nation. The multiplicity of parties led to political deadlock and further aggravated the social and economic ills of postwar Europe. In place of what they believed to be an outmoded system, fascists offered the rule of one man supported by a mass party. Such a formulation greatly differed from traditional liberal practice, in which local notables comprised the basis of the party. Mobilizing the masses struck such men as irresponsible and dangerous. The fascists, however, viewed the masses as necessary to implementing their plans of national renewal. Acting as the spokesman for the “General Will” of the population, the leader (or the Führer or Duce) was simultaneously empowered to govern on behalf of his subjects. This organic connection between ruler and ruled clearly distinguished fascism from its liberal and conservative competitors, if not quite so clearly from Stalin’s Soviet regime. The development of this leadership cult proved an important component of fascism.

Laissez-faire capitalism also struck fascists as completely incapable of dealing with the staggering problems facing postwar Europe. The evils of “plutocratic” and “financier” capitalism thus figured prominently in fascist propaganda. Not only did such a system leave the majority of a nation’s citizens at the mercy of a small caste of financier capitalists, the fascists also believed it generated the class divisions that plagued Europe. These allegedly artificial divisions within society worked against the fascist ideal of unifying the national community.

Fascist economic thinking centered on the withdrawal from the world economy and the creation of an autarchic nation, invulnerable to the whims of the markets and the “plutocrats,” usually identified as Jews, who controlled them. How this was to be achieved, however,

was extremely unclear and, outside of the Italian and British variants, no specific programs were offered. In Italy, the fascist government, building on developments of World War I, attempted to organize its economic system around corporatism, a hierarchical organization of business interests and workers that harkened back to the medieval guilds and their alleged social peace. Under Mussolini, however, the state maintained ultimate control. Sir Oswald Mosley, leader of the British Union of Fascists, developed an even more elaborate economic plan based on corporatism; for this former rising star in the Labour Party, fascism offered the best possibility to salvage the British economy during the Great Depression. These ideas reflected a much more interventionist impulse on the part of fascist movements as opposed to traditional liberal and conservative practices when it came to economic matters.

Scorn for liberalism only increased with the ascension of socialist parties into ruling coalitions following the war. Fascists viewed liberals as too weak and effete to prevent the left from gaining power. This development proved especially abhorrent to fascist parties for several reasons. First, the Marxist view of societies divided by class directly opposed the core fascist goal of unifying the nation along ethnic lines. Policies enacted by leftist parties were seen as favoring one class and therefore harming the nation. Second, the existence of the Communist International, or Comintern, meant that workers’ loyalties were frequently drawn towards an international organization as opposed to their own nation. Third, fascists believed that the leveling inherent in Marxism would produce materialistic drones in which the individual’s will and creativity were completely extinguished. With such human material, the fascist “new man” could never be created.

The final piece of postwar society which engendered fascist protest was the explosive social change taking place within Europe. Of these, fascists believed that the emancipated woman was certainly the most dangerous and troubling. This struck them as merely another example of individualism run amuck. Fascist ideology held that “maternity is the patriotism of women” and those women who placed work above family were sacrificing the needs of the nation in favor of their own selfishness. The three “Ks” of *Kinder, Küche, und Kirche* (children, kitchen, and church) summed up the Nazi attitude towards women and their proper roles in society.

The postwar world, based on liberal principles but heavily influenced by the political left, formed the laboratory in which fascism emerged. A generation reared in war detested the weakness of traditional liberal leaders, whose political education during the nineteenth century left them unable to deal with the various crises facing postwar Europe. In political, economic, social, and cultural affairs, the fascists offered different, more interventionist answers that, while borrowing elements from both the liberal and Marxist positions, diametrically opposed both of these ideologies. In this regard, fascism certainly fits the description of an “anti” party that defined itself by what it was against instead of what it was for. This, however, fails to deal with the revolutionary aspect of fascism, an important ingredient in its political success.

While many aspects of fascist ideology, especially in the social sphere, were reactionary, it also contained a revolutionary streak that attempted to redraw the boundaries between the public and the private, between the state and the individual. It was this revolutionary aspect of fascism that differentiated Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany from reactionary regimes such as Horthy’s Hungary and Franco’s Spain. Though this idea of a totalitarian society was first publicly discussed in Fascist Italy, the increasingly powerful and interventionist state found its most radical fascist development in Nazi Germany, where the regime became heavily involved in determining the most basic of all individual rights: the right to live.

The term “totalitarianism” has come under fire both for its partisan use during the Cold War and for the near impossibility of any government, no matter how repressive, in maintaining total control over society. It does retain validity, however, in describing the goals of fascist regimes. These governments, a fusion of authoritarianism and mass mobilization only possible during the modern age, attempted to rally their citizens and make them participants in a scripted celebration of the nation.

By consistently hammering their message home through propaganda events, including such massive spectacles as the Nuremberg Party Rallies in Germany and the anniversary celebrations of the March on Rome in Italy, as well as through the much more ubiquitous media of poster and pamphlet, fascism tried to create a “new man” who thought and acted “fascist” at

all times. One prominent Italian fascist summarized this as follows: “one cannot be a Fascist in politics . . . and non-Fascist in school, non-Fascist in the family circle, non-Fascist in the workshop.” Hitler declared that “in the struggle for self-preservation which the German people are waging, there are no longer any aspects of life which are non-political” (Mazower 1998: 16, 35). Ferenc Szálasi, leader of the Hungarian Arrow Cross fascist movement, declared that “all aspects of social life [would be] subordinated to the government . . . an active, and brutally realistic statism” (Mann 2004: 246). Fascism called for the subjugation of all aspects of life under the political sphere. As will be discussed below, the state used considerable resources to re-sculpt the hearts and minds of its citizens in this revolutionary attempt to form the “new man.” It also provided other, more tangible benefits to those who belonged to the ethnic community.

Since the fascists envisioned the integration of the various social classes and strata into an inviolable national whole, it only stood to reason that they attempted to develop an advanced welfare system to both protect and preserve the “racial power” of their communities. This complemented the individual’s duty to maintain his or her racial purity in order to propagate the race and therefore strengthen the nation. The efforts of the state and the individual thus worked together towards the fascist utopia of national regeneration or, with a slightly different emphasis in the German case, the construction of the “racial state.”

The flip side of this improved system of state care, however, was that those who the regime identified as unworthy of assistance or dangerous to the community were treated in an increasingly barbaric manner. While this was much more muted in Fascist Italy until the outbreak of war – though Slovenians living in the areas bordering Yugoslavia were victims of forced Italianization policies – such thinking became increasingly prominent in Germany following Hitler’s appointment as Reich Chancellor in January 1933. While political opponents were immediately rounded-up and imprisoned in the Third Reich, racial “enemies” such as Jews and Sinti and Roma, as well as the sick and social outsiders (designated as “asocials”), received the full brunt of the Nazi assault against alleged threats to the health of the national community.

Fascism in Practice: Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany

Fascism was a European-wide movement during the interwar period. Only in the case of Italy and Germany, however, did fascist regimes come to power before the outbreak of war. Once the Axis powers had established control over Europe, several client regimes also seized power, notably the Ustaši movement in Croatia, as well as the Arrow Cross Movement in Hungary. However, it was Germany and Italy, where fascist parties ruled for 12 and 21 years, respectively, that saw the fullest attempts to construct the totalizing, fascist state.

Despite the stubborn staying power of myths that have surrounded the Fascist March on Rome in October 1922, Mussolini and his men never seized power; the former was offered the position of prime minister by King Victor Emmanuel III in his hopes of creating some sort of government with actual support as well as avoiding an armed confrontation with the fascist militia, the Blackshirts. While this constituted a dramatic victory for the Fascist Party, the role of the king highlighted the compromise accepted by Mussolini. Instead of seizing power unilaterally and being able to unleash his revolution without outside interference, Mussolini was forced to work within the framework of a monarchy. Attempts to limit the throne's power in political life continued throughout the regime's existence, and despite the progressive increase in his own power, Mussolini ultimately remained responsible to King Victor Emmanuel III.

The sharing of power with the king highlighted the limits placed on Mussolini's power. In addition to the throne, a monarchist-leaning army, influential industrialists and, most importantly, the Catholic Church, all jockeyed for power with Mussolini and his party. These powerful interests, all possessing different ideas concerning Italy's future, forced the Italian Fascist Party to scale back its revolutionary ideas. Italian social conditions, however, played the dominant role in determining the final outcome of the fascist revolution.

Mussolini came to power in a country that lagged far behind the traditional European Great Powers in terms of literacy, industrialization, and integration. In 1931 some 21 percent of the Italian population was illiterate; 20 years later, 18 percent of the population still had not

completed elementary school. Approximately half of the population was still engaged in agricultural labor during the late 1930s, as opposed to 26 percent for Germany in 1939. The lack of an industrial workforce was reflected in Italy's paltry industrial production. The historian Macgregor Knox, in his work *Hitler's Italian Allies* (2000), has calculated that in terms of industrial potential in 1938, Italy rated far and away last in a comparison of the European Great Powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan. These two problems were further aggravated by the geographical split of northern and southern Italy. While northern Italy possessed a similar industrial and social make-up to that of the more modern states of Europe, southern Italy, as epitomized by Sicily where illiteracy reached 40 percent in 1931, remained mired in pre-modern times. Southern Italy's resistance to modernity was typified by the importance of the family unit and the parochialism engendered by this outlook. These were problems that Hitler did not face in his attempt to remake German society. Such obstacles frustrated the fascist revolution in its Italian context.

The first three years of Mussolini's rule were a period of transition, in which he governed squarely within the context of the traditional Italian ruling classes. The elections of 1924 returned a solid Fascist majority, seemingly assuring Mussolini's political power. The murder of Giacomo Matteotti, a leading socialist member of parliament, later that year, however, led to a serious crisis within the regime. It was widely assumed that Mussolini was involved in planning the murder and it seemed that the king would force him to resign. Instead, Mussolini took the opportunity provided by the chaos surrounding the Matteotti Affair to steadily consolidate political power. Parliament was shorn of its political power and, in 1926, all political parties, save the PNF, were banned. A Fascist Party Grand Council was created to coordinate the political and legislative actions of the regime. While this amounted to an accumulation of fascist power at the commanding heights of government, the lower levels remained wedded to their traditional practices; both the civil service and judiciary generally retained their personnel and functions. And, of course, the king still retained ultimate power. Within the realm of politics, Mussolini's desired revolution was stillborn.

Frustrated in creating a purely Fascist political state, Mussolini and his party turned their efforts to producing the “new man” through other means. This centered on the promulgation of fascism as a civic religion. Recognizing the importance of the visual in twentieth-century mass politics, the regime utilized parades, symbols, and a “liturgy” of the movement, in an attempt to spread the fascist myth. This mythology incorporated elements of imperial Roman history, a celebration of the cult of the war dead and, finally and most importantly, the cult of the Duce. These elements were interwoven and diffused through newspapers, theater productions, and children’s textbooks as the regime tried to transform Italian society.

Mass organizations were also established as means to fascistize the state’s population. Youth organizations such as the pre-1937 ONB (Opera Nazionale Balilla) and the post-1937 GIL (Gioventù Italiana del Littorio) were designed to indoctrinate the young and mold them into committed fascists. The largest of the Fascist mass associations, boasting 5 million members in 1940, was the Fascist leisure organization, the OND (Opera Nazionale Dopolavro). Focusing on sports and recreation, this organization proved most successful in breaking down class barriers, as some 40 percent of the industrial working class had joined by 1939.

Women were also encouraged by the regime to join such associations, where they were subjected to the government’s message that the ideal woman was a mother, who utilized her reproductive capacity to better the nation. Unlike their Nazi contemporaries, however, the Italian Fascist state never resorted to eugenics; their view of women fit neatly into the European-wide conservative view of women. Fascism wanted to remove women from employment where they threatened both the male worker’s job and his masculinity. In practice, though, legislation was directed more at maintaining women’s subordinate role in society to men and tying them to the home than in creating a fascist “new woman.”

While Fascists believed that the emancipated woman of the postwar period threatened the social order, in their view workers constituted the gravest threat to the organic community. Consequently, the regime took several steps to develop the corporatist state and harmonize class divisions. By 1926, all socialist and Catholic trade unions had been banned and all workers

were organized under the Fascist Trade Unions. This was complemented by the Rocco Law of the same year which banned both strikes and lock-outs. Six corporations of employers and workers were established, with the state acting as arbitrator between the two sides. While theoretically integrated into the nation, the reality of corporatism proved far different from its theoretical side.

In summing up the development of the corporatist state, one Italian fascist with radical tendencies noted that “the government had handed over the working masses to the business world” (cited in Bosworth 2005). Such a statement is supported by the government’s sanction of three separate waves of wage cuts between 1927 and 1934, as well as the dramatic growth in unemployment in major industrial areas from the mid-1930s on. The regime itself frequently ignored the union leadership, preferring to negotiate directly with heads of major enterprises themselves. The lowering of workers’ standards of living also made it nearly impossible for large numbers of laborers to participate in various activities offered by the OND; food came before leisure.

Similar problems plagued the other Fascist mass organizations. The OND, for example, was singularly ineffective in making any headway in southern Italy. Here the concept of free time was completely alien to peasants stuck in the rhythms of agricultural work. Attempts to transform Italian youth into Fascist youth were also recognized as a failure by the authorities as the family’s central importance in everyday life could not be overcome. All of these organizations ran up against the previously discussed structural problems in Italian society, as well as the inability of the Fascist regime to eliminate all other poles of power within Italy. The survival of the monarchy, the relative independence of the bureaucracy and military and, most importantly, the accommodation reached with the Catholic Church with the signing of the Concordat in February 1929, all provided the Italian population with other institutions that demanded their loyalty. By the mid-1930s it was clear to Mussolini and others that the attempt to create “new man” had failed.

While Fascism never reached its goal of completely mobilizing the Italian population, Nazi Germany came much closer to creating a *Volksgemeinschaft* (racial community) that looked aggressively to recreate its racist utopia throughout

broad swathes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This process started almost immediately following the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor on January 30, 1933. While Hitler and the Nazi Party constituted part of a rightist coalition Cabinet, only three of the twelve ministers were Nazis, and the NSDAP did not possess a majority in the German parliament, the Reichstag; in this regard, Hitler and the Nazi Party entered into a similar governing position as Mussolini and the Fascist Party. In Germany, however, the dual processes of *Gleichschaltung*, or coordination, and exclusion were carried out in a much more thorough and systematic manner.

A mere four days after assuming power, the Nazi assault on communism began in earnest. A decree which rolled back the freedom of the press and outlawed any public meetings that posed a threat to public order was enacted. Three weeks later, the infamous Reichstag fire took place. Set by a young Dutch communist, Hitler utilized the opportunity to have the Decree for the Protection of People and State issued. This severely curtailed civil rights and gave the federal government power to intervene in state government affairs when necessary; in effect, this allowed for the paramilitary SA units to declare open war on the political left. The most important piece of legislation passed by the German parliament was the Enabling Act of March 23, which gave Hitler the power to rule without consent of the Reichstag for four years. This effectively made Hitler dictator and opened the door for the construction of the one-party state.

Over the course of the next few months, all other political parties, including the National Socialists' coalition partners, were banned, independent trade unions were dismantled and subsumed under a Nazi-led German Labor Front, and Nazi leaders were appointed to head the individual state governments. The entire police apparatus was subordinated to the SS, the elite Nazi organization dedicated to racial "purity," and charged with maintaining discipline on the domestic front. Following the death of the Reich President Paul von Hindenburg in August 1934, Hitler combined the offices of President and Chancellor into that of Führer and Reich Chancellor. Unlike Mussolini and the PNF, Hitler and the NSDAP had eliminated all political competitors and established a one-party dictatorial state. This *Gleichschaltung* of the

political sphere was complemented by an attempt to politicize the private sphere as well.

The numerous groups and clubs that dotted German society also fell under Nazi control. Professions, such as doctors, teachers, lawyers, and dentists, for example, were all placed under National Socialist umbrella organizations. Private sporting clubs as well as choral societies also fell victim to *Gleichschaltung*. Youth groups were forced either to disband or to join the party's official Hitler Youth organization. Of course, those whose political views opposed the Nazis were unable to join these organizations and many of the more prominent of these individuals found themselves in the various concentration camps that dotted the German Reich. Within the first five years of their rule, the National Socialist Party had made strikingly successful interventions into German society in their bid to create a centrally controlled and unified society.

Nazi treatment of the German working class highlights both the regime's desire to integrate workers into the racial community as well as the inconsistencies inherent in National Socialist ideology. The dissolution of all independent trade unions and the arrests and murders of the unions' leadership certainly illustrated the NSDAP's revulsion towards organized labor. The fact that the regime nearly always supported management's policies led to depressed wages, another indication that fascism was certainly amenable to capitalism. On the other hand, the Nazi government celebrated workers for being workers; this certainly was a change from all previous Reich governments. Manual labor was recognized as producing not only invaluable industrial materials but also steeled men who neatly fit into Nazi propaganda. The German Labor Front, while not particularly effective in representing workers' interests in the factories, did provide new-found leisure activities through programs such as *Kraft durch Freude* (Strength through Joy). This vacation program allowed workers to sail through Norwegian fjords on cruise ships or to hike through the Black Forest. While only low numbers of workers participated in the more exotic trips, the program did work to highlight the regime's attempts to integrate the laboring classes.

Paralleling this attempt to bring the German nation together under Nazi rule was a simultaneous effort to purge German society of those elements considered alien or threatening. While

political opponents such as social democrats and communists were the first to feel the wrath of the fascist state, Jews, Sinti and Roma, and those termed "asocials" by the regime were targeted in a much more systematic manner. Though SA men beat and killed Jews and burned Jewish homes, synagogues, and businesses throughout the 1930s, these random occurrences (with the notable exception of the "Night of Broken Glass") paled in comparison to the government's actions. Beginning in April 1933 the regime launched a legal assault designed to repeal all advances made by Jews since their emancipation in the mid-nineteenth century: in other words, they wanted to make them into non-citizens. By 1938, Jews had been dismissed from the civil service sector; excluded from the armed forces; disenfranchised; forbidden from working for the state as teachers, professors, or physicians; denied civil rights; and prohibited from marrying "Aryans."

The "Aryanization" of Jewish owned businesses also acted to strip German Jews of their identity. Stores, hotels, and enterprises owned by Jews were forcibly sold to "racially pure" Germans for pennies on the dollar. In Hamburg, for example, a minimum of 625 Jewish-owned businesses were Aryanized in 1938–9; the actual number is probably closer to 1,000. Not only did such actions contribute to the social death of Jews in Germany; they also created groups of Germans who, reaping the benefits of Aryanization, found themselves welded to the regime that provided them with such an opportunity. These laws were mirrored by more banal measures that forbade Jews from flying the national flag or using the "German greeting." Jews were also forced to use the compulsory names of Sara or Israel in addition to having their passports and other official documents stamped with a "J." The social ramifications of these laws struck right at the identity of German Jewry; while they might still consider themselves German, it was clear the state did not. At this point, the regime still favored an attempt to force its Jewish population into emigration.

A much deadlier solution for purifying the "Aryan" section of the German population, however, emerged. Fearful that the mentally and physically handicapped would not only exhaust the state's welfare resources but also produce more "damaged genetic material," the regime authorized a program of euthanasia for

those it deemed "unworthy of life." By September 1, 1941, over 70,000 people had been murdered in the name of the national community. This was complemented by a forced sterilization program that aimed to halt the reproduction of those individuals the regime viewed as harming Germany's "racial stock": the "feeble-minded," "schizophrenics," "alcoholics," and "disorderly." These terms were haphazardly used to diagnose anyone whose behavior differed from the moral norms set by the regime or who opposed the Nazi government in some way. Between 1934 and the outbreak of war, some 320,000 people were forcibly sterilized, the overwhelming majority of whom were women.

Sterilization constituted the most drastic action undertaken by the state within a larger set of eugenic policies directed towards women. In order to produce a healthy "racial collective," the regime focused on women and their reproductive ability. Not only were those "racially fit" women rewarded, both financially and in terms of other symbolic rewards, for the number of children they reared, they were encouraged to lead lives of moral rectitude and raise their children in a proper manner. Divorce was also placed within a context of racial policy. Those marriages that the state deemed unable to produce children were annulled, as "dead marriages" made no contribution to the community. As these policies made clear, the household was considered the natural environment for women; while menial, unskilled labor was permitted, skilled, industrial labor, even in a period of labor shortage, remained strikingly low.

The strengthening of the "racial collective" also informed Nazi foreign policy during the 1930s. It focused on returning Germans who, due to the Treaty of Versailles, were now living outside of the Reich. Early diplomatic triumphs, such as the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 and *Anschluss*, or union, with Austria in March 1938, provided Germany not only with strategic and economic benefits, but also brought Germans home to the Reich. The next diplomatic crisis facing Europe concerned the status of ethnic Germans living in the Sudetenland, a border province within the newly created Czechoslovakian state. Following the successful absorption of this area into the Greater German Reich, brokered at the infamous Munich conference in September 1938, Hitler then turned his eyes

to the former German areas that now constituted parts of western Poland. It was this diplomatic crisis that sparked the onset of war. While it would surely be negligent to ignore the multitude of other considerations that went into these maneuvers save the nationalism angle, the latter did play a large role in Hitler's thinking and would continue to do so to an even greater extent during the war itself.

Fascism and War

The social imperialism practiced by both Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany significantly differed from that of their nineteenth-century predecessors. Instead of embarking on wars of aggression in hopes of shoring up the existing social order, both Mussolini and Hitler hoped to create fundamentally new societies through the war itself. Here again, however, significant differences arose in the success of the two fascist powers in achieving their goal. Mussolini's Italy ultimately failed the acid test of war while Hitler's Germany nearly fulfilled its goals. The horrifying cost of this endeavor, however, ensured that fascism's ultimate failure left it a ruined and discredited ideology.

For Mussolini, war would be the medium to salvage his stalled revolution. In the midst of Italy's intervention in the Spanish Civil War, he announced to his foreign minister that "when Spain is over, I'll think of something else: the character of the Italians must be created through battle" (Knox: 2000a). The first inklings of the savage nature of fascist war took place in Italy's North African colony of Libya. Here, in what the historian Richard Bosworth in his study *Mussolini* (2000) has termed a "policy of utter brutality," the Italian military, under orders from Rome, initiated a policy of what later commentators have termed ethnic cleansing, driving some 100,000 native inhabitants into a series of concentrations camps, where hunger and sickness frequently finished the army's work. Though perhaps closer to traditional European colonial practices than Nazi-style imperialism, Fascist Italy's pacification of Libya certainly pointed in the direction of their future Axis allies' ruthless behavior.

The first outright aggression undertaken by Italy was the invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935. While this war was couched within the context of revenge for the humiliating Italian defeat at Adua in 1896, it also looked ahead as the

first step in the reconstitution of the Roman Empire. Again, Mussolini demanded a brutal conduct of war, ordering villages burned and ten Ethiopians shot for every one Italian death. The Italian military utilized poison gas and aerial bombings to destroy the extremely primitive Ethiopian armed forces.

The international reaction to the invasion caused a twofold effect. First, it led to an increased support from the Italian people for the fascist project as they rallied around Italy's new-found power on the international scene. Second, the strains between Britain and France, on the one hand, and Italy, on the other, greatly increased, and Italy found itself moving closer to the orbit of Nazi Germany. While Italy made a sizeable intervention in the Spanish Civil War, sending some 50,000 "volunteers" to assist the Spanish rebels, neither this war nor the earlier colonial adventures were on a grand enough scale to initiate the revolution Mussolini so desperately desired. The victories in Africa were undertaken by relatively small numbers of men under the auspices of the conservative army.

Unlike Hitler, who was able progressively to Nazify the German army as the war progressed, Mussolini failed to rid himself of the monarchist and frequently incompetent officer corps that dominated the Italian military. The professional value of such men was highlighted by the disastrous defeat suffered by the Italian troops in Spain at Guadalajara in March 1937. Not only did this conflict end up costing the Italians dearly in men and weaponry, it also led to an outbreak of anti-fascist jubilation in Italy following news of the defeat. The limitations of the army, reinforced by the failure of industry to provide adequate weaponry both qualitatively and quantitatively, ensured that the Italian war effort had reached its peak of success in the conquest of Ethiopia. Instead of forging a new fascist man, war only highlighted the incomplete nature of Mussolini's revolution.

War also served to radicalize Italian racial policy. The conquest of colonies in Africa increased contact between Italian soldiers and administrators and black Africans, with the latter providing the foil for the superiority of the conquering Italians. Fraternalization between soldiers and native Ethiopians, however, was prevalent enough for Mussolini to complain of Italian "racial immaturity" and subsequently force through legislation in 1937 banning sexual

relations between whites and blacks. Racial laws were introduced in Italy itself in 1938. These called for the removal of Jews from the teaching profession and the army as well as instituting a ban on marriage between Jews and Christians. While the legislation was repugnant in and of itself, its focus on religion as opposed to the alleged race of Jews differentiated it from the Nazi's more radical variant. Such legislation fit into a more general pattern of European anti-Semitism during the late 1930s; it also offered the regime an internal bogeyman with which to mobilize the population, something desperately needed by a "revolutionary" regime that had already been in power for 16 years.

Mussolini's dream to make the Mediterranean Sea into an "Italian Lake" was shattered by a series of successive defeats in 1940 and 1941. Hanging on to his German ally's coattails, Mussolini declared war against France when it appeared the French were on the verge of collapse. The Italian army, however, failed to dislodge its French opponent from the border and it received only minimal gains from the war. This was followed by the astonishingly inept handling of the Western Desert Campaign in North Africa. Here some 130,000 Italian and Libyan soldiers were taken prisoner by a British force that never numbered more than 35,000 men and suffered fewer than 2,000 casualties during the ten-week campaign. Only a shifting of British forces to Greece saved the complete collapse of Italian North Africa. The final humiliation suffered by the Italian military occurred during the invasion of Greece. Greek troops not only halted the Italian advance, but then began their own counter-attack, pushing Italian forces back across the border in some areas. Quick action by German troops rectified the situation here as they later did in North Africa as well. By the summer of 1941, Fascist Italy had devolved into a mere supplicant to Nazi Germany, forever ceding its initial position as the dominant fascist state.

The changing tides of war, culminating with the Allied invasions of Sicily and mainland Italy in August and September 1943, respectively, led to the overthrow of Mussolini, his subsequent arrest, and an armistice with the Western Allies. Though the Duce was freed by the Germans and later headed the short-lived Salò Republic in northern Italy, this was merely a puppet government, propped up by the Germans. The Fascist revolution proved abortive in Italy. Mussolini,

recognizing that the party was unable to remold Italians into Fascists, attempted to jump-start the process through war. Obstacles that existed in the prewar period, however, were only exacerbated during the war. These ranged from the military's stubborn conservatism to working-class resistance, typified by the great Turin strikes of March 1943. A regime publicly dedicated to improving the lot of ordinary Italians as it drove them towards a brighter, Fascist future appeared utterly bankrupt when the rations it provided its own people were only equivalent to those available in German-occupied Poland. Two decades of Fascist rule in Italy had failed to transform society, and war only emphasized the enormous gap between Fascist promises and the everyday reality of its practices. A regime that emphasized the importance of violence and war had no chance of survival when its own military performance was so execrable.

Hitler, on the other hand, had managed to revolutionize the German people in a way that led to success in the nation's war effort. The war initiated by the Third Reich in September 1939 against Poland quickly illustrated that the victory sought by Nazi Germany was far different from the type that had eluded its imperial predecessor some 25 years before. The military conquest of Poland was followed by an attempt to remake that society under Nazi auspices. SS murder squads followed the German army into Poland, eliminating the Polish intelligentsia, army officers and Catholic priests. Jews were also murdered, though this was not as of yet part of a systematic program of extermination. Whole sections of Poland were emptied of Poles in order to make room for the ethnic Germans "returning" to their homeland from their scattered communities throughout Eastern Europe. Many of these Germans had lived for generations in foreign countries and had only very distant ties to the Reich. In the eyes of the Nazi leadership, however, they constituted better material for the new racial community than did physically handicapped German children. The national idea at the heart of fascism only radicalized during the war.

War also radicalized the violence inherent in fascism, especially following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. Stigmatized as the fount of the murderous "Judeo-bolshevism" that threatened western civilization, the Soviet Union was victim to a war of unimaginable

cruelty and barbarism that eventually culminated in genocide. Not only was the Red Army to be eliminated, but the Soviet Union as a state was to disappear and its population was to be decimated by some 30 million souls, primarily through starvation, with the survivors reduced to a slave caste. Both ideological and rational grounds for the invasion tied into the fascist mindset that developed during the 1920s and 1930s.

For the Third Reich, and Hitler in particular, Bolshevism constituted the strongest threat to the fascist *imperium*. Liberalism had already been swept away in most of Central and Eastern Europe before the war and, in the case of Western Europe, by the German army. Soviet-style Bolshevism, however, offered an alternative modernity to that espoused by Hitler and Mussolini. Its eradication would not only eliminate the international communist movement that tore at every state's national fabric, but it would also leave no alternative to a Nazi-dominated Europe. On the more tangible level of everyday life, the immense resources of the Soviet Union, especially foodstuffs, could be used to maintain the relatively high standards of living of the German home front. This classic case of imperialist aggression was undertaken in part to ensure that the valuable "racial material" in Germany continued to thrive despite being mired in a war.

While the occupied territories of the Soviet Union constituted the most striking case of naked exploitation undertaken by the Third Reich, the remainder of occupied Europe also fell prey to Hitler's New Order. Unlike the liberal vision of Europe which foresaw a collection of states cooperating with one another through institutions such as the League of Nations and benefiting from free trade, the Nazi vision of Europe saw a hierarchical arrangement with the racially superior German nation on top and lesser states following their political masters in Berlin.

The Reich also desired an economic system that responded to its needs; the subordinate countries would work to follow the German plan. Such practices led to the whole French locomotive industry, as well as nearly its entire machine tool industry, producing for the German war economy in 1942. A few weeks after the Nazi conquest of Greece in the spring of 1941, a German economic official reported that "the entire output of Greek mines of pyrites, iron ore, chrome, nickel, magnesite, manganese, bauxite and gold

was obtained for Germany on a long-term basis" (Mazower 1993: 24). Poland sent some 1.3 million workers to the Reich, in addition to producing large amounts of ammunition for the German army. These, of course, are only a few examples of exploitive economic plans drawn up by the Nazi regime; such practices were standard throughout occupied Europe.

These rapacious economic policies were complemented by callous and even genocidal policies toward the people of the occupied territories. Starvation led to millions of deaths throughout Europe as the German occupying authorities were much more concerned with supplying the "racially superior" German population at the expense of the "inferior races" of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. During the winter of 1941–2, some 300,000 Greek citizens died from a famine induced by German economic programs. At the same time, the Ukrainian city of Kiev suffered some 100,000 civilian deaths from starvation. In terms of numbers, these cases pale before the city of Leningrad. Hitler and the German high command decided that feeding the Soviet metropolis following its capture would only take food away from the German home front. Consequently, it was decided to blockade the city and let starvation bring it to its knees. In scenes of desperation and horror not witnessed in Europe since the Thirty Years War, between 1 and 1.3 million inhabitants of the city starved to death. Even those nations which the Germans believed had strong "racial stock" such as the Netherlands were subjected to starvation as the "Hunger Winter" of 1944–5 claimed 16,000 Dutch lives. The food needed to sustain these people was ruthlessly extracted from the occupied territories and shipped back to the Reich: the occupied population was sacrificed at the altar of German nationalism.

German policy towards the Jews became the most radicalized aspect of fascist ideology. While prewar measures were designed to socially ostracize the German Jewish population and force them to immigrate, the invasion of the Soviet Union opened a new and much deadlier chapter in Nazi practice. After preliminary plans to deport Jews under German control to Madagascar or Siberia came to naught, Nazi Germany implemented a policy of extermination. SS murder squads, as in Poland, followed the advancing German army during the Soviet campaign. This time, however, all male Jews were

targeted for liquidation. Sometime in the fall of 1941, this murder campaign was expanded to include all Jews, regardless of age or sex. These executions reached staggering heights, as in Riga in November and December where 27,800 Jews were killed and at Babi Yar where 34,000 Jews were shot in the span of a few days in early September. Such shootings, however, proved both damaging to the men who carried them out as well as an uneconomical way of liquidating the enormous numbers of Jews now under Nazi control and the regime looked for a new way of “purifying” Europe.

The search for a more economic and rational manner of carrying out the murder of all European Jewry culminated in the construction of extermination camps. While some of the camps were also utilized as labor camps, most notably at the Auschwitz-Birkenau complex, the primary function of these camps was to kill people deemed threats by the Nazi regime as quickly and efficiently as possible. Even when the military situation turned against the Third Reich and resources were desperately needed to staunch Allied and Soviet offensives, the Holocaust, or murder of the Jews, continued to receive high priority from the Nazi government. Just as the National Socialist movement had “purified” Germany of Jews, it now attempted to do so for the entire European continent under its control. In the eyes of the more ideologically committed members of the regime, the changing fortunes of war only illustrated the Jews’ insidious power and this demanded increased efforts to purge them from Europe. The fascist fixation on purity, in this case racial, led to approximately six million men, women and children being murdered, merely on the basis of their perceived status as outsiders.

Through this process of war, subjugation and murder, the Nazi regime was able to build upon its pre-war efforts to re-mold German society. Constantly exposed to the regime’s messages concerning threats to the purity of the German race, the population increasingly accepted such statements as truth. What Claudia Koonz (2003) has termed the Nazi Conscience in her study of the same title led the German people to accept Nazi messages about the collective health of the nation. The onset of war only inflamed this racial mission, especially after the swift and relatively painless victories in Western Europe reinforced notions of German superiority.

The war with the Soviet Union, however, played the decisive role in the refashioning of German society. Eighteen million men served within the Wehrmacht’s ranks during the war and the overwhelming majority of them fought in the East. The ruthless war called for by the Reich leadership allowed these men a wide degree of latitude in their behavior. The violence so celebrated in fascist thought was not only encouraged but demanded and millions of soldiers suddenly found themselves elevated from their prewar status of clerks and laborers to positions of absolute power over their subject populations.

Soldiers’ motivations and actions reveal the dual nature of the Nazi revolution: while many soldiers believed that they were fighting for a more egalitarian and just state at home, their behavior in the field ensured that the Soviet population realized that they were being reduced to mere helots. The need for administrators of all sorts throughout occupied Europe, but especially in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, led to a new imperial class, at once technocratic and racist, convinced of their mission in draining the occupied territories of everything possible to support the Reich’s war effort. The importation of slave labor into Germany acted as a social glue between the regime and the working class. No longer the lowest social group within German society, workers now possessed increased clout and authority in the workplace as they played the part of the racially superior German lording over their “inferior” workers. This was the alternative modernity offered by fascist Germany to Europe.

Conclusion

The collapse of fascism as a viable political ideology was even more stunning than its meteoric rise. Fascism failed on two important counts. First, the most radical variant of fascism, Nazism, painfully demonstrated the impossibility of fascism solving the problems of modernity for Europe as a whole. Based on a radical nationalism that while inclusive towards the nation’s ethnic majority, turned violently exclusionary against those deemed outsiders, fascism inevitably led to the triumph of the one strongest state. During World War II, this state was the German Reich. Mazower (1998) has summed up Europe’s situation under German occupation: “against the liberal defense of individual liberties the

Nazis counterposed the racial welfare of the collectivity; against liberalism's doctrine of the formal equality of states it offered Darwinian struggle and rule by racial superiors; against free trade it proposed the coordination of Europe's economies as a single unit under German leadership." Such a program had little appeal for other nationalities, even for those individuals who sympathized with the fascist program. The callous and exploitive policies of the German occupation generated a ubiquitous resistance throughout occupied Europe during the war, thus exposing any claims that the fascist idea had solved the problems associated with modernity on an international level.

Second, fascism as an ideology demanded the continual mobilization of a state's population in the service of the nation and its revolution. This rallying of the nation was usually directed at some "enemy," be it internal or external. In the case of National Socialist Germany, the racist basis of Nazi ideology provided the German population with a myriad of foes, with the most insidious being the "Jew," that threatened the "racial purity" of the Reich. Such racism acted as cohesive ideological glue, bonding the German people and regime together, and, once this was wedded to the violence inherent in fascist thought, it provided the necessary impetus for Nazi leadership to wage a long, brutal war of annihilation against the Soviet Union as well as fight desperate, rearguard battles in Italy and Northwest Europe against the advancing Allies. Even if the Germans had emerged victorious from the war, however, it would have eventually run out of enemies; would the population continue to live under such a repressive regime when there was no one left to fight?

Italian Fascism, on the other hand, failed to unite its subject population with the Fascist Party in any meaningful way. Once the political left was subjugated, Fascism groped about for new ways of mobilizing Italian society. The racist legislation of 1938 should be viewed as a futile attempt to provide a new enemy for public consumption. Colonial forays temporarily provided the basis for such support, but humiliating military failures in Spain, North Africa, and the Balkans not only displayed the gaping chasm between Fascist ideology and reality in Italy, but also led to diminishing support for the regime by a war-weary population. While war acted as stimulant for Nazi Germany, for Italy, it merely

emphasized the hollowness of Fascist claims of greatness. Military debacle effectively ended the increasingly fossilized Fascist regime much the same way that the final Allied victory, and the subsequent revelations of the brutalities engendered by the fascist idea, ensured its consignment to the dustbin of history.

SEE ALSO: Germany, Socialism and Nationalism; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945); Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Bajohr, F. (2002) *"Aryanization" in Hamburg: The Economic Exclusion of Jews and the Confiscation of their Property in Nazi Germany*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Bessel, R. (Ed.) (1996) *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: Comparisons and Contrasts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bosworth, R. J. B. (1998) *The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism*. London: Arnold.
- Bosworth, R. J. B. (2000) *Mussolini*. London: Arnold.
- Bosworth, R. J. B. (2005) *Mussolini's Italy: Life under the Dictatorship, 1915–1945*. New York: Allen Lane.
- Burleigh, M. & Wippermann, W. (1991) *The Racial State: Germany 1933–1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- De Grazia, V. (1992) *How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922–1945*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Eatwell, R. (1995) *Fascism: A History*. New York: Penguin.
- Griffin, R. (1991) *The Nature of Fascism*. London: Pinter.
- Kershaw, I. (1998) *Hitler: 1889–1936. Hubris*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Kershaw, I. (2000a) *Hitler: 1936–1945. Nemesis*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Kershaw, I. (2000b) *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*. London: Arnold.
- Knox, M. (1982) *Mussolini Unleashed, 1939–1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Knox, M. (2000a) *Hitler's Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940–1943*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Knox, M. (2000b) *Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Koonz, C. (2003) *The Nazi Conscience*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Linz, J. J. (1976) Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective. In W. Laqueur (Ed.), *Fascism: A Reader's Guide*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Mann, M. (2004) *Fascists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mason, T. (1995) *Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mazower, M. (1993) *Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation 1941–1944*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Mazower, M. (1998) *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*. New York: Vintage.
- Mosse, G. L. (1966) *Nazi Culture: A Documentary History*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Mosse, G. L. (1999) *The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism*. New York: Howard Fertig.
- Paxton, R. O. (2004) *The Anatomy of Fascism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Payne, S. (1995) *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Peukert, D. J. K. (1987) *Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition, and Racism in Everyday Life*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony

Richard Goff

Like many utopian communities in the New World, the Rappite Harmony settlements (Harmony, New Harmony, and Economy) trace their origins to eighteenth-century European religious conflicts. Similar to the Puritans of England, German Pietism sought to reform the Lutheran Church, emphasizing personal piety and the virtue of actively living a Christian life. Father George Rapp, a journeyman weaver and radical, broke with the Lutheran Church in 1785 and established his own congregation of approximately 4,000 followers. Rapp's congregation grew rapidly in the late 1700s, his followers peaking at 10,000 in 1800. Fearful of persecution, Rapp traveled to America in 1803 to seek a location where his congregation could settle and live along his principles.

Like many religious separatists, Rapp was heavily influenced by apostolic teachings and Christian communal practice. In addition to holding property in common, Rappites believed sex to be sinful and members were required to practice abstinence. For Rapp, celibacy and communism would allow members to achieve perfection in preparation for Christ's reign. The members adopted a simple style of dress and all

shared the labor tasks necessary for the community. This almost monastic lifestyle proved to be a relatively durable system.

Rapp established the first Harmony community in Butler County, Pennsylvania, 30 miles north of Pittsburgh in 1805. Similar to the Shakers, the Harmonists interacted with the surrounding communities through trade and tourism. The initial group of 500 quickly established farms, homes, and basic industry along communal lines. The town grew slowly, but by 1814 it had become relatively prosperous with several mills, a brewery, and a wool manufacturing facility. Rapp served as the organizational head of the community and was an active and relatively authoritarian leader. As the community grew and geographical problems became more severe, Rapp decided to move the community in 1814.

Establishing New Harmony near the Wabash River in Indiana, the community quickly carved a new village out of the wilderness. New Harmony became extremely prosperous by the early 1820s, allowing Harmonists to make numerous material improvements to the community, constructing schools and libraries that far exceeded those of surrounding settlements. In 1824 Rapp decided to sell New Harmony to utopian socialist Robert Owen. A curious decision given the community's success, Rapp cited scriptural justifications for the move; however, the wilderness had begun to take its toll, both physically and spiritually, on the community, and Rapp feared losing control. In 1825 the community reestablished itself in Economy, Pennsylvania, near their original home and the bustling market of Pittsburgh. Problems developed as some members were not happy with the new articles of association and others began to question the need for abstinence. As dissent grew, Rapp became more authoritarian, producing a schism in 1832. After Rapp's death in 1834, the remaining community of 288 continued to function, with leadership passing to several of Rapp's closest friends and relatives. The community continued to prosper economically but shrink demographically, ultimately producing a power struggle between the remaining members over the financial assets. It formally dissolved in 1905.

Although Harmony was not democratic and largely hinged on the dynamic spiritual leadership of Father Rapp and his adopted son

Friederich, its ability to survive and prosper without private property inspired utopian socialists like Robert Owen and Frances Wright to try similar experiments, along secular lines. Additionally, Rapp's contribution was not simply to prove that a planned community could survive, it could prosper. Rapp's emphasis on education and culture demonstrated that it was possible to have a community that was not simply economically viable, but also made life worth living.

SEE ALSO: Amana Inspirationist Utopians; Cooperative Commonwealth; Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians; Hutterites; Icaria Utopian Community; New Harmony; Oneida Perfectionist Utopians; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Shakers Utopian Community; Utopian Communities, United States; Utopian Intentional Communities; Wright, Frances “Fanny” (1795–1852)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bestor, A., Jr. (1950) *Backwoods Utopias: The Sectarian Origins and the Owenite Phase of Communitarian Socialism in America, 1663–1829*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Hayden, D. (1976) *Seven American Utopias: The Architecture of Communitarian Socialism, 1790–1975*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Jacoby, R. (1999) *The End of Utopia*. New York: Basic Books.
- Morris, C. (1992) *Fanny Wright: Rebel in America*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Pitzer, D. & Elliot, J. (1979) New Harmony's First Utopians, 1814–1824. *Indiana Magazine of History* 75 (September): 225–300.

Fawkes, Guy (1570–1606) and the Gunpowder Plot

Christian A. Griggs

Guy Fawkes was a key member of a radical group of English Roman Catholics who attempted to kill King James I in what became known as the Gunpowder Plot. Though the plot failed, it led to further decline in the status of Catholics in England and fed Protestant belief that God was protecting the country.

Fawkes was born in York to Protestant parents but converted to Catholicism while still in school, likely due to the influence of his stepfather and

schoolmates. While in his early twenties, Fawkes went abroad to fight with the Spanish army in the Netherlands. Allowed to practice his religion freely, he gained a reputation as a devout Catholic and an able soldier. He visited Spain during these years and asked for Spanish military intervention to assist the suffering Catholics in England. When such aid was not forthcoming, Fawkes returned to England and learned of a plot developed by English Catholics to establish their religion in the country.

In May 1604 Fawkes and others met in London with Robert Catesby, who had developed the plan now known as the Gunpowder Plot. The plot aimed to blow up the Houses of Parliament, killing the king and members of Parliament, thereby destroying the existing government and allowing it to be replaced with a Catholic regime. Fawkes offered his assistance and became a central figure in the preparations. By late fall 1605 the conspirators had built a stock of 36 barrels of gunpowder in a cellar beneath the House of Lords, all hidden by firewood. On the night of November 4, Fawkes was left alone in the cellar to ignite the gunpowder when Parliament convened the next day. Word of a possible attack



Guy Fawkes (1570–1606) was an English footsoldier who gained notoriety for his involvement in the Gunpowder Plot of 1605. The Gunpowder Plot was an attempt by a group of English Roman Catholic revolutionaries to kill King James I by blowing up the House of Lords in Westminster Palace on November 6, 1605. After the plot had been revealed and the conspirators were sentenced to be hanged, drawn, and quartered, Fawkes escaped his fate by jumping from the scaffold and breaking his neck. (Getty Images)

had reached the royal court, however, and King James I ordered the area searched, which led to the discovery of Fawkes and the gunpowder. Fawkes was arrested and refused to provide details of the plot, until convinced to do so by torture.

With the plot foiled and his fellow conspirators either killed or captured, Fawkes awaited trial. He was found guilty of treason and executed on January 30, 1606. Parliament passed an act declaring November 5 a day of public thanksgiving, which has become known as Guy Fawkes' Night or Bonfire Night. The celebration of this night involves burning an effigy, typically of Fawkes, to commemorate God's deliverance of England from the Catholics. The vaults under the House of Lords are still searched before the opening of Parliament.

SEE ALSO: English Reformation; English Revolution, 17th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Fraser, A. (1996) *Faith and Treason: The Story of the Gunpowder Plot*. New York: Doubleday.
- Garnett, H. (1962) *Portrait of Guy Fawkes: An Experiment in Biography*. London: Robert Hale.
- Nicholls, M. (1991) *Investigating the Gunpowder Plot*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI)

Eduardo Romanos

The FAI was a clandestine organization of Spanish and Portuguese anarchists, mostly affiliated with the Spanish anarcho-sindicalist trade union, the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT). The FAI became very active in the 1930s in Spain, first organizing revolutionary insurrections against the Second Republic and then during the Spanish Civil War.

The FAI was founded at a conference in Valencia on July 25–26, 1927 by the National Federation of Anarchist Groups of Spain, which had been set up four years previously in Barcelona. First, the National Federation, and later the FAI, tried to force the CNT to adopt an anarchist orientation, which under the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923–30) meant remaining illegal and subject to persecution. This bond, where the

anarchist organization was an ideological safeguard for the union, was known as the *trabazón* (“connection” or “link”) and aimed at transforming the CNT into a powerful and revolutionary anarchist working-class movement in Spain, after the expulsion of communists and the more reformist members from the ranks. The main theorists of this organizational principle were Emilio López Arango and Diego Abad de Santillán. The latter would later be general secretary of the FAI in 1935.

The idea of founding an anarchist organization on the Iberian Peninsula had been previously expressed at a congress in Marseille in May 1926. Those in favor consisted of the Federation of Spanish-Speaking Anarchists in France, where numerous refugees had gathered, as well as the Regional Federation of Anarchist Groups of Catalonia who voiced their support at a meeting in Barcelona in March 1927. The subsequent Valencia Conference brought the Spanish Federation, the French refugees, and the União Anarquista Portuguesa into the FAI, defined the relationship with the CNT under the *trabazón* principle, and called for a campaign of agitation that could spark off popular dissent and ultimately lead to social revolution.

Nevertheless, until the mid-1930s the FAI existed as little more than a vague network of anarchist *grupos de afinidad* or “affinity groups.” This traditional form of anarchist organization – very active in underground activities – usually consisted of five to ten members connected by personal relationships and a strong commitment to the same ideological principles. Within the FAI the affinity groups organized themselves territorially in local or *comarcal* federations. Their committees were in contact with regional bodies, which in turn were in contact with the top-level peninsular committee. One of the most important affinity groups was *Los Solidarios*, set up in the early 1920s by Buenaventura Durruti, Francisco Ascaso, and other notorious anarchists. During the Barcelona “Years of Lead” these “kings of the working-class gun,” as Juan Garcia Oliver later called his cohort, organized sabotage, robberies to fund workers’ strikes, and attempts on employers’ and officials’ lives, as well as taking part in the foundation of the National Federation that preceded the FAI. After being exiled in Argentina, Cuba, and France, Durruti and Ascaso were charged along with Gregorio Jover with trying to kill King Alfonso XII and

General Primo de Rivera in 1926 in Paris. Thanks to an impressive international campaign of solidarity, they were freed and went to Belgium. They returned to Spain with the advent of the Second Republic (April 14, 1931) and immediately adopted a belligerent position towards the government. The group did not officially become part of the FAI until 1933, changing its name to *Nosotros* ("We"), although it had always been a *de facto* member.

During the Second Republic these and other elements within the FAI gained an increasing influence over the CNT. This was achieved through the monopolization of the defense committees set up jointly by the two organizations and the control exerted over the so-called Pro-prisoner Committees in support of jailed anarchists and anarchosyndicalists. Solidarity campaigns were followed by active agitation against the government. This approach clashed with more syndicalist-oriented groups within the CNT, who envisaged a period of recovery and growth after the progressive decline suffered under the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. However, internal strife soon ended when the moderates were expelled and members of the FAI began occupying top-level posts in the CNT's committees and journals.

Between 1932 and 1933 the FAI promoted a series of armed insurrections against the Republic in Catalonia, Aragon, La Rioja, and Andalusia in what García Oliver termed "revolutionary gymnastics." According to historian Chris Ealham (2005), "as far as the FAI insurrectionists were concerned, even if these armed exercises did not provide the spark to ignite a revolutionary fire, they would at least force the authorities to rely on increasingly repressive measures and thereby impede the institutionalization of the proletariat within the Republic." The insurrections usually began with attacks on *guardia civil* (rural police) barracks, followed by the burning of the official registers of the village, the proclamation of libertarian communism, the appointment of administrative and defense committees, and the abolition of currency. These actions invariably resulted in the failure of insurrection to proliferate across the country, the arrival of state police reinforcements, and the flight or repression of the more ardent anarchists. This cycle of mobilization and repression exhausted the FAI and eroded trust in the revolutionary spontaneity of its sympathizers, which partly explained

its absence in the October 1934 insurrection in Asturias, a movement led by the socialists.

In the beginning of 1936, 496 groups gathered at a general meeting of the FAI in Madrid. The previous meeting organized in the same city in October 1933 in an atmosphere of insurrection had 1,201. In May 1936 the CNT held its Fourth Congress in Saragossa and dismissed both the FAI's insurrectionary tactics and the possibilist syndicalism supported by moderate groups within the union. Just two months later, the two organizations, now under the joint title CNT-FAI, found themselves in control of different cities and regions after having defeated the military uprising that sparked the Spanish Civil War (July 17, 1936–April 1, 1939). With the collapse of the state, they succeeded in enacting a program of libertarian communism in the form of industrial and agrarian collectives in the rearguard, especially in Catalonia, eastern Aragon, and Valencia. In the first months of the revolution, political violence was partly executed by armed squads that launched repressive raids on right-wingers. This violence was neither the work of anarchists alone, nor entirely supported from above. Well-known libertarian figures (e.g., Joan Peiró) soon condemned and struggled to limit the extent of these events.

Breaking with the anti-parliamentary tradition, members of the CNT-FAI joined the Catalan and the Republican governments in the autumn of 1936, thus opening a deep rift with the rank and file. Disunity spread after the famous May Days of 1937, when the rank and file accused the leaders of giving in during the riots and skirmishes on the streets of Barcelona that pitched the CNT-FAI and the members of the dissident communist party Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (Workers' Party of Marxist Unification) (POUM) against Catalan communists and the Republican police. As a result, a new government was appointed under the parliamentary socialist Juan Negrín without the participation of the CNT-FAI. The new government's decrees dismantled revolutionary collectivization and the local organs of workers' power while militarizing the libertarian militias and imposing central control on industry. The general meeting organized in Valencia in July 1937 by the FAI abandoned the traditional organizational framework of affinity groups in favor of a "new and more efficient" federal structure. Participation in state institutions was also ratified at the

meeting. Amid these contradictions the FAI went into a decline, both in terms of resources and influence, as did the entire *Movimiento Libertario* (ML), set up in October 1938 with the CNT and the anarchist youth organization *Federación Ibérica de Juventudes Libertarias* (FIJL).

Soon after the end of the war the Francoist police concluded a period of harsh repression against the members and organizations of the ML that broke up the FAI in all its practical forms. In the early postwar period some calls for reformulating the anarchist federation into a libertarian political party that could act as a substitute for the union in political alliances against Franco were rejected. The organization-in-exile maintained an extremist discourse that diffused second-generation affiliation. The papers of the FAI Peninsular secretariat from the Spanish Civil War are kept in the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, where they join those of the CNT and of the *Oficinas de Propaganda Exterior* set up by the two organizations during the Civil War.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Spain; Anarchosyndicalism; Anti-Franco Worker Struggles, 1939–1975; Barcelona General Strike, 1919; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Mujeres Libres; Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Abad de Santillán, D. & López Arango, E. (1925) *El anarquismo en el movimiento obrero*. Barcelona: Cosmos.
- Casanova, J. (2004) *Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain: 1931–1939*. London: Routledge. Original version in Spanish (1997) *De la Calle al Frente. El Anarcosindicalismo en España*. Barcelona: Crítica.
- Ealham, C. (2002) The Crisis of Organized Labour: The Battle for Hegemony in the Barcelona Workers' Movement, 1930–6. In A. Smith (Ed.), *Red Barcelona: Social Protest and Labour Mobilization in the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge.
- Ealham, C. (2005) *Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898–1937*. London: Routledge.
- Elorza, A. (1973) *La utopía anarquista bajo la II República*. Madrid: Ayuso.
- García Oliver, J. (1978) *El eco de los pasos*. Barcelona: Ruedo Ibérico.
- Gómez Casas, J. (2002) *Historia de la FAI*. Madrid: Fundación Anselmo Lorenzo.
- Ledesma, J. L. (2005) La santa ira popular del 36: la violencia en guerra civil y revolución, entre cultura y política. In J. Muñoz, J. L. Ledesma, & J. Rodrigo (Eds.), *Culturas y políticas de la violencia. España siglo XX*. Madrid: Siete Mares.

Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS)

Edward T. Brett

The National Trade Union Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS), El Salvador's largest industrial trade union confederation, was founded in 1974 to bring unity to the nation's trade union movement and thereby strengthen it. It consisted of 16 trade unions with a combined membership of 25,000. It was affiliated with the International Trade Union Confederation and its main headquarters were located in San Salvador, just two blocks from the command center of the National Police.

Accused by Salvadoran and US authorities of being a front organization for the FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front), several of its leaders as well as its headquarters were under constant surveillance. Its members were continually harassed and threatened by Salvadoran security forces. Minor acts of harassment, however, escalated into more serious violence in 1989. On February 22 and September 5, bombs were thrown at the union's headquarters, but they did not result in any loss of life. On October 31, however, FENASTRAS members were not so lucky. On that day a bomb, which had been placed by a door near the building's lunchroom, exploded at approximately 12:30, when the lunchroom was full of workers. Nine unionists were killed and about forty wounded. Febe Elizabeth Velásquez, the general secretary of FENASTRAS and El Salvador's most important labor figure, was among the dead. The day before, FMLN operatives had carried out an assault on a meeting of the joint staff of the Salvadoran military, and it seems that the October 31 bombing was in retaliation.

The attack on the FENASTRAS headquarters had important ramifications in that it convinced FMLN leaders to break off peace negotiations with the Salvadoran government and instead go forward with a major offensive that had been in the planning stage for over two years.

SEE ALSO: Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN); Martí, Farabundo (1893–1932)

References and Suggested Readings

United Nations Security Council Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (1993) *From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador*. New York: United Nations.

Fell, Margaret (1614–1702)

Amy Linch

Margaret Fell was the co-founder, with George Fox, of the Religious Society of Friends, or Quakers. She was also an early preacher, organizer, and political advocate for the movement. Quakers believed that direct experience of Christ was available to all people without mediation by church officials or ceremony. Due to their rejection of any established creed, along with their emphasis on spiritual equality among people and their refusal to observe rituals that sustained the rigid social class hierarchy in seventeenth-century England, the Friends were widely regarded as subversive to both church and state. Margaret Fell shepherded the early movement through periods of intense persecution and was a major force behind its later institutionalization. In her writings and political intercession on the behalf of her co-religionists she fought for freedom of conscience, the right of assembly, and women's right to public ministry.

Margaret Fell was by birth and marriage a member of the landed gentry. Her husband, Thomas Fell, was a prominent judge and politician whose family had achieved gentry status through the redistribution of monastic lands during the Henrician Reformation. Their home became the administrative center of early Quakerism when Margaret was persuaded of the truth of George Fox's teachings while he was still an itinerant preacher. Margaret maintained correspondence between Fox and traveling missionaries, provided a safe haven for Friends fleeing persecution, and communicated with those who were in prison. She used her wealth and social status to petition Charles II for intercession on the behalf of imprisoned Quakers and establish a charitable fund to aid traveling missionaries and their families. Her husband also used his position to afford legal protection to Quakers until his death in 1658.

In 1664 Margaret Fell was arrested and sentenced to life in prison. She was also forced to forfeit her property for holding meetings in her home and refusing to take an oath of allegiance to the king. From prison she wrote and published religious pamphlets, most notably *Womens Speaking Justified*, a scripturally based polemic defending women's ministry. While most justifications of women's public voice in the mid-seventeenth century were based on the notion that women could transcend their gender through communion with the divine, Fell argued that women were not only spiritually equal to men but also uniquely suited to public ministry by virtue of their gender. She combined specific examples of female leaders in the Bible with scriptural passages that affirm women's equal responsibility for their own salvation and that of their communities.

Margaret married George Fox after she was released from prison in 1668 through the intercession of Charles II. She returned to her home, which had been granted to her son, the sole member of the family who was not a Quaker. Soon after her return she was arrested again and spent a year in prison for violation of the Conventicle Act, which forbade religious gatherings of more than five people outside of the Anglican Church. Fell, like many Quakers, supported the restoration monarchy and regarded Cromwell's government as having betrayed its ideals for worldly power. She advocated secular obedience among Friends but cautioned that people were ultimately bound to obey God rather than man where the two laws were in conflict.

SEE ALSO: Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658); English Reformation; English Revolution, 17th Century; English Revolution, Women and; Fifth Monarchist Women

References and Suggested Readings

- Gill, C. (2005) *Women in the Seventeenth-Century Quaker Community: A Literary Study of Political Identities, 1650–1700*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Kunze, B. Y. (1994) *Margaret Fell and the Rise of Quakerism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Ross, I. (1949) *Margaret Fell, Mother of Quakerism*. London: Longmans Green.
- Smith, H., Suzuki, M., & Wiseman, S. (Eds.) (2007) *Women's Political Writings, 1610–1725*. London: Pickering & Chatto.
- Thickstun, M. O. (1995) Writing the Spirit: Margaret Fell's Feminist Critique of Pauline Theology. *Journal of American Academy of Religion* 63 (2): 269–80.

Feminist performance

Magda Romanska

Starting in the 1960s, feminist performance artists began “defining their own roles, their own genitals, their own eroticism, and their own rules” (Juno 1991: 74). Because it combines visual imagery with the spoken word, theater offers a unique opportunity to deconstruct both the language and the visual codes of patriarchal tradition. Experimenting with nudity and obscenity as a way of dislocating the patriarchal discourse, female performance artists turned to their own bodies to search for “a symbolic reclamation of woman’s subjectivity through the body” (Dolan 1987: 159).

Women have done this in a number of ways. In 1968 in a performance called “Touch Cinema,” Valie Export put her breasts in a cardboard box and enticed street-fair passersby to touch them while simultaneously staring into her eyes. In 1973 in a show called *Erosion*, Export rolled her naked body over broken glass in order, as she said, “to change the male gaze. The man sees you naked . . . yet he cannot see you the way he *wants* to see a naked female body” (Juno 1991: 189–90). In 1976 Ulrike Rosenbach recreated Botticelli’s classic *The Birth of Venus*. In her own *Reflections on the Birth of Venus*, Rosenbach “placed herself in front of the figure of Venus as a slide of Botticelli’s masterpiece was projected life-size onto a wall. Turning in place, Rosenbach absorbed the identity of this female archetype (when the black half of her body-suit faced the audience) and projected it (when the white half faced the audience)” (O’Dell 1998: 96–7).

In the early to mid-1980s, a second wave of feminist performance artists continued struggling with the same issues their predecessors had. Within the context of the growing porn business (and the slowdown in women’s economic and social advancements during the Reagan years), female performance artists were caught between the real (the economic) and representational (the aesthetic) of the sex industry and the new erotic gaze that it launched. The most interesting performer to emerge from this climate was a former porn star, Annie Sprinkle, noted for a 1985 solo routine that she called *Post-Porn Modernism*, a show-within-a-show of Richard Schechner’s *Prometheus Project*. In an attempt, as Sprinkle put

it, to “demystify women’s bodies,” she inserted a speculum in her vagina and invited spectators to look inside it, with a flashlight, and describe her cervix. Sprinkle’s *Post-Porn Modernism* made money and its relationship to sex, power, and the agency of the commodity in question the main focus of her show. In early 1984 two semi-pornographic shows took place in New York: one was a performance titled *The Second Coming* by seven women artists called Carnival Knowledge, which explored “the possibility of a ‘new definition of pornography,’” and the second one was *Deep Inside Porn Stars*, “which promised ‘live performances by 7 top film stars from the sex industry’” (Fuchs 1996: 114).

Another strategy was to form a discourse around the vagina that would challenge the stereotypical relationship between patriarchy and creativity. The “cunt-masculinity” had its first inklings in the 1960s in the performances of such artists as Shigeo Kubota, who in 1965 at Perpetual Fluxfest in New York City attached a brush to her vagina and made *Vagina Painting* (with red paint simulating menstrual blood). In the 1990s more works focusing on female genitals emerged. In more eclectic art circles, Rocio Bolivar sewed up her labia with a plastic baby doll Jesus inside her vagina to protest the virgin/whore dichotomy which she blamed on the cult of the male/Jesus. In 1996, Holly Hughes published *Clit Notes*, based on her one-woman show. In the late 1990s, Eve Ensler’s *The Vagina Monologues*, a solo performance piece based on confessional interviews of women talking about their vaginas in various contexts (including rape), became a pop culture phenomenon. Heralded as “celebrating female sexuality,” *The Vagina Monologues* inspired a countrywide campus V-Day movement aimed at fighting violence against women and changing the meaning of Valentine’s Day (including the meaning of the Valentine’s heart, seen now as a symbol of the female genitals).

In recent performance art, many feminist artists have turned away from examining the female body to addressing the male body and masculinity. A good example of the new trend is Catherine MacGregor’s performance and video piece *On the Rag*. The video features a short scene in which a well-manicured female hand slashes the tip of a penis with a surgical razor. MacGregor’s piece is designed to do what Butler advocates in her recent book: “focusing on

the question of what it might mean to undo restrictively normative conceptions of sexual and gendered life” (2004: 1).

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Gender; Guerrilla Girls; Riot Grrl

References and Suggested Readings

- Butler, J. (2004) *Undoing Gender*. New York: Routledge.
- Dolan, J. (1987) The Dynamics of Desire: Sexuality and Gender in Pornography and Performance. *Theatre Journal* 39 (2): 156–74.
- Dolan, J. (1993) Desire Cloaked in a Trenchcoat. In L. Hart & P. Phelan (Eds.), *Acting Out: Feminist Performances*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Forte, J. (1990) Women’s Performance Art: Feminism and Postmodernism. In S.-E. Case (Ed.), *Performing Feminisms: Feminist Critical Theory and Theatre*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Fuchs, E. (1996) When Bad Girls Play Good Theaters. In *The Death of Character: Perspectives on Theater after Modernism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Juno, A. (Ed.) (1991) *Angry Women*. San Francisco: Re/Search.
- O’Dell, K. (1998) *Contract with the Skin: Masochism, Performance Art, and the 1970s*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Phelan, P. (1993) *Unmarked: The Politics of Performance*. New York: Routledge.

Fenian movement

Matthew Wahlert

The Fenian movement – revolutionary secret societies dedicated to gaining independence for Ireland – arose when nineteenth-century Irish nationalists created the Fenian Brotherhood, named after the Gaelic hero Fionn mac Cumhail. The movement, which was active in both Ireland and America, was committed to liberating Ireland through “physical force”; its position was that revolution should be “sooner or never.”

The movement originated with veterans of the 1848 revolt of Young Ireland. In the wake of that uprising’s defeat two of its leaders, James Stephens and John O’Mahony, fled to Paris. In 1853 O’Mahony traveled to America with the intention of gaining political support from Irish refugees, and in 1858 he founded the Fenian Brotherhood in the United States. Also in 1858 Stephens returned to Ireland with the aim of

establishing a similar organization; his efforts resulted in the creation of the Irish Republican Brotherhood. Stephens created the party journal of the Fenians, the *Irish People*, in Dublin in 1863.

The Fenians targeted artisans rather than the agrarian population for support. They faced stiff opposition in Ireland not only from the British authorities but also from the Catholic Church. In 1865 British officials made a concerted effort to suppress the Fenians, and Stephens was arrested. He escaped, however, and fled to the United States, where the Fenian Brotherhood had flourished and had attracted a significant number of Irish immigrants with military experience gained during the American Civil War.

The American wing of the Brotherhood was officially launched by an 1863 convention. However, the organization soon broke into two factions – one led by O’Mahony and the other by W. R. Roberts. In 1865 a convention of Roberts’ followers in Cincinnati, Ohio, demonstrated that the Fenians had developed significant support in the United States.

The Cincinnati convention took the decision to invade Canada. In June 1866 General John O’Neill and 800 men crossed the Niagara and took control of Fort Erie. The Fenians believed the Canadian transportation network could be easily seized, giving them a powerful bargaining chip in their struggle. Britain, they thought, would surely grant Ireland its freedom in exchange for British holdings in Canada. Some historians have suggested that the US government at first acquiesced in the Fenian plan as payback for Britain’s tacit support of the Confederacy during the Civil War. Be that as it may, US forces eventually intervened, cut off the Fenians on the Niagara River, and arrested approximately 700 of them.

In spite of the defeat, the Fenians were not demoralized and were obviously planning further actions of a similar nature. The following year, in 1867, a Fenian convention in Philadelphia put its intentions on display by parading an army of 6,000 Fenian soldiers in the streets in full uniform. A second attempt to invade Canada was decided – this time from Vermont – but it was also foiled.

Also in 1867, the Fenian organization in the United States made an effort to take a direct part in the fight in Ireland itself. The ship *Erin’s Hope* left for Ireland filled with Civil War veterans ready to join the struggle. They were taken into custody while attempting to land, however, and

a number of small uprisings and attempts to rescue the jailed Fenians proved fruitless.

The Fenian movement persevered into the World War I era, when it was replaced by newly formed organizations, including Sinn Féin, a group founded by a former Fenian, Arthur Griffith. Although the Fenians failed in terms of their military objectives, they were important for having kept the plight of the Irish nation alive in the consciousness of worldwide public opinion, and for steadfastly maintaining the continuity of the Irish nationalist spirit from the revolt of 1848 to the Easter Rising of 1916. The Irish Republican Brotherhood was a direct antecedent of the Irish Republican Army. The term “Fenians” is still used today, by friend and foe alike, to refer to Irish nationalists in general.

SEE ALSO: Davitt, Michael (1846–1906); Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War; Gonne, Maud (1866–1953); Irish Nationalism; Irish Republican Army (IRA); Parnell, Charles Stewart (1846–1891); Sinn Féin; Young Ireland

References and Suggested Readings

- Moody, T. W. (Ed.) (1985) *The Fenian Movement*. Cork: Mercier Press.
- O’Broin, L. (1976) *Revolutionary Underground: The Story of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, 1858–1924*. Dublin: Gill & McMillan.
- Owen, D. (1990) *The Year of the Fenians*. Buffalo: Western New York Heritage Institute.

Feuchtwanger, Lion (1884–1958)

Ian Wallace

Lion Feuchtwanger, the Jewish writer who reached a global readership in the three decades between the publication of his first bestselling novels in the 1920s and his death in exile, was deeply affected by his experience of revolution in his native Germany. Unlike writers such as Ernst Toller and Erich Mühsam, he did not take a leading role in the revolution in Bavaria following World War I, but as a citizen of Munich he observed it first hand and supported its main aims: free elections, a free press, and the removal of censorship. However, his “dramatic novel” *Thomas Wendt* (1919) reflects his anguish over the conflict he saw between revolutionary ideals and the seemingly inevitable use of brutal

force. Herein are the seeds of that constant preoccupation with the tension between contemplation and action which characterize the intellectuals and writers who inhabit his subsequent literary work.

As a man of liberal persuasion, Feuchtwanger favored the American and French over the Bolshevik revolutionary model. He deviated from this position only in the mid-1930s, when the Soviet Union seemed to represent the best hope of defeating the Fascist forces which had forced him into exile – first in France in 1933 and then, after the fall of France in 1940, in the US. His short book *Moscow 1937* (1937) is remarkable for its fulsome praise of Stalin and its disparaging asides against western democracies – controversial judgments which he never withdrew. Elsewhere, his sympathy for the revolutions in America and France prevails, especially in three historical novels which are also a tribute to the two countries which had provided him with refuge from Fascism: *Proud Destiny* (1947–8), *This is the Hour* (1951), and *’Tis Folly to be Wise* (1952). The central figures in these novels are, respectively, Benjamin Franklin, Francisco Goya, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau – protagonists who both represent the idea of historical progress over reaction and also prefigure, in different ways, the lot of twentieth-century émigrés like Feuchtwanger.

His novel *Success* (1930), with its mocking portrait of Adolf Hitler in the fictional figure of Rupert Kutzner, was the first major prose work in any language to protest against the rise of National Socialism in Germany. When the National Socialist revolution arrived in 1933 Feuchtwanger was unsurprisingly among the first to be deprived of their German citizenship and to see their books publicly burned, but even in exile he continued to protest against the Nazis and, in *The Oppermanns* (1933), against their brutality towards the Jews. The attack on Hitler personally continued in the historical novel *The Pretender* (1936) and in the satire *Double, Double, Toil and Trouble* (1944), where Feuchtwanger exposed the Führer as a charlatan whose irrational hold over the masses is based on lies and an absurd belief in his exceptional powers. As a writer, Feuchtwanger protested particularly against the turgid and ungrammatical German of Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, a sure indication that the revolution he represented was a betrayal of true German culture.

SEE ALSO: German Revolution, 1918–1923; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; *Mein Kampf*; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778); Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”

References and Suggested Readings

- Feuchtwanger, L. (1920) *Thomas Wendt. Ein dramatischer Roman* [Thomas Wendt: A Dramatic Novel]. Munich: Georg Müller.
- Feuchtwanger, L. (1991–5) *Gesammelte Werke in Einzelbänden* [Collected Works in Single Volumes], 16 vols. Berlin: Aufbau.
- Spalek, J. M. & Hawrylychak, S. H. (1998–2004) *Lion Feuchtwanger: A Bibliographic Handbook*, 4 vols. Munich: K. G. Saur.
- Sternburg, W. von (1994) *Lion Feuchtwanger. Ein deutsches Schriftstellerleben* [Lion Feuchtwanger: Life of a German Writer]. Berlin: Aufbau.

Fifth Monarchist women

Amy Lynch

The Fifth Monarchists are unique among the religious sects in seventeenth-century England for the specifically political content of their spiritual vision and practice. Inspired by the biblical prophecies of Daniel and Revelation, Fifth Monarchists understood history as the ascension and decline of four world empires, after which Jesus would reign directly on earth with his saints for 1,000 years. While other sects shared their millenarian beliefs, the Fifth Monarchists were distinct both in their expectation that the New Jerusalem would come from the ranks of ordinary citizens and soldiers, and in their commitment to bringing the revolution to fruition through violence if necessary. It was, they believed, the right and duty of godly people to take up arms in overthrowing the existing regime to shepherd in the New Jerusalem. In the new kingdom, godliness, rather than social class, would distinguish people, and the poor and oppressed would reign. They sought a social and political revolution with an end to centralization and hierarchical mediation in law as well as in religious matters, care for the poor, break up of monopolies, and an end to taxation.

The priority given to revelation as a source of truth and the right of the inspired to public voice among Fifth Monarchists opened the way for women to claim authority in social and political

matters. Published writings from more than eighty radical women survive from the period 1640–1680 and an estimated 300 women were active as prophets from the period just prior to the English Civil War through the restoration of Charles II to the throne (Mack 1992). Of these women, Anna Trapnel was perhaps the most famous, garnering public attention for the visions and trances through which she and others believed God spoke to her. Mary Cary, by contrast, based her claim to divine inspiration on deep knowledge of scripture. Assumption of the prophetic voice enabled women to transcend the rigid gender roles that relegated them to domestic space and concerns. They challenged political authority and asserted their relevance not just to social matters within their own communities, but to national and international politics as well.

Anna Trapnel (fl. 1642–60) was the daughter of a shipwright and a devout mother whose deathbed blessing Trapnel considered the source of her own special connection with the divine. She began having prophetic visions in 1642, but claimed national attention when she went into a trance at the examination for treason of Vavasor Powell, a Fifth Monarchist minister, by Oliver Cromwell's Council of State in 1654. She neither ate nor drank during 11 days and 12 nights of prophesying. From the fifth day a member of the audience recorded her words, later published as *The Cry of a Stone*. Cromwell, the army, merchants, the clergy, and universities were all targets of Trapnel's wrath. Cromwell was vilified for having betrayed his responsibility to the new kingdom. Arriving on the heels of Cromwell's installation as Lord Protector and dismissal of the Barebones Parliament, her visions reflected the anger and frustration of the Fifth Monarchists at his thwarting of their revolution. She accused him of having been seduced by luxury and flattery and contrasted her own asceticism with his excesses. She likened the destruction of the corrupt aristocratic and popish order to the fall of Babylon and reveled in the specter of its demise.

In April 1654 Trapnel went to visit Cromwell on divine instructions and stayed with Fifth Monarchist members of the disbanded Barebones Parliament. She was arrested at the urging of local clergy on the grounds that she was spreading subversion and subsequently accused of witchcraft, treasonous declarations, and disturbing the peace, as well as madness, whoredom, and vagrancy. At her trial she defended her right as

an independent English woman and a taxpayer to pursue God's will according to her own discretion. While imprisoned she continued her evangelism through correspondence, and eventually public outcry at her martyrdom led to her release.

In 1654 she published *A Legacy for Saints*, a spiritual autobiography, and *Report and Plea*, a description of her treatment by the authorities and response to the allegations against her. In both works she used her own life to affirm the truth of the Fifth Monarchist message and presented herself as a moral and political example by contrasting her own actions with those of the authorities and through her pointed challenges to their legitimacy. In *Legacy for Saints* she contested the prevailing social order on the basis of her belief in predestination. The elect were not evident by their clothes or the trappings of class. Instead, human value was determined by the divine rather than by social convention.

Another Fifth Monarchist woman, Mary Cary (b. 1620/1), invoked the prophetic form in articulating both the role of the saints in social and political transformation and her vision of the New Jerusalem. For her, prophecy was not a consequence of "any immediate revelation . . . or that she had been told it by an Angel" (*Resurrection, Epistle to the Reader*), but the result of proper understanding of how God's promises were manifest historically. She developed her ability to know the future through engagement with scripture, especially the books of Daniel and Revelation. The promises in those texts were about the world rather than the spirit and thus must be observed in historical time rather than experienced through direct revelation. The power to interpret was unique to the saints but could be developed through study. Saints could come from any sect or social class; the only requirement was recognition of the imperative to overthrow the existing regime to make way for the reign of Jesus.

The priority of the political task before the saints required cooperation with any who shared their cause regardless of their spiritual inclinations, and a willingness to use violence if it was necessary. In the New Jerusalem the converted would be filled with divine joy and justice and integrity would prevail in human relationships. That time, however, was not yet at hand. In this respect Cary disagreed with the Quakers, who sought immediate experience of the spiritual

world and withdrew into their own hearts rather than assume responsibility for the political. Her concerns were situated nationally; the reign of the saints would begin in England and from there spread to the rest of the world (*The Resurrection*, 1653).

Cary championed lay preaching, condemned the use of force against members of nonconforming religious sects, and eschewed imposition of any orthodoxy (*A Word in a Season*, 1647). She proposed redistribution of wealth from university endowments to poor scholars and preachers, simplification of laws, and decentralization of courts (*A New and More Exact Mappe, Description of New Jerusalems Glory*, 1651). In the New Jerusalem she envisioned an end to physical suffering, especially the trauma of infant mortality, and equitable distribution of wealth such that people would no longer, "labour and toyl day and night . . . to maintain others that live . . . in idleness," but would "comfortably enjoy the work of their hands" (*Little Horns Doom*, pp. 307–8).

SEE ALSO: Calvin, John (1509–1564); Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658); English Revolution, 17th Century; Fell, Margaret (1614–1702)

References and Suggested Readings

- Capp, B. S. (1972) *The Fifth Monarchy Men: A Study in Seventeenth-Century English Millenarianism*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Cohen, A. (1964) The Fifth Monarchy Mind: Mary Cary and the Origins of Totalitarianism. *Social Research* 31, 2 (Summer): 195.
- Feroli, T. (2006) *Politically Speaking Justified*. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
- Hinds, H. (1996) *God's Englishwomen: Seventeenth-Century Radical Sectarian Writing and Feminist Criticism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Loewenstein, D. (2006) Scriptural Exegesis, Female Prophecy and Radical Politics in Mary Cary. *Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900*, 46 (1).
- Mack, P. (1992) *Visionary Women: Ecstatic Prophecy in Seventeenth-Century England*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Richards, J. & Thorne, A. (Eds.) (2007) *Rhetoric, Women and Politics in Early Modern England*. New York: Routledge.
- Trapnel, A. (1654) *Strange and Wonderful News from Whitehall*. London. Available at Women Writers Project, Lehigh University Library, www.wwp.brown.edu/texts/trapnel.strange.html.
- Trapnel, A. (2000) *The Cry of a Stone*. Ed. H. Hinds. Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies.

Fiji, parliamentary insurrection

Justin Corfield

The islands of Fiji, in the southwestern part of the Pacific Ocean, were visited by European explorers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with Abel Tasman's visit in 1643 being the first confirmed European contact with Fiji. Although trade in sandalwood started soon afterwards, it was usually through middlemen, and the first direct trade between the Europeans and the Fijians over sandalwood was in 1805. In order to get the wood, the Europeans often traded weapons, and the access to these in the Fijian islands usually led to fighting with violent tribal warfare during the first part of the nineteenth century.

During the 1830s European missionaries started to arrive in Fiji. By this time, tribes from Tonga had become involved in some fighting in Fiji, and the missionaries were also mediating between the various sides while trying to get chiefs to convert to Christianity. Starting with the high chief of Viwa, gradually several other chiefs converted, and the Methodists were even able to get the warlike Cakobau to convert. However, there was local disquiet over the influence of these missionaries, and Reverend Thomas Baker, who was proselytizing in the western highlands, was killed and eaten in 1867.

During this period European companies also set up sugar and cotton plantations in Fiji. The American Civil War had led to the destruction of many of the cotton fields in the United States, and an alternate source was needed. With the colonial need for indentured labor, many local people were pressed into working in the plantations, some by being misled, but many through kidnapping. This became known as blackbirding.

In 1873 the acting British consul in Fiji, J. B. Thurston, proposed that Fiji be annexed to the British crown. He saw it as preferable to the French or the Germans gaining control, and on October 10, 1874, at Levuka, Fiji was pronounced to be a British Crown Colony. The Deed of Cession was signed by Cakobau as "King of Fiji and warlord," Ma'afu, the chief of la Lau, Tavenui, and much of Navua Levu, and 11 other chiefs. This represented all but one chief from eastern Fiji. The absence of chiefs from the

west was to become an important political issue for many years to come.

In 1875–6 the Kai Colo Uprising occurred, involving highlanders from the western part of Vitu Levu who were unhappy about Fiji becoming a British colony. When a measles epidemic broke out in 1875, killing about a third of the population of Fiji, the Kai Colo mountain people viewed this as a punishment inflicted by the gods for their abandoning of their tribal ways and the acceptance of British rule, so they revolted. Sir Arthur Gordon established a Fijian Constabulary of 1,000 men under the command of Nadroga Chief Ratu Luki. This force crushed the rebellion by killing many of the rebels and jailing many others.

After the end of the rebellion, much new capital was invested in Fiji, with the capital being moved to Suva in 1882. A land commission was established to review all the land that Europeans had obtained prior to cession, and whether or not it had been bought at a fair price. Most of the remaining land either became crown land or was retained by the traditional owners. Indeed, with the exception of the period 1905–9, when the rules making tribal land inalienable were waived to encourage investment, most of the Fijian traditional lands were kept by their traditional owners, and even today more than 80 percent of the land is owned by the Fijians.

To prevent a return to blackbirding and to stop the exploitation of the Fijians, Governor Arthur Gordon introduced regulations to prevent Fijians from being exploited as indentured labor. To solve the labor problems, the colonial government started bringing in large numbers of Indians, many from Calcutta in the northeast of India and Madras in the south. The laborers were often beaten by their employers, with regular reports of abuses of human rights. Many of these Indians – 80 percent of whom were Hindu – remained in Fiji, where they established communities, and with the ending of the system of indentured labor in the early 1900s there were large numbers of Indians in Fiji.

Manilal Maganlal Doctor, an Indian lawyer from Mauritius, came to Fiji in 1912 and provided a focus for the discontented Indian laborers. He helped organize strikes against the 12-hour working day and protests against rising prices and seemingly arbitrary taxation. This had little effect in Fiji, but it did lead to a decline in the number of Indians being transported to Fiji,

with the ending of indentured labor in January 1919. The colonial authorities discouraged contact between the Fijians and the Indians, but gradually this became inevitable as many Indians started leaving plantations and setting up their own businesses.

The composition of the Legislative Council, established to advise the governor, changed in 1904. It had consisted entirely of nominees of the governor, all of whom were Europeans. The constitution was amended to allow two Fijians to be nominated by the Great Council of Chiefs, and six Europeans to be elected. In 1916 the first Indian was nominated to the Legislative Council, and in 1929 the first Indian members were elected.

Fijians participated in both world wars. In World War I there were about 700 Europeans from Fiji, and 100 Fijians went to serve in Europe. During World War II, in anticipation of Japanese attacks, 800 Fijians were recruited to form the Fiji Military Force, trained by American and New Zealand soldiers. They were involved in fighting in the Solomon Islands. After World War II Fijian soldiers were involved in fighting the communists in Malaya, and a strong military tradition started with the military subsequently serving in the Middle East in United Nations' peacekeeping forces, and in Zimbabwe.

During the 1960s moves were made towards independence with the start of ministerial government, the extending of the franchise to cover women, and the formation of political parties. Many of the parties were set up along racial lines, with the National Federation Party established by A. D. Patel urging independence from Britain, and all the electors of Fiji to be on a common electoral roll, rather than separate rolls for the Fijians, Indians, and Europeans. However, the main political force was the Alliance Party formed by Ratu Kamisese Mara, which drew most of its support from indigenous Fijians. They wanted electoral rolls drawn up along racial lines, but stated their support for multiculturalism.

In 1963 there were 38 members of the Legislative Council, divided between the Europeans, the Fijians, and the Indians. This perpetuated the separate electoral rolls, but in 1966 a new constitution was introduced to expand the Legislative Council to 40 seats, with less representation for Europeans, but maintaining the separate rolls. The Alliance won a majority in

the 1966 elections and Ratu Mara became chief minister in September 1967.

On October 10, 1970 Fiji became independent, ending 96 years of colonial rule, with Sir Ratu Mara as prime minister (he had been knighted in 1969). The first governor general of the country was Ratu George Cakobau, a descendant of the Great Chief Cakobau, who ceded Fiji in 1874. The new Fijian constitution established a Senate which comprised the Fijian chiefs, and a House of Representatives with 22 Fijian, 22 Indian, and 8 general members (Europeans, part-Fijians, and Chinese). This entrenched segregation in the country.

A rise in Fijian nationalism in 1975 led to one politician, Sakesai Butadroka, calling a parliamentary motion which urged for the repatriation of the entire Indian population of Fiji. This was rejected by both the National Federation Party (NFP), which represented many Indians but which was badly split between Hindu and Muslim factions, and the Alliance Party. By contrast many extreme Fijian nationalists supported the idea. In the elections in 1977 Butadroka's Fijian Nationalist Party drew support away from the Alliance Party and allowed the NFP to win. However, a new election was called soon afterwards and the Alliance Party won a majority.

As Fiji prospered with a massive increase in tourism and the clothing industry, some Indian families came to dominate many parts of the economic life of the country. This led to a growing disparity between the wealthy Indians and the majority of Indians who remained poor. Many Indians, disillusioned by the infighting in the NFP, and some moderate members of the Alliance Party decided to come together and form the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) in 1985, which was led by Timoci Bavadra.

The FLP, in coalition with the NFP, managed to win 28 of the 52 seats in the House of Representatives in the April 1987 elections, with 19 Fijian Indians as part of the coalition. Bavadra, an ethnic Fijian, became prime minister and formed his government with a Cabinet which had a Fijian majority. In spite of this, many people saw the government as being Indian-dominated, setting the scene for the first military coup in Fiji.

On May 14, 1987 Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka staged the first of several coups d'état in Fiji. He led armed soldiers into the parliament and took over the control of the government,

placing Bavadra and the Cabinet ministers under arrest. The governor general Ratu Penaia Ganilau then declared a state of emergency, and Rabuka set up a civil interim government which included many members of the former Alliance Party government, with himself as a "military member" with the role of "directing" the council of ministers. This was approved by the Great Council of Chiefs but the actions were widely condemned outside Fiji. When the Commonwealth moved against Fiji, on September 15, 1987, Rabuka staged a second coup d'état, imposing martial law. On October 7 Rabuka declared Fiji a republic, invalidating the 1970 constitution and appointing himself as head of the interim military government, holding that position until December 5.

Although Rabuka described how he planned the coups in *Rabuka: No Other Way*, written by Eddie Dean and Stan Ritova, even allowing them to publish his plans, there are still many different theories about the real causes of the coups. On an economic level there were immediate moves to prevent the Fijian Indian sugar farmers from increasing their economic power. The coups certainly caused large numbers of Indian professionals and artisans to emigrate. Many viewed the Methodist Church as having a major role in the coups, with some closely connected with the extreme Fijian nationalist Taukei movement. Church leaders certainly supported the coups, after which legislation was introduced to protect Sunday observances, including a ban on shops opening on Sundays. Others saw that the coups were essentially a dispute within the Fijian nationalist movement with the FLP-NFP wanting to limit the power of the Great Council of Chiefs. There were even theories that the US Central Intelligence Agency was involved because the Timoci Bavadra FLP-NFP government was against the presence of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific.

On December 5, 1987 Sir Ratu Kamisese Mara became prime minister again, and on July 25, 1990 a new constitution was proclaimed by President Ratu Ganilau. This massively increased the power of the Great Council of Chiefs, which was allowed to appoint the president and also a majority of members of the Senate. They also issued a special immunity to Rabuka and all the army, police, and prison services who had taken part in the coups. Also, 37 of the 70 seats in the House of Representatives were reserved for

Fijian members, 27 for Indians, 1 for Rotumans/Polynesians, and 5 for others. The new constitution also entrenched the Christian church, legislating Sunday observance.

A major change in Fijian politics followed when, in March 1991, the Alliance Party was disbanded and the Soqosoqo-ni-Vakavulewa-ni-Taukei (Party of Policy Members for Indigenous Fijians) (SVT) was established. Soon afterwards the General Voters Party was formed for Europeans, part-Fijians, and Chinese, with the NFP and FLP initially planning to boycott the forthcoming elections, but later deciding to participate. In November 1991 Rabuka was elected president and leader of the SVT. Rabuka then sought to become a populist leader, and on June 2, 1992 he became prime minister, a position he held until May 19, 1999, leaving a SVT-GVP coalition government.

With the two coups, an outflow of Fijian Indian capital, and a lack of investment in the economy, the economic situation of Fiji declined quickly, made worse by Hurricane Kina hitting the islands in early 1993. However, in 1994 elections the SVT were able to increase their seats in parliament by one – winning 31 of the 37 seats reserved for indigenous Fijians. With the real possibility of Fiji being declared bankrupt, the Fijian government proposed a scheme to resettle 28,000 Chinese migrants from Hong Kong but abandoned the move as worries were raised about it.

Gradually, more and more pressure was placed on Rabuka by the international community to amend the 1990 constitution. Having promised a review in 1992, in 1995 he finally oversaw the establishment of the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC). The SVT wanted the 1990 constitution to be retained, but the Citizens' Constitutional Forum (CCF), a multiracial pressure group, submitted its own report to the CRC. It argued for the importance of a new constitution which embraced multiracial concepts and was seen as being fair to all Fijians. When the CRC presented its findings in 1996, its 800-page report urged for the creation of non-communal seats in parliament, where all Fijians could vote and stand for election. The report asked for 12 seats to be reserved for Fijians, 10 for Indians, 2 for other races, and the remainder (45) to be from a common electoral roll. It did accept that there could be a provision that ensured that the president had to be an indigenous Fijian, but did not

believe that this provision should also apply to the office of the prime minister.

The result was the 1997 constitution, which went some way to meeting the points raised by the CRC. It allowed for a House of Representatives of 71 seats, with 23 being reserved for Fijians, 19 for Indians, 1 for Rotumans, and 3 for other races, with 25 open seats. Against the CRC report, the Great Council of Chiefs had the power to appoint the president, and it was compulsory to have a multi-party government so that any party which managed to get more than 10 percent of the seats was entitled to join the new government. There was also a Bill of Rights which outlawed racial discrimination, guaranteed freedom of speech and association and the right of equality before the law, and ensured the independence of the judiciary. With the passing of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill of 1997 the new constitution became law. Sitiveni Rabuka then apologized to Queen Elizabeth II for the 1989 Declaration of a Republic, and Fiji rejoined the Commonwealth on July 27, 1997.

The Fijian economy had been hard hit during the early 1990s. First, there was a long drought which wrecked much of the sugar cane crop. Then there was the outflow of Indian professionals and their capital. Finally, the Asian economic crisis resulted in a plunge in the number of Asian tourists going to Fiji.

In the May 8–15, 1999 elections, Fijian voters rejected Rabuka and the SVT. The FLP, led by Mahendra Chaudry, won a majority of seats in the House of Representatives and took power in coalition with the FAP. The SVT suddenly saw itself marginalized, and the NFP, led by former opposition leader Jai Ram Reddy, which had planned on an alliance with the SVT, was also marginalized. Rabuka resigned from the SVT and then from the House of Representatives and was elected chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs on June 17.

On May 19, 2000, the first anniversary of Mahendra Chaudry coming to power, a group of armed men led by failed businessman George Speight invaded the parliament and took hostage Chaudry and 30 other senior politicians. They declared themselves in favor of Fijian rights as hundreds of supporters of the coup then attacked and looted Indian businesses in Suva. The outbreak of violence occupied the police while Speight and his armed supporters were able to entrench themselves and secure the grounds

of the parliament against any attack. President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara then declared a state of emergency.

The Great Council of Chiefs offered major concessions in return for the release of Chaudry and the other hostages, and on May 27 Ratu Mara announced that he had dismissed the Chaudry government and offered amnesty to George Speight. By this time Speight was giving regular interviews to the press, revealing his charisma. His control of the parliamentary compound by armed supporters and large numbers of poor Fijians who could come to his aid when needed, also became evident. Although Australia, New Zealand, and many other countries condemned the coup, no diplomatic action was taken against Speight for fear of reprisals against Chaudry and the other hostages.

The situation in Fiji changed again on May 29 when Commodore Frank Bainimarama, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, announced that Ratu Mara had resigned as president, and that the military had imposed martial law and a curfew. Negotiations with Speight continued and on June 6 Fiji was partially suspended from the Commonwealth. Ten days later the new Military Executive Council announced that it would amend the 1997 constitution which had given the Indo-Fijians more political rights. On July 12 nine of the hostages were released, and on the following day Chaudry and the other 17 still held were also freed. Laisenia Qarase, leader of the United Fiji Party, formed an interim government with elections to be held within three years.

On July 26 the amnesty was lifted and George Speight was arrested. In the next week more than 500 of his supporters were also arrested, with 300 of them charged with unlawful assembly. Speight argued that he was still covered by the amnesty, but even that only covered actions from the date of the coup of May 19, 2000, leaving Speight open to charges of preparing an armed rebellion which clearly took place before the date of the actual coup. On August 11 Speight and 14 of his most prominent supporters were charged with treason and conspiracy to commit treason with armed force.

Fiji was in turmoil again soon afterwards with the Counter Revolutionary Warfare unit of the Fijian armed forces staging a mutiny on November 2, 2000. Eight of the officers in the unit had been charged with treason, and the

mutiny attempt, during which Commodore Frank Bainimarama only narrowly escaped capture, was seen as possibly another coup attempt – eight soldiers died in that action. On November 15, 2000 the High Court ruled that Bainimarama's abrogation of the 1997 constitution was illegal and restored Ratu Mara as president, declaring the government of interim prime minister Laisenia Qarase illegal. The matter was appealed, and Ratu Mara retired from public life, dying four years later. In the meantime Laisenia Qarase was sworn in as prime minister and formed a Cabinet made up of entirely ethnic Fijians, which was sworn in on September 10.

George Speight and ten of his associates were found guilty of treason on February 18, 2002 for their role in the May 2000 coup. Speight himself was sentenced to death but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. In April it was announced that the new Fijian constitution would be put to the people in a referendum. On November 6, 2002, 15 members of the Counter Revolutionary Warfare unit were found guilty of mutiny in their attempt to overthrow Commodore Frank Bainimarama. On May 8, 2003 Jopi Seniloli, one of the people arrested for the swearing in of the Speight provisional government in May 2000, was also found guilty of treason and sentenced to life imprisonment.

On June 3, 2003 Rabuka was reelected president of the SVT and on July 18 the Supreme Court ruled that the party of deposed prime minister Mahendra Chaudhry was entitled to hold one third of the seats in the Cabinet, but Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase rejected this. With many people still uncertain about who was exactly behind the May 2000 coup, investigations were started by the Australian Andrew Hughes, who held the post of police commissioner. His task force to investigate the coup was established on March 22, 2004.

After many warnings that he was planning a coup d'état, Commodore Frank Bainimarama finally took power on December 5, 2006, deposing Laisenia Qarase. He had warned the government that it should stop plans to introduce three bills to parliament. The main one would have questioned the legality of the 2000 attempted coup d'état, offering pardons to the participants still being held in custody, notably George Speight. Bainimarama had set a deadline of December 1, and three days later used the military to estab-

lish roadblocks around Suva. On the following day he placed key government ministers and other politicians under house arrest. The Great Council of Chiefs condemned the coup on December 7, and the Anglican archbishop was critical of the coup. However, there were no outbreaks of looting as had taken place in 2000, and although the international community disapproved of the coup, it largely remained inactive as Bainimarama initially assumed the role of the president but handed the presidency to Ratu Josefa Iloilo on January 4, 2007. On the following day Iloilo appointed Bainimarama as the interim prime minister.

SEE ALSO: French Polynesia, Protest Movements; Micronesia, Nationalist and Labor Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Bain, K. (1989) *Treason at 10: Fiji at the Crossroads*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
- Coulter, J. W. (1967) *The Drama of Fiji: A Contemporary History*. Melbourne: Paul Flesch.
- Dean, E. & Ritova, S. (1988) *Rabuka: No Other Way*. Sydney: Doubleday.
- Mara, S. R. (1997) *The Pacific Way: A Memoir*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Prasad, S., Hince, K., & Snell, D. (2003) *Employment and Industrial Relations in the South Pacific: Samoa, the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji Islands*. Sydney: McGraw-Hill.

Finland, civil war and revolution, 1914–1918

Kyle E. Frackman

The revolution or civil war of 1917–18 in Finland is one of the decisive events in the nation's history. Representing a forceful break with Russia, which had controlled Finland since 1809, the conflict put Finland on the short path toward independence and democratization. The concerted movement for independence began around World War I, as the Finnish political scene had previously been absent of plans for separation from Russia. The only revolutionary tendency before World War I was for a restoration of Finnish autonomy within the Russian empire.

Since the thirteenth century, Finland had been under Swedish rule, administered by Swedish-speaking nobles and bureaucrats. For some

time and to varying degrees, many Finns had been dissatisfied with their position under Sweden's control. Finland found itself situated literally between these two greater powers. Nonetheless, Sweden-Finland had the benefit of a strong constitutional government, something that Russia began using to its advantage already in the eighteenth century in order to weaken the position of the Swedish monarch. In 1809, following the successful military efforts of Alexander I of Russia (1777–1825), Finland became a part of the Russian empire. As part of the Grand Duchy of Finland, Finns were promised autonomy under the Russian tsars.

From Finland's creation as a Grand Duchy through the 1880s, Finnish autonomy was largely a reality. As it had before, Russia encouraged the constitutional aspirations of Finns, because it furthered the separation of Finland from its former ruler, Sweden. Alexander III (1845–94), however, who ascended the throne in 1881, grew increasingly critical of Finland's exceptional status as an autonomous Grand Duchy. He was not alone, as concerns about Finnish connections to Germany, Sweden, and Britain abounded and agitated Russian nationalists. In 1890, Alexander III initiated a series of efforts aimed at bringing Finland under tighter Russian control. After Alexander's death and the accession of Nicholas II (1868–1918), this period of Russification continued and expanded throughout the Russian empire. In Finland, this gained full force in 1899 when Finnish legislation came under the purview of the Russian government, starting the first "period (or years) of oppression" (*sortokausi* or *sortovuodet* in Finnish).

There were several factors that contributed to the revolutionary climate in Finland in the first quarter of the twentieth century. First and foremost were conflicts and friction between Finland and Russia. The aforementioned Russification fomented conflict as it prevented or hindered Finnish control of national legislation. Finns desired representation in the Russian parliament, the Duma, created after the tsar's 1905 allowance. Largely involuntary support of the Russian military was required and simultaneously offensive to a great portion of the Finnish population. Russian involvement in official uses of Swedish and Finnish fostered Finnish national antagonism. Additionally, there was internal Russian discord over Finland's exceptional status

as a Grand Duchy. Furthermore, Finns were increasingly indignant about the poor state of the Finnish economy and the country's overwhelming poverty. These sources of Finnish rancor led merely to developing support of the restoration of Finnish autonomy; up to 1910 none of the political parties was planning on Finland becoming an independent nation.

Two groups were integral in the developments surrounding Finland's conflicts with Russia. The Young Finnish Party (Nuorsuomalainen Puolue) or Young Finns (*nuorsuomalaiset*) became a political party in the 1890s, comprising a younger generation of Finnish speakers as well as Swedish-speaking liberals who sought a constitutional solution to problems with Russia. Many Finnish nationalists were suspicious of the Young Finns, because of their willingness to collaborate with the Swedish-speaking upper class. The Old Finns (*vanhasuomalaiset*) or the members of the Finnish Party (Suomalainen Puolue), on the other hand, were concerned that the Young Finns' desired resistance would further erode the Grand Duchy's autonomy and wished to cooperate as much as possible with the Russian government. Internal Russian strife, specifically the 1905 Revolution, made it possible for the Finnish Diet (Suomen valtiopäivät) to abolish the system of the four Estates with the creation of a new unicameral, 200-member legislative body, the Eduskunta. Suddenly, Finland had a progressive form of government elected by equal and universal suffrage. Despite these advances, Finnish civil rights continued to be threatened until Finland had complete independence.

Again in 1917 internal Russian affairs created a climate in which Finland's status could change. Following the "March Revolution" in which the tsar was overthrown, political dissidents who had been living in exile returned to Finland after the replacement of the Russian Governor-General Franz Albert von Seyn (1862–1918) by Mikhail Stakhovich (1861–1923). The new provisional government reinstated Finland's constitutional rights. Simultaneously, parliament convened after a 1916 election in which the Social Democratic Party (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue) was overwhelmingly victorious and elected a government headed by Oskari Tokoi (1873–1963), who was the first socialist in the world to become prime minister of a

democratically elected government. On July 18, 1917, the Eduskunta passed an Enabling Act or Power Act in order to proclaim Finland's independence from Russia in all areas except defense and foreign affairs. The Russian provisional government, however, did not accept and promptly dissolved the parliament in favor of new elections, in which the conservatives then took power. Leaders of the Democratic Party and the Trade Union Federation called a general strike for November 14, 1917. According to Oskari Tokoi, "what ensued was more than a strike; it was rebellion and revolution" (Singleton 1998: 107). A new government, elected by the Eduskunta, assumed control under the leadership of a conservative Finnish nationalist, Pehr Evind Svinhufvud (1861–1944). This new parliament issued on December 6, 1917 a declaration of independence drafted by K. J. Ståhlberg (1865–1952), which Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870–1924) promptly accepted.

Meanwhile, tension grew between two active segments of the population, namely the Reds (*punaiset*), the socialists, and the Whites (*valkoiset*), the non-socialist conservatives. The Finns had no army, due to the waiving of conscription for soldiers in favor of a monetary contribution to Russian military efforts. In the disorder during and following the Russian revolutions of 1917, the absence of force was filled by the Red Guards, formed by the labor movement, and the White Guards, organized and populated by conservatives and nationalist youth, volunteers from Finland and Sweden, and defectors from the Russian army. Some of the Whites had been secretly trained in the Prussian 27th Jäger Battalion, specially created to support the cause of Finnish independence from Russian and Germany's interests therein.

On January 27/28, 1918, civil war finally erupted. Overnight, the Red Guards took control of Helsinki and declared a revolutionary government, the People's Commission (Kansanvaltuuskunta), headed by Kullervo Manner (1880–1939). With the Whites headquartered in Vaasa under the command of Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim (1867–1951), an Imperial army general, Finland was effectively divided between the Whites' area of control in the north and the Reds' area, including the cities of Pori, Tampere, Lahti, Lappeenranta, and Viipuri in the south. In addition to the Finnish Jäger battalion, more German forces arrived in February to aid

the Whites' efforts to take back Tampere and Helsinki. The latter fell on April 13, 1918 to a German expeditionary force led by General Rüdiger von der Goltz (1865–1946). The end of the civil war was celebrated with a parade in Helsinki on May 16, 1918. It has been estimated that around 5,500 men on both sides died in battles, although this figure does not include numbers of executions and deaths by neglect or starvation in prison camps. Indeed, another source approximates the casualties of the revolution to be 23,000 people, that is, those killed legally and illegally as a result of battle and acts of "terrorism."

As the violence ceased, the pressing issue facing Finns was how their government would be structured. The two options under consideration were monarchy and republic. Not unrelated to Germany's considerable involvement and support in the revolution, a German, Prince Friedrich Karl of Hesse (1868–1940), was offered the crown. The issue became irrelevant after Germany's defeat in World War I. Svinhufvud, who had been regent of Finland, stepped down and was succeeded by Mannerheim. Following new elections and a new constitution, Mannerheim lost as the right-wing candidate to Ståhlberg, a leading force behind the constitutional reform, who became the first president of the Republic of Finland.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Finland; International Socialism: Mass Politics; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Alapuro, R. (1988) *State and Revolution in Finland*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Envall, M. (1998) The Period of Independence I, 1917–1960. In G. Schoolfield (Ed.), *A History of Finland's Literature*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Kirby, D. (2006) *A Concise History of Finland*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Laitinen, K. (1998) The Rise of Finnish-Language Literature. In G. Schoolfield (Ed.), *A History of Finland's Literature*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Schoolfield, G. (1998) A Sense of Minority. In G. Schoolfield (Ed.), *A History of Finland's Literature*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Singleton, F. (1998) *A Short History of Finland*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Upton, A. (1980) *The Finnish Revolution 1917–1918*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Fitzgerald, Lord Edward (1763–1798)

Karen Sonnelitter

Lord Edward Fitzgerald was born on October 15, 1763 into the highest level of the Irish aristocracy. His father, James Fitzgerald, was the Duke of Leinster, and his mother, Emily, was the daughter of the Duke of Richmond. Lord Edward arrived in Ireland as an infant and was placed in the care of a private tutor, William Ogilvie, who schooled him according to the ultraprogressive educational theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. After the death of his father in 1773 his mother took her children and Ogilvie (her lover) to France.

Lord Edward embarked upon a military career in 1776, transferring regiments several times in his early years. He fought on the British side in the American Revolutionary War and in 1781 almost died in battle. His life was saved by a recently freed black slave named Tony Small, whom Lord Edward subsequently employed, but treated more as a boon companion than a servant. He and Tony Small spent some time among the Huron Indians, whom he affectionately perceived as representative of Rousseau's "noble savages." On his return to Ireland in 1783 he was "elected" to the Irish parliament for the borough of Athy in Kildare. (His seat was in fact bought for him by his brother, a common practice at the time.) He aligned himself politically with the Whig Party led by his cousin Charles James Fox, and with a group of Irish patriots, including Richard Brinsley Sheridan.

During the 1780s Fitzgerald traveled a great deal. In 1792 he experienced Parisian radicalism at its height, befriended Thomas Paine and Girondin leaders, and became an enthusiastic partisan of the French Revolution. While in France he met and married a young woman named Pamela, who was widely believed to be the unacknowledged daughter of her "governess," Madame de Genlis, and the Duke of Orléans (a.k.a. "Philippe Egalité," a member of the royal family who supported the Revolution in its early stages but was eventually guillotined).

Fitzgerald returned to Ireland in 1793 and immediately became deeply involved in revolutionary circles. In 1796 he traveled to Hamburg with Arthur O'Connor seeking French military

support for an Irish rebellion. Upon his return he formally joined the Society for United Irishmen, and was the group's most experienced military leader. In 1797 he made the mistake of trusting half-hearted radical Thomas Reynolds, who betrayed Fitzgerald and the United Irish's Leinster directory to the police. Fitzgerald fled and lived in hiding for a time before his dramatic capture in May 1798. He was wounded and imprisoned in Newgate Gaol. An attempt was made to rescue him before the outbreak of the Rebellion but it failed. In prison his wounds became infected and he died in his cell on June 4, 1798.

Lord Edward Fitzgerald in life and death was the very model of a romantic revolutionary hero. Irish nationalists continue to this day to regard him as one of the most revered figures in their pantheon of martyred Irish patriots.

SEE ALSO: Ireland, Age of Revolutions, 1775–1803; Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798; Napper Tandy, James (1737?–1803); O'Connor, Arthur (1763–1852); Tone, Theobald Wolfe (1763–1798); United Irishmen

References and Suggested Readings

- Curtin, N. J. (1998) *The United Irishmen: Popular Politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791–1798*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Knox, O. (1997) *Rebels and Informers: Stirrings of Irish Independence*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Packenham, T. (1972) *The Year of Liberty: The Great Irish Rebellion of 1798*. London: Granada.
- Tillyard, S. (1999) *Citizen Lord: The Life of Edward Fitzgerald, Irish Revolutionary*. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.

Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley (1890–1964)

Heather Squire

Elizabeth Gurley Flynn was a prominent labor activist, feminist, communist, and one of the founding members of the American Civil Liberties Union. The daughter of Irish immigrants, Flynn was born in Concord, New Hampshire, but raised primarily in a poor neighborhood in the Bronx (New York City). Flynn was introduced to socialism at an early age by her parents, and gave her first political speech at the age of 16. Flynn joined the Industrial Workers of the

World (IWW) in 1906, and a year later became a full-time organizer for the radical union.

Flynn led of a number of important IWW strikes, such as the 1912 Lawrence textile workers' strike and the 1913 Paterson silk workers' strike. The Lawrence strike was a great success, but neither she nor the other IWW leaders were able to secure a long-term presence. Still determined, however, she agitated among restaurant workers in New York, and miners in Minnesota, Montana, and Washington. She also became more vocal about women's rights at this time, championing birth control and suffrage, as well as castigating the male union leadership for not addressing the needs of women workers. From 1914 to 1915, Flynn corresponded with Joe Hill, the imprisoned IWW activist and working-class songwriter. Before his execution, Hill wrote the song "Rebel Girl" about Flynn, dedicating it to her and all the other women in the IWW.

In 1916, Flynn was the center of a controversy surrounding a court case involving two other IWW organizers, three miners, and her. The miners as well as the three IWW organizers were arrested for the murder of a hired gunman; because of a plea bargain debacle, Flynn was accused of saving herself and the organizers, and leaving the miners to face prison. As a result, she and another IWW organizer were ousted from the IWW. Four years later, Flynn co-founded the American Civil Liberties Union and was an active proponent of free speech, as well as an advocate for Sacco and Vanzetti. Flynn would be dismissed in 1940, however, due to her membership in the Communist Party.

Flynn moved to the West Coast in 1926, spending ten years as a birth control activist and continuing to support the labor movement. She joined the Communist Party in 1936. Back in New York during World War II, she ran for US Congress as an independent, but did not garner enough votes to win. In 1951, Flynn and several other Communist Party members were arrested for violating the Smith Act (a US statute that makes it illegal to "knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty, necessity, desirability or propriety of overthrowing the Government of the United States"; many political activists of the left were charged under the Smith Act in the 1950s). Flynn was found guilty and sentenced to two years in prison. Her book, *The Alderson Story: My Life as a Political Prisoner* (1963), details her experiences.

After her release from prison, Flynn remained politically active until her death in 1964, becoming the Communist Party national chairperson in 1961 and visiting the USSR numerous times. Flynn died in Moscow in 1964 and received a state funeral there.

SEE ALSO: Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA); Haymarket Tragedy; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 20th Century; Paterson Silk Strike of 1913; Sacco and Vanzetti Case

References and Suggested Readings

- Camp, H. C. (1995) *Iron in her Soul: Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and the American Left*. Pullman: Washington State University Press.
- Flynn, E. G. (1916) *Sabotage: The Conscious Withdrawal of the Workers' Industrial Efficiency*. Chicago: IWW Publishing Bureau.
- Flynn, E. G. (1955/1973) *The Rebel Girl: An Autobiography*. New York: International Publishers.

Fo, Dario (b. 1926)

Mauro Stampacchia

Dario Fo is an actor, director, and playwright of international fame whose artistic career is characterized by his advocacy of civil, democratic, and workers' rights. In 1997 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature.

Born on March 24, 1926 in San Giano, in the province of Varese, he studied at the Brera Academy in Milan and wrote satirical texts for radio, television, and cinema. Italian public television (RAI) censored his work and that of his wife, actress Franca Rame, so heavily that they were forced to turn to theater, in many cases performing in factories and public places (*Case del popolo*) to appeal to popular audiences.

Fo drew on the tradition of *commedia dell'arte*, writing pieces on social and political issues that had great impact. In *Mistero Buffo*, a solo piece, he used a new theatrical language, *gramelot*, which was made up of words that resemble (but do not actually correspond to) many northern Italian dialects. His plays have been defined as narrative theater.

In the 1970s Fo and Rame founded La Comune, an artistic and political collective that sided with the new left and staged dramas dealing with political issues, such as *Accidental Death of an Anarchist* (*Morte accidentale di un anarchico*,

1970), which focused on the recent supposedly accidental death of anarchist activist Giuseppe Pinelli. Fo's theater pieces generally center on characters from the humble classes. For their militancy the couple have often paid a high price, facing press campaigns against them as well as subtle discrimination. Rame has even suffered physical assaults.

The Nobel Prize opened for Fo the way to international acknowledgment. He was awarded a *laurea honoris causa* by the University of the Sorbonne in 2005 and by La Sapienza University in Rome in 2006. In January 2006 he ran unsuccessfully in the primaries for mayor of Milan, but was elected as a councilor. Rame was elected senator in the 2006 general elections.

SEE ALSO: Italy, from the New Left to the Great Repression (1962–1981)

References and Suggested Readings

- Behan, T. (2000) *Dario Fo: Revolutionary Theatre*. London: Pluto Press.
- D'Angeli, C. & Soriani, S. (Eds.) (2006) *Coppia d'arte: Dario Fo e Franca Rame*. Pisa: Plus.
- Valentini, C. (1997) *La storia di Dario Fo*. Milan: Feltrinelli.
- www.dariofo.it.

Fonseca, Carlos (1936–1976)

Robert Sierakowski

Carlos Fonseca Amador was born the illegitimate scion of one of the wealthiest local families in the northern mountains in the region of Matagalpa, Nicaragua. Though his father was a liberal Somoza supporter, Fonseca developed a passionate drive to overthrow the regime and the reigning social order. Early in his youth, Fonseca and childhood friend Tomás Borge (b. 1930) came upon the Marxist critique of capitalism and the necessity for a transition to socialism. The young Carlos Fonseca joined several groups that were active in the movement against the dictatorship before becoming involved in the then-outlawed Socialist Party of Nicaragua, which was the Moscow-line communist party. He attended the local National Institute of the North where he graduated at the top of his class before heading to León to attend law school at the National University

of Nicaragua. While at the university he was very active in the growing anti-regime student movement, particularly through the Student Council of the National University (CUUN).

In 1957, Fonseca traveled to the Soviet Union, an experience which further solidified his commitment to a Marxist-Leninist analysis, political strategy, and vision of social change. The 1959 Cuban Revolution had a seismic effect upon Latin American politics, with a particular resonance in Nicaragua. Armed struggle and the development of a rural-based guerilla insurgency became the touchstones of leftist political praxis throughout the region. Fonseca participated in the 1959 El Chaparral invasion from Honduras led by traditional opposition parties, of which he later wrote: “it wasn’t a battle, it was the most terrible of massacres.” It was this experience that convinced him that the foundation of a new guerilla organization outside of the framework of long-established political parties was necessary. “The danger of adventurism must not become an excuse for moving at a turtle’s pace,” Fonseca argued.

In the early 1960s, Fonseca was integral in the foundation of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), which went through several name-changes before settling upon the reference to Augusto César Sandino (1895–1934) in its name. Founded by Fonseca, Borge, and Silvio Mayorga, the FSLN built directly upon student activism. Fonseca’s chief contribution was in the realm of ideology. He is credited with the rediscovery and reinvention of the figure of Sandino, a guerilla leader who militarily resisted the United States occupation from 1927 until the Marines’ withdrawal in 1933. Following the cessation of hostilities, Sandino was captured and assassinated by Somoza’s National Guard. Through investigations and propaganda recasting Sandino as a “proletarian guerilla,” Fonseca created a national symbol of guerilla struggle and anti-imperialism through which he could link Che Guevara’s model to a profoundly national project. Sandino, he wrote, was “a kind of path” they could use in the struggle for national liberation. In defending the historical search for antecedents, Fonseca opined that “to the same extent that we are able to use our rifles effectively, we will also be able to revive our people’s historical traditions, and to the same extent that we master our popular traditions, we will also find ourselves able to use our rifles.” Among

other activists, Fonseca earned a reputation for moral rectitude and a tireless passion to see the revolution brought to fruition.

The Sandinistas' initial attempt at recreating Sandino's struggle, a 1962–3 operation in the Ríos Coco y Bocay region, was less than successful and the FSLN returned to the urban underground. The National Guard captured and jailed Fonseca in June 1964. While imprisoned, his courtroom speech, "From Jail I Accuse the Dictatorship," allowed him to denounce the poverty, corruption, and violence with which the Somozas and their American backers had saddled Nicaragua. After popular pressure won his release, he was deported to Mexico and continued to be active in the exile communities of Latin American countries, fomenting opposition to the dictatorship.

In 1967, Fonseca and his fellow Sandinistas again attempted to draw on Che Guevara's *foco* model of guerilla strategy in the isolated northern regions of Nicaragua. In Pancasán, the FSLN lost much of its leadership members in a very uneven confrontation. Fonseca himself was badly wounded and left the country, only to be jailed for a bank robbery in Costa Rica. He was only freed when a fellow Sandinista carried out an airplane hijacking in 1970.

As Fonseca languished in exile in Havana, the FSLN divided into various factions in disagreement over the correct manner for combating the dictatorship. Without taking sides, Fonseca entered the country clandestinely in 1976 and headed for the mountainous guerilla zone, hoping to bring the three factions together. In an isolated group and on the run, Fonseca would fall victim to the National Guard, being shot in Zinica, Matagalpa, in November 1976.

In 1979, the Somoza regime fell to a popular insurrection, largely under the leadership of the Sandinistas. Of the FSLN's early leadership, only Fonseca's childhood friend Tomás Borge remained alive. With the advent of the Sandinista Revolution in power, Fonseca was elevated by the governing Sandinistas to the status of national hero with his visage – tall, thin, and with thick glasses – becoming a central symbol of the revolutionary pantheon.

SEE ALSO: Borge, Tomás (b. 1936); Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Martí, Farabundo (1893–1932); Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s; Ortega, Daniel (b. 1945); Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN); Sandino, Augusto César (1895–1934)

References and Suggested Readings

- Fonseca, C. (1982) *Obras*. Managua: Ed. Nueva Nicaragua.
- Hodges, D. (1986) *The Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Nolan, D. (1984) *The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution*. Coral Gables, FL: Institute of Interamerican Studies, University of Miami.
- Palmer, S. (1988) Carlos Fonseca and the Construction of Sandinismo in Nicaragua. *Latin American Research Review* 23: 91–109.
- Zimmerman, M. (2000) *Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Food Not Bombs, United States

Stacy Warner Maddern

Food Not Bombs is a global movement of volunteers who seek to end poverty, hunger, and war by distributing surplus food to those in need. Currently, Food Not Bombs has hundreds of autonomous chapters throughout the world that share free vegetarian food with hungry people as a means of protesting war and poverty. As a grassroots organization its activity has spread not only throughout the United States, but into Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Australia as well. In its 25-year history, Food Not Bombs has fought to end hunger and support an end to globalization of the economy, restrictions to the movements of people, and the exploitation and destruction of the earth.

Food Not Bombs was founded in Cambridge, Massachusetts after a group of anti-nuclear activists began spray painting the slogan "Money for Food Not for Bombs" on the side of a nuclear power plant. The slogan was later shortened and put into action as an all-volunteer organization dedicated to non-violent social change. The action began by recovering food that would otherwise have gone to waste, collecting it from grocery stores, bakeries, and sometimes even dumpsters. The food was then prepared into fresh hot vegetarian meals to be served outside in public spaces. The group later began providing meals at rallies, protests, and other events.

As nuclear power protesters, the first organizers in Cambridge wanted to remind people of a 1930s-style soup kitchen to highlight the waste

of valuable resources on weapons while many people were hungry and homeless. At first, they thought of using actors to play the part of the homeless, but then realized that they could feed the actual homeless as a means of protest. They began by distributing flyers at local shelters and collected day-old bread from bakeries and fruit and vegetables from local co-ops. The next morning they set up a table with a huge pot of soup in front of the Federal Reserve Building in Boston and nearly a hundred homeless showed up for a meal. Thus, a movement was born.

By the summer of 1988, Food Not Bombs was operating in Boston, San Francisco, and Washington, DC, but it did not become a national movement until the San Francisco chapter was shut down by riot police for serving free food in Golden Gate Park. By the end of that summer a total of 94 arrests would be made in San Francisco as successive mayors Art Agnos and Frank Jordan instituted campaigns to criminalize the organization, leading to 700 felony arrests for sharing free food. In the wake of such events, instead of defeat, the organization only grew. Because of the media attention that Food Not Bombs was getting in San Francisco, other chapters began to form all over the world in the 1990s.

Food Not Bombs states as a fundamental principle that “society needs to promote life, not death.” Its criticism is that societies, in general, spend far too much time concerned with developing, using, and threatening to use weapons of massive human and planetary destruction. Because governments spend money on bombs instead of food, violence and poverty are exacerbated.

On the revolutionary premise, Food Not Bombs commits neither its time nor its resources to attack, tear down, or overthrow the existing power structure. Instead, it exerts its rights of free speech and association to challenge the power elite. While the idea of food recovery and recycling is not new, it is a revolutionary concept to recover large amounts of food in an organized and consistent manner in order to feed the hungry.

Food Not Bombs provides food to those who want it without the bureaucratic control that often attempts to humiliate those who are poor. It also invites those who are receiving food to provide it as well, allowing them an opportunity to regain their self-esteem by recognizing their ability to contribute. It also provides food and

supplies to the survivors of natural disasters and terrorist attacks. In 1989, after an earthquake shook San Francisco, Food Not Bombs was the only organization providing hot meals to survivors. It also provided hot meals to the rescue workers responding to the September 11 World Trade Center attacks, as well as the survivors of both the Asian tsunami and Hurricane Katrina. Supporting protest against the Iraq War, Food Not Bombs has supplied food to protests on a global scale. Because of its involvement with the anti-war movement on the campuses of the University of Texas, Food Not Bombs was placed on the FBI’s Central Texas “Terrorist Watch List.”

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Anti-War Movement, Iraq; Food Riots; Food Sovereignty and Protest; Non-Violent Movements: Struggles for Rights, Justice, and Identities

References and Suggested Readings

- Burton-Rose, D., Yuen, E., & Katsiaficas, G. (2004) *Confronting Capitalism: Dispatches From a Global Movement*. Brooklyn: Soft Skull Press.
 Butler, C. T. & McHenry, K. (2000) *Food Not Bombs*. Tucson: See Sharp Press.
 Food Not Bombs, www.foodnotbombs.net.

Food riots

Raj Patel

Theories of Food and Riot

“Food riot” is a term applied to mass protests over the price and accessibility of key foods. The protests usually occur in urban areas and are associated with other kinds of political organizing. The foods over which protests are made are usually staple cereals or products such as bread that are made from such cereals, though people have also rioted over other important food such as meat (Orlove 1997).

The phenomenon of people taking to the streets to protest hunger has a very long history. Cicero (106–43 BC) witnessed this first-hand, when his house was attacked by a hungry and angry mob. The first serious study of the food riot as a political phenomenon was conducted by E. P. Thompson in a piece entitled “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century” (1971). Thompson’s aim was to

tease apart the term “riot,” situating the events surrounding this form of protest in a broader political context. Key to this was his idea that food riots were not a direct function of food shortage in the material economy, but a sign of contest over the rules of how the economy worked. He used the term “moral economy” to point to the cluster of political and pre-political ideas circulating within society that governed the natural and desirable means of the distribution of common wealth. This moral economy was not only manifest in times of protest, but a fixture of social life and governance in the eighteenth century. “The word ‘riot’ is,” Thompson observed, “too small to encompass all this” (1971: 79). His analysis offered a means to understand some of the most spectacular food riots of the eighteenth century, which were not to be found in England, but in France.

The French Revolution

Tilly (1971) points to two key features that spawned food riots, also linking them to Thompson’s idea of moral economy. First, she suggests the formation of a national market in grain eroded the kinds of local control over the economy that were possible for peasants and the urban poor to exercise in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Second, the French government’s withdrawal from strong market regulation and price-setting meant an end to the varieties of paternalism and *noblesse oblige* on which large swathes of the working poor depended in times of crisis.

The gap between people’s expectation of the moral economy and their experience of poverty within the material economy has been explained by development economist Amartya Sen as an “entitlement failure.” Sen’s seminal work on hunger and famine serves as a helpful corollary to Thompson – if the latter’s work made it much harder to use the term “riot” unproblematically, Sen did the same for the term “famine.” His 1981 work on the Bengal Famine of 1943, in which between 1.5 and 3 million people died, pointed to a key problem in food economics. In times of modern famine, food has always been available. Famine is, in other words, not a result of a food shortage. The reason that people died in Bengal was that they lacked the means to buy food on the open market. Having seen that this was not, then, a problem of inadequate supply

or want of demand, Sen theorized this as an “entitlement failure.”

This thinking around entitlements has been deployed in understanding the French Revolution. It was, of course, about more than simply food, but the sentiment “let them eat cake” – mistakenly attributed to Marie Antoinette rather than, more plausibly, to Maria Theresa of Spain, the wife of Louis XIV – points to the tenor of the protests. Tilly notes that the *Sans-Culottes* had explicit food-related demands: “During the French revolution, the Maximum . . . [a] Jacobin version of ‘war communism,’ was a response to entitlement loss” (1983: 339).

It is the dynamics of the moral economy and the perception of injustice, not a simple shortage of food, which explains the emergence of mass protest in the run up to, and in the 50 years after, the French Revolution. Food riots continued in France well into the 1850s. This can again be explained with respect to shifts within the moral economy, for the shift from paternalism to *laissez-faire* was protracted – the replacement of one set of entitlements with another was not smooth or swift, but fragmentary, disjointed, and sometimes violent. Theorists attribute the end of protests, however, to the successful completion of the bourgeois project. Protests end when markets in food have successfully been instituted and, similarly, when other forms of protest (such as a strike for higher wages to afford better or more food) became predominant.

World War I Protests

Food riots did not, however, disappear. At the end of World War I a number of instances of food riots were observed, particularly in North America. Food riots broke out in Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, Toronto and, most notably, in New York (Frank 1985: 264). The price of food in North America had, after 1916, started to rise dramatically. Increasing quantities of North American grain were being diverted to Europe, still in the throes of the war. This drain on the grain markets, while welcomed by farmers, caused tremendous hardship in urban areas. Again, however, the hardship was widespread, but while some areas saw protest, others did not.

Beyond being in urban areas, the protests had two key common features: they were usually linked to radical (usually socialist or communist) organizations and the majority of participants and

organizers were women. The idea of a moral economy works well here. The gap between expectations and reality was fueled, on the one hand, by food price inflation making food less attainable, and on the other by revolutionary organizing that suggested an economic logic at variance with capitalism. There were, furthermore, no ready alternative means for women to register their protest. In the US, the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution, recognizing women's right to vote, was only passed in 1920, about five years later (with some variation across provinces) than in Canada. The streets were the only place that women could make their voices heard. Food riots were also a means through which organizing to win the vote was carried out. As a contemporary New York magazine reported, "the need of votes for women, to strengthen this new woman's movement, will be emphasized at every anti-high price meeting" (Frank 1985: 279).

It was no accident that women found themselves in the front line – the gendered division of labor laid the duties of domestic reproduction at their door. The language of protest in 1917 still rings true. Consider this quote: "With \$14 a week we used to just make a living. With prices as they are now, we could not even live on \$2 a day. We would just exist." The woman who said this was interviewed in New York on the front lines of an East Side Jewish Women's protest. But she might have come from any of the developing countries that have, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, experienced agricultural inflation-related riots.

IMF Riots

As part of the disciplines of structural adjustment, governments have rolled back state-based entitlements, particularly in the domain of social welfare. These entitlements, such as access to education, healthcare, and basic needs, are not eroded uniformly (Tilly 1983). That the disproportionate burden borne by the poor, and poor women in particular, has resulted in women's organizing, has been central (Daines & Seddon 1994) to the increasing incidence of what have been called "IMF riots." Between 1976 and 1982 there were at least 146 such riots, with a peak at the beginning of the widespread imposition of monetarist economic policy between 1983 and 1985. Explaining this, Walton and Seddon

suggest that austerity protests be defined as "large-scale collective actions including political demonstrations, general strikes, and riots, which are animated by grievances over state policies of economic liberalization, implemented in response to the debt crisis and market reforms urged by international agencies" (1994: 39). They further suggest that because the economic policies that mandated austerity were often authored by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, such protests have come to be called IMF riots. The term can, however, be a little misleading, in that it suggests that the ire of the crowds was directed exclusively at a Bretton Woods institution rather than at a cluster of individuals and policies, domestic and international. Indeed, the strength of the link between actual IMF involvement in economic policy management and subsequent riots has been disputed. Despite strong claims for an association between the two (Walton & Ragin 1990), some scholars have seen a more complex relationship, in which IMF riots occur either at the beginning or several years after a structural adjustment policy.

Thompson's theories of moral economy continue to be useful in explaining these phenomena. Again, the incidence of protest is not correlated to material indicators of deprivation, but to the gap between expected and actual entitlements, and the available repertoire of forms of protest. Pre-existing political organizing, whether in unions, Islamic brotherhoods, churches, or housewives' clubs, raises expectations, and expands the repertoire of protest.

Recently, however, a new phenomenon has precipitated a fresh round of food riots. In 2007 grain harvests were particularly poor. This combined with the high price of fossil fuels (used throughout fertilizer and farming processes), an increasing demand for meat (and therefore feedgrain for livestock), and a reduction in the available food supply due to demand for bio-fuels, led to increasing prices for food. The price rises, known as "agflation," have been so rapid that even modest expectations of entitlement have been rendered moot. With governments increasingly unresponsive to popular pressure (most structural adjustment programs are unpopular), conventional petitions to parliaments are often ineffective.

Thus, in the period 2007–8, the world has seen widespread political protest around food, from

the pasta protests of Italy, to Mexican tortilla riots which resulted in a government promise for price stability, to the rise of protests in parts of Africa considered immune to them, such as Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania. It seems as if the food riot is not quite ready for the dustbin of history.

SEE ALSO: Food Not Bombs, United States; Food Sovereignty and Protest; French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution, Women and; *Masses, The*

References and Suggested Readings

- Daines, V. & Seddon, D. (1994) Fighting for Survival: Women's Responses to Austerity Programs. In J. Walton & D. Seddon (Eds.), *Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 57–96.
- Frank, D. (1985) Housewives, Socialists, and the Politics of Food: The 1917 New York Cost-of-Living Protests. *Feminist Studies* 1: 255–85.
- Orlove, B. S. (1997) Meat and Strength: The Moral Economy of a Chilean Food Riot. *Cultural Anthropology* 12: 234–68.
- Sen, A. K. (1981) *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Thompson, E. P. (1971) The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century. *Past and Present* 50: 76–136.
- Tilly, L. A. (1971) The Food Riot as a Form of Political Conflict in France. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 2: 23–57.
- Tilly, L. A. (1983) Food Entitlement, Famine, and Conflict. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 14: 333–49.
- Walton, J. & Ragin, C. (1990) Global and National Sources of Political Protest: Third World Responses to the Debt Crisis. *American Sociological Review* 55: 876–90.
- Walton, J. & Seddon, D. (1994) *Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Food sovereignty and protest

Brenda Biddle

Origins and Definitions of Food Sovereignty

Food sovereignty is an alternative model for agriculture and trade first introduced in Rome

at the World Food Summit in 1996 by Via Campesina, a transnational movement of peasants and small farmers. Via Campesina was formed in 1993 by farm leaders from various countries to address the escalating global agrarian crisis experienced by small farmers, peasants, fisher people, pastoralists, and landless laborers in food production. Initially a concept that critics dismissed as utopian, food sovereignty is increasingly promoted and supported by social movements, non-profit organizations, academics, consumer groups, the former UN (United Nations) Rapporteur on the Right to Food, as well as several regional and national governments.

The fundamental premise of food sovereignty is that food is more than a commodity to be traded on world markets; it is a basic human right, inscribed in international law. For the right to food to be realized, peoples, communities, and nations must have the autonomy to determine their own food and agriculture policies, ones that are socially, culturally, and environmentally appropriate to their unique circumstances. Food sovereignty advocates do not oppose all international trade, but free trade policies, such as those enshrined in NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) in 1994, and in the Agreement on Agriculture of the Uruguay Round, activated with the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, and multiple bilateral treaties and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). These trade agreements override or dismantle national policies, such as supply management, price floors, food security reserves, and even health standards needed by governments to guarantee the right to food.

Background

The Via Campesina has had a strong presence at global justice events, G8 meetings, WTO ministerials, and NGO (non-governmental organization) forums on food and agriculture. More than a decade of dialogue about hunger, poverty, world trade, rural displacement, agrarian reform, and peasants' rights has taken place between Via Campesina members, international NGOs, and other members of civil society, resulting in the dissemination of the food sovereignty platform in a further proliferation of texts, conferences, websites, blogs, theatrical performances, tribunals, caravans, marches, and other actions related to promoting food sovereignty at local, regional, and

global levels. One of these international gatherings was a parallel civil society forum held in conjunction with the High Level Conference on World Food Security in June 2008 at the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome. The alternative forum, organized by the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC) was called Terra Preta: Forum on the Food Crisis, Climate Change, Agro Fuels and Food Sovereignty.

In May 2007, in the village of Nyéléni, Mali, food sovereignty held another international gathering. Via Campesina worked with members of other major global civil society groups including IPC, Food Sovereignty Network; World March of Women; two international forums of fisher people; and ROPPA, a network of farmer and producer organizations of West Africa.

Principles of Food Sovereignty

From 1996 onward the *Vía Campesina* platform for food sovereignty encompassed varying principles, including food as a basic human right and food as first and foremost a source of nutrition for people and only secondarily an item for trade. Food sovereignty entails the proper stewardship of natural resources based on both the practice of agro-ecology and traditions of peasant knowledge, and real agrarian reform is necessary. Food sovereignty opposes corporate control of multinationals over food and agriculture. The organization opposes multilateral trade and economic agency policies that commercialize food – the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB). Food sovereignty seeks to curtail new trade conventions, including biopiracy, and patenting of life forms. The platform seeks gender equity in all practices and policies related to food production, and freedom from violence and oppression; and seeks to end ongoing displacement of rural people. The organizers seek to advance the voice of small-scale agriculturalists and traditional food producers – including fishermen and nomadic herdsmen, indigenous people, and rural women – in determining agricultural policies at all levels.

Subsequent definitions of food sovereignty stress the importance of access for all people, especially women and marginalized groups, to productive resources, such as land and water, and of traditional practices such as seed saving. *Vía Campesina* and other groups in the food

sovereignty movement also call for the democratic creation of an International Commission on Sustainable Agriculture and Food Sovereignty, as well as an independent dispute settlement mechanism to be tied to an international court of justice to enforce the prohibition against commodity dumping which disrupts local agricultural markets.

According to an extensive 2005 report on food sovereignty by the Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN) most of the analyses about the need for food sovereignty written in the last 12 years converge, but policy proposals about enacting it diverge. This is to be expected since food sovereignty is not a top-down concept, to be imposed by one group on another; it is a flexible, grassroots, participatory model based on the principles listed above.

Current Dimensions of Food Sovereignty

Food sovereignty is gaining considerable traction as a policy platform. Several national governments, including Mali, Bolivia, Nepal, and Venezuela, have embraced the concept and some have written it into their constitutions. The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology for Development (IAASTD) released a series of reports based on four years of research, jointly sponsored by the World Bank, farmers' organizations, and agribusiness and biotech firms (who eventually pulled out). The findings confirm that the type of production that food sovereignty promotes – sustainable, small-scale, based on techniques of agro-ecology that are adapted to local needs and conditions – is the way forward for world agriculture in this age of climate change and vanishing resources.

In June 2008, 12 years after *Vía Campesina* first introduced the idea of food sovereignty at the FAO, an emergency meeting of the High Level Conference on World Food Security was held at the FAO. Attended by several heads of state, this high-profile meeting was convened to discuss factors in the current world food crisis – ever rising food prices for consumers, the growing demand for biofuels, the annual addition of one million hungry people to the ranks of the 854 million lacking adequate food, the outbreak of food riots around the globe, and the potential destabilization of 34 national governments.

The official meeting on World Food Security, previously one of the few multilateral arenas in which Via Campesina has consistently engaged in dialogue, ignored the IAASTD report on the future of agriculture, and the joint statements on food sovereignty produced by Via Campesina and a multitude of civil society allies at the Terra Preta parallel forum. The official summit concluded that the dominant paradigm of neoliberal, corporate, agro-industrial agriculture, based on trade liberalization and chemical inputs of biotechnology, was a means to expand food availability for the rapidly growing ranks of poorly nourished people in the world. Food sovereignty advocates disagreed.

At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the global corporate agriculture model and the food sovereignty model, based on small-scale, sustainable, healthy, local food production, were at odds. Food sovereignty is more than a program or policy, but represents a paradigm. As an organizing principle, food sovereignty delineates two paradigms, the past and the future. The old paradigm stresses industrial rationality and corporate profit as the ultimate good; the new paradigm, one that peasants have struggled for over hundreds of years, demands access to the commons, sustainability, and freedom from hunger as ultimate goods.

SEE ALSO: Assembly of the Poor; Food Not Bombs, United States; Food Riots; Shiva, Vandana (b. 1952); Via Campesina and Peasant Struggles; World Social Forums

References and Suggested Readings

- Borras, S., Edelman, M. et al. (2008) Transnational Agrarian Movements: Origins and Politics, Campaigns and Impact. *Journal of Agrarian Change* 8 (2/3): 169–204.
- Bové, J. (2005) *Food Should Be Left Off the Free Trade Table*. Yale Global Online. Available at www.yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5529 (accessed July 8, 2008).
- Cohn, A., Cook, J. et al. (Eds.) (2005) *Agroecology and the Struggle for Food Sovereignty in the Americas*. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
- Desmarais, A. (2003) The Via Campesina: Peasant Women on the Frontiers of Food Sovereignty. *Canadian Woman Studies* 23 (1): 140–5.
- ETC (2008) Food's Failed Estates = Paris's Hot Cuisine . . . Food Sovereignty – à la Cartel? Available at www.etcgroup.org/en/materials/publications.html?pub_id=673 (accessed July 8, 2008).
- Holt-Giménez, E. & Peabody, L. (2008) *From Food Rebellions to Food Sovereignty: Urgent Call to Fix a Broken Food System*. Food First. Available at www.foodfirst.org/en/node/2120 (accessed July 8, 2008).
- McMichael, P. (2007) Feeding the World. *Socialist Register*. New York: Monthly Review.
- Pimbert, M. (2006) *Transforming Knowledge and Ways of Knowing for Food Sovereignty. Reclaiming Diversity and Citizenship*. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
- Rosset, P. (2006) *Food is Different*. London: Zed Books.
- Via Campesina (2001) What is Food Sovereignty? Available at www.viacampesina.org/art_english.php?id_article=216 (accessed July 8, 2008).
- Windfuhr, M., Jonsen, J. et al. (2005) *Food Sovereignty: Towards Democracy in Localized Food Systems*. Rugby: ITDG Publishing.

Foreign intervention and revolution

Paul Rubinson

The importance of foreign intervention and external forces on a revolution cannot be overestimated. Each of these factors can both cause a revolution and determine the outcome. States do not exist, and revolutions do not occur, in a vacuum. The fates of states and revolutions depend to a large extent on the actions of other powerful state actors in the geopolitical landscape. Scholars have shown that war, ideology, and imperialism can act as agents of revolution and counter-revolution; furthermore, these three factors can also be the targets of revolutions and revolutionaries themselves. Specifically, war can cause a country to become destabilized enough to encourage the outbreak of revolution. Alternately, countries themselves can initiate wars in order to spread revolutions. Using war intentionally to spread revolution usually stems from a revolutionary ideology. Imperialism (an ideology of its own) acts to repress revolution by forcing states into colonial subservience, though this process inspires as many revolutions as it thwarts. Other scholars have analyzed the role of foreign powers in revolutions through the lens of world systems theory, which offers an attempt to make and test predictions about the effects of external factors on revolutions. Finally, scholars have also begun to study what revolutionaries themselves have thought and done about foreign intervention during revolutions.

War: Forcing Revolutions

Scholars have long recognized that of all the ways nations interact, war has the most potential to influence revolutions. Sociologist Charles Tilly, an experienced scholar of social movements and revolutions, argues that the “connections among state-making, the building of armed forces, and the maintenance of internal control help account for the tendency of revolutions to occur in conjunction with the preparation and the termination of war” (1975). The most direct way in which war leads to revolution, according to Tilly, is by destabilizing in one way or another the state’s control of the means of violence. Tilly identifies two general paths this process could take: first, “the exaction of men, supplies, and – especially – taxes for the conduct of war incites resistance from crucial elites or important masses,” and second, “the absorption or weakening of a government’s repressive capacity by war, coupled with a decline in the government’s ability to meet its domestic commitments, encourages its enemies to rebel.” The state suddenly finds itself with depleted “coercive reserves.” Preparation for war and a build-up of the means of social control lead to what Tilly (1975) describes as a paradox: “the building up of the government’s coercive capacity for war sometimes has that very consequence [of encouraging revolution], because it leads to diversion, dilution, disloyalty or defeat of the forces destined for domestic control.”

Skocpol and Social Revolutions

In 1979 Theda Skocpol published a landmark comparative study of the Chinese, French, and Russian revolutions that further elaborated the role of war in the making of revolutions. In *States and Social Revolutions*, Skocpol argues that these three revolutions, in very different time periods and disparate parts of the world, stemmed from remarkably similar factors. In all three cases, war with foreign nations acted as an external force that destabilized power in each state. The disruption of a war – especially when the war does not go well – creates opportunities for revolutionaries. But war alone is not enough. In China, France, and Russia, war combined with internal distress to force a government collapse (war alone can often unify a nation behind its flag and prevent revolution). In Skocpol’s words, “a combination of unusual external pressures

with particular internal structures and developments” can spark a “revolutionary political crisis.”

In the cases of China, France, and Russia, revolution did not arise from within the state. Instead, external forces created the instability that eventually led to internal revolutions. France under the Bourbons, Russia under the Romanovs, and China under the Manchu all found themselves in conflict with neighboring states. These neighboring states had, in each instance, overwhelming economic and military power, having already achieved an industrialized economy and military. Thus, in order to preserve their states, the ruling classes had to transform completely the socioeconomic structures with which they ruled their states.

Notably, these three states all proved unable to transform and instead became paralyzed. In Skocpol’s (1979) words,

revolutionary political crises, culminating in administrative and military breakdowns, emerged because the imperial states became caught in cross-pressures between intensified military competition or intrusions from abroad and constraints imposed on monarchical responses by the existing agrarian class structures and political institutions. The old-regime states were prone to such revolutionary crises because their existing structures made it impossible for them to meet the particular international military exigencies that each had to face in the modern era.

Any attempts to reform signaled the weakness of the old regime. With the old regime revealed as weak, class struggles broke out in each state that eventually led to revolution.

China

For centuries, and well into our own present day, capitalists in western nations have looked to China’s tremendous population with greed and envy. The competition to open and control China as a market for western goods has caused numerous geopolitical conflicts during vastly different eras of history – Columbus, after all, had hoped to find a faster route to China in 1492 (of course, by the twenty-first century, the situation had become reversed, with the United States becoming the market for goods produced in China by cheap Chinese labor). At any rate, in the mid-nineteenth century, industrial empires

from the West attempted to seize control of the China market. Britain's Opium Wars (1839–42) menaced the Chinese Empire from the outside, just as the internal government structure came unbalanced from within.

External powers continued to weaken the authority of China's government. As Skocpol notes, China lost a war against Japan in 1895, forcing the government to realize it must reform from within or face destruction from external forces. France and Germany followed Britain's scramble for the China market, which resulted in the carving up of China into various "spheres of influence" controlled by foreign empires. The United States, arriving too late to win its own sphere, called for an "Open Door" policy, essentially a plea to replace the spheres system with a free market. Eventually, the foreign intervention inspired nationalist rebellions in China, of which the Boxer Rebellion (beginning in 1899) was the most notable.

At the turn of the century, China's imperial government slowly began reforms to preserve power, but quickly learned that reform movements can harm governments as often as they can help them – as happened with Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika* reforms of the late 1980s which undermined Communist Party authority in the Soviet Union. In China the reform movement similarly undermined the government and revolution began in 1911.

France

As with China, France felt "unwonted pressures from more developed nations abroad," which led to internal class conflicts in the French homeland. In Skocpol's (1979) words,

by early 1793 foreign enemies were pressing in anew upon France. Simultaneously there were internal revolts. Spurred by the threat of conscription to the national army, the peasants of the Vendée rose against the revolutionary government in March. . . . What emerged to meet the crisis of defending the Revolution from its armed enemies at home and abroad was a dictatorial and arbitrary system of government.

Eventually, of course, Napoleon took control of the revolution and embarked upon a military conquest of Europe, in the process forcing revolutionary changes across the continent.

Russia

Skocpol's analysis of the Russian Revolution illustrates how external factors besides war can indirectly encourage a revolution. By the late 1800s, according to Skocpol, Russia's process of industrialization had "international implications." In other words, the Russian state and economy had become tied more and more to Europe. Foreign capital had invested heavily in Russia, whose economy depended upon agricultural exports to England and Germany, as well as loans from England, Germany, and France. Thus, when a depression swept Europe in 1899–1900, the Russian economy fell apart.

Ultimately, however, it was war that led directly to the Russian Revolution – specifically, the debacle of World War I. Overpowered by Germany, Russia's experience in World War I proved so devastating by 1917 that the government brokered a settlement and withdrew from the war. Subsequently, the Russian state essentially collapsed, replaced after a civil war by a communist system.

Exceptions: Japan and Prussia

In some cases, Skocpol shows, foreign intervention does not lead to revolution. During the nineteenth century, states facing threats from an industrialized nation could avoid revolution by adapting to a western-style government. Japan, for example, faced foreign interventions during the nineteenth century, but instead of revolution, Japan simply transformed into a western-style nation during the Meiji Restoration. This transformation could take place, Skocpol argues, because there was no "politically powerful landed upper class." As a consequence, reform did not instigate class conflicts as it had in China. Similarly, Skocpol shows that after invasion by Napoleon, Prussia refused to collapse entirely. Instead, it adapted, as the Junkers passed economic reforms, freed serfs, and started universal military conscription – a move that encouraged a nationalist fever following years of French intervention. As a result, war did not lead to revolution as in China and France. Eventually, German unification in the mid-nineteenth century quickened Germany's emergence as the most powerful state in Europe.

In all these cases, however, foreign conflict led to drastic change, be it a genuine revolution or transformation into a state that resembled the foreign power itself. Where the ruling class

had greater control, they remained in power; elsewhere, misfortune in war signaled a weakness that allowed class conflict to turn into revolution. Therefore, war must be considered the swiftest and most dramatic way in which external forces can influence the structure of states.

Ideology: Exporting Revolution

Inherent in Tilly's and Skocpol's analyses is the fact that war so often causes revolutions because war itself occurs as a regular and ordinary feature of the nation-state system. Sometimes, however, revolution can be the policy of a state's ideology. In other words, ideology urges a state to attempt to cause revolutions abroad; war is but the best instrument for doing so. Thus, where the above analysis sees revolution as a likely but essentially accidental outcome of war, the following analysis looks at war as a method of intentionally creating revolutions.

Revolutionary France

Although the export of revolution is most commonly associated with the communist nations of the twentieth century, the French Revolution, begun in 1789, led to a similar policy. During the early nineteenth century, the French Emperor Napoleon embarked on a conquest of Europe, establishing democratic states in all the conquered lands. Tilly (1975) explains: "With the French Revolution and its Napoleonic aftermath, state-building received a new emphasis while the concept of the nation and of the nation-state became full blown both in the sense of a shared community of purposes, privileges, and benefits, and in the sense of a 'peculiar people' exercising its right of self-determination." Napoleon's conquest resulted in the spread of a democratic and nationalistic ideology, which "now became a political dogma that was self-consciously grasped and philosophically elaborate and embellished." More recently, modern states have attempted to create "regime change" – essentially a revolution without violence – through the process of "nation building," the efficacy of which has been clearly revealed by the cataclysm of violence unleashed by the US war with Iraq, which began in 2003.

Communism

Most instances of exporting revolution stem from the Marxist and Leninist goals of spreading

revolutions across countries through the power of the proletariat. Indeed, Marx himself expected the working class to do as much, judging by his remarks in the *Communist Manifesto*:

The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: (1) In the national struggles of the proletariat of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. (2) In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.

The conception of working-class solidarity embodied by communism essentially urged the proletariat to erase such concepts as nationalism and borders by subverting national boundaries and joining with fellow workers in other countries. The *Manifesto* continues:

The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself as the nation, it is, so far, itself the nation, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word. National differences, and antagonisms between peoples, are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto. The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilized countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.

Shortly after the consolidation of the Soviet Union, Lenin made it the official policy of the proletariat to seek revolution in the industrial world. For the rest of the first half of the twentieth century, however, a transition to communist rule most often occurred not by workers'

uprisings, but behind the gun barrels of the Red Army as it liberated Eastern Europe from Nazi rule and replaced it with puppet communist governments. In China, however, Mao Zedong's 1949 triumph reflected both indigenous communist rebellion as well as aid from the Soviet Union. Camaraderie between China and the Soviet Union quickly turned to enmity by the late 1950s, however. Each nation vowed to support national "wars of liberation" in the Third World; this common cause sprang not from solidarity but from a competition for the allegiance of the Third World and for the mantle of true revolutionary power.

Despite their rivalry, the Soviet Union and China encouraged a host of revolutionary movements throughout the second half of the twentieth century. In the 1960s Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev promised to "bring imperialism to its knees" by supporting "wars for national liberation." He declared that "Communists are revolutionaries, and it would be a bad thing if they did not exploit new opportunities." Thus the Soviet Union supported struggles against western imperialism throughout the Third World, especially Latin America and the Middle East. China meanwhile supported communists in Indochina (later Vietnam) led by Ho Chi Minh in their fight against French colonization and, later, American militarism.

Even indigenous movements, such as Fidel Castro's Cuban Revolution (1959), eventually found support from the Soviet Union. Because of the Soviet support, Cuba itself supported in turn other revolutions, as the communist-Soviet-revolutionary ethos mandated. One cannot dismiss revolutionary rhetoric as merely symbolic, however. Instead, the concept bred a shared solidarity and purpose among many people. In a word, ideology mattered – Cuba, for example, aided revolutions in Africa despite the risk of alienating potential allies like France.

Piero Gleijeses has offered the most penetrating analysis of Cuba's efforts to aid revolutionaries, especially in Africa. Throughout the 1960s, Cubans – often led by Che Guevara – participated in several African missions to support revolutions. Cuba's assistance in Zaire, for example, proved to be "Cuba's most daring move yet in the Third World," according to Gleijeses (2002); "more Cubans fought in Zaire than in all of Latin America through the first two decades of the Castro regime."

More than perhaps any communist nation, Cuba embraced the concept of spreading and supporting revolutions. Lúcio Lara, leader of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, talked about Cuban assistance in 1965. "We wanted only one thing from the Cubans: instructors," he said.

The war was getting difficult, and we were inexperienced. We wanted Cuban instructors because of the prestige of the Cuban Revolution and because their theory of guerrilla warfare was very close to our own. We were also impressed with the guerilla tactics of the Chinese, but Beijing was too far away, and we wanted instructors who could adapt to our way of living. (Cited in Gleijeses 2002)

In some cases, however, the revolutionary ideology did not reflect solidarity. Castro, for example, could use the pretext of aiding revolutions in a cynical, self-aggrandizing manner. After Che Guevara arrived in Bolivia hoping to aid revolutionaries, Castro essentially left Guevara to wither and eventually die in the Bolivian countryside. After his comrade's death, Castro frequently evoked Guevara's crusades in order to coopt the martyr's revolutionary efforts as his own.

Imperialism: Controlling and Causing Revolution

The ideological basis of pro-revolutionary activity in communism (especially during the twentieth century) springs from an inherent opposition to imperialism. Imperialism, however, can have its own role to play in revolutions, both within and without the context of communism. In 1958, while Castro was engaged in a rebellion against the Batista regime, but before he had embraced communism, he declared that his movement consisted entirely of a nationalism adamantly opposed to US domination of his Cuban homeland. "The Americans are going to pay dearly for what they are doing," he stated. "When this war is over, I'll start a much longer and bigger war of my own: the war I'm going to fight against them. That will be my true destiny."

Imperialism has two types of effects on revolutions. On a basic level, imperial powers hope to suppress revolutions in colonial lands in order

to protect and maintain their economic and national interests. At the same time, as Castro's words indicate, imperialism can plant the seeds of opposition exactly because of this suppression. Many examples indicate that empires have caused as many revolutions as they have suppressed by inspiring nationalist movements against imperialism.

From the perspective of an imperial nation, their role in revolutions is to thwart them. The imperial system prefers stability, often at the expense of ideology. Thus the United States, formed in its own Revolutionary War, has attempted to stop and frequently stifled many revolutions, often siding with imperial and autocratic powers to do so. For example, President Woodrow Wilson ordered US troops to Russia during the 1917 revolution in an attempt to stop a communist victory. Throughout the early twentieth century the United States backed a corrupt Chiang Kai-Shek against Mao's communist insurgency. And in Latin America the United States has consistently intervened, using more-or-less covert operations to overturn or prevent genuine populist revolutions and governments and instead install leaders of its own choosing. In 1954, for just one example, the CIA overthrew Jacobo Arbenz, the popularly elected leader of Guatemala who had nationalized 400,000 acres of land belonging to the United Fruit Corporation, a US company. The new leader installed by the CIA instantly returned the land to United Fruit. As another example, in 1965 the Lyndon Johnson administration interrupted a civil war in the Dominican Republic that had broken out after the fall of dictator Rafael Trujillo. Unwilling to let revolution and counter-revolution take its course, the United States sent thousands of Marines to the Dominican Republic in order to establish a regime of which it approved. In other revolutions, the United States would merely support one of the contestants for power, as when Wilson alternately supported Venustiano Carranza, Pancho Villa, and Carranza again during the Mexican revolution of the early twentieth century.

The United States is not unique in betraying its revolutionary ideals. Although the Soviet Union pledged support for Third World revolutionaries during the Cold War, Soviet leaders would not tolerate revolutionary yearnings among its own captive satellite nations. Thus the USSR brutally repressed anti-Soviet

(and thus anti-imperialist) uprisings in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968).

The influence or rule of an imperial power can also have the opposite effect: inspiring a nationalist revolution. The Cuban Revolution, as we have seen, started because the grip of the United States on Cuba became unbearable. Iran's revolution, begun in 1978, started as a backlash against the Shah of Iran, who the CIA had installed in the 1950s. The many conflicts that ravaged Africa during the 1960s also contained more anti-imperialist than pro-communist ideology. While Che Guevara oversaw the Cuban efforts in Zaire, he told a reporter: "I have found here in Africa . . . entire populations that are, if you'll allow me this image, like water on the verge of boiling. I have found leaders who understand the importance of the struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism."

World Systems Theory: Predicting Foreign Intervention

World systems theory, as espoused by Immanuel Wallerstein and his disciples, offers a useful theoretical framework in which to view the relationship between external factors and revolutions. In short, world systems theory sees the world as divided into a core of capitalist nations that exploit peripheral regions as producers of raw materials and as markets for consumer goods. Thus, intervention in revolutions occurs as the result of the core attempting to keep the periphery docile. According to David Kowalewski (1991), the nature of world systems theory suggests that core nations will intervene when the periphery exhibits "revolutionary activity." Because the economy of the core nations depends on the raw materials and markets of the periphery, revolutions threaten to disrupt the core's hegemony and economy since revolutions discourage investment, target elites in the periphery, and seek to spread to other nations.

Intervention by the core in the periphery does not occur in a perfectly consistent manner, however. At different times in history, Kowalewski (1991) shows, the core has dedicated very different amounts of time and resources to preventing revolutionary activity in the periphery. World systems theory predicts that intervention in revolutions will occur more often during a growing economy (what world systems theorists would call an expansion of the Kondratieff cycle

of the world economy). The core wants greater control over the periphery to maximize profits, hence revolutions are more threatening when the economy exhibits growth. At the same time, the core has an increased tax base enabling the state to fund military ventures and maintain a high standard of living at home. Finally, a good economy shifts the nation's attention away from domestic issues and toward international relations; as a result, the core becomes more confrontational. When the economy stagnates, on the other hand, economic expansion subsides, resulting in retrenchment at home. Production output drops, the value of raw materials from the periphery falls, and revolution appears as far less of a threat to the core. Additionally, in times of economic stagnation, few among the populace of the core nations support expensive military intervention abroad.

Politics also plays a role in determining the likelihood of core intervention in revolutions, Kowalewski (1991) argues. When one nation dominates the core – acting as a hegemon – competition among the core states declines. Control of the periphery becomes the responsibility of the lone hegemon, and intervention in the periphery becomes less common. When no single hegemon exists, however, intervention becomes more likely because the core is in flux and competing nations hope to take advantage of the periphery, such as when France aided the American Revolution in order to harm its rival, Great Britain. Ascending core nations, such as the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War, might even encourage revolutions in the periphery in order to destabilize the core. In short, when no clear hegemon exists, rivalry within the core makes the periphery more important and revolutions there more of a threat, causing the likelihood of intervention in the periphery by the core to increase.

At times, then, intervention in revolutions can be “periphery-driven” in that more revolutions result in more intervention by the core. When the economy is strong, the core-periphery power structure is destabilized by revolution and restabilized by intervention. But revolutions can be “core-driven” as well, particularly when no hegemon dominates the core. At these times, revolutions can be a threat to one core nation but opportunity to another. In summary, at all times the core hopes to control the periphery, but intervention becomes more likely during times of

economic expansion and non-hegemony. When the global economy contracts and when a hegemon dominates, revolutions in the periphery merit only a moderate response from the core.

Revolutionaries: Crafting Foreign Policy

Although scholars have long recognized the importance of external factors for revolutions, revolutionaries themselves have for just as long or longer known to take external factors into account. In essence, modern revolutionary movements have developed their own unique foreign policies. Some of the most innovative and recent works about the Cold War have provided a chance to learn how revolutionaries themselves have conceived of and confronted foreign intervention in and external factors on revolutions.

The historian Odd Arne Westad (1992) has offered the best analysis of the role of the Third World during the Cold War. Revolutionary movements, he finds, have always been aware of potential allies and enemies abroad; they knew that their revolution existed in a capitalist world system ruled by “powerful and intervention-prone US administrations.” (Of course, as we have seen, the Soviet Union intervened in revolutions as well.) During the Cold War, the bipolar US–Soviet conflict enhanced the likelihood of revolutions because regimes in the Third World could not monopolize foreign support; revolutionaries could always appeal to the other Cold War power not allied with the ruling regime.

Westad (1992) finds that Third World revolutionaries acted to attain international support or prevent foreign intervention in three ways. First, revolutionaries could mobilize nationalist sentiment in their native land (their most visible action), as Chinese communists did in 1947 and 1948, and Iranians did in 1978. Second, they could form an alternative alliance with a foreign power (their most productive action). This method aimed at forestalling foreign intervention as well as enlisting foreign allies to give legitimacy to a revolutionary regime; in addition many revolutionaries hoped a shared ideology with a foreign power might lead to cooperation or assistance. Third, they could spread anti-interventionist propaganda (their most meaningful action). Westad (1992) argues that such demands for non-intervention were often in reality attempts to strike a deal with interventionist power.

Of special interest is Westad's argument that during the Cold War, revolutionary movements attempted to make deals with potential interventionists without regard to ideology or history. In contrast to the above discussion of Cuba, Africa, and the export of revolution, assistance often proved far more important to revolutionary groups than ideology. Mao and Zhou Enlai attempted to strike a deal with the United States even as late as 1946. Other Third World revolutionary movements, including those in Iran, Vietnam, Angola, and Nicaragua, were willing to deal with the United States – and “let bygones be bygones” in Westad's words – if it refrained from intervention. Perhaps ideology was not as important as simply acting like – and being treated like – a legitimate nation-state. After all, according to Westad, most revolutionary groups had a cadre of foreign officers (for example, Zhou Enlai in China and Lopo do Nascimento in Angola), the leaders of the movement tightly controlled foreign policy, and they had foreign policy expertise and experience. Most revealing, Third World revolutionaries saw their revolution as a part of the geopolitical world structure.

Conclusion

Thus we see that the polarization of the world during the Cold War led to more revolutions by forcing revolutionary leaders to choose either capitalism or communism, despite a desire for Third World nationalism and some efforts at non-alignment. For example, the US refusal to see Ho Chi Minh as an independent nationalist encouraged him to seek help from communist nations; likewise, the Eisenhower administration's suspicion of Castro's revolution drove him into the welcoming arms of the Soviet Union.

Revolutions – and even mere attempts at revolution – can shake the foundations of the geopolitical system. A revolutionary movement attempts to stake its place in the globe, rather than in merely a local or regional area. Instead, revolutions can be acts of defiance against the power structure of the entire world. At the same time, revolutionaries can be great pragmatists by cooperating with unexpected allies for limited ends. Just as different states in the geopolitical system can see revolutions as a threat and an opportunity, revolutionaries see their movement in the same global context. Revolutionaries also see themselves as connected to other revolu-

tionaries from the past. After all, when Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam free from colonial rule on September 2, 1945, in Hanoi, he turned to Thomas Jefferson and the American Revolution for inspiration. “All men are created equal,” Ho stated.

They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This immortal statement was made in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in 1776. In a broader sense it means: All peoples on earth are equal from birth, all peoples have a right to live, be happy and be free.

Twenty years after this declaration, Ho would find himself at war with the very nation that inspired his own rebellion. It seems that the title of “revolutionary” can thus overshadow all other identities, which perhaps explains the camaraderie that freedom fighters see with others who define themselves as revolutionaries, no matter how distant in space, time, or ideology. And as unlikely as Ho's embrace of American rhetoric may seem, it shows that influences on revolutions can come from the past, as well as from overseas.

SEE ALSO: Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán (1913–1971); Castro, Fidel (b. 1926); Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967); Imperialism and Capitalist Development

References and Suggested Readings

- Bradley, M. (2000) *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Gleijeses, P. (2002) *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kowalewski, D. (1991) Core Intervention and Periphery Revolution, 1821–1985. *American Journal of Sociology* 97, 1 (July): 70–95.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1998) *The Communist Manifesto: A Modern Edition*. London: Verso.
- Skocpol, T. (1979) *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Skocpol, T. (1994) *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, C. (Ed.) (1975) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wallerstein, I. (1974) *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press.

Westad, O. A. (1992) Rethinking Revolutions: The Cold War in the Third World. *Journal of Peace Research* 29, 4 (November): 455–64.

Westad, O. A. (2005) *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zubok, V. & Pleshakov, C. (1996) *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Foster, William Z. (1881–1961)

James R. Barrett

Born in Taunton, Massachusetts and raised in the slums of Philadelphia, William Z. Foster passed through the Socialist Party, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and a series of his own syndicalist organizations to become one of the key figures in the Communist Party USA (CPUSA). He was the party's presidential candidate in 1924, 1928, and 1932 and its chairperson from 1932 to 1957, years which saw the party's decline from a major progressive influence in the Popular Front of the late 1930s and the World War II era to an isolated, sectarian organization during the McCarthy era of the early 1950s.

After leaving school in the third grade, Foster hoboed around the United States and worked a series of jobs ranging from deep water sailor to locomotive fireman. He played a key role in the IWW's 1909 Spokane, Washington Free Speech fight and traveled throughout Europe studying the continent's labor movements in 1910–11. Foster taught himself to read in German and French and devoured the Marxist classics. During the World War I era he earned a national reputation as a brilliant strategist for his successful union organizing campaigns in meat packing and steel and his direction of the 1919 steel strike, the largest industrial conflict in the United States up to that point. Drawn to the Soviet model during a visit to Russia in 1921, Foster secretly joined the American party later that year. In the 1920s he built the Trade Union Educational League (TUEL) which provided the main radical opposition to the American Federation of Labor (AFL). For more than a decade he directed the party's trade union work, including the Trade Union Unity League

(TUUL), a federation of dual revolutionary unions.

Foster suffered a severe physical and psychological collapse during the 1932 presidential election and spent the mid-1930s recovering from this crisis. During the following decade he represented the only serious left-wing opposition to Earl Browder's leadership (1935–45) which took the party's policies far in the direction of social democracy. A staunch Stalinist, Foster led the party back toward a more sectarian Marxist-Leninist position in the postwar era. In the context of Cold War, severe government repression, and increasingly conservative domestic politics, this turn proved disastrous for American communism. In 1956–7 Foster resisted efforts to democratize the CPUSA in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Hungary and Khrushchev's revelations of Stalin's crimes. His own physical deterioration in the late 1950s paralleled his party's decline. Foster died in September 1961 in Moscow where had gone for medical treatment.

SEE ALSO: Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA); International Workers of the World, Marine Transport Workers; Marxism; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and "Revolution from Above"

References and Suggested Readings

Barrett, J. R. (1999) *William Z. Foster and the Tragedy of American Radicalism*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Johanningsmeier, E. P. (1994) *Forging American Communism: The Life of William Z. Foster*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Zipser, A. (1981) *Workingclass Giant: The Life of William Z. Foster*. New York: International Publishers.

Foucault, Michel (1926–1984)

Petros Metafas

A prominent philosopher, historian, sociologist, critical thinker, and activist, Michel Foucault rose to become one of the most highly regarded intellectuals within French mainstream circles while simultaneously retaining his focus on social groups diverging and excluded from this very mainstream. Foucault's study of certain social institutions derived to a large extent from his lived experiences: for a significant part of his life he suffered from depression, subsequently

examining psychiatry and medicine (Foucault 1973). Similarly, his own homosexuality might have triggered his interest in the history of sexuality (Foucault 1978, 1985, 1986). Foucault provided some of the most excellent and critical studies of repressive social institutions and structures, explained through his analysis of power according to which the latter runs through the entire social body and is incorporated into all social relationships.

Distrustful of so-called social progress, he denounced the dark side of the Enlightenment and attacked the prescriptions which comprise “normality.” Foucault refrained from exploiting the authority of his intellectual skills, thus never suggesting a concrete alternative welfare social condition. And yet his critical study of structural societal repression was embraced by those who were faced with and opposed to it: his work came heavily to influence poststructuralist radical thought primarily within the fields of social history, feminism and gender studies, anthropology, cultural studies, and human geography. Foucault’s most direct encounter with a revolutionary movement was arguably also the most controversial: his enthusiastic support of the Iranian Revolution (1978–9) largely overlooked, as claimed since, the repressive elements of the new regime.

Foucault’s work can be divided into three periods, namely archaeology, genealogy, and ethics. In his first period (ending with the *Archaeology of Knowledge*) he showed that the so-called objectivity of “human sciences” is a facade: following a Nietzschean perspective he argued that there is no possibility for neutral, general criteria to be set against “independent truth,” against “right” and “false” in such sciences. In his second period, now as a genealogist (ending with the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*) Foucault reached nihilism: he concluded that what we count as a statement of order and reason is in fact a product of dominance and subjection. Power, then, is not simply something that is imposed on us via prohibitions and restrictions; it is “positive,” crossing through boundaries and producing discourses, bearing pleasure, effecting modes of knowledge, and finally, producing identities. And yet, power encompasses the potentiality of its reversal: the subject is not the foundation of thought and history but rather their product. In his third and final “ethical” period Foucault turned to an aesthetics of existence. Here, he

argued that we need to create ourselves as a work of art: “care of the self” is not a process for the discovery of our deeper “real self,” but rather an invention and creation of what someone could be.

An identifiable link seems to exist between the political philosophy of anarchism and the post-structuralism of Foucault. There is no single, privileged point for resistance and social transformation in either. Since power is diffused, a critique against it must also be exercised everywhere: at the level of the human race, of teaching relations, in relations between psychiatrists and “mad” people, in the field of sexuality and beyond.

Foucault wrote for the dark side of our society, for the people who have no political rights, for delinquents, for the confined, for the factory workers, for the poor, for sexual deviants, even for the oppressed students of severe schools of an earlier century. He eventually rejected centralized disciplined political actions. He chose specialized, local, and “partial” battles against the micro-physics of power rather than economy based “class struggle.”

He did not refuse the revolutionary proletarian movement, but preferred the struggles of the imprisoned, of women, of institutionalized “insanes,” of homosexuals, of deviants of all kinds. It is through this unique perspective that Foucault came to influence and intellectually arm – directly or indirectly – a vast array of contemporary revolutionary thought, thus leaving a precious legacy. He had a dramatic end in 1984 as one of the first famous victims of AIDS.

SEE ALSO: Enlightenment, France, 18th Century; Iranian Revolution, 1979; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements; Marxism; Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900); Sexuality and Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Foucault, M. (1965) *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*. New York: Pantheon.
- Foucault, M. (1970) *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. New York: Pantheon.
- Foucault, M. (1972) *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. New York: Pantheon.
- Foucault, M. (1973) *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*. New York: Pantheon.
- Foucault, M. (1977) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Pantheon.
- Foucault, M. (1978) *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction*. New York: Pantheon.
- Foucault, M. (1985) *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure*. New York: Random House.

Foucault, M. (1986) *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3: The Care of the Self*. New York: Random House.
 Hoy, D. C. (Ed.) (1986) *Foucault: A Critical Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians

Richard Goff

Following the collapse of the Owenite communities, Arthur Brisbane became the new leader of the utopian socialist movement. Influenced by the ideas of French utopian socialist Charles Fourier, Brisbane's "phalanxes" prompted thousands to engage in social experimentation over the 1840s and 1850s. Brisbane's secular communities sought to solve the problems of civilization through communitarian organization.

Brisbane's intellectual inspiration came from Fourier. Born in 1772 and maturing during the Age of Democratic Revolution, Fourier developed an interest in social experimentation and city planning. In 1808 he published his massive work, *The Theory of Four Movements and of General Destinies*, in which he criticized modern industrial civilization for its corrupt and exploitative practices. Fourier believed that a radical change was necessary to save humanity and that change would come through cooperative communities.

Fourier argued for the creation of planned communities, or "phalanxes," which would provide the economic and social basis for humanity's transformation. These phalanxes would be comprised of 1,620 people (twice the number of personality traits Fourier believed to exist) living in 4,000-acre compounds. These communities would include people with various skills; however, they would function on the basis of equality within the community. Women would enjoy equality with men and freedom of sexual choice. Members would freely choose their vocation and would rotate jobs as desired and as needed for the well-being of the community. The community would blend work, leisure, and intellectual development, allowing individuals maximum freedom to develop their capacities. Fourier hoped that his quite specific, but grand vision would produce millions of communities, transcending

national borders, and would provide the basis for a new civilization.

Fourier's theories remained a European phenomenon until Arthur Brisbane discovered his writings and became an instant convert. Brisbane, having grown up in an intellectually curious household, traveled to Europe to attend college and began translating Fourier's works. Upon his return to the United States, Brisbane started the newspaper *The Phalanx*, which popularized Fourier's ideas. In 1840 Brisbane published his major work, *The Social Destiny of Man*, in which he made the case for Fourierism.

Throughout the early 1840s over twenty-five phalanx communities formed across Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa. Although these initial communities were generally short-lived, the burst of experimentation is significant. The movement initially attracted an eclectic lot of intellectuals, idealists, workers, and farmers. Although Fourier's description of the phalanx was relatively specific, implementing his ideas proved to be more challenging. Most communities lacked the initial capital to construct the necessary housing, farming, and production facilities to make the phalanx economically viable. Fourier's "instant" commune approach left members with little choice but to significantly scale back their idealism for practicality, and in most cases, the communities failed due to infighting.

A handful of the phalanxes survived the initial surge and retreat. In 1843 approximately 200 people created a phalanx in central Wisconsin. The community successfully blended farming and industrial production with rotating labor assignments and elected supervisors. The community initially prospered, attracting additional members, including many single parents seeking a desirable social arrangement for rearing children, before dissolving in 1849. Similarly, the North American Phalanx of New Jersey, established in 1843, continued to function into the 1850s, ultimately breaking up over religious issues pertaining to the abolitionist and women's rights movements.

Although Brisbane's Fourierest communities failed, they left their imprint on the American social and political landscape. The Brook Farm community attracted many notables of the time, including prominent transcendentalists Ralph Waldo Emerson and George Ripley, as well as Nathaniel Hawthorne, Margaret Fuller, and

Horace Greeley. In many cases, Phalanx veterans, following the collapse of their communities, created socialist clubs and cooperatives, and became more deeply involved in social and labor reform movements. By the 1850s the impetus for gradualist reform had replaced the immediacy of Fourier's vision; however, the desire for social change remained.

SEE ALSO: Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony; Icaria Utopian Community; New Harmony; Oneida Perfectionist Utopians; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Shakers Utopian Community; Utopian Communities, United States; Utopian Intentional Communities

References and Suggested Readings

- Hayden, D. (1976) *Seven American Utopias: The Architecture of Communitarian Socialism, 1790–1975*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Miller, T. (1998) *The Quest for Utopia in the Twentieth Century*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Pitzer, D. E. (1997) *America's Communal Utopias*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Sutton, R. P. (1994) *Les Icariens: The Utopian Dream in Europe and America*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Fox, Charles James (1749–1806)

Gordon N. Pentland

Charles James Fox was a leader of the Whig Party in the British parliament. Spending 37 years in parliament and achieving high office on two occasions, he gained a reputation as a champion of religious and civil liberty after pushing for the Libel Act of 1792 (known as Fox's Act) and the abolition of the slave trade in 1806.

His family background augured well for a political career. He was the son of Henry Fox (1705–74), a well-known political manager, and Lady Caroline Fox (1723–74), daughter of the second Duke of Richmond and a great-granddaughter of Charles II. He enjoyed all the privileges of aristocratic life – Eton, Oxford, and a Grand Tour – and early on he developed, under the eye of his indulgent father, the crowded and lively private life that would so persistently shape the perceptions of the public man.

It was through his impeccable connections that Fox was able to enter parliament in 1768, at the age of 19. In his early career he acted with

his father's friends and against his father's enemies, who included those Rockingham Whigs with whom he would later be associated. In spite of his later reputation as a friend of America, he initially supported Lord North's colonial policies, twice holding minor office in his ministry and twice resigning precipitately for family reasons.

After the death of his father in 1774, Fox gravitated slowly toward the Whig opposition to North's ministry and developed a close relationship with Edmund Burke. There was, however, no Damascene conversion, but a process whereby Fox's politics coalesced around two broad concerns: first, a growing dislike of George III and a fear that royal influence was being used to undermine the cherished Whig shibboleth of a "balanced" constitution; secondly, a growing association with the American cause and a developing conviction that royal influence was being used for the same pernicious ends in America.

His first experience of real ministerial power – which was to imprint itself strongly on his later politics – came in the period of political and ministerial flux that accompanied the latter stages and the ending of the war with America. First, he acted as foreign secretary in a ministry headed by the Earl of Shelburne and the Marquess of Rockingham from March 1782 until the latter's untimely death in July of the same year; second, he formed a coalition with his erstwhile bitter opponent, Lord North, which lasted from March until December 1783. If this Fox–North coalition established Fox's reputation for political opportunism, the manner in which it ended – with the king putting pressure on the House of Lords to throw out the coalition's India Bill – cemented Fox's belief in the pernicious power of the crown.

The dismissal of the coalition saw William Pitt (the Younger) come to power, and it was against this celebrated opponent as well as George III that Fox was to play out the rest of his political career. The principles and the contests derived from his experience in 1782–4 drove Fox's politics in the 1780s, notably during the Regency Crisis (1788–9) and the impeachment of Warren Hastings (1788–94). If both of these crises illustrated his fundamental principles, they also demonstrated deficiencies in his political leadership.

The French Revolution was to mark another turning point both in British politics as a whole

and in Fox's individual career. Fox, constantly in contact with liberal members of the French nobility, interpreted the Revolution as a French version of Britain's Glorious Revolution, designed to create a constitutional monarchy along British lines. This was in stark contrast to the gloomy predictions of Edmund Burke in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790). Fox's ambiguity over questions of popular sovereignty and democracy also distanced him from the more radical fringe of his supporters. These ideological fissures presaged the division of the entire party after 1794. After this point the term "Whig" was increasingly replaced by "Foxite," which demonstrated not only that the hemorrhaging of support left Fox in command of a small rump which could scarcely be called a party, but also that it was Fox's dominant personality that was taken to shape the convictions and command the loyalty of this rump.

Throughout the 1790s Fox spoke consistently against the restriction of civil liberties and against the ministerial conduct of the war with France. The tangible political achievements of the 1790s were slim – some early victories over foreign policy questions and securing the passage of the Libel Act of 1792 – and Fox's own dithering leadership and the disastrous policy of secession after 1797 must take much of the blame.

When the Peace of Amiens of 1802 seemed briefly to vindicate Fox's anti-war stance, he was among the many Whigs who took the opportunity to visit France and held three interviews with Napoleon. On the resumption of war, his belief in the peaceful intentions of the French was just as quickly discredited. An increasingly domesticated Fox was to enjoy one last taste of power as foreign secretary in the Ministry of All the Talents, whose signal achievement was the abolition of the slave trade. He died in September 1806 and was buried in Westminster Abbey.

Fox was almost immediately canonized by his political support and a cult of Fox survived well into the nineteenth century. His dilatoriness as a leader and his ambiguity over questions such as parliamentary reform and the role of the people in politics were quickly airbrushed by supporters in favor of a projection of him as "the perpetual advocate of freedom" and as a tragic figure assailed by political misfortune. Less partisan assessments in the twentieth century have tended to point out Fox's deficiencies as a parliamentary leader and the ambiguities of

his thinking on issues such as parliamentary reform, but have confirmed his reputation as a mesmerizing politician with sincere commitments to religious toleration, the abolition of slavery, and the protection of civil liberties.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776; Britain, Anti-War Movement, 1775–1783; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Glorious Revolution, Britain, 1688

References and Suggested Readings

- Cannon, J. (1969) *The Fox–North Coalition: Crisis of the Constitution, 1782–4*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Derry, J. W. (1972) *Charles James Fox*. London: B. T. Batsford.
- Dinwiddie, J. R. (1970) Charles James Fox and the People. *History* 55: 342–59.
- Mitchell, L. G. (1971) *Charles James Fox and the Disintegration of the Whig Party 1782–1794*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mitchell, L. G. (1992) *Charles James Fox*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- O'Gorman, F. (1967) *The Whig Party and the French Revolution*. London: Macmillan.
- Perry, N. B. (1976) The Whig Cult of Fox in Early Nineteenth-Century Sculpture. *Past and Present* 70: 94–105.

Fox, George (1624–1691)

Amy Linch

George Fox was founder of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in the mid-seventeenth century. A social and spiritual reformer, Fox asserted that true knowledge came directly from God, without intercession from textual or priestly authority, and he encouraged his followers to recognize the "inner light" of faith available to all regardless of gender or class. His followers, dubbed Quakers by critics of their emotional enthusiasm, eschewed social conventions of speech, dress, and manner that maintained class boundaries. Fox's spiritual doctrine and practice represented a profound challenge to the social and political structures with which the institutional church was entwined. For over three decades he and his fellow Friends endured dispossession, imprisonment, physical abuse, and death as they asserted their right to freedom of conscience and responsibility to reshape the world in accordance with their view of social justice.

Fox was born in Drayton-in-the-Clay (now Fenny Drayton), Leicestershire, England to a relatively affluent Puritan family and was apprenticed to a cobbler in his late teens. In 1643, at the beginning of the Civil Wars in Britain and Ireland, a spiritual crisis prompted him to begin wandering about England wrestling with depression and pondering religious questions. He sought relief to no avail from clergy, an experience that shaped his perspective that priests were largely a vain and hypocritical group of dissemblers. He began reading the Bible and emulated the simple practices of the early Christians, preaching, praying, and protesting against the trappings of wealth and power represented by the churches in the towns he traveled through. Fox began to convert people to his understanding of the Christian faith as the experience of Christ as an immediate, life-changing reality; of the church as a fellowship of believers; and of ministers as people who serve and reveal Christ to others.

Much like the Fifth Monarchists, Fox envisioned a world transformed, in which equality before the law and among men and women would be instantiated by rule of the virtuous. He published a pamphlet in 1659 that placed 59 demands before the parliament. Among his requirements were conversion of abbeys to almshouses for the poor and elimination of the death penalty for property crimes, which were most likely to be committed by the poor. He further maintained that courts should be held near the people and laws should be written in common language so that people could represent themselves and be freed from the burden of lawyers' fees. He argued for reform of prisons and care for the lame by the nation as "the way to bring the nation like a garden, and make a free nation, a free people." Fox's concern with the accessibility of courts and the state of prisons was based on regular personal experience with these institutions. His public preaching and practice of disrupting church services to argue doctrine with priests resulted in five periods of imprisonment.

Fox encouraged his followers to pursue reform through political participation. He asserted the duty of Quakers to monitor and instruct magistrates and to use the courts and electoral process to change oppressive laws. He placed a heavy burden of responsibility on individuals to evaluate the dictates of the state according to their own consciences. Civil disobedience against unjust

laws and his unrestrained evangelizing in the reactionary climate of the Restoration led to several more periods of imprisonment for Fox. Between 1660 and 1680, more than 10,000 of his followers were incarcerated and over 250 died in prison. In this climate, in 1661 Fox first declared the doctrine of pacifism that has come to be associated with Quakers as he struggled to reconcile the demands of conscience and the survival of his community in the face of political hostility.

Despite Fox's denunciation of institutionalized religion, by 1700 the Friends represented the largest nonconformist sect in Britain. In North America, Pennsylvania was established as a Quaker colony by his associate William Penn, and Fox led teams of missionaries to Barbados, Jamaica, Holland, and Germany. As the Society of Friends became institutionalized, many of the more radical practices of Fox's followers were circumscribed. The question of women's power in the organization resulted in a schism, but Fox defended the power and dignity of women as their "right and possession." The Friends became a major force in promoting women's literacy and pioneered humane, non-violent approaches to educating children. Fox's followers also played important roles in campaigns for the abolition of slavery, women's suffrage, prison reform, and native rights. Fox died in London on January 13, 1691.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658); English Revolution, 17th Century; English Revolution, Radical Sects; Fell, Margaret (1614–1702); Fifth Monarchist Women

References and Suggested Readings

- Fox, G. (1659) *To the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England*. London. Available at www.universalistfriends.org/quf2002.html.
- Fox, G. (1952) *The Journal of George Fox*. Ed. J. Nichalls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Greaves, R. (1992) Shattered Expectations? George Fox, the Quakers and the Restoration State, 1660–1685. *Albion* 24 (2): 237–59.
- Hill, C. (1972) *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution*. New York: Temple Smith.
- Ingle, H. L. (1994) *First Among Friends: George Fox and the Creation of Quakerism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mullet, M. (1999) *New Light on George Fox, 1624–1691: A Collection of Essays*. New York: Hyperion Books.

FPMR (Frente Patrioco Manuel Rodriguez)

Iván Torres Apablaza

The Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) is a political-military organization that operated in Chile from December 14, 1983. In its early years it worked as an armed extension of the Chilean Communist Party (CChP). It was formed against the background of military dictatorship and progressive growth of popular discontent. This contingent was formed mainly by communist militants trained militarily in Cuba.

After a 1973 coup in Chile the Communist Party, with support from countries like Cuba, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Vietnam, began the military preparedness of young communists to graduate as officers and promote a force in Chile's military capable of sustaining a popular victory. This system provided Chile with about 200 officers. In 1978 some of them were sent to Nicaragua to fight alongside the Sandinista National Liberation Front. These officers are those who later led the FPMR.

In 1980 the CChP proclaimed the People's Political Mass Revolt that validated all forms of struggle against the dictatorship. Its first job was the formation of the Front Zero as the embryo of what would become the FPMR three years later. The work began with small military combat units responsible for carrying out destabilizing actions. In 1982 a military command structure within the party itself, with the capacity to plan and decide on direct actions, was implemented. Approximately 130 new fighters were trained in Cuba, which later formed part of the middle structure of the FPMR. Special units for kidnapping, interrogation, and the use of military technology were formed and trained in socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

In 1983 Chilean officers entered the country from Cuba, assuming the leadership of the military commission of the CChP. On December 14, 1983 the FPMR was launched with a military campaign of sabotage, including a nationwide blackout. In 1985 the FPMR had 500 battle units with a total force of 1,500 cadres and logistical support for the mobility of the military cadres. Between 1983 and 1986 the protest against the dictatorship reached its peak. In that context the FPMR proposed a strategy of

national revolt to overthrow the dictatorship. The actions taken included sabotage, activities of agitation and armed propaganda, attacks and ambushes, executions of officials of the dictatorship, and kidnappings. The FPMR saw 1986 as the decisive year because it carried out two of its most important actions: the interment of more than 100 tons of armaments that soon was detected by the dictatorship; and Operation XX Century, the intent to assassinate dictator Augusto Pinochet, who nevertheless managed to escape. In 1987, 12 members of the FPMR were killed by state security agents.

After the failure of the most important actions and the withdrawal of the mass movement, the CChP removed its political and military support for the FPMR and generated its division into two fractions: Autonomous FPMR (FPMR-A) – which was the largest military contingent – and the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Movement (MPMR) that joined the electoral politics of the CChP and abandoned the insurrectionist strategy. The FPMR-A implemented a policy of “redesign” to evaluate the organization's strategy. Its analysis oriented it to the constitution of a combative social base and military operations to execute the agents of the dictatorship. At the same time the workers' militia, *Milicias Rodriguistas*, and social work with structures like Patriotic Youth, were strengthened. The redesign gave substance to what was defined as a National Patriotic War in 1988, whose strategic goal was a mass revolt in order to take control of the most important political centers of the country, putting an emphasis on rural guerrilla units. The FPMR-A decided to take four towns in rural areas. The operation succeeded in its immediate objectives, although in one of the villages the coordinated work between military police and secret service – which had infiltrated the structure of the FPMR-A – led to the arrest and killing of two of the main FPMR-A commanders.

As a result of the assassination of top leaders of the organization, and the constant internal challenge to focus more on military activity than on the construction of social bases and a political debate, at the end of dictatorship in 1990 the FPMR-A began a process of “national consultation” among the rank and file to discuss collectively the strategy to implement. The result of the analysis was a characterization of the period as the structural continuity of the dictatorship and the reaffirmation of the necessity of the armed

struggle, focusing on the killing of emblematic figures of the dictatorship. The FPMR-A sentenced to death a senator and kidnapped the son of the owner of a newspaper which consistently supported the dictatorship.

In 1992 the FPMR-A was at its most critical stage because strong repression during the dictatorship had dismantled its bases, the organization had been infiltrated, many arms depots had been discovered, and a political debate involving the whole organization was absent. The excessive emphasis on the military even generated a loss of popular support and the criminalization of its actions. In the middle of this crisis about twenty FPMR-A militants were imprisoned or killed. In 1992 the organization entered a process of internal discussion, seeking "a new political project." The process did not achieve the expected results and the FPMR-A broke up into several small autonomous groups continuing with armed operations.

In 1996 only a variety of small groups were left of what was once the FPMR. The same year the First Encounter for the Reorganization of Rodriguismo took place. Its main conclusion was the need to gain legitimacy for the organization politically and socially and give up the armed struggle. A national leadership was created, but it failed to activate the organization. By 2008 there were several expressions of political "rodriguista culture," including the MPMR, Identidad Rodriguista, Manuel Rides Again (Manuel Cabalga de Nuevo), and a structure called FPMR, which seeks to set up a political project in Chile, structuring its work in political and social fronts, following a Marxist-Leninist ideology and form of party organization.

SEE ALSO: Chile, Popular Resistance Against Pinochet; Cuban Revolutionary Government; Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s; Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)

References and Suggested Readings

- Palma, R. (2001) *Una larga cola de acero. Historia del FPMR 1984–1990*. Santiago: LOM.
- Peña, C. (2007) *Los Fusileros. Crónica secreta de una guerrilla en Chile*. Santiago: Debates.
- Rosas, P. (2004) *Rebeldía, Subversión y Prisión Política: Crimen y Castigo en la Transición Chilena. 1990–2004*. Santiago: LOM.
- Salazar, G. (2006) *La violencia política popular en las Grandes Alamedas. La violencia en Chile 1947–1987 (Una perspectiva histórico popular)*. Santiago: LOM.

Salazar, G. & Pinto, J. (2003) *Historia contemporánea de Chile. Niñez y Juventud*. Vol. 5. Santiago: LOM.

France, 1830 Revolution

Bradford C. Brown

The French Revolution of 1830 (July Revolution) was a popular rebellion that succeeded in overthrowing the rule of King Charles X and his ministers. The revolt was prompted by the government's rejection of legitimate election results and its suspension of the constitution. Armed crowds in Paris and other cities throughout France took to the streets to oppose the king and to support the elected representatives of the parliamentary opposition. Three decisive days of fighting, July 27–9, gave the insurrection its other names: *la Révolution de Juillet* and *les trois glorieuses*. Revolutionary leaders moved quickly to force the king's family into exile and to crown one of his distant cousins, Louis-Philippe, the Duc d'Orléans. The new regime, called the July Monarchy (or sometimes the Orléans Monarchy), would last until the February Revolution of 1848 created the Second Republic.

Origins

Charles X became king of France in September 1824. He had been waiting a long time, and the years had marked him. Even before the Revolution of 1789, as the Comte d'Artois, he had opposed any reform that would diminish the power of the monarchy. After the fall of the Bastille, he chose emigration. Detesting the revolutionary changes and plotting for their reversal, Charles learned of the beheading of his eldest brother, King Louis XVI, in 1793. For 20 more years he lived in exile, watching as French armies spread revolutionary ideas across Europe and Napoleon crowned himself emperor. The great general and his armies were eventually defeated in 1814 and again in 1815 at the Battle of Waterloo. After both defeats, the monarchy was restored to power and Charles returned to France in the shadow of foreign armies. His pragmatic older brother, now King Louis XVIII, accepted a compromise between monarchical authority and revolutionary liberties that was inscribed in a new constitution, the Charter of

1814. Charles did not approve. Ten more years would pass before Charles, the aged but still living symbol of counterrevolution, claimed the throne at the age of 67. He commemorated his personal triumph by reenacting the medieval religious ceremony of anointing the new king at the Cathedral of Reims. Providence, the ritual insinuated, had restored the union of church and state.

The accession of Charles X to the throne in 1824 altered every political calculation. From 1815 until his death, Louis XVIII and his ministers had tried to rule from the center of conservative elite opinion with the support of moderate royalists in the two houses of the legislature, the Chambers of Deputies and Peers. The moderates accepted the compromises embodied in the Charter. However, even for the wealthy who were allowed to vote under the Restoration (about 100,000 men in a population of 30 million, or less than 0.4 percent), and the even richer elite eligible for office, politics was divided between conservative and liberal poles. With the crown on the head of a reactionary, the balance of power had tipped to the right.

Conservatism was a new political ideology that appeared to be ancient. Writers like René de Chateaubriand, Louis Bonald, and Joseph de Maistre envisioned a return to the values of an idealized pre-revolutionary past in which the French nobility worked in concord with the monarchy and the Catholic Church to reestablish national glory and social order. Extreme conservatives were called ultra-royalists, or simply ultras, because they professed to be “more royalist than the king.” Ultras had demonstrated their capacity for violence and ruthlessness in the wake of Waterloo. During the “White Terror,” counterrevolutionary attacks and murders escalated in the south and west, and ultras purged their opponents from administrative, judicial, and National Guard positions. Ultras controlled the Chamber of Deputies in 1815–16 and were a potent force from 1821 to 1827. In religious matters, the high tide of conservative power was evidenced by evangelical missions against the legacies of the Revolution (featuring elaborate processions, enormous expiatory crosses, and the burning of irreligious literature), the return of the Jesuits (banned since 1764), the return of the Congrégation (a Catholic organization suppressed by Napoleon), and increasing church control over all levels of education.

Behind the scenes, the salons of the Faubourg Saint Germain and a secret society with rich and powerful members, the Chevaliers de la Foi (Knights of the Faith), connected the social, religious, and political agendas of the ultras. To atone for the sins of the Revolution, the Chapelle Expiatoire was built on the site where Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette had been buried after their executions. Ancient symbols of the monarchy returned to erase the memory of revolution and empire. The white flag of the Bourbons flew over government buildings. The flag of the Revolution, the tricolor, and the revolutionary national anthem, *La Marseillaise*, were banned. Other emblems and mementos were seized and destroyed as part of an official policy of forgetting the past. The statue of Napoleon on the Vendôme column was melted down to recreate a statue of King Henri IV on the Pont Neuf.

Liberalism was the political ideology of secularism, liberty, and equality. By 1815, the glories of the Enlightenment, the early Revolution, and the triumphs of revolutionary armies throughout Europe had been tarnished by the experiences of the Terror, the personal corruption of revolutionary leaders, the privations of more than two decades of war, and the tyranny of Emperor Napoleon. The left was in disarray; revolution was in disrepute. Liberals turned in a variety of directions. English and American examples lent support for the bicameral compromise of the Charter of 1814. Moderation became the watchword for the most significant new interpreters of the liberal political tradition: Pierre Daunou, Antoine Destutt de Tracy, Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant, Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard, Victor Cousin, and François Guizot. Others, less theoretical, turned to conspiracy. Old revolutionaries, freemasons, Napoleonic veterans, and enthusiastic students banded together in a series of clandestine societies – such as the Black Pin, the Devilishly Philosophical Society, the Knights of Liberty, and the Charbonnerie – in preparation to seize power for loosely defined ends. A series of small local revolts revealed the existence of these plots without ever seriously threatening the government.

In 1821, Napoleon’s early death in exile on Saint Helena dashed the hopes of Bonapartists for another spectacular return to power. Yet, popular Bonapartism, mixing myth and nostalgia with current discontents, continued to thrive.

Universally vilified, republicans were slow to regain a public voice for the far left. Socialists and communists remained tiny splinter factions. Given the tenor of the times, liberal opinion found better expression in history, poetry, plays, novels, and the arts. The popular songs of Pierre-Jean de Béranger blended nationalism, Bonapartism, and anti-clericalism in anthems to liberty. Liberal salons, newspapers, and journals, such as *Le Constitutionnel*, *Le Globe*, and the provocatively titled *Le Figaro*, provided rallying points for the otherwise divided opponents of a series of conservative governments.

By the late 1820s, however, the tide of political initiative had turned. Broader social, economic, and cultural changes put increasing pressure on the French political system. Economic growth between 1818 and 1825 gave way to a downturn that would last until 1832. The crisis was at once financial, industrial, and agricultural. As always, the rural and urban poor suffered the most as bread prices rose, wages fell, and unemployment became chronic. Incidents of protest and civil disobedience proliferated in the countryside. Discontent mounted in cities, too, where a growing population, swelled in the summer by seasonal laborers, strained traditional institutions and an aging infrastructure. The social crisis was also generational as a new cohort came of age under the Restoration. The literate were increasingly influenced by a changing world. Echoes of liberal revolution could be heard all throughout the West as rebellions in Spain, Russia, and the Italian kingdoms were brutally suppressed, while others succeeded in creating independent states in Greece and throughout Latin America. The spirit of rebellion was simultaneously transforming the arts through Romanticism.

Therefore, between 1824 and 1830, French politics became increasingly polarized as the right pushed for counterrevolutionary measures and liberals organized in response. A war of words escalated as pamphlets flew off the presses. With Charles X on the throne, conservatives pushed through legislation that compensated landholders who had lost assets after 1789, imposed new censorship restrictions, and tried to make primogeniture legal again. In religious matters, new laws insisted on the sacristy of Catholic worship and expanded the numbers of female Catholic religious orders. The government also seized every opportunity to undermine free elections by excluding eligible voters, scratching candidates,

and manipulating the press. The church got involved in elections as well; bishops endorsed candidates from the pulpit. In reaction, liberals rallied to the defense of liberties enshrined in the constitutional Charter of 1814. They organized programs and events to mobilize popular support. Free schools were established in Paris and an anti-clerical publishing campaign cheaply distributed the works of Voltaire, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and free thinkers. Funeral processions for famous liberals, such as General Maximilien Foy, François-Alexandre, Duke de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, and Jacques-Antoine Manuel, brought thousands out into the streets. Meanwhile, two associations, Friends of Freedom of the Press and Heaven Helps Those Who Help Themselves (*Aide-toi, Le Ciel t'aidera*), disseminated information about voting rights. The result was a surprising liberal electoral victory in November 1827. Celebrations led to a riot, barricades were erected in the streets of Paris, and five people died before the popular revolt was suppressed. The new Chamber of Deputies worked quickly to roll back censorship laws and reduce church control over education.

Confronted by a resurgent political opposition, the king and his ministers bided their time. Charles had signaled his defiance before the election in April 1827, when elements in the Paris National Guards expressed political dissent during an annual review. He disbanded this militia, sending them home with their weapons.

By August 1829, the king decided to directly challenge the liberal tide. He appointed as prime minister the ultra-royalist Prince de Polignac, who then formed a right-wing government. Liberals protested publicly in their newspapers, organized a banquet campaign, and circulated a petition to refuse to pay taxes. Republicans began to reorganize. In his customary speech, the king asked for support for his government. After much debate, 221 out of 402 deputies voted in March 1830 for an Address to the King that registered their loyal opposition and asserted that the government did not have the support of the nation. The response of Charles X was indignant: "As father of my people, my soul was wounded, as king I was offended; the Chamber is thus dissolved." New elections were held and a landslide victory increased the liberal opposition to 274. Before the deputies could gather, the king signed four emergency decrees on July 25, 1830. These ordinances imposed strict

press censorship, dissolved the new parliament, rewrote the rules for elections by reducing the number of electors, and set a date for new elections. The king's ministers claimed that Article 14 of the constitution authorized these extraordinary powers for the protection of state security. The long-anticipated counterrevolution had begun. It would last less than a week.

Revolution

In July 1830, Adolphe Thiers was an editor of a new opposition newspaper, *Le National*. A commoner from the south, he had arrived in Paris less than ten years before, a short lawyer in spectacles. Within that decade, however, Thiers had written his way to the forefront of the liberal press with spirited articles and a popular history of the French Revolution. When notice of the ordinances first appeared on July 26, Thiers was immediately involved in the first acts of civil disobedience. In an extra edition, his paper denounced the ordinances for pushing the country toward revolution and called for the refusal of tax payments. The offices of *Le National* quickly became a center for organized resistance. Thiers called for and drafted a formal protest signed by 44 editors and journalists from 11 newspapers. After detailing the unconstitutionality of the ordinances, the protest concluded with an appeal: "Today the Government has lost the stamp of legality which commands obedience. We will resist it in that which concerns us; France must judge how far to extend its own resistance." Four papers published the protest the following morning. Copies were posted on walls and read aloud to crowds in the streets. The police moved rapidly to close down the presses and tried to seize the printed newspapers. Arrest warrants were issued for all who signed the protest. Among others, Thiers fled the city.

The spontaneous urban uprising that followed astonished observers. Augmented by the closing of printshops and other workshops, large crowds of men and women formed early on Tuesday, July 27, in and around the Palais Royal looking for news and a target for their anger. Shouts of "Long live the Charter!" and "Down with the ministers!" were heard. At first, the crowds focused on symbols of the monarchy, destroying royal signs and coats of arms. Efforts by the police to clear the area heightened tensions. Royal troops

arrived to confront the unarmed crowds here and elsewhere in the city. Cavalry charges led to injuries in the crowds. The first barricades were erected out of anything on hand: paving stones, trees, omnibuses. Pelted with rocks and other missiles from crowds in the street and supporters in buildings on either side, the soldiers fired back. The bodies of the dead were taken up and paraded through the city. That night crowds raided arms shops and museums in search of weapons. Street lamps were broken everywhere.

By Wednesday, July 28, the battle for Paris had begun in earnest. Barricades were erected throughout the city. The fight for City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, raged back and forth. Columns of troops struggled to confront the elusive enemy by clearing the main thoroughfares only to have the insurgents vanish in front and reappear behind them. Diminished by other deployments, including the invasion of Algeria earlier that spring, government forces were also poorly provisioned and lacked ammunition. With telescopes, courtiers with the king at his palace at Saint Cloud observed the tricolor flag flying from the towers of Notre Dame Cathedral.

Thursday, July 29, was the decisive day of street fighting. More barricades made the streets impassable for cavalry and cannons. Tired, hungry, and unconvinced of their cause, regular soldiers deserted in growing numbers to the rebels. Finally, after being pinned down, a withdrawal of troops from positions in the Louvre and Tuileries became a rout. The crowds who occupied the palace marveled at its opulence, raided the cellars, selectively attacked symbols of the monarchy, took turns sitting on the throne, and set guards to prevent looting. Later that day, the archbishop's palace was sacked and its valuables thrown into the river.

In the course of the fighting, at least several thousand people were wounded and perhaps as many as 1,000 died. Official records of compensation for casualties (211 killed, 1,327 wounded) offer a useful (if imperfect) guide to the social background of the revolutionary crowds. The majority were skilled artisans (carpenters, masons, shoemakers, locksmiths, jewelry makers, printworkers, and tailors). A substantial number were day laborers and servants. Middle-class professionals and shopkeepers made up a much smaller remainder. These numbers also argue against the significance of women, students, and

street urchins in the July Days, even though they became important symbols of the revolution for contemporaries.

Since the revolution was accomplished in defense of an existing constitution, a political settlement emerged rapidly. Only a small number of the recently elected deputies and peers were in Paris on July 25; every day thereafter, though, allowed more to reach the capital. Caution and even resignation dominated the perspective of most of those present at meetings in the first days of protest against the ordinances, despite the revolutionary enthusiasm of a few and the encouragement of crowds who gathered outside. On July 28, some deputies attempted to negotiate a ceasefire but could not move either Polignac or Marmont. That same day, the deputies were able to agree on a declaration of protest, drafted by Guizot. The printer came back to demand signatures, and the deputies who remained added the names of 63 of their colleagues. The following day, fearing the influence of republicans and Bonapartists, the deputies moved to establish authority in the city, approving the Marquis de Lafayette as commander of the reconstituted National Guard and empowering five deputies (Casimir Périer, Jacques Laffitte, François Mauguin, General Georges Mouton, Auguste de Schonen, and Pierre-François Audry de Puyraveau) to take charge of the city as a provisional municipal committee at the Hôtel de Ville. Late in the day on July 29, Charles X was persuaded to withdraw the ordinances and replace Polignac's government.

Confident from the victory of Paris, deputies rejected the authority of the king's new orders on the following day, and voted a proclamation calling on Louis-Philippe, Duc d'Orléans, to assume executive power as Lieutenant General of the Realm. On returning to the city, Thiers had composed a poster extolling Louis-Philippe as a "Citizen King" and went himself to convince the duke to join the rebels. The next morning, July 31, the deputies presented the proclamation to the duke at the Palais Royal and then together they paraded to the Hôtel de Ville. There the duke repeated his promises to preserve the constitution and, in one of the iconic moments of the revolution, Lafayette and Louis-Philippe waved an enormous tricolor flag and embraced on a balcony to elicit the cheers of a vast crowd assembled on the Place de Grève. This ritual, repeated in other locations over the following

months, and other forms of symbolic fraternization between Louis-Philippe and the revolutionary crowds (including repeated choruses of *La Marseillaise* and *La Parisienne*, a new patriotic anthem) garnered popular acceptance for a renewed constitutional monarchy. After retreating to another palace at Rambouillet, Charles X abdicated in favor of his 7-year-old grandson, the Duc de Bordeaux (later the Comte de Chambord). A regency had insufficient support, however, and the final act of the revolutionary crowds was a disorganized march of tens of thousands that forced Charles to accept exile for himself and his family.

By August 7, the Chamber of Deputies had worked out the basis of a revised constitution. They discarded the old absolutist preamble, while preserving the basic protections of liberty and equality in the Charter of 1814. In addition, they formally separated the state from the Catholic Church, eliminated electoral restrictions imposed during the Restoration, doubled the franchise, and abolished censorship. The deputies then declared the throne vacant and called Louis-Philippe and his male heirs to take up the crown. On August 9, the former duke, wearing the uniform of the National Guard, swore (and signed in triplicate) an oath to the constitution and received the traditional symbols of the monarchy: crown, scepter, sword, and hand of justice.

While the revolution had been achieved in the capital, it was ratified throughout France by local action. Tax records and toll-houses were burned. Liberty trees replaced missionary crosses. Tricolor flags and cockades appeared everywhere. Local liberals and notables moved quickly to establish committees in support of the new regime and to contain popular violence with the reestablishment of the National Guard. Conservative resistance was rare and often cut short by the news of the victory in Paris. The adhesion of the country to the new regime was celebrated on August 29, when the new king reviewed 50,000 National Guardsmen assembled on the Champ de Mars from all over the country. The revolution was over, or at least for the moment. A new period of public dissent and intermittent revolt would follow.

Interpretations

The great painter Eugène Delacroix was an eyewitness to the events of the July Days in Paris.

A contemporary of Thiers, he had established himself in the art world of the 1820s by a daring use of color and his depiction of Romantic literary subjects: scenes from Shakespeare and Goethe, Lord Byron and Sir Walter Scott, medieval conflicts and the exotic East. In the Salon of 1831, Delacroix exhibited a painting that would become the most famous image of the Revolution of 1830. *Liberty leading the People* (now hanging in the Louvre) portrays a woman, or goddess, mounting a barricade, carrying a large tricolor flag and a musket, followed by an armed crowd, advancing over the dead. The new government inducted the artist into the Legion of Honor and bought the painting. Critics were divided over the merits of his celebration of popular revolution. Exhibited for a while, the canvas was shelved, and the artist moved on to new commissions. Today the painting is an icon of France, modernity, and the spirit of revolution; it is reproduced constantly in new and surprising contexts.

Like the painting, the reputation of the Revolution of 1830 has changed over time. Debate about its meaning and significance commenced almost immediately. Two basic questions have preoccupied interpreters. Did the revolution really change much? And, if so, what?

In the aftermath, both radicals and conservative liberals argued that there had been no real revolution. Casimir Périer, a prime minister of the new government, called it “a mere change in the person of the head of state.” Some historians persist in treating 1830 as a relatively minor political crossroad in the history of an essentially unchanged period of constitutional monarchy stretching from 1814 to 1848. On this view, political ideologies and organizations were weak factors in dividing a moderate political elite with common interests, and the four ordinances were mistakes of judgment rather than symptoms of a cultural war. The July Days seem an accidental combination of separate socioeconomic and political crises aggravated by minor circumstances of military preparation and urban geography. In consequence, they argue that 1830 did not fundamentally transform a society that continued to be dominated by traditional, landholding notables and racked by ongoing social discontent.

Prosper Enfantin, a utopian socialist, also believed that the July Days could not be called a revolution. Without a “basic change in the existing social structure,” he insisted, the revolt

had not gone far enough. For a number of historians on the left, social revolution in 1830 had been cut short by class conflict. On this view, the revolution was made by the sweat and blood of workers before being stolen by middle-class elites who seized control of the state for their own purposes. Karl Marx famously described the July Monarchy in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* as “the political expression of the usurpation of power by the upstart bourgeoisie” accompanied by a “retinue of lawyers, professors, and smooth-tongued orators.”

For most contemporaries, however, 1830 constituted a genuine revolution. A revolution made even more marvelous by its brevity. Jules Michelet argued in his *Introduction to Universal History* that, as a revolution, 1830 represented a profound moment in the evolution of humanity; a revolution of the people that balanced liberty, equality, law, and order revealed the road to the future. Many other historians have echoed this appreciative spirit, even as they have offered more critical analyses and disagreed about the revolution’s origins, character, and consequences. If the July Days represent the culmination of political and religious conflict during the Restoration, then what are the relevant factors? Was the revolution a consequence of mass politicization (revealing a subterranean radical tradition, a resurgent anti-clericalism, or even a resilient popular royalism), the development of political movements (with new organizations, ideologies, and repertoires of protest), or unresolved contradictions in the categories of political discourse? For some historians, 1830 reveals a high-water mark for the influence of new communications media. For others, it is a step in the further centralization of state power. Scholars are increasingly less convinced that revolutions are simple expressions of class conflict, yet some have argued that 1830 represents an important stage in the development of both working-class and bourgeois identities.

By any standard, the July Days became an important symbol of the development of modern political culture: a victory for secularism, nationalism, popular sovereignty, parliamentary democracy, and freedom of the press. It was a clear defeat for monarchical despotism and hereditary privilege. The role of the new king was now circumscribed; his court abolished, he ruled as king “of the French” and not “of France.” The Revolution of 1830 was, moreover, a defeat for the

international containment of revolution associated with the Holy Alliance. Inspired by the example of France, revolution once again spread across Europe from Belgium to Poland and Italy. Witnesses of the Revolution of 1830 and its interpreters alike have been struck by the force of that historical past in informing the practical and symbolic actions of the revolutionaries of July. Therefore, in August 1830, the Church of Sainte Geneviève again became the Pantheon, as it was during the French Revolution, a temple to the greatest names of the nation. Later, the July Column, a monument to the heroes of the July Days topped by a statue of the Spirit of Liberty, was erected to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the revolution in 1840. The column still stands on the Place de la Bastille.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873); Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); France, June Days, 1848; France, Revolution of 1848; French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution, Historians' Interpretations

References and Suggested Readings

- Alexander, R. (2003) *Re-Writing the French Revolutionary Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bertier de Sauvigny, G. de (1970) *La Révolution de 1830 en France*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Brown, B. C. (1999) Kingship and the French Revolution of 1830: The Meaning of Royal Authority in Popular Political Culture and Orleanism. PhD dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara.
- Collingham, H. A. C. (1988) *The July Monarchy: A Political History of France 1830–1848*. London and New York: Longman.
- Furet, F. (1992) *Revolutionary France, 1770–1880*. Trans. A. Nevill. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kroen, S. (2000) *Politics and Theater: The Crisis of Legitimacy in Restoration France, 1815–1830*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mansel, P. (2001) *Paris Between Empires: Monarchy and Revolution 1814–1852*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Merriman, J. M. (Ed.) (1975) *1830 in France*. New York and London: New Viewpoints/Franklin Watts.
- Pilbeam, P. (1991) *The 1830 Revolution in France*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Pilbeam, P. (2000) *The Constitutional Monarchy in France, 1814–48*. New York: Longman.
- Pinkney, D. H. (1972) *The French Revolution of 1830*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rader, D. L. (1972) *The Journalists and the July Revolution in France: The Role of the Political Press in the Overthrow of the Bourbon Restoration, 1827–1830*. The Hague: Nijhoff.
- Roberts, J. (1990) *The Counter-Revolution in France, 1787–1830*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Spitzer, A. (1987) *The French Generation of 1820*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

France, June Days, 1848

Casey Harison

The June Days rebellion in Paris (June 23–6, 1848) was the largest and most violent urban uprising in Europe between the French Revolution of 1789–94 and the Paris Commune of 1871. It erupted in the wake of the dashed hopes of the February Revolution and ended only after three days of bitter street fighting between workers and the armed forces of France's new republican government. For a long time, the June Days would stand as the clearest example of class struggle in the modern European experience.

Revolution swept across much of Europe in 1848, including in France where the February Revolution replaced the Orleanist monarchy with a republican provisional government. Among the many reforms of this "springtime of revolution" were the right to vote and hold elected office (for males), plans for a constitution and National Assembly, better access to education, the abolition of slavery in French colonies, and, for the working class, the promise of improvements in housing, pay, hiring practices, and working hours. In the end, these advances proved difficult to sustain. Within three years the republic and most of its reforms were ended.

Yet another development of the spring of 1848 was the creation of National Workshops, which provided menial labor for the unemployed of Paris, partly in the hopes of stifling political unrest. Disliked by a portion of the nation's middle and upper classes, the Workshops were dissolved in June – a signal of a shift in the political mood and the final spark for the June Days. Within days of the end of the Workshops, the city's working class was erecting barricades, mostly in the narrow, winding streets of central and eastern Paris, as well as in neighborhoods on the Left Bank of the Seine River. Learning from the experience of February, General Eugène Cavaignac suppressed the rebellion with the tremendous armed forces at his disposal: police, regular troops (many of them brought to the city by railroad from outlying areas), and the newly established urban militia – the Garde Mobile, itself made

up mostly of young workers. In the end, the rebellion failed because of the ferocity of the repression and because potential leaders such as Armand Barbès (1809–70) and Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805–81) had been arrested earlier.

The exact number of casualties from the June Days is unknown, though scholars have estimated 1,500 to 3,000 insurgents killed or summarily executed. Judging from these figures and from the nearly 12,000 arrests that followed, a sizable minority of Paris's working-class population took part. Alexis de Tocqueville, one of the best-known political writers of the century and a member of the National Assembly, believed that virtually all of the city's working class supported the eruption in spirit if not in deed. Among the various trades that joined in, building and metal workers proved most susceptible to arrest, as did the provincial workers from central and northern areas of France who had come to the city to look for jobs. Drawing upon the abundant arrest and trial records produced by the June Days, scholars also discovered that most of the insurgents fought as independent groups and in their own neighborhoods – characteristics that contributed to the struggle's awful ferocity. The hopes of a “Democratic and Social Republic” in spring 1848 concluded tragically with the June Days. Soon, counterrevolution had set in almost everywhere across Europe. By 1852, France was ruled autocratically by an emperor (Napoleon III).

The June Days rebellion had declared an open break between working-class and bourgeois segments of Paris's population. In 1848 and after, the French state and the middle and upper classes it mostly represented had won out, though at the cost of thousands of casualties and a deepening of the class struggle. Contemporaries saw the June Days as undiluted class war, a “sort of ‘Servile War,’” Tocqueville wrote, the experience bringing to mind the wars of antiquity when the besieged population of a city, here the middle and upper classes of modern Paris, believed they had no recourse but to think in terms of the most ruthless kind of repression. Not only Tocqueville, but also Karl Marx (1818–83) (situated on the other end of the political spectrum from Tocqueville) agreed about the essential nature of the rebellion. In his classic “The Class Struggles in France, 1848–1850,” Marx cast the rebels as proletarians, the historical class whose destiny was to usher in the last age of human history.

Though the concept of class struggle has been difficult for scholars to define and locate historically, it is almost unanimously agreed that it was present in June 1848. Ever since the nineteenth century, historians have echoed the assessments of Tocqueville and Marx about the salient role of social class in the rebellion, and the proposition that the June Days represented a genuine turning point in modern French and European history.

SEE ALSO: Blanqui, Louis Auguste (1805–1881); Class Struggle; Counterrevolution, France 1789–1830; European Revolutions of 1848; Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Paris Commune, 1871

References and Suggested Readings

- Agulhon, M. (1983) *The Republican Experiment: 1848–1852*. Trans. J. Lloyd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Duveau, G. (1984) *1848: The Making of Revolution*. Trans. A. Carter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gould, R. (1995) *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Harsin, J. (2002) *Barricades: The War of the Streets in Revolutionary Paris, 1830–1848*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Marx, K. (1973) *The Revolutions of 1848, Political Writings*, Vol. 1. Ed. and Intro. D. Fernbach. New York: Penguin.
- Merriman, J. M. (1979) *The Agony of the Republic: The Repression of the Left in Revolutionary France, 1848–1851*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sperber, J. (1994) *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, C. & Lees, L. (1975) The People of June 1848. In R. Price (Ed.), *Revolution and Reaction: The French Second Republic*. London: Croom Helm.
- Tocqueville, A. de (1970) *Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848*. New York: Doubleday.

France, post-World War II labor protests

Marcelline Block

Large-scale labor demonstrations – including strikes, protests, and insurrections – are a major political, economic, and social presence in post-World War II France, a legacy of the French Revolution, itself the biggest social protest in the country's history. Although the largest, best-known, and most important labor protest in

the postwar era occurred in May 1968 – “an explosion of revolutionary lyricism,” according to Milan Kundera – several significant protests occurred in 1958 and 1995, as well as through the first decade of the twenty-first century. Major labor uprisings occurred in 2006 and 2007 and continued throughout 2008 during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy. In May 2008 France’s leading trade union, the Communist Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), called for port workers to have a 24-hour strike each week, blocking tankers on May 20 and June 9, 10, 17, and 18 at the biggest French oil port, Fos-Lavera, near Marseille, which is also the world’s third largest oil port.

Fos-Lavera was the scene of labor protests throughout March 2007, starting with port workers staging a 12-day strike against Gaz de France management policies (strikes went on throughout the month and work resumed on March 31, 2007). On July 7, 2008 a CGT protest took place in Nantes, briefly interrupting the Tour de France.

Yet May 1968 remains the largest strike in the history of France and in French cultural memory, a point of reference for social and cultural upheaval. May 1968 was predated by the 1958 strikes.

On April 1, 1958 a million French public workers went on strike for 24 hours in an attempt to force the government to raise wages in nationalized areas of French industry, particularly the transportation sector. This brief, yet intense, labor protest paralyzed France, since nearly all transportation was halted while train, plane, bus, and subway workers were on strike. This strike was called by a coalition of communist, socialist, and Roman Catholic labor leaders as a “warning” to the French government.

This massive labor protest arrived on the heels of the May 13, 1958 riots in Algiers by French settlers who demonstrated against the French government of the time, and which nearly led to a coup d’état or civil war in France. The appointment of General Charles de Gaulle as premier by President René Coty on May 29, 1958 eventually led to the formation of the Fifth French Republic, of which de Gaulle would be elected president in December of the same year. The political chaos including the workers’ strike of 1958 brought de Gaulle out of his self-imposed 1946 political exile/retirement to lead the French government; ten years later, the labor protests of

1968 would bring about his downfall, although not before the inauguration of the infamous, specially trained and equipped French riot police, the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS), created directly in response to the 1958 labor protest. This branch of the French police is notorious for brutality. CRS officers in their ominous, dark uniforms – complete with lead-lined capes that can easily harm, maim, and even kill – have been a ubiquitous presence at French riots throughout the postwar period since 1958.

Ten years after the 1958 labor protest, in the spring of 1968, students in Paris organized to demand reforms of the French university system, which they perceived as rigid, elitist, and sexist. Most of all, university facilities were not equipped to accommodate the postwar baby boom in student population. At the University of Nanterre outside of Paris, discontent had been brewing since the fall of 1967 when a small-scale student strike occurred after the Marxist, anarchist student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit – also known as Danny le Rouge (Danny the Red) – was to be expelled by university officials for his activism. On March 22, 1968 – after the arrest of several student leaders at the behest of university administrators on March 20–21 – students occupied administrative buildings, leading to the closing of the campus in early May. Student activism moved to the Sorbonne, located in the heart of Paris, which was also quickly shut down and student leaders were arrested on May 3. On May 10 and 11 violent clashes occurred between students and police in Paris’ Latin Quarter, where barricades were erected among flying Molotov cocktails and smashed cars set on fire. There was a great deal of police repression and brutality against student leaders, activists, and protestors – including the use of tear gas and mass arrests – yet the student movement only grew rather than diminished.

Student activism catalyzed around Cohn-Bendit, who, although born in France, was of German-Jewish ancestry, leading to one of the movements’ major slogans, “Nous sommes tous des Juifs allemands” (We are all German Jews). In effect, Cohn-Bendit participated little in the movement of May 1968, yet ironically is perhaps its best-known participant and is remembered as the poster child of 1968. Cohn-Bendit’s political and social activism continued, and today he is the highest-ranking official of the European Greens in the European parliament.

Most significantly for the 1968 student movement, on May 13 French trade unions declared their solidarity with the student protestors and called a general one-day strike, which was backed by the CGT, the French Communist Party, and the Force Ouvrière (FO). Over 1 million demonstrators marched in Paris to support the solidarity of students, teachers, and workers, as well as to demand the resignation of de Gaulle. Soon more than 10 million employees of all sectors, representing two-thirds of the French labor force – initially beginning with truck drivers and encompassing nearly all other industries and professions – went on strike, decrying unemployment and demanding better wages as well as other social reforms to improve working conditions and to uphold the right to self-management. It was the largest group of French labor strikes since 1936, as well as the longest strike in French history. Workers occupied factories throughout France, such as the Sud Aviation plant near Nantes and the Renault factories in Rouen, Flins, and Boulogne-Billancourt, among others.

Yet due to their fear of spontaneous revolt, the CGT and the Communist Party, two of the most influential organizations for French laborers, did not actively support the workers' strikes. Although the CGT negotiated with the French government for numerous reforms – among others, a 35 percent pay increase for over 1 million workers, a shorter working week, improved benefits, half of their pay for their time on strike and a younger retirement age – the workers rejected these reforms because their goal was to overthrow capitalism, not to work within the existing system. The workers' agenda was more radical than that of the CGT, yet the protestors were fragmented in their aims and disorganized. They refused to return to work, nor would they leave the factories they were occupying (some of the protestors held their managers hostage, imprisoning them inside their own offices). As part of the labor protests, the French Stock Exchange building was set afire. The Grenelle agreements – which proposed to increase the minimum wage by 25 percent as well as general salaries by 10 percent – were rejected by the protestors, who continued to strike, demanding a total transformation of workers' conditions, as well as the overthrow of the government.

Although de Gaulle called the protests of 1968 “incomprehensible,” taken within their global context they are representative of a period of

dramatic global instability as well as social and political upheaval. Other significant moments of uprising, protest, instability, and revolutionary movements in 1968 include worldwide youth protests against the Vietnam War, as well as the Vietnamese Tet Offensive; the Chinese Cultural Revolution; the Prague Spring; the Naxalite movement in India; the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in Alabama; and the Black Power movement in the United States. Massive international student protests were inspired by May 1968 in Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Italy, Mexico City, Poland, Senegal, Spain, and Yugoslavia, as well as later on in the United States during the early 1970s, as exemplified by the Kent State Student Uprising and its brutal police repression.

While the labor protests paralyzed French society at the time, without more concrete goals other than the overthrow of de Gaulle's government and capitalist ideology in general, the protests subsided. The protests of May 1968 temporarily paralyzed France, yet without a motivating factor to move the protestors forward; work resumed in June after de Gaulle dissolved the National Assembly and ordered workers to return to their employment. The Sorbonne was taken over by French police on June 16.

May 1968 rang the death knell of de Gaulle's career, and was followed by his death shortly thereafter on November 9, 1970. Although his government survived the demonstrations – indeed, the Gaullist Party emerged even stronger in the June 1968 elections – de Gaulle himself resigned in April, 1969. His successor was his prime minister, Georges Pompidou, who was responsible for the government's survival during the 1968 chaos; forging agreements with the protestors and the unions, he prevented the unified, well-organized right-wing deputies from dismantling the government. Pompidou successfully negotiated an acceptable group of measures that satisfied both the CGT and the protestors, including an increase in the national minimum wage and salary increases of 7–10 percent throughout the country.

The legacy of 1968 is the emergence of such cultural and social theories as feminism, anti-colonialism, gay civil rights, the green movement, and anti-nuclear awareness. Studies have been undertaken of the slogans, signs, and graffiti of May 1968 from the perspectives of literary theory, semiotics, and sociology. Slogans such as “We are all German Jews,” as well as the many

examples of graffiti, signs, and posters (in particular, those likening de Gaulle to Hitler), prove to be noteworthy. It is a lasting topic of analysis about different aspects of French culture and society in the 1960s and 1970s, in particular the influence of the Situationists. Not only, though, did Situationism play a role in the events of May 1968, but also, according to Jean-François Sirinelli, “May 1968 is the first French crisis of the media age . . . the media dimension played a definite role” (Sirinelli 2007: 109–10). Indeed, the events of 1968 have been commemorated in numerous films, including Guy Debord’s 1973 *The Society of the Spectacle*, Chris Marker’s 1977 documentary *A Grim Without a Cat*, Louis Malle’s *Milou in May* (1990), and Bernardo Bertolucci’s *The Dreamers* (2003), among others. It has also been featured in novels and song.

After 1968, several labor protests occurred in France: postal workers in 1974; nurses in 1989; social workers in 1991. The most important were the large-scale labor strikes of November–December 1995, whose magnitude and significance are reminiscent of May 1968. This group of strikes mainly protested Prime Minister Alain Juppé’s plan to cut welfare and other social programs. On October 10 and November 24, 1995 civil servants struck in protest of Juppé’s pay freeze on the workers of the public sector as well as the Juppé Plan in general. These strikes were organized and supported by all the trade unions. In December 1995 railway unions called out their workers on strike against the Juppé Plan, severely disabling France’s railroad system and eventually all public transportation. The railway workers protested against abolishing retirement at age 55 and the French National Rail Company (SNCF)’s planned eliminations of thousands of jobs as well as of railroad tracks deemed “useless.” Paris’ metro conductors, gas and electric employees, postal employees, schoolteachers, hospital personnel, streetcar drivers, and other union members and public sector workers joined the railway workers in the protests. Strikes, marches, and demonstrations soon spread from Paris to the rest of France, the most important of which took place on December 12 and 16. After Juppé abandoned his retirement reform plan, the strike ended on December 15, 1995.

There are parallels between 1968 and the protests of 1995. As in 1968, the labor protests of winter 1995 destabilized the government leadership of President Jacques Chirac. The 1995

strikes were also preceded by a student protest that started, this time, at Rouen University in October 1995. Yet the labor strikes of 1995 differed from those of 1968 in several ways. Unlike those of 1968, the 1995 labor protestors were more united and coherent, with clearly stated demands: in 1995 “there was a great uprising against the Juppé Plan and in favor of defending public services (these were the themes which, beyond the particular concerns of each sector, consolidated the movement) . . . because everyone felt strongly that a safety net of social protection and high quality public services were necessary to avoid further deepening of social inequality” (Trat 1996: 232). Unlike in 1968, it was the unions such as the CGT that called for the 1995 strikes. It was not a general strike, since workers in the private sector did not participate. Following the student protest in 1995 was a large-scale demonstration in November in favor of abortion, contraception, and reproductive rights, after which the labor protests followed.

Labor protests continued in France into the twenty-first century. In November 2002 public sector employees – including air traffic controllers, railway and postal employees, and radio technicians – went on strike in Paris in order to obtain better job security and retirement benefits. They were also protesting Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s policies allowing employers to fire employees at will. Just before this strike, truck drivers had walked off the job and had set up blockades around Paris.

Gas and electricity employees, hospital personnel, and schoolteachers struck in May 2003 against government plans to reform public employee pensions, which once more forced school closings all over France; more than half of the teaching force went on strike.

Labor protests have not only affected public education and transportation, but also artistic and cultural life has been disrupted by striking employees. In June 2003 performing artists – actors, singers, dancers, circus performers, choreographers, lighting technicians – went on strike to protest new limitations on unemployment benefits, thus disrupting several cultural events such as the annual Montpellier Dance Festival and other festivals in Aix-en-Provence, Avignon, Caen, and Marseille. Paris theaters including the Comédie Française cancelled performances. Protestors were supported by the CGT as well as by star actors and directors.

In 2006 a major youth labor protest took place against Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin's approval of a bill that would allow for the implementation of the *Contrat première embauche* (CPE or First Employment Contract). Although the CPE supposedly was going to create new jobs, it would allow employers more easily to dismiss employees under 26 years of age during their first two years on the job. It also allowed for physical apprenticeships for 14 year olds and night labor for adolescents as young as 15 (as opposed to the previous age limit of 16). Even before the bill was signed, protests against it began in February 2006. Those opposing the bill believed it not only would diminish job security and lower wages, but would also lead to tolerance of sexual harassment and other forms of mistreatment on the job, since employees would fear their complaints about personal abuse would lead to retaliation and dismissal. Protests continued from February through April in all of France; student protestors once more occupied universities in Rennes, Toulouse, and Marseille, among others. Violent altercations between the protestors and the police took place on a daily basis. Nearly 5,000 people were arrested. Most of the protesters were university or high school students, and several student unions, such as Dijon's, actively supported and called for general strikes. Air and train transportation, postal services, and public education were disrupted by the strikes. On April 10 the CPE was rejected by President Chirac, who was under pressure from the ongoing protest and blockades across France. Within a week of the withdrawal of the CPE, the protests ceased and universities were either reopened by April 18 or set to do so.

Several weeks before the 2007 French elections, Airbus employees, demonstrating against proposed company changes and rumored job cuts, went on strike in French cities that housed Airbus factories, such as Toulouse, Nantes, Méaulte, and Saint-Nazaire. The Airbus employee strike can be seen as a prelude to the November 2007 general strikes against President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister François Fillon's plans to end early retirement benefits for 500,000 public employees whose dangerous and/or hazardous professions allow them to retire after 37.5 years of work rather than 40. The Sarkozy government believed this early retirement policy costs \$7 billion per year (one of Sarkozy's campaign slogans being "Work more to earn more"). In eliminating

fiscal penalties on overtime for workers, Sarkozy essentially ended Prime Minister Lionel Jospin's 35-hour work week, instituted in 2000 as a solution to unemployment. On November 13, 2007, after the CGT called a strike, French rail workers and Paris Métro personnel, along with gas and electric employees as well as performers from the Opéra National de Paris, were the first groups to walk off their jobs. Some university students also participated and blocked the entrances to their campuses, including once more the University of Nanterre, which had been the starting point of the events of 1968. A counter-strike took place on November 18, 2007, but by November 20, a key day of protest, many other union members had joined the demonstrations, including teachers, postal workers, air traffic controllers, and newspaper printers. Railroad tracks were set on fire, an act of arson and vandalism condemned by the unions and the government. The strikes continued until the end of November, with the employees of the justice system protesting on November 29.

In response to the December 2007 negotiations when the French government rejected employee demands for salary increases, civil servants went on strike in January 2008 throughout France, demonstrating in Paris, Lyon, Toulouse, Bordeaux, and Marseille to protest job cuts and demand higher salaries for all French government workers. The protestors – teachers, hospital workers, firefighters, and postal workers, among others – were called upon to strike by the major labor unions representing them.

On May 16, 2008 the continuing clash between Sarkozy and labor unions erupted when teachers and civil servants demonstrated against Sarkozy's proposed cuts of civil service positions. Demonstrations occurred in Paris, Marseille, Toulouse, and Strasbourg. A week later the transport unions also went on strike. These union-backed strikes continued in June and July of 2008. In April 2008 journalists of *Le Monde*, one of France's established and prestigious daily newspapers, went on two 24-hour strikes against chairperson Éric Fottorino's proposed job cuts aiming to solve the newspaper's budget and circulation problems. During each of the 24-hour strikes, the newspaper did not publish, which had not happened for decades.

According to Sarkozy, "every time we change something in our country, actions undertaken to better answer the expectations of the French for

their schools raise worries, even dissatisfaction, and these worries sometimes, like today, express themselves through strikes” (Erlanger 2008). Despite the omnipresence and seemingly endless wave of labor protests since the start of his administration, Sarkozy declared he would go ahead with his intention to cut 22,900 civil-service jobs in 2008 and 35,000 in 2009, likening his economic policies to a “French New Deal.”

The words of one striking civil servant succinctly describe the prevalence of French labor protests well into the twenty-first century: “We have to keep our tradition of strikes. It’s a French thing to do” (Sciolino 2002).

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, France; Anti-War Movement, France, 20th Century; Cohn-Bendit, Daniel (b. 1945); Confédération Générale du Travail and Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Immigrant and Social Conflict, France; May 1968 French Uprisings; Mexico, Worker Struggles and Labor Unions, 1950s–1970s; Naxalite Movement, 1967–1972; Prague Spring; Situationists; Student Movements

References and Suggested Readings

- Bernstein, S. (1993) *The Republic of De Gaulle, 1958–1969*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Block, M. (2007) Mutations sociales et politiques de la France contemporaine. *Vingtième siècle: Revue d'histoire* 96: 276–7.
- Brown, B. J. (1974) *Protest in Paris: Anatomy of a Revolt*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
- Caute, D. (1986) *Nineteen Sixty Eight: The Year of the Barricades*. London: Hamilton.
- Erlanger, S. (2008) Strikers in France Challenge Sarkozy’s Plan to Reduce Jobs in the Public Sector. *New York Times* (May 16), n.p.
- Fraser, R. (Ed.) (1988) *1968: A Student Generation in Revolt – An International Oral History*. New York: Pantheon.
- Gregoire, R. & Perlman, F. (1970) *Worker-Student Action Committees: France May '68*. Detroit: Black and Red.
- Hamilton, R. F. (1967) *Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hirsch, A. (1981) *The French New Left: An Intellectual History from Sartre to Gorz*. Boston: South End Press.
- Judt, T. (1986) *Marxism and the French Left: Studies in Labour and Politics in France, 1830–1981*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Katsiaficas, G. N. (1988) *The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968*. Boston: South End Press.
- Kesselman, M. (Ed.) (1984) *The French Workers’ Movement: Economic Crisis and Political Change*. Winchester, MA: Allan & Unwin.

- Lorwin, V. R. (1954) *The French Labor Movement (Wertheim Publications in Industrial Relations)*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schnapp, A. & Vidal-Naquet, P. (1968) *Journal de la commune étudiante: textes et documents, novembre 1967–juin 1968*. Paris: Seuil.
- Sciolino, E. (2002) Strikes Jolt France, but it has Seen Worse. *New York Times* (November 27), n.p.
- Sirinelli, J.-F. (2007) *Les Vingt décisives: Le passé proche de notre avenir, 1965–1985*. Paris: Fayard.
- Sturmthal, A. F. (1983) *Left of Center: European Labor Since World War II*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Trat, J. (1996) Autumn 1995: A Social Storm Blows Over France, trans. S. Michel. *Social Politics* (summer/fall): 223–36.

France, resistance to Nazism

Timothy M. Neeno

The French resistance movement can be said to have begun on June 18, 1940 with Charles de Gaulle’s appeal to Frenchmen everywhere to continue the struggle against Nazi Germany. De Gaulle had been one of the few French military commanders to have success against the invading blitzkrieg (“lightning”) strategy. Promoted to brigadier general on June 1, 1940, he was later appointed under-secretary of state for national defense. With the French army collapsing, however, he had to flee in exile and issue his appeal for resistance from London.

Initial French resistance to the Nazi occupation was limited. While de Gaulle established a Free French movement in the French colonies with the backing of the British, most notably in French Equatorial Africa, resistance at first had little support in France itself. The overwhelming defeat of the French army in May–June of 1940 had deeply shocked and demoralized the French. Hitler also allowed a *Zone Libre* in the southern part of France, where a collaborationist French state was established under Marshal Philippe Pétain at Vichy. Pétain’s authoritarian government was popular, at least initially, with conservative and reactionary groups in France. Resistance was made more difficult by the ill-considered British attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir in July of 1940. This attempt to prevent the French navy from falling into

German hands, along with the bungled British-Free French assault on the French base at Dakar in West Africa in August, served only to reawaken traditional French suspicion of the English.

German rule, however, remained unpopular, and gradually a resistance movement formed, printing and distributing underground newspapers, carrying out sabotage, and smuggling downed Allied pilots to safety. The British Special Operations Executive (SOE) attempted to aid the French Resistance and set up a network of intelligence agents inside occupied France. However, the German Gestapo was very effective in rooting out nascent spy networks. The SOE and de Gaulle's own intelligence service, the Bureau Central de Renseignement et d'Action (BCRA), were also hampered by their inability to cooperate with each other. Yet even displaying the double-barred Cross of Lorraine, the symbol of the Free French movement, or vandalizing German posters with the ubiquitous V-for-Victory symbol popularized by Winston Churchill, was a form of resistance.

Three events transformed the situation. The first was Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Up until this time, the French communists, at Stalin's behest, were generally quiescent, as Hitler and Stalin had maintained a non-aggression pact since 1939. Now the French communists, with their large and secretive underground network, joined the resistance in earnest. On August 21, 1941 a team of communist assassins carried out the first successful attack on a German officer, gunning down a naval cadet in the Paris Metro. The wave of German reprisals only made the Resistants more popular.

The second event was the success of Operation TORCH, the Allied invasion of French North Africa. This, and the willingness of French troops in North Africa to go over to the British and Americans, led the Germans to occupy the *Zone Libre*. This move undermined the authority and credibility of the Vichy regime at the exact moment when de Gaulle's Free French movement was growing in prestige, and the Allied cause in general was on the rise.

The third milestone in the growth of an active guerrilla resistance was the Vichy decree of October 4, 1942 establishing the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO), a compulsory labor draft for able-bodied Frenchmen. The STO was created at the insistence of the Germans, who

by this time were desperately short of factory workers. However, the Germans were known to treat foreign workers as virtual slaves. So when the first labor draftees were called up under the law in February 1943, widespread evasion ensued. Many able-bodied Frenchmen fled to the countryside. By the end of 1943 some 150,000 Frenchmen were in hiding from the labor draft. By mid-1944 this figure had risen to nearly 300,000. At first just hiding out, these groups became the seeds of the Maquis, armed French guerrilla groups resisting German occupation by force. Maquis was originally a term for the scrub brush of the rugged hill country of Corsica and southeastern France, and became the name of a Corsican resistance movement against French rule in the eighteenth century. There had been sporadic resistance in the countryside before, but now the maquisards became widespread and increasingly effective.

The Resistance was also becoming better coordinated. In May 1943 Jean Moulin, an agent for de Gaulle, brought five clandestine groups together in a secret meeting in Paris and established the Conseil National de la Resistance (CNR). A week later, on June 4, 1943, the French Committee of National Liberation was proclaimed in Algiers, which quickly came under the undisputed control of General de Gaulle. The British soon after began coordinating SOE operations with de Gaulle, making it easier to get arms, supplies, and agents into occupied France to help the Resistance and coordinate intelligence gathering. The Germans were skillful at using radio direction finding gear to ferret out clandestine radio transmissions. In order to keep these to a minimum, the British transmitted coded signals to underground groups in France disguised as "personal messages" over the BBC. Even so, many Allied agents and French Resistance members were hunted down and killed.

In January 1943 the Vichy government established the Milice Française under a militant French fascist, Joseph Darnand. The miliciens were a brutal mix of French fascists, opportunists, and thugs. They were used by the Germans to hunt down the Maquis, Jews, and others deemed "troublemakers," and were bitterly hated by the Resistants. The Germans and their milicien allies ruthlessly pursued any who they perceived as a threat. Taking of hostages and wholesale reprisal executions were standard practice.

De Gaulle's proclamation of the Free French movement in June 1940 had signaled the start of what was in effect a civil war in France's far-flung colonial empire. From the spring of 1943 on, it is possible to interpret France itself as being in a state of civil war, with the Germans aiding one side, and the Allies aiding another. The Resistance was always a heterogeneous movement. It included militant communists, democratic socialists, Gaullists, and moderate nationalists. There were also exiled Germans: Jews, communists, and opponents of Hitler who had fled the Nazi takeover. In the southwest of France as many as 60,000 exiled Spanish Loyalists who had fled pro-fascist General Francisco Franco's takeover of Spain joined the Resistance, perceiving it as a continuation of the struggle against fascism. Vichy supporters were also mixed in their views but were generally more conservative. The divide between Resistants and Vichyites was, in a sense, a continuation of the ideological divisions of the prewar era.

In the spring of 1944 matters came to a head, as the Allies prepared to launch the D-Day invasion of France from Britain. As the Allies stepped up air raids across France to disrupt German communications, teams of American and British agents were parachuted into occupied France to make contact with the various Maquis cells. On February 1 the French Committee of National Liberation proclaimed the creation of the Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (FFI) in an attempt to further unite the Resistance movement. In this same period the Nazis increased the size and scope of Milice operations. Milice headquarters was moved from Vichy to Paris, and a new decree gave it the power to conduct its own courts martial, effectively making it a French Gestapo. The Germans and the Milice also stepped up anti-partisan operations.

The Maquis could harass the occupiers, raiding, sniping, and carrying out acts of sabotage, but it was extremely difficult for Maquis groups to gain undisputed control of large tracts of land for very long. For example, in February 1944 one Maquis group attempted to establish a liberated zone in the Glières Plateau of Haute Savoie in the French Alps. They successfully repulsed an assault by Vichyite forces on March 20 in a pitched battle. However, on March 26 the Germans arrived with elite mountain troops, backed by aircraft and artillery support. The Germans and Vichy troops suffered heavy

casualties, but the issue was not in doubt. Of 458 maquisards, 125 were either killed, wounded, or captured, and the Glières Plateau redoubt was abandoned.

Yet the Maquis as a whole were invaluable to the Allied cause, providing intelligence on German movements, tying down troops to protect vital installations, and making it difficult for the Germans to operate freely in the countryside. Starting in May, the Resistance began targeting locomotives, making it harder for the Germans to move reinforcements around. By the time of the Normandy invasion, it took three days to go by rail from Paris to Toulouse, and some 400,000 French men and women were part of the FFI.

Immediately following the D-Day invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944, FFI groups began a wave of coordinated attacks against German communications across the length and breadth of France. Their effectiveness can be gauged by the savagery of the reprisals carried out by the Germans. One FFI group blew up the main fuel dump for the elite SS *Das Reich* Panzer division. Instead of being able to race to the beaches at Normandy, this powerful armored unit was forced to crawl along, scavenging fuel from wherever they could. In retaliation the SS massacred the entire French village of Oradour-sur-Glane, murdering 642 men, women, and children in cold blood.

In July Allied forces broke out from their beachhead in Normandy, while on August 15 Americans, backed by the French first army, landed in Provence. Nazi control of France collapsed. The day after the Allied landings in southern France, the Germans moved the Vichy premier out of Paris under armed guard to Belfort, in German controlled Alsace-Lorraine. Four days later, they did the same to Marshal Pétain. The Milice melted away. The Vichy regime was over.

As the Allies pushed eastward, Paris loomed large, both as a population center and as a symbol. American General Dwight Eisenhower would have bypassed Paris to push directly toward the Rhine, but the French Resistance forced a change of plans. On August 15, 1944 strikes began in Paris, including the police and Metro workers. By August 18 Paris was in the grip of a general strike. On August 19 Parisians took to the streets, erected barricades, seized key points, and trapped the German garrison in the center of the city. Partisan street fighting raged

for days, as the Allied forces turned south to relieve the rebellious Parisians. On August 25 elements of the French Second Armored Division rolled into Paris. The German garrison surrendered. The next day, General de Gaulle paraded in triumph through the city. On September 19 de Gaulle, now in control, declared the FFI dissolved and reintegrated into the regular French armed forces.

If the Liberation of Paris is used as the marker for the end of a French civil war, the *Épuration*, the reprisals dealt out to Axis collaborators, can be interpreted as its aftermath. Statistics are difficult to come by, but at least 11,000 collaborators met their end before angry mobs. To put things in perspective, it is estimated that, in four and a half years, the Germans and their Vichy cohorts killed some 300,000 people, including some 80,000 Jews deported for extermination in Nazi death camps. In Lyons alone, the Gestapo chief, Klaus Barbie, oversaw the deportation of 7,500 people, the murder of 4,300 others, and the arrest and torture of over 14,000 people accused of being Resistance fighters. In comparison, French retaliation was mild. Of 125,000 people formally tried as Nazi collaborators in courts, only 767 were finally executed. In comparison to the population of France, the percentage of those executed is smaller than comparable retaliation in Belgium. Percentage-wise, the French sent to prison only a fraction of those jailed in the other western occupied countries. By being relatively merciful, de Gaulle helped ensure that the wounds of the French civil war would heal.

SEE ALSO: Bloch, Marc (1886–1944); Germany, Resistance to Nazism; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Jewish Resistance to Nazism

References and Suggested Readings

- Aubrac, R. (1997) *The French Resistance: 1940–1944*. Paris: Hazan.
- Clinton, A. (2002) *Jean Moulin, 1899–1943: The French Resistance and the Republic*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lacouture, J. (1990) *De Gaulle: The Rebel, 1890–1944*. Trans. P. O'Brian. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Lorain, P. (1983) *Clandestine Operations: The Arms and Techniques of the Resistance, 1941–1944*. Trans. D. Kahn. New York: Macmillan.
- Millar, G. (2003) *Maquis: The French Resistance at War*. London: Cassell.

- Rougeyron, A. (1995) *Agents for Escape: Inside the French Resistance, 1939–1945*. Trans. M.-A. McConnell. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Schoenbrun, D. (1980) *Soldiers of the Night: The Story of the French Resistance*. New York: E. P. Dutton.
- Sweets, J. (1994) *Choices in Vichy France: The French Under Nazi Occupation*. New York: Oxford University Press.

France, Revolution of 1848

Stephen W. Sawyer

February 22, 1848 in Paris marked the uncontested beginning of a year of revolution. In its wake, France would once again be the spearhead of a republican movement on the European continent, giving birth to political emancipation in the form of universal suffrage and the abolition of slavery. This year would also witness some of the fiercest social and class struggles seen to date. It is no coincidence that the young Karl Marx would carve his intellectual teeth on this event by writing *Class Struggle in France*. The year 1848, then, suggests far more than just a few days of revolution; it represents a transition in the history of nineteenth-century politics. The two key turning points that were essential to this year of political and social upheaval occurred in June and December. The workers' revolt during the June Days framed the last gasp of a radical social revolution led by early socialists and based as much on the right to work as the right to vote. The presidential elections of December, on the other hand, marked the first election of a French president through universal suffrage and outlined an attempt to anchor republican political foundations within the French nation. These two traditions within 1848 reveal the dominant threads of this transformative moment.

The February Revolution or the "Lyrical Illusion"

The roots of 1848 began during the banquet campaigns organized by the political opposition in 1847. The campaigns were designed to mobilize the population against the limited suffrage that reigned in France during the July Monarchy (1830–48). François Guizot, minister of the interior since 1840, had categorically refused any

reforms of the electoral system, which required, as a condition for voting, that the individual pay 200 francs in taxes per year.

The revolutionary fervor was driven by an unprecedented level of organization within the press, political associations, and proto-political parties, which organized the opposition since the mid-1840s. The republican press consisted of primarily two newspapers, *Le National* (radical republican), edited by Armand Marrast, and *La Réforme* (republican and socialist), edited by Flocon. These papers fanned the flames of social and political discontent throughout the last years of the July Monarchy, and their presence during the Second Republic's provisional government is indicative of the press's influence during this revolution. Marrast would even be named mayor of Paris during the first months of 1848.

The press was seconded by an unprecedented level of political organization emanating from the Central Committee of the Opposition of the Seine. This committee managed the banquet campaigns in Paris, organized the lists of candidates for the opposition for municipal and national elections in many of the provinces, and maintained an extensive correspondence with the opposition outside Paris. It also organized the elections to the National Guard, which had been reestablished during the July Monarchy, and succeeded in placing members of the opposition within its officer corps.

By the winter of 1847, the opposition movement had gained steam, and on January 14, 1848, the government banned a political banquet to be held in the 12th *arrondissement* in Paris. When the banquet was suspended again on February 21, riots ensued in the capital. On February 22, the revolt continued and, in spite of Guizot's dismissal on February 23, the National Guard rallied behind the insurgents. Louis-Philippe, the king of the July Monarchy, abdicated on February 24, and thus left the door open for a Second French Republic.

On February 25, the provisional government established itself in the Paris Hôtel de Ville (City Hall), which once again, as so many times before in the Revolutions of 1789 and 1830, had become the center of a national revolution. Within the Hôtel de Ville, the revolutionaries attempted what Henri Guillemin has called "the first resurrection of the Republic." Indeed, the memory of the Revolution of 1789 and its Reign of Terror had been, and would be, at the heart of

political debates in 1848. In an effort to call upon the greatest moments of the Revolution, and at the same time leave behind its darkest hours, the provisional government immediately abolished the death penalty for political acts and adopted the tricolor flag (instead of the red flag desired by the socialist far left). These two declarations summarize the provisional government's desire to appropriate the progressive legacy of 1789, while turning its back on the Terror of the first French Revolution.

The period following the establishment of the provisional government up to the month of June has been widely interpreted as the period of the "lyrical illusion." That designation suggests the temporary euphoria and lack of realism within the republican resurrection during this "springtime of peoples." However, it would be inaccurate to suggest that these first months of 1848 were inconsequential for the political and social history of France. While certain elements of this "first 1848" have been interpreted as a chimera, they contributed greatly to the history of Paris, French republicanism, and nineteenth-century European politics.

Universal Suffrage and National Workshops

Two declarations mark the early moments of the 1848 Revolution. First, on February 25 the provisional government declared the right to work and three days later created the National Workshops to alleviate unemployment among the workers. Then, on March 2, it announced universal manhood suffrage for all elections (excepting the municipality of Paris). These two declarations evidenced the extent to which political and social equality were integral parts of the Second Republic.

The image of Alexandre Auguste Ledru-Rollin (1807–74) at the Hôtel de Ville declaring universal suffrage would become a cornerstone of the political history of France. Other key advances in political and civil equality were achieved with complete liberty of the press and public meetings, which led to the publication of more than 171 newspapers printed in the spring of 1848. The new government also allowed for equal access to the National Guard, and the abolition of slavery on April 27.

In this period of "Absolute Republic," social and political equality were seen as integral parts

of a new age of republican justice. Convinced that social injustice was perpetuated by unequal access to the ballot boxes, the radical opposition of the July Monarchy had been confident that political equality would alleviate all social divisions within the republic. However, once in power, following the February Revolution, the confrontation between the unified voice of the people and the persistence of political and social conflicts kept the provisional government off balance during the first months of 1848.

The Two 1848s

That these two declarations, the right to work and the right to vote, were part of the same moment suggests that there were two 1848s: the first four months of 1848 were marked by a struggle between the achievement of political and social rights. The first 1848 was marked by attempts at an organized socialism, while the second 1848 would be an attempt to organize elections and consolidate political order in the hands of more conservative liberals.

From February to June 1848

The right to work was understood as the counterpart to equal voting rights. The provisional government, reluctant to create a minister of work, created the Luxembourg Commission (the name came from the fact that it met in the Luxembourg Palace in Paris) led by Louis Blanc and Albert l'Ouvrier (born Alexandre Martin and known as "Albert the Worker") as well as delegates elected from among the workers. This commission was to handle issues raised by the newly created National Workshops designed to employ all workers. The creation of the Luxembourg Commission gave hope to the socialists who pushed for a more radical conclusion to the days of February. However, in spite of their aspirations for social and economic equality, the events that followed revealed the divisions inherent within the republic.

The first parliamentary elections to be conducted under universal suffrage were scheduled for April 9. However, the Parisian socialists and radicals feared that this early date for elections did not allow sufficient time for the provinces to be persuaded to support the radical cause, and would lead to a political backlash. The provisional government accepted a symbolic postponement of the elections for two weeks. On April 16,

Parisian workers, led by Louis Auguste Blanqui, came out into the streets in a show of force but met the National Guard at the Hôtel de Ville. The national guardsmen showed sufficient determination to cause the workers to back down without a fight. The day ended calmly, but it revealed the first cracks in the revolution's unity as the workers confronted the intransigent armed forces of the republic.

The first signs of armed conflict came following the parliamentary elections in Rouen on April 26. The organizer of the National Workshops in Rouen, Frederic Deschamps, ran against the conservative Antoine Marie Jules Sénard. When Sénard won the seat in the legislative assembly, conflict mounted within the city, and workers took to the streets and built barricades. Sénard called out the National Guard and then brought in troops and cannons to tear down the barricades. The bloody ending to this revolt foreshadowed the June Days in Paris two months later.

The confrontations in Paris between the people in the streets and the political authorities continued in May when a group of radicals took over the National Assembly. They did not ultimately topple the newly elected chamber, but the incident did lead to the arrest of most of the far-left leaders. The last phase of this cycle of revolution took place a month later. The June Days were brought on by the decision to close the National Workshops on June 21. On June 22, the first riots began and erupted into a full-scale revolt of Parisian workers. The working-class neighborhoods in the western part of the capital took to the streets and built barricades. The revolt lasted for three days, as the workers faced the National Guard and General Louis Eugene Cavaignac on June 23, 24, and 25. But in the end, the workers' revolt was crushed and the socialist ambitions of 1848 ended. The June Days marked a historical turning point; they signaled the end of a radical revolution that simultaneously fought on the dual front of social and political rights.

The Search for Stability, July to December 1848

With the passing of the June Days, the Second Republic settled into the second phase of this tumultuous year. The remaining months of 1848 were characterized by the introduction of elections – municipal elections on July 31, departmental elections on August 27, presidential elections on December 10 – and a search for stability.

In the field of political organization, the year 1848 marked a new horizon in French politics. First, the Second Republic was charged with writing a constitution, a process lasting much of the year. The Constituent Assembly, elected on April 23, met for the first time on May 4. The final vote of the constitution was held on November 4. In the end, the Second Republic's constitution created a unicameral legislative body and a president of the republic, and both were to be elected directly through universal male suffrage. The directly elected president would be an exception in the republican history of France prior to the Fifth Republic, marking one of the first attempts to overcome the fear of an overly strong executive that has marked French republican history.

The establishment of universal suffrage also gave birth to new electoral opportunities for much of the French population. With the institution of universal suffrage, all French men over age 21 – almost 9.5 million people – had the right to vote, an unprecedented exercise in European democracy. The preparation for the presidential elections marked a fundamental turning point in the evolution of the French political landscape. On November 4, Ledru-Rollin marked a new phase in the organization of French politics by creating one of the first political parties under the name “Republican Solidarity.”

At the same time, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, entered the political scene. He had been exiled from France following an attempted coup d'état in the 1840s. Already in June 1848, following the legislative elections, there had been extensive debates as to whether he should be admitted into the country and allowed to participate in government. On June 13 he was accepted, but he relinquished his position as member of parliament only to return to run for president a few months later. He would win the presidential elections in December 1848 with a majority of the peasant vote. He received 5,400,000 votes while Cavaignac, in second place, won only 1,400,000 votes. The pitiful 8,000 votes cast for Lamartine suggest the political change that had occurred between February and December 1848. Louis-Napoleon's election marked the end of a tumultuous year of revolution and political innovation as the republic settled into its new institutions. It also foreshadowed the quick demise of the Second Republic, as Louis-Napoleon, following a coup d'état in 1851, ended the

short-lived republic. He later declared himself Napoleon III, the head of the Second Empire, on December 2, 1852.

Since 1789, Parisian revolution had been tantamount to national revolution; however, the June Days marked the end of this Parisian domination. Louis-Napoleon was elected by the rural peasant vote, and Paris remained relatively silent during Louis-Napoleon's coup in 1851, while the provinces were surprisingly active. Paris's last revolutionary uprising of the nineteenth century occurred with the Paris Commune of 1871.

Thus, while the Revolution of 1848 has been understood generally as a Parisian phenomenon, it did have a strong impact on the rest of France. The creation of universal suffrage gave new weight to the provinces, which would be increasingly dominant in nineteenth-century French politics. Furthermore, while the revolution in Paris has been considered primary, and has received most of the attention, historians have also begun to explore the extent to which the history of 1848 is a history of cities throughout France, including Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Limoges. If 1848 began in Paris, it ended in the countryside.

SEE ALSO: Blanqui, Louis Auguste (1805–1881); Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873); Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); France, 1830 Revolution; France, June Days, 1848; French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution, Historians' Interpretations; Hôtel de Ville, Paris; Paris Commune, 1871

References and Suggested Readings

- Agulhon, M. (1983) *The Republican Experiment, 1848–1852*. Trans. J. Lloyd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gallaher, J. G. (1980) *The Students of Paris and the Revolution of 1848*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Gould, R. (1995) *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community and Protest from 1848 to the Commune*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Harsin, J. (2002) *Barricades: The War of the Streets in Revolutionary Paris, 1830–1848*. New York: Palgrave.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1962) *The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789–1848*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Price, R. (1972) *The French Second Republic: A Social History*. London: Batsford.
- Stearns, P. N. (1974) *1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Traugott, M. (1988) The Crowd in the French Revolution of 1848. *American Historical Review* 93, 3 (June): 638–52.

Francophone Africa, protest and independence

Ayokunle Olumuyiwa Omobowale

Just like other European nations, France assumed colonial control of stretches of territory in Africa, starting with Senegal in 1677 and gradually laying claim to other areas by the early twentieth century. French rule extended from North Africa to West Africa, Equatorial Africa, and African islands in the Indian Ocean. Colonial rule was meant to implement reforms which would modernize the ways of life, technology, administration, and culture of the supposedly primitive indigenous people. Conveniently, the territories also served as a market and source of raw materials for France. French rule in Africa, however, was not devoid of popular protests against colonial domination, especially as nationalists emerged around the mid-twentieth century, clamoring for self-determination and independence.

North Africa

Algeria

French rule in North Africa commenced with the invasion of Algeria in 1830. France subsequently moved eastward and westward to bring Tunisia and Morocco respectively under its rule. Of course French incursion into Algeria did not occur without resistance from the locals. The French war in Algeria subsequently continued for another 30 years, ending in 1860, when Algeria effectively came under French rule. From the outset, French officials viewed the newly acquired territory neither as a colony nor a protectorate. Rather it was seen as a part of France in mainland Africa. Algeria was therefore divided into three departments – Algiers, Oran, and Constantine – and a governor-general was appointed to be in charge of the general administration of the territory.

Indeed, having Algeria as an extension of France also meant an integration of the territory into the larger French society. Aside from French administration, French citizens and other Europeans continually migrated to Algeria. Thus, from a population of 300,000 Europeans in 1870, Algeria accommodated as many as 752,000 in 1911. This new population of predominantly

French citizens inevitably shared the notion of Algeria as a French territory to which their claim was superior to that of the indigenous population. Thus began a process of *refoulement* – an action directed at repression and forceful acquisition of land from the local population for redistribution to European settlers. This process apparently continued more vigorously from 1870 with the overthrow of Napoleon III, who had declared a decade earlier that Algeria was an Arab kingdom where both French men and Arabs were equal. With the fall of Napoleon III, the way was clear to further the *refoulement* process, and thus every act of resistance by the local populace was an opportunity to appropriate land on a massive scale. In addition, the French government policy of divesting land from family/communal holdings left land in the hands of private individuals from whom French/European speculators could easily buy cheaply.

Consequently, a racial system of differentiation into *colons* (French/European settlers) and *indigènes* (local population) emerged, with the *colons* controlling economic resources and occupying political and administrative positions while the majority of the *indigènes* lived in abject poverty. Of course, there was a policy of assimilation in place through which educated *indigènes* who accepted the French way of life and renounced their subjection to Islamic law could become French citizens. Very few *indigènes* were assimilated, however, because Islam was not just a religion to them. It was a way of life which could not be easily repudiated. Thus, as much as France wanted to have Algeria French, the indigenous population just as clearly saw in the French the reflection of a domineering alien force that should be resisted.

The sentiment for Algerian self-determination within Islamic/Arab social identity, which the leadership of the local population believed would engender equality, fair play, and liberty, served as a precursor for Algerian nationalism. Hence, by the 1920s, nationalist sentiments had been concretized through the works of nationalists such as Messali Hadj, who founded the Etoile Nord-Africaine (North African Star) in France in 1920 and the Party of the Algerian People in 1936. The latter particularly attracted Muslim workers. Likewise Ferhat Abbas successfully brought nationalist groups together under an umbrella body, the Algerian Muslim Congress,

in 1936 and 1944. Engaging the French in armed conflict, however, was almost unthinkable at this time, so the nationalists asked only for reforms which would abrogate certain offensive rules, avoiding categorical calls for independence.

Apparently in order to douse mounting nationalist tensions, the French government implemented reforms in 1947 which allowed all Algerians to become French citizens irrespective of religious affiliation. Supposedly, therefore, *indigènes* could enjoy the same rights as *colons*. In reality, however, the reform further exacerbated the *colon-indigène* divide by creating different electoral colleges for the minority *colons*, along with the small population of assimilated *indigènes*, and the majority *indigènes*. Each electoral college was empowered to elect the same number of representatives to both the French National Assembly and the Algerian Assembly. In essence, therefore, the dominance of the minority *colons* was preserved against the possible interest of the larger number of the local citizens who constituted about 90 percent of the Algerian population.

With widespread disenchantment continually growing, a group of nationalists, some of whom had been militant members of the Party of the Algerian People, formed the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN) in 1954, with an armed wing called the National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération Nationale, NLA), with the ultimate objective of engaging France in armed conflict in order to win independence. Having sought and received assistance from the Egyptian government, the FLN launched an armed attack on French interests on November 1, 1954. Thus, the Algerian revolution, which would last another seven years, commenced.

The NLA gradually developed from a rag-tag army to become a disciplined and relatively well-equipped force of about 40,000 troops. About 30,000 of the troops were stationed in safe havens in Morocco and Tunisia, and about 6,000 fighters and other irregulars numbering in the thousands were stationed in Algeria. The NLA adopted guerilla tactics, attacking government and civilian targets in urban areas and escaping by simply melting into the civilian population afterwards.

Furthermore, the FLN had an external arm called the External Delegation stationed in Cairo and Tunis, which carried on the struggle at the diplomatic and international levels. The External

Delegation subsequently became an Algerian government in exile in 1958, based in Tunis and with Abbas as head. It enjoyed recognition especially from Asian and African governments.

Of course, both the French armed forces and the *colons* stepped up reprisal and counterinsurgency attacks on the NLA, with the civilian population bearing the brunt of the operations. By 1956, French forces in Algeria amounted to over 400,000 and had been able to arrest some of the leadership of the FLN, including Ahmad Ben Bella, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohammed Khida, and Mohammed Boudiaf, after a plane conveying them to Tunis was forced to land in Algiers. Thus, as the years went by, the FLN, along with its armed wing the NLA, was increasingly forced on the defensive, with superior French firepower and sheer ruthless repression. By 1958, however, unfolding political events in France led to the collapse of the Fourth Republic, while army officers who felt French power was increasingly waning into ignominy staged a coup d'état in Algeria on March 13 and sought to advance on Paris to sack the French government, unless Charles de Gaulle was made leader. The appointment of de Gaulle was approved by the French parliament on May 29.

Indeed, the coup leaders initiated the *putsch* that brought de Gaulle to power in order to strengthen the French hold on Algeria. Subsequent events, however, had the contrary effect. By purging the army, de Gaulle established himself as the indefatigable leader of France and commenced a process of negotiation with the leadership of the FLN. The negotiations eventually culminated in the signing of the Evian Agreement, which led to Algerian independence in March 1962, with the election of Ahmad Ben Bella as the first president of independent Algeria. By the time the war ended, however, about 141,000 insurgents, 15,000 French troops, 20,000 local civilians, and 3,000 Europeans had been killed. In addition, about two million Algerians became refugees. With Algeria in the hands of the locals, it was no longer home for the *colons* who had hitherto been in control. Thus, by 1962, out of over a million Europeans, about 900,000 had left Algeria *en masse*, since their security could no longer be assured.

Tunisia

Unlike Algeria, the French colonial territories of Tunisia and Morocco were administered as

protectorates. Hence, it appears that the consciousness that French rule was to last only for a while was kept alive among both *indigènes* and European settlers/administrators. French control over Tunisia effectively began in May 1881, after the bey of Tunisia agreed to place his domain under French protection in order to defend it against the rampaging Kroumir rebels. Thenceforth, French colonial rule in Tunisia commenced, with a process of transformation of the territory in line with standards stipulated by France. Of course, just as in Algeria, Tunisia subsequently attracted an influx of European migrants who served as business merchants and colonial officials. By 1955, the population of Europeans in Tunisia was about 250,000, compared with an indigenous population of about 3,250,000.

Nevertheless, nationalist pressures against colonial rule commenced in Tunisia early in the twentieth century. By 1920, the nationalists, who were mostly educated young Tunisians, formed the Destour Party. Although the Destour Party agitated for a parliamentary system of government which would eventually lead to Tunisian independence, the party lacked a large following around the country, and thus was largely moribund.

This was the case until Habib Bourguiba came onto the scene in 1930. Bourguiba was a young and educated Tunisian lawyer married to a French woman. He was largely dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the Destour Party and so he founded the Neo-Destour Party in 1934. The new party quickly appealed to the hearts and minds of Tunisians, such that by 1938, the Neo-Destour Party had about 28,000 members spread across over 400 local branches. Bourguiba's efforts at advancing nationalist demands were so intensive that he was arrested in 1939 and imprisoned in France. After his release, Bourguiba returned to Tunisia in 1944 to resume an active role in the Neo-Destour. Around the same period, the party worked in collaboration with two of Tunisia's vigorous workers' unions, the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT) and the Union Générale de l'Agriculture Tunisienne (UGAT).

By 1952, when independence did not seem to be in sight, with increased suppression from France, Tunisian guerilla groups called the Fellagha engaged the French in armed struggle, especially in the countryside. The French govern-

ment claimed the Fellagha were working for Neo-Destour, an allegation the leadership of the Neo-Destour stoutly denied as it publicly advocated for a peaceful resolution. Consequently, French premier Pierre Mendès-France entered into negotiation with the nationalists in 1954 and Tunisia achieved home rule in 1955 and finally independence on March 20, 1956.

Morocco

Morocco was the last of the three North African territories to come under French rule. French rule in Morocco commenced in March 1912, following Sultan Mulay Hafiz's decision to place his kingdom under French protection in order to save it from imminent collapse as a result of attacks from Berber insurgents. Hafiz was subsequently forced to abdicate the same year and was replaced by his brother, Yusuf. For as long as the reign of Sultan Yusuf lasted, French officials enjoyed official collaboration in policy formulation and implementation without opposition from the royal court, whose head, the sultan, was empowered by the 1912 treaty to endorse all French decrees (*dahirs*) before they took effect. In an apparent move to ensure a reenactment and possible continuation of the experience under Yusuf, the French authorities chose 18-year-old Prince Sidi Mohammed as sultan in 1927, in place of his older brother, who was the heir apparent. Against the expectations of the French authorities, however, upon ascending the throne, Sultan Sidi Mohammed emerged as a leader of his people, supporting the nationalist quest even at the risk of his throne.

Just as in Tunisia, nationalist organizations emerged in Morocco, beginning in the 1920s with the pioneering efforts of Allal al-Fasi and Ahmad Balafrej, who organized congresses of young men in Fez and Rabat respectively in 1926 to discuss the future of Morocco. From this relatively small beginning, Moroccan nationalists were able to successfully protest against the introduction of the Berber Decree in the 1930s, which recognized Berber customs and largely freed them from subjection to the Islamic law. For the nationalists, the implementation of the Berber Decree was like a deemphasizing of Islam and a veiled granting of autonomy to "recalcitrant" Berbers who had often resisted the authority of the sultan. With a victory over the Berber Decree, Moroccan nationalists gained the support of a wide spectrum of Moroccan

society, leading eventually to frequent clashes with the French authorities, who usually applied repressive measures to control protesters. By 1939, many nationalist leaders were in jail, while Allal al-Fasi was exiled to Gabon.

A new trend, which would eventually lead to open support of the efforts of the nationalists by the sultan, began in 1943. After a meeting with President Roosevelt of the United States, during which the president expressed his opposition to colonialism, Sultan Mohammed was emboldened more than ever before to identify with the quest of the nationalists. The following year Moroccan nationalists founded the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, which presented a document demanding Moroccan independence to both the sultan and the French authorities. In 1947, Sultan Mohammed openly supported the cause of the nationalists in a speech he delivered in Tangiers. With rising independence consciousness among Moroccans, the *colons* were apparently also becoming conscious of their alien status in Morocco. If this was not redressed, independent Morocco might mean the loss of the special privileges and rights they had always enjoyed.

Apparently in an attempt to address this, the French embarked on pro-European settler reforms in which French citizens would become *indigènes* and both the minority French settlers and the majority indigenous Moroccans would send the same number of representatives to the parliament. Likewise, the sultan would share co-sovereignty with the French government. In spite of pressures from colonial officials, Sultan Mohammed refused to append the legislation, which he saw as an infringement of his sovereign status and as short-changing his subjects. Since the sultan's endorsement was required for it to be effected, in line with the Fez Treaty of 1812, the sultan's refusal effectively stalled the implementation of the legislation. Consequently, Sidi Mohammed was deposed on August 20, 1953, and exiled to Madagascar, while the new Sultan Mohammed ben Arafa appended the controversial legislation.

Following the deposition of Sultan Sidi Mohammed and the imprisonment of most of their leaders, the remnants of the Istiqlal Party launched guerilla attacks against French interests and local collaborators, and also organized a militia force – the Moroccan Liberation Army – which mostly operated along the Moroccan–

Algerian border. Nonetheless, following peace negotiations initiated by Pierre Mendès-France, the French premier, Sidi Mohammed was reinstated in 1955. Morocco eventually became independent in March 1956.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Unlike North Africa, popular anti-colonial protests were less commonplace in sub-Saharan Africa. Whereas some cases could be reported, especially in Madagascar, Ubangui-Shari (now Central African Republic), Congo-Brazzaville, and Cameroon, most of the territories earned their independence as a consequence of the French decision to divest itself of its African colonies. Nevertheless, the inter-territorial Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) and its local affiliates took a relatively active role in demanding reforms in the colonies which would allow Africans greater participation in administration.

Madagascar

Starting with Madagascar, French rule commenced following the capture of the Merina Island Kingdom on September 30, 1895. Prior to the French invasion, the Merina dynasty, which had survived for over 100 years, had begun moving towards modernization by adopting elements of western systems of government and military organization, unifying the different tribes under a Malagasy national identity, and even adopting Christianity as the state religion. French forces met little resistance as they marched into the capital Antananarivo.

Within two months, however, the Menalamba revolt erupted, lasting until 1897. The Menalamba protesters, who were mostly traditionalists, directed their action against identifiable elements of westernization. Hence, the protesters principally attacked Europeans, missionaries, churches, and local converts. By the time the revolt was quelled, 750 churches had been destroyed and 200 Europeans and about 5,000 natives had been killed. The quelling of the revolt was a crushing defeat for the nationalists and a spectacular victory for the French, which kept further protest at bay for about five decades.

After a period of political tranquility, nationalist sentiments once again evolved, apparently in response to de Gaulle's assurance in 1943 that African colonies would have representatives in

the French Assembly once World War II was over and the assembly was reconstituted. In Madagascar, two medical doctors, Joseph Ravoahangy and Joseph Raseta, emerged in the mid- to late 1940s to champion the Malagasy nationalist cause. The duo subsequently formed a political party, the *Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache* (MDRM), in 1946. The party thereafter swept the polls in elections for the newly created Malagasy Assembly, while both Ravoahangy and Raseta moved to Paris to join the French Assembly.

However, what Malagasy nationalists wanted was far beyond just representation in France. Thus, Ravoahangy and Raseta lobbied the French authorities for self-rule as a precursor to independence. At the same time, in Madagascar, nationalists were beginning to form secret societies, which attracted a good number of Malagasy conscripts who had participated in World War II. With possible independence not yet in sight and a rumor of American support, a band of guerillas numbering hundreds attacked a French military base in northern Madagascar on March 29, 1947, and killed 200 French soldiers and Europeans.

The insurrection came as a surprise to the French authorities. In order to quell the revolt, the French government dispatched a force of 18,000 men, mostly Senegalese conscripts, to the island. The ensuing events were a form of outright massacre as officers and men of the requisition force used brute force to quell the uprising. By the time the insurrection ended, 90,000 Malagasy men, women, and children had been killed on the battlefield or in prison, or through starvation and disease; and over 200,000 Malagasy nationalists were in prison; while Ravoahangy and Raseta were arrested, tried, and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The repression did not put a stop to nationalist yearnings, and the leftists increasingly won local polls in Madagascar, especially in 1959. France therefore stepped up measures aimed at handing over power to pro-French Malagasy nationalists who would not court the friendship of the communists, especially during the crucial period of the Cold War. Hence, after holding a conference with moderate Malagasy politicians in February 1960, France granted Madagascar independence on June 26, 1960, with Philibert Tsiranana, a pro-French politician, as the first president.

Central African Republic

Another popular revolt worthy of note was the Gbaya rebellion of 1928–31 in Ubangui Shari (now Central African Republic). The initial stage of the rebellion was spearheaded by Barka Ngainoumbey, a religious leader nicknamed Karmu. Following certain spiritual revelations which he claimed he had seen, Karmu prophesied that a day was coming when all blacks would be united and the whites would leave. He subsequently called for resistance through the boycott of European goods and non-payment of taxes. From 1924 onwards, his influence and message spread from his base at Nahing to other Gbaya settlements in Central African Republic, and onward to parts of neighboring Cameroon and Congo. Karmu apparently became a messianic leader among the people, who were coerced into forced labor for the construction of the Congo–Ocean railroad and the Bangui–Yaounde road and faced a huge increase in the head tax from 3 francs to 7.5 francs. The colonial authorities' excruciating demands must have made Karmu's words appear as those of a likely liberator. Gradually Karmu built up a considerable following, and he allocated a hoe handle to each follower, supposedly as a protection against European bullets.

As intelligence reports reached the colonial authorities about the activities of a prophet in the countryside spreading sentiments against the French and other Europeans, and asking his followers not to pay taxes, a decision was made to remove him. The actual onslaught did not, however, start until some Gbaya fighters resisted colonial officials and African guards who had gone to villages to collect taxes in September 1928, attacking them with arrows, spears, and stones. Of course, this attack was attributed to the followers of Karmu, and French colonial officials consequently resolved to suppress the uprising with military force. Hence, the French military commenced a scorched-earth operation on October 24, burning and destroying villages as the troops advanced towards Karmu's base at Nahing. French troops eventually reached Nahing on December 11, after heavy resistance from Karmu's men. Nahing was captured and Karmu was killed in action. His death was not an end to the revolution, however, and the repression continued.

Karmu was succeeded by new "prophets" who continued to spread Karmu's message and prophecies and led a resistance against the

French authorities. Between 1930 and 1931, these leaders were either killed or captured, one after the other, and the resistance was gradually whittled down. The last "battle" occurred around Bocarango, where the local African troops had brutally treated local residents in the maintenance of French rule. The local residents retaliated by identifying and attacking in particular those African soldiers who had been brutal to them. French troops responded to the attacks with an enormous military offensive against the entire population. The people escaped to underground holes from where they were "smoked out with pepper-laden fires and massacred by machine guns" (O'Toole 1984: 338). This was the end of the Gbaya revolt, and Central African Republic (formerly Ubangui-Shari) nationalists did not take up violence again until the country attained independence in August 1960.

Congo-Brazzaville

Popular protest against colonial rule in Congo-Brazzaville was rather short-lived. It largely centered on the pioneering efforts of André Matswa, who had served in the French army in Morocco between 1924 and 1925. Upon discharge, he formed an organization in Paris in 1926 with the main objective of assisting underprivileged Congolese living in France, and received considerable support from the French Communist Party. The group subsequently spread to Congo where it had a large following. With supposedly increasing nationalist influence, Matswa's group started protesting against French rule, which was considered draconian by the local population. The response of the French authorities was the proscription of Matswa's organization and the arrest and imprisonment of Matswa in 1929. This culminated in widespread demonstrations and resistance against the colonial regime. Matswa died in prison in 1942, but his followers made his thinking their guiding ideology. In 1956, a Catholic priest named Abbé Fulbert Youlou eventually emerged as a successor to Matswa. Youlou was subsequently elected the leader of Congo-Brazzaville at independence in 1960.

Cameroon

Cameroon was seized from Germany during World War I and subsequently split between France and Great Britain as Mandate Territories of the League of Nations in 1919, and Trust

Territory under the United Nations at the end of World War II. The nationalist quest was championed in the French section from the mid-1940s by the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), which served as the local affiliate of the radical inter-territorial RDA. The UPC right from its inception unequivocally called for Cameroonian independence and retained strong links with the French Communist Party, against pressures from the French government, and was able to build a network of local branches, which cut across a wide spectrum of the Cameroonian polity, right to the grassroots. It thus became a strong political party, which was vocal enough to challenge the policies of the French government, even before the United Nations.

Indeed, the unabating effrontery of the UPC to challenge the French government and its policies in Cameroon was interpreted as a manifestation of support from the communists. In the absence of a viable opposing party, the UPC could have been the party to take over power from the French. However, a party with communist ideology and links was not to be allowed to take over a French trust territory. Thus, a policy of repression of the UPC commenced from 1954, involving an alignment with local chiefs and officials for the suppression of the UPC and its supporters, and the strengthening of the police and the military to intensify anti-UPC actions. After a series of acts of repression from the police, military, and pro-government groups, the UPC resorted to revolt in 1955 through violent attacks on state institutions. The government responded by banning the UPC and imprisoning its members.

Many of its leaders, however, escaped and went underground or into exile. Reuben um Nyobe emerged as a leader of those who had remained underground in Cameroon. Nyobe's initial strategy was to appeal for amnesty for UPC militants, issue statements condemning French policies, and call for the unbanning of the UPC so that it could participate in elections as the only truly nationalist party. However, by 1957, the French authorities had been able to evolve a collection of moderate politicians, constituting the parliament and government under the leadership of Prime Minister Mbida, who would rather have French control over Cameroon retained. Mbida did not see the possibility of Cameroonian independence for another decade.

Hence, following the unsuccessful appeal for amnesty and the unbanning of the UPC so that it could participate in elections in preparation for self-rule, the UPC, under the leadership of Nyobe, again carried out violent attacks on mission stations, government structures, local opponents, and plantations in the Sanaga-Maritime province. Nyobe was captured, however, and killed a year later in 1958. The death of Nyobe did not bring an abrupt end to revolt among his loyalists, in whose hearts and minds he had become something of a martyred revolutionary leader. Thus, in 1959, the Bamileke people resorted to popular revolt, which spread across southern Cameroon. By this time, Mbida had fallen from power, and another anti-nationalist, Ahmadu Ahidjo, had stepped in as prime minister in his stead.

Ahidjo's approach to the insurrection was a combination of repressive measures and promises of amnesty for insurgents who laid down their arms. The struggle nevertheless lasted for three years, resulting in about 20,000 casualties among militants and civilians, and the death of about 1,000 soldiers. The French authorities, however, granted independence on January 1, 1960, with Ahidjo as the first president. Ironically, France thus handed power over to those who would rather have France retain its control over Cameroon.

Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA)

Quests in other French territories across Africa did not develop into violent protest as such. Nonetheless, the RDA emerged as an inter-territorial party, especially in West and Equatorial Africa, to formulate and coordinate local African interests within the French empire. The RDA evolved following the failure of the French government to implement the reforms it had promised African nationalists during World War II, which could have included Africans in administration and moved colonial territories closer to independence. Thus, to address this issue, 800 nationalist delegates across Africa gathered at Bamako, Mali (formerly French Sudan) in October 1946 and subsequently formed the RDA under the leadership of Félix Houphouët. The RDA thereafter got the support of local parties and labor organizations and affiliates.

As the RDA came into being, the French Communist Party was the only French political

organization which identified with the yearnings of the nationalists; thus the RDA became closely associated with French communists. However, when the communists left the French government in 1947 and moved to the opposition, the government and colonial authorities descended heavily and repressively on the RDA (along with its local affiliates) and its leaders, because of both its support for the French communists and its nationalist quest.

By 1950, the RDA had severed links with the communists and aligned with the French government. Consequently, nationalist leaders across French sub-Saharan Africa began to share the view that African colonies could not survive without French paternalistic support, and so independence was not a priority and should not be immediate. This notion apparently remained until Guinea's dramatic vote for independence in 1958 under the leadership of Sékou Touré. Guinea's vote against retention in the French union culminated in the immediate withdrawal of French officials and an end to economic assistance from France. Yet, Guinea survived in spite of its poor state. Of course, the Guinean example was an essential success story which possibly enhanced independence for other French territories in West and Equatorial Africa by 1960.

SEE ALSO: Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962; Ben Bella, Ahmad (b. 1918); Congo, Brazzaville Protest and Revolt; Guinea-Bissau, Nationalist Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Connelly, M. (2000) Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North–South Conflict During the Algerian War of Independence. *American Historical Review* 105 (3): 739–69.
- Hallet, R. (1974) *Africa Since 1875*. London: Heinemann.
- Joseph, R. (1974) Ruben um Nyobe and the “Kamerun” Rebellion. *African Affairs* 73 (293): 428–48.
- Little, D. (1990) Cold War and Colonialism in Africa: The United States, France, and the Madagascar Revolt of 1947. *The Pacific Historical Review* 59 (4): 527–52.
- Mortimer, R. A. (1970) The Algeria Revolution in Search of African Revolution. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 8 (3): 363–87.
- O'Toole, T. (1984) The 1928–1931 Gbaya Insurrection in Ubangui-Shari: Messianic Movement or Village Self Defence? *Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines* 18 (2): 329–44.

- Rilvin, B. (1955) Context and Sources of Political Tension in French North Africa. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 298: 109–16.
- Rilvin, B. (1982) The United States and Moroccan International Status, 1943–1956: A Contributory Factor in Morocco's Reassertion of Independence from France. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 15 (1): 64–82.
- Sangmuah, E. N. (1992) Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef's American Strategy and the Diplomacy of North African Liberation, 1943–1961. *Journal of Contemporary History* 27 (1): 129–48.
- Smith, T. (1978) A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 (1): 70–102.

Frankfurt School (Jewish émigrés)

Christina Gerhardt

The Institute of Social Research – more commonly known as the Frankfurt School (a term that was first applied in the 1960s) and, in Germany, as *Kritische Theorie* (critical theory) – was founded in Frankfurt, Germany in 1923. It sought to bring together a wide variety of disciplines – spanning sociology and philosophy, psychology and history, economics and aesthetics, and literary and music criticism – within a critical Marxist framework. The most central and best-known members of the Frankfurt School's first generation included Theodor W. Adorno, Erich Fromm, Max Horkheimer, Leo Lowenthal, Herbert Marcuse, and Friedrich Pollock.

Loosely affiliated with the University of Frankfurt, which had itself been established relatively recently in 1914, the institute was founded with private funding by Felix J. Weil, whose father had amassed a fortune as a grain merchant. Together with Kurt Albert Gerlach and Pollock, Weil drew up the plans for the institute. All three were committed to formulating a critical approach to society and culture that linked these disciplines to a Marxist analysis. In fact, they had initially intended to name the new research center the Institute for Marxism. All three were conversant with Marxism and shared a commitment to many of its principles: earlier in 1923, Weil had organized the First Marxist Work Week, which had inspired the

idea of establishing the institute; Gerlach had previously been a professor of economy at the Technische Hochschule in Aachen; and Pollock had written his dissertation on Marx's labor theory of value.

Gerlach was to serve as the first director of the institute, but after his sudden death in 1922, Pollock served briefly as interim director until Carl Grünberg assumed the permanent position from 1922 until 1928, when he stepped down for medical reasons. Pollock again served as interim director until Horkheimer assumed directorship of the institute in 1930.

Although not typically remembered for its Weimar years, the early Frankfurt School had vital ties to political and social movements. The early institute dedicated itself primarily to studying the history of European workers' movements outside the context of political parties, be it the Communist Party (KPD), which was going through upheavals and transitions after the October Revolution, or the Socialist Party (SPD), which was going through various transitions subsequent to the Spartacus Uprising and the murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. In addition, when Grünberg took over as director, he brought to the institute his work on labor movements in the form of a journal he had begun editing in 1910. Entitled the *Archive for the History of Socialism and the Workers' Movement*, but commonly known as the *Grünberg Archiv*, the journal sought to assemble a history of the labor movement. Lastly, the early institute helped to forward copies of the unpublished manuscripts of Marx and Engels to the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow for inclusion in their collected works, the famous MEGA (*Marx-Engels Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe*). While several of its early members – Wittfogel, Borkenau, and Gumperz – were involved with the Communist Party, the institute was officially unaligned with any political party, which its relationship with the University of Frankfurt would not have allowed. Instead, it drew on a Marxist framework and contributed to the history of labor without an explicit political affiliation.

Undoubtedly, this separation of Marxist analysis from party allegiances was both beneficial and detrimental. It allowed for an analysis that did not have to adhere to positions dictated by the party line. Yet it also resulted in critiques of the Frankfurt School as disconnected from

concrete political struggles and organizing efforts. These critiques were to reappear during the late 1960s student movement.

The institute's focus and approach shifted somewhat when Horkheimer became director in 1930. It moved away from a concentration on the history of the European workers' movement, which Grünberg had underscored, to a broader exploration of Marxist analysis. Horkheimer sought to develop a critical theory of contemporary society, bringing a Marxist framework together with an array of disciplines including, naming only a few, psychoanalysis through the work of Fromm and Marcuse, literature and music through the studies of Lowenthal and Adorno, philosophy and sociology. Horkheimer's methodology was laid out in his inaugural address, "The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute for Social Research." In it, he argued for an analysis "of the connection between the economic life of society, the psychical development of individuals, and the changes in the realm of culture in the narrower sense (to which belong not only the so-called intellectual elements, such as science, art, and religion, but also law, customs, fashion, public opinion, sports, leisure activities, lifestyle, etc.)."

In March 1933 the Nazis closed the institute for "tendencies hostile to the state" and weeks later revoked Horkheimer's *venia legendi*, his right to teach in Germany. The institute relocated first to Geneva and in May 1934 Horkheimer secured offices for the institute in New York City and an affiliation with Columbia University. Publication of the institute's journal moved to Paris. The institute remained in the US in exile, first in New York and then in Los Angeles, until it was reconstituted in Frankfurt, officially reopening its doors on November 14, 1951.

This move from Germany to the United States marked a shift in the research priorities of the institute. Drawing on a combination of Hegelian, Marxist, and Freudian analyses of the family, *Studies on Authority and Family* (1936), for example, no longer focused exclusively on the working class but rather on the structure of the family in various classes in times of economic crisis. Additionally, the work brought a Freudian analysis to the fore. The volume included both introductory theoretical essays – written by Horkheimer, Fromm, and Marcuse – and data. In this way it marked the first instantiation of the theoretically informed empirical studies

that Horkheimer had called for in his inaugural speech of 1931.

The second volume to reflect such an approach, again combining sociological and psychological studies, was *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), for which research was conducted between 1944 and 1950 in US exile. Adorno and Lowenthal were principal contributors to this latter volume, which examines various forms of prejudice, including anti-Semitism, a topic that had been conspicuously absent from previous studies. This volume and the *Studies on Authority and Family* represented the main collaborative works of the institute.

Of its central members, Pollock (1894–1970) and Horkheimer played pivotal roles in the institute from its beginning until their deaths. Their close friendship began in 1911 and lasted until Pollock died in 1970. Pollock studied sociology, philosophy, and economics, finishing his PhD in economics at the University of Frankfurt in 1923. In 1927 he participated in the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution in the Soviet Union, research that ultimately led to his habilitation entitled "Attempts at Planned Economy in the Soviet Union 1917–1927." Pollock, like Horkheimer, fled to New York – via London, Geneva, and Paris – after the Nazis assumed power in 1933. Tending mostly to the institute's administrative matters, Pollock nonetheless occasionally published articles in the institute's journal. He returned to Frankfurt in 1950 to reestablish the institute with Horkheimer and Adorno. In addition to his work with the institute, he was also professor of economics and of sociology at the University of Frankfurt until his retirement in 1958. Pollock and Horkheimer moved to Montagnola, Tessin in 1959, where Pollock died.

Horkheimer (1895–1973) studied philosophy and psychology, finishing his PhD in philosophy at the University of Frankfurt in 1922 with a dissertation on Kant. In 1925 he completed his habilitation, writing on Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. His work would show an abiding interest in critiquing Kantian metaphysics. In his 1932 essay "Materialism and Metaphysics," for example, Horkheimer defines materialism as explicitly anti-metaphysical. In 1930 he assumed a chair in social philosophy at the University of Frankfurt and directorship of the institute. Two years later he founded the institute's journal, *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, which appeared

annually until 1939. In light of the institute's American exile, the journal was renamed *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* in 1940 and appeared in English, though its publication was discontinued after a year. In 1940 Horkheimer moved to California for health reasons, joined by his younger colleague Adorno. Here, they wrote *Dialectic of Enlightenment* – first published in 1947 – a meditation on the relation between myth and reason that examines and critiques the potentially barbaric consequences of idealist thinking (the historical reference point is German fascism). Touching on a broad array of disciplines and texts, the volume weaves together Marxian materialism, Freudian psychoanalysis, and a Weberian critique of rationalization and disenchantment in its analysis of the “culture industry,” anti-Semitism, and “instrumental reason.” Horkheimer lays out related arguments about the dialectic of idealism in his *Eclipse of Reason*, written in 1941 and first published in 1947.

Horkheimer was also interested in the relationship between authoritarianism and changing familial structures, and their political consequences. The institute explored these topics, collaborating on the previously mentioned volume *Studies on Authority and Family*: Horkheimer, Fromm, and Marcuse wrote the introductory essays to the volume, while other scholars gathered and evaluated empirical studies for the project. Horkheimer's 1942 essay “The Authoritarian State” revisits some of its arguments.

Adorno (1903–69) began his intellectual career in Frankfurt, studying philosophy and psychology. He met Horkheimer in 1922, when both attended a seminar on Edmund Husserl taught by Hans Cornelius, who served as dissertation adviser to both students. Adorno completed his PhD in 1924, writing his dissertation on Husserl's phenomenology. Subsequently, Adorno moved to Vienna, where he lived from 1925 to 1928, in order to study music with Alban Berg. Music played a central role in his life from an early age: his mother was an accomplished singer and her sister, who lived in the household, was a well-regarded pianist. Adorno returned to Frankfurt and to philosophy in 1928, completing his habilitation on Kierkegaard in 1931. During the 1930s Adorno worked on Kierkegaard's aesthetics and Husserl's phenomenology while also writing articles on the sociology of music. After the institute was shut down and most of its mem-

bers went into exile, Adorno studied at Merton College, Oxford from 1934 to 1937. He officially joined the institute there when he emigrated from England in 1938. In 1940 he would follow Horkheimer to California, where their collaborative work on *Dialectic of Enlightenment* would begin.

Adorno's writings encompass a broad array of disciplines, spanning music and literary criticism, philosophy and sociology, psychology and aesthetics. He published book-length studies on Alban Berg, Gustav Mahler, and Richard Wagner, as well as on Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Søren Kierkegaard. In addition to articles on music and philosophy, his collections include essays about the writings of Franz Kafka, Thomas Mann, and Samuel Beckett; the poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin, Heinrich Heine, and Joseph Freiherr von Eichendorff; and aspects of popular and mass culture including astrology, television, radio, and jazz. The multidisciplinary approach Adorno takes in these essays expresses his belief that the concerns of one medium inform those of another.

Most of Adorno's major works were published after he returned to Germany in 1950 to reconstitute the institute with Horkheimer and Pollock. These publications include *Minima Moralia*, *Notes to Literature* (1974), *Prisms* (1977), and *Critical Models* (1977). Additionally, he published the co-authored *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947), *Negative Dialectics* (1966), and *Aesthetic Theory* (1970).

Lowenthal (1900–93) joined the institute in the late 1920s. He studied literature, history, philosophy, and sociology at the University of Frankfurt, finishing his PhD in philosophy in 1923 and becoming involved with the institute in a limited manner in 1926 and full time in 1930. In 1933 he immigrated to Geneva where the institute had an office until it was reestablished in New York City, to which he moved along with Horkheimer, Pollock, Fromm, and Marcuse in 1934. Together with Adorno, Lowenthal brought a shift towards aesthetic concerns to the institute. He also served as the managing editor of the institute's journal, although final editorial decisions were left to Horkheimer. Additionally, according to Martin Jay (1973: 33), “Only Lowenthal and Fromm . . . ever evinced any real interest in Jewish theological issues.” Unlike Horkheimer, Pollock, and Adorno, Lowenthal remained in the United States, joining the Department of Sociology at the University of California at Berkeley

in 1956, where he taught until his retirement in 1968.

Fromm (1900–80) was brought into the institute in the early 1930s. He had studied sociology at the University of Heidelberg, finishing his PhD in 1922. Subsequently, he trained to become a psychoanalyst and opened his own practice before he joined the institute in 1930. Fromm's writings and research brought Freudian psychoanalysis together with Marxist critiques that were to have a lasting impact on Frankfurt School writings (cf. Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*). In 1934 he immigrated to the United States, joining the group in New York City. Here, he encountered the writings and work of Karen Horney. In the early 1930s, Fromm was Horkheimer's most important interlocutor – a role that Adorno would assume in the late 1930s. During their time in New York City, relations between him, Horkheimer, and other members of the institute became increasingly strained, a tension due in part to Fromm's increasingly critical stance toward Sigmund Freud. Consequently, Fromm split from the institute in 1939, though his efforts to combine psychoanalysis with political analyses would leave its mark on the later work of the Frankfurt School.

Marcuse (1898–1979) joined the Frankfurt School in 1932. He had been involved in the Social Democratic Party in Berlin before studying philosophy at the University of Freiburg, finishing his PhD in 1922 with a dissertation on the *Deutsche Künstlerroman* (“German artist's novel”). Subsequently, he returned to Berlin and worked in publishing before returning to Freiburg, studying with Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, and finishing his habilitation with the latter on “Hegel's Ontology and the Foundation of a Theory of Historicity.” Marcuse joined the institute shortly before its move to New York. Aside from his interest in philosophy, he brought a Freudian framework to his analyses and to those of the Frankfurt School. Despite diverging opinions and approaches, unlike Fromm, Marcuse never split from the Frankfurt School, although he did remain in the United States. His earlier writings, such as *Reason and Revolution* (1941) and *Eros and Civilization* (1955), brought together a critique of Karl Marx and Hegel, and of Marx and Freud, respectively.

And although neither was officially ever a member of the Frankfurt School, it should be

mentioned that Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer are often associated with it. Some of the institute's members, especially Adorno and Horkheimer, held their work in high esteem. Adorno admired Benjamin's work and tried to use his influence on Horkheimer to bring Benjamin into the institute. Yet although Benjamin did receive a modest amount of funding from it in the late 1930s and published articles in its journal, he was never officially welcomed into the group.

The institute was reestablished in 1951 in Frankfurt when Horkheimer, Adorno, and Pollock returned to Germany, while Lowenthal, Marcuse, and others stayed in the United States. Key figures of the Frankfurt School's second and third generations include Detlev Claussen, Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, Oskar Negt, Alfred Schmidt, and Albrecht Wellmer.

In the late 1960s Marcuse's writings – of the Frankfurt School members – had the most influence on the New Left and the student movement in the United States, Germany, and elsewhere. The members of the institute, who had returned to Frankfurt, too, supported student movements, especially – and contrary to popular belief – Adorno. In the summer of 1967, after the police's killing on June 2 of the student Benno Ohnesorg, who had been participating in a protest against Riza Shah Palavi of Iran's visit to Berlin, Adorno prefaced a guest lecture at the Free University in Berlin with an expression of solidarity with the students, criticizing the police brutality and demanding a legal inquiry into the shooting. He condemned the 1968 shooting of SDS leader Rudi Dutschke. And when students occupied the main building of the Department of Sociology, he supported their basic concerns but questioned their tactics and methods, not only in this action but more broadly as he had done throughout the late 1960s. Yet when the students occupied the institute in 1969 he immediately called the police to clear them from the building. The event marked a significant rupture with the student protest movement.

Marcuse's writings greatly resonated with student activists, who found their concerns addressed in works such as *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), *An Essay on Liberation* (1969), which was written in the wake of the May 1968 worker strikes and student demonstrations in France, and *Counter-Revolution and Revolt*

(1972). In sum, the Frankfurt School contributed both to social movements and to their study from its founding, through the 1960s, and to today.

SEE ALSO: Benjamin, Walter (1892–1940); Davis, Angela (b. 1944); Fromm, Erich (1900–1980); Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831); Lukács, Georg (1885–1971); Marcuse, Herbert (1898–1979); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism

References and Suggested Readings

- Arato, A. & Gebhardt, E. (Eds.) (1982) *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*. New York: Continuum.
- Benhabib, S. (1986) *Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Buck-Morss, S. (1977) *The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt School*. New York: Free Press.
- Jameson, F. (1971) *Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jameson, F. (1990) *Late Marxism: Adorno, or, The Persistence of the Dialectics*. London: Verso.
- Jay, M. (1973) *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research, 1923–1950*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jay, M. (1984) *Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wiggershaus, R. (1994) *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Freedom Rides

Susan Love Brown

Freedom Rides were the organized bus trips undertaken from May to September 1961 by racially integrated groups of men and women in order to desegregate both buses and interstate bus terminal waiting rooms in the South. The rides were part of a strategy to test the recent Supreme Court decision, *Boynton v. Virginia* (December 5, 1960), which outlawed the segregation of interstate bus terminals. Although previous decisions, *Mitchell v. US* (1941) and *Morgan v. Commonwealth of Virginia* (1946), had outlawed segregation on interstate buses themselves, both decisions were ignored in the Southern states.

The first Freedom Ride, which began on May 4, 1961, was organized by James Farmer of

the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). The 13 participants (seven African Americans and six whites, three women and ten men, adults from college age to their sixties) were trained in non-violent techniques before boarding two buses leaving Washington, DC, heading south to New Orleans. The plan was for the whites to sit in the back of the bus and the blacks in the front and for them to use the waiting rooms assigned to people of the opposite race. The riders informed authorities, including the presidents of Greyhound and Trailways bus companies, the Interstate Commerce Commission chairman, the FBI director, the attorney general, and the president of the United States, ahead of time as to their intentions.

The freedom riders first ran into trouble in Rock Hill, South Carolina, on May 4, and then again in Winnsboro, South Carolina, where they were beaten and two of them arrested and then released. The group again encountered hostilities in Anniston, Alabama, when their bus was attacked and firebombed. Their other bus was boarded by six members of the Ku Klux Klan, who forced all of the black passengers to sit in the back of the bus. After arriving in Birmingham, more mob assaults occurred. The attempt of the freedom riders to leave Birmingham and resume their journey to New Orleans was curtailed when the bus companies refused to allow them to board. They were also unable to leave by air due to continuous bomb threats. An assistant to President Kennedy, John Seigenthaler, flew to Birmingham and finally succeeded in getting the freedom riders out of the state on an unscheduled flight to New Orleans.

When news of the abandonment of the mission due to physical danger reached students in Nashville, Tennessee, many of whom were members of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), they decided to pick up where the CORE volunteers had left off. On May 17, John Lewis, a veteran of the first Freedom Ride, left with ten students for Birmingham, where one white and one black student were arrested for violating segregated seating on the bus. The Birmingham police arrested more students before they could board the bus for Montgomery, Alabama, and the students then launched a hunger strike in jail, refusing to move when ordered back to Nashville. They were forcibly loaded onto a bus out of town, but when they found their way back to the bus station,

their numbers had increased. The bus left for Montgomery on May 20, but upon arrival the riders and members of the press were beaten by a mob of Klansmen, several into unconsciousness.

On May 24, 27 freedom riders boarded two buses headed for Jackson, Mississippi. Although the bus carrying 12 freedom riders, 16 journalists, and six Alabama guardsmen made it safely to the border, when Mississippi guardsmen took over, the journalists got off, and the 12 freedom riders were arrested for breaching the peace. They were tried, convicted, and fined. Since they refused to pay the fines, they were sent to Parchman State Penitentiary for 60 days, but new freedom riders kept arriving, coordinated by Diane Nash in Nashville, and the Freedom Rides gradually spread to other parts of the South. More than 300 were arrested during 1961.

The Freedom Rides reaffirmed the strategy of testing laws through non-violent direct action. They demonstrated that violence would not be allowed to stop the quest for civil rights and that it would be met with even more resistance. They forced President Kennedy and his administration to take a stand for civil rights, which before had remained a low priority. Many of the student participants were also members of SNCC, and their experiences on the Freedom Rides committed them to the cause of ending racial segregation. Because of the large numbers of students involved, the Freedom Rides also marked a generational shift in the civil rights movement.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; CORE (Congress of Racial Equality); Freedom Summer; King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Parks, Rosa (1913–2005) and the Montgomery Bus Boycott; Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

References and Suggested Readings

- Arsenault, R. (2006) *Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hampton, H., Fayer, S., & Flynn, S. (1990) *Voices of Freedom: An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement from the 1950s through the 1980s*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Niven, D. (2003) *The Politics of Injustice: The Kennedys, the Freedom Rides, and the Electoral Consequences of a Moral Compromise*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Freedom Summer

Susan Love Brown

Freedom Summer was the name given to the summer of 1964 when the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) decided to carry out a voter registration project among blacks in Mississippi. In June, approximately 500 Northern volunteers converged on Mississippi to assist in the project. In addition, some 40 Freedom Schools, manned with volunteers, conducted classes for poor black students, and the decision was made to challenge the traditional Democratic Party that had excluded black voters. However, the summer is best remembered for the brutal slaying of three volunteers – James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Mickey Schwerner.

COFO consisted of three organizations: the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). The organization had decided to concentrate on voter registration within Mississippi, which was considered one of the most resistant Southern states to black equality. State and local officials in Mississippi had not hesitated to use brutality or to sanction the killing of civil rights activists, including Herbert Lee, Louis Allen, and Medgar Evers. COFO director Robert Moses, a native Mississippian, along with Northern lawyer Allard Lowenstein, had previously worked with Northern volunteers and local organizers to carry out a mock election, which involved encouraging local blacks to participate in a Freedom Vote. This was the first project that COFO had taken after deciding to concentrate on voter registration. The Freedom Vote resulted in the participation of 83,000 blacks.

Encouraged by the success of this project, COFO decided to step up its efforts at voter registration. Discouraged by the lack of progress by local organizers alone, the group sought to recruit volunteers from outside to help in the process, although the decision to bring in Northern whites remained controversial, especially among the members of SNCC, who disliked the class disparities and potential loss of black leadership within the movement. The Mississippi Freedom Project involved the recruitment of mostly white Northern college students, who received training at the Western College for Women in

Oxford, Ohio, before they arrived in Mississippi to participate in the project. It would be two veteran workers and one recruit who would become the victims that helped to wake up the nation to the murderous violence of law enforcement officials in league with the Ku Klux Klan.

After visiting Longdale, Mississippi, the site of a church burned down by the Klan, James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Mickey Schwerner were arrested on June 21, 1964, by a Neshoba county deputy sheriff, who was a member of the Klan. After holding the three in jail for hours, he suddenly released them. As they drove away, they were followed by Klan members, shot to death, and buried in an earthen dam.

The FBI investigated the disappearances of the three men. In the meantime, national news had picked up the story, and this encouraged the FBI to open an office in Jackson, Mississippi. Search efforts on the part of sailors sent by President Lyndon Johnson exposed previous murders of blacks, whose disappearances the FBI had failed to investigate before. The national publicity led to the firing of Mississippi law enforcement officials who were Klan members. The response of local whites was increased violence. On June 23, the FBI found the car that the three civil rights workers had driven, and on August 4, the bodies of Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner were found, confirming their deaths by violence.

The voter registration project proceeded, and the publicity resulted in the participation of 300 National Council of Churches ministers who helped to make the project a success. As a result, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) was formed as an opponent to the traditional Democratic Party in order to challenge the participation of the segregated party at the upcoming Democratic convention in Atlantic City later that year. In addition to work within the state, veteran activist Ella Baker worked to give the MFDP a national presence by setting up an office in Washington, DC under the auspices of SNCC.

When President Johnson arranged for the MFDP to be given two token seats, while the regular Democratic Party from Mississippi would be seated under regular conditions, members of the MFDP were outraged. Moses and James Forman of SNCC were opposed to any compromise. This political maneuvering on Johnson's part, and the counsel of Martin Luther King, Jr., Bayard Rustin, and others to

accept the compromise, led to an increased lack of trust in white liberals who had been their allies in the civil rights movement, and it opened the door to the disaffection of young members and the rise of the Black Power movement within SNCC.

In December 1964, Cecil Price, the deputy sheriff who had arrested Chaney, Goodman, and Schwerner, and 20 others who had been involved in their murders, were charged with violating the civil rights of the three men. Their trial was held in October 1967. With an openly racist judge and an all-white jury, Price and six others were found guilty, but the others were freed.

Although the summer of 1964 was filled with fear and anger over political compromises and racial violence, and while some believed that their efforts to curb Mississippi's violation of black rights had failed, others thought that it marked the beginning of the end of state-sanctioned segregation and voting inequities in Mississippi.

SEE ALSO: Baker, Ella Josephine (1903–1986); Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; CORE (Congress of Racial Equality); Evers, Medgar (1925–1963); Freedom Rides; King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Parks, Rosa (1913–2005) and the Montgomery Bus Boycott; Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

References and Suggested Readings

- Aretha, D. (2007) *Freedom Summer*. Greensboro, NC: Morgan Reynolds.
- Davis, T. (1998) *Weary Feet, Rested Souls: A Guided History of the Civil Rights Movement*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- McAdam, D. (1990) *Freedom Summer*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Martinez, E. S. (2007) *Letters from Mississippi: Personal Reports from Civil Rights Volunteers of the 1964 Freedom Summer*. Brookline, MA: Zephyr Press.
- Rubel, D. (2005) *The Coming Free: The Struggle for African-American Equality*. New York: DK.

Freire, Paulo (1921–1997)

Michael F. McCullough

Paulo Freire, the Brazilian educator and author of *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, published in 1972,

viewed education as an integral part of broader efforts to advance personal, social, and political liberation. In what has come to be known as critical pedagogy, Freire sought not only to displace rote teaching methods with participatory learning but to empower students as autonomous actors in social transformation. Through *conscientização*, defined by Freire as “learning to perceive social, political and economic contradictions and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality,” students cease to be passive observers of reality and achieve a critical consciousness that enables them to partake in and build a world of their own making. Such an approach to learning made Freire a dangerous criminal in the eyes of the military dictatorship that forced him into political exile in 1964, but won him broad international support from educators and activists who espouse the need for radically democratic change.

Freire was born in 1921 in Recife, Pernambuco, the largest city in Brazil’s Northeast, the poorest region in a country whose income inequity has long ranked among the highest in the world. Growing up in middle-class circumstances did not spare him or his family from the ravages of the Great Depression. Hunger-induced sleep often prevented him from doing school homework and made him sensitive to the needs of those even less well off.

Freire considered his work as an educational administrator with the Pernambuco state Serviço Social da Indústria (SESI) in the late 1940s and 1950s “the most important political-pedagogical practice” of his life. The deferential, self-deprecating fatalism that Freire often encountered among Atlantic fishermen, sugar workers in the Zona da Mata, and rural peasants of the sertão while working with SESI became one of the defining characteristics of what he would label the “culture of silence” or the “culture of domination.” Also at SESI, Freire undertook his first experiments in democratizing educational processes, opening several projects to participation by students, teachers, and local administrators. Passed through the prism of theoretical concepts he studied while pursuing a doctorate with the University of Recife – alienation and class struggle in Marx, necrophilia and biophilia in Erich Fromm, and the personalism of Emmanuel Mounier, among many others – Freire’s SESI experiences helped him fashion and solidify his own worldview.

Freire played major roles in the broad-based progressive movement that became a strong political force in Brazil by the early 1960s, co-founding the Movimento de Cultura Popular in Recife in 1960, launching innovative literacy programs through the University of Recife’s Cultural Extension Service, and becoming the director of President João Goulart’s National Literacy Program in June 1963.

On April 1, 1964, a right-wing military coup expelled Goulart from the presidency and lashed out against the progressive movement, including Freire, who lost his national literacy post and spent 72 days in prison, much of the time in a 2 feet by 6 feet cell. In September 1964 the military summoned Freire to Rio de Janeiro to appear before a Military Police Inquiry. Friends concerned for his safety urged Freire to take asylum in Rio’s Bolivian embassy. The day after he did so the regime signaled its displeasure by encircling the Bolivian embassy with army tanks. In the embassy Freire contracted with the government of President Paz Estenssoro to conduct an assessment of Bolivia’s primary and adult education systems. Bolivia’s ambassador to Brazil escorted Freire to Bolivia when, after a 40-day standoff, the military regime finally granted him a safe-conduct pass. Days after his arrival, however, a right-wing coup ousted Estenssoro. Once again Freire became *persona non grata* in a military dictatorship and had to negotiate a safe-conduct pass out of the country.

Freire lived the next 15 years as a political exile, four and a half years in Chile, almost a year in the United States, and a decade in Geneva, Switzerland with the World Council of Churches. During his exile he traveled the world speaking about his ideas and worked on literacy programs in Tanzania, Guinea Bissau, Angola, Peru, Nicaragua, Australia, and Italy.

During the most repressive periods of its 25-year reign, Brazil’s dictatorship prohibited publication of Freire’s books and did not permit the mass media to mention him by name. Under a general amnesty granted in 1979, Freire returned to Brazil and assumed teaching posts at the Pontifical Catholic University in São Paulo and the State University of São Paulo in Campinas. He served as the secretary of education for the city of São Paulo from 1988 to 1991 in the administration of Workers Party Mayor Luiza Erundina, an experience he reflected on in *Pedagogy of the City*. On May 2, 1997 he died in São Paulo.

A recurring theme of *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* echoed by Freire throughout his life is that oppression is dehumanizing for oppressors and oppressed alike and liberation is not simply a project for the oppressed but the vocation of all humanity. Although mainstream educators have generally eschewed such themes in teacher training and classroom curricula, the debates engendered by Freirean critical pedagogy have reverberated through the world of education and beyond. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* has been translated into dozens of languages. Institutes dedicated to promoting Freirean ideas and educational practices have been established in South Africa, Spain, Portugal, Malta, Finland, Germany, Los Angeles, and Argentina, as well as his native Brazil. During Freire's Chilean exile such enthusiasm for his message was much in evidence in the neighborhood bars of Santiago that named a drink after him – the Apperitif Paulo Freire. Asked what prompted the name, the Chileans explained: "It's very strong. It makes us lucid. And it opens our spirit."

SEE ALSO: Brazil, Peasant Movements and Liberation Theology; Latin America, Catholic Church and Liberation, 16th Century to Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Freire, A. M. A. (2005) *Paulo Freire: Uma Historia da Vida*. Indaiatuba, São Paulo: Villa das Letras Editora.
- Freire, P. (1972) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. New York: Herder & Herder.
- Freire, P. (1993) *Pedagogy of the City*. New York: Continuum.
- Freire, P. (1996) *Letters to Cristina: Reflections on My Life and Work*. New York: Routledge.

FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique)

Justin Corfield

FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique; Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) was founded on June 25, 1962, 13 years to the day before Mozambique became independent. It was established after a conference which began on June 20, 1962, when leaders opposed to Portuguese rule in Mozambique met in Dar-es-

Salaam in Tanganyika (Tanzania as of 1964). The leaders who met included Marcelino dos Santos, Eduardo Mondlane, Matthew Mmole, and Uria Simango, with Julius Nyerere of host-nation Tanganyika and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana urging for a united front. FRELIMO was created from the merger of three anti-Portuguese nationalist movements: the Mozambican African National Union (MANU), the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO), and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI). All three had been fighting the Portuguese but had different backers and different political stances, with MANU being supported by the Tanganyikan government, UDENAMO being essentially Stalinist with aid from Ghana, and UNAMI being based in Malawi. The three groups were brought together under the (elected) leadership of Eduardo Mondlane (1920–69), who gave up his position as professor of anthropology at Syracuse University (New York) to become leader of FRELIMO. The new organization set up its office at 201 Arab Street in Dar-es-Salaam, the street later being renamed Nkrumah Street – FRELIMO appeared in the telephone directories of the period as “Mozambique Liberation Front, Political Party.”

FRELIMO's stated objectives were to run Mozambique as an independent nation, without Portugal having any role in its future. There would be a party government and collective endeavor in the same way that Tanganyika and the People's Republic of China were being run. They also wanted to move away from domination of ethnic groups toward the formation of a Mozambican national identity.

It was not long before FRELIMO decided to send in large numbers of soldiers from Tanzania to fight the Portuguese. The first major operation was led by Samora Machel (1933–86), a nationalist trained in guerilla warfare in Algeria, and one of the military commanders of FRELIMO. It managed to capture parts of Niassa in northern Mozambique, and hold some of it on a semi-permanent basis against Portuguese counterattacks. Gradually wearing down the Portuguese forces, by the early 1970s FRELIMO, with a guerilla force of 7,000, had taken control of much of the northern and central parts of Mozambique, managing to hold its own against 60,000 Portuguese soldiers. However, the Portuguese did manage a number of successes,

including the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, who died after opening a parcel bomb. Mondlane was succeeded by Samora Machel.

The Carnation Revolution of 1974 in Portugal led to the decision to pull out of Mozambique, which resulted in FRELIMO negotiating for independence and then coming to power, with Joaquim Chissano (b. 1939) as premier from September 20, 1974 to June 25, 1975, when Mozambique officially became independent. Samora Machel was subsequently elected president. Machel, who was keen on developing a socialist economy, embarked on an ambitious program of building health clinics and schools throughout the countryside. He also oversaw the nationalization of many Portuguese and South African properties and businesses throughout the country, which led to opposition from many quarters. It was not long before the anti-communist Mozambicans, the Rhodesians, and the South Africans found common cause, establishing RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana; Mozambican National Resistance).

There was a bitter civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO, and visiting journalists were heavily critical of RENAMO's excesses, denouncing the human rights abuses and atrocities by its soldiers. Although RENAMO managed to take control of much of the countryside, the FRELIMO government refused to compromise until finally Machel decided to reach an agreement with the South African government, signing the Nkomati Accord on March 16, 1984, by which he would cease supporting the African National Congress (ANC), and in return the South Africans would stop their support for RENAMO. Although the Mozambican government reluctantly followed its side of the agreement, some elements of the South African military continued to support RENAMO.

Samora Machel was killed when his plane crashed in South Africa on October 19, 1986, and he was succeeded by Joaquim Chissano. Although Machel had moderated his policies from 1985, Chissano was more pragmatic and sought to engage with the West, removing the Marxist ideological background that had underpinned FRELIMO from its earliest days. This led to a truce with RENAMO on August 7, 1992, and the Rome General Peace Accords of October 6, 1992.

With Chissano endorsing the democratic process, elections were held in 1994, which saw

Chissano win the presidential vote with 53.3 percent of the vote, while RENAMO's Afonso Dhlakama garnered just 33.7 percent. Five years later in the presidential elections, Chissano received 52.3 percent, with Dhlakama's vote rising to 47.7 percent. In the legislative elections, FRELIMO won 133 of the 250 seats in parliament, but there was considerable criticism from overseas about the fairness of the election. As criticism of Chissano became more pronounced, FRELIMO selected Armando Guebuza (b. 1943) to contest the presidential elections of December 1–2, 2004, gaining 63.7 percent of the vote, with RENAMO's share falling to 31.7 percent. It also saw FRELIMO win 160 of the 250 seats in the parliament, ensuring that FRELIMO would continue to be the ruling party in Mozambique.

SEE ALSO: Chissano, Joaquim (b. 1939); Machel, Samora (1933–1986); Mondlane, Eduardo Chivambo (1920–1969); Mozambique, Worker Protests; Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974

References and Suggested Readings

- Azevedo, M. (1991) *Historical Dictionary of Mozambique*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.
- Cabrita, J. M. (2000) *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Chilcote, R. H. (1972) *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Documents*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
- Cornwall, B. (1972) *The Bush Rebels: A Personal Account of Black Revolt in Africa*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.
- Henriksen, T. H. (1983) *Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Mozambique's War of Independence 1964–1974*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Mondlane, E. (1969) *The Struggle for Mozambique*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Núñez, B. (1995) *Dictionary of Portuguese–African Civilization*. London: Hans Zell.

French Caribbean in the Age of Revolution

Laurent Dubois

During the early 1790s, Guadeloupe and Saint-Domingue (present-day Haiti) were both French plantation colonies. Their histories paralleled each other during this period. In each there were conflicts among white colonists over the particular

meaning the changes of the French Revolution should have in the colonies and violent struggles over the rights and status of free people of color. Most importantly, both saw large-scale mobilization and revolt among the enslaved during the early 1790s. As a result of the mass insurrection of the enslaved in Saint-Domingue, by 1794 the enslaved in both colonies had gained their freedom and become citizens of the French Republic.

For the next several years, the parallels continued: in both colonies administrators created a new order that combined emancipation with new forms of labor coercion in an attempt to maintain the plantation economy. In the early 1800s, the populations in both colonies confronted missions sent by Napoleon Bonaparte to reassert metropolitan control over what the French government then saw as dangerously autonomous leaders of African descent. War erupted in both places, but with quite different outcomes. In Guadeloupe the French relatively quickly overcame resistance, while in Saint-Domingue a two-year conflict eventually led to French defeat and the creation of a new nation: Haiti.

Before the 1790s both islands had, like all Caribbean plantation societies, an important history of slave resistance, both on a daily level and in the form of periodic revolts and the formation of maroon communities. These traditions of resistance lay the foundation for what took shape in the 1790s, when the revolutionary changes that began in Paris in 1789 created a series of important openings and possibilities for political change in the colonies. For different constituencies in the Caribbean, revolution meant different things. Many white planters sought more political representation and freedom of trade, while free people of color demanded political rights and an end to racist laws. The enslaved, meanwhile, sought out ways to change their own condition either incrementally or, ultimately, through an overthrow of the entire slave system itself. It was the enslaved who ultimately produced the dramatic revolutionary transformations of this period in the French Caribbean. Through a large-scale and successful slave revolution, they challenged and ultimately demolished slavery in the French empire, through a combination of military success and the crafting of political alliances with sympathetic French republicans.

Starting in August 1789, there were small-scale revolts in Guadeloupe and Martinique, but all

were successfully repressed. It was in Saint-Domingue, starting in August 1791, that revolt went beyond its first stages, burgeoning into a large-scale military assault against the institution of slavery. Burning cane fields, smashing cane-processing equipment, and killing whites, enslaved insurgents gained control of much of the northern plain of the colony of Saint-Domingue. They were never defeated, and ultimately forced local officials to abolish slavery, a decision ratified by Paris and applied to the entire French empire in 1794.

How did they succeed in doing what no other slave rebels in history had done before – destroying the slave system in their society? Slaves were a majority in Saint-Domingue, and this numerical superiority was of course crucial, but this did not distinguish the colony from Jamaica or other colonies. Interestingly, Saint-Domingue had a less strong tradition of slave resistance – smaller maroon communities, and no single event of the size of Tacky's Revolt, for instance – than Jamaica until the revolutionary period. Saint-Domingue did have a heavily African population, and as the scholar John Thornton has argued, among the things these individuals brought was often military knowledge and experience as "African veterans" (Thornton 1991). If they were able to fight off French missions against them, it is certainly in part because of the sophisticated military strategies they deployed.

While the triumph of the enslaved revolutionaries of Saint-Domingue was clearly a military triumph, it was also a political one. The political triumph was not just to mobilize a mass movement against slavery, but to create and secure allies within the French republican movement itself who supported and ultimately embraced emancipation. The way in which they did this is well crystallized in a large revolt that took place in Trois-Rivières, Guadeloupe in 1793. At the time, whites in Guadeloupe were violently divided between republicans, who supported revolutionary changes, and royalists, who were at odds with the revolutionary changes. In Trois-Rivières, several royalist planters sought to arm and mobilize their slaves to fight for them against local republicans. Some of the slaves of these royalist planters, however, chose their own camp. Led by a man named Jean-Baptiste, they rose up and massacred their masters, and then marched off to the nearby

capital of the island, Basse-Terre, to explain what they had done. Startlingly, when they met white troops coming to put down the revolt, they presented themselves as “Citizens and Friends” and explained that they had in fact saved the republicans by their actions. Perhaps even more strikingly, the white troops responded sympathetically, ultimately accepting the slaves’ version of the events as true, and even celebrating what they had done as a courageous defense of the republic.

In Saint-Domingue, similarly, slave insurgents eventually found allies among the metropolitan administrators Léger Félicité Sonthonax and Etienne Polverel, who besieged by anti-republican whites and facing widespread slave insurrection – as well as the looming threat of British and Spanish invasion – made a bold decision during June, July, and August of 1793. They offered slaves who would fight for the French Republic freedom and citizenship. Over time, they extended the offer to include volunteers’ families, and then abolished slavery outright in August of 1793. They had no orders to do so from Paris, and indeed took an audacious step in doing so. Their decision was a response to the situation in the colony, and represented both an acceptance that slave insurgents had transformed themselves into the most militarily powerful group in the colony, and an embrace of the political demand for freedom that the slave insurrection represented.

Once this decision was ratified in Paris in 1794, an insurrection directed against France was transformed into an empire-wide project of emancipation in which the French government and former slave insurgents, now free citizens, became allies against France’s slave-holding enemies, particularly Britain. Guadeloupe and Martinique had both fallen to British invasion in early 1794, but a small mission of French soldiers sent out under the command of Victor Hugues managed to take Guadeloupe back by announcing that France had decreed emancipation and so recruiting slaves to their side to fight the British. The British eventually fled the island, leaving behind several hundred French planters who had joined with them, who were executed by Hugues. This event had significant demographic consequences in Guadeloupe, where the richest members of the planter class were decimated both by the slave revolt in Trois-Rivières and by Hugues, leading to the rebuilding and

transformation of this class in the early nineteenth century. In Martinique, in contrast, where slavery was never abolished because the British kept control throughout the 1790s, the planter class was able to maintain more continuous control between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

After being taken back by the French, Guadeloupe saw a massive military mobilization as former slaves were recruited into the army. Emancipation was a powerful weapon of war for the French. Guadeloupe became the central base for French attacks against British colonies in the Eastern Caribbean, which included a successful invasion of St. Lucia, where slavery was abolished by the French, though the British took it back relatively quickly, and widespread attacks in St. Vincent and Grenada, where the French allied with local insurgents. About 60,000 British troops died in the French Caribbean during the 1790s in both the Eastern Caribbean and Saint-Domingue, while the French essentially raised armies on site by recruiting ex-slaves. These armies, furthermore, were fighting not just for France but also for emancipation, a fact which gained them allies among slaves and free people of color in British colonies they attacked.

The French also successfully deployed privateers, ships manned by crews that included many ex-slaves, which attacked shipping heading for British colonies. In the Eastern Caribbean, Guadeloupe became the major base of operations for these privateers, and they brought their spoils to the island, creating an economic boom in the process. Among the ships they captured were slave vessels, and they brought those Africans they captured to Guadeloupe, where they were placed on plantations but granted the limited freedom of other former slaves in the colony. Sailors on the privateers played an important role in spreading news and information about the events in the French Caribbean colonies throughout the Greater Caribbean.

Despite these radical changes, the pinnacles of power in Guadeloupe remained occupied by white administrators sent from France, most notably Victor Hugues. Within the army itself, there was an important presence of officers of African descent who rose up through the ranks through these wars. The situation in Saint-Domingue was quite different, and largely because of the actions of the most legendary figure of the revolutionary period: Toussaint Louverture. Although he did not live to see

independence, which was secured by one of his top generals, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, his actions during the 1790s and early 1800s lay the foundation for independence.

Louverture's trajectory remains of central importance. As a leader he confronted perennial problems for the Caribbean, and for other parts of the post- and not-so-post-colonial worlds of the present: the continual, but often failed, striving to escape an economic order based on monoculture and dependency; the search for political formations that can both resist and negotiate with the demands and pressures of empires; and the struggle of leaders to balance the representation of the aspirations of a national constituency with a set of broader conditions that inevitably contain and limit those aspirations.

As soon as emancipation was decreed in 1794, many planters began actively seeking to reverse the decision. Caribbean leaders such as Louverture were well aware that this planter lobby was present and was a threat to liberty, and watched developments in the French metropole carefully, as well as planning for the possibility that they would have to defend emancipation from its enemies. During the next years, the struggle over the future of emancipation took several twists and turns, and the rise of critics of abolition was not as inexorable or as unavoidable as is often assumed. Still, in the midst of a broader process of reaction and the dismantling of certain institutions and discursive hegemonies of the revolutionary period, there was a steady erosion of support for emancipation – and for figures like Louverture – and a growing acceptance of various dangerous forms of nostalgia for the “old regime” in the colonies. As Louverture sought to respond to threats he saw on the horizon, his actions – ironically, though perhaps inevitably – provided new fodder for his enemies in the metropole. The political dynamics of this period were shaped by a complex transatlantic ballet of suspicions and accusations in which each side helped call into existence precisely what it sought to avoid.

The central content of Louverture's political ideology was racial egalitarianism. A part of this was a defense of emancipation, which he consistently insisted was irreversible. But he was willing to accept a quite restricted form of emancipation, one in which the majority of ex-slaves continued as plantation laborers: paid, but poorly, subject to physical and legal coercion,

and forced into a circumscribed economic and social existence. He was willing to negotiate a social order that sacrificed much of the content of liberty in order to preserve it as a political reality. This social order, however, was to be devoid of explicitly racial exclusions. The ranks of military and political power were to be open to all people of all races.

At the same time, and despite his keen awareness of the hostility toward emancipation in many quarters in metropolitan France, Louverture did not declare independence from France. Why? He may have simply thought the time was not right. But it could be argued that he was in fact still hoping, at the time, that France could be controlled and appeased, and that ultimately a renegotiated imperial relationship would secure and strengthen the gains of the previous years. Louverture seems to have concluded that it was only through negotiation with the powerful empires that surrounded Saint-Domingue, especially Britain and France – as well as the United States – that a colony without slavery could survive. On an economic level, this meant doing what was necessary to maintain plantation agriculture, to secure this as a foundation for exchange and trade. On a political level, it meant balancing the necessity of securing liberty and racial equality within Saint-Domingue with the necessity of protection and support. Louverture – precociously suffering and seeking to negotiate the dilemmas of Caribbean nationalism – sought to secure sovereignty by accepting the denial of much of its content. He sought to create a social order that would be acceptable in an imperial world and that would allow the fulfillment of the role that world had placed upon Saint-Domingue.

Ultimately, when Napoleon Bonaparte rose to power in France, he came to see Toussaint Louverture's regime as an unacceptable challenge to his own control over and plans for the Caribbean. Despite Louverture's attempt to craft a quite conservative order, the new French regime was unable to accept either his demands for racial equality or his autonomous political action, embodied most potently in his 1801 Constitution, which declared him governor for life of Saint-Domingue and created a detailed set of laws for the colony. Bonaparte's decision to turn against Louverture was a clear turning point, for it created a radically new context for debates about emancipation and sovereignty. The refusal

of Louverture's advance on the part of the French essentially eliminated the possibility of compromise around the question of imperial governance. The possibility that a local leadership of African descent could have a role in crafting colonial governance from within was essentially closed off. This polarized the political situation, and ultimately forced a new set of choices on the Caribbean leadership. The battle became one between emancipation and racial equality defended through a more radical sovereignty, on the one hand, and a return to much of the old colonial order on the other.

The period from 1802 to 1804 was one of extremely complex and cross-cutting allegiances and involved a confusing series of surrenders and then desertions on the part of insurgent leaders. In Saint-Domingue, the war began when the French troops arrived and refused to wait for Louverture's permission to land at Le Cap. His commander, Henri Christophe, set the town on fire and began fighting the arriving French troops. Not all of Louverture's officers remained loyal and, especially in the western and southern portions of the colony, many joined the French. Nevertheless, Louverture and his loyal generals – including Christophe and Jean-Jacques Dessalines – forced Leclerc into several months of hard campaigns that culminated in a battle at Crête-à-Pierrot at which the French won a very costly victory. Soon afterwards, Christophe defected to the French, and Louverture and Dessalines followed suit. In June, Leclerc set up a trap for Louverture, fearing that he was still animating resistance in the colony, and deported him and his family to France, where he died in prison.

The first stage in the war was a victory for the French, but not a complete one. A major part of Leclerc's mission, as laid out by Bonaparte in a series of instructions, was to co-opt or eliminate the black officers of the colony and disarm the black army. But the casualties he suffered from disease and battle during his first months in the colony made this impossible: as he confronted ongoing resistance on the part of small bands of rebels after the surrender of Christophe, Dessalines, and Louverture, he had to depend on the very army he was supposed to destroy. And – as both French officials in the metropole (including Bonaparte) and Louverture knew – the rainy months in the late summer and fall, when outbreaks of disease were more common and more

virulent, would be a particularly dangerous time for the French troops.

By late 1802, however, defections from the French side began to accelerate. The remaining bands of rebels – led in the north by Sans-Souci and another Congo-born officer, Macaya – attracted more and more soldiers. The French, seeking to stop the defections by threatening and increasingly massacring and terrorizing segments of the black troops in their service, instead accelerated the process. In the end, the officers, including Dessalines, followed the lead of many of their soldiers, and in October the tide clearly shifted against the French. The final stage of the war of independence began, and increasingly the lines of opposition became clear and intractable.

Over the course of 1802, events in Guadeloupe shaped the process of political mobilization in Saint-Domingue. Bonaparte had also sent a mission to Guadeloupe, where they were to confront a group of rebellions. Soldiers had expelled a white metropolitan administrator sent by Bonaparte and set up an autonomous government on the island. The French troops were welcomed by a proportion of the army under the command of Magloire Pélage. The French, however, immediately began disarming all black troops, which prompted another set of soldiers, under the command of Louis Delgrès, to begin resisting the French. At the end of a few weeks of combat, during which Pélage and his troops aided the French, Delgrès retreated to a mountain plantation at Matouba, where rather than surrender he and his troops committed mass suicide, blowing up the plantation with gunpowder to the cry of "Vivre Libre ou Mourir!" – "Live Free or Die!" The French carried out brutal executions and many deportations in the wake of this conflict, and some prisoners were shipped to Saint-Domingue, where they may have helped spread the news of what happened in Guadeloupe.

News about French actions in Guadeloupe, as French General Victor-Emmanuel Leclerc himself admitted, was seen in Saint-Domingue as proof of French intentions to reestablish slavery. In fact the French administrators in Guadeloupe would put off the official reestablishment of slavery until 1803, fearing continued revolt, but even Leclerc himself was convinced in 1802 that slavery had been reinstated in

Guadeloupe. This meant that in Saint-Domingue the ambiguity about French intentions, which had been maintained during the campaigns against Louverture, melted away, as more and more people became convinced that the choice before them was between victory against the French and a return to slavery. The repression of revolt succeeded in Guadeloupe, but the impact of that successful repression was to provide inspiration to revolutionaries in Saint-Domingue by making the battle lines and the stakes of the war much clearer. It took months more of brutal fighting, during which many French atrocities were directed against black troops who were fighting *for* them, to help seal popular support for the opposition, even among free people of color who retained strong loyalties to France. When victory against the French came in late 1803, the army was led by Jean-Jacques Dessalines but included a range of officers from different social backgrounds, including a number of men of color.

As the battle between the French and rebel troops under Dessalines's command raged from late 1802 to November 1803, a series of symbols was deployed in an attempt to craft a new unified identity. The most famous is the blue and white flag that became the flag of Haiti. At the time, many of the insurgents – veterans of the decade-long wars against the British in the colony – seem to have fought under their old French republican flags. In March 1803, an article was published claiming that this signified that they were still seeking, and willing to imagine, a reconciliation with France. Dessalines's response was to produce a new flag: the white was ripped out of the tricolor, leaving the blue and red together. Dessalines did not invent this gesture, however. Nearly a year earlier, the rebels under Louis Delgrès in Guadeloupe had also flown a French tricolor with the white ripped out.

The new flag suggested that the white would be expelled, while those of African descent would remain, united to form a new nation. The language of the January 1804 declaration of Haitian independence, however, took aim primarily at the French rather than at all whites. And Dessalines, while he later declared that all Haitians would henceforth be defined as “black” – an act aimed at undermining conflicts between those of purely African descent and those of mixed European and African ancestry in the colony – also exempted

and delivered naturalization papers to a number of French individuals, most notably widows, who were allowed to keep their property, as well as groups of Polish deserters from the French army and German colonists. While mobilizing the symbolism of a rejection of the white color, Dessalines's proclamations took aim at a particular construction of France as the real enemy of the new nation. And he allowed certain individuals – who had to pledge their rejection of France in order to gain naturalization as Haitians – to escape that construction, and the broader expulsion of the “white,” in order to become Haitians, and therefore black (Dubois 2004a).

United in this period of revolution, Haiti and Guadeloupe would move forward into strikingly different futures. Haiti, the second independent nation in the Americas, would become a symbol of black independence and dignity, and suffer political isolation and economic marginalization at the hands of the empires and nations that surrounded it. In Guadeloupe the majority of the population, once reenslaved in 1803, would have to wait until 1848 for a second, this time permanent, emancipation. The island is today a department of France, politically integrated into the nation, though its status and relation to the metropole remain the subject of ongoing debate and conflict. It is now home to an increasing number of Haitian immigrants who are sometimes treated as unwelcome outsiders, but who in fact are also bearers of a common history.

SEE ALSO: Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806); Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath; Haiti, Saint-Domingue and Revolutionary France; Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution, 1796–1799

References and Suggested Readings

- Dubois, L. (2004a) *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Dubois, L. (2004b) *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- James, C. L. R. (1963) *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint Louverture and the San Domingo Revolution*. New York: Vintage.
- Scott, J. (1996) *Crisscrossing Empires: Ships, Sailors, and Resistance in the Lesser Antilles in the Eighteenth Century*. In R. Paquette & S. Engerman

(Eds.), *The Lesser Antilles in the Age of European Expansion*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, pp. 128–43.

Thornton, J. (1991) African Soldiers in the Haitian Revolution. *Journal of Caribbean History* 25 (1 & 2): 58–79.

French Guiana, ecological movements against the Guiana Space Center in Kourou

María Ximena Alvarez Martínez

Guiana became a French overseas department in March of 1946. Ninety percent of its land is made up of forest and represents a treasure of biodiversity. It is also rich in gold. Because of its favorable geographic conditions, such as its proximity to the Equator and the Atlantic Ocean, as well as its climatic benefits and its low demographic index (a total population of 45,000 in 1964), it was chosen in 1965 as the site for a French space base, the Guiana Space Center, in the small town of Kourou.

Public opinion over the benefits of the space program was divided. The Socialist Party and other leftist organizations were afraid that it might become a potential site for nuclear conflict during the Cold War, and they feared the risk of the establishment of an apartheid system similar to South Africa. The environmental impact of this development was also protested by the international World Wildlife Fund (WWF), but base experts argued that even though the rockets and engine tests produced pollutants, overall the program posed less of a direct environmental threat than most forms of industry.

On the other hand, the program offered some advantages, such as the employment opportunities it created and the benefits and comfort of modernization. It was necessary to build an infrastructure which included the improvement of the port, the modernization of Rochambeau's airport, and the construction of railroad tracks, housing, and other services.

The indirect effects of the space center were also felt, such as the demographic explosion (the population tripled after 1964), the spread of

artificial environments, and the birth of a culture of consumption. In the 1980s the country faced an energy shortage as a result of the demand created by the system of telecommunications operated by Télé Diffusion France (TDF) and the space center; to cover that demand, a dam was built across the Sinnamary River at a site known as Petit Saut. Even though studies on the environmental impact were conducted, the population was concerned about the ecological and health repercussions. There were several protests from environmental and political groups, who shared the view that France was imposing its politics and viewpoints. Finally, a railroad system had to be constructed for the space base. In the 1990s, there were more protests on the streets, and the media responded to the construction of an alternate route to Petit Saut by denouncing the base as a "state within the state."

The ecological problem that the rainforest is faced with is determined not only by the Guiana Space Center, but also by the illegal extraction of gold (which is responsible for most of the damage to the rainforest), along with overharvesting of fauna and the pollution of rivers by mercury and sediment load. More protests took place in 2005 against the creation of a launching platform near Kourou, and the environmental movement succeeded in establishing national parks to protect the rainforest, such as the 2 million-hectare Guiana Amazonian Park, which was created in 2007.

SEE ALSO: French Caribbean in the Age of Revolution; French Guiana, Indigenous Rebellions; French Polynesia, Protest Movements

References and Suggested Readings

- Adélaïde-Merlande, J. (2002) *Histoire contemporaine de la Caraïbe et des Guyanes*. Paris: Karthala.
- Burton, R. D. E. & Reno, F. (1995) *French and West Indian: Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guyana Today*. Hong Kong: Macmillan.
- Cardoso, F. C. (1999) *La Guyane française 1715–1817: Aspects économiques et sociaux*. Cayenne: Ibis Rouge.
- Mam-Lam-Fouck, S. (1996) *Histoire Générale de la Guyane Française*. Cayenne: Ibis Rouge.
- Poldermar, M. (2004) *La Guyane française 1676–1763. Mise en place et évolution de la société coloniale, tensions et métissage*. Cayenne: Ibis Rouge.
- Redfield, P. (2000) *Space in the Tropics: From Convicts to Rockets in French Guiana*. California: University of California Press.

French Guiana, indigenous rebellions

Leticia Pacheco Espejel

Located on South America's northern coast, French Guiana is an overseas department of France. Originally inhabited by Native Americans, it was settled in the seventeenth century by the French, who used it for penal settlements beginning in 1852. This area has seen a number of protests, the earliest of which involved the struggles of the indigenous peoples to maintain their rights to their homeland. Since the 1970s, there have been protests for autonomy from France, as well as ecological protests against the Guiana Space Center in Kourou.

The first contact between the Europeans and the indigenous people can be traced back to the fifteenth century when the first French expedition arrived at French Guiana. The first attempt to evangelize the indigenous people began in 1630, and the rest of the century was characterized by constant indigenous resistance to evangelization, as in every other French colony.

The First War of Resistance

In 1643, the French faced an attack by indigenous peoples at the same time as Poncet de Brétigny led a 281-man expedition to establish a foothold in French Guiana. The indigenous resistance, the inability of the Europeans to adapt to the climate, and de Brétigny's unpreparedness caused the expedition to fail.

In 1652, a new expedition landed in French Guiana under bishops Marivault and Biet, who arrived with 800 marines, soldiers, and, for the first time, women. This expedition lasted until 1654, but because of internal differences and indigenous attacks, the colonists abandoned the country. Owing to disparities in military weapons, the arrival of new diseases, and alcohol introduced by the colonists, the indigenous population declined from 30,000 to 2,000 by the end of the nineteenth century.

One of the most important indigenous resistance struggles was led by the Arouas. They had originally come from Brazil, settling in the area surrounding Cayenne, and aroused the ambitions of French slave traders. The Arouas resisted enslavement, provoking a division between inhabitants and the administration. The

colonists wanted to enslave the indigenous population and profit from their labor. However, the missionaries rejected slavery as a violation of Christian principles and led the remaining Arouas into the Mission of Kourou. Although saved from slavery, they were prohibited from practicing their own religion and culture.

In the Mission of Kourou, the established indigenous groups were the Arouas, the Maronnes, and the Coussarys, who had been obliged to work in the plantations that belonged to the Jesuits. Despite arguing against slavery, the missionaries only considered indigenous peoples good if they demonstrated a will to integrate and to be evangelized. Those who opposed their evangelical efforts were seen as wild or savage.

Slavery

During the time slavery prevailed in French Guiana, the African and indigenous slaves formed different methods of resistance. One was passive resistance, such as committing suicide, which they carried out on the plantations and in the mission's habitations. This was, without doubt, the most radical form of resisting slavery. Another form of passive resistance was to ignore the colonists' orders by working slowly or refusing to fulfill orders. An extreme form was to avoid producing descendants to become future slaves. This was most often done by pregnant women provoking abortions by working vigorously. Active resistance was practiced by escaping and trying to live autonomously with other fugitives and rebels in hidden places. This frequently used form of resistance was known as *marronage*, and typically involved the participation of several slaves, mostly headed by a leader who organized arms. To combat *marronage*, the colonial government practiced terrible reprisals against slaves who were caught. First they were tortured according to Article 38 of the *Código Negro* by having their ears cut off, then they were branded with a red-hot iron. Anyone who tried to escape again had his calf amputated. Slaves who attempted to escape more than twice were often condemned to death. Another form of resisting slavery was to become integrated into the colonial system through marriage or inheritance. Various relationships developed between male colonists and enslaved women, a process known as *mestizaje*.

In 1748, a number of fugitive slaves settled at Plomb Mountain. The colonists first sent the

Jesuit missionary Fauque to arrange extradition of the rebels, promising them leniency. Only 50 out of 612 rebels accepted the offer. The Maroons then resisted a massive attack by the French army and began to establish themselves in Reibera de Korou, where they divided the land into equal lots and cultivated potatoes, bananas, and other fruit. They also practiced their own religion and culture. The Maroons of Plomb disintegrated, however, after their chiefs André, Remy Lois, and Félicité died of tropical diseases and cancer.

In 1782, the slaves of the Cayenne Company revolted against the director, Dubois Berthelot, when they learned that he intended to establish another factory where they would be forced to work more. As the protesters burned down the plants and looted houses, the colonists came to recognize that they were powerless to suppress the rebels and tried to calm them with offers of a pardon. While no one was severely punished, most were sold to Tobago and Santo Domingo.

After Slavery

After slavery was officially abolished by a decree in 1848, French Guianese society began to integrate mestizos, creoles, blacks, and indigenous peoples. The initial process of integration took more than a century. The indigenous population had been contracted to work in difficult regions, laboring in unhealthy workplace conditions and being deprived of educational opportunities. The end of slavery and the Maroon communities did not put an end to their struggle to maintain their culture and ensure their basic needs.

SEE ALSO: French Caribbean in the Age of Revolution; French Guiana, Ecological Movements against the Guiana Space Center in Kourou; French Guiana, Political Movements against Departmentalization; French Polynesia, Protest Movements

References and Suggested Readings

- Adélaïde-Merlande, J. (2002) *Histoire contemporaine de la Caraïbe et des Guyanes*. Paris: Karthala.
- Burton, R. D. E. & Reno, F. (1995) *French and West Indian: Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guyana Today*. Hong Kong: Macmillan.
- Cardoso, F. C. (1999) *La Guyana française 1715–1817: Aspects économiques et sociaux*. Cayenne: Ibis Rouge.
- Mam-Lam-Fouck, S. (1996) *Histoire Générale de la Guyane Française*. Cayenne: Ibis Rouge.

Poldermar, M. (2004) *La Guyana française 1676–1763. Mise en place et évolution de la société coloniale, tensions et métissage*. Cayenne: Ibis Rouge.

French Guiana, political movements against departmentalization

María Ximena Alvarez Martínez

French Guiana, along with Martinique and Guadeloupe, become an overseas department of France with the arrival of the Fourth French Republic in 1946. The approval of the law of departmentalization on March 19, 1946, was led by the leftist majority in the National Assembly, which included the Communist Party and the Gaullists. This new jurisdiction determined the management and transfer of the central government's subsidiary resources, which created a strong economic dependence. Even though on one hand it improved the quality of life, it also led to a decline in productivity and a high unemployment rate. Decisions at a local level had to be authorized by the cabinet of ministers in France, which indicated that the "colonial relationship" with Europe had not improved.

In the 1950s, criticism from leftist organizations against the current system of departmentalization began. Until the 1960s, the political arena was dominated by those who were in favor of decentralization, while wishing to remain integrated with the French nation. In the 1970s, however, some began to go further and promulgate total independence from France. Guiana's Communist Party was one of the groups that had been in favor of the system in 1946, but it then began to promulgate self-determination and autonomy. Guiana's Socialist Party (PSG), however, founded by Justin Catayée in 1956, was in favor of cultural assimilation and was opposed to independence. It called for "special status" for Guiana that would involve keeping its role in the French family, but requested autonomy rights. The party's April 18, 1960 memorandum demanded a number of rights, including the application of self-determination, the creation of a local executive power regulated by a Regional Assembly, and self-management and financial independence.

Anti-colonialist views were prevalent in the ideological context of the time, especially among Guianese intellectuals and students. Most had been educated in France and upon returning were eager to promote revolutionary changes. Such was the case of the Union of Guiana's People (UPG), which was created in 1958 by young Guianese intellectuals to push for the creation of an independent nation.

With the arrival of France's Fifth Republic in 1958, a new constitution was proposed. It would not only modify the system of departmentalization but also deny the right of the French overseas departments (DOM) to autonomy and self-determination. In spite of the opposition led by the Communist Party, it was approved by a majority. Guiana's Socialist Party was in favor of the constitution because the new government promised the special status it promoted. Furthermore, the new constitution promised administrative, political, and social reforms seeking greater equanimity and fairness among the overseas and metropolitan territories.

A great act of repression against the autonomist movements, known as the Vile Ordinance, aroused animosity and led to confrontation on October 15, 1960. Applicable to the departments of Algeria, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Guiana, the ordinance gave the prefect the authority to expel any public officer who disturbed public order. It was an effort to intimidate the supporters of separatist ideas. After several protests, it was finally abolished in 1972.

In the 1970s, a new economic and cultural context in Guiana, as well as external factors such as Algeria and Surinam gaining independence in 1975, led to the birth of new leftist political organizations with anti-colonialist and separatist ideas. A number of new organizations appeared in the political arena: in 1973 the Guianese National Movement (Marxist-Leninist); in 1974 the anti-colonialist and nationalist group MOGUYDE (Guianese Movement of Decolonization), which had great influence among students; and in 1975 Guiana's National Liberation Front, FNLG (Maoist). These organizations shared the view that the system of departmental division perpetuated colonial dependency, which was disguised as assimilation and economic assistance but in reality amounted to cultural alienation for Guiana. Sovereignty could only be gained through independence. In the Annual Congress of 1973, the Guianese Trade Union

(UTG) proclaimed independence. These organizations were severely repressed by the government, as in the case of "Noel's plot" in December of 1974, when 13 supporters of MOGUYDE and UTG were arrested, leading to a general strike. These movements had minimal impact on elections, however, and the legislative elections of 1973 and 1978 were won by the Gaullist candidate, who favored the system of departmental division.

In the 1981 presidential elections between the Socialist Party's François Mitterrand and President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the former garnered 66.5 percent of the vote. When Mitterrand and the Socialist Party took office, reforms were made, leading to the Law of Regionalization in 1982. This would determine greater autonomy and the creation of a Regional Council, a Regional Executive Power, and advisory committees in different aspects such as social, economic, cultural, educational, and environmental affairs. With the transformation of the department into a region, some historical vindications of self-government were achieved, but integration was not obtained.

SEE ALSO: French Caribbean in the Age of Revolution; French Guiana, Ecological Movements against the Guiana Space Center in Kourou; French Guiana, Indigenous Rebellions; French Polynesia, Protest Movements

References and Suggested Readings

- Adélaïde-Merlande, J. (2002) *Histoire contemporaine de la Caraïbe et des Guyanes*. Paris: Karthala.
- Burton, R. D. E. & Reno, F. (1995) *French and West Indian: Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guyana Today*. Hong Kong: Macmillan.
- Cardoso, F. C. (1999) *La Guyana française 1715–1817: Aspects économiques et sociaux*. Cayenne: Ibis Rouge.
- Mam-Lam-Fouck, S. (1996) *Histoire Générale de la Guyane Française*. Cayenne: Ibis Rouge.
- Poldermar, M. (2004) *La Guyana française 1676–1763. Mise en place et évolution de la société coloniale, tensions et métissage*. Cayenne: Ibis Rouge.

French Polynesia, protest movements

Justin Corfield

French Polynesia in the Pacific consists of 118 islands which form five archipelagos. It has been

occupied by France since 1842, becoming an overseas territory of France in 1946, with its own territorial assembly. Its population is 78 percent Polynesian, 12 percent Chinese, with 6 percent being local French settlers and their families, and 4 percent being French from metropolitan France.

Although a Protestant missionary, George Pritchard, asked the Tahitian Queen Pomare IV in 1837 whether she wanted to make French Polynesia a protectorate of the British crown, it was the French who took the islands. The French Admiral Abel Dupetit-Thouars arrived in Tahiti in 1842 when Pritchard, by then the British consul, and Queen Pomare were briefly absent. When Queen Pomare returned she was forced to agree to the proclamation of the French protectorate over Tahiti on September 9, 1842. Queen Pomare soon realized that the French had come to take over the country and took refuge on a British ship, the HMS *Basilisk*, which was in Papeete harbor as the Tahitian people rose up against the French.

The first major engagement between the French and the Tahitians was in March 1844 at Taravao. In April of that year the French governor, Armand-Joseph Bruat, and French marines fought with 400 Tahitians on Mahena beach. Some 102 Tahitians were killed, and the remainder retreated to the hills, continuing guerilla attacks against the French. One attack, at Huahine in January 1846, was so successful that Tahitians decided to attack Papeete itself, but were driven back, and in December 1846 the French stormed Fautaua Fort where they were holding out. To stem the rising death toll, Queen Pomare agreed to accept the French protectorate over Tahiti and Moorea on January 7, 1847.

In June 1880 the king of Tahiti, Pomare V, abdicated. He was given a pension of 5,000 francs a month in return for ceding Tahiti, which in 1885, along with nearby islands, became the Etablissements Français de l'Océanie (French Oceania). On September 22, 1914 the township of Papeete was shelled by two German cruisers. Later in the war it became an important rest stop for ships sailing between Australia and the Americas. In World War II, some 300 Tahitians fought with French forces, with the "Tahitian battalion" serving at Bir Hakeim in North Africa. At war's end, in 1945, universal suffrage was

introduced and all residents in the colony given French citizenship.

The first modern nationalist movement arose in 1947 when Pouvanaa a Oopa, a World War I veteran, created what became known as the Pouvanaa Committee. This was transformed in 1949 into the Rassemblement Démocratique des Populations Tahitiennes (Tahitian Democratic Group, RDPT). The organization opposed the recruiting of civil servants from metropolitan France, wanting vacancies to be filled with people from Tahiti. Pouvanaa a Oopa was elected to the French Chamber of Deputies in 1949 and became vice-president of the government council in 1957.

His demands for autonomy resulted when the French renamed the Etablissements Français de l'Océanie French Polynesia on July 27, 1957. Charles de Gaulle then offered a referendum in French Polynesia on independence, with two-thirds of the electorate voting for Polynesia to remain French. However, Pouvanaa a Oopa, opposing the election, was arrested on charges of arson, and after a questionable trial, was jailed and then exiled.

In 1963 work began on the construction of the Centre d'Expérimentation du Pacifique and the start of a nuclear testing program; five years later, the first hydrogen bomb was exploded at Mururoa Atoll. When Pouvanaa a Oopa was permitted to run for office, he was elected to the French Senate in 1971, remaining a senator until his death in 1977. In that year the elected local government was given wider powers and in 1984 Tahiti was granted full internal autonomy.

In 1985 France decided to restart nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia in spite of objections by signatories of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. The international environmental group Greenpeace sent their ship *Rainbow Warrior* to the Pacific to protest. While the ship was in Auckland Harbor in New Zealand, French agents boarded the vessel while it was open to the public, and at about 11.45 p.m. blew it up with two limpet mines. They did not anticipate killing anybody and did not realize the complication of evacuation procedures on a non-military vessel. The ship was sunk and a Portuguese-Dutch photographer drowned while trying to salvage some of his equipment following the second mine explosion. The French government initially denied involvement,

condemning terrorists for the action. However, the New Zealand authorities arrested two French agents traveling on false Swiss passports, who pleaded guilty to manslaughter and were jailed for ten years. After eight months, the prisoners were moved to Hao in French Polynesia to serve out their sentences. New Zealand buckled under threats of a trade war and restrictions on their exports to the European Economic Community (European Union). The French admitted responsibility, paying NZ\$13 million compensation, but repatriated both prisoners to metropolitan France in violation of their agreement. The man who placed the bomb has subsequently been named as Gérard Royal, who 20 years later admitted that François Mitterrand, the French president, personally authorized the bombing.

The events coincided with political changes in French Polynesia. Gaston Flosse, president of the council of ministers for the territory, was forced from office in February 1987 after allegations of corruption. In October 1987 major protests and a dock strike were broken, resulting in a mass uprising in the capital, Papeete. Flosse returned to power in April 1991, and again faced charges of corruption.

In 1992 the French government announced a moratorium on nuclear tests in French Polynesia, with French President Mitterrand promising their suspension through at least May 1995 if the US, Britain, and Russia also ended nuclear tests. Without an agreement from the other nations, in June 1995 the new French president, Jacques Chirac, sought to hold eight nuclear tests at Mururoa Atoll and Fangataufa, in spite of protests from many countries in the Pacific. The Australian government, under public pressure, banned French companies from seeking government tenders for bonds. The New Zealand government took France to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The court later ruled that it had no power to decide on underground nuclear explosions. With a massive increase in spending in French Polynesia, few protests broke out in the islands, but large demonstrations were held in Australia and New Zealand, many coinciding with the annual Bastille Day celebrations held by French diplomatic and consular staff there. At the height of these protests, an Israeli student firebombed the office of the honorary French consul in Perth, Western Australia. The Greenpeace ship

Rainbow Warrior 2 sailed for French Polynesia, where it was seized by French commandoes, an event shown on television around the world. The French were surprised by the extent of international press coverage and opposition to the tests, which were quickly cut back to six.

The economic boom brought to the economy of French Polynesia by the tests quickly dissipated, and on September 6, 1995 trade unions called for a strike, resulting in uprisings in Papeete, with shops ransacked and burned. The labor insurrection increased popular support for the small pro-independence movement, with growing support for Oscar Temaru and the Tavini Huia'atira Party. Toward the end of 1995 the French government announced an end to nuclear tests and signed the Rarotonga Treaty, which created a nuclear-free zone in the Pacific. The French gave contributions to supporters of Gaston Flosse who, in 1996, won the elections with 39 percent of the vote, securing 22 of the 41 seats in the Territorial Assembly. Oscar Temaru's party increased its seats from four to ten, seven of which were located in the Iles du Vent (Windward Islands), which had the highest levels of youth unemployment. In May 1998 Flosse was reelected, and two months later the dismantling of the nuclear test site at Mururoa Atoll was completed. In June 2000, the French Foreign Legion, based in French Polynesia since 1963, left the islands.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Movement, Japan; Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Anti-Nuclear Protests, Marshall Islands; Greenpeace; Hawaii, Resistance to US Invasion and Occupation

References and Suggested Readings

- Aldrich, R. (1993) *France and the South Pacific since 1940*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
 Howarth, D. (1983) *Tahiti: A Paradise Lost*. London: Harvill Press.
 Putigny, B. (1985) *Tahiti and its Islands* Singapore: Editions du Pacifique.

French Revolution, 1789–1794

Clifford D. Conner

On July 14, 1789, Paris exploded in a massive insurrection that proved to be the opening salvo



In one of the most famous revolutionary acts in European history, workers, shopkeepers, tradesmen, and other members of the Third Estate storm the French prison known as the Bastille on July 14, 1789. This act, which was both an attack upon a hated symbol of oppression and an attempt to seize munitions, has for most people become the symbol of the French Revolution. (Musée de la Ville de Paris, Musée Carnavalet, Paris/The Bridgeman Art Library)

of one of history's most thoroughgoing social revolutions. The French Revolution dealt the death blow to the traditional social structure in Europe and cleared the way for the transformation of the continent and the world.

Although Bastille Day, July 14, is celebrated in France every year as the day when the Revolution erupted into the open, it had been developing beneath the surface for a long time before 1789. The beginning of any chain of historical causation is impossible to pinpoint, but a good case can be made for starting with the American Revolution. The expenses of France's involvement in that war stretched the royal government's finances to the breaking point. The monarchy was so deeply in debt that 50 percent of its budget was going for interest on its loans.

Louis XVI's advisors began desperately seeking new sources of revenue. The peasants were already so heavily taxed that squeezing them harder could only produce minimal returns. The crown's frantic search for new financial resources forced it to turn to the aristocracy, which had traditionally enjoyed extensive exemption from taxation. In spite of their privileged social position, the nobles had long been excluded from a direct political role in governing the country. The threat to their economic

interest prompted them to begin agitating for political rights as a means of defense.

The "aristocratic rebellion" succeeded in shaking the monarchy, but in doing so it opened the door for other social layers to begin raising demands as well. One of the great ironies of 1789 is that the social class that began the Revolution was the one that was ultimately destroyed by it. Georges Lefebvre, in his seminal work *The Coming of the French Revolution*, explained how the process unfolded in 1789 as a succession of four overlapping revolutionary waves crashing against the monarchy. The nobles initiated the turmoil, followed by the bourgeoisie (the incipient capitalist class), the peasants, and the urban poor – the *sans-culottes*.

Estates General

The nobles' drive for political rights led them to demand a reconvening of the Estates General, a medieval parliamentary body that had last met more than a century and a half earlier, in 1614. It was hardly a democratic institution because the three "estates" that constituted the assembly had equal voting weight but represented vastly unequal numbers of constituents. In the population as a whole the First Estate (the clergy) numbered about 100,000, the Second Estate (the nobility) about 400,000, and the Third Estate (everybody else) about 25 million people. Since the clergy could generally be counted upon to vote with the nobles, the assembly would effectively be under aristocratic control.

Nonetheless, because the nobles' call for an Estates General was seen as a challenge to the oppressive monarchy, it gathered broad support among the population at large. Louis XVI's government, pushed to the wall by the fiscal crisis, was forced to accede. The Estates General was set to be held at the beginning of May 1789. The leaders of the Third Estate, however, had a different kind of Estates General in mind, one that would more clearly reflect the real numerical strength of their following.

When the nobles, with the king's backing, refused to consider their demand, the representatives of the Third Estate held their own meeting and on June 17 declared themselves the National Assembly. France then had a new potential focus of governmental power in competition with the existing royal regime. While the leaders of the Third Estate – and therefore

of the National Assembly – were almost entirely of the urban “middle classes” (professional people, intellectuals, small proprietors, and so forth), they enjoyed widespread popular support.

Fall of the Bastille

In mid-1789 the Parisian *sans-culottes* – especially the masses of artisans and tradespeople – were on the verge of open revolt. The spark that ignited the conflagration was the dismissal of an undeservedly popular finance minister, Jacques Necker, on July 12. Angry crowds began arming themselves by looting gunsmiths’ shops. Revolutionary-minded political leaders attempted to bring order to the rebellion by organizing a citizens’ militia, the National Guard. The royal troops, whose ranks had been strongly affected by the spread of revolutionary ideas, withdrew to their barracks.

After two days, on July 14, the uprising came to a climax with the famous assault on the Bastille. The old prison had been used as an armory, and the crowd proceeded to liberate its guns and ammunition. The existing municipal administration was swept aside and a new city government, the Paris Commune, was formed. The National Guard was officially established and placed under the command of a popular military hero, the marquis de Lafayette.

Louis XVI recognized the triumph of the Revolution by publicly accepting the tricolor cockade to the cheers of the Parisian masses. The insurrection had legitimized the rule of the National Assembly and initiated a period of *de facto* constitutional monarchy. While Paris led the way, it was by no means the only urban revolution. As news of July 14 spread, insurrections occurred in cities throughout France and established the rule of municipal revolutionary committees.

Meanwhile, in the countryside, the peasants were engaged in their own revolution. During July and August, they rose up against their landlords all over the country. Oppressed for centuries by feudal dues, taxes, tithes, and forced labor, they took advantage of the weakness of the royal regime to redress their own grievances. Manor houses were sacked and burned, some *seigneurs* were chased away, but most importantly the peasant revolts – coming right at harvest time – were able forcibly to block the collection of dues, taxes, and tithes. As the peasants set their

fires, their main targets were the archives where records and documents defining their obligations were kept.

Aristocrats Renounce their Privileges

On August 4 – less than a month after Bastille Day – a most peculiar session of the National Assembly took place. Aristocrats stood up, one after the other, to voluntarily renounce their privileges. This was not a case of belated generosity or guilty consciences, as might be supposed if the remarkable session were viewed in isolation from its social context. For one thing, the nobles were renouncing rights and privileges that had already come under sharp attack by the peasants’ revolt. They were in a sense putting the best face possible on a *fait accompli*.

More significantly, the aristocrats were hoping by their action to win compensation for the privileges they were surrendering and, indeed, the National Assembly backed their requests. The peasants would be expected to pay for their emancipation. Feudal dues were to be legally done away with, but only in exchange for large cash payments. Since hardly any peasants were able to pay such amounts, they were faced with being perpetually in debt to their former landlords. Instead of feudal dues, they would from then on be making payments on their “loans.”

The peasants, understandably, were not at all satisfied with this arrangement. Their struggle continued (often in open rebellion to the point of civil war) from 1789 until their complete victory in 1793, when a more radical legislative body, the Jacobin-dominated Convention, declared the peasants’ redemptive debts null and void.

Meanwhile, back in Paris after the fall of the Bastille, the democratic aspects of the French Revolution began to manifest themselves very directly. The monarchy’s repressive apparatus ceased to function, and Parisians began to exercise long-denied democratic rights of free assembly and free expression. The breakdown of royal censorship resulted in an immediate explosion of publication. In Paris alone, 180 new journals appeared in 1789; by the end of the following year the number had risen to 355.

These newfound liberties were codified by the National Assembly on August 26 in its Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom

from arbitrary arrest, and religious freedom became the law of the land. In addition to these basic democratic rights, the Declaration affirmed the inviolability and sacredness of *property* rights, underlining the social character – and limitations – of the Revolution. Its aim was to promote personal liberty and civil equality, not social equality.

“October Days” of 1789

At the beginning of October another major mass action occurred, stimulated by the continuing high price of bread and the fear of an aristocratic plot to militarily crush revolutionary Paris. The king’s court at Versailles, about 15 miles from Paris, was widely assumed to be a nest of reactionary intrigue. A seemingly spontaneous movement erupted with the aim of marching to Versailles, “rescuing” the king from his treasonous advisors, and bringing him and his family to live in Paris under the watchful eyes of patriotic citizens.

On October 5 a huge crowd – largely made up of women armed with broomsticks, pitchforks, swords, and muskets – set out from Paris on foot to march to Versailles. Later, about 20,000 men, including large numbers of National Guards, set out after them. General Lafayette was nominally at their head but it would be inaccurate to say that he was leading them; in a political sense, he was straining to keep up. When the marchers reached Versailles the royal forces were overwhelmed and the king had no choice but to obey the demand of the crowds. He and his family were escorted to Paris and installed in the Tuilleries palace.

With the king pretending to accept his constitutionally limited role, the Revolution entered a phase of relative calm that lasted a year and a half. Throughout 1790 and the first half of 1791 the social turbulence subsided and the class antagonisms seemed to have dissolved into a pervasive mood of social unity. The feel-good spell was broken, however, on June 20, 1791, when the king attempted to make a run for it. In the dark of night he and his family hid themselves in a carriage and sneaked out of the palace, heading for the border, where they hoped to join up with counterrevolutionary émigrés and their Austrian-backed armed forces. Many of these dispossessed aristocrats had gained military skills in the officer corps of the royal army. Their object was to reconquer France and destroy the

Revolution. Upon them Louis XVI pinned his hopes for a return to full autocratic power.

The disguised king’s flight was interrupted close to the border in a small town named Varennes. The strange entourage attracted attention, the king was recognized (from his portraits on French coinage) by local patriots, and he was forced to return to Paris under armed guard. The illusions of social unity that had prevailed over the previous year and a half rapidly dissipated. On July 17, 1791, soldiers under Lafayette’s command committed a massacre by opening fire on a massive crowd that had gathered on the Champ de Mars to petition for the king’s removal. The mass radicalization deepened significantly and the influence of Jean Paul Marat and other radical agitators increased by leaps and bounds. Nonetheless, another year would pass before the tension would once again explode in insurrection in Paris.

Monarchy Overthrown

On August 10, 1792 – more than three years after the original Bastille Day – the most powerful insurrection up to that point took place. The *sans-culottes* emerged as a more independent political force, seeking ever more radical leadership. Lafayette – now unpopular because of his role in the Champs de Mars massacre – attempted to march on Paris to restore law and order, but his troops deserted him and he fled to join the Austrians. The monarchy was overthrown and the Republic was proclaimed the following month. A National Convention was elected on the basis of adult male suffrage, making the new Republic far more democratic and popular than the ousted constitutional monarchy and its National Assembly.

Meanwhile, France had been at war since April of that year against a coalition of old-regime powers determined to crush the Revolution. The government had appealed to revolutionary internationalism by calling on oppressed people throughout Europe to rise against their monarchs, pledging French armed support. But in the field the ragtag French armies, shorn of their traditional officer corps, seemed no match for the professionally led Austrian and Prussian forces. Before long the revolutionary enthusiasm of free French soldiers fighting in their own interests would begin to turn the tide, but at first the Revolution appeared to be in grave danger of military defeat.

A chest of Louis XVI's correspondence was discovered that proved what had been suspected since his flight to Varennes: the king himself was neck-deep in collaboration with the counter-revolutionary armies invading France. In January 1793 citizen Louis Capet – formerly King Louis XVI – was tried, condemned to death, and guillotined for his treason. The execution of the ex-king stood as a powerful symbol of the irreversibility of the Revolution. It threw down the gauntlet to the counterrevolutionary forces both inside France and throughout Europe. In the following months England, Holland, and Spain joined the war coalition against France, and a major counterrevolutionary revolt erupted in the Vendée in western France.

Birth of the Jacobin Republic

With the Revolution under siege from all sides, class antagonisms intensified apace. The mood of the Parisian people was white-hot with revolutionary fervor. They began to perceive the new republican leaders as too moderate and too conciliatory toward the Revolution's enemies; as a result, the radical Montagnard faction gained in influence within the Convention.

An insurrection erupted in Paris on May 31 and came to a climax two days later when armed *sans-culottes* and units of the National Guard, some eighty thousand strong and organized in a disciplined manner, surrounded the Convention, blocked its exits, and brought more than a hundred cannons into position. The Girondins, the moderates, were ousted from power and replaced by the Montagnards, led by Maximilien Robespierre, Georges-Jacques Danton, Marat, and other popular left-wingers.

The insurrection of May 31–June 2 cleared the way for the birth of the Jacobin Republic. In mid-1793 the French Revolution entered a critical stage in which the gains of 1789 and 1792 were consolidated and made irreversible. On June 17, 1793 the renewed Convention would pass a crucial law canceling all remaining feudal dues and obligations without compensation.

Onset of the Terror

The revolutionary crisis deepened throughout the summer of 1793 as the counterrevolutionary armies drew closer. On September 5 yet another popular insurrection in Paris brought Robespierre

to the head of a much more centralized government and marked the onset of the Terror. The climax of the Great French Revolution was at hand. The radical government, in alliance with the rebellious peasants and the *sans-culottes*, dealt the final, mortal blows to the aristocracy as a class.

Moralizing conservative historians have labored long to discredit the French Revolution by removing the Terror from its historical context and making violence the essence of the revolutionary process – an obvious object lesson with which to frighten future generations. They portray Robespierre and other members of the Committee of Public Safety as bloodthirsty paranoids who used the guillotine to intimidate the masses and eliminate their factional opponents. But the danger to the Revolution was no paranoid fantasy – its external and internal enemies were numerous and powerful.

The Terror was therefore a justifiable policy necessary to the survival of the Revolution. The need for unity and security, however, led the Jacobin leaders to commit unjustifiable abuses of power. Tens of thousands of people are estimated to have been executed in Paris alone, many of whom were undoubtedly innocent of any counterrevolutionary intent. Most notable in this regard were the large numbers of dissident revolutionaries whom Robespierre and his allies silenced by the guillotine, including Danton, Camille Desmoulins, Jacques-René Hébert, and the “red priest” Jacques Roux. (Roux, who had been the leading figure of the *Enragés*, an ultraradical plebeian movement, cheated the executioner by taking his own life in prison.)

The dangers of war and counterrevolution pressed the Jacobin government to bring the turbulent mass movement under strict control. In doing so, it suppressed the revolutionary energy of its own political base and sowed the seeds of its own downfall. The persecution and liquidation of popular revolutionary leaders like Hébert and Roux was particularly disorienting and demoralizing.

Law of the Maximum

The Jacobins' difficulties stemmed from the fact that the *sans-culottes* were not a homogeneous social class, but combined elements with different, and at times opposing, social interests. When bread prices rose to the crisis point, artisans and wage-workers alike hit the streets – and

sometimes hanged the baker from the nearest lamppost.

A solution to this problem that included nationalization of production and a planned economy might have appealed to the wage-earning part of the urban crowd but not to its more active small-proprietor part. The Jacobins instead attempted to impose equality of consumption – socialization of distribution rather than of production. To that end, the radical government of 1793 instituted the Law of the Maximum, which fixed price ceilings on necessary commodities – in the first place, bread – and threatened speculators and hoarders with the guillotine. Such policies made production less profitable and inevitably led to a drop in production, growing pressure to raise prices, and an increasing scarcity of goods. The Law of the Maximum, far from solving the problem of bread prices, only exacerbated it.

Radical revolutionaries like Robespierre thus found themselves in a bind. The low level of productive forces in late eighteenth-century France prevented them from transcending the bounds of a capitalist revolution. Because the *sans-culottes'* demands for social and economic equality were for all practical purposes unrealizable, their demoralization was inevitable.

Thermidor: The Moderates Return to Power

By the middle of 1794 the military tide had turned and the threat from the counterrevolution had eased considerably. With the primary justification for the Terror disappearing, the moderate faction in the Convention was able to isolate and defeat Robespierre and send him and his supporters to the guillotine. Revolutionary organizations called for an insurrection in defense of the Jacobin leaders, but this time the demoralized Parisians failed to respond. The fall of Robespierre, according to the revolutionary calendar, occurred on the 9th of Thermidor; hence the end of the radical phase of the Revolution became known as the Thermidorian reaction, or simply Thermidor.

The conservative historian François Furet has pointed out that participants in and interpreters of the French Revolution can be divided into two groups: '89ers and '93ers. The '89ers are the middle-class revolutionary leaders of

1789 and those who identify with them. Like Furet himself, they believe the Revolution would have been better if it had been more moderate – if its participants had been satisfied with what had been accomplished in 1789 and stopped with that. The '93ers, on the other hand, are the radical Jacobins and their latter-day sympathizers who believe that turning the world upside down in 1793 was necessary to consolidate the Revolution's achievements.

Who “won” the Revolution? The Thermidorian reaction brought the moderates – the '89ers and the remnants of the Girondins – back to the fore. It was their task to begin the process of stabilizing French society on a capitalist basis. In 1799 Napoleon Bonaparte would take over and complete the job.

The '93ers had sought to create an egalitarian democracy of small producers that would combine private property rights with social justice. Although they failed, it was their struggle for that utopian dream that mobilized the urban and rural masses to destroy the old regime, clearing the way for a new society with a modern capitalist economy. The Revolution rid France of a class whose right to rule was based upon aristocratic birth and traditional privilege, but it raised up a new ruling class that staked its claim to social dominance on wealth and wealth alone. The problems of poverty and social inequality remained as intractable as ever. Although the '93ers made the Revolution, in the end it was the '89ers who came out on top.

What Did the French Revolution Achieve?

The tumultuous events of the French Revolution obviously had an immense impact on French and European society during the decade following 1789. But after the dust settled, what had been accomplished? Had a fundamental social transformation occurred or not? Were there any positive and enduring results, and if so, what were they? The traditional answer to these questions has been that the Revolution brought about the historic transformation from medieval feudalism to modern capitalism. But what, exactly, does that mean?

Economic activity – the production of the necessities of life – is the basis of all human culture. Before the Revolution, production was

predominantly agricultural, and the producers were almost all peasants. Of France's total population of about 25 million, considerably more than 20 million were peasants. Non-agricultural production included the varied output of urban and rural artisans plus a small textiles industry, a small iron industry, and a small chemical industry producing such things as soap, dyes, and gunpowder. In 1789, however, the Industrial Revolution was still three-quarters of a century in the future for France, so both agriculture and industry were characterized by very small productive units.

Prior to the Revolution agriculture was organized in a manner generally described as feudal, but the term "feudalism" has been applied to a broad variety of social arrangements. Classical feudalism legally bound the serfs to the land and subjected them to the arbitrary rule of local landowners. By the late eighteenth century, classical feudalism had vanished from large parts of Western Europe, although it had been maintained in varying degrees of rigidity in the East. Generally speaking (and ignoring the Iberian peninsula), the farther east one looked in Europe, the harsher the lot of the peasant was – from Austria, through Prussia, to Russia, where serfs were virtual slaves well into the nineteenth century.

In France, however, the face of feudalism had changed considerably by 1789. Only about 5 percent of French peasants were still serfs in the classical sense; the rest were legally free. Almost three-quarters of peasant heads-of-households owned at least some of the land they cultivated, but because their holdings were so small, most also had to work as sharecroppers or tenant farmers on land they did not own. The one-quarter who were completely landless worked as rural laborers. The minority of peasant landowners who owned enough to survive without sharecropping or tenant farming were the furthest removed from classical serfdom. Even these freeholders, however, were far from free in their role as agricultural producers.

Plight of the "Free" Peasant

No one could improve on Alexis de Tocqueville's description of the status of the landowning French peasant in relation to his aristocratic "neighbors" in the pre-Revolutionary era. This peasant, de Tocqueville wrote, is

a man so passionately devoted to the soil that he spends all his earnings on buying land, no matter what it costs. To acquire it, he must begin by paying certain dues, not to the government but to other landowners of the neighborhood.

When at long last he has gained possession of this land . . . the neighbors aforesaid put in an appearance, drag him away from his cherished fields, and bid him work elsewhere without payment. When he tries to protect his seedlings from the animals they hunt they tell him to take down his fences, and they lie in wait for him at river crossings to exact a toll.

At the market there they are again, to make him pay for the right of selling the produce of his land, and when on his return home he wants to use the wheat he has put aside for his daily needs, he has to take it to their mill to have it ground, and then to have his bread baked in the lord's oven.

Thus, part of the income from his small domain goes to supporting these men in the form of charges which are imprescriptible and irredeemable. Whatever he sets out to do, he finds these tiresome neighbors barring his path, interfering in his simple pleasures and his work, and consuming the produce of his toil. And when he has done with them, other fine gentlemen dressed in black [tithe collectors] step in and take the greater part of his harvest.

When we remember the special temperament of the French peasant proprietor in the eighteenth century, his ruling interests and passions, and the treatment accorded him, we can well understand the rankling grievances that burst into flame in the French Revolution. (de Tocqueville 1955)

Feudal exactions in money, in kind, and in forced labor continued to define and delimit the economic activities of even these "free" peasants. One can only concur with de Tocqueville's conclusion that "even after it ceased to be a political institution, the feudal system remained basic to the economic organization of France."

The landowning peasants in particular had the glories of capitalist agriculture dangled before their eyes, but their hands were tied by all the encumbrances described by de Tocqueville. Under those conditions, the incentive to improve their land or increase production was limited, since the benefits would go more to their parasitic "neighbors" than to themselves. They could see, however, that if they could get the nobles off their backs – if they could take

full advantage of the free market without the burden of feudal dues and taxes – greater crop yields would redound to their own profit. Aristocratic domination of the countryside, then, was the primary obstacle to the further development of agricultural productivity.

Despite their differing conditions, all of the peasants were united in their opposition to the feudal system because all faced the same enemy. The freeholder's "neighbor," the sharecropper's landlord, the agricultural laborer's boss, and the serf's lord were all members of the same aristocratic ruling class. The peasants, in alliance with urban revolutionaries, freed themselves by defeating their common enemy in struggle from 1789 to 1793.

Creating a Modern Working Class

The most far-reaching result of the liberation of the peasantry was not its effect on agriculture but its impact on the production system as a whole. An essential prerequisite for the development of a capitalist economy is the existence of a free labor force – a pool of propertyless people who in order to survive are forced to become wage-workers. As long as the vast majority of the population is unable to leave the land, no such labor force is possible and capitalist development must necessarily be sharply restricted.

As previously noted, the moderate revolutionaries of 1789 ended feudalism as a legal system, but proposed that the peasants compensate the nobles by paying a heavy price for their emancipation. Such an arrangement would have replaced the bonds of feudal law with debt bondage, leaving the peasants tied to the land for a long time, as in Russia following the 1861 emancipation of the serfs. The development of a modern working class would have been severely impeded. That is why the 1793 decree canceling all of the peasants' obligations without compensation was the decisive act of the transformation from feudalism to capitalism. It put a decisive end to feudalistic restrictions on the peasants' mobility, thus transforming them into a potential working class.

Changing the Tariff System

The system of non-agricultural production was in dire need of change as well. Urban manufacturing was hamstrung by royal monopolies,

internal tariffs, the guild system, and the lack of a uniform system of weights and measures.

The internal tariffs were economic obstacles in a very literal sense. The most notorious case involved a wall built around Paris to prevent smugglers from avoiding certain tariffs. Although smuggling was a capital offense, the death penalty was apparently an insufficient deterrent; it has been estimated that before the wall was built about 20 percent of the goods entering Paris entered as contraband.

A great deal of money was spent constructing impressive buildings along the wall to serve as customs posts. The project became a focus of popular odium. The customs posts were perceived as fortresses for the oppression of the people, and the tariffs were resented because they added appreciably to the cost of food and wine entering the city. During the insurrectionary days of July 1789 the Parisian *sans-culottes* systematically demolished 40 of the 54 customs posts.

The internal tariff system was much more than a physical wall around Paris, however; it formed economic walls separating all of the provinces of France from each other. To sell a commodity more than a few miles from where it was made meant crossing a tariff barrier and paying a fee. It also meant paying exorbitant tolls for transportation on roads and rivers. The farther a manufacturer or merchant tried to extend the market for his product, the more tariffs and tolls he would encounter. This system prevented the development of even regional, let alone national, markets and set sharp limits to economic growth and development.

In addition to these restrictions on commerce, the guild system directly hampered production by forcing artisans to pay heavy fees for the privilege of plying their trades. In 1776 Jacques Turgot, Louis XVI's finance minister, tried to introduce reforms that would abolish these "arbitrary institutions" that "stifle industry." Turgot issued an edict stating that "by means of the inordinate expenses artisans are compelled to incur in order to acquire the liberty of labor, by the exactions of all kinds they must endure, by the multiplied penalties for so-called offenses," the guilds "surcharge industry with an enormous tax" and "give rise to schemes whose effect is to increase beyond all natural proportion the price of commodities which are most necessary for the subsistence of the people." Turgot's diagnosis of the problem was accurate, but his

reforming efforts were to no avail; they led only to his removal from office.

Turgot was but one of many would-be reformers who failed. It took the dynamite blast of the Revolution to dislodge the entrenched interests defending the status quo. By February 1791 the National Assembly had introduced a uniform system of weights and measures, abolished the internal tariffs, eliminated private tolls on roads and rivers, and suppressed the guilds.

The Yuppie Problem

Another critical social problem in pre-revolutionary France affected the “yuppies,” the young urban professionals. In spite of all the handicaps placed upon trade and production, capitalist wealth had continued to expand during the eighteenth century, primarily on the basis of international commerce. The distortion of the economy and the social restrictions of the old regime combined to generate a layer of educated youth with limited prospects for employment. Some found occupations as lawyers, doctors, teachers, writers, or scientists, but many more remained on the fringes of the professions.

Success for a yuppie often depended upon finding noble patronage. The prestigious positions at the top of the professions – especially in politics, law, and the military – were reserved for nobles. As a result, the members of the marginalized intelligentsia became the most vocal proponents of the democratic revolution, raising the powerful slogan “Open careers to talent!” Representatives of this social layer – including Brissot, Marat, Danton, and Robespierre – predominated in the leadership of the Revolution from 1789 forward.

And, in fact, the democratic aspects of the Revolution very quickly answered to the career interests of the young professionals. Freedom of the press stimulated employment in publishing and journalism, equality before the law and the extension of the legal system required an increase in the number of lawyers and judges, and vast opportunities in politics and administration were created with the birth of a parliamentary government. Most importantly, the Revolution succeeded in “opening careers to talent” by breaking the social dominance of the nobility.

In summary, these were the primary accomplishments of the French Revolution: The peasants were liberated from feudal exactions,

the guilds and internal tariffs were swept away, and careers were opened to talent. Furthermore, the extensive landholdings of the Church were expropriated, and the very definition of “property” was profoundly transformed.

Good for Business

All of these measures created a relatively free-market economic environment that was *good for business*. The principal long-term beneficiaries of the Revolution were the business class: entrepreneurs, manufacturers, merchants, and bankers. The new society was geared to serving their class interests rather than those of the landed aristocracy.

That is not to say that a full-blown capitalist economy immediately sprang into existence in France. The destruction of internal tariff barriers, for example, created the *possibility* of a unified national market, but the actual development of the national market would have to wait almost a century until railroads were able to connect all parts of France.

Likewise, the loosening of the traditional ties holding the peasants on the land provided a *potential* source of urban industrial workers, but the actual conversion of peasants into proletarians was a lengthy process. Paradoxically, the sale of nationalized Church and émigré lands tended to retard that movement by strengthening the position of the rural smallholders. But again, regardless of the pace of capitalist growth after the Revolution, the Revolution was the indispensable action that cleared the way for capitalist development.

A Contradictory Democratic Legacy

Although the socioeconomic transformation was the essential achievement of the Revolution, that was not its only important legacy. At the time of the 1989 bicentennial celebrations, most commentators paid more attention to the Revolution’s democratic features as symbolized by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.

The old regime had been founded on the principle of natural inequality: that some people were by birth superior to others and thereby entitled to special privileges. The Revolution produced a social order based on the opposite

premise of human equality. From this premise were derived the rights to equality before the law, representative government, and guarantees of civil liberties.

The importance of the democratic legacy of the French Revolution to the cause of human progress cannot be overstated. But those who focus solely on the democratic achievements are seeing only the surface of events and missing the underlying dynamic, as the Napoleonic experience illustrates. The export of the French Revolution to the rest of Western Europe began before Bonaparte came on the scene. Sister republics were created in Holland, Switzerland, Northern Italy, Naples, and the Papal States by means of revolutionary action led by local “Jacobins” with the crucial support of French arms. Thus was the social transformation of Western Europe initiated, later to be consolidated and extended by the Napoleonic wars.

Bonaparte, however, was anything but a democrat. He did away with the sister republics and converted them into kingdoms ruled by his brothers (as well as other relatives and assorted sidekicks). By naming his brother Jerome as King of Westphalia, his brother Louis as King of Holland, and his brother Joseph as King of Naples (and later Spain), he intended to create a new royal dynasty to rule Europe long into the future. At home he scrapped the French Republic, had himself crowned Emperor, and even created a new titled nobility.

Nonetheless, the Napoleonic system differed in key respects from traditional monarchies. For one thing, the titles of his newly created nobility were not based on birthright or landownership but on merit: military, administrative, or scientific “talent.” It is also significant that this aristocracy was only about one-seventh the size of the old Bourbon nobility. Secondly, he imposed on the territories he conquered a unified body of law, the Napoleonic Code, based on the principle of equality before the law, which is the negation of legal aristocratic privilege.

But most importantly, he exported the *revolution in property relations* to those areas he controlled. The essence of the Napoleonic Code was the principle of private-property rights, which supplanted the old-regime system based on birthright and the feudal system of production. In 1807 Napoleon sent a constitution for Jerome to impose on the newly created Kingdom of Westphalia. The main point, he

wrote to his brother, was “that every trace of serfdom, or of a feudal hierarchy between the sovereign and the lowest class of his subjects, shall be done away with.”

Bonaparte’s armies, in short, reproduced throughout Western Europe that new social order that was good for business. Again, Bonaparte’s regime did not create capitalism out of nothing, nor did it produce fully developed capitalist economies, but it did liberate peasants and clear away obstacles to the future development of capitalism.

Spread of a New Social System

The spread of the dynamic new social system extended beyond the bounds of Bonaparte’s conquests. After his victory over Prussia at Jena in 1806, he directly abolished serfdom in territories wrested from Prussian control. But Prussia itself, which was defeated but not conquered or occupied, also experienced a social transformation. The Prussian Reform Movement came to power and abolished serfdom throughout its remaining territories. The French Revolution had created a new Europe, and Prussia was forced to modernize or cease to exist as a sovereign state.

What Bonaparte’s armies carried with them of the French Revolution was not democracy or republicanism, but the social relations that characterize the capitalist economic system. That was the essential legacy of the French Revolution to human progress. Parliamentary democracy and stable republics were far in the future for most of Western Europe.

After Bonaparte’s final defeat at Waterloo in 1815, the Bourbon monarchy was reimposed on France, and the Metternich era of reaction descended upon Europe. But for all the superficial, symbolic reversals, the essential achievements of the Revolution survived, both inside and outside France. Some of the French aristocratic families got some compensation – hush money, really – but they never got their lands back. Nowhere were freed serfs returned to serfdom; nowhere were the results of the peasant rebellion undone. (These generalizations must be qualified with regard to two countries – Poland and Spain – where the incipient capitalist “middle class” was relatively small and weak. In Poland, Bonaparte had emancipated the serfs but was unable to liquidate the aristocracy, so *de facto* feudal relations persisted. Spain was the only

country where Napoleonic reforms were actually reversed after the final defeat of the Napoleonic empire.)

Fifteen years of Bourbon restoration in France vanished with hardly a trace in 1830 as a relatively small insurrection dispatched the Bourbons once and for all and allowed Louis Philippe, widely known as "the bourgeois king," to come to the throne. Louis Philippe immediately displayed a partiality toward the great magnates of finance capital. Although he appeared to be their royal patron, the opposite was the case: it was they who had put him on the throne.

The spirit of the times can be appreciated by looking at Daumier's prints and reading Balzac's novels. Balzac's *Père Goriot*, for example, illustrates that during the Bourbon restoration the trappings of aristocracy were highly prestigious, but money nonetheless was what made the world go round. The essential transformation wrought by the French Revolution proved to be irreversible.

SEE ALSO: Bastille; Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); Brissot, Jacques Pierre (1754–1793); Condorcet, Marquis de (1743–1794); Counterrevolution, France, 1789–1830; Danton, Georges Jacques (1759–1794); Estates General, France; French Revolution, Historians' Interpretations; French Revolution, Radical Factions and Organizations; French Revolution, Women and; French Revolutionary Theater; Lafayette, Marquis de (1757–1834); Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–1793); Marianne, French Revolutionary Icon; Mirabeau, Comte de (1749–1791); Paine, Thomas (1737–1809); Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794); Saint-Just, Louis Antoine (1767–1794); *Sans-Culottes*; Sieyès, Abbé (1748–1836); Tennis Court Oath, France, 1789

References and Suggested Readings

- Jones, C. (Ed.) (1988) *The Longman Companion to the French Revolution*. New York: Longman.
- Lefebvre, G. (1947) *The Coming of the French Revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lefebvre, G. (1964) *The French Revolution*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lefebvre, G. (1969) *Napoleon*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lefebvre, G. (1973) *The Great Fear of 1789*. New York: Random House.
- Mathiez, A. (1928) *The French Revolution*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Mathiez, A. (1931) *After Robespierre: The Thermidorian Reaction*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Michelet, J. (1967) *History of the French Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Rudé, G. (1959) *The Crowd in the French Revolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rudé, G. (1988) *The French Revolution*. New York: Grove Weidenfeld.
- Soboul, A. (1977) *A Short History of the French Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Soboul, A. (1980) *The Sans-Culottes*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Soboul, A. (1988) *Understanding the French Revolution*. New York: International Publishers.
- Tocqueville, A. de (1955) *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

French Revolution, historians' interpretations

Soma Marik

As one of the great turning points in modern history, the French Revolution has naturally been the focus of immense historiographical examination and debate. Conflicting interpretations have reflected the opposing political and ideological standpoints of the historians who have studied it. For more than the last hundred years the primary conflict has been between Marxist and non-Marxist (or anti-Marxist) interpretations. The first major historical account of the French Revolution to be inspired by Karl Marx's philosophy of history was a multi-volume work published by Jean Jaurès between 1901 and 1904. Jaurès's *Socialist History of the French Revolution* was an early example of "history from the bottom up," highlighting the role of the masses instead of elite maneuvering.

Radical interpretations of the Revolution were further stimulated by two eminent academicians, Alphonse Aulard and his student Albert Mathiez. Their analyses were not identical – Aulard portrayed Danton as the hero of the Revolution, while Mathiez exalted Robespierre. But although both Aulard and Mathiez demonstrated extraordinary mastery of the historical sources, their tendency to lionize a personal hero often made their work unconvincing to others. Following the path opened by Jaurès, major studies of popular participation in the Revolution were produced by Georges Lefebvre and Albert Soboul, both of whom also looked to Marx for inspiration.

The first salvo in the great ideological war against the French Revolution had been launched in 1790 by the English conservative Edmund Burke. His *Reflections on the Revolution in France* assailed radical social change and lauded tradition as the tried-and-true basis of social policy. The extreme elitism of his position, however, was revealed in an infelicitous reference to the majority of the population as “the swinish multitude.” Dozens of radical pamphleteers in England challenged Burke’s manifesto, but by far the most influential response was Thomas Paine’s *The Rights of Man*. Paine, who had earlier distinguished himself as a major participant in the American Revolution, found himself the ideological leader of a powerful radical movement in England. He then moved on to France and was soon at the center of revolutionary events there as well.

Another direct participant in the French Revolution who attempted to interpret it as a historian was Antoine Barnave, whose 1792 work *Introduction to the French Revolution* initiated the important idea that what had just transpired in France was a *bourgeois* revolution – that is, a socioeconomic transformation led by men of new property. Barnave explained that during the eighteenth century artisan production and commerce had “succeeded in penetrating the people and created a new means to wealth” to such a degree that “all was ready for a revolution in political laws; a new distribution of wealth produced a new distribution of power.” Although this line of interpretation was later to be condemned by conservative historians as a Marxist precept, it was not at all controversial in the first half of the nineteenth century; at that time liberal historians simply took it for granted.

Barnave’s notion of the bourgeois revolution placed blame on the aristocratic class – feudal nobles who possessed the land and ancient privileges – for retarding the social progress of the nation. The rising bourgeois class, by contrast, was credited with advancing personal liberty, political equality, and industrial development. Karl Marx obviously did not initiate this idea, but he adopted it as the basis of his own interpretation of the Revolution. For Marx, however, the formal democracy and equality before the law produced by the Revolution were not ultimate goals, but were important steps along the way toward the final emancipation of humankind.

Georges Lefebvre was the most important of the historians to follow Marx’s lead. Lefebvre held the chair of the History of the French Revolution at the Sorbonne, the institutional reflection of his stature as the leading interpreter of the great event. His masterful weaving together of all the disparate strands of social history, known as the “Lefebvre synthesis,” became the standard account of the Revolution. After his death in 1960 his chair at the Sorbonne was occupied by Albert Soboul, a prominent intellectual spokesman for the French Communist Party.

Lefebvre backed his analysis with a series of studies. He was able to demonstrate the existence of an autonomous peasant revolution that was not simply an adjunct of the urban struggle against the monarchy. His studies of the role of the urban poor, the *sans-culottes*, encouraged other historians to follow suit, resulting in important works by Soboul, Daniel Guérin, and George Rudé.

The Revisionist Challenge

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century the Marxist interpretation of the French Revolution went virtually unanswered. In the 1950s, however, a “revisionist” current arose that called some of the fundamental Marxist assumptions into question. The revisionist challenge was initiated by Alfred Cobban’s *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution*, which argued that the bourgeoisie could not be considered revolutionary, and even if it could, no clear line could be drawn between the nobility and the bourgeoisie. Although Cobban was able to identify what appeared at first glance to be flaws in the Lefebvre synthesis, he did not attempt to present an alternative picture that could replace it.

Stronger challenges were to follow. Although the revisionist school originated in the English-speaking world, it eventually gained a following in France as well. The most prominent among the French revisionists was François Furet, a former member of the French Communist Party who had succumbed to the anti-communism of the Cold War era. Furet argued that the Revolution was not a historical necessity. The problems that sparked it, he maintained, could and should have been resolved by a compromise between the monarchy and the bourgeoisie. That possibility had been dashed, however, by the

ultraradical Jacobin dictatorship, which represented what Furet saw as an unfortunate deviation from the orderly revolutionary settlement.

The Cold War climate ensured the increasing popularity of the challenge to Marxist-influenced historiography in the 1970s and 1980s. With the end of the Cold War, the revisionists' emphasis shifted from anti-communism to postmodernism. Rather than singling out Marxist interpretations of the Revolution, they claimed to reject *all* grand historical syntheses or "metanarratives," including Marxism, that offer broad explanations of the course of history. That has put them in a rather ambiguous position. Although most recent books on the French Revolution reflect the revisionists' outlook, they cannot be said to have triumphed over the Lefebvre synthesis, because they have been unwilling to offer a new synthesis of their own to take its place. For those historians who reject the postmodernist premise and remain committed to the proposition that there is meaning and lawfulness in history, the Lefebvre synthesis has retained its potency.

The core of the revisionist case can be summarized in a few sentences: The Revolution was not a bourgeois revolution. It neither destroyed feudal political structures nor paved the way for the development of capitalism. The class struggle played little role in the Revolution. Many of the individuals who were at the top of the social ladder before the Revolution were still on top after it. The nobility and bourgeoisie were part of a single ruling elite of "notables," primarily made up of landowners, with no fundamental social conflict within it. Indeed, all of the elite were in favor of reform, and if only people had been more sensible and patient, political reform was possible without social upheaval.

Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret went so far as to argue that it was the nobility, not the bourgeoisie, that was in the vanguard of change. The Revolution is thus reduced to merely a squabble among sub-elites that is not rooted in any social base but is fueled (as Furet puts it) by the "autonomous political and ideological dynamic" of the struggle itself. According to Nogaret, the nobility exercised cultural hegemony and generously held out a cooperative hand to those members of the bourgeoisie wishing to enter France's social elite. The Revolution's destruction of the nobility was therefore unjust, irrational, and inhuman; Nogaret likens it to anti-Semitic pogroms.

Furet brushes aside the Parisians' great fear of counterrevolution as nothing more than mass plot psychosis, and depicts the repression of counterrevolution not as class conflict but as genocide. This focus accords well with his refusal to see the Revolution as having anything to do with the underlying social conditions of the mass of people: "What matters is not poverty or oppression," Furet insists. By ignoring the French Revolution's social dimensions, neither Furet nor his British co-thinker Simon Schama can make sense of the Terror except by viewing it as either utopian-inspired violence or as the inevitable consequence of any revolution. That leads them to contest not only the question of the nature of the bourgeoisie, but also the meaning of the Reign of Terror, the role of the *sans-culottes*, why the Girondins and Jacobins split, and the nature of the peasantry and of the counterrevolution.

Some other historians simply turn away from the central issues of the Revolution altogether, focusing instead on cultural or superficial political matters. Lynn Hunt, for example, concentrates on what she identifies as a new type of politics introduced by the Revolution. She discusses the "invention" of ideology, and the institution of a political culture of democratic republicanism, bypassing the classic debates over the class struggle and the Revolution's causes and consequences. Another postmodernist strategy has been to explicitly deny the possibility of meaningfulness in history. The well-researched works of Richard Cobb are valuable for the wealth of information they assemble and present, but Cobb steadfastly resists drawing any conclusions as to the meaning of the Revolution.

An Assessment of the Debate

Historical evidence casts grave doubt on the revisionists' argument that reforms would have sufficed if only the revolutionaries had shown better sense, or had been less suspicious of their real or supposed opponents. The researches of John Markoff and P. M. Jones on the peasantry demonstrate that the kind of reforms the peasants wanted threatened the very existence of the rural nobles. What the peasants wanted is not unknown; studies of *cahiers* (lists of grievances) reveal that in a number of cases when general *cahiers* from a locality omitted peasant demands, the peasants drew up separate *cahiers* of their own.

Between December 1788 and March 1790 virtually every part of France saw collective peasant violence or at least insubordination. In response the nobles offered a compromise granting limited rights to the peasants while preserving most of the landed property for themselves. The compromise was rejected and peasant radicalism remained a central aspect of all the party conflicts in the three great assemblies of the Revolution.

The idea that mindless violence caused by a false sense of insecurity, or by an allegedly "natural" inclination toward terrorism ingrained in the common people, can explain the bloodshed in the Revolution is equally dubious. David Andress's study of the Terror, for example, demonstrates the reality of the aristocratic counterrevolutionary threats. The nobility was unwilling to accept the Revolution even in its early, relatively moderate, phases. The revolutionaries were therefore compelled to defend their Revolution, making its deepening radicalization inevitable.

Two well-known incidents shed light on the reasons why the revolutionaries had recourse to violence. The execution of the governor of the Bastille in July 1789 has been repeatedly decried, ignoring the fact that the governor's troops had just killed a hundred Parisians. And just before the infamous September Massacres of 1792, the Royalist press in Paris published lists of revolutionary "patriots" who were to be executed when the monarchy regained power. But on a grander scale, the greatest source of violence that compelled the revolutionaries to answer in kind were the wars of intervention launched by the European old order in an effort to snuff out the Revolution.

The revisionists' contention that feudalism had disappeared in France long before 1789 is based on a legalistic definition of feudalism. The fiefs that formed the original basis of the feudal order had indeed ceased to exist many centuries earlier. An estimated 95 percent of the French peasants were not serfs. Nonetheless, the peasants continued to be bound to the land by legal and economic restrictions that had survived from the feudal system. The revisionists insist that this should be called "seigniorialism" rather than "feudalism," but this is mere wordplay rather than serious historical analysis.

The revisionists' most effective arguments target a weakness in the Stalinist-inspired caricature of Marxism that influenced Lefebvre

(and even more so, Soboul) – its tendency toward mechanical, deterministic, and teleological explanations. Sometimes the Marxist historians leave the impression that all was preordained – that history inevitably marched toward progress, and that at just the right moment a revolutionary bourgeoisie with a clear consciousness of its class goals sprang up to seize power. Not enough attention is devoted to conscious human intervention in making history, or to how revolutionary crises transform consciousness. But Lefebvre, Rudé, and Soboul were too sophisticated as historians to allow Stalinist determinism to completely undermine their analyses. Together with the anti-Stalinist Marxist Daniel Guérin, their writings continue to provide the only fully developed explanation of the dynamics of the Revolution, together with a narrative that presents it from the perspective of the toiling people.

The revisionists deny the existence of the class struggle by demanding to be shown precisely demarcated lines between social classes and by demanding evidence that the wealthiest capitalists were the staunchest supporters of the Revolution. That neither of these demands can be met does not, however, mean that there were not opposing social classes locked in mortal combat, or that the rising capitalist class as a whole did not back the Revolution. The line between the classes was blurred, especially at the top, with some capitalists making money through land, and some nobles becoming involved in trade. But it is ironic that revisionist historians who complain about Marxist oversimplification themselves end up presenting a simplified, caricature version of classes, ignoring the real complexities.

Nor is the apparent contradiction in the fact that the wealthiest of the French capitalists did not enthusiastically greet the Revolution difficult to resolve. As financiers to the monarchy, they were tied to the old regime by strong bonds of self-interest. The revisionist method is to identify such exceptional groups and use them to deny the validity of the general proposition that capitalist interests provided the underlying motive for the Revolution.

The class analysis of the lower rungs of the French social ladder – the *sans-culottes*, the *menu peuple*, the *bras nus* – has also been a matter of historical dispute. Using contemporary documents, Guérin, Soboul, and Rudé all examined the urban masses and exploded the myth that they

were a “mob” of down-and-out gutter-dwellers, as the conservative historian Hippolyte Taine portrayed them. Rudé analyzed police records of those arrested during demonstrations and insurrections – presumably the most militant of the participants – to prove that the “crowd,” as he called them, was not a lumpen mob, but poor working people with fixed places of residence and steady occupations. Rudé’s work established that the Parisian *menu peuple* exhibited an autonomous rationality, and represented a popular radical politics within the broad framework of a bourgeois revolution. Guerin’s study emphasized, in addition, that the *sans-culottes* included within their ranks the Parisian working class of the period. Strikes, wage demands, and similar conflicts gave evidence of class struggle within the bourgeois republic. Guerin has been accused of anachronistically reading the twentieth century back into the eighteenth, but in fact, he was pointing out the autonomy of the lower classes and questioning the easy assumption about a firm bourgeois hegemony over the entire third estate.

The debates among historians are echoes of the passionate emotions unleashed by the French Revolution that more than two centuries have not sufficed to completely erode. Anyone seeking to understand the *meaning* of the French Revolution will not find what they are looking for in the works of the revisionist or postmodernist authors. It is in the comprehensive picture of the French Revolution developed by such historians as Jaurès, Lefebvre, Soboul, Mathiez, Rudé, and Guerin that the legacy of the monumental event has been preserved and defended.

SEE ALSO: Danton, Georges Jacques (1759–1794); French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution, Radical Factions and Organizations; French Revolution, Women and; Paine, Thomas (1737–1809); Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794); *Sans-Culottes*

References and Suggested Readings

- Andress, D. (2006) *The Terror: The Merciless War for Freedom in Revolutionary France*. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.
- Chaussinand-Nogaret, G. (1986) *The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cobb, R. (1987) *The People’s Armies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Cobban, A. (1999) *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Furet, F. (1988) *Marx and the French Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Furet, F. (1996) *The French Revolution 1770–1814*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Guerin, D. (1977) *Class Struggles in the First French Republic: Bourgeois and Bras Nus 1793–1795*. London: Pluto Press.
- Hunt, L. (1986) *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*. London: Methuen.
- Jones, P. M. (1989) *The Peasantry in the French Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kates, G. (Ed.) (1997) *The French Revolution: Recent Debates and New Controversies*. London: Routledge.
- Lefebvre, G. (1947) *The Coming of the French Revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lefebvre, G. (1989) *The French Revolution 1787–1799*. London: Routledge.
- Lewis, G. (1993) *The French Revolution: Rethinking the Debate*. London: Routledge.
- Markoff, J. (1996) *The Abolition of Feudalism: Peasants, Lords and Legislators in the French Revolution*. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Rudé, G. (1959) *The Crowd in the French Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rudé, G. (1964) *Revolutionary Europe 1783–1815*. Glasgow: Fontana.
- Schama, S. (1990) *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*. New York: Vintage.
- Soboul, A. (1964) *The Parisian Sans-Culottes and the French Revolution, 1793–94*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

French Revolution, radical factions and organizations

Soma Marik

The French Revolution was driven forward by a series of powerful insurrections in Paris between 1789 and 1794. Those massive explosions of political discontent were by no means unplanned, spur-of-the-moment affairs. A great deal of organization was necessary to give them shape and focus. The political organizations that could mobilize the power of the *sans-culottes*, call them into the streets, and give them political direction were essential to the revolutionary process.

In 1789 when the power of the French monarchy began to crumble, the people of Paris spontaneously exercised the right of free association by forming political groupings of their own choosing. The best known of these was the Jacobin Club, which has become virtually

synonymous with organized radicalism in the French Revolution. A few of the other political groupings that rose to prominence during the Revolution were the Cordeliers, Feuillants, Girondins, Montagnards, Enragés, Dantonists, and Hebertists. These were not cadre or political parties in the modern sense, but organizations, factions, or tendencies that took on some of the key functions of political parties. Trying to place them on a spectrum ranging from counter-revolutionary to ultra-revolutionary would be a waste of time, because the rapidly radicalizing political context in which they operated meant that a group could quickly move from one end of the spectrum to the other.

Jacobins, Cordeliers, and Feuillants

When deputies to the Estates General met in mid-1789 to transform themselves into the National Constituent Assembly, a left wing formed among them. The left-leaning deputies, many of whom were from Brittany, formed a loose association called the Breton Club. In the early stage of its existence, it consisted of about 205 of the delegates to the Constituent Assembly at Versailles. In October 1789, as the result of a massive insurrectionary movement in Paris, the seat of government was relocated from Versailles to Paris. Soon thereafter, in December, the Breton Club was reorganized as the Society of the Friends of the Constitution. Because it held its meetings in a former Jacobin monastery, it became widely known as the Jacobin Club.

The Jacobin Club transformed itself into a more general political organization by ceasing to restrict its membership to Assembly delegates. Its membership fees were high, however, which tended to exclude the less affluent. A more democratic alternative appeared in the form of the Society of the Friends of the Rights of Man and Citizen, which was far less expensive to join, and which accepted women into membership. This group also took its popular name, the Cordeliers Club, from the monastic order that had formerly owned the place in which its meetings were held. Due to its less elite social composition, the Cordeliers were at that time more radical than the relatively moderate Jacobins. No sharp line divided the two groups, however; many of the Jacobins' members also joined the Cordeliers. A young lawyer, Georges Jacques Danton, and a

young journalist, Camille Desmoulins, emerged as the Cordeliers' foremost spokesmen. By the middle of 1790 the Cordeliers were in the vanguard of a movement to set up patriotic societies in every Parisian section, incorporating articulate members from among the disenfranchised, a major step in the process of rapidly spreading political organization.

In the summer of 1791 a political confrontation developed when the majority of the Constituent Assembly moved to establish two unequal categories of citizenship, active and passive. A massive protest campaign opposed the move. The Constituent Assembly, feeling threatened by this expression of direct democracy, adopted decrees restricting the freedom of action of the popular political societies and the elected councils in each of the Parisian sections. Radical democrats within the Assembly, led by Maximilien Robespierre and Jérôme Pétion, opposed the decrees, but they passed anyway.

The crisis deepened after the king and his family were caught, on June 20, attempting to flee Paris to join with counterrevolutionary forces militarily threatening the Revolution. The Cordeliers Club agitated for the ouster of the king, and a left-wing faction within the Jacobin Club led by Robespierre concurred. By this time the Jacobins had achieved national scope with some 900 affiliates throughout France. Most of its members in Paris, however, were adamantly opposed to overthrowing the king, so the organization split, with the less radical majority leaving to form a rival political group, the Feuillants Club. (Once again, the name was taken from a monastic order whose former premises the club occupied.) Although the split caused the Jacobins to suffer a significant drop in membership (from about 2,400 to 1,200) and a temporary loss of influence as the vast majority of its parliamentary deputies left, it also changed the club's political character by bringing the left-wing faction, and especially Robespierre, to the fore.

The Feuillants represented a wing of the original supporters of the Revolution who believed the Revolution had gone far enough and wanted to see a return to normalcy in the form of a stable constitutional monarchy. The Cordeliers and Jacobins, however, felt the Revolution had not gone nearly far enough in the direction of democratizing French society, and that Louis XVI was an obstacle that had to be removed. On July 17,

1791, the Cordeliers held a mass demonstration of tens of thousands at the Champ de Mars to demand the king's ouster. Defenders of the constitutional monarchy, however, still held the main positions of power, and they called out the National Guard to suppress the demonstration. National Guardsmen under General Lafayette's command opened fire against unarmed demonstrators, killing dozens. The Champ de Mars massacre thus drew a line of blood between the radicals who remained committed to extending the Revolution and the moderates who were resisting it.

The issue of counterrevolution had been posed in a new way. Now the threat came not only from royalists and aristocrats, but also from those who had thought of themselves and presented themselves as moderate revolutionaries. In October, a newly elected Legislative Assembly took up where the National Assembly had left off. At this juncture a new political grouping, the Girondins, came onto the scene.

Jacobins and Girondins

The loosely knit faction of radical deputies to the Assembly that came to be known as the Girondins was at first called the Brissotins, after their best-known leader, Jacques Pierre Brissot. The hard core of this faction's deputies numbered about 50 or 60, but they generally controlled between 130 and 200 votes. Because many of their most influential members (though not Brissot himself) represented the Gironde area of France, the name "Girondins" was later attached to them.

The political turmoil and the constant threat of external military invasion produced a paradoxical political situation in which both left-wing and right-wing extremists were agitating for the same thing: for France to declare preemptive war on Prussia and Austria. The royalists and their new Feuillant allies were in favor of war because they were confident that the ragtag forces of revolutionary France would be no match for the professionally trained and led Prussian and Austrian armies. The Revolution would thus be militarily crushed.

Brissot and the Girondins, on the other hand, were using an ultra-radical rationale to beat the drums for war. The French revolutionary armies were not only capable of defending French territory, they declared, but could mount a great

international crusade of liberation to extend the Revolution throughout Europe. Everywhere they went, the French forces would find rebellious patriots rising up to greet them and join them in overthrowing feudalism and autocracy. It was an intoxicating idea with great appeal for the revolutionary-minded people of Paris, so it is not surprising that the Girondins were able to attract overwhelming support for it. They should have been more suspicious, however, when the king appointed them, rather than Feuillant politicians, to ministerial positions so they could implement their war program.

Almost all of the revolutionary-minded opinion leaders of the day supported the Girondins' call to war, but there were some important exceptions. Neither Robespierre, still the most influential Jacobin leader, nor Jean-Paul Marat, the most influential radical journalist in Paris, was caught up in the war mania. Instead they warned that the royalists were trying to draw them into a trap that would end in the bloody defeat of the Revolution. To the idea that the peoples of other countries would welcome the French armies as liberators, Robespierre responded with a famous line that "armed missionaries" were never welcomed abroad. And, both Marat and Robespierre presciently warned, *even if* the French armies could somehow pull off a victory, their generals would be emboldened to try to impose a military dictatorship on the Revolution.

The Girondins prevailed and in April 1792 France declared war. A coalition comprising Austria, Prussia, and the French émigré nobles repulsed a French offensive and soon invaded French territory. The Assembly called for a levy of 100,000 military volunteers, but the king vetoed the decree. At that point the Girondins made a left turn and attacked the king. As Prussian forces drove toward Paris, their commander, the Duke of Brunswick, committed a fatal public relations blunder by issuing a manifesto promising to burn Paris to the ground and massacre its inhabitants if any harm were to befall the royal family. The Brunswick Manifesto was intended to intimidate the Parisians, but it had the opposite effect. The reinvigorated mass movement launched a great insurrection in Paris on August 10 that resulted in the decisive end of the monarchy and the birth of the Republic. The Legislative Assembly of the constitutional monarchy was

to be replaced by a more democratically representative body, the National Convention.

Jacobins, Girondins, and Montagnards

The National Convention provided the stage for the next great political battle of the Revolution. The combatants were rival factions within the Convention, with the Girondins on one side and a coalition of left-wing delegates, the Montagnards, on the other. The Montagnards (or “men of the mountain,” because they occupied the highest tier of seats and loomed above the other delegates) were mostly Jacobins and Cordeliers who looked to Robespierre and Danton for leadership. As the hostility between Girondins and Montagnards heated up, the battle lines became ever more clear. Brissot, despite his ferocious rivalry with Robespierre, had remained a member of the Jacobin Club, but in October 1792 the Jacobins expelled him. Meanwhile, Marat, who had previously presented himself as an independent radical standing aloof from factionalism, became ever more closely identified with the Jacobin leadership.

The Girondins’ great military crusade of liberation proved to be the disaster Robespierre and Marat had predicted. On August 19 the enemy armies crossed the frontiers of northern France and on September 2 the fortress of Verdun fell into their hands, giving the invaders an apparently clear path to Paris. The monarchist press had been issuing bloodcurdling threats, publishing lists of revolutionaries to be executed once the counterrevolution was victorious. Thirty thousand Parisian militants had volunteered to go to the front to fight the invaders, but a fear arose among them that their departure might leave Paris defenseless against its internal enemies who, although currently imprisoned, remained a formidable threat. If the counterrevolutionaries were to gain the upper hand, they would open the prisons and the freed royalists would massacre the families that the volunteers were leaving behind in Paris. As a result, many of the militant revolutionaries decided to make a preemptive strike on the prisons and mete out summary justice. Most of the prisons were broken into, and makeshift tribunals heard the cases of the prisoners. Between 1,100 and 1,400 were executed, and a similar number were freed. These “September massacres” greatly exacerbated the conflict between the Girondins, who decried them

as mindless mob violence, and the Montagnards, who tended to justify them (although not taking direct responsibility for them).

The struggle between the two factions reached crisis proportions in the dispute over the fate of Louis XVI. When the former king was put on trial for treason his guilt was not in question, but whether he should be put to death or not was hotly contested. The Girondins were hesitant, given the political climate, to appear as defenders of the monarch, so rather than overtly arguing that his life be spared, they demanded that the question be decided by a popular referendum. When the Convention voted, the ex-king was unanimously found guilty (673 to 0) and the proposal for a referendum was defeated (424 to 283). The former monarch was guillotined on January 21, 1793, signifying an irreconcilable rupture with the old order.

The next flashpoint occurred on April 5, when a leading general with close ties to the Girondins, Dumouriez, defected at the front and went over to the enemy forces threatening Paris. That supreme act of treachery sealed the alliance between the Montagnards and the radical Parisian populace, the *sans-culottes*. The Girondins made efforts to raise the provinces against Paris, but they failed. The overthrow of the Girondins was accomplished by an immense insurrection that shook Paris from May 31 through June 2, 1793. The Girondin leaders were arrested, imprisoned until October when they were put on trial, and executed on October 31.

***Sans-Culottes*, Montagnards, and Enragés**

Through all of this the bond between the Montagnards and the *sans-culottes* had grown strong but far from absolute. The *sans-culottes* were not a homogeneous social class but contained within itself serious conflicts of material interest. The Montagnards tended to support the interests of the better-off layers – the master artisans, shopkeepers, and small manufacturers – as opposed to the more numerous wage-workers, laborers, and urban poor. The rapidly rising prices of basic necessities led the Parisian poor to demand strict state control of prices, to be enforced by harsh measures against hoarders and speculators, and terror against the aristocracy.

Meanwhile, a loosely organized group of radical democrats, including Jean Varlet, Théophile

Leclerc, Jacques Roux, and two radical feminists, Claire Lacombe and Pauline Léon, had given birth to a movement independent of the Montagnards and Jacobins that put forward social demands corresponding to the needs of the *sans-culottes*. The extremism of their demands and their demeanor prompted their opponents to call them *enragés* – madmen – but the name stuck and they bore it with pride. The Enragés were revolutionary activists who emerged in 1792–3 from the popular society movement of the earlier years.

The differences between the Enragés and the main body of the Montagnards, led by Robespierre, were clear. When, early in 1793, the *sans-culottes* repeatedly demanded the imposition of price controls, they were rebuffed and eventually denounced by the Montagnards. Roux and Leclerc preached a doctrine very different from the economic liberalism of the Montagnards. They demanded the death penalty for speculation and usury, and argued that property was a trust, and that the land belonged to the nation. Robespierre perceived these men and women as dangerous because they expressed the deepest egalitarian instincts of the *sans-culottes*.

Before the fall of the Girondins, in March 1793 Varlet and his allies created a Central Assembly of Public Safety, which challenged the authority of the central government and thus resulted in competing centers of power in Paris. The Girondins were bitterly opposed to the Enragés, and most of the Montagnards were only lukewarm toward them.

When the Girondins were removed from the scene, the Enragés stepped up their demands for economic justice and direct democracy. The Montagnards resisted, citing the war emergency and arguing that the need for unity in the face of powerful enemies required a strong central government. From that point forward, the struggle of the Montagnards to control the popular movement would become increasingly tense.

Hebertists, Dantonists, and Thermidorians

As long as the Girondins had posed a mortal threat on their right, the Montagnards needed the mobilizations of the Parisian poor as a counterbalance on the left. But the fall of the Girondins allowed the Montagnards to turn their attention to fighting challengers from their left, namely the

Enragés. A left wing within the Montagnards led by Jacques Hebert emerged to rival the Enragés for the allegiance of the Parisian poor. But while adopting the Enragés' program, Hebert joined the other Montagnards in attacking the Enragés' leaders.

Another major insurrection in Paris on September 5 pressured the Convention into introducing price controls (the Law of the General Maximum) and making Terror the "order of the day." But the partial adoption of the *sans-culottes*' social program was accompanied by the swift suppression of their independent leaders. Varlet and Roux were arrested; the latter committed suicide in prison. Leclerc disappeared to the front. The independent organization of *sans-jupons* (female *sans-culottes*) founded by Léon and Lacombe, the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women, was hounded by the Jacobins until it was formally abolished in October. The demise of the *sans-culottes*' independent organizations greatly diminished their political influence.

With both the Girondins and the Enragés removed from the scene, the Jacobins no longer faced organized external opposition. But the political struggle between moderates, radicals, and ultra-radicals soon reproduced itself *within* the Jacobin party. The Cordeliers Club and other political organizations continued to exist, but the Jacobin Club had become the predominant theater of political action. Hebert's faction, known as the Hebertists, denounced the centralization of power by the Committee of Public Safety and demanded that the democratic provisions of the new "Constitution of the Year II" produced by the Convention be immediately implemented. Robespierre and his supporters denounced the Hebertists' demands as impractical – and virtually treasonous – at a time when the Revolution was struggling for its very survival in the face of civil war and foreign invasion. The threats Robespierre cited were certainly genuine and his arguments were sufficiently compelling to allow him to maintain control of the reins of power. The Constitution of the Year II had been officially suspended until the coming of peace and emergency government by the Committee of Public Safety was for the moment secure.

Meanwhile, a relatively moderate faction led by Danton – the "Indulgents" – also chafed at the emergency measures of the Terror and called for peace negotiations with the enemy powers. When the Hebertists and the Indulgents clashed

at the Jacobin Club, Robespierre intervened on the side of the latter, leading Danton to form a bloc with Robespierre to isolate Hebert and his co-thinkers. On March 2 a leading Hebertist, Charles Philippe Ronsin, addressed the Cordeliers Club and called for another insurrection in Paris. For that, Robespierre had Ronsin, Hebert, and other Hebertist leaders arrested for treason, and they were executed on March 24. The Hebertists' base had been at the Cordeliers Club, which effectively ceased to exist after their demise.

After the Hebertists had been destroyed, Danton's faction was the only remaining political group capable of organizing opposition to Robespierre's policies. Continuing to play the war-threat card, Robespierre was also able to portray the Indulgents as traitors to the Revolution, and to have them physically removed as well. Danton, Desmoulins, and their associates were guillotined on April 5.

As long as the counterrevolutionary threat was palpable, the rest of the Convention considered Robespierre indispensable, but after the great military victory at Fleurus in late June 1794 freed France from imminent danger of foreign invasion, the Convention turned sharply against Robespierre's personal rule. The destruction of the Enragés had meant the end of popular initiatives, and the removal of the Hebertists and Dantonists left Robespierre's faction all alone to face the remnants of the Feuillants and Girondins, who now came out of the woodwork, coalesced, and defeated him. He and his lieutenants were arrested on July 27 and executed the following day. The moderates who overthrew him, though not a cohesive political tendency in their own right, came to be known collectively as the Thermidorians. With their ascendance to power, the revolutionary phase of the French Revolution was over.

SEE ALSO: Brissot, Jacques Pierre (1754–1793); Counterrevolution, France, 1798–1830; Danton, Georges Jacques (1759–1794); Estates General, France; French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution, Women and; Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–1793); Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794); Saint-Just, Louis Antoine (1767–1794); *Sans-Culottes*

References and Suggested Readings

Andress, D. (2006) *The Terror: The Merciless War for Freedom in Revolutionary France*. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.

- Bouloiseau, M. (1983) *The Jacobin Republic 1792–1794*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Conner, C. D. (1997) *Jean-Paul Marat: Scientist and Revolutionary*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
- Godineau, D. (1998) *The Women of Paris and their French Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Guerin, D. (1977) *Class Struggles in the First French Republic: Bourgeois and Bras Nus 1793–1795*. London: Pluto Press.
- Lefebvre, G. (1989) *The French Revolution 1787–1799*. London: Routledge.
- McPhee, P. (2002) *The French Revolution 1789–1799*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rude, G. (1959) *The Crowd in the French Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Slavin, M. (1964) Jacques Roux: A Victim of Vilification. *French Historical Studies* 3, 4 (Autumn): 525–37.
- Slavin, M. (1986) *The Making of an Insurrection: Parisian Sections and the Gironde*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Soboul, A. (1964) *The Parisian Sans-Culottes and the French Revolution, 1793–94*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Sydenham, M. J. (1961) *The Girondins*. London: Athlone Press.
- Tackett, T. (1996) *Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789–1790)*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

French Revolution, women and

Soma Marik

The French Revolution is often cited as a defining moment of modernity. Apart from a number of specialized studies, much of the general work on the revolution has ignored the questions raised by feminist scholarship, but it is necessary to look at the complex ways in which women took part in this revolution, and the ideological positions that developed. Landes (1988) describes the period as one in which women actually lost status. Referring to the salons like those of Madame Du Deffand and Madame Geoffrin, the patroness of the Encyclopedia, she suggests that women had a greater degree of freedom in the last decades of the *ancien régime*. Noblewomen and nuns even had some political space, as shown by the elections to the Estates General, where some of them could be represented, even though by



This painting, entitled *French Revolution, 1789*, depicts Parisian women marching to Versailles on October 5, 1789. Parisian women took an active part in the French Revolution by forming clubs, such as Etta d'Palme's Friends of Truth, which provided meeting places where women could discuss revolutionary ideals and develop feminist concepts. The Revolutionary Republican Women sought to expand literacy and obtain female suffrage and the right to bear arms. (The Granger Collection, New York)

men. The revolution and its consciously masculinist discourse, however, excluded them from the public sphere and, as Landes shows, the republic was not just constructed without women, but against them. This reading of the revolution suggests that women, as a category, did not have a revolution.

Women's Conditions and Protests to October 1789

Women had few rights in law during the last decades of the *ancien régime*. Their testimony could be accepted in criminal or civil courts but not for the purpose of notarized acts such as the making of wills. A woman, never an adult, lived under the authority of her father, husband, or son. Over and above this, there hung the threat of arranged and indissoluble marriages, disinheritance through the rule of primogeniture, and forced relegation to the convent. Upper-class women enjoyed some limited political opportunities, including the regency in case of minority, and the right to send representatives from some religious orders.

As for the mass of women, the level of poverty in eighteenth-century France was such that they, during a hard winter, even demanded to be arrested as beggars, simply to avoid starvation. Though women's earnings were essential to the survival of lower-class families, their wages were very low. Guild offices were closed to them.

What little industrial modernization had occurred before the revolution tended to worsen their conditions. Domestic service, heavy labor, and ill-paid labor-intensive sectors such as the lace trade were the sectors open to them, and there was no general provision for women's education under the *ancien régime*.

Some feminist pamphlets appeared during the terminal crisis of the old regime (1787–9). The Marquis de Condorcet, advocating a propertied franchise for women, propagated the sharing of domestic authority. A few *Cahiers de Dallianges* (lists of grievances) appeared, showing women's demands and occasionally demanding votes for women. By and large, however, women remained marginal all the way to the July 14, 1789 attack on the Bastille. Their participation in the revolution began on that day, however, as Marie Carpenter Hauserne, a laundress, was one of the 900 conquerors of the Bastille and Pauline Leon helped barricade the streets.

On October 5 and 6, 1789 women took center stage. Incensed by price increases, Parisian women sparked off an uprising when news came of counterrevolutionary activities by soldiers in Versailles. Marching to Versailles on October 5, arms in hand, around 7,000 women, followed by the National Guard, compelled the royal family to return to Paris and the king to give his consent to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and the decrees abolishing feudal rights. Women of almost all classes went, mostly spontaneously, but the principal role was played by poor women of the artisan and wage-worker mix that would eventually be called *sans-culottes*.

That the October Days were primarily days of political self-expression for women is borne out by the testimonies of some of the participants like Marie Rose Bare, Louise Chabry, and Françoise Rolin. Their words demonstrate that they had made the connection in their thinking between the immediate shortage of bread in the capital and the shortcomings of the existing political system, and also bear witness to the truth of the statement that they wanted bread but not at the price of liberty. The women's action revealed, not a mere bread riot, but articulations of anti-feudal as well as anti-clerical political ideas. Statements made by the women showed they were quite determined to break the deadlock in the Constituent Assembly. And their action threatened not only the king, but also patriarchy.

Early Political Societies

Thousands of women participated in public celebrations, as in the *Fête de la Fédération* at the Champ de Mars in Paris on July 14, 1790, the first anniversary of the capture of the Bastille. This was also an occasion when women were allowed to act as citizens, an issue that was deeply contentious throughout the revolutionary period, as involvement in mass politics raised the question of organized mobilization.

Most organizations, like the Breton Club, ancestor of the Jacobins, were at first exclusively male in membership. Some, such as the *Société des Cordeliers*, allowed women to observe and even to speak, though not to vote. However, a great number and variety of political and popular societies and clubs soon opened their membership to women as well as to men. Théroigne de Méricourt founded *Amis de la Loi* (Friends of the Law) in Paris (1790). Claude Dansard's *Société Fraternelle de Patriotes des Deux Sexes* (Fraternal Society of Both the Sexes) was established in March 1791 and aimed at disseminating political education for all and rejected the division of citizens into two groups and the image of all women as passive. Louise Keralio (later Louise Robert), one female member, envisioned a humanitarian role for women in the clubs which would involve an active participation in improving the lot of the underprivileged.

In May 1791 the *Comité Central des Sociétés Fraternelles* (Central Committee of Fraternal Societies) was created with François Robert (husband of Louise Keralio) as president. From that day forward the women of the clubs were involved in a highly energetic and tenacious political movement which was to grow in strength and determination as the revolution progressed. Pauline Léon appeared before the Legislative Assembly in March 1792 with a petition signed by more than 300 women demanding the right to arm themselves for defense. Only a few days later, Théroigne de Méricourt, member of the Fraternal Society, proposed to the women of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine that a legion of armed women be formed in order to repulse the enemies of liberty. Meanwhile, from 1789, exclusively women's societies were also formed outside Paris, for example in Dijon, Breteuil, Aunay, and Bordeaux.

Women's activities entered a different phase after the king accepted the new Constitution in

September 1791. There had been no serious attempt to enfranchise women by the Constituent Assembly. In the very month in which the new Constitution went into effect, however, Olympe de Gouges demanded this right in her historic Declaration of the Rights of Women. Declaring that the Constitution had freed men, but not yet women, Palm d'Aelders moved a petition to the Assembly on April 1, 1792, seeking political liberty, legal equality, and a divorce law. Indeed, the Assembly later in the year did grant women legal majority at the age of 21, including the right to appear as witnesses in civil lawsuits, and produced a law making divorce possible by mutual consent or marital incompatibility. The period of the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies also witnessed the appearance of a number of newspapers published by women's groups and edited by women or addressed to a female audience. One such journal complained that women suffered more than men and demanded female representatives at the National Assembly.

Women activists like Reine Audu, Théroigne de Méricourt, Claire Lacombe, and Pauline Léon also played an active role in the invasion of the Tuileries Palace on June 20, 1792, as well as in the insurrection of August 10, 1792 which overthrew the monarchy. Some women were formally decorated for their efforts with civic crowns from the Commune of Paris.

Two Notorious Women

One woman who played a striking, but rather individual, role was Olympe de Gouges, who wanted revolutionary reform to encompass women, who she saw as victims of oppression and social corruption. Her Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizeness (September 1791), prepared on the model of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, was a bold charter for women. Apart from demanding political equality, it also identified male tyranny as the major burden on women and denounced the concept of illegitimacy and advocated equal property rights for women.

Théroigne de Méricourt, an agitator and street activist, was another prominent player in the revolutionary drama. She is often portrayed as the sword-wielding woman in a riding cloak, sometimes mounted on a white horse, who directed the action in the streets during some of the most memorable days of the revolution, like the

storming of the Bastille, the march to Versailles, and the insurrection of August 10, 1792. She delivered a famous address on March 25, 1792 to the Société Fraternelle des Minimes (Fraternal Society of the Small Ones) advocating the formation of battalions of females to serve in the defense of the nation. She is often accused of murdering the royalist collaborator François-Louis Suleau. While direct responsibility for Suleau's murder is difficult to prove, there is no doubt that on that day she played an important role in urging the crowd to arm themselves and use courage and patriotism to defend their fatherland from danger.

In her *Address to the Forty-Eight Sections* she proposed a system whereby women would participate in patriotic life in a positive but non-military manner, unlike the proposals made in 1792 for battalions of female soldiers. On May 15, 1793 de Méricourt was to become involved in an altercation with women belonging to the Citoyennes and was subjected to a public whipping. Soon after, she lost her mental stability. Her political career was ended, and she died in 1817, locked up for a decade in an asylum.

Sans-Culotte Women

In the course of 1792 and 1793 many poorer women moved from passive to active politics, forming their own organizations. In Lyon in September 1792 members of the women's club posted price lists all over the city, the rates being fixed on a revolutionary vision of just price emanating from the will of the people. Women "police commissioners," posted to enforce the prices of essential commodities, compelled the municipal and departmental authorities to take some price-control measures and root out counter-revolutionaries. Neither their economic program, nor the fact of women's militant participation, was wholeheartedly supported by the Jacobins. Clearly, there was both a class and a gender issue involved here. The bourgeoisie supporting the Jacobins had profited from the purchase of the nationalized land and war contracts and were willing to make slight concessions to the *sans-culottes* to save the revolution.

Meanwhile, a new patriotic club, the Société des amies de la liberté et de l'égalité, was established in 1792 to push for price control, support the jurors (Constitutional Clergy), and even demand votes for women. Nonetheless,

at each radical turn, the original pressure came from below, and the Jacobins sometimes responded half-heartedly, as on May 31 to June 2, 1793, when a popular insurrection broke out to expel the Girondins. Militant women played a very active role in these popular struggles. Eventually, the club collapsed under Jacobin pressure and was formally shut down in November 1793.

At the same time, to fight "counterrevolutionary women," there was a need to enlist the support of revolutionary women. But the dynamics of organization turned the radical women into activists going beyond the narrow limits set by Jacobinism. The early women's clubs combined patriotic politics with religious devotion and charitable activity along with overtones of pre-revolutionary religious confraternities. But these were overtaken by the new tasks and the new ways of thinking promoted by the revolution. The clubs of Nancy, Le Mans, Besaçon, and Beaumont reproached the Convention for denying them the right to express their vote.

The massive participation of *sans-jupons* in political and social movements and their transgressions against the code ascribed to them by patriarchy raised male hostility. It was assumed that women's mentality made them suitable for only "caring" tasks, and they were deemed unsuitable for more direct politics. Women's role was not to change the political course of the revolution, but rather to decorate and inspire, to crown and to animate. The women's societies seemed at times to suggest that revolutionary education could change her "natural" mysterious, seductive, and deceptive characteristics. This shows the strong grip of patriarchal values which made the women themselves internalize the social construct of femininity.

Even as they sought to influence public politics, the women's clubs never denied that their primary role was within the home. Yet the participation in politics was transforming how they visualized home and their role in it. For example, in a 1792 speech in Bordeaux, Marie Dorbe urged unmarried women to marry only those men who were ardent patriots, and to tell men that they did not care for flattery and romance, but frankness and truth. But this had its own problems. If women were to act as moral regenerators, it opened them to close scrutiny of their own sexuality and moral code.

Society of Revolutionary Republican Citizenesses

It is within this wider context that we should locate the rise and fall of the Société des Citoyennes Républicaines Révolutionnaires. This organization came into being in 1793 and its best-known presidents were Claire Lacombe and Pauline Léon, both of whom were republicans who had been active in the revolution prior to this. The women of this group viewed the defense of the *patrie* (fatherland) as a dual undertaking – men were responsible for defense on the exterior, while women took upon themselves the task of safeguarding the revolution in the interior by being ever alert against counter-revolutionary threats.

Shortly after its formal organization the Citoyennes began to involve itself in the struggle for dominance between the Jacobins and the Girondins. They supported free access to the Convention galleries. Finding the Assembly unresponsive, they resorted to direct action, stopping people carrying passes at the gate of the Assembly hall and tearing up their passes. On May 18, 1793 Gamon, a Girondin member, accused these women as agents of the enemies of the republic. He also accused them of deliberately trying to create disorder. A Montagnard deputy, Ruhl, stated that equality existed everywhere and if passes to the galleries were suppressed the women would no longer have this pretext for coming there and they would cease to do so. On May 29, 1793 the women of the Mont Blanc section were forbidden to observe the meetings of the General Assembly, and they employed the same methods at the door of the section assembly as they did at the door of the Convention. A dozen of them were posted at the door so that no “aristocrat” could enter the meeting room.

The insurrections of May 31 and June 2, 1793, which saw the fall of the Girondins, were the work of the *sans-culotte* masses, both men and women. These committees with the women of the Citoyennes were in the very vanguard of the action. A very visible demand was for the fixing of prices. Prevented from speaking at the General Council of the Paris Commune, the women’s delegation presented their own petition on June 2, when the movement to unseat the Girondins accelerated. According to the testimony of the Girondin deputy Gorsas, armed

and “shameless” women were among those who ensured that the proscribed Girondin deputies could not escape. From the side of the victors in the insurrection, Jacques Roux, before the General Council of the Commune, praised the Citoyennes for their role. Led by the Citoyennes, the women prepared themselves for the insurrection and participated in it, in the Convention, the Commune, the sections, and on the streets in their own way.

Since mid-June the women of Paris had expressed their discontent with the standard of living forced upon them, and they advocated stringent punishments for hoarding. On June 25, 1793 a group of laundry women stopped two wagons loaded with soap on the Rue Saint Lazare. They fixed prices and compelled on-the-spot selling. This was the start of three days of rebellion in the streets of Paris. Then, on August 26, Claire Lacombe led a deputation to the bar of the Convention. It demanded the implementation of the new Constitution, which emphasized *sans-culotte* demands for direct democracy and a state-regulated economy, geared to the needs of the poor masses. Throughout the summer months the capital had been plagued with a severe shortage of bread and on September 5 the women rose in protest. Although the problem of subsistence was secondary to their main political concerns, during the later part of August the members of the Citoyennes served mainly as vociferous complainants on the subject of hoarding. The culmination of these feelings of discontent was the *journée* of September 4 and 5, as a result of which Terror was made the order of the day.

Now that the opposition had been expelled from the Convention, threat of counterrevolution minimized, and news of French victory coming from the battle front, the Jacobins no longer felt the need for mass support to save the revolution. A new phase of reaction and terror was unleashed to eliminate popular initiatives for democracy so that the gains made by the propertied during the revolution could be perpetuated at any cost. The *Enrage* leaders and the women were among the first casualties. On October 6, Le Société des hommes du 10 août (Society of the Men of 10 August) denounced the Citoyennes to the Convention as “unpatriotic.” The crime of Charlotte Corday, who had assassinated Marat, was held against seemingly all political women. The next day, Claire Lacombe, at the head of

a delegation of the Citoyennes, addressed the Convention. She argued that women had produced only one monster, while men had produced many tyrants.

In early November 1793 came the trial and execution of two famous female revolutionaries, Olympe de Gouges and the Girondin Madame Roland. At the same time, the Jacobins decided to deliver the final blow to the pro-*Enrage* women. The working women were involved in the war effort as much as in the struggle for bread. They contributed tons of household linen, often their main assets, as bandages for the wounded. But such sacrifices were accepted by bourgeois leaders without any qualms even as they set about the task of destroying the organization of these women. The Jacobins now mobilized market women, who were obviously opposed to price fixation. On October 28 some 6,000 market women invaded the headquarters of the society. On October 29, at the Convention, the Dantonist deputy Fabre d'Églantine denounced the members of the society for not being good mothers and daughters, for going after bread like "pigs at a trough," and for being "emancipated girls." Two days later in the Convention, Amar, deputy from the Isère, embarked on an astonishingly brutal tirade against the Citoyennes. He believed that women must not leave their families and private functions to which they were destined by nature in order to involve themselves in the affairs of government. Finally, the National Convention banned all kinds of women's popular clubs by the October 30 (9th Brumaire) decree. After two abortive attempts to revive women's political activities, on November 20 women were also forbidden to attend section meetings.

What Did Women Gain?

While there is no doubt that most male revolutionaries were positively opposed to women's political participation, women nonetheless made gains in the course of the revolution. The Constitution of 1791 made women passive citizens, but accorded them a slender rights base from which to proceed further. It was the Constitution of 1795 that took away citizenship from them.

Wives gained some rights through the social legislation of the revolution. In 1791 marriage was recognized as a civil contract, so that divorce became possible. On September 20, 1792 divorce on the basis of mutual consent was legalized. The

land transfer as well as the abolition of feudalism benefited millions of peasants and their families. A countrywide cultural revolution increased awareness and therewith birth control, giving women some control over their own bodies.

SEE ALSO: French Revolution, 1789–1794

References and Suggested Readings

- Abray, J. (1975) Feminism in the French Revolution. *American Historical Review* 80: 43–62.
- Agulhon, M. (1981) *Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789–1880*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Andress, D. (2005) *The Terror: Civil War in the French Revolution*. London: Little Brown.
- Cliff, T. (1987) *Class Struggle and Women's Liberation 1640 to the Present Day*. London: Bookmarks.
- Desan, S. (1992) Constitutional Amazons: Jacobin Women's Clubs in the French Revolution. In B. T. Ragan, Jr. & E. A. Williams (Eds.), *Re-Creating Authority in Revolutionary France*. Available at www.worc.ac.uk/CHIC/suffrage/document/jacoclua.htm. Accessed February 24, 2008.
- Desan, S. (2004) *The Family on Trial in Revolutionary France*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Elson Roessler, S. (1996) *Out of the Shadows: Women and Politics in the French Revolution, 1789–95*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Godineau, D. (1990) Masculine and Feminine Political Practice during the French Revolution, 1793–Year III. In D. Levy & H. Applewhite (Eds.), *Women and Politics in the Age of the Democratic Revolution*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Graham, R. (1977) Loaves and Liberty: Women in the French Revolution. In R. Bridenthal and C. Koonz (Eds.), *Becoming Visible: Women in European History*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Hufton, O. (1971) Women in the French Revolution, 1789–1796. *Past and Present* 53: 90–108.
- Landes, J. B. (1988) *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Rudé, G. (1968) *The Crowd in the French Revolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schama, S. (1990) *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*. New York: Vintage.

French revolutionary theater

Christina Suszynski Green

In the early to mid-eighteenth century, theater was an integral part of the French urbanite's life,

as tickets were affordable for most economic classes, and the theater house was considered a nexus for social gathering, gossip, political discourse, and romantic intrigue. The audience was as much a part of the performance as the actors on the stage: the lights were always up, talking was commonplace, spectators mingled with actors on the stage, and opinions were not reserved for the end of the show. In fact, the parterre section of the auditorium (all-male standing room on the main floor) was renowned for the rowdiness of its patrons. Many attempts were made to silence the theater throughout the second half of the eighteenth century with armed gunmen, dimmed lights, seating in the parterre, and the removal of seating closest to or on the stage, but the spirit of individual rights that was sweeping over France was felt as strongly in the theater as in the circulating political pamphlets demanding the representation of the people before the king. Attempts to silence audiences were thus analogous to attempts to silence the will of the people, and the parterre became a soapbox for the resistance of passivity.

Measures to silence the masses were also considered reflections of the paranoia felt by the crown (under Louis XV and later Louis XVI), as the theater possessed the potential for serving as a meeting place for dissidents eager to plan the overthrow of the king. Such a suspicion was perhaps justified given that actors were among the first to take up arms in the National Guard – the military arm of the revolution – in the days immediately leading up to and following July 14 (Bastille Day). J. B. Jacques Nourry and Jean-Baptiste Naudet – actors from the king’s theater (*comédiens du roi*) – were prominent for the leading roles they took in defending the city against the royal guard. And Collot d’Herbois, though retired from the theater, would live to serve on the Committee of Public Safety, renowned for ensuring the opposite of safety after the revolution.

Actors stood much to gain by the revolution, considering they did not possess full citizenship under the old regime. They were considered no better than prostitutes, tolerated only for the entertainment they offered. It did not help their cause that *comédiens du roi* were formerly employed by the king and existed as a mouthpiece for the regency. This tainted image cast doubt on the sincerity of actors’ convictions in this new role and stripped them of the dignity with

which so many others served; they were regularly attacked in pamphlet literature and denounced at public hearings.

Not all aspects of the political life were hostile to the virtues of the theater. Civic life began to look quite like a staged production, there being a few places of assembly under the new regime architecturally akin to theaters (the Assembly of Notables, the Salle de Spectacle in the Tuileries Palace, and the Assemblée fédérative). Indeed, seats for spectators were now common, and tickets were sold for entry into the largest political clubs. And in a crystallizing episode for the theater and the political stage, the revolution’s Cicero of the Assembly – Mirabeau – was regularly honored as a man of the theater, even receiving applause when he attended performances as a patron. Without question, the art of political persuasion owed much to the art of performance.

SEE ALSO: French Revolution, 1789–1794; Mirabeau, Comte de (1749–1791)

References and Suggested Readings

- Carlson, M. (2002) *The Resistance to Theatricality. SubStance* # 98/99 31 (2–3): 238–50.
- Freidland, P. (2002) *Political Actors: Representative Bodies and Theatricality in the Age of the French Revolution*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Maslan, S. (2005) *Revolutionary Acts: Theater, Democracy, and the French Revolution*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Friedan, Betty (1921–2006)

Shari Childers

“I did not set out consciously to start a revolution,” said Betty Friedan. Even so, her book *The Feminine Mystique* (1963) is credited with launching second wave feminism and significantly energizing the women’s movement in the United States. Certainly, her path to revolution began inauspiciously enough. Born Bettye Naomi Goldstein, in Peoria, Illinois, she attended Smith College and then married Carl Friedan in 1947. Her story, though still questioned by some, is that she was fired from her job as a journalist as a direct result of her pregnancy with her second child. Like most women, she went home to devote herself to her family.

Unlike other women, however, Friedan's sense of isolation and lack of fulfillment in her role as housewife led her to conduct a series of interviews with her former female classmates from Smith College. She published the results of her interviews in *The Feminine Mystique*, which became a bestseller, and exposed the "secret" that many women were not entirely fulfilled in their roles as wives and mothers – she called it "the problem with no name." This revelation, however bold, was not revolutionary. The book, though, *was* revolutionary, for two reasons. First, it unraveled the cultural, Victorian myths of what a woman should be by attacking their roots in the language of science and psychology. More importantly, it brought the "secret" out in the open. Women had been told that they were physically or intellectually unfit for jobs outside of the home, where they should be perfectly happy; they now had words for their feelings and words to counter the cultural discrimination and condescension. They began talking – to one another, to their spouses, and to politicians and doctors.

While Friedan posed as a "sister suburbanite" in her text, though, she was already a radical. She may not have intended to start a revolution, but she undeniably had a revolutionary political consciousness born of her longtime involvement in anti-fascist left and union movements – a radical past that she omitted to help her book succeed. Consequently, the book that earned her notoriety as a radical feminist also earned her criticism from fellow radicals because, to avoid "red-baiting," she focused her work on the problems of middle-class housewives rather than those of minorities or the working poor.

While Friedan's publication of *The Feminine Mystique* is her most frequently cited contribution to the women's movement, she was actively involved in the movement in many other ways. She played a significant role in the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, including Title VII that prohibited employer discrimination on the basis of sex. In 1966 the National Organization for Women (NOW) was founded by women who had their first meeting in Friedan's hotel room. She also served as the organization's president until 1970. In 1967 she led a Mother's Day campaign in which women asked for "rights, not roses," and in 1968 she was one of a few feminists who led invasions of men's only clubs. On August 26, 1970 she led a Women's Strike for Equality on the

50th anniversary of women's suffrage. In 1971 the National Women's Political Caucus was formed to begin fielding female political candidates for office, and Friedan was an early member. She served as the vice president for the National Association to Repeal Abortion Laws from 1972 to 1974 – an important position considering *Roe v. Wade* legalized abortion in 1973. Through her activism, she urged women to work in solidarity to improve their collective condition and provided them with concrete outlets for doing so.

Her path, however, was not untarnished. Her initial insistence that NOW exclude lesbians resulted in personal and public reproach and caused considerable discontent within the women's movement. She officially changed her position, however, at the National Women's Conference held in Houston, Texas, in 1977. When she seconded the resolution that opposed any discrimination based on sexual orientation, lesbian activists cheered and released balloons – a defining moment for Friedan, the women's movement, and lesbian rights. Her widely publicized and baseless disparagement of Gloria Steinem, which also included accusations that Steinem was working with the CIA, yet again led to unnecessary division within the movement – a sad irony. These recurring claims seem to be the result of post-McCarthy suspicions, which, in the case of Steinem, were complicated by Friedan's personal jealousy: the media recognized Steinem as the leader of the women's movement, a title Friedan felt that she had earned. Both of these errors in judgment are representative of a more general difficulty that Friedan seemed to have with the younger generation of women's activists. While she and her original comrades had come directly from other movements that taught them to "politicize and publicize" social and economic injustice by relying on solidarity and disciplined action, the younger "women's lib" generation, for Friedan, seemed too focused on sex and self-transformation and had no political background.

Many veteran feminists were very disappointed in Friedan's second book, *The Second Stage* (1981), which critiqued the women's movement. She claimed "the feminine mystique" had simply been exchanged for the "feminist mystique," an equally dangerous problem. Drawing on examples of what she saw as a growing "feminist fatigue," she argued that "Women may have to think beyond 'women's issues' to join their energies

with men” in the task of redefining home life, careers, intimacy, and national priorities. Friedan remained an activist and author until her death, on her 85th birthday, in 2006.

SEE ALSO: National Organization for Women (NOW); Steinem, Gloria (b. 1934); Women’s Movement, United States, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Horowitz, D. (1998) *Betty Friedan and the Making of the Feminine Mystique: The American Left, the Cold War, and Modern Feminism*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Rosen, R. (2000) *The World Split Open: How the Modern Women’s Movement Changed America*. New York: Penguin.
- Scutt, J. (1986) *Different Lives: Reflections on the Women’s Movement and Visions of its Future*. Camberwell, Australia: Penguin.

Friedländer, Benedikt (1866–1908)

Rowena Griem

Benedikt Friedländer (or Benedict Friedlaender) was active in the natural sciences before becoming a social and political philosopher and activist in the modern German homosexual rights movement. He sought to normalize relationships between men by viewing them in their historical and cultural context. He embraced the *Frei Körper Kultur* (Free Body Culture) movement and published articles advocating nudism in nature. In 1903 his first of several works on homosexuality appeared. His most influential book was *Die Renaissance des Eros Uranios* (1904).

Friedländer was a member and financial supporter of Magnus Hirschfeld’s Wissenschaftlich-humanitären Komitees (WhK) or Scientific-Humanitarian Committee. WhK fought against Paragraph 175, which criminalized all homosexual acts in Germany, and educated the public on homosexuality. In 1902 Friedländer co-founded the Gemeinschaft der Eigenen (Community of the Special), an all-male intellectual and cultural society. In 1906 Friedländer broke with Hirschfeld to help establish Sezession des Wissenschaftlich-humanitären Komitees (Secession of the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee). While Hirschfeld described homosexuals as an effeminate “third” or “intermediate sex,”

Friedländer bristled at this characterization. He was married and considered bisexuality the norm, but promoted the benefits of male-male relationships, including those between men and youths. He believed homoerotic relationships to be normal, beneficial to the nation, and superior to male-female relationships. He objected to Hirschfeld’s reliance on science and medicine to define homosexuality. Friedländer believed that this would portray homosexuality as an illness or anomaly, engendering pity rather than equality based on moral grounds. Friedländer emphasized historical, cultural, and anthropological concepts in his support of male-male homoerotic relationships. Although Hirschfeld and Friedländer had similar goals, these ideological and philosophical differences adversely affected the homosexual rights movement in Germany.

SEE ALSO: Hirschfeld, Magnus (1868–1935); Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements, Germany

References and Suggested Readings

- Keilson-Lauritz, M. (2005) Benedict Friedlaender und die Anfänge der Sexualwissenschaft. *Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung* 4, 18 (December): 311–31.
- Steakley, J. D. (1975) *Homosexual Emancipation Movement in Germany*. New York: Arno.
- Various (1991) *Homosexuality and Male Bonding in Pre-Nazi Germany*. New York: Haworth.

Fries’s Rebellion

Paul Douglas Newman

Fries’s Rebellion was a popular resistance movement, or “regulation,” by rural Pennsylvania Germans in the Lehigh Valley region in 1798–9. It followed two earlier post-Revolutionary regulations: Shays’s Rebellion of 1786 in Massachusetts, and the 1794 western Pennsylvania Whiskey Rebellion. In Fries’s Rebellion the resisters sought to regulate the federal government by protesting against and petitioning for the repeal of the Alien Acts, the Sedition Act, and the Direct Tax, mostly the work of the Federalist Party. When a federal marshal arrested resisters for obstruction of process and sedition and prepared to transport them to the nation’s capital for trial, the local militia mobilized to free the prisoners and secure a local trial. Within weeks, the national government sent an army into the region to quash the “insurrection” and make

arrests. A year of trials followed with dozens of minor convictions, and three convictions of treason carrying the death penalty, including the rebellion's namesake, John Fries. President John Adams pardoned Fries at the eleventh hour.

In 1798 the Federalist Party controlled both houses of Congress and the Executive, and had for several years pursued a pro-British economic and foreign policy, to the chagrin of the erstwhile US ally France as well as the admirers of the democratic ideals of the French Revolution in America, the Democratic-Republican Party. During the Anglo-French wars the Federalist Washington administration first proclaimed neutrality, and then in 1795 negotiated the Jay Treaty with Britain, opening the West Indies to American trade while forgoing trade with the French. After ratification in 1796, the French Directory began attacking American trading vessels heading to British ports. By 1797 the Federalist Adams administration sent a team of envoys to Versailles to negotiate an end to hostilities, but the Directory sent three anonymous agents to demand a bribe before granting them an audience. The envoys sent written proof of the slight back to Adams, who released the "XYZ Dispatches" to the media in March, 1798 and enraged the public. Adams hoped to use the anti-French sentiment to quell Democratic-Republican dissent in the newspapers, and to justify the augmentation of the US navy and coastal defense. More conservative Federalists in the House and Senate clamored for war and the creation of a standing, professional army. By July a number of bills passed both houses and sat on the president's desk for signing: the Sedition bill to outlaw anything "false, scandalous, and malicious" written or spoken against the government or president with the intent to "bring them into contempt or disrepute;" a series of Alien bills, designed to undercut the urban base of the Republican Party, that increased the period required for naturalization to 14 years and authorized the president to deport aliens of enemy nations; the authorization of more than \$10 million in military expenditures, including the creation of the "New Army" and the "Provisional Army" to meet the French threat and the "Eventual Army" to put down domestic rebellions, three warships, and dozens of defense projects in ports and harbors; and the Direct Tax on Lands, Dwelling Houses, and Slaves to fund the expenditure.

To collect the tax, the Adams administration appointed loyal Federalists, and in the Lehigh Valley that meant English-speaking Quakers and their fellow town-dwelling and pacifist German-speaking Moravian allies, both of whom had been recently turned out of office by rural Pennsylvania German Lutherans and Reformed. These "Church People" or "Kirchenleute," as they called themselves, had joined the Democratic-Republican Party in 1796 to take local control of northern Bucks and Montgomery counties, and most of Northampton county from the wealthier Quaker and Moravian minority. The Kirchenleute celebrated their service in the Revolution as citizen soldiers and still resented those who had refused to serve. They also resented the new Sedition Act, the standing professional army, and the saber-rattling directed at the French who helped secure American independence.

In October 1798 Democratic-Republican politicians campaigned in the region for the US House and the Pennsylvania Assembly, and told the crowds that the laws could be repealed. The Lehigh Valley elected a Republican Representative to the US House, and the local militias drafted and passed around petitions to the US Congress. Communities erected liberty poles with slogans denouncing the "Gag Law," the alliance with Great Britain, and the House Tax. The militias and the communities formed "Associations" that crossed township and county borders, in which the signers pledged to resist the assessment of their homes, to refuse to do business with the assessors, and to boycott or pressure any neighbors who complied with the tax on property until they heard back from the Congress about their petitions. While Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were authoring the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, developing the theory that states could determine the constitutionality of a federal law and legally nullify it, the Lehigh Valley Kirchenleute argued that the people held that right, and used the militia as the arm of popular nullification within their conception of popular constitutionalism, in accordance with the Second Amendment.

The Adams administration disagreed. Federal judges were sent to the area to take depositions in January 1799, and they sent a federal marshal with warrants for arrests for the obstruction of the tax in late February. The marshal succeeded in serving 20 resisters, and held them prisoner at a tavern in Bethlehem while preparing to take

them all to Philadelphia for trial. Approximately 150 armed militia and 250 unarmed Associators from Bucks and Northampton converged on Bethlehem on March 7 and offered to bail the prisoners provided that their trials be held in the area where they were presumed to have been committed, in accordance with the Sixth Amendment. The Marshal refused bail and reported the prisoners stolen. President Adams declared the situation to be insurrection on March 12, and called for the insurgents to submit. Within a week, the militias of the region met and unanimously voted to submit to the laws of the United States. Two weeks later the Eventual Army of 600 regulars and 320 Philadelphia militia marched into the region and arrested nearly 100 men on charges of treason, sedition, obstruction of process, and other charges.

Of 92 indictments, the federal prosecution won only 32 convictions, including just three treason convictions from eleven true bills. The most celebrated of the three was John Fries. Fries was not the leader of the rebellion, he was one militia captain from one township who happened to be the eldest captain at the Bethlehem rescue, and so assumed the role of negotiator with the marshal. Yet Federalist prosecutors, newspaper editors, and politicians made him into the figurehead of insurrection. Many conservative or “High Federalists” thought that Fries’s conviction and execution was imperative for the nation and the Federalist Party, including three of Adams’s four cabinet secretaries and the party’s intellectual leader, Alexander Hamilton. When in May 1800 a Philadelphia jury convicted Fries and two others of treason, and Judge Samuel Chase sentenced them to death, President Adams pardoned all 32 convicts, including Fries. This was the last in a chain of perceived missteps that led Hamilton and his followers to withdraw support from Adam’s reelection bid in 1800.

SEE ALSO: Shays’ Rebellion; Whiskey Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Bouton, T. (2000) “No Wonder the Times Were Troublesome”: The Origins of Fries’ Rebellion. *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 67 (Winter): 21–42.
- Churchill, R. (2000) Popular Nullification, Fries’ Rebellion, and the Waning of Radical Republicanism. *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 67 (Winter): 105–40.

- Kramer, L. D. (2004) *The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Newman, P. D. (2000) The Federalists’ Cold War: The Fries’ Rebellion, National Security, and the State, 1790–1800. *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 67 (Winter): 63–104.
- Newman, P. D. (2004) *Fries’s Rebellion: The Enduring Struggle for the American Revolution*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Fromm, Erich (1900–1980)

Richard Schaefer

Humanist-philosopher, psychoanalyst, and public intellectual, Erich Fromm was born in Frankfurt am Main, Germany in 1900. Author of over twenty books, Fromm’s socialist humanism was influential in New Left circles in the second half of the twentieth century. Raised in a strongly religious Jewish household, Fromm was attracted to the radical politics of Judaism, but ceased practicing the faith in his mid-twenties. After earning his PhD in sociology from the University of Heidelberg in 1922, Fromm underwent training to become a psychoanalyst at the Berlin Institute for Psychoanalysis.

Fromm was the co-founder of the Southwest German Institute for Psychoanalysis in 1929, and was later invited to join the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt in 1930. While at the Institute, Fromm undertook a study of the social psychology of German workers that supplied key material for Max Horkheimer’s *Studies on Authority and Family* (1936) and Theodor Adorno’s *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950). Fromm was also very influential in promoting the synthesis of Marx and Freud that became the hallmark of Critical Theory.

Immigrating to the United States in 1934, Fromm’s critique of Freud’s theory of drives led to a break with the Institute, and put him at the center of the movement known as neo-Freudianism. This critique emerged fully in *Escape From Freedom* (1941), in which Fromm sought to contextualize Freud’s unconscious in a more robustly sociohistorical direction by articulating the concept of the “social character.” A theoretical attempt at mediating individual

psychology with the Marxian dialectic of human history, the concept helped Fromm explore the appeal of fascism as an attempt to overcome feelings of isolation and alienation.

In the 1950s Fromm joined the American Socialist Party and helped organize the Society Against Nuclear Energy (SANE), and in 1968 he worked on behalf of Eugene McCarthy's presidential campaign. Fromm's activism found its counterpart in a series of popular writings, such as *The Sane Society* (1955) and *The Art of Loving* (1956), in which he advocated a renewal of ethics and the cultivation of "communitarian" socialism as a means to overcome the problems of advanced technological society.

During the Cold War, Fromm worked closely with many people, including Raya Dunayevskaya, to rehabilitate Marxist humanism and stimulate East-West dialogue, editing *An International Symposium of Socialist Humanism* in 1965. Though his influence on Critical Theory and Marxist humanism has often been underestimated, recent scholarship has made important strides towards rehabilitating Fromm's important contributions in these areas. Fromm died of a heart attack in Muralto, Switzerland in 1980.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Critical Theory; Dunayevskaya, Raya (1910–1987); Frankfurt School (Jewish Émigrés); Marxism; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Funk, R. (2000) *Erich Fromm: His Life and Ideas, An Illustrated Biography*. New York: Continuum.
- Jay, M. (1973) *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923–1950*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- McLaughlin, N. (1999) Origin Myths in the Social Sciences: Fromm, the Frankfurt School and the Emergence of Critical Theory. *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 24, 1: 109–39.

Fronde, France, 1648–1653

Wendy Maier

The Fronde was a series of revolts that occurred in France between 1648 and 1653, during the minority of Louis XIV. The word *fronde* means "catapult" or "sling" and its use to signify these revolts derives from the device utilized to throw

mud or rocks at coaches and government buildings during the disturbances.

The Fronde began as a struggle for power over the crown among the nobility and members of Parliament. This conflict later developed into a series of serious revolts that directly challenged the existing crown and estate hierarchy. The Fronde spread to the masses, who suffered the most during this time. A contemporary description of the way the common people saw themselves was as "a being who always goes on foot, who has no millions, as all of you wish to have, no castle, no valets to serve him, and who lives simply with his wife and children, if he has any, on the fourth or fifth floor. He is useful, because he knows how to plow a field, to forge, to saw, to file, to roof a building, to make shoes." It was the legal and societal distinctions between the classes, coupled with challenges to crown authority and individual desires for power at the expense of the people, that gave rise to the rebellions of the Fronde and led to the absolutist state of Louis XIV.

The first phase of the Fronde, known as the Fronde of the Parliament, occurred from 1648 to 1649. Precipitated by a severe financial crisis due largely to France's involvement in the Thirty Years War (1618–48), the crown relied heavily on taxes to restore the treasury. In addition to rate increases on existing tariffs, the government increasingly attempted to impose new taxes at the expense of the populace, the majority comprising the lowest socioeconomic classes in France, and who could not afford to pay more. Illegal searches and seizures of property escalated as tax collectors became more aggressive, causing irrevocable harm to the image of the crown and Parliament in the eyes of the general population.

This first wave of revolts occurred in January 1648, in direct response to the negative financial restructuring policies of Anne of Austria, the king's mother who ruled as *de facto* regent, and the crown's primary consultant, Cardinal Mazarin, who increased his personal wealth at the expense of the citizens. The crown also sold judgeships and royal offices to generate income. To raise crown revenue for war and other expenses, Anne and Mazarin devised a plan that included manipulation and exploitation of the *rentes* (national treasury shares). For example, Mazarin and other crown advisors would postpone interest payments on the shares until their price fell, and then the crown would buy more. Increased interference

with the *rentes* caused a great deal of discord among the upper classes.

In addition, Mazarin moved to abolish taxes, such as the *paulette*, which did not directly benefit the royal treasury. Some nobles were heavily reliant on taxes like the *paulette* in order to maintain hereditary authority of government offices and autocratic control over their provinces. In the eyes of the nobles, abolishing the *paulette* amounted to an attack on their hereditary fiscal rights. Another crown scheme was to revoke the salaries of members of the courts. The Parliament and law courts not only refused to ratify that proposal, but countered with a petition demanding limitations on crown authority. This was a serious challenge to the monarchy, and the courts pressed ahead by demanding legislative reforms. One key demand was that the crown cease arbitrarily imposing taxes and instead seek legislative approval for all taxation. Some members of Parliament threatened that failure to reform unpopular tax practices would result in civic unrest.

When the magistrates called for limitations on crown authority, however, Anne and Mazarin refused to back down and ordered the arrest of some of their severest parliamentary critics. Word of the arrest of the parliamentary agitators, including the popular Pierre Broussel, spread to the streets of Paris and elsewhere, precipitating riots. Broussel and the others were released, but that failed to end the insurrection. Crowds of rebellious citizens barricaded the main thoroughfares of Paris, and the royal regime seemed to be losing control of the capital city.

Forced to capitulate by the immediate threat of revolution, Mazarin and the queen regent agreed to most of Parliament's demands; including continual payment of the *rentes* and an end to Mazarin's illegal fiscal machinations. In early 1649, however, Anne, on Mazarin's advice, revoked the agreement and again ordered the arrest of some of her leading opponents. She was able to get away with it because by then the Thirty Years War was over, freeing up more royal troops to defend Paris. The first revolt thus officially ended in March 1649, but the problems that had sparked it not only remained, but had been exacerbated.

The second phase of the Fronde, known as the Fronde of the Princes, lasted from 1650 until 1653 and included both noble uprisings and massive civic unrest. The turmoil of the first

Fronde prompted a "prince of the blood," Louis de Bourbon, Prince of Condé, to try to wrest control of the monarchy from Anne and to remove Mazarin. Alerted to the possibility of a coup attempt, Mazarin ordered Condé's arrest. The Prince, however, had gained a measure of popularity with the parliamentarians and the "Third Estate" (the commoners) because he was perceived as a possible champion who could rid them of Mazarin. Condé had the backing of a section of the nobility and the support of Marshal Henri Turenne, an important general, so when he was imprisoned, a provincial army was raised against the royal forces. Mazarin was forced to release Condé, who immediately made a treaty with Spain against the French monarchy. Turenne then changed sides and led the royal armies against Condé, his regional factions, and Spanish troops. Civil war ensued, civil order broke down in many French cities and provinces, and the suffering of the people escalated.

During this phase Mazarin was forced to flee to Cologne, and despite Anne's attempts to pacify Condé's supporters, she was in constant danger of losing control of her son, the boy-king Louis XIV. Despite being only 13 years old, his majority was declared, but this had little effect on the war, as Spanish troops drew closer to the French borders. At the end of 1651 Mazarin returned at the head of a small army and France descended further into war and anarchy. A number of French provinces experienced waves of chaotic civic rebellions, mass starvation, and looting and pillaging by crown soldiers. Marie-Angelique Arnauld, the abbess of Port Royal, described the suffering of the ordinary people in these words:

This poor country is a horrible sight; it is stripped of everything. The soldiers take possession of the farms and have the corn threshed, but will not give a single grain to the owners who beg it as alms. It is impossible to plough. There are no more horses; all have been carried off. The peasants are reduced to sleeping in the woods and are thankful to have them as a refuge from murderers. And if they only had enough bread to half satisfy their hunger, they would indeed count themselves happy.

The Fronde of the Princes ended in 1653, and shortly thereafter France went to war against Spain. The widespread turmoil and misery caused by the Frondes ushered in the absolutism of

Louis XIV by making royal autocracy appear as a preferable alternative. Louis XIV took control of the government in 1661, consolidating the military and Parliament under his jurisdiction. He also removed the seat of government from Paris to Versailles as a means of insulating it from popular disorders. Louis's absolutism brought order and stability, but taxes increased, war ensued until almost the end of his reign in 1715, and living standards generally did not increase. The majority of the Third Estate, with the exception of some of the educated and merchant classes, experienced no improvement in its socioeconomic status. However, even after the final phases of the Fronde, members of the aristocracy continued to protest against usurpation of their noble privileges. Their grievances continued to smolder for several generations, until 1788 when they burst forth again with explosive force and ushered in the French Revolution.

SEE ALSO: Estates General, France; French Revolution, 1789–1794

References and Suggested Readings

- Baker, K. M. (Ed.) (1987) *The Old Régime and the French Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gibson, W. (1990) *A Tragic Farce: The Fronde, 1648–1653*. Bristol: Elm.
- Pascal, J. (2003) *A Rule for Children and Other Writings*. Ed. & trans. J. J. Conley. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rudé, G. (1988) *The French Revolution: Its Causes, Its History, and Its Legacy after 200 Years*. New York: Grove Weidenfeld.
- Treasure, G. (1995) *Mazarin: The Crisis of Absolutism in France*. London: Routledge.

Fuller, Margaret (1810–1850)

Holly M. Kent

Most famous for her pathbreaking feminist text *Woman in the Nineteenth Century* (1845), Sarah Margaret Fuller devoted much of her short life to challenging the narrow, restrictive notions about women's abilities and proper sphere and advocating greater educational, social, and professional rights and opportunities for women. Fuller was a quintessentially public figure, in an era in which women were expected to be quiet, domestic, and self-effacing.

Fuller was encouraged in her early intellectual endeavors by her father, politician and lawyer Timothy Fuller. A sometimes harsh and exacting parent, he nonetheless enabled his young daughter to receive a remarkably thorough home education, encouraging the young Margaret to study subjects traditionally deemed “unfeminine,” such as classical Latin and Greek. Fuller also had a considerable amount of formal education outside of the home, attending several schools for girls and young women, including the prestigious Boston Lyceum for Young Ladies. Frustrated at being barred from attending college because of her gender, Fuller began to channel her considerable intellectual energies towards a consideration of why women were so severely discriminated against.

When Fuller was 23 she moved with her family to Groton, Massachusetts, where she became involved in the region's Transcendentalist circles. With its mystical, nature-centered spirituality, a tremendous faith in the power of the individual to shape reality, and commitment to radical social change, Transcendentalism attracted many great nineteenth-century thinkers, including Bronson Alcott, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Henry David Thoreau. Between 1836 and 1839 Fuller worked as a teacher at several different schools in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.

In 1839 she began hosting her famous “conversations” in Boston. These conversations (which Fuller ran until 1844) provided women with the opportunity to meet and discuss significant intellectual, political, and theological issues in a women-only environment. Deeply frustrated by her lack of access to a university education, Fuller used her conversations to provide like-minded women with the opportunity to discuss art, literature, and politics with one another, voicing their ideas without having to fear being belittled by men skeptical of their intellectual abilities.

After having worked as the editor of *The Dial*, a Transcendentalist newspaper, between 1840 and 1842, Fuller published “The Great Lawsuit, Man vs. Men and Woman vs. Women” (1843). She expanded upon it and published it as *Woman in the Nineteenth Century* in 1845. In this treatise she tackled an assortment of subjects, including the need for women to be financially independent, the injustices of the American sex trade, and women's rights to property, higher education, and intellectually stimulating

employment. Although Fuller believed that there were fundamental gender differences between women and men, she argued passionately that women ought to have the right to pursue whatever profession they saw fit, regardless of whether or not the work they chose was considered “feminine” by mainstream society. *Women in the Nineteenth Century* was widely read and fiercely discussed in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe, earning Fuller both fulsome praise and harsh condemnation for her daring challenge to America’s rigid gender system.

In 1846 Fuller traveled to Europe as a foreign correspondent for the *New York Tribune*. Traveling widely across the continent, she was present during Italy’s revolutions of 1848 and 1849, becoming a staunch supporter of rebel leader Giuseppe Mazzini’s attempts to form an independent Roman republic. While in Italy, Fuller met, fell in love with, and possibly married a young revolutionary, Giovanni Angelo, the Marchese d’Ossoli. Fuller, Ossoli, and their newborn son left Italy for the United States in 1850, drowning in a shipwreck in July of that year. The manuscript of the history Fuller had been

writing of the Italian revolution was also lost in the wreck. Although her life was tragically short, Fuller’s influence on American society was profound, fundamentally shaping the ways in which the American public thought about women in their roles and rights in society.

SEE ALSO: Women’s Movement, United States, 19th Century; Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–1797)

References and Suggested Readings

- Capper, C. (2007) *Margaret Fuller: An American Romantic Life*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cheever, S. (2006) *American Bloomsbury: Louisa May Alcott, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Margaret Fuller, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Henry David Thoreau: Their Lives, Their Work*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Hudspeth, R. N. (Ed.) (1994) *The Letters of Margaret Fuller*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Myerson, J. (Ed.) (1980) *Critical Essays on Margaret Fuller*. Boston: G. K. Hall.
- Steele, J. (Ed.) (1992) *The Essential Margaret Fuller*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Von Mehren, J. (1994) *Minerva and the Muse: A Life of Margaret Fuller*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

G

G8 protests, Genoa, 2001

Dario Azzellini

The protests against the G8 (Group of Eight, most industrialized nations) summit in Genoa, Italy, from July 19–21, 2001, was a highpoint in the history of the “alter-globalization movement.” On July 21, after months of mobilizing across Europe, around 300,000 people took part in one of the largest “movement of movements” demonstrations in the world to date. At the same time, the police unleashed violence of a dimension unknown in Western Europe in the previous two decades, shooting dead the young Carlo Giuliani.

The mobilization’s success was primarily attributable to the coming together of a broad spectrum within the Genoa Social Forum (GSF), which organized the protests. It reached from grassroots Catholic organizations and left-wing neighborhood associations, over One World initiatives, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Rifondazione Comunista (Refounded Communist Party), the grassroots trade union Cobas and metal workers’ union FIOM, to the Tute Bianche (TB) and squatted social centers. The coalition was enabled on the one hand through a rejection of offensive violence, and on the other through the acceptance of the “defensive-offensive” approach of the TB, which involved forms of self-defense against the police, including the building of barricades. In addition, the protests found themselves at a political conjuncture favorable for the extra-parliamentary left in Italy. The right-wing electoral coalition, composed of the authoritarian Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale (AN), which emerged from the fascist party, and the regionalist-racist Lega Nord, had won the election, and Silvio Berlusconi, a businessman embroiled in numerous scandals and criminal offenses, had come to power.

Democratici di Sinistra (DS, the ex-Italian Communist Party (PCI)), and their electoral coalition, “Ulivo,” had created disappointment first of all through their neoliberal policies and then with their weak opposition. The grassroots were in search of possibilities for expressing dissent. This was to be found in the mobilization at Genoa.

At the same time, it was the first G8 summit in Europe since the “Battle of Seattle” around the World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial in 1999. With the protests against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in Prague in September 2000, and against the European Union (EU) summit in Gothenburg in June 2001, the European movement had been “warming up.”

The Protests

On Thursday, July 19, the Day of the Migrants, Genoa was overflowing. Tens of thousands were being accommodated in parks turned into campsites, while over 10,000 TBs and associated groups and networks (who later together formed the Disobbedienti) were camped in the city’s Carlini Athletic Stadium. Demanding equal rights for everyone and the opening of borders, 60,000 took part in the demonstration. The spectrum of those involved reached from Nigerian opposition groups and Kurdish PKK sympathizers, over Roma initiatives to numerous Turkish communist parties, exiles, and war refugees. Alongside anti-racist groups, factory delegations, trade unions, and church initiatives, they marched amid a sea of flags, banners, and placards. And all this despite the increased number of identity checks being carried out by the police in the city which had intimidated many migrants out of participating. For weeks, the press had warned of “violent attacks” and those presumed to be demonstrators were turned back at the Italian border. Police identity checks were set up on the



A group of demonstrators, their hands painted white to symbolize their opposition to violence, march through downtown Genoa, Italy, during the 2001 Group of Eight (G8) summit that began on July 20. About 200,000 people participated in demonstrations that quickly overshadowed the actual summit due to police violence. Hundreds were arrested or injured, and one 23-year-old anarchist, Carlo Giuliani, was shot dead by the police. Numerous charges of excessive force and planting evidence were brought against police and other officials, but none was found guilty. (Darko Bandic/AP/PA Photos)

roads leading into Genoa and accredited journalists were among those taken to police stations to have their identities confirmed. It was here that the first assaults took place.

On Friday, July 20 different parts of the movement gathered throughout the city to protest in various ways. Forms of action reached from “Inter-Confessional Praying Against the G8,” far away from the Red Zone (the security cordon around the conference center), to the anarchist “Black Bloc” demonstration which involved hundreds of people moving through the city looking for objects to attack. Beyond this, there was a “Pink and Silver Bloc” with imaginative costumes, pom-poms, and samba music; a meeting point for ATTAC and related NGOs, as well as for Trotskyists and for Cobas. These demonstrations, like that of the TB, attempted to reach the Red Zone. The non-violent grassroots Catholic organization, Lilliput, organised a sit-in.

The police attack, which began in the morning, was directed against the entire movement. Even the participants in the sit-in were shot at with tear gas and brutally beaten. The most severe attack, however, was launched against the TB demonstration of “civil disobedience.” Alongside baton charges and the use of hundreds of gas grenades, several shots of live ammunition were fired, and 18 bullet casings were later collected.

Around 15,000 people took part in the demonstration from Carlini Stadium. This exceeded the size of all previous TB actions. The militancy of the action concentrated itself on overcoming the police lines and the steel wall which blocked the route into the Red Zone. In order to publicize the concept of an offensive, politically directed approach, no damage was supposed to be done to property in the city. The armaments taken to the demonstration – helmets, protective padding made from foam and plastic, and Plexiglas shields – are neither explicitly legal or illegal under Italian law. The ability to use such armaments is generally a political question. For precisely this reason, an example was made of the most radical wing of the GSF coalition, the TB, which had grown the most in size. Though the demonstration had official permission, the police attacked demonstrators with tear gas and batons, using a narrow street to confine demonstrators, leaving them unable to move either forward or backward. The disciplined and highly organized nature of the demonstration prevented the outbreak of chaos at that point.

A seven-person caucus, appointed by a plenary meeting in Carlini Stadium, had decided upon the common approach and laid out the phases of the concept for action ahead of time. The caucus was to decide, in conjunction with the front of the demonstration, about advancing, retreating, breaks, and other actions. Right up until the end of the demonstration, decisions were communicated via a sound-system in several languages. Various groups were responsible for extinguishing gas grenades with buckets of water. Others helped wash gas out of people’s eyes, while others distributed water.

Even with such careful planning and coordination, however, chaos did eventually erupt after a young demonstrator named Carlo Giuliani was killed by a shot to the head from a Carabinieri (military police) jeep. The leadership of the demonstration decided not to become embroiled in a spiral of escalation and to spend the evening inside the stadium. The DS officially canceled their mobilization to Genoa, but their grassroots reacted in the opposite way with thousands making their way to Genoa in special trains, busses, and under their own steam.

Only with difficulty was the 300,000-strong demonstration able to make its way through Genoa’s narrow streets, and police resumed their attack as columns of smoke rose from the

banks and grand shops on the seafront. A sizeable proportion of the Genovese population who had remained in the city supported the demonstrators. In the heat, water hoses were turned on the thankful demonstrators. Drinking water and fruit were distributed, escape routes pointed out, and demonstrators hidden.

The Repression

On Saturday night police special forces stormed the A. Diaz School in which G8 opponents and journalists were sleeping. Out of 93 who were present, 82 were injured. Over 60 were carried out of the building covered in blood, unable to walk. They had multiple compound fractures, fractured skulls, and broken teeth. Three were beaten into a coma. Several were critically injured. Many found themselves in a state of shock. One German received serious damage to his head, requiring an emergency operation, and one British person's rib was broken, puncturing his lung. Information about the state of the injured – who were then also arrested – and their locations was still being withheld from relatives days later. Lawyers and civilian medics were not allowed to visit the prisoners. The state prosecutor was only informed about the arrests over 18 hours after the assault on the school.

According to the police, the school building was occupied by “the hard core of the Black Bloc who had provoked the excesses.” Stones were said to have been thrown at police vehicles from the school and officers attacked with knives as they stormed the building. The evidence: two Molotov cocktails, two empty bottles, several iron bars, and a Swiss Army knife. There was no search warrant. The police made use of an emergency law introduced under Fascism in 1931 which stated that permission to enter a building was not needed from a judge if there was suspicion of weapons being present. The attack in the Diaz School took place out of sight of the public. While screams and calls for help were heard from the building, five Italian members of parliament as well as lawyers and journalists were all denied access. Two members of parliament were beaten and thrown to the ground. Among the victims in the school were numerous journalists. The floors, walls, steps, and radiators were covered in blood. The following day, the police removed all the evidence. Shortly after, the police forced their way into the Pertini School,

opposite to where the GSF and Independent Media Centre were based. Here, journalists were also beaten, and computers and other facilities destroyed. Hard discs, photographs, and film materials were stolen.

The police had declared the ominous Black Bloc public enemy number one. The possession of a black t-shirt was enough to get one arrested, abused, and charged with participation in the excesses. The balance sheet read one death and hundreds injured and arrested, 49 of whom still remained in prison a week later. This systematic abuse and removal of basic rights did not just occur during the demonstrations and in the storming of the schools. In police vehicles, in custody and prison, arrestees were beaten, burned with cigarettes, had their bones broken, and were denied medical assistance. In several instances, prisoners were required to stand with their hands raised and faces against the wall for up to 26 hours. A woman with a broken leg was beaten into continuing to stand. Tear gas was fired into numerous police cells. Women and men were threatened with rape and death. Prisoners were beaten and tortured for days on end at the Bolzaneto Detention Center, where 250 people were taken. Prison doctors ripped piercings out of people's bodies and guards banged their heads against the walls until they bled. Amnesty International expressed serious concern and demanded an independent investigation into the events. They claimed democracy had been suspended while the most serious abuses of human rights in any EU state over the previous years had taken place. Indeed, the fascist disposition of many Italian police and Carabinieri is no secret. Pictures of Mussolini and the German Wehrmacht (German armed forces, 1935–1945) hung on the walls of police stations. Several police units sang anti-Semitic, racist, and right-wing songs. However, it was only through the support of the government that the officers were able to unleash such violence without fear of repercussions.

Excesses, the Black Bloc, and Agent Provocateurs

The hysteria about the Black Bloc died down a few days after the G8 as the media and part of the left began to calm down. At that point, the police violence became the focus of interest. Many factors pointed toward the excesses in Genoa being politically desired by the authorities in

order to provide a political legitimation for repression, intended to divide the movement. It has been shown on numerous occasions that the police allowed those who moved through the city streets setting fire to residents' cars and looting small businesses to do so relatively undisturbed, away from the Red Zone, while other demonstrators were subject to massive attack. Video evidence also shows masked and helmeted "demonstrators" with iron bars walking in and out of police stations. Police were observed swapping their uniforms for black clothes, close to their headquarters. Senator Gigi Malabarba, while visiting a police station, saw black-clad and masked people walking into the police station and talking to officers, sometimes in French and German. Neo-Nazis are also known to have taken part in the excesses. A known British Nazi drunkenly bragged in an interview with a journalist from the Italian *il manifesto* newspaper in Genoa that he had been contacted by "Italian comrades" to whom the police had given "a free hand in the destruction of the city." A social worker from the Genoa region also made known to *Secolo XIX* newspaper that an activist from the Forza Nuova Nazi group, whom he worked with, had told him that around 60 comrades were in Genoa.

Official Reaction

Much suggests that the repression in Genoa was planned and coordinated at the highest level. The deployment of firearms was not simply allowed for, but planned. The Carabinieri were ordered to fire. Vice-Premier Gianfranco Fini from the AN was present in the Genovese police control room throughout the G8. He provided the political line. According to *La Repubblica* newspaper, the far-right minister of justice, Roberto Castelli, who was recognized by blood-covered prisoners on his visit to Bolzaneto on Saturday, July 20, claimed to have seen "no indication" of assault. Minister of Interior Claudio Scajola argued during a parliamentary debate on 23 July, 2001 that "The security forces behaved with exemplary dignity."

As expected, the right-wing ruling majority rejected both the opposition's mistrust of Interior Minister Scajola as well as calls for a parliamentary investigation commission. Nevertheless, events were not able to be simply swept under the carpet. The Italian and then the inter-

national press documented hundreds of assaults. The large number of media activists present in Genoa contributed to the generation of publicity, releasing thousands of videos and photos. On Tuesday, July 24, 300,000 demonstrators took to the streets of different Italian cities to protest against what had happened. Demonstrations and actions took place around the world. Human rights organizations and trade unions, Italian and EU members of parliament, and members of European governments expressed their concern.

Inquiries and Legal Proceedings

The pressure led to the dismissal of three high-ranking police chiefs, including Arnaldo La Barbera, the head of the Anti-Terror Unit (UCIGOS), and the highest-ranking officer involved with the case of the Diaz School. Others dismissed included Francesco Colucci, chief of police in Genoa, who ordered the action, and Ansoino Andreassi, Italy's deputy chief of police and a member of the G8 Security Committee who was present as a supervisor.

The young Carabinieri Mario Placanica, accused of killing Carlo Giuliani, was found not guilty in May 2003, deemed to have acted in self-defense. Numerous video recordings, however, disprove the self-defense thesis. Because the shooter is not visible in any of the videos, Placanica provided contradictory evidence, and numerous inconsistencies remain unresolved, it has often been presumed that Placanica was made into a scapegoat to protect a more senior officer.

On April 29, 2005 a number of police, including several high-ranking officers, were accused of grievous bodily harm, the fabrication and concealment of evidence, abuse of authority, and perjury in relation to the events in the Diaz School. The police heavily impeded legal clarification of events, but one of the deputy chiefs of police in Genoa, Michelangelo Fournier, offered extensive testimony, admitting to having remained silent for six years out of *esprit de corps*. It was found that the storming of the Diaz had been decided upon in the afternoon. The throwing of stones from the building and the knife attacks had been made up. Both Molotov cocktails were planted by police on the orders of senior officers. Despite everything pointing toward the assault as being planned, the actions of the police at both schools were

widely presented as irrational acts. In the Diaz School, and moreover in the GSF headquarters, the police destroyed tens of thousands of pieces of evidence, photographs, and video recordings documenting crimes committed by the authorities, and stole records of items which had been confiscated. The GSF had requested in advance that evidence be collected there. Forty-five judicial officers, doctors, nurses, and police were accused of abuse of office, bodily harm, and the concealment of evidence in relation to the assaults in Bolzaneto. The treatment of prisoners was found to be in breach of the European and UN conventions against torture.

The investigating judge concluded that collective punishment should be handed down for falsifying evidence, as all police commanders present knew what was taking place and the course of action had been planned by the national police command. Even so, almost all police officers involved with the assaults were rewarded with promotions. Andreassi was appointed deputy director of the secret service (SISDE) and Caldarozzi, accused of perjury, libel, and abuse of office, was promoted within his job as chief of Criminalpol at Central Operations Service.

Around 300 demonstrators were also subjected to preliminary proceedings. Charges included destruction and looting, arson, the manufacture, transportation and possession of explosives, possession of illicit weapons, and resistance and violence against officers. The legal proceedings against the 93 people in the Diaz School were discontinued in February 2004 after a judge was unable to find evidence for actions of violence.

The Italian Movement After Genoa

Within the Italian left, Genoa is generally understood as the beginning of a new era. On the one hand, it is seen as a “declaration of war” on the global movement, and on the other as an anticipation of the transformation which took place after September 11, 2001, where war became a primary instrument of political control.

Genoa clearly demonstrated what a broad movement is capable of – and what it will be confronted with. In particular for the generation which had not lived through the 1970s, the “movement of movements” protests in Genoa offered a new experience which despite – and also because of – the brutal repression, led to an enormous politicization which showed itself in

numerous movements to come. Over a few weeks, over 150 social forums were set up throughout Italy. In the following two years, movement followed movement and numerous demonstrations with 2.5–3 million participants took place, as well as half a dozen with 1–1.5 million. A broad movement against the Afghanistan war emerged, mobilizing hundreds of thousands. On the initiative of the Italian General Confederation of Labor, following three general strikes organized by Cobas and a year of movement activism by the FIOM, more than 3 million people demonstrated in Rome on March 23, 2002 against the reform of Article 18 which practically abolished protection against being fired from work. Three weeks later an 8-hour general strike brought the country to a halt. Grassroots trade unions and the *Disobbedienti*, who had by this point emerged from the TB, took part in the strike. On July 20, 2002, the anniversary of Carlo Giuliani’s death and the G8, rallies and actions took place throughout the whole of Italy. In Genoa, nine days of public debates, conferences, actions, street theater, concerts, and demonstrations took place and 150,000 people took part in the main demonstration.

Around 1 million people took part in the demonstration that followed the European Social Forum in Florence in November 2002. This was followed by a broad protest against the Iraq war which mobilized more than 3 million people to its main demonstration in February 2003. In spring 2004 it was still able to bring 1.5 million into the streets. At the same time, workplace struggles erupted, adopting forms of social disobedience.

From the end of 2003 onwards, blockades and occupations were increasingly used in social struggles, protests against nuclear waste, and in teachers’ strikes. The attempt to destroy the movement in Italy had the opposite effect. The movement first entered a downturn as the liberal left and *Rifondazione Comunista* began orienting themselves towards the next election, and finally with the electoral victory of the center-left coalition in April 2006. The new government prevented the parliamentary inquiry into Genoa from taking place, which they had themselves demanded while in opposition. Instead, Minister of Interior Giuliano Amato appointed Gianni De Gennaro to the Cabinet. He was the former chief of police in Italy and in the process of being prosecuted for incitement to perjury.

SEE ALSO: Disobbedienti/Tute Bianche; G8 Protests, Gleneagles, 2005; G8 Protests, Heiligendamm, June 2007; Global Day of Action Against the IMF and World Bank, Prague, September 26 (S26), 2000; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Grassroots Resistance to Corporate Globalization; Indymedia Global Justice Campaign, 2000s; Italian Communist Party; World Social Forums; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999

References and Suggested Readings

- Amnesty International (2001) Italy: G8 Genoa Policing Operation of July 2001. A Summary of Concern. Available at www.news.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR300122001?open&of=ENG-315 (downloaded October 27, 2007).
- Neale, J. (2002) *You Are G8 – We Are Six Billion: The Truth behind the Genoa Protests*. London: Vision.
- One Off Press (Ed.) (2001) *On Fire: The Battle of Genoa and the Anti-Capitalist Movement*. London: One Off Press.

G8 protests, Gleneagles, 2005

Emma Dowling

The G8 summit is an annual meeting of the Group of Eight most industrialized nations (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, the UK, the United States and, since 1998, Russia). It is designed to help form a consensus around issues of mutual political and economic importance. The 2005 G8 summit in Scotland, however, was met by protest networks active within the global justice movement who had organized a number of activities to draw attention to the responsibility of the G8 for continued poverty, exploitation, and environmental destruction across the globe.

Relations between the multiplicity of actors associated with the global justice movement have never been straightforward, given the diversity of their tactics, strategies, and aims. At past protest events there had been at least some sense of unity against the effects of neoliberal globalization and the institutions associated with it. In Scotland, however, three different component forces of the movement organized separately from, and in many ways in opposition to, one another. Importantly, efforts ranged from a pro-G8 stance intent on lobbying the G8, to a complete rejection of the G8 and the capitalist system it stands for. Additionally, the massive Live 8 con-

certs, organized by philanthropic pop stars such as Bob Geldof and Bono, were a new feature of the summit events. Further to this, the UK government, as host to the G8, succeeded in conveying itself as not so much the object of the protests, but as an ally to certain elements of the movement, i.e., Make Poverty History (MPH) and Live 8.

Make Poverty History, G8 Alternatives, and the Dissent! Network

Led by the UK's poverty and development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Oxfam, Christian Aid, Action Aid, and Cafod, the MPH campaign brought together a broad range of what is often termed "civil society," including charitable organizations, church groups, local councils, members of the public, businesses, and celebrities. Its intentions were to lobby the G8 (via the UK government) to implement policies that would alleviate extreme poverty in developing countries through trade justice, debt cancellation, and "more and better aid." The campaign began in the autumn of 2004 and involved awareness-raising to mobilize broad sections of the British public to support the campaign and its three demands. Participating organizations sold white wrist bands for people to wear to symbolize their support for the initiative, and thus raise money for their individual projects. Celebrities were brought on board and TV advertisements used to mobilize British society successfully.

Key to the campaign was the generation of public support for the lobbying efforts of organizations seeking to put moral pressure on the G8 to eradicate extreme poverty in the world. On Saturday July 2, before the official opening of the G8 summit, 300,000 people congregated in Edinburgh, mostly dressed in white, forming a large circle around the city center, symbolizing a giant white band to demand the G8 implement the policy proposals of MPH.

Political divisions as to the extent to which to collaborate with the UK government existed within the coalition between the larger (and wealthier) organizations such as Oxfam and the smaller, often politically more radical organizations such as War on Want or the World Development Movement, who also fostered close links with other wings of the movement. Yet the dominant organizations of the MPH campaign

succeeded in stamping their vision of a close proximity to UK government policy on the campaign. MPH became the dominant actor in the public perception of the protests around the summit.

MPH was part of the Global Call to Action Against Poverty (G-CAP), which includes NGOs, but also networks and organizations traditionally associated with the global justice movement, such as local and national ATTAC groups (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions in the Aid of Citizens). In terms of the social base of the campaign, participants in MPH were almost exclusively UK-based. In many ways, MPH could be said to represent the “liberal” wing of the global justice movement, one which seeks to influence state power through lobbying its national government to achieve reform on a global scale.

A different grouping was the G8 Alternatives coalition, a Trotskyite-dominated coalition which involved some political parties, trade union branches, and smaller NGOs, as well as elements of the anti-war movement. They differentiated themselves from MPH by taking a more critical stance towards the G8 and neoliberalism, albeit encompassing “those who are against the G8 and also those who wish to lobby the G8,” as G8 Alternatives spokeswoman Gill Hubbard stated at the time. Their politics found expression in a counter-summit conference to discuss alternatives to neoliberal globalization and the G8, as well as a legal protest march (predominantly) against the G8 in Auchterarder, a town near to the Gleneagles Hotel, where the summit security fence was breached by protesters. Many speakers at the counter-summit were public figures recognized as activists of the global justice movement, such as Third World Forum director Samir Amin, former ATTAC vice president Susan George, and South African anti-privatization activist Trevor Ngwane. G8 Alternatives adopted the slogan “Another World Is Possible,” originating from the World Social Forum.

A third initiative was the Dissent! network, encompassing groups and individuals who had previously been involved in Britain’s ecological direct action movement, the People’s Global Action (PGA) network, the anti-war movement, and mobilizations against previous international summits. This network took an explicitly anti-G8, anti-capitalist, and anti-authoritarian stance, with

a focus on direct actions involving disruption to the running of the summit and its policing efforts. Actions included road blockades, a Carnival for Full Enjoyment in Edinburgh (which intended to draw attention to the increasing precariousness of employment conditions), a series of discussions and training workshops entitled Days of Dissent at the University of Edinburgh, the opening of an independent media center (for activists to write and publish reports and photos of the protests), an eco-village protest camp in nearby Stirling, and the formation of a theatrical direct action group, the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army (CIRCA).

Dissent!’s days of action spanned the weekend before the summit, where workshops were organized in Edinburgh and “convergence centers” (self-organized protest camps) opened to begin planning direct actions. The greatest visibility this network had was on July 6, when groups blockaded the roads out of Edinburgh and around Gleneagles in an attempt to disrupt the summit. The network as a whole issued no public statements due to its refusal of representational politics. Overwhelmingly, participants in this network rejected the G8 in its entirety, along with the state as a reference point for social change, intent on achieving the desired “other possible worlds” through self-organization beyond the realms of the nation-state. The politics of this network can be associated with anarchism, autonomism (non-institutionalized organization of class struggle), and anti-authoritarianism, but also more generally with notions of non-hierarchical and non-party/non-institutionalized activism associated with new social movements.

Relations Between MPH, G8 Alternatives, and Dissent!

The relations between these different initiatives were mostly antagonistic. While some ties existed between G8 Alternatives and Dissent!, whose participants equally perceived themselves as the direct descendants of previous summit mobilizations, their engagement with one another was cautious. This was because Dissent! network activists were largely both reluctant to find themselves being represented by those considered less radical than themselves and critical of G8 Alternatives’ perceived reluctance to take

practical, direct action against the summit; while many of G8 Alternatives' protagonists were critical of what they saw as the elitism of a movement which privileged action taken by relatively small groups of activists over the building of broad-based mass movements with strong leadership structures.

At the same time, an understanding existed of the necessity to not appear divided in public. For example, David Miller, a spokesperson of G8 Alternatives, publicly condemned the police for their heavy-handed policing of actions associated with the Dissent! network. MPH existed virtually outside of this nexus, and hostilities were played out via the press where particularly the actions of the Dissent! network were relegated, much like in the discourse of the UK government, to an apolitical realm.

Live 8 and the UK Government

A novel feature of the 2005 event was the celebrity-led Live 8 pop concert extravaganzas, which took place in a number of cities across the globe simultaneously on July 2. Organized by musicians Bob Geldof, Midge Ure, and Bono with the involvement of the filmmaker Richard Curtis and the sponsorship of corporations such as AOL and Nokia, these concerts sought to revive the spirit of the Live Aid initiative of the early 1980s in drawing attention to the plight of African countries and calling for the G8 to act in line with the demands of MPH. The Live 8 leaders surpassed their role as entertainers for a good cause and became political actors, making demands of the G8 and commenting publicly on the political process taking place. Bob Geldof, Bono, and Richard Curtis all had previous involvement with charitable work and in the run up to the G8 they gave press conferences and met regularly with UK governmental advisors.

The ideological emphasis here was on salvation, on the global North helping the "poor victims" of Africa who could not help themselves. The imagery of these concerts resonated perfectly with a position that would enable the political course of neoliberal globalization to continue, whereby the wealthy and powerful countries are understood as benign agents of positive change. Moreover, Live 8 exhibited the idea of politics as entertainment and consumption sold to a public that in this way is not so much

politicized as disciplined into towing the line set out for them by those with power in the existing system.

The relationship that Live 8 exhibited towards other currents of protest was one of domination. The MPH/Live 8 axis was an uneasy one. In the run up to the event, the Live 8 protagonists supported MPH, but increasingly attempted to dominate the agenda by making direct comments regarding the political process of the G8 summit.

The UK government played an unusually active role in its attempts to integrate more moderate elements of the movement into its poverty alleviation discourse. It sought to insert itself as a movement actor, publicly supporting MPH and Live 8 and deploying discourses previously associated with the global justice movement. It created an image of itself as the representative of the movement for global justice within the G8 negotiations, taking the policy demands of MPH to the G8 and "doing its best" to see them implemented. Under the leadership of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the plight of Africa had been placed at the top of the agenda for the summit meeting and the Commission for Africa set up, bringing together UK government departments with carefully selected civil society actors from the UK and the African continent, as well as celebrities such as Bob Geldof.

This further contributed to shifting the discourse which had previously targeted the G8 as a hindrance to global justice, to one in which the G8 could now be understood as part of the solution to the ills of neoliberal globalization. Clear dividing practices were employed selectively to facilitate and repress the different sections of the movement. While direct actions such as street blockades were branded as "violent" and without political content, the MPH campaign was seen as a welcome ally in tackling the world's problems with concrete policies supported by broad sections of UK society.

The year 2005 was also the first time the J8 (Junior Eight) summit gained larger visibility, where school children enacted the summit meeting and were also invited to develop their own ideas for how to make the world a better place, which were in turn submitted to the actual G8 meeting. This initiative formed part of the construction to position the G8 as an institution with the political will and power to alleviate social ills. It thus reflected the basic

message that Live 8 and MPH carried: the G8 is a legitimate institution which, if effectively lobbied, can provide for the type of social change demanded by the global justice movement.

On July 7, news of bombings in the London Underground by an al-Qaeda sympathetic Islamist group (as became public in the subsequent days) interrupted summit events and bestowed a more somber atmosphere on the protests. Tony Blair declared to the press that he would not be deterred by violence and used the attacks in London as a way of separating the good forces for change (civil society, the G8, and benign state actors) from those supposedly intent on mindless disruption. While the deployment of a poverty alleviation discourse by heads of state, civil society actors, and the G8 itself signals a shift, critics argue this to be a smoke-screen to enable “business as usual” by the G8 states.

The 2005 G8 summit protest events reflect the complexity of activism for social change. It is not always easy to understand the dividing lines between progressive and reactionary forces. For some, MPH was a real success in bringing a more human and environmental focus to the table of the G8. For others, it signaled cooption and the failure of the global justice movement to maintain a legitimate yet confrontational voice in emphasizing the importance of struggles and grassroots movements as opposed to the top-down, market-oriented solutions of policy advisors, government officials, and multinational corporations.

SEE ALSO: G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; G8 Protests, Heiligendamm, June 2007; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Grassroots Resistance to Corporate Globalization; Indymedia Global Justice Campaign, 2000s; World Social Forums

References and Suggested Readings

- Harvie, D. et al. (Eds.) (2005) *Shut Them Down! The G8, Gleneagles 2005 and the Movement of Movements*. New York: Autonomedia.
- Hubbard, G. & Miller, D. (2005) *Arguments Against G8*. London: Pluto Press.
- McCormick, D. (2005) *When the G8 Came to My Town: A Big Event in a Small Town in the Big Country*. Stirling: Northern Sky Press.
- Sachs, J. (2005) *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for our Time*. London: Penguin.
- Trewin, S. (2005) *Live 8 – The Official Book*. New York: Century.

G8 protests, Heiligendamm, June 2007

Ulrich Brand

From June 6–8, 2007, the annual summit of the Group of Eight (G8) most industrialized nations took place in Heiligendamm, Germany, on the Baltic coast. The gathering was hosted by the German government and accompanied by intense protests.

The G8 is an informal group which gathered for the first time in the city of Rambouillet, close to Paris, France, in November 1975. The heads of government of France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States participated. In 1976 the Canadian government joined, and the government of Russia in 1998. The EU Commission has participated since 1977, although since it is a supranational organization it is not an official member state.

The G8 fulfils a symbolic function. It is seen as where the “world leaders” get together in order to efficiently steer the world economy. Institutionally, it intends to be an important forum to deal with conflicts among the major political and economic states and problems within the world economy, such as currency imbalances, inflation, external debt, and energy security. It aims to ensure both the stability and dynamism of the global economy. More recently, other topics have been integrated into the agenda. In Heiligendamm the issues discussed included financial and capital markets, investment security, intellectual property, energy efficiency, climate politics, and development in Africa.

The noncommittal results of the summit were criticized and reinforced the political concerns of the protesters. The growing critique of neoliberal-imperial globalization led to an expansion of the agenda and the invitation of heads of governments of poor countries (especially from Africa). This was on top of an outreach initiative which has led to the governments of China, India, South Africa, Brazil, and Mexico – the most important so-called “emerging markets” besides Russia – being invited as guests, though not official members.

Beyond the annual summits and the meetings of finance ministers, which generate major publicity, the G8 is an ongoing process between

high-ranking officials based in a range of government departments geared towards coordinating political-economic activities. The G8 plays a central role in global economic governance, or – to use a more critical concept – is a part of contemporary “ultra-imperialism” (a term used by Karl Kautsky to describe a period of capitalist development which characterized the early twentieth century) where powerful states coordinate among themselves, developing the political rules of the world economy. Yet the G8 is not the political center of the global economy. It is better understood as one node where major conflicts among powerful nations are dealt with and strategies developed. Nevertheless, it is a symbol of neoliberal imperial globalization and as such has become a target of protest.

As a result of the growth in protests against the annual G8 summits, and the 2001 summit in Genoa, Italy, in particular, meetings have since tended to be located in mountain regions or the countryside to make protest more difficult. It is for this reason that the 2007 summit did not take place in a major city, as with earlier meetings in Germany – Bonn in 1978 and 1985 (which was then the capital of West Germany), Munich in 1992, and Cologne in 1999 – but in a resort close to the town of Heiligendamm. Heiligendamm marks an important step in the history of the global justice movement as a result of the large, intense, and international mobilization, and because of the gaining of strength of the radical left within the counter-globalization movement in Germany in particular.

Towards the Protests

The mobilization began two years ahead of the summit in the autumn of 2005. The autonomous left formed the Dissent network in continuation of the network of the same name which was formed ahead of the 2005 G8 summit protests in Gleneagles, Scotland. Another network, the Interventionist Left (IL), was formed in the same year, describing itself as “post-autonomous” (in other words, radical left and anti-capitalist, with an openness toward working with non-autonomous others, such as trade unions and political parties). ATTAC Germany also decided early on to mobilize against the summit. Two annual conferences of BUKO (the Federal Coordination for Internationalism), which has existed since 1977, focused on the G8 in 2006 and

2007. In 2006 a large number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Left Party, and the Green Party all decided to mobilize. (The Greens were voted out of the federal government in late 2005 and subsequently tried to reestablish the relationship with social movements that it had almost completely lost during its seven years in a power-sharing government.)

Countless local, regional, federal, and international meetings took place. Something along the lines of a nationwide steering committee, the Hannover Group, was formed by representatives of different actors within the mobilization to try and coordinate activities during the week of protest. Hundreds participated in three “Action Conferences” in Rostock itself to coordinate the preparation of specific events. An international initiative produced 50,000 copies of ten different posters, each produced by a different artist, under the label “Holy Damn It.” The posters criticized processes of privatization and exploitation, militarization and war, and racist, patriarchal, and class domination. They also called for the opening of space for alternatives.

In March 2006 a strategy paper was published by BUKO, articulating for the first time political positions which were widely shared by others within the mobilization (similar strategy papers published by others later put forward similar arguments). The paper interpreted the intensity of the mobilization, which began long ahead of the summit, as indicative of a widespread recognition of the need to organize politically and develop strategies against neoliberal and imperial globalization. The G8 was described as a node in a complex web of relations of global domination which had been placed under pressure due to numerous crises and the growth of protest. It concluded that central strategies for the mobilization should involve a delegitimation of the G8, using the occasion of the summit to reflect on the current situation, to mobilize, to bring different movements together, and to organize politically. The goal would then be to undermine dominant thinking and action, to criticize dominant politics, and to strengthen counter-movements and alternatives. In addition, an important aspect of the protests should involve allowing visibility and a voice for those people and forces which are generally marginalized. Special attention, the paper also pointed out, should be given to the fact that the

state and media would likely try to divide the protest movements.

From the winter of 2006/2007 onwards, the production of alternative knowledge began to play an increasingly central role. Dissent, the Interventionist Left, and ATTAC all produced their own information and propaganda. Several anthologies and monographs were published. Numerous alternative and radical publications produced a special issue about the summit, and the Internet played an important role. Several left-wing and center-left daily newspapers, such as *Neues Deutschland*, *Junge Welt*, *die tageszeitung*, and the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, provided extensive coverage of the event in advance and supplements during the week with detailed reports and background information. A number of raids by police on offices and apartments thought to be connected to those involved with the mobilization served as a final mobilizing factor. They were widely criticized, including within the liberal media.

The Week of Protest

Camps were organized to accommodate thousands of protesters, with the support of the local government in Rostock and the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. The protests opened on June 1, 2007 with a demonstration against the “Bombodrom” (a site where bombs are test-dropped), near Rostock. The largest demonstration took place on Saturday, June 2, in Rostock, where 80,000 people protested against the G8, neoliberal and imperial globalization, and the recent repression of social movements in Germany. The demonstration ended with a confrontation between some protesters – parts of the Black Bloc, which consisted of between 3–5,000 anarchists, members of autonomous and anti-fascist groups, and others – and the police. The police had already criminalized protesters in the run-up to the week of protest and consciously provoked them during the demonstration and blockades. While the police might not have “started it” during the demonstration, many witnesses reported that they did deploy violence in situations where there was no provocation. Their policy was a long way from the “de-escalation” they had promised. Many argued that the police and government both had an interest in producing images of confrontation during the demonstration on Saturday. Occurring within the

context of an increased dismantling of civil and social rights in Germany, the protests in Rostock and around Heiligendamm have since been used to further justify demands for an expansion in the state’s security apparatus.

A significant moment that followed the demonstration on Saturday was the refusal of the grassroots to allow a split to emerge within the movement, despite a number of statements by “representatives” of the protest in this direction, including demands for the blockades of the summit planned for later in the week to be cancelled. Despite a number of people distancing themselves, the fact remained that the radical and autonomous areas of the left formed a major part of the protests. It had not “attached” itself to the mobilization, or “instrumentalized” it (despite some people exploiting the opportunity of the demonstration, or displaying irresponsibility towards other protesters while throwing stones). They remained an important and dynamic part of the movement.

On Sunday, June 3 a day of action took place on the issue of agriculture and genetic engineering. On Monday the 4th, protests and demonstrations took place demanding global freedom of movement and equal rights for everyone, including migrants and refugees. On Tuesday the 5th, a day of action was held against war, militarism, torture, and the “global state of exception.”

The centerpiece of the week of protest was the blockade of the summit itself on Wednesday the 6th through Friday the 8th, involving around 13,000 people. They produced images of colorful, radical, and successful protests against the summit, blocking many of the roads into the conference center, forcing many delegates, journalists, and service providers to be either flown in or to be brought into Heiligendamm by sea. The blockades were complemented by an Alternative Summit in Rostock, with around 2,000 participants.

Alongside the demonstration and blockades, one of the events that drew the most media attention was a huge pop concert on Thursday, June 7, which drew around 60,000 spectators. The concert sought to provide a “voice for Africa” and had been organized by Herbert Grönemeyer, a well-known German rock musician. Musicians and lobbyists Bob Geldof and Bono, who had organized a similar event to coincide with the 2005 G8 summit, drew further media attention by also taking to the stage.

Beyond Heiligendamm

During the two-year mobilization against the G8 summit, and during the week of protest itself, the diversity of the movement – and the benefits that could be drawn from this diversity – became clear to most of those either directly involved or observing the process. Mutual points of reference, common forms of action, and intense debate and marked difference, all characterized the movement around Heiligendamm. Public credibility was gained through sound reasoning and sharp criticism. The left in Germany moved along a steep learning curve, as well as growing numerically, with a large number of younger people becoming politically active for the first time. The interaction between the movement and political parties – and the Left Party in particular – was relaxed and cooperative. In all these respects, the mobilization served as a genuine crystallization point for the broad left.

Despite all this, and the clear orientation as being of the left (the extreme right in Europe, of course, is also against globalization), success was limited. It has since been pointed out that the production of a positive public image for left-wing social movements is not the same as subverting neoliberal and imperial hegemony, or the construction of alternative forms of social interaction (Brand & Wissen 2005; Mertes 2004; della Porta 2007). The culture of the market, competitive individualism, and the culture of fear – all of which make emancipatory thought and practice difficult – do not simply disappear. During the mobilization the question of political organization was widely debated. While the protests were successful in attracting a large number of people not affiliated to any political organization, the challenge of developing organizational and institutional structures to increase the effectiveness of struggles remains largely unfulfilled.

A further perceived failure of the mobilization was the inability to formulate coherent, emancipatory positions on climate change and energy use – key topics discussed at the summit. Increasing efficiency and ecological modernization, as propagated by the German government and others around the summit, have made considerable ideological inroads – including into the left. The primary criticism of radicals has simply been that these policies do not go far enough. There has been very little success in terms of making connections between, for example, global

warming, social crises, and questions of power and domination.

The movement in Germany has largely set itself the task of extending the positive experiences of the mobilization and applying them to other parts of society, developing a “rebellious consciousness,” articulating concrete critiques of social relations along various lines of conflict, and building alternative structures and transforming existing institutions. In other words, “translating” the recent experience of the mobilization into everyday politics and everyday life in order to shift the current balance of forces.

SEE ALSO: G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; G8 Protests, Gleneagles, 2005; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Grassroots Resistance to Corporate Globalization; Indymedia Global Justice Campaign, 2000s; Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938)

References and Suggested Readings

- Brand, U. (2007) *The G8 Process as a Successful Feast of Political Imagination: Image Creation, Reconstructing the Left and Radical Social Change*. Trans. O. Pye. Available at www.transform-network.org/index.php?id=623 (downloaded November 7, 2007).
- Brand, U. & Wissen, M. (2005) Neoliberal Globalization and the Internationalization of Protest: A European Perspective. *Antipode* 37 (1): 9–17.
- BUKO – Federal Coordination of Internationalism (2006) *Delegitimize G8, Strengthen Social Movements and Try Out Alternative Ways of Living. What We Expect from the G8 Process – A Discussion Paper, March 2006* (BUKO Working Group on the World Economy). Available at www.dissentnetzwerk.org/files/buko%20engl.pdf (downloaded November 7, 2007).
- Della Porta, D. (Ed.) (2007) *The Global Justice Movement. Cross-National and Transnational Perspectives*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
- Holloway, J. & Sergi, V. (2007) *Of Stones and Flowers: A Dialogue*. Available at www.turbulence.org.uk/turb_g8heil_of_stones.html (downloaded November 7, 2007).
- Mertes, T. (Ed.) (2004) *A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?* New York: Verso.

Gabriel's Rebellion

Douglas R. Egerton

The enslaved revolutionary known only as Gabriel was born in 1776 near Richmond, Virginia, at Brookfield, the Henrico County plantation of

Thomas Prosser. By Virginia standards, Brookfield was a large plantation, with approximately 50 laborers. Most likely, Gabriel's father was a blacksmith, the occupation chosen for Gabriel. Status as an artisan provided considerable standing in the slave community, as did his ability to read and write. In the fall of 1798 Gabriel's master died, and ownership of Brookfield passed to 22-year-old Thomas Henry Prosser, who maximized his profits by hiring out his surplus slaves, so Gabriel spent a considerable part of each month smithing in Richmond for white artisans. Although still a slave, he enjoyed a rough form of freedom.

Emboldened by this quasi-liberty, in September 1799 Gabriel moved toward overt rebellion. Caught in the act of stealing a pig by a white neighbor, Gabriel wrestled the man to the ground and bit off the better "part of his left Ear" and was formally charged with attacking a white man, a capital crime. Although found guilty, he escaped the gallows by pleading "benefit of clergy," which allowed him to avoid hanging in exchange for being branded on the thumb with a small cross as he was able to recite a verse from the Bible.

Gabriel's branding and incarceration served as a brutal reminder that despite his literacy and privileged status, he remained a slave. By the early spring of 1800 his fury began to turn into a carefully considered plan to bring about his freedom, as well as the end of slavery in Virginia. Slaves and free blacks from Henrico County would gather at Brookfield on the evening of August 30 to march on Richmond. If Governor James Monroe and the town leaders agreed to Gabriel's demands for black liberty and an equitable distribution of the property, the slave general intended to "hoist a white flag" and drink a toast "with the merchants of the city."

The conspiracy matured in the context of Atlantic and political affairs of the late 1790s. Since 1793, large number of refugees from the slave rebellion in French Saint Domingue had arrived in Virginia, many of them bringing their bondservants with them. But if the uprising in the Caribbean helped to inspire mainland rebels, it was the divisive election of 1800 that provided Gabriel with his opportunity. Rumors held that if Thomas Jefferson was victorious the Federalists would not relinquish power, and one Federalist newspaper predicted an "ultimate

appeal to arms by the two great parties." Most likely, Gabriel not only hoped to exploit this split among white elites, but also to throw his lot in with either side who would do the slaves the most favor in the coming civil conflict.

The planned uprising collapsed just before sunset on the appointed day, when a severe thunderstorm hit the Richmond area. The chaos of the storm convinced two Henrico slaves that the revolt could not succeed. They informed their owner of the conspiracy and he hurried word to Monroe. After hiding along the James River for nearly two weeks, Gabriel risked boarding the schooner *Mary*. Captain Richardson Taylor, a recent convert to Methodism, spirited him downriver to Norfolk, where he was betrayed by an enslaved crewman, who had heard Monroe offered a \$300 reward for the rebel's capture.

Returned to Richmond under heavy guard, Gabriel was quickly tried and found guilty of "conspiracy and insurrection." On October 10, 1800, the 24-year-old revolutionary died on the town gallows. In all, 26 slaves were hanged for their part in the conspiracy. Eight more rebels were transported to Spanish New Orleans; at least 32 others were found not guilty. Reliable sources placed the number of slaves who knew of the plot to be between five and six hundred.

In the aftermath, white authorities tightened restrictions upon all slaves. In late 1802 Monroe established the Public Guard of Richmond, a nighttime police force designed to protect the public buildings and militia arsenals. The state assembly passed a law ending the right of masters to hire out their surplus slaves, and in 1806 the legislature amended the state's Manumission Act of 1782 by requiring liberated bondpeople to leave Virginia or face reenslavement.

SEE ALSO: Nat Turner Rebellion; Queen Nanny and Maroon Resistance

References and Suggested Readings

- Egerton, D. R. (1993) *Gabriel's Rebellion: The Virginia Slave Conspiracies of 1800 and 1802*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Sidbury, J. (1997) *Ploughshares into Swords: Race, Rebellion, and Identity in Gabriel's Virginia, 1730-1810*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer (1898–1948), UNIR, and revolutionary populism in Colombia

Raina Zimmering

Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was a popular politician in Colombia and advocate who appealed to common people, and is best remembered for his tremendous oratory. His death created the deepest crisis in Colombian history. He was born on January 23, 1903 in Bogotá and died in April 9, 1948. After studying political science and law in Bogotá at the National University of Colombia and obtaining his doctoral thesis with the title “The socialist ideas in Colombia,” he completed a doctorate in law at the Sapienza in Rome, where he earned the second doctor title in jurisprudence with the thesis “The positive criteria of the premeditation.”

Gaitán was educated as professor of law at the National University of Bogotá and the Free University. He was critical of the control of Colombia by a small oligarchy and the marginalization of peasants and workers and opposed the growing imperial influence of the United States. As a congressman of the Liberal Party he became known for the denunciation of the massacre of banana workers of Magdalena. In 1933 Gaitán was elected leader of the Chamber of Representatives.

Frustrated by the failed reforms of the Liberal government of Olaya Herrera, Gaitán and supporters founded the Unión Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria (UNIR) as a movement of popular masses and labor unions that differed from the traditional parties. As advisor for unions in their fight for better life and labor conditions, Gaitán broadened the organization’s basis. The UNIR disbanded after winning only 3,800 votes in parliamentary elections in 1935. This was the result of its temporary elections boycott and the Liberal Party tactic of coopting the demands of UNIR for social intervention with the notion of “Revolution in March.” In 1936 as mayor of Bogotá, Gaitán implemented important social reforms. The Liberal Party offered Gaitán a seat in parliament; he accepted with plans to introduce UNIR’s strategy. His view was that the people should take command of the party, fire the Liberal

oligarchy, and establish a democratic program, transforming the Liberals into a genuine people’s party.

As minister of education in the government of Santos (1938–40) Gaitán was responsible for a series of educational reforms, especially the campaign of alphabetization. He instituted free school shoes, school lunch, and the ambulant educational cinema, and expanded cultural events. President López Pumarejo named Gaitán labor minister and supported the agrarian and tax reforms (Café Export), reintroduction of general voting rights, and an active union policy. Not only the Conservatives, but also the Liberal oligarchy resisted all these reforms. From 1945 Gaitanism grew to a mass movement without a solid structure or organization.

In the 1946 presidential elections Gaitán ran as a dissident candidate of the Liberal Party, and came third behind the Conservative Ospina Pérez and the Liberal Gabriel Turbay. Most of Gaitán’s support was from his base on Colombia’s Atlantic coast and Bogotá. The Conservative Party victory encouraged conservative landowners to suspend land reform. Gaitán left the populist efforts and returned to the liberal mainstream, opposing a general strike on legal grounds. In 1947 Gaitán, as Liberal Party leader, gained popularity among Liberals and Conservatives in Congress, and was considered a most promising candidate to win the next presidential elections in 1950. In the years leading up to the elections he proclaimed the March of Silence and the March of Torches in opposition to the Conservative government’s state repression and assassination of a journalist.

On April 9, 1948 Gaitán himself was assassinated by Juan Roa Sierra as he was leaving his law office in Bogotá. According to CIA Director Hillenkoetter, Roa was related to a murder victim in a case Gaitán had successfully tried the day before. The assassination took place during the Ninth Pan-American Conference in Bogotá from March to May 1948, presided over by US Secretary of State George Marshall. The final act of the conference was a pledge for hemispheric solidarity in opposition to “international communism,” marking the beginning of the Cold War in Latin America. The Organization of American States (OAS), headquartered in Washington, DC, was also founded at the Bogotá meetings.

The assassination of Gaitán was followed by days of rioting in Bogotá known as *Bogotazo*, and in cities across Colombia. Supporters of Gaitán attacked the Government Palace of the Conservative President Ospina Pérez and other official buildings. Many soldiers and policemen were called in, including the Chulavitas, a militia from Boyacá, to fight the insurrection and protect the palace. Almost the whole center of Bogotá burned; some 3,000 people lost their lives in the *Bogotazo*. The *Bogotazo* represented the beginning of the civil war between Conservatives and Liberals, known as *La Violencia*, which claimed the lives of 200,000 people from 1948 to 1963. During *La Violencia* the Liberal and Communist parties organized autonomous defense groups (later FARC) against the violence of the Conservative bands of Pajaros and Chulavitas who were massacring the peasant population in the countryside. From the armed hostilities emerged “independent republics” in many parts of the country, consisting of members of the Communist Party and Liberal and independent countrymen.

Jorge Eliécer Gaitán is considered among the most important symbolic figures in Colombian history, used as a heroic symbol by people of diverse political perspectives.

SEE ALSO: *Bogotazo* and *La Violencia*; Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1960s–1970s; Colombia, Labor, Insurrection, and the Socialist Revolutionary Party, 1920s–1930s

References and Suggested Readings

- Alape, A. (2005) *El Bogotazo: Memorias del olvido*. Bogotá: Planeta.
- Centro Gaitán (1984) *Un ejemplo de democracia participativa. La constituyente de 1947*. Bogotá: Otalora.
- Gaitán, G. (2002) *Jorge Eliécer Gaitán*. Bogotá: Áncora.
- García Marquez, G. (2002) *Vivir para contarla*. Bogotá: Norma.
- Ocampo Lopez, J. (1994) *Historia Básica de Colombia*. Bogotá: Plaza & Janés.
- Palacios, M. (2006) *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875–2002*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Pécaut, D. (2003) *Violencia y Política en Colombia. Elementos de reflexión*. Medellín: Hombre Nuevo.
- Torres, M. (2006) *El crimen del siglo*. Bogotá: Planeta.
- Zelik, R. & Azzellini, D. (1999) *Kolumbien – Große Geschäfte, staatlicher Terror und Aufstandsbewegung*. Köln: ISP.

Galleani, Luigi (1861–1931)

Jeff Shantz

Luigi Galleani was, during his lifetime, among the most significant and best known anarchist-communists. Largely forgotten for decades, he has recently been rediscovered by the generation of anarchists politicized during the alternative globalization struggles.

Born in Vercelli, Italy, Galleani studied law before turning into one of its most dedicated enemies; early in life, he was forced to flee from country to country to escape prosecution, traveling through France, Switzerland, Egypt, and Britain – punctuated by a five-year jail stint on the island of Pantelleria – before reaching the United States in 1901. There, he led a textile workers’ strike in Paterson, New Jersey, before resettling in Vermont and Massachusetts, where he published a weekly newspaper, *Cronaca Sovversiva* (Subversive Chronicles). Deported to Italy with eight of his followers in 1919, Galleani quickly landed in prison again three times for inciting soldiers to mutiny, receiving anarchist propaganda by mail, and speaking out against the rise of Italy’s Fascist Party. Toward the end of his life, he penned *La fine dell’anarchismo?* (*The End of Anarchism?*, 1925) as a retort to the disparaging comments of ex-anarchist Saverio Merlino, who had turned toward parliamentary politics (Seele 1998).

Already suppressed in 1918 for its anti-war stance, then targeted by Attorney General Alexander Mitchell Palmer following a series of bombings committed by Galleani’s supporters in 1919, the *Cronaca Sovversiva* gained international attention during the trial of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti (1920–7), as the supposed association of Galleani’s paper with the two accused was used as evidence of their avowal of violence. For his part, as a defender of “propaganda by the deed” – exemplary acts of violence by individuals – Galleani refused to separate any particular act of rebellion from the context in which it arose, an intricate convergence of predisposing conditions which, at certain times, demand “force and violence,” since the ruling classes, reigning by these means, will yield to them alone (1925/1982: 11). Likewise, Galleani declined to separate propaganda by the deed

from the broader revolutionary process, seeing it as a necessary phase between theoretical affirmation and insurrectionary movement. He presented “propaganda by the deed” as the manual counterpart to the intellectual labor of speeches, writings, denunciations, and public meetings. One fulminates, the other acts; both are necessary.

Galleani drew a distinction between “anarchist-communism” and “socialist-collectivism” and offered a critique of the “administrative government” or council system which some socialists envisioned as a replacement for the state. He also provided a strong defense of the “free individual within the free society” (1925/1982: 10), arguing against even limited administration and representation. Establishing himself as a firm opponent of reformism, Galleani used economic as well as political arguments to illustrate how reforms restore the advantage of capital, helping capitalists to reorganize and extend their rule. Reforms, “the ballast the bourgeoisie throws overboard to lighten its old boat in the hope of saving the sad cargo of its privileges from sinking in the revolutionary storm” (1925/1982: 13), were, for him, the business of ruling classes, not anarchists or socialists.

In place of short-range reformism Galleani advocated “tactics of corrosion” and “continuous attack.” Galleani offered an immanent view of anarchism, seeing anarchist proclivities in selfless acts of aid and support in the present, reminding his readers that such acts are received with a joy and appreciation that “never greeted a commandment of god, an edict of a king, a law of parliament” (1925/1982: 27). Recognizing the daily contradictions and obstacles anarchists face – e.g., jobs, rent – he advocated, wherever possible, carving out realms of autonomy, creativity, and self-determination (1927/2006). Such tactics should not be limited to pursuing material gains, although Galleani and his comrades were extremely poor, but must seek a more extensive experience and deeper awareness in various aspects of life. Galleani enthusiastically advocated “immediate attempts at partial expropriation” along with “individual rebellion” and insurrection “for the sake of struggle itself” (1925/1982: 12).

In rather harsh terms, Galleani dismissed the supposed disagreement between “individualist” anarchists such as Max Stirner and “organizational” anarchists such as Luigi Fabbri and

Errico Malatesta as having no “really important basis,” characterizing it rather as “only the result of incomprehension and equivocation, caused more often by inaction and indolence than by bad faith, and which hard experience is bound to dispel” (1925/1982: 35). Galleani’s position derives from his definition of anarchism as the struggle for a social condition in which the solidarity of material and moral interests provides the only link among individuals, in the absence of vicious competition.

The character of solidarity is itself formed from spontaneity and freedom. Communism, understood as the free cooperation of people, and individualism, the development of the individual free from institutional authority, rather than being contradictory or incompatible, are complementary terms. Conversely, those who “presume to practice individualism in the name of their *ego*, over the obedient, resigned, or inert *ego* of others” are merely “heralds of domination” (1925/1982: 40). While championing free cooperation, however, Galleani reserves little sympathy for formal organizations, be they proletarian parties, programmatic groups, or labor unions. Galleani rejects any notion that anarchists, simply by virtue of their being anarchists, would not succumb to the hierarchies and authorities structured within organizations (1927/2006).

Galleani’s perspective is marked by a strong progressivism in which anarchism is presented as an evolutionary phase beyond socialism, and he viewed human development in terms of the satisfaction of an ever-growing variety of ever more complicated and extensive needs, which provide the index of progress, both for individuals and communities. He viewed this development as nothing less than the increasing solidarity of humans united in struggle against nature, their common adversary.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Italy; Anarchism in the United States to 1945; Anarchocommunism; Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932); Palmer Raids; Sacco and Vanzetti Case

References and Suggested Readings

- Galleani, L. (1925/1982) *The End of Anarchism?* Orkney: Cienfuegos Press.
- Galleani, L. (1927/2006) *The Principle of Organization in the Light of Anarchism*. Cascadia: Pirate Press Portland.
- Galleani, L. (2006) *Anarchy Will Be! Selected Writings of Luigi Galleani*. Edinburgh: AK Press.

Seele, M. (1998) A Fragment of Luigi Galleani's Life. *Bulletin of the Kate Sharpley Library* 6 (15). Available at flag.blackened.net/ksl/bullet15.htm#Galleani.

Gambetta, Léon (1838–1882)

Torbjörn Wandel

Léon Gambetta was instrumental in bringing down the regime of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte (Napoleon III) and the Second Empire (1852–70) and in bringing about the Third Republic (1870–1940). Born in Cahors in southwest France to an Italian grocer of modest means, Gambetta went to Paris to study law and soon joined the opposition to the Second Empire that fomented in the Latin Quarter in the 1860s. He emerged as a leading voice of a new generation of republicans. He and his confidants, who were often young, from the provinces, fresh to the political scene, and hostile to the Catholic Church, represented a new breed in French politics, labeled by Gambetta himself as “the new social layers” (*les nouvelles couches sociales*), which called for an end to the “monopoly of the elders” (*monopole des Messieurs*) that dominated Second Empire politics and finance.

As a leader of the opposition, Gambetta helped pave the way for the republic that would fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the empire during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. Two days after the emperor's defeat at Sedan, the “men of September 4,” led by Gambetta, declared France a republic at the City Hall of Paris. Although he had opposed the war – and had left Paris in a dramatic balloon flight out of the city – Gambetta, now as minister of the interior, urged his compatriots to continue the fight. After Adolphe Thiers, the executive, had crushed the Paris Commune in the Bloody Week and signed a treaty with Prussia to end the war, Gambetta, while never muting his fiery rhetoric, began to moderate his politics. Many republicans would settle for nothing less than a unicameral assembly modeled on the First Republic, established during the French Revolution in 1792. With monarchists in a sizable majority in the makeshift legislative body, Gambetta argued that it was better to save a moderate, compromised republic than lose it completely, thus inaugurating the major political division among republicans for the remainder

of the century, that between Opportunists and Radicals. For the same reason, he supported the conservative constitution of 1875, modeled on the Restoration Charter of 1814 that formally inaugurated the Third Republic and abandoned the Radical program of social legislation and immediate separation between church and state. At the same time, he conducted speaking tours around the country, helping to elect republican candidates in the by-elections that followed the ratification of the constitution. His tireless efforts and enormous appeal enabled republicans to capture the Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and presidency by 1879. Thus, Gambetta deserves much of the credit for diminishing support for the empire, ushering in the Third Republic, and placing it securely in republican hands, where it would remain until 1940, making it the longest-lasting constitutional regime to date in French history. His vast popularity caused his fellow republicans, suspicious of magnetic personalities, to refrain from offering him the post of prime minister until late 1881 and early 1882. He died less than a year later.

Following his death in 1882, Gambetta received a majestic state funeral and his heart was placed in the Pantheon, where the greatest French citizens are interred. In the twentieth century, however, his reputation fluctuated. His advocacy of free trade, education, and election reform, along with his opposition to socialism, exemplified to many a bourgeois republic that fecklessly presided over a stalemated society. Recently, with the decline of Marxism and rise of neoliberalism in France and elsewhere, Gambetta's reputation has soared, with many hailing him a clear-headed pragmatist and sober realist. Neither image is totally accurate. Clearly, Gambetta came to favor educational reform and access to the ballot box over a more direct solution to the social question. Whatever flaws have subsequently become apparent, he did more than anyone else to bring down the empire and establish what was at the time politically one of the most democratic societies in the world.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873); France, 1830 Revolution; France, June Days, 1848; France, Revolution of 1848; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Paris Commune, 1871

References and Suggested Readings

Bury, J. P. T. (1936) *Gambetta and the National Defence: A Republican Dictatorship in France*. London: Longman.

- Bury, J. P. T. (1973) *Gambetta and the Making of the Third Republic*. London: Longman.
- Deschanel, P. (1920) *Gambetta: A Biography*. London: Heinemann.
- Nord, P. (1995) *The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948)

Kunal Chattopadhyay

Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma) Gandhi was a foremost Indian nationalist and considered by many as the founder of modern non-violent resistance. Born in Porbandar, Gujarat State in 1869, Gandhi was married to Kasturbai when he was 13 and she slightly younger, an experience that turned him into a bitter opponent of child marriage. Gandhi left for England in 1888 to study law, after which he went to South Africa in search of a job. In 1907, fighting against a Transvaal law imposing the compulsory registration and fingerprinting of Indians, Gandhi developed a unique non-violent method of agitation known as *satyagraha*. This non-violent form of protest involved the peaceful violation of specific laws, courting mass arrests, occasional *hartals* (a form of general strike or closing shops and markets), and spectacular rallies. The protest was followed by another *satyagraha* of Indian women and miners against the imposition of a poll tax, refusal to recognize Indian marriages, immigration regulations, and indentured labor. In 21 years in South Africa, Gandhi's ideas were formulated, inspired by Ruskin, Tolstoy, and Thoreau. Motivated by Ruskin, Gandhi lived an austere life in a commune, first in Phoenix Farm in Natal, and then in Tolstoy Farm just outside Johannesburg. During this period certain experiments involving diet, childrearing, nature cure, and his personal and professional life convinced Gandhi that a political leader must also be morally pure.

The Gandhian Style

The peculiar conditions of South Africa made possible the unity of Hindus, Muslims, Chris-

tians and Parsis, Gujaratis and South Indians, upper-class merchants and lawyers as well as mineworkers. This made Gandhi, by the time he returned to India, much more of an all-India figure than any of his predecessors. The basic Gandhian style, worked out in South Africa, included *satyagraha*, meticulous attention to organizational and specifically financial details, training of disciplined cadres, a readiness to negotiate and to call off movements unilaterally even when it was unpopular, the cultivation of vegetarianism, experiments in sexual self-restraint, and so on. During World War I Gandhi campaigned for military recruitment, in the hope of winning postwar political concessions. Pre-Gandhi nationalist politics had oscillated between the “moderate” politics of “mendicancy” (petitions, meetings in halls, editorials in nationalist journals, and so on) and “terrorism” (individual violence). Working-class strikes in Bombay after Bal Gangadhar Tilak's arrest in 1908 or on other occasions made mill owners fearful. Gandhian techniques promised to bind the mass movement to a leader whose social ideas, especially ideas about property rights, were impeccable. Non-violence made Gandhi and the Gandhi-led Indian National Congress able to mediate internal social conflicts so that they did not transgress bourgeois limits, thereby assuming the character of an umbrella-type organization that straddled all social divides.

Another aspect of Gandhi's appeal lay in his program of social regeneration, which was combined with the political struggle for independence. This enabled him to work out a model of hegemony. Taking over and extending the Romantic critique of industrialism from Ruskin, Gandhi argued that mere political *swaraj* (self-rule) would mean English rule without the English. His alternative was a small peasant utopia, as outlined in his book *Hind Swaraj* (1908). Gandhi argued that railways had spread plague and produced famines by exporting food grain, and western medicine was costly and ruined natural health measures. All this, he averred, had to go, and the upper classes had to live the life of a peasant. He concretized this vision by the programs of *khadi* (handspun coarse cloth), village reconstruction, and later welfare of the Harijan (lower caste or untouchables). None of these were programs capable of challenging fundamental social relations, so the upper classes could be happy. Noted Indian Marxist historian Sumit Sarkar



Mahatma Gandhi is, for many, the embodiment of non-violent peaceful popular resistance. Here he marches with Indian poet and politician Sarojini Naidu and 77 others to protest the British monopoly on salt production. This "Salt March" protest covered 241 miles in 24 days in 1930 and has inspired a number of peaceful protests since, including Martin Luther King, Jr.'s civil rights marches in the United States. (Getty Images)

has used this feature to refute the imperialist, Cambridge School-style interpretation that sees Gandhi as principally a broker between different factions, saying they ignore his immense mass appeal. Given the diverse social matrix of India, a Gandhi-type leadership was historically necessary. On one hand, peasant participation was giving a radical twist to Gandhi's program. On the other hand, when he called off movements, they had no alternative leadership to carry the struggles forward: they still could not represent themselves but had to be represented. This fact of ultimate peasant limitation as regards centralized leader-centric politics has possibly been ignored by scholars of the subaltern school such as Ranajit Guha, who in their romanticization of the spontaneous revolutionary potential of the peasantry tend to overestimate the possibility of localized peasant resistance.

The Rise to Leadership

Gandhi returned to India in 1915 and gained a political reputation through three local struggles. In Champaran, a village in Bihar, the key role was played by rich and middle peasants who had invited Gandhi, local moneylenders who resented planter competition, and some village teachers. Gandhi's role lay in giving indigo planter oppression in Champaran wide publicity through an inquiry. In the Kheda district of Gujarat, there was a struggle for rent reduction in times of poor harvest by the *patidars* (peasant proprietors). Though the initial movement had limited success, Gandhian methods were appreciated because the peasants, as property owners, did not want a violent revolution. But the peasants had their own views and were far from mindless puppets manipulated by Gandhi and his "subcontractors." In the same Kheda area, Gandhi's campaigns for war recruitment met not just with refusal but with outright hostility. The Ahmedabad struggle was one of Gandhi's rare interventions in urban working-class protests. Textile workers in this city in Gujarat were demanding a 50 percent wage hike in a period of rising prices, but owners were unwilling to give more than 20 percent. However, the textile magnate Ambalal Sarabhai had been a follower of Gandhi and had contributed substantially to the Sabarmati Ashram (retreat) that he had set up in Gujarat. Gandhi used the tactic of the hunger strike for the first time and the workers got a 35 percent wage rise. This outlook never spread beyond Ahmedabad, and unlike other bourgeois nationalist leaders, Gandhi kept himself aloof from the All-India Trade Union Congress when it emerged a few years later.

Gandhi made his debut in all-India issues only after creating this reputation and wide base for himself, when the Rowlatt Act (1919) continued the suspension of civil rights even after the war. While all sections of Indian political opinion opposed the Rowlatt Act, it was Gandhi who showed the way to mass protest without leaving the terrain of elite control. The initial plan of courting arrest by public sale of prohibited works was expanded by Gandhi to include the novel and radical idea of an all-India *hartal*. Trouble broke out in Punjab, where Lieutenant Governor Michael O'Dwyer, who already had a bad reputation, imposed martial law. On April 13, 1919, General Dyer ordered his troops to open

fire on an unarmed gathering without warning, in the enclosed ground named Jallianwalabagh. Nearly 2,500 men, women, and children were killed or injured. This unprecedented violence seems to have frightened most politicians, including Gandhi. Seeing widespread violence in retaliation, Gandhi confessed that he had made a “Himalayan blunder” in introducing *satyagraha* to Indian agitation, as people were not yet prepared for non-violent confrontation, and he unilaterally called it off.

Non-Cooperation

Gandhi hoped to cement Hindu–Muslim unity by calling for support for the Khilafat movement, which demanded that the Turkish sultan, as the khalifa (religious head of the Sunni Muslims), should retain control over Muslim sacred places, with enough territory to enable him to defend the Islamic faith. The movement had a moderate and a radical wing. Lower-middle-class journalists and *ulama* (Muslim legal scholars) with considerable influence in small towns and villages, led by Mohammed Ali and Shaikat Ali, wanted countrywide *hartals*. It was this group that first demanded non-cooperation at the Delhi all-India Khilafat Conference on November 22–3, 1919. According to Brown (1972), Gandhi emerged as an important broker between Khilafatists and Hindu politicians. After the Treaty of Sèvres, the radicals became dominant in the Khilafat movement and Gandhi sided with them. He now began pressing the Congress to adopt a plan of campaign around three issues: the “Punjab wrong,” the “Khilafat wrong,” and the nebulous concept of “*swaraj*.” Between September and December 1920, Gandhi was emerging as the supreme leader of the Congress, which approved a program of surrendering titles awarded by the British, boycotting schools, courts, and councils, boycotting foreign goods, and encouraging national schools, arbitration courts, *khadi*, and a no-tax campaign. Even Gandhi’s main opponent, Chittaranjan Das, dramatically changed sides. Crucial structural changes, made at Gandhi’s insistence, included expansion of the Congress’s mass base so that it was possible to recruit beyond the middle classes; a hierarchy of village *taluka* (district or town) committees; reorganization of provincial Congress committees on a linguistic basis (laying the foundations for the future states reorganiza-

tion principle in independent India); and the creation of a small Congress Working Committee (CWC) as executive head.

Gandhi received mass support on the crest of a popular upsurge. At the biggest ever Congress session in Nagpur (December 1920), his supporters included the countrywide network of Marwari (People from Northwestern India) businessmen and traders, Muslim Khilafatists, and the Andhra delegates, whose linguistic identity was submerged. Muslims below the elite category gave Khilafat a social dimension absent in the original. In addition, there was a rising tide of labor and peasant struggles. The Congress-sponsored non-cooperation movement assumed a more militant phase of black flag demonstrations against the visit of the Prince of Wales in November 1921. Angered by the arrest of the Ali brothers, Khilafat leaders like Maulana Hasrat Mohani were demanding complete independence at the Ahmedabad Congress in December 1921. By February 1922, Gandhi decided to begin a no-revenue campaign at Bardoli, in Gujarat, on the issue of infringed liberties of speech, press, and association. But on February 5, 1922, angry peasants at Chauri Chaura, in Gorakhpur district of the United Provinces, burned 22 policemen alive. Gandhi immediately called off the entire movement unilaterally, greatly alienating the Khilafatists and completely disregarding the mood of the masses.

Despite attempts to contain the movement to a narrowly anti-British line, excluding social dimensions, popular response tended to go over the line. This was why Chauri Chaura was, for Gandhi, not a single incidence of violence but the capstone of an entire edifice. British alarm at the incident is recorded by the fact that initially 172 of the 225 accused were sentenced to death (eventually 19 were hanged). But neither Gandhi nor any other leaders condemned this. Gandhi’s self-justification revealed his political orientation. While stressing absolute non-violence he argued, in *Young India* on February 16, 1922, that if the country became independent, such violent people would pose a problem. Gandhi was now arrested and given a six-year jail term. The next few years saw realignments. Motilal Nehru, C. R. Das, and others formed the Swarajya Party within the Congress and pressed for participation in elections with the radical purpose of “wrecking the constitution from within.” After his release from jail, Gandhi, who

was noncommittal about this proposal, concentrated on constructive programs like impressive relief work in emergencies (floods), in building national schools, the promotion of *khadi* and other cottage crafts, anti-alcohol propaganda, and work among the untouchables. As a program for India's social problems, the effort was a failure. National schools were never successful except in brief periods of political excitement. Even Gandhi's program for the untouchables was very limited. In rejecting basic land reforms, he ignored the deeply exploitative agrarian system that was at the base of the poverty of most of the Dalits (oppressed: the term former untouchables prefer to Gandhi's term Harijan). Radical anti-casteists, like E. V. R. Naicker of Tamil Nadu, were disappointed when Gandhi defended the *Varnashrama* ideals (caste ideals as formulated in the *Vedic* literature). Gyanendra Pandey (2002) and other modern studies confirm that the constructive program was valuable in building political linkages and establishing Congress hegemony. But Gandhi never parted company with Madan Mohan Malaviya, founder of the Hindu Mahasabha (a Hindu fundamentalist organization), and his followers, who had never fought British imperialism.

Civil Disobedience

In November 1927, the British government announced the all-white Simon Commission to look into the question of further constitutional and administrative changes. A Simon Commission boycott movement generated radical political developments. But given Congress softness toward the Mahasabha, the Congress was largely responsible for the aloofness and hostility of Muslim leaders toward the next round of the Gandhian movement two years later.

Throughout 1928 and 1929, Gandhi sought to limit pressure for a fresh round of all-India mass struggle aimed at complete independence. Despite repeated Congress resolutions on *purna swaraj* (complete independence) from 1927 to 1929, Gandhi emphatically demanded a moderate proposal for dominion status. Gandhi's hesitations reflected business reluctance and ambiguity. In a March 1929 speech, Homi Mody, chairman of the Bombay Mill Owners' Association, focused on the "unprecedented general strike" organized by the communist-led Girni *Kamgar* (Worker) Union. In 1929, Dorabji

Tata, Cowasji Jehangir, and Ibrahim Rahimtulla, the most pro-government capitalists who were dependent on state contracts and patronage, sought to develop a business-oriented party distinct from the Congress. Rather different was the strategy of Ghanshyam Das Birla, seeking to use Gandhi's influence to counter growing radicalism. On November 2, 1929, Gandhi, Motilal, the Liberals, and Malaviya joined in accepting Viceroy Irwin's offer of a Round Table Conference on the condition of discussing amnesty and the details of dominion status among other issues. Subhas Bose, one of the radical leaders, objected, but Jawaharlal Nehru ultimately went along. With the viceroy rejecting Gandhi's conditions, however, negotiations broke down. Then in the Lahore Congress of 1929 with Jawaharlal's presidential address attacking capitalism and trusteeship theory, Gandhi emerged fully in control at the sessions. Subhas Bose's proposals for non-payment of taxes and general strikes were rejected. Gandhi pushed through the main resolution so that it ultimately had a word of praise for Irwin, and endorsed initial acceptance of his offer. Nonetheless, despite the hesitant leadership, a qualitative leap forward was taken in the anti-colonial struggle. Delegates welcomed the unfurled tricolor which displayed not only the traditional slogan *Bande Mataram* (salutations to the motherland), but also *Inquilab Zindabad* (long live the revolution).

Gandhi neutralized the radical turn in the Congress by launching a new program of *satyagraha* against the tax on salt involving a 400-kilometer march from Ahmedabad to Dandi (March 12–April 6, 1930). Though his 11-point ultimatum to Irwin seemed a climbdown from the demand for complete independence, this charter reflected his expertise in harmoniously combining bourgeois issues with peasant ones couched as a national demand. Demands included 50 percent cuts in military-bureaucratic expenses as well as three specific bourgeois demands (lowering of the rupee-sterling exchange ratio, textile protection, and reservation of coastal shipping for Indians) and two basically peasant themes (the lowering of land revenue and the abolition of the salt tax). Gandhi clearly had no intention of endorsing Jawaharlal's suggestions for anti-*zamindar* (landlord) no-rent campaigns. The salt tax had the effect of being a peasant issue which targeted only the government.

Popular pressure was evident when village officials began resigning along Gandhi's route, and *patidars* in the Borsad *taluk* of Kheda district demanded permission to start non-payment of revenue – a demand Gandhi conceded with great reluctance. However, it was no longer possible to restrict everything as Gandhi would have liked. A few instances of violence occurred, such as the armed rising and seizure of the Chittagong armory organized by Surya Sen in April 1930 and the refusal of upper-caste Hindu soldiers sent by the British government to attack the Khudai Khidmatgar organized by Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan in Peshawar, thwarting British hopes of creating a communal divide. Gandhi repudiated this action, saying that as soldiers they ought to have obeyed their superiors. Finally, in Sholapur, an industrial city in Maharashtra, news of Gandhi's arrest sparked off a textile strike which turned violent. Order was restored only through martial law after May 16.

The stated goal of the civil disobedience agitation was nothing short of complete independence. Brutal violence was used on the most peaceful of agitators. Purushottamdas Thakurdas bitterly complained about the beating of women and children by the police. The no-rent campaign was highly successful in the Gandhian base at Bardoli. Negotiations at this stage, with Gandhi and Nehru demanding a complete national government with control over defense and finance, broke down. From September 1930 onwards, both traders and mill owners were showing signs of strain. In the countryside, purely Gandhian forms of struggle, based on relatively prosperous peasants, were losing potency, while socially dangerous forms such as no-rent campaigns and tribal rebellions were emerging. Mass movements from below stimulating capitalist pressure from above led to Gandhi's sudden shift. By a formal pact in March 1931, the British government agreed to set all political prisoners free in return for the suspension of the civil disobedience movement. Furthermore, Gandhi was invited to attend the Round Table Conference in London as the sole representative of the Indian National Congress. Radicals in the leadership felt badly let down by these constitutional concessions. Gandhi made little attempt to save the life of Bhagat Singh, who had been sentenced to death on March 23, 1931. This was just before the Karachi Congress, and the Naujawan Bharat

Sabha (Young India Association) organized a demonstration against Gandhi at the Karachi station, with the slogan *Naujawan ko kya mila? Bhagat Singh ko phansi milla* (What did the youth gain? The hanging of Bhagat Singh). But at the Karachi session, Gandhi's left-wing critics failed. Jawaharlal again surrendered to Gandhi, a pattern that would be seen repeatedly. Gandhi emerged as the victor once more.

The British had been compelled to treat Gandhi as a national leader and negotiate with him. After the Gandhi–Irwin Pact, the Congress expanded. The assumption of office by a Tory-dominated National Government, headed by the renegade Labourite Ramsay MacDonald, meant a further shift to the right. At the second Round Table Conference in 1931, offers concerning central power were minimized. Meanwhile, at the level of provinces, the Hindu Mahasabha was intransigent about not giving Muslims majority seats in Bengal and Punjab, two Muslim-majority provinces. This alienated the Muslim delegates. Now separate electorates were demanded by diverse groups, including the depressed castes. Along with Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, and Europeans, they came together in a “minorities pact.” Gandhi fought against this trend, arguing that the solution to the communal question would crown the constitution rather than be its foundation. Gandhi then, as later in 1945–6, would offer to accept most of the Muslim demands if they accepted the demand for full independence, but given the Mahasabha intransigence about not providing any guarantees to Muslim sensibilities, this was a meaningless gesture. Gandhi eventually returned empty-handed to India. The one gain for Gandhi was a dubious one. In 1932, through the campaigning of the Dalit leader B. R. Ambedkar, the government granted untouchables separate electorates under the new constitution. In protest, Gandhi embarked on a six-day fast in September 1932, successfully forcing the government to adopt a more equitable arrangement via negotiations mediated by the Dalit cricketer turned political leader Palwankar Baloo. At the same time, the Harijan welfare work of Gandhi and his associates did help in taking Congress hegemony to those castes, and for several decades, including in independent India, they would remain part of the core Congress vote bank. But this reform work was a bid to establish hegemony over more radical struggles, like E. V. R. Naicker's Self-

Respect movement in Tamil Nadu. The militant atheism and resistance to upper-caste oppression of such movements steered some of their members in the direction of communism.

In 1937, when elections were held under the new Government of India Act 1935, the Congress gained 711 out of 1,585 provincial assembly seats, winning absolute majorities in five provinces out of 11. The Muslim League cut a sorry figure, even in the Muslim-reserved seats, as did the Hindu Mahasabha in general seats. Only in Bombay did Ambedkar's Independent Labor Party win 13 out of 15 seats reserved for Harijans, showing that on the Dalit question there existed a real challenge to the Hindu communalist as well as Gandhian alternatives. The All-India Congress Committee (AICC) session of March 1937 accepted a resolution on conditional acceptance of office, moved by two old Gandhians, Patel and Rajendra Prasad. Jayaprakash Narayan's left amendment rejecting office was defeated by 135 to 78 votes. Gandhi himself played a less than glorious role, his task being to persuade Nehru to toe the line.

The election of Subhas Bose in 1938 as Congress president posed a problem. While less internationalist than Nehru, Bose was also less likely to toe Gandhi's line. Before the Tripuri Congress, in 1939, Subhas was reelected president by defeating Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Gandhi's candidate. But Gandhi aided the Congress right to snatch victory out of defeat. On February 22, 13 out of the 15 members of the old CWC resigned, including Nehru. At the Tripuri Session in March, the right won a vote on a resolution moved by Govind Ballav Pant, asking Bose to nominate his new executive in accordance with the wishes of Gandhi. Ineptness and internal discord within the left enabled Gandhi to control the Congress. When Gandhi told Bose he was free to choose his own committee, Bose failed to take up the challenge against this cultism and resigned. By 1940, he was hounded out of the Congress.

Gandhi, Women, and Sexuality

Gandhi's emergence as a mass leader had a partially positive impact on women's participation in politics. He was not a believer in equality, but he did believe that men and women were complementary. He stressed the need to draw women into the freedom struggle, upwardly valuing the

kind of work women could do for the nationalist struggle, such as spinning cloth at home, and bringing about a feminization of politics. He also tactically approved women's violation of the law to shame more men into joining the movement. But he was reluctant to accept full equality of women in the movement, and during civil disobedience, it was only after pressure from women like Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay and Sarojini Naidu that he accepted women's participation in the salt *satyagraha*.

At the same time, Gandhi had a very troubled vision of female sexuality. He wanted women in his movement to be chaste, and flew into a rage when some prostitutes took part in constructive Gandhian work. While arguing that women were sisters (thereby shifting to a non-sexual identity), he also felt women's sexuality to be threatening for men. He opposed Sucheta Kripalani's proposed marriage to his follower J. B. Kripalani, saying that she would be breaking his right arm. Finally, his sexual experiments, including sleeping in the nude with a number of women to find out how far he could control his sexuality, were done without any evident regard for what the women felt.

World War II and Quit India

When World War II broke out, Gandhi's initial response had been to offer "non-violent moral support" to the British effort, but other Congress leaders objected to the unilateral declaration that India too was in the war, without consulting the people's representatives. And Gandhi's moderate line of individual *satyagraha* only contributed to the petering out of the movement. The aim was clearly to register a token protest without making serious trouble for the government. Gandhi was more concerned by the appeal of communism to youth than with fighting imperialism. As often before, when he took the decision to move to a more militant struggle, the reason may well have been a desire to defeat the left.

Initially, capitalist circles in India were happy with a war that brought profits. It was the left that saw the war as an imperialist one. But the Communist Party of India (CPI) decided that after Hitler's invasion of the USSR the war had become an anti-fascist "people's war." Nehru sought for a compromise to enable Indian support for the war during the Cripps Mission

negotiations. Subhas Bose viewed the war as an opportunity to strike at a weakened enemy.

Gandhi's perspective was different to that of the Congress right wing. As the war progressed, Gandhi increased his demands for independence, drafting a resolution calling for the British to quit India. In his famous "do or die" speech on August 8, 1942, Gandhi said that every Indian should consider himself to be a free person, and for the first time in an interview, he even considered the weapon of the general strike. But the Quit India resolution was kept suitably vague as a bargaining counter. It was turned into an upsurge not by the Congress high command, which was promptly arrested, but by socialists and other radicals. By the arrest of the leadership, the British thought they would provoke Indians and crush them. Instead they had to confront an upsurge, described by Viceroy Lord Linlithgow as the most serious rebellion since 1857.

Gandhi could gauge the popular mood better than others, including the communists. The defeat at the hands of Japan had taken a tremendous toll on British prestige. It also revealed once more the gross racism of the rulers of India. The result was a combination of anti-white anger and a belief that English rule was about to end. Sumit Sarkar suggests that the United Provinces and Bihar, scenes of some of the most powerful unrest in August 1942, were also areas from where migrant labor went to Southeast Asia. Losses incurred in Southeast Asia possibly also led to a change in attitude within the business communities. *Hartals*, strikes, and clashes with police and army occurred in many places. From the middle of August, the struggles shifted from the towns to the countryside. Parallel governments were formed, as in Satara and Midnapore, respectively in Maharashtra and Bengal. Gandhi was held for two years in the Aga Khan Palace in Pune. He was released on May 6, 1944, because of his failing health: the Raj did not want him to die in prison and enrage the nation.

Freedom and Partition of India

In July 1945, the Labour Party, the soft imperialists, swept to power after the elections. The objective situation was such that no alternative existed to getting out of India. But the decisive shift came from the postwar upsurge. A restive

army and navy (the navy actually revolted) and mass civilian unrest nearly on the scale of 1942 showed Labour that it had to act. On February 20, 1946, Clement Attlee announced that a Cabinet Mission would be sent to India. At this point, Gandhi, Nehru, right-wing leader Patel, and Muslim League supremo Jinnah stood shoulder to shoulder, condemning the mass movements. Gandhi condemned the display of interreligious unity by the rebel Royal Indian Navy ratings, saying that a combination of Hindus, Muslims, and others for the purpose of violent action was unholy. However, once the battle of the barricades was discarded, Gandhi found there was no place for him either. The elections of 1946 were held in a communally charged situation. Astute moves by the Muslim League after the 1937 drubbing had enabled it to emerge as the voice of Muslims. The Congress did well in the non-Muslim seats, winning 57 out of 102 seats in the Central Assembly. In the provinces it won everywhere except Bengal, Sind, and Punjab. It was in this context that the Congress gave up its slogan of a Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage. Only the communists raised this demand seriously. Congress leaders, including Gandhi, accepted the election of the Constituent Assembly by the indirect method of election from the Legislatures, themselves elected by very restricted franchise. This was not an abstract issue.

So when the British Cabinet Mission came to India in 1946, imperialism and Indian bourgeois leaders were united in their desire to halt any further progress of radicalism, whether of the CPI variety or any other. The strike wave of 1946 involved 1,629 stoppages, 1,941,948 workers, and 12,717,762 labor days. This time negotiations were serious on both sides. But the situation further changed with the rise of the most fascistic form of communalism, both that of the Muslim League and that of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteers' Association or RSS). The Cabinet Mission had proposed a scheme of a weak central government with three groups of states, the Hindu majority center and the Muslim majority northwest and northeast. When Nehru refused to accept that the groupings would be permanent (Bengal and Assam, for example, would be united into a permanent Muslim majority state), Jinnah called on Muslims for direct action. Direct Action Day, August 16, 1946,

was a day of mass riots in Calcutta. Hindu rioters hit back. Soon, the entire country seemed engulfed. To many, including Nehru, partition now seemed the lesser evil so that communal peace could be restored. But for Gandhi this was not the case. He even proposed the seemingly quixotic suggestion that Jinnah be made prime minister and the British stay on for a while to protect the majority. But with power so close, the bourgeoisie did not want to let it go. The Hindu bourgeois politicians also had little time for the utopian old man who did not want power. Isolated from the Congress leadership, Gandhi at the age of 77 decided to stake everything in a bid to vindicate his lifelong principles of non-violence and change of heart. Sarkar calls this “the Mahatma’s Finest Hour.” He spent his time in the riot-torn villages of Noakhali in East Bengal, followed by Bihar, and then in Calcutta. He lived with a handful of companions in hostile Muslim-dominated villages, threatened a fast-to-death if Hindus in Bihar did not change their attitudes, and walked barefoot through Noakhali, singing the Rabindranath Tagore song *Jadi tor dak shume keu na aashe tabe ekla chalo re* (if none heeds thy call, walk alone). At a moment when all forms of political power could have been his, had he uttered a word, he shunned it all and fought on for communal amity, rethinking strategy and principles at this stage of his life. Congress leaders prevailed upon him not to oppose partition, and he accepted their pressure with a heavy heart. But he did not return to Delhi, staying on in Beliaghata in Kolkata to halt rioting.

The Final Period

After India’s independence, Gandhi focused on Hindu–Muslim peace and unity. When riots began in Delhi, with a massacre of Muslims as revenge for the Punjab, Gandhi’s fast in January 1948 had a temporary impact. This last fast seems also directed in part against the increasingly communal attitudes of his erstwhile disciple, Sardar Patel, who was thinking in terms of a total population transfer in the Punjab and was refusing to honor a prior agreement according to which India was obliged to hand over Rs. 550 million as Pakistan’s share of the pre-partition government of India’s assets.

The post-partition period saw the Hindu communal forces who had always acted as loyal

subjects of the empire now become increasingly vocal. The RSS at that time openly expressed its admiration for Hitler. V. D. Savarkar, head of the Hindu Mahasabha, was implicated in a conspiracy to kill Gandhi. This was part of a general attempt to destabilize the new government and make a bid for Hindutva power. On January 30, 1948, when Gandhi was on his way to a prayer meeting, Nathuram Godse, who had renounced his RSS membership to keep the organization out of trouble, confronted Gandhi and shot him. Godse and Narayan Apte were condemned to death and executed. What is significant is that the Delhi and Bombay police had had ample warning that a conspiracy was being hatched, but had done nothing. Gandhi’s last words as he was shot are said to have been *He Ram* (roughly translated as “Oh God”).

SEE ALSO: Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945); Dalit Liberation Struggles; India, Civil Disobedience Movement and Demand for Independence; India, Non-Violent Non-Cooperation Movement, 1918–1929; India, Post-World War II Upsurge; Jinnah, Muhammad Ali (1876–1948); Khuda-i Khidmatgar; Pashtun Non-Violent Resistance Force (1929–1948); Narayan, Jayaprakash (1902–1979); Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964); Quit India Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Brown, J. (1972) *Gandhi’s Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915–1922*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chatterjee, P. (1983) *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Dalton, D. (1993) *Mahatma Gandhi: Non-violent Power in Action*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gandhi, M. K. (1951–95) *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, 100 vols. Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division.
- Iyer, R. (Ed.) (1989) *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, 3 vols. New York and Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Joan, B. (1971) *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kishwar, M. (1986) *Gandhi and Women*. Delhi: Manushi.
- Maureen, S. (1985) *Gandhi: The South African Experience*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- Nanda, B. R. (1985) *Gandhi and His Critics*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Pandey, G. (2002) *The Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh: Class, Community and Nation in Northern India, 1920–1940*. London: Anthem Press.

- Parekh, B. (1989) *Gandhi's Political Philosophy: A Critical Examination*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Parekh, B. (1997) *Gandhi*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Parekh, B. (1999) *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform*, rev. ed. Delhi: Sage.
- Puri, B. (Ed.) (2001) *Mahatma Gandhi and His Contemporaries*. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study.
- Sarkar, S. (1983) *Modern India: 1885–1947*. Delhi: Macmillan.

Garibaldi, Giuseppe (1807–1882)

James Baer

Giuseppe Garibaldi was born in Nice and gained renown as the “Hero of Two Worlds” for his exploits in the Risorgimento (Resurgence) movement that brought about the unification of Italy and in South America in defense of liberty. Best known as the leader of the Red Shirts, an army of Italian patriots that defended the short-lived Roman Republic in 1849 and successfully brought down the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1860, Garibaldi’s prior achievements in South America are significant for two reasons. First, Garibaldi gained his skills as a guerrilla fighter in South America. Second, Garibaldi came to lead the Italian Legion in Montevideo, Uruguay, which formed the original band of Red Shirts. With these skills and an armed force of Italian patriots Garibaldi became one of the best-known revolutionary leaders in the nineteenth century.

As a young man Garibaldi earned his license as a ship’s captain and worked in the coastal trade in Italy. He learned about the Giovane Italia (Young Italy) movement, led by the Italian patriot Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–72), and joined in an unsuccessful rebellion in 1834. Garibaldi escaped to France and, after being sentenced to death *in absentia* in Genoa, fled to Brazil. There he used his skills as a sailor in support of a republican uprising against the monarchy of Brazil. Garibaldi was given command of troops and began his military career as a guerrilla fighter in the backlands of southern Brazil. It was at this time Garibaldi met Anita, a young woman whose husband was away at war. Their mutual attraction was immediate and Anita left with Garibaldi, never to return. She later married

Garibaldi and bore him four children: Menotti, Rosita, Teresa, and Ricciotti.

In 1841, with the war going badly for the rebels, Garibaldi and Anita left Brazil for Uruguay. Garibaldi and his family settled in Montevideo, where he taught mathematics in a local school before volunteering his services to the government. Uruguay was then embroiled in a war with Argentina. Juan Manuel de Rosas, the Argentine strong man, had supported Manuel Oribe, Uruguay’s ex-president, in his attempt to retake power from the current president, Francisco Rivera. Initially, Rivera had the support of Great Britain and France, who opposed Rosas’ dominance in the River Plate region. But in 1840, when the French withdrew from active participation in the conflict, Oribe began to take control of Uruguay, besieging Montevideo in 1843. Foreign residents in Montevideo responded to Oribe’s threat not to respect the lives and property of those who supported Rivera by forming military companies. The Italian community created a legion of about four hundred soldiers, formed into three battalions. Garibaldi became the leader of this Italian Legion, nick-named the Red Shirts for the uniform.

One of Garibaldi’s first assignments in 1842 was to take a flotilla of small ships up the Paraná River into Argentine territory. In 1843 Garibaldi led the Italian Legion to victory at the battle of Tres Cruces on the outskirts of Montevideo. For the next few years he fought on land and sea as the circumstances required. In 1845 Garibaldi assisted the British naval squadron in its blockade of Buenos Aires by attacking the island of Martín García in the Rio de la Plata. Later that year he successfully led his troops in an attack on the small city of Colonia, Uruguay, where Manuel Oribe’s forces had congregated. Perhaps Garibaldi’s greatest fame, however, came from the battle of San Antonio in 1846 when, surrounded and outnumbered, he held out successfully, killed many of the enemy, and escaped with his troops. In June 1847 Garibaldi was appointed commander-in-chief of all Uruguayan forces, although he resigned one month later because of complaints about a foreigner in command of national forces.

In April 1848 Garibaldi left Uruguay for Italy after hearing about the uprising under Giuseppe Mazzini that created a liberal republic in Rome. Garibaldi took with him approximately eighty of his legionnaires on the ship

Esperanza (Hope) provided to him by the people of Uruguay through donations. Garibaldi and these Italian Red Shirts became famous fighting for Italian unification. In Italy Garibaldi unsuccessfully defended the short-lived Roman Republic in 1849 against a much larger French army that restored the pope. In his retreat through Austrian-held territory Garibaldi lost much of his army. His wife, Anita, became sick on the retreat and died near Ravenna in 1849. Garibaldi then fled abroad, living in the United States and later serving as a ship's captain on voyages from Peru to Asia.

Garibaldi returned to Italy in 1854 and purchased a home on the small island of Caprera. He continued to look for opportunities to serve Italy, secretly planning a rescue of political prisoners in Naples, and agreeing to join the Piedmontese army in its war with Austria in 1859. By now he had come to believe that only a strong state, like that of the king of Piedmont-Sardinia, could effectively unite Italy. Garibaldi's volunteers, called Hunters of the Alps, took Varese and Como in the war. Victor Emmanuel (1820–78), the king of Piedmont-Sardinia, gained Lombardy with the peace treaty. Garibaldi was elected to parliament from Nice, but became furious when the city of his birth was transferred to France.

Finally, in 1860, Garibaldi and a volunteer army of about a thousand Red Shirts invaded the island of Sicily and then Naples, toppling the Bourbon Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In an agreement with Victor Emmanuel Garibaldi achieved the unification of Italy, except for the city of Rome, then under the authority of the pope. This led Garibaldi to form an expedition against the pope in 1862, in defiance of the king. At Aspromonte Garibaldi was wounded and captured. After recovering he returned to his home in Caprera, but remained active in Italian politics. Garibaldi died in 1882 and is considered a hero in Uruguay, the United States, Italy, and most of Europe because of his dedication to liberty. In the Spanish Civil War the anti-fascist Italian volunteers in Spain named their brigade after Garibaldi, and so did the communist partisans during the Resistenza; in the 1948 general elections the Italian Fronte Popolare, an alliance between communists and socialists, used Garibaldi as an electoral symbol. The legacy continues, as many countries have honored Giuseppe Garibaldi with statues and monuments.

SEE ALSO: Italian Risorgimento; Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–1872); Resistenza

References and Suggested Readings

- Coppa, F. J. (1992) *The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence*. New York: Longman.
 Garibaldi, G. (2004) *My Life*. London: Hesperus.
 Hibbert, C. (1966) *Garibaldi and his Enemies: The Clash of Arms and Personalities in the Making of Italy*. Boston: Little, Brown.
 Ridley, J. G. (2001) *Garibaldi*. London: Phoenix.
 Trevelyan, G. M. (1948) *Garibaldi and the Thousand*. New York: Longman.
 Viotti, A. (1979) *Garibaldi: The Revolutionary and His Men*. Poole: Blandford.

Garrison, William Lloyd (1805–1879)

Amy Hatmaker

William Lloyd Garrison, controversial editor of *The Liberator*, was a central figure in the abolitionist crusade. Garrison's radical views on immediate emancipation, women's rights, and political non-resistance put him frequently at odds with more conservative abolitionists. His commitment to the abolitionist cause never wavered, and he is hailed as one of the most important voices of the anti-slavery movement.

Garrison was born December 10, 1805, in Newburyport, MA. He was the third child of Abjah and Fanny Garrison. Abjah, a sailing master with a penchant for whiskey, abandoned the family when Garrison was 3 years old. Fanny worked as a nurse, employment she found demeaning, to support her small family. A devout Baptist who had been banished from her Anglican family because of her faith, Fanny was determined to prevent her two sons from sliding into the same state of sinful disrepute as their father. The rigors of maintaining a household required that Fanny separate the family. Garrison was left in the care of Ezekial and Elizabeth Bartlett, a devout couple who made sure he was well schooled in spiritual matters but neglected to provide him with an education. The family was reunited in Baltimore briefly, but Garrison was unhappy in Baltimore and with his unstable family life. At the age of 11, he left his family to head back to Newburyport.

In Newburyport at the age of 13 in 1818, Garrison entered into an apprenticeship contract



William Lloyd Garrison, pictured here in a daguerreotype by Albert S. Southworth (1811–94) and Josiah Hawes (1808–1901), was a nineteenth-century American abolitionist and social reformer. Garrison, founder of the New England Anti-Slavery Society, advocated immediate and complete emancipation, in opposition to those who sought a gradual end to slavery and to the American Colonization Society, which proposed recolonization of enslaved Africans in Africa. (Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Massachusetts, USA, Gift of Edward Southworth Hawes in Memory of his Father/The Bridgeman Art Library)

with Ephraim W. Allen, owner and editor of the *Newburyport Editor*. It was during his time learning the printing trade that Garrison would teach himself how to read. He also became a staunch supporter of the Federalist Party. Garrison had a failed attempt at newspaper ownership following his seven-year term with Allen in Newburyport. He then moved to Boston and became part of the evangelical reform movement. He received a job as an editor of a temperance publication, but his tendency toward rhetoric extremism alienated many of his readers. He came to the cause of abolition when he met Benjamin Lundy, the most prominent adversary of slavery, in 1828. Garrison, never reticent in taking up moral causes, joined the anti-slavery movement. After another brief editorship in Vermont, he took a position as co-editor of Lundy's *The Genius of Universal Emancipation*. Around this time he married Helen Benson, the daughter of a Connecticut abolitionist Quaker, and they had seven children.

The emancipation cause would define Garrison's life. He became one of the leading figureheads of the battle against slavery calling for immediatism, the immediate emancipation of slaves rather than colonization or gradual abolition, and he was frequently attacked for his position. In Baltimore, Garrison was jailed in 1830 for libel over an article condemning a local merchant who was involved in the slave trade, and he and a group of abolitionists were mobbed in Boston in 1835. Yet his resolve never wavered.

The role that brought Garrison the most acclaim was his publication of *The Liberator*. Financed through the aid of some elite Bostonians who shared Garrison's beliefs, the first issue of *The Liberator* was published January 1, 1831. It unabashedly denounced the institution of slavery, and Garrison made it clear to his readers that this was the aim of the publication: "I will not equivocate – I will not excuse – I will not retreat a single inch – AND I WILL BE HEARD." *The Liberator* created such a stir that when Nat Turner led a revolt of slaves later that year, many held Garrison accountable and he was barraged with hate mail, many containing death threats.

Garrison would also have instrumental roles in the development of anti-slavery organizations. He and a small group of followers started the New England Anti-Slavery Society in 1832. Further, Garrison played an active part in organizing the American Anti-Slavery Society the following year, for which he served as secretary of foreign correspondence due to his contact with English abolitionists. He also wrote the *Declaration of Sentiments* for the organization, calling for the use of non-violent methods to bring about the end of slavery and fight against race prejudice. This was to be accomplished through the reformists' tactics of "moral suasion," or appeals to the conscience.

Convinced of the moral superiority of his position, Garrison became more radical in his views. He embraced the belief of perfectionism, living strictly for the will of God. Part of this new doctrine was the certainty that all humans, including women, should be granted certain rights. He began to see the church and state as institutions that were inherently flawed because they interfered with the human achievement of perfection by denying rights to women and the *ad hoc* acceptance of slavery. Garrison would begin to espouse a platform encouraging non-

resistance, a doctrine that called for withdrawal from obedience to civil and religious participation. Many supporters denounced Garrison for this stance, known as Christian anarchy, and it caused a split within the abolitionist organization. Garrison stood steadfast in his beliefs despite renunciation by many former friends.

At the conclusion of the Civil War and the emancipation of the slaves, Garrison was once again hailed as a leader of abolitionists. People recognized that he had continuously fought for his beliefs, even as others turned against him. The final issue of *The Liberator* was printed in December 29, 1865, when the news arrived that the Thirteenth Amendment has been ratified.

After a trip to England, Garrison retired with a pension collected by friends and admirers.

SEE ALSO: American Civil War and Slavery; Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Brown, John (1800–1859); Nat Turner Rebellion; Women’s Movement, United States, 19th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Fredrickson, G. M. (1968) *William Lloyd Garrison*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Hoganson, K. (1993) Garrisonian Abolitionists and the Rhetoric of Gender, 1850–1860. *American Quarterly* 45, 4 (December): 558–95.
- Loveland, A. C. (1966) Evangelicalism and “Immediate Emancipation” in American Antislavery Thought. *Journal of Southern History* 32, 2 (May): 172–88.
- Merrill, W. M. & Ruchames, L. (Eds.) (1981) *The Letters of William Lloyd Garrison*, 6 vols. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Stewart, J. B. (1992) *William Lloyd Garrison and the Challenge of Emancipation*. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson.
- Thomas, J. L. (1963) *The Liberator: William Lloyd Garrison*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism

Ernest A. Amador

Marcus Garvey, the son of a modest Jamaican family, used his skills as a charismatic orator, gifted journalist, inventive entrepreneur, and political advocate to pioneer the first global black movement, a “back-to-Africa” campaign, known as Garveyism. The movement enraptured millions

and influenced future black activists and organizations for generations.

Marcus Mosiah Garvey was born in St. Ann’s Bay, Jamaica, on August 17, 1887. He was the youngest of nearly a dozen children, although only one sibling survived childhood. His father, also named Marcus, was a stonemason by trade and an avid reader, an uncommon characteristic in an area where illiteracy was prevalent. His mother Sarah was a domestic worker who was known for her compassion and even disposition. Although Garvey was considered an above-average student, it was the access to his father’s large personal library that allowed him to develop an intellectual curiosity and an immense vocabulary – tools that helped him gain recognition as one of the greatest orators of his day. As a young boy, Garvey frequently played with his classmates and neighbors, blacks and whites alike. However, as a teenager he realized there was an unsettling division among races: his white childhood companions eventually distanced themselves from him socially.

At 16, Garvey’s curiosity prompted him to move to Kingston, where he found work as a printer for the Jamaican pharmaceutical company, P. A. Benjamin. Even this early in life his leadership ability was pronounced; it only took him a few years to become the youngest master foreman in Kingston, a position that was usually outsourced to Europeans or North Americans. However, his success came to a halt when he, as the Kingston Union vice president, was fired for siding with strikers. Although his participation in the strike ended unsuccessfully, it marks the origin of his lifelong commitment to eradicate the deplorable conditions suffered by blacks worldwide. During his stay in Kingston, Garvey became a proficient public speaker: he paid close attention to the different speaking styles at church and was placed well in many public speaking contests. He worked for three local Kingston newspapers, including his own, *Garvey’s Watchman*.

In 1910 Garvey, who by age 23 was already known as a respected journalist, speaker, and political activist, followed many of his fellow Jamaicans overseas. Garvey’s first stops were in Central and Latin America. While working as a journalist and laborer, he recognized not only the cruel conditions forced upon West Indians, but also the absence of an institution to represent or protect them. Within a few months, Garvey’s inquisitive, restless nature carried him to London.

He attended Birkbeck College and eagerly accepted a position for the Pan-African, Pan-Oriental magazine *Africa Times and Orient Review*. Again, he took note of the many blacks in England and the harsh conditions they faced, but, as in Central America, an organization representing the welfare of blacks could not be found.

Dismayed at the worldwide mistreatment of blacks, in July 1914 Garvey sailed back to Jamaica with a very clear agenda: within two weeks of his return, he founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), which ultimately grew to over 900 branches in dozens of countries. This organization, boasting 6 million members at its peak, would serve as the political machine for the first worldwide Pan-African movement, known as Garveyism.

Garveyism was a composite of several principles. It called for all peoples of African descent to approach every endeavor with a “black-first” state of mind; it encouraged all blacks to embrace the idea of self-love; and it postulated that blacks could be liberated from their intolerable circumstances by economic self-reliance. Realizing that the desolate conditions blacks experienced world-wide stemmed from the lack of a unified black nation, Garveyism campaigned for the repossession of Africa to be inhabited only by blacks.

The drive for a “black-first” mindset was apparent, even in religion. The African Orthodox Church, founded by the UNIA, insisted blacks should visualize God in their own likeness: a black Christ. In turn, conceiving the image of a dark-skinned God or Christ helped reinforce the idea that possessing dark skin should not be considered a mark of shame, but that “black is beautiful” and good.

In 1919, with the help of an all-black pool of investors, Garvey provided his movement with a concrete example of economic self-reliance by opening a shipping company called the Black Star Line. Although the Black Star Line failed after only a few years, it employed blacks for almost every position, and it abandoned racist practices that were common in white-owned shipping companies. The Negro Factories Corporation, which also failed after a few years of business, was also an invention of Garvey to promote black economic self-reliance.

Perhaps the most radical aspiration of Garveyism was the eviction of all non-black

authorities from Africa. Garvey officially voiced this ambition in August 1920 at the month-long First International Convention of the Negro Peoples of the World, which filled Madison Square Garden with over 25,000 UNIA representatives from all over the globe. Garvey was convinced that a strong, independent all-black nation would foster a new-found sense of African nationalism throughout the world; however, this extreme tenet of Garveyism was the catalyst for much of Garvey’s growing opposition. Europeans were disconcerted by this goal because it would disturb their economies. In North America, W. E. B. De Bois, who promoted integration and assimilation, criticized Garvey’s call for an all-African country because it promoted racial segregation. The aggression against Garvey and Garveyism in the United States came to a climax when he was imprisoned in 1925 for mail fraud and deported to Jamaica in 1927.

Although it was banned in many parts of the world, Garvey’s most successful newspaper, *Negro World*, spread the ideas of Garveyism to millions of followers worldwide. Garvey’s message was also preserved by his second wife, Amy Jacques, who anthologized his writings in *Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey*, which was first published in 1923. In 1940 Garvey died without seeing the African continent free from non-native powers (and, strangely enough, without a single visit to Africa). But it was Garvey and his ground-breaking, yet controversial ideology that would inspire others, such as members of the Rastafari movement and the Nation of Islam, organizations that endorsed many of Garvey’s doctrines.

SEE ALSO: Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963); Malcolm X (1925–1965)

References and Suggested Readings

- Garvey, M. (1923) *Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey*. Ed. A. Jacques-Garvey. New York: Atheneum.
- Martin, T. (1976) *Race First*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Martin, T. (1983) *Marcus Garvey, Hero: A First Biography*. Dover, MA: Majority Press.
- Stein, J. (1986) *The World of Marcus Garvey*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Watson, E. (1994) Marcus Garvey’s Garveyism: Message from a Forefather. *Journal of Religious Thought* 51, 2 (Winter): 77–94.

German Democratic Republic protests, 1945–1989

Michael E. O'Sullivan

During the Cold War, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) gained a reputation as the most successful and stable communist state in Eastern Europe. It experienced less unrest and better economic results than its neighbors in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. This apparent tranquility made the revolutionary events of 1989 especially surprising. Previously silent East Germans demonstrated until the ruling communists granted them the freedom to travel and voted for unity with their western neighbors. Heated debates have ensued to explain both this long history of stability in the GDR and the sudden upheaval of 1989.

Social histories of the GDR have proven difficult because of the nature of the communist dictatorship. The state existed largely because of Cold War disagreements and Soviet intervention. It possessed limited popular legitimacy. Therefore, many historians diminish the importance of popular behavior. Totalitarian studies of communist East Germany claim that society withered away and ceased to exist in the midst of a powerful state. Others insist that the social history of the German Democratic Republic can only be understood through political history. Furthermore, several GDR supporters and dissidents alike argue that the state's overall stability stemmed from the lack of opposition of a passive population. For example, a former GDR human rights advocate, Ehrhart Neubert, wrote: "The rapid downfall of the GDR should not conceal the fact that the long-lived domestic political stability derived from SED policies which induced people into active cooperation and passive toleration" (Ross 2002: 106).

Revisionist scholars, however, express differing views regarding popular protest. Researchers, such as Ralph Jessen, claim that social history is most significant when analyzing the development of the GDR. He believes that society restrained and shaped the policy of the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) from below. Communist functionaries frequently changed policies to accommodate preexisting social structures, the Christian churches, and complaints about



On the morning of November 10, 1989, protesters in Berlin tear down the first section of the Wall separating the east and west of the city. The protests brought an end to the Soviet-dominated German Democratic Republic in the east, leading to reunification of the German state under the liberal democratic and free-market German Federal Republic of the west in October 1990. Berlin became the capital of a unified Germany in 1994. (Getty Images)

the workplace. In addition, many other studies indicate a high level of protest against the GDR. Most prominently, Stefan Wolle and Armin Mitter claim that significant patterns of resistance occurred throughout the entire history of the GDR. According to this interpretation, the state maintained stability only through coercion.

These conflicting views of the GDR can be reconciled through two theories. First, Thomas Lindenberger's ideas about *Eigen-Sinn* (Sense of One's Interests) provide a complex view of relations between state and society. Lindenberger argues that people played a role in both constructing and deconstructing the GDR. East Germans adopted state policies and reshaped them based on their own interests. The population acted in its own self-interest both when protesting and cooperating with GDR policy, providing motives both for outbursts of dissent and long phases of silent perseverance. Furthermore, Konrad Jarausch postulates the notion of "civil society" to the debate about popular protest in the GDR. He argues that attempts by dissidents and everyday Germans to create a public sphere of peaceful cooperation outside the privacy of the home and external to the influence of the state eventually weakened the GDR dictatorship and hastened its downfall. The SED crushed civil society during the 1950s and 1960s, but dissidents revived it beginning in the 1970s as a prelude to 1989. The concepts of *Eigen-Sinn* and civil society can be used to trace the history

of protest, coercion, and compliance in the GDR. They illuminate the ways that popular behavior influenced the construction, stability, and downfall of the socialist project in Germany.

The Difficulties of Grassroots Activism in the Formation of the GDR, 1945–1949

Political opponents of Nazism entered a period of agitation in the immediate years following World War II in both East and West Germany. After toiling in prisons, concentration camps, exile, and underground resistance groups, they campaigned for ideal and radical forms of government in post-National Socialist Germany. The occupying powers quickly relegated these activists to the fringe in both east and west. Grassroots advocates of communism and socialism made little impact on the Soviet occupation and the formation of the GDR because their goals conflicted with Soviet policy and their ideas diverged with those of the mainstream population.

The most powerful group of German Marxists consisted of exiles from the former German Communist Party (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands*, KPD) who spent the war years in Moscow. These men received training under the Stalinist system and sometimes even gained dual citizenship in Germany and the Soviet Union. As they prepared to enter Germany at the end of the war, the Soviets flew a cadre of these exiles, led by Walter Ulbricht, to ease the transition of Germany to the Soviet occupation and arrange the beginnings of a “civilian administration.” Led by Ulbricht, Wilhelm Pieck, and others, this group quickly seized control of the KPD and sought positions of power in local governments throughout the Soviet zone of occupation. Favored by the Soviets, these German communists maintained power through their ability to anticipate Soviet aims and formulate policy accordingly.

Several anti-fascist groups that spent the war resisting Nazi rule also became active from 1945 to 1946. The few remaining members of the German left wing welcomed the Soviet arrival as an opportunity to spread socialism in Germany after their persecution under the Third Reich. For example, the concentration camp in Buchenwald (Saxony) became a center for communist activism. Communists and socialists ran

the internal machinery of the camp and anxiously awaited liberation.

One group of anti-fascists advocated a “Soviet Germany” with workers’ councils, a counter-revolution, and the immediate nationalization of industry. They hoped for a Bolshevik Revolution in Germany and began renaming streets after Rosa Luxemburg and Ernst Thälmann, and encouraging Germans to greet one another with the KPD saying “Red Front.” The Soviets and the “Ulbricht Group” referred to these zealous activists as “sectarians” because of their willingness to alienate other political groups in the name of radical revolution.

Besides the “sectarians,” other bands of socialists worked for a departure from traditional political parties in favor of “anti-fascist fronts.” Through radio broadcasts, the Soviets had encouraged committees of anti-fascists that combined communists and socialists in 1944. They believed these groups would make the Soviet liberation more orderly. These “antifas,” as they were called, hoped to avoid past mistakes and promote unity between socialists and communists. They demanded the termination of the KPD in favor of a “people’s republic” based on “anti-fascist democratic principles.”

The sectarians and anti-fascists failed to extend their influence for two major reasons. First, the Soviets and the “Ulbricht Group” opposed them. The occupying powers worried about how their radicalism would influence the population. Most importantly, the Soviets wanted to work with groups they could control. Stalinists remained suspicious of grassroots organizations. The sectarians and anti-fascists both opposed their early goals of creating multiple political parties. The Soviets hoped the KPD would utilize the resources provided them by the occupation to gain legitimacy through electoral victories. Once this course of action failed, the Soviets pressured the Social Democratic Party of Germany (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD) into a unity party, known as the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*, SED). This unity party did not match the goals of the anti-fascists. They desired committees that genuinely combined both socialist and communist points of view. Communists dominated the SED and it became the conduit for Soviet policy in its eastern zone of occupation.

Grassroots movements for communism and socialism also failed because of their lack of

connection with the German population. Most Germans experienced the end of the war in a tired, hungry, and disillusioned state. They usually had little sympathy with either the Soviets or communism. Influenced by negative wartime propaganda about the brutality of Soviet communism and angered by Soviet rapes, the German people initially viewed the prospect of communist rule with fear. Radicalism of the sectarians and the anti-fascists often frightened them even more than the Soviet occupation authorities.

Despite the marginalization of these left-wing anti-fascists, they affected the future of the German Democratic Republic in two ways. First, they inspired the Soviets and the SED to use anti-fascism as one of the major justifications for their state. SED leadership emphasized the role of communist resistance during the Third Reich and portrayed itself as an anti-fascist alternative. Second, these organizations sowed the seeds of hope for reform socialists who emerged as GDR dissidents in future generations. Many of the most significant East German critics of the SED dreamed of a more humane form of socialism and looked back at the sectarian and anti-fascist movements with nostalgia.

Failed Revolution and Muted Protest, 1949–1968

After the thorough Stalinization of the GDR, the consolidation of power by the SED, and the election of Walter Ulbricht as general secretary of the party, East Germany resembled the communist dictatorships in other East European Soviet satellite states. In the early years of this “People’s Republic,” elements within the population staged both large and small-scale protests. The most famous of these articulations of dissent occurred with the workers’ uprising on June 17, 1953. Elite members of the SED as well as ordinary GDR citizens offered less vocal protests during the revolt in Hungary during 1956, the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and the Prague Spring of 1968. Despite these actions, popular protest never created revolution or the destabilization of the communist state. Increased social control and unity by the SED and growing resignation by the populace made the German Democratic Republic the most stable of all the Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe.

The workers’ revolt of 1953, which included a national strike, passionate demonstrations, and

calls for a new government, was the most significant instance of meaningful popular protest in East Germany before 1989. Celebrated in the West as a revolt against socialism and in favor of unity, this landmark event caused the SED to increase its levels of popular surveillance and coercion. This incident resulted from a build-up of popular resentment; changes within Soviet policy; inefficiency on behalf of the SED; and anger at rapid changes in expectations for industrial workers.

One full year of policy modifications by the SED preceded the uprising of June 1953. For example, the government increased border fortifications and restrictions of movement during the summer of 1952. Furthermore, the pressure to conform increased through a handful of public trials as well as more subtle measures against social democratic sympathizers and young members of Christian organizations. Finally, the pace of agricultural collectivization increased in 1952–3, which caused discontent in the countryside and the emigration of many farmers to the West.

Against this backdrop of general discontent, an abrupt change toward industrial workers sparked mass protests. While the SED tried to ease the increasing tension among the middle class and the peasants, they made a surprise announcement that workers had to dramatically increase their productivity (“work norms”) despite complaints about wages and poor living conditions. The contradictory nature of SED policy caused shock in the population. Dissension within the SED and a change in the direction of Soviet leadership created this inconsistent treatment of peasants and workers. After Stalin’s death, new Soviet leadership called for a “New Course” in East Germany that would include a liberalization of domestic and foreign policies. These new policies received support from some prominent SED leaders, such as Rudolf Herrnstadt and Wilhelm Zaisser, but were rejected by Walter Ulbricht. The confusing dissonance within GDR leadership led to the contradictory course of easing restrictions in the countryside and increasing hardship for industrial workers.

Disunity at the highest levels of the SED caused a minor protest about “work norms” to escalate into a major uprising. On June 16, 1953, a group of angry workers staged protests outside the central trade union building in Berlin as well as before the administrative building housing SED ministers. They received assurances that the

new “work norms” would be abandoned from Minister of Heavy Industry Fritz Selbmann, but the Politburo offered only a vague promise of change. The workers felt both empowered and confused at the results of their action. Some leaders of the spontaneous and decentralized uprising called for the removal of the Ulbricht regime and lower prices. To achieve these goals, they demanded a mass strike for the following day. On June 17, at least 300,000 GDR industrial workers, representing a minimum of 5.5 percent of the workforce, did not show up for work and joined demonstrations in Berlin, Leipzig, Magdeburg, and other cities. The workers were encouraged by supportive editorials in a party-controlled newspaper, *Neues Deutschland*, while the official SED trade union newspaper, *Tribüne*, condemned the uprising. Disarray and lack of communication within the SED simultaneously encouraged workers about the possibility for change and angered them with denunciations.

The demonstrations on June 17 were uncoordinated, spontaneous, and without clearly defined leadership. Participants addressed a wide range of issues. Some workers simply wanted a repeal of the new work norms, while many others desired sweeping economic changes that would improve their standard of living. Many East Germans used the uprising as a platform for other issues, such as the freeing of political prisoners, freedom of movement, and German unity. Although protesters usually came from the ranks of industrial workers, many students, housewives, and other spectators joined the demonstrations. With a broad base of participants and several issues, the uprising possessed a complicated amalgam of causes and aims.

The uncoordinated protest met a disorganized response by the SED. Local officials struggled to articulate state policy and GDR leadership doubted the capability of their police force and army to quell the unrest. These workers’ protests posed a serious problem for the political survival of Walter Ulbricht and his followers. Therefore, they requested the intervention of the Soviet military. In the afternoon of June 17, Soviet tanks supported by GDR police violently clashed with protesters and the uprising was quieted.

Three major consequences resulted from this instance of public protest. First, the SED repealed work norms and passed other measures to increase the amount of consumer goods available and to adjust prices. More important,

dissent within the GDR was crushed. The police arrested over 6,000 people with connections to the unrest of 1953, including many strikers and leaders of the uprising. Thousands of SED party members throughout East Germany received punishment if they indicated social democratic tendencies or failed to support the party line. Top SED officials, such as Rudolf Herrnstadt and Wilhelm Zaisser, were purged from the party, and the effectiveness of the police and the Stasi was increased to prevent such events from occurring in the future. Finally, Ulbricht’s political position was strengthened. Despite his disagreements with its “New Course,” Moscow supported him rather than risk further disturbances. They believed that any other position would have been a concession to the protesters and signaled weakness. In the stifling atmosphere that followed the uprising, all of Ulbricht’s political rivals were suppressed and the repressive institutions of the GDR were strengthened to the point that they discouraged future protest from above and below.

Throughout the remaining years of the 1950s and 1960s, only scattered and muted protest existed. Occasionally, elite members of the SED leadership pressured Ulbricht to undertake a thorough process of de-Stalinization. For example, Wolfgang Harich and his Marxist allies published a call for democratization and possible reunification in 1956. Economists Fritz Behrens and Arne Benary demanded economic reform and a decentralized economy. The Politburo also contained Marxists critical of Ulbricht during the late 1950s, such as Karl Schirdewan, Fritz Selbmann, and Gerhart Ziller. Each of these figures, however, was removed from positions of influence, silenced, or imprisoned.

The events of 1956 in Hungary and the Soviet Union as well as the Prague Spring sparked only small waves of dissent in East Germany. A few disparate groups caused an increase in strikes, sabotage, and arson in East Germany after Khrushchev’s Secret Speech and the disruptive protests that sparked Soviet intervention in Hungary. For example, Magdeburg witnessed a few factory strikes during 1956. In one case of dissidence, a group of workers burnt swastikas and SS (*Schutzstaffel* or Protective Squadron) insignias into their bricks as a protest against GDR policy. The Prague Spring of 1968 in neighboring Czechoslovakia sparked a stronger reaction. Trade union members, youth, the

intelligentsia, and students utilized the event to articulate distaste for SED policies. Evidence exists for widespread discontent among all classes and regions during the summer of 1968. However, most dissenters contradicted one another, lacked cohesion, and possessed no unified leadership. Some youths sang fascist songs, while simultaneously calling for political freedom. While political graffiti leaflets, sabotage, and accounts of conversations by the Stasi indicate discontent, most anger was directed toward events occurring outside the borders of the GDR.

Perhaps the greatest protest that followed the June 1953 unrest was the wave of westward emigration that occurred during the 1950s. A lack of consumer goods and unpopular policies, such as collectivization, caused increasing numbers of people to move to the Federal Republic of Germany by way of West Berlin. By 1961, three and a half million people emigrated out of the GDR for the West. This figure caused the erection of the Berlin Wall by Ulbricht and the SED to seal the border. Although many citizens grumbled about the Wall, few voiced their opinions openly.

The years that followed the uprising of 1953 lacked popular upheaval for several reasons. The SED leadership emerged unified in the aftermath of 1953. After several party purges, few cracks occurred in the top echelons of the communist state, which inhibited any revolutions from above. Furthermore, the state increased the extent and effectiveness of its surveillance. After the failures of 1953, the money, infrastructure, and reach of the State Security Service (*Ministerium für Staatssicherheit*, Stasi) increased. The SED effectively crushed what remained of civil society in East Germany. They denied the population a public sphere that was independent of the state. The population resigned itself to life under the GDR dictatorship as well. Although they anonymously complained about some policies, the surveillance of the Stasi and the realization that revolution was impossible without western intervention deterred most opposition. East Germans' interests were best served by adapting to life in a communist dictatorship. In sum, both state leadership and the population made adjustments after 1953 that decreased the possibility of unrest.

Revolt and public protest failed to materialize throughout most of the 1970s as well for one further reason. After Erich Honecker replaced

Walter Ulbricht in 1971, he pursued “the unity of economic and social policies.” The GDR undertook economic reforms that improved the quality of life of its citizens. They increased their foreign debt in order to bring about social changes that would gain support from the population. Although they failed to reach the material standards of the West, welfare, full employment, and increasing access to some consumer items allowed many to live fulfilling private lives under communist leadership. Programs to open swimming pools, increase the availability of food, improve housing, upgrade public transportation, and provide vacations helped ease tension between the GDR and its people. This phenomenon of trading social programs for popular support is what Mary Fulbrook calls “paternalism” and Konrad H. Jarausch terms the “Welfare Dictatorship.” It contributed to the persistence of only muted protest during the 1970s.

The Stasi: Coercion in the GDR

While “paternalism” and “welfare” contributed to the stability of the GDR, repression created a culture of fear that inhibited organized dissent. The most infamous element of GDR power was the State Security Service, known as the Stasi. Formed in February 1950, the Stasi increased its strength and power throughout the history of the GDR. By 1989, the reach of the intelligence service was remarkable. It possessed a budget of four million marks, kept files on six million people, and paid as many as 105,000 employees. Furthermore, an estimated 500,000 people, or one in every 13 citizens, acted as informers for the Stasi throughout its history. The coercion of the Stasi contributed to the lack of unrest from 1953 to 1989 because of its cooperation with the state and its ability to gain collaborators from within the East German population.

The leader responsible for much of the Stasi's influence was Erich Mielke, minister for state security from 1957 to 1989. A powerful figure joining the Politburo during the 1970s, Mielke expanded the reach of the State Security Service. In the aftermath of June 1953, he helped articulate the mission of the Stasi to find and prevent political dissent in “its earliest stages.” In Mielke's eyes, anything that could “potentially” harm “the victory of socialism” required immediate suppression. He gradually increased his army of informers and officers to the point that they

could observe almost all aspects of life in the GDR. After Honecker's rise to power, the Stasi grew exponentially. Employing around 9,000 people during the 1950s, the organization grew to 59,458 employees in 1975 and 105,000 by 1989. The most active period of growth from 1968 to 1982 occurred as a result of *détente* because increased contact with the West necessitated more extensive security.

The Stasi experienced success in its tasks as a result of cooperation with the state police and the SED. Although some rivalry existed, Stasi coercion was reliant on collaboration from the People's Police, the National People's Army, and SED leadership on a local and national level. This combination of forces contributed to a culture of fear in the GDR that forced numerous individuals to retreat from public life. Despite the unhappiness of large sections of the populace with SED policy at various times, the information provided by the Stasi helped the party and the police to suppress dissent before it bubbled to the surface.

The greatest threat posed by the Stasi was the ability to destroy private and professional lives. Through its army of informers, it gathered information about people's domestic affairs, pressured them to stop unwanted political activity, and began harmful rumors about those who failed to cooperate. It often spread gossip and doctored photographs to discredit reputations, disturb family lives, and stall careers. This undercurrent of surveillance and fear caused many GDR citizens to retreat from the public world of politics. Many people strove for external conformity and tried not to invite unwanted interest from the state. They retreated into what Günter Graus has termed a "niche society," where citizens obeyed authority publicly, but expressed their true opinions in private and domestic settings.

The most problematic element of the Stasi's legacy remains the high level of popular collaboration. Without its long list of informants, the State Security Service would have been far less invasive in people's everyday experience. Information provided about friends, family, neighbors, colleagues, and acquaintances ruined lives and aided the SED's desire to maintain a façade of popular legitimacy.

A book by British historian and journalist Timothy Garton Ash carefully scrutinizes his own Stasi file from time spent in the GDR during the late 1970s and 1980s. It illustrates the wide vari-

ety of motives for becoming a Stasi accomplice. For example, one female informant who provided information about him became involved with the Stasi as a result of ambition. Through her collaboration she gained several professional promotions as well as the rare freedom to travel to western countries, such as Switzerland and Austria. Another of his informants cooperated out of fear of blackmail. A junior lecturer in English during the 1960s, he was denounced for becoming drunk, telling unflattering stories about a state-sponsored trip to Asia, and flirting with male students. Cultivating the informant's dependence on alcohol and threatening to punish him for these past events, the Stasi received reports from him until his sudden death in 1984. Another informant was an Englishman who moved to the GDR after marrying an East German woman. The Stasi coerced him into cooperating after falsely informing him that his name was associated with western intelligence agencies. Fearing deportation and under the illusion that he could alter the state from within, he provided detailed reports for over a decade. Finally, a German Jewish woman provided surveillance for the Stasi after years of committed service and suffering for the sake of communism in the Soviet Union and the GDR. In sum, a combination of self-interest, ideology, and fear led people to aid the Stasi and contribute to the perceived tranquility of a police state. While voluntary help existed, the Stasi relied upon incentives and blackmail to recruit its collaborators and stifle East German civil society.

The Protestant Churches: Between Dissent and Cooperation

Few topics attract as much scholarly controversy as the role of the Protestant churches in East Germany from 1949 to 1989. Historians, theologians, and journalists, such as Gerhard Besier and Ehrhart Neubert, have lambasted the churches for collaboration in the communist dictatorship of the GDR. Others, such as Mary Fulbrook and Christoph Klessmann, take a more balanced view and emphasize the significance of church dissent during the 1950s and 1980s. The churches alternated between inhibiting and contributing to the existence of the GDR. They shifted positions based on their own self-interest in maintaining their institutions as well as their desire to best serve their congregations.

The Protestant churches, which claimed at least nominal loyalty from 15 million of the 17 million inhabitants of the Soviet Zone of occupation, firmly opposed the GDR in several prominent ways. First, they clashed with the regime over the place of Christianity in a socialist dictatorship. Church officials led protests about the secularization of school instruction in 1951; the attempt to undermine the Protestant *Junge Gemeinde* (Youth Groups) in favor of the state-sponsored Free German Youth (*Freie Deutsche Jugend*, FDJ) in 1952; and the imposition of the secular youth confirmation (*Jugendweihe*) in 1954. The tension over confirmation became especially intense, as the numerous church elites condemned the state's attempt to replace a Christian ceremony with an event based on "an atheistic-materialistic worldview."

The church also publicly disagreed with SED leadership about some political issues. For example, churches formed the center of opposition to the remilitarization of East Germany. They protected conscientious objectors to military service after the start of conscription in 1962. Protestant leadership helped establish alternative forms of compulsory service by successfully advocating for work on construction projects as a substitute for joining the military. Protestantism also served as a focal point for dissent over the collectivization policies pursued in 1959–60.

Finally, the churches provided a haven for opposition to the GDR, even if those articulating dissent were not devout Christians. They incorporated contemporary music into their services that was scorned by the SED for its association with western consumerism. For example, they instituted *Gottesdienste einmal anders* (services which are different for once), which included jazz, blues, and spiritual music. The churches ran programs that aided drug addicts, homosexuals, alcoholics, and others with no place in the socialist Welfare Dictatorship as well. Throughout all of its efforts, Protestantism created a forum for civil society that was absent elsewhere in the GDR. It cultivated a public space where people could express opinions that were free of SED slogans and coercive influence.

Two major developments caused the churches to retreat from their persistent opposition to the GDR during the 1970s and 1980s. Protestant East Germany experienced the secularization process that overwhelmed much of the industrialized

western world after 1945. Between 1950 and 1964, the percentage of non-practicing East German Christians increased from 7.6 percent to 31.5 percent and the proportion of self-identified Protestants declined from 80.5 percent to 59.3 percent. Church attendance suffered especially among the young and in cities. Many church officials also felt stifled by constant church–state conflict and sought an accommodation with the SED in order to improve the standing of Protestantism in the GDR.

These motives led many church leaders to reconciliation and collaboration with the GDR dictatorship. Many officials lived by the slogan of Bishop Schönherr: "We want to be a church not alongside, not against, but rather a church within socialism." Recognizing that the GDR seemed permanent, Protestants sought avenues for church–state convergence. They emphasized common goals of socialism and Christianity and cooperated with the SED on shared charitable endeavors, such as hospitals, orphanages, nursing homes, day care, and mental institutions. The church also lent the GDR much-needed legitimacy in the international community through a well-publicized church–state agreement on March 6, 1978. This accord secured the existence of several church institutions and endorsed the existence of a socialist dictatorship in East Germany.

The most extreme examples of church–state accommodation involved collaboration with the Stasi. During the 1950s, the Stasi already infiltrated church institutions in Thuringia by gaining the cooperation of Gerhard Lotz, an influential church official who encouraged the pro-GDR course of Bishop Moritz Mitzenheim. Lotz also arranged for Ingo Braechlein, another Stasi informant, to succeed Mitzenheim. The most prominent case of partnership with the Stasi was that of Manfred Stolpe, a powerful church functionary who became a social democratic prime minister of Brandenburg after German unity. Stolpe provided detailed information during frequent discussions with Stasi agents. It is debatable whether Stolpe intended to aid the state in its attempt to control and observe the church's sphere of influence or to help preserve church institutions by cooperating with the dictatorial state. Either way, he inhibited opposition groups that sought shelter from the church and damaged the personal lives of several individuals.

In sum, the church wavered between opposition and accommodation in its relations with

the GDR. While the church contributed to the construction of a sphere of civil society that would be significant to the protests of 1989, it also legitimized the SED-led state out of self-interest for its own institutions. The heated debates over the role of Christianity in the GDR indicate the ambiguous nature of the church's actions.

1989: Revolution from Below, Above, and Within

Three explanations are commonly used to explain the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the GDR, and the surprising opportunity for German unity in 1989. Some scholars emphasize the importance of foreign policy by stressing the role of Mikhail Gorbachev's moderate policies, the unwillingness of the Soviets to intervene, and the aggressiveness of Helmut Kohl in pursuing unity. Others highlight the role of popular protest throughout the 1980s and in the months that led to the opening of the Berlin Wall. Finally, some academics argue that the GDR self-imploded through ineffective economic policies that ultimately caused the regime to cave in. In reality, a combination of these factors contributed to the swift fall of the seemingly permanent communist dictatorship in East Germany.

Before the rupture of 1989, several types of dissent emerged during the 1970s and 1980s that revived spheres of civil society in East Germany. Some groups advocated for changes within the system by using the institutions and ideology of the SED to request reform. Some youths used the Free German Youth to avoid military service, and SED university groups utilized special access to banned writings in order to discuss "subversive" ideas. People successfully submitted petitions utilizing the language of Marxist ideology to demand material improvements in their everyday lives. By staying within the system, they often received a response from local authorities to complaints about prices, living conditions, and work arrangements.

Much more aggressive patterns of dissent also developed among pockets of youth during the 1970s. Rock music caused several public confrontations over issues of free speech. A 1977 concert that attracted at least 8,000 spectators devolved into chaos when police halted the music. Clashes between concertgoers and police resulted in two dead officers and 200 wounded people. The most renowned individual who protested through

music was Wolf Biermann. After moving east as an idealistic young communist, he soon became disillusioned with SED abuses and was banned for his critical songs. After years of circumventing authorities with popular church concerts and informal gatherings, he was expelled after a well-publicized concert in Cologne, West Germany. Biermann's expulsion sparked a protest by 100 GDR intellectuals and caused international embarrassment for the SED.

Handfuls of GDR citizens also sought an alternative public sphere within Protestant churches that increasingly supported and protected regime critics. For example, they aided peace movements and environmentalists in a series of vigils, workshops, and minor demonstrations. Although these acts of civil disobedience involved a small number of individuals, were subject to repression, and usually caused little immediate change, they prepared the way for the major changes of 1989. Left-wing reformers began a revival of civil society in the GDR that made more significant transformations possible.

The protests that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and German unity in 1990 contained two major elements. The largest and most significant group of protesters came from the mainstream population and demonstrated in favor of freedom of movement. After Hungary removed its fences on its western border in May 1989, East Germans began escaping through this new gateway to the West. The SED tried to contain the illegal exodus throughout the summer and fall by pressuring its eastern neighbors, easing some travel restrictions, and cracking down on East German refugees. These events led to massive demonstrations. A protest movement of only a few hundred people developed around Leipzig's St. Nicholas Church, which had long nurtured GDR dissidence. It quickly grew into a national movement that attracted several hundreds of thousands to demonstrations in November. At the highpoint of the protests, 300,000 people showed up to a demonstration and a crowd of 500,000 formed in East Berlin. These public protests utilized peaceful methods, but frequently suffered from a violent police response. The growing numbers of protesters caused the GDR to repudiate violent police tactics on October 9 and eventually ease travel restrictions and open the Berlin Wall on November 9. After months of illegal border crossings, a torrent of East Germans entered West Germany. Throughout

1989, 343,854 refugees voted with their feet against the socialist experiment in the GDR.

Although the refugee crisis sparked this protest movement, it had several long-standing causes. Throughout the 1980s, the citizens of the GDR became increasingly disillusioned with their material conditions and the SED's reliance upon political repression for stability. A Stasi report stated: "The great majority of refugees resent problems and deficiencies of social development, especially in the personal sphere and living conditions." Both Stasi reports and opinion surveys indicate that economic complaints about lack of consumer goods, a poor working environment, low salaries, and inadequate health care motivated many of the illegal refugees of 1989. These problems resulted from a faltering East German economy. Although special trade agreements with West Germany provided the GDR more financial strength than other Eastern European nations during the same time period, its dependence on imported fuel and raw materials caused major disruptions with the price increases of the 1970s. East Germany fell behind the West in the new field of electrical engineering and computers and its growth rates plummeted. East Germans also articulated disillusionment with political repression. Travel restrictions, unfavorable prospects for the future, and suppression of free speech were among the most frequent motives named in surveys conducted by the West.

The effective articulation of grievances was aided considerably by left-wing dissenters in the GDR with roots in protests from the 1970s and 1980s. The 1989 protests emanated from St. Nicholas Church, a Protestant church in Leipzig that encouraged the peace movement in previous years. Many left-wing intellectuals found sudden popular support after several years of activism. For example, Bärbel Bohley, a painter, became a leader of the 1989 demonstrations after years on the fringes. She founded the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights in 1985 as an association of secular intellectuals devoted to critiquing and reforming the abuses of the GDR. In 1989, she and her colleagues formed the New Forum. This group, along with others, such as Awakening 89 and Democracy Now, created organization and leadership structures to lead a spontaneous and diverse mass of demonstrators. Scientists, pastors, writers, and film directors, such as Katia Havemann, Rolf Heinrich, Jens Reich, and Reinhard Schult, joined Bohley in a call for dia-

logue with government officials. They demanded democratic change, economic reform, civil rights, and better environmental care. This leadership core, absent in June 1953, helped achieve changes, such as freedom of the media and the founding of new political parties. Eventually these protest leaders formed the Round Table, which created a series of meetings with SED leaders and GDR organizations to initiate major changes.

Bohley and other left-wing intellectuals became bitter at the outcome of German unification. She and her fellow intellectuals sought a democratic reform of socialism within the GDR, but rejected unity with the West as a desirable goal for the future. They supported a "third way" for East Germany and hoped to create "socialism with a human face." Their ideas diverged from the majority of East Germans. Hungry for western consumer goods and a better standard of living, they voted for German unity. After the surprisingly aggressive intervention of West German Prime Minister Helmut Kohl with his "Ten-Point Plan for German Unity" on November 28, 1989, momentum increased for a quick reunification. Despite warnings by reform socialists in the East and the Social Democratic Party, East Germans voted for the Christian Democratic Union's Alliance for Germany in March 1990 and chose union with the capitalist West over a resumption of socialist reform in an independent East. The majority of East Germans opted for the quick material improvements offered by Kohl and a currency union with the Federal Republic of Germany.

While popular protest sparked the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was not the only factor in the rapid changes of 1989. Foreign policy played a major part in the collapse of the GDR. One of the major differences from the events of 1953 was the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to intervene. The refusal of Mikhail Gorbachev to aid Erich Honecker in the repression of protesters during a state visit in October 1989 caused a significant change of course by the SED. It replaced Honecker as party leader with Egon Krenz and attempted to quell unrest with reform rather than violence. Furthermore, the softening of Soviet foreign policy caused the changes in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia that sparked the German protests in the first place.

Finally, many historians emphasize the internal implosion of the GDR as the primary cause of the 1989–90 revolution. Conditions in the GDR declined for years. The faltering economy

and the inability of the SED to maintain order without the coercion of the Stasi and the police caused much of the bitterness behind the protests and the willingness of the international community to approve German unity. Without the glaring political and economic failures of the SED, the motives behind the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Leipzig and Berlin in 1989 would not have existed.

The fall of communism and the unity of Germany resulted from a mixture of popular protest with foreign policy and long-term GDR failures. The importance of the demonstrations that gained popularity between the summer and fall of 1989, however, should not be underestimated. The long-developing left-wing leadership as well as the spontaneous popular demand for change provided the pressure necessary to overturn a dictatorship that enjoyed decades of stability and an air of permanence.

The German Democratic Republic contained fewer episodes of popular unrest than any other communist state in the Soviet Union's Eastern European sphere of influence. After the threat posed to East German communists by protesters in 1953, the SED underwent several changes that deterred organized articulations of dissent for decades. By improving SED unity, increasing the reach of Stasi suppression, cultivating economic ties to the West, and strategically implementing several welfare programs, the GDR dictatorship avoided future challenges against its authority, such as the Prague Spring of 1968 or the Solidarity Movement in Poland in 1980–1. To the great surprise of contemporary observers, this veneer of order proved an illusion that could be maintained for several decades in the context of the Cold War, but not indefinitely. Although foreign policy shifts and GDR failures contributed to the sudden collapse of 1989, popular protest set in motion a process that resulted in the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the GDR, and the unification of Germany under the capitalist government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

SEE ALSO: Biermann, Wolf (b. 1936); Communist Party, Germany; Prague Spring; Socialism; Solidarność (Solidarity)

References and Suggested Readings

Ash, T. G. (1997) *The File: A Personal History*. London: Flamingo.

- Fulbrook, M. (1992) *The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918–1990*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fulbrook, M. (1995) *Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949–1989*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gieseke, J. (2006) *Die Mielke-Konzern: Die Geschichte der Stasi 1945–1990*, 2nd ed. Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.
- Graus, G. (1986) *Wo Deutschland liegt*. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Jarausch, K. H. (1994) *The Rush to German Unity*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jarausch, K. H. (Ed.) (1999) *Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn.
- Jarausch, K. H. (2006) *After Hitler: Recivilizing the Germans, 1945–1995*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lindenberger, T. (Ed.) (1999) *Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur: Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR*. Cologne: Böhlau.
- Naimark, N. (1995) *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
- Ross, C. (2002) *The East German Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of the GDR*. London: Arnold.

German nationalism and workers' movements, 19th century

Helen Bluemel

The long nineteenth century, which lasted from the French Revolution of 1789 to World War I (1914–18), marked a period of great change for Germany. The French Revolution led to a new consideration of self in the German nation. The French claim for freedom, equality, and fraternity inspired the German people. It resulted in the realization that, despite the rivalry of sectionalism, there was an overarching cultural and historical connection. The rough road from small individual kingdoms to a united German Reich also conditioned the expression that nationalism found after the 1871 unification of the Reich and its progression until the eve of war in 1914. The 1800s were the century when Germany underwent its industrial revolution, and despite

a late start, became a world economic leader. It was the century when workers became the "proletariat," and when this new social stratum grew conscious of its position in society and established workers' movements.

The nature of German nationalism in the nineteenth century and the harsh circumstances that necessitated the organization of workers' movements would appear to clash with each other. The former was a romantic ideal of a united nation and country, the latter advanced an international mindset following Karl Marx's battle call in the *Communist Manifesto*: "working men of all countries, unite." The theoretical concepts behind both movements were different; the protagonists, however, were periodically the same pursuing common aims. This meant that the reality of the development of German nationalism and the workers' movements progressed interactively and symbiotically. German workers were calling for a united fatherland, and the demands of the middle classes for free political participation included the proletariat. Both movements were revolutionary as they rebelled against the status quo of their time.

Political Background

The political development of Germany in the nineteenth century was enormous. Through the Napoleonic wars, the former Holy Roman Empire of the German nation broke down in 1806. The emperor abdicated and the imperial crown was laid to rest. Although this empire could not be described as a united state, it still provided a common denominator. From 1806 until the liberation wars against Napoleon during 1813 to 1815, the German states were no longer linked through the Holy Roman Empire, and even fought on different sides of the Napoleonic system.

The wars of liberation, especially the Battle of Leipzig in 1813, facilitated the defeat of French foreign rule. These victories reestablished a sense of patriotic pride and of belonging together in the German people. However, the 1814 Congress of Vienna, called to redraw the European map after the defeat of Napoleon, constituted a setback for these aspirations. The Austrian Clemens von Metternich (1773–1859) used his leading position in the congress to reestablish a reactionary system, devoid of the "follies" of the French Revolution and its concepts. The agreement reached for the German territory was the foundation of the

Deutscher Bund (German federation); however, this could not satisfy the patriotic longing for a united fatherland. This federation consisted of about forty rather autonomous members. Political participation of the people was only granted in the middle states through their constitutions. The powerful and influential states, however, most predominantly Austria and Prussia, would not allow for constitutions.

The German federation was dominated by Austria; thereby Metternich was enabled to further exercise his reactionary rule. This was shown for the first time in response to the *Wartburgfest* (celebration at the Wartburg castle) in 1817. Two years previously, after the foundation of the *Deutscher Bund*, the first *Burschenschaft* (student fraternity) was founded at the university in Jena, and other universities followed suit. These associations, filled with romantic ideals of a united fatherland, echoed the maxims of the French Revolution. In 1817 students congregated at the Wartburg for a symbolic celebration. It was 300 years since Martin Luther's theses, which founded Christian Protestantism. In addition, the Wartburg was the place where Luther translated the Bible and, as legend has it, attacked the devil with an inkstand. The speeches given at the *Wartburgfest* revolved around the theme of a united nation, and expressed a deep yearning for a united Reich under a single Kaiser.

This provocation was soon to be avenged. When the writer and journalist August Kotzebue (1761–1819) was murdered in 1819, Metternich seized the opportunity and proclaimed the Karlsbad decrees. These decrees included a ban on student fraternities, censorship of all newspapers, and the directive to remove all lecturers from university office guilty of having furthered civil unrest. Pursuant to these directives, an addition to the treaty of the German federation (*Wiener Schlussakte*) was made in 1820. It decreed that all political power was to be exercised exclusively by the respective sovereigns in their states. Therefore, all political ambition outside the courts was suppressed.

It was not until 1830 that a new lease of life came into the political aspirations of the German people. The July Revolution of 1830 in Paris sparked popular unrest and regional uprisings in the German states, but also enabled people of the middle states to achieve improvements of their constitutions. The culmination of these

developments was the *Hambacher Fest* (Hambach celebration) in May 1832. Over 30,000 people gathered, making it the largest mass demonstration in modern German history. It was yet another expression of the demand for more political freedom and a united fatherland. The repressive response was immediate. In July 1832 a federal resolution for the maintenance of law and order in the *Deutscher Bund* was proclaimed, reinforcing press censorship, banning all political organizations, curtailing the right of assembly (including celebrations), and banning all public political speeches.

However, economic development in the German federation produced a dynamic toward further unification. The requirements of the market necessitated the removal of tariff borders between individual German states. Therefore, a *Deutscher Zollverein* (German tariff union) was established in 1834. The exclusion of Austria in this alliance was an early harbinger of the united German Reich without Austria. In addition, despite all repressions, the spirit for political change could not be extinguished anymore. Unrest and tensions grew over the following decade and were released in the Revolution of 1848. Again, it was France that led the way; after the February insurrection in Paris, uprisings followed in both Vienna and Berlin in March 1848. This revolution ended the era of Metternich; he fled to Britain and was not to return to political importance. Other early successes of these events included freedom of assembly and the granting of a constitution for Prussia by King Frederick William IV (1795–1861). Furthermore, the unification of Germany seemed within reach. A so-called pre-parliament was established in Frankfurt am Main. It decided to convene a German National Assembly with the task of formulating and ratifying a constitution for Germany. This constitution was finally accomplished in March 1849; it envisaged a unified Reich under the Prussian king who was to be its emperor. However, the Prussian king refused what he called a “crown of dirt” and thereby created a crisis in the national assembly that led to its final demise. The revolution had failed, a unification of the German states “from below” (meaning through the German people) did not take place, and in an effort of restoration of the old power, relations were reinforced.

The next major political change was engineered, not by the German people, but by Otto von Bismarck (1815–98), a politician who became

Prussian prime minister in 1862. His main political aim was the furthering of Prussia’s role in Germany and Europe. Initially, he increased Prussia’s territory in an 1864 war with Denmark. The resulting problems with Austria (which had fought alongside Prussia in the Danish war) were “solved” in the *Bruderkrieg* (war of brethren) in 1866. Thereby, Bismarck achieved concurrently both a territorial increase and the supplanting of Austria’s importance in the German federation. In 1867 he founded the North German federation under Prussian leadership. In 1870 Bismarck engineered a war against France; the *Reichseinigung* (unification of the Reich) crowned the victory over this old enemy of Germany on January 18, 1871. The new German Reich consisted of the states of the North German federation and the South German kingdoms, excluding Austria. The king of Prussia was crowned as Kaiser of Germany; the unification from “above” was accomplished.

The size and growing industrial and military power of the German Reich, paired with an unwise alliance policy in the post-Bismarck era (after 1890), led Germany into conflict with the other European powers. The resulting mounting pressure found its final release in World War I.

Economic Background

The German territories around 1800 were pre-industrial. About two thirds of all Germans were living and working in the countryside. There were small manufactures but no large factories. Germany was backward in comparison with other states, such as Great Britain. The manufacturing occupations were organized in guilds that controlled the trades. The Napoleonic wars instigated the necessity to change. Starting from Prussia, reforms were initiated to modernize society and thereby the economy. In 1807 Prussia ratified the liberation of farmers. That meant that farmers, previously the bondsmen of their princes, were free people. Other reforms included the establishment and widening of the state education system, and the granting of freedom of trade (only fully achieved in the 1860s).

These reforms created wageworkers for the first time. Previously, work relations between masters and servants were on levels outside mere economic considerations, for the entire person was bound to the lord for better or worse. Now, people began to work for money. However, while liberation

had definitely taken place, it was not salvation. Farmers had to buy themselves from their princes or leave their land in exchange for their freedom, thereby losing their livelihood. Journeymen were free to set up businesses quickly. However, the consequent wave of business foundations left most destitute, as the heavy competition made making a living impossible. Reforms which would have assisted a furthering of industrialization came too early. The result was an army of workers looking for work that did not exist, which in turn led to pauperization. The climax was reached in the 1840s, when several workers' revolts demanded the barest living essentials (the most famous was the Silesian weavers' uprising of 1844).

However, it was also around 1830–40 that industrialization came into full force in Germany. In 1834 the German Tariff Union removed tariff barriers between members. The first German railway was built in 1835 and the railway industry expanded quickly. From 1850 onward, the first great wave of industrialization captured Germany. New factories took in as many workers as possible, and demanded more. Many people moved from the countryside to the cities as this process gathered speed. Nevertheless, although these developments ended the pauperization process, they also led to the "social question." The living and working conditions of the workers were at the center of this question. Workers were forced to work 80-hour weeks. There were insufficient safety measures in factories and accidents resulting in disability were common.

When Germany defeated France in 1871 it gained reparation payments. This 5-billion francs influx stimulated the German economy. Another positive effect of the *Reichseimigung* was the unification of measurements, which simplified trade and gave an additional impetus to economic development. The German Reich also profited in unforeseen ways from its rather late industrialization. The basic industries had been tried and tested in other countries. Thus, Germany did not encounter the early troubles that accompanied the burgeoning years of the industrialization process elsewhere. This enabled the concentration on new technologies that furthered Germany's international economic standing and guaranteed a leading role for the country. Especially in the areas of electrical and electronic engineering, the chemical industry, optical instruments, and automobiles, Germany occupied one of the

pole positions. On the eve of World War I every second electrical machine and installation worldwide came from a German company.

Germany also acquired a leading role as a trading region. It was the country with the world's oldest trade fair and it developed this heritage comprehensively. Furthermore, the two great harbors of Bremen and Hamburg facilitated a traffic in goods that from the late 1880s onward exceeded the levels of places like Liverpool or Marseille. These harbors also allowed for a boom in shipbuilding. Emperor Wilhelm II (1859–1941), who supplied it with massive state contracts, favored this industry. He attempted to supplant the British fleet and recreate Germany as a seafaring nation. His delusional ambitions were proved wrong in World War I.

Development of German Nationalism and Workers' Movements

With these political and economic circumstances in mind, one can see the problems facing any movement for change, be they national or social. Both German nationalism and the workers' movements were revolutionary, as they demanded change. German nationalism was based on several concepts. Both the philosophies of the Enlightenment (such as that of Immanuel Kant) and Romanticism (the prevailing art and literature genres of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Germany) showed Germans that regardless of location, they shared a common cultural heritage and the same language. However, with the breakdown of the Holy Roman Empire, the last linking element was lost. A show of existing national consciousness was the fact that many Germans, especially students, enlisted for the Battle of Leipzig in 1813 to defeat Napoleon. The subsequent formation of the German federation raised hopes for a new connection between the German states and their people. However, these expectations were crushed when it became known that all members would remain largely autonomous within this loose federation. The first group to voice in public their aspirations for a properly united fatherland after 1815 was fraternity students. Their approach at the *Wartburgfest* ended with the Karlsbad decrees. Many students, as well as their university professors, had to go into exile to avoid imprisonment or poverty (lecturers found guilty of causing

public unrest were prohibited from working at any university inside the German federation).

Around the same time, economic problems for the growing number of free wagedworkers reached a level that forced them to seek labor elsewhere. Journeymen, who traditionally took to the road during their vocational training, went abroad. These men had the great advantage of being able to use traditional networks common to their trades to secure safe journeys and a livelihood. Abroad (mainly Switzerland, France, and Britain), they were introduced to liberal notions of politics and, in the more industrialized parts, to the concepts of workers' movements. It is therefore not surprising that journeymen were the precursors of the German workers' movements. They formed workers' associations abroad that focused on developing ideas to achieve more rights for workers. It is abroad that the German workers' movement began. The first exponent of the workers' associations was the *Volksverein* (people's association) founded in 1832 in Paris.

The term "worker," in the context of German development, was a generic term encompassing different people. Journeymen had a rather good social standing. Unlearned wagedworkers, the former farmers and domestics, were a social underclass. Students and their professors also belonged to a mid-section of society. However, it was a mixture of all these groups that formed the core of the early German workers' movement. The economic situation, the shared status of poverty, merged them into one class. It was not until the 1830s that the term "proletariat" first surfaced to describe this new emerging social stratum that evolved alongside the unfolding industrialization in Germany. Nevertheless, the proletariat grew into one of Germany's biggest classes, thereby facilitating political change. Thus, the worker is to be seen as synonymous with the proletarians, the working class.

The fact that the workers' associations emerged abroad where the German language was not spoken meant that the sense of togetherness between German speakers grew. The regional differences disappeared into the background, journeymen from all over Germany understood themselves to be just Germans, and thus the national element appeared naturally. The involvement of students in the foundation of the workers' associations particularly influenced their orientation on national as well as social demands. These students had already voiced their nationalist sentiments at

Wartburg and Hambach. The call for a united German fatherland always accompanied demands for freedom and sociopolitical change.

Workers' associations also founded branches within the German states. These, however, were persecuted and their numbers minimized through multiple arrests in the 1840s. Nevertheless, the growth of a working class influenced German ruling elites. Prussian King Frederick Wilhelm IV founded a *Zentralverein für das Wohl der arbeitenden Klassen* (Central Association for the Good of the Working Classes) in 1844. This was followed by the formation of *Arbeiterbildungsvereine* (workers' educational associations) to facilitate improvement of workers' living conditions through education. Workers slowly began to develop a political consciousness of their position and the injustice of their status.

The plight of the working classes also surfaced in the 1840s. The Silesian weavers' revolt, among others, demonstrated that workers were struggling to secure their existence. This added to the growing unrest in wider circles of the German public during this decade. Political interest was not only the vocation of workers or intellectuals. It reached into the middle classes, which grew dissatisfied with their lack of political influence and began to hold assemblies to discuss political matters. A crop failure in 1846–7 increased the misery of the lower classes and fueled their wrath. These tensions climaxed in the revolution of 1848–9. Although the revolution is largely understood to have been a bourgeois one, meaning that its leading protagonists were middle class, workers were at the heart of events. The barricades of March 1848 in Vienna and Berlin were manned with workers and their fights triggered the concessions made in all German states. In addition, workers' associations used the early success of achieving the freedom of assembly to legally establish organizations in Germany. An *Arbeitervorbrüderung* (unity of workers) with a large membership was founded.

Although the convocation of the National Assembly in Frankfurt should have secured a united German state with a constitution, the infighting in parliament soon superseded the uniting political aim. There was no agreement about which territory the new state should encompass, for the question of a *Kleindeutschland* ("lesser Germany," without the German part of Austria) or a *Großdeutschland* ("greater Germany," with Austria) caused great dispute. Accordingly,

the final constitution of March 1849 was merely a compromise.

Reactionary forces had already weakened whatever power the parliament had in late 1848. Therefore, the rejection of the crown by Prussia's king completely ended its aspirations to political importance. As the monarchs retained the command of the armed forces over the entire period, they quickly disposed of the remainder of the assembly after the refusal of the crown. The revolutionary forces had tried to achieve too much and had failed, while the old forces soon took over again and secured their position through the persecution of the revolutionaries. Many had to go into exile, while others were imprisoned or executed.

The Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels, published in 1848, was targeted at German workers to direct their role in the forthcoming revolution. It had nearly no impact in Germany during the events of 1848–9, but the philosophy of Marxism was to shape the coming developments of workers' movements considerably.

When a slow liberation found its way into Germany in the 1860s and allowed for the freedom of coalition, Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–64) founded his Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein (General German Workers' Association) in Leipzig in 1863. This was the first political workers' party in Germany. Lassalle pursued an improvement of workers' status through political reform proposals. In contrast, the Social Democratic Workers Party, under August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, followed Marxist revolutionary principles. These two parties finally merged during growing state persecution in 1875 into the Socialist Workers Party. However, they did not manage to reconcile the contradictions of reformism and revolution until 1914.

Bismarck engineered a united Reich with the so-called three wars of unification (1864, 1866, 1870–1). He created a constitutional state under the rule of an emperor. Through this, German unification was achieved, yet it was not the united fatherland of freedom and equality. The euphoria of unification and the defeat of France could not gloss over the problems within Germany. Workers' resentment about their low position found its expression in stronger support for workers' parties. Bismarck perceived this as a threat to his established order and suppressed the political influence of workers' representatives through the *Sozialistengesetz* (law against social-

ists) of 1878, which banned the Socialist Workers Party. However, he was not able to remove the destitution of workers and their anger. Thus, in an effort to stabilize the state and save it from further revolutionary tendencies, he enacted a social security policy, thereby establishing the first welfare state. The measures included health insurance (1883), casualty insurance (1884), and a pension scheme (1889). His plan of winning over the workers did not work. The prosecution of politically active workers and the Marxist claim that proletarians had no fatherland were too ingrained in the working class's mind to be resolved by Bismarck's legislation. In 1890, the year of Bismarck's resignation, the *Sozialistengesetz* was abolished and the Socialist Workers Party renamed itself the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Despite attempts by churches to organize workers' unions with a Christian ideal, the majority of the proletariat backed this political organization. It grew over the turn of the century into the largest party in Germany and became, despite an unfavorable electoral system, the largest parliamentary party in 1912. However, the main demands of the workers, such as the 8-hour workday, were only realized after the war in the Revolution of 1918–19.

German nationalism took a turn for the worse after the *Reichseinigung* and especially after the coronation of Wilhelm II in 1888. Militarism, furthered through the armaments industry under this emperor's rule, became the leading feature of a somewhat engineered patriotism that claimed German superiority on a world scale. It was this national arrogance, a trait Imperial Germany shared with other European powers, which allowed for the catastrophe of World War I.

SEE ALSO: *Communist Manifesto*; Communist Party, Germany; Ethnic and Nationalist Revolts in the Hapsburg Empire, 1500–1848; France, 1830 Revolution; Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; Social Democratic Party, Germany

References and Suggested Readings

- Berger, S. (2000) *Social Democracy and the Working Class in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany*. Harlow: Longman.
- Breuilly, J. (2001) *Nineteenth-Century Germany: Politics, Culture and Society, 1780–1918*. London: Arnold.
- Fulbrook, M. (1997) *German History since 1800*. London: Arnold.
- Geiss, I. (1997) *The Question of German Unification, 1806–1996*. London: Routledge.

- Hughes, M. (1988) *Nationalism and Society: Germany, 1800–1945*. London: Arnold.
- Kitchen, M. (2006) *A History of Modern Germany, 1800–2000*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1998) *The Communist Manifesto*. New York: Verso.
- Ogilvie, S. & Overy, R. (2003) *Germany: A New Social and Economic History*, Vol. 3. London: Hodder Arnold.
- Sperber, J. (2004) *Germany, 1800–1870*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Williamson, D. G. (2005) *Germany since 1815: A Nation Forged and Renewed*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

German Peasant Rebellion, 1525

Simone Cezanne De Santiago Ramos

The Peasant War of 1524–5 was an uprising of several hundred thousand peasants, workers, and artisans in mostly southern Germany but also in Tyrol, Alsace and Lorraine, as well as Carniola, Slovenia. The war, brought on by a combination of several factors, including changes in social and economic structures, heavy taxation by both the nobility and Catholic Church, religious changes engendered by the Reformation, and a crisis of the old feudal system, is often seen as the last medieval peasant revolt in Europe. Marxists, however, interpret it as the first modern revolution.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Germany started slowly to industrialize. Weaving industries, including silk, emerged around southern trade cities, particularly Augsburg and Nuremberg. Other industries, such as fine metals, etching, and woodcarving, provided employment. This in effect increased commerce, and more money was distributed. More and more people moved into cities to find work, and the countryside was developed into farmland to feed the growing population. Yet other parts of Germany had little trade or commerce beyond their regions. Commerce was heavily regulated by the guild system in the cities and the nobility in the countryside. To complicate matters, various currencies used in the fifteenth century also contributed to agricultural economic instabilities. Standards of grain measurement differed from region to region.

Social and economic structures were also changing. A tiered nobility structure in Germany consisted of knights, or lesser nobility, which



Abb. 115. Aufständischer Bauer. Holzschnitt aus: Murner, *Beschwörung des Lutherischen Narren*. Straßburg, Grüninger, 1522.

Referred to as “the last great medieval peasant revolt” and “the first modern revolution,” the German Peasant Rebellion of 1525 was inspired by the Reformation ideas of Martin Luther, Huldrych Zwingli, and Thomas Müntzer. Though Luther condemned the rebellion, his teachings, such as the idea of a priesthood of all believers, inspired the peasants by convincing them their cause was divinely sanctioned. (*Bibliothèque des Arts Décoratifs, Paris/Archives Charmet/The Bridgeman Art Library*)

slowly disappeared through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The middle nobility was also disappearing since the medieval feudal system had shifted the power structure and it lost many of its privileges over the decades. Finally, the princes or upper nobility in Germany were almost independent of the ruling house and possessed sovereign rights. With new trade opportunities and new industries opening up, the taste for luxury items grew among this group and the needed funds were collected by heavily taxing the lower orders, predominantly the peasantry. These payments included the “great tithe” for livestock and “small tithe” for fruits and vegetables, a *Handlohn* or hand fee on all feudal property if there was a change in ownership, a death duty if either the landowner or tenant died, taxes on cheese and wine in wine-producing regions, as

well as an acorn levy. Nobility also owned the right to decide whether peasant pigs could feed in their woods. In addition, an investiture tax had to be paid for every new bishop's inauguration to cover some of the expenses. A "huff tax" for every cow sold was implemented in 1522, followed by the Turk tax in 1524.

Thus, not only were peasants taxed but their old rights were circumvented. These "old rights" or laws existed only orally but had a long tradition in Germany. Old manorial obligations to the landlords were now converted into direct payments, while "old rights" like hunting, collecting firewood on manor lands, or fishing became increasingly restricted. Fishing rights in particular were seen more as a symbol of freedom going back to biblical times. Around the same period, the Catholic Church started to place greater monetary demands on the peasants, increasing the expenses and resulting tensions.

Although the Peasant War of 1525 was mainly an agrarian rebellion, the Reformation had a major influence on the war. In 1517, Martin Luther posted his 95 Theses in Wittenberg, after he translated the Bible into German, and common men began to question "God's will" and the interpretation the Catholic Church offered. Many peasants believed erroneously that the nobility, which embraced and introduced the Reformation, would be on their side. Other church reformers, including Huldrych Zwingli and Thomas Müntzer, further emboldened the peasants with their theories that the common man could have a relationship with God without an indispensable intermediary like the Catholic Church.

Even as it was growing as an opposition force, the peasantry was as fragmented as the nobility. Serfdom itself was rare in most German regions after the Renaissance. However, landless agricultural laborers and so-called cottagers were at the bottom of the spectrum. Because of their lack of property, these day-laborers or migrant workers could freely move to other regions or cities to find work. Leaseholders, who made up the majority of the peasants, rented the land they farmed and consumed most of what they produced, so little money was left to pay the levies and taxes imposed. Particularly in southern Germany, a hereditary law of divisible inheritance existed, making farms smaller and smaller over the generations. Landowning peasants actually had improved their positions throughout the fif-

teenth century, although they were still required to pay certain taxes and tithes.

Ironically, it was not the landless peasantry that revolted in 1524 but the peasant middle classes, together with the artisans and skilled workers from the cities. Furthermore, doctors, lawyers, even some mayors of smaller towns, as well as monks and lower clergy priests, and a few knights, were on the side of the peasants. In addition there were regional differences in rationale behind the uprisings. In Franconia, at least in the beginning, the revolt was concerned with urban matters of town self-government. Most peasants in southern Germany were hereditary leaseholders living on fixed-rent farms. An agrarian depression combined with several years of bad harvests had hit Germany in the fifteenth century, with smaller nobility and manor holdings suffering the most. The agrarian economy also underwent structural changes when cities attracted people, causing a population shift and labor shortages in the rural regions. Peasants and landowners had a harder time finding help, and those who were working could demand higher wages. Yet this changed around the mid-fifteenth century when the agriculture population grew and the labor force increased. By the outbreak of the uprising, the southern German regions of Swabia, Franconia, and southwest Germany had fairly dense populations. The rural population, dissatisfied with the political structure in Germany, existed in a confusing overlapping of unevenly defined and unevenly consolidated political sovereignties, with the middle peasantry wedged between the two groups of the growing landless masses and the ever-demanding upper nobility, including the church.

Local peasants began an uprising in the summer of 1524 on the property of Count von Lupfen in the vicinity of Schaffhausen under the leadership of Hans Müller. A loose organization was formed, and the peasants were asked to make a small monetary contribution for the cause. Their demands were simple: there should be no lord but the emperor to whom the taxes were owed, and they wanted to return to the "old rights" discussed above. At the same time, a few hundred miles away in Franconia peasants refused to pay the grain tithe, followed by more insurrection into the fall of that year around Lake Constance and Villingen. These uprisings were again based on grievances over the "old rights" or the denial of them. Over the course of the winter and the early part of 1525, more

and smaller, but more radical, uprisings broke out in the same regions. The main revolts took place in the late winter and May of 1525 in the southern and central parts of Germany. The revolts had spread from Swabia and the Black Forest region into northern Switzerland, north to Franconia, Wurttemberg, parts of the Palatine, and all the way to Thuringia.

In the southwest, peasants rallied under the slogan “divine justice” and, through the Memminger Peasant Parliament, presented their demands through the *Twelve Articles*. Modeled after a Swiss peasant organization, these articles were reprinted in Augsburg and distributed throughout the other German regions. The *Twelve Articles* requested not only the return to the “old rights” but also free access to the forests, hunting and fishing rights, and a suspension of the obligation to pay tithes. Common lands taken by nobility should be returned to the people as communal lands. While these requests clearly show an interest in agricultural concerns, the demand for the gospel to be preached according to the true faith was asking for church reforms. No political demands were made, nor were topics affecting burgher, artisans, or landless peasants incorporated into the articles.

The Swabian League, the armed forces of the nobility which was co-financed by wealthy cities, was assembled to keep the peace and if necessary fight against the revolting peasants. Under the leadership of Truchsess von Waldburg, who was financially supported by the Augsburg Fugger bank, the League eventually assembled 9,000 *Landsknechte* and almost 2,000 armed horsemen. At the end of March 1525, Truchsess and the League marched toward Leipheim where more than 5,000 peasants had plundered and burned church property. The armies met on April 4 and Truchsess was able to defeat the peasants. The city of Leipheim had to pay reparations as punishment for aiding the peasants.

While the League was engaged in Leipheim, several counts and knights were killed further north near Weinsberg by revolting peasants. After this incident, known as the *Weinsberger Blutat* or blood deed, the peasants were portrayed as vicious and cruel. The Weinsberger peasants eventually joined up with lower nobility and fought side by side with Florian Geyer and Götz von Berlichingen.

In the meantime, the League defeated the Leipheim peasant armies and started negotiations

with the Allgau section back in the south, encouraging the false belief that the demands of the *Twelve Articles* would be met. In reality, Truchsess needed time to defeat Berlichingen and his men. This was an easy task, since Berlichingen had abandoned his men a day before the battle. Leaderless and without guidance, the peasants were crushed by the League and almost 8,000 peasants died within two hours. Believing they would not be attacked by the League, the Allgau section of the peasants prepared to present their complaints to the courts. Before their demands could be heard, the League had broken the armistice and was approaching fast. The peasants, acting in anger, burned down castles and confiscated church property, but they were no match for the League. Hans Müller was able to assemble roughly 12,000 men and at the end of May 1525, marched with his army toward Freiburg. Without major fighting, the city opened its gates while fighting was still continuing on the Alsatian side of the Rhine until the Duke of Lorraine suppressed the revolt.

The peasants were at a disadvantage, not only because they had little or no military training, but also because of poor coordination. The inability to unify and properly communicate with revolting groups in other regions and to form one cohesive group contributed to this shortcoming. While there were exceptions, the majority of conflicts were fought with scythes, axes, flails, and other farming tools. The League was also at an advantage by having armed horsemen, who could cover long distances much faster than a marching peasant army.

Altogether about 100,000 peasants and sympathizers either died in combat or were later executed during the Peasant War of 1524–5. Many survivors were tortured and lost their privileges and property. Cities and villages that aided the revolts lost their rights; their weapons were confiscated and they were forced to pay reparations.

SEE ALSO: German Reformation; Luther, Martin (1483–1546); Müntzer, Thomas (ca. 1489–1525); Zwingli, Huldrych (1484–1531)

References and Suggested Readings

Blickle, P. (1981) *The Revolution of 1525: The German Peasants' War from a New Perspective*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Engels, F. (1956) *The Peasant War in Germany*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publication House.
- Scribner, B. & Benecke, G. (Eds.) (1979) *The German Peasant War of 1525: New Viewpoints*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Sessions, K. C. (Ed.) (1968) *Reformation and Authority: The Meaning of the Peasants' Revolt*. Lexington: Heath.

German Reformation

Kevin Ostoyich

On the night of October 31, 1517, an Augustinian monk and university professor named Martin Luther (1483–1546) nailed his “Ninety-Five Theses on Indulgences” on the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg. This cataclysmic event heralded the German Reformation, a movement that spread throughout the Christian world.

Luther’s actions, however, were not without root and precedent. Almost a full century prior to his Ninety-Five Theses, the Bohemian reformer Jan Hus (ca. 1369–1415) had denounced both the theological and material underpinnings of the Catholic Church. Hus and his followers (known as Hussites) were branded as heretics, and Hus himself met with a fiery end at the heretic’s stake.

Besides the “heretics,” a much more immediate and influential precedent came from within the accepted parameters of late medieval Christianity through Desiderius Erasmus (ca. 1466–1536), who embodied the growing intellectual movement of humanism. Humanists looked favorably upon the ability of man to actively know the surrounding world. They believed that through the cultivation of knowledge and the pruning of superstition, man could establish a harmonious relationship with nature and God. The humanists’ growing appreciation of cultivated knowledge at the expense of rigid dogma helped establish an intellectual environment by 1517 whereby Luther’s ideas (although similar in many ways to those of Hus) could spread healthy roots, despite official condemnation by both church and state.

Martin Luther

When Luther nailed his Theses to the door, he was immediately responding to the use of indulgences by Catholic leaders. An indulgence can be thought of as a contract in which a Christian would pay for the remission of his sins or the sins

of a loved one in Purgatory. Church officials frequently used indulgences in order to pay for the construction of church buildings.

Luther’s condemnation of the practices of the Roman Catholic Church and its papal head led to legal proceedings and his eventual excommunication on January 3, 1521. In April of that year, Luther was summoned before the Imperial Diet of Worms, where under the guidance of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (1500–58; r. 1519–56) he was asked to recant his views. He refused. The Edict of Worms was decreed on May 25, 1521, officially condemning Luther and his writings throughout the empire.

Luther was saved through the intervention of the elector Frederick of Saxony. Frederick, known as “the Wise,” had the homeward-bound Luther whisked away to Wartburg Castle. While hiding in Wartburg for the next year, Luther continued to develop his attack on the Catholic Church and drafted a German translation of the Bible. The first part of Luther’s translation appeared in 1522. The full translation, which Luther produced with the assistance of his colleagues, was finally published in 1534.

Indulgences were only the tip of a large iceberg. In Luther’s eyes, the clergy and the pope in particular promoted idolatry and superstition among the laity. For Luther, the papal indulgence was symptomatic of the clergy’s attempt to obfuscate the true means of salvation in order to serve their own interests. The clergy had become burdensome middlemen standing between God and Christian. They fed upon Christian fears by promoting Pelagianism, or the belief that the Christian could earn the grace of God through good works and, thus, bring about his salvation. According to Luther, the church’s promotion of this erroneous belief in meritorious works strengthened the clerical hold over a prostrated laity.

Luther’s fundamental breakthrough was his realization that salvation was neither earned by the Christian nor dispensed by the clergy. For Luther the Catholic insistence that salvation was to be achieved through penance and meritorious works only heightened Christian anxiety. Luther knew only too well that man is an inherently sinful beast, and he argued that the Christian did not earn salvation, but rather received it from the righteous Christ. Thus, the inherently sinful Christian need not perform spiritual gymnastics (be it penance, monastic life,

or purchase of indulgences), but only believe that he is “justified by [God’s] grace as a gift, through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus” (Romans 3: 24). This doctrine of “justification by faith alone” was the key to Luther’s reform. From it followed Luther’s views on the sacraments and the Mass and his rejection of monasticism and ecclesiastical authority.

Luther’s reform movement expanded throughout the German lands despite the efforts of Charles V and the various meetings of the Imperial Diet in Nuremberg, Augsburg, and Speyer during the 1520s. Luther’s message spread largely due to the growing importance of the printed word (Luther’s works would quickly become the first “bestsellers” in the aftermath of Gutenberg’s printing press). His message of reform was communicated through pamphlets, pictorial broadsides, and by word of mouth. Given the high illiteracy rate (perhaps as high as 95 percent) within the German lands, a combination of these forms was necessary for the movement’s success.

Luther’s words and actions took on lives of their own, and as new reformers added their own complaints to those of Luther, the Reformation took on new meanings for different people. The reformers who would gain followings in Zurich and Geneva (two cities that would eventually join Luther’s Wittenberg as Reformation centers), for example, often espoused beliefs that coincided with Luther’s own; nevertheless, these points of commonality were quickly overshadowed by points of variance.

Huldrych Zwingli

The leading voice of reform in the southwestern German lands (including the German-speaking part of Switzerland) belonged to Huldrych Zwingli (1484–1531). Zwingli, although in agreement with Luther in many respects, such as his condemnation of indulgences, was ultimately more radical than the Wittenberg professor when it came to such matters as images and the Mass, the latter of which Zwingli abolished in Zurich on April 13, 1525. While Luther viewed images as unnecessary for the faith but not harmful, Zwingli believed that any religious image was a form of idolatry and thus unacceptable and subject to eradication.

The disagreement between the two reformers on the Mass and the sacramental qualities of

the Eucharist was perhaps even more crucial. The debate turned on the definition of the word “is” in the passage “This is my body . . . This is my blood” (Matthew 26: 26–8; Mark 14: 22–4). Luther’s literal interpretation of the passage led to his doctrine of consubstantiation. As with Catholic transubstantiation, Luther’s consubstantiation involved the real flesh of Christ; however, unlike transubstantiation, consubstantiation did not require miraculous action on the part of the clergy. At the invitation of Landgrave Philip of Hesse (1504–67), Luther and Zwingli met in Marburg in October 1529 in an attempt to iron out their differences. The attempt failed. Luther stuck to the literal meaning of “is,” arguing for the real presence of Christ in the Lord’s Supper. He challenged Zwingli to provide scriptural proof that “This is my body” somehow did not mean “This *is* my body.” Zwingli and the Basel reformer Johannes Oecolampadius (1482–1531) countered that “is” was to be taken symbolically and that their proof could be found in John 6: 63 in the words “The flesh is of no avail.” The disagreement at Marburg proved too deep to overcome.

The reform movements of Luther and Zwingli also split on sociopolitical lines. In his doctrine of the Two Kingdoms, Luther emphasized the division of the temporal and spiritual realms. Zwingli was set on merging the temporal and spiritual together within one Christian community. Zwingli’s radical message that social and spiritual reforms were one and the same had great resonance within the Imperial cities of southwest Germany and German-speaking Switzerland. Zwingli’s days were numbered, however, as Switzerland became a battleground of religious civil war. He was killed in the Second Battle of Kappel on October 11, 1531. After Zwingli’s death, Heinrich Bullinger (1504–75) became the leader of the Swiss Reformation.

Conrad Grebel and the Anabaptists

Even Zwingli’s radical reform was criticized for not being “radical” enough. This criticism came from within Zurich itself. In 1525 Zwingli was taken to task by his former disciple Conrad Grebel (1498–1526). Quarreling since 1523 about the Mass, the two men ultimately broke ties over infant baptism: Zwingli supported the practice and Grebel did not. On January 21, 1525, Grebel started the Anabaptist movement by baptizing

the adult George Blaurock. The following year Grebel died of the plague without leaving any major published works, but the Anabaptist movement did not die with him.

On February 24, 1527, the Anabaptists articulated their beliefs in the Schleitheim Confession (primarily written by Michael Sattler, ca. 1495–1527). The seven articles of the Confession not only set down the main tenets of the Anabaptist movement, such as adult baptism, but also addressed the proper stance of Anabaptists vis-à-vis the secular state. The Anabaptists, by stressing communal Christianity, refused to accept the authority of the traditional state. This did not mean that the Anabaptists led undisciplined lives. On the contrary, they pursued a strictly pious lifestyle and as the second article of the Schleitheim Confession attests, implemented the ban to purify their ranks. Given the radical implications of Anabaptist communalism for the traditional secular states, the Anabaptists were actively repressed by Catholic and Lutheran princes.

The most spectacular repression of the Anabaptists on German soil occurred in June 1535 in the Westphalian city of Münster. Münster had been drawing Anabaptist refugees from all over Germany, and in February of 1534 a group of Anabaptists influenced by the reform teachings of Melchior Hoffman (ca. 1495–1543) seized the city and imposed their brand of communal Christianity. In their New Jerusalem there was to be no private property, no unbelievers, and none but the Good Book. Books were burned and dissenters banished. This New Jerusalem was short-lived, however.

Lutherans and Catholics banded together, conquered the city, and administered harsh justice. With their New Jerusalem sacked and their ringleaders' corpses displayed in cages on St. Lamberti's Tower in Münster, the Anabaptists left Germany for Moravia, Poland, and the Netherlands. In their new environs the Anabaptists mixed austere discipline with a decidedly more pacific demeanor.

The Peasant Rebellion of 1525

The blood of Münster was by no means the first shed as a consequence of the Reformation. A full decade earlier, in the countryside of the southwestern German lands, the Reformation had taken a particularly ugly turn. Starting in

the Black Forest territory of Stühlingen in June 1524, unrest swept through the German lands as peasants listed their grievances against their lords.

The first demand in the Articles of the Peasants of Memmingen was the right of the peasants to choose their own pastor, and they had in mind the radical reformer Thomas Müntzer (ca. 1489–1525). Müntzer believed that the time had come to bring about God's kingdom on earth, even if it required the sword. Müntzer and thousands of peasants were soon to die by that sword, however, as the Peasants' Revolt ended in complete and bloody failure.

The Reformation as Revolution

Although the Reformation was at its core a religious phenomenon, it was not without social and political consequence. It was nothing short of revolutionary in its curtailing of the Roman Catholic Church's power as a social, economic, political, and religious institution. While Martin Luther believed his message to be purely spiritual, whether he liked it or not, it had socio-political consequences. The Catholic Church in 1517 was by no means simply a spiritual entity; rather, it was a central (often *the* central) social and political institution of European communities. Luther's conception of the church differed greatly from the institution as it then existed. He defined the church to be the collection of the faithful as opposed to the hierarchy in Rome. In so doing, Luther's views, although religious at the core, could not help but have social and political meaning and consequence.

John Calvin

The last major reform movement to take hold on German soil was forged in the French-speaking Swiss city of Geneva under John Calvin (1509–64). Calvin was deeply influenced by the years that he had spent with the reformer Martin Bucer (1491–1551) in Strasbourg from 1538 to 1541. Calvin took from Bucer the desire to build an ecclesiastical hierarchy to run parallel with civil administration. Ultimately, Calvin was more successful in achieving this goal in Geneva than Bucer had been in Strasbourg. Calvin agreed with the Lutheran emphasis on the Word and upon the Lord's Supper but rejected Lutheran consubstantiation. This did not mean, however, that he agreed with the assertions that had been

made by Zwingli at the Marburg Colloquy. Instead, Calvin took a middle position in which “the signs of bread and wine become an instrument of God’s grace in uniting the believer to Christ” (MacCulloch 2003: 250).

Another point of distinction between Calvin and Luther was that whereas the Wittenberg professor believed Christ’s presence to be “ubiquitous” on earth and thus, within the whole congregation, Calvin believed that Christ was only present with God’s elect. Calvin’s emphasis on a limited number of God’s elect (or “saints”) derived from his doctrine of “double predestination.” According to this doctrine God has already ordained all those who are to be saved and all those who are to be damned.

Reformed Protestantism

In the Zurich Agreement of 1549, the Calvinist and Zwinglian movements were reconciled into the Reformed faith. In the years that followed, Calvinism spread much more easily than did Lutheranism outside the German lands. Calvinism quickly spread through France and the Netherlands, and then in the 1560s reentered the German lands along the Dutch border. The essential figure for the spread of Calvinism in the northwestern German lands was the elector and count palatine of the Rhine, Frederick III (1559–76), who made the city of Heidelberg the center of German Calvinism and who in 1563 sponsored the Heidelberg Catechism, which consolidated doctrine for the German Reformed Church. The German Reformed Church, however, was not protected under the Peace of Augsburg; thus, the rights of Calvinists within German lands were not secured.

Despite their numbers in Western European states, Calvinists only resided in tiny pockets within the Holy Roman Empire. German-speaking lands were for the most part split along Lutheran and Catholic lines. The Peace of Augsburg solidified the confessional boundaries on the German map. Lutheranism predominated from the Danish border in the north to Franconia in the south, as well as from the center of the Holy Roman Empire to the borders with Poland. In the south, Catholicism constituted the majority from Baden in the west through Bavaria in the east. The western German lands along the Rhine River were much more checked. After the conclusion of the Thirty Years’

War (1618–48), the Peace of Westphalia guaranteed the rights of the minority Reformed Protestants along with those of the much larger Lutheran and Catholic population within the Holy Roman Empire.

SEE ALSO: Anabaptist Movement; Calvin, John (1509–1564); German Peasant Rebellion, 1525; Luther, Martin (1483–1546); Müntzer, Thomas (ca. 1489–1525); Reformation; Zwingli, Huldrych (1484–1531)

References and Suggested Readings

- Dickens, A. G. (1966) *Reformation and Society in Sixteenth-Century Europe*. London: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Edwards, Jr., M. U. (1994) *Printing, Propaganda, and Martin Luther*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Greyerz, K. von (2004) The Reformation in German-Speaking Switzerland. In R. Po-chia Hsia (Ed.), *A Companion to the Reformation World*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Hendrix, S. H. (2004) *Recultivating the Vineyard: The Reformation Agendas of Christianization*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox.
- MacCulloch, D. (2003) *The Reformation: Europe’s House Divided 1490–1700*. New York: Penguin.
- Ozment, S. (1992) *Protestants: The Birth of a Revolution*. New York: Doubleday.
- Scribner, R. (1994) *For the Sake of the Simple Folk: Popular Propaganda for the German Reformation*. New York: Oxford University Press.

German Revolution, 1918–1923

Alex Zukas

The German Revolution of 1918–1923 was one of a number of popular insurgencies that had roots in class-based inequalities and grievances before World War I, the unprecedented carnage of the war itself, severe deprivation on the home fronts, war-weariness, and anti-war organizing by revolutionaries. The greatest wave of collective revolts in Europe since the revolutions of 1848, they began with the Russian revolutions of 1917 and continued with a flood of revolutions and class-based civil wars that ebbed and flowed across Europe from 1918 to 1923.

The German Revolution has held particular interest for political scientists and historians, especially after World War II, precisely because the democratic promise of the mass uprising of

sailors, soldiers, and workers against the *Kaiserreich* (German Empire) found only partial expression in the ensuing Weimar Republic. The revolution's democratic deficit relates to broad questions of German history, in particular, how this democratic shortfall contributed to the Weimar Republic's fatal instability and lack of legitimacy with broad sections of the German population, resulting in its overthrow by counterrevolutionaries in 1933 and its replacement by a brutal, racist, and dictatorial Nazi regime that embarked on a war of terror and conquest of world-historic dimensions and deadly consequences for tens of millions of people. The urban and industrial regions of north, western, and central Germany in and around Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, the Ruhr, the Rhineland, Saxony, and Thuringia were strongholds of revolutionaries, whereas the heartland of counterrevolution lay in the rural areas of eastern and southern Germany. While some historians end the German Revolution in spring 1919 and others in spring 1920, a close analysis reveals that the revolution went through four distinct phases and the pent-up waves of revolutionary energy unleashed in late 1918 which found expression in assassinations, coup attempts, general strikes, mass demonstrations, and the creation of a mass-based communist party and only finally ebbed in late 1923.

Social and political tensions in Germany predated World War I. A major capitalist industrial powerhouse, political power in Imperial Germany remained in the hands of a small agrarian-based pre-industrial elite: the *Kaiser* (emperor, head of state), his advisors, and leaders of the army and civil service. The most forceful challenge to that elite came from the main workers' party, Social Democracy (SPD), which featured three ideological tendencies: revisionist (conditions for workers can improve under capitalism through reforms), orthodox (conditions need to ripen under capitalism for a successful workers' revolution in the future), and revolutionary (conditions are ripe for a workers' revolution).

The differences between these tendencies would intensify during the German Revolution. The national leaders of the SPD were revisionist and orthodox socialists who equated democracy with parliamentary representation and activity. Unions also saw a split between a reformist leadership and a militant rank-and-file, especially in mining and metallurgy. Social tensions were aggravated rather than eased by the experience of

total war after 1914. New sections of the population (women and youth) found jobs in industry as men went to the front and new workers became increasingly politicized as they gained first-hand experience of union organization, confrontation with employers, and revolutionary socialist ideas of "class war." As World War I dragged on, circumstances on the home front worsened. Food supplies became a problem as early as 1915 and everyday life became politicized.

First Wave of Revolution, 1917

In April 1917 the first major strikes occurred in Berlin and other large cities to protest a reduction in bread rations. For the first time strikers made political demands (one of them being equal franchise); workers' councils and revolutionary shop stewards organized these strikes, since the official trade union leadership had promised not to initiate strikes during wartime and actively worked to suppress them (the so-called *Burgfrieden*). Such a commitment to social peace while workers suffered during wartime with longer hours, a faster work pace, and dwindling rations would detach much of the union leadership from the rank-and-file membership by war's end.

To wage the war more effectively and stifle discontent on the home front, the army high command assumed effective control of Germany in July 1917, creating a *de facto* military dictatorship. This move did not stem the revolutionary tide. In August 1917 sailors, whose leaders were in contact with the anti-war Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) (USPD), carried out a politically motivated mutiny in favor of a compromise peace with the Allies. The armed forces suppressed the mutiny but sailors continued to believe that the war was being prolonged to suppress demands for changes to the German and Prussian social, political, and economic orders.

In November 1917 workers demonstrated in Berlin and other German cities for an end to the war, and strikes broke out in a number of important factories that lasted until early December. In January 1918, 400,000 workers went on strike in the Berlin metal industry. The strike leadership consisted of three leaders from the pro-war SPD and three leaders from the break-away anti-war party, the USPD, founded in April 1917. The strike demands were political as well as economic.

For instance, the strikers wanted a peace without annexations or indemnities (Lenin's formula) at the Russo-German negotiations in Brest-Litovsk and demanded a democratic government based on universal suffrage, the abolition of martial law, worker representation at peace negotiations, and bigger rations. Rehearsing his later counter-insurrectionary role, Friedrich Ebert (1871–1925), who supported the war and was one of the SPD leaders of the strike, later said he joined the strike leadership in order to end the strike as soon as possible and keep it from becoming a political insurrection against the state. The strike only lasted a few days and met with severe repression under the wartime "state of siege," but before it was over a million workers throughout Germany had laid down their tools. Military courts jailed thousands of strikers and sent their leaders off to the front. Food prices rose dramatically during the war and people worked longer hours (including Sundays) to pay higher prices. By 1918 agricultural production was 40 to 60 percent below prewar levels and official food rations limited consumption to no more than 47 percent of prewar levels, although this official level was rarely achieved. In addition, war casualties were high: nearly 2 million German men were killed and over 4 million wounded.

German military offensives in 1918 failed to achieve victories and the German high command suggested to the imperial chancellor (prime minister) in October that he form a broad coalition government to improve Germany's negotiating position with its enemies, since the German army was on the verge of collapse. As a result, Social Democrats entered the government for the first time. On October 5 the new government approved the change to a parliamentary system in which the chancellor (executive branch) would be responsible to the elected *Reichstag* (legislative branch) rather than to the *Kaiser*. Prussia would institute equal suffrage and national decisions about war and peace were to be the responsibility of the civilian *Reichstag*. The *Reichstag* passed the bills on October 26 and went into recess until November 9. A "palace revolution," orchestrated to a large extent by the old elites to displace onto the new parliamentary leaders the odium of suing for peace with the Allies, had altered the system of government in Germany but left the military, social, economic, and bureaucratic structures, the bases of elite power, intact. While Ebert and the SPD leadership were content

with these political reforms and saw no need for a "revolution from below" to secure the new German state, the German masses had other ideas. Because their opinion differed on the kind of democratic state which should succeed the monarchy, in short order Ebert regarded those insurgent masses as the enemies of German democracy, not its most ardent supporters.

An unanticipated spark set off the tinder that had been gathering and would fuel the German Revolution "from below" for years to come. Hoping to improve its negotiating position, the German government acceded to President Woodrow Wilson's (1856–1924) demand to end submarine warfare; however, German admirals decided on their own initiative and without consulting the government to put to sea and attack the much larger British fleet in a final suicidal engagement. The fleet had been at harbor for three years and the ordinary sailors who had endured bad conditions while at anchor refused to follow orders. They mutinied on October 30 and hoisted a red (i.e., socialist) flag, initiating the first wave of the German Revolution. While the mutiny was being suppressed in Wilhelmshaven, it broke out in Kiel on November 3 and then spread to army troops and citizens of the coastal towns of north Germany. By November 8 the uprising had spread inland to all the major urban centers of Germany. The hastily constructed but democratically elected councils of servicemen and workers followed one of three options: they assumed the duties of local authorities, exercised control jointly with existing authorities, or supervised local authorities who remained at their posts. The collapse of military officers' authority in the army meant that an armed revolutionary movement took control of state power in Germany since, apart from some divisions on the western front, the councils were the only effective power in Germany. A moderate council movement developed most strongly in those industries where there had been little or no union organization before 1914, like textiles or railroads, while the radical council movement developed in those industries where there had been a massive influx of new, young proletarians during the war, as in metallurgy, chemicals, and mining. The councils had broadly socialist aspirations and rank-and-file council members were frankly unimpressed with the minimal parliamentary concessions of the outgoing imperial regime. However, the SPD leaders had been

instrumental in gaining those reforms and they had no interest in, and saw nothing to gain by, fomenting a popular uprising that would decisively democratize the state and society. In fact, as members of the central government, they had every interest in dampening popular action and the initiative for mobilizing broad masses of workers for extensive social, economic, and constitutional changes came from USPD rather than SPD council members.

On November 7 a revolutionary movement of workers', soldiers', and farmers' councils overthrew the king of Bavaria (the first of four royal houses to fall in Germany). On November 8 USPD member Kurt Eisner (1867–1919) declared a council republic and he became head of a coalition government of USPD and SPD members. The national SPD came under increasing pressure from the party's rank-and-file members to take a more radical stance in the fluid circumstances of revolutionary upheaval. SPD leaders, worried about growing working-class support for the anti-war USPD and the even more radical Spartacist League, demanded the abdication of the *Kaiser* as the only way to avert social revolution, which SPD leaders abhorred, and as the price of their remaining in the government. The *Kaiser*, Wilhelm II (1859–1941), refused to abdicate and the SPD left the government. By November 9, when Wilhelm finally abdicated, it was too late to save the Prussian/German monarchy. On that day armed workers and soldiers carrying red flags marched into central Berlin and took possession of public buildings. No one defended the old regime and power lay with the revolutionary left.

The wartime divisions within the socialist movement on issues of annexations and war credits found expression in divergent attitudes toward the revolution. Revisionist and orthodox SPD leaders like Gustav Noske (1868–1946) and Ebert had not wanted a revolution and were content with a liberal parliamentary regime which meant convening a national assembly (i.e., constitutional convention) as soon as possible. That regime, granted in October, predated the revolution by a few weeks. Wanting to make the most of the revolution's transformative momentum to sweep away the oppressive structures of the old regime, revolutionary USPD leaders sought to postpone convening such an assembly until after the revolution had been secured and old-regime power bases eliminated by socializing the eco-

nomy and democratizing the military and civil service. Cognizant of the power of the popular protest which had swept aside the monarchy, they wanted to institute far-reaching social, economic, and political changes while the forces of reaction were overwhelmed and not squander the revolutionary surge by running a caretaker government pending national elections. Finally, Spartacists pushed for a council government on the Russian *soviet* model.

On November 9 Karl Liebknecht (1871–1919), a Spartacist leader and *Reichstag* deputy, pushed the revolutionary process forward: he led a demonstration to the Berliner Schloß where he declared a German Socialist Republic while the SPD leader Philipp Scheidemann (1865–1939), hoping to undermine support for a revolutionary worker's state, proclaimed a German Republic on the same day without consulting any of his SPD colleagues. In a mass meeting the next day, November 10, 3,000 representatives from the Greater Berlin workers' and soldiers' councils elected six People's Commissioners, three from the SPD and three from the USPD, to form a Council of People's Commissioners and bestowed a mandate on the Council to govern Germany. Germany had become a *de facto* council republic. Fatefully, the Council elected Ebert, a long-serving SPD party bureaucrat fond of order, wary of insurrection, and fearful of popular initiatives, as its chairman, not knowing that he was already working to curtail the momentum and power of the revolution.

The day before, November 9, the chancellor of the outgoing imperial government, Prince Max of Baden (1867–1929), had appointed Ebert his successor in a procedure of doubtful legality, but it provided members of military and business circles for whom a council republic (i.e., bolshevism) was an abomination with an alternative government. In this situation of "dual power" (which reflected the opposing aspirations of revolutionary workers, soldiers, and sailors who favored a socialist council democracy and reformist workers, party and trade-union bureaucrats, and bourgeois who favored liberal parliamentary democracy), Ebert allied with the defeated but still potent forces of the old imperial order to stem the forces of change.

In a series of secret conversations culminating on November 10, General Wilhelm Groener (1867–1939) and Ebert agreed that the imperial army would maintain Ebert in office as chancellor

in return for Ebert's ensuring that officers retained power of command and his pledge to fight bolshevism (i.e., a council republic) and social disorder. This covert alliance between a reformist socialist leader and one of the most detested elements of the old regime, the military, resurrected the defeated army's role as one of the pillars of the German state and inaugurated the political counterrevolution.

At the same time as Ebert was negotiating with Groener, the head of the SPD-oriented trade union federation, Carl Legien (1861–1920), was publicly negotiating the Stinnes-Legien Agreement with the heads of German big business and agreed on November 15 to guarantee orderly production, end wild-cat strikes, drive back the influence of the councils, and prevent a nationalization of means of production. In return the employers agreed to introduce the 8-hour day, recognize free unions as sole representatives of workers (instead of company unions or revolutionary workers' councils), and arbitrate contract disputes. Inaugurating an economic counterrevolution by allying themselves with old-regime capitalists, union leaders leveraged the threat of revolutionary upheaval to extract many of their longstanding demands, but they deliberately derailed all efforts to nationalize the means of production and to institutionalize the power of the councils.

Nevertheless, these agreements did little to end the fundamental hostility of the broadly nationalist right to the new regime because on November 11 representatives of Chancellor Ebert, not representatives of the government of the deposed *Kaiser* or of the army high command who had prosecuted the war, signed an armistice with the Allies at the high command's urging. To disguise the operational collapse of the German army and avoid culpability, the high command immediately propagated the rumor that an undefeated Germany was sold out, "stabbed in the back," by socialist and liberal politicians. German monarchists and militarists accepted and spread the claim which helped legitimize future right-wing, counterrevolutionary coup attempts against the government of "November traitors."

Ebert's USPD colleagues on the governing council had no knowledge of his secret deal and while they agreed with him that a national assembly needed to be convened to form a new state, they argued that the council would use the momentum of a people's revolution to

dismantle the existing class structures by socializing the economy and democratizing the military. Reflecting the SPD's organizational advantages, on December 20 about 80 percent of the delegates to the first all-German congress of workers' and soldiers' councils rejected the demand for a government based on the councils (a key Spartacist demand) and voted to hold immediate elections for a national assembly (on January 19), a key demand of Ebert. Unaware of Ebert's pact with Groener, the congress also passed radical restructuring resolutions which would not be implemented under Ebert's watch: the socialization of "ripe" industries, particularly coal mining, and the establishment of a people's militia, an old SPD demand to have elected officers and democratize the army.

A new situation emerged after the congress and the character of the councils underwent a substantial change inasmuch as they swung to the left. The USPD and Spartacists attained dominant positions in many local and regional councils, especially in those regions where the left traditionally had strong support (Berlin, Saxony, Thuringia, Hamburg, the Rhineland, etc.), and these councils looked to become an alternative government. Radical council governments took over a considerable number of large cities, including Bremen, Düsseldorf, and Brunswick. In Berlin a group of revolutionary sailors (the People's Marine Division) angry over arrears in pay invaded the Chancellery and seized SPD leaders on December 23. A prisoner of revolutionary militia, Ebert phoned Groener to use army troops against the sailors, but the attack ended in a stalemate with the soldiers openly siding with the sailors. Angry Spartacist demonstrations then broke out, ending in the seizure of SPD newspaper offices in Berlin and other German cities. The USPD commissioners, already suspicious of Ebert's visibly cozy relationship with the former imperial high command, saw his summoning troops to attack the sailors as a confirmation of his hostility to the revolution; on December 29 they resigned from the council.

The next day the Spartacists left the USPD and formed the German Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands) (KPD) and, on January 6, 1919, identifying the Ebert government with counterrevolution, representatives from the KPD, the Berlin USPD, the People's Marines, and the revolutionary shop stewards agreed to launch an armed struggle

with the goal of overthrowing the Ebert government in order to pursue a thoroughgoing revolutionary transformation of German politics and society. Strikes and building occupations ensued in Berlin, pitched battles were fought with police and soldiers, but the attempted coup was poorly led and badly coordinated. Since the regular army was no longer reliable, Gustav Noske, Ebert's chief of defense, invited volunteer right-wing anti-republican paramilitary units (*Freikorps*) organized by senior officers of the old army into Berlin to curb the insurgent left. *Freikorps* troops fomented a blood bath and counterrevolutionary forces won the day by the time fighting ended on January 12. Among many atrocities that cost the SPD the support of large sections of the German working class, on January 15 *Freikorps* troops found and murdered the unarmed communist leaders Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, sealing an enmity between the SPD and KPD that would last throughout the Weimar Republic.

Elections for the national assembly were held on January 19, 1919, under the bayonets of the *Freikorps*. Thanks to its well-established electoral organization, the SPD won nearly 38 percent of the vote, while the USPD won nearly 8 percent, the Catholic Center Party almost 20 percent, the liberal Democratic Party (DDP) almost 19 percent, the conservative German People's Party about 4 percent, and the monarchist German Nationalists about 10 percent. Social Democrats were disappointed with the results since it meant forming a coalition government, but they took some comfort in the fact that the anti-republican parties won only 16 percent of the vote.

The SPD, Center, and DDP formed a coalition government of moderate socialist and bourgeois parties that was even less prone to structural social and economic reforms than the People's Commissioners and the National Assembly at Weimar, meeting under *Freikorps* guard, and elected Ebert president of the republic. The convening of the National Assembly marked the end of the first phase of the German Revolution, but in many respects the revolutionary impetus had only been deflected because workers' fundamental grievances had been left unaddressed.

Second Wave of Revolution

By late January a process of mass grassroots radicalization had begun across Germany. Counter-

revolution in Bavaria began the second wave of revolutionary upheaval. Violence swept Bavaria after the February 21, 1919 assassination of Kurt Eisner by a right-wing anti-Semitic ex-soldier. In April successive council governments were established in Munich in competition with a SPD-led parliamentary regime. The council prevented the parliament from convening, declared a republic based on workers' councils following the Russian soviet model, and a revolutionary council called for a general strike. The government of Bavaria refused to capitulate and once again armed forces of the state settled the issue with great brutality.

Early in March renewed fighting broke out in Berlin during a general strike called by the revolutionary shop stewards to enforce socialization of the factories and the dissolution of the *Freikorps*. Noske once again dispatched the *Freikorps* who killed anyone found armed. In spontaneous social protests, leftist governments took over Bremen and Brunswick and mass strikes of gigantic proportions rocked the Ruhr, Berlin, and central Germany. The revolutionary workers involved in these strikes, harboring great distrust of established trade unions and the SPD as collaborators with the class enemy, demanded immediate socialization of major industries and workers' control.

A second congress of workers' and soldiers' councils met in April 1919. Skirmishing continued throughout Germany but by the end of May the Ebert government and the *Freikorps* had crushed the insurgents and the independent power of the workers' and soldiers' councils. Nevertheless, the Ruhr and Halle-Merseburg remained under a state of emergency through 1919 and into 1920 as civil war smoldered. German militarism, discredited by the events of World War I, revived swiftly and the *Freikorps* became the basis of the new German army (*Reichswehr*), making sure it retained the anti-republican spirit of the old imperial army.

This was not difficult since the harsh treatment of a defeated Germany in the Treaty of Versailles, which the republican government had no choice but to approve on June 23, 1919, aroused great anger among Germans, but especially within the reactionary, monarchist, and nationalist right composed for the most part of large landowners, military officers, ex-officers and ex-soldiers, civil servants, big businessmen, and rural farmers. It confirmed for them that revolution was the

cause of national defeat and humiliation rather than the reverse: that the oppressive structure of the old regime and the experience of protracted war were grounds for an anti-authoritarian revolution. These groups provided the social basis for recurring violent attacks against the republic and revolutionary workers from 1918 to 1923.

After approval by the assembly, Ebert signed a liberal-democratic constitution into law on August 11, 1919. Perhaps to maintain a link to the past and appease its right-wing opponents, the new republic was officially *Das deutsche Reich* (German Empire) rather than *Die deutsche Republik* (German Republic). While the creation of a parliamentary regime was already in the works in October 1918 before the revolution broke out, revolution had not accomplished the three goals set forth by its protagonists: democratization of German society and administration; expropriation of big business and socialization of major industries; and transformation of the repressive army into an egalitarian people's militia.

Third Wave of Revolution

After ebbing for a few months, the third wave of the German Revolution began in March 1920 when right-wing officers and civil servants initiated a coup (*putsch*) against the republican government in Berlin. Known as the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch, the main organizers were a civil servant named Wolfgang Kapp (1858–1922) and counterrevolutionary Generals Walther von Lüttwitz (1859–1942) and Erich Ludendorff (1865–1937).

Lüttwitz was an outspoken critic of the Treaty of Versailles. He especially disliked its provisions to reduce the German army to 100,000 soldiers and to disband the right-wing paramilitary *Freikorps*. When ordered by Defense Minister Noske to disband the *Freikorps* under his command, Lüttwitz refused. Noske removed him from command for insubordination and Lüttwitz decided to act. On the night of March 12 the *Freikorps* Marine Brigade Ehrhardt, which had been under Lüttwitz's command and targeted for disbanding, marched on Berlin to depose the government and establish a right-wing military dictatorship. Lüttwitz, who commanded troops in the Berlin area, supported the *putsch* with his forces. Much to the shock of the government, the regular army under the command of General

Hans von Seeckt (1866–1936) refused to intervene against the putschists and the government fled to Dresden. The coup only lasted a few days: a general strike called by the trade unions paralyzed Germany, defeated the *putsch*, and restored republican government.

Before the *putsch* collapsed, thousands of workers had armed themselves and taken over large areas of the Ruhr. Workers' dissatisfaction had been building in the Ruhr for almost a year and there the general strike became an armed uprising against the military and paramilitary presence in the region, but also against the policies of the deposed government.

In many instances the "Red Ruhr Army" was more than a match for the riot police, *Freikorps*, and army units and after the collapse of the *putsch* the workers refused to surrender their weapons given the doubtful loyalty of the armed forces to the republic and the republic's own conservatism. This proletarian army based itself on a new kind of council movement, on radical factory councils that had little in common with the old workers' councils. As new centers of revolutionary activity, these councils promoted open class warfare. They demanded guarantees against future military coups and the initiation of the structural social changes promised by the SPD before and after 1918.

Under the Bielefeld Agreement of March 24 negotiated with the government, which recognized the revolutionary nature of the Ruhr movement, workers agreed to hand over their weapons and return to work. The government agreed to disarm and punish those who participated in the coup, to disband all anti-republican organizations, to purge the government bureaucracy of counterrevolutionary elements and reform it along democratic lines, to implement "co-determination" (a weakened form of economic democracy) by workers and owners in industry and commerce expeditiously, to socialize "ripe" industries (especially the highly monopolized coal and potash industries) immediately, to form pro-Republic local militias, to expand social welfare legislation, to provide financial help for the dependents of those Red Ruhr Army personnel killed and wounded, to institute no reprisals against those workers who had joined the Red Ruhr Army, and to keep regular army units out of the Ruhr as long as the workers kept their side of the bargain. Most workers relinquished their weapons, but the government did not live up to

its side of the agreement. Army and *Freikorps* units were sent into the region and even into the demilitarized zone in violation of the Versailles Treaty and enacted brutal reprisals.

In the wave of revulsion to the aftermath of the Bielefeld Agreement, workers turned away from the SPD, which lost heavily to the USPD and KPD in the June 1920 elections. For the first time the USPD outpolled the SPD in major centers of revolutionary activity: Halle–Merseburg, Berlin, and Leipzig. Trade unions suffered a tremendous hemorrhage of members unhappy with union support of the increasingly unsatisfactory status quo. Partly in reaction to the behavior of the SPD government leaders, in December 1920 a majority of USPD members joined the KPD (making it a mass party for the first time) and became unremittingly hostile to a Republic which had not only abandoned any attempt to institute socialism but did not seem able or willing to defend workers from predation by the anti-republican and counterrevolutionary military, bureaucracy, and big business, the prewar “forces of order” against which workers revolted and with which the SPD leaders had fatefully allied themselves in November 1918. Fearing even greater loss of working-class support, the SPD withdrew from leadership of the national government until 1928, although Ebert remained president until his death in 1925.

Fourth Wave of Revolution

Revolutionary embers kept burning. Armed uprisings occurred in the central German industrial districts in March 1921, but the fourth wave of the German Revolution began on January 11, 1923 when Franco-Belgian forces occupied the Ruhr in an attempt to force Germany to comply with the reparations clause of the Versailles Treaty. The German government declared the occupation illegal and urged passive resistance (ceasing economic production and refusing to cooperate with the occupiers) by the Ruhr’s population. Passive resistance failed to break the French occupation and the need to subsidize citizens in the Ruhr cost the German government 40 million marks a day. Unable to raise enough revenue to cover costs, the government printed money, causing the value of the mark to fall until German paper currency had no value. The German government declared an end

to passive resistance in the Ruhr on September 26, 1923.

During the social chaos and suffering created by horrific inflation, Hans von Seeckt and other military officers planned a coup to institute a military regime and end the Republic. Before such plans could be realized, ex-officers staged a coup attempt in Berlin that Seeckt’s forces put down and Adolf Hitler and various associates staged a coup attempt (the so-called Beer Hall Putsch) in November to take over the government in Bavaria as a prelude to a March on Berlin to overthrow the national government in a recreation of Benito Mussolini’s (1883–1945) successful March on Rome in 1922. The coup failed within 24 hours, but it seemed to have kept Seeckt’s plan in check. The revolutionary impulse was still alive in regions that had supported the USPD and council democracy during the revolution. Communists revolted in Hamburg from October 23–26, 1923, and hoped it would lead to a general uprising in Germany, which it did not. Socialist-Communist coalition governments in the left-wing strongholds of Saxony and Thuringia formed workers’ militias in anticipation of a revolutionary upsurge and counterrevolutionary attacks from Berlin and Munich. Seeckt ordered the army to disband the militias and depose the elected parliamentary governments, something he did not do in Bavaria despite the increasingly separatist activities of the right-wing government of Gustav von Kahr (1862–1934), which came to power in a coup and had inspired Hitler’s own coup attempt. With the defeat of these movements, armed revolutionary struggle in Germany came to an end. Ten years after the end of the German Revolution Hitler staged a successful counterrevolution in league with the very forces of the old regime that the revolutionaries had tried to obliterate.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Communist Party, Germany; Counterrevolution; Germany, Socialism and Nationalism; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Liebknecht, Karl (1871–1919); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marxism; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Socialism; Zetkin, Clara (1857–1933)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bertrand, C. (1977) *Revolutionary Situations in Europe, 1917–1922: Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary*. Montreal: Interuniversity Centre for European Studies.
- Bock, H. M. (1993) *Syndikalismus und Linkskommunismus von 1918 bis 1923: Ein Beitrag zur Sozial- und*

- Ideengeschichte der frühen Weimarer Republik*. Second edition. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Carsten, F. L. (1972) *Revolution in Central Europe, 1918–1919*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Haimson, L. H. & Tilly, C. (Eds.) (1989) *Strikes, Wars, and Revolutions in an International Perspective: Strike Waves in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harman, C. (1982) *The Lost Revolution: Germany, 1918–1923*. London: Bookmarks.
- Jones, N. H. & Burleigh, M. (2004) *A Brief History of the Birth of the Nazis: How the Freikorps Blazed a Trail for Hitler*. Rev. Ed. New York: Carroll & Graf.
- Klüge, U. (1985) *Die deutsche Revolution, 1918/19: Staat, Politik und Gesellschaft zwischen Weltkrieg und Kapp Putsch*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Kolb, E. (1978) *Die Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Innenpolitik, 1918–1919*. Expanded edition. Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein.
- Miller, S. (1978) *Die Bürde der Macht: Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie, 1918–1920*. Düsseldorf: Droste.
- Mommsen, W. J. (1981) The German Revolution, 1918–1920: Political Revolution and Social Protest Movement. In R. Bessel & E. J. Feuchtwanger (Eds.), *Social Change and Political Development in Weimar Germany*. London: Croom Helm.
- Morgan, D. W. (1975) *The Socialist Left and the German Revolution: A History of the German Independent Social Democratic Party, 1917–1922*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Rürup, R. (Ed.) (1975) *Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte im rheinisch-westfälischen Industriegebiet: Studien der Geschichte der Revolution 1918/19*. Wuppertal: Peter Hammer.
- Waite, R. G. (1969) *Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany, 1918–23*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Weber, S. (1991) *Ein kommunistischer Putsch? Märzaktion 1921 in Mitteldeutschland*. Berlin: Dietz.
- Winkler, H. A. (1984) *Von der Revolution zur Stabilisierung: Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung in der Weimarer Republik, 1918 bis 1924*. Berlin: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf.

Germany, Green movement

Eric F. Trump

The German Green movement flourished as part of the post-materialist political agitation of the 1960s German left and student protest movements. The Green Party, officially founded in 1980 and today formally known as Bündnis

90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens), is the most politically successful Green party in the world. A product of complex ideological strains, its core members were devoted to integrating ecological and socialist politics. Though early Greens wanted to transcend partisan categories, some theorists argue they simply reconstructed Marxian socialism. From the start Greens aimed to give voice to members of marginalized groups, such as gays and lesbians, radical ecologists and women's rights activists. From 1998 to 2005 as junior partner in a coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the party was lodged between protest and power, testing its dedication to its founding principles.

The Green movement began as a loose, politically variegated constellation of groups and citizen initiatives from right to left and seeking to change power structures in loosely organized extra-parliamentary opposition, or *Ausserpolitische Opposition*. At the local and state levels, protesters were motivated by, among other issues, the Vietnam War, NATO, nuclear power, and West Germany's postwar industrialization. Such groups as the Red Army Faction, the anarchist Spontis and *Putzgruppe*, and K-Groups, or communist groups, self-organized by resisting the 1966–9 Grand Coalition of the liberal SPD and conservative CDU (Christian Democratic Union). The stationing of NATO missiles in Germany and passing of the German Emergency Acts in 1968, allowing the federal government to restrict civil rights in case of crisis, drove many of the extra-parliamentary groups to join the Greens against a common enemy.

Initially, Green parties were less opposed to political institutions than the system itself. Core member Petra Kelly referred to the Greens as the "anti-party party." In the mid-1970s discontinuous pressure groups and action committees fared poorly in all but two local elections. In 1979 a Green Party representative won a German state legislative seat in the Bremen legislature for the first time, and afterward the Green-oriented parties coordinated to form a national party. At two founding conferences in 1979 in Offenbach and Karlsruhe the new national party program was drafted on four pillars: sound ecology, social responsibility, grassroots democracy, and pacifism. The groups arrayed at the two conferences from far left to far right, including core member and former CDU parliamentarian Herbert Gruhl, founder of Green Action Future.

The four broad principles were acceptable to conservative and alternative forces alike. The remarkable convergence of political strands prompted Gruhl to coin his famous slogan for the Greens: "neither left nor right, but out in front."

The big electoral break for the German Greens came in 1983 when they garnered 5.6 percent of the vote and 28 seats in the Bundestag, or federal parliament. The Green platform transformed the postwar status quo almost as much as the tennis shoes and jeans worn by its representatives: withdrawal from NATO, legalizing marijuana, shutting nuclear plants providing Germany with one-third of its electricity, abolishing advertising in public media, and speed limits for the highway system.

Just after winning seats in the Bundestag, enduring strategic divisions opened within the party between the *realos* ("realistic" reformers) and *fundis* (fundamentalists). *Fundis*, as represented by Petra Kelly, considered compromises would lead to politics as usual. Subversion trumped reform. The *realos*, whose spokesperson was Joschka Fischer, probably the Greens' most recognizable figure, argued that change occurs through existing power structures and opposition was insufficient. These trying debates were highly public, as the Greens invited the press to all meetings.

Despite the internal strife, the various factions coalesced in the 1980s to protest Pershing missiles, nuclear power, and construction of a new runway at Frankfurt Airport. Acid rain and the Chernobyl nuclear disaster gave their message urgency, and the party performed well in state elections. The Greens were central in triggering investigations into influence peddling of the German conglomerate Flick with federal political parties. Owing to consistent Green pressure and legal dexterity, Chancellor Kohl canceled amnesty for those implicated, forcing the resignation of the economics minister. In the early 1990s, following German unification, the Green Party in the West joined with civil rights activists from the former East Germany called Bündnis 90 (Alliance 90). The West German Greens' focus on the environment did not resonate with a nation still euphoric over reunification and despite the alliance the Green Party has failed to gain traction in the East.

For two electoral terms from 1998 to 2005 the Green Party formed a coalition with the SPD, the Red-Green coalition, with Joschka Fischer

as foreign minister and vice chancellor. The party's traditional repulsion to NATO and dedication to non-violence was tested when Germany joined the US-led NATO air war against Serbia. German aircraft were placed into combat for the first time since World War II, causing a major identity crisis for the party and leading to resignations of numerous outraged members. With Fischer's approval, Germany sent troops again to Macedonia, the Congo, and Kuwait, leading to a string of local and regional electoral defeats.

Despite these electoral losses, the party managed to push through reform of the citizenship law, no longer based solely on blood lineage, but birthplace. The party also presided over passage of the Nuclear Exit Law that will gradually close Germany's 19 nuclear power plants by 2020. Other reforms include arms-export guidelines, legalization of gay partnerships, and an ecology tax.

In 2002 the Green Party adopted a new program called *Grün 2020*, its first major restructuring since its founding. Observers consider the manifesto signifying continued commitment to ecological renewal and social justice, but on a more pragmatic basis than 1980. Visions of a new society based on radical ecology or anti-capitalism are not evident. In 2005, Alliance 90/The Greens came fourth in federal elections, and with a new generation of leaders the party maintains a larger electoral presence than any Green party in the world.

SEE ALSO: Dutschke, Rudi (1940–1979); Germany, Socialism and Nationalism; Greenpeace; Kelly, Petra (1947–1992)

References and Suggested Readings

- Blüdhorn, I. (2004) New Green Pragmatism in Germany – Green Politics beyond the Social Democratic Embrace? *Government and Opposition*, 4 (September): 564–86.
- Harper, B. S. (2000) Small Parties in the New Bundesländer: Bündnis 90/die Grünen in Brandenburg. *German Politics*, 2 (August): 89–108.
- Markovits, A. S. & Gorski, P. S. (1993) *The German Left: Red Green and Beyond*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Parkin, S. (1989) *Green Parties: An International Guide*. London: Heretic Press.
- Raschke, J. (2001) *Die Zukunft der Grünen*. Frankfurt-am-Main: Campus.
- Talshir, G. (2002) *The Political Ideology of Green Parties*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Germany, Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Group)

Brian Vetruba

Through three decades and 53 major terrorist acts against the West German state, the left-extremist Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction) (RAF) became one of the most violent and persistent terrorist groups in Western Europe. The RAF grew out of the *Außerparlamentarische Opposition* (Extraparliamentary Opposition) (APO) and the *Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund* (Socialist German Student Union) (SDS), two of the main groups of the New Left in West Germany protesting against the Vietnam War, proposed curtailment of citizen rights during national crises, and the conspicuous silence on Germany's Nazi past.

Tensions escalated between student groups and police in the aftermath of the shooting of 26-year-old student Benno Ohnesorg by a policeman in West Berlin on June 2, 1967, during a demonstration. Gudrun Ensslin, future founder of the RAF, exclaimed, "This fascist state means to kill us all. . . . Violence is the only way to answer violence. This is the Auschwitz generation" (Aust 1985: 55). The attempted assassination of Rudi Dutschke, SDS leader, in 1968, led to more violence against the "fascist" West German state.

On April 2, 1968 a group of four people, including Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin, future leaders of the RAF, fire-bombed two department stores in Frankfurt to protest the Vietnam War and West German capitalism (Becker 1989: 67). Arrested shortly thereafter and convicted of arson, the four were released while their case was under appeal. After losing the appeal, Baader and Ensslin went underground in Paris but returned to West Berlin, where Baader was recaptured on April 4, 1970.

Ensslin, together with prominent leftist journalist Ulrike Meinhof and four others, freed Baader from prison on May 14, 1970. This daring prison break is considered the birth of the Red Army Faction. The fugitives fled in the summer of 1970 to a Jordanian training camp led by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), where they were instructed in urban guerrilla warfare. Returning to West Berlin in

August 1970, they began a series of bank robberies. In May 1972 the RAF bombed US military bases, police stations, and the Springer publishing house, and attempted to assassinate a federal judge. During a massive manhunt in June, Baader, Ensslin, and Meinhof were captured.

Throughout the mid-1970s the second generation of the RAF continued with assassinations and abductions. On April 25, 1975, six RAF members took hostages at the West German embassy in Stockholm, demanding the release of 26 RAF prisoners. When these demands were not met, two hostages were killed, but a subsequent accidental explosion allowed the remaining hostages to escape and police to arrest the perpetrators. The trial against Baader, Ensslin, Meinhof, and other RAF prisoners began in May 1975 in Stammheim, a specially constructed prison.

On May 9, 1976 Ulrike Meinhof hanged herself in her prison cell. Although her death was ruled a suicide, many leftists suspected government involvement (Varon 2004: 198). In spring 1977, Baader, Ensslin, and Jan-Carl Raspe were convicted and given life sentences.

With the assassination of federal prosecutor Siegfried Buback and Jürgen Ponto, head of the Dresdner Bank, in 1977, the RAF began another offensive which culminated in the abduction of Hanns-Martin Schleyer, a leading industrialist, on September 5. A 43-day stand-off ensued when the West German government refused to release Baader, Ensslin, Raspe, and others. In support of this demand, militants belonging to the PFLP hijacked Lufthansa Flight 181 on October 13, 1977. Eventually flown to Mogadishu, the plane was stormed and the hostages freed on October 18, 1977 by the GSG 9, the West German counterterrorism unit. That same evening, Baader and Raspe died of gunshot wounds in their cells and Ensslin by hanging. Although the authorities claimed suicide, the RAF and its supporters accused the government of murder (Varon 2004: 198). On October 19, 1977 the kidnappers executed Schleyer. This six-week period became known as *Deutscher Herbst* (German Autumn), reflecting the perceived scale of the threat internal terrorism posed to the Federal Republic (*Deutscher Herbst* 2007).

Changing its tactics in the late 1970s and 1980s, the RAF concentrated on thwarting perceived imperialism in Western Europe, targeting both NATO and the US. Assassination attempts were made against General Alexander

Haig in June 1979, in Brussels, and against General Frederick Kroesen in Heidelberg in August 1981. Car bombs struck at US air force bases in Ramstein in August 1981 and in Frankfurt in 1985. The RAF also began cooperating with other left-wing terrorist groups in Western Europe, most notably Action Directe (Direct Action), which assisted with the attack in Frankfurt. Together with Direct Action, the RAF issued a joint communiqué calling for the “unity of West European revolutionaries” against imperialism (Alexander & Pluchinsky 1992: 65).

With the dissolution of the German Democratic Republic, the RAF not only lost a model of Marxism-Leninism but also its prime benefactor. It is now well documented that the Stasi (East German Ministry for State Security) provided training to the RAF as well as refuge in East Germany for RAF fugitives. (Schmeidel 1993: 59). Following unification, ten former members of the RAF were arrested.

Protesting the Persian Gulf War, the RAF strafed the US embassy in Bonn with automatic weapons fire in 1991. The last victim of the RAF, Detlev Rohwedder, who headed the governmental agency responsible for privatizing East German government property, was shot on April 1, 1991. On April 18, 1998, the RAF declared itself disbanded.

To this day, Germany is still conflicted on how best to come to terms with the RAF legacy. An art exhibition focusing on the RAF which opened in Berlin in 2005 was highly criticized for glorifying the terrorists and failing to discuss the suffering of the victims and their families.

SEE ALSO: Dutschke, Rudi (1940–1979); Student Movements; West German “New Left”

References and Suggested Readings

- Alexander, Y. & Pluchinsky, D. A. (1992) *Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations*. Portland: Frank Cass.
- Aust, S. (1985) *The Baader-Meinhof Group: The Inside Story of a Phenomenon*. London: Bodley Head.
- Becker, J. (1989) *Hitler's Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang*, 3rd ed. London: Pickwick Books.
- Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2007) Die Geschichte der RAF. Available at www.bpb.de/themen/TSS56U,0,0,Die_Geschichte_der_RAF.html (accessed February 28, 2008).
- Deutscher Herbst (2007) *Der Brockhaus: in 15 Bänden*. Online ed. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. Available at

www.xipolis.net/suche/artikel.php?shortname=b15&artikel_id=600092361 (accessed February 28, 2008).

- Kraushaar, W. (2006) *Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus*, 2 vols. Hamburg: Hamburg Edition.
- Schmeidel, J. (1993) My Enemy's Enemy: Twenty Years of Co-operation between West Germany's Red Army Faction and the GDR Ministry for State Security. *Intelligence and National Security* 8, 4 (October): 59–72.
- Varon, J. (2004) *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Germany, resistance to Nazism

Ingo Schmidt

Resistance to Nazism began during the Weimar Republic in an effort to contain the Nazi movement and stop its rise to power. Once Hitler was appointed as chancellor and the Nazis transformed representative democracy into a terrorist dictatorship, resistance took various forms ranging from attempts to organize mass action and topple the government to sabotage and absenteeism in the production process and cultural non-conformity. While direct efforts to overthrow the regime obviously failed, the role of passive forms of resistance and opposition to the Nazis is still controversial. There is also debate about the impact of all kinds of resistance on the shape of postwar Germany after the military defeat of the Nazi regime.

Resistance and Opposition in Context

For a long time, historians defined resistance as conscious efforts to overthrow the Nazis either through the organization of mass actions or by counterterrorist acts. This view was widely shared by those who had been active in any such resistance movement. During the Cold War there was considerable dispute about which kinds of resistance would qualify as legitimate and truly anti-Nazi. In East Germany the ruling Socialist Unity Party, mostly a successor of the Communist Party, argued that the labor movement, led by the communists, had been the major force in anti-Nazi resistance, whereas the failed coup d'état on July 20, 1944 that was

planned and carried out mostly by army officers had only been an attempt to avoid military defeat and the subsequent deconstruction of German imperialism. Ideologues of the West German ruling class, on the other hand, saw the communists as a vehicle of Soviet rule in the East. Since, according to their notions of totalitarianism, there was no difference between the Soviet and Nazi regimes, no actions that were undertaken or initiated by communists would qualify as anti-Nazi or anti-totalitarian resistance. Other oppositional activity, such as that by the student group *Die Weiße Rose* (The White Rose), Christian circles, or Georg Elser's individual attempt to assassinate Hitler by means of a bomb attack in 1939, stood in the shadow of the disputes about the significance of either communist-led labor resistance or the conspiracy that led to the July 20 attack on Hitler.

The focus on labor and military conspiracy was not only caused by Cold War controversies but was also founded in the potential role those two kinds of resistance could have played. A military conspiracy was much more appropriate under the conditions of a terrorist regime than any attempt at mass mobilization; some observers go so far as to suggest that counterterrorism would have been the only viable strategy of anti-Nazi-resistance (Haffner 1940: 181–90). However, even if the July 20 attack on Hitler had been successful, it would not have led to substantial political changes. The pro-communist bias of former East German research notwithstanding, it still provided plenty of evidence that the anti-Hitler conspiracy shared most of the Nazis' principal goals and was opposed to the Nazi leaders only because they were obviously not capable of achieving those goals (Petzold 1984: 131–6).

Labor, on the other hand, had been declared and treated as enemy no. 1 by the Nazis. In fact, 90 percent of all individuals who were convicted for opposition to the Nazi regime had ties to the labor movement (Abendroth 1972: 145). Therefore it is no surprise that the largest numbers of people working against the Nazis came out of that movement. Moreover, no other social group in Germany had constituted itself as a class through so many and (in terms of membership) in such large organizations as the workers.

Why was labor resistance to the Nazis unable to stop their rise to power? Why, after the consolidation of the Nazi regime, did the

hoped-for mass action against the Nazis fail to occur? The first question is usually answered with reference to the deep political divisions and animosities within the labor movement (Scharrer 1987). The organization of mass action became virtually impossible once the Nazis had established their terrorist regime. Conspirative underground work, which was necessary to at least try to protect Nazi resisters, is, by definition, not geared to reach out to broad masses. Thus, small groups of determined activists, pursued, imprisoned, tortured, and often murdered by the Nazi state, could do little more than agitate masses of workers who had been active in unions, labor culture, and sport organizations during the Weimar Republic but didn't want to risk their own or their families' lives under the Nazis.

However, a new labor history developed in the 1970s which considered the dominant focus on labor organizations and their theoretical and strategic debates insufficient and patronizing. This new approach looked at the daily lives of workers, activists and non-activists alike, and discovered a wider variety of passive or unorganized resistance, ranging from slow work, absenteeism, and sabotage, through cultural non-conformity to helping hunted Jews, prisoners of war, or forced foreign laborers. Some historians went so far as to argue that this kind of "workers' opposition" not only replaced much "workers' resistance" (Eiber 2003), which the Nazis could suppress to a great extent, but even impacted Nazi policies. Discontented with their working and living conditions, more and more workers reduced their work efforts and asked for higher wages. To restore control over the production process through martial law, these historians argue, the Nazis had to go to war much earlier than they had planned (Behrens 1974).

Workers' Resistance

The establishment of the Nazi regime found labor organizations largely unprepared (Schneider 1999: 791–850). Although the communists had prepared for illegal activity since 1932, they had underestimated the viciousness, brutality, and effectiveness with which the Nazis would suppress the labor movement. Moreover, they thought the Nazi regime would just be an interlude on the way to revolutionary change and had planned neither organizationally nor strategically for long-term resistance. The social democrats, as opposed

to the communists, did not try to reach out to masses of workers but instead attempted to maintain illegal networks among their old membership base. While this strategy helped to reduce the number of arrests, there was no attempt to organize a resistance movement. As with the communists, they thought of the Nazi regime as a short-term episode and were not prepared for long-term resistance or opposition. Smaller groups, such as the Communist Party Opposition or the Socialist Workers Party of Germany, were better prepared for illegal activity, but compared to the Communist and Social Democratic Parties, had only a very small membership base upon which to draw. Regardless of organizational capacities and strategic outlook, practically all labor organizations were mostly occupied with building and rebuilding (after the arrest of some of their activists) networks of communication and distribution of propaganda materials, much of which had to be smuggled into the country. By 1935 most of those networks were destroyed and could only be rebuilt on a very small scale. By this time, efforts to mobilize mass resistance had effectively been crushed by not only state repression against the most determined opponents but also by the social and economic consolidation that was achieved by the mid-1930s. In the face of labor shortages, which had replaced mass unemployment, and strong growth, workers expected a recovery of their real wages that were still at depression levels. However, with ever more economic resources devoted to arms production, any such claims were rejected. The regime's attempts to integrate the working class thus had only limited success. Yet the Nazi regime's mix of terror against its dedicated opponents and attempts to integrate more cautious workers was rather effective in unmaking the German working class as a political force (Schneider 1999: 766–82).

Workers' Opposition

The Nazis never managed to win the same wholehearted support from workers that they had from much of the peasantry and middle and capitalist classes, at least until the demise of the regime was written on the walls of bombed cities. One reason for this was that too many workers had either been actively involved or were at least sympathetic to one wing of the labor movement or another. Another reason was that

the National German Socialism that the Nazis' own proletarian base was waiting for after it had helped to destroy the labor movement was called off after the leaders of this proletarian wing of the Nazi party were killed in June 1934. Thus, workers knew that they had to expect wage pressures, speed-ups, and longer hours.

Without autonomous union or political representation, the *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* (German Labor Front) with its mandatory membership was an effective tool to apply the Nazi state's *Führerprinzip* (Führer Principle) to workplace organization. Under these conditions workers found subtle ways to slow the labor process down, neglect quality of work, or even engage in acts of sabotage. Once the economy was short of labor, there were even spontaneous strikes for higher wages, mostly momentary and on the level of single shops of larger companies. This kind of workers' opposition mostly ended with the beginning of the war in September 1939. On an individual level, managers could send unwanted workers to the front. On the aggregate level, war mobilization changed the composition of the working class. Many male workers had to trade their work clothes for uniforms and were increasingly replaced by female and forced foreign workers. These latter two groups had either little experience in capitalist work places or were subject to the most brutal conditions, where even a short break could cause beatings or killings from Nazi supervisors. Impressively enough, even under those conditions, there were rudiments of resistance in the form of mutual help to lessen individual workers' exposure to terror. On the other hand, some of the remaining German male workers adopted the role of a labor aristocracy in a patriarchal and racially structured workforce. Although even German workers, male and female, faced ever harder working and living conditions during the war, the Nazis were able to contain growing discontent by avoiding starvation through increasing economic robbery of food supplies from the occupied countries. Moreover, a significant number of Germans from all classes feared advancing foreign troops would take revenge for their actual and/or supposed complicity with the Nazis (Abendroth 1972: 147). This led to the paradox that a vast majority of Germans couldn't wait for the war to be over, but were also in fear of the Third Reich's downfall and subsequent military occupation.

Exile

The first political refugees started to emigrate from Germany even before the Nazi regime was fully established. The communists relocated their headquarters to Paris, the social democrats chose Prague. Exiled labor activists spent much of their time acquiring visas, work, and accommodation for themselves and newly arrived refugees. They were also busy in establishing and maintaining contacts with their illegal comrades in Nazi Germany. While the immediate impact of workers' resistance in Germany was very limited, there were endless theoretical and strategic discussions in exile. More often than not the divisions and factional splits that had already existed in Germany and helped the Nazis to get into power were replicated in exile. Mutual accusations between communists and social democrats as "red painted fascists" and "social fascists," respectively, were maintained, although there was a common understanding that a united front of the big workers' parties might have stopped the Nazi rise to power. Such factional disputes were actually more prevalent in exile than they were in Germany, where the common threat often helped to overcome organizational competition and ideological battles. A major shift finally occurred in 1935, at the same time that workers' resistance in Germany had mostly been stamped out, when the Communist International adopted its Popular Front strategy. This would comprise not only the various factions of the labor movement, but also bourgeois and religious opposition to the Nazi regime. A practical test case for this strategy was the Spanish Civil War (1936–9), in which many political refugees from Germany fought on the side of the republic against Franco's troops, who received military support from the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy. Unfortunately, the popular front in Spain was not only overpowered by its military adversaries but also torn apart by internal ruptures. There were two internal reasons for this failure. First, the communists, advised by their Soviet comrades, applied the same methods to break internal opposition that Stalin used to consolidate his power in Moscow. Second, the communists were regarded with suspicion by non-communist Nazi opponents because of the Hitler-Stalin pact (1939–41). Practical problems weakened exile resistance when a seemingly unstoppable German war

machine swept over most of Europe and forced refugees either underground or to one of the few countries the Nazis had not occupied. Eventually, it was the troops of the anti-Hitler alliance, not internal resistance of any sort, which destroyed that war machine and the Nazi regime. Against this background it is sometimes argued that resistance, and the death toll that came with it, was in vain. However, others, particularly surviving resistance fighters, maintain that humanistic ideas, no matter whether they were couched in socialist, religious, or radical democratic philosophies, were kept alive only through resistance.

SEE ALSO: Communist Party, Germany; France, Resistance to Nazism; Germany, Socialism and Nationalism; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Hitler, Assassination Plot of July 20, 1944; Jewish Resistance to Nazism; Social Democratic Party, Germany

References and Suggested Readings

- Abendroth, W. (1972) *Sozialgeschichte der europäischen Arbeiterbewegung*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Behrens, E. (1974) Arbeiterkampf und Kapitalistischer Gegenangriff unter dem Nationalsozialismus. In K.-H. Roth (Ed.), *Die andere Arbeiterbewegung*. Munich: Trikont, pp. 101–74.
- Bergmann, T. (1987) *Gegen den Strom – Die Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei-Opposition*. Hamburg: VSA.
- Drechsler, H. (1983) *Die Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands*. Hanover: SOAK.
- Eiber, L. (2003) Vom Arbeiterwiderstand zur Arbeiteropposition – Hamburger Arbeiter unter dem NS-Regime. In A. Klönne et al. (Eds.): *Fluchtpunkte – Das soziale Gedächtnis der Arbeiterbewegung*. Hamburg: VSA, pp. 32–49.
- Haasis, H. (1999) "Den Hitler jag' ich in die Luft" – *Der Attentäter Georg Elser*. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
- Haffner, S. (1940) *Germany: Jekyll and Hyde*. Munich: Knauer.
- Kershaw, I. (1995) *Der NS-Staat – Geschichtsinterpretationen und Kontroversen im Überblick*. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
- Kühnl, R. (1987) *Der deutsche Faschismus in Quellen und Dokumenten*. Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein.
- Petzold, J. (1984) *Faschismus – Regime des Verbrechens*. Frankfurt am Main: Röderberg.
- Scharrer, M. (Ed.) (1987) *Kampflose Kapitulation – Arbeiterbewegung 1933*. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
- Schneider, M. (1999) *Unterm Hakenkreuz – Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung 1933–1939*. Bonn: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf.

Germany, socialism and nationalism

John M. Cox

Led by Adolf Hitler, the National Socialist, or Nazi, Party took power in Germany in January 1933, promising a “thousand-year empire.” Twelve years later, Germany and most of Europe lay in ruins, German Nazism having been subdued by the armies of the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, led by the United States and Britain. But while outside forces were required to bring down Hitler’s tyranny, the Nazi dictatorship was never free from domestic opposition. The Third Reich, as the Nazi government was called, found its most persistent and numerous enemies in the remnants of Germany’s left-wing parties, which Hitler had ruthlessly suppressed upon taking power. Although many thousands of German workers and socialists undertook anti-Nazi resistance activity, their story has been overshadowed, in Germany and elsewhere, by an attempt on Hitler’s life organized by opponents within the military elite in July 1944. This conservative military resistance is often inaccurately designated *the* German resistance. However, the resistance of Germany’s socialists and communists began in the first days of the dictatorship and only ended with its defeat.

Socialist and Communist Parties Before Hitler

By 1914 the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) (SPD) was the largest socialist party in the world, with a membership of nearly 1.1 million. Its associated trade unions grew in membership from less than a quarter million in 1893 to 2.5 million by 1913. The party’s strength was reflected in its electoral successes; the SPD received 34.7 percent of the national vote in 1912, giving the socialists the largest delegation in the Reichstag, the German legislature. The SPD commanded the allegiance of most German workers, and through its numerous mass organizations – including sporting, cultural, youth, and women’s clubs – the party built a thriving social and cultural milieu.

For many years the SPD contained competing factions, including a far-left wing, a steadily growing right wing, and a large “left center.” The

issue of support for the German military effort precipitated a split within the Social Democratic Party. On the eve of the war in July 1914, the SPD’s leadership instructed the party’s Reichstag delegation to vote for the war budget – a decision that was deeply unpopular among the party’s rank and file.

The war greatly compounded the party’s internal divisions and by 1917 open factions had appeared, competing for control of local organizations and of the party’s formidable press apparatus. In April 1917 the left wing formed its own party, the Independent Social Democrats (Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) (USPD). The USPD was, however, not simply a product of dissension within the SPD leadership; it also reflected the explosive social conditions of 1917 resulting from labor protests and a deepening popular abhorrence of the war.

Shortages and austerity combined with war-weariness to produce widespread discontent, culminating in massive strikes and civil unrest in April 1917 and a general strike in January 1918. This upsurge in working-class militancy gave further impetus to the left wing of German socialism. Meanwhile, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, in October 1917, promoted the growth of communist and left-wing socialist parties and movements throughout Europe. This influence was both direct – through the efforts of the Communist International (Comintern), founded in March 1919 – and indirect, through the inspiration that the Russian Revolution initially provided to many thousands of workers and intellectuals.

Revolution broke out in Germany in November 1918, the same month World War I ended, and swept away the centuries-old Hohenzollern monarchy. When navy leaders ordered an attack on the British at the end of October, sailors in Kiel rose up in protest, and within a few days a generalized mutiny erupted. The sailors’ grievances intersected with those of large sectors of German society, and sailors, soldiers, and workers quickly established revolutionary councils. Kaiser Wilhelm II fled Berlin, and then the country, and on November 9 SPD leaders Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed a republic.

By this time the Independent Social Democrats had grown to more than 100,000 members, a figure that would increase several-fold in subsequent months. The USPD was strong in some

of the industrial centers, most importantly Berlin, which had always been a bastion of left social democracy. The new USPD's far-left wing adopted the name "Spartacus League" in homage to the anti-Roman slave rebellion. The Spartacists, a small minority, abandoned the USPD at the end of the year, meeting on December 30 to form the Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands) (KPD).

The SPD, now the governing party, enlisted the aid of right-wing paramilitary forces to suppress the communists and other revolutionary forces in Berlin, Munich, and elsewhere during the first months of 1919. The memory of the short-lived revolution – and of the moderating and even counterrevolutionary role of the SPD in those dramatic days – would far outlive the 1918–19 German Revolution, causing bitter recriminations on the left and, for conservatives and rightists, stoking fears of workers' revolution.

German Socialism During the Weimar Republic

The Weimar Republic was the German government and political system that originated in a February 1919 National Assembly meeting in the town of Weimar. Throughout most of its 14 years, the republic was governed by a "grand coalition" comprising the SPD and two centrist parties. The SPD's leading role in a government that was beset by severe economic problems, forged alliances with discredited business and bureaucratic elites, and sought pacification in its first months through the excesses of right-wing military forces drove large numbers of workers out of the political center and into the ranks of the socialist left in 1919. The radicalization of large sections of the industrial workforce aided the USPD first and foremost. The USPD's membership increased from approximately 300,000 to 750,000 during 1919 and continued to grow at a more modest pace for the first few months of 1920.

But the Independent Socialists would soon be overtaken by the Communists as the second-largest party in German socialism. Despite ill-conceived communist uprisings in 1921 and 1923 – each of which was met with harsh repression – the KPD established itself as a major political force throughout the Weimar years. The USPD disappeared in the early 1920s, much of its membership joining the KPD, which by the end of the decade began to rival the Social

Democrats. In the midst of a generalized polarization and radicalization, the KPD's membership burgeoned from 117,000 in 1929 to approximately 360,000 by 1932. The party's strength was demonstrated in the November 1932 elections – the last election before the Nazi takeover – in which the Communists drew 16.9 percent of the overall vote and 38 percent in Berlin. By 1933 the KPD was the largest communist party in the world outside the Soviet Union.

The KPD's increasing numerical strength was accompanied, however, by its political degeneration. Under the influence of changes in the Soviet Union – where the consolidation of power by Josef Stalin and his supporters signified the abandonment of anything resembling democratic and socialist values – the KPD became in many ways an appendage of the Soviet party, which handpicked its leaders and dictated its political line. These problems were compounded by the Comintern's imposition since 1928 of a bizarre doctrine known as the "third period" theory. Under this theory, capitalism had supposedly entered a third and terminal stage by the late 1920s, and the communist parties should assume leadership of the coming revolution by attacking their "opponents" in the workers' movement, primarily the Social Democrats. Thus the KPD lost considerable time and energy in Weimar's final years denouncing and trying to outmaneuver the SPD, rather than preparing for its real enemy, the ever-growing far-right and Nazi movements.

Rise of the Nazi Party

The left was not the only political force to gain sustenance from Germany's deepening economic and political turmoil. Initially a minor grouping in the spectrum of nationalist and racist organizations, the National Socialist German Workers Party or Nazi Party (Nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiterpartei or NSDAP) drew German nationalists, anti-Semites, and other right-wingers under its banner during the Weimar years. Founded as the German Workers Party in early 1918, the party adopted its full name in early 1920, a few months after a 30-year-old demobilized army veteran from Austria, Adolf Hitler, found his way into its ranks.

In the early 1920s the Nazis were based in Munich, the site of their ill-fated 1923 Beerhall Putsch, which led to the deaths of a few members

and Hitler's conviction and imprisonment. A sympathetic criminal justice system ensured that Hitler served less than one year of his five-year sentence. While in jail he composed his magnum opus, the 700-page collection of diatribes and malicious outbursts that would be published as *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle). The NSDAP languished in the political wilderness for a few more years after Hitler's release from prison, but gained greater support as well as converts at the end of the 1920s. The Nazi Party quadrupled its membership in the second half of the decade, from 25,000 to 100,000, although this was still not a large number on the landscape of German politics.

The Nazis combined radical-sounding populism with ultra-nationalism and extreme anti-communism and anti-Semitism. Their paramilitary outfits and penchant for street battles with leftists appealed to wayward youths, and they benefited from a broader upsurge in nationalist sentiment. While most of the Nazis' vote, as well as membership, came from lower-middle-class Germans, by the early 1930s they received significant support from workers as well.

The worldwide economic depression brought about the collapse of Weimar's governing coalition. The centrist parties were pushed to the sidelines by the far right and far left, whose parties made significant electoral gains in the early 1930s, and in July 1932 the Nazis gained the largest share in federal elections. Those elections registered the severe polarization of German politics, which was now embodied in the spectacle of 100 uniformed KPD deputies and 196 brownshirted Nazi deputies sitting in the Reichstag. By this point a growing number of Germany's landowning and industrial elites had come to see the Nazis, whose hooliganism and overheated rhetoric they had earlier disdained, as their best defense against the far more frightening specter of revolution from the left.

Meanwhile, the left was paralyzed. The Social Democrats, committed to legalism and a program of gradual reform, believed that the institutions of state and society would withstand the Nazi threat, while the Communists failed to recognize the extraordinary nature of the Nazi menace, seeing in Hitler simply another pawn of big business, barely distinguishable from other bourgeois politicians. Both parties issued hollow threats of more resolute action, such as a general strike, but as Weimar democracy collapsed and the Nazis

moved to fill the void, there was still no unified action.

1933: Disaster for the Working-Class Movements

After going through three chancellors in less than three years, in January 1933 President Paul von Hindenburg and other ruling conservatives appointed Adolf Hitler to the post, mistakenly believing they could thereby rein in the Nazis. The traditional conservative elite would be grossly mistaken. Hitler and his movement consolidated its hold over the next year and a half.

While each of the two large working-class parties underestimated the danger, the Communists were particularly short-sighted in their disastrous refusal to unite with the Social Democrats in the hour of greatest need. The KPD tirelessly attacked the Social Democrats as "social fascists" and went so far as to label them the "major enemy," a greater menace to the working class than the true fascists. Communist leaders simultaneously preached that Hitler's gang would only last a short time, and that the Nazi government would simply exacerbate the crisis of bourgeois rule, paving the way for a KPD victory. "First the Nazis, then the Communists!" went the KPD slogan, though as it turned out most Communists would be in exile, jail, or the grave well before the year was out.

Hitler had declared in *Mein Kampf* his belief that the "elimination of the Marxist poison from our national body" should be the "very first task of a truly nationalist government," and his regime wasted little time achieving this goal. The burning of the Reichstag by a 24-year-old Dutch immigrant at the end of Hitler's first month in power provided a handy pretext for the Nazis. The manifold repressive agencies of the state and party unleashed a fearsome terror on the working-class movements; thousands of communists, including as many as 1,500 in Berlin alone, were arrested immediately. By the end of Hitler's first year tens of thousands of KPD members were under arrest, many of them subjected to that feature of Nazism that would come to define its rule throughout Europe, the concentration camp. Approximately half the KPD's 1933 membership would be subjected to Hitler's extensive, ghastly jail and camp system, and some 20,000 communists perished under the Third Reich. Among them was Ernst Thälmann,

leader of the KPD since 1925, who would die in Buchenwald concentration camp in 1944. The Social Democratic Party also suffered greatly under this reign of terror. Thousands of its members were arrested, and the government banned the party in June 1933. The Nazis had already destroyed the SPD-led trade union movement and confiscated its funds.

Beginning of Leftist Resistance

But the socialists and communists were not simply passive victims of Nazism. From the moment of Hitler's appointment as chancellor in 1933, they energetically resisted the regime. Communist activists engaged Nazis in street battles on the day the Hitler Cabinet was announced, and in working-class districts of several cities the KPD staged public demonstrations against the new government. Working-class and socialist resistance would take many forms in subsequent years, and indeed "resistance" is still a difficult concept to define. Today, many historians and other commentators acknowledge that acts of nonconformity, passive and moral resistance, refusal to submit to the Nazis' social and political policies – in short, anything that consciously undermined the goals of the regime – should be included in any appraisal of resistance.

Communist Underground Resistance

In the first weeks and months of the dictatorship, communist resistance primarily consisted of illicit production and distribution of leaflets, newspapers, and other literature. The KPD managed to publish its main newspaper, *Die Rote Fahne* (The Red Flag), until 1935. The party also sometimes organized public actions. Communists also held secret May Day celebrations, which helped to maintain morale and a fighting spirit. In addition, KPD members organized a charitable endeavor called Red Aid, which collected money for family members of political prisoners. The heavy hand of the state took its toll over the first two years of the regime, though, and by the end of 1935 the KPD underground had greatly reduced its activity. The Gestapo, the German secret police, successfully employed double agents within the communist underground and gathered additional information through torture, threats, and other such techniques. The entire leadership of the Berlin KPD was arrested in March 1935.

The Nazis never succeeded in completely destroying the communist resistance, however, as KPD members organized in smaller units, increasingly isolated from one another and from the party's exiled leadership. Many of the KPD's leaders – those fortunate enough to have eluded the mass arrests of 1933 – fled the country for the relative safety of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and other locales. Under the excessively strict guidance of the Soviet party, the KPD leadership sent directives to its German members as best it could, often proposing sharp reversals or shifts in policy. In 1935, for example, German communists were instructed to abandon the counterproductive hostility toward the Social Democrats they had cultivated for many years, and to seek alliances with underground socialists and other anti-fascists. This shift came a few years too late to have presented a threat to Nazism, and at any rate the new-found friendliness of KPD members toward Social Democrats was often met with understandable confusion and suspicion. Nevertheless, KPD members were able to initiate and participate in some common anti-Nazi activity with non-communists throughout the remaining years of the Nazi period.

The German communist resistance was continually buffeted by such unpredictable shifts of Soviet diplomacy and politics. For rank-and-file German communists, the August 1939 Soviet German Non-Aggression Pact (or Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, named after its respective foreign ministers) between Stalin and Hitler was especially disorienting. The two dictatorships agreed to refrain from aggression against one another and secretly divided parts of eastern and northern Europe into spheres of influence. The pact was accompanied by a trade agreement. For more than six years the KPD had energetically denounced the Hitler regime and, within their means, worked to undermine it. The August 1939 agreements implied a new, unforeseen friendship between Moscow and Berlin – or at the very least, a cessation in political and diplomatic hostility – and the KPD's subservience to Moscow placed the German communists in an untenable position.

The KPD leadership, however, heartily promoted this treaty that had so dismayed much of the party's membership. No longer was communist criticism directed at Hitler. England, France, and the United States were now the "enemies of peace," and KPD literature began speaking in vague terms about the responsibility

of international imperialism for the world war. German communists were now instructed to laud the pact with Hitler, thereby alienating any allies they may have established among non-communist resisters. Compounding this, the KPD wasted little time renewing its tirades against the Social Democrats, this time dubbing them “agents in the pay of English and French imperialism.” Communist leaders falsely believed that the non-aggression treaty would offer their members more political freedom within Germany – some even fantasized that perhaps Hitler would legalize their party. Despite Stalin’s overtures – draping the Kremlin in the swastika flag to welcome Nazi diplomats, for example – there was never any possibility that Hitler would mitigate his hatred of communism, the unholy twin brother of Judaism in his fevered imagination.

Marking another reversal, the KPD resumed a more energetic resistance following Germany’s June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union, which rudely disabused Stalin of his misplaced faith in the pact with Hitler. Now almost completely cut off from their external leadership, local communist networks organized smaller and more isolated units, and in some cases collaborated with people of other political persuasions.

The relatively large Robert Uhrig network organized several hundred resisters in Berlin and had cells in several of the city’s factories, including as many as 80 members in one armaments plant alone. Uhrig was a toolmaker and communist who, like many of the resisters in the network he started in 1940, had spent time in prison for his political activities in the 1930s. His network also attracted some Social Democrats as well as other youths who had never been in the orbit of the KPD. Uhrig expanded his operations substantially after the German invasion of the Soviet Union and united his groups with those of Beppo Römer, whose background was quite different from Uhrig’s. A former captain in the German army, Römer had been a leader of the Nazi Party in the 1920s, but later traveled in communist circles and eventually joined a group of leftist intellectuals, which led to his arrest in 1933 and 1934 and a five-year incarceration at Dachau concentration camp.

In short, the Uhrig network bore little resemblance, in organization and in social and political composition, to the communist underground of the first years of the Third Reich, which were homogenous and tightly controlled by the party

leadership. This was characteristic of the KPD-related underground in the last years of the war and dictatorship: the isolation of individual communists from their exiled leaders allowed them to develop new, more imaginative units and political tactics. At the same time, though, the war-weary, terrorized population was less receptive than ever to resisters’ appeals for even more sacrifice and danger than was already the lot of the German people.

Other important communist-led resistance circles during World War II included those of Bernhard Bästlein and Franz Jacob in Hamburg, Berlin’s Saefkow-Jacob group, and a group led by Wilhelm Knöchel, also in Berlin. These groups continued to produce clandestine leaflets, undermine industrial production by holding work slowdowns, and assist families of working-class prisoners, among other activities. The Saefkow-Jacob group was similar to Uhrig’s network in its composition – it included large numbers of Social Democrats and other workers – and was able to establish large cells in several Berlin factories, including armaments plants, where the Saefkow-Jacob members worked to sabotage production. Wilhelm Knöchel, a member of the KPD’s central committee, returned to Berlin from exile and established an underground network in 1942 that published an anti-war newspaper and distributed plastered stickers and posters in factories and working-class neighborhoods denouncing the regime. The group was broken up by the arrests and execution of Knöchel and two dozen of his comrades in 1944.

The Red Orchestra was another particularly intriguing resistance operation which organized wide-ranging political discussions, produced and distributed literature, and gathered intelligence on Nazi military activities and atrocities. This group originated in a large intellectual and political circle around Harro Schulze-Boysen, a German intelligence officer, and Arvid Harnack, who worked in the Economic Ministry. Their loose network was based principally upon personal relations, and comprised similarly well-educated, middle-class, left-leaning Germans of all ages. The Red Orchestra (a title invented by the Gestapo, but not used by the group) included a few communists, most importantly Hans and Hilde Coppi. Schulze-Boysen and Harnack had contact with the Soviet embassy during the period of the Non-Aggression Pact, but had little success in keeping this contact open after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. German

army decoders deciphered a radio broadcast from Moscow that led them to Schulze-Boysen in August 1942, and over the next several months the police rounded up 126 resisters who were connected to the Red Orchestra – and four dozen, including the central leaders, were executed.

Intersections of Leftist and Jewish Resistance

Other KPD-related groups are harder to categorize. Berlin's Herbert Baum groups, for example, were led by a veteran of the KPD (Baum), but included an assortment of Jewish youth activists, socialists, communists, and others. Many of Baum's comrades were too young to have been members of the KPD or the SPD and felt an allegiance to socialist ideals rather than to any particular party or ideology.

Herbert Baum, who had been a leader of the KPD's youth organization before Hitler's rise to power, acted as the coordinator of this network of groups, which originated in the late 1920s and persevered until 1942. The Baum groups are notable for their large number of young Jews – Baum's groups conducted many of the same activities as other leftists: nighttime leafleting or "graffiti-actions," distribution of newspapers, gathering and conveying news from outside Germany, and so on. They also placed great importance on study groups, with members secretly gathering in groups of seven or eight at an apartment for lengthy and passionate discussions of literature, political texts, and music. These sessions buoyed the morale of the members and lent cohesion to the groups.

The Baum groups are known to history primarily for a spectacular attack they engineered in May 1942. Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels had staged an exhibition ironically titled "The Soviet Paradise," depicting the deprivations of daily life in Russia in exaggerated and lurid detail. Anti-Semitism was a prominent feature of the Soviet Paradise, which was staged in Berlin's central Lustgarten square. Herbert Baum and several of his colleagues decided to sabotage the offending exhibition, and on the evening of May 18 placed firebombs in two locations of the Soviet Paradise, damaging a portion of the show. This is among the very few semi-military actions undertaken against the Nazis within Germany, and was particularly bold given that most of the perpetrators were Jewish. The Gestapo reacted swiftly, arresting Baum and

most of his comrades within a few days. More than thirty members of the Baum groups were eventually executed, and the Nazis murdered an additional 500 Jewish citizens of Berlin in reprisal.

The Baum groups are often cited as an example of "Jewish resistance," while others label them "Communist resisters." Neither categorization captures the heterogeneity and ever-changing character of the Baum groups, which evolved over the decade of their existence. But clearly the Baum groups exemplify the courageous resistance of the most threatened and oppressed segment of Hitler's Germany. Jews resisted their tormentors in large numbers and in multiple ways throughout Nazi-occupied Europe – from the Warsaw Ghetto to the Lithuanian forests, in partisan armies in Poland and the Soviet Union, by participating in Western European resistance outfits, fighting in the Spanish Civil War and in the ranks of Allied armies, and organizing uprisings in concentration and death camps – and also through their work in groups like Baum's in the heart of the Nazi empire.

Socialist Anti-Nazi Resistance in Germany and Exile

The communist-inspired resistance was supplemented by an equally substantial resistance of Social Democrats and other socialists. The non-KPD socialist underground encompassed the SPD as well as numerous small groups whose origins and politics placed them in the socialist or anti-Stalinist tradition. The Social Democrats withstood their initial losses and regrouped in order to fight the Nazi tyranny. Underground SPD groups were stronger than the KPD in many industrial areas, owing to the party's considerable support among industrial workers throughout the Weimar Republic. Socialists produced leaflets and distributed them in factories where they worked and put up posters under cover of the night in large cities like Berlin and even in Munich, the bastion of Nazism since the early 1920s.

Socialist resisters developed an intricate system of courier transport to smuggle illegal literature into the country from exile bases in Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Holland, and Denmark. Socialists disguised anti-Nazi literature with fake covers and mixed it with titles by Schiller, Goethe, and other traditional German authors. Underground activists devised elaborate methods to distribute their literature while

avoiding arrest. A device called the jumping jack (*Knallfrosch*), for example, was used to propel leaflets from atop buildings or in rail stations. The SPD's executive committee (Sopade), based in Prague, maintained contact with the German membership, gathering reports on public opinion that provided realistic assessments to the exiled leadership, and in later years would prove useful to historians.

Resistance of Smaller Leftist Groups

The fragmentation and dispersal of the two large parties – the KPD and the SPD – gave rise to smaller leftist groups in the first months and years of the Third Reich in the 1930s. Numerous smaller groups had already split off from the communists and socialists in previous years, and new organizations emerged as well. These groups usually comprised many former members of the KPD and SPD, had youthful memberships, and created new forms and strategies to combat Nazism. Their anti-Stalinist character places them within the rubric of socialist, rather than communist, resistance.

With the exception of the SPD, the Socialist Workers Party (SAP) was the largest of the non-Stalinist left organizations throughout most of the 1930s. The SAP was strongest in Berlin, and had a membership of about 17,000 at the time of Hitler's rise to power in 1933. The SAP barely managed to survive the suppression of the left, with most members arrested, driven into exile, or discouraged from political activity. The SAP maintained a diminished presence on the domestic front, operating three regional organizations in the late 1930s. The group continued its struggle outside Germany, establishing a leadership unit in Paris, where it collaborated with other exiled anti-Nazis. Many SAP activists fought in the Spanish Civil War in the militias of the left-socialist Workers' Party of Marxist Unification (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista) (POUM).

The International Socialist Combat League (Internationale sozialistische Kampfbund) (ISK) combined various left-wing traditions and philosophical ideas in its distinctive character. The group, which was founded in the mid-1920s, was based in Göttingen in central Germany. The ISK anticipated the massive repression that a Nazi government would unleash, and, by dissolving itself at the beginning of the dictatorship, many of its members avoided the dragnets of 1933.

The ISK reorganized into six regional outfits and for cover used such venues as vegetarian restaurants and a bread store. These fronts provided some funds for the group's production of illegal leaflets and other literature, and the ISK managed to distribute a monthly newspaper up to the end of 1937, when the organization was virtually destroyed by arrests.

A variety of even smaller socialist groups carried out anti-Nazi activities in the mid-1930s. The Socialist Front, based in Hannover, distributed hundreds of its newspapers until the summer of 1936. A wave of Gestapo arrests led to the convictions of about 250 members, effectively dismantling the group. A left-socialist group, called the Red Shock Troop, included students, workers, and others and maintained contact not only with Social Democrats and Communists but with Quakers and other opponents of the regime. The Shock Troop distributed thousands of newspapers in Berlin and collected aid for Hitler's leftist prisoners, but the organization was broken up quickly by arrests and internment. Approximately 200 of its members were sent to prisons and concentration camps in 1933; a few members kept the group's spirit alive by carrying out anti-Nazi activity until the last days of the Third Reich.

The Org: Anti-Stalinist Intellectuals and Workers

The Org was a particularly significant socialist group that originated in the left wings of the KPD as well as the SPD. Walter Loewenheim, a member of the KPD's left wing, and a few close associates founded the Org (short for its original name, the Leninist Organization) in 1929, in Berlin. A one-time leader of the Communist Party, he became disenchanted with the KPD's politics by the mid-1920s and began to take an interest in Leon Trotsky's critique of Soviet domestic and foreign policies. Loewenheim resigned from the KPD in 1927, and began recruiting such people to his own group at the end of the 1920s in Berlin, soon establishing contacts in a few other cities as well.

The Org began small, numbering about 100 members at the time of Hitler's victory in 1933, but it grew in the first months of the Nazi dictatorship to approximately 500. The Org had many members and contacts among Berlin's working-class population, and recruited several dozen trade-union leaders and functionaries. The

group maintained a full-time staff of about twenty people that included a secretariat, archivists, and couriers. In addition, Loewenheim – or Miles, as he was known in the underground – was a skilled and charismatic organizer. The Org also cultivated an extensive network of sympathizers, who included the underground leaders of the railroad workers' union and leaders of the Religious Socialists, a group of about a hundred people based in Berlin.

In 1933 Walter Loewenheim wrote a pamphlet entitled *Neu Beginnen* (New Beginnings), a name by which the group would often be known after the war. *Neu Beginnen* was subtitled "Fascism or Socialism: A Basis for Discussion among Germany's Socialists," and it succeeded in provoking debate, creating a stir among leftists beyond the Org's periphery, as well as among exiled German socialists and communists, even inspiring some socialists to form study groups to discuss the pamphlet.

As was the case with the other sections of the left-wing and working-class German resistance, the oppressive Nazi state prevented the group from achieving anything resembling mass action. Its main task was distribution of a newspaper, *Sozialistische Aktion*, which was printed by exiled members and smuggled into Germany through a complicated courier system. The group distributed 27,000 copies of the paper in 1935, and more than 5,000 of the paper's final edition in 1938. The Org also produced and distributed anti-Nazi leaflets and raised funds to support political prisoners. And, like members of other oppositional networks, Org activists maintained their spirits by combining the personal and social with the political.

The Org eventually succumbed to a combination of state repression and internal division. Loewenheim left Germany in 1935, and many of his adherents left the group or fled the country. An opposing faction retained the name "Org" and, even after arrests claimed about one-third of its members in late 1935 and early 1936, had a brief revival in 1937. By the end of 1938, though, arrests and attrition had taken their toll, and the Org was no longer able to sustain its operations in Berlin, which had always been the group's nexus. Once captured, Org members – like many other political prisoners – attempted to carry out resistance activities in the camps and prisons. The Org maintained a network in exile – with members in Paris, Prague, London, and New

York – and only formally disbanded after the fall of Nazi Germany. After World War II, many Org veterans attained prominence in academies and politics in both parts of Germany, as well as the United States.

Other Arenas of Resistance

Alongside other Germans, communists and socialists also resisted the Third Reich by sheltering Jews from the Nazis' genocidal policies. An intriguing but little-known group that called itself the Community for Peace and Construction (*Gemeinschaft für Frieden und Aufbau*) coalesced in 1944 through highly unusual circumstances. The resistance activities of a Berlin Jew named Werner Scharff, an electrician born in Poland in 1912, began in 1941 when he was ordered to install lighting at a deportation assembly point located in a synagogue. He obtained work with the administration of the deportation center during the initial round-ups of German Jews in order to help those targeted for transportation to the prison-like Lodz Ghetto. Scharff aided some in relatively small ways – returning property stolen by the German guards, for example – and others in much larger ways, enabling some Jews to avoid being transported eastward by recording their names as "deported" rather than "to be deported."

Scharff went into hiding in June 1943, but was soon arrested and deported to the Theresienstadt ghetto in August 1943. While in transit to Theresienstadt, Scharff learned about a non-Jewish Berliner, Hans Winkler, who helped hide and protect Jews. Scharff escaped and returned to Berlin, where he located Winkler. The two started the *Gemeinschaft* and rapidly attracted approximately thirty people, including Communists and Social Democrats. Some of their literature emphasized the destruction wrought upon Germany by Hitler's war, while other leaflets publicized, for example, the atrocities that the German army had visited upon Poland and other countries overrun by the Wehrmacht, the German armed forces. A wave of arrests disbanded the *Gemeinschaft* in October and December 1944. Although Scharff perished in the Sachsenhausen camp, most of the other Jewish members survived the war, saved by the advancing Red Army. Their trial, scheduled for April 23, 1945 – a week before Hitler's suicide – never took place, as the government and its institutions were already collapsing.

Effects and Legacies of Resistance

The Nazis' leftist enemies never threatened to overthrow the Third Reich and had little influence on public opinion in Germany. Yet the success or failure of any form of resistance cannot be measured in an empirical, immediate sense. Seemingly humble and non-threatening actions – cultural activities and self-education, for example – thwarted the Nazi ambition to dehumanize and crush its victims. Collections for families of political prisoners and food-distribution operations could not topple Hitler or the Nazi Party, but they prevented the dictatorship from corrupting its victims morally and spiritually, another of its goals. Leaflet and graffiti actions, and the rare spectacular act, alerted some portion of the public that not everyone had submitted, and that it was possible to resist.

It is also impossible to evaluate or appreciate the significance of the leftist opposition to Hitler by only examining the years of the Third Reich, 1933–45. Despite the great losses and immense suffering of much of the memberships of the left-wing parties, they ultimately outlasted the Nazi regime. The tenacity and courage of the socialist resistance helped to preserve democratic traditions and human ideals, and contributed to the moral and political rebuilding of West Germany after the war. The legacy of anti-Nazi resistance was more complicated in East Germany, where communists transformed their earlier opposition to Hitler into a state ideology that sought to legitimize a new, if less brutal and aggressive, dictatorship. In both West and East Germany, the Cold War made it difficult to accurately assess and place in context the efforts of Hitler's leftist opponents, which were downplayed in the West while simplified and exaggerated in the East. It is now easier to appreciate the extent and significance of this resistance, which deepens our understanding of life in Nazi Germany in all its complexities.

SEE ALSO: German Revolution, 1918–1923; Germany, Resistance to Nazism; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Hitler, Assassination Plot of July 20, 1944; *Mein Kampf*; Reichstag Fire of 1933

References and Suggested Readings

Benz, W. & Pehle, W. H. (Eds.) (1997) *Encyclopedia of German Resistance to the Nazi Movement*. New York: Continuum.

- Evans, R. (2005) *The Third Reich in Power, 1933–1939*. New York: Penguin.
- Foitzik, J. (1986) *Zwischen den Fronten: Zur Politik, Organisation und Funktion linker politischer Kleinorganisationen im Widerstand 1933 bis 1939/40*. Bonn: Neue Gesellschaft.
- Large, D. C. (Ed.) (1995) *Contending With Hitler: Varieties of German Resistance in the Third Reich*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lidtke, V. (1985) *The Alternative Culture: Socialist Labor in Imperial Germany*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Merson, A. (1985) *Communist Resistance in Nazi Germany*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Morgan, D. (1975) *The Socialist Left and the German Revolution: A History of the German Independent Social Democratic Party, 1917–1922*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Paucker, A. (1997) *Jewish Resistance in Germany: The Facts and the Problems*. Berlin: Gedenkstätte deutscher Widerstand.
- Peukert, D. (1989) *Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition, and Racism in Everyday Life*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Weber, H. (2001) *Kommunistischer Widerstand gegen die Hitler-Diktatur 1933–1939*. Berlin: Gedenkstätte deutscher Widerstand.
- Weitz, E. (1996) *Creating German Communism, 1890–1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ghana, nationalism and socialist transition

Seunfunmi Molatokunbo Olutayo

The Gold Coast (now Ghana) was the first African state to gain its independence from Britain, through a mass movement led by Kwame Nkrumah, on March 7, 1957. After this, other African nations hastened the pace for independence, putting pressure on France and Belgium as well as on Britain. Nkrumah's ultimate aim was backed by the determination to build a socialist society in Ghana. Socialism for Ghana was supposed to be uniquely "African," for he was strongly opposed to neocolonialism, that is, imperialism and capitalism. He was of the view that capitalism was too complicated a system for a newly independent nation, and he saw socialism, the antithesis of capitalism, as the only means of development in Africa. Despite his hopes for a customized African socialism, he took as a model the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

The world situation determined Nkrumah's orientation as well as that of other former colonies in Africa, where independence had become the utmost desire and capitalism was equated with colonial domination. Colonialism, to most Africans, was the precursor of capitalism which, in turn, destroyed the indigenous social structure through the exploitation of Africa and its resources. The question for the new leaders of Africa was how to maintain the precolonial ideal of "communalism" in spite of the new technology and market economy that had penetrated the indigenous structure.

Kwame Nkrumah and Socialism in Ghana

At independence, Ghana was placed on the road to socialism. This was mainly because of Nkrumah's view and theoretical foundation of scientific socialism. He believed that the underdevelopment of African societies was a consequence of politics, with the colonial powers being responsible for the social, economic, cultural, and political backwardness of Africa. His choice of socialism was based on the belief that only the socialist form of society could enhance a rapid rate of economic progress without destroying social justice, freedom, and equality. His principle is best illustrated by the often quoted injunction of "seek first the political kingdom and all things will be added unto it." In other words, it is political freedom that dictates the pace of economic and social progress. He also believed that Ghana as a socialist society would give to each person according to his ability and receive according to his need. Unfortunately, this idea was informed by the belief that Ghana was an egalitarian society and failed to take cognizance of the introduction of colonial capitalism through the mining of gold and the cultivation of cocoa which, to all intents and purposes, had restructured the indigenous economy.

As in the Zambia of Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere's Tanzania, the one-party system was the norm in Nkrumah's Ghana: the state owned everything, with the support of international organizations, and Nkrumah retained most of the control. Regulations imposed by the colonial government were expanded, including the rights and powers of trade unions, and private interests were taken over by the government. Nkrumah launched a seven-year economic plan

and moved to collectivize agriculture against the wishes of indigenous large-scale cocoa farmers who constituted the tax base of Ghana's economy. Within five years he established over 40 state-run industries and enterprises in distilling, metallurgy, manufacturing, vegetable oil production, boat building, paper mills, cocoa processing, footwear manufacturing, and pharmaceuticals.

Unfortunately, these enterprises could not make profits. First, the technologies involved were not indigenously created and thus had to be bought in from the world capitalist economy, leading to lower currency reserves. Also, Nkrumah's Youth Party members, the Young Pioneers, could not operate the farms successfully. At the same time, there was much corruption among members of the governing Convention People's Party.

As the Ghanaian economy tumbled, the British and US governments, who considered Nkrumah a "dangerous opponent," held meetings and devised plans to contain and, if possible, eliminate him. Nkrumah was successfully overthrown in 1966. By that point, his popularity had dwindled as a result of his dictatorial posture and his repression of political opponents and trade unions.

Socialism after Nkrumah

The fall of Nkrumah led to the demise of socialism in Ghana. He had been the embodiment of the socialist ideology and there was little or no succession. Having been successful at mobilizing marginalized workers, peasant farmers, demobilized war veterans, students, small traders, teachers, and junior professionals into an anti-imperialist force, through which he was able to break the back of colonialism, a combination of historico-sociological exigencies contributed to his overthrow in February 1966.

Of utmost significance was the lack of a rigorous theoretical basis for his brand of socialism. Ghana at independence was not as "communal" as Nkrumah perceived, neither were the means of production well developed enough to determine the political superstructure. Indeed, Nkrumah, along with the mobilized workers and peasants, lacked the economic wherewithal to create a technology relevant to the industries established. As such, it was a superstructure grafted onto a "faulty" substructure. Coupled with these problems were the international dimensions of the

Cold War and the world capitalist economic structures within which the socialist agenda could be undertaken.

The military that overthrew Nkrumah was lacking not only in any ideological bases but in economic and political backbone as well. The civilian regimes that have subsequently ruled in Ghana, as in other African nations, have had to subordinate their values to the capitalist ideology that prevails in most of the world. This is even more the case with the end of the Cold War and the reforms that have been imposed on African nations. Sociopolitical and economic constructions and reconstructions have, therefore, had to align and realign themselves with the global economy.

SEE ALSO: Imperialism and Capitalist Development; Imperialism, Historical Evolution; Imperialism, Modernization to Globalization; Kaunda, Kenneth (b. 1924); Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972); Nyerere, Julius (1922–1999); Marxism; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Ayittey, G. B. N. (1990) *The End of African Socialism*. Bradley: The Heritage Foundation. Available at www.heritage.org/Research/Africa/HL250.cfm.
- McCain, J. A. (1979) Attitudes toward Socialism, Policy, and Leadership in Ghana. *African Studies Review* 22 (1): 149–69.
- Nkrumah, K. (1970) African Socialism Revisited. In W. Cartey & M. Kilson (Eds.), *The African Reader: Independent Africa*. New York: Random House.
- Olutayo, A. O. (2002) The Concept of Mode of Production in the Analysis of Development. In U. C. Isiugo-Abanihe, A. N. Isamah, & J. A. Adesina (Eds.), *Currents and Perspectives in Sociology*. Lagos: Malthouse.
- Smitha, F. E. (1998) Black Africans into the 1960s. Available at www.fisthma.com/h2/ch25.htm (accessed May 25, 2008).
- Socialist Worker (2007) What is the Real Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah? *Socialist Worker* 2042. Available at www.socialistworker.co.uk/art.php?id=10924 (accessed May 25, 2008).

Giustizia e Libertà, Partito d'Azione

Chiara Colombini

From 1929 to 1947, Giustizia e Libertà (Justice and Liberty), and then Partito d'Azione (Action Party), actively resisted Italian fascism on the

principles of democracy, the legacy of the Italian Risorgimento, and the ideals of social reform.

Giustizia e Libertà (GL) was founded in Paris in the summer of 1929 by Carlo Rosselli, Emilio Lussu, Fausto Nitti (all of whom had escaped confinement on the island of Lipari), Alberto Tarchiani, Gaetano Salvemini, Alberto Cianca, and Cipriano Facchinetti. The movement was polemically opposed to apathetic forms of resistance to fascism and helped form the Concentrazione Antifascista (Anti-Fascist Concentration) in exile. However, GL considered Concentrazione Antifascista an opportunistic movement unprepared for underground action within Italy.

GL brought together socialists, republicans, democrats, and liberals (mostly influenced by Piero Gobetti and Giovanni Amendola), who sought to overcome ideological factionalism to unify resistance in the revolutionary battle to overthrow both the fascist regime and the pre-fascist reconciliatory form of democracy they considered had produced the dictatorship. GL aimed therefore to remove the historical, economic, and cultural causes of fascist dictatorship.

In November 1931, GL aligned politically with Concentrazione Antifascista, emerging as the unifying force behind underground action in Italy. But GL's relations with the constellation of organizations in Concentrazione Antifascista became strained, as it did not restrict itself to underground action but began defining an independent political program. The Revolutionary Program published in January 1932 in the *Quaderni di Giustizia e Libertà* stated the political aims of the republic: state organization based on local autonomy, socialization of many industrial sectors, bank and agrarian reform, and separation between church and state.

The GL leaders in exile in Paris engaged in public demonstrations, including the flight over Milan by Giovanni Bassanesi in 1930 and support for underground groups in Italy. But GL's efforts were repeatedly targeted by police, who were alarmed by the organization's militancy and the spread of its influence into the middle classes. Between 1930 and 1934, GL cells in Lombardy, Florence, Rome, Sardinia, Turin, and Venezia Giulia were dismantled and organizers arrested.

Upon Hitler's rise to power in Germany in 1933, GL warned of the warlike objectives of fascism. GL recognized the importance of the

Spanish Civil War and in August 1936 formed the Italian Column, which went into combat on the Aragonese front. After Rosselli's assassination in 1937, Emilio Lussu and Silvio Trentin assumed the GL leadership, endorsing a radical socialist transformation even as ties with Italy were decreasing. After Nazi Germany's invasion of France in May 1940, GL members were dispersed throughout Europe, North Africa, and the Americas.

Partito d'Azione (PdA) was the newly founded party (May–June 1942) that mobilized former GL members and democratic and anti-fascist organizations, including the Milan Liberal Democrats and Liberal Socialist movement. A seven-point program was promulgated for a republic, calling for local autonomy, mixed economy, agrarian reform, free unions, separation of church and state, and a European federation. After fascism's fall in September 1943, PdA elected an executive committee that firmly supported republicanism and rigorously opposed the monarch and the government of Pietro Badoglio that came to power after Mussolini was overthrown.

The PdA, socialists, and communists formed the National Liberation Committee (CLN) and in October 1943 organized a provisional government with full constitutional rights. But in April 1944, after Communist Party leader Palmiro Togliatti formed an alliance with the Badoglio government, the Actionist project waned along with the central role of PdA in the coalition of the anti-fascist parties. After the communists, the PdA was the largest political force in the resistance movement, but the party was weakened by divisions on the right and left and by regional differences.

After liberation in June 1945, PdA leader Ferruccio Parri emerged as the country's first prime minister in a fragile government that collapsed in November 1945. Internally, the PdA was gripped by disunity. Its first national congress in Rome in February 1946 brought about a split, with Parri and his faction founding the Movimento per la Democrazia Repubblicana (Movement for Republican Democracy). On June 2, 1946, elections were held for the Constituent Assembly. PdA, unable to compete with the mass-based parties, won a scant seven deputies. The *azionisti* contribution to the Italian constitution was nevertheless important.

Fernando Schiavetti, Riccardo Lombardi, and Alberto Cianca were the party's subsequent

secretaries until the party dissolved in October 1947. While most of its members joined the Socialist Party (PSI), the *azionisti* elite, who had strong anti-fascist and democratic sentiments, gained significantly greater influence in post-war Italian politics than their limited political dimension.

SEE ALSO: Italian Risorgimento; Italian Socialist Party; Rosselli, Carlo (1899–1937); Salvemini, Gaetano (1873–1957); Spanish Revolution; Togliatti, Palmiro (1893–1964)

References and Suggested Readings

- Cooke, P. E. (1998) *The Italian Resistance: An Anthology*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Di Scala, S. M. (1996) *Italian Socialism: Between Politics and History*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Giovana, M. (2005) *Giustizia e Libertà in Italia. Storia di una cospirazione antifascista 1929–1937*. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri.
- Novelli, C. (2000) *Il Partito d'Azione e gli italiani. Moralità, politica e cittadinanza nella storia repubblicana*. Milan: La Nuova Italia.

Glasgow general strike, 1820

Gordon N. Pentland

The Glasgow general strike of 1820 was part of a wider and, ultimately, abortive attempt to initiate a general rising in the south of Scotland and the north of England. Estimates vary, but some 60,000 workers struck in and around Glasgow during the first week of April in response to a proclamation, purportedly the work of the Committee of Organization for Forming a Provisional Government, calling upon "all to desist from their labour . . . and attend wholly to the recovery of their Rights" (Ellis & Mac a'Ghobhainn 1970: 23).

While this was probably the first attempt in Britain to effect a general strike, it seems to have been intended not to paralyze the economy but to release men to pursue their political rights. Large numbers did indeed go on strike from work and the government received numerous reports of "idle" crowds in the streets, but far fewer seem to have responded to the call to arms. The week witnessed a group of radicals from Glasgow defeated and captured at the Battle of Bonnymuir on April 5, further arrests after a contingent of

men from Strathaven marched out armed, before returning home on April 6, and a bloody encounter that left 11 dead, when a crowd rescued radical prisoners who were being escorted to Greenock gaol on April 8. Three men (Andrew Hardie, John Baird, and James Wilson) were executed for their role in the events and 19 others were transported to Botany Bay.

Different explanations have been forwarded for the failure of 1820. It should be noted that the response to the call for a general strike, albeit a localized one, was a marked success: the failure lay in the lack of response to the call to follow this up with a general rising. One interpretation sees the rising as largely the work of agents provocateurs in the first place, who operated at the behest of government to entrap ardent Scottish nationalists (Ellis & Mac a'Ghobhainn 1970). This interpretation has been strongly challenged, and both the nationalist agenda of the strike and the rising and the role of government spies have been called into question (Davidson 2003; Donnelly 1976). The events of 1820 retained a place in popular memory and thereafter have intermittently provided inspiration for political and industrial action by Chartists and Scottish nationalist and labor activists as well as appearing in novels, poems, plays, and paintings.

SEE ALSO: Brandreth, Jeremiah (1790–1817) and the Pentrich Rising; Peterloo Massacre, 1819; Red Scotland and the Scottish Radical Left, 1880–1932

References and Suggested Readings

- Davidson, N. (2003) *Class Consciousness and National Consciousness in the Scottish General Strike of 1820*. In K. Flett & D. Renton (Eds.), *New Approaches to Socialist History*. London: New Clarion Press.
- Donnelly, F. K. (1976) The Scottish Rising of 1820: A Reinterpretation. *Scottish Tradition* 6: 27–37.
- Ellis, P. B. & Mac a'Ghobhainn, S. (1970/1989) *The Scottish Insurrection of 1820*. London: Victor Gollancz.
- Thomis, M. I. & Holt, P. (1977) *Threats of Revolution in Britain 1789–1848*. London: Macmillan.

Glencoe Massacre, 1692

Evan M. Gaughan

The Glencoe Massacre took place on the morning of February 13, 1692. Two companies under Captain Robert Campbell of Glenlyon, whom the

MacDonalds of Glencoe had peaceably billeted for nearly two weeks in the Western Highlands of Scotland, began a rampage against their hosts, leaving over 38 dead. The massacre became symbolic – an act of political terrorism on behalf of the English government and its sympathizers in lowland Scotland. The massacre reveals the complex political relationship between England, lowland Scotland, and highland Scotland in the wake of William III's succession. Two issues were of particular relevance. On the one hand, William's invasion in the so-called "Glorious Revolution" necessitated that Scots choose between James VII and William of Orange. On the other hand, it heightened tension between lowland elites, who tended to favor a closer union with England, and highland clans, who emphasized their independence. When the Edinburgh-based Scottish parliament accepted William as their king, highland Scots revolted. These Jacobites, supporters of James VII, were defeated decisively by late 1691.

The pretext for attacking the MacDonalds was a result of King William's directive requiring all Scottish chieftains to sign an oath of allegiance to the crown by January 1, 1692. Through a series of unfortunate events, chief Alexander MacDonald, also known as Alasdair MacIain, submitted his oath five days late. Though the king's instructions pledged mercy to all who submitted to the oath, even after the deadline, joint secretary of state for Scotland, John Dalrymple, used MacIain's tardiness to further his own political ambitions. A lowland presbyterian, Dalrymple disliked the highland MacDonalds, seeing them as an impediment to unification.

By the time news reached Edinburgh that MacIain had acquiesced, a plot to eradicate the MacDonald clan was already in motion. The plan, engineered by Dalrymple and approved by the king, called for three regiments to "root out" the "damnable sept" at Glencoe by "fire and sword and all manners of hostility" (Roberts 2000: 226–8). Two of the regiments never arrived, claiming setback by bad weather.

Robert Campbell and his soldiers entered the Glencoe valley 12 days before the massacre. The soldiers were welcomed and quartered in MacDonald homes according to highland codes of hospitality. On the morning of February 13, Campbell's troops received orders to begin their annihilation of the clan. Some of the soldiers

defied the command and alerted their host families, giving them time to escape. Still, by the end of the hostilities, 38 lay dead, including chief Alasdair MacIain. Though many MacDonalds found shelter in the hills, an unknown number died from exposure on the mountainside.

Scotland was incensed by the malice of the slaughter, calling it “murder under trust.” When the Scottish parliament met in 1695 it drew up an *Address to the King touching the Murder of the Glencoe Men*. Although the document exonerated the king from any responsibility, it laid blame on Dalrymple, who was consequently dismissed from office.

SEE ALSO: English Revolution, 17th Century; English Revolution, Radical Sects; Glorious Revolution, Britain, 1688

References and Suggested Readings

- Hollis, M. (1982) Dirty Hands. *British Journal of Political Science* 12, 4 (October): 385–98.
- Hopkins, P. (1986) *Glencoe and the End of the Highland War*. Edinburgh: John Donald.
- Linklater, M. (1982) *Massacre: The Story of Glencoe*. London: Collins.
- Macdonald, D. (1965) *Slaughter Under Trust: Glencoe 1692*. London: Robert Hale.
- Roberts, J. (2000) *Clan, King, and Covenant: History of the Highland Clans from the Civil War to the Glencoe Massacre*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Global Day of Action Against Capitalism, June 18 (J18), 1999

Ben Trott

Friday, June 18, 1999 (which became dubbed simply “J18”) was a global day of action against capitalism, primarily in financial and banking centers around the world. It was the opening day of the 25th G8 (Group of Eight, most industrialized nations) summit in Cologne, Germany. Emerging out of a global movement which had been gradually growing in the wings of the world’s stage, and going on to inspire the protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial in Seattle, USA, later that year, J18 belongs to the little-known prehistory of what has since become referred to as the counter-globalization or global justice movement.

Restarting Global History

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the demise of western social democracy, the downturn in trade union militancy worldwide, and the crushing or cooptation of many anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles led Francis Fukuyama (1992) to declare “the end of history.” Fukuyama’s thesis, however, did not ring true for long. On January 1, 1994, several thousand armed rebels, belonging to the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), emerged from their hide-outs in the Lacandon Jungle to seize control of a number of towns in Chiapas, Mexico, on the day the neoliberal North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was due to come into effect.

The inspiration the Zapatistas provided to movements around the world stemmed not only from their hope for a world of “democracy, liberty, justice” (EZLN 1998: 19) at a time in which revolutionary possibility was thought dead, but in the innovative nature of their discourse, practice, and organizational forms. The Zapatistas did not claim that they (or anyone else) had all the answers. They were not seeking to seize state power, but to claim autonomy and dignity for Mexico’s indigenous – and to inspire others to do the same, making possible “a world where many worlds fit” (EZLN 2001). In July 1996 they played host to the First Intergalactic Encuentro (encounter) for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism. At this gathering, 3,000 delegates from social movements around the world met to discuss the economic, political, social, and cultural aspects of life under – and resistance to – neoliberalism; and the means by which a global network of resistance could be built.

The following year a similar number gathered in Spain for the Second Encuentro, inspired by the success of the first. On the back of this event, a three-day meeting followed seeking to establish a more permanent framework for the coordination of action directed against the institutions and structures of neoliberalism. The result was an invitation to the first meeting of People’s Global Action (PGA) Against “Free” Trade and the World Trade Organization (WTO), in the WTO’s own hometown of Geneva, Switzerland, in February 1998. It was here that the G8 summit in Birmingham, UK, and the WTO ministerial in Geneva, both scheduled for May that year, were decided upon to become the first targets for global, coordinated action by PGA.

Both events were regarded as successful. A Call for Action had been issued by London Reclaim the Streets (RTS), who had attended the meeting in Geneva and taken on the role of PGA European Convenors, for a Global Street Party on May 16 as the G8 were set to meet in Birmingham. RTS was already well known for its organizing of huge events, reclaiming often large and busy roads with thousands of people, transforming them into party zones designed to highlight both the ecological impact of cars as well as the means by which private vehicles serve as a way of enclosing public space. Street parties were held in 30 cities around the world. In Birmingham the summit was relocated to a rural location at short notice because of the threat of protest. Six thousand took part in one of the largest RTS events to date as 75,000 others demanded the G8 “drop the debt.” A few days later, in Geneva, riots erupted as the WTO held its second ministerial. At around the same time, 200,000 farmers marched in Hyderabad, India, against the organization, while 10,000 others took to the streets of Manila, Philippines, demanding the cancellation of the WTO treaties its government had signed.

History Returns in the UK

While global networks of resistance had been developing through the Zapatista encuentros, the PGA network, and the first global days of action, a similar process was underway in the UK. A radical ecological direct action movement, within which RTS had played a key role, had been developing throughout the 1990s. Many thousands had taken part in the protests against the new road building program that formed the cornerstone of Margaret Thatcher’s so-called “great car economy.” Many more had taken part in Reclaim the Streets parties. The campaign of solidarity with the Liverpool Dockers (sacked in 1995 for refusing to cross a picket line), led by London RTS, as well as the experience of direct confrontation with the state by those resisting the road building program, had radicalized the movement. By the late 1990s the beginnings of a movement that could call itself “anti-capitalist” could be seen in Britain.

At around the same time as the PGA meeting in Geneva, an invitation was issued by part of the recently disbanded Class War Federation for an event entitled Reclaim Mayday on May 1,

1998, a few weeks before the Global Street Party scheduled to take place around the G8 summit in Birmingham. The event brought together a large number of people from the ecological direct action movement with an older generation of political militants whose background was largely in the anarchist and anti-authoritarian movement of the 1980s. It was partly on the basis of this new cooperation that the mobilization in Birmingham was to be such a success.

The Mobilization Begins

It was from this position of strength, rooted in increased communication and cooperation among groups and movements both in the UK and on a global level, that the ambitious call for an International Day of Protest, Action and Carnival Aimed at the Heart of the Global Economy: The Financial Centers and Banking Districts on 18 June, 1999 was born. In the early summer of 1998 an informal dialogue began between RTS and London Greenpeace (a small, radical environmental group set up in the early 1970s which predates the international NGO of the same name and to whom it was never affiliated). During the 1980s the group had been involved with organizing a series of four Stop the City actions in London’s financial center, designed to highlight its role in war, environmental destruction, and oppression. Out of the discussions, an idea for a similar, but globally coordinated, day of action began to take shape.

That year’s nationwide Earth First! Summer Gathering brought together people from the anti-roads movement, RTS, London Greenpeace, and former members of Class War Federation. Delegates discussed for the first time at this meeting a proposal for the simultaneous occupation and transformation, through carnival (an expansion of the RTS concept), of the world’s financial districts on the opening day of the following year’s G8 summit in Cologne, Germany.

At first, there was some skepticism. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) had detonated a series of bombs inside London’s financial district, the City of London (also known as the Square Mile) in the early 1990s, bombing the Stock Exchange in 1990, the Baltic Exchange in 1992, and setting off a car bomb in Bishopsgate close to the site of the 1992 bomb a little over a year later. As a result, a security and surveillance “ring of steel” was established

around the city, consisting of closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras, police sentry points on all roads running in and out of the area (some of which were armed, which is very unusual in the UK), and a series of chicanes and roadblocks which enabled the area to be sealed off to traffic with ease. The area was regarded as one of the most secure, easy to control, and observed in the world. Nevertheless, confidence and ambition had been gained by the successes and strengthening of the global movement over the previous years. A few weeks after the Earth First! Gathering, a nationwide meeting was held in London to discuss the proposal in more detail. Here, an international call to action was drafted. It was taken to the PGA Continental Convenors meeting in Finland in September 1998, where it was endorsed and circulated around the world.

From this point on, the idea began to snowball. Working groups were set up with responsibility for various tasks: networking, producing publicity, researching the city, and developing ideas for actions. One group began working on a website where news, photos, and video from actions scheduled to take place around the world could be collated. Its conception and software went on to form what became the global Indymedia (www.indymedia.org) network of dozens of websites around the world to distribute news about social movements worldwide, circumventing the mediation of the mainstream media. Meanwhile, local groups were set up around the UK, organizing fundraising events, producing publicity, and planning their own autonomous actions to carry out on the day. In London, Reclaim the Streets started to plan an ambitious Carnival Against Capital to move through the City of London, ending at a secret location.

The Day of Action Draws Closer

The City of London is a unique part of Britain's capital city in terms of having such a large workforce (around 300,000 in 1999) relative to its population (around 7,000). It was therefore decided that the best way to cause disruption to the city would be to try to stop its workers from reaching their places of employment.

In the week preceding J18, and coinciding with a visit by hundreds of mostly Indian farmers taking part in the PGA Inter-Continental Caravan designed to facilitate an exchange between movements in the global South and North, tens of thousands of spoof versions of London's right-

wing local newspaper, the *Evening Standard*, were distributed across the city. With the title *Evading Standards* (mocking what was seen as the poor journalism published in the London paper), it explained the reasoning behind the day of action and the history behind the movements which were calling for it (both in the UK and beyond), highlighted the importance of everyday resistance in anti-capitalist struggles, and encouraged workers to "phone-in sick" and not go to work on June 18.

While trying to encourage absenteeism, the mobilization also started looking at ways of cutting the city off from its workforce through various acts of direct action and civil disobedience. Access points into the city (major roads, bridges, and train and underground stations) were identified and various groups within the now national J18 network took responsibility for disrupting different routes into the city.

June 18, 1999

In London, on the day of action itself, there was relatively minor disruption during the morning rush hour. Several mainline and underground trains were delayed after emergency cords were pulled, and a number of roads (including London Bridge) were partially obstructed for a short time. Banks and offices were occupied in protest at their involvement in the arms industry, and a demonstration was held in front of a McDonald's restaurant. Several arrests were made. From around midday, people started to gather at Liverpool Street Station, a short distance from the Square Mile, for the Carnival against Capital.

Over the preceding months a small group had been working on a strategy for moving thousands of people from Liverpool Street to a secret location. The goal was to maintain confusion among the police, who were keen to prevent disruption to the financial center's smooth running. In accordance with this plan, the crowd was divided into four different groups with around 3,500 people in each. At exactly the same time, one hour after the official meeting time, the groups were led off in different directions by clusters of 10–15 people who knew the secret destination.

The police were surprised by the maneuver and soon lost control. The confusion was exacerbated by the lack of coordination between the City of London Police, who had official jurisdiction in

the city, and the London Metropolitan Police, who had been called in for back-up and had much more experience of crowd control.

By around 14:00, three of the four groups had successfully been led to their final destination in front of the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (Liffe). At the time, Liffe was one the world's three largest futures exchanges. It was chosen as the destination of the Carnival because of both its important function within the global economy and the symbolism involved with its buying and selling of futures (a contract to deliver an agreed commodity for a particular price at a certain time in the future). (The fourth group was absent because it had become embroiled in a fierce battle with the police, triggered by a woman being run over by a speeding police van.) As the crowd arrived, sound-systems, stages, public announcement equipment, and decorations which had been hidden in vehicles parked nearby were unpacked.

As the day drew on, a number of windows of banks and car dealerships were broken and in some cases property inside the buildings was also damaged. Several hundred people took part in the demolition of the glass front to the Liffe building, before an attempt was made to storm the trading floor. Brokers fought with demonstrators, holding them back until riot police were able to clear the building.

By early evening, the police gradually regained control of the area in front of the Liffe, pushing people out of the city and towards Trafalgar Square, where a rally had been called by the Movement Against the Monarchy. By around 21:00, the day's activities were over.

Consequences and the Simultaneous Rise and Fall of a Movement

The day of action was initially considered a momentous victory by many who had taken part. Around 15,000 people had been mobilized; far more than thought possible on a working day. A major police operation had not been able to stop the Carnival reaching its planned destination. Around a dozen new groups had been set up across the UK, developing a network that could prove useful in the future.

The Internet project collating news and reports had worked well, and a surprisingly large num-

ber of actions and events had also taken place around the world. In Nigeria, Port Harcourt, the country's oil capital, was completely shut down in a coordinated protest action. In Pakistan demonstrations demanded, among other things, an end to the country's nuclear testing program. In Mexico demonstrations were held in front of the stock exchange. In South Korea a demonstration was held in the capital, Seoul. A Reclaim the Streets Party was held in Tel Aviv, Israel. The stock exchange was occupied in Madrid, Spain, and stock exchanges blockaded in New York, USA, Amsterdam, Netherlands, and Vancouver, Canada. Further actions were held in Australia, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brazil, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Nepal, Portugal, Senegal, Slovakia, Switzerland, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe. An "electronic blockade" of the Mexican embassy's website was organized in solidarity with the Zapatista rebels, and hackers attempted to break in to the Liffe computers while demonstrators rioted in front of its doors.

In Cologne, Germany, where the G8 summit was getting under way, demonstrations were limited. Around 500 people, including many of the Indian and other farmers participating in the PGA Inter-Continental Caravan, were surrounded by police and prevented from taking part in the actions they had planned. The following day a demonstration took place through the city with around 10,000 participants.

In the UK, however, the period following June 18 was characterized by a downturn in the emergent anti-capitalist movement. The reaction of both the media and the British state was considerable. The tabloid media ran articles focusing on the day's violence (with almost no mention of police brutality, or the running over of a demonstrator which caused the day's first confrontations), creating a political climate in which lengthy custodial sentences could be handed down to those arrested on the day. The City of London set up a website displaying pictures of those suspected of committing crimes in connection with the day and wanted for questioning by the police. Numerous people received prison sentences of up to four and a half years for their actions. The police published a lengthy report on the event and developed a number of new strategies for crowd control which controversially included preventatively surrounding and detaining large sections of crowds on demonstrations and other events. The City of London

Police, Britain's oldest police force, was almost disbanded as a result of its inability to maintain control on the day.

Alongside the increasing state repression over the years which followed, the movement was faced with a number of other challenges. On the one hand, some felt that RTS had started to lose its original ecological focus in favor of the social. Others argued that a radical, transformative politics could not simply focus on organizing occasional spectacular "events," but rather had to develop a more *everyday* political practice, rooted in specific localities and work places. And still others argued that the day of action, by concentrating on finance capital and big business, had failed to understand the nature of its supposed target: capitalism, a particular set of social relations without a "center." Exploitation, they argued, is certainly enabled by finance capital and big business, but they are not its precondition. At the same time, debates around the issue of political militancy and the extent to which movements should be committed to the principle of non-violence, around the role of mass mobilizations and large events in processes of social change, and the centrality which ecological and social struggles should respectively occupy within contemporary social movements, drove a number of wedges between different areas of the movement.

Even so, much of the inspiration for the carnivalesque blockades which famously shut down the opening ceremony of the WTO in Seattle, USA, later that year is attributed to J18. Indeed, some of those who had been involved with organizing the events in London were invited to several events in the US designed to train and inspire those working towards the Seattle protests. Similarly, inspiration was drawn from J18 and the politics and street tactics of Reclaim the Streets by those organizing events around the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank meeting in Prague, Czech Republic, in September 2000 and the Genoa G8 summit in 2001.

The influence of carnival as a form of protest was also formative of the EuroMayDay events which, since 2001, have sought to both highlight the increasingly precarious conditions of life and work under neoliberalism, as well as expose the challenge that this poses to the organizational forms that traditionally claim to represent the interests of those who work. Their

goal has been to highlight the plurality of social subjects involved in production and social reproduction today, as well as to develop new forms of self-representation which celebrate their common struggles. In some ways, the EuroMayDay events can be understood as a reply to the charge of the movement's earlier superficial approach to critiquing and organizing against capitalism, focusing on symbols and institutions rather than contemporary relations of production/reproduction.

June 18, 1999, then, simultaneously marked a high point, followed by a period of steep and steady decline, of the burgeoning anti-capitalist movement in the UK; as well as a partial launch-pad for the rise of the global movement against neoliberalism.

SEE ALSO: Earth First!; EuroMayDay; G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; Global Day of Action Against the IMF and World Bank, Prague, September 26 (S26), 2000; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Grassroots Resistance to Corporate Globalization; Peoples' Global Action Network; Reclaim the Streets; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999; Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Class War Federation (1998) *Class War is Dead! Live the Class War! Class War 73*. Available at www.struggle.ws/last_cw.html (accessed November 19, 2007).
- Do or Die (1999) Friday June 18th, 1999. *Do or Die: Voices from the Ecological Resistance* 8: 1–34.
- EZLN (1996/1998) First Declaration of La Realidad For Humanity and Against Neoliberalism. In *The Zapatistas, Zapatista Encuentro: Documents from the First Intercontinental Encounter for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism*. New York: Seven Stories Press, pp. 11–19.
- EZLN (2001) *Words of the EZLN in Puebla, Puebla*. February 27. Available at www.flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/ezln/2001/ccri/ccri_puebla_feb.html (accessed October 30, 2007).
- Fukuyama, F. (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man*. London: Penguin.
- Klein, N. (2004) Reclaiming the Commons. In T. Mertes (Ed.), *A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?* London: Verso, pp. 219–29.
- Mckay, G. (Ed.) (1998) *DIY Culture: Party and Protest in Nineties Britain*. London: Verso.
- Mentinis, M. (2006) *Zapatistas: The Chiapas Revolt and What it Means for Radical Politics*. London: Pluto Press.
- Notes from Nowhere (2003) *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism*. London: Verso.

SchNEWS (2000) *SchQUALL: SchNEWS and Squall Back to Back – The Best of UK Independent Media in the Mix*. Brighton: Justice?

Wall, D. (1999) *Earth First! and the Anti-Roads Movement: Radical Environmentalism and Comparative Social Movements*. Oxford: Routledge.

Global Day of Action Against the IMF and World Bank, Prague, September 26 (S26), 2000

Radim Hladík and Chelsea Mozen

The protests against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in Prague, Czech Republic, in September 2000 were a pivotal moment in the history of the post-socialist Czech Republic's alter-globalization movement. As an expression of radical politics in an era of relative social peace and political stability, following the so-called Velvet Revolution of 1989, the protests left a deeper imprint on Czech collective memory than have other ad hoc, single issue, or trade union mobilizations. The principal day of protest, September 26, became known as simply S26 and was called for as a Global Day of Action against the IMF and World Bank by the Peoples' Global Action (PGA) network.

The protests in Prague were certainly not the first time international financial institutions had been the object of protest. For over twenty years, demonstrations had been held, primarily in the global South, as a response to the IMF and World Bank's imposition of neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programs. In Prague, criticism focused on the institutions' promotion of a form of economic globalization which involved the opening of markets, privatization, and the cutting of social spending.

Initiative Against Economic Globalization (INPEG)

The first public meeting to discuss holding a protest against the anticipated summit took place in Prague in September 1999. It attracted representatives of anarchist, socialist, and environmental groups and non-governmental organiza-

tions (NGOs), as well as a number of politically active individuals. Among the groups represented were the Czechoslovak Anarchist Federation, Earth First!, Initiative for the Support of EZLN, Socialist Solidarity (International Socialist Tendency), NESEHNUTÍ (Independent Social Ecological Movement), and other Czech groups.

Agreement was reached as to the need for visible protests against the summit, and coordination meetings became regular. The original informal group evolved into a common Platform with the establishment of the Initiative Against Economic Globalization – Prague 2000 (INPEG). The inclusion of “Economic” in the Platform's name was intended to illustrate a desire to unite humanity, while refusing globalization driven by economic interests. Its founding document, entitled “General Position,” argued that economic globalization was not a solution, but instead “a major cause of the serious problems of today's world.” It emphasized that “the desperate condition of today's world is not natural – it is merely a logical consequence of the system in which heightening of the profits of the most rich is the only respected value.”

INPEG's orientation as explicitly anti-capitalist, rejecting economic protectionism as an alternative to neoliberal globalization, led to the disengagement of NESEHNUTÍ, the only well-established NGO participating in the Platform. After doing so, they joined forces with Hnutí Duha (the Czech branch of Friends of the Earth) (FoE) and Central and Eastern European BankWatch. In contrast to INPEG, their strategy focused on seeking a dialogue with the IMF and World Bank, as well as the Czech government, in officially sanctioned forums, rather than street protests.

Czech trade unions also failed to participate in INPEG, not wanting to be associated with radicals. In addition, some believed that the unions were worried that participation in the protests would undermine their collaboration with the Czech Social Democratic Party which was in power at the time. As a result, the involvement of organized labor was restricted to a small number of press releases critical of IMF and World Bank policies towards workers. The absence of the Czech unions was in stark contrast to the heavy participation of US unions in the protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) which had taken place in Seattle, USA, the previous year.

INPEG clearly distanced itself from Czech neo-Nazis, many of whom were also opposed to the forms of globalization the IMF and World Bank were seen as promoting – favoring instead policies of economic protectionism, seen as allowing the Czech Republic to develop a stronger, independent national economy. On September 23, a few days before the summit opened, several dozen neo-Nazis demonstrated against globalization and in defense of Czech national and “racial” identity. Their demonstration was disrupted by left-wing anti-fascist demonstrators.

INPEG, then, was primarily composed of grassroots activists, anarchists, and one Trotskyist organization, Socialist Solidarity. Despite little involvement by many large or established organizations, INPEG became the primary space within which the mobilization took place, and the focal point of coordination for many activists coming from abroad.

Mobilization

Few of those involved with INPEG were able to trace their political history back beyond 1989. The majority had become politically active through their engagement with the emergent anarchist and socialist milieu. Of particular importance for many was a series of Reclaim the Streets parties in 1998 and 1999, which were formative of the Czech alter-globalization movement. Inspired by similar events in the UK and elsewhere, these parties sought to take over major roads, “reclaiming” them from private vehicles and returning for use as common spaces of interaction, debate, celebration, and protest. The first such event coincided with the G8 (Group of Eight most industrialized nations) meeting in Birmingham, UK – alongside several dozen similar events taking place around the world. Three thousand people took part, and the event ended in the destruction of property belonging to multinational corporations. A second Street Party took place on September 18, 1998, and a third on June 5, 1999. Each attracted around 10,000 participants. It is through these series of parties that a debate around the issue of globalization began to be discussed among the public.

Images of these street parties, alongside the disruption of the WTO ministerial in Seattle, were used by the media as a means of focusing on the issues of potential conflict and violence around the upcoming summit, and both sides

were aware of the potential for disorder. An ad hoc NGO, Civic Legal Watch, was formed in order to provide independent observation of the police during street demonstrations. At the same time, the police underwent intensive training and their equipment was modernized. As a result, those organizing the protests felt intimidated and threatened by the apparent militarization of the policing operation around the meeting, resulting in distrust of a number of proposals by President Václav Havel, such as to allow a camp for protesters to be constructed within a disused sports stadium. Indeed, police harassment and intimidation of protesters intensified ahead of the protests with, for example, identity cards being checked at public lectures delivered by IMF and World Bank officials. A climax was reached a few days ahead of the summit when numerous suspected protesters – including an entire train from Italy, in which 1,000 Tute Bianche activists were traveling – were denied entry into the Czech Republic, at least temporarily.

As the protests drew closer, INPEG appealed for international support. In response, a small number of activists, mostly from the UK, Spain, Norway, the United States, and Canada, moved to Prague in the summer of 2000. Three international organizing meetings were held between May and August 2000 to draft calls for action, plan the protests, and arrange the logistics. These meetings were attended by around 60–75 people, largely from Western Europe. The international mobilization largely took place through PGA. An independent media center was established in Prague, largely by international volunteers. The fact that ahead of the summit INPEG became a genuinely international group was picked up on by the Czech media, largely as a means of casting the protests as “illegitimate” – organized by and for an external “other.”

Days of Action

Protest activities were organized from September 22–28. On September 22–23, INPEG held a “Counter-Summit” – a series of lectures and panel discussions involving both grassroots activists and renowned academic figures such as Samir Amin, Walden Bello, and Alex Callinicos. Central and Eastern European BankWatch, Jubilee 2000, and Friends of the Earth held their own forum, A Different Message (*Jiná zpráva*), with

lectures and film screenings from September 24–27.

Parallel to the neo-Nazi demonstration (and the anti-fascist protests organized by INPEG), a number of other events also took place on September 23. Various NGOs and church-based initiatives held a theatrical funeral march, commemorating the deaths of children from malnutrition which result from neoliberal policies. They demanded the cancellation of the debts of poor countries. On September 24, a cultural festival featuring musicians and other performers had been scheduled by INPEG. However, the venue cancelled at the last minute, apparently the result of government pressure to do so.

The main protest event coincided with the opening of the IMF and World Bank summit on September 26 (S26). Final plans for the protest had been formed the previous evening at a meeting of hundreds of activists at the convergence center – the primary meeting point for the coordination of protests. INPEG's original pledge "not to initiate violence" was again agreed upon, along with the suggestion to emulate the success of the anti-WTO protests in Seattle – but in reverse. Whereas delegates had been prevented from reaching the conference center in Seattle by decentralized, coordinated blockades, in Prague the plan was to blockade delegates *inside* their meeting, symbolically giving them time to reflect on their previous activities and dissolve their organizations.

The protests were to begin with a central rally in Prague's Náměstí Míru (Peace Square). From here, one united march would commence, later splitting into different color-coded strands. Each strand would approach the congress center from a different angle. Color codes corresponded roughly to different political tendencies and tactical preferences. The pink march was predominantly socialist in orientation. The yellow was led by Tute Bianche, the Italian network who used helmets, shields, and body-protection beneath white overalls in order to try and push their way through lines of police. The blue march was composed primarily of anarchists, autonomists, and those who defined themselves as anti-authoritarian. The pink and silver march was inspired by the carnivalesque tactics of Reclaim the Streets. Between 10–15,000 people assembled at the rally in Náměstí Míru.

The blockades, however, proved rather ineffective. The pink march went back on its agree-

ment to try and blockade a number of streets around the congress center, leaving several roads unblocked. Instead, it followed the yellow march to the most visible (and least difficult to block) point: a large bridge leading directly into the congress center. The pink and silver route was made up of a samba band and costumed dancers, as well as a group carrying a reinforced banner at the front of the demonstration bloc to try to push their way through lines of police. After an initial, failed attempt, however, the police launched a fierce attack on the demonstrators, some of whom fought back with sticks and stones, while others sought to de-escalate the situation. The blue march also failed to reach its intended destination. After attempting to break through lines of police, a violent confrontation ensued which lasted for several hours before the police finally regained control. In retreat, crowds of protesters attacked symbols of economic globalization such as banks and multinational corporations. While the blockades, as such, failed in their stated goal, the intensity of the conflict which ensued and the difficulty the police had in controlling the situation led to delegates being escorted out of the congress center by metro to a safer location.

As part of the Peoples' Global Day of Action, collectives from around forty countries reported holding actions and demonstrations in solidarity with the protests in Prague and against the IMF and World Bank on S26. Many of these actions took place in the Global South, as well as the United States, Australia, and a number of Eastern European countries.

After S26

The days following S26 in Prague were also originally planned to be filled with protest. However, the police prevented this from happening by arresting 859 people. Of those, 330 came from outside the Czech Republic. Most international activists left the country on the morning of September 27, to the frustration of Czech activists left to bear the brunt of the fall out. Only a few hundred people took part in the demonstration planned for September 27, a legal demonstration prevented by the police.

Stories were published in the media comparing the protests to a war. The hitherto ambiguous public opinion turned strongly against the protesters. Later in the day, the IMF and World

Bank declared the meeting had been concluded ahead of schedule. Many activists read this as a sign that the protests had been successful in shutting down the meeting.

By September 28, protest activity had shifted its focus from the IMF and World Bank to highlighting police brutality and showing solidarity with those who had been imprisoned. As arrestees were released, reports were gathered about cruel treatment in custody. Physical violence, humiliation, and psychological abuse were claimed to be commonplace within the police stations. Subsequent investigations found evidence of such unlawful behavior, but specific perpetrators were not identified.

Aftermath

In the period immediately following the protests, many Czech activists evaluated the events with ambivalence. Although the mobilization had seemingly successfully disrupted the conference proceedings, the police brutality and the markedly adverse public opinion toward the protests could not be overlooked. Repression of activists in Prague continued after the protests, including the eviction of the squatted Ladronka social center, an established and important focal point of activity for the alter-globalization movement in the Czech Republic.

Over the months that followed, the Czech alter-globalization movement began to fracture. Grassroots activists and anarchists became increasingly unwilling to work with the socialist organizations who had failed to carry out the agreed plan on S26 and the NGOs they regarded as having been too uncritical of the IMF and World Bank, as well as the Czech government, in order to get a seat at the negotiating table. Many NGOs also became even more unwilling to be associated with radicals than had been the case throughout the 1990s, largely as a result of the scenes of violence around the congress center picked up on by the media.

Several international activists also voiced criticism of the way in which INPEG had organized its media work, using spokespeople seen as having little mandate to represent the views of all those who had gathered to take part in the protests. Further criticism was also made of the way in which INPEG dealt with media claims that protesters had initiated violence. These criticisms intensified already ongoing discussions

within the alter-globalization movement about militancy and the destruction of private property as a form of political protest, as well as the role of the mainstream media and the means by which the movement should relate to it, if at all.

Despite the fracture created by the protests, within the Czech area of the European alter-globalization movement in particular, the Prague protests nevertheless represented an important moment in the growth and development of the movement. Not only was the summit regarded as having been successfully disrupted, but new connections and networks had been built between political activists in Eastern and Western Europe and beyond. Moreover, the European wing of the alter-globalization movement had held its first large counter-summit event since the WTO protests in Seattle the previous year. The event went on to inspire later mobilizations, against the European Union summit in Gothenburg, Sweden, and the G8 summit in Genoa, Italy, the following summer – as well as against a NATO conference in Prague itself in November 2002. While INPEG itself ceased to exist soon after the summit, its existence helped establish a far better networked radical milieu that remains politically active.

SEE ALSO: Disobbedienti/Tute Bianche; G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; Global Day of Action Against Capitalism, June 18 (J18), 1999; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Grassroots Resistance to Corporate Globalization; Havel, Václav (b. 1936); Indymedia Global Justice Campaign, 2000s; Peoples' Global Action Network; Reclaim the Streets; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Bello, W., Bullard, N., Chomthongdi, J. C., Adams, C., & Guttal, S. (2000) *Prague 2000: Why We Need to Decommision the IMF and the World Bank*. Focus on the Global South, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.
- Caffentzis, G. & Federici, S. (2001) A Brief History of Resistance to Structural Adjustment. In K. Danaher (Ed.), *Democratizing the Global Economy*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
- Kagarlitsky, B. (2004) Prague 2000: The People's Battle. In E. Yuen et al. (Eds.), *Confronting Capitalism: Dispatches from a Global Movement*. New York: Soft Skull Press, pp. 86–101.
- Notes from Nowhere (2003) Global Day of Action: S26 – Balls to the IMF. In Notes from Nowhere (Eds.), *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anti-Capitalism*. London: Verso, pp. 286–9.

Patkar, M. (2003) A River Comes to Prague. In Notes from Nowhere (Eds.), *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anti-Capitalism*. London: Verso, pp. 296–7.

Global justice movement and resistance

Ben Trott

The protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial in Seattle, 1999, brought the growing global movement against neoliberalism into mainstream consciousness worldwide. It has since manifested itself in numerous mobilizations against political and economic summits, from Quebec, to Prague, Cancun and Hong Kong; given birth to the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre; and taken to the streets against the global “war on terror.” Having contributed to the rupturing of the neoliberal project at the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, the movement for a different kind of globalization (“counter-globalization movement” hereafter) is also presented by a number of serious challenges.

The End of History

In the summer of 1989, the year in which the Berlin Wall fell, further accelerating the collapse of what had often been dubbed “really existing socialism,” political economist Francis Fukuyama famously declared “the end of history.” In his essay, which he later extended into a widely debated book, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Fukuyama proclaimed “an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.” Western liberal democracy, he argued, was able to present itself as “the final form of human government” on the basis of “the total exhaustion of viable systemic alternatives” (Fukuyama 1992: xi). Despite the enormous criticism that Fukuyama’s book drew, he nevertheless seemed to capture the sentiment of the moment perfectly. The earlier proclamation of Margaret Thatcher, British prime minister 1979–90, that “There is no alternative” to neoliberal globalization appeared to ring true.

Fukuyama was writing in a period that saw the implementation of the policies of *Glasnost* and

Perestroika in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev (general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985–91). *Glasnost* was a series of political reforms related to the freedom of the press, information, and dissent, and *Perestroika* an economic reform package. These changes were followed by the declaration of independence from the Soviet Union by a large number of states, and ultimately the USSR’s dissolution in December 1991. Elsewhere, the entire workers’ movement had suffered a symbolic defeat with the crushing of the 1984–5 British miners’ strike, a central battlefield in the struggle against neoliberal restructuring. The election of Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan (US president 1981–9) in the US was taken to symbolize the end of western social democracy.

Many of its proponents finally turned toward what they described as a “Third Way,” displaying a new openness towards the market. Anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles in the so-called “Third World” had either long since been defeated, or else achieved victory often only to be seen by many as having betrayed their original principles once forced to face up to the challenges of political and economic survival on the world stage. And finally, the mostly youth-based sub- and countercultural movements which had blossomed in Western Europe, North America, and beyond in the 1960s and 1970s had entered a steady but certain demise.

History’s Inevitable Return

However, in the first few hours of 1994, emerging from the perhaps unlikely location of the Lacandon Jungle in Chiapas, Mexico, a group of rebels catapulted themselves onto the world stage, declaring war on *neoliberalismo*. History was back.

Having recovered from the 1980 debt crisis, the Mexican economy had gone from strength to strength, becoming a poster-child of neoliberalism by the early 1990s. The economy had been opened up to the world market and a process of privatizing state-owned industries embarked upon. In 1992, Carlos Salinas (president of Mexico 1988–94) amended Article 27 of the Constitution, meaning that previously communally held land was now available for sale on the free market. In doing so, he paved the way for Mexico’s signing up to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada.

At this point, Mexico was one of the countries with the greatest income disparity in the world. In 1992 almost 40 percent of the rural population were living below the poverty line. NAFTA – which would remove many barriers to trade, open up new markets in Mexico (especially in the realm of intellectual property), and end the subsidizing of Mexican agriculture – was seen by many as likely to have catastrophic consequences for the rural poor.

On the day on which the agreement was due to come into effect, a group of mostly indigenous rebels, calling themselves the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN – *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*) emerged from their rainforest base to seize control of seven cities in Chiapas. They called for the millions of Mexico's dispossessed to join them, "so that we will not die of hunger" (EZLN 1993). The EZLN's spectacularly successful military operation, the elegance of their prose, and the apparent novelty of their discourse – which talked more about dignity and autonomy than the seizure of state power – found resonance throughout Mexico and beyond. On January 10, 1994 over 100,000 people demonstrated in Mexico City against the federal army's operations against the Zapatistas. Two days later, a ceasefire was declared.

Despite this, and the fact that the EZLN have engaged in neither offensive nor defensive military operations since these initial days of the conflict, a low intensity war against the Zapatistas continues to this day. Even in the face of severe brutality, the solutions they have sought have been consistently civil rather than military. Practically, their philosophy of "walking asking questions" (*preguntando caminamos*) – the sign of a new openness and uncertainty in an age in which "revolutionary ideology" (be it Marxist, anarchist, or socialist) was no longer able to claim to have all the answers – has involved constantly attempting to connect their own, indigenous struggle to those of others, in Mexico and around the world. The first, and perhaps most historically important attempt, was the First Intergalactic Encuentro (Encounter) for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism, attended by over 3,000 delegates from 44 different countries from July 27 to August 3, 1996. The delegates gathered to discuss politics, economics, identity, and culture in a conference center built by Zapatista communities deep inside the conflict zone.

A year later, in the summer of 1997, thousands converged again for the second Zapatista Encuentro, this time spread over four locations in the Spanish State. Like the first gathering, it sought to provide a forum for dialogue among the world's left-wing social movements. A three-day meeting followed, focusing on the means by which the dialogue and exchange of information and inspiration could continue. And importantly, those who met attempted to devise a means by which this could be translated into forms of common action which would mutually reinforce day-to-day struggles against neoliberalism worldwide.

Peoples' Global Action

The result of the meeting was the issuing of an invitation for the world's social movements to attend the founding conference of Peoples' Global Action (PGA) in Geneva, Switzerland, in February 1998. Here, after days of discussion between hundreds of delegates from over seventy different countries, a basis for cooperation was established in the form of a Manifesto and – more importantly – a set of Hallmarks which would define the network. Essentially, the Hallmarks articulated a commitment to "horizontal" (non-hierarchical organization) and decentralization, the development of structures which allowed for and promoted autonomy, to recognizing and rejecting a multiplicity of structures and mechanisms of domination, and to direct action and civil disobedience as a means of resisting neoliberalism.

The Peoples' Global Action network came into being at a time when discussions around globalization were dominating academic debate and defining popular discourse more generally. NAFTA and a number of other regional trade agreements had recently come into effect. The controversial (and eventually abandoned) Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was a hot topic of discussion. The 50-year-old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had just, in 1995, been formalized into a permanent institution: the World Trade Organization (WTO), a multilateral body responsible for devising and implementing international trade rules. While the network agreed to embrace a wide range of struggles, it particularly sought to establish cooperation and coordination around resistance to the WTO and other neoliberal institutions.

In this spirit, the 1998 G8 summit (Group of Eight most industrialized nations), to be held in Birmingham, UK, in May later that year, and the second ministerial of the WTO, to be held in Geneva shortly after, were to be the first focal points for coordinated action by PGA.

Partly as a result of the call for action by PGA, hundreds of thousands of peasants and workers took to the streets of Hyderabad, India, on May 2, calling for the country's withdrawal from the WTO. Two weeks later, in Manila in the Philippines, 10,000 fishermen and women called for the cancellation of treaties signed at the WTO and Asian Pacific Economic Conference (APEC). On May 16, inspired by the British-based Reclaim the Streets (RTS) movement which had brought together social and ecological struggles to temporarily take back city streets from enclosure by cars and return them to commons, a Global Street Party took place in 30 cities around the world on the opening day of the G8 summit. In Birmingham, 75,000 people took part in an action, organized by Jubilee 2000, to surround what would have been the summit location, calling for debt cancellation as 6,000 others joined an RTS party, transforming the city's streets into a carnival. The summit was relocated at short notice from the city center to a rural location, for fear of disruption by protest. In Geneva two days later, over 10,000 demonstrated against the WTO ministerial and three days of rioting followed.

In the summer of 1998, in large part as a response to the success of these early coordinated actions, a call was issued by London Reclaim the Streets – who at this time was the first European Convenor of PGA – for a global day of action in the world's business and finance centers on June 18, 1999 (J18), the opening day of the following year's G8 summit to be held in Cologne, Germany. The call was later endorsed by all of the PGA continental convenors at a meeting in Finland in September 1998.

On June 18 itself, over 15,000 people took over London's financial center for a Carnival Against Capital. Protesters forced their way into the lobby of the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (Liffe) and almost made it up the escalators and on to the trading floor, but were evicted by riot police shortly before doing so. In Port Harcourt, Nigeria, a similar number of people succeeded in closing down the country's oil capital for the day. The

stock exchange was invaded in Madrid, Spain, and blockaded in Amsterdam, Netherlands, Vancouver, Canada, and New York, USA. Other actions took place in over forty countries, including Brazil, Israel, Zimbabwe, and Nepal. A central website was used on the day to collate video, audio, and text reports about actions taking place around the world. The concept, and the software used, was later partly developed into what became the Indymedia (www.indymedia.org) network of independent news websites reporting on social movements and struggles around the world.

Around six weeks later, from August 23–26, 1999, the Second PGA Conference took place outside Bangalore, India. It was here that PGA took the decision to support and take part in the protests around the third ministerial of the WTO, scheduled to take place in Seattle, from November 30 to December 3, 1999, preparations for which were well under way by the North American-based Direct Action Network (DAN) and others. November 30 was set as a Global Day of Action.

Seattle: A Movement's "Coming Out" Party

The protests in Seattle were more successful than anyone could have predicted. While 75,000 took part in an official, mostly trade union organized demonstration away from the city center, 10,000 others joined early morning mass blockades of the ministerial, preventing the opening ceremony from taking place. Neither US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky nor US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright were able to make it out of their hotel rooms. Simultaneous actions were held in over thirty countries around the world.

The breadth of the spectrum taking part in the blockades – which ran from trade unionists to environmentalists, nuns to queer activists, college and high school students to pensioners – came as a surprise to many commentators. But the protests which occurred on the streets of Seattle were in fact just one manifestation of a new era, or "cycle," of struggles which had its roots in a thousand other ways and means of struggling with which people had been experimenting around the world for years. The Zapatista struggle in Chiapas is an obvious but pertinent example of this. Texas-based academic Harry Cleaver (1998) commented:

“In a very real sense, the Zapatista movement emerged as a tentative and transitory solution to precisely the problem which confronts us everywhere: how to link up a diverse array of linguistically and culturally distinct peoples and their struggles, despite and beyond those distinctions, how to weave a variety of struggles into one struggle that never loses its multiplicity.” And for many, Seattle – this taking of common action, despite and beyond difference – marked the beginning of something very new.

History and Struggle

History, however, is obviously not quite as neat as the above chronology would seem to imply. To paraphrase Marx and Engels in *The Communist Manifesto* (1888), history is nothing other than the product of those struggles which make it. In this sense, neither history nor struggle can simply “end” or “return” as we perhaps implied above. It is always there.

Capitalism, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, had been shaken, globally, by a series of ferocious struggles. In France in 1968 over 10 million workers went on strike, joining forces with rebellious students. The so-called Italian Hot Autumn of 1969 overflowed into a decade-long movement known as *autonomia*. Uprisings occurred in numerous US cities, from Newark and Detroit to Los Angeles. Resistance to the US military in Vietnam grew alongside a whole range of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles worldwide, many of which received both political and material support by radicals in the world’s “core.” The ability of capitalism to continue to reproduce itself was seriously called into question. It is *as a response* to these struggles that neoliberalism, and a number of other transformations within the organization of capitalist production, can – at least in part – be understood.

Neoliberalism is generally thought of as being born alongside the Thatcher and Reagan administrations, although Harvey (2005) has shown that Pinochet’s Chile was in fact the first time neoliberal economic policy was systematically implemented. The policies were adopted by successive administrations (such as those of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton in the UK and US, respectively), as well as other governments elsewhere. Neoliberalism was also often “imposed” on countries, primarily in the global South, via IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment

Policies (SAPs) generally attached as conditionalities to loans.

In general, neoliberalism has meant the privatization of state-owned industries, the cutting back of any existing welfare state, and the curbing of trade union power. Barriers of entry into markets have been opposed. Often this has meant either opposition to treaties and regulations designed to protect the environment or labor rights, or speaking out in favor of creating new markets in fields such as intellectual property. On an international level, market access has been ensured via a series of bi- and multilateral trade agreements and the creation of organizations such as the WTO, able to impose sanctions on those engaging in forms of “protectionism.” Processes of neoliberalization have tended to coincide with a number of transformations in social production.

The period running from the 1930s to the 1970s is often referred to as the Fordist era. The name derives from Henry Ford of Ford Motors, the primary innovator of mass commodity production, often based around the conveyor belt, for mass markets. Fordism is generally associated with the Taylorist organization of workers around F. W. Taylor’s principles of “scientific management.” Relatively unskilled workers perform simple, repetitive tasks, with the idea being that the more often one repeats a task, the quicker one is able to do it. Fordism/Taylorism was dominant in a political climate of Keynesianism, where the state intervened relatively freely (at least in comparison to neoliberalism) in the economy and where the welfare state was still – in many places at least – reasonably strong.

However, the bringing together of large numbers of workers within one plant or factory, upon which production in this period was largely premised, provided favorable conditions in which workers were able to organize. Workers were easily able to identify the common condition in which they found themselves, and communication was relatively easy, considering many workers were spending upwards of 40 hours a week standing next to each other on assembly lines. A widespread refusal of work (strikes, sabotage, and absenteeism) spread like wildfire towards the end of the 1960s. In Italy in 1969 over 7 million hours of work were lost due to unrest, in the engineering sector alone (Katsiaficas 1997: 20). Stanley Aronowitz (1991: 214) explained of 1967 in the US, “The number of strikes as a whole, as well as rank-and-file

rejections of proposed union settlements with employers, and wildcat actions has exceeded that in any similar period in the modern era.” In much of the global North, workers’ confidence to struggle was often boosted by the safety net of the welfare state.

In response to these struggles at the point of production, mass Fordist/Taylorist production processes tended to be gradually replaced by smaller scale, more decentralized, networked and flexible forms of production, along the “just-in-time” model promoted by Toyota, Benetton, and others. In this system, goods are delivered to the market shortly before they are expected to be purchased. This allowed firms not only to respond more easily to fluctuations in demand and changing market conditions, but also to reduce the number of workers congregated in one place.

Conditions of work in what has been called post-Fordism are generally considered more insecure or “precarious,” with long-term employment contracts increasingly uncommon. Such conditions have presented the traditional organizational forms of the workers’ movements, such as trade unions, with enormous challenges. On the level of regulation, neoliberalism both attacked the ability of unions to act through legislative reforms, and increased the mobility of capital through restricting international barriers to market entry, enabling it to flee those areas where workers are able to organize. Neoliberalism and the move towards post-Fordism, then, simultaneously involved capital’s own restructuring, while depriving existing resistance movements of their power to act and influence.

From the End of Fordism to “the End of History” and Beyond

In the period of neoliberalism’s ascendance and the initial period of post-Fordism, there was of course not a complete absence of struggles. So called “single issue” campaigns (against nuclear weapons, or for the environment), or movements based on “identity politics” (which sought to further the interests of a given group on the basis of a presumed common identity, related for example to ethnicity, gender, sexuality, or physical disability) thrived. While many of these movements grew to considerable size, and some won substantial victories, they generally failed (or refused) to move beyond their

respective niches and connect with the struggles of others. Difference was privileged over commonality. It is worth noting here, however, that many of the characteristics later identified with the counter-globalization movement (networked organization, a rejection of leadership and traditional representational forms) were very often defining characteristics of these movements.

Some commentators, such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their book *Multitude* (2004) (the sequel to *Empire* (2000), which was tremendously influential in the counter-globalization movement), have described the way in which horizontal, networked forms of struggle (such as the first Palestinian Intifada which began in 1987, and the South African anti-apartheid struggles of the late 1970s and 1980s) began to emerge parallel to existing vertical and centralized structures (like the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the African National Congress (ANC)) during the move from Fordism to post-Fordism.

The Zapatistas present an even clearer example of this process of transformation. They remain an army, with a centralized and hierarchical command structure, yet they consistently undermine their own hierarchy. For example, by claiming to “govern obeying,” frequently engaging in lengthy processes of consultation and rotating leadership positions. The forms of organization experimented with and developed by the Zapatistas have been said to represent a broader tendency. So much so, in fact, that the RAND Corporation, which grew out of the US military following World War II, has described them as the “prototype” for what it calls “social netwar” in the twenty-first century (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 1996: 73).

The move away from hierarchical, centralized forms towards dispersed, decentered, horizontal networks continued apace following the Zapatista uprising in 1994, alongside not only the rise of post-Fordist processes of production but also a tendency towards the networked form of global governance characteristic of the neoliberal era (involving complex webs of national governments, international organizations and institutions, large non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and others). This tendency was observable in the movement which erupted around French Prime Minister Alain Juppé’s (1995–7) proposals for welfare reforms in France in 1995; the protests surrounding the Asian Pacific Economic

Conference (APEC) in Manila, Philippines, in 1996; in the so-called IMF riots which erupted throughout the 1990s in response to the imposition of neoliberal policies; in the demonstrations around the European Union summit in Amsterdam, Netherlands, in 1997; and the rise of anti-corporate activism in the United States and beyond throughout the 1990s.

It is for this reason that Naomi Klein (author of *No Logo* (2000), another book influential in the early counter-globalization movement) was able to describe Seattle as the movement's "coming out party" (Klein 2004: 219). The street protests which took much of the world by surprise were only the latest – albeit perhaps the most "developed" – manifestation of a series of movements and struggles developing an organizational form based around decentralization and autonomy; and where, unlike previous eras of struggle, the composition of the movement was not defined by sameness or driven by a desire for unity, but the establishing of *commonality despite difference*.

In an article which has become influential within the European wing of the counter-globalization movement, Rodrigo Nunes (2005) built on the empirical work of network theorists such as Manuel Castells (2000) and sought to relate their research to ideas of "horizontality" and "openness" within the movement. Nunes argues that while these can in a way be understood as "ethics" of the movement, seeking to address previous problems related to democracy or power imbalances within social movements, the prevalence of the network form today needs to be understood as *having been made possible* by a more general "becoming-hegemonic" of the network form throughout social life: from industrial production processes, to telecommunications, and military organizations.

The Beginning of the End of Neoliberalism?

The WTO ministerial in Seattle, however, did not only mark the breaking of the surface of public consciousness of a movement which had been growing in the wings of the world stage. It also marked a turning point in the dominance of the politics of neoliberalism. Partly encouraged by the scale and intensity of the protests on the streets outside, a coalition of countries from the global South formed a temporary alliance, refusing to

back down to the US delegation and others' intransigence on demands for reform – for example, in relation to the speed at which certain liberalization programs were to be implemented, and the means by which decisions were made within the organization. The negotiations, which had been designed to provide the basis for another round of trade talks, faltered. The first very overt cracks in the hegemony of the neoliberal project had begun to emerge.

Almost every round of trade talks which have followed (perhaps with the exception of the fourth WTO ministerial in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, where conditions for protest were somewhat unfavorable) have been surrounded by scenes of protest on the streets, and a lack of consensus within the conference hall.

The 2003 WTO ministerial in Cancun, Mexico, for example, saw the formation of the G21 (Group of 21) nations, led by South Africa, China, and India. They broke off negotiations after countries from the global North declined to reciprocate the opening of barriers in the South, while fierce battles raged on the streets outside. In 2005, at the sixth WTO ministerial in Hong Kong, again no consensus was found and thousands demonstrated against the WTO, which was beginning to be declared "dead" as an institution.

The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations have faced a similar destiny. After negotiations led to the proposal of a watered down agreement ("FTAA-Lite") at the talks in Florida, in 2003, the November 2005 round of talks in Mar del Plata, Argentina, coincided with huge street protests – before finally collapsing.

Further indication of the beginning of the end of neoliberal hegemony was to be found in the series of presidential electoral victories in Latin America won on what was – at least superficially – an anti-neoliberal ticket: Chavez in Venezuela, first Nestor and then Cristina Kirchner in Argentina, "Lula" in Brazil, Vasquez in Uruguay, Morales in Bolivia, Ortega in Nicaragua, and Correa in Ecuador. A similar, although somewhat less wide-ranging or radical tendency can be observed in Europe, such as Zapatero's Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) victory over Aznar's ruling Partido Popular in the 2004 Spanish general election. The "No" vote in the referendum on the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands in

May and June of 2005, respectively, can also be understood as a recognition of the bankruptcy of the neoliberal project – as well as itself dealing it a further blow. In Britain a similar result was expected. The referendum was cancelled.

At the same time as the neoliberal project seemed to be coming apart at the seams, the forces of opposition were gaining strength. One of the important means by which they went about doing so was through the development, first, of the World Social Forum (WSF), and later of a series of continental, regional, national, and local social fora worldwide. It is within such fora – some of which have involved upwards of 150,000 participants and the first of which was held in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in January 2001, parallel to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland – that a relatively open space has been created for discussion, debate, and an exchange of proposals for action against neoliberalism and the domination of the world by capital. The fora have provided spaces for movements to discuss issues such as militarism, racism, ecology, gender, indigenous rights, workers' struggles, food sovereignty, democracy, and sexuality.

Challenges to the Movement

Nevertheless, despite a number of real or perceived gains won by the counter-globalization movement and blows struck against neoliberalism, the movement has also found itself confronted by a number of serious challenges.

First Challenge: Global War

From July 20–22, 2001, the G8 met in Genoa, Italy, around a month after three protesters had been shot (one of whom critically) during an international demonstration against the European Union summit in Gothenberg, Sweden. On the opening day of the summit, upwards of 200,000 took to the streets for rallies, demonstrations, blockades, attempts to enter the security Red Zone where the conference was being held, and militant actions. The demonstrators were subjected to brutal and indiscriminate attack by the police. According to Amnesty International (AI), demonstrators, people clearly identified as doctors or nurses, and journalists reporting on the protests all became targets. The Carabinieri (military police) later admitted firing 15 shots of live ammunition, and 23-year-old protester Carlo Giuliani was shot dead.

The following day, July 21, the Diaz School, being used for accommodation by the Genoa Social Forum (the main organizers of the protests), was raided by a special police unit. AI later reported that of the 93 people being detained at the school, 62 were injured and 20 were carried out of the building on stretchers, two of them unconscious. Of the hundreds arrested, many reported mistreatment and brutality in custody.

Police brutality had often been deployed against counter-globalization movement activists, yet Genoa marked a new level in the intensity and indiscriminate nature of this violence – in the global North, at least. Voices within the movement, such as that of George Caffentzis (2001), described the policing of Genoa as the waging of war on its European wing.

Less than two months later, on September 11, 2001, two hijacked airplanes were flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and a further plane into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the US Defense Department. The response of the governing Republican administration was to announce the onset of what President George W. Bush (2001–8) described as an open-ended global “war on terror.” The war has not only involved the US-led military invasion of Afghanistan (in October 2001) and Iraq (in March 2003), but also the introduction of new counterterrorist legislation in the US and elsewhere (much of which has been criticized for curtailing civil liberties) and the adoption of a number of new resolutions by the United Nations (UN) said to be designed to restrict terrorist activity. The truly global nature of the “war on terror” and its implications have since become apparent through the range of nation-states who have joined the US-led operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere; those who have lent this effort various levels of support; the international agencies (from the UN to NATO) who have become embroiled in the conflicts or “reconstruction projects”; the scope of the so-called “fields of operation”; and the proliferation of regionally based, supposedly related operations which have taken place around the world, from the UK and Spain to Pakistan and Indonesia. From late 2001 onwards, the issue of war became a key focus for the counter-globalization movement. On February 15, 2003, millions took part in demonstrations around the world against the forthcoming invasion of Iraq.

The onset of war has posed a number of challenges to the movement. How do those struggling to build movement strength and challenge the dominant order continue to do so without becoming embroiled in cycles of violence and counter-violence which, ultimately, can only lead to the movement's military defeat? How should the movement understand the current global war? And how can it be resisted?

One of the responses to the deployment of massive state violence in Genoa has been the developing of new, innovative forms of disobedience around international summits which aim to establish a common political practice (avoiding the emergence of divisions within the movement) designed to demonstrate its continued power to act and intervene. One example of this was the Block G8 coalition in 2007. It was made up of a broad range of movements from the radical left and anti-fascists, over parts of the counter-globalization network ATTAC and student organizations, through to NGOs, church groups, and trade union youth organizations. It succeeded in blockading two of three main roads leading to the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany. The coalition stated in advance that, even if provoked, they would not allow themselves to become embroiled in an escalation with the police, yet they would do all that they could to make sure they occupied and remained in the roads leading to the summit, using various methods of civil disobedience.

Discussions around the nature of the "war on terror" have been a topic of heated debate within the movement. Many have cast the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as essentially imperialist projects, with the control of oil and other resources in the region the primary motivating factor. Others have emphasized what they understand as the new role of war in contemporary societies; namely, the production, control, and management of social life in general. In particular, the shift from "defense" to "security" which came about in US policy in 2002 (where military strategy no longer aims simply to defend and maintain the status quo, but to shape and form society both within and beyond the national boundaries) is taken as one example of this (Bush 2002).

Those who have emphasized the imperialist nature of US-led interventionism since 2001, such as Britain's Trotskyist Socialist Workers' Party (SWP), have tended to adopt a reasonably

traditional "anti-imperialist" strategy, lending political support to those resisting the perceived imperialist project "at the sharp end." Meanwhile, those who have argued the global war to be a more dispersed project of social control and management have tended to emphasize the multitudinous ways in which this can be resisted and rejected the privileging of particular struggles in particular places. For this second, seemingly more nuanced, approach, however, the question as to how to effectively "wage war on war" remains largely unanswered.

Second Challenge: The Temptation of a Global Keynesianism

A further significant development within the global political economy over the last few years, which also poses the movement with huge challenges, is the partial appropriation of its discourse by certain factions within capital. Perhaps the clearest – although by no means the only – example of this occurred around the 2005 G8 summit, held at Gleneagles in Scotland. Here, a new constellation of actors came together which included the governing British Labour Party, the Make Poverty History (MPH) coalition of British NGOs set up to lobby the summit, and Live8 – a campaign led by pop stars Bob Geldof and Bono, culminating in simultaneous mega-concerts around the world ahead of the summit supporting MPH's policy proposals.

This perhaps unlikely axis, acting largely in cooperation with one another, professed to want to influence both the G8 summit and world politics in general to achieve a number of goals which had long been demanded by the counter-globalization movement itself, namely: the reduction of poverty, increased investment in medical and other provisions, and greater access to education for the poor in the global South. Some dismissed this as a mere smoke-screen, creating the illusion of concern when the G8, which was being hosted by Britain, intended nothing other than business as usual. Others, however, recognized the strategy as an attempt to genuinely reduce world poverty: albeit with the stabilization of a global political economy headed towards crisis as its ultimate goal.

One of the primary ideological influences on MPH and Live8, with not inconsiderable influence within the British Foreign Office around this time, was Jeffrey Sachs. Shortly before the summit, Sachs published a book, *The End of*

Poverty (2005), in which as an economic advisor he takes on the role of a twenty-first century John Maynard Keynes. Against the neoliberal grain, his argument was that avoiding crisis and creating growth required short-term political intervention in the economy. He proposed investment in education, health, and nutrition as a means of lifting up to a billion people out of poverty and into the global labor market within 20 years. Like Keynes before him, Sachs similarly refused to get drawn into debate as to the extent to which waged-laboring practices may be rooted in exploitation, or how the nature of capitalist social relations could be the ultimate cause of the very poverty he claimed to want to root out (Caffentzis 2005).

Of course, there had always been currents within the movement with a Keynesian orientation, such as those represented by former Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions to Aid Citizens (ATTAC) vice president Susan George (2007) and British *Guardian* newspaper columnist George Monbiot (who incidentally was himself critical of Live8 and Make Poverty History). However, the adoption of a neo-Keynesian discourse by the British government and others around this time served to seriously disorient the movement.

In particular, radicals within the counter-globalization movement were presented with a twofold challenge. On the one hand, it needed to deploy a critique which went beyond calling into question a neoliberal politics which even the G8 itself no longer seemed to be (quite so overtly) deploying, rejecting more fully capitalism as a social system based on exploitation and alienation. And on the other, it needed to avoid isolation – the buying off of the most “moderate” end of the movement by offering them a (temporary) seat at the negotiating table, while its “radical fringe” continued to be subjected to repression. It was a challenge to which the movement, at this particular time, was largely unable to rise.

Moving Beyond “Unity in Diversity”

If the question raised at Gleneagles was how the diversity of the movement could be maintained, this was expanded on and reformulated in both the theory and practice of a range of movement actors. The task became one of creating a movement in which no one single element was able to

establish a hegemony or remake all the others in its own image. It was also important for the movement’s component parts to move beyond merely existing indifferently alongside one another. Through open and honest debate and – importantly – the developing of new political practices which did not remain the exclusive terrain of a particular niche, there was a possibility of not only maintaining diversity, but rising to the challenge of developing organizational forms that establish “commons” (both what the constituent parts have *in common*, as well as the production of *the commons* as shared social wealth) despite difference.

Certain steps were taken in this direction with the Block G8 coalition around the 2007 G8 summit, described above. *La otra campaña* (The Other Campaign), initiated by the Zapatistas with their Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, moved in this direction as well. They are no longer simply discussing with non-indigenous others such as students, workers, and the unemployed, but becoming directly involved in collaborative action with a range of social actors right across Mexico (Marcos 2006).

The EuroMayDay movement, in a similar way, has set as its goal not only attempting to open up the realm of social production and reproduction as a concrete sphere of struggle to be addressed by those involved in the cycle of struggles from Seattle to Genoa (and beyond), but to do so in a way which highlights the plurality of social subjects this involves today. Since a few thousand people took part in the first EuroMayDay Parade in Milan, Italy, on May 1, 2001, intended to highlight the “precarious” and insecure conditions of life and work under neoliberalism, the event has grown to involve upwards of 100,000 people. It has spread as an annual event occurring simultaneously in numerous cities across Europe and beyond. The goal has been precisely the establishing of that which those who participate – from temporary and part-time workers, over migrants and refugees, to students, environmentalists, and queer activists – share with one another: namely, their role as producers (as opposed to appropriators) of the social wealth that capitalism deprives them of everyday.

There are, of course, serious limitations to *La otra campaña* and the EuroMayDay movement, as there were with the Block G8 coalition. And indeed, many of these problems are connected to an inability to fully move beyond the identity

oriented and ideologically loaded politics they each claim to be trying to leave behind. What all of them and other similar projects indicate, however, is that despite a relatively low level of institutionalization (compared, for example, to trade union movements or projects headed by political parties in previous eras), the movements have been able to accumulate knowledge and develop a collective intelligence. In particular, it has been able to both stay attuned to developments taking place at the level of (economic) production and (political) regulation and the challenges and opportunities that this poses; as well as learn from both the victories and defeats of its own young history.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Apartheid Movement, South Africa; Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954); Deleuze, Gilles (1925–1995), Guattari, Félix (1930–1992) and the Global Justice Movement; Disobbedienti/Tute Bianche; EuroMayDay; G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; G8 Protests, Gleneagles, 2005; G8 Protests, Heiligendamm, June 2007; Global Day of Action Against Capitalism, June 18 (J18), 1999; Grassroots Resistance to Corporate Globalization; Indymedia Global Justice Campaign, 2000s; Italy, from the New Left to the Great Depression (1962–1981); May 1968 French Uprisings; Multitude; Negri, Antonio (b. 1933); Ortega, Daniel (b. 1945); Peoples' Global Action Network; Reclaim the Streets; Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula da (b. 1945); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; World Social Forums; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Cancun, 2003; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Hong Kong, 2005; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Quebec City, 2001; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999; Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Aronowitz, S. (1991) *False Promises: The Shaping of American Working Class Consciousness*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D. (1996) *The Advent of Netwar*. New York: RAND Corporation.
- Amnesty International (2001) Italy: Genoa G8 Policing Operation of July 2001. Summary of Concerns. Available at [www.web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/EUR300122001ENGLISH/\\$File/EUR3001201.pdf](http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/EUR300122001ENGLISH/$File/EUR3001201.pdf) (accessed August 20, 2007).
- Bush, G. W. (2002) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed August 27, 2005).
- Caffentzis, G. (2001) *Genova and the Antiglobalization Movement*. Jamaica Plain, MA: Midnight Notes.
- Caffentzis, G. (2005) Dr. Sachs, Live8, and Neoliberalism's "Plan B." In D. Harvie et al. (Eds.), *Shut Them Down! The G8, Gleneagles 2005 and the Movement of Movements*. New York: Autonomedia, pp. 51–68.
- Castells, M. (2000) *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. 1: The Rise of the Network Society*, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Cleaver, H. (1998) The Zapatistas and the International Circulation of Struggles: Suggested Lessons and Problems Raised. Available at www.eco.utexas.edu/~hmcleave/lessons.html (accessed August 13, 2007).
- EZLN (1993) First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle: Today We Say, Enough is Enough! Available at www.ezln.org/documentos/1994/199312xx.en.htm (accessed October 29, 2007).
- Fukuyama, F. (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man*. London: Penguin.
- George, S. (2007) Alternative Finances. *Le Monde Diplomatique* (English edition), January.
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2004) *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. New York: Penguin.
- Harvey, D. (2005) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Katsiaficas, G. (1997) Italian Autonomia. In *The Subversion of Politics: European Autonomous Social Movements and the Decolonization of Everyday Life*. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, pp. 18–58.
- Klein, N. (2004) Reclaiming the Commons. In T. Mertes (Ed.), *A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?* London: Verso, pp. 219–29.
- Marcos, Subcomandante (2006) *The Other Campaign: The Zapatista Call for Change from Below*. San Francisco: City Lights Books.
- Notes from Nowhere (2003) *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism*. London: Verso.
- Nunes, R. (2005) Nothing is What Democracy Looks Like: Openness, Horizontality and the Movement of Movements. In D. Harvie et al. (Eds.), *Shut Them Down!: The G8, Gleneagles 2005 and the Movement of Movements*. New York: Autonomedia, pp. 299–319.
- Sachs, J. (2005) *The End of Poverty: How We Can Make it Happen in Our Lifetime*. New York: Penguin.
- Sen, J. et al. (Eds.) (2007) *World Social Forum: Challenging Empires*, 2nd ed. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

Glorious Revolution, Britain, 1688

Steven Pincus

England's Glorious Revolution of 1688–9 holds a special place in our understanding of the

modern world and the revolutions that had a hand in shaping it. For the better part of three centuries scholars and public intellectuals identified England's Revolution of 1688–9 as a defining moment in England's exceptional history. Political philosophers have associated it with the origins of liberalism. Sociologists have contrasted it with the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions. Historians have pointed to the revolution as confirming the unusual nature of the English state. Scholars of literature and culture highlight the Revolution of 1688–9 as an important moment in defining English common sense and moderation. All of these interpretations derive their power from a deeply held and widely repeated narrative of England's Revolution of 1688–9. Unfortunately, that narrative is wrong. Replacing that historical narrative with a new one will necessarily force us to revise many of the basic historical, political, moral, and sociological categories we use to make sense of the modern world. The old narrative emphasized the Revolution of 1688–9 as a great moment in which the English *defended* their unique way of life. Recent scholarship suggests instead that the English revolutionaries *created* a new kind of modern state. It was that new state that has proved so influential in shaping the modern world.

Men and women all over the English-speaking world once knew what happened in England's Revolution of 1688–9. In 1685 the Catholic King James II inherited the crown of England. In 1689 the English people agreed to replace him with Protestants – King William III and Queen Mary II. In the intervening years, James II gradually and myopically alienated the moderate and sensible English people. He did this in a series of well-known missteps. In late 1685 he overreacted to the romantic but hopeless rebellion of his nephew, the Protestant Duke of Monmouth, by judicially murdering hundreds of humble inhabitants of the English West Country in the Bloody Assizes. Determined to improve the social and political status of his Catholic co-religionists, James then ran roughshod over English law. He insisted on his right to defy parliamentary statute and awarded Roman Catholics military and naval commissions. In 1687 he used his newly formed and illegal Ecclesiastical Commission to force England's Protestant universities to accept Roman Catholic fellows. When the fellows of Magdalen College Oxford resisted their king's demands, he had the dons stripped

of their fellowships, turning the institution into a Catholic seminary.

According to this once well-known narrative, after James II had failed to persuade the House of Commons or the House of Lords to repeal England's laws against Roman Catholicism, he decided to emasculate Parliament. He first asserted his right to nullify the Test Acts and Penal Laws. These parliamentary statutes – requiring, in the case of the Test Acts, that all political or military officeholders take the sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England, and in the case of the Penal Laws punishing those who officiated at or attended non-Church of England services – had successfully insulated the English from continental Catholic practices. Then, James determined to have his royal fiat ratified by a Parliament packed with men whom he knew would do his bidding. When, in June 1688, seven Bishops of the Church of England defied James II by refusing to have his Declaration of Indulgence, emasculating the Penal Laws and Test Acts, read from England's pulpits on the grounds of its illegality, James had the seven men dragged into court for a show trial. That even a carefully picked English jury acquitted the bishops demonstrated the limits to which the English were willing to go in support of their king. Soon after the trial, the English invited the Dutchman William III Prince of Orange to England to vindicate their religious and political liberty.

The English people enthusiastically welcomed William upon his arrival in the West of England in 1688. James's army quickly melted away after a series of spectacular defections, including that of the future Duke of Marlborough. James himself, preceded by his wife and newborn son, fled to France. The English people, in what was thought to have been a remarkable moment of political unanimity, agreed to replace James with William and Mary in February 1689. The English justified the crowning of the new monarchs with the publication of the Declaration of Right, detailing the ways that James II had violated English law, thereby insisting on the limited power of English kings. In the traditional account of the Glorious Revolution, the English people, led by their natural leaders in the two Houses of Parliament, changed the English polity in the slightest of ways in 1688–9. They slightly altered the succession, they made it illegal for a Catholic ever to inherit the throne,

and they passed the Toleration Act, allowing Protestant Nonconformists to worship freely. There were, to be sure, some significant unintended consequences of this bloodless revolution. But these outcomes were to be understood less as a direct consequence of these events than as the natural outgrowth of the English national character – a character that the Catholicizing Stuart monarchs had done much to pervert.

This was the story that every English school-child, and many North American ones, used to know. This was the story that the great Victorian historian Thomas Babington Macaulay laid out in his magisterial *History of England*, first published in the middle of the nineteenth century. That *History* was an immediate and runaway best-seller, and has deservedly been deeply influential ever since. Macaulay told his story in beautiful and accessible prose. He based his account on exhaustive research.

Macaulay's thesis became the classic statement of the Whig interpretation of the Revolution of 1688–9. It had a number of distinctive facets. First, the revolution was unrevolutionary. Unlike other subsequent revolutions, England's revolution was bloodless, consensual, aristocratic, and above all sensible. The English had no desire to transform their polity, their society or their culture. Instead, they worried that James II had intended to do just that. Second, the revolution was Protestant. James II had tried to reinstitute Catholicism in England. The revolution insured that England would remain a Protestant polity. Third, the revolution demonstrated the fundamentally exceptional nature of English national character. Continental Europeans vacillated between the wild extremes of republican and popular government on the one hand and tyrannical royal absolutism on the other. The English, by contrast, were committed to limited monarchy, allowing just the right amount of tempered popular liberty. Just as the English church was a sensible middle way between the extremes of Roman Catholicism and radical Protestant sectarianism, so the English polity, by maintaining its ancient constitution, was sensible and moderate. In this context the English remained committed to their hierarchical social structure precisely because it did not impose unbridgeable gaps between the aristocracy and the people. Fourth, there could have been no social grievances undergirding the revolution of 1688–9 because English society had changed little in the period

prior to James II's flight. It was only once English property rights were secured by the revolution, only once absolutism was no longer possible in England, that the English economy could truly flourish.

Recent scholarship challenges every element of this established account. England's Revolution of 1688–9 can now be understood as the first modern revolution. The English experience in the late seventeenth century was not exceptional, but in fact typical (if precocious) of states experiencing modern revolutions. The Revolution of 1688–9 is important not because it reaffirmed the exceptional English national character, but because it was a landmark moment in the emergence of the modern state.

England in the later seventeenth century was rapidly becoming a modern society. Its economy was booming. Its towns were growing and growing more comfortable. Its trade was expanding. These developments made it possible for English statesmen to conceive of a more active role for the English government. But social and economic change did not make the Revolution of 1688–9 inevitable. James II, deeply influenced by the particular brand of Catholicism he practiced and by the successful political model of his cousin, Louis XIV of France, sought to develop a modern absolutist state. James and his supporters created a centralizing bureaucratic state, a professional standing army, and a world-class navy. At the same time, James fashioned a modern Catholic polity. James, like his cousin Louis XIV, wanted Catholic subjects but not a papal overlord. Instead, James insisted on absolute sovereignty within his own dominion, while at the same time seeking to Catholicize his Protestant country. James successfully promoted the spread of Catholic apologetic literature, the proliferation of Catholic schools and colleges, and the opening of Catholic churches. No one living through the 1680s in England could have failed to appreciate the new prominence of Catholicism in English everyday life. James and his advisors appreciated that his modern state needed an expanding set of resources to support his more interventionist state. They quickly concluded that a centralized overseas territorial empire, with bases in India, North America, and the West Indies, was an essential prop. James marshaled newly available resources, and devised plans for a vastly increased empire, to create a modern Catholic state.

James's opponents were, by and large, revolutionaries, not reactionaries. They appreciated that only a modernized English state could compete in contemporary Europe. Unlike James, however, the revolutionaries looked to the Dutch Republic rather than to the French monarchy for political inspiration. They, too, wanted a state that could support a powerful army and a first-class navy. They, too, imagined that such a state would have to be centralized and interventionist. But, unlike James and his advisors, the revolutionaries imagined that England would be most powerful if it encouraged political participation rather than absolutism, if it were religiously tolerant rather than Catholicizing, and if it were devoted to promoting English manufactures rather than a landed empire. The revolutionaries understood full well that these political preferences put them at ideological loggerheads with Louis XIV's modern Catholic monarchy. The revolutionaries were therefore fully committed to fighting an all-out war against France, not only to protect the British Isles against a potential French-backed Jacobite restoration, but also to ensure that there would be European markets available to English manufactures and that European liberty would be preserved against French-style absolutism.

James II and his opponents did not only advocate radically different modernizing programs, they also were able to deploy a modern arsenal of political tools. James had succeeded in raising, maintaining, and deploying an efficient and disciplined army. He was in the process of molding most corporations throughout England and Wales into loyal instruments of local politics. James used the press and various political institutions to spread his regime's values and silence alternative viewpoints. James's regime may look brief and fragile in retrospect, but from the perspective of the later seventeenth century he had created a powerful edifice. It was precisely because James had been able to create such a powerful state that many of James's opponents realized that it could only be resisted with violence and that only a revolutionary transformation could prevent a future English monarch from recreating his modern absolutist state. Those who overthrew James II in 1688 and shaped the new regime in the following decade were necessarily revolutionaries.

Though we have come to view the Glorious Revolution as bloodless, aristocratic, and con-

sensual, the actual event was none of these things. The Revolution of 1688–9 was, of course, less bloody than the violent revolutions of the twentieth century, but the English endured a scale of violence against property and persons similar to that of the French Revolution of the end of the eighteenth century. Englishmen and women throughout the country threatened one another, destroyed each other's property, and killed and maimed one another throughout the revolutionary period. Englishmen and women, from London to Newcastle, from Plymouth to Norwich, experienced violence or threats of violence, or lived in terrifying fear of violence. This was not a tame event. Nor was it a staid negotiation conducted by elites. Men and women of all social categories took to the streets, marched in arms on England's byways and highways, and donated huge amounts of money – some in very small quantities – to support the revolutionary cause. When the members of the House of Lords tried calmly to settle the succession issue after James II had fled the country, an angry crowd numbering in the tens of thousands cut short the nobles' deliberations and forced their hands. Given the power, efficiency, and ideological cohesion of James II's new regime, it was not surprising that many supported their king with great enthusiasm even in 1688 and beyond. Since many of the revolutionaries sought to replace James II's French-style modernization program with one based on a Dutch model, it was also predictable that many others would support the undoing of James II's new state edifice while doing everything they could to prevent the creation of a Williamite alternative. The English throughout the 1680s, 1690s, and thereafter were politically and ideologically divided. There was no moment of English cohesion against an un-English king. There was no period in the late seventeenth century in which the sensible people of England collaborated to rid themselves against an irrational monarch. The Revolution of 1688–9 was, like all other revolutions, violent, popular, and divisive.

The English in the later seventeenth century forged the first modern revolution. This revolution had long-term causes and long-term consequences. The English could not have transformed their state and society in the ways in which they did in the 1680s and 1690s had the events of the previous century – especially those of the crisis of the 1640s and 1650s – not

unleashed a series of ideological debates that informed and transformed conceptions of state, religion, and society. English politicians, whether supporters of James II or of William and Mary, could not have transformed England's state institutions had the English economy not diverged from the late seventeenth-century European pattern of recession and retrenchment. Because there were long-term causes of the Glorious Revolution, the consequences of that revolution were not necessarily unintended. The creation of the Bank of England, war against France, and religious toleration were all explicit goals of many of the revolutionaries. Precisely because the debates over these issues had long pedigrees, it would be wrong to understand 1688 or 1689 as a fundamental break in English history. The debates over these issues continued, albeit modified and reshaped by new institutional realities. Early Modern England did not come to an end in 1688, nor did Modern England begin then. It would, however, be fair to say that the character of English state-society relations was fundamentally transformed.

The revolutionaries created a new kind of English state after 1689. They rejected the modern, bureaucratic absolutist state model developed by Louis XIV in France. But they did not reject the state. Instead, the revolutionaries created a state that was intrusive in different ways. Their state sought to transform England from an agrarian into a manufacturing society, oversaw the massive military buildup that was necessary to fight a war against the greatest military power that Europe had ever seen, and sought to promote a religiously tolerant society. John Locke, often described as one of the earliest and most influential liberal thinkers, was one of these revolutionaries. If the Glorious Revolution was a critical moment in the development of modern liberalism, that liberalism was not antagonistic to the state. The liberalism spawned in 1688–9 was revolutionary and interventionist rather than moderate and anti-statist.

The Glorious Revolution was not the triumph of a group of modernizers over defenders of traditional society. Instead, the revolution pitted two groups of modernizers against one another. Both sides tried, against long odds, to appeal for the hearts and minds of the reactionaries. This was a pattern typical of all modern revolutions. Revolutionary situations, in the vast majority of cases, have been created when the

regime in power decides, for whatever reason, that it needs to modernize. In so doing, the regime extends the tendrils of the state deeper and more extensively into society than they had ever gone before, necessarily generating resentment. At the same time, by announcing a break with the past, the regime has lowered the bar for opposition movements. Potential revolutionaries no longer need to persuade their fellow subjects to break with traditional and trusted ways of life. They merely need to persuade them that they have a superior model for change. The regime in power can no longer rely on the habitual loyalty of elites. The revolutionaries of late seventeenth-century England set the model for this now-typical political pattern.

SEE ALSO: Britain, Renaissance-Era Conflict; English Revolution, 17th Century; Locke, John (1632–1704)

References and Suggested Readings

- Harris, T. (2008) *Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685–1720*. New York: Penguin.
- Pincus, S. (2006) *England's Glorious Revolution: A Brief History with Documents*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Vallance, E. (2007) *The Glorious Revolution: 1688 – Britain's Fight for Liberty*. New York: Pegasus Books.

Godwin, William (1756–1836)

Marco de Waard

William Godwin's works of philosophy, history, and fiction were instrumental in the formation of modern anarchist thought. Writing in Britain in the aftermath of the French Revolution, and in a climate of hardening reaction, he developed a critique of government and a utopian philosophy of justice which made social and moral progress dependent on the increase of philosophical understanding and the free, unshackled exercise of private judgment.

Godwin was brought up in the English tradition of religious dissent. In his early teens he was the pupil of an independent minister whose hyper-rationalistic "Sandemanian" doctrines in theology reinforced the gloom and anguish he had imbibed in his Calvinist youth. From 1773 to 1778 he received a rigorous philosophical training at

a dissenting academy in Hoxton, where he prepared for the ministry. Godwin failed to secure a post as minister, however, and from 1782 a reading of Helvétius, Holbach, and Rousseau radicalized his thought. Over the next ten years he held a variety of religious views, ultimately becoming an atheist. Importantly, the *philosophes* also redirected his attention from theological to political concerns, teaching him that political solutions can be found for “ills which he had hitherto considered endemic in human nature” (Marshall 1984).

The French Revolution incited Godwin to write a work of political philosophy that was published as *An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* in February 1793. Initially, his goal was to replace the environmental determinism of Montesquieu with a theory of political and psychological determination, and to examine how governments could help virtue and morality develop. As his manuscript grew, however, Godwin became convinced that government itself “by its very nature counteracts the improvement of individual mind” and that the perfect society would render government superfluous. The utopian individualism which he then developed – aimed at realizing an ideal of moral self-direction in society through the optimization of private judgment – was original in its context. It provided a utilitarian alternative to Helvétius, whose assumption of self-interested behavior Godwin rejected in favor of a theory of rational “benevolence.” It also provided a radical alternative to Thomas Paine, whose belief in natural rights Godwin did not share.

Godwin associated with many advocates of reform. In *Cursory Strictures on the Charge delivered by Lord Chief Justice Eyre to the Grand Jury* (1794) he defended English Jacobins of the London Corresponding Society who had been charged with high treason. Yet his distrust of political associations soon placed him at the head of an anti-revolutionary faction among English radicals, and in subsequent editions of *Political Justice* (1795, 1798), as well as shorter philosophical essays (e.g., the volume *The Enquirer*, 1797), his cautious gradualism became more pronounced. Godwin propagated reform through education and enlightenment rather than political action and agitation. In line with his educationism he produced a spate of novels, children’s books, and works of history which explored the affections on which virtue is based but also the

pathological states induced by a corrupt society. This prolific output notwithstanding, Godwin’s reputation declined sharply after 1800. Continued biographical interest has been generated, however, by his affair resulting in marriage to Mary Wollstonecraft (1796–7) and his relations with the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley, husband to his daughter Mary.

Although, formally speaking, *Political Justice* is a work of political philosophy, it is underpinned by original – albeit unsystematic – propositions in moral philosophy and ethics. In his metaphysical assumptions Godwin was a Lockean sensationist of a necessitarian cast. He was also an “intellectualist” who believed that ideas have greater agency than physical stimuli, and that ultimately mind will achieve control over matter. His premise that there are no innate differences between people at birth meant that all inequalities could be analyzed as the result of social arrangements. Godwin’s critique of inequality and interpersonal dependence compares well to Rousseau’s in the positive conception of freedom underlying it, but as Crowder (1991) points out, Godwin was far more optimistic about humanity’s capacity for recovering free and authentic forms of living. Belief in perfectibility sustained his thought. If in potential everyone is rational and capable of benevolent intentions, Godwin believed, reason would lead the way out of the predicament of modern culture, if only the social and political constraints upon it would be abolished.

Godwin’s ethics were sanctioned by criteria of utility. Much has been made of his advocacy of impartiality in relations, illustrated by his famous “fire case.” If facing the choice between rescuing the archbishop Fénelon from a burning house or a servant who is also one’s parent, the choice, Godwin argued, should be for the former: to respect domestic affections in this case would amount to a failure of reason to grasp that Fénelon’s survival would better contribute to producing a greater balance of good over evil in the world. Yet if Godwin subtly combined “act” and “rule” utilitarianism (Clark 1977), some of his central tenets – that virtue is essential to happiness, that people are social beings whose individuality places them in need of autonomy – were never assimilated within a utilitarian system. In recent years, analyses of Godwin’s utilitarianism have therefore been supplemented by readings which see his theory

of private judgment as a secularization of the Dissenting and Calvinist traditions of private conscience (Philp 1986).

In Godwin's political theory the central question is which arrangements are most conducive to the increase of rationality, benevolent dispositions, and happiness. Criticizing all man-made laws as arbitrary and oppressive, and government as essentially coercive, he proclaimed the desirability of a total "euthanasia of government." Godwin distinguished strictly between government and society, however, and some of the functions of political arrangements could in his view be transferred to decentralized, simplified societal forms. The ideal form was the parish community or voluntary federation, in which individuals could be self-sufficient with a minimum of cooperation and dependence. As long as reason did not reign supreme, justice would be administered by small, non-professional juries. A permanent regulating function was assigned to public opinion, which would function by means of social censorship and social sanctioning among equals, the only form of "punishment" which Godwin believed was rational and just. The resulting anarchic community would achieve the highest form of order.

In terms of a theory of revolution and protest, Godwin's philosophy is restricted by the fact that in his view the possibilities for reform and change rest almost exclusively on the intellectual and moral improvement that can be achieved by individuals. His distrust of all forms of cooperation and association – which even extended to orchestras – left little space for political action, and his educationalism and trust in the gradual diffusion of truth by enlightened opinion have been criticized as restricted or even elitist. Characteristically, while in the editions of *Political Justice* of 1795 and 1798 Godwin's anarchism became more consistent, he also grew more conservative and suspicious of sudden change. In 1811 he reiterated that he was "an enemy to revolutions" and looked "to the understanding alone for all real & solid improvements in the structure of human society" (Marshall 1984).

Put alongside Godwin's philosophical writings, the cultural impact of his literary work was vast. His first mature novel of six, *Things as They Are, or The Adventures of Caleb Williams* (1794), gave his anti-authoritarianism a very wide dissemination. Its psychological plot, demonstrating how

society creates the very crimes it punishes, reads like an early exercise in the analysis of hegemonic discourses. Godwin's historical writings have rarely received due attention. From his early *History of the Internal Affairs of the United Provinces* (1787), to his later *History of the Commonwealth of England* (4 vols., 1824–8), Godwin was more appreciative of republicanism and political revolt as historiographer than he was as theorist, an appreciation that was based on his recognition of virtuous characters and not on constitutional or legalist considerations (Morrow 1991).

Godwin's work remains relevant to the traditions of philosophical anarchism, non-revolutionary socialism, and modern liberalism. Although he welcomed technology, his propagation of parish communities may have set the pattern for the opposition to industry and machines of a following generation (Luddites). His influence extended to the Chartists, the Federalists, and American abolitionists, and his unorthodox utilitarianism, enriched by a notion of positive liberty and by concern with the quality of life, anticipated John Stuart Mill. Godwin's work was acclaimed in nineteenth-century France and Russia, where his treatment of property and conception of voluntary communism were taken up by anarchists like Proudhon and Kropotkin.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Calvin, John (1509–1564); Chartists; English Revolution, 17th Century; Enlightenment, France, 18th Century; Luddite Riots in Nottingham; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778); Utopian Communities, United States; Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–1797)

References and Suggested Readings

- Clark, J. P. (1977) *The Philosophical Anarchism of William Godwin*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Crowder, G. (1991) *Classical Anarchism: The Political Thought of Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Godwin, W. (1993) *Political and Philosophical Writings of William Godwin*, 7 vols. Gen. ed. M. Philp. London: Pickering.
- Marshall, P. H. (1984) *William Godwin*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Morrow, J. (1991) Republicanism and Public Virtue: William Godwin's History of the Commonwealth of England. *Historical Journal* 34 (3): 645–64.
- Philp, M. (1986) *Godwin's Political Justice*. London: Duckworth.

Goldman, Emma (1869–1940)

Heidi M. Rimke

Emma Goldman, an anarcho-feminist intellectual, activist, writer, organizer, and public speaker, is arguably the most famous, or perhaps infamous, anarchist in the history of North America. She spent a lifetime agitating for universal principles such as: an end to war, nationalism, authoritarianism, imperialism, and gender inequalities; social justice for all working people; reproductive freedom; the abolition of capitalism; and freedom of spiritual, political, intellectual, and sexual expression – including polyamory or free love. Admirers called her “Rebel Woman” and “the modern Joan of Arc,” while the press and her enemies mockingly named her “Red Emma,” “High Priestess of Anarchy,” or the “Anarchist Queen”; her resistance was so formidable to authorities that she was described by J. Edgar Hoover as “the most dangerous woman in the world.” From approximately the age of 20, Goldman dedicated her life to an unrelenting campaign of political agitation for social revolution, becoming a pivotal figure in the history of political philosophy. She faced lifelong criminalization, expulsion, public humiliation, and social scorn as a result of her controversial convictions and activities.

Goldman was born in a Jewish Orthodox family to Taube Bienowitch and Abraham Goldman on June 27, 1869 in Kaunas, Russia (now Kovno, Lithuania), the youngest of three daughters. She endured a harsh childhood, and her father forced her to work when she wanted to attend school as a teenager. Shortly after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881, her family moved to St. Petersburg, where the Jewish community suffered a wave of pogroms. Although her father prohibited her from pursuing formal education on the grounds that girls only needed to know how to cook and be a good wife, she was an avid reader and became an astute observer of the social and political world, particularly its oppressive effects on class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and politics.

Goldman and her step-sister Helena immigrated to Rochester, New York, in 1886, where she worked in a clothing factory and married Jacob Kershner, a fellow worker. The marriage

lasted less than one year. While Goldman already possessed a revolutionary consciousness, it was the horror of the Haymarket events that inspired and moved her to anarchism. The blatant injustice of the 1886 trial and state execution of the Haymarket anarchists profoundly stirred Goldman and from that day forward defined her entire life course, which she tirelessly devoted to advancing the revolutionary cause. Her goal of human emancipation was predicated on overthrowing the capitalist, patriarchal, and hierarchical structures of society that she viewed as the root of all human suffering.

In 1889 Goldman moved to New York City, where she met Alexander Berkman and Johann Most, amongst other prominent radicals, decided to join the anarchist movement, and began delivering public lectures. In 1892, inspired by Most’s theory of *attentat* or propaganda by the deed, Berkman and Goldman planned to assassinate Henry Clay Frick in retaliation for his role in the death of the Homestead strikers by Pinkerton armed guards. Without Goldman’s knowledge or presence, Berkman shot and wounded Frick. He was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to 14 years in Western Penitentiary. Goldman’s defense of Berkman gained her public notoriety as well as prominence in the anarchist movement. Goldman became a marked woman and her public speeches were regularly disrupted by the authorities. In 1893, she was arrested for encouraging the unemployed to take food “by force” at a demonstration. Goldman was sentenced to ten months in Blackwell’s Island Penitentiary, where she became a prison nurse. In 1895, she traveled to Vienna, Austria, to study nursing. Shortly thereafter, while in London, she met renowned anarchists Errico Malatesta and her political mentor, Peter Kropotkin. In November of 1899 she met and began a relationship with the anarchist Hippolyte Havel and went to France to help organize the International Anarchist Congress.

Goldman’s anarchism was inextricably intertwined with her feminism, which differed sharply from the first-wave women’s movement. She rejected the suffragist’s goal of securing the vote as well as their growing efforts to criminalize prostitution. The women’s movement often supported laws that hurt working-class women’s interests. Goldman criticized those feminists who treated prostitutes as criminals rather than as victims of an unjust society built upon

economic exploitation. While organizing women into trade unions and working as a nurse and midwife among immigrant workers on the Lower East Side of New York City in the 1890s, Goldman became convinced that birth control was fundamental to women's sexual and economic freedom and smuggled contraceptive devices into the United States. Despite her woman-centered activism, Goldman refused to identify herself as a feminist and denounced the women's movement of her time, which she saw as bourgeois and exclusive of the real sufferers of society – the working class. Goldman rejected the suffragists' argument that the vote would make women better Christians, wives, and citizens, on the grounds that such aspirations would fortify rather than eradicate women's oppression.

Goldman maintained that women would achieve equality not through the ballot or by the moral purification of society but by taking direct action against the sources of their collective misery, oppression, and exploitation – the church, the family and marriage, and the state. Accordingly, women needed to resist the “internal tyrants” of tradition by assuming control of their bodies and sexuality. The goal was for women to become self-defined and self-directing agents rather than blindly conforming to social dictates governed by traditional gender rules that benefited one sex to the disadvantage of the other. Overthrowing institutions and practices of oppression, not choosing one's oppressor through the ballot, was the only means of breaking free from the social, political, and economic chains shackling womankind to a social system based on sexual and economic exploitation.

In 1901, Theodore Roosevelt and the United States Congress passed the Anarchist Exclusion Act in response to the assassination of President William McKinley, marking the first time a US policy explicitly set out to interrogate the political views of prospective immigrants. When Leon Czolgosz, a self-proclaimed anarchist, committed the assassination, Goldman was blamed and forced underground along with many other radicals in a massive anti-anarchist campaign. In 1903, she became involved with the Free Speech League in New York City in response to the passage of the draconian anti-anarchist laws. She began the publication of the radical monthly, *Mother Earth*, in 1906 and wrote essays on anarchism, politics, prisons, labor issues, drama, atheism, militarism, freedom of speech, socialism, homo-

sexuality, and feminism; some were later published as a collection in *Anarchism and Other Essays* (1910).

By 1915, Goldman was working with Margaret Sanger in a mass movement for birth control, lecturing frequently on “the right of the child not to be born.” Demanding that women's bodies be freed from the coercion of government and tradition, she urged women to go on a “birth strike” to achieve equality between the sexes. Goldman was arrested in February 1916 and charged with violation of the Comstock Law, which prohibited the dissemination of “obscene, lewd, or lascivious articles,” including information relating to contraception. She spent two weeks in prison.

As the United States government appeared to be heading for war in 1916, Goldman used the magazine as a medium to oppose the military agenda. The federal government crushed the anti-war movement in what became known as the Palmer raids, orchestrated by the Woodrow Wilson administration in an anti-radical, pro-patriotism crusade. The passage of the Espionage and Sedition Acts of 1917 and 1918 resulted in extensive prison terms for those who protested the United States entry into World War I. The *Mother Earth* headquarters was among the first to be raided in the crackdown and the magazine was outlawed along with other anti-war literature and actions.

Goldman co-facilitated the founding of the No-Conscription League in May 1917 soon after the United States joined World War I. The following month, Goldman was arrested and charged with conspiring to obstruct the draft. She was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison. After an unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court, Goldman entered the Missouri State Penitentiary and was released on September 27, 1919, when she was immediately rearrested on the order of J. Edgar Hoover. He persuaded the courts to deny Goldman citizenship, thus making her vulnerable to deportation under the 1918 Alien Act, which allowed for the expulsion of any immigrant identified as anarchist. One of numerous cases prosecuted under a web of wartime legislation designed to throttle resistance, she and Berkman were deported alongside 247 other radical immigrants to Soviet Russia, on December 21, 1919, aboard the *SS Buford*.

The advantage to deportation was directly experiencing the Russian Revolution. Goldman

was prepared to overlook the First International's conflict with anarchism in order to support the Bolsheviks. However, in 1919 as Goldman and Berkman traveled throughout the country, they were revolted by the growing bureaucracy, political persecution, and forced labor they witnessed throughout Soviet Russia. Goldman was shocked by the brutal authoritarianism of the Bolshevik regime, its ruthless repression of anarchists, and its disregard for individual freedom and liberation. Nonetheless, she continued to defend the revolution as distinct from the Bolshevik regime itself. She was able to sustain this theoretical position until 1921, when libertarian sailors revolted at Kronstadt by siding with striking workers against the Bolshevik government. When Trotsky and the Red Army killed 600 sailors and arrested 2,000 more, she realized Soviet Russia was anything but the revolutionary society she had envisioned and so tirelessly worked toward her entire life.

The repression of the Kronstadt rebellion was intolerable to Goldman, and in a state of disenchantment she and Berkman left Soviet Russia in 1921 and moved to Britain, where she was essentially alone on the left in condemning the Bolsheviks. Her critical analysis was unpopular amongst radicals because most still wanted to believe that the Russian Revolution was a cause for celebration, not critique. To avoid deportation in 1926, Goldman married James Colton, an anarchist miner, in order to obtain British citizenship, which permitted her to stay in France and Canada while writing her two-volume autobiography, *Living My Life* (1931). After numerous attempts she was finally permitted reentry into the United States in 1934 for a period of 90 days to give a lecture tour.

In 1936, shortly after Berkman committed suicide, an anarchist-inspired revolution erupted in Spain due to an attempted coup d'état against the government of the Second Spanish Republic. For the following three years, Goldman committed to supporting the anarcho-syndicalist fight of the Spanish Confederación Nacional del Trabajo and Federación Anarquista Ibérica. Her invited participation in the Spanish Civil War lifted the weight of Berkman's crushing death. For the first time in her life, she lived in a community run by and for anarchists, acting as editor of the weekly *CNT-FAI Information Bulletin* and replying to English-language mail. She

disagreed with joining the coalition government of 1937 in the name of uniting against fascism, not only on the basis of the anarchist tenet of refraining from participation in state structures: cooperating with communists would be a denial of fallen comrades in Stalin's concentration camps. Goldman returned to Canada in 1939. She suffered three strokes and died in Toronto on May 14, 1940, at age 70. She was permitted back into the United States to be buried in the German Waldheim Cemetery, Chicago, next to the Haymarket anarchists and other celebrated radicals and revolutionaries.

Law enforcement officials monitored Goldman for much of her life in exile from the United States. She was deported by the governments of Soviet Russia, Holland, and France and denied entrance to many others. The state repression and infamy forced Goldman to occasionally withdraw from the public arena and to adopt the pseudonym "Miss E. G. Smith." Goldman resisted every governing institution of her time, and, like other revolutionary visionaries, experienced tyranny for advocating new possibilities for the social world, problems second-wave feminists addressed again in the 1960s, and all of which still remain to be realized today.

Emma Goldman wrote hundreds of pamphlets, numerous newspaper and magazine articles, and six books throughout her life. These include: *Anarchy and the Sex Question* (1896), *Anarchy Defended by Anarchists* (1896), *Mother Earth* (1906–17), *What I Believe* (1908), *A New Declaration of Independence* (1909), *Anarchism: What it Really Stands For* (1910), *The White Slave Traffic* (1910), *Marriage and Love* (1911), *The Failure of Christianity* (1913), *Syndicalism: The Modern Menace to Capitalism* (1913), *The Social Significance of Modern Drama* (1914), *The Philosophy of Atheism* (1916), *The Truth About the Bolsheviks* (1918), *My Disillusionment in Russia* (1923), *My Further Disillusionment in Russia* (1924), *Voltaire de Cleyre* (1932), *The Tragedy of the Political Exiles* (1934), and *Was My Life Worth Living?* (1934).

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchism and Gender; Anarchism in the United States to 1945; Berkman, Alexander (1870–1936); Bolsheviks; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI); Haymarket Tragedy; Kronstadt Mutiny of 1921; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932); Palmer Raids; Sanger,

Margaret (1879–1966) and the American Birth Control Movement; Spanish Revolution; Women’s Movement, United States, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Chalberg, J. (1991) *Emma Goldman: American Individualist*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Drinnon, R. (1961) *Rebel in Paradise: A Biography of Emma Goldman*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Goldman, E. (1931/1970) *Living My Life*, 2 vols. New York: AMS Press.
- Moritz, T. & Moritz, A. (2001) *The World’s Most Dangerous Woman: A New Biography of Emma Goldman*. Vancouver: Subway Books.
- Shulman, A. K. (1971) *To the Barricades: The Anarchist Life of Emma Goldman*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
- Shulman, A. K. (Ed.) (1982) *Red Emma Speaks: Selected Writings and Speeches by Emma Goldman*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Wexler, A. (1989) *Emma Goldman in Exile: From the Russian Revolution to the Spanish Civil War*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Gomas, Johnny (1901–1979)

Lucien van der Walt

Johnny Gomas (John Stephen Gomas), a leading South African syndicalist, was born in 1901 on a mission station in the Cape to David and Elizabeth Gomas. He was largely brought up by his mother, a devout Christian; he was profoundly alienated from his drunken father, a laborer who abandoned the family. He was educated at a mission school, until his mother moved to Kimberley in 1911 in search of work and to escape her abusive husband. The family lived in the Malay Camp slum, and the studious Gomas was forced by poverty to leave school to find a job. In 1915 he was apprenticed as a tailor at a local firm, Gordon’s, where his employer, a Russian Jew, apparently introduced him to socialist ideas.

In 1919 the revolutionary syndicalist International Socialist League organized two syndicalist unions in Kimberley, the Clothing Workers’ Industrial Union and the Horse Drivers’ Union, based among the town’s Colored workers. Gomas joined the Clothing Workers’ Industrial Union; he was among a number of Colored

workers who also joined the International Socialist League, and went out on strike when employers reneged on an agreement with the union. He also joined the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) and the South African Native National Congress, later renamed the African National Congress (ANC). In 1920 he was arrested for a burglary at Gordon’s and imprisoned for three months. His family moved to Cape Town after his release, where he resumed work as a tailor.

Unlike many of the local revolutionary syndicalists, Gomas did not join the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) when it was formed in 1921. In 1923 he became a full-time ICU organizer and union secretary for the Western Cape, and joined the CPSA in 1925, becoming branch secretary and later a member of the Political Bureau. As part of the group trying to reform the ICU, Gomas was expelled with other CPSA members like T. W. Thibedi in 1926. He remained active in union work, and also became the vice president of the provincial ANC. In 1928 Gomas was sentenced to three months in prison after organizing a protest against police brutality, and was involved in the short-lived Independent ANC.

A supporter of the 1928 two-stage “Native Republic” strategy of the CPSA, Gomas escaped unscathed from the purges of the “New Line” period, and was an important figure in the Popular Front period, the epitome of a party loyalist. Gomas was a founder member of the National Liberation League, active in the Non-European United Front formed in 1938, and, in the 1940s, was an official in the Tin Workers’ Union and a leading CPSA leader. He was marginalized in the CPSA in the late 1940s for his increasingly Africanist views. Although he was among those arrested in the state of emergency declared in the aftermath of the Sharpeville Massacre of March 21, 1960, Gomas was not notably active in his later years, and died in 1979.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Syndicalism, Southern Africa; Communist Party of South Africa, 1921–1950; South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC

References and Suggested Readings

- Drew, A. (2002) *Discordant Comrades: Identities and Loyalties on the South African Left*. Pretoria: University of South Africa Press.

- Grassroots* (1982) Johnny Gomas: A Lifetime of Struggle. *Grassroots* 3: 7.
- Musson, D. (1987) *Johnny Gomas: Voice of the Working Class: A Political Biography*. Cape Town: Buchu Books.
- Simons, J. & Simons, R. (1969/1983) *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850–1950*. London: International Defense and Aid Fund.

Gonne, Maud (1866–1953)

Kathleen Ruppert

Edith Maud Gonne was an Irish revolutionary, feminist, and actress. Of Anglo-Irish descent, she actively promoted the cause of Irish nationalism and other social causes throughout Europe, particularly in France and America. Gonne also founded *Inghinidhe na hEireann* (Daughters of Erin), an Irish nationalist organization for women.

Gonne was born to an upper-class English family in Surrey in December 1866. She spent the early years of her childhood in Ireland, where her father, Captain Thomas Gonne of the 17th Lancers, was stationed. Following the death of their mother in 1871, Gonne and her sister Kathleen moved several times before ending up in France under the care of a governess. At the age of 17 Gonne rejoined her father, who was once again stationed in Ireland. Gonne moved among the circles of Dublin high society for the next three years until her father's death in 1886.

In 1887 Gonne returned to France where she began a relationship with the radical politician and journalist Lucien Millevoye that would last until 1899. She would bear him two children: George (b. 1890), who died in infancy, and Iseult (1894–1954). Millevoye enlisted Gonne's help in support of the Boulangist cause – a French nationalist movement of somewhat right-wing character that aimed at restoring the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to France – and he encouraged her to work for the Irish nationalist cause as well. At a meeting of the Contemporary Club, an informal debate society in Dublin that included prominent nationalist intellectuals, Gonne was introduced to Fenian leader John O'Leary. O'Leary urged her to read all that she could about Irish history and literature in

order to begin lecturing in support of Irish independence.

As a woman, Gonne was denied membership in the Contemporary Club and other nationalist organizations, including the Celtic Literary Society and the National League. The latter had replaced the then-defunct Land League and was overseeing a Plan of Campaign in rural Ireland. Funds and morale were low, however, and mass evictions threatened in the wake of an agricultural depression. Tim Harrington, a member of parliament and the head of the National League, recognized the value of Gonne's talents as a propagandist. Although Gonne's gender barred her from full membership in the National League, Harrington sent her to Donegal to raise awareness of the plight of evicted tenants. Gonne wrote countless letters to newspapers and cared for the sick in her small hotel room. She also helped resurrect the practice of building Land League huts for the homeless.

Gonne's experience in Donegal deepened her commitment to Irish nationalism and instilled in her both a deep-rooted hatred of the landlord class and a disdain for parliamentary politics, which seemed to her to be accomplishing little of value. She regarded the British presence in Ireland as the root cause of Ireland's problems and dedicated herself to the cause of Irish independence. A warrant for her arrest in June 1890 forced Gonne to return to France where, after suffering the loss of her infant son, she embarked upon a lecture tour to raise awareness and funds for evicted tenants. In the early 1890s she also took up the cause of Irish political prisoners in English jails. She toured England and Scotland, and later America, speaking on behalf of the treason-felony prisoners and raising money for the Amnesty Association. When the Conservative government fell from power, the warrant for Gonne's arrest was cancelled and she was free to return to Ireland. After giving birth to her daughter Iseult in 1894, she continued to divide her time between Ireland and France. She launched the newspaper *L'Irlande Libre* in 1897 to promote Irish nationalism on the Continent and, with the help of the poet and dramatist William Butler Yeats, with whom she had a tumultuous affair, she founded a Paris branch of a group called Young Ireland in emulation of the mid-nineteenth-century nationalist movement of that name.

Frustrated by the lack of access that women had to nationalist organizations in Ireland, Gonne founded Inghinidhe na hEireann in 1900 and became its first president. Among other things the Inghinidhe offered free classes in Irish history, language, and culture for the children of Dublin. It also staged propagandist nationalist pageants; most famously, Gonne played the title role in Yeats's *Kathleen Ni Houlihan* (1902). Inghinidhe na hEireann also produced a monthly journal, *Bean na hEireann* (The Irish Woman), to which Gonne contributed numerous articles on both nationalist and feminist topics.

While busy launching Inghinidhe na hEireann, Gonne also chaired the Irish Transvaal Committee, an organization aimed at discouraging Irish men from enlisting in the British army during the Boer War. It was through her anti-recruitment activities that Gonne met Major John MacBride, the head of an Irish Brigade organized to fight on behalf of the Boers. Gonne and MacBride toured America together to raise support for the Irish Brigade. The two were married in 1903 and gave birth to a son, Sean MacBride, the following year. The marriage quickly disintegrated, however, and after an acrimonious separation in 1905, Gonne spent most of her time exiled in France with young Sean. She continued to campaign for Irish nationalism and for various social programs, including the feeding of Dublin schoolchildren.

At the outset of World War I Gonne worked as a Red Cross nurse in Argelès. Following John MacBride's execution for his part in the Easter Rising of 1916, Gonne returned to Ireland with her son. She spent nearly six months in Holloway Gaol in 1918 for leading an anti-conscription campaign. During the Irish War of Independence Gonne worked with the White Cross to assist victims of the war and their dependents. Following the signing of the 1921 treaty, which Gonne ultimately opposed, she and Charlotte Despard established the Women's Prisoners' Defense League (WPDLe) to help Republican prisoners and their families. As a result of her involvement with the WPDLe, Gonne was again arrested in 1923, this time by the Irish Free State, and joined other prominent female prisoners on a hunger strike.

Gonne remained an outspoken republican and prisoners' rights advocate throughout the remainder of her life. In 1932 she became the chair of the Indian-Irish Independence League.

Six years later Gonne joined the Anti-Partition League and published her autobiography, *A Servant of the Queen* (1938). Maud Gonne died on April 27, 1953, and was buried in the Republican Plot in Glasnevin Cemetery, Dublin.

SEE ALSO: Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War; Fenian Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Gonne, M. (1995) *The Autobiography of Maud Gonne: A Servant of the Queen*. Ed. A. N. Jeffares & A. M. White. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ó Céirín, K. & Ó Céirín, C. (Eds.) (1996) *Women of Ireland: A Biographic Dictionary*. Kinvara, County Galway: Tír Eolas.
- Ward, M. (1993) *Maud Gonne: Ireland's Joan of Arc*. London: Pandora.

Gorbachev, Mikhail (b. 1931)

Luke Perry

Mikhail Gorbachev rose from meager beginnings to become one of the most powerful figures in an international system dominated by the Cold War. A pivotal figure in domestic and international politics, Gorbachev's legacy will be debated for decades; however, there is no denying his significance in the course of Russian history and the end of the Cold War.

Gorbachev was born on March 2, 1931 in the village of Privolnoye in southwestern Russia. Born to a peasant family, Gorbachev began working on a state farm at 13 and joined the Communist Youth League at 15. After graduating high school, Gorbachev studied law at Moscow State University, graduating in 1955. In addition to his law degree, he took correspondence courses from Stavropol Agricultural Institute, culminating in a second degree in agricultural economics in 1967.

Gorbachev returned home after graduation and began working for the Communist Party. By 1970 he held the highest post in Stavropol, one of the largest and most economically significant territories in Russia. This was the same year Gorbachev was named a member of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) Central Committee. Gorbachev moved to Moscow in 1978 after becoming a Central Committee secretary.

Originally responsible for Soviet agriculture, he was soon involved in a variety of policy areas and became a full member of the Politburo (political bureau) in 1980. Five years later he became general secretary of the Party Central Committee, making him the youngest member in the Politburo at the time.

The Soviet Union was characterized by economic underdevelopment at home and significant power abroad. According to Valerie Bunce (1993), no previous leader sought to address the gap between domestic weaknesses and projected international strength. Gorbachev's development strategy was embodied in three concepts: *glasnost* (openness), *perestroika* (restructuring), and *demokratizatsiia* (democratization). Richard Kelley (1999) argues that each was purposely utilized as a political weapon: these weapons sought "to mobilize the intelligentsia that had given up hope of reform or meaningful involvement in public life, to reassure the dissident community that had been pushed aside or worse in the Brezhnev years, and to win the support of the general public that had soured on the fiction of Soviet democracy and the promise of a better life." Gorbachev, more than any other political actor, was responsible for the pluralization of the Soviet political system.

1989 was a watershed year. While Gorbachev promised material improvement, there was a reversion to food rationing. Technological divisions between the Soviet Union and industrial capitalist countries had widened in all sectors but weapons procurement. Agriculture was so inefficient that food imports constituted 40 percent of hard currency expenditures. These and other social ills precipitated a state of economic emergency. Gorbachev suddenly faced "two life-or-death alternatives: either abandon the reforms or make them more radical"; abandoning reforms was never seriously considered.

Nationalist dissent rose throughout the Soviet republics. Political leaders convinced citizens that respective national problems could not be effectively addressed without greater economic and administrative reforms. The KGB stopped arresting citizens for unlawful dissent. A moderately independent press slowly emerged. Many republics created democratically elected presidencies and legislatures, though the degree of democracy varied from region to region. Every country east of the Elbe River was communist at the beginning of 1989. By the end of the year,

just one country, Albania, was still communist. In February of 1990 Gorbachev sought approval from the Congress of People's Deputies for multi-party politics, which was ratified in April of that year.

In January 1991, 15 people were killed when Soviet Special Forces in Lithuania overran a Vilnius television tower in an attempt to deter separatist ambitions. Determined to preserve territorial integrity in the USSR, Gorbachev organized a public referendum in March that asked: *Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and freedom of the individual of any nationality will be guaranteed?* The vote included a second referendum that proposed the creation of a Russian presidency. This was even more popular than preserving the Union. On June 12, 1991 Boris Yeltsin became the first publicly elected president of Russia. Yeltsin was concerned that if the Communist Party did not adapt to changing political attitudes, they would be dealt a total historical defeat.

Gorbachev orchestrated a new Union treaty that would grant greater autonomy to regional governments. The treaty was accepted in principle by the Central Committee, but was not signed because of an attempted coup by prominent Soviet leaders, including the prime minister, the vice president, and the head of the KGB, who feared the treaty would dismantle the Soviet Union. Gorbachev was held in isolation while coup leaders declared him incapable of fulfilling his duties and implemented a state of emergency. A major setback to the coup was their failure to test the loyalty of Pavel Grachev, the chief of military operations. When put to the test, Grachev refused to abandon Gorbachev and Yeltsin. This enabled Yeltsin to organize an impromptu rally at the White House. Tens of thousands of Russians gathered as Yeltsin famously climbed on one of the tanks and from an exposed position declared his opposition to the coup. Unwilling to be responsible for significant casualties, the coup ended shortly thereafter.

Gorbachev returned to Moscow severely discredited. Though Gorbachev refused to blame the CPSU, the general secretary reluctantly agreed to dissolve the party under pressure from Yeltsin. The coup had fundamentally changed the USSR with Yeltsin, not Gorbachev, emerging atop the political hierarchy. Gorbachev sought

to redraft the Union treaty, but these efforts unraveled when Ukraine supported a referendum for independence on December 1, 1991. The Commonwealth of Independent States was formed days later as a loose association of states who shared a commitment to economic coordination. Gorbachev resigned on December 25, 1991 and at midnight, December 31, 1991 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics came to an end.

Although Gorbachev struggled to avoid the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it was the natural outcome of policies that he and his administration implemented. By embracing democratization, Gorbachev permitted the articulation and defense of dissent, which forever altered the centralized nature of the Soviet system. The Soviet political process was never in line with western conceptions of democracy, even though both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation shared formal elements of democracy, such as constitutions, elections, and institutions that meant very little in terms of a competitive political system with representative government. The key question after 1991 was if and how the system would change.

Gorbachev remained politically active during the subsequent two decades. The former Soviet leader undertook an unsuccessful presidential bid in 1996, and founded the now-defunct Social Democratic Party of Russia in 2001. In the private realm, Gorbachev created the Gorbachev Foundation in 1992 to provide in-depth analysis of evolving social, economic, and political developments, and the Green Cross in 1993 to deal with environmental consequences of war. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990 for his leading role in the Cold War peace process, which according to the committee opened new possibilities for the world community to solve its pressing problems across ideological, religious, historical, and cultural divides.

SEE ALSO: Russia, Revolutions: Sources and Contexts; Soviet Union, Fall of; War Communism and the Rise of the Soviet Union

References and Suggested Readings

- Brown, A. & Shevtsova, L. (Eds.) (2001) *Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin: Political Leadership in Transition*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.
- Bunce, V. (1993) Domestic Reform and International Change: The Gorbachev Reforms in Historical Perspective. *International Organization* 47: 107–38.

Gorbachev Foundation (2008) *Biography of Mikhail Gorbachev*. Available at: www.gorby.ru/en/rubrs.asp?rubr_id=310. Accessed June 3, 2008.

Kelley, D. (1999) *Politics in Russia and the Successor States*. Orlando: Harcourt Brace.

Service, R. (1997) *A History of Twentieth-Century Russia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Zlotnik, M. (2003) Yeltsin and Gorbachev: The Politics of Confrontation. *Journal of Cold War Studies* 5, 1: 128–64.

Gordon “No Popery” Riots, Britain, 1780

Colin Haydon

The Gordon Riots, which resulted from anti-Catholic tensions, were some of the most serious riots in eighteenth-century England. In 1778 Parliament passed the first Catholic Relief Act, curtailing various provisions of the persecuting English penal code. Soon afterwards, a Protestant Association, demanding the measure’s repeal, was founded under the leadership of Lord George Gordon (1751–93), an eccentric MP from a Scottish noble family. Petitions for the Relief Act’s repeal were raised in London and the English provinces. In Scotland petitions inveighed against a proposed relief bill for that country; and, early in 1779, rioting in Edinburgh and Glasgow ensured the abandonment of the planned legislation.

London followed suit with massive “No Popery!” rioting from June 2–8, 1780. It began when 60,000 “Protestants” marched to Westminster and Gordon presented to Parliament London’s petition – boasting 44,000 signatures – for the Relief Act’s repeal. There were scuffles in Palace Yard and some MPs and Lords were jostled. The crowd dispersed from Westminster in the evening, but later the chapels of the Bavarian and Sardinian embassies were burnt. Attacks followed on subsequent days on other Catholic chapels and Catholic schools, businesses, and homes. A crowd wrecked the Bloomsbury house of Lord Mansfield, a prominent supporter of Catholic relief. The scope of the riots quickly widened. At Newgate a mob released the prisoners and burnt the gaol. Prisoners were released from the Fleet prison, part of which was then fired, as were the King’s Bench prison, the New Gaol, Southwark, and the toll houses on Blackfriars Bridge. At the height of the violence an unsus-

cessful assault was launched on the Bank of England. There were also demonstrations and disturbances in the provinces – at Bath, Birmingham, Hull, and Newcastle upon Tyne. In some places there were false alarms or anticipated rioting was prevented.

Eventually, the military suppressed the riots. Despite the riots, Parliament did not repeal the Relief Act; and it passed a comparable measure for Scotland in 1793. Gordon was tried for high treason in 1781, but was acquitted. Twenty-five rioters were hanged; others were imprisoned or whipped. The Gordon Riots appalled contemporaries, who called for a strengthening of the forces of authority.

SEE ALSO: Catholic Emancipation

References and Suggested Readings

- Haydon, C. (1994) *Anti-Catholicism in Eighteenth-Century England c. 1714–80*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Randall, A. (2006) *Riotous Assemblies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rogers, N. (1998) *Crowds, Culture, and Politics in Georgian Britain*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Rudé, G. (1956) The Gordon Riots: A Study of the Rioters and their Victims. *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 5th Series, 6: 93–114.

Gori, Pietro (1865–1911)

Franco Bertolucci

Pietro Gori was born in Messina, Italy on August 14, 1865. He was a lawyer, writer, and poet, but above all he was one of the most important leaders of Italian and international anarchism from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth. While studying in Pisa, he became an anarchist and wrote political pamphlets, one of which, “Pensieri ribelli” (Rebel Thoughts) (1889), became famous because of his subsequent arrest and trial. On May 1, 1890, after a demonstration of workers in Livorno, Gori and other students and workers were arrested. He was sent to the prisons of Livorno and Lucca, finally being released in 1890. In 1891, he took part in the congress to create the Revolutionary Anarchist Socialist Party, along with other anarchist leaders such as Errico Malatesta. In December the same year, he founded the magazine *L'Amico del popolo* (The People's Friend), which was forced

to close after six issues. Gori wrote for many anarchist magazines and translated the Communist Party manifesto. He also published poetry in *Prigioni e battaglie* (Prisons and Battles). During a conference in 1892, he expounded anarchism's critical position regarding authoritarian socialism. During a national congress the same year, he defended, along with Galleani, the anti-parliament faction's intransigent position against reformist socialists. He was expelled with Cipriani from the congress of the Socialist International. On July 8, 1894, a few days before the approval of Crispi's laws against anarchists, Gori went to Lugano, escaping the libelous theory that linked him with the outrage of Caserio against the French president, Carnot.

In Lugano Gori became an important point of reference for anarchist exiles, which led to his and other anarchists' expulsion. “Addio a Lugano” (Farewell to Lugano), a song about this situation, was written by Gori in prison and became very popular. After traveling to Germany he went to Belgium, where he met Elisée Reclus, and then to Amsterdam, where he met Domela Nieuwenhuis, finally settling in London, where he remained in contact with the most important anarchist leaders (Kropotkin, Michel, Malato, Faure, and Malatesta).

His public speaking abilities were impressive: traveling around the United States he gave many conferences, the most famous of which, “Il vostro ordine, il nostro disordine” (Your Order, Our Disorder), took place in San Francisco. On returning to London, Gori participated in the Third Congress of the Workers' International. After the exclusion of several anarchists from the congress, Gori signed a document protesting the attempt made by the social democrats to gain hegemony over the international workers' movement.

After being treated at the National Hospital in London Gori returned to Italy and regained contact with the anarchist movement. He supported the idea of acting with the working-class parties to defend their rights and freedoms, but he also opposed any kind of government. The unrest that followed the rising price of bread forced him to leave Italy. He went to Buenos Aires and opened a legal office with Antonio Riva, another anarchist lawyer. In Buenos Aires he wrote and printed *La nostra Utopia* (Our Utopia), a synthesis of his political thought, written after the murder of Umberto I by Gaetano Bresci and the severe attacks on

anarchists by Giovanni Bovio. In November 1898 he directed and published the magazine *Criminologia moderna* (Modern Criminology). While in Latin America he gave conferences in Uruguay, Paraguay, Patagonia, and Chile; his powerful oratory brought many workers close to the anarchist movement and helped give rise to the Federacion Obrera Argentina in May 1901.

Owing to an amnesty and because of his health problems Gori returned to Italy, where he edited the magazine *Il Pensiero* (Thought) with Luigi Fabbri. In November 1905 he took part in a revolutionary syndicalist meeting in Bologna where he expressed the need for a strongly unified working class. On November 14, 1909, in Portoferraio, he made his last speech, a commemoration of Francisco Ferrer. He died two years later in Portoferraio. His funeral lasted three days, during which workers from all over Tuscany paid their last respects to the poet of anarchy.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Argentina; Anarchosyndicalism; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932); Malato, Charles (1857–1938); Michel, Louise (1830–1905); Reclus, Elisée (1830–1905)

References and Suggested Readings

- Antonoli, M. (1996) *Pietro Gori, Il cavaliere errante dell'anarchia*, 2nd ed. Pisa: BFS.
- Zaragoza, G. (1995) *Anarquismo argentino (1876–1902)*. Madrid: Ed. de la Torre.

Gorz, André (1923–2007)

Nichole Shippen

André Gorz was a western social philosopher whose work combines the insights of Marxism, existentialism, and ecology. Gorz is predominantly known for his politics of autonomous free time, and his reinvigoration of socialism with what he viewed as the inherent anti-capitalist politics of the ecology movement. André Gorz was born in Vienna in 1923 to a Catholic mother and a Jewish father. Educated in Switzerland at the Institut Montana boarding school and at the University of Lausanne, Gorz subsequently moved to Paris in his early twenties, and later acted as a political editor for *Les Temps Modernes*, a French political and literary journal founded by Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir.

In his early work, Gorz concentrated primarily on “workerism” (e.g., worker control, workers’ councils, self-management); however, the redivision of labor under advanced capitalism greatly undermined his confidence in the workplace as a place of democratic possibilities. Gorz believed early on that the new class of technological experts would act as the radical vanguard for the mass of workers, only to recognize later that the new division of labor ultimately created a distinctive hierarchy among the workers and further contributed to the alienation felt by all workers.

In contrast to orthodox Marxists, Gorz moved to a post-Marxism position in the mid-1960s. He reprioritized individual emancipation by increasing the sphere of autonomy outside of wage work, arguing that consumerism and work no longer gave existential meaning to people’s lives and that dissatisfaction logically manifested itself in the form of demands for higher wages.

As outlined in *Farewell to the Working Class* (1980), Gorz was very focused on the politics of time. He argued that with the increase in part-time and temporary work, it has become possible for society as a whole to work fewer hours, which in turn offers the potential to enlarge the sphere of autonomous work versus heteronomous work or work for economic ends. Gorz was also one of the first theorists to fuse socialism and ecology; in *Ecology as Politics* (1975), he declared that the lifestyles of excessive consumerism and “built-in obsolescence” lead to excessive waste and contribute to the decline of the environment. Gorz further identified the affinity between capitalism and Marxism in their promotion of industrial productivity (albeit for different ends), but recognized early on that economic growth arguments fail to consider that resources could be more equitably distributed. In 2007, Gorz and his wife Dorine committed suicide together in France, after his wife’s prolonged illness.

SEE ALSO: Ecological Protest Movements; May 1968 French Uprisings; Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–1980)

References and Suggested Readings

- Gorz, A. (1975) *Ecology as Politics*. London: Pluto Press.
- Gorz, A. (1980) *Farewell to the Working Class: An Essay on Post-Industrial Socialism*. London: Pluto Press.
- Little, A. (1996) *The Political Thought of André Gorz*. New York: Routledge.
- Lodziak, C. & Tatman, J. (1997) *André Gorz: A Critical Introduction*. Chicago: Pluto Press.

Gouges, Olympe de (1745–1793)

Karen Offen

Olympe de Gouges, playwright, pamphleteer, opponent of black slavery, and advocate of women's rights, is best known for her *Declaration of the Rights of Woman* (1791). Born Marie Gouze in May 1745, officially to Anne-Olympe Mouisset and her husband in Montauban, she nevertheless claimed descent from a local noble. Indeed, scholars have since established, as Marie claimed and physical resemblance confirmed, that her mother's lover, Jean-Jacques LeFranc, Marquis de Pompignan, was very likely her real father.

In 1767, already widowed with a small son (Pierre Aubry, who subsequently became a French general), the young Marie Gouze moved to Paris where she reinvented herself as Olympe de Gouges and led a lively social existence. Well known in progressive literary and political circles in Paris, she published plays, a fictionalized autobiography, and during the French Revolution, many exuberant and patriotic pamphlets and broadsides. During the early years of the revolution (1789–91) de Gouges identified herself with the cause of constitutional monarchy. She supported the efforts of the Girondins and was on good terms with Condorcet, Mirabeau, and Brissot.

In September 1791 de Gouges published her best-remembered tract, "The Rights of Woman" (*Droits de la femme*). She deliberately followed the style and format of the celebrated Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), and invoked its principles on behalf of the female sex. Her analysis of women's position was more radical than those of Condorcet, who had demanded women's admission to citizenship in 1790, or the English feminist Mary Wollstonecraft, whose *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* appeared in 1792.

De Gouges addressed all her political writings – including those on women – to royal patrons. In the *Droits de la femme* she called on the queen, Marie-Antoinette, to turn away from counter-revolutionary intrigue with foreign powers (especially Austria, then governed by the queen's brother, Joseph II) and to champion instead the cause of women, the better to lead a long overdue revolution in morals. "The revolution will occur," she wrote in the dedication, "only when

all women are convinced of their deplorable fate and of the rights they have lost in society. Madame, support such a good cause, defend this unfortunate sex, and you will soon have one half the Kingdom on your side, along with at least one third of the other half."

The *Droits de la femme* opened with a challenge: "Men, are you capable of being just? It is a woman who asks you this question; at least you will not deny her this right. Tell me! Who has given you the sovereign authority to oppress my sex?" She quickly called for a national assembly of women – "mothers, daughters, sisters" – and drafted her Articles in the Preamble. The first of her 17 articles is: "Woman is born free and remains equal in rights to man. Social distinctions can be founded only on general utility." She also demanded that women be "equally admissible to all public offices, places, and employments" (Art. 6) and that, being equally liable for their crimes, women must have the right to speak out in public (Art. 10). Clearly mirroring Rousseau's *Social Contract*, she drafts a model marriage contract, which included a formula for legitimizing children "from whatever bed they might spring." She also advocated civil divorce. She took part in a number of revolutionary festivals, sometimes leading the women's processions. She published vitriolic polemics against the Jacobins Marat and Robespierre.

The Jacobins (who took control of the new French Republic in 1792–3) cracked down on women's political action as part of the Terror. In early November 1793, after a peremptory show trial, they guillotined de Gouges, making it unmistakably clear that the combination of her monarchist politics with her "unwomanly" behavior, especially her assertive campaign for women's equality, would no longer be tolerated. "She wanted to be a statesman, and it appears that the law has punished this *conspiratrice* for forgetting the virtues of her sex" (*Feuille de salut public*, Nov. 1793).

The reputation of Olympe de Gouges has been rehabilitated since the late twentieth century, and in 1993 a group of French feminists proposed that her remains be transported to the Pantheon in Paris. In 2003 Olivier Blanc published the most authoritative, deeply researched, and contextualized biography, a major update of his earlier efforts (1989 and 1981). This biography includes a complete bibliography of published works by Olympe de Gouges.

SEE ALSO: Brissot, Jacques Pierre (1754–1793); Condorcet, Marquis de (1743–1794); French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution, Women and; Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–1793); Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–1797)

References and Suggested Readings

- Blanc, O. (2003) *Marie-Olympe de Gouges: une humaniste à la fin du XVIII siècle*. Paris: René Viénet.
- Gouges, O. de (1986) *Œuvres*. Intro. Benoîte Groult. Paris: Mercure de France.
- Gouges, O. de (1989) *L'Esclavage des noirs 1792*. Preface by Eleni Varikas. Paris: Côté Femmes.
- Gouges, O. de (1993a) *Ecrits politiques*, 2 vols. Preface by Olivier Blanc. Paris: Côté Femmes.
- Gouges, O. de (1993b). *Théâtre politique*, 2 vols. Preface by Gisela Thiele-Knobloch. Paris: Côté Femmes.
- Levy, D., Applewhite, H., & Johnson, M. (1979/1983) Women in Revolutionary Paris. In S. G. Bell & K. Offen, *Women, the Family, and Freedom*, Vol. 1. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Mousset, S. (2003/2006) *Women's Rights and the French Revolution: A Biography of Olympe de Gouges*. Trans. J. Poirel. New Brunswick, NY: Transaction.

Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937)

Paul Le Blanc

Antonio Gramsci was the foremost revolutionary Marxist theorist of the Communist Party of Italy, of which he was a founder, and an insightful critic of society, culture, and politics whose influence can be found among an incredibly large number of theorists, intellectuals, and activists both internationally and across the political spectrum.

Born on the island of Sardinia, Gramsci's early years were shaped by his family's economic distress – mainly because his father, a clerk in a state agency, had been suspended from service and put in jail for some misdoings related to his job. In his later years, Gramsci recalled that his poverty made him especially sensitive to social injustices.

Thanks to a scholarship, Gramsci was able to enter the University of Turin in 1911 and within two years became an activist within the Italian Socialist Party. In 1919 he helped to found a new weekly, *L'Ordine Nuovo* (New Order), which sought to apply the lessons of

the 1917 Russian Revolution to Italy. This paper became the voice of militant factory workers who engaged in a general strike and factory occupations that in 1920 seemed to threaten the overturn of Italian capitalism and a workers' revolution. Socialist Party moderates who led the trade union movement quickly effected a compromise, however, which ended the strike, resulting in modest concessions for the workers and the continued (if temporary) survival of a liberal capitalist regime.

Frightened by the workers' militancy, however, the landed aristocracy and industrialists concluded that a right-wing counter-force was needed, and they poured substantial resources into the rising fascist movement led by Benito Mussolini. Disillusioned by the socialists selling out their principles, Gramsci and many others on the left end of the political spectrum concluded that a genuinely revolutionary workers' party was needed. The result was the foundation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in 1921.

Gramsci was one of the key figures of the PCI in the early 1920s, but he also worked for the Communist International (or Third International) in Moscow and Vienna in this period. The rise and succession of victories of the fascist movement was a major concern to Gramsci and his comrades, but there was no agreement on appropriate perspectives for the PCI. Gramsci developed a perspective that was an alternative to what he saw as a sectarian and ultra-left line represented by Amadeo Bordiga and also independent of the moderate line advanced by Angelo Tasca. His perspective became predominant in the PCI, and he was considered to be its central leader. His columns in the Communist daily *L'Unità* profoundly influenced and helped to educate his party's working-class base. Gramsci was elected to parliament in 1924, and at the Lyon national congress in January 1926, a party majority was won to Gramsci's positions (advanced with the support of Palmiro Togliatti). Later in the year, however, he was arrested as the fascists consolidated their dictatorship.

During his ten years in prison, where his health was finally broken, Gramsci was able to fill 34 thick notebooks with a remarkable range of political, socialist, historical, and cultural writings. The presence of fascist censors forced him to use code words and obscure formulations. The rising influence of Stalinism within the interna-

tional communist movement – and his resistance to aspects of Stalinist ideology combined with a desire not to be isolated from that movement – also contributed to obscure and contradictory formulations. This is especially so due to a number of indications that his theoretical and political orientation was fundamentally incompatible with that which Stalin imposed.

Gramsci's impact on Italian intellectual life (and beyond) began after the fall of the Italian fascist regime of Mussolini and the conclusion of World War II. The Communist Party had achieved mass influence in Italy, and although, under the leadership of Togliatti, it had adapted to the Stalinist ethos dominant in the world communist movement, it referred strongly to Gramsci's memory. His prison letters were published first and won a wide readership – and this was followed by initial editions of his Prison Notebooks, under the direct supervision of Togliatti. Only in the 1970s did a more authoritative critical edition become available.

“Open Marxism”

Gramsci has been associated with a trend that has been given the misleading label of Western Marxism, associated with such different theorists as Georg Lukács, Karl Korsch, and also some thinkers affiliated with the Frankfurt School (including Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse). The so-called Western Marxists shared in common a fairly sophisticated philosophical orientation, and also a tendency to reject the somewhat rigid interpretation of Marxism associated with many of the so-called orthodox Marxists of the Second International (or Socialist International) of 1889–1914 – an interpretation which tended to view “subjective” cultural and political factors as being merely reflections of “objective” economic factors, and which also tended to argue that socialism would inevitably come into being through the working of “scientific laws” related to such objective factors.

It is certainly the case that Gramsci was profoundly influenced by the dialectical philosophical orientation of G. W. F. Hegel, popularized in Italy by Benedetto Croce and Antonio Labriola. Croce profoundly altered Hegel's philosophy in order to develop his own system, however, insisting that “Marxism is dead.” In contrast, Labriola emphasized Hegel's philosophy as pre-

liminary to Marxism, a quite sophisticated version of which he advanced through his esteemed position as a university professor.

Gramsci rejected so-called orthodox Marxism as a distortion of Marx's actual revolutionary orientation. “The overall vulgarization of Marxism,” according to Gramsci, has generally taken the form of “deterministic, mechanistic, fatalistic elements.” In his view, the common tendency among Marxists to hold that one or another aspect of capitalist development inevitably assigns to the mass of working-class individuals any specific consciousness (whether revolutionary or non-revolutionary) is highly problematical. “We should, I think, prepare a funeral elegy on the concept of fatalism,” Gramsci concluded, “praising its usefulness in a certain historical period but burying it once for all – with full honors.”

As a Marxist, Gramsci saw future possibilities as being conditioned by past and present “objective” economic and social realities. But his thought was also alive to multiple possibilities – grounded in the understanding that not only are “objective” factors too complex and fluid to be *fully* grasped in analysis, but that the consciousness and actions of human beings (especially when informed by revolutionary theory and focused through effective organization) can alter the “objective” factors.

Consequently, Gramsci gave one of his first articles about the 1917 Russian Revolution the provocative title “The Revolution Against *Capital*.” Here he was not referring to the revolution against capitalism, the common position of all socialists, but rather a challenge to a dogmatic understanding of Marx's classic work *Capital*. This was because that revolution took place in a country where capitalism was very much underdeveloped and the working class a small minority in a predominantly peasant country. He asserted that “events have exploded the critical schema determining how the history of Russia would unfold according to the canons of historical materialism” – although adding that, in fact, “the canons of historical materialism are not so rigid as . . . has been thought.”

In the 1920s a remarkable example of Gramsci's supple interpretation of Marxism emerged in an essay analyzing realities of “Americanism and Fordism” from his prison in Fascist Italy. He rejected the notion, common among Marxists, that somehow political developments in the United

States lagged behind those in Europe. Instead, he prophetically suggested that US developments – particularly the efficiencies of the assembly line and high-wage consumerism (associated with innovations of industrialist Henry Ford), and the manipulative and seemingly classless form that “democratic” politics had taken in the US – might show “advanced” Europe aspects of its own future.

He stressed the implications for Europe of the socioeconomic development of US capitalism. He wrote of “an ultra-modern form of production and of working methods” in which industrial and commercial life, freed from “parasitic sedimentations” of Europe’s pre-capitalist traditions, is able to develop on “a sound basis,” allowing increased efficiency and productivity. “These economies affected production costs and permitted higher wages and lower selling prices,” combined with “various social benefits” and “extremely subtle ideological and political propaganda” in promoting capitalism among the workers. Also involved, however, were greater ideological, cultural, and social controls over the working class – especially control over the labor process through which capitalists “maintain the continuity of the physical and muscular-nervous efficiency of the worker.” Gramsci raised the possibility that “America, through the implacable weight of its economic production . . . will compel or is already compelling Europe to overturn its excessively antiquated economic and social basis,” thereby generating “‘a new culture’ and ‘new way of life’ which are being spread around under the American label.”

The Modern Prince

As both a revolutionary and as a prisoner in a fascist prison, Gramsci was naturally interested in the question of political power. Steeped in Italian history and cultural traditions, he turned to the classic text *The Prince* by Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), foremost political theorist of the Italian Renaissance, for the purpose of theorizing the question of political power in modern times. Like Machiavelli, Gramsci conducted his examination in a manner that superficially seems chillingly amoral. Politics is a science that can serve heroes and villains, progressives and reactionaries, democrats and authoritarians, those bent on self-defense and those bent on murder and theft – the goals of emancipation of Marx and

Lenin, but also the despotic designs of Mussolini and Stalin.

Like Machiavelli, Gramsci sees the key to politics as the question of leadership: “The first element is that there really do exist rulers and ruled, leaders and led. The entire science and art of politics are based on this primordial and (given certain general conditions) irreducible fact.” A difference between Machiavelli and Gramsci lies in the phrase “given certain general conditions.” These are the conditions of modern class society, that have not always existed and – as a Marxist – Gramsci believes can and must be overcome. As he puts it: “In the formation of leaders, one premise is fundamental: is it the intention that there should always be rulers and ruled, or is it the objective to create the conditions under which this division is no longer necessary?”

Another difference between Machiavelli and Gramsci is that the theorist of the Middle Ages believed that leadership would be provided by individual heroes or villains – princes – whereas Gramsci believed that the modern prince must be collective and can only be a political party. As he notes, “the formation of the party system” involves “an historical phase linked to the standardization of broad masses of the population (communications, newspapers, big cities, etc.)”

In Gramsci’s discussion there are a variety of ambiguities, deriving from several problems. One is his desire to elude the watchful eyes of various censors – certainly those of his fascist jailers, but also, potentially, some of his own comrades in the Italian Communist Party who were coming under the powerful and intolerant influence of Stalinism (the rigid ideology associated to the dictatorship crystallizing in Soviet Russia and the international communist movement). Intertwined with this is the fact that he is dealing, more or less, with all political parties of modern times. Consequently, it is sometimes unclear whether he is talking about a fascist party; a more or less democratic-republican bourgeois or petty-bourgeois party, whether of liberal or conservative persuasion; a reformist social democratic party; or a communist party (and if the latter, one that is healthy or one that is infected with bureaucratic or sectarian tendencies).

It is possible that certain contradictions are consciously and provocatively advanced. For example, he asserts that “the counting of ‘votes’ is the final ceremony of a long process, in which it is precisely those who devote their best energies

to the State and the nation (when such they are) who carry the greatest weight” – but then he goes on to say that “the historical rationality of numerical consensus is systematically falsified by the influence of wealth.” From this point, Gramsci moves immediately to a veiled discussion of an expansive, revolutionary democracy – based on governance by working-class councils (the Russian term being *soviets*) in which, as he puts it, political life moves beyond “the canons of formal democracy,” and “the people’s consent does not end at the moment of voting,” but rather also involves active participation in implementing the decisions, giving new life and deeper meaning (or, away from the censor’s watchful eye, what he might have called *proletarian content*) to the idea of *self-government*.

This relates to Gramsci’s remarks about “that determinate party, which has the aim of founding a new type of State (and which was rationally and historically created for that end).” From his 1921 mini-essay “Real Dialectics” we can see that Gramsci unambiguously viewed the Italian Communist Party in this light, emerging from lessons that were learned from momentous events, “the real dialectics of history,” by growing numbers of individuals who are part of “the worker and peasant masses.” While he makes reference in *The Modern Prince* to this party’s “inevitable progress to State power, however, he was convinced that victory would also be dependent on the revolutionary party developing in a manner that linked it organically to the laboring masses. He is critical of so-called parties (which certainly include left-wing sects) made up of “‘volunteers,’ and in a certain sense of declassés” that “have never or almost never represented homogeneous social blocs,” but are instead “the political equivalent of gypsy bands or nomads.”

To understand the nature of a genuinely revolutionary party, Gramsci speculates on how the history of such an organization might be written. “A simple narrative of the internal life of a political organization” – focusing on the first groups that bring it into being, “the ideological controversies through which its program and conception of the world” are formed – will provide only an account of “certain intellectual groups” or even “the political biography of a single personality,” but will not provide an adequate understanding of the political party. To develop such an understanding, much more is required:

The history will have to be written of a particular mass of men who have followed the founders of the party, sustained them with their trust, loyalty and discipline, or criticized then “realistically” by dispersing or remaining passive before certain initiatives. But will this mass be made up solely of members of the party? Will it be sufficient to follow the congresses, the votes, etc., that is to say the whole nexus of activities and modes of existence through which the mass following of the party manifests its will? Clearly it will be necessary to take some account of the social group of which the party in question is the expression and the most advanced element. The history of a party, in other words, can only be the history of a particular social group. But this group is not isolated; it has friends, kindred groups, opponents, enemies. The history of any given party can only emerge from the complex portrayal of the totality of society and State (often with international ramifications too). Hence it may be said that to write the history of a party means nothing less than to write the general history of a country from a monographic viewpoint, in order to highlight a particular aspect of it. A party will have had greater or less significance and weight precisely to the extent to which its particular activity has been more or less decisive in determining a country’s history.

The richness of Gramsci’s discussion is deepened as he takes up a variety of questions. This includes an examination of different layers within the party: the “mass element” of “ordinary, average” members, who are essential to the organization’s existence but who by themselves cannot ensure the party’s existence; the experienced, knowledgeable, and “innovative” layer constituting the party’s leadership, whose qualities make it the essential ingredient to the party’s existence; and “an intermediate element” of party militants who provide the crucial physical, intellectual, and moral interconnections between the other two layers. The cohesion (or “centralism”) of the party is dependent on a so-called “policing” function that can either be educational, progressive, and democratic or repressive, reactionary, and bureaucratic. “The problem of assimilating the entire grouping to its most advanced fraction” is an educational problem that is threatened by the “danger of becoming bureaucratized.”

Related to this is Gramsci’s discussion of spontaneity. Gramsci insists that “pure” spontaneity

does not exist in history, “that every ‘spontaneous’ movement contains rudimentary elements of conscious leadership, of discipline.” At the same time, it is not possible for “modern theory [Marxism] to be in opposition to the ‘spontaneous’ feelings of the masses.” Nonetheless, he sees “spontaneity” as an ideologically contested terrain, with the possibility of either “progressive” or “regressive” outcomes, and often involving “bizarre combinations.” The revolutionary theoretician (and revolutionary party) must “unravel these in order to discover fresh proof of [revolutionary] theory, to ‘translate’ into theoretical language the elements of historical life.” But he warned that “it is not reality which should be expected to conform to the abstract schema,” and that it is a mistake to see “as real and worthwhile only such movements of revolt as are one hundred per cent conscious, i.e., movements that are governed by plans worked out in advance to the last detail or in line with abstract theory.”

The appropriate interplay of spontaneous upsurges with conscious revolutionary organization, in Gramsci’s opinion,

can only be found in democratic centralism, which is, so to speak, a “centralism” in movement – i.e., a continual adaptation of the organization of the real movement, a matching of thrusts from below with orders from above, a continuous insertion of elements thrown up from the depths of the rank and file into the solid framework of the leadership apparatus which ensures continuity and the regular accumulation of experience.

Hegemony, Maneuver, Position

Elaborating on insights developed in discussions of the early congresses of the Communist International, Gramsci developed innovative analyses regarding a contest between the cultural, ideological, and political *hegemony* (predominance) of the capitalist class and that of the working class – both in relation to the *state* (institutions through which laws are formulated and enforced) and *civil society* (formally organized social and cultural institutions interconnected with and helping to shape the norms of everyday life outside of the realm of state coercion). Gramsci followed Lenin, Trotsky, and others in emphasizing important differences between revolutionary

options and dynamics in “backward” Russia and “advanced” Western Europe.

“In the advanced capitalist countries,” he noted in 1926 (before being imprisoned), “the ruling class possesses political and organizational reserves which it did not possess, for instance, in Russia.” The result was that “even the most serious economic crises do not have immediate repercussions in the political sphere,” enabling the ruling class-dominated state “in organizing greater forces loyal to the regime than the depth of the crisis might lead one to suppose.” This is related to the class (in this case the capitalist class) believing in and having the capacity to persuade broad social layers of the legitimacy of its leadership and the validity of its worldview (ideology) through a variety of social and cultural mechanisms. In Western Europe, where capitalism had developed and thrived over far more extended periods than was the case in less capitalistically developed areas such as Russia, the bourgeois penetration and permeation of civil society was far more developed and intensive. This would have implications for the revolutionary strategy and tactics of the working-class movement.

In his prison notebooks Gramsci gave considerable attention to such matters. “If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e., is no longer ‘leading’ but only ‘dominant,’ exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously.” This by itself would not be sufficient, however, to lead – contrary to the naïve hopes of some on the left – to any automatic replacement of capitalism with a bright socialist future. If “the old way is dying and the new cannot be born,” then it is likely that “a great variety of morbid symptoms” would appear, which is how he saw the rise of fascism in postwar Italy. Bourgeois hegemony as well as the “morbid symptoms” could only be overcome if the working-class movement was able to develop itself as a viable alternative in the eyes of substantial social layers – but this must involve opening “the struggle for an autonomous and superior culture” which would enable the working class to become “really autonomous and hegemonic, thus bringing into being a new form of State” and generating “the concrete birth of a need to construct a new intellectual and moral order, that is, a new type of society.”

Utilizing military analogies, Gramsci contrasted a political *war of position* with a political *war of maneuver*. A war of maneuver involves a direct assault on the enemy's positions and fortifications, a "final conflict" launched with the intention of winning an absolute victory, with (in this case) the working-class movement coming to power. But such an assault could be a disastrous failure in an advanced capitalist society, whose "fortifications" involved not only the institutions of the state, but also a cultural and ideological predominance within civil society. Preliminary to any hoped-for triumph in the "final conflict," the working-class movement would have to engage in something akin to a more protracted trench warfare – a war of position – that would increasingly narrow, isolate, and make vulnerable the terrain occupied by capitalist forces.

There must be extended struggles and multifaceted movement-building around immediate, democratic, and transitional demands, involving a variety of united fronts and alliances, undergirded with broad and multi-level socialist education. Through these methods the revolutionary party could establish strong positions on the social, cultural, and political field that would enable it to triumph over the powerful positions of the bourgeoisie when – through economic crises and other crises – revolutionary situations developed.

Some interpretations of Gramsci's thought on the political left argue that his discussions of gradually building up working-class "hegemony" and conducting a "war of attrition" against capitalism (as opposed to a revolutionary "frontal assault") anticipated the reformist Popular Front policies advanced by the mainstream of the communist movement of the late 1930s and after. Some scholars have also argued that Gramsci's thought was so unique that it represented a qualitative shift away from the traditional revolutionary Marxist framework (and, particularly among some postmodernists, many of his notions are advanced independently of any political-activist connections). But Gramsci himself appears to view what he wrote as reflections developed very much within the Leninist political framework that he embraced unambiguously in the early 1920s.

Many Gramsci scholars would concur with the characterization of the man advanced by Carl Marzani, the first person to introduce

Gramsci's thought to an English-speaking readership: "He is a Marxist in the great tradition of Marx himself, a thinker with an open mind, disciplined in the search for truth. . . . The deeper one's Marxism, the less one's dogmatism. . . . [Even in his last years] the thinking remains lucid, vigorous, trenchant, while the style continues posed and professional, spiced with humor, irony, and a genial twist of phrase."

SEE ALSO: Bordiga, Amadeo (1889–1970) and the Italian Communist Party; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marxism

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, P. (1976/7) The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci. *New Left Review* 100 (November/January).
- Cammatt, J. (1967) *Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Firoi, G. (1973) *Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolutionary*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Germino, D. (1990) *Antonio Gramsci: Architect of a New Politics*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Gramsci, A. (1973) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. Ed. Q. Hoare & G. N. Smith. New York: International Publishers.
- Gramsci, A. (1975) *Quaderni del carcere, edizione critica dell'Istituto Gramsci, 1929–1935*, 4 vols. Ed. V. Gerratana. Turin: Einaudi.
- Gramsci, A. (1977, 1978) *Selections from Political Writings, 1911–1926*, 2 vols. Ed. Q. Hoare. New York: International Publishers.
- Gramsci, A. (1988) *An Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916–1935*. Ed. D. Forgacs. New York: Schocken Books.
- Marzani, C. (1957) *The Open Marxism of Antonio Gramsci*. New York: Cameron Associates.

Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo

Rita Arditti

In March 1976 a military junta in Argentina established a reign of terror over the country's population. By the end of the dictatorship in 1983, thousands of people had disappeared, primarily leftists, journalists, and political activists. Argentine government sources estimate about 9,000 disappeared, while human rights organizations estimate around 30,000. People were kidnapped, tortured in clandestine detention

centers, and killed. The majority of the disappeared were between the ages of 16 and 35.

The relatives of the disappeared pressed the regime for justice and information about their loved ones. On April 30, 1977 a group of mothers gathered at the Plaza de Mayo in front of the presidential mansion, signaling the birth of their group, Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo). Some of them were looking for two missing generations: their children and grandchildren. On October 22, 1977, 12 of these women established what became known as Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo).

The majority of the children who disappeared were kidnapped with their parents or born in captivity in secret detention camps. Most of the pregnant women who were kidnapped were allowed to give birth and were killed afterwards. The Abuelas estimate that the number of missing children – the “living disappeared” – is about 500 (Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo 2007b). These children were given as war booty to families linked to the regime or abandoned, so that they would lose their identities. Separating the children from their families was a major strategy of the military, who believed that if the children grew up with their legitimate families they would end up hating the military.

The Abuelas became veritable detectives in the search for their grandchildren. They worked with forensic anthropologists to identify remains of the disappeared and asked scientists to develop a blood test that would show biological affiliation even when the parents of a child were dead. A grandparenthood test (with 99.99 percent accuracy) was soon developed and is now a standard procedure ordered by judges. In 1987 the Abuelas pressed the government to create a National Genetic Data Bank that would store the blood of relatives of the disappeared so that after their death it would still be possible to check the identity of the found children. The use of science to further human rights was the first of its kind and has since been applied in many other parts of the world (Arditti 1999).

The Abuelas conceptualized a new human right, the right to identity, which has been incorporated into the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, as part of articles 7, 8, and 11. The implications of the right to identity are vast and apply to illegal adoptions, trafficking of children, and other forms

of oppression. As of March 2008, the Abuelas have found and identified 88 children. The organization and their president, Estela Barnes de Carlotto, have received numerous awards and recognition from governments, universities and institutes, international human rights organizations, and the United Nations.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Grassroots Workers' Movement: Villa Constitución, 1975; Argentina, Human Rights Movement; Cordobazo and Rosario Uprising, 1969; Ezeiza Protest and Massacre, 1973; HIJOS Movement, Children of the Disappeared; Madres de la Plaza de Mayo; Peronist Resistance

References and Suggested Readings

- Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (2007a) *La Historia de Abuelas. 30 años de Búsqueda*. Buenos Aires: Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo.
- Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (2007b) *Niños Desaparecidos. Jóvenes localizados. En la Argentina desde 1975 a 2007*. Buenos Aires: Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo.
- Arditti, R. (1999) *Searching for Life: The Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo and the Disappeared Children of Argentina*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Grass, Günter (b. 1927)

Stacy Warner Maddern

Born in 1927 in Danzig-Langfuhr to Polish German parents, Günter Grass is a political activist and writer whose work tends to be emotionally charged in reference to German guilt and the atrocities of the Nazis during World War II. In 1942, Grass was drafted into the Reichsarbeitsdienst (state labor service), and in November 1944 into the Waffen-SS. He would see combat with the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg and was wounded on April 20, 1945. Shortly thereafter he was captured and sent to an American POW camp. Grass's involvement with the Waffen-SS would remain a secret until 2006, when the author disclosed it in an interview for his memoir *Peeling the Onion*.

After the war, Grass worked as a farm laborer and miner and studied art in Düsseldorf and Berlin. In 1955 he became a member of Gruppe 47, a literary association in Germany that sought to inform the public on democracy after the fall of Hitler. During occupation, Gruppe 47 would have its publishing license revoked by the Allied forces on grounds of nihilism. In 1959, Grass

obtained international success with the novel *The Tin Drum*, which was followed by *Cat and Mouse* and *Dog Years*, to form what is called the Danzig Trilogy.

The Tin Drum is recognized as the most highly acclaimed novel of postwar Germany. The novel's hero, Oskar Matzerath, refuses to grow during the war and it is only afterward that he is hit with an onslaught of guilt. The narrative is viewed as a symbolic tract to expose the country's guilt. The novel is an expression of atonement, something Grass would consistently revisit throughout his literary career. In the 1960s Grass became active in politics, participating in election campaigns on behalf of the Social Democratic Party and Willy Brandt, for whom he was a speech writer. The content of his political speeches and essays advocated that Germany be free from fanaticism and totalitarian ideologies. In both *The Flounder* and *The Rat*, Grass was very critical of civilization and pressed his concern to promote peace and environmental movements.

Grass was largely critical of the United States during the Cold War, claiming: "There's no shortage of great Führer figures; a bigoted preacher in Washington and an ailing philistine in Moscow." He was especially ashamed to be from a country that considered the United States an ally. After visiting Nicaragua in 1982 he asked: "How impoverished must a country be if it is not a threat to the United States?" He was equally critical when it came to the unification of Germany, fearing that a quick-moving process would lead to the economic exploitation of the East by capitalists in the West.

At the age of 10, Grass joined the Jungvolk, an organization that recruited boys into the Hitler Youth, and by 17 he was a soldier in the Waffen-SS. When he finally acknowledged his involvement he was harshly criticized and accused of being a hypocrite. In his memoir Grass acknowledged: "What I had accepted with the stupid pride of youth I wanted to conceal after the war out of a recurrent sense of shame. But the burden remained, and no one could alleviate it." It was with a moral certainty that Grass held himself accountable. In his recollection of narrative symbols he acknowledges: "Even if an author eventually becomes dependent upon the characters he creates, he must answer for their deeds and misdeeds." While he may have tried to represent German guilt through a fictional tract, it was the consciousness of his

own personal narrative that became the truest lesson of atonement. The work of Günter Grass represents a life subjected to turmoil by what is deemed national pride only to be self-realized in age by the consequences of collective guilt. What separates Grass from most is his acknowledgment of participatory crimes and a commitment to learn something from it.

SEE ALSO: Germany, Resistance to Nazism; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Schindler, Oskar (1908–1974); Social Democratic Party, Germany

References and Suggested Readings

- Arnds, P. (2004) *Representation, Subversion and Eugenics in Günter Grass's The Tin Drum*. Rochester, NY: Camden House.
- Grass, G. (1990) *The Tin Drum*. New York: Vintage.
- Grass, G. (2007) *Peeling the Onion*. New York: Harcourt.
- Irving, J. (2007) A Soldier Once. *New York Times*, July, p. 8.

Grassroots resistance to corporate globalization

Walden Bello

Crisis of Multilateralism

The World Trade Organization's first ministerial meeting, held in 1996 in Singapore, opened to an air of triumphalism, a sense among government delegates that corporate-driven globalization was the wave of the future. Mike Moore, the second director general of the organization, toasted the newly established WTO as the "jewel in the crown of multilateralism," and officials of the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank saw the remaining major task of global governance as the achievement of "coherence." All that was left to do, in their view, was to coordinate the neoliberal policies of the three institutions in order to ensure the smooth technocratic management of the global economy. Those who dissented from this view of the future were definitely a minority. Ten years later, the World Bank and the IMF held their annual meeting in Singapore behind the heavy protective shield of the Singaporean government,

which banned possible dissidents from entering the country on various pretexts. Seemingly triumphant a decade before, corporate-driven globalization was in very deep crisis due to widespread resistance.

Several factors indicated crisis. First was the loss of legitimacy of the key multilateral institutions that serve as the political canopy of corporate-driven globalization. For one thing, the IMF was practically defunct. Knowing how the Fund precipitated and worsened the Asian financial crisis, more and more of the advanced developing countries began refusing to borrow from it or paid ahead of schedule, with some declaring their intention never to borrow again. These include Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil, and Argentina. Since the Fund's budget greatly depends on debt repayments from these big borrowers, this boycott is translating into a budget crisis, creating what Ngaire Woods, an Oxford University specialist on the Fund, describes as "a huge squeeze on the budget of the organization."

The World Bank, having been central to the debacle of structural adjustment policies that left most developing and transitional economies that implemented them in greater poverty, with greater inequality, and in a state of stagnation, also began suffering a crisis of legitimacy. Robin Broad, one of the leading experts on the Bank, claimed that the crisis of the Bank was really more profound than that of the Fund, but that careful publicity on the part of the Bank allowed the organization to hide the truth. Even with the publicity campaign, the Bank found more and more governments reluctant to borrow heavily from it. Since the Bank, like the Fund, is mainly supported from debt repayments, this led to a budget crisis as well.

Perhaps the crisis of legitimacy was most acute at the WTO. Talks among the so-called Group of Six collapsed in acrimony. A key reason for this was that developing country governments, under pressure from their citizenries, no longer wanted to open their agricultural markets to dumped goods from the European Union and the United States and to allow their manufacturing industries and services to be bankrupted or taken over by transnational corporations. The pro-free-trade American economist Fred Bergsten once compared trade liberalization and the WTO to a bicycle: they collapse when they are not moving forward, and things had ceased to move forward.

Dimensions of the Crisis of Globalization

Other deeper indicators began to reveal crisis in the globalist project. In the 1990s the writings of the globalists celebrated the emergence of a functionally integrated global economy, the so-called borderless world. Ten years later, despite runaway shops and outsourcing, what passed for an international economy was still a collection of national economies – interdependent no doubt, but economies whose dynamics were still largely determined by internal factors.

Also in the 1990s, advocates of globalization insisted that state policies no longer mattered and that corporations would soon dwarf states. A decade later, however, the European Union, the United States government, and the Chinese state were stronger than before. Moreover, state policies, such as industrial policy and trade policy – that is, interfering with the market in order to build up industrial structures or promote welfare policies – still made a difference. Indeed, interventionist government policies had spelled the difference between development and underdevelopment, prosperity and poverty. Malaysia's imposition of capital controls during the Asian financial crisis in 1997–8 prevented it from unraveling like Thailand or Indonesia. And it was also strict capital controls that insulated China from the economic collapse engulfing its neighbors.

Globalists also expected the emergence of a transnational capitalist elite that would manage the world economy. Indeed, this was a project of Bill Clinton and his Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin. The adoption of a strong dollar policy in the mid-1990s that would assist the recovery of the Japanese and German economies, even at the expense of US firms, was Washington's way of saying that it had the long-term strategic interests of global capital in mind. A strong dollar translated into cheaper Japanese and German products in the US and European markets relative to US products, thus acting as a boost to Japanese and German recovery, as Robert Brenner (2002) pointed out. But the Clinton project was aborted under Bush. The transnationalized fractions of the different national capitalist classes have been overwhelmed by the nationalist fractions, and what resulted was a system of national elites in sharp competition with one another. For instance, the US elite did not sign the Kyoto Protocol in order to get the

European and Japanese elites to absorb most of the costs of global environmental adjustment and thus make US industry more competitive against them.

Causes of the Crisis

Three main factors led to this crisis. One was the preference of national capitalist classes for a strategy of shifting the burden of adjusting to the global crisis of overproduction and stagnation and the environmental crisis to each other rather than forging one common, cooperative response. A second factor has been the corrosive effects of the double standards displayed by the United States. While the Clinton administration tried to move the US toward free trade, the Bush administration preached free trade while practicing protectionism. Thirdly, there has been too much of a dissonance between the promise of globalization and free trade and the actual results of neoliberal policies, which have been more poverty, more inequality, and stagnation.

Perhaps the most critical factor in the collapse, however, has been people's resistance. The battles of Seattle in 1999, Prague in 2000, and Genoa in 2001, the massive global anti-war march on February 15, 2003, when the anti-globalization movement morphed into the global anti-war movement, Cancun in 2003, and Hong Kong in 2005 were critical junctures in the decade-long people's counter-offensive that has resulted in the equivalent of a Stalingrad for the neoliberal project. For over a decade before Seattle, the United Nations Development Program and other agencies had been publishing data showing the negative impact of Structural Adjustment Programs, neoliberal reforms, and corporate-driven globalization. However, these remained lifeless statistics that were largely ignored by the media, the academy, and policymakers that held on to faith-based assumptions about the beneficial impact of these measures and processes. Seattle, by bringing the message of the protestors so forcefully to world attention, turned abstract statistics into brutal facts. Paradoxically, Seattle made anti-globalization opinions respectable.

Down but not Out

Corporate-driven globalization entered a state of crisis, but it did not die. With things not

moving at the WTO, the big trading powers put emphasis on free trade agreements (FTAs) or economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with developing countries. These agreements are in many ways more dangerous than the WTO since they often require greater concessions in terms of market access and tighter enforcement of intellectual property rights. Moreover, the massive flow of corporate investment from the US, Japan, and Europe to China continued, with the tremendously negative consequences for workers in these countries as well as workers in China.

When it comes to FTAs, however, people in the South became aware of their interests and began to resist. The Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA) was derailed by the opposition of key South American governments, under pressure from their citizenries, during the Mar del Plata conference in November 2005. Also, many people came out to resist Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra because of his rush to conclude a free trade agreement between the United States and Thailand. It was assumed that the flow of labor from the rural areas of China, where some 700 million Chinese make an average of \$285 a year per capita, would ensure that wages would forever remain low and attractive to foreign capital. On the contrary, increasing resistance of migrant labor and peasants to the low wages, loss of land, and environmental poisoning has accompanied the foreign-capital intensive export-oriented model of growth. In 2004 the Public Security Bureau reported that the number of "mass incidents" had risen to 74,000. In 2005 the number jumped another 13 percent. All this resistance worried the leadership, and a "New Left" emerged and proposed hitching China's growth to the internal market. In order for that to happen, local wages would have to rise significantly to create consumers with purchasing power. That could mean the end of China as the nirvana of cheap labor and the haven of transnational corporations. This could also be accompanied by measures to take China on a more environmentally sustainable path.

The World Social Forum

The World Social Forum (WSF) was founded in Porto Alegre, Brazil in January 2001 as an alternative to neoliberalism. It served as the counterpoint to the World Economic Forum

that was taking place in Davos, Switzerland and it elicited widespread enthusiasm in its early years. Proclaimed as an “open space,” the WSF became a magnet for global networks on many issues, providing a place where they could come together, compare notes, and debate. Soon, regional versions of the WSF were spun off, the most important being the European Social Forum and the African Social Forum. The direct democratic experiences of Seattle, Prague, Genoa, and the other big mobilizations of the decade, then, were institutionalized in the WSF or Porto Alegre process.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchism and Sabotage; ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens); European Union Summit Protests, Gothenburg, 2001; G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; G8 Protests, Gleneagles, 2005; G8 Protests, Heiligendamm, June 2007; Global Day of Action Against Capitalism, June 18 (J18), 1999; Global Day of Action Against the IMF and World Bank, Prague, September 26 (S26), 2000; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; People’s Global Action Network; Indymedia Global Justice Campaign, 2000s; Reclaim the Streets; World Social Forums; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Cancun, 2003; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Doha, 2001; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Hong Kong, 2005; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Quebec City, 2001; Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Bello, W. (2004) *Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy* London: Zed Books.
- Bello, W. & Malig, M. (2006) The Sixth WSF in Caracas: A Shot in the Arm for Global Civil Society. Focus on the Global South, February 3. Available at www.focusweb.org/the-6th-wsf-in-caracas-a-shot-in-the-arm-for-global-civil-society-7.html.
- Brenner, R. (2002) *The Boom and the Bubble* New York: Verso.
- Broad, R. (2006) Research, Knowledge, and the Art of “Paradigm Maintenance”: The World Bank’s Development Economics Vice Presidency. *Review of International Political Economy* 13, 3 (August): 387–419.
- Center for Global Development (CGD) (2006) Reasons Why the IMF and World Bank Must Change, and Four Ways They Can. *CDG Brief*, April, p. 2.
- Kwong, P. (2006) The Chinese Face of Neoliberalism. *Counterpunch*, October 7–8. Available at www.counterpunch.org/kwong10072006.html.
- Mallaby, S. (2006) Why Globalization has Stalled. *Washington Post*, April 24.
- Santos, B. de Sousa (2004) The World Social Forum: Towards a Counter-Hegemonic Globalization. In F. Polet & CETRI (Eds.), *Globalizing Resistance*. London: Pluto Press.

Greece, anti-dictatorship protests

Loudovikos Kotsonopoulos

After a prolonged period of political instability in Greece, a small group of middle-ranking Greek army officers staged a successful coup d’état, under the auspices of the CIA, on April 21, 1967. Although signs of army interference in politics were omnipresent throughout the 1960s, there were no resistance activities against the military putsch on the part of the country’s political forces. Only after the establishment of the junta’s military regime did the first cells of resistance begin to emerge. At the outset was the creation of Democratic Defense (Δημοκρατική Άμυνα), a resistance group that comprised mainly prominent members of the academic community as well as liberal center-leftist intellectuals.

Subsequently, a group of political cadres and youth leaders associated with the left-wing party Union of the Democratic Left (EDA; ΕΔΑ), which since 1951 had acted as a proxy for the clandestine Greek Communist Party stationed at Bucharest, formed the Patriotic Anti-Dictatorship Front (PAM; ΠΑΜ) on April 30, 1967. Certain fragments of the liberal Center Union (Ενώση Κέντρου) party supporters also joined the resistance movement by founding various organizations such as the National Movement of Democratic Defense (EKDA; ΕΚΔΑ) and the National Resistance (Εθνική Αντίσταση). The aforementioned organizations formed the backbone of the early resistance movement. Their principal aim was to call into question the credo that the military regime was the unanimously recognized guardian of law and order. Hence the activities of this early wave of resistance were directed toward dynamic actions against carefully selected targets in order to pinpoint the weaknesses of the regime. In this respect, Democratic Defense launched a series of bomb attacks mainly against targets of American interests. Targets included an American Express

branch, numerous cars belonging to US military staff, and gas stations belonging to the ESSO-Pappas refinery. According to the public prosecutor in the trial of the organization, which took place in April 1970, Democratic Defense launched 19 bombing attacks with no civilian casualties other than five lightly wounded. However, the most spectacular act of resistance came from the centrist National Resistance on August 13, 1968, when Alexandros Panagoulis staged an unsuccessful attempt against the life of the regime's top man, George Papadopoulos. The left-wing PAM, on the other hand, directed its activities toward the distribution of leaflets, slogan painting, and implantation of concealed loudspeakers booming out anti-dictatorship slogans. Later on, as a token of radicalization, it formed a sabotage group called Group Aris (Άρηδ), which recorded an unsuccessful attempt to blow up the American Embassy in Athens in September 1970. The bomb went off inside the vehicle used for the attack, killing two of the group's members, Cypriot George Tsikouris and the Italian Elena Angeloni.

In retrospect, the strategy of armed struggle conducted by small clandestine cells of resistance seemed at the time the most efficient solution, since the preconditions for organizing a massive popular movement capable of bringing down the regime were completely lacking. It is worth mentioning that the passivity demonstrated by the Greek people during the early period of the regime could be explained by the fact that the military coup coincided with the completion of a very intense protest cycle extending throughout the 1960s. On the other hand, the organizational resources necessary for the development of a mass movement were missing as the bourgeois political parties were organized along patronage lines, and thus were unable and unwilling to support organized collective action. Only the Greek Communist Party possessed the practical knowledge to build up networks of resistance, since it had been a clandestine organization for a couple of decades due to its involvement in the Greek Civil War (1946–9), but its organizational ability was undermined in 1968 by the split between the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Communist Party of Greece (Interior) (KKE-Εσωτερικού).

Eventually the first wave of resistance came to a halt by 1969 when the most important clandestine organizations were disbanded by military

police and their members were imprisoned. From that time onwards, armed resistance played a marginal role in the anti-dictatorship struggle and was conducted by various left-wing groups. Despite their detention, the protagonists of this early wave of anti-dictatorship struggle continued their contribution to the resistance. Most of the imprisoned militants were brutally tortured by the regime and some of the cases went public, provoking a widespread international outcry against the junta. European public opinion, strongly influenced by prominent Greeks living in exile such as Mikis Theodorakis and Melina Merkouri, as well as by resistance organizations active abroad such as the Greek Committee (Ελληνική Επιτροπή) and the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (Πανελλήνιο Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο), successfully discredited the regime's detention practices, resulting in the withdrawal of the latter from the Council of Europe on December 12, 1969 so as to avoid conviction for torturing political prisoners. The early wave of the resistance dealt its most decisive blow against the junta in March 1970, when the regime put 35 militants of Democratic Defense on trial.

Anxious to gain an ideological victory against the liberal intelligentsia, the colonels allowed the newspapers to publish the proceedings of the trial. This initiative boomeranged against them, as it was the first time that people inside Greece could learn in detail, through the daily press, about the tortures conducted by the military police. They watched as numerous personalities of international caliber traveled to Greece to testify in favor of the accused professors. Most significantly, they witnessed important intellectuals, such as Panteion University professor Sakis Karagiorgas (who was a leading member of Democratic Defense), delivering rousing speeches in the courtroom on the virtues of democracy and freedom. Although most of the militants secured heavy sentences for themselves, they managed to question openly the morality and legitimacy of the regime. Broadly speaking, the early wave of resistance succeeded in isolating the military regime at a European level, and in some respects it paved the way for the development of a new wave of resistance characterized by massive collective action.

A preliminary sign of the people's propensity toward collective action was recorded on November 3, 1968 at the funeral of the leader of the Center Union party and former prime

minister, George Papandreou, also known as “democracy’s old man.” The funeral march of 300,000 people was transformed into a massive pro-democracy demonstration. Such spontaneous activity appeared occasionally, a case in point being the funeral of the Nobel Prize-winning poet George Seferis on September 22, 1971, which nevertheless failed to provide the impetus for the development of massive resistance activity. Similarly, the (to some extent) spontaneous strike activity of rank-and-file workers in 1970–1 did not manage to forge a political bloc against the dictatorship on the solid basis of an alliance of social interests. In fact, the only social grouping that succeeded in forming a massive resistance movement was the university students. The students participated in the resistance with a reference framework significantly different to that of the democratic struggles of the 1960s, which had shaped the political context of the early wave of resistance. Most of these students entered the universities after 1968, only to discover that the ideology of the military regime, enforced via particular structures of oppression, was utterly inconsistent with their own system of beliefs, forged by the post-1968 youth culture.

Daily actions of non-compliance with the regime’s cultural options involved listening to illegal songs, mainly those of Theodorakis, reading banned books, and watching forbidden movies. The first step toward the formation of collective resistance was the creation of the Greek European Youth Association (EKIN) in August 1970. This was a lawful association comprising students of various universities. Its primary aim was to organize public discussions on scientific and cultural issues in order to keep in touch with novel scientific and ideological trends in Europe.

By so doing, EKIN bypassed the official stance of isolation adopted by the pro-junta faculties and created an autonomous public sphere of criticism within which the students started to converse openly about matters concerning the situation inside the universities. Having already dismissed almost all dissident professors, the junta regime attempted to tighten further its control over the universities through the imposition of a new bill for higher education in 1972. The new legislation decreed that all appointments of professors would be made directly by the regime and that students would be required to possess a certificate of political beliefs from the police in order to enroll at their institutions. In an

attempt to enhance discipline within the universities and in order to secure the enforcement of the new measures, the regime appointed commissioners in each university charged with overseeing university life. It also appointed all members of the student unions’ councils so as to suppress student militancy. These measures were met with discontent on the part of the students, who started to self-organize around student action committees.

Throughout the spring of 1972 the students appealed to the courts against the appointed councils, since the latter refused to hold elections. They also bypassed the pro-junta student unions through the creation of lawful associations formed on the basis of their members’ geographical origin. Thus shortly before the disbandment of EKIN in May 1972, a series of associations, such as the Association of Cretan Students, emerged to coordinate student activity. The regime, confident of its capacity to control university life, called for student elections in November 1972, but the anti-regime students denounced them as phony and successfully boycotted them. As a result, the official student unions were completely discredited and a massive anti-dictatorship movement seized the opportunity by calling general students’ assemblies in each university faculty. In view of the situation, the military regime decided to conscript into the army 91 students of various faculties on February 13, 1973. This decision triggered extensive riots between the students and the police in the National Technical University (or Polytechnic School; hereafter Polytechnio), the Law School, and the Economic University of Athens, which culminated in the first occupation of the Athens Law School on February 22.

Although the occupation was terminated within 24 hours following the rector’s intervention, on February 24 university students across Greece abstained from their lectures as a token of solidarity with their conscripted colleagues. Evidently, what had begun as a mobilization to settle university-specific issues was evolving into a massive anti-dictatorship movement. On March 20, 1973, 4,000 students reoccupied the Athens Law School – only this time the occupants were shouting for freedom. The occupation was eventually brutally terminated by the police 24 hours later. The politicization of the movement was enhanced further by student organizations

attached to the political parties of the left. The most important of them were Rigas Pheraios (Ρήγας Φεραιός), linked to the Communist Party of Greece (Interior), and anti-EFEE (Αντι-ΕΦΕΕ), linked to the Communist Party of Greece. These were accompanied by various leftist groups such as the pro-Maoist Anti-Imperialist Anti-Fascist Student Association of Greece (AASPE; ΑΑΣΠΕ). It should be noted that although there was a proliferation of student organizations, the antidictatorship student movement remained to a large extent autonomous. The second occupation of the Law School was followed by the intensification of the students' anti-dictatorship struggle at all levels.

The massive nature of the movement was promoted by two political facts. First was the stillborn movement of navy officers against the regime on May 22, 1973, which, even though a failure, demonstrated that the junta regime was not supported by all segments of the armed forces. The second was the transition of the regime from a formal dictatorship to a dictatorship with a democratic façade, from *dictadura* to *dictablanda*. The government conceded some liberties, such as amnesty for political prisoners and the appointment of Spyros Markezinis (a right-wing politician) as prime minister in October 1973, but real power remained in the hands of the dictator George Papadopoulos.

Relentless student protests were emboldened by the prospect of liberalization, ending in the famous Polytechnio revolt. On November 15, 1973, students from the Law School sought refuge inside the Polytechnio after an anti-dictatorship march accompanied by street fighting with the police, by that time a relatively common occurrence. Students decided to occupy the Polytechnio building to protest the police brutality. Throughout the night, thousands of students gathered in the Polytechnio to support the occupation. Apart from blocking the city center the students established a radio station transmitting anti-junta messages.

The people of Athens expressed solidarity with the students, and several rank-and-file workers and pupils from the majority of Athens schools actively supported the takeover, while thousands of students occupied university buildings in other major cities, namely Thessaloniki, Patra, and Ioannina. The dictatorship was faced with a rapidly spreading student revolt with large popular support. The regime ordered the army

to suppress the revolt, and during the night of November 17, armed forces accompanied by armored tanks rolled over the Polytechnio gates, killing numerous students. Simultaneously, the junta's snipers fired into the crowd gathered around the Polytechnio, injuring and killing many civilians and students. Brutal tactics were applied to terminate the student occupations in every major university in the country.

The immediate result of the revolt was the overthrow of the dictator, George Papadopoulos, by his colleague and chief of the repressive military police, George Ioannides. What followed was the return into a *dictadura* – and the hunting down of all suspected dissidents, especially students, by the military until July 1974, when the dictatorship collapsed following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Although the junta's downfall was set off by the Cyprus imbroglio, the student movement created a profound crisis of legitimization for the military regime.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Greece; Chile, Popular Resistance against Pinochet; Greece, Partisan Resistance; Greece, Socialism, Communism, and the Left, 1850–1974; Greece, Socialism, Communism, and the Left, 1974–2008; Greek Nationalism; Indonesian Protests against Suharto Dictatorship; Korea, Post-World War II Popular Movements for Democracy

References and Suggested Readings

- Athanassatou, G., Seferiades, S., & Rigos, A. (Eds.) (1999) *The Dictatorship 1967–1974: Political Practices, Ideological Discourse, Resistance*. Athens: Kastaniotis Editions (in Greek).
- Dafermos, O. (1999) *Students and the Dictatorship: The Anti-Dictatorship Student Movement 1972–1973*. Athens: Gavrielides Editions (in Greek).
- Korovessis, P. (1969) *La filière: Témoignage sur les tortures en Grèce*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
- O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P., & Whitehead, L. (Eds.) (1986) *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Seferiades, S. (1998) Protest Movement and Politics: Greek Trade Unionism before the Dictatorship (1962–1967). *Greek Political Science Review* 12 (November): 5–34.
- Vlachou, E. (Ed.) (1971) *Free Greek Voices*. London: Doric Publications.
- Yannopoulos, G. (1972) The State of the Opposition Forces since the Military Coup. In R. Clogg & G. Yannopoulos (Eds.), *Greece under Military Rule*. London: Secker & Warburg.

Greece, partisan resistance

*Giannis (Jean-Marie) Skalidakis and
Christos Giovanopoulos*

Armed Resistance against the Nazi Occupation and Puppet Governments (1941–1944)

Greece was occupied by the Wehrmacht in April 1941 during the German campaign in the Balkans. Before the occupation, the Greek army had fought successfully against Italian aggression in the autumn of 1940. After Greece's defeat, the country was divided into three zones of occupation: Italian (the largest zone), German, and Bulgarian. The government and King George II fled the country along with the British troops after the latter's defeat in the battle of Crete (May 1941). A new collaborationist government with General Georgios Tsolakoglou as prime minister was installed by the forces of occupation.

The dreadful consequences of the new order were soon felt. The larceny of the country's food supplies and equipment by the occupiers, the wholesale destruction of its transportation system, and a naval blockade imposed by the Allies led to a famine which in the winter of 1941–2 left more than 50,000 dead in Athens alone. The country's very existence came under threat due to claims upon Greek territories by Italy and Bulgaria. In this context, the need for organized resistance by the Greek people against the new order of conquerors and their collaborators was vital.

The largest resistance organization in wartime Greece was the National Liberation Front (EAM), which was an initiative of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). It was formed in September 1941 with the participation of other smaller parties of the left: the Socialist Party of Greece (SKE), the Union of Popular Democracy (ELD), and the Agrarian Party of Greece (AKE). From the beginning EAM was concerned with the possibility of armed struggle. While EAM was organizing its political struggles and the economic, political, and social conditions for an armed struggle were taking shape, the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) was founded by EAM in Athens in February 1942.

Since the country had no recent experience of partisan war, preparations and training were undertaken from scratch. Under these conditions, the skills of Aris Velouhiotis (1905–45) proved invaluable. Born Thanasis Klaras, Velouhiotis was at the time already a veteran communist, having spent many years in exile under the former regime of dictator Ioannis Metaxas. Velouhiotis and his small group of partisans started off in the mountains of central Greece. Despite having to draw men and supplies from the weak communist organizations in the local villages, Velouhiotis's group turned out to be very successful. First, the partisans (*andartes*) came out of hiding and entered the villages to speak about the national liberation and the need to struggle. The villagers were impressed and many joined the partisans.

A second important step was the confiscation of agrarian production, which up to that point had been gathered by services of the state in warehouses and redistributed to the producers – who kept a small amount for the partisans' needs. The conflict between the collaborationist government and the agrarian population over this production, the small but vital organizational and political support offered by EAM and KKE, and the uncontested skills of Aris Velouhiotis all resulted to the consolidation and strengthening of the partisan armed resistance. This first period was marked by the first major battle between ELAS and an Italian platoon in the Rika position of the Giona mountain on September 9, 1942. The Italian platoon was completely defeated.

During the Axis occupation, the British tried to control the Greek resistance and to coordinate it for their own political and warfare purposes. For this reason, small British military groups entered occupied Greece. The first such group under the command of Major Myers entered Greece on October 1, 1942 with the goal of cutting off the railway connection between Athens and Salonika. The task brought together forces from both ELAS under Velouhiotis and the National Republican Greek League (EDES), which was another, smaller guerilla resistance group under Colonel Napoleon Zervas. The partisans attacked the Italian guards on the railway bridge at Gorgopotamos and successfully blew up the bridge (Margaritis 2003).

During the subsequent period up to spring 1943, political struggle in Athens intensified.

The capital was shaken by massive demonstrations organized by EAM which made political and economic demands against the occupation and the collaborationist government. As a result, the influence and strength of EAM increased. Nonetheless, ELAS was also growing in the countryside, from approximately 500 partisans in December 1942 to more than 10,000 in April 1943 (Sarafis 1980). Large parts of Greece's countryside were liberated along with some bigger towns. Several battles in Thessaly forced the Italian forces to abandon the area (Margaritis 2003).

ELAS was reorganized into an army that could fight tactical battles and drew a great number of officers from the former Greek army. A well-known republican colonel, Stefanos Sarafis, became the commander of ELAS. An organizational formula of a three-member leadership was adopted, from the General Staff down to every unit in May 1943. At the head was the army commander (Stefanos Sarafis), the political leader from EAM (Andreas Tzimas), and the *kapetanios* (captain) (Aris Velouhiotis). The *kapetanios* had been the partisans' leader before the restructuring of ELAS and was now responsible for supplies, morale, and army discipline, amongst others (Mazower 1993).

Up to the summer of 1943, ELAS numbered 30,000 fighters. Its strength led to the formation of a semi-governmental apparatus that was responsible for the administration of the liberated territories, which formed a large area designated as "Liberated Greece" (*Eleftheri Ellada*). In 1944, the EAM administration formed a government of the liberated territories, the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA). Meanwhile, ELAS was recognized by the Allies and was given some military aid by the British. Unfortunately, Britain was deeply concerned about the growth of ELAS, which was not only not under its political control, but worse, was even connected through EAM to the Communist Party. For this reason, British liaison officers in Greece made great efforts to enforce other (minor but more loyal) partisan groups like EDES and National and Social Liberation (EKKA). This eventually led to armed conflicts between these partisan groups and ELAS over disputed areas of control from autumn 1943 to spring 1944.

On September 8, 1943, Italy capitulated. As an Allied force, ELAS demanded and forced the Italian troops in its area to surrender to its units.

At a stroke ELAS solved its biggest problem, namely, the supply of weapons and ammunition. As an army of 35,000 men, not a small partisan army, it represented a direct continuation of the former Greek national army led by skilled Greek officers, combining this with the political orientation of EAM. Only the Wehrmacht could confront ELAS in Greece. In fact, the German forces had to reconquer the country following the Italian capitulation. In October 1943, a vast campaign of anti-guerilla operations began. This translated into the methodical destruction of all infrastructure that could support the armed resistance: villages, farms, and livestock were burned down and destroyed, mass executions terrorized the population, and entire communities were slaughtered.

In December 1943 in the village of Kalavryta, the 117 German Jäger Division executed more than 1,000 male residents. These retaliation operations and the war against the resistance forces in general also involved Greek paramilitary groups, the Security Battalions (Tagmata Asfaleias). These battalions were formed by the collaborationist government of Ioannis Rallis and were equipped and led by the Germans, especially the Waffen-SS. One estimate shows that more than 30,000 people were killed in the context of these terrorist operations by the Germans and their collaborators (Margaritis 2003). As a result of the armed resistance in Greece, it is also estimated that the Italian army lost approximately 2,000 men and the Germans another 5,000. A vital contribution by ELAS was the stopping of production and export of chromium from Greece to Germany to cover the latter's military needs.

During the summer of 1944, PEEA and EAM participated in a government of National Unity under Georgios Papandreou. While the Cazerta agreement of September 28, 1944 between the British and the Greek resistance forces recognized British General Ronald Scobbie as the supreme commander of all the Greek and British forces operating in Greece, ELAS had already liberated a major part of the country. On October 12, 1944, the German army left Athens – the moment of liberation had arrived.

After liberation the government of National Unity was confronted with a ruined country. The former political parties, effectively absent from the resistance struggle and participating solely in the governments in exile under the auspices of the British, now had to confront the great

political power of EAM, whose biggest party was the Communist Party, and its armed forces, ELAS, numbering 45,000 men. The disarmament of ELAS was the the most pressing issue for the British and for the political parties loyal to them, as well as for the Greek economic elites – both old and new, the latter profiting through collaboration with the occupation regime.

General Scobbie demanded the disarmament of ELAS. As EAM and ELAS refused his demand, the left ministers quit the government of National Unity and it subsequently ceased to exist on December 1, 1944 (Iatrides 1981). Two days later, on December 3, a huge demonstration was organized by EAM to protest these events. Police officers opened fire and killed many unarmed demonstrators. The next day a general strike and several clashes took place in Athens. In the countryside, ELAS forces rather easily disarmed the newly formed police service. The clashes in Athens escalated progressively as neither side could control the capital. The British were increasingly involved in the battles day after day, always on the side of the troops loyal to the government. Overall, the British troops that participated in the December events are estimated to have exceeded 80,000, far more than the troops that confronted the Germans in Greece in 1941.

As the situation worsened and the British casualties were severe, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill visited Athens during Christmas 1944. Negotiations between Churchill, Anthony Eden, Greek Archbishop Damaskinos, Greek Prime Minister Papandreu, and the leaders of EAM and KKE, Siantos, Partsalidis, and Mandakas, ended in failure. After 33 days of fierce fighting, on January 5, 1945, ELAS finally withdrew from Athens.

The Civil War (1946–1949)

Following the end of the December clashes and with the overall situation tipping against them, the leaders of EAM-ELAS decided to agree to a political solution and to disarm ELAS. With the Agreement of Varkiza of February 12, 1945, all armed forces were to disarm and a new National Army was to be formed. A plebiscite on the question of the return of the king was to be held, as well as general elections for a Constitutional Convention. Yet a highly problematic point was that amnesty given for political crimes could easily be misinterpreted by the state's courts.

Indeed, the new governments, with British support, had decided to crash the left movement and to deny it any decisive role in the country's politics. A wave of "white terror" spread through the country as former EAM-ELAS members were brutalized and murdered in the streets and others taken to court and convicted for fictitious crimes – even for collaboration with the enemy. Paramilitary acts against leftist citizens were primarily organized by the right-wing government of Constantinos Tsaldaris, which emerged from the elections of March 31, 1946. One year after the Varkiza Agreement, left-wing citizens had suffered 1,192 murders, 6,413 injuries, 6,567 robberies, and 572 assaults to offices of left-wing newspapers and magazines, according to National Solidarity (*Ethniki Allilegii*), an EAM organization. In June 1946, the so-called "Third Resolution" was adopted by the government, which punished by death a vast range of activities against the "nation" or the "authorities" – clearly a political act against the left movement and the former partisans. In the next month, the first seven to be convicted were executed, amongst them a teacher, Eleni Gini, the first woman to be executed in Greece.

In this context, and pressured by the former partisans who were hunted by the state, the Communist Party decided to respond to the state's violence in military terms. On October 26, 1946, the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE) was founded under the leadership of Markos Vafeiadis, a former *kapetanios* of ELAS and member of the Communist Party. Meanwhile, a plebiscite in September 1946 brought back King George II and the army took over responsibility from the police for maintaining order in the largest part of the country. General Constantinos Ventiris, Commander of the General Staff, was a representative of the far right in the army.

In the international context, the Cold War had already begun: the Truman Doctrine for aid to Greece was the forerunner of the Marshall Plan. As Great Britain could not afford any further involvement in Greece, the United States were eager to take its place and did so with the provision of economic as well as military aid.

In 1947 the civil war was raging. The National Army, despite American aid, could not exterminate the partisans. In the political field, the circulation of the left's newspapers was banned, and after the Communist Party formed a Provisional

Democratic Government with Markos Vafeiadis as its prime minister, it too was outlawed by the end of the year.

An important aspect of the civil war in Greece was the foundation of the military camp in the deserted island of Makronisos. There, soldiers suspected of having left-wing sympathies were gathered and brutally tortured (often ending in murder), and were forced to deny their beliefs and even fight against the DSE. Many thousands of left-wing citizens were also exiled to small islands like Ikaria and Ai Stratis.

Despite the clear superiority of the National Army in terms of weapons and equipment thanks to US support, it still did not manage to defeat the DSE of the left partisans for another two years. The Democratic Army had some military successes in 1948, but could not tip the balance of power. Finally, in the summer of 1949, the National Army launched an all-out attack (even with planes using napalm bombs) in the mountains of Vitsi and Grammos in northern Greece. The Democratic Army withdrew into Albania. The civil war ended, leaving behind 50,000 dead: 25,000 from the National Army, the police, and paramilitary groups and 25,000 from the Democratic Army. The political result was a state of repression and terror, which concluded in the military dictatorship of 1967–74.

SEE ALSO: Albania, Socialism; Greece, Anti-Dictatorship Protests; Greece, Socialism, Communism, and the Left, 1850–1974; Greece, Socialism, Communism, and the Left, 1974–2008; Greek Nationalism

References and Suggested Readings

- Baerentzen, L., Iatrides, J., & Smith, O. (Eds.) (1987) *Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War, 1945–1949*. Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum.
- Close, D. H. (1993) *The Greek Civil War, 1943–1950*. New York: Routledge.
- Hondros, J. (1983) *Occupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony, 1941–1944*. New York: Pella.
- Iatrides, J. (Ed.) (1981) *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*. London: University Press of New England.
- Margaritis, G. (2000) *History of the Greek Civil War, 1946–1949*. Athens: Vivliorama (in Greek).
- Margaritis, G. (2003) The Armed Resistance. In *History of New Hellenism*, 8. Athens: Ellinika Grammata (in Greek).
- Mazower, M. (1993) *Inside Hitler's Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–44*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sarafis, S. (1980) *ELAS: Greek Resistance Army*. London: Merlin Press.

Greece, socialism, communism, and the left, 1850–1974

George Margaritis

Throughout the nineteenth century Greece remained a small country with a population of approximately 750,000; geographically it comprised Peloponnesus, the Cyclades islands, and the hinterland of Athens reaching up to the Lamia region in the north. The annexing of the Ionian islands in 1864 and of the Thessaly region in 1881 did not alter the overall picture significantly: the majority of Greeks lived outside the country's contemporary borders up until 1912. The main centers of what might be called a Greek bourgeois class were to be found in Constantinople, Smyrna, Alexandria in Egypt, in the Russian coast cities on the Black Sea, or elsewhere around the East Mediterranean basin.

This small kingdom missed the first industrial revolution of the steam engine and continued to be an agrarian society. A deficient railroad network was built after the 1880s but was not completed until almost 20 years later. Shipping was active but it was only in the city of Hermoupolis, on the island of Syros, that it had an obvious industrial impact. Mining was another important activity, yet it was mainly to be found on some islands – Euboea, Melos, and Naxos – near the coast, and the technology used was rudimentary. The combination of these factors meant that there was nothing to give rise to a well-defined working class.

Social tensions were never acute in the cities or in the provinces. The agrarian economy was based mainly upon small family holdings. For farmers the main problem was the merchant, not the landowner. Furthermore, migration was a useful channel, always ready to absorb problems, impasses, and frictions.

The appearance of Saint-Simon followers during the reign of King Otto (1830–62), son of King Ludwig of Bavaria, did not prove enough to create a socialist tradition in the country. The revolutionary events of 1848 did not affect Greece in spite of the arrival of political refugees from Italy, Poland, Hungary, and other countries. The annexing of the Ionian islands in 1864 added some radicalism to Greek political thought and a number of intellectuals

began to explore socialist ideas of the nineteenth century.

The working class, based in the mining industry (in the Lavrion area of Attica), held occasional strikes and other demonstrations throughout the nineteenth century. Even so, no events that could compare to the unrest prevailing in other European countries occurred in Greece.

By the end of the nineteenth century Greek intellectuals from abroad had pioneered socialism in Greece, including Plato Drakoulis, who in 1908 founded the League of the Working Classes of Greece and in 1909 the Socialist Party of Greece. These groups enjoyed a limited success but were short-lived; yet such initiatives became more frequent and tenacious just before the Balkan Wars.

In 1911, Nikos Yiannios from Constantinople founded the Socialist Center, and the subsequent year the Socialist League of Greek Youth, whose membership comprised some hundreds of partisans. Some trade unions followed but, overall, their influence was also limited and of short duration. Building a socialist movement in the country proved to be a very difficult task, and yet new leaders emerged to continue the effort, including Panagis Dimitratos from the island of Cephalonia.

In Ottoman Salonika, socialism appeared to have a better chance, in part due to the influence of the Young Turks movement of 1908. The equality the latter declared between the different nationalities and religions of the empire, along with the political liberties granted, appeased past nationalistic tensions and allowed for the propagation of a socialist way of thinking. The Macedonian Struggle – the nationalistic dispute over the Macedonian region – had painfully divided the city and its surrounding region for almost ten years.

Members of the city's sizable Jewish community took the initiative to transform this socialist-friendly mood into an organized working-class movement. The first Workers' Club of 1908, created by Jewish workers, saw unexpected success and was promptly upgraded, in April 1909, to the Workers' League of Salonika. Avraam Benaroya, a worker, was the most eminent leader of this socialist association. Workers from the other communities of the city, such as Muslims, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Armenians, came together in the same class organization by embracing this important Jewish core (including,

for example, the union of Jewish tobacco workers – which had approximately 1,000 members before 1908). Mass demonstrations held throughout the summer of 1909 revealed the new possibilities opening up for the movement. The suppression it suffered at the hands of the Turkish authorities served to convince a yet larger part of the population of the right of its cause. In August 1909 a unitary conference of both worker and socialist groups of the city, disregarding their national identity, founded a political workers' party – the Federation. This was by far the most important of all the organizations that had made their appearance in Greece, as well as in the regions that were to be annexed by the Greek state in the years to follow.

The first journal of the Federation, the *Worker's Voice*, was printed in four different languages: Spanish-Hebrew, Greek, Turkish, and Bulgarian. Subsequent papers, *Solidaridad Obrera* and *Avanti*, had most of their articles published in Spanish-Hebrew. It is through these papers and the public declarations of the Federation's leaders that we can define the ideology and the political stance of the organization: the influence of German social democracy and of Karl Kautsky seemed to be the strongest current. In 1909 the Federation was linked with the Second International.

Following the Balkan Wars (1912–13), Salonika was incorporated into Greece, whose leadership was anxious to give a Greek identity to the city. The Federation, which had opposed the war and called for the working class not to participate in what was not its own affair, was now faced with the new situation. Under these circumstances it became urgent to establish contacts with Greek socialists. In spite of this rather unfavorable situation, the year 1914 saw the biggest mobilization (to that date) of workers in Salonika and elsewhere. Greek authorities responded with arrests and deportations, mainly of Jewish unionists and socialists. The repression of social disorder had a clear nationalistic aspect.

War in the Balkans broke out in 1912. Socialist initiatives to oppose nationalistic passions were important in this area and it was in the summer of 1915, a few months before Zimmerwald, that a conference of socialist movements in the Balkans met in Bucharest to condemn the war and to proclaim a Balkan Socialist Federation as part of a new International. In this conference Greece was represented by the Federation and the groups collaborating with it.

However, when Greece decided to enter the war, socialists found themselves as divided as the other political forces of the country. Yiannios and his followers opted for the immediate participation of Greece on the side of the Entente powers; the Federation and others championed neutrality – the former aligned with the Venizelist (Democratic) Party, the latter with the royalists. It was on the subject of neutrality that the Federation and other socialist forces of northern Greece collaborated with royalists in the elections of March 1915, electing two deputies to the Greek parliament (Aristotelis Sideris and Alberto Couriel).

Greek socialists were also divided in 1917 over their attitude towards the Russian Revolution. Some, like Dimitratos, saw the revolution as a personal coup d'état of Lenin. Others (including Plato Drakoulis, Demosthenes Ligdopoulos, and the members of Socialist Youth) were enthusiastic about what was taking place in Russia from the very beginning and aligned their cause to that of the Bolsheviks.

The so-called Venizelos era in Greek politics began in 1910 and was marked by the extensive renewal of the country's members of parliament. Among these new politicians some had socialist ideas, in the loosest definition of the term. The movement of the "sociologists" for example, led by Alexandros Papanastassiou, formed an important branch of the Venizelist political reform. A strong workers' movement serving Venizelist aspirations comprised an integral part of the political planning of the Cretan leader. In this sense his leadership was always favorable to trade union organizations or even to socialist political actions. In 1917 what could be described as a Greek working class comprised only a few tens of thousands of workers. But Venizelists were impressed by the dynamism of this small social class: between 1912 and 1916, a number of important strikes demonstrated the possibilities of the movement and made a possible alliance with it an important issue for the major political forces in the country.

Following a series of failures, the process of unification of the various different socialist groups began in the summer of 1917, with the mediation of the Second International. Venizelos was in power, having overthrown King Konstantinos, and joined the Entente powers in the war. As he sought to maximize his claims in the Peace Conference based on national claims, he

urgently needed some Greek presence in the European socialist movement to promote his policy. For this purpose, he appointed a Greek socialist delegation to the Socialist Conference that was held in London in February 1918.

However, Venizelos's desire to use the socialist influence to promote his own vision had further consequences. In September 1918 he called a meeting with the most prominent socialist and trade unionist leaders of Greece, mainly those of the Federation. At this meeting it was decided that the government would not oppose any attempt to create a unified social political party nor a confederation of existing trade unions and workers' organizations. In this way Greek socialists and trade unionists were given an unexpected opportunity to establish their political and unionist status.

In October 1918 the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (GSEE) was founded in Athens. It represented almost all of the organized workers of Greece, about a third of the country's total workforce. The influence of Benaroya gave the tone to the final decisions, which were far more radical than Venizelos would have wished. Class struggle was accepted as a basic theory. In November the same radical leaders founded the Socialist Workers' Party of Greece (SEKE), which was later to become the Communist Party.

The war with Turkey (1919–22) ended with a near total collapse of Greece's state structure. The Greek army was entirely destroyed and hundreds of thousands of refugees crossed the Aegean Sea along with the defeated soldiers. In 1923 the agreement between the governments of Greece and Turkey to proceed with a general exchange of populations changed the character of Greek society dramatically. The country was to receive between 1.2 and 1.5 million Christian subjects of the ex-Ottoman empire in exchange for the half a million Muslims left behind in the new Greek territories. Refugees became a new social category that had to be incorporated into the main population.

It was a painful period and many officials, including diplomats of the Foreign Office in Greece and officials in the Society of Nations, considered it to be a revolutionary one, having in mind what had happened earlier in Germany or even in Russia. But Greece was a different case altogether. Soldiers returning from the long war preferred to return home rather than take any form of political action, and most refugees were

too exhausted and hungry to foment a revolution. The pro-Venizelist coup, the exile of the king, the proclamation of a republic, and the execution of six members of the royalist regime were more than sufficient to absorb popular anger.

Socialists had almost no influence over these events, partly because theirs was still a divided movement. The most prominent socialist intellectuals followed the Venizelist liberals, attracted by the radical political initiatives that the latter took shortly after the Asia Minor defeat. Papanastasiou, a former leader of the so-called “sociologists” (and now leader of the Democratic Union), became prime minister, using his socialist identity to promote the anti-royalist policy of Venizelos. On the other hand, communists had to deal with strong internal conflict in order to align themselves with the principles and the policy of the Comintern, a goal achieved in 1924 when the name of the party changed to become the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), a Greek section of the Communist International. An important faction of the trade union movement kept its distance from political parties and searched for an independent route to improve workers’ conditions.

Strikes were common throughout this period and often turned into combative demonstrations suppressed violently by the police or even the army. Yet there was nothing that could be described as an open rebellion with any serious political repercussions. Up to 1930 the League of Nations helped the country to resolve its acute refugee problem through the Commission of Rehabilitation of Refugees (EAP). A smooth social policy combined with bold agricultural reform proved able to absorb pressure from below. Communists and other radical elements of the left often found themselves obliged to follow events, rather than to create them. In a society with many urgent problems to resolve, some abstract reference to a socialist revolution was not a high priority. This situation, combined with friction within the Soviet Union, forced the KKE to isolate itself in a quest for its own identity. Its influence dropped considerably: in the elections of 1928 the party had only 1.41 percent of the vote, and in 1931 its organized strength was fewer than 1,800 members.

The Macedonian question and sectarianism marked the first period of the Communist Party. The Comintern opposed the partitioning of the Balkans as dictated by the Paris Conference at the

end of World War I. A Balkan communist confederation was founded to propose a communist solution to national disputes. Greek communists protested against this directive, claiming that the large exchange of populations between Bulgaria and Greece had in reality solved the national identity problem of the Greek part of Macedonia, which was now clearly Greek. Nevertheless, the official position of the Comintern was adopted up until 1928. This proved to be a hazardous choice: the young party found itself at the epicenter of a nationalist turmoil which gave its enemies a dangerous advantage. Many considered it to be a form of pan-Slavic organization working for the interests of Slav people rather than the Greeks. KKE was declared illegal for the first time during the Pangalos dictatorship in 1925; its illegalization was mainly a consequence of this Macedonian policy.

Internal crisis was a persistent condition within the KKE and most of its leaders were obliged to leave: Benaroya in 1924, Yannis Kordatos (a historian and the intellectual secretary of KKE) and Pouliopoulos in 1927, and Maximos in 1928, along with hundreds of lower cadres and militants. The radicalization of the party led to a widespread rupture in the trade union movement. In the summer of 1925 the KKE broke its relations with the GSEE and in 1929 founded the Unified General Confederation of Greek Workers (EGSEE).

The central state authorities in Athens had always considered communism to be a major threat. Suppression of the workers’ movement was a permanent preoccupation for the state administration. During the third Liberal government under Eleftherios Venizelos, such oppression became a constitutional policy. By 1929 a notorious new law (*idionymo*) had been created, legislating against all communist activity; after 1931 this was used against any form of contest in the difficult years that followed. From 1929 to 1931, 12,000 people were persecuted and many hundreds of them were sentenced to prison terms of one year or longer.

Such a policy of violent suppression did not produce the expected results – on the contrary, persecuting any political disagreement and any democratic, socialist, or even liberal idea as a “communist” one meant that the communists gained a leading reputation as the protectors of political and social liberties – even when their own policy did not reflect this role. In fact, up

until 1931 the political practice of the KKE was characterized by voluntarism and sectarianism, accompanied by an intense, almost militaristic, activity. The approach that all reformists, social democrats, and liberals (not to mention Trotskyists) were allies of the bourgeois class and fascism – “social fascists” as they were frequently defined – made the political presence of the KKE a very isolated one.

In 1930–1 internal struggle and external pressure led the Communist Party to an impasse; however, the intervention of the Comintern helped resolve internal problems, while the complete failure of the social democratic government of Papanastasiou in 1932 helped reestablish the dominant position of the party inside the Greek left.

The Comintern imposed a new leadership upon the KKE from November 1931. Nikos Zachariades, 31 years old at the time, was elected to be the secretary general of the party in 1934. The new leadership, backed by the mechanisms of the Comintern, changed the internal structure of the party, dissolved factions, and imposed discipline at all levels. The policy of “social fascism” was abandoned progressively, to give way to a more flexible policy. From 1933 onwards, the main threat was recognized to be the spread of Nazism in Europe and, in the case of Greece, the restoration of the monarchy and the dictatorial tendencies and ambitions of the army.

The new direction was fully adopted in 1934 and the Communist Party tried to organize an anti-fascist front, searching for allies among democrats, socialists, agrarians, or even anti-monarchist elements. In reality this entire surrounding political field proved to be very weak and too dispersed to form a coherent response to Greek totalitarianism. Communists did not succeed in influencing the political situation in 1935 when military coups marked the end of the Greek republic and the return of the monarchy. Nor did they succeed in preventing the arrival of the dictatorship emanating from the Greek palace and materialized in the figure of Ioannis Metaxas in August 1936. Nevertheless, the unitary policy of the communists impacted, in a way, upon the future. Their final efforts to prevent the dictatorship included overtures to the Liberal Party and the reunification of the trade union movement. While not quite enough to succeed, this activity nevertheless established

the KKE as the main political force combating fascism in Greece. Aspiring to a radical overthrow of the bourgeois parliamentary system, the party found itself to be the final defendant of a limited democracy.

On August 4, 1936, Ioannis Metaxas, backed by King George II of Greece and with no reaction from the two main political parties (populists and liberals), established a dictatorship. The Metaxas regime lasted for four and a half years, but the efforts of the dictator to consolidate his power through a massive fascist movement, the National Youth Organization (EON), failed. His was a profoundly anti-communist regime, with its main rhetoric including preventing a communist revolution and thus saving Greece from the fate of Spain at the time.

The Communist Party was once again declared illegal and its members were persecuted, put in jail, or deported to concentration camps or small islands across the Aegean Sea. A vast anti-communist campaign developed in many forms. On the eve of the war the organized force of the KKE had dropped to about 2,000 members, the large majority of whom were in prison or had been deported.

Nevertheless, the anti-communist focus of the Metaxas regime had unexpected consequences. While repression focused on communist activities, and all democratic opposition was identified as communist, previously held anti-communist feelings among liberal elites and middle classes faded away. The fact that almost 2,000 communist detainees in prisons and concentration camps refused to engage in any kind of compromise with the regime added a moral and political advantage to communist opposition. Thus the Metaxas regime’s repression gave the communists a leading position in the struggle for democracy, given the passivity of the “traditional” political formations during the same period.

On October 28, 1940, Greece entered World War II. The Italian invasion turned into an indecisive six-month war deep in the Albanian mountains. Germany invaded the country on April 6, 1941; Greek resistance collapsed soon after and the country was divided into three occupation zones: German, Italian, and Bulgarian.

The war proved to be the decisive moment for the Greek left overall, and for the communists in particular. At the beginning of the war, just a few hours after the Italian invasion, Nikos Zachariadis called from his prison cell for the

communists, with all their forces, to take part in the war effort, even if the latter was administrated by the Metaxas regime. His call was published and thus the illegal KKE came to be the only political party to publicly call for resistance. Zachariadis and 2,000 communists remained, of course, in prison and in April 1941 they were handed over to German military forces. Yet even in this way the patriotic prestige of the communist forces had significant gains: the political bases for an anti-fascist patriotic front had been established.

From the first days of Axis occupation the communists tried to create a large patriotic and anti-fascist front with the participation of all political parties, groups, or individuals regardless of their ideological beliefs. The effort was only delayed by the poor condition of the organized forces of the party, with fewer than 250 party members managing to escape from prison. In September 1941, the National Liberation Front (EAM) was founded. Its initial declaration was signed by the Communist Party and by a small number of political formations of the socialist left: the Union for Popular Democracy (ELD) and the Socialist Party of Greece (SKE), who were later joined by the Socialist Workers' Party (SEK), the Agrarian Party (AKE), and the Social Democratic Union (SDE). A few high-profile individuals from the old Liberal Party also joined the front.

The occupation regime turned out to be a system of brutal exploitation of all of the country's human, natural, and productive resources. Great numbers of people in the cities and in the countryside soon found themselves in a desperate condition. Several thousands of people, mainly in the cities, died of starvation during the terrible winter of 1941–2. Meanwhile, the deregulation of the economy, the emergence of black market activities, and the construction of important public works on behalf of the occupying forces (e.g., fortifications, roads, air and naval bases) created opportunities for enrichment and opened up a huge social gap, as many lost everything in order for a few to profit. This collaboration was an economic and social issue well before its evolution into a political one.

The appearance and development of the EAM was a social as well as a political process. The struggle against the Axis forces was also an expression of the struggle against social upheaval. The resistance movement accomplished a small

miracle in the country: in only a few months it became the principal political force, with 1.5 million organized militants in a total population of no more than 7.5 million people. A whole army, the Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS), with a front-line force of 50,000 and reserves of about 30,000 militants, was created, equipped mainly with Italian weapons left behind during the Italian collapse in September 1943. An unofficial administration was formed to cover almost one-third of the Greek territories, and an actual government – the Political Committee for National Liberation (PEEA) – was established in March 1944.

The Communist Party demonstrated political and tactical abilities during this period and consolidated its dominant position in the Greek left. It had become almost an entirely new party, as most of its old members were executed or killed during the occupation. The old leadership represented a minority in the new central committee and included Giorgis Siantos and Yannis Ioannidis, who assumed the responsibilities of the absent Zachariadis, who had been deported to Dachau earlier on. It was also a question of unitary policy, a practice almost unknown to the communists in the prewar past. In September 1944, the communists and their socialist or liberal allies in the EAM or PEEA joined a government of national unity.

In October 1944, at the time when the Axis forces evacuated Greece, the resistance movement (and within it the KKE) was the most important political force in the country. But compromise with the conservative forces was precarious and within a few weeks social tensions and political unrest overtook Athens. When British General Ronald Scobie ordered the demobilization of all "volunteer" military formations except the royalist third brigade, a new armed conflict occurred. In December 1944, for 33 days, fighting broke out all over Athens. The British faced an open revolt in the popular quarters of Athens and sent in expeditionary corps and elements from five different divisions, including almost 80,000 men, with air and naval gunfire, in order to defeat the ELAS and assume control of the capital. The bloodshed ended with a new compromise, the Varkiza Agreement (February 1945).

Political and physical persecution of the left and the resistance movement – "White Terror" as it was called – took on disproportionate dimensions during 1945 and 1946. The abstention of the

Communist Party and some of the socialist and liberal elements was a feature of the elections held on March 31, 1946, and the result was far from convincing. The new conservative government under Tsaldaris added new legal instruments to the already sizable anti-communist inventory of the Greek legal system.

In the summer of 1946 clashes between small groups of the persecuted, police forces, and irregulars of the anti-communist bands multiplied all over the country. After the monarchy was restored in September the tension soon turned into a civil conflict. At the end of October the Communist Party approved the creation of the Democratic Army of Greece (DSA) under the command of an ex-general of the ELAS, Markos Vafeiadis. Yet it was only in December 1947, when the KKE adopted military action as the main plank of its policy, that the conflict rapidly turned into an open war. Great Britain was obliged to detach itself from the Greek situation, having neither the financial nor the military means to support the conservative camp. From the beginning of 1947 the United States supplanted the British in this role. The Truman Doctrine was the first clear signal of the decisive American involvement in Greek affairs.

The Greek civil war lasted for three years until the end of 1949, with more than 50,000 fatalities. The communists formed a Provisional Democratic Government in the mountains and hoped for a general rupture between the East and West. Substantial military and humanitarian aid was sent to the Provisional Government and the Democratic Army through communist parties and trade unions of Eastern Europe. In 1948 and 1949 the rupture between Titoists in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union restricted all kinds of material support to the Greek communists.

The Democratic Government and the Democratic Army were in fact a purely communist affair and Nikos Zachariadis, who was reinstated in the post of secretary general after his repatriation from Dachau in June 1945, became the incontestable leader in this struggle. There was no form of national unity similar to that of the EAM during this conflict, in spite of the fact that the KKE assimilated this war as a struggle against imperialism and American occupation. American intervention was of course decisive for the final issue of the conflict, offering the conservative camp huge economic and military assistance.

However, with the exception of some advisors and specialists, there was no direct military involvement of US forces.

The EAM legacy did not survive the postwar tensions and most of the allies of the communists in the resistance movement chose to follow independent political options. It seems that an important section of the communists themselves, mainly in the big cities, rejected the military solution and instead preferred to retire from political activity. Plenty of those who opted for such passive resistance were concentrated by the authorities in the “reformation” camp of Makronissos Island (near Lavrion, Attica). In 1949 the Democratic Army was obliged, after crucial military defeats, to evacuate Greece and to cross the border to Albania or Bulgaria, together with the main leaders of the communist movement.

At the beginning of the 1950s Greece entered the Cold War era with a political system inherited from the civil war. It was not a dictatorship, as elections were held and the parliamentary system was similar to that of the other West European countries, but with some crucial differences: all communist activities were illegal and laws relating to espionage or high treason could send people not only to jail but also to the firing squad. The monarchy, the army, and a number of secret organizations, such as the famous Sacred Bond of Greek Army Officers (IDEA), were always ready to take action in order to “protect the nation” from supposed communist infiltration and subversion. In 1950, 2,289 people were condemned to death for communist activities, 22,000 were imprisoned, and 13,000 deported. Meanwhile, the bulk of the members of the Communist Party, numbering more than 30,000, found themselves dispersed in exile, mainly to Tashkent in the Soviet Union.

Back in Greece, liberal individuals, socialists, and former allies of the communists in the resistance movement created small organizations looking for ways to reestablish some kind of political representation of the left. In August 1951 a number of these political formations met to create a new united political expression of the left. The Unitary Democratic Left (EDA) was founded, bringing together the Socialist Party of Greece (Yannis Passalidis), the liberals of the left, the Radical Democratic Party (Michalis Kyrkos), and other smaller formations. The effort had the approval of the communist leadership in exile.

The impact of this new party was extensive, given the circumstances. Just a few weeks after its formation, the party received 10.57 percent of the vote in the general election, gaining ten deputies, all imprisoned or deported. In Athens and Salonika the electoral percentages were 20 percent and 28 percent respectively, reflecting the strong social background of this political formation. Of course the background of the EDA was a hotbed of internal as well as external tensions. As it included “legal” socialists and liberals, along with illegal communists, the dispute about its real character never ceased. The former wanted it to be a social democratic formation open to all possible collaborations with other political formations against the conservative right; the latter wanted it to function as no more than a legal expression of the illegal KKE. In spite of these internal conflicts the EDA received 25 percent of the vote in the elections of 1958, becoming the main political force of the opposition.

The Cypriot revolt against British colonialism gave the left the opportunity to once again organize mass mobilizations on a patriotic issue. The transformation of Greek society changed the audience of the left: the emergence of a middle class, mass migration to Germany or Australia which absorbed social tensions, the development of local industry, and public works, and the intense rebuilding of the great cities all changed the economic profile of Greek society and gave new dimensions to the democratic demands of the left. As the conditions changed, many more people needed political rights to defend and to promote their new social status. Liberal mobilizations at the beginning of the 1960s expressed this climate and brought demands for political change (and even socialism) to the fore. The left-wing tendency of the Union of the Center (Enossi Kentrou), the party that won the elections of 1963 and 1964 under the leadership of Georgios Papandreou, openly referred to a social democratic policy.

This must have been a step too far for the conservative forces within the country: interventions from the king and many brutal actions against the left took place, including the assassination of the EDA’s deputy Grigoris Lambrakis (1963), and the killing of left activists due to an explosion during the Gorgopotamos National Resistance anniversary celebrations (1964). The army took the initiative to uphold “law and order”: on April 21, 1967 a military coup gave

power to a junta consisting mainly of colonels of the Greek army. This form of dictatorship lasted until July 1974.

The dual presence of the Greek left in exile and in the interior of the country caused many frictions from 1951 up to the dictatorship. The coup took the organized forces of the left by surprise and there was virtually no opposition to the establishment of the colonels’ regime. Internal conflicts of the past came to the fore and, in 1968, the Communist Party of Greece split into two different parts: the traditional KKE and the KKE Office of the Interior (or KKE–Esoterikou). The crisis in the communist faction marked the democratic resistance against the dictatorship. It also permitted the emergence of a number of important organizations of the left, some with a communist profile (Maoists, etc.) and some with a social democratic – but no less combative – profile. The movement of Democratic Defense (Demokratiki Amyna) and the PAK (Panhellenic Liberation Movement) of Andreas Papandreou were the most important among them. The latter formed the nucleus of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), a party that was to govern Greece for almost 20 years after 1981.

SEE ALSO: Albania, Socialism; Anarchism, Greece; Bulgaria, 20th-Century Leftist and Workers’ Movements; Bulgaria, World War II Resistance and the Rise of Communism; Greece, Anti-Dictatorship Protests; Greece, Partisan Resistance; Greece, Socialism, Communism, and the Left, 1974–2008; Greek Nationalism; Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Yugoslavia, Anti-Fascist “People’s Liberation War” and Revolution, 1941–1945; Yugoslavia, Resistance to Communism, 1948

References and Suggested Readings

- Close, D. (2002) *Greece since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society*. London: Longman.
- Kordatos, Y. (1972) *History of the Greek Labor Movement*. Athens: Boukoumanis (in Greek).
- Leontaritis, G. (1976) *The Greek Socialist Movement and the First World War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Liakos, A. (1993) *Labor and Politics in Interwar Years Greece*. Athens: Commercial Bank of Greece (in Greek).
- Loulis, J. (1982) *The Greek Communist Party, 1940–1944*. London: Croom Helm.
- Margaritis, G. (2000) *History of the Greek Civil War, 1946–1949*. Athens: Bibliorama (in Greek).
- Mavrogordatos, G. (1983) *Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Moskov, K. (1982) *An Introduction to the History of the Workers' Class Movement in Greece*. Athens: Kastaniotis (in Greek).
- Noutsos, P. (1990) *Socialist Ideology in Greece 1875–1974*. Athens: Gnosi (in Greek).
- Tunkay, M. (Ed.) (1994) *Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1923*. London: British Academic Press and International Institute of Social History.

Greece, socialism, communism, and the left, 1974–2008

Christos Giovanopoulos and Giannis (Jean-Marie) Skolidakis

Greek history after the dictatorship is characterized by a transition from a post-civil war police state to democratic stability, known as *metapolitefsi* (Μεταπολίτευση). This process was to a large extent a reaction to the forceful political presence of a socialist and communist left movement, leading to a deeper integration of the traditional left in the “national backbone” of political life. At the same time, grassroots movements and a dynamic extra-parliamentary left contested this political mutation and reinforced antagonistic struggles, on some occasions with spectacular results. Thus it is no coincidence that the Greek left and communist movement remains one of the strongest in Europe.

The Radical Seventies (1974–1981)

The seven-year (1967–1974) dictatorship (“junta of colonels”) collapsed on July 24, four days after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus that was prompted by a failed coup d'état on the island (July 15). However, it was the Polytechnic School uprising of November 17, 1973 that managed to derail the process of gradual democratization of the military regime toward a pre-1967 model of limited democracy. A plan promoted by the dictatorship and accepted by a unified national political front – including the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and its Eurocommunist split Communist Party of Greece-Interior (KKE-Esoterikou; KKE-Εσωτερικού) – caused initial condemnation of the advocates of the revolt by KKE as agents provocateurs (*Panspoud-*

astiki 8, January–February 1974). The KKE's initial stance was quickly replaced by an attempt to recuperate the revolt as it was embraced by the people while dealing a blow to the regime.

The 1974–81 period is marked by political radicalization, the upsurge of a strong anti-imperialist and anti-American movement, and the struggle for the “dejunification” of the state apparatuses. Karamanlis, the most prominent conservative leader and first post-dictatorship prime minister, was forced to withdraw Greece from the military wing of NATO and called for a reconsideration of the presence of US bases in Greece. The absorption of this radicalization became a crucial element in the developments of the next period. Hence the political contract of *metapolitefsi* saw the legalization of the communist parties and of political activity (outlawed since the civil war in 1946). This in turn translated into drawing limits on acceptable activities and demands by the movement, expressed by the secretary of KKE Florakis's theory of “juntolitefsism,” namely that the ultra-left functions in favor of the ultra-right.

An initial test of the left's intentions was the proclamation of the first post-dictatorship elections on the first anniversary of the November 17 revolt. The postponement of celebrations until after the elections was respected by the left parties. Thus the political significance of the one million-strong official demonstration after the election was absorbed within the limits of *metapolitefsi* and the left's aim to become integrated in the political establishment. Nevertheless, a crowd of 50,000 gathered on November 15 to celebrate the uprising, thereby disrespecting the electoral atmosphere and marking the presence of a strong extra-parliamentary left. This revolutionary left consisted of numerous organizations of various complexions, the most prominent being the OMLE/PPSP (Organization of Marxists-Leninists of Greece) which later founded the KKE M-L and EKKE/AASPE (Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece), both Maoist.

Karamanlis's New Democracy Party (ND; ΝΔ) triumphed in the elections, winning 54.4 percent of the vote. The “official” communist left (KKE, KKE-Interior, and EDA) as the United Left received 9.5 percent, and PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement; ΠΑΣΟΚ) emerged with 13.5 percent. The latter was formed by two anti-dictatorship organizations, the

PAK (Panhellenic Liberation Movement) of Andreas Papandreou and Dimokratiki Amyna (Democratic Defense). PASOK's "3 September manifesto," with strong elements of "third worldism," demanded "national independence, popular sovereignty, social liberation, and democratic structures." PASOK's advent marked the leftwards shift of the political center and gave life to a viable "socialist" party in Greece, between the center and the communist left, by absorbing the former and recuperating the slogans of the latter.

"Dejunctification" was a concern of the established political parties in securing the post-1974 democracy, but also a demand of the anti-fascist movement owing to the strong links between the conservative government and the military regime. "Para-state" centers were left more or less intact, however, and a new military coup was threatened in 1975. The assassination on May 1, 1978 of A. Panagoulis, a hero of the anti-dictatorship struggle and a member of parliament for Enosi Kentrou (Union of the Center), followed by suppression of the mass movement, confirmed the continuation of police state tactics.

Anti-imperialist protest in this period was directed against both US interventionism and the European direction of the Greek bourgeoisie, demanding Greece's complete disengagement from NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC). The struggle for national independence was central to this movement, even for the urban guerilla groups, most prominent among whom were November 17 (*17 Νοέμβρη*, named after the date of the anti-dictatorship uprising) and ELA (People's Armed Struggle; EAA), which chose their targets accordingly, continuing the tradition of the anti-dictatorship armed struggle.

Student and working-class urban youth comprised the critical mass of the revolutionary movement which in 1975 and 1976 spurred grassroots syndicalism, wildcat strikes, farmers' road blockades, and lengthy strikes and factory occupations across most industries. The unrest alarmed the state as well as the reformist left. The former reacted by intensifying state oppression, while the GSEE (General Confederation of Greek Workers), controlled by the official left, maintained a reluctant and hostile stance, labeling many of these workers' initiatives the acts of agents provocateurs and aiming to control and marginalize grassroots factory assemblies.

However, these struggles succeeded in securing above-inflation pay rises of 25–35 percent.

New Democracy conservatives won the elections of 1977 with 41.84 percent of the vote, with PASOK emerging as the leading opposition party with 25.3 percent. KKE achieved 9.36 percent and the Alliance of Progressive and Left-Wing Forces (KKE-Interior) 2.72 percent. The 1979 student movement that led to the government's lockout of universities in order to restrict the advancing occupations dealt a second blow to Karamanlis. In his 1980 New Year's Eve message, he announced the cancellation of the already voted law 815/1978 for the "modernization" of higher education. Once more the split between the reformist and the revolutionary communist left was expressed by the condemnation of the student occupations by KNE (the Communist Party's youth organization), which sent its members to violently break up the occupation of the School of Chemistry in Athens (December 17, 1979), earning it the congratulations of Minister of Home Security Balkos. The appearance of the Autonomous current was a new element in this movement.

The last event of this radical wave was the attempt to break the ban on the annual November 17 march to the US embassy, which had been in force since 1975 and was respected by the parliamentary left. The initiative (November 17, 1980) was taken by extra-parliamentary organizations, resulting in severe clashes with police next to the Greek parliament and the deaths of two demonstrators, Koumis and Kanelopoulou. This was a critical moment for the movement which, despite its vitality and determination, had been unprepared for such escalation.

The Years of PASOKism (1981–1990)

"Change" was the central slogan in the electoral victory of PASOK in October 1981, with 48.1 percent of the vote. Its phenomenal rise to power demonstrated the shift of Greek society away from 40 years of anti-democratic regimes and a deeper transformation within the Greek bourgeoisie. The years 1981–90 defined the second phase of *metapolitefsi*, which saw the rise and fall of the first socialist, even if only nominal, government in Greece and the stabilization of a western-type democracy.

PASOK's triumph created great expectations in the Greek people and great problems within the communist left. Very soon Andreas Papandreou and PASOK shifted away from their "contract with the people" to a more pragmatic stance, abandoning the pledge for Greece's withdrawal from NATO and the EEC and for ousting the US bases. PASOK introduced the basic elements of a welfare system, democratized the state and education, created a national health system, and recognized gender equality and civil marriage. Additionally, it officially recognized the Greek resistance to the Nazis and promoted national reconciliation between right-wing nationalists and the communist resistance. These measures helped PASOK to build a popular profile and, especially during the first period of its governance, to put pressure on the left as many of the latter's immediate demands were materialized. The two communist parties met PASOK's policies with tolerance due to its friendly tendencies toward the eastern bloc. Yet PASOK's foreign policy was nothing but a more daring continuation of Karamanlis's, which Papandreou was better able to implement. In addition to his links with the Arab states, Papandreou's creation of the "initiative of the six nations" for nuclear disarmament was another of his moves to project Greece as an independent player.

The "socialization" of financially problematic industries was accompanied by restrictions on trade union activity, and erupting strikes forced PASOK to a trade union coup d'état in the GSEE's 22nd Conference in December 1983. This was the first point of conflict with the official left, which still demanded to be part of the change, as KKE's slogan, "change cannot be done without the KKE," clearly expressed. PASOKism, however, affected even the most radical forces of the previous period, which were disbanded during 1981–2. The thousands of members of these organizations had given life to numerous campaigns regarding the rights of privates in the army (mandatory in Greece), of prisoners, and for the extension of civil and social rights. The latter was a response to PASOK's stop and search operations "Areti" (merit; Επιχείρησιδ Αρετή), which were part of an urban gentrification plan targeting politically active public spaces. The occupation of the Polytechnic School and the dynamic response to the lethal shooting of a 15-year-old by the police in November 1985, as

well as the anti-fascist march against Le Pen's visit to Greece, indicated a new generation of youth political activity influenced by anti-authoritarian and anarchist ideals.

The student movement remained strong and contested PASOK's modernization from as early as 1982. This movement, which opposed EEC educational reforms, culminated in the occupation movement of 1987 that also spread to secondary education. Thus it set up a precedent for successive movements by teachers and students against educational reforms, causing the seat of the ministry of education to be dubbed an "electric chair."

By 1989 PASOK had established its own status quo. The disclosure of the Koskotas economic scandal against the backdrop of radical changes in Eastern Europe created what many believed to be the end for PASOK. One important actor in this period was Synaspismos (Alliance of the Left and of Progress; Συνασπισμός), formed in 1989 by KKE and EAR (the successor of KKE-Interior) under the auspices of perestroika. When the June 1989 elections failed to deliver a working majority for any party, Synaspismos (with 13.1 percent of the vote) attempted to occupy the center of political life by forming a short-term coalition government with the New Democracy conservatives under the slogan "catharsis" (clearance; κάθαρση) from PASOK's corruption. This caused the entire youth sector of KKE to split from the party. PASOK mobilized its anti-conservative populism and managed to retain power, succeeding with a respectable 39.1 percent. In the November 1989 elections, once again no party was able to form a government; PASOK achieved 40.7 percent of the vote, while Synaspismos lost 2.1 percent. Another short-term "ecumenical" government was formed that included PASOK, New Democracy, and Synaspismos.

The End of *Metapolitefsi* and the New Radical Left (1991–2008)

In the third elections within a year in April 1990, New Democracy won 151 out of 300 seats and formed a government. PASOK slipped to 39.3 percent and Synaspismos lost another 0.5 percent. This period coincides with the introduction of neoliberal policies and the corresponding reconstruction of political and social life. The privatization of the nationalized

industries was met by consecutive strikes, the most prominent being that by EAS (ΕΑΣ), the public transport drivers' organization. The latter challenged the need for reforms by the "ecumenical" government and official trade unionism, which failed to provide support and coordination to numerous workers' struggles that received unprecedented popular support. The slogan "when you agree within the parliament, we are the only opposition" voiced by hundreds of thousands of students in the winter of 1990–1 expressed the popular belief of the time. Educational reform proposals were challenged by the occupation of 95 percent of schools and universities in the country, bringing education to a standstill. The government's attempt to put an end to the occupation of schools by violent means in January 1991 resulted in the murder of a teacher, Nikos Temponeras, while four other people were burned by police smoke bombs the following day in Athens, and clashes with police erupted all over Greece. These events forced the minister of education to resign and the white paper was withdrawn. It was the first defeat of neoliberal policies in Greece, achieved by a genuine grassroots movement.

Throughout the 1990s, even after (New) PASOK's return to office in 1993, constant opposition to educational reforms by teachers' strikes and students' occupations acted as a hotbed for a young generation of radical activists. KKE abandoned Synaspismos in 1993 and opposed the Maastricht agenda for a neoliberal restructuring of the EU. The rebalkanization of the Balkans in the 1990s was another focal point of this decade. PASOK's tactics, which were now lined up with US policies, fostered a strong anti-war and anti-imperialist movement in Greece, especially after the handing over of the Kurdish leader Öcalan to the Turkish authorities, with Greek involvement, and the bombardment of Yugoslavia by NATO in 1999. It persisted until the huge global movement against the war in Iraq in 2003. During the same period there were numerous workers' protests against privatization and the effects of globalization and EU policies. Most prominent were the farmers' month-long road blockades of 1996 and the 200,000-strong demonstrations of March 2001 which postponed PASOK's restructuring of the pension system.

The Seattle anti-World Trade Organization (WTO) demonstration and the anti-G8 protest in Genoa, in which thousands of Greek activ-

ists took part, contributed to the formation of an anti-globalization movement in Greece, which made its first dynamic appearance at the anti-EU summit protests in Salonika in 2003. The fourth European Social Forum in Athens (May 2006), with its 70,000-strong demonstration, acted as a catalyst, followed by a new movement in education that lasted more than a year and stopped a constitutional reform permitting private universities.

The last decade has also seen the emergence of a permanent anti-racist movement. The disastrous forest fires of 2007, caused by neglect on the part of the conservative government and the handing over of Greece's few remaining open spaces to developers, elicited a strong public reaction and a grassroots movement for the defense of public spaces. This environmental catastrophe almost cost the elections for New Democracy conservatives, who won with only a two-seat majority. These developments saw the vote shift to the left, which recorded its highest score since 1977, and a deep crisis for both PASOK and the two-party political system. The end of *metapolitefsi*, desperately sought by the Greek bourgeoisie in the hope of finishing with a strong left movement, ironically coincides with the emergence of a new, modern, radical left that once again challenges the rules of the game.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Greece; G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; Greece, Anti-Dictatorship Protests; Greece, Partisan Resistance; Greece, Socialism, Communism, and the Left, 1850–1974; Greek Nationalism; Socialism; Student Movement, Greece, 1990–1991; Syndicalism, Greece; World Social Forums; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999

References and Suggested Readings

- Autonomous Citizen Initiative (1983) *November 73: These Struggles Continue; They Cannot be Bought Off, They Were Not Vindicated*. Athens: Autonomous Publication (in Greek).
- Clogg, R. (2002) *A Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hontzeas, Y. (1994) For a Critical Evaluation of the Marxist-Leninist Movement of Greece. In *For the Communist Movement of Greece*. Athens: A/synecheia (in Greek).
- Pappas, T. (1999) *Making Party Democracy in Greece*. London: Macmillan.
- Sakellariopoulos, S. & Sotiris, P. (2004) *Reconstruction and Modernization: Social and Political Transformations in Greece During the 1990s*. Athens: Papazisis (in Greek).

- Voulgaris, G. (2002) *The Greece of Metapolitefsi 1974–1990*. Athens: Themelio (in Greek).
- Woodhouse, C. M. (1986) *Modern Greece: A Short History*. London and Boston: Faber & Faber.

Greek nationalism

Yanis Yanoulopoulos

Greece became independent in the early 1830s, after a prolonged war of liberation/secession from the Ottoman empire. Like the contemporaneous revolts of the Carbonari in Italy and France (1820, 1821) and the victorious uprising of the anti-monarchist Spaniards (1820–3), it was a war fueled by the ideas of the French Revolution, which the diaspora Greek merchants of the secret society *Philiki Etairia* (Association of Friends) had enthusiastically espoused in order to bring down the Ottoman *ancien régime*. It was a war carried out by the “damned of the earth” (mostly landless peasants) in the poor and inconspicuous southwestern corner of the sultans’ possessions that had fired the imagination of liberals and radicals all over post-Napoleonic, counterrevolutionary Europe. An eight-year confrontation with the Porte (1821–9), with many ups and downs and considerable infighting, ended in the defeat of the radical elements that had started the revolt. Territorial expansion was the compensatory mirage offered by the new rulers, King Otto and his Bavarian army, since Greece, as the first Balkan nation to achieve statehood, was allowed to exist only as a monarchy, and it ventured into the modern world under the watchful eyes of the three Protecting Powers – England, France, and Russia – who carefully monitored the first steps of this energetic newcomer into the china shop of the Eastern Question.

This was due to the fact that the liberation of the “unredeemed Hellenes” of the empire and, as an ultimate goal (of a millennial nature), the restoration of Christian Byzantium to all its former glory, very soon came to constitute the central pivot of Greek foreign policy. A grandiose program of action, named the *Megali Idea* (Great Idea), permeated life and society in the new state at all levels. It was much more ambitious than the analogous *Nacertanije* (Program) of the Serbs, who had first risen up in revolt (1808, 1816) to gain their autonomy from the Ottoman sultan. The means to achieve the

Megali Idea, or any substantial part of it, were simply not at Greece’s disposal, but the threat of the unforeseen consequences arising from local action during one or more – or indeed all – of the recurring crises of the Eastern Question throughout the nineteenth century was very real, from the vantage point of London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.

The Greeks may have lacked military strength but they possessed certain advantages at least until the middle of the nineteenth century. They could address appeals for an Athens-led campaign against the “Ottoman yoke” to the other Christian populations of the Balkans, most of whom were still ethnically undifferentiated. Greek was the language of the Orthodox Church and of commerce. Many outward-looking Slavs or Albanian Christians with the necessary means aimed at a Greek education for themselves or their children (the University of Athens opened its doors as early as 1837), adopted Greek surnames, and considered themselves Greek as a way of enhancing their social and economic status. New Greece, “reborn from its ashes,” was an object of admiration of the Philhellenes of liberal Europe. It looked as though the liberation of the Balkans could go hand in hand with its hellenization.

Europe’s approving enthusiasm, however, did not last very long. New Greece did not at all look like the “model kingdom in the East” that was expected to blossom at the southern part of the Balkan peninsula. Philhellenism was steadily going out of fashion. This was preceded by the gradual retreat of the ideas of the Enlightenment that gave it birth. Before the middle of the nineteenth century, the first stirrings of nationalism began to appear in areas other than Serbia (which was already an autonomous entity ruled by a local dynasty). What was worse for Greece’s prospects for western support was the fact that liberal opinion itself seemed to have second thoughts about its Greek “investment.” Administrative chaos, an “incurably eastern” mentality, a civil society that refused to emerge, and an emphasis on religion, which ruled the lives of its mostly agrarian population, were characteristics of a state fit to serve as a client of the hated tsarist Russia rather than as a representative of the ideas of progress and liberty. A staunchly liberal German professor, Jacob Philipp Fallmerayer, came up with the theory that the belief forming the lynchpin of the



“The Predicted Fall of Constantinople” depicts an allegory of the independence of Greece: a sultan sits on his throne by the Istanbul strait, while Rhigas de Velestino inspires Greek troops to rise up and fight, ending in the establishment of Greece in the Treaty of Constantinople, 1832. From the Pictorial History of the Greek War of Independence (artist unknown/Greek School, nineteenth century). (Private Collection, The Stapleton Collection/The Bridgeman Art Library)

philhellenic movement – that the Greek-speaking former *rayas* of the Sublime Porte were the true descendants of Pericles and Aristotle – was all wrong. And Karl Marx, writing on the Crimean War, concluded that all liberation movements in the Balkans were either intentionally serving or simply ended up helping Russia’s reactionary rulers. These adverse conditions for Greek aspirations, however, took some time to seep through. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Greek position in the Balkans appeared somewhat battered, but it was still fairly strong.

Things began to change with the acceleration of the Tanzimat reforms, the price paid by the sultan for Anglo-French support in the Crimean War. For the Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians of the empire, reform was a mixed blessing. It guaranteed a much greater degree of security of property and of commercial transaction, but it also dealt a serious blow to the exclusive authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate over all Orthodox Christians in the Balkans, who now claimed their right to appoint their own priests and bishops and to hear the church liturgy in their own language rather than in Greek.

This language was the outward manifestation of the growing sense of nationality that gained momentum, first in Bulgaria – an exarchate, administratively independent from the Patriarchate Bulgarian Church, was established

in 1870 – and later in Macedonia, toward the end of the century, among the Vlachs (who, as mostly Greek-speaking merchants, nevertheless tended to side with Athens), and later still in Albania, where the Patriarchate (by now fully hellenized) fought a protracted rearguard battle until the 1920s to prevent the establishment of an autocephalous Albanian Church.

To the growing strength of Bulgarian and, later, Macedonian nationalism, Greece replied using similar methods. It laid a claim to Ottoman Macedonia, based on its “historical rights” in the area and the “real wishes” of its mixed population. These “real wishes,” needless to say, were interpreted very differently by each of the other interested parties (Bulgarians, Serbians, and Macedonian autonomists). The conflict was to develop into an open and bitter war of schools, churches, cultural societies, statistics, and, ultimately, of armed bands, backed by all the above-mentioned parties.

A new and much more radical change in Balkan affairs was heralded by the Young Turk revolution of 1908. In the early days of the new regime, the Greek government toyed with the idea of cooperation with the Porte against their “common enemy,” Bulgaria. The clear victory, however, of the Committee of Union and Progress over their rivals in the Young Turk movement – the liberal wing, who planned to delegate a substantial degree of power to the ethnic/religious minorities in a quasi-“federalized” empire – sounded as a warning bell in Athens, and the same seems to have happened in Sofia.

A policy of cooperation of rival nationalisms in the area seemed to be the only alternative. Sofia decided to bury the hatchet and Belgrade did the same, with more than a little help from Russian diplomacy. Greece, under its new charismatic prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos, joined up at the last moment with almost unseemly haste. The end result was the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, which at one stage brought the western frontiers of the empire to less than 160 kilometers from its capital. It was indeed a time of great exaltation that made it difficult for outsiders to discern the developing cleavage between King Constantine – an admirer of all things German – and his anti-Slav priorities and the more pragmatic approach of his liberal pro-Entente prime minister. World War I brought this conflict into the open and led to the well-known *Dichasmos* (division) of the nation into two almost equal

parts, with Constantine favoring (pro-German) neutrality and Venizelos advocating direct involvement in the war, on the side of the Entente, on account of the “lavish rewards” at the Peace Conference.

With military help from the Entente, Venizelos prevailed and at the end of the war, the prizes were there for the picking. Western Thrace was severed from Bulgaria and passed into Greek hands, and in May 1919, Greek troops landed in Izmir as a result of a rather impromptu decision by the Paris Peace Conference. In opposition since the elections of November 1920, the leader of the liberals was the first to see the writing on the wall from his self-imposed Paris exile. In view of the growing strength of the Turkish national liberation movement, led by Mustafa Kemal, he supported a drastic limitation of Greek military objectives – a necessary first step, perhaps, to a negotiated compromise. It was too late. His opponents, in thrall to an excited public opinion, which was kept in total ignorance by the Athenian press of the real difficulties ahead, had to carry on, smiling confidently in newspaper photographs.

The military impasse that followed the failed advance on Ankara (August 1921) was accentuated by serious financial difficulties. Greece needed an immediate diplomatic exit from the war. It did not happen. Defeat came a year later, in August 1922, and it was Venizelos as the principal Greek negotiator at Lausanne who was called to sign the bankruptcy documents of the *Megali Idea* (July 1923). The entire leadership of the conservative party, five leading politicians, and the last commander of the Asia Minor army were tried and executed in Athens on charges of high treason.

The combination of military defeat on a grand scale in the Asia Minor war and the political, socioeconomic, and cultural tensions brought about by the influx of more than one million destitute refugees (in an existing population of around five million) had a shock effect on Greek society. The old nationalist/expansionist rhetoric that had reigned supreme in the newspaper headlines of previous decades became discredited, if not suspect.

During the interwar years (1922–40 in the case of Greece), Greek nationalism underwent a genuine metamorphosis, turning inwards in two distinct yet interrelated directions. The movement shifted, on the one hand, toward an explora-

tion of the notion of *hellinikotita* (Greekness), in an attempt to gain new insights into its indestructible “essence,” and, on the other, it turned militantly against a new enemy. The enemy in question was an internal one: the Greek communist left and its novel internationalist mentality, which gained a firm foothold, mainly in the trade union movement, during the 1920s and 1930s – a development not unrelated to the Asia Minor defeat and the uphill struggle of the refugees in the often unwelcoming environment of “old Greece.”

Even far-right groups in northern Greece, heirs, in a way, to the Greek or Greek-sponsored armed bands who had fought bitterly against other armed contestants over the division of Ottoman Macedonia at the beginning of the twentieth century, had turned their attention not against Greece’s Slav neighbors, the age-old adversaries of “hellenism” in the Balkans, but against another internal foe – the Jewish community of Thessaloniki, which, until the post-1922 exchange of populations with Turkey, was by far its largest ethnic group.

Greek foreign policy between the wars was a policy of both compliance with the decisions of the League of Nations and avoidance, at almost any cost, of external military “adventures.” General Metaxas’s dictatorship (1936–40) – a cross between the *Estado Novo* of Salazar in Portugal and Fascist Italy – had to toe the same line.

The extensions of World War II into the Balkans, inaugurated by the unprovoked attack by Mussolini’s army on Greece’s Albanian borders in October 1940 – the failure of which was followed by the occupation of the whole peninsula by the Wehrmacht (1941) – radically changed the scene once again. In occupied Greece, as in occupied Yugoslavia and Albania, an all-powerful resistance movement (EAM/ELAS) emerged, one that was initiated – again as was the case with its northern neighbors – by the outlawed Greek Communist Party (KKE) (which had been banned at the beginning of Metaxas’s dictatorship). It was run by local recruits who answered the “patriotic” call for the liberation of their fatherland from the Nazis, in keeping, no doubt, with the best traditions of rebelliousness, which was still at a high premium in the then predominantly rural Balkan societies.

The governing liberal and conservative/royalist elites of the interwar years were completely marginalized during the Axis occupation. Most

of their clientele transferred their allegiance to the resistance and its promise of a “fairer society” after the end of the war, some collaborated openly with the occupiers and their puppet government in Athens, while others preferred the time-honored practice of *attentisme*. The only way in which the former political rulers of Greece could hope to emerge from oblivion in the postwar era was to wave the flags of Greece’s *Ethnika Themata* (National Issues) – in other words, past territorial claims against its northern neighbors which, in their view, could be reopened following the unexpected victory of the Greek army against the Italians in the winter of 1940–1. The victory came just at the moment when Britain stood alone against Hitler and created a positive attitude toward “little heroic Greece.”

These so called “National Issues” comprised the question of northern Epirus, i.e., the largest part of southern Albania to which Greece had finally lost its longstanding claim back in the early 1920s, as well as two non-starters: the substantial “correction,” in Greece’s favor, of its borders with Yugoslavia and the “rolling back” of the long Greek–Bulgarian frontier to a safe(r) distance from the Aegean Sea. If in the case of the territorial dispute between Athens and Tiranë one could argue that this matter had been settled *de facto* (as Greece had refrained from even mentioning its claims for almost 20 years) but not *de jure*, the last two claims involved the “correction” of the peace treaties of 1913 and 1919 following, respectively, the Balkan wars of 1912–13 and World War I, which had been unchallenged ever since.

This did not stop the anti-EAM forces in Greece, when, after Stalingrad, the tide of the war began to turn against the Axis, from accusing members of the resistance that they were not keen on the territorial rewards due to their country because these were issues likely to bring them into conflict with their communist comrades in other resistance movements in the Balkans, which were poised to seize power in Yugoslavia, Albania, and (eventually) Bulgaria, after Germany’s expected defeat. At the height of their power and influence (1943–4), with about two-thirds of Greece under their effective control, EAM/ELAS and the KKE had no problem answering these charges (in clandestine or freely circulating publications), pouring scorn on the “cheap tricks” of the Greek nationalists who,

“like nationalists and fascists everywhere,” were engaged in the lowest form of political deceit. They were heirs to the same “criminal rhetoric” that had led to the ignominious defeat in the Greco-Turkish War of 1922, “fatherland mongers” who were, at best, conspicuously absent from the only front for “true patriots”: the resistance front.

Following the military defeat of the Greek left, however, in the Battle of Athens (December 1944–January 1945) – which was fought for control of the Greek capital shortly after the German withdrawal by local ELAS resistance members, along with British troops brought in from Italy and their motley allies, including many ex-collaborators – the tables were turned against them. Faced with this new situation, Zachariadis, KKE’s general secretary, who had just returned to Greece from a German concentration camp where he had spent the war years, opted for a complete volte-face in regard to the so-called “National Issues.” Instead of continuing to denounce their right-wing protagonists, he decided to join the game, promoting his own “National Issues” which were of guaranteed popularity, since they too involved territorial gains for Greece designed to embarrass the opponents to the left.

The first of these left-sponsored “National Issues,” which, admittedly, made only a brief and somewhat awkward appearance in some left-wing newspapers during 1945–6, was the demand for the “return” of eastern Thrace to Greece. This was a province of the Ottoman empire that Greece had held from 1920 to 1922 following a treaty that was never ratified, and then lost to Turkey as a result of the Greek defeat in Asia Minor. This call for the unilateral revision of the international Treaty of Lausanne (1923) came out of the blue. It was put forward for the simple reason that the Greek government, propped up by British troops, and the government of Turkey were at the time close allies in the ideological war on communism – it has been argued that they were forerunners in the Cold War which began in earnest in 1947 – and on the Soviet Union.

The other focus however, for which KKE propagated the need for “panhellenic agitation” – the Cyprus Question – was a much more serious matter. It was in fact, and to a large extent still is, six decades later, albeit in a different context, the Greek “National Issue” *par excellence*,

leaving an indelible imprint both on the Greek left and on its rivals. Interestingly, when Zachariadis first placed the need for a “concerted struggle for the liberation of Cyprus from British colonialism and its *Enosis* [union with Greece]” on the public agenda in 1945–6, General Grivas, the future leader of EOKA, the pro-*Enosis* guerilla movement on the island in the mid-1950s, condemned the KKE initiative as an “anti-national ploy” designed to sow the seeds of discord between Greece and Britain, its most valuable ally. General Grivas was at that time heading a British-sponsored paramilitary organization of the far right (called X), which had fought alongside British troops in the Battle of Athens.

During the civil war (1947–9), Cyprus made the headlines again. At the closing stages of that war when, in an attempt to replenish the ranks of its guerilla army, the KKE promised complete autonomy to the Slav-speaking minority of Greek Macedonia, the left found itself once again on the defensive amid the minefield of “National Issues.” To charges of “treason” – a view now shared, to various degrees, by a sizable portion of public opinion, particularly in northern Greece – Zachariadis replied with an urgent call for an all-out struggle that would lead to the *Enosis* of Cyprus with its “motherland.”

In 1949, against its better judgment, the Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) was prevailed upon to finally turn down the set of constitutional proposals for extensive self-government of the island which Britain, hard pressed on a number of fronts in its colonial empire, had put on the table a year earlier. In the early 1950s, however, no longer under the influence of the KKE, the left in Cyprus became skeptical about the wisdom of pressing for instant *Enosis*, and AKEL changed its position. In yet another move of musical chairs, Grivas, a staunch anti-communist, took up the cause of *Enosis*, turning the fire power of his EOKA guerillas not only against British troops on the island but also against other selected targets: AKEL “traitors” and Turkish Cypriots. The KKE, on the other hand, having been defeated in the civil war and banned, with its leadership in exile in Eastern Europe and its political front in Greece – EDA/United Democratic Left – operating in conditions of semi-legality, continued to toe the “patriotic” line on the Cyprus Question and never wavered in its support for EOKA.

It has been argued that this policy of outdoing the church (at the head of the pro-*Enosis* Panhellenic Committee in Athens) and the traditional right-wing nationalists in anti-British rhetoric made a lot of political sense at the time. True, Britain was no longer the military power that propped up the Greek regime, having relinquished this role to the US in 1947, but both were pillars of NATO. The pro-*Enosis* agitation in Greece, therefore, leading to massive demonstrations with the wholesale participation of the left (and occasionally ending in serious clashes with the police and the shooting dead of demonstrators), did acquire an anti-NATO and anti-western dimension.

What was even more important, however, was that by immersing itself in the pro-*Enosis* movement, the KKE, less than ten years after the end of the civil war, achieved a remarkable comeback into the fold from which it was ostracized in 1948 on account of its pro-autonomy policy for the Slav-speaking Macedonians. Long after it was deemed a mistake and rescinded, the policy constituted for many years the main ideological weapon of the victors in the civil war against the side that lost it. In other words, and in view of the fact that nationalism was always extremely popular in Greece (save for the brief period of EAM preponderance during the resistance), the Cyprus issue was the *deus ex machina* that ended the political isolation of the Greek left. But it came at a price. It endowed its discourse with a quasi-permanent element of populist/nationalist rhetoric – this is certainly true of the KKE today and to a much lesser extent of the new left radicals and activists of Synaspismos (which had incorporated the Eurocommunist KKE-Interior) – long before these matters became commonplace with the post-1989 communist parties in Eastern Europe and in Russia itself.

With the Cyprus Question still open for almost 50 years after independence (1960), another “National Issue” made its unexpected yet spectacular entrance into Greek politics in the early 1990s. This was the resurrection of the old Macedonian controversy in a new form. Following the breakup of Tito’s Yugoslavia (1990–1) and the imminent independence of its southern part, the Republic of Macedonia – so named in 1944, without any protest or signs of annoyance from the Greek side at the time – a number of mayors of northern Greek towns

began a vote-catching campaign on the subject of what Greece's northern neighbor "ought to be called," and came up with the absurd demand that the former Yugoslav Republic should not, as an independent state, include the word "Macedonia" in its name in any form, since all things "Macedonian" – in their view, which was enthusiastically endorsed by all mainstream political parties – were an intrinsic part of Greek cultural heritage. Faced with the refusal of the newly independent republic to comply with this demand, and the inability of the rest of the world to understand what the Greeks were talking about (and why), Athens responded with a 19-month trade embargo that badly damaged Macedonia's landlocked economy.

The embargo was lifted in 1995, after a UN-negotiated Interim Agreement – by 1993 Macedonia was already a member of the UN under the provisional name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) – which provided for the inviolability of its frontiers and left the two countries to find a solution to the name dispute. With Athens insisting on its original position in the years that followed, "negotiations" became a mere formality and Skopje used that time to gain diplomatic recognition under its constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia, from about two-thirds of the UN's members, including four out of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

In 2008 Athens finally decided to change its position and limit its demand to a name that reflected the geographical fact that its northern neighbor represented a part and not the whole region of Macedonia. On this basis, Greece had successfully vetoed the accession of the Republic of Macedonia to NATO until a new agreement between the two parties could be worked out.

SEE ALSO: Albanian Nationalism; Anarchism, Greece; Greece, Anti-Dictatorship Protests; Greece, Partisan Resistance; Greece, Socialism, Communism, and the Left, 1850–1974; Greece, Socialism, Communism, and the Left, 1974–2008; Young Turks

References and Suggested Readings

- Crouzet, F. (1973) *Le Conflit de Chypre, 1946–1959*. Brussels: Emile Bruylant.
- Dertilis, G. (2005) *History of the Greek State, 1830–1920*. Athens: Estia (in Greek).
- Hering, G. (1992) *Die Politischen Parteien in Griechenland, 1821–1936*. Munich: Oldenburg.

- Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (Eds.) (1983) *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Karakasidou, A. (1993) Fellow Travellers, Separate Roads: The KKE and the Macedonian Question. *Eastern European Quarterly* 27 (4): 453–77.
- Kitromilides, P. (1989) Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Questions in the Balkans. *European History Quarterly* 19 (2): 149–92.
- Kostopoulos, T. (2007) *War and Ethnic Cleansing: A Forgotten Aspect of a Decade of "National Aggrandizement"*. Athens: Vivliorama (in Greek).
- Mouzelis, N. (1978) *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*. London: Macmillan.
- Stavrianos, L. (2000) *The Balkans Since 1453*. London: Hurst.
- Stefanides, I. (2002) *The Isle of Discord*. London: Hurst.
- Svoronos, N. (1972) *Histoire de la Grèce Moderne*. Paris: Presses Universitaires.
- Yanouloupoulos, Y. (2001) "Our Benign Blindness": Foreign Policy and "National Issues" from the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 to the Asia Minor Defeat of 1922. Athens: Vivliorama (in Greek).

Green bans movement, Australia

Meredith Burgmann and Verity Burgmann

The Australian green bans movement lasted from 1970 to 1975. It was the first such action in the world. It occurred when builders' laborers (BLs) took the unusual action of refusing to work on environmentally or socially undesirable construction and a significant social movement developed in support of these bans. The movement saved Sydney from much of the devastation that would otherwise have been wrought by developers and had international ramifications within environmental politics.

The trade union involved was the New South Wales branch of the Australian Builders' Laborers' Federation (NSWBLF), which covered unskilled and certain semi-skilled workers employed on building sites. The NSWBLF, with about 11,000 members, was guided by many committed officials, including three particularly outstanding union leaders: Jack Munday, Joe Owens, and Bob Pringle. They were strongly influenced by new left ideology with its emphasis on equality, participatory democracy, and direct action. The union became committed to the

principle of “the social responsibility of labor,” insisting all work should be socially useful and ecologically benign. Munday maintained unions had to become involved with environmental issues because “too few people question the products we make” (Munday 1988: 179–80). Owens argued that unions had the ability to restrain corporations and prompt governments to reconsider foolish decisions, so had to concern themselves with “important social issues” and “become more active in opposing pollution and despoliation of natural resources” (*Canberra Times*, March 2, 1973).

Green bans were also imposed by other state branches of the Builders’ Laborers’ Federation (BLF), preserving threatened bush, parkland, housing, and historic buildings in Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Canberra, Perth, and Hobart. However, green bans were most significant in Sydney and other areas of New South Wales, where the construction boom was centered and the union branch most committed to the bans.

In February 1973, Munday coined the term “green bans” to distinguish them from traditional black bans. He claimed the use of “green” expressed the union’s determination to save open space or valued buildings and ensure people in any community had some say in what affected their lives (Munday 1981: 105). The neologism assisted “green” to enter the world’s political vernacular. Petra Kelly’s launching and naming of the German Greens was motivated by her experience of the green bans when she visited Australia in the mid-1970s and became inspired by the way they brought together resident activists, conservationists, and unionists.

The first green ban was imposed by builders’ laborers in Melbourne in October 1970 to prevent a developer destroying a park in the inner-city suburb of Carlton. In Sydney, the first green ban occurred in June 1971 when a resident action group from the suburb of Hunters Hill sought the help of the NSWBLF to save Kelly’s Bush on Sydney Harbor foreshore, where developer A. V. Jennings wanted to build luxury houses. The union agreed to ban the destruction of Kelly’s Bush, which remains a public reserve – with a plaque to commemorate the green bans.

The green bans were of three main kinds: to defend open spaces from various types of development; to protect existing housing from demolition to make way for freeways or high-rise development; and to preserve older-style buildings from replacement by office blocks or

shopping precincts. Environment, heritage, and social issues were intertwined. In contrast to the pattern of middle-class flight from American inner-city areas, gentrification of inner-Sydney suburbs threatened low-income residents with displacement by developers keen to exploit more affluent markets. The Rocks on the edge of Sydney Cove was both a working-class residential area and site of the first British settlement. Despite its historical significance, only a green ban prevented these oldest buildings in the country being replaced by high-rise office blocks and luxury apartments. In other instances, the green bans’ defense of working-class residential areas was linked with the NSWBLF’s opposition to freeway construction and diversion of funding from public transport. Many fine old theaters, banks, and other civic buildings were also preserved, because the NSWBLF refused to demolish any buildings deemed valuable by the National Trust.

After the first success at Kelly’s Bush, resident action groups rushed to ask the NSWBLF to impose similar bans. The union was prepared to defend its green bans on picket lines and at demonstrations, and was aided by enthusiastic residents inspired by the bans, which enhanced their chances of success. A popular green bans movement slogan was “People before Profits,” indicative of the radicalized resident activism encouraged by the NSWBLF action in challenging developers. The green bans movement also rallied left-wing students and other political activists after the intense campaigns around Vietnam and apartheid sporting tours had subsided. In Victoria Street in Kings Cross, green ban supporters squatted for months in the houses protected by green bans to prevent deliberate damage to them by criminal associates of the developer.

By 1975, in New South Wales, more than 40 green bans had stalled AU\$5 billion worth of development at mid-1970s prices. About half of these prevented the destruction of individual buildings or green areas; the other half thwarted development projects affecting much larger areas, such as Woolloomooloo. Munday maintains that the political significance of the green bans movement was that it forged a “winning alliance” between environmentalists and unionists.

The movement ended when developers, desperate to break the green bans, bribed federal officials of the BLF to move against its New

South Wales branch. Late in 1974 these officials arrived in Sydney, declaring the NSWBLF had “gone too far on green bans.” Despite massive protests against this “intervention,” the federal union and employers worked together to ensure only builders’ laborers with new “federal” union tickets were employed in the industry and those with “state” tickets were denied a living. Work commenced on some sites that had been subject to green bans – but many were saved permanently.

Despite the breaking of the bans, they had a significant longer-term impact on environmental legislation, town planning, and public attitudes. Because of the power wielded by the builders’ laborers and the popularity of the green bans, governments were obliged to respond to the union’s challenge. At both state and federal levels, governments initiated or improved legislation to ensure more socially responsive and ecologically responsible planning and development.

SEE ALSO: Australia, New Social Movements; Germany, Green Movement; Kelly, Petra (1947–1992); Munday, Jack (b. 1929)

References and Suggested Readings

- Allaby, M. (Ed.) (1983) *Macmillan Dictionary of the Environment*, 2nd ed. London: Macmillan.
- Burgmann, M. & Burgmann, V. (1998) *Green Bans, Red Union: Environmental Activism and the New South Wales Builders’ Labourers’ Federation*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- Burgmann, V. (2008) The Green Bans Movement: Workers’ Power and Ecological Radicalism in Australia in the 1970s. *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 2 (1): 63–89.
- Munday, J. (1981) *Green Bans and Beyond*. Sydney: Angus & Robertson.
- Munday, J. (1988) Preventing the Plunder. In V. Burgmann & J. Lee (Eds.), *Staining the Wattle*. Melbourne: McPhee Gribble/Penguin.
- Thomas, P. (1973) *Taming the Concrete Jungle: The Builders’ Labourers’ Story*. Sydney: Australian Builders’ Labourers’ Federation.

Greencorn Rebellion, Oklahoma, 1917

John Trumbour

An uprising against military conscription in World War I, the Greencorn Rebellion mobilized a social base of eastern Oklahoma tenant farmers including whites, African Americans, and Native

Americans against US intervention in Europe and wider economic injustice. Centered in Seminole, Hughes, and Pontotoc counties during early August 1917, this rebellion led to the cutting of telegraph lines, destruction of bridges, and wider mayhem, provoking the authorities to round up over 450 people in the sparsely populated region. In total, 184 people received indictments, with 150 found guilty.

The Greencorn name refers primarily to the early harvested crops used to feed the rebels and secondarily to the annual rites celebrated by several Native American nations in the weeks before the uprising. Though rebels were armed, they hesitated to fire upon the posses suppressing the insurrection. As Greencorn rebel Walter Strong recalled: “Some of the men in the posse were neighbors of ours, and we couldn’t shoot ’em down in cold blood. That’s the way we felt ’bout the Germans too. . . . We didn’t have no quarrel with them at all” (Green 1978: 360).

Spearheaded by the Working Class Union (WCU), an organization that established a national headquarters in 1914, the revolt sought to ignite a wider social conflagration by enlisting farmers and the downtrodden in many states. The leaders envisioned a people’s march on Washington, culminating in the overthrow of the Democrat regime of Woodrow Wilson, whom the Oklahoma protesters called Big Slick. They labeled World War I “a rich man’s war, a poor man’s fight.”

Wilson had run for US president in 1916 and secured Oklahoma’s electoral votes under the slogan “He kept us out of war.” Even so, Oklahoma gave the Socialist Party presidential candidate Allan Benson his greatest state support: 15.55 percent of the total compared to a figure of 3.3 percent nationally. In 1912, socialist Eugene Debs had received 6 percent of the national vote and over 16 percent in Oklahoma, a percentage exceeded only in Nevada. US Senator Thomas Pryor Gore of Oklahoma, a Democrat, steadfastly opposed US entry into World War I even after the intervention, and some contemporaries blamed him for emboldening the Greencorn rebels. A populist who did not like people, in the formulation of his grandson Gore Vidal, T. P. Gore lost his Senate seat in 1920 due to the counterattacks on his putative lack of patriotism.

Oklahoma radicalism had several currents, incorporating populism, Pentecostal Christianity, and socialist visions of a just social order ultimately stirred into action by severe agrarian

distress and the ravages of boom-and-bust capital. According to the 1890 census, less than 1 percent of Oklahoma farmers had tenant status, though the actual figure may have been higher as recent arrivals into Indian Territory anticipated they would make a swift transition to ownership. With an extraordinary burst of speculation increasing land prices by 246 percent from 1900 to 1910, over half the farmers had fallen into tenant status by 1915. The Panic of 1907 in particular drove many farm owners into foreclosure and tenantry. Of those who still owned farms, a majority found themselves paying off burdensome mortgages, which in the three counties of the rebellion carried the nation's highest interest rates. Anti-usury statutes in the state of Oklahoma had proven ineffectual in stopping the exorbitant gouging of tenant farmers, who reported annual interest rates ranging from 20 to 200 percent and on occasion higher (Sellars 2002: 1110–13). The WCU called for the “total abolition of the crime, disease, and death-producing practice of rent, interest, and profit taking.” Henry Starr, who carried out spectacular thefts of trains and banks, gained sympathizers among the hill people of Oklahoma for saying that the bankers were indeed in “the robbery business, too” (Burbank 1976: 141, 148).

The Greencorn Rebellion has been dismissed as an upsurge of country bumpkins and yokeldom, the doomed remnants of rural idiocy. The reality is that finance capitalism had spread the railways, the telegraph lines, coal mines, and oil wells to Oklahoma, and many tenant farmers had experience laboring in a variety of industries, especially in mining and petroleum drilling. WCU organizer “Rube” Munson is frequently dismissed as a rube; but Cal State Hayward feminist Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz and Harvard historian John Womack, Jr. in an unpublished essay note that Munson's father had joined up with John Brown in the fight against slavery, while Rube himself had decades of work and organizing experience in Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, and Oklahoma (Dunbar-Ortiz & Womack ca. 2007). In his autobiography, the socialist organizer Oscar Ameringer conceded that, despite “poor schooling,” the rebellious tenant farmers had “a great deal of native intelligence. . . . Their state of illiteracy protected them, partially at least, against the flood of lying propaganda with which their ‘betters’ of press, pulpit, and rostrum deluged the country, while

their native common sense allowed them to see through the pretensions of the war mongers far better than could many a PhD, LL.B., or D.D.” (Ameringer 1940: 350).

Even though the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) had largely spurned tenant farmers and Greencorn rebels later expressed betrayal at the hands of “electric-light city” socialists, the authorities cited the rebellion as justification for a suffocating blanket of repression thrown upon the IWW and the Socialist Party (Dunbar-Ortiz 1997: 15). With the support of town notables, respectable professionals, and a variety of petty bourgeois elements, the Ku Klux Klan unleashed further waves of reactionary terror against radical sympathizers in the countryside. Though the IWW had some bursts of vitality in the 1920s, agrarian radicalism in the Southwest fell into decline. In August 1940 Oklahoma arrested 12 people, including the Ivy League-educated state secretary of the Communist Party Robert Wood, under a law inspired by the Greencorn Rebellion proscribing criminal syndicalism, which was defined as “the doctrine which advocates crime, physical violence, arson, destruction of property, sabotage or other unlawful acts or methods, as a means of accomplishing or effecting industrial or political ends, or as a means of effecting industrial or political revolution” (Howell 1991).

The Greencorn Rebellion continues to generate reflection on a number of scholarly and activist fronts. Communication scholars have wondered whether attacks on telegraph lines, while having immediate strategic aims, may have also reflected a deeper hostility to corporate abuses in monopolizing the communication system, which rendered prices many times more expensive in the United States than in the telegraph systems of other nations under public post office control (Schiller 1996: 8–10). Meanwhile, Thomas Frank's polemic, *What's the Matter with Kansas?* (2004), has contrasted the agrarian radicalism of the early twentieth-century Plains with the postwar conformity and reaction that persists into the twenty-first century: “The poorest county in America isn't in Appalachia or the Deep South. It is on the Great Plains, a region of struggling ranchers and dying farm towns, and in the election of 2000 the Republican candidate for president, George W. Bush, carried it by a majority of greater than 80 percent” (Frank 2004: 1). The Greencorn

Rebellion remains a signal event for retracing the origins of this extraordinary historical rupture.

SEE ALSO: Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Socialist Party, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Ameringer, O. (1940) *If You Don't Weaken*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Burbank, G. (1976) *When Farmers Voted Red: The Gospel of Socialism in the Oklahoma Countryside, 1910–1924*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Dunbar-Ortiz, R. (1997) *Red Dirt: Growing Up Okie*. New York: Verso.
- Dunbar-Ortiz, R. & Womack, J. (ca. 2007) *Dreams of Revolution: Oklahoma 1917*. Unpublished MS.
- Frank, T. (2004) *What's the Matter with Kansas?* New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Green, J. R. (1978) *Grass-Roots Socialism: Radical Movements in the Southwest, 1895–1943*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Howell, J. (1991) Reporter Recalls Trial of State Communist Party Leader. *Tulsa World*, February 11.
- Schiller, D. (1996) *Theorizing Communication: A History*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sellars, N. A. (2002) Treasonous Tenant Farmers and Seditious Sharecroppers: The 1917 Green Corn Rebellion Trials. *Oklahoma City University Law Review* 27, 3 (Fall): 1097–141.

Greenpeace

Terry Simmons

Greenpeace is a household name associated with dramatic efforts to save whales and harp seals from commercial exploitation and to stop nuclear testing in Alaska and French Polynesia. Known around the world for its aggressive environmental advocacy, non-violent direct action, and clever, media-savvy events, Greenpeace International has organizations in 42 countries in Europe, the Americas, Asia, and the Pacific. Headquartered in Amsterdam, it has about 2.8 million supporters worldwide, and describes its actions as “bearing witness in a non-violent manner.” In short, Greenpeace is the manifestation of the common elements and concerns of the environmental movement and the peace movement.

The group's activism began in 1971, when protesters and journalists sailed to confront US underground nuclear testing at Amchitka Island in Alaska's Aleutian Islands. Despite humble beginnings, Greenpeace established fundamental, innovative attributes that transformed and

expanded the way Greenpeace International and the environmental movement operates today. The origins, values, and tactics of Greenpeace were shaped in the formative years of 1969–74. Greenpeace began as both an organization and a concept in 1969 with a small group of a few dozen single-purpose, *ad hoc* volunteers in Vancouver, British Columbia. Greenpeace's original goal was to stop or at least protest the US Atomic Energy Commission's detonation of the Cannikin underground nuclear test on Amchitka Island scheduled for October 1971. But events at Amchitka Island transcended the concerns of anti-nuclear protesters. Since Amchitka Island had been part of the US Fish and Wildlife Service wildlife refuge system, more conservation activists had become concerned about the island as well.

The combination of environmental and peace politics at Amchitka Island illustrates the unique ability of Greenpeace to deal with issues and circumstances that reach far beyond an organization's normal sense of purpose or boundaries. Many protest groups strictly avoid entanglement in issues beyond their own stated concerns, while others form alliances or coalitions with related protest groups. In contrast, Greenpeace combined aspects of the environmental and peace movements to become a hybrid. It merged and expanded the scope of a traditional conservation organization (concerned with wildlife, natural landscapes, and public land management) with the purposes, tactics, and moral urgency of well-established pacifist groups.

The Quakers, the American Friends Service Committee, the Committee for Non-Violent Action, and other pacifist groups had vocally opposed nuclear warfare, testing, and weapons development during the 1950s and early 1960s. But many active and powerful peace organizations became moribund after the ratification of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, while others shifted their attention to the escalating war in Vietnam. In contrast, the Amchitka protest was strictly limited: no position was taken against the war in Indochina. Greenpeace opposed nuclear testing by all the nuclear powers, including France, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. Since sailing to the Chinese test site in the Gobi Desert was not possible, Greenpeace started with the US testing site in Alaska. A protest voyage of the *Vega*, or *Greenpeace III*, to Mururoa in French Polynesia would follow.

Greenpeace created a necessary bridge between those persons concerned about the environmental consequences of nuclear testing and those individuals opposed to nuclear testing and nuclear warfare generally. While environmental health studies of radiation and fallout had been conducted in the 1970s, mainstream environmental groups would not embrace issues concerning the environmental consequences of military activities or the civilian use of nuclear power plants until the mid-1970s. As obvious as it may seem now, the first lasting contribution of Greenpeace was to create a successful hybrid – Green + Peace – that expanded the dimensions and possibilities of the environmental movement.

Greenpeace's most distinctive and enduring attributes are the concept of bearing witness and the strategy of non-violent direct action. Both were originally inspired by the attempts of Albert Bigelow and the crew of the *Golden Rule* to sail to the Eniwetok test site in 1958, and by Earle Reynolds, who sailed the *Phoenix* into the security zone established around Bikini Atoll. The *Golden Rule's* crew was arrested and the vessel seized in Hawaii; Reynolds was arrested for sailing into a prohibited zone too close to the test site.

Together, the voyages of the *Golden Rule* and the *Phoenix* provided a model for action, a renewed sense of purpose, and valuable lessons for a new, ambitious organization. Ultimately, the fishing vessel *Phyllis Cormack*, soon renamed *Greenpeace*, sailed from Vancouver's False Creek fish dock on September 15, 1971, en route to the Amchitka underground test site, 2,400 nautical miles northwest, in the stormy waters between the North Pacific and the Bering Sea. Following the principles of non-violent direct action, the crew of *Greenpeace* planned to arrive at Amchitka shortly before the scheduled test to observe and record the environmental impact of Cannikin insofar as it was possible, and to establish a floating picket line in international waters off the island.

The voyages of the *Golden Rule* and the *Phoenix* had demonstrated to Greenpeace a serious flaw: the protest voyages had little political impact. Very few persons had been aware of the peace activists' drama on the high seas. Bearing witness often involves standing or sitting in silence in the public plaza or in the middle of the road. Protests are non-violent and tend to be passive, since the demonstration, be it a picket line or voyage to a distant island, speaks for itself.

Greenpeace embraced a distinctly secular version of bearing witness during its voyage to Amchitka. At the same time, the volunteers about Greenpeace realized that floating picket lines were not enough. Accordingly, the crew organized its own media campaign onboard. The crew of 12 included, by design, four experienced journalists, who sent almost daily accounts back to Vancouver for distribution to the media and the general public. Direct action journalism transformed the process of bearing witness from a distinctly local phenomenon into a worldwide event.

Greenpeace created a new *modus operandi* which combined direct action with sophisticated, aggressive use of mass media. The protest vessel became an active stage for crafting purposeful messages, spreading daily news, exploiting newsworthy events, and even making explicit political propaganda. The crew of *Greenpeace* was well versed in the media theories of the age, including Marshall McLuhan's dictum that "the medium is the message." For these activists, the entire world was a stage, literally and figuratively, whether sailing to remote islands or speaking to large urban audiences. Non-violent direct action took the form of practical and media-savvy activities.

Ultimately, the *Greenpeace* voyage was turned back by the US Coast Guard and the prospects of heavy, early winter seas. In the middle of Akutan Bay, one of the most dramatic events during the entire voyage occurred when the *Greenpeace* crew received a simple, handwritten letter of support, signed by 18 US Coast Guard crew members, just as their commanding officer was in the process of ordering the skipper of the *Phyllis Cormack* to turn around and to report to US Customs at Sand Point, Alaska. Significantly, this was the only Greenpeace event that reached the US mass media directly, when Walter Cronkite reported the incident on the evening television news.

Nonetheless, political momentum was building. The Cannikin underground nuclear test was detonated on November 6, 1971, but the nuclear testing program was canceled a few months later, and the US Atomic Energy Commission returned management of Amchitka Island to the US Fish and Wildlife Service. Altogether, the first voyage of *Greenpeace*, initially a mere battered halibut-fishing boat, increased the scope of environmental activism by merging the environmental

movement with the peace movement, and by embracing and transforming non-violent direct action with new, sophisticated tools for aggressive, global environmental action.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Ecological Protest Movements; French Polynesia, Protest Movements; Green Bans Movement, Australia; Nuclear-Free New Zealand, 1987

References and Suggested Readings

- Bigelow, A. (1959) *The Voyage of the Golden Rule*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Bohlen, J. (2001) *Making Waves: The Origins and Future of Greenpeace*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Greenpeace International, www.greenpeace.org/international/about (accessed June 26, 2008).
- Hunter, R. (2004) *The Greenpeace to Amchitka: An Environmental Odyssey*. Photographs by R. Keziere. Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press.
- Kohlhoff, D. W. (2002) *Amchitka and the Bomb: Nuclear Testing in Alaska*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- McTaggart, D. with Hunter, R. (1978) *Greenpeace III: Journey into the Bomb*. London: Collins.
- Reynolds, E. L. (1961) *The Forbidden Voyage*. New York: D. McKay.
- Ross, K. (2000) *Environmental Conflict in Alaska*. Boulder: University Press of Colorado.
- Scarce, R. (2006) *Eco-Warriors: Understanding the Radical Environmental Movement*, updated ed. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.
- Wapner, P. (1995) In Defense of Banner Hangers: The Dark Green Politics of Greenpeace. In B. R. Taylor (Ed.), *Ecological Resistance Movements: The Global Emergence of Radical and Popular Environmentalism*. Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 300–14.
- Weyler, R. (2004) *Greenpeace: How a Group of Ecologists, Journalists and Visionaries Changed the World*. Vancouver: Raincoast Books.
- Zelko, F. (2003) “Make It A Green Peace”: The History of an International Environmental Organization. PhD dissertation, Department of History, University of Kansas.
- Zelko, F. (2004) Making Greenpeace: The Development of Direct Action Environmentalism in British Columbia. *BC Studies* 142/143: 197–239.

Grenadian Revolution, 1979–1983

Brian Meeks

Early in the morning of March 13, 1979, a small group of armed militants of the opposition New

Jewel Movement (NJM) stormed and captured the army barracks at True Blue on the tiny southern Caribbean island of Grenada. Simultaneously, another detachment secured the sole radio station, renaming it “Radio Free Grenada” and calling on the citizenry to take to the streets and demand, by popular demonstration, the surrender of all police stations across the island. Six hours later, NJM and constitutional opposition leader Maurice Bishop declared the formation of the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG), arguing that the revolution was for “work, food, shelter, and a bright future for our children,” and all resistance ended. The NJM was in effective control of Grenada and her two smaller Grenadine islands of Carriacou and Petit Martinique.

The Grenadian Revolution lasted for some four and a half years. It collapsed in October 1983 when deep, though previously hidden, divisions in the party leadership led, first, to the detention of Bishop, the popular prime minister, and then, in a series of fast-moving events, to his release by a crowd of supporters, their seizure of a military base, and, tragically, the recapturing of the base and murder of Bishop and some of his closest allies by soldiers of the People’s Revolutionary Army (PRA), of which he had been, until these events, commander in chief.

The Grenadian Revolution can be considered part of a powerful though short-lived wave of postcolonial revolutions that occurred in the late 1970s. Indeed, while in terms of scale and international significance it pales in comparison to the Iranian and Nicaraguan Revolutions that both took power in the same year, it shares many structural similarities. All three involved a postcolonial government that was widely considered corrupt and had lost support across the social and political spectrum. All three took power in an international window of possibility, predicated by the hesitancy of the United States in the latter phase of its post-Vietnam syndrome, to intervene in local insurgencies. And all three declared themselves militantly anti-imperialist, though Grenada and Nicaragua adopted more typical Marxist revolutionary principles, while Iran chose its unique brand of Shi’ite Islamic fundamentalism. Yet, it would be an error to see these processes as simply local manifestations of an international conjuncture. All three owe their origin and development significantly to local histories and conditions. The Grenadian Revolution,

in particular, requires careful scrutiny, because it is the single instance of revolutionary overthrow in the Anglophone Commonwealth Caribbean, a region where parliamentary electoral politics has predominated in the postcolonial period.

Historical Background: From Eric Gairy to Revolution

The origins of the 1979 Revolution can be traced to the popular upsurge of 1951 and the rise to prominence of Eric Gairy in Grenadian politics. Unlike many other Caribbean territories, Grenada avoided the riots of the 1930s against extremely adverse social and economic conditions. However, when agricultural staple prices fell in 1950 and employers demanded a rollback in wages, local stoppages and other forms of resistance, including incendiary acts, occurred, leading to a general strike across the island in February 1951. Despite the declaration of a state of emergency, the presence of a British warship, and the detention of the striker leader, Eric Gairy, the governor was unable to prevail, and the strike gained momentum through February and into March. Eventually it was only Gairy, released by the governor, who was able to convince the workers to return to work in exchange for wage increases and union recognition. This victory signaled the decisive rise to prominence of the black trade unionist Gairy in Grenadian politics, a position he would not lose until the triumph of the Revolution in 1979.

Gairy can be considered a prototypical messianic leader. From a poor, rural background, he had traveled to nearby Aruba to work in the oilfields. On his return, with newly acquired trade unionist skills, he placed himself at the head of the unrepresented workers as their hero and redeemer from both economic and racial bondage. His political role can be divided into two periods. Before Grenada's independence in 1974, he sought to provide some relief for his poorest supporters. This was manifested primarily in wage increases and the normalization of trade union negotiations. However, it created a bedrock of loyal followers, many of whom never deserted him. More substantially, he used his limited control over the state apparatus to illegally enrich himself and a small elite of his supporters. This was evident in the 1961 "Squandermania" scandal, when under the damning report of a commission of inquiry exposing

extensive corruption, he was forced from office and banned from participating in politics for five years. When he returned to leadership after victory in the 1967 general elections, Gairy resumed his old policies. His 1968 "Land for the Landless" program bought out or acquired the estates of the local oligarchy, but the beneficiaries were not so much the genuinely "landless" as the government itself or its closest associates. Gairy also bent the electoral rules to suit his purposes. In both the 1967 and 1972 electoral exercises, credible charges of vote rigging and intimidation of opponents were made against Gairy and his party, the Grenada United Labour Party (GULP).

After his 1972 victory, however, Gairy faced new, formidable opponents. In 1970, nearby Trinidad and Tobago had experienced the "Black Power Revolution" – three months of huge demonstrations against the perception that eight years after independence the economy was neocolonial and that there still remained deep racial biases in employment and social life. The Trinidadian movement and the regional and international upsurge of radicalism of the late 1960s had profound effects on Grenada. Newly returned university graduates combined with local activists to form a variety of black power organizations. The nascent movement opposed Gairy's authoritarian rule, describing it as a dictatorship, and supported popular actions like the 1970 nurses' strike. Gairy in turn formed a detachment of police aides – derisively labeled the "Mongoose Gang" – who brutalized members of the growing movement and their supporters, particularly among the unemployed youth. The perception of widespread vote rigging during the 1972 election gave further impetus to the radical opposition. Some younger members of the losing Grenada National Party (GNP) were now convinced that the Gairy regime could not be defeated by conventional means and joined the black power movement.

However, it was Gairy's decision to seek independence from Britain without having raised it as an election issue in 1972 that helped to create the decisive coalition against his leadership. Supporters of the movement from the working classes and unemployed saw independence as an opportunity for Gairy to unleash further brutality against them, without the constitutional restraints of the colonial power. Members of the middle and wealthy classes who had always seen

him as an arbitrary usurper were also afraid of unhindered Gairyite power and were convinced that he had gone too far. The new organization that emerged to address the widespread dismay was led by members of the young, radical intelligentsia, notably Maurice Bishop and Unison Whiteman, and was called the New Jewel Movement.

The NJM was formed in 1973 and began immediately to organize large demonstrations against the regime and other targets of the movement. In May, it gathered some 15 percent of the country's population to a Convention on Independence. In November, on the eve of a People's Congress to call for Gairy's resignation, the leadership of the NJM, including Maurice Bishop, Unison Whiteman, and Selwyn Strachan, were brutally beaten by members of the Mon-goose Gang and police regulars, precipitating a general strike and popular street demonstrations that lasted for three months.

The 1974 pre-independence lockdown can be considered the first phase of the Grenadian Revolution. The widespread support for the action suggested the extent to which Gairy, with his messianic, authoritarian brand of leadership, had become isolated. The upsurge also decisively placed the NJM and its leaders, particularly Maurice Bishop, at the head of a broad national movement. The NJM was not, however, able to remove Gairy in 1974. In February the strike was broken and Gairy, with British support, declared independence. The defeat of the popular upsurge led to a rethinking within the NJM of its ideological and organizational structures. The decision was made to abandon loose and open structures and to create a Leninist vanguard. Ideologically, the new approach provided the basis for a variety of alliances, including a critical one with the bourgeoisie against the common opponent of the Gairy regime. Leninism also implied the elaboration of different levels of organization within the party, including legal as well as clandestine forms, all under the strict direction of a Central Committee (CC) and Political Bureau (PB).

The new approach began almost immediately to pay dividends. In the 1976 general elections, the NJM was able to forge an alliance with the traditional opposition GNP. Unable to defeat Gairy in what was again considered a rigged election, Bishop, along with Whiteman and Bernard Coard, nonetheless won their seats, and Bishop

became the formal leader of the opposition in parliament. From this new position, Bishop and the NJM were able to consolidate their popular support and campaign against Gairy more effectively in local, regional, and international forums. The NJM, however, never abandoned clandestine forms and prepared a small military contingent alongside its legal, parliamentary arm. On March 10, the houses of a number of NJM leaders were searched simultaneously while they attended a party meeting. On March 12, PB member Vince Noel was arrested and while in custody urged by sympathetic police to escape by nightfall in order to save his life. That day Eric Gairy left for New York, and NJM leaders claimed that he had left orders for their arrest and murder. NJM militants assembled that evening and at 4.00 a.m. on March 13, launched the decisive attack against the army barracks at True Blue.

The NJM in Power

The first years of NJM rule witnessed the paradoxical juxtaposition of a healthy pragmatism in political and economic policy with a dogmatic approach to internal party organization. The first statements of the leadership, including forgiveness of former supporters of the regime, the retention of the Commonwealth principle of the queen as head of state, and the announcement that elections would be held in due course, all served to win support among the moderate elements in Grenadian society and neighboring parliamentary regimes in the Caribbean. The election promise, however, increasingly became a millstone around the party's neck, with the failure to hold elections in the first four years. The policy of detaining opponents of the Revolution, or "counters," was also paid scant attention when it involved just a few members of the Gairy regime. But as the number of political prisoners increased over the years, it became a major point of contention with regional governments and human rights advocates.

The PRG did undertake some novel political initiatives. The annual budget debates, of which three were held, involved citizens at all levels in the discussion and ratification of the annual budget. While this process was still very experimental, it suggested an alternative impetus, toward a reliance on popular direction and away from centralist control. This was also the case with the Parish Councils, which were nascent

bodies of popular debate and democracy in the communities, though throughout the life of the Revolution, they were more receivers than initiators of policy. These were accompanied by innovative educational programs, like the adult literacy Center for Popular Education (CPE) and the National In-Service Teacher Education Program (NISTEP).

The most striking feature of the Revolution, however, was one largely hidden from the public. The party, reaping the benefits of power from its policy of centralism and clandestinity, which helped in the March 13 overthrow, sought not to expand its membership by bringing in its many supporters but to further restrict entrance by the application of rigid, supposedly Leninist principles of selectivity. This led to a tiny, centralized, and increasingly hierarchical party, with a membership overburdened with administering the state and increasingly alienated from the population at large.

The economic policies of the regime were equally pragmatic. Based more on neo-Keynesian policies of infrastructural development than on more esoteric notions of “socialist orientation,” they centered on the building of an international airport. A full-sized international airport with the ability to land the largest carriers had always been a dream of Grenadians, but one never fulfilled under previous regimes. The PRG was able to assemble the finances from an international consortium, though the greatest technical and manpower assistance came from Cuba. This project, along with others in roads, public works, and housing, helped to significantly reduce youth unemployment and won greater support for the government throughout the country.

The government’s international policies were more complex. The PRG followed a consistent policy of opposition to “US imperialism,” which won it no friends in the Reagan administration. This, it could be argued, might have been its best defense, given the stated hostility of the US government to the PRG. However, the absence of nuance in this approach was also obvious. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1980, rather than adopt a neutral position in keeping with its non-aligned status, the PRG sought to stand with a small minority of states that supported the USSR, creating unnecessary enemies. Yet, the sources of finance that the government was able to secure for the airport and other projects, from Europe, Canada, the OPEC

countries, and elsewhere, suggest that on the diplomatic front it was far from being isolated.

The Collapse of the Revolution

By early 1983 the Grenadian Revolution appeared to be more consolidated than ever. It had weathered a number of early tests to its power, including attempts to assassinate the PRG leadership in 1980. Despite the numerous threats coming from the US government and the various military maneuvers in the Caribbean and the Atlantic directed at a mock invasion of Grenada, the country seemed secure so long as it retained a measure of acceptance in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the wider Caribbean. This seemed certain, for when in 1980 some Caribbean leaders had tried to isolate Grenada at the CARICOM summit in Jamaica, the attempt backfired and Maurice Bishop emerged triumphant, with the full support of the meeting and the applause of the local population.

There were, however, profound rifts within the party and government and these would soon prove to be fatal. Bernard Coard, deputy leader and minister of finance, had resigned from his party positions in October 1982 on the basis that he did not have the support of other members of the leadership. This reflected a deeper division that had grown between Coard and Bishop as the Revolution progressed. Bishop had always been the popular leader of the NJM, with his attractive, charismatic personality. Coard, on the other hand, had been the ideological and organizational genius, who had helped convert the party to Leninism in 1974 and build its clandestine structure for the overthrow in 1979. However, when Bishop became prime minister, his profile and that of the PRG as a whole rose both nationally and internationally, while that of the NJM slipped into the shadows. It was this tension between the small, centralist party with its increasingly overburdened membership cadre that actually ran the government and the growing national and international profile of the popular leader, coupled in 1983 with a downturn in the economic fortunes of the government, that led to a crisis of leadership and the denouement of the Revolution.

In early 1983 a number of loans promised to the PRG were not fulfilled. This led to some layoffs, and unemployment, for the first time in four years, was once again on the increase. Party

members also reported significant declines in attendance at NJM meetings, popular functions, and militia training at the same time that the US was staging new maneuvers off the coast of Barbados and making increasingly bellicose sounds toward Grenada. Within the NJM, the response to these threats was to strengthen Leninism, and more critically to call for the return of Bernard Coard to the party in the position of joint leader with Maurice Bishop.

The introduction of joint leadership eventually led to the destruction of the Grenada Revolution. Whatever the intention of the advocates of this notion, whether conspiratorial or benign, it was fraught. Bishop had been projected for four years as the single leader. He had developed a mass following far beyond that of the party and, despite Grenada's diminutive size, had become an international figure of substantive proportions. To ask him to simply reduce his stature within the party to that of joint leader, without any evident crisis, was entirely unrealistic. When the Central Committee and subsequently the majority of the NJM membership voted for such a proposal, they placed the party and the Revolution on a crash course. In order to understand this, it is important to recount the sequence of events. On September 16, 1983, the majority of the CC voted in favor of joint leadership, with Bishop abstaining. On October 25, an extraordinary meeting of the membership of the NJM again voted in favor. After intense debate, a wavering Bishop was eventually won over to the idea. On September 26, Bishop left for a scheduled trip to Eastern Europe and Cuba. On October 8, he returned and immediately expressed renewed reservations. On October 12, a rumor circulated that Bernard Coard and his wife were planning to kill Bishop. On investigation, one of Bishop's personal security officers suggested that the rumor started with Bishop himself. On October 13, in response to this accusation, Bishop was detained indefinitely. On October 19, after days of popular agitation, he was freed from detention by a large group of demonstrators, overwhelming the guard at his residence. Bishop and his supporters then marched and took over the large garrison at nearby Fort Rupert. The Fort, now under his control, was soon attacked by a contingent of soldiers loyal to the NJM, who after skirmishes, recaptured it, arrested Bishop and a number of his closest followers, and executed them.

The death of Maurice Bishop signaled the fatal blow to the Grenadian Revolution. Six days later, a force of US Marines and soldiers landed by air and sea in Grenada and, after fierce but limited resistance, defeated the PRA and arrested the surviving leaders of the party and army. Many of the former leaders, including Bernard Coard, remain in prison to this day.

The demise of the Grenada Revolution was not simply, if at all, a question of hegemonic power and military superiority, but an internal political breakdown and a failure of the creative imagination. The NJM, despite some novel and promising policies, failed to move beyond dogmatic notions of ideology and political organization rooted, ultimately, in another experience, and therefore was unable to forge creative approaches to politics and society appropriate to the needs of Grenada and the wider Caribbean in the postcolonial period.

SEE ALSO: Bishop, Maurice (1944–1983); Iranian Revolution, 1979; New Jewel Movement; Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s

References and Suggested Readings

- Brizan, G. (1998) *Grenada: Island of Conflict*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Cotman, J. W. (1993) *The Gorrión Tree: Cuba and the Grenadian Revolution*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Heine, J. (1990) *A Revolution Aborted*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Lewis, G. K. (1987) *Grenada: The Jewel Despoiled*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Mandle, J. (1985) *Big Revolution, Small Country: The Rise and Fall of the Grenadian Revolution*. Lanham, MD: North South Publishing.
- Marable, M. (1987) *African and Caribbean Politics: From Kwame Nkrumah to Maurice Bishop*. London: Verso.
- Meeks, B. (1993) *Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory: An Assessment of Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Noguera, P. (1997) *The Imperatives of Power: Regime Survival and the Basis of Political Support in Grenada from 1951–1991*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Pryor, F. (1986) *Revolutionary Grenada: A Study in Political Economy*. New York: Praeger.
- Sandford, G. & Vigilante, R. (1984) *Grenada: The Untold Story*. Lanham, MD: Madison Books.
- Smith, C. (1995) *Socialist Transformation in Peripheral Economies: Lessons from Grenada*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Thorndike, T. (1985) *Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society*. London: Frances Pinter.

Grimké, Angelina (1805–1879) and Sarah (1792–1873)

Danielle Gougon

Sarah and Angelina Grimké helped pioneer the anti-slavery and women's rights movement in the United States. Although they were born into a wealthy, slaveholding family in Charleston, South Carolina, the sisters were profoundly disturbed by the concept of slavery and shared the belief that all people are created equal.

The sisters became formally involved in anti-slavery efforts when they converted to the Quaker faith in the late 1820s. In addition to its anti-slavery doctrine, Sarah and Angelina were also attracted to the Quakers' acceptance of women into leadership positions within the church. However, the sisters soon found that the church's views on women were too conservative for their taste; they were disappointed by their limited roles within the church and they longed to be more involved with the anti-slavery effort.

A letter to the editor Angelina wrote in 1835 to William Lloyd Garrison's newspaper, *The Liberator*, changed the sisters' lives forever. In the letter, Angelina professed her support and commitment to the abolitionist cause. The letter, which was published without Angelina's knowledge, received an overwhelming response and was later reprinted in all of the major reform newspapers of the day. The anti-slavery community embraced the sisters as it was rare to have members of Southern slaveholding families, especially women, speak out against slavery. The American Anti-Slavery Society asked Sarah and Angelina to become agents of the Society and tour the country lecturing about their experience and knowledge of slavery.

In 1837 Sarah and Angelina officially embarked on a tour of 67 American cities. The tour caused great controversy. The sisters were arguing for immediate abolition, a strategy that was rebuked by many in the abolition movement. Even more controversial was the fact that Sarah and Angelina Grimké were among the first women to speak publicly to audiences composed of both men and women. The sisters endured a bevy of criticism for speaking in public; ministers, fellow abolitionists, and the general public

accused the sisters of violating the "natural role" and "proper sphere" of women.

Sarah responded to the attacks by writing a series of letters defending a woman's right to speak in public. The public outcry over their lectures also heightened Sarah and Angelina's awareness of the parallels between the condition of slaves and the subjugation of women in society. These letters were later compiled and published as the *Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and the Condition of Women*, one of the first documents to link slavery to the unequal treatment of women. Angelina concluded the tour in 1837 with an address to the Massachusetts State Legislature and in doing so became the first woman in United States history to address a legislative body.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Garrison, William Lloyd (1805–1879); Women's Movement, United States, 19th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Browne, S. H. (1999) *Angelina Grimké: Rhetoric, Identity, and the Radical Imagination*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.
- Ceplair, L. (1989) *The Public Years of Sarah and Angelina Grimké*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lerner, G. (1998) *The Feminist Thought of Sarah Grimké*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lerner, G. (2004) *The Grimké Sisters from South Carolina: Pioneers for Women's Rights and Abolition*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and the Condition of Women*. Available at www.pinn.net/~sunshine/book-sum/Grimké3.html.
- McKivigan, J. (Ed.) (1999) *Abolitionism and Issues of Race and Gender*. New York: Garland.

Grove Vallejo, Marmaduke (1879–1954)

Mauricio González Arenas

Marmaduke Grove Vallejo, military man, political and revolutionary Chilean, was born in Copiapó on July 6, 1878. Son of the attorney Jose Grove and Ana Vallejo Burgoa, between 1924 and 1949 he stood out as one of the principal figures of Chile's political scene.

In 1892 he joined the naval academy, from which he was expelled for taking part in a so-called “revolt of the hard bread,” which took place in 1894. In 1897 he entered military school, graduating as sub-lieutenant of artillery. In 1906 he traveled to specialize in a German regiment of artillery, returning to Chile in 1911 with the rank of captain. In 1913 he became part of the Artillery Regiment of Tacna. Between 1920 and 1924 he served as assistant director of the military school of Santiago.

On September 2, 1924, 56 army officers entered the Senate abruptly during the voting of new parliamentary diets to protest the rising incomes of politicians while there were legislative delays and problems concerning labor laws and the pay of soldiers. This action, with Grove as outstanding figure, was named the “noise of sabers” and constituted the commencement of the coup d’état of September 1924. The coup was led by a group of civilian and military leftist opponents to Alessandri. As a colonel, in January 1925 Grove was designated by the new government as director of the school of military aviation and head of the military mission in Europe. In 1926 Vice President Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, who in 1927 would become dictator, sent him again to Europe. Understanding that Ibáñez sent him to Europe only to remove him from political life, in January 1929 he signed the Agreement of Calais. In this document the conspirators swore to reconquer democracy for Chile. He was expelled from the army and exiled in November 1929. On September 21, 1930 he returned to Chile on board a red plane ready to depose Ibáñez. Caught again, he was deported to Easter Island.

After the fall of Ibáñez, Grove, who had fled to Europe, returned to Chile and in February 1932 was reincorporated into the army. One month later he was designated chief of the Chilean air force. On June 4, 1932 he rose against the government and proclaimed the Socialist Republic of Chile, in which he served as secretary of defense. A product of the political and social chaos, the movement was led by Grove and Carlos Davila, among others. At this time, the Communist Party was weak and the Socialist Party had not even been founded.

The socialist experiment only lasted 12 days. On June 16, 1932 Carlos Davila, president of the meeting, betrayed and demolished the Socialist Republic with another coup d’état, and Grove was deported to Easter Island. This did not

prevent him from being proclaimed presidential candidate for the elections in October 1932. Despite returning from exile only two days before the voting, he obtained second position with 17.7 percent of the vote. The winner was Arturo Alessandri Palma.

On April 19, 1933 Grove helped found the Socialist Party of Chile (PS). He was elected senator for the periods 1933–41 and 1941–9. As senator he stimulated a rejected Agrarian Reform titled “No to the land without men, no to the men without land.” Marmaduke Grove died in Santiago on May 15, 1954 at the age of 75.

SEE ALSO: Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973); Chile and the Peaceful Road to Socialism; Chile, Social and Political Struggles, 1950–1970

References and Suggested Readings

- Aránguiz Latorre, M. (1933) *El 4 de junio*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Zig-Zag.
- Arrate, J. & Rojas, E. (2006) *Memoria de la Izquierda Chilena*. Santiago de Chile: Javier Vergara Editor.
- Bravo, A. G. (1932) *4 de junio: el festín de los audaces*. Santiago de Chile: Empresa Letras.
- Grove, J. (1933) *Descorriendo el velo: episodio de los doce días de la República Socialista*. Valparaíso.
- Grove Vallejo, M. (1939) *Reforma agraria: la tierra para el que la trabaja*. Santiago de Chile: Secretaría Nacional de Cultura.

Guadeloupe, labor protest

Yarimar Bonilla

Guadeloupe came under the authority of the French crown in 1674 and, with the exception of a few brief British takeovers, has remained under French control until the present day. However, despite its seeming stability as a French territory, its place in the French nation has always been ambiguous, fluctuating, and often violently contested.

French citizenship was originally granted to Guadeloupean residents in 1848 following the abolition of slavery. Yet, this was at best a partial or “colonial citizenship” in that they did not possess the full spectrum of rights and responsibilities as citizens of mainland France. In 1946 political elites in the French Antilles sought to remedy the social and economic disparities in the region by promoting greater integration

into the French nation. Thus, at a time when the colonial territories throughout Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean were being swept into the global tide of decolonization through political independence, politicians in the French Antilles sought to strengthen, rather than break, their ties to the colonial center by fully integrating the Antilles into the French nation as “overseas departments.”

The political project of departmentalization, as conceptualized by its main proponent Aimé Césaire, was born out of the conviction that the lingering economic disparities and structural inequalities that plagued the French Antilles could only be resolved through full political integration into the French nation. However, this move coincided with major shifts in the global market for tropical exports that radically transformed the local economy. As a result, under departmentalization, agricultural production slowly gave way to a service-based economy, centered on tourism, commerce, French imports, a bloated government bureaucracy, and an ever-increasing dependency on French welfare and government subsidies. The collapse of the agricultural economy led to skyrocketing unemployment rates, increased rural-to-urban migration, and significant social unrest, including numerous labor strikes, most notably among agricultural workers. Many of these strikes and protests became the targets of government repression, as in the February 14, 1952 labor strike at the Gardel sugar mill in the town of Le Moule, during which French military police opened fire on striking workers resulting in four deaths and over a dozen injuries.

During this period, the French government sought to calm rising dissatisfactions through the promotion of migration to the French mainland. This led to the creation of an Office for the Development of Migrations from the Overseas Departments (Bureau des migrations intéressant les Départements d’Outre-mer, BUMIDOM), which during its operations from 1963 to 1981 successfully recruited more than 84,000 Antillean workers to mainland France. The establishment of the BUMIDOM responded to numerous objectives, including the stabilization of the political and economic climate in the Antilles, and the demographic control of the *outrre-mer* populations. In addition, Antillean immigrants provided a cheap labor force, particularly for poorly remunerated jobs in the public sector.

Many of these immigrant workers became actively involved with local labor unions and civic associations. Initially, these activists were concerned with improving the reception and training of migrants arriving in France. However, over time, greater emphasis was placed on improving work conditions back home in order to put an end to organized migration from the Caribbean, and specifically to put an end to the BUMIDOM, which became a symbol of the unfulfilled promises of integration. In fact, the BUMIDOM offices were seized by Antillean activists in May of 1968.

As Antillean migrants increasingly headed to the metropole in search of education and employment opportunities, there was also a notable influx of mainland French citizens (locally referred to as *métropolitains*) to the Caribbean overseas departments. These French transplants filled positions as top administrators, civil servants, technocrats, and *cadres* in the enlarged government bureaucracy. The influx of French bureaucrats, combined with the massive migration of Antillean workers, led Aimé Césaire to describe the situation as a form of “genocide by substitution.”

The increasing dissatisfaction of local political elites with the results of departmentalization led to the rise of a new anti-colonial movement in the French Antilles. From the 1960s to the 1980s Guadeloupe experienced a strong nationalist wave that included numerous bombings, riots, and other forms of social protest. This movement was fueled by the militancy of both Antillean workers and students in mainland France. University students in particular were significantly influenced by the struggles for decolonization in the former French colonies, the rise of pan-Africanism, the Cuban and Algerian Revolutions, and the political climate leading up to the May 1968 movement in France. These students came together under new or reinvigorated student associations such as the General Association of Guadeloupean Students (Association Générale des Etudiants Guadeloupéens, AGEG). From the AGEG numerous organizations sprouted, including the Front Antillo-Guyannais (FAG) in 1961 and the Groupe d’Organisation Nationale de la Guadeloupe (GONG) in 1963.

These groups consisted of only a handful of leaders (mostly former AGEG members), but their propaganda campaign against the French presence in the Antilles, and their efforts to

build a mass movement, quickly caught the attention of the French government. In May of 1967, during a GONG-supported labor strike among urban construction workers, national police opened fire on demonstrators leading to three days of racial violence, rioting, and police repression which left numerous Guadeloupeans dead. The exact number of deaths is unknown; at the time French police claimed only seven deaths, while militants claimed that over 45 died in the three-day massacre. In the days that followed, numerous activists and militants were arrested and charged with treason. In 1968, 18 activists were tried for political crimes before the Court of State Security (Cour de Sûreté) in mainland France. Several of them were sentenced to stiff prison sentences for their presumed involvement in the nationalist struggle.

This period of repression led to a shift in the anti-colonial movement in the French Antilles. In response to increased persecution, nationalist activists went underground in the Guadeloupean countryside and began mobilizing agricultural workers. In the tradition of the Marxist and Maoist movements of the time, labor leaders began organizing rural peasants, carrying out literacy campaigns in the countryside, and setting up “night schools” where peasants were taught basic reading and math skills. Labor activists gained wide support from local peasants, in part because of their use of the Creole language, but also because their form of “popular” unionism differed sharply from the previous “old guard” unions that were simple extensions of national organizations in France, and thus ill equipped to address the needs of Guadeloupean workers. These efforts eventually led to the creation of the Union of Agricultural Workers (Union des Travailleurs Agricoles, UTA) in 1970, and the Union of Poor Guadeloupean Peasants (Union des Paysans Pauvres de la Guadeloupe, UPG) in 1972. Both of these unions merged together into the General Union of Guadeloupean Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs de la Guadeloupe, UGTG) in 1973.

With the rise of this new labor movement, the nationalist current became reinvigorated once again in Guadeloupe. In 1978 labor activists and nationalists created a new political organization, the Popular Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe (Union Populaire pour la Libération de la Guadeloupe, UPLG), which sought to bring together different factions

of the nationalist movement under the political platform of national independence, while highlighting the importance of cultural practices such as Creole language revival, and an emphasis on *gwo ka* music and dance.

While the UPLG represented a mainstream alternative for nationalist politics, during the 1980s a new series of militant and clandestine pro-independence and armed struggle groups emerged, such as the Armed Liberation Group (Groupe de Libération Armée, GLA), the Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (Alliance Révolutionnaire Caribéenne, ARC), and the Popular Movement for Guadeloupean Independence (Mouvement Populaire pour la Guadeloupe Indépendante, MPGI). During the early 1980s these groups claimed responsibility for over 60 bomb attacks throughout the Antilles and mainland France. Targets included hotels, department stores, airline companies, automobile clubs, banks, prisons, restaurants, police stations, and tax offices. Their movement soon became a target for state intervention. In 1984 the French government arrested Luc Reinette, the presumed leader of the MPGI, and by the end of the 1980s the French government had incarcerated or forced into exile many of the movement’s principal leaders.

During the 1990s these armed struggle movements faded away, and labor activism remained the main site of social struggle and protest. The 1990s marked the height of the labor movement’s strength in Guadeloupe as the UGTG expanded into the lucrative hotel industry, the mammoth civil service sector, and other key sectors of the economy such as communications, commerce, and the petroleum industry. These efforts were aided by the political climate of the Mitterrand government in France (1981–95) and its decentralization policies, which created a fertile ground for both labor organizing and social struggle. In addition, union membership rose dramatically during the implementation of the 35-hour work week in France (1998–2000), as workers became syndicated in order to enforce the 35-hour work week in their industries.

Today the UGTG is the largest labor union in Guadeloupe with over 6,000 members and is responsible for over 70 percent of all labor strikes on the island. It currently represents workers across a wide spectrum of labor sectors, including hotels, hospitals, gas stations, civil service, transportation, and even the fast food industry. Although the UGTG has become an

important presence in Guadeloupean politics, it is often criticized for bringing an anti-colonial ideology into the sphere of syndicalism and for becoming involved in struggles that extend beyond the workplace – such as battling for Abolition Day to become a local holiday, or going on strike to force multinational companies to sell their franchises to Guadeloupean workers rather than foreign interests.

In order to engage in these wider struggles, labor leaders have sought to foster the development of a new organization (or cultural arm) charged exclusively with issues of historical memory and cultural identity. In collaboration with a handful of politically engaged historians and university professors, in 2001 they created a new organization called NONM which was charged with expanding the politics of the UGTG beyond the sphere of syndicalism. The organization takes its name from the Creole word for “Man” or “Humanity.” Their stated goal is to *fe nonm*, which in Creole means literally to “make man.” Within the domain of union struggles this idea is often invoked in relationship to the development of an increased *political* consciousness. Labor strikes are thought to *fe nonm* on the picket line through the creation of new social relationships with fellow strikers, bosses, and the wider society. Within the context of the NONM organization, to *fe nonm* speaks to the creation of a new *historical* consciousness through an engagement with local histories of resistance and collective struggle, particularly previous histories of anti-colonial resistance, and the histories of slave revolts and Maroon communities.

As Guadeloupe enters the new millennium, the local labor movement remains an important site of social struggle. Through labor organizing, Guadeloupean activists continue to question the lingering colonial ties that link the French Antilles to mainland France, while simultaneously emphasizing local cultural practices and fostering an active engagement with previous histories of protest and resistance.

SEE ALSO: Caribbean Islands, Protests against IMF; Césaire, Aimé (1913–2008); French Guiana, Political Movements against Departmentalization; Trinidad, Labor Protests

References and Suggested Readings

Blérald, A. P. (1988) *La question nationale en Guadeloupe et en Martinique: essai sur l'histoire politique*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

- Céleste, C. (1983) Entretien avec Chérubin Céleste: Chrétien, donc indépendantiste . . . *Les Temps Modernes* 39 (441–2): 1946–60.
- Condon, S. A. & Ogden, P. E. (1991) Emigration from the French Caribbean: The Origins of an Organized Migration. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 15 (4): 505–23.
- Daniel, J. (2000) Conflits sociaux et construction identitaire à la Martinique. In J. Bernabe et al. (Eds.), *Au Visiteur lumineux – Des îles créoles aux sociétés plurielles, Mélanges offerts à Jean Benoist*. Petit Bourg, Guadeloupe: Ibis Rouge.
- Dubois, L. (2004) *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Schnepel, E. (2004) *In Search of a National Identity: Creole and Politics in Guadeloupe*. Hamburg: Helmut Buske Verlag.
- Tardieu, M. (2005) *Les Antillais à Paris: d'hier à aujourd'hui*. Monaco: Rocher.
- Wilder, G. (1999) Practicing Citizenship in Imperial Paris. In J. L. Comaroff & J. Comaroff (Eds.), *Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa: Critical Perspectives*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Guaicaipuro (ca. 1530–1568)

Dario Azzellini

Guaicaipuro was a pre-Columbian indigenous leader, or cacique, in the Spanish province of Venezuela in the sixteenth century who organized fierce and successful resistance against the Spanish colonialists, driving them from the region of Los Teques in the Caracas Valley and the nearby coast for nearly a decade. In the twenty-first century, Guaicaipuro remains a popular icon in Venezuela of indigenous power and resistance to foreign colonial incursion. Guaicaipuro was cacique of his own village called Suruapo or Suruapay, situated in the region of Los Teques, north of the Caracas Valley. As chief of several indigenous clans in the region, Guaicaipuro formed a broad alliance against Spanish colonialism.

In 1560, after the Spanish discovered gold in Los Teques and commenced mining, Guaicaipuro and 500 rebels defeated the Spanish soldiers, forcing an end to their operations. In other battles, Guaicaipuro defeated settlers and colonialists, prompting Venezuelan governor Pablo Collado to send a force to mollify the indigenous insurgency and resume mining operations. After the Spanish soldiers left, mistakenly believing Guaicaipuro

dead, he attacked the mines and killed all the workers, destroying Fajardos, a new settlement in the Caracas Valley. Continued efforts to restore Spanish control over the indigenous peoples failed. In 1561, Guaicaipuro ambushed and killed colonial leaders of the settlement.

In February 1562, Guaicaipuro organized a strategic alliance of caciques in the region, defeating Luis de Narváez's Spanish expeditionary force. Out of 150 Spanish soldiers, only three survived, forcing the colonialists to flee to Margarita Island, just north of Venezuela's mainland. However, intent on colonizing the mainland, the Spanish soon returned to wage war for control over Venezuela. On July 25, 1567, Spanish armies defeated 17,000 indigenous soldiers from 16 regional tribes in the western Caracas Valley. Guaicaipuro and several other caciques had been unable to engage the Spanish forces, due to poor weather. After the Spanish victory, the alliance unraveled, leaving the way for Spanish forces to conquer indigenous communities one by one.

In 1567, the Spanish founded Santiago de León de Caracas, but remained wary of attacks by Guaicaipuro and set out to capture him, dead or alive. In 1568, with the assistance of indigenous collaborators, Spanish military forces reached and attacked Suruapo. In a fierce struggle, Guaicaipuro was killed by colonial troops who set fire to his dwelling.

Through the centuries Guaicaipuro has represented the fearless and courageous struggle of the indigenous people. However, the Venezuelan government did not officially commemorate Guaicaipuro until 2001, when President Hugo Chávez, a descendant of indigenous peoples, ceremonially inaugurated him into the country's National Pantheon. His memory was further publicly honored in October 2003 when Venezuela created Mission Guaicaipuro, a program to restore collective land rights, human rights, and sustainable ecology for the 500,000 members of the country's 33 indigenous communities.

SEE ALSO: Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954); Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–Present


References and Suggested Readings

- Gómez, C. A. (1996) *Los caciques de Venezuela*. Caracas: Panapo.
- Quevedo Martín, A. (2000) *Visión panagírica de los caciques de Venezuela*. Caracas: Circulo de Escritores de Venezuela.

Guatemala, Democratic Spring, 1944–1954

Henry J. Frundt

The Guatemalan revolution of 1944 remains a high point of democratic resistance in Central America, and perhaps the western hemisphere, in the mid-twentieth century. The revolution offered the structural opportunity for state and nation to integrate, networks to expand, and new indigenous and oppressed identities to surface and have a voice in society. Jorge Ubico's policies generated an explosive buildup of resentment that culminated in a series of strikes in 1944 at United Fruit and elsewhere, but the revolutionary movement really expanded as students filled the streets. Soon they were joined by disgruntled small business people, military officers, and intellectuals. When the telegraph and railway workers organized a general strike, Ubico stepped down and Juan José Arévalo (1944–51) soon emerged as the national leader. While he mainly reflected youthful, middle-class interests, Arévalo also made structural changes beneficial to workers and indigenous. He eliminated the vagrancy law and rural militias and promoted a fairer economic system. Labor unions coalesced via the National Committee of Trade Union Unity (CNUS) "for unity for the proletariat and protection of rights for all." Workers successfully gained the 1947 Labor Code that set minimum wages, equal pay, social security, and the right to strike, despite objections from the US and the United Fruit Company with its 40,000 workers and thousands of unplanted acres. However, like earlier liberal visionaries, Arévalo also sought to include Indian communities in the national project by replacing backward and feudal models with "sensible capitalist development." To promote this approach, his administration asked the Instituto Indigenista Nacional to implement a rural education program that would promote national culture and appropriate patriotic emblems. To stimulate greater Mayan involvement in political life, the government encouraged political parties at the municipal level. Of these, the Revolutionary Action Party especially became a network of Indian *campesinos* that challenged local ladino leaders. By 1948, half of the highland communities



President Juan José Arévalo wears the presidential sash at his inauguration on April 1, 1945. Arévalo was a reformer and the first of Guatemala's presidents to be democratically elected since the country's independence from Spain. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

had elected indigenous mayors. Peasant organizations also successfully lobbied to extend labor rights to rural workers. Labor actions against United Fruit accelerated.

Even broader Indian participation occurred in the subsequent administration of Jacobo Arbenz (1951–4), a colonel in the Guatemalan army. Under Arbenz, hundreds of thousands of indigenous workers joined a national movement that pursued their new right to unionize and accelerated their claims over local property. According to ministry of agriculture surveys, they owned 88 percent of farms but only 14 percent of the land. Even more amazing, less than 12 percent of privately owned land was under cultivation. The Guatemalan Section of the Communist Party (PGT) played a key role in unifying 400 worker organizations under the banner of the General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers (CGTG), bringing together Indians and ladinos in one broad movement of 200,000 workers with both Christian and communist ties that portended significant implications for the rest of Central America. Petitions from newly organized indigenous also led Arbenz to issue a major land decision in 1952. While conceived as an anti-feudal proposal, the Agrarian Reform Law 900 was mainly aimed at unused plantation land which the law would transfer to *campesinos*. The law also set up a fairly careful process

in which local agrarian councils evaluated the suitability and fairness of any land transfer by considering historical claims and earlier expropriations. In addition, the government provided extension services and credit.

Decree 900 was effective, largely because of the willingness of *campesinos* and rural workers to organize and confront the violent opposition of landowners. They created more than 3,000 councils by October 1952, and distributed 1.5 million acres to 100,000 families. Rural unions rapidly expanded in most villages, competing with *campesino* leagues to see who could better provide social services and protect the dispossessed against violence from landlords and armed officials. At times, the interests of small rural hamlets (*aldeas*) conflicted with ladino municipal leaderships, so the peasant unions created a separate route of influence beyond traditional state and religious structures. They displaced local officials and rented municipal lands to broader constituencies. Several scholars suggest that these steps undermined traditional community supports, thereby weakening indigenous coherence and identification. Indeed, some land was given to the landless, bypassing propertied *campesinos*. Nevertheless, despite the residue of traditional disputes, most evidence points to a strengthening of local communities.

In 1953, Arbenz nationalized unused United Fruit properties. At one point the company held 20 percent of Guatemala's arable land. The government agreed to compensate United Fruit for double its purchased value. But it also sought a new Pacific highway that would end the United Fruit shipping monopoly. The banana firm summoned its friends in Washington and the CIA to protect American power from the "communist threat." Historians debate the degree to which the takeover of United Fruit properties precipitated the US intervention that sadly ended the Guatemalan revolution, an action for which US President Clinton finally apologized in 1998. What is clear is that the US was very worried about the rising autonomy of Mayan and ladino workers and communities as they gained a sense of their own power. US leaders feared their efforts could well be replicated in other nations and therefore had to be terminated. In addition, the Guatemalan army felt its traditional role in the countryside was being supplanted by activist unions. All agree that the US intervention established a new kind of professional

army in Guatemala, one schooled by US officers to torture civilians and impose severe human rights violations. It also ushered in a period of repression against all forms of social activism that continues to have severe and detrimental consequences for labor unions, non-profit organizations, and autonomous indigenous Mayan entities throughout the country. The US government cancelled military aid in response to a congressional mandate because of these abuses.

SEE ALSO: Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán (1913–1971); Ecuador, Indigenous and Popular Struggles; Guatemala, Popular Rebellion and Civil War; Guatemala, Worker Struggles and the Labor Movement, 1960s–1990s; Menchú, Rigoberta (b. 1959); Tecún Umán (d. 1524)

References and Suggested Readings

- Adams, R. (1970) *Crucifixion by Power*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Gleijeses, P. (1991) *Shattered Hope*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Grandin, G. (2004) *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Handy, J. (1984) *Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala*. Boston: South End Press.
- Immerman, R. H. (1982) *The CIA in Guatemala*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Jonas, S. (1991) *The Battle for Guatemala*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- ODHAG (Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala) (1998) *Guatemala: Nunca más. Informe del Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica*. Guatemala City: ODHAG.
- Smith, C. (Ed.) (1990) *Guatemalan Indians and the State, 1540–1988*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Torres-Rivas, E. (1987) *Centroamérica: La democracia posible*. San José, Costa Rica: EDUCA and FLACSO.
- Wickam-Crowley, T. (1993) *Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wilkinson, D. (2002) *Silence on the Mountain*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Guatemala, popular rebellion and civil war

Henry J. Frundt

More than any Central American nation, Guatemala remains a country of indigenous as well as ladino (*mistiso*) protest and revolution,

joining the ranks of Bolivia and Ecuador. In its struggle, the Mayan “nation” often contests an authoritarian or capitalist “state” and the interests it represents. As time progresses, the struggle assumes an increasingly nuanced character that integrates class and ethnicity.

Mayan Resistance to Spanish Colonialism (1524–1820)

Guided by their commitment to a spirituality and culture centered on maize, in the sixteenth century the Guatemalan regional population stringently resisted the Spanish occupiers. The Maya’s foundation document, the *Popol Vuh*, urged “that all arise, that all be called.” Although Tecún Umán, leader of the Quichés, was defeated near Quetzaltenango (the region’s second largest city) in 1524, the neighboring Cakchiquels fought on for five years. Mayan resistance that characterized the Yucatan peninsula up through the nineteenth century also marked western Guatemala, despite that region holding the Spanish Captaincy General of the isthmus. As a countermeasure, the Spanish concentrated the Indians into separate towns, intended to facilitate agricultural labor and taxation. The division also reinforced the more than 20 differing Mayan language and subcultural systems. Nevertheless, notable rebellions periodically developed in the Verapaz provinces (1556, 1633), Tecpan Guatemala (1764), and Cobán (1770, 1803). The Mayan Quiché took over church lands in 1811, rebelled against levied tributes in 1818, and declared an independent Totonicapán with a separate constitution in 1820 under Anastasio Tzul. Nevertheless, the Maya and other Mesoamerican indigenous groups’ predominant mode of protest was to form a “closed corporate community,” as Eric Wolf has characterized it, one that “emphasizes resistance to influences from without which might threaten its integrity.” The communities downplayed personal acquisition or manifestations of wealth as an antidote to colonial pressure and acquisitiveness. They surrendered taxes to the crown, but in exchange received local autonomy. Since Guatemala did not have extensive mines or plantations (lowland cacao areas proved disease-prone), the government did not require a massive labor force. Certainly some workers migrated from the highlands to work for wages in indigo or sugar production and several

thousand became forced labor on indigenous Spanish (Creole) wheat farms. In so doing, they learned Spanish and adopted Creole dress and religion, becoming cultural “ladinos.” Biological *mestizaje* also increased ladino membership. However, most highland Mayans resisted such transformation, preferring to farm their own communal plots, practice their own *cofradia* brotherhood rituals, and govern their municipalities via elders or *principales*.

In a separate protest, the urban Creole, *mestizaje*, and acculturated families became increasingly disenchanted with the tax and control system imposed by the Spanish crown, especially after the Bourbon reforms of the late 1700s. They desired to “liberalize” the country from foreign control. As part of Mexico, Central America became independent when that nation won its independence in 1821. The following year the autonomous Central American nation was founded, consisting of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua.

Thus as a process, Mayan protest and revolution developed quite distinctly from liberal protest and revolution. Although both impetuses had commonalities, they also contained important differences that affected each of the three bases of social movements: structural opportunities, mobilizing networks, and forged identity. The postcolonial period reveals three major phases of each movement: indigenous reaction to nineteenth-century liberalization (1821–1944); indigenous involvement with the nation’s democratic revolution (1944–54); and Mayan participation in social demands and guerilla campaigns (1960–96). In the second two periods, indigenous and ladino protest joined forces in notable ways.

The Anti-Liberal Revolts (1821–1943)

The colonial period established the context for subsequent protest. At the time Guatemala declared independence, it still retained the provincial structures that the crown used to control much of the isthmus, from Chiapas to Costa Rica. Both the local Spanish elite and the more liberal Creole elite had established bases in the capital which they tapped to form the United Central American States. By 1830, this political congruence had disintegrated. So under Dr. Mariano Gálvez (1830–8), an admirer of the US Constitution, Guatemala established a

separate liberal regime that abolished ecclesiastical privilege and sought to fully integrate the Mayan people on an equal basis. The results had unanticipated structural, network, and identity effects. First, such integration meant that indigenous communities lost the special autonomy they had received from the crown and Spanish elites (an opportunity indigenous elsewhere did not receive). So when Gálvez imposed the new changes, the Mayan highland communities reacted negatively. From the standpoint of identity, they had no desire for an equality that assimilated them into a national project, even one that promised economic development and investment. In 1837 and 1838, they rebelled against fresh attempts at forced labor. By 1838, with Mayan assistance, the conservative elites overthrew Gálvez and restored Indian protections along with ecclesiastical benefices. The Rafael Carrera administration that followed (1837–46) maintained some of these protections and identities. While capitalist development expanded in other areas, Guatemalan Indian communities retained control over their own property, labor, and religious practices with only minimal incursions from urban administrative and religious interests. When this regime was not honored, uprisings restored traditional arrangements, such as in 1846 in Verapaz, Sololá, Ixtahuacán, Chichicastenango, and Cotzal.

This situation remained until the liberal takeover of 1871 under Justo Rufino Barrios, who abolished church and Indian lands to stimulate capitalist development, and implemented a modern army, civil bureaucracy, and well-funded infrastructure. Like Gálvez, Barrios took a proactive view toward Indian assimilation. However, his new structural rationale was to expand coffee exports that were already rapidly transforming the central highlands and neighboring El Salvador. The Barrios government redistributed communal Mayan land to investors who would produce for wider markets, attracting German families for coffee production. When the state added guaranteed labor recruitment, an increasing number of Mayans joined the ranks of permanent ladino workers to prepare the earth and tend seedlings on landed estates. However bean harvests required a much larger workforce, including women. Highland villages in the “closed corporate community” mode often mounted a major resistance against Barrios policies, with a dramatic show of force in 1876

in Totonicapán. This caused Barrios to retaliate with significant military force that restored entrepreneurial claims on indigenous labor. Soldiers entered communities and transferred land from dissidents to those who cooperated, thereby undermining Mayan community networks. While the city of Quetzaltenango remained under Mayan control, traditionalists sought subtle rapprochement with the nation-state.

Nevertheless, both Mayans and ladinos reacted against liberal policies. Indians revolted in 1885 (Alta Verapaz), 1898 (San Juan Ixcay), 1905 (Totonicapán), and 1906 (Alta Verapaz). Elsewhere, workers confronted other foreign investors, such as Electric Bond and Share and United Fruit. When the latter took control of the International Railways of Central America and operated Guatemala's largest port, it brought together large groups of workers who had never before interacted. The company's abusive treatment of these workers fomented resentment, creating a structural opportunity for new worker consciousness. The International Railways' 15,000 workers helped establish the Guatemalan Section of the Communist Party (PGT) of Central America in 1922, and the Workers' Regional Federation of Guatemala as a radical alternative to class-collaborationist efforts from the AFL. In 1931, the ruling classes consolidated behind dictator Jorge Ubico. Ubico followed the state policies of Barrios, implementing a vagrancy law with the primary intent of providing labor for coffee. Army officers with coffee interests oversaw its implementation. Ubico also lowered wages, banned strikes, and executed scores of labor leaders. In the mid-1930s, the leader expressed his admiration for Adolf Hitler.

By 1940, three social classes had structurally developed within the region: the Creole elite, which now included an influx of German capital in the coffee sector; the ladino workforce that served as permanent workers, plantation administrators, and lower-middle merchants; and the semi-proletarian Mayans who lived communally in the highlands and traveled seasonally to labor in coffee, sugar, and other traditional exports. Structurally, however, Ubico made the miscalculation of alienating both ladino and Mayan sectors, precipitating reactions such as the 1944 Cakchiquel rebellion in Patzicá against loss of lands. Just as the economy was behaving precariously, the president sided with fascist Germany, to the dismay of international elites.

The Insurgent War (1960–1996)

The considerable repression unleashed between 1954 and 1960 sent most protest underground. In its horrendous attack, the government cancelled the registration of 533 local unions, arrested known communists, and killed thousands of community activists. While the US raised a perfunctory protest, it implemented its regional military counterinsurgency training program. At the same time, economic conditions deteriorated significantly for 90 percent of the population, in part because it did not have enough land on which to subsist while wages remained stagnant. However, rebellion against these conditions subsequently expressed itself in three major phases: the early guerilla movement (1960–8); urban labor and popular protest (1972–80); and the struggle for peace (1986–96).

Early Guerillas (1960–1968)

In 1960, a group of officers training near Quetzaltenango learned that without army knowledge, lands were being utilized as a training area for anti-Castro forces readying an attack against Cuba. Having been exposed to the principles of a patriotic military under Arbenz, these officers found such use of national territory vilely objectionable. They also had increasingly become attuned to economic conditions faced by the people. In November, nearly a third of the army mobilized to overthrow the corrupt Ydígoras administration (1958–62). When they were rebuffed, several leading officers (Turcios, Yon Sosa) escaped to the eastern ladino region where they enjoyed peasant support. Meanwhile, the largely underground PGT, which had roots in the 1944–54 period, also formed a military unit that sought a revolutionary response. With some PGT support, in 1962 the officers formed the Revolutionary Movement of November 13 (MR-13), which demanded land for *campesinos* through a moderately socialist program. Just as students' and women's groups protested fraud in the interim elections, the insurgents consolidated as the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), gaining notable peasant recruits east of the capital. FAR pursued the *foco* approach of irregular attacks developed by Che Guevara that depended on a revolutionary vanguard leading the population. Its strategy was first to create liberated areas of self-defense, and then consolidate sufficient popular strength to take state control.

Operating from such *focos*, FAR attacked army barracks for armaments and captured hostages to negotiate for funds. Several scholars believe that FAR and its allies (which went through various divisions and permutations) enjoyed greater success than most other Latin insurgencies. However, by its own later admission, the project held an idealistic vision about what “action by example” would accomplish; it did not sufficiently mobilize its base in the east, much less make inroads in the Indian highlands. This made it more vulnerable to the 1967–8 extermination campaign led by General Carlos Arana Osorio, a protégé of US counterinsurgency training. With the guerillas defeated, Arana gained the national presidency on a platform of political and free market reforms. He then turned his attention to urban troublemakers, declaring a state of siege in 1971 in which 700 political and union leaders were murdered. Despite Arana’s rule, the officers of the mountains became the haven for new protest movements that continued for the next 25 years.

Indigenous Involvement

In part because of suffering enormous losses following the 1954 coup, the indigenous population retreated to their “corporate communities.” Nevertheless, several factors challenged this condition. The state proposed a new “Plan for National Development,” introducing structural changes similar to the liberal period of 1871. US funding for economic diversification enhanced communications, added infrastructure for non-traditional export crops, and altered commercial relations. While the government restricted most organizations in the countryside, arriving foreign clergy, Catholic Action cells, and “base communities” were able to set up cooperatives as a new avenue for credit and savings and consumption, especially chemical fertilizer. These changes affected traditional power relations in indigenous municipalities, especially around the mainstay crop of maize, and the *cofradía* brotherhoods and *principales* who distributed employment and rented community land.

Young catechists also questioned why traditional rituals should hold exclusive claims on ancestral identity. Although market capitalism made inroads, with religious assistance a fresh group of indigenous leaders pursued secondary and university training. They stimulated a national debate over Indian conditions and why the

guerillas had failed to win their involvement. These leaders formed the Pastoral Indígena and Seminarios Indígenas and other venues where people from various indigenous affiliations (Quichés, Ixiles, and so on) began to share common political and economic experiences, such as the spike in petroleum and fertilizer prices that created extensive hardship at the end of 1973. Study groups also probed peasant rights and constitutional implementation, while the more traditional indigenous leaders sought greater power via the Christian Democratic Party, gaining several assembly seats as Indians for the first time.

The Struggle for Peace (1986–1996)

Although the new civilian government under Vinicio Cerezo (1986–91) remained stymied under military control, the regional Esquipilas II Accords in 1987 established conditions for negotiating a peace respectful of cultural and linguistic differences. Divisions within the upper class and army opened further opportunities for economic protest. The Unidad Acción Sindical Popular (UASP), formed in 1988, fought together the Committee for Campesino Unity (CUC), the union federations, angry indigenous and ladino women who had lost loved ones (Grupo Apoyo Mutuo, GAM; Comité Nacional de Viudas Guatemaltecas, CONAVIGUA), students, and others, once again bridging racial differences to protest structural adjustment requirements dictated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for Guatemala to qualify for international loans. In March, the UASP negotiated an agreement on price controls, agrarian improvements, minimum salaries, and recognition of unions. As prices continued to rise, UASP-led demonstrations mushroomed. Agricultural and urban workers bottlenecked major traffic routes and government buildings, winning higher minimum wages over the next several years. The US Guatemala Labor Education Project (later US Labor Education Project in the Americas, US/LEAP) offered supportive assistance from the north.

Meanwhile, despite government detentions and secret prisons, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) continued its sporadic resistance, led by such leaders as Everardo, who was eventually captured, brutally tortured, and killed without trial by a CIA operative with US complicity. Peace efforts increased

in Guatemala during the early 1990s, as the URNG and presidents Serrano Elías (1991–2) and de León Carpio (1993–5) tested possibilities for negotiation despite continuing a strategic war. Social movements also exploited the opportunity. Unions and indigenous organizations became major participants in evaluating political and economic proposals, as well as constructing new social institutions. The Consejo de Comunidades Étnicas “Runujal Junam” (CERJ) became increasingly effective in demanding the elimination of the civil self-defense patrols (PACs). Out of CUC had come the more directly ethnic Coordinadora Nacional de Pueblos Indígenas y Campesinos (CONIC), which was able to resolve *campesino* petitions, gain some lands for redistribution, and achieve local development committees. Defensoría Maya helped resolve legal human rights cases and revive indigenous customs for conflict resolution.

CERJ, Defensoría, and another 150 organizations in the Coalición de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya (COPMAGUA) set up in 1994 actively participated in the Guatemalan Asamblea Civil, which brought to the peace negotiations table issues that both the government and the URNG had neglected. With labor and popular participation, the Asamblea is credited with winning a widely respected accord on indigenous rights, although it was less successful in gaining a solid socioeconomic agreement. Indigenous organizations helped establish the Frente Democrática Nueva Guatemala (FDNG) in 1995 which successfully elected six Mayan representatives to Congress. In December 1996, the Peace Accords negotiated with the Arzú administration (1996–2000) came into effect. Although they were not publicly ratified in a 1999 plebiscite, subsequent governments have had to acknowledge most of the principles the accords established.

During the 1990s, the Mayan movement underwent various permutations, but its solid growth led to a plethora of public presentations and debates. Language and cultural institutions thrived, such as the Academy of Mayan Languages and Consejo de Organizaciones Mayas de Guatemala (COMG). While deep racism remained, representatives from all sectors articulated the social value of understanding and promoting the nation’s indigenous heritage. The five major universities devoted special attention to Mayan issues, as did the Centro

de Investigaciones Regionales de Mesoamérica (CIRMA) library in Antigua. Women’s groups and NGOs such as the Centro de Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos (CHARLA) advocated for the disenfranchised in a way that integrated indigenous and ladino interests. Nevertheless, women assumed important leadership positions in many NGOs and union locals. Due to continued efforts by CERJ, CONIC, Defensoría Maya, CHARLA, the Catholic Human Rights Office, AVANSCO, Fundación Ebert, the United Nations Verification Mission, and other local and international groups, human and labor rights continued as a national preoccupation during a fresh cycle of attacks in the twenty-first century.

Following Spanish occupation, protest and revolution in Guatemala has undergone four phases: early Mayan resistance (1524–1820); anti-liberal revolts (1821–1944); the Guatemalan Revolution (1944–54); and the insurgent war (1960–96). The last three revealed similar structural opportunities that developed from the liberal attempt to modernize agriculture, reorganize Mayan communities, and impose uncontrolled capitalist development. In their protest, Mayans and ladinos organized separate networks and expressed distinct identities; nevertheless, under Arbenz, Indian and ladino identities began to “merge” via the General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers. They did so again in the fourth period with the marches of CNUS/CUC and joint actions of the URNG, UASP, and the Asamblea Civil. Both Mayan and ladino participants revealed a growing consciousness that common class issues could be integrated in a way that valued ethnic differences and led to a more humane and democratic society.

SEE ALSO: Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán (1913–1971); Ecuador, Indigenous and Popular Struggles; Guatemala, Democratic Spring, 1944–1954; Guatemala, Worker Struggles and the Labor Movement, 1960s–1990s; Menchú, Rigoberta (b. 1959); Tecún Umán (d. 1524)

References and Suggested Readings

- Adams, R. (1970) *Crucifixion by Power*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Brett, R. (2006) *Movimiento social, etnicidad y democratización en Guatemala, 1985–1996*. Guatemala City: F&G Editores.
- Falla, R. (1994) *Massacres of the Jungle*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Gleijeses, P. (1991) *Shattered Hope*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Grandin, G. (2004) *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Handy, J. (1984) *Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala*. Boston: South End Press.
- Harbury, J. (1997) *Searching for Evarardo*. New York: Times Warner Books.
- Immerman, R. H. (1982) *The CIA in Guatemala*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Jonas, S. (1991) *The Battle for Guatemala*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Jonas, S. (2000) *Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Manz, B. (1988) *Refugees of a Hidden War: The Aftermath of Counterinsurgency in Guatemala*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Menchú, R. (1984) *I . . . Rigoberta Menchú*. Ed. and Trans. E. Burgos-Debray. New York: Verso.
- Montejo, V. (2005) *Maya Intellectual Renaissance: Identity, Representation and Leadership*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- ODHAG (Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala) (1998) *Guatemala: Nunca más. Informe del Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica*. Guatemala City: ODHAG.
- Porras, G. (1978) Guatemala: la profundización de las relaciones capitalistas. *ECA* 343: 374–406.
- Smith, C. (Ed.) (1990) *Guatemalan Indians and the State, 1540–1988*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Stoll, D. (1999) *Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Torres-Rivas, E. (1987) *Centroamérica: La democracia posible*. San José, Costa Rica: EDUCA and FLACSO.
- Warren, K. B. (1998) *Indigenous Movements and their Critics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wickam-Crowley, T. (1993) *Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wilkinson, D. (2002) *Silence on the Mountain*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Wolf, E. (1957) Closed Corporate Peasant Communities in Mesoamerica and Central Java. *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 13 (1): 1–18.
- Woodward, R. (1985) *Central America: A Nation Divided*, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Guatemala, worker struggles and the labor movement, 1960s–1990s

Henry J. Frundt

The military suppression of the Guatemalan Revolution of 1954 destroyed official labor unions

and forced the workers' movement to go underground. From 1954 to 1960, the Guatemalan government cancelled the registration of 533 local unions, arrested communists, and killed thousands of labor and community activists. With the assistance of the US, Guatemala implemented regional military counterinsurgency training programs to suppress all forms of worker and community organization in the 1960s. The removal of legal rights for labor organization and the right to strike for better wages contributed to a decline in living standards for workers and peasants who comprised more than 90 percent of the country's population. The rural working class was prevented from organizing collectives and wages and conditions deteriorated dramatically. Due to the elimination of formal labor rights, the labor movement was pushed underground and into insurrectionary and direct action against employers and the state.

While political and military repression from 1954 continued through the 1960s and early 1970s, by 1973, poor economic conditions for Guatemala's workers boiled over into mass unrest and popular revolt through a series of labor strikes in the face of state repression. The labor mobilization began among school teachers in 1973, when 20,000 teachers went on strike to publicize poor classroom conditions and a ten-year wage freeze. The teacher actions were soon followed by additional strikes among railroad, electrical, tobacco, and bank workers. Following a 1976 lockout, the Coca-Cola workers refused to vacate their factory compound, generating a rallying point for three major union federations to recreate the National Committee of Trade Union Unity (CNUS). A dramatic earthquake in 1976 devastated highland areas, leaving one million homeless. The national government's ineffective and corrupt response broadened the structural opportunity for local organizations like Catholic Action, helping to delegitimize official responses and "radicalize" younger "base community" participants. Despite racism and mistrust, earthquake relief united Catholic organizations, indigenous, and urban labor unions such as the National Workers' Central (CNT) to which Coke workers belonged. Traditionalists formed a Mayan political party, but its ambivalent links to repressive national leaders furthered class polarization among other Mayans. Just as CNUS was expanding its demonstrations in 1976–7, indigenous campesinos sought an

organization for “all tillers of the earth” (EGP leader Pablo Ceto, quoted by Arias 1990: 247).

Self-directed yet inspired by events elsewhere in the hemisphere, remnants from the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), which had also separated from the Guatemalan Section of the Communist Party (PGT) over strategy, aided the development of two guerilla units among indigenous. The Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP) and the Organization of People in Arms (ORPA) began around 1972 and soon grappled with the severe exploitation of Indian migrations and the importance of Mayan identity. They emphasized political opportunities in place of *foquismo*'s military objectives, and sought to avoid actions that jeopardized the broader Mayan population. In the Ixcán highlands, Quiché base communities found sustenance from the largely indigenous EGP, despite its denouncement by traditionalists from Nebaj and Santa Cruz.

ORPA operated even more quietly around Lake Atitlan and west toward coffee and sugar areas of the coast until 1979, when it also expanded into urban areas. In fact, throughout the 1970s but especially after 1978, three of the four guerilla organizations formed alliances with urban constituents. The FAR, which now had a base in the Petén, linked with city labor unions. The PGT, a nucleus of which operated on the southern coast, made a similar move. ORPA promoted connections with university students. All mounted sporadic attacks on military outposts, political figures, and landowners.

Campesinos such as Vicente Menchú (the father of Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú) from an Ixil base community began organizing the Committee for Campesino Unity (CUC) to protest land takeovers and mandated military service. In a notable symbolic protest in November 1977, Indian and ladino miners from Ixtahuacán linked to CNT and CNUS walked 351 kilometers toward Guatemala City to demand better working conditions. As they moved along the highway, various indigenous groups offered food and sometimes joined so that 150,000 reached the city. Simultaneously, striking CUC sugar workers marched from the south. In a follow-up action the following spring, CUC demanded an end to discrimination, repression, high living costs, forced recruitment, and the landless conditions faced by all the peasantry. Its “May 1 demonstration was transcendental for the country's political life. The presence of Indians

in the street, with their typical clothes . . . immediately aroused great applause” (Arias 1990: 250). Sympathy grew for CUC, especially when the government massacred 150 Q'eqchi at Panzós. Radicalized Indian *campesinos* broke away from traditionalists and Indian bourgeoisie who had significant commercial connections as they searched for a fresh identity. Their CUC–CNUS alliance became the first bona fide confederation of urban and rural indigenous workers since 1954.

In 1978, the newly elected and partly indigenous president, General Romeo Lucas García, inaugurated a dramatic state-sponsored counterinsurgency attack on labor unions and popular movement participants, hoping to sever them from the revolutionary effort. While the state remained an agent for capitalist development, it preferred to repress the entire population to prevent modernizing features from changing the power structure. However, its actions ultimately revealed to both landed and middle rural classes that the existing “pre-capitalist” order no longer made any sense.

Coca-Cola leaders were among Lucas García's first urban targets, but as the military increased the number of peasant massacres in the highlands, leaders of popular organizations were routinely killed. Until that point, the indigenous favored mass organization in place of armed struggle. Responding in the Ixil, guerillas held public forums in various municipalities, helped young men to escape conscription, and aided communities with survival techniques. Following government attacks against cooperatives, schools, and clinics, CUC engaged in direct resistance, supporting guerilla activities with highway barricades and sabotage. Meanwhile in Quezaltenango, Mayan traditionalists and commercialists stressed *indigenismo* as the only route to authentic identity, hoping to recuperate power lost in Spanish times.

In late 1979, a CUC commission arrived in the capital to urge President Lucas García and the Congress to stop repression in the Ixil. Turned away, they occupied the Spanish embassy which the government quickly burned, killing 26 Mayan representatives including Vicente Menchú, and nearly killing the ambassador. The embassy fire precipitated an international outcry against official Guatemalan atrocities that would only conclude with the signing of the Peace Accords 17 years later.

Many in the wider population now felt they had few options but to join the war. On the southern coast, as many as 70,000 CUC and CNT workers struck, uniting with indigenous from the highlands. Implored to confront military onslaughts, when CUC issued the Declaración of Iximché (a virtual declaration of war), thousands of young Mayans joined the EGP in Sactepequez, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Huehuetenango, and Alta and Baja Vera Paz. A smaller number entered ORPA in San Marcos, Quezaltenango, Sololá, and Chimaltenango. Some 250,000 to 500,000 men and women participated in self-defense practice, offering supplies to the guerillas and collaborating in larger military operations. “When EGP guerrillas occupied the villages of Chichicastenango and Sololá, local Indians cut telegraph lines and blockaded the highways with nails, barricades, fallen trees” (Arias 1990: 255).

FAR stepped up operations in the eastern part of the country as the PGT’s military wing operated in the capital. By 1981, the entire country was touched by rebellion. Traditional *indigenista* groups also took action, although their tensions with the guerillas remained. Nevertheless, the state’s counterinsurgency soon took its toll. In June, 27 CNT leaders were abducted and killed, sending unions underground once again. To counter popular mobilization, the army initiated a genocidal project throughout the countryside.

In 1982 the four guerilla factions officially united as the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), with forces poised to capture large areas of the country. What they did not anticipate, however, was the government’s expansion of the scorched earth policies of Lucas García under Generals Efraín Ríos Montt (1982–3) and Mejía Victores (1983–6): instead of directly targeting the guerillas, it eliminated whole indigenous communities. Such genocidal attacks resulted in the extermination of 600 villages and 200,000 people (Guatemalan Archbishop’s Office for Human Rights [ODHAG], 1998). After the army had cleared or burned an area, it would often establish model villages and recruit returning males to form self-protective civil patrols (PACs). While some former insurgent irregulars felt forced to comply, others joined the Communities in Resistance that disappeared into the mountains to maintain their identity and avoid being placed in army

villages or development poles. An additional 100,000 Mayans fled to Mexico.

Although they still experienced incursions from the Guatemalan army and felt disillusioned with the guerillas, Committees in Resistance developed a fresh sense of pride and assertiveness. Out of these three strands new grassroots movements emerged from popular organizations and cultural institutions. Internationally, support groups developed such as the Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA) and the Guatemala Human Rights Commission in the United States, which played important advocacy roles in reorienting northern state policies toward the country.

In 1983 and 1984, Guatemala experienced a deteriorating economy, provoking a major rise in inflation. Widespread knowledge that corrupt military officers were personally gaining from currency devaluations and relaxed import regulations increased public demand for accountability. A phony bankruptcy closure of Coca-Cola brought a year-long union occupation of the plant in Guatemala City in 1984 that offered a haven for resistance in the midst of persistent attacks. This helped catalyze the union movement’s three strands, the US/AFILD-backed Confederation of Labor Unity of Guatemala (CUSG), the Christian Democratic General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers (CGTG), and the formation of UNSITRAGUA, an independent labor confederation with 27 affiliates.

From the 1990s to 2005, due to employer opposition and the restriction of rights to organize unions, the Guatemalan labor movement made limited inroads in organizing workers employed in garment and other industries exporting goods abroad, chiefly to North America and Western Europe. However, labor unions remained strong in state offices, the banana industry, and the food sector via FESTRAS (Guatemalan Food and Agricultural Workers’ Federation) and other labor organizations. The privatization of government functions, the shift of employees from the formal to the informal sector, the withdrawal of international financial resources, and the persistent and severe anti-union attacks placed social movements on the defensive.

SEE ALSO: Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán (1913–1971); Guatemala, Democratic Spring, 1944–1954; Guatemala, Popular Rebellion and Civil War; Menchú, Rigoberta (b. 1959); Tecún Umán (d. 1524)

References and Suggested Readings

- Arias, A. (1990) Changing Indian Identity: Guatemala's Violent Transition to Modernity. In C. Smith (Ed.), *Guatemalan Indians and the State, 1540–1988*. Austin: University of Texas Press, pp. 230–57.
- Brett, R. (2006) *Movimiento social, etnicidad y democratización en Guatemala, 1985–1996*. Guatemala City: F&G Editores.
- Fruendt, H. J. (2003) *Pausas refrescantes: la Coca-Cola y los derechos humanos en Guatemala*. Guatemala City: Magna Terra Editores.
- Grandin, G. (2000) *The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Handy, J. (1990) The Corporate Community, Campesino Organizations and Agrarian Reform: 1059–1954. In C. Smith (Ed.), *Guatemalan Indians and the State, 1540–1988*. Austin: University of Texas Press, pp. 163–182.
- Immerman, R. H. (1982) *The CIA in Guatemala*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Manz, B. (1988) *Refugees of a Hidden War: The Aftermath of Counterinsurgency in Guatemala*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- ODHAG (Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala) (1998) *Guatemala: Nunca más. Informe del Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica*. Guatemala City: ODHAG.
- Porras, G. (1978) Guatemala: la profundización de las relaciones capitalistas. *ECA* 343: 374–406.
- Spohn, R. (2002) *Hard Work: Labor Relations in Contemporary Guatemala*. Guatemala City: Intrapaz/Universidad Rafael Landívar.
- Woodward, R. (1985) *Central America: A Nation Divided*, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Guerilla theater

Chris McCoy

Guerilla theater is a form of political protest that presents unannounced, politically or socially motivated performances in public spaces for an unsuspecting audience. Derived from the Spanish term which loosely translates as “little warrior,” guerilla theater stems from the legacies of Russian agit-prop, Antonin Artaud’s Theater of Cruelty, and Erwin Piscator and Bertolt Brecht’s Epic Theater.

The phrase was first used around 1965 to describe the work of the San Francisco Mime Troupe, a nomadic theater company performing socially and politically relevant plays in the

parks of San Francisco. The invention of the phrase is commonly attributed to R. G. Davis or Peter Berg, founding director and member of the San Francisco Mime Troupe respectively (Davis 1975: 70). The term became prevalent upon the publication of Davis’s essay, “Guerilla Theatre: 1965,” in the *Tulane Drama Review* (1966). In this essay, Davis asserts that guerilla theater is intended to present “effective protest or social confrontation” in order to “confront hypocrisy in the society” (1966: 132).

Many political activist theater troupes adopted the methods of guerilla theater during the Vietnam War and social protests of the 1960s in order to explore, provoke, or raise awareness of sociopolitical issues. The most pervasive of these are The Living Theater, Bread and Puppet Theater, El Teatro Campesino, the Youth International Party (or Yippies), and Free Southern Theater.

Evolving beyond the watershed protests of the 1960s, guerilla theater became a mainstay in political and social resistance adopted by many national and international organizations in the late 1970s to 1980s. Guerilla tactics were used in drawing attention to many social ills, such as the absence of female artists in museums and the visual arts through the Guerrilla Girls, the environmental crisis and ecological issues through Greenpeace, and the AIDS epidemic through ACT UP (AIDS Coalition To Unleash Power). These groups used guerilla tactics and evolved the form from small grassroots organizations to encompass national and multinational political movements.

Since the 1980s, guerilla theater has remained prevalent in all forms of social and political protest. Contemporary guerilla troupes take aim at a panoply of social and political issues in creative, subversive, and often satirical forms. Reverend Billy and the Church of Stop Shopping have appeared in New York and across the country to spread their message of anti-corporate control of the US economy; Church Ladies for Choice takes aim at the anti-abortion movement; the Church of Euthanasia attempts to raise awareness on overpopulation; the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army is a British group using clowning techniques to mock pertinent political issues; the Oil Enforcement Agency satirically informs of the economic and ecological issues of dependence upon oil; Billionaires for Bush poked fun at

the corporate lobbying and control of the US political system; and Reclaim the Streets is an international organization dedicated to reclaiming privatized, homogenized public spaces for free expression.

SEE ALSO: ACT UP; Anti-Vietnam War Movement, United States; Bread and Puppet Theater; Greenpeace; Guerrilla Girls; Reclaim the Streets

References and Suggested Readings

- Bogad, L. M. (2005) *Electoral Guerilla Theatre: Radical Ridicule and Social Movements*. New York: Routledge.
- Cohen-Cruz, J. (1998) *Radical Street Performance*. New York: Routledge.
- Davis, R. G. (1966) Guerilla Theatre: 1965. *Tulane Drama Review* 10 (4): 130–6.
- Davis, R. G. (1975) *The San Francisco Mime Troupe: The First Ten Years*. Palo Alto: Ramparts Press.
- Kershaw, B. (1997) Fighting in the Streets: Dramaturgies of Popular Protest, 1968–1989. *New Theatre Quarterly* 13 (51): 255–76.

Guerrilla Girls

Brett M. Van Hoesen

Founded in 1985, the Guerrilla Girls is a collective of anonymous female artists and art world professionals committed to monitoring sexism, racism, and corruption in pop culture, the arts, and the film industry. Calling themselves the “Conscience of the Art World” they are famous for their provocative posters that attempt to police the injustices of the art establishment. Additional causes over the course of their movement have included labor issues, abortion rights, gay rights, AIDS awareness, and anti-war protests.

Using humor to invoke change, their fame is also linked to their practice of wearing gorilla masks in public. This disguise allegedly gives them “mask-ularity.” It also protects their real-life identities and engenders the group’s autonomy. According to art critic Lucy Lippard, “The Guerrilla Girls had the sense to realize that anonymity was a perfect weapon against art-scene/art-market greed and gossip, and they have adamantly remained in their masks, from behind which they can say the unspeakable” (Lippard 1995: 257). To further ensure the Guerrilla Girls’ anonymity, each member assumes a pseudonym, the name of a dead female artist

or writer such as Frida Kahlo, Käthe Kollwitz, Gertrude Stein, or Lee Krasner.

Drawing attention to the lingering legacy of influential women throughout history, the Guerrilla Girls are devoted to challenging the patriarchal paradigms of western art history. Their 1998 publication, *The Guerrilla Girls’ Bedside Companion to the History of Western Art*, radically re-envisioned the Middle Ages to the present by showcasing the lives and work of female artists as the exclusive producers of culture from the past five centuries. This overt bias of rewriting the history of western art as a 100 percent female achievement is in direct response to the shocking lack of representation of women artists and artists of color in mainstream museums, galleries, and art criticism.

Their first target, which prompted the foundation of the group, was the Museum of Modern Art’s 1985 show, “An International Survey of Painting and Sculpture,” promoted as the most up-to-date evaluation of the contemporary art scene. The exhibition featured 169 artists, only 13 of whom were women, and none of whom were artists of color. The curator of the exhibit, Kynaston McShine, suggested that “any artist who wasn’t in the show should rethink *his* career.” This inspired the development and widespread dissemination of propaganda-style posters and open letters targeting individuals and institutions responsible for such glaring imbalances.

Additional museums under the Guerrilla Girls’ surveillance and scrutiny have included the Metropolitan Museum of Art, Whitney Museum of American Art, and most recently the new Broad Contemporary Art Museum at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art. While two of the founding members of the Guerrilla Girls, Frida Kahlo and Käthe Kollwitz, remain active participants, over the duration of the group’s existence nearly 100 women have served as members. The group continues to spread its message by delivering public talks at universities, museums, and conferences, as well as through publications, their newsletter *Hot Flashes*, and commercial items available on their website, including copies of their famed posters, t-shirts, postcards, and CDs. As their website touts, the Guerrilla Girls continue to “reinvent the f-word – feminism” striving to “fight discrimination with humor, facts, and fake fur.”

SEE ALSO: Feminist Performance; Guerilla Theater

References and Suggested Readings

- Guerrilla Girls (1998) *The Guerrilla Girls' Bedside Companion to the History of Western Art*. New York: Penguin.
- Lippard, L. R. (1995) Guerrilla Girls. In *The Pink Glass Swan: Selected Feminist Essays on Art*. New York: New Press.
- www.guerrillagirls.com/index.shtml.

Guevara, Ernesto "Che" (1928–1967)

Mike Gonzalez

Two generations after his death in 1967, Ernesto "Che" Guevara retains an extraordinary symbolic significance. His face adorns t-shirts and posters across the world in two iconic guises: the youthful and energetic figure embodied in the myriad reproductions of Alexis Korda's photograph, or the thin, sparsely bearded face which, on each reprinting, comes more and more to resemble the Renaissance portraits of Christ by Andrea Mantegna.

While succeeding generations have identified a timeless quality of resolution and vision in that face, it has become disengaged from the brief but significant political history of the young Argentinian doctor. This is not to say that it is a false vision of the man – only that it is both partial and strangely depoliticized. His brief life (he was 39 when he died) was exemplary in its unwavering dedication to a revolutionary cause. Every one of his collaborators testifies to the depth of his commitment, and to the constancy he demanded of others. That resolve could be unforgiving and at times even cruel – but it was applied with equal intensity to himself.

The battle for control of the image of Che continues between new generations rediscovering the value of resistance and rebellion, and the advertisers anxious to exploit the icon while draining it of ethical or political content. Yet for all it has inspired for a new generation of anti-capitalists, it is Che Guevara's political engagement – its errors and achievements, and the consequences of both – which offers the richest practical lessons for a new generation.

An Awakening

Born in Rosario, Argentina, in 1928, Ernesto's childhood was dominated by his asthma, a con-

dition that encouraged his characteristic refusal to allow external conditions to limit his ambition. Equally influential were his parents, but particularly his mother, Celia, whose connections with the Argentine Communist Party were mainly social but whose home was also the venue for frequent gatherings and debates. This was the era of Perón, the skilled demagogue and acknowledged leader of the new working class now flowing from the provinces toward the Argentine capital. The relationship between Perón and the Communist Party could hardly have been worse, and the party's relative isolation from a mass working-class base of any kind shaped its politics. Indirectly it also shaped Guevara's perception of what it meant to be a communist.

There is little to suggest more than a passing interest in politics in Guevara's life until the life-changing trip through Latin America recorded in his *Motorcycle Diaries*. It began as the adventure of two young men in search of new experiences, but it became a journey from a white and urban Latin America into a very different, more brutal, and more divided reality. In Chile, Guevara records, he met two migrant laborers seeking work in the nitrate mines of the north, whose story of exploitation and persecution deeply moved the young Argentinian medical student.

It was at the Inca city of Machu Picchu that Che came face to face with the greatness of the Inca past and the monstrous act of destruction that had swept it away. Like Pablo Neruda (1904–1973) just a few years earlier, Guevara found in this last redoubt of Inca resistance the evidence of another America, the marks of the anonymous men and women who had created an extraordinary civilization and whose successors had been reduced to exploitation and poverty.

Persuaded to return to finish his medical studies by the Peruvian Marxist doctor Hugo Pesce, Guevara worked hard, graduated, and immediately embarked on a second journey. It was 1953, a year after Bolivia had lived through a social revolution; its echoes could be felt in the political confrontation that still rocked the society when Guevara arrived there. He was not indifferent to the racist undertones of the conflict between the indigenous miners of the country and the state. But he declared himself still to be a "neutral observer," and seemed equally fascinated by more exotic aspects of the worlds he was encountering.



Ernesto "Che" Guevara (1928–67) was an Argentinian Marxist revolutionary philosopher, medical doctor, and guerilla leader who played a pivotal role in the Cuban 26th of July Movement. In 1967, Guevara was captured and assassinated in Bolivia by CIA operatives. Since his death, popular identification with Guevara, known simply as Che, has grown worldwide, and by the early twenty-first century he remains an enduring symbol for anti-imperialists, progressive youth, and revolutionaries. (Rene Burri/Magnum Photos)

This journey ended in Guatemala where Guevara experienced a political conversion of some kind. He arrived in December 1953, as the country was going through a social and political transformation. The government of Jacobo Arbenz (1913–1971) was far from revolutionary, but it was dedicated to continuing the process of reform and modernization that had begun in 1944. The heart of his strategy was agrarian reform and the redistribution of land. Inevitably this meant a confrontation with the giant United Fruit Company, which for half a century had shaped and dominated the national economy. Some 40 percent of Guatemala's cultivable land was owned by what was called "La Yunai" and devoted to the cultivation of bananas for export.

It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that United Fruit and its directors, who included the Dulles brothers – one the secretary of state, the other head of the FBI – should have organized a military coup to overthrow Arbenz. Six months after Che's arrival, aircraft strafed the streets of Guatemala City and a US-backed military force entered the country. Arbenz resigned a week later. Despite circulating rumors, there was no armed resistance; the Guatemalan communists, the PGT, had accepted Arbenz's decision rather than mobilize resistance.

The fall of Arbenz was a traumatic and revealing event. It showed how implacable imperialist

hostility was to processes of reform that in any way challenged US economic or political interests in the region. Roosevelt's proclamation of the "four freedoms" ten years earlier, with their emphasis on democracy, were clearly no match for the desire for hegemony in a Cold War era.

The debates that followed among the Latin American exiles had a seminal influence on Guevara's personal political education. In Guatemala he met Hilda Gadea, a Peruvian communist who helped to develop Che's interest in and knowledge of Marxism. In his correspondence at the time, Che speaks approvingly of the Communist Party and of the Soviet Union, but it is clear that Guevara was not involved in any kind of military or political activity, though he did volunteer for the medical services. His meditations on the Guatemalan experience were largely personal and abstract, and they focused almost entirely on the military question: Why did Arbenz not fight back? Why did he not distribute arms? Guevara's conclusion was that there had been a failure of will on the part of the political leadership of the left, which had been unable to organize a sufficient response to the US-backed aggression.

Despite his growing interest in communism, there is no indication that Che was beginning to think through questions of class struggle or the role of political organization. His comment to a friend that he would probably join the Communist Party "at some point" once he had "seen Europe" suggests it was not a priority.

A Historic Meeting

Leaving Guatemala, Che joined many other Latin American exiles in Mexico City, where he earned a precarious living as a photographer and worked part-time in an allergy clinic. Early in July 1955, he was taken by a Cuban friend to meet Raúl Castro, Fidel's brother. The two men agreed that the only way to gain power in the region was through military engagement, a conclusion Che drew from his Guatemalan experience. When Che met Fidel a few weeks later, their instant rapport was at least in part the fruit of their agreement on these strategic matters.

In Mexico, many of Che's friends were Cuban exiles who prepared the way for his meeting with Fidel. He continued to read Marx, possibly guided by Hilda, who had joined him in the Mexican capital and whom he later married. As

he said at the time, rather whimsically, "Saint Charlie (Marx) had become the axis of my life." Che saw himself now as a revolutionary, driven (according to Fidel) by "the desire to act." Their fates from then on would be inextricably tied together.

Even at this stage there were ideological differences, but Che deferred to Fidel's history and the force of his conviction. After all, his plans for making a revolution were at an advanced stage. On the other hand, Fidel was a revolutionary nationalist whose guide was José Martí (1853–1895), while Che described himself as a communist and was exploring political theory, an activity with which Fidel had little patience.

What drew Che and Fidel together was a shared conviction that the key role in the process would be played by resolute revolutionaries. Fidel Castro's history of involvement in armed actions together with his skepticism about the Cuban Communist Party and the tradition it represented led him inexorably to that conclusion. Guevara's reading of Marxism until then had not embraced the debates around organization in the socialist tradition, but his Guatemalan experience did emphasize both the urgency and the possibility of an armed response. These were the circumstances under which the two men began their training in preparation for the landing of an armed expedition in Cuba.

The Politics of Revolutionary War

The motor launch *Granma* landed in Cuba on December 2, 1956 with 82 men aboard. Che and Fidel had trained in the Mexican countryside with Alberto Bayo, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War. The small, leaky craft was bought with cash gathered from supporters of the enterprise, including enemies of Batista from the old bourgeoisie. Within Cuba, the attitude of the Communist Party was deeply hostile, so it was members of the 26th of July Movement (J-26-M) who prepared for the *Granma's* arrival. On November 30, the agreed arrival date, J-26-M members took to the streets of Santiago. They withdrew at the end of the day, leaving nine dead. When the boat failed to arrive, the group waiting with weapons and support assumed the expedition had been aborted and left.

But it seemed that others were also expecting the group. They were met by Batista's troops and only 19 survived the shootout that followed.

The survivors scattered, and Che himself was wounded. He recorded the moment when the bullet hit, in the cane field at Alegría del Pío, as well as a symbolically significant decision he had to make. Faced with a box of medicines and another of bullets, and unable to carry both, he abandoned the medical chest. For the following few days Che and a small group of five wandered in the Sierra Maestra mountains, linking up with Fidel only on the 17th. Fidel's reaction when they met was to severely criticize Che for the loss of their arms, demoting and humiliating Che in the process. Che's acceptance of Fidel's rebuff says much about his regard for the man and his recognition of the structure of command.

The beginning of the Cuban guerilla war was inauspicious. Fidel had assumed that early military actions, combined with urban actions, would produce a general popular rising. And Che recorded his growing impatience as December dragged on with no direct conflict. He was becoming impatient with Fidel's paternalistic and at times arbitrary style of leadership. The story of the revolutionary war would be rewritten in the aftermath of the overthrow of Batista and given a sense of strategic direction it did not exhibit at the time. It would be Guevara's key political task to interpret the guerilla war for the rest of Latin America.

Che Guevara's military role very quickly became key, despite his lack of experience under arms. He compensated for that inexperience with a courage bordering on recklessness, and by an uncompromising discipline, applied to himself and to others. His execution of the informer Eutimio Guerra was carried out with speed and efficiency. It is as if he saw himself being tested, perhaps by Fidel or by his own relentless conviction.

In these early weeks of 1957, the rebel army grew slightly with the addition of peasant recruits who knew the terrain and lived with the violence of life in the Sierra Maestra. But they were hardly revolutionaries in any conscious political sense. There is some element of concern in Guevara's notes at the time, at the low level of political commitment among the fighters. In fact, Che was a member of the army's command structure, but still had no political role. Thus when Castro conducted his famous interview with Herbert Matthews for *Life* magazine, Che was not present. The moment did provide the opportunity, however, for him to meet for the

first time with J-26-M's political leadership. His diaries express his surprise and concern at their political limitations: "Through isolated conversations . . . I discovered the evident anti-communist inclinations of most of them." They were, he felt, nationalists fighting to overthrow a corrupt dictatorship, rather than revolutionary socialists. Che was now discovering the complexities of Cuban politics and his own limited knowledge of these complexities. He could not participate, for example, in the battle for leadership that was currently taking place within the J-26-M – between Frank País and the urban movement in *el llano* (the plains) and Castro in *la sierra* (the mountains).

For Che, the guerilla struggle was the heart of the matter; he saw the movement in the cities or of the working class as secondary. Given that his source of understanding of Cuban politics was Fidel, this is hardly surprising. But it also complemented the politics of individual action and exemplary moral fervor which drove him. By mid-1957, the defeats suffered by the J-26-M in the cities, and the continuing hostility of the Communist Party, tilted the balance definitively toward a guerilla war.

Che was convinced that the revolution would be made in the mountains. Who would be the subject of that process, however, was less clear. The relationship between the peasantry and the revolutionary army was one of support rather than control. Those who had joined the rebel army in the Sierra Maestra had not always proved reliable, and Che's stern discipline was clearly directed at those new recruits. It was the revolutionaries themselves, therefore, who were the leading protagonists in the process of change rather than the social forces they represented. This view explains the deep unease felt by Guevara over the Miami Pact which Fidel had entered into without consultation with his fellow leaders – a skepticism he shared with Raúl. Yet while Raúl was demoted in the wake of this disagreement, Che was given the rank of *comandante* toward the end of July. Perhaps the point Fidel was making was that the vision of the role of the revolutionary army was one that he shared with Che. A correspondence with Daniel, an urban leader of the J-26-M, in the wake of the murder of Frank País, makes it clear that Che supported absolutely Fidel's argument that the "*sierra*" must have the unquestioned leadership of the movement.

In September, a rising of naval officers in Cienfuegos was timed to coincide with simultaneous actions in Havana and Santiago. They failed to materialize and 300 conspirators were murdered in the repression that followed. Che wrote that his judgment at the time was that "a generalized uprising throughout the country was looming on the horizon." This was a misjudgment of serious proportions, though one shared by Fidel, and it explained the decision to move to "total war" against the regime, starting with a general strike in April. It was a disaster all the more so because the Cuban communists refused to support the J-26-M's call. In the mountains, however, relations with the Communist Party were prospering, though Che remained suspicious of the enthusiasm of the communists for a guerilla army which it had previously dismissed as "adventurist."

The meeting of the National Directorate of the Movement in May marked the definitive consolidation of Castro's undisputed command of the J-26-M. In Che's words, "the guerilla conception would emerge triumphant from that meeting."

The revolutionaries could not have known how brief a period in power remained for Batista, though they were almost certainly aware of Washington's declining support for the dictator. The response of the regime after April was to intensify repression and encircle the rebel forces in the Sierra Maestra. Throughout May and June, Fidel and Che commanded separate camps, with Che running the rebels' communication center, which was becoming increasingly central to the struggle. Raúl's second front in the Sierra de Cristal was also under siege. Within the guerilla encampments, tensions were emerging, particularly among the new recruits. Che, while admired, was implacable; he imposed severe punishments and in some cases approved executions of deserters. By late July of 1958, it became clear that Batista's exhausted and demoralized troops were retreating. The rebel army had survived.

To seize the advantage from this situation, Fidel saw opening a second front in Escambray as a necessity, and entrusted Che with the task of creating it. On August 30 Che set out for the center of the island. The journey should have taken four days; instead it became, according to Gonzalez (2004), "a harsh 42-day trek through mud and rain. In the course of the 'long march,' the legend of Che Guevara was definitively born." It is unlikely that these less than hardened

fighters would have survived the journey without the leadership of Che Guevara. Equally, it seemed that these very conditions (and he would face worse later) reinforced his moral fervor and his conviction that self-sacrifice oiled the wheels of revolutionary struggle.

The legend of the "long march" also served another purpose. There were several other armed groups functioning in Escambray, and it was Castro's urgent purpose to unite them under the leadership of the J-26-M. Che was the person best able to do that, and particularly with the aura of heroism with which he and his men finally arrived in Escambray on October 16. The critical issue was the hostility between the communists and the J-26-M in the area. Che was far more sympathetic to communism than Fidel, but had absorbed Castro's deep suspicion of the Cuban party. Nevertheless, he was able to negotiate with their cadres in Escambray, even though tension in Castro's own circle remained unresolved. Patiently negotiating on the one hand, on the other Che insisted on launching a series of small actions in the run-up to the November elections – although his comrades vetoed the suggestion of a bank robbery!

By late December, the 350 men under Che's command approached the city of Santa Clara. The garrison there consisted of over 4,000, and a supply train with arms and weapons was on its way to reinforce them. The decision to rip up the rails and prevent the train from arriving was attributed to Che; in any event, the three-day battle ended in defeat for the government troops. One day later, on December 31, 1958, Batista fled the country.

A Revolutionary in Power

On January 2 Che and Camilo Cienfuegos (1932–59) led the 300-kilometer column into Havana; in the east, Fidel was occupying Santiago. Che was absent from the final parade into the city, however, having arrived the night before with responsibility for organizing security and the beginnings of revolutionary justice. Some have argued that it was Che's absolute and uncompromising reliability, as well as his military discipline, that led Castro to have him organize security instead of leading the victory column – which was carried out by Cienfuegos instead. In the first weeks of the revolution, the hated secret police and torturers of the Batista regime

were dealt with in summary executions in the La Cabaña fortress in Havana under Che's command. It was a new kind of justice, dispensed in public and at speed – but it was conducted according to specific rules. In any event Che's involvement would be brief, as he became virtually bedridden with asthma for the next four months.

Che won a central role in the conduct of the guerilla war; he had distinguished himself in battle and earned a place in the political leadership of the movement. He had also become a key symbolic figure in post-revolutionary iconography, an exemplar of discipline, commitment, and courage. He would become all the more prominent as the history of the Cuban Revolution was written as an essentially military victory. The other contributory elements – the internal corrosion of the regime, the withdrawal of US support, and the broad character of the anti-Batista alliance, for example – were not addressed. Che's status was a consequence of this military way of understanding the revolution; soon after he would face a new range of tasks in consolidating the infant revolutionary state.

In Escambray, Che enacted a revolutionary agrarian reform, echoing Castro's slightly more timid program in the Sierra Maestra. From government, he returned repeatedly to the central significance of the agrarian reform as a guarantee of peasant support for the revolution. Similarly, as the sugar harvest approached and Cuba began to seek new buyers for the sugar previously sold in the United States, Che observed to a colleague that unemployment was a central issue for the semi-employed rural workers, and that a shorter working day should be introduced.

Politically, Che's interest in the socialist tradition, and his vision of the Cuban Revolution as a socialist process, was explicit from the outset. Castro, it should be noted, was less clear at this stage about the character of the Cuban Revolution. At the same time, Che's thinking about revolutionary leadership still emphasized the centrality of the rebel army and its leading cadres as the subject of revolution.

Fidel used the early months of the revolution to travel to North America and test attitudes, though the nationalization of US assets in Cuba predisposed the US government to hostility. At this stage Fidel's relations with Cuba's communists were strained, and his intention was to marginalize them. Che, like Raúl, was suspicious of these trips. For him, the US government was

clearly the enemy, and Guatemala had taught him to be on the alert for intervention from the north. When Fidel met with Che and Raúl at a stopover in Houston during his April travels, it is likely that he faced criticism from both men.

Che was playing a central role in the reorganization of the army, the elaboration of economic policy, and, with some circumspection, the political debates about the direction of the revolution. His perception of the army's role was as "the vanguard" – a role ascribed in the socialist tradition to the revolutionary *party*. In the economic arena, agrarian reform was central for Che – and his vision was the socialization of land. When Fidel signed the bill into law on his return on May 7, it represented a radicalization of the revolution – and a response to the US government's hostility. It was logical, therefore, that the next step should be to seek out other allies and markets in anticipation of a US embargo. Che was given that mission. It was recognition of his central political role; however, some have suggested that it was also Fidel's way of distancing Che from the Cuban scene.

Che's journey took three months and he visited 14 countries. The most important part of the trip was his secret sugar negotiations with the Soviet Union. When Che returned to Cuba, events had moved forward with speed. Fidel had now taken direct charge of the Agrarian Reform Institute. A new Department of Industrialization within the Institute was to be headed by Che. At the same time, Che's role in the army, as head of security and as a *comandante* of the revolutionary army, would continue. Two months later, Che was named director of the National Bank, and his famous scrawled signature appeared on Cuba's banknotes.

Even for a committed revolutionary, this was a heavy workload, but also evidence of how central Che was to the revolution. In fact the three roles were connected: the future of the Cuban economy needed to break its dependence on sugar, always the tie that bound the island to the US. Che was a fierce advocate of rapid industrialization, though the manner of it would later involve him in a crucial and bitter debate. At the same time, the US trip had shown that Washington's hostility was implacable and military preparedness was essential. Che was crucial here too. The directorship of the National Bank was, at that stage, a highly political task to

which Che's authority and absolute reliability were essential. The internal political atmosphere was hardening, as the trial of Huber Matos, described as "an old anti-communist," showed. Raúl, as head of the armed forces, argued for exemplary maximum punishment; Che was persuaded to advocate a 30-year jail sentence instead.

As the Cuban Revolution began to define itself politically, the increasingly close relationship with the Soviet Union confirmed Che's economic and political vision. Internally, the growing emphasis on discipline and effort closely corresponded with Che's view. Neither was it an accident that his *Guerrilla Warfare* appeared in April 1960. It was significant that for neither Che nor Fidel was internal democracy a key question. Their command view transferred effortlessly from the army to the state.

The Cuban Revolution gave hope to a new generation of revolutionaries. And it was Che's writing that generalized that experience into a political method: *foquismo*, the creation of small guerrilla cells that could develop the campaign of "armed propaganda," undermining the state and stimulating a more generalized resistance. For Che, it was important to open new fronts against imperialism, and from all over Latin America young men and women were arriving to train for their own guerilla war. The problem was that Latin America's ruling classes and their American allies had also generalized from the Cuban experience. Their response was to isolate Cuba politically and economically, and to reinforce the military apparatus throughout the region. The result was the effective crushing of most guerrilla strategies as they were attempted, from Guatemala to Paraguay.

The intensification of external attacks, mainly from Miami, and the new radical direction taken by the revolution were reflected in an increasing internal emphasis on discipline and sacrifice, the recurrent themes in so many of Che's speeches and writings of the time. His June 1960 article, "On Sacrifice and Dedication," set out his concept of "the new man," with its emphasis on moral as opposed to material benefits. It was an argument that had particular relevance as it became necessary to divert resources from the health and education programs, which marked the revolution's first two years in the area of economic development. Che was clear that this was the inescapable cost of political and economic independence, but he argued that material benefits

should be replaced by social gains and a sense of the advance of the revolution.

The October Missile Crisis of 1962 showed both Che and Fidel the limits of Soviet support for Cuba, and left in both a deep distrust of Soviet intentions. It also served to deepen the political cracks that were beginning to show within the Cuban leadership itself. The Soviet presence in the state, and particularly in the economic ministries, sharpened the debate that had flowed out of Che's emphasis on the new man. The political core of the debate renewed the argument over moral and material incentives: should state enterprises act like individual firms, measuring profit and loss in the same way as any other capitalist firm, or should the economy as a whole be seen as a single unit whose different component parts contribute to the global development of the economy?

Behind the technical argument lay a political disagreement, particularly with the Cuban Communist Party who were now central to the state – a reflection of Soviet influence. In the wake of the Missile Crisis, Che's deepening distrust of the Soviets and their Cuban allies resonated in the debate around the new man. It expressed his frustration with what he saw as an economistic version of the transition to socialism, as well as recognition of the economic difficulties to come and the political challenges they would pose.

In order to escape the trap of growing dependence on the Soviets and the consequent slowing down of the process of revolutionary transformation, Che offered two linked answers: one was the growth of socialist consciousness, an ideological great leap forward in which ideas could once again overcome material limitations and stimulate a culture of voluntary labor; the other was a return to the continental revolutionary strategies he had espoused early in the revolution's history – the development of a continental guerilla struggle based on the peasantry. There was an increasing urgency in his speeches and writings of the time, public appearances in which he was seen pushing himself to new levels of work, as well as a growing irritation with the inadequacies and inefficiencies of some state enterprises and their Soviet suppliers. There were clearly growing differences among the communists within Cuba (over economic questions) and in Latin America (over guerilla strategy). This in turn seemed to be opening a gulf between himself and Fidel.

Che's reception at the Moscow meeting of communist parties in 1963 was very different from three years earlier. There were official complaints aimed at his position, and his speech on his return in November 1963 made clear his growing disillusionment. It was not clear at the time, but this was the first step in Che's departure from Cuba. While Fidel, pragmatist that he was, protected his relationship with the Russians and with the communists, Che was more trenchant in his views – some said even dogmatic. He was also becoming more short-tempered with his colleagues. The Cuban–Soviet Sugar Agreement of 1964 set back any notion of rapid diversification of the economy. In March, his address to an UNCTAD conference in Geneva was radical and acerbic; his visit to Africa on his return journey was more significant. In an interview later that year he commented that the trade unions had no independent role, an indirect criticism of the state bureaucracy. He returned to Africa in January 1965 and the following month, in Algiers, delivered what was his most explicit criticism of the Soviet Union at a Third World Solidarity meeting.

When he returned to Cuba in March it was to resign. Shortly thereafter, Che disappeared; we now know that he went to the Congo, to relaunch an international guerilla strategy there. It was a disaster, as the Cuban fighters found themselves embroiled in sectarian conflicts and endless delays. Che had clearly been inadequately advised, but the Congo debacle exposed a deeper political problem. The experience of the early 1960s had shown very clearly that a guerilla strategy alone could not carry forward the revolution in Latin America. Yet Che remained wedded to that strategy and was putting it to the test again in Africa. Its failure should have led to recognition that force of will alone could not overcome objective conditions, and that revolutions are made by social forces and not by dedicated individuals alone.

Che's most important essay, "Man and Socialism in Cuba," was published in Uruguay after his departure (in late March 1965), and only later in Cuba. It was a clear sign of his alienation, his fall from grace. Before he left, he gave a letter to Fidel renouncing his Cuban citizenship. It was clearly intended for publication in the event of his death; instead it was published by Fidel in October. Effectively, it made Che's return impossible. Having escaped from the Congo,

Che spent several months in Prague, isolated and depressed; his second wife, Aleida March, was his only visitor. He returned to Cuba later that year, in disguise and in secret, to prepare for what would be his final campaign – Bolivia.

The Bolivian campaign was apparently masterminded with key figures in the Cuban state. It was a strange decision; the strategy of rural guerilla warfare isolated the revolutionaries from the key social force in Bolivia, the organized workers' movement – as Che's *Bolivian Diary* so poignantly revealed. And a recent agrarian reform, however opportunistic it may have been, undermined the conditions for peasant resistance. Perhaps Che's vision was to create a continental guerilla nucleus; if so, it was misplaced. Above all, the mistaken idea that the Bolivian Communist Party would support the guerillas was quickly exposed. In fact, Che's closest advisors expressed severe doubts even before he arrived in October 1966. Why he went is still a matter of debate.

Che's *Bolivian Diary* does not explain why he went to Bolivia, but it does reveal the isolation of the group, its failure to connect with wider social forces, and the high level of organization on the part of counterinsurgency forces, advised as they were by US personnel. Che was captured, exhausted, sick, and separated from most of his comrades, and taken to the village schoolroom at La Higuera, where he was murdered on the explicit orders of a US agent.

SEE ALSO: Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán (1913–1971); Bolivia, War of the Pacific to the National Revolution, 1879–1952; Castro, Fidel (b. 1926); Congo Crisis, 1960–1965; Cuba, General Strikes under Batista Regime, 1952–1958; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Cuban Revolutionary Government; Guatemala, Democratic Spring, 1944–1954; Martí, José (1853–1895) and the Partido Revolucionario Cubano; Marxism; Neruda, Pablo (1904–1973)

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, J. L. (1997) *Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life*. London: Bantam Books.
- Castañeda, J. G. (1997) *Compañero*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Gerassi, J. (Ed.) (1968) *Venceremos: Speeches and Writings of Ernesto Che Guevara*. London: Weidenfeld.
- Gonzalez, M. (2004) *Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution*. London: Bookmarks.
- Guevara, E. (1961) *Guerrilla Warfare*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

- Guevara, E. (1968) *El diario del Che en Bolivia*. Havana: n.p.
- Guevara, E. (1978) *Man and Socialism in Cuba*. New York: Pathfinder.
- Guevara, E. (1996) *The Motorcycle Diaries*. London: Fourth Estate.
- Guevara, E. (1998) *Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Guevara, E. (2000) *The African Dream*. London: Harvill.
- Lowy, M. (1973) *The Marxism of Che Guevara*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Taibo II, P. I. (1998) *Ernesto Guevara: también conocido como el Che*. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta.

Guillén, Abraham (1913–1993)

Rady Roldan-Figueroa

Born in Guadalajara, Spain, Abraham Guillén was a leading Latin American theorist of urban guerilla warfare. His work was informed by his first-hand experience in the anarchosindicalist popular militias that were active during the Spanish Civil War (1936–9). Ideologically, Guillén was firmly rooted in the Spanish anarchosindicalist tradition of the National Confederation of Labor (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, CNT) and the Federation of Spanish Anarchists (Federación Anarquista Ibérica, FAI). He spent several years in prison after the civil war until successfully escaping in 1945, first to France and then, in 1948, to Argentina.

In Argentina he worked as a journalist, publishing his works under two different pseudonyms, Jaime de las Heras and Fernando Molina. In 1956, he published his two-volume *Agonía del imperialismo* (The Agony of Imperialism). In the early 1960s he became involved with the Argentinian guerilla movement known as the Uturuncos. He was detained in 1961 by the Argentinian security forces, and after his release he moved to Montevideo. It was there that Guillén commenced work on his *Estrategia de la guerilla urbana* (Strategy of the Urban Guerilla), which appeared in 1966. In this work Guillén advocated an alternative to the “established” thinking in guerilla warfare. In contrast to the Fidelista model, Guillén shifted attention away from the jungles and mountains and made cities the new focal points of insurrection. His thinking was influential among the Tupamaros and other

urban guerilla movements in Argentina, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic.

In the 1970s he authored a series of works criticizing the Soviet model of bureaucratic socialism and articulating a form of socialist *autogestión* (self-management) inspired by the model of the former Yugoslavia. In 1972, he published his "*Socialismo de autogestión*": *De la utopía a la realidad* ("Socialism of Autogestion": From Utopia to Reality), in which he laid the foundations of his economic thought along the lines of the Yugoslav experience. He fully developed his criticism of the Soviet model in the 1979 work *El capitalismo soviético: última etapa del imperialismo* (Soviet Capitalism: The Last Phase of Imperialism), an obvious allusion to the classic work by Russian political philosopher and revolutionary strategist Vladimir. I. Lenin. He returned to Spain after the death of General Francisco Franco (1892–1975) and continued writing and lecturing in progressive circles.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Argentina; Anarchism, Spain; Argentina, Armed Struggle and Guerilla Organizations, 1960s–1970s; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI); Marighella, Carlos (1911–1969) and the Brazilian Urban Guerilla Movement; Spanish Revolution; Tupamaros; Workers' Self-Management, Yugoslavia

References and Suggested Readings

- Guillén, A. (1956) *La agonía del imperialismo*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sophos.
- Guillén, A. (1966) *Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana*. Montevideo: Manuales del Pueblo.
- Guillén, A. (1973) *Philosophy of the Urban Guerilla*. New York: William Morrow.
- Joes, J. A. (2007) *Urban Guerrilla Warfare*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.

Guinea-Bissau, nationalist movement

Justin Corfield

The Portuguese first arrived in what is now Guinea-Bissau in about 1450 and began trading in slaves, gold, ivory, and pepper. They gradually started building forts, and it became Portuguese Guinea. The Portuguese only ventured into the interior from the 1880s; prior to that they had been happy to trade with the people along the coast. In the 1920s, however, the Portuguese

government decided to keep out foreign companies and let Portuguese businesses run Guinea and the rest of the Portuguese Empire. The result was that most of the peasant population of Guinea-Bissau who were not working on subsistence farms had to be laborers on plantations growing peanuts.

In Bissau, the capital of Portuguese Guinea, on September 19, 1956, a number of nationalists led by Amílcar Cabral founded the Partido Africano da Independência do Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) to fight for independence for both Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, after, if necessary, an armed struggle. To this end, the PAIGC started recruiting African bureaucrats, artisans, and laborers. In 1959 they managed to organize a strike at the Pijiguiti dockyards, located on the Geba River in Bissau. There the longshoremen refused to work and picketed the place. The Portuguese responded by shooting and killing 50 strikers and wounding another 180. The Pijiguiti Massacre, as the event became known, not only inflamed many people in Portuguese Guinea, but also managed to persuade Amílcar Cabral and many other moderate leaders of the PAIGC that they would have to resort to the armed struggle for independence.

The PAIGC drew many of its leaders from better-educated Cape Verdeans, but most of its members were from Portuguese Guinea, which became its first target. In 1961 soldiers of the PAIGC, backed by Guinea (formerly French Guinea), left that former French colony to infiltrate into isolated parts of Portuguese Guinea. With the remoteness of much of Portuguese Guinea, their task was relatively simple, and it was not long before they had 10,000 men under arms. The Portuguese responded by deploying 25,000 and raising an African militia of another 10,000. However, Portuguese efforts were largely in vain. By 1966 the PAIGC had control of half of Portuguese Guinea, with the Portuguese and their supporters pulling back to towns and cities.

The Portuguese commander, General Antonio Riberio de Spínola, pledged himself to the creation of a "Guinea for the sons of Guinea within a Portuguese community." With Bissau swollen with refugees, in 1973 Portuguese agents assassinated Amílcar Cabral in Conakry, French Guinea, but the war was largely over. Guinea-Bissau was effectively in nationalist hands by late 1973. The PAIGC held elections

in much of Portuguese Guinea with, by their own counts, 52,400 voters from a registered electorate of 58,000 electing 15 regional councils, which in turn elected 80 members of a National Assembly. On September 24, 1973 the PAIGC, based in Dakar, Senegal, announced that the National Assembly had proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau after a meeting near the village of Medina de Bow in the eastern part of the country. It was not long before 80 countries recognized independence. By then, the Portuguese government had changed. The military coup d'état in Lisbon, Portugal's capital, on April 25, 1974, led by General Spínola, saw the end of Portugal's colonial ambitions.

Guinea-Bissau faced many problems. First, there were only a few factories, mainly for the processing of peanuts, and a brewery left behind. Literacy was as low as 5 percent, with life expectancy at 35 years of age, and nearly half of all children were dying before their fifth birthday. There were only 14 university graduates in the entire country, and no trained doctors. To try to improve this, Guinea-Bissau wanted a merger with the newly independent Cape Verde Islands. However, Guinea-Bissau's president, Luiz Cabral, brother of Amílcar Cabral, was overthrown in 1980 when he was visiting the Cape Verde Islands. The new military government of Joao "Nino" Vieira then took power, with Vieira, a hard-line Marxist, becoming president. The Soviet Union gave the new government military aid, but Vieira also managed to get non-military aid from the West. In 1986 following a coup attempt, Vieira became more pragmatic and began to endorse the free market system. Vieira narrowly won the 1994 presidential elections, with opposition leader Kumba Ialá (or Yalla) urging his supporters to accept the result and not precipitate a civil war.

On June 7, 1998 General Ansumane Mane, the former head of the army who had been sacked by President Vieira five months earlier, started a coup d'état. Mane had the support of the vast majority of the army, with Vieira relying on soldiers from neighboring Guinea and Senegal to keep him in power. In August 1998 a ceasefire was arranged, and elections were planned for 1999. In May 1999 General Mane came to power, overthrowing Vieira. Koumba Ialá became president on February 17, 2000. Mane was killed in an ambush by Ialá's supporters on November 23, 2000, and Ialá survived an attempted coup in

December 2001, but was overthrown in another coup on September 14, 2003.

SEE ALSO: Cape Verde, Independence Struggle

References and Suggested Readings

- Chilcote, R. H. (1972) *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Documents*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
- Cornwall, B. (1972) *The Bush Rebels: A Personal Account of Black Revolt in Africa*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.
- Davidson, B. (1969) *The Liberation of Guiné: Aspects of an African Revolution*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Forrest, J. B. (1992) *Guinea-Bissau: Power, Conflict and Renewal in a West African Nation*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Galli, R. E. (1990) *Guinea-Bissau*. Oxford: Clío.
- Galli, R. E. & Jones, J. (1987) *Guinea-Bissau: Politics, Economics and Society*. London: Pinter.
- Lobban, R. & Lopes, M. (1995) *Historical Dictionary of the Republics of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.
- Núñez, B. (1995) *Dictionary of Portuguese-African Civilization*. London: Hans Zell.

Gunawardena, Don Philip Rupasinghe (1901–1972)

Charles Wesley Ervin

Don Philip Rupasinghe Gunawardena is considered the first leader of socialism in Sri Lanka. Born in rural Boralugoda, then in colonial Ceylon, Philip Gunawardena was the son of a prominent landowner and Sinhalese patriot, Don Jacolis Rupasinghe Gunawardena. While studying at the University of Illinois-Urbana and the University of Wisconsin-Madison, he became a socialist through his friendship with fellow student Jayaprakash Narayan, who would later form the Congress Socialist Party in India. Gunawardena graduated from Columbia University in New York City with a doctorate in agricultural economics. Here he joined the communist-led League Against Imperialism (LAI) in 1925.

In 1928 Gunawardena went to London, joined the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), and was assigned to work in the LAI and the India League, where he met and recruited youth from the various British colonies, including the handful of very talented intellectuals who later would

help him form the Lanka Sama Samaja Party. As a courier to the Communist International's headquarters in Berlin, he witnessed the disastrous impact of Stalin's ultra-left line. Gunawardena became a secret Trotskyist. As Ervin (2006) has documented, he even made an attempt to visit Trotsky, who was then living in exile on the Turkish island of Prinkipo after his expulsion from the USSR. In 1932 Gunawardena was also expelled by the CPGB for his criticism of the party line and connections with British Trotskyists.

Building the Lanka Sama Samaja Party

Returning to Ceylon in late 1932, Gunawardena joined the South Colombo Youth League, a nationalist group affiliated to the All-Ceylon Youth Congress. Joined by his recruits from London, Gunawardena developed a Marxist nucleus within the Youth League. His roaring speeches earned this charismatic leader the nickname "the Lion of Boralugoda." In December 1935 Gunawardena and his followers launched the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) as an anti-imperialist and broadly socialist party. The first Marxist party in Ceylon fielded candidates in the elections to the second State Council. Being elected, Gunawardena and N. M. Perera turned the chamber into a platform for denouncing the British and proposing reforms to benefit the urban and rural working people.

Outside the Council, Gunawardena fought to get a working-class base for the party in Colombo, combating the authoritarian style of pioneer labor leader A. E. Goonesinghe, which took him two years. The LSSP had a more difficult time penetrating the upcountry plantations, where the vast majority of the island's working class, the Tamil estate laborers, lived and toiled. In December 1939, after the Stalin–Hitler Pact, the LSSP majority condemned the Third International, expelled the Stalinist minority, and in March 1940 openly solidarized with the Fourth International, launched by Trotsky in 1938 as the revolutionary alternative to the Stalinized Comintern. In 1939 Philip married Kusuma (Amarasinha), the first woman member elected to the parliament in Ceylon.

In April 1940 the Ceylonese government banned the LSSP and imprisoned Gunawardena and three other senior party leaders in an attempt to silence the party's anti-war propaganda and stop

the plantation strikes that the party was leading. Forced underground, the LSSP stepped up its efforts to unify the Trotskyist groups in India. Gunawardena had developed the thesis that a revolution in India was the precondition for independence and a socialist transformation in Ceylon. In April 1942 Gunawardena and his comrades escaped from jail, slipping away to India and joining the Bolshevik Leninist Party of India (BLPI), the Indian section of the Fourth International formed in May 1942. The BLPI, unlike the Communist Party of India (CPI), gave unconditional support to the Quit India movement in August 1942. In July 1943 Gunawardena along with other BLPI activists was arrested by the police, acting on information provided by the CPI (Ervin 2006). After six months in a Bombay jail, he was deported to Ceylon and imprisoned for the duration of the war.

From Mass Mobilizer to Parliamentarian

Gunawardena played a prominent role in the militant strikes that flared during 1945–7. He formed the powerful All-Ceylon Harbor and Dock Workers' Union in 1946. He was elected to the first parliament in 1947. In 1950 Gunawardena and his followers split from the LSSP and formed the Viplavakari (Revolutionary) LSSP (VLSSP). It formed a United Front with the Ceylon Communist Party, which had grown substantially during the war, when it supported the government and was allowed to function freely. Gunawardena believed that Stalinism was on the decline and therefore Trotskyism was a "dead ideology."

In the 1956 elections Gunawardena allied with the rural-oriented democratic socialist Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) to create the People's United Front (MEP). The MEP swept into power with a massive majority. Gunawardena was appointed minister of agriculture, food, and cooperatives, while P. H. William de Silva became minister of industries and fisheries. In 1958 Gunawardena, as the general secretary of the Central Council of Ceylon Trade Unions, drafted a sweeping land redistribution scheme, the Paddy Lands Act, eventually implemented in a less radical form. He pushed to nationalize bus transport and the port and agitated for the takeover of the British air force and naval bases. His radical proposals combined with his ability to stage disruptive strikes, especially in

the harbor, polarized the cabinet and led to the famous “cabinet ministers’ strike” that forced Gunawardena and de Silva to leave the government in 1959.

His next move astonished even those who expected him to make bold leaps. In 1965 he made an alliance with the United National Party (UNP), so long demonized as a party of the rich, westernized elites. He served as minister of industries and fisheries in the UNP’s “Middle Path” government until 1969. However, Gunawardena continued to profess to be a revolutionary. He was one of the few senior Sri Lankan politicians to hail the insurrection of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in 1971.

SEE ALSO: De Silva, Colvin Reginald (1907–1989); Internationals; Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and Sri Lankan Radicalism; Narayan, Jayaprakash (1902–1979); People’s Liberation Front of Sri Lanka (JVP); Quit India Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Arjuna (1969) *Pilip Gunawardhana caritaya* (The Life of Philip Gunawardena). Moratuwa: Sarat Gunasena.
- Ervin, C. W. (2006) *Tomorrow is Ours: The Trotskyist Movement in India and Ceylon, 1935–48*. Colombo: Social Scientists’ Association.
- Gunawardena, L. (2004) *Kusuma: A Life in Left Politics*. Colombo: L. Gunawardena.
- Palitha, H. T. (2003) *Philip Gunawardene Lipi Saranaya* (A Collection of the Life and Times of Philip Gunawardena). Colombo: n.p.
- Richardson, A. (Ed.) (1997) *Blows Against the Empire: Trotskyism in Ceylon*. London: Porcupine Press.

Gustav Rebellions

Nathan James Martin

Protest and revolution are historically integral to the democratic transformation of Sweden from an autocratic monarchy to a constitutional democracy with egalitarian norms. Many of the major social changes in the country’s political and economic development occurred over the three centuries of Gustav rule, from 1521 to 1792.

Opposition to Kristian II and End of the Union of Kalmar

A period of civil war undermined the effectiveness of the Union of Kalmar. Following the defeat of King Kristian I’s army by Sten Sture

the Elder in 1471 at the Battle of Brunkenberg, the realm was ruled by regents until 1523. In 1515 a dispute developed between the regent, Sten Sture the Younger, and the elected archbishop of Uppsala, Gustav Trolle, instigated when Sture threatened the castle and fief of Ståket, the traditional demesne of the archbishopric. Tension between Trolle and Sture escalated in 1517 when Sture appealed to the Riksdag (parliament) and to peasants and miners of Dalarna in opposition to the archbishop. Sture was summarily excommunicated, and Kristian, an ally of Trolle, attacked Stockholm in 1517, but was defeated and imprisoned by Sture’s forces. After another attack in 1518, Sture was forced to sign an armistice permitting six members of the Swedish nobility to return from Denmark, one of whom was Gustav Vasa. In 1520, after careful planning, Kristian raised a mercenary army and won major battles in Halland, Västergötland, and Tiveden. Sten Sture was killed in the first battle on Lake Åsunden and Kristian later surrounded Stockholm and was crowned king by the archbishop.

In November 1520 Trolle petitioned the king to punish those in the Riksdag who supported Sture’s opposition to the archbishop three years earlier. Trolle claimed that miners and peasants supporting Sture’s resistance breached the papal decree of Roman authorities and should be burned at the stake. Kristian agreed and 82 resisters were executed, including churchmen, council members, and lesser nobles. In a symbolic act, Kristian ordered Sten Sture’s body exhumed and burned with the rest. Kristian’s purge of the Swedish nobility became known as the Stockholm Bloodbath.

Kristian II was unpopular with the Swedes. In the traditional Eriksgata procession (king’s path) to the provinces after the coronation of a new king, the king collected heavy taxes and executed resisters. Local revolts erupted in central and southern Sweden. In Dalarna, with its strong tradition of opposition, revolts broke out as well. Gustav Vasa traveled to Dalarna in February 1521 to win support in resistance against Kristian, but did not gain support from the local inhabitants. Reconsidering the rejection, the Dalarnese sent their best skiers to catch up with Vasa, who was approaching the Norwegian border. Once accepted by the Dalarnese, others were won over and Vasa began a war to liberate Swedes from the Danes. He allied with the Hanseats and

Frederick, who had vied with Kristian for control of Denmark. Kristian was eventually defeated and pushed out of Swedish territory. Despite the debt incurred by Gustav for the war of liberation, he was crowned king of Sweden on June 6, 1523, and the modern Swedish state was born.

Rebellions During Gustav Vasa's Reign

Though the people of Dalarna supported Gustav Vasa's ascent to the throne in 1523, two years later a new revolt erupted against higher taxes, higher living expenses, and shortages of salt and other commodities. The driving force behind the revolt was the Daljunkare, a pretender claiming to be the son of Sten Sture, who had a strong legacy in Dalarna. Having won the support of the Estates of the Riksdag held in Västerås, Vasa proceeded with confidence. He summoned the rebels to Tuna, where the Daljunkare's supporters were brutally executed. The Daljunkare fled to Germany, was captured and killed.

Another revolt in Dalarna occurred in 1530, and was precipitated by Gustav's issuance of a decree stating that each church should give up one bell to give to the crown's coffers. A similar decree was announced earlier, but it only pertained to town and monastery church bells. When Gustav's men came to collect the bells, they were met by the commoners who were ready to fight. It may seem a trivial matter, but to these churchgoers, bells had great significance, and with the Lutheran threat of Olaus Petri looming, it had even greater significance. Gustav's response to the indignant Dalarnese was delayed because of a new threat by Kristian II, but in 1533 he ruthlessly punished the rebels, some of whom had supported him earlier in 1521. After the Bell Rebellion, Dalarna no longer was a threat to Vasa's sovereignty.

The last major revolt during Gustav's reign was the Nils Dacke Rebellion in 1542 in Småland. The peasantry opposed high taxes, opposed the stripping of ornamentation from churches, and the control of the regional economy by foreign interests. Nils Dacke, a peasant organizer opposed by authorities, recognized the discontent as an opportunity to launch a rebellion. Dacke amassed a rebel army of several hundred peasants and seized Kronoberg. Dacke and his rebels planned to overthrow the monarch, but Gustav, in power for 20 years, called on loyal nobles to quell the

opposition. Gustav benefited from a general suspicion of Smålanders, who were geographically closer to Denmark and were not as zealous in the war against the Danes. After Dacke's revolt, Gustav consolidated control over Sweden's monarchy, and no major dissent followed during his reign.

Assassination of Gustav III

Starting in the 1730s and continuing for several decades, Swedish politics were defined by a rivalry in the noble's estate by two groups, the Hats and the Caps. The Hats, generally, represented the older aristocracy and nobility, while the Caps supported the lower estates of clergy, burghers, and farmers. During the mid-eighteenth century, two Swedish sovereigns (Frederick and Adolf Frederick) ruled with limited power due to the competing factional dispute. In 1765 the Caps sought to institute progressive change based upon the ideals of the Enlightenment, such as free speech, education, and an end to noble privilege.

Gustav III, crowned in 1771, drafted a new constitution in 1772 as a response to the reforms. The passage of this constitution is often referred to as a "peaceful coup" that expanded the power of the king. The constitution included a clause that the king would lead the four estates of parliament. The power of the nobles was preserved, and the lower three estates of clergy, burghers, and farmers were reduced. Noble influence expanded steadily throughout Gustav's reign. In 1789 at the Riksdag, the king sought to reduce the power of the nobles by advancing the lower three estates, passing the Act of Union and Security. This reduction in power through the reforms infuriated the nobility, leading the lords to plot a conspiracy against Gustav. On March 16, 1792 Jacob Johan Anckarström shot Gustav, who died from his wounds 13 days later. The assassination was memorialized in Verdi's *Un Ballo Maschera* and represented the end of a period of artistic and scientific achievement under Gustav's rule.

SEE ALSO: Nordic Revolts and Popular Protests, 1500–Present; Swedish Revolution of 1809

References and Suggested Readings

Andersson, I. (1970) *Sveriges Historia*. New York: Praeger.
 Nordstrom, B. (2002) *The History of Sweden*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

- Roberts, M. (1968) *The Early Vasas: A History of Sweden, 1523–1611*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sawyer, P. & Sawyer, B. (1993) *Medieval Scandinavia: From Conversion to Reformation, circa 800–1500*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Scott, F. D. (1977) *Sweden: The Nation's History*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Gutiérrez, Gustavo (b. 1928)

Stefan Thimmel

Gustavo Gutiérrez, who in 1999 joined the Catholic Church's Dominicans fraternity, is considered the "Father of liberation theology." He was born in 1928 in Lima, Peru, and studied medicine, theology, psychology, philosophy, and theology in Lima, Leuven, Santiago de Chile, and at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. In 1967 he coined the expression "theology of liberation." His 1971 book *Theology of Liberation* converted him into a public person and brought upon him the wrath of the conservative sectors of the Catholic Church, which accused him of developing a theory with Marxist influences.

The conservatives tried to marginalize him and at the Episcopal Conference of Puebla in 1979 he was excluded, together with other Latin American progressive priests like Hugo Assmann (Brazil), Ignacio Ellacuría (El Salvador), and Pablo Richard (Chile/Costa Rica). The conflicts with Rome were intensified during the 1980s, when Cardinal Ratzinger, the current Pope Benedict XVI, was chairman of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Gutiérrez had to defend himself against the charges of Marxism and accusations that he had disobeyed the Catholic Church.

The liberation theology Gutiérrez made famous has become a broad social movement. Also called "liberation Christianity," it is supported by some Catholic priests and bishops, especially in Latin America. It has played an important role in a number of Latin American movements, such as in the revolutionary process in Nicaragua in the 1980s, social justice movements in El Salvador, the new movements of small farmers in Brazil, and the Chiapas Uprising in Mexico. This theology of liberation demanded radical political and social change in Latin America from as early as the 1970s, showing that the

poor and excluded could be actors of their own history and subjects of their own liberation.

Gutiérrez, who in his youth lived in the shantytowns of Lima, was ordained a priest in 1959 after several years of study in Europe. After his return to Lima in 1960 he became a professor, teaching classes at the University of the Peruvian capital. In his classes he tried to involve the works of philosophers such as Camus, Marx, and Vallejo because he did not want to separate the religious world from the real world. In 1975 he founded a study center in Lima named the Instituto Bartolomé de la Casas. Today he teaches at the University of Notre Dame in the United States, but his home remains the endless slums of his hometown, Lima. His lifelong link with the poor makes the difference: the man who "invented" the system of base communities in Latin America and who has been honored throughout the world has never given up contact with ordinary people.

SEE ALSO: Latin America, Catholic Church and Liberation, 16th Century to Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Brown, R. M. (1990) *Gustavo Gutiérrez: An Introduction to Liberation Theology*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Gutiérrez, G. (1971) *Teología de la liberación*. Lima: Centro de Estudios y Publicacions.

Guyana, protests and revolts

Teruyuki Tsuji

On June 13, 1980, an explosion broke the evening peace in Georgetown, the capital of Guyana, taking the life of Guyanese historian Walter Rodney. He was assassinated – though there has been no official investigation to date – by the People's National Congress (PNC) regime, led at the time by Forbes Burnham. The bomb was reportedly placed inside a radio device that had been given to Rodney by a member of the Guyana Defense Force. Rodney's pioneering documentation and lectures across the world illuminated the repercussions of European colonialism, and increased awareness of the conditions of Africans and the African diaspora. His numerous publications include his influential book, *How Europe Underdeveloped*

Africa (1972), which is an often-cited reference in the literature on third world development and has given impetus to the evolution of Pan-Africanism.

Being a preeminent scholar, Rodney also became internationally renowned as a self-defined Marxist and political activist. While in Jamaica, where he held a lectureship at the University of the West Indies (UWI), Rodney frequently left classrooms for *groundings* – a Rastafarian term for reasoning through discussion – with and lectures to the underprivileged in the ghettos of Kingston, particularly those who professed Rastafarianism. He believed that Rastafarians were the “leading force of the expression of black consciousness in the Caribbean” and saw in their faith and expressions the potential to assist the region to gain not only political but also social and cultural freedom from imperial domination. His statements, speeches, and reflections on his encounters with Rastafarians during this period were published in *Groundings with My Brothers* (1969), which became a *vade mecum* for those concerned with the Black Power movement. Rodney’s groundings with the working poor, in addition to his sympathetic attitude toward the Cuban Revolution, concerned the Jamaican Labor Party government, and in 1968 the government actually expelled him from the country, declaring him *persona non grata*. This action triggered riots in Kingston, Jamaica, which resulted in the loss of several lives in clashes with police. Choosing a date to mark the beginning of the Black Power movement in the Caribbean is an arbitrary act; but it is unarguable that the so-called Rodney Riots were a critical juncture, giving momentum to the movement, which would infect the region during the 1970s. In 1974, Rodney returned to Guyana to take up a professorship at the University of Guyana, but the government abrogated his appointment. Shortly thereafter, Rodney joined the newly organized political group, the Working People’s Alliance (WPA), and acted as a leading figure in the resistance against the increasingly authoritarian PNC government until his death.

Guyana, formerly known as British Guiana, is where this vibrant and passionate “revolutionary intellectual” – Rodney’s self-defined goal – was born, nurtured, and died a violent death. Rodney’s life, though spanning only 38 years, represents the potential and limitations of social revolution and protest within the context of

Guyana, and to some extent the entire Caribbean. He stated in a speech: “The revolution is made by ordinary people, not by angels, made by people from all walks of life, and more particularly by the working class who are in the majority.” In Guyana, the long history of labor militancy and resistance is equivalent to the struggle to organize and mobilize the “working class who are in the majority” across racial and ethnic segmentation, which is, according to Rodney (1981), an enduring “contradiction among the working people.”

Plantation: A Matrix of Races and Ethnicities

Guyana has a population of 769,095 people (2007). In 2002, the largest ethnic group was Indo-Guyanese and accounted for 43.5 percent of the population, followed by Afro-Guyanese, who made up 30.2 percent of the population. The rest of the population identified themselves as mixed heritages (16.7 percent); aboriginal Indians (9.2 percent); European Creoles, including the descendants of former Portuguese colonies (0.06 percent); Chinese (0.19 percent); and “other” (0.01 percent). Despite some shifts afterwards, the current racial and ethnic configuration is essentially an outgrowth of coerced and voluntary settlements of immigrant laborers for plantations.

British expansionism in the Americas was typically driven by a quest for production of sugar. There are two requirements for making sugarcane cultivation a profitable undertaking: land and labor. Sugar is a labor-intensive crop – it will not become sound until extreme care and attention are given throughout the months of the plant’s growth. The British colonization necessarily brought about dramatic demographic shifts – an explosion and diversification of the population – through the introduction of large-scale migrant workers: first African slavery, and then the indentured labor system in the post-emancipation era. Placed under British control in the late eighteenth century, this sugar-induced revolution of the social structure was repeated in Guyana, but sugar affected the configuration of Guyanese society in ways limited to its own contextual conditions and produced unique consequences within the general framework of the British West Indies.

Britain abolished the slave trade in 1807; however, the demand for African laborers was

greater than ever in Guyana and other conquered colonies, which had just started supplying sugar to the international market. The unlawful importation of workers from Africa continued; at the same time, the planters' search for labor generated an influx of Africans from traditional colonies where sugar production had already peaked. In order to relieve the labor shortage caused by emancipation, the British adopted an extensive labor importation scheme in Guyana and other possessions, recruiting indentured servants from diverse places, including Portuguese-ruled Madeira and the southern provinces of China, though a majority came from India, the most populous colony in the British empire at that time. By the time the indentured system was repealed (1917), 400,000 laborers had departed from various parts of the Indian subcontinent for the British West Indies, 60 percent of whom – 239,000 laborers – arrived in Guyana, which used indentured labor longer than any other Caribbean colony.

In Guyana and other plantation colonies, immigrant workers were incorporated into the unified stratification system according to their putative racial and cultural traits. This entailed the emergence of an ethnic division of labor and residence, under which settlers with different cultural origins framed distinctive and exclusive socioeconomic activities and relative claims. This reflexively reinforced their sense of ethnic affiliation. In Guyana, there were several geographic and economic conditions that formed a reproductive mechanism of this mutually reinforcing relationship between race/ethnicity and institutional activities.

V. S. Naipaul (1962), the Nobel laureate writer from neighboring Trinidad, describes the landscape of Guyana: "One can learn much about British Guiana from the air: its size, its emptiness, the isolation of its communities." Guyana was the largest British West Indian colony (83,000 square miles), but a substantial portion had poor soil and was not suitable for commercial agriculture; the best arable land was on a narrow strip along the northern coastline. Even so, the coastland was generally below sea level, so drainage and irrigation were required for sustained agriculture in the face of endemic floods and drought. The environment of the Guyanese coastland required a constant provision of workers, not only for cultivation but also for land reclamation and dam maintenance. This

reinforced the sugar monoculture, with little room for other crops, and allowed a few giant corporations to dominate Guyana's small colonial economy (Rodney 1981). The difficult nature of the Guyanese terrain and the sugar plantations' monopoly of the best land slowed the growth of free peasants in Guyana. Given that small-scale independent farming was less attractive, generally speaking, former slaves migrated to towns and cities, and sought work in the mining industry, whereas time-expired indentured laborers remained on estates as contract workers. In consequence, racial and ethnic distinctions came to coincide with job specialization and residential separation. The two isolated sub-economies – Indo-Guyanese agriculture and Afro-Guyanese commercial urbanism – still characterize Guyana, though they are not as clear cut as they used to be.

Compared to other West Indian territories, it was easier for planters and colonial administrations to control the labor market in Guyana, with its spacious and fertile lands. Consequently, Guyanese planters were relatively successful in their attempt to compensate for deteriorating productivity by a further concentration of landowning and an expansion of the labor force, rather than through diversification and modernization of the industry. In response, strikes and insurrections became a frequent occurrence as workers fought for increased wages, improved working conditions, the abolition of various taxes, and the relaxation of land tenure. However, spontaneity rather than organization characterized working-class resistance in the nineteenth century. More importantly, the ethnic divisions of labor and residence created communal social protests and resistance during this period. Most of the participants in strikes and insurrections on sugar estates were of East Indian origins and their local-born descendants, who came to represent more than 80 percent of plantation workers by the end of the nineteenth century. Moreover, although low wages and poor work environments were the result of the elites' control of the labor market, growing working-class grievances increased intraclass and interracial/interethnic conflicts. The constant arrival of new immigrants, urged by the landowners' quest for a dependable and affordable workforce, stirred resource competition among the working class, and had a dampening effect on their struggles for a better standard of living. This partly explains why anti-Portuguese sentiment ran high among African

workers in post-emancipation Guyana. There were also instances of authorities using Africans against East Indians – for example, black drivers assaulting and beating East Indians, and black policemen harassing East Indians – as an increasing number of East Indian workers participated in protests and uprisings in the late nineteenth century.

Paving the Way: Trade Unionism

Percy Hintzen (1989) pointed out that in the colonial setting, where the apparatus of government and bureaucracy served as the machinery of elite domination, social change was made possible only through mass mobilization. In order to unsettle the colonial order by transgressing rigid social, economic, and political bounds, mass mobilization must assume a class and nationalist character, encompassing different socioeconomic sectors. It also needs leadership that is able to translate the participants' demand for economic and material welfare into public political issues.

These characteristics were present in the riots of November–December 1905. The riots are often referred to as the “Rumveldt Riots,” due to the fact that workers from Plantation Rumveldt were among the first to lose their lives in the violence. Unlike earlier labor rebellions, whose implications were regional and limited to a particular economic sector and thus a particular ethnic group, the disturbance in Rumveldt spread to Georgetown, where dock workers stopped working to protest poor working conditions and inadequate wages. Eventually, European business owners and administrators became the target of the rebellious crowd. In an effort to suppress the riots, the police opened fire, leading to the deaths of eight individuals.

The 1905 riots were a critical juncture in the history of labor militancy and social protest in Guyana because they demonstrated the possibility that racial, occupational, and residential divisions within the working class could be transcended. The events had implications for future labor movements as well, because middle-class individuals rose up as political figures through their negotiations with colonial authorities on behalf of the rioting workers (Rodney 1981). They included those who would later take active roles in the creation of trade unions and the organization of labor movements in the 1920s and 1930s.

A sharp rise in the cost of living during World War I resulted in many labor disturbances and the formation of the British Guiana Labor Union (BGLU), the first trade union in the British West Indies, in 1919. From the late 1920s on, the dramatic decline in the price of sugar crippled the Guyanese economy and aroused extensive strikes and demonstrations in Georgetown. In 1931, the second trade union in Guyana, the British Guiana Workers' League (BGWL), came into being. As representatives for different economic sectors and occupations, the trade unions had already assumed the character of ethnically based organizations. Competition among the working class made it extremely difficult to mobilize labor across racial and ethnic lines, even in the general economic plight of the 1930s. However, during this period, race and ethnicity played a relatively small part in the upsurge of political consciousness among the working masses. Trade unions did not often call for strikes or demonstrations; however, as a rare vehicle for expressing the grievances of the working class, their actions and statements functioned to forge a common purpose and overarching strategy across regional, occupational, and racial boundaries, which laid the groundwork for a more extensive mass mobilization in the future.

Into a Merger: Enter Nationalist Politics

In the early 1940s, circumstances furthered the politicization of working-class grievances. First, constitutional reforms were implemented in Guyana, which expanded local representation in the Legislative Council, although mass interests remained unrepresented due to the stringent qualifications for voter eligibility. Second, a group of professionals and intellectuals, largely educated abroad, launched the Political Affairs Committee (PAC). The first issue of the PAC Bulletin set forth its goal to “assist the growth and development of the Labour and Progressive Movements of British Guiana, to the end of establishing a strong, disciplined, and enlightened Party, equipped with the theory of Scientific Socialism.” The PAC filled a historic vacuum of middle-class leadership necessary to channel mass discontent into a nationalist movement.

Most importantly, Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham – the two most dynamic and influen-

tial leaders in labor and national politics in Guyana – were among the rising political actors during this period. Having returned to Guyana in 1943 after seven years of study in the United States, Jagan participated in the formation of the PAC and founded a new union, the Guiana Industrial Workers' Union (GIWU). He was a self-proclaimed Marxist whose ideology, principles, and political technology enabled the PAC to provide a definite course to the dispersed trade union movement in Guyana, and made the GIWU more successful than the other unions in creating political mobilization in support of demands for radical redress. Burnham developed his radicalism while in England under the rule of the British Labour Party. He immediately joined the PAC and, under his presidency, successfully transformed the BGLU from a conservative to a radical and dynamic union.

Burnham became as popular among the Afro-Guyanese working class as did Jagan among his Indo-Guyanese supporters, but they did not seek to develop political organizations in close alignment with particular ethnic groups. As a reflection of this, in 1950 the PAC developed into the first mass-based political party, the People's Progressive Party (PPP), with Jagan as leader and Burnham as chairman. Since decolonization had begun and the focus of political campaigns had shifted to domestic contentions over who would control the inherited state, the mobilizing idioms in the trade union movement (e.g., anti-imperialism) had become less effective. However, the PPP's socialist agenda, as a supplement to anti-colonialism, enabled the party to achieve mass support. Indo- and Afro-Guyanese, together, formed political groups within the party structure throughout the country. In the first general elections under adult suffrage, held in May 1953, the PPP scored an impressive victory, winning a majority of the parliamentary seats and more than half of the popular vote.

A Split in the Movement: The (Re)ethnicization of Politics

Once it had gained power, the PPP came under pressure to disintegrate its comprehensive nationalist movement. Its socialist ideas, rhetoric, and symbols had unquestionably allowed the PPP's revolutionary politics to achieve a level of integration among the working-class mass that no other political groups or organizations could

ever have reached. Yet the ambitious and expansive image of socialism around which the PPP's policies and strategies were fashioned turned from a force of convergence to one of divergence. First, it created ideological cleavages within the party between two factions, which respectively advocated softer and stronger lines of socialism. Second, in the escalating Cold War, the adoption of socialism connected Guyana to the international struggle between the great power blocs and resulted in international interventions. Because it considered the PPP a threat to foreign capital with interests in Guyana, the British government suspended the constitution to remove the PPP from power in October 1953. The British governor declared a state of emergency; a number of PPP leaders were placed in detention; and the PPP's organs, including the Pioneer Youth League, were declared illegal and banned.

Equally importantly, the party organization – and thus national electoral politics – eventually became realigned along racial and ethnic lines. In Guyana, it was extremely difficult for local middle-class political leaders to mobilize the electorate across ethnic bounds that embodied conflicting socioeconomic interests. The political institutions introduced by the British through constitutional reforms only served to reinforce the impact of ethnicity on political organization. Given ethnically divided residential patterns, which shared more or less the same boundaries as electoral political constituencies, the single-seat electoral district system has rendered party alignments assured, and election outcomes predictable. The national electoral politics of Guyana was bound to racialize/ethnicize despite the intentions of leading actors because of the association of racial and ethnic boundaries with class and occupational and residential distinctions, whose roots reach to the colonial period.

After another victory in the 1957 general elections, the PPP split into two factions, represented by the two most popular leaders, Jagan and Burnham. As a result, Burnham and his followers left the PPP in 1958 and formed a new political party, the People's National Congress (PNC). This party has since supported the interests of Afro-Guyanese urbanites and consequently drawn its support mostly from Afro-Guyanese electorates in Georgetown. In reaction, the PPP had to realign itself along ethnic lines and came to focus on Indo-Guyanese voters in rural districts. In Guyana, as in many other

postcolonial societies, non-political institutions representing the interests of the majority working mass have remained undeveloped; as a result, politics has retained a commanding position for resource allocation since independence. The support derived from ethnic alignment is a prerequisite for being competitive in Guyanese elections – and for gaining the control of the state.

From 1964 to 1992, the Burnham-led PNC dominated Guyana's national politics, chiefly through rigged elections. Although Rodney held a good opinion of Jagan's contribution to labor militancy and national politics, he did not join the PPP primarily because he felt the party exclusively represented Indo-Guyanese interests. Rodney instead participated in the development of the WPA and worked with various pressure groups, such as the African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent Africa, Indian People's Revolutionary Associates, and the Working People's Vanguard Party. As the most active leader in the WPA, which became a political party in 1979, he continued to work with all the forces opposed to the increasingly authoritative PNC government in forming national unity government until his death.

SEE ALSO: Demerara Slave Rebellion, 1823; Jagan, Cheddi (1918–1997); Jamaica, Independence Movement, 1950–Present; Jamaica, Peasant Uprisings, 19th Century; Rodney, Walter (1942–1980); Trinidad, Anti-Colonial Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Bolland, O. N. (1995) *On the March: Labour Rebellions in the British Caribbean, 1934–39*. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle.
- Despres, L. A. (1967) *Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Hintzen, P. (1989) *The Cost of Regime Survival: Racial Mobilization, Elite Domination, and Control of the State in Guyana and Trinidad*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Naipaul, V. S. (1962) *The Middle Passage: Impressions of Five Societies – British, French and Dutch in the West Indies and South America*. London: André Deutsch.
- Rodney, W. (1981) *A History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881–1905*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Rodney, W. (1990) *Walter Rodney Speaks: The Making of an African Intellectual*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
- St. Pierre, M. (1999) *Anatomy of Resistance: Anti-Colonialism in Guyana, 1823–1966*. London: Macmillan Education.

H

Haiti, democratic uprising, 1980s–1991

Alexander King

Following the overthrow of the dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier early in 1986, a democratic rebellion unfolded in Haiti that opposed the restoration attempts by the elite class of the Duvalier era. In the presidential election at the end of 1990, the strength of this democratic movement found expression through the clear victory – despite the restorative attempts within Haiti and by the US – of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the candidate of the progressive social movements. After seven months in office, a violent coup forced the president into exile. The democratic movement was then subjected to years of persecution.

The Overthrow of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986

The Dictatorship of the Duvalier Family

The rule of the Duvalier family over Haiti lasted nearly 30 years. It began with the election of Jean-Claude's father, François Duvalier, to the office of president in 1957. Formerly a country doctor, François Duvalier had the support of the Army when he ran for president; after his election, however, he quickly consolidated his power by purging potential opponents within the military and by creating, beginning in 1959, the *Volontés de la Sécurité Nationale* (VSN) (the Free Corps for the National Security), a separate armed apparatus for repression. In 1964 Duvalier named himself “president for life” and initiated a bizarre personality cult.

The VSN was recruited primarily from the lumpenproletariat of the capital city, Port-au-Prince, and grew to a strength of 10,000 men and women. The VSN took over the key positions

within the police and secret services. Its goal was to crush all opposition before it could begin. Feared among the populace as the *ton tons macoutes* (“cannibal uncles”), the VSN embodied state terror under Duvalier. Between 30,000 and 50,000 were killed by the regime (*Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 1987).

A member of the Ethnographic Institute, François Duvalier built his power base with the support of the black middle and upper classes. His rule was ideologically nourished by a form of black nationalism (*noirisme haïtien*) that was directed against the mulatto bourgeoisie and presented as a popular movement drawing on the cult of voodoo. To secure his rule, Duvalier instrumentalized longstanding social and economic conflicts between the black and mulatto populations. In addition to obtaining the support of the black middle and upper classes and of the urban lumpenproletariat, he secured the support of the Levantine merchant class, which competed against the mulatto bourgeoisie for economic influence. Within this constellation, Duvalier built up a malevolent and intimidating base of political and economic power that depended upon favoritism and the systematic appropriation of government revenues derived from state enterprises as well as from supposedly charitable foundations.

The rule of François Duvalier was characterized not only by corruption and terror, but also by economic collapse and social exclusion. Per capita income fell annually by an average of 1.4 percent. Infrastructural and social development fell well below that of other Latin American countries.

After the death of François Duvalier (“Papa Doc”) in 1971, the presidency was transferred to his 19-year-old son Jean-Claude (“Baby Doc”). He transformed the political base of the family's domination and entered into a *pacte de domination* (Dupuy 1997, 2007) with the mulatto elite, consolidated through his 1980 marriage to Michèle

Bennett, of the mulatto bourgeoisie. Under Jean-Claude Duvalier, the Army was strengthened both in manpower and in logistics, and a new unit to suppress rebellion was created. In contrast to his father, who had ruled as an autocrat by decree, Jean-Claude Duvalier built his rule upon a technocratic state apparatus and upon economic incentives to foreign investors as well as the participation of the mulatto bourgeoisie. However, to a large extent he lost the support of the black middle class.

The son further developed the kleptocratic system of the father. The Duvaliers absconded with a total of between 600 and 900 million US dollars (*Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 1987), including 120 million US dollars diverted from the state treasury between January 1983 and February 1986, of which 86 million was transferred into foreign bank accounts.

The Forces and Movements in Opposition to the Dictatorship

That the Duvalier system stood on clay feet, despite repression and favoritism, became apparent when the opposition dared to come increasingly into the open in the 1980s. The rejection of Duvalier by large sectors of the Church, along with the spread of grassroots Catholic parish organizations (*Ti Legliz* = “small churches”), was decisive. The visit of the pope in March of 1983 and his call “*Fòk sa chanje*” (“things must change”) encouraged the forces within the Catholic Church of Haiti that wanted to bring about change.

From 1985 on, the opposition movement against Duvalier grew ever stronger. Demonstrations were organized and communications networks (radio projects and so on) created around the demand for *déchoukaj* – a “clearing,” meaning the complete eradication of the Duvalier system. The youth movement played an important role both within and outside the Catholic Church. Student groups were founded in the universities. The Youth Council that was held in Jérémie from April 8 to 14, 1985, complained in its “Manifesto of Youth” of bad living conditions, repression, and corruption and demanded freedom of speech, agrarian reform, and investment in health care and education. During a demonstration in Gonaïves in November 1985 in which primarily young people took part, the Army and *tontons macoutes* killed three students. As a result, the country became increasingly restless, and the protests grew.

The Role of Foreign Countries

Although the US discontinued humanitarian support for Haiti from 1963 to 1969, the US government supported – against the backdrop of the Cuban Revolution – the regime of Duvalier as a bulwark against communism. After the change in leadership from Papa Doc to Baby Doc, the US substantially increased its support.

The European Union (EU) and multilateral banks were also strong contributors. During a brief phase under US President Carter, support was conditioned upon concessions in the arenas of political and human rights. But beginning in 1980, under President Reagan, the pressure on the Haitian regime was again reduced, and the repression of the Haitian opposition was increased via arbitrary arrests, deportations, and the closing of radio stations.

Because of the widening democratic movement in Haiti, the US government was finally forced to withdraw support from the Duvalier regime so as not to lose control over the political developments in Haiti and so as to prevent further radicalization. On February 7, 1986, the US finally convinced the Duvalier government to step down; Duvalier was then flown to France rather than being brought to justice, as the opposition had demanded.

The Difficult Transition to Democracy

After the flight of Duvalier, the National Government Council (*Conseil National de Gouvernement*, CNG) took over the government. The CNG consisted of four military and two civilian members under the leadership of General Henri Namphy and was to organize free elections and to prepare the way for a democratic society.

The end of the dictatorship set into motion a grand democratic reform movement that presented itself in a great multiplicity of organizations. Ever more political parties, professional associations, trade unions, human rights organizations, youth groups, women’s groups, farmers’ groups, neighborhood and community committees, grassroots initiatives, and media (radio and newspapers) sprang up in all regions of the country, thereby bringing political discourse well beyond the capital city of Port-au-Prince for the first time. Within the democratic camp, there were two main tendencies. The enlightened sectors of the bourgeoisie and of the middle

class had ended their alliance with Duvalier and his supporters and were pushing for civil liberties and parliamentary democracy. The democratic movement “from below” was articulating more extensive demands for complete democratic, economic, and social participation.

On the other hand, the restorative tendencies in the CNG soon became evident. Many functionaries and elites of the Duvalier regime were largely unscathed by the change and remained part of the government and administrative apparatus. The *tontons macoutes* were not held accountable, but instead became members of the Army or fled into exile with the help of the Army. With their privileged role threatened by the democratic rebellion, the *tontons macoutes* and the Army – which for decades had been rivals – now formed an alliance that was supported by the US government and that was joined by parts of the Church hierarchy. On February 9, 1986, the Bishop of Cap-Haïtien, François Gayot, explained the “common-sense” reasons for this alliance: “It is time to reconcile. The danger to guard against from now on is Communism!” (cited in Aristide 1992).

The Struggle Against Neo-Duvalierist Restoration

The Military Government of General Namphy

In the course of the year it became ever clearer that the military and the neo-Duvalierists who dominated the CNG did not want to give up control of the country. Those whose courageous protest had brought about the end of the dictatorship saw themselves confronted with a “Duvalierism without Duvalier.” The democratic movements felt cheated of their success by the CNG. The latter rejected the aspirations of the opposition with extreme and increasing rigidity. As a result, only 20 percent of those entitled to vote participated in the election of the Constitutional Assembly of October 19, 1986. In March and April 1986, several demonstrators had already been killed in confrontations with the Army.

In order to bring under control the electoral process that was to commence with a presidential election in November 1987, the CNG in June of 1987 issued a decree to limit the independence, power, and authority of the independent electoral commission (*Conseil Electoral Provisoire*, CEP); the CEP had been formed on May 15, comprising

representatives of civil society (the churches and human rights organizations) and of the executive and legislative branches of government. Furthermore, the civilian oversight of the military was to be revoked. At the end of June and the beginning of July 1987, church groups, unions, and political parties complained about the reduction of the authority of the CEP. The Army killed at least 25 people; however, finally the decree was withdrawn. Nevertheless the intimidation of the CEP by the *tontons macoutes* increased. The CNG altogether refused to provide the CEP with the necessary protection for the electoral process.

The conflicts grew so extreme that the bourgeoisie saw its political, social, and economic privileges threatened. On July 23, 1987, in Jean-Rabel in the northwest, as many as 300 small farmers were killed, after they had made demands for land reform through their organization *Tèt Ansanm*, in a massacre instigated by large landowners.

The threat to the democratic movement by the restorative elements necessitated increased consolidation and organization by the opposition. In January 1987, a broad array of social democratic organizations founded the KONAKOM (*Komitè Nasyonal Kongrè Oganisasyon Demokratik*), which would henceforth have important influence in the political discussions and which would serve as a counterweight to the neo-Duvalierists. In August 1987, more than 50 organizations within the KONAKOM founded a political platform named FNC (*Front National de Concertation*), in order to take part in the electoral process to come and, by this means, take over the power from the neo-Duvalierists. The FNC named the human rights activist Gérard Gourgue as its presidential candidate. Further political alliances were formed, primarily within the moderate bourgeois spectrum, including the ANDP (*Alliance Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Progrès*), launched by Marc Bazin, who was formerly a government minister under Duvalier and an official of the United Nations as well as of the World Bank.

But on election day, Sunday, November 29, 1987, the fledgling democracy was drenched in blood. The presidential election that was to have taken place on this day had to be abruptly canceled after the *tontons macoutes* massacred the voters at the polls. The presidential candidates withdrew their candidacies. The election was nevertheless repeated as “farce” on January 17,

1988. But then, only a small number of voters participated, resulting in the election of the Christian Democrat Leslie Manigat as president. His cabinet stood in a continuum with the CNG, especially in the person of the defense minister, General Williams Regala, who had previously been a member of the CNG and who was accused of having been involved in the massacre of November 29, 1987.

But on June 20, 1988, Manigat was removed from office, and General Namphy himself took power again. He was strongly supported by the Duvalierist hardliners and the former *tontons macoutes* in the Army. The terror against the democratic movement increased again and reached a new climax in the massacre of September 11, 1988, when approximately 100 *tontons macoutes* forced their way into the Jean-Bosco Church in the north of Port-au-Prince – where the Catholic priest and grassroots activist Jean-Bertrand Aristide was preaching – and killed 13 people.

The Putsch Government of Avril and the Transition to Democracy

Namphy was, however, increasingly confronted with rivals within the Army. On September 17, 1988, there was a military putsch by General Prosper Avril, who immediately began to purge the *macoutes* from the upper ranks of the Army. And in 1989, against the backdrop of the end of the East–West confrontation, international pressure grew to clear a way for a transition to democracy. The US government and, increasingly, the Haitian bourgeoisie calculated that the more quickly this transition could be made, the more difficult it would be for the forces of the left to organize themselves – and the more likely it would be that the forces of the moderate right could prevail in an election.

Avril saw himself increasingly isolated from the US, from the Church, and from the bourgeoisie. Like his predecessor, he turned to the neo-Duvalierists and increased the repression until, finally, he received the telephone call of the US ambassador in Port-au-Prince, who demanded that he resign (Dupuy 1997, 2007). General Avril left the country on March 12, 1990.

A Supreme Court judge, Eartha Pascal-Trouillot, was appointed temporary president. She was provided with a provisional council, on which 11 political parties were represented. Despite the conflict between the president and the council, and despite the attempts of the Duvalierists to make use of this conflict in order

to delay the process of democratization, preparations were made for the first free elections in more than 30 years, to be held on December 16, 1990.

The Grassroots Churches and the Rise of Jean-Bertrand Aristide

The grassroots movement in the Catholic parishes had created the fundamental conditions for the overthrow of Duvalier and was also the backbone of the movement against neo-Duvalierist restoration. Some 2,000 grassroots parish organizations (*Ti Legliz*) existed in Haiti at this time. They arose, beginning in the 1970s, under the influence of Latin American liberation theology. The emphasis of their work in the parishes was popular education (*éducation populaire*) and the articulation of the needs and demands of the poor. The degree of support from the official Church varied. For example, while Bishop Romélus in Jérémie actively supported the grassroots parish organizations as well as the resistance against Duvalier and the military regime, Archbishop Ligondé in Port-au-Prince remained on the side of the Duvalierists to the end.

The priest and soon-to-be president Jean-Bertrand Aristide rose quickly, beginning in 1985, to become a leading figure in this grassroots movement. Bishop Romélus fostered his rise, but others in the Church hierarchy vigorously opposed him.

Born on July 15, 1953, in Port-Salut in a small house in the mountains of the southern peninsula, the son of a farmer, Aristide moved to Port-au-Prince soon after the death of his father, but he did not lose contact with his rural homeland. He went to a school run by the Salesian Society (a Roman Catholic religious order originally known as the Society of St. Francis de Sales) and in 1966 entered the seminary in Cap-Haïtien. His work towards a degree in theology and psychology included study abroad, for example in Israel and in Greece. In 1982, he was ordained as a priest. He had always regarded the Catholic Church in Haiti critically, and upon returning from doctoral studies in Canada, he took over the parish of Saint-Jean Bosco in a slum on the northern edge of Port-au-Prince on January 5, 1985. His parish would serve him as a base for his political work against the military government and against the outrageous social injustices in his country.

Aristide quickly gained in popularity among the poor, but he also made powerful enemies.

Several assassination attempts were made upon him and his supporters. On August 23, 1987, on the way back from a ceremony commemorating the victims of Jean-Rabel, his convoy was attacked in Pont Sondé near Saint Marc. As noted above, on September 11, 1988, *macoutes* forced themselves into his church and killed several worshippers. In December 1988, Aristide was expelled from the Salesian Society because of his political engagement.

His popularity did not suffer. Numerous activists in the democratic mass movement urged Aristide, the priest, to get into politics and run for president in the election scheduled for December 16, 1990. Aristide finally agreed to run and was nominated by the FNCD (*Front National pour le Changement et la Démocratie*), a coalition of leftwing political parties founded in 1990. However, Aristide did not regard himself as the candidate of any political party, nor of a coalition of parties. He had a low opinion of the political effectiveness of political parties, that is to say, he had no confidence that they could achieve any significant influence that would extend beyond small academic circles (Aristide 1992, 1994).

The numerous grassroots organizations seeking democratic change from below joined together in a mass movement, *Lavalas* (Creole for “flash flood”) to support him in the election campaign. The candidacy of the priest of the poor, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, brought forth a surge of enthusiasm. Accordingly, there was a high level of participation in the election of December 16, 1990. Long lines formed at the polls. For the first time in the history of the country, this was an election in which the hopes and aspirations of the masses found expression. The enthusiasm culminated in mass gatherings in the capital city. The result left no room for doubt: over 67 percent voted for Aristide, while only 14 percent voted for Marc Bazin, whose candidacy was supported by the US government and by Haitian businessmen. The Church hierarchy immediately sought a confrontation: Archbishop Ligondé turned his New Year’s sermon into a harangue against Aristide.

Aristide was sworn into office on February 7, 1991. On January 6, 1991, the neo-Duvalierists had already tried to prevent this through a putsch. Roger Lafontant, previously interior minister under Duvalier, as well as the ringleader of the *tontons macoutes*, stormed the presidential palace with some militias and declared the presidential election void. He was supported neither by the

Army’s leadership nor by the US government. An authentic national uprising came to the defense of the president. Lafontant had to concede and was arrested; Archbishop Ligondé was able to escape.

The Putsch of September 1991

On the night of September 29, however, a second putsch was carried out by the Army leadership and was supported by the Haitian bourgeoisie. General Raoul Cédras, whom Aristide had himself named Chief of the General Staff and then Chief Commander of the Army, was the leader of the putschists. Soldiers surrounded Aristide’s residence and the presidential palace and stood guard throughout the city to prevent the people from again rising to defend Aristide. The putschists were supported by *tontons macoutes* who had returned from the Dominican Republic. Hundreds of *Lavalas* members were killed. Radio stations were occupied or destroyed. As a result of diplomatic pressure, Aristide was flown out of the country and thereafter spent three years in exile in the US.

On October 7, 1991, the parliament named, under pressure, a new president (Joseph Nérette; Jean-Jacques Honorat was named prime minister). The bourgeoisie applauded the coup. The resistance of the enlightened political class was weak and to some extent half-hearted. In contrast, the social movements resisted fiercely and with great sacrifice. In the following three years under the putsch government, *Lavalas* suffered massive casualties and was never able to recover from these traumatic experiences.

SEE ALSO: Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (b. 1953); Haiti, Foreign-Led Insurgency, 2004; Haiti, Protest and Rebellion, 19th Century; Haiti, Protest and Rebellion, 20th Century; Haiti, Resistance to US Occupation; Haiti, Revolutionary Revolts, 1790s; Haiti, Revolutionary Struggles; Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath; Haiti, Saint-Domingue and Revolutionary France; Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1801–1804

References and Suggested Readings

- Aristide, J.-B. (1992) *Tout moun se moun – Tout homme est un homme*. In collaboration with C. Wargny. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
- Aristide, J.-B. (1994) *Dignité*. In collaboration with C. Wargny. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
- Dupuy, A. (1997) *Haiti in the New World Order: The Limits of the Democratic Revolution*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Dupuy, A. (2007) *The Prophet and Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the International Community, and Haiti*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Smarth, L. (1997) Popular Organizations and the Transition to Democracy. In M. Kaufmann & H. Dilla Alfonso (Eds.), *Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: The Transformation of Social Life*. London: Zed Books, pp. 102–25.

Haiti, foreign-led insurgency, 2004

Alexander King

In the year of the 200th anniversary of national independence, Haiti witnessed the second violent overthrow of its president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Those democratic forces within the Haitian bourgeoisie which had, from the end of the 1980s to 1991, supported his rise to president now formed an alliance with the death squads of the past dictatorships, along with former military officers, with the aim of overthrowing Aristide. In this they counted upon the support of foreign powers. The resistance against the coup was weak because Lavalas, the grassroots movement that supported the president, had lost a significant amount of support.

Overthrow Instigated by the Military

On February 5, 2004, the Revolutionary Artibonite Resistance Front took over the port city of Gonaïves in western Haiti. The Front was led by Jean Pierre Baptiste and Butteur Métayer, both of whom had been freed from the Gonaïves prison through a break-in by the Cannibal Army in August 2002. Métayer was the leader of the Cannibal Army, which developed from a grassroots group within the government party, Fanmi Lavalas; however, he had turned against Aristide and had been arrested in connection with violent riots in Gonaïves. Baptiste had done time in Gonaïves prison for his participation in the massacre of Raboteau (in 1994, during the putsch government).

Starting out in Gonaïves, the rebels began a campaign of conquest throughout the northern part of the country. First they cut a path from the west coast to the border with the Dominican Republic in the east. There they were joined by armed military units, led by Guy Philippe and Jodel Chamblain, that crossed into Haiti from the Dominican Republic; these units had been recruited mainly from exiled cadres of the

Haitian army (Forces Armées d’Haïti, FAd’H) that had been dissolved in 1995. As a known participant in the 1994 massacre of Raboteau, Chamblain had gone into exile in the Dominican Republic. Philippe had relocated there in October 2000, in connection with a failed putsch attempt. Together the rebels conquered the big northern cities and then advanced south.

In response to the advance of the rebel troops, the Haitian president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, left the country on February 29, 2004. Whether he left of his own will or whether due to pressure by the US soldiers who picked him up at his residence in the capital city of Port-au-Prince and flew him to the Central African Republic is still debated today. The forcible regime change was accompanied by the armed intervention, on March 1, 2004, of a US, French, Canadian, and Chilean multinational strike force under US command. The UN Security Council had mandated this intervention on February 29. Beginning in June of 2004, the multinational strike force was replaced by a UN mission, MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation d’Haïti), which was under Brazilian command, with broad participation of Latin American armies, as per UN Resolution 1542.

Civil Opposition

From May 2000, a *crise post-électorale* had been smoldering in Haiti, sparked by manipulation of vote counting during the elections for the parliament and the senate. Through this manipulation, the government party, Fanmi Lavalas, had sought to enlarge the majority it had already achieved in these chambers. In response, the opposition had boycotted the presidential election of December 2000 and had selected a “counter-president.”

Lavalas had long benefited from the fact that there were no alternatives to it: the scant competition consisted only of a deeply divided bourgeois opposition that hardly had any popular support, and the old insider networks from the era of the Duvalier dictatorships (up until 1986) and the era of the neo-Duvalierist military government (1986–90). Specifically:

- Social democratic parties (some with communist roots) that had close relations to the Socialist International and to the contemporary social democratic governments of Europe,

but had no mass base in Haiti; a majority of these had been in the camp of Aristide supporters in 1990, and some had been part of Lavalas until the split of the mid-1990s.

- Conservative parties and personalities that had been somewhat discredited as a result of their work with the neo-Duvalierists after 1986: for example, Leslie Manigat, whose career was fostered by Germany's Konrad Adenauer Foundation, as well as representatives of the old Duvalierist and neo-Duvalierist elites.
- The most influential group: the rich merchant families, many of them of German or Syrian origin, who had organized and financed the first coup against Aristide (1991 to 1994).

But the influence of the opposition never extended much beyond the bourgeois neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince and the villas of the wealthy suburb of Pétionville. In elections, the opposition always had the overpowering voters' block of Lavalas – the masses of the poor – against it, and did not have a chance. Their good international contacts were their most important trump card. Only by internationalizing the political crisis in Haiti could the opposition hope to further its own interests.

The Internationalization of the Conflict

The coup in Haiti was prepared with international participation. Relations between the US and Haiti had grown significantly worse since the autumn of 2000, when Aristide was elected president of his country in a contested election. In 2003 alone, the Bush administration, which came to power as well in a disputed election, invested about a million US dollars for regime change in Haiti. In this the US was able to make use of the justified displeasure over the increasing use of repressive means to secure Aristide's rule and also the disappointment regarding the unrealized promises of social reform.

In 2000 and 2001, the opposition joined together to form a coalition with the name Convergence Démocratique (CD), later enlarged to the Group of 184. The US International Republican Institute (IRI) supported the growth of the fledgling Haitian opposition by, among other things, holding seminars in Santo Domingo, the capital city of the neighboring Dominican

Republic, and inviting opposition representatives. Through these efforts, the IRI obtained the commitment of the regime's opponents to an uncompromising course of action against Aristide, and this substantially contributed to the destabilization of the situation in Haiti.

The government of Aristide reacted with increasing repression against the protests, which spread rapidly among the students and some other parts of civil society. However, the civil opposition was not well rooted and therefore still lacked significant power. The latter came about only through the appearance of the armed rebels. It was decisive that former military personnel and death squads from the time of the junta and the putsch supported the rebel gangs from Gonaïves in their campaign. From their exile in the Dominican Republic, where they had for months prepared the intervention, these gangs came into Haiti and augmented the rebel troops, finally taking charge of the command of the revolt.

The rebels could in fact easily reach the provincial cities, where they were not met with resistance. Only 50 rebels were able to take Hinche; only 180 rebels took Cap-Haïtien, the second largest city in the country and the metropolis of the north. But the power of the rebels would not have been sufficient to conquer Port-au-Prince, with its 2.5 million inhabitants. Thus the advance of the rebels came to an abrupt halt at the gates of the capital city. Only the rapid intervention of the multinational strike troops under the leadership of the US brought a quick end to the Aristide government.

US-Imposed Interim Government and Changeover to René Préval

After the coup, the US government set up an interim government in Haiti; those who had been in exile in the US held the important positions. The new head of state was Gérard Latortue, previously a member of the 1988 government, which had been formed under controversial circumstances; he had subsequently lived for 16 years in the US. His government, which was limited to two years, had absolutely no support among the people. It was isolated within the region. The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) suspended Haiti's membership, seeing a dangerous precedent in the regime change, and in the participation of the western states in that change. In addition, the

government of Latortue proved incompetent: for example, in the crisis management with respect to the two flood catastrophes in the fall of 2004.

Following the overthrow of Aristide, violence escalated. During Latortue's period in office, more than 1,600 people died violently, including 78 police. Thousands of Lavalas members lost their government positions, and there were arbitrary arrests, while no serious efforts were made to collect and destroy the weapons held by the armed gangs.

At the same time, in the slums of the capital city and especially among the poor, a sense of social injustice combined with unhappiness at the overthrow of the president. Above all in the slums of the capital city, the protest against the UN occupation, the absence of government infrastructures or authority, and the high level of criminal violence created a mixture so explosive that it was impossible to tell the difference between political and criminal motives. During MINUSTAH's campaign against gang criminality, numerous innocent residents of the slums were killed.

The situation was first stabilized through the elections of February 7, 2006, with the convincing victory of the candidate René Préval, formerly president from 1996 to 2001 and a political partner of Aristide in Lavalas. His return to politics was a great shock to the bourgeois political establishment and the merchant class. They felt cheated of the victory they had thought was assured. The Social Democrat Micha Gaillard had even declared in September 2005 that the presidency must always be reserved for "democratic" forces; he thereby explicitly excluded members of the former Lavalas government.

But the vote-getting power of Lavalas – even though split – was then, and remains to this day, the decisive electoral force in Haiti. To be sure, René Préval did not present himself as the candidate of Lavalas, but instead as that of a new group, *Lespwa* (Creole: hope), but he appealed to precisely the same constituency – the slum inhabitants and the farmers – that had won a majority in every free election. The electoral victory of René Préval was unambiguous: 51.2 percent on the first ballot. His nearest competitor, the Christian Democrat Leslie Manigat, received 12 percent; Charles Baker, the favorite of business, received around 8 percent. This electoral result gave clear expression to the broad unhappiness with the political and social results

of the coup and the foreign occupation, as well as the hope for a new democratic beginning.

SEE ALSO: Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (b. 1953); Haiti, Democratic Uprising, 1980s–1991; Haiti, Protest and Rebellion, 20th Century; Haiti, Resistance to US Occupation

References and Suggested Readings

- Chomsky, N., Goodman, A., & Farmer, P. (2004) *Getting Haiti Right This Time: The US and the Coup*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
- Dupuy, A. (2006) *The Prophet and Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti, and the International Community*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Robinson, R. (2007) *An Unbroken Agony: Haiti from Revolution to the Kidnapping of a President*. New York: Basic Civitas Books.

Haiti, protest and rebellion, 19th century

Stewart R. King

The political history of Haiti in the years after independence parallels in many respects similar developments in other newly independent Latin American countries. The fault lines are familiar to any student of nineteenth-century Latin America: military versus commercial elites, rural/small city versus capital, peasant versus capitalist agriculture, conservatives and monarchists versus liberals, and divisions on racial or ethnic lines. The groups divided by these fault lines formed a kaleidoscope of shifting alliances, which resulted in periods of calm, usually under a strong leader, with interludes of violent conflict.

Haiti became independent in 1804, at the end of a 13-year war of independence that radically transformed society and killed or drove into exile between one third and one half of the population. At the end of the struggle, Haiti, like the Spanish colonies some years later, found itself with a large, battle-tested, very professional military with little call for its services. Haiti feared reconquest by France, and in fact both Napoleon I and his successor, Louis XVIII, considered sending troops to renew the struggle. For the first ten years of the nation's independence, though, French forces were bottled up in Europe by the British navy. Britain had tried to conquer the island early in the Haitian Revolution, but after its forces were expelled by the Haitian rebels it developed a tacit ceasefire

and in fact preferred an independent Haiti to one controlled by France. This also paralleled the experience of the newly independent Spanish American nations, which were theoretically subject to reconquest by Spain but *de facto* protected by Britain, which preferred small, weak, independent nations in the Americas, especially ones with free trade principles, to empires owned by potential rivals. Haiti did face one military threat at the time of independence: the thinly populated eastern two-thirds of the island of Hispaniola, the future Dominican Republic, inhabited by Spanish speakers and ruled by Spain since 1493, became part of the French colony of Saint-Domingue in 1795. This colony was still controlled by French troops in 1804. Haitian and British troops cooperated to throw out the French in 1808, and turned the colony over to Spain. Spanish Santo Domingo continued to pose security threats for Haiti and justified preserving a significant military force.

But, for the most part, the Haitian armed forces had little military role to play after the end of the revolution. The leader of the victorious Haitians, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, crowned himself Emperor Jacques I in 1805 and tried to organize the country along military lines. Former slaves were required to return to work on their plantations, for wages fixed by government inspectors, who were also responsible for enforcing order and protecting the “cultivators” against the plantation owners. The plantations were owned or leased by military officers, and soldiers were assigned higher-status jobs on the plantations or put to work repairing the colony’s infrastructure. In theory, everybody had a job and a wage, but in fact the system was rife with abuses. If the emperor was paying attention, things worked fairly smoothly, but if he was away, corruption, mistreatment of workers, theft, and violence were rampant. Dessalines’s officers resented his dictatorial style and feared for their own prerogatives. They finally sparked a rural rebellion, then ambushed and killed the emperor while he was marching to attack the rebels.

The two leaders of the conspiracy, Henry Christophe and Alexandre Pétion, could not agree on who was to succeed him. They each retreated to their own home areas: Christophe to the north around Cap-Haïtien and Pétion to the west near Port-au-Prince. Christophe was black and had been one of Toussaint Louverture’s generals from the early days of the revolution. Pétion

was mixed-race and had supported a variety of factions during the long war of independence. His supporters were many of the pre-revolutionary free people of color who had lost plantations and businesses during the war and who hoped he would restore their fortunes. The struggle between Pétion and Christophe was also the struggle between the capital, a city of growing size and importance, and the northern regional center of Cap-Haïtien, which had been the “Paris of the Antilles,” the wealthiest city in the world and one of the largest in the Americas before the revolution. Cap had been burned to the ground twice, once by slave rebels in 1792, and once by Christophe and his men when the last French army arrived in 1802.

The two factions fought an intermittent struggle, mostly a war of attrition along the mountainous border between the north and west regions, but marked by one serious attempt by each side to conquer the other. Pétion’s forces invaded the north in 1806 and were defeated by Christophe at the battle of Siebert, January 1, 1807. Christophe invaded the south in 1810 and besieged Port-au-Prince for two months before retreating. Finally, the two leaders agreed to divide the country between them: the north became the Kingdom of Haiti under King Henry I, while the south was the Republic of Haiti under President-for-Life Pétion.

Monarchy was part of the black political discourse, and several Haitian leaders in the nineteenth century tried to establish kingdoms or empires. This parallels the experience of Spanish American conservative, rural-based parties, who often thought about establishing monarchies, like the two short-lived Empires of Mexico (1821–3, 1863–8) or the Empire of Brazil (1822–89). During the early phases of the Haitian Revolution, the slave rebels thought of the king as their protector and benefactor and fought in his name against the revolutionaries, who appeared to be allied with their white oppressors. Christophe also tried to continue Emperor Dessalines’s policy of militarization and forced labor, while Pétion rewarded his military veterans with small farms carved out of the former plantations. As a result, Christophe faced numerous rebellions while Pétion was known as “Pè Bon Kè” (Father Goodheart).

Pétion died in 1818 and was succeeded by Jean-Pierre Boyer, another mixed-race, pre-revolutionary free colored general who had

fought against the revolution in his early days. Christophe was finally overthrown and killed himself in 1820, and Boyer became the ruler of the entire country. In 1822, the colonists in the eastern part of the island declared their independence from Spain, and Boyer promptly invaded and took control there, too. Finally, in 1825 Boyer signed a treaty with France that imposed a ruinous indemnity on the fledgling Haitian state (to repay the French slave owners who had lost their "property" during the revolution), but gave Haiti recognition and membership in the club of nations. Meanwhile, in 1823, US President James Monroe had proclaimed that the US would not accept any European invasions of the independent nations of the Americas, and, although American governments refused to formally recognize Haitian independence until after slavery was abolished in the United States in 1863, Haiti was finally free of the threat of reconquest from France.

Boyer's rule lasted until 1843. He reduced the size of the military and tried to reestablish plantation agriculture, using a system of forced labor that was less onerous than that employed by Christophe and Dessalines. He was able to bring in some foreign investment and increase exports. However, in the early 1840s, economic troubles and a government financial crisis caused by the large payments on the French indemnity led to unrest in the countryside.

Rural Haitians by this point had decided that they were not interested in working on plantations, no matter how regularly wages were paid. In this, they took the same attitude as freed slaves throughout the Americas were taking. From Argentina to Mexico, newly freed people were leaving the plantation areas, looking for land where they could live as peasants. Everywhere planters were searching desperately for labor, offering wages and better living conditions than the slaves had gotten, and not getting many takers. In the British Caribbean, planters imported East Indian coolies, whose descendants make up a significant percentage of the population of Trinidad and some of the other Lesser Antilles islands. In the remaining French colonies, there was an abortive move to import "indentured servants" from Senegal, Syria, and Madagascar, which the British opposed as a covert renewal of the slave trade. But Haiti had no such access to new labor sources, and so plantation agriculture was in decline there. By 1843, the end of Boyer's tenure in office, Haitian

exports of sugar, worth 150 million francs in 1789, had fallen to 10 million francs. The mixed-race elite, Boyer's supporters, had moved from rural plantations to urban commercial wealth. The commercial capital of the country by this point was Port-au-Prince, and the country increasingly became divided between an economically vibrant capital and a countryside in decline.

The countryside still had more people, however, and those people had not forgotten how to fight. As Boyer's efforts to renew the plantation sector became more repressive and the benefits of a powerful central government became less apparent as the central government had less and less money to spend, the country people became restive. They finally rose in rebellion, starting in the south near Les Cayes and forming rebel armies known as *piquets* for the pikes they carried as their principal weapon. Boyer finally fled into exile as a rebel army approached the capital. At the same time, the Spanish-speaking people in the eastern part of the island declared their independence as the Dominican Republic.

The leader of the rebel army that overthrew Boyer, Charles Hérard, became president but only kept power for a few months. He was succeeded by three more presidents who ruled, in total, for two and a half years. Each of them was a black military leader who hoped to wrest some of the benefits of power from the mixed-race Port-au-Prince elite for his own region and racial group. In each case, the Port-au-Prince elite tried to co-opt him, with greater or lesser degrees of success. This process of co-optation of a charismatic black military leader by the mixed-race interests became known as the *politique de doublure*, or puppet policy, a common feature of Haitian politics to this day.

The political chaos caused by the fall of Boyer was finally resolved when Faustin Soulouque came to power. Originally selected as president by the mixed-race power brokers who had supported Boyer, he represents a failure of the *politique de doublure*. He appeared biddable until invested with power, at which point he turned on his patrons and became a powerful advocate for the black rural interest, declaring himself the second emperor of Haiti in 1849. Under his rule, the political division in Haiti became formalized with the creation of two parties, the National Party representing the black, provincial interest and the Liberal Party representing the mixed-race, urban interest.

Faustin also created another important institution in Haitian politics, the personal militia. He was supported by a political police and bodyguard called the *zinglins*. His *zinglins* would beat or imprison or kill his political opponents, operating under the cover of night and using symbols of the traditional religion, Vodun. The terror they inspired, and fervent support from the rural masses, kept Faustin in power for ten years.

During this time he strengthened central government institutions and tried once again to build up the plantation sector, relying on good economic relations with Britain. He also tried repeatedly to reconquer the eastern part of the island, but without success. Haiti's army was more numerous, but by this time all the veterans of the earlier wars were gone, and doctrine and equipment were outmoded. The Dominican Republic had a good relationship with the United States and Spain and was able to field better-organized and equipped troops who, fighting defensively, were able to prevail. The tension caused by these repeated invasions remained strong and justified important investments in the armed forces in both countries. Faustin was finally overthrown by a military uprising led by his chief of staff, Fabre-Nicholas Geffrard.

Geffrard was the first Haitian chief of state to be born after the end of slavery. He was a black military officer, but he tried to balance the interests of the liberals and nationalists. He cut the military and tried to build better relations with the Dominican Republic. When Spain briefly reestablished its colonial rule over the eastern part of the island, Geffrard supported the Dominicans seeking independence, and after they won, he signed a treaty with the new republic ratifying the current border between the two countries. He also normalized relations with the United States, gaining full international recognition. He tried to encourage American blacks to move to Haiti by offering land grants, similar to those that other Latin American countries offered to immigrants from Europe at this time.

Geffrard was also a faithful Catholic and he finally managed to end the isolation of Haiti from the Catholic Church. The Vatican had withdrawn Haiti's priests at the time of the revolution, in part because of the anti-Catholic measures adopted by the French revolutionary government. The Vatican and the French under Napoleon resolved their differences in 1801, but this agreement did not apply to Haiti. For

more than half a century, while most Haitians remained at least nominally Catholics, Haiti had few or no priests. Geffrard's agreement with the pope gave considerable control over church affairs to the government, including the right to approve the choice of priests and bishops, but in return obligated the government to suppress Vodun.

There was a prominent trial in 1863, the *Affaire de Bizoton*, in which important Vodun practitioners were convicted of ritual murder and executed. A harsh crackdown on popular religion followed, with destruction of temples and ritual objects, imprisonment of practitioners, and consequent rural unrest. Geffrard called on his British allies for military support against the rural rebels, and British gunboats defended Haitian government positions against rebel forces on several occasions. Persistent unrest, though, especially in the north, finally brought Geffrard down in 1867.

Geffrard's defeat led to a period of instability that lasted for several years, during which the urban/rural and black/mixed-race tensions were inflamed. Sylvain Salnave, a mixed-race military officer, was nominally president for two years, but never controlled much of the country outside Port-au-Prince. The rebel forces controlled the country's navy, so Salnave borrowed the price of a new ironclad steamer from America. The American ship defeated the Haitian vessels, but when the rebels finally overthrew Salnave they repudiated the debt, along with some other loans that defeated factions had obtained from France and Spain. The political crisis that erupted around this debt threatened Haitian sovereignty, but was finally resolved by sharp negotiating by Nissage Saget, president from 1870 to 1874 and the first Haitian head of state to complete his constitutionally mandated term and leave office peacefully. Saget ushered in a period of relative calm in Haitian politics, during which a consensus liberal policy combined with an easy rule in the countryside resulted in relative prosperity. Most transfers of power during this period were unconstitutional in some respect, but there were few casualties and the central government preserved effective control over the entire country for most of this time.

This period of stability ended with the fall of President Nord Alexis in 1908. Alexis was the grandson of King Henry Christophe and shared his political commitment to the interests of the provinces, especially the north, and the black military class over the Port-au-Prince mixed-race commercial elite. By this time urbanization had

created a black working class in Port-au-Prince, which Alexis had mobilized for his support. This added element of the black constituency has proven to be an important factor in twentieth- and twenty-first-century Haitian politics. At the time, it proved destabilizing. There were three main sources of power in Haitian politics during the period 1908–15: peasant rebel forces, called the *cacos*, urban workers, increasingly organized through political parties and unions, and the private guard forces of the commercial and political elite. The professional armed forces of the country were split by factions and were no longer either well trained or well equipped. The central government lost the monopoly on armed force that is one of the basic components of sovereignty. Presidents succeeded one another with dizzying rapidity: nine men held power in Port-au-Prince during these seven years, with several other contenders assuming the title of chief of state without ever controlling the capital.

In August 1914, World War I broke out in Europe. Germany had been interested in Haitian affairs for some time. In one incident in Gonaïves in 1902, a rebel force took control of the Haitian navy's flagship, named the *Crête à Pierrot* after a heroic defeat during the Haitian Revolution. A German warship, seeking to collect on a claim that some German businessmen had against the Haitian government, and also perhaps trying to support the government of Nord Alexis, tried to capture the ship, at which point its commander, Commodore Killick, sent the crew into the lifeboats and blew the ship up at the cost of his own life rather than letting it fall into foreign hands. Germany had tried to get a lease on the northern port of Môle St.-Nicholas from the Alexis government, and preserved good relations with the various mixed-race Liberal factions from 1908 on. The United States opposed the German project, both on the principle of the Monroe Doctrine and specifically because after the outbreak of World War I a German military presence in the Americas threatened American neutrality. In 1915, General Guillaume Sam, a black military officer from the north, took control of Port-au-Prince, promising among other things to keep the Germans out. However, he rapidly sparked rebellion by harsh reprisals against mixed-race politicians, including a massacre in which more than 100 died. His supporters were overwhelmed and he took refuge in the French embassy. A rebel mob stormed the

embassy and killed him. The invasion of diplomatic premises provided a pretext for an American intervention that lasted more than 20 years, ushering in another period of relative calm in Haitian politics.

SEE ALSO: Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806); Haiti, Protest and Rebellion, 20th Century; Haiti, Resistance to US Occupation; Haiti, Revolutionary Revolts, 1790s; Haiti, Revolutionary Struggles; Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1801–1804; Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution, 1796–1799

References and Suggested Readings

- Dayan, C. (1998) *Haiti, History and the Gods*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Nicholls, J. (1995) *From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour, and National Independence in Haiti*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Trouillot, M.-R. (1997) *Silencing the Past*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Haiti, protest and rebellion, 20th century

Matthew J. Smith

In the first century of its existence (1804–1904), the republic of Haiti established a reputation as the most rebellious nation in the Caribbean. While most of its neighbors welcomed the twentieth century as outposts of European imperialism, Haiti remained a beacon of self-rule in spite of its complex history of protest, coups, and revolts. One of the consequences of this history was a political culture that by 1904 was defined by exclusion. Democracy remained a seemingly unattainable goal, and the largely peasant majority was more often than not on the periphery of much of the contests waged by political elites and powerful military leaders. This experience, rooted in the nineteenth century, sowed the seeds for a new century of political discontent, protest, and rebellion that would change its dynamic several times as the century progressed.

1904–1915

Late nineteenth-century political rivalries between liberals and nationalists were all but gone by the time of the Haitian centenary in 1904. The aging general Nord Alexis, president since 1902,

managed through strong-man rule to keep his foes at bay, giving the country a surface appearance of political quiet. Not far beneath, his rivals within and outside the army led by, among others, Anténor Firmin, a former statesman and esteemed intellectual, worked to undermine Alexis's rule. Like so many nineteenth-century rulers, Alexis tried to eradicate his opposition through forced exile. And like them, Alexis would learn that forced exile could not extinguish the determination of his rivals. Political elites inside and outside of Haiti remained heavily invested in overthrowing Alexis.

Their opposition was based on both the uncompromising despotism of Alexis's rule and a perception that a weak state run by corrupt generals would expose the country's vulnerabilities and invite foreign invasion. In this regard Alexis's rivals were correct. By the turn of the century, German settlers in Haiti had dominated much of the urban commercial sector and managed to gain political influence. The expansion of United States imperialism in the Caribbean region following Cuban independence also meant that Cuba's closest neighbors in Hispaniola would be highly attractive to US interests. President Roosevelt's foreign policy toward Haiti included a commitment to weakening Germany's financial role. Haitian political elites remained divided on how to treat the United States in the context of Big Stick policy initiatives. While some argued that US, or even British, influence would bring an end to the violent political tribalism, others maintained that any direct foreign influence would serve to weaken the country's cherished independence. Indeed, an early attempt to establish a railroad in Haiti under a US company, MacDonald, in 1910, met with popular resistance among peasant workers. Still, US and German interests proved far too powerful a force in a country with a weak economy and wracked by unending political instability.

These factors would prove significant in shaping the political climate following Alexis's ouster in 1908 by rival military forces. Firmin, the favored successor, was unable to secure the presidency in two failed attempts in 1908 and 1911. Instead, a series of short-term presidents, each susceptible to a range of external influences, ruled Haiti for the next few years. The internecine battles that were drawn on regional and class lines stripped the Haitian state of its

defenses. The unifying factor among political elites, the protection of independence and Haitian property against foreigners (enshrined in the constitution), was used as a bargaining chip by power-hungry generals seeking to gain external support and weaken their opponents. World War I increased the competition between Germany and the United States in the Caribbean and raised the stakes for Haitian leaders in need of foreign capital to finance their expeditions. Generals were primarily reliant on the armed support of rural forces who formed a rag-tag army. These armies were instrumental in supporting and resisting rebellions.

Thus much of the protest in the first decade and a half of the twentieth century, while frequent, was nonetheless prone to co-optation by well-financed generals. Rivals would routinely rally their own groups to cause disorders in the provinces, which would eventually enflame the country and force a coup against the head of state. Once these funds ran out, however, the leader was in jeopardy of losing control of his forces. This situation only served to encourage a high level of repression on the part of the sitting president desirous of holding on to power. In March 1915, Vilbrun Guillaume-Sam became the seventh president since Alexis. When he ordered the murder of opponents in the national prison, Haitians, exhausted with abuses of successive military leaders, responded with violent force. Guillaume-Sam was captured and brutally murdered by a large and angry mob. The execution of President Guillaume-Sam brought Haiti to the brink of anarchy and provided the impetus for the United States to respond. In an effort to forestall the entry of European powers to abate the crisis, the United States landed troops in Haiti on July 27, 1915.

1915–1934

When the US Marines set foot on Haitian soil in the summer of 1915, they had no intention of establishing a long occupation. They were, in fact, more concerned with claiming geopolitical control of the republic and neutralizing the threat posed by the German presence in the Caribbean. They achieved this fairly early on through control of the customs houses and the Haitian national bank. But the complicated set of events that preceded the occupation and the ostensible goal of building democracy in Haiti

forced the Marines to remain in the country for two decades. Moreover, US business interests and policymakers hoped to reap economic benefits from Haiti as they did in neighboring Cuba and the Dominican Republic during their simultaneous occupations. This would take time. Haitian laws prohibiting foreign ownership of land had to be abrogated and previous European interests weakened before the United States could harness Haiti's untapped economic potential.

The hostile and violent means by which the Marines set about clearing the ground for this to happen raised immediate protest from Haitians. When Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, a popular leader in the country, was prevented from pursuing the presidency, his supporters rose in revolt. The *cacos*, as the rural armies were called, became symbols of militant peasant resistance to the occupation, launching a prolonged guerilla struggle against the Marines. Lacking the technological advantage of their occupiers, the *cacos* succumbed to harsh Marine reprisals. Thousands of *cacos* and their allies in the interior of the island were murdered before the war ended. A second conflict in 1918 had similar results. The two principal leaders of the insurgents, Charlemagne Péralte and Benoît Batraville, were murdered by 1920. Péralte, whose dead body was put on public display and photographed, would become a martyr for peasant resistance and an enduring hero of twentieth-century Haitian protest whose memory is evoked by Haitian leaders to this day.

The end of the *caco* insurgency dampened the prospects of armed protest against the occupation. Haitians of all classes nonetheless remained antagonistic to the Marines during the 1920s. They had ample reason to be incensed. The Marines practiced Jim Crow segregation in Haiti, revived a forced labor law, the *corvée*, which recruited hundreds of peasant farmers, and imposed restrictive laws on social movement. They also sought to maintain social control by creating a military school and a semi-professional army, the *gendarmerie*. These measures found tacit government support through two US-installed presidents, Sudre Dartiguenave and Louis Borno.

While these developments limited the potential of popular class protest, a new generation of elites began to engage in new forms of resistance. Drawing on the cultural influences of the Harlem Renaissance, *Négritude*, and the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century writings of Haitian intellectuals such as Firmin,

elite intellectuals of the 1920s created a new cultural movement called *Indigénisme*. The doyen of the movement was Jean Price-Mars, a writer, ethnologist, and educator. Price-Mars's book *Ainsi Parla L'Oncle* (1928) was a provocative critique of the attitudes of the Haitian elite and a celebration of the country's indigenous culture. Price-Mars argued that Haitian folk culture was the source of national pride and should be embraced rather than shunned.

Price-Mars's work released shockwaves among the Haitian intelligentsia and encouraged several writers and poets to take up their pens and chronicle aspects of Haitian social life previously neglected. This "generation of the Occupation" included young revolutionary elites such as Jacques Roumain, Emile Roumer, Carl Brouard, and others who became contributors to the short-lived but highly influential journal, *La Revue Indigène*. The indigenous writers were critical of the US occupation, which they saw as the negation of Haiti's anti-colonial past. Their work, while restricted to an elite audience, would provide inspiration to subsequent generations of Haitian radicals. Some of the writers, such as Roumain, would meld this literary resistance with political organization after a change in the political climate at the end of the decade.

In December 1929 public protest against the occupation was reawakened. The global impact of the Wall Street crash had a severe effect on Haitian workers and students. When restrictions were placed on students at the agricultural school in Damien, several rebelled. The student strike stoked the frustrations of workers in Port-au-Prince and eventually set off a national strike against the government's limited response to the economic conditions. When the Marines retaliated and shot a dozen peasant protesters in the south, the Hoover administration was embarrassed. In the face of mounting criticism in the US about the occupation, and international concerns over the handling of the strike, Hoover sent a commission to Haiti to review the state of affairs. The Forbes Commission was received by parades of nationalistic Haitians brandishing red and blue flags and calling loudly for a return to political autonomy. The commission recommended the gradual removal of Marine control over the course of the next few years.

President Louis Borno was pressured to step down in 1930, and in his place, Sténio Vincent became the head of state. Vincent was a critic of

the occupation early in his political career. This position won him support from some elite radicals who dubbed him Haiti's "Second Liberator." In reality, Vincent became less concerned with revolutionary nationalism and more conciliatory to the United States shortly after his ascendance. When the Marines left in 1934, Vincent shifted to a more autocratic form of leadership that would arouse a great deal of resentment at a time when popular disenchantment was giving way to ideological resistance.

1934–1957

The defining period in twentieth-century protest in Haiti came in the two decades following the US occupation. During this period, a wave of radical nationalism engulfed Haiti, leaving few sectors of Haitian politics untouched. In 1934, the Parti Communiste Haïtien (PCH) surfaced after two years of underground activity. It was the first such organization in Haiti. Under the leadership of Jacques Roumain, the party made an attempt to build a network of communist cells across the country with a view to challenge the Vincent government. Their reach was extremely limited, however, as most Haitians were unfamiliar with Marxism and unwilling to support the movement. The membership of the PCH was also elite and urban-based, and without a viable labor movement, unable to extend itself. The party's presence nonetheless gave Vincent the opportunity to clamp down on his opponents by outlawing the PCH. Roumain, Christian Beaulieu, and Max Hudicourt, the leftist leader of another radical organization, Réaction Démocratique (RD), were arrested, tried, imprisoned, and eventually exiled.

Marxism was not the only radical ideology competing for political space in the 1930s. A group of young intellectuals who revered Price-Mars sought to continue his work in the journal *Les Griots*. Among them were Lorimer Denis, a lawyer, and François Duvalier, then a young medical doctor. Together, Denis and Duvalier authored scores of ethnological studies that went beyond the cultural nationalism of the indigenous movement, to promote a political ideology of "black power" commonly referred to as *noirisme*. The *noirisme* of the Griots broadened similar nineteenth-century ideas by advocating the natural legitimacy of dark-skinned leaders, rather than light-skinned ones, to rule. Most of

these men hailed from the black middle class that came into prominence during the occupation years and viewed themselves as best endowed with the qualities the country needed to progress. Their position raised a long-lasting debate with the Marxists over class and color that would define Haitian politics during these years.

Color and class conflicts in the country deepened under the leadership of Elie Lescot, Vincent's successor in 1941. Lescot ruled with a firm hand and like Vincent relied heavily on the Garde d'Haïti (the former gendarmerie) to retain his rule. Still, he was unable to contain the radical impulses unleashed by the victory of the Allied forces in 1945. Young Marxists in Haiti drew much inspiration from the Russian Revolution, the Spanish Civil War, French Marxists, and the previous generation of Haitian communists, particularly Roumain, whose renown and legend grew after his sudden death in 1944. Defiantly revolutionary in their outlook, these Marxist students, who included the gifted writers Jacques Stephen Alexis, René Depestre, and Gérald Bloncourt, were agitated not only by elite abuse of political power, but also by the interference of the United States in Haitian politics and economy during World War II. In the 1946 New Year's edition of their organ *La Ruche*, they called for a dramatic reorientation of Haitian politics and an end to dictatorship in Haiti. Lescot's forced closure of the press prompted a mass student protest led by members of the *La Ruche* collective. Within days the student protest swelled to a large countrywide strike. A helpless Lescot was forced to resign.

In the aftermath of the "1946 Revolution," Haiti experienced a period of intense radical activity. For the first time in the country's history, there was a flurry of radical newspapers and dozens of political parties formed, including several prominent left-wing parties. Among them were a revived PCH and the Parti Socialiste Populaire (PSP). The PSP was led by former allies of Roumain and had stronger connections with Marxist groups in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the United States. But it was the *noiriste* groups that held the greatest influence in 1946. *Noiriste* radicalism owed a great deal to the expansion of black consciousness in the 1940s and the late development of a labor movement in 1946.

The leading figure in the labor movement and of the pre-Duvalier era was unquestionably

Daniel Figiolé. A young mathematics teacher and writer from a poor rural background, Figiolé was an extraordinarily gifted orator with phenomenal appeal among the urban majority in Port-au-Prince. Figiolé's emergence on the political scene in 1946 was attributed to his unique ability to tap into the concerns of the majority of Haitians in dramatic speeches delivered in Krèyol. *Noiriste* writers regarded Figiolé as the epitome of their hopes, and his enormous following saw him as a savior from the political dominance of the bourgeoisie. Figiolé's party, Mouvement Ouvrier et Paysan (MOP), was formed in 1946 and became the largest labor organization in Haitian history.

In spite of Figiolé's magnetism, and the radical agenda of the Marxists, the United States and the Garde d'Haïti remained the most important powerbrokers in 1946. Under the direction of the Garde elections were held in August and resulted in the victory of Dumarsais Estimé, a deputy from Verettes with *noiriste* sympathies. Estimé's administration proved to be one of the more progressive of the twentieth century. During his presidency, Estimé introduced several far-reaching labor laws and supported the expansion of *noirisme* in all major areas of Haitian life. This was especially pronounced in the popular culture and the arts, which celebrated the aesthetics and heritage of Vodou and found state sponsorship in the monumental bicentenary celebration of Port-au-Prince in 1949–50. For all his merits, Estimé was unable to shake the international taint of his government as being leftist, nor the proclivity of Haitian presidents to succeed themselves. His attempt to do so in 1950 was read by his opponents, particularly the PSP (the only remaining Marxist party after the autodissolution of the PCH in 1947) and Figiolé, as a betrayal of the democratic promise of 1946. Figiolé, who launched intermittent labor protests against the government throughout the late 1940s, lent his support to a widescale protest against Estimé in 1950.

The 1950 coup removed Estimé from office and shifted the tenor of Haitian politics once again. Estimé's rivals in the Haitian army were instrumental in usurping him and promoted as his replacement General Paul Magloire.

Magloire was the first military president of Haiti since the beginning of the occupation. He was also a staunch supporter of anti-radicalism in Haiti, using his position as leader of the army

and state to quash the remaining radical movements of the era. The PSP and MOP were outlawed by the middle of the decade and all radical papers were closed. Magloire also strengthened Haiti's ties to North American interests, though the economy was hard hit following the devastation of Hurricane Hazel in 1954. The economic plight, which intensified with rapid urbanization and poor yields from the country's major export, coffee, served as a backdrop to popular resentment. By the time Magloire made his own attempt to remain in power in 1956, Haitians were ready for a change. Magloire was overthrown by a coup in December of that year.

The protracted election campaign in 1957 proved to be a greater challenge to reestablishing democracy than predicted. The leading candidates included representatives from across the political spectrum. The more popular candidates were Daniel Figiolé and his former associate in MOP, François Duvalier. After several violent clashes among supporters of the various candidates, Figiolé became provisional president. His administration would be short-lived. A coup led by army leaders who supported Duvalier cleared the way for his victory on October 22, 1957.

1957–1986

The coming to power of François "Papa Doc" Duvalier in 1957 effectively muted the oppositionist voice in Haitian politics. During much of his presidency, the large public demonstrations and protest movements of the past seldom, if ever, surfaced. Duvalier's firm military support enabled him early on to use force to intimidate his opponents, both radical and conservative. Never one to place his trust in any institution, Duvalier, along with his closest associates, built a paramilitary force in the late 1950s that would buttress the armed forces as protectors of the state while maintaining exclusive loyalty to the executive, something his predecessors were unable to achieve. First called *cagouards*, *la milice civile*, and later the Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale (VSN), this group was more commonly referred to by their more sinister name, the Tonton Macoutes. With state support, the Macoutes, which eventually outnumbered the national army, were charged with the responsibility of quelling all potential resistance against the dictatorship.

Under Duvalier, the *noirisme* of the 1930s and 1940s metamorphosed into Duvalierism. While Papa Doc continued to make symbolic reference to black consciousness, *noiriste* politics were emptied of their historical significance and subordinated to Duvalier's cult of personality and complete domination of the state apparatus. The transition was made complete in 1964 when Duvalier made himself president for life, and declared himself the personification of the state.

All of this served to increase cruelty and repression. Threat, intimidation, and outright state violence were part of daily life under the Duvalier dictatorship. The labor movement, once the source of much anti-government protest, was forced underground and then eventually outlawed. Left-wing organizations never functioned openly, and most of the leading radicals of the previous two decades numbered among the thousands of Haitian exiles of the 1960s. In spite of the weaknesses in militant protest, Duvalier proved as adept as his regional contemporaries in using the threat of communism's spread in the Caribbean to gain international support for his dictatorship.

The challenge to democracy posed by François Duvalier's regime, coupled with the success of the revolution in nearby Cuba and the expansion of leftism in Latin America in the 1960s, inspired young Haitian militants to attempt armed resistance against the dictatorship. In April 1961, then-exiled Jacques Stephen Alexis, the gifted writer and activist of the "1946 Revolution," organized a handful of communist members of the Parti pour l'Entente Nationale (PEP), a party he formed in 1959, to launch an insurgency against Duvalier. The group was captured by Macoutes shortly after arriving on Môle St. Nicholas, and Alexis was assassinated.

A stronger operation against the dictatorship occurred in August 1964. A group of 13 exiles, mainly from the southern province of Jérémie, calling themselves Jeune Haïti, launched a three-month guerilla campaign in the south. Over the course of their campaign, most of the members of Jeune Haïti died in combat with the Haitian army. The last two survivors were taken into custody and given a public execution. Prior to that, Duvalier had ordered the massacre of several of their family members and associates in Jérémie.

The twin forces of Macoutism and Duvalierism cast a long shadow over Haiti after the death of Papa Doc in 1971. Both would endure under the leadership of his successor and son, Jean-

Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier. Baby Doc maintained the structure of the Duvalierist state, though there were notable differences in his administration. Pressure from the Jimmy Carter administration in the United States over human rights violations, and the exodus of thousands of Haitians to the US by the late 1970s, forced Baby Doc to ease the harshness of the regime by supporting a brief period of liberalization. Independent papers were unmuzzled for the first time in decades, and pro-democracy organizations formed. In 1979, however, the government reversed its policies, dramatically announcing the full return to repression with a brutal attack on a human rights rally in the capital.

Like his father, the younger Duvalier had to contend with small-scale and unsuccessful guerilla attempts to topple him, notably in 1978 and 1981. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, torture, slaughter, and imprisonment were sufficient to dissuade large-scale protest. Little, however, could be done to conceal the downturn in the economy. In an attempt to separate his rule from that of his father, Jean-Claude introduced new economic policies that were of greater benefit to the country's elite and foreign interests than to the national economy. US firms set up assembly plants and hotels in Haiti and employed Haitians at extremely low wages. The firms were given great latitude by the dictatorship. These moves shifted attention from the agricultural sectors and deepened the plight of the peasantry and urban poor.

By mid-1983, following the visit of Pope Jean-Paul II, who made a veiled critique of the regime, grassroots and religious groups began to organize. Many were inspired by liberation theology then sweeping across much of Latin America and having its echoes in the *ti legliz* (little church) movement, which exploded in Haiti in the 1980s. *Ti legliz* raised the political consciousness of the Haitian peasantry through its advocacy of democracy and disavowal of oppression. In October 1985 a protest in Gonaïves began a series of rebellions that would shatter the regime. In the face of brutal retaliation, massive numbers of protesters overwhelmed the state's security forces in all the major cities over the course of four months of daily protests. This era of *dechoukaj* (uprooting) witnessed a remarkable outpouring of popular resistance to Haiti's rulers and a fearless determination on the part of the populace to topple the dictatorship. By

February 1986, concerned over the crisis in Haiti, both the Reagan administration and the Jamaican government strongly urged Duvalier to step down. On February 7 he fled the country into exile with his family and ended the long dynastic dictatorship.

1986–2004

The excitement and euphoria of the popular 1986 overthrow of the Duvalier dictatorship echoed the events of 1946. Indeed, there were clear parallels between both in the immediate aftermath. Veterans of the earlier period returned from exile, such as labor leader Daniel Fignolé, who briefly considered running for the presidency before his death later in the year; independent papers and radio stations flourished; history and the country's brave rebellious tradition were celebrated in the popular culture; a wave of democratic promise swept across the country; and there was renewed international solidarity with Haiti. Nonetheless, there were more important differences. The demolition of the physical remnants of Duvalierism could not erase its ideological foundations, which remained firmly institutionalized in the Haitian body politic. Although scores of exiles returned with hopes of participating in political rebuilding, state power remained in the hands of the army under the leadership of Henri Namphy. The army supervised elections in November 1987, which were aborted when dozens of voters were killed. Namphy's firm rule ended with an overthrow in 1988 by another army leader, Prosper Avril. Macoutist terror, corruption, and authoritarianism were still very much present during this period of "Duvalierism without Duvalier."

Frustrations with military rule and international attention to human rights abuses propelled grassroots movements into action. A coup against Avril pushed the country into a spiral of political instability marked by increasing violence and rebellion. At the center of much of this protest was Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Catholic priest from a rural background, and key player in the *ti legliz* movement, who would become the most important political force in late twentieth-century Haiti. Possessing great intellectual talent and tremendous charismatic appeal, Aristide developed a large following in the late 1980s. Although there were several popular leaders in the post-Duvalier period, none proved as capable of leading a massive nationwide following. Aristide

expertly managed his supporters into the Lavalas (Avalanche) movement to contest the 1990 general elections, the first truly democratic election in Haiti's long history. Despite declaring his candidacy only a few weeks before, Aristide won 67 percent of the national vote.

Inaugurated on February 7, 1991, Aristide's presidency was heralded as the promise of democratic change that Haitians had so long hoped for. So great a promise could not last. Seven months later Aristide was overthrown by a military coup. For the next three years while Aristide remained in exile, the country was once again in the hands of the military forces under the command of Raoul Cédras, who ruled with great terror. The result of all this was censure of the independent press, massacres, and large-scale emigration. Intervention from the Bill Clinton administration, including a forced embargo on Haiti, forced Cédras to capitulate. Aristide returned and finished his term of office in 1996, when he was succeeded by another civilian president, René Préval.

Prior to demitting office, Aristide disbanded the Haitian army, so long the arbiter of political power in the country. A controversial decision, the move had the dual effect of weakening the army (although the Haitian police force was strengthened) and creating new enemies for Aristide. Under Préval's five-year term these enemies would regroup. In 2001, Aristide once again ran and won the general elections. By this time, however, the Lavalas Party had undergone several transitions. Rival political parties were created among defectors and Aristide could count former supporters from a cross-section of Haitian society among his opponents. Many grew dissatisfied by the slow growth in the economy, unchecked corruption, and a perceived neglect on the part of the country's leaders of increasing crime and violence. The unsolved 2000 murder of Jean Dominique, a popular radio journalist on his self-owned station Radio Haïti, and a radical voice since the 1950s, highlighted the political tensions of the period. Added to this, violence increased in the city's urban centers, where marauding thugs known popularly as *chimere* patrolled the streets and kidnappings increased. Aristide's opponents lay the blame for all of this at his feet and began to wage a series of public anti-Lavalas protests. They demanded Aristide's resignation and new elections. Support from former military leaders resulted in a series of large protests that began in late 2003 and would

end with Aristide's controversial overthrow in February 2004. Two years later, under the watch of foreign military forces, elections were finally held and Préval won a second term in office.

In 2004 as debates over Aristide's forced removal raged on, people across the globe duly commemorated the incredible achievement of Haitian independence and reflected on the magnificent story of rebellion and revolution that created it. The 2004 bicentenary also allowed for a consideration of Haiti's rocky course from Alexis to Aristide. In the century between both men, Haiti experienced foreign occupations, revolutions, radical political awakenings, repressive dictatorships, military rule, and several political transitions. The one constant has been the undying rebellious spirit that has enabled the oldest country in the Caribbean to endure. As Haiti settles into a post-Aristide era, it is this rebellious spirit that will doubtless prove most important in the uneasy struggle for political stability.

SEE ALSO: Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (b. 1953); Haiti, Democratic Uprising, 1980s–1991; Haiti, Foreign-Led Insurgency, 2004; Haiti, Protest and Rebellion, 19th Century; Haiti, Resistance to US Occupation; Haiti, Revolutionary Struggles; Harlem Renaissance; Négritude Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Bellegarde-Smith, P. (2004) *Haiti: The Breached Citadel*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Dash, J. M. (1981) *Literature and Ideology in Haiti, 1915–1961*. Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble.
- Fatton, R. (2002) *Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Hector, M. (1989) *Syndicalisme et socialisme en Haïti*. Port-au-Prince: Henri Deschamps.
- Heinl, R. & Heinl, N. (2005) *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492–1995*, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: University Press of America.
- Nicholls, D. (1995) *From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti*, 3rd ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Plummer, B. G. (1988) *Haiti and the Great Powers, 1902–1915*. Knoxville: Louisiana State University Press.
- Schmidt, H. (1995) *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Smith, M. J. (2009) Race, Color, and the Marxist Left in Pre-Duvalier Haiti. In D. D. Curry, E. D. Duke, & M. Smith (Eds.), *Extending the Diaspora: New Scholarship on the History of Black Peoples*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.

Trouillot, M.-R. (1990) *Haiti, State Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Wilentz, A. (1989) *The Rainy Season: Haiti since Duvalier*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Haiti, resistance to US occupation

Stewart R. King

Haitian politics in 1915 was very disorderly. Political power in Haiti had long been traded back and forth between primarily black, military, provincial forces and primarily mixed-race, urban, commercial leaders. Both sides made use of militias drawn from the country's many poor. These militia groups were called *cacos*. The international community had mostly isolated and ignored Haiti since the Haitian Revolution of 1791–1804, though there were substantial American business interests, especially the Haitian American Sugar Company (HASCO), which owned substantial land in the fertile Plaine du Cul de Sac north of the capital, Port-au-Prince.

But by 1915, the United States was no longer interested in letting Haitians work out their own political destiny. Two factors led to this change in policy. World War I had broken out in Europe. The United States was neutral, though friendly to the Allies. Germany had been interested in expanding its commercial and colonial presence in the Americas since well before the war, and in 1914 had tried to negotiate the lease of a port with the Haitian government. The United States was very much opposed to the establishment of a German naval base in the Caribbean, and even more opposed to the possibility that Britain or France would invade the country to prevent it. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was the basis of American policy in the Caribbean Basin, and it held that the US had the duty to intervene in the internal politics of Caribbean nations if their actions might lead to intervention by powers from outside the Americas and a consequent violation of the neutrality of the Americas in European struggles. This doctrine had been used to justify a number of other American adventures in the region during the 20 years leading up to 1915, in such places as Nicaragua, Cuba, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic.

Secondly, the relatively bloodless exchange of power between the two factions in Haitian politics had been interrupted in 1915 with the overthrow of President Guillaume Sam. Sam was from the black, military faction, and he favored closer economic and military ties with the United States. He came to power in March of 1915 with the aid of *caco* militiamen from the north, and he paid his militias by looting the members of the mixed-race political opposition. Protesters were locked up in Fort Dimanche, in the poor district of the city where President Sam's partisans were strongest. On July 27, 1915, Sam ordered the execution of these political prisoners, including the former president, and 167 of them were killed. The killings outraged the urban middle class, who rose up against Sam, driving him from power. He took refuge in the French embassy, whereupon his political opponents stormed the building, lynched him, dismembered his body, and paraded the parts around the city in triumph.

United States President Wilson ordered the Marine contingent on some US Navy ships moored in Port-au-Prince harbor to enter the capital on July 28, beginning an occupation that was to last until 1940. The original mission of the Marines was to protect American and other foreign citizens' lives and property during the disorder, but mission creep meant that they rapidly became the effective government of the country. Marines and Navy Department civilian employees managed many of the Haitian government departments, especially those dealing with taxation and spending. There were Marine officers in each of the departments of the country with substantial armed contingents, who had veto power over the decisions of local government officials. Haiti retained a central government, its own president and congress, and nominal sovereignty. In many ways, the occupation of Haiti prefigured later American occupation and nation-building missions, including that under way in Iraq from 2003 onward, rather than being modeled on European colonial rule at the time. The mixed-race faction in Haitian politics was more friendly to European interests, and especially to the Germans, to begin with, but for cultural reasons related to American racial attitudes, the Americans fairly rapidly began to favor mixed-race politicians as their intermediaries with the Haitian people. It is unclear how much American officers really understood

Haitian politics at the time, rife as it was with regional, racial, military-civilian, and class divisions. But the effect was that the Americans mostly allied with their former enemies and fought against their former friends, at least in the early years of the occupation.

The powerful black military faction, and regional forces represented by the *cacos*, felt betrayed. Originally, they saw the American intervention as saving their movement from their urban, mixed-race, pro-European, centralizing, business elite enemies. *Caco* chieftains throughout the country, but especially in the Northern Department, rose up in rebellion almost at once. The Marines fought several campaigns in 1915 and 1916 against various *caco* groups, with Major Smedley Butler playing an important role and winning a Congressional Medal of Honor for bravery. In 1917, a fragile calm prevailed, and Marine units began to withdraw as the United States geared up for war in Europe. Major Butler became commander of the Haitian Gendarmerie, a rural paramilitary police force that was to replace the American forces in the provinces. The Gendarmerie organization did not grow quickly enough to replace the withdrawing Marines, though, because Haitians mistrusted the American occupiers' motives and the Americans distrusted the Haitian recruits on racial and political grounds. The level of repression in the countryside declined, and resistance began to appear possible again.

At the same time, the US occupation forces and the Haitian government had an aggressive agenda of rural development, much of it designed to force subsistence farmers in the countryside into a cash-cropping system, either on their own land as small capitalist farmers or, if their resources were not sufficient, as landless farm laborers on American-owned plantations. The roads and other infrastructure necessary for this system were built by forced labor, a *corvée* harshly administered by Gendarmerie and Marine troops. The harshness of the system revived memories for Haitians of the forced labor systems of Jean-Jacques Dessalines, Henry Christophe, and Toussaint Louverture during the revolutionary period, and of the slave system that preceded the revolution. Even many Haitians who had the status to resist conscription into the *corvée* hated it for nationalistic reasons.

A young Haitian army captain, Charlemagne Péralte, who had resigned his commission in

1915 rather than serve the occupying forces, was arrested for anti-American political agitation in the central plateau area in the fall of 1917. Péralte broke out of prison and rallied *caco* forces for a fight against the occupiers. Units of the Gendarmerie went over to him, and he rapidly commanded thousands of troops. His base was near Grande-Rivière du Nord, not far from the Citadelle of Christophe and the strongholds of Toussaint during the Haitian Revolution. Péralte appealed to Haitians' memory of their successful resistance to foreign occupation in that struggle, and began to forge a national coalition and establish a provisional government. The Americans reacted energetically, sending aircraft and more Marine ground troops to oppose Péralte's movement. By the spring of 1919, two brigades of US Marines plus Army soldiers and airmen were in the field, alongside thousands of Haitian gendarmes. Heavy fighting lasted for more than a year, during which about 2,000 Haitians lost their lives. Finally, Péralte subordinate Jean-Baptiste Conzé betrayed him to the Marines, who killed Péralte in 1919. They publicized photographs of the dead Péralte, in an attempt to demoralize the resistance forces, but the effect was to galvanize political opposition. The image of Péralte, hanging as if crucified, unified the resistance in the same way that Toussaint Louverture, betrayed and murdered by Napoleon, had done for the Haitian rebels after 1801.

Armed resistance to the occupation in the countryside did die down after 1919, though, to be replaced by urban resistance. A wave of strikes and riots swept the country in 1929, in response to the worsening economic climate. An agricultural depression had hit the United States in the mid-1920s, presaging the Great Depression to follow, and American policy on agricultural imports was becoming harsher. In addition, Haitian elites began to get a sense that the temporary occupation was becoming permanent. The strikes finally led the American government to promise withdrawal of the occupying forces over a five-year transition period, with American supervision of Haitian government taxation for a further ten years. The Haitian government accepted this, and the disengagement began in late 1929. It was accelerated by the Franklin Roosevelt administration's Good Neighbor policy under which the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was officially

renounced, and a system of collective security and multinational institution building was designed to replace it.

The American occupiers had favored the educated urban elite, but still many of their members felt excluded by American racial attitudes. In addition, economic growth during the colonial period, and an improved educational system, had created a black middle class that experienced racial prejudice both from the Americans and from the mixed-race old elite. This group expressed itself in a cultural movement of Négritude, or black consciousness, led by anthropologist Jean Price-Mars. His defining work, *Ainsi Parla l'Oncle* (Thus Spake the Uncle), appeared in 1928. Many American artists and intellectuals, as well as some Marines, had begun to take an interest in Haitian culture. The Marine pharmacist's mate and shameless self-promoter Doc Reeser famously stayed on in Haiti after the end of his enlistment, working at the Haitian national insane asylum and becoming a *vodun houngan*, or priest. American occultist and folklorist William Seabrook's *The Magic Island* brought American attention to Haitian culture. The flowering of Haitian culture, and of American interest, that resulted connected with an international movement to revalorize black culture and African roots that included the Harlem Renaissance in the United States and the black consciousness movement around the world. In Haiti, it led to a period of relative harmony between the racial groups and steady economic progress that lasted until 1957, when Price-Mars's student Dr. François Duvalier, known as "Papa Doc," came to power.

SEE ALSO: Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806); French Caribbean in the Age of Revolution; Haiti, Democratic Uprising, 1980s–1991; Haiti, Protest and Rebellion, 19th Century; Haiti, Protest and Rebellion, 20th Century; Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath; Haiti, Saint-Domingue and Revolutionary France; Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1801–1804; Négritude Movement; Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution, 1796–1799

References and Suggested Readings

- Renda, M. (2001) *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of US Imperialism, 1915–1940*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Schmidt, H. (1995) *The United States Occupation of Haiti: 1915–1934*, 2nd ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Haiti, revolutionary revolts, 1790s

Alexander King

On the eve of the French Revolution and the start of the slave uprising in Saint-Domingue, the French central government attempted – even as late as the 1880s – to modernize the colonial system and at the same time bind the colonies closer. The system of *Exclusif* was liberalized through trade agreements with England (1786) and the USA (1787), as well as through the partial opening up of some of the ports (1784) for the importation of selected foods. The French secretary of the navy, Castries, promised an improvement in the status of the free blacks and mulattos. The whites in Saint-Domingue responded to this aspect of the reform process with fierce resistance, and it failed. Castries was forced to resign in 1787: this demonstrated that the white planters had effective political networks at their disposal not only in the colonies, but also in Paris.

The announcement in 1787 by the French monarch Louis XVI that he would convene the Estates-General for the first time in 175 years aroused great expectations among the planters of Saint-Domingue. They saw it as an opportunity to obtain a hearing regarding their dissatisfaction with the *Pacte colonial* to have their demands for economic reforms and more political self-determination heard. However, opinions were mixed as to whether or not to send a delegation to the Estates-General. In 1788 the Saint-Domingue planters residing in France founded their own separate political party, and the wealthy planters and aristocrats in Saint-Domingue, as well as the merchants and the Chamber of Commerce of Cap Français, joined it. They put forth a demand to have a representative of their colony seated in the Estates-General and submitted a petition with 3,000 signatures. The more conservative planters rejected this approach; they wanted to avoid the colonies becoming the subject of political debate in the Estates-General. Their concern had been stirred up by the activities of a new group, the Société des Amis des Noirs, which was founded in February 1788. This group lobbied for the abolition of slavery and for equal rights for free blacks and mulattos. It was led by Jacques-

Pierre Brissot, who would later become a representative; among its members were influential men such as the Marquis de la Fayette, the Marquis de Concorcet, and Abbot Henri Grégoire. Organized in the form of networks, the Société des Amis des Noirs anticipated the organizational structure of the Jacobins.

Despite the opposition of the conservative planters (who feared that representation for the colonies in the Estates-General could provoke the Amis des Noirs into a debate about the colonies and slavery) and also against the will of the governor of Saint-Domingue, delegates from the Chamber of Commerce of Cap Français were indeed elected. And in fact at the first session of the Estates-General, on May 5, 1789, there was a heated debate regarding the participation of representatives from the colony. The Marquis de Mirabeau, a spokesman for the Third Estate in the Estates-General (and later the chairman of the National Assembly and the president of the Jacobin Club) rejected colonial representation on the grounds that it was not democratic, as it had come about when a large proportion of the free inhabitants of the colony had been excluded from the political process. He was supported not only by the Amis des Noirs, but also by the Club Massiac, an association of *Absentéistes* who were interested in maintaining the *Pacte colonial* and who were therefore against representation in the Estates-General by a delegation from Saint-Domingue.

Ultimately, seven delegates from Saint-Domingue were admitted to the Estates-General on July 7, 1789, as the French Revolution began its stormy course: the founding of the French National Assembly by the representatives of the Third Estate in the Estates-General, with the self-defined mission of drafting a new constitution; the disempowering of the aristocracy; the storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789; the issuing of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* on August 26, 1789. And in the face of these events – also confronted by ever more determined demands for equality by the Parisian mulattos of the society *Colons américains*, who were encouraged by the progress of the French Revolution – the Club Massiac decided to form a coalition with the delegates from Saint-Domingue. The colonists together came to the conclusion that new power structures needed to be created in Saint-Domingue in order to wrest away from the National Assembly its mandate to

reconfigure the political order of the colony and to instead vest this mandate in the local corporate bodies in the colony.

In this showdown with the mulattos and the Amis des Noirs the white planters initially prevailed. In the deliberations of the Constitutional Assembly in February 1790 a Committee on the Colonies was even included in the language of the new constitution. The interests of the white planters were quite aggressively represented in the committee, which criminalized any criticism of slavery and placed the property of the colonists – including the ownership of slaves – under special protection. The committee called for constitutional powers for the colonies and set forth in its decree of March 8, 1790 that separate legislative bodies could be established in the colonies, the *Assemblés coloniales*. Thereby the strategy of the white planters, to strengthen their own political sphere of influence in the colonies and to separate from the French central government, was realized. This was a clear defeat for the Amis des Noirs. And for the free blacks and mulattos it meant their hopes – that in the course of the French Revolution, they would achieve legal equality with the colonial whites – were for the time being rebuffed.

By this time the planters in Saint-Domingue had already begun implementing their plans. With the consent of the secretary of the navy they had, beginning in September 1789, prepared the convening of provincial assemblies (the *Assemblés provinciaux*) that were to take control of the colony. The provincial assemblies were to take responsibility for the internal affairs of the provinces of Saint-Domingue; they were to be directly accountable to the king alone and were thus to have no relationship with the French National Assembly.

Meanwhile, the power relationships within the white society of Saint-Domingue shifted. The storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789 inspired a wave of revolutionary enthusiasm – particularly among the *petits blancs* and the small planters. Opposition forces, the “Patriots,” took over the militia and drove out the colonial administrator, the *intendant* Barbé-Marbois. The planter aristocracy felt under pressure to allow whites from all social strata to stand for election as representatives to the provincial assemblies. The Northern Province Assembly elections were held on November 1, 1789, and the

oppositional Patriots indeed won a victory in that election. The Western Province Assembly elections followed in January 1790; the Southern Province elections were held in February 1790. Of course, only whites could vote and become members of these assemblies.

In March 1790 the first Colonial Assembly (*Assemblée coloniale*) was convened in Saint Marc. The Patriots dominated here as well and expressed their separatist sentiments by changing the name of this Assembly from *Assemblée coloniale* to *Assemblée générale*, as well as mandating the drafting of a constitution for the colony. Through their resolute approach the Patriot majority drew upon itself the displeasure of government representatives and provoked a dispute among the white planters.

Per the draft of the constitution for the colony presented on May 28, 1790, the Colonial Assembly declared itself the highest authority in the colony and responsible only to the king. Accordingly, neither the French National Assembly nor the representatives of the French government in Saint-Domingue were to retain any political authority over matters pertaining to the colony. This secessionist draft constitution brought the Colonial Assembly not only into opposition with the French government and its highest local representative, Governor Puyricard, but also incurred the displeasure of the provincial assemblies, which saw their own sphere of influence endangered through this proposal to grant the Colonial Assembly such wide-ranging authorities. The powerful Northern Province withdrew its representatives from the Colonial Assembly and allied itself with the French government representatives: for the first time, a seriously divisive situation arose among the white colonists. The Colonial Assembly with its Patriot majority – above all supported by the *petits blancs* and disaffected small planters – faced a coalition of French government representatives and the conservative planter elite, whose main stronghold was the Assembly of the rich Northern Province.

The conflict escalated into a civil war when the Colonial Assembly set up its own military and then sought to persuade members of the regular troops to defect and join their new armed forces. However, their opponents prevailed. Under their general, Chevalier Mauduit, and with support from the Pompons blanches, which was

a militia set up by the planters of the Western Province, the government troops put down the insurrection of the Patriots and on August 8, 1790 dissolved the Colonial Assembly.

The civil war left behind a colony divided into three parts. In the West, the French government had for the time being prevailed; in the South, the Patriots continued to dominate; in the North, the Provincial Assembly had absolute rule. In the conflict between the Patriots and the government, the Assembly at first remained neutral. But in March 1790, with the help of reinforcements from a French battalion that had defected, the Patriots again took control of the West, while the planters of the North declared their loyalty to France. Even prior to the beginning of the great uprising of slaves, the colonial society was already characterized by explosive contradictions. These contradictions split the society of the white colonists. But it became evident that there was an even sharper conflict of interest between the white planters and the free blacks and mulattos, who were themselves owners of plantations and slaves.

From the Uprising of the Mulattos in the West to the Concordats

Like the white planters from Saint-Domingue, the free blacks and mulattos hoped that their lot would improve as a result of the upheavals in the mother country. Their interests, however, were diametrically opposed to those of the white planters. The planters wanted to keep their domination over the colony and at the same time free themselves from the constraints of *Pacte colonial*. In contrast, the free blacks and mulattos wanted to achieve legal and political equality with the whites and therefore had no interest in secession: quite the contrary, they were keen to link further developments in Saint-Domingue as closely as possible to the political upheavals in France.

The mulattos were lobbying on the fringes of the Estates-General and the National Assembly. They had strong allies in the Amis des Noirs. Their cause nevertheless advanced quite slowly and their opponents initially retained the upper hand. In its decree of October 20, 1790 the National Assembly left to the colonies the power to regulate the status of all persons living in their territories. The white colonists had thus prevailed

despite the efforts of the Amis des Noirs, who sought to have Paris enforce a uniform code on the status of free blacks and mulattos in the colonies.

The political confrontation concerning the legal status of the free blacks and mulattos was of course echoed in the colony itself. As early as the fall of 1789 there were increased hostilities targeting the free blacks and mulattos, including murders. Gradually, the colony began drifting into a civil war between the whites and the mulattos. The *petits blancs* and their political representatives, the Patriots, were particularly hostile. Provoked by the economic success of the mulattos and by their growing self-confidence inspired by the French Revolution, the *petits blancs* became markedly more radical out of concern for their own political privileges.

In March 1790, simultaneous to the convening of the Patriot-dominated first Colonial Assembly in Saint Marc, there was an insurrection by the mulattos in the nearby valley of the Artibonite that was quickly put down by local militias. In October 1790 there followed a further insurrection under the command of Ogé, a leader of the mulattos in the North, near the Spanish border. Vincent Ogé was born in 1768 in Dondon in the mountains of the Northern Province. He was the son of a white planter and a free mulatto woman and was educated in France. In Paris he had been one of the lobbyists on behalf of the free blacks and mulattos and had pushed for an alliance between the white and mulatto property owners in the colony. Disappointed by the Massiac Club's rejection, he returned in October 1790 to Saint-Domingue and armed his followers in the region of Dondon. The uprising was suppressed. Ogé fled but was arrested in Hinche, which was at that time in the Spanish part of the island. This revolt had a strong impact that only grew stronger upon reports of the barbarous execution of Ogé.

In France there was increasing revulsion at the archaic social relations in the colony and also increasing sympathy for the cause of the mulattos. The disputes concerning the legal status of free blacks and mulattos were carried on bitterly in France, and public opinion gradually turned in favor of equality. After a fierce debate in the National Assembly, on May 15, 1791 a compromise formulated by Representative Rewball

was agreed upon. The compromise agreement provided that the status of free blacks and mulattos not born of free parents could only be changed in consultation with, and upon the wish of, the colonies; however, freeborn blacks and mulattos were to be admitted to all assemblies at once. This decree, enacted despite the resolute resistance of the colonial delegation, was the first major victory of the Amis des Noirs. Not surprisingly, it provoked much opposition among the whites in Saint-Domingue. Secessionist efforts increased. Even Blanchelande, the French governor who had succeeded Peynier, criticized the decree in a letter to the central government; he threatened that the colony would be moved to secede if the government enforced the decree. Wishing to distance themselves from the National Assembly and ward off its decisions, the white planters called for a new Colonial Assembly to convene on August 8, 1791. Following an adjournment, it convened on August 25 in Cap Français.

For their part, the mulattos of Saint-Domingue were determined that the decree of May 15, 1791 be enforced. Beginning in August 1791, they started up their own associations in the Western Province, particularly in Vallée de l'Artibonite in the north of the Western Province, where the mulattos had their strongest base of support: the remainder of the Western Province, particularly the capital city, Port-au-Prince, was at this time dominated by the Patriots. However, through their revolutionary zeal, the Patriots drove new allies over to the camp of their worst enemies, the mulattos. In Port-au-Prince the Patriots had established white ethnic domination under the Maltese adventurer, Praloto. The royalists felt themselves deprived of their usual broad powers and gathered in Croix-des-Bouquets on the plain of Cul-de-Sac, to the east of Port-au-Prince.

At the same time, the first reports of slave rebellions in the Northern Province reached the West and the South. To save the colonial society and their own privileges, the royalists now rested their hopes on a coalition with the battle-ready mulattos. Letters from contemporary witnesses indicate that the royalists intended no more than a temporary pragmatic alliance with the mulattos and did not think of sharing their privileges on a permanent basis. They hoped, and apparently speculated, that the counterrevolution in France would triumph and would then do away

with the National Assembly and its decisions recognizing the demands of the mulattos. The alliance of convenience between royalists and mulattos brought together diametrically opposed interests: the royalists wanted to push through a restoration of the old order; the mulattos wanted to achieve legal equality with the whites in accordance with the decree of May 15, 1791. This alliance based on mutual opposition against the revolutionary and racist zeal of the radical *petits blancs* was nevertheless sealed on September 7, 1791 by the Concordat of Croix-des-Bouquets. This concordat specifically recognized, as per the decree of May 15, 1791, the equality of all free persons and therefore the equality of the whites and the free blacks and mulattos. Moreover, all assemblies of the colony that had been elected without the participation of the free blacks and mulattos were to be dissolved, and new assemblies were to be elected with their participation. Worried by the reports of slave uprisings in the north of the colony, the National Guard of the planters of Port-au-Prince concluded a concordat on September 11, 1791 with the army of the free blacks and mulattos. In this, the Concordat of Port-au-Prince, September 11, 1791, the free blacks and mulattos were able to achieve even more of their demands. Their right to bear arms was recognized, and it was agreed that the insurrectionists would be granted a blanket amnesty. The free blacks and mulattos were even to be allowed to possess weapons at a later time. Further concordats with the planters of Saint-Marc and Saint-Louis-du-Sud were concluded.

However, the Colonial Assembly in Cap Français rejected these concordats, and in Port-au-Prince there was rioting against the Concordat of September 11. The Patriots feared the restoration of the old order. But at the end of October 1791 the royalist troops blockaded the capital city and thus forced the city administration to sign the concordat and to approve the stationing of mulatto troops in Port-au-Prince.

In November there were more riots: the French National Assembly had revoked the decree of May 15 and had put the status of free blacks and mulattos back under the authority of the Colonial Assembly; against this backdrop there was to be a referendum in Port-au-Prince that would decide whether or not to keep the concordat in force. In the course of the referendum the explosive mood took a violent turn: a racist

mob attacked rich merchants and unarmed mulattos and drove the mulatto troops out of the city. Port-au-Prince, built of wood, was turned into rubble and ash within a few hours.

Given this development, the mulattos were now all the more determined to use armed force to defend the concordat. A cruel civil war exploded all over the Western Province, while the capital city remained at the mercy of the reign of terror of Praloto the Maltesean. The civil war among the wealthy classes accelerated the decline of the colonial social order of Saint-Domingue. And exactly at this time, in the summer of 1791, the colony was shocked by the first slave uprisings. The fundamental contradiction and the most explosive element in the colonial order – the enslavement of 80 percent of the population – finally erupted.

Slave Revolt in the North

The history of slavery in Saint-Domingue is also the history of the attempts of the subjugated to throw off the shackles of slavery, whether individually through flight or suicide, or collectively through different, sometimes drastic, forms of disobedience. Reports of slave revolts in Saint-Domingue go back to the earliest period of the colony, the end of the seventeenth century. From that time on, occurrences of this kind took place regularly without ever fundamentally endangering the colonial order. There was the legendary fame of François Mackandal, the Black Messiah, who in 1758 together with a group of co-conspirators planned to poison the drinking water of Cap Français and then, after everyone fell ill, capture the city and murder all the whites. Mackandal's plan was discovered; he was arrested and executed. He remained alive in the memory of the blacks of Saint-Domingue and inspired many imitators.

There had already been isolated slave revolts in 1791, when finally, in August 1791, there was a large-scale slave insurrection carried out with cruel vehemence in the Northern Province. According to Haitian mythology, this insurrection began with the ceremony of Bois Caïman, which likely took place on the evening of August 21, 1791 near Petite-Anse, just south of Cap Français in a small forest called the Bois Caïman. The stories about this gathering serve as the basis for the fame of the legendary slave leader Boukman, a coachman from Clément at

Acul-du-Nord, a small sugar plantation southwest of Cap Français. Historians are not absolutely certain of the exact place, or even the date, of this ceremony, nor the exact sequence of events. But generally the events are described as Bellegarde (1953) described them. According to his account, one evening approximately 200 leaders of the black slaves from the surrounding plantations gathered in the forest Bois Caïman to plan the insurrection. Boukman, who inspired those present with his incendiary speeches, led this meeting, which ended with a voodoo ceremony held in thunder, lightning, and pouring rain. A tall female slave – a voodoo priestess – appeared, armed with a long knife. Those present gathered in a circle around her as she danced in a hypnotic trance. Then a pig was brought to her: she killed it by stabbing a knife into its throat and collected the blood in a bowl. At a signal from the priestess, all those present fell to their knees, vowed loyalty to Boukman, and sealed their vows by drinking the pig blood that was passed around in the bowl. It is thought that, in addition to Boukman, Jean-François and Biassou were chosen as leaders of the insurrection during this ceremony.

These details have not been confirmed. For a long time skeptics questioned whether such an event ever took place. Today, however, it can safely be assumed that this event, or a similar event, did indeed happen. Nationalist poets and politicians have often called the ceremony of Bois Caïman a constituent element of Haitian national identity – a symbol of the close connection between the war of independence and voodoo, the religion of the common people. The rebellion actually was planned a week prior to the ceremony during a gathering of slave leaders on the Lenormand plantation in the parish of Plaine-du-Nord on August 14, 1791. The ceremony in the Bois Caïman was meant ceremoniously to seal the conspiracy and mobilize support for it.

The insurgency began on August 22, 1791 – not the day that had been planned, historians believe. They conjecture that in the original plan the uprising was to have commenced on August 25, the day when the Colonial Assembly was to convene in Cap Français. On that day the entire political class of white planters would have been in the city – especially the representatives of the Patriots, the most determined opponents of black liberation. But as a result of several arrests there was a danger that the

conspiracy would come to light. Boukman was therefore forced to begin the uprising earlier than planned. He proclaimed it on August 22 from the sugar plantation Clément in Acul-du-Nord.

Because of this change in plans the insurgents were forced to improvise. The insurgency was not coordinated and did not reach the city of Cap Français, but it spread semi-spontaneously from plantation to plantation across the whole territory of the Plaine-du-Nord and developed a tremendous destructive force: 200 sugar cane fields and 1,200 coffee plantations, as well as several dozen indigo plantations, were burned down, and all the equipment on them was destroyed. A huge conflagration blazed across the plains for days. In the space of two months about 2,000 whites were murdered – sometimes in most cruel ways – and their homes and farms were wrecked and burned. The resistance of the colonists was ineffective. On August 23, 1791 the insurgents, who had 60,000–100,000 armed men, repulsed an expedition of regular troops and militias (according to a report of Governor Blanchelande). The Plaine-du-Nord, the great plain of the North surrounding Cap Français and once the treasure house of the colony, was turned into a smoky military camp: the insurgents in their positions confronting the colonial troops and militias in theirs. Everywhere the roads were lined with corpses or parts of corpses put on display. Boukman himself was killed in battle on November 6, 1791. His head was chopped off and displayed in the central square of Cap Français.

First Civilian Commission

In the fall of 1791 the once-prosperous colony of Saint-Domingue was reduced to a picture of decline and destruction: in the North the Colonial Assembly and the white planters were helpless against the slave insurgency. The plantations were destroyed along with all of their facilities. Sugar cane production was virtually at a standstill. In the West there was a civil war between the Concordat of white royalists and mulattos on one side and white Patriots on the other. The Patriots had established white rule in Port-au-Prince. The Concordat dominated in the Vallée de l'Artibonite. In the South, meanwhile, the white planters still ruled without challenge. They had created the Confederation of Grande-Anse and were increasingly secessionist.

On November 29, 1791, on orders of the French National Assembly, the first Civilian Commission arrived in the port of in Cap Français to stabilize the situation. The success of this mission was in question from the outset. First, there was a lack of clarity regarding its mandate: it originally had been put together on the basis of the decree of May 15, 1791, which it was supposed to implement; however, just before the departure of the commission from France this decree was superseded by the decree of September 24, 1791. Second, the commission received no support from France, where the power of the Jacobins was growing. The Jacobins were victorious in the new elections to the National Assembly on October 1, 1791; with 136 representatives, they were a powerful opposition party in the National Assembly, which was overall more than before dominated by radical forces, with many newly elected representatives. The Jacobins saw in the insurgency a conspiracy of the counterrevolutionary planters. They were also vociferous opponents of the decree of September 24. They had had some supporters of this decree within their own ranks, and these had been excluded from the Jacobins' Club immediately after the decree was passed. Together with the Amis des Noirs the Jacobins had several times prevented the authorization of military support for Saint-Domingue, despite the ever more urgent calls for help from the colony.

The commissioners Frédéric-Ignace de Mirbeck and Philippe-Rose Roume installed themselves in Cap Français; the third commissioner, Edmond de Saint Léger, traveled on to Port-au-Prince. Mirbeck and Roume had some initial success in the North, but ultimately they failed due to the rigid attitude of the white planters. Jean-François and Biassou, the leaders of the black insurgents, had even made a peace offer to the commission and had declared their readiness to end the insurgency and send black slaves back into the fields in exchange for an assurance of freedom and amnesty for the ring-leaders, along with some amelioration of the work regime.

At the beginning of their revolt the insurgents were not focused on the goal of complete liberation of the slaves; instead, they sought to address concrete issues having to do with the working conditions on the plantations, such as abolishing the whip and extending their free time to three days. But the white planters were

not in the least interested in granting amnesty and insisted on the sole authority of the colonial administration regarding the legal status of any subordinate. As a result, the insurgency was reignited and even spread to neighboring regions in the Northeast (Fort-Dauphin, today's Fort-Liberté) and in the Northwest (Môle Saint Nicolas). At the same time, there were sharp conflicts between the Colonial Assembly and the Civil Commission regarding which was to be the ultimate authority. The Colonial Assembly, which saw its regulatory powers threatened by the commission, joined together with the *petits blancs* of Cap Français in a common front against the commission and Governor Blanchelande. After an unsuccessful uprising by the *petits blancs* against the representatives of France, a frustrated Commissioner Mirbeck left the island on March 30, 1792 and sailed to France.

Meanwhile, civil war raged in the West. To counter effectively the threats of slave uprisings and of an armed group near the border with the Spanish part of the island, Commissioner Saint Léger attempted to reconcile the whites and mulattos in the West. To this end, he traveled to Port-au-Prince at the end of January 1792. However, there he encountered fierce opposition from the Patriots; he then joined the Concordat. The Concordat fell apart in February 1792 after the killing of many whites during an uprising by the mulattos in Vallée de l'Artibonite. A new front arose: now the white factions united to fight against the mulattos. The entire Western Province was engulfed in civil war. Saint Léger traveled back to France on April 9, 1792 without having accomplished anything. Now only Commissioner Roume remained in Saint-Domingue. He stayed in Cap Français in order to prevent Governor Blanchelande from aligning himself with the counterrevolutionary forces. Roume was indeed able to tally up another – though double-edged – success: white royalists and mulattos in the West revived their alliance in April 1792, with the aim of jointly putting down the slave insurrection in their province. Once this was achieved, these allied troops – together with the representatives of France, Roume and Blanchelande – took the capital city of Port-au-Prince from the Patriots. But Roume's subsequent efforts to persuade the mulattos to break their alliance with the royalists and join on the side of the Revolution were unsuccessful.

Second Civil Commission

While in Saint-Domingue the first Civilian Commission failed overall and the breakdown of the colonial society continued, in France the Jacobins gained more influence during the spring. The Feuillant government faltered – partly due to negative reports from the colony of Saint-Domingue, reports which materialized in rising prices for coffee and sugar and thus contributed to widespread discontent. Even within conservative circles in France there was less and less sympathy for the rigid attitude of the white planters in the colony, who were unwilling to agree voluntarily to any change in the status of the free blacks and mulattos and therefore also unwilling to return to central government for a solution.

In a decree of April 4, 1792 the French parliament finally acknowledged the rights of the free blacks and mulattos and decided to send a new Civil Commission to Saint-Domingue, accompanied by 6,000 soldiers to enforce the decree and end the insurgency. The new decree, formulated by the Jacobin Gensonné, included the following provisions. The Colonial Assembly and the provincial assemblies were to be dissolved, and new assemblies were to be elected. The free blacks and mulattos were to be allowed to vote and to run for office. The second Civil Commission was to have full powers to enforce this decree. Its authority extended over the civil administration, the military, and the judiciary. The commissioners of the second Civil Commission were empowered to dissolve the provincial assemblies and the Colonial Assembly and, in case of resistance, to order every possible sanction up to and including deportation. To preserve the colony for France, they were to win over the free blacks and mulattos, to strengthen the alliance between them and the white planters, and to combat the secessionist ambitions of the whites.

Heading up the commission was the Jacobin Léger-Félicité Sonthonax. An attorney, Sonthonax was a member of the Société des Amis des Noirs and belonged to a radical wing of the Jacobins, the *Enragés*. In an article that was published a year before he was sent to Saint-Domingue, he wrote about his beliefs as follows: "The ownership of land both at San Domingo and the other colonies belongs in reality to the negros. It is they who have earned it with the

sweat of their brows, and only by usurpation do others enjoy the fruits" (quoted in Stoddard 1914: 183). With this stance, radical for its time, Sonthonax set forth to Saint-Domingue with the second Civil Commission, in which the Jacobins Etienne Polverel and Jean-Antoine Ailhaud were also members. The composition of this commission reflected the power relations in France after the fall of the Feuillant government in March 1792 and gave a clear indication of France's new policy in dealing with the colony. Upon receiving reports of the new May 1792 decree, the white planters of Saint-Domingue were horrified. At first they did not mount active resistance; they greeted the commission upon its arrival on September 18, 1792, though clearly rather aloofly. Many planters feared that the commission had come to the colony with the secret intention of abolishing slavery. Even though the commissioners quickly gave assurances that they had no plans to abolish slavery, a confrontation between them and the white planters was imminent.

That confrontation took shape against the background of the radicalization brought about by the French Revolution and the rumblings of war in Europe. On August 10, 1792, when crowds in Paris stormed the royal city palace, the Tuileries, the National Assembly resolved to depose the king. But the National Assembly itself was rapidly losing its own legitimacy in the face of the increasing revolutionary spirit and the growing political aspirations of those who had been excluded from voting under the "census" election rules, the so-called "passive citizens." The National Assembly dissolved itself and called for the election of a National Convention that would be mandated to draft a new constitution. This National Convention was the first parliament in France to be elected under elections in which all could participate. It convened on September 20, 1792 and proclaimed the Republic on September 21, 1792. This radicalization took place in the face of growing threats to the revolution from counterrevolutionary forces both inside and outside the country.

The close connection between the revolution and the colonial question can also be seen in the American Legion that was deployed by the revolutionary forces between December 1792 and April 1793. In this legion mulattos and blacks fought in France for the revolution; at the same time the French commissioner, Sonthonax, was

in Saint-Domingue to enforce equal rights for mulattos and blacks with whites. In this phase the interrelation between the course of the French Revolution and the upheavals in Saint-Domingue becomes especially clear. After disbandment of their unit, the members of the American Legion published a manifesto against slavery that was addressed to the Convention. In it they called upon the French revolutionaries to unite with the insurgents in Saint-Domingue, to fight with them together against the "tyranny of the colonists," and to break with colonial society.

The royalists in Saint-Domingue feared all the more a loss of their privileges and strove to get rid of the commission. But Sonthonax was resolved to accomplish his mission. By exploiting the rivalries between the different factions in white society in Cap Français, and with the help of the Patriots, he succeeded in eliminating the royalists as a political force. Having achieved this, he turned to challenge the Patriots and abolished their Club.

Sonthonax ruled sternly. In contrast to his predecessors of the first commission, he had been granted broad powers and an army of 6,000 soldiers. He dismissed Governor Blanchelande and had him deported to France (where he was guillotined in April 1793). The Colonial Assembly was dissolved and not reelected, but instead replaced by a Provisional Committee comprising six whites, five mulattos, and a free black. Sonthonax had several influential whites deported and replaced them with mulattos. He soon lost all support from the white population of Cap Français and instead relied on the free blacks and mulattos.

Commissioner Polverel and his colleague Ailhaud had in the meantime installed themselves in the West. In response to the aggravations in the North a new coalition formed in the West. The Patriots joined together with the royalists, while the mulattos went over to the commission. On April 13, 1793 the mulattos and Polverel seized the capital city, Port-au-Prince. The whites fled to the South, where the white planters' Confederation of Grand-Anse ruled. In the North, the intense conflicts in Cap Français had overshadowed the insurgency in the surrounding Plaine-du-Nord. But tensions were rising on the plains as well: the white colonists fled in great numbers, and the insurgents set up their camps in the mountains or headed to the Spanish-occupied eastern part of the island.

Production in this once very productive region came to a standstill.

After some half-hearted and not very effective attempts to put down the insurgency militarily, Sonthonax hoped that a new National Convention might resolve the slave question. He saw himself and his mission confronted by a new difficulty when the new French governor, Galbaud, arrived in Cap Français. Right away a conflict between the governor and Sonthonax flared up regarding who between them had the ultimate authority. This developed into an armed conflict between the commissioners and the mulatto troops and Galbaud and the white militias. The latter at first had the upper hand. Sonthonax called upon the black insurgents from the plains for assistance. Following Sonthonax's promise to free them from slavery, 15,000 black insurgents marched into Cap Français under the command of the rebel leaders, Pierrot and Macaya, and took back the city from Galbaud. As Cap Français burned down in the heavy fighting, Galbaud fled with a thousand whites across the ocean to the US.

At the same time as the whites in Cap Français were rising up under the leadership of Governor Galbaud against the commission, the colony was increasingly threatened by an outside danger: the enemies of the French Republic – Spain and Great Britain – pushed forward to Saint-Domingue and established a beachhead. Sonthonax and Polverel sought to win over the insurgent black armies – some of which had placed themselves under the Spanish flag – to the cause of the Republic. They hoped to gain additional troops for their resistance against the British and Spanish invaders. They therefore decided, in view of the growing inner and outer dangers, to take the decisive step, and on June 21, 1793 proclaimed liberty from slavery for all blacks who bore arms.

In the North, Sonthonax announced the universal abolition of slavery on August 29, 1793; in the South, Polverel pronounced the same on September 21, 1793. The French National Convention declared the universal abolition of slavery on February 4, 1794. This radical measure could not, however, stop the leading commanders of the black insurgents such as Toussaint Louverture, Biassou, and Jean-François from continuing to fight on the side of Spain, which had also promised them freedom.

In the course of the year 1793, with the

support of the insurgents, Spanish troops pushed further and further into the French colony. In the fall of 1793 the British also fell upon Saint-Domingue. Already by the end of 1793 a large part of the French colony was occupied by Spanish or British troops. On June 4, 1794 Port-au-Prince fell to Great Britain. The commissioners were faced with the failure of their mission. They were removed from office upon a decision of the French National Convention; in 1794, they were deported to France as prisoners. But even if they must be regarded as having failed – in face of the advancing British and Spanish invasion – in their mission to pacify the colony and save it for France, on balance they had taken some key steps, through their alliance with the mulattos and through the abolition of slavery, for the war of liberation that would follow.

SEE ALSO: Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806); French Revolution, 1789–1794; Haiti, Revolutionary Struggles; Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath; Haiti, Saint-Domingue and Revolutionary France; Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1801–1804; Mackandal, François (d. 1758); Ogé's Revolt, 1790; Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution, 1796–1799

References and Suggested Readings

- Bellegarde, D. (1953) *Histoire du peuple haïtien (1492–1952)*. Port-au-Prince: no publisher.
- Edwards, B. (1796) *An Historical Survey of the French Colony of San Domingo: Comprehending an Account of the Revolt of the Negroes in the Year 1791, and a Detail of the Military Transactions of the British Army in that Island in the Year 1793 and 1794*. London: John Stockdale.
- Fick, C. (2000) La Révolution de Saint-Domingue: De l'insurrection du 22 août 1791 à la formation de l'Etat haïtien. In L. Hurbon (Ed.).
- Gauthier, F. (2000) Comment la nouvelle de l'insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue fut-elle reçue en France (1791–1793). In Hurbon, L. (Ed.), *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Geggus, D. (2000) La Cérémonie du Bois Caïman. In Hurbon, L. (Ed.), *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Hurbon, L. (Ed.) (2000) *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.

- Moise, C. (2003) *Dictionnaire historique de la révolution Haïtienne (1789–1804)*. Montréal: Images et al.
- Stoddard, T. S. (1914) *The French Revolution in San Domingo*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Haiti, revolutionary struggles

Alexander King

Toussaint Louverture did not accept the transfer of authority from Hédouville to Rigaud, but instead brought Roume from Santo Domingo, who arrived in Port-au-Prince in January 1799 and took over the function of representative to the directorate in Saint-Domingue. Formally, in taking this step Toussaint demonstrated his interest in showing his lasting loyalty for his mother country and countered existing rumours which claimed he was aiming at independence.

In fact, Roume was only subordinated to Toussaint who was close to the zenith of his power. In February 1799, based on the initiative of Toussaint, Roume revoked André Rigaud's supreme command over some districts in the South that had until then been under his control, and placed them under Toussaint's command. Tensions between the mulatto André Rigaud and the black Toussaint Louverture increased and quickly took military dimensions. Both sides were able to mobilize the racial hatred between the "old" and the "new" free people, the mulattos and the blacks. This racial hatred between mulattos and blacks had its roots in the experiences in slave society where the former had been slave owners and the latter slaves. The hostilities were also nourished by the competition between these two groups in their struggle for positions in the new society in which one group, the *anciens libres*, had a clear advantage in terms of property rights, while the other group, the *nouveaux libres*, had to fight for their place in society as well as their share in property.

Finally, in July 1799, Toussaint, who had been provided with arms and ammunition from Great Britain and the United States, marched with 20,000–30,000 soldiers into the South in order to force Rigaud to surrender. Although the military confrontation mainly took place in the South, the conflict impacted the whole colonial society. The followers of the leader of the mulattos, Rigaud, stood up in other regions, too,

especially in the Artibonite valley and in Môle Saint Nicolas, where they were defeated by the Toussaint's troops. In August 1799 numerous followers of Rigaud were executed as traitors in Cap Français, which had been the center of the mulattos until the failed *coup d'état* of Villatte. The civil war ended in August 1800 with the invasion of Toussaint Louverture in Cayes and the flight of Rigaud and his officers – among them Alexandre Pétion. Toussaint had fought the civil war with utmost rigor against the mulattos and four months after the war's end a massacre ensued against Rigaud's officers. During the civil war Jean-Jacques Dessalines, who had risen to the position of the second strongman after Toussaint and would later become the emperor of the new state of Haiti, revealed extreme zealotry in eliminating his opponents. He achieved his greatest military victories for Toussaint Louverture and thereby was driven by the decisive antagonism against the mulattos. These hostilities between the "new" and the "old" free people have endured the postcolonial phase and are determining Haitian politics today.

After the flight of his fiercest opponent and enemy, André Rigaud, Toussaint Louverture started to consolidate his power in the colony. Between 1794, when he had switched sides from the Spanish to the French, until 1799 his forces had grown from 4,000 to 30,000 men. The upper ranks were mainly occupied by black *nouveaux libres*, a new elite also benefiting from the reorganization of the agricultural sector. The administration of the majority of confiscated plantations that had been left by their white owners was transferred to black officers, some of whom were also officially registered as owners.

Toussaint prepared the occupation of Santo Domingo, the eastern part of the island which since the peace agreement of Basel formally belonged to France. For Toussaint, the unification of the island was another necessary precondition for securing his regime and, in the long term, to prevent the return of the old regime. The French government warned Toussaint against taking this step. However, Roume, who in concordance with his successor in Santo Domingo, the French representative Antoine Chanlatte, had resisted the plans for occupation, was arrested on November 25, 1800 and interned in Dondon. Therefore, the political prerequisites for unifying the island had been established. On January 6, 1801, 4,500 soldiers under the command of Paul

Louverture, Toussaint's brother, crossed the border Rivière Massacre in the North. After the capitulation of the Spanish governor of Santo Domingo and Chanlatte's flight to Venezuela, on January 26, 1801 Toussaint Louverture received the keys to the town of Santo Domingo and abolished slavery.

Toussaint had virtually got rid of French authority, chased away the Spanish and British occupying forces, and prevailed against internal rivals. At the same time, with the conquest of the eastern part of the island and flourishing economic relations with Great Britain and the United States, he built the foundation for the final separation from the mother country. The first constitution of Saint-Domingue, announced in a ceremony on July 8, 1801 in Cap Français, further substantiated his claim on power. The constitution provided him with the title of governor of Saint-Domingue for his lifetime and transferred all legislative and executive competences completely to him. Accordingly, his political life's work gained constitutional momentum with the abolition of slavery and racial discrimination.

The commissioners Sonthonax and Polverel had a special interest in rebuilding the productivity of the colonial economy to the pre-revolutionary level, of course, without slavery. The military conflicts with Spain and Great Britain in Europe and in Saint-Domingue had soaked up many resources; France could no longer abdicate from the lucrative colonial economy. Sonthonax and Polverel constructed a new labor regime designed to further enable the profitable exploitation of the colony and structurally resembled the slave economy. The *Code de Travail* brought plantation workers several improvements as opposed to slavery: in particular, there were no property ownership relations between plantation owner and worker. However, plantation workers were not allowed to become landowners. Polverel unambiguously countered the claims of freed slaves for the distribution of individual land rights: the plantations were not to be divided.

The whip as disciplinary means was abolished, and workers were to receive one quarter of the profit produced on the plantation. Nevertheless, workers were further bound to their respective plantations and were not granted freedom of movement; they had to work six days a week, from sunrise to sunset. Workers were allowed indi-

vidual parcels of land (*places à vivre*) that they could cultivate at their own cost on their free days. The parcels were limited in size to 600 square meters. By and large the plantation system was left untouched, and the work conditions improved only gradually.

Workers reacted with different forms of protest to the new constraints: some of them illegally enlarged their *places à vivre* by occupying plantation territory, others openly refused to work, and a group of workers went as far as destroying tools and sugar cane fields, or fled from the plantations. These actions resulted in the decision to provide repressive provisions inscribed in a police decree of February 28, 1794. Now, at least, repression was in the hands of the state and not based on the arbitrariness of plantation owners.

In the South, however, where André Rigaud ruled in a mulatto republic that was *de facto* independent from colonial authorities, the measures of coercion and punishment were much more drastic. In his territory the organization of the labor market had a military character.

Under the reign of Toussaint Louverture the rigorous labor regime was not only maintained, but in addition labor relations were militarized. Toussaint viewed the plantations as regiments and the agricultural workers as soldiers. He leased confiscated plantations to his soldiers of higher ranks or installed them as administrators. According to a decree of October 12, 1800 the workers were now completely bound to their plantations, normally to those where they had already worked as slaves; any freedom of movement was abolished. The commanders of the communities were to report any unauthorized movement of any worker to his plantation, and to arrest and incarcerate the "delinquent." Military law was put in place for all administrators, foremen, and workers. With the constitution of 1801 the militarization of the agricultural sector was established by constitutional law. Feeding the army expended 60 percent of the national budget.

Nevertheless, Toussaint Louverture's agromilitary state did achieve economic success. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, for the first time since the outbreak of the revolution in 1789, there was a slow economic turnaround. In 1801 sugar exports reached 13 percent of the capacity of 1789, prior to which they had fallen to only 1.2 percent in 1795. While in 1795

cotton exports were only at 0.7 percent of the capacity in 1789, they rose to 35 percent of their pre-revolutionary value; coffee exports, which had almost ceased, even reached 55 percent. This economic boom correlated with the rigorous reintroduction of the plantation economy and the concurrent opening up of the economy for international trade. From 1792 onwards the French government had already loosened the *Exclusif* and hence enabled exchange with other partners, especially the US. Saint-Domingue under Toussaint Louverture was committed to active trade relations with Great Britain and the US. The trade decrees of 1798 (with the US) and 1799 (with Great Britain) anticipated the autonomy of the colony in economic matters.

At the same time, these economic achievements had been bought with the growing discontent of the agricultural workers. Resistance mounted against the strict labor regime which bore little difference to slavery. In the Plaine-du-Nord, which 10 years before had set the stage for the first general slave uprising of Saint-Domingue, in October 1801 a revolt broke out among agricultural workers, in the course of which 300 white persons were massacred. Although the uprising was crushed mercilessly by Toussaint's troops, and hundreds of insurgents were killed, this event marked the beginning of the final decline of the plantation economy and the reign of the planters. Agricultural workers left the plantations in huge numbers and lived in the mountains, where their visions of freedom could be met.

In the course of the civil war, two fundamentally different views developed regarding the question of how the freedom that was achieved against the slave owners could be created and maintained in the long term. In other words, which form of society was to take the place of the colonial order? In the revolutionary process, state and nation formed juxtaposing tendencies. When Boukman, the leader of the slave revolt in August 1791, appealed to his followers to listen to the voice of freedom, the term "freedom" did not correspond to the European notion of freedom. Neither did it imply democratic principles, nor was it based on the ideology of the foundation of the state. Instead, the struggle for freedom was nourished by the concrete daily experiences of the slaves – humiliation, subjugation, exploitation – and focused on the right to resistance by any means. For the slaves, freedom meant being granted a piece of land to use for

subsistence agriculture, where they could grow crops for individual consumption or sell in local markets. The insurgent slaves were constantly looking for cooperation with the French government and its representatives in Saint-Domingue and for some time even struggled by its side and under its flag.

The *Paysannerie* developed under the conditions of slavery and in the course of the liberation struggle. Based on the aspiration for independent work and the ownership of a small piece of land, it thus manifested itself in the so-called *places à vivre*, gardens that had been granted to the slaves in which they were allowed to grow vegetables for their own use. The cultivation of potatoes, manioc, corn, etc. for a rapidly growing population only played a subordinate role in the slave economy, in quantitative as well as in structural terms. However, food production was functional for the colonial economy in so far as the *places à vivre*, mainly located on the property of the plantation, secured the reproduction and therefore the possibility of exploitation of slave labor. Under these harsh conditions, rudimentary peasant markets had already developed in which surpluses were traded.

Repeatedly, claims for three free days were made and played a decisive role in the mobilization of the insurgencies. This claim focused on the goal to spend more time in the *places à vivre* and to cultivate them in a self-determined way and according to one's own needs. Concurrent with the beginning of the slave economy, resolute slaves aimed at leaving the plantations once and for all, in order to form an independent existence in the mountains. The escaped slave that took up the struggle against the white planters in the mountains was later honored by a memorial in the center of Port-au-Prince: *Le Marron inconnu*, designed by the Haitian sculptor, architect, and painter Albert Mangonès and erected in 1968.

As early as 1751 there were an estimated 3,000 *marrons*. They found protection in the inaccessible mountains of the island, often in the borderlands between the French and Spanish parts. Among them were many women, and thus, half a century before the foundation of the independent state of Haiti, a self-contained society began to form and reproduce itself. At night, the *marrons* would often walk down into the valleys to steal livestock, raid plantations, and plunder. In some cases they also committed

murder. The *marrons* always kept their ties with the slaves in the plantations and played a focal role in the revolution, although none of the revolutionaries was a *marron* and despite the fact that the *marrons*' notion of freedom stood in fundamental contradiction to that of the revolutionaries, especially in the final phase of the revolution. In their draft of an alternative society they relied on organizational forms that they had known from their mother country. Regardless of the attempts of the post-colonial elites to maintain the plantation economy, the *contre-plantation* developed steadily: the counter-draft of the small farmers set against the capitalist agriculture. Barthélemy (1989) defines the cultural elements of this society as common language (Creole), religion (Vodou or a syncretism of Vodou and elements of Catholicism), and the specific organization of reproduction that deviated from the capitalist model (extended families, no marriage). In the economic sphere, a superstructure consisting of three elements evolved: *égalité*, *auto-suffisance*, and *auto-régulation*.

The equality of all members is a requirement that the *Paysannerie* still hangs on to. Real property relations that do not meet this requirement disappear in daily life, behind the facade of a homogenized culture and uniform social habits. However, in the daily life of the *Paysannerie* there are no institutional hierarchies. In this society of equals, bare of any institutionalized relations, the role of self-sufficiency, autonomous reproduction, was central. The *Paysannerie* developed contrary to the capitalist model not only in terms of its worldview, but also in geographical terms. Whereas the sugar cane plantations from the colonial era were located in the plains, the establishment of the *Paysannerie* took place in the mountains.

The *Paysannerie* developed in resistance against the slave economy and also counteracted the idea of the state as developed by Toussaint Louverture. The small farmers resisted his regime as they had resisted the slave owners, they acted against the attempt to maintain the plantation economy even after the final days of slavery and the white supremacy in Haiti, and they protested the revival of these oppressive structures. Like the French commissioners Sonthonax and Polverel, Toussaint Louverture and his successors did not keep the plantation economy in independent Haiti from 1804 onwards.

SEE ALSO: Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806); French Revolution, 1789–1794; Haiti, Revolutionary Revolts, 1790s; Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath; Haiti, Saint-Domingue and Revolutionary France; Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1801–1804; Ogé's Revolt, 1790; Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution, 1796–1799

References and Suggested Readings

- Barthélemy, G. (1989) *Le Pays en dehors: Essai sur l'univers rural haïtien*. Port-au-Prince: Editions Henri Deschamps.
- Bell, M. S. (2007) *Toussaint Louverture: A Biography*. New York: Pantheon.
- Blancpain, F. (2004) *La Colonie française de Saint-Domingue: de l'esclavage à l'indépendance*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- D'Ans, A.-M. (1996) La réforme agraire nécessaire mais difficile à mettre en œuvre. *Problèmes d'Amérique Latine* 22 (September): 101–19.
- Fick, C. (2000) La révolution de Saint-Domingue: De l'insurrection du 22 août 1791 à la formation de l'Etat haïtien. In L. Hurbon (Ed.), *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Hurbon, L. (Ed.) (2000) *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Lundahl, M. (1993) Toussaint Louverture and the War Economy of Saint Domingue, 1796–1802. In H. Beckles & V. Shepherd (Eds.), *Caribbean Freedom: Economy and Society from Emancipation to Present*. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.
- Moïse, C. (2003) *Dictionnaire historique de la révolution Haïtienne (1789–1804)*. Montréal: Images et al.
- Stoddard, T. S. (1914) *The French Revolution in San Domingo*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Trouillot, M.-R. (1990) *Haiti, State against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, aftermath

Alexander King

The colony of Saint-Domingue was succeeded by Haiti, the first independent state in Latin America. The declaration of independence on January 1, 1804, called out by Jean-Jacques Dessalines – “Independence or Death” –

expressed the fierce determination underlying the defense of national independence and the liberation from slavery against foreign powers, especially France. A few days later this vigorous determination was demonstrated with the murder of all French citizens still residing in the country and the deportation of all foreigners. The new state stood in continuity to the regime of Toussaint Louverture. This continuity was reflected in the elevated position and overarching power of one leading person. In the course of 1804 Jean-Jacques Dessalines turned into Emperor Jacques I. The new constitution of May 20, 1805 provided him with all-encompassing political, military, and judicial rights. The power of the state was completely transferred to one person.

The intention never again to submit to any external power was also manifested in the constitution which prohibited foreigners to acquire property in Haiti. This instruction was maintained until the country's occupation by the United States starting in 1915, which modified the constitution in order to enable the penetration of the Haitian economy by US capital.

Dessalines concentrated his efforts at dismantling the military force. He founded a regular army of 60,000 men. He also paralleled his predecessor Toussaint Louverture in his project of creating a strong state defense focusing on the inland which he likewise turned into a fort. Moreover, he moved the capital to the town of Marchand at the foot of the *Montagnes Noires*. Dessalines also continued his predecessor's economic policies. He kept the system of large-scale plantations intact and held on to the export-oriented agricultural model. The agricultural workers were bound to their plantation and shared a quarter of the profits. At the same time, property relations were fully reorganized. Hence, the state was the largest landholder. In a law of July 24, 1805 he ordered the inspection of all property titles. This measure enraged landowners who held properties of different sizes, as well as mulatto landholders.

The mulatto upper class resisted Dessalines' dictatorial leadership style and refused to cooperate with his reign. This group saw their economic interests seriously threatened by Dessalines' land policies, a stand supported by racist sentiments against the black elite. The discontent raised by Dessalines' failed attempt to conquer militarily the Eastern part of the island

and his ineffective and wasteful governance finally led to insurgencies in the South and the West. On October 17, 1806 Dessalines was murdered on his way from Marchand to Port-au-Prince and chopped into pieces.

The separation between the *anciens* and *nouveaux libres* that had appeared to belong to the past in the war of independence broke out again. This schism remains a decisive factor in Haitian politics. After the murder of Dessalines this separation even manifested itself in the temporary division of the country: following his death, Alexandre Pétion ruled the mulatto elite in the South and West.

On January 1, 1807 Henri Christophe took power in the North and on March 26, 1811 declared himself Emperor Henri I. He continued the project of large state plantations and militarization, while Pétion started to distribute land to his followers. The division of the country could only be surmounted in 1822, following the death of both rulers. Neither private nor state large-scale ownership of land prevailed as a dominant cultivation model. Former slaves left the plantations in order to found family farms on formerly uncultivated land. Due to a shortage of labor the plantations had to be divided and leased in small units. There emerged a new residential and societal pattern which until today is present in the form of settlements with scattered buildings (*habitations*) and family farms (*lakou*). These settlements irrevocably unlocked the Haitian mountain regions as additional living space. In turn, due to the title of inheritance favoring every child the family farms were scaled down from generation to generation. As a consequence, at present rural Haiti features by far the smallest average farm units in all Latin America, contrary to the colonial order.

From the very first moments of its independence Haiti was isolated in the international arena. The United States only acknowledged Haiti's independence 60 years after the event. France acknowledged it through the payment of compensation amounting to 150 million gold francs. Even Latin American states did not let Haiti participate in their political rise following the liberation. Although Alexandre Pétion supported the South American liberation fighter Simón Bolívar by sending ships and soldiers and providing him with protection, Haiti was not granted acknowledgment by newly founded South American states and was not invited to

the first Pan-American Congress in 1826 in Panama.

Slavery was maintained in the South American states for many decades after independence. In the French colonies slavery was reintroduced in 1802 and finally abolished as late as 1848. Great Britain first ended slavery in 1807 and in 1832 officially banned it. In the United States slavery was banned in 1865 after the Civil War. The men and women of Saint-Domingue were exceptional in many regards: the majority was born in Africa, illiterate, according to western standards uneducated, and in the dominant discourse not accepted as fully human. Despite all these obstacles they became the pioneers in the struggle for basic rights for freedom. They completed the French Revolution by staking their claims for all people, no matter the color of their skin. They were far ahead of their time. In this sense their contribution to the history of human rights is of crucial importance.

SEE ALSO: Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806); French Revolution, 1789–1794; Haiti, Revolutionary Revolts, 1790s; Haiti, Revolutionary Struggles; Haiti, Saint-Domingue and Revolutionary France; Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1801–1804; Ogé's Revolt, 1790; Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution, 1796–1799

References and Suggested Readings

- Barthélemy, G. (1989) *Le Pays en dehors: Essai sur l'univers rural haïtien*. Port-au-Prince: Editions Henri Deschamps.
- Bell, M. S. (2007) *Toussaint Louverture: A Biography*. New York: Pantheon.
- Bellegarde, D. (1953a) *Haiti et son peuple*. Paris: Nouvelles Editions Latines.
- Bellegarde, D. (1953b) *Histoire du peuple haïtien (1492–1952)*. Port-au-Prince: no publisher.
- Blancpain, F. (2004) *La Colonie française de Saint-Domingue: de l'esclavage à l'indépendance*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- D'Ans, A.-M. (1996) La réforme agraire nécessaire mais difficile à mettre en œuvre. *Problèmes d'Amérique Latine* 22: 101–19.
- Dubois, L. & Garrigus, J. (2006) *Slave Revolution in the Caribbean, 1789–1804: A Brief History with Documents*. Boston/New York: Bedford/St. Martin's Press.
- Dupuy, A. (1989) *Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race, and Underdevelopment since 1700*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Edwards, B. (1796) *An Historical Survey of the French Colony of San Domingo: Comprehending an Account of the Revolt of the Negroes in the Year 1791, and a Detail of the Military Transactions of the British Army in that Island in the Year 1793 and 1794*. London: John Stockdale.
- Fick, C. (1990) *The Making of Haiti*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Fick, C. (2000) La révolution de Saint-Domingue: De l'insurrection du 22 août 1791 à la formation de l'Etat haïtien. In L. Hurbon (Ed.), *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Gauthier, F. (2000) Comment la nouvelle de l'insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue fut-elle reçue en France (1791–1793). In L. Hurbon (Ed.), *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Geggus, D. (2000) La cérémonie du Bois Caïman. In L. Hurbon (Ed.), *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Hector, M. & Moïse, C. (1990) *Colonisation et esclavage en Haïti: le régime colonial français à Saint-Domingue (1625–1789)*. Port-au-Prince: Editions Henri Deschamps.
- Hilaire, S. (1995) *Le Prix d'une agriculture minière*. Port-au-Prince: no publisher.
- Hilliard d'Auberteuil, M.-R. (1776) *Considérations sur l'état présent de la colonie française de Saint-Domingue. Ouvrage Politique et Législatif*. Paris: Grangé.
- Hurbon, L. (2000a) Le clergé catholique et l'insurrection de Saint-Domingue. In L. Hurbon (Ed.), *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Hurbon, L. (Ed.) (2000b) *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- James, C. L. R. (1963) *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint l'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*. New York: Random House.
- Lundahl, M. (1993) Toussaint Louverture and the War Economy of Saint Domingue, 1796–1802. In H. Beckles & V. Shepherd (Eds.), *Caribbean Freedom: Economy and Society from Emancipation to Present*. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.
- Moïse, C. (2003) *Dictionnaire historique de la révolution Haïtienne (1789–1804)*. Montréal: Images et al.
- Moreau de Saint-Méry, M. L. E. (1797/1958) *Description topographique, physique, civile, politique et historique de la partie française de l'île de Saint-Domingue*. Paris: Société de l'histoire des Colonies Françaises & Librairie Larose.

- Robin, L. (2000) La cérémonie de Bois Caiman et le pacte de sang dahoméen. In L. Hurbon (Ed.), *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Stoddard, T. S. (1914) *The French Revolution in San Domingo*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Théodat, J.-M. (2003) *Haiti. République Dominicaine. Une île pour deux 1804–1916*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Trouillot, M.-R. (1990) *Haiti, State Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Haiti, Saint-Domingue and revolutionary France

Alexander King

The revolution that took place from 1789 to 1804 in the French colony of Saint-Domingue mirrored the French Revolution. Its dynamics developed in the context of the mercurial revolutionary upheavals in the French metropolis; and conversely, the revolution in Saint-Domingue was of fundamental importance for the course of the French Revolution. The events in Saint-Domingue also influenced the struggle for independence throughout Latin America and paved the way for the worldwide liberation of the slaves.

The end result of the conflict in Saint-Domingue was the African slaves' self-liberation from slavery and the founding of the first independent nation-state in Latin America, but the path towards that end was not at all unilinear. And the interests that initiated these developments – that drove them forward with the utmost determination – were not at all in harmony with each other. The large white landowners fought against the white proletarians, and both together fought against the colonial government; the mulattos fought at times on the side of monarchists and against the revolutionaries and at other times in alliance with the revolutionaries and against the monarchists; the black slaves at first fought in alliance with the Spanish monarchy against revolutionary France, and then they fought with France against Spain. Constantly changing fronts and coalitions characterized the final 15 years of the French colony of Saint-Domingue.

The dynamics of the conflict finally culminated in the creation of the first modern black nation-state: Haiti. The founding of a state by a people who had shortly before then been captured, enslaved, and brought against its will from Africa to the Caribbean – a people who had come from very different parts of the African continent – is a unique historical event.

Colonial Society and Its Contradictions

In accordance with the Treaty of Riswick, which was concluded between Germany, France, Holland, and Spain in the year 1697, the western part of the Spanish possession of Santo Domingo became French property. This part of the island, henceforth to be known as the French colony of Saint-Domingue, had for the most part not been touched by Spanish colonization; French and English settlers, the so-called *Boucaniers*, had therefore been able to settle here during the decades prior to the signing of the treaty. The *Boucaniers* supported themselves mainly through hunting wild cattle and pigs; they also were traders of leather and meat. Their customers were the *Flibustiers*: pirates who were already carrying out operations from their base on the Ile de la Tortue as early as 1520 and partly on contract from the French government.

The *Boucaniers* at first settled on the Ile de la Tortue, an island off the north coast of the land now known as Haiti; thereafter they settled on the north coast itself. Beginning in 1625, and increasingly after 1660, the French settlements received systematic support from the French government. Settlers and their employees were offered financial incentives: these included trading privileges, tax relief, and start-up aid, as well as making grants of land to contract workers and bringing in female orphans as settlers. Contract workers were promised that they would receive land upon completion of their contracts.

In 1663 there were in total 14 French possessions in the Caribbean. To carry on colonial trade and to structure the relationship between the mother country and the colonies, the Compagnie des Indes Occidentales was established in 1664 and granted military rights and trade privileges. Furthermore, this company was allowed to appoint governors and to maintain its own army. It was granted a tax break of 50 percent of all import and export taxes and from

the beginning enjoyed a virtual monopoly in colonial trade. To exclude foreign competitors from the colonies and to further the growth of the French economy, the colonial trade was organized under the system of *Exclusif* (also called *Pacte colonial*). The system of *Exclusif* included the following provisions (Stoddard 1914: 16):

- 1 The colonies were required to obtain all of their agricultural and industrial imports exclusively from France.
- 2 The products of the colonies were exported to France exclusively.
- 3 France obtained tropical products exclusively from its colonies.
- 4 No industrial production could take place in the colonies.

The system of *Exclusif* must be seen as an essential component of mercantile state intervention. In France under Prime Minister Colbert this intervention was designed to secure primary capital accumulation, in which the colonies were supposed to play a key role. This is the means by which capitalist development of the mother country was begun.

Up until 1680, tobacco cultivation by small farmers was the dominant industry in Saint-Domingue. In addition, cocoa and indigo played a role in trade. In this phase the productive labor was not carried out by slaves from Africa, but by contract workers from France. The transition to slavery only commenced after the beginning of sugar cane cultivation, when there was a revolution in the relations of production. A condition of the new form of production was the creation of larger enterprises. Small planters were ousted. They were pushed out through the sale of their land, or they were driven into handicraft occupations; some became foremen on the plantations. Collectively, the former small planters formed the basis of a new social strata, the *petits blancs*. There was a significant concentration of land ownership.

The conversion of the colonial economy from the small-scale cultivation of tobacco, cocoa, and indigo to the cultivation of sugar cane and coffee on large plantations produced a surge of economic growth. The *révolution de la canne* (Hector & Moïse 1990: 78) began early in the eighteenth century and reached its highpoint, as well as the beginnings of its reversal, between 1770

and 1789 – that is to say, just before French control over Saint-Domingue was ended. During this period high population growth in Europe along with increasing population concentration and industrialization enabled the development of rapidly expanding markets for colonial products. The colonial economy in Saint-Domingue flourished. Trade in the products of the colony brought an industrial and economic boom to the commercial cities of the mother country such as Nantes, La Rochelle, and Bordeaux. Sugar refining, shipbuilding, the iron, textile, and export-oriented industries, the trade in flour, meat, and other food products, and the re-exporting of colonial goods all grew rapidly and contributed to the industrial development of France.

On the eve of the uprising, Saint-Domingue was the richest colony in the Caribbean and was contributing more than a third of the total of France's revenue from foreign trade: 70 percent of all of France's revenue from trade with the colonies in the New World was derived from Saint-Domingue. One out of eight French citizens was living directly or indirectly from the wealth created by this colony. Each year 1,500 ships were sailing from Saint-Domingue to bring a total of 220,000 tons of colonial goods (sugar, coffee, indigo, copper) annually to France. The number of sugar mills in Saint-Domingue grew from 35 in 1671 to 793 in 1789. Alongside these, manufacturing grew up in the form of steam boilers, furnaces, and distilleries.

France organized the exploitation of its colonies for the benefit of industrialization in the mother country – just like Britain did – in an extremely efficient manner. The existing conditions in Saint-Domingue were exploited in the most rigorous possible way to create value. The disappearance of the original population enabled the French government to obtain unlimited access to the fertile plains of the colony. Permits for large tracts of land (usually of several hundred hectares) were issued to French entrepreneurs. The large size of these land grants allowed for a certain amount of vertical integration on the plantations; for example, there were often processing plants on the premises.

To ensure ease of trade between the colony and mother country, a network of roads was created leading to the harbors that were used for export of goods. Because the plains had fertile soil but barely enough rainfall, they were crisscrossed with

irrigation systems more extensive than have ever existed there since that time. A merchant fleet ensured the efficient transportation of agricultural products from the colony and their distribution to the European market, and all of this trade was required to pass through France. The decisive factor, however, was the exploitation of unpaid labor. The work of the slaves formed the basis of the new production system, which in turn to a large extent enabled the economic development of the metropolis.

In addition to 800 sugar cane plantations in Saint-Domingue, there were about 3,000 coffee, indigo, and cotton plantations. A large amount of capital from the metropolis was invested in the colony. With the large-scale and standardized production on the plantations, the need for unskilled labor grew concurrently. The demand could not be met in Europe, as labor contracts under these conditions could no longer be negotiated. Instead, to carry out the labor-intensive production processes (clearing, weeding, harvesting), hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of Africa were forcibly brought to Saint-Domingue and enslaved there. Stoddard (1914: 51) estimates that the total number of slaves imported to Saint-Domingue by 1789 was about 1 million.

Some 150,000 Africans were brought to Saint-Domingue and enslaved between 1784 and 1789; 55,000 of them were brought in 1789 alone. Most of them were deployed to the North. In 1788 over one hundred ships were engaged in transporting slaves from Africa to Saint-Domingue. The slave trade was then a lucrative business. Due to inhuman working conditions and poor medical care and nourishment, the mortality rate of the slaves in Saint-Domingue was very high: it stood at 2.5 percent annually, 11,000 deaths per year. Hilliard d'Auberteuil (1776) expressed the common opinion of the slaveholders: "it is cheaper to buy slaves than to breed them" (quoted in Stoddard 1914: 51). Despite this, because of the massive import of slaves, their number grew from 20,000 in 1701 to 230,000 in 1754 and finally to 450,000 in 1789. The slaves were faced in 1789 with only 35,000 whites (including about 10,000 women), along with 27,000 *Affranchis* (free blacks and mulattos).

At the end of the eighteenth century the three provinces making up the French part of the island of Saint-Domingue – the provinces of the North, the West, and the South – were densely

populated and characterized by bustling economic activity; however, the Spanish part of the island languished in a state of economic lethargy even though geographical conditions there were better. In 1789 only 125,000 people were living in Spanish Santo Domingo, mainly as livestock breeders and shepherds. Almost no export-oriented agriculture was carried out. Only about 14,000 slaves worked on the Spanish side of the colony. After the mineral resources were extracted, there was no economic restructuring in the Spanish colonies along the lines of modern capitalist requirements. On the contrary, the colonization of the Spanish possessions by settlers from the mother country and the farming economy they created aimed only at meeting their own subsistence needs and ran counter to the necessary requirements for capitalist development – the separation of agriculture and industry, the separation of producers from the means of production, and an increasing division of labor and standardization of production.

With the growing prosperity and the increasing importance of Saint-Domingue for economic development in France, in the mid-eighteenth century the French central government made increasing efforts to bind the colony closer politically. A judicial and police apparatus was created, and a system for taxation was introduced. Against the will of the local planters, the *de facto* local system of justice was replaced by a system of justice imposed by the metropolis.

Politically, French rule over the colony was characterized by a hybrid leadership structure. The governor was the crown's representative in the colony. He was the commander of the military and was responsible for the foreign relations of the colony. Usually, he was himself a former soldier or sailor. The intendant was the second representative of the mother country, usually a bureaucrat, who supervised the civil administration and the judiciary. Contemporary observers described this hybrid rule, in which the governor was the main center of power, as a mixture of anarchy and tyranny. The administration of the colony was subject to a "European caste." The local colonists did not participate in it.

The colonial system gave rise to a specific use of space. The population of the colony of Saint-Domingue was concentrated primarily on the fertile plains, the *Plaine-du-Nord* (in the Northern Province), *Plaine de Cul-de-Sac* and *Plaine de Leogane* (in the Western Province), and the

Plaine des Cayes (in the Southern Province). Among the first French settlements, which were founded before the government instituted its settlement policy, were Ile de la Tortue, Port Magot, and Port-de-Paix on the northern coast and Grand-Goâve, Petit-Goâve, Miragoâne, Les Nippes, and Baradères on the southern peninsula. Following the Treaty of Riswick and international recognition of the French claim to Saint-Domingue, further settlements were established on the northern plains: for example, Limbé, Dondon, Quartier Morin, Limonade, Grande-Rivière-du-Nord, Trou-du-Nord, Terrier Rouge, or Bayahà (later Fort Dauphin, then Fort-Liberté). Jacmel, Cayes, Grande-Anse, and Saint-Louis-du-Sud, among others, rose up on the coastal plains of the southern peninsula. In addition, settlements were begun at the Artibonite Valley (Vallée de l'Artibonite) and on the plain of Cul-de-Sac.

The first capital city of the colony was Cap Français. Even after the establishment in 1749 of the new capital city of Port-au-Prince, Cap Français remained the largest and most important city in the colony. It formed, together with the surrounding Plaine-du-Nord, the Northern Province: the oldest, richest, and most densely populated province in the colony within a spatial structure that consisted mostly of many separate lots of land. The Western Province, which included Port-au-Prince and Léogane, was climatically at a disadvantage; only with the assistance of irrigation could its plains be put to productive use. The Southern Province had the least economic significance and was socially and economically the least developed. It was isolated from the other provinces by the highest mountain chains in the colony and had few valleys and plains. However, it was accessible to the British island of Jamaica only 200 kilometers away.

On the eve of the revolution of 1789, Cap Français was with 20,000 inhabitants the largest city in the colony. After only 40 years, Port-au-Prince had become, with about 8,000 inhabitants, a dynamic and busy port city. In an economy based entirely on foreign trade, the port towns of Port-de-Paix, Gonaïves, Saint Marc, Léogane, Grand-Goâve, Aquin, Jacmel, Cayes, and Jérémie played an important role. These port towns were able to develop a social life quite equal to that of the cities of Cap Français and Port-au-Prince. The provincial towns benefited from the colonial infrastructure, which connected isolated

production units with the nearest ports. Each of these port towns had its own backcountry, from which it supplied itself with trading goods. This decentralized structure of the colony played an important role during war of independence: the various parties in the civil war formed different coalitions in the North, in the West, and in the South, and for a time two separatist parliaments were constituted in Cap Français and Saint Marc.

The society of the white colonists of Saint-Domingue was small (35,000) in number, but had reached a high level of social stratification. At the top of "white" society – and much disliked by the local planters – was the "European caste." This caste was made up of the officials from the mother country, in charge of colonial administration, and of the aristocratic large-scale planters (*Absentéistes*) who had close ties to French nobility and resided sometimes in the colony and sometimes in France. The representatives of the clergy were also in this caste. The middle class consisted of merchants and shopkeepers; it was made up exclusively of Europeans. Small local planters (Creoles) comprised the rural middle class. The so-called *petits blancs* were at the bottom of the social hierarchy. In the countryside the *petits blancs* worked in such occupations as plantation inspector, mechanic, and so forth; in the cities they often had marginal jobs doing manual labor or managed to get by in some other way. Among the *petits blancs* were many foreigners, particularly Germans, Italians and Maltese.

The *Affranchis*, as the free blacks and mulattos were called, rose rapidly in number during the eighteenth century. Free blacks were former slaves or the children of former slaves set free by their owners. Among the *Affranchis* the mulattos were dominant both numerically and in terms of social status; they were the descendants of black women who had had relations with white planters. Due to a high number of excess white males in the colony many planters cohabited with black housekeepers or courtesans. Economically, many free blacks and mulattos caught up with the white middle class: free blacks and mulattos possessed, according to various sources, between one tenth and one third of all agricultural property and between 50,000 and 100,000 slaves. In the granting of civil and political rights, racial separation nevertheless remained the rule. This was set forth in the Code Noir laws of 1685. Mulattos were not allowed to hold any public

office and were not allowed to enter skilled occupations or receive honors; they were required to sit in the segregated seats reserved for them in theaters and in churches.

By far the largest social class in Saint-Domingue society was composed of the black slaves. Their number rose in the course of the eighteenth century to around 450,000 and thus surpassed the combined population of the whites, the free blacks, and the mulattos many times over. Their relationship to the slaveowning classes was therefore not only characterized by extreme exploitation under the harshest working conditions, but also by fear on the part of slave owners. On the isolated plantations the planter families often faced as many as 200–300 slaves. Their fear of delinquencies led them to impose ever harsher discipline: for even the slightest offenses against the whites' established order, punishments of indescribable cruelty were meted out.

The blacks of Saint-Domingue had been kidnapped from different regions of Africa – from Senegal to Mozambique. The largest group among them came from the west coast of central Africa (today, the Congo and Angola); the second largest group came from the Gulf of Benin (today, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Benin). At the time of the revolution, 60–70 percent of the black slaves in Saint-Domingue had been born in Africa. They brought with them their cultural heritage into the colonial society of Saint-Domingue. Their strong affiliations to their respective ethnic groups and communities shaped the development of new patterns of cultural expression and the creation of new social relations – and also shaped the patterns of the slaves' resistance against the colonists. Quite a few of them could even draw upon previous military experience from the civil war of 1779 to 1788 in the kingdom of the Congo.

Colonial relations were designed so as to promote the industrialization of the mother country while preventing industrialization of the colony. Thus the colonial economy remained dependent and unstable. The market for the products of the colony remained artificially limited; conversely, the colonial economy was dependent upon the monopoly of French importers, leading to inflated prices for imported goods. French merchants were the profiteers; the planters of Saint-Domingue were the losers.

The slave economy made possible a significant quantitative advance in the development of

productive forces, but proved an obstacle to qualitative innovation. For lack of purchasing power, no market could develop in the colonies. Therefore, there could be no realization of capital. Rather than a free and equal contract between workers and employers, the former were totally at the disposal of the latter. For this reason a flexible commitment of productive labor to the demands of developing productive forces was not possible. On the contrary, to prevent a mass exodus of the slave labor force out of the system, a large amount of effort was of necessity dedicated to repression.

The society of Saint-Domingue had developed a multiplicity of class and racial contradictions. The dominant class of big merchants and large-scale sugar planters – who as *Absentéistes* profited from the colonial system of trade although they did not live in Saint-Domingue – was in conflict with the so-called *Créoles*: the small, local planters whose dissatisfaction with the colonial system often brought them into conflict with the mother country. From 1750 an increase in coffee exports led to the rise of the free blacks and the mulattos. They formed an economically potent social stratum that was nevertheless excluded from political participation. They did not have the same legal rights as whites and were subject to extensive restrictions. The whites insisted all the more assiduously on these restrictions the more they felt threatened by the economic progress of the free blacks and mulattos.

Within this society, which was doubly stratified along class and racial lines, the *petits blancs* had an ambivalent role: as whites they were socially privileged in comparison to the mulattos and free blacks, even when the latter were large landowners. But as proletarians or small farmers, they found themselves in a situation of structural dependence and economic precariousness.

The most obvious contradiction – and simultaneously the explosive element in this social formation – was the situation of the slaves whose unpaid labor created the wealth that the other social strata and groups competed among themselves to distribute, while the slaves were themselves excluded from the distribution of this wealth.

The French Revolution – with its aspiration of achieving freedom, equality, and fraternity – resonated in Saint-Domingue in diverse and contradictory ways. It was the signal that

brought the social contradictions of the slave-owning society to a crisis of violent conflict and thus ended the *Ancien Régime* in the colony of Saint-Domingue as well as in the mother country.

SEE ALSO: Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806); French Revolution, 1789–1794; Haiti, Revolutionary Revolts, 1790s; Haiti, Revolutionary Struggles; Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath; Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1801–1804; Ogé's Revolt, 1790; Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution, 1796–1799

References and Suggested Readings

- Dupuy, A. (1989) *Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race, and Underdevelopment since 1700*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Gauthier, F. (2000) Comment la nouvelle de l'insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue fut-elle reçue en France (1791–1793). In L. Hurbon (Ed.), *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Hector, M. & Moïse, C. (1990) *Colonisation et esclavage en Haïti: le régime colonial français à Saint-Domingue (1625–1789)*. Port-au-Prince: Editions Henri Deschamps.
- Hilaire, S. (1995) *Le Prix d'une agriculture minière*. Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie Le Natal.
- Hilliard d'Auberteuil, M.-R. (1776) *Considérations sur l'état présent de la colonie française de Saint-Domingue*. Ouvrage Politique et Législatif. Paris: Grangé.
- Hurbon, L. (2000a) Le clergé catholique et l'insurrection de Saint-Domingue. In L. Hurbon (Ed.), *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Hurbon, L. (Ed.) (2000b) *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Moreau de Saint-Méry, M. L. E. (1797/1958) *Description topographique, physique, civile, politique et historique de la partie française de l'Île de Saint-Domingue*. Paris: Société de l'histoire des Colonies Françaises & Librairie Larose.
- Robin, L. (2000) La cérémonie de Bois Caïman et le pacte de sang dahoméen. In L. Hurbon (Ed.), *L'Insurrection des esclaves de Saint-Domingue, 22–23 août 1791: actes de la table ronde internationale de Port-au-Prince, 8 au 10 décembre 1997*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
- Stoddard, T. S. (1914) *The French Revolution in San Domingo*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Haitian Revolution and independence, 1801–1804

Alexander King

In 1801 Toussaint Louverture consolidated his power over Saint-Domingue, reaching the zenith of his military and political career. Formally, however, Saint-Domingue continued to be a French colony, but the constitution from July 8, 1801 granted him unfettered power in every political realm. The military and political ranks subordinated to him were placed with followers, mainly *nouveaux libres*. The leaders of the *anciens libres*, especially André Rigaud and Alexandre Pétion, resided in French exile. For the first time since 1697 the island was unified under a single reign.

Meanwhile, in France, Napoléon Bonaparte attained overarching power. Born in 1769 in Corsica, Napoléon had climbed the social ladder in the army during the French Revolution. At the end of 1799 he spearheaded a coup d'état and as the first consul gained far-reaching authority with the constitution of December 25, 1799. His military successes during the Second Coalition War and the resulting peace treaty with Austria (February 9, 1800), Russia (October 8, 1801), and Great Britain (March 25, 1802) strengthened his popularity. Moreover, following a successful plebiscite in 1802, he was granted the title of consul for life, furthering his determination to turn to the problem of France's overseas possessions, especially Saint-Domingue.

Although Toussaint Louverture never openly aimed at independence, Napoléon viewed the self-made constitution of Saint-Domingue as a challenge to France's reign over the colony. For Napoléon, it was unacceptable that the constitution granted Toussaint the title of governor for a lifetime and provided him with overarching power, as well as the close economic cooperation with Great Britain and the United States. He also disliked the fact that Toussaint Louverture defied the orders of the French representatives by subjugating the Eastern part of the island. Napoléon aspired to reverse the separation of Saint-Domingue and to win back control of the colony. At the same time, he approved of Toussaint's skills in politically and economically

stabilizing the colony, commanding a huge and disciplined force, and striking back against France's enemies in Saint-Domingue.

This situation offered Napoléon two scenarios for action. He could cooperate with Toussaint Louverture and accredit him as civil and military leader, and, in a countermove, introduce a French trade monopoly and the taxation of plantations led by black officers. Or he could recapture the island, deport the black officers, and enforce the ownership of the white planters. Napoléon anticipated that the second scenario would lead to enduring conflict in the colony and possibly to a sustained weakening of France, but he finally opted for the latter. He prepared a military expedition on October 23, 1801, entrusting its leadership to his brother-in-law General Leclerc, who at the same time became supreme commander and first magistrate of the colony. On November 18, 1801 Napoléon informed Toussaint Louverture in a letter about the forthcoming arrival of the expedition.

Leclerc was ordered to crush and disarm the black insurgents. He ordered Toussaint Louverture's arrest, his deportation to France, and the restoration of property rights to the white planters. The goal was to cooperate with the mulatto leaders and to reintroduce French trade monopoly. The reintroduction of slavery was ordered explicitly, yet unofficially. However, Blancpain (2004) suggests that from the very beginning of the expedition the reintroduction of slavery was on its secret agenda. A strengthened planter lobby had great reach: Josephine Beauharnais, since 1796 wife to Napoléon, originated from a rich Creole planter family from the Caribbean island of Martinique and was among the advocates of slavery.

At the same time, French traders complained about the economic loss caused by the removal of the *Exclusif* and the clear-cut orientation of the colony's trade politics towards Great Britain and the United States. In addition, Napoléon may have been further motivated to act militarily due to recent developments in international relations: in the United States, with the change from President John Adams to his successor, Thomas Jefferson (he took office in March 1801), the attitude towards Saint-Domingue also changed. Jefferson, a Southerner, was himself an advocate of slavery and, in contrast to his predecessor, opposed the independence of Saint-Domingue. It was not expected that he would voice any dissent against the military

expedition. Great Britain, after signing a temporary peace treaty with France on October 18, 1801, also took a neutral position.

Starting on December 14, 1801, 73 armadas with 30,000 soldiers were shipped to Saint-Domingue, among them 6,000 Swiss, German, and Polish soldiers. A Dutch marine division also took part in the expedition. Furthermore, in the Spanish part of Saint-Domingue 3,000 Spanish militias were recruited. Among those who arrived with the expedition were the leaders of the *anciens libres* André Rigaud and Alexandre Pétion. Pétion, born in 1770 in Port-au-Prince to a French soldier and a mulatto, had gained honors when serving during the war against the British, but later during the conflict between Toussaint and Rigaud took the side of the latter, left Toussaint's army, and joined the army of the South. After the defeat, together with Rigaud and other mulatto leaders, he left for French exile.

By the end of January 1802 the French armadas gathered at the Samaná peninsula in the Eastern part of the island. From there they headed towards the coastal towns of Fort-Dauphin, Cap Français, Port-au-Prince, and Santo Domingo. Toussaint had given orders to burn these towns; Henri Christophe, the commander of Cap Français, followed the order and destroyed his town before he handed it over to Leclerc and his troops. Other important towns, however, were voluntarily handed over to the French (Santo Domingo and Santiago in the East, Jérémie and Cayes in the South), or they fell after little resistance, like the capital Port-au-Prince.

Following the defeat of the coastal regions, resistance rose in the heartland, with a focus on Canton Louverture and the mountainous areas bordering to the South. When the message of the arrival of the expedition arrived, Toussaint had restocked his colonial army to 20,000 men for the general mobilization struggle. Christophe held the command of the Northern Division consisting of 4,800 soldiers; Dessalines led the Western Division with 11,000 soldiers, Clervaux the Eastern Division with 4,200 men. The colonial army was able to inflict huge losses on the expedition. Nevertheless, it succumbed in the decisive battles of Ravine à Couleuvres, east of Gonaïves, on February 23, 1802, and of Crête-à-Pierrot at Artibonite, from March 4–24, 1802.

On April 26, 1802 Christophe turned himself over with 1,000 soldiers and several localities, among those Acul-du-Nord, Dondon,

Grande-Rivière-du-Nord, and Sainte Suzanne. Hence, the complete Northern frontline between the Plaine-du-Nord and the Canton Louverture fell to Leclerc. Toussaint Louverture, too, finally handed himself over on May 6, 1802. He first withdrew to his estate near Ennery, but he stayed in close contact with his followers in order to lead a new offensive against the expedition. On June 7, 1802 Leclerc, in the know about these moves, ordered Toussaint's arrest. Toussaint was finally deported to France and on August 23, 1802 interned in the prison of Joux in the Jura mountain range. There he died only half a year later, on April 7, 1803.

Notwithstanding the defeat of Crête-à-Pierrot and Toussaint's deportation, the drive for freedom of the blacks against the expedition was not broken. Resistance was carried on by a third party in the War of Independence, the *marrons* and parts of the *nouveaux libres*, a federation of militias fighting in changing alliances, sometimes together with the French against the black army, then on the side of the black army against the expedition army. These militias did not aim at national independence of the colony, but opposed the state model as drafted by Toussaint Louverture. Their notion of freedom focused on the right to live as independent farmers on their own parcels of land and to cultivate their land at their own cost and for their own benefit. Drawing support from black generals and officers they resisted the general disarmament carried out by the expedition troops.

However, the peace between the black generals and Leclerc was temporary. They were only linked in their opposition against the *marrons* and their alliance marked a short break for the armies to get ready for the decisive battle in the War of Independence. Following Toussaint's arrest and after the message arrived in Saint-Domingue concerning the reintroduction of slavery in Guadeloupe (July 16, 1802), resistance intensified, joined by Dessalines, Henri Christophe, and Alexandre Pétion. The insurgency extended from the North to the South. All military commanders, mulattos and blacks, *anciens libres* and *nouveaux libres*, allied themselves for the final joint battle against the expedition army as well as against the militias of the *marrons*. In an assembly in May 1803 they elected Jean-Jacques Dessalines as leader.

In the meantime, yellow fever became the most brutal enemy of the European troops: 15,000 men are believed to have fallen victim

to the fever, among them Leclerc himself on November 2, 1802. Thus decimated and confronted with the fierce and determined resistance of the blacks and mulattos under their most competent military commanders, the military fate of the expedition worsened. Under the command of Leclerc's successor, Comte de Rochambeau, and despite his cruel and pitiless acts, the expedition troops rapidly lost significant positions and finally only held on to Cap Français. The final battle of this war – now a real war of independence – took place on November 18, 1803 in Vertière, a suburb of Cap Français. With the defeat of the expedition troops, Cap Français fell and thus Napoléon's first military reverse did not occur in Europe, but in the Caribbean.

Of the 43,000 soldiers sent to Saint-Domingue, only 7,000 survived. In addition to the 36,000 soldiers killed in the war or by yellow fever, 20,000 more civilian casualties were counted among the French. Roughly 100,000 dead were counted among the local population. This was the price paid for independence, proclaimed on January 1, 1804 in Gonaïves by Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the leader of the successful troops in Vertière.

SEE ALSO: Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806); French Revolution, 1789–1794; Haiti Revolutionary Revolts, 1790s; Haiti, Revolutionary Struggles; Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath; Haiti, Saint-Domingue and Revolutionary France; Ogé's Revolt, 1790; Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution, 1796–1799

References and Suggested Readings

- Bell, M. S. (2007) *Toussaint Louverture: A Biography*. New York: Pantheon.
 Blancpain, F. (2004) *La Colonie française de Saint-Domingue: de l'esclavage à l'indépendance*. Paris: Editions Karthala.
 Moïse, C. (2003) *Dictionnaire historique de la révolution Haïtienne (1789–1804)*. Montréal: Images et al.

Hamas: origins and development

Lawrence Davidson

Origins

Hamas was founded in 1987, soon after the outbreak of the first Intifada, or uprising, against Israeli occupation, in Palestine. Its founders were

educated professionals residing in the Gaza Strip. All of them, led by the charismatic Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, were members of the Society of Muslim Brothers and dedicated to reviving Muslim values and piety within their community. They also believed that Palestine should eventually become a Muslim state.

Shaykh Yasin had proven himself a dynamic and talented organizer. In 1973 he established the Islamic Center in Gaza city and quickly made it the hub of an Islamist infrastructure that delivered religious, social, medical, educational, and economic programs to tens of thousands of people. Affiliated programs were established in the West Bank. Soon the center was one of the most influential institutions in the Occupied Territories and, slowly but surely, it was injecting a religious point of view into Palestinian national consciousness. By the 1980s the talent and organizational potential necessary for an Islamic fundamentalist mass movement existed in Palestine.

In 1983, in response to the activities of the Israeli occupation forces, Yasin established a paramilitary organization called the al-Qassam regiments. It was authorized to use violence against selected Israeli targets as well as Palestinian collaborators. Later, when Hamas was founded, both the regiments and charitable efforts were folded into the new organization. That same year Yasin was arrested by the Israeli authorities and charged with belonging to a group hostile to Israel. He never denied the charge. Ten months later he was released as part of a prisoner exchange.

It was the spontaneous outbreak of the Intifada in 1987 that served as the catalyst for Yasin and his companions to form Hamas as an organization designed, in part, to sustain the uprising. Hamas assumed a leadership posture in the Intifada by encouraging the popular demonstrations and swelling the ranks of the demonstrators. Beyond these immediate actions, Hamas was designed to begin the process of competing politically with Palestine's secular parties. It also sought to work out its own strategy for the war for liberation against Israeli occupation. As the Hamas activist Mahmud al-Zahar has put it, Hamas aims at once to "change the corrupted system" of governance (the Fattah-controlled Palestine National Authority or PNA) and "force the Israelis to abandon the occupation."

Yasin organized Hamas to operate in a decentralized fashion. This was essential given the

frequent arrests of Hamas principals by the Israeli authorities. Decisions were, and continue to be, taken by consultative councils whose members can be readily replaced from second and third tier cadres. In this way the organization has been able to repeatedly reconstruct its leadership throughout the Occupied Territories. Yasin also established Hamas offices outside of Palestine, for instance in Damascus and Amman, and principals from these sites also are part of the organization's leadership structure.

Hamas has become very popular throughout the Occupied Territories. The population sees it as a successful national defense organization and it is also responsible for an array of charitable activities which the PNA cannot provide. In addition, Hamas has associated the fight for national salvation with the religious drive for personal salvation. It takes as its rather wordy motto the following phrase: "Allah is the goal, the Prophet is the model, the Quran is the constitution, jihad is the path, and death on God's path is our most sublime aspiration." The promise of personal salvation through death in the cause of national liberation is something the secular resistance groups cannot offer. And, since the odds are great that death will come to one in the struggle against a vastly superior enemy, fighting under the banner of Hamas brings a deep sense of comfort and determination. As Yasin said, "When all doors are sealed, Allah opens a gate."

What Hamas Wants

Hamas' success in becoming a leading participant in the first Intifada and those uprisings that followed, along with its allied social services programs, transformed the organization into a major political contender for control of the Palestine National Authority. Thus, one must consider what Hamas wants in relation to Palestinian governance as well as in relation to Israel.

What Hamas wants the PNA to do is adopt its Islamic program. However, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), while controlled by Fattah, had always advocated a secular state. Indeed, until it decided to participate in country-wide elections in 2006, Hamas considered the whole idea of a Palestinian national government premature. The organization's position was that there needed to be liberated territory before the formation of such a government was warranted. Therefore, it opposed nationwide elections

in the Occupied Territories, viewing them as an Israeli tactic to distract world attention from the process of colonial expansion. Nonetheless, by 2005 Hamas was forced, by virtue of its very success, to alter its position on elections. By that time its base was very large and its supporters were urging it to take power. Its growing popularity meant that Hamas had reached a point where it would have done the organization's reputation more harm than good to remain aloof from national governance.

When it comes to the struggle against Israel, Hamas' position has also evolved. In the long term it seeks the destruction of the Zionist state. Therefore, Hamas opposed the "peace process" to which the PLO, again controlled by Fattah, committed itself in the early 1990s. Negotiations with Israel were worse than a waste of time because, as a Hamas pamphlet put it, they were designed to "defeat the will of our people in the Occupied Territories, tranquilize the Muslim Arab people around us, and remove them from the scene of the battle." Yasin told the Palestinians that "our enemy will not concede anything to us except by force." Until the early 2000s Hamas held to this position consistently. Yet once more, it was success in building a mass base that forced the leadership to look for maneuvering room in its position. As an Islamic mass movement it has to remain true to its religious doctrines, but also remain responsive to its supporters' desires. Most Palestinians, including those who favor Hamas, strongly desire final status negotiations with the Israelis. This creates a dilemma for Hamas. Given that Israel is dedicated to the preservation and expansion of a Jewish state, and Hamas to the establishment of a Muslim state in Palestine, there would seem to be no common ground for negotiations.

By 2005, however, Hamas had publically foreseen the possibility of eventual talks with Israel. The organization's prime minister, Ismail Haniya, has said that "If Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders" and "recognizes Palestinian rights" then Hamas could negotiate "peace in stages." This means that the organization would leave to "future generations" the question of the ultimate destruction of the Zionist state. This is diplomatic maneuvering that should be taken seriously. The leaders of Hamas have a clear conception of present power relationships. It was in recognition of Israel's ability to ratchet up the hardships suffered by the Palestinians that Hamas agreed

to what amounted to a unilateral ceasefire in March 2005. The organization's victory at the polls in January 2006 only deepens its dilemma in relation to Israel. How does it continue to wage war on an enemy that can cause immense suffering to the people Hamas must now govern? This being said, one should not underestimate Hamas' determination to resist Israeli occupation. Hamas will not accept the western assertion that for it to be a proper government it must renounce violent resistance to Israel. To do so would, in the minds of the Hamas leadership, mean renouncing the struggle for independence. Thus Ismail Haniya has declared, "Our weapons are not up for discussion. They are non-negotiable." This should not strike the western observer as unreasonable. If Hamas did renounce violence it would be the only governing power in the world to have embraced pacifism in the face of invasion and occupation.

The Issue of Tactics

History is replete with people of all religions who believed that their cause came from God. In many cases these people ended up losing touch with humane "rules of engagement." The men of Hamas certainly experienced a variation on this theme. They did not, and still do not, believe that those who "fight in God's path" and who "suffer under the yoke of intruding oppressive occupation" have any obligation to struggle according to the rules set down by others. Thus, on occasion, Hamas has resorted to acts of terrorism.

If the western observer cares to understand the more extreme aspects of Palestinian resistance he or she must honestly consider the "facts on the ground." Keep in mind that what brought about the founding of Hamas was the same thing that brought about the Intifada, and that is the material conditions under which the Palestinians have lived and continue to live. Those conditions can be found documented in United Nations reports, the publications of numerous human rights organizations, and even the annual country reports of the US State Department. The public record they present goes like this: the ongoing Israeli colonization of the West Bank and East Jerusalem along with the conditions imposed upon the Gaza Strip has pushed a Palestinian population of some two and a half million people into canton-like enclaves. Israeli policies regulating

movement into and out of these enclaves have reduced the general mobility of the Palestinians and commerce has suffered. A majority of the population live at or below the poverty level. Other Israeli policies and practices have reduced Palestinian access to healthcare and education. Frequent community wide curfews keep the populations of whole towns and cities indoors, with only brief breaks, for weeks at a time. Access to water supplies for the Palestinians is limited. Frequent land confiscations lead to the destruction of the livelihoods of increasing numbers of the rural population.

The Israeli government and Zionist spokespersons have defended these policies in the name of Israeli security and have offered historical and religious arguments to justify taking large tracts of land in the Occupied Territories. Whether one agrees or disagrees with their arguments does not speak to the issue laid forth here. The immediate point is one of simple historical reality. If you put roughly two and a half million people of whatever religion or nationality in a series of boxes and then proceed to reduce their society to its primitive basics, you are going to get resistance that will sometimes take violent form. An important source of this kind of resistance encountered by Israel comes from Hamas.

From the point of view of the Palestinians, the policies of forced confinement and societal destruction constitute massive state terrorism on the part of Israel. Israel dismisses this judgment and has been able to keep western media descriptions of their behavior toward the Palestinians in line with the Jewish state's own perceptions of the situation. Yet western opinion has little to do with the tactical decisions of Hamas and other resistance organizations. They do not play to a western audience. Palestinian resisters have used an array of tactics, including non-violent ones, about which the western media report little. They have also carried out suicide bombings on civilian targets which the western media report fully. What is not reported at all is that, with the one difference of the perpetrator committing suicide, the terror tactics of the Palestinians have a multitude of historical precedents, some recent ones being found in the behavior of resistance movements during World War II, as well as in the tactics of Zionist organizations such as the Irgun and Stern gang.

In words that echo the French resistance under the Nazis and the Zionists under the British,

the Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal asserts: "We live under occupation and we don't have the traditional tools of warfare." Therefore, Hamas feels that it must pursue other options. The severity of the options chosen is dictated by Israeli behavior. For Hamas, Palestinian terror is a response to the terror of the occupier. The strategic goal is to exact such a cost on Israel that it will give up the occupation. Western observers might conclude that this makes Hamas an uncivilized organization. However, as long as the Israelis do not adhere to the rules set forth by the fourth Geneva Convention, Hamas (and most other Palestinians) will dismiss western demands for the end of Palestinian terrorism as hypocrisy.

In January 2006 a combination of military prowess and social accomplishment brought electoral victory to Hamas. This achievement was helped along by the fact that many Palestinians viewed the Fattah-run Palestine National Authority as corrupt and ineffective. It has been reported that Hamas' leaders were taken aback by their victory. They now controlled the Palestine National Authority (except for the office of the president, which continued to be held by the Fattah leader Mahmoud Abbas) and were required to confront the problem of satisfying a population yearning for stability and economic well-being while carrying on a war against an enemy that has shown itself willing to inflict great hardship on the Palestinians.

Before Hamas could resolve their dispute with the Israelis, the United States government and the European Union moved to cut off all material and financial assistance to the new Hamas government. In essence they sought to punish the Palestinians for the democratic choice they made in a free and fair election. Simultaneously, the US and Israel began to support militant elements within Fattah that sought to use their militia forces against the elected Hamas government. In this they found a cooperative partner in the PNA President, Mahmoud Abbas. In June 2007 things came to a head when Hamas successfully moved to expel the subversive Fattah elements from the Gaza Strip. Abbas then declared the Hamas government "illegal" and, with Israel's help, overthrew its government representatives in the West Bank. Palestine, under siege in Gaza and occupation in the West Bank, now had two opposed movements claiming the loyalty of its people.

SEE ALSO: Arafat, Yasser (1929–2004), Fatah, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Intifada I and Intifada II

References and Suggested Readings

- Abu-Amr, Z. (1994) *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Chehab, Z. (2007) *Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement*. New York: Nation Books.
- Hroub, K. (2000) *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice*. Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies.
- Hroub, K. (2006) *Hamas: A Beginner's Guide*. London: Pluto Press.
- Mishal, S. & Sela, S. (2006) *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hampton, Fred (1948–1969)

Roderick Bush

On December 4, 1969, the Chicago police raided the apartment of Fred Hampton, chairman of the Illinois Black Panther Party (BPP), killing Hampton and Mark Clark. With the assistance of a paid FBI informant, William O'Neal, the FBI had amassed a 12-volume, 4,000-page file on Hampton. This ended the life of one of the most promising young leaders of the 1960s. It is crucial to understand the larger context in which this action was taken.

The Black Panthers believed that black communities could develop by utilizing the strengths of the people themselves. They did not translate the struggle for self-reliance as a struggle for autarchy. Not only did they utilize external forces, they were also able to inspire people to undertake struggles in their own interests. Thus they were able to get wealthy liberals such as Leonard Bernstein to assist them in raising funds, and develop alliances with organizations such as the Puerto Rican Young Lords in Chicago, the Chicano Brown Berets, the white working-class Young Patriots who had moved from Appalachia to the northside of Chicago, and the Chinese American Red Guards.

One of the most remarkable of the young leaders of the BPP was Fred Hampton, leader of the Maywood, Illinois NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People).

Known in Maywood as a remarkable young man, Hampton is said to have defused a potential riot by leading 500 angry youth on a non-violent march to protest a whites-only swimming pool. When Hampton assumed leadership of the youth section of the Maywood NAACP, he increased the membership from 17 to 700, drawing the attention of the FBI who began to monitor his activities via informants and wiretaps (Austin 2006: 197).

Lennie Eggleston of the LA branch of the BPP met and talked to Hampton while on a speaking tour in Chicago. The black nationalist-leaning Hampton was persuaded that black people should define their own reality instead of simply reacting to the racism of the white working class. In this way, a poor minority could use a strategy of class solidarity as a tool to unite the poor and revolutionize America (Rice 2003: 50).

In December 1968, FBI informant William O'Neal reported to his superiors that Hampton was on the verge of pulling off a merger between the BPP and the Black Stone Rangers, a south-side street gang with several thousand members. This merger would have doubled the size of the national BPP. The FBI sent anonymous letters to Black Stone Ranger leader Jeff Fort and BPP leader Hampton to create antagonism between them.

In November 1969 Hampton traveled to California to speak at UCLA and meet with BPP national leadership. They informed Hampton that he was being selected to serve on the Central Committee as chief of staff and main spokesperson for the national BPP (Churchill & Vander Wall 1988: 64–9). To prevent this enhancement of the BPP national leadership, FBI agents helped arrange an arms raid on Hampton's apartment, on the basis of information supplied by O'Neal about weapons located there. O'Neal had supplied them with a floor plan of the premises, showing the bed in which Hampton would be sleeping.

SEE ALSO: Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Black Panthers; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978

References and Suggested Readings

- Austin, C. J. (2006) *Up Against the Wall: Violence in the Making and Unmaking of the Black Panther Party*. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press.
- Churchill, W. & Vander Wall, J. (1988) *Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret War Against the Black*

Panther Party and the American Indian Movement.
Boston: South End Press.

Rice, J. (2003) *The World of the Illinois Black Panthers.* In J. Theoharis & K. Woodard (Eds.), *Freedom North: Black Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940–1980.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hani, Chris (1942–1993)

Allison Drew

Born in Sabalele, Cofimvaba, in the former Transkei, South Africa, “Chris” Martin Tembisele Hani was the fifth of six children, three of whom died in infancy. His father was a migrant mine-worker and building worker, and his mother was engaged in subsistence farming.

As a child Hani was an eager student and an altar boy so committed to the Catholic Church that he hoped to become a priest; his father forbade this. In 1954 the apartheid government introduced Bantu Education; Hani’s anger at this initiative laid the foundation for his political activism. Three years later he joined the African National Congress (ANC) Youth League. He attended Matanzima Secondary School, Cala, and Lovedale Institute, Alice, matriculating in 1958. He studied at Fort Hare College between 1959 and 1961, coming into contact with Marxist ideas and graduating from Rhodes University in 1962 with a BA in Latin and English.

In 1961 Hani joined the South African Communist Party (SACP). The next year he joined *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (“Spear of the Nation” or MK) and left South Africa for military training in the Soviet Union. In 1967 he became a political commissar in the Luthuli Detachment of MK’s joint military campaign with the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army forces at Wankie. He narrowly escaped capture but was detained in Botswana for arms possession until late 1968, when he was deported to Zambia. In 1974 he joined the ANC’s national executive council. That same year he infiltrated into South Africa to build an underground network and then operated from Lesotho for seven years. The target of several assassination attempts, Hani left Lesotho for Lusaka, Zambia, in 1982. In 1987 he replaced veteran communist Joe Slovo as MK’s Chief of Staff.

Following the unbanning of the ANC and SACP in February 1990, Hani returned to South Africa, where he rapidly became popular amongst

radicalized black youth. He became a member of the SACP’s central committee in July 1990 and replaced Slovo as SACP general secretary in December 1991, resigning as MK’s Chief of Staff to devote more time to the SACP. That December, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was launched as a forum to negotiate a democratic transition. CODESA gave significant representation to the apartheid and bantustan parties, and the ANC was under pressure from its youth and radical wings not to sell out. Despite his own skepticism, Hani had agreed to the suspension of armed struggle to pave the way for negotiations. As an MK veteran and militant communist, Hani’s presence legitimized CODESA.

Hani was assassinated in front of his home in Dawn Park, Boksberg, by Polish anti-communist immigrant Janusz Walus. Hani was second only to Nelson Mandela in popularity amongst black South Africans, and his assassination almost derailed the negotiations. Walus and his accomplice Clive Derby-Lewis were sentenced to death for the murder; their sentences were commuted to life imprisonment following South Africa’s abolition of the death penalty.

SEE ALSO: Communist Party of South Africa 1921–1950; Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918); Slovo, Joe (1926–1995); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC

References and Suggested Readings

Hani, C. (1991) *My Life: An Autobiography Written in 1991.* Available at www.anc.org.za/people/hani_c.html (accessed January 13, 2008).

South African History Online (n.d.) Tembisele (Chris) Hani, 1942–1993. Available at www.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/bios/hani,c.htm (accessed January 13, 2008).

Hardy, Thomas (1752–1832)

Victoria Arnold

Thomas Hardy was a leading figure in the French Revolution-inspired British Jacobin movement. He was a working man – a shoemaker by trade – who founded the London Corresponding Society (LCS), the first successful organizational attempt in England at bringing the working class

into the political arena. The LCS was dedicated to promoting parliamentary reform, specifically universal manhood suffrage and annual parliaments, but it also included within it more radical currents that developed explicitly revolutionary agendas.

Hardy was born in Scotland, where he was brought up by his mother and maternal grandfather. His father, Walter Hardy, had drowned when Thomas was 8 years old. Hardy was schooled until the age of 10 and then trained in the cobbling trade, eventually moving to Glasgow to find work. In 1771 he abandoned shoemaking and worked briefly as a bricklayer, but in 1774 after a workplace accident in which one of his colleagues died, Hardy decided to return to his original trade and relocated to London. He found work as the foreman of a shoemaking shop and in 1781 married Lydia Priest. Together they had six children, none of whom survived past infancy.

In 1791 Hardy set himself up as a master bootmaker in Piccadilly, which despite early growing pains became a profitable business. At about the same time Hardy began to involve himself in radical politics, his interest having been aroused initially by reading Richard Price's *Observations on Civil Liberty and the Justice and Policy of the War with America* (1776). He also began to read pamphlets issued by the Society for Constitutional Information (SCI) calling for parliamentary reform and universal suffrage, which had a significant impact on the development of his political thought.

The reform movements of the era were, like the SCI, all solidly middle class in composition, but Hardy devised a plan for a reform society made up of and directed by working men like himself – a bold political innovation for the late eighteenth century. After reading Price's *Discourse on the Love of Our Country* (1789), he decided that a network of progressive-minded societies, all in contact with one another, was the best way to promote the cause of reform. In January 1792 Hardy's plans for a London Corresponding Society were approved at a public meeting he had called. Eight members joined and Hardy was elected both secretary and treasurer. By April 1792, LCS membership had increased to 70 and the society continued to grow thereafter.

Hardy quickly set about establishing links with other provincial reform societies and the SCI. The LCS also issued a number of public state-

ments calling for political rights and social justice. Despite its insistence on the need for legal and constitutional methods in order to achieve change, the government regarded the politically radical LCS with suspicion, believing it to be in league with French revolutionaries. The publication by the LCS of a *Congratulatory Address to the French Nation* in September 1792 did little to quell the government's fears.

In April 1794 Hardy issued a letter to the SCI and likeminded provincial associations calling for a general convention to promote reform. In the context of recent French revolutionary experience, a "convention" could suggest the creation of a quasi-governmental body – an alternative parliament – that could challenge the legitimacy of the existing parliament. The government, convinced that radical societies would use the opportunity to plan revolution, took action against them and in May arrested Hardy and several other LCS and SCI members. Hardy was confined in the Tower until October 1794 when he stood trial on suspicion of treasonable practices. If found guilty, Hardy and his associates would have been hanged as traitors.

A few years later government prosecutors would perfect the art of rigging juries, but at the time of Hardy's trial London jurors tended to be independent-minded and not necessarily unsympathetic to political radicalism, so on November 5, 1794, Hardy was triumphantly acquitted. Exhausted by his ordeal, and devastated by the death of his wife while he had been imprisoned, Hardy stepped down as secretary of the LCS and ceased his political activism. He focused instead on rebuilding his business, which had fallen into ruin due to his incarceration, and set up another shop in Covent Garden. Despite a brief period of initial success, the business failed to prosper. Although he distanced himself from politics, Hardy remained in touch with his radical friends and continued to support parliamentary reform and allied social causes.

In 1815, in poor health and with his business failing, Hardy retired. By the early 1820s his savings had run out and he was forced to appeal to his friends for aid. The most radical MP of the era, Sir Francis Burdett, stepped forward and supported Hardy with a pension of £100 per annum. Hardy died on October 11, 1832, just four months after the passage of the 1832 Reform

Act, which he welcomed as an important step toward more extensive parliamentary reform. His importance to the development of working-class political movements in Britain can be partially appreciated by the fact that his 1794 acquittal was celebrated with a commemorative dinner every year until 1842.

SEE ALSO: Burdett, Sir Francis (1770–1844); London Corresponding Society; Reform Acts, Britain and Ireland, 1832

References and Suggested Readings

- Goodwin, A. (1979) *The Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic Movement in the Age of the French Revolution*. London: Hutchinson.
- Hemmings, R. (2000) *Liberty or Death: Early Struggles for Parliamentary Democracy*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Hone, J. A. (1982) *For the Cause of Truth: Radicalism in London 1796–1821*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Thompson, E. P. (1963) *The Making of the English Working Class*. New York: Vintage.

Harlem Renaissance

Michael Zeitler

The Harlem Renaissance, as identified, defined, and celebrated by Alain Locke in the preface to his 1925 anthology, *The New Negro*, was a consciousness-transforming political, aesthetic, and spiritual “Coming of Age” for black Americans. Cutting across the whole spectrum of culture and social thought, including literature, criticism, music, dance, theater, painting, and sculpture, the black artists and intellectuals of the Harlem Renaissance reconfigured black history, explored contemporary urban life, and experimented with new, culturally derived aesthetic forms. Its influence spread far beyond the borders of Harlem, impacting not only America and the English-speaking world, but all of the cultures of the African Diaspora. The Harlem Renaissance powerfully influenced Négritude writers such as Léopold Senghor and Aimé Césaire, and every aesthetic and political expression of pan-African ideology that would follow.

The Harlem Renaissance had its beginnings in the decade preceding World War I, as Harlem, centered around 135th Street and 5th Avenue, became the destination of choice for tens of thousands of blacks leaving the American South

and the West Indies for better opportunities in the cities of the urban North. More than a seismic demographic shift, the Northern Migration was also a collective redefinition of what it meant to be a black American. “In the very process of being transplanted,” Alain Locke (1925) wrote of the movement north in his preface to *The New Negro*, “the Negro is becoming transformed . . . Negro life is seizing upon its first chances for group expression and self-determination.”

Among those first attracted to Harlem were members of what W. E. B. Du Bois had called the “Talented Tenth,” the vanguard of black writers, artists, intellectuals, and political leaders who would spearhead African Americans’ fight for political and economic justice. Harlem quickly became home to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the National Urban League (NUL), the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), *The Crisis*, *Opportunity*, *Negro World*, and *The Messenger*, edited by socialists A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen. Over the next 20 years, however, Harlem was to become more than a political center; this “New Negro,” as the literati of Harlem would proclaim themselves, would generate an explosion of artistic creativity and racially conscious expression in poetry, music, theater, dance, and the visual arts that would define its own political legacy and force Americans to view blacks in a new way.

From its beginnings, black political leaders like W. E. B. Du Bois and James Weldon Johnson understood the political implications of the growing artistic renaissance. In Johnson’s 1922 preface to *The Book of American Negro Poetry*, he emphasized the need to change white Americans’ “mental attitude” toward blacks, arguing that “nothing could do more to raise his status than a demonstration of intellectual parity by the Negro through the production of literature and art.” As editor of *The Crisis*, Du Bois eagerly embraced the new generation of writers and artists, hiring as literary editor Jessie Fauset, a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Cornell University and one of the Renaissance’s most important novelists. In addition to its political coverage, *The Crisis* was soon publishing important poetry by Langston Hughes, Countee Cullen, and Claude McKay, and the artwork of Aaron Douglass. Not to be outdone, *Opportunity*, the journal of the NUL, offered a regular column by Cullen in addition to short stories, poetry, plays,

and illustrations by up-and-coming black artists. Both publications sponsored literary prizes, award dinners, and all-star galas attended by celebrities, both black and white.

The embracing of the Harlem Renaissance by progressive whites continued a bond with black leadership that had been growing since the early days of the Niagara Movement and the founding of the NAACP. White publishing houses like Boni and Liveright, Knopf, Macmillan, Harper & Brothers, and Harcourt Brace eagerly brought out works by black authors, breaking down longstanding barriers between those writers and mainstream publication. Jean Toomer's novel *Cane* (Boni and Liveright, 1923) and Countee Cullen's book of verse *Color* (Harper & Brothers, 1925) were the first books of African American fiction and poetry published by major American publishing houses since the turn of the century. White social scientists like Franz Boas, writers like Eugene O'Neill, and musicians like George Gershwin discovered the Negro and black culture as both subject and inspiration. Sculptors and Cubist painters discovered the power in African ceremonial masks. White audiences flocked to concerts by Paul Robeson and Roland Hayes, to stage productions like *Shuffle Along* starring Josephine Baker and the music of Eubie Blake, to Harlem venues like the Apollo and Cotton Club to hear the jazz of Duke Ellington and Cab Calloway and entertainers like Bessie Smith and Ethel Waters. White patrons such as the novelist Carl Van Vechten, whose controversial bestseller *Nigger Heaven* (1926) sensationalized the wild side of Harlem night life, Fannie Hurst, and Charlotte Osgood Mason encouraged and financially supported a number of black writers, including Langston Hughes, Claude McKay, and Zora Neale Hurston. To the bohemian literary left of Greenwich Village, the art of the Harlem Renaissance offered an exuberant alternative to the complacent "normalcy" of post-World War I America. "Harlem," in Langston Hughes's phrase from *The Big Sea* (1940), "was in vogue."

Although the poets and novelists of the Renaissance shared a strong sense of racial pride and commitment to the struggle for economic opportunity and social equality, they were never limited to a particular literary style. While Langston Hughes's verse, for example, owes much to Walt Whitman and Carl Sandberg in its democratic embracing of the lives and idioms

of everyday Americans, poems like "Jazzonia," "Dream Variations," and "The Weary Blues" also incorporate the syncopated rhythms of jazz and verbal patterns of the 12-bar blues to evoke the sights and sounds of Harlem night life. Poets like Claude McKay and Countee Cullen, on the other hand, mastered traditional European forms such as the sonnet to explore the black experience. McKay's "If We Must Die" (1919) heroically responds to the anti-black riots that swept across America after World War I: "Like men we'll face the murderous, cowardly pack / Pressed to the wall, dying, but fighting back." Cullen's "Yet Do I Marvel" (1925) confronts the black artist's alienation and outsider status; "Yet do I marvel at this curious thing / To make a poet black, and bid him sing!"

Similar stylistic variety exists among the fiction writers of the period. Jessie Fauset's *Plum Bun* (1928) and Nella Larsen's *Quicksand* (1928) and *Passing* (1929), while staying within traditional novelistic forms, opened up new territory in their psychological depiction of educated, middle-class African American women. In contrast, Zora Neale Hurston's *Jonah's Gourd Vine* (1934) and *Their Eyes Were Watching God* (1937) drew heavily on the idioms, music forms, and folklore of the rural South. More modernist and experimental than either, Jean Toomer's *Cane* impressionistically combined prose, poetry, and drama to connect the deep racial memories of the rural South still alive in the urban North.

Differences in style and subject were never just aesthetic or just generational. By 1926, the political aims and ideology of the NAACP officialdom were, as often as not, at odds with the creative impulses of the writers they had once showcased in *The Crisis*. Outraged by what he felt was an uncritical acceptance by both blacks and whites of the stereotypical images of blacks as uneducated criminals, drug pushers, prostitutes, gamblers, and clowns that populated white novelist Carl Van Vechten's *Nigger Heaven*, W. E. B. Du Bois used *The Crisis* as a pulpit to denounce the direction the New Negro writers were going. He bitterly attacked not only Van Vechten's novel as a "slap in the face" (Lewis 1994) but McKay's *Home to Harlem* as well. He hosted a symposium on "The Negro in Art: How Shall He Be Portrayed?" and argued in "The Criteria of Negro Art" that black artists were politically regressive and irresponsible in choosing the underside of Negro life for their subject rather

than uplifting stories of struggle and resistance. “All art is propaganda,” he declared. “I do not give a damn for art that is not propaganda” (Lewis 1994). Although the ideological split would remain, few writers went along with Du Bois’s dictum.

By the mid-1930s, the Harlem Renaissance was in decline. Unemployment reached 50 percent in Harlem in 1932. The Great Depression also meant fewer publishers interested in black authors, fewer recording contracts for black musicians, and fewer patrons for black artists. The end of Prohibition in 1933 opened other venues for the white patrons of Harlem night life. As the economic crisis worsened, many of the leading figures of the Renaissance turned increasingly to Marxist aesthetics and the militancy of the Communist Party. On March 19, 1935, Harlem erupted in rioting, resulting in three deaths and over two million dollars’ worth of property damage. A multiracial Mayor’s Commission headed by African American sociologist E. Franklin Frazer attributed the rioting to its root causes in job discrimination, segregation, and police brutality; the riots, more than anything else, symbolized the waning of that optimism, vitality, and creativity that had fueled the Harlem Renaissance. In its wake, many key figures of the movement left Harlem, either for black universities in the South, like Du Bois and James Weldon Johnson, or following Paul Robeson, Langston Hughes, Josephine Baker, and Claude McKay for the increased tolerance of Europe. Nevertheless, the Harlem Renaissance, in its exploration of a new racial consciousness, successfully redefined how America, the world, and blacks themselves understood the African American experience. By doing so, it set the stage for the progress in civil rights that would be its most enduring political legacy.

SEE ALSO: Césaire, Aimé (1913–2008); Civil Rights, United States, Overview; Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963); Négritude Movement; Randolph, A. Philip (1889–1979); Robeson, Paul (1898–1976); Senghor, Léopold (1906–2001)

References and Suggested Readings

- Gates, H. L. & McKay, N. Y. (2003) *The Norton Anthology of African American Literature*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Huggins, N. (1973) *Harlem Renaissance*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Huggins, N. (Ed.) (1994) *Voices from the Harlem Renaissance*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, D. L. (1981) *When Harlem Was in Vogue*. New York: Knopf.
- Lewis, D. L. (1994) *The Portable Harlem Renaissance Reader*. New York: Viking.
- Locke, A. (1925) *The New Negro*. New York: Albert & Charles Boni.
- Wintz, C. (1988) *Black Culture and the Harlem Renaissance*. Houston: Rice University Press.
- Wintz, C. & Finkelman, P. (2004) *The Encyclopedia of the Harlem Renaissance*. New York: Routledge.

Harris, Charles (1896–1939)

Wessel P. Visser

Charles Harris, a white unionist of Jewish descent, began to work in the mining industry in 1914 as a developer, including at the Randfontein Estates, Luipaardsvlei, and Robinson Deep gold mines. He was involved with the South African Mineworkers’ Union (SAMWU), and served on the executive of the South African Industrial Federation alongside figures like Archie Crawford. After the 1922 Rand Revolt, he was blacklisted on the mines for four years.

Harris subsequently rose quickly in SAMWU, becoming its general-secretary. There were allegations of irregularities during his election, and a great deal of controversy and dissatisfaction with his management style throughout his tenure. He forged the office of general-secretary into a powerful and almost untouchable position of authority, virtually becoming dictator of SAMWU. Among the methods used were irregular measures to alter the union’s constitution, the falsification of minutes, rigged elections, and, in several cases, violence against dissidents.

The Harris administration was dogged by rumors of gross mismanagement and by widespread corruption. While the gold mines boomed and workloads increased in the 1930s and early 1940s, real wages for many whites on the mines remained static or declined. Harris was insulated from rising dissatisfaction in the ranks by his autocracy and SAMWU’s shop agreement with the Chamber of Mines from 1937: acting harshly against opponents and unofficial actions, the Harris administration was increasingly regarded as disciplining the white workers on behalf of the mine owners.

The union was also afflicted by ethnic tensions. By the 1930s, most members were Afrikaners, many supporters of the Afrikaner nationalist National Party. Harris was widely regarded as pro-English and as a supporter of the predominantly English South African Labor Party. National Party-supporting factions in the unions like the *Afrikaner Bond van Mynwerkers* (Afrikaner League of Mineworkers), followed by the *Herformingsorganisasie* (Reformers' Organization), were established: championing members' grievances, and led by figures like Daan Ellis, they aimed at ousting Harris.

The struggle in SAMWU took a dramatic turn when, on Saturday June 15, 1939, a young Afrikaner miner from Springs called Jacob Moller Hugo shot and killed Charles Harris opposite the SAMWU offices in Johannesburg. Some sources suggested Hugo committed the murder under the influence of the Reformers' Organization, but the court found no evidence: considering Hugo mentally disturbed, it sentenced him to life. The new general-secretary, Bertie Broderick, ran the union in much the same way as his predecessor, and it was only after the National Party's 1948 election victory that the Reformers finally managed to capture SAMWU; the newly installed apartheid government also released Hugo from jail.

SEE ALSO: COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions); Ellis, Daniel Edward "Daan" (1904–1963); South Africa, Labor Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- De Kock, L. (1983) *Die Stryd van die Afrikaner in die Suid-Afrikaanse Mynwerkersunie aan die Witwatersrand, 1936–1948*. Masters thesis, Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit.
- Die Mynwerker* (1935) The Man at the Helm. December, p. 21.
- Die Mynwerker* (1939) Our Leaders and Would-Be Leaders. March, p. 37.
- Die Mynwerker* (1939) Charles Harris Shot Outside His Office. June, pp. 6–7.
- Die Mynwerker* (1939) Great Tribute to Charles Harris. June, p. 11.
- Moodie, D. (1975) *The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press.
- Naudé, L. (1969) *Dr. A. Hertzog, die Nasionale Party en die Mynwerkers*. Pretoria: NRT.
- O'Meara, D. (1983) *Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism 1934–1948*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Simons, J. & Simons, R. (1969/1983) *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850–1950*. London: International Defense and Aid Fund.

Walker, I. L. & Weinbren, B. (1961) *2000 Casualties: A History of the Trade Unions and the Labour Movement in the Union of South Africa*. Johannesburg: South African Trade Union Council.

Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and the Muslim Brotherhood

Lawrence Davidson

Hasan al-Banna was the founder and first leader of Egypt's Society of the Muslim Brothers. As such he stands as a model for many subsequent Islamic fundamentalist leaders. He was born in the Egyptian delta town of Mahmudiya in October 1906. As a youth, al-Banna went to lay schools but also joined a series of religious societies, the most important of which was the Hasafiya Sufi order. His early upbringing oriented him toward an active interest in and concern for the community's welfare, which he saw in Muslim religious terms.

In 1923 al-Banna left home for Cairo, where he entered Dar al-Ulum, Egypt's teacher training college. While in Cairo he personally witnessed the process of transformation Egypt was undergoing as western influences permeated the local culture and affected the lifestyles of the country's middle and upper classes. By the first half of the twentieth century Egypt suffered from many of the problems that beset the Muslim world. The country remained subject to British imperial control. From behind the scenes, a British high commissioner set the parameters of official action for Egypt's constitutional monarchy. With imperial control came a quickening of an ongoing westernization of major institutions. Civil law, for example, increasingly displaced Shariah or Muslim religious law, and secular education competed with the religiously oriented mosque schools. Trade had long been directed toward Europe, and a wealthy indigenous upper class had grown up with western tastes and values. This alien point of view spread, as all things European were touted as modern, progressive, and superior. His experiences in Cairo convinced al-Banna that Egypt was in a morally

weak social condition and this was allowing it to be drawn away from the Islamic traditions he so valued by a process of westernization.

After graduation from Dar al-Ulum, al-Banna was assigned as an instructor in Arabic at the primary school in Ismailiya, the town along the Suez Canal which was also the site of the Suez Canal Company's headquarters. Here he experienced at first hand the racism and foreign dominance that went with British imperialism. It was this collective experience that finally led al-Banna to found the Society of the Muslim Brothers in March 1928. Because al-Banna believed that the root cause of Egypt's (and generally the Muslim world's) problems was its deviation from a true Islamic community, the goal of his society was to bring Egypt's Muslim population back to an accurate understanding and practice of Islam. This meant a return to traditional Muslim values and assuring that the government ruled on the basis of Muslim norms.

The new organization faced many challenges, some of which were suggested by al-Banna's critique of Egyptian society. British colonialism, of course, had to be fought against and eventually eliminated. But the corruption of Egyptian institutions by British rule compounded the problem of organizing political resistance. For instance, the major political parties (such as the large Wafd Party) within the parliamentary political structure encouraged by the British had, in al-Banna's view, been captured by a western worldview. He associated this worldview with the qualities of radical individualism, gender equality, class conflict, materialism, and atheism. While many of these Egyptian political parties stood for independence, their secular and western orientation did not allow them to address the country's cultural alienation or socioeconomic woes. Their platforms had little or no Islamic content. Thus, argued al-Banna, Egypt possessed a pseudo-democracy that was only leading the country away from its Islamic traditions and duties of piety, altruism, community fellowship, strong family orientation, domestic roles for women, and social justice. Similarly, Egypt's western law codes had "no relation to its citizens and does not spring from their hearts." Just so, Egyptian capitalism, as it had evolved under the influence of western-dominated trade, served only to exploit the land and the peasants. It entailed no acknowledgment of the Muslim belief that wealth comes from God and requires

the well-to-do to have a sense of obligation to serve the community.

What sort of future did al-Banna and his young organization offer in the place of this dismal present? As with all Islamic fundamentalists, the Muslim Brothers drew inspiration from the past. As the Brothers interpreted it, the initial period of Muslim rule – the time of Muhammad's rule at Medina followed by the first four Caliphs – set forth the outlines of ideal government. In that period the Caliph was elected by the community, which therefore represented the source of the ruler's authority. Those people elected were pious men well versed in Islamic law. Tax monies were devoted to community needs, and a sense of religious brotherhood prevailed. That the Muslims had fallen from this state of governmental grace was due to the mistakes and sins committed by the Umayyad dynasty and other successor regimes following the first four "rightly guided" Caliphs. After them, the Caliphate was transformed into a hereditary kingship, factionalism replaced Muslim solidarity, and greed and materialism prevailed. Eventually, these conditions so weakened the Islamic community as to allow foreign invasion to occur. The latest manifestation of this decline was modern western colonialism.

If the decay and disintegration of the Muslim world were to be reversed, the original virtues, that is, the example set by the earliest Muslims, had somehow to be reinterpreted in light of twentieth-century realities. Hasan al-Banna and his followers did not espouse a return to the lifestyle of the seventh and eighth centuries. Rather, they sought to create a community governed by age-old Islamic ideals, which they thought were inherent in Muslim religious law and practice and also compatible with the technical and scientific advances of their day. Thus they sought an Islamic order at once old and new.

Central to al-Banna's vision of an Islamic order was the reinstatement of Muslim religious law and the concept of rule by consultation (shura). He often quoted the motto, "the Quran is our constitution." As long as the community was governed by these general principles, the particular form of government adopted was secondary. Outright dictatorship, however, was ruled out by al-Banna's interpretation of the nature of the early Muslim polity as being one where the ruler was elected, and by the Quranic injunction that governance was to involve

consultation. From these principles, the Muslim Brothers saw the root of authority resting with the community of Muslim believers as a whole. A consultative body of learned and pious men, chosen by the community, would lead both the people and the ruler down the “straight path” and thus produce an environment conducive to a good Muslim life. Neither al-Banna nor the other thinkers produced by the Society of the Muslim Brothers went much beyond these general principles. Yet, in terms of the ideal, most Muslims do not believe that Islamic fundamentalist political thought leads only to some form of tyranny.

Hasan al-Banna would seek to convince the Egyptian people that this ideal Islamic order was possible. He did so by establishing a pattern of operation that proved so successful that the organization he founded grew with great rapidity. Energetically preaching in the mosques and coffee houses, he sought to win the support of “opinion makers” (the ulama, the shaykhs of the Sufi religious orders, the heads of leading families and clans, leaders of the various social and religious clubs and teachers). With their financial support, he organized community self-help projects such as the building of mosques, clinics, recreation halls, and small community businesses. All of this was organized around the message that improvement and contentment could come by pursuing goals based on altruistic Islamic values: charity, cooperation, generosity, the social responsibility that came with wealth. The message plus the achievement of specific community based projects tied theory to practice.

By the time World War II broke out in 1939, the Society of the Muslim Brothers was one of the most active and popular organizations in Egypt. Its membership crossed all class and occupational lines, encompassing laborers, peasants, artisans, merchants, educators, students, and civil servants. It ran its own press, youth groups, hospitals, and schools. It even ran athletic training and physical fitness groups.

As the society grew it took on an organizational form that could be called benevolent autocracy. This format did not quite match the consultative and elective ideal the society held for an Islamic state, but it did reflect the cultural norm in Egypt and much of the Arab Muslim world. That is, in its organization, the Society of the Muslim Brothers reflected the hierarchical arrangements that characterized family, economic, social, and

political life in its culture. Al-Banna led the brotherhood with the title “General Guide.” All members took an oath of loyalty in which they swore to “have complete confidence” in the organization’s “leadership and to obey absolutely under all circumstances.” The day-to-day operation of the brotherhood was managed by a General Consultative Council of 12–15 members out of which a Secretary General was elected. He was the chief operations officer, but both he and the Consultative Council were responsible to the General Guide. The organization also had a Consultative Assembly that met annually to review the society’s status, and periodic mass meetings of members also were held. The ultimate power, however, rested with the General Guide.

Many administrative subdivisions evolved over time. A section devoted to the “propagation of the Message” ran missionary programs, trained speakers for public meetings, and oversaw publications and the general education of members. Other sections of the organization dealt specifically with peasants, laborers, students, and the professions. Each section shaped the message and activities of the brotherhood to the needs of its particular assigned constituency.

At the base of this organizational structure were local chapters or branches, each of which had its own “council of administration.” The branches broke down into “families” of five to ten members. Each member was encouraged to see himself connected to each other “family” member in a way that expressed the living out of Muslim values. They were to be mutually responsible for each other in good times and bad; they spent time together, and supported each other in avoiding such Islamic defined evils as gambling, drinking, usury, and adultery. More positively, they were to encourage each other in the establishment and maintenance of an Islamic home life (cultivation of individual virtue, devotion to wife and children, and restriction of women to domestic roles). Every “family” was to maintain a “cooperative treasury” contributed to by each member.

As has been suggested, al-Banna’s dedication of the society to the service of the community in the name of age-old Muslim values proved very successful. It will also be remembered that al-Banna saw Egypt’s problems as stemming in large part from a compromised and corrupted political environment that could only be redeemed through an “Islamic order.” Thus we have a very large organization with a growing and

dedicated membership ultimately seeking the re-Islamization of Egyptian society. The political implications of this stand were undeniable. The Society of the Muslim Brothers could not help but eventually be drawn into politics.

The political cause over which the brotherhood most easily mobilized was anti-imperialism. Muslim brothers were called out repeatedly to demonstrate against the British role in Egypt. In the same vein, they actively supported the Palestinian cause against Zionist settlement. With the outbreak of World War II, the society advocated a status of non-belligerency for Egypt. This stance brought the organization into direct conflict with the pro-British government of the day and led to the first serious action against the society by the Egyptian state. In 1941 al-Banna and other leaders of the Muslim Brothers were temporarily arrested and the society's publications banned.

It was in these times of trouble that al-Banna took a fateful step. In late 1942 or early 1943 he created a section of the brotherhood called the secret apparatus. It was a clandestine group within the organization designed to defend the society from both the British and the government. But the secret apparatus also developed an aggressive, offensive capability of an extralegal nature, often expressed through hit-and-run attacks on British personnel and Egyptian police. The identity of those brothers belonging to the secret apparatus was unknown to the society's general membership, and its leaders reported directly to al-Banna. In theory, he controlled the group and its activities. However, control was never complete, and herein lay a fatal flaw for the future.

The end of World War II did not bring peace between the Muslim Brothers and the government. The economy turned downward and unemployment rose sharply. A great number of peasants left their villages and migrated to the cities in search of work. The Brothers' response was to expand their schools to offer technical training that would increase the employability of these often unskilled migrants. The Brothers also began more small businesses and increased the number of their medical clinics. While the Society of the Muslim Brothers reached out to the unemployed and the poor, the government seemed indifferent to their sufferings, leaving many Egyptians alienated from the ruling elite. Continuous labor strife as well as ongoing anti-

government and anti-British demonstrations marked the postwar period.

Finally, in December 1948, the Egyptian government, fearing that the Muslim Brothers were plotting an imminent uprising, issued orders dissolving the society (a decree that would remain in effect until December 1951). Much of the Brothers' leadership was again arrested. Although al-Banna was allowed to remain free, he was placed under "strict surveillance." What the Egyptian government failed to realize was that by taking this action it had cut the chain of command between al-Banna and the secret apparatus. As closely watched as he was, he could no longer receive information or issue orders. This meant that there was now a religiously motivated, well trained group of brothers whose identity remained hidden, ready to do violence against a government that had declared its intention of suppressing the society. The one man who could restrain them was beyond communication. On December 28, 1948 one of these secret apparatus operatives assassinated the Egyptian prime minister, Mahmud Nuqrashi. Al-Banna had nothing to do with the attack and immediately repudiated it, but the government held him ultimately responsible. On February 12, 1949, in an act of revenge, government agents assassinated Hasan al-Banna.

From that point on the brotherhood was subject to periodic banning and mass arrests by the various postwar Egyptian governments. While such suppression did prevent the Muslim Brothers from becoming an effective political challenge in Egypt, it did not prevent them becoming a role model for many of today's contemporary Muslim fundamentalist movements.

SEE ALSO: Egypt and Arab Socialism; Egypt, Peasant Rebellion of 1824; Egypt, Revolution of 1952

References and Suggested Readings

- Appleby, R. S. (Ed.) (1997) *Spokesman for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- El-Awaisi, A. A.-F. M. (1998) *The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question, 1928–1947*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Mitchell, R. P. (1993) *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rahnema, A. (Ed.) (1994) *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*. London: Zed Books.
- Wendell, C. (Ed.) (1978) *Five Tracts of Hasan Al-Banna (1906–1949)*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hatta Shūzō (1886–1934)

Takashi Ikeda

Hatta Shūzō was a Japanese anarchist in the interwar years, known as a representative of “pure anarchism” and an opponent of anarcho-syndicalism, the most influential anarchist theory at that time. He was born the last of seven children in Mie, Japan. In his teens he worked at a post office in Taipei, Taiwan, where he encountered Christianity. After returning to Japan, he graduated from a theological college in Kobe and started to engage in missionary work. While working as a clergyman, however, he lost his faith in Christianity and showed more and more sympathy with anarchism. In 1924 he was banished from the church and moved to Tokyo, where he worked intensively on creating the pure anarchism theory.

The main point of his criticism is that under the influence of Marxism, anarchosyndicalism pursues revolutionary change through class struggle and organizes it in a labor movement. In his view, such an attempt cannot lead to a genuine revolution insofar as it is led by a specified set of people – namely, city workers or the proletariat. He believed that the revolution for a decentralized community for all people must exclude all kinds of power, including the dictatorship of the proletariat. He insisted that the necessary condition for realizing such a revolution was to abandon the division of work, which is originally demanded by the capitalist economy and divides the people into groups concerned with their own industry and its profit.

Following Peter Kropotkin’s (1842–1921) theories of “social physiology,” Hatta argued that revolutionary action should be exercised in a number of small communes on the basis of research about how people can satisfy their needs with the least human energy. According to Hatta, the reason why such a proposal is regarded as utopian is based upon the assumption that human need is infinite and must be controlled by a certain kind of central power. But such an assumption, he claimed, results from the sickness in developed capitalist societies which constantly increases human desires. He believed that decentralized mutual aid for satisfying finite common needs is partially realized in Japanese

farming areas, so these areas could be the origin for spreading revolution. This “pure anarchism” became one of the most important streams in the Japanese anarchist movement after World War II. Supporters founded an association named the Nihon Anarchist Club.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Japan; Dictatorship of the Proletariat; Ishikawa Sanshirō (1876–1956); Japan, Post-World War II Protest Movements; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921)

References and Suggested Readings

- Crump, J. (1993) *Hatta Shuzo and Pure Anarchism in Interwar Japan*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
 Hatta, S. (1981) *Zenshū Museifukuyōsanshugi*. Tokyo: Kokushoku Sensensha.
 Komatsu, R. (1972) *Nihon Anarchism Undōshi*. Tokyo: Aoki Shoten.

Hatuey (ca. 1400s–1512)

Camila Piñeiro Harnecker

Hatuey, an indigenous Taino chieftain of Arawak origin, is revered as the first Cuban independence martyr and cited as an example of national dignity and courage. Having seen the horror of Spanish colonization on his native island, Hispaniola (Dominican Republic and Haiti), Hatuey fled from western Haiti to eastern Cuba in 1511 and organized the first major resistance to European conquest. From 1492, when Columbus’s expedition landed on Hispaniola, to 1510, nearly 75 percent of the island’s indigenous population were exterminated, reducing their numbers from an estimated 200,000 to 46,000 people.

Conquistadors – Spanish nobles and merchants who sought to extract the riches of the “new world” and enslave its inhabitants – carried out massacres across the island against unarmed people, often after having been received with the hospitality that characterized the Taino people. Many Tainos also died from the hardships of forced labor, starvation, sexual servitude, and disease.

When Hatuey learned that the Spaniards were planning to move to neighboring Cuba in search of more gold, he gathered the surviving 400 men, women, and children of his clan and traveled there to warn other Tainos of the Spaniards’ motives. Seeking to create a united front to defend against the common enemy, he

arrived at what is now Maisí, Cuba, and explained to his people that the Spaniards' brutality was due to a need to appease their God: gold. Many in Cuba were skeptical and declined to join him at that time. Diego Velázquez de Cuéllar (a Spanish conquistador, then governor of Haiti and later of Cuba) arrived in northeastern Cuba in pursuit of the rebel leader and founded the first Spanish settlement in Baracoa. After initially trying to avoid confronting Velázquez's troops, Hatuey launched an offensive using guerilla warfare tactics, and helped bring together Cuban Tainos and Ciboneyes in several major rebellions. For three months he kept the Spaniards on the defensive, confining them to their fort in Baracoa.

Hatuey was betrayed by a fellow Taino and captured by Spanish forces on February 2, 1512 in Yara. According to the testimony of the conquistador turned Dominican friar, Bartolomé de las Casas, the Taino leader was sentenced to death and offered a choice by his captors: accept the Spaniards' Christian faith and receive a swift execution, or be burned alive at the stake. He chose the latter, claiming that if there were Spaniards in heaven he preferred going to hell. Nearly 500 years later, he remains a powerful national symbol and important part of Cuban identity. During the 1895–8 Cuban independence war, the "Hatuey Regiment" – formed by Cubans of indigenous descent, under the instructions of José Martí – fought audaciously under Major General Antonio Maceo (Barreiro 2004). A town in Camagüey Province is named after him, as well as a brand of beer, and his legend has inspired pilgrimages, paintings, poems, and other literary tributes.

SEE ALSO: Cuba, Struggle for Independence from Spain, 1868–1898; Martí, José (1853–1895) and the Partido Revolucionario Cubano

References and Suggested Readings

- Barreiro, J. (2004) Beyond the Myth of Extinction: The Hatuey Regiment. *KACIKE: Journal of Caribbean Amerindian History and Anthropology*. Available at www.kacike.org/Barreiro.html (downloaded May 6, 2008).
- Casas, B. (1992) *Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies*. Ed. N. Griffin. London: Penguin.
- Rodríguez-Expósito, C. (1944) *Hatuey, el primer libertador de Cuba, apunte biografico* (Hatuey, the First Liberator of Cuba, a Biographical Note). Havana: Cubanacan.

- Rogonzinski, J. (2000) *A Brief History of the Caribbean: From the Aravak and Carib to the Present*. New York: Plume.
- Sierra, J. A. (2006) The Legend of Hatuey. *The History of Cuba*. Available at www.historyofcuba.com/history/oriente/hatuey.htm (downloaded May 6, 2008).
- Stannard, D. E. (1992) *American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, E. (1984) *From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean 1492–1969*. New York: Vintage.

Hauptmann, Gerhart (1862–1946)

Romena Griem

Gerhart Hauptmann was a German literary author, chiefly known today for his early naturalistic social drama *Die Weber* (*The Weavers*), which was published in 1892. It portrays the 1844 weaver revolt in Silesia and features a realistic portrayal of the suffering and humanity of the poor, and the hopelessness of their situation. While Hauptmann argued that the play was merely a faithful depiction of a historic event, the Prussian government feared that it condemned contemporary conditions for weavers. Public performances were temporarily banned in Berlin and elsewhere in Europe out of a fear that it would lead to class conflict. When it was performed publicly, the German imperial family cancelled their theater box in protest. The anarchist Johann Most participated in an American staging that included extra incendiary sections provided by its leftist performers.

Hauptmann's early social dramas successfully revealed the suffering of the poor to a new middle-class audience who might otherwise have turned a blind eye to the conditions of the poor. He was criticized by leftists for not being militant enough, while conservatives considered his early social dramas to be troubling and potentially dangerous. Hauptmann later turned to other themes, earning the derision of contemporary and modern critics.

In 1912 Hauptmann was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. The next year he was commissioned to write a play to commemorate the one hundredth anniversary of the end of the Napoleonic Wars. After a few performances, the production was halted by Crown Prince

Wilhelm, who complained that the work was not nationalistic enough and objected to its depiction of monarchs as puppets. Hauptmann's closing scene in the play compared war to murder, but after World War I broke out in 1914, the author supported the German war effort.

SEE ALSO: Silesian Uprisings

References and Suggested Readings

- Dobie, A. B. (1969) Riot, Revolution, and *The Weavers*. *Modern Drama* 12 (September): 165–72.
- Hauptmann, G. (1912–13) *Social Dramas*. Ed. L. Lewisohn. New York: Huebsch. Available at www.gutenberg.org/wiki/Main_Page.

Havel, Václav (b. 1936)

Christopher W. Harwood

A Czech dramatist whose absurdist plays earned him international acclaim in the 1960s, Václav Havel became widely known in the 1970s and 1980s as a human rights activist and prisoner of conscience, and later as the central figure in the Velvet Revolution of 1989, which ended 40 years of communist rule in Czechoslovakia. Havel then served as the last president of Czechoslovakia and first president of the Czech Republic.

Havel won fame as a playwright with successful productions of his early plays at Prague's Theater on the Balustrade. During the period of liberalization that culminated in the Prague Spring of 1968, Havel's essays and speeches prominently advocated free expression and democratic reform. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968 and subsequent imposition of a repressive, pro-Soviet regime, Havel was blacklisted from the theater and his writings were banned.

In April 1975 Havel wrote an open letter to communist leader Gustáv Husák in which he diagnosed the grim, demoralized state of Czechoslovak society under the post-1968 regime of "normalization" and held party leadership accountable. In January 1977 he co-authored Charter 77, a petition calling on the Czechoslovak government to uphold its commitment to international human rights agreements, and began serving as spokesperson for the Charter 77 civic initiative for monitoring human rights. For these activities he was jailed for four months. In

October 1978 Havel wrote "The Power of the Powerless," deepening his analysis of totalitarian society and raising the ideal of "living in truth" as an antidote to political repression and concomitant moral malaise. The essay became an inspiration for dissident movements throughout Eastern Europe. In 1979 Havel was arrested and sentenced to four and a half years in prison for "subversion of the republic."

After student demonstrations initiated the Velvet Revolution on November 17, 1989, Havel co-founded Civic Forum, an umbrella group of activists seeking an end to authoritarian, single-party rule. As the group's spokesperson, Havel led negotiations with communist authorities on the transfer of power, which led to his being elected president, first by the Communist Federal Assembly in December 1989, then by a freely elected parliament in July 1990. Unable to avert the dissolution of Czechoslovakia negotiated in parliament, he resigned in July 1992.

Havel was elected president of the Czech Republic in January 1993 and reelected in January 1998. Thanks in part to his efforts, the Czech Republic joined NATO in March 1999 and advanced toward membership of the European Union. In February 2003 Havel left active politics at the end of his second term to pursue humanitarian projects and return to playwriting.

SEE ALSO: Charter 77; Prague Spring; Velvet Revolution, 1989

References and Suggested Readings

- Havel, V. (1990) *Disturbing the Peace: A Conversation with Karel Hvižd'ála*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Havel, V. (1991) *Open Letters: Selected Writings, 1965–1990*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Havel, V. (1992) *Summer Meditations: On Politics, Morality and Civility in a Time of Transition*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Havel, V. (1999) *Spisy [Works]*, 7 Vols. Prague: Torst.

Hawaii, resistance to US invasion and occupation

Stacy Warner Maddern

On January 16, 1893, Queen Liliuokalani yielded to the "superior force of the United States of America," in an effort to avoid bloodshed and in

the hope that the United States would one day undo the wrong it had inflicted on the Hawaiian people. The monarchy in Hawaii had thus been toppled by an armed insurrection of a small group of men, mostly American businessmen, with the backing of US troops sent ashore from a warship located in Honolulu Harbor. In justification of this “revolution” from above, the wealthy sugar planters who led the coup cited corrupt and unsatisfactory conditions in government. Sugar was the principal commodity of the Islands, with a large portion of profits coming from the US market. With plantation ownership dominated by American and European interests, the growth of the industry contracted large numbers of laborers from China, Japan, and some European countries.

In 1887, a Hawaiian League was formed by a group of planters and businessmen seeking to gain economic and political control of the Island. The League was a secret organization comprised predominantly of American businessmen, with a membership not exceeding 400. This took place during the reign of King Kalakauna (Liliuokalani’s brother) over a population of Native Hawaiians not exceeding 40,000. The League was organized and led by a lawyer named Lorrin A. Thurston, the grandson of American missionaries.

After threatening Kalakauna with insurrection, the League convinced him to accept a new cabinet. After further protests, the king was also compelled to form a new constitution, which came to be known as the Bayonet Constitution. The new constitution granted the League complete executive power by stating that the king could not dismiss cabinet members. It also removed the majority of Native Hawaiians from the political process by extending the voting privilege to foreign residents of American and European descent. Asians were excluded from voting even if they were naturalized citizens. The House of Nobles, a political body formerly appointed by the king, was now subject to election. However, in order to vote or to be a candidate, individuals had to meet high property ownership or income requirements that excluded two-thirds of the native population. Native Hawaiians could still vote for appointees to the House of Representatives, but they could only vote for candidates who swore to uphold the Bayonet Constitution.

Protests by Hawaiians over the erosion of their voice in governance and outrage over the dimin-

ished capacity of the monarch’s powers fell on deaf ears. The cabinet offered no explanation, retorting that only an act of the legislature could override the constitution – the same constitution that had never been put to a vote. In 1889, a group of about 80 Hawaiians, led by Robert W. Wilcox, staged an uprising to overthrow the Bayonet Constitution. The intent was to march to Iolani Palace, the center of government, and to present a new constitution for the king to sign. Wilcox and his men were put down after the cabinet called out troops. Wilcox was tried for conspiracy and later acquitted by a jury of Native Hawaiians.

Liliuokalani ascended the throne after her brother’s death in 1891. Soon thereafter, in 1892, Thurston brought together the Annexation Club, whose sole purpose was to overthrow the queen and pursue annexation by the United States. On a trip to Washington to promote annexation, Thurston was encouraged by President Benjamin Harrison’s message that he would find there “an exceedingly sympathetic administration.”

On January 14, after being inundated with petitions for a new constitution, the queen decided to act to restore power to the throne and rights to the Native Hawaiian people. Nevertheless, after heated arguments with her cabinet, who refused to sign a new constitution, and fearing her enemies would remove her from the throne, the queen deferred. Even so, an alerted Annexation Club moved quickly to finalize plans for her overthrow and establish a provisional government. The queen had provided the justification for revolution, according to Annexation members, who claimed she had, in constructing a new constitution, committed “a revolutionary act.” With the American warship *USS Boston* anchored in Honolulu Harbor, Thurston notified US Ambassador John L. Stevens, who had pledged to deploy troops “to protect American lives and property.” Stevens offered recognition of the provisional government by the United States once Annexation members were in possession of government buildings or in relevant control of the city.

Sensing a mounting crisis, the queen issued a proclamation on January 15 declaring that she would not seek to alter the constitution except by constitutional means. She also sought the assurances of Ambassador Stevens, but to no avail. The following day, several hundred Native Hawaiians congregated around Palace Square

to express their support of the queen and their loyalty to the monarchy. When Thurston arrived, he vehemently denounced the queen and asked for a resolution to remove her from the throne. Against the wishes of the crowd, the resolution was passed and the monarchy was overthrown. On hearing of this, Ambassador Stevens deployed 162 fully armed troops from the *Boston*.

On January 20, 1893, the provisional government was formally recognized as the *de facto* government of Hawaii, and by the end of the month Ambassador Stevens authorized the raising of the American flag. The new administration then sent a commission headed by Thurston to Washington to negotiate a treaty for annexation. Thurston's negotiations with Secretary of State John Foster were fruitful, and on February 14, 1893, the treaty of annexation was drawn up and signed by both parties. The Senate favored ratifying the treaty until incoming President Grover Cleveland ordered that it be withdrawn for further consideration. The president followed by sending Colonel James A. Blount to Hawaii as special commissioner charged with conducting a thorough investigation of the affairs connected with the revolution.

On his arrival in Hawaii on March 29, Colonel Blount immediately ordered that the American flag be lowered. Thurston and other members of the provincial government viewed Blount's investigation as a mere formality in the path toward annexation. However, as spring gave way to summer, annexationists became less hopeful. By June, Thurston was given the impression that the best that might come from President Cleveland was a declaration of protection. Colonel Blount completed his investigation and left Hawaii on August 8, 1893. The provincial government expected that President Cleveland, reassured, would make a formal statement reflecting his support of the Hawaiian policy. No statement was ever made. Instead, the president appointed Albert S. Willis as the new ambassador to Hawaii in November 1893, making no mention of annexation.

Blount's investigation charged that Ambassador Stevens had conspired with Thurston and others to overthrow the monarchy. He further suggested that the events of January 17, 1893 would not have been possible without the support of US troops. He concluded that the undoubted sentiment of the people was "for the queen, against the provincial government and against annexa-

tion." Blount went even further to suggest that "There is not an annexationist in the Islands, so far as I have been able to observe, who would be willing to submit the question of annexation to a popular vote." President Cleveland accepted Colonel Blount's recommendations and ended all hope of annexation. In response to the misuse of power by Ambassador Stevens, the president offered that "the United States cannot fail to vindicate [Hawaiian] honor . . . by an earnest effort to make all possible reparation." President Cleveland then placed the entire matter in the hands of Congress.

John Tyler Morgan, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and a strong supporter of annexation, conducted the Senate hearings. His final report placed all responsibility for the revolution squarely on the queen. While Morgan's findings were disputed in the Senate, the House censured Stevens and passed a resolution opposing annexation, but to no avail. Congress ended up taking no action toward restoring the monarchy, and took no official position on annexation.

In Hawaii, Thurston and the annexationists were frustrated but not defeated as they moved to form a republic. Their new constitution required all voters to swear allegiance to the republic, which thousands of Native Hawaiians opposed out of loyalty to the queen. Because property and income requirements were necessary to qualify for the right to vote, most of the Native population was once again excluded from the process. The constitution was proclaimed law by a vote of those who had originally favored annexation. On July 4, 1894, Sanford Dole, cousin of the pineapple magnate James Dole, was chosen by Thurston to serve as the first and only president of the Republic of Hawaii.

Unrest and frustration on the part of Native Hawaiians set the stage for counterrevolution with the aim of restoring the monarchy. In January 1895, Robert Wilcox led another insurrection that was eventually quelled, after ten days of fighting, by the Republic's troops. After Wilcox and ten others were captured, troops entered the home of Queen Liliuokalani where they found a cache of arms buried in a flower garden. The queen was arrested and charged with having knowledge of treason and failing to report it. After being tried by a military commission, she was found guilty and sentenced to five years of hard labor and a \$5,000 fine. Although the sentence was eventually suspended, she was kept prisoner in

the palace for another eight months, after which she returned to her home and remained under house arrest until late 1896.

The queen traveled to Washington one last time in 1897 to meet with President Cleveland and present documents signed by many Hawaiians requesting her reinstatement. Unfortunately, the president could no longer help, as his successor, William McKinley, had already begun the process of annexation by sending a new treaty to the Senate for ratification on June 16. The following September a group of Senators visited Hawaii, among them John Tyler Morgan, who urged annexation. Morgan gave public speeches and newspaper interviews informing Native Hawaiians of the benefits and improved status they would have as American citizens.

Later that month a group of some 3,000 Native Hawaiians gathered in Palace Square to express clear opposition to annexation and to address Senator Morgan. F. J. Testa, editor of the *Ka Makāainana*, a Hawaiian-language newspaper, read a “Memorial to the President and Congress of the United States” outlining reasons against annexation. J. O. Carter, a confidant of the queen, warned of the “grave responsibilities for the Hawaiian people” of an alliance with the United States, maintaining that so long as Hawaii remained independent, she would be “free from all the entanglements that beset the rest of the world.” The event raised doubts in those Senators present, other than Morgan. On November 20, 1897, four Hawaiian men – John Richardson, William Auld, James Kaulia, and David Kalauokalani – traveled to Washington with a petition of 40,000 signatures of Hawaiians opposed to annexation. Assisted by Senator Richard Franklin Pettigrew, the Hawaiians presented their petition during the treaty debates. Soon after, the Senate failed to ratify the treaty, but any celebration would be shortlived.

In 1898, with the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, Hawaii was given strategic preference because of its position in the Pacific. This strengthened the annexation movement, and when it proved to be unavoidable, Grover Cleveland wrote that he was “ashamed of the whole affair.” Sovereignty of Hawaii was officially transferred to the United States on August 12, 1898. During annexation ceremonies, Hawaiians listened to their national anthem as they watched their flag being lowered and replaced with the American flag, to the accompaniment of the “Star-Spangled

Banner.” Honored and revered by her people as queen for the rest of her life, Liliuokalani, died in 1917, at the age of 79.

SEE ALSO: Crazy Horse (1849–1877), Sitting Bull (1831–1890), and Native American Resistance at the Battle of Little Bighorn; Cuba, Struggle for Independence from Spain, 1868–1898; Imperialism and Capitalist Development; Native American Protest, 20th Century; Philippines, Protest during the US Era

References and Suggested Readings

- Fritz, W. (2007) *Hawaiian Revolution: Tomorrow Is Too Late*. Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse.
- Pizer, P. (1994) The Overthrow of the Monarchy. *Spirit of Aloha*, May.
- Pratt, J. (1932) The Hawaiian Revolution: A Reinterpretation. *Pacific Historical Review* 1, 3 (September).
- Rowland, D. (1935) The Establishment of the Republic of Hawaii, 1893–1894. *Pacific Historical Review* 4, 3 (September).
- Russ, W. (1992) *The Hawaiian Republic: And its Struggle to Win Annexation*. Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press.
- Russ, W. (1993) *Hawaiian Revolution, 1893–94*. Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press.
- Weigle, R. (1947) Sugar and the Hawaiian Revolution. *Pacific Historical Review* 16, 1 (February).
- Welch, R. (1988) *The Presidencies of Grover Cleveland*. Kansas: Kansas University Press.

Haya de la Torre, Víctor Raúl (1895–1979)

César Germana

Without doubt, one of the most discussed political characters in twentieth-century Peruvian history is Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. During his long political career, which took him from exile to the underground and finally to the presidency of the 1978 Constituent Congress, Haya de la Torre was an active participant in the central affairs of Peruvian politics. Distinguished and praised by his supporters, wronged by his enemies, no one remained indifferent to his proposals.

Born to a middle-class family in the northern coastal city of Trujillo, Haya de la Torre attended private schools and studied at the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos in Lima. In 1919, as president of Peru’s Student Federation, he carried forward the struggle for university reform. In 1920, invited by the Textile Workers’ Federation, he founded the People’s University,

Manuel Gonzales Prada, in Lima and Vitarte. In 1923 he led a movement against Peru's consecration to the Heart of Jesus, promoted by the government of Augusto B. Leguía in order to legitimize his second presidential term. That same year, Haya de la Torre was deported because of an alleged conspiracy to overthrow the government.

In 1924, while in Mexico, Haya de la Torre established the programmatic and organizational bases of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), which became Peru's strongest party and for years the most serious threat to the oligarchy's waning hold on power. From its inception, APRA played an important role in Peruvian politics. It is today the largest and best-organized political association in Peru. More than any other political party, APRA was able to use its vertical structure to infuse its members with a powerful mystique of sacrifice. Within the party, Haya de la Torre, who was addressed as the "Maximal Chief" or the "Great Teacher," exercised total authority.

The first period (1924–39) of Haya de la Torre's political development was marked by his espousal of a democratic nationalist radicalism and a proposal for a "non-socialist social revolution." Deported in 1924, Haya de la Torre traveled throughout the United States and Europe. He attended union and political meetings, met with socialist and social democrat leaders, and followed courses in economics and anthropology at Oxford. He returned to Peru in 1931 and that year ran for the presidency of the republic. President Leguía (1919–30) had already been ousted and the Partido Aprista Peruano (1930) had been founded. Defeated in the elections, Haya de la Torre led an uncompromising opposition against the government of Luis M. Sanchez Cerro (1931–3). The year 1932 was known in Peruvian history as the "year of barbarism" because of the bloody repression that killed hundreds of APRA militants during an uprising in the northern city of Trujillo. The imprisonment of Haya in the same year marked the beginning of a long period of underground activity for APRA.

Haya de la Torre's main theses during that period were developed in his book *El antimperialismo y el Apra* (1936). At the core was his imperative belief in the capitalist modernization of the country. The basis of his argument was how to overcome the secular backwardness of a society

dominated by imperialism and feudalism. Then there was the problem of how to make "our own French Revolution," in a country where the national bourgeoisie was not powerful enough to displace from power the imperialist bourgeoisie and its internal ally, the feudal class.

Thus, the originality of Haya de la Torre's political proposal was to assert the new characteristic that the bourgeois revolution would assume in countries dependent on imperialism. Unlike the bourgeois revolutions in Europe, in colonial or semi-colonial countries the bourgeois process could not rely on either private capital or liberal democracy. In the Mexican Revolution of 1910, Haya de la Torre saw both the state model that should be built and the mistakes that should be avoided. Through this experience he concluded that "a triumphant anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution cannot use the old state apparatus (liberal-bourgeois) for its purposes," because in doing so it "would inexorably fall on the rollers of imperialism."

The "anti-imperialist state" would conduct the national economy, denying the "individual or collective rights of economic order whose use implied an imperialistic danger." Haya de la Torre's name for this new economic organization was "state capitalism." He argued that the development of a national capitalism in semi-colonial countries could not rely on private property and liberal capitalism, because if this "classic model of capitalism" were introduced, the revolution "would soon fall into the imperialism machinery from which no bourgeois national body can escape."

The "anti-imperialist state" was seen as an expression of national majorities, but the middle class, the only social class Haya de la Torre deemed capable of developing an anti-imperialist consciousness, would lead it. With this program, in an anti-liberal and anti-socialist project, Haya de la Torre sought to systematize the nationalist and democratic aspirations of the social classes oppressed by the imperialist domination of the time.

In the 1940s there began a change that would be crucial in the development of the political thought of Haya de la Torre. In this period his political project was evolving, abandoning the most radically democratic and nationalist elements. Haya de la Torre returned to public life in 1945, when APRA supported the candidacy of José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, who was elected

president and governed the country until being overthrown by a coup d'état in 1948. During the dictatorship of General Manuel A. Odría (1948–56), APRA operated clandestinely once more and Haya de la Torre sought political asylum at the Colombian embassy in Lima (1949), only managing to leave the country in 1954 under the protection of the International Court of Justice.

The confluence of changes occurring both internationally and in Peru was critical for the reformulation of Haya de la Torre's political project at this time. Regarding changes in international circumstances, F. D. Roosevelt's New Deal policies and the opposition of democracies to the Nazi-fascist regimes during World War II were crucial. The fight against totalitarianism and the defense of "western democracies" were present in the liberal democratic characteristics of Haya de la Torre's thinking and in his abandoning of the corporate proposal of functional democracy. In addition, the new role of American foreign policy forced him to review imperialism issues. Starting in 1954, Haya de la Torre traveled through several cities in Europe and was influenced by the policies of the social democratic governments in the Nordic countries.

Two important changes in Peruvian society also affected his program. First, the oligarchic-imperialist coalition's ability to restore its economic and political power was broken by the crisis that began in 1930. Secondly, the middle class had become complacent owing to growing satisfaction of their economic, political, and social demands by the expansion of the export economy. Haya de la Torre managed to adapt to the new conditions, and APRA co-governed the country with President Bustamante y Rivero (1945–8).

Returning to Peru in 1956, Haya de la Torre again became involved in politics. That year he supported the candidacy of Manuel Prado, a conspicuous representative of oligarchic imperialist interests, whom he had questioned in the 1940s. In 1962, Haya de la Torre was a candidate for the presidency of the republic, but the electoral process was annulled by the military, which had overthrown President Prado's government. In the elections of 1963, Haya de la Torre was defeated by Fernando Belaunde Terry, who ruled the country until 1968 when another military coup d'état unseated him. That year marked the beginning of the radical nationalist regime

of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–75), whose government carried out far-reaching anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist reforms very similar to those proposed by APRA in the 1930s. General Morales Bermudez replaced General Velasco as president of Peru (1975–80); he called for a Constituent Assembly, whose presidency was held by Haya de la Torre as the candidate who had received most votes. He signed the new Peruvian constitution a few days before his death in 1979.

The evolution of Haya de la Torre's political ideas clearly shows his originality. His career also highlights his skills as a politician, constantly adapting himself to the changing conditions of Peruvian society and giving meaning to political actions. This involved not only abandoning proposals for the radical democratic nationalism of the 1930s, but also accommodating himself to the demands of an audacious, and often cynical, struggle for power.

SEE ALSO: Mariátegui, José Carlos (1894–1930); Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Peru, Labor and Peasant Mobilizations, 1900–1950

References and Suggested Readings

- Haya de la Torre, V. (1973) *Aprismo: The Ideas and Doctrines of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Pike, F. B. (1986) *The Politics of the Miraculous in Peru: Haya de la Torre and the Spiritualist Tradition*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Stein, S. (1980) *Populism in Peru: The Emergence of the Masses and the Politics of Social Control*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Haymarket tragedy

Heidi M. Rimke

The Chicago Haymarket tragedy is a seminal event in the social history of anti-capitalist movements in the United States. During the 1870s, Chicago was an active center of revolutionary organizing and radical thought. Class antagonism was especially heightened due to the bloody clashes of the 1875 Long Strike and the 1877 railroad strike. This tension increased a decade later when the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions (the predecessor to the American Federation of Labor) called for a movement to fight for

the eight-hour workday as part of an international struggle to improve working conditions and to establish workers' rights. The basic plan was to spend two years demanding that all bosses implement a standard eight-hour day instead of the 10- to 16-hour days that were prevalent. After May 1, 1886, all workers not yet on an eight-hour schedule were to participate in a national strike until their demand was met.

On May 1, 1886, nearly 350,000 workers went on strike for a shorter day at approximately 1,200 factories nationwide. An estimated 80,000 in Chicago took part in demonstrations. The anarcho-syndicalist International Working People's Association played a central organizing role in the protest. Chicago's bourgeoisie and press viewed the actions as a forewarning of revolution and demanded a police crackdown.

On May 3, August Spies, the editor of *Abeiter-Zeitung*, spoke at a meeting of 5,000 workers, including approximately 500 strikers from the nearby McCormick plant. A short time later, fights broke out as strikebreakers attempted to cross a picket line. The police arrived and opened fire, killing four people and wounding many more, sparking outrage in working-class communities. Anarchists distributed fliers calling for a rally near Haymarket Square. The leaflets denounced the police for murdering the strikers on behalf of capitalists and urged workers to seek justice.

On May 4, an assembly of 2,500 people near Haymarket Square protested the most recent police brutality against workers. As the last speaker was closing his address, 180 police marched in and demanded an immediate end to the rally. In response to the peremptory dispersal order, Samuel Fielden pointed out that the peaceful gathering was about to close. At this moment a dynamite bomb was thrown into the police lines, which incited a hail of police gunfire, leading officers to shoot many of their own as well as fleeing demonstrators. Medical evidence later showed that their own bullets caused most of the injuries sustained by the police. The number of dead among the police rose to eight over the next week, and at least four dead among the protesters. The bomb thrower's identity was never determined. Many working people, including Albert Parsons, were convinced that an agent provocateur threw the bomb to turn public sentiment against the workers' movement, particularly the fight for a shorter workday. Others believed that a police agent threw the bomb with the express

purpose of derailing the eight-hour movement, jailing activists, and terrifying workers into silence and submission.

In the weeks following the bombing, Chicago authorities carried out an accelerated campaign of repression. The mayor banned all meetings and demonstrations. Radicals of all stripes were rounded up, arrested, charged, and imprisoned, characterizing the period as one of unprecedented police terrorism. The press sensationalized stereotypes about radical immigrants and dangerous revolutionaries and published unsubstantiated theories about violent anarchist plots, which polarized public reaction to the incident and fed the anti-union fervor amongst the privileged classes.

At the behest of prosecutor Julius Grinnel, police began raiding homes and press offices, seizing records, confiscating manuscripts, books, and banners, and they closed at least 50 headquarters and halls. Hundreds of women and men were arrested and subjected to cruel interrogation and denied food, water, counsel, and medical treatment. Eight known anarchists – August Spies, Michael Schwab, Samuel Fielden, Albert R. Parsons, Adolph Fischer, George Engel, Louis Lingg, and Oscar W. Neebe – were charged with conspiracy to commit murder even though only two of the accused were present at the time of the bombing.

Court proceedings against the eight anarchists commenced on June 21, 1886 and held that their "inflammatory speeches and publications" incited the actions of the bomber. The prosecution did not offer evidence connecting any of the defendants with the bombing yet argued that they shared equal responsibility for the crime. On August 20, the jury returned guilty verdicts for all eight defendants. Neebe received a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment and the remaining seven were sentenced to death by hanging. International protest erupted and legal appeals were launched but the Illinois and US Supreme Courts upheld the decision.

The Chicago Bar condemned the trial as a farce. The prosecutor stacked the jury with men who openly admitted their prejudice; witnesses for the prosecution contradicted themselves and each other and confessed to accepting money, jobs, and immunity for their testimony; and the presiding judge, Joseph E. Gary, constantly ruled against the defense attorney, who was inexperienced in criminal law.

Within days of the execution date, two of the condemned men's sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. Louis Lingg committed suicide in prison by biting a fulminating cap. Albert Parsons, August Spies, George Engel, and Adolph Fischer were killed on the morning of November 11, 1887, in the Cook County Jail. Oscar Neebe, Samuel Fielden, and Michael Schwab remained in prison until Illinois Governor John Peter Altgeld granted a full pardon to the eight men on June 26, 1894.

The Haymarket events made the defendants international political heroes. Many revolutionaries and radical labor unions, including the Industrial Workers of the World, were inspired to establish May 1 as an International Workers' Day in many countries. Although it was never officially adopted as a holiday in the United States and Canada, many radical groups continue to celebrate international labor solidarity every May Day.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; EuroMayDay; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Internationals; May Day; Palmer Raids; Sacco and Vanzetti Case; US Labor Rebellions and the Rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)

References and Suggested Readings

- Avrich, P. (1984) *The Haymarket Tragedy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- David, H. (1958) *The History of the Haymarket Affair*. New York: Russell & Russell.
- Foner, P. S. (1969) *The Autobiographies of the Haymarket Martyrs*. New York: Monad Press.
- Nelson, B. (1988) *Beyond the Martyrs: A Social History of Chicago's Anarchists, 1870–1900*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Roediger, D. & Rosemont, F. (Eds.) (1986) *Haymarket Scrapbook*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.

Haywood, Big Bill (1869–1828)

Stacy Warner Maddern

Born in Salt Lake City, Utah, William D. "Big Bill" Haywood was the son of a Pony Express rider and became one of the most prominent, although volatile, leaders of the American labor movement. Haywood began working in the silver mines at the tender age of nine and after witnessing the Haymarket Riots in 1886 and later the

Pullman strikes in 1893, "Big Bill" would obtain a keen interest in radicalism and labor politics. After hearing a speech by Western Federation of Miners (WFM) president Ed Boyce in 1896, Haywood decided to join the union and by 1900 was a member of its executive board.

During this time the WFM engaged in very militant and difficult strikes. Outside of the already dangerous conditions that were a part of mining in the West, miners found themselves in the midst of a labor war that involved dozens of strikes and battles with a government that was unsympathetic to their cause. The WFM dealt constantly with court injunctions, state militia, imprisonment, and deportation of strikers. In addition, miners were frequently attacked by armed guards working for mine owners.

In 1902 Boyce stepped down from leading the WFM and named Haywood and Charles Moyer as his successors. Unfortunately, the two men were polar opposites. Moyer was cautious and deliberate. He favored negotiations over strikes. Haywood, on the other hand, was volatile and overbearing. He was a natural organizer who had a talent for stirring up crowds at union meetings. One of Haywood's championed causes was the 8-hour work day for which he would bellow, "Eight hours of work, eight hours of play, eight hours of sleep – eight hours a day!"

At the turn of the twentieth century the most significant battles between labor and capital were occurring between miners and mine operators. In most cases state government and its authorities maintained strong support for the mine operators. In Colorado the struggle reached what some historians regard as the closest the United States ever came to outright class warfare. Standing right in the middle of this conflict was the WFM and the period would later be referred to as the Colorado Labor Wars. From 1902 to 1905 the WFM, under the leadership of Haywood and Moyer, was constantly engaged in brutal and bloody conflicts with mine operators, particularly the Cripple Creek Mine Owners' Association. These conflicts would result in the loss of 33 lives and considerable casualties of both union and non-union workers. One incident in Independence, Colorado involved a train-station bombing, which killed 13 non-union workers. While Haywood was suspected of organizing the explosion, he was never charged.

On December 30, 1905 former governor of Idaho Frank Steunenberg was killed in an

explosion near his home in Caldwell, Idaho. Immediate speculation concurred that the bombing was again the work of Haywood and the WFM, citing the governor's tough anti-union stance as a motive for the killing. In his own state's battle with the WFM, Steunenberg directly stated, "It is a plain case of the state or the union winning and we do not propose that the state shall be defeated." Following his death, the state of Idaho contracted the Pinkerton Detective Agency and renowned investigator James McFarland to hunt down Steunenberg's killers. After a long exhaustive manhunt that involved debates over extradition Haywood, Moyer, and a close advisor George Pettibone were arrested and tried for the murder. While in jail awaiting trial Haywood spent much of his time designing new WFM posters and reading books like Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle*. He even ran for governor of the state of Colorado as a socialist, for which he received 16,000 votes. At trial the three men were represented by legendary attorney Clarence Darrow and were acquitted, but the event was not without consequences for Haywood, who was later ousted from the WFM by Moyer, who considered his tactics too militant and thus too violent.

Haywood next turned his attention to the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and in 1915 became its formal leader. In the years leading up to America's entry into World War I, Haywood helped to recruit over 3 million members into the IWW. He led textile strikes in both Massachusetts and New Jersey. At the same time Haywood had begun to mesh his political views into his philosophy of organizing. For many years, Haywood had been an active member of the Socialist Party of America. His political views were largely Marxist, and he was a regular supporter of Eugene Debs for whom he campaigned during the 1908 presidential election. In addition, Haywood had represented the Socialist Party in 1910 as a delegate at the Second International, an organization working towards international socialism, and in 1912 was elected to the Socialist Party National Executive Committee. However, odds between Haywood and the Socialist Party began when the IWW started calling for the abolition of the wage system and the overthrow of capitalism. Tension between the more moderate faction of the party and the IWW was largely due to Haywood's insistence on direct action and strikes. When these

often led to violence, the party was critical and began calling for political tactics or more respectable forms of negotiation to resolve conflict. When Haywood continued to encourage the practice of sabotage and imprisonment to foster revolution he was eventually ousted by the National Executive Committee in January of 1913. As a result thousands of IWW members followed Haywood out of the Socialist Party.

The entry of the United States into World War I resulted in an opportunity for the government finally to quell the agitations of the labor movement. Citing the Espionage Act, passed in 1917, government officials began raiding union establishments, including the IWW. In 1918 Haywood would be among nearly 100 IWW members arrested for violating the Espionage and Sedition Acts, namely for organizing strikes in war-sensitive industries. In the midst of these federal indictments against the members of the IWW, Haywood would urge them to surrender to the authorities. This came as a surprise to most radicals, considering the labor icon's personal distaste for those who had "sold out."

Haywood would be convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. Released on bond, provided by the IWW, to await an appeal, he would flee the country for the Soviet Union, where he remained a confidant of the Bolsheviks until his death in 1928. Haywood's self-imposed exile was seen as an act of cowardice by members of the IWW. Having to forfeit the bond they had provided for Haywood's release shattered the labor union financially. Haywood's decision to flee had made a mockery of solidarity and those who had provided for his release found it hard to forgive him. Still, the legacy of William D. "Big Bill" Haywood left an indelible mark on industrial unionism in America. Upon his death in 1928, half of Haywood's ashes were buried in the Kremlin while the remaining half was returned to the United States and buried near a monument to the Haymarket Riots in Chicago, the event that had so inspired him.

SEE ALSO: Debs, Eugene (1855–1926); Haymarket Tragedy; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 20th Century; Non-Interventionists, 1914–1945; Palmer Raids

References and Suggested Readings

Carlson, P. (1983) *Roughneck: The Life and Times of Big Bill Haywood*. New York: W. W. Norton.

- Conlin, J. (1969a) *Big Bill Haywood and the Radical Union Movement*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Conlin, J. (1969b) *Bread and Roses Too: Studies of the Wobblies*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Dubofsky, M. (1969) *We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Dubofsky, M. (1987) *"Big Bill" Haywood*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831)

Frank M. Kirkland

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was one of the founders of the philosophical movement known as German idealism. He is best known for his dialectical theories which inspired many later philosophers, most famously Karl Marx. Born in Stuttgart in southwestern Germany, to Georg Ludwig and Maria Magdalena Louisa Fromm Hegel, he read the works of Enlightenment authors and followed the events of the French Revolution with enthusiasm. He taught at universities in Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin and published four books – *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) (also known as *Phenomenology of Mind*), *Science of Logic* (1811, 1812, 1816), *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1816), and *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (1822).

Because Hegel's philosophy played a key role in influencing Karl Marx, helping him form the core ideas that led to Marxism, many historians have focused on his connection to revolution. Because the revolutions in Russia and China were Marxist revolutions, many see a clear connection between Hegel and revolutionary ideology, via Marx. Looking at Hegel's views on the French and Haitian revolutions, however, it becomes clear that the connection is not so simple.

Although Ritter (1977), a noted scholar of Hegel's political philosophy, is quite ardent with the claim that, "in its innermost aspirations, *only* Hegel's philosophy is the philosophy of revolution," there is much in Hegel's work to suggest that claim to be problematic. Now this neither signifies nor implies that Hegel or his work harbored counter-revolutionary tendencies. Even Habermas (1963), who sustains Ritter's claim by asserting that "Hegel raised revolution to

the principle of his philosophy," admits "Hegel's philosophy of revolution is his philosophy as the *critique* thereof." This suggests that Hegel's position regarding revolution is more nuanced, more complicated, than Ritter concedes.

Hegel's philosophy of revolution is meant to address the problem of the political realization of the principle of freedom. Historically, not philosophically, Hegel comes to address this problem through his embrace of the French Revolution. To be sure Hegel was a celebrant of the French Revolution. He was known to have danced the *carmagnole* during his youthful days at Tübingen and to have remained an admirer of that revolution, despite its violence, throughout his life. He was also an avid reader of the highly regarded *Minerva*, a political journal of intellectual gravitas edited by Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz, which provided non-partisan yet favorable reportage of the French Revolution widely across Europe.

Hegel did not extend his admiration to the Saint-Domingue Revolution, which was not engendered through the revolutionary ideas and actions of the French, but through the actions of enslaved Africans. That revolution, taking place in the French colony of Saint-Domingue in the Caribbean, was the first successful armed struggle of enslaved Africans, not only against the brutal exploitation committed by the European plantation owners and maritime bourgeoisie, but also against the consecutive waves of French, Spanish, British, and again (later) French expeditions, over a 12-year period, sent to crush the revolution.

When Hegel's quietude regarding the Saint-Domingue Revolution is introduced into the discussion along with his critique of the French Revolution, his stance toward revolution is rendered more complicated and more problematic than Ritter and many other scholars make it out to be. In affirming, through the French Revolution alone, the importance of the right of acting under the idea of freedom, Hegel seeks to find that right's political realization, as Ritter claims. But he does so not only while criticizing the revolutionaries who integrate, as their immediate objective, that entitlement with revolutionary action, but also while ignoring a concurrent revolution which emphasizes the same aforementioned right and that right's political realization. These two points need to be examined. Hegel's criticism pertains to the idea that the right to

act under the idea of freedom can never be or include the right to revolution. Those two rights *neither* are equivalent to *nor* entail one another. The capacity for revolution is not the right to it.

Hegel takes revolutions as extralegal activities of violent resistance, which fail necessarily to be effective rationally, because their concept of right can never be valid, can never be conceptually bound up with or realized in those activities. To be rationally effective is for a free person to have a justifying reason for an action whose normative authority would be dependent on certain social/political arrangements enabling such a reason for action to be recognized. So a right to revolution would have to entail the free activity of individuals whose rules or norms govern or define it as revolutionary conduct while being incorporated in a polity operating in terms of such norms.

However, for Hegel, it is impossible for revolutionary activity to be rationally effective because, albeit free, it cannot sustain a reason whose authority is reliant on political institutions incorporating it as a norm to be acknowledged. No social/political arrangement of the modern world, for Hegel, would enable a reason for or a right to revolutionary activity even under the idea of freedom. Rather, they would disable it for the very sake of the right to act under that idea. Hegel thus criticizes the right to revolution, because the reason to engage in such free yet “destructive” activity must always be detached from the capacity of any social/political arrangements to incorporate it normatively for the sake of being recognized.

Hegel’s critique of the right to revolution still carried his appreciation of the French Revolution’s importance. Its significance was that it was a historical event that prompted in principle the *shift* to the notion that *all* persons could rightfully act under the idea of freedom. In Hegel’s mind, it made possible the shift to the realization of that state of affairs and the principles that sustain it. However, *only* through the shift it engenders, *not* by the revolution itself, does history become, for Hegel, the actualization or the rational effectiveness of *all* persons acting under the idea of freedom.

But what is the bearing of Hegel’s critique on his willful neglect of the Saint-Domingue Revolution? The French Revolution was framed under banners such as “Live Freely or Die” and

“Rather Death than Slavery,” both of which would be apropos to the Saint-Domingue Revolution as well, but the phrase “rather death than slavery” would have a different connotation for each revolution. In the French case, the phrase would refer to the act of resisting the despotic coercion of the sovereign and centuries-old feudal obligations in the face of (physical) death. In the Saint-Domingue case, it would refer *first* to the act of abolishing the social condition wherein one is unable to take possession of oneself, is unable to be the subject of one’s life. French revolutionaries were always able to be the subjects of their own lives, as members of a polity or a family, even when they had submitted to despotic coercion and were unable, as members of a polity, to secure the right to act under the idea of freedom, in effect, unable to secure the right to live freely.

As slaves, Africans were denied all duties and claims to a polity, a family, a heritage. They were prohibited from anchoring their understanding of a social world to the meanings they inherited and, thus, could never be the subjects of their own lives, because slavery was a secular excommunication. The resistance against colonial oppression and the establishment of a civil state under a constitution wherein *all* persons could rightfully act under the idea of freedom then became concomitant with their abolition of slavery.

Hegel had the philosophical and conceptual wherewithal to examine the Saint-Domingue Revolution and its attachment to the abolition of slavery. He never brought it, however, to bear on that revolution. His silence became distortion when he claimed in the three editions of his *Encyclopedia* that Africans had formed a state in Haiti on Christian principles. No mention is made of a violent revolution conducted by enslaved Africans for the sake of the abolition of slavery and colonial despotism and the political realization of the right of all people to live freely. The claim that Hegel’s philosophy is the philosophy of revolution becomes suspect then, not because Hegel denies that there is a right to revolution, but because he denies (enslaved) Africans the realization of their *capacity* to engage in revolution.

SEE ALSO: French Revolution, 1789–1794; Haiti, Revolutionary Struggles; Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1801–1804; Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism

References and Suggested Readings

- Buck-Morss, S. (2000) Hegel and Haiti. *Critical Inquiry* 26 (4): 821–65.
- Habermas, J. (1963) Hegels Kritik der Französischen Revolution. In *Theorie und Praxis*. Berlin: Luchterhand.
- Pinkard, T. (2000) *Hegel: A Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ritter, J. (1977) Hegel und die französische Revolution. In *Metaphysik und Politik: Studien zu Aristoteles und Hegel*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag.
- Tavares, F. P. (1992) Hegel et Haiti, ou le silence de Hegel sur Saint-Domingue. *Chemins Critique* 2 (3): 113–31.

Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich (1812–1870)

Paul Le Blanc

Alexander Ivanovich Herzen, one of Russia's foremost revolutionary intellectuals, was born in Moscow, the "illegitimate" son of a wealthy nobleman and a young woman of German background and humble social origin. Inspired by the revolutionary conspirators who plotted the ill-fated Decembrist uprising of 1825, when he entered Moscow University a few years later Herzen was also profoundly influenced by the utopian socialist ideas of St.-Simon and Fourier. No less important to him were the development of the natural and social sciences, the historical example of the French Revolution, and the revolutionary ferment filtering through Europe in the 1830s.

Such influences caused Herzen to help organize and lead a secret circle of intellectuals who swore to dedicate their lives "to the people" and to the cause of liberty "on the basis of socialism." The group broke up when Herzen and one of the other organizers, Nikolai Ogarev, were arrested for "vile and ill-intentioned expressions" regarding the absolute monarchy of Russia's tsar. During a brief exile in Russia's hinterlands, Herzen engaged with Hegelian philosophy, which he described as "the algebra of revolution" and utilized in the development of a radical critique of the political and social realities around him – particularly the expansion of capitalism, which he saw as "a syphilitic sore infecting the blood and bone of society."

In 1847, Herzen went into self-imposed exile in Western Europe to escape the stifling atmo-

sphere of the tsarist autocracy. While critical of the rising bourgeois order as well as of the residual repressiveness of the remnants of feudalism's "old order," Herzen hailed the popular democratic upheavals that swept through the continent in 1848. "Repent, gentlemen, repent," he challenged the upper classes (albeit from the margins of the radicalized literary intelligentsia); "the judgment day of your world is here." When the democratic insurgencies went down to disappointing defeat – largely due to the business classes choosing to align themselves with aristocrats and despots, against the radicalized lower classes – Herzen became more confirmed in his social radicalism than ever. Disillusioned by France as it drifted toward the dictatorship of Napoleon III, he moved first to England and finally to Switzerland, which was a major center of radicalized Russian émigrés.

From 1857 until 1869 Herzen published a quite influential revolutionary journal, *The Bell (Kolokol)*, which secretly passed from hand to hand among the Russian intelligentsia. Tolling on behalf of freedom and enlightenment, against oppression and prejudice, it was read for a time by all of literate Russia, from the tsar himself to secondary school children. Yet, finally, the intolerance of the authorities cut off its circulation, and aspects of his own outlook increasingly cut him off from rising layers of radicalizing youth.

In his later years, Herzen's hopes for the future were especially focused on the possibility of a revolutionary transformation in his native Russia. Yet he was inclined to avoid revolutionary intransigence and class struggle, appealing to both the upper classes and the lower. To Russia's nobles, he appealed: "You can't be a free man and own household serfs, whom you buy like chattels and sell like a flock of sheep. . . . You can't even talk of human rights when you own human souls." On the other hand, "we say to the peasant there is no freedom without land, and add only this: land is not secure without freedom." And he dared to foresee a relatively painless transition to the hoped-for future.

While Herzen was a relatively well-to-do literary intellectual, his life was not without personal tragedy, but even more was marked by political disappointment. Once a prominent figure among Europe's revolutionary, democratic, socialist, and nationalist intellectuals, when he died in 1870, during a visit to Paris, it could be said that

“Herzen had outlived his political importance” (in the words of biographer E. H. Carr). Those coming into collision with the old order were increasingly drawn to other intellectual influences – to the inflammatory anarchism of Mikhail Bakunin and his manipulative disciple Sergei Nechayev, to the uncompromising revolutionary populists under the spell of Nikolai Chernyshevsky, and to the worker-oriented “scientific socialism” of Karl Marx.

SEE ALSO: Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Chernyshevsky, Nikolai G. (1828–1889); Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russia, Revolutions: Sources and Contexts; Tolstoy, Leo N. (1828–1910)

References and Suggested Readings

- Carr, E. H. (1961) *The Romantic Exiles: A Nineteenth-Century Portrait Gallery*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Herzen, A. (1982) *My Past and Thoughts*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Malia, M. (1965) *Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812–1855*. New York: Grosset & Dunlap.
- Yarmolinsky, A. (1962) *Road to Revolution: A Century of Russian Radicalism*. New York: Collier.
- Venturi, F. (1983) *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth-Century Russia*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hezbollah: organization and uprisings

Lawrence Davidson

Hezbollah (Party of God) is Lebanon’s strongest and best-known Islamic fundamentalist organization. The group was formed in the early 1980s in reaction to the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90) and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982), both of which traumatized the nation.

Lebanon had long been dominated by Christian and Sunni Muslim communities, while the Shi’ite community represented the poor and discriminated sector of society. Lebanon’s Shi’ites gained inspiration and encouragement from the Iranian Revolution of 1979, however, and the founders of Hezbollah initially saw Iran as a model for

what they wished to achieve in Lebanon. Thus, Hezbollah at its inception had the following agenda: to wage a struggle against Lebanon’s Christian and Sunni leadership along with what were perceived as their foreign backers: France, Israel, and the United States; to promote an acceptance of martyrdom and self-sacrifice among the Lebanese Shi’ites in order to carry on this effort; and upon the defeat of their enemies, to transform Lebanon into an Islamic republic along the lines of Iran.

One of the founding members of Hezbollah was the former Lebanese schoolteacher Abbas al Musawi. Musawi had become dissatisfied with the more moderate policies of the dominant Shi’ite militia organization known as Amal (hope). He objected to Amal’s acceptance of a secular state for Lebanon that gave considerable power to the country’s Christian minority. Musawi left his teaching position and relocated to the city of Baalbeck, in the Bekaa Valley of eastern Lebanon. There he began a new militant organization, Hezbollah, committed to the creation of a Muslim state. Musawi had come to Baalbeck because it was the center of Iranian-inspired activity in Lebanon, and the headquarters of 1,500 Iranian revolutionary guards who, in 1982, had volunteered to fight in Lebanon against the invading Israelis. The Iranians would provide the weapons and initial training for Hezbollah.

Hezbollah grew rapidly into a series of chapters organized around mosques in the Bekaa Valley, the capital city Beirut, and throughout southern Lebanon. Local leadership became vested in young Shi’ite clerics who saw fundamentalist Islam as an alternative to the secular political systems of the capitalist West and communist East. Thus, the organization evolved along more or less decentralized lines, a convergence of like-minded people attracted by Musawi’s militancy.

Hezbollah became more structured over time. A supreme consultative council made up of clerics and militia leaders was formed and regional committees were set up. Influential clerics emerged as “spiritual guides” to the organization, for instance, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. Fadlallah, whose parents were Lebanese immigrants, was born in Najaf, Iraq, a city of Shi’ite religious schools and holy shrines, on November 16, 1935. He received a thoroughly Shi’ite Muslim education and proved himself precocious and gifted – an accomplished poet and charismatic speaker.

In 1966 the repression exercised by the secular-minded Iraqi regime against the country's *ulama* (the learned of Islam) forced Fadlallah out of Iraq and back to Lebanon. He settled first in the mixed Shi'ite-Palestinian shantytown of Nabaa, which was part of east Beirut. There he became the community's teacher and preacher. He developed a strong bond with the poor and oppressed of the area, setting up clinics, youth clubs, and Islamic schools. In the sermons he delivered at his mosque, he spoke of the need for an Islamic government as the best means of solving Lebanon's social and economic problems. He also denounced the imperialist economic and cultural policies he believed the West pursued in the Muslim world, as well as the existence of the state of Israel. He perceived Israel as "an instrument of the West."

In the mid-1970s, at the beginning of the Lebanese civil war, Fadlallah wrote a book entitled *Islam and the Logic of Force* (1976). In this work he said that the Shi'ites must arm themselves not only in self-defense against other aggressive Lebanese sectarian groups, but also so as to participate in a broader war against imperialism and Israel. He predicted that Lebanon would be a "flashpoint" in a worldwide struggle between Islam and the West. Muslims had to prepare for this struggle by gaining absolute faith in their cause. This faith would banish the fear of confronting militarily superior foes and give them the strength to make necessary sacrifices. On the other hand, he espoused careful and realistic planning. "Legitimate and effective violence," he noted, "could only proceed from belief welded to sober calculation."

The civil war forced Fadlallah out of Nabaa in 1975, and after taking refuge in south Lebanon, he was again forced to flee in 1976 because of Israeli attacks. He finally resettled in the southern Beirut neighborhood of Bir al-Abd. Here he slowly rebuilt his congregation and social service network.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution gave Fadlallah and most of his fellow Shi'ite clerics great encouragement. The notion of an Islamic government was no longer a dream. Fadlallah cooperated with the Iranian representatives in Lebanon, but initially he opposed the creation of the militant organization Hezbollah because he feared it would split the Shi'ite community. Most Shi'ites already gave their allegiance to

the more moderate Amal. Instead, Fadlallah wanted to transform Amal into an Islamic fundamentalist organization. Hezbollah was established, however, with Iranian aid and soon was involved not only in the civil war, but, by the early 1980s, also in fighting the Israelis and other foreign forces in Lebanon. Fadlallah supported Hezbollah in these efforts, though he regretted the need for violence against civilians.

By this time Fadlallah was an active member of Hezbollah. Through his public anti-American and anti-Israel stance, he became identified as one of the Hezbollah leaders responsible for terrorism. In the 1980s there were repeated attempts on his life reportedly organized by both Israeli and American agents. Fadlallah survived them all, giving his supporters the impression that he was divinely protected.

Despite charismatic leaders such as Musawi and Fadlallah, Hezbollah never became truly centralized. To this day, its structure remains a relatively loose one, and individual Hezbollah chapters often operate independent of one another. This is why attempts to destroy the organization (mostly carried out by Israel) by assassinating its leaders (Musawi was murdered in 1992) have proved ineffective.

Hezbollah's leaders have maintained close connections with Iran. Into the 1990s, the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria, coordinated the distribution of money and supplies to Hezbollah. At the time, this amounted to some ten million dollars a month. Hezbollah used this income to two ends. One was the creation of a network of social welfare programs for the poverty-ridden Lebanese Shi'ite community. The network included schools and educational scholarships (Hezbollah has reportedly subsidized over 400,000 students), hospitals and clinics, food cooperatives, and low-income housing projects. The other end was the waging of war against those whom the organization saw as the enemies of Lebanon and responsible for the oppression and injustice in the country. This included not only many of the country's Christian and Sunni leaders, but also Israelis, Americans, and the French.

These latter groups were often targets of Hezbollah "martyrs" in the 1980s and early 1990s. The organization was involved in the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 in Beirut, as well as the kidnapping of Americans such as the journalist Terry Anderson (who was the last

American hostage to be released in Lebanon in December 1991) and Colonel William Higgins. Higgins, who was assigned to the United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon, was accused of being a spy for American intelligence and was executed while in captivity in 1990. It should be noted that Shaykh Fadlallah opposed the hijacking of a TWA airliner at Beirut and generally disapproved of hostage taking; however, his opposition to such tactics was kept within Hezbollah circles.

One of the operations that Fadlallah likely supported was the October 1983 suicide truck bombing of the United States Marines barracks on the outskirts of Beirut, which killed 250 American servicemen. It was Fadlallah who tried to explain the reasons for such suicide attacks. He explained that such suicide attacks were justified when they were part of a *jihad* recognized by legitimate Muslim authorities. He also observed that since the Shi'ites did not have the modern war machines of the West and Israel, they were forced to use other means; they did not have to play by the rules set by their enemies.

With the end of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990, Hezbollah's violence diminished and its political radicalism moderated. Fadlallah had much to do with this shift. While the West identified him with the organization's violent tactics, he actually proved to be one of Hezbollah's more adaptable and compromising leaders. As he put it, "I learned to be pragmatic and not to drown in illusions." Such an attitude allowed him to combine religiously derived principles and tactical realism. He argued that the Lebanese situation was very different from that of Iran, and so Muslims had to adapt to the new conditions in Lebanon. Though it would continue to seek the establishment of an eventual Islamic state in Lebanon, Hezbollah would no longer call for the violent overthrow of the government. It would accept the country's re-created democracy and seek to achieve its ends through the use of the ballot box.

Since the 1990s Hezbollah has functioned as a political party within the Lebanese parliamentary system. As of 2007, 12 members sit in the National Assembly, which makes Hezbollah the largest single party bloc. It has actively aligned itself with other parties to try to bring constitutional changes that would make the distribution of power more equitable. Such changes would increase its power within the government.

While Hezbollah now operates as a political party, it also continues to operate as a militia organization and maintains effective control of the southern part of the country. One major reason for the continuation of its armed status is the reality of aggressive and intrusive Israeli activity along Lebanon's southern border. Until 1999, Israel occupied a portion of southern Lebanon and funded an armed Maronite Christian force in the area. It was resistance on the part of Hezbollah and the high casualties it inflicted on Israeli occupation forces that helped push the Israelis out of the country. That made Hezbollah a very popular institution not only in Lebanon, but throughout the Middle East. Hezbollah, now led by the charismatic Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, repeated this performance when, in July of 2006, Israel reinvaded southern Lebanon. Ostensibly done as a response to border violence which saw the capture of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah, Israel's action was more likely the implementation of a plan of attack that had long been prepared. Although Israel used its superior fire power to inflict massive damage on Lebanon's civilian infrastructure, it could not defeat Hezbollah forces which were well dug in throughout the south. It also could not stop a continuous barrage of Hezbollah ground to ground missiles from disrupting life in northern Israel. Once more, Hezbollah was seen as a heroic and victorious organization throughout the region.

SEE ALSO: Cedar Revolution, Lebanon; Iranian Revolution, 1979; Islamic Political Currents; Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Mussawi (1902–1989) and the Shi'ite Islamic Revolution; Lebanon, Civil War, 1975–1990; Nasrallah, Sayed Hassan (b. 1960)

References and Suggested Readings

- Achcar, G. & Warschawski, M. (2007) *The 33-Day War: Israel's War on Hezbollah in Lebanon and its Consequences*. Taos: Paradigm.
- Hamzeh, A. N. (2004) *In the Path of Hezbollah*. Syracuse: University of Syracuse Press.
- Jaber, H. (1997) *Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance*. New York: New York University Press.
- Noe, N. (Ed.) (2007) *Voice of Hezbollah: Statements of Sayed Hassan Nasrallah*. London: Verso.
- Norton, A. R. (2007) *Hezbollah: A Short History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Qassem, N. (2005) *Hizbollah: The Story From Within*. London: Saqi Books.

Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel (1753–1811)

Edward T. Brett

Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, born on May 8, 1753 on a hacienda in Guanajuato where his father served as overseer, was a leading Mexican nationalist and opponent of Spanish colonialism. When he was 12 he was sent to Valladolid to study with the Jesuits at the Colegio de San Francisco Javier. There the Jesuits had recently replaced traditional scholasticism with the new rationalism and scientific methods then in fashion in Europe. This innovative curriculum greatly influenced Hidalgo throughout his life.

When the Jesuits were expelled from Mexico in 1767, San Francisco Javier was closed and Miguel was forced to complete his basic education at the nearby, but more traditional, diocesan Colegio de San Nicolás Obispo. It was here that he became proficient in several indigenous languages. He matriculated at the University of Mexico, earning a bachelor's degree in theology in 1773. He was ordained a priest in 1778. Two years earlier he had begun teaching at San Nicolás Obispo, where he was eventually named rector, a position that enabled him to revise the curriculum in accordance with the Jesuit-inspired reforms he had long championed. Meanwhile, he continued his studies at the university, working towards a doctorate. Although he finished his dissertation and it was awarded a prize for the best thesis in theology, he did not receive his doctorate, since he never defended his dissertation before his doctoral board. In 1792 Hidalgo was forced to resign from his academic position, probably as a result of his radical teaching methods, his questionable orthodoxy, and his scandalous lifestyle. He had already fathered three of his five children and was said to be addicted to gambling.

After serving for ten years as pastor of two churches named San Felipe, he was assigned in 1803 to the parish of Nuestra Señora in Dolores. He immediately began projects there aimed at developing his parishioners' social awareness and mitigating their poverty. He soon began to associate with *criollo* (American-born Spaniards) conspirators and by 1810 had been brought into a revolutionary plot led by Ignacio Allende, a captain in the Guanajuato cavalry. Hidalgo had

developed a great rapport with local Indians and *mestizos* and his fellow *criollo* conspirators hoped he could convince them to serve as foot soldiers in the revolt they planned for December 1810. In early September, however, governmental authorities discovered the plot. This caused Hidalgo and Allende, who had not yet been arrested, to begin the uprising prematurely.

Summoning his Indian and *mestizo* parishioners to his church, Hidalgo mesmerized them with his *Grito de Dolores*, possibly the most famous speech in Mexican history. Promising them a chance to regain their lost lands and win freedom from their Spanish oppressors, about 600 of his poor parishioners heeded his call. Armed with machetes and lances, they marched with Hidalgo in command and Allende as subcommander to San Miguel el Grande, attracting hundreds of additional followers along the way. Although the residents of San Miguel offered no resistance, Hidalgo was either unwilling or unable to control his undisciplined followers. After much looting, killing, and destruction of property, Allende had to call on his *criollo* cavalry to restore order. The rebel army next moved on to Celaya. Although they faced no resistance, the priest's rag-tag forces looted and pillaged and Allende was again forced to restore order. These two episodes mark the beginning of what eventually led to a split between Hidalgo and his *criollo* supporters, a split that would in the long run destroy his revolution. For whereas Hidalgo seems to have envisioned a genuine socioeconomic revolution, this was anathema to his fellow creoles, who saw his uprising as no more than a means for usurping the top-level governmental and economic positions hitherto reserved for *peninsulares* (Spanish-born officials in America). The *criollo* class initially supported Hidalgo because they expected him to use his Indian and *mestizo* army as cannon fodder for the *criollo* cause. When the priest's lower-class followers refused to adhere to their script and instead turned their wrath against all Spaniards, making no distinction between *criollos* and *peninsulares*, most creoles turned against the revolution. Switching sides, they now allied themselves with the hated *peninsulares* in order to protect themselves from a genuine revolution.

Following the pillaging of Celaya, Hidalgo's forces, now numbering about 25,000, moved on to Guanajuato, where for the first time they faced armed resistance. Although Hidalgo's

untrained forces suffered heavy casualties, they were eventually able to take the city because they greatly outnumbered their opponents. Again the mob looted and all royalists who had survived the battle were massacred. The rebels next took Valladolid, where Hidalgo issued a proclamation declaring the abolition of slavery and the Spanish tribute system.

The insurgents next moved on towards Mexico City. As they approached the capital, they encountered a small royalist army. After a fierce battle in which Hidalgo's untrained fighters suffered heavy losses, the royalists retreated, leaving the capital with only about 500 soldiers to protect it. By this time rebel forces had swelled to about 80,000 and it seemed like Mexico City was theirs for the taking. But inexplicably, to the chagrin of Allende who urged him to attack, Hidalgo chose to retreat. With their expectations of victory and looting dashed, about half of his soldiers deserted. Moreover, for the first time since he marched from Dolores, he was unable to find new recruits. To make matters worse, his retreat enabled General Félix Calleja to move a new royalist army to the capital to bolster its defenses. It is worth noting that the royal forces consisted largely of *criollos*, fighting under the command of a *peninsular* general. This is significant for it demonstrates that the Creole class, which had earlier supported the uprising, had now turned against it due to their fear of Hidalgo's Indian and *mestizo* soldiers and the possibility of a genuine revolution.

By March 1811 most *criollo* officers who had sided with Hidalgo had switched sides and were now turning cities and towns over to royalists without a fight. One such turncoat, Francisco Elizondo, set an ambush for what was left of the rebel army. He suggested that Hidalgo and Allende, who had earlier separated their forces, rendezvous at Baján in Coahuila, where there were wells and the insurgents could replenish their water supply. Not knowing that Elizondo had turned against them, the rebel leaders fell into his trap and were captured. Hidalgo was tried and found guilty of heresy and treason and executed by firing squad on July 31, 1811, ending the first phase of the war for Mexican independence.

SEE ALSO: Cuauhtémoc (1502–1525); Latin America, Catholic Church and Liberation, 16th Century to Present; Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921

References and Suggested Readings

- Brett, E. T. (2007) Padre Miguel Hidalgo: Mexican Revolutionary. In W. R. Weisberger, D. P. Hupchick, & D. L. Anderson (Eds.), *Profiles of Revolutionaries on Both Sides of the Atlantic, 1700–1850*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hamill, H. M. (1966) *The Hidalgo Revolt: Prelude to Mexican Independence*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
- Hamnet, B. R. (1986) *Roots of Insurgency: Mexican Regions, 1750–1824*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hijos Movement, Children of the Disappeared

Sebastián Cominiello

In *porteño* jargon (the popular language of Buenos Aires and other major cities in Argentina), *escrache* means to put in evidence, to expose, or to make public the bad deeds of someone who previously enjoyed a good reputation and was considered honorable. *Escraches* consist of public protests outside the homes of those responsible for political crimes in Argentina in the 1970s to alert the neighborhood to the identity of presumed criminals. A festive spirit and a range of cultural activities, including musical and theatrical performances, accompany these forms of protest. Protesters seek to isolate accused individuals through publicly shaming them and encouraging neighbors to repudiate them. *Escrache* is, then, a form of popular justice arising from moral condemnation. *Escraches* began to be held in Argentina in 1998, during the debates in Congress surrounding the derogation of the Due Obedience and Full Stop laws, when most of those accused of human rights violations during the military dictatorship of 1976–83 were allowed to escape prosecution for their crimes. Protests were led by middle-class, professional groups.

HIJOS (Hijos por la Identidad y la Justicia contra el Olvido y el Silencio [Children for Identity and Justice and against Forgetting and Silence]) is the organization that introduced *escraches* as a form of protest. Its members include the children and relatives of those who “disappeared” during the military dictatorship and the previous Peronist government (which between 1973 and

1976 carried out the first killings, especially through the actions of paramilitary squads such as the Anti-Communist Argentine Alliance – Triple A – led by Juan Domingo Perón’s personal assistant, José López Rega). Created in October 1995, the main purpose of the organization is to bring justice and seek punishment for those state and parastate agents responsible for the deaths (disappearances) of thousands of men and women during the 1970s. Its first national congress set the goals, basic agenda, and the dynamics of the organization.

In social terms, *escrache* is a form of action corresponding to the categories of “manifestation,” “protest,” or “demonstration.” Demonstrations are one of the oldest and most common forms of political action in the expression of social interests. *Escrache*, then, does not constitute a novel form of protest in the history of social struggle, neither in Argentina nor in the rest of the world. Not even the festive and cultural activities surrounding *escraches* are new. What does distinguish *escraches* from other forms of protest are their goals and the social interests being represented.

Previous research has identified 66 *escraches* in Argentina between 1995 and 2001, 44 of which were carried out in Buenos Aires and 22 in the rest of the country. These protests were organized by HIJOS and other human rights organizations. One or two weeks before an *escrache*, the neighborhood was covered in graffiti depicting the face of the *escrachado* for the purposes of identification. Then flyers were distributed to inform people about the day, time, and location of the upcoming event. *Escraches* were accompanied by *murgas* (groups of street dancers and singers), together with art shows, sculptures, and other cultural activities. *Escraches* carried out by HIJOS demanded a huge amount of organization, which is why they cannot be described as the spontaneous activities that some analysts have perceived them to be.

This type of action was carried out centrally by groups of the urban petty bourgeoisie, Argentina’s “middle class,” including small and medium-size businessmen and professionals. In political terms, *escraches* expressed the defeat of the social forces that during the 1970s sought society’s radical transformation. The social and political context in which *escraches* took place (from the end of Carlos Menem’s government in 1999 to that of Fernando de la Rúa between 1999 and 2001) witnessed the moral strengthening

of these subaltern classes as they reconstituted themselves as a social force. In other words, by vindicating the struggle of the 1970s and the social activists who took part in it (the *desaparecidos*), the participants of *escraches* became part of the process of creating a new social force in which new forms and actors such as the piquetero movement converged. This new social force became the main actor in the insurrections leading to the fall of de la Rúa’s government in December 2001. *Escraches*, then, fall between the end of one cycle of struggles (those of the 1970s) and the beginning of a new one (those of the 1990s).

Despite having their origins in the activities of human rights organizations, a large number of *escraches* were organized by labor unions, political parties, and other organizations. This process relates to the rise of protests leading to the popular insurrection in Buenos Aires on December 19 and 20, 2001, known as *Argentinazo*. Unlike *escraches* organized by HIJOS, in which the individual targeted was a criminal, *escraches* carried out by other organizations had the goal of denouncing politicians in office, such as those identified with Carlos Menem (1991–8), including economics minister Domingo Cavallo and minister of justice Carlos Corach, or organizations identified with neoliberalism such as the IMF and the World Bank.

Escraches and *cacerolazos* (involving protesters banging pots, pans, and other utensils) were original forms of protest developed in Argentina before the *Argentinazo*. Different studies undertaken from a Sartrean or autonomist perspective indicate that these forms of protest were a radical novelty, both in Argentina and throughout the world. Among these studies, the work of Colectivo Situaciones deserves particular mention. Their most representative work is the book *Genocida en el Barrio: Mesa de escrache popular* (2002), which highlights the phenomenon’s originality and spontaneity.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Labor Unions and Protests of the Unemployed, 1990s; Argentina, *Piquetero* Movement; *El Argentinazo*, December 19 and 20, 2001

References and Suggested Readings

- AAVV (2008) *El 19. Expropiación y radicalización. Buenos Aires 1983–2001*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones ryr.
- Campione, D. (n.d.) “Escraches” en expansión (O el reencuentro con los enemigos). Available at www.rebelion.org.

- Colectivo Situaciones (2000) *Los “escraches.”* Buenos Aires: Ediciones de mano en mano.
- Colectivo Situaciones (2002) *19 y 20, apuntes para el nuevo protagonismo social.* Buenos Aires.
- Cominiello, S. (2003) El escrache: una hipótesis preliminar. *Razón y Revolución* 11 (Winter), Buenos Aires.
- Cominiello, S. (2004) Otra vez: ¿qué es un “escrache”? *Razón y Revolución* 12 (Summer), Buenos Aires. www.hijos.org.ar.
- Zibechi, R. (2003) *Genealogía de la revuelta.* Buenos Aires: Nordan.

Hilferding, Rudolf (1877–1941)

Robert Goodrich

Rudolf Hilferding proved the most influential of the Austro-Marxist economists and the leading socialist theoretician under the Weimar Republic (1918–33). The son of a Jewish Viennese merchant family, Hilferding joined the circle of socialist students around M. Adler, with whom he co-founded the *Marx-Studien* in 1904 that served as the catalytic forum for Austro-Marxism. Hilferding later participated in the German November Revolution in 1918, supported the short-lived Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD), and twice served as finance minister of the Weimar Republic (1923, 1928–9). Following the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, he fled into exile where he was captured by the Vichy French police and disappeared in Gestapo custody in Paris in 1941.

Hilferding rose to leadership in the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) through his relationship with Karl Kautsky, his editorship of *Vorwärts*, and his reputation as a leading economic theoretician. Yet his opposition to World War I led to his removal as editor and his consequent allegiance to the anti-war USPD for whom he edited *Die Freiheit* and briefly served as finance minister in 1920. Hilferding sought a centrist position during Weimar's first chaotic years, though he ultimately favored a merger with the SPD by 1922 and supported a moderate policy of parliamentary coalition to defend Weimar. In 1924 he was elected to the *Reichstag* where he served as the SPD's chief spokesman on financial matters. Together with Kautsky he formulated the Heidelberg Program in 1925. He again served as the finance minister between 1928

and 1929 on the eve of the Great Depression, by which time his increasingly cautious economic policies contributed to the growing alienation of rank-and-file socialists.

While Hilferding's political legacy appears one of failure (SPD support for the war; collapse of the USPD; brief tenures as finance minister; overthrow of Weimar), his theoretical contributions included his concept of organized capitalism, his contributions to the Crisis Debate, and his ideas of the “total state.”

Hilferding developed the so-called economic reading of Marx in his defense of Marxism against the Neoclassical Austrian School, or Marginalists. Building on his preliminary *Böhm-Bawerk's Criticism of Marx* (1904), Hilferding's *Finance Capital* (1910) applied the empirical experience of Central European cartelization to *Das Kapital* and explored the transformation of “liberal capitalism” into monopolistic “finance capital.” From these new conditions, Hilferding foresaw a new path towards socialism: “Once finance capital has brought the most important branches of production under its control, it is enough for society, through its conscious executive organ – the state conquered by the working class – to seize financial capital in order to gain immediate control of those branches of production.” In effect, monopoly and banking had altered capitalism and the state, which could serve as a neutral institution; the social revolution was transformed into a political revolution. Thus, Hilferding not only proposed the first theory of developed capitalism, later elaborated in 1915 to encompass a full theory of “organized capitalism,” but he also drew the political conclusion that socialism could be achieved through control of the state and socialization in a highly monopolistic economy even if capitalism were not fully developed. Further, he concluded that finance capital inevitably led to imperialism and the war conditions that would lead to revolution. Both propositions deeply influenced Lenin and Bukharin.

As part of the socialist response to the economic crises of the 1920s and 1930s, Hilferding participated in the Crisis Debate. He rejected the orthodox Marxist view of the inevitable breakdown of capitalism and instead contended that the concentration of capital served to stabilize capitalism. Later, in the wake of the Nazi victory, Hilferding reassessed his views on the state as he came to see the state, especially through its

monopoly on violence, as an autonomous force. His theory of the “total state” became one of the foundational analyses of totalitarianism.

As the heir to Kautsky, Hilferding’s theories shaped the official views of the Second International throughout the 1920s and 1930s. However, the failure of the Weimar Republic led to an inevitable critical reaction. Consequently, Hilferding’s reputation suffered. The English and German literature offer few monographs, and, aside from translations of his major works, neither an English anthology nor a translation of the *Marx-Studien* exists. Nonetheless, each of his three theoretical contributions remains seminal in their respective fields; indeed, particular attention has returned to Hilferding’s *Finance Capital* due to the economic trends of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, explaining the noticeable increase in scholarship beginning in the 1990s.

SEE ALSO: Austro-Marxism; Bauer, Otto (1881–1938); Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888–1938); German Revolution, 1918–1923; Germany, Socialism and Nationalism; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Imperialism and Capitalist Development; Internationals; Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marxism; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Hilferding, H. (1910/1981) *Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development*. Ed. T. Bottomore. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Smaldone, W. (1998) *Rudolf Hilferding: The Tragedy of a German Social Democrat*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.
- Wanger, F. P. (1996) *Rudolf Hilferding: Theory and Politics of Democratic Socialism*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
- Zoninsein, J. (1990) *Monopoly Capital Theory: Hilferding and Twentieth-Century Capitalism*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Hindu nationalism, Hindutva, and women

Soma Marik

Gender and Hindu Nationalism

The attempt of the British colonial state to establish a centralized administration in India ended in heightened tensions between Hindus and Muslims. At the same time, British rule defined

itself in a gendered manner, seeking to justify itself in part by reference to the plight, real and supposed, of Indian women. Consequently, responses to colonial rule also had to confront gender issues, especially in the context of growing Hindu cultural nationalism in the late nineteenth century, when a number of early nationalists, in their search for definitions of Indianness, identified Indian with Hindu. Having accepted British rule in the public sphere, nationalists decided that battle must be given on the terrain of the private, claiming the illegitimacy of colonial interference in domestic issues and redefining community by modernizing patriarchy.

The attempt to create a militant nationalist ideology often resulted in a sharply gendered image. Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, a forerunner of cultural nationalism, wrote novels which envisaged the country as motherland, with its song, *Bande Mataram* (salutations to the motherland), becoming a rallying cry for nationalists of Hindu origin as well as Hindu communalists. The early writings of Chattopadhyay displayed a great deal of concern for class, caste, and gender oppression, but in his later works his focus changed to a search for an ethico-religious site to define the nation. Despite his early concern for women’s rights, he also developed careful gender codes. In his 1869 *Mrinalini* he valorized *sati*, the act of self-immolation by a “chaste” woman in her husband’s funeral pyre. Thus, the nation is identified with, and rejuvenated by, the most extreme form of violence that the woman can exercise upon herself in conformity with her religion. Significantly, this came after the actual ban on *sati*. Many of Chattopadhyay’s contemporaries, too, argued that westerners could not understand the capability of the Hindu woman for self-sacrifice. For example, during a debate over the Age of Consent Bill (1891) Hindu nationalists argued against forbidding child marriage by insisting that saving the community was more important than the health or even life of a few individual women.

From Cultural Nationalism to Hindu Communalism

This Hindu cultural nationalism provided the basis for a more aggressive Hindu communalism in the early twentieth century. Challenges to the upper-caste and class power from peasants, “untouchables,” and other backward castes, and

from other communities, led to a rise in militant Hindu chauvinism. The caste and community identifications in the census reports and the creation of the fear of the “dying Hindus” resulted in the numerically defined strength of the community becoming a significant component of communal consciousness.

It was argued that the Muslim population was rising faster, partly supposedly due to the marriage between Muslim men and Hindu widows, abducted by the former. It was also claimed, through gross distortions of history, that child marriage, and the resulting increase in widowhood, had been caused by the Muslim conquest of India and the need to protect women from the Muslim rapists. It was because of these complexities that erstwhile opponents of widow remarriage now became supporters. Widows were attacked for their lustful and carnal desires, but it was argued that these problems could be turned into advantages by reversing the decline in Hindu numbers. Thus the focus of reforms like widow marriage was changed from a rights issue to community interest. Dayanand Saraswati, founder of the Arya Samaj, was an early proponent of such views, which became quite pervasive by the 1920s.

The early 1920s saw important political changes as the unilateral withdrawal of the Non-Cooperation movement by Gandhi angered Muslims, while the assertions by “untouchables” also created tensions for the upper-caste Hindus. Hindu Mahasabha (the Hindu Assembly), and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (the RSS – National Volunteer Organization), the first political organizations of Hindutva (radical right-wing politics based on projecting a homogeneous Hindu identity), emerged with the clear aim of restoring Brahmin-landlord-elite hegemony by constructing an ideology of Hindu supremacist fundamentalism. They sought to create an upper-caste dominated, yet apparently unified, aggressive Hindu identity by fostering an enemy image of the Muslims.

Gender was central to the Hindutva ideologues’ redefinition of the Hindu. Scholars like Gupta (2001) have demonstrated that the Hindus, according to this imagery, were, though the majority of India, always oppressed by the minority Muslims because of the former’s “effeminate” character. Women formed the boundaries of the Hindu “nation” or “race,” and were called upon to restore the manhood of the Hindus by pro-

ducing strong sons – not to fight the British colonialists, but the Muslims.

From the 1920s the creation of the Muslim “Other” involved attacks on Allah, the Prophet, as an assertion that it is not merely this or that Muslim, but the essence of Islam that represents sexual perversion and a threat to all Hindus. There was a fear of the women of the other community producing more children. In 1923 Madan Mohan Malaviya, president of the Hindu Mahasabha, in a speech delivered at Benaras attempted to create a systematic narrative of abductions or victimizations of Hindu women by the aggressive males of the other community with three consequences: women were to become active agents, not merely passive victims, to protect their chastity, and therewith the honor of the community; Hindu virility was to be manifested by restricting women’s mobility and by imposing controls on women’s sexuality; and the Hindu male was urged to become aggressive and to kill the enemy so as to defend the honor of the Hindu women and community.

During the *Shuddhi* and *Sangathan* campaigns in the 1920s to “reclaim” those who had converted from Hinduism to other religions, it was explained among other things that the prime religious duty was for every sister to have a sharp knife to protect her chastity and honor. The creation of “a sister in arms” image to exhort women to be empowered for self-defense gave women an opportunity to reinforce their stereotyped mother and wife roles in a public space. They would be simultaneously brave women capable of striking terror into the enemy and of shaming Hindu men.

Such efforts eventually led to the formation, by Lakshmibai Kelkar, of the Rashtra Sevika Samity (Society of Women Serving the Nation – Samiti), a subordinate women’s wing of the RSS. In this organization the component of self, as institutionalized in *atmaraksha* (self-defense), is identified with the womb rather than a comprehensive individual. So the Hindu woman’s body became the appropriate site for the formation of hostile community identities which cater to the needs of the Hindu supremacist agenda.

Retributional violence, including violence on Muslim women, was advocated in a particularly frenzied tone by V. D. Savarkar, one of the founders of Hindu Mahasabha, in his voluminous communal distortions of the history of India. His vision of history always had the Aryans as

a race confronting the Other. Portraying the Muslims not as Turks, Afghans, or Mughals, but as Muslims, was essential to validate the construction of Islam as the principal enemy to the Hindu nation. Hindus alone were defined as a nation, having their fatherland as well as holy land in India, while all others were outsiders. It was then argued that Muslim males were all rapists, who could only be stopped if Hindu men gave up their misplaced chivalry by raping the women of the “Enemy” community.

Contemporary Hindutva and Women’s Mobilization

Immediately after India’s independence there was tremendous communal violence, culminating in the murder of Gandhi (January 30, 1948) by Nathuram Godse, associated with both the RSS and Hindu Mahasabha. Both organizations lost credibility. To regain legality the RSS Supremo M. S. Golwalkar promised that the group would remain a “cultural” association, but it floated an electoral front, the communal and aggressive nationalist Jan Sangh (People’s Association) in 1951. After some years as a marginal force, the RSS and Jan Sangh gained in stature, especially during 1974–7, when a left-right alliance fought Indira Gandhi’s regime, resulting in her defeat in the 1977 elections. That year saw the formation of the Janata Party (Peoples’ Party), in which the Jan Sangh was an important constituent. Eventually, RSS supporters formed the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP – Indian Peoples’ Party) at the end of 1980. By the second half of the 1980s an aggressive fascist type of Hindu communalism began to be projected. The major rallying cries were the special status of Kashmir, the Uniform Civil Code (UCC), and above all, the construction of a Ram temple at the so-called *Ram Janmabhoomi* (birthplace of the Hindu mythological figure, Ram) by destroying the existing Babri mosque.

Gender became an important aspect of the Hindutva mobilizations as women were brought into extremely visible and active roles. During the campaigns of the late 1980s and early 1990s the Rashtra Sevika Samiti literature emptied motherhood of its customary emotional and affective load and charged mothers with bringing up heroic children. But the thrust of the transformation of the Samiti was to erase concern

with social and gender justice and to situate the public identity in a totalitarian model derived from the RSS as an all-male organization.

While the Samiti looked at middle-class women of mainly upper castes, other organizations were floated to attract women of other kinds. The *Durga* (goddess of power) *Vahini* (forces) was launched to create vocal women who would actually take part in communal violence. Female role models and leaders exhorting violence included Uma Bharati and *Sadhvi* (female ascetic) Rithambhara. The latter, a relatively obscure young woman, projected dramatically during the *Ramjanmabhoomi* campaigns of 1986–92, delivered hate-speeches. These ringing exhortations to Hindu men to arise and kill Muslims were recorded and distributed through audio cassettes even in areas previously free of communal tensions. Warrior images were also drawn to mobilize women, who were to use their anger to give birth to avenging sons, while the space for violence was ultimately reserved for men. Uma Bharati, another *sanyasin* (ascetic), also played a central role during the attack in 1992, on the Babri *Masjid*, which had been created by a general of the emperor Babar by destroying a temple dedicated to Ram, according to the myth created by the RSS and its “family,” including the Viswa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council–VHP) and the *Bajrang Dal* (Party of Hanuman, a Gray Langur who was the greatest devotee of Ram in the epic).

Hindutva and Muslim Women

The campaigns also included sustained planning to inflict violence on women of the Other, primarily Muslims, but also Christians, and even Hindu women who did not conform. The election of BJP or BJP-led governments, whether at provincial or central levels, gave added thrust to the gender dimensions of the Hindutva brigade’s strategies. One of its repeated arguments has been the need to bring in a Uniform Civil Code. But while the demand for a UCC from the women’s movement even before independence had been based on a concern for gender justice and a perceived injustice in all religious Personal Laws, the Hindutva forces identified the UCC with the Hindu legal code, possibly with marginal modifications, imposed on all communities in the name of national unity.

Court verdicts having Hindu slants, from the Shah Bano case (1985) to the Sarla Mudgal case (1995), strengthened this campaign. It was argued that the existence of the Muslim Personal Law made them non- or anti-national.

For public consumption there was often a claim that Muslim women were oppressed due to the existence of Muslim polygamy and the survival of a form of divorce in which the husband can simply say “talaq” three times to the wife to divorce her. This concealed the fact that there are more illegal Hindu polygamies than legal Muslim polygamies. Also, targeting Muslim Personal Laws ignores the reality that all communities are governed by unequal anti-woman Personal Laws, and that even people who do not identify as Hindus are linked to Hindu laws of inheritance and various forms of Hindu customs and rituals. Thus the campaign over the UCC was sought to be hijacked by the BJP and turned into a weapon against Muslims. It also compelled Muslim women, many of whom had fought for their rights under secular laws, to choose between gender and community while their community came under extreme threats.

Violence on women was carried out and justified in a number of ways. The rape of nuns in Jhabua (BJP-ruled Madhya Pradesh) in 1998 was declared a patriotic Hindu reaction to Christian conspiracies concerning conversions by the general secretary of the VHP. Home minister L. K. Advani refused to condemn this in parliament. But the most sustained violence carried out according to the fascist worldview was in Gujarat in 2002. Savarkar’s formula excluded Muslims and Christians from the body-politic as outsiders. The central conclusion drawn from this by the Hindutva brigade is that revenge must be taken on all Muslims. The prolonged BJP rule in Gujarat (since 1995) enabled it to communalize state and civil society alike within a few years. Following this, careful plans were laid for a pogrom, with names of Muslims and Muslim-owned establishments marked out, using voter lists and sales tax records. A fire in a train that killed a number of people at the Godhra station in Gujarat, including *Ram Janmabhoomi* activists returning from Ayodhya (the site of the so-called *Janmabhoomi*), in February 2002, was used as the excuse to set off pogroms.

One of the most spectacular forms of sadism in these events had been the nature of violence

on Muslim female and infantile bodies. At the mass grave that was dug on March 6 to provide burial to 96 bodies from Naroda Patiya (Ahmedabad), 46 women were buried. In a large number of cases women were paraded naked, raped, gang-raped, mutilated, and objects were inserted into their bodies, and children were killed in front of them.

In readings of community violence, rape is taken to be a sign of collective dishonoring. Patriarchy designates the female body as the ultimate symbol of community purity. Therefore, rape of women of the Other community constitutes the greatest dishonor to them. Rape, in Gujarat violence, obviously performed that function. The violence of Gujarat reflected the revenge theme, as well as the fear of Muslim fertility. Hence the killing of children and their bearers, too. At the same time, by drawing in *dalits* and *adivasis* (former “untouchables” and “tribals”), they were assured that at least in inflicting violence and sexual assault on Muslims, they would be treated as equals.

SEE ALSO: India, Hindutva and Fascist Mobilizations, 1989–2002; India, Nationalism, Extremist; India, Post-World War II Upsurge

References and Suggested Readings

- Chattopadhyay, K. (Ed.) (2002) *The Genocidal Pogrom in Gujarat: Anatomy of Indian Fascism*. Baroda: Inquilabi Communist Sangathan.
- Chattopadhyay, M. & Marik, S. (Eds.) (2002) *Garbhaghati Gujarat* (Gujarat: The Slayer of Wombs). Kolkata: Peoples’ Book Society.
- Gopal, S. (Ed.) (1991) *Anatomy of a Confrontation: The Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhumi Issue*. New Delhi: Penguin Books India.
- Gupta, C. (2001) *Sexuality, Obscenity, Community*. Delhi: Permanent Black.
- Sarkar, T. (2001) *Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation*. New Delhi: Permanent Black.
- Sarkar, T. & Butalia, U. (Eds.) (1995) *Women and the Hindu Right*. New Delhi: Kali for Women.

Hirschfeld, Magnus (1868–1935)

Larry W. Heiman

Magnus Hirschfeld was a German physician, sexologist, and author best known today for his exhaustive study of all aspects of human sexuality.

A prominent champion of the acceptance and decriminalization of homosexuality, he was also a social reformer in areas of women's reproductive rights, socialized medicine, and prostitution.

In 1896 Hirschfeld published the pamphlet *Sappho und Sokrates*, under the pseudonym Th. Ramien, prompted by the suicide of a patient distressed by society's rejection of his homosexuality. It presented Hirschfeld's first ideas on the biological basis of homosexuality. He argued that homosexuality was a variant of human love that should be both scientifically studied and decriminalized, "a natural, inborn variation that simply occurs statistically less often than heterosexuality but can equally form the basis of the noblest love" (Brennan & Hegarty 2007: 8). Although criticized in his time for theories not always supported by science, Hirschfeld's doctrine of *Zwischenstufenlehre* or "sexual intermediaries," with its primacy of sexual variance and rejection of a hetero/homosexual binary, foresaw by decades twentieth-century queer theory discussions of a dichotomous sexuality.

Other groundbreaking publications by Hirschfeld would follow, including *Die Transvestiten* (*Transvestites*) in 1910, a term he originated; *Die Homosexualität des Mannes und des Weibes* (*The Homosexuality of Men and Women*) in 1914, his major study of homosexuality; *Sexualpathologie* (*Sexual Pathology*) in 1917–20, intended as a textbook for physicians and medical students; and *Geschlechtskunde* (*Sexology*) in 1926–30, a summation of his life's work.

In 1897 in Berlin, Hirschfeld cofounded the *Wissenschaftlich-humanitäres Komitee* (Scientific-Humanitarian Committee). With "justice through science" as its motto, it was the world's first organization dedicated to social and legal emancipation of homosexuals and other sexual minorities through scientifically based research and understanding. The *Komitee's* first point of action was to start a campaign for repeal of Paragraph 175, the provision of the German Criminal Code that made male homosexual acts a crime. Supported by political parties of the left and with the signatures of many prominent Germans, Hirschfeld and the *Komitee* worked during the next 30 years, making various petitions to the Reichstag, but the provision's repeal never attained a majority of support in the German parliament. (The provision would not be completely nullified until 1994.) In 1899 the *Komitee* began publishing *Jahrbuch für sexuelle Zwischenstufen* (*Yearbook for*

Sexual Intermediaries), the first journal devoted to scholarship on sexual variance. It ceased publication in 1923 after 23 volumes.

In 1919 Hirschfeld opened in Berlin the *Institut für Sexualwissenschaft* (Institute for Sexual Science), a center for the study of all aspects of sexuality. It also served as a counseling service on marriage and sexual problems and would eventually house the results of over 10,000 interviews from a questionnaire on sexuality developed by Hirschfeld, as well as a library and museum of international scope on sexuality. As a means of bringing sexologists together, Hirschfeld organized the first International Congress for Sexual Reform in 1921 in Berlin, which led to the formation of the World League for Sexual Reform. Other conferences followed, under the new name of the Congress of the World League for Sexual Reform, in Copenhagen, London, Vienna, and lastly in Brno, Czechoslovakia, in 1932.

Hirschfeld's notoriety as a sexologist eventually led to his becoming a controversial figure and the object of both personal and professional attacks. Carl Jung and Albert Moll published prominent criticisms of his work and were eventually joined by Sigmund Freud, an early supporter. Among the criticisms were inflated statistics, unsubstantiated theories, and his political activism getting in the way of science. Hirschfeld's court appearances as an expert witness publicly identifying homosexuals, most notoriously during the Eulenberg Affair, caused many supporters to turn against him, even though his testimony often kept people from being jailed. Benedikt Friedländer, Adolf Brand, and other homosexual rights activists broke with Hirschfeld over his ideas on homosexuality, which in their view identified all male homosexuals as effeminate and all female homosexuals as masculine. His being Jewish made him a target of right-wing nationalists and Nazis. His lectures were often disrupted, and he was physically threatened and assaulted on several occasions.

In 1930 Hirschfeld left Germany for a lecture tour of the United States, where the press dubbed him "the Einstein of Sex" (Bauer 2004: 1). He extended his tour to include Hawaii, Japan, China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, Egypt, and Palestine. Throughout his travels abroad he was received with honor and lauded for his achievements. Returning to Europe in 1932, he remained in France after

receiving warnings about the growing anti-Semitism in Germany. In 1933 the Nazis ransacked the *Institut für Sexualwissenschaft*, burning its library and files, an event Hirschfeld viewed in newsreel footage at a Paris cinema. He died in exile in Nice in 1935.

SEE ALSO: Brand, Adolf (1874–1945); Friedländer, Benedikt (1866–1908); Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements, Germany

References and Suggested Readings

- Bauer, J. E. (2004) Hirschfeld, Magnus (1868–1935). In *gbtq: An Encyclopedia of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Culture*. Available at www.gbtq.com/social-sciences/hirschfeld_m.html (downloaded March 16, 2008).
- Brennan, T. & Hegarty, P. (2007) Who Was Magnus Hirschfeld and Why Do We Need to Know? *History and Philosophy of Psychology* 9 (1): 12–28.
- Bullough, V. L. (2003) Magnus Hirschfeld, An Often Overlooked Pioneer. *Sexuality and Culture* 7, 1 (January): 62–72.
- Hirschfeld, M. (2002) *The Homosexuality of Men and Women*. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
- Wolff, C. (1986) *Magnus Hirschfeld: A Portrait of a Pioneer in Sexology*. London: Quartet Books.

Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism

Amy Beth Carney

Nazism was a political movement and mass ideology that developed in Germany following the country's defeat in World War I. As a form of fascism, Nazism did not have a single founder or ideological theory but drew upon many ideas and philosophies that originated in the nineteenth century, including a racial history of civilization, the “science” of eugenics, and notions of crowd psychology. It was also influenced by nationalism, which was on the rise throughout Europe by the last third of the nineteenth century. Nazism differed from other forms of fascism by its devotion to the ideal of the “blond-haired, blue-eyed” Aryan race. The perception of Germans possessing these physical attributes derives from the work of the first-century Roman historian Tacitus, who erroneously depicted ancient Germans in such terms.

The Growth of Fascism in the Postwar Years

Though strongly shaped by the recent past, fascism, and subsequently Nazism, only developed as an independent ideology following World War I. As with communism, the other ideology born from that war, fascism promised to solve society's postwar ills and to foster greater unity among the people. However, whereas communism had an international focus, fascism had a national one. It additionally pledged to deliver a strong leader who would overcome the paralysis in society that had been created by inefficient democracies. This promise of an authoritarian leader appealed to many people, especially as they suffered from political instability, inflation, and unemployment in the postwar era. Fascism further boasted that it was anti-communist: during the interwar years, both fascism and communism gained popularity on the basis that one ideology represented the antithesis of the other.

Fascism appealed to many people worldwide in the 1920s and 1930s. For example, the British Union of Fascists promoted a patriotism which emphasized the values of king, country, and empire. It called for a strong government that would rejuvenate the economic, political, and social life of Britain. In Spain, the *Falange Española* (Spanish Falanx) made little headway politically until after the Spanish Civil War when Francisco Franco's new government turned it into the country's sole political party. Despite this status, the Falanx had no real power in Franco's authoritarian regime. Fascism likewise developed in the United States, but no movement ever gained a large following. However, a few prominent Americans espoused fascism, including poet Ezra Pound and Louisiana governor and senator Huey Long. Active movements were also established in China and Japan, both of which emphasized the militaristic aspects of fascism. As for Latin America, groups in Argentina and Chile imitated the European parties, though they never achieved electoral success. Thus, while acceptance of fascism was widespread, fascist parties never achieved any major success except in Germany and Italy.

German Fascism

Within Germany, World War I had bankrupted the imperial regime militarily, politically,

financially, and morally and had left the nation unprepared to cope with defeat. Furthermore, although it symbolized a hope for a new start, the Weimar Republic, which had been proclaimed on November 9, 1918 following the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II, was beset with internal and external problems.

The Weimar Republic

Domestically, the new government had to manage a sudden and large demobilization. Officials feared this mass movement of soldiers might create disorder; however, demobilization went smoothly because it was the only task the army had to complete. The soldiers were proudly welcomed home, and the jovial reception by the public helped shape the legend that the German army had never been defeated on the battlefield. This inability to recognize their military loss was politically damaging to the fledgling Weimar government as many Germans came to believe that the army could have won the war had the republic not stabbed it in the back.

The new government additionally had to convert the economy from one concerned with military needs toward one designed to serve the general public. There were several impediments to this transition. Inflation, which had begun during the war, inhibited recovery. The postwar Allied blockade, the shortages of general supplies, and the lack of government purchases following the war created more problems. The Weimar Republic also made poor economic choices: decisions that would have aided financial growth in the long run were not implemented because they were politically disastrous in the short term. Instead, the government created policies that were designed to foster immediate political support from the people at the expense of long-term economic recovery.

A third domestic issue that plagued the Weimar Republic was nostalgia among the people for the prewar period. Numerous Germans believed that World War I, combined with postwar inflation and abortive revolutions, had unraveled the moral fabric of their country. Thus, many of them wanted to return to what they believed had been a “normal” life. They assumed that if the moral decline could be reversed, then normal peacetime conditions would return. However, this life that many Germans imagined had existed in the past never actually existed, and the Weimar govern-

ment bore responsibility for the failure to return to the perceived better times.

The Legacy of Versailles

Beyond these internal issues, there was one major external problem that stigmatized the Weimar Republic: the Treaty of Versailles. Signed on June 28, 1919 at the Palace of Versailles, this treaty imposed harsh and vindictive terms. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, hatred for this treaty, especially Article 231 which branded Germany as the sole instigator of the war, was the only factor that united all Germans. There is no doubt that the treaty harmed Germany economically and politically, but in reality, the myth of the severity of the treaty caused more psychological than material damage. The humiliation imposed by the Versailles Diktat, as the Germans referred to it, disenchanted many people and embittered them toward the democratic government that had signed it.

Overall, the Weimar Republic was beset with domestic and foreign setbacks that it could not resolve. The German people became disenchanted with democracy before it had a chance to establish itself. However, the failure of democracy did not automatically lead to the rise of National Socialism. The Nazi party was only one of many political factions vying for power and voters in the 1920s. These small groups challenged the hegemony of the traditional political parties by proclaiming they could solve the problems of German society, especially the plights of the middle and working classes.

The German Workers' Party

The German Workers' Party (*Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*, DAP) – the precursor of the Nazi party – was founded on January 5, 1919 by a Munich locksmith named Anton Drexler. It espoused nationalism and lionized the importance of a unified German people. The party also promoted anti-Semitism, though this was not unique, as this mentality had been prominent since the last decades of the nineteenth century.

Party leaders had ambitions to develop the DAP into a mass organization that would represent the German workers. However, initial growth was limited. The transformation of the party into a nationally recognized and successful political entity primarily resulted from the efforts

of the man who would become the DAP's most famous member: Adolf Hitler. The DAP had originally come to Hitler's attention through his work for the German army when the military had assigned him to monitor the Munich faction. Hitler was not initially impressed with the party, but he still joined in September 1919 because he believed its content and goals could still be molded.

Over the next few months the DAP shaped its political program, laying out a 25-point plan in February 1920 that included calling for the creation of a German state based on national self-determination. That same month the party changed its name to the National Socialist German Workers' Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*, NSDAP). The term "Nazi" comes from the compression of the first two words. Another change to the party was its size: its numbers grew throughout that year, largely due to Hitler's rhetorical abilities. His skills as a propagandist provided the NSDAP with a reputation for being more energetic than other political parties, and the people of Munich began to attend NSDAP rallies in greater numbers. By 1921, party membership reached 3,000 and several local party branches had been formed outside of the Bavarian capital.

The Rise of Adolf Hitler

This popular leader, Adolf Hitler, was born on April 20, 1889 in Braunau on the River Inn, Austria, to Klara Hitler. Though there are doubts about his paternity, Alois Hitler raised him as his son. He was their fourth child, but the first one to survive infancy. Hitler attended many schools in his youth, and while he received fairly good marks as a young child, his performance declined during his adolescence. After he finished school at age 16, his father had high hopes for Hitler to follow in his career path and become a civil servant. Hitler, however, wanted to become an artist and rejected the idea of joining the civil service. He attempted to enter the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna in 1907 and 1908; he failed the entrance examination both times. Hitler spent the next five years in Vienna painting and performing manual labor. There he was exposed to anti-Semitism, which was endemic in prewar Vienna.

In 1913 he moved to Munich, partially to continue to avoid military service in the Austrian

army. Yet, when World War I broke out, Hitler volunteered for a Bavarian regiment. He fought on the western front, where he was wounded in the leg, promoted to lance corporal, and received the Iron Cross First and Second Classes. Hitler believed that the war was the most important time in his life, and he was upset with Germany's defeat, which he learned about while recovering in a hospital from temporary gas blindness. After the war, he remained in the army, but returned to Munich. In 1919, the army ordered him to investigate the German Workers' Party, and that is what led to his involvement with the party, which gave him a niche to which he could devote his energy. During his early years with the party, he dedicated his time to propaganda speeches, a task for which he was eminently suited. The topics of his speeches ranged from contrasting Germany's present weakness with its former strength, accusing Jews of obstructing German victory, lambasting the British and French for their intention to destroy Germany, condemning the Treaty of Versailles, and censuring the German government for ruining the country politically and economically. These topics were hardly original, but Hitler's success lay in his ability to present these unoriginal ideas in a novel way.

By May 1921, Hitler was no longer just the leading propagandist of the NSDAP, he had also become its leader. His ascendancy created friction among party leaders, many of whom did not want to have Hitler direct the party. Nonetheless, other leaders capitulated to Hitler's personal rule because they recognized that the successful growth of the party was due to him, so they amended the party's constitution and gave him dictatorial control.

Hitler consolidated his rule by gaining the loyalty of party members. His primary supporters were from the party's paramilitary organization, the *Sturmabteilung* ("Storm Troopers," or SA). The role of the SA was to protect party meetings and march in rallies, though these duties often led to scuffles with other political soldiers, especially communists. With the backing of the SA, Hitler believed he could ignite a revolution that would topple the Weimar Republic. On November 8–9, 1923, the Nazi party attempted to emulate Benito Mussolini's successful March on Rome with its own march on Berlin; this abortive coup, known as the Beer Hall Putsch,

failed and led to the dissolution of the NSDAP and the incarceration of its leader.

Hitler was placed on trial for treason, and during the proceedings he assumed full responsibility for his actions. The court sentenced him to five years in jail, but he remained incarcerated for only nine months, during which he dictated *Mein Kampf*. In this book, Hitler expounded on his basic worldview. He proclaimed that history was a struggle among different races and that Germany, with its superior Aryan race, would be led to victory in this struggle by a dictator who could make the German people aware of their racial heritage and future. Part of this future victory included attaining *Lebensraum*, or living space, for the German people. Besides spending his time dictating *Mein Kampf*, Hitler also requested that the Austrian government terminate his citizenship in March 1925 because of his service record in the German army and his desire to become a German citizen. His Austrian citizenship was terminated one month later, although he would not gain German citizenship until February 1932.

The Nazi Party

After his prison sentence, Hitler devoted himself not just to reestablishing the party, but to making the NSDAP a legal force in German politics. Weimar Germany was a democratic republic, so the re-formed Nazi party sought to achieve power through the electorate. Throughout the mid- and late 1920s, the party continued to grow, gaining support primarily from people who longed for an authority that could save Germany from its worsening economic problems. Starting in late 1928 and deteriorating further with the onset of the Depression in late 1929, Germany's economy plummeted, exacerbating the poor economic decisions made by the government earlier in the decade. Moreover, this economic downturn eroded democracy as each successive chancellor sought to solve the problem by ruling through emergency decrees and not through the Reichstag, the German parliament. These chancellors normalized authoritarian rule as a viable alternative prior to the Third Reich.

Once on the fringe of the political system, the NSDAP now came to the forefront. In each successive Reichstag election, the Nazi party gained seats, and by 1930 it had become the second largest political party. With this electoral

achievement, Hitler ran for president in 1932 against incumbent Paul von Hindenburg. In his campaign, Hitler traveled around Germany by plane and personally addressed millions of people. Despite this successful modern propaganda campaign, Hitler lost the election. Nonetheless, the Nazi party subsequently became the largest party in the Reichstag by July 1932 after receiving over 37 percent of the vote. Hitler tried to use this electoral success to persuade Hindenburg to appoint him chancellor. Hindenburg refused at first, and this refusal was Hitler's greatest setback since the 1923 putsch. However, after former Chancellor Franz von Papen persuaded the president to reconsider his refusal, Hindenburg relented and appointed Hitler chancellor on January 30, 1933.

Hitler consolidated his power over the course of the next few months. In March 1933, the Reichstag building was set on fire, enabling Hitler to solidify his control when the Reichstag subsequently passed the Enabling Act, which indefinitely suspended all personal liberties granted by the Weimar constitution and essentially gave him the power to rule uninhibited. This Act furthermore signaled the end of other political parties. By July, every political party but the NSDAP had been banned. Hitler additionally strengthened his position by seizing the presidency upon the death of Hindenburg in August 1934. Shortly thereafter, the German army personally swore an oath of allegiance to him. The actual impetus for this oath did not come from Hitler or any member of the Nazi party, but from the army leaders, who hoped that such a pledge would divorce Hitler from the NSDAP and make him loyal to the armed forces.

Totalitarianism in Germany

The reordering of German life to suit the Nazi party was never specifically instigated by Hitler. He was simply the ultimate beneficiary as millions of Germans willingly collaborated with the Nazification of the country. While the Nazi party maintained the support of over one-third of the German population until the end of the Third Reich, a much higher portion acceded to the changes because of their confidence in Hitler. In the mid-1930s, this trust seemed to be well placed. For example, the economic policies of the Hitler government, although not radically different from those made by the Weimar

Republic, solved the economic and unemployment crises. Approval for the Nazi regime increased due to foreign policy decisions, such as the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations, the remilitarization of the country, the formation of the Berlin–Rome–Tokyo Axis, and the removal of Germany’s signature from the Treaty of Versailles.

Faith in the *Führer* (leader), as Hitler was commonly called, remained strong. He did not have to direct either the party or the government, especially as it became common for party and government officials to implement policies that they believed would promote what they presumed to be Hitler’s will. This course of action meant that the *Führer* could be a dictator without having to dictate. It established a cult of Hitler that permeated the country. The very existence of Nazi society became based not on a shared loyalty to fascist ideology, but on a collective allegiance to one man. From 1933 to 1945, this fidelity was bolstered through propaganda which, as clearly illustrated by the slogan *Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer* (One people, one nation, one leader), promoted Hitler as the man who had restored Germany to its former strength and glory.

The solidification of Nazi control led to the permeation of the NSDAP into the everyday lives of the German people. For many, this infiltration came from belonging to the party or one of its organizations. The SA still existed and boasted a strong membership. However, the leadership of the German army as well as many prominent businessmen who supported the party felt threatened by the ambitions of the SA and its leader, Ernst Röhm. To gain the backing of the army and to continue the sponsorship of the business community, Hitler had the SA purged on June 30, 1934. During this event, the Night of the Long Knives, approximately 200 people were killed, including Röhm. Two weeks later in a speech to the Reichstag, Hitler accepted full responsibility for the murders. The international community was horrified by this incident, though there were no real signs of domestic disapproval.

The SA continued to exist, but following the purge, its place as the dominant party organization was taken over by the smaller, more elite *Schutzstaffeln* (“Protective Squadrons,” or SS). Founded in 1925, the SS had begun its meteoric ascension under the leadership of Heinrich Himmler, who became its head in 1929. As the elite faction of the party, SS men supposedly

embodied the ideal characteristics of the superior Aryan race, but although all applicants had to meet strict physical guidelines, most members did not have blond hair and blue eyes. Furthermore, during the 12 years of the Nazi regime, the SS built up its own economic empire, almost becoming an independent state within the Third Reich.

All sectors of society were brought into the Nazi fold. For women in Nazi society, there was the *Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft* (National Socialist Women’s Association, NSF). The top female leader of the NSF, Gertrud Scholtz-Klink, promoted the Nazi standpoint that encouraged women to stay home raising large families. A women’s role was exemplified by three Ks: *Kinder, Küche, Kirche* (children, kitchen, church). As for children, adolescent and teenage boys joined the *Hitlerjugend* (Hitler Youth) and young girls participated in its female equivalent, the *Bund der deutscher Mädel* (League of German Maidens). Membership in these youth organizations reached into the millions, and the Nazi party developed a comprehensive program to educate the children about the values of National Socialism and to instill in them a reverence for their *Führer*.

Even people who did not join either the party or any affiliate organization could not escape Nazi encroachment into their lives. One of the Nazi party’s highest aims was to create a *Volksgemeinschaft*, or people’s community, that incorporated all ethnic Germans. The NSDAP posited that it would form a racial state by accumulating all Germans whom it believed had “good” hereditary qualities and convincing these people to reproduce, thus creating a healthy and thriving German population. This perspective led the Nazi party to assert that married couples should produce a minimum of four children and to value women who exceeded that number.

Eugenics and Race in the Nazi State

Not everyone in Germany, however, was a valued member of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, and the NSDAP clearly indicated who did not belong in the Third Reich. The primary group that the Nazi party excluded was the Jews, though the Nazis sought to remove anyone they deemed inferior, such as Slavic peoples. The Nazi government implemented various measures designed to eradicate these people from German society. In July 1933, the regime passed a compulsory

sterilization law that affected anyone with certain physical or mental disabilities. During the 1935 Nuremberg rally, the party proclaimed the Nuremberg laws, which defined who was Jewish, prohibited marriage and sexual relations between Jews and Germans, and stripped Jews of their German citizenship. Other ostracized groups included asocials, communists, criminals, gypsies, and homosexuals.

The Nazi party successfully enforced its racial policies because it had the cooperation of the majority of the people. Without this support, the Nazi government and its secret police, the *Geheime Staatspolizei* (“Secret State Police,” or “Gestapo”), could have never efficiently implemented such measures. Although many Germans believed that the Gestapo had agents everywhere, in reality this police organization relied on denunciations. For the Gestapo to create an effective police state, it had to elicit the participation of the people and then act on the information they provided. Consequently, ordinary German citizens, most of whom were not fervent Nazis, played a key role in the creation of the Nazi state.

Hitler’s Foreign Policy

As chancellor, president, and head of the German armed forces, Hitler set an aggressive foreign policy. He withdrew Germany from the League of Nations in late 1933, arguing that while Germany had disarmed as stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles, other world powers had not followed through with their promises to reduce their armaments. He formed the Rome–Berlin–Tokyo Axis between 1936 and 1940. This alignment of powers started with the signing of an accord between Germany and Italy in 1936. It continued with the joining of Germany and Japan to form an anti-Comintern pact later that same year. Germany and Italy then created a military alliance in May 1939, and Japan joined this partnership in September 1940. Once formed, the Axis powers remained aligned with one another until Germany’s unconditional surrender at the end of World War II.

Additionally, in blatant violation of the Treaty of Versailles, Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936 by sending German troops across the Rhine River to occupy the demilitarized zone that had existed between Germany and France since 1919. The citizens of the region warmly welcomed

the arrival of these soldiers. Both France and Britain criticized Hitler for this aggressive action, but neither nation physically intervened. Emboldened by his success in the Rhineland, Hitler continued to make brash foreign policy decisions. Speaking to the Reichstag on his fourth anniversary as chancellor in 1937, he removed Germany’s signature from the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler declared that the treaty had been signed by a weak German government which had acted under duress and against its better judgment. By withdrawing Germany from the confines imposed by Versailles, Hitler claimed that he was primarily disregarding the clause in the treaty which had branded Germany solely responsible for World War I.

The Quest for *Lebensraum* and Appeasement

Hitler’s foreign policy decisions in the interwar era culminated with the physical expansion of Germany. One of the first points of the Nazi party program was the unification of all German people into one land. This process began when the Hitler government forced an *Anschluss*, or unification, of Germany and Austria in March 1938. Despite the pressure used to compel the Austrian government to capitulate to its own obliteration as a sovereign nation, the people of Austria fervently welcomed Hitler’s arrival to his home country, and in a plebiscite held less than one month after the *Anschluss*, the Austrian people voted almost unanimously in favor of the union.

Hitler continued on his path to unite all Germans when he demanded that Czechoslovakia turn over the Sudetenland, a region of the country primarily populated by Germans, to Germany. To forestall German military aggression against Czechoslovakia, other foreign leaders intervened in September 1938. Hitler met with fellow fascist leader and Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, and French Premier Edouard Daladier in Munich. The latter three leaders sought to appease Hitler and avoid war by permitting an immediate transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany in return for his promise that he would respect the territorial integrity of the remaining land of Czechoslovakia. Hitler agreed, and the other leaders left Munich believing they had secured peace. However, Hitler betrayed this promise in March 1939 when he sent German troops to occupy Czechoslovakia.

Nevertheless, Hitler's popularity among the German people soared. Most citizens firmly backed him because he had revitalized the nation and restored its dignity without any bloodshed. His authoritarian rule was bolstered by this popular support. By this time, Hitler reigned supreme in Germany because not only he, but most of the German population as well, believed in his infallibility as a leader. The only other power in Germany which could have kept Hitler and his ambitions in check was the army, but the military was far more concerned with restraining the Nazi party than its leader.

The Nazi–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

The final prewar foreign policy decision that Hitler made for Germany involved the Soviet Union. In August 1939, to the surprise of other European powers, these two countries signed the Nazi–Soviet Pact, or Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Officially, this was a non-aggression pact which meant that Germany and the Soviet Union would not fight one another should a European war break out. Unofficially, it allowed for the division of Eastern Europe between Hitler and Soviet ruler Joseph Stalin. While this agreement came as a shock to the German people, it did mean that Germany could avoid a costly two-front war, as had plagued the country during World War I.

World War II

The Nazi–Soviet Pact ultimately provided Hitler with the security he needed to invade Poland on September 1, 1939. Two days later, Britain and France declared war on Germany, and World War II had commenced in Europe. Following the defeat of Poland, Germany continued with successful attacks against Norway, the Low Countries, and France in the spring of 1940, ending with the French capitulation in June 1940. Hitler was elated when the French government sued for peace in June 1940, and he forced the French to sign their capitulation in the same railcar that Germany had signed the armistice ending World War I. These successes gave Hitler a series of almost unprecedented political, diplomatic, and military triumphs.

With the fall of France, Hitler wanted to end the war between Germany and Britain, but the British continually rejected all German peace offers. He then attempted and failed to invade

Britain in late 1940. This failure led Hitler to believe that Britain was holding out against Germany because it was waiting for support from the Soviet Union. He thus thought that beating the Soviet Union would force the British to admit defeat too. Therefore, in June 1941, under the pretense that the Soviets were going to invade, Germany attacked the Soviet Union. This German invasion was initially successful, but despite early gains it became clear that the invasion was a failure. The Soviet Union was eventually able to rebound, and after the catastrophic German loss at Stalingrad in February 1943, the German armed forces found themselves on the defensive.

The Beginning of the End

The war in the east absorbed all of Hitler's energy and left little time for public appearances, which had been the basis of his political success since he had joined the Nazi party in 1919. Consequently, his popularity among the German people began to fall. Despite mounting German losses in the eastern theater between 1941 and 1944, and a growing desire among the German people to see the fighting end, Hitler insisted on continuing the war. During these years his distrust of the German army officers grew, and he believed that all of Germany's military problems were caused by the betrayal, incompetence, disobedience, and weakness of others. Hitler felt that he could only rely on himself for command decisions; no other Axis or Allied head of state was so intimately involved with the military affairs of his country. World War II took a heavy toll on his health, and he also survived many assassination attempts, including an assault on July 20, 1944. Because some army officers had been involved in this failed plot, Hitler's conviction that he could not trust the army leadership grew even stronger.

In spite of the continued successes of the Allied forces by 1945, Hitler refused to retreat. He no longer had a clear perception of the military action, and his orders became more chaotic. Finally realizing that the war was lost, he gave up command responsibilities in late April. On April 29, he married his mistress Eva Braun and dictated his will. In this testament, he named his political successors – Karl Dönitz as president, Joseph Goebbels as chancellor, and Martin Bormann as party chancellor – and expelled long-time supporters Hermann Göring and Heinrich

Himmler from the party. One day later, he and his wife committed suicide. Their bodies were removed from his bunker in Berlin and burned. The only physical remains of Hitler were fragments of his jaw bone, which the Soviet army confiscated when they captured the bunker. The empire that Hitler had built, the so-called Thousand Year Reich, outlasted him by one week.

Genocide

Despite military defeat, the Nazi regime expended an enormous amount of resources implementing the Final Solution. Prior to the war, the NSDAP had wanted to rid Germany of the Jews, and coercing them to immigrate was the principal method of removal. The war eliminated this possibility, and following the invasion of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany instigated a more lethal solution. Originally, a series of battalions called *Einsatzgruppen* (task forces) was deployed to round up Jews, communists, and other enemies on the eastern front and execute them by firing squad. Within a year, this method of execution was supplemented with the opening of six death camps in occupied Poland. No documentation exists to indicate when the Nazi regime decided upon the Final Solution or if Hitler knew of or ordered this course of action. However, by the end of the war, over 11 million people had died in the Holocaust, 6 million of whom were Jewish.

The End of the Nazi Regime

Overall, World War II had a tremendous influence on Germany and the Nazi regime. Although support for Hitler never completely diminished, his popularity did fall throughout the war as the brutal realities of the conflict were evident not only to the soldiers at the fronts, but to the civilians at home who suffered material deprivations and constant aerial bombardment by Allied bombers.

After the war the Allied governments recognized that the treaties which had ended World War I were partially responsible for the rise of Nazism and World War II, and they opted to hold trials to conclude this war instead of writing new treaties. The Trial of the Major War Criminals was held in Nuremberg, Germany from November 1945 to October 1946. Twenty-four high-ranking Nazi and German officials as well as six organizations – including the Nazi

party, the SA, and the SS – were put on trial. The charges were conspiracy to commit crimes against peace; planning, initiating, and waging wars of aggression; war crimes; and crimes against humanity. The defendants received a range of sentences from acquittal, to prison terms, to execution. This trial marked the initiation of an intense de-Nazification process that the Allied governments believed was necessary for German recovery.

SEE ALSO: Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Germany, Resistance to Nazism; Germany, Socialism and Nationalism; Hitler, Assassination Plot of July 20, 1944; *Mein Kampf*; Reichstag Fire of 1933

References and Suggested Readings

- Bessel, R. (1993) *Germany after the First World War*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Fritzsche, P. (1990) *Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gellately, R. (2001) *Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gellately, R. & Stoltzfus, N. (Eds.) (2001) *Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kershaw, I. (1998) *Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Kershaw, I. (2000) *Hitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Koonz, C. (1987) *Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family and Nazi Politics*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Krausnick, H. et al. (1965) *Anatomy of the SS State*. Trans. R. Barry et al. New York: Walker.
- Llobera, J. R. (2003) *The Making of Totalitarian Thought*. Oxford: Berg.
- Nicholls, A. J. (1979) *Weimar and the Rise of Hitler*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Orlow, D. O. (1965) The Organizational History and Structure of the NSDAP, 1919–23. *Journal of Modern History* 37, 2 (June): 208–26.
- Peukert, D. J. K. (1987) *Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition, and Racism in Everyday Life*. Trans. R. Deveson. London: B. T. Batsford.

Hitler, assassination plot of July 20, 1944

Ingo Schmidt

On July 20, 1944, on his way to a military briefing, general staff officer Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg placed a bomb in Hitler's head-

quarters in East Prussia. By pure chance, Hitler survived the assault. Later that day, Stauffenberg, along with a number of co-conspirators, was arrested and executed without a trial. The goal of this attempted coup was to replace the Nazi regime by a military dictatorship and to enter a coalition with Britain, France, and the US that could have continued the war against the Soviet Union. The conspirators realized that Nazi Germany's defeat was imminent when they planted the bomb in 1944, but their reasons for wanting to oust Hitler went deeper than a desire to prevent Germany's humiliating defeat.

Indeed, the history of the assassination attempt went back to the late 1930s when the Nazis and the German Armed Forces were preparing the annexation of Czechoslovakia and open warfare against other neighboring countries. Most state and military officials shared the imperialistic goal of expanding Germany's political and economic rule, particularly in Eastern Europe, and establishing German hegemony over all of Europe, but they argued for the use of diplomatic instead of military means, or at least for the postponement of military action until the German army was sufficiently prepared. Among those skeptics were Ludwig Beck, Chief of the General Staff in 1938, and Carl Goerdeler, Commissioner of the Third Reich (Reichskommissar) until 1935 and mayor of the city of Leipzig until 1937. Beck was designated to be named president after a successful assassination of Hitler, and Goerdeler was to be made chancellor in that case. However, these plans were delayed by German military victories between 1939 and 1942.

Things began to change during the battle of Stalingrad, which signaled the imminent defeat of Germany. With German troops in withdrawal from Russia, Northern Africa, and Italy in 1943, criticism of Nazi strategy and warfare came to the fore again among clandestine military and state official circles. Joined by the Kreisauer Circle, a group of conservatives of the gentry and traditional aristocracy who met to coordinate resistance to the Nazi regime, social democrats, and church personnel who opposed the Nazis, a coup d'état was planned, but disagreements over the future structure of the German state occurred during the planning period.

Supporters of Beck and Goerdeler and members of the Kreisauer Circle agreed that under the reign of Nazi terror and the state of

war, only Hitler's assassination and the subsequent unfolding of a coup d'état could change the course of politics before Germany would be militarily defeated and occupied by foreign troops. They did not see any room for, and were not interested in, mass upheavals to achieve that goal. However, whereas members of the Kreisauer Circle wanted to establish a democratic regime after the coup, the Beck and Goerdeler circles, many of whom came from noble families, favored the reinstatement of the German monarchy without the right of independent workers' organizations or other democratic rights. Since these circles were the only ones that could infiltrate military ranks needed for a successful coup, the Kreisauer Circle eventually gave in to the conservative-monarchical design for a post-Nazi regime.

SEE ALSO: Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; White Rose (Weiße Rose)

References and Suggested Readings

- Gottschaldt, E. (1985) *Antifaschismus und Widerstand – Der Kampf gegen den deutschen Faschismus, 1933–1945*. Heilbronn: Distel-Verlag.
- Kühnl, R. (1987) *Der deutsche Faschismus in Quellen und Dokumenten*. Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag.

Hlinka, Andrej (1864–1938) and the Slovak People's Party

Stanislav J. Kirschbaum

Roman Catholic priest, social activist, and politician, Andrej Hlinka was a major force in advancing Slovak national self-determination. As a Slovak politician in the first Czechoslovak Republic, Hlinka determinedly opposed Prague centralism and the ideology of Czechoslovakism employed to legitimize Czechoslovakia as a nation-state. He demanded that Slovakia be granted the autonomy promised in the Pittsburgh Pact, signed by the first president of Czechoslovakia, Tomas G. Masaryk, during World War I.

Hlinka's political career began in 1905 when, together with Ferdinand Juriga and František Skycák, he broke away from the Hungarian People's Party to form the Slovak People's Party. Initially lacking organizational structure, the

party's activities were minimal until July 1913 when the party was formally institutionalized with Hlinka as president. Although inactive during World War I, in October 1918 Hlinka became a co-founder of the Slovak National Council and a signatory of the Declaration of the Slovak Nation, which indicated the willingness of the Slovaks to join the Czechs in a common state. In November 1918, Hlinka founded the Catholic Clerical Council, and through its initiative recreated the Slovak People's Party a month later. He remained chairman of the party until his death in August 1938.

The Slovak People's Party program initially concentrated on religious and social issues, confessional schools, and the resolution of church–state relations. After 1919, inspired by the Pittsburgh Pact, the party made autonomy the mainstay of its political agenda. Except for the years 1927–9 when it had two representatives in the Czechoslovak government, the party was in opposition in parliament. In 1925 it was renamed Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSPP) to honor its founder. It won a plurality of seats in the Czechoslovak National Assembly from Slovakia in 1925, 1929, and 1935. In 1938, after Slovakia established its autonomy, the HSPP was the sole Slovak party to contest the elections to the Slovak Assembly. It remained in power throughout the existence of the first Slovak Republic.

Hlinka first gained national and international prominence at the time of the Černova massacre in 1907. He came to the attention of the world again when he traveled in August 1919 to the Peace Conference in Paris on a Polish passport to try, unsuccessfully, to make the case for the autonomy of Slovakia before the conference. On his return from Paris he was interned by the Czecho-Slovak government in Mirov, Moravia, despite being a member of the Czecho-Slovak Revolutionary Assembly, and was not released until his election to the Czechoslovak National Assembly in the elections of 1920. He continued to be reelected thereafter and remained a member of parliament until his death, when he was succeeded by Josef Tiso as head of the HSPP.

As a parliamentarian, Hlinka was a fiery speaker and consummate politician who fought for the autonomy of Slovakia, as well as the rights of the Catholic Church, a democratic system, social justice, and free enterprise. He opposed socialist and communist ideologies and policies.

He remained loyal to the common state of the Czechs and Slovaks, acknowledging the improvements that Slovakia had undergone since the founding of Czecho-Slovakia.

During his lifetime, Hlinka's popularity was such that many political organizations were named after him. Among them were the Hlinka Academic Club, later the Hlinka Academic Guard, and the Hlinka Guard, a paramilitary organization of the HSPP, created in 1938. It was a highly structured organization, based on the black shirts in Italy and the SA and SS in Germany. The Hlinka Guard backed the fascist pro-German wing of the HSPP, published the daily newspaper *Gardista*, and intervened in public life despite the absence of a political mandate. Its units were involved in the rounding up and deportation of Slovak Jews in 1942 and in the emergency squads created to hunt down partisans when the 1944 uprising broke out. It was dissolved in 1945.

SEE ALSO: Tiso, Josef (1887–1947)


References and Suggested Readings

- Felak, J. R. (1994) *“At the Price of the Republic”*: *Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1929–1938*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Jelinek, Y. A. (1976) *The Parish Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party 1939–1945*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs.
- Kirschbaum, S. J. (2005) *A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival*, 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave.
- Seton-Watson, R. W. (1965) *A History of Czechs and Slovaks*. Hamden: Archon Books.

Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh) (1890–1969)

Pang Yang Huei

Hô Chi Minh (alias Nguyen Tat Thanh) was an anti-imperialist communist revolutionary who worked determinedly throughout his life for the goal of independence and unification of Vietnam. His revolutionary leadership was a leading factor in the defeat and expulsion of French and US occupying forces in the Indochina Wars from 1946 to 1974. He went on to become the president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). A native of Kim Lien village, Nghe An province (central Vietnam), Hô was born on May 19, 1890 to a minor government functionary, Nguyen



Hô Chi Minh (1890–1969) was a revolutionary, anti-colonialist, and Marxist-Leninist president of Vietnam, shown here at a military base in Viet Bac in 1950. He was the founder of the Vietnam Workers' Party, which waged a massive military campaign against French forces in Indochina. The conflict later resulted in a full-scale Indochinese war with the French and then the US that ended in 1975. (AFP/Getty Images)

Sinh Sac. The patriotic elder Nguyen regarded the Vietnamese Imperial household with contempt as it was functioning as a French protectorate. He only reluctantly worked for five years before he was dismissed from the government in 1910. Hô inherited from his father that same stubborn patriotism. He studied at the National Academy (Quoc Hoc) in Hue, but he was expelled when he took part in peasants' protests (May 1908). He fled south to become a schoolteacher in Phan Thiet and later studied for a little while in a vocational institute in Saigon.

Eager to see the world, Hô left Vietnam in 1911. For the next six years, Hô experienced at first hand the toils of a common laborer. He was a kitchen helper on French ships for two years. In the United States, he labored at Boston and New York. Next in London, Hô washed dishes at the Carlton Hotel.

When he arrived in France in 1917, he promptly joined the French Socialist Party. The years in France were prolific ones for Hô, who supported himself through a series of menial jobs. He unsuccessfully lobbied for Vietnamese legal rights and political representation in Indochina during the Versailles Peace Conference (1919). His moderate petition made no mention of Vietnamese self-determination. However, Hô's actions gave him a prominent place among his Vietnamese nationalists.

Obviously, he found the French Socialist Party too docile. He urged the splinter leftist group

to join the Comintern (Third International), as Lenin's anti-imperialistic tract, "Thesis on the National and Colonial Questions," proved irresistible. Hence, the creation of the French Communist Party (1920) partly owed its existence to the indefatigable Hô. He tried to rally the energies of exiled colonial radicals in Paris. To this end, he had a hand in the founding of the Intercolonial Union in 1921. Under this organization, he contributed as the editor of *La Paria* (*The Pariah*) on the problems of colonialism. Combining his experiences as an organizer, agitator, and educator, he further expounded his views on the colonial problem. In *Le Procès de la colonisation française* (*French Colonialism on Trial*), he argued for the relevance of Marxism for Vietnamese independence. Class revolution, Hô stressed, must go hand in hand with the demands of nationalism.

For most early revolutionaries, the allure of USSR experiences and doctrine was magnetic. Hô enthusiastically traveled to Moscow. He studied in the University of Oriental Workers in 1923. During the same period, Hô also functioned as a cadre of the Comintern from 1922 to 1924. In Moscow, he assumed the Krestintern's (Peasant International) vice-presidency. Such was his prominence that Hô addressed the Comintern Fifth Congress. In his speech, Hô again stressed the importance of the colonial peasantry struggles as opposed to a hitherto European emphasis.

On Comintern orders, Hô arrived in Guangzhou (1924) as the translator of Michael Borodin (Soviet advisor to Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang) and immediately started organization work. He contacted his father's old friend and renowned Vietnamese nationalist, Phan Boi Chau. He founded the Thanh Nien Cach Menh Dong Chi Hoi (Vietnam Revolutionary Youth League), which was responsible for disseminating communism among exiled Vietnamese. The expansion of membership was another vital aim of his organization. Appropriating his experiences in Moscow and his revolutionary vision in a readily accessible form, Hô wrote *Duong Cach Mang* (*Revolutionary Path*) outlining approaches toward a revolution in Vietnam.

When the united front between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang was torn asunder in 1927, Hô quickly left. He took this opportunity to travel the length and breadth of Southeast Asia as an agent of the Comintern. In February 1930, he went to Hong Kong

to address the split within the Thanh Nien. To further consolidate the disparate, fractious, but revolutionary exiled elements under his leadership, he launched the Indochinese Communist Party.

One of the issues that Hô had to address was the growing importance of a rival non-communist group, the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang or VNQDD). The VNQDD proved at this point even more militant than Hô's group. It launched a military mutiny at Yen Bay in February 1931. Although it was crushed, the Yen Bay mutiny prompted other revolts and even the setting up of proto-soviets in Nghe An and Ha Tinh. Because of the communist connection, Hô was fingered as the head of a vast communist conspiracy. The French crushed these revolts and passed a death sentence on Hô *in absentia*.

The British quickly arrested Hô in Hong Kong for his covert activities as Comintern's Far East Bureau liaison officer in June 1931. In reality, Hô's reputation preceded him. The British were taking precautionary measures lest Hô agitated the crown colonies. In mid-1932, Hô escaped from Hong Kong and slipped back into the Soviet Union via Shanghai.

Owing to his Comintern responsibilities, Hô returned to Moscow in 1933. During this fateful period, Hô experienced and witnessed at first hand the horrors of Stalin's purge of the Communist Party and the Comintern from 1936 to 1938. Hô was particularly vulnerable, as he seemed more nationalistic than communist, especially after many prominent foreign communists, including Bela Kun, were executed by Stalin. It was only in 1938, when the party line, as dictated by Stalin, on indigenous nationalism shifted that Hô was permitted to leave the USSR. He arrived in Yanan, China, in time to observe the debilitating impact of the Japanese military invasion. Because of his close ties with the Chinese Politburo, he was welcomed as a training officer with the Eighth Route Army.

The French repression had continued throughout the 1930s. Large numbers of Hô's party members were executed or languished in jail. Still, the repression was more of a boon than an unmitigated disaster, as it cleared the scene of the VNQDD for Hô's embattled party veterans to emerge onto the national level. Remnants of Hô's party had escaped to Southern China, Guangxi. Hô moved to South China to gather

his lieutenants in 1940. Hô was able quickly to rebuild his party upon the grievances of the local populace, aided by his strict organizational leadership in the inaccessible mountainous region of Pac Bo.

With the onset of World War II, Hô's Viet Minh came up against the Japanese, which controlled the whole of Indochina. Hô formed the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi or Viet Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam) in May 1941 as an armed paramilitary group, which would insert into Vietnam as guerillas. Hô shrewdly emphasized that Viet Minh's foremost purpose would be national independence through participating in anti-Japanese activities. He quietly downplayed the role of class struggle. At one stroke, his new position broadened the Viet Minh's appeal and the organization qualified for aid from the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS). At this point, this revolutionary formally assumed the name Hô Chi Minh (Bearer of Light). In one of his numerous forays into China, Hô was arrested by Chiang Kai Shek's forces in August 1942. He was incarcerated for a year. Upon his return, Hô established, together with General Vo Nguyen Giap, numerous strategically placed Viet Minh armed camps throughout North Vietnam by 1944.

When the Japanese interned all the French administrators in March 1945, and then ignominiously surrendered later in August, the Viet Minh stepped into the political vacuum. In the so-called August Revolution, Hanoi was seized with little Japanese resistance on August 26, 1945. Other Northern provinces soon fell. Viet Minh's National Liberation committee accomplished the seemingly impossible. Bao Dai, the last Nguyen emperor, abdicated in acknowledgment of Hô's *fait accompli*. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam was established on September 2, 1945.

Hô had seized the strategic initiative by persuading the remaining nationalist parties to form a provisional government with the Viet Minh. Cooperation resulted in a functioning National Assembly. Hô was even formally elected by the National Assembly as the president in 1946.

These were all superficial successes. The Viet Minh was faced with rival returning Vietnamese nationalists backed by the occupying Chinese Nationalist forces in the North. British troops under General D. D. Gracey occupied the South. Gracey was so efficient that large tracts

of South Vietnam passed into the control of the returning French under General Jacques Leclerc.

From this precarious position, Hô reached a temporary agreement with the French on March 6, 1946. In return, for the status of a Viet Minh-controlled Vietnamese “free state” within a French union, French troops would substitute for the Chinese forces in the North. This rid Vietnam of Chinese troops and gave a much-needed respite for Hô’s forces to consolidate their bases.

For three months in Fontainebleau (France), Hô was very much in favor of negotiations and he proved conciliatory. But the French were unwilling to give up what was not lost on the battlefield. Domestically, the Viet Minh under Giap conducted a brutal campaign of sweeping terror, rooting out dissenters and “traitors” in rival nationalist groups when the Chinese troops left. This political cleansing contributed to the breakup of the alliance with other Vietnamese nationalists, which resulted in a rump National Assembly. The French backed away from the initial agreement of having a Vietnamese “free state.” Still, Hô managed again to salvage another limited understanding with the French in September 1946. The agreement was tenuous at best. Three months later, war resumed between the belligerents.

The First Indochina War (1946–54) was a brutal affair where no quarter was given; it prefigured the intensity of the later conflict. The Viet Minh retreated to the mountains. Giap conducted guerilla warfare on the French troops and mounted a campaign of terrorism and assassination in the cities. The “puppet” government led by Bao Dai was systematically targeted. In late 1953, the Viet Minh had isolated the cities and effectively controlled all of the countryside.

The embattled French tried to destroy the Viet Minh in a setpiece battle at Dien Bien Phu (1954). However, the Chinese managed to contribute significant military hardware (mortars and artillery) and advisors to the Vietnamese communists. Rings of artillery bombardments, which Giap had set up, trapped the French. France gave up only when its military debacle in Dien Bien Phu and US inaction dissolved whatever colonial pretensions it had harbored.

Nevertheless, China’s aid meant that the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai had considerable leverage over his Vietnamese partners. In the June 1954 Geneva Conference, China and the Soviet Union applied pressure on the Vietnamese to

accept the provisional partitioning of Vietnam at the 17th parallel. Over the outright protests of his party, Hô agreed to a temporary divide. Hô pragmatically reasoned that half a loaf of bread guaranteed was better than none. He further cautioned his colleagues that stubbornness would only provoke the US.

This split was formalized in 1956. The Republic of Vietnam (RVN) under Ngo Dinh Diem, with US President D. D. Eisenhower’s acquiescence, refused to hold elections for the purpose of unification as stipulated in the Geneva Accords. Diem’s counterrevolutionary security forces uprooted entire Communist Party structures in the South.

As a countermeasure, the DRV decided to support the Vietcong (South Vietnamese Communists), which were to infiltrate and unify South Vietnam in 1959 through armed struggle. The Hanoi Politburo created a broad front, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) combining the efforts of the Vietcong and other nationalist groups repressed by Diem. The infiltration route became the famous Hô Chi Minh Trail. Starting from North Vietnam, the route snaked through the inhospitable jungles and mountains of Laos and Cambodia into the flat plains of South Vietnam. At the same time, the DRV’s foreign policy supported communist activities in neighboring countries such as Laos and Cambodia. Pathet Lao and Khmer Rouge thus had their first sponsorship from the DRV.

Hô was acutely aware of how his persona had become synonymous with the Vietnamese revolution. To that extent, he cultivated a humble image, living in a modest house in Hanoi. Photos of Hô surrounded by grinning children were distributed. The image of Bac Hô or “Uncle Hô” softened the steel of the revolution and endeared Hô’s cause to the deprived population at large.

Nevertheless, Vietnam’s partitioning and the obstacles to various domestic economic and political policies such as collectivization in 1956 and class struggles eroded the popularity of the Workers’ Party of Vietnam (Lao Dong). At this juncture, through the sheer weight of his prestige, Hô Chi Minh moved in to smooth inner-party disagreements and reaffirmed the party’s linkage with the people through reassurances.

Still, he left most of the administration to loyalists such as Pham Van Dong, General Vo

Nguyen Giap, Le Duan, and Truong Chinh. Hồ retreated voluntarily from politics. In 1955, he ceded the premiership to Pham Van Dong. At the Third Congress of the Lao Dong (1959), Hồ stepped down as secretary-general for Le Duan. Although enfeebled by bouts of ill health, Hồ reminded a potent presence. He performed his role as the mediator between conflicting interest groups, which had grouped around personalities such as Secretary-General Le Duan and Truong Chinh, Chairman of the National Assembly. Perhaps Hồ's experiences in the Soviet Great Purge left an indelible mark. He placed emphasis on group decisions. He did not go all out, as Mao Zedong or Stalin had done, to purge the inner rungs of the leadership. Most of the time, violence was reserved for opponents of the party.

Throughout the Cold War, Hồ also deftly navigated between the demands of his communist neighbors. He made various visits to the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC). However, he avoided choosing sides. Even with the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s, the DRV maintained and received material support from the PRC and the Soviet Union. This dexterous diplomacy stood the DRV in good stead as it battled RVN's main sponsor, the United States, at the outbreak of the Second Indochina War (1965–75).

It was in this issue of Vietnam unification that Hồ remained active in championing Vietnam's cause on the international arena. Hồ refused to accept the Korean solution, but settled upon the strategy of a war of attrition. Due to the military limitations of the DRV and the superiority of the US forces, preparing for protracted guerilla warfare was a logical outcome. Hồ declared in 1966: "nothing is as dear to the heart of the Vietnamese as independence and liberation." Hồ carefully avoided Marxist jargon. Instead, he drew for available western journalists stark Manichean contrasts of steadfast Vietnamese purpose and rapacious US neo-imperialism. He played upon rudimentary stereotypes of the perseverance of the Vietnamese peasant nationalists against the ruthless engagement of the US military, which had vast technological superiority in arms.

Ultimately, his immense international visibility proved profoundly disastrous for South Vietnam's viability and upsetting for US President L. B. Johnson. In a celebrated exchange of letters in 1967 with LBJ, Hồ counterdemanded that the US should "unconditionally" cease "all other acts of war" against the DRV. Despite his professional

revolutionary past, Hồ ironically became a symbol for US anti-war peace activists, and chants such as "HỒ, HỒ, HỒ CHI MINH! NLF IS GONNA WIN" were standard fare throughout US university campuses.

On the eve of his death, Hồ provided political support for the Tet Offensive, which was a military failure, but a political success for the DRV. After the offensive, LBJ declined to run for the presidency and suspended aerial bomber operation "Rolling Thunder" (March 31, 1968). Hồ subsequently generously dispensed advice to North Vietnamese negotiators at the 1968 Paris peace talks.

Hồ died on September 2, 1969. His greatest achievement was undoubtedly his iron determination in advocating the unification of Vietnam. That being the ultimate goal, Hồ was forced to respond in kind to the violence of the French and then US armed strategies of pacification. The ingenuity of Hồ lay in his flexible advocacy posture, and the irresistible combination of Vietnamese nationalism and the internationalism of the communist movement. Although Hồ remained a strong supporter of the Comintern's vision, he pragmatically rooted his programs in local Vietnamese conditions most of the time. The resulting matrix of Hồ's aspirations, Marxism, Comintern's international communism, the needs of the Vietnamese peasantry, and external foreign pressures were all tempered and contained within the structure of Hồ's Lao Dong party. Unlike Mao or Stalin, Hồ worked within the party and graciously stepped aside for younger and more vigorous leaders. From a comparative perspective among communist states, his actions vis-à-vis succession were unprecedented.

The starkest reminder of Hồ's presence in modern-day Vietnam is Hồ Chí Minh City, which was formerly known as Saigon. Renamed in 1975, the former capital of the deposed RVN has transformed willy-nilly into Vietnam's largest city. Elsewhere in Hanoi, a mausoleum dedicated to the memory of Hồ is the best-maintained building in the capital, attracting thousands of tourists. Forty years after his death, the poignant symbol of Hồ Chí Minh has served to unify the north and south in a manner Bac Hồ would surely not have expected.

SEE ALSO: Imperialism and Capitalist Development; Imperialism, Historical Evolution; Imperialism, Modernization to Globalization; Indochina, World War II and Liberation in; Le Duan (1908–1986); Leninist

Philosophy; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Marxism; Pham Van Dong (1906–2000); Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”; Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925); Vo Nguyen Giap (b. 1911); Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bartholomew-Feis, D. R. (2007) *The OSS and Hô Chi Minh: Unexpected Allies in the War against Japan*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Brocheux, P. (2007) *Hô Chi Minh: A Biography*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Duiker, W. J. (2000) *Hô Chi Minh: A Life*. New York: Hyperion.
- Koblev, Y. (2000) *Hô Chi Minh*. Hanoi: Thêe Gioi Publishers.
- Osborne, M. (1982) *Hô Chi Minh*. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.
- Quinn-Judge, S. (2003) *Hô Chi Minh: The Missing Years 1919–1941*. London: Hurst.

Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679)

Deborah Kepple-Mamros

Thomas Hobbes was one of England's most prominent philosophers and political theorists during the age of the Enlightenment, as well as one of the most vilified personalities in the early modern period. He can generally be seen as part of two distinct revolutions. Politically, he was part of the English Revolution of the mid-seventeenth century, writing tracts that supported a strong sovereign entity and opposed interference from either parliament or the church. Unlike a typical authoritarian figure, Hobbes's theoretical sovereign authority rested upon a covenant made between the sovereign and the people, an idea that was a precursor to John Locke's social contract. Intellectually, he was a part of the scientific revolution, corresponding with the likes of René Descartes and Marin Mersenne, and commenting in scholarly circles on the work of Galileo and Baruch Spinoza. His writings sometimes showed outright hostility toward both religion and the church.

Hobbes was born into a middling family in the west of England during the reign of Elizabeth I (1558–1603). His education began at a small country school in Gloucestershire where he became proficient in both Greek and Latin. By age 15, Hobbes had entered Magdalen Hall, Oxford, where he received a typical education grounded in Aristotelian logic. Upon receiving

his BA in 1608, he was recommended to the position of personal tutor to the son of William Cavendish, Baron Hardwick (future Earl of Devonshire).

Over the course of Hobbes's life, he tutored three generations of Cavendish males, as well as becoming a secretary, traveling companion, and intellectual correspondent to various members of this large and extended family. Through his connections with the Cavendishes, Hobbes was able to travel to the continent, meet Marin Mersenne and Galileo, and tutor the future King Charles II.

By Hobbes's own account, the turning point of his career was 1640, when animosity between the English king, Charles I, and his parliament finally came to a head. It was this political controversy that led Hobbes to produce his first political tract, *The Elements of Law*, which outlined his theories on absolute monarchy, arguing against parliamentary rights and for the supremacy of the monarchy. The backlash against this work caused Hobbes to go into exile in France, where he would spend the next 11 years of his life. While in France, Hobbes produced many shorter tracts, as well as his most celebrated work, *Leviathan* (1651), which argued for the supremacy of the rightful sovereign to keep the peace and contained elements that undermined the existing state church.

SEE ALSO: English Revolution, 17th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Condren, C. (2000) *Thomas Hobbes*. New York: Twayne.
- Hobbes, T. (1651/1996) *Leviathan*. Ed. R. Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Martinich, A. P. (1999) *Hobbes: A Biography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pocock, J. G. A. (1996) *Varieties of British Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sorell, T. (1996) *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Holbach, Baron d' (1723–1789)

Melanie A. Bailey

Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d'Holbach, participated in the Enlightenment and thereby the intellectual stirrings that fueled the French Revolution of

1789 both as a patron and as a controversial writer. He wrote articles on chemistry and geology for the *Encyclopédie*, along with several influential philosophical works. He also provided a meeting place for the important thinkers and writers who passed through Paris in the mid-eighteenth century.

After attending the University of Leyden and enjoying the relative freedom of thought in the Netherlands in the 1740s, Holbach returned to Paris, where he had been raised by his uncle. The beneficiary of large legacies left by his uncle and his father-in-law, Holbach had the resources to provide warm welcomes to friends at his home in Paris or his château in Grandval. He became renowned for his extravagant dinner parties and for facilitating discussions of controversial topics. His weekly *salons* and his patronage enabled men such as Denis Diderot and Claude-Adrien Helvétius to publish their works. Even those who did not share his atheism or agree with his trenchant critiques of the French monarchy enjoyed their visits to Holbach's salon. Even though Rousseau disagreed with many of his views, he used Holbach as a model character, an atheist with the morals of a Christian, in *La Nouvelle Héloïse*.

Holbach published controversial books such as *Système de Nature (System of Nature)* (1770) and *La Politique Naturelle (Natural Politics)* (1773) anonymously; all were banned in France and some were publicly burned. According to his naturalistic ethics, humans are driven by self-preservation and motivated to seek happiness. People behave virtuously when they correctly understand the best means to preserve their life and happiness. Vice results from ignorance; ignorance is caused by our failure to understand the true laws of nature or by our willingness to yield to passion rather than reason. Holbach criticized many religions, especially Christianity as practiced in his time, for undermining virtue. By distorting human perceptions of nature and rejecting reliance on reason, the Roman Catholic Church prevented its followers from becoming truly happy. Education and the cultivation of reason would enable people to develop a more enlightened perception of self-interest.

Once equipped with an accurate understanding of how to secure happiness, people would interact more peacefully. Government, Holbach contended, should provide for the general welfare by protecting property and by ensuring

that citizens enjoyed freedom of conscience and expression. When the government failed to fulfill these basic responsibilities, then the people had the right to effect revolution. Indeed, he thought that a revolution would be likely if a government failed to educate its citizens, given that passion would therefore gain sway over society. In light of the manifest failings of the French government in the later eighteenth century, Holbach anticipated and justified the revolution that began in the last year of his life.

SEE ALSO: Diderot, Denis (1713–1784); French Revolution, 1789–1794; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778)

References and Suggested Readings

- Cushing, M. P. (1914) *Baron d'Holbach: A Study of Eighteenth-Century Radicalism in France*. PhD dissertation. New York: Columbia University.
- Goodman, D. (1996) *The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Kors, A. C. (1976) *D'Holbach's Coterie*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hollywood Ten

Melanie E. L. Bush

Between the late 1940s and 1950s, members of the entertainment industry came under scrutiny for left-wing beliefs and alleged connections to the American Communist Party. The Cold War and anti-union political environment provided the context for concern by the United States government and leaders of the Hollywood motion picture industry that Soviet-leaning messages were being conveyed through films. In November 1947, a group of mostly screenwriters, directors, and producers were called before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) to testify about their affiliations and refused. These included: Alvah Bessie, Lester Cole, Ring Lardner, Jr., Albert Maltz, John Howard Lawson, Samuel Ornitz, Dalton Trumbo, Herbert Biberman, Edward Dmytryk, and Adrian Scott. They became known as the “Hollywood Ten.”

By a vote of 346 to 17 in a hearing before the House of Representatives, these individuals were cited in contempt of Congress. Simultaneously, in the renowned “Waldorf Astoria Declaration,” top Hollywood executives (Motion

Picture Association of America) proclaimed that they would not employ individuals who would not swear non-affiliation. Political pressure to do this mounted both internally and from some of their financial bases in banks and corporations. Anti-Semitism may also have played a role. The Hollywood Ten were suspended without pay and in 1950 each served six months to a year of prison time. They ultimately had difficulty finding employment in the industry, with the exception of director Edward Dmytryk, who "named names." Another major public hearing was conducted in 1951; smaller ones were held throughout the 1950s.

Defense lawyers argued that the First Amendment guaranteed the freedom of association and that these rulings were unconstitutional; however, this was ignored due to the anti-communist political climate. There was resistance to this strong wave of censorship and red-baiting, for example in the form of a Committee for the First Amendment, but political times favored actions such as those by the Screen Actors' Guild (with Ronald Reagan as head), which voted to make its officers take a pledge that they were not communists.

The HUAC hearings gave rise to official and unofficial "blacklists," with hundreds of names drawn from sources such as Federal Bureau of Investigation files and analyses of the *Daily Worker* newspaper compiled by organizations such as the American Legion. A pamphlet called "Red Channels" included such a list and was distributed to sectors of the entertainment industry involved in hiring. People were pressured to "talk," and if they did not, their name was added to the list and they were denied employment.

The Hollywood Ten were the most publicized of cases, especially for their unwavering non-participation in HUAC questioning. They represented a powerful statement against the repressive force that became known as "McCarthyism."

SEE ALSO: Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA)

References and Suggested Readings

- Eckstein, A. (2004) The Hollywood Ten in History and Memory. *Film History* 16 (4): 424–36.
- Horne, G. (2001) *Class Struggle in Hollywood 1930–1950*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Horne, G. (2006) *The Final Victim of the Blacklist: John Howard Lawson, Dean of the Hollywood Ten*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Navasky, V. S. (1981) *Naming Names*. New York: Penguin.

Honduran General Strike of 1954

Edward T. Brett

Virtually all historians agree that the Great Strike of 1954 was the most important episode in Honduran labor history. Following the long dictatorship of Tiburcio Carías Andino (1933–49), Juan Gálvez Durón became president of Honduras. Although he had previously been a lawyer for the Boston-based United Fruit Company (UFCO), the most powerful and richest corporation in the country, he began his presidency by courting labor in an attempt to build a populist base for his presidency. An 8-hour workday law was passed, which also stipulated that employees were to be paid on holidays. UFCO and the Standard Fruit Company, however, chose to ignore these reforms.

On May 1, 1954 UFCO dockworkers in Puerto Cortés, choosing Luis García as their spokesman, requested double pay for work on Sunday. When UFCO officials said they would consider the request, the workers returned to their jobs, but only to find that García had been fired for being an "agitator." When company officials ignored workers' demands that García be reinstated, the dockworkers went out on strike. All 25,000 UFCO laborers, along with 15,000 from Standard Fruit, soon joined them. Mine, textile, tobacco, and brewery employees soon followed suit. The General Strike paralyzed the whole north coast of Honduras.

The strikers demanded a 50 percent increase in wages (in 1954 the average worker earned \$1.68 per day), better working conditions, and legal recognition of their union. Standard Fruit and some of the other companies settled with the strikers fairly soon, but UFCO refused. The Gálvez regime could ill-afford to act against the interests of UFCO, but on the other hand it did not want to appear to be breaking a popularly supported strike since national elections were scheduled for October. Consequently, Gálvez decided to establish a government mediation commission and the workers formed a Central Strike Committee, which met with UFCO representatives in San Pedro Sula on May 28. After several days of negotiation, talks broke down.

Meanwhile, UFCO officials in the United States convinced the Eisenhower administration

that the supposedly communist government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala was the real force behind the strike. All scholars agree that this was a fabrication of the truth. The US embassy next identified “communists” on the Central Strike Committee for the Gálvez regime, which promptly arrested them. They were eventually replaced with “anti-communists” who were more conciliatory. United Fruit officials then attempted to divide the strikers by offering \$20 bonuses to all who returned to work immediately. An agreement was finally reached on July 9 and the strike ended. It had lasted 69 days.

Not surprisingly, the workers got only a small fraction of what they had demanded. They did, however, achieve legal recognition of their unions. About a year later the government issued a decree guaranteeing workers the right to organize, engage in collective bargaining, and strike. As a consequence, the labor movement in Honduras quickly gained in strength and influence.

SEE ALSO: Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán (1913–1971)

References and Suggested Readings

- MacCameron, R. (1983) *Bananas, Labor, and Politics in Honduras: 1954–1963*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Meza, V. (1981) *Historia del movimiento obrero hondureño*. Tegucigalpa: Guaymuras.
- Posas, M. (1980) *Lucha ideológica y organización sindical in Honduras (1954–1965)*. Tegucigalpa: Guaymuras.
- Posas, M. (1981) *Luchas del movimiento obrero hondureño*. San José: EDUCA.
- Schulz, D. E. & Schulz, D. S. (1994) *The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Hong Kong democracy protests

Michael H. C. Chun

Hong Kong democracy protests, and the democracy movement as a phenomenon, have their origins in the colonial period. As the debate on democracy continued into the post-1997 period, when Hong Kong was faced with a series of challenges, both economic and political, the democracy movement gained new momentum. Democracy protests became part of Hong Kong people's lives, in the form of a mass rally held every year since July 1, 2003. These large-scale

protests of the 1980s and the post-1997 period are historic milestones of the Hong Kong democracy movement, which has its origins in the 1980s when the 1997 Question emerged.

Although Hong Kong was a British colony for over 150 years, her struggle for democracy has a long history. Political reform had been discussed by both the government and local activists even before the 1997 Question surfaced. Political changes and advancement, however, were minimal up until the 1980s, as neither the Hong Kong colonial government nor the British government was enthusiastic about political reform. With most having fled from Mainland China during the Chinese Civil War, the majority of Hong Kong Chinese were not interested in politics. Hong Kong's struggle for democracy did not gain momentum and become a full-fledged movement until after the 1997 Question emerged.

However, Hong Kong people were no strangers to social protests and mass movements, for there had been a number of social and political protests and movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Although in the 1980s most Hong Kong Chinese had no interest in politics, there existed pro-democracy activism led by pressure groups. Prominent pro-democracy activists Martin Lee Chu-ming and Szeto Wah later became core members of the Democratic Party, which was founded on October 4, 1994. Lee and Szeto remained active as democracy activists and Legislative Council members in the post-1997 period.

Historical developments surrounding the 1997 Question in the 1980s sparked a new, long struggle for democracy involving both local democracy advocates and Hong Kong people in the next 20 years. Approximately two months before the end of the Sino-British negotiations of 1982–4, in July 1984, the British colonial government embarked on political reform in an attempt to democratize Hong Kong, making sure that a democratic political system would be in place for the sake of Hong Kong's future. In July 1984 the Hong Kong government issued a consultative green paper on political reform. Three years later an official review was carried out on the 1984 political reform plans. The 1984 political reform proposal and the subsequent review sparked off a debate on democratization by local political leaders as well as Hong Kong people. The 1987 review in particular angered local democracy activists. For the government's

Survey Office, in its findings for the review, by mistakenly excluding the results of 21 signature campaigns, concluded that there was not enough support for the introduction of direct elections in 1988, when in fact there was overwhelming support for it. Pro-democracy activists such as Martin Lee were outraged.

It was against this background that the democracy movement of the 1980s began. On September 16, 1984 over a thousand people from 89 different pro-democracy groups gathered in a Kowloon park at a rally calling for direct elections to the Legislative Council. Following their unsuccessful campaign for the introduction of direct elections in 1988, pro-democracy activist groups organized gatherings at the Ko Shan Theatre in the following years, including the meeting in November 1986 and another in May 1993. For local democracy activists, the Ko Shan gatherings were historic moments that marked the beginning of Hong Kong's democracy movement. Later, pro-democracy groups from the first Ko Shan gathering formed the loose alliance Joint Committee for the Promotion of Democratic Government.

After the first draft of the Basic Law was made and a five-month consultation on the draft began, pro-democracy activists became even more active. Debates, exhibitions, marches, and signature campaigns were held on the Basic Law. On December 3, 1988 over fifty democracy advocates, including Szeto Wah, who at that time was a member of the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC), participated in a 24-hour fast outside the Xinhua News Agency in protest against the Louis Cha proposal on Hong Kong's future political system, which in their view was too conservative. The fasting group was soon joined by Martin Lee, who led a protest march from Victoria Park the next day. On their way to the Xinhua headquarters, the 600 demonstrators in the march sang songs and held banners calling for democracy in 1997.

The year 1989 was a turbulent one for both China and Hong Kong. The democracy movement in Mainland China sparked off a series of large-scale democracy protests in Hong Kong in May and June 1989. In late May 1989 massive rallies and protests were held in Hong Kong in support of the students in Beijing. On May 20, 1989, 50,000 people protested outside the New China News Agency amid strong winds and heavy rain. Protesters held pro-democracy ban-

ners and wore headbands supporting Beijing students. As events in Beijing took a turn for the worse as the Chinese government sent troops into the city, Hong Kong people were outraged. Fear and panic engulfed the colony as Hong Kong people became concerned about the implications events in Beijing might have for the colony's future after 1997.

On May 21 approximately 1 million Hong Kong citizens took to the streets in support of the Beijing democracy movement. The rally was the largest ever held in the history of Hong Kong. Protesters wore headbands and held banners. The protest lasted over 8 hours, starting with a 15-kilometer march from Chater Garden at 2:15 p.m. and ending at 10:30 p.m. after a mass rally at the Happy Valley racecourse. Among the protesters were pro-democracy activists and legislators Martin Lee and Szeto Wah. Shortly after 9:30 p.m. the crowd was joined by members of the left-wing Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, which had approximately 170,000 members at the time. Amid the May 21 protest the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Democratic Movement in China was formed. Following the Chinese government's crackdown on the student movement, more protests and rallies were held in Hong Kong, including the June 5 sit-in protest in Happy Valley, where 200,000 protesters dressed in black protested against the violent crackdown.

The democracy movement was given new life in post-1997 Hong Kong, particularly by the July 1 protest rally of 2003. A number of factors contributed to Hong Kong people's dissatisfaction with the government, which ultimately led to the 2003 protest. Immediately after the 1997 handover, Hong Kong was faced with two crises: the outbreak of the avian influenza (bird flu) epidemic and the Asian financial crisis. Despite Hong Kong's strong economic basis and the fact that the Asian financial crisis was not the only factor contributing to the decline of Hong Kong's economy, the financial crisis sped up its decline. Stock and property values plummeted and the unemployment rate increased. Hong Kong entered into recession, from which it would not recover until 2004.

The post-1997 years also saw the resurfacing of the debate on democracy and the emergence of new pro-democracy groups. From the beginning, the political legitimacy of the first HKSAR administration, under the leadership of Chief

Executive Tung Chee-hwa, had a narrow basis. The chief executive was elected not by direct election by the whole Hong Kong population, but by an essentially pro-Beijing and pro-business 400-member Selection Committee. The Tung government's lack of political leadership and legitimacy, the economic problems, and the government's inability to tackle them were all contributing factors to Hong Kong people's anger with the Tung administration. Other factors included the SARS outbreak in early 2003, the controversial "85,000" housing plan (the untimely introduction of which contributed to the fall of property prices), and the proposed National Security Bill (Article 23 legislation). It was feared that the Article 23 legislation would restrict freedom of speech and press freedom. It was Hong Kong people's frustration and anger with the Tung administration over six years that ultimately led to the July 1 protest of 2003.

On July 1, 2003 more than 500,000 people took to the streets in protest against the Article 23 legislation. It was the largest protest since the 1989 pro-democracy rally in which 1 million Hong Kong people participated. The protest went on for six hours and the crowd did not disperse until 9:30 in the evening. Although the 2003 rally was held specifically in protest of the controversial proposed National Security Bill, it was also characterized by the protesters' demand for democracy. The July 1 protest rally was a significant event as it marked a new chapter in Hong Kong's struggle for democracy. It highlighted Hong Kong people's demand for democratic government and gave the democracy movement, which had been somewhat stagnant after 1997, new life. The protest greatly boosted the morale of Hong Kong's democracy movement. Since 2003 the July 1 protest rally has been held every year, providing an outlet for the people of Hong Kong to voice their concerns and demands, particularly in relation to democracy.

SEE ALSO: China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Democracy Wall Movement, 1979; Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997); Tiananmen Square Protests, 1989

References and Suggested Readings

- Carroll, J. M. (2007) *A Concise History of Hong Kong*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
 Cheng, J. Y. S. (2005) Introduction: Causes and Implications of the July 1 Protest Rally in Hong

- Kong. In J. Y. S. Cheng (Ed.), *The July 1 Protest Rally: Interpreting a Historic Event*. Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press.
 Choi, C. K. (2003) *Xianggang zhengzhifazhan de huigu yu zhanwang* (Hong Kong Constitutional Development: Review and Vision). *Justice and Peace* November: 3–6.
 Ho, L. S. (2002) Policy Blunder of the Century Threatens Hong Kong's Economic Future. In L. Siu-kai (Ed.), *The First Tung Chee-hwa Administration: The First Five Years of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
 Lau, C. K. (1997) *Hong Kong's Colonial Legacy: A Hong Kong Chinese's View of the British Heritage*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
 Pepper, S. (2008) *Keeping Democracy at Bay: Hong Kong and the Challenge of Chinese Political Reform*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
 Roberti, M. (1996) *The Fall of Hong Kong*. New York: John Wiley.
 So, A. Y. (2002) Social Protests, Legitimacy Crisis, and the Impetus toward Soft Authoritarianism in Hong Kong. In L. Siu-kai (Ed.), *The First Tung Chee-hwa Administration: The First Five Years of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
 Tsang, S. (2006) *A Modern History of Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
 Yeung, C. (2000) Democracy in Hong Kong? A Bumpy Road Toward Political Reform. *Harvard International Review* 22 (2): 83–4.

Horne Tooke, John (1736–1812)

Pia K. Jakobsson

John Horne Tooke was an English political activist and philologist, and the only Briton to be put in prison for opposing the war with America. Born in Westminster to a well-to-do poulterer, he went to school at Eton and Cambridge and was a law student until being ordained as a priest in 1760, taking up a position in Brentford. His public engagement in politics began with a 1765 pamphlet in defense of the radical John Wilkes. In 1769 Horne, Wilkes, and others founded the Society for Supporting the Bill of Rights to support Wilkes's election to parliament, but also more generally to support freedom and the constitution. They met regularly at the London Tavern, but disagreements about priorities split them apart by 1771.

In 1775 Horne publicly attacked the government's actions in America, raising money for relatives of Americans "murdered" by British troops. He was tried on the charge of seditious libel and spent over a year in prison. After his release he remained a strong supporter of free speech, writing pamphlets, raising money for the defense of prosecuted printers and booksellers, and financing radical works such as Thomas Paine's *The Rights of Man*. In 1791 he began to work closely with Thomas Hardy and the London Corresponding Society, campaigning for the vote, attacking the government's foreign policy, and working to create links with other reform groups in Britain. By the end of 1793 over 6,000 members had signed their petitions and the government clamped down, arresting several delegates to a national convention.

The reformers tried arranging another convention and this time Horne, Hardy, and John Thelwall were arrested, put in the Tower, and charged with high treason in October 1794. There was little evidence presented at the trial, and the jury found them all not guilty. Yet Horne and the others had lost their energy for the conflict; they became less politically active and less radical in their ideas. Horne still wanted parliamentary reform, but was no longer in favor of universal suffrage.

Horne's moderate positions gave him broader support and made it possible for him to stand for election to parliament in 1801. He won, but his enemies opposed his admission to the House of Commons because he was a minister of the church, and he was never allowed to take his seat. He spent his last years with friends and family at Wimbledon and was known for his parties and his great wit.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776; Hardy, Thomas (1752–1832); London Corresponding Society; Paine, Thomas (1737–1809); Wilkes, John (1725–1797) and the "Wilkes and Liberty" Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Bewley, C. & J. (1998) *Gentleman Radical: A Life of John Horne Tooke, 1736–1812*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Stephens, A. (1968) *Memoirs of John Horne Tooke, Interspersed with Original Documents*. New York: B. Franklin.
- Tooke, J. H. (1995) *The Prison Diary (16 May–22 November 1794) of John Horne Tooke*. Ed. A. V.

Beedell & A. D. Harvey. Leeds: Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society.

Wharam, A. (1992) *The Treason Trials, 1794*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Hôtel de Ville, Paris

Stephen W. Samyér

The Paris Hôtel de Ville, or City Hall, found itself at the heart of the four major French revolutions that shook Paris: those of 1789, 1830, 1848, and 1871. In each case, the Paris City Hall symbolized the importance of the capital city and the Parisian people in national politics.

During the French Revolution of 1789, the local city hall erupted onto the French political scene on July 14, the day now celebrated as Bastille Day. Angry protesters who had taken the Bastille turned toward the Hôtel de Ville and gathered on the Place de Grève, the square in front of the building. They overturned the municipal government and killed the head municipal magistrate, Jacques de Flesselles. Following this event, the site was at the center of a decade of revolutionary tumult. By 1793, it was commonplace for Parisian revolutionaries to gather in front of the city hall to manifest their discontent before marching on the Constituent Assembly, the governing body.

In July 1830, the city hall reappeared on the political scene, as the Bourbons, the royal family deposed in 1792 and restored in 1814, were deposed once again. Following the abdication of King Charles X in the throes of revolution, a municipal commission formed within the Hôtel de Ville to govern the nation as a provisional government. The July Monarchy was finally established when Louis-Philippe d'Orléans, the new king, embraced General Lafayette, the hero of the Parisian revolutionaries, in the window of the Hôtel de Ville in front of the Parisian crowd.

The scenario of 1830 repeated itself in 1848. Following the abdication of King Louis-Philippe on February 24, the Second Republic was declared from the Hôtel de Ville. For the first months of the regime, the provisional government remained within the Hôtel de Ville. Subsequent conflicts, such as the workers' uprising on April 16, 1848, would make the building one of the key sites of political conflict during the early months of the Second Republic.

Finally, in 1871, the Paris Commune returned the Hôtel de Ville to center stage. The Commune was announced on the place of the Hôtel de Ville on March 28, but this event marked the end of an almost century-old tradition. When the national troops broke into Paris during the bloody week of May 21–7, 1871, the Communards burned the building. It would be rebuilt in the early years of the Third Republic, but just as 1871 was the last Parisian revolt of the nineteenth century, the Hôtel de Ville's importance in French revolutionary history came to a close.

SEE ALSO: France, 1830 Revolution; France, Revolution of 1848; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Paris Commune, 1871

References and Suggested Readings

- Agulhon, M. (1983) *The Republican Experiment, 1848–1852*. Trans. J. Lloyd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Edwards, S. (1971) *The Paris Commune, 1871*. New York: Quadrangle.
- Gould, R. (1995) *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community and Protest from 1848 to the Commune*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Pinkney, D. (1972) *The French Revolution of 1830*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

House, Callie (1861–1928)

Amy Linch

Born a slave, Callie House was an early advocate for reparations for African Americans, founding the Ex-Slave Mutual Relief, Bounty and Pension Association in 1894. She raised five children working as a washerwoman before moving to Nashville, where she was first drawn to the movement by Henry Vaughn's pamphlet *Freedmen's Pension Bill: A Plea for American Freedmen*. She allied with Isaiah Dickerson in organizing a new movement that would both respond to the immediate health and monetary needs of ex-slaves, and organize politically to seek pensions and slavery reparations on their behalf. While Vaughn, a white democrat, sought reparations as a source of much needed funds to boost the South's economy, House and Dickerson based their claim on equality for blacks, demanding:

“We deserve for the government to pay us as an indemnity for the work we and our foreparents was rob[bed] of from the Declaration of Independence down to the Emancipation.” While white supremacy was being codified in Jim Crow laws and violence against African Americans was at its highest point since the end of slavery, House and Dickerson built a 300,000-member organization that accused the United States government of facilitating the theft of black labor and demanded monetary compensation.

The Ex-Slave Mutual Relief, Bounty and Pension Association was open to all regardless of race, religion, class, or color. At the local level chapters provided burial expenses and care for sick and disabled members. Nationally it worked for the passage of congressional legislation in support of slave reparations. Members paid a 25-cent initial membership fee and 10 cents per month thereafter. Local chapters paid \$2.50 to the national organization, which was organized democratically, holding conventions and electing officers. The organization drew disproportionately from the poorest African Americans, whose plight was largely neglected by black elites such as Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois. House's grassroots social and political activism was either ignored or criticized by black newspapers and elites, who believed progress for the African American race would come through education and assimilation rather than mobilization.

As the organization grew in strength, House became the target of harassment and surveillance by the United States government. Ironically, white southerners accused House of defrauding people by taking money to pursue slave reparations by alleging that the mission itself was futile. House resigned from her position as secretary of the organization in 1902 in hope that the government would cease its surveillance of the organization. She continued to organize local chapters of the movement, however, and in 1915 filed suit against the treasury department for \$68 million in cotton taxes traced to slave labor in Texas. The postmaster general indicted House for fraud in 1916. Refusing to enter into a plea bargain that would involve abandoning the reparations cause, she was convicted by an all-male white jury and sentenced to a year and a day in prison. After 1916, many chapters of the organization became part of the movement led by Marcus Garvey.

SEE ALSO: American Civil War (1861–1864); American Civil War and Slavery; Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963)

References and Suggested Readings

- Berry, M. F. (2005) *My Face is Black is True: Callie House and the Struggle for Ex-Slave Reparations*. New York: Alfred Knopf.
- Martin, M. T. & Yaquinto, M. (Eds.) (2007) *Redress for Historical Injustices in the United States: On Reparations for Slavery, Jim Crow, and their Legacies*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Hoy, Senna (1882–1914)

Jesse Cohn

Adopting the *nom de guerre* of “Senna Hoy” (a reversal of his first name), Johannes Holzmann, a German Jew, made a brief but definite mark on the German anarchist movement, imparting to it a distinct concern for sexual liberation that would grow after his untimely death. In a 1903 pamphlet, *Das dritte Geschlecht. Ein Beitrag zur Volksaufklärung* (The Third Sex: A Contribution to Popular Enlightenment), and especially through the influential Berlin journal that he published between 1904 and 1905, *Kampf: Zeitschrift für gesunden Menschenverstand* (Struggle: Journal for Common Sense), Hoy linked homosexual rights and feminism to a broad anti-authoritarian politics. In so doing, Hoy politicized bohemian artists and intellectuals such as Erich Mühsam, Peter Hille, Paul Scheerbart, Else Lasker-Schüler, Ludwig Rubiner, Benedikt Friedländer, Herwarth Walden, and Franz Pfemfert. The sexual politics of *Kampf* were disdained by some anarchists, however, including Max Nettlau and Gustav Landauer. The government banned 11 of its 25 issues, driving Hoy into exile in Switzerland in 1905. In Zurich, he befriended labor activist Margarethe Hardegger and contributed to another anarchist journal with an anti-militarist focus, *Der Weckruf* (The Dawn). In 1907, inspired by contacts with Polish and Russian insurrectionaries, Hoy joined an anarchocommunist group in Russia, taking part in robberies to finance the cause. Caught in 1908, jailed and tortured, Hoy languished in a Warsaw prison, dying of kidney disease and tuberculosis in a Russian insane asylum in 1914.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Friedländer, Benedikt (1866–1908); Landauer, Gustav (1870–1979); Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements, Germany

References and Suggested Readings

- Fähnders, W. (1995) Anarchism and Homosexuality in Wilhelmine Germany: Senna Hoy, Erich Mühsam, John Henry Mackay. *Journal of Homosexuality* 29 (2–3): 117–54.
- Hoy, S. et al. (1903) *Das dritte Geschlecht. Ein Beitrag zur Volksaufklärung*. Ed. S. Hoy. Berlin: Authors.
- Revolutionary Portraits: Senna Hoy (2003) *Organise!* 60 (Summer): 28.

Huerta, Dolores (b. 1930)

Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh

Dolores Huerta co-founded the National Farm Workers Association (later renamed United Farm Workers, or UFW) with César Chávez. Many Americans associate her name almost exclusively with California’s farm worker movement, but she also was a highly effective lobbyist and a leading feminist and proponent of Latino and Latina pride and rights. Chávez and Huerta met in 1955, when both were working in Mexican American barrios for Saul Alinsky’s Community Service Organization (CSO). They shared a profound commitment to the plight of the poor, and when Chávez left the CSO to found the National Farm Workers Association, he asked Huerta to help lead the new group.

Huerta, a lively and quick-thinking orator, was remarkably adept at working the halls of California’s governing institutions. She differed from Chávez, who viewed such exchanges as of secondary importance, instead placing his trust in public events such as boycotts and dramatic fasts that would pressure otherwise unreliable legislators and growers into actions that would help farm workers. Huerta, by contrast, believed strongly in the influence of discussion and discourse. Her obvious skills with words meant that most UFW negotiation and lobbying assignments fell on her lap.

Chávez at first balked at having Huerta work in Sacramento. He preferred her to work in the fields and organize farm hands. He was, however, blind to working-class males’ refusal to be organized by a woman. According to historian

Margaret Rose (2002: 102), “To Huerta, the state capitol was a place where she was not only effective but also removed from the male workers whom she tried to organize and who resisted an independent female labor leader. The elected officials, by contrast, listened.”

In Sacramento, she helped shepherd through bills that provided higher minimum wages for field workers and aid to dependent children of unemployed field hands. Among her most important achievements was facilitating the passage of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 – an unprecedented bill that recognized the collective bargaining rights of California’s agricultural workforce. Later, she performed similar feats in Washington, DC, testifying before committees on immigration policy and lobbying individual lawmakers and bureaucrats for medical care and unemployment insurance for farm workers.

Meanwhile, Huerta was given the task of hammering out union contracts with growers. She earned the nickname “dragon lady” because of her toughness and intensity during negotiations. Among the non-wage issues that concerned her were the use of pesticides and medical care for workers’ families. In addition, she and Chávez established the National Farm Workers Service Center to build low-income housing for farm hands, and Radio Campesina, a radio network for rural audiences in California, Washington, and Arizona.

After the mid-1970s, Huerta came to describe herself as a “born-again feminist.” She began to organize voter registration drives for women and to recruit and prepare female candidates for public office. In 1997, *Ms. Magazine* recognized Huerta as one of the three most important women of the year, and in 1998 President Clinton presented Huerta with the Eleanor Roosevelt Human Rights Award.

SEE ALSO: Alinsky, Saul (1909–1972) and the Industrial Areas Foundation; Chávez, César (1927–1993) and the United Farm Workers

References and Suggested Readings

- Chávez, A. (2005) Dolores Huerta and the United Farm Workers. In V. L. Ruiz & V. S. Korrol (Eds.), *Latina Legacies: Identity, Biography, and Community*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Huerta, D. (2005–6) Dolores Huerta at Seventy-Five: Still Empowering Communities. *Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy* 18: 13–18.

- Levy, J. (2007) *César Chávez: Autobiography of La Causa*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Rose, M. (1990) Traditional and Nontraditional Patterns of Female Activism in the United Farm Workers of America, 1962–1980. *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies* 11 (1): 26–32.
- Rose, M. (2002) César Chávez and Dolores Huerta: Partners in “Las Causa.” In R. W. Eutlain (Ed.), *César Chávez: A Brief Biography with Documents*. Boston: St. Martin’s Press.

Hugo, Victor (1802–1885)

Nicole Martone

Victor Hugo was a French Romantic novelist, dramatist, poet, and political activist. He was an advocate of human rights and sponsored several social and political causes. An ardent republican, Hugo became extremely active in politics following the French Revolution of 1848 and vehemently protested against the overthrow of the French Second Republic by Napoleon III. Remaining critical of the Second Empire, Hugo went into voluntary exile in protest. Hugo’s work as a political writer, activist, and politician influenced the French government and the establishment of the Third Republic.

Hugo was born in February 1802 in Besançon to Joseph Léopold Sigisbert Hugo and Sophie Trébuchet. In 1803, Hugo’s parents separated and he was raised mostly by his mother in Paris. Although Hugo came to support republican views, his childhood was influenced by the beliefs of his parents. Hugo’s father was a Napoleonic general loyal to the emperor, while his mother was a royalist in favor of the Bourbons. While living in Paris with his mother, Hugo had a Catholic, royalist education and thought such beliefs just. As he grew older, however, and with the onset of the French Revolution and Napoleon I’s power, Hugo rejected the ideals of his youth, shifting toward republicanism and the left.

Hugo had a prominent literary career and was accepted into the Académie française (French Academy) in 1841. He gained initial fame as a poet in the 1820s and published his first novel, *Hans of Iceland*, in 1823. Hugo did not achieve instant success as a dramatist. However, in his preface to *Cromwell* (1827), Hugo urged performers to free themselves of the restrictions of the French

classical style, thereby igniting the debate between classicism and Romanticism in France. In 1830, Hugo wrote *Hernani*, one of the greatest works of Romantic theater, and helped launch the French Romantic movement. He then embarked on a successful dramatic career, writing *Ruy Blas* (1838) and an essay on Shakespeare, whose works he sought to emulate. In 1831, Hugo published *The Hunchback of Notre Dame* (*Notre-Dame de Paris*), which became an instant success. In 1862, *Les Misérables*, focusing on the injustices in France following the French Revolution, was finally published after a germinating period of 17 years. Hugo wrote subsequent pieces, but his success as a Romantic began to decline as naturalism gained prominence. His last major novel, *Ninety-Three*, dealt with the Reign of Terror.

Hugo emerged as a social and political activist, agitating through his works for change and against perceived social injustices. He was against the death penalty and was a staunch defender of human rights. In 1829, Hugo published *The Last Day of a Man Condemned to Death*, an influential novel that recounts the thoughts of a man condemned to die. Considered an early example of “true crime” fiction, Hugo published *Claude Gueux* (1834) about a real-life murderer executed in France. He considered this novel a precursor to the themes in *Les Misérables*.

As Hugo grew older, he became more vocal about his republican political views, which transcended his writings and his political efforts. King Louis Philippe elevated Hugo to the peerage, and in 1841 he entered the Chamber of Peers, the higher house of the French legislature, where he spoke out against the death penalty and social injustice and for rights such as freedom of the press. Hugo was later elected to the Legislative Assembly and the Constitutional Assembly following the French Revolution of 1848 and the establishment of the Second Republic.

Hugo continued to voice his political views, even after Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte seized power in 1851, becoming Napoleon III. Hugo openly declared the self-appointed emperor a traitor to France before going into exile, a status he would maintain until 1870, when Napoleon III was removed from power following the Franco-Prussian War. Hugo went first to Brussels, and then to Jersey, before settling in Guernsey.

While in exile, Hugo continued to protest against the Second Empire through his literary works. His republican beliefs were portrayed

through his political pamphlets, which included *Napoléon le Petit* (“Napoleon the Little”) and *Histoire d’un crime* (“History of a Crime”). Both pieces opposed the emperor, and although influential, were banned in France. Napoleon III granted political amnesty to all political exiles in 1859; however, Hugo maintained his exile voluntarily in an act of protest.

While abroad, Hugo continued his efforts to eliminate the death penalty. He convinced the British government to spare the lives of two Irishmen convicted of terrorism, and his influence encouraged the abolition of the death penalty in Switzerland and Portugal. Following the demise of the Second French Empire in 1870, Hugo returned to France, where he resumed political activity, being quickly elected to the National Assembly and Senate in the new Third Republic.

Hugo’s financial status deteriorated as his career neared its end. He died in May 1885 and was buried in the Pantheon, an honor reserved for France’s greatest citizens.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873); Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); France, 1830 Revolution; France, Revolution of 1848; French Revolutionary Theater

References and Suggested Readings

- Frey, J. A. (1999) *A Victor Hugo Encyclopedia*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Josephson, M. (1942) *Victor Hugo: A Realistic Biography of the Great Romantic*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, and Company.
- Robb, G. (1999) *Victor Hugo: A Biography*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Huk Rebellion, 1946–1954

Pierre Rousset

The Huk Rebellion, a major rural guerilla peasant movement, began in 1946 in the months following the Philippines’ declaration of independence and was quelled only in the 1950s, after deeply marking the history and popular consciousness of the country. The Hukbalahap/Communist Party (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, PKP) armed struggle was an act of self-defense in response to escalating levels of savage repression by government forces. As the insurrection grew, the movement ascended from



Representing the Communist People's Anti-Japanese Army, or Hukbalahap, Luis M. Taruc won a seat in the Philippine Congress in an election held in anticipation of independence from the US in 1946. After gaining independence, however, leaders of the victorious Liberal Party ousted Taruc and other Huk candidates, sparking a peasant movement known as the Huk Rebellion (1946–54). In an attempt to dampen the movement's morale, the government reported Taruc dead a number of times. Surrounded by supporters, the Huk leader holds a Manila newspaper displaying the current date to prove that he is indeed alive. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

a protective strategy of defense to a moment of revolutionary liberation.

Situated in Central Luzon, the Huk made use of an explosive social situation, reflecting a popular historical tradition of resistance under the threat of geographic isolation. At independence, regional disparities remained considerable in the archipelago, as resistance to the Japanese occupation during World War II and accession to independence had not been the occasion for a “founding struggle” creating a new collective political and national identity. Independence did not reduce entrenched social divisions that punctuated antagonisms among the dominant classes, working classes, and peasants along political and regional divisions. The dislocation of the Japanese war and occupation only intensified resentment.

Aftermath of World War II

Following independence, the pretense of democracy concealed the upper classes' fear and aversion of the Hukbalahap resistance that was gaining prominence internationally. At the provincial level, large and wealthy families wielded political power outside of the rule of law, and were free to use private armies to punish and impose laws arbitrarily. The ruling family death squads

assassinated with impunity popular movement leaders and representatives of competing clans running for election. With state power fragmented, smuggling syndicates flourished and in various regions violence became the norm, distorting traditional patronage relationships. With US support, anti-communism supplied an ideological cover for repression.

In urban areas, the immediate postwar era saw the emergence of a middle class that was subordinated to the key foreign and domestic capitalist interests. US firms supplied capital that dominated trade and mines while in the rural areas the landed oligarchy, especially planters on sugar cane haciendas, directed the export-oriented agro-industry.

Communist and leftist forces for liberation were suppressed by the armed forces, including many former guerillas, supporting the US geostrategic concern that the Philippines archipelago was vital to its interests with the rise to power of the communists in China and leftist forces throughout East Asia and Southeast Asia.

Reorganization of the Peasant and Worker Movements

In the provinces of Central and South Luzon, after liberation, a new organization emerged more powerful than the former PKP: the National Peasants' Union (Pambansang Kaisahang mag Magbubukid, PKM). When PKM military units were disbanded, many Huks joined, and it became among the biggest peasant organization in the history of the country.

In urban regions, the Committee on Labor Organization (CLO), established in March 1945 and soon renamed the Congress of Labor Organizations, maintained dominance. Under Japanese occupation, union development was not seen as a priority of the PKP. But in the postwar era, the Huks actively sought to reconstitute the urban movement. The CLO was rooted in Metro Manila, organized on “industrial lines,” with a federation for each industrial sector: printing, tobacco, water, petrol, and so on. Ten months after its formation, the CLO grew to 80,000 members. In the Visayas in the center of the archipelago, José and Jesus Lava reactivated the Federation of Workers of the Philippines (Federation Obrera de Filipina, FOF), a 70,000-member organization with established links to the CLO.

In response to the deteriorating economic conditions in the first year after the war, 49 strikes broke out, and workers often emerged victorious. Centered on concrete economic demands, the struggles in particular organized the unemployed. In connection with the Democratic Alliance, protests extended to political and anti-imperialist issues. However, the popular peasant, urban poor, workers' movements and progressive parties were suppressed by the violence of the upper classes and the dominant capitalist order. On February 24, 1948, Manuel Joven, CLO general secretary, was abducted and then assassinated.

Democratic Alliance

In 1945–6 the progressive forces (radical or simply liberal) regrouped in a defensive political front, called the Democratic Alliance. It was composed of four organizations that each had few members: the League for National Liberation, the Anti-Traitors' League, the Anti-Japanese League, and the Civil Liberties Union. The alliance, supported by the PKM in the countryside and by the CLO in urban areas, proved capable of organizing demonstrations of tens of thousands. Six of its candidates were elected to the Congress in Central Luzon in the 1946 elections, but they were denied the right to take their seats in government.

Some leaders of the PKP were members of the executive council of the Democratic Alliance. However, the Democratic Alliance leadership was dominated by reformists who had a moderate program. They supported Sergio Osmeña in the presidential election campaign of April 1946, a race that was won by Manuel Roxas of the Nacionalista Party.

Rural Crisis and Agrarian Struggle

At war's end, the stability of traditional rural social relationships was in disarray, undermining capitalist development in agriculture. The impersonal economic character of the legal contract replaced old personal ties between landlords and tenants. For peasants, a moral contract was betrayed. Landowners frequently seized on the subordinate position of peasants to unjustly demand services, but they also were forced to assume customary responsibilities in dramatic situations: granting no-interest loans, distributing food rations in times of scarcity, supplying

medicine and hospital treatment for sick children, and authorizing subsistence plantation (rice, vegetables, fruit) on plots of land. In an environment of deep exploitation and great poverty, the obligations of wealthy farmers to their tenants represented a crucial and legitimate security net for peasants.

The breach in the moral contract between wealthy landlord and tenant farmer was brutal, beginning in the 1920s and expanding into the next two decades. The capitalist "modernization" of law reinforced the legal right of landowners, eroding the traditional right of land users. After World War II inequality expanded dramatically: the rural elite earned spectacular wealth from the world trade in rice and sugar and seized on the precariousness of the peasant condition as mechanization displaced rural jobs. The popular feeling was animated by injustice, abandonment, and adversity in the face of the unilateral violation of customary obligations in Central Luzon and beyond, constituting the basis for future struggles.

The PKP program included land redistribution and socialization of much of the economy. In local struggles, land ownership was the primary focus of protests. In the 1930s and 1940s, land struggles were often aimed at reforming the tenancy system rather than its abolition, including respect for landowners' customary obligations. Land redistribution was not a traditional demand as peasants retained an embellished memory of patron-client relationships, explaining in part the success of the counterinsurgency of the 1950s by the Magsaysay regime: the promise of a moderate agrarian reform would seemingly restore protective patronage links.

An ideology of justice punctuated peasant resistance to repression and nurtured efforts to avenge the criminal behavior of landlords and their surrogates, frequently the police. Before taking up arms in the postwar rebellions, the peasantry exhausted all forms of struggle: petition for redress to authorities, strikes, demonstrations, or secret appropriation of part of the harvests. Peasants frequently relocated in search of more human landowners, free land, or complementary non-agricultural work. But the conditions of exploitation became uniform and peasants turned to lawyers and intellectuals for legal assistance in the courts, often in vain. Due to the parliamentary regime, unlike other Asian countries at the time, peasants could explore

electoral action, linking with clientelist or progressive parties. But peasants were unsuccessful in these efforts at redress.

The geographic and cultural dispersion of the Philippines has always intensified the capacity of workers and peasants to unify against the dominant classes. In the 1930s and 1940s landlords recruited the most deprived peasants into private armies, the *Cawal ng Capayapaan* (Knights of Peace) and the Civilian Guards. In resistance, peasants organizing cadres gave rise to numerous exchanges of experience among rural communities, contributing to the advent of a collective consciousness broadening peasants' vision beyond the horizon of the village and creating horizontal links among activists. Similarly, the anonymity and dominance of the new capitalist rural market economy placed into sharp relief exploitative class relationships that were previously hidden behind the idiosyncrasies of local patronage relationships. The rebellion of the Huks was made possible by the decades-long tradition of organization and multifarious struggles among peasants in Central Luzon, of which resistance against the Japanese occupation was only one expression.

The peasants exhausted all peaceful means of appeal and protest against the propertied classes to reconstruct a tolerable life in the rural areas. In response to legal means, the authorities increased repression, which in turn pushed peasants to join the rebellion, as they had done in resisting Japanese occupation. The resumption of armed struggle in Central Luzon was not imposed externally but was a product of regional history, and it was not reproduced identically in other parts of the archipelago. In the interim, the PKP hesitated before reengaging in armed struggle.

The PKP and Armed Struggle

The Hukbalahap and the PKP were officially outlawed only in March 1948. Negotiations continued with mixed success until June 1948, on each occasion failing on the question of disarmament as revolutionaries in local areas were repeatedly under attack. The Huks initially limited themselves to measures of local defense. In May–June 1947, those among the PKP national leadership still hoping for presidential compromise became a minority, as talks continued in spite of the intensification of repression. Huk leaders

were abducted and killed. Juan Felco, who had participated directly in negotiations with Roxas, was arrested by men in uniform and disappeared. In August through November, the government launched a massive offensive in Central Luzon, deflating popular morale. Huks continued a defensive posture but, to reduce pressure, began expanding their bases in other provinces of Luzon and the Visayas.

Manuel Roxas died suddenly of a heart attack on April 15, 1948 and was replaced by his vice-president, Elpidio Quirino, who resumed negotiations with Luis Taruc, the emblematic figure of the rural resistance. An amnesty on ambiguous terms was proclaimed on June 21, 1948, and Taruc and other elected members of the Democratic Alliance were finally authorized to sit in Congress. However, in the field, units of the Constabulary Police and the Civilian Guards continued their attacks. With promised reforms aborted, the interregnum finally came to an end on August 15, 1948, and Huk leaders returned to the underground armed struggle. The Democratic Alliance disintegrated and the theater of military operations expanded into the Central and Southern Luzon. The Huks adopted a new name, the Army of National Liberation (*Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan*, HMB). Political education was reinforced, and after three years of adopting a defensive posture the leadership of the PKP announced a renewed surge in the tide of revolution.

The radicalization of the PKP did not exclude political maneuvering and HMB provided critical and discreet support to the Nacionalista Party during the 1949 electoral campaign. But the presidential elections of 1949, which included José P. Laurel, who had collaborated with the Japanese occupation, were considered fraudulent and electoral politics entirely lost its legitimacy. A political crisis emerged among the elites as the economy deteriorated, with unemployment spreading and political corruption becoming widespread. In 1949, after the Red Army and the Communist Party had taken power in China, the PKP leadership concluded that a revolutionary situation existed in the Philippines and called for the overthrow of “the imperialist-puppet regime.” The atmosphere shifted from optimism to euphoria in the party ranks. In January 1950, the leadership predicted that the following two years would be decisive in preparing for the conquest of power. For many, victory seemed at hand.

The revolutionary armed forces rapidly expanded, with the PKP commitment to the armed struggle reaching its zenith from 1949 to 1951. Between 11,000 and 15,000 Huks were armed, a figure similar to 1946–8 during resistance to the Japanese occupation. The regional stronghold of the resistance was situated in provinces that made up “Huklandia”: Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan (and Laguna and Batangas). But the theater of operation expanded as two commands expanded to six, and by 1951 the resistance grew to 27 provinces in Luzon in sectors of Panay and Negros (Visayas), and even Mindanao. The year 1950 appeared to be a turning point in the Huk Rebellion. But the PKP dangerously underestimated the capacity of US reaction.

Counterinsurgency

The period 1949–50 marked the eve of the declaration of the Korean War. In Vietnam, French expeditionary forces were coming up against increasing resistance. For Washington policymakers, the development of a new revolutionary center in the Philippines was unthinkable. The Philippines was one of the first countries in which the US carried out a comprehensive policy of counterrevolution.

Militarily, the counterrevolution integrated the Philippine Constabulary into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Subsequently, the AFP expanded beyond external defense and took direct charge of the counterinsurgency, through the creation of New Battalion Combat Teams (BCT), with improved armaments and equipment. The AFP made extensive use of napalm bombardments and the intelligence services were reorganized, reinforced by the CIA under the direction of Edward G. Lansdale.

Politically, Lansdale selected a new strongman, Ramon Magsaysay, a former member of the anti-Japanese guerilla forces in Luzon with close ties to the Americans. His ultimate accession to the presidency was carefully planned with US support and the active participation of the CIA. In 1950, under President Quirino, Magsaysay became defense secretary, taking charge of the army and directing the new Office of Psychological Warfare – renamed the Civil Affairs Office (CAO). Magsaysay publicized his efforts throughout the Philippines and developed networks independent from the political party

apparatus, presenting himself as a popular man of action, the opposite of the aristocratic Quirino. He visited villages, walked barefoot in rice fields, and ate ostensibly with his hands, a traditional practice in the Philippines.

In 1953, Magsaysay won a landslide victory in the presidential elections. His rise to power became a model for Washington, which used its inspiration in other countries of the region, and again in the Philippines some 15 years later. Washington also forced the Philippines to renovate its democratic façade. Just as the 1949 elections had openly been “dirty,” so the 1951 senatorial race appeared “clean.” The National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) was created with American support. The army intervened in the campaign to “guarantee” equity, an intervention that created a dangerous precedent but which, at the time, was accepted by public opinion. The Nacionalista Party of Jose P. Laurel won the contest, trust in the elections was restored, and Magsaysay was declared “man of the year.”

Magsaysay launched a program of agrarian reform, appropriating the slogan “land for the landless.” He created the Presidential Assistant for Community Development (PACD) – a CIA project. Thousands of development workers were sent to the villages, appearing to the peasants as direct envoys of the presidency. While the land reform measures implemented were quite limited, their psychological impact was real.

Psychological warfare was the trademark of Lansdale, the CIA, Magsaysay, and the Philippines military. In October 1950, PKP leaders (including José Lava) were captured and party documents seized. Lansdale opened talks with the Catholic hierarchy, the Iglesia ni Kristo, and the Chinese community. Magsaysay launched vast anti-Huk propaganda operations, including disinformation, media infiltration, and intervention in universities and schools, frequently using US missionaries in his operations. The army tried to infiltrate the revolutionary ranks and recruit informers. The operation launched a “resettlement” program for repentant Huks, the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), a program that was limited in scope but useful in terms of political propaganda.

Beyond electoral demagoguery, many US officials sought genuine capitalist agrarian reform. But landed elites were strongly opposed, and Washington sought to maintain good relations

with the rural aristocracy. As revolutionary pressure faded, the reform projects lost much of their radicalism, and all the concrete content of the agrarian laws adopted in 1954–5 was eliminated.

Nevertheless, through counterinsurgency, the Philippine regime and the CIA scored points through maintaining permanent military pressure, multiplying civic action and psychological warfare measures and providing peasants hope for an improvement in their lot through restoring credibility in the electoral process and giving Magsaysay a populist image.

From Decline to Defeat

Revolutionary optimism was short-lived. *A posteriori*, the year 1954 was decisive. In February–March, the government launched an important military offensive, Operation Milagrosa, with more than 20,000 soldiers and air force units. The offensive was a harsh blow to the morale of the Huks, especially when Luis Taruc, their famous leader, surrendered on May 16, 1954. This surrender sanctioned a conflict within PKP leadership, which had already begun in 1951 when Luis and his brother Peregrino opposed the Lava brothers' turn toward parliamentary struggle. Even in Central Luzon calm was progressively restored: the armed units were forced to become more and more mobile to avoid the AFP, and survival for the Huks became more tenuous. In 1956, the leadership of the PKP resigned itself to adopting the principle of legal/parliamentary struggle, but in June 1957 the party was for the second time outlawed by decree. The leaders of the PKP and the Huks were killed in battle or captured one by one. Jesus Lava himself was finally arrested on May 21, 1964, marking the end of the “centralized” armed struggle. Only local pockets of resistance remained.

In the 1950s the geographical extension of the armed and social struggles in the Visayas and in Mindanao was limited. When the PKP had been committed to total military victory, it sent most of its urban cadres to the countryside to reinforce rural guerillas, neglecting the task of urban mobilization. During the 1950s, in contrast to other countries in the region, students remained politically passive and indifferent to social issues. Faced with the US global policy of counterinsurgency, the Huks were isolated and the PKP

could not fall back on traditional bases of support in urban areas.

A Complex Experience

In spite of the defeat, the Huk Rebellion represents a rich historical experience of resistance, with a complex relationship between the peasant movement and the PKP. The PKP played a central role through systematic Marxist political training, supplying cadres and infrastructure, contributing to the geographic spread and coordination of the struggle, and inscribing an international and historical perspective. But the leadership of the PKP was unable to impose authority on the peasant movement. In several instances, important differences emerged between the political choices of the PKP leadership and those implemented on the ground by the Huks. As was the case under Japanese occupation, when the PKP adopted a policy of “retreat for defense,” Hukbalahap military units neither withdraw nor reduced operations. In 1946 and 1947, the rural armed struggle resumed long before the PKP leadership agreed with the plan. In 1950 and thereafter, the capacity of the Huks in rural areas had already begun to decline, even though the PKP political bureau were calling for an offensive to be launched.

The discordance of rhythms pitted the Communist Party against the peasant movement, as if they were two organizations independent of each other. Many cadre members belonged to the PKP and the Huks. Conflicts expressed themselves through “vertical” tensions between different levels of leadership. The central nucleus of the PKP was above all composed of intellectuals, scientists, lawyers, and civil servants, while organizers and the local military command of HBM were village peasants. Veteran militants occupying key intermediary leadership posts arose from peasant and urban working-class backgrounds and were crucial interlocutors between localities and regions, cities and provinces, the Huk command and the PKP Political Bureau. The leaders of the militants included Luis Taruc, José de Leon, and Juan Felco, among others.

Beyond the question of rhythms and the controversial analysis of the relation of forces at each step of the struggle, the PKP leadership set a high bar for the peasant movement, setting out a program for social revolution but offering

little support. Thus, in 1950, the communist leadership called for the overthrow of the government while the peasantry fought for an end to repression. If the workers' movement, urban poor, and students had been engaged in a common struggle with the peasants, the expectation for social revolution may have been more realistic.

The Huk Rebellion could simply take over the torch of anti-Japanese resistance. The US did not provoke the same rejection as Japan had, given that it did not occupy the country in the same way, and even played an important role in the background. No remote or border sanctuary could protect the rear base of the peasant army. Geostrategically speaking, the Huk were in a less advantageous situation in the Philippine archipelago than resistance movements in Vietnam or China. Although key socioeconomic problems remained, the Huk Rebellion raised the issues of inequality in a concrete way. Some 20 years later, this historical experience helped a new revolutionary movement.

The PKP and the HBM were defeated as organizations by the counterrevolutionary forces of the Philippine power structure and US military and secret services. But for the peasant movement as a whole, the outcome was more nuanced. Though it did not obtain radical and lasting reforms, in many areas landowners were forced temporarily to reduce exploitation. The basic right to organize, negated by brutal repression from 1946 to 1948, was again permitted. In Central Luzon, the Huks were at the origin of two peasant associations in the following period: the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) and the Free Farmers' Union (Malayang Samahang Magsasaka, MASAKA). A tradition of organizing was transmitted from one generation to the next, although within a restrictive reformist framework.

The rebellion and return to armed struggle was not a "free choice" for the Huks but a necessity, as witnessed by the statements of peasant veterans to researcher Benedict J. Kerkvliet (1979): "Even if we got nothing, that's not important. What's important is that we had to fight back. And we fought so well that the big people and the government will never forget us again. [. . .] We didn't lie down like whimpering dogs when they started to whip us. We stood up and fought for what was rightfully ours. [. . .] No strike, no

demonstration, no rebellion fails. Protest against injustice always succeeds."

SEE ALSO: Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897); Philippines, Colonial Protests during the Spanish Era; Philippines, Protest during the US Era; Philippines, Protests, 1950s–1970s; Philippines, Protests, 1980s–Present; Rizal, José (1861–1896)

References and Suggested Readings

- Abaya, H. J. (1970) *Betrayal in the Philippines*. New York: A. A. Wyn.
- Agoncillo, T. A. & Guerrero, M. (1973) *History of the Filipino People*, 4th ed. Quezon City: R. P. Garcia.
- Constantin, R. & Constantino, L. R. (1978) *The Philippines: The Continuing Past*. Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies.
- Kerkvliet, B. J. (1979) *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines*. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.
- Lachica, E. (1971) *Huk: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt*. Manila: Solidaridad.
- McCoy, A. (Ed.) (1994) *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- McCoy, A. W. & De Jesus, E. C. (Eds.) (1982) *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Pomeroy, W. J. (1963) *The Forest*. New York: International Publishers.
- San Juan, Jr., E. (1988) *Only by Struggle*. Quezon City: Kalikasan Press.
- Schirmer, D. B. & Shalom, S. R. (1987) *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance*. Boston: South End Press.
- Taruc, L. (1967) *He Who Rides the Tiger*. London: Geoffrey Chapman.

Hungary, anti-communist protests, 1945–1989

Caryn E. Neumann

In early 1945, the Soviet-backed secret police and people's courts began to arrest and imprison Hungarian supporters of democracy in a campaign of repression that continued for several decades. Many Hungarians were nonetheless determined to establish democratic governance. Under the control of the Independence Front, national

councils were elected to administer municipal governments nationwide. Meanwhile, communists began to take control of trade unions and destroy opposition political parties. They undermined party leaders by declaring them anti-democratic reactionaries and forcing their resignation. The leaders of the governing Smallholders' Party met this fate at the end of 1946. Bela Kovacs, secretary general of the party, was arrested on Soviet orders for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government. Ferenc Nagy was compelled to resign from his post as prime minister in 1947 after the communists kidnapped his son. The party subsequently dissolved. Later that year political leaders were told to conform to the communist agenda or leave the country. Organized democratic opposition was largely eliminated by 1948. Over the next five years under Rákosi as the general secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party, an estimated one million people – one tenth of the population – suffered arrest, prosecution, imprisonment or deportation (Judt 2005: 192).

Between 1948 and 1953 the communist government forced collectivization of agriculture and nationalized major industries. With the political opposition neutralized, the churches were the primary source of resistance. The communist authorities responded by expropriating church property and nationalizing religious schools. Protestant leaders reached a compromise with the new regime but there was open conflict between the communist authorities and the Catholic Church between 1945 and 1950; most religious orders were dissolved, Catholic associations were forced to disband, religious periodicals were banned, and approximately 2,500 monks and nuns were exiled. Catholics represented over two-thirds of Hungarian society at the time and the churches were important centers of popular resistance. Much of the institutional resistance, however, was motivated not by a commitment to democratic pluralism but by the desire to maintain institutional privilege and restore the Hapsburg monarchy (Kenez 2006).

The death of Soviet premier Joseph Stalin in 1953 revived democratic hopes as the Soviets gradually loosened their grip on Hungary. On June 4, 1953, Imre Nagy, the new Hungarian premier, presented parliament with a reform agenda that included the establishment of collective leadership. Under the Patriotic People's Front, Nagy organized opposition to the Soviets

but he was forced out of office by Rákosi and other Stalinist devotees.

In the late spring and early summer of 1956, university students revived the Association of Hungarian University and College Students to call for a pluralist system and universal suffrage by secret ballot as well as economic reforms and prosecution of Rákosi. Hungary's leading writers and journalists further demanded freedom of expression and the ouster of the Communist Party's orthodox leaders, initiating the events known as the Revolution of 1956. With the crushing Soviet defeat of the uprising, the political parties, student organizations, and workers' councils established in the fall of 1956 were disbanded and resistance was silenced for over a decade.

The signing of the 1975 Helsinki Accords by Hungarian representatives initiated another movement for democratization. In January 1977, 34 prominent Hungarian intellectuals signed Charta 77, a Czechoslovak initiative demanding the civil liberties guaranteed by the Accord. Clubs and seminars followed as well as *samizdats*, illegal publications that gave voice to dissident opinions.

In 1985 about 45 prominent Hungarian intellectuals gathered in Monor to discuss Hungary's growing economic and social crisis. Dissidents, reform economists, historians, sociologists, and independent writers as well as representatives of all the major opposition groups were present. They initiated a public dialogue about the necessary direction of public reform. On March 15, 1986, anti-government demonstrations on a scale not seen in Hungary since 1956 began with the arrest of several dissidents, including Gabor Demszky, Tamas Molnar, Ottillia Solt, and Miklos Haraszti. Protesters demanded reforms and freedom of the press and assembly. New political organizations were formed, including the Association of Young Democrats and the Network of Free Initiatives. During the fall of 1988, the new political organizations became political parties while the Smallholders' and Hungarian People's Parties were resurrected. On March 22, 1989, representatives from the political parties, trade unions, and social organizations formed the Roundtable of the Opposition. On June 13, they joined the newly created National Roundtable and this organization facilitated the election of the first post-communist government. The new government took office on May 23, 1990.

SEE ALSO: Hungary, Revolution of 1848; Hungary, Revolution of 1956; Nagy, Imre (1896–1958); Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”; Soviet Union, Fall of

References and Suggested Readings

- Bozóki, A. (Ed.) (2002) *The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy: Analysis and Documents*. New York: Central European University Press.
- Granville, J. C. (2004) *The First Domino: International Decision Making During the Hungarian Crisis of 1956*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
- Judt, T. (2005) *Postwar*. New York: Penguin.
- Kenez, P. (2006) *Hungary from the Nazis to the Soviets: The Establishment of the Communist Regime in Hungary, 1944–1948*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kenney, P. (2002) *A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- McDermott, K. & Stibbe, M. (Eds.) (2006) *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule*. Oxford: Berg.

Hungary, protests, 1815–1920

Alexander Maxwell

Hungary underwent tremendous social and political transformations during the nineteenth century, the most significant of which was the development of a more socially inclusive idea of the nation. In 1815 most Hungarians equated the nation with the nobility – a large segment of society relative to other European countries but still only 10 percent of the Hungarian population. The French Revolution inspired reform-minded nobles to support a more modern and socially inclusive idea of the Hungarian nation. Specifically, they supported the abolition of serfdom and other feudal taxes, and promoted economic modernization. They sought to open the civil service to those without an expensive classical education by promoting popular education in Hungarian, and replacing Latin with Hungarian as the language of government administration. Finally, they wanted the Hungarian frontier expanded to include Transylvania, a province with a significant Hungarian population.

Hungary’s Reform Era officially began in 1825, when Count István Széchenyi (1791–1860), a wealthy magnate popularly remembered as “the greatest Hungarian,” offered a year’s income from

his estates to found a Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Széchenyi inspired the first generation of Hungarian liberalism, dominated by reform-minded aristocrats such as Baron Miklós Wesselényi (1796–1850) and Count Károly Zay (1791–1871). These Liberal aristocrats enjoyed considerable support beyond their caste, not least because of their willingness to collaborate with people of humbler birth who shared their political goals. Hungarian liberals replaced the Latin based *natio Hungarica* with the Hungarian based *Magyar nemzet*: a Hungarian nation claiming its freedom against Hapsburg tyranny.

Hungarian liberals faced opposition from two corners: the Hapsburg court and Hungary’s national minorities. The central government in Vienna saw Hungarian liberals as impractical day-dreamers: Austrian statesman Clemens Metternich (1773–1859) described Széchenyi as “a man lost through vanity and ambition – one of those who bring unhappiness upon themselves.” The Hapsburg central government consistently opposed popular pressure for political change in Hungary, though it often made concessions to liberal demands in hope of avoiding confrontation. This reactive policy foundered with the outbreak of the Revolution of 1848, which brought Kossuth to power, forced Metternich from office, and eventually cost Ferdinand I his throne.

Language War

Hungary’s national minorities agreed with the social demands of the liberals, but objected to the increasingly hegemonic status of the Hungarian language. Over half of Hungary’s population spoke German, Romanian, or a Slavic language, and the *Magyar nemzet* promised to disenfranchise these “non-Magyars.” In what became known as the Language War (1840–8), minority leaders defended Latin as a neutral language for government administration. When this battle was lost they began demanding a role for minority languages in government administration. Despite Hungarian accusations to the contrary, minority leaders did not seek independence from Hungary, but fought instead for a multi-ethnic Hungary that respected all ethnic groups in the kingdom. Hungarian liberals contemptuously rejected this vision of the polity.

During the Hungarian Reform Era, ethnic Hungarians developed a tremendous fear of Pan-Slavism. In 1840 Michal Hlaváček (1803–85), a

secondary school teacher in Levoča/Lősce/Leutschau, published a book of poems extolling “the Slavic Nation and Language.” Another teacher at the school, Karl Kramárčsik (1813–95), denounced him in the Hungarian press: “Nobody who is bound to his fatherland by true feeling can allow that there should be a teacher in Hungary . . . who is a preacher of Pan-Slavism.” Lajos Kossuth took up the issue, and for the rest of the decade Slavs, Croats, and Hungarians published increasingly angry manifestos on language rights. Important titles include Johann Thomášek’s defense of Slovak in *The Language War in Hungary* (1841), Stephen Ludwig Roth’s defense of Romanian in *The Language War in Transylvania* (1842), and Samuel Hojč’s *Apology of Hungarian Slavism* (1843). Texts articulating the Hungarian viewpoint include Károly Zay’s *Protestantism, Magyarism, Slavism* (1841) and Miklós Wesselényi’s *A Voice Concerning the Hungarian and Slav Nationality* (1844). Ironically, all these works were written in German, the lingua franca of Hapsburg Hungary.

The conflict led to an increasingly bitter struggle over the language used in various public settings. Latin ceased to be the sole language of government administration in the 1830s. In 1843 Hungarian was made compulsory everywhere in the country except Croatia, which was then a small district around Zagreb. Officials in Slavonia and Hungarian Dalmatia were given a six-year grace period to learn Hungarian. The conflict between nationalities during the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 was an important legacy of the language war.

Hungarian Revolution

After the overthrow of the French monarchy in February 1848 popular demonstrations for political reform erupted throughout the Hapsburg empire. The Hungarian liberal movement won the restoration of the Hungarian parliament during the so-called March Days, captured by Sándor Petőfi (1823–49) in his famous poem *Nemzeti Dal* (National Song): “rise up, Hungarian, now or never.” Lajos Kossuth (1802–94) became the most powerful politician in Hungary, and a series of radical reforms followed, notably the abolition of serfdom. In July 1848 Kossuth asked parliament to fund a Hungarian army.

Fighting began in the summer of 1848. Hungarian armies defeated Serbian and Romanian

uprisings and the Croatian-imperial army led by Josip Jellačić. In January 1849 an imperial army occupied Budapest and the Hungarian government was forced to flee to Debrecen. Despite distrust between Kossuth and Hungarian General Artúr Görgey (1818–1916), a Hungarian offensive in April 1849 drove the Austrians from central Hungary and recaptured the Hungarian capital, though Hapsburg forces in Buda citadel held out until May. Emboldened by this success, Kossuth declared the Hapsburg dynasty dethroned and Hungary independent of Austria, but fighting continued in Transylvania.

Caught between Austrian and Russian intervention, however, Hungarian armies were eventually forced to surrender at Világos in August 1849, though a fortress at Komárom resisted siege until October. The Hungarian prime minister, Lajos Batthyány (1806–49), was executed on October 6, 1849, as were 13 Hungarian officers, remembered as the Martyrs of Arad. Hungary was integrated into a unitary Austrian administration known as the Bach Regime after interior minister Alexander Bach (1813–93).

Non-Magyar Uprisings Against the Magyars

The revolutionary government of Lajos Kossuth made Hungarian the sole language for the administration of Hungary and refused to grant any concessions to Hungary’s national minorities: “never, but never, shall I recognize in the framework of the Holy Hungarian Crown another nation or nationality but the Magyar.” When Djordje Stratimirović (1822–1908) asked Kossuth to support the establishment of a Serbian district, Kossuth told him: “the sword will decide between us.”

The intransigent chauvinism of the ethnic Hungarians or Magyars eventually provoked armed resistance among most of Hungary’s nationalities. Jews were the only minority group in Hungary to side with the revolution. Stratimirović led a Serbian revolt in June 1848 and was quickly defeated despite covert help from the government of Serbia. This defeat inspired Ban Josip Jellačić (1801–59), a career military officer who believed in the unity of South Slavic peoples, to declare Croatia’s “independence and equality with Hungary” in April 1848. In August 1848 he marched on Budapest with an army of 40,000 soldiers. This army was defeated

at Pákozd in September by a Hungarian volunteer army that was one-third Jewish. Jellačić retreated to Vienna, but put his army under the control of Austrian General Alfred Windischgrätz (1787–1862), who had already put down revolutionary movements in Italy and Prague. Windischgrätz occupied Budapest in January 1849.

In eastern Transylvania, after a series of political meetings at Blaj in April–May 1848, and a revolt in neighboring Wallachia in June, a Romanian peasant revolt broke out in September. Transylvanian Saxons, under the leadership of Stephan Ludwig Roth (1796–1849), sided with the Romanians out of loyalty to the Empire. A Hungarian army led by Józef Bem (1794–1850) restored Hungarian rule by January 1849, not least because Romanians and Serbs quarreled about the status and organization of the Orthodox Church. Romanian forces retreated to the Érc mountains in central Transylvania, where Avram Iancu led a Romanian peasant army of nearly 20,000 and spurned Kossuth's half-hearted attempts at national reconciliation. Roth, meanwhile, was executed in April 1849 despite Bem's promise of amnesty.

In Slovakia, revolutionary poet Janko Kráľ (1822–76) led a brief peasant uprising in March 1848 over the unwillingness of local landlords to acknowledge the end of serfdom. Slovak leaders protesting his imprisonment had to flee Hungary to avoid arrest. In September 1848 Slovak leaders Ľudovít Štúr (1815–56) and Josef Hurban (1817–88), after attending the Prague Pan-Slav Congress, organized a group of “Slovak Volunteers” in Vienna and entered western Slovakia. The Slovaks did not greatly influence military events.

Magyar nationalists saw the failure of Hungary's non-Magyars to support the revolution as reactionary Hapsburg loyalism and the betrayal of the national ideal. Romanians, Slovaks, Serbs, and Croats, however, remember their fight against Kossuth as a national struggle. Unwillingness to accommodate the “national” demands of Hungary's minorities would remain characteristic of Magyar politics throughout the nineteenth century.

After the Revolution

After the failure of the Hungarian Revolution the Hapsburg central government abolished the Hungarian parliament and tried to rule Hungary

directly from Vienna. Passive resistance made this unworkable, and in 1860 Emperor Franz-Joseph (1830–1916) granted an imperial parliament and returned to constitutional rule. Hungarian liberals were not placated, however, and in 1867 Franz-Joseph negotiated the famous *Ausgleich* (compromise), which granted the Hungarian parliament complete autonomy over Hungarian affairs and jurisdiction over Transylvania.

In 1868 the newly independent Hungarian parliament passed a series of laws extending autonomy to nationalities. An autonomous Croat parliament was established, and while other nationalities were denied such legislative independence, all were guaranteed the right to use their languages in schools, courts, and church administration. The implementation of these rights, however, was patchy from the start, and after 1875, when Kálmán Tisza (1830–1902) became prime minister, the Hungarian government actively suppressed minority cultural institutions. In 1896 Serbian, Romanian, and Slovak political leaders formed the (ineffectual) Congress of Non-Magyar Nationalities, to protest Magyarization and demand regional autonomy.

Congress of Non-Magyar Nationalities

During the final decades of Hapsburg rule, Hungary's electoral system gave wildly disproportionate representation to ethnic Hungarians (Magyars) in the Hungarian parliament. To counteract their disenfranchisement, politicians from Hungary's national minorities began to consolidate their political efforts to resist the Hungarian government's policy of Magyarization. The resulting Congress of Nationalities produced a measured document protesting the Hungarian government's failure to respect the Language Law of 1868 and demanding that minorities receive “freedom within their linguistic frontiers,” which in practice meant regional autonomy and the use of minority languages in government administration. This demand for autonomy was accompanied by declarations of loyalty to the Hungarian kingdom: “the society of Romanian, Slovak and Serbian nationalities declares that it desires to preserve and strengthen in every way the unity and integrity of the lands belonging to the crown of Saint Stephen.”

In April 1896 the non-Magyar nationalities also attacked the Hungarian government's

millennium celebrations, which commemorated the thousand-year anniversary of the Magyar conquest of Hungary with monuments and public celebrations. Their document protested that “the millennium celebrations are designed to demonstrate to Europe that the Hungarian state was and is nationally a Magyar state. This however is a falsehood against the historic and ethnic conditions of our state, against which we must protest.”

As elsewhere in the Hapsburg monarchy, domestic politics in Hungary had become sharply divided along ethnic lines. Austro-Hungarian defeat in World War I transformed this discontent into open rebellion. In 1918 national councils appeared in Subcarpathia, Slovakia, Croatia, and Romania, demanding either independence from Hungary or incorporation into one of the various national states emerging from the ruins of the Hapsburg monarchy. The 1920 Treaty of Trianon confirmed the ethnic partition of Hungary: Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and even rump Austria all received Hungarian territories.

SEE ALSO: European Revolutions of 1848; France, Revolution of 1848; Hungary, Revolution of 1848; Slovakia, Štúr Generation

References and Suggested Readings

- Bona, G. (1999) *The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence, 1848–1849*. Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs.
- Deák, I. (1979) *The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848–49*. New York: Colombia University Press.
- Freifeld, A. (2000) *Nationalism and the Crowd in Liberal Hungary, 1848–1914*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Hitchins, K. (1996) *The Romanians, 1774–1866*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jaszi, O. (1961) *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Johnson, O. (2000) Losing Faith: The Slovak-Hungarian Constitutional Struggle, 1906–1914. In *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kann, R. (1974) *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526–1918*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Krnjevic, J. (1948) The Croats in 1848. *Slavonic and Eastern European Review* (December): 106–14.
- Macartney, C. A. (1969) *The Habsburg Empire 1790–1918*. New York: Macmillan.
- Ormis, J. (1973) *Oreč a národ*. Bratislava: SAV.
- Paget, J. (1839) *Hungary and Transylvania*. London: John Murray.
- Rapant, D. (1948/1949) Slovak Politics in 1848–1849. *Slavonic and East European Review* 27, 68 (December 1948): 67–90; & 69 (May 1949): 381–43.
- Seton-Watson, R. (1908) *Racial Problems in Hungary*. London: Constable.
- Spira, G. (1975/1992) *The Nationality Issue in the Hungary of 1848–49*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
- Varga, J. (1993) A Hungarian Quo Vadis: Political Trends and Theories of the Early 1840s. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.

Hungary, Revolution of 1848

Ferenc Laczó

The Hungarian Revolution of 1848 was one of the most important of the near-simultaneous revolutions that encompassed most of the European continent in early 1848. It was the culmination and practical manifestation of a liberal nationalist reform program that had been gradually emerging in Hungary since 1825. This program, which in many crucial ways resembled those of revolutionaries across the continent at the time, was developed primarily at feudal diets held in Pozsony (today Bratislava, Slovakia). Its overarching objectives were the transition to a constitutional, liberal, and *polgári* (bourgeois citizenship) Hungary that was free to modernize and develop, and the establishment of wide autonomy for the country within the larger framework of the Hapsburg monarchy.

These broad revolutionary goals were initially pursued largely through legal means. They drew their strongest support from the reformist wing of the Hungarian nobility, comprised primarily of the lower gentry. The major opponents of the reforms were members of the loyal aristocracy and the conservative nobility. A group of conservative nobles tried to preempt radical change by urging more Hapsburg-centered reforms. Another group known as the Centralists, who were less influential than the reform wing, strived for an all-encompassing break with the nobility-based feudal system.

The incongruence between this “bourgeois revolution” and its origin with the nobility has long been the subject of debate. The idea that the nobles voluntarily sacrificed their class privilege by liberating the serfs in order to adapt to the pressures of changing times was the accepted

narrative of the revolution in nineteenth-century Hungarian historiography. In the early twentieth century this interpretation was challenged by socialist-syndicalist theorist Ervin Szabó, who saw in the developments of 1848 tactical maneuvering on the part of the nobility to maintain its political and economic hegemony.

News of the outbreak of revolution in Paris in February 1848 prompted the most influential representative of the reform-oriented liberal nationalists, Lajos Kossuth, to issue a series of demands to the Hungarian parliament in early March 1848. He called for the adoption of a constitution and the establishment of an independent Hungarian government responsible to an elected legislature, as well as the abolition of serfdom and more equal distribution of the tax burden (nobles had been exempted from their payment). The demands for independent representative institutions were new, while appeals for economic reforms had been issued previously and rejected by the dominant conservative forces.

Meanwhile, an uprising led by radical youth erupted on March 15 in Pest, just a few days after similar developments in Prague and Vienna and a few days before uprisings in Berlin and Milan. The major demands of the revolutionaries were articulated in a list of 12 points including a call for equality before the law, establishment of responsible government and regular meetings of parliament, release of political prisoners, and establishment of a National Guard. This list was originally addressed to the parliament, but at the insistence of a crowd of around 2,000 people the demands were turned into a manifesto. The manifesto was printed without the usual censorship in one of the first instances of freedom of the press – another of the basic demands of the revolutionaries.

The uprising in Pest motivated the Hapsburg emperor, Ferdinand V, to accept the demands of the Hungarian reformists. He appointed Lajos Batthyány prime minister. The new cabinet over which Batthyány presided took office on April 10; the following day the feudal diet was abolished and a package of reforms was passed in what became known as the “April Laws.” The laws authorized radical transformation of the political and economic life of the country, while unifying Hungary and Transylvania. Hungary was nearly independent for a brief period, though still greatly influenced by developments elsewhere in the monarchy, as later

events would reveal. The liberation of serfs was nominally accomplished, but effective implementation of the new law remained to be seen.

The activities of the Hungarian revolutionaries from within the system in 1848 at first mainly consisted of defending these major gains. Prime Minister Batthyány, in particular, was interested in dynastic consolidation. Liberal forces prevailed in the elections, which took place in the second half of June. The newly elected parliamentarians gathered July 5 at the newly established government seat in Pest. The specifics of Hungarian independence, including the status of Hungarian finances and military and foreign affairs, remained a bone of contention between the House of Hapsburg and Hungarian nationalists that would continue to cause friction. In an effort to settle the matter in practice, and defend itself against the anticipated move toward restoration by anti-liberal factions, the new parliament focused on organizing the Hungarian army. It also began to issue a Hungarian currency.

Relations between the major factions within the Hapsburg monarchy progressively worsened, and by September 1848 had deteriorated into mass mobilization and open, large-scale warfare. The invasion of Hungary by imperial troops led by the Ban of Croatia, Josip Jelačić, with tacit approval by the emperor, was the first military action. The Batthyány government resigned, and was followed by the Committee of National Defense headed by the somewhat more radical Lajos Kossuth. With parliamentary approval, the new government assumed full powers on October 8.

The Hungarian revolutionary army successfully resisted the invaders at first. On October 6 another uprising took place in Vienna and was suppressed by military means. With order restored in all of the other territories of the monarchy, Emperor Francis Joseph waged a second, much more forceful imperial invasion of revolutionary Hungary. This new attack quickly took control of the western, Trans-Danubian territories of Hungary as well as of Buda-Pest, forcing the authorities to flee. The war was not over yet, however. In the spring of 1849 the Hungarian side saw successes in Transylvania and recovery of Buda. The open, violent conflict led to the dethroning of the Hapsburgs and the Hungarian declaration of independence in April 1849.

With decisive help from the Russian army, the majority of the Hungarian forces were crushed

by the end of the summer of 1849. Although it was ultimately defeated, the Hungarian Revolution lasted longest and proved the most resilient of the revolutionary struggles during the Spring of Nations.

During the conflict, confrontation between the different nationalities of the Kingdom of Hungary greatly intensified. In 1848–9, over half of the population of the Hungarian Kingdom belonged to nationalities other than the dominant Magyar. At this time the national belonging of many was still ambiguous, and there was no firm connection between ethnic identification and allegiance in the 1848–9 conflict. Nonetheless, the events of 1848–9 marked the first instance of open, violent conflict between competing nationalist programs – particularly between Hungarian and Croatian, Serbian and Romanian – in modern times. These conflicts, which at times acquired the features of civil wars, ultimately cost more than 10,000 lives from the non-Magyar nationalities within Hungary, a number comparable in range with that of Hungarian (Magyar), Hapsburg, and Russian victims.

Conflicting claims by the various nationalities revealed the limitations of the proposed liberal nationalism. The Hungarian concept of a unified nation, even when combined with a representative government and constitutional rule, was unable to provide an equitable and satisfactory accommodation of the basic demands. However, radicalization of these national conflicts within the Kingdom of Hungary was partly due to imperial support for the nationalities directed at weakening the Hungarian revolutionaries.

The revolution and the ensuing struggle for independence were avenged by repression and the execution of several of its leaders, including Hungarian army generals and former prime minister Batthyány. A decade of neo-absolutism followed during which the spirit of the revolution was largely suppressed. Several reforms were preserved, however, such as the liberation of the serfs, and other modernizing reforms were implemented. Hungary remained part of the Hapsburg monarchy and its political elite retained some of its previous influence. The Hungarian elite eventually achieved a compromise with the House of Hapsburg, reflected in the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy in 1867. This unique arrangement fulfilled many of the key demands of 1848, despite

the country's continued dependence. Importantly, the nationality conflicts remained unresolved.

After 1867 attitudes toward the revolution constituted the major schism in Hungarian political life for most of the ensuing half-century, until the collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy. The events of 1848–9 have been central to Hungarian national identity ever since, and they have been appropriated and reinterpreted by each new regime. The most important actors of the Reform Era and the 1848–9 Revolution and War of Independence have acquired great symbolic importance occasionally bordering on cult status. Among those held in high esteem are Lajos Kossuth, often viewed as the liberator of the serfs and a heroic fighter for an independent Hungary, and Sándor Petőfi, a major figure within radical circles in Pest who has been regularly hailed as the national poet of Hungary.

SEE ALSO: European Revolutions of 1848; Ethnic and Nationalist Revolts in the Hapsburg Empire, 1500–1848; France, June Days 1848; France, Revolution of 1848; Hungary, Revolution of 1956; Hungary, Women Radicals, 1848–1849

References and Suggested Readings

- Bóna, G. (1999) *The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence, 1848–1849: A Military History*. Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs.
- Deák, I. (1979) *The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848–1849*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Deme, L. (1976) *The Radical Left in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848*. Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly.
- Dénes, I. Z. (2006) *Liberty and the Search for Identity: Liberal Nationalisms and the Legacy of Empires*. Budapest: CEU Press.
- Evans, R. J. W. (2007) *Austria, Hungary, and the Habsburgs: Essays on Central Europe c.1683–1867*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sked, A. (1979) *The Survival of the Habsburg Empire: Radetzky, the Imperial Army and the Class War, 1848*. London: Longman.
- Spira, G. (1992) *The Nationality Issue in the Hungary of 1848–49*. Budapest: Akadémiai.
- Stiles, W. H. (1971) *Austria 1848–49*. New York: Arno.
- Szabó, E. (1921) *Társadalmi és pártarcok a 48–49-es magyar forradalomban* (Social and Party Struggles in the Hungarian Revolution of 48–49). Vienna: Bécsi Magyar Kiadó.
- Varga, J. (1971) *A jobbágyfelszabadítás kikívánása 1848-ban* (The Achievement of the Liberation of Serfs in 1848). Budapest: Akadémiai.

Hungary, Revolution of 1956

Ferenc Laczó

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, commonly referred to as the “revolution and fight for freedom” in Hungarian (*forradalom és szabadságharc*), denotes the uprising of a significant part of the Hungarian population and the ensuing armed struggle against the Stalinist dictatorship and the Soviet occupation of Hungary. As one of the major challenges to Soviet rule in Eastern Europe during the Cold War period, the Revolution of 1956 is comparable in importance only to the Prague Spring and the emergence of *Solidarność* (Solidarity) in Poland. François Fejtő memorably called the events the first anti-totalitarian revolution; Hannah Arendt saw in it a peaceful way to a self-ruling society organized through councils.

Historians tend to date the prehistory of the revolution from 1953, with the adoption of the “New Course” by Hungary’s reform communist government under Imre Nagy. Its major direct consequences are commonly seen as concluding in 1963 with the granting of general (albeit partial) amnesty to participants. Strictly speaking, however, the revolution and freedom fight lasted only from October 23 to November 11, 1956. The events can be divided into three phases, each lasting approximately a week. The early days were characterized by a spontaneous mass uprising



Protesters smash the Stalin monument on Hosök tere in Budapest during uprisings in Hungary from October 24 to November 11, 1956. After the monument was brought down and demolished, Stalin’s head was dragged into the city center. (akg-images)

that quickly led to the establishment of revolutionary organizations and their assumption of power around the country. This period was followed by a few victorious revolutionary days when a multiple party system and a new balance of forces based on the sharing of power were emerging. Internal consolidation seemed to be under way and the threats of civil war or counter-revolutionary restoration were minimal. The third phase was characterized by armed struggle: a Soviet military intervention that began on November 4 all but completely suppressed the Hungarian armed resistance by November 11. Revolutionary councils and workers’ councils founded during the early days of the revolution continued to struggle against the reemerging dictatorial regime through political means. Over the next several months these organizations were violently disbanded by the Soviet-backed leaders of Hungary claiming to rule in the workers’ name. A general strike on December 11 and 12 was the last major event organized by the workers’ councils. Arrest of council leaders and declaration of martial law finally quelled the resistance, which until that point remained so strong that the Kádár government could not be considered stable.

The massive Stalinist repressions and the miserable performance of the planned economy rank first among the general causes of the revolution, although these factors were present in other communist countries as well. What marks Hungary as unique from a comparative perspective is the intraparty struggle that followed the death of Stalin. In 1953 when the reformist Imre Nagy was appointed prime minister, the party and state organs remained largely in the hands of hardliners. Under his “New Course” Nagy slowed the pace of industrialization and ended forced collectivization of the agricultural sector. He sought to raise living standards and decrease the level of terror. His reform course was halted by Stalinist forces in 1955 and Nagy was expelled from the party. The ensuing restoration of hardline policies set in motion a radicalizing dynamic triggered by crushed hopes of reform.

Khrushchev’s secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress commenced an ambiguous program of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union and the countries over which it ruled. In Hungary the case of László Rajk, the communist victim of the most notorious show trial, was reconsidered.

This and similar revelations of Stalinist crimes generated a powerful intellectual reform movement even among committed communist intellectuals. The movement, which occurred largely within the framework of the Petöfi Circle (Petöfi Kör) and the Writers' Union, intensified after Hungary's chief Stalinist leader, Mátyás Rákosi, resigned from his post as party secretary in July 1956. The widely attended public burial of Rajk and other victims of the same show trial that took place on October 6, 1956, just before the outbreak of the revolution, might be viewed as the first mass protest against Stalinism. Various newly composed student bodies in several university cities, such as the first independent student body formed in Szeged, were crucial in articulating demands and thereby moving the events forward just before October 23, 1956. Their list of 16 points demanding democratization and its accompanying basic rights as well as an end to Hungary's subordination to the Soviet Union became one of the most widespread and consensually supported platforms of the revolution.

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 began with a peaceful student protest in Budapest in the afternoon of October 23. The protest was organized in support of the Polish reform course introduced by Wladislaw Gomulka – the turn to national communism that became known as the Polish October. Spontaneous mass protests emerged in response to the students' initiative and by six o'clock that evening approximately 200,000 people had gathered in front of the parliament building. The mood among the crowd was characterized by general malcontent coupled with a euphoric sense of liberation, rather than a fighting spirit. The toppling of Stalin's massive statue heralded revolution.

Protesters brandished the Hungarian flag with the added communist symbols cut out, which subsequently became the main symbol of 1956. The revolutionaries also drew heavily on the powerful symbols of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 in representing their campaign. That popular movement for liberal reform a century earlier had been symbolically appropriated by the Communist Party in 1948 as it consolidated the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

The communist leadership was alarmed by the actions on the streets throughout this consequential day, but internal divisions constrained its ability to respond effectively. Reform communists,

who were in opposition within the party, were divided among themselves as well. The student demands for democratization of the Communist Party, the establishment of a multiple party system, and general free elections included a call for the return of Imre Nagy as prime minister. However, despite being identified as a champion of their cause, he did not initially support the protesters. Rather, he sided with the party, cautiously offering no more than consistent application of his reform program from 1953.

Three protesters from a crowd of nearly 30,000 in the eastern city of Debrecen became the first victims of the revolution on October 23 when they were killed by members of the State Protection Authority (Államvédelmi Hatóság, ÁVH) at around 6 p.m. Although the events centered on Budapest and approximately 80 percent of those killed or injured over its course were from the capital, the scope of the revolution was countrywide. Fighting broke out in Budapest the same evening, following unprovoked shootings by members of the ÁVH who were defending the Hungarian State Radio building. Many soldiers took the side of the revolutionaries. Budapest chief of police, Sándor Kopácsi, announced that his forces would not intervene against peaceful protesters. Unquestioning loyalty to the regime from the army and police was no longer a foregone conclusion.

The dreaded ÁVH proved to be the last domestic stronghold of the communist regime and the major ally of the Soviet forces. It committed various atrocities throughout the revolution, and was most likely responsible for the notorious massacre on Kossuth tér, the square in front of the parliament, on October 25 that led to the deaths of 60 to 70 people. The ÁVH became the main target of popular wrath, provoking a brutal assault on agents of the collapsing regime by the revolutionaries (regularly exploited by communist propaganda later on): 23 government officials and a number of insurgents were killed in the siege of the Budapest Committee of the Communist Party on Köztársaság tér on October 30.

At the urging of Hungary's Stalinist leader Ernő Gerő and the local Soviet ambassador Yuri Andropov, the leadership of the Soviet Union decided to launch an immediate though relatively modest military intervention on October 24. The proposed intervention encountered much fiercer domestic resistance than was expected.

Since the Hungarian military refused to cooperate, the decision served only to strengthen the resolve of the revolutionaries and turn what had been an anti-Stalinist armed uprising into a national freedom fight. Keeping the flame of revolt alive in spite of significant losses (by October 24 almost 250 people had been killed in Budapest alone), the revolutionaries hoped to preserve their chances for a political victory and acceptance of their demands for democratization and independence.

Imre Nagy remained uncommitted to the revolutionary cause, calling for a political resolution to the uprising and real reforms. He was declared head of the new communist government on October 24 with the official expectation that he would condemn the insurgency while indicating willingness to recognize some of the articulated demands. The position of the newly appointed party secretary, János Kádár, was similarly conciliating when he promised fundamental reforms as well as tough measures against armed resistance.

The revolutionaries represented a broad spectrum of Hungarian society, including top political leaders, freedom fighters, and members of revolutionary organizations. There were significant ideological divisions among them but they were nonetheless united in their demands for the abolition of the dictatorship and establishment of national independence. The desire for national independence was coupled with a demand for Hungarian neutrality – a status neighboring Austria had achieved the year before. Among their more specific demands were the abolition of the State Protection Authority and amnesty for participants in the uprising.

By October 26, protests and strikes had flared up across the country. New revolutionary organizations were emerging and cooperation between existing ones was taking place in leaps and bounds. Armed fighters, engaged in some strategic offensive action but primarily focused on territorial defense, were well networked with the surrounding population. In some cities the revolutionaries were violently repelled (as in Esztergom or Kecskemét), while in others they were victorious in spite of violent resistance by loyal members of the regime (as in Miskolc or Mosonmagyaróvár). In some places they were able to attain power without fighting because the communist authority simply collapsed (as in Győr, Nyíregyháza, Szolnok, or Veszprém),

while a number of other places remained without significant revolutionary challenge at this point (Salgótarján or Szekszárd). By the next day, national councils had seized power in several other significant cities as well. Around October 28 the revolution reached the villages where the revolutionary organizations that took power were often composed of people who had been influential in the early postwar years when Hungary still had a multiparty system – many had been members of the Small Landholders' Party, which was especially influential at the village level. Meanwhile, the workers' councils, originally called on by the communists, started to emerge as another significant revolutionary force.

The emergence and spread of revolutionary organizations, widespread popular support, and committed armed resistance were obstacles to a military solution. The government, which was still largely composed of communists of various shades – although the most exposed hardliners were just about to flee to Moscow – was forced to acknowledge the popular demands and begin negotiations. In his radio address on October 28, Nagy offered significant concessions, including recognition of the new organizations, a ceasefire agreement coupled with amnesty for the participants of the uprising, and reorganization of the organs of state security. Recognizing the ever-increasing likelihood that it would be swept aside by the revolutionary forces, the leadership began to refer to the previous days' events as a national democratic movement caused by sins committed in the past. However, it was not yet prepared to call the developments revolutionary.

The reformist wing of the communist leadership seemed able to offer a political alternative that was acceptable to the Hungarian public as well as the Soviet Union. Khrushchev accepted the reformists' change in attitude since the new political solution offered by the Hungarian leadership questioned neither the leading role of the party nor Hungary's role as a Soviet ally. Meanwhile, the Soviet side was strengthening its military presence and sending warnings against further concessions. Nagy announced that it would start negotiations over the withdrawal of Soviet troops against the will of the Soviet leaders but he wished to consolidate the revolution at its current level. He wanted people to give up their weapons and quit striking. The revolutionaries, however, considered only the withdrawal of Soviet troops and reestablishment of

a multiple party system as proper guarantees of their victory – precisely what the Soviet leaders refused to consider.

On October 30 Imre Nagy changed the composition of his government, dismissing the Stalinists and turning it into a popular front type of government, and accepted the end of the one-party system. At first the Soviet Union seemed to accept these developments, but Khrushchev apparently changed his mind on November 1 and, without notifying the Hungarian leadership, opted for military intervention. This led Nagy to declare Hungarian neutrality in order to preclude the appearance of legality in the Soviet intervention. The few days prior to November 4 saw the beginnings of national consolidation in Hungary and the emergence of a largely unified National Guard. Power was shared at the highest level. Over the brief course of the revolution the composition of the government changed several times, coming to resemble a true coalition government, though Imre Nagy, who was identifying more and more with the revolution after his initial reservations, remained in charge throughout.

Between 10,000 and 15,000 people fought against the massive second invasion of the Soviet army that began on November 4. Approximately 2,500 Hungarians lost their lives, 90 percent of them male and over 700 who fought on the side of the Red Army. The majority of the revolutionary victims were laborers, and many of them were very young. In the aftermath of the revolution, 200,000 people fled Hungary to the West.

Belief in a reformed socialist future or various models of a third way combining private property (without the extremes of capitalism) with a social democratic state was ideologically predominant during the revolution. No significant force supported the reestablishment of the regime from before 1945 or called for a capitalist economy. While there was general support for notions such as freedom, democracy, and socialism, opinions varied on what these terms would mean in practice. Perhaps unsurprisingly for a country under Bolshevik rule for nearly a decade, and the brief window of opportunity availed the revolutionaries, demands for democracy were frequently uttered, but were not coupled with detailed plans specifying its mechanisms. The reemergence of a range of political parties was taking place concurrent with the

spread of organizations of direct democracy at all levels of society, but the terms of their anticipated relations were unspecified. Similarly, limits on the authority of revolutionary councils as well as the future role of parliament as a representative national body remained ambiguous.

As part of the ruthless reprisals inflicted by the Soviet-backed government led by János Kádár, approximately 22,000 people were imprisoned and 229 were executed over the course of the next five years. The imposition of martial law and initial efforts to suppress the revolution through internment of leaders and activists were applied so widely and arbitrarily that they certainly had the aim of frightening the population as a whole. By 1957 with the beginning of the second round of retaliation, the groups and deeds to be punished were more strictly defined.

Relations between János Kádár and Imre Nagy were rather complex. The two were relatively close allies in the early days of the revolution; Nagy, for example, claimed he would only accept the position of prime minister on the condition that Kádár replace Gerő as first secretary of the party (eventually he did take the role of prime minister, one day prior to Gerő's replacement by Kádár). But their choices radically diverged as the revolution gained ground. While Nagy came to identify with the revolutionary cause, Kádár betrayed the people he had come to recognize during the revolution's unfolding. Kádár assumed leadership of the Soviet-backed government that was to collaborate in crushing the revolution, with neither party, state apparatus, local military force, nor popular support behind him.

Kádár ordered Nagy's execution and endorsed a counterrevolutionary narrative of the events of 1956 as long as he was dictator of Hungary, until the late 1980s. Initially, Kádár stressed that the intervention was necessitated by the growing threat of counterrevolution, but he did not call the events counterrevolutionary as a whole. Assessment of the whole event as counterrevolutionary came to be accepted in early December 1956, even though it did not even square with the role Kádár himself played, let alone with many other facts. Alongside this change in official judgment, condemnation of Stalinism as a cause of the events was also gradually relegated.

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 had momentous consequences despite its failure to achieve its objectives. Its afterlife has also been

of great importance. Official attempts to distort or silence the memory of the revolution had an essential legitimating function in the Kádárist period. The leadership's fear of another uprising led it to adopt a policy aimed at depoliticizing society, while continuously providing modest but tangible gains in living standards. The revolution remained a central part of the political identity of many emigrant groups as well as 1956ers within Hungary, and the recovery and cleansing of its tarnished memory were among the most important aims of the Hungarian democratic opposition in the 1980s.

The memory of 1956 played a highly significant role in 1989 as well. The proper burial of Imre Nagy and those executed alongside him, who had until then been lying in an unmarked grave, was attended by approximately 200,000 people in the early summer of 1989. This event is considered to have provided the symbolic delegitimation of the communist system of rule in Hungary. The proclamation of the republic took place on October 23, the day of the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, which was declared a national holiday. Though the role of the history and memory of 1956 in 1989 was more complex than is often assumed, the restoration of its memory and the alleged achievement of the revolution's goals in the fall of the communist regime went hand in hand with warnings against its reoccurrence, as 1956 was often presented as a national tragedy.

Since 1989, the memory and legacy of the revolution have served a far less unifying function in Hungary. The revolution has been intertwined with fundamental ideological divisions, and its legacy is contested by nationalists who see in it the demand for national independence and the struggle for freedom from Soviet dominance; leftists who stress the popular demands for a reformed socialist system, and the crucial role played by reform communists; and liberals who tend to emphasize, among other issues, the reestablishment of a multiparty system and the aim of separation of powers. In the absence of a significant leftist force in Hungary, nearly 20 years after the collapse of communism, only the role played by the workers' councils has not been appropriated by a major political organization as the crucial source of revolutionary power whose spirit animates some contemporary cause.

Much quality research into the events has been conducted since 1989, largely within the

framework of the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Among the achievements of the institute is the establishment of a precious oral history collection featuring interviews with participants. The fiftieth anniversary of 1956 led to renewed attention to the events and an unprecedented number of new explorations of their meaning.

SEE ALSO: Hungary, Anti-Communist Protests, 1945–1989; Hungary, Revolution of 1848; Nagy, Imre (1896–1957); Poland, 1956 Uprising; Prague Spring; Solidarność (Solidarity); Soviet Union, Fall of; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”

References and Suggested Readings

- Arendt, H. (1962) Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution. In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Békés, C., Byrne, M., & Rainer, J. M. (2003) *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*. Budapest: CEU Press.
- Berecz, J. (1986) *Ellenforradalom tollal és fegyverrel* (Counterrevolution with Pen and Weapon). Budapest: Kossuth.
- Bibó, I. (1991) The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Scandal and Hope. In K. Nagy (Ed.), *Democracy, Revolution, Self-Determination: Selected Writings*. Boulder, CO: Atlantic Research and Publications, Highland Lakes.
- Dent, B. (2006) *Budapest 1956: Locations of Drama*. Budapest: Európa.
- Fejtő, F. (1957) *Behind the Rape of Hungary*. New York: David McKay.
- Hegedűs, A. B. (1992) *Ötvenhatról nyolcvanhatban: Az 1956-os magyar forradalom előzményei, alakulása és utóélete című. 1986. december 5–6-án Budapesten rendezett tanácskozás jegyzőkönyve* (On 56 in 86. The Origins, Development and Afterlife of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Proceedings of the Workshop held in Budapest on December 5 and 6, 1986). Budapest: Századvég – 56-os Intézet.
- Huszár, T. (2006) *Kádár: a hatalom évei 1956–1989* (Kádár: The Years in Power, 1956–1989). Budapest: Corvina.
- Kenedi, J., Kende, P., Hegedűs, A. B., Varga, L., & Becski, H. (Eds.) (1989) *Az igazság a Nagy Imre ügyben* (The Truth in the Imre Nagy Case). Budapest: Századvég.
- Király, B. K. & Congdon, L. W. (Eds.) (2003) *The Ideas of the Hungarian Revolution Suppressed and Victorious 1956–1999*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs.
- Kőrösi, Z. & Tóth, P. P. (Eds.) (1997) *Pártok 1956: válogatás 1956-os pártvezetők visszaemlékezéseiből* (Parties 1956: Selection of the Recollections of the Party Leaders in 1956). Budapest: 1956-os Intézet.

- Kozák, G., Molnár, A., & Körösi, Z. (Eds.) (1993) *“Szuronyok hegyén nem lehet dolgozni!”: válogatás 1956-os munkástanács-vezetők visszaemlékezéseiből* (“It is Impossible to Work on Top of Bayonets”: Selection of the Recollections of Leaders of Workers’ Councils in 1956). Budapest: Századvég – 56-os Intézet.
- Litván, G. (Ed.) (1996) *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt and Repression 1953–1963*. London: Longman.
- Lomax, B. (1976) *Hungary 1956*. London: Allison & Busby.
- Molnár, M. (1971) *Budapest 1956: A History of the Hungarian Revolution*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Rainer, J. M. (2006) *Imre Nagy. Vom Parteisoldaten zum Märtyrer des ungarischen Volksaufstandes. Eine politische Biographie 1896–1958* (Imre Nagy. From Party Soldier to the Martyr of the Hungarian Uprising. A Political Biography 1896–1958). Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag.
- Ripp, Z., Horváth, J., & Ságvári, Á. (1997) *Örvenhat októbere és a hatalom* (October 1956 and the Authorities). Budapest: Napvilág.
- Sereda, V. & Rainer, J. M. (1996) *Döntés a Kremlben, 1956: a szovjet pártelnökség vitái Magyarországról* (Decision-Making in the Kremlin, 1956: The Debates of the Soviet Party Leadership on Hungary). Budapest: 1956-os Intézet.
- Szakolczai, A. (2006) *1956*. Budapest: Osiris.
- Szakolczai, A. & Varga, L. (Eds.) (2003) *A vidék forradalma, 1956* (The Revolution of the Countryside, 1956). Budapest: 1956-os Intézet.

Hungary, women radicals, 1848–1849

Robert Nemes

It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the 1848 Revolution for Hungary, which was at that time part of the Hapsburg monarchy. Over the course of 18 months, Hungary experienced unprecedented political mobilization, dramatic constitutional change, a costly military struggle to preserve the revolution, and, finally, a harsh crackdown by the victorious forces of order. Like few other events, the 1848 Revolution lodged itself deeply in the Hungarian collective memory, and every political regime since has attempted to bolster its legitimacy by appropriating the symbols of 1848. The 1848 Revolution likewise stands as a landmark in Hungarian women’s history, an event that broke down barriers to political participation and set an

important precedent for later generations. As the case of the Radical Hungarian Women shows plainly, women forcefully addressed the political and national questions at the heart of the 1848 revolutions.

Women’s activism during the revolution had its roots in the period before 1848. Hungary in the first half of the nineteenth century was a largely agricultural society with a small urban population, sizable nobility, and a majority of poor peasants, many of whom were serfs. In this tradition-bound society, women had few rights and limited educational opportunities. Change came in the 1830s and 1840s with the emergence of a noble-led “party of movement,” which demanded liberal and national reforms from the rulers in Vienna. Significantly, this political agitation was concentrated in Buda-Pest, whose booming population reached 100,000 in the 1840s. The combination of intense politicization and rapid urbanization created new possibilities for women, who subscribed to (and sometimes wrote for) the patriotic press, wore Hungarian-made clothes to support domestic industry, and organized a number of educational and charitable associations. As elsewhere in Europe, such activities were largely limited to women from the middle and upper strata of society, and it is important to underscore that the walls of prejudice and the fragile nature of Hungarian civil society placed real restrictions on what women could accomplish.

The outbreak of revolution in March 1848 seemed to change everything. The events in Hungary have been called a “lawful revolution,” a phrase that neatly captures the meaningful continuity and surprising innovation that defined Hungary’s sudden transformation into a constitutional monarchy (Deák 1979). Hungary in 1848 had a responsible ministerial government and an elected parliament based on expanded but still limited suffrage, under which women, like the majority of laborers and peasants, did not have the vote. For women, the expansion of civil liberties (and, in particular, the removal of many restrictions on the press, assembly, and speech) was much more consequential. In the first months of the revolution, Hungarian women demonstrated in the streets, attended mass meetings, signed petitions, read the many new journals and newspapers, and displayed their political loyalties in a wide range of symbolic

actions (wearing the tricolor cockade, greeting people as “citizen” in place of older titles, and hanging revolutionary banners from their windows). This revolutionary political culture downplayed differences of social status, religion, ethnicity, nationality, and gender; constitutional government and individual liberties, it was hoped, would create a unified, equal citizenry. Yet such divisions soon made themselves felt in Hungary, and the late spring brought sharp struggles between landlords and tenants in the cities, growing national conflicts in the countryside, and deepening acrimony between moderates and radicals within the revolutionary movement itself.

It was in this context that the “Demands of the Radical Hungarian Women” appeared in a leading revolutionary journal. The 24-point “Demands” was one of many petitions and appeals to appear over the course of the revolution, yet it broke new ground in asserting at the outset that women should “actively take part in public affairs as much as possible,” a demand with few precedents in Hungary (Nemes 2001). The petition was conventional in that it highlighted the role women could play as national-spirited wives and mothers, and it reminded women not to forget “about the woman’s realm and responsibilities.” But it also encouraged women to take up their pens in service of “freedom, the homeland, and women” and to form a network of associations across the country. Underscoring the significance of symbolic acts, the petition called on women to speak the Hungarian language, purchase domestic goods, wear national costumes, and dance national dances. At the same time, the “Demands” also demonstrated the ways in which revolutionaries used symbols to define the national community and expose “enemies”: “Those Hungarian women who avoid the national literature and arts and deem only foreign ones worthy of attention,” read the petition, “women who, for example, subscribe to German or French papers and read only foreign books, are forever despised, and we will expel these traitorous, degenerate girls from our circles.” If the “Demands” appears moderate in comparison with documents like the Seneca Falls Declaration, with its call for women’s suffrage, it is likely because the authors of the “Demands” faced even greater obstacles and because they (like many European women in the nineteenth century) gave precedence to

social and educational needs over civil and political rights.

The newspaper in which the “Demands” appeared noted only that “this petition has already been signed by several hundred Hungarian women.” These women may have formed their own political club (as did women in Vienna and Prague), or they may have been connected to the Radical Circle, one of the largest and most influential clubs in revolutionary Buda-Pest. There is no question that women remained critical to the revolutionary movement. In the summer of 1848, the Hungarian government sponsored a pedagogical congress, which closely examined the question of female education. But the situation in Hungary was worsening, and by the fall, war broke out between the Hungarian government on the one side and the Hapsburg dynasty and its allies on the other. Women, like much of Hungarian society, were divided in their allegiances. Those who continued to support the revolution did so by donating food, clothing, and money to the war effort; many women also served as nurses and a handful even became soldiers in the Hungarian army (Farkas 1910). The war ended in late 1849, and several women were among those targeted in the repression that followed. Within a decade, however, women who had participated in the 1848 Revolution would again form clubs, demand educational reforms, and use symbols to demonstrate their political and national loyalties. The pioneering political events of 1848 had left their mark.

SEE ALSO: European Revolutions of 1848; Hungary, Protests, 1815–1920; Hungary, Revolution of 1848; Poland, Revolutions, 1846–1863; Women in the 1848 Revolution, Poland

References and Suggested Readings

- Deák, I. (1979) *The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848–1849*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Farkas, E. (1910) *Az 1848–49-iki szabadságharc hősnői* (Heroic Women of the 1848–49 War of Independence). Budapest: Rózsa Kálmán.
- Nemes, R. (2001) Women in the 1848–1849 Hungarian Revolution. *Journal of Women’s History* 13, 3 (Autumn): 193–207.
- Szegvári, K. (1981) *Út a nők egyenjogúságához* (The Road to Equal Rights for Women). Budapest: Kossuth.

Hunt, Henry "Orator" (1773–1835)

Pia K. Jakobsson

An English radical orator and activist who advocated universal suffrage and annual parliaments, Henry Hunt was born in Wiltshire, the son of a gentleman farmer. He was educated at the local grammar school and then returned to work on the family estate, taking it over when his father died. In his late twenties he met the radical lawyer Henry Clifford and his circle of friends. Through them he became involved in politics and soon established himself as a supporter of House of Commons independent Francis Burdett. An excellent public speaker, he was asked to speak in front of large groups across the country. He advocated annual parliaments, universal suffrage, and secret balloting – positions he also espoused when he stood, unsuccessfully, as the radical candidate for Westminster in 1818.

On August 16, 1819, Hunt was asked to speak to a meeting of over 60,000 people demonstrating for parliamentary reform at St. Peter's Fields. His friend William Cobbett had already turned down an invitation, concerned that things would turn violent. Worried about an uprising, the authorities had decided to arrest the leaders, but the meeting remained peaceful until the yeomanry charged into the crowd. Then chaos ensued; several hundred people were injured and 11 were killed in what has become known as the Peterloo Massacre. In the aftermath Hunt, Samuel Bamford, and several others were arrested on the charge of holding a seditious meeting. Hunt was sentenced to two and a half years' imprisonment and spent the time writing an exposé of conditions in Ilchester Jail.

After his release Hunt continued to agitate for popular parliamentary reform as well as for ten-hour workdays and an end to child labor. In 1830 he was elected to parliament, where he was to remain for only a few years. He strongly disapproved the Reform Act of 1832 because he felt it did not go nearly far enough, but the Act had strong support and in the elections held the next year, Hunt lost his seat. He retired from public life and died in Hampshire in 1835.

SEE ALSO: Burdett, Sir Francis (1770–1844), Cobbett, William (1763–1835), Peterloo Massacre, 1819; Reform Acts, Britain and Ireland, 1832

References and Suggested Readings

- Bamford, S. (1984) *Passages in the Life of a Radical*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Belchem, J. (1995) "Orator" Hunt: *Henry Hunt and English Working-Class Radicalism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Burgess, G. & Festein, M. (Eds.) (2007) *English Radicalism, 1550–1850*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hutchinson, Anne (1591–1643)

Amy Linch

Anne Hutchinson was born in England to a Puritan family. Her keen intellect and radical spiritual views were cultivated by her father, a deacon whose open denunciation of Church of England ministers led to his imprisonment. At 21 she married Will Hutchinson, and together they followed the teachings of John Cotton, a Puritan minister who, like her father, sought to purify the Anglican Church of its residual Catholic elements.

In 1634 when Cotton emigrated to New England after being silenced by the Anglican Church, the Hutchinsons and their 11 children joined him in search of an environment more hospitable to their religious practice. Hutchinson and her family quickly became prominent members of Boston society. An accomplished herbalist and midwife, Anne's skills were greatly valued by the women in her new community.

She also began holding Bible studies for women in her home, initially interpreting the teachings of John Cotton, but eventually developing an independent theological position that emphasized direct experience of spirituality over conformity with socially prescribed behavior. She was also openly critical of the Puritan ministers and the religious orthodoxy she found in much of the colony. The establishment of religious practice, in her view, was redolent of the Catholicism Puritans sought to escape. She was further critical of the priority accorded to the preservation of the Puritan community over the individual experience of truth. Through interpretation of scripture she affirmed the equality and rights of women, decried racial prejudice, and denounced the enslavement of

Native Americans. Her meetings eventually attracted men as well as women, and as their popularity grew her unorthodox teachings were increasingly regarded as a threat to the religious orthodoxy that was the basis of political authority in the colony.

As a result, Hutchinson was arrested by John Winthrop in 1637 and charged with subversive behavior. Winthrop, unlike the previous governor, Sir Henry Vane, regarded Anne as “an American Jezebel who has gone a-whoring from God.” He denounced her meetings as “a thing not tolerable nor comely in the sight of God, nor fitting for [her] sex,” and labeled her views heretical. Winthrop presided over her civil trial in 1637 where she was accused of violating the fourth commandment to honor one’s father and mother, by encouraging dissent against fathers in the commonwealth and luring women away from their domestic responsibilities. She was accused of disrupting social order by assuming authority that was the prerogative of men, ministers, and magistrates.

After her conviction she was sentenced to house arrest until her church trial in the spring of 1638. At the religious trial she was found guilty of blasphemy and lewd and lascivious behavior and sentenced to excommunication and banishment. Accepting her exile without challenge, she and her family and many of her followers established a new settlement in an area that is now Rhode Island. In 1642, amid increasing religious conflict, she moved to the Dutch colony of New Amsterdam near Pelham Bay, New York. She and six of her children were killed by Native Americans in 1643.

SEE ALSO: Calvin, John (1509–1564); English Reformation

References and Suggested Readings

- Battis, E. (1962) *Saints and Sectaries: Anne Hutchinson and the Antinomian Controversy in the Massachusetts Bay Colony*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Bremer, F. J. (Ed.) (1981) *Anne Hutchinson: Troubler of the Puritan Zion*. Huntington, NY: Krieger.
- Hall, D. (Ed.) (1990) *The Antinomian Controversy 1636–1638: A Documentary History*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- LaPlante, E. (2004) *American Jezebel: The Uncommon Life of Anne Hutchinson, the Woman Who Defied the Puritans*. San Francisco: Harper.

Hutterites

Richard Goff

One of the longest lasting utopian communities, the Hutterites are a communal, Anabaptist religious group that trace their history to the theological disputes of the Protestant Reformation and have a shared history with the Amish and the Mennonites. Founded by Jakob Hutter in 1528, the sect established the communal sharing of goods outlined in the New Testament as a model. Initially an itinerant group, they settled in Moravia in the late 1500s. Fusing communal property ownership with paternalistic privilege, the group flourished through the 1500s. Over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, warfare and religious persecution made life in Europe difficult for the pacifistic group, producing migrations to Transylvania and the Ukraine. In 1874, in response to a new Russian law requiring military service, the group sent members to the United States to search for new land. The Hutterites eventually set up multiple communities in South Dakota, Montana, and Alberta, Canada.

Hutterite theological views underpin their social organization. Similar to the Shakers and other Anabaptists, the Hutterites view the world as overridden with sin and corruption. Therefore, the true Christian must separate themselves from the world and submit to the community of God. Based on their history of persecution and their theological values, Hutterites have cultivated a strong sense of community and place great emphasis on collective decision-making. Leaders are selected by the male members of the community and matters of public import are discussed at community meetings. Although they emphasize collective-decision making, they believe that it is ultimately the individual’s choice as to whether they want to stay in the community.

One key to the Hutterites success has been their ability to adapt economically to the modern age. Hutterites are typically farmers, with some skilled trades, and unlike the Amish, embrace technology. Men and women perform stereotypically gendered tasks, with children attending school until the age of 15 before being apprenticed into an appropriate trade. With this labor system, they have been relatively successful in establishing diversified farms and have at times been so prosperous that localities have forbidden the sale of land to Hutterites, due to their rapid

expansion. Hutterite colonies vary in size, typically including about 20 families with populations ranging from 60 to 150. When colonies become too big, they seek out more land and “split” into daughter colonies. The community, although traditional in many respects, is open to change so long as it can be reconciled with their Christian mission.

While Hutterite communities continue to thrive, they face a growing set of challenges. As with many Christian communes, they firmly believe they are the last, best hope for the human race. Recently, however, corporate farming has undermined Hutterite economic competitiveness and increased access to the mass media has placed external pressures on the community, raising apostasy rates among the young.

SEE ALSO: Amana Inspirationist Utopians; Co-operative Commonwealth; Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony; Icaria Utopian Community; New Harmony; Oneida Perfectionist Utopians; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Shakers Utopian Community; Utopian Communities, United States; Utopian Intentional Communities; Wright, Frances “Fanny” (1795–1852)

References and Suggested Readings

- Foster, L. (1981) *Religion and Sexuality: Three American Communal Experiments of the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hayden, D. (1976) *Seven American Utopias: The Architecture of Communitarian Socialism, 1790–1975*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Holloway, M. (1951) *Heavens on Earth: Utopian Communities in America 1680–1880*. London: Turnstile Press.
- Hostetler, J. (1974) *A Hutterite Society*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Miller, T. (1998) *The Quest for Utopia in the Twentieth Century*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Oved, Y. (1988) *Two Hundred Years of American Communes*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Pitzer, D. E. (1997) *America’s Communal Utopias*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Sutton, R. P. (2004) *Communal Utopias and the American Experience*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Sutton, R. P. (2005) *Modern American Communes*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Hyde, Evan Anthony (b. 1947)

Edward T. Brett

Evan Anthony Hyde (Evan X Hyde), founder of the United Black Association for Develop-

ment (UBAD) and publisher of *Amandala*, Belize’s largest newspaper, was born in Belize City on April 30, 1947. He was educated at Holy Redeemer Primary School, by St. John’s College (High School), and SJC Junior College. He received a scholarship to Dartmouth College in New Hampshire, where he graduated in 1968 with a bachelor’s degree in English.

Influenced in the United States by the Black Power movement, Hyde joined other young blacks in Belize to form UBAD in February 1969. Hyde became the organization’s secretary, eventually taking over the presidency in March when the first president resigned. This would be a position that Hyde retained throughout UBAD’s existence.

Hyde and his associates felt that Belize’s two major political parties, the People’s Unity Party (PUP) and the opposition National Independence Party (NIP), were too conservative. Thus, they created UBAD to fight for better conditions for Belize’s poor black majority. Its constitution was patterned after the Belizean branch of Marcus Garvey’s United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), which was founded in 1920 but quickly lost its original militancy. In August 1969, Hyde created a newspaper, *Amandala*, to promote the ideology of UBAD. In October the newly formed People’s Action Committee (PAC), headed by Assad Shoman and Said Musa, merged with UBAD to form the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), with Hyde as president. But by early 1970 the new popular front was embroiled in internal disputes and disbanded.

UBAD was resurrected in July 1971 and entered electoral politics, forming a coalition with NIP. Hyde and eight other coalition candidates ran for Belize City Council but were badly defeated. When Hyde lost another election in 1974, he terminated UBAD. He ran unsuccessfully for City Council again in 1977 as a PUP candidate.

After the dissolution of UBAD, Hyde devoted himself full time to *Amandala*, first as its editor, and then its publisher. His “From the Publisher” columns, which discussed Belizean history and current events, attracted a wide readership. Hyde was able to obtain government approval in 1989 to create Radio KREM. Combining Belizean indigenous music with sociopolitical commentary, the station quickly gained a large audience. In 2004 Hyde began KREM Television.

Hyde is considered one of Belize's most notable literary talents. His *Knocking Our Own Ting* (1969) satirizes the 1798 Battle of St. George's Caye and its annual creole commemoration. *North Amerikkkan Blues* (1971) highlights his years at Dartmouth, while *The Crowd Called UBAD: Story of a People's Movement* (1972) traces the history of that organization. In 1975 he turned his talents to the realm of fiction with the publication of *Feelings*, and in 1981 to poetry, when he co-authored *Poems of Passion, Patriotism, and Protest*.

SEE ALSO: Belize, General Strikes, 1952; Belize, National Independence Movement; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism

References and Suggested Readings

- Hyde, E. X (1995) *X-Communication*. Belize City: Angelus Press.
Shoman, A. (1995) *13 Chapters of a History of Belize*. Belize City: Angelus Press.

I

Ibrahim, Mirza (ca. 1906–2000)

Farooq Sulehria

Known as *Baba-e-Mehnat-Kashan* (father of the workers), Mirza Ibrahim was a pioneer of the trade union movement in Pakistan. When he died at the age of 94 he had spent a quarter of his life behind bars, besides having lived the horror of the notorious torture center at the Lahore Fort. A committed communist and respected trade unionist, Mirza was born in 1905 in the village of Kala Googran, Punjab. He was born into a poor family and did not get the chance to attend school. Ibrahim had an early brush with politics at the age of 16 when he was arrested for his active participation in the Khilafat movement (a South Asian political campaign aimed at protecting the Ottoman Empire post-World War II). In 1924 Mirza moved to Rawalpindi and started as a brick-kiln worker. After briefly working as a gardener at a British household in 1926, he was employed at a railway workshop in Jhelum. His political metamorphosis occurred in 1930, when he was posted to Lahore, an important political and cultural center in British India. Here he came into contact with the trade union and left movements. He joined the Communist Party in the 1930s and became active in the trade union movement. When Mirza was elected vice president of the Railways Federation, the union's presidential slot was held by V. V. Giri, who was later elected the fourth president of India. Jyoti Basu, the longtime chief minister of West Bengal, was also involved at that time in trade union activities under Ibrahim's leadership.

At the end of World War II the Indian government wanted to fire hundreds of thousands of railway workers, thinking that with the end of war their services were no longer required.

On May 1 railway workers went on strike under the militant leadership of Mirza, who was then the president of the North Western Railway Workers Union. The government had to bow before the striking workers. The strike action not merely helped to save the jobs, but also won a salary hike worth 20 rupees.

After the partition of India in 1947, Mirza became active in establishing the Pakistan Trade Union Federation. In 1950 he ran for a seat in the Punjab Assembly from the Lahore constituency. His enormous popularity was evident when ballot boxes were found full with votes as well as money for Mirza Ibrahim. Thousands of working-class voters left rupee notes with Mirza's name written on them as contributions towards the creation of a fighting fund. He won the election, but the government candidate was fraudulently declared victorious. In 1951 he was implicated in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case and was tortured at Lahore Fort.

In 1970 he ran for a seat in the assembly yet again, but this time his legend was not strong enough to defeat the Bhutto bandwagon. The railway activists lobbied the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) to have Mirza nominated as the PPP candidate; however, Mirza was not ideologically aligned with the PPP and declined.

Mirza was again jailed during the Zia ul Haque dictatorship. Brutally repressed by the Zia dictatorship and in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, the trade union movement in Pakistan suffered a massive downturn. Despite his failing health, Mirza played a leading role in forging a broad-based trade union alliance – the Pakistan Trade Union Confederation, formed in 1994, which was an umbrella organization for nine trade union federations.

SEE ALSO: Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1911–1984); Iqbal, Muhammad (1877–1938); Jalib, Habib (1928–1993); Pakistan, Protest and Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Anonymous (1999) *Daily Dawn*, August 12.
Anonymous (1999) *Weekly Mazdoor Jeddoujhd* [Workers Struggle] 31, August 19–25.

Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (b. 1938)

Andrew J. Waskey

Eddin Saad (Sa'd al-Din or Sa'ad Eddih) Ibrahim was born in Mansura, Egypt. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of Cairo in 1960. In 1968 he graduated with a PhD in sociology from the University of Washington and became an American citizen. He is a human rights advocate and a 2002 Noble Peace Prize nominee for his work promoting the causes of minority rights and democracy.

In 1988 Ibrahim founded the Ibn Khaldun Center for Developmental Studies in Cairo. Its program of studies seeks ways to develop democracy and to advance it as a way of organizing the public life of a society. Specific projects conducted by the Ibn Khaldun Center (a freedom house) have included monitoring elections, voter education, and training students in social science research methods.

Ibrahim's work on elections allowed him the opportunity to serve as the secretary general of the Independent Commission for Electoral Review. The Commission monitored Egyptian elections in 1900 and 1995. While preparing to monitor the Egyptian elections of 2000 Ibrahim was arrested. Among the investigative activities being conducted that were offensive to Egyptian authorities was the documentary film being prepared describing Egyptian election irregularities. To silence Ibrahim the publication of the Ibn Khaldun Center's periodical, *Civil Society*, was banned in January 2000. The Center itself was closed in June 2000.

Between the banning of *Civil Society* and the closure of the Ibn Khaldun Center, Ibrahim and 27 other colleagues were tried and convicted by Egyptian authorities. They were indicted for collecting funds without official permits, fraud in the use of funds, using illegally obtained funds to prepare forged voter registration lists, creating fraudulent voter registration cards, and preparing public relations media that used deceptive information with false phrases, rumors, and other

disinformation that would spread provocative propaganda inimical to the interests of the Egyptian public.

Other charges claimed that Ibrahim and his associates were a danger to the safety of Egypt because they had received funds from a foreign country that was seeking to harm Egyptian national interests by producing a film that would damage Egypt's standing in the world. Ibrahim was convicted on the charges against him and given a sentence of seven years' imprisonment with hard labor. On March 18, 2003, Egypt's Supreme Court reversed his sentence and dismissed all charges against him. Human rights activists believe that the reversal was due to international pressure.

Dr. Ibrahim has authored over 30 books and taught at a number of universities; he has been involved various other organizations, including serving as president of the Egyptian Sociological Association. Since being released from prison he has continued his advocacy for democracy in Egypt.

SEE ALSO: Egypt and Arab Socialism; Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and the Muslim Brotherhood; Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970)

References and Suggested Readings

- Ibn Khaldun Center for Developmental Studies. Available at www.icds.org/ (downloaded July 11, 2008).
Ibrahim, S. E. (2002) *Egypt, Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays with a New Postscript*. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press.
Norton, A. R. (Ed.) (1995) *Civil Society in the Middle East*. New York: E. J. Brill.

Icaria Utopian Community

Richard Goff

Like many utopian experiments, the roots of Icarianism reside in Europe. Similar to Charles Fourier and Robert Owen, the movement's founder, Etienne Cabet, was reared in the context of revolutionary upheaval. As a young man he joined the Society of the Chabonnerie, a radical republican organization opposed to the restored French monarchy. Cabet's outspoken opposition to the government earned him a conviction for treason and exile to England.

While in England, Cabet became a disciple of Robert Owen and penned his major work, *Voyage en Icarie* (1834). The novel was modeled after Thomas More's *Utopia* and described in great detail the "nation" of Icaria. Similar to *Utopia*, *Icarie* was a thinly veiled attack on the corruption and inequality of Europe. The fictional nation was an egalitarian one, based on democratic principles, and the model of urban and rural planning. The elected leadership took care of the needs of all citizens, including food, housing, medical care, and entertainment. The state-managed production facilities were efficient and humane. Education was free for both sexes, organized religion was non-existent, and crime and vice had disappeared. The society blended aspects of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's protosocialism with Cabet's own Christian mysticism into a society simply governed by the Christian Golden Rule.

The book was an immediate success, prompting Cabet to organize an Icarian political party and to entertain the notion of creating a community based on its principles. Given the oppressive atmosphere in France and Cabet's persistent legal problems, following the advice of Robert Owen, Cabet looked to the United States. With the help of Owen, Cabet acquired a 3,000-acre tract of land just north of Dallas. The Icarians began their voyage in 1848. The poorly planned trip quickly degenerated into chaos and thus a second location was suggested, this one in the more hospitable area of Nauvoo, Illinois.

Nauvoo became the first permanent Icarian community in 1849. The community quickly adopted the social framework of the *Voyage en Icarie* and over the next two years constructed living quarters, a communal dining hall, theater, library, pharmacy, and tailor shop. Additionally, they constructed production facilities for their basic necessities and for items to be sold. Politically, their constitution declared Icaria a "democratic republic." Women, however, could not vote, but were free to express their opinions. Marriage was encouraged and each family was assigned roughly the same amount of space and furniture. Icarians placed great emphasis on cultural life, holding concerts and theatrical productions regularly. Their impressive library contained over 4,000 volumes. By the mid-1850s the nearly 500 Icarians enjoyed a relatively rich life.

Primarily due to Cabet's dictatorial manner, problems began to develop in the 1850s. In Cabet's

brief absence in 1852–4 some members had begun to use tobacco and alcohol, items discouraged by Cabet. Icarian women began to question the legitimacy of denying them the franchise and the standardized form of dress. In 1853 Cabet revised the constitution, making it more authoritarian, expressly forbidding the use of tobacco and alcohol, and prohibiting talking while at work. These reforms generated more vociferous dissent and a split in the community.

Following the schism and the death of Etienne Cabet in 1856, members formed multiple communities near St. Louis and in Corning, Iowa. The former community withered due to its meager size and the health problems of several members. The latter continued to function into the 1870s, buoyed by the economic boom associated with the Civil War. A subsequent dispute produced another split and ultimately the demise of the communities. The final Icarian community dissolved at Corning in 1898.

What is remarkable about the Icarian experiment was the continuity between all the communities. Although there were no shortage of disputes within the communities over the exact applications of Icarian principles, all members were bound by Cabet's work and carefully tried to replicate his vision in practical ways. The Icarian communal experiment demonstrates both the power and pitfalls of shared vision in attempts to construct the "better society."

SEE ALSO: Amana Inspirationist Utopians; Co-operative Commonwealth; Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony; Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians; New Harmony; Oneida Perfectionist Utopians; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Shakers Utopian Community; Utopian Communities, United States; Utopian Intentional Communities; Wright, Frances "Fanny" (1795–1852)

References and Suggested Readings

- Foster, L. (1981) *Religion and Sexuality: Three American Communal Experiments of the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jacoby, R. (1999) *The End of Utopia*. New York: Basic Books.
- Miller, T. (1998) *The Quest for Utopia in the Twentieth Century*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Pitzer, D. E. (1977) *America's Communal Utopias*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Sutton, R. P. (1994) *Les Icaréens: The Utopian Dream in Europe and America*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Ife–Modakeke conflict

Olayinka Akanle

The Ife and Modakeke are both Yoruba of Osun state in southwestern Nigeria. According to local ancestral myth, both are descendants of Oduduwa, the perceived progenitor of the Yoruba people. The sociocultural and political systems of the two communities are essentially identical and their geographical distribution largely overlaps. As related as Ife and Modakeke are, however, both have engaged in protracted conflict for over a century. It remains the oldest intra-ethnic conflict in Nigeria.

The Modakeke people are generally considered strangers, tenants, and migrants in Ife. Historical accounts suggest that they migrated and settled in Ife in the aftermath of the collapse of the Old Oyo empire in the nineteenth century, causing a refugee crisis to the south and resulting in the occupation of their contemporary location. Two distinct categories of people were thus created: the original settlers (landlords) and the migrants, tenants, farmhands, and a resettled group considered as refugees (Modakeke). These categorizations form the remote causes of the conflicts between the two groups. Indeed, crises are bound to exist in relationships like this when parties perceive their aspirations to be contradictory and their values, needs or interests divergent. Thus, while from a general sociocultural and identity perspective the two groups are identical as part of the Yoruba race, economic and political gains engendered through superior–subordinate notions have created an overarching challenge to peace.

The first major economic cause of the crises was the *isakole* (land tribute) which the Ife landlords collected from the Modakekes until the late 1970s. After the promulgation of the Land Use Decree of March 29, 1978 by the military government, land tributes were abolished. The Decree created uneasy relationships between the two groups as the Ife people perceived it as an infringement of their rights as landowners. The Modakeke, who were predominantly farmers, saw the Decree as an opportunity for free tenancy and refused to pay tributes to their landlords. A battle for liberation then began, finding its expression in the political arena as the legitimate domain for different power groups.

Political agitation for self-determination took the form of local government creation as the third and smallest tier of government in Nigerian federalism. Modakeke agitation for the creation of a Modakeke local government was rejected in 1981 by the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) government in Oyo state, led by Governor Bola Ige, due to supposed Modakeke support for a rival party, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN).

The relocation of the headquarters of the Ife–East local government from Modakeke to the Ooni’s Enuowa palace in Ife led to yet another crisis in 1997. Following this crisis, the government’s refusal to reverse the relocation served as evidence of its acquiescence of Ife superiority. The people of Modakeke subsequently boycotted the local government elections of 1999 as an indication of their opposition.

In February 2000, the two communities engaged in yet another violent conflict, resulting in loss of life and property. The federal government intervened by improvising a compromise, announcing its intention to create an Area Office – a sort of sub-local government area for Modakeke. The Area Office became operational on April 1, 2002. Since then, there has been relative peace between the two feuding communities.

The destruction of lives and property during the Ife–Modakeke struggles has been wanton. Records suggest that during the 1997 crisis alone no fewer than 2,000 and perhaps as many as 5,000 people were killed. Property destruction exceeded \$42.4 million, and 10,000 farmers were displaced from Modakeke farmlands. Schools, public utilities, houses, and cars were burned while over 10,000 people were internally displaced. Economic activities have been affected, as many businesses have relocated from the two communities due to the ongoing conflict. Suspicion and distrust are mutual, fueling violence at the slightest provocation.

A dangerous dimension is youth aggression and disorientation. Young people became the conscience of their communities during crises and unleashed mayhem beyond the elders’ control. Youth organizations have emerged, however, that have transcended the conflict and immediate post-conflict era. Some of these youth organizations include the Great Ife, Youth Vanguard, Modakeke Progressive Union, and Drivers’ Union.

Permanent resolutions to the conflict, which assumes both ethnic and class dimensions, have

been elusive. The first documented account of such an attempt was that by Ibadan's Bashorun Ogunmola of 1849, which involved oath taking and sacrifices by the two communities. Colonial administrations also attempted to resolve the crises, with varying degrees of success. During the Anglo-Yoruba treaties of 1886–93, Ife–Modakeke chiefs were made to sign what has come to be known as the 1893 Peace Treaty to End the Yoruba Wars. All in all, there have been at least 12 high-profile attempts to resolve the crises permanently.

The latest attempt occurred on February 4, 2008, when Governor Olagunsoye Oyinlola of Osun state scheduled a peace meeting between the Ooni of Ife (king of Ife) and Ogunsua of Modakeke (paramount ruler of Modakeke), imploring each to give him peace in the communities as his 57th birthday present. The response of the communities to the meeting was encouraging as both exchanged pleasantries. Nevertheless, it is important to note that such gestures are not new in the history of the Ife–Modakeke conflict.

SEE ALSO: Agbekoya Peasant Uprising and Rebellion, 1968–1969; Nigeria, 1993 Political and Electoral Protest and Conflict; Nigeria, Protest and Revolution, 20th Century; Nigeria, Separatist Agitation, Contemporary

References and Suggested Readings

- Agbe, G. A. (2001) The Ife/Modakeke Crisis: An Insider View. *Ife Psychologia* 9 (3): 14–19.
- Atanda, J. A. (1967) The New Oyo “Empire”: A Study of British Indirect Rule in Oyo Province 1894–1934. Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts, University of Ibadan, October.
- Faturoti, G. (n.d.) At Last Ife/Modakeke Settle Decades of Disputes. *Daily Independent Newspaper*. Available at www.independentonline.com/poli/dev/article02# (accessed July 15, 2008).
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2000) Communal Violence and Displacement because of Dispute about Boundaries between Ife and Modakeke Communities in Osun State. Conflict related to New Administrative Boundaries and Political Elections. Available at [www.internaldisplacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/\(httpEnvlopes\)/559230FC72D8C58](http://www.internaldisplacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvlopes)/559230FC72D8C58) (accessed 7/15/2008).
- Osinubi, T. S. & Osinubi, O. S. (2006) Ethnic Conflicts in Contemporary Africa: The Nigerian Experience. *Journal of Social Sciences* 12 (2): 101–14.
- Toriola, J. O. (2001) Ile-Ife/Modakeke Crisis: An Insider View. *Ife Psychologia* 9 (3): 21–9.

Immigrant protests, United States, 2000s

David Bacon

On Monday, May 1, 2006 over a million people filled the streets of Los Angeles, with hundreds of thousands more in Chicago, New York, and cities and towns throughout the United States. Again on May Day in 2007 and 2008, immigrant marchers and their supporters demonstrated and marched, from coast to coast. One sign found in almost every march said it all: “We are Workers, not Criminals!” Often, it was held in the calloused hands of men and women who looked as though they’d just come from work in a factory, cleaning an office building, or picking grapes. The sign stated an obvious truth. Millions of people have come to the United States to work, not to break its laws. Some have come with visas, and others without them. But they are all contributors to the society they’ve found here.

The immigrant rights protests in the United States have seemed spontaneous, but they come as a result of years of organizing, educating, and agitating – activities that have given immigrants confidence, and at least some organizations the credibility needed to mobilize direct mass action. This movement is the legacy of Bert Corona, immigrant rights pioneer and founder of many national Latino organizations. He trained thousands of immigrant activists, taught the value of political independence, and believed that immigrants themselves must conduct the fight for immigrant rights. Most of the leaders of the radical wing of today’s immigrant rights movement were students or disciples of Corona.

Immigrants, however, felt their backs are against the wall, and came out of their homes and workplaces to show it. In part, their protests responded to a wave of draconian congressional proposals to criminalize immigration status, and work itself for undocumented people. But the protests were more than reactions to particular congressional or legislative agendas. They were the cumulative response to years of denigrating US immigrants generally, and Mexican and Latinos in particular. In 1986 the Immigration Reform and Control Act made it a crime, for the first time in US history, to hire people without papers. Defenders argued that if people could not legally work they would leave. Life was not so simple.

Undocumented people who migrated to the US formed part of the communities where they lived and worked. They sought the same goals of equality and opportunity that working people in the US had historically fought to achieve. In addition, for most immigrants, there were no jobs to return to in the countries from which they've come. Rufino Dominguez, a Oaxacan community leader in Fresno, California, says, "The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) made the price of corn so low that it's not economically possible to plant a crop anymore. We come to the US to work because there's no alternative." After Congress passed NAFTA, 6 million displaced people came to the US as a result.

Instead of recognizing the reality that many immigrants were in the US to stay, in the first decade of the twenty-first century the US government attempted to make it a criminal act for immigrants to hold a job. Some states and local communities, seeing a green light from the US Department of Homeland Security, passed measures that go even further. In 2007 Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff proposed a rule requiring employers to fire any worker who could not provide proper documentation for their Social Security numbers provided to their employers. The regulation assumed workers had no valid immigration visa and therefore no valid Social Security number. With 12 million people living in the US without legal immigration status in 2008, the regulation led to massive firings, bringing many industries and businesses to a halt. Citizens and legal visa holders would be swept up as well, since the Social Security database is often inaccurate. Under Chertoff the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement has conducted sweeping workplace raids, arresting and deporting thousands of workers. Many have been charged with an additional crime – identity theft – because they used a Social Security number belonging to someone else to get a job. Yet workers using another number actually deposit money into Social Security funds and will never collect benefits their contributions paid for.

The Arizona legislature has passed a law requiring employers to verify the immigration status of every worker through a federal database called E-Verify, which is even more incomplete and full of errors than Social Security. Under the law, employers were required to fire workers whose names were flagged. And Mississippi passed a bill making it a felony for an undocumented

worker to hold a job, with jail time of 1–10 years, fines of up to \$10,000, and no bail for anyone arrested. Employers were immune from prosecution.

Many of these punitive measures were incorporated into proposals for "comprehensive immigration reform," that were debated in Congress in 2006 and 2007. The comprehensive bills combined increased enforcement, especially the criminalization of work for the undocumented, with huge guest worker programs under which large employers would recruit temporary labor under contract outside the US, bringing workers into the country in a status that would deny them basic rights and social equality. While those proposals failed in Congress, the Bush administration implemented some of their most draconian provisions by executive order and administrative action. Together, these draconian measures have produced a huge popular response, which has become most visible in the annual marches and demonstrations on May Day. Nativo Lopez, president of both the Mexican American Political Association and the *Hermanadad Mexicana Latinoamericana*, says

the huge number of immigrants and their supporters in the streets found these compromises completely unacceptable. We will only get what we're ready to fight for, but people are ready and willing to fight for the whole enchilada. Washington legislators and lobbyists fear the growth of a new civil rights movement in the streets, because it rejects their compromises and makes demands that go beyond what they have defined as "politically possible."

The marches have put forward an alternative set of demands, which include valid legal status for the 12 million undocumented people in the US, the right to organize to raise wages and gain workplace rights, increased availability of visas which give immigrants some degree of social equality, especially visas based on family reunification, no expansion of guest worker programs, and a guarantee of human rights to immigrants, especially in communities along the US-Mexico border.

At the same time, the price of trying to push people out of the US who had migrated for survival is that the vulnerability of undocumented workers has increased dramatically. Unscrupulous employers use that vulnerability to deny overtime or minimum wage, or fire workers when they protest or organize. Increased vulnerability

ultimately results in cheaper labor and fewer rights for everyone. After deporting over 1,000 workers at Swift meatpacking plants, Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff called for linking “effective interior enforcement and a temporary-worker program.” The government’s goal is cheap labor for large employers. Deportations, firings, and guest worker programs all make labor cheaper and contribute to a climate of fear and insecurity for all workers.

The May 1 actions highlighted the economic importance of immigrant labor. Undocumented workers deserve legal status because of that labor – their inherent contribution to society. The value they create is never called illegal, and no one dreams of taking it away from the employers who profit from it. Yet the people who produce that value are called exactly that – illegal. All workers create value through their labor, but immigrant workers are especially profitable because they are so often denied many of the union-won benefits accorded to native-born workers. By 2008 the average undocumented worker had been in the US for five years. By that time, these workers have paid a high price for their lack of legal status, through low wages and lost benefits. As a result a growing number of immigrant activists and organizers have argued that immigrants have already earned the right to stay in the US legally. “Undocumented workers deserve immediate legal status, and have already paid for it,” according to immigrant organizer Nativo Lopez.

On May 1 the absence of immigrant workers from workplaces, schools, and stores demonstrated their power in the US national immigration debate and continuously sends a powerful message that that they will not be shut out of the debate over their status. They have rescued from anonymity the struggle for the 8-hour day, begun in the Haymarket tragedy on May 4, 1884 in Chicago by immigrants of that era. They overcame the legacy of the Cold War, in which celebrations of May Day were attacked and banned. In the early twenty-first century, immigrants have recovered the radical traditions of all working people in the US.

SEE ALSO: Haymarket Tragedy; Korea, Migrant Workers’ Struggle; Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 20th Century; May Day; May 1968 French Uprisings; Mexico, Labor Movement and Protests, 1980–2005

References and Suggested Readings

- Bacon, D. (2008) *Illegal People: How Globalization Creates Migration and Criminalizes Immigrants*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Gordon, J. (2005) *Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigrant Rights*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Ness, I. (2005) *Immigrants, Unions, and the New US Labor Market*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Piore, M. J. (1979) *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Immigrant and social conflict, France

Mary Demhurst Lewis

France has been a major country of immigration for a century and a half, thanks to spontaneous labor migration in the nineteenth century, organized recruitment during and after World War I, and refugee resettlement in the 1920s. By 1931, France’s population was nearly 7 percent foreign, and by the 1980s, some 25 percent of French citizens had at least one immigrant grandparent.

Almost continuously since 1889 – except during World War II and despite restrictions instituted between 1993 and 1998 – France’s liberal nationality laws have allowed children born in France to claim citizenship at adulthood if residency requirements are met. But French society has also confronted periodic waves of xenophobia, and France’s colonial past continues to breed social division. France’s political tradition downplays cultural differences in the name of an idealized notion of the common good – which, paradoxically, also prevents discrimination from being addressed and hinders the accommodation of religious pluralism in a country where in the early twenty-first century Muslims represent 5–10 percent of the 61 million residents.

Changes in Immigration Trends, 1945–1962

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, France’s immigrants came mostly from within Europe. Migration from the overseas empire was heavily restricted until after World War II, when impediments to it became more difficult to sustain. A 1947 law making Algerians “citizens”

rather than “subjects” affirmed the principle of free circulation between Algeria, a French colony since 1830, and France itself. Whereas North Africans constituted just over 2 percent of France’s immigrant population in 1946, by 1968 they represented nearly a quarter of it. Facing this population shift, the government aimed to counterbalance Algerian migration by facilitating the entry of southern Europeans and encouraging “voluntary” repatriations of Algerians. Between 1946 and 1968, the size of the Spanish immigrant population doubled, while that of the Portuguese increased 13 times. The Portuguese population tripled again between 1968 and 1982.

Once post-World War II rebuilding got underway, jobs remained plentiful until the oil shock of the 1970s. Unemployment ranged between 1 and 2 percent between 1950 and 1973, as French GDP per capita grew 150 percent during the same period. The expansion of the consumer goods market drove this growth and the demand for immigrant labor. Increasing affluence also bred new social divisions. At war’s end, much of the population lived modestly, often making do without indoor plumbing, piped gas, electric appliances, or automobiles. As the middle class expanded, their standard of living improved, while working-class immigrants often continued to live in overcrowded and less comfortable conditions. Immigrant shantytowns, which sprouted up in France’s industrial suburbs, epitomized this new social inequality. Housing discrimination was partially to blame for the advent of shantytowns, as newly constructed low-income housing estates initially housed few immigrants.

The concentration of Algerian immigrants in shantytowns made them prime targets of propaganda during the Algerian War (1954–62). The French Federation of the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) circulated in the shantytowns, gathering and sometimes coercing contributions for their cause. Meanwhile, the French police and social services also intervened, subjecting shantytown residents to surveillance and paternalist measures that were off-limits with the majority population. In particular, the Paris police under the leadership of Maurice Papon (b. 1910) used Algerian auxiliary police forces to interrogate and sometimes torture their countrymen who were brought in for questioning.

In order to curtail the FLN’s nocturnal collections, and in reprisal for FLN attacks on the police, Papon ordered a curfew for all Algerian

French Muslims in October 1961. To protest the curfew, the FLN organized the first mass demonstration by Algerian immigrants in Paris. Police estimated that 25,000 Algerians participated in the October 17 demonstration. Although the protesters remained peaceful, police made over 11,500 arrests, conducted over 14,000 interrogations, and killed a still untold number of demonstrators. Estimates of deaths range from as few as two to as many as 300.

The October 1961 incidents helped bring the Algerian war to mainland France. Although led by Muslims and occasionally making symbolic use of Islam, the Algerian insurrection was not about religion so much as the right to self-rule. Religion entered into the question mainly because the French government had, since its conquest of Algeria in 1830, treated Muslims as “subjects,” requiring them to maintain Quranic civil status, and then using this as a pretext for denying political rights. Until 1947, the Muslim franchise was restricted to a tiny minority, only able to vote in local elections for councils engineered to ensure French predominance. The Muslim majority was also subjected, through a series of “indigenous codes,” to repressive laws from which the minority ruling population were exempt. In contrast to Muslims, Jews were collectively naturalized under the Crémieux Decree of 1870.

Immigration and Islam in France After Algerian Independence

Algeria’s independence in 1962 raised the question of the legal status of the 350,000 Algerians living in France. Although the French government had long claimed that Muslim Algerians were French nationals, after independence it forced Algerians living in France to apply for citizenship. This was not required of so-called *pieds noirs*, the Algeria-born descendants of European settlers. In this way, the colonial condition affected Algerian immigrants even after decolonization.

From the 1970s on, new immigration from sub-Saharan Africa contributed to an increasingly diverse Muslim population in France. Customs among France’s Muslims varied, and some practices – such as animal sacrifices and polygamy, however rare – occasionally provoked legal conflicts. Nonetheless, public debate regarding, and government attention to, Islam remained limited until the late 1980s, when the first of three “Muslim

headscarf” debates erupted. Rather than establish an official body to regulate Muslim affairs, as had existed for Protestants and Jews since Napoleon, the French government encouraged Arab states to oversee Muslim practices in France. As a result, mosque construction was funded, and imams were trained and remunerated, largely by foreign sources. The institution, in 2002, of a French Council for the Muslim Religion marked the first attempt to create a permanent domestic structure to manage relations between the secular state and Islam.

The Politicization of Immigration in the 1980s

Immigration entered the public eye in the 1980s thanks to the political coming of age of second-generation descendants of North African immigrants and the xenophobic platform of the far-right political party the Front National (FN). Led by Jean-Marie Le Pen (b. 1928), a former paratrooper in the Algerian War, the FN was formed in 1972. In his first bid for presidential office in 1974, Le Pen acquired less than 1 percent of the vote, but a worsening economy, relentless campaigning, and shifts in party politics enabled him to win more than 14 percent of the vote in the 1988 elections, and 17 percent in 2002. Unemployment, which had been negligible in the 1960s, reached 6 percent in 1980, 10 percent in 1985, and 13 percent in 1999. Drawing many of its adherents from disaffected working-class persons who had formerly voted for the Communist Party, the FN proposed to address the unemployment crisis by expelling immigrants. The government’s discontinuation of labor immigration in 1974 did not subdue anti-immigrant politics. As asylum and family reunification replaced labor contracts as the main means of emigrating legally, immigrant workers settled more permanently and had their families join them, fearing that even temporary visits home would prevent readmission. The disconnection between the newly visible immigrant families and the official rhetoric that immigration had been stopped fed into France’s new political divisions.

New forms of social segregation also contributed to the politicization of immigration. As the original occupants of the suburban housing estates began to move, immigrants took their place, prompting other long-term residents to flee. When jobs became scarce, conditions in the

housing projects worsened, becoming a source of discontent among the second generation, who, while legally French, felt trapped in what had become ghettos. They expressed their dissatisfaction through popular music, in political protest, and occasionally through violent attacks on symbols of affluence and mobility. The first notable such incident occurred in the Lyons suburb of Vénissieux in the summer of 1981, when over 250 cars were destroyed. In the aftermath of this violence, young-adult children of immigrants set off in 1983 from Vénissieux and similarly disaffected suburbs on a march “for equality and against racism” that traversed France and grew to be 100,000-strong by the time it culminated in Paris six weeks later. This “March of the Beurs” (after the slang inversion of the French word “Arabes”) marked the advent of a new generation of political actors.

New Divisions Since the Late 1980s

The politicization of immigration initially turned on social, rather than religious, factors. Muslim adolescents’ clothing did not spark controversy until 1989, when Ernest Chénière (b. 1945), the principal of a middle school in the Parisian suburb of Creil, expelled three girls for wearing “veils” in a public school. French schools are strictly secular, but the action was seen as an attack on religious freedom. In response to the ensuing debate, the socialist minister of education, Lionel Jospin (b. 1937), refrained from establishing a universal policy regarding headscarves, contending that decisions regarding discipline rested with the individual leadership of each school. The French Council of State upheld Jospin’s approach, issuing an opinion in November 1989 permitting veils as long as they did not interfere with a school’s educational mission. A second headscarf debate erupted in 1994, when the center-right education minister François Bayrou (b. 1951) forbade “ostentatious” religious signs, claiming that the very wearing of them constituted proselytism. A third phase of the debate emerged when a new center-right government appointed a commission in 2003 to advise the legislature on Islam in public life. By this time, the debate was inflected by fears of political Islam, which grew with the worsening of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Algeria’s spiral into brutal civil war in the 1990s after the cancellation in 1992 of elections which fundamentalist Islamists stood

poised to win, the 1995 bombing of a Parisian subway station by adherents of the Algerian "Armed Islamic Group," a resurgence of anti-Semitic incidents involving French Muslims, and the September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda attacks in the United States in which a French citizen, Zacarias Moussaoui (b. 1968), was implicated and later found guilty of involvement. Although only about 1,500 Muslim public school pupils insisted, for various reasons, on covering their heads at school in 2004, the commission's recommendations led to a March 15, 2004 law banning the wearing of "ostentatious" religious signs in public schools. The French media overwhelmingly applauded the law as a stand for universal values and women's rights against balkanization and extremism.

As France entered the twenty-first century, despair in the suburbs reached unprecedented levels. Jobless rates in 1999 approached 20 percent in the suburbs and reached levels of 40–50 percent for young adults in some places. Idle youth increasingly came into conflict with the police, whose tough-law tactics had fostered accusations of mistreatment since the 1980s. In the fall of 2005, violence erupted after two teenagers were electrocuted and a third was injured while taking refuge from the police in a power station in Clichy-sous-Bois, a Paris suburb. Between October 27 and November 17, young suburban residents set fire to some 10,000 cars and about 300 buildings. Three people died in the unrest that spread to a few hundred different suburban municipalities throughout the country. To restore order, the government authorized a curfew in some areas, drawing on a law that had been initially intended to quell FLN operations during the Algerian War. Although some politicians and commentators saw the riots as an indication of a larger cultural clash between Islam and the West, not all participants were Muslim, and no evidence of a direct link between the unrest and militant Islamic groups emerged. By contrast, some imams appealed for calm.

While French political culture has made addressing prejudice difficult, recent governments have tried to address some of the underlying social causes of unrest, with few tangible results. The socialist government's reduction of the work week to 35 hours in 1998 sought to create more jobs and greater job flexibility but has been unpopular among many of the people it aimed to help because it has restricted overtime.

In early 2006, the center-right government under Dominique de Villepin announced its own strategy for creating a more supple labor market: the "first job contract," which would allow employers to hire persons under age 26 for two years and dismiss them without cause at any time during that period. The contract created a furor, as the labor unions joined forces with university and eventually high school students to protest this apparent strike at job security. Massive demonstrations and campus occupations in the heart of Paris and other major cities throughout March and into April 2006 were led primarily by middle-class students and public employees unions, not by the youth who were the target of the reform, though some of these did become embroiled in violent skirmishes and vandalism, some of it reminiscent of the November 2005 conflicts. The movement was so persistent that the government was forced to reverse the reform.

Conclusion

The 2006 demonstrations proved that concerted social movements striking directly at political power in the capital can be effective, at least at blocking the liberalization of the labor market. It is less clear how to foster job creation and fight discrimination. The unrest in 2005 rekindled debates about how the French can best manage their nation's pluralism. Some commentators have called for a multiculturalist approach that would institute a form of "positive discrimination," as affirmative action programs are known in France. Others reject multiculturalism as an Anglo-American import that institutionalizes racism. It remains unclear how French society will address worsening unemployment, religious division, social stratification, and the legacy of imperialism as the twenty-first century progresses.

SEE ALSO: Britain, Post-World War II Political Protest; France, Post-World War II Labor Protests; Immigrant Protests, United States, 2000s

References and Suggested Readings

- Cole, J. (2003) Remembering the Battle of Paris: 17 October 1961 in French and Algerian Memory. *French Politics, Culture and Society* 21, 3 (Fall): 21–50.
- Gaspard, F. (1995) *A Small City in France: A Socialist Confronts Neo-Fascism*. Trans. A. Goldhammer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Joppke, C. (2005) *Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Laurence, J. (2005) From the Elysée Salon to the Table of the Republic: State–Islam Relations and the Integration of Muslims in France. *French Politics, Culture and Society* 23, 1 (Spring): 37–64.
- Noiriel, G. (1996) *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship and National Identity*. Trans. G. de Laforcade. Foreword C. Tilly. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Silverstein, P. (2004) *Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race and Nation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Imperialism and capitalist development

Paul Le Blanc

The development of the global economy since the sixteenth century – especially as it has accelerated since the explosion of the Industrial Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century – has, to a very large extent, provided the context and the impetus for the rise of modern revolutionary protests. Essential conceptualizations for understanding this process have involved the interlinked notions of *imperialism* (defined here as economic expansion beyond the borders of a nation into other regions, often economically less developed, in order to secure markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities) and *capitalist development*.

Such concepts have evolved as part of the Marxist theoretical tradition – although they have also influenced, and been influenced by, theorists and observers functioning outside of that framework. Especially since the realities being dealt with are incredibly complex, quite dynamic, and relatively fluid, it should not be surprising that there have been significant differences (including among many relating to the Marxist tradition) on how best to understand the realities, and on the adequacy or proper use of one or another theorization. Nonetheless, certain continuities in analysis can be traced that appear to have value for understanding the contexts within which protests and revolutions have emerged. Examining these concepts helps to shed light, at the very least, on the ideological orientations of many who have engaged in such protests and revolutions.

Elements in Marx’s Thought

In the 1848 *Communist Manifesto*, Karl Marx (1818–1883) and co-thinker Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) described capitalism as an inherently expansionistic global economic system. “The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie [i.e., capitalist class],” they wrote. The rise of the capitalist mode of production in Europe was seen as being intimately connected with the penetration of “the East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonization of America, trade with the colonies,” and with the Industrial Revolution “modern industry has established the world market”; “the need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.”

Marx and Engels noted that “the bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.” In addition to the relentless quest for markets, it has developed a need for “raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe,” at the same time “creating new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes,” resulting in the “universal inter-dependence of nations.” According to the *Manifesto*:

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians’ intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.

Marx and Engels added that “just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeoisie, the East on the West.”

The *Communist Manifesto* perceived an inexorable spread of capitalism across the face of the Earth, accompanied by the increasing dispossession, proletarianization, and exploitation of the world's peoples for the enrichment of dominant capitalist minorities. A result would be the struggles of various sections of the growing working class against various aspects of oppression, in order to advance living standards, human rights, and democracy. Ultimately this would culminate in working-class majorities taking political power in more and more sections of the world, and then advancing toward socialism. This creative and emancipatory conclusion, however, was dependent on the relentless global onslaught of capitalist development.

In his masterwork of 1867, the first volume of *Capital*, Marx described the development of capitalism as a global accumulation process in which capital changed its form within the market place – from money to means of production (raw materials and tools) combined with labor-power, leading to the process of production in which “the means of production have been converted into commodities whose value exceeds that of their component parts, and thus contains the capital originally advanced plus a surplus-value.” These commodities then “must be sold, their value must be realized in money, this money transformed once again into capital, and so on, again and again.” Marx waxed poetic: “Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets! ‘Industry furnishes the material which saving accumulates.’ Therefore save, save, i.e., reconvert the greatest possible portion of surplus-value or surplus product into capital.”

From its very beginning, this essential accumulation process pushed capital beyond national boundaries, contributing to the rise of “the colonial system [which] ripened trade and navigation as in a hothouse.” This system involved the military and political domination by an advanced capitalist nation-state (the “mother country”) over economically and technologically less advanced areas (the colonies), for the purpose of securing markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities. Throughout the period of what Marx termed *primitive capital accumulation*, “the colonies provided a market for the budding manufactures, and a vast increase in accumulation which was guaranteed by the mother country’s monopoly of the market” – but, more than this, “the treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised

looting, enslavement and murder flowed back to the mother-country and were turned into capital there.” Marx summarized: “Capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt.”

The capital accumulation process was nothing less than a capitalist exploitation process in which “the wealth of the nation is, . . . by its very nature, identical with the misery of the people.” The impact of colonialism on native peoples, he noted, simply highlighted the dynamic within “the mother country” itself: “The capitalist modes of production and accumulation, and therefore capitalist private property as well, have for their fundamental condition the annihilation of that private property of the individual himself; in other words, the expropriation of the worker.” In the third volume of *Capital*, Marx noted that “capital invested in foreign trade can yield a higher rate of profit” in the colonies “on account of the lower degree of development, and so too is the exploitation of labor, through the use of slaves and coolies, etc.”

The fact is, however, that while Marx was an astute observer of capitalist economic development and its growing penetration and impact throughout the world, he was not in a position to develop an analysis of the new forms of imperialism that were to become so important in the years after his death. More than this, different scholars have drawn on his writings to highlight very different understandings of how these pieces fit together. While Bill Warren in his provocative study *Imperialism, Pioneer of Capitalism* (1980) argued that imperialism has played an essential pre-capitalist obstacle to modernization and industrial growth, which are prerequisites for socialism, an older work by Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (1957), stressed that the impact of imperialism was not to promote modernization and economic progress in “backward” areas but to keep these areas backward the better to exploit them for the benefit of the advanced capitalist countries. This mirrors differences that arose in the early twentieth century among European socialists – with reformists such as Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932) arguing that colonialism had a progressive role to play. “Our economies are based, in large measure, on the extraction from the colonies of products that the native peoples had no idea how to use,” he emphasized, adding that there was also “the need for civilized peoples to act

somewhat like guardians of the uncivilized.” Revolutionaries such as Rosa Luxemburg (1870–1919) and V. I. Lenin (1870–1924), on the other hand, insisted that colonialism and all forms of imperialism represented negative developments that must be opposed.

Aside from controversies over how one might utilize different aspects of Marx’s thought in dealing with developments after his death, there have been controversies over how Marx himself viewed matters in the face of the realities of his own time. In a 1968 introduction for a collection of excerpts and articles “on colonialism and modernization” (conceptualizations that were actually not part of Marx’s vocabulary), Shlomo Avineri (1969) suggested that Marx – concerned about the static and authoritarian qualities which he associated with variants of “the Asiatic mode of production” – looked favorably on the impact of western colonialism. According to Avineri, Marx felt that the progressive road to modernization and socialism required the break-up of traditional hierarchical societies which, at least in sections of Asia, could not be accomplished by internal social forces. Instead, “the heavy artillery” of colonialism would be required to batter down walls of tradition. Kenzo Mohri (2000) has argued, on the other hand, that Marx did, in the 1840s and 1850s, believe in “the ‘revolutionary’ role of British free trade,” but from the 1860s onward he had come to the conclusion that “the forcible integration of the old society into the world market system” would yield negative rather than “progressive” consequences and should therefore be opposed.

Revolutionary Theorizations of Imperialism

Harry Magdoff (1913–2006) was one of the most influential analysts of imperialism in the late twentieth century, closely associated, through *Monthly Review*, with Paul Sweezy and Paul Baran. All followed lines of analysis laid out by V. I. Lenin in 1916, who in turn was influenced by the non-Marxist left-liberal J. A. Hobson, the Austrian German Social Democrat Rudolf Hilferding, and Lenin’s Bolshevik comrade Nikolai Bukharin.

As Magdoff notes, “empire-building, territorial expansion, and domination of weaker by stronger powers – features commonly associated with the term imperialism – have a long history.”

In pre-capitalist social systems, however, “the economic root of expansionism was the exaction of tribute” through such means as “plunder, piracy, capture of slaves, and the establishment of colonies,” while for capitalist powers “the economies and societies of the conquered or dominated areas were transformed, adapted, and manipulated to serve as best they could the imperatives of capital accumulation at the center.” As Magdoff points out, Lenin led the way in seeking to limit the term imperialism to the form it took beginning in the late nineteenth century, in order “to distinguish its unique features from earlier processes of expansionism.” Magdoff suggested the following as defining periods of capitalist expansionism:

1. Late 1400s to mid-1600s: European commerce enters the world state.
2. Mid-1600s to late 1700s: commercial capital dominant.
3. Late 1700s to the 1870s: rise of industrial capital.
4. 1880s to World War I (1914–18): monopoly capital and the new imperialism.
5. Since 1918: decolonization and the rise of the multinational corporation.

Following Lenin, Magdoff viewed the last two periods listed above as the epoch of modern imperialism. Viewing the US capitalist economy as an organic whole that is inseparable from the global economy, what he termed “world monopoly capitalism” (essentially a market economy dominated by powerful multinational corporations), he added that “it is important to recognize the essential unity of the economics, politics, militarism, and culture of this social organism.” His conclusion was that “imperialism is the way of life of capitalism. Therefore, the elimination of imperialism requires the overthrow of capitalism.”

Rosa Luxemburg’s classic *The Accumulation of Capital* (1913) offered perspectives on imperialism quite consistent with aspects of Magdoff’s perspective, but containing several distinctive features different from the Leninist view. A key involves her stress on the coexistence in the world of different cultures, different types of society, and different modes of production (or forms of economy – different economic systems). Historically, the dominant form of economy worldwide was the communal hunting and gathering mode of production, which was succeeded

in many areas by a more or less communistic agricultural form of economy which she characterized as a primitive “peasant economy.” This was succeeded in some areas by non-egalitarian societies dominated by militarily powerful elites, constituting modes of production that she labeled “slave economy” and “feudalism.” Sometimes coexisting with, sometimes superseding, these was a “simple commodity production” in which artisans and farmers, for example, would produce commodities for the market in order to trade or sell for the purpose of acquiring other commodities that they might need or want. This simple commodity mode of production is different from the capitalist mode of production, driven by the capital accumulation process, overseen by an increasingly wealthy and powerful capitalist minority.

Three features especially differentiate the analysis in *The Accumulation of Capital* from the perspectives of other prominent Marxists.

(1) Luxemburg advances a controversial conceptualization of imperialism’s relationship to the exploitation of the working class in the advanced capitalist countries. Because workers receive less value than what they create, they are unable to purchase and consume all that is produced. This underconsumption means that capitalists must expand into non-capitalist areas, seeking markets as well as raw materials and investment opportunities (particularly new sources of labor) outside of the capitalist economic sphere.

“Non-capitalist organizations provide a fertile soil for capitalism,” she noted, which means that “capital feeds on the ruins of such organizations, and, although this non-capitalist milieu is indispensable for accumulation, the latter proceeds, at the cost of this medium nevertheless, by eating it up.” Penetration into non-capitalist economies facilitates the capital accumulation process, but capitalist accumulation “corrodes and assimilates” these economies. This constituted a new contradiction: “capital cannot accumulate without the aid of non-capitalist organizations, nor, on the other hand, can it tolerate their continued existence side by side with itself. Only the continuous and progressive disintegration of non-capitalist organizations makes accumulation of capital possible.” The inevitable tendency this leads to will be “the standstill of accumulation,” which “means that the development of the productive forces is arrested,” leading to capitalist collapse.

(2) Another distinctive quality of her conceptualization of imperialism is that it is not restricted to “the highest stage” or “latest stage” of capitalism. Rather, imperialism is something that one finds at the earliest beginnings of capitalism – in the period of what Marx calls “primitive capitalist accumulation” – and which continues non-stop, with increasing and overwhelming reach and velocity, down to the present. Or as she puts it, “capitalism in its full maturity also depends in all respects on non-capitalist strata and social organizations existing side by side with it,” and “since the accumulation of capital becomes impossible in all points without non-capitalist surroundings, we cannot gain a true picture of it by assuming the exclusive and absolute domination of the capitalist mode of production.” Quoting Marx, she concluded:

The historical career of capitalism can only be appreciated by taking them together. “Sweating blood and filth with every pore from head to toe” characterizes not only the birth of capital but also its progress in the world at every step, and thus capitalism prepares its own downfall under ever more violent contortions and convulsions.

This meant, on the international arena,

colonial policy, an international loan system – a policy of spheres of interest – and war. Force, fraud, oppression, looting are openly displayed without any attempt at concealment, and it requires an effort to discover within this tangle of political violence and contests of power the stern laws of the economic process.

(3) Another special feature of Luxemburg’s contribution is her anthropological sensitivity to the impact of capitalist expansion on the rich variety of the world’s peoples and cultures that one cannot find in the key works of Hilferding, Lenin, and Bukharin. The survey of capitalist expansionism’s impact in her *Accumulation of Capital* includes such examples as:

- the destruction of the English peasants and artisans;
- the destruction of the Native American peoples (the so-called Indians);
- the enslavement of African peoples by the European powers;
- the ruination of small farmers in the mid-western and western regions of the United States;

- the onslaught of French colonialism in Algeria;
- the onslaught of British colonialism in India;
- British incursions into China, with special reference to the Opium wars;
- the onslaught of British colonialism in South Africa (with lengthy reference to the three-way struggle of black African peoples, the Dutch Boers, and the British).

“Each new colonial expansion is accompanied, as a matter of course, by a relentless battle of capital against the social and economic ties of the natives,” she wrote, “who are also forcibly robbed of their means of production and labor power.” Observing that “from the point of view of the primitive societies involved, it is a matter of life or death,” she noted that the invariable consequence involved “permanent occupation of the colonies by the military” and that “native risings and punitive expeditions are the order of the day for any colonial regime.” The economic underpinnings of such realities were always emphasized: “Their means of production and their labor power no less than their demand for surplus products is necessary to capitalism,” Luxemburg wrote. “Yet the latter is fully determined to undermine their independence as social units, in order to gain possession of their means of production and labor power and to convert them into commodity buyers.” But the destructive impact of all this on the cultures of the world’s peoples was emphasized by Luxemburg as by no other Marxist theorist of her time: “The unbridled greed, the acquisitive instinct of accumulation must by its very nature take every advantage of the conditions of the market and can have no thought for the morrow. It is incapable of seeing far enough to recognize the value of the economic monuments of an older civilization.”

These strengths in Luxemburg’s analysis were drawn together, in 1915, after the eruption of World War I, in an eloquent anti-war polemic composed from a prison cell:

Capitalist desire for imperialist expansion, as the expression of its highest maturity in the last period of its life, has the economic tendency to change the whole world into capitalistically producing nations, to sweep away all superannuated, pre-capitalistic methods of production and society, to subjugate all the riches of the

earth and all means of production to capital, to turn the laboring masses of all zones into wage slaves. In Africa and in Asia, from the most northern regions to the southernmost point of South America and the South Seas, the remnants of old communistic social groups, of feudal society, of patriarchal systems, and of ancient handicraft production are destroyed and stamped out by capitalism. Whole peoples are destroyed, ancient civilizations are leveled to the ground, and in their place profiteering in its most modern forms is being established.

This brutal triumphant procession of capitalism through the world, accompanied by all the means of force, of robbery, and of infamy, has one bright phase: it has created the premises for its own final overthrow, it has established the capitalist world rule which, alone, the socialist world revolution can follow. This is the only cultural and progressive aspect of the great so-called works of culture that were brought to the primitive countries. To capitalist economists and politicians, railroads, matches, sewerage systems, and warehouses are progress and culture. Of themselves such works, grafted upon primitive conditions, are neither culture nor progress, for they are too dearly paid for with the sudden economic and cultural ruin of the peoples who must drink down the bitter cup of misery and horror of two social orders, of traditional agricultural landlordism, of super-modern, super-refined capitalist exploitation, at one and the same time.

While sharing Luxemburg’s revolutionary commitments and aspects of her analysis, Lenin’s discussion of imperialism in his 1916 *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism* offers a quite different perspective. According to Lenin, Marx’s analysis held that under capitalist development “free competition gives way to the concentration of production, which, in turn, at a certain stage of development, leads to monopoly.” Lenin argued that “capitalism [was] transformed into imperialism” by the opening of the twentieth century. “Although commodity production still ‘reigns’ and continues to be regarded as the basis of economic life, it has in reality been undermined and the bulk of the profits go to the ‘geniuses’ of financial manipulation.” He defined *finance capital* as “the concentration of production; the monopolies arising therefrom; the merging or coalescence of the banks with industry.”

This was a period, according to Lenin, in which “a monopoly . . . inevitably penetrates into *every*

sphere of public life, regardless of the form of government and other ‘details,’” with a tendency by the state to identify the needs of the massive firms with the national interest. This is also a period in which “the ownership of capital is separated from the application of capital to production, . . . and that the rentier on income obtained from money capital, is separated from the entrepreneur and all who are directly concerned in the management of capital.” Financialmanagerial interests assume heightened importance. Under the old capitalism, the export of goods was typical, while under the new capitalism of the early twentieth century the more important dynamic is the export of capital.

The logic of the accumulation process, in Lenin’s view, leads to the fact that “surplus capital will be utilized not for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given country, for this would mean a decline of profits for the capitalists, but for the purpose of increasing profits by exporting capital abroad to the backward countries. In these backward countries profits are usually high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap.” While Luxemburg saw capital as being driven into “under-developed” areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America because the capital accumulation process was being clogged in the more capitalistically developed terrain of Europe and North America, Lenin perceived, more simply, a magnetically inexorable pull of investment opportunities. Luxemburg thought that when all the world was finally in the embrace of capitalist development, the system’s collapse was assured. Lenin, not accepting all of Luxemburg’s reasoning, did not assume this to be so, although he viewed imperialism as increasing and intensifying “the anarchy inherent in capitalist production *as a whole*,” certainly for workers affected by capital flight to far-off lands.

For Lenin, however, imperialism involved not simply the quest for profits in formally colonized areas, but also the drive to invest in independent countries, sometimes “semi-colonies” for all practical purposes, but sometimes enjoying even greater autonomy than that – creating “diverse forms of dependent countries which, politically, are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and

diplomatic dependence.” While this might “to a certain extent . . . arrest development in the capital-exporting countries, it can only do so by expanding and deepening the further development of capitalism throughout the world.” In contrast to Luxemburg, Lenin stressed that expanding capital sought entry into “not only agrarian territories, but even most highly industrialized regions . . . because (1) the fact that the world is already partitioned [into colonial empires] obliges those contemplating a *redivision* to reach out for *every kind* of territory, and (2) an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several great powers in the striving for hegemony.” He concluded:

The epoch of the latest stage of capitalism shows us that certain relations between capitalist associations grow up, *based* on the economic division of the world; while parallel to and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between political alliances, between states, on the basis of the territorial divisions of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the “struggle for spheres of influence.”

The result of all this, in the view of Lenin and Luxemburg alike, would be a chain of catastrophes: world crises, economic depressions, social calamities, wars, dictatorships, civil strife, and the possibility – through the intensification of struggles of oppressed people (particularly class-conscious workers) throughout the world – of revolutions. Yet the process was complex, Lenin cautioned, largely because of imperialist-created divisions among workers not simply along national lines but even within countries: “Imperialism has the tendency to create privileged sections also among the workers, and to detach them from the broad masses of the proletariat.”

Challenging the Revolutionary Analyses of Imperialism

Against the belief, shared by Luxemburg and Lenin, that imperialism is inseparable from the nature and existence of capitalism, the prominent Marxist Karl Kautsky (1854–1938) – choosing a different theoretical path than his erstwhile comrades – advanced the view that “imperialism is a particular kind of capitalist policy, just like Manchesterism [i.e., free trade], which it rep-

laces." For Kautsky, imperialism involved "the struggle of every big capitalist state to expand its own colonial empire in conflict with other kingdoms of this kind." It represented "only one among various means of expanding capitalism." Not only is it not "necessary for the continuation of the capitalist mode of production," he argued, but it is "becoming a barrier" to capitalist development. According to Kautsky, "the capitalist economy . . . is extremely threatened by the conflict between the states," and he added, only slightly tongue in cheek, that "every far-sighted capitalist today must call to his comrades: Capitalists of the world unite!"

Kautsky envisioned a possible future development that he termed *ultra-imperialism*: "dissolving imperialism by a holy alliance of the imperialists." This would not eliminate the subjugation of agrarian countries for their raw materials by advanced capitalist countries, he acknowledged. Only the overthrow of capitalism by the working class, he asserted, or by independence struggles of the colonized peoples, could accomplish that. But ultra-imperialism – like capitalism itself – could represent a progressive stage in the development toward socialism. George Lichtheim has characterized Kautsky's conception of ultra-imperialism as "a planetary economy controlled by a unified elite of scientifically trained managers who have left the national state behind and merged their separate identities in the formation of a global cartel linking all the industrially advanced centers of the world."

Although he saw ultra-imperialism as something that "of course we must fight against just as energetically as we fought against imperialism," Kautsky sounded a characteristically optimistic note: "Socialism, that is general well-being within modern civilization, would only be possible through a powerful development of the productive forces which it concentrates into the hands of the capitalist class." He saw that "the various states of the world are at very different stages of economic and political development," but it was possible, in his view, that ultra-imperialism could facilitate a progressive development. In line with the unilinear schema which was part of his own brand of Marxist orthodoxy, he emphasized that "the more a state is capitalist on the one hand and democratic on the other, the nearer it is to socialism."

The divergent conceptions of imperialism that we have noted here dovetail with profoundly different theorizations regarding economic development in the modern world.

SEE ALSO: Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932); Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888–1938); *Communist Manifesto*; Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Hilferding, Rudolf (1877–1941); Imperialism, Historical Evolution; Imperialism, Modernization to Globalization; Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Avineri, S. (Ed.) (1969) *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization*. Garden City, NY: Anchor.
- Baran, P. (1957) *The Political Economy of Growth*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Bukharin, N. (1972) *Imperialism and World Economy*. London: Merlin Press.
- Chilcote, R. H. (Ed.) (2000) *Imperialism, Theoretical Directions*. Amherst: Humanity Books.
- Howard, M. C. & King, J. E. (1983, 1990) *A History of Marxian Economics, 1883–1990*, 2 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kautsky, K. (1983) *Selected Political Writings*. Ed. P. Goode. London: Macmillan.
- Le Blanc, P. (1996) *From Marx to Gramsci: A Reader in Revolutionary Marxist Politics*. Amherst: Humanity Books.
- Lenin, V. I. (1967) *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. In *Selected Works*, Vol. 2. New York: International Publishers.
- Lichtheim, G. (1971) *Imperialism*. New York: Praeger.
- Luxemburg, R. (1968) *The Accumulation of Capital*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Magdoff, H. (1978) *Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Marx, K. (1977) *Capital*, Vol. 1. New York: Vintage.
- Marx, K. (1981) *Capital*, Vol. 3. New York: Vintage.
- Mohri, K. (2000) Progressive and Negative Perspectives of Capitalism and Imperialism. In R. H. Chilcote (Ed.), *Imperialism, Theoretical Directions*. Amherst: Humanity Books.
- Renton, D. (Ed.) (2001) *Marx on Globalization*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Rist, G. (1998) *The History of Development, From Western Origins to Global Faith*. London: Zed Books.
- Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. H., & Stephens, J. D. (1992) *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sweezy, P. M. (1968) *The Theory of Capitalist Development*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Wallerstein, I. (1979) *The Capitalist World-Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Warren, B. (1980) *Imperialism, Pioneer of Capitalism*. London: Verso.

Imperialism, historical evolution

Clifford D. Conner

When the apologetics and ideological obfuscation are stripped away, the essence of imperialism is straightforward and easy to understand: It is the forced subjugation of less powerful nations by more powerful nations. It is invariably accompanied by cruelty and oppression on the part of the conquerors, and resistance – sometimes simmering under the surface but frequently bursting forth in protest, rebellion, and revolution – on the part of the victims. Since 1500, when Europeans gained control of the seas, European nations and their American offshoot have been the foremost imperialist powers.

Imperialism has existed since ancient times – the “first imperialist” of recorded history was Sargon of Akkad, who subjugated the neighboring city-states of Mesopotamia – but the European expansion that began just before 1500 represented a qualitative change in the character of imperialism. For most of the many millennia of human history, Europe was a backward and unimportant part of the world. It remained that way until about 500 years ago, when Europeans suddenly burst forth and began to dominate the entire globe. The advent and spread of empires of European origin is the primary historical determinant of the state of the world as it is today. The world is divided into nation-states, a few of which are wealthy and technologically advanced, but most of which, representing the overwhelming majority of the human race, are mired in poverty and dependency. The United States, for example, with only 6 percent of the world’s population, consumes an estimated 40 percent of its resources. The history of imperialism affords some insights into how this extremely inequitable situation came about.

Ancient imperialism was essentially a military phenomenon, sometimes but not always supplemented by political control. The underlying motivation for imperial conquest was nakedly economic: the conqueror wanted tribute. A conquered city would have the choice of paying up voluntarily or being sacked and looted. An

ancient empire was not usually an organically connected social system, but a loose federation of territories that were forced to pay heavy taxes to a central authority. The payments would have to be regular and ongoing, so it amounted to what might be thought of as a large-scale protection racket.

Some ancient empires – the Chinese, for example – went further and were able to politically and culturally unify their territories, but that was the exception rather than the rule. Ancient empires were not held together by economic forces; they were maintained by soldiers, policemen, bureaucrats, and the threat of violence. The economic basis of ancient imperialism was generally no more complicated than putting a gun to a person’s head and demanding their money. Modern imperialism is a much more sophisticated form of robbery.

The key to world conquest in the early modern era was gaining control over the ocean routes that ships depended upon for carrying longdistance trade. Whoever controlled the sea lanes could eventually control the world. In the waning years of the fifteenth century, when Portuguese ships first crept around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa and tentatively entered the Indian Ocean, they found no one there capable of stopping them, so they and other Europeans were able to establish control over the world’s most important trade routes.

Some European kings and queens played a role in promoting the development of sea power and long-distance trade. Decisions of monarchs, however, were not the dynamic force behind European expansionism. The real motive that caused the ships to be built and then put out to sea was commercial profit. The key to European expansion was neither kings seeking new lands to pay them tribute, nor generals seeking glory, but merchants seeking markets for their goods.

Monarchs, landed aristocracies, and the Catholic Church all wielded a great deal of political power in fifteenth-century Europe, but they were perpetually engaged in a three-way power struggle, which gave the merchant classes ample room to thrive in their relatively free cities. As the merchants got richer, the royal rulers turned to them for loans to run their kingdoms. Monarchs like Prince Henry the Navigator of Portugal or Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain supported the merchants’ efforts to expand their overseas markets. Europeans armed their ships

to fight off pirates, but they could also use their guns to gain an advantage over local merchants wherever they went. It was not enough to simply find new markets; the profit motive drove Europeans to control those markets any way they could.

The traditional ruling classes of Europe were unable to stifle the growth of a new social class, the capitalist class. Capitalism created immense wealth and fostered the development of new sailing and military technology, enabling Europeans to dominate world trade. Eventually this new European economic system based on production for the market would insinuate itself and force itself into every part of the globe, wiping out the traditional economic systems and creating a new, unified, worldwide system. Europeans and people of European descent would continue to hold most of the key positions in the new world system. That, in a nutshell, is the history of modern imperialism, but the process unfolded in a variety of ways as Europeans gained control over four major parts of the world – the Americas, the “Indies,” China, and Africa.

The Americas

Columbus’s voyages were part of a much larger European effort to find a way to trade with Asia. Most people thought the best way would be to sail south around Africa, but Columbus believed he could sail due west and wind up in Asia. When Columbus returned to Europe with the erroneous news that he had reached Asia, it set off a mad rush and within a few years transatlantic voyages were commonplace. The Spanish did not find much in the way of commerce in the Western Hemisphere, but they did find gold and silver, and they found some native peoples that they could force to mine it for them, so they began to build colonies.

Some of the native peoples they encountered had developed sophisticated civilizations of their own, especially in the areas that are now Mexico and Peru. But the Spaniards had a number of military advantages and were able to defeat and subdue them. What followed, after the European invasion of the Western Hemisphere, was the most spectacular demographic collapse in the history of the world. A major percentage of the native population was wiped out. The island Columbus landed on, which is now where the Dominican Republic and Haiti are, is estim-

ated to have dropped from a native population of 100,000 to 300 in a short time. The native population of central Mexico declined from 25 million to 1 million within a century of the Spanish conquest.

This demographic collapse was not caused primarily by Europeans killing them in warfare or working them to death in mines, but by the germs that Europeans brought with them, especially smallpox. Europeans had developed immunity and could carry the germs without catching the diseases, but native Americans had no natural immunity and died by the millions. The population vacuum was filled by European settlers and Africans who were enslaved and transported by the Europeans to do the hard work. Europeans therefore came to dominate one of the world’s two hemispheres by replacing its original population and Europeanizing North and South America.

By far the wealthiest colonies in the early Americas were in the parts that are considered “underdeveloped” today. Before the first British attempt at colonization in North America (Jamestown, 1607), the Spanish had already created a sophisticated civilization in Mexico and South America, with many large cities, universities, complex governmental commercial institutions, and extensive commerce. The richest colonies – *because* they were the richest – were not developed with their own welfare in mind, but only as sources of wealth to be exploited by the mother country, Spain. The poorer colonies to the north, on the other hand, did not command much attention from England, so they were able to develop relatively independently, without being mercilessly drained. Later, as the North American settlers developed their wealth, England began to show more interest and the colonists were forced to defend themselves.

Spain extracted a great deal of monetary wealth from its new-world colonies. From 1500 to 1650, an estimated 16 million kilograms of silver and 185,000 kilograms of gold were shipped from the Americas to Spain. With all that money flowing in, not to mention the even greater profits from agricultural production in the colonies, one would expect Spain to have become the richest of European countries, but instead it became one of Western Europe’s least affluent nations. When the gold and silver began to arrive, Spain had been the strongest power in Europe, but it did not remain in that position long.

Spain's case demonstrates that money alone cannot make a country prosperous. More recently, the billions of dollars flowing into the oil-producing countries of the Middle East did not raise the countries there out of poverty or dependency. The "petrodollars" flowed in and then quickly flowed back out, into the hands of multinational corporations based in the industrialized countries. Likewise, sixteenth-century American gold and silver flowed into Spain, but stayed there only long enough to cause inflation. The money was spent buying goods manufactured elsewhere rather than creating manufacturing capacity in Spain.

Most of the gold and silver went to Antwerp, which became the greatest financial center in the world. By the end of the sixteenth century, the center of financial power had shifted to Amsterdam. The Low Countries were the first to benefit in a significant way from the American gold and silver, but in the long run the greatest beneficiary was England, which was to take Spain's place as Europe's primary power.

The "Indies": India, Indonesia, and the Spice Islands

In 1600 a group of English merchants formed a commercial firm they named the British East India Company. In spite of the word "British" in its title, it was not a national endeavor undertaken by the British government; it was a private enterprise. Merchants in other countries followed suit – there was a Dutch East India Company, a French East India Company, and so forth.

The English were not the first to try to develop trade by sea with India. The Portuguese were there first, because it was they who first found out how to sail around Africa to get to the Indian Ocean. There they came upon a long-existing free-trade system established by Arab, Chinese, Indian, and other merchants. They could have simply participated in it, but that was not what they had in mind. They wanted to control the whole market, and with their efficient sailing ships and the ability to mount powerful cannons on them, the Portuguese were able to gain control in less than 15 years.

The Portuguese thus created the first of the European "trading-post empires." They had no interest in controlling territory or populations – all they wanted was to control the trade. To

accomplish that, because the trade routes were oceanic, all they had to do was control a few key locations along the coastal areas, so they built forts where they could protect their ships, store their goods, load and unload cargoes, and trade with local merchants. Portuguese forts arose at Mozambique on the east coast of Africa, at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, on the coast of India, and on the Malaysian peninsula in Southeast Asia. From those positions they were able to dominate the seas. They took over about half of the lucrative spice trade to Europe that went via the trade route under Africa, dominated shipping in the Asian ports, and forced the native merchants in the Indian Ocean to pay duties of 6 to 10 percent on their cargoes.

Portugal, however, had bitten off more than it could chew. When the Dutch and English came along in the seventeenth century, the Portuguese were unable to withstand the competition. The Dutch East India Company replaced them in Southeast Asia and the British East India Company took over in India, but these were at first still trading-post empires.

The Dutch went beyond controlling the shipping of spices and began to control the production as well by capturing several of the Molucca Islands where spices were grown, and enforcing a ban on growing those spices anywhere else. On the islands they had seized, the Dutch would not allow anything except spices to be produced, so food and clothing had to be imported. That way, the natives of the islands were made completely dependent upon the Dutch East India Company. Their traditional economy was destroyed and they were permanently reduced to poverty: a classic case of the imperialist ploy known as "enforced monoculture."

The spices brought the merchants big profits, but the market for them was limited, because it was essentially a luxuries market. In the following century, the volume of trade increased immensely as its content shifted from luxury goods to commodities for a mass market, such as coffee, tea, and textiles.

As the trade grew in volume and importance, another shift occurred. Slowly, the trading-post empires began to grow into a new form of European domination. Both the British in India and the Dutch in Indonesia gradually found it necessary – if they wanted to defend and expand their commercial interests – to assert direct political control over larger and larger areas, until by

1800 they found themselves governing immense territories and millions of native peoples on the other side of the globe. The original trading-post empires became transformed into territorial empires. The Dutch came to think of Indonesia as their *possession*, and the English felt the same way about India.

Africa

In the fifteenth century, Africa north of the Sahara desert was, as it still is today, Islamic territory, so the Muslim world was a barrier to trade or even cultural contact between Black Africa and Europe, as long as trade could only be carried on by camel caravans across the desert. In the middle of the fifteenth century, when the Portuguese began their efforts to develop seaborne trade, their first motivation was not to get to Asia, but to get to Black Africa. The Africans had gold and they would trade it directly for Portuguese products if the Portuguese could avoid the Islamic middleman, so the new sailing technology was created with that in mind. Only later did they develop the ambition to sail around Africa to reach Asia.

The slave trade was not at first a major factor in the commerce with Africa. But a new market for slave labor had just begun to open up with the development of a new product for mass consumption – sugar – and a new way of producing it: the tropical plantation system. Experimental plantations on the Canary Islands and in the islands of the Mediterranean were proving successful, and as they multiplied, the demand for slave labor grew. Until that time, most slaves had come from the East (the word “slave” derives from “Slavic”). But in the middle of the fifteenth century the Ottoman Turks had cut off trade between Europe and the East, so the traditional supply of white slaves dried up and the demand for African slaves rose. As the demand went up, the price went up, and as the price went up, so did the supply of slaves from Africa.

After 1492, the sugar plantation system expanded into the Western Hemisphere – in Brazil and the Caribbean islands – and that is when the African slave trade went from a trickle to a torrent and became a major factor in the world economy, not to mention a major factor in the demographic patterns of the world. The central motivation underlying the enslavement and forced emigration of 12 million Africans,

and the slaughter of many more, was the profitability of sugar production for the European market.

China

European expansionism proceeded differently in China than it had in the Americas, Africa, and the Indies. European traders went to China, but the Chinese empire was strong and unified enough to resist the Europeans and control the terms of trade themselves. At first China simply rebuffed the European merchants. There was very little trade allowed, until 1685 when the emperor, for his own reasons, decided to permit some very carefully controlled trade. By 1759 the system had evolved to a situation where all trade with Europeans had to be conducted at a single port city – Guangzhou, which the Europeans called “Canton” – and by then the British East India Company had managed to squeeze out its rivals and monopolize the trade. But the British merchants were not in charge there; the Chinese emperor and his mandarins were. The fees and taxes and other restrictions the emperor imposed irritated the British because they cut into their profits, but there was nothing they could do about it.

The Chinese emperor considered the British to be barbarians and believed that China had no need for the products of barbarians. The British were allowed to buy Chinese goods, but the Chinese unwillingness to trade for British goods meant that the British had no choice but to pay cash for what they wanted. Britain had long since replaced Spain as the dominant power in Latin America, so the British had access to Latin American silver to pay for the Chinese products they wanted – above all, tea, which had become an item of mass consumption in Britain. This caused the problem that modern economists call a perpetual imbalance of payments – a continuous flow of monetary wealth from Britain to China. It became especially serious when the American Revolution blocked British access to silver from Latin America.

If this one-sided “trade” had been disrupted because Britain ran out of money and could no longer afford to pay, it would have thrown a monkey wrench into the workings of the entire world capitalist system. So the British East India Company made a major effort to find something – anything – that the Chinese would

buy. What they found was opium. As they increased the supply of opium to China, opium addiction increased and the market grew, and as opium was exchanged for silver, the British began to solve their balance of payments problem. The Chinese emperor didn't allow this to happen; it happened in spite of him. It was illegal under Chinese law to import opium, but the demand was so strong that the trade went on anyway. The ability of the Chinese empire to resist the pressure of European capitalism began to break down. Opium was smuggled into China by bribing customs officials to look the other way. As lower-level officials paid off higher-level officials, before long the corruption reached all the way to the top.

In 1834 the British East India Company lost its official government-protected monopoly, and competition for the Chinese opium market was opened up. That is when American capitalism made its debut in China, quickly becoming the second-largest drug dealer after the British. An estimated three and a half million pounds of opium were imported into China in the year 1835, in exchange for 17 million ounces of silver.

The addiction and corruption that this opium trade brought with it caused devastating political and social problems. By the late 1830s the imperial regime had decided to launch a really serious "war on drugs" by cracking down hard against smuggling and corruption. In 1839 the Chinese government seized and destroyed two and a half million pounds of opium. The British opium smugglers were outraged. Facing financial ruin, they went to the British government and demanded that it take military action not only to force the trade open again, but also to force the Chinese government to pay them for the opium they had destroyed.

The British government did exactly that. Steam-powered gunboats now gave them total military superiority, so in 1842 British warships steamed up the Yangzi River, pointed their guns at the city of Nanjing, and threatened to blow it off the map. The Chinese government realized that it was powerless to resist, so it signed a treaty that gave Hong Kong to Britain, opened up five seaport cities for trade, and paid the British the equivalent of 21 million dollars for the opium that had been destroyed. This chapter of its commercial history speaks volumes for the noble ideal of British liberalism called "free trade." It meant their freedom to force dope down the

throats of foreigners whether the latter wanted it or not. Today's notorious "drug cartels" of Colombia are small potatoes in comparison to their illustrious British predecessors.

The 1842 Treaty of Nanjing marked the beginning of what the Chinese call the "Century of Humiliation," which only ended in 1949 with the victory of the Chinese Revolution. In retrospect, the military action that led to the 1842 treaty was called the "First Opium War," but it was just a beginning. With the Chinese no longer able to resist, other western countries, especially the United States and France, began to take advantage of their weakness. A Second Opium War took place in the late 1850s and in 1860 another unequal treaty was forced upon the Chinese, opening up 11 more seaports for foreign commerce and officially legalizing the drug trade.

Because no one western power, not even the British, was able to exclude the others, they all jointly propped up the existing Qing dynasty government as a means of policing the Chinese people and making China safe for western business. Since the Chinese government's function was to serve the interests of foreigners, China had lost its national sovereignty.

The case of how Japan was introduced to the new world economic order was similar. For 200 years, Japan had almost completely closed itself off from any contact with the rest of the world. In 1853 American warships sailed into Japanese harbors and demanded that they open their country up for trade relations – *or else!* Imagine this scenario: Suppose you are at home one day and a salesman comes to the door and you tell him, "Sorry, I don't want any." The salesman pulls out a gun and says, "Oh yes you do!" That is essentially how Japan was brought into the world of "free trade." The western "salesmen" said, "You are going to buy my products and sell me your products, whether you like it or not." There is a crucial element of force and coercion underlying modern imperialism, but it is a more complicated form of conquest and domination than was the case with ancient imperialism.

From Mercantile to Industrial Imperialism

This new aggressiveness is indicative of an important transition in the history of imperialism – from mercantile imperialism to industrial imperialism. There is continuity between the

two phases. In both, western expansionism was motivated by the quest for profit, but in the latter phase that quest was so greatly accelerated by the Industrial Revolution that imperialism was transformed into something qualitatively different. Controlling trade was no longer enough to satisfy the voracious appetite for profits.

The development of industrial technology that occurred in Britain around the beginning of the nineteenth century created an enormous increase in productivity. The new productive capacity created new economic needs. First of all, new factories created a demand for more raw materials. Secondly, there was a need for more customers to buy the mountain of new products that the factories were churning out. And third, as the manufacturers and their bankers accumulated more and more wealth, they found themselves faced with an unfamiliar dilemma. They seemed to be running out of profitable ways to invest all of the money – the surplus capital – that they had amassed.

As they looked for new sources of raw materials, they looked overseas. When their home markets were saturated with their products, they also looked overseas for new customers. And when they needed new investment opportunities, they began to see the teeming masses of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a huge pool of exploitable workers.

The new imperialists were impelled not only to export surplus production and surplus investment capital; they also felt a need to export *surplus people*. The industrialization process had created a growing body of permanently unemployed workers who were beginning to pose a revolutionary threat. Some wise policymakers proposed a solution they called “social imperialism,” whereby excess population would be encouraged to emigrate to the colonies as settlers. This program was put into practice by France, Portugal, and Britain in Algeria, Angola, Kenya, Rhodesia, and South Africa. From the standpoint of the native peoples, these “settler states” represented an especially harsh form of imperialist exploitation, with an influx of white settlers taking over all the best land. In South Africa, for example, the whites constituted only about 20 percent of the population but claimed almost 90 percent of the land for themselves.

The mounting economic pressures in nineteenth-century Europe led to the feverish growth of imperialist penetration of the whole

globe, and as the various imperialist nations began to fear that they were running out of places to economically control, they began fiercely competing with each other for various territories.

At first western nations found it generally more efficient to exercise indirect or informal control over foreign territories, but as the competition among the imperialists heated up, they felt compelled to stake out their claims more forcefully, to draw boundaries on the map and say, “This territory belongs to us.” When they drew their boundaries in Africa, they did not bother to consider the fact that they were dividing some African peoples and combining others who did not want to be combined. This is one of the legacies of imperialism that continues to cause a great deal of strife in Africa today.

To keep rival imperialists off their turf, each western nation was impelled toward direct rule, turning territorial possessions into formal colonies governed directly by Europeans. In Nigeria, for example, about 2,000 Englishmen made up a government that ruled 40 million Africans. Those 2,000 Englishmen were compelled to recruit and train a cadre of Africans to help them administer the country. It was European-trained Africans such as these who would form the pro-western ruling elites of the African nations that won their political independence after World War II.

This era of colonialism culminated, at the end of the nineteenth century, with an orgy of annexations that the history books call the “Scramble for Africa,” as all of the European powers frantically sought to stake their claims to parts of the continent – and then a similar “Scramble for Concessions” in China occurred as well. It was about 1875 when the scrambling really became frenzied, triggered by a significant economic recession in Europe from 1873 through 1896. Manufactured goods that could not be sold piled up in European warehouses. Workers were laid off and social turmoil was increasing. At that point the industrialists and financiers began to panic and to clamor for their governments to step up the imperialist policies.

The political leaders were not particularly anxious to take on the direct administration of large parts of Africa, but they were pushed into it by the businessmen. The latter succeeded in generating mass enthusiasm for imperialist policies by manipulating nationalist sentiment by means of the mass-circulation newspapers

they controlled. They were able to persuade the working people of Europe that there was something glorious about their nation taking possession of other parts of the world. Intellectuals did their part by constructing ideologies to justify imperialism. Nationalism was a potent one. Racism, which had developed as a means of justifying the slave trade, also came in very handy for justifying the scramble for Africa.

By 1914, Europe and countries controlled by people of European descent ruled about 85 percent of the Earth's land area, and most of the remaining 15 percent was made up of semi-colonies that had been forced into the role of producing raw materials to supply the technologically advanced countries. In that year all of the scrambling and interimperialist frenzy came to a head when the rivalry for colonies exploded, initiating an era of world war that lasted until 1945. When the dust settled, Britannia no longer ruled the waves, nor did France or Germany or Italy. The United States had become the dominant force over the world market and the era of the hegemony of American imperialism had begun.

Neocolonialism and "Neoimperialism"

It bears repeating that modern imperialism is not primarily a matter of military or political control, but of economic control. After the era of world wars this came ever more to the fore as colonial territories in all parts of the world began to win their political independence – India and Pakistan in 1947, Ghana in 1957, and then, very quickly, almost all of Africa. But were the former colonies now really independent? Had they become the captains of their own destiny? Or were they still somehow in the grips of their former colonial masters? As time went by, it became clear that the former colonies were still completely economically subordinated to the industrialized part of the world. This situation has been given the name "neoimperialism," but there is really nothing new about it. In fact, it was a return to the older kind of informal imperialist domination that had been most common before 1875. It was preferred as a cheaper and more efficient means of exploiting poor countries, because it eliminated the great expense of maintaining the administrative machinery of government. It was made possible by the reduction in interimperialist

rivalry brought about by the postwar American predominance.

Apologists for the current world economic order, however, argue that imperialism no longer exists – that it ended when the colonies gained their independence. The former colonies, they say, are not poor because they are exploited, but because it will take time for them to modernize their economies and catch up with the industrialized countries. Meanwhile (the argument goes) they are completely free to develop their economies any way they see fit. If they have failed to do a good job of it, it is nobody's fault but their own.

The euphemism commonly used to describe the impoverished and exploited countries of the world is "underdeveloped." But that word has worn so thin that an even worse euphemism has become current: "developing" countries. The implication is that although they are poor now, they are on the right track and are catching up. But Walter Rodney, a Guyanese scholar and revolutionary political leader who was assassinated in 1980, exposed the reality of the concept of underdevelopment by using the word not as an adjective but as a transitive verb in the title of his masterful *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. According to this usage, underdevelopment is not an unfortunate condition like leprosy, but a purposeful act of victimization that Europeans perpetrated on other parts of the world. How, then, did Europe underdevelop Africa . . . and Asia, and Latin America? When it forced them into the new world system, why were the newcomers unable to modernize their economies and carry out an industrial revolution, as the European countries had?

First of all, the Western European countries had the great advantage of starting out without any larger competitors blocking their path. After World War II, when the former colonies entered the scene, they were faced with competitors hundreds of times larger, in terms of economic power. Consider this metaphor: If newborn fish are put in a fishtank by themselves, they will grow into adult fish. But then if those adult fish have babies, and they are all left in the same tank, the big fish will immediately eat the baby fish. The second generation lacks the opportunity to grow as their parents did, because the competitive environment is completely different. And the same is true for poor countries trying to grow in a world dominated by powerful industrialized

economies. Any wealth they produce will simply be gobbled up by their larger competitors.

How does this actually happen in practice? Do the imperialist countries simply rob their colonies at gunpoint? In isolated instances, yes; that is what the Belgians did in the Congo, but that is not the *typical* mechanism of modern imperialism. The fundamental problem confronting the former colonies after World War II, whether they were very large countries like India or small African countries, was the same: To succeed in the international capitalist system, the first thing they needed was some capital. In order to pull themselves out of poverty, they needed to industrialize, which is to say that they had to increase their ability to produce the necessities of life for their people. But to industrialize, they needed investment; they needed *capital*. Where could that have come from?

Most of the wealthy countries originally got their capital from commerce, supplemented by very important infusions of capital from American gold and slave labor. But even without striking gold or oil, or enslaving their neighbors, it is conceivable that the poor countries could work hard, produce commodities, sell them on the world market, and invest the profits in industrialization. If they could do that, they could slowly develop their productive capacity and pull themselves out of poverty.

Unfortunately, it is not that simple, because commerce is a two-edged sword. While the poor countries are selling their products to the industrialized world, they are also buying things they need, and the wealthy countries have the financial power to control the terms of trade. As a result, prices of things that poor countries produce – raw materials, agricultural products – are held low, and prices for things they have to import tend to rise. This is a phenomenon known all too well to the poor countries as the “deteriorating terms of trade.” Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania, gave a typical example: His country, he said, “had to export 38 tons of sisal to buy a seven-ton truck in 1972, but in 1982 the same truck required the sale of 134 tons of sisal.” The deteriorating terms of trade mean that in the supposedly free world market, the deck is completely stacked against the non-industrialized countries. They cannot gain the capital they need by emulating their western predecessors.

But there are other possibilities. Another source of capital might be investment from outside. If foreign firms export their capital to poor countries, does that not bring capital in? Yes, it does, but it does not tend to help alleviate the poverty in the receiving countries. The foreign investors do not send capital as a charitable exercise; their motive is to make a profit. Their aim is not to benefit the country they are investing in, but to *repatriate* their profits – that is, to take their profits out.

But even so, when foreign investors build a factory in a poor country, is that not a step toward industrializing that country? Are jobs not created, which begins the process of creating an industrial working class? Yes, but there are two problems. First of all, the foreign investment tends to go into high-tech industries, which are capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive, and that means they create relatively few jobs.

The more important problem is that when foreign capitalists create industries, it gets in the way of native capitalists creating industries. The latter simply cannot compete with the huge multinational firms. The development of a native capitalist class is thereby blocked – another reason that the original model of capitalist development that took place in Western Europe is no longer valid. Foreign investment, then, serves mainly to make the rich richer and to strengthen the imperialists’ control over the neocolonial world. Foreign investment is a cause of, and not a solution for, economic backwardness in the neocolonial world.

Neither trade nor foreign investment, therefore, is an adequate source of capital, but there is still one more possibility: borrowing. Poor countries can get loans from western banks and governments, and from international agencies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Once again, the problem is that the loans have enriched the lenders at the expense of the borrowers. The former colonies find themselves deeper and deeper in debt and forced to use ever-increasing portions of their national budgets simply to pay interest on the loans.

As for the international lending agencies like the IMF, they attach strings to their loans, demanding that recipient nations implement “austerity” programs to increase the level of exploitation of already desperately poor

populations. Clearly, borrowing capital has not proven to be a viable way out of the dilemma of underdevelopment.

With these considerations in mind, an answer as to how European imperialists underdeveloped the rest of the world begins to emerge. It was not primarily direct robbery, although some of that occurred. It was not even primarily a matter of repatriation of profits, although there was a lot of that, too. The main way was by using their immense financial dominance to block the rise of native competitors.

Consider this metaphorical example of how financial power prevents the rise of competitors. In the first years of postwar America, grocery stores were small neighborhood markets – “Mom and Pop” stores – and they were ubiquitous. Then along came the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company with something new called “supermarkets.” Wherever the A&Ps appeared, they began competing with the Mom and Pop stores for customers, or, as they say, for “market share.” To maximize their market share, they decided to drive the Mom and Pop stores out of business, and they did. With their great financial resources, they could afford to operate at a loss for a considerable period of time, and so they actually sold their products at a loss. The Mom and Pop stores were unable to compete with that for long, so they went under rather quickly. Once the supermarkets had the customers all to themselves, they were free to raise their prices back to profitable levels – and more.

That is the essential way that imperialism works, too. Industrialized countries have a great advantage in productivity, which means they can manufacture products at much lower cost than non-industrialized countries can. But if the imperialist countries flood the markets of the poorer countries with cheaply produced machine-made products, that alone prevents the latter from industrializing. That is the primary answer to the question of how Europe underdeveloped Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

England’s deindustrialization of India provides an instructive case study. In 1750, India produced almost 25 percent of the world’s total manufactured goods. By 1914, India’s share had dropped to 2 percent. In 1750, India’s largest export was cotton textiles. By 1850, its largest export was opium for the China market.

The imperialists use their overwhelming financial power to distort the economies of the poorer

countries. They force them to produce commodities for the American and European markets, rather than products that their own people need. A study of hunger in Latin America pointed to instances in which widespread hunger increased during periods when agricultural production was rising. How could it be that people were hungrier when farmers were producing more food? It turned out in one case that Central American farmers were growing feed for beef that would wind up in McDonald’s hamburgers in the United States. In another case, large numbers of farmers in Colombia had switched over from growing rice and beans for the local market to growing carnations for the American market. No one held a gun to the heads of those farmers and forced them to grow carnations. The farmers found they could increase their incomes thirty-fold if they would forsake rice and beans and grow flowers instead. Who can blame them? Most people, if offered jobs paying thirty times what they had previously been earning, would take them, too. That is how financial power distorts weaker economies and causes them to produce for the export market.

When the newspapers run stories about famines in Africa, readers are led to believe that the Africans are so backwards they cannot grow enough food to feed themselves, but that is not the case. African countries typically continue to export cash crops such as cotton on a massive scale while people are starving to death, and if they can grow cotton, they could be growing food. Droughts and other natural disasters may trigger or exacerbate famines in Africa, but the primary blame must be ascribed to the economic forces of imperialism.

Is There a Solution to the Problem of Imperialism?

For the exploited countries, the only way out of this dilemma – or at least the first step – is to somehow remove themselves from the worldwide economic system where the wealthy countries have an overwhelmingly unfair competitive advantage. They have to gain control of their own fragile economies and protect them so they can at least have the opportunity to grow. They can do that by centralizing economic decision-making, putting all foreign investments under strict central control, and declaring a state monopoly of foreign trade to prevent cheap foreign goods

from flooding their markets and wrecking their own industries. These initial steps cannot solve all of a poor country's problems, because it still has to buy its imports and sell its exports on the world market. But gaining control over its own production decisions is an absolutely critical step, without which no further progress is possible.

Gaining that control, however, is easier said than done. When poor countries have tried to opt out of the world market system, they have invariably met with great resistance from the powerful industrialized countries. That is where the military side of imperialism comes back into play. As previously noted, China, Japan, and the African colonies were originally forced into the international economic system by military violence. Likewise, any countries trying to leave the system have found that they have to fight their way out.

Russia was the first country to successfully remove itself from the world system, and in the process showed that it could only be accomplished by means of a social revolution that abolished capitalist economic relations within the country – a lesson learned and applied by China and Cuba as well. The period when countries could pull themselves up by their own bootstraps in the context of the capitalist system seems to have ended, leaving revolution as the only means by which they can regain their sovereignty and self-determination.

The one example of a country victimized by imperialism that managed to break free of foreign domination without leaving the world capitalist system is Japan, which not only regained its sovereignty but went on to join the imperialist club itself. In the years preceding World War II, Japanese capitalists were excluded from the markets of the British empire, and the United States invoked the Monroe Doctrine to exclude them from Latin America, so Japan set out to carve out its own "sphere of influence" in eastern Asia and the Pacific. The way they went about it was every bit as brutal as what the Europeans and Americans had done in the past. What a wonderful, inspirational story Japan might have been – the first example of a non-white people overcoming and defeating the murdering, raping racists of the western world . . . if only they, too, had not created a murdering, raping, racist, imperialist regime of their own. The attempt to emulate the economic development of the western nations seems to have had a terrible

effect on Japan's moral development as a nation. In any event, the Japanese exception does not invalidate the general rule because Japan accomplished its modernizing transformation by the end of the nineteenth century, before that window of opportunity had closed forever.

More recently, certain countries of the so-called Pacific Rim – especially Taiwan and South Korea – seem to have taken major steps toward economic modernization without removing themselves from the global market system. South Korea, for example, has reached a level of industrialization such that its automobiles can compete on the world market. And according to certain standard economic indicators, Taiwan and South Korea are no longer "underdeveloped" countries, but have joined the ranks of the "developed" world. It is important to note, however, that the standard economic indicators fail to tell the whole story. The primary indicator that economists use to measure development is GNP (gross national product) per capita. But although these countries have undergone a degree of industrialization that has raised their GNPs, have they really prospered? Their process of development has been so unbalanced and uneven that by most social indicators – life expectancy of the entire population, infant mortality rate, and literacy rate – they are still deeply mired in poverty.

It is not clear yet that these countries have really risen out of economic dependency in any meaningful sense. Nonetheless, the levels of industrialization that they have accomplished are impressive and demand an explanation. What was the secret of their success? And more important: Can their success be repeated by other poor countries?

The most significant factor was the position of Taiwan and South Korea in global Cold War politics following the Chinese Revolution. After China successfully broke the grip of imperialism and withdrew from the world system in the mid-1950s, and after the Korean War, the United States determined to make Taiwan and South Korea showcases of Asian capitalism. These two countries were groomed as outposts of imperialism in the Far East, and a political decision was made to modernize their economies. But the "economic miracle" of the Pacific Rim must be placed in numerical perspective. The combined populations of Taiwan and South Korea total only about 70 million – a drop in the Asian bucket of between two and three billion

people. Market economies have always allowed small minorities to enrich themselves, but they have no answers for the problem of global poverty as a whole.

The history of imperialism is still developing. The demise of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites has begun to reopen a large part of the world to free-market exploitation. American imperialism has for some years been in decline relative to its main competitors, giving rise to a renewed increase in interimperialist rivalry. Yet American imperialism is still the dominant military power on the planet and is more arrogant than ever, now that the Soviet threat has been removed. Its armies have already proudly triumphed over such mighty powers as Grenada and Panama, but seem to be having difficulty conquering slightly larger countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. All of this indicates that the history of imperialism has entered a new and dangerous phase of instability that will bring about more of the wars and revolutions that are characteristic of the imperialist era.

SEE ALSO: Imperialism and Capitalist Development; Imperialism, Modernization to Globalization; Rodney, Walter (1942–1980); Taiwan, Anti-Imperialism and Nationalism

References and Suggested Readings

- Chomsky, N. (2003) *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Hochschild, A. (1998) *King Leopold's Ghost*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Lenin, V. I. (1939) *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. New York: International Publishers.
- Louis, W. R. (Ed.) (1998) *The Oxford History of the British Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Magdoff, H. (1969) *The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of US Foreign Policy*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Rhodes, R. I. (Ed.) (1970) *Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Rodney, W. (1982) *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Washington, DC: Howard University Press.
- Roy, A. (2004) *An Ordinary Person's Guide to Empire*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
- Strayer, R. W. (1995) *The Making of the Modern World*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Wallerstein, I. (1974, 1980, 1988) *The Modern World System*, 3 vols. New York: Academic Press.
- Williams, E. (1994) *Capitalism and Slavery*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Imperialism, modernization to globalization

Paul Le Blanc

Modern theories regarding the dynamics of capitalism and global economic development have been profoundly influenced by the perspectives of Karl Marx and others attempting to utilize those perspectives. Not only are the realities being analyzed quite fluid and complex, however, but there have been significant divergences among those employing Marxist perspectives. For example, the revolutionary theorizations of such figures as Rosa Luxemburg and V. I. Lenin were sharply challenged by conceptions of Karl Kautsky, generally perceived as the leading theoretician of the German socialist movement and as “the Pope of Marxist orthodoxy” (although some have argued that the notion of “orthodoxy” is inconsistent with the dialectical, non-dogmatic quality of Marx’s own thought).

“Orthodox” Marxism

The so-called “orthodox” Marxist approach typified by Kautsky and his Russian counterpart Georgi Plekhanov tended to see history (as Kautsky wrote in his classic *The Materialist Conception of History*) as involving an “evolution to ever higher forms” in a manner that “operates independently of men’s volition and knowledge and, rather, determines their direction” – that is, “special laws of the development of society . . . that do not contradict the laws of natural evolution, but form, one can say, their natural extension.” History was seen as involving a succession of stages of society, each leading to a higher phase of human development: primitive-communal societies giving way to a progression of civilizations – ancient slave societies, feudalism, and then a capitalism whose accelerating productive capacities would create the material basis for socialism.

Applying this approach to “backward” tsarist Russia, Plekhanov argued that capitalist development would provide a progressive breakthrough making possible the hoped-for future, that “every factory founded in Petersburg . . . strengthens the ‘flame of economic progress,’” because “the objective social conditions of production for

socialist organization have not yet matured.” In his view, “in order to fight capitalism, only one way is left: to help it grow as fast as possible.”

Before 1914, even Lenin had accepted what was then considered the “orthodox” Marxism of Kautsky and Plekhanov, stressing “the bourgeois character of the Russian revolution” of the future, which, in overthrowing tsarist absolutism and the semi-feudal backwardness of old Russia, “will, for the first time, really clear the ground for a wide and rapid European, and not Asiatic, development of capitalism.”

The Kautsky/Plekhanov “modernization” process projected an evolving industrial capitalist economic base creating a social, cultural, and political superstructure (a growing working class, capitalist class, and intermediate layers; a growing economic surplus; growing urbanization and literacy; freedom of expression and a democratic republic; and so on). Only then would it eventually become possible for a diverse but united proletarian majority to struggle for and win the economic democracy of socialism. This was seen as the essence and the promise of the “bourgeois-democratic revolution” that had triumphed in the American and French Revolutions.

Modernization Theory

In later years, this general approach was utilized by non-Marxists who developed what came to be known as “modernization theory,” muting class struggle and leaving off the need for an eventual socialism, what development scholar Gilbert Rist calls a “Marxism without Marx.” One of its best-known representatives was Walt Whitman Rostow (1916–2003), who played a key role in helping to shape US foreign policy in the mid-twentieth century. Using as a starting point a somewhat idealized conception of the rise of industrial capitalism and democratic politics in Britain and the United States, he theorized in *Stages of Economic Growth* (1960) a developmental model that promised a future of freedom and abundance for all of the world’s peoples. According to Rostow, “it is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories: the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption.”

Early Britain, for example, as a “traditional society” during its feudal period, had a low level

of economic productivity, but by the late 1600s and early 1700s it had entered into “preconditions for take-off” as the “insights of modern science began to be translated into new production functions in both agriculture and industry, in a setting given dynamism by the lateral expansion of world markets and the international competition for them.” In the “age of enlightenment” the idea spread “not merely that economic progress is possible, but that economic progress is a necessary condition for some other purpose, judged to be good: be it national dignity, private profit, the general welfare, or a better life for the children.” The proliferation of education and enterprising attitudes helped to generate new capitalistic personality types “willing to mobilize savings and to take risks in pursuit of profit or modernization.”

The take-off period is equivalent to Industrial Revolution – “the interval when the old blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally overcome. . . . The forces making for economic progress, which yielded limited bursts and enclaves of modern activity, expand and come to dominate the society. Growth becomes its normal condition.” All of this has a profound impact on cultural habits and institutional structures. Profitable new industries “stimulate, through their rapidly expanding requirement for factory workers, the services to support them, and for other manufactured goods, a further expansion in urban areas and in other modern industrial plants. . . . The new class of entrepreneurs expands; and it directs the enlarging flows of investment in the private sector.” There are also profound changes in agriculture and the quality of rural life, and a shrinking rural population with the acceleration of urbanization. “In a decade or two both the basic structure of the economy and the social and political structure of the society are transformed in such a way that a steady rate of growth can be, thereafter, regularly sustained.”

After a half-century of such industrializing/modernizing “take-off” comes “what may be called maturity,” constituting “the stage in which an economy demonstrates the capacity to move beyond the original industries which powered its take-off and to absorb and to apply efficiently over a very wide range of its resources – if not the whole range – the most advanced fruits of (then) modern technology.” This, in turn, leads to “the age of high mass consumption, where, in

time, the leading sectors shift towards durable consumers' goods and services." Rostow notes that "as societies achieved maturity in the twentieth century . . . a large number of persons gained a command over consumption which transcended basic food, shelter, and clothing," and also "the structure of the working force changed in ways which increased not only the proportion of urban to total population, but also the proportion of the population working in offices or in skilled factory jobs aware of and anxious to acquire the consumption fruits of a mature economy." This involves a transition to a higher stage within which, in Rostow's description, we can see a flowering of democratic process and the common welfare:

It is in this post-maturity stage, for example, that, through the political process, Western societies have chosen to allocate increased resources to social welfare and security. The emergence of the welfare state is one manifestation of a society's moving beyond technical maturity; but it is also at this stage that resources tend increasingly to be directed to the production of consumers' durables and to the diffusion of services on a mass basis, if consumers' sovereignty reigns. The sewing-machine, the bicycle, and then the various electric-powered household gadgets were gradually diffused. Historically, however, the decisive element has been the cheap mass automobile with its quite revolutionary effects – social as well as economic – on the life and expectations of society.

This pathway to modernization (in which we can see the economic base transforming the social, cultural, and political superstructure) was, according to Rostow, open to all nations and all peoples. Rostow was a leading Cold War ideologist in the United States. If the "underdeveloped" regions of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and certain sections of Europe did not make their breakthroughs to "take-off" in a timely manner, he warned, they could be diverted and set back by communist revolution. He therefore advocated policies targeting the "underdeveloped" countries with foreign aid from advanced capitalist countries plus international institutions (the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and so on) and foreign investment from multinational corporations, to help stimulate their economies and propel them toward the take-off of modernization.

Uneven and Combined Development

A dramatically different analytical approach was put forward by Leon Trotsky (1879–1940), which he began to develop in the wake of the 1905 revolutionary upsurge in Russia, giving full expression to it in the 1930s. He articulated a far more complicated view of the historical development of Europe than the simple, unilinear schema of "orthodox" Marxists (primitive-communal → ancient slave civilization → feudalism → capitalism → socialism) or of Rostow (traditional → enlightenment/commerce → industrial take-off → modernized maturity and consumer democracy). We have seen that for Rostow the Marxist emphasis on class struggle is absent, although later scholars have noted that the advances of democracy and human rights were gained through such struggles, often focused through the efforts of labor and social movements (Rueschemeyer et al.; Eley; Nimtz). In contrast to Rostow, Trotsky was far more in line with classical Marxism on this matter. But Trotsky's conception employs Marxist perspectives in a manner allowing for a greater complexity of forms and historical variety – matching more the "messiness" of life and of actual social development. He labeled this conception "the law of uneven and combined development."

While specifics of Britain's development were no less important for Trotsky than for Rostow, the specifics of France's development were also important in a way that is missing from Rostow. As with other Marxists, Trotsky saw the French Revolution as the high point of *bourgeois-democratic revolution*. This is defined as a revolution that sweeps away the vestiges of the feudal mode of production, clearing the way for the full development of capitalism, replacing monarchist absolutism with a popular and representative form of government. Something of the sort had been achieved by the earlier bourgeois-democratic upheavals of the 1600s in England, and although the monarchy and elements of feudal residue had not been entirely eliminated there, the outcome had also cleared the way for capitalism's full development – enabling England to be the site of the Industrial Revolution's inauguration, which soon spread to France as well.

In the course of the nineteenth century, the capitalist mode of production triumphed throughout Europe. Yet the transformation took

place in a manner that was qualitatively different from the form it took in England and France. This relates to the *law of uneven development*: different areas and different countries are just that – different. While all of Europe had been dominated by some variety of feudalism, and while all of Europe was affected by the development of the capitalist market, the different regions had their own particular characteristics. For various reasons, technological and cultural and ideological innovations arose first in one area and then had an impact on other areas at different times – leading to uneven development in the history of Europe as a whole.

This leads to another historical law, explained by Trotsky in this way: “Unevenness, the most general law of the historic process, reveals itself most sharply and complexly in the destiny of backward countries. Under the whip of external necessity their backward culture is compelled to make leaps. From the universal law of unevenness thus derives another law which, for the lack of a better name, we may call the law of *combined development* – by which we mean a drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms.”

This *law of uneven and combined development* guaranteed that the dynamics of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and the transition to a capitalist social order, would be quite different in other parts of Europe and in later periods than had been the case in France at the end of the eighteenth century.

The traditional, aristocratic ruling classes of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe very much felt what Trotsky called “the whip of external necessity.” This took several forms. One was the dangerous example of the French Revolution that could potentially become a model for their own discontented classes. Some traditionalists undoubtedly wanted to deal with this through increased repression, pure and simple – favoring reactionary policies that would prevent any changes in the forms and norms of the old social order. There were, however, three other “whips of external necessity” which thwarted such an easy “solution.”

Most important was the Industrial Revolution that was unleashed by the capitalist economic development of Western Europe. Such a mighty generator of material wealth and power could hardly be shrugged off. Related to this was the

fact that the traditional ruling classes – despite their feudal origins and inclinations – had themselves, for well over a century, been inescapably seduced by and entangled in the world capitalist economy. These two interrelated “whips” (the progress of the Industrial Revolution and the traditional ruling classes’ own involvement in the world capitalist economy) made it impossible to return to an earlier feudal “golden age.” The traditionalists were, instead, compelled to adapt to a profoundly changing social order. A third “whip of external necessity” was provided by the French invasions during the Napoleonic wars that spanned the first 15 years of the nineteenth century, which both impacted on all of Europe with French “modernizing” influences and compelled the traditional ruling classes themselves to “modernize” in order to survive and compete in the changing world.

Even with the old ruling classes’ grudging adaptation to some aspects of capitalist “modernization,” however, their determination to maintain as much monarchist power and aristocratic privilege as possible was destined to generate a wave of revolutionary explosions throughout Europe in 1848. But the law of uneven and combined development ensured that these explosions would assume different forms and have different consequences than had been the case during the French Revolution.

The further development of capitalism – and especially of industrial capitalism – had resulted in a growing divergence among the new social classes throughout Europe’s cities and towns in the nineteenth century. What had been simply “the people” in revolutionary France became increasingly the sharply defined, self-conscious, and often openly antagonistic classes of capitalist employers on the one hand and proletarian wage-workers on the other. In between was a middle stratum of independent artisans and small shopkeepers, impelled by the dynamics of the capitalist marketplace but also on the verge of being ruined by larger capitalist enterprises. In Trotsky’s view, this three-layered class structure in the urban areas – bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and proletariat – did not form a cohesive revolutionary mass such as had existed in Paris of 1789, but rather an uneasy alliance in the struggle against semi-feudal absolutism. In the rural areas there were large landowners and various peasant strata – the former more often than not constituting a backward-looking aristocracy,

while the peasant masses (who were a majority of Europeans) were often inclined toward traditionalist values and hostile to urban capitalist pressures, but also inclined to be revolutionary if this could satisfy their deep hunger for land and dignity.

Given this sociological line-up, Trotsky (and other Marxists, such as Lenin and Luxemburg, but also Marx and Engels before them) found the explanation of why French events of 1789–93 were not duplicated during the democratic upheavals of 1848 in Europe. In the earlier situation, amid an admittedly complex swirl of events, elements of the rising bourgeoisie helped lead a mass-based movement of the urban and rural poor in smashing the remnants of the old feudal order. Results of the revolutionary triumph included: the replacement of monarchy with a constitutional republic; the achievement of national unity, with a form of nationalism strongly tinged with radical-democratic content; and a sweeping land reform which broke the power of the aristocracy, clearing the way for a thoroughgoing development of capitalism. In 1848, dominant elements of the already-existing bourgeoisie, frightened by working-class radicalism, drew back from revolution and sought an alliance with potent remnants of the old feudal order. The results of the defeated revolution included: the preservation of powerful monarchies; in some cases (such as Germany) the failure to achieve national unity; the combined thwarting of democratic political currents and development of a conservative-tinged nationalism; maintenance of power by a landowning aristocracy; and capitalism becoming entwined with traditional elites.

In tsarist Russia, which did not experience the democratic storms of 1848, the monarchy itself had initiated a degree of “modernization” and the capitalists had become junior partners of the autocracy. For Trotsky, this meant that only a rising of the working class, supported by the vast peasantry, could carry out the democratic revolution, against both the traditional classes and the bourgeoisie. This would, he theorized, put the working class in power, helping to pave the way for a transition to socialism – which was one aspect of his theory of permanent revolution (the other being that this would be part of a global revolutionary process).

Another obvious outcome of uneven and combined development was that the more advanced capitalist countries would naturally interfere

with the “natural” development of regions of the world where capitalism was just beginning or where it didn’t exist at all. In expanding across the world in their quest for markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities, the dominant capitalist powers would be inclined to swallow up earlier systems while at the same time utilizing aspects of them in new ways in order to exploit the newly dominated regions. Certain forms of development would be fostered that were consistent with the needs of the profit-seeking outsiders and their local helpers, but there would obviously be no interest in allowing “modernizing” developments (locally controlled industrialization, rising living standards, democracy, and so on) that would in any way undercut the ability of the dominant capitalists to maximize their profits.

Dependency Theory, World Systems Theory, and Theoretical Challenges

This line of thought, often developed without reference to Trotsky, but instead with reference simply to the unfolding realities themselves, informed the outlook of a number of figures who developed variations of what came to be known as “dependency theory.” As Paul Baran (1910–64) commented in his 1957 study *The Political Economy of Growth*, “the colonial and dependent countries had no recourse to such sources of primary accumulation of capital as were available to the advanced capitalist countries.” He added that “development in the age of monopoly capitalism and imperialism faced obstacles that had little in common with those encountered two or three hundred years ago.” Even in the transition from colonialism to the postcolonial era of the twentieth century, these dynamics continued, thwarting the independent development of the now-liberated regions, continuing the dynamics of dependence on, exploitation by, and subordination to the advanced capitalist countries.

André Gunder Frank (1929–2005) developed this in his 1967 work *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. “Historical research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries,” Frank wrote, adding that “these relations are an

essential part of the structure and development of the capitalist system on a world scale.” As he summed it up, in Latin America (and it was argued that the same was true in Asia, Africa, and portions of Europe) “the centuries-long participation in the process of world capitalist development” had added up to the “development of underdevelopment.” A number of influential theorists (Paul Sweezy, Samir Amin, Pierre Jalé, Rodolfo Stravenhaven, Fernando Cardoso, and others) embraced and helped develop this general perspective, which profoundly influenced a variety of revolutionary movements in the 1960s and 1970s.

Even on the political left, however, a number of reservations were being raised about dependency theory by the last years of the twentieth century. One of the most obvious problems has to do with the implications of the word “dependency,” tending to obscure the fact that the global capitalist economy – the “advanced” no less than the “underdeveloped” areas – has, from the beginning, been profoundly *interdependent*. “The Achilles heel of these conceptions of development has always been the implicit, and sometimes explicit, notion of some sort of ‘independent’ alternative for the Third World,” is how a self-critical Gunder Frank put it in 1981, adding that this “theoretical alternative never existed, in fact.” He and others sought to overcome this flaw by embracing and helping to develop the “world systems theory” pioneered by Immanuel Wallerstein (b. 1930), which built on, while at the same time transcending, aspects of dependency theory. Perceiving capitalism as a global system involving different regions – the *core* represented by the advanced capitalist countries, the *periphery* represented by non-industrialized regions, and a *semi-periphery* of countries having, in varying proportions, characteristics of the other two – Wallerstein and his co-thinkers saw the world economic reality as interdependent and dynamic, with important flexibilities not allowed for in dependency theory, in particular significant socioeconomic mobility that could enable one or another country to pass from periphery to semi-periphery. At the same time, they shared in the belief that since “the modern world comprises a single capitalist world-economy,” it follows that separate national economies do not follow their own individual stages of development – that “to the extent that stages exist, they exist for the system as a whole.”

Other critics – often without admitting this to be the case – have preferred a return to a more sophisticated variant of the Kautsky/Plekhanov/Rostow approach of “stages in economic development.” One contribution, particularly influenced by theorizations of philosopher Louis Althusser (1918–90), involves a focus on Marx’s conception of *modes of production*, i.e., types of economy, in which are combined “forces of production” (raw materials, technology, labor) and “relations of production” (having to do with ownership and management of productive forces, and distribution of what is produced). The argument is advanced that any given society contains more than one mode of production, although today capitalism is dominant – but in some regions (especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) elements of pre-capitalist modes of production have blocked the full development of capitalism, leading to underdevelopment. In a sense, such regions may be suffering less from capitalist exploitation than from its absence.

Taking this further, Bill Warren’s 1980 work *Imperialism, Pioneer of Capitalism* insisted that the primary impact of imperialism in the non-capitalist regions of the world was not to put into place a system of oppressive underdevelopment, but rather to play the progressive role of bringing about the full capitalist economic development of those areas, including industrialization and a “modernization” consistent with Rostow’s conceptualizations. Also challenging the dependency/world systems approach have been theorizations associated with Robert Brenner in his historical explorations of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. In contradiction to Sweezy and others associated with the emergence of dependency theory, Brenner’s thesis was that not the expansion of world trade but rather a series of class struggles between lords and peasants acted as “the prime mover” in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. A key conceptual approach here involves a notion of *internal dynamics* as opposed to *external forces* bringing about deep-going social change. Viewing capitalism as representing a systematic tendency to improve productive technique and thereby increase productivity, Brenner has argued that such a system will not act as a brake on productive development in the so-called “underdeveloped” countries – instead, the cause of underdevelopment is to be found within the social structures

of those countries. Also, the exploitation of backward areas is not necessary for the development of advanced capitalist countries, because capitalism has its own internal dynamics for growth; the place of peripheral regions in the global economy has more to do with the class structures within those regions.

Developments in the global economy since the late 1970s, involving the emergence of newly industrializing countries (NICs) in some “Third World” areas – such as Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, India, and Malaysia – have buttressed these challenges. More than this, points made by economic historians M. C. Howard and J. E. King had gained considerable currency by the final decade of the twentieth century:

Corporations with huge assets on several continents can no longer be regarded as “American,” “British” or “Japanese” simply because their head offices are New York, London or Tokyo; patriotism may be, increasingly, unprofitable. To the extent that transitional corporations treat all nation states as fair game, and identify with none of them, the continued relevance of the classical Marxian approach to imperialism is in doubt.

The collapse of communism, which was occurring in the same period, contributed to a further shift away from Marxist theorizations of imperialism and critiques of capitalist development. Indian economist Prabhat Patniak commented in 1990 on what he and other Marxist “die-hards” viewed as “the paradox that while the system of relations covered under the rubric of imperialism has hardly changed over the last decade and a half, fundamental questions are discussed today, even among Marxists, without any reference to it.” Suggesting that this could be related to “the very strengthening and consolidation of imperialism,” Patniak warned that such a left-wing retreat from theorizations of (and therefore active opposition to) realities of imperialism “would only mean that the right-wing opposition to it within the Third World would get strengthened,” which would consequently “spawn racist, fundamentalist, and xenophobic movements in the Third World” putting themselves forward as the only alternative to imperialism.

Yet newer conceptualizations were gaining currency among many left-wing theorists seeking to address the realities of the new era.

Globalization and Empire

As *globalization* became the catchword of the 1990s, so *empire* would become the fashionable term for the first years of the twenty-first century. Continuities can be found between the realities covered by these conceptualizations and the dynamic developments that were the focus of the theorizations of imperialism and capitalist development that have been under examination here, despite the utilization of the new concepts, by some theorists, to dismiss the old.

Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz described economic globalization as “the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and . . . people across borders,” adding that “globalization is powerfully driven by international corporations, which move not only capital and goods across borders, but also technology.” This has enabled multinational corporations to rise above restraints or impositions that national governments or labor movements or the populations of any country may wish to establish.

Dutch economist Robert Went noted: “A growing number of people and companies find it easier and easier to meet, travel, send goods, receive images, cooperate and compete across frontiers. . . . Products from cigarettes to cars are assembled today with parts brought together from every corner of the world.” This naturally gives corporations much greater leverage in dealing with workers in these and in other countries. “If the company thinks it profitable, it can close or move its operations,” observed Went. “More often it can threaten to do so in order to extract concessions from trade unions.” More than this, according to Prabhat Patniak, “there is a tremendous globalization of capital,” and “this fluidity of finance represents globalization in a double sense: not only in the sense that finance flows everywhere, but also in the sense that it is sucked out of everywhere,” and that “national economies become the plaything of speculative forces with nation-states being reduced to the role of helpless spectators.”

The global expansion of capital has also meant the global expansion of paid labor (working-class occupations doubling between 1975 and 1995 to 2.5 billion), with developing technologies

and job mobility – according to sociologist Ronaldo Munck impacting negatively on “the industrial workers of the old smokestack industries” of Europe and North America. He added that “any gains from increased economic integration will go to capital and not to labor, especially the traditional working class outside of the high-tech sectors.” The average income in Africa also fell steadily, and far more dramatically, in the last three decades of the twentieth century to barely 7 percent of that in the industrialized nations. The average income in Latin America was one-third of that in the industrialized North at the end of the 1970s, but only one-fourth by the end of the century. “Only a handful of East Asian countries seemed at the time to have succeeded in narrowing the gap or even joined the North,” Went reported. “But since the outbreak of the Asian crisis in 1997 it is these very prodigies that have been demoted to total losses.”

The growing inequalities have assumed proportions that some find startling: half the global population of 6 billion living on less than \$2 per day – with 1.3 billion getting by on less than \$1 per day. As of 2005, the world’s 225 richest people enjoyed a combined income of \$1 trillion – equal to the combined annual income of the world’s 2.5 billion poorest people. It has been estimated by US economist Michael Yates that a tax of 4 percent levied on these 225 richest people would pay for basic and adequate health care, food, clear water, and safe sewers for every person on earth. Despite uncertainty over how best to theorize such realities, they have given rise to a massive and diverse global protest movement seeking to challenge the path that global capitalism has taken. Influential economist Jeffrey Sachs, while acknowledging that “the antiglobalization movement has a powerful point” in stressing abuses of power by the multinational corporations, has argued: “The movement is too pessimistic about the possibilities of capitalism with a human face, in which the remarkable power of trade and investment can be harnessed while acknowledging and addressing limitations through compensatory collective actions.”

Sachs and others placed much hope in a massive worldwide “modernization” program represented by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals campaign, initiated in 2000 and endorsed by 191 governments. It established detailed proposals and projections for achieving, by 2015, eight overarching goals: (1) eradicate

extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop a Global Partnership for Development.

Marxist critics responded that such a campaign could not be successful in a global context dominated by multinational corporations and their institutional appendages (such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). Such campaigns, if carried out successfully, would necessarily alter the political-social balance of power, opening the possibility of improving the quality of life for many millions of people and transforming culture and consciousness in ways that facilitate further struggles against problematic aspects of the status quo. The critics insist that this would have to amount to a revolutionary challenge to the capital accumulation process, and the related necessary process of profit-driven global expansion, that Luxemburg, Lenin, and other revolutionary Marxists sought to comprehend in their own time. While the processes of capitalist development and imperialism have undergone dramatic transformations over the past century, transformations that have recently been explored by analysts employing the conceptualization of globalization, in the first decade of the twenty-first century there appeared to be a renewed confidence among many regarding the continued relevance of the older Marxist concepts.

A new theoretical construct arose, however, which both utilized and challenged aspects of these older concepts – renewing a notion that many dependency theorists had utilized during the Cold War (1946–90), that world capitalism had moved far from the days of Lenin and Luxemburg when “interimperialist rivalry” had led to global war (in 1914–18 and again in 1939–45). In the face of “the communist challenge” in the Cold War era, a unified international capitalism was being overseen by the immense power of the United States. With the fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was dominant, now more than ever – as a center of neoliberal economic and social policies, as a central driving force in the globalization process, and as the most preeminent military power in the world. The term some theorists used was *empire*.

“The concept of Empire is presented as a global concert under the direction of a single conductor, a unitary power that maintains the social peace and produces its ethical truths,” commented Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their surprise bestseller *Empire*, read with rapt attention by both partisans and opponents. “And in order to achieve these ends, the single power is given the necessary force to conduct, when necessary, ‘just wars’ at the borders against the barbarians and internally against rebellion.” The two analysts note that “Empire presents its order as permanent, eternal, and necessary,” that it “is formed not on the basis of force itself but on the basis of the capacity to present force as being in the service of right and peace” – or, to phrase it somewhat differently, “although the practice of Empire is continually bathed in blood, the concept of Empire is always dedicated to peace – a perpetual and universal peace outside of history.”

Hardt and Negri asserted that imperialism had now passed out of existence, superseded by this new reality of “Empire.” Yet in their description, empire “constructs its own relationships of power based on exploitation that are in many respects more brutal than those it destroyed,” and they added that “the geographical and racial lines of oppression and exploitation that were established during the era of colonialism and imperialism have in many respects not declined but instead increased exponentially.” Given the definition we have been using here, however, what they describe suggests not a replacement, but rather a dramatically new phase of imperialism, in some ways reminiscent of the “ultra-imperialism” theorized by Kautsky.

Hardt and Negri themselves noted that Lenin, perhaps Kautsky’s severest critic, wrote that “there is no doubt that the development [of the global capitalist system] is going in the direction of a single world trust that will swallow up all enterprises and all states without exception,” but in his 1915 introduction to Nikolai Bukharin’s *Imperialism and World Economy* he had argued that global imperialist wars and social revolutions would destroy capitalism before this “ultra-imperialist” conclusion was reached. Given the seeming failure of Lenin’s prophecy, Hardt, Negri, and others were inclined to see this new phase opening up at the dawn of the new century – particularly as the United States appeared to be moving forward

with a strategy to refashion, more or less unilaterally, the world order by means of a relentless invasion of Iraq.

On the other hand, a significant range of currents with perspectives akin to classical Marxist conceptions have argued that the new phase of imperialism had more continuity with the old than Hardt and Negri allowed for. From the Philippines shrewd global analyst Walden Bello, monitoring US policy regarding Iraq, commented: “Although the United States remains the world’s prime power, its global system of domination is under severe assault and may be unraveling.” From the United States, geopolitical theorist David Harvey concurred that “the US is highly vulnerable,” stressing that “the geopolitical picture is extremely volatile,” with a number of unpredictable trouble-spots in the world that “could easily spill over into major global dislocations” that would be beyond the ability of the United States to impose any “ultra-imperialist” resolution.

While the realities of the new century were sufficiently complex and fluid to preclude the possibility of a universally agreed-upon analysis of how best to comprehend continuities and novel developments, for at least some revolutionary-minded analysts and activists the traditional theorizations of imperialism, dovetailing with the theory of uneven and combined development, seemed to retain much of their analytical strength. The realities of the early twenty-first century have caused some to conclude – along with thoughtful British analyst Sam Ashman – that the reality of the global system truly “is a combined and uneven social entity” (which she has also characterized as “clumpy and territorialized, but dynamically so and in complex ways”) that it “is clustered around capitalist cores and states,” and that it “generates movements of resistance and opposition.” This would mean – regardless of its shifting incarnations – that continued capitalist development on a global scale promises, as in the past, to continue triggering protests and revolutions throughout the world.

SEE ALSO: European Revolutions of 1848; Imperialism and Capitalist Development; Imperialism, Historical Evolution; Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marxism; Negri, Antonio (b. 1933); Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- Baran, P. (1957) *The Political Economy of Growth*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Bello, W. (2005) *Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Bukharin, N. (1972) *Imperialism and World Economy*. London: Merlin Press.
- Frank, A. G. (1967) *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2000) *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2005) *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Howard, M. C. & King, J. E. (1989) *A History of Marxian Economics, 1883–1929*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kautsky, K. (1988) *The Materialist Conception of History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Le Blanc, P. (1996) *From Marx to Gramsci: A Reader in Revolutionary Marxist Politics*. Amherst: Humanity Books.
- Lichtheim, G. (1971) *Imperialism*. New York: Praeger.
- Löwy, M. (1981) *The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development: The Theory of Permanent Revolution*. London: Verso.
- Magdoff, H. (1978) *Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Munck, R. (2002) *Globalization and Labour: The New "Great Transformation."* London and New York: Zed Books.
- Patniak, P. (2003) *The Retreat to Unfreedom: Essays on the Emerging World Order*. New Delhi: Tulika.
- Renton, D. (Ed.) (2001) *Marx on Globalization*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Rist, G. (1998) *The History of Development, From Western Origins to Global Faith*. London: Zed Books.
- Rostow, W. W. (1960) *Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rueschmeyer, D., Stephens, E. H., & Stephens, J. D. (1992) *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Sachs, J. (2005) *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time*. New York: Penguin.
- Wallerstein, I. (1979) *The Capitalist World-Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Warren, B. (1980) *Imperialism, Pioneer of Capitalism*. London: Verso.
- Went, R. (2000) *Globalization: Neoliberal Challenge, Radical Responses*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Yates, M. (2003) *Naming the System: Inequality and Work in the Global Economy*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

India, armed struggle in the independence movement

Kunal Chattopadhyay

India's independence movement has widely been regarded as a prime example of a "peaceful" revolution. But the image of Gandhi's non-violent national struggle conceals several strands of protest. Peasant and worker movements cannot be categorized as non-violent since they were not moved by the same ideals as Gandhi. Within the British armed forces, too, there were smaller revolts well before the great revolt of 1857, which saw the direct takeover of rule over India by the British state from the East India Company. From the late nineteenth century, middle-class youth were trying to organize the overthrow of British rule by force.

British rulers designated as "terrorists" those who sought to end British rule by force of arms. Indian nationalists called them revolutionaries or militant nationalists, a term many nationalist historians in independent India have accepted. However, Sumit Sarkar (1973), writing about the Bengali revolutionaries of the anti-Bengal Partition period, pointed out that the term terrorism was not inappropriate, since what the Indian freedom movement saw were not plebeian uprisings by the popular masses, as in Paris or Petrograd, nor long peasant wars, as in China, but assassinations of oppressive officials, spies, and traitors, bank robberies to finance political operations, and occasionally more grandiose plans for armed coups by penetrating the army's ranks.

Revolutionary nationalism of this kind was inspired by a combination of factors. The rise of a national consciousness among the petty bourgeoisie involved the influences of the French Revolution, the American War of Independence, and the Young Italy of Mazzini. Secondly, there was a feeling by the late nineteenth century among considerable sections of militant youth that the politics of humble supplication was achieving nothing. Thirdly, both in Bengal and Bombay, two major centers of political activity in the period, Hindu cultural politics of a new, very militant kind was influencing youth. In some cases the Hindu revival went on to become Hindu cultural nationalism and eventually a Hinduism-based right-wing politics. But in its

early stages it influenced many to take a radical direction.

There were many reasons why early attempts at armed struggle turned to revolutionary terrorism rather than mass armed struggle. In the first place, with a few exceptions, the middle-class advocates of armed confrontation lacked faith in the willingness and ability of the popular masses to fight the British. Secondly, the success of the British rulers in keeping Indians disarmed by means of the Arms Act of 1878 made it impossible for Indian revolutionaries to organize large-scale operations. As a result, hatred of British rule, disgust with the politics of mendicancy, and distrust of the masses were combined in the ideology and politics of petty bourgeois youth. This left the formation of secret societies as the only option. In fact, in Calcutta, then the capital of British India, secret societies were being formed and had been recruiting among students since the 1870s, though at this stage they emphasized ideological propaganda and physical culture. The novel *Anandamath* by Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, with its tale of a secret order of Hindu monks fighting against the waning power of the Bengal Nawab as well as against the emerging power of the British, inspired the youth of Bengal. Militant youth were also inspired by a speech in 1893 by Swami Vivekananda at the Chicago Parliament of Religions, where he addressed westerners as equals, and by his missionary activities and attempts to challenge what he saw as colonialist-sponsored efforts to impose Christianity through a more militant Hinduism.

The first instance of armed action took place in the Bombay presidency. An oppressive British official named Rand, in charge of enforcing anti-plague regulations in Poona near Bombay, was assassinated in 1897 by the brothers Damodar and Balkrishna Chapekar. Both were hanged after a trial. Their condemnation of Rand included a perception that his work involved repression and insult to their religion.

Revolutionary attitudes were also being fostered in Bombay by Bal Gangadhar Tilak through the invocation of Marathi nationalism and militant Hinduism. Secret societies were being formed, for example the Mitra Mela (Friends' Association) set up by Ganesh Savarkar and his younger brother, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. Thus secret societies and the idea of militant struggle were developing more or less simultaneously in Bengal

and Bombay. The return of Aurobindo Ghosh from Britain also had an impact. Aurobindo was employed by the ruler of Baroda, from where he wrote a series of articles criticizing traditional politics. Pramathanath Mitra, Surendranath Tagore, and others set up a secret revolutionary organization named Anushilan Samiti, which emphasized physical, mental, and moral development. Margaret Noble, an Irish follower of Vivekananda whom he had named Nivedita, had contacts with Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin and was possibly among those responsible for circulating the idea of propaganda by deed. However, the political outlook of anarchism was entirely foreign to these nationalists, who sought not a stateless society but an independent India.

First Phase of Revolutionary Terrorism: 1905–1911

Lord Curzon's decision to partition Bengal led to an intense mass movement within the middle classes. Internal weaknesses and the inability to draw in peasants, the urban poor, and Muslims of all social layers created a feeling of desperation, leading some sections to turn to revolutionary terrorism. Two papers that had been advocating militant action from an early stage were *Sandhya*, edited by Brahmabandhav Upadhyay, and *Yugantar*, published by a faction within Anushilan Samiti led by Bhupendranath Dutta, Aurobindo's brother Barindra Kumar Ghosh, and Abinash Bhattacharyya. The *Yugantar* group soon lost faith in the Anushilan strategy of physical culture using traditional instruments and forms (sticks, swords, wrestling) and turned to secret advocacy of guns and bombs. Aurobindo had made contacts in 1902 with a group in Midnapur founded by Jnanendranath Basu, his brother Satyendranath, and Hemchandra Kanungo. In the same year, Sarala Ghosal, a remarkable young woman, started a gymnasium at her father's house; one of the first young men to train there was Pulinbehari Das, the founder of the Dhaka Anushilan Samiti. These small revolutionary groups found many potential recruits when the mass movement of 1905 began.

Earlier attempts to assassinate former Lieutenant Governor Bampfylde Fuller had ended in failure. In 1908, while trying to kill a repressive magistrate named Kingsford at Muzaffarpur, Kshudiram Bose and Prafulla Chaki hurled bombs at the wrong car and killed an innocent British

couple, the Kennedys. Chaki committed suicide rather than be caught, while Bose was arrested, tried, and hanged. While under arrest he was tortured brutally by the police, who extracted enough information to arrest Aurobindo, Barin Ghosh, Upendranath Bandyopadhyay, and others, leading to the Alipore Conspiracy Case. Led by Pulinbehari Das, the branch of Anushilan Samiti at Dhaka set up a large network all over northern and eastern Bengal and carried out several raids. In November 1908 Pulinbehari Das was arrested, but other young men like Trailokya Chakraborty, Amritalal Hazra, and Pratul Ganguly provided leadership.

Some revolutionaries, such as Jatindranath Mukherjee, often called Bagha (“tiger”) Jatin, had more far-reaching plans for an all-India collaboration among revolutionaries and worked toward an uprising by infiltrating the army. The class-caste limitation was evident, however, for in an official list of 186 killed or convicted revolutionaries from 1918, at least 165 came from the three upper castes of Bengal – Brahmin, Kayastha, and Vaidya.

Though the number of incidents was greater in Bengal, other places also saw important – in some ways more important – attempts at revolutionary armed struggle. From about 1909, the Punjab experienced revolutionary terrorism, initiated by people like Sardar Ajit Singh, Amba Prasad, and Lala Hardayal. The increase in land rent there had caused widespread anti-British feeling, and the revolutionaries were also more inclined to look into peasant grievances.

In Maharashtra, an organization set up by Savarkar and others called Abhinav Bharat (Unique India) kept in touch with secret societies in various parts of western and central India. It also set up a bomb manufacturing workshop, which was later discovered by the police. As a result of the ensuing Kolhapur Bomb Case, many revolutionaries were given severe sentences.

As well as organizing secret societies in India, revolutionary nationalists sent their members abroad. Some, like Hemchandra Das, went chiefly to learn about modern weapons, while others set up propaganda organizations and attempted to get help from countries hostile to Britain. Shyamji Krishna Verma (1857–1930), professor of culture at Oxford, set up a center for Indian students and in 1905 began publishing a paper called *Indian Sociologist*. Later, to avoid arrest, he went to Paris and then Switzerland. Madam Bhikaji Rustam

Cama (1861–1934) was active in London and Paris. She and her colleague Sardar Singh Rajoji Rana smuggled arms to Indian revolutionaries back home. Madam Cama and Rana joined the French Socialist Party and attended the International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart in 1907.

In 1906, Vinayak Savarkar went to England and worked under the guidance of Krishna Verma. In 1909, he was behind Madanlal Dhingra’s assassination of Sir John Curzon Wyllie. Dhingra was hanged in an English jail on August 17, 1909. Savarkar was arrested and sent to India, but he jumped ship near Marseilles and swam to the French coast. The French police handed him back, which led to a trial at the International Court at The Hague on the question of political asylum. However, imperialist pressure was enough to get the case dismissed. Brought back to India, Vinayak and his elder brother were both sentenced to transportation for life in the Andaman Islands. Life in the Andamans was terrible and Savarkar broke down there, sending in a clemency petition as early as 1911. In 1913 he sent a letter to the Imperial Council promising not only his own conversion to constitutionalism, but also that of many other young people who had seen him as their guide. He was finally released subject to a condition that he abstain from political activity for five years. His future career shows that subsequent Hindu nationalism of the Savarkar variety, with its violence directed entirely against Muslims, was pro-imperialist.

By contrast, Virendranath Chattopadhyay, also in Europe, and Tarak Nath Das and Lala Hardayal in the United States were consistent propagators of revolutionary politics. The most significant effort abroad, however, prior to World War I was taken by Punjabis, both Sikh and Hindu, in the United States and Canada. Led by Baba Sohan Singh Bhakna, Kartar Singh Sarabha, Lala Hardayal, and many others, they formed the Ghadar (Revolution) Party in 1912. The party planned armed struggle in India and tried to get military training for its adherents. It had connections with Maulavi Barkatullah, a professor at Tokyo University, and through him it also attracted many Muslims.

Second Phase of Revolutionary Struggles: 1914–1918

The outbreak of World War I gave an impetus to armed struggle attempts. The number of British

soldiers in the Indian army had declined to 15,000, and the revolutionaries hoped to use this opportunity to drive out the British by force of arms. Their strategy involved four targets. First, they sought to get Indian soldiers in India and Burma to defect to their side. Second, the Ghadar revolutionaries, who were returning to India, were to organize with the others and take part in the armed struggle. Third, there was to be effective coordination among all the revolutionary groups in India. Britain's war with Turkey, the seat of the Khalifa, which claimed religio-political leadership of all Sunni Muslims, brought about close cooperation between militant nationalists and militant pan-Islamists like Maulana Obeidullah Sindhi, Barkatullah, and others. Finally, a serious bid was made for German military assistance.

In 1915, Virendranath Chattopadhyay, Abinashchandra Bhattacharyya, Dr. Bhupendranath Dutta, Lala Hardayal, and their comrades set up the Indian Independence Committee, better known as the Berlin Committee. It received promises of military assistance from the German ministry of foreign affairs and planned to invade India. As an initial step, plans were made to send two shiploads of German weapons to India. Three distinct components existed in the bid for armed uprising. Raja Mahendra Pratap and his associates planned to invade India through Afghanistan. In collaboration with Obeidullah Sindhi and Barkatullah, he formed a Provisional Government of India in Kabul. Meanwhile, the Ghadar revolutionaries were coordinating action in America and India. Baba Sohan Singh Bhakna and his companions left for India on August 22, 1914. Punjabis abroad were incensed by the *Komagata Maru* incident, when a shipload of emigrants from Punjab was turned back from Canada after two months of privation and uncertainty. On their arrival at Calcutta harbor, they were treated badly, leading to a riot in which 20 to 40 were killed. Baba Sohan Singh Bhakna and his companions contacted Bengal revolutionaries like Jatindranath Mukherjee, Narendranath Bhattacharyya, and Rashbehari Bose as well as soldiers stationed in many camps of north India, especially at Mian Mir (Lahore), Jalandhar, Ferozpur, Peshawar, Jehlum, Rawalpindi, Mardan, Kohat, Bannu, Ambala, Meerut, Kanpur, and Agra cantonments. Many party workers joined the army with a view to obtaining arms and ammunition. Finally, Jatindranath Mukherjee and Narendranath Bhattacharyya tried to get arms for an insurrection in Bengal.

In Bengal, the revolutionaries achieved a major success in August 1914, when they managed to obtain 50 Mauser pistols and 46,000 rounds of ammunition from the Rodda firm at Calcutta. Jatindranath Mukherjee united most revolutionary groups, planning the disruption of rail communications, the seizure of Fort William in Calcutta through contacts within the 16th Rajpur Rifles, and the landing of German arms. To arrange the German arms shipment, Narendranath Bhattacharyya was sent to Java. The Bengal plans were part of a far-reaching conspiracy organized by Rashbehari Bose and Sachin Sanyal in collaboration with the Ghadar Party. The plan for a coordinated revolt on February 21, 1915, based on military uprisings at Rawalpindi, Ferozepur, and Lahore, to be backed up by popular risings, was, however, foiled by treachery. There were some scattered mutinies, notably at Singapore on February 15, 1915, for which 37 soldiers were executed and 41 transported for life. Rashbehari Bose fled to Japan, while Sachin Sanyal was transported. Despite its failure, this planned revolt showed a significant departure from earlier actions. This was no plan for heroic action by individuals but an armed revolution whose chief organizers, the Ghadarites, were the first to reach out to the army and the peasantry. The authorities struck back ferociously, organizing nine conspiracy trials, sentencing 42 to death, transporting 114 for life, and awarding various prison terms to 93 others.

In Bengal, Jatindranath Mukherjee had sent Narendranath Bhattacharyya to Batavia to procure arms. But the plans were ruined by poor coordination and accurate British intelligence reports. The captain of the ship *Maverick*, carrying the arms, did not go to India. Unaware of this, Jatin and a small band of his followers waited in the Sunderbans for ten days, after which they fled to Orissa, where they were apprehended by a huge British force in Chasakhand near Balasore. In a pitched battle fought on September 9, 1915, Chittapriya Roy died on the battlefield and Jatin was mortally wounded, dying the next day.

Third Phase: From National Revolutionary Politics to Mass Revolutionary Politics

At the end of World War I, British imperialism adopted a carrot and stick policy to subdue the

revolutionaries. Some constitutional concessions to moderate nationalists were followed by the Rowlatt Bills in 1919, which sought to deny normal legal processes for anyone accused of terrorism or sedition. The government retained its special powers despite the end of the war. The Congress launched the non-cooperation movement and supported the Khilafat movement. But when Gandhi unilaterally called off the movement after enraged peasants had killed some policemen in Chauri Chaura, the revolutionaries again started planning operations. From 1923, "patriotic robberies" resumed. Applying the Bengal Ordinance, notorious police officer Charles Tegart carried out massive repression. In 1924, several thousand revolutionaries were arrested without trial. At the Belgaum Session of the Indian National Congress, Gandhi brought a resolution condemning political killings, which was passed by a narrow margin.

Meanwhile in northern India, the Hindustan Republican Association was set up. Its first daring action was a rail robbery at Kakori in August 1925. Many of the revolutionaries were eventually arrested; four of the principal organizers, Ram Prasad Bismil, Asfaquallah, Rajendranath Lahiri, and Roshanlal, were hanged and Sachindranath Sanyal, Jogeshchandra Chatterjee, and three others were sentenced to life imprisonment. After the elimination of its initial leadership, control of the organization fell to Bhagat Singh and Chandrasekhar Azad. In 1925, Bhagat Singh, the nephew of Ajit Singh, had returned to Lahore and within a year he and his colleagues had started a militant youth organization called the Naujawan Bharat Sabha (Young India Association). In April 1926, Bhagat Singh established contact with Sohan Singh Josh, a former Ghadar activist now veering toward socialism, and through him the Workers and Peasants' Party, which published a monthly magazine, *Kirti*, in Punjabi.

For the next year Bhagat Singh worked with Josh and joined the editorial board of *Kirti*. In 1927, he was arrested on the charge of association with the Kakori Case, being accused of writing an article under the pseudonym *Vidrohi* (Rebel). Bhagat Singh spent the years from 1927 to 1928 studying the history of the revolutionary movement in India. His articles, mostly written for *Kirti*, dealt with the Babbar Akali Movement, the Kakori Case, the Delhi Bomb Case, individual revolutionaries, the need for young people to come forward and join the

revolutionary movement, and the necessity of evolving an alternative to the mainstream leadership of the Congress.

By 1928, Singh was writing about anarchism and Marxism, making it clear that the counterposition between terrorism or violence and non-violence was false, the real issue being whether the struggle was for the liberation of the people or not, and why violence was being applied. Thus, it was not surprising that at a meeting in Delhi's Feroz Shah Kotla ground in 1928, the leading members of the Hindustan Republican Association decided to change the name of their organization to the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association (HSRA). Attempts were made to link up with the working-class struggles in major industrial cities. Branches of the organization were set up across north India, Bombay, and Madras. By this time, a Communist Party of India (CPI) had been set up, formed partly by emissaries of the Communist International (sent by Narendranath Bhattacharyya, who as M. N. Roy had become a leading Comintern figure). However, the emphasis on mass organization did not mean that the HSRA gave up the idea of violence. During the anti-Simon Commission agitations in the Punjab, police brutality caused the death of veteran Congress leader Lala Lajpat Rai. The HSRA decided to avenge his death. Bhagat Singh and Rajguru killed a police officer. In April 1929, Bhagat Singh and Batukeswar Dutt entered the Central Legislative Assembly during a discussion on the Trade Dispute Bill, threw a bomb, and waited to be arrested. They shouted the slogans "Inquilab Zindabad" (long live the revolution) and "Down with Imperialism." This was the first public utterance of what has become the standard communist slogan in India. Their aim was to use the arrest to propagate their ideas.

In the ensuing Assembly Bomb Case, Bhagat Singh was sentenced to transportation for life. But this was followed by the Lahore Conspiracy Case, in which he was sentenced to death, along with Sukhdev and Rajguru, and they were hanged on March 23, 1931. During the trial, the prisoners agitated for political prisoner status and declared a hunger strike; Jatin Das died after going without food for 64 days. Bhagat Singh explained during his trial that revolution was not the cult of the bomb and the pistol but a social transformation culminating in the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Having learned his Marxism directly rather than through

the medium of the Stalinized Communist International, he was also refreshingly free of talk about the necessity of supporting the bourgeoisie and a two-stage revolution. Many of the survivors of the HSRA went on to found the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), the biggest of the anti-Stalinist parties formed in the late 1930s in India, though others joined the CPI. Jogesh Chatterjee, as well as many of the younger cadres, including former Anushilan Samiti activists, joined the RSP. The death penalty for Bhagat Singh caused a countrywide stir, for he was at that time practically as popular as Gandhi. Indeed, at the Round Table Conference, Gandhi candidly told the British side that if they did not deal with him they would have to deal with the revolutionary terrorists. At Karachi, Gandhi was greeted by black flagwaving youth. In 1930, after the death of Chandrasekhar Azad in an encounter with the police in Allahabad, revolutionary activities in north India died down.

In Bengal, a number of groups were active in the early 1930s. The most important was the group led by Surya Sen in Chittogram (Chittagong). Sen was not only the leader of the revolutionary group but also a local Congress leader. The group conceived a plan to set an example for the youth and students of India and to demoralize the imperialists. Thanks to the group's political strength and cohesion, the plan remained totally unknown to the police. The objective was to occupy both armories in Chittagong on April 18, 1930, cut off the telephone and telegraphic links, thereby isolating the city, and round up as many English officers as possible to be used as hostages or eliminated if they offered resistance. One assault group took over the Police Armory housing 500 policemen. More than 500 rifles, several dozen revolvers, and large quantities of ammunition were captured in the operation. The disruption to railway and telecommunication lines was also successful. On April 22, 1930, the revolutionaries confronted a huge armed enemy force at a small hill known as Jalalabad Hill; 83 of the enemy were killed, while machine gun fire from a higher hill resulted in the death of 12 rebels. The remainder retreated at night to carry out guerilla warfare.

A significant departure on the part of Surya Sen was his willingness to accept that women had the same right to fight for India's independence as men, and the same capacities for self-sacrifice.

Kalpana Dutta and Pritilata Waddedar were two heroic women who fought in this armed struggle. Pritilata took part in a raid on the Pahartali European club on September 24, 1932. After the successful raid, which she had led, on the way back she committed suicide, leaving a note for the women of India calling on them to share with their brothers the tasks of armed struggle.

The Third Armory Raid Trial that commenced on June 15, 1933 involved Surya Sen, Tarakeswar Dastidar, and Kalpana Dutta. The first two were sentenced to death by hanging, while Kalpana was given a life sentence. Before being hanged, Surya Sen and Tarakeswar Dastidar were beaten to death by the top executive officers and their dead bodies were taken to the gallows and hanged. Instead of being handed over to their kin or cremated, their bodies were thrown into the Bay of Bengal, indicating the desire for vengeance on the part of the rulers against those who had frightened them out of their wits for nearly four years.

Another distinctive feature of the Chittagong struggle was the participation of Muslims. In some of the areas where the underground guerilla activists operated, the majority of peasants were Muslims. It was they who provided shelter to Surya Sen, Kalpana Dutta, and others. As Dutta wrote, there were police informers, but they needed to be identified as informers, not as Hindu or Muslim informers.

The Bengal Volunteers, another revolutionary organization of this period, killed in succession three cruel district magistrates of Medinipur – Burge, Peddy, and Douglas. However, while Ganesh Ghosh, Kalpana Dutta, Ananta Singh, and other cadres of Surya Sen later became communists, at the time of the uprising the group carried out little socioeconomic analysis, an important difference with Bhagat Singh.

The Indian National Army

During World War II, a much more serious attempt at armed resistance was made by Subhas Chandra Bose, a well-known left-wing Congress leader who had been expelled from the Congress in 1940. Bose had fled India, hoping to get support from other countries. After being turned down by the USSR, he obtained some support from Italy and Germany. But though he organized an Indian Legion, he felt that

Germany was not giving him real help. Meanwhile, Japan had begun war with the western Allies. So Bose left Germany for Japan on February 8, 1943.

Bose's relationship with the Japanese was much better than with the Germans. He met Prime Minister Tojo and was invited to the Japanese parliament. He then moved on to Singapore. When the British surrendered there, a large Indian army contingent was present. Out of their number Captain Mohan Singh organized a free Indian army. Rashbehari Bose, then a resident of Japan, presented Subhas to a cheering crowd. Three and a half months later, on October 21, 1943, Bose publicly announced from the Cathay Theater in Singapore the formation of an Azad Hind Government (Indian National Government). The tides of war had already started moving against Japan. But Subhas Chandra nonetheless persuaded the Japanese to attack India from Manipur, neighboring Burma, using the Azad Hind Fauz or Indian National Army (INA).

To most Japanese officers the issue of Indian independence was irrelevant and the conquest of India was to be carried out by the imperial Japanese army. There was mutual distrust between INA and Japanese senior officers. Pro-British writers have claimed that the INA never fought the British. The reality, however, as even British intelligence reports state, is that the INA fought the British with great courage, despite being outgunned and having limited equipment and no food. The INA marched in battalion formations, refusing to be broken up into smaller units and integrated with the Japanese army. Subhas Chandra Bose was repeatedly accused of being a Quisling. The CPI, which after the Nazi invasion of the USSR had declared the war a people's war and supported the imperialist war effort, called him a fifth columnist. The record, however, shows that this is incorrect. He refused to fight any enemy except the British. When Aung San rose in revolt in Burma, Bose refused to let the Japanese use the INA against Aung San's soldiers.

The INA itself was organized in a secular manner and its units were named after national leaders. From the beginning Bose laid emphasis on recruiting women. A young Tamil doctor, Lakshmi Swaminathan, became the leader of the women's battalion. The INA fought valiantly and came close to Kohima, where the national flag

was raised. But it was forced to retreat as the Japanese were themselves retreating. In May 1945, when the defeat of Japan was only a matter of time, the INA continued to fight with death-defying courage. Two units under Captain Bagri and Lieutenant Gyan Singh Bisht fought against superior armed British forces (in one instance against a motorized column including 13 tanks and 11 armored cars); all died in action. When Japan surrendered, Bose tried to fly to Darien in Manchuria to contact the Soviet army, reasoning that after the war Soviet and imperialist interests would diverge. But he died in a plane crash on the way.

The legacy of the Azad Hind Fauz was considerable. For the first time after 1857, Indian soldiers had fought in uniform against the British and, despite the odds, had been able to move into India. This fact enthused many people and the trials of the Azad Hind Fauz soldiers became the starting point for the postwar upsurge. Clement Attlee, the British prime minister from 1945 to 1951 who presided over the final transfer of power, told a former Bengali judge that Bose's INA did much more than Gandhi's *satyagraha* (peaceful protest) to persuade him that it was time for Britain to pull out of India.

SEE ALSO: Aung San (1915–1947); Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945); Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); India, Civil Disobedience Movement and Demand for Independence; India, Nationalism, Extremist; India, Post-World War II Upsurge; Indian National Liberation; Singh, Bhagat (1907–1931)

References and Suggested Readings

- Banerjee, K. K. (1969) *Indian Freedom Movement Revolutionaries in America*. Calcutta: Jijnasa.
- Fay, P. W. (1994) *The Forgotten Army: India's Armed Struggle for Independence*. Calcutta: Rupa.
- Ghosh, A. (1979) *Bhagat Singh and his Comrades*. New Delhi: CPI.
- Hechs, P. (1994) *The Bomb in Bengal: The Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism in India, 1900–10*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Josh, S. S. (1978) *Hindustan Ghadar Party: A Short History*, 2 vols. New Delhi: PPH.
- Noorani, A. G. (2002) *Savarkar and Hindutva: The Godse Connection*. New Delhi: Leftword Books.
- Roy, S. (1970) *The Restless Brahmin: Early Life of M. N. Roy*. New Delhi: Allied Publishers.
- Sarkar, S. (1973) *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal: 1903–1908*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.

India, civil disobedience movement and demand for independence

Kunal Chattopadhyay

The first demand for complete independence from Britain was raised in the forum of the Indian National Congress (Congress) in 1921 by Maulana Hasrat Mohani and Swami Kumaranand. But the mainstream nationalist forces, the Moderates, and the Indian capitalist class supporting them, were willing to accept self-government within the Empire. The reforms demanded by the Congress were not conceded by imperialism and subsequent attempts at contesting elections and wrecking the system from within, proposed by a section, did not work out. Gandhi's strategy of constructive work paid some long-term dividends in terms of building organizations, but little more. The unilateral withdrawal of struggles in 1922 by Gandhi had angered the All India Khilafat Committee representing a large number of Muslims. Meanwhile, new forces began to rise. Socialist and communist movements developed. The influence of the Russian Revolution was also felt in circles beyond the emerging communists. The formation of the All India Trade Union Congress saw the rise of organized labor militancy. Conflicts between the bourgeoisie and the imperialist rulers had increased in the early decades of the twentieth century, but fear of popular radicalism had restrained the bourgeoisie. The rise of Gandhi had resolved this problem to a certain extent, for the Gandhian techniques involved a completely controlled mass movement and a careful eschewing of proletarian struggles. But in 1927, during Gandhi's absence, the Congress session saw an upset victory for a resolution demanding complete independence. Gandhi opposed the demand in 1928, but facing a significant militant nationalist and leftist pressure, promised that if within one year his demand for *Swaraj* (a term Gandhi never explained elaborately, but one that was roughly a demand for Dominion Status within the Empire) was not met, he would move for complete independence.

Simon Commission and Nehru Report

Throughout 1928 and 1929 Gandhi acted as a brake on the increasing pressure for a fresh round of all-India mass struggle, remaining emphatic in his moderate demand for *Swaraj*. But the announcement of an all-white commission headed by Sir John Simon to look into further constitutional changes led to radicalization. The Simon Commission was boycotted by militant nationalists. Liberals like Sapru and a large section of Muslim leaders led by Jinnah joined hands with the Congress to try and draw up the outlines of a constitution. In the Central Legislative Assembly, Lala Lajpat Rai's resolution stating that Indians had no faith in the commission was supported by Jinnah. The Simon Commission arrived in Bombay on February 3, and was greeted by black flags and slogans saying "Simon go back." But anti-Simon Commission protests came at a cost. In Lahore, Lajpat Rai was severely injured in a baton-charge by the police, and died a few days later. The responsible police officer, Saunders, was subsequently shot dead by Sardar Bhagat Singh and his comrades.

Meanwhile, the Indian political parties tried to arrive at a consensus. Virulent opposition by the Hindu Mahasabha (a Hindu communal organization) to any concessions to minorities was a major hindrance, especially as many Congress leaders had Hindu communal leanings. At a meeting of Muslim organizations and personalities organized by Jinnah in 1927, a set of proposals included the creation of a province of Sind, and the introduction of reforms in Baluchistan and the North Western Frontier Provinces (NWFP) on the same footing as in any other province. In case the foregoing were accepted, the Muslims were willing to give up separate electorates, and were also willing to make to Hindu minorities in Sind, Baluchistan, and NWFP the same concessions that Hindu majorities in the other provinces were prepared to make to Muslim minorities. It was further proposed that in Punjab and Bengal the proportion of representation should be in accordance with the population. In the Central Legislature, Muslim representation should not be less than a third and that also by a mixed electorate. Thus, Jinnah had prevailed upon the Muslims to cooperate with other communities and peoples without any communally separated electorate. But the Motilal

Nehru Committee Report (1928) reflected the positions of the Congress Moderates and the Hindu communalists. At the all-parties meeting (December 1928) Jinnah's emotional appeal for Hindu-Muslim unity was curtly turned down by Hindu Mahasabha leader M. R. Jayakar. As a result, Jinnah was compelled to ally with the more conservative factions of the Muslim League and to raise the demand for a separate electorate, as well as full provincial autonomy in a federal constitution.

The Salt *Satyagraha*

Gandhi's hesitations about launching a militant movement stemmed from a dichotomy of the capitalist class. On one hand, the Indian capitalist class, notably cotton, jute, and steamship concerns, were restive at the attitude of the rulers who protected the profit of their British counterparts. But they were also fearful of the rise of labor militancy. Throughout 1928 and 1929 there was thus a pull between militancy and moderation. On November 2, 1929 Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, the Liberals and Madan Mohan Malaviya, a Hindu communalist Congress leader, joined in accepting Viceroy Irwin's offer of a Round Table Conference on the condition of discussing amnesty and the details of Dominion Status, among other issues. Subhas Bose objected, but Jawaharlal Nehru ultimately went along. With the Viceroy rejecting Gandhi's conditions, however, negotiations broke down. Then, at the Lahore session of the Congress (1929), Gandhi agreed to the resolution for *purna swaraj* (complete independence), and Jawaharlal in his presidential address attacked capitalism. Control of the movement was left entirely with Gandhi. Subhas Bose's proposals for non-payment of taxes and general strikes were rejected. The main resolution even praised Irwin, and endorsed the initial acceptance of his offer. Nonetheless, a qualitative leap was taken forward in the anti-colonial struggle. The delegates welcomed the unfurled tricolor with the slogan *Inquilab Zindabad* (long live the revolution).

Following the Lahore Congress there was a lull, till Gandhi decided on the precise methods of the struggle. January 26, 1930 saw the independence pledge being taken all over India. In Calcutta, Subhas Bose and others were brutally beaten up by the police for trying to hoist the tricolor. Congress legislators were ordered to resign on January 6, an instruction obeyed by

most, but not all, including Muslim Congressmen like Ansari, who had been unhappy with the idea of a national struggle without a pact between the major communities. A communist-led railway strike was allowed to go down in defeat without much nationalist support. On January 31, 1930 Gandhi's much diluted 11-point ultimatum to Irwin combined issues of general interest, such as 50 percent cuts in army expenses and civil salaries, total prohibition, release of political prisoners, and reform of the police. Changes were sought in the Arms Act (a strange demand from a votary of non-violence), along with three specific bourgeois demands, these being the lowering of the rupee-sterling exchange ratio to 1 shilling 4 pence, textile protection, and reservation of coastal shipping for Indians. Two basically peasant themes were sounded. One was a demand for a 50 percent reduction in land revenue, and the other an abolition of the salt tax and the government salt monopoly.

The demands show the clear commitment of the Gandhi leadership to bourgeois hegemony. There was not a single demand for the working class. The specifically bourgeois demands were extremely conjunctural. A Mercantile Marine Conference in January 1930 had failed to settle disputes between British-owned and Indian-owned shipping interests, while in March 1930 the Bombay Mill-Owners' Association demanded protection against British and Japanese competition. The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) denounced the existing rupee-sterling ratio. At the Calcutta Indian Chamber of Commerce, D. P. Khaitan declared that without India attaining self-government, the economic position was not likely to improve.

Gandhi did not take up any of the radical demands for the peasantry. He mentioned peasant woes only to highlight direct colonial exploitation. The selection of the salt tax, from which the entire movement came to be called the Salt *Satyagraha* (a program of peaceful violation of specific laws, mass courting of arrests, occasional general strikes), was thus symbolic. It emphasized a universal grievance of the rural poor without focusing class issues. It offered the peasant the chance of a small but psychologically important extra income, and offered to urban adherents the possibility of symbolic identification with peasant sufferings. The resounding success of the movement showed that

the immense surge of popular discontent had been tapped and canalized into safe routes by Gandhi. It was not so much that Gandhi called the movement into being, but that he was able to render it harmless enough for the bourgeoisie.

Gandhi organized a march from his Sabar-mati *asrama* (retreat) near Ahmedabad to Dandi on the Gujarat coast, from March 12 to April 6, 1930. Accompanying him were 71 members of his *asrama*, drawn from all parts of India. But right from the beginning, the popular pressure on Gandhi was discernible. Village officials began to resign their posts along Gandhi's route. On March 19, well-to-do peasants in Kheda district demanded permission to start immediate non-payment of revenue, a demand Gandhi conceded with great unease. It was in mid-May, after Gandhi's arrest, that the Congress Working Committee (CWC) sanctioned full-scale non-payment of land revenue in the *raiyyatwari* provinces where the state collected revenue directly, while in the *zamindari* provinces (where the state collected revenue through landed intermediaries) they advocated non-payment of *chaukidari* tax (a tax paid to the state) and the violation of forest laws in the Central Provinces. At Dandi, in protest against British taxes on salt, Gandhi and thousands of followers broke the law by making their own salt from seawater. There were tremendous levels of violence going beyond what had been done in 1920–2. In Calcutta, Karachi, and Madras there were clashes between the crowd and the police. After pressure, Gandhi and the CWC agreed that women too could take part in the *satyagraha*. Sarojini Naidu took part in the Dandi *satyagraha*, and subsequently led a massive salt raid in Dharasana, when there was extreme police brutality.

A few major outbursts went clearly beyond the outlines of Gandhian civil disobedience and intensified repression. Notable were the armed struggles initiated by Surya Sen and his followers in Chittagong, East Bengal; the activities of the Hindustan Socialist Revolutionary Army in the Punjab; and the proletarian uprising in the city of Sholapur, where for a few days a parallel government was set up.

Within the Gandhian framework, most alarming from the British point of view was perhaps the popular upsurge in Peshawar. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a Pathan chieftain's son, had been carrying out educational and social reform work among his countrymen. Influenced by Gandhi,

in 1929 he had organized a huge volunteer force of over 50,000, the Khuda-i-Khidmatgar (volunteers for god). On April 23, 1930 the arrest of Ghaffar led to a mass upsurge in Peshawar and intensive firing at Kissakahani Bazar for hours. According to unofficial estimates the number of dead ranged from 200 to 250. Garhwal Rifles troops, all upper caste Hindus, were brought in, but they refused to fire on the unarmed Muslim protestors. It took the British ten days to regain control over the city. Thakur Chandra Singh Garhwali, who had led the military refusal, was criticized by Gandhi, who insisted that a soldier in uniform had to obey his superior officers.

With complete independence the declared goal, the movement this time was a step forward from previous Gandhian struggles, and the result was the policy of tremendous brutality adopted by the frightened imperialist government. The number of people arrested was much higher – 92,124 according to the estimate of Nehru. Bengal with 15,000 provided the largest contingent, followed by Bihar with 14,251. Non-payment of tax was met by wholesale confiscation of household goods, implements, and even land.

As with any all-India movement, there were regional variations. Metropolitan Bombay, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu under the Gandhian C. Rajagopalachari, Bengal, where *bhadralok* (a cultural identity combining landed interests with urban petty bourgeois linkage) Congress leaders played a very limited role, but Gandhian cadres mobilized significant numbers of people, Orissa, Bihar, and particularly UP, saw major advances in the struggles. However, in Bengal communal riots in Dhaka and in villages in Kishoreganj cut short the initial Muslim tendency to join the struggles. The failure of *bhadralok* nationalism to address peasant (mostly Muslim) issues and the failure of communists at this point to pose an alternative contributed to the communal transformation of class agenda. By contrast, Sind saw a weak movement due to the absence of Muslims, Andhra and Assam saw peasant movements but less participation in the Gandhian movement itself, and in Maharashtra, while new, anti-Brahmin campaigners like Keshavrao Jedhe were coming into the movement, many followers of Tilak (who had promoted a Hinduized nationalism) like B. S. Munje were moving in a distinctly fascist Hindu communal and loyalist direction. The ultra-left policy of the Communist International (its "Colonial Thesis" called for no truck

with any section of the colonial bourgeoisie) meant the Communist Party of India tried to keep away from these struggles. A distinctive voice was also raised by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, who participated in the Round Table Conference in 1930 and raised the demand for separate electorates for untouchables.

Gandhi-Irwin Pact

From the autumn of 1930 there was an overall weakening in forms of struggle associated with the bourgeois groups or upper peasantry, while popular struggles continued but fewer under Congress control. In such a situation, both the Gandhian leadership and the bourgeoisie moved towards a negotiated, compromise settlement, vital for British aims. So far the Round Table Conference had attracted only Homi Mody among big capitalists, along with a range of Muslim leaders including Jinnah, and Hindu Mahasabha leaders, Liberals, and a big princely contingent. But the mass struggle made implementation of the Simon Commission Report impossible. Liberal leaders like Sapru, Chintamani, and others had been pressing the Congress to accept some settlement. But Gandhi's change of front cannot be attributed to their pressure. Rather, there is some evidence that Indian capitalist interests were at work. On February 7, 1931 the Bombay governor reported to the Viceroy that some of Gandhi's mercantile followers were likely to break with him unless he moved to a settlement. During the Gandhi-Irwin talks, Gandhi accepted federation (a weak central government with strong imperialist control), Indian responsibility (the executive would be responsible to the legislative), and reservations and safeguards, i.e., that defense, external affairs, the position of minorities, the financial credit of India, and the discharge of obligations were kept for the Viceroy. The Gandhi-Irwin agreement of March 5, 1931 agreed to release the civil disobedience prisoners and gave concessions over salt and non-political *Swadeshi* propaganda. But this was more than offset by Gandhi giving up his demands for an enquiry into police atrocities and the return of confiscated land already sold to third parties.

Radical nationalists were angered by the terms of the pact, and further angered by the hanging of Bhagat Singh and two of his comrades on March 23, 1931, just before the opening of the

Karachi session of the Congress. The Naujawan Bharat Sabha, the mass organization built by Bhagat Singh, organized a demonstration against Gandhi at Karachi railway station. But the left inside Congress could not resist Gandhi, a pattern that would be recurrent over the years. Nehru had worked out a fairly radical agrarian program while in jail. He also put forward the idea of a constituent assembly as the central political slogan, but then, as later, he never stood up to Gandhi. With most leading communists in jail, the only socialist criticisms came from people like Yusuf Meherali of the Congress Socialist Party, who denounced the politics of compromise, but drew back before making any operative proposal. The Karachi session did adopt a resolution on pro-left fundamental rights and economic policy, as a part of the hegemony-building strategy of the Congress. Long-term goals would be adopted with radical rhetoric, but policy and tactics would be determined by the right. It was mostly about general democratic rights such as civil liberties, legal equality, adult suffrage, free primary education, and a state policy of religious neutrality, with much of Gandhi's 11 points of 1930, and a few modest promises for labor, such as living wages, an end to forced labor, trade union rights, and a vague statement about state control over key industries and mineral resources. A very moderate program of agrarian change included reduction in land rent and revenue, and no reference was made to the abolition of *zamindari* (landownership).

After the compromise the Congress found its hands tied. By allowing the mass movement to fritter away its energies, the Congress had done what imperialism wanted it to do. At the Round Table Conference, separate electorates were demanded by Muslims, the *Harijans* or the *dalits* (untouchables or depressed classes), Indian Christians, and others. Gandhi fought against the concerted move to make all constitutional progress conditional on a solution of the communal problem. At one stage he even offered to accept all the Muslim claims provided they supported the Congress demand for *Swaraj*. But this was an empty gesture, since the Congress had not broken decisively with the Hindu Mahasabha. Ramsay MacDonald now threatened to impose a unilateral communal award if the Indians failed to agree. Outmaneuvered, Gandhi returned to India to find Nehru and

Ghaffar Khan in jail, and large-scale repression underway. Viceroy Willingdon rudely turned down Gandhi's request for an interview, after all preparations had been taken by imperialism for a crackdown. As a result, a poorly organized second civil disobedience movement was launched. Arrests and convictions were high in January and February 1932, but started declining thereafter to not over 4,000 from May onwards. The imperialists themselves admitted that there was little difference between their rule and fascist rule, with Willingdon saying that he was becoming a sort of Mussolini in India.

When civil disobedience was renewed, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry decided to keep away from the constitutional discussions. G. D. Birla assured the British that the decision to boycott the Round Table Conference had been taken under pressure from member bodies, and the door was not closed for further talks. At the Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference in the summer of 1932, India conceded lower import duty rates for a number of British commodities in return for preferential treatment for Indian industry in the UK. In accordance with the Lees-Mody Pact of 1933, Bombay mill-owners agreed to a further preferential cut for British textiles in return for a Lancashire promise to buy more Indian raw cotton. Some disputes remained, like that over the rupee-sterling ratio. Lancashire aligned itself with the extreme imperialist Churchill. A series of concessions was wrested by British capitalism. Still the capitalist class was not willing to go for an all-out struggle for independence over this. On the other hand, the imperialist pressures were a reminder to Indian capitalism of the need to retain strong links with the national movement. The ultimate result was capitalist pressure on the Congress for participation in elections and eventually ministerial participation. Faced with a socialist current, the bourgeoisie and the Gandhians formed strong links, and bourgeois support was crucial to Congress election victories in 1937.

By the second half of 1932, Gandhian strategy showed a shift to constructive work from the policy of confrontation. MacDonald's Communal Award of August 1932 focused his attention on *Harijan* welfare. His "fast unto death" and the Poona Pact (September 1932) were able to bring about an agreement whereby the Hindu joint electorate was retained, but with reserved seats

for untouchables to a greater extent than under MacDonald's award. Making *Harijan*-upliftment a central concern, he however made his campaign rather ambiguous. He attributed the terrible Bihar earthquake of January 15, 1934 to divine punishment for the sins of caste Hindus, an obscurantist campaign that deeply shocked Rabindranath Tagore and led to a war of words between the two. Civil disobedience was formally withdrawn in April 1934.

Orthodox Hindus within the Congress disliked Gandhi's *Harijan*-upliftment campaign, and Hindu communal leaders moved away from him. Gandhi's meetings were disrupted repeatedly, and there was even a bomb attack on his car in Pune on June 25, 1934. Gandhi's campaign, which never rejected the caste system, was also delinked from economic demands. He also advised caution on inter-caste marriage and inter-caste dining. For *dalits*, the Hindu-tinged nationalism and the Hindu communalism of many upper caste politicians, and their glorification of an imagined golden age, was unacceptable, as that age was seen as one violent towards *dalits*. *Dalit* leaders like Ambedkar argued that political and economic empowerment was essential.

Constitutionalism

In August 1935 the Government of India Act was promulgated. From 1932, Indian participation in the making of this supposed constitution had been negligible. Virtually all sections of the Indian public opinion criticized it as representing little real advance over 1919. At the federal level, direct election was replaced by indirect election. Only at the provincial level, diarchy was replaced by responsible government, and the electorate was increased from 6.5 million to about 30 million. But governors retained discretionary powers regarding summoning of legislatures, giving assent to bills, and administering certain special regions. On matters like minority rights, privileges of civil servants, and prevention of discrimination against British business interests, power was "reserved."

The proposed federal structure was to come into existence only after the accession of 50 percent of the princes. It envisaged a strong center, with a few subjects transferred to elected ministers but limited by safeguards. Foreign affairs and defense were to be retained by the Viceroy, while the Central Reserve Bank and the railways

were kept out of assembly control. Ultimate financial control was transferred from London to Delhi, but that meant nothing as the power was in the hands of the Viceroy. In any case the federal part of the Act proved a non-starter as the princes, who had accepted this part of the proposal only out of fear of the civil disobedience movement, were unenthusiastic once that movement declined. The Muslim League felt it was too unitary, while the Congress denounced it as a sham.

In 1937 elections were held under the new system. The Congress won outright in five out of eleven provinces (Madras, Bihar, Orissa, Central Provinces, and UP) with a near majority in Bombay (86 out of 175 seats). It received 711 out of 1,585 provincial assembly seats. Even in the Muslim seats, the Muslim League was not able to make much headway. But Jinnah's appeal for a Congress-Muslim League coalition was turned down curtly by Nehru and Maulana Azad, who advised the League to merge with the Congress. This unwillingness to adjust with other forces in the country pushed Jinnah finally away from moderate nationalism towards communalism. His success, in turn, was caused by the Congress failure to develop and implement a radical social policy.

SEE ALSO: Ambedkar, B. R. (1891–1956); Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945); Dalit Liberation Struggles; Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); India, Non-Violent Non-Cooperation Movement, 1918–1929; Jinnah, Muhammad Ali (1876–1948); Naidu, Sarojini (1879–1949); Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964); Singh, Bhagat (1907–1931)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bandyopadhyay, S. (2004) *From Plassey to Partition*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
- Jalal, A. (1985) *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Partition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Khaliqzaman, C. (1961) *Pathway to Pakistan*. Lahore: Longmans.
- Low, D. A. (Ed.) (1977) *Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle 1917–1947*. London: Heinemann.
- Markovits, C. (1985) *Indian Business and Nationalist Politics, 1931–1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pandey, G. (1978) *The Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh 1926–34 – A Study in Imperfect Mobilization*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Panikkar, K. N. (Ed.) (1980) *National and Left Movements in India*. Delhi: Vikas.

Sarkar, S. (1983) *Modern India: 1885–1947*. New Delhi: Macmillan.

India, Great Rebellion of 1857 (the Sepoy Revolt)

Kunal Chattopadhyay

Sepoy Revolt

Despite all its claims of good governance and ethical government, British rule in India was mainly rule by force of arms. The army was the crucial institution for the establishment, expansion, and extraction of revenue for British rule. From the mid-eighteenth century the British East India Company started recruiting peasants, gave them training and discipline according to European military standards, and created a permanent independent Indian army. The commanders were European officers, some appointed from the British army, and others nominated by the company's directors. By 1794 the number of sepoys (Indian soldiers) rose to 82,000, expanding further to 154,000 in 1824 and 214,000 in 1856. There were distinct components of the army: the Bengal army, the Bombay army, and the Madras army. Despite its name the Bengal army, created first, mostly recruited upper-caste



A group of Sikh officers and men, 1858 (photographer unknown). In May of 1857, Indian soldiers in the service of the British East India Company mutinied. The rebellion spread and took a year to suppress. The revolt is considered by historians as the first prominent Indian nationalist protest. (National Army Museum, London/The Bridgeman Art Library)

elements, Brahmans, Rajputs, and Bhumihars from Awadh and Bihar. A policy of respecting caste and the dietary and other practices of the sepoys fostered a sense of caste identity in the army. As the British domains expanded, however, other communities and other types of soldiers were also recruited, such as Marathas, or Gurkhas from among the Nepalis. The Bombay and Madras armies became more heterogeneous, but the Bengal army remained relatively more upper caste. Alavi (1996) shows that the military reforms of the 1830s, creating a more uniform military culture, gave rise to discontent.

Kaye (1878) and Malleon (1891) were among those British writers who sought to portray the revolt as purely a mutiny of soldiers motivated by narrow and selfish ends. Indian historians have normally argued that though the principal revolt began with an outbreak at Meerut, 36 miles from Delhi, on May 10, 1857, there were indications beforehand. On March 29, 1857 a soldier named Mangal Pandey rebelled in Barrackpore, near Calcutta, and attacked his superior officers. Though his regiment did not join the revolt, only one soldier moved against him, while Jemadar Iswari Prasad (an Indian non-commissioned officer) refused to arrest him. Ultimately, Pandey was arrested, court-martialed, and hanged on April 8. Prasad was hanged on April 22. The entire regiment was punished by being disbanded. This, however, resulted in the disbanded soldiers going home and fueling further discontent.

There are two ways of looking at incidents like Mangal Pandey's revolt. One is to have a long debate over whether his act constituted a chain in the revolt. According to Pandey's deposition in court, he had taken *bhang*, an intoxicant. *Bhang* was to the Indian sepoy what rum was to the British soldier. But a more fruitful way is to look at the string of military mutinies before 1857, and recognize that racism, pay-related issues, and other factors of discrimination and torture had contributed to them. The Bengal army had wavered on a number of occasions. There had been mutinies in Java in 1815 and in Gwalior in 1834. There had been trouble during the Afghan campaign of 1839–42 when the deficiencies of white leadership were exposed. In the 1850s grievances among the sepoys began to increase. The General Service Enlistment Act of 1856, which demanded that sepoys should affirm their readiness to serve abroad, ignored their religious sensibilities, including the caste restriction on

Hindus in crossing the sea. It was an attempt to make the army more flexible, from the colonialists' point of view. It also went along with policies designed to introduce a wider range of caste and regional groups, such as the Sikhs of the Punjab. A large part of the Punjab army was integrated into the British army. This alarmed the Hindi-speaking Rajputs and Brahmans who had hitherto dominated the military services. In addition, Dalhousie's annexation of Awadh was widely resented, particularly by the sepoys of the Bengal army, most of whom came from Awadh. Moreover, as a result of the annexation the higher pay for serving outside the East India Company's territories disappeared. In addition, the company's direct rule meant higher taxes in Awadh, which fell on the families of sepoys. The Burma campaign had led to the demand that they should travel by sea, which once again involved a threat of loss of caste. It was in this highly charged situation that the story of the cartridges came.

From the late 1830s the Brown Bess gun was replaced by the new and superior Lee Enfield percussion cap rifled musket in the British army. The Enfield rifle had cartridges in casings, which had to be torn off using one's teeth. There was a rumor that the casing was greased with cow and pig fat. One was sacred to Hindus and the other was considered sacrilegious by Muslims. The idea that this would pollute them and make them Christians was a rumor that fell on fertile soil. Interestingly, though, during the rebellion the cartridges were used by the sepoys against the British.

Modern historians rejected the myth that a countrywide conspiracy had been created among the sepoys. What is definite is that incidents of disobedience, incendiarism, and violence were reported from army cantonments in extensive parts of India. Bengal, considered to have remained quiet after the solitary incident of Pandey, is now known to have had military incidents at different places. Discontent was rife in the army cantonments of Ambala, Lucknow, and Meerut. Eventually, on May 10, the Meerut sepoys started the revolt when 85 soldiers of the 3rd Light Cavalry were imprisoned and harshly punished for refusing to use their cartridges. The soldiers rescued their arrested colleagues and killed some of their European officers.

The Meerut garrison, however, had the largest proportion of British troops: 2,038 European troops with 12 field guns versus 2,357 sepoys

lacking artillery. As a result, the Meerut garrison could hold out. The revolt spread rapidly in its initial stage, but then was restricted to certain parts of the country. The initial crucial link in the chain was the march of the rebel soldiers from Meerut to Delhi on the night of May 10–11, 1857. They proclaimed the Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar the Emperor of Hindustan. Within a week Awadh, Rohilkhand, the land between the Ganga and the Jamuna (the Doab), Bundelkhand, Central India, large parts of Bihar, and the East Punjab all shook off British authority. In many of the princely states the rulers remained loyal to the British, but the soldiers were on the brink of revolt. Over 20,000 of the Sindhia's troops from Gwalior went over to Tantia Tope, Commander-in-Chief of Nana Saheb's (the adopted son of Peshwa Baji Rao II, and also the claimant to the highest authority among the Marathas, in Kanpur) army and the Rani (Queen) of Jhansi. Many lesser chiefs of Rajasthan and Maharashtra rebelled with popular support. Local unrest was also seen in Hyderabad.

Much is made of the fact that only the Bengal army revolted, whereas the Madras and the Bombay regiments remained quiet, while the Punjabi and Gurkha soldiers actually helped to suppress the rebellion. Against this it needs to be noted that the maximum number of Indian sepoys were in the Bengal regiment, and in terms of total number, around half the sepoys had rebelled. To the discontent with service rules had been added a fear that the British were determined to convert them into Christians, a belief fueled by the presence of missionaries as well as the cartridge issue. Moreover, as peasants in uniform, the sepoys were concerned about the declining condition of the peasantry due to new revenue settlements in Awadh. Sikh support for the British might have been the consequence of the role of the Bengal army in suppressing the Sikh army a few years previously, and of the administration of Lawrence in Punjab, where the interests of the well-to-do were looked after.

Civilian Revolt

No uniform explanation can be given for the civilian rebellion. Colonial rule had a differential impact on Indian society, so responses were not uniform. Among the active rebels were two kinds of people. There were the nobles and landlords on the one hand and the peasants on the other.

The nobles' grievances included the annexations, especially under Lord Dalhousie's Doctrine of Lapse, which refused to recognize adopted sons as legal heirs of ruling princes and annexed a number of kingdoms, like Satara, Nagpur, Sambalpur, Udaipur, and Jhansi, between 1848 and 1853. This amounted to British interference in the traditional system of inheritance. Finally, in 1856, the annexation of Awadh on the ground of misrule not only affected the entire aristocracy of the region but also created a panic among rulers of the Indian states. It was now becoming evident to them that groveling before the British did not ensure security of their throne. The British had indeed announced that Mughals would lose the title of *Badshah* (Emperor) after the death of the Badshah of Delhi, Bahadur Shah II. They would be known as mere princes. They had already been offended by Dalhousie, who was responsible for shifting them from the historic Red Fort to a humbler residence at the Qutub on the outskirts of Delhi. In a large number of cases, deposed and disgruntled princes provided political leadership, like Nana Saheb, Begum Hazrat Mahal in Lucknow, Khan Bahadur Khan in Rohilkhand, and Rani Lakshmibai in Jhansi, though earlier she was prepared to accept British hegemony if they had recognized her adopted son as the heir to the throne. By contrast, in Indore, where many soldiers of Holkar (Maratha chief) were on the verge of rebellion, the ruler remained loyal, as did Sindhia (another Maratha chief) in Gwalior. A number of powerful *taluqdars* (landed intermediaries) had lost about half their estates as the revenue settlement was made with the actual occupiers of the land or village coparcenaries in Awadh. So Awadh and the North-Western provinces, where too many *taluqdars* had been dispossessed, saw revolt. Their former tenants acknowledged their claims and united with them against the British.

Peasants joined the revolt as they were hit hard by excessive revenue demands of the state. In Awadh, for example, there were areas where revenue assessment went up, so peasants and *taluqdars* joined hands. Where agriculture was insecure, high revenue demands pushed peasants into debt and dispossession, with British courts and the legal system assisting the transformation. In 1853, in the North-Western provinces alone, 110,000 acres of land were sold through auction (Bandyopadhyay 2004). Chaudhuri's (1965) classic study of popular uprisings showed how

the new revenue systems united former exploiters and exploited against the British. However, Stokes (1980), Roy (1994), and others have provided some evidence that the picture was not so straightforward. Not all *taluqdars* suffered under the British, and post-1857 official writings mention the “loyal *taluqdars*.” Such elements exerted an influence on their community. Among the peasants, also, region-specific conditions varied. Social homogeneity and collective power were also factors in determining resistance. Of about 150,000 men who died fighting the English in Awadh, over 100,000 were civilians. Roy traces how peasants in Bundelkhand turned against the administration, then against indigenous class hierarchies as well.

Unlike other conquerors, the British were not a people who shifted to India and became part of the local population. They treated all Indians with a haughty racist disdain. So in Indian behavior, there was a good deal of anti-British attitude well before the revolt. Monish Mohanlal of Delhi, a loyalist, nonetheless wrote afterwards that even those who had grown rich under British rule showed a degree of hidden delight at British reverses.

A further factor for the growth of popular hostility was fear of British attacks on religion. This fear stemmed from the activities of the Christian missionaries, who were keen on converting people and ridiculed Hinduism and Islam, including long-held customs and traditions. Moreover, they were given ample state protection. Regardless of the actual number of people converted, they appeared as a threat to the religions of the people of India. Religious sentiments were also, at times, connected to hard economic realities, since the imposition of tax on previously exempted land hurt many Brahmin and upper-class Muslims.

At the same time, in the course of the previous two decades, people had had the experience of seeing the English face major military difficulties in the First Afghan War (1838–42), the wars in the Punjab (1845–59), and the Crimean War (1854–6). In fact, there was probably an excessive optimism on this score, for the Indians had no idea about how much military strength the British could rely on.

Structure of Administration

In the wake of the initial success of the rebels came the weakening and disintegration of the strong

anti-British combine. Rivalry arose between the Mughals and the Marathas, to the extent that Nana Saheb refused to go to Delhi, fearing he would be overshadowed by the Mughal court.

The former ruling elements, however, found control slipping out of their hands. By early July 1857 Bahadur Shah was reduced to a figurehead. After the arrival of General Bakht Khan, leader of the mutineers of Bareilly, the rebels in Delhi issued a *parmanah* (administrative order) outlining the structures of the proposed state. Though Bahadur Shah was again declared to be the emperor, real executive power was vested in a Court of Administration, which was to administer the state, maintain peace and order, collect land revenue, raise loans from the money lenders, defend the realm, and prosecute the wars. The court consisted of ten members, six from the army and four civilians. The members were to be elected by a majority vote from among intelligent, wise, capable, and experienced men who also had a record of faithful service. But this last clause was not strictly enforceable. One out of the ten members of the court was to be elected *Sadr-e-Jalsa* (President) and another *Naib Sadr-e-Jalsa* (Vice President). Each member of the court had charge of a department. In each case, four members of the court and appointed secretaries were to assist them. In other words, steps were taken to move towards a constitutional monarchy with a council of the army along with some civilians.

Bahadur Shah had the right to attend sessions of the court, and no decision of the court was enforceable without the signature of the emperor. In practice, it seems, the court was supreme. During his trial, he submitted in self-defense the argument that he was a *de facto* prisoner of the soldiers, compelled to sign and affix his seal on whatever they brought before him. While there may be some exaggeration, this suggests the rebels were trying to find solutions to modern problems, not just returning to the past. However, the procedures suggest an admixture of modernization efforts with foundations in the procedures of the traditional village self-government rules, known as the *panchayat* system.

The court was more an executive than a legislative body. But it was clear that it would not allow the princes to usurp its authority. This led to conflicts between the Mughal princes and the court. Mirza Mughal, the eldest son of the emperor, who had commanded the army till the

arrival of General Bakht Khan, was unhappy at being removed from his command. The court also established law courts, appointed judges, and regulated the judicial procedure for civil and military cases. In the sphere of finance, too, it was supreme. But the propertied classes seem neither to have advanced loans, nor to consider the abolition of landlordism. On the other hand, the peasant soldiers came from a social background where a capitalist transformation could not be envisaged. So the court tried to fix prices and check hoarding. But it did not introduce rationing or assure supplies. Realizing that so far taxes had been paid by those who could least pay, the peasants demanded tax measures that would burden mainly the rich. Orders passed by the court show it trying to abolish landlordism and pass on land to the cultivator, as well as to overhaul the whole revenue system.

A similar Court of Administration was set up in Lucknow, consisting of a number of principal servants of the king, the great landed proprietors of the area, along with representatives of the army. There, the rebel soldiers crowned Birjis Qadr, a son of the deposed Nawab of Awadh. He was declared the Nawab Vazir, but real power was vested in a minister and a Court of Administration.

Nature of the Revolt

Some contemporaries thought the revolt was a Muslim conspiracy to restore the Mughal Empire. The dominant official version was that it was chiefly a mutiny of the sepoys, the term even now most favored in English historiography. Benjamin Disraeli had asked in the House of Commons whether it was a national revolt. Marx called it in truth a national revolt. An Indian nationalist, V. D. Savarkar, called it a war of independence, a claim contested by Sen (1957) but much supported by S. B. Chaudhuri.

A large body of scholarly opinion contends it was not national, for a number of reasons:

- The revolt did not spread out all over India, but only over a restricted part.
- It was only the Bengal army that revolted, not the other armies under British control.
- Many of the princely states took no part in the rebellion, and those who did were more concerned with their own positions than with creating a united India.

- With rare exceptions, the western-educated intelligentsia sided with the British and acclaimed the queen's proclamation of 1858 taking over direct rule of India.
- There was no national consciousness in India at that time, and the creation of 1857 as a national revolt was the myth of a later nationalist movement.

Some of these issues have already been noted. In brief, the responses have been that the scope of the revolt was national in geographic terms, as more recent archival evidence has shown, such as Lt. Governor Halliday's 150-page unpublished note on unrest in Bengal discloses. As late as the early twentieth century, a Bengali nationalist like Surendranath Banerjea was still titling his autobiography "a nation in making," so it is wrong to expect a full-fledged nation in the ideology of the rebels. Yet the rebellion shows something different from either past peasant revolts or a "feudal reaction." The real power was not the nobles but the soldiers and peasants. Contrary to the view that peasants always restrict themselves to localism, Tapti Roy's study shows how they moved forward. More crucially, the invocation of the Mughal state suggested a wider concept of the country on the part of the rebels. Rajat Ray has argued that they were trying to free "Hindustan" of foreign rule. And while they invoked the Mughals, they also had in mind a relatively decentralized set up. Thus, when Birjis Qadr was made the ruler of Awadh, he had to accept the Mughal emperor as the suzerain authority.

The argument that the rural revolt was elitist in character (Stokes 1980: 185) ignores or downplays the autonomy of the peasantry. In some cases, as in Jagdishpur, the noble Kunwar Singh was pushed into providing leadership by the peasants themselves. Bahadur Shah agreed to be the leader of the revolt in Delhi after great hesitation. Tantia Topi's confession shows that Nana Saheb in Kanpur was forced by the rebels to join them (Mukherjee 2001: 62–3). And the profession of loyalty by the western-educated intelligentsia was less absolute than a simplistic reading suggests. Thus, the *Hindoo Patriot* proclaimed loyalty, but also criticized the violence unleashed by the British state to restore authority. So feelings of disaffection and voices of criticism were found at all levels, even if they did not translate directly into a demand for independence.

Revolt and Reconquest

Though there were stirrings elsewhere, the main areas of revolt were Meerut, Delhi, Kanpur, Lucknow, Jhansi, Nasibpur in eastern Punjab (modern Haryana), Sialkot in Punjab, and Jagdishpur in Bihar. Occasional efforts were made to seek foreign help, for example by Rao Tularam, who after fighting at Nasibpur tried to go to Russia to get military assistance, but he died on the way.

The British started their efforts at recapturing the lost territories. Two columns left Meerut and Simla in the direction of Delhi, killing and hanging numerous Indians, including plenty of non-combatants. Troops were moved from the Crimean War and the proposed operation at China. After defeating the Indians in a major battle at Badli-ke-Serai (around Delhi), the British established a base on the Delhi ridge to the north of the city. The siege of Delhi began on July 1, 1857 and continued till August 31. But the encirclement was not complete, and reinforcements and assistance came in. Subsequently, troops from the Punjab army, Pathan soldiers, and Gurkha soldiers recruited from Nepal were also used to help the British. Eventually, the British broke through the Kashmiri gate by blowing it up on September 14, and began a week of street fighting. By September 20 they had recaptured Delhi. The victorious army looted the city and murdered a huge number of people. Cannons were set up in a mosque and neighborhoods were bombarded. On September 21 Bahadur Shah surrendered. The next day the British officer Hodson shot his sons Mirza Mughal, Mirza Khizr Sultan, and Mirza Abu Bakr at the Khooni Darwaza (the bloody gate).

At Kanpur there had been one scene of major violence from the Indian side. First, after a three-week siege, negotiations were carried out whereby the British would be given safe passage. But a number of soldiers on the British side were subsequently killed. Later, the massacre of British women and children prisoners of Nana Saheb at Bibi-Ghar was used to whip up hysteria in England about India and the rebellion, with calls for annihilation of Indians. Nineteenth-century English historians played up this incident while remaining silent about the massacres perpetrated by the British. Savarkar, on the other hand, sought to glorify the massacre, something other Indian historians have not

attempted. After the retaking of Kanpur, sepoys were killed, often by being tied to the mouth of cannons which were then fired. A number of sepoys were made to lick the bloodstains at Bibi-Ghar.

In Lucknow, Henry Lawrence, the British commander, was able to fortify his position in time. When the direct assault failed, the rebels besieged the English. Lawrence himself died. After 90 days the number of defenders was reduced from 1,700 troops to 350 English soldiers and 300 sepoys, along with a number of non-combatants. On September 25 Sir Henry Havelock and Sir James Outram brought a force that defeated the besiegers but was numerically too small to break them. So the first relief of Lucknow, as it is called, ended with the relieving forces joining the besieged. Eventually, on November 18, 1857, the city was evacuated after Sir Colin Campbell, the new commander in chief, had brought larger forces in October and relieved the garrison.

In Bundelkhand, Rani Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi repulsed the attacks by the loyalist rulers of neighboring Datia and Orchha in September and October. In March 1858 Sir Hugh Rose captured Jhansi, but the Rani fled, to continue the struggle. Tantia Tope joined her. Sindhia, a British loyalist, tried to resist her, but his troops went over to the rebels and he fled to Agra. On June 1, 1858 she was able to take over Gwalior. She died three weeks later in battle, clad in a battle dress and mounted on a charger, on June 17, 1858, when the British had besieged Gwalior.

In Jagdishpur, Kunwar Singh, at the time nearly 80 years of age, performed as the most able military leader and strategist. He fought the British in Bihar, and later joining hands with Nana Saheb's forces, he also campaigned in Awadh and Central India. Turning back to Bihar, he defeated the British forces near Arrah, but suffered an injury which led to his death soon afterwards, on April 27, 1858.

Another outstanding leader of the revolt was Maulavi Ahmadullah of Faizabad, an inhabitant of Madras. In January 1857 he moved north to Faizabad where he fought a large-scale battle against the British troops sent to stop him from preaching sedition. When the revolt broke out in May, he emerged as one of its acknowledged leaders in Awadh. After the fall of Lucknow on October 23, 1857, he led the rebellion in

Rohilkhand till he was treacherously killed by the Raja of Puwain, who was paid 50,000 rupees as a reward.

In 1858 the defeats continued, punctuated by a few victories, like Kunwar Singh's at Arrah. But on May 6, 1858 Bareilly was captured from Khan Bahadur Khan. On June 20 Gwalior was recaptured from the rebels. On October 17–19 Amar Singh, brother of Kunwar Singh, was defeated. The final mopping up in 1859 saw the defeat of Tantia Tope on January 21, and his betrayal by Raja Man Singh on April 7, 1859. He was hanged on April 18. Between October and December 1859, rebels in Northern Awadh and Nepal were smashed, with 4,000 of Nana Saheb's followers captured.

Defeat was followed by murderous revenge. Village after village was taken back after heavy fighting, and immense numbers were slaughtered, either by being tied to cannons and the cannons then being discharged, or by being strung up from trees.

Nationalist appropriation of the revolt has always been inadequate because the revolt was ultimately neither a revolt of feudal reaction nor a constitutionalist struggle. The reason why the urban middle class remained silent, or at most mildly critical of the British, was because of the peasant war dimension of the revolt. The new *zamindars* created by the Permanent (revenue) Settlement, and the emerging bourgeoisie, at that stage tied to them by a thousand strings, did not want to support a peasant war.

On the other hand, one of the strengths of the revolt was the degree of unity between Hindus and Muslims. Both among the soldiers and the people, and among the leaders, there was a good deal of inter-community cooperation. The Meerut rebels directly marched to Delhi to proclaim Bahadur Shah the emperor. In Delhi a proclamation in the name of Bahadur Shah immediately halted cow-slaughter as a gesture to Hindu sensibilities.

Aftermath

A watershed in Indian history, the revolt of 1857 meant the end of East India Company rule, with parliament declaring Queen Victoria the sovereign of British India. Bahadur Shah was tried for rebelling, a patently illegal act, for the East India Company had held its authority under the Mughal emperor, even though for many years that

formality had been a legal fiction. A secretary of state for India, aided by a council, took over from the directors of the company and the board of control. The secretary was a member of the British Cabinet and as such directly responsible to parliament. The queen's proclamation of November 1, 1858 declared that Indians would be subjects with due rights. But the most important reality was the virulent racism unleashed by the British in response to the revolt. At the same time, in order to garner a degree of public support for British rule, all the conservative forces were now backed. This in turn would subsequently generate frustration, and eventually militancy, from rising middle-class nationalism later in the century.

In 1861 the India Councils Act enlarged the council and turned it into the Imperial Legislative Council. The governor-general was authorized to add to the Executive Council a few Indians. Usually, they were princes or their ministers, big landlords, big merchants, or retired government officials. In fact, therefore, the government of India remained despotism by an alien race.

SEE ALSO: India, Armed Struggle in the Independence Movement; Indigo Rebellion; Santal Rebellion; Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864

References and Suggested Readings

- Alavi, S. (1996) *The Sepoys and the Company: Tradition and Transition 1770–1830*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bandyopadhyay, S. (2004) *From Plassey to Partition*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
- Chaudhuri, S. B. (1965) *Theories of the Indian Mutiny, 1857–1859*. Calcutta: World Press.
- Embree, A. T. (1963) *1857 in India: Mutiny or War of Independence*. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
- Joshi, P. C. (Ed.) (1986) *Rebellion 1857: A Symposium*. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi.
- Kaye, J. W. (1878) *A History of the Sepoy War in India*, 3 vols. London: W. H. Allen.
- Malleson, Colonel G. B. (1891) *The Indian Mutiny of 1857*. New York: Scribner & Sons.
- Metcalf, T. R. (1964) *The Aftermath of the Revolt: India, 1857–1870*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mukherjee, R. (2001) *Awadh in Revolt 1857–1858*. Delhi: Permanent Black.
- Ray, R. K. (2003) *The Felt Community: Commonalty and Mentality Before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Roy, T. (1994) *The Politics of a Popular Uprising: Bundelkhand 1857*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

- Savarkar, V. D. (1947) *The Indian War of Independence: 1857*. Bombay: Phoenix.
- Sen, S. N. (1957) *Eighteen Fifty–Seven*. Delhi: Indian Ministry of Information & Broadcasting.
- Stokes, E. (1980) *The Peasant and the Raj*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Trevelyan, G. O. (2002) *Cawnpore*. Delhi: Indus.

India, Hindutva and fascist mobilizations, 1989–2002

Kunal Chattopadhyay

Hindu Communalism and Indian Fascism

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, National Volunteer Organization), set up in 1925 in Nagpur, became, by the early 1930s, a radical right organization with clear fascist tendencies. It had great contempt for democracy, hailed the Nazis, tried to imitate them, and set up a tight, leader-centric organization with a rabidly Hindu chauvinist agenda. The construction of a homogeneous Hindu identity meant negating any idea of class and caste divisions through token gestures, while retaining an upper-caste and upper-class hegemony. It also meant creating the image of a permanent enemy, the Muslims, and a gendered concept of communal identity, which meant a strong effort at controlling women by the imposition of a modernized patriarchy. M. S. Golwalkar, the second supreme leader of the RSS, in his book *We, or Our Nationhood Defined* (1939), welcomed the events of *Kristallnacht* and said that the Germans had proved that two nations cannot live in one country. During the violent days of Partition the Hindu communalist organizations made a bid for power, but the murder of Gandhi by a Hindu communalist led to strong government action, and to a decline of the organizations. However, the strategy of the RSS was already one of deeply penetrating civil society. So Golwalkar got the ban on the RSS rescinded by promising the government that it would remain a “cultural” organization and would not contest elections. To circumvent the restriction on politics, the RSS, with the help of like-minded Hindu communalists, set up the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS, Indian People’s Association), a militant right-wing

communalist party calling for an *akhand bharat* (indivisible India, implying the forcible incorporation of Kashmir, or even designs on Pakistan); an independent Indian nuclear arsenal; deep hostility to Muslims, Christians, and communists; a rejection of democracy; and espousal of economic liberalism. Between 1971 and 1984 attempts to form left-right combinations to fight the Congress rehabilitated the BJS. In 1977 it even became part of a coalition that defeated Congress (I) leader Indira Gandhi. There was a short-lived unification of the non-communist opposition into one party, the Janata [People’s] Party. RSS interference led to the eventual break up of the Janata Party, but in the process the BJS reemerged as the much strengthened Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, Indian People’s Party). By the mid-1980s the RSS was ready for a more attacking role.

Ram Janmabhoomi Campaign

The opportunity for massive right-wing communal mobilizations came through a combination of events. The widespread popularity of the television serial *Ramayana* (the story of the mythical Ram, king of Ayodhya) enhanced popular fervor about Ram, widely worshipped in North India as an incarnation of the god Vishnu. At around this time, the Congress (I) government, led by Rajiv Gandhi, embarked on a strategy of balancing between communal concessions to various communities. After conceding to Muslim communalists over the Shah Bano case, where the right of Muslim women to access to a secular law on maintenance against desertion was sought to be nullified by the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, it felt the need to turn to the Hindu right as well. So in November 1989 Gandhi’s government took the initiative in allowing the religious rites of laying the foundation stone of a Ram temple within the precincts of a Masjid set up by a general of Babar, the founder of the Mughal dynasty in India. Hindu communalists, aided by British colonialists, had claimed from the nineteenth century that it had been built by destroying a Ram temple, though no contemporary source mentions such a thing, and no post-1992 archaeological work confirmed the existence of a prior temple. But this was immediately turned into a weapon by the BJP-RSS.

In 1989 the Congress (I) was defeated and a coalition government led by Viswanath Pratap

Singh came to power, supported by communist parties as well as the BJP. Seeking to create a social base, Singh's project of focusing on a large mass of formally not untouchable but socially deprived classes undercut the RSS agenda of an upper-caste-dominated yet unified Hindu community. The Ram Mandir (temple) campaign went into overdrive. L. K. Advani, the BJP president, declared a *ratha yatra* (chariot tour – a Toyota dressed as one) systematically to mobilize extreme communalism. In the past, riots had been based on particular local grievances, real or imagined, as well as local socioeconomic interests. But Advani's tour of India sparked off one-sided riots in 43 towns and cities, based not on threats to particular groups of Hindus but supposedly to the core of Hindu identity, threatened as long as the Babri Masjid was not thrown down and a Ram temple constructed there. The sustained Ram Janmabhoomi campaigns of 1989–92 by the RSS and their more aggressive front organizations, like the Viswa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council), served to transform Hindu communalism in India into a single national and cohesive force. When Advani was eventually arrested to preserve communal harmony, the BJP brought down Singh's government by withdrawing support. Thereafter the weak Congress government at the center preferred to try to appease Hindu communalists. The Supreme Court of India, which played a confusing role, noted in its order on November 29, 1992 the warning of the lawyer O. P. Sharma that if a mob was allowed to gather in Ayodhya, all promises of peace would be rendered null and void. But the Apex Court, on the strength of the assurance of BJP MPs and the BJP-led UP state government, permitted a gathering of volunteers known as *kar sevaks* (voluntary labor for building the Ram temple). On December 6, 1992 the BJP government of UP remained passive while a huge frenzied mob systematically destroyed the mosque, with clear evidence of advance planning. Subsequently, regardless of changes in governments, a veritable township developed near the place, called Karsevakpuram (town of Kar Sevaks), where the parts of the proposed new temple were built. Thus, the destruction of the mosque, which represented Muslim rule over Hindus, even in independent India, and the construction of the temple were made a national campaign issue to integrate Hindus all over India.

Attacks on Islam and the implementation of a Hindu supremacist agenda were also attempted through a number of other ploys. Notable were the sudden championing of a Uniform Civil Code, the cause of the Kashmiri Pandits, and the integration of Kashmir into India as a whole through the abolition of Article 370 of the Constitution (granting Jammu and Kashmir some autonomy). This Article has been much abrogated and abused, while in turn it was a long retreat from the promise of a referendum to let the people of Kashmir decide on their future. RSS propaganda asserts that Muslims in India, like the Jews in Nazi propaganda, are unduly privileged. In post-Independence India, Muslims are grossly underrepresented at elite levels. The Uniform Civil Code as demanded by the BJP was simply a call for removal of Muslim Personal Laws. While the plight of Muslim women caused by the triple *talaq* (a husband can pronounce *talaq* thrice, to divorce his wife) is highlighted, and Muslim polygamy is denounced, this is done out of a desire to paint Muslims as privileged. At the same time, concerted propaganda is issued proclaiming that Muslim polygamy will lead to Muslims outnumbering Hindus in a short time. Actually, studies show that illegal Hindu polygamy is higher than legal Muslim polygamy.

Coalition and the Gujarat Pogrom

In 1998 the National Democratic Alliance, led by the BJP, won enough seats for it to form a minority government. It went to the polls in 1999, was returned with a bigger margin, and served a full five-year term. It opted for a strongly neoliberal economic policy, and in order to retain popular support, pursued jingoistic nationalism and extremist Hindutva mobilizations. These included the Pokharan nuclear weapons tests and the development of Hindutva-fascist politics wherever possible.

One province where the BJP was able to entrench itself firmly was Gujarat. There, through a molecular process of penetration into civil society, the RSS, the VHP, and other non-parliamentary arms of the fascists had entrenched themselves. From a traditionally upper- and middle-caste party, they became a party of *dalits* (former untouchables), and *adivasis* ("tribals"). Over the years Gujarat provided the largest number of Kar Sevaks for building the Ram temple. Socioeconomic factors also intervened.

While older industries like the Ahmedabad textile mills often shut down, leading to job insecurity, new industries such as the chemical industries provide no social security, not even minimum wages. These enabled the RSS cadres, providing certain forms of collective backing, through RSS-run schools and social welfare steps, to establish their hegemony. Using the educational institutions, a massive communalization was carried through. These advantages were then turned into a massive pogrom, as inside the NDA the BJP had been forced to accept a "secular" agenda. It could not openly talk about abrogation of Article 370 or the Uniform Civil Code. At key ministries like Home (Advani) and Human Resource Development (M. M. Joshi), a deep and sustained Hindutva drive did begin. However, misgovernance, as well as the economic implications of globalization, combined to produce dissatisfaction, causing the defeat of the BJP in four states as well as in the Delhi municipal elections. Reviving the fortunes of the Sangh family eventually came to be seen as more dependent on direct action by non-electoral, cadre-based wings of the combine.

Ostensibly, an attack by Muslims on a train-load of Kar Sevaks returning to Gujarat at Godhra station on February 27, 2002 sparked off violence. Subsequent investigations have questioned whether indeed outside attackers set fire to the compartment in question. In any case, this was followed by a series of actions calculated to create frenzy. Gujarati-language right-wing papers falsely reported that women had been abducted, raped inside madrasas (Muslim educational institutions), and then mutilated and killed. The bodies of the Godhra dead were brought to Ahmedabad and put on display. From the next day, several days of violence began.

These were not spontaneous reactions. Hundreds of thousands of leaflets were put out, showing preparation. Equally, preparation and state complicity were evident in how electoral lists and sales tax records were used to identify Muslim households, shops, and establishments. Muslim-majority areas were attacked by large mobs led by BJP leaders, as well as RSS-VHP forces. Narendra Modi, chief minister of Gujarat, who controlled the police force, stood by and remarked that it was a matter of Newton's Third Law, an action producing a reaction. At least 2,000 were killed. In a large number of cases they were set on fire. In one case a woman's womb was cut open and the fetus killed. In a number of cases

women were gang raped. Property owned by Muslims was systematically targeted. The pogrom was followed by keeping many of the survivors in camps, with little government help. Attempts by secular activists to protect or to provide help were put under threat. Under such circumstances, Modi's return with a thumping majority after dissolving the state assembly showed the RSS that in its bid for power, fascist violence, pogroms, hate campaigns, and a radical-right economic agenda were essential ingredients. While the NDA lost at the center in 2004, Modi continued to be returned in Gujarat in 2007, and this legitimized overt fascist styles of politics to wider sections of the right-wing forces, including sizable parts of the Indian bourgeoisie, which is unable to liberalize as fast as it would like, due to resistance from the workers and peasants, the trade union movements, and the degenerated, but still existing mainstream left, as well as the radical left.

SEE ALSO: Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Hindu Nationalism, Hindutva, and Women; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism

References and Suggested Readings

- Anand, J. & Setalvad, T. (Eds.) (2002) *Genocide Gujarat 2002. Communalism Combat* 8 (March–April): 77–8.
- Chattopadhyay, K. (Ed.) (2002) *The Genocidal Pogrom in Gujarat: Anatomy of Indian Fascism*. Baroda: Inquilabi Communist Sangathan.
- Chattopadhyay, M. & Marik, S. (Eds.) (2002) *Garbhaghati Gujarat* [Gujarat: The Slayer of Wombs]. Kolkata: Peoples' Book Society.
- Gopal, S. (Ed.) (1991) *Anatomy of a Confrontation: The Babri Masjid–Ram Janmabhumi Issue*. New Delhi: Penguin Books India.
- Hansen, T. B. (2001) *The Saffron Wave*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Noorani, A. G. (2000) *The RSS and the BJP: A Division of Labour*. New Delhi: Leftword.

India, nationalism, extremist

Kunal Chattopadhyay

The Emergence of Indian Nationalism

The emergence of nationalism among the middle classes in India in the late nineteenth century was not simply an imitation of western models.

Its roots may be traced back to the political legitimacy of the Mughal empire, cultural contacts between different regional groups, and an ethical tradition of good government. This traditional patriotism was reworked after the revolt of 1857, when direct rule by the British government replaced rule by the East India Company. An institutionalized public space was created for contestation with the colonial regime. Contrary to early middle-class belief in the positive value of British rule of law, colonialism brought, not a partnership of equals but exploitation, racial tension and inequality, and a threat to the Indian middle- and upper-classes' sense of culture and community. A result was the construction of an image of indigenous culture, a bid to purify it and "recover" a superior Indian civilization, capable of standing on a par with western civilization. This search for purity involved religious and social reform projects, the construction of new ideal types of womanhood and a modernization of patriarchy, and through all these, an eventual creation of the ideological basis of Indian nationalism.

One of the strands that entered into the making of Indian nationalism included the rationalist and democratic thought of the modern West, introduced through education. Concepts like citizenship, civil society, human rights, equality before the law, popular sovereignty, and social justice were used to construct a critique of the colonial state. A number of regional associations sprang up, such as the Indian Association. By 1875 there were around 400 newspapers in English and Indian languages, with the circulation of English-language papers rising from 90,000 in 1885 to 276,000 in 1905. By 1885, early nationalist aspirations had converged to create the Indian National Congress (Congress).

The early Congress was less a political party and more an annual conference organized by professional middle-class men with some landlord backing, which passed certain resolutions and put forward a set of fairly limited demands. Their ideological baggage included a good deal of western liberalism, along with a belief that British rule was fundamentally good. At the founding Congress, the speech by English ex-Civilian Allan Octavian Hume portraying the assembled people as "children of Queen Victoria" received sustained applause. In his Presidential Address at the Second Session of 1886 in Calcutta, Dadabhai Naoroji asked

rhetorically whether the Congress was an organization for propagating sedition and organizing revolt, to which the hall erupted with cries of "no." For the first decade of its existence, the Congress seldom demanded any fundamental political reforms, and certainly no social reform demands concerning workers, peasants, and lower castes. Naoroji offered a specious argument, asserting that the Congress knew about no class other than its own, and so it could not discuss demands relating to those classes. Its demands included broadening Indian participation in the legislature by having 50 percent elected representation from local bodies, chambers of commerce, and universities; giving the legislature the right to discuss and vote on the budget, and to interpolate; and freedom of the press. The demand for Indianization of the civil services meant, in the immediate sense, the introduction of simultaneous civil service examinations in India and London, and raising the age limit for the test to 23 years. Demands were made for the curtailment of military expenditure and the introduction of volunteer service as well as the promotion of Indians to upper ranks. But ultra-loyalist proposals, such as forming a volunteer army to fight the British colonial wars, would have to be set against the Arms Act, which forbade Indians from possessing or receiving training in modern arms. From 1889 to 1903, every annual session of the Congress demanded the extension of the Permanent Settlement (which had created a class of landlords in full ownership of the land in Bengal) to the land revenue system of every province. But every session, from 1891 to 1903, also adopted various resolutions favoring industrial growth in India. Progressives such as Dwarkanath Ganguly were disgusted because they could not even get the issue of planter oppression over indentured tea garden laborers listed for discussion in the early years. Even when tea garden workers' conditions were taken up, the Indian-owned Bombay textile industry was omitted.

At the same time, these moderate, loyalist Congressmen made an economic critique of colonial rule that became the foundation of militant nationalism. Naoroji, R. C. Dutt, and M. G. Ranade were the architects of a "drain theory" that argued that colonial rule caused a constant outflow of resources from India to Britain and was the principal reason for poverty and famines in India. They also proposed the

reduction of state expenditure on military activities, reduction of taxes, protectionism for Indian industry, reduction of revenue assessment, and encouragement of cottage industry and handicrafts.

The Rise of Extremism

The all-India organization created a sense of Indian-ness that had hitherto been absent. But British rejection of the nationalists' principal demands produced disillusionment with the principles and methods of the dominant leadership of the Congress. There was a strong call for more vigorous action and methods than those of meetings, petitions, memorials, and speeches in the Legislative Councils. Between 1896 and 1900, disastrous famines claimed over 9 million lives. The Indian Councils Act of 1892 was a complete disappointment. It retained the official majority, though conceding a few indirectly elected seats to Indians in the Imperial Legislative Council as well as the Provincial Councils. The councils were given the right to discuss annual budgets but not the right to vote on them. In 1898, a law was passed making it an offense to excite "feelings of disaffection" toward the government. In 1904, the Official Secrets Act was passed restricting the freedom of the press. In 1897, the Natu brothers were deported without trial, and the charges against them were not made public. In the same year, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and other newspaper editors were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for rousing the people against the government.

In response to growing imperialist aggressiveness under Tory governments, a new leadership arose comprising men like Tilak, Bipin Chandra Pal, and Lajpat Rai. Speaking a different language, they were critical of the "politics of mendicancy" and were soon to question British rule itself. This was the second strand in the making of Indian nationalism. Political extremism was not simply a reaction to the failure of moderate politics. Broadly speaking, it was an attempt to define the Indian nation in terms of Hindu religious symbols, myths, and a version of history that saw the struggles of Hindus as central, and which therefore tended to cast Muslims as outsiders. Instead of attempting to bring Hindu society into conformity with the rationalist ideas of the West, this current contested the western critiques of Hindu civilization. In Bengal, it was

represented by the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda movement. Ramakrishna Paramhansa, a priest in the Dakshineswar temple near Calcutta, was not so much an opponent of western rationalism as totally outside the world created by it. But his teachings, without entering into disputes with colonial rule, rejected the values imposed by it. Ramakrishna himself was a religious eclectic, not a revivalist. But his catholicity was projected by his disciple Vivekananda as the essence of Hinduism's superiority. Vivekananda condemned previous reform movements as elitist, stressing that the best way to serve God was to serve the poor. His emphasis on the superiority of Hinduism, his faith in the glory of Hindu civilization, and his belief in its recent degeneration made it possible for revivalists to appropriate him. His rhetoric combined sudden appeals to near-socialistic ideas (such as the claim that the *shudra* [lowest caste] would gain supremacy in every society, and talk of socialists and anarchists as the vanguard of a coming social revolution), along with a near-total lack of clarity about concrete socioeconomic programs, and even political objectives. His declaration that he hated politics probably referred to the moderate Congress politics. His combination of a cult of manly virtues, unspecified populism, and evocation of Hindu glory provided the starting point for Bengali extremism and the politics of revolutionary armed struggle.

The first major revivalist political offensive came in 1884–91, when Behramji Malabari's sustained campaign led to the passage of the Age of Consent Act of 1891. A strong Hindu nationalist storm was raised in opposition. While some nationalists, like Tilak, would fight other battles, there were many who showed strong loyalism during actual political struggles. The issue was a relatively minor one – increasing the age of marriage from 10 to 12. The matter became serious after the Phulmoni case, when a young girl was forced to have intercourse by her much older husband. Hindu nationalism argued that the woman's body was a crucial site for the preservation of the community, and therefore it was better for some women to die than for the community to be weakened. Tilak's "nationalist" argument lay in his assertion that foreign rulers had no right to interfere with religious and social customs – a specious argument, since Hindu orthodox groups were more than happy to campaign for a law to ban the slaughter of

cows, thereby interfering with Muslims' right to observe their social and religious customs. In Bengal, the movement against raising the age of consent was spearheaded by the *Bangabasi*, which had a circulation of 20,000.

In Maharashtra, revivalism was based on Pune, and was narrowly Brahmanical. Tilak's alliance with the declining Brahmanical forces in the 1890s was a (dangerous) political use of existing material. Personally, Tilak was hardly obscurantist. But he allied himself with the traditional literati who saw their stipends drying up under British rule, and made much of Maratha glory. Tilak organized *Ganapati utsav* (Festival of the God Ganesha), and in 1895 refused to allow M. G. Ranade's reform-oriented National Social Conference to meet at the Congress session in Pune.

In North India much headway was made by the Arya Samaj of Swami Dayanand Saraswati. It combined a sharp critique of many Hindu practices (idolatry, polytheism, child marriage, the taboo on widow remarriage and foreign travel, a caste system based on birth, and so on) with an aggressive assertion of the superiority of Hinduism over other religions. As a result, the specific goals of social reformers were absorbed into a Hindu supremacist agenda. In Punjab the Arya Samaj struck deep roots, its membership rising to 40,000 in 1891 and eventually to half a million by 1921. The Samaj also became quite aggressively anti-Muslim. At the same time, some of the Samajists, like Lala Lajpat Rai, were involved in Congress politics.

The rise of "extremism" began with a twofold critique of the moderate Congress. It was criticized for its "mendicant" technique of appealing to British public opinion, and also for being a movement of an English-educated elite alien to the common people. There were three elements in extremist politics – self-development through constructive work; political extremism proper, attempting mass mobilization for *swaraj* (independence) through techniques of passive resistance; and revolutionary nationalism or "terrorism."

In 1893–4, Aurobindo Ghosh wrote a series of articles entitled "New Lamps for Old," to denounce the policy of seeking slow constitutional progress. Upholding the model of the French Revolution, he said that the vital need was to establish a link between the middle class and the proletariat. However, by this last term he seems to have meant little more than the common

people, and his attempted strategy was a revivalist Hinduism. By the end of the century, he was trying to organize secret societies.

In Bengal, Aswini Kumar Dutt of Barishal, the poet Rabindranath Tagore, and Vivekananda's disciple, Sister Nivedita (an Irishwoman), all contributed to the development of extremism. The Bengali *bhadralok*, a cultural identity combining landed interests with urban petty bourgeois development, were also turning to *swadeshi* (indigenous) enterprise, a fairly large effort.

But the real trailblazer for extremism was Tilak. His development of the Shivaji cult as a patriotic-historical symbol (the fight of the Maratha hero Shivaji against the Mughals, and his espousal of a Hindu-tinged identity, projected him as a freedom fighter), and his experimentation with a kind of no-revenue campaign in 1896–7, were pioneering efforts. The British reacted strongly to even these early manifestations of extremism. The main reason for Tilak's conviction for sedition and a two-year jail term was his justification in his paper *Kesari* of the assassination of the Bijapur general Afzal Khan by Shivaji.

Bengal Partition

Extremism developed into a major current with the plan for Bengal partition. The underlying aim of the proposed partition was to weaken extremist politics (strong in Bengal) as well as the Bengalis by pitting Muslims against Hindus. Even when no overt anti-Muslim move was contemplated, the politics of the *bhadralok* effectively excluded Muslims, defining society, reform, and regeneration in diverse Hindu terms. Nonetheless, the British effort was openly communitarian and Bengal did not submissively accept this imperialist game. A mass anti-partition movement was initiated on August 7, 1905. An invitation appeared in the paper *Sanjibani* for the boycott of all foreign products and the use of only *swadeshi* products. Formal partition occurred on October 16, 1905. Many Muslims as well as Hindus observed it as a day of mourning. The *hartal* or general strike, including closure of shops and markets as well as business, was observed in towns and many villages. A day of abstinence from cooking was practiced in many homes, an action mainly involving women. Thousands of people participated barefoot in mourning processions.

The tide of *swadeshi* spread from Calcutta to various district headquarters. At the Varanasi session of the Congress, the moderate Gokhale in his Presidential Address called the Bengal partition one of the “meanest acts” of British rule in India. The moderate Surendranath Banerjea responded to Viceroy Lord Curzon’s utterance that the Bengal partition was a “settled fact” with the remark that he would “unsettle the settled fact.” But soon the limitations of moderate politics became evident. When students wanted to boycott educational institutions and a call was made for the formation of a national college, people like Banerjea drew back. Faced with an out-and-out imperialist ruler like Curzon, the moderate political agenda had no hope of success. So leadership of the movement passed to extremists. Indeed, it was at this stage that the two camps started using these terms to describe their opponents.

As the youngest layer of the intelligentsia, students tended to be more radical. There was also a material basis for their grievances, as jobs seemed to be drying up, but they initially rallied round the slogan of a national education, which would have led to even fewer jobs, since many employers were unlikely to accept degrees from such an institution. The first ever proper student organization, the Anti-Circular Society, was formed in protest against the Carlyle Circular, forbidding students from taking part in politics. This society organized boycotts of foreign textiles in shops and sales of Indian-made cloth by hawkers to people at home. Popular songs of the period glorified *swadeshi* goods. The tides of boycott and *swadeshi* flowed through Bengal, Maharashtra, and Punjab. People held festivals and burned British cloth. Women’s political involvement began to grow from this time, and attempts were made to get them to donate to the *swadeshi* cause. When Bhupendranath Dutta, the revolutionary younger brother of Swami Vivekananda, was arrested, a “Ladies’ Meeting” was held in his honor, with 200 women signing the address. Individual women who stood out include Sister Nivedita and Sarala Debi Chaudhurani, who sought to create a nationalist warrior-hero and urged Bengali youth to fight against British rule.

Indigenous manufactures were also enthusiastically promoted. The well-known chemist Prafulla Chandra Roy set up the successful Bengal Chemical Works. Many more textile, match,

and soap factories were established. Jamshedji Tata’s steel factory was based on *swadeshi* subscriptions, while banks and insurance companies grew up through *swadeshi* enterprise. In Delhi, the driving force behind the *swadeshi* cause was Saiyad Hyder Reza.

On March 11, 1906, a National Council of Education (NCE) was founded in Calcutta. A number of national schools were affiliated to the council, and students who had boycotted the examinations of Calcutta University were allowed to appear at two special examinations. The NCE also set up a school and a college of its own in Calcutta, with Aurobindo Ghose as its principal. Probably due to pressure by more orthodox Hindus, a number of reformist Brahmans were kept out. The college stressed teaching in culture and the liberal arts, with an all-India outlook. An alternative route was taken by Tarak Nath Palit, Nil Ratan Sarkar, Bhupendranath Bose, and others, who set up the Bengal Technical Institute. In 1910, the two institutions merged to create the College of Engineering and Technology, eventually becoming Jadavpur University in independent India.

The ascendancy of moderates, especially after Aurobindo’s departure for armed struggle, meant the failure to establish counterhegemony through national education. Moreover, the lack of a firmly secular basis, as well as the inability to innovate, turned the NCE toward increasingly mainstream academic concerns delinked from mass-based nationalism. Rabindranath Tagore’s alternative vision stressed constructive *swadeshi*, involving the mass of people and the use of mother languages for education. The NCE and the *swadeshi* movement failed to mobilize mass struggles, while at the same time, in a concession to extremists, its rhetoric was replete with invocations to Hinduism, making it difficult to integrate Muslims and lower castes.

Boycott achieved initial success. In September 1906, the Calcutta Collector of Customs noted a 22 percent fall in the quantity of imported cotton piece-goods, 44 percent in cotton twist and yarn, 11 percent in salt, 55 percent in cigarettes, and 68 percent in boots and shoes for August compared to August 1905. The sharpest demand came in items consumed mainly by the middle class, like cigarettes and shoes.

The *swadeshi* mood did bring about a significant revival in handloom, silk-weaving, and some other traditional artisan crafts. There were other

successful ventures too, such as the Calcutta Pottery Works, but lack of capital became a crucial factor, with the Marwari compradors (investors from the northwest of India) as yet showing no interest in investment.

A major achievement of the *swadeshi* age was the emergence of *samitis* (associations). In a 1907 police report, there were an estimated 8,485 volunteers from all the *samitis* in East Bengal. Up to 1908, most of these bodies were engaged in a variety of activities, including physical and moral training, social work during famines, epidemics or religious festivals, preaching the *swadeshi* message, and implementing the techniques of passive resistance. Five major *samitis* were banned in January 1909: *Swadesh Bandhav*, *Brati*, *Dacca Anushilan*, *Suhrid*, and *Sadhana*. The Anti-Circular Society stood apart for its secularism, counting among its associates important Muslims like Liaquat Hussain, Dedar Bux, and Abdul Gafur.

Outside Bengal, extremists were active in Punjab, Madras, and above all in Bombay. By 1907, the *Kesari* had a circulation of 20,000, and there was a revival of the religious and political festivals pioneered by Tilak. But Bombay's industrialists were lukewarm about *swadeshi*, even though *swadeshi* enthusiasm definitely helped them stave off a major slump in 1906–7.

Two major new initiatives were associated with extremist activity in Maharashtra in 1907–8. One was the mass picketing of liquor shops, and the other was an effort to develop contacts with the working class – easier in Bombay, where workers were Marathi-speaking, like the middle class, whereas in Bengal most workers were non-Bengalis. Tilak's arrest and trial in July 1908 generated massive proletarian anger. On the day of Tilak's conviction, July 22, 1908, the cloth shop employees of the Mulji Jetha Market called for a six-day *hartal* (one day for each year of Tilak's sentence). At the height of the strike, 76 out of 85 textile mills, as well as the railway workshop at Parel, were involved.

From 1905 to 1907, the struggle over tendencies was fought out within the Congress. In 1906, a split was averted by making Dadabhai Naoroji president. But differences surfaced constantly. In 1905, while partition was condemned, methods for combatting it remained vague, and the coming visit of the Prince of Wales was welcomed against opposition in the Subjects Committee from Tilak, Lajpat Rai, and Motilal

Ghosh. In 1906 an attempt to extend the resolution on boycott beyond Bengal was repudiated. At the 1907 Surat Congress, both sides came prepared for a fight. The moderates, after forcing a split, made it definitive by adopting a constitution stating that Congress methods were strictly constitutional and limited to bringing about reform of the existing system of administration. However, the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 dashed moderate hopes that Liberals, back in power, would be generous. The policies of Secretary of State Morley and Viceroy Minto were characterized by outright repression of radicals, a policy of divide and rule, and petty concessions to the moderates. The new Indian Councils Act allowed some increased influence in budget discussion, including putting questions and sponsoring resolutions to members of Legislative Councils, and for the first time formally introduced the principle of elections. Details of seat allocation and electoral qualifications were to be made by regulations in India, leaving ample scope for whittling down reforms. A number of seats were reserved for Muslims, beginning a trend of separate electorates and constituencies. However, it was not the Muslim community as such that benefited, but a handful of upper-class Muslims. The moderates at the Madras Congress of 1908 welcomed the proposals. Yet by 1909, even some of them became skeptical and attendance at Congress sessions fell off.

The Bengal partition was revoked in 1911, but the capital of India shifted to Delhi in a bid for Muslim support for the rulers. However, extremists, moderates, and Muslim nationalists came together, especially with the beginning of World War I, when the Lucknow Pact (1916) saw a united stand for further constitutional reforms including separate electorates and the distribution of seats being presented by a reunited Congress and a nationalist-oriented Muslim League. The only element of extremism still in existence was an attempt at building mass movements through Home Rule Leagues. Two were set up, by Tilak and Annie Besant. Activities consisted of organizing discussion groups, mass sale of pamphlets, and lecture tours. The Besant League was also responsible for making inroads into areas where extremism had not been present, such as smaller towns in Madras, among urban professionals in Uttar Pradesh, and among new groups in Sind and Gujarat. Many of the young

men roused to action by the Home Rule movement would be important in the 1920s, including Jawaharlal Nehru in Allahabad.

SEE ALSO: India, Armed Struggle in the Independence Movement; India, Civil Disobedience Movement and Demand for Independence; India, the Great Rebellion of 1857 (the Sepoy Revolt); India, Non-Violent Non-Cooperation Movement, 1918–1929; Jinnah, Muhammad Ali (1876–1948); Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bandyopadhyay, S. (2004) *From Plassey to Partition*. Delhi: Orient Longman.
- Chandra, B. (1982) *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.
- Chattopadhyay, K. (2005) Colonial Rule, the Struggle against the Bengal Partition, and National Education. *West Bengal* 47, 8 (August): 43–51.
- Desai, A. R. (1959) *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.
- Gopal, S. (1965) *British Policy in India, 1858–1905*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hasan, M. (1991) *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885–1930*. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Kumar, R. (2002) *The History of Doing*. New Delhi: Kali for Women.
- Sarkar, S. (1973) *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal: 1903–1908*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.
- Sarkar, T. (2001) *Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation*. New Delhi: Permanent Black.
- Seal, A. (1968) *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tripathi, A. (1967) *The Extremist Challenge: India between 1890 and 1910*. Calcutta: Orient Longman.

India, non-violent non-cooperation movement, 1918–1929

Kunal Chattopadhyay

Following World War I, British rulers attempted to introduce limited reforms in India through the Montague-Chelmsford Report of 1918 and the Government of India Act of 1919. The aim of these measures was to co-opt nationalist opposition. The 1919 Act established a “dyarchy” with at its center a bicameral system with elected majorities and a viceregal veto as well as a “certificate” procedure for pushing rejected

bills. Departments with limited funding and political support (education, health, agriculture, local bodies) were transferred to ministers responsible to provincial legislatures. Provincial governors too had the veto, while finance and law and order remained under the control of the bureaucracy. The electorates were enlarged to 1.5 million for the imperial legislature and 5.5 million for the provinces, with provisions for community-based representation and reservations.

From World War I, rising military expenditure, runaway inflation, and forced recruitment caused a massive drain on all classes in India, but capitalists and peasants were most affected, a key factor in the phenomenal rise of Gandhi. Grain and raw materials financed a 300 percent increase in defense spending as much of the Indian population starved. Peasants, who supplied the bulk of recruits, could not be pushed further, so customs and income tax were expanded. Overall inflation doubled from 1913 to 1920, but export prices of Indian agricultural goods increased in the same proportion as domestic and imported industrial goods. The standard of living among peasants declined with the expansion of commercial agriculture, leading to a rise in the cost of basic grains.

But war also meant fabulous profits for some sectors of the capitalist class, leading to the foundation and expansion of industrial wealth and a transformation from a colonial comprador to industrial capitalism. A rising group of Calcutta-based businessmen of the Marwari community began Indian-owned jute mills, while in the western cities of Bombay and Ahmedabad Indian textile mill production surpassed Lancashire imports.

But the British capped the growth of Indian manufacturing through reducing the value of the pound sterling against the Indian rupee, thus reducing exports. Indian businesses, in turn, demanded greater state intervention without disturbing property rights, while big industrialists, dependent on the state and patronage, called on the state to firmly suppress working-class movements.

Between 1911 and 1921, strikes expanded considerably in industries and plantations organized by unions, culminating in the formation of the All-India Trade Union Congress at Bombay in November 1920. Its militant leadership included future communists like Sripad Amrit Dange. Gandhi carefully avoided any involvement,

and was especially opposed to the political general strike, however peaceful, as an instrument of opposition of the industrial working class.

In the wake of the Russian Revolution of 1917, there was much working-class unrest which was not merely the outcome of economic grievances but was part of a worldwide upsurge of anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism among the oppressed as well as Indian soldiers returning from distant lands. The immediate British panic was excessive, and there was fear that revolutionary nationalists might consider Russia a substitute for the defeated Germany as a supplier of arms. While details of the Russian Revolution were difficult to understand, concern was spreading among capitalists about a world turned upside down.

The Rise of Gandhi

Gandhi returned to India from South Africa during World War I. While in South Africa, he had developed a method of protest he called *satyagraha*, a form of non-violent resistance that involved accepting any resulting punishment. What was not negotiable in his strategy was *ahimsa* (non-violence), a method combining the more radical goal of the extremists with the moderate desire for peaceful agitation, binding the mass movements closely to a leader whose social ideas, especially support for property rights, were impeccable.

At the same time, Gandhi's critique of western modernity, especially as applied to India, struck a chord in the hearts of peasants, artisans, and small-town intelligentsia. Gandhi argued that mere political *swaraj* (self-rule) would mean British rule without the British. A small peasant utopia was starkly outlined in his *Hind Swaraj* (1909), which contended that railways spread plague and produced famines by exporting food grain, and western medicine was costly and ruined natural health measures. All this, he averred, had to go, and the upper classes had to live the life of a peasant. Taken literally, this was an obscurantist and reactionary utopia. But aspects of his ideas appealed to many groups of people. In addition, Gandhi's chosen style – wearing a loincloth from 1921, speaking in simple Hindustani, traveling third class in trains, using the imagery of Tulsidas's *Ramayana*, deep rooted in the popular religion of Hindus in the Hindi belt of north India – gave him fur-

ther accessibility to peasants, making him the greatest mass leader India has ever produced.

During the three years after his return from South Africa in 1915, Gandhi gained the reputation of a man who would combat local wrongs by taking up three *satyagrahas*. Agitation at Champaran (indigo planters), Kheda (peasants), and Ahmedabad (textile workers) introduced a new style of resistance, quite different from the established top-down strategy of fighting over relatively abstract all-India issues. In each case there was pressure from below, as well as the first indications of a restraining hand.

Rowlatt Agitation and Non-Cooperation

In early 1919 the Rowlatt Act was pushed through the Imperial Legislative Council to make wartime restrictions on civil liberties permanent. While Indian political opinion opposed the Act, Gandhi promoted mass protest while remaining on the terrain of elite control. The initial plan was modest – volunteers would court arrest by the public sale of prohibited texts. Subsequently, Gandhi extended the protest to include the novel and radical idea of an all-Indian *hartal* (mass work stoppage), although proceeding with extreme caution. The day chosen was a Sunday, and those working could participate only with their employer's consent. Gandhi explained this position as the only means of avoiding more militant struggles.

The organizational vehicles for the struggles were the Home Rule Leagues, pan-Islamist groups with which Gandhi had developed good relations, and the newly formed Satyagraha Sabha (Association). In the Punjab, the government of Lieutenant-Governor O'Dwyer was already very unpopular because of ruthless exactions and recruitment during World War I, and repression in the wake of revolutionary developments. In a province noted for its communal divisions, extraordinary unity was achieved. Two local Amritsar leaders, Dr. Satyapal and Saifuddin Kitchlu, were deported and Gandhi was prevented from entering Delhi and Punjab. On April 11, 1919, martial law was declared in Punjab, and two days later troops opened fire without warning on an unarmed gathering in the enclosed ground of Jallianwallabagh. Government officials estimated 379 dead, while Indians claimed a significantly higher death toll. Indiscriminate

arrests followed, as well as public flogging, special tribunals, and mass humiliation such as making people crawl on a road where a white woman had allegedly been insulted. Gujranwala district was subjected to aerial bombing. This unprecedented violence seems to have frightened most politicians, including Gandhi. It was left to Rabindranath Tagore to express the country's agony and anger in a famous letter renouncing his knighthood. At the sight of such widespread aggression, Gandhi confessed that he had made a "Himalayan blunder" and called off the *satyagraha*. This taught him the lesson that movements were not to be launched without strong organizational structures.

A number of issues were then woven together to form a bigger movement. With rumors about a harsh peace treaty to be imposed on Turkey, the Khilafat movement, which supported the Turkish sultan who was also the Khalifa (titular head of Islamic Sunni states), had gained ground. The movement developed both a moderate and a radical current. The Central Khilafat Committee, organized by Bombay merchants like Chotani, wanted to limit agitation to meetings, memorials, and deputations. The radicals, led by Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, had the support of lower-middle-class journalists and *ulama* (experts in Islamic jurisprudence) who had considerable influence over small towns and villages. The Khilafat was a symbol used to create a pan-Indian identity for Muslims. Gandhi made himself indispensable to both groups and acted as their link with Hindu politicians. The Khilafat leaders were extremely eager for Hindu-Muslim unity, since that was essential for any kind of successful boycott, especially of services or councils.

The punitive Treaty of Sèvres against Turkey was followed on May 28, 1920 by the Hunter Commission Majority Report on Punjab, which whitewashed O'Dwyer. The House of Lords had rejected censure of his actions, while the *Morning Post* had raised a sum of £26,000 for the mass murderer of Jallianwallabagh. Public anger mounted in India. In June, the radical Khilafatists' call for non-cooperation was backed by Gandhi, who began pressing the Indian National Congress to adopt a similar program. He called for a campaign around three axes: the Khilafat demand, the "Punjab wrong," and a vague call for *swaraj*. Younger Congress activists, like Jawaharlal Nehru, were enthusiastic, but

older leaders were wary of mass movements, preferring to plan for election campaigns under the new constitution. Between September and December 1920 a dramatic conversion of the leaders took place, in particular C. R. Das, who had mobilized a large delegation at Nagpur in December and even paid the train fares of many delegates. He eventually moved the central resolution accepting the implementation of the non-cooperation program at a time that would be suitable for the All-India Congress Committee (AICC). The goal of the Congress was redefined to read "the attainment of *swaraj* by all legitimate and peaceful means," although *swaraj* was still left undefined. The Congress organization was transformed into a mass party with committees all the way to the village. Membership dues were lowered to four *annas* (one quarter of a rupee). At the top, a 15-member Congress Working Committee was created to become, until independence, the real leadership of the organization. Support for Gandhi came from the hitherto "backward" provinces.

The Rise and Fall of the Movement

The non-cooperation movement began in January 1921. From January to March, the focus was on students and lawyers boycotting institutions. This movement of the intelligentsia soon showed signs of flagging, resulting in a decision to enroll ten million Congress members and raise a fund of ten million rupees. But mounting popular pressure led to a more militant stance in July, when the AICC called for an embargo on foreign clothing and a boycott of the Prince of Wales' forthcoming visit in November. Everywhere in India, the prince's visit was marked by black flag demonstrations. Between November 1921 and February 1922, the government had reached a virtual crisis point. Viceroy Reading sent a secret telegram to Montague suggesting a Round Table Conference and an early revision of the newly implemented reform scheme. But Gandhi refused to compromise. He decided to begin a no-revenue campaign at Bardoli to protest infringed liberties of speech, press, and association, beginning in the second week of February. But when on February 5, 22 policemen were burned alive by angry peasants at Chauri Chaura in Gorakhpur district of the United Provinces (UP), Gandhi unilaterally called off the movement, alienating the Khilafatists.

Despite attempts to reduce the movement to a narrowly anti-British line, to the exclusion of social dimensions, peasant militants managed to retain their autonomy. In UP, Bihar, Andhra, Gujarat, and Midnapore in Bengal, peasants showed considerable initiative. Tribal populations also revealed a developing political consciousness, as in the movement of Alluri Sitaram Raju. Peasants used the image of Gandhi they themselves had constructed, even though Gandhi repudiated their militancy. The bourgeois nationalism of Congress was contested from within the movement. The Congress resolution confirming the withdrawal of non-cooperation emphasized that withholding rent payments was contrary to Congress intentions and reassured *zamindars* (landlords) that Congress did not intend to attack their legal rights. In other words, the nationalist leadership was willing to betray the peasants for an alliance with “patriotic” landlords.

Such assurances were necessary because of the militant peasant struggles before and during the period of operation of the non-cooperation movement. A no-tax movement had been planned for Bardoli, a *raiyatwari* area (where the state itself stood as the rent receiver). In the deeply feudal princely states of Rajasthan, important agrarian struggles had developed and achieved partial victories between 1920 and 1922. These included agitation against free labor service and access to the Udaipur Maharana (king) in May 1921, and other struggles in Mewar, Alwar, and other states. In the Andhra delta region, there was broad peasant support for non-cooperation. There were mass resignations of village officers and a refusal to pay taxes, resulting in the reduction of tax collection from 1,473 million rupees to 0.4 million, until Gandhi pressurized the Andhra Congress to call off the campaign. Most violent was the anti-British, anti-landlord Moplah rebellion, in which over 1,000 Moplahs (communities located in Malabar, the northern part of present-day Kerala) were killed, and where peasant struggles at times crossed over into religious sectarianism, with forced conversions of some Hindus. In UP, where there had already been a powerful peasant movement before the non-cooperation agitation, peasants interpreted Gandhi in their own way, attacking *talugdari* property in 1921–2 (*talugdars* were traditional landlords of Awadh, protected after 1857 by the British). Gandhi criticized the peasants for their violence, but this did not deter them. Congress

eventually decided to abandon the movement. Baba Ramchandra, the local peasant leader, was arrested and the movement suppressed without protest from Congress. The Gandhi imagined by the peasants was endowed with extraordinary powers. Chanting his name, peasants became involved in activities that crossed all boundaries set by Gandhi. Tribal peoples of Bengal believed that if they wore a Gandhi cap or chanted his name, police bullets would not harm them. Generally, therefore, peasant acceptance of Gandhi was a highly complex phenomenon, and peasant aspirations were firmly voiced. Thus Chauri Chaura was not, for Gandhi, an isolated example. This also shows why, despite the original harsh sentences (172 of the 225 accused were initially sentenced to death, and 19 were eventually hanged), neither Gandhi nor any other leaders condemned them. Gandhi’s self-justification stood on two planks, both of which were revealing. On one hand he passionately reiterated his faith in non-violence. But he also asked his critics what would have happened if the British government had abdicated. He warned that nobody would be able to control unruly elements. Calling off the non-cooperation movement, no less than its initiation, showed that Gandhian movements were firmly committed to preserving existing social structures of domination, notwithstanding Gandhi’s projection of a peasant utopia.

Once the movement was called off, the British government, emboldened by this retreat, arrested Gandhi and sentenced him to a fairly severe prison term. The lack of significant protest against the sentence showed that the movement had weakened. Moreover, by unilaterally calling off the movement, Gandhi had alienated many Muslim leaders, a fact that had momentous consequences later on.

SEE ALSO: Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); India, Nationalism, Extremist; Moplah Revolts; Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964); Rampa Rebellions in Andhra Pradesh

References and Suggested Readings

- Bandyopadhyay, S. (2004) *From Plassey to Partition*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
- Brown, J. (1972) *Gandhi’s Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915–1922*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gordon, A. D. D. (1978) *Businessmen and Politics: Rising Nationalism and a Modernising Economy in Bombay, 1918–1933*. New Delhi: Manohar.

- Hardiman, D. (1981) *Peasant Nationalists of Gujarat: Kheda District 1917–1934*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Low, D. A. (Ed.) (2004) *Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle 1917–47*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Minault, G. (1982) *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Sarkar, S. (1983) *Modern India: 1885–1947*. New Delhi: Macmillan.

India, post-World War II upsurge

Kunal Chattopadhyay

At World War II's end, the British faced a political dilemma in India. During the Quit India struggles of 1942, only the wartime special powers had enabled the British to suppress the movement. The Congress leftists were clamoring for a resumption of militant struggles. British troops were war-weary and wanted no part in smashing popular upsurges in India. Indian army units used to help the Dutch and French recover their lost colonies in Indonesia and Vietnam were unhappy. Viceroy Wavell was apprehensive, but the Supreme Allied Commander, Lord Mountbatten, overruled him. Meanwhile, postwar problems of unemployment and high prices, exacerbated by a partial crop failure and other local factors, resulted in a ration cut by February 1946 to 1,200 calories per head, compared with wartime London's 2,800 calories (in 1943). Eventually, upsurges occurred in cities, among workers, radical youth, soldiers, and peasants, creating the potential for a mass revolution. While the British imperialists were under pressure to withdraw, nationalists pushed the country toward a compromise of freedom with partition and a conservative government.

The INA Trials and the Urban Upsurge

During the war, Subhas Chandra Bose had formed an army named the Azad Hind Fauz (Indian National Army, INA) out of volunteers and prisoners of war in Singapore. Bose died in a plane crash shortly after the surrender of Japan while en route to Soviet forces. The INA sur-

rendered, and some 20,000 INA soldiers were interrogated and transported back to India. In a number of little publicized trials, soldiers were condemned and at least nine were hanged. To denigrate the INA, a show trial was arranged for Captain Shah Nawaz, Captain Prem Sehgal, and Lieutenant Gurbux Singh Dhillon, who were accused of treason, murder, and incitement to murder and of being "war criminals." With the lifting of wartime censorship, however, the deeds of the INA were reported and made them appear as selfless patriots.

The Indian National Congress, which had ejected Bose in 1939–40, found the INA and Bose's death useful propaganda material, even though they were moving in practice to abandon mass struggles. The All-India Congress Committee (AICC) meeting in September 1945 decided to defend the accused as "misguided patriots." Among others, Jawaharlal Nehru put on the barrister's gown. When the trial of the three officers began on November 5, 1945, popular anger boiled over.

The accused, from three different backgrounds, revealed the INA's secular nature, engendering unity across communities. An INA week was observed between November 5 and 11, and the movement extended to remote localities, from Assam to Baluchistan. In Bengal, where Bose and the INA's popularity surpassed Gandhi's, a mass upsurge broke all bounds. On November 21, the Bengal Provincial Students' Federation (BPSF–Mirzapur Street), led by the Congress left and non-Communist Party of India (CPI) Marxists, called a central rally. Even the pro-CPI BPSF, which had previously called Bose a Quisling, participated in demonstrations. Tens of thousands of protesters poured into Wellington Square in Calcutta, and after several speeches set out to march to Government House. When they were blocked by police, a discussion over tactics broke out as Congress leader Sarat Chandra Bose, brother of Subhas, sent a letter advising the students to go back. Students from the Forward Bloc (FB, the party founded by Subhas) and Trotskyists condemned this attempted sabotage. Rameswar Banerjee, a student supporter of the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), and a young worker, Abdus Salam, were killed by police fire while trying to break through the armed cordon. Barricade fighting broke out and a handful of nationalist student leaders went home, but students supporting the Revolutionary Communist

Party (RCPI), the RSP, the FB, and the Bolshevik Leninist Party (BLPI), as well as the CPI, stayed on, as did two women leaders – the nationalist Jyotirmoyee Ganguly, who was killed by police fire, and the Trotskyist Bimalprotiva Devi. The previously hesitant CPI leadership called a general strike.

November 22 saw a massive general strike, joined by the transport workers of Calcutta and the entire industrial belt around the city. By afternoon, the crowd had swelled to between 50,000 and 100,000. Sarat Chandra Bose's press statement called the entire movement a "communist conspiracy." Congress leader Sardar Patel remarked that *goonda* (hooligan) elements had become dominant. Viceroy Wavell commented privately that the Congress leaders wanted to reduce political tensions because of capitalist apprehension about the security of property. Compared to the Congress, the CPI seemed radical. However, it was against independent revolutionary struggles under working-class hegemony. At that point, only the CPI of all the left parties had the requisite strength among the working class to put forward such a call as realistic, not simply rhetorical. As the agitations entered their third day, the CPI instead called for Congress–Muslim League unity in the struggle. Similar militant confrontations developed in Bombay, Karachi, Patna, Allahabad, Banaras, Rawalpindi, and other places. Though the INA officers were found guilty, in the face of this unprecedented upsurge, the government set them free on January 3, 1946.

In mid-January, the report of an unofficial inquiry into British atrocities in Orissa in August 1942 described, with slight exaggeration, the Koraput jail as Orissa's Belsen. On January 23, 1946, Bombay decided to observe Subhas Chandra Bose's birthday. Police fired on a huge demonstration demanding the release of the INA prisoners, killing ten demonstrators. On January 24, Bombay observed a complete *hartal* (shutdown).

On February 11, 1946, the All-Bengal Muslim Students' League (MSL) condemned the sentence of the INA officer Captain Rashid Ali in another trial (February 4, 1946). Other student associations supported the MSL. Colleges were totally shut down, and by the evening the transport workers' unions had decided on a strike. Calcutta and its industrial suburbs exploded on February 12. Over a million factory workers walked out, in an area stretching over 100 kilometers from north to south. As a half-million-strong

demonstration paraded the streets of Calcutta, Governor Casey gave orders to the army to shoot at sight. Machine gun-wielding soldiers on cars patrolled and reconquered the main roads, but the side streets and lanes were held by the protesters. Unofficial estimates put the number killed by bullets at over 200. Almost every town and market center of Bengal expressed solidarity with the Calcutta uprising. But once more Congress condemned the struggles, while the CPI, after initially calling for and joining the strikes, went into pacification mode.

Naval Rising

Within days of the Rashid Ali uprising, India's other great industrial city, Bombay, saw an even more dramatic struggle. Protesting racism, poor rations, and the trial of the INA soldiers, ratings of the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) planned for a mutiny. The revolt started on February 18, 1946 at the RIN shore signal school, HMIS *Talwar*. After confronting their officers, the leaders of the protest seized the communications room and broadcast news of the revolt to every ship and shore base. A large number of petty officers as well as a few ranking officers joined the rebels and a Central Strike Committee was formed under M. S. Khan. The next morning the mutineers seized military vehicles and drove round Bombay, shouting slogans in support of the INA prisoners. Demands also included the withdrawal of Indian troops from Indonesia. Fighting also erupted at Castle Barracks when ratings tried to break out of encirclement, with ships providing artillery support, and crowds started fraternizing with the sailors. By February 22, the strike had spread to naval bases all over the country as well as to some ships at sea: 78 ships were involved, as well as 20 shore establishments and over 20,000 ratings. Solidarity actions occurred in Karachi, Madras, Trichinopoly, and Madurai.

The Bombay Trotskyists were the first to issue a leaflet calling for a general strike. A little later, but with greater organizational force, the CPI issued a similar call; 70 of Bombay's 74 textile mills were shut down. Once more the CPI called for a demonstration to campaign for Congress, League, and communist unity. Nonetheless, on February 22, some 300,000 workers downed tools. In the working-class districts of Bombay, like Parel and Delisle Road, fighting

continued for two days. Two army battalions had to be pressed into service, 228 civilians were killed, and over 1,000 were injured before the rule of law could be restored. One CPI woman leader, Kamal Dhonde, was among those killed.

The bourgeois leadership was forthright in its condemnation of the revolt. Sardar Patel, while negotiating surrender on February 23 with the assurance that there would be no victimization, was simultaneously telling Andhra Congress leader Viswanathan that discipline had to be maintained. Gandhi condemned the ratings and called Hindu-Muslim unity on the barricades unholy. A panicky imperialism announced that a Cabinet Mission would be sent to finalize the transfer of power. But independent India did not accord the RIN ratings the status of freedom fighters.

The postwar upsurge did not die down immediately. The first ever all-India general strike of the working class took place on July 29, 1946, with 12 million total labor days lost. Only in Madras province, where the BLPI had a significant presence in the factories, was the situation different. The provincial government feared that the Trotskyists were planning to foment a general strike throughout the province. Trotskyist leader Anthony Pillai, who was elected president of the Madras Labor Union and president of the Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway Workers' Union, Perambur branch, was arrested on March 10, 1947 by the police under the orders of the Congress ministry. His arrest provoked a general strike in Madras on March 31, continuing for 100 days and was supported by the CPI.

Rural Upsurge

One of the biggest agrarian struggles in postwar India was the *tebhaga* movement in rural Bengal supported by a large class of sharecroppers, who were massively exploited by a landowning class named *jotedars*. Sharecroppers were formally obliged to hand over half their produce, but with extra deductions the amount came to much more, leaving them destitute and dependent on loans from *jotedars*. During World War II, imperialist military-economic policy resulted in a massive famine, causing the deaths of between one and a half million (official estimate) and five million (highest unofficial estimate), with 600,000 tenants losing their holdings in 1943.

Accumulated peasant anger was unleashed in the elections of 1946, when the CPI's candidate, Rup Narayan Ray, unexpectedly won in Dinajpur. Pressures from the district levels compelled the CPI-led Kisan Sabha (Peasant Association) to launch a *tebhaga* (two-thirds for sharecroppers) campaign, even though sharecropping was purely customary and was governed by no legal provisions. In the first phase organized peasants harvested and shifted paddy to common silos and invited the *jotedars* to take their one-third share. The second phase saw sharecroppers in unorganized areas move into action. They too harvested the crops and took them to a common silo. More often than not, news of the movement reached sharecroppers after the harvesting was done; in these cases they attacked the silos of rich *jotedars* and took away grain. Although the movement was strongest in Dinajpur district, it spread to 19 districts overall, and at its peak involved something like six million peasants.

Participation in terms of community was varied. *Rajbanshi* (a community of north Bengal, Nepal, and Assam), Muslim, and *adivasi* (tribal) sharecroppers and agricultural laborers all participated, resulting in police clashes in February at Khanpur, Thumnia, and Chirir Bandar in Dinajpur as well as in a number of other places. At least 50 peasants and agricultural laborers, including a number of militant women, were killed, revealing the weakness of the central leadership, which had given no thought to resisting state violence. Even when peasants captured the police and took away their guns, they were not encouraged to use them.

A feature of the *tebhaga* movement was its anti-communalism. Class identity was able to transcend ethnic and communal identities, and it was not unknown for Muslim peasants to attack the silos of Muslim landlords, as was the case also with Hindus. Class struggle halted the spread of communal violence for some months in rural Bengal. The most famous incident was the march of 10,000 peasants, armed with sticks, which halted an emerging riot in the town of Nilphamari in Rangpur district. Another important feature was the massive participation of women, who formed autonomous women's squads and resisted the police and the *jotedars'* thugs. In district after district, women peasants stormed their way into the organization and the party, often resisting deep-rooted patriarchy. They questioned traditional norms, challenged wife-

beating, fought the police, snatched guns, and died in uprisings in Khanpur, Odlabari in Jalpaiguri, and in the Hajong (tribals) areas of Mymensingh district. In all, according to the Kisan Sabha, more than 3,000 activists were arrested. After early 1947, the movement petered out except in a few isolated areas.

Even more massive was the Telengana movement in Hyderabad state, one of the largest princely states in India. The Nizam of Hyderabad was an absolute ruler and a loyal servant of the British, enjoying considerable autonomy. In most cases cultivators were treated as *pattadars* (registered occupants, not owners), working either in special *jagirs* (land grants) or on crown lands. Nearly 6,500 villages were under the *jagirdari* system. The peasants of Nalgonda, Mahbubnagar, and Warrangal districts in particular were most intensely exploited. Extractions in this area (*Vetti*) involved forced cultivation of the landlord's land. A serf-like condition was imposed on poor people, usually from *adivasi* communities, reducing them to the status of bond-laborers for generations. The bulk of the rural masses were either from untouchable castes like the Malas and Madigas, or from tribals like the Hill Reddis, Chenchus, Koyas, Lambadis, and Banjaras.

Following the legalization of the CPI in 1942, the party was able to penetrate legal organizations in both British Andhra and Hyderabad. At the Bhongir Conference of the Andhra Mahasabha (Association), two young communists, Ravi Narayan Reddy and Baddam Yella Reddy, were elected president and general secretary respectively. By early 1946, Nalgonda and Warrangal had strong CPI units. A major incident occurred in July 1946 when over 1,000 peasants, armed with *lathis* (sticks) and slings, demonstrated in a village that formed part of the estate of a large and extremely oppressive Telengana landlord (*Deshmukh*). The landlord's hired thugs fired on the demonstrators, killing the village peasant leader, Doddi Komarayya, and injuring a few others. This incident marked the beginning of the Telengana insurrection, which spread first to Jangaon, Suryapet, and Huzurnagar *talukas* (administrative units) of Nalgonda.

According to one estimate, the movement involved peasants in about 3,000 villages with a combined population of about three million, reaching its greatest intensity between August 1947 and September 1948. The movement mobilized 10,000 village squad members and

about 2,000 guerilla squads. About one million acres of land were distributed, based on broad class and communal alliances, which nevertheless began to unravel after land seizures commenced and the land ceiling question was settled in favor of rich peasants. Omvedt (1994) argues that Dalits were ignored because the CPI leadership did not take caste oppression seriously. During this period, the CPI made skillful use of the anti-Nizam slogans of the State Congress leaders, most of them operating from Indian territory, unlike the underground communist leaders. In this movement too, there was a considerable degree of autonomous peasant initiative, contrary to the legend of a perfect CPI leadership, which was built up afterwards. The intensification of the armed struggle sharpened class conflict. The Congress withdrew from its alliance with the communists. Then, on September 13, 1948, the Indian army under General J. N. Chaudhuri moved into Hyderabad and ensured the merger of the state into independent India. The period between September 1948 and October 1951 saw the transformation and ultimate weakening of the movement, until it was eventually called off, under circumstances rather different from those that had given rise to it. As in *tebhaga*, there was a significant participation of women in the movement. However, it needs to be noted that while Dalits and women were present in significant numbers, neither gained full equality.

Two smaller but important CPI-led struggles occurred in Maharashtra, among the Varli tribals, and in the princely state of Travancore in the Shertalai-Alleppey-Ambalapuzha area. Both cases involved police actions and much brutality. After a prolonged struggle, the Varlis working in forests were brought in under the Minimum Wages Act, while the struggles in Travancore, including armed resistance at Punnapra and Vayalar, while causing immediate losses (around 800 people were killed), discredited the Travancore Dewan (prime minister), Sir C. P. Ramaswami Iyer, and his attempt to maintain an independent Travancore.

SEE ALSO: Ambedkar, B. R. (1891–1956); Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945); Dalit Liberation Struggles; India, Armed Struggle in the Independence Movement; India, Civil Disobedience Movement and Demand for Independence; Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964); Quit India Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Basu, N. (1992) *The Political Parties and the Labor Politics, 1937–47*. Calcutta: Minerva Associates.
- Chattopadhyay, G. (1976) *The Almost Revolution: A Case Study of India in February 1946*. In B. De et al. (Eds.) *Essays in Honour of Prof. S. C. Sarkar*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.
- Cooper, A. (1988) *Sharecropping and Sharecroppers' Struggle in Bengal, 1930–1950*. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi.
- Das, D. K. (1993) *Talwar Revisited*. Delhi: Ajanta.
- Dhanagare, D. N. (1991) *Peasant Movements in India, 1920–1950*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Dutta-Ray, K. (1992) *Political Upsurges in Post-War India, 1945–46*. New Delhi: Intellectual Publishing House.
- Omvedt, G. (1994) *Dalits and the Democratic Revolution: Dr. Ambedkar and the Dalit Movement in Colonial India*. New Delhi: Sage.

Indian national liberation

Soma Marik

British Expansion and Resistance: 1757–1857

The British colonization of India began with the Battle of Plassey in 1757, when Nawab Siraj-ud-Daulah's forces lost to Robert Clive. By 1765 the *suba* (province) of Bengal, one of the richest in Mughal India (1526–1857), was controlled by the English East India Company, which had obtained the *dimani* rights to collect taxes. From this base the British expanded in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries under aggressive governor generals, especially the Marquis of Wellesley, Lord Hastings, and the Marquis of Dalhousie. The kingdom of Mysore was annexed, the *Nizam* (ruler) of Hyderabad forced to accept a subsidiary alliance, and the Marathas and the Sikhs vanquished.

Resistance to British rule from the late eighteenth century took three forms: Mughal, popular struggles, and tribal rebellions.

In the initial era of subjugation, some Mughal princes did not peacefully accept dispossession. Mir Qasim of Bengal, who originally gained power with British assistance, sought sovereignty from the British before his defeat. But the staunchest opponents of the British and the East India Company were rulers of Mysore, Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan, who joined forces with the

Marathas and others in the region. Alone among the Indian rulers, Mysore rulers seemed to have perceived the dangers posed by the British. While the Marathas were less consistent, Nana Phadnavis and several others sought to cobble together an anti-British alliance. However, succession problems among opponents to the British presented the colonial authority with the opportunity to support one faction over the other, thereby weakening the alliance. By the early nineteenth century the British had defeated all the major powers of western and southern India, conquered much territory, and compelled the Moghuls to agree to indirect rule through “subsidiary alliance,” where a British resident official decided policy. In the north, the ruler of Awadh was the first to be forced to accept British policies. The last major independent Indian state, the Sikh kingdom of Ranjit Singh, was conquered after his death, through the utilization of internal dissidence and the bribing of some nobles. For example, the British rewarded Gulab Singh for his support by selling him the Kingdom of Kashmir.

From the 1770s a series of large and small popular struggles against the British raged in opposition to colonial control, notably the *sanyasi* and *fakir* (Hindu and Muslim ascetic) rebellions, and the revolt of Titu Mir in Bengal. Outside Bengal, as British rule began to be imposed, popular resistance formed against oppressive land tax. Economic exploitation, racism, and trampled religious sensibilities combined to produce repeated political outbursts in India, often described by the rulers as riots or disturbances. Even official reports, however, show a combination of class, national, and racial resistance.

Finally, tribal revolts spread across a vast zone of India, from Gujarat in the West through the central Orissa, Bihar (present-day Jharkhand) and Bengal in the East, and Andhra in the South. The rights of “tribals” were completely ignored when the British regime of absolute private property imposed its rule. Repeated tribal uprisings broke out, like the Kol revolt of 1831–2, the Santal *Hool* (revolt) led by Sidhu and Kanhu, two Santal brothers, resisting colonial land settlements (1855–7), and repeatedly among the Rampas of Andhra and the Moplahs of Malabar, or the important tribal revolt of Birsa Munda (1899–1900).

Peasant resistance, discontent against racism, soldiers' discontent, princely and old ruling-class

discontent, and religious grievances all converged in the revolt of 1857, the high-point of early resistance. Though former rulers, including Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar, the Maratha leader Nana Sahib, and Khan Bahadur Khan at Bareilly, were important participants, the 1857 revolt was not a feudal reaction. The 1857 actions included an army revolt against racial oppression and economic deprivation, and a massive peasant upsurge in some of India's most densely populated areas. The revolt was permeated by a sense of good governance under "national" and Mughal rule, and the sharp deviation of the East India Company from the previous era. The revolt was followed by extreme repression, including the mass hanging of suspected rebels and binding rebels to cannons while firing. In the aftermath the East India Company was abolished and the British ruled India directly through parliament. As a new nationalism was growing in India, the British engaged in limited efforts to provide a voice for a limited segment of the population.

Modern Nationalism and its Stages

From the early nineteenth century, English-educated public figures in Calcutta, capital of British India, began criticizing the British for their restriction of civil liberties and Indian rights. But nationalism as a mass ideology can be traced to the second half of the nineteenth century. Early middle-class nationalists did not envisage driving the British out, but appealed to the British sense of justice against the un-British rule of the viceroy and his council.

In its formative years the Indian National Congress (henceforth, Congress), the first all-India organization, founded in 1885, explicitly rejected the idea of ejecting the British from India. Repeated failures of the politics of pleading and petitioning led to the growth of a more militant nationalist current. While moderate nationalism had been secular, extremist nationalism, in drawing upon strongly religious imageries, opened more explicitly religiously chauvinist or communalist politics.

The Bengal partition resulted in significant growth of militant nationalism, which developed the call for independence, and new tactics of struggle, including boycotting British goods and emphasizing indigenous production (*swadeshi*). Militants also planned armed struggles against

notorious members of the ruling class and military uprisings, leading to the eventual split of moderates and extremists within the Congress. The British sought to divide Hindus and Muslims on communal lines, leading to the formation of the Muslim League in 1906. During World War I, repression increased and popular anger grew. By 1916 the political positions of moderates and extremists, as well as the Muslim League, drew closer. A Congress-League pact created the possibility of a constitutional struggle on limited demands.

The period 1917–47 saw major struggles of different kinds, culminating in freedom with Partition. The coming of Gandhi to India, and his emergence as a mass leader, brought a new style of politics, involving mass politics and an articulation of many of the grievances of the oppressed peasants, while ensuring that the reins of control remained firmly with Gandhi, who was not a revolutionary. The nationalist movement enabled Gandhi to overcome the limitations of elite moderate politics and the politics of armed struggle. The stress on non-violence ensured the continued support of the Indian upper classes, while giving the movement a new mass dimension.

Major Gandhian movements were the Rowlatt *Satyagraha* (peaceful violation of specific laws) (1919), the non-violent non-cooperation movement (1920–1), and the civil disobedience movement (1930–4). While Gandhi's left-wing critics saw in these repeated compromises with the British, others view the strategy as a successful effort of escalating "pressure-compromise-pressure" (Chandra et al. 1989). For the Gandhian movement, capturing the imagination of the popular masses was as important to spurring the successful anti-colonial struggle as was Gandhi's actual message.

Class, Community, Oppressed Groups

The emergence of mass politics, however, unleashed new dynamics. Gandhian movements saw the large-scale entry of women into the freedom struggle. Women had been active in the national movement earlier, but Gandhi ensured that space for women was created. Important women leaders included Sarojini Naidu. Initially auxiliaries, women were increasingly fighting for equal space in the national movement, and concomitantly demanding legal and social equality for themselves.

The pressure of Hindu communalism on Congress pushed even many liberal Muslims like M. A. Jinnah into opposition. The Muslim League revived, as a reaction to aggressive Hindu communalism. The Congress remained tied to uppercaste interests, as noted by lower-caste leaders, including E. V. Ramaswamy Naicker (“Periyar”) and B. R. Ambedkar, who formed alternative social and political organizations. Ambedkar demanded a separate electorate for *dalits* (the “untouchable castes”) during the Round Table Conference, but eventually agreed, through the Poona Pact, that assembly and parliamentary seats were to be reserved for untouchables, with popular elections through a general electorate. He rejected Gandhi’s *Harijan* (Gandhi’s term for the untouchables) upliftment program as a meaningless sop.

There was also a revival of calls for armed struggle, this time with greater sophistication in its politics. Two outstanding groups were the Hindustan Socialist Republican Army, led by Sardar Bhagat Singh, Chandrasekhar Azad and others, and the Chittagong revolutionaries in Bengal, led by Surya Sen. Both groups were moving from revolutionary nationalism to communism, and many of the surviving revolutionary nationalists became members of the Communist Party (CPI), or were involved in founding the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP).

Working-class and peasant struggles also developed, as did organized socialist and communist movements. The Congress Socialist Party was a party combining Marxists, Fabians, and other socialistically inclined Congress members. The CPI was a more revolutionary organization, founded in 1920 in Tashkent and in 1925 in India. By the 1930s it had become dominant within the All India Trade Union Congress, and was also a major force within the All India Kisan Sabha (Peasant Association). Nationalist leftists and socialists combined within the Congress and supported first Jawaharlal Nehru and then Subhas Chandra Bose as Congress presidents. In 1939, after Bose was elected by defeating right-wing Congress candidate Sittaramayah, who had been supported by Gandhi, the right wing hit back. Outmaneuvered, Bose was forced to resign a few months later. He formed the Forward Bloc. Thereafter, the left split, and the Congress right sought to consolidate its position in the provincial assemblies.

Compromise and Struggle: 1935–1947

In 1935 the British rulers promulgated the Government of India Act, which expanded the powers of the provincial assemblies somewhat. The Congress accepted this and went on to contest elections. Forming governments in this way turned out, however, to be an unhappy experience, as mass aspirations grew. Congress, tied to mill-owner, trader, and landlord interests, did not respond favorably to popular demands. Congress thus began to be discredited. It was therefore relieved by the unilateral declaration of war by Viceroy Linlithgow on Nazi Germany in 1939, instructing all Congress ministries to resign because the national will had not been ascertained. However, still reluctant to launch serious mass movements, Gandhi opted for a strategy of individual *satyagrahas*, where hand-picked volunteers would violate the law and be arrested. This was calculated not to embarrass the government and to avoid any repression. At this stage the left, notably the CPI, condemned the Congress.

Then in 1941 came the Japanese invasions as well as the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. At this stage it was Gandhi and the Congress Socialist Party who wanted a more militant struggle, feeling that a weakened Britain might give in, while the CPI sided with the most moderate elements in Congress, opposing struggles. In 1942 Congress adopted its historic Quit India resolution, but within 24 hours almost the entire top echelon of Congress leadership was put behind bars. Struggles developed nonetheless, and were led mostly by Gandhians and Congress Socialists, and sometimes by CPI members who defied their party’s line. Smaller Marxist parties like the Revolutionary Socialist Party and the Bolshevik Leninist Party also took part in the struggles. Hindu and Muslim communalists both opposed the movement. Close to 100,000 people were arrested, and massive repression was carried out.

Subhas Chandra Bose, who had been arrested and subsequently kept under house arrest, fled to Afghanistan, and then made his way first to Germany and then by submarine to Japan, where he received much greater support. In Southeast Asia he formed the Azad Hind (Free Indian) government and created the Azad Hind Fauz (Indian National Army or INA) with

Indian prisoners of war and Indian expatriates living in Southeast Asia. The Japanese defeat doomed the INA, but stories of its valor electrified Indians.

British attempts to put on trial INA soldiers as deserters and war criminals resulted in massive India-wide struggles demanding their release, unleashing a spate of postwar upsurges, including a revolt of the Royal Indian Navy, several major agrarian struggles (in Bengal, the *Tebhaga* movement; in Hyderabad, the *Telangana* struggle; and in Kerala, the Punnapra-Vayalar struggle), and working-class protests culminating in a massive general strike. Fearful of social struggles, Congress chose to call them off whenever possible and take the path of negotiations, signaling the end of non-secular protest and the rise of communal demands and discord.

A total breakdown of law and order occurred in many parts of the country. In the 1946 elections to the Constituent Assembly, Congress dominated the General Seats and the Muslim League controlled Muslim seats. Communal riots organized by communalists – Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh – tore the country apart. On August 16, 1946, chosen as Direct Action Day, the Muslim League unleashed communalist violence in Calcutta. Hindu communalists struck back. In four days, over 4,000 perished in the “Great Calcutta Killings.” Gandhi alone fought against the communal madness engulfing the country, moving from one riot-torn area to another, but Congress leaders were in no mood to listen to his advice for a settlement with Jinnah. Eventually, the British rulers decided to pull out of India by June 1948. Lord Mountbatten, appointed viceroy, had a clear mandate of expediting the process of British withdrawal. On June 3, 1947 the Mountbatten Plan proposed transfer of power on August 15, 1947 to two successor Dominion governments, India and Pakistan, with Bengal and Punjab divided on communal lines. What followed soon after was the most widespread communal violence and displacement in the subcontinent’s political history, with about a million people killed and more than 75,000 women raped. Over 10 million people were displaced, and over six decades later, descendants of some still live in refugee camps or precarious conditions.

SEE ALSO: Ambedkar, B. R. (1891–1956); Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945); Dalit Liberation Struggles; Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–

1948); Hindu Nationalism, Hindutva, and Women; India, Armed Struggle in the Independence Movement; India, Great Rebellion of 1857 (the Sepoy Revolt); India, Non-Violent Non-Cooperation Movement, 1918–1929; Indigo Rebellion; Jinnah, Muhammad Ali (1876–1948); Joshi, P. C. (1907–1980); Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964); Quit India Movement; Santal Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Bandyopadhyay, S. (2004) *From Plassey to Partition*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
- Bose, S. & Jalal, A. (2004) *Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy*. New York: Routledge.
- Chandra, B. et al. (1989) *India’s Struggle for Independence*. New Delhi: Penguin Books India.
- Dutta-Gupta, S. (2006) *Comintern and the Destiny of Communism in India, 1919–1943: Dialectics of Real and a Possible History*. Kolkata: Seribaan.
- Joshi, P. C. (Ed.) (1986) *Rebellion 1857: A Symposium*. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi.
- Kumar, R. (2002) *The History of Doing: An Illustrated Account of Movements for Women’s Rights and Feminism in India 1800–1990*. Delhi: Kali for Women.
- Nanda, B. R. (1985) *Gandhi and His Critics*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Omvedt, G. (1994) *Dalits and the Democratic Revolution: Dr Ambedkar and the Dalit Movement in Colonial India*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Sarkar, S. (1983) *Modern India, 1885–1947*. New Delhi: Macmillan.
- Tripathi, A. (1967) *The Extremist Challenge: India between 1890 and 1910*. Calcutta: Orient Longman.

Indigo Rebellion

Kunal Chattopadhyay with Muntassir Mamoon

The Indigo Rebellion (Indigo Revolts) comprised widespread peasant uprisings in Bengal from 1839 to 1860 against rapacious planters of the indigo crop that are viewed by historians as important events giving rise to the early Indian nationalist movement. With the growth of the textile industry after the Industrial Revolution, dyeing of clothes became an important branch of apparel manufacturing. From the time of the East India Company, British planters had been settling in parts of India. The planters started taking a keen interest in indigo when the supply of indigo from other sources dried up and India emerged as the largest exporter of the crop. They established *kuthis* (large concerns) in different parts of Bengal. The biggest concern,

the India Indigo Company, was established in Nadia-Jessore-Khulna. The European planters induced Bengali *ryots* (peasants) to reserve a part of their land to grow indigo by making small payments as *dadon* (an advance) to be adjusted against final payment at the time of delivery. Once the *ryot* took the advance, as happened extensively over several districts of Bengal, like Jessore, Nadia, and Pabna, the *ryot* was in the clutches of the planter. When taking produce to the planter's factory, people were cheated by dealers who used distorted scales. The value of the produce was calculated at rates far below market price. After the deductions, including the value of revenue stamps used in the agreement papers, the cost of seed supplied by the planter, and transport charges, the *ryot* often ended up with no profits, or even a net debt to the planter on account of the advances given. For all practical purposes a debt bondage developed in the planter-dominated areas, being handed down from father to son. Attempts to break away from the tyranny of indigo planters were tackled by sending in armed *lathiyals* (retainers), who would beat up the peasant and his family members and destroy his crops. The peasants had no access to the legal system.

The indigo rebellions had two phases: 1839–48 and 1859–60. The first attack on the indigo establishments was launched by Bishwanath Sardar in Nadia district to loot the *kuthis* and to harass their owners. But he was soon arrested and hanged by the British government. Larger-scale revolts followed in Mymensingh and Khulna, where in the latter an indigo trader named Renee brought a large area of land under cultivation forcibly through torture and coercion, displacing small *zamindars*. Such *zamindars*, *talukdars* (a sub-feudatory layer), and the cultivators joined in resisting the oppression of Renee. In addition, the indigo planters had purchased *zamindaris* and intermediate tenures to appear in even stronger guise as exploiters. As a result, the 1859–60 rebellion assumed mass forms in Nadia, Murshidabad, Pabna, Jessore, Khulna, and Birbhum, involving some 500,000 peasants. In many cases peasants banded together and set upon the indigo planters, uprooting the indigo plants, burning several factories, and consigning accounts books to the fire.

According to Reverend James Long, a British missionary sympathetic to the peasants, the rise in prices of goods, including agricultural produce,

the rising cost of labor power, the growth in political consciousness from the middle of the nineteenth century, and the evident sympathy of the educated middle class provided an impetus to the peasants in openly rebelling.

In most cases, leadership was in the hands of indigo cultivators themselves. In Chougachha, Nadia district, the leaders were two brothers, Bishnucharan Biswas and Digambar Biswas, former employees of the planter who resigned in protest at the oppression of the peasants by the planters. To ameliorate conditions to a considerable extent, the peasants petitioned the government or went to courts, but when this strategy was unsuccessful, historical records demonstrate the burning of crops, and planters fled. However, elements within the middle class supported the cultivators. Palit (1975), for example, views the insurrections as purely factional disputes rather than landlord-planter rivalries. Other scholars, like Kling (1966), view the Indigo Rebellion as the beginning of an emergent nationalist movement. Certainly, there was some rivalry, and some *zamindars* supported the peasants, as did middle-class nationalists seeking to establish hegemony over the peasantry. Harishchandra Mukherjee, editor of *Hindoo Patriot*, and Girishchandra Ghosh were strong supporters of the cultivators. Mukherjee admitted before the Indigo Commission his active support for the cultivators. Mukherjee helped Pleaders (a category of lawyers in courts) financially to defend peasants and was arrested on charges of instigating supporters of the rebellion. In an attempt to mobilize sympathy for the peasants, Sisir Kumar Ghosh argued the disputes were completely peaceful, a conclusion supported by middle-class proto-nationalists seeking to remain loyal to British rule and only urging reforms.

Popular hatred of the planters among the urban middle classes was expressed through the popularity of the play *Neeldarpan* (A Mirror of Indigo) by Dinabandhu Mitra, translated into English reportedly by Michael Madhusudan Dutt, the foremost Bengali poet of his generation, and published by Reverend James Long.

Ultimately, the peasant militancy and popular opposition compelled the British government to establish the Indigo Commission in 1860 and issue a declaration that planters could no longer arrange forced cultivation. But planter oppression was difficult to stop. In some cases planters moved to Bihar to avoid the law. Ultimately, the

discovery of chemical substitutes for indigo broke the planter monopoly.

SEE ALSO: Bengal, Popular Uprisings and Movements in the Colonial Era; India, Great Rebellion of 1857 (the Sepoy Revolt); Santal Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Bhattacharya, S. (1977) *The Indigo Revolt in Bengal. Society and Change* 5, 12 (July): 13–23.
- Chattopadhyay, M. (1985) *Petition to Agitation: Bengal 1857–1885*. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi.
- Kling, B. (1966) *The Blue Mutiny: The Indigo Disturbances in Bengal, 1859–1862*. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press.
- Palit, C. (1975) *Tensions in Bengal Rural Society: Landlords, Planters and Colonial rule (1830–1860)*. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers.

Indochina, World War II and liberation in

Daniel Hémerly

World War II rang the death knell of the European colonial empire. However, decolonization was deferred for French Indochina. The beginning of the end of the French colonial empire in Indochina was signaled by the cataclysmic collapse of France in June 1940, followed by a brief Franco-Thai war arbitrated by Tokyo to benefit Bangkok in May 1941. On September 23, 1940 the Phuc Quoc (National Restoration) nationalists with the assistance of the Japanese army launched a short but intense attack on Lang Son in Northern Vietnam on September 23. The Phuc Quoc entered Tonkin with the Japanese army confident that they were commencing the liberation of their country.

However, the Lang Son uprising was immediately quashed, as was the Bac Son communist uprising in Tonkin in late September, as was a subsequent intense communist insurrection on November 22, 1940 in 11 of the 20 provinces of Cochinchina. They were crushed by relentless military and police repression, decimating the Communist Party of Indochina. But this was only a brief respite for the government installed by Maréchal Pétain's regime in Vichy after the Franco-German armistice and entrusted to Admiral Decoux. The Indochinese administration and army, faithful to Vichy until 1945 despite the formation of clandestine networks of General

de Gaulle's Free France, was forced to comply with the Japanese ultimatum as of August 30, 1940 and then sign the Franco-Japanese agreements of January, May, and July 1941.

Vichy and the general government accepted the installation of a Japanese army of 50,000 men in the cities, at strategic points and military bases, as well as the insertion of the Indochinese economy into the "Sphere of Japanese Co-prosperity" – in other words, placement in service of the Japanese war effort. In exchange, Japan agreed to respect French sovereignty over Indochina where the colonial administration remained.

As early as 1940 the colonized Indochinese had an unshakable conviction that liberation from colonial domination and independence was only a matter of time and that the "favorable moment" (to cite an ancient Confucian belief) was very near. The major event of 1940–5 took place in the minds of all Indochinese: the national project became an event of the masses. In Cambodia the old tacit pact between the elites and the Protectorate was ripped apart at the "manifestation of the parasols" of July 20, 1942 at Phnom Penh, held to protest the arrest of one of the organizers of the "Nagaravatta," Hem Chieu. This manifestation gave rise to the first repression, heavy condemnation, and the exile of Son Ngoc Thanh to Tokyo.

Japanese repression triggered the emergence of a popular nationalism aided by a segment of the Buddhist clergy and to which the entourage of young King Norodom Sihanouk – crowned in 1941 – was agreeable. In Laos the idea of independence and revival of the collective Laotian past progressed rapidly among the educated youth. In Vietnam the idea of modern nationalism progressed like never before and the collective culture was converted to nationalism at a pace completely unknown until then. New reviews and periodicals like *Tri Tan* (Knowledge of Novelty) and *Thanh Nghi* (Enlightened Opinion) were the most active organs for these nationalist impulses, which the authorities contained only with difficulty and which were encouraged by Japanese propaganda on the theme of the Great Asia. Modern literature and theater enjoyed unprecedented success, while a thirst for knowledge and interest in national history pervaded the popular urban classes and at times even the countryside. Controversies and debates about culture, education, development, and the future of the country were followed avidly. Major movements had in fact emerged before 1940 in

which clandestine political currents participated, such as the Indo-Chinese Communist Party (PCI), which in 1943 published a Cultural Manifesto exhorting writers and artists to participate in the elaboration of a “national, scientific and proletarian culture.”

Starting in 1943 the politization of the masses increased dramatically. The educated youth immersed itself in innumerable social activities, such as the SOS movements for flood victims or the popular movement for the elimination of illiteracy in *Quốc Ngu* that in 1938 was launched by the Association for the Diffusion of “*Quốc Ngu*” created in Hanoi and headed by *Truong Chinh*, future secretary-general of the PCI. Under the umbrella of these activities in 1944, youth movements were begun. These apparently apolitical movements – in particular Youths of First Line, whose chief scout was *Ta Quang Buu* in *Huế*, and *Thanh Niên Tiên Phong* (Youths of the Avant-Garde), whose creators were secretly members of the PCI in Cochinchina, such as *Dr. Pham Ngoc Thach* – were difficult for the French Commission of Youth and Sports to control.

Such movements were fertile fields of activism for the Vietminh communist insurgents. There was a vocabulary war: the term “*Viet-Nam*” was spread everywhere, driving back little by little the old colonial placenames such as *Annam*, *Tonkin*, and even *Cochinchina*. The word “*Viet-Nam*” imposed itself from then on, as it was the incontestable marker of the new national identity, to the point that French authorities were sometimes forced to use it. The authorities attempted to play a subtle game of channeling a phenomenon which was about to overwhelm them, but as 1945 neared, for the Indochinese people, colonization had become intolerable and Independence unavoidable.

Meanwhile, due to the prudent protection of the Japanese, nationalist movements quickly resumed activities. The *VNQZD*, the Vietnamese nationalist party, remained in the Chinese *Guomindang* but linked its reappearance in Vietnam to the occupation of the northern half of Indochina by Chinese troops, as agreed at the Potsdam Conference. The small, nascent nationalist parties of the *Dai Việt* and the *Phuc Quốc*, linked for the time to the Japanese, had only limited influence and at the approach of Japanese defeat were planning to transfer allegiance to the Chinese generals of the armies

from Yunnan and Guangxi. This was in contrast to the *Caodaisme* and the *Hoa Hao*, who from 1944 endeavored to control entire regions in Cochinchina with the consent of the Japanese. In Cochinchina they started to constitute armed militias in such a way that the colonial authorities could not oppose them.

However, essential events occurred elsewhere, in the mountains of the High Region, the *Viet Bac*, the border zone with China, which was poorly controlled by the colonial authorities, and where, in early 1941, the PCI endeavored to reorganize itself on the basis of a decisive strategic reorientation. The crucial event was the return of *Nguyễn Ai Quốc* from the USSR after a long, cautious stay at *Yanan* between 1938 and 1941, and who in 1942 assumed the name *Hồ Chí Minh*. He crossed the border on February 8, 1941 with his suitcase and his typewriter and settled near China in the northwest of *Cao Bang*, imposing himself as the historical instigator of Vietnamese and Indochinese communism.

It was in *Viet Bac* that the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee in *Pac Bo* from May 10–19, 1941 adopted a new political lineage, recommended *Hồ Chí Minh* and the young survivors of the colonial repressions of 1939–40 in *Tonkin* – essentially, *Vo Nguyễn Giap*, *Pham Van Dong*, and *Truong Chinh* – that he had regrouped. The new political lineage prioritized the “revolution of national liberation,” ending in the agrarian revolution and the class struggle, established a political front known under the abbreviation *Vietminh*: the *Viet-Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh* (Alliance for the Independence of Vietnam), officially created on September 8.

In spite of its propagandist speeches, the *Vietminh* was not an alliance between independent political forces, nor a political coalition, nor a new Popular Front, nor a new anti-imperialist front. Its function, according to the 8th Plenum, was “to reunite all the patriots, without distinction of fortune, age, sex, religion or political opinion, in order to work together for the liberation of our people and for the safety of our nation.” It was a vast and flexible structure, almost-ungraspable, but which promised to be omnipresent, totally communist, and was destined to prevent and neutralize eventual political rivalry, mobilize and lead the population, encourage popular patriotism, nationalist forces, and influential networks – in brief, an apparatus to create unanimity, constituted in preparation for

the inevitable fight for power that any “national liberation essentially implies.” They conceived an armed struggle – the first core of the Army of National Safety, the future Popular Army, and the first *maquis* organized immediately in the High Area – and as such, the installation of national structures of a party-state to be based upon the model offered by the communist revolution, Maoism, and the Chinese Communist Party, with whom the Vietnamese communists were in regular contact.

The objective was national liberation and the seizure of power. The means was armed struggle and political work. In Viet Bac it managed to establish cooperation with US officers of the Indochina section of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) in China, aiming for the appearance at least of American and Allied legitimation. Because national Vietnamese communism was anything but isolationist, the plan was to operate patiently on an international political terrain and constantly claim solidarity among all people, including the French and Americans.

The bifurcation of Indochinese communism occurred only in Tonkin – where the PCI’s presence was more recent – and in some provinces of Annam. In the South the PCI was almost completely cut off from the North and was more classically Stalinist-communist. It was quickly reconstituted, starting in 1943 under the direction of its prewar leader Trần Văn Giàu. By 1945 it possessed a dense, clandestine network of labor unions and peasant and urban associations organized around the goal of seizing revolutionary power.

Ideologically, strategically, and practically, the meeting at Pac Bo meant that Vietnamese communism was decisively transformed into a new and essentially Asian configuration – national communism – already a strong tendency within the PCI and which reappeared at its core in 1937–8. This communism would emerge victorious and remain fundamentally faithful to the strategic formula Red China explored and elaborated in the 1930s.

Events validated the operational capacity of the new communist line in Vietnam. From 1944 onwards, the colonial regime vacillated and then rapidly unravelled. Its economic structures were dislocated under the combined effects of enormous Japanese demands, inflation, the rupture of railway and maritime communications between Cochinchina and Tonkin following the Allied

bombings, and generalized shortages. During the winter of 1944–5 a catastrophic rice harvest and the interruption of rice deliveries from the South contributed to famine in Tonkin and North Annam, with approximately 1 million victims. In the cities to which starving peasants fled, scores of corpses of those who died of starvation during the night were found each morning. From then on, the isolated colonial regime was paralyzed.

From March 1945 the Japanese were in an increasingly difficult situation on all Asian fronts. Worried about the activity of Free France networks in the army and the French administration of Indochina, and the possibility of their turning against their own settlements, they decided to take a decisive step. On the night of March 9, Japanese troops disarmed the colonial army and imprisoned French soldiers and those in authority in camps and jails. Within a few days the colonial regime had broken down irremediably in all of Indochina. In Hué, at the urging of the Japanese ambassador, Emperor Bao Dai proclaimed Vietnamese independence on March 11 and constituted a government of national figures, as similarly undertaken by King Sihanouk in Cambodia and King Sisavang Vong in Laos. With the end of three-quarters of a century of French domination, the history of the Indochinese people consequently underwent abrupt and unforeseeable change.

Until the Japanese surrender was announced on August 10, 1945, the three new Indochinese governments were confronted with general skepticism towards an independence issued not by the Allies but by a virtually vanquished Japan. These governments had only five months to organize and consolidate their power. Throughout Vietnam, a revolutionary environment prevailed. Once the colonial administration had disappeared, imperial authorities, although they were supported by the Japanese, did not succeed in taking over from the colonial administration. Taxes ceased being raised, rent stopped being paid to landowners, official buildings were occupied, plundered, or burned down by mobs, jails and prisons were emptied, the Indigenous Guard and the militiamen of old mandarins gradually dispersed, and disorder and social fear set in.

At the end of July and the beginning of August a wave of revolutionary and nationalist sentiment and activism lifted the peasantry, youth, blue-collar workers, and the common people of the

cities, causing a general power vacuum in countryside and town. For everyone, it was a decisive moment situated between the Japanese surrender, the entry of Chinese troops in the North upon which nationalist groups and British troops in the South counted, and the foreseeable and dreaded return of the French. Time seemed suspended between past oppression and an ominous future. For national survival, the near-eschatological concept of national safety (*cuu quốc*) became a decisive “now or never.”

The communists seized power under the Vietminh banner. From the end of 1944 the Communist Party with its 5,000 members – of which a thousand were in jail – was the only political force organized on a national scale or at least in a great number of provinces. It created hundreds of committees of national safety (*cuu quốc hoi*), probably grouping together tens of thousands of activists. In Tonkin, starting in March 1945, armed Vietminh groups equipped with new material by the American OSS officers who accompanied them, pushed all the way to Thai Nguyên. Hồ Chí Minh established his headquarters in Tan Trao, 70 kilometers from Hanoi, and in Cochinchina the PCI had armed its working militia.

After the announcement of the Japanese surrender an improvised “national convention” at Tan Trao from August 13–15 proclaimed the constitution of a provisional government headed by Hồ Chí Minh. Vietminh units marched toward Hanoi, where the Vietminh committee and its militia seized without violence essential buildings on August 19, after negotiating with imperial delegates in Tonkin. The Japanese army remained neutral throughout Indochina. Hồ Chí Minh, who discreetly entered the city on August 26, proclaimed on September 2 before an enthusiastic crowd of hundreds of thousands independence and the formation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), as well as a government of national unity that was in fact largely communist.

At Hué, the Vietminh took possession of the capital on August 22. On August 29 Emperor Bao Dai agreed to abdicate and assume the title of “supreme advisor” of the government of the DRV. In Saigon an Executive Committee of Nam Bo took power on August 24–25, presided over by the communist Tran Van Giau. The PCI formed the majority of the committee, the minority comprising politico-religious sects and Trotskyists.

In the protectorates of Cambodia and Laos the consequences of the Japanese surrender were different. In Phnom Penh, through the coup d'état of August 9, Son Ngoc Thanh removed the young King Sihanouk and governed until his arrest by Leclerc on October 15, 1945. There was a different outcome in Vientiane, where King Sisavang Vong chose to join France again, while Prince Phetsarath and his half-brothers Souvanaphouma and Souphanouvong demanded independence and created the Lao Issara movement, with which the Vietminh came into contact in October.

The leaders of the CPI and of the DRV were immediately confronted with the need to preserve power and install everywhere the apparatus of the “popular committees” charged with the local management of the fight against the French and/or Chinese enemy. Very quickly, August's national unanimity was broken. In the North, while the VNQZD of Dai Việt and Phuc Quốc nationalists sought with little success to compete on the terrain of the Vietminh, they were reinforced by the entrance of the Chinese army from Yunnan in Tonkin and in Laos, and reorganized openly, particularly in the cities.

In Saigon, conflict raged at the heart of the Executive Committee of Nam Bo, who fought in a dispersed manner the Battle of Saigon against French troops. Japanese resistance was sustained on September 23 by the British who had arrived ten days before and were reinforced by the Expeditionary French Task Force in the Far East (CEFEO) of General Leclerc, arriving on September 25, 1945 in Saigon, and endeavoring to reconquer the southern half of the peninsula. In several regions the Vietminh physically eliminated enemy leaders: Pham Quynh in Hué and the constitutionalist chiefs in Cochinchina (Bui Quang Chieu in particular). Trotskyists, still influential in the South, were assassinated by the Vietminh: Ta Thu Thau in September with Quang Ngai, his comrades Phan Van Hum, Tran Van Thach, Huynh Van Phuong, and several others, probably executed in Cochinchina during or after the Battle of Saigon, as would be Huynh Phu So, the prophetic leader of the Hoa Hao, killed in 1947.

The result of the August Revolution was binary: seizure of power by the Indochinese Communist Party (in fact, Vietnamese) and installation by the communists of the DRV, then vested with considerable popular support. These two fragile

phenomena were incompatible with the Chinese military and political presence and its support for anti-communist nationalism, and the French Indochinese project (secretly prepared in 1943 and revealed in the declaration of the government of General de Gaulle of March 24) whose realization on the ground was entrusted to Admiral d'Argenlieu, the appointed high commissioner in Indochina.

The incompatibility of the French project with Indochinese independence was total. For de Gaulle and the new French political class emerging from the Resistance and the Liberation, there was no question of accepting the *fait accompli* of the August Revolution. Rather than simply restoring the old colonial order, they sought to establish a renewed colonial dependency, neocolonial in the true historical sense of the term. They sought the installation of a new political partnership with the modern elites of the five countries of old Indochina (notwithstanding recognition of the Vietnam unit) using a formula of self-government associated with political democratization but under the control of a powerful federal government presided over by the French high commissioner. The secret Indochinese Constitution was written to that effect.

A plan was drawn up for accelerating the industrialization of Indochina, to be financed by metropolitan investment and with the goal of remedying the alarming underdevelopment of the Vietnamese and Khmer countryside, in decline since the 1930s. This was the true meaning of the geopolitical concept of Indochinese Federation proposed in the March 24 declaration that was considered the cornerstone of the French union, then discussed within the framework of the constitutional French debate of 1945–6 and destined to replace the political structures of the old colonial empire. War with the DRV was therefore unavoidable.

The Vietnamese August Revolution was disconcerting in Indochina, its success submitting it almost instantly to the heavy and multiple constraints of war. It was a continuous war because – as in future Third World revolutions – once independence was achieved, political power was immediately and durably confiscated. Political democracy had barely taken hold and time was against it. In Vietnam, the state was built into the revolutionary movement itself. It was not all-powerful, but it was stronger than society, and affirmed the rise of an executive bureaucracy

invested in the monopoly of power. Everything was accomplished within a strikingly short time: an immense popular revolution was almost instantaneously captured by the communist movement and immediately transformed into a party-state in a revolutionary war. The revolutionary Vietnamese intelligentsia marched toward power and its transformation into the communist bureaucracy.

This unpredictable metamorphosis would expand beyond Vietnam and emerge triumphant throughout Indochina. The Vietnamese August Revolution was a striking prologue to the rise of extremes in the peninsula, sparking three consecutive and interminable wars – the “10,000-day war,” to use a contemporary Vietnamese expression. Indochina would experience the longest wars of the twentieth century because of the enmeshment of decolonization, a peninsular civil war, the Cold War, and the Sino-Soviet conflict.

SEE ALSO: Cambodia, Anti-Colonial Protests, 1863–1945; Cambodia, Communist Protests and Revolution; Cambodia, Rebellion Against France; Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh) (1890–1969); Vietnam, Anti-Colonial, Nationalist, and Communist Movements, 1900–1939; Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954; Vietnam, Protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974; Vietnam, Protests, 1975–1993

References and Suggested Readings

- Bourdeaux, P. (2003) *Emergence et constitution de la communauté du Bouddhisme Hoa Hao. Contribution à l'histoire sociale du delta du Mékong (1935–1955)*. Thesis, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, IV.
- Brocheux, P. (1995) *The Mekong Delta: Ecology, Economy and Revolution, 1860–1960*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Brocheux, P. & Hémerly, D. (2001) *Indochine, la colonisation ambiguë (1858–1954)*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Devillers, P. (1952) *Histoire du Viêt-Nam de 1940 à 1952*. Paris: Le Seuil.
- Fall, B. (1960) *Le Viet-Minh, La République Démocratique du Viêt-Nam, 1945–1960*. Paris: A. Colin.
- Huynh Kim Khanh (1982) *Vietnamese Communism, 1925–1945*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Hy Van Luong (1992) *Revolution in the Village: Tradition and Transformation in North Vietnam, 1925–1988*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Marr, D. (1981) *Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920–1945*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Marr, D. (1995) *Vietnam 1945: The Quest to Power*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Quinn-Judge, S. (2003) *Hô Chi Minh: The Missing Years*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Translated by Marcelline Block

Indonesia, colonial protests, 16th century to 1900

Henri Myrntinen

The European colonial conquest of the Indonesian archipelago began in the mid-1500s with the arrival of Portuguese traders seeking access to the spice and sandalwood trade, which at the time was mainly controlled by Arab, Bugis, Chinese, and Gujarati traders. Almost from the outset, the European traders were met with local resistance, in some instances manipulated by the competing imperial powers seeking dominance.

The first European traders to arrive in the archipelago were the Portuguese, who succeeded in setting up several bases across the archipelago but were soon forced into the eastern part of the archipelago due to local revolts such as in 1575 in Ternate and competition from the rapidly growing Dutch Empire. By the seventeenth century the Portuguese trading outpost network was reduced to a presence in East Timor, a colony they managed to retain until 1975. British colonial efforts tended to focus on the Malay Peninsula, though Britain had a foothold at the port of Bengkulu on the island of Sumatra.

Dutch East India Company

Dutch traders first arrived in the archipelago in 1596 with a four-ship expedition under Cornelis de Houtman. The Dutch fleet attacked the port of Banten, West Java, the major pepper trading port of the time. After clashes with local and Portuguese traders in Banten and further bloody battles along the Javanese coast and in Madura, the expedition returned to the Netherlands with enough plundered goods to encourage further expeditions. The frequency and size of Dutch efforts to monopolize the spice trade expanded with the establishment of the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC), granted a monopoly on trading activities in the region by the Dutch parliament in 1602.

The VOC pursued an aggressive policy of expansion, pushing Portuguese traders out of their bases in the eastern archipelago through allying with local leaders and consolidating settlements in Java. While the VOC was first based in Mabon

in the Moluccas, the most important base soon became Batavia (later Indonesia's capital city of Jakarta), which was built at the site of the town of Jayakarta razed by VOC troops in 1619.

Javanese and Sundanese resistance to VOC advances continued throughout the seventeenth century, but the Banten kingdom or the more powerful Mataram kingdom under Sultan Agung were unable to dislodge the VOC from Batavia. Through cooptation, coercion, and brute force, the VOC gained hegemony in the spice trade, often relying on cooptation of local rulers and Ambonese and Bugis mercenaries to impose its monopoly. The VOC presence was tenuous, relying initially on a minimal Dutch presence and manipulating local power politics. The dependence on local mercenary leaders also had risks, as displayed by the insurrection of the Ambonese Captain Joncker in Batavia in 1689.

On Java the VOC became increasingly involved in local political struggles and gained important concessions from Amangkurat II of Mataram in 1677, when Dutch troops and mercenaries from nearby islands supported his bid to become Sultan. Over the next century the presence of "the Company" in Java became increasingly prominent as it established a system of tribute payments and forced delivery of goods, overseen by a network of resident Dutch officials. VOC involvement in Javanese politics became increasingly commonplace, with the Dutch presiding over intra-Javanese power struggles.

The last *stadtholder* of the Dutch republic, William V of Orange, having fled to British exile after establishing the Batavian Republic, gave the British control of Dutch-controlled territories for "safe-keeping" in 1795. The former VOC settlements, however, only came under British control after sustained military campaigns from 1811 to 1816. Facing bankruptcy in 1799, the VOC was dissolved due to failure of its own economic policies. The Dutch government assumed control over VOC areas, which in the turmoil of the Napoleonic Wars changed hands from the Batavian Republic to the French. Louis Bonaparte named H. W. Daendels governor-general of the Dutch East Indies, who was instrumental in laying the foundations of the Dutch colonial system.

Dutch Colonial System (1814–1900)

Following the British interregnum from 1811 to 1814, the territory of what is now Indonesia

became formally recognized by the other colonial powers as the colony of the Dutch East Indies by the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814.

While the VOC-system had mainly been mercantilist, focused on maintaining a trade monopoly by force and cooptation, the Dutch colonial system established after the archipelago became a proper colony had significantly more ambitious goals, including establishing a thorough and hierarchical administrative system, improving infrastructure, a social system based on racial discrimination, the establishment of plantations and extraction of raw materials for the economic benefit of the Netherlands, and, especially in Eastern Indonesia, opening of the territory for proselytizing by Christian missionaries.

The financial impact of the Padri and Java Wars (see below), coupled with the loss of Belgium in 1830, led to a new, more intense strategy of resource extraction by the Dutch government in its colonies in order to avoid bankruptcy. The new *cultuurstelsel* policy of forced cultivation of export crops such as indigo, coffee, and sugar at the expense of food crops brought massive financial gains for the Dutch colonial government and local compradors, but starvation and poverty to the local peasantry.

The *cultuurstelsel* policy was abandoned in 1870 following an outcry in the Netherlands after publication of Multatuli's (the pen name of Edward Douwe Dekker) book *Max Havelaar*, a fact-based novel outlining the human cost of forced cultivation. The new policies adopted in 1870 came to be known as the Liberal Period. During this time some of the worst excesses of the cultivation system were curbed and the colony opened to capitalist expansion and increasing commodification of labor, land, and goods. The Liberal Period saw the development of larger plantations, the introduction of new crops, and intensified extraction of oil from Sumatra and Kalimantan and other natural non-renewable resources. The era ended in 1901 with the introduction of the Ethical Policy, increasing public access to education, healthcare, and limited political participation for the colonized population.

Padri War (1821–1837)

From 1821 to 1837 the Dutch colonial administration in Western Sumatra faced its first major challenge in the Padri or Minangkabau War. The conflict was sparked by internal struggle in

Western Sumatra between traditionalist (*adat*) and reformist Islamist (*padri*) factions over control of Minangkabau society. The *adat* faction gained the support of Dutch forces in military engagements against the *padri* faction from 1821 to 1824. The Masang Treaty temporarily brought an end to the fighting, but hostilities resumed in 1830, centering on the *padri* stronghold of Bonjol. After a three-year siege, Bonjol was captured by the Dutch and the *padri* leader Tuanku Imam Bonjol was forced into exile, effectively ending the conflict.

Java War (1825–1830)

During the pause in the fighting in Sumatra's Padri War, the Dutch faced a major and far more threatening uprising in the heart of their colony as the Java War raged from 1825 to 1830. The Java War was triggered by a Dutch road project in Tagalareja, Central Java, but its roots lay much deeper. The Dutch colonial administration appropriated land for plantations and introduced new taxation systems. The presence of new European landowners and Chinese middlemen and the reduction of the Javanese royal courts to mere cultural centers profoundly transformed the traditional socioeconomic structure. Droughts, floods, famines, and the eruption of the holy Mount Merapi volcano were viewed by many as portents for the coming of a new era, for the end of the Age of Chaos and the coming of the Just King (Ratu Adil). These millenarian dreams were to find their repository in Prince Diponegoro, over whose parents' graves in Tagalareja the Dutch were planning to build a road.

Prince Diponegoro was versed in Islamic teaching and Javanese mysticism, and lived in peasant communities rather than in the royal courts. He was able to tap into both Javanese elite and grassroots discontent, formulating the revolt in religious and traditional terms familiar to the population. Diponegoro took on the title of Ratu Adil, mounting a prolonged five-year guerrilla war against the Dutch and Dutch-supported Javanese rulers. The Dutch were forced to bring in reinforcements from the Netherlands as well as recruit mercenaries from Sulawesi and Western Africa. Adopting an early form of counterinsurgency strategy, the Dutch eventually gained control of Central Java. Tricked into ceasefire negotiations, Diponegoro was arrested

and exiled to Sulawesi. Some 7,000 Javanese and 8,000 Dutch soldiers lost their lives in the war, but the conflict directly or indirectly caused the death of about 200,000 civilians.

The Java War marked the end of Javanese elite resistance to Dutch colonialism, though some argue that reverting to a more cultural role was in itself a kind of spiritual resistance against Dutch colonial rule. Localized grassroots peasant revolts persisted in Java, as elsewhere in the Dutch East Indies, throughout the rest of the colonial era, often with a millenarian or otherwise religious tinge, but triggered by economic and social hardship. These, like the short-lived revolt in Ciomas, West Java, in 1886, were usually crushed quickly and forcefully by colonial forces.

Following the end of the Padri and Java Wars, most revolts against Dutch rule – for example, the Banjarmasin War in southern Kalimantan – remained local and small scale, with the exception of the Aceh War and the sustained Dutch efforts to conquer Bali.

Aceh War (1873–1904)

The next major uprising against Dutch rule was the Aceh War, beginning in 1873 and lasting over thirty years until 1904. Acehnese independence had been *de facto* recognized by the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814, but rescinded following the purchase of the Dutch Gold Coast Colony by Great Britain in 1871. The initial Dutch assault on the Sultanate of Aceh was officially triggered by their fears that Aceh might align with France, Turkey, or the United States to ensure its independence.

The initial Dutch expedition under Major General Köhler was quickly defeated by the Acehnese troops and Köhler was killed in what was the most humiliating defeat of Dutch forces in a colonial war until that date. A second, far larger expedition in 1874 managed to occupy the Sultan's palace and a thin strip of land. Intermittent guerrilla warfare continued for another six years or so, with the Dutch controlling the capital city of Banda Aceh and other settlements and the Acehnese forces the countryside. In 1880 the Dutch colonial government declared the war's end.

Hostilities flared again in 1883 after Acehnese insurgents captured and held hostage British sailors. Dutch and British forces mounted an offensive against Acehnese forces and the sailors

were released for ransom. Dutch forces continued their military campaign with limited success. A Dutch breakthrough in the guerrilla war seemed closer when a local leader, Teuku Umar, agreed to join the Dutch forces in return for weapons, money, and opium. But in 1896 the newly appointed “chief warlord” turned against the Dutch once his troops had been trained and equipped. Following the death of Teuku Umar in battle in 1899, the struggle was continued by his widow, Cut Nyak Dien, until 1905.

Dutch tactics changed when Major J. B. van Heutsz (who became governor of Aceh in 1898) began using an early form of a “hearts and minds” strategy. The Dutch embarked on a strategy of targeted cooptation of the traditional aristocracy (*ulee balang*) while marginalizing the religious *ulama*. The social strategy was accompanied by brutal military campaigns against the Acehnese. Colonel van Daalen killed some 2,900 Acehnese, including 1,150 women and children, while losing 26 Dutch soldiers.

The Dutch officially completed the conquest of Aceh in 1904, killing some 500,000 to 1 million people. But in the Acehnese Highlands, intermittent small-scale guerrilla attacks continued for another decade. The Aceh War laid the seeds for future attempts at regaining independence in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries against the Republic of Indonesia.

Conquest of Lombok and Bali (1894–1906)

Though the first European ships had landed on Bali in the late 1500s and initial Dutch bases established in the 1840s, the Hindu island remained effectively outside of Dutch control. While the Aceh War continued, Dutch colonial forces also launched several attempts to gain control of Bali and the neighboring island of Lombok, which was under Balinese rule. Dutch troops landed in Lombok in 1894 to “liberate” the Sasak population, and having defeated the Balinese forces in 1895 the remaining members of the ruling class committed ritual suicide (*puputan*). Expeditions to conquer Bali continued until 1906, when Dutch forces finally conquered Badung and Klungkung. In both cases the Balinese rulers along with several hundred loyalists committed *puputan*; in addition, scores of Balinese civilians were massacred by Dutch forces.

The Dutch East Indies in 1900

After nearly 400 years of European colonial presence in the Indonesian archipelago, by the early twentieth century they could only claim to have little more than nominal control of the territories. Conquest came at a heavy price, especially once the imperial powers began attempting to impose a colonial state system rather than relying on coopting local elites. Resistance against European expansion took three forms: on the lower-intensity end of the scale were individual riots and uprisings, often sparked by local concerns and/or millenarian and religious influences. The Padri and Java Wars were more serious and sustained uprisings, evolving into guerrilla wars, aimed at reducing Dutch influence but not necessarily being fully-fledged, anti-colonial, protonationalist uprisings. The third category of colonial war engaged by the Dutch was essentially international wars against extant states; preliminary campaigns against the Majapahit kingdom or the decades-long attempts to forcibly subdue Aceh and Bali. Aceh, especially, was for all intents and purposes already *de facto* an independent state in the modern sense of the word when the Dutch military campaign was commenced.

The excesses of the cultivation system and the socioeconomic upheavals caused by the plantation system and limited industrialization, turning peasants into more mobile wage laborers, began radicalizing the population as a whole. The discontent at the living and working conditions led to numerous small-scale peasant revolts and strikes, especially in those parts of the archipelago most impacted by the Dutch colonial system, i.e., Sumatra and Java. Unrest continued also in other parts of the archipelago, for example in Western Timor or Lombok, leading to punitive operations by the Dutch colonial forces and their locally recruited mercenaries. Several areas, most notably Aceh and Bali, held out against the Dutch colonizers into the first years of the twentieth century. In other areas, especially in Papua, the eastern islands of the archipelago, and in parts of Kalimantan, Dutch colonial presence was nominal at best.

Concomitantly, the increased access to secondary and tertiary schools, though highly restricted, created educated elites imbued with revolutionary ideas such as nationalism and communism, often imported by Indonesian intellec-

tuals studying in the Dutch metropole. The third important revolutionary ideology in Indonesia – reformist, political Islam – also began making headway in the Indonesian archipelago, much as in other parts of the Islamic world. A further tool which the Dutch unwittingly gave to the upcoming political elite was that of a common language, Indonesian, a Malay-based Creole language lingua franca which later evolved into modern-day Indonesian. The survival of a common language provided a foundation upon which a community could be imagined by numerous ethnicities of the archipelago and a practical tool for communicating in a territory with hundreds if not thousands of indigenous languages.

SEE ALSO: Imperialism and Capitalist Development; Imperialism, Historical Evolution; Indonesian Revolution and Counterrevolution; Islamic Political Currents; Netherlands, Protests, 1650–1800; Netherlands, Protests, 1800–2000

References and Suggested Readings

- Alfian, T. I. (2006) Aceh and the Holy War (Prang Sabil). In A. Reid (Ed.), *Verandah of Violence – The Background to the Aceh Problem*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
- Anderson, B. (1990) *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Nordholt, H. S. (2002) A Genealogy of Violence. In F. Colombijn & T. Lindblad (Eds.), *Roots of Violence in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Pemberton, J. (1994) *On the Subject of "Java."* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Reid, A. (2000) Early Southeast Asian Categorizations of Europeans. In A. Reid (Ed.), *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Reid, A. (2006) Colonial Transformation: A Bitter Legacy. In A. Reid (Ed.), *Verandah of Violence – The Background to the Aceh Problem*. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
- Ricklefs, M. C. (2001) *A History of Modern Indonesia Since 1200*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Indonesian pro-democracy protests

Max Lane

With the rise of the Suharto military regime at the end of the Indonesian revolution new

policies were enacted to further the suppression of the left. Once the immediate threat of social revolution had been dealt with, the new counter-revolutionary government began a political restructuring aimed at ending any form of open mobilization politics. A ban on villagers participating in any party activity at all – except voting at election time – was central to institutionalizing political passivity. The village people, who formed the overwhelming majority of the population in 1965–75, were simply to work, produce, and have no political engagement.

After a national revolutionary struggle, lasting nearly 60 years, Indonesia entered a new era of mass counter-revolutionary violence. Suharto's New Order deployed a process of depoliticizing through a territorial command system of the armed forces. Special national coordinating bodies, based in armed forces headquarters, were established to coordinate this system of political management. The first was called Command for the Restoration of Stability and Order (Kopkamtib), later slightly restructured and renamed the Body for Coordination of National Stability (Bakorstannas). Military command posts existed at almost every level of society, with military personnel posted to all villages. This structure ensured that the ban on political party activity in the villages was strictly implemented.

Some parties were allowed to continue to open offices at the district town level and in larger towns. The New Order decided that the counter-revolutionary movement needed these parties – nine in all – to be further de-politicized. The Islamic parties were forced to fuse into one party to be called the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP). The non-Islamic parties, including the now thoroughly purged Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI), were forced to merge into the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI). Both the PPP and PDI were also subject to permanent intervention by the government in the selection of their leaderships. The regime's own party, Golkar, made up the third party that was allowed to participate in elections.

The political restraints on these outside parties included a limit on campaigning to a ten-day period before the four-yearly elections, and an opportunity to hold rallies and marches on only three out of the ten days. Not surprisingly, under these conditions, when elections did

occur, the PDI and PPP could never match Golkar, which had massive funds and a *de facto* presence in the villages. The regime declared a policy of *monoloyalitas* for all civil servants, right down to the village head and his staff. They all had to be active members of Golkar.

After 1972, organizations of workers, peasant farmers, fisher people, youth, civil servants, and civil servants' wives were established. All were affiliated to Golkar, and considered to represent key "functional groups." They were consistently used throughout the New Order period to stifle genuine unionization. When internal rumblings from within these organizations occurred, in an attempt to offer genuine representation, they were immediately suppressed. By this means, the majority of Indonesians were removed from all political involvement in order to leave them more time to work and produce.

In the world of ideas Suharto's regime realized that terror and suppression would not be enough. Those key institutions which could propagate left-wing ideas had been destroyed. The remaining threat came from the national revolution itself, that is, from its legacy. Memory of the national revolution had to be erased from the popular consciousness. Given that the very existence of Indonesia, even conceptually, was a direct product of the revolutionary process, the institutions of media, arts, culture, and education were put under the control of the state. The country's most prestigious university, the University of Indonesia, became the location for joint seminars with the armed forces to map out the country's future. The nation's left cultural organizations were banned and writers and artists were jailed and then exiled to Buru Island.

In this process of "Guided Democracy" all of the writings of former President Sukarno and other leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and intellectuals were banned and removed from bookshops and libraries. However, the wiping of the memory of the previous 60 years of history also required a more systematic approach. The New Order began a total rewriting of Indonesian history to be propagated in schools, universities, and through the mass media. New textbooks were written for all levels of schooling and a feature film was produced that depicted the New Order's version of politics under Sukarno, designating it as an "abortive communist coup." This film was compulsory viewing in schools throughout Indonesia for almost two decades. For

many, it is almost as if Indonesian history began some time in the 1980s, as the systematic and unchallenged falsification of history through the education system virtually eliminated any memory in the popular consciousness of the national revolutionary process that occurred before 1965.

It took almost 30 years – until the late 1980s – for a movement to revive that could challenge this powerful coalition, with so many resources and with a monopoly on the means of violence. The pro-democracy campaign in Indonesia included the Petition of Fifty, a group comprising former leaders of traditional non-communist political parties, retired democratic-minded military figures, intellectuals, and former student activists. This group consistently issued statements demanding democratic reforms. In the 1980s they were harassed and sometimes jailed on various trumped-up charges. Another group was the Forum Demokrasi (FODEM), a coalition of Muslim and secular liberal democrats, mainly intellectuals, who advocated democratic reform. A third was a group of organized students who formed the Pijar Foundation and the Indonesian Students' Action Front (FAMI). One Pijar member, Beathor Suryadi, served a four-year sentence for distributing political leaflets, while an additional 21 were put on trial for anti-government protests. The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) was a long-term public advocate and courtroom defender of civil liberties.

During this time, a new important development was the emergence of committees in solidarity with particular groups of workers and peasants. The most prominent of these was a campaign in solidarity with peasants being forced off their land, with minimal compensation, to make way for a World Bank project in the Kedung Ombo region of Central Java. A series of public protest actions in Java and Jakarta brought the case to national attention, only to be suppressed after two years by President Suharto who declared the Kedung Ombo area to be a base for communist activity.

This new generation had studied and developed a class analysis of politics and began to look around the region for other experiences of struggle. A few went to the Philippines and spent time with anti-dictatorship movements fighting to overthrow President Ferdinand Marcos. The Indonesian Students in Solidarity with Democracy (SMID), organized in 1990,

subsequently formed a political party made up of workers, peasants, and students. The People's Democratic Association (Persatuan Rakyat Demokratik) was formed in 1994 by SMID students and became the People's Democratic Party (PRD) in 1996. In its founding declaration, the PRD called for a restoration of full democratic rights and freedoms, civilian rule, and the redistribution of the wealth of society to the poor. The PRD declaration also goes much further than any previous pro-democracy group in Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s by publicly calling for the restoration of full civil rights to the tens of thousands of former communist and nationalist political prisoners. It also called for a peaceful resolution in East Timor, without military intervention and recognizing the human and democratic rights of the East Timorese nation.

Between 1990 and 1996, these students organized a series of joint student-worker and student-peasant actions. The aim of these actions was to break the floating-mass political culture where mass action and mobilization had become taboo. Some of these actions in the early 1990s were quite extensive, involving thousands of workers or farmers, but they were still locally based or concentrated on local issues. In 1992 the movement brought out thousands of people in Central Java waving white election boycott flags in local elections, and there was a large demonstration at Gajah Mada University against the undemocratic administration of the elections. In 1993, 15,000 turned out in protest against new traffic regulations which had enormous potential for expanding police corruption and increasing the burden on the public transport system, especially the sector servicing the poor. In the same year, the threat of a transport strike in Jakarta eventually forced the government to back down, and additional protests in Yogyakarta against the corrupt multi-million-dollar state lottery, involving Suharto's children, were followed up with mass actions held outside the presidential office in Jakarta, forcing the abolition of the lottery. In 1994, 13,000 workers, mainly women, demonstrated in Solo against the minister of labor Abdul Latief, and another 25,000 in the major city of Medan, North Sumatra, and six days of riots ensued after a stand-off with the military.

The strategy of concentrating on the immediate demands of workers and farmers or on issues of popular concern such as the state lottery or traffic regulations, rather than the issue, for

example, of presidential succession or anti-party laws, enabled these protests to continue for a considerable period of time while obtaining sympathetic press coverage and a minimum of harassment. As these protests increased they also began to have a major impact on the general political atmosphere, with issues such as land, wages, trade union rights and so on becoming more and more frequently discussed in the media. This systematic organization of actions helped generate a very large number of other spontaneous actions modeled on detailed, hour-by-hour chronologies of the actions, which were then circulated around the country in bulletins, newsletters, and sometimes via email. With amazing speed, protest mobilizations – *aksi* as they were called – spread around the country. While these actions did not develop into a political movement of their own, in 1995 they had radicalized the political atmosphere, re-legitimizing in the popular mind an old form of struggle associated with the national revolution.

SEE ALSO: Indonesian Protests against Suharto Dictatorship; Indonesian Revolution and Counter-revolution; Sukarno (1901–1970)

References and Suggested Readings

- Action in Solidarity with Indonesia and East Timor (1996) *The Fight for Workers' Rights in Indonesia*. Sydney.
- Bourchier, D. & Hadiz, V. R. (2003) *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader*. London: Routledge.
- Hadiz, V. (2003) *Decentralisation and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives*. City University of Hong Kong, Working Paper Series, No. 37.
- Lane, M. (1994) Winning Democracy in Indonesia: New Stage for the Progressive Movement. *Links – International Journal of Socialist Renewal* 2: 19–36.
- Peta Politik di Indonesia* (1998) Center for Strategic and International Studies. No. 22.

Indonesian protests against Suharto dictatorship

Max Lane

In 1965, Indonesia's largest student organizations were those affiliated to the leftist Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia,

PKI) and Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI), which were suppressed by the new military dictatorship. This left the field to the Islamic Students' Association (HMI), ideologically aligned with Masyumi and "non-political" groups, which forged an alliance in late 1965 as the Indonesian Students' Action Front (KAMI), which, backed by the army, campaigned against Sukarno and the PKI.

It was the next generation of students who turned against the Suharto government, which had consolidated itself by 1967 when Suharto became acting president. There were small protests in 1971 and 1972, and the first clearly anti-Suharto student newspaper, *Sendi*, was published, until banned a few months later.

In 1973, student protest began again but on a larger scale, organizing through student councils on major Indonesian university campuses. Students protested against corruption, abuse of power, rapidly expanding foreign debt, and foreign investor domination of the economy. The 1973 protests reached a climax in major demonstrations in January 1974 during a visit to Jakarta by Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka, and hundreds of students and academics were arrested. Three of them – Hariman Siregar, chairperson of the University of Indonesia student council, Aini Chalid, a brilliant student activist from the University of Gajah Mada in Central Java, and Syahrir, an economics lecturer – were put on trial and sentenced to several years' imprisonment.

The second wave of student protests began in 1978 and was suppressed, resulting in the conviction and imprisonment of several central leaders. In response, all campus political activity was banned and student councils were abolished, and no significant student mobilizations appeared for the next ten years. In 1978, there was a wave of factory strikes among workers in new industries, but the unrest did not converge into a mass workers' movement. These single workplace strikes, mainly over wages and conditions, never congealed into a sustained movement, but forced the government to suppress the labor sector more systematically, including further developing the state-controlled trade union. No independent labor union activity was permitted by the Indonesian military dictatorship.

In 1979, after having achieved a high level of political "stability" following the suppression of the student sector, and under pressure from

international public opinion and the US administration of President Carter, Suharto released 14,000 political prisoners, including left Sukarnoists and communists. Those released included writer, Pramoedya Ananta Toer; publisher, Hasyim Rachman; and journalist, Joesoef Isak. In open defiance of a law banning former political prisoners from the publishing sector, the resistance formed a publishing company, Hasta Mitra. In 1981, they began publishing a series of novels that had been written by Toer while in prison. *This Earth of Mankind* was set in Java at the beginning of the twentieth century and told the story of the personal struggle of a Javanese woman who had been taken as a concubine by a Dutch businessman, her relationship with a young Javanese man who married her daughter, and their fight against Dutch colonialism and racism. The book was an immediate critical and popular success throughout Indonesia. Toer and the publishers were summoned to see Suharto's vice-president, Adam Malik, a radical in his youth, who also praised the book, calling for the entire nation's youth to read it.

Several months later, newspapers claimed that the book was communist propaganda, and it was banned for spreading Marxism-Leninism under a 1967 law banning the ideology by the Suharto-controlled parliament. As each book in the series was published, it was soon after banned. Hasta Mitra fought the bans with public statements and continued to publish books until it was no longer financially possible. Between 1981 and 1987 several people went to jail because of their association with the books. Joesoef Isak went back to jail for three months. Two university students and a university employee were arrested, tried, and jailed in Central Java for selling and discussing the books at a seminar. Joesoef Isak's son was expelled from the University of Indonesia for inviting Toer to speak on campus.

The books had a profound, almost revolutionary effect on the course of political developments. Students began talking to former political prisoners about the 1960s, as well as researching the early history of the left from the 1920s. Many studied ideas about politics, journalism, mass organizations, and the secret police, which were discussed in the novels that followed *This Earth of Mankind*. These books related stories about the founding of the first mass organization that fought the Dutch, the Sarekat Dagang Islam (SD), or Islamic traders' union. The refusal to give

in by Hasta Mitra served as a symbol of resistance among these students. These activists played the leading role in building the movement that succeeded in bringing about the fall of Suharto in 1998.

From 1990 to 1995 cracks had started to appear in the dictatorship's political system. It began when the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) named Megawati Sukarnoputri, a daughter of former President Sukarno, as chairperson. Despite 30 years of negative propaganda against her father, his name continued to resonate positively among a significant section of the masses. Suharto moved to dislodge Megawati from her position, but her stubborn refusal turned her into a symbol of popular opposition. In 1996, Suharto moved to withdraw official recognition of Megawati as PDI leader, instead recognizing a rival leadership that had held its own congress with government support. Megawati and her leadership refused to recognize the government's actions and vacate PDI offices.

The PDI took advantage of this opportunity by throwing its support behind the newly established People's Democratic Party (PRD), along with other student protest groups, organizing a mass rally in central Jakarta. A few weeks later, armed thugs attacked the PDI office, killing and injuring several supporters of Megawati. News of the attack sparked more rallies and protests, and mass insurrections spread through Jakarta, causing millions of dollars of damage to public and private property.

The government accused the PRD of provoking the unrest, alleging it was communist, and ordered the arrest of all members. Eventually, the PRD's chairperson, Budiman Sujatmiko, was arrested. Several key members of PRD's leadership, including Danial Indrakusuma, Web Warouw and Agus Jabo Prijono, and Andi Arief, escaped and went underground. The party continued organizing using various front organizations to hold protest actions. Party members also participated in activities initiated by other protest groups.

One of the party's most important interventions was the mass distribution of leaflets and anti-government protests during the May 1997 general elections. Hundreds of thousands of people joined in marches and rallies on the streets of Jakarta. The Islamic United Development Party (PPP) was shocked and cancelled its own rallies and marches. The protests called for a Mega-

Bintang alliance to oust Suharto. Mega stood for Megawati and "Bintang," or "star," referred to the Islamic political constituency. It was a huge spontaneous demand for a united campaign to oust Suharto. When marches and rallies were met by police or army barricades, they tore down the barricades and burned police stations. Suharto's Golkar party easily "won" the elections, even as its electoral offices in some regions were attacked and burned down by angry masses charging the government with vote rigging. The government's inability to stem these huge and militant outbursts signaled an end to Suharto's reign of power.

In August and September 1997, after the Asian financial collapse, militant student mobilizations spread throughout the country, in virtually every provincial capital, finally hitting Jakarta in early 1998. Physical clashes between students and the army occurred more frequently, with students often fighting back, even detaining security officers. The protests concentrated on attacking the corruption and cronyism surrounding the government, embodied in more detailed exposés of the massive wealth of the Suharto family.

As student protests spread, additional mobilizations were carried out by other sections of society. Activist organizations such as Solidaritas Perempuan held their own protest events, including street protests. After the economic crisis, food prices increased, and housewives also began mobilizing. One organization, Suara Ibu Peduli (The Voice of Concerned Mothers) became particularly prominent. Women factory workers had always been a majority section of the most militant participants in factory strikes, providing the backbone of new union formations, such as the Indonesian Center for Labor Struggles (PPBI). Female students, housewives, and poor urban women started organizing, strengthening the authority of the protest movement as a movement increasingly representing the whole of society.

In March 1998 the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) reelected Suharto, who then proceeded to appoint a cabinet that was more nepotistic than any previously selected. He even appointed one of his daughters as a minister. The street protests around the country became larger and more frequent, with the PRD calling for different committees of protest to form a People's Committee.

More moderate forces called on the leaders of the opposition, which included mainstream

figures who had joined the anti-Suharto movement, to form a presidium as a collective that could take over power from Suharto. As these calls started to gain momentum, central figures in Suharto's Golkar began to call for him to resign, wanting to pre-empt any further radicalization. In May, the students, organized in a cross-campus coalition involving at least 14 major campuses, called for a mass student mobilization in central Jakarta. However, moderate leaders, afraid of the radicalization, appeared on television calling for it to be canceled, claiming that the army would suppress it violently.

Students mobilized to occupy the parliament grounds instead which resulted in more Suharto supporters abandoning him. On May 23 Suharto appeared on national television and resigned. His vice-president B. J. Habibie became president. The PRD and other groups had also been able to popularize the demand that the army end all political involvement. Mobilizations around this demand continued growing in size and militancy as an "Extraordinary Session" of the MPR approached in November. Again a radicalization process developed as student leaders demanded that the three mainstream opposition leaders – Megawati, Amien Rais, of the urban Muslim constituency, and Abdurrahman Wahid, of the rural Muslim constituency – form a presidium and demand that Habibie resign and hand power to them. The three leaders of the liberal and excluded bourgeoisie declined to accede to the students' demands. When word spread, the student-led mobilizations collapsed.

SEE ALSO: Indonesian Pro-Democracy Protests; Indonesian Revolution and Counterrevolution; Sukarno (1901–1970)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bourchier, D. & Hadiz, V. R. (2003) *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader*. London: Routledge.
- Dhakidae, D. (2003) *Cendekiawan dan Kekuasaan dalam Negara Orde Baru*. Jakarta.
- Hill, H. (1999) *The Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Consequences and Lessons*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Lambert, R. (1993) *Authoritarian State Unionism in New Order Indonesia*. Working Paper 25, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Perth.
- Lane, M. (1999) Mass Politics and Political Change in Indonesia. In A. Budiman & D. Kingsbury (Eds.), *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia*. Clayton, Victoria: Monash Asia Institute.

Indonesian revolution and counterrevolution

Max Lane

The fundamental process of forging an Indonesia emerged in the twentieth century with the emergence of a nationalist movement that created a state identity through revolution. The word Indonesia first came into general circulation in the 1920s. It was first introduced by a British naturalist in the nineteenth century, based on the Latin *Indus* for “India” and the Greek *nesos* for “island.” In this respect, the creation of Indonesia was a revolution in itself as an absolutely new entity was created, building on some minimal elements of the previous eras of history – in particular the interchange of goods and ideas between the islands – but more generally the processes of anti-colonial revolution.

The processes that began at the start of the twentieth century, and are still unfolding today, required in their first phase the complete overturning of the colonial social and political system, the expulsion of the Dutch capitalist class as the ruling class in Indonesia, and, at the same time, the creation of a new entity: the Indonesian nation. It was a nation-in-formation that struggled for its independence during the first decades of the twentieth century. And it was a nation-in-formation that continued that struggle after independence attempting to liberate itself from the constraints of neocolonialism. Even today, after the end of 35 years of counterrevolution, the nation-in-formation still faces the necessity of an anti-neocolonial revolution.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Dutch colonial power and commercial interests had been dominant in the archipelago for at least 300 years. In many areas of the archipelago, the Dutch did not rule directly but through their military presence and commercial clout. The Dutch political power in the main cities of Batavia (Jakarta) and Surabaya provided overwhelming dominance over political, economic, and even social life throughout the archipelago. The first indications that opposition to Dutch colonialism was transforming itself beyond local resistance or efforts to restore the previous social order into an arch that might lead to a national revolution were reflected in the emergence of foreign trav-

elers returning with a modern perspective on the question of political equality.

The most outstanding example of Indonesian nationalist currents is found in the writings of the young Javanese woman Kartini (1879–1904), who lived in central Java and was the daughter of a bupati, a low-level aristocrat working in the Dutch administration. Kartini was raised in the environment dominated by the Dutch aristocracy. At the age of 12 she went into seclusion, as did all young women upon reaching puberty until their parents arranged marriage for them.

Kartini began corresponding with Dutch feminists, and later socialists, revealing a new consciousness in the Netherlands Indies. The native peoples soon became aware that they were suffering systematic discrimination at the hands of Dutch colonial powers. Kartini viewed this as a question of racial equality. In collaboration with her sisters, Kartini established a school to provide general and vocational education to young women in the hope of freeing them from the necessity of marriage. Kartini wrote the Dutch colonial authorities to petition that women have greater access to education.

Forced into a polygamous marriage, in 1904 Kartini died in childbirth. But her legacy lived on in the following years as young women, influenced by Kartini’s philosophy, established similar schools. Kartini’s writings, published posthumously, revolutionized thinking among young educated people in the archipelago. While the idea of an Indonesian nation-state had not yet emerged, the necessity of opposing a foreign power that sanctioned inequality was on the agenda. Kartini’s writing stressed that a colonial power did not have the right to prevent a people from modernizing and advancing, a form of moral opposition markedly different from previous forms of resistance against Dutch colonial rule, serving as a turning point in the revolutionary process, at the sociological level, which eventually led to the creation of the Indonesian nation.

Over the centuries, the Malay language was used as the lingua franca to facilitate the exchange of ideas and goods among the islands. Used primarily in trade, Malay was a language of contracts and bargaining in the marketplace. However, at the turn of the twentieth century, commercial life in the urban centers of the archipelago advanced so far as to support publication of a number of Malay-language vernacular newspapers and periodicals. Initially the newspapers, owned mostly

by Chinese merchants, were used for advertising. Malay-speaking Chinese emerged as popular writers of short stories and novels, and Malay gradually was used as a language of contract and price as well as a means of discussing and relating conditions of modern urban life. In the early twentieth century, Malay was transforming into the national language of Indonesia, and subsequently the vernacular of a national revolution.

The newspaper *Medan Priyayi*, founded in 1907 by Tirta Ahdisuryo (1880–1918), was an early example of the importance of Malay as a means of communication in the archipelago. Tirta, who received a privileged Dutch high school education and medical college training, used the newspaper to expose corruption in the Dutch administration and campaign against injustices under the slogan “voice of the governed.” While the concept of Indonesia was not yet developed, a deeply felt common interest of all those governed had developed extensively in major urban centers throughout Indonesia.

The colonial courts and authorities sought to discipline Tirta for his exposés on the corruption of the Dutch administration. Tirta was among the first of his generation to recognize the importance of organization based on a common political outlook and a modern political structure. If Kartini had been the first to begin to transform ideas, Tirta was the first to understand the necessity of organizing and mobilizing the masses to improve conditions. His initial organizing effort was among the native bureaucracies who were members of the Sarekat Priyayi (Union of Priyayi), who were mostly descendants of aristocratic families (referred to as priyayi) employed under the Dutch. Owing to their exposure to western education, Tirta assumed that members of Sarekat Priyayi would gravitate to a more enlightened political outlook. However, the attempt at organizing the organization failed, due to the subservient mentality flowing from material dependence on the Dutch colonial power. Tirta later became a founding member of the Islamic traders’ union, the Sarekat Dagang Islam (SI), in 1911, which by 1912 became the first mass organization opposed to Dutch colonial rule.

Indonesian historian and writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer argued that Tirta formed the SI as he was searching to organize people who had independence, unlike those with a mentality of dependency that he found among the salaried workers of the Dutch colonial administration,

many the descendants of a long-defeated aristocracy. As such, the SI recruited from diverse social and economic backgrounds – traders, peasants, coolies, religious teachers, among many others. Tirta was arrested and exiled shortly after the formation of the SI and died in Batavia soon after his return from exile. Pramoedya Ananta Toer and other historians suspect Tirta may have been murdered on the orders of the Dutch colonial authority. A few years after its founding, the SI recruited several hundred thousand members among almost anyone who considered colonial rule unjust. The SI would eventually serve as the basis for the first mass communist party in Indonesia, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

The first socialist organization, the Indies Social Democratic Organization (ISDV), was founded in 1914 by four Dutch socialists, and as it expanded some members joined the SI, which was organizing more and more protest actions against the policies of the colonial government. Concomitantly, important ideological disputes were developing inside the SI, particularly over opposition to capitalism. Semaun, the son of a low-ranking railway worker, would emerge as the leader of the PKI. Semaun joined the SI at the age of 15, and by 1917, during the Russian Revolution, became leader of an SI branch in Semarang, one of Java’s busiest urban centers. In 1923, Semaun was arrested, exiled, and spent the rest of his life in the Soviet Union.

From 1920 to 1926 the SI engaged in mass organizing of “non-dependent” sectors of society – radicalizing the consciousness of coolies, workers, peasants, and traders and laying the ground for deeper trade union radicalism. Due to a lack of industry, the size of Indonesia’s working class was small, and most organizing took place in small sugar mills, mines, and rail and tram sectors. Following Semaun’s arrest for leading a large rail worker strike, physical attacks on Dutch officials increased, including an assassination attempt on the Dutch governor-general. Radical ideas, strikes, and large public meetings emerged as the major forms of expression of the new Indonesian political culture. This period, known the *pergerakan*, conveys a sense that all is in motion.

By 1927 the PKI launched an armed insurrection against the Dutch colonial state. The rebellion was quickly crushed: 18,000 people were arrested and 4,800 detained. The Dutch sent 1,308 of the detainees to a malaria-ridden prison

camp, Boven Digul in Dutch western Papua, where many died, including the left-wing journalist and writer Marco Kartodikromo (ca. 1890–1932), who worked on Tirta Adhisuryo's publications. While the failure of the insurrection was an enormous blow to the movement, at the same time a new generation of young nationalists emerged, including the prominent future leader Sukarno. For Sukarno, the notion of equality was linked to the idea of Indonesia.

In September 1928, youth activists adopted an "Oath of Youth: One country, One people, One language: Indonesian." Sukarno became active by establishing the idea of *merdeka* – "freedom" or independence – but the question was how to achieve it. Mass organization and action, reflected in the growth of the SI and later the PKI and the trade unions, already demonstrated its enormous potential. However, the next wave of future nationalists saw the movement as divided and weak.

An article by Sukarno entitled "Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism" sought to elaborate a basis of unity among adherents of the three "isms" that was consistent with the ideals of ending inequality and oppression. His method was to facilitate greater unity within the nationalist movement by emphasizing opposition to capitalist economic exploitation and social inequality. Sukarno went on to establish the Indonesian National Party (PNI), which grew rapidly as he traveled the country explaining his ideas at large public meetings, often in cinemas. He insisted the party's newspaper be distributed to all those present at meetings, and it was not long before the Dutch grew suspicious of the PNI. In 1930, they arrested and tried Sukarno, who spent the next ten years in prison or exile. In 1933 the Dutch, aware of the threat of the independence movement, suppressed all open nationalist political activity.

The revolutionary process in Indonesia went through a unique and extraordinary experience after 1942. The socioeconomic transformation of society under colonial capitalism was producing some of the material elements required for the emergence of a nation. The political struggle against colonialism was forging a new national culture, standing in opposition to the hegemony of "feudal" and colonial despotism. Then came Japanese occupation soon after Japan entered World War II, during which most of the advanced sector of the colonial economy – plantations,

mines, railways – as well as some agriculture were destroyed. The whole Indonesian economy turned to the immediate economic needs of the Japanese war effort rather than supporting Europe. By war's end, tens of thousands of Indonesians were forcibly recruited as slave labor for Japanese war projects in Indochina. The military administration became increasingly brutal and repressive as the war effort pressed on.

The Japanese occupation introduced an entirely new set of colonial features, turning those living under Dutch rule upside down. The Japanese promised eventual independence and released all nationalist leaders from prison, with the exception of known communist activists who were hunted down, jailed, or killed. Indonesian became the official working language, and due to the small number of Japanese who could speak Indonesian, large numbers of Indonesians took positions formerly occupied by the Dutch in the civil service. The Japanese also began training a people's militia, involving thousands of young people. The Dutch had previously provided military training to Indonesians serving in the Dutch colonial army, but the Japanese were training Indonesians to aim their rifles at Europeans, institutionalizing a psychological revolution among the youth.

The Japanese released nationalist leaders from prison who were willing to support the war effort, permitting them to travel and speak to large mass gatherings and on the radio. Sukarno and others, including the conservative nationalist Mohammad Hatta, took the Japanese offer. Some, such as social democrat intellectual Sutan Syahrir, refused to cooperate with the Japanese but was permitted to hold discussions in his house in Jakarta as long as he did not engage in anti-Japanese activities. Sukarno, a gifted orator, traveled the country agitating for national independence, often sliding around Japanese censorship by alluding to local stories and anecdotes.

During 1945, as the Japanese suffered more defeats in the war, they made more concessions to the nationalists, allowing the formation of a committee to prepare for independence. However, political repression remained severe. While nationalist leaders had the right to speak and express their views, organizing was banned. But, after the US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, underground youth groups in Batavia called on Sukarno and Hatta to declare independence. During negotiations,

the two leaders were kidnapped by youths who sought to pressure them to declare independence immediately. Two days later, after the official surrender of the Japanese, on August 17, 1945, Sukarno and Hatta wrote a short statement proclaiming Indonesian independence on the steps of a suburban house in Jakarta. Soon after, the committee to prepare Indonesia constituted itself as a government, electing Sukarno and Hatta as president and vice-president. Indonesian nationalists defied the Allied powers, who instructed the Japanese to continue to police the country and await the arrival of Allied armies who would eventually hand the colony back to the Dutch colonial authorities. The demand represented further complications of dominance between the new nation and its former colonizer, and only after a four-year guerilla war did the new nation of Indonesia negotiate an agreement in which the Dutch finally recognized independence in 1949.

In 1949, national liberation was achieved to the extent that the Indonesian nation was recognized as independent with equal formal status with other nations. Indonesia was admitted into the United Nations in 1951. The agreement the Hatta government negotiated with the Netherlands left the Indonesian economy burdened by a massive foreign debt, returning almost all of what little modern sector there was to Dutch ownership and control.

As soon as the guerilla war ended and Dutch forces withdrew, nationalist political struggle reorganized for operation within a multiparty parliamentary system, a cabinet government, and a social system that continued to legally recognize private property through all spheres of production. Within this framework, class divisions were asserted and political parties polarized into two blocs: the Islamic MASYUMI Party, based in towns of West Java and in Sumatra, and the Islamic Nahdatul Ulama, based in the villages of Java. The framework dominated government in one combination or another until 1965, when the revolution was considered over.

The party system supported the country's integration into the world economy, accepting the conditions demanded by the western states with whom it aligned in global politics and opposing efforts to introduce major redistributive policies, especially land ownership. It supported policies to facilitate the transformation of holders of bureaucratic positions into a new business class,

through a corrupt system of distribution of business licenses, monopolies, and other privileges. And it opposed the use of mass mobilization in politics, which it claimed was an obstacle to rational administration, trying to channel all political energies into short-lived election campaigns.

MASYUMI was allied with both the PNI, based in towns and villages, and the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), based mainly among a small section of the intelligentsia. These parties dominated cabinets from 1948 until 1960 and remained influential between 1960 and 1965 in partnership with the army. All these parties shared the same general political outlook and supported the same kind of economic strategy for the country. The differences between them did not reflect fundamental policy issues but cultural and religious cleavages, usually related to the history and sociology of dissimilar regions of the archipelago.

The leaderships of the MASYUMI, PNI, and PSI were overwhelmingly drawn from the urban and village bourgeoisie, including rural landowners. They recruited their mass following through appeals to religious and cultural ideas and symbols. They were also built upon complicated conglomerations of patron-client relations that linked landowners and small business families to their dependent workforces and communities, sometimes organized directly at the site of work, sometimes through mosques and village administrations and, as time went on, through the parties and their myriad affiliated organizations.

The other bloc comprised the PKI and affiliated organizations, together with a layer of left-leaning intellectuals. The PKI remained the permanent opposition for the post-independence political elite. During 1949–59, Sukarno had minimal power, due to constitutional constraints and the fact that he led no political party. The PKI, reestablished in 1950 and rebuilt under the influence of the ideas of the Soviet and Maoist leadership, made no concessions to Sukarno's appeal to leftist interpretations of Islam. The philosophy and vocabulary of the PKI were very much within the orthodoxy of 1950s mainstream communist parties. While the majority of the PNI leadership supported Sukarno's emphasis on nation-building and national unity, some were hostile to his Marxist interpretation of colonialism and imperialism. Therefore, as president, Sukarno was locked into the same

mode of political practice as during the Japanese occupation.

Complicating factors for Sukarno were the immediate questions considered the unfinished business of the revolution: remaining colonial domination of western Papua, the foreign debt to the Netherlands, and the continuing ownership of most of the profitable sectors of the economy by Dutch capital. The most contentious issue with the broadest support was for the liberation of western Papua and its integration into Indonesia. A broad front organization was established demanding that the Dutch leave Papua. The PKI and the PNI, and their affiliated mass organizations, were the most active in this campaign. While the main target was the liberation of Papua, the campaign could not but provide a platform for agitation around the demand for the repudiation of the foreign debt to Holland. Mass campaigning on the Papuan issue and against the continuation of the Dutch neocolonial presence escalated from the early 1950s onwards.

Anti-colonial and anti-imperialist sentiments were further consolidated and deepened through Indonesia's hosting of the 1955 Asia–Africa Conference in Bandung. The conference was attended by Third World leaders from around the world, including Hô Chi Minh, Chou Enlai, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Jawaharlal Nehru. The 1955 Bandung conference is considered to have helped initiate the non-aligned movement. Indonesia had an important material basis for the growing support for these campaigns, specifically growing poverty in the post-independent state. The undeveloped economy was viewed as a consequence of the Dutch colonial economy of extraction.

While liberation of Papua was a central goal, repudiation of foreign debt and nationalization of Dutch enterprises were more pressing demands. Through 1956 and 1957 the strength of the trade unions enabled the first radical and concrete steps against the Dutch neocolonial presence by occupying Dutch-owned enterprises. This allowed parliament to pass legislation to nationalize the enterprises in order to repudiate the remaining foreign debt to the Netherlands. During 1950–7, the Indonesian economy stabilized as Dutch capital and technical expertise returned and resumed some steady growth. By 1958, Indonesia had a state-controlled modern sector and only a very small foreign debt. This modern sector was, however, extremely underdeveloped relative to the size of the country.

When Indonesia became independent, it had a domestic bourgeoisie but not a national bourgeoisie – small-scale capitalists operating parochially in local towns, cities, or regions with relatively few resources. The Dutch had not built a university system in the colony, so very few families had educated their children in post-secondary institutions. As such, intellectual, scientific, and cultural resources were minimal.

The ideological-political weaknesses of the domestic bourgeoisie – flowing from its general underdevelopment as a social class – left it few resources in suppressing radicalism on the left, opening the way for an increased political role of the army leadership. The military itself was dissatisfied and envious of the official leadership role of the civilian politicians and parties. The army made another enormous advance in the wake of the trade union occupations of the Dutch enterprises.

With martial law in operation throughout the country, the military was in a position to seize enterprises from workers in the name of the government, which later appointed many military officers as managers of the Dutch enterprises. With this step, the foundations for army officers to become the most likely candidates to succeed in becoming national-scale capitalists were laid, if not immediately, at least in the medium term. In the immediate term, there was the increasing strength of political radicalism and the PKI to contend with. By 1959 these series of developments had resulted in another change in the balance of forces between the two contending class blocs. There appeared to be a stalemate.

As early as 1956, strategic differences had emerged as President Sukarno increasingly became critical of the political parties. In 1956, Sukarno delivered a speech known as “Bury the political parties,” where he expressed his “dream” that all the party leaders would gather and decide to abolish the parties, replacing them with a single party or a single mass movement. There was little support for this idea from any quarter. Behind Sukarno's thinking was the idea that a way must be found to mobilize the energies of the population in a single state-building and development effort.

In the absence of any signs of a voluntary dissolution of the parties, Sukarno shifted emphasis to include all parties in decision-making processes of the state, including at the top level of government, the cabinet. In a 1957 speech,

Sukarno proposed the formation of a Gotong Rojong cabinet, a form of taking advantage of village practices of mutual assistance and cooperation in completing various projects. He proposed that all parties winning a specified electoral quotient be included in the cabinet. Sukarno also proposed that the cabinet be assisted by a National Council comprising representatives of the parties, of "functional groups" such as labor, peasants, and the intelligentsia, and which included armed forces heads and some ministers. The revolution was still not yet complete, and for that it had to head in the direction of building "Indonesian socialism."

The counter-position was most clearly articulated by Vice-President Hatta, who recognized the destructive impact of constant "political squabbles." The contradiction came to a head in July 1959, when Sukarno disbanded the Constituent Assembly and decreed that the 1945 Constitution replace the existing 1950 Constitution. Islamic and other right-wing parties consistently opposed the 1945 Constitution, a shorter, simpler document providing the president more room to maneuver in reordering governmental structures. But the key significance of this move was ending the constitutional deadlock.

From 1959 on, a massive campaign began, led by Sukarno, to win Indonesians over to the idea of actively supporting the move in a socialist direction. Sukarno sought to connect socialism, human liberation, and the goals of the Indonesian national revolution. As the left expanded in numbers, Sukarno's capability to press the government in a socialist direction advanced. Still, Sukarno could never appoint a cabinet with a strong left presence, meaning that most steps to move government in a radical direction were aimed at the imperialist presence in the country rather than at capitalist or landlord privilege.

In 1962, Sukarno's government rejected austerity proposals from a World Bank delegation visiting the country in the aftermath of an economic crisis precipitated by a fall in the world price of Indonesia's main export, rubber. The delegation proposed the imposition of fiscally severe proposals that would have rolled back social expenditures. At a rally in Jakarta, where the US ambassador was present, Sukarno made his famous remark: "Go to hell with your aid!" In August 1965, Sukarno announced plans to nationalize all foreign trade.

There seemed little doubt by the beginning of 1965 that elections would result in a majority for the left parties. The prospect of elections deepened fears in the military and its conservative political allies. Already several initiatives were under way to establish anti-Sukarno and anti-left political organizations, such as the Body in Support of Sukarnoism, Democracy League, and, in the cultural field, the Cultural Manifesto. These organizations were banned, often with the initiative of rival anti-communist elements in the government seeking to appear as members of the pro-Sukarno camp. Even in 1965, conservative and moderate forces, including army officers, held many cabinet posts.

However, apart from possible elections, other tensions created by increased radicalization stemmed from the fact that one of its key agents was actually head of state. The armed forces leadership began organizing more seriously to seize any opportunity or misstep by the PKI or Sukarno. They had already, some time earlier, begun the process of establishing what amounted to their own political party, although they did not call it a party, as they hankered for an end to open party activity. This organization was called the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (SEKBER GOLKAR), structured as a centralized federation of occupational groups. Backed by significant resources from the army, GOLKAR did not develop a large active membership.

On the early morning of October 1, 1965, pro-Sukarno military officers, led by the commander of the presidential guards, Colonel Untung, attempted to arrest seven senior generals. The soldiers and officers sent to detain the generals had no training, photos of the generals, or intelligence about their houses. Untung's forces occupied the main radio station and central square of Jakarta, announcing that officers plotting against President Sukarno were arrested. During the day, as the conspiracy was failing, all the other abducted generals, detained at an air force base, were killed.

By evening this action had collapsed; but one key general was not on the detention list – Major-General Suharto, who controlled the Strategic Reserve Command comprising very mobile troops. He moved quickly to disperse Untung's troops. By the following day, the army was in a position to blame the PKI for a coup attempt, setting off one of the largest killing sprees of the twentieth century. An estimated

500,000 supporters of the PKI and left-wing champions of Sukarno were killed and tens of thousands arrested.

All conspiracies are organized in secrecy, as were Colonel Untung's actions. The army claimed it was a conspiracy by the PKI. Since 1965, several other analyses have emerged to explain the events. Some argued that the so-called September 30 Movement was purely an internal army affair. Others say it was masterminded by General Suharto, who may have initially blessed Untung's conspiracy but later turned against him.

Many of those killed died horribly as part of a terror campaign – decapitated, disemboweled, dragged behind trucks, or otherwise cruelly slaughtered. Hundreds of thousands more were detained for between a few months to a year, often in unlisted safe houses. At least 12,000 were further detained for another 10 to 12 years. Tens of thousands were dismissed from their jobs, especially in the teaching service, civil service, and railways.

This terror, however, must be seen as aimed at more than the annihilation of the organized left, the PKI, and all other groups following Sukarno's left direction. This terror was aimed at ending the processes of the national revolution. It was meant to end the politics of *pergerakan*: all of the ideas and methods that had been an integral part of the Indonesian national revolution between 1909 and 1965. It is not difficult to understand why Suharto and the leadership of this counterrevolutionary offensive felt the need to annihilate these ideas and methods. In 1965 they faced an impending social revolution. More than half of the voting population actively mobilized behind demands that would completely undermine the privileged position of aspiring military businessmen and rural landowners. This movement for worker control of state enterprises, land reform, further nationalization of the economy, and deeper cooperation among non-aligned countries had developed as an extension of the national revolution itself, as an extension of the struggle to consolidate Indonesia as a stable and sovereign nation.

The counterrevolution launched by Suharto in October 1965 was a counterrevolution not only in the sense of being an act of massive suppression of the organizations of the left and of the social revolution, but also of the national revolution itself. The first part of this counterrevolution was perceived clearly by its perpetrators.

On this their cry was *ganyang PKI!* – crush the PKI! On the second aspect, they were probably blind to the destruction they were doing to the Indonesian national revolution, although the following decades were to show that they did indeed have only little conception of and commitment to a genuine development of an Indonesian nation.

The terror, murder, and massive arrests were the first step in ending open mobilization politics. The physical elimination and the psychological destruction of the movement itself, right down to the grassroots, was the first task. Suharto's purges were not purges aimed only at decapitating the leadership of the movement. Nor were they aimed at simply combining decapitation of the leadership and some modest "shock therapy" to demoralize and unbalance the rest of the movement. It went further than that. The violence was aimed at the class base of the movement itself. Factories with a reputation for militancy had their whole workforce slaughtered. Villages that had supported the left were annihilated. Of course, this policy was implemented unevenly, depending on the intensity of the local social conflict. However, the fundamental policy behind all the killings was to decapitate the leadership, eliminate the activist base, and terrorize the millions of sympathizers of the PKI, the left wing of the PNI, and all affiliated mass organizations – all of Sukarno's supporters.

The slaughter and terror were accompanied by policies of immediate suppression of the organizational left. While the new Suharto regime felt compelled to continue to refer to socialism and revolution in its rhetoric, Marxism, Leninism, and subsequently the writings of Sukarno were banned. The PKI and Sukarnoist left press was closed down. Papers with obvious organizational affiliations with the PKI were immediately closed; others lasted a few months before being closed. The PKI and its mass organizations were banned. In the case of the PNI, both the party and its mass organizations were allowed to continue subject to purge. The secretary general of the PNI, Surachman, was detained, tortured, and killed.

SEE ALSO: Indochina, World War II and Liberation in; Indonesia, Colonial Protests, 16th Century to 1900; Indonesian, Pro-Democracy Protests; Indonesian Protests against Suharto Dictatorship; Sukarno (1901–1970)

References and Suggested Readings


- Asmara, A. (1981) *Analisa Ringan Kemelut Roman Karya Pulau Buru Bumi Manusia Pramoedyana Ananta Toer*. Yogyakarta.
- Aspinall, E. (2006) *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bourchier, D. & Hadiz, V. R. (2003) *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader*. London: Routledge.
- Lane, M. (1982) A Sense of Déjà Vu. *New Internationalist* 116.
- Marzuki, A. (1974) *Peristiwa 15 Januari 1974*. Jakarta.
- Moertopo, A. (1974) *Dasar-dasar Pemikiran tentang Akselerasi Modernisasi Pembangunan 25 Tahun*. Jakarta: Yayasan Proklamasi.
- Reid, A. (1993) *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680, Vol. 2: Expansion and Crisis*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Shiraishi, T. (1990) *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912–1926*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)

Paul Buhle

The Industrial Workers of the World, known colloquially as Wobblies, remains unique in the history of US labor and the left despite its troubled history and small size, for a number of crucial reasons. Founded in 1905 as the industrial era proper reached a new phase across much of the globe, the IWW set out to build a global labor movement, ignoring national boundaries as well as differences in race, ethnicity, and gender. The IWW also represented, from its first day, a unique perspective upon the prospects for democracy: it sought to replace not only capitalist economics but also the political state with a decentralized democracy based in the workplace. In short, unlike socialist or communist visions of the future, it did not seek to take over a state mechanism or replace it with a party-style rule. Not ideologically anarchist, either, the IWW sought a functional as well as egalitarian answer to the question of how a modern society could govern itself.

The exact origins of the IWW are elusive not only because it arose out of largely untutored and often violent labor experience in the Western US of the nineteenth century, but also because the language of participants was so frequently



The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) or “Wobblies” was founded in Chicago in 1905 as a more inclusive and radical alternative to the American Federation of Labor (AFL). Founded by a group of socialists, anarchists, and radical trade unionists, including such figures as Eugene V. Debs, Big Bill Haywood, and “Mother Jones” (Mary Harris Jones), the IWW sought to promote solidarity among all workers and encourage the growth of class consciousness. This 1933 pamphlet illustrates its call for “One Big Union.” (Oregon Military Department Records, Communist Activity Intelligence Reports, Oregon State Archives)

non-English. The “social revolutionaries” of the Chicago-based radical movement that peaked in the middle 1880s disdained the word “anarchist,” but clearly stood outside the socialist movements based upon patience in the eventual influence of education and the voting power of the working class. Most, but not all, of the activists were foreign-born and mainly German in origin. The infusion of anarchist ranks after the suppression that followed the Mayday 1886 Haymarket Incident was due mainly to “new” immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, primarily Jewish and Italian. These groups, along with German immigrants, were no strangers to the ideas of syndicalism, and rightly suspected that the mainstream American craft labor movement was conservative by nature.

A very different source of IWW ideas and energy came out of the Knights of Labor, peaking at a half-million members in the middle 1880s, also from Western mining camps, railroaders and others active in the 1890s who looked upon the American Federation of Labor (AFL) as a sad failure in its own terms. The American Railway Union, formed under the leadership of Eugene Victor Debs after the failure of railroad brotherhoods (and the rival Knights of Labor) to form cohesive unions, guided the Pullman Strike of 1894, hugely successful until its suppression – but only west of the Mississippi River. The Western Federation of Miners, likewise disdainful of craft unions' exclusionary practices and inability to cope with the effect of changes in mechanization upon union prospects, joined veterans of the collapsed ARU and others in forming a Western Labor Union, then (with some further participants in the East) an American Labor Union. These were weak bodies, but expressive of large-scale impulses towards real solidarity.

The political scene on the left added complications. Never large by European standards, the socialist movements of the US exerted sometimes considerable influence upon particular unions, including the largely German-American brewery workers (a genuinely international union, with workers carrying the membership cards from the homeland, and an all-inclusive union within the breweries) and the substantially Jewish needles trades. Unionists led by the small but active Socialist Labor Party had sought to launch a new labor federation in 1894, following the near-collapse of the Knights of Labor and the sharp decline of the AFL in the severe depression beginning the previous year. The Socialist Trades and Labor Alliance was intended to be a more European-style union, openly socialistic. But it quickly failed, due in no small part to strike-breaking by AFL bodies and by local authorities. The parent SLP soon began to split apart, and loyal AFL unionists sought a different kind of socialist movement, amenable to existing unionism of any kind, but especially to the progressive craft unionists who made the local central labor federation their home base.

The Socialist Party, formed from a handful of existing groups in 1901 and already following Eugene Debs' presidential run in 1900, sought to be catholic in all things except the necessity of a socialist political mechanism and associated educa-

tion. As elsewhere in the world, the assumption of a rapid decline of capitalism ahead lent a degree of optimism to the hope for peaceful transition through patient agitation. The initial steady if modest growth of the Socialist Party seemed to verify this prognosis, but the languishing AFL (and its small-scale rivals) and the notable lack of socialist progress in the overwhelming majority of working-class neighborhoods and communities prompted difficult questions. The Democratic Party frequently held the whip hand, especially among Irish Americans (who, in turn, dominated considerable sections of the AFL, especially the building trades), leaving socialists out in the cold. In short, even with a certain success, the political movement alone was not likely to bring socialism.

And yet, as past experience had shown, American workers of nearly every description were capable on occasion of striking in solidarity, often building upon the strengths of working-class (and frequently) ethnic communities. How could it be possible to use that strength and presumably bring political energy forward, reversing the usual procedure of the Europeans? For this question, a handful of labor's own intellectuals and organizers offered proposals in a series of meetings held during 1904. All aimed at solidarity, and most agreed that the needed industrial unionism (that is, unionism throughout the major workplaces of the great industries) had little prospect within the AFL, its leadership increasingly centralized under its deeply conservative, anti-immigration, unembarrassed racist president, Samuel Gompers.

The opening convention of the IWW in Chicago, famously described by mineworkers' leaders William D. "Big Bill" Haywood as the Continental Congress of the Working Class, had a bundle of fresh ideas and an ocean of prospects. It did not, however, succeed in drawing the more socialistic-minded AFL members or locals into the new organization. Most notable in their absence were the brewery workers (their leader, William E. Trautmann, became a Wobbly intellectual and leader, heavily influenced by German syndicalism, but brought few with him), garment workers, metal workers, and coal miners (also known for their industrially inclusive union practices).

The IWW vision had been best laid out by Daniel DeLeon, the leader of the shrunken Socialist Labor Party and editor of its *Daily*

People newspaper. Addressing an audience in Minneapolis a few days before the convention, DeLeon offered an anthropologically influenced view that society was ready to return, at a higher technological level, to the democracy it had known before the rise of class society. The IWW, then, represented the end of capitalism because the system had done its job and become unnecessary, as had the political state. Unlike the plans of European socialists, this transcendence was to be realized by workers of all kinds, political and non-political.

However, the IWW flagged after an initial burst of energy, and it nearly collapsed as the recession of 1907–8 made strikes almost impossible to win. Worse, the Western Federation of Miners withdrew, and in the political fracas DeLeon was expelled (as a “lawyer”) and powerful socialists, especially Eugene Debs, badly alienated. The IWW had become a propaganda organization more than a union.

Within that framework it recovered, gained new leaders, and invented a style of agitation that quickly drew upon the best of American radical traditions, from Abolitionism to Populism and the Knights of Labor. The emblematic songs, hilariously anti-capitalist (but also drawing upon current vaudeville hits), marked the street-corner style of reaching unskilled workers, itinerant laborers in extractive industries, and others excluded by the AFL. Notwithstanding the WFM withdrawal, the IWW became a beloved (by the employers, despised) part of the Western scene, with clubhouses in the towns where lumberworkers and crop pickers stopped, usually spent their money on liquor and prostitutes, and then threw themselves upon the mercies of the Salvation Army. The IWW offered self-education in place of all forms of degradation, and hopes for liberation from the grinding capitalist system: a brother- and sisterhood of a new, comprehensive quality. Among the high points of agitation were the “free speech fights” in Western cities, the right to agitate openly, fights that brought IWW supporters on the rails from all directions, and resulted in much publicity, mass arrests, jailhouse sing-alongs, and moral support of liberty lovers along with the iron fist of legal representation.

The IWW reached its apex first in the strikes of the unskilled, mostly foreign-born workers in the mass industry of the East and Midwest, 1911–13 – mirroring the strikes of unskilled

workers across much of Europe just before the outbreak of war. The Lawrence, Massachusetts, textile strike of 1912, with more than a dozen nationalities taking part, was a particular high point and a signal victory, although not with IWW union recognition. Defeat followed in a textile strike in Paterson, New Jersey the following year and the center of gravity shifted definitively westward, to migratory agricultural labor in particular.

This last development, of crucial importance to the institutional strength of the IWW but mainly among white, male, younger workers, tended to disguise other, subtler developments in the trans-racial, global outreach of the IWW and its ideas. The Brotherhood of Timber Workers, a mostly African American organization in Louisiana from 1909 to 1913, briefly offered the most significant racial breakthrough in the South (or anywhere in the US) since the rise of Populism during the 1890s. It was brutally crushed. The followers of the Flores Magón brothers, in the US Southwest, created a cross-border movement of labor mobilization and support of the Mexican Revolution. Faithful Wobblies, the Magonistas contained dozens of organizers who crossed the border back and forth, sometimes hiding from authorities among supportive Native American peoples. On the West Coast, Japanese Americans (influenced by anarchism in their homeland) and Chinese Americans sought to organize through the IWW. (The popular term “Wobbly” was commonly attributed to a Chinese immigrant cook’s pronunciations of the organization’s initials.)

Likewise, the IWW and its approaches heavily influenced working-class movements in Ireland, Scotland, and above all Australia, among English-speaking peoples. In a few years the appearance of Russian “soviets” (or workers’ councils) was widely considered “the Russian IWW.” The analogy was natural if overblown. The IWW was becoming a world society of labor within itself and beyond its organizational self a model for solidarity, not merely an expression of socialist or anarchist (or by 1917, communist) ideas, but solidarity in its own name and for labor’s own destiny.

It was no wonder, then, that the repression, when it came, was so absolute. The IWW, at its second apex as the US government prepared to enter the world war, likely would have emerged a significant competitor to the craft labor move-

ment in the very homeland of the new global capitalist empire. Instead, the White House, under noted liberal president Woodrow Wilson, engaged in the most extensive persecution of any labor or political group in US history (later matched in intensity, if perhaps not in scope, by the persecution of the Black Panthers in the 1960s). IWW leaders were arrested and sentenced to long terms in prison, local IWW halls were destroyed by right-wing mobs with the compliance of authorities, and promising organizing drives blunted, local organizations shattered.

It was notable that industrial unionism in some AFL and independent unions meanwhile surged forward, buoyed by the restriction of immigration and consequent labor shortage in the wartime economy. Most important of these developments was the rapid emergence of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, under leadership sympathetic to the idea of “workers’ control” but careful not to draw repression by open statement of anti-war sentiments. A handful of leading IWW agitators, especially Italian Americans, went over to the ACWA. Meanwhile, former Wobbly William Z. Foster as much as led the 1919 steel strike, and many Wobblies or former Wobblies took part in what amounted to a near general-strike movement that year, shutting down the port city of Seattle for a time and inspiring hopes that global revolution would spread to the new center of global capital. Only in the next several years, with the steady retreat of organized labor, did the calamity of the 1910–21 repression (choreographed by the new Bureau of Investigation, soon to become the Federal Bureau of Investigation and already under the hand of eagerly repressive J. Edgar Hoover) and its full effects become evident.

The IWW survived, its leadership wiped out, into the 1920s, and with one significant addition: the waterfront and seamen’s labor pocket of Wobbly strength in Philadelphia. Years later, when industrial unionism of this sector took hold under communist leadership, the surviving radicals, non-whites in particular, were aging Wobblies, and in some places the radical influence continues today. Meanwhile, technological advances eroded organization among agricultural workers, and Wobbly efforts to gain footholds in coal mining and other sectors proved unsuccessful. In truth, the young radicals, especially immigrants and their descendents,

flocked to the communist movement. Ideological differences notwithstanding, the emphasis on mobilization among the very poor and non-whites, on direct action rather than patient education, were Wobbly expressions in communist form.

The rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (and in a few sectors, the rapid expansion of AFL-affiliated unions, such as Teamsters) left the IWW behind in practical terms, but hardly in terms of vision. The civil rights movement during the 1950s and 1960s recalled, to many aging radicals, the sense of solidarity in the IWW, the uplifting of the lowest sectors by their own efforts and collective self-confidence (as did Black Power at a somewhat later time), and the free spirited New Left, women’s, gay and lesbian movements all recalled memories of the IWW sensibility. Scarcely existing in organizational form, the IWW maintained itself during the 1970s–1990s through cultural associations and printing “job shops” owned cooperatively by IWW members. The Charles H. Kerr Company of Chicago, before 1920 a chief publisher of pro-IWW materials, also returned to the scene with important historical works of Wobbly history.

The idea survived into the twenty-first century mainly by these means, and through the perennial popularity of IWW music, sung by the likes of Utah Phillips and even Bruce Springsteen. As the US workforce became steadily more immigrant-based and as the mainstream of organized labor steadily collapsed, the appeal of Wobbly ideas found new audiences. A much-publicized organizing drive among the employees of Starbucks had scant success in attaining union recognition as such, but brought the IWW back to visibility for the young, casually employed generation in particular.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Australia; Anarchism, Britain; Anarchism, Canada; Anarchism, Chile; Anarchism and Culture, 1840–1939; Anarchism, Mexico; Anarchism, New Zealand; Anarchism and Syndicalism, Southern Africa; Anarchism in the United States to 1945; Anarchism in the United States, 1946–Present; Anarchosyndicalism; Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley (1890–1964); Haywood, Big Bill (1869–1928); Knights of Labor and Terence Powderly (1849–1924); Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 1775–1900; Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 20th Century; Magón, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922) and the Magonistas; South Africa, Labor Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Bird, S., Georgakas, D., & Shaffer, D. (Eds.) (2001) *Solidarity Forever: An Oral History of the IWW*. Chicago: Lake View Press.
- Buhle, P. & Schulman, N. (Eds.) (2005) *WOBBLIES! A Graphic History of the Industrial Workers of the World*. New York: Verso.
- Dubofsky, M. (1969) *We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Flynn, E. G., Salerno, S., Smith, W. C., & Trautmann, W. E. (1997) *Direct Action and Sabotage: Three Classic IWW Pamphlets from the 1910s*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.
- Kornbluh, J. (Ed.) (1998) *Rebel Voices: An IWW Anthology*, 2nd ed. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.

Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), Australia

Verity Burgmann

The Australian Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), an offshoot of the American IWW, achieved public notoriety and popularity amongst militant workers between 1907 and the 1920s. By 1916 it had about 2,000 members in a population of 4.5 million, but many more sympathizers. Only waged workers could join, so unemployment or domestic duties excluded many potential members. Its acerbic, lively newspaper, *Direct Action*, had a circulation of around 15,000. As in the US, IWW members addressed each other as “Fellow Workers” and were known as “Wobblies.” Leading members included Tom Barker, Tom Glynn, J. B. King, and Charlie Reeve.

Like its American progenitor, the Australian IWW maintained all workers should join One Big Union (OBU) that would be so powerful it could assume control of production and end capitalist class rule. It shared with European syndicalism the belief that workers should not entrust the task of abolishing or ameliorating capitalism to representatives in parliament, who would betray that trust, but should use their own working-class organizations to achieve their aims; but its OBU project was grander and more centralized.

The first IWW Club was formed in Sydney in 1907. After the split in the American IWW

in 1908, new Australian branches (Locals) were formed, first in Adelaide in 1911, which adhered to the Chicago IWW that disdained all connections with parliamentary parties. This section became what is commonly known as the Australian IWW. The Detroit IWW Clubs continued to function, but were less influential, because of their sectarianism and commitment to parliamentary politics.

Australian workers had secured voting rights and payment of politicians before the end of the nineteenth century, so Labor parties and governments formed earlier than elsewhere. The Chicago Locals grew by appealing to workers disillusioned with the inability of Labor governments to significantly improve working-class conditions. Australian Wobblies were distinguished by contempt for “Labor fakirs.” Their song “Bump Me Into Parliament,” to the tune of “Yankee Doodle,” caricatured the moderation and self-serving motivations of a Labor politician. It began: “Oh yes I am a Labor man, And believe in revolution, The quickest way to bring it on, Is talking constitution.”

Unlike the American IWW, the Australian IWW did not practice dual unionism, because the trade union movement was well developed. Wobblies were predominantly unskilled and semi-skilled male workers, who were already members of trade unions, so the IWW “bored from within” the existing union movement while establishing Locals and meeting places in capital cities and large working-class regional centers. It opposed the White Australia Policy, which was then supported by most of the labor movement. It campaigned strongly against Australian involvement in World War I from its outbreak in August 1914, in *Direct Action* and at huge outdoor meetings. Tom Barker was prosecuted in 1915 for publishing a poster “prejudicial to recruiting.” The IWW was significant in the defeat of two wartime referenda seeking support for conscription for military service.

Fearing the rise of the labor movement for its growing influence amongst workers, in December 1916 the national Labor government outlawed the IWW and made membership punishable by six months’ imprisonment: 103 Wobblies were jailed, many more lost their jobs, and a dozen foreign-born Wobblies were deported. Also in 1916, 12 Wobblies were accused of seditious conspiracy to commit large-scale arson on Sydney business premises and received

jail sentences of 5 to 15 years. Amidst widespread union-led agitation to secure justice for the IWW 12, they were all released by late 1921 after two royal commissions into the trial found serious deficiencies and evidence that the IWW men were framed by police.

In the 1920s militant workers carried on IWW ideas in the OBU movement and successor organizations, such as the International Industrial Workers and the Industrial Union Propaganda League. There were occasional reformations of IWW Locals, in Adelaide from 1928, in Perth in the late 1930s, and in Sydney during the 1940s. The Communist Party of Australia always had to contend with the IWW's continuing syndicalist influence amongst workers. The Australian IWW still exists, in diminished form.

SEE ALSO: Anarchosyndicalism; Australian Labor Movement; Communist Party of Australia; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)

References and Suggested Readings

- Burgmann, V. (1995) *Revolutionary Industrial Unionism: The Industrial Workers of the World in Australia*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
- Burgmann, V. (1999) Antipodean Peculiarities: Comparing the Australian IWW with the American. *Labor History* 40, 3 (August): 371–92.
- Cain, F. (1993) *Wobblies at War: A History of the IWW and the Great War in Australia*. Melbourne: Spectrum.
- Shor, F. (1992) Masculine Power and Virile Syndicalism: A Gendered Analysis of the IWW in Australia. *Labor History* 63 (November): 83–99.
- Turner, I. (1967) *Sydney's Burning*. Sydney: Alpha Books.

Indymedia global justice campaign, 2000s

André Spicer

Indymedia describes itself as “a network of collectively run media outlets for the creation of radical, accurate, and passionate tellings of the truth” (www.indymedia.org). It is made up of a network of over 150 local Indymedia Collectives (IMCs) around the world who publish and broadcast independent news and opinion. They largely do this through a series of local websites that allow members of the public to post news

stories. The website of each IMC consists of an open newswire where articles posted by the public appear, a features section which picks out major stories, and a links section which includes connections to other IMCs and campaigns. IMCs also frequently engage in mobilizations for large protests or meetings. During these mobilizations, they often aim to provide a way activist groups can represent their own perspective on the events. IMCs often also run events such as film screenings, dance parties, and discussion groups. Finally, some collectives have sought to branch out into the distribution of other media such as print, radio, and film.

Indymedia has a number of important precursors. Many of the activists involved in establishing the early IMCs were inspired by the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, Mexico. The Zapatistas' use of the Internet to distribute communiqués from their figure head, Subcommandante Marcos, was seen as an important model for Indymedia. IMCs also drew on the deep and rich experience and talents built up in the community and do-it-yourself (DIY) media movement. This movement is based on the principle of users creating their own media content and distributing it themselves, often at very low cost. It provided significant competencies in developing and distributing media content. Additional impetus and technical skills came from the Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) movement. This movement provided the technology that was necessary for using the Internet to distribute news. The “alter-globalization” movement of the late 1990s and early 2000s provided a significant political impetus to Indymedia and served as an important source of stories. For instance, the June 18 protests in London during 1999 were central in the founding of UK Indymedia. Finally, radical political movements in each locality feed into the founding and development of each collective. For instance, the United Kingdom IMC drew a lot of inspiration and experience from the anti-roads movements of the 1990s.

The first IMC was established in 1999 during the anti-World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle. Initially it was established by North American alternative media activists who were seeking to distribute media content produced by activists. They set up an independent media center in downtown Seattle where activists could upload footage from the protests.

They also established a website which would allow activists to directly upload their reportage. The website proved to be an immediate success and was widely accessed during the mobilization. This site served as a model that quickly spread throughout North America, Europe, and some other locations. Often IMCs were set up in response to large-scale summit protests. Indymedia has also been an important part in social forum mobilizations.

Because Indymedia is such a large and autonomous network of collectives, there is significant diversity in the orientations of people in the network. However, there are some common points of commitment that appear to be shared by many throughout the network. The first is a commitment to self-representation. This involves a concern that many political groups have to go through mainstream news media to have their voice heard. In order to get around this problem, radical groups should set up alternative media outlets where they have control over their own voice and the way they are represented. A second ethic underlying Indymedia is an anti-corporate and anti-state orientation. This is based on the idea that the growing domination of the media by large corporations and in some cases governments has resulted in an increasingly narrow range of news stories being available. A third ethic is a commitment to participation in media making. This means breaking down the split between consumers and producers of media content. Finally, IMCs often have a commitment to “horizontality.” This means a commitment to flat and participative forms of organizing and decision-making.

As Indymedia has developed, it has faced a number of significant dilemmas. The first of these involves issues around editorial process and charges of censorship. Initially, the open newswire meant that any content could appear on an IMC site. The result was that a small percentage of posts contained anti-Semitic, racist, and sexist content. In order to deal with this, many Indymedia adopted an editorial process. This involves collective members examining posts, and if they are judged offensive, they are assigned to the “hidden” newswire. A second challenge faced by many IMCs has been processes of collective organizing. Typical problems include individuals holding up consensus decision-making processes, difficulties around involving new members, and lack of a stable resource base.

A third challenge has been balancing the autonomy of each local collective with the solidarity of the whole global network. This has become particularly pronounced when issues such as funding sources and the involvement of more formal NGOs have been debated. A fourth challenge that IMCs face is increasingly punitive policing of their activities. This has extended to police raids on an IMC during the Genoa protests of 2001 and the seizure of Indymedia servers during 2004 in London. A final challenge that IMCs face is the changing nature of the media as a whole. Indymedia has found that many activists have begun using commercial services such as YouTube which allow the easy distribution of user-generated content.

SEE ALSO: Earth First!; G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; Global Day of Action Against Capitalism, June 18 (J18), 1999; Reclaim the Streets; World Social Forums; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Atton, C. (2002) *Alternative Media*. London: Sage.
- Indymedia essay collection, www.docs.indymedia.org/view/Global/ImcEssayCollection.
- Mamadouh, V. (2004) Internet, Scale and the Global Grassroots: Geographies of the Indymedia Network of Independent Media Centres. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 95 (5): 482–97.
- Pickard, V. W. (2006) Assessing the Radical Democracy of Indymedia: Discursive, Technical and Institutional Constructions. *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 23 (1): 19–38.
- Platon, S. & Deuze, M. (2003) Indymedia Journalism: A Radical Way of Making, Selecting and Sharing News? *Journalism* 4: 336–55.

Infoshops

Antonios Vradis

Infoshops (sometimes also called social centers) are physical spaces serving as nodes for the distribution of anarchist and other radical material and the exercise of such ideas and practices. Infoshops exist across the world, with a particularly prominent presence in North America and Western Europe.

The origins of contemporary infoshops can be traced to autonomism in 1970s Germany and Italy, as well as the peace and justice centers in the US during the Vietnam War era (Munson

1998). Germany's *autonome* focused on campaigns against nuclear weapons and airport expansions. The Italian *autonomia* was based around worker struggles (*operaismo*, or "workerism"). Both social movements utilized occupied spaces as centers wherein they could promote their propaganda and develop a political culture that was autonomous from, and antagonistic to, the mainstream.

In the early 1990s the sharp rise of urban gentrification threatened rented and occupied infoshops alike. This threat ignited an ongoing discussion on the appropriate occupational status of infoshops. Such debate is particularly relevant in the light of recent evictions of social centers in Europe. Copenhagen's *Ungdomshuset* and London's *RampART* were evicted in 2007; Berlin's *Koepi* was under imminent threat in the summer of 2008.

Infoshops can be understood in relation to the *Temporary Autonomous Zone* tactic as described by Hakim Bey (1985). By suggesting that political change can start from confined social and physical spaces, this tactic has crucially differentiated anarchist and autonomist politics from more conventional theories of the left.

SEE ALSO: Autonomism

References and Suggested Readings

- Bey, H. (1985) *T.A.Z.: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism*. Brooklyn: Autonomedia.
- Katsiaficas, G. (1997) *The Subversion of Politics: European Autonomous Social Movements and the Decolonization of Everyday Life*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
- Munson, C. (1998) Your Friendly Neighborhood Infoshop. *MaximumRockNRoll*. Available online at www.practicalanarchy.org/infoshops.html.
- Tobocman, S. (2000) *War in the Neighborhood*. Brooklyn: Autonomedia.

International Congress of Women at The Hague

Cayo Gamber

Eight months after the start of World War I, almost 1,500 women – from neutral and “belligerent” nations – congregated in the Netherlands for four days to discuss how to achieve

international peace. From April 28 to May 1, 1915, at the International Congress of Women at The Hague, the participants concurred that international disputes “should be settled by pacific means” and “the parliamentary franchise should be extended to women” who then would have a say in deciding between war or peace. In spite of the fact that travel was made difficult by war, 12 nations participated with the following number of members: Australia, 6; Belgium, 5; Canada, 2; Denmark, 6; Germany, 28; Great Britain, 3 (180 others were prevented from attending due to the closing of the North Sea for military reasons); Hungary, 9; Italy, 1; the Netherlands, 1,000; Norway, 12; Sweden, 12; and the United States, 47. The women who gathered also received messages of solidarity from women from Argentina to Romania.

From the outset, the Congress advanced transnational organizing and was the only international meeting, of any kind, during World War I to bring together representatives from both neutral nations and those at war. A spirit of appreciative solidarity was evidenced by both belligerent and neutral nations. Nonetheless, the competing demands of nationalism and internationalism were felt. For example, the French sent no delegates because they were under invasion and thus believed discussions of peace were not possible when they themselves were fighting for their country.

In their opening statement, the participants protested “against the madness and horror of war, involving as it does a reckless sacrifice of human life and the destruction of so much that humanity has labored through centuries to build up.” They decried the horrible violation of woman which attends all warfare; the transfer of territories without the consent of the people of said territories; the exercise of secret treaties; and the greed of transnational arms corporations that grew rich from the sale of weapons.

In order to advance their resolutions, the Congress repeatedly called for the enfranchisement of women. Once given full participatory power, they believed women, as the “World’s Mothers,” would guide men toward peace. They also envisioned the formation of a permanent International Court of Justice accompanied by a permanent Council of Conciliation. In advancing this proposal, they argued that to achieve peace in a postwar world, it would be necessary to negotiate an international peace based on

mediation by neutral nations rather than on a military settlement. Whipps (2006) asserts that these “proposals were taken seriously by presidents and prime ministers and were incorporated into President Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points speech (1918)” (124).

While their efforts were transnational in nature, the women who gathered at The Hague were, for the most part, white and middle class. Not only military movements restricted participation, financial concerns also limited participation as “delegates to the Hague Congress footed their own bills” for international travel, which proved to be quite expensive (Rupp 1994: 1577).

In the various contemporaneous accounts of the women who attended the Congress – especially those of Jane Addams (who chaired the proceedings), Emily G. Balch, and Alice Hamilton, of the American contingent – the participants spoke of women as victims of war, as mothers who have suffered the loss of their sons and as wives now widowed. In addition, these women reported that the men who were fighting the war repeatedly appealed to women to come to their aid by voicing their opposition to warfare.

At the conclusion of the meeting, delegates from the Congress met with governmental leaders of the various war capitals to call for an end to war. They believed the countries of war-torn Europe could unite if the “perfectly artificial national boundaries . . . made to signify collective greeds and hatreds” were overcome (Addams et al. 2003: 11). In her accounts, Addams appealed to a desire for “the fruitful processes of cooperation in the great experiment of living together in a world become conscious of itself” (Addams et al. 2003: 66). At the conclusion of the Congress, the International Committee for Permanent Peace was formed, and later, in 1919, the Committee adopted a new name, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. The women who participated believed that “if national hatred could be taught, so, too . . . could international understanding and love” (Rupp 1994: 1600).

SEE ALSO: Addams, Jane (1860–1935); International Women’s Day; Popelin, Marie (1846–1913) and the Belgian League for Women’s Rights

References and Suggested Readings

Addams, J. (2002) *Peace and Bread in Time of War*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

- Addams, J., Balch, E. G., & Hamilton, A. (2003) *Women at The Hague: The International Congress of Women and Its Results*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Alonso, H. H. (1993) *Peace as a Women’s Issue: A History of the US Movement for World Peace and Women’s Rights*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Braker, R. (1998) Helene Stöcker’s Pacifism: International Intersections. *Peace and Change* 23, 4 (October): 455–65.
- Rupp, L. J. (1994) Constructing Internationalism: The Case of Transnational Women’s Organizations, 1888–1945. *American Historical Review* 99, 5 (December): 1571–1600.
- Whipps, J. D. (2006) The Feminist Pacifism of Emily Greene Balch, Nobel Peace Laureate. *NWSA Journal* 18, 3 (Fall): 122–32.

International socialism: mass politics

Kevin J. Callahan

In the year 1848, as Europe was in the throes of liberal and national revolutions from Paris to Berlin to Vienna, two unlikely figures – a German philosopher named Karl Marx and the Rhenish industrial magnate Friedrich Engels – published a pamphlet in London with the clarion call “Workers of all countries, unite!” By the eve of World War I in 1914, the slogan of the famous *Communist Manifesto* had come to inspire the largest mass-based political and social movement of the western, and perhaps the entire, world. International socialism was born.

International socialism galvanized a significant portion of the disenfranchised population of the working classes of Europe in the emergent industrial society of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Scottish socialist Keir Hardie estimated in 1912 that European socialism rallied 15 million voters and represented 45 million workers. The German Social Democratic Party was by far the world’s largest political party, with over one million party members. Organized workers of Europe carrying the banner of socialism constituted a protest to the existing liberal industrial order on several levels: the exploited status of workers in the new industrial era, the lack of political rights and power for the masses

in an elitist liberal and monarchical political culture, and the unfulfilled goals of fraternity and equality harking back to the 1789 French Revolution.

International socialism was probably the most pioneering and innovative social movement of its day. Its success was based on its ability to unite a complex and diverse group of national-based worker parties, while devising innovative political tactics and strategies with the objective of influencing public opinion and public policy. As a result, the movement prior to World War I became a model of social and political organization, which many twentieth-century mass movements such as communism and fascism would in certain ways emulate.

Protest or Revolution?

Five traits define the salient features of international socialism. First, the movement stands out in its efforts to articulate and embody the spirit of internationalism in an era plagued by rampant nationalism and imperialism. Second, the movement formulated a powerful critique against the liberal middle-class capitalist hegemony of the Victorian era, with all of its problems and contradictions ranging from social disparities to lack of political and economic rights. Third, in offering a class-based and global analysis of current injustices and events in the world, the movement was fueled by members of the working classes of Europe, even if the leadership came mainly from the middle class. Fourth, the movement was truly mass-based, relying on the direct participation of hundreds of thousands of citizens. It largely provided the operating definition of the phenomenon of mass politics contemporary sociologists like Max Weber and Robert Michels have identified as changing the political landscape of Europe from the 1880s until today. The fifth important characteristic of international socialism is its use of demonstration as a method of mass politics. Demonstration in the pre-World War I era entailed the practice of showing, manifesting, expressing, and displaying, and included propaganda, public display, manifestos, political symbolism, and massive anti-war rallies.

The concept of demonstration entailed an element of both protest and revolution. In fact, two demonstrations in Russian history – the January 1905 demonstration led by Father Gapon and the 1917 March demonstration celebrating

International Women's Day – were catalysts for the 1905 and 1917 Russian revolutions. Such demonstrations were a powerful indictment of a specific aspect of the status quo and offered socialism as the logical solution to the problem. Thus, they were simultaneously against and for something, and they undermined control of the public order while holding out the possibility of instigating a revolutionary situation. The emphasis of demonstrations was not on fomenting a revolutionary crisis but rather on using this potential scenario as a tactic of intimidation to convince European governments to take action to remedy the situation. Consequently, international socialist demonstrations were mass-based social and political protests with potential revolutionary implications.

The Trajectory of the Socialist Ideal and Mass Politics until the Second International

The intersection of the political and social mobilization of the working classes of Europe and the doctrine of socialism did not occur in a sustained fashion until the rise of international socialism around 1900. Both evolved along different trajectories from their origins through the course of the nineteenth century. The history of the socialist ideal is nearly as old as western civilization itself.

Some scholars assert that the first communist uprising occurred during the French Revolution, when Gracchus Babeuf instigated the “Conspiracy of Equals” in 1796, only to fail miserably and face the guillotine. Babeuf believed in a strong state that would abolish private property and implement a sweeping land reform. More important than Babeuf the individual is the significance of the French Revolution itself. Socialists from the nineteenth century onward drew inspiration from the possibility of a dramatic overhaul of societal institutions and the unfulfilled social ideals of equality and fraternity. It was no coincidence that the second Socialist International was founded on July 14, 1889 in Paris, the centennial of the Storming of the Bastille, nor that later the Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin drew lessons from the French Revolution to apply to the 1917 October Russian Revolution.

Mass mobilization in the nineteenth century was sporadic in continental Europe, punctuated by the revolutionary outbursts of 1830, 1848, the

1871 Paris Commune, and occasional nationalist uprisings. In England, workers forged an impressive mass movement in the early nineteenth century, from 1832 until the early 1850s, known as Chartism. The internationalist ideals of the time were of a conservative and liberal republican variant. Liberal internationalism stood for a fraternity of independent and peaceful nations. Jacobins of the French Revolution and later Romantic nationalists such as the Italians Giuseppe Mazzini and Giuseppe Garibaldi embraced this creed. A counterdoctrine known as “conservative internationalism” was intended as an antidote to the upheaval of the French Revolution. Crafted by the Austrian minister Klemens von Metternich at the 1814 Congress of Vienna, it entailed a diplomatic approach to social control: Europe’s dynasties and nobility pledged to cooperate in a “Concert of Europe” in order to fend off all forms of popular politics and the subversive ideologies of nationalism, liberalism, and democratic radicalism. This variant of cooperation virtually disappeared when Germany’s Iron Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, reconfigured the international system according to the nationalist principle of the Balance of Powers. Liberal internationalism lost much credibility against the backdrop of escalating national tensions from the 1860s until World War I.

Socialist internationalism was merely a phrase in 1848, year of the publication of the *Communist Manifesto*. It emerged as a weak force in the 1850s and 1860s when liberal and conservative internationalism were faltering in light of the national unification by military means of Italy and Germany. At first, socialist internationalism consisted of the intermingling of exiled socialist agitators in Europe’s urban safe havens such as Geneva, Paris, and London. English and French worker organizations began to forge alliances across the English Channel, resulting in the creation of the International Workingmen’s Association or First International in London in 1864.

The First International was a centralized organization consisting of socialist leaders and activists from several European countries, but it was never a mass-based movement. The personal and ideological struggle between Karl Marx and Mikhail Bakunin, both of whom accused the other of manipulating the institution for his own sectarian purposes, plagued the International until it dissolved itself in 1872.

Its significance is not, however, negligible. First, the organization exemplified, on occasion, international solidarity in the form of financial support for strike funds across frontiers. Such solidarity even made its way into popular novels of the time, such as Emile Zola’s classic account of the tensions of a French coalmining town, *Germinal*. Second, it provided an institutional framework, albeit briefly, for the ideal of socialist internationalism that inspired European militants to resurrect the Second International in 1889. Third, although the First International had limited influence, its mere existence played into the fears and phobias of Europe’s ruling elites, who greatly exaggerated its influence (claiming, for example, it had started the 1871 Paris Commune) and thus in part legitimized the force of socialist internationalism.

A Decade of Transition: The Second International in the 1890s

When the Second International was established on Bastille Day in 1889, the symbolism of the event could not cover up the patent disunity of the movement. Nor did the occasion receive much notice since it was drowned out by the fanfare of the French Third Republic’s own celebration of the centennial of the French Revolution. Even so, the disparate socialists in attendance made their commitment to internationalism clear by passing a memorable resolution declaring May 1 to be an international day of labor and peace, or what has become simply known as May Day. The 1890s was a decade of transition for international socialism, sowing the seeds of the movement, which would blossom after the turn of the century.

The struggles of the First International were initially carried over into the Second International. The periodic international socialist congresses in the 1890s – 1891 Brussels, 1893 Zurich, 1896 London, and 1900 Paris – were beset by factionalism, ideological conflict, and simply uncivil behavior. The dispute between Marxists and anarchists was renewed, while new currents of thought such as socialist reformism entered the fray. With socialists finding it difficult to settle their own personal and ideological differences, international cooperation was a virtual impossibility. In fact, only on rare occasions did leaders hatch the idea of coordinated action and

almost exclusively a bilateral, as opposed to an international, initiative. The relative calm decade of the 1890s in terms of international relations created few scenarios in which the International felt compelled to express its internationalism in a concerted and organized campaign.

Two developments were occurring which portended the dynamism of international socialist demonstrations in the future. First, the late 1880s and 1890s marked a watershed in socialist movements, establishing nationally based political parties and worker organizations. For example, the Belgian Workers' Party was founded in 1885, the Austrian Social Democratic Party in 1888–9, and the Swedish Social Democratic Party in 1889. The Second International later relied on such national-based organizations to mobilize workers in its mass demonstrations. Second, broader developments within European society were preparing the ground for the emergence of mass politics. Technological advances such as the typewriter and the telegraph made a thriving print and press culture possible. Freer press and assembly laws along with improved urban and national transportation networks made it easier and faster for people to congregate in the city center. The International masterfully exploited the newest technologies and an increasing expansion of the public sphere by directing political activism beyond parliament and the king's court into the extraparliamentary realm of the press and street protests.

The Activities of the International Socialist Bureau

The year 1900 marked a turning point for the movement of international socialism because the International executed a resolution it had passed at its 1900 Paris congress to establish an International Socialist Bureau (ISB). Located in Brussels, Belgium, the ISB attended to the secretarial business of the International as well as to organizing international socialist congresses. Its mandate also empowered it to organize "protest movements" and "anti-militarist agitation" on all instances of "international importance."

The exact nature and scope of "protest movements" and "anti-militarist agitation" the ISB was charged to fulfill were unclear in the beginning. Tactics available for member parties to implement were theoretically wide and varied, including economic boycott, propaganda, parliamentary

intervention, protest meetings (indoor), street demonstrations, the general strike, and/or the anti-war strike targeting strategic industrial sectors. Different movements and even factions or individuals within a single movement favored specific strategies for the mobilization of the working class. For example, the Scot Keir Hardie and the Frenchman Eduard Vaillant supported firmly the tactic of an anti-war strike, while the leaders of German and Austrian socialism dismissed any form of strike as impractical. Socialist delegates at the periodic international socialist congresses (1900 Paris, 1904 Amsterdam, 1907 Stuttgart, 1910 Copenhagen, and 1912 Basle) engaged in spirited debate about the best strategies for shaping public opinion and public policy until the outbreak of World War I. At the same time, unlike the First International and the first few congresses of the Second International, national sections after the 1900 Paris congress sought to uphold the unity of the international movement at all costs, so compromise and behind-the-scenes negotiations became the order of the day.

The result of debates over tactics was that the ISB, with input from representatives of its constituent socialist parties, gave concrete meaning to socialist internationalism by promoting demonstration activities. These actions consisted mainly of passing resolutions, issuing manifestos, and facilitating the organization of mass-based international protest meetings. International socialist congresses were also an extension of this prerogative, in that they became carefully orchestrated public spectacles designed to project the image of unity and solidarity of the international socialist movement. The most notable example of the trend is certainly the 1912 Basle congress when the ISB staged a spectacular congress and organized mass-based international demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands of people across Europe with the goal of preventing a regional war in the Balkans from engulfing the entire European continent.

The ISB held regular conferences from 1901 until 1914, at which the leaders of Europe's socialist parties conferred on matters influencing the international movement and set the agenda for the next international socialist congress. In addition, it was common for the ISB members to pass resolutions expressing the International's support or protestation of pressing current events. For example, the ISB conference held on

February 7, 1904 adopted resolutions on the following topics: congratulating Russian socialists for their efforts toward party unity, protesting the expulsion of foreign socialists from Argentina, protesting the German government's persecution of Russian socialists, protesting the prospect of a Russian–Japanese War, and protesting against the massacres in Macedonia. Resolutions were generally of a symbolic nature and readily passed at ISB conferences without much discussion or debate. It is unlikely that these resolutions were given wide dissemination in the socialist press.

The issuance of a manifesto by the ISB was a far more serious and complicated process. Manifestos were official public announcements of the International and intended for mass publicity. They were published periodically when neither an ISB conference nor an international socialist congress was imminent. The primary function of a manifesto was to call immediate attention to an international crisis or event. Unlike resolutions, manifestos sometimes underwent an arduous process of behind-the-scenes negotiations among the national sections of the International. When announced, they were widely publicized in the socialist press and represented the united front of the international socialist movement. For example, in 1903, the ISB issued two manifestos protesting against the pogroms of Kishinev and condemning the lynching of black Americans. In terms of topical content, four themes were predominant: May Day, protestations against the Russian tsar and/or injustices committed in the Russian empire, violations of human rights, and opposition to war. Through manifestos, the International presented itself as the guarantor of a secular morality, whose obligation it was to make known violations against human dignity. In many ways, it was a modern-day Amnesty International.

International Demonstrations: Examples against Russian Tsar Nicholas II

The most dramatic exhibition of the spirit of socialist internationalism occurred at international demonstrations. The ISB fostered the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of workers across Europe in protest of specific international issues or crises. In terms of logistics, the ISB relied heavily on the established political parties and worker organizations in a given country to organize demonstrative activities. Consequently,

the intensity and size of activism within a country and from nation to nation could vary greatly. Generally, the German Social Democratic Party and its affiliated trade unions were able to generate the largest numbers of protesters, while the French Socialist Party was the most eager to call the International to action. Large-scale campaigns were infrequent until 1908. Thereafter, the ISB oversaw one international demonstration or more of considerable magnitude almost every year culminating with the massive anti-war rallies in late July 1914 on the eve of World War I, when as many as one million Europeans filled the streets to express their vehement opposition to the impending European bloodletting. An overview of two such international demonstrations directed against the Russian tsar Nicholas II sheds light on how the International mobilized the masses around political causes in the attempt to influence public opinion and policy.

For socialist and labor movements around the world and particularly in Europe and North America, the Russian tsar stood as the supreme symbol of tyranny and despotism. The enmity militants held for the “bloody tsar” specifically, and Russian tsarism as an institution, was deep-seated, dating as far back as the French Revolution. For example, French militants held Russian autocrats in contempt for their repeated suppression and crackdown of Polish independence uprisings in the nineteenth century. A veritable tsarophobia permeated the German socialist milieu among its leaders and the rank-and-file. In the United States, hundreds of thousands of Russian Jewish immigrants, some of whom were sympathetic with or activists in the US labor, socialist, and anarchist movements, recalled with horror the state-sponsored pogroms of Alexander III in 1881 following the assassination of Alexander II.

The event that really galvanized the international socialist and labor movement against Nicholas II was the suppression of the 1905 Russian Revolution, symbolized by the violence of “Bloody Sunday” on January 22, 1905. On this day, hundreds of thousands of Russian workers and peasants led by Father Gapon marched through St. Petersburg to submit to Nicholas a list of grievances. Nicholas happened to be away, but his security officials chose to disperse the unarmed crowd by force, resulting in the death of more than 100 people. In reaction to this tragedy, the ISB promptly issued a manifesto on January 31, 1905, condemning the actions of

the tsarist government and its head, Nicholas II. Thereafter, socialist and labor organizations throughout Europe and North America, emboldened by the ISB's manifesto, raised their voices in uncoordinated actions on behalf of the martyrs of Bloody Sunday and against the Russian tsar. Local and national activism generated momentum for an organized and sustained international campaign when the San Francisco branch of the United States Socialist Party sent a letter to the ISB on November 11, 1905, requesting the ISB to draft a manifesto that would call for the workers of the world to organize demonstrations on January 22, 1906, commemorating the anniversary of Bloody Sunday. The ISB issued a manifesto on December 2, 1905, to the workers of all countries. The content of the manifesto summarized the atrocities committed by the counterrevolutionary forces and the tsarist regime since the outbreak of the Revolution, listing several of the martyred heroes of the Revolution and the Bloody Sunday massacre.

The summons of the International to organize demonstrations in the form of public meetings or processions was heeded throughout Europe, North America, and even parts of South America. In Italy, no fewer than 80 public reunions were organized in Venice to commemorate the Russian martyrs. One socialist group decided to use black flags to decorate the hall where the publicist Guido Marongoni was to speak. The agitation in France was also keen, with public meetings organized for January 20–2 in Paris and in the provinces. A meeting in St. Etienne on January 21 included a procession of 5,000 workers, who carried six large red flags and sang the *Internationale* on their way to a public reunion. In Germany, the German Social Democratic Party used the occasion skillfully to combine two political objectives at the same time: to honor the dead of Bloody Sunday and to agitate for the cause of universal suffrage in Prussia. For the public meetings organized in Berlin, socialist organizers deliberately waited until the last minute to publicize where the reunions would take place in order to frustrate the attempts of the public authority to monitor them. One socialist newspaper estimated the attendance of workers at the meetings in Berlin at around 200,000, and about 1,500,000 for all of Germany. Meetings held to commemorate Bloody Sunday and likewise protest against the Russian autocrat were held in the United States, Belgium, Spain, Norway,

Serbia, Sweden, Bulgaria, Romania, parts of the Russian empire like Warsaw and St. Petersburg, and the Republic of Argentina.

Participants of these international demonstrations expressed their solidarity with financial contributions to a fund on behalf of the Russian revolutionary movement. The month following the commemoration of Bloody Sunday, the ISB was inundated with money designated for this Russian fund. In the month of February alone, the ISB received a total of 28,966.72 Belgian francs, the lion's share of contributions coming from the United States. The small Socialist Party of Argentina gathered almost 2,000 francs; the International Socialist Club of Sydney represented the most distant donor, mustering more than 250 francs for the cause. Over the next three years, the ISB continued to receive a steady stream of contributions.

In the summer of 1909, the Russian tsar Nicholas II embarked on a European tour in order to shore up his political alliances with England and France and to procure additional foreign loans to ensure the solvency of his administration. When the International heard of the tsar's travel plans, it encouraged its members to launch an extensive demonstration campaign. A few days prior to Nicholas's departure, the ISB issued a manifesto on June 17 protesting the tsar's planned visits to meet the heads of state of Sweden, England, France, and Italy. The content of the manifesto was a summary of the political injustices the tsarist regime had committed since the 1905 Russian Revolution. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the sections of the International through whose country Nicholas would pass to protest against the presence of the tsar and his desire to attain foreign loans. The ISB manifesto refrained from prescribing specific courses of action socialist parties should take other than that they should "raise their voice" in order to generate publicity in condemnation of Nicholas II.

The manifesto of the ISB complemented the multitude of national manifestos issued by its members, giving the campaign a truly international character. Socialist members of parliament in Sweden, England, Italy, and France expressed their opposition to the tsar's visit in parliament. In addition to parliamentary intervention, socialist and labor organizations organized hundreds of public meetings to protest the tsar's arrival, while the socialist press published daily anti-tsarist

resolutions and manifestos passed by local socialist and labor organizations. The extent of protest from the different sections varied, but it appears that protest activities in Sweden, England, and Italy were carried out vigorously, while the amount of protest in France did not match the expectations of the leaders of French socialism. In spite of the different levels of mobilization, the English, French, and Italian movements prided themselves on the fact that the tsar had not actually stepped foot on land. Their protest, the socialists argued, had intimidated the tsar and so he had to be received off the coast in a navy vessel.

The Social Democratic Party of Britain made the most noise about the upcoming visit of the tsar. Its daily organ *Justice* published "An Open Letter to the Bloody Tsar Nicholas" that incited polemical responses in the English public and was even denounced in the House of Lords as a provocation to murder the Russian tsar. The letter was indeed subversive, justifying that in the name of humanity certain "venomous and dangerous creatures" ought to be destroyed. Part of the letter appeared on posters that hung in public spaces all over England; in pamphlet form, it was distributed to participants in demonstrations against the tsar.

The Independent Labour Party also mobilized its sections by organizing protest meetings. On July 10, 1909, the British Section to the International Socialist Congress, representing the diverse socialist and labor organizations affiliated with the International, issued a joint resolution. The proclamation protested against the hospitality offered by the king and the government to the Russian tsar and invited all worker associations to join together and express their outrage. The apogee of the protest activities in England occurred on July 25 in Trafalgar Square; socialist and anarchist organizations mobilized over 10,000 people. The principal objective of the protest movement for both anarchists and socialists was to influence British public opinion against the tsar so that the House of Commons would reject financial and political projects that served to stabilize the tsarist regime. In this goal, they failed.

The French Socialist Party engaged in an energetic propaganda campaign to protest the arrival of the tsar off the coast of France near Cherbourg on July 31 and August 1, where a few devout militants in Cherbourg hatched an innovative, if posterous, idea to bring atten-

tion to the tsar's crimes. They wanted to release a bunch of balloons representing the "heads of the dead" of Russian revolutionaries precisely when French President Fallières was to welcome Nicholas II. Logistical complications such as the unpredictability of the wind and the inability to find a company to make the "*têtes de mort*" balloons thwarted their idea.

French socialist newspapers printed several manifestos publicizing the tsar's journey, while local organizations plastered a mass-reproduced proclamation of the national party on city walls. Titled *Contre le Tsar Rouge* (Against the Red Tsar), the manifesto started with a short description criticizing republican France's relationship with Russia. After listing the atrocities committed by the tsar, the manifesto concluded with an emphatic plea to French workers to demonstrate their internationalism by attending organized anti-tsar rallies and meetings. In spite of strident rhetoric, militants barely responded to the publicity campaign. Protest meetings were poorly attended and the leader Eduard Vaillant lamented in the socialist press that French workers had protested "with less vigor" than their English and Italian counterparts.

Perhaps the most successful international demonstration was held in the German port city of Kiel, near which the tsar's naval contingent passed en route to and in return from Western Europe. Two mass meetings were organized: the first one took place at the end of July to protest against the tsar's journey, and the second one on August 15 to demonstrate for world peace. At the first meeting, the Kiel working populace marched through town to the meeting hall, where Karl Liebknecht was to speak about the barbarism of the Russian regime. The facility turned out to be too small, so the meeting organizers asked the police for permission to hold the meeting "in the open air" on a nearby sports field. Request granted, a crowd of about 10,000 people assembled and listened attentively to Liebknecht's speech, raising their hands in solidarity with the spirit of the resolution.

The evident success of this demonstration motivated the Kiel authorities to use their power to thwart the scheduled demonstration for August 15. The demonstration organizers wanted to surpass the success of the first meeting by giving the second one a truly international dimension. The cause it championed was the call for peace amid the rising political tension between Germany,

England, Sweden, and Norway and the resultant naval arms race. The local socialist organization first requested permission to hold the demonstration on the same sports field as the previous meeting. After the Kiel police denied this request in the name of public security, the demonstration organizers sought to procure the public hall used for the first meeting. This time, Kiel's marine authority pressured the facility's owner not to rent it out, so the local organization was forced to rent the three next largest public halls in Kiel, together capable of accommodating about 8,000 people. The organization had to leap over another bureaucratic obstacle because invited foreign speakers not proficient in German were required to obtain a permit to speak in their native tongue. The regional Schleswig government denied these permits without an explanation. As a result, when the Scot Ramsay MacDonald wanted to address each assembly, the German Eduard Bernstein was forced to summarize his thoughts and speak on his behalf in German. The other guest speakers from Copenhagen, Denmark, and Malmö, Sweden, spoke adequate German. The police interference in the organizational details of the demonstration failed to prevent a successful display of internationalism. To the contrary, as the German and foreign speakers emphasized, it gave their event additional propagandistic power.

Conclusion

International socialism continued to grow steadily in the years approaching World War I, and the vigor and size of its international demonstrations were a testament to this trend. The predominant mood of the times was the possibility of a war unlike any ever experienced, and the International was resolved to prevent a European bloodbath where Europe's working classes would face the most hardship. Even so, the peace activism of the International could not withstand the tidal wave of nationalism that engulfed Europe's middle and upper classes in the summer of 1914. In spite of a valiant anti-war campaign in late July 1914 mobilizing up to one million demonstrators, Europe's kings, prime ministers, and generals disregarded the voice of the International. As socialists had accurately predicted, industrial warfare resulted in the toppling of the European dynasties of Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, and Romanov, and ushered in a period of war that

lasted from 1914 until 1945, claiming the lives of tens of millions of people. World War I transformed Europe and brought about the split of the European left between social democrats and communists. The precarious yet impressive unity of the Second International was never again attained.

However, the influence of international socialism of the pre-World War I era continued into the twentieth century in tangible ways. Many figures of the Second International assumed positions of extraordinary power after World War I as prime ministers, presidents, the leader of the first communist state of the world, and even prominent members of the fascist movement. The phenomenon of mass politics became a trademark of the twentieth century around the world, inspiring popular protest, insurrection, and revolution from Russia to China to Cuba to Iran to the Philippines. No political movement or ideology would be the sole custodian of the mobilization of the masses. Demonstrations, extraparliamentary activism in the press and the streets, and a politics of performance and spectacle have all become staples in the repertoire of modern political culture from Pyongyang to Caracas to Washington, DC.

The major thrust of the socialist internationalism of the Second International rooted in social justice, human rights, and international peace combined with elements of liberal internationalism, leading to the establishment of international organizations such as the League of Nations in 1919 and the United Nations in 1945. Even today, citizens from around the world are members of the modern Socialist International, dedicated to democratic socialism and to realizing the spirit of international fraternity expressed in Karl Marx's 1848 slogan: "Workers of all countries, unite!"

SEE ALSO: Babeuf, François-Noël (1760–1797) and the Conspiracy of Equals; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932); Chartists; *Communist Manifesto*; Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); European Revolutions of 1848; French Revolution, 1789–1794; International Women's Day; Internationals; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Liebknecht, Karl (1871–1919); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); May Day; Paris Commune, 1871; Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Social Democratic Party, Germany; Socialism; Socialism, Britain

References and Suggested Readings

- Archer, J. P.W. (1997) *The First International in France, 1864–1972: Its Origins, Theories, and Impact*. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Callahan, K. (2001) *European Socialism and the Demonstration Culture of the Second International, 1889–1914*. Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington.
- Eley, G. (2002) *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Holbraad, C. (2003) *Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Joll, J. (1966) *The Second International, 1889–1914*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Müller, H. (1892) *Werth und Bedeutung politischer Demonstrationen. Festschrift zur Maifeier*. Berlin.
- Newton, D. J. (1985) *British Labour, European Socialism, and the Struggle for Peace, 1889–1914*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pasture, P. & Verberckmoes, J. (Eds.) (1998) *Working-Class Internationalism and the Appeal of National Identity*. New York: Berg.

International Women's Day

Marilyn J. Boxer

International Women's Day (IWD), celebrated annually on March 8 in dozens of countries and on every continent, originated in the revolutionary socialist movement of the early twentieth century. Commemorated today with tributes to outstanding women past and present, even in some places with gifts to sweethearts and spouses, the socialist heritage of IWD may be forgotten. But IWD first entered public discourse on August 27, 1910 in the form of a resolution presented to the International's Socialist Women's Conference held at Copenhagen. Meeting in conjunction with the Second International, that is, the Socialist International founded in 1889 to succeed the defunct First International (as the International Workingmen's Association founded in 1864 by Karl Marx was known), the women's group was led by German socialist Clara Zetkin. With her comrades, Zetkin submitted the following resolution:

In agreement with the class-conscious, political and trade union organizations of the proletariat of their respective countries, the Socialist women

of all countries will hold each year a Women's Day, whose foremost purpose it must be to aid the attainment of women's suffrage. This demand must be held in conjunction with the entire women's question according to Socialist precepts. The Women's Day must have an international character and is to be prepared carefully.

The resolution in Copenhagen actually followed the first celebration, for that event had occurred in New York City on Sunday, February 23, 1909, when American socialists met to commemorate a demonstration the preceding year by women of the Lower East Side of New York City for the vote as well as for an end to sweatshops and child labor. It has also been asserted that the date was selected to commemorate a much earlier event, a strike by women textile workers on March 8, 1857, and its fiftieth anniversary celebration in 1907; but historians have not been able to find any evidence of either supposed event and now consider the tale a myth.

The Copenhagen resolution, however, is well documented; and like the 1909 event in New York, reflected a decision by men and women of the Second International to abandon their earlier position of dismissing campaigns for woman suffrage as mere reforms unable to assuage the condition of working-class women, for whom only socialist revolution could bring better lives. Suffrage campaigns were now reaching their peak, enrolling hundreds of thousands of women in countries around the world. In 1907 in Stuttgart, during the first meeting of the International Conference of Socialist Women, attended by women from 13 countries, an extensive discussion of woman suffrage had been held. The issue was complicated by the fact that universal manhood suffrage had not yet been achieved in countries with prominent socialist parties, such as Austria and Belgium. Zetkin and other socialists opted for limited cooperation with non-socialist women, always keeping in mind their socialist goals. Votes for women, they hoped, would serve their purposes by helping to educate working-class women to support the socialist movement.

Influenced by the 1907 conference, the Socialist Party of America created a Women's National Committee to Campaign for the Suffrage and held a mass meeting on March 8, 1908, stating, however, that "socialist women shall not carry on this struggle for complete equality of the right

to vote in alliance with the middle-class women suffragists, but in common with the socialist parties, which insist on woman suffrage as one of the fundamental and most important reforms for the full democratization of political franchise in general." During 1909 and 1910, despite some resistance to cross-class collaboration, the American socialist women's groups cooperated with the National American Women's Suffrage Association, then led by Carrie Chapman Catt, to circulate suffrage petitions. More than 5,000 socialists joined the famous citywide suffrage parade held in New York in 1912, constituting, according to one description, "a brilliant mass of red sashes, banners, and red torches."

The first European celebration of IWD took place in Vienna on March 18, 1911, a date selected to commemorate the Paris Commune of 1871. There also, women marched with red flags. There are said to have been some 300 demonstrations that year by women in the Austro-Hungarian empire. Similar events took place in Germany, Denmark, and Switzerland. Russia first celebrated the holiday on February 23, 1913, when both liberal feminists and Bolsheviks marked the occasion with meetings, lectures, and publications. (It should be noted that February 23 in the Gregorian calendar then used in Russia is the same day as March 8 in the western calendar.) France marked the occasion on March 8, 1914, with some 2,000 attending. The outbreak of war later that year created major problems for the socialists, who were caught between an internationalist ideology and patriotic defense of their homelands.

Nevertheless, some celebrations of IWD took place during the war years, including the most significant of all, that in St. Petersburg in 1917, which is considered by historians to be the event that launched the Russian Revolution. While in 1917, IWD was marked in Paris and Turin, and elsewhere, it was doubtless the events of late February (old calendar) in St. Petersburg that turned IWD into one of the leading national holidays of the Soviet Union, along with May Day and the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. Celebrated the last Sunday in February in 1913 and 1914, IWD in 1917 came amidst a bitter winter when, after several years of war, prices for food, fuel, soap, and other necessities had reached grossly inflated wartime prices that working people could not pay. During January and February many men and women workers

protested by striking. On February 23, 1917 (March 8, new calendar), women workers at the textile factories defied a party order not to strike by staging a walkout and mass meeting in the street. Textile workers joined hungry housewives in the streets. Male metalworkers soon enlisted in sympathy. The theme of the IWD celebration was inclusive: "The War, High Prices, and the Situation of the Woman Worker." Along with middle-class feminists, women workers also demanded voting rights. Most remarkably, some women walked right up to the soldiers who had been called to control the demonstrations, took hold of their rifles, and said, "Put down your bayonets – join us." Other women attacked bakeries and grocery stores. Two days later, after the call "Give us bread" had escalated into "Down with autocracy," the tsar ordered one of his generals to shoot if necessary to stop the demonstrations. The women had provided an example of unstoppable civil disorder that was dangerous to the tsarist regime. By February 27, Nicolas II was forced to abdicate. The Russian Revolution was begun on IWD by hungry women and children demanding food and looting shops.

After the war, everything had changed. The Bolsheviks cancelled an IWD celebration planned for 1918, partly in response to male leaders who opposed it. Lenin's government created a special "women's section" to pursue educational, health, and political work among women that lasted until 1930, when it was eliminated by Stalin. Elsewhere, scattered celebrations took place in 1918 and the following years, while the socialists of the Second International contended with, and were eventually eclipsed by, the new Communist Third International. In 1922 Lenin declared March 8 (new calendar) a communist holiday. The Chinese Communist Party followed suit. But although IWD continued to be celebrated in the USSR, its original impulse as a way to support women's rights was lost. While lauding notable Bolshevik women, party leadership used the occasion to stress the need for women to support government policies. In 1930 the IWD slogan in the Soviet Union was "100% Collectivization." In 1931 German socialist women used the occasion to demonstrate under the slogan "Against War and Nazi Terrorism, for Socialism and Peace." Scattered celebrations of IWD continued through the 1940s and 1950s in countries as widespread as France, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Australia, Germany, England, China, and Indonesia, with

numbers recorded that ranged up to half a million in the latter case. In 1942, the Chinese revolutionary and feminist poet Ding Ling marked the occasion by addressing revolutionary women with a stirring speech about the conflicting demands they faced seeking to meet expectations of both new and traditional roles for women. "When will it no longer be necessary to attach special weight to the word 'woman' and raise it specially?" She hoped for "less empty theorizing and more talk about real problems."

Following World War II, celebrations of IWD lapsed in some countries, including the United States, perhaps because of its association with international communism. Its resurgence as a source of feminist interest seems to have started in the late 1960s, when a group of women at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, in 1967, commemorated the day by showing the film *Salt of the Earth*, which depicts a labor struggle by women workers in the American Southwest. The Chicago group is said to have included a number of "red diaper babies," who had heard of IWD from their parents. In 1971 the day was marked by sit-ins by women in Boston and New York.

During the 1970s, as knowledge of the day's history spread, especially through burgeoning women's studies programs, it became the occasion for feminist events on many campuses. In 1976 a women's studies student at San Diego State University who was active in the National Organization for Women (NOW) successfully petitioned the city schools to designate April 18–24 as Women in History Week. In 1977 a student of women's history at Sonoma State University who sat on the Santa Rosa Commission on the Status of Women convinced the Sonoma County school system to proclaim the week that included March 8 as Women's History Week. By 1981 celebrations of IWD had spread across the nation, and Representatives Barbara Mikulski and Orrin Hatch helped then-Representative Barbara Boxer win support for a resolution on Women's History Week from the United States Congress. Expanded in 1987 into Women's History Month, Congress has continued to pass similar resolutions every year since. Designated as a national holiday in numerous countries, March 8 is now recognized as International Women's Day by the United Nations, as part of a global effort to promote gender equality as a fundamental human right.

SEE ALSO: International Congress of Women at The Hague; Internationals; National Organization for Women (NOW); Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Socialism; Zetkin, Clara (1857–1933)

References and Suggested Readings

- Buhle, M. J. (1981) *Women and American Socialism, 1870–1920*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Chatterjee, C. (2002) *Celebrating Women: Gender, Festival Culture, and Bolshevik Ideology, 1910–1939*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Foner, P. S. (Ed.) (1984) *Clara Zetkin, Selected Writings*. New York: International Publishers.
- Kaplan, T. (1985) On the Socialist Origins of International Women's Day. *Feminist Studies* 11 (1): 163–71.
- Stites, R. (1978) *The Women's Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860–1930*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

International Workers of the World, Marine Transport Workers

Jon Bekken

The Marine Transport Workers Industrial Union (MTW-IWW) was a vital presence in the maritime industry from 1913 through the 1940s, organizing longshoremen throughout the Americas and establishing a network of union halls that served seamen on four continents. Although the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) established offshoots in many countries, the MTW was the IWW's only truly international industrial union. In addition to its US halls, the MTW maintained halls in Bremerhaven, Hamburg, and Stettin, Germany; Tampico, Mexico; Stockholm, Sweden; Adelaide and Sydney, Australia; Vancouver and Port Arthur, Canada; and Iquique and Valparaíso, Chile, for many years. In Germany, MTW members published *Der Marine-Arbeiter* through 1930.

In the early 1920s, the MTW seemed on the verge of becoming the dominant union in the American maritime industry, but it was ultimately unable to dislodge the AFL-affiliated International Seamen's Union (ISU) and the International Longshore Association. However, the MTW had an impact far beyond its numbers because of the MTW's reputation among maritime workers as a militant, fighting union, because its direct action tactics maximized

workers' power, and because the MTW never accepted the divisions of craft, port, and the like that enabled maritime employers to isolate workers' struggles.

Themselves a multinational workforce, Wobbly maritime workers recognized the importance of global cooperation and solidarity. Both the MTW-dominated Chilean section of the IWW (from the 1920s) and the MTW itself (in 1935) joined the syndicalist International Workingmen's Association (AIT), even though the IWW as a whole ultimately decided against affiliation. MTW newspapers carried detailed reports on the struggles and conditions of maritime workers around the world. In September 1925, the MTW walked out in solidarity with striking British seamen, tying up dozens of ships in Baltimore, Mobile, New York, and Philadelphia. The Baltimore MTW forwarded the names of scabs who shipped out to Latin America to MTW affiliates there, so they could be greeted appropriately. Given the lack of support from other US maritime unions, the strike lasted only a few weeks, although some seamen won agreements to hire from the MTW hall, shorter hours, and wages of \$15 a month above the Shipping Board/ISU scale.

Similarly, the union took a stand of international solidarity in political matters. In 1936 MTW seamen in Philadelphia struck against the shipping of 34 tons of dynamite to Francisco Franco's army in Spain, holding up the ship for several hours until the ISU imported scabs from New York City. While other US maritime unions demanded hazardous duty pay for working war cargo, the MTW called on maritime workers to refuse to handle cargo to ports where the fascists held power, and they published lists of ships that should not be worked.

The IWW enjoyed a great deal of power in its heyday. Many shipping lines found themselves obliged to hire seamen through MTW halls or to accede to MTW demands, often delivered by a crew committee as a ship was preparing to sail. The MTW called several successful strikes and played an important role in many others, even though only a minority of maritime workers ever held IWW membership. In March 1922, the ISU's president reported that the IWW had taken complete control of the Boston waterfront. Boston Wobblies reported that hardly a ship left the port without a majority of the crew carrying IWW cards. The IWW was so strong there for a time that the Marine Transport Workers

secretary issued crew menus with the IWW seal affixed and posted them on mess hall bulletin boards. Ship owners who refused to follow the menu were confronted with direct action.

While seafaring is an intrinsically transient occupation, the IWW was able to establish a lasting presence among longshoremen, who provided some of the union's most stable job branches and often helped maintain the MTW halls that were a vital part of the union's presence on the waterfront. Best known is the IWW's organization on the Philadelphia docks, where a biracial MTW held job control from 1913 until 1921 – and continued to have an organized presence into the 1930s. There were also significant, if shorter-lived, MTW presences among longshoremen in Baltimore, Boston, Hoboken, New Orleans, Newport News, Norfolk (where the IWW was especially strong among black longshoremen), Portland, and San Pedro.

MTW also organized longshoremen in Canada, Chile, Mexico, and Puerto Rico. The MTW's Chilean section grew to 9,000 members in seven maritime cities, before being suppressed by the military dictatorship in the late 1920s. In Valparaíso, longshoremen formed an IWW branch in April 1918 that quickly established job control and spread to other ports over the following year. Chilean Wobblies used direct action tactics to force individual employers to grant better terms, whipsawed other firms into line, and relied on the "redondilla" system of work sharing to maintain solidarity. A series of bitter strikes weakened the union in many ports, but when Valparaíso dockworkers struck March 1, 1924, they wired the names of ships that left Chilean ports to other MTW branches, urging maritime workers to boycott the ships and refuse to handle their cargo. While these battles won some victories, the Chilean IWW often found itself alone in its struggles, and was once again outlawed in 1927. In 1936, after the Ibañez dictatorship fell, the Chilean MTW reorganized, publishing *La Voz del Industrialismo* on a press donated by US Wobblies, and organizing short job actions. But the union was ultimately unable to reestablish itself in Chile. Seamen also helped carry the IWW to Mexico, although workers who crossed the border played at least as important a role. IWW branches were established throughout Mexico – most notably in Tampico, where the union successfully organized maritime and petroleum workers.

The period from 1913 to 1924 was the peak of the Marine Transport Workers' influence. But several ships remained under IWW control throughout the 1930s, and in some ports many longshoremen carried two union cards. The IWW press was replete with stories of seamen forcing better conditions through direct action. Quickie strikes on the eve of sailing prevented captains from slashing wages and officers from beating and harassing crew members, and they enforced vacations and working hours. The transitory nature of the work and the hostile legal climate made it difficult to maintain union conditions over the long haul, however. One crew organized en route from New York to the Panama Canal (there were three IWW members when the ship left port, and 22 when it reached the Canal) and was able to win better food, extermination of the bed bugs that infested their sleeping quarters, and other improvements. But when the ship reached Australia, the captain fired four of the most active MTWs. When the remaining crewmen refused to sail without them, he had 16 arrested on mutiny warrants.

In 1937, a National Maritime Union-CIO organizer estimated that there were 10,000 MTW seamen (with the NMU and ISU each having 25,000) on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts. The MTW was strongest on the Pacific and Gulf coasts, where it was able to build a working alliance with other maritime unions. When Congress passed legislation requiring seamen to carry a Continuous Discharge Book (a record of each job worked and the terms under which the seamen left: essentially a traveling blacklist), the Marine Transport Workers worked with the Sailors Union of the Pacific (temporarily independent of the ISU, which ordered its members to carry the fink books), the Firemen's Union of the Pacific Coast, and a dissident NMU caucus (the NMU officially opposed the fink book, but directed its members to cross picket lines) to picket US Maritime Commission halls. Determined resistance persuaded several shipping lines to abandon the fink books, especially in the SUP's Pacific Coast stronghold.

But the MTW was increasingly surrounded by contracts that cemented business unionism in place. The IWW retained a strong presence on the waterfront through the mid-1940s, but it was a minority presence. Most seamen shipped by the voyage, and since hiring was done through union halls Wobblies either had to have at least

tacit agreements with captains to hire through their halls or had to carry two (or more) union cards to get jobs. Few ships chose to hire Wobblies, and so the Marine Transport Workers halls generally could not function as a source of jobs. And both the National Maritime Union (CIO) and ISU (AFL) worked to keep IWW members off ships.

MTW mounted its last organizing drive in 1945–7, lining up Houston tugboat workers in early 1945. The Galveston & Houston Towing Co. defeated the MTW by firing union activists, a promised cash bonus if the company union won the election, and the reluctance of many MTW members to stay on the job through months of National Labor Relations Board delays when better-paying jobs were available. Despite the loss, MTW activists tried (with some success) to pull the tugboat crews in fall 1946, when a wave of strikes swept the industry, and the MTW won two union representation elections among towing and ferry workers in 1947, though no permanent union presence was established.

Like the rest of the IWW, the seriously weakened Marine Transport Workers collapsed under the combined pressure of the Taft-Hartley Act and increasingly entrenched craft unions. MTW reports in the late 1940s and 1950s refer to empty halls, the impossibility of finding maritime workers to staff them, and the ever-present danger that they would be overrun by drunks and transformed into dingy flophouses where no self-respecting seaman would set foot. The Baltimore hall was closed in 1954, partly because the port was doing less business but primarily because no one could be found to keep it open. The New Orleans hall closed in 1953, again for lack of a delegate to keep it open. By the 1960s, there were only about a dozen (mostly retired) members of the Houston MTW branch, and the union's last maritime hall was falling apart around their ears (it was finally sold and bulldozed in 1967).

SEE ALSO: Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), Australia

References and Suggested Readings

- Bekken, J. (1995) Marine Transport Workers IU 510 (IWW): Direct Action Unionism. *Libertarian Labor Review* 18: 12–25.
- Cole, P. (2007) *Wobblies on the Waterfront: Interracial Unionism in Progressive-Era Philadelphia*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.

- Kimmeldorf, H. (1999) *Battling for American Labor: Wobblies, Craftworkers and the Making of the Union Movement*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Thompson, F. & Bekken, J. (2006) *The Industrial Workers of the World: Its First 100 Years*. Cincinnati: IWW.

Internationals

Michael Forman

The Internationals were associations aimed at promoting, facilitating, and coordinating working-class solidarity beyond national and local attachments. They served as the institutional embodiment of workers' internationalism and as the symbols of the labor movement. They were also the precursors of today's non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and of the World Social Forum, under whose banner internationalist globalization activists have gathered annually since 2001.

Internationalism, the notion that human solidarity in freedom and equality properly extends beyond the nation, has its roots in the Enlightenment's universalism, which early liberals deployed as a secular alternative to Christian cosmopolitanism. During the French Revolution, for example, "committees of correspondence" emerged across Europe and North America, in solidarity with the French revolutionaries. It was the more radical elements of the labor movement that took up the banner of internationalism in the 1840s, eventually establishing those institutions which would be known as the Internationals. At least a dozen organizations have claimed the name. Among them, three stand out because of their influence and historical importance: the International Workingmen's Association (First International), the Workers' or Socialist International (Second International), and the Communist International (Third International). While each of these organizations took on the issues of the day, their primary concern was to counter the nationalist discourse that was influencing the working class and their organizations.

The First International

During the first half of the nineteenth century a number of largely secret societies of intellectuals emerged to take up radical causes such as the extension of democratic rights and the cause of

labor. Though the First International was their descendant, it was by all accounts a new organization with grassroots origins. The idea of the First International emerged when the London Trades Council invited representatives of the French labor movement to the "party of international fraternization" at London's Masonic Pub in April of 1862. The contacts they established came to fruition two years later when as many as two thousand people attended the founding Congress of the International Workingmen's Association in London.

On a day-to-day basis the First International (1864–76) was led by a General Council which consisted of the corresponding secretaries of the national sections. These were composed of regional or local sections with mass membership. From its inception, the First International was marred by conflicts between three factions: labor unionists, Marxist socialists, and communalists or anarchists. While they all agreed on the basic purpose of the organization, their conceptions of its mid-range goals and means were very different: communalists and then anarchists rejected participation in state-oriented politics, unionists looked to use the political arena without seeking political office, and socialists sought to capture the state. Once Bakunin joined in 1868, the conflicts between anarchists and Marxists intensified, at least in part because of the mutual dislike between Bakunin and Marx. The most important factor in the dissolution of the International was the Paris Commune of 1871.

From the start of the Paris events, divisions between Marxists and Bakuninists intensified. The former initially thought the uprising ill-advised and untimely, the latter became deeply involved through their French sections. When the Commune fell after two months, the International, at the behest of Marx, issued what was essentially a eulogy to the fallen Communards (Marx's "The Civil War in France"). Thinking the position of the International too radical, the English section which had always held the balance withdrew from the organization. At the same time, European governments blamed the International for the insurrection and intensified their campaign of repression against it, its sections, and its members. That the International did not have the resources to bring about such events did not matter: the repression was systematic. This, in turn, meant that at the next

congress, held in The Hague in 1872, Marx and Engels were able to secure the expulsion of Bakunin and his followers. The latter went on to establish the Anti-Authoritarian International (1873–7). After the 1873 congress, the General Council relocated to Philadelphia, where it dissolved following the 1876 conference.

The Second International

Almost twenty years later, the Workers' or Socialist (Second) International (1889–1940) held its first congress in Paris. Members of the Anarchist International (1881–1907) were not invited. Labor unions organized separately into international trade secretariats, many of which survived to the present as the global union federations of the International Trade Union Confederation. The Second International, then, was an organization of political parties with a working-class base. Mostly, these parties called themselves socialist or social democratic. All of them counted a broad spectrum of the left, from radicals to reformists, among their leadership and their membership. They all also accepted some version of Marx's analysis of capitalism, if not his full-blown revolutionary ideas.

Much had happened since the collapse of the First International. By the late nineteenth century the labor movement was a significant political force in the major countries of Europe. The German Social Democratic Party was well on its way to becoming that country's largest party. Elsewhere, especially in Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Holland, and a little later in Britain, labor-based parties were on the rise and held seats in national legislatures. In France, socialists soon faced a new political and philosophical challenge: whether to participate in a coalition government. In fact, the pragmatic goal of the Paris Congress was to mend the divisions between "revolutionaries" and "revisionists" on the political side of the labor movement, not least those among the two principal French parties, led respectively by Jules Guesde (1845–1922) and Paul Brousse (1844–1912).

Judging by its reach (parties from every European country, the United States, Argentina, Japan, and later other Asian and Latin American countries joined), by the stature of the figures participating in its congresses (e.g., Otto Bauer, Eduard Bernstein, Jean Jaurès, Karl Kautsky, V. I. Lenin, Wilhelm and later Karl

Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Norman Thomas, Clara Zetkin), and by its ability to command the popular imagination, the Second International was the most significant and broadly representative of all. At its congresses the Second International pronounced itself and proposed guidelines for its members on all the major issues of the day: revisionism, women's rights, imperialism, and national minorities. Most importantly, from its very first congress, the International considered the question of war. While very few among its principal figures would reject the national right to self-defense, the real issue was what socialists should do to forestall this eventuality. Congress after congress of the International committed its members to agitation against war, proposed the calling of mass strikes in the eventuality of war, and pledged that its members would oppose war efforts in their respective legislatures. In the end, however, most member parties would support their governments' war efforts. Some, notably the German Social Democrats, split over the decision, but at least for a time the most committed internationalists were isolated and marginalized in their parties. While the Second International held two congresses (1919 and 1920) and one conference (1919), and its governing body, the Bureau of the International, did not disband until 1940, it lost its stature and importance after 1914. In 1951 it was succeeded by today's Socialist International, which counts over 150 parties and organizations among its members, but does not have the same political or symbolic stature as its predecessor.

The Third International

The reasons member parties of the Second International, especially the German Social Democrats, chose to support their governments at the start of World War I remain a matter of controversy among scholars, but it was Lenin's analysis of these decisions which would prove politically significant. Lenin saw the decisions of the western parties as a great betrayal. In his view, the working classes of the major powers now benefited from their countries' imperialism – they had become an aristocracy of labor. The leaders of these parties were blinded by their successes and subordinated their principles to electoral considerations. Finally, the International itself simply lacked the institutional capacity to control its own members. Lenin sought to advance

this line of analysis at a series of conferences organized by the Zimmerwald (Switzerland) Committee in 1915 and 1916 at the behest of radicals such as Liebknecht, Luxemburg, and Radek, but he failed to carry the day. Still, the Zimmerwald movement also failed to reinvigorate the Second International.

The first conference of the Communist International or Comintern (1919–43) took place in Moscow. At the time, uprisings in central Europe and radical activism elsewhere made it reasonable to believe that the flames of revolution would spread west from Russia. The Bolsheviks and other radicals thus saw the establishment of a new and revolutionary international as a viable and necessary option; in fact, Lenin had called for it as early as April 1917. This option, however, was not without its opponents. Rosa Luxemburg, for example, instructed the Spartacus delegates to the 1919 congress to oppose a new international. Similarly, efforts to reconcile the two Internationals continued for some time, most notably through the so-called “Two and a Half” International based in Vienna. These were unsuccessful; the Vienna group eventually merged with the remnants of the Second International, while some of its members and leaders joined the Third.

It was not only political and philosophical considerations that kept the two Internationals apart. In keeping with his analysis of the Second International, Lenin proposed and the second Congress of the Comintern (1920) approved a specific organizational model which excluded most Second International parties. The statutes of the Third International provided for a structure similar to the centralized model of the Soviet Communist Party, thus guaranteeing that the member parties would consistently follow the policies and directives of the Third International. In addition, another document, the so-called Twenty One Points, set up conditions for membership, including similar organizational structure and programmatic standards for all parties, as well as the exclusion of parties which counted among their members a number of explicitly named individuals such as Karl Kautsky (1854–1938). It was these measures, as well as the prestige and resources of the Soviet state, which brought the Communist International under the control of the Russian party. In the end, the Comintern would become an effective instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

The Third International was conceived as a revolutionary organization, but it soon changed its position. Although the International embraced the policy of a “united front” during its third congress (1921), which would promote alliances among workers of all movements to defend their class interests, it also accepted at this time the proposition that capitalism had stabilized itself, thereby preparing the way to remove revolutionary action (but not rhetoric) from the agenda. Despite this and despite Stalin’s opposition, the Executive Committee of the International did approve of a revolutionary action in Germany in 1923. It would be the last independent action of the Comintern. As Stalin consolidated his position within the Russian party and so in the Soviet Union, he also came to have greater control over the International, which by then was very much under the influence of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This trend was reinforced once the Stalin government embraced the principle of “socialism in one country” (originally proposed by Bukharin in 1922) toward 1924. From this pragmatically justifiable point of view, the defense of the Soviet Union became the overriding concern of the communist labor movement and particularly of the International.

Certainly in its organizational capabilities, the Comintern embodied Lenin’s answers to the institutional weakness of the Second International. During the 1920s and 1930s the Third International was able to provide authoritative guidance to communist parties around the world. In Europe, and especially in Germany, this involved purging a number of significant figures from the party. Similarly, the Comintern remained silent when, in 1923, the USSR provided crucial support to the founders of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and made for an alliance between the Chinese communists and the Kuomintang, which resulted in the massacre of the Chinese communists – all of this despite the fact that the Chinese communists were members of the Comintern. On a more positive note, once the Nazis had come to power in Germany (1933), the Communist International promoted the “Popular Front” among its member parties. Through this policy, communists joined with socialists and even liberals in forming governing coalitions which would seek to prevent the rise of fascism in a number of countries, including France, Spain, Chile, the Netherlands, and, less

urgently, the United States and Great Britain. All of these policies were very much in keeping with the Soviet leadership's conception of that state's interests. In the end, when the USSR was negotiating the opening of a European front with the Allies in 1943, the Presidium of the Third International announced the dissolution of the organization.

SEE ALSO: Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Paris Commune, 1871; Social Democratic Party, Germany; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”

References and Suggested Readings

- Braunthal, J. (1967) *History of the International*, 2 vols. Trans. H. Collins, K. Mitchell, & J. Clark. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.
- Bronner, S. (1992) *Moments of Decision: Political History and the Crises of Radicalism*. New York: Routledge.
- Claudin, F. (1975) *The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform*. Trans. B. Pearce & F. MacDonagh. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Forman, M. (1998) *Nationalism and the International Labor Movement: The Idea of the Nation in Socialist and Anarchist Theory*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Ishay, M. (1995) *Internationalism and Its Betrayal*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Puech, J. (1907) *Le Proudhonisme dans l'Association internationale des travailleurs*. Paris: Félix Alan et Guillaume Réunis.
- Thomas, P. (1985) *Karl Marx and the Anarchists*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Intifada I and Intifada II

Lawrence Davidson

Intifada is the Arabic word for “shaking off.” It is the name given to two recent popular uprisings of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories against Israeli occupations and oppression. Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip following its victory in the 1967 Six Day War. For 20 years thereafter it proceeded to confiscate Palestinian land, create illegal Jewish settlements in the conquered territories, and place the Palestinian population under repressive rules that restricted their personal mobility and economic potential.

This process created a situation that can metaphorically be compared to a volcano. In other words, in the year 1987, Israel's occupation sat atop a thin layer of seeming stability underneath which roiled a deep and broad layer of tension and resentment. All that was needed to have the volcano explode was an incident that would crack the layer that held back the tensions of the situation. That incident took place on December 8, 1987 near a crowded checkpoint leading in and out of the Gaza Strip. An Israeli truck went out of control and struck and killed four Palestinians. Though the incident was most likely accidental, the rumor rapidly spread that it was a deliberate act of murder. Within days the Gaza Strip, and soon after the West Bank, were in a state of general rebellion. This first Intifada would last for six years, until the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993.

The Intifada was not organized by any central authority, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO, then headquartered in faraway Tunis). Indeed, the PLO was as much surprised by the rebellion as were the Israelis. As the spontaneous acts of resistance (initially youths throwing rocks at Israeli soldiers, settlers, and policemen) spread, they began to be organized and directed by grassroots elements most of which were associated with either Yasser Arafat's Fatah or Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic fundamentalist organization. Eventually a united front group formed called United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU). Other grassroots organizations which had taken root to support the population under occupation, such as medical groups, women's groups, and religious groups, also played a role in sustaining the Intifada. Soon the rock throwing was joined by such tactics as general strikes, the refusal to purchase Israeli goods, and a tax boycott.

As the Intifada generated grassroots organizations within the Occupied Territories, this growing local leadership put pressure on the PLO in Tunis to develop a plan with more definitive steps to guide the Palestinians to their national goals. As a result the PLO leadership called a meeting of the Palestine National Council (PNC) held in Algeria in November of 1988. The PNC proclaimed the goals of the Palestinian struggle to be the creation of an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This would be established as a state living peacefully next to Israel, which the PNC now recognized. It also

renounced terrorism as a tactic of the Palestinian struggle. If the Israeli government had responded in kind to this momentous compromise in Palestinian goals there would be peace in the Holy Land today. However, the Israeli policy of colonizing the Occupied Territories was a clear sign that powerful forces in Israel were more interested in territorial expansion than peace.

Because Israeli interest in a just peace was lacking, its government responded to the Intifada with massive force and brutality. They called this a strategy of "force, power, and blows." Army commanders were instructed to break the arms of rock throwers (several instances of this tactic were captured on video tape and shown worldwide, except in the United States). Between 1987 and 1991 the Israeli army killed over 1,000 Palestinians, 200 of whom were under the age of 16. About 100 Israelis died. The Israelis increasingly labeled the Palestinians terrorists but failed to note the ten to one kill ratio. Nonetheless, the Israelis were not able to suppress the Intifada by force.

As this first Intifada went on, year in and year out, a division occurred within the Israeli government. Yitzhak Rabin, who was of the Labor Party and had become defense minister within the unity government then ruling Israel, came to a realization that force alone would not end the rebellion. He concluded that the Palestinians must be given some form of statehood. This did not mean that he had in mind the same form of viable statehood the Palestinians desired, but Rabin was at least willing to begin negotiating with the Palestinians. Unfortunately, there was strong opposition to this position on the part of the right-wing Likud Party, whose leader at the time, Yitzhak Shamir (who had once been a member of the terrorist Stern Gang), was prime minister. The Likud wanted a "military solution" to the Intifada.

It was not until 1992, with the Palestinians still in a state of rebellion, that Rabin was elected prime minister of Israel. He soon authorized the secret negotiations that led to the Oslo Accords (signed in Washington, DC on September 13, 1993). These Accords were to lead the way to a staged Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and the creation of a Palestine National Authority. The Accords also allowed Yasser Arafat to return from Tunis to Ramallah in the West Bank. The initial optimism generated among the Palestinians by the Oslo Accords

brought an end to the first Intifada. In retrospect many Palestinians now think that they were misled by the Israelis and that Oslo's promise of a productive "peace process" was only a myth.

Several years of negotiations followed and the "facts on the ground" provided evidence that the Israeli government had no real intention of completely withdrawing from the Territories. Indeed, during the seven years of the Oslo peace process that preceded the outbreak of the second Intifada, conditions for the Palestinians deteriorated and the colonization process accelerated. However, in the initial period following the signing of the Accords, the mere fact that Rabin was discussing territorial compromise with the Palestinians caused a growing number of Israeli religious extremists to brand him a traitor. In 1995 one of these extremists murdered Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. It was a sign of the reluctance of the Israeli people in general to sacrifice for peace that in the general election that followed Rabin's assassination, they elected a right-wing conservative majority to the Knesset and placed Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud Party in the office of prime minister. From that point on any chance that the Oslo Accords would succeed was gone.

In the summer of 2000 there was an abortive effort made to institute a variation on the Oslo Accords when President Bill Clinton brought Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat to the United States for Camp David II. Although the story was put out that Barak had made Arafat a "generous offer" which he foolishly refused, the truth is quite different. What was offered Arafat was a Palestinian "state" divided into numerous, disconnected cantons the external and economic affairs of which were to be controlled by Israel. This may well have always been the end product that Israel envisioned for the Oslo Accords, but it was one that Arafat, or any other serious Palestinian leader, could not accept.

By the early fall of 2000 most Palestinians realized that the Oslo process was at a dead end and optimism turned to despair. Then, on September 28, in a move approved by the Barak government and almost certainly planned as provocative, Ariel Sharon, leader of the Likud Party, entered the Haram al-Sharif complex in Jerusalem accompanied by a massive police contingent. This was the Muslim holy site of

the Al-Aqsa Mosque. This episode triggered the second Intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

The second Intifada has proven much more violent than the first. The initial Palestinian demonstrations were met with even greater Israeli violence than was the case in the first Intifada. Within a month 200 Palestinians were dead. Also, very quickly Palestinian popular demonstrations gave way to guerilla war tactics on the part of an armed resistance.

In February of 2001 Ariel Sharon became Israel's prime minister. Sharon was a hardline general who had the well-deserved reputation for brutal and aggressive action against Palestinians. Immediately the repression intensified. According to the Israeli writer Yitzhak Laor, Israeli army records reveal that Israeli forces fired approximately one million rounds of live ammunition at Palestinian targets at this time ("Diary," in the *London Review of Books*, October 3, 2002). Tactics such as targeted assassination of Palestinian leaders, the use of helicopter gunships and F-16 warplanes against civilian urban areas, prolonged "shoot to kill" curfews, and the shooting down of unarmed demonstrators now became common. In the opinion of the Palestinian intellectual Ali Abunimah, "no people in history, not Indians led by Gandhi, nor South Africans led by Nelson Mandela, ever faced the kind of state violence that Palestinians faced without some of them resorting to armed resistance or desperate acts of revenge" ("On Violence and the Intifada," *The Electronic Intifada*, January 22, 2003).

It was the Israeli army's total disregard for Palestinian civilian life, against the backdrop of prolonged despair, that brought an eventual response in kind. As a tactical last resort, after decades of repression, some of the Palestinian resistance groups launched suicide bombings against Israeli civilian targets. It was an "illegitimate and immoral response to an illegitimate and immoral occupation."

The second Intifada has also seen the growing popularity of the Palestinian Islamic fundamentalist movement Hamas. Hamas has led the second Intifada resistance in the Gaza Strip and has developed a widespread social service system to meet the needs of many Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Its initial tactic of resistance was the support of mass demonstrations but when these proved ineffective and led to growing civilian casualties, Hamas took up arms and

was involved in launching some of the suicide bombings against Israel.

The use of suicide bombings became a much more riveting topic in the western media than the repression and oppression of the Occupation ever were. Because this was so, western readers are almost unanimously unable to place the tactic within an accurate historical context. Nonetheless, it was the growing worldwide objection to the tactic that eventually caused the Palestinian resistance groups to halt the practice. The Israelis seem to have credited their own countermeasures, such as the so-called "security fence," for the abatement of bombings.

The second Intifada also spurred on American efforts to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as can be seen in George W. Bush's "Road Map to Peace." These, however, have been as ineffectual as past American efforts and for the same reason. The US political structure is tied to powerful lobby groups, and the American Zionist lobbies, both Jewish and Christian, are among the strongest. Thus any American plan for a settlement of the conflict is subject to prior Israeli review. Nor does lack of Israeli cooperation bring about any serious American reaction.

For the Palestinians the failure of both the first and second Intifadas to move the Israelis toward a just peace has generated dangerous, though not surprising, divisiveness. That divisiveness is most clearly seen between Hamas and Fatah, which have long competed for leadership within the Occupied Territories. However, since the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004, Fatah itself has split into factions some of which wish to cooperate with Israel. This fracturing of Palestinian resolve in the face of prolonged occupation is what Israel's decades-long policy has aimed at. The western governments must take much responsibility for the injustice as they consistently refused lay down any penalties for Israeli brutality, even when officially declared in violation of international law. The world has given Israel a green light to crush the Palestinians and they have proceeded to do so in the harshest fashion.

SEE ALSO: Arafat, Yasser (1929–2004), Fatah, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Hamas: Origins and Development; Israeli Peace Movement; Israeli Settlers Movement

References and Suggested Readings

Baroud, R. (2006) *The Second Intifada: A Chronicle of a People's Struggle*. London: Pluto Press.

- Beinin, J. & Lockman, Z. (1989) *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation*. Boston: South End Press.
- King, E. M. (2007) *A Quiet Revolution: The First Intifada and Nonviolent Resistance*. New York: Nation Books.
- Pearlman, W. (2003) *Occupied Voices: Stories of Everyday Life from the Second Intifada*. New York: Nation Books.
- Pratt, D. (2006) *Intifada: Palestine and Israel – The Long Day of Rage*. Glasgow: Sunday Herald Books.

Iqbal, Muhammad (1877–1938)

Farooq Sulehria

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, reverentially known as *Allama* (Sage), is unquestionably one of the most important twentieth-century Urdu poets. While Pakistan claims Iqbal to be its national poet, responsible for conceiving the idea of Pakistan, India takes pride in Iqbal's masterpiece "Tarana-e-Hindi" (The Song of India); in fact, Iqbal died nearly ten years before the creation of Pakistan and the division of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. Iqbal was highly critical of capitalism, and paid glowing tributes to Karl Marx and Lenin. He was, however, a devout Muslim, and never associated with atheistic Bolshevism. While declaring the Qur'an a panacea for all ills and capitalism a curse to this world, Iqbal rejected the destruction of capitalism. The Progressive Writers' movement in Pakistan was divided over Iqbal's legacy. While a large majority of progressives disowned Iqbal, stalwarts like Faiz Ahmed Faiz defended him as a Muslim intellectual who sought to cleanse the House of God of all false idols; others viewed him as an obscurantist *mullah*, a withdrawn mystic, and a demagogue.

Muhammad Iqbal was born in Sialkot, a town in northern Pakistan, in 1877. After his matriculation and intermediate examinations at the Scotch Mission School, he moved to Lahore. He graduated from Government College, Lahore in 1897 and later earned a master of arts in philosophy (1899). After graduation he started teaching English at Government College in Lahore, and began drawing a large audience to hear his poetry. It was his "Tarana-e-Hindi," written in 1904, which brought him fame across British India.

In 1905 Iqbal left Lahore for Europe to study for three years, earning another BA, a law

degree, and a PhD in philosophy. On his return he settled in Lahore. It was as a poet and Muslim intellectual that he became immortal. The publication of his first Persian-language collection of poems, *Israr-e-Khudi* (1915), resulted in both fame and controversy. In his attempt to explain his concept of *Khudi* (Ego), he criticized the Sufis, especially the legendary Persian poet Hafiz. Since Hafiz is held in great esteem by Muslims, many Muslim intellectuals strongly criticized Iqbal for desecrating a holy man. The reaction was so strong that in the second edition Iqbal withdrew the poems about Hafiz.

Controversy surrounded Iqbal throughout his life. On January 1, 1923 he was knighted and a year later he lent support to Abd' Al-Aziz Saud of Arabia. A *mullah* (Islamic legal expert) in Lahore issued a fatwa declaring Iqbal an apostate. Both his knighthood and his support for Saud antagonized a section of Muslims involved in the Khilafat movement, in alliance with the Gandhi-led Congress. The Khilafat movement demanded the retention of the Ottoman Empire since its Sultan was also the Khalifa, or head of all Sunni Muslims (the majority of Indian Muslims were Sunnis). Saud's British-backed attempt to establish an independent Arab kingdom was seen as treachery.

Iqbal's poetic reputation was enhanced further, in spite of the controversy, with the publications of *Piam-e-Mashriq* (The Message of the East, 1923) and *Bang-e-Dra* (Call of the Caravan, 1924). The former was a response to Goethe's *West-Ostlicher Divan* (itself a reaction to Hafiz). In it, Iqbal tried to send a message of spirituality to the West. *Bang-e-Dra* was his first collection of Urdu poems.

In 1926 Iqbal ran for a seat in the Punjab Legislative Assembly and was elected; however, as a parliamentarian he remained obscure. He expressed himself best in literary and philosophical terms. Away from politics he delivered his famous six lectures in 1928, later published as *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (1930); it was considered a bold attempt to interpret Islam in line with the modern age. As President of the Muslim League in 1930 Iqbal was the first to envisage an autonomous state for the Muslims of India in Northwestern India (roughly present-day Pakistan). In 1931 he traveled to London to represent Indian Muslims at the Round Table Conference called by the British rulers to solve the Indian question. On his

way back he stayed in Rome and called on Mussolini. His poem praising the Fascist leader triggered yet another round of controversy. In 1932 he published *Javed Nama*, which he called an Asian “divine comedy.” In 1935 his second poetry collection in Urdu, *Bal-e-Jibrael*, came out. He died soon after in Lahore on April 4, 1938.

SEE ALSO: Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1911–1984); Jalib, Habib (1928–1993); Jinnah, Muhammad Ali (1876–1948); Pakistan, Protest and Rebellion; Quit India Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Iqbal, J. (2004) *Zinda Road*. Lahore: Sang e Meel.
 Majeed, S. (Ed.) (2005) *Culture and Identity: Selected English Writings of Faiz*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
 Zakaria, R. (1993) *Iqbal: Poet and Politician*. New York: Viking.

Iran, Kurdish national autonomy movement

Nandini Bhattacharya

The Kurds are the largest non-state nation in West Asia, and their homeland, Kurdistan, remains distributed mainly among Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, and to a lesser extent in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Syria. Five to six million Kurds, forming 10 percent of Iran’s population, still live in Iran and strive to carve out their autonomous existence. Despite the changes in ideology and regimes, Iranian nationalism and Kurdish identities have repeatedly clashed since 1945.

During World War I, Kurdish leaders announced independence, taking advantage of Iran’s political weakness. Ismael Agha established authority in the west of the Lake Urmia zone from 1918 to 1922, and Jafar Sultan began to expand his control between Marivan and Halabja. Reza Khan, leader of the Iran empire, suppressed the efforts at autonomy. Ismael Agha was killed in 1930 and hundreds of Kurdish chiefs were deported and exiled. During World War II, when Allied troops entered Iran in 1941, the Kurdish movement gathered momentum under Hama Rashid from Baneh, who was finally driven out in late 1944 by the Persian army.

Meanwhile, from 1942 onwards, the Society for the Revival of Kurdistan, popularly known

as Komala (Kurdish for society), developed in Mahabad in Iran. Principally an urban bourgeois body with a small nationalist clergy and landed aristocracy, Komala became the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1945 with the program of establishing an autonomous republic in the area under the Soviet sphere of influence. On January 22, 1946, Qazi Muhammad of the KDP proclaimed a progressive Kurdish Republic, with space for marginals, minorities, and women, in the city of Mahabad with tacit Soviet support. Confined to the cities of Mahabad, Bukan, Nagada, and Oshneviyeh, the republic did not claim independence, although it had a president, a flag, a cabinet, and a national army, and Kurdish was the official language.

Some of the republic’s social and political demands were: the use of Kurdish as the medium of education and administration; the establishment of a single law for both peasants and notables; the election of a provincial council for Kurdistan to supervise state and social matters; all state officials to be of local origin; and unity and fraternity with the Azerbaijani people. Though small, the Kurdish Republic inspired hundreds of Iraqi Kurds to actively participate in military and civil administration. Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani, the leader of the Iraqi Kurdish movement who had been driven from Iraq, was commander of the republic’s army.

The US and Britain viewed the Kurdish Republic as an extension of Soviet influence and supported the Shah’s military campaign against it. Soviet troops withdrew from Iran in May 1946, and seven months later, Iranian forces suppressed the autonomous republic. Qazi Muhammad was hanged in Mahabad on March 31, 1947 on charges of treason. Devoid of a rural social base, the republic was isolated.

From the 1950s, peasant uprisings developed as the outcome of social transformation in Kurdish villages. Land reforms by the central government and the peasant exodus to Kurdish cities led to the development of an urban, educated working class. A modern bourgeoisie comprising mainly professionals rather than entrepreneurs emerged, while a small Kurdish working class formed in the oil industry, construction, and other factories. Traditional *ulama* (experts in religious law) and landed elites were displaced by an emerging modern intelligentsia. Gender relations changed as urban women gained access to education, followed by public participa-

tion in social, economic, political, and cultural life. Such changes left their impact on the various strands of Kurdish autonomy movements.

In the 1960s and 1970s armed resistance in Iraq initially contributed to the revival of the KDP in Iran (KDPI). In 1969, a group of radical intellectuals formed the Revolutionary Organization of Toilers of Kurdistan. Distinct from both pro-Soviet tendencies and the urban guerilla emphasis of some Iranian revolutionary groups, it mobilized Kurdish peasant youths. One wing's program was close to Iran's Communist Tudeh (Mass) Party, while another wing after 1968 was influenced more by European social democracy. The party program of 1973 demanded autonomy, parliamentary democracy, equal rights for landlords and peasants, redistribution of land, and gender equality. The anti-Shah revolution saw the KDP integrating demands for linguistic rights and self-government into the common call for the abolition of the Shah's rule. But it had to compete with numerous radical left groups that called for a social revolution besides autonomy.

The pro-Tudeh wing of the KDP, opposed in principle to religion, accepted collaboration with Ayatollah Khomeini. The KDP mainstream, steering a course between left radicalism and accommodation, engaged in guerilla resistance when the new regime sent its army to Kurdistan. Khomeini, consolidating his position, engaged in brutal persecution, since the majority of Kurds were Sunni, while most Iranians were Shi'ite Muslims. Khomeini prevented Abdul Rahman Ghassemlon, the elected representative of the Iranian Kurds, from entering the assembly of experts. In 1980, the regime unleashed a military campaign to capture most of the Kurdish cities, including Mahabad. After 1983 the KDP and its left factions participated peripherally in the Kurdish movement of Iran as its leaders were forced to move across the Iraqi border. The new regime could not trust the Kurdish faction given its cross-border alliances and separatist ethno-linguistic identities, even as it sought to manipulate Iraqi Kurds against Saddam Hussein.

SEE ALSO: Barzani, Mulla Mustafa al- (1903–1979); Iranian Revolution, 1979; Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Mussaui (1902–1989) and the Shi'ite Islamic Revolution; Kurdistan Nationalist Movement and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bruinessen, M. van (2003) *The Kurds in Movement: Issues, Organization, Mobilization*. Available at www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/kurds_IISH_talk.htm (downloaded March 27, 2008).
- Eagleton, W., Jr. (1963) *The Kurdish Republic of 1946*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Hassanpour, A. (n.d.) *The Kurdish Experience*. Available at www.xs4all.nl/~tank/kurdish/htdocs/lib/kurdish_ex.html (downloaded March 27, 2008).
- McDowall, D. (2004) *A Modern History of the Kurds*. New York: I. B. Tauris.
- The Republic of Kurdistan: Fifty Years Later* (1997) Special issue of the *International Journal of Kurdish Studies* 11 (1 & 2).

Iran, the Mossadegh era: democratic socialists and the US-backed coup

Nandini Bhattacharya

Imperialist exploitation of Iran was carried out primarily through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company or AIOC in 1935), which played a role analogous to the East India Company in India in earlier times. The discovery of oil in 1908 by the British in Khuzestan gave rise to new interests regarding Iran in the British empire. The significance of oil as a factor in the world economy was becoming well recognized by the beginning of World War I, and as a result, Iran's occupation by Russian, British, and Ottoman troops during the war was linked to its oil.

Iranian oil was not just a valuable source of revenue for the British. It was central to maintaining the British empire throughout the world against other European competitors and aspiring independence movements in the colonies themselves. Reza Khan Pahlavi, who carried out a coup in 1921 and subsequently almost forced the Majlis (parliament) to depose Ahmad Shah, the last Qajar king, in October 1925 on an assurance to landlords and the conservative clergy that he would defend Islamic law and would not undertake any radical reform, had the full backing of British imperialism. Some leaders of the Majlis, particularly Hassan Modarres and the young Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, were opposed to

Reza Khan's plan to consolidate his autocracy, but the Majlis declared him the Shah on December 12, 1925.

As the founder of the Pahlavi dynastic rule, Reza Shah unleashed a policy of modernization and secularization of politics on the western model. At the same time, despite an opportunity to improve the terms between the APOC/AIOC and Iran, the Shah did little. Abdolhossein Teymourtash, a leading minister, had demanded 25 percent of the APOC's shares, but the Shah's agreement in 1933 ultimately gave the best 100,000 square miles to the AIOC (as it was renamed), and accepted an agreement whereby it would pay £750,000 per year at a minimum. In response, Mossadegh and other opponents of the Shah's repressive rule formed the *Jebhe Melli* (National Front) of Iran, which profoundly shaped the contours of oil nationalism.

During World War II, Iran became a vital link in the Allied supply line. Reza Shah Pahlavi, suspected of secretly collaborating with the Germans, was forced to abdicate in favor of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi by the combined British and Soviet troops in 1941. Mohammad Reza Shah's regime, which continued till 1979, was a period of utter chaos and indecision. Yet voices in favor of independent political decisions on some important issues could be heard quite distinctly. Public opinion in favor of nationalization of Iran's oil industry grew from 1949 onwards.

The Shah versus Oil Nationalism

By 1950 Abadan, a city in the Khuzestan province in southwestern Iran, had become the world's largest refinery. The AIOC, which had a monopoly control over oil supply in Iran, relied heavily on Iranian oilfields for three-quarters of its supplies. At the same time, most extreme forms of exploitation were carried out. Iranian laborers lived in slums and long dormitories with only primitive sanitation. The air was heavy with sulfur fumes, a constant reminder of the vast wealth that was pouring from Iranian soil into AIOC's coffers. Politically conscious Iranians were aware that the British government derived more revenue from taxing the concessionaire, the AIOC, than the Iranian government derived from royalties. The oil issue figured prominently in the 1949 elections for the Majlis, and nationalists were putting heavy pressure on the government to renegotiate the terms of contract

with AIOC. During the 1950s, Iran's dynamic leader, Mossadegh, who was pro-democratic in spirit, stubbornly upheld the nationalist demand for oil industries.

In November 1950, the Majlis committee concerned with oil matters, headed by Mossadegh, rejected a draft agreement in which AIOC refused to accept 50–50 profit-sharing terms like most of the other Persian Gulf oil concessions. When AIOC ultimately offered this equal share of profit, nationalists demanded complete nationalization of the oil industries. The prime minister, General Ali Razmara, who advised against nationalization on technical grounds, was assassinated in March 1951 by a militant of the *Fadayan-e Islam* group. In the same month the Majlis voted to nationalize the oil industry. Mohammad Mossadegh was made prime minister in the next month by the demand of the Majlis under popular pressure.

Oil nationalization was a landmark in the nationalist history of Iran. Britain took the issue of Iran's oil nationalization to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The dispute between Iran and AIOC remained unsettled as the court ruled in Iran's favor. Ultimately, the US intervened in the oil issue and manipulated AIOC to offer better terms. Meanwhile, British rejection of the initial efforts led to radicalization within Iran. An atmosphere of militant anti-compromise politics was created, whereby the government rejected all offers. The economy began to suffer from the loss of foreign exchange and oil revenues as countries allied to Britain refused to take Iranian oil, and the Abadan refinery was closed. AIOC withdrew from Iran and traded off its other reserves. Mossadegh's growing popularity and power challenged various imperial powers.

The Shah's refusal of Mossadegh's demand for the constitutional prerogative of the prime minister to name a minister of war forced his resignation in 1952. But as a result of rising public pressure coordinated by the National Front and supported by Communists, Mossadegh was reappointed three days later. Mossadegh now took up seriously the cause of Iranian nationalism. Using emergency powers, Mossadegh tried to strengthen the democratically elected political institutions by limiting the monarchy's powers, cutting the Shah's personal budget, forbidding him to communicate directly with foreign diplomats, and transferring royal lands back to the state.

Cold War Politics and the Coup

Mossadegh also weakened the landed aristocracy, abolishing Iran's centuries-old feudal agriculture sector, seeking progressive land reforms in a bid to undercut the growing influence of the Tudeh (Communist) Party, even though they were convenient allies. In Marxist terms, Mossadegh was a bourgeois nationalist. But in 1952–3, when he traveled to the United Nations to make a case for the Iranian people, his was the first voice of the third world that the West heard, before Nkrumah, Nasser, or Lumumba. In that Cold War era, Mossadegh transgressed the limits of protest. As a willing associate of progressive forces, including the Tudeh Party, he was immediately a suspect figure. This further determined his Anglo-American critics to move strongly against him.

A secret CIA operation for the shift of the regime, code-named TPAJAX, which worked directly with royalist Iranian military officers, chose an officer named Shah General Zahedi as an alternative for the prime minister, but ultimately looked forward to the initiative on the part of the Shah for the overthrow of the nationalist regime. The scheme for a coup was not moving very smoothly as Shah Pahlavi continued to vacillate. Meanwhile, Mossadegh began to realize that there was a plot against him. He sought to consolidate power by calling for a national referendum to dissolve the parliament in August 1953. The results of this referendum, held on August 4, were overwhelmingly in his favor.

Within ten days the Shah was finally forced by the operation to sign the decrees agreeing to support an army-led coup, news of which spread rapidly among the army officers backing General Zahedi as prime minister, who could only be appointed or dismissed by the Majlis. The coup began on August 15–16, but initially did not attain much success. The soldiers sent to arrest Mossadegh at his home were captured. On August 17 and 18, a massive demonstration in support of Mossadegh was staged, while statues of the Shah and his father were pulled down all over the country. Indecision prevailed for quite a few days as the operation was stalemated, and the Shah left for Baghdad. Mossadegh, on the other hand, dissolved the parliament. Meanwhile, the Tudeh Party had been attacked and destroyed by Iranian soldiers in support of the Shah. The Shah's return to Iran in late

August was followed by the imposition of martial law.

Mossadegh was ousted in 1953 and the coup turned out to be successful, with the CIA taking full credit for the event. With Iranian society still containing a strong royalist section, the coup succeeded because substantial sections of the army and upper-class opinion ultimately decided to back the Shah, in view of the communist support for Mossadegh. Mossadegh was jailed for three years, while his minister of foreign affairs, Hossein Fatemi, was executed, as were many Tudeh Party members. Hundreds of National Front members were imprisoned. The coup of 1953 and the overthrow of the parliamentary regime showed how the Cold War politics of the United States was crucial for the smashing of nationalism. Anti-US sentiment in Iran subsequently drew its legacy from the memory of the coup.

In return for the removal of Mossadegh, with US support, Mohammad Reza Shah agreed in 1954 to allow an international consortium of British (40 percent), American (40 percent), French (6 percent), and Dutch (14 percent) companies to run the Iranian oil facilities for the next 25 years, with a 50–50 split of profit with Iran. But the consortium refused to allow Iran to audit its accounts to confirm the amount of profit properly, or to have members on its board of directors. During the oil crisis the Shah took a lukewarm stand in favor of the Anglo-US design. However, once the coup succeeded, his pro-West policy became even more blatant and unrestricted. Despite a return to some sort of stability in the late 1950s and the 1960s, with such a surrender to western high-handedness, the scope for the economic development of Iran along national lines was thwarted.

SEE ALSO: Iran, Political and Cultural Protests, 1844–1914; Iranian Revolution, 1979; Mossadegh, Mohammad (1881–1967)

References and Suggested Readings

- Hertz, N. (2003) *The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Iran Chamber Society (n.d.) History of Iran. Available at www.iran.chamber.com/www.iranchamber.com/history/historic-periods (downloaded November 25, 2006).
- Iran Heritage (2003) Britain Fights Oil Nationalism. Available at www.iran-heritage.org/interestgroups/politicalarticle2.htm (downloaded January 21, 2008).

- Katouzian, H. (1999) *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*. London and New York: I. B. Tauris.
- Kinzer, S. (2003) *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Iran, political and cultural protests, 1844–1914

Nandini Bhattacharya

Iran, the land of ancient civilization, with a history of political preeminence and rich cultural heritage, witnessed in the nineteenth century almost a clash of culture and civilization while encountering western encroachment in the realm of ideas and politics. It stood as the only country that refused to accept the western model of state and polity. Forms of protest must therefore be judged in terms quite distinct from models set by western ideas. Two distinct forms of protest can be recorded – resistance within an Islamic framework, and constitutionalist resistance.

The Babi Conference

The quest for freedom was one of the most exalted ideals for which Iranians had long struggled. Intellectual trends to rise against the existing norms could be traced back as early as the Babi movement of the 1840s, when a section of religious activists challenged the existing Shi'ite norms and practices of Islam in Iran. The Babi were a group of people with a charismatic leader, Sayyid Ali Muhammad, surnamed the Bab (the Gate). In 1844, he promised to usher in the way to *Qa'im* (Messiah), thereby initiating a new era in the history of Islam. This claim on the part of the Bab implied outright challenge to the position of the Shi'ite clergy as well as the temporal authority of the Qajar dynasty (Iranian–Turkmen dynasty established in 1781). Subsequently his imprisonment by the authorities generated a movement by 81 of his followers, the Babis. As a result, the Babi Conference took place at Badasht in Khorasan between June and July 1848. Mulla Muhammad Ali Barfurushi, popularly known as Qaddus, was one of the first leaders to join the Babi movement and participated in the Badasht Conference along with his

companions. The other famous Babi leader was a poetess named Qurrat al-'Ayn, who along with her companions was traveling from Teheran in order to join Qaddus and his companions. The two groups met and decided to rent three gardens. The first garden was assigned to Qurrat al-'Ayn surnamed Tahirih (the Pure One), the second to Qaddus, and the third to Mirza Husayn Ali, who later took the title of Abdu'l-Baha. Undoubtedly the most significant event in this regard was the occasion of the poetess' unveiled appearance at the public meeting. The unveiling of a woman spontaneously in the public sphere in nineteenth-century Shi'ite Iran was virtually an act of revolt against male domination. Thus, the Babi Conference carried a revolt within a revolt for which the remaining leaders were unprepared. Even revolutionary men who had assembled against tradition in their quest for a new religious direction could not accept such independence and strong individuality on the part of a woman. This startling event received marked attention in the writings of contemporary narrators, such as *Nabil's Narrative*, which recorded Shaykh Abu Turab's experiences. Abu Turab described that it was inconceivable for the other male members to accept the public unveiling of a woman, who was regarded as the incarnation of *Fatimah* – the noblest symbol of chastity. Turab's narration also mentions that one participant even cut his throat in reaction and many others left the conference. Qurrat al-'Ayn, however, remained unperturbed; with composure and dignity, she sat beside Qaddus to deliver her speech. Not only did she show unprecedented courage in going against social norms, she also claimed enormous power for herself in defying the authority of the chiefs and nobles. Moreover, the poetess-leader argued for a definitive break with old Islamic traditions at the conference and questioned Qaddus's very claim to leadership as he had failed to rouse a Babi revolt in Mashhad, one of the holiest cities of the Shi'ias. This radical split between the two leaders indicates the complex dynamics of the Badasht Conference and brings up the question of gender relations within Islam. The event has been viewed in contemporary history as representing two opposite extremes of women and Islam: as the starting point of women's liberation, or as an outright act of heresy.

An important landmark in the history of Iran, the Babi Conference raised one of the basic

social issues that still remains unresolved – that of the *hijab* and the public–private dichotomy within the Islamic framework. It is also noteworthy that rejection of the *hijab* had come from within the religious community and was voiced by a woman, without the intervention of any alien agency. This exceptionally brave woman was ultimately put to death by the existing Qajar ruling orthodoxy.

The Qajar Era: Constitutional Revolution

With the turn of the century Iran began to face a number of problems in the political sphere as western thoughts and ideas began to percolate. There was also the overbearing presence on her borders of two European great powers – Russia and Britain. The rulers of the Qajar dynasty, who had governed Iran since 1797, could not wholly ignore the influence and domination of imperial forces from outside. During the rule of the Qajar king, Nasser-al-Din Shah (1848–96), western science, technology, and educational methods were introduced in Iran and the country's modernization began. Despite his best efforts, Nasser-al-Din Shah could not actually prevent foreign encroachments into the traditional regional life of Iran. The regime of his weak successor Mozaffar-al-Din Shah (1896–1907) became financially dependent on foreign powers, particularly Russia. Protests were organized against the Shah by the Shi'ia religious establishment, merchants, and other sections of the population. In January 1906, fearing possible arrest, merchants and clerical leaders took sanctuary in mosques in Teheran and outside the capital. On August 12, 1906, the Shah was forced to accept the popular demand and issued a decree promising a constitution.

In the Qajar era, Iranian society was stratified into two broad categories of privileged and underprivileged people. The privileged were a narrow section comprising courtiers, state officials, tribal leaders, religious notables, landlords, and big merchants, while the vast majority of peasants, tribals, agricultural laborers, and laborers in traditional handicrafts and services remained underprivileged. However, between these two broad divisions, there were several middling strata that included local notables, headmen of semi-urban zones and villages, ordinary landowners and merchants, master artisans and

shopkeepers, and others. Interestingly, the constitutional law introduced by the Shah in 1906 attested to this social hierarchy quite vividly.

Instead of applying a simple “one man-one vote” rule, this law brought six categories with a distinct number of votes assigned to them according to their class position and social standing. The *tabaqas* (classes) were: (1) princes and the Qajars; (2) *a'yun va ashraf* (nobles and notables); (3) *ulama* (religious leaders) and *tollab* (theology students); (4) *tojjar* (merchants); (5) landed proprietors and *mallakin va fellahin* (farmers); and (6) *asnaf* (master artisans and shopkeepers). Out of a total of 156 deputies, 60 were to be allotted from the capital. The law limited the right to vote to men over the age of 25 and restricted it further to those who belonged to one of the aforementioned categories. Thus the vast majority of the population fell outside these six social categories, including the mass of peasantry, tribesmen, laborers, apprentices, and foot-boys in the bazaar. And, of course, women across the categories remained out of the orbit of enfranchisement and in effect were not recognized as “citizens.” In October, an elected assembly was convened which drew up a constitution that markedly limited the royal power and created a *Majlis* (elected legislature) and a cabinet accountable to the *Majlis*. The Shah signed the constitution on December 30, 1906 and died five days after. The new Fundamental Laws approved in 1907 provided limited freedom of speech, press, and association, and recognized the security of life and property.

Mohammad Ali Shah, the next monarch (1907–9), made a futile attempt in 1908 to abolish parliamentary government with Russian assistance. In retaliation, resistance to the Shah arose in Tabriz, Esfahan, Rasht, and elsewhere. Many intellectuals and political activists swelled the ranks of revolutionaries and several became martyrs in their zeal to uphold freedom and liberty. Bibi Khānoom Astarābādi's name deserves special mention not only as one of the founding figures of the Iranian women's movement but also as a major activist, who contributed to this constitutional revolution by her pen. Founder of the girls' school in Teheran (the first of its kind in Iran) in 1907, Astarābādi's satirical book *Ma'ayeb al-Rejal* (Failings of Men) was published 11 years before the constitutional revolution. Mirzā Jahāngir Khān was another revolutionary who was also a crusading editor of a progressive

newspaper, *Sūr-e-Esrāfil*. He and Malek al-Motakallemin were particularly targeted as Babis, and were executed in 1908.

By April 1909, Tabriz freedom fighters led by Sattar Khan, in attempting to break through a blockade, lost many fellow revolutionaries. The joint effort of Bakhtiari leaders like Samsam ul Sultaneh and Haj Aligoli Khan Bakhtiari and the Gilan fighters ended in a successful takeover of the capital on July 16, 1909. The constitutional forces spared no time in deposing the Shah; he was exiled to Russia and the constitution was reestablished. In spite of their success, the constitutional forces had to face further challenges. Mohammad Ali, with Russian help, attempted a military coup in July 1910. Meanwhile, the Anglo-Russian entente in 1907 destroyed any ultimate hopes of independence and progress in Iran under the constitutional regime. By the terms of the entente, Russians controlled the north while the British preferred their stronghold in the south and east of Iran. The Iranian government, on the other hand, had appointed an American expert, Morgan Shuster, as its treasurer general. Under his directives the Iranian government sought to collect taxes from the powerful officials who were patronized by Russia. This led to the entry of the tax department of Iran into the Russian zone, near Azarbaijan. In December 1911, Russian troops attacked the capital after the *Majlis* had refused the Russian ultimatum to dismiss Shuster. Bakhtiari tribal chiefs and their troops surrounded the *Majlis* building on December 20, 1911 to combat Russian aggression and forced it to accept the Russian ultimatum, closing down the assembly. This shows the government did not have the means to enforce law and order. Constitutional experiments also remained suspended for the time being when Iran remained occupied by British, Russian, and Ottoman forces.

Though the constitutional monarchy came to an end in 1925 with the dissolution of the Qajar dynasty, it should be noted that the movement for constitutional freedom and civil liberties took a different note in Gilan, northern Iran, from 1914. Mirza Kuchak Khan organized a revolutionary movement based in the forests of Gilan known as the *Nehzat-e Jangal* (Forest movement). Propagating an agenda of total social reform for the poor *Jangalis* (forest tribes) combined with independence and Islamic unity, this movement spearheaded actions against the Qajar rulers, imperialists, landed elites, and tribal leaders.

They were fought by White Russian forces and British troops under General Dunsterville. In response, Mirza Kuchak formed an alliance with the Soviet forces. However, differences soon arose between the Communist Party, supported by Soviet Russia, and Mirza. One reason was Mirza's unwillingness to abolish feudalism. In addition, a tussle between the secularism of the communists and the religious views of Mirza Kuchak contributed to the collapse of the alliance. As a result, Reza Khan was able to defeat him.

SEE ALSO: Iran, Kurdish National Autonomy Movement; Iran, the Mossadegh Era: Democratic Socialists and the US-Backed Coup; Iranian Revolution, 1979

References and Suggested Readings

- Afaqi, S. (Ed.) (2004) *Tahirih in History: Perspectives on Qurratu'l-'Ayn from East and West*. Los Angeles: Kalimat Press.
- Afary, J. (1996) *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ahmed, L. (1992) *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Amanat, A. (1989) *Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran 1844–1850*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Bayat, M. (1991) *Iran's First Revolution: Shi'ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1909*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Browne, E. G. (1995) *The Persian Revolution 1905–1909*. Washington, DC: Mage.
- Ebrahim, F. (1983) *Sardar-e Jangal* (The Commander of the Forest). Tehran: Javidan.
- Mernissi, F. (1987) *The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam*. New York: Addison Wesley.
- Negar, M. (n.d.) The Unveiling of the Babi Poetess Qurrat al-'Ayn Tahirih in the Gardens of Badasht. *Iran Chamber Society*. Available at www.iranchamber.com/religions/articles/unveiling_qurrat_alayn_badasht.php (downloaded November 16, 2006).

Iranian Revolution, 1979

Nandini Bhattacharya

The Rule of the Shah

In 1953, a CIA-sponsored coup d'état overthrew the nationalist government of Mohammad Mossadegh and firmly installed Mohammad Reza

Shah Pahlavi as the dictatorial ruler of Iran. The era of martial law (1953–7) and the Baghdad Pact brought Iran closer to the West, particularly the US and its military and economic aid. The elite-based modernization program of the government, known as the White Revolution, and the increasing arbitrariness of the Shah had alienated not only certain Islamic religious and political groups but also a number of intellectuals seeking democratic reforms. Both denounced the Shah's subservience to the United States. Throughout the late 1970s there were widespread religion-led protests, supported by and involving as participants a vast majority of the disaffected population.

The Shah's regime suppressed all opposition from the working class and the left, jailing and torturing some 20,000 political prisoners with the help of Iran's security and intelligence organization, the SAVAK. Relying solely on oil revenues, especially from 1973, the Shah's pursuit of developing Iran as a mighty Gulf power within the US hegemony ultimately increased poverty for the masses and destroyed political freedom. Growing oil profits helped Iran to become the world's largest arms importer in the 1970s and to acquire a huge army – with an air force rivaling that of France – which became the guardian of US interests in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, the oil money and US military aid that flowed into Iran served to industrialize the country and create a sizable working class, with some 2.5 million people employed in manufacturing and 70,000 workers in the all-important oil industry.

The Origins of the Revolution

A significant drop in oil revenues in 1975 and the aggravated economic crisis, with disparities and cuts in wages, helped to explode the seething discontent into a widespread popular rising that eventually toppled the Shah's regime. For the first time in 14 years, thousands of slum dwellers in Teheran protested publicly against the Shah in June 1977. These movements by workers and the urban poor, followed by legalization of some opposition, opened the floodgate of protest between July and September, involving other sectors of society such as intellectuals and *mullahs* (traditional clergy) who had felt left out of the earlier economic boom and squeezed by foreign companies. The protests culminated

in one of the largest demonstrations in history, bringing together some two million people in Teheran on September 7, 1978, although the regime retaliated by imposing martial law and massacring over 2,000 demonstrators. Subsequent strikes, particularly the strike of 30,000 oil workers, brought the country's economy to a standstill, sparking off a massive strike wave in which workers took over factories, offices, hospitals, and universities across the nation. *Shoras* (democratic workers' committees) were organized, which either bypassed or confronted owners and managers. Slum dwellers' committees were also set up around local mosques, thereby playing a key role in allowing the clergy to take control of the movement of the marginalized urban poor. They also took over the functions of the police and army by patrolling the neighborhoods. The main forces on the left, People's Fedayeen, People's Mojahedin guerillas, and the Communist Tudeh Party, played a leading role in mobilizing urban subaltern revolts.

On February 11, 1979, a rebellion of the Shah's army at the instigation of the Fedayeen and Mojahedin guerillas paved the way for Ayatollah Khomeini's forces and his coalition of clergy and liberal capitalist politicians to seize power. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, just returned from exile, was able to capture the leadership of a struggle actually initiated by the working class. Despite the prominent role of the working-class strike, as Sepehri (2000) has observed, the strike committees made no coordinated attack on the structure of the capitalist system, nor was there much coordination with civil society institutions outside the workplace. This gap was filled by the religious opposition, which held a relatively privileged status, while other forces were completely smashed.

Khomeini and Islamic Fundamentalism

Since the early 1960s, Khomeini had been identified as a religious leader who had conducted a hate campaign against the Shah. Strongly opposed to the Shah's autocracy from an Islamic moralist standpoint, he began to attract much popular attention and was therefore repeatedly exiled by the Shah regime. Intellectuals and, more intriguingly, clerics in Iran upheld freedom as a sacred goal. This was reflected in numerous statements issued on the eve of the Islamic

Revolution by Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Shariat Madari, and others. Khomeini was vehemently opposed to the spread of the western model of secularization, introduced in Iran by the Shah's reform program. Khomeini was imprisoned more than once, from 1963, for fomenting anti-establishment protests through his writings and speeches during the White Revolution. Khomeini's attack on the Capitulation Law, whereby any member of the US army held guilty in Iran would be tried according to US laws, met with six months' imprisonment. This had terrible repercussions when the prime minister of Iran, Hassan Ali Mansur, forced Khomeini to apologize upon his release; when he refused to do so, the prime minister slapped him. Hassan Ali Mansur was assassinated soon after this event. Four members of Fadayan-e-Islam, a secret fundamentalist society closely associated with Khomeini, were executed for the crime while Khomeini was exiled.

In exile Khomeini spent about a year in Turkey and the rest of his 14 years' absence in the Shi'ite religious city of Najaf in Iraq, where he developed his ideas in his writings. However, in 1978 he was thrown out of Iraq by Saddam Hussein, then vice-president, and went to France on a temporary visa. Taking the opportunity of the Shah's absence, he appeared in Iran on February 1979, announcing an alternative interim government against the provisional government under Shapour Bakhtiar. A majority of the army were in favor of Khomeini, because it was evident to the military high command that the *mullahs* were less dangerous than the militant working class. Severe repression of left-wing opponents was combined with a demagogic referendum, with the alternatives of the monarchy or an Islamic Republic. For the masses, the key issue was rejection of the monarchy. This polar opposition enabled Khomeini to secure a 98 percent vote in favor of the Islamic Republic on March 30–1, 1979. A new era of revolution ensued in Iran. But this revolution had its own unique blend of highly intoxicating religiosity and conservatism on the one hand, and adjustment with modernity and international considerations on the other. Since 1963, Khomeini had been focusing on the legend of the Karbala, the most popular symbol of martyrdom and self-sacrifice in Shi'ism, and placing it in juxtaposition to the sufferings of the people under the Shah. In 680 AD Imam Hussain, the third

Imam (a powerful religious leader), opposed the tyrannical rule of Yazid, the Umayyad Caliph, risking his own life. Depicting the Shah as Yazid, Khomeini rallied the charged-up people to attain this holy martyrdom.

The charismatic personality of Ayatollah Khomeini, combined with his reputation for leading the anti-Shah struggle, made him an attractive and respected leader of the revolution. He mobilized a social bloc including the traditional bourgeoisie, with its various factions, the large and medium-sized *bazaar* merchants and small manufacturers, a large petty bourgeoisie, and the plebeian masses, though the uprising of February 1979 was actually started without his support. In order not to be outflanked, he supported it after it had begun. His supporters then tried to demobilize the workers' *shoras*, to disarm the left, and to set up an Islamic regime. The White Revolution was undermining the hold of the Shi'ite clergy, and this was what had generated Khomeini's opposition. Hence, he had supported Mossadegh's overthrow, but had subsequently opposed imperialism's influence and the westernization of Iran, which struck a chord among the masses.

The Islamic Revolution was a major turning point in the modern history of Iran. It did not merely overthrow the monarchy but was designed from the outset to achieve a complete revolution, by the Islamization of all spheres of life. After long years of repression, the referendum was a free one, with all Iranians of 16 years and above eligible to vote. Thus, a democratic maneuver was used to impose the conservative solution. From the very outset, this revolution carried a striking dichotomy. Although it rejected the western model of democracy and liberalism, the regime established itself by popular election. And, above all, at one stroke the revolution allowed all women to express their political opinions and technically to enjoy political equality alongside their male counterparts. But this was a token right and did not signify women's liberation in general. The state rather became even more repressive and authoritarian in regard to its women subjects.

The Islamic Regime

While Islam was the religion of the Iranians, not all of them saw Islam as the sole solution to their problems. Only 5,000 of the 70,000 villages had

a permanent *mullah* presence in 1979. And they were connected to landowners. Peasants fought for and, in hundreds of villages, occupied land. Land reform legislation was stalled at the end of 1979, when *mullahs* like Ayatollah Golpayegani opposed it on the grounds that division of large landowners' land was contrary to Islamic principles. Thus, the radical socioeconomic dimensions of the Iranian Revolution were suppressed by using Islam as a unifying credo. The revolutionary credo *al-Islam buna al-hal* (Islam is the solution) embodied the alternative vision. But "Islam" is not a monolithic structure of thought and practice. The Iranian Revolution followed the Shi'ite variant of Islam. And here, too, there were multiple interpretations of the same religion. Khomeini's version of Shi'ism formed an innovative discourse.

His experimental model of a traditional Islamic brand of ideology led to a regime quite unprecedented in tradition. Beginning from a conventional religious standpoint, it reached very novel conclusions that were possible only in the modern political set-up of a nation-state. In many ways, the takeover of government was just the first phase. The revolution then had to prove that its dogma could cure society's ills, and this task became the main challenge for the revolutionary regime, especially during the Iran–Iraq War. Apparently, the revolution led to the unification of religion and state and the transfer of both theological and political power to the highest religious authority, the *marja'-al-taqlid* (the highest Shi'a authority), or *velayat-e faqih* (government of Islamic jurists). But problems developed at two levels. First, there was conflict between the philosophy of the revolution and the political interest of the Iranian state. Second, there were conceptual, factional, and personal conflicts among the revolutionaries themselves on the questions of policies, power structure, and the succession issue at the end of Khomeini era.

Khomeini found in Islam the tool to contest and combat western political and cultural ideologies. He formulated his new ideas at a time of acute internal social distress. Peasants were running away from villages to town slums, and small businessmen were feeling threatened by wealthy entrepreneurs linked to the central government as well as by multinational corporations. Khomeini harped on the point of national security threatened by the Americans, and also on the Pahlavi (state) alternative of

steady encroachment upon religious properties and institutions, especially seminaries, publishing houses, and landed endowments. At this juncture, when state was about to take over religion, Khomeini turned the situation upside down and it was religion that ultimately took over the state. In fact, in his book *Hokumat-e Islami: Velayat-e faqih* (Islamic Government: Authority of the Jurist), he claimed the supremacy of the clerical judges while denouncing monarchy as an alien institution imposed by various external forces. This claim for supreme leadership in political as well as religious decision-making made Khomeini the unquestionable supreme authority of the state.

The Khomeini brand of "fundamentalism" received diverse and contradictory explanations from various intellectual positions. According to Abrahamian (1993), the Khomeini regime was an experiment with populism as this term is associated with ideological adaptability and intellectual flexibility, with political protests against the established order, and with socioeconomic issues that fuel mass opposition to the status quo. "Fundamentalism," in contrast, implies religious inflexibility, the centrality of scriptural doctrinal principles, political traditionalism, and social conservatism. In other words, "fundamentalism" implies the rejection of the modern world, while "populism" connotes attempts made by nation-states to enter that world. Achcar (2006: 48–59) argues that fundamentalism had a distressed petty bourgeois social base, but distinguishes between nationalism with Islam as a component and fundamentalism, which sees Islam as an end in itself. It involves a form of reactionary "internationalism" that wants to go beyond the border of the country of its origin, opposing the US not because it is imperialist and Israel not because it is a Zionist usurper of Palestinian land but because the US is the "Great Satan" and Israel "the Jewish usurper of an Islamic holy land."

In fact, the constitutional proposals saw a radical innovation. It was Khomeini who for the first time fused the two distinct yet overlapping positions of authority (political and religious) into one, by making the religious head the supreme political authority. The Islamic Revolution reached a new level of experimentation when Khomeini abolished the office of the Shah and brought political, ethical, cultural, and religious responsibilities under a new model of

Islamic rule. After the success of the revolution, the task of rebuilding the state and running the government became the major practical objectives at hand. Khomeini upheld the view that the *faqih* (jurist-consult) had the right to act as a political ruler as part of common Shi'i political theory. But he had further extended the position of the *faqih* and transcended the traditional Islamic parameters of Shari'a (Islamic law). These ideas, held by Khomeini, emerged in writing Articles II and V of the Constitution of Iran in 1979. It was specifically claimed that in the absence of the *mahdi imam* (messiah), guardianship over the affairs of the community should be bestowed on the just *faqih*, who is pious, knowledgeable, courageous, and acceptable to the majority of the masses. If no *faqih* can achieve this majority, a leader or a leadership council composed of *faqih* meeting all the requirements would shoulder this responsibility. Thus a shift of emphasis from Shari'a to the *faqih* as the ultimate leader was a reinterpretation of the traditional idea of an Islamic state. The pragmatic political leadership sought to replace the age-old written texts. Khomeini's stand was revolutionary even within the traditional parameters of Islam itself. While running the government, the Iranian Revolution, instead of sliding back toward tradition, started Islamizing western political ideas and institutions such as "republic," "constitution," "cabinet," and "parliament." And since final decision-making power remained with the leader, revolutionary policies remained fluid, divergent, often contradictory, and in constant quest for a balance between theoretical claims and the demands of the real world.

The constitution of the new revolutionary regime was prepared under the direct supervision of Khomeini. The text of the constitution with its 175 clauses began with the declaration that the Islamic Republic was based on the "principal faiths" of the justice of God; the existence of one God and submission to his will; the divine message and its fundamental role in all human laws; and the concept of the "resurrection" and its role in human evolution. But the text also included a number of pragmatic clauses. It divided the government into the executive, headed by the president, supervising a highly centralized state; the judiciary, with powers to appoint district judges and review their verdicts; and the national parliament, elected through universal adult suffrage. Khomeini, who had

opposed the Shah's decision in 1963 to let women vote in local elections, now changed his stance and argued that to deprive women of the vote was un-Islamic. The constitution also contained many populist visions. It promised all citizens pensions, social security, unemployment benefits, disability pay, medical services, and free secondary as well as primary school education. It further promised to eradicate hoarding, usury, monopolies, unemployment, poverty, and social deprivation; provide interest-free loans; and utilize science and technology. Finally, the constitution declared that it would plan the economy in such a way that all individuals would have the time and opportunity to enhance their moral and social development.

Thus, Iran's revolutionary constitution promised to make Iran fully independent, pay off external loans, cancel foreign concessions, nationalize foreign companies, and strive for the total unity of all Muslims. Despite Khomeini's vehement rejection of "western" ideologies and practices, a number of ideas that he had reestablished within traditional Islamic vocabulary were actually borrowed from the West. He divided society into two opposite camps as the *mosta-zafin* (oppressed) and the *mostakberin* (oppressors), the *fogara* (poor) and the *sarvatmandan* (rich), and so on. The slogan of helping the world's oppressed struggle against their oppressors had an overwhelmingly socialistic rhetoric. The constitution pledged to balance the government budget, encourage "home ownership," and respect the predominance of the private sector in agriculture, trade, services, and small industries. Khomeinism thus mobilized the masses and played on their lived-reality issues in a radical-sounding rhetoric against the external powers and the ruling elite, carefully securing the right to private property. It claimed to be a return to native roots and a means for eradicating cosmopolitan ideas, thereby showing a non-capitalist, non-communist "third way" toward development. The former USSR initially provided lip-service to the revolutionary endeavor in Iran as an anti-US, anti-capitalist movement. But Iran did not lean much on support from that quarter – nor did the USSR bend further to promote Cold War praxis to this area.

However, in reality, Khomeini had to pay much attention to running the revolutionary state, often compromising his theoretical premises. To run the vast array of social services, the

Islamic Republic had no choice but to extend the large ministries and their regional departments. It had a system of *Komitehs* (local committees) and *Sepah-e-pasdaran* (loyal Islamic troops of the regime). To alleviate public discontent, it introduced food rationing and price controls and periodically launched campaigns against speculators, hoarders, and price-gougers. To administer the then recently nationalized enterprises, mostly confiscated from multinational corporations, the royal family, and their close associates, the new regime had to dramatically expand the bureaucratic machinery. Above all, the inherent contradiction between his populist rhetoric and his respect for private property created a double standard in Khomeini's regime. The majority in the *majlis* (parliament), the "progressives," attacked wealth, while the Guardian Council, the body with constitutional authority, ensured that all parliamentary bills conformed to the sacred law. In fact from 1981 to 1987, the Guardian Council vetoed some 100 reform bills as violations against the sanctity of private property, which included issues as important as land reforms, labor legislation, progressive income tax, and nationalization of foreign trade. Khomeini was reluctant to alienate his wealthy supporters, while deeming it inexpedient to immediately turn against the laboring classes. He was rather concerned about the support of the *bazaaris*, who were the economically proactive class as well as the commercially thriving section of society. As Islam's main pillar of strength throughout Iranian history, this class was always very vocal in the state's political affairs.

The model of state thrown up by the Islamic Revolution was one that respected private property but presented a version of "Third Worldism." It talked of Islam as protecting the poor, but clearly marked itself off from any genuine socialism. At the same time, through bank nationalizations (of mostly crisis-ridden banks), it portrayed itself as different from western liberal democratic models with a capitalist framework. It seemed most intriguing to discover Khomeini's interest in observing May Day officially in Iran. May 1, 1979 was a major public festival in the Islamic Republic, which was openly hostile to Marxism and communism as an alien western ideological importation. However, the streets of Iran were flooded by people celebrating International Workers' Day as well as freedom from the tradition of repressive mon-

archy from time immemorial. May Day had been an integral part of leftist tradition in Iran, and had been observed since 1921. But with the establishment of the Islamic Republic it was made a gala show as a ploy by the Khomeini regime to mobilize the urban working class and as much left supporters as possible under its hegemony, so that any threat from the secular left could be forestalled. The takeover of May Day was logically followed by the systematic elimination of the leftist parties one by one. In 1981, the Mojahedin, the National Front, and many Marxist groups were outlawed. In 1982, the authorities arrested members of the Tudeh Party on a mass scale. In the late 1980s, the regime shifted May Day celebrations from streets to confined spaces such as university campuses and sports stadiums, which also indicated the growing conservatism and skepticism of the revolutionary regime's political outlook. Thus with the consolidation of the regime, the spirit of May Day was manipulated and narrowed down. But that it still remains alive in Iran evidences the deep-rooted existence and symbolic strength of the leftist tradition in modern Iran.

Alternatives and their Failures

Ahcar has described the Iranian Revolution as a "permanent revolution in reverse." In origin it was a popular national democratic revolution with anti-despotic, anti-monarchic, and anti-imperialist stances, which was steadily pushed to the right by Islamic fundamentalists. Beginning as a national democratic revolution with a powerful proletarian component, it ended up by enacting extreme reactionary measures. Among the political forces that participated in the revolution were the Tudeh Party of Iran, the Iranian People's Fedayeen guerillas, the Organization of People's Mojahedin of Iran, the National Front, the Freedom Movement, and pro-Khomeini clergy. From the beginning, tensions existed between these groups.

The victory of the February 1979 Revolution resulted in the emergence of a political atmosphere in which for the first time, after 25 years of repression and suppression of progressive forces by the Shah's regime, political parties and organizations were allowed to organize freely. The Tudeh Party of Iran was prominent among those. But it tended to support the Khomeini regime as "anti-imperialist." The Fedayeen and the

Mojahedin were more opposed to the regime. In the Turkoman region, where members of the former ruling family held extensive land, peasant struggles to expropriate landowners were supported by the Fedayeen, and initially they fought the *pasdaran* to a standstill. But this uneasy equation between completely diverse ideologies could not last long. The Mojahedin, following a policy of aligning with one or other wing of the elite, sided with Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, who had fallen out with Khomeini, and started carrying out terrorist activities in 1980–1. Using this as an excuse, the regime cracked down on all opponents. The militant opponents were smashed first. Shortly thereafter, the Tudeh Party also found that Khomeini had no more need of it. As part of a general repression, prominent members of the party were imprisoned as Soviet spies. Almost 10,000 cadres were arrested and the party was declared illegal. By the time of Khomeini's death, all radical forces had been destroyed and every progressive issue for which the masses had fought in 1979 snatched away from them.

Khomeini's new experimental populism was deeply rooted in tradition, orthodoxy, and patriarchy. Although the revolutionary regime utilized women as a vote bank, it moved swiftly to push women back into domesticity soon after its consolidation. Both their private and public lives were affected. Laws and policies concerning women in revolutionary Iran were not only orthodox, they were also crafted in a misogynistic way and were therefore quite obviously derogatory to women. *Hijab* (the veil) was made mandatory in public places and use of cosmetics was restricted, with punishment for defiance ranging from whipping to imprisonment. Higher study was markedly restricted for women. They were not allowed to participate in sports, or even watch men play sports. Women also could not travel or acquire a passport without the written permission of their male guardian (husband or father). Such endless restrictions came to women as a result of their vote for the revolution. The stipulation of equality for women was qualified in the constitution by adding that equality only went so far as Islamic law allowed. A series of new laws restricting women's mobility was passed between 1981 and 1983. Gender segregation started in the public transport system and even in educational institutions. The freedom of women performers was severely curbed. Women were being silently removed from important political

positions and barred from participating in the judiciary. The case of Iran provides the classic example of the fact that the right to vote by itself cannot change or improve the position of women. Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2006) quite legitimately pointed out that women did not get a fair deal by the regime's fierce Islamization process. The more extreme steps included legalization of stoning to death for adultery, the annulment of the Family Protection Law of 1967 (and its 1975 amendments), which had abolished men's right to *talaq* (repudiation), restricted their right to polygamy, and placed men and women on a more or less equal legal footing in terms of access to divorce and custody rights, and the restoration in 1979 of the Shari'a in order to "protect the family" and realize women's "high status" in Islam. The legally approved marriageable age became 9, and polygamy was legalized.

Women did not accept this silently. When the new family courts presided over by Islamic judges started functioning, women were incredulous to learn that their husbands could divorce them without securing their consent. They started challenging the judges. Even after several years, voices of protest could still be heard. The enforcement of patriarchal *fiqh* (the science of jurisprudence) notions of marriage and divorce created such havoc in family life that eventually a series of reforms had to be brought in by the government, at least for those women who presented no overt challenge to the patriarchal ethos of the law as defined by classical Muslim jurists. To exercise his right to divorce, a man was told to either obtain his wife's consent or pay her substantial compensation. Rather than producing matrimonial harmony, the ostensible reason for the return to the Shari'a, the reality was increased marital breakdown.

Struggles Within the Islamic Camp

Stabilization of the regime was possible only after internal conflicts were resolved. With the consolidation of the clerical regime, significant differences within the revolutionary camp over the formulation of concrete policymaking and governance became more vivid within the inner core of Khomeini's power base. After Khomeini's death, this polarization and conflicts within the leadership increased even more as each party vied for ultimate political authority while deal-

ing with social issues. The practical context did much to foment this tension within the leadership. Internally, the most serious difficulties included the struggle for power among the different groups in the revolutionary movement, socioeconomic challenges following the revolutionary takeover, and a substantial drop in oil income. Externally, post-revolution Iran faced a number of persistent troubles – tension with the United States and other western powers, the prolonged and indecisive Iran–Iraq War, and also the uneasy equation with most of Iran’s immediate neighbors.

On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. The US and its allies, in order to teach Iran a lesson, provided supplies to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Iraq also obtained its weaponry from the Soviet camp at one point. This destructive war, which caused a constant drain on money and manpower for the new Islamic state of Iran, ended with UN intervention in 1988. Khomeini died in 1989, leaving the future of the Iranian Revolution at an indecisive midway point.

SEE ALSO: Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Mussau (1902–1989) and the Shi’ite Islamic Revolution; Mossadegh, Mohammad (1881–1967)

References and Suggested Readings

- Abrahamian, E. (1993) *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Achcar, G. (2006) *Eastern Cauldron*. New Delhi: Aakar.
- Afary, J. & Anderson, K. B. (2005) *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ayubi, N. (1994) *Political Islam, Religion and Politics in the Arab World*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Duret, A. (1983a) The Iranian Revolution Four Years after the February 1979 Insurrection. *International Viewpoint* 27: 16–25.
- Duret, A. (1983b) The Crisis of the Iranian Revolution. *International Viewpoint* 28: 17–26.
- Mir-Hosseini, Z. (1999) *Islam and Gender: The Religious Debate in Contemporary Iran*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mir-Hosseini, Z. (2006) Muslim Women’s Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and Feminism. *Critical Inquiry* 32: 629–45.
- Omidvar, M. (1993) *Brief History of the Tudeh Party of Iran*. Available at www.tudehpartyiran.org/history.htm (downloaded February 28, 2008).
- Sepehri, S. (2000) The Iranian Revolution. *International Socialist Review* 9 (August–September). Available at www.isreview.org/issues/09/iranian_revolution.shtml (downloaded March 31, 2008).

Shevlin, N. (n.d.) *Velayat-e Faqih in the Constitution of Iran: The Implementation of the Theocracy*. Available at www.gongfa.com/yilangxianfa.htm (downloaded March 31, 2008).

Iraq, anti-British nationalists

Shibashis Chatterjee

Iraq’s modern history begins from the eighteenth century with the gradual penetration of western trade and capital as a byproduct of Ottoman Turkish agreements with the western powers, primarily through the commercial agency of the British East India Company. The early nationalism came in the form of urban opposition to Ottoman rule. In particular, the Iraqi and Syrian army officers who had fought for the Ottomans came to support the first wave of Arab nationalism against this regime. But the movement, led by the Hashemite Prince Faisal and strategically supported by Britain, proved abortive. Full independence of the people of Iraq was not considered because of the imperial struggles between France and Britain. Although Britain lost control of Syria to France, it managed to gain Iraq and Palestine as mandated territories under the League of Nations. Faisal became the puppet-king.

The Al Ahad Society, formed by Arab officers in 1916, began to demand an independent Arab state, also supported by the Kurds (an ethnic group settled in the adjacent parts of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey) and the Iraqi peasants. The Kurdish declaration of independence in May 1919 was followed by spontaneous armed struggle in 1920, when the peasants and a section of the urban lower and middle classes also joined in. But this anti-proto-colonial domination collapsed when confronted by British retaliation against the Kurdish peasant villages. The Cairo Conference of 1921 saw the further perpetuation of the mandate system with the grant of British-controlled minor political concessions.

A combination of repression and bribery eventually secured Faisal’s place on the throne. Iraq gained nominal independence in 1932 and a seat in the League of Nations, with British advisers remaining firmly in power behind the scenes. A treaty between the two governments in 1930 maintained Britain’s military domination of Iraq. The British granted land titles to the tribal

sheikhs, the predominant landowning class of Iraq. Private property in land thus replaced the traditional communal agricultural system. The new landed gentry, together with a section of army officers, became the new aristocracy of Iraq, who agreed to complete subservience to British dominance in return for their total control over agriculture. The resultant appalling degradation of peasantry ignited a series of peasant revolts throughout the 1930s. The superior technology of counterinsurgency succeeded in crushing but could not silence this mass resurgence.

The political reality of the 1930s was one of continuous plots, subterfuges, and nefarious backstage manipulation by the British through their agents, particularly Nuri-al-Said, many-times prime minister and a key figure in the old regime. Even in the 1920s the social basis for the Iraqi monarchy had been very thin, and by the 1940s it was even thinner, as new social forces, such as the growing working class, the urban poor, and the new middle class, combined in protest at its continued domination. The government's usual response was increased repression. Parties were banned, strikers shot down, and communists slaughtered publicly. Jobs, dependent on the British army, shrank with the end of the war in a situation when prices and rents remained ruinously high and the population doubled, particularly in Baghdad. War profiteering combined with an oil boom allowed a thin layer of the elite to indulge in conspicuous consumption. Meanwhile industrialization, however small scale, pulled people out of the villages into the great urban centers. The turning point came in 1948, when a regressive regime led by Iraq's first Shi'ite prime minister, Salih Jabr, planned to extend the hated Treaty of 1930 with the British in the guise of revising it. Massive protests (*Al-Wathba* or the Leap) broke out in Baghdad and other cities and were followed by repression, combined with some concessions.

The British concession came in the form of a new design for constitutional monarchy, armed with a bicameral legislature and voting rights for the citizens. But the opposition parties had little influence over the masses. By the early 1950s the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) had become a mass party, drawing several trade unions and students into its fold. Communist support for Kurdish national rights combined with their defense of Kurdish peasants and workers meant that in many areas of Kurdistan the ICP could

count on much greater support than the nationalist Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

The *Wathbah* uprising, led by students, workers, and the urban poor, showed that the relationship between the nationalist and the class struggle was a key factor in maintaining the dynamic of mass protest. Almost all manifestations of opposition by organized labor during the 1940s and 1950s tended to combine claims for higher wages and better living conditions with the struggle for national independence. It was often against British-owned or controlled concerns that the strikes and demonstrations were concentrated. After a brief lull in the early 1950s, the pressure from below reemerged with the *Al-Intifada* (the Uprising) in 1952. External events were by now adding to the pressure on the old regime. Nationalism in Iran under Mossadeq in 1951 and Nasser's rise to power in Egypt helped the reemergence of the nationalist movement, which could not be arrested despite Nuri-al-Said's announcement that his Constitutional Union Party was calling for the reform of the electoral system.

Several tendencies developed in Iraqi nationalism. The first of these saw the crystallization of a sense of Iraqi national identity, which invoked the historic memory of the great Babylonian or Mesopotamian heritage. *Jamat-al-Ahali* was the principal mouthpiece of this tendency of social reformism, largely inspired by Fabian socialist ideals. But its broad bourgeois character demanded political independence and democratic rights be achieved through political moderation and gradualism. The other tendency was Arab educationist Sati' al-Husri's pan-Arabism, connoting the idea of a single Arabic geopolitical entity without arbitrary political divisions created by the colonial West. Pan-Arabism as an idea attracted the Sunni Muslims, who were to be an overwhelming majority in an undifferentiated Arab republic. This very reason made the idea unfavorable with the Shi'ite population and the northern Kurds, who together constituted the demographic majority of the Iraqi state.

A third current, popular radicalism with significant communist presence, also existed, as discussed above. By the mid-1950s the Suez Crisis also radicalized a whole generation of officers who were inspired by the success of Nasser in Egypt. The anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact in 1955 also pushed many toward rebellion. However, the nationalist officers were still a

small minority inside the army. So unpopular were the monarchy and the old ruling class, however, that this military group was able to carry out the revolution of 1958.

SEE ALSO: Iraq, Protest, Rebellion, and Revolution: Overview; Iraq, Revolution of 1958; *Wathbah* of 1948

References and Suggested Readings

- Alexander, A. (2003) Daring for Victory: Iraq in Revolution 1946–1959. *International Socialism Journal* 99.
- Batatu, H. (1978) *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movement in Iraq*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Farouk-Sluglett, M. & Sluglett, P. (2003) *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*. New York: I. B. Tauris.
- Tripp, C. (2002) *A History of Iraq*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Iraq, protest, rebellion, and revolution: overview

Johan Franzén

The history of modern Iraq is often characterized as an unremitting popular struggle against various ruling constellations at the apex of power. This is due, in large part, to the inception of the modern Iraqi state as a British “mandate” in the aftermath of World War I and a range of political groups challenging its legitimacy. From the outset, British intentions in Iraq of creating a colony to be incorporated into the empire were confronted by Iraqi nationalists, and the British eventually had to settle for a “semi-colony” in the form of an officially “independent” state. Relentlessly challenged in a series of events – the Rashid ‘Ali al-Gaylani regime of 1941, the *Wathbah* of 1948, the Intifadas of 1952 and 1956 – the pro-British regime eventually fell on July 14, 1958, after a carefully orchestrated military coup that was carried out by a group of army officers and a populist front.

Unfortunately for Iraq, the new era opened up by the 1958 Revolution eventually led to bitter and bloody power struggles between Iraq’s various political and ethnic groups over the legacy of British rule. The Qasim regime that had been in power since the 1958 Revolution was overthrown in February 1963 by the Baath Party,

which went on to massacre many of Qasim’s supporters. Overthrown later in the same year, the Baathists would manage a comeback in 1968, whence they held on to power through the iron-fist rule of the infamous Saddam Hussein until the 2003 US/UK invasion.

In the 1960s, the Kurdish national movement started to come to the fore. Led by the legendary Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani, it fought wars against the regime throughout the decade and into the next until splitting into contending factions that fought each other as much as they combated the regime.

The other significant group in Iraq, the Shi’a, who were repressed during Saddam Hussein’s regime (1979–2003), also tried to resist the regime as best they could. Following the Coalition expulsion of the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1991, they rose in a rebellion against the regime, which was bloodily put down. The same fate awaited the Kurds when they attempted their own rebellion in the north.

Despite the efforts of large sections of the population and their almost 25 years of unyielding clandestine resistance, it was the military might of the American army that eventually toppled the dictator, whom, ironically, they had been instrumental in propping up and arming throughout the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s.

SEE ALSO: Barzani, Mulla Mustafa al- (1903–1979); Iraq, Anti-British Nationalists; Iraq, Revolution of 1958; Iraqi Resistance, 1991–2007; Kurdistan Nationalist Movement and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party); Syria and Iraq, Baathists; *Wathbah* of 1948

References and Suggested Readings

- Barzani, M. & Ferhadi, A. (2003) *Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Farouk-Sluglett, M. & Sluglett, P. (2001) *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*. New York: I. B. Tauris.
- Polk, W. (2006) *Understanding Iraq: The Whole Sweep of Iraqi History, from Genghis Khan’s Mongols to the Ottoman Turks to the British Mandate to the American Occupation*. New York: HarperCollins.

Iraq, Revolt of 1920

Johan Franzén

At the close of World War I, Kurdish areas of northern Iraq fell under the control of Great

Britain. In December 1918, the British appointed a local notable, Shaykh Mahmud al-Barzinji, as governor of lower Kurdistan. Shaykh al-Barzinji was an ambitious man and as such tried to spread his influence throughout Kurdistan. While the British tried to restrain him, he eventually declared Kurdistan an independent state in May 1919. This prompted the British to dispatch an expeditionary force to Kurdistan, eventually capturing Shaykh al-Barzinji and instituting direct rule in al-Sulaymaniyyah. Soon after, they also abolished existing Ottoman elected municipal councils throughout Iraq in favor of their own political officers. This was not a welcome change as it inspired many native uprisings that included the assassination of British political officers.

Another group that became increasingly averse toward British rule was the old Ottoman bureaucratic “aristocracy,” the so-called *effendiyyah*. During Ottoman times, this group had been very prominent and in effect constituted the ruling elite. When Britain opted for direct rule, its position became directly threatened. Many disgruntled members, mostly of the younger generation, radicalized for nationalist purposes. Together with other urban nationalists, they joined forces with rural nationalist shaykhs and religious *'alims* and *mujtahids* (Shi'i religious scholars) and formed the backbone of what was to be the 1920 Revolt.

The revolt began brewing in 1919 when an Iraqi delegation was prohibited from going to the Versailles Peace Conference to discuss the postwar settlement of the world. This prompted the formation of Haras al-Istiqlal (the Guardians of Independence), a mostly Shi'i nationalist organization led by Muhammad al-Sadr, son of a prominent Shi'i *mujtahid*, Ayatollah Hasan al-Sadr. Muhammad al-Sadr turned to Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi al-Shirazi to succeed the moderate Ayatollah Yazdi as the “the spiritual leader of the revolt.”

Matters were further enflamed in May 1920 when a San Remo Conference granted the Iraqi territory to Britain. Realizing that independence could now only be achieved through armed action, nationalist cooperation between Sunnis and Shi'is started to take shape. The Ayatollah al-Shirazi followed suit and issued a *fatwa* declaring working for the British administration unlawful. Soon after, Ayatollah al-Shirazi's son was arrested by the British. This prompted another *fatwa* that supported an armed revolt. In

response the British made a preemptive strike on the nationalist shaykhs and arrested many of them on cooked-up charges. On June 30, a nationalist shaykh of the Zawalim tribe was arrested in Rumaythah in al-Diwaniyyah province. After being freed by an armed group of his men, he declared a rebellion against the British by destroying nearby infrastructure. News of the revolt soon spread to nearby Samawah, where a British garrison was taken completely by surprise and had to surrender.

In the months that followed British forces began defending themselves on several fronts simultaneously, causing the British governor at al-Najaf to withdraw when a Provisional Revolutionary Government was set up to support the revolt. In Iraqi Kurdistan, many Kurdish *aghas* (Kurdish tribal leaders) opportunistically seized the moment and rose up in local rebellions against British rule.

Fearing for the safety of Baghdad, British military commander General Haldane requested British War Minister Winston S. Churchill to send reinforcements from Iran. The request was granted and two squadrons of the Royal Air Force were sent. This inevitably shifted the balance of forces and marked the beginning of the end of the revolt. After five months of fighting, the rebels' resources were eventually depleted. The British forces were able to quell the revolt before it was able to encompass all of Iraq. In some areas, notably al-Kut and al-'Amarah, the local shaykhs, as a result of having their vast landowning recognized by the British, decided to take the British side and worked against the revolt.

While the revolt had failed, the British suffered a death toll of 500. For the Iraqis it is estimated that 6,000 were killed. The cost of subduing the revolt amounted to a staggering £40 million, forcing the British to rethink their whole policy toward Iraq. Instead of reinstating direct rule, they eventually decided to establish an “indigenous” monarchy, with the son of the Meccan Sharif, Faysal bin Husayn, appointed as king of the new state in 1921.

SEE ALSO: Fahd, Yusuf Salman Yusuf (1901–1949); Iraq, Anti-British Nationalists; Kurdistan Nationalist Movement and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)

References and Suggested Readings

Catherwood, C. (2004) *Churchill's Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq*. New York: Carroll & Graf.

- Fromkin, D. (1989) *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and Creation of the Modern Middle East*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Simon, R. (2004) *The Creation of Iraq, 1914–1921*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Iraq, Revolution of 1958

Shibashis Chatterjee

Communists and Nationalists: The Roots of the Revolution

A watershed in Iraq's modern history, this revolution was responsible for creating the broad parameter within which the vicissitudes of Iraq's sociopolitical contradictions took shape. The advent of the Allied armed forces during World War II meant a sudden rise in market demand for commodities backed up by good purchasing power. The wreckage of the war also led to supply disruptions from the West, which gave a new boost to industrial production in Iraq. The result of this spurt in industrial activities was the beginning of a very strong working-class movement, to be led by the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), which had momentous consequences for political trends in the future. Despite the imposition of martial law in Iraq between 1941 and 1946, the dynamic leadership of Yusuf Salman Yusuf (more popularly known as Fahd) created a mass base for the underground ICP, established in 1934. The ICP did not work for the overthrow of the Hashemite regime, which was a puppet of the UK, an ally of the USSR during World War II. However the communists played a leading role in the 15-day railway workers' strike in Iraq in April 1945. The striking workers got a wage hike but their union was declared illegal by the Iraqi authorities.

The period after the lifting of martial law also saw the development of a large number of important political parties, such as the liberal National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, upholding a somber vanity of pan-Arabism. There was a massive expansion of trade unions during this period, under the overwhelming control of the ICP. The climate of political activism and turbulence from below alarmed the British and their domestic political surrogates. A major event of the period was the

July 1946 strike in the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in Kirkuk that turned violent when police fired against the strikers. The Salih Jabr cabinet resorted to wanton persecution of the communists, with three of their top leaders executed, and banned the National Democratic Party in anticipation of further political mobilization. Repression failed to quell a rising crescendo of mass struggles. The uprising of January 1948 followed more than two years of rising industrial struggle. As the huge street protests of 1948 subsided, major strikes, involving railway workers and postal workers, continued even with Jabr's replacement by the new cabinet of Muhammad al-Sadr. The situation exploded when the Communist Party led a massive strike of April–May 1948, in the IPC pumping station near Haditha, where the main demand was a wage rise of 25 percent to 40 percent. The strike committee organized round-the-clock picketing, marshaling 3,000 strikers so efficiently that production completely stopped. The state retaliated brutally, but the unfazed workers staged a dramatic counteraction of supreme defiance – a spectacular march called the *al-Mazira al-Kubra* – where class demands coincided with those of national independence. This explosive combination turned the class movement into a nodal focus of organizational struggles with greater mass appeal. Brought back in January 1949, Nuri-al-Said, a trusted politician of the puppet regime, gave orders for the public hanging of Fahd. The party was virtually purged of its leaders, but the hanging of Fahd and the slaughtering of his comrades assumed an immortal martyrdom in the public imagination that turned the ICP into the most potent ammunition in the battle to gain complete independence from the British and the Hashemite government.

The mood of political discontent had, however, made the collapse of the surrogate system only a matter of time. Gamal Abdel Nasser's success in Egypt in 1952 had tumultuous consequences for the politics of the entire Arab world. The announcement of land and social reform in Egypt acted as a spur to the movement in Iraq. In response to growing pressure from below, Nuri-al-Said announced that his Constitutional Union Party was calling for the reform of the electoral system. Finding an opening within the ruling class front, the mass movement poured in. There began the Intifada. The government quickly reacted by declaring martial law and banning all political parties. But repression could

not halt the resumption of communist activities. Iraq's ruling class, calculating a final intervention by the British, tried to articulate new developmental schemes to share its oil wealth with other deprived classes, but did not succeed. Their schemes had nothing to offer to the poor peasants, whose condition had by then become unbearable. The newly mobilized and ascendant urban class of salaried civil servants, teachers, middle- and low-ranking officers of the army, petty businessmen, and new professionals found no incentive in these schemes. The idea gained ground that even if the development schemes spawned benefits, these would invariably be controlled by the ruling aristocracy and the British agents. The new middle class could no longer be politically contained – their aspirations had outgrown the exclusionary limits of the existing regime. The catalyst to the insurrection finally came in the apparently outrageous decision, viewed in hindsight, by the Iraqi government to swim against the tide and draft Iraq into the US-led Baghdad Pact in 1955 and then to unite with Jordan in 1957 to counter the combined might of Syria and Egypt. The Suez misadventure by the British finally removed the ground completely from under the feet of the “old gang.” Mass discontentment swelled to an unprecedented pitch, with the communists playing a stellar role, and a second national opposition front was formed in February 1957 comprising the National Democratic Party, the Independence Party, the Communists, and the Ba'ath Party.

But the decisive blow to the old establishment came from the army, most of whom being Sunni were attracted to pan-Arabism. By the mid-1950s discontent was also spreading in the army. The Suez Crisis radicalized a whole generation of officers who were inspired by the success of Nasser in Egypt. The Baghdad Pact also pushed many toward rebellion. However, the nationalist officers were still a small minority inside the army. The political sterility of the system, coupled with the past ruthlessness of the establishment and the grave political ambiguity that gave different messages to the constituent parts of the new coalition, meant that a revolution was inevitable in the absence of a peaceful and democratic political transformation. The young generation of army officers led by a senior free officer called Brigadier Karim Qassem (or Qasim) plotted a coup on July 14, 1958. This coup terminated the constitutional monarchy and created a new republic based on nationalist ideals.

The narrative thus far reads the rebellion of 1958 in essentially political terms. Underlying the revolution were, however, major tectonic shifts of political economy, brilliantly summarized by Hanna Batatu (1978). Batatu located the epicenter of the revolution in the mass impoverishment of the lower peasants in the countryside and the urban lower classes and workers, as against the growing opulence of a new commercial elite based on the wealth of oil. The inevitable class polarization and antagonism within an archaic political setup that did not allow even nominal political representation of the newly emerging groups made revolutionary transformation a possibility. Support from the lesser classes, who did not understand the dynamics of the groups that were to seize power, made the rebellion happen at a comparatively low cost. Batatu's account stresses primarily the class contradiction, possibly reducing the significance of the existing reality that consisted of a whole range of ethnic and religious diversities, and largely omits the role of the motley of groups standing somewhere in the middle of these class hierarchies. The 1958 revolution, like all social revolutions, was multi-causal rather than a simplistic narrative of class. Most crucially, there was no consensus about what the revolution meant to its makers. This deep schism within the ideational blueprint(s) of the event amounted to its defeat in a decade's time.

The Qassem Regime

Iraq in 1958 inherited the pre-1958 structures – the hapless peasantry caught in the grip of the gentry; the IPC in British hands and being the main conduit for providing much-needed developmental funds to the state; and several weaknesses that dwarfed the growth of the domestic capitalist class and pegged Iraq to the exploitative structure of the West. Like so many other postcolonial leaders, Qassem essentially worked on a negative agenda. The main objective of the new government was to remove the older, venal aristocracy from power and shift the locus of authority to the new urban classes. But there was no political imagination that could hold the new groups together and there was no political strategy to deepen the mass base of the regime by drawing the peasants and the workers into the system. The ambiguity was clearly manifest in Qassem's tryst with land reforms. While he knew that the landed gentry had to be weakened,

there was no attempt at distributing land to the peasants. The same weakness was demonstrated in his dealings with the IPC. Although he was instrumental in revoking the concessions of the international cartel, he stopped short of full nationalization, unsure of the consequence it might provoke.

The ultimate tragedy of Qassem lay in the contradictions of his structures of support, namely the Ba'athist and the communist notions of independence. The pan-Arabist leaning of the Ba'athists had made them demand Arab unity as the material-cum-ideological basis to defy the West. Their fascination lay with the Nasser version of Arab nationalism, epitomized by his decision to merge with Syria. Arab nationalism was the core of the Ba'ath ideology, who recruited heavily from the Sunni Arabs of Tirkit and Baghdad. Right-wing nationalists such as Abdul Salain Aref vindicated nationalism as the motive force of post-1958 Iraq.

The nationalist left stood opposed to Aref's brand of Arab nationalism. The most important players here were the communists and the Kurdish Democratic Party, the latter having a distinctive left leaning after 1945. The communists held Nasser's vision to be undemocratic and reactionary. They argued that joining the United Arab Republic (UAR) would mean the end of Iraq's hard-won democratic freedoms. The ICP organized huge demonstrations acclaiming Qassem as "sole leader" of the Iraqi Revolution, hoping to build his support as a counterweight to Nasser. But ideologically the Communist Party had a typical Stalinist multi-stage concept of revolution. The Kurds were suspicious of pan-Arabism on ethnic grounds. The NDP also opposed Nasser's ideas as totalitarian. The ultimate deciding factor, however, remained the army, a sizable section of whose officers were indeterminate and thought Iraqi nationalism under Qassem to be safer for their sectional interests than a broader unity dictated by Nasser's Egypt. In May 1959, the city of Mosul reached a flashpoint. Near the Syrian border, it was relatively conservative, and Nasserite forces were rumored to be planning a coup. In response, the ICP organized a massive demonstration, again with the slogan "No leader but Abd'al-Karim Qassem." Clashes broke out, and the rebellion was eventually crushed by the communist front People's Resistance and troops loyal to Qassem, but not before the fighting had spread along ethnic and religious lines in

Mosul. Yet, as Hanna Batatu points out, the overwhelming divide in the conflict was class.

The Communist Party now demanded positions in the cabinet. After initially refusing, Qassem invited some of its members. But this was a meaningless gesture, as he was plotting to purge the army of communist influence. He calculated that his regime rested on a delicate balance of pan-Arabist and left nationalist forces. Hence, he turned next to containing the communist challenge, which led to an enormous sapping of strength for both Qassem and the communist forces. By the second half of 1959, the ICP was under severe attack. Why did the Iraqi communists come so close to power, and yet still fail? A crucial role was played by the Soviet leadership. Emissaries from Moscow put pressure on the ICP, telling it that no support would be forthcoming in case of seizure of power, for Moscow saw a stable anti-American Iraq as more valuable than a revolution in which the Americans might intervene, as the US navy was already moving close to the Gulf. However, despite this outside pressure, when the ICP's politburo debated the possibility of breaking with Qassem, a minority were in favor of "daring for victory" and taking power. But throughout 1958, the party had made no political preparations for such a struggle. In November 1958, the ICP attempted to revive its alliance with its erstwhile partners, the nationalists and the Ba'athists, even though they were moving to the right. The party's mass mobilizations had taken place under the banner of national unity, not class struggle. Rather than fight to increase the social content of the nationalist struggle, the communists generally worked to smooth over cracks in the cross-class alliance.

Qassem's problems were, however, far from over, since the Kurds and the national democrats were also disillusioned with him, as he failed either to grant the former the kind of autonomy they wanted or to democratize the political system rapidly by liquidating the military regime from above. Hemmed in by such diverse pressures, and trying to dominate all, Qassem undercut his own popularity and support base. Ultimately, Qassem fell to a coup, engineered by his one-time compatriot, Abdul Aref, in 1963, who inaugurated another phase of tenuous rule in Iraq before dying in a mysterious helicopter crash in 1966. His brother and successor Abd al-Rahman Aref ultimately fell pray to yet another military coup – though bloodless – by the Ba'ath Party under

the dual leadership of Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein in 1968.

SEE ALSO: Fahd, Yusuf Salman Yusuf (1901–1949); Iraq, Anti-British Nationalists; Iraq, Protest, Rebellion, and Revolution: Overview; Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970)

References and Suggested Readings

- Alexander, A. (2003) Daring for Victory: Iraq in Revolution 1946–1959. *International Socialism Journal* 99.
- Armstrong, R. H. (2006) *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Batatu, H. (1978) *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movement in Iraq*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Farouk-Sluglett, M. & Sluglett, P. (2003) *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*. New York: I. B. Tauris.
- Feldman, B. (2005) A People's History of Iraq. *Toward Freedom*, July.
- Marr, P. (2003) *The Modern History of Iraq*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Tripp, C. (2002) *A History of Iraq*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Iraqi resistance, 1991–2007

Shibashis Chatterjee

Invading Iran and Kuwait

Iraq was an oil-rich country with a dictatorship trying to steer an autonomous course, which brought it into confrontation with the US as the Cold War ended. During the Cold War, Iraq's geopolitical and strategic significance had brought Saddam Hussein gains. Holding together a state divided between ethnic and sectarian identities of the Iraqi Sunnis, Shi'ias, and Kurds, Hussein opted for a brutal dictatorship, but received support from both the US and USSR. The importance of Iraq increased rapidly after the Shah's collapse in Iran in 1978, with the US desperate to balance Soviet interests in the region. Second, a regional conflict of interest existed between Iran and Iraq. The Shi'i Islamic rebellion in Iran emboldened the local Shi'i community to challenge the Sunni Ba'ath rule. Fearful of Iranian support for Shi'i and Kurdish groups as well as ambitious for a regional leadership role, Hussein went in for a war against Iran to mobilize domestic support and

garner military help from abroad. The war with Iran was a careful gamble, and Saddam was able to achieve some goals, though at an enormous cost. Saddam's grandiose plans of weaponization, including weapons of chemical warfare, were realized with the full knowledge and connivance of the US and Moscow. Moreover, the war apparently united Iraq in the face of a bellicose neighbor. The Kurds as the only exception paid a terrible price for their betrayal at the hour of national peril, as Saddam saw it.

The nine-year-long Iran–Iraq War (1979–88) ended in stalemate with major gains for Iraq. This success made Saddam more adventurous and risk-taking. He had already alienated the United States by refusing to give up his weaponization drives. On top of this, Iraq was badly in need of funds to tide over an acute domestic economic distress occasioned primarily by the ravages of the war. The Gulf Council States under the leadership of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, at the insistence of the US, would not allow the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to increase oil prices, thereby allowing Saddam to generate additional revenues. Pushed to the brink, Saddam's gamble of occupying Kuwait (August 1990) misfired. Saddam could not grasp the post-Cold War reality of power politics. The lone superpower of the unipolar world, the US, did not allow any system-breaker to prevail uncontested. The First Gulf War of 1990–1 followed, which saw a US-led international coalition quickly vanquish Iraq. Sanctions and other punitive measures like no-fly zones were put in place to break the Ba'ath resolve to hold on to power. But sanctions unleashed by the West failed to remove Saddam from the seat of power.

The Sanctions Debate

Responses to the Gulf War of 1990 were mixed. West Asia as a whole saw a mass–elite disjuncture, with Arab (Sunni) states witnessing massive pro-Saddam demonstrations and strong currents of anti-American and anti-Israel protests. Support for Saddam was rather symbolic. He was eulogized for his defiance of the United States.

The sanctions regime became the new discourse, which divided political opposition against Saddam. The Saddam regime, as the opposition anticipated, did not collapse under pressure. The US indeed was in a quandary, as it wanted to leave intact an Iraqi state, and therefore hoped

for internal dissidence within the Ba'ath Party to remove Saddam. The popular insurgency in southern Iraq was ruthlessly suppressed. The political dissenters hoped that sanctions would restrict Saddam's capacity to subsidize the machinery for repression. Defeat, isolation, the sliding economy, and the consequent weakening of Saddam's hold would provide a fresh opportunity to strike.

These expectations did not materialize. Saddam found resources to distribute to the masses. He invested in new infrastructural projects, particularly big electrification plants. And most crucially, he succeeded in neutralizing the army. As in the 1958 revolution, radical change was not possible without a revolution led by the army. As a result, internal opposition, including in Islamist quarters, questioned the sanctions, arguing that they did not draw the necessary distinctions between the regime and the people. The West seemed impotent against Saddam's resilience. The political opposition thus became disillusioned with the West.

Resistance to US Invasion

The final chapter in the history of Iraq till today was drafted unilaterally by the United States. The attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the parameters of US policy to a large degree. Offshore preemptive strikes and anticipatory military measures, completely illegal in international law, became the new doctrines of the imperial hegemony. Ultimately the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. The charge that Iraq was remaking its weapons of mass destruction (i.e., nuclear weapons) and refusing to allow international agencies to monitor them was a complete fabrication, as is evident from American official sources later. Nor could Saddam's links with al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups be confirmed. The invasion of 2003 was simply a further step to transform the US into a planetary superpower by military means, to remove Saddam Hussein, and to bring Iraqi oil under the control of US corporations.

Defeat was preordained. Saddam was captured in March 2003 and an interim government set up by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGA) came into force. The state was devastated by collateral damage during the war. Out of such wreckage, the contours of a new Iraq are emerging. Democracy has been established from the top and is guaranteed life by the coalition forces.

However, as Chomsky (2003) points out, talk of democracy was lofty rhetoric forming an obligatory accompaniment to any resort to force. A large number of political parties and civil society groups have emerged. Some see hope of a genuine democratization out of the ashes of the present carnage, while others condemn the pliant puppet regime in Iraq that would serve America's geopolitical and geo-economic interests in the long run.

The Shi'ites and the Kurds, together the numerical majority within Iraq, are by and large with the new regime and the coalition forces. Ali al-Sistani, a senior influential Shi'i cleric, had in fact issued a religious injunction (*fatwa*) to allow cooperation with the coalition forces. The Shi'ites, who desire full sovereignty, dare not risk a Ba'ath return to power and a reversion to tyranny.

The Kurds with their cultural, religious, and linguistic distinctiveness have always demanded full autonomy short of secession. Invariably after defeating its adversaries, the strong Iraqi state had punished the Kurds for what it saw as acts of gross disloyalty to the nation. Hence, it is scarcely surprising that in northern Kurdistan, the coalition forces received the full cooperation of the Kurds.

Opposition to the IGA and then to the newly elected multiparty alliance after the elections of 2006 came from three sources. Most of the violent attacks took place in the Sunni triangle of Baghdad and the territory to its north and west, in towns like Tirkat, Ramadi, and Fallujah, and were carried out by supporters of the old regime, ex-secret police personnel and agents, and a group of Islamic terrorists with links to Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. The second line of opposition came from the Arab states that saw the IGA as a US-controlled rump coalition. The third line of critique came from people who wanted change to come from within, without the involvement of the western forces.

Creating a Culture of Rights

The resistance to war is, however, not to be confused with resistance to democratization in the current phase. Democracy is alien to Iraq, as it is to most of the Arab world. The ethical propriety of the external grafting of "democratic" institutions and practices through the agencies of an illegal, invasive force remains questionable. The present regime's alignment with ethnic

and sectarian forces would probably balkanize Iraq along ethnic lines. The ethnic polity in this model is largely one of elite cartelization rather than mass based. Even amidst this fear of imperialist aggression and unceasing sectarian violence there are signs of political mobilization, attempts at democratization, and a new aspiration to a culture of rights. Most progressive political forces in Iraq, including communists and a large number of women's organizations, want democratization to deepen and consolidate in Iraq. Feminists fear the dominance of the Shi'ite clerics, who would not hesitate to emulate Iranian standards in depriving women of a whole range of political, social, and economic rights.

SEE ALSO: Iran, Kurdish National Autonomy Movement; Iranian Revolution, 1979; Iraq, Revolution of 1958; Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Mussaui (1902–1989) and the Shi'ite Islamic Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Chomsky, N. (2003) The Iraq War and Contempt for Democracy. *ZNet*, October 31. Available at www.chomsky.info/articles/20031031.htm (downloaded March 26, 2008).
- Cockburn, A. & Cockburn, P. (2000) *Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein*. London: Harper Perennial.
- Dodge, T. (2005) *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Graham-Brown, S. (1999) *Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Intervention in Iraq*. New York: I. B. Tauris.
- Karsh, E., Rautsi, I., & Stowell, J. M. (2003) *Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography*. New York: Grove.
- Marr, P. (2003) *The Modern History of Iraq*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Ricks, T. E. (2006) *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: Penguin.
- Rosen, N. (2006) *In the Belly of the Green Bird: The Triumph of the Martyrs in Iraq*. Washington, DC: Free Press.
- Tripp, C. (2002) *A History of Iraq*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ireland, Age of Revolutions, 1775–1803

Daire Keogh

In her study of eighteenth-century Ireland, Edith Mary Johnston (1974) employs an elegant aphorism to describe the period; for the elite it was an

age of elegance, and for every section of the community an age of insecurity. A great deal of that anxiety stemmed from the nature of the Kingdom of Ireland, which was at once an example of a colony and an *ancien régime*-type society.

The century was born from the embers of the Williamite Wars (1688–91) in Ireland and from the paradox at the heart of the Protestant victory. For while the Jacobites had been defeated, the Protestant community was left with a real sense of its own insecurity. At the root of its fears were the terms of the Articles of Limerick (1691), which concluded the wars but left the defeated Catholics in a far stronger position than might have been expected. The implications were clear: Catholic strength implied Protestant weakness and there could be no accommodation between the two. The Protestant state owed its life to the destruction of Catholic power. Yet the security of the state was threatened by Britain's continued war with Catholic France and the continental allies of the exiled James II.

It was from this pervasive background of fear that the Penal Laws emerged, not from a desire to eliminate the Catholic religion, but rather as an attempt to destroy the political and military threat of the Catholic majority. For this reason the inheritance of land, the political system, and the legal profession were closed to Catholics, while regular clergy and those exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction were banished. Penal legislation was also extended to the Presbyterian community, and while they were never excluded from parliament or from the franchise, they were barred from civil and military offices, including municipal government, by the imposition of a sacramental test in 1704. The application of the laws was uneven; there were loopholes which Catholics exploited and their consequences were softened for Presbyterians by the passage of annual indemnity acts, but the effect of the legislation was to divide Irish society along sectarian grounds.

The concept of "Protestant Ascendancy," however, is not without its limitations, as the benefits of this monopoly of privilege did not extend to the entire Anglican community. The Irish parliament was almost exclusively Anglican, since Catholics (70 percent of the population) were excluded by law, and Presbyterians (a further 13 percent) were excluded by their social and economic status. Yet, of the 300 members in the House of Commons, 234 represented boroughs, while the franchise for the 64 seats representing

the 32 counties was restricted not only by the Penal Laws but also by a property qualification. As a consequence, before 1793, the electorate in each county was less than 4,000, with the exception of County Down, which had 6,000 voters.

The Irish parliament also reflected the quasi-colonial nature of Ireland. In spite of Ireland's constitutional status as a separate kingdom, the Dublin parliament was subordinate to Westminster. Its prerogatives were limited by Poynings's Law (1494), which curbed its legislative potential, and the Declaratory Act (1720), which denied the appellate jurisdiction of the Irish House of Lords and asserted the right of London to pass legislation binding to Ireland. The implications of these claims were manifest in the restrictions on Irish trade imposed by the Cattle Acts (1671) and the Woollen Acts (1699). Moreover, the Irish executive was headed by a lord lieutenant or viceroy who was answerable to the cabinet in London, not to the Irish parliament, which he could manage through a judicious use of patronage and pensions. Such manipulation, however, could create resentment and resulted in distinctions in parliament between what was regarded as an "Irish interest," as opposed to the "English interest" of the viceroy.

Opposition to England's claim to legislate for Ireland found expression in a small but vocal "patriot" tradition, which had among its ideological champions William Molyneux (1656–98) and Jonathan Swift (1667–1745), who had memorably compared "government without the consent of the governed" to slavery. This patriot voice became the principal source of opposition to the administration represented in parliament by the Dublin "Castle Party." The patriots were never very numerous: they were not a party in the modern sense, nor had they a coherent policy. On occasion, however, they were able to present a serious threat to the government based in Dublin Castle, as in the celebrated "Wood's Halfpence" affair (1722–5) and the money bill dispute (1753–6), which highlighted the erosion of the constitutional rights of the Irish parliament.

By the second half of the eighteenth century there was also great economic change, which brought not just opportunities but social tension. The period after 1741 was marked by increasing prosperity, but the effects of the agricultural boom had not filtered down. Indeed, the combination of rising population, which doubled to reach five million by the end of the century,

created land hunger, bringing rent increases, subdivision, and frequently subsistence living. The consequent tensions found expression in the growth of agrarian protest movements. Amongst the earliest groups were the Whiteboys, who arose in protest to the enclosure of common land in County Tipperary in 1761. As the movement spread, its agenda increased to include excessive rents and tithes payable to the state church, the Church of Ireland. The Whiteboys established a pattern of rural protest. In Ulster their example was followed by the Hearts of Oak and the Steelboys, but of greater concern was the Rightboy movement, which began in Cork in 1785 and gradually fanned out across the provinces of Munster and South Leinster. The Rightboys opposed high rents, tithes, and other taxes, but in a novel departure they made attempts to regulate the dues charged by Catholic priests for their services.

Such anti-clericalism demonstrates the folly of simple notions of a "penal consensus" in Ireland; indeed, the Whiteboys and Rightboys were both excommunicated by the Catholic bishops. However, such realities failed to calm Protestant anxiety in the context of the Seven Years' War (1756–63) and the subsequent American Revolution (1775–83), during which such popular protest was interpreted as evidence of a Catholic plot. The fullest expression of such fears was given in a pamphlet written by the Anglican bishop of Cloyne, Richard Woodward, entitled *The Present State of the Church of Ireland* (1787), which ran to several editions, both in Dublin and in London. It eventually developed into a paper war between the defenders of the church establishment and their Catholic and Presbyterian adversaries.

The American Revolution, of course, transformed the political landscape in Ireland. Not only were there historic ties between Ulster and America, but the grievances of the colonists struck a sympathetic chord with Irish patriots, who Benjamin Franklin believed were disposed to be friends of America. The Catholic leadership, for its part, remained conspicuously loyal during the American War. This decision was rewarded by two Relief Acts (1778 and 1782), removing the principal restrictions on land ownership and the practice of religion, which the London government sponsored in an effort to boost recruitment to the forces. The patriots, in contrast, became more assertive in the course of the war. The

economic consequences of the conflict sharpened patriotic sensitivities, while the failure of the government to establish a militia prompted the formation of independent Volunteer companies, beginning in Belfast in March 1778.

At their height the Volunteers boasted 100,000 members, and once the threat of invasion receded they turned their attention toward a political agenda. In November 1779, the Dublin Volunteers gathered at College Green demanding “Free Trade or a Speedy Revolution,” in a powerful display which Lord North’s government could not resist. And having wrested that prize, the Volunteers campaigned to remove constitutional restrictions, culminating in a delegate convention at Dungannon in February 1782, which asserted the exclusive legislative authority of the Irish parliament. Lord North’s government collapsed in the following month, creating circumstances that were more favorable to the Volunteers. In opposition, the Whigs had supported the Irish patriots; now in office, the new Rockingham administration introduced a body of legislation to repeal the Declaratory Act and amend Poyning’s Law.

The achievement of legislative independence for the Irish parliament ushered in a wave of euphoria and Henry Grattan (1746–1821), the hero of the hour, was awarded £50,000 by the Irish House of Commons “in testimony of the gratitude of this nation for his . . . unequalled services to this kingdom” (*Parliamentary Register*, 1.383). Such emotion, however, was short-lived as the limitations of the so-called Constitution of 1782 became apparent. Henry Flood (1732–91) identified the weakness of “simple repeal,” pushing instead for an unequivocal renunciation of Westminster’s right to legislate for Ireland, which was conceded in 1783. The Volunteers under the leadership of Flood and Frederick Hervey (1730–1803), the earl bishop of Derry, turned to the complex issue of parliamentary reform. A grand national convention of Volunteers was held in Dublin in November 1783. It divided on what William Drennan (1754–1820) later called “the rock of religion and indulgence to Catholics,” and its reform agenda was defeated by the Irish House of Commons, in a vote which reflected parliament’s increasing hostility toward the Volunteers and out of doors political agitation.

From a British perspective, the extension of the rights of the Irish parliament made political

management more critical. The new circumstances challenged the abilities of successive viceroys. In the short term, the executive arm of the government was strengthened by the appointment to key offices of reliable members like John Foster (1740–1828), John Fitzgibbon (1749–1802), and John Beresford (1738–1805), the talented troika who served as an informal Irish cabinet. In the long term, however, the implications of the patriot achievement demonstrated the desirability of a legislative union as the ultimate solution to the problem of parliamentary management. This was immediately apparent in the “Regency Crisis” of 1789, when only the king’s recovery averted a constitutional catastrophe. The outbreak of the French Revolution in the same year confirmed the urgency of a correction of the Anglo-Irish connection.

The Revolution quickly became, in Theobald Wolfe Tone’s expression, “the test of everyman’s political creed.” French principles were obviously attractive to radical Anglicans and Catholics, but among the Presbyterians of Antrim and Down they had immediate resonances. In July 1790, the Volunteers marched again in Belfast, to celebrate not the Battle of the Boyne but the fall of the Bastille. Significantly, too, news from France began to diminish the anti-Catholic sentiments that had divided reformers in the previous decade. Not only did Catholics now appear capable of living in liberty, but the French enjoyed rights in excess of those afforded by Britain’s vaunted constitution. That sense was developed in Tone’s *Argument on behalf of the Catholics of Ireland* (1791), the most influential pamphlet in Irish history, which dismissed the Constitution of 1782 as a “bungling and imperfect business” which had “left three quarters of our countrymen slaves as it had found them.” William Drennan, the Belfast radical, shared Tone’s enthusiasm for a new departure. Having tired of the Whigs, whom he dismissed as an “aristocratical society,” he called instead for “a benevolent conspiracy – a plot for the people.” Drennan collaborated with Samuel Neilson (1761–1803), Thomas Russell (1767–1803), and the Belfast Volunteers, and in October 1791 the Society of the United Irishmen was founded. In the following month, the veteran Dublin radical and Volunteer James Napper Tandy (1737?–1803) convened a United Irish Society in the capital. The aims of the United Irishmen reflected the long pedigree of Irish radicalism,

the British Whig tradition, and Irish patriotism transformed by the American and French Revolutions. Yet, in a radical departure, it called for “immediate, ample, and substantial justice to the Catholics,” and only then “a reform of parliament.” The Belfast society was dominated by the Presbyterian middle class, while the Dublin society was divided equally between Protestants and Catholics. From the outset, the Society was decidedly propagandist and aimed, in Thomas Addis Emmet’s (1764–1827) expression, “to make every man a politician,” through the *Northern Star* and cheap editions of Paine, Locke, and Godwin.

Just as the reform movement and Volunteering were transformed by events in France, so too were Catholic politics. Since the Revolution, the aristocratic and episcopal leadership of the Catholic Committee had given way to a new bourgeois generation, including founders of the Dublin United Irish Society such as Richard McCormick and John Keogh, who demanded “relief” as a right, not a reward to be sought with deference. In July 1792, Tone was appointed assistant secretary of the Committee, thus establishing an important connection with the United Irishmen. His organizational ability was critical to the success of the Catholic Convention of December 1792, the so-called “Back Lane Parliament” which petitioned the king directly, over the head of the viceroy and the Dublin parliament, for emancipation. This affront to the Dublin establishment spoke volumes for the ambitions of Irish Catholics, but with the advent of war with France on February 1, 1793 the peace of Ireland became a priority for William Pitt, as was the recruitment of Catholic troops. For these reasons, the London government pushed a relief measure through the Irish parliament which extended the franchise to Catholics. From a radical perspective, the vote without the right to sit in parliament was nonsense, but the ultra-Protestant conservatives were equally irate. The Speaker of the Commons, John Foster, acknowledged it was “vain to imagine that admission to the elective franchise does not draw with it the right of representation” in parliament, while the chancellor, John Fitzgibbon, believed that the only solution to this revolution of rising expectations was a legislative union between the two islands. War, however, was no time for such constitutional innovations, and the government introduced a raft of legislation aimed at securing the kingdom. This

included restrictions on the importation of arms, a seditious libel act, an unpopular militia act, and a Convention Act, which outlawed representative political assemblies.

The effect of such legislation was to drive radicalism underground. The United Irishmen were not formally suppressed until May 1794, but as prosecutions silenced prominent members, the Society was gradually reorganized into a secret, oath-bound military conspiracy intent on separation from Britain with French aid. Traditional historiography attributed this move to the failure of the liberal Fitzwilliam viceroyalty in 1795; indeed, the United Irish leadership claimed as much in the wake of the Rebellion of 1798. However, this conspiratorial tendency was present in the United Irish ranks from the outset, particularly in Ulster, and it is evident in Tone’s writings from as early as July 1791. The Society faced a twofold challenge. The first was to transform itself from a bourgeois debating society into an army of citizen soldiers. This would take time, but the task of securing foreign aid was rapidly advanced by Tone, and the appearance of a fleet at Bantry Bay in December 1796 was evidence of French enthusiasm for an Irish rebellion. That attempted invasion failed, but the presence of the fleet boosted United Irish confidence. Historian Nancy Curtin (1998) estimates that in Ulster alone, membership increased from 38,576 in October 1796 to 117,917 by the following summer. Sectarian tensions were heightened, too, and clashes between the loyal Orange Order and the Catholic “Defenders” led to the formation of an alliance between the United Irishmen and this radicalized secret society. This coalition represented a fundamental departure from the non-sectarian ideals of its foundation, but it served to broaden the base of the United Irish conspiracy, which by the spring of 1798 would claim 280,000 members in arms.

The Dublin Castle administration met this threat with heightened surveillance and a vigorous and often draconian campaign of counter-insurgency. An Insurrection Act (1796) provided for the death penalty for those administering illegal oaths. It also allowed the government “proclaim” areas, thereby suspending trial by jury and giving sweeping powers to magistrates. This was employed with great effect in the so-called “dragooning of Ulster” in the spring of 1797, but it failed to break the organization. The United Irishmen faced a dilemma: whether to await the

promised French invasion or to go it alone. Within the leadership, Arthur O'Connor (1763–1852) and Lord Edward Fitzgerald (1763–98) advocated the latter, and a complex military plan was prepared for a rebellion beginning in Dublin and fanning out across the country in response to a series of signals. The organization, however, was infiltrated by informers, and the plan was frustrated by the arrest of the Leinster Directory of the United Irishmen in February 1798. This and the subsequent capture of Fitzgerald, the talismanic military leader of the movement, threw the plan into disarray. Neither were the French likely to support an insurrection, since the Directory had committed itself to Napoleon's ill-fated Egyptian campaign.

From the outset, the United Irish rebellion had little chance of success. The insurgents gathered in Dublin on the night of May 23 to discover their assembly points occupied by government militia. Unaware of the fate of the city, rebels in the surrounding counties of Meath, Kildare, and Wicklow gained control of a broad crescent of territory around the capital. Within days, however, they had lost the initiative and the inactivity of United Irish leaders in the provinces brought success to the government forces, which accepted the rebel surrender in Kildare on May 30. The province of Ulster failed to rise until June 7, and divisions in the United Irish leadership on the propriety of waiting for French aid and, perhaps, the "popish tinge" of the rebellion in the south severely affected the turnout in counties Antrim and Down. And there, too, the pattern of initial success and then rapid failure was repeated, as victories at Antrim town and Saintfield were reversed following a crushing defeat at the Battle of Ballynahinch on June 12–13.

In contrast, strategic victories at Oulart and Enniscorthy on May 27–8 allowed the rebels to take most of County Wexford, which they maintained until their defeat by General Lake's army at Vinegar Hill on June 21. At that point, the rump of the Wexford rebels formed two large columns which broke into the midlands. One received little support in the neighboring counties of Kilkenny and Laois, but the second had greater success in the mountainous parts of north Wexford and Wicklow, where Joseph Holt and Michael Dwyer held out in the hopes of French assistance. Yet when a small fleet, under General Humbert, landed in County Mayo on August 22, it was too little, too late. News of the

French landing, however, roused rebels in counties Sligo, Longford, Westmeath, and Leitrim. Again, the Franco-Irish force enjoyed initial success at an encounter, celebrated as "the Races" of Castlebar, but they were no match for the superior force of the crown under the command of the viceroy, Charles Cornwallis, veteran of the American Wars. General Lake surrounded and overwhelmed the rebels at the Battle of Ballinamuck, County Longford, on September 8. This defeat marked the end of the rebellion of 1798, although guerilla resistance continued in parts of Wicklow, where Michael Dwyer, "master of the mountains," remained at liberty for several years.

The Rebellion of 1798 failed because it lacked coordination as a consequence of the pre-rebellion arrests. Moreover, the failure of the French to provide a substantial force deprived it of potential leadership, discipline, weaponry, and recognition. Perhaps, more significantly, the rebellion failed because Catholic Ireland had, by and large, sided with the government. The Catholic bishops, in particular, were distinguished by their steady loyalism, and of the lower clergy, a mere 70 of the 1,800 priests were even remotely associated with the rebel cause. Such realities, however, were lost in the immediate aftermath as many loyalists sought to portray the rebellion as a religious war, a "Popish Plot," or a rerun of the turmoil of the 1640s and 1690s. Certainly, as rebel discipline broke down, there were horrific incidents of blatant sectarianism, as in County Wexford where 200 innocent Protestants were burned alive in a barn at Scullabogue. On the loyalist side, too, there were atrocities, such as the slaughter of 500 rebels as they surrendered at Gibbet Rath in County Kildare. Ironically, the rebellion in the north had many of the hallmarks of a religious war, for the rebels were largely Presbyterian, while their opponents were adherents of the Established Church, or Catholic soldiers. In the aftermath of the rebellion, however, such distinctions were ignored and efforts were made to separate the risings in Antrim and Down from the tumult in the south. When Sir Richard Musgrave published his monumental history of the rebellion in 1801, so far had amnesia about the rebellion in Ulster developed that he devoted a mere 12 pages to events in Antrim and Down, compared with over 600 in which he described the religious mayhem in Leinster.

It is a great irony of the 1790s that the decade which began with hopes of a "brotherhood of

affection” and independence for Ireland ended in 30,000 deaths and the extinction of the Irish parliament in the Act of Union. Indeed, no sooner had William Pitt received news of the outbreak of the rebellion than he enquired: “cannot crushing the rebellion be followed by an act appointing commissioners to treat for a union?” There was little novel in the prime minister’s suggestion; as early as 1707, in the context of the Anglo-Scottish Union, the Irish House of Commons expressed a hope that this would establish a precedent for a more comprehensive union. The events of the eighteenth century clearly illustrated the difficulty and insecurity of the Anglo-Irish relationship, and in spite of Irish patriotic opposition to such a measure, legislative union remained an option. Ironically, however, it was the great patriot victory in the “Revolution of 1782” that made a union of the parliaments imperative. And if this was so, the concessions to Catholics in 1793 and the rebellion of 1798 moved the question of union into the realm of practical politics. Irish nationalists have subsequently claimed that Pitt provoked the rebellion in order to promote a union. Such an assertion is unrealistic, but the rebellion did make the union possible. Protestants were made aware of the precariousness of their position; indeed, King George approved of “using the present moment of terror for frightening the supporters of the Castle into union.” And the Catholic establishment, too, in the white terror that followed the rebellion, welcomed the prospect of a union: Thomas Hussey, the bishop of Waterford, expressed his preference for a union with the “Beys of Egypt” rather than continued oppression of the “Mamelukes” of the Irish Ascendancy. Significantly, one of the most vociferous opponents of the measure was the Speaker, John Foster, who opposed the union not on patriotic grounds alone but for fear that direct rule from London would undermine the Protestant Ascendancy.

The difficult task of managing the union fell to Cornwallis, who favored a broad union with “the Irish nation instead of making it with a party in Ireland.” But his proposals to include Catholic emancipation in the union package threatened to endanger the entire project; apart from opposition in Ireland, King George had set himself against any “further indulgences” to Catholics. Accordingly, an Emancipation Bill would not accompany the union, but the

promise of immediate relief was an important inducement to Catholics to support the measure. Critics of the union, however, including the young Daniel O’Connell (1775–1847), argued that the continuation of the Irish parliament, even with Catholic inferiority, was preferable to the loss of Ireland’s legislative independence.

When the proposed union was first debated in the Irish House of Commons on January 22, 1799, the government found itself with a majority of one; two days later it was defeated by five votes. Cornwallis had not expected such a reversal, and there was great rejoicing in the streets of Dublin. There was recrimination on both sides, but the government was not to be deterred. The Irish chief secretary, Viscount Castlereagh, applied additional pressure to secure support for the union. The tried and tested measures of parliamentary management were employed with great effect: £32,336 was extended to purchase votes and seats, while pensions, places, and peerages were offered. When the session of 1800 began Castlereagh was confident of the outcome, and on August 1, 1800 the Union of Great Britain and Ireland Act (1800) received the royal assent.

The Irish parliament was no more. The politicization of the 1790s and the previous decades had made this union inevitable; the alternative was an overthrow of the existing order if not a complete separation of the kingdoms. In the absence of Catholic emancipation, however, the Act of Union embodied a fatal flaw. In the shorter term, too, the government’s strategy of normalization was challenged by the rebellion of 1803, led by Robert Emmet (1778–1803). And while the Castle could derive solace from the fact that it was the rebels’ ill-judged timing which had saved the day, rather than any effort of their own, this Protestant-led rebellion gave stark lie to the assumption that the union had offered a panacea or final settlement of the Irish question.

SEE ALSO: Catholic Emancipation; Emmet, Robert (1778–1803) and Emmet’s Rebellion; Fitzgerald, Lord Edward (1763–1798); Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798; Napper Tandy, James (1737?–1803); O’Connell, Daniel (1775–1847); O’Connor, Arthur (1763–1852); Tone, Theobald Wolfe (1763–1798); United Irishmen

References and Suggested Readings

Bartlett, T., Dickson, D., Keogh, D., & Whelan, K. (Eds.) (2003) *1798: A Bicentenary Perspective*. Dublin: Four Courts Press.

- Curtin, N. J. (1998) *The United Irishmen: Popular Politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791–1798*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dickson, D. (2000) *New Foundations: Ireland 1660–1800*, 2nd ed. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.
- Elliott, M. (1982) *Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Elliott, M. (1989) *Wolfe Tone: Prophet of Irish Independence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Geoghegan, P. M. (1999) *The Irish Act of Union: A Study in High Politics 1798–1801*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.
- Johnston, E. M. (1974) *Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.
- Pakenham, T. (1972) *The Year of Liberty: The Great Irish Rebellion of 1798*. London: Granada.

Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798

Clifford D. Conner

In 1798 a long-anticipated rebellion burst forth in Ireland, releasing the repressed fury that had accumulated over decades of oppression. Ireland's impoverished Catholics – politically disenfranchised, tormented by harsh penal laws, barred from formal education, and economically helpless in the face of the ever-increasing demands of rack-renting landlords – were ready for revolution. They had the requisite determination, courage, and numerical superiority to sweep aside their oppressors, if only their potential power could be organized and focused. The unknown factor was leadership. Could the raw power of the Irish rebels be harnessed to create a coordinated striking force?

The penal laws imposed on Ireland over the previous century had been designed to prevent the development of political leadership in the Catholic community. They had forbidden Catholics to hold any office or position of civic authority, or even to vote or serve on juries. They made it illegal for Catholics to be lawyers or schoolmasters, or to buy or inherit land, or even to receive land as a gift from a Protestant. Some of the most extreme provisions of the penal laws were repealed in 1778, but their general spirit remained intact. "This horrible system," Wolfe Tone declared, "had reduced the great body of the Catholic peasantry of Ireland to a situation, morally and physically speaking, below that of the



In May 1798, 100,000 people in Ireland revolted against the British government. This portrait entitled "Tone's interview with Napoleon, December 23rd, 1797" depicts the leader of the Irish independence movement, Theobald Wolfe Tone, pointing out Ireland to Napoleon on a map of Europe. It was Tone's hope that the French would come to the aid of Ireland in its fight against the British empire. (Image courtesy of the National Library of Ireland. PD Weekly Freeman 1897 December 11 (A))

beasts of the field." Leadership, therefore, had to be found elsewhere.

The Presbyterians, or Dissenters, who made up a sizable proportion of the population of the northern province of Ulster, were Protestants but were not of the established Anglican Church. Dissenters were subjected to legal and political discrimination which, though not nearly as severe as that imposed upon the Catholics, was a source of constant irritation. They were also legally compelled to pay tithes to support a Church that regarded them as heathens. The resulting resentment created fertile ground for a dissident political movement in Ulster. In addition, a small number of scions of Anglican families – including Theobald Wolfe Tone, Lord Edward Fitzgerald, and Arthur O'Connor – had been radicalized by the American and French

Revolutions and were attracted to the ideals of democratic equality and national independence.

In October 1791 a movement of great historic importance was founded in Belfast. Wolfe Tone, then a young Irish lawyer, was invited by a few Belfast radicals to help create an organization they named the United Irish Society. The United Irishmen urged Protestants and Catholics to put aside their differences and join forces to break the British stranglehold on their country – “the never-failing source of all our political evils,” in Wolfe Tone’s words. Irish nationalists today lay claim to history’s longest-running national liberation struggle, which dates from Henry II’s annexation of Ireland in the twelfth century.

Protestant radicalism and Catholic anger thus merged in the years preceding 1798 to create a massive movement for political reform, at the head of which stood the United Irish Society. As Ireland’s social crisis deepened during the 1790s, the United Irishmen were transformed into an explicitly revolutionary movement with an underground army capable of seriously challenging the mighty British empire. At the same time, their social base became increasingly less Protestant and more Catholic.

Catholics and Protestants

Although Ireland’s misery was rooted in British domination, the Rebellion was not an insurrection of the entire Irish nation against England, because most Protestants – a significant minority of the Irish population – supported British rule. Superimposed upon the struggle for national liberation was a civil war that tended to split Ireland along Catholic versus Protestant lines. The United Irish Society struggled mightily to overcome that communal division but was only partially and temporarily successful.

There was a long history in Ireland of bitterness between the disadvantaged Catholics, who constituted some 70 percent of the population but owned only 7 percent of the land, and the privileged Protestant elite, whose ancestors had stolen the Catholics’ land. The hostility between Catholics and Protestants thus had little to do with theological or doctrinal disputes; the religious identifications were surrogates for social divisions. Furthermore, the governing class was entirely composed of Protestants, while the people governed were mostly Catholics. With Protestants wielding a vastly disproportionate share of

economic and political power, it would have been peculiar if the Catholics had not been deeply resentful.

Although limited land resources fueled endemic agrarian warfare, the sectarian hatreds prevented the conflict from becoming a pure class struggle of poor against rich, or tenant farmers against their landlords. The wealthy Protestant upper classes had a vested interest in maintaining British power in Ireland; they perceived the redcoat army as guardians of their property against the land-hungry Catholic hordes. The bulk of the Protestant population, on the other hand, consisted of small farmers – yeomen or tenants – who were far from wealthy, but who enjoyed social and economic privileges over their Catholic counterparts. Loath to surrender those privileges, many of the less affluent Protestants allied themselves with the big landlords and British governors, and served as shock troops to repress the Rebellion. The savagery with which the Protestant yeomen behaved in the years preceding the rising of 1798, however, had the effect of further arousing and galvanizing the Catholic population rather than intimidating it.

This complex mix of nationalism, sectarian strife, and agrarian grievances made Irish society highly unstable and prone to explosive rebellions. The aim of the United Irishmen was to harness that revolutionary energy and give it direction. In spite of the deep antagonisms separating the Catholic and Protestant populations, the United Irish Society’s leadership of the struggle for Catholic emancipation – full political rights for everyone regardless of religious affiliation – provided a basis for nonsectarian unity.

The Catholic peasantry of Ireland had an established tradition of organized resistance. Their secret societies, however, were localized and transitory. Although they frequently gained a measure of revenge through violent action, they were in turn always savagely repressed. As long as their attacks remained scattered and unfocused, they posed no threat to the continued existence of the social order that oppressed them.

By 1793 the great fear of the landowning class – that the agrarian secret societies would someday coalesce into a unified movement – seemed to be coming to pass in the form of a rapidly growing, nationwide, plebeian Catholic organization called the Defenders. As government repression escalated, both the Defenders and the United

Irishmen were driven toward seeking a revolutionary solution, and as their interests converged, Defender militants began to join the United Irish underground army in large numbers. The amalgamation of the Defenders and the United Irishmen was far from seamless, but from 1795 to 1798 the level of collaboration between Catholic and Protestant freedom fighters reached a height never before attained.

The United Irish leaders – most of whom were from upper-class Protestant families – were radical democrats who courageously dedicated their lives to freeing their country from foreign domination. Their class background, however, contrasted sharply with that of the dirt-poor Catholics who constituted the mass base of the Rebellion. The Catholics wanted more than mere political equality; they yearned for a *social* revolution that would bring about economic equality as well. Above all, they wanted the land to be equitably distributed. The United Irish leadership perceived this as a utopian “leveling” demand that was unachievable and could lead only to a communal bloodbath. They also knew that if they launched a fight to redistribute the land, most of their supporters among the Protestant gentry and middle class would desert them.

As a result, the United Irishmen were hesitant to mobilize the full power of the Catholic masses, and instead looked for salvation to the French army, a power that could drive the British out without turning the social structure of Ireland upside down. By thus attempting to bring about a controlled revolution, the United Irish leaders sapped the Rebellion of a great deal of its natural dynamism and vitality.

“The French Are On the Sea”

Nonetheless, a shared desire to gain French military aid to liberate Ireland was a major factor in bringing the Defenders into alliance with the United Irish. Many generations of Irish peasants had looked to Catholic France to someday avenge their historic defeat at the hands of William of Orange. *Tá na Francaigh teacht thar sáile* – “The French are on the sea” – was a common refrain, expressing an almost messianic hope that a great external power was on its way to deliver them from their enemies.

Although revolutionary France no longer fought in the name of Catholicism, it had gained a reputation as the champion of oppressed

peoples everywhere. In November 1792 the French legislature issued a ringing proclamation of international solidarity, including a pledge to use French military power to help others win their liberation. The promise was only implemented insofar as it suited France’s diplomatic interests, but the United Irishmen devoted intense efforts toward holding the French government to its word. United Irish leaders including Tone, O’Connor, and Fitzgerald created an Irish republican embassy-in-exile in Paris and vigorously lobbied for French ships, troops, and weapons to be sent to Ireland.

By 1795, when the United Irish diplomacy began, the French Revolution had already begun to lose its original ardor. The fall of Robespierre’s revolutionary regime in July 1794 initiated the period of Thermidorian reaction. The five members of the Directory who held the reins of power when the first United Irish emissaries arrived in Paris behaved more like bureaucrats than revolutionaries, and the liberation of oppressed peoples was of little interest to them. But France was at war against England, so the Directory saw potential value in cultivating a relationship with the United Irishmen. If Ireland was, as the United Irish envoys claimed, on the verge of a massive nationwide uprising against English rule, it would serve French strategic interests to encourage that revolt. Whether it succeeded or not in liberating Ireland, it would tie down British troops and ships and prevent their use against France. The Directory was therefore receptive to the United Irishmen’s overtures.

The United Irish representatives established a virtually permanent mission in Paris that would survive the Directory and continue through the Napoleonic era. Britain and France were at war almost continuously from 1792 to 1815, and Bonaparte, too, looked upon the Irish rebels as a potentially valuable political asset. In all, five French attempts at invading Ireland were launched in collaboration with the United Irishmen between 1796 and 1798. In addition, Bonaparte drew up plans for further invasions in 1803, 1805, 1807, and 1812, but none was implemented.

The first of the French attempts, launched in the winter of 1796–7, was substantial enough to represent a genuine military threat. General Lazare Hoche, whose influence in France rivaled Bonaparte’s at the time, commanded

an invasion force of more than 35 ships and 14,450 troops, and carried a store of more than 40,000 weapons to be distributed to the thousands of Irish rebels who were expected to rise up and welcome them. Wolfe Tone, one of the chief organizers of the expedition, accompanied it and bore the rank of general in the French army. Whether this force was sufficient, in conjunction with Irish rebel forces, to liberate Ireland will never be known. The fleet was separated at sea by storms; when some of the ships reached Bantry Bay on December 21, 1796, General Hoche's frigate was not among them. The harsh weather prevented a landing and after five days dwindling supplies induced the fleet's acting commander to weigh anchor and turn back to France.

As disappointing as this episode was to the United Irish leaders, it transformed their mission in the eyes of all concerned observers. Throughout Ireland, the news of the near invasion electrified the population. The French really were, at long last, on the sea! Although this first attempt had been foiled by bad luck, future efforts were expected to follow. The British government, too, was shocked by the revelation that a major French expedition had so easily evaded the supposedly impregnable naval blockade they depended on to shield all of the British Isles from French attack. Subsequent French invasion attempts, however, were considerably less potent.

Dependence upon French military assistance led the United Irishmen to preach against premature risings and to counsel patience, patience, patience . . . until the French arrived. In spite of the restraints it imposed, the United movement won the allegiance of the insurgent Catholics, who agreed that France's assistance in freeing Ireland would be most welcome. A United Irish assessment of its own numerical strength in March 1798 counted 279,896 men in arms in three of Ireland's four provinces (Ulster, Leinster, and Munster; no figures were given for Connaught). While this figure may be exaggerated, there can be no doubt that the underground rebel army under United Irish command was immense and ubiquitous.

The rebels faced a formidable enemy. England's determination to maintain its rule was evidenced by the 100,000 troops it had at its disposal in Ireland, compared with only about 30,000 at home in England itself. Its forces

in Ireland comprised not only British soldiers but also Protestant yeomanry and local Irish militia detachments. The militias were considered of dubious loyalty, however, because their rank-and-file was Catholic in composition. They had ostensibly been formed to defend against foreign invasion, but it was generally assumed that in a civil war situation the militias would mutiny against their Protestant officers and switch sides. After all, the only threat of foreign invasion in 1798 was from the French, whom the Irish Catholics looked upon as potential liberators.

The British and their puppet Irish government in Dublin deeply feared the people they governed. Over the previous decade landlords had introduced an innovative technique known as "rack-renting" as a means of intensifying the exploitation of their tenants. Rack-renting required tenant farmers to put up large sums of cash in advance, which they could only do by going deeply into debt to city bankers and speculators. It also entailed short-term leases on which the rents were jacked up each time a lease expired. The victimized peasants tried to defend themselves by the only means at their disposal – threats and acts of violence against their oppressors. As the peasants' misery and anger increased, localized agrarian warfare raged throughout Ireland. The rural gentry barricaded their houses, stockpiled firearms, and lived in a state of siege for fear of midnight visits from their tenants.

The Rebellion Begins

In response to the agrarian violence the government launched a campaign of military terrorism that treated every poor Catholic as a potential rebel. The peasants' continuing resistance and the increasingly savage reprisals by the government culminated in the Great Rebellion of 1798. On March 30 the government proclaimed the entire country in a state of rebellion and imposed nationwide martial law. The United Irishmen responded with a formal call to rise – with or without the French – on May 23.

The attitude of the British military had been expressed the previous year by General Gerard Lake when he put the province of Ulster under martial law. "You may rest assured," Lake declared, "that nothing but coercive measures in the strongest degree can succeed in this country. The lower order of people and most of the middle class are determined republicans, have

imbibed the French principles, and will not be contented with anything short of a revolution.”

In early 1798 the government intensified its efforts to systematically disarm the rebels; all hidden pikes and firearms were to be handed over or the military would “lay the country waste.” A policy of “collective punishment” including torture and executions was implemented to force the surrender of arms. Blacksmiths and carpenters were primary targets because they were collectively blamed for the manufacture of pikes, the main offensive weapon of the rural insurgents. British army units encouraged local gentry and yeomanry to draw up long lists of “suspects” whose homes then were burned down and who were tortured to extract confessions and to force the naming of friends and neighbors as rebels.

A hundred years later the Protestant historian W. E. H. Lecky described the suffering thus visited upon the Irish nation. “It was a scene of horrors,” he wrote, “hardly surpassed in the modern history of Europe.” Even considering the worst atrocities of the twentieth century, the savage repression that preceded and followed the Rebellion of 1798 remains among the most tragic entries in the chronicles of man’s inhumanity to man. Apologists for British rule attempt justification by insisting that outrages were committed by both sides, but the reciprocal violence should not be considered morally symmetrical. The cruelty of the oppressor cannot be excused by pointing to the defensive violence of the oppressed.

Two particular instruments of torture – triangles and portable gallows – became symbols of the British terror campaign. The triangles were three-sided frameworks to which suspects were tied as they were publicly flogged with a fiendish whip called a cat-o’-nails – a cat-o’-nine-tails with barbwire tips. The portable gallows were wooden apparatuses upon which suspects were subjected to a procedure known as half-hanging: They would be hanged by the neck until almost unconscious, then let down, requestioned, and if their answers were still deemed unsatisfactory the procedure would be repeated. A third form of torture that also became emblematic of the period was pitch-capping, whereby a cap of coarse cloth or paper filled with boiling tar was forced onto the victim’s head and held until it cooled.

The military terror sparked widespread uprisings in the southern counties of Kildare, Carlow, Wicklow, and Wexford in March 1798. At the end

of May and the beginning of June an army of 20,000 rebels took over the town of Wexford, and by the beginning of June another massive rebel army in Wicklow was threatening to move against Dublin. In spite of their courage and superiority in numbers, the poorly armed and poorly trained peasant combatants were at a significant disadvantage. Fighting with pikes against experienced British soldiers with cannons, they were decisively defeated by Lake’s army in a famous battle at Vinegar Hill.

Meanwhile, a second phase of the Rebellion had begun in Ulster in the north. A rebel force of 6,000 men led by Henry Joy McCracken took Antrim on June 7 but was forced to withdraw later the same day. Four days later 7,000 rebels commanded by Henry Munro captured Ballynahinch in County Down. Risings occurred elsewhere in Ulster, but in an uncoordinated manner that allowed government forces to defeat them one at a time. All in all, the insurrection in Ulster lasted less than a week; McCracken and Munro were captured and executed. In the aftermath of these events the general populations of both north and south were treated with great brutality. For his particularly barbarous role General Lake is still remembered in Ireland as “the Butcher of Wexford.”

The Republic of Connaught

The final scene of the Rebellion occurred in the west of Ireland when – at long last – the French arrived. On August 22 a force of slightly more than 1,000 French soldiers under the command of General Jean-Joseph Humbert landed at Killala in the province of Connaught. By that time, however, the rest of Ireland had been brutally pacified and the full strength of the English armies could be brought to bear against Humbert’s tiny band of men.

Humbert was supposed to represent only the vanguard of a considerably larger French invasion force. His instructions were to establish a beachhead and await the arrival of 12,000 more men under the command of Generals Hardy and Kilmaine. He was explicitly ordered not to undertake offensive action on his own, but when hundreds of Irish peasants flocked to his banner and pressed for action, he proclaimed the birth of the Republic of Connaught and proceeded to win a series of impressive victories in its name. On August 27 Humbert challenged a far

superior force at Castlebar, the main British garrison in Connaught. The British troops at Castlebar were commanded by three experienced Generals: Lake, Hutchinson, and Trench. Nonetheless, their ranks broke in the heat of battle and turned tail and ran, prompting Irish nationalists to commemorate the battle as “the Races of Castlebar.” It was a humiliating defeat for Lake and the British army. From Castlebar, Humbert marched his small but growing force toward the interior of Ireland.

Meanwhile, the British authorities feared that the French military presence and their inspiring victory at Castlebar would rekindle the Rebellion that they thought had been snuffed out once and for all in the other provinces. The lord lieutenant of Ireland, General Cornwallis, took personal command of the Anglo-Irish armies and set out to crush Humbert before it was too late. Although Cornwallis’s forces numbered 30,000 against Humbert’s 2,000 French and Irish troops, he dispatched an urgent appeal to London to send “as large a reinforcement as possible.” His concern, of course, was that Humbert would provide leadership and organization to many hundreds of thousands of Irish rebels.

Cornwallis, who had been forced to surrender to the American rebels at Yorktown in 1781, was determined not to be embarrassed again. In spite of his overwhelming numerical advantage he proceeded very cautiously and methodically against Humbert. The French general, meanwhile, was counting on the arrival of Hardy and Kilmaine with significant reinforcements, but they never appeared. Humbert put his men on a forced march toward Dublin, which was lightly defended, but ultimately Cornwallis intercepted and encircled them and forced Humbert to surrender at Ballinamuck, County Longford, on September 8.

Cornwallis recognized Humbert and his French soldiers as prisoners of war; they were treated humanely and repatriated to France in exchange for English prisoners of war. The Irish fighters who had joined Humbert, however, were considered rebels not to be accorded prisoner-of-war status. Rather than being allowed to surrender peaceably they were hunted down and slaughtered without mercy. The Republic of Connaught was destroyed.

General Hardy’s long-delayed invasion force finally departed for Ireland on September 16 – a week after Humbert’s surrender. It ran afoul

of the British navy on October 12, however, and was defeated. Wolfe Tone, who accompanied Hardy’s expedition, was captured, imprisoned in Dublin, and sentenced to death, but cheated the hangman by cutting his own throat on November 11. He died a week later and remains among the most revered of Irish martyrs.

Why Did the Rebellion Fail?

Everywhere the freedom fighters rose in 1798 the plebeian majority rallied solidly behind them. Viewed from each local vantage point the insurrection appeared universal and unstoppable, but viewed on a larger scale it could be seen to have unfolded unevenly. Ultimately the Rebellion failed as the forces of order were able to isolate the localized risings and defeat them one at a time. Tens of thousands of rebels paid with their lives.

The inability of the United Irish Society to coordinate the uprisings resulted from the government’s success in destroying its central leadership on the eve of the Rebellion. Government intelligence services had penetrated the organization at its highest levels; the greatest betrayals were those committed by informers Leonard McNally, a Central Committee member, and Thomas Reynolds, a confidant of Lord Edward Fitzgerald. Before the United Irish Society issued the call to rise, virtually all of its original leaders were dead, in prison, or in exile. Most of the leaders had been arrested in a raid on March 11; only Fitzgerald escaped, but he was captured shortly afterward and died in prison on June 4 of wounds sustained during his arrest.

Consequently only unseasoned third- and fourth-rank leaders were on the scene in Ireland at the outset of the Rebellion. Furthermore, communications between them were risky and difficult, making it virtually impossible to coordinate their actions. Each local insurgent group thus found itself on its own.

Another major factor in the defeat of the Rebellion was the failure of significant French support to materialize. The successes of Humbert’s minuscule force provide a small indication of what a serious French invasion might have accomplished. The two most influential French backers of Irish liberation – “the two Lazares,” Lazare Hoche and Lazare Carnot – were lost to the cause in September 1797 when General Hoche died of tuberculosis and Carnot was chased into exile by Bonaparte’s coup d’état of

Fructidor. Bonaparte originally endorsed the policy of attacking England by invading Ireland, but in the spring of 1798 he decided to invade Egypt instead – a disastrous decision for the Irish rebels (and, as it turned out, for Bonaparte himself).

The Aftermath

After Humbert's surrender the Rebellion was over, but the defeated rebels' hatred of their persecutors was undiminished. Cornwallis realized that continued violence against the vanquished populace would only lay the groundwork for future rebellions, but his efforts to restrain the Protestant yeomen who were bent on revenge met with little success. He bewailed "the numberless murders that are hourly committed by our people without any process or examination whatever. The yeomanry . . . take the lead in rapine and murder. The Irish Militia with a few officers, and those chiefly of the worst kind, follow closely on the heels of the yeomanry in murder and every kind of atrocity." Later, in 1799, Cornwallis complained that the counterproductive reprisals were continuing: "The same wretched business of Court-martial, hanging, transportation etc. attended by all the dismal scenes of wives, sisters, fathers kneeling and crying, is going on as usual."

No fundamental problems had been solved; indeed, they had been aggravated. Cornwallis recognized the "same spirit of disaffection continuing to pervade the lower orders." Although "the rebellion is less openly persisted in," he said, "it does not fail to show itself in various outrages and depredations not less destructive and infinitely more embarrassing . . . than open insurrection." The United Irish leadership in exile drew similar conclusions and consequently anticipated another general uprising in the very near term, and continued to entreat the French government to invade Ireland once again.

Cornwallis led a political campaign in favor of abolishing the puppet Irish government and replacing it with direct, unambiguous rule from London. The corrupt Irish Parliament was bribed to vote itself out of existence. The Act of Union was passed in 1800 creating the United Kingdom of England and Ireland, but the Union's two partners were far from equals. It was a coercive partnership of prince and pauper.

With the Irish Protestants no longer empowered to legislate for Ireland, British policy-

makers took the opportunity to make concessions to the Catholics in hopes of avoiding more Great Rebellions in the future. In 1829 Catholic Emancipation finally became the law of the land and the majority of the Irish people were no longer legally second-class citizens in their own country. Later generations nevertheless continued to fight for genuine national independence. In 1922 a compromise resulted in 26 of Ireland's 32 counties forming the Irish Free State. Six counties in the north of Ireland, however, remain part of the United Kingdom, and Irish nationalists continue to insist that they will not be satisfied until the whole of their country is free from English rule.

The divisions in Irish society that gave rise to the Great Rebellion, and that were exacerbated by it, have still not fully healed. The savagery with which the Catholics were treated in its wake ensured that it would not soon fade from memory. On the other hand, the resistance of the rebels was so courageous that today, more than 200 years later, Irish nationalists still derive inspiration from the spirit of 1798.

SEE ALSO: Emmet, Robert (1778–1803) and Emmet's Rebellion; Fitzgerald, Lord Edward (1763–1798); Ireland, Age of Revolutions, 1775–1803; Napper Tandy, James (1737?–1803); O'Connor, Arthur (1763–1852); Tone, Theobald Wolfe (1763–1798); United Irishmen

References and Suggested Readings

- Curtin, N. J. (1998) *The United Irishmen: Popular Politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791–1798*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Elliott, M. (1982) *Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Elliott, M. (1989) *Wolfe Tone: Prophet of Irish Independence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Packenham, T. (1972) *The Year of Liberty: The Great Irish Rebellion of 1798*. London: Granada.
- Póirtéir, C. (Ed.) (1998) *The Great Irish Rebellion of 1798*. Dublin: Mercier.
- Tillyard, S. (1999) *Citizen Lord: The Life of Edward Fitzgerald, Irish Revolutionary*. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.

Ireland, the Troubles

Robert W. White

"The Troubles" is a neutral term that attempts to balance the perspective of paramilitaries, who



A demonstrator is chased by a British soldier during a Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association march in Derry, Northern Ireland, on January 30, 1972 (Bloody Sunday). Twenty-six unarmed protesters were shot by the British military, 14 of whom were killed while fleeing military gunfire. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

saw themselves as soldiers engaged in a war, and the perspective of the media and government officials who observed a sectarian conflict between the Northern Irish Catholic and Protestant communities. Events associated with the Troubles that made worldwide news include the bombing of Birmingham pubs (Provisional IRA, 1974), the attack on the Miami Showband (Ulster Volunteer Force/Ulster Defence Regiment, 1975), the firebombing of the La Mon House restaurant (Provisional IRA, 1978), and the Omagh bombing (Real IRA, 1998).

Between 1969 and 2005 more than 3,500 people died in the Troubles. The Provisional IRA, or “Provos,” with more than 1,750 victims, was responsible for more deaths than any other organization. More than half of the Provos’ victims were members of the security forces, including 454 British army personnel. The Provos killed more than 625 civilians, including more than 300 Protestant civilians. Loyalist paramilitaries (loyal to the British crown) killed approximately 1,100 people, most of whom were Catholic civilians. The security forces killed more than 350 people, most of whom were killed by the British army. The British army killed 104 Provisional IRA volunteers, 118 Catholic civilians, and 20 Protestant civilians. The Troubles were simultaneously a war and a sectarian conflict, and most of its victims were civilians.

The Troubles began on October 5, 1968 in Derry City (the Unionists call it Londonderry),

when the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) attacked Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) marchers, precipitating a riot. The attack’s origins stem from events of previous decades and even centuries. Northern Ireland, established by the Government of Ireland Act (1920), was created in the midst of the Anglo-Irish War, a part of the 1919–23 generation’s “Troubled Times.” The province’s Protestant majority dates from the seventeenth-century plantation of Ulster.

NICRA sought equal rights for Northern Ireland’s Nationalist population, claiming they suffered discrimination at the hands of Unionists. Most Nationalists are Catholic and desire the reunification of Ireland. Most Protestants are Unionists and want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom. Civil rights protests were met by counter-demonstrators, often supported by the RUC. A particularly vociferous opponent of civil rights was the Reverend Ian Paisley, Moderator of the Free Presbyterian Church and known for his anti-Catholic statements. In August 1969 major rioting throughout Northern Ireland resulted in several deaths, the burning of Belfast neighborhoods, and the deployment of British troops as peacekeepers. The troops were welcomed by many Nationalists.

The Nationalist and Unionist communities reacted differently to these events. In December 1969 the Irish Republican Army split and the Provisional IRA was created. The Provisional IRA (henceforth referred to simply as the IRA) rejected constitutional politics, embraced armed struggle in support of a united Ireland, and was complemented by Provisional Sinn Féin (henceforth, Sinn Féin). In 1971 moderate Nationalists formed the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), which seeks the reunification of Ireland through peaceful methods. Also in 1971, hard-line Unionists left the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and formed the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), led by Reverend Paisley. In the early 1970s Loyalists organized paramilitary organizations.

In August 1971 the British government authorized the internment without trial of persons suspected of paramilitary activity, but until 1973 only Nationalists were interned. This alienated a large segment of that community, an alienation that was exacerbated in January 1972 – “Bloody Sunday” – when 14 unarmed civil rights

protestors attending an anti-internment rally were shot dead by British soldiers. In March 1972 the British prorogued Northern Ireland's government and instituted direct control from London; almost 500 people were killed in the Troubles that year.

There were several attempts to resolve the conflict. In 1973–4 moderate Nationalists and Unionists, with the support of the London and Dublin governments, formed a power-sharing executive, but it was brought down by a Loyalist-led general strike. In 1975 the British entered into an open-ended, bilateral truce with the IRA in a failed attempt to engage Irish Republicans in constitutional politics. In the early 1980s, in response to rapid growth in Sinn Féin following the deaths of Irish Republican prisoners on hunger-strike, including Bobby Sands, MP, the British organized a Northern Ireland Assembly. The SDLP, fearing it would be outflanked, followed Sinn Féin's lead and boycotted it.

In the early 1990s, after secret talks between Sinn Féin, Irish and British governmental representatives, and the SDLP, the situation changed. The Downing Street Declaration (1992) included the principle that the people of Ireland should determine their future, including the possibility of unifying the North and South. In August 1994 the IRA declared a unilateral ceasefire. Six weeks later, the Combined Loyalist Command did the same. Over the next four years the London and Irish governments, the SDLP, the DUP, the UUP, Sinn Féin, and others haltingly worked out the Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) of April 1998. The agreement led to reform in Northern Ireland, including changes in the RUC, which was renamed the Police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI). Following a referendum in the Republic of Ireland, the Irish government's claim on Northern Ireland was deleted from the Irish constitution.

In 2007, after some false starts and defying all expectations, London devolved power to a Northern Ireland Assembly with the Rev. Ian Paisley (until 2008) as first minister and Martin McGuinness, IRA veteran and prominent Sinn Féin member, as deputy first minister. The two unlikely leaders worked together well. Some Republican organizations, including Republican Sinn Féin, the Continuity IRA, the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, and the Real IRA,

rejected the Good Friday Agreement and continue to resist, but on a relatively small scale.

SEE ALSO: Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War; Irish Nationalism; Irish Republican Army (IRA); Northern Ireland Peace Movement; Paisley, Ian (b. 1926) and Unionism, Northern Ireland; Sands, Bobby (1954–1981); Sinn Féin

References and Suggested Readings

- Bell, J. B. (1993) *The Irish Troubles: A Generation at War*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Elliott, S. & Flackes, W. D. (1995) *Northern Ireland: A Political Directory, 1968–1999*. Belfast: Blackstaff Press.
- McKittrick, D., Kelters, S., Feeney, B., Thornton, C., & McVea, D. (2007) *Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles*. Edinburgh: Mainstream.
- Sutton, M. (1993) *An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Northern Ireland 1969–1993*. Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications.
- White, R. W. (1997) The Irish Republican Army: An assessment of Sectarianism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9/1: 20–55.

Irish nationalism

Claire Fitzpatrick

Irish nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries included various currents: the movement for self-government, land agitation, cultural regeneration, and eventually radical separatism. For many years the discourse on nationalism in Ireland was dominated by a teleological perspective that viewed the struggle for, and achievement of, independence as inevitable – the natural result of long-established national consciousness defined by the colonial relationship with Britain. This view has been superseded by a more complex and elaborate picture of the factors shaping Irish nationalism. Nationalism must be seen in the context of growing modernization and development in class relations and social structure. The transformation of the power structure led to the rise of rural and petty bourgeoisies as the main architects of the nationalist identity. Famine and emigration are also now recognized as important influences in preparing the ground for the flourishing of nationalism by making it more amenable to modernization and assimilation. Three variants can be discerned in the development of Irish nationalism: constitutional, cultural, and radical-separatist.

Constitutional Nationalism

Constitutional nationalism was the dominant form, centering on the quest for home rule. The land question, which had dominated Irish politics in the late nineteenth century, had developed into a wider movement initially led by Charles Stewart Parnell, which put the policy of self-government at the forefront of its agenda. The identification of the nationalist cause with the land question gave Irish nationalism a distinctive mark, and the alleviation of the land question by the Wyndham Land Purchase Act of 1903 led to a significant reduction in activism, which altered the nature of the nationalist cause. During this period nationalism was curtailed by the narrow confines of the British parliamentary structure, which to some extent accounts for its failure to realize its goals.

Parnell and the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) that he formed in 1882 were somewhat out of step with the dynamics of modern Irish nationalism. Although the IPP is often thought of as the most representative of Irish nationalist parties, it became increasingly conservative and to some extent irrelevant. When John Redmond, the IPP's leader from 1900 to 1918, declared support for the British war effort in World War I, he alienated provincial nationalists and hastened the party's decline. For more radical nationalists the war was a great catalyst to action challenging British rule.

Cultural Nationalism

The decline of parliamentary nationalism in the late 1890s resulted in a period of political stagnation and gave rise to a new nationalism that took cultural and radical forms. The cultural resurgence of the 1890s involved a conscious move to cultivate a truly national consciousness that would stress self-reliance and evoke pride.

The Gaelic League, formed in 1893, drew on Douglas Hyde's call in 1892 for the de-Anglicanization of Ireland and a revival of all things Irish. It developed a nationalist historicism that stressed the injustices of the colonial relationship. Together with the Romantic literary movement that celebrated a quasi-mythical construct of "Irish Ireland," the cultural nationalists aimed to educate and gaelicize the populace. However, although the Gaelic League succeeded in making the Irish language an important

political rallying point, the language revivalist movement failed in its primary aim to displace English as the country's dominant language. It was through English that Irish nationalism was expressed.

The anti-modern nature of the Gaelic revival was reflected in its aversion to the growing assimilation of Irish society to British values, and the cultivation of an ethnocentric cultural distinctiveness in defiance of Victorian Britain. Among other things, it created a symbolic basis for the political mobilization of Catholics. The equation of Catholic and Irish by D. P. Moran, the editor of the nationalist periodical *The Leader*, has been credited as a critical influence in that regard.

The Gaelic League, by reflecting the hopes and ambitions of those who felt socially excluded from power and status, filled a gap the IPP could not by mobilizing urban Ireland for nationalist politics. Although the League was the most important influence on the governing elite of the Irish Free State, the revolution that produced that state exposed (as one historian put it) the "hollowness of the cultural movement" (Garvin 1987). Nevertheless, as a vehicle for Catholic mobilization and promotion of "Irish Ireland" identity, it was of fundamental importance in the development of both modern separatist nationalism and the broader nationalist identity.

Radical Separatism

Concomitant with the cultural regeneration, and heavily influenced by it, more radical groups emerged offering new views and resolutions of the Irish national question. Of these, Arthur Griffith's non-republican Sinn Féin, founded in 1904–5, embodied bourgeois nationalism and represented a middle way between constitutionalism and physical force. It stressed the policy of national independence alongside passive resistance. By 1910 it was a spent force, eclipsed by a revitalized IPP and a regrouped Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). The ambiguous nature of Sinn Féin and the conciliatory approach of the IPP were both scorned by more radical separatist nationalists who combined the ideals of the Romantic literary movement and Gaelic revivalism with the militant urgency of Fenianism. The formation of the IRB in 1858 had added a physical-force dimension to Irish nationalism and it later recruited from the Gaelic revival

movement to become the main force behind the Rising of 1916. Contemptuous of the idea of a constitutional settlement within the context of the British empire, the more militant nationalists strove for the establishment of an Irish Republic.

The arming of the northern Unionists, who rejected any form of self-government for Ireland, had contributed to this resurgence of militant nationalism. Patrick Pearse, the leader of the rebels in 1916, was “glad the north had begun,” and the cult of violence and blood sacrifice was proclaimed as a legitimate response, although it remained a marginal ideal. Pearse propounded the mythical ideals of Irish nationalism and Catholic aspirations, and espoused separatism as the only true nationalist position. Meanwhile, the presence among the rebels of the Marxist James Connolly, who equated the cause of labor with the cause of Ireland, had a profound effect on labor politics in Ireland, and perhaps lent to Irish nationalism an egalitarianism it did not always espouse. Connolly’s socialism was often at odds with Irish nationalism.

In recent years the conflict in Northern Ireland has brought the role of nationalism under intense scrutiny. “Revisionist” interpretations of the role of nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have challenged the idea that republicanism was inevitable and argue that 1916 was “aberrant” and not a logical extension of developments in early twentieth-century Ireland. More cogent arguments, however, support the notion that the post-1916 revolution was the triumph of the “Irish Ireland” party, which had managed to express Irish nationalist aspirations by capturing the middle ground and its ideals in Irish politics. The aspirations and ideas of all three strands of Irish nationalism were influential in shaping the subsequent expression and development of nationalism in Ireland, and the Rising of 1916 transformed the nationalist debate in Ireland and made possible the establishment of the modern Irish state.

SEE ALSO: Catholic Emancipation; Connolly, James (1868–1916); Davitt, Michael (1846–1906); Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War; Fenian Movement; Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798; Ireland, the Troubles; Irish Republican Army (IRA); O’Connell, Daniel (1775–1847); Parnell, Charles Stewart (1846–1891); Pearse, Patrick (Pádraig) (1879–1916); Young Ireland

References and Suggested Readings

- Bew, P. (1987) *Conflict and Conciliation in Ireland, 1890–1910*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Boyce, D. C. (1991) *Nationalism in Ireland*. London: Routledge.
- Garvin, T. (1981) *The Evolution of Irish Politics*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.
- Garvin, T. (1987) *Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.
- Hoppen, T. (1989) *Ireland since 1800: Conflict and Conformity*. London: Longman.
- Hutchinson, J. (1987) *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Laffan, M. (1989) *The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Féin Party 1916–23*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lyons, F. S. L. (1973) *Ireland since the Famine*. London: Fontana.
- McGee, O. (2005) *The IRB: Irish Republican Brotherhood from the Land League to Sinn Féin*. Dublin: Four Courts Press.
- O’Mahony, P. & Delanty, G. (2001) *Rethinking Irish History: Nationalism, Identity and Ideology*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Paseta, S. (1999) *Before the Revolution*. Cork: Cork University Press.

Irish Republican Army (IRA)

Robert W. White

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was born in April 1916 when rebels in Dublin declared an Irish Republic, but its roots date from much earlier. Some of the 1916 rebels had been Fenians in the 1860s–1880s and some Fenians had been Young Irelanders in the 1840s. The IRA’s ideology dates from eighteenth-century republican philosophy and the United Irishmen of the 1790s, who, in the words of Theobald Wolfe Tone sought “to break the connection with England, the never-failing source of our political ills . . . and to substitute the common name of Irishmen in place of the denomination of Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter.”

The 1916 Easter Rising failed, its leaders were executed, and its soldiers were arrested and interned. Most Irish people had not supported the rebellion, but by the time internees were released in late 1916 the brutal British overreaction to the Rising had laid a fertile ground for the reorganization of the IRA and an associated political party, Sinn Féin. Sinn Féin

won the majority of Irish seats in the 1918 election to the British parliament. Instead of taking their seats in London, Sinn Féin's representatives formed a revolutionary government in Dublin, Dáil Éireann.

On the day Dáil Éireann convened, January 21, 1919, an IRA group in County Tipperary started the Irish War for Independence (also known as the Black and Tan War or the Anglo-Irish War). IRA fighters went on the offensive throughout Ireland, especially in Dublin and the west. They received less support in the northeast province of Ulster, where the predominantly Protestant population, which was descended from the seventeenth-century English "plantation" of Ireland, favored union with Britain.

The Government of Ireland Act (1920) partitioned Ireland, but the rebels ignored this. In January 1922, however, Dáil Éireann ratified a treaty that confirmed partition and provoked a split in the IRA and Sinn Féin. Northern Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom and the pro-Union Protestant majority formed a government in Belfast. In Southern Ireland the armed forces of the newly born Irish Free State pursued the soldiers of the anti-treaty IRA, executed former comrades, and won the Irish Civil War.

The IRA and Sinn Féin refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Dublin and Belfast parliaments. In 1938 a group of Dáil Éireann veterans who, based on a resolution passed by the revolutionary government, considered themselves the *de jure* government of the Irish Republic, devolved the powers of government to the IRA Army Council. This provided a legitimacy that cannot be underestimated; it gave the IRA a moral basis for armed struggle.

In 1939 an IRA campaign led by 1916–23 veterans started with bombings in England and spread to Ireland. The British, Northern Irish, and Free State governments responded severely with internment and executions. The Free State government, led by former IRA men, let IRA members die on hunger strike rather than recognize their political status. The campaign ended in 1945. In December 1956 a "Resistance Campaign," organized by 1916–23 veterans and 1940s veterans, and by the children of 1920s veterans, was launched. The campaign began with activity in many Northern Irish locations, but over time it was confined to attacks along the border with the Republic of Ireland (which in

1949 officially replaced the Irish Free State). The two Irish governments again responded firmly, arresting and interning activists without trial. The campaign ended in 1962 in failure, but many of those involved believed they had kept faith with their predecessors and had handed on a tradition to the future.

In the mid-1960s the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was organized to support Irish nationalists – primarily Catholic and supporting the reunification of Ireland – who argued they suffered discrimination at the hands of the majority Unionist community. NICRA marches were met by counterdemonstrations and there was major unrest in August 1969. British troops were called in as "peacekeepers" and in December 1969 the IRA split over how best to respond to the situation. The "Official" IRA wanted to combine military action with revolutionary politics and participate in the Belfast, Dublin, and Westminster parliaments. The Provisional IRA ("Provos") supported a military response but held to the traditional view that the Belfast and Dublin governments were illegitimate and that participation in constitutional politics would inevitably undermine armed struggle.

The Official IRA declared a ceasefire in May 1972. In 1974 some members of the organization formed the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and returned to armed struggle. The INLA and its political counterpart, the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP), although small, continue to this day.

The repressive response of the British and Northern Ireland governments, including internment without trial of suspected republicans in 1971 and "Bloody Sunday" in 1972 (in which 26 unarmed civil rights protesters were shot, 14 of them fatally, by British troops), fueled the rapid growth of the Provisional IRA. Hunger strikes by IRA prisoners also generated sympathy and support for the organization, especially after the May 1981 death of Bobby Sands, who had been elected as an abstentionist MP for Fermanagh/South Tyrone.

As electoral support for Provisional Sinn Féin increased, the Provos split. In October 1986 delegates to an IRA convention recognized the authority of the Dublin parliament. A minority (including the vast majority of the Provos' founders who were still active) continued to reject that parliament and, believing that

constitutional politics would lead to compromise rather than a united Ireland, formed the “Continuity” IRA (CIRA). They also formed “Republican” Sinn Féin. In August 1994 the Provisional IRA entered into a unilateral ceasefire, followed by a ceasefire by the Combined Loyalist Military Command. In 1996, with the Provisional IRA still on ceasefire, the CIRA formally revealed itself. In 1997 the Provisional IRA split again and internal critics created the Real IRA. In April 1998 the Provisional leadership accepted a political compromise, the Good Friday Agreement (Belfast Agreement), which was rejected by both the CIRA and the Real IRA.

The Provisional IRA formally ended its military campaign in July 2005. By that time, Provisional Sinn Féin members had taken seats and participated in the Dublin parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Continuity IRA and the Real IRA remain active, though on a small scale.

Although members of the Provisional, Continuity, and Real IRAs view themselves as guerrillas pursuing national liberation, they are all proscribed by the British, Irish, and United States governments as “terrorist” organizations. Among the most noteworthy of the acts for which various groupings calling themselves the IRA have claimed responsibility are “Bloody Friday” (1972), in which 22 bombings in Belfast killed 11 people and wounded more than a hundred; the firebombing of the La Mon House restaurant (1978) that took 12 lives; the assassination of the Queen’s husband’s uncle, Lord Mountbatten (1979); and the Omagh, County Tyrone bombing (1998) that killed 29 and wounded more than two hundred.

The IRA’s membership has included such prominent political leaders and statesmen as Eamon de Valera, Seán Lemass, Seán MacBride, and Martin McGuinness, as well as author, playwright, and poet Brendan Behan. The current president of Provisional Sinn Féin and MP for West Belfast, Gerry Adams, is reportedly an IRA veteran, which he denies.

SEE ALSO: Collins, Michael (1890–1922); De Valera, Eamon (1882–1975); Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War; Fenian Movement; Ireland, the Troubles; Irish Republican Army Resistance Campaign; Northern Ireland Peace Movement; Paisley, Ian (b. 1926) and Unionism, Northern Ireland; Sands, Bobby (1954–1981); Sinn Féin; Tone, Theobald Wolfe (1763–1798); United Irishmen; Young Ireland

References and Suggested Readings

- Bell, J. B. (1979) *The Secret Army: The IRA 1916–1979*. Dublin: Academy Press.
- Bishop, P. & Mallie, E. (1992) *The Provisional IRA*. London: Corgi.
- English, R. (2003) *Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA*. London: Macmillan.
- Moloney, E. (2002) *A Secret History of the IRA*. New York: Norton.
- White, R. W. (2006) *Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, The Life and Politics of an Irish Revolutionary*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Irish Republican Army resistance campaign

Robert W. White

On December 12, 1956 the Irish Republican Army began what they called the Resistance Campaign, which would continue until February 26, 1962. For the first three years IRA forces attacked Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) police stations and officers, British army bases and personnel, and government facilities in many parts of Northern Ireland. By 1960, however, strong opposition from the British and Northern Ireland governments and the collaboration of the Republic of Ireland’s Cabinet limited military action to areas along the border of these two states. Disappointed, internal IRA critics began to refer to it as the Border Campaign, and it is by this title that it is popularly known. Many 1950s IRA activists, however, including Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, the primary author of the IRA statement “to end the Resistance Campaign,” continue to use the original name.

The Resistance Campaign is important because it served as the transmitter of the ideals, goals, and tactics of 1916–23 IRA veterans to future generations of activists. Between 1916 and 1922 agitation and political action by the IRA and the political party Sinn Féin achieved independence for 26 of Ireland’s 32 counties, which formed the Irish Free State (later the Republic of Ireland), with a government in Dublin. The six counties of Northern Ireland, established in 1920–1 with a separate government in Belfast, remained part of the United Kingdom. The IRA and Sinn Féin split over the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1922), which confirmed the partition of Ireland. Anti-Treatyites lost the Irish Civil War (1922–3), but the treaty’s opponents in Sinn

Féin and the IRA never accepted the “partitionist” governments.

IRA veterans of 1916–23 organized an IRA campaign that began with bombs in England in 1939 and ended with small-scale actions in Northern Ireland in 1945. In the late 1940s, and in spite of their failures, the 1916–23 IRA veterans, complemented by veterans of the 1940s campaign, again reorganized the IRA. Key personnel included Paddy McLogan and Larry Grogan, who joined the IRA in the 1910s, and Tomas Mac Curtain, the son of the Sinn Féin lord mayor of Cork, who was killed by the Royal Irish Constabulary in 1920. Tony Magan, chief of staff from 1948 to 1957, joined the IRA in the 1930s. The veterans were complemented by younger recruits, many of whom were the children of activists from the 1916–23 era, including Dáithí O’Connell and Ruairí Ó Brádaigh. In the late 1950s O’Connell joined the IRA Army Council and was director of operations. Ó Brádaigh was IRA chief of staff when the campaign ended. Although the 1950s IRA failed to reunite Ireland, many activists believed that by taking up arms they had kept faith with their predecessors and handed on a tradition to the future. The statement ending the campaign declared: “The Irish Resistance Movement renews its pledge of eternal hostility to the British Forces of Occupation in Ireland.”

IRA and Sinn Féin activists of the 1950s, as middle-aged men, were key organizers of the Provisional IRA and Provisional Sinn Féin in 1969–70; Dáithí O’Connell was the first Provisional IRA director of publicity and served on the organization’s founding Army Council; Ruairí Ó Brádaigh was the first president of Provisional Sinn Féin. In 1986, when the Republican movement split again, it was still-active 1950s veterans who organized the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Féin (RSF), including Dáithí O’Connell, the first Continuity IRA chief of staff, and Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, the president of RSF. The Continuity IRA was named by Tom Maguire, a prominent IRA veteran of the 1916–23 era and member of the revolutionary Irish government of 1921, the Second All-Ireland Dáil Eireann. Using the word “Continuity” in its name staked the organization’s claim to direct descent – through an unbroken link – with the IRA of 1916–23. The Resistance Campaign provided that link. The founders of the Provisional IRA, Provisional Sinn Féin, Continuity IRA,

and Republican Sinn Féin are often, appropriately, described as traditionalists.

The Resistance Campaign failed for several reasons, including the “apolitical” approach of the IRA leadership in the early 1950s. During the 1940s campaign the IRA was almost destroyed by severe state repression on the part of the Dublin government. By concentrating their military activities in Northern Ireland and avoiding conflict with Dublin (a government whose authority they never recognized, *de jure* or *de facto*) the leadership hoped to avoid a repeat of the 1940s. Yet, when the campaign started, both the Northern Irish and Dublin governments responded quickly with internment without trial, as well as the banning of Sinn Féin and its newspaper in the North, and the use of military courts in the South. These actions undercut the ability of the IRA and Sinn Féin to complement military activity in Northern Ireland with political action there and in the South. Late in the campaign younger activists pushed to combine military and political approaches, which set the stage for important political developments in the Republican movement in the 1960s.

SEE ALSO: Collins, Michael (1890–1922); De Valera, Eamon (1882–1975); Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War; Ireland, the Troubles; Irish Nationalism; Irish Republican Army (IRA); Sinn Féin

References and Suggested Readings

- Bell, J. B. (1979) *The Secret Army: The IRA 1916–1979*. Dublin: Academy Press.
- Moloney, E. (2002) *A Secret History of the IRA*. New York: Norton.
- White, R. W. (1993) *Provisional Irish Republicans: An Oral and Interpretive History*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- White, R. W. (2006) *Ruairi O Brádaigh, The Life and Politics of an Irish Revolutionary*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- White, R. W. (2008) Unpublished interview with Ruairí O Brádaigh, March 8, 2008.

Irish revolts, 1400–1790

Kathleen Ruppert

By the beginning of the fifteenth century the English colonial presence in Ireland, having reached a high point in the thirteenth century, had declined in both area and profitability. Henry IV (1399–1413) was preoccupied with a

rebellion in Wales. Furthermore, with plots in England aimed at overthrowing him, he and his successors were too concerned with an ongoing struggle against France to devote significant resources to the Irish colony. Under these circumstances, powerful Gaelic lords from beyond the Pale (the area around Dublin where English law prevailed) were able to mount an almost constant threat to English rule. Unable to reassert dominion over Ireland, the government was forced to rely on Anglo-Irish magnates to maintain law and order. When the Gaelic Irish *sept* (chieftain), O'Reilly, took up arms in a 1423 rising, for example, the intervention of the Earl of Desmond, with a large force from Munster, was required to protect the Leinster colonists. However, the presence of powerful Anglo-Irish magnates posed its own difficulties, as disputes among leading Anglo-Irish families (particularly between the Butlers and the Geraldines) were endemic and contributed to the unrest.

In the second half of the fifteenth century, as England once again became embroiled in a dynastic struggle, Ireland began to assume a greater significance in English politics. When Richard, Duke of York, was convicted of treason during the Wars of the Roses, he fled to Ireland. In defiance of the English parliament, an Anglo-Irish parliament confirmed York in office and declared that any law passed in England must be accepted by the Anglo-Irish parliament in order to be binding in Ireland. Following a Yorkist victory in 1461 the Earl of Ormond, who had supported the Lancastrian side, was executed in England. The late earl's brother, Sir John Butler, invaded Ireland, and with the help of his cousins captured Waterford and New Ross, and incited risings in the midlands. Inadequate resources rendered the crown authorities in Dublin unable to suppress the rebellion, but the Earl of Desmond marshaled his forces to defeat the Butlers.

As a reward for his assistance against the Butlers, Desmond was appointed chief governor of Ireland in the spring of 1463. The Anglo-Irish within the Pale doubted the loyalty of the great gaelicized magnate, however. Desmond was dismissed in 1467 and charged with treason the following February. Desmond's subsequent beheading sparked widespread risings throughout the country. The Earl of Kildare, who had been charged with treason along with Desmond, escaped from custody and joined in the rebellion

along with several Gaelic Irish leaders. Unable to subdue the opposition, the administration agreed to reverse the charges against Kildare if he would induce the Irish chieftains to make peace. The incident served as a powerful reminder to crown authorities that they could not keep the peace without the cooperation of powerful local magnates.

Ireland once again factored into England's dynastic struggle in 1487 when young Lambert Simnel, posing as the nephew of Edward IV, was crowned King Edward VI in Dublin. Backed by Irish supporters and German mercenaries, Simnel invaded England but was soundly defeated by the forces of Henry VII. Following a similar attempt on the Tudor throne in 1491, Henry VII sent Sir Edward Poyning to Ireland. Poyning's Law, passed in 1495, greatly restricted the freedom of the Irish parliament by providing, among other things, that future Irish parliaments and legislation must receive prior approval from the English Privy Council. Though it would be several decades before the crown attempted a consistent policy of direct rule, circumstances had forced the nascent Tudor state to begin taking a more active role in Ireland.

Sixteenth Century

The first serious challenge to Tudor rule in Ireland occurred in 1534 under the leadership of Thomas, Lord Offaly ("Silken Thomas"), son of the ninth Earl of Kildare. The Kildare family's control was threatened by increased Tudor centralization under the direction of Henry VIII's chief minister, Thomas Cromwell. The rebellion began in June when Lord Offaly, supported by a guard of 140 horsemen, resigned his position as vice deputy and repudiated his allegiance to Henry VIII before the Irish Council. Intended as a show of force to remind the king that the crown could not govern effectively without the backing of the Fitzgeralds of Kildare, the rebellion took on a religious aspect as well. Lord Offaly denounced the English king as a heretic and demanded an oath of allegiance to himself, the pope, and Holy Roman Emperor Charles V. It took 14 months for the crown's forces of 2,300 men to suppress the rebellion.

The consequences of the Kildare rebellion were far-reaching. The extensive Kildare lands were confiscated and Lord Offaly and his five uncles were all put to death. The religious chal-

lenge posed by the Kildare rebellion prompted King Henry VIII to convene an Irish parliament to declare him supreme head of the church. In addition, the king established a permanent garrison in Ireland and thereafter appointed only English-born governors to Ireland. In the power vacuum that followed the removal of the Kildare family, Gaelic lords of the midland area were free to launch sporadic attacks on the Pale. Repeated disturbances, including a joint invasion of the Pale by Manus O'Donnell and Con O'Neill, necessitated a new strategy to restore order to Ireland. The resultant "surrender and re-grant" policy was aimed at turning Irish enemies into loyal subjects of the crown. In exchange for surrendering their lands and title to the crown, Irish chiefs and Anglo-Irish lords were offered secure titles to their lands and the protection of English law. At the same time, the Irish parliament in 1541 elevated Henry VIII's status from lord of Ireland to king of Ireland.

Not all Gaelic chieftains were willing to submit to the terms of surrender and re-grant, as a disputed succession to the earldom of Tyrone soon made clear. In 1559 Shane O'Neill took the Irish title "The O'Neill" in defiance of English law. Determined to assert English authority, the Earl of Sussex sought to oust Shane O'Neill from Ulster. Military excursions into Ulster proved ineffective, however, and the Anglo-Irish community resented the exactions taken to finance the military campaign. Anglo-Irish hostility was heightened when Sussex's successor as governor, Sir Henry Sidney, attempted the plantation of English families onto Irish soil by granting land to colonial adventurers. A series of insurrections resulted, prompting Elizabeth I to put an end to Sidney's scheme of colonization through private enterprise. The queen granted clemency to the insurrection leaders, with the exception of James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald, who was forced to flee to the Continent.

In 1579 Fitzgerald returned to Ireland accompanied by a papal nuncio and a small band of papal troops. Given Ireland's strategic position *vis-à-vis* England, the pope was willing to aid insurrection in Ireland as a means of attacking English Protestantism. The so-called Desmond Rebellion attracted widespread support in Munster and, to a lesser extent, within the English Pale. The Earl of Desmond's brothers, and later the Earl himself, joined Fitzgerald in launching a rebellion against the "heretic queen" and the

Protestant faith. Although Fitzgerald was killed shortly after his arrival in Ireland, the rebellion spread to Leinster the following summer under the leadership of Lord Viscount Baltinglas and Gaelic chieftain Feagh McHugh O'Byrne. An army of 8,000 men under the command of Arthur Lord Grey de Wilton succeeded in suppressing the rebellion by 1583. Although most participants in the rebellion were motivated by resentment at the extension of English power as much as by religious concerns, the English government feared a general Catholic conspiracy throughout Ireland and implemented a swift and fierce military repression. Elizabeth I showed no mercy to the leaders, who were deprived of their property and executed. Portions of the confiscated lands, which amounted to approximately 300,000 acres, were used subsequently for the plantation of English families into Munster.

The final decade of the sixteenth century witnessed a rebellion of such magnitude that it threatened to overturn English rule in Ireland. Hugh O'Neill, claimant to the earldom of Tyrone, had sided with the English in suppressing the Desmond Rebellion. Nevertheless, his desire to regain all the hereditary powers of his family in Ulster led O'Neill to take up arms against the English. The conflict, known as the Nine Years' War (1564–1603), or Tyrone's Rebellion, began as a squabble between O'Neill and minor English officials, whom he sought to remove from Ulster. As the conflict escalated, O'Neill solicited the help of other discontented lords in Ireland, most notably Hugh O'Donnell. O'Neill broadened his appeal overseas by advancing himself as a champion of the Counterreformation, thus earning the support of Philip II of Spain.

Seventeenth Century

Having won a number of victories against the forces of the English crown in the Nine Years' War, including the Battle of Yellow Ford (1598), the Gaelic rebels welcomed the arrival of 4,000 Spanish troops at Kinsale in 1601. The Spanish forces quickly capitulated, however, and English forces under Lord Mountjoy managed to crush the rebellion by defeating O'Neill's men as they attempted to aid the Spanish, and employing what amounted to a scorched-earth policy throughout Ulster. O'Neill surrendered in March 1603, days after Elizabeth I's death.

Despite a surprisingly lenient settlement in which the leaders of the revolt were allowed to retain their lands in Ulster, O'Neill and other Gaelic lords continued to find English rule intolerable. As officials pressed ahead with plans to divide Ulster into counties, and extend English common law to all of Ireland, Rory O'Donnell (brother of Hugh O'Donnell) entered into secret negotiations with Spain in a conspiracy to seize Dublin Castle and spark a general rebellion. When the alleged plot was discovered, the O'Neill and O'Donnell clans, along with many of their followers, fled to the Continent. The historic "flight of the earls" in 1607 paved the way for the most comprehensive land settlement yet attempted in Ireland. Elizabeth I's successor, James I of England, approved the state-sponsored plantation of English and Scottish settlers onto confiscated lands in Ulster and, to a lesser degree, other regions of Ireland. Native Ulstermen who had remained loyal to the crown during Tyrone's revolt were assured that they would not be deprived of their lands. Following the short-lived rebellion of Sir Cahir O'Doherty in April 1608, however, the Ulster plantation became more extensive and punitive.

With increasing numbers of Protestant settlers arriving from England and Scotland as part of the government's plantation scheme, the Anglo-Irish gentry and burghers, most of whom were Catholic, began to call themselves the "Old English" in order to distinguish themselves from the more recent Protestant arrivals. Efforts to force the Old English into conformity with the Church of Ireland provoked hostility to both church and state. This was particularly the case after 1633, when Thomas Wentworth arrived on the scene as Lord Deputy of Ireland. Wentworth managed to alienate the landed classes (Gaelic, Old English, and New English alike) by challenging land titles, and charging landowners heavy fines to retain their estates. Additionally, in an attempt to enforce conformity with the state religion and raise money for the royal coffers, Wentworth levied recusancy fines for failure to attend Church of Ireland services. Resentment and insecurity continued to grow, particularly as rumors began to circulate about plans for a plantation of Old English lands in Connacht and elsewhere.

In the summer of 1641, with royal authority severely undermined both by Scottish Covenanters and by extreme Protestants within

the English parliament, Old English and native Irish Catholics faced the likelihood of a rigorous anti-Catholic policy in Ireland. Fearing a fresh wave of confiscations, native Irish landowners in Ulster began to plot a preemptive strike for late October. Plans to seize Dublin Castle were thwarted at the last moment by an informant, but Sir Phelim O'Neill and other Irish gentry managed to seize control of a number of towns, castles, and forts throughout Ulster. In late November the insurgents inflicted a key defeat on English relief forces at Julianstown, County Louth.

Fearing that crown officials would use the rebellion as a pretext for confiscating all Catholic lands, and perhaps for ending the tacit toleration shown the Catholic religion, the Old English lords of the Pale decided to join forces with the native Irish rebels in the north. Together, the two groups formed the Confederation of Kilkenny in 1642. By that time the rebellion had become, despite the intentions of its planners, a widespread popular rising characterized by brutal attacks on the settler population and their property. An estimated 2,000 to 4,000 Protestant settlers were killed, and thousands more stripped of their possessions and driven from their land. Given the native Irish atrocities (the extent of which was greatly exaggerated in English reports), suppression, when it came under Oliver Cromwell in 1649, was brutal and left a legacy of lasting animosity between Protestants and Catholics in Ireland.

Eighteenth Century

The first three decades of the eighteenth century witnessed the consolidation of the Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland, as a series of comprehensive laws greatly limited the ability of Catholics to own land and eventually deprived Catholics of the vote. In addition, the penal code barred Catholics from the legal profession, the army, and all public offices. However, it was not only Irish Catholics who found cause for resentment. A 1704 law requiring holders of public office to take sacraments according to the usage of the Church of Ireland offended and alienated Presbyterians as well. Furthermore, even those Irish who conformed to the state religion were disgruntled at the fact that the best posts in both church and government were given to English-born individuals. The fact that the

Irish market was controlled from Westminster, while Scotland enjoyed free trade, was also a source of considerable grievance, particularly since Westminster forbade the export of Irish wool. There was considerable sympathy in Ireland for the demands of the American colonists, and by mid-century a Patriot party had been formed to oppose the subordinate status of the Irish parliament as enshrined in Poyning's Law.

The middle decades of the century were also characterized by endemic violence in the Irish countryside. In Munster and south Leinster agrarian rebels known as Whiteboys rose up against the local gentry and Church of Ireland officials, primarily over the issues of tithes and the enclosure of common lands. Major outbreaks of Whiteboy violence occurred between 1761 and 1765, and again between 1769 and 1776. Such outbreaks included the widespread destruction of property, the maiming of animals, and the terrorizing of landlords and tithe collectors. Similar agrarian violence was carried out simultaneously in Ulster, where the Oakboys and Steelboys launched insurrections in 1763 and 1769, respectively.

The American War of Independence left Ireland dangerously exposed to both internal unrest and foreign invasion, as troops normally stationed in Ireland had been sent overseas to America. Irish Protestants, many of them members of the Patriot party, formed militia units known as the Irish Volunteers. By 1778, when France entered the war against Britain, the political demands emanating from Dublin carried an unprecedented weight. Between 1778 and 1782 a good deal of legislation was passed to redress Irish grievances. Restrictions on Irish commerce were lifted and Poyning's Law was amended to give the Dublin legislature greater independence. Despite concessions, however, the political situation became much more radical with the outbreak of the French Revolution. A decade of mounting unrest met by increasing repression culminated in the Great Rebellion of 1798.

SEE ALSO: Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658); English Revolution, 17th Century; Ireland, Age of Revolutions, 1775–1803; Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798

References and Suggested Readings

Barnard, T. (2004) *The Kingdom of Ireland, 1641–1760*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Boyce, D. G. (1982) *Nationalism in Ireland*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Canny, N. (2001) *Making Ireland British, 1580–1650*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cosgrove, A. (1981) *Late Medieval Ireland*. Dublin: Helicon.
- Donnelly, J. S., Jr. (Ed.) (2004) *Encyclopedia of Irish History and Culture*. Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference.
- Ellis, S. G. (1985) *Tudor Ireland: Crown, Community and the Conflict of Cultures, 1470–1603*. London: Longman.
- Foster, R. F. (1988) *Modern Ireland, 1600–1972*. New York: Penguin.
- Foster, R. F. (1992) *The Oxford History of Ireland*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lennon, C. (1995) *Sixteenth-century Ireland: The Incomplete Conquest*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Perceval-Maxwell, M. (1994) *The Outbreak of the Irish Rebellion of 1641*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Ishikawa Sanshirō (1876–1956)

David G. Nelson

Ishikawa Sanshirō, a Japanese socialist turned anarchist theorist influenced by the works of anarchists Edward Carpenter and Elisée Reclus, was born and raised in Saitama Prefecture. Upon graduation in 1902 from Tokyo Hōgakuin (currently Chūō University), Ishikawa began his writing career with the popular newspaper *Yorozu Chūhō*. After the paper endorsed the Russo-Japanese War, Ishikawa and fellow journalist Kōtoku Shusui resigned in protest and helped found the socialist society Heimisha, publishing an associated newspaper that lasted for two years.

Like other activist writers of the late Meiji era, a period when Japan was undergoing rapid industrialization and modernization, Ishikawa was imprisoned several times for his socialist advocacy. While incarcerated Ishikawa spent much of his time reading and studying the history of western socialist movements. Ishikawa turned toward anarchist theory reading the writings of Carpenter and others. Upon his release from prison Ishikawa spent 1913 to 1920 in self-imposed exile in Europe, deepening his understanding of anarchism through correspondence with Carpenter and Paul Reclus, Elisée Reclus's son.

Returning to Japan in 1920, Ishikawa promoted anarchist ideas both through his Mutual Study Society and associated publications and through the practical application of the anarchosyndicalist principle of autogestion (worker self-management). Considering peasant life as the basis of democracy, Ishikawa actively promoted and organized self-governing peasant associations. In 1946 Ishikawa founded the Anarchist League of Japan, and remained active in the movement until his death in 1956.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Japan; Anarchosyndicalism; Hatta Shūzō (1886–1934); Reclus, Elisée (1830–1905)

References and Suggested Readings

- Button, J. (1995) *The Radicalism Handbook: A Complete Guide to the Radical Movement in the Twentieth Century*. London: Cassell.
- Hunter, J. (1984) *Concise Dictionary of Modern Japanese History*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ishikawa, S. (1976) *Kindai nihon shisō taikai 16: Ishikawa Sanshirō shū* (Anthology of Modern Japanese Thought 16: The Collected Works of Ishikawa Sanshirō). Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō.
- Nishiyama, T. (2007) *Ishikawa Sanshirō no yūtopia: shakai kōsō to jissen* (Ishikawa Sanshirō's Utopia: Social Thought and Practice). Tokyo: Tōji Shobō.

Islamic political currents

Jason Hannan

Like other religious cultures, the Islamic world has been forced to reckon with a variety of modern realities, including secularism, democracy, industrial capitalism, human rights, gender equality, and natural science. These developments have revealed certain tensions between Islam and modernity. It is often said that Islam today is in a state of crisis and must undergo reform if it is to flourish in the modern world. There has been a wide range of Muslim responses to the challenges of modernity and all have had to face an inescapable dilemma: how to address such challenges while remaining faithful to the Islamic tradition. In some cases, the responses have become powerful political movements; in others, they remain mere ideas. There are pointed disagreements among Muslims concerning how to respond to modern realities.

What binds these different points of view, however, is a common struggle for the future of Islam.

Historical Background

The emphasis that Muslims place upon the contemporary crisis of Islam derives in large part from an enduring cultural memory of the historical grandeur of the Islamic civilization. During the medieval period, Muslim societies flourished in a network of empires stretching from Spain and large parts of Africa to the Middle East and Persia, India, and even parts of China. Muslim cities such as Cordoba, Cairo, Baghdad, and Isfahan were among the cultural capitals of the world. Muslims were at the forefront of science, philosophy, mathematics, medicine, and technology. The cultural achievements of this period were enormous and later influenced much of modern western culture. Algebra, humanism, the university, and even the common law, for example, owe their origins to medieval Islam. Although the number and sophistication of such achievements declined considerably under the Ottoman empire, the Islamic world nonetheless enjoyed several centuries free of external domination.

This state of affairs changed dramatically with the rise of European imperialism. Beginning with the British takeover of India and culminating in Britain and France's division of the former territories of the Ottoman empire, the Islamic world underwent a fundamental transformation in several crucial ways. First, the majority of the



Iranian Shi'ite students protest in front of the embassy of Saudi Arabia in Teheran on July 24, 2007 in response to reports of an insult by Saudi Wahhabi clerics regarding the holy shrines of Shi'ites in Karbala and Damascus. From the early twentieth to early twenty-first centuries, Islamic protest movements have ranged from extremist to modernist currents. (AFP/Getty Images)

Muslim world fell under non-Muslim rule. This was the single most traumatic and disorienting experience for the collective Muslim body. Second, the political geography of the Islamic world was further transformed when it was divided into separate nation-states, a system that was entirely foreign to Muslim societies. Third, the practice of Islamic law was heavily influenced, if not systematically replaced, by European civil law. This required training in a foreign legal tradition, leading to the decline of Islamic law. Fourth, whereas a career in Islamic law had formerly been regarded with high esteem, Muslims now accorded greater prestige to careers in modern medicine, the sciences, the civil service, and, most notably, engineering. Fifth, the traditional languages of Islamic learning, such as Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and Urdu, were relegated to a secondary status, while European languages, such as English and French, became the *lingua franca*.

These structural changes had the humiliating effect of underscoring European hegemony. Although the period of decolonization following World War II permitted Muslim countries some degree of sovereignty, the Islamic world has since been unable to revive its past glory. It remains ravaged by poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, autocratic government, and political violence. The sense of despair pervading much of the Islamic world has generated a number of Muslim discourses concerning possible solutions to these problems. Such discourses shape a large part of public discussion in the Islamic world today.

Early Muslim Responses to Modernity

Among the earliest responses to modernity were those of Muslim reformers Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–97) and his student Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905). Al-Afghani and ‘Abduh were both trained in Islamic law, the former at schools in Afghanistan and Iran and the latter at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University. They later spent considerable time in Europe, where they became acquainted with western intellectual fields and disciplines. In particular, they were impressed with western philosophy and science, which they regarded as important tools of knowledge missing in the Islamic world. They argued that Muslim societies stood to gain by adopting

these fields and disciplines, provided that those conclusions that conflicted with Islamic beliefs were rejected.

Al-Afghani and ‘Abduh rejected the established view that Islam was closed to *ijtihad* (novel interpretations of Islamic law) and that Muslim laypersons were required to practice *taqlid* (uncritical imitation of scholars). They held that Muslim societies had been thwarted under the imposition of *taqlid* and that systematic reform was needed if Muslim societies were to move forward in the modern world.

Al-Afghani in particular was not fond of Europe. He believed that European science and philosophy had to be deployed precisely to subvert European hegemony. He was fierce in his rejection of scientific materialism and Darwinism, the latter being a key part of modern science. Al-Afghani maintained that any worldview devoid of theistic content was detrimental to the larger society and he deemed evolution a categorically atheistic science. Among his most subversive ideas, however, was a program for pan-Islamism, a movement to unite Muslim territories under the banner of the Caliphate.

‘Abduh adopted this program for pan-Islamism, as did his most renowned student, Rashid Rida (1865–1935). Rida is best known for launching modern Salafism, a movement aimed at returning to the original principles of Islam. Believing that Islamic societies had been suffocating under a conservative legal tradition, Rida called for bypassing that tradition and returning to the original textual sources of Islam, the Qur’an and the *hadith*. He advocated an anti-traditional view according to which the practice of *ijtihad* ought to be unencumbered by centuries of established legal precedents. His intellectual legacy, however, was contradictory. On the one hand, he inspired further reformist thinkers, most notably ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966), who challenged the necessity of the Caliphate. On the other hand, the Salafi movement to which Rida gave birth eventually turned on him and morphed into an anti-reformist and ultra-conservative movement.

Salafism

Salafism is among the most powerful political currents in the contemporary Islamic world. It is a synthesis of Rida’s anti-traditionalism and the Wahhabi movement founded by Muhammad ibn

‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92) of Arabia. Although Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was not a modernist like Al-Afghani, he is noted for his aggressive campaign to return to a pure and unadulterated Islamic past. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was critical not only of traditional Islamic jurisprudence, but also of Islamic mysticism and theology. He regarded the bulk of the Islamic tradition as aberrations and therefore established a program of doctrinal purification. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was an absolutist in the most severe sense. Whereas disagreement within certain juristic and theological boundaries had long been tolerated, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s purist program fixed each article of Islamic belief and practice and imposed harsh punishments for violations of those articles.

Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s conservative program sustained a large number of followers after his death. Following its consolidation of power, which it secured through a longstanding alliance with the al-Saud family, the Wahhabi movement gained control of the Arabian peninsula, including Mecca and Medina. The established kingdom became Saudi Arabia and its official state religion became the Wahhabi creed. It was not until the 1960s that the Salafi and Wahhabi movements merged with one another to become a super-movement known today as Salafism. With the enormous financial power afforded by its lucrative oil production, Saudi Arabia has managed to propagate Salafism throughout much of the Islamic world. It produces Salafi literature in several languages, organizes Islamic conferences, and funds Islamic schools. Several of the largest mosques in the West have been built with Saudi funding.

Today, there is a heated battle of ideas between the adherents of Salafism and those who follow a traditional interpretation of Islam. Salafis are accused of both intolerance and heresy. They are also frequently accused of promoting violence in the name of Islam. However, although Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organization al-Qaeda are often described as Salafi, the official creed of Salafism strictly prohibits terrorism.

The Muslim Brotherhood

Another powerful Muslim movement today is the Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna (1906–49), the Brotherhood began as a reformist movement dedicated to

reviving Islam and has since become a major political influence in its native Egypt. Led by scholars trained at Al-Azhar University, its adherents advocate the implementation of Islamic law and the rejection of western culture. They call for uncompromising segregation of the sexes, strict prohibition of liberal lifestyles, and a return to conservative forms of Islamic dress. The Brotherhood is known for using Islamic clothing as a symbol of cultural and political defiance. Although it is frequently accused of violence, the Brotherhood officially rejects violence as a means to achieve its goals. Today, it has local chapters throughout the Middle East and North America, where members of the Brotherhood often serve as imams.

Islamic Reform in South Asia

One of the earliest Muslim reformers in South Asia was Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938). He was the first to propose an independent state for Muslims in greater India and was the principal inspiration of Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), the founder of modern Pakistan. Like al-Afghani, Iqbal received a European education and advocated the revival of Islamic power and knowledge. However, Iqbal argued that Muslims should reject western culture. He dreamed instead of a modern Muslim state based on the principles of an Islamic enlightenment. Although Iqbal’s vision of an independent Muslim state materialized shortly after his death, the newly formed state of Pakistan was soon ravaged by a civil war, which claimed the lives of over one million ethnic Bengalis. The massacre was supported by West Pakistan’s largest Muslim political party, the Jamaat-e-Islami.

The Jamaat-e-Islami was founded by Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi (1903–79), one of the most influential Muslim scholars of the twentieth century. Maududi wrote extensively about his vision of an ideal Islamic state, one in which democratic government would be practiced alongside Islamic law. He called for a strict application of Islamic law, replete with harsh penal codes and a second-class status for non-Muslims. Although his political vision was quite unlike that of Iqbal or Jinnah, Maududi’s ideas continue to exert considerable influence in Pakistan. His Jamaat-e-Islami remains an important political force in contemporary Pakistani politics.

Other Islamic Political Movements

There are several other Muslim political movements prominent in the Islamic world today. These include Hizb ut-Tahrir, a powerful Islamist organization dedicated to the implementation of Islamic law and the revival of the Caliphate. It has become a political force in large parts of Central Asia where the reformist Jadidi movement once wielded considerable power. Although Hizb ut-Tahrir officially rejects violence, several of its members have been prosecuted on charges of terrorism.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is an example of a modern Shi'ite Islamic movement that has achieved its dream of establishing a Shi'ite Islamic state. The movement was initially led by revolutionary intellectuals such as the Ayatollah Khomeini (1902–89), Ali Shariati (1933–77), and Morteza Motahhari (1920–79). These intellectuals capitalized upon the widespread public dissatisfaction with the government of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and prevailing anti-western sentiment. That sentiment has since become a major part of the cultural and foreign policy of the post-revolutionary Islamic government. Public dissatisfaction with the Islamic government, however, has prompted reformists to rethink the revolutionary program. Among the most influential reformists in Iran today is Abdolkarim Soroush (b. 1945), who advocates a liberal and democratic model of Islamic government.

The most violent Islamic political movements, however, are those not solely dedicated to Islamic revival and whose origins lie in political conflict, such as border disagreements. Organizations such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah owe their origins to political tensions involving Israel, whereas Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba owe theirs to border disputes involving Kashmir. Similarly, al-Qaeda was not formed to revive or purify Islam, but rather as a mercenary force in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although these organizations universally declare their intention to establish Islamic law, that determination is secondary to their original political ambitions.

Liberal and Traditional Islam in the West

The most recent political currents in Islam are led by liberal and traditionalist Muslim intellectuals

from Europe and North America. The climate of intellectual and political freedom afforded in the West permits a lively debate about a wide range of concerns. Liberal intellectuals notably call for democracy, gender equality, and the suspension of Islamic penal laws. Muslim feminists in particular call for a rejection of sexist practices, with some going so far as to demand the right for women to lead men in prayer. More extreme liberals argue for recognition of the rights of sexual minorities. Although there are substantive disagreements among Muslim liberals, they generally concur on the need to bring the practice of Islam into conformity with modern liberal values. Notable liberal Muslim intellectuals include Farid Esack (b. 1959), Tariq Ramadan (b. 1962), and Amina Wadud (b. 1952). The liberal movement has received fierce criticism from more conservative Muslims.

The 1990s also saw the rise of the traditionalist movement in the West. Led largely by Muslim converts such as Hamza Yusuf (b. 1960), Zaid Shakir (b. 1956), and Abdal Hakim Murad (b. 1960), the traditionalist movement advocates a collective healing of the Muslim body by returning to classical forms of learning. Traditionalists emphasize the importance of learning Arabic, studying under a properly trained scholar, and creatively engaging with western culture. Traditionalists are critical of the Salafi movement and equally critical of Muslim liberals. However, it is their adherence to established scholarly methodologies and emphatic rejection of violence that gives the traditionalists credibility in the eyes of the Muslim public and therefore gives the movement relatively strong prospects for success.

SEE ALSO: Bin Laden, Osama (b. 1957) and al-Qaeda; Hamas: Origins and Development; Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and the Muslim Brotherhood; Hezbollah: Organization and Uprisings; Jinnah, Muhammad Ali (1876–1948); Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Mussaui (1902–1989) and the Shi'ite Islamic Revolution; Saud, Abd al-Aziz ibn (1879–1953) and the Founding of Modern Saudi Arabia; Taliban, 1996–2007

References and Suggested Readings

- Abou El Fadl, K. (2002) The Orphans of Modernity and the Clash of Civilisations. *Global Dialogue* 4 (2): 1–16.
- Bulliet, R. W. (1995) *Islam: The View from the Edge*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Esposito, J. (1998) *Islam: The Straight Path*, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Esposito, J. (Ed.) (2000) *The Oxford History of Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hallaq, W. (1997) *A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni ūsul al-fiqh*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kerr, M. (1966) *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Nasr, S. (1966) *Ideals and Realities of Islam*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Voll, J. (1982) *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Weiss, B. G. (1998) *The Spirit of Islamic Law*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Israeli peace movement

Eitan Y. Alimi

Israeli scholars usually agree that the vast majority of peace groups consolidated in the wake of the Six Day War (a.k.a. June 1967 War) between Israel and a joint Arab armies front, resulting in Israel's taking over of East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip and, soon after, extending its rule over these territories.

There are two closely related reasons for the significance of the Six Day War in the peace movement. First, the Israeli government's decision to maintain and extend domination over the occupied Palestinian lands was a major factor in the rise of internal opposition. Originally, the idea was to use the territories as a bargaining card for peace – the Territories for Peace formula – which, at first, lessened to a considerable extent harsher criticism over the immorality of the very act of occupation. Still, the lack of any meaningful progress in that regard and the perpetuation of the occupation became an important impetus in the consolidation of peace groups. The second reason was the increasing evidence of *de facto* takeover of the territories – the policy of “creeping annexation” – as was the case with the implementation of Israeli law in Eastern Jerusalem already in 1968 and the irresolute attitude of the government to illegal settling attempts in the West Bank by religious right-wing activists. These examples and others were indi-

cative of the government's surrendering to the pressure by national religious right-wing forces who considered the results of the war as a divine miracle signaling the beginning of redemption of the Jewish people, thereby promoting the agenda of deportation of the Palestinians and full annexation of the territories.

A useful example of the significant influence of the June War on Israeli peace groups was the Israeli Socialist Organization, also known by the name of its news outlet, Matzpen (Compos). Matzpen was formed in 1962 by former members of the Israeli Communist Party who were soon joined by several Arab members of the ICP Haifa chapter, notably Jabra Nicola and Daoud Turki. All agreed on several principles, such as rejection of Zionism, revolutionary socialism, support for the integration of Israel in a socialist Arab union, and international solidarity on the basis of self-determination. Accordingly, the group established links with socialist organizations worldwide and also with left-wing Palestinian organizations such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Following the June 1967 War, internal tensions surfaced over the issue of whether the war was a necessary and just act of self-defense or an unnecessary act of pure Zionist chauvinism and aggression. Soon afterwards the group went through ideological and organizational fragmentation, the result of disagreements revolving around the appropriate balance between nationalism and class struggle. In 1970 those who were concerned with the oppression of the Palestinian right for self-determination and with neglect of the group's commitment to class struggle from within Israel splintered and became involved in assisting and guiding community based activism.

Period I: 1967–1977

In late 1968 students from Tel-Aviv University and the Hebrew University, influenced deeply by the worldwide wave of New Left activism, decided to join hands and form SIH – Smol Israeli Hadash (New Israeli Left). Despite differences of opinion, mostly found in the groups' respective stances towards Zionism, Ran Cohen, Tzvika Doitsh, and others united around their utter objection to the morally corrupting occupation, and support for participatory democracy and freedom of speech. For over five years, until its dissolution in mid-1973, SIH set an important

precedent not only in its dominant unruly, direct mode of action, but also in its bold and radical sociopolitical outlook, promoting the idea of Arab-Palestinian Zionism and Israel's responsibility in fulfilling it.

Although SIH was a relatively small and marginal episode of radical left-wing peace organizing, things began to change dramatically as a result of the traumatic experience of the October 1973 War (Yom-Kippur War). During 18 days Israel suffered the loss of nearly 2,600 soldiers and civilians and 7,500 wounded, facing the most imminent threat to its existence by a joint Arab States front. Despite intelligence evaluations, the Israeli leadership failed to foresee the Arab States' military attack. This misjudgment threw into question the leadership's competence and credibility, a crisis exacerbated by the leadership's misconduct during the war itself.

For the first time in the history of the Israeli state peace groups proliferated, this time from the mainstream of the political spectrum. The October War, or as it is labeled in Israel "the omission," has illustrated for many the possible devastating repercussions of the creeping annexation policy. During the run-up to the national elections of December 31, 1973, the growing public unrest forced the government to found the Agranat State Investigating Committee on November 18. After months of investigation the committee recommended to end the ministry of the military chief-of-staff David Elazar and several other high officers. The political level, that is, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Prime Minister Golda Meir, was found to be only indirectly responsible. In face of what was seen as mild recommendations in the committee's report and during the formation of yet another Meir-led coalition, peace-oriented groups from within the Labor Party institution raised stern criticism of the government's decision-making process in security issues. Such were Etgar (Challenge) and the Hoog Le'libun Baayot Hevra Ve'Medina (Circle for Sorting out Social and State Problems), who demanded a peace initiative based on a significant territorial compromise.

The criticism raised by these groups, however, was soon to be magnified by a considerable portion of the public as well as large numbers of released reserve soldiers and officers who, disappointed with the Agranat Investigation Committee's recommendations, voiced a deep

sense of estrangement from the political system. Perhaps the strongest expression of this trend was the action taken by released military officers who protested individually (at first) in front of the government offices (e.g., Assa Kadmony and Moti Ashcenazi), and Israel Shelanu (Our Israel) who believed the war could have been prevented if decision-making processes, accountability norms, and checks and balances in the political systems had not been ineffective and faulty, and employed disruptive actions to promote its goals.

The wave of peace-driven protest abated primarily as a result of a dramatic development. On April 11, 1974 the continuing unrest led Prime Minister Meir to resign from office, and Dayan, minister of defense, was not included in the new government formed by Itzhak Rabin. Ironically, however, the subsequent period witnessed the formation of Gush Emunim (Block of the Faithful), who soon became the vanguard of right-wing forces who argued that the state had veered from its course and needed to correct these acute aberrations, viewing the situation as an opportunity to undermine the current secular state apparatus in order to transform it into a religious state (*Halakha* state) over the entire promised land of Israel. The religious Zionist camp, however, produced a counter-movement to Gush Emunim, Oz Ve'Shalom (Valor and Peace), a small group formed in 1975 committed to promoting the ideals of tolerance, pluralism, and justice, and support for peace on the basis of political reality and justice. As a reaction to a Gush Emunim-led unruly campaign against the evacuation of Yamit (April 1982) and the Lebanon War, a second group was formed, Netivot Shalom (Paths of Peace), which joined hands with Oz Ve'Shalom in 1985 to present an alternative peace-oriented expression of religious Zionism.

Period II: 1977–1992

The ascendancy of Menachem Begin and the formation of a Likud-led coalition in 1977 was more than a mere political realignment. It was a significant shift in the decades-long conflict over the character, identity, and essence of the Jewish Israeli state; the rise to power of those who claimed for the historical and divine right of the Jewish people on the land of Israel – the Greater Israel. Indeed, Begin's first term in office (1977–81) made the settlement of the occupied territories

a straightforward government policy under the supervision of Ariel Sharon as minister for settlement affairs. At the same time, however, Begin also decided seriously to explore the possibility of peace with Egypt. This dual policy was key to the formation of perhaps the most influential peace group in Israeli history, Shalom Achsav (Peace Now).

Troubled by Gush Emunim's growing influence within Israeli society and the "corridors of power" and concerned with lack of progress in the peace talks at Camp David, a group of reserve officers drafted a carefully worded letter to Prime Minister Begin with a blunt warning: "only a peace-seeking Israel that exhausted all possible means for attaining peace would continue to enjoy the support of its soldier-citizens, and thus be capable of standing firm and winning any future war forced upon it." While avoiding any actual signs of disobedience, Shalom Achshav set a meaningful precedent by which soldiers conditioned their military service on a moral basis, arguing that only unequivocal threats to Israel's existence would receive their full support and personal sacrifice.

The launching of the Lebanon War on June 6, 1982 turned out to be exactly what Shalom Achshav members had in mind when drafting the Officers Letter. Whereas during the first few weeks of fighting Shalom Achshav was paralyzed, mostly because so many of its members were involved in the war front, things began to change quickly following the collapse of the first ceasefire agreement (June 16). Shalom Achshav was the key player behind two mass demonstrations against the war: the 100,000-strong demonstration following the siege on Beirut on July 3 and the 400,000-strong demonstration on September 25 protesting Israel's role in the massacre of Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps.

Other peace organizations formed during the war included Without Languor, a group of several thousand Israeli soldiers who refused to accept the war decoration and medal of valor, and Soldiers Against Silence and Parents Against Silence who demanded full exposure of all war-related information. The deepening ambivalence of soldiers towards the use of force spread to wider sectors in Israeli society and was reflected in the mass media and academia. The Sabra and Shatila refugee camps massacre, which many believed Israel knew about but did nothing to

prevent, accelerated this tendency and was critical in that regard. Shortly after, two military officers – Colonel Eli Geva and later Brigadier General Amram Michna – resigned from duty. The most organized expression of this development was There Is A Limit, a group of several hundred soldiers who rejected the war in Lebanon and openly called for insubordination.

The removal from office of defense minister Sharon, following the harsh recommendation of the Kahan investigating committee into the Sabra and Shatila events, the formation of a National Unity Coalition in 1984 and the subsequent partial withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985, combined to bring about a relative abatement of the peace group-led protest campaign. Yet the outbreak of the Palestinian Uprising in December 1987 (the Intifada) which, at least during its first few weeks, made Israeli peace groups pause, acted as a major catalyst for the renewal of protest campaigns and the formation of yet additional peace groups. An exception was the Anti-Occupation Treaty – Year 21st. Several weeks before the outbreak of the Intifada this group was formed calling for a total struggle against the occupation, including boycotting of settlements products, changing of schools' curriculum, or refusing to serve in the occupied territories. The continuation of the Intifada and the growing signs of brutal Israeli crackdown acted not only as a validation and subsequent expansion of the Year 21st campaign, but also as an impetus for Shalom Achshav to renew its protest campaign activity. Members of Shalom Achshav continued to develop an infrastructure of dialogue with Palestinian public figures such as Ziad abu-Zyad and Faisal Husseini, and to initiate joint Israeli-Palestinian peace conferences – the type of activity they had begun prior to the Intifada – as well as initiating peace rallies and demonstrations such as the demonstration in December 1988 in which a demand was raised to recognize the PLO.

But Shalom Achshav and Year 21st were not alone; for the first time in the history of the state, women joined the arena of protest. A group of Jewish and Palestinian women, representing a wide spectrum of voices (e.g., Zionist, non-Zionist, feminists, religious, and non-religious) and called Women in Black began to gather in Paris Square, Jerusalem from January 1988 every Friday with signs in Hebrew as well as Arabic and English on which the slogan "Enough with the Occupation" was written.

Period III: 1992–Present

The period extending from October 1991 to the present began with a dramatic breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the Madrid Peace Conference. If up to 1992 Israeli peace groups were trying to put Israel on the track of peace – demanding recognition of the Palestinian people, an end to the occupation, and recognition of the PLO – the bilateral negotiation between Israel and Jordan-Palestinians in Madrid, the subsequent self-rule municipal elections in the Occupied Territories during 1992, and the signing of the peace accord in Oslo in September 1993 between the Israeli government and Yasser Arafat – all marked a significant change in the essence of the peace groups' campaign. Peace groups, old and new, have since been trying to keep the Israeli government on the peace track, with some offering a more radical agenda.

Shalom Achshav has begun focusing mostly on the issue of construction of new settlements, expansion of existing ones, and establishment of illegal outposts in the Occupied Territories using a combination of information reports, known as the Settlement Watch, and legal actions. Such was the petition to the Israeli High Court for Justice in July 2005 to demolish the illegal outpost of Amona, resulting in its evacuation in February 2006. The political activity of There Is A Limit has significantly decreased following the signing of the Oslo Accords, yet it continues to lend support to soldiers who refuse to serve in the army. During the *al-Aqsa* Intifada (2000–5) the group petitioned to the International Criminal Court, accusing high Israeli military officers of war crimes.

Since 2000 many new peace groups emerged with meaningful innovations and developments introduced by several, demonstrating that the Israeli peace movement has yet to have its final word. First, there has been a significant increase in the quantity and quality of collaboration efforts and coordinated activities among peace groups. The Coalition of Women for Peace is a case in point. Comprising several autonomous women's organizations (the most central of which are Bat Shalom, MachsomWatch, New Profile, and Women in Black), the coalition was formed in November 2000 and has been committed since then to “end the occupation; to the full involvement of women in peace negotiations; to an end to the excessive militarization

of Israeli society; to equality, inclusion, and justice for Palestinian citizens of Israel; to equality and social justice for all inhabitants of Israel.”

Second, there also has been a significant shift in the mode of contention, from an emphasis on conventional forms of protest (e.g., demonstrations and peace rallies) to more disruptive direct action. There is growing evidence for this, such as Anarchists Against the Wall (i.e., the security fence/barrier), a group of Israeli anarchists formed in 2003 that organizes protest and confrontation campaigns against the Wall in varying locations, the most famous of which is the four-year-long campaign at the West Bank Palestinian village of Bil'in, during which several activists were severely injured in shootings by soldiers.

A third development involves the formation of joint peace groups, Israelis and Palestinians, at the grassroots level involving acts of solidarity and support. Such is the case of Ta'ayush (Arabic for “life in common”), formed as a result of the outbreak of the *al-Aqsa* Intifada and the October Events (i.e., a wave of violent confrontations between Israeli police forces and Israeli Arabs/Palestinians resulting in the death of 13 protestors). Comprising Israelis as well as Palestinian activists, Ta'ayush has been engaged in voluntary activities such as providing food and medical supplies, and building playgrounds and roads for Palestinians both within Israel and inside the territories.

Ta'ayush, however, represents also a fourth development in the Israeli peace movement: the shift in the center of action from within Israel to the actual scene of contention. Here, in addition to the activity of Ta'ayush and Anarchists Against the Wall, the activity of MachsomWatch is especially illuminating. Formed during the early stages of the *al-Aqsa* Intifada (February 2001), MachsomWatch is a group of Israeli women who decided to protest against the systematic violation and repression of Palestinian human rights as it is practiced at the myriad of military checkpoints (*Machsom* in Hebrew) throughout the West Bank. The MachsomWatchers are not only scrutinizing the behavior of the soldiers and inspecting the protection of human rights on the ground, but they also spotlight violations and arbitrariness in military court rulings through daily, monthly, and yearly reports, as well as through photographic exhibitions.

Several additional new peace groups demonstrating the expansion and broadening of the goals and activities of the aforementioned groups are Courage to Refuse, a group of Israeli combat officers and soldiers who published a letter of refusal (hence, Refuseniks) to serve in the Occupied Territories in early 2002 after which the group was formed, stating that the occupation poses a threat to the security of Israel; Peace Bloc, founded by Uri Avneri in 1992 and calling ever since for recognition in principle of the right of return of Palestinian refugees and Jerusalem as the capital city of two states; and Four Mothers, who played a lead role in bringing about the full withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon in 2000. These are only several of the additional groups constituting the Israeli peace movement.

SEE ALSO: Arafat, Yasser (1929–2004), Fatah, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Begin, Menachem (1913–1992) and the Irgun; Hamas: Origins and Development; Intifada I and Intifada II; Israeli Settlers Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Bar On, M. (1985) *Peace Now*. Tel Aviv: Hakibutz Ha'meuchad.
- Coalition of Women for Peace (2008) www.coalitionofwomen.org/home/english/about/general_info/. Accessed June 8, 2008.
- Ezrahi, Y. (1997) *Rubber Bullets*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Feige, M. (2002) *One Space, Two Places: Block of the Faithful, Peace Now, and the Construction of Israeli Space*. Jerusalem: Hebrew University Magnes Press.
- Herman, T. (1989) *Between the Peace Covenant and Peace Now: The Pragmatic Pacifism of the Israeli Peace Movement in Comparative Perspective*. PhD dissertation, Tel Aviv University.
- Herman, T. (2002) *The Sour Taste of Success: The Israeli Peace Movement, 1967–1998*. In B. Gidron, S. N. Katz, & Y. Hansensfeld (Eds.), *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kaminer, R. (1996) *The Politics of Protest*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.
- Menuchin, I. & Menuchin, D. (1989) *The Limits of Obedience*. Tel Aviv: Siman Kri'a Books.
- Resheff, T. (1996) *Peace Now*. Jerusalem: Keter.
- Sasson-Levi, O. (1995) *Revolutionaries' Awareness, Conformists Identities, Year 21st Protest Movement*. Jerusalem: Shine Center.
- Shulman, D. (2007) *Dark Hope: Journal of a Ta'ayush Activist 2002–2006*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved.

Israeli settlers movement

Lawrence Davidson

When Israel won the Six Day War in 1967, it found itself in control of territories that had traditionally been considered part of Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel) by the Zionist movement. As early as 1918, when Chiam Weizmann presented the case for Zionist control of Palestine to the Paris Peace Conference, he put forth a map that included the territories taken in 1967. After the Six Day War, this expansionist point of view was not just held by the conservative Likud Party – leaders of the Labor Party were also of this conviction. Thus, the idea that the conquered territories – the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, Syria's Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem – would be useful as bargaining chips in negotiations that would trade land for peace has always been debatable, and historically it is a position that has never been realized.

Almost immediately after the end of the 1967 war, Israel's Labor government began to establish colonies along the Jordan River. These were referred to as “defensive military establishments,” but they soon had all of the characteristics of small civilian agricultural settlements. This made them illegal under international law. Within a year of the war's end, some 14 colonies had been set up throughout the conquered lands. In the early years of the colonization program Israel's Labor government tried to manipulate the process. This was done not to limit the numbers of settlers, but rather to direct them to strategic points that would facilitate long-term control of the territories. With the election of the more conservative Likud Party governments in the 1977 election and beyond, restraints on settlement loosened considerably. Both parties used special tax breaks and subsidized housing to attract colonists.

To populate the West Bank, the Israeli government provides financial incentives for settlement through tax breaks and subsidized housing, attracting many Jewish settlers. Many of those who settle in the West Bank are apolitical citizens motivated by such economic imperatives, while others are religious zealots who view the Occupied Territories of Judea and Samaria as integral to the “Land of Israel,” granted to the Jewish people by God as a form of patrimony.

One example of the latter group is Gush Enumin (the Bloc of the Faithful). The group was established in 1968, significantly, in a hotel in occupied Hebron. Their radical ideology required further settlement to advance the coming of the Jewish messiah. By 1974, under the leadership of Rabbi Moshe Levinger, Gush Enumin was the most aggressive settlement organization in Israel. This aggressiveness included booby-trapping the cars of several West Bank mayors and plotting to blow up Arab buses. In 1984, the more militant wing of the Gush Enumin, the Gush Enumin Underground, planned (and failed) an attack on the Muslim holy site of the Harem al-Sharif (Jerusalem's Dome of the Rock mosque). With the election of Menachem Begin and the Likud Party in 1977, Gush Enumin secured a green light to settle anywhere in the territories. They did so as armed squatters with the cooperation and assistance of the Israeli government, particularly the man who was then agricultural minister, Ariel Sharon.

Once the right-wing Likud government of Israel consolidated an alliance with the Gush Enumin and other religious settlers, the living status of Palestinians on the West Bank was even more precarious, as large tracts of land on the West Bank were occupied and expropriated. In addition, the vast majority of water drawn in the West Bank is diverted for the use of the colonists. Palestinian freedom of movement is severely limited as the land they do live on was cut up into isolated cantons by checkpoints, Jewish-only roads, and "security" walls; and violence by settlers toward Palestinians has become endemic. It must be understood that the status of the more fanatical and violent colonists is not that of rebels or resisters. It is that of a vigilante arm of the Israeli government. Taking the colonizing movement as a whole, it represents an ongoing process of ethnic cleansing and cultural genocide against the indigenous Palestinian population.

Things have not always gone well for Israel's settlers. For instance, the incessant resistance put up by the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip finally convinced the Likud government of Ariel Sharon, in August of 2005, to cut its losses and withdraw the settlements located in that area. There were only 8,000 settlers in the Gaza region living next to nearly a million and a half hostile Palestinians. This process – sometimes referred

to as "Sharon Shock" – so upset the religious settlement movement that they threatened civil war if they were called upon to leave the West Bank. There is no indication of present or future Israeli plans to do this. Indeed, settlement of the West Bank and East Jerusalem continues apace, and Israel now has transferred nearly half a million of its citizens into these areas.

All of Israel's settlements are illegal under international law. The law referred to here is the Fourth Geneva Convention to which Israel is a signatory. That convention forbids the forceful or voluntary transfer of a conquering country's civilian population into the conquered areas. The illegal status of the Israeli settlements has been confirmed by the International Court of Justice at The Hague, various international human rights organizations, various United Nations Resolutions, and even the legal council for the Israeli Foreign Ministry. The legal council's Theodor Meron stated officially in 1967 that "My conclusion is that civilian settlement in the administered territories [the Occupied Territories] contravenes the explicit provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention." In spite of this, Israel continues to deny the illegality of the settlements, arguably using a distorted interpretation of the law; but most of the time the government chooses to ignore the issue. It has been allowed to do so because the governments of the United States and Europe have willfully ignored and supported Israeli policy and behavior. Thus, while Israel is in violation of international law, there are no police to move against that nation and its settler agents.

SEE ALSO: Begin, Menachem (1913–1992) and the Irgun; Intifada I and Intifada II; Zionism

References and Suggested Readings

- Friedman, R. (1994) *Zealots for Zion: Inside Israel's West Bank Settlement Movement*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Mitchell, T. (2000) *Native vs. Settler: Ethnic Conflict in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, and South Africa*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Morrison, D. (2003) *The Gush: Center of Modern Religious Zionism*. New York: Gefen Books.
- Quigley, J. (2005) *The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Roy, S. (2006) *Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*. London: Pluto Press.
- Ruthven, M. (2004) *Fundamentalism: The Search for Meaning*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Italian Communist Party

Peter Ryan

The Italian Communist Party (PCI) was established in 1921 through a split within the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) orchestrated by Antonio Gramsci and Amadeo Bordiga. Though outlawed by the Mussolini regime throughout the fascist period, it eventually emerged as the strongest party of the left in Italy. At its peak it was the largest Communist Party in the West. It received a great deal of funding from the Soviet Union, largely for organizational purposes, and was often the target of attacks from both far left and far right groups. It can be fairly said that much of post-fascist politics in Italy was organized around the perceived need to keep the PCI out of power.

From the beginning the PCI was torn between international aspirations represented by Russia's October Revolution and the particulars of Italian political and cultural life. Italy was a relatively new nation with profound regional differences. Any group seeking substantial influence would either have to control the existing parties or create its own, as well as have a broad enough agenda to have mass appeal in a poor, agricultural country with pockets of rapid industrialization. The PCI emerged from the PSI with both a reformist, nationalist faction and an internationalist, Soviet Union-oriented one that were in conflict throughout the party's history.

The division between the reformist and revolutionary factions in the PCI took on tragic significance as the threat of fascism rose in the years immediately following World War I. Amadeo Bordiga was a primary proponent of the Italian left in the early part of the twentieth century. He became quite prominent in the PSI as an ally of Mussolini, but split with him over involvement in World War I before helping to found the PCI. Bordiga saw the war as a catastrophe for the working classes and was scathing of what he regarded as the Socialist Party's "revisionism" of Marxist dogma to justify involvement in the war.

Although part of the justification for the war was expressed in terms of national greatness, returning soldiers found the economy in shambles. Workers rioted throughout Italy, provoking

continuous and violent suppression by the government. There were fatalities in most of the major cities. In late August 1919, workers began self-organizing in Turin's Fiat plant. These organizations became known as "factory councils" and were endorsed by workers throughout Turin and the rest of the country. By 1920, 150,000 workers were self-organized in factory councils; by the end of the year, participation peaked near 800,000.

Antonio Gramsci had theorized a path to communism that was not reliant on institutions that had evolved out of capitalism, namely unions and established political parties. These institutions would invariably be used to prop up the current political order and diffuse the ambitions of the working classes. Gramsci saw the establishment of factory councils as uniquely capable of reflecting the evolving consciousness of the working class and thus as a critical step toward communism. They were not, however, run by the party, and efforts to integrate the councils into the larger political program faltered when Moscow insisted that the Socialist Party be a "streamlined, 100 percent revolutionary party . . . molded on the Bolshevik pattern" with no tolerance for a reformist wing in its ranks (Weinberg 1995: 10).

From within parliament, the leader of the Socialist Party, Filippo Turati, sought to undermine the sudden strength of the workers' movement. This exacerbated the split on the left, just as the threat from the far right was growing. In early September 1920, metal workers seized factories throughout Italy, in major cities north and south. Turati advised the government to use force to regain control. In the spring of 1921 workers declared a strike at the Fiat plant in Turin in response to proposed layoffs of 1,500 out of 13,000 workers. The fragmented left was unable to press its temporary advantage, and the owners responded with a lockout. Fascist "punitive expeditions" soon followed; beatings, murders, and arson became commonplace. Elections strengthened the socialist presence in the Assembly, and the extra-legal reaction was ferocious. Hundreds of social centers, union halls, cooperatives, and peasant trade union halls were destroyed, even those run by moderate socialists and Catholics. Any threat to the dominance of landowners was met with harsh retaliation. The lack of a coordinated response on the part of the left, the unwillingness of the PSI

or the government to stem or even criticize the fascist tide, and rapidly growing support of the fascists by landowners emboldened and strengthened the attackers.

Bordiga led the split from the ineffectual Socialist Party, bringing Gramsci with him. Fascist violence, both organized and spontaneous, utterly delegitimized parliament. With Mussolini's ascension to prime minister, and the subsequent arrests and murder of hundreds of prominent leftists, the Communist Party fell back. The fascists claimed wide and deep support across most regions of Italy, emphasizing nationalism, order, and discipline. Among the many arrested was Gramsci himself, who while in prison, on what available scraps he could lay his hands, wrote his famous Prison Notes.

With Gramsci in prison, Palmiro Togliatti became the *de facto* leader of the PCI. The party saw itself as the only true resistance to the fascists, yet even this position took years to develop. PCI's unique standing among the major parties in Italy was forged in the struggle against fascism and proved the basis for its mass appeal through much of the twentieth century.

After the war, while the PCI was uniquely positioned to be a legitimate and authoritative voice for Italy, it was held in check by numerous factors. The escalation of the Cold War in the late 1940s challenged its ideological coherence as it put the party in a position of both advocating for and distancing itself from the international communist movement. The support the party received from the USSR, although in secret, provoked numerous intrigues by the United States. The most significant obstacle to the PCI's influence in government was the determination of the Socialist and Christian Democrat (DC) parties to keep the communists out of power. These parties refused to form coalitions with communists; they were thus marginalized in the absence of a clear majority. The PCI's popular base continued to grow nonetheless.

At the local level, with its control of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and Le Marche – the so-called “red belt” – the PCI developed a reputation for competence and integrity, especially when compared with the DC and PSI. It had rejected Bordiga's revolutionary posture in favor of Gramsci's plan for “a long march through the institutions.” Yet the PCI was continuously kept outside of the government by the coalitions arrayed against it.

In the postwar period, Togliatti began to fashion the PCI into a mass party with broad appeal. His strategy, the so-called *svolta salerno*, emerged during the war as the PCI developed autonomy. Its alliance with other anti-fascist parties was part of a broader strategy that emphasized national liberation first, and advancement of the PCI as a substantial voice in national politics (Serfaty & Grey 1980: 25). Togliatti refocused the PCI by emphasizing its national character, dispensing with “purely propaganda functions,” and preparing to govern. The PCI would no longer be a party of the working class but a mass party, concerned with democracy and alliances between the various economic classes in the name of the national interest.

The influence of these changes was felt soon after the war. In 1947 the Constituent Assembly, presided over by a communist, approved a new constitution which included such “fundamental laws” as the right of citizens to a job, a living wage, free education and health care, and the right of workers to share in profits with employers. The DC, seemingly in a trade-off, was given a far more concrete concession: Catholicism was also recognized as the official religion of the country. Though highly criticized, the PCI's apparent concession to the DC indicated a willingness to work with almost all elements in Italian politics. The early postwar period was one of unusual concord. Even though Italy's political climate would become more factional, and the PCI continued to be kept out of power, it would grow eventually into the West's largest Communist Party.

The growing strength of the PCI remained a source of anxiety to many, both in Italy and in the West, especially the United States. In May 1947, between the election of the Constituent Assembly in 1946 and the adoption of the constitution in December 1947, the Christian Democrats, under pressure from the Vatican and the US, expelled the PCI from the coalition. The Soviet invasion of Hungary created further conflict within the party, between revolutionaries of an internationalist inclination and reformists who tended to support a nationalist agenda, independent of Moscow. Italy had also entered a period of sustained, if uneven, economic growth, which for many seemed to undermine the fundamental claims of orthodox communism. Yet the party continued to appeal to an ever broader constituency.

By the late 1960s, the PCI was demonstrating considerable independence from Moscow. The 1968 protests in Czechoslovakia, for instance, were overtly supported by the party leadership and seemed to indicate a national rather than international orientation. The center-left coalition of the early 1970s, which partly relied on the communists' support but did not include them in the government, illustrated both the electoral strength of the party and the limits of that strength during a time of political extremism while the party's antagonists (e.g., the Catholic Church) were so entrenched and powerful. The government proved unable to meet the diverse demands of the student demonstrators and the many factions, left and right, that had sprung up throughout the country. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the student uprisings, and the Piazza Fontana bombing in Milan in December 1969 all created challenges for the PCI. Its very electoral presence was a provocation to neofascist groups, and its moderate, reformist approach infuriated the far left.

The Milan bombing, which killed 16 and wounded many others, was initially blamed on the left, though it was in fact the first of many attempts by the far right to destabilize the country and move it toward a more authoritarian footing. The Red Brigades emerged in 1970 and were soon followed by the Italian Social Movement, an openly neofascist group. The two decades of frequent bombings and assassinations from 1969 to 1986 came to be known as the *anni di piombo* (years of lead).

By the early 1970s the PCI came to see Marxist dogma as largely irrelevant to the achievement of its political goals in Italy. This created an opening for groups like the Red Brigades, whose activities the far right would then use to justify its own violence. This, combined with a widespread suspicion that its acceptance of democratic methods was no more than a means to an end, created a period of blockage in the Italian government and rendered it incapable of meeting the diverse and often violent challenges it faced.

By 1973, worldwide economic shocks and the resulting unrest forced the Christian Democratic Party leader Aldo Moro to broaden his support by appealing to the trade unions. An attempt by the Catholic right to ban divorce had failed, revealing the party's weakness as its traditional electoral base was becoming more

and more secular. The PCI, led by charismatic Enrico Berlinguer, now saw a way out of the permanent opposition that had been the party's fate. Berlinguer undertook a pact with Moro to shore up the credibility of the PCI as a party of reform rather than of revolution. Marxists abandoned the party, and the party itself even considered dropping the word *comunista* from its name. The compromise was effective. Moderate communists gained control of most of Italy's big cities in the elections of 1975. This success can be attributed to general administrative competence on the part of the PCI, and the perception of widespread corruption on the part of the ruling DC. A reaction against this, however, boosted DC turnout: in 1976 the DC gained a little over a third of the vote, the PCI a little less.

The kidnapping in broad daylight and subsequent murder of Aldo Moro in March 1978 by the Red Brigades put irreconcilable strain on the attempt at coalition. The Red Brigades sought to undermine the PCI, which clearly opposed its campaign of terror. Many on the left believed that the United States was sponsoring a "strategy of tension" to destabilize the country and prevent any coalition involving the communists from succeeding.

The collapse of the Soviet Union provoked the PCI to split into two progressive, leftist parties: The Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and the Communist Refoundation Party (PRC). The former took part in the government of Romano Prodi in 1996. It had been 50 years since a communist party had been part of a ruling coalition.

SEE ALSO: Berlinguer, Enrico (1922–1984); Bordiga, Amadeo (1889–1970) and the Italian Communist Party; Eurocommunism; Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Italian Labor Movement; Italian Socialist Party; Italy, from the Anti-Fascist Resistance to the New Left (1945–1960); Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945); Red Brigades; Togliatti, Palmiro (1893–1964); Turati, Filippo (1857–1932)

References and Suggested Readings

- Barth, J. (1986) *Moscow and the Italian Communist Party: From Togliatti to Berlinguer*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Drake, R. (2003) *Apostles and Agitators: Italy's Marxist Revolutionary Tradition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. with Napolitano, G. (1977) *The Italian Road to Socialism: An Interview*. London: Lawrence Hill.

- Kertzer, D. (1998) *Politics and Symbols: The Italian Communist Party and the Fall of Communism*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Ruscoe, J. (1982) *On the Threshold of Government: The Italian Communist Party, 1976–81*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Sassoon, D. (1981) *The Strategy of the Italian Communist Party: From Resistance to Historic Compromise*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Serfaty, S. & Grey, L. (1980) *The Italian Communist Party: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Weinberg, L. (1995) *The Transformation of Italian Communism*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Italian labor movement

*Maurizio Antonioli and
Jorge Torre Santos*

The first development of workers' associations in Italy dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century. Friendly societies (*società di mutuo soccorso*) spread from Piedmont, where they began to be established since 1848, to the rest of the country after Unification in 1861, and from a few hundred they rose to more than 5,000 in 1885. They gathered in annual congresses (the first in Asti, 1853), mainly for the aim of mutual assistance (unemployment, health, disability, age benefits), and in many instances also included members of the bourgeoisie and aristocracy. In some cases mutual assistance was matched with salary and working hours claims; but the transformation of those associations into local unions (*leghe di resistenza*) is more an exception than a general rule and it is highly questionable to consider local unions of the late nineteenth century as instrumental in developing socialist ideology.

From the 1880s, mutualism and resistance had two distinctive paths, although in some cases (e.g., printers) overlapping, confronting the rapid growth of conflict-oriented and workers-only organizations. In the countryside the agrarian crisis generated organized protest movements such as the *la boje* ("the pot is brewing"), that unified land workers from Rovigo, Mantova, and Cremona in 1884–6. In cities some industrial workers (printers, typesetters, and construction workers) tended to create associations claiming better wages and working conditions. Often,

these organizations, called *di miglioramento* or *di resistenza* (improvement, resistance), were ideologically close to the rising socialist movement, whose different currents converged into a single party in 1892, when a *Partito dei lavoratori italiani* (from 1895 *Partito socialista italiano*) was founded in Genoa.

The workers' *società di resistenza* are the core of an important organizational form of the Italian trade union movement: the chamber of labor. They were inspired by French *Bourses du Travail*, spread mainly in Northern Italy during the 1890s, under the unceasing propaganda of Osvaldo Gnocchi Viani (commonly remembered as the father of the chambers of labor). The first one to open was the Piacenza Chamber in 1891, but the leading role at the national level was taken by the Milan Chamber of Labor. The tasks of the chambers of labor range from territorial representation of workers – through sections to which different craft societies adhered – to the employment of workers. The chambers formally had no political affiliation and exercised a public service function, receiving funds from local administrations. This explains why the Milan Chamber of Labor was not dissolved in 1894, when government repression struck the *Fasci siciliani*, the proletarian organizations born in Sicily during the 1890s that had become an important movement in voicing popular claims, and acquired a socialist orientation. The first trade unions were formed alongside the chambers of labor: in Milan a federation of printers and a federation of construction workers were the first to be established.

The trade union movement as a whole was overwhelmed by repression after the bread riots in Milan in 1898. The failure of the authoritarian shift marked the beginning of a new liberal course during which the labor movement gained a role as protagonist. The sharp rise in conflicts, often with a spontaneous character, is considered by historiographers as a sudden, almost telluric, phenomenon, contemporaneous with a strengthening of the trade union movement, industrial unions in particular. The year 1901 saw the take-off of Italian unionism, as numerous federations were established (*Federazione italiana operai metallurgici*, FIOM, *Federazione nazionale lavoratori della terra*, *Federazione Italiana Operai Tessili*, FIOT, respectively industrial unions of metal, land, and textile workers) and others brought to new life (book, construction, and glass workers).

The strengthening of trade unions paralleled the outbreak of factional struggle within the Socialist Party and the formation of a revolutionary current – revolutionary syndicalism – that in 1904 gained sway over the party and at different moments of the chambers of labor and the *Segretariato della resistenza*, established in 1902 as the first national committee for coordinating industrial and territorial organizations. The first general strike in Italian history, in September 1904, newly reinforced the influence and thrust of revolutionary syndicalism, which was later to decline in 1905 and 1906, as socialist reformist leaders regained influence within the trade union movement through the founding of the *Confederazione Generale del Lavoro* (CGdL) in 1906.

This new confederation organizational model, promoted by FIOM, and aligned with reformist-led federations and the socialist leadership, unified unions among different industries, marking the triumph in a longstanding conflict between industrial unions and chambers of labor, which sought to gain monopoly representation of the labor force. The process of merging trade unions into the CGdL was not automatic and thus remained incomplete. Sections of the trade union movement did not join, for political reasons or because of autonomist industrial craft traditions. The case of the *Sindacato Ferrovieri Italiani* (railwaymen's union) founded in 1907 is in that sense paradigmatic.

The evolution of the CGdL paralleled the expansion of collective bargaining: in 1906 the car factory Itala in Turin signed an agreement establishing a *commissione interna* (a workers' commission internal to the workplace) sanctioning organs of workers' representation created in the previous decade. A short period of "agreements of union truces" followed, and agreements included a mutual and consensual end to conflict and a set of conciliatory procedures emerging from the *commissione interna*.

The early 1910s opened a new cycle of labor struggles, reaching an apogee in 1913, but showed some weaknesses among unionists. The state of the economy was poor and entrepreneurs aggressively resisted workers with the founding of a national association of industrialists, the *Confederazione Italiana dell'Industria* (1910). The union movement was in a state of crisis over its relationship to the Socialist Party. Internal conflict in the party divided reformists on the

occasion of the Libyan War in 1912, giving rise to the emergence of a revolutionary party leadership by revolutionaries Costantino Lazzari and Benito Mussolini at the Reggio Emilia Congress.

In the union movement a new generation of revolutionary syndicalists sought to undermine the reformist hegemony in the CGdL, promoting the general adoption of a direct action method with the aim of a radical transformation of society, and also a new organizational model, shaped in similarity to Anglo-American industrial unionism. In November 1912, led by charismatic figures such as Alceste De Ambris and Filippo Corridoni, syndicalists founded a new national organization, the *Unione Sindacale Italiana* (USI).

The CGdL for the first time faced strong union competition, especially in the urban and industrial zones of Northern and Central Italy and among unskilled workers. Internal divisions in the union movement and within the Socialist Party grew sharper during the strikes of spring and summer 1913 and the so called *Settimana Rossa* (Red Week) of June 1914, when a strong wave of protest and insurrectional strikes shook the whole country, centered in the Marche and Romagna regions.

The outbreak of World War I had strong repercussions on the Italian union movement. The USI experienced a profound crisis as part of its leadership supporting intervention was forced to resign. In 1918 a split in the federation formed the new *Unione Italiana del Lavoro* (UIdL). Some secessionists became leading forces in the growth of Fascist unionism. Conversely, the CGdL paid a heavy price for its outspoken neutrality after Italy's entrance into the war. Union repression during the war was proportional to involvement in the organization of production, by participating in the organs of industrial mobilization, in a context leaving little space to unions, anticipating the authoritarian turn of the following decade.

In the immediate post-World War I period working-class militancy, repressed during the war, forcefully broke out as feverish social and political unrest shook the whole country. The union successes of the Red Biennium (1919–20), particularly through national bargaining and the creation of the 8-hour work day, led by 1920 to a sharply increased membership of 4 million in the CGdL, USI, UIdL, and CIL (a Catholic union founded in 1918).

The CGdI and USI's (now under anarchist hegemony) failure to reach agreement and the growing internecine conflict among socialists, with the formation of the Italian Communist Party (PCd'I) in 1921, substantially weakened opposition to Fascism. Mussolini's rise to power in 1922 brought growing repression of free unionism and simultaneously the growth of Fascist unionism, which was given preferential status by the state and entrepreneurs in collective bargaining. With the Pact of Palazzo Vidoni in 1925 Confindustria, the entrepreneurs' organization, granted Fascist unions a monopoly of labor power and rights. The Fascists ended independence through declaring the USI and SFI illegal. Meanwhile, the CIL dissolved itself in 1925, followed by the CGdL. The decision of the latter, taken by the leadership in Italy, was not accepted by the union leadership in exile. Bruno Buozzi, the last secretary of the CGdL, began a process of reconstructing confederal organization with a reformist tendency from exile in Paris. In 1927 Italian communists founded an underground CGdL d'Italia, which in 1930 came under the direction of party leader Giuseppe Di Vittorio. In the 1930s the two organizations operated primarily among Italian emigrants, mainly in France, but the tormented relations between socialists and communists created substantial hostility.

In 1934, with the "pact for unity of action" among socialists and communists, a new effort was made to achieve unity among labor unions, but the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Stalin and Hitler put a halt to cooperation between the two parties.

The mounting difficulties of the Fascist regime, particularly after Italy entered World War II in 1940, brought a resurgence of anti-Fascist parties inside Italy. After the September 1943 armistice and the beginning of the resistance against Nazis and Fascists, the status of unions was also transformed. In June 1944 the main representatives of free unionism met in Rome and signed an agreement creating a united union confederation, the *Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro* (CGIL), under first secretaries Di Vittorio (communist), Oreste Lizzadri (socialist), and Achille Grandi (Christian democrat). This new union, representing other smaller influences, operated in liberated zones, while under the Fascist Repubblica Sociale in the North of Italy the clandestine united struggle created a new element of cohesion among labor unions.

The postwar political strains and contrast in political culture among the different currents within the CGIL tended to separate Christian democrats from the socialist and communist bloc, although the fact that all three agreed substantially on many matters has been under-appreciated.

A break in unity took place in July 1948 in the aftermath of the proclamation of a general strike, when republicans and social democratic union members left the CGIL. In 1950 Italian unionism saw two new organizations emerge that promoted an organizational model based on associations. The first was the *Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori* (CISL) that, in spite of its Christian democratic roots, attempted to play an "apolitical" and "a-confessional" role, oriented to collective bargaining; the second was the *Unione Italiana del Lavoro* (UIL), with a republican and social democratic orientation.

Competition between major confederations during the 1950s took place mainly in the factories of Northern Italy, where difficult economic and political conditions made union activity problematic, especially when promoted by communists. Elections to the internal commission, born anew after the war, mirrored the strength of every union. The severe defeat of metal workers of the FIOM-CGIL at Fiat plants in Turin in 1955 was the occasion for a change of strategy of the CGIL, which would now pay more attention to the different contexts of factories and work plants. Inside the CISL a new generation of union rank and file saw the necessity of closer unity between the different unions, a phenomenon that took place in the 1960s, more as the result of industrial conflict and rank-and-file support than agreement between union leaderships.

The impressive cycle of struggles (1969–73) begun by the strike wave of the Hot Autumn of 1969 brought a new array of social goals such as the *Statuto dei lavoratori*, a law to protect workers against discrimination in the workplace. The metal workers of the three union confederations were the spearhead of the entire union movement, as they were the first to gain formal unity with the establishing of a united *Federazione dei Lavoratori Metalmeccanici* (FLM). Confederations, on the other hand, after a troubled process of growing closer (at the three congresses in Florence, the first in 1971, the second and the third in 1972), gave birth only to a federative pact to establish a coordinating committee with the name of *Federazione unitaria CGIL-CISL-UIL* (1972).

The strength of confederation unionism was bound to decline in the face of the 1970s Italian economic crisis and political tensions, even though unions were seen as at the front line in defense of democracy. The *Federazione unitaria* was pressed increasingly on the left by rank-and-file unions and on the right by disagreements within the CISL and UIL leadership, which emerged in the severe union defeat at Fiat in October 1980 and in the curbing of *scala mobile* (an automatic wage adjustment to inflation), causing the *Federazione unitaria* to disband in 1984.

The political and institutional crisis that struck Italy in the 1990s coincided with a new role for the union movement, which in some cases functioned as a political substitute for political actors. The 1993 agreement between the executive, the three confederations, and Confindustria was the foundation of a new phase of industrial relations based on the idea of *concertazione*, a general agreement on wages and economic policies that came to characterize Italian unionism. In the first decade of the 2000s the traditional union system underwent major organizational changes, with the strengthening of organizations not aligned with historical Italian unionism, in a context of deep transformation of industries and of the labor force further punctuated by a transition to neoliberalism in the new century.

SEE ALSO: Di Vittorio, Giuseppe (1892–1957); Italian Communist Party; Italian Socialist Party; Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945); Resistenza; Settimana Rossa; Togliatti, Palmiro (1893–1964)

References and Suggested Readings

- Antonioli, M. (2002) *Lavoratori e istituzioni sindacali. Alle origini delle rappresentanze operaie*. Pisa: Bfs.
- Barbadoro, I. (1977) *Storia del sindacalismo italiano. Dalla nascita al fascismo*, 2 vols. Florence: La Nuova Italia.
- Campbell, J. D. L. (1992) *European Labor Unions*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Craveri, P. (1977) *Sindacato e istituzioni nel dopoguerra*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Eley, G. (2002) *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Horowitz, D. L. (1963) *The Italian Labour Movement*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Procacci, G. (1970) *La lotta di classe in Italia agli inizi del secolo XX*. Rome: Editori Riuniti.
- Riosa, A. (1976) *Il sindacalismo rivoluzionario in Italia e la lotta politica nel Partito socialista nell'età giolittiana*. Bari: De Donato.

- Turone, S. (1992) *Storia del sindacato in Italia dal 1943 al crollo del comunismo*. Bari-Rome: Laterza.
- Vallauri, C. (2008) *Storia dei sindacati nella società italiana*. Rome, Ediesse.
- Varzi, E. (2008) *I metallurgici d'Italia nel loro sindacato*. Rome: Ediesse.

Italian Risorgimento

Marcelline Block

The nineteenth-century struggle for the political, cultural, and social unification of Italy is known as the *Risorgimento*, which means “the resurgence” or “the rebirth.” The *Risorgimento* had many supporters, including conservative members of the aristocratic establishment such as Count Camillo Benso di Cavour (1810–61), who after 1852 was the prime minister of Piedmont-Sardinia under King Victor Emmanuel II. Other significant actors in the *Risorgimento* include the revolutionary,



In this painting (artist unknown), Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–82) fights the French in Rome. Garibaldi was a military and political leader of the *Risorgimento* in the nineteenth century and was instrumental in unifying the Italian nation-state. (Getty Images)

pro-democratic philosopher Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–72) and the popular, charismatic folk hero Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–82). Garibaldi is commemorated by the street named “rue Garibaldi” in Nice, his birthplace, while Cavour is memorialized by the street called “via Cavour” in the historic center of Rome.

Cavour was not only prime minister of Piedmont-Sardinia under King Victor Emmanuel II but also a staunch advocate of Italian unification as a constitutional monarchy as opposed to Mazzini’s vision of a democratic republic. Cavour eventually succeeded in his plan to unite Italy around Piedmont-Sardinia as a constitutional monarchy under Victor Emmanuel’s rule in 1861. Although in 1870 Italian unification was nearly completed when Rome, still under papal rule supported by the French, was seized by Italy, the goal of a fully unified Italy was not entirely attained until during and after World War I. The Italian *Risorgimento* of the nineteenth century went beyond political unification, however, since it represented a rebirth of Italian society as well as its liberation from the rule of foreigners.

The *Risorgimento* accomplished its objectives through diplomatic efforts as well as a series of violent conflicts, and had numerous – often clashing – leaders and factions. The *Risorgimento* was a drawn-out, fragmented movement and process that continued throughout the nineteenth century and even spilled into the twentieth. The *Risorgimento* movement in the twentieth century was known as *Italia irredenta* or “unredeemed Italy.”

The impetus of the *Risorgimento* can be found in the eighteenth century, inspired by the French Revolution of 1789 as well as eighteenth-century Italian intellectuals such as Ludovico Muratori, Vittorio Alfieri, and Antonio Genovesi. Italian nationalist sentiment and unification movements took hold in 1815 after the Congress of Vienna. At this important diplomatic conference the main powers of Europe redrew the borders of the European continent after the overthrow of Napoleonic France, disbanding the Kingdom of Italy, which had been ruled by Napoleon. Italy was returned to its pre-Napoleonic status as a group of fractured, independent states, each of which was loyal to and/or ruled by Austria or another prominent European country.

Austria was in charge of much of the Italian peninsula, including Lombardy and Venetia, while dukes loyal to Austria were in charge of several other states. According to the Austrian

diplomat Prince Metternich, Italy was “a mere geographical expression” (Merriman 1996: 754). Naples and Sicily were ruled as the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies by the French Bourbon royal family, and the Papal States were returned to the pope. Piedmont-Sardinia became the Kingdom of Sardinia under the rule of the House of Savoy.

The phase of the *Risorgimento* that began in 1815 as a reaction to the Congress of Vienna lasted until the failed European and Italian revolutions of 1848–9, after which Cavour’s diplomatic tactics allowed for the unification of Italy. The years leading to the 1848 revolutions were times of romantic ideologies and revolutionary insurgencies, led in particular by the Southern Italian secret society known as the *Carbonari* (“Coal Burners”). The best-known uprisings of the *Carbonari* were in 1820 in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and in the Kingdom of Sardinia in 1821. Members of the *Carbonari* were mainly middle-class intellectuals, and many leaders of the *Risorgimento*, including Mazzini and Garibaldi, were initially members of the *Carbonari*, as was Emperor Napoleon III in his youth. In the early 1830s *Carbonari* insurrections took place in the papal legations of Bologna, Forlì, Ravenna, Imola, Ferrara, Pesaro, and Urbino; the Grand Duchy of Tuscany; the Duchy of Modena; the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia; and the Duchy of Parma. The *Carbonari* persisted throughout the *Risorgimento*, condemning Napoleon III to death – a botched assassination attempt by Felice Orsini occurred in 1858.

Another secret society devoted to a unified Italy was the radical and anti-clerical *La giovine Italia* (“Young Italy”), formed in 1831 by the Genoese Giuseppe Mazzini, who was arrested and exiled to Switzerland and London for his revolutionary activities on behalf of Italian unification. Mazzini “frequently dressed in black (often surrounded by cigar smoke and in the company of his pet canaries), vowing to remain in mourning until Italian unification could be achieved” (Merriman 1996: 757). *La giovine Italia* sought the independent and republican nation of Italy with Rome as its capital. Cavour and Mazzini’s leadership and diplomatic styles clashed since Mazzini, unlike Cavour, was against the monarchy and aristocratic rule and privilege. Mazzini’s movement was brutally defeated by the Austrians in 1853, since Cavour informed them of a planned insurrection led by *La giovine Italia* in Lombardy. Mazzini furthermore organized a failed invasion of the

Kingdom of Naples in 1857, losing many of his followers, who formed the National Society in support of Cavour and his more moderate message of nationalism which opposed Mazzini's ambitious plan for total social reform.

Along with the *Carbonari* and *La giovine Italia*, other factions persisted during the *Risorgimento*, particularly after the wave of European revolutions in 1848 in Austria, France, and the German states. Revolutionary and nationalist fervor inspired by the revolutions of 1848 throughout Europe soon arrived in Italy, beginning in Lombardy in January 1848, spreading to Tuscany in February 1848, and Milan and Venetia in March 1848. The Milanese uprising toppled the Austrian army, while Venetia stated that it was an independent republic led by Daniele Manin. Tuscany and Rome established themselves as republics, the latter led by Mazzini, but Austria squashed the revolutions in 1849, defeating the Kingdom of Sardinia under the rule of King Charles Albert, who voluntarily left the throne and gave his title to his son, Victor Emmanuel II, who quickly established peaceful relations with the Austrians.

Tuscany was once again ruled by the grand duke; the pope took control of Rome with the help of the French army; and although the Venetian Republic fought alone against Austria for a year, it, too, surrendered. Austria also repressed revolutions in Parma, Modena, and the Two Sicilies. In 1849, while the Italian uprisings of 1848 were entirely defeated, nationalist desire for Italian unification was focused on the mutual hatred of Austria, which now ruled most of the Italian peninsula.

The liberal unification effort focused upon Piedmont-Sardinia, the only Italian state that kept its own constitution, elected parliament, and tricolor flag under the rule of Victor Emmanuel and Cavour. Nearly all Italian nationalists, except for loyalists to Mazzini, accepted the leadership of Piedmont-Sardinia as the seat of Italian unification. Cavour understood that Piedmont-Sardinia would need foreign troops and aid in order to defeat Austria. Cavour hoped to win international support by establishing progressive social reforms in his state, including a free-trade policy, placing Sardinia in European councils as the voice against Austrian rule over Italy, and joining the Allies in the 1855 Crimean War.

Cavour and Napoleon III met at Plombières in 1858, during which Napoleon promised mil-

itary aid to Sardinia in its fight against Austria. War between Sardinia and Austria took place in 1859. The Sardinians and the French defeated the Austrian army at Magenta, forcing the Austrians to retreat at Solferino. Cavour, with the aid of the French as well as the non-Mazzini nationalists known as the Italian National Society, made Austria cede Lombardy to Piedmont-Sardinia, although Austria kept Venetia. The Italian victories came at a high price, and so Napoleon signed a separate armistice at Villafranca di Verona. Tuscany, Modena, Parma, Bologna, and Romagna, which had been ruled under provisional revolutionary governments, were to be returned to their former leaders. However, this aspect of the armistice was not satisfied since these states voted for union with Sardinia after plebiscites were held in March 1860. Napoleon recognized these plebiscites and in turn received Savoy and Nice.

In 1860 Garibaldi, Italy's most admired and well-liked hero – a former member of Mazzini's *La giovine Italia* and a veteran who fought against the Austrians in Lombardy in 1848 as well as in the war of 1859 – sailed to Sicily with 1,000 members of his volunteer army (known as the Red Shirts) in order to help the Sicilians in their uprising against Francis II, the French Bourbon ruler of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. At the Sicilian Battle of Calatafimi, on May 15, 1860, Garibaldi's famous rallying cry was "Qui si fa l'Italia o si muore!" ("Here we make Italy, or die!"). Urged by Mazzini (openly) and Cavour (secretly), Garibaldi's shocking victory over the stronger, professional Neapolitan army in Sicily strengthened his scrappy, colorful band of nationalist followers, which went on to take Palermo in May and eventually Naples, the biggest city in Italy, in September.

According to Maxime du Camp, in Naples in 1860 people first shouted "Long Live Italy!" after which they asked the meaning of "Italy" (Merriman 1996: 765). Out of concern that Garibaldi's military victories, as well as his assumption of dictatorial power in Sicily, may possibly lead to support for a republic rather than a monarchy, as well as further conflicts with Austria, Prussia, and/or France, Cavour sent Piedmontese troops to the Papal States the very day that Naples fell to Garibaldi. The combination of Cavour and Garibaldi's factions quelled papal resistance as well as the rule of the French Bourbon family of Naples.

Plebiscites in October in Naples, Sicily, and the Papal States indicated their overwhelming support for joining Piedmont-Sardinia, which also took Umbria and the Marches. Victor Emmanuel went to Naples triumphantly with Garibaldi in November 1860. The only remaining unincorporated states in the new Italy were the small country of San Marino, Venetia (Austrian), Rome, and Latium (both under the dominance of the pope with the support of France). In March 1861 Victor Emmanuel of Piedmont-Sardinia became King Victor Emmanuel II of Italy. The Kingdom of Italy under King Victor Emmanuel II was announced in Turin, the capital of Piedmont-Sardinia. Cavour died unexpectedly on June 6, 1861 before seeing the realization of his dream of a fully unified Italy, which occurred in the following decade. By allying itself with Prussia, the victor over Austria in the month-long Austro-Prussian War of 1866, Italy received Venetia. Italy seized the last of the papal holdings in 1870 when France withdrew its army due to the Franco-Prussian War. On May 13, 1871 the Italian parliament passed the Law of Papal Guarantees, which limited the realm of the pope to the Vatican. Rome became Italy's capital in 1871.

Although Italian unification was considered complete by 1871, it was a difficult transition, since violent resistance to the *Risorgimento* occurred in the South of Italy as well as in Sicily, where poverty, unemployment, and local brigades of bandits combined in what proved to be potent catalysts for uprisings against the new, centralized Italian bureaucracy, fashioned on France's. The oppression against these incidents of insurgence was brutal, killing more Italians than in the sum total of all the wars of the *Risorgimento*. Moreover, unfulfilled nationalism under the rubric of *irredentism* continued well into the twentieth century, since even after the triumphs of the *Risorgimento* in the nineteenth century many Italians continued to live outside of the bounds of the Kingdom of Italy.

With the secretly negotiated 1915 London Pact, Italy joined the Allies and declared war against the Central Powers, receiving Friuli, Trentino, and Dalmatia in return. After World War I Italy gained 9,000 square miles of Austria-Hungary, including Trentino and Trieste, as well as Gorizia, Istria, and in 1919 the city of Zara. When Italy was defeated in World War II, it lost Istria and Dalmatia. Secessionist factions

wishing to unite with Austria continue to exist in the Italian Alto Adige/South Tyrol.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873); European Revolutions of 1848; Garibaldi, Giuseppe (1807–1882); Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–1872); Resistenza

References and Suggested Readings

- Davis, J. A. (2000) *Italy in the Nineteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gramsci, A. (1949) *Il Risorgimento*. Turin: Einaudi.
- Grew, R. (1963) *A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity: The Italian National Society in the Risorgimento*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hales, E. E. Y. (1954) *Pio Nono: A Study in European Politics and Religion in the Nineteenth Century*. New York: P. J. Kenedy.
- Header, H. (1983) *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento*. London: Longman.
- Holt, E. (1971) *The Making of Italy, 1815–1870*. New York: Atheneum.
- Lovett, C. M. (1972) *Carlo Cattaneo and the Politics of the Risorgimento, 1820–1860*. The Hague: Nijhoff.
- Merriman, J. (1996) *A History of Modern Europe: The Renaissance to the Present*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Salvatorelli, L. (1970) *The Risorgimento: Thought and Action*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Smith, D. M. (1954) *Cavour and Garibaldi 1860: A Study of Political Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, D. M. (1971) *Victor Emmanuel, Cavour, and the Risorgimento*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stendhal (2006) [1839] *The Charterhouse of Parma*. London: Penguin.
- Trevelyan, G. M. (1910) *Garibaldi's Defense of the Roman Republic, 1848–1849*. London: Longmans, Green.
- Trevelyan, G. M. (1911) *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy*. London: Longmans, Green.
- Trevelyan, G. M. (1912) *Garibaldi and the Thousand: May 1860*. London: Longmans, Green.
- Woolf, S. J. (1969) *Italian Risorgimento*. London: Longmans.

Italian Socialist Party

Peter Ryan

The Italian Socialist Party (PSI) was founded in 1893 by trade unionists and socialists. It was the first political party in Italy to represent the interests of a wide spectrum of Italian society and gave political voice to many people, including the masses, for the first time. It had a profound

influence on Italian reform movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; most significantly it unified the many rural and urban workers' movements that were arising throughout the country.

PSI's origins lay partly in the early Italian Workers' Party, a federation of numerous groups that asserted the freedom to act and organize on one hand, and promulgated institutional reforms such as expanding suffrage and a free education on the other. They did not question the legitimacy of the state and allied with other progressive groups in electoral competition. As the Socialist Party consolidated, it easily absorbed all but the most radical of these groups.

A brutal economic downturn drove much of rural Italy close to starvation in the 1880s. Soldiers returning home had seen prosperity abroad, and those at home caught glimpses of a better life as railroads and the telegraph penetrated into long-isolated regions. These contrasts were bitter indeed when the national government appeared to do little but tax salt. The economic crisis provoked strikes and bloodshed. Socialist, largely urban intellectuals understood little of these regions, but saw the political opportunities they presented and sought to explain the disruptions in Marxist terms. The government, long controlled by elites north and south, blamed the unrest on the socialists and embarked on a fierce campaign of suppression. Far from breaking the progressive forces throughout Italy, the government's action against the socialists helped consolidate them in opposition to the government.

In November 1903, after a period of increased prosperity and expanded rights, Giovanni Giolitti became prime minister and signaled that he considered many of the policies of the previous years unfair and counterproductive. He criticized taxes on food when there were no taxes on wealth *per se*, and indicated that conservatives were as much to blame for recent instability as the socialists. This softening toward the left had an immediate effect. The PSI's policy of gradual socialism was evolving rapidly at this time and it was willing to take a more conciliatory stance toward the government.

Although socialism appealed far more to industrial workers and intellectuals than to those in the rural south, whose way of life had been profoundly disrupted by the many economic and technological changes of the late nineteenth century, the PSI's share of the vote and its

representation in the national assembly rose dramatically. In order to bridge the factions emerging within it, Filippo Turati arranged the approval of both a minimal and maximal program for the PSI. He regarded the former as the means to the latter. The party did not abandon revolution but was freed to work with liberals to achieve more immediate goals, such as the right to strike, government neutrality in labor disputes, and universal suffrage. The PSI had become a mainstream political party with a mass base. It would prove to have a difficult and turbulent history, often lurching between efforts to accommodate liberal and bourgeois parties on the one hand and communists on the other, with its own highly divergent left and right wings struggling for ideological control.

Prior to World War I conflicts within the PSI were between its so-called maximalist, or revolutionary, wing and those who sought to reform existing institutions. Among the maximalists was future fascist leader of Italy Benito Mussolini. As a journalist for the party organ *Avanti!*, Mussolini pushed strongly for involvement in World War I to unite Italy with the Italian-speaking territories under Austrian rule. Pacifist and internationalist elements within the party, as well as trade unions, opposed the "bourgeois war." The wing of the party Mussolini represented was eventually purged. At around the same time, another anti-reformist wing split off, forming the Italian Communist Party (PCI).

The conclusion of World War I polarized various aspects of Italian political life. Fascists had coalesced around a strongly nationalist, corporatist agenda and battled socialists and communists in the streets of many cities throughout Italy. Under Turati's leadership, the PSI maintained a policy of allying with any democrats in order to undercut the growing power of reactionary forces throughout the country. As the PCI was mostly revolutionary in its posture, and the fascists seemed increasingly able to intimidate the political center into compliance with their agenda, the PSI was caught in the middle. Its reform program was lost in the severe political crisis Italy was facing.

The fascist ascent to power was facilitated by the fragmenting of the left. Fascist violence had driven the leadership of the PSI to Paris. In an attempt to regain leadership of the Italian left, the socialists in exile called a conference in 1930 and issued a joint unification document creating

an anti-fascist front. Pietro Nenni, now a major voice in the PSI, rejected revolutionary tactics but tried to retain Marxist class analysis and a strong anti-capitalist posture. The document firmly emphasized democratic means and ends, seeking to effect the transformation of existing institutions into “instruments of the exploited class.”

Some leaders of the PSI, such as Rodolfo Morandi, sought to institute a program of gradual reform but with immediate practical action. Some socialist leaders alleged that the founding of the republic merely gave rise to a bourgeoisie that wanted democracy only to the degree that it boosted productivity, and then endorsed fascism in order to limit reform and economic enfranchisement.

Domestically, throughout World War II it was the Communist Party that became associated with the resistance to fascism. The practical response of the communists in the face of the fascist threat gave them considerable moral authority and support – at the expense of the PSI.

Nenni viewed the classical Marxist emphasis on economic conditions alone to be a mistake. Change, in postwar Italy, required power, which meant direct involvement in the country’s institutions. Representation in the government was only possible with a united left. However, the Communist Party saw itself as the genuine force for reform in Italy and was unwilling to cede what it saw as its moral standing. The PSI, on the other hand, sought to lead this united left into power by blunting the revolutionary rhetoric and tactics of the PCI. Adding to the volatility was the robust support of the PCI by the Soviet Union, and the thorough opposition of the Roman Catholic Church to all parties on the left. Later, during the immediate postwar occupation, any alliance with the Communist Party was looked on with great suspicion by the Americans. Despite the enormous difficulties, the PSI formed an uneasy pact with much of the left which helped shape the new republic that emerged from the Constitutional Assembly of 1946.

The party continued to be plagued by division between accommodation with the PCI and with centrist and center-left parties. The PSI vociferously denounced the invasion of Hungary by the USSR in 1956, leading to yet another split with the Communist Party. Its participation in numerous center-left governments left it vulnerable to criticism that it sought power more than

reform, and the party eventually lost its leadership of the left to the PCI. This resulted in Italy’s distinction as the only western democracy with a communist party larger and more powerful than its socialist party.

By the mid-1970s, under the leadership of Bettino Craxi, the PSI had become, in effect, a typical social democratic party. It no longer represented the socialist/workers’ party tradition, having ceded that portion of the electorate to the growing PCI. Craxi sought to distance the party from its Marxist roots and position the PSI as the key to forming a governing coalition without the communists – who had become the country’s second largest party after the Christian Democrats.

A series of countrywide scandals (known as Tangentopoli or “bribesville”) was eventually tied to Craxi, the personification of the modern Italian Socialist Party. He resigned soon after and was sentenced to prison for taking millions of dollars in bribes. The PSI never recovered and the party was disbanded in November 1994.

SEE ALSO: Bordiga, Amadeo (1889–1970) and the Italian Communist Party; Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Italian Communist Party; Italian Labor Movement; Italy, from the Anti-Fascist Resistance to the New Left (1945–1960); Italy, Peasant Movements, 19th–20th Centuries; Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945); Resistenza; Turati, Filippo (1857–1932)

References and Suggested Readings

- Berman, S. (2006) *The Primacy of Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- De Grand, A. (1989) *The Italian Left in the Twentieth Century: Socialist and Communist Parties*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- di Scala, S. M. (1988) *Renewing Italian Socialism: Nenni to Craxi*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- di Scala, S. M. (1996) *Italian Socialism: Between Politics and History*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Miller, J. E. (1990) *From Elite to Mass Politics: Italian Socialism in the Giottian Era, 1900–1914*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.

Italy, anti-racist movement

Nicola Montagna

Modern anti-racist movements in Italy have primarily sought to defend the rights of

migrants, especially as international migration has expanded significantly in the late 1980s to 2000s. From the 1990s to the early 2000s, most anti-racist mobilizations evolved in reaction to attacks on migrants and aimed to confront xenophobic demonstrations organized by local citizen committees and the Lega Nord (Northern League). This first phase of anti-racist mobilizations sought to expand migrant citizenship rights. Unlike the larger presence of the more paternalistic institutional left and trade unions, independent organizations were weakly organized (Della Porta 2000). In the 1990s, the first cycle of mobilizations was primarily local, without coordination at the national level (Cousin & Vitale 2007).

Since 1998 anti-racist mobilizations shifted focus to the Centri di Permanenza Temporanea (Temporary Stay Centers, CPTs) and the restriction of freedom and movement for undocumented migrants. The passage of the Turco-Napolitano law in 1998 and then the Bossi-Fini law in 2002 provided the Italian government with powers to hold undocumented migrants in CPTs prior to expulsion. The law introduced “administrative detention” procedures whereby migrants could be imprisoned without committing any crimes while the government deliberated their status.

The anti-racist movement demanded the closure of CPTs and freedom of circulation for all migrants. The struggle against the CPTs emerged as a symbol of a broader movement involving Occupied Social Centers (Centri Sociali), traditional left parties, unions, Catholic associations, and immigrant organizations (Cousin & Vitale 2007). Popular mobilizations shifted from a local to a national base, and ultimately to the transnational level when migrants’ freedom of movement was taken up by the European Social Forum and the global justice movement. The anti-racist movements organized demonstrations, church occupations, hunger strikes, and direct action. On October 24, 1998, several hundred protesters from throughout Italy joined an organization known as White Overalls (Tute Bianche), converging on a newly built CPT detention center in Porto Vecchio, Friuli Venezia Giulia. The protesters clashed with police seeking to prevent their passage and occupation. On January 29, 2000, 10,000 people organized by Tute Bianche demonstrated against the CPT in Milan, and in spring 2000, several thousand migrants mobilized in Brescia to reclaim the right of “leave to remain”

and of “freedom of circulation” (Montagna 2001). On January 25, 2002, Disobbedienti protesters engulfed a CPT in Bologna and “dismantled” a wing of the center. Subsequently, several mobilizations throughout Italy focused on direct action, targeting airline companies involved in the deportation of migrants and associations administering CPTs. Since the 2001 anti-G8 protest in Genoa, the global justice movement has coordinated protests against CPTs and calls for the freedom of movement. The CPTs are viewed internationally as a symbol of the violation of human rights and of the perverse effects of neoliberal globalization. On January 31, 2004 and April 2, 2005, protesters mobilized on CPTs in several Italian localities as part of the First and Second European Action Days of the October 2004 social forums held in Paris and London.

SEE ALSO: Disobbedienti/Tute Bianche; G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Italy, Centri Sociali; Migration Struggles and the Global Justice Movement; World Social Forums

References and Suggested Readings

- Cousin, B. & Vitale, T. (2007) La gauche italienne face au Mouvement pour les Libertés Civiles des Sans-Papiers. *Critique internationale* 37: 9–21.
- Della Porta, D. (2000) Immigration and Protest: New Challenges for Italian Democracy. *South European Society* 5(3): 108–32.
- Mezzadra, S. (2002) *Diritto di Fuga: Migrazioni, Cittadinanza, Globalizzazione*. Rome: Ombre Corte.
- Montagna, N. (2001) La Primavera dei Migranti. *Posse* 2 (Winter).

Italy, anti-war movement, 1980–2005

Nicola Montagna

The peace movement in Italy from the early 1980s and the early 2000s arose in reaction to the Italian government’s joining external allies in international conflicts. The coalitions in the anti-war movement are actors from a diversity of political cultures: trade unions, Catholic groups, environmentalists, left-wing parties, and Occupied Social Centers. Overall, five cycles of protest characterize the peace movement from 1980 to 2005.

The Italian anti-war movement arose in response to the Italian government’s support for NATO and US President Jimmy Carter’s decision in

1979 to deploy 120 cruise missiles in Comiso, Sicily, and the Reagan administration's escalation of the arms race with the USSR in Western Europe. Italian anti-war activists viewed the NATO deployment of nuclear weapons as a means of further escalating the arms race with the Soviet Union. The Italian anti-war movement was part of a wider protest wave in Western Europe calling for the unilateral end to the intensification of the arms race. From 1981 to 1986, Comiso emerged as the main focus of the Italian peace protests, as the movement organized a number of non-violent direct actions to stop the deployment of the nuclear missiles. The actions were supported by dozens of demonstrations in Italian cities and the formation of 600 anti-war committees across Italy. On October 22, 1983, on the International Day for Peace, 500,000 demonstrators joined a non-violent march in Rome.

In the early 1990s, the Italian peace movement began a new cycle of mass protest to support diplomatic resolution of the crisis following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, prior to the US Gulf War in Kuwait against Iraq. On October 7, 1990, 100,000 demonstrators marched from Perugia to Assisi; and in November a delegation of Italian pacifists traveled to Iraq, securing the freedom of 270 Italian workers held hostage by Saddam Hussein's government. The peak was reached on January 12, 1991 when 150,000 people took part in a national demonstration in Rome, while mobilizations ended soon after the bombing of Iraq started.

Two other intense phases of mobilization occurred during the Bosnian War (1992–5) and the bombing of Kosovo by NATO (1996–9). The movement engaged in street protests, boycotts of products, and vigils against parties implicated in the hostilities.

The fifth cycle of protests, in 2002 and 2003, was against the US war in Iraq, targeting the Italian government's support for the US administration of George W. Bush and culminating in the largest mobilization ever in Italy when 400 groups and associations brought three million demonstrators to protest the war plans on February 15, 2003. In addition, Italian anti-war protests engaged in several non-violent direct actions, including some attempts to prevent the transportation of arms, known as "armament trains." The Italian anti-war movement was closely linked to the global opposition and international activist organizations coordinating protests against the

coalition war against Iraq. The global anti-war movement participated actively in various protests against the G8 multilateral international meeting of the world's leading economic powers and joined the World Social Forum meetings for justice and peace organized throughout the world.

SEE ALSO: Anti-War Movement, Iraq; Ecological Protest Movements; G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; Italy, Centri Sociali; World Social Forums

References and Suggested Readings

- Della Porta, D. (1996) *Movimenti Collettivi e Sistema Politico in Italia*. Rome and Bari: Laterza.
- Della Porta, D. & Diani, M. (2004) "No to the War with No Ifs or Buts": Protest against the War in Iraq. In V. della Sala & S. Fabbrini (Eds.), *Italian Politics*. Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 200–18.
- Marrone, D. & Sansonetti, P. (2003) *Né un Uomo né un Soldo: una Cronaca del Pacifismo Italiano del Novecento*. Milan: Baldini Castoldi Dalai.
- Tosi, S. & Vitale, T. (2009) Explaining How Political Culture Changes: Catholic Activism and the Secular Left in Italian Peace Movements. *Social Movements Studies* 2.

Italy, Centri Sociali

Nicola Montagna

From the 1980s to the 1990s, the squatter movement flourished in Italy as activists engaged in a policy of occupying empty buildings in the country in what became known as Occupied Social Centers (OSCs), or Centri Sociali. Although the category of OSC varies in space and time, occupation of empty buildings and squatting and managing the affairs of the buildings were common features of the movement. OSCs represented a radical criticism of representative democracy, the rejection of bureaucratic hierarchy, and the adoption of political autonomy and participative forms of decision-making processes in society. The occupied buildings were the avatar of social and de-commodified spaces where activists self-organized political initiatives, cultural events, and community services in opposition to the gentrification and decline in housing for workers and the poor.

The informal and putatively illegal nature of OSCs created liberated but precarious places for those who squatted in the buildings for political purposes and as representations of the de-commodification of housing and the failure of

capitalist society to provide for basic social needs. Most members of Centri Sociali participated in loose multifaceted networks. In the 1980s, Centri Sociali emerged in several locations, expanding dramatically to about 120 by the 1990s. By the 2000s, the number of OSCs has grown further to approximately 150, spread throughout Italy and concentrated in the urban centers of Milan, Turin, and Rome. Even the number of activists engaged in the Centri Sociali has fluctuated dramatically.

The historical origins of the OSCs are rooted in the antagonistic social movements of the 1970s when youth groups began a process of “claiming the city” through the occupation of empty buildings. Some activists and members of Centri Sociali claim they are the successors of the 1970s new left, operating within the social conditions created by the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial society. On the one hand, the OSCs filled the physical void left by the dismantling of inner-city factories and their move toward extra-urban areas. On the other hand, the social composition of the OSCs reflects the restructuring of the labor force that has occurred in Italy in the 20 years from 1980 to 2000 and the fragmentation of the labor market, based on the increase of flexible work in the service sector and the decline of permanent and full-time employment.

Most OSCs participate in regional and national networks through political affinities and tactical alliances for specific activist campaigns, differing in political and cultural orientation as libertarians, neo-Leninists, and post-autonomous, non-ideological organizations in contrast with hostile, pragmatic, and strategic institutions. The various strands of the Centri Sociali are cultural, political, and social, dividing the “countercultural” and the “political” and representing a continuum of political tendencies that encourage alliances or fissures. The “countercultural” networks mainly emphasize the innovations of cultural languages, the alternative use of communication and information technology, and the promotion of independent music, alternative models of development, and ethical lifestyles. The “political” networks target political opponents and adopt repertoires of protest based on direct action and civil disobedience.

SEE ALSO: Italy, From the New Left to the Great Repression (1962–1981); Italy, New Syndicalism, Cobas, and Precarious Workers’ Organization

References and Suggested Readings

- Dines, N. (1999) Centri Sociali: Occupazioni Autogestite a Napoli negli Anni Novanta. *Quaderni di Sociologia* 43 (21): 90–111.
- Montagna, N. (2006) The Decommodification of Urban Space and the Centro Sociale Rivolta. *City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action* 10 (3): 295–304.
- Moroni, P. (1994) Origine dei Centri Sociali Autogestiti a Milano. Appunti per una Storia Possibile. In *Comunità Virtuali: I Centri Sociali in Italia*. Rome: Manifestolibri, pp. 43–74.
- Ruggiero, V. (2000) New Social Movements and the “Centri Sociali: in Milan.” *Sociological Review* 329 (2): 167–85.

Italy, from the anti-fascist resistance to the new left (1945–1960)

Dario Azzellini

The Italian partisan resistance (La Resistenza) were critical in defeating fascism and the German occupying forces in northern and central Italy from 1943 to 1945. The partisan army was made up of 250,000 men and women, of whom the majority were communists, with smaller numbers of socialists, conservatives, leftist Catholics, monarchists, small leftist factions, and regional autonomists. Most partisans fought for national liberation in a civil war against Italian fascism. But beyond national liberation, partisans also struggled for a social revolution to transform the society, a view that is often denied by mainstream, liberal, and even Communist Party historians.

The broad political spectrum of the resistance and its many contradictions deeply influenced Italian postwar society as the future of liberal democracy and worker power surfaced. While the Italian Communist Party (PCI) superstructure sought to participate in a government of national unity, the rank-and-file pressed for radical social change. After the defeat of Italian fascism and German occupation, some fascist groups still actively sought to oppose socialist revolution and defend capitalist privilege. The Allies faced the contradiction of relying on partisans in the war against Germany but opposing armed communist troops and social reforms. While the US hoped to rely on anti-fascist bourgeois forces, given their absence, the US had no choice but to

rescue and reinstate the former fascist upper classes and their political allies. Upon arrival in southern Italy in 1943, the US relied heavily on factions of organized crime to establish stable conditions. In 1944, the US even supported the candidacy of Trapani mafia boss Virgilio Nasi for High Commissioner of Sicily. The CIA joined forces with Italian organized crime as they both shared a common anti-communist enemy.

Throughout the Italian partisan war and thereafter, many workers hoped for social revolutionary changes, evinced by 1943 strikes in northern Italy where police killed 95 people from July to September. By 1944, social pressures elevated in southern Italy as peasants seized great quantities of fallow land. The US soon recognized that the elites they supported were not equipped to challenge the leftist threat. Their next move would be the construction of an anti-communist front of fascists, oligarchs, the bourgeois right, and even a former conservative faction of the partisans.

In 1944 the PCI was given direct orders from Moscow to respect the spheres of influence established by the US and the USSR. In January, demands were reduced to the resignation of the king, and the question of a new constitution was postponed. In March the Soviets recognized General Pietro Badoglio's government and the PCI renounced its demand for the king's abdication, opting for a constitutional pact with the industrialists. On June 6, PCI General Secretary Palmiro Togliatti returned from exile in the USSR to inform communist leaders in northern Italy that the central goal was national liberation from German occupation and the defeat of Italian fascism, not socialist or communist uprising and power. Social inequality in Italy, according to Togliatti, should be resolved at a later date through a national constituent assembly.

By April 1945, when the Allies advanced into the northern Po valley, most cities were liberated by popular uprisings organized by the resistance and administered by the CLN (Committees of National Liberation). In December 1944, the CLN were recognized as official representatives of areas formerly occupied by the Germans by both the Italian government and the Allied forces. Tensions mounted when the oligarchy and bourgeoisie, supported by the US, tried to expand and consolidate power while workers and peasants engaged in strikes and occupation of land in pursuit of social reform. The PCI evoked national unity, supported the bourgeoisie's inter-

ests, and ceased to advocate radical democratic anti-fascist parliamentarianism, as the CLN had achieved in northern Italy. The PCI simply compromised and supported a bourgeois democracy. However, in May 1947, after solidifying their position, conservatives excluded communists and socialists from government.

Disappointed by the "unfinished revolution," former partisans formed armed groups and began carrying out punitive actions against fascists. Within the first 18 months of liberation the central Italian region of Emilia reported 1,496 "political criminal offenses" committed by communists. In the district of Bologna alone, 615 fascists were killed and 75 "disappeared." A communist unit in Schio stormed a prison on July 8, 1945 and executed 54 fascist detainees. These groups also attacked landlords to force land redistribution. In the district of Bologna, 21 landlords were killed or seriously injured and in Ravenna 15 landlords were killed, while 12 more were abducted, never to be found. A part of the Resistenza had refused to hand over weapons after the war. In 1947, some 80,000 former partisans remained armed.

In 1945 and 1946 Palmiro Togliatti, serving as minister of justice, issued a vaguely formulated amnesty leading to the release of all convicted fascists, which was intended to end all legal proceedings arising from strong discontent among partisans against collaborators. Over 500 armed partisans returned to the mountains and were disbanded only in 1947. Fascist groups that remained were dispersed by the police and some were incorporated into the intelligence services. The secret service was rebuilt through integrating former exponents of the fascist secret police with 4,500 members of the conservative partisan division Osoppo in April 1946, with US support. Minister of the Interior Mario Scelba (1947–55), a member of Christian Democracy (DC), restructured the police according to a fascist model, purging former partisans who had joined the police in the postwar era. National police chiefs Giovanni Carcaterra (1953–60) and Angelo Vicari (1960–73) were members of Mussolini's personal staff in the Republic of Saló. During the 1950s, only two first-grade police prefects had not participated in the fascist regime. All 135 police chiefs and 139 deputies began their careers under fascism, with only five deputies connected to the anti-fascist resistance. It is crucial to emphasize that repressive Italian postwar policies

were supported by a broad authority that spanned fascists to former anti-fascist conservatives. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Italian policy was strictly anti-communist and would remain so for several decades.

With extensive resources from the Marshall Plan flowing almost entirely into the industrialized north and with wages stagnating because of moderate union politics, the big companies in northern Italy accumulated significant capital which was invested in restructuring production with a focus on export and goods of mass consumption through the widespread introduction of assembly lines. These industries were staffed by unskilled workers migrating from the impoverished south of Italy, and required strong mechanisms of repression and control in the workplace.

Scelba conducted a campaign of forced capitalist restoration through police brutality against militant workers and peasants. Six communist workers were killed by police at a 1949 strike in Modena. Later that year, in response to unauthorized peasant occupation of land in the south, police responded with machine gun fire and hand grenades, killing three and seriously injuring another 12. Between June 1947 and January 1951, 81 protesters were killed by police, landlords, or organized crime gangs.

In the 1953 election the Christian Democratic vote fell from 12.7 million in 1948 to 10.86 million, creating concern among right-wing circles in Italy and the US. That same year 6.1 million voted for the PCI and the party expanded to 2.5 million members, with a strongly ideologically conscious working-class base. Still, the PCI followed General Secretary Palmiro Togliatti's line of a democratic seizure of power without a revolutionary process. Between 1953 and 1958, the PCI grew weary of coordinating local strikes. The historical task defined by the PCI was constant progress of the productive forces and implementation of the new constitution. The PCI argued that progressive democracy was incompatible with the interests of entrepreneurs, and for that reason also was a step toward socialism and ultimately peaceful factory takeovers. The policy of the PCI and its trade union CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) was suddenly oriented toward sporadic land struggles and city hall occupations in southern Italy and factory occupations in the north.

The PCI's support for the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 finally led to the emergence

of a new left. The position led to the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) leaving its unity agreement with the PCI, with hundreds of intellectuals leaving both parties. By the early 1960s, the new left sought to advance a new autonomous workers' movement.

The year 1960 marked the beginning of a new dynamic of political and social conflicts. The election of Christian Democrat Fernando Tambroni on March 25 was made possible by support from the fascist party MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano). Tambroni authorized a congress of the MSI on July 2 in Genoa, a leftist stronghold, to test to what extent society accepted an institutionalized opening toward fascists. The organizations of the institutionalized left limited themselves to demanding the prohibition of the congress. But students, workers, and youths organized a protest meeting on June 25. When police tried to break up the meeting, workers from a nearby port fought side by side with protesters, wielding iron bars and hooks. In an effort to regain control of the protest, leftist parties and trade unions called for a general strike in Genoa and Savona on June 30. But while the PCI, PSI, and union officials stressed the peaceful character of the protest, thousands of students, working-class youth, communist dissidents, and anarchosyndicalists began attacking some 15,000 police. The protesters, lacking weapons, called for intervention by the former partisans. In Turin, workers organized a spontaneous solidarity strike and were prevented by CGIL from attacking the police. In Genoa, clashes started the next day without the presence of the official left. The chairman of the PCI-dominated National Partisan Association (ANPI) made a public call not to support those arrested, while CGIL tried to relieve the situation. Nevertheless, thousands of young people and armed ex-partisans traveled to Genoa and soon the congress was canceled. The following day the official left organized "peaceful demonstrations" across Italy that ended only in heavy clashes with the police. From July 1 to 9, ten workers were killed and the protest resulted in a general strike. Tambroni resigned on July 19.

The events of June and July 1960 are considered the birth of the non-traditional Italian new left in response to the failure of traditional leaders to support the struggle and demands of youth and workers. The working class found the conciliation and appeasement of the PCI in

Genoa loathsome, while the militant behavior of youth was considered remarkably refreshing. The media labeled them “youngsters with the striped jerseys,” making it clear that while they may not have been workers, they formed part of a new oppositional generation to the rigid social norms of Italian postwar society. Without an alternative leftist organization to the PCI, they identified with unskilled mass workers from the south who refused to work under inhumane conditions.

SEE ALSO: Italian Communist Party; Italian Socialist Party; Italy, From the New Left to the Great Repression (1962–1981); Resistenza; Togliatti, Palmiro (1893–1964)

References and Suggested Readings

- Clough, S. (1964) *The Economic History of Modern Italy*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Coglitore, M. & Scarso, S. (1991) *La notte dei gladiatori. Omissioni e silenzi della repubblica*. Padua: Calusca Edizioni.
- Ginsborg, P. (1990) *A History of Contemporary Italy*. London: Penguin.
- Low-Beer, J. (1978) *Protest and Participation: The New Working Class in Italy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Woolf, S. J. (1972) *The Rebirth of Italy 1943–50*. London: Longman.

Italy, from the new left to the great repression (1962–1981)

Dario Azzellini

The formation of a mass independent left in Italy from 1962 to 1981 in response to the institutionalization of the traditional left and working-class parties and mass organizations created a mass wave of popular unrest and government repression that turned to armed struggle and further suppression of freedoms. The new left was rooted in new social movements of workers, students, women, and those marginalized by Italy's postwar industrialization.

By the 1950s and 1960s, northern Italy's economy industrialized on a massive scale, as labor productivity expanded from 100 (1953) to 140.6 (1960). However, the working class was not integrated economically or culturally into the Italian economy as in the US or Germany, as wages grew to

only 108.9. Italy restricted wages by encouraging 1.5 million unskilled workers to migrate from the poor agrarian south of Italy to the industrial north. Southern migrants resided in large dormitory suburbs or ghettos with substandard conditions on the edges of large cities. As living costs rose and pay scales fell, Italy's middle-wage workers' and students' standard of living declined precipitously.

Social discontent broke out in 1962 with mass strikes at the Michelin and Lancia factories in Turin, as workers in the metal trades demanded new collective contracts. Remarkably, young unskilled workers employed in Turin's factories participated widely in the strikes. By late June 1962, production ceased at all industrial factories in Turin, including the huge Fiat motor vehicle plant that employed 60,000 workers. As the strike wore on, Fiat workers' demands expanded beyond higher wages to reducing work hours, the intensity of production, and draconian disciplinary standards.

From July 7 to 9, as labor rank-and-file leaders called for new strikes, the two major unions, Unione Italiana dei Lavoratori (UIL) and Sindacato Italiano Dell'Auto (SIDA), signed separate agreements exclusively covering wage increases, without addressing concerns over labor conditions. Industrialists believed a contractual settlement would break the strike, since UIL and SIDA had won the previous worker representation elections in Fiat with 63 percent of the workers' votes. In opposition to the settlement, on July 10, thousands of workers of all unions and factories gathered at Statuto Square in Turin at UIL headquarters, and by the afternoon the demonstration had grown so large that police squads clashed with workers, who defended themselves. Workers disregarded union and Italian Communist Party (PCI) efforts to persuade a return to their jobs. The rank-and-file strike and violence lasted for three days, prompting conservatives to accuse PCI's union, Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL), of provoking disorder. The PCI accused the police, industrialists, fascists, and “radical groups” of initiating the violence. The Turin labor uprising instigated the Italian autonomous workers' movement, a militant worker movement independent of organizational ties with established unions and left parties.

The theoretical foundation of the autonomous workers' movement and the new left was built

by circles of dissidents who left the PCI and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) in the early 1960s. In 1961, the position of worker autonomy was advocated in a publication of leading left and Marxist intellectuals named *Quaderni Rossi* (Red Notebooks). Among the leading intellectuals in the autonomy movement were Rainiero Panzieri, Mario Tronti, Sergio Bologna, Massimo Cacciari, and Antonio Negri.

Supported by worker cadres, an independent organizing network was established in the factories of northern Italy. In 1962 the magazine *Quaderni Piacentini* (Piacenza Notebooks) was founded, followed by *Classe Operaia* (Working Class) in 1963, aiming to initiate and defend worker rank-and-file struggles outside of parties or unions. The PCI rejected the autonomist approach, which postulated a permanent workers' struggle as incompatible with the party's social partnership policy. But the PCI could not prevent the advance of autonomous worker organizations, wildcat strikes, and clashes with the police. While the PCI lost support from a growing number of union members in plants, the party was gaining electoral support, winning one million additional votes in the 1963 elections and emerging as the party that promised the best hope for the working class. The PCI's electoral gains occurred while the youth revolt was spreading and the counterculture expanding through imaginative public actions, including the setting up of a tent city in the center of Milan. By the mid-1960s the youth rebellion had reached schools and universities, with the emergence of anti-war, anti-imperialist, and socialist sympathies supporting China, Algeria, Cuba, and the Vietnamese liberation struggle. Mao Zedong and Che Guevara became iconic symbols of rebellion and new paths beyond traditional leftist positions. As the diverse movements expanded in Italy, a heterogeneous left linked to global movements emerged. A source of the unrest was the growing and relatively inexpensive access to the political writings of revolutionary leaders throughout the world, as evinced through the publications of the Italian communist Giangiacomo Feltrinelli.

By the fall of 1967, students were supporting workers in labor conflicts and the student movement occupied the University of Trento, University of Milan, and Turin University. Protests were initiated by official students' associations, but the official representations were rapidly displaced by self-organized autonomous structures.

While student opposition originated in discontent with learning methods, antagonism turned rapidly to focus on the centrality of the working class in society and the role of the universities, by the late 1960s shaping into a movement.

In early 1968, student activists occupied half of Italy's 36 universities. In Turin and other cities, violent police evictions of students from campuses were followed by their reoccupation. On February 2, students occupied Italy's largest university, La Sapienza in Rome, and were evicted by police four weeks later on February 28. The following day, student demonstrations reoccupied the university and engaged in a major confrontation with authorities that was dubbed the "Battle of Valle Giulia." For the first time, students did not disperse in response to a police attack but resisted in a battle that provided a new impulse to university occupations and influenced high school student occupations in Milan.

Police responded to student, farmer, and worker demonstrations by escalating repression, engaging the Carabinieri militarized units to attack protesters. From October 1966 to June 1968, approximately 10,000 workers and students were convicted for participation in protests. In addition, leftist demonstrators faced widespread armed attacks by fascists.

As in other European countries, 1968 was a pivotal year of Italian protest. The movement in Italy was led by dissidents from traditional leftist parties, as well as Trotskyists, Maoists, anarchists, anarchocommunists, leftist Catholics, critical theorists, the beat movement, factory workers, anti-psychiatric movement activists, anti-colonial and anti-imperialist solidarity organizations, and an emergent feminist movement. The demonstrations criticized and rebelled against government authority, exploitation, consumption, mental institutions, and prisons. Protesters emphasized the importance of self-determination, autonomy, collectivity, and liberation directed against the establishment as well as the traditional left.

In 1968, communist dissidents, workers, and students unified through the foundation of new labor organizations: *Potere Operaio* (Workers' Power) and *Lotta Continua* (Constant Struggle). Italy's factories experienced an explosive atmosphere that included physical attacks on directors, foremen, and widespread sabotage of machines. On March 7, trade unions organized a general strike against the government. At the Fiat factory

– considered the symbol of Italian progress – worker participation in the struggle was extensive, motivated less through traditional unions than by autonomous worker discontent.

The protests spread to the cultural sector as well. In Venice, students and artists disrupted the Biennale and the film festival. In October the Unitarian Grassroots Committee CUB (Comitato Unitario di Base) was founded in the Pirelli tire factory in Milan, and spread first to the Sit-Siemens factory and then to other plants. Together with collectives from schools and neighborhoods, the CUB built the Political Metropolitan Collective (CPM). On December 2, police fired on and killed two day laborers in Avola, Sicily, who were protesting the renewal of the national work contract. Strikes and demonstrations throughout Italy followed.

The year 1969 also represented a new peak and revitalization for the movements. Visible unity between students and workers crystallized into less visible but stronger organizational ties among professional workers and students. At universities, student struggles were institutionalized through dogmatic communist organizations. The primary worker mobilization of 1969 focused on the renewal of the national work contract in the metal industry. A movement of employees arose and merged with the workers' movement. Autonomous worker committees emerged and mobilized to oppose work rules, the oppressive organization of work, and long working hours. Workers sought wage increases independent of labor productivity, leading to mass strikes throughout the country. On April 9 police shot two striking workers in Battipaglia. In May and June several autonomously organized strikes stopped production in Fiat for 50 days.

In December, four bombings struck Rome and Milan, one bomb exploding in the National Agricultural Bank in Milan, killing 16 and injuring 84. In response, police prohibited all marches and focused investigations on the revolutionary left. One leftist, Giuseppe Pinelli, fell from the fourth floor of the police department during interrogation in a death police presented as a confession.

The movements placed responsibility for the bombing on the state, viewing the event as a military counteroffensive from above. Still, in 1969, some movements postulated “revolutionary violence” as a necessary response to violent state repression. In Genoa the guerilla group

“October 22” was founded and the publisher Feltrinelli formed the GAP (Groups of Partisan Action).

The PCI had already begun in 1968 to exclude members showing affinity to the movement. In 1970 the PCI excluded former World War II partisan Rossana Rossanda and the whole current referring to the group and newspaper *Il Manifesto*. The PCI sought to legitimate its participation in the government and declined to criticize the system, fearing radicalization of the conflicts. In 1970 and 1971 most revolutionary groups forced out of factories shifted focus to neighborhoods. Potere Operaio and CPM both sought to further radicalize the struggles, the former in the context of mass militancy, the latter as periodic interventions. Due to persecution and repression in the factories, only clandestine organizations could retain some capacity of intervention in factories.

Founded in 1970 by militants of the CPM in Milan, the Red Brigades (BR) supported worker struggles with small attacks on the cars of shift bosses, with the support of factory employees and working-class suburbs. The BR's goal was to build a Marxist-Leninist urban guerilla movement through armed struggle from below.

In March 1972, the communist publisher and member of GAP Giangiacomo Feltrinelli was found dead near an electricity pylon in Milan, apparently from the detonation of his own explosives. His death provoked broad discussion among social movements about armed struggle and alliances with radical democrats established after the 1969 bombings broke them apart, creating a democratic and revolutionary left. From 1972 to 1973, the radical left focused on defending civil rights, including the passage of a referendum to permit divorce, while the traditional leftist parties and unions could again consolidate their positions.

In March 1973, workers' unrest did not end after a four-week strike at the Fiat-Mirafiori factory in Turin ended in an agreement with unions and employers. Workers in autonomous organizations organized a movement for improved working conditions that undermined factory management and productivity. They occupied the Fiat-Mirafiori factory and raised red flags. The police did not dare to evict it. But the movement inside factories became aware of the limitation of factory politics, which could not resist efforts by employers to restructure factories to reduce worker resistance.

The autonomous organization forms spread throughout workplaces and society. In March delegates from autonomous labor structures in 28 factories founded *Autonomia Operaia* (Workers' Autonomy). Following the Mirafiori occupation, *Potere Operaio* dissolved and joined autonomous structures, while *Lotta Continua* slipped into a crisis and dissolved in 1976. Throughout Italy, tens of thousands of people joined hundreds of collectives, *Centri Sociali* (social centers), and squatted vacant houses and buildings.

The movement was called the "environment of the *Autonomia*" or autonomist movement. It represented a new militant, intellectual, and artistic model based on new forms of communication outside established organizations, with greater representation of women and working-class youth. The autonomous movement made use of a range of mobilizing techniques, including theater, dance, free radio, magazines, public festivals, and musical events to bring together diverse segments of society seeking new forms of organization. Public spaces became major sites of mobilization that brought thousands of people throughout metropolitan areas to the urban cores of cities, frequently clashing with police who had been ordered to suppress unsanctioned public gatherings. The autonomous movement besieged public expressions of private wealth through raiding food shops and luxury boutiques that were typically restricted to the upper class.

In the summer of 1976, the autonomous movement together with *Lotta Continua*, anarchists, and *Autonomia Operaia* organized a large youth festival in the *Parco Lambro* in Milan that attracted 100,000 participants. However, the festival turned into a disaster, with outbreaks of violence marking the end of the hippy movement's calls for "love and happiness" and making all too obvious their limited capacity to change society. The festival also failed to turn consumers into actors. A lack of common political objectives and dynamism persisted throughout, resulting in a violent release of pent-up frustration. The events provoked a broad debate among the movements, which acknowledged the need to strengthen their political aims and "declare war on capitalism and the bourgeoisie."

In sharp contrast, the PCI, deducing from the 1973 coup d'état in Chile that radical politics was impossible, postulated a historic compromise with the Christian Democrats (DC) and shared government responsibility as the party's goal. As

part of the new compromise with the political right, the PCI gave up any pretense of defending the popular movements outside its ambit, permitting the criminalization of the autonomist movements. In the Italian parliament, the PCI abstained when an act was introduced giving police immunity when committing violence against activists and protesters. Nearly 100 activists were killed by the police from 1975 to 1977, and during the late 1970s dozens of armed groups emerged in response. Most of the armed leftist organizations consisted only of a few militants and lasted for a few months. The BR turned to a more inflexible position that postulated the need to engage war against the state and its institutions. While the more orthodox political positions of the BR had little in common with those of the autonomous movements, their armed operations managed to find hidden sympathies.

In 1977 the struggles exploded. A radical youth movement flourished, mixing creativity and subculture with militant and armed actions. It took over public spaces, raided stores, and entered concert halls and cinemas without paying. The year began with massive student protests and university and school occupations all over the country. In Rome and Turin, after several leftist activists were killed by fascists, thousands of protesters took to the streets in a demonstration that ended with the burning down of the offices of the fascist party, MSI (*Movimento Sociale Italiano*). Police responded with firearms during demonstrations and leftist militants shot back. The PCI and CGIL opposed the student demonstrators occupying the universities. The final break between revolutionary movements and the PCI and established unions occurred after CGIL Secretary Luciano Lama tried to speak at Rome University, leading to a fierce confrontation between the PCI and CGIL security services and students and ending with Lama being chased out of the university.

Subsequently, on March 11, a student was killed by the *Carabinieri* near the occupied University of Bologna. Massive disorders followed and the university was occupied by armored infantry vehicles. The next day, a demonstration in Rome turned into a mass protest against the killing, with over 100,000 protesters marching through the city, attacking police stations, businesses, prisons, and party offices with firearms and gasoline bombs. The protesters plundered armories and engaged in armed shootouts with police. Similar actions

occurred in Bologna and Milan, which were subsequently occupied by the military. The police engaged in widespread repression in the aftermath of the protests, storming legal leftist meetings and seizing or destroying documents.

In 1977, as mass legal activity became near impossible due to a total ban on the movements, many activists turned toward armed struggle. The government in turn passed new laws, with the support of the PCI, establishing special prisons and declaring a permanent state of emergency. From September 22 to 24, over 100,000 youths gathered for a meeting in Bologna. They argued about revolutionary strategies and fell into sectarianism, the optimistic mood of the movements turning into a generalized feeling of hopelessness. New production technologies led to mass dismissals. The revolutionary left again advocated a further radicalization of the struggle, leading to about 2,000 armed actions during 1977.

In March 1978, the BR kidnapped Christian Democrat chairman Aldo Moro, in order to prevent a "historical compromise" between the PCI and the Christian Democrats. The Italian state for the first (and only) time refused to negotiate, and Moro was killed by the BR after 55 days in captivity. In 1978 and 1979, additional armed actions were carried out even as many small armed groups disbanded. The BR and established organizations recruited massively among activists, even though they had little in common with the movement of 1977. But the armed groups and the movement of 1977 had no strategy beyond reaction to state repression.

On April 7, 1979, hundreds of leftist militants, mainly intellectuals with revolutionary ideas and spokespeople for legal groups, were arrested, including lecturers of the Padua University Philosophy Institute. The mass arrests were justified by a judge and PCI member, who sought to place responsibility on Antonio Negri and other leftist professors for what he saw as subversive activities in Italy. He accused Negri, Oreste Scalzone, Emilio Vesce, Luciano Ferrari Bravo, Franco Piperno, and other former leaders of the *Autonomia Operaia* and *Potere Operaio* of setting up a subversive organization and preparing armed insurrection against the state. Moreover, Negri was accused of being the mastermind of the BR. Most of the accusations were dismissed later during the trial that started in January 1987.

In October of 1979, just a few months after April 7, the first 61 politically motivated dismissals

at Fiat took place. One year later, Fiat laid off 23,000 workers, creating a sense of fear and the basis for deep social transformation. Meanwhile, the mass arrests continued until 1982. The Italian state countered the social conflict with a total of 40,000 legal cases, 15,000 arrests, and over 4,000 convictions for "terrorist activities." Hundreds were killed on both sides and several thousand leftist militants were forced underground or into exile. By 1982, the mass movements were destroyed and those few isolated armed groups that survived disbanded within a few years.

SEE ALSO: Italian Communist Party; Italian Socialist Party; Italy, *Centri Sociali*; Italy, *From the Anti-Fascist Resistance to the New Left (1945–1960)*; *Manifesto, II*; Negri, Antonio (b. 1933); Red Brigades; Rossanda, Rossana (b. 1924)

References and Suggested Readings

- Balestrini, N. & Moroni, P. (1997) *L'orda d'oro 1968–1977. La grande ondata rivoluzionaria e creativa, politica ed esistenziale*. Milan: Feltrinelli.
- Ginsborg, P. (1990) *A History of Contemporary Italy*. London: Penguin.
- Lumley, R. (1990) *States of Emergency: Cultures of Revolt in Italy from 1968 to 1978*. London: Verso.
- Red Notes (Eds.) (1978) *Italy 1977–78: Living with an Earthquake*. London: Red Notes.
- Red Notes (1979) *Working-Class Autonomy and the Crisis*. London: Red Notes/CSE Books.
- Ragini, M. & Lange, P. (1980) (Eds.) *Italy in Transition: Conflict and Consensus*. London: Frank Cass.
- Tarrow, S. (1989) *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965–75*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Wright, S. (2002) *Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism*. London: Pluto Press.

Italy, new syndicalism, cobas, and precarious workers' organization

Andrea Fumagalli

Origins: Hot Autumn and the 1970s

Cobas are independent rank-and-file worker organizations that emerged in Italian factories in the 1980s in opposition to the established system of trade union representation averse to class conflict. The history of Italian cobas can be

traced to the late 1960s, during what was known as the great blue-collar movement called *autunno caldo* (hot autumn). In that period within the large firms of the North, some autonomous workers' collectives opposed to traditional trade unions that were linked to Italy's left-moderate parties began to develop a new form of unionism based on autonomous labor control. The first cobas took the names *Comitati operai di base* and *Cub*, and continued into the early 2000s. The philosophy of cobas is rooted in response to the repressive labor conditions in the 1960s, aimed at supporting "same wage increase for all," without taking into account different occupational categories. *Cub* and *Comitati operai di base* were autonomous organizations linked to leftist extra-parliamentary political groups (*Avanguardia Operaia*, *Lotta Continua*, *Potere Operaio*) and the student movement.

During the 1970s a militant Italian labor movement engaged in major strikes at manufacturing facilities, leading to significant growth in organized labor. In 1973 over 6 million Italian workers went on strike. Most notably, in March 1973 workers occupied the Fiat-Mirafiori plant for two days, contributing to the formation and growth of autonomous workers' assemblies (*Autonomia Operaia*) in the North of Italy and the industrial belt surrounding Rome. The demands of *Autonomia Operaia* extended beyond improving labor conditions in factories to support socially driven petitions calling on government to improve the provision of housing, transport, education, and public welfare. After 1977, radicalism in the established labor movement precipitously declined, after which the *Autonomia Operaia* capacity for mobilizing workers also decreased, in part due to state repression in response to the growing radicalization and militancy among some autonomous labor organizations. In 1980, after a 35-day strike at Fiat, three autonomist union caucuses – *Cgil*, *Cisl*, and *Uil* – were defeated at the auto company, throwing the independent labor movement into crisis.

1980s and the Fragmentation of the 1990s

After the repression and defeat of the autonomist movements, the 1980s were characterized by a period of trade union moderation and conflict-free bargaining. Autonomist labor organizations opposed the restructuring of large manufactur-

ing firms and the shift towards the post-Fordist model of flexible production. Among the autonomists' most important initiatives was a referendum opposing corporate plans to institute wage indexation (*scala mobile*) to inflation. The failure of trade union unity further weakened the position of workers in the factories, as the long and painful process of resistance to neoliberal restructuring ended with the defeat of the resistance to prevent elimination of wage indexation in 1992, which inevitably contributed to higher income inequality in Italy. Dissatisfaction with the failure of trade unions encouraged a renewal of labor activism outside of traditional union forms, with representation on the basis of specific regional and territorial units and within industries at the firm level. The two most influential organizations in central Italy and Rome are *Rdb* (*Rappresentanza di base*) and *Cobas*. *Rdb* was founded as part of the struggles that occurred in some manufacturing industries in Rome's manufacturing belt, especially among public sector workers employed in pensions and welfare, fire departments, railways, and bus transportation.

Created in 1987, cobas operated in education, especially in secondary schools, opposing school privatization and the growth of unstable jobs (labor precariousness), and in support of improved job and wage conditions. The experience of cobas spread from workers in schools and educational institutions to other labor markets. The formation of the National Committee of Cobas provided a forum for workers in many public services, including *Enel* (energy), health, telecommunications, and private firms.

During the 1980s and early 1990s Cobas engaged in a protracted struggle with *Alfa-Romeo*. In northern Italy, especially in Milan, metal-industry trade unionists that were expelled from *Fim-Cisl* (the Catholic trade union) because of their radical positions, created the *FMLU*, which in the 1990s founded the *CUB* (Basic Unitary Committee) and federated with *RdB*. Hence, by the late 1990s, a new form of antagonistic trade union was constituted – *Cobas*, *RdB* in central Italy, and *RdB-Cub* in the North. Cobas had to overcome a major challenge of official recognition by state labor organizations to bargain on a regional territorial level on behalf of workers. Existing trade union law specified that only the primary representative trade unions – *Cgil*, *Cisl*, and *Uil* – were allowed to engage in nationwide bargaining activity.

A first attempt at reform was the election of RSUs at the firm level. Subsequently, in a growing number of medium to large enterprises and in public services, Cobas gained official trade union rights to bargain on behalf of their members. Since in Italy collective bargaining activity is based on a dual system (national and firm) of bargaining, Cobas were only able to operate at the firm level. Thus, beyond the ideological differences among cobas and established trade unions, established Italian labor law forced the organizations into pursuing new bargaining strategies. As such, the failure of the system's laws to mesh with the emerging unions furthered the fragmentation of established trade unionism, which reached its high point in the mid-1990s, as a growing number of cobas emerged across Italy (Slai-Cobas, Al-Cobas, and Sin-Cobas).

Recomposition of 2000 and San Precario Movement

In Italy the late 1990s were characterized by responding to the spread of precarious unsteady work through organizing, and the formation of new social struggles linked to the increasing activity of Autonomous Social Centers and the anti-globalization movement. The growth in part-time and precarious work arrangements in Italy increased the complexity of labor union representation. Several labor reforms were passed by the Italian government in the 2000s to take into account the growth of precarious work, and by 2008 more than forty types of precarious ("typical" and "atypical") labor contracts were in place – from full-time and lifelong work to temporary labor. The labor contracts differ on the basis of length of job tenure (temporary to permanent), the number of hours (full or part time), and degree of social security coverage. The dramatic expansion of unsteady work in Italy established the foundation for one of the strongest national movements against precariousness in Europe in the country at a time of relatively non-antagonistic labor-management relations. Autonomous labor organizations contended that contingent part-time labor was becoming a structural and generalized problem and that workers engaging in precarious work tended to lead precarious lives.

In 2001 a chainworkers' collective decided to highlight the plight of precarious workers by organizing a May Day Parade. This event quickly

became the most important rally against precariousness in Italy, with almost 100,000 participants, spread throughout the whole of Europe (Euro May Day). Traditional trade union rallies disappeared and new forms of communications, new languages, and unconventional use of media (subvertising, free press, and so on) stimulated the creation of new tactics in resisting precariousness and improving life and work conditions. The San Precario icon for precariousness, a Catholic religious symbol known all over the world, is considered the representation of this movement, which signifies the frontier of a new form of labor syndicalism responding directly to the structural changes in the modern neoliberal capitalist system.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Italy; Italy, from the New Left to the Great Repression (1962–1981)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bernocchi, P. (1993) *Dal sindacato ai Cobas*. Rome: Massari Editore.
- Malabarba, G. (1995) *Dai Cobas al sindacato. Un percorso per ricostruire un'organizzazione di classe dei lavoratori*. Brussels: Dataneews.
- Virno, P. & Hardt, M. (Eds.) (1996) *Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics*. Mancato: University of Minnesota Press.
- Wright, S. (2002) *Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism*. London: Pluto Press.

Italy, operaism and post-operaism

Sandro Mezzadra

Operaismo ("operaism"), also known in the English-speaking world as "autonomist Marxism," refers to a theoretical and political current of Marxist thought that emerged in Italy in the early 1960s. An original reading of Marx in the framework of the radical workers' struggles that developed in the country during the decade led to the invention of new theoretical concepts (such as technical and political class composition, the mass worker, the refusal of work) and of a new political methodology (so-called militant investigation or co-research). The development of operaism deeply influenced both the political culture and social movements of the 1960s and 1970s in Italy. The theories of Italian

revolutionary operaism, which after 1968 shaped political experiences such as Potere Operaio (Workers' Power) and the multifarious movements of Autonomia Operaia (Workers' Autonomy), were widely circulated abroad as well.

After the waves of repression that began on April 7, 1979 and that led to the imprisonment and exile of hundreds of militants and intellectuals of the autonomous movement in Italy, the early 1990s marked the beginning of a new theoretical and political season and the birth of what is currently referred to as "post-operaism." Key to this new season have been such concepts as "general intellect," "immaterial labor," "cognitive capitalism," the "autonomy of migration," and the "multitude." Hardt and Negri's *Empire* (2000) has widely contributed to the global dissemination of such concepts within social movements, in Marxist and post-Marxist discussions, as well as in cultural and postcolonial studies.

A New Era of Class Struggle

"The workers have imposed it on the capitalists, through the objective violence of their organized strength in the factories. Capital's power appears to be stable and solid; the balance of forces appears to be weighted against the workers. And yet precisely at the points where capital's power appears most dominant, we see how deeply it is penetrated by this menace, this threat of the working class." These are the opening sentences of Mario Tronti's "Lenin in Inghilterra" ("Lenin in England"), written in 1964 as an editorial for the first issue of the newspaper *Classe Operaia* (Working Class) and republished in 1966 in *Operai e capitale* (Workers and Capital). The above-quoted article by Tronti is particularly important in the history and formation of operaism: the first sentences clearly indicate one of the main polemical fronts of this current of political thinking, that is, the frontal attack against all theories of working-class integration that were circulating widely in the 1960s, in mainstream social sciences, in public discourse, and even in some varieties of "third-worldist" Marxism. To this polemical front Tronti added, in the same article, the formulation of a methodological principle (often emphatically referred to as a kind of "Copernican revolution") that remained crucial to the theories of operaism and post-operaism: the idea that it is necessary to reverse the classical relation between capitalist development and workers'

struggles, to identify in workers' struggles the real dynamic element (the real "mover") of capitalistic development, and to affirm the latter's subordination to workers' struggles.

As a newspaper, *Classe Operaia* (1964–7) emerged out of the militant journal *Quaderni Rossi* (Red Notebooks), which had been founded in 1961 in Turin by Raniero Panzieri, a prominent intellectual and left-wing leader of the Italian Socialist Party. Critical toward the new party line that was laying the basis for the experiences of the center-left governments in the country, Panzieri gathered a group of young intellectuals, workers, and technical employees and started an investigation into the living and labor conditions of the working class in and around Turin. The journal *Quaderni Rossi* was born out of a connection with similar groups based in other regions of northern Italy: intellectuals such as Antonio Negri and Mario Tronti (the former linked to the Socialist Party in Padua, the latter to the Communist Party in Rome), and militant researchers such as Romano Alquati and Guido Bianchini. In many senses the work done by *Quaderni Rossi* can be considered the origin of operaism, although it is also correct to emphasize the split within the group (which led to the birth of *Classe Operaia*) as the real moment of emergence of a *political* operaism. *Quaderni Rossi*, which originally maintained a strong relationship with the left wing of the trade unions, produced a rupture within the hegemonic political culture of the Italian left of the time, which was deeply shaped by the reading of Gramsci (as proposed by intellectuals of the Communist Party in the 1950s and by the political line set by Palmiro Togliatti since the end of the war). Although it may appear paradoxical, the rupture produced by *Quaderni Rossi* consisted in a double rediscovery: the rediscovery of Marx (the first Italian translation of a fragment of Marx's *Grundrisse*, the famous "Fragment on the machinery," was published in the fourth issue of *Quaderni Rossi*), and the rediscovery of the factory. After the historical defeat of the left at Fiat in 1953, the factory was conceived of (by the official organizations of the labor movement) as a site of resistance and political formation of cadres, but certainly not as a strategic site of offensive workers' attack: while a "historicist" reading of Marx prevailed, the politics of alliances was recognized as the main task of communist and socialist politics.

Quaderni Rossi looked for a way out of the internal and international crisis of the labor movement, with an emphasis on the new quality of class struggle and composition within the novel conditions determined by the wave of mass industrialization that had radically transformed the Italian social, economic, and cultural landscape between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. The journal started to produce an accurate cartography of workers' conditions and struggles, stressing the importance of seemingly "unpolitical" workers' behaviors such as absenteeism and small (even individual) gestures of sabotage, and initiated "militant investigations" in many factories, directly involving workers in the production of knowledge about their living and working conditions and experimenting with the transformation of this knowledge into a condition for struggle. In a way it is possible to say that *Quaderni Rossi* played a key role in the establishment of industrial and labor sociology in Italy, in a condition in which the predominant historicist culture of the left was basically hostile to sociology *per se*.

Classe Operaia tried to interpret the radicalization of workers' struggles that had become apparent at least since 1962, when an uprising in Turin (the so-called Piazza Statuto uprising) brought to the fore the oppositional behaviors of new, unskilled, and young workers – mainly migrants from the south of the country whose recruitment had radically transformed the composition of the working class in the factories of the north. Crucial to the split within *Quaderni Rossi* was the idea that the Italian situation was ripe for political experiments in revolutionary autonomous workers' organization. At the same time, *Classe Operaia* was also the theoretical laboratory within which the main categories and the methodology of the first wave of operaism were defined. The concept of "technical class composition" was developed as a kind of reverse side of what Marx had termed the "organic composition of capital." To this the concept of "political class composition" was added, in order to take into account the subjective behaviors, needs, and traditions of struggle in the definition of class.

While the analysis of the new role assigned to the state by Keynesianism led to the concept of the "plan of capital" (later developed by Negri in the early 1970s into the "plan state" theory), in the most engaged theoretical chapter of his *Operai e capitale* on Marx, labor-power, and the

working class, Tronti contended that the relation of labor to capital is always double: at once incorporated into its workings as a commodity (as "labor-power") and separated from its logic as a form of political subjectivity (as "working class"). Drawing on a reading of Marx's *Grundrisse*, Tronti developed the idea of "labor as subjectivity" – labor as set against capital, as *not-capital*. This idea implied a radical emphasis on the *partiality* of the subjectivity of the working class. On the one hand, Tronti stressed the fact that only from the unilateral point of view of this partial subject was it possible to produce knowledge of the "totality" of capitalism. On the other hand, he fully developed the political consequences of this theoretical point, setting the interest (and the "explosive power") of the working class against such concepts as the "people" and "popular sovereignty" itself, which had been key to the theory of "progressive democracy" in the Communist Party under the leadership of Togliatti (cf. Tronti 1971: 79). The militant investigation of the new technical conditions of labor in the "Fordist" factories led the *Classe Operaia* group to identify the new composition of the working class as the so-called *mass worker*: the lack of identification of the unskilled worker in the "content" of labor, far from being described in terms of "alienation," was considered by Italian operaists as the root of a *refusal of work* and of political struggles for wages independent of productivity.

The students' movement of 1968 and the workers' "hot autumn" of 1969 led to a new split within Italian operaism. Mario Tronti and others decided to continue their political and intellectual activity within the Communist Party, since they were convinced that workers' struggles structurally needed a political "supplement" in order to multiply and consolidate their power (a position that was later elaborated by Tronti in his theory of the "autonomy of the political"). Antonio Negri and others were instead convinced that the level of autonomous power expressed by workers in the "hot autumn" directly posited the problem of a revolutionary rupture. The organization Potere Operaio (Workers' Power) was founded upon this political evaluation and was active until 1973. Although the history of the organization was shaped by many contrasts on the "party line" (with positions ranging from an emphasis on workers' autonomy and violence to a rediscovery of the Leninist politics of

insurrection), its newspaper was an important point of reference for the most radical workers' experiences in Italy.

Both the new dimension of workers' struggles (symbolically represented by the occupation of the Mirafiori Fiat plant in March 1973) and the spread of new social movements from the end of the 1960s led the majority of Potere Operaio to propose an end to the group and its confluence into the wider movement of *Autonomia Operaia* (Workers' Autonomy). The composition of this movement was radically heterogeneous, from both a political and a social point of view: although the proposal of "workers' autonomy" came from a few large factories in the north and from workers' committees in the service industries in Rome, the movement increasingly registered and expressed the political militancy of new proletarian sectors, especially in the peripheries of the metropolitan areas. The slogans and language of operaism were rearticulated in the new situation and hybridized on the one hand with older political traditions (such as workers' councils), and on the other with the emerging experiences of feminism, environmentalism, and counterculture. The emphasis on organization, "counterpower," and the spread of proletarian violence against the state and capital, which were the defining components of the movement for some, was met by an emphasis on creativity, micropolitics, and the rediscovery of "situationism," which were the defining components for others. The uprising of 1977 in Italy (particularly in Bologna and in Rome) was the culminating moment of the growth of the autonomous movement: in a way it can be retrospectively considered as the embryonic emergence of a new social composition of labor and as the announcement of many of the issues that have been crucial in the development of post-operaism in recent years. That year was also shaped by a dramatic clash between the autonomous movement and the Communist Party: after 1977, in a situation increasingly characterized by the military actions of the Red Brigades and other leftist armed organizations, the Communist Party played a key role in the criminalization of the autonomous movement and in the organization of repression against its militants and intellectuals.

From a theoretical point of view, the development of Italian revolutionary operaism in the 1970s was intertwined with the history of political and social struggles briefly sketched

above. A first element can be identified in an attempt to reconstruct the international dimension of the cycle of struggles of the mass worker. This attempt led to an intensive study of the history of class struggles in the US, particularly focused on the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and on such experiences as "facing reality" in the 1950s, as well as to an investigation of workers' struggles in the 1960s and the early 1970s in Western Europe. *Operai e stato* (Workers and State), a collectively authored book published in 1972 that can be considered an important move in this direction, introduces a second important theoretical element, which is the role and changing shape of the state in capitalism. Particularly important in this regard is the work of Antonio Negri and Luciano Ferrari Bravo: the definition of the "plan state," which has already been mentioned, was elaborated on the basis of two essays included in *Operai e stato*, one devoted to Keynes by Negri and the other discussing the New Deal in the US by Ferrari Bravo. In subsequent years, the struggles of the mass worker were recognized as the crucial element that produced the crisis of the "plan state": while politically the operaists within the autonomous movement thought it necessary and possible to deepen the disarticulation of the form of the state through a mixture of sabotage and social struggles for "indirect wages" (that is, for the increase of the state's public expense), the analysis of the crisis of the "plan state" led to the proposed concept of the "crisis state," which anticipated many debates on the crisis of the welfare state. A third crucial theoretical element in the 1970s was the militant investigation into the incipient forms of capitalistic restructuring as a response to mass workers' struggles. At least since 1973, many collective investigations and analysis have stressed the fact that capital itself was compelled by the intensity of these struggles to invent new forms of production and new modalities of intertwining between production, circulation, and reproduction. Such concepts as the "diffused factory" have tried to grasp these emerging new capitalistic forms, while the concept of the "social worker" was proposed in order to identify the class composition that could politically anticipate capital's attempt to reaffirm its command over the whole of society.

What is currently referred to as "post-operaism" began to emerge in the early 1990s. While in Italy a new students' movement

(1990–1) and the consolidation of the social centers (*Centri Sociali*) movement opened up new possibilities for radical political action and thinking, two journals were launched that contributed to a critical examination and renewal of the legacy of operaism: the first, *Luogo Comune* (Common Place), was started in Rome by Paolo Virno and others; the second, *Futur Antérieur* (Future Anterior), was started in Paris by Antonio Negri, other Italian political expatriates, and French intellectuals such as Jean-Marie Vincent. Both journals initiated a debate on “post-Fordism” that tried to read many of the characters and the rhetoric itself of the new “flexible” organization of capitalism against the grain. The following years witnessed several developments: a new reading of Marx’s concept of “general intellect” was proposed in order to stress the role of knowledge and language in the composition of labor dominated and exploited by capital; a lively discussion focused on the concept of “immaterial labor”; the emphasis on the mobility of labor led some post-operaist theorists to propose a theory of the “autonomy of migration”; and the concept of the multitude, originally developed by Negri in his reading of Spinoza, was further elaborated in order to grasp the “technical” heterogeneity of the composition of labor and to propose a form of political organization beyond the tradition of the labor movement.

Since 1999, post-operaist concepts and theories have deeply influenced discussions within the alter-globalization movement. They have been sharply criticized by some leftist intellectuals and activists, while others have enthusiastically appropriated them. Through the publication of *Empire* by Hardt and Negri (2000), operaism and post-operaism have become “traveling theories,” an essential part of the global critical discussion within social movements and of knowledge production within and outside the academy.

SEE ALSO: Autonomism; Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Italy, *Centri Sociali*; Italy, from the New Left to the Great Depression (1962–1981); Marxism; Multitude; Negri, Antonio (b. 1933); Red Brigades; Togliatti, Palmiro (1893–1964)

References and Suggested Readings

- Alquati, R. (1975) *Sulla Fiat e altri scritti*. Milan: Feltrinelli.
 Birkner, M. & Foltin, R. (2006) *(Post-)Operaismus. Von der Arbeiterautonomie zur Multitude. Geschichte und*

- Gegenwart, Theorie und Praxis. Eine Einführung*. Stuttgart: Schmetterling.
 Bologna, S., Rawick, G. P., Gobbini, M., Negri, A., Ferrari Bravo, L., & Gambino, F. (1972) *Operai e stato. Lotte operaie e riforme capitalistiche tra Rivoluzione d'Ottobre e New Deal*. Milan: Feltrinelli.
 Borio, G., Pozzi, F., & Roggero, L. (Eds.) (2005) *Gli operaisti*. Rome: DeriveApprodi.
 Ferrari Bravo, L. (2001) *Dal fordismo alla globalizzazione*. Rome: Manifestolibri.
 Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2000) *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
 Hardt, M. & Virno, P. (Eds.) (2006) *Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
 Lothringer, S. & Marazzi, C. (Eds.) (2007) *Autonomia: Post-Political Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Semiotext(e).
 Milani, F. & Tratta, G. (Eds.) (2008) *L'operaismo degli anni Sessanta. Dai "Quaderni rossi" a "Classe operaia"*. Rome: DeriveApprodi.
 Negri, A. (1979/2007) *Dall'operaio massa all'operaio sociale. Intervista sull'operaismo*. Verona: ombre corte.
 Tronti, M. (1966/1971) *Operai e capitale*, 2nd enlarged ed. Turin: Einaudi.
 Virno, P. (2004) *A Grammar of the Multitude*. Cambridge, MA: Semiotext(e).
 Wright, R. (2002) *Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism*. London: Pluto Press.

Italy, peasant movements, 19th–20th centuries

Max Henninger

The pre-capitalist subsistence agriculture of traditional peasant societies was largely eliminated in Italy within the first decades of the nineteenth century. At Italian unification, small property in land and sharecropping (*mezzadria*) were to be found in Piedmont, Lombardy-Veneto, the Papal States, and Tuscany; the latifundia of Latium, Naples, and Sicily employed landless agricultural workers (*braccianti*). Closer in some ways to urban proletarians than to traditional peasants with their family-based subsistence economy, the *braccianti* gradually became modern Italy’s typical agricultural workers, and the driving force behind much rural unrest. By the turn of the century the agricultural strike had largely replaced tax boycotts and food riots as the dominant form of collective action in rural areas.

The years 1845–7 brought poor harvests and high bread prices. As food riots erupted in most cities, peasant bands outside Milan attacked grain convoys. Land was occupied throughout Italy, as would be done repeatedly during the next two decades (notably in Calabria between 1850 and 1853). The occupiers typically demanded the redistribution of lands formerly held in common. Other practices observed in rural areas during the 1848 revolutions included the destruction of tax and land records and the burning of private woods. Sicily was the heartland of rural unrest during the 1850s; hostility was often directed at the *gabellotti* (estate administrators employed by landlords). A rural food riot occurred in Arona (Lombardy) in 1853. An April 1860 insurrection in Palermo prompted tax boycotts and attacks on mills in the countryside; the attacks on mills were a response to the imposition of a milling tax (*macinato*). In July 1860 the restoration of enclosed commons was demanded at assemblies in Matera. Landlords were successfully pressured to redistribute land.

Millenarian peasant movements were active during the 1870s, notably the movement of Davide Lazzaretti in Tuscany. Yet most rural unrest during the period was of a secular nature. *Braccianti* organized agricultural strikes in Lombardy in 1875. Similar strikes occurred in the Po Valley during the 1880s, usually within the context of industrial conflicts. An 1884 organizational effort by Mantovano peasants, the founding of the Mutual Aid Society of Peasants, was responded to with mass arrests by the authorities, although the peasants' resources were sufficient for staging, in April 1885, a major strike that spread to the Milan and Cremona provinces (*La Boje* revolt). Romagna rice workers went on strike in 1888 and 1889. In 1890 rice workers in Conselice (Ravenna province) marched to the local municipal building alongside unemployed *braccianti*; three demonstrators were shot.

The 1890s brought numerous agricultural strikes, tax boycotts, and land occupations, mainly in Sicily. In 1893 several hundred peasants took to hoeing formerly common land near Catavuturo, prompting repression that left 11 dead. The massacre led many *braccianti* to join the Sicilian *fasci*, autonomous political organizations with a republican and socialist program. *Fasci* were founded in several Sicilian cities in the early 1890s; agitation against Sicily's landowners was common during their demonstrations. A

regional congress of Sicilian *fasci* was held in Palermo in May 1893. By 1894 the *fasci* had largely been crushed by police repression. Popular unrest continued during the rest of the decade, partly due to the rise in bread prices that followed the poor grain harvest of 1897. The Sicilian food riots of 1897 spread to central Italy in 1898.

The period between 1900 and the outbreak of World War I was one of major agricultural strikes in various parts of Italy: in Apulia and Sardinia between 1901 and 1906, in Parma province in 1908, and in the Po Valley between 1910 and 1913. The period from 1919 to 1921 brought a wave of land occupations in southern Italy, but also in Latium in central Italy. They occurred against a backdrop of general working-class restiveness. Peasant demonstrations and strikes returned with a vengeance after World War II, particularly in southern Italy from 1949 to 1950. In March 1950 some 10,000 to 12,000 *braccianti* squatters seized uncultivated land outside Messina, in Sicily. Raniero Panzieri, soon to become an influential theorist of the *operaista* current of Marxism, participated in the squat and helped create a consensus, within the left, that land reform was essential.

The population of the *barbagia* in central Sardinia are a case unto themselves. They constitute a genuine peasant society, excepting those living as semi-nomadic shepherds. Sardinia's peasants have cultivated a subsistence economy based on communal land ownership and periodic repartition of land until well into the twentieth century. The nineteenth-century Sardinian resistance to enclosure took the form of land invasions, organized attacks on landowners, and storming of municipal offices (with subsequent burning of property and tax records). As "primitive rebels," Sardinian peasants in the *barbagia* also engaged in banditry (*banditismo*) throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The practice peaked in the late nineteenth century, but resurged in the 1960s. Armed confrontations between *barbagia* inhabitants and the police were common during the mid-1960s. In 1969 attempts to convert the town of Orgosolo's commons, the *pratobello*, into a military training ground led to the commons being squatted, with support from the student left. At the time, Milan-based Marxist Giangiacomo Feltrinelli believed the *barbagia* bandits might form a guerrilla army akin to those active in Latin America.

SEE ALSO: Food Riots; Italian Risorgimento; Italy, from the Anti-Fascist Resistance to the New Left (1945–1960)

References and Suggested Readings

- Ginsborg, P. (1974) Peasants and Revolutionaries in Venice and the Veneto, 1848. *Historical Journal* 17: 503–50.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1959) *Primitive Rebels*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Pirastu, I. (1973) *Il banditismo in Sardegna*. Rome: Editori Riuniti.
- Romano, S. F. (1959) *Storia dei Fasci siciliani*. Bari: Laterza.
- Soldani, S. (1973) Contadini, operai e ‘popolo’ nella Rivoluzione del 1848–49 in Italia. *Studi storici* 14: 557–613.
- Tarrow, S. (1967) *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tilly, C., Tilly, L., & Tilly, R. (1975) *The Rebellious Century 1830–1930*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Italy, 17th-century revolts in the south

Nicole Martone and Eric Martone

During the early modern period, the Italian peninsula remained divided and experienced frequent invasions from various foreign powers, which exercised control over parts of the peninsula. Often, such foreign occupation was met with fierce resistance by the Italian people, resulting in numerous insurrections in the pursuit of freedom. Furthermore, while the northern Italian peninsula remained, for the most part, independent of foreign domination and emerged as a cultural center during the Renaissance, the southern Italian peninsula was exploited by foreign powers. The result was sharp social divisions and uneven development among the peoples of Italy.

In the seventeenth century, the southern Italian regions of Sicily and Naples remained under foreign occupation by Spain. Spain, which had territories throughout Europe, was engaged in frequent wars during the seventeenth century, including the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48), and war with the Netherlands (1621–48) and France (1635–59). In order to finance these wars, Spain increased taxation and borrowing, placing an enormous burden on its

territories. This pressing burden, when exacerbated by other facts (such as poor harvests), led to several rebellions in southern Italy.

Sicily, which usually was a grain exporter, had a poor harvest in 1647 that resulted in massive inflation in the cost of bread. Food riots broke out in May in Palermo, the island’s largest city, focusing popular discontent on the local elites who continued to have food despite the increase in prices. Giuseppe d’Alesio, an advocate of civic republicanism, emerged as the leader of the protesters. The Spanish viceroy, lacking the forces necessary to suppress the rebellion, turned Palermo over to d’Alesio; however, once in control, the rebels soon turned on each other, resulting in d’Alesio’s murder. Property owners, fearful for their land, rallied to support the Spanish viceroy in an attempt to restore order. The rebellion was suppressed by September 1647.

In July of 1647, a rebellion also broke out in Naples. The Spanish had relied on the Neapolitan nobility to maintain control over Naples; however, the local nobility abused its privileges and manipulated the judicial system to its benefit. Popular dissatisfaction with the rule of the landowning aristocracy and perceived injustices on the part of government exacerbated existing tensions. Finally, in July, a new tax on the sale of fruit sparked massive resistance. Rebels protested against existing conditions, assaulting tax collectors, nobles, and other figures symbolic of oppression. The Spanish garrison was also attacked. The first leader of the rebellion was Tommaso Aniello (ca. 1622–47), a fishmonger who became known by his nickname “Masaniello.” Shortly after the seizure of the Spanish garrison, Masaniello was murdered.

The rebellion spread to the countryside. As it spread, the rebels became more brazen in their demands, calling for the abolition of taxation and reforms to the administration to reduce the political power of the nobility. The rebels, under the leadership of Gennaro Annese, a blacksmith, proclaimed Naples a republic. In an effort to secure French aid against the Spanish, the rebels cited the Duke of Guise as the new head of the republic. In October, Spain sent a fleet of ships to restore order. The rebels’ petition for French aid was in vain. Finally, in April 1648, Spain appointed a new viceroy and sent troops. The rebels returned control of the Spanish garrison upon promises to remove taxes on food

and to grant amnesty to all the rebels. Shortly thereafter, the Neapolitan nobles resumed control over local administration. Following the rebellion, Spain was wary of imposing new taxes, leaving Naples deprived of the revenues necessary to maintain its administration. The economic crisis in Naples continued to deteriorate after the reoccurrence of the plague in 1656.

In 1674, Sicily witnessed yet another rebellion. A group of unsatisfied oligarchs in Messina rebelled against Spain by appealing to France for aid against the popular party, Merli, a coalition encouraged by Spain to undermine the influence of the local elites. France initially sent assistance, only to abruptly rescind its support in 1678, leaving the rebels to face severe reprisals from the Spanish.

With the end of Spanish domination, southern Italy emerged as an intellectual center. A separate branch of the French royal family, the Bourbons, became rulers of Spain. Enlightenment ideas from France spread to Italy, gradually introducing political reforms. The new spirit of the age led many members of the upper middle class to inquire about society and the natural order, paving the way for the entrance of the French Revolution and the changes it would cause to the Italian peninsula.

SEE ALSO: Food Riots; French Revolution, Historians' Interpretations; Italian Risorgimento

References and Suggested Readings

- Cohn, S. K. (2000) *Creating the Florentine State: Peasants and Rebellion, 1348–1434*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dumas, A. (1888) *Masaniello, or the Fisherman of Naples*. New York: George Munro.
- Epstein, S. R. (1992) *An Island for Itself: Economic Development and Social Change in Late Medieval Sicily*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Marino, J. (Ed.) (2002) *Early Modern Italy: 1550–1796*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Villari, R. (1993) *The Revolt of Naples*. Trans. J. Newell. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Itō Noe (1895–1923)

David G. Nelson

Born to a family of landed aristocracy on the southern island of Kyushu, Itō Noe would be forced into an arranged marriage after graduating from Ueno Girls High School. In protest

she ran away to Tokyo where she would become a feminist anarchist seeking to break with the social conditions of Japan. In Tokyo she joined the Seitoshu (Blue Stocking Society) and in 1915 became an editor of its magazine, *Seito* (Blue Stocking). This gave Itō the opportunity to develop her literary, aesthetic, and political capabilities. Skilled in several languages, including English, she translated articles by the anarchist Emma Goldman.

In 1916 Itō met Ōsugi Sakae, a prominent anarchist, and abandoned the journal to assist Ōsugi with his writings and political activism. As a couple, Itō and Ōsugi believed in the concepts of free love, which allowed Ōsugi to conduct an affair with fellow woman anarchist Ichiko Kamachiko. However, the concepts of free love soon collided with human nature as Kamachika stabbed and severely wounded Ōsugi with a knife in a fit of jealousy. The mass media used this incident to attack Itō, Ōsugi, and Kamachika for their immorality and the anarchist movement in general. Because of this bad publicity, several prominent members of the anarchist movement split from Itō and Ōsugi.

In 1919 Itō and Ōsugi, along with fellow anarchists Wada Kyutaro and Kondo Kenji, published the first *Rodo Undo* (Labor Movement) magazine, seeking to form a coalition between the anarchist movement and the industrial working class. In 1921 Itō was also instrumental in the helping to form Japan's first socialist women's group, Sekirankai (Red Wave Society). Believing that this couple was a threat to domestic tranquility, the Imperial Police kept them under constant surveillance. In the aftermath of the 1923 Tokyo earthquake many fires broke out and more people were killed by these than by the quake. Soon after, may rumors, perhaps encouraged by the authorities, began to spread that various "unpopular" anarchist groups were responsible for starting fires. As a result, mobs attacked many immigrant Korean and Chinese workers, and the police began gathering and arresting several political activists, among them Itō and Ōsugi. They were taken into custody and were beaten and strangled in the cells of the secret police. For a long time, Ōsugi had been number one on a death list circulated by the secret police, so when a secret policeman, Amakasu Masahiko, was later found guilty of the murder, on orders from Emperor Hirohito, there was little surprise. Amakasu was given a ten-year

prison sentence and was later released by personal order of Hirohito and assigned to special duties in Manchuria. In 1945 he committed suicide before his crimes could be avenged by the many anarchists after his blood.

British activist Bertrand Russell would recall, in his autobiography, the first time he met Itō Noe in Japan in 1921. “She was young and beautiful . . . Dora [Bertrand Russell’s wife] said to her: ‘Are you not afraid that the authorities will do something to you?’ She drew her hand across her throat, and said, ‘I know they will sooner or later.’”

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Gender; Anarchism, Japan; Goldman, Emma (1869–1940); Ōsugi Sakae (1885–1923)

References and Suggested Readings

- Buckley, S. (1997) *Broken Silence: Voices of Japanese Feminism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ide, F. (2000) *Jiyū sorewa watakushi jishin: hyōden Itō Noe* (Liberty is Found Within Myself: A Critical Biography of Itō Noe). Tokyo: Pandora.
- Sievers, S. L. (1983) *Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern Japan*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

J

Jabotinsky, Vladimir (Ze'ev) (1880–1940) and revisionist Zionism

Lawrence Davidson

Vladimir Jabotinsky was born in Odessa, Russia, on October 18, 1880 into a middle-class family with an intellectual and internationalist outlook. He had a secular education and, while still in high school, developed an interest in journalism. Following graduation he got a job as the European correspondent for several Russian newspapers and traveled in that capacity to Bern in Switzerland and Rome in Italy. While in Rome he also took up the study of law.

Jabotinsky was pushed toward the ideology of Zionism, as well as the need for organized self-defense throughout the diaspora, by the 1903 pogrom against the Jews of Kishinev in Russia. He took it upon himself to organize armed self-defense units in the Jewish communities of Russia, while encouraging as many Jews as possible to immigrate to Palestine. It was also at this time that he taught himself modern Hebrew and took on the Hebrew name of Ze'ev (wolf).

When World War I broke out, and the Ottoman empire joined the struggle on the side of the Central Powers, Jabotinsky sensed that this was a historical moment that might lead to a Jewish Palestine. Thus, he urged the World Zionist Organization (WZO) to ally with the British empire and form a Jewish Legion to fight alongside the British forces moving into Palestine. He was somewhat successful, as the British did eventually create a small number of Jewish units. Jabotinsky enlisted in this effort, rose to the rank of lieutenant, and saw combat in Palestine.

After World War I, Jabotinsky became increasingly impatient with the gradualist approach of the WZO leadership. He wanted an immediate declaration of a Jewish state and the preparation

for war, if necessary, to achieve this end. He repeated his efforts at organizing military units, but this time among the Jewish communities in Palestine. Many of these engaged in spiraling acts of violence with the Arab resistance that developed to both British postwar occupation and Zionist immigration.

In 1925 Jabotinsky broke with the WZO and formed his own political organization, the Union of Zionists-Revisionists, which called for the immediate establishment of a Jewish state in all of historical Palestine, including what is now Jordan. To this organization he appended two others, the youth movement Betar, which he had established in 1923 to inculcate Jewish youth with a nationalistic and military spirit, and later, in 1937, the Irgun Tzvai Leumi, the military arm of the revisionist movement. The Irgun was destined to fight against both the British and Arabs in Palestine and would use terror tactics in doing so.

As World War II approached, Jabotinsky took it upon himself to tour Eastern Europe to warn the Jews, particularly those in Poland, that they faced approaching disaster. In this he was quite prescient. He even drew up plans for the evacuation of all Jews from Poland, the Ukraine, Hungary, and Romania to Palestine, and negotiated with these governments to this end. The British, who controlled Palestine, vetoed the plan.

Jabotinsky assumed that a Jewish state in Palestine would necessitate a war with the Arabs. Yet once the war was won and the state established, he stated that he was quite willing to see the Arabs living in the Jewish state “participate on an equal footing throughout all sectors of the country’s public life.” Jabotinsky died of a heart attack while visiting a Betar youth camp in New York in 1940. His revisionist movement did not achieve power in Israel until the electoral victory of Menachem Begin’s Likud Party (a successor of the revisionist movement) in 1977.

SEE ALSO: Begin, Menachem (1913–1992) and the Irgun; Zionism

References and Suggested Readings

- Brenner, L. (1984) *The Iron Wall: Zionist Revisionism from Jabotinsky to Shamir*. Plymouth: Zed Books.
- Katz, S. (1996) *The Lone Wolf: A Biography of Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky*. Fort Lee, NJ: Barricade Books.
- Medoff, R. (2006) *Militant Zionism in America: The Rise and Impact of the Jabotinsky Movement in the United States, 1926–1948*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Sarig, M. (Ed.) (1999) *The Political and Social Philosophy of Ze'ev Jabotinsky: Selected Writing*. Edgware: Mitchell Vallentine.
- Schechtman, J. (1961) *Fighter and Prophet: The Jabotinsky Story. The Last Years*. New York: Thomas Yoseloff.

Jackson, Jesse (b. 1941)

Yusuf Nuruddin

Born on October 4, 1941, Jesse Jackson was a leading US civil rights activist and leader, human rights sponsor, international mediator, and populist presidential candidate from the 1960s to the early twenty-first century. Jackson, a controversial and charismatic figure, rose from humble origins to become the most influential African American civil rights leader in the post-Martin Luther King era.

Jesse Louis Jackson was born Jesse Louis Burns in Greenville, South Carolina, to Helen Burns, a 16-year-old impoverished, unwed mother. His biological father, Noah Robinson, was Burns's next-door neighbor, a married middle-class black man. His mother later married Charles Jackson, who eventually legally adopted Jesse, but he was actually raised by his maternal grandmother.

Jackson initially attended the University of Illinois on a football scholarship (1959) but transferred the following year to North Carolina A&T, where he met his future wife, Jacqueline, whose enthusiastic talk of Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution unnerved the somewhat conservative Jackson. She would challenge Jackson's political beliefs throughout their courtship and married life, constantly radicalizing him, pushing him in later life, for example, to meet with PLO representative Yasser Arafat and Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan. Other motivating influences in his life included the college class-

mates who drafted the cautiously apolitical Jackson to be a spokesperson for sit-in demonstrations in Greensboro, North Carolina. This was his initial foray into the activism that was to be his life's calling.

Earning a bachelor's degree in 1964, Jackson attended Chicago Theological Seminary from 1964 to 1966, but he ended up dropping out for full-time work in the civil rights movement after participating in the 1965 Selma to Montgomery march with King. He was ordained as a minister without a theological degree in 1968, receiving an honorary doctorate from the Seminary in 2000. In 1966, King selected Jackson to head the Chicago office of Operation Breadbasket – the economic development program of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) – and promoted him to national director of this program in 1967. A major focus of Operation Breadbasket was a “selective buying” campaign, which included the boycotting of businesses that did not hire minorities or purchase from minority vendors.

On April 4, 1968, Jackson was with the coterie of SCLC leaders at the Lorraine Hotel in Memphis when King was assassinated. Jackson attempted to inherit King's mantle of leadership, clashing with the low-key Ralph Abernathy, who had been King's second in command in the SCLC. Their dispute was irreconcilable. Jackson resigned under pressure from Operation Breadbasket and in 1971 founded a similar organization, People United to Save Humanity (Operation PUSH). PUSH became involved in economic empowerment through the development of the black bourgeoisie and employment of black workers while promoting educational achievement for urban youth through a program called PUSH/Excel.

In the 1980s, Jackson entered the arena of electoral politics, first locally and then nationally. He organized 100,000 new voters during a 1983 Chicago voter registration campaign, thereby ensuring the victory of Harold Washington as the city's first black mayor. During the same year, he was encouraged to seek the highest national office himself, and the slogan “run, Jesse, run” became a chorus in the black community. His first international diplomatic intervention, a trip to Syria resulting in the release of a captured black American pilot, gave his 1984 presidential campaign an enormous boost, but this was counterbalanced by his anti-Semitic remark that New

York City was “Hymietown,” which cost him the Jewish vote and the loss of the New York Democratic primary.

His candidacy broke racial barriers and resonated among the many marginalized, powerless, disenfranchised, and left-of-center groups. Jackson, who in his former capacity as director of Operations PUSH and Breadbasket was an advocate of black capitalism, was influenced by the policy advisors of his various constituencies – militant trade unionists, feminists, gay rights activists, farmers’ groups, peace and anti-nuclear activists – to adopt a radical social democratic platform. He garnered 80 to 90 percent of the nationwide black vote – despite the lack of support from black establishment politicians – and won convincing victories in Louisiana, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, and second place showings in Arkansas, Mississippi, and South Carolina. All in all, he yielded over three million votes and 384 delegates.

Organizing his dispossessed supporters into a Rainbow Coalition, Jackson ran again in 1988, this time with an even more impressive showing. Winning five states on Super Tuesday, and temporarily toppling Michael Dukakis, the Democratic front-runner in Michigan, Jackson ultimately gained some seven million votes and won 1,200 convention delegates, to come in second after Dukakis in the Democratic primaries.

Jackson’s post-presidential election activities have included international mediation in hostage crises, leadership in the anti-war and anti-apartheid movements, and election to a non-salaried post in Washington, DC to lobby Congress for the right of the District of Columbia to elect a senator.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)

References and Suggested Readings

- Barker, L. J. & Walters, R. W. (1989) *Jesse Jackson’s 1984 Presidential Campaign: Challenge and Change in American Politics*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Collins, S. D. (1986) *The Rainbow Challenge: The Jackson Campaign and the Future of US Politics*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Frady, M. (1996) *Jesse: The Life and Pilgrimage of Jesse Jackson*. New York: Random House.

Jacobite risings, Britain, 1715 and 1745

Kieran German

The Jacobite risings of 1715 and 1745 were major uprisings that seriously challenged the Hanoverian regime in Great Britain. Their aim was the restoration of the royal House of Stuart to the thrones of England, Ireland, and Scotland. As well as immediate Irish and Scottish resistance to the “Glorious” Revolution, other Jacobite attempts occurred in 1708 and 1719, although these were relatively unconvincing. Jacobitism sustained itself as an ideological movement in Britain until the death of Charles Edward Stuart (aka Charles III, aka the Young Pretender) in 1788. As a militant movement it remained a sporadic cause in England until 1716, but in Scotland motive and organization sustained it into the late 1720s, and it resurfaced again in 1745. While Jacobitism represented a dynastic alternative to the monarchies of William III & II, Queen Anne, and subsequently the House of Hanover, it became a vehicle for other causes, which included confessional disenchantment, the movement for Scottish parliamentary independence, and the private fortunes of out-of-favor politicians. Jacobitism was also a powerful tool in European statecraft, and the Jacobite cause was occasionally adopted as an expedience by rivals to Britain.

The Jacobite rising of 1715 (the ’15) was a major domestic uprising which tested the stability of the Hanoverian government of the United Kingdom. Upon ascending the throne in 1714, George I dismissed the Tory ministry and formed a new government of Whigs. With monarchical backing, the Whigs also won the election of 1715, thus achieving a monopoly of power. Leading Tories, most notably James Butler, 2nd Duke of Ormond, Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, and John Erskine, 6th Earl of Mar, became convinced that the revival of their fortunes could only be achieved by restoring the Stuarts. Foreign intervention was courted to coincide with uprising in the West of England. The Jacobite leadership also had high expectations that Catholics in the North of the country would contribute significantly and that the Scots would too. However, the chief Jacobite conspirator, Bolingbroke, entered exile when the Whig

ministry launched impeachment proceedings against him and his Tory ministerial colleagues. Ormond likewise fled, abandoning the rising in western England, which subsequently floundered.

The English Jacobites, mindful of the strong personal relationship between James II & VII and Louis XIV, had high expectations of French support. In reality, the only Jacobite at the French court with any significant status was James Fitzjames, Duke of Berwick; James Francis Edward Stuart (James III & VIII, aka the Old Pretender) was resident in Lorraine, having been sidelined by the Treaty of Utrecht (1711), which had concluded the War of the Spanish Succession. The French government was not prepared openly to breach the treaty and reopen hostilities. Nevertheless, Louis and his government saw advantage in the Jacobite crisis hitting Britain and, intent upon benefiting whatever the outcome, provided surreptitious support for James. Spain provided financial support and, while interested, Sweden was too embroiled in the Great Northern War to provide assistance.

In the end it was the Scottish Jacobites who formed the brunt of the Jacobite army. Opposition to the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707 was a major contributory factor. The uprising was run on a mandate that a Scottish parliament would be called by the restored James VIII.

Scots Episcopacy also provided an important Jacobite motive. The Episcopal Church was institutionally Jacobite, on account of which it had been disestablished in 1689 and subjected to penal laws. The Union of 1707 reasserted the Presbyterian Church government in Scotland, but Scots Episcopacy had persevered as an ideological force in the North of Scotland and engaged in Jacobite activity with the clear aims of a Stuart restoration, reestablishment of the Episcopate, and the dissolution of the Union. Indeed, Episcopalian regions were the most significant areas of Jacobite recruitment in the '15.

The rising in Scotland was led by John Erskine, 6th Earl of Mar. Like his English colleagues, Mar was a former Tory secretary of state facing Whig charges of ministerial misconduct. Without an official commission from the Jacobite court, he succeeded in convincing influential Highland clan leaders and Lowland nobility and heritors to raise their men. With little resistance, the Jacobites took control of a string of northeast coastal towns and based their army at Perth. In Aberdeen they proved competent in assuming and

administering local government. But they failed to hold Inverness and were unable to take control of Edinburgh, Glasgow, or Stirling. Thus Mar, an experienced politician but no military general, failed to consolidate his advantage in Scotland. John Campbell, 2nd Duke of Argyll, the commander-in-chief of government forces in Scotland, was a veteran of Marlborough's campaigns in the Low Countries. He skillfully and repeatedly outmaneuvered his hesitant opponent. Argyll's force sustained significant casualties at the Battle of Sheriffmuir (November 13, 1715), but lost no ground to Mar's larger, albeit disorganized, army.

In England the insurrection failed to materialize except in the North, where it was energized by the Catholic community. Though relatively organized, they had to be reinforced by a force of Scots, led by William Mackintosh of Borlum. They were cornered in Preston on the same day as Sheriffmuir, and, rather than take the fight to the government, they surrendered (to the fury of their Scottish comrades). By the time James arrived in the North of Scotland in December of 1715 the war was lost.

The Jacobite armies which fought at Sheriffmuir and Preston together numbered 14,000 Scots and 1,000 English. Considering army turnover, it is more likely that the Scots serving, at one point or another, in the Jacobite army actually reached as high as 20,000. This number is considerable; the ceiling of Scottish recruitment in the eighteenth century is estimated to have been 25,000. The size of the army compared favorably with the Scottish Jacobite army of 1690, which numbered between 2,000 and 5,000.

While historiographical tradition has painted a different picture, less than half of the Scots Jacobite recruits were Highlanders. The majority came from the Scottish Lowlands, particularly the Northeast, and a significant number were from urban areas. The government army was augmented by up to 6,000 Dutch and Swiss mercenaries. Nevertheless, in total, 10,000 Scots served in the government army.

Following the failure of the uprising, the government trod a path of authority and clemency. Transportation was the preferred means of punishment; by and large, capital punishment was exemplary. The government provoked anger among the Scottish establishment by attempting to try Scottish prisoners by English law. Mass forfeiture of property was initiated, which the

well-affected Scottish establishment sought (and often succeeded) to frustrate. Thus, the property and livelihood of many Scottish Jacobites were preserved in a manner which placed a burden of honor on individual Jacobites to their patrons. It has been argued that this, rather than the government's policies, harnessed Scottish Jacobitism for a generation.

The historical and cultural legacy of the '45 is far greater than that of the '15. However, as an uprising, it was of a smaller scale and its imperatives were less explicit. By the 1730s the putative Jacobite generals in exile had actively begun to campaign against the movement as a military endeavor. A French-sponsored invasion of Britain in 1744 miscarried. Nevertheless, on his own initiative, in 1745 the Jacobite Prince of Wales, Charles Edward Stuart, arrived on the northwest coast of Scotland without an army, with little money, and with false promises of foreign support. He slowly generated an army and went on to record extraordinary success in Scotland, defeating the government army at Prestonpans and assuming control of Edinburgh and, effectively, the administration of Scotland.

Rather than press its advantage in Scotland, the Jacobite army marched towards London in the winter of 1745/6. It failed to pick up further recruits in England and suffered mass desertion. Charles lost the confidence of his council of war and, despite the proximity of London, the Jacobites turned back at Derby. The army retreated deep into Northern Scotland. Outside Inverness on April 16, 1746, the government army finally caught up with the Jacobites and overwhelmingly defeated them at the Battle of Culloden. The Jacobite failure was brought about by the collapse of its leadership, and in particular the exclusion of General Lord George Murray from key decisions. Though some troops mustered at Ruthven in the aftermath, Charles lost heart, disbanded the army, and fled.

In 1745/6 the Jacobites mustered the support of fewer Highland clans than in 1715. At the most, they raised 12,000 men and never numbered more than 9,000 at once, a significant drop compared to 1715. Recruitment to the Jacobite army relied heavily on both the Highlands and the Northeast Lowlands of Scotland. Lowlanders may have outnumbered Highlanders in recruits, but clansmen formed the majority of actual fighting forces. At the Battle of Culloden, 67 percent of the Jacobite army was Highland.

The popular image of the '45 as a Highland endeavor can be undercut. First, Highland clans had gravitated toward military neutrality by 1745 and, in the case of the Black Watch Regiment, support went to the highest bidder. More cynically, impressment, into both government and Jacobite armies, was also recorded among the Highland clans. On the contrary, impressment was notoriously difficult to achieve in the Lowlands, especially the towns; thus, the Jacobite success there reflects voluntary enlistment.

The association between Episcopacy and Jacobite recruitment testifies, again, that the continuing loyalty of Scots Episcopalians to the Stuarts remained compelling. So, too, does the fallout: meeting houses across the Episcopalian heartlands were systematically razed to the ground in the aftermath of the uprising and strict penal laws were instituted to disrupt their services and eventually render the diminution of the church. It was not until the death of Charles Edward, in 1788, that the Episcopal Church was able to reconcile itself to Hanoverian monarchy and initiate a process of recovery.

The response of the British government to the Jacobite rising was considerably less clement than after the '15 and the clans found themselves on the frontline. Government policy in the aftermath of the battle was disproportionate to the threat. Massacre extended beyond the battlefield, has been described as "state terrorism" on the brink of "ethnic cleansing," and was designed to wipe out Jacobite sensibility once and for all (Macinnes 1996: 211). In the rout, the distinction between Jacobite clansman and loyal Highlander was not made. Propaganda, which served as justification for the atrocities, conflated Scottish and Highland culture with barbarism, irrespective of actual Jacobite commitment. That notwithstanding, the government pursued both military and legislative means to assume the loyalty and duty of clansmen in the aftermath of the '45 and integrate the valuable manpower of clanship into the British imperial project.

SEE ALSO: Counterrevolution; English Revolution, 17th Century; Glencoe Massacre, 1692; Glorious Revolution, Britain, 1688; Scottish Reformation

References and Suggested Readings

- Ó Ciardha, É. (2002) *Ireland and the Jacobite Cause, 1685–1766*. Dublin: Four Courts Press.
- Macinnes, A. I. (1996) *Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603–1788*. East Linton: Tuckwell Press.

- Monod, P. K. (1989) *Jacobitism and the English People, 1688–1788*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Monod, P. K., Pittock, M. G. H., & Szechi, D. (Eds.) (2009) *Loyalty and Identity: Jacobites at Home and Abroad*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pittock, M. G. H. (2009) *The Myth of the Jacobite Clans: The Jacobite Army in 1745*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Sankey, M. (2005) *Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion: Preventing and Punishing Insurrection in Early Hanoverian Britain*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Press.
- Szechi, D. (2006) *1715: The Great Jacobite Rebellion*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Jagan, Cheddi (1918–1997)

Perry Mars

Cheddi Jagan was a revolutionary in the Guyanese anti-colonial movement, primary opponent of imperialism, and advocate of social equality who helped guide the country to independence. Born and raised on a sugar plantation in Port Maurant, Guyana, Jagan was admitted at the age of 15 to Queens College, the most prestigious secondary educational institution in Guyana at the time. Upon completion of high school Jagan left for the United States to study dentistry, first at Howard University in Washington, DC, and subsequently at Northwestern University in Chicago. During Jagan's studies in the US, he was attracted to Marxism and socialism. There also he met his wife Janet, whose own leftist political orientation reinforced his radical beliefs and commitment.

Jagan, along with his new wife, returned to Guyana upon graduating in dentistry, and plunged directly into the national political arena. He won a seat in the Guyana parliament in 1947. The Enmore Riots of 1948, when striking sugar workers on a plantation were shot and killed by the colonial police, propelled Jagan to a lifelong commitment to revolutionary struggle for the total emancipation and elevation of the Guyanese working classes.

By 1946, Cheddi and Janet Jagan, along with several Guyanese professionals and intellectuals (including Ashton Chase and Jocelyn Hubbard), formed a pro-Marxist political pressure group called the Political Affairs Committee (PAC), an embryonic organization that in 1950 formed the

basis of the People's Progressive Party (PPP) with a more radical mass-based political agenda. In 1953, the PPP under Jagan won the first national election under universal suffrage by a landslide. However, this victory was shortlived as the British swiftly suspended the new constitution, dismissing from office what they perceived as a communist government in their colony, incarcerating PPP leaders including Cheddi and Janet Jagan, and by 1955 engineering an ideological-racial split in the party.

Consequent political and ethnic conflicts violently manifested themselves from 1962 and 1964, involving British military and US (CIA) covert interventions. The result was a legacy of seemingly irreparable racial-ethnic polarization along partisan political lines, with East Indians overwhelmingly supporting Jagan's PPP, and Afro-Guyanese adhering to the rival People's National Congress (PNC) headed by Forbes Burnham. Jagan's party was eventually defeated at the polls in 1964 conducted under the newly introduced proportional representation (PR) system, leading a rival coalition led by the PNC into power. The 1964 electoral defeat relegated Jagan and PPP into political oblivion for 28 years, since national elections were rigged in favor of the PNC between 1968 and 1992.

During this "wilderness" period Jagan worked closely with other opposition forces, particularly the Working People's Alliance (WPA) and Patriotic Coalition for Democracy (PCD), with the objective of restoring free and fair elections in Guyana. In 1992, as collective opposition to one-party rule mounted with the support of high-profile US and foreign appeals, internationally supervised elections were held, and Jagan and the PPP were returned to power.

However, almost immediately, Jagan and the PPP were forced to embrace neoliberal reforms to ensure US and western support, leading to a significant ideological shift of the party toward the political right. Jagan adopted International Monetary Fund economic strategies inherited from the previous administration, diluting his working-class base. In addition, Jagan could not stem the rising trend of East Indian ethnic dominance within the party, which gained momentum particularly since the elections.

Yet Cheddi Jagan retained a revolutionary rhetoric and stance, reflected in his indefatigable opposition to colonialism, imperialism, and economic inequality, his unwavering support for poor

and working-class people and causes, his commitment to the political sensitization of the labor movement, and his internationalism reflected in his consistent support for Cuba and the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War. Just before his death in March 1997, Cheddi Jagan, in keeping with his concern for the human condition, crafted a very sensitive conceptualization of what he termed the “New Global Human Order” to promote the alleviation of poverty and human suffering throughout the world.

SEE ALSO: Castro, Fidel (b. 1926); Guyana, Protests and Revolts; Manley, Michael (1924–1997); Rodney, Walter (1942–1980)

References and Suggested Readings

- Jagan, C. & Jagan, J. (1999) *New Global Human Order*. Milton, Ontario: Harpy.
- Mars, P. & Young, A. H. (2004) *Caribbean Labor and Politics: Legacies of Cheddi Jagan and Michael Manley*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Rabe, S. (2005) *US Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Jalib, Habib (1928–1993)

Farooq Sulehria

Known as the People’s Poet, Habib Jalib signifies struggle for democracy, socialism, secularism, peace, and human and women’s rights in Pakistan. Born in 1928 at Miani, an Afghan village in Hoshiarpur district, Punjab (now in India), Jalib witnessed extreme poverty as his father, a shoemaker, was hardly able to make ends meet. His parents, however, were ambitious regarding the education of their children. In 1943 the family moved to Delhi, which for centuries has been the political and cultural center of the Indian subcontinent. Young Jalib was greatly influenced by Delhi’s literary atmosphere through his elder brother Mushtaq Mubarak. In Delhi Jalib’s father managed to establish himself as a small trader, and the family experienced relative prosperity. This financial comfort proved short-lived, however, as the partition of India in 1947 forced his family to migrate to Karachi, ushering in another period of extreme poverty.

At the age of 20 Jalib often frequented *Mushairas* (public poetry recitations) and soon established himself as a poet of some repute. In

1952 he became active in the peasant movement in Sindh province, led by charismatic peasant leader Comrade Haider Bux Jatui, and joined the secular left-wing National Awami Party (NAP). Formed in the 1950s, the NAP absorbed members of the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP), which was banned in 1954. For a brief period, Jalib worked as proofreader at *Dawn*, a leading English daily in Pakistan, and the daily *Jang*, a widely circulated Urdu-language newspaper. He then moved to Faisalabad, a center of the textile industry in Pakistan, and started working at Koh-e-Noor Textile Mills.

Jalib soared to fame with his poem “Dastoor” (The Constitution), written in response to military dictator Ayub Khan’s foisting of a new anti-democratic constitution on the country in 1962; soon Jalib was reciting his poems at opposition rallies attended by thousands of people. Because of his popularity and defiant political stance, Jalib was arrested and his book of poetry, *Sar-e-Maktal*, was banned.

In 1970 Jalib ran as a candidate for the National Assembly with the NAP in the first nationwide general election in Pakistan since independence, but he lost to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) candidate. The PPP was committed to socialism, but its politics were at best social democratic and was committed foremost to Islam, while Jalib was a secular communist striving for revolution. In the end, all but one of the seats in East Pakistan went to the Awami League (AL), while the PPP retained control of the seats in West Pakistan (although not by the same large margin). AL control of the government was seen as a threat to the economic and political interests of the military, and so the convening of the new AL government was postponed with the help of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Jalib was arrested and sent to jail along with other NAP leaders when the Bhutto government dissolved the NAP governments in Balochistan and the North Western Frontier Provinces. He remained imprisoned for 14 months and was finally bailed out. With the imposition of the Zia ul Haq dictatorship in 1977 a new period of imprisonment, police torture, trumped-up charges, and harassment began for Jalib. As the democracy movement began to gather steam in 1984, Jalib once again held hundreds of thousands of people spellbound with his verses at opposition rallies, which got him arrested yet again. In total, he spent over seven years in various jails from 1952 to 1988.

With the restoration of democracy in 1988, Jalib had a relatively calm life for the first time. His passport, after 30 years of confiscation, was returned; he traveled to Moscow and European countries, but his health was failing. From 1991 he spent most of his time in hospitals and finally died on March 13, 1994.

Jalib never accepted a government award; he refused dozens of offers by various governments for economic help. He earned his living by reciting *Mushairas*, accepting meager book royalties, and composing songs for films. He remained banned on radio, television, and official *Mushairas* until 1988.

SEE ALSO: Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1911–1984); Iqbal, Muhammad (1877–1938); Pakistan, Protest and Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Asghar, T. (1993) *Jalib Beeti*. Lahore: Jang.
 Hasan, S. S. (2003) *A True People's Poet*. Available at www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv9n1/jalib.htm (accessed November 11, 2007).
 Pervez, S. (1994) *Habib Jalib, Ghar ki Gawahi*. Karachi: Danial.

Jamaica, independence movement, 1950–present

Obika Gray

Despite significant shortcomings, radical social movements in post-independence Jamaica exerted enormous influence on the island's political evolution, occasionally directing it along paths more favorable to popular needs than power holders preferred. Dissident movements accomplished this by displaying creativity in fashioning a variety of ideological challenges to power, by producing a succession of political organizations, notable personalities, and anti-status quo groups with popular appeal, and by summoning poor Afro-Jamaicans and alienated middle-class intellectuals to a common agenda. For two decades – 1960 to 1980 – this broad social movement, with its protean ideological and diverse social composition, retained an unmatched unity in challenging the authority of the state, in impugning the legitimacy of its repressive power, and undermining the cultural bases for its moral claims.

Despite the enormity and duration of this influence, however, the Jamaican social movement's hold on the popular imagination, and its capacity to subvert authority on the basis of an alternative politics and competing moral claims, dissipated and even unraveled after 1980. Faced with the defeat of left-wing regimes at home and abroad, the imposition of a neoliberal economic agenda in the region, and disillusionment with the meager gains of radical politics, the dissident social movement collapsed. It was replaced by a fearsome, but sharply different, kind of challenge to power holders – resort to nihilistic social and interpersonal violence, often led by drug and criminal gangs newly freed of political influence.

Horizontal, self-immolating violence among the alienated urban poor, and criminal gangs' predation and search for booty, displaced the ideologically driven opposition of earlier political formations. Nihilism and self-criminalization by sections of the Afro-Jamaican urban poor now became the mutant form of dissidence after 1980. In it criminal violence replaced the moral authority of traditional post-independence social movements. This displacement of ideologically motivated social movements by interpersonal and gang-related forms of violence after the 1980s had massive political consequences. That is, by exposing the Jamaican state's inability to rein in criminal violence and punish perpetrators, the agents of this kind of "protest crime" showed that they too were political actors, stirring public disaffection and increasing disgust with the seeming failure of the Jamaican state to exercise its most basic functions. Despite these calamities and a raging violence that claimed hundreds of lives each year, hesitant state-led reforms and newer, collective forms of dissent highlighted the emergence of a new consensus, this time around the twin goals of effective governance and citizen engagement.

Sources of Discontent

In a remarkable development, Jamaica's peaceful achievement of political independence in August 1962 brought with it neither social unity nor political stability. On the contrary, political independence produced social tensions, upheaval, and instability. Indeed, the occasion of the island's independence threatened both the viability of the newly won independent state and the authority of the nationalist leaders who claimed the granting

of independence as their greatest achievement. There were several reasons for this dissatisfaction.

Firstly, the postwar boom in the global economy produced uneven effects on the island. On the one hand, foreign direct investment in the island's bauxite industry and in the service sector – particularly tourism, banking and finance, and manufacturing – generated significant economic growth in the 1950s. Capital-owning groups, the local middle class, and unionized workers in the manufacturing, services, and mineral sectors, enjoyed the benefits of this development. On the other hand, growth in these sectors was not reproduced in the wider economy. That growth, paced by foreign capital, did not stimulate significant development, either in the agricultural sector, or for that matter in manufacturing, and thus remained confined mainly to bauxite and services. Consequently, most Jamaicans, including agricultural laborers, the urban working class, and especially the rural and urban unemployed, were left behind.

This marginality was particularly acute for the rural population in the 1940s and after, who began to make their way to the capital city, Kingston, and its adjacent parish of St. Andrew. Between 1943 and 1961, for example, some 173,000 persons trekked from the countryside to the city of Kingston, increasing the population in both parishes by 85 percent. These unskilled migrants lived in overcrowded tenements and shacks in the western parts of the city and became part of the permanently unemployed. Their desperate condition, in sharp contrast with the growing affluence and upward mobility of better-off classes in the city, heightened social tensions at the moment of independence.

Secondly, apart from economic factors, political and cultural strains heightened social tensions. For example, the political leadership of the anti-colonial movement that had bargained successfully for political independence on the basis of their political reliability and loyalty to the empire met the determined opposition of black cultural nationalists. The two nationalist leaders, Norman Washington Manley – the brown-skinned Oxford-trained lawyer and leader of the People's National Party – and Alexander Bustamante – the tall light-skinned labor leader and head of the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) – had emphasized shared values with Britain in the long transition to political independence between 1938 and 1962. Neither leader made appreciation for African

civilization or immediate independence a part of anti-colonial discourse, ignoring the fact that the majority of the population was of African ancestry, and that poor Afro-Jamaicans began embracing cultural nationalism in the late 1950s. This nationalism insisted, against Creole mockery, on Africa's importance to Jamaica and to global civilization. In opposition to this Jamaican Africanism, the Creole elite, led by Bustamante and Manley, muted cultural and racial differences with the British and instead summoned Jamaicans to a multi-racial nationalism that demoted black racial consciousness. This alternative summons was aptly captured in the Creole-inspired national motto: Out of Many One People. Between the 1950s and late 1960s, therefore, both verbal attacks as well as police violence against the Rastafarian community – and that group's denunciation of Creole nationalism – captured this epic clash between the two nationalisms.

Thirdly, the state's authoritarian uses of power, as well as a violent political clientelism, which distributed benefits to supporters on the basis of political loyalty, fed broad discontent against post-independence regimes in Jamaica. On the one hand, autocratic exercise of power alienated middle-class dissidents, who turned to oppositional politics. On the other, political parties' use of a violent clientelism to stifle the militancy of the urban poor also fostered popular resistance to national governments. This was so even as that clientelism favored a few political loyalists among the poor.

Blossoming of Social Movements: The Rastafarians

Unemployed members of the urban Rastafarian community led the first wave of opposition to post-independence Jamaican governments. Beginning in the late 1950s and cresting a decade later, the Rastafarian movement established the political terms for opposition to post-independence regimes. Representing a tributary of the migrant unemployed and slum-dwelling rural population in Kingston, this movement, with its religio-political appeals, frontally challenged the ideology and moral claims of the nationalist elite. Firstly, the Rastafarians criticized these leaders' right to rule. Where other Jamaicans looked to this political leadership as a guide to state and nation-building, the Rastafarians put

forward a most subversive assertion. They argued that they were not Jamaicans, and were therefore not subject to the authority of the Jamaican state and its rulers. Rather, they asserted, they were African sojourners living in exile and held in captivity in Jamaica. They therefore had only one demand of the Jamaican government: repatriation to Africa to enjoy the birthright freedom they once had on that continent. This startling demand was incomprehensible to Jamaican governments, then desperately summoning the Afro-Jamaican population to middle-class Creole multi-racial nationalism. Derision and contempt, and often assault and incarceration, therefore greeted the defiant claims of the Rastafarians.

Secondly, in sharp opposition to Creole cultural identification with Europe and to most Jamaicans' uncertainty about their cultural identity, or shame about blackness, the Rastafarians affirmed pride of race. They hailed the teachings of the late Marcus Garvey, the Jamaican black nationalist and race leader, who was long ignored and condemned by both colonial governments and the nationalist elite. The Rastafarians also grew their hair in dreadlocks and proudly proclaimed the distinctiveness and beauty of Africans' physical features even as most Afro-Jamaicans were made to feel uncomfortable with their physical appearance.

Thirdly, Rastafarian-inspired reggae music reinforced the political and cultural critique of the elite multi-racial nationalism for its rejection of the claims of black consciousness. Musicians, singers, and other popular artists inspired by Rastafarian beliefs quickly generated a new subversive musical form that achieved immediate and widespread support among poor Afro-Jamaicans. In its lyrical content, aesthetic style, and performative values, Rastafarian-inspired reggae music challenged the entire moral and ideological edifice on which Jamaican independence and progress for the new nation-state rested. Recurrent anti-Creole Rastafarian themes informed the new music, including the charge of false decolonization and the accusation that puppeteer and culturally dependent national leaders ruled the country. Early creative exponents of the new music, like the young Bob Marley, struck complementary themes that resonated with the black and militant urban poor. Early Marley songs, including the defiant "Slave Driver" and the revolution-inspiring "Small Axe," threatened powerholders' claim to legit-

imacy while reminding the black poor of the bankruptcy of national governments.

Sustained Rastafarian cultural and political defiance and the growing popularity of the group's values thus created anxieties and fed government's security concerns. The discovery of an arms cache during a police raid on the premises of a Rastafarian leader, Claudius Henry, in April 1960, and the suppression of an attempted coup by his son, Ronald, in June, heightened government fears. The urgency of these concerns thus led the Jamaican government to call for an inquiry into the origins of the movement, as well as the nature of its beliefs and its demands. Within weeks, three professors at the University of the West Indies had turned in to the government a sympathetic report on the Rastafarian movement. Among other things, the report recommended repatriation to Ethiopia for the Rastafarian brethren, proposed welfarist measures to improve their lot in Jamaica, and suggested changes in the state's repressive response to the group. For all the modesty of the academics' report and recommendations, however, the credibility and intellectual respect the report generated for the Rastafarian movement led to condemnation of both the report and the professors who had produced it. Just the same, it was clear that despite elite and respectable society's contempt for the Rastafarians, the movement would not be denied, as its ideology and appeal spread far beyond black slum-dwellers, to influence urban youth, large swaths of the urban unemployed and, stunningly, university students, the middle class, and sections of the dissident intelligentsia.

Left-Wing Grassroots Militancy: The Unemployed Workers Council

Even as Rastafarian dissidence encouraged panic within Jamaica's ruling circles, other challengers from the slums emerged with equally corrosive anti-system ideologies and practices. The Unemployed Workers Council (UWC) was one such militant social force in the slums of Kingston. Founded in March 1962 by Ben Monroe, a willful, self-assured carpenter and long-time left-wing militant in labor politics, the UWC challenged the country's divisive "party-unionism" on behalf of the mass of urban unemployed workers and of labor more generally.

With the development of Jamaica's modern trade union movement and mass political parties

after 1938, a situation unfavorable to the working class had developed. This was the notorious phenomenon of party-unionism. In it, the two dominant and competing trade unions were affiliated with the two dominant and competing political parties. Hence, unionized workers in the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) were also typically members of the JLP. The same was true of members of the National Workers Union affiliated with the People's National Party (PNP). Political unionism, therefore, meant that workers were often forced to stifle their independent interests as workers when those interests collided with the policies of the affiliated parties. Party membership and trade union membership thus did not always conform to workers' interests. Moreover, as each party favored its own supporters for unionized jobs and political spoils, competition for jobs and spoils unleashed violent party and trade union wars in which laborers engaged in destructive attacks against each other.

The UWC therefore set its face against these practices, denouncing both the union and party cartels for engaging the victimization of workers and the unemployed. UWC Leninism, its opposition to political unionism, and its affirmation of the United Nations' Charter on Human Rights – particularly Article 23 on the Right to Work – formed the core of UWC ideology and activism. At the same time, the UWC went beyond ideology critique to engage in direct action. The UWC leadership, and its cadre of unemployed workers from the slums, repeatedly laid siege to job sites all across Kingston in the early 1960s, demanding non-partisan distribution of work and an end to political unionism.

Likewise, Ben Monroe fearlessly led squatter resistance to the JLP's heedless and insensitive slum clearance policies in West Kingston in 1963. Although the UWC was unable to deter the bulldozers indefinitely, it did manage to call public attention to the plight of slum dwellers and embarrassed the JLP administration into acknowledging squatters' right to be given housing and jobs on a non-partisan basis.

Rude Boy Phenomenon and the Gangsterization of Jamaican Politics

Social defiance and moral outlawry among unemployed male youth in Kingston's slums matched desperate squatters' plaintive protests

there. Emerging in 1961, and achieving its apogee within three years, a rebellious male youth movement mounted yet another challenge to middle-class moral sway. This time the assault took the form of an inversion of moral class values. With the Creole elite acting as moral standard bearers, the majority of the respectable poor lived by the rules of Christian moral propriety. The latter therefore knew the importance of both decency and respectability in this class-and-status-conscious ex-colonial society. Not surprisingly, then, this law-abiding group sought uplift through hard work, personal sacrifice, and moral restraint. In this respect, the majority of poor Afro-Jamaicans shared much with their middle-class kin, who constantly warned the black poor against succumbing to indiscipline and moral depravity. The rebellious male youth movement in urban Jamaica wholly rejected these values, substituting instead a celebration of urban ghetto culture. Cultivation of a "cool pose" that combined emotional distance with readiness to use violence and menace against an unjust society distinguished this oppositional formation.

Rebellious males in urban slums proudly wore the badge of social outlawry as an identity. They copied the stylized violence of the bandits and gunslingers from American cowboy movies; they adopted the proud black nationalism of the Rastafarians, as well as their disdain for Jamaican leaders; and they gave full expression to both wanton hedonism and an unchecked, violent gangsterism. In their eyes, social injustice had expressed itself in the form of middle-class cultural domination. Hence, calls for restraint and demands for a return to moral decency were wholly rejected as only the summons of an oppressive government and the ruling groups it represented.

This cultural and political refusal had massive social and political consequences. It occasioned violent gunfights among rival youth gangs and pitted these gangs in violent encounters with the police. At the same time, however, the decades-long party clientelism in which poor voters received material benefits in exchange for political loyalty, fatefully adapted this gangsterism to its own agenda. Hence, in a remarkable development in Jamaican politics in the early 1960s, both the JLP and the PNP moved away from only trying to stamp out the gangs, to soliciting their support and recruiting their leaders to do political work.

In this case the rival parties and their middle-class leaders made an unprecedented move: they brought juvenile street gangs and gang leaders into the political process, using them now to end political competition in constituencies through violence and intimidation. The effectiveness of this practice created the first garrisoned communities in urban Kingston, violently barring political competition in poor communities there, while elevating politically aligned gang leaders, on both sides, to positions of honor and notoriety in the slums. In such circumstances a few notables and recruits from the dispossessed urban poor had clearly moved from marginality to close political affiliation with powerholders. Thus, a mutual dependency had emerged in this cohabitation between politicians and political gangsters, as poor slum-dwellers with guns traded on their expertise in the political uses of violence.

Revolt of the Intellectuals and a Social Explosion

From the foregoing, it is clear that the militant black poor in urban Jamaica were leaders of the anti-systemic social movement in post-independence Jamaica. By the mid-1960s this contingent had generated both the subversive ideologies and the social forces that challenged the legitimacy of post-colonial governments. Until then, university-trained political intellectuals and the alienated middle class had mostly responded to the state's authoritarianism with circumspection and even fear. Although a few West Indian economists at the University of the West Indies had played a major role in the formation of the West Indies Federation in the 1950s and had publicly campaigned on its behalf when it was threatened in 1961 by Jamaica's imminent withdrawal, university-based intellectuals remained largely above the political fray. This was the case notwithstanding the fact that in 1963 the Young Socialist League – a youthful left-wing dissident political formation allied to the PNP – had won support from intellectuals at the Mona (Jamaica) campus of the University of the West Indies (UWI) with the establishment of the UWI Area Council affiliated with the League.

This relative aloofness of intellectuals began to change in the mid-1960s as the authoritarian JLP regime and an autocratic university administration pushed intellectuals at the Mona campus into political opposition. Mention has already been

made of government dissatisfaction with the 1960 university report on the Rastafarians and the tensions it produced between academics and the state. The conservative JLP regime and its political allies had attacked the writers of the report for not expressing the official view concerning the subversive character of the Rastafarian movement. Relations between university-based intellectuals and the state thus became more conflicted as the 1960s wore on. This was apparent in 1962 when a small group of West Indian economists in Guyana burst onto the Caribbean political scene with powerful critiques of regional governments' economic policies and political conduct. Calling themselves the New World Group, this circle of economists – the majority of whom who were based on the Mona campus – established themselves as yet another force in opposition to the Jamaican and Caribbean status quo.

In March 1963 the group published the first issue of the *New World Quarterly*, a journal of ideas devoted to the creation of informed public opinion on regional problems. This development represented a major breakthrough in intellectuals' involvement with public issues because the group sought to win independent public support for their critical ideas. Thus, instead of regarding themselves as merely technical consultants to governments in the region, the New World Group now made a bid for public support on the basis of a critique of the status quo, and for the establishment of an independent public opinion. This stance brought the group into direct confrontation with the Jamaican government, already suspicious of dissenting and politically unreliable intellectuals.

In 1965 the JLP administration struck back. It seized and cancelled the passports of LeRoy Taylor and George Beckford, two notable West Indian economists associated with the New World Group who had traveled to Cuba during the summer of 1965. Although the JLP refused to explain the seizure as punishment for visiting Cuba, and for opposing the government's policies, the Jamaican government left little doubt about its antipathy for uncooperative intellectuals at the university. That distrust was followed by the suspension of work permits for dissenting academics from Britain and the United States who were also teaching at the Mona campus. And in October 1968 a panicked Jamaican administration capped this assault on intellectuals with the banning of Walter Rodney, a Guyanese historian

at the university. Rodney's crime, according to the JLP, was that he had become a security threat. He had evidently achieved this status by consorting with the Rastafarians in the slums; debating Jamaica's racial problems with them there; inviting them to meet at the campus; and in other ways giving intellectual respectability to Rastafarian ideas. In addition, Rodney had evidently linked poor Jamaicans' cultural dissent to the turbulent history of African peoples at home and abroad. Furthermore, in his public lectures and talks, Rodney had given a fillip to Rastafarian ideas by suggesting the need to throw off Creole class oppression in Jamaica by remembering the importance of Jamaicans' African civilization identity.

With the alarming news of Rodney's expulsion and JLP intolerance and stifling of intellectual dissent at the university, dissatisfaction and fierce opposition expanded. Students, professors, workers, and sections of the alienated middle class marched in opposition to the banning. The militant urban poor and the irrepressible *lumpenproletariat* joined them in the streets of Kingston. The latter burned buses, disrupted traffic, and fought with police trying to quell the disturbance with tear gas and batons. For the first time in Jamaica's post-colonial political history, intellectuals at the university and allied middle-class groups joined the militant black poor in united opposition to the disreputable and increasingly discredited JLP administration.

Fall of Black Culturalism and Emergence of Caribbean Leninism

The social explosion of October 1968 exposed the JLP's cultural and political isolation from the Jamaican people. That party's reliance on authoritarian measures to cope with dissent, its unwillingness to accommodate demands from the black poor for cultural respect, and its inability to solve the country's mounting economic problems, made it a target of widening public ridicule. Moreover, the emergence of a Caribbean black power movement in this period only made matters worse. Across the English-speaking Caribbean, and in Jamaica in particular, the Afro-Caribbean peoples, as well as dissident leaders and organizations, challenged national governments in the region to address the cultural, political, and economic needs of the black majority. This claim found particular resonance

in Jamaica in the 1960s. In the wake of the "Rodney rebellion" of October 1968, then, it was not surprising that the appeal of black consciousness found expression in yet another dissident social movement: the Abeng Newspaper movement.

A polyglot group of dissidents held this formation together. New World activists, radical Catholics, black cultural nationalists, socialistically inclined activists, and patriotic pro-PNP personalities belonged to the Abeng movement. As a diverse grouping united in opposition to the JLP administration, Abeng activists coalesced around the cause of the militant but marginalized black poor in the urban slums. Identifying themselves with these black "sufferers," Abeng activists sounded the diverse themes already abroad in the emerging black power movement in the region. Consequently, when the first copy of the Abeng newspaper appeared on February 1, 1969, its pages confirmed the movement's preoccupation with racial uplift for the black poor and with their relief from joblessness, police brutality, and political victimization.

Because of the many ideological tendencies in the Abeng, however, other outlooks competed with the movement's focus on race. These included Marxist critiques of class relations, concern for human rights, analyses of Jamaica's economic dependency, and indictments of a compromised judicial system that was deemed unfair to poor Afro-Jamaicans. This jostling of anti-status quo ideologies produced divisions within the Abeng movement, as contending groups fought for ideological dominance. By the time a suspicious fire had razed the Abeng printery in June 1969, the movement was already in disarray, falling apart over ideological differences.

Intellectuals' defense of the working class and their adoption of Marxism-Leninism now replaced the earlier vogue of Black Nationalism. By 1974 this stance, adopted by a tiny minority of left-wing intellectuals at the UWI, led to the creation of the Workers Liberation League (WLL) in that year. The League acted as a pressure group from the far left, militantly urging a reluctant PNP – in power since 1972 – to go beyond its cautious and ambivalent adoption of democratic socialism in December 1974. But as the PNP's embrace of a mild form of socialism deepened class polarization and social divisions, WLL leaders saw an opportunity to rally disaffected workers to a left-wing agenda. In 1978

they formed a Marxist-Leninist political party, the Workers Party of Jamaica (WPJ). Thus, ten years after the Walter Rodney-inspired black power revolt, university-based intellectuals made a decisive shift from Black Nationalism to Marxism as a basis of organization and social mobilization.

Implosion of Leninism and Return to Anarchy

This journey to the far left in which class identity replaced cultural concerns was short-lived. The PNP's democratic socialist agenda that had favored the poor and working people since 1972 collapsed in 1980. Voters, fed up with social polarization, raging political violence, and economic hardship unleashed by the PNP's policies, removed that party from power in a brutal electoral contest that took some 800 lives. Pragmatic voters, dissatisfied with the meager returns of PNP democratic socialism, thus returned the conservative, pro-private enterprise JLP to power in that year.

This defeat for the Jamaican left was followed by a shattering event on the island of Grenada. There, the Marxist Peoples Revolutionary Government (PRG) that had been in power since a 1979 coup, imploded. Political differences within the leadership of the PRG resulted in the army's execution of Maurice Bishop, the popular party leader on October 19, 1983. The United States' invasion of the island on October 25 and its ouster of remnants of the PRG sounded the death knell for socialist experiments in Jamaica and for Caribbean Leninism more generally. Indeed, Jamaica's own communist party, the WPJ, collapsed in disarray in the early 1990s, as events in Grenada and the subsequent collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union took their toll.

Beginning therefore with the 1980 PNP defeat and the self-immolation of the PRG leadership in Grenada, these momentous events brought down the curtain on a remarkable 20-year-long era of dissenting movements in Jamaica and throughout the Caribbean. There, cultural nationalists, Marxist-Leninists, radical Christians, and a militant and unbowed poor people's movement had faced down conservative governments across the region. Remarkably, social movements in Jamaica and in the wider Caribbean had often dictated the terms of contestation, had typically

exercised a remarkable hold on the popular imagination, and had occasionally broken through to win political power.

These grand achievements were nullified after 1980. Mounting economic hardships in the 1980s and after added to the sting of political defeat for the movements. Indeed, the PNP's ideological turnabout in the mid-1980s only made matters worse, even as that party's reversal of course highlighted the agony and crisis of the social movement in Jamaica. In 1989 voters returned the PNP to power, but only after Michael Manley, the once-radical party leader, had wholly repudiated the party's welfarist policies and progressivist tradition in favor of the privatization of state enterprises and the adoption of economic neoliberalism.

This political and ideological reversal in Jamaica fed popular disillusionment with an economically retrenching government and encouraged widespread resort to crime. In the absence of a social ideology that could motivate the population to a credible national agenda beyond appeal for worker productivity as well as company-and-government efficiency, individual self-interest, greed, and a get-rich-quick mentality replaced utopian norms. In the 1990s and after, self-interest, nihilism, and resort to crime became the commonsense for many among the militant Afro-Jamaican urban poor. Discontent with ineffective governments unable to deliver benefits found release in corrupted self-and-group immolating violence. No longer inspired by ideologically motivated heralds of an earlier time like Bob Marley and the Rastafarians, the dissenting urban poor turned once again to internecine drug-and-gun-involved gang warfare, this time with more murderous weapons and with a higher death toll. Spiraling criminal violence in the 1990s and after typically claimed many hundreds of lives each year.

Although this violence was not accompanied by any political vision or critique of power, it did have massive political consequences. For by committing murder and mayhem on a grand scale with near-total impunity, and answering to no political authority, marauding criminal gangs in urban Jamaica held the Jamaican state up to public ridicule for its inability to rein in crime or to punish the perpetrators. Paradoxically, then, although the new criminal gangs are inspired neither by ideology nor by politics, their mayhem did politicize crime by

stirring public disaffection and disgust with the seeming failure of the Jamaican state to exercise its most basic functions.

Civism and New Social Movements Today

Confronted with such unpalatable circumstances, social movements in the 1990s and after could only mount a plaintive call for a return to traditional norms and values, to civility and the rule of law. This civism and its recovery became the rallying cry of embryonic reforming social movements in the 1990s and after. Led by notable political figures, crusading journalists, human rights organizations, community leaders, and rump political organizations, the new social movement spoke up for social reconstruction on the basis of good governance and citizen empowerment. Civic groups such as Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE), Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ), and Families against State Terrorism (FAST) confirmed this renewed interest in civic politics. Its importance for contemporary Jamaica cannot be overstated, for as Gray (2007) has observed, “what is remarkable about such groups is not so much the demands made of weakened politicians, as these groups’ bid to rescue the idea of the public interest, to restore the category of the citizen, and to promote the norm of civism as an autonomous citizen-based activity for the common good.” That a few leaders in both political parties have taken this appeal to heart and are beginning to institutionalize the idea of the primacy of the citizen over the claims of the partisan political loyalist is yet another promising development wrought by ever-evolving social movements in Jamaica.

SEE ALSO: Grenadian Revolution, 1979–1983; Manley, Michael (1924–1997); Rodney, Walter (1942–1980)

References and Suggested Readings

- Gray, O. (1991) *Radicalism and Social Change in Jamaica, 1960–1972*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Gray, O. (2004) *Demeaned But Empowered: The Social Power of the Urban Poor in Jamaica*. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press.
- Gray, O. (2007) Civic Politics in Jamaica: New Populism or Political Breakthrough? In B. Meeks (Ed.), *Culture, Politics, Race and Diaspora: The Thought of Stuart Hall*. Kingston: Ian Randle.

- Munroe, T. (1972) *The Politics of Constitutional Decolonization: Jamaica 1944–1962*. Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research.
- Rodney, W. (1969) *Groundings With My Brothers*. London: Bogle L’Overture.
- Smith, M. G., Nettleford, R., & Augier, R. (1960) *Report on the Rastafari Movement in Kingston*. Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research.

Jamaica, 1938 labor riots

Obika Gray

The 1938 labor rebellion in Jamaica did not end British colonial rule in this former slave colony. However, the sustained and unprecedented militancy of the laboring classes there unleashed events that transformed the political history of the island, with major implications for the wider Caribbean.

The 1938 labor riots spurred two momentous processes. First, the riots gave birth to Jamaica’s modern nationalist movement, with the emergence of notable leaders, development of party politics, and a mature trade unionism. Second, labor’s militancy in 1938 convinced the British Colonial Office to end colonial rule and initiate major reforms. In the aftermath of the unrest, the British therefore made significant concessions to the strikers and, equally important, initiated constitutional reforms that ended colonialism.

The labor revolts of May–June 1938 in Jamaica were not an isolated event. Rather, they capped a three-year-long series of strikes and demonstrations in Caribbean territories under British colonial rule. World recession, low pay, high levels of unemployment, and land hunger provoked unrest in the 1930s. An autocratic and moribund colonial political structure aggravated these economic circumstances by blocking native political advance. Marginality, both economic and political, in the context of 1930s uncertainty, encouraged dissatisfied workers and emergent nationalist leaders to protest British colonialism.

In the 1930s the laboring classes faced difficult economic circumstances. Firstly, the global recession of 1929 hurt the islands’ exports, as prices for these commodities fell by nearly half between 1928 and 1933. This decline led to layoffs and reductions in wages for already poorly paid workers across the region. Thus, in

his study of the 1938 labor revolts in Jamaica, Post (1978) observed of the largest British territory that while 12s. 0d. per week was regarded as a living wage for some rural workers, a worker's typical weekly earnings was actually 7s. 8d. Equally worrisome for labor was the fact that work on agricultural estates was seasonal and this tended to encourage the paying of low wages. Some Jamaican estate workers earned wages of 1s. 9d. to 1s. 3d. per day. These developments increased economic insecurity among wage earners and provoked restiveness among the growing ranks of the rural unemployed.

Secondly, as if falling export prices, low wages, and widespread unemployment were not enough, inequality in the distribution of land also deepened economic uncertainty in the countryside. There, big farmers and multinational companies like the United Fruit Company and the Standard Fruit Company dominated landholding. They controlled large estates, occupied the most arable land, and sought to limit the growth and expansion of a vast smallholding peasantry. Smallholders' hunger for land, reluctance to do estate work, and the big planters' monopoly of land were, therefore, major sources of tension that fed unrest.

Thirdly, rural unemployment combined with land scarcity increased migration from the countryside. This trek of the rural population to the cities contributed to labor's discontent as migrants moved into tenements and shantytowns. They lived a pitiful existence in makeshift, overcrowded shacks with names like Trench Pen, Ackee Walk, Jones Pen, and Back-O-Wall. This mass of unskilled, alienated unemployed workers promptly joined the rebellion in the region.

Fourthly, general discontent with a moribund colonial government that levied taxes and fees on the working people while excluding them from power added to resentment in the region.

The revolts against these circumstances began on January 28, 1935 on the island of St. Kitts, as sugar workers demanding a wage increase walked off estates. They were met not with conciliation, but with bullets. Arrests, imposition of a state of emergency, and the dispatching of a British warship to the island ended the protest. The collapse of the strike in St. Kitts did not deter labor's militancy, however. In February, oilfield workers in Trinidad walked off the job. Strikers in British Guiana and St. Vincent joined them in September and October, while workers in

St. Lucia entered the fray later that year. While the region saw some diminution of protest in 1936, widespread discontent continued into 1937, as laborers expressed dissatisfaction with strikes and demonstrations in Barbados, Trinidad, the Bahamas, British Guiana, St. Lucia, and Jamaica.

It was in Jamaica in May-June 1938 that the unrest of the 1930s had its greatest impact. There, labor's desperate circumstances produced the combination of sustained popular militancy from below and emergence of ideologically moderate middle-class leadership from above. These developments encouraged the Colonial Office to initiate far-reaching reforms. The triggering event came on Friday, April 29 at the Frome estate of the West Indies Sugar Company (WISCO) in the parish of Westmoreland, as a dispute over pay caused a riot. Laborers on the estate walked off the job, demanding more pay – 4 shillings for laborers and more for skilled workers. Armed police were rushed to the scene, where they clashed with protestors on Monday, May 2, firing into the crowd of demonstrators, killing four and wounding fourteen. Outraged workers retaliated by burning cane fields at Frome and other WISCO estates.

The dispute spread to Kingston between May 2 and 23, where marches, mass meetings, and rallies summoned thousands to labor's cause. There, dock workers, railway employees, hospital and sanitation workers, and tramway drivers and construction workers walked off the job. As well, unemployed slum dwellers joined striking workers in Trench Pen from May 16 to 18 to disrupt work at a construction site.

A subsequent wave of agitation in the countryside matched the turmoil in Kingston. From May 25 through June 3, laborers at the Caymanas sugar estate in Clarendon Parish, dockworkers in the city of Montego Bay, and agricultural workers in the parishes of Portland, Clarendon, and St. Mary, burned cane fields, while others stoned and fought with police. One such clash with armed police in St. Mary on June 3 resulted in more deaths as police fired yet again on a riotous crowd, this time killing four persons. Hence, despite the colonial governor's effort to crush the rebellion by reading the riot act, by employing the police force at every turn, and by sending in the Sherwood Foresters and the typically brutal Special Constables, by early June 1938 the Jamaican working people were in revolt against colonial rule all across the island.

However, the announcement of a conciliation board on May 26 to negotiate with the strikers, and the governor's June 2 proposal to spend some £500,000 on a land settlement scheme, eased the crisis. By June 6, 1938 normality returned, though intermittent strikes continued into the next year.

This epic confrontation provoked inspired leadership from two Jamaican personalities, Alexander Bustamante and Norman Washington Manley. The former was a tall demagogic brown-skinned moneylender and critic of colonialism. His assault on the system was expressed in rhetorical flourishes suggesting willingness to abet the fury of the working people if local authorities ignored their claims. This menace was complemented by a contrary disposition that reminded demonstrators of Bustamante's value to them and their need to temper hostility to the old order. In contrast with the largely unschooled but canny Bustamante, Manley was a brown-skinned urbane and highly educated nationalist. Having graduated from the elite Jamaica College, Manley went to Oxford University on a Rhodes scholarship to study law. After returning to the island, Manley established an illustrious career as a social reformer and highly regarded barrister, who at the time of the upheaval counted WISCO as one of his clients.

Both leaders entered the fray on labor's behalf. Bustamante led demonstrations, spoke at rallies, and joined marchers in forays against employers. Manley did much the same, emphasizing his role as mediator between capital and labor. Each leader demanded better pay for workers, and offered himself as broker and negotiator for the strikers. But each leader did so with a concern for the restoration of order, not the elimination of colonial rule. What was most striking about these leaders was not their backing for increased worker militancy to deepen the crisis of colonialism. Rather, rhetorically and politically each tempered labor's militancy and channeled it into representative but politically moderate organizations that each leader had by then created.

Thus Bustamante became the unchallenged union leader as head of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) that was founded in 1938. In September of that year Manley became the leader of a major nationalist organization, the People's Nationalist Party (PNP). Within months of the disturbances, then, two nationalist political figures, a representative trade union, and a political party had appeared on the scene with each

enjoying widespread support from the Afro-Jamaican population. By 1943, in anticipation of major constitutional reforms, Bustamante also hastily founded his own political party, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), to compete in forthcoming elections in 1944.

Despite suppression of unrest in the colonial Caribbean, the 1930s labor revolts in the region, and in particular the 1938 labor revolt in Jamaica, signaled the coming demise of British colonial rule. Indeed, the Moyne Commission that was established to study the causes of unrest in the region was permitted to include in its mandate both political and constitutional issues. Besides calling for the funding of improved social services and proposing a land settlement, the commission also recommended political and constitutional reforms. By 1943 several of these reforms were adopted, the most important of which was the granting of universal adult suffrage with a popularly elected House of Representatives in Jamaica.

The first national elections were held under the new constitution in December 1944, and the JLP won in a landslide with 23 seats to the PNP's five. An embryonic competitive two-party system had therefore been established in Jamaica – a first for the British colonies in the Caribbean. To be sure, while electoral politics under colonial rule did not establish a democracy in Jamaica, competition on the basis of a universal franchise did begin the diminution of colonial autocracy and encourage a competitive party pluralism in the region. These achievements, alongside colonial governments' acceptance of trade union representation, adoption of land settlement programs, public works expenditures, and other labor reforms, provide incontestable evidence of the power of Caribbean laborers and unemployed workers to shape momentous changes in the governance of the colonial Caribbean.

SEE ALSO: Jamaica, Independence Movement, 1950–Present; Manley, Michael (1924–1997)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bradley, C. P. (1960) Mass Parties in Jamaica: Structure and Organization. *Social and Economic Studies* 9 (4): 375–416.
- Lewis, A. (1993) The 1930s Social Revolution. In H. Beckles & V. Shepherd (Eds.), *Caribbean Freedom*. Princeton: Marcus Weiner.
- Phelps, O. W. (1960) Rise of the Labour Movement in Jamaica. *Social and Economic Studies* 9 (4): 417–68.

Post, K. (1978) *Arise Ye Starvelings: The Jamaica Labour Rebellion of 1938 and Its Aftermath*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Jamaica, peasant uprisings, 19th century

Mimi Sheller

Peasant uprisings in nineteenth-century Jamaica can be understood as part of a longer history of slave uprisings and anti-slavery struggles. They also connect to the emergence of African and black liberation movements throughout the Americas, to wider working-class movements across the transatlantic world, and to ongoing peasant movements in twentieth-century Latin America. Thus they are an important link between different historical forms of popular social protest and political uprising.

As Great Britain's largest and most economically significant Caribbean colony at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Jamaica was a major producer of sugar and coffee, but also had areas specializing in cattle pens and export items like ginger and logwood. Only towards the end of the nineteenth century would this be joined by the fruit trade, with the development of the banana industry. As an export-oriented colonial plantation economy, Jamaica was controlled and governed by a small, mainly white elite of landowners, joined by some merchants, while the vast majority of the population were of African descent. Jamaica has a lively history of slave resistance and rebellion, including the Maroon Wars of the eighteenth century and a major slave uprising in 1831.

Slavery in the British West Indies ended between 1834 and 1838, as the transitional system known as "apprenticeship" finally gave way to full freedom. It is at this point that we can begin to think in terms of a "reconstituted peasantry" existing, as anthropologist Sidney Mintz (1974) describes it, consisting of small farmers, squatters, and landless agricultural laborers, some of whom did occasional wage-labor on larger plantations and lived in the "interstitial" spaces of the plantation economy. Such Afro-Caribbean peasantries are considered to be a modern form of resistance to a capitalist world system, rather than a precursor from an earlier age. Thus when we speak of "peasant uprisings" in Jamaica, it

must be understood to encompass a wide array of people who may have described themselves as emancipated laborers, smallholders, or small settlers. The immigration of Indian indentured workers after emancipation also created the foundations for an Indo-Jamaican peasantry.

Access to land was significantly constrained by white planters and the local government that they controlled; nevertheless, the rapid expansion of the peasantry in the post-emancipation period took place through the struggles of the ex-slaves and ex-indentured workers to gain landholdings despite the efforts of white planters to prevent it. While some gained legal title to land, many more squatted on crown lands, while others leased land or engaged in sharecropping. Much of the internal marketing of peasant produce was carried out by women. In the effort to gain land, the formerly enslaved people also created new institutions such as "family land," indivisible plots passed down to all the children of a family line to share in perpetuity (Besson 2002). Access to land was one of the key issues contributing to peasant political movements in the post-emancipation period (Bakan 1990), but there were also many other grievances concerning poor governance, lack of justice, unfair taxation and tolls, and racial injustice (Heuman 1994; Sheller 2000).

Many of these grievances came to a head in the events known as the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865, which is considered one of the most significant formative events in British colonial history (Holt 1992). The rebellion, and especially the brutal government response to it, marks a turning point in British colonial forms of governance indicated by a hardening of racial ideologies, the emergence of more paternalistic forms of direct rule, and a retreat from democratization and equal citizenship. Appreciating the scope and extent of peasant mobilization and political uprising in the periods before, during, and after the Morant Bay Rebellion offers insights into the larger transitions taking place in colonial regimes after slavery was abolished. While Jamaica is a unique case, events there had great influence over British colonial policy in general.

Social Unrest Prior to Morant Bay

Almost immediately after the celebration of Emancipation Day on August 1, 1838, the Jamaican sugar plantations were convulsed by

work stoppages and vehement disputes over wage rates, hours of work, rent of houses, employment of women and children, and use of provision grounds (small plots where food was grown). Many freed people believed that they should have been given land as compensation for their enslavement, but instead payment was made to plantation owners for loss of their slaves. Public meetings were held at Baptist chapels in the months prior to and just after full emancipation, providing public space for the expression of grievances and calls for justice. These meetings were in part addressing immediate economic issues, but agricultural workers also began to sign petitions calling for electoral enfranchisement and the framing of new laws. And they also turned their attention to the abolition of slavery elsewhere in the world, including in the United States of America.

Among Baptist and Native Baptist congregations in the rural milieu of the plantations and the “free villages” that formed near them, social and economic tensions in the 1840s produced an increasingly autonomous and racially conscious black or African-identified counterpublic. The Sugar Duties Act of 1846 and a broader economic crisis in 1847 led to strained labor relations and a growing “spirit of disaffection.” In 1848, the year of many popular uprisings throughout Europe, there was an “apprehended outbreak” in the western parishes of Jamaica, with witnesses describing discontent, debate, field consultation, and passive resistance taking place amongst the peasantry. This unrest was linked to an alleged “insurrectionary movement” against the white populace. It is indicative that the first decade of freedom was already leading to disappointment and political mobilization of the peasantry.

Other “riots” and “disturbances” continued to take place, such as the Westmoreland Tollgate Riots of 1859, when tollhouses and gates were pulled down after petitions against them were ignored, and there were violent clashes with police during the court proceedings. A riot also took place to disrupt another court proceeding in Falmouth in 1859, in which prisoners were freed and police attacked. But more often grievances were expressed through non-violent means such as holding public meetings, signing petitions, and participating in electoral politics.

Planters and their attorneys dominated political life in Jamaica, despite emancipation, in part

because of tight restrictions on voting rights and office holding. For example, in the 1864 election, out of a population of 436,807, only 1,903 men were eligible to vote, and actual voters were only around 1,450. Nevertheless, in the early 1860s there was a lively oppositional politics led by members of the brown middle class, by newspaper editors, and by Baptist clergy, who were willing to represent the interests of the black majority. One particularly important series of meetings known as the Underhill Convention took place in 1864–5 and involved a central role played by the prominent “brown” politician George William Gordon, who became a catalyst of popular mobilization against the governing elite. He also developed ties with a group of peasant smallholders in a Native Baptist settlement known as Stony Gut in St. Thomas-in-the-East, which would be the epicenter of the Morant Bay Rebellion.

The Morant Bay Rebellion

On October 7, 1865, a fracas in the Morant Bay courthouse over a court case involving trespass resulted in an armed group of people associated with the Native Baptist leader Paul Bogle rescuing a young man from the police. When the police arrived in the small village known as Stony Gut to arrest those involved, they were attacked and several black policemen were captured and forced to swear oaths to “cleave to the black.” On October 11, people from Stony Gut were joined by several hundred men and women from surrounding rural areas in an organized, armed march into Morant Bay, the capital of the sugar-growing parish of St. Thomas-in-the-East, where the local government was holding its monthly meeting in the courthouse. They seized weapons from the police station and came face to face with the volunteer militia who were protecting the courthouse. Fighting erupted and by the end of the day the crowd had killed 18 people and wounded 31 others. The rebellion then spread across other parts of the parish, leading to additional deaths and destruction of property.

The government forcefully suppressed the rebellion, making use of the army, local Jamaican forces, and the Maroons (a community of former runaway slaves in the nearby Blue Mountains who had signed treaty rights with the government). In the process, nearly 500 people were killed

and hundreds of others seriously wounded, including women who were as prominent as men in participating in the uprising. Villages were burned to the ground and hundreds of houses destroyed. Many political leaders were arrested and tried by court martial, leading to executions including those of Paul Bogle and, more controversially, G. W. Gordon, who was captured in Kingston but claimed to have no knowledge of the rebellion.

These events led to public outcry in Britain, and an official inquiry by the Jamaica Royal Commission in 1866. The critical conclusions of the Royal Commission resulted in the dismissal of Governor Edward John Eyre. However, it also led to the abolition of Jamaica's 200-year-old House of Assembly and its replacement by Crown Colony rule, which effectively ended democratic electoral politics in Jamaica for some time to come. This was the most significant uprising against British colonial power in the post-emancipation era, and its harsh suppression ensured that it would not be repeated.

After Morant Bay

The latter part of the nineteenth century did not see any further violent uprisings like that of 1865. This may be because of the discouraging example of the lack of success of the rebellion and the suppression of political opposition and newspapers that it fomented, and also because of the more encouraging changes for the better that it partly helped to effect. Another result of the Royal Commission was the recommendation that crown lands be opened up to leasing by small settlers, which met some of the demand for and helped support the growing peasantry. Even more importantly, as Jean Besson's research shows, during this period peasants themselves appropriated and overturned European institutions and built their own culture in the heart of Jamaica (Besson 2002). The peasant economy gradually grew in the latter decades of the century, and by the 1880s the emerging banana industry offered new opportunities.

In another sense what began as a peasant politics in the nineteenth century was gradually transformed into a working-class politics in the early twentieth century, feeding into new political and social movements such as Garveyism, Rastafarianism, and the 1938 labor rebellion. Thus the peasant uprisings of the post-emancipation

period would eventually culminate in the independence movement and the transition towards a national politics in which the same issues of land, good governance, justice, and ultimately freedom continued to be sources of struggle. Despite the advances made by black creole nationalism in the post-independence era, many Jamaicans consider emancipation to remain incomplete. The descendants of the post-emancipation peasantry live in today's highly urbanized ghettos where political warfare is taking far more lives each year than were lost in the largest peasant uprising of the nineteenth century.

SEE ALSO: African American Resistance, Reconstruction Era; Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Caribbean Islands, Protests against IMF; Caribbean Protest Music; Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism; Haiti, Protest and Rebellion, 19th Century; Jamaica, Independence Movement, 1950–Present; Jamaica, 1938 Labor Riots; Jamaica, Rebellion and Resistance, 1760–1834; Morant Bay Rebellion: Overview and Assessment; Radical Reconstruction, United States, Promise and Failure of

References and Suggested Readings

- Bakan, A. (1990) *Ideology and Class Conflict in Jamaica: The Politics of Rebellion*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press.
- Beckles, H. & Shepherd, V. (1993) *Caribbean Freedom: Economy and Society from Emancipation to the Present*. Kingston: Ian Randle.
- Besson, J. (2002) *Martha Brae's Two Histories: European Expansion and Caribbean Culture-Building in Jamaica*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Bryan, P. (1991) *The Jamaican People, 1880–1902*. London: Macmillan Caribbean.
- Cross, M. & Heuman, G. (Eds.) (1988) *Labour in the Caribbean: From Emancipation to Independence*. London: Macmillan Caribbean.
- Heuman, G. (1994) "The Killing Time": *The Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica*. London: Macmillan Caribbean.
- Holt, T. (1992) *The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832–1938*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Mintz, S. (1974) *Caribbean Transformations*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Sheller, M. (2000) *Democracy After Slavery: Black Publics and Peasant Radicalism in Haiti and Jamaica*. London: Macmillan Caribbean.
- Stewart, R. J. (1992) *Religion and Society in Post-Emancipation Jamaica*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Jamaica, rebellion and resistance, 1760–1834

Steeve O. Buckridge

Resistance to slavery in Jamaica was a daily occurrence among the slave population. Slaves pursued complex and diverse activities to express their anger and frustrations at their enslavers and the institution of slavery. The record on slave rebellion confirms that slaves were not passive beings; instead, they resisted the institution of slavery that sought to dehumanize them and make them powerless. Edward Long (1774: 51–2), a local historian and Jamaican planter, described West Indian-born slaves as “irascible, conceited, proud, indolent . . . and very artful” and as “always trying to overreach their overseers by thwarting their plans.” Similar views were expressed by Long’s contemporaries, who described Coromante slaves as ferocious and the instigators of every rebellion in Jamaica. Slave rebellions often led to destruction of property and much loss of life among slave owners and slaves. Furthermore, suppressing slave revolts created a financial burden for the colonial regime. The slave rebellion of 1760, for instance, resulted in the death of 60 white settlers and 400 slaves. The expense of putting down this rebellion was estimated at £100,000. During the last slave rebellion of 1831–2 in Jamaica, the expenses accrued and the value of property destroyed exceeded five times the amount spent in 1760. In addition, parliament granted £300,000 as a loan to assist those planters whose plantations had been destroyed by the slaves.

Excluding Haiti, formerly known as St. Domingue, the largest slave rebellions in the western hemisphere were in Jamaica and in Demerara and Essequibo, or the Dutch Guianas. These areas averaged one major revolt every two years during the period between 1731 and 1832. The high incidence of slave revolts was due to several factors. Many slave owners in Jamaica chose to spend most of the year in England living off the profits of their estates. Their absence led to estrangement between owners and their slaves. In addition, the high African to white ratio, combined with extremely harsh conditions for slaves and a large concentration of unseasoned foreign-born African slaves, fostered an atmosphere conducive to revolts. Slave revolts were

more common in areas where African slaves outnumbered Creole or local-born slaves. Consequently, planters in these areas lived in a state of perpetual insecurity and under constant threat of slave insurrection.

Slave resistance contested the colonial regimes of power and slaves devised various methods to deceive their owners and to subvert the system of slavery. These resistance activities can be divided into two broad categories, one overt or blatant and the other covert or subtle. Overt resistance consisted of individual and collective violent acts such as destruction of property, deliberate harm to others, rebellions, or revolts. However, not all slaves believed in open insubordination since they realized that in almost any context that would provoke a more rapid and ferocious response from the authorities than a more pervasive resistance, one that would never venture to contest openly the formal definition of hierarchy and power. Therefore, some Jamaican slaves resorted to covert activities such as foot dragging, false complaints, sabotage, feigning illness, reopening old wounds, malingering or go slows, refusal to work, general inefficiency and deliberate laziness or evasion, satire, marronage or running away, suicide, or disguise.

Resistance was an ongoing process in the daily lives of slaves; all slaves, including women, resisted servitude. Slave women in Jamaica participated with slave men in various forms of resistance activities such as revolts and running away. Many of the rebellious slaves captured during Tacky’s rebellion in 1760 were women. Some slaves committed suicide to resist slavery and a few slave women chose to kill their children to prevent them from becoming slaves, as in the case of Sabina Park, who was tried in the Half Way Tree slave court for the murder of her 3-month-old child. Infanticide was atypical among slave women but some women sought a final way out of their suffering, if not for themselves then at least for their children.

Disguise as Resistance

Jamaican slaves sometimes stole and destroyed clothing that belonged to their enslavers as an act of defiance. During the slave rebellion led by Tacky in 1760, great houses were attacked and European clothes were seized by slaves and destroyed. In some situations, stolen clothes were used as disguise for possible escape. Others used

clothing to mock and ridicule slave owners. Such was the case in the 1831 slave rebellion when the head driver of an estate allowed a party of rebels to burn the great house, then imitated his master by galloping around the property on his master's horse wearing his owner's hat.

Some runaway slaves disguised themselves by cross-dressing to escape servitude. Slave women dressed as men and men as women; girls dressed as boys and vice versa, sometimes changing gender identities several times to evade slave catchers. A fascinating example of cross-dressing in Jamaica was that of the slave Hurlock, who disguised himself for the benefit of the slave rebels in 1831. Dressed as a woman, Hurlock successfully deceived every guard in Montego Bay and eventually learned strategic information that benefited the resistance movement.

Runaway slaves also disguised themselves as freepersons and were able to resist being caught. Although there were no codes that regulated slaves' dress, there were certain aesthetic norms in dress that were associated with specific groups of people. Slaves tended not to wear shoes since this was not part of the clothing rations provided by their owners. Slaves were usually branded on the shoulder with the logo of their owner or their owner's name. These characteristics in a slave's appearance served as markers that identified the person as a slave. Those slaves fortunate to obtain shoes, or a dress of refined fabric and stockings, were perceived by observers as freepersons once outside their familiar circles. Slaves obtained money to buy their disguise by selling their produce in the local market in their free time. Others stole garments from their owners. Female runaway slaves were ingenious at disguising themselves as freewomen, and local newspaper advertisements such as those in the *Jamaica Mercury* often described them as artful and very skilled in deception, warning whites to be on their guard against them. The runaway slave Mary Sadler, for example, successfully escaped capture by dressing as a freewoman. She fled in 1779 with her two young sons; later her owner, Isaac Furtado, discovered that she had hired herself out, dressed as a freeperson, and eventually lived with a freedman as his wife. Runaway slaves who dressed well and spoke fluent English could meld into free society unless they were identified.

Slaves who fled into the hills often camouflaged themselves to evade slave catchers while traveling through the forests. Successful runaway

slaves who were welcomed by Maroon communities participated in the military tactic of camouflage during times of war. Among the Moore Town Maroons, women and men tied carcoon bushes around their bodies so that they could easily ambush their enemies or move their camp through the mountains without being detected by the British. The carcoon plant was used in this manner because its leaves and branches remained green long after cutting before turning dry and crumbling.

Slave Dress as Symbolic Resistance

Slaves' responses to enslavement were greatly influenced by African cultural patterns and a deep yearning on the part of slaves to survive and be free. Dress was a principal exponent of this process. Personal adornment and expressive cultural patterns in dress were regular features in slave society. For some slave women in particular, dressing the body was more than a mere aesthetic act; it was also a way of communicating a message. These messages were based on slaves' relationships with each other and their experiences within their environment. Slave women's style of dressing reflected and reinforced their commitment to their African heritage and their fellow enslaved Africans. Such was the case of the slave woman Cubah, who had amassed a huge following among the slave population and was a key organizer of a major rebellion planned in 1760. Cubah dressed as an African queen and sat in state under a canopy with a short robe on her shoulders and a crown on her head. Although warned by the authorities to stop this, she refused. It was believed that she performed the functions similar to those of a West African queen mother. Cubah was later captured and shipped off the island, transported for life. However, she managed to prevail on the captain of the transport to put her ashore again on the leeward part of Jamaica. Cubah remained there for a while, but eventually was rearrested and executed. Some slaves used their dress to reflect communal or collective resistance. The ringleaders of the 1831 slave rebellion in Jamaica wore scarlet jackets as a uniform statement of resistance and to reflect some level of military sophistication and organization. Similar to several African societies, red was not only symbolic of strength and courage but was also closely associated with resistance, war, and ritual dress.

Jamaican slaves received Oznaburgh fabric, a type of German linen, from their owners to make their own clothes. Many slaves accessorized their outfits to create an African aesthetic in dress. During holidays, slave women often appeared decked out in a profusion of beads, corals, and gold ornaments of all descriptions. Some slaves proudly displayed their ethnic marks or scarring with a mixture of ostentation and pleasure, either considering them highly ornamental or appealing to them as testimonies of distinction from Africa. Hairstyles for women, meanwhile, consisted of plaits, braids, or having their hair combed into lanes like the parterre of a garden, as in West Africa.

Nonetheless, the most popular garment that represented the continuity of African customs in dress was the African woman's headwrap known in Jamaica as the tiehead. During slavery, many slave owners considered the headwrap a badge of enslavement, but to slave women this type of dress was distinctly African. Headwraps in Jamaica were diverse in styles and colors and they reflected the woman's own creativity.

Headwraps served many functions. They absorbed perspiration and offered an expedient means to cover the hair quickly to make one presentable or to protect newly styled hair. Moreover, they assisted with balancing loads on the head, as in Africa. The headwrap would be complemented with a piece of cloth or dried banana leaves rolled into a coil, shaped into a donut called a *cotta* and laid flat on top of the headwrap before the load was placed on the head. The headwrap also served as a protection against injuries to the head during beatings by the slave owner and against scalp infections such as lice. Among the Moore Town Maroons, women wrapped their heads in a particular style to signal a state of war. According to Maroon legend, their leader, Nanny, wore headwraps that reflected her status as leader and spiritual healer among her people. She also used her headwrap to store her bullets during the Maroon wars.

Another feature of slave dress that was reminiscent of Africa was that worn during slave carnivals. Enslaved Africans held crop-over fêtes and evening dances and celebrated Christian holidays. On Christmas Day, Boxing Day, and New Year's Day, slaves participated in masquerades called Jonkonnu or John Canoe that consisted of masked troupes, dancers, actors, and processions of women called Set Girls in their

finest dresses. Jonkonnu has its roots in West Africa and the masqueraders were accompanied by slave bands that provided music for spectators and performers. The entertainers as well as the masked participants were usually slaves or freed persons of non-European descent. Aesthetically, these slave carnivals emphasized dress and revelers could show off their fancy clothing while others competed for the best outfits. The carnival parade consisted of a contrast of costumed segments each with its own colors, style, and floats. For some African slaves, carnival was an opportunity to have fun, take a break from the rigors and stress of work, and enjoy their free time. For others it was also a return to their roots, to reminisce about the use of masks in mediating between supernatural beings and the society within which they dwelt. The masks and outfits worn in carnival were similar to those used in West African rituals and festivals.

Carnival dress among slaves was important because the dress functioned as a mask that transformed the persona, permitting slaves to do wild and uninhibited things such as mock Europeans and even the slave owner with antics, taunts, and pelvic gyrations. During the festivities slaves sang satirical philippics against their master and mistress, communicating a little free advice now and then; but they never lost sight of decorum or went too far. Such carnivals were in themselves a satire that allowed slaves, including women, to subtly resist the norms of the colonial society. Behind this mask of fancy dress, slave men and women could act freely, and at times even mimic whites. They could be outrageous, thus going beyond the normal structures of plantation morality and behavior. In this manner, slaves experienced some control, if only temporarily.

The continuity and popularity of African customs in dress among the Jamaican slave population enabled slaves to resist Europeans' efforts at cultural annihilation and simultaneously maintained a vital link to their African heritage. All resistance, whether overt or covert, was essential to slaves' survival against the institution of slavery that sought to rob them of their African identity.

SEE ALSO: Jamaica, Independence Movement, 1950–Present; Jamaica, Peasant Uprisings, 19th Century; Queen Nanny and Maroon Resistance

References and Suggested Readings

- Buckridge, S. (2004) *The Language of Dress: Resistance and Accommodation in Jamaica, 1760–1890*. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press.
- Craton, M. (1982) *Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Hall, D. (1989) *In Miserable Slavery: Thomas Thistlewood in Jamaica, 1750–1780*. London: Macmillan.
- Higman, B. (1976) *Slave Population and Economy in Jamaica, 1807–1834*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Long, E. (1774) *The History of Jamaica or General Survey of the Ancient and Modern State of the Island*, 3 vols. London: T. Lowndes.
- Mathurin Mair, L. (1975) *The Rebel Woman in the British West Indies During Slavery*. Kingston: Institute of Jamaica.
- Sherlock, P. & Bennett, H. (1998) *The Story of the Jamaican People*. Kingston: Ian Randle.

James, C. L. R. (1901–1989)

Roderick Bush

C. L. R. James is one of the preeminent revolutionary theoreticians, activists, and cultural critics of the twentieth century. His role as anti-colonial militant, Pan-African internationalist, Marxist revolutionary, and political activist establishes him as one of the intellectual giants of the twentieth century in the tradition of W. E. B. Du Bois. James's life began in the Trinidadian periphery of the world-system in a middle-class family of schoolteachers. He combined the benefits of a superb education with an uncommon sensitivity to the common people of Trinidad. In Trinidad he was a teacher but became an anti-colonial militant who infused his writings with the lives of the common people whose passion, common sense, and decency he had come to respect and love.

This class standpoint was to stay with him throughout his travels and was to stamp his particular angle of vision. From these early beginning James was a practical theorist. He wrote about the exciting lives of the Trinidadian masses in *Minty Alley* and a short story, "Triumph." This mental attitude also inclined James to take a proactive position in his historical writing. He wanted to write about the Haitian Revolution because he wished to focus not simply on what

had been done to people of African descent, but on what kind of action people were taking on their own behalf. He was concerned for people to be the subject of their own history. That was the logic behind the writing of *The Black Jacobins* and *The History of Negro Revolt*. When he traveled to England in 1932, his anti-colonial and labor sympathies placed him in the company of a number of people who were rejecting the liberal reformism of the British Labour Party. This inspired him to study Marxism, in which James found an attitude toward history and people that he had not encountered in other books but which resonated profoundly with his own attitudes. He had already read Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution*, so he was aware of the critique of Stalinism. But he read Marx and Engels, as well as Stalin and Trotsky, before determining that he would join the Trotskyist movement.

James's origin as an anti-colonial militant with a strong working-class standpoint was the filter through which he read and interpreted Marxism. He therefore offered a corrective to the Eurocentric reading and interpretation of Marxism that dominated the movement in Europe and North America. Both *The Black Jacobins* and *The History of Negro Revolt* give prominence to the agency of black people, and indeed argue for their centrality to revolutionary history on a world scale. The sense in which traveling to England liberated James had more to do with his liberation from a government job and from the tutelage and oversight of his parents. James was indeed an opponent of the predominant Eurocentric reading and interpretation of Marxism, despite his own wide exposure to European history and culture. Because of his education, he was able to read a great deal in English, Latin, French, and Greek.

While James's political practice focused on Europe when he lived there, he worked with George Padmore in the International African Service Bureau. Padmore had been the highest-ranking black person in the Comintern, but left the organization when, because of the popular front against fascism, it changed its stance toward the "democratic capitalist" nations of Britain, France, and the United States who were now in an alliance with the Soviet Union. Padmore argued that Britain and France were the major colonial powers in Africa and that the United States was the most race-conscious country in

the world. He refused to accept this change in line and thus resigned from all his posts in the Communist International. When James moved to the United States, his focus was more on the issue of race but he maintained a critique of the practices of the international communist movement.

For James, Leninism argued against the possibility of socialism in one country. Lenin had argued in 1919 that “We live not in a state but in a system of States, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for an extended period of time is unthinkable” (James 1993: 131). Admitting that it was bound up with the international market from which it could not break away, Lenin’s final written statement held that it was a question of whether the Soviet Republic could maintain itself until the capitalist countries of Western Europe completed their development to socialism. He did not think they were civilized enough to pass directly to socialism, though he thought they had the political premises for it (James 1993: 132).

James argued within the Trotskyist movement for the autonomy of the black liberation movement, despite the need for alliances and coalitions with whites. But the logic of the autonomy of the black liberation movement was soon generalized as James came to oppose the necessity of a vanguard party, without which the revolutionary forces could not establish a socialist society. James split with the Trotskyist movement when he argued that it was the activity of the working class and not the vanguard party which would lead to the building of a socialist society. This profoundly democratic and egalitarian position differed profoundly from the authoritarian views of the communists, who are quite like the Jacobins that James criticizes near the end of *The Black Jacobins*.

SEE ALSO: Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Cannon, James P. (1890–1974) and American Trotskyism; Class Identity and Protest; Class, Poverty, and Revolution; Class Struggle; Haiti, Revolutionary Revolts, 1790s; Haiti, Revolutionary Struggles; Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath; Haiti, Saint-Domingue and Revolutionary France; Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1800–1804; Internationals; Marxism; Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972); Nyerere, Julius (1922–1999); Rodney, Walter (1942–1980); Trinidad, Anti-Colonial Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Farred, G. (Ed.) (1996) *Rethinking C. L. R. James*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Grimshaw, A. (Ed.) (1992) *The C. L. R. James Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- James, C. L. R. (1963) *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*. New York: Random House.
- James, C. L. R. (1969) *A History of Pan-African Revolt*. Washington, DC: Drum & Spear Press.
- James, C. L. R. (1973) *Modern Politics*. Detroit: be wick/ed.
- James, C. L. R. (1993) *World Revolution 1917–1936: The Rise and Fall of the Communist International*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
- James, C. L. R. (2001) *Mariners, Renegades and Castaways: The Story of Herman Melville and the World We Live In*. Hanover: University Press of New England.
- Worcester, K. (1996) *C. L. R. James: A Political Biography*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Japan, community labor union movement

Edson I. Urano

Enterprise unions are functionally “adjusted” to the productionist and enterprise-centered characteristics of Japanese society, with both core enterprises and regular workers as the pillars of the social system. The emergence and hegemony of this type of union has effectively resulted in the exclusion of marginal workers, such as part-timers, temporary workers, and foreign workers, from the labor movement. In this context, Japanese community unions are meaningful organizations which function as alternatives to the mainstream labor movement. Despite their numerical irrelevance, their link to the progressive social movements of the past, their combativeness, and their inclusive role on the unionization of minorities and atypical workers make them of major relevance as a sociological phenomenon.

In many ways, community unions are the antithesis of enterprise unions. While enterprise unions organize workers through union shop agreements, community unions promote unionization through individual membership, focusing on specific niches, occupations, and the identities of local communities. Categories such as gender, ethnicity, and employment patterns frequently

serve as criteria for the unionization of workers and the determination of union strategies. For example, the Women's Union Tokyo, founded in 1995, is mainly focused on women's labor rights and the abolition of sexual discrimination. The Managers' Union Tokyo was born out of the crisis so many middle management workers faced in 1993 when restructuring began as a result of the economic recession. The Kanagawa City Union, located in Kanagawa Prefecture south of Tokyo, originally organized Korean migrant workers, but from the mid-1990s started to organize Latin Americans of Japanese descent, who are now the most numerous constituent group of associates (more than a half of a total of around 800 members). These examples give us an idea of the mosaic drawn by diversity based on gender, ethnicity, and employment patterns that the constellation of community unions spread throughout Japan have developed over time. At the same time, the plurality of their agendas means the criteria for unionization is not just limited to occupation or enterprise.

Social Movements: Sohyo and Rengo

The left-wing social forces that emerged in the postwar period were triggered by the democratic political framework instituted by the American occupation forces as they carried out the process of deliberately dismantling the political and social system that led Japan into World War II. However, this strategy was drastically changed in the context of the Cold War. In 1950, a Red Purge was directed against left-wing activism, which had significant consequences on emerging social movements. Sohyo, a labor union with a national structure founded in 1950, played a fundamental role in terms of the political agenda and provided the initiative for community-based labor movements to spring up around Japan as an alternative to enterprise unions. The Godo Roso type of unions constituted under the Sohyo movement in the 1960s were predecessors of community unions. They were an attempt to organize workers with a policy of individual membership, by industrial sector, by occupation, and by region and local community, as a way to improve the grassroots nature of the labor movement.

In 1989 the Sohyo movement was dissolved, and Rengo (Japanese Trade Union Confedera-

tion) was founded. For the labor movement, this effectively established a system which had been in the process of development since the 1960s. It was a consolidation of enterprise unions as the dominant type of labor organization.

Edogawa Union: The Pathbreaking Case

Takagi (1988) first used the expression "community union" to designate these new forms of organizations, quoting from the American community unionism of the United Auto Workers (UAW) in the 1960s. The community union movement arose in the mid-1980s with the Edogawa Union, Tokyo, founded in March 1984, as the pathbreaker. Created by the Edogawa Ward Labor Union Federation (EWLUF), the Edogawa Union was the result of EWLUF efforts to unionize small and micro enterprise workers in the local community through a process of labor consultation and mobilization. This initiative proposed a new way to organize workers by decentralizing unionization from enterprise-based membership to a system of community-based individual membership. Obata (2004) rightly noted that the main objective of the community unions was to organize unstable workers excluded from the scheme of mainstream trade unions and emphasize the community as a place of living as well as employment.

Organizing the Unorganizable?

There are concerns that the institutional framework of the traditional labor union organization has not been able to respond to drastic changes in the social and economic system, such as the flexible production system and accumulation on course, and that new paradigms are needed. In this landscape, the versatile characteristics of organizations like non-government organizations (NGOs) are providing some new perspectives on how to redefine the role of labor unions as social entities. Like American workers' centers, Japanese community unions are basically hybrid, community-based organizations that provide labor consultation and support services, and also operate through alliances and coalitions with NGOs and civil organizations.

The remarkably singular institutional framework established by the Japanese Labor Law permits individual membership and representa-

tion in collective bargaining even if only one worker of a company is a member of the union. This “liberal” institutional framework has provided the basis for the existence of community unions. In addition to this, the initiative of two workers is sufficient to start a new union. This, however, can also be viewed as an indication of the frailty of community unions, since legal reform could clearly have a lethal effect on this type of organization.

With regard to organizing workers from outside the workplace, the need for labor consultation has been the trigger for community union membership in Japan. When faced with a variety of labor problems, such as unfair dismissal, industrial injury, and unpaid wages, workers excluded from traditional forms of labor organization turn to the unions. Through consultation and the resolution of individual matters, community unions are permanently at the frontier, dealing with the changing nature of the labor problems in society. However, their dependence on such a fluid membership base has resulted in chronic budgetary constraints since their finance derives mainly from contributions from settlement money from labor disputes and union dues. Structures such as the local unions of Zenroren, the second largest national center, and Chiiki Union structure of Rengo, the major national confederation, are similar to community unions. This is also true of the General Union, Osaka, affiliated to Zenrokyo, the third largest national center in terms of scale.

As a way to compensate for their atomized character, community unions actively develop networks. These networks can be local, regional, national, union centered, or a combination of any of these. The largest network of community unions is the Community Union National Network (CUNN), with around 70 unions spread throughout almost all regions of Japan, from Hokkaido, the north island, to Kyushu in the south. Formed in 1990, and with a total membership of around 15,000 workers, the CUNN does not have a deliberative role, but through annual national meetings, joint actions, and information exchange, the CUNN amalgamate has atomized power, and this is felt all around the country. It is very difficult for the CUNN, with its loosely structured network, to assume a deliberative role due to the heterogeneity of its members with regard to scale, membership, and regional differences. However, it plays a significant role, as

can be seen in the case of the great earthquake in Hanshin-Awaji, in Kobe Prefecture, in January 1995. The network allowed for rapid mobilization and offered help and labor consultation to the victims. The unionization of numerous workers fired due to the consequences of the catastrophe resulted in the Kobe Workers’ Union becoming the main actor in the CUNN.

Many community unions stayed out of Rengo at the time of its foundation in 1989, in an attempt to preserve and build up a left-wing and locally oriented labor movement. However, in 2003, 11 community unions affiliated to the CUNN founded the Japan Community Union Federation (JCUF). With a total of 11 union members and two observer members, it has a total membership of 3,300 associates (the actual number is around 7,000 associates, but only 3,300 officially pay dues to Rengo). A number of activists within the CUNN are still critical of Rengo, and have remained outside the JCUF system. Nevertheless, the JCUF has effectively served as a bridge between the minority movement network and the National Confederation, which has implications in terms of the resonance it can have in the broader political sphere. In 2005, the candidacy of JCUF’s president, Momoyo Kamo, for Rengo’s presidency brought some fresh air to its “consensual” and bureaucratic electoral process. The winning candidate, she is a former boss of the most “ambitious” Rengo union, the Japanese Federation of Textile, Chemical, Food, Commercial, Service, and General Workers’ Unions, UZENSEN, well known for its know-how in unionizing new members, including part-timers in the service sector, through union shop agreements and its approach to the management side. Her election effectively confronted two different models of unions in internal politics and in the broader political arena. Mrs. Momoyo’s victory was a clear indication of opposition to the possibility of Rengo supporting proposed reforms to the country’s constitution and the consequent remilitarization of Japan.

Another example of how community unions contribute with innovative cases is the challenge to unionize McDonald’s workers, which began in 2006. The pathbreaking case that served as a precedent for McDonald’s workers’ unionization at Rengo was that of a single store manager, a member of the Managers’ Union of the JCUF, who made a claim against overtime exemption

and lengthy working hours and started a legal dispute against the company.

For the future, with an inevitable increase in the number of atypical workers and foreign workers in Japan, and a decrease in labor density, the experiences, experiments, failures, and successes that community unions accumulate over the decades will certainly be of major significance when rethinking the rigid framework of enterprise unionism in Japan. How the mainstream of the labor movement and marginal movements are going to interact, through coalitions and alliances, may be the nodal point for the future of the labor movement of Japan.

SEE ALSO: Japan, Labor Protest, 1945–Present; Sohyo; Zenroren Labor Federation

References and Suggested Readings

- Clawson, D. (2003) *The Next Upsurge: Labor and New Social Movements*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Community Union National Network (CUNN) (1993) *Union Ningen Network*. Tokyo: Dai'ichi Shorin.
- Fine, J. (2005) Community Unions and the Revival of the American Labor Movement. *Politics and Society* 33: 155–99.
- Fine, J. (2006) *Workers' Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Japan Institute of Labor (2003) Rengo Moves Toward Organizing Community Unions. *Japan Labour Bulletin* 42 (5): 3–4.
- Obata, Y. (2004) Achievements and Prospects of the Community Union Movement. *Center for Transnational Labour Studies*, Bulletin No. 9 (November).
- Ogawa, K. (2001) The Organization of Foreign Workers in Japan: A Case Study of the Kanagawa City Union. *Center for Transnational Labour Studies*, Bulletin No. 6 (February).
- Takagi, I. (1988) *Community Union Sengen*. Tokyo: Daiichi Shorin.
- Urano, E. I. & Stewart, P. (2007) Including the Excluded Workers? The Challenges of Japan's Kanagawa City Union. *Working USA: The Journal of Labor and Society* 10 (1): 103–23.

Japan, labor protest, 1945–present

Masao Inoue

It is possible to divide Japan's six-decade postwar labor movement into three distinctive periods. The first lasted from 1948 to the 1973

oil crisis. At this time, during the Korean War and the "Red Purge," the Sohyo Federation (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan), formed under the approving watch of GHQ (General Headquarters of the Allied Powers) and SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers), gradually developed stronger leftist tendencies. At the same time, the Sanbetsu Federation (Japan Council of Industrial Labor Unions), which had ties to the Japanese Communist Party, had declined. Thus, Sohyo was able to play a powerful role in improving labor conditions and was active on various political fronts. The second period lasted from the 1973 oil crisis to the collapse of Japan's bubble economy at the beginning of the 1990s. During this time Sohyo had lost its ability to influence unions in the private enterprise sector, as corporate management undertook rationalization measures in response to the economic recession that followed the oil crisis. In contrast, the Domei Federation (Japan Federation of Labor) and IMF-JC (Japan Council of International Metalworkers' Federation), which were nationwide rightist unions, enlarged their power to boost wages. In line with the policies favored by these rightist labor unions, Japan's two major labor federations, Sohyo and Domei, formed a united front. The third period began in the early 1990s. After Japan's economic bubble burst and for the next ten years, a time known as "the lost decade," Japan's economy found itself mired in the greatest recession since World War II. Corporate restructuring accelerated and economic development in the name of globalization was promoted, but labor unions found themselves unable to devise effective countermeasures to the changes approved over their heads, and thus became insignificant.

First Period (1948–1973)

During the initial postwar period the labor movement, led by the Sanbetsu, which was heavily influenced by the Communist Party, developed into the most aggressive political and industrial action force in the history of modern Japan. For example, unions acquired the power to severely erode the decision-making prerogatives of corporate management. However, a few years after coming into existence, Sanbetsu lost all influence. The reverse-direction occupation policy of GHQ/SCAP and resistance by management, which



An example of the tactics used by protesters in the Japanese labor movement. Here Japanese coal miners, wearing protective clothing, form a human barricade to prevent strikebreakers from entering the Mitsui Miike mine at Kumamoto on May 19, 1960. (Getty Images)

was eager to reconstruct Japan's economy, along with criticism from inside the unions of extreme leftist tendencies and a lack of union democracy, had a crippling effect.

In 1950 Sohyo was founded with the support of GHQ/SCAP to replace Sanbetsu. But with the sudden outbreak of the Korean War and the "Red Purge" of workers presumed to be communists and their sympathizers from public office and the workplace, within one year of its formation Sohyo was in defiance of GHQ/SCAP based on calls for the conclusion of a full-scale peace treaty and voiced objections to rearmament. Sohyo's conversion from a labor organization with a rightist outlook to one that embraced a leftist philosophy, known in Japan as "the chicken to the duck" transformation, was born of a worker consciousness that had become more combative against the background of an international political environment that was starting to crystallize around the Cold War.

The Sohyo movement developed along three dimensions. The first was political confrontation. Sohyo organized a popular movement against the various anti-labor and anti-peace policies of the government, such as military rearmament, and united with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which Sohyo supported, to form the "Japan Socialist Party–Sohyo Block." The second and unsurprising dimension was providing support for improved working conditions through union activism, while the third dimension was campaigning for greater worker control of the workplace.

As for the fight for higher wages, the centerpiece of campaigns to improve working conditions, Sohyo's origination of the *shunto* (annual spring offensives in support of wage increases) is particularly important. The first *shunto* occurred in fall 1954, when in response to a proposal put forward by Kaoru Ohta, the chairman of Gokaroren (Japanese Federation of Energy and Chemistry Workers' Unions), five industrial unions organized a joint fight for higher wages, followed in spring 1955 by eight industrial unions joining together. The *shunto* became a deeply rooted Japanese style of fighting for wage gains because the rightist labor organizations Domei and IMF-JC, formed in 1964, adopted that style for their own springtime wage-hike campaigns.

The *shunto* style can be described as follows. First, powerful unions in the private sector achieve strong wage gains. Second, their success is filtered through the Shitetsusoren (General Federation of Private Railway and Bus Workers' Unions of Japan) and is spread to the Korokyo (Council of Public Corporations and Government Enterprises Labor Unions Council), an umbrella organization for various unions like Kokuro (National Railway Labor Union). Third, the fore-going becomes reflected in the wage-hike recommendations of the National Personnel Authority, which decides national government civil service salaries, a procedure that is also linked to salary decisions for local government employees. Finally, this train-like action influences the annual setting of minimum wages for remaining groups of workers around the country.

In effect, *shunto* functions to establish the social standards that govern pay-raise decisions in Japan. Strongly motivated to boost the wages of workers, *shunto* became a process by which unions demanded uniform pay raises for all enterprises regardless of the type of industry in question. Two conditions made this process possible. The first was uniform pay raises that did not greatly affect competitive conditions between enterprises, and the second was supportive labor market conditions made possible by labor shortages during times of high economic growth.

Sohyo also pioneered various kinds of workplace control, particularly during the labor strife on the shopfloor in the 1950s. In one typical case involving the coal industry, where poor working and health conditions led to a relatively high degree of solidarity among miners, the union for this industry tried to achieve workplace control

by opposing the foreman. In one famous labor action, the Miike labor union of the Mitsui Mining Co. Ltd. successfully maneuvered to control the equal distribution of coalmining work to miners. However, Mitsui Mining fought back, arguing that the union was infringing the management's workplace rights and obstructing growth in productivity. In 1959 it found a way to strike back at the union as the conversion of Japan's national energy policy from coal to petroleum provided an opportunity to make large-scale dismissals of nearly 1,300 people, including powerful union activists. It is clear that the dismissals were intended to weaken the union and its control of the workplace.

At the same time, this particular labor dispute was connected to a broader social conflict over revision of the Japan–US Security Treaty, which developed intensely into Japan's biggest postwar popular political movement. This labor dispute experienced many ups and downs. Some union members who opposed the aggressive policies of the union split away to form a second union and one member was stabbed to death by a criminal gang, while on the other hand the spouses of union members devoted themselves to organizing "housewife associations" and joining the dispute. But after the government in power railroaded a revised Security Treaty through Japan's parliament (the Diet), the opposition to the treaty dissolved and was followed by the defeat of the union in what had been an intense labor dispute for nearly one year.

Following labor's defeat in the Miike dispute, Japan experienced all-out economic growth in the 1960s and Japan largely turned into a mass consumption society. Also, old-fashioned work skills gave way to new skills following a process in which workers on the factory floor were introduced to new mechanical equipment as a result of capital investments in technological innovations. Among workers there was of course some resistance to the changes, but the strong desire for more affluence facilitated acceptance of the new equipment, even though this led to the dilution of labor skills and corporate wage policies that created a tiered wage structure tied to differences in work ability. This desire chipped away at a worker consciousness that Japanese workers shared in common with workers around the world, a consciousness that held that workers should demand the greatest pay for the least amount of work and that it was natural for unions

to control work on the shopfloor. It is the reason why working-class consciousness was weakened and a middle-class consciousness took firm hold among Japanese workers.

This transformation in worker consciousness was rooted in the fact that the labor skills workers possessed were not constituted into a common social system due to the weakness of guild control over craftsmanship during premodern times and the collapse of the vocational education system in modern times. Therefore they came to rely on working hard for a particular company, not on labor unions formed around their particular labor skills. High economic growth acted to weaken working-class consciousness and strengthen middle-class consciousness by offering more chances to workers to demonstrate their work ability. Needless to say, this change in consciousness dovetailed nicely with policies advocated by management that were designed to raise production efficiency. As worker consciousness underwent a major change, unions affiliated with Domei managed to gradually expand their power.

In contrast to Sohyo, Domei and IMF-JC, adhering to a policy of a greater distribution of the fruits of a company's success, cooperated with the effort by corporate industrial management to boost productivity through replacing outdated equipment. This policy conformed with the insatiable drive by workers to raise their standard of living through the acquisition of a large number of consumer goods. Unions under the control of management-friendly Domei achieved a dominant position among unions at large-scale corporations through adroit exploitation of worker self-interest. Most likely, however, the policies pursued by Domei ended up subordinating the needs of workers to the logic of the corporate enterprise. Moreover, because the expansion of Domei-affiliated unions undermined the basis of Sohyo's organized opposition to management, both labor organizations inevitably clashed with each other. Because of Domei, in this way from the late 1960s onward, Sohyo gradually began to lose support among the unions at major private corporations. As a result, Sohyo's main base of organized workers became limited to public sector unions with no connection to market competition, and the unions at small and medium-sized private businesses.

Although workers gradually adopted a more conservative outlook in conjunction with improvements in their standard of living during the

high economic growth period, from 1968 to the beginning of the 1970s university students, feeling too pigeonholed in an increasingly managed society, exploded into rebellion against the stifling supervision of university administrations. The rebellion of youth around the world had a homogeneous character that incorporated the anti-war movement in the US that opposed the Vietnam War and the student movements in France and Germany opposed to the development of a more structured society. The resistance movement in Japan consisted of the “new left,” the children of the anti-Security Treaty movement in 1960, and students unaffiliated with any of the established political parties (the so-called Non-Sect Radicals), young people suffused with anger who were the most sensitive to the changes happening in Japanese society and bursting with a desire for self-expression.

In addition, around 1970 there was an outbreak of multiple pollution-related health disasters, such as Minamata disease, the itai-itai disease, chronic asthma, and many more. Business activities that only had economic growth as the primary objective caused water contamination, air pollution, and other forms of environmental destruction. Intense reactions of grassroots concern in local communities and among the victims of a degraded environment led to cross-examinations of offending companies and of central and local governments to assess who was responsible. Furthermore, in 1971, farmers, supported by students and workers, offered strong resistance to government efforts to expropriate farmland in order to construct a planned international airport in Narita city in Chiba Prefecture. The struggle against the construction of Narita Airport became deeply inscribed in the public’s mind as a result of the intense objections raised to the unilateral exercise by government of its power to take away a community’s livelihood.

Second Period (1974–1990)

In this period the advanced industrialized countries suffered “stagflation,” a combination of inflation and stagnation, due to the oil crisis triggered by the fourth Middle Eastern war in October 1973. In Japan, during the 1974 *shunto*, unions achieved a substantial wage increase of 32.9 percent corresponding to extreme inflation. That led government and business organizations to argue that wage hikes served to accelerate infla-

tion, and so they began a campaign to restrain wage gains in time for the next *shunto* in 1975.

Acting in sympathy with this argument, Domei and IMF-JC moved to exercise self-restraint over pay raises. In the end the wage gains for unionized employees at major companies resulting from the 1975 *shunto* were restricted to an average of 13.1 percent, substantially less than what was demanded. After this IMF-JC took over the leadership of *shunto*, and an abnormal situation settled in which low wage gains continued over the long term even after companies managed to weather the effects of the oil crisis. With defeat now marking campaigns for wage increases, many unions belonging to Sohyo began to call it “the end of *shunto*.” The result was that Domei-affiliated unions, which acquiesced in subordinating worker needs to the logic of enterprise, conversely gained the upper hand in the labor movement, while the idea inspired by Sohyo at the time of the first *shunto* of establishing social standards for wage increases on the basis of the needs of the workers and of continuing to press management as a prerequisite of business activities was weakened.

But this does not mean there was no resistance by labor during this time. From among the Sohyo-affiliated unions at small and medium-sized companies that fell into bankruptcy as a result of the economic downturn induced by the oil crisis, new worker efforts emerged. Under their own form of management and control, unions at shuttered factories sought to guarantee a place of employment for themselves. At the same time, the kind of worker self-management movements that existed in countries like Great Britain and France started to appear in Japan.

In comparison with workers employed by major corporations, the workers at small and medium-sized companies, where wage levels and other working conditions were inferior, searched for ways to manage factories on their own in order to revitalize their companies. These workers found themselves in confrontation with court-appointed administrators and others trying to effect legal bankruptcies, or they shared extremely low-level working conditions based on difficult conditions caused by corporate bankruptcy. This kind of struggle has continued in Japan on a long-term basis for two to three years or in some cases even longer. In the end, some workers managed to finally establish a new small company, where they can then try experimenting with making

democratic decision-making compatible with efficient corporate management amidst severe market competition.

In addition, one important fight from this time that cannot be forgotten was the fight to recapture the right to strike, which is being attempted mainly in regard to Kokuro. Japan's public sector employees lost their right to engage in labor disputes when the civil servant law was reformed in 1948 as a result of the "MacArthur letter" being issued. But in November 1975 Korokyo attempted an extended eight-day strike directed mainly at Kokuro at the same time the Miki Takeo cabinet, the most liberal Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) cabinet ever, was inaugurated. This strike depended on Kokuro launching a tough counter-offensive against a plan that was devised four years earlier by the Japanese National Railways authorities to weaken the power of unions through a productivity improvement drive that was in name only. But faced with hardline opposition to allowing the right to strike from a conservative faction within the LDP, this extraordinary undertaking, known as the "strike to recapture the right to strike," ended in defeat. The defeat of this strike effort reduced the militancy of a powerful public sector union like Kokuro and represented a devastating blow to Sohyo's union base, all of which had a later negative effect on Japan's labor movement.

The existence of this Kokuro union delivered another decisive shock to Sohyo's survival when in 1987 Japanese National Railways was broken up and privatized. When the Suzuki cabinet came into office in 1980, restructuring of government administration in order to achieve fiscal reform without resorting to tax increases was raised as an important policy consideration. The focus became privatization of the Japanese National Railways, which was burdened by an enormous deficit. But behind the scenes was a plan to weaken the power of Kokuro, which had a relatively strong voice in the workplace given its powerful organization abilities.

In 1982, Yasuhiro Nakasone, who succeeded Suzuki as prime minister, acted to limit as much as possible government intervention in the economy in line with the neoliberal policies espoused by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan. Trust was placed in market mechanisms. As privatization of public enterprises was now viewed as an important step in the direction of reforming

government administration, the spotlight was focused on forcing through the breakup and privatization of the Japanese National Railways. Four labor unions affiliated with the Japanese National Railways, which organized to oppose privatization under this process, were unable to cooperate.

Doro (powered vehicle labor union) and other labor unions stopped participating in the campaign of opposition, which resulted in Kokuro being isolated. Moreover, driven by worries about the loss of jobs, union members began to quit Kokuro. Faced with the hardline stance of the central government and the Japanese National Railways authorities, Kokuro convened a special meeting in September 1986 at which time a proposal by the union's executive committee to recognize the breakup and privatization of the Japanese National Railways was denied. When a new executive committee was elected, Kokuro dismembered. Once this schism occurred, more union members resigned, leaving Kokuro with vastly reduced influence in the ranks of Japanese labor.

In sum, Kokuro's battle against the breakup and privatization of the Japanese National Railways was bound to be defeated in the face of intimidation from the government and the authorities. Quite probably Kokuro itself had problems, such as a relaxation of labor discipline among union members who were in a position to exercise control in the workplace. On the other hand, other key factors cannot be ignored. The unsympathetic regard for Kokuro by unions at private companies which had overcome the adverse economic effects of the oil crisis and, similarly, by people who had developed stronger inward-looking conservative tendencies in the wake of the oil crisis played a role in the collapse of the movement to oppose the privatization of the Japanese National Railways. The defeat of Kokuro in its labor struggles marked the beginning of difficulties for unions functioning within Japanese society to maintain a fight with no loss of worker pride.

At nearly the same time as the battle to oppose the Japanese National Railways privatization, a unified Japanese labor front materialized. At one time toward the end of the 1960s there was a discussion about a united labor front, but differences in labor movement philosophy between Sohyo and Domei caused them to collapse. In 1978, however, the need for a unified

labor front, primarily among private enterprise unions, was once again raised by Domei. In reply, Zensendomei (Japanese Federation of Textile, Garment, Chemical, and Mercantile Workers' Unions), a Domei-affiliated union, and Tekkororen (Japan Iron and Steel Industry Labor Union Federation), which was the core union of IMF-JC though a Sohyo member, issued a call in support of the unified front concept to private enterprise unions. At this point, successive *shunto* failures for the labor movement as a result of severe economic conditions provided the reason why a stronger voice was needed in government policy decision-making, in order to achieve better living conditions for workers through favorable economic and social welfare policies. But in addition to this, in the workplaces of private enterprises, differences in union activities resulting from belonging to the two different national federations, Sohyo and Domei, were minimized. Because of the economic downturn caused by the oil crisis, the need to maintain employment functioned to temper existing differences and disagreement in labor union policy toward such matters as rationalization.

Workers were urged to accept the idea that stable company management through stronger corporate competitiveness was a matter of vital importance. As a result, at the end of 1982, Zenminrokyo (All-Japan Private Labor Union Council) was the first united council of unions to form in the private enterprise sector. The organization then began to take harsh action, such as expelling unions that were strongly influenced by the Japanese Communist Party. This led in 1987 to the formation of Minkanrengo (Japan Private Labor Union Federation), an umbrella labor organization of the entire body of unions in the private enterprise sector. Next, 1989 witnessed the dissolution of Sohyo, and Domei, as the main organized labor body in the public sector, was dismantled through the privatization of the Japanese National Railways. Formed in the aftermath was Rengo (Japan Labor Union General Federation), which now serves as the umbrella labor organization for most unions, including those in the public sector.

In resisting labor front unification, the small number of unions under the influence of the Japanese Socialist Party's left wing and the Japanese Communist Party each formed separate small national federations of labor unions. For the present, Rengo's formation is a major event to

the extent that it has managed to subsume the pre-World War II disagreements between labor's left and right. But the result has been a weakening of the independence and the will of Japanese workers to resist. Here it can be seen that, with the passing of the age of affluence, this outcome has become reflected in a change in human values that marks an unmistakable turning point in contemporary thought.

Third Period (Post-1990s)

With the collapse of the bubble economy at the beginning of the 1990s, the Japanese economy became mired in the longest and deepest economic depression since the end of World War II. What has become known as the "lost decade" had arrived, but this was accompanied by other major historical events around the world: the "big story" of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and a form of globalization that was based on spreading an American-style market capitalism. As for the labor movement, it now found itself even more on the sidelines. Faced by a deep economic depression and more competitive markets, Japanese companies accelerated corporate rationalization in order to achieve the cost reductions that would help provide them with a sharper competitive edge. Long-term employment practices were abandoned, the use of new types of employment increased, and performance-based working principles were introduced. The discarding of the custom of long-term employment, a distinctive feature of Japan's longstanding employment system, while decreasing the number of full-time employees and, through an increased division of labor, replacing them with temporary agency workers, contract workers, part-timers, free-floating part-timers, and other kinds of unconventional workers was also accompanied by layoffs of full-time workers unresponsive to the greater number of demands coming from management. Even when full-time employees were retained, another fundamental change in the employment system was the introduction of merit-pay systems tied to short-term business performance results.

The reorganization of the employment system functioned, on the one hand, to augment the work loads of the slimmed-down full-time labor force, and on the other hand to increase reliance on the unconventional employment of women and young people and to further enlarge differences

in the employment structure. In contrast, ignoring the existing slow-moving unions, this base of irregular workers formed community unions, unions for administrative workers, unions for part-timers and temporary workers, or woman-only unions. Furthermore, worker cooperatives sprang up. All of this was a sign that various forms of resistance to unjust corporate layoffs and unilaterally imposed low working conditions had taken root. In what has become a difficult age, this free experimentation with solidarity by workers who are strongly motivated to guard their own employment and lives and attempts by workers to resist discrimination and labor inequalities represent important developments. Also, Rengo, which sits at the center of the nation's labor organization, has become sensitized to these new events and has started to help unionize part-timers and tackle improvements in the labor conditions applicable to unconventional forms of employment. It can no longer afford to overlook the vigorous attempts that are underway to correct workforce disparities and the newly emerging employment problems.

Conclusion

Japan's postwar labor movement generally suffered defeat in the major struggles that took place during the period of high economic growth. An important factor is that for Japanese workers, rather than realizing a vision of life based on forming social bonds with labor unions, the development of a job–workplace–company platform that encourages a sense of self-identity has cleared the way to a certain inherent mentality. Because Japanese managers are promoted from within the rank-and-file they are in a position to be familiar with the humiliation and depression of workers. By talking of the worker mentality in a management context, management has succeeded in converting this depression into energy for the job. The social class divisions between workers and managers are few, but they are strong enough to be a factor in causing brittleness in the Japanese labor movement.

However, as a result, what now faces Japanese workers is the amount of damage done to civic freedoms caused by working hours that are so long that death through overwork has become routine, and by the excessive demands companies endlessly put on their workers. Postwar Japanese workers have been deprived of the “bountiful

times” that bring a modestly affordable lifestyle as well as depth and variety to life.

SEE ALSO: Japan, Community Labor Union Movement; Japan, Post-World War II Protest Movements; Japan, Protest and Revolt, 1800–1945; Japan, Resistance to Construction of Narita Airport; Japan Socialist Party (JSP); Japanese Communist Party; Sohyo; Zenroren Labor Federation

References and Suggested Readings

- Masao, I. (1997) *Shakaihenyo to Rodo* (The Labor Movement under Social Change). Tokyo: Bokutakusha.
 Tsutomu, H. (1997) *Rodo no Sengoshi* (A History of Industrial Relations in Japan, 1945–1989), Vols. 1–2. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press.

Japan, pacifist movement, 1945–present

Ichijo Muto

After Imperial Japan's defeat in World War II in 1945, a broad pacifist social consensus emerged in Japan. By 1995, it came to permeate not just the peace movement, but also social movements in general as their guiding spirit. For decades this pacifism enjoyed majority popular support and served as one of the defining characteristics of post-World War II Japanese state and society.

This pacifism, however, was neither a clearly defined credo nor the sole guiding principle of state and society in postwar Japan. It had to live in chronic conflict with two other factors defining the state – military alliance with the United States and the ruling group's usually concealed allegiance to, and justification of, the Japanese imperial past, both war-friendly and incompatible with pacifism. Indeed, this pacifism has seen concentrated attacks from conservative forces headed by far right political and ideological groups which set out in the mid-1990s to remake the postwar Japanese state into a new type of war-capable regime. They pursued two goals: legitimating the now unconstitutional Japanese military by changing the constitution in order to more fully satisfy US strategic global requirements, and openly reinstating the “glory” of the modern Japanese empire. The postwar pacifist principle is the main obstacle to the achievement of this design.

The Historical Backdrop: Three Factors at Work

This pacifism came into being reflecting a few historical factors that conditioned postwar development in Japan. First, the broadest popular base of this pacifism was the bitter wartime experience of the common people. Three million Japanese died in the 15-year war since the 1931 invasion of Manchuria, and in the last stage of this long war, US aerial bombings devastated most cities in mainland Japan, causing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians. The vast majority of the population also cherished democracy, welcoming the collapse of the wartime military fascist rule that had harshly silenced all free expression. It was by the middle of the 1950s that the broad public consensus favoring peace and democracy settled among the Japanese public. Though broadly based, this pacifism had serious limitations, including the failure to clearly recognize the vast sacrifices and damage Japanese imperialism had inflicted on neighboring Asian peoples and the complicity of the Japanese people in wars and aggression. Other weak factors in this pacifism were a clear understanding of the causes of the war and the urge to identify and punish the individuals and groups responsible for the war.

Second, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki genocides by atomic bombs imparted a unique character to postwar Japanese pacifism: the shared public imagination that the entire Japanese people were nuclear victims and that prohibition of nuclear weapons was the Japanese people's cosmopolitan mission to the rest of the world. This perception, galvanized by the 1954 Bikini incident, gave rise to a very broad movement in favor of the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Third, the constitutional abandonment of war strengthened, and provided a legal ground for, pacifist consensus. The 1946 constitution, known as the Peace Constitution, under Article 9 declared that Japan would abandon war and would not maintain military forces and denied the state's right of belligerency. The US occupation authorities led by General Douglas MacArthur were the first drafters of this constitution. While the US merely wanted by this pacifist clause to demilitarize Japan as a potential enemy, the Japanese people soon reappropriated the constitutional pacifism to resist the US Cold War strategies imposed on them, including remil-

itarization. Under popular pressure, the conservative government adopted a series of peace policy guidelines as "principles," such as three non-nuclear principles (no manufacture, no possession, and no introduction of nuclear weapons) and three principles restricting arms export. The conservative governments did not fully subscribe to pacifism but felt that its use would facilitate their rule over a peace-oriented public.

Japan and Okinawa under US Imperial Strategy

By far the strongest factor faced by postwar Japanese pacifism was Japan's full integration into the system of US imperial dominance through the US–Japan Security Treaty. In 1952, Japan regained independence through the San Francisco peace treaty but simultaneously signed the security treaty accepting continued US military presence. The United States has maintained numerous permanent bases and military troops in Japan since 1945. (The treaty, revised in 1960, still continues today.)

In addition, the occupation authorities ordered the creation of Japanese military forces immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, first ostensibly as a police reserve force. In subsequent decades, however, this so-called self-defense force was built up as the world's third most expensive modern military force, complementing the US forces deployed in Asia-Pacific. From the beginning this military force was unconstitutional, but Japanese conservative governments have managed to find one interpretation after another of the constitutional clause to justify the military build-up. This was not only to better serve US interests but also to fulfill the ruling elites' dream of some day reinstating their gloried imperial past with a full-fledged constitutional armament.

Okinawa, the southwestern chain of islands now belonging to Japan, has traversed a very difficult path in relation to Japan and the United States. Annexed in 1872–9 as an internal colony of Imperial Japan, the people of the former Ryukyu kingdom were subjected to discrimination and poverty. In 1945, when Japan's defeat was imminent, the Tokyo government chose to order a desperate resistance in Okinawa against surging US forces. In the fiercest ground battle fought in World War II, an estimated 120,000

Okinawa civilians were killed and the land was turned to debris. The Japanese army ordered Okinawa civilians to fight with it and ordered them not to surrender, forcing them to kill themselves when the situation became desperate. After conquering the islands, the US turned Okinawa into its military colony, building huge bases which have been used freely for the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraq wars.

Under the San Francisco peace treaty, Japan willingly surrendered to the United States the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of Okinawa, allowing the US to use it as its exclusive military territory. In fact, the early postwar US policy of demilitarizing Japan was predicated on the indefinite US retention of Okinawa as the largest US overseas military citadel to serve its global military requirements.

Though Okinawa reverted to Japan's sovereignty in 1972, the US and Japanese governments agreed to continued American military presence at Okinawa. Even now, 75 percent of the US bases present in Japan are concentrated on Okinawa. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, a series of new US–Japan arrangements for military transformation has been introduced to strengthen the US and Japanese posture of joint military operation, and a new base is being imposed in Okinawa, provoking determined resistance by local people. In their half-century resistance, Okinawa people have developed strong pacifist traditions, thoroughly rejecting any justification of the military.

Anti-Base Action as a Pillar of the Peace Movement

Thus embracing its own version of pacifism, postwar Japan has developed vigorous movements, campaigns, and grassroots resistance pertaining to peace issues. One of the most typical peace struggles has been the anti-military base struggle directed against the presence, expansion, and/or establishment of US bases under the security treaty as well as against Japanese military bases perceived as violations of the peace constitution.

The first wave of anti-base struggle in mainland Japan dates back to the early 1950s when the United States, fighting the Korean War, set out to confiscate fishing people's land for the

expansion and/or establishment of military bases. The forerunner was the fishing community's resistance to the US project of using the beach of Uchinada as a firing ground. This struggle, fought in 1952–3 jointly by peace movement, labor, and other social movements, drew national support and achieved victory. Similar struggles unfurled around US base projects all over the country and culminated in the Sunagawa struggle in 1955–7. This was a dynamic mass resistance by the organized farmers of the affected village of Sunagawa, joined by workers and students, to the expansion of the Tachikawa US air base on the fringe of Tokyo. It finally achieved victory in 1968 when the US scrapped the plan.

The Sunagawa struggle was of landmark significance too because it called into question the constitutionality of the US–Japan military treaty. The Tokyo District Court acquitted those accused of trespass of the US base area by declaring the treaty unconstitutional. This sent a shock wave through the Japanese government. The Supreme Court immediately overturned the Tokyo court verdict, claiming that security treaty matters belonged in the realm of “political judgment” and were not amenable to judicial judgment. Since then the court, using this flimsy legal argument, has systematically evaded judgment over the constitutionality of the US military presence in Japan.

Resistance to Japanese military bases also developed. In a lawsuit filed in Hokkaido against the destruction of forests by the construction of a missile base, local residents won a district court verdict declaring that the self-defense forces were unconstitutional. Again the higher court rejected this by recourse to the same “political judgment” logic as in the Sunagawa case. Since the 1950s it has become the tradition of Japanese progressive movements to take action against strengthened US and Japanese military arrangements, ranging from operation of military bases through visits by US aircraft carriers, to transportation of munitions to Vietnam.

Okinawa Develops its Own Pacifism

The anti-base protest in Okinawa has taken more acute forms than on the mainland. The first major confrontation came in 1956 when the US wanted to establish permanent land

tenure for people's land used for bases. The struggle, known as the "whole island struggle," exploded in island-wide action, forcing the US to retract its policy. Faced with the harsh repression of resistance by the US military authorities, Okinawa people by 1960 started a movement for reunification with Japan, thinking that Okinawa, by "going back" to Japan, would come under the rule of the pacifist constitution. In the subsequent protest against the bases and military rule, particularly during the Vietnam War when Okinawa was used for B52 bombing operations in Vietnam, the anti-base movement in Okinawa developed into a genuine pacifist movement, rejecting the military as murderous machinery under the slogan "Life is the treasure."

Anti-Nuclear Bomb Movement: Hiroshima/Nagasaki

In the early postwar years, the occupation authorities severely restricted reports about the atomic genocide in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Stories, poems, and photos about what happened in the two cities in August 1945 were practically banned and circulated only secretly. So when the occupation ended in 1952, information about the atomic genocides gushed out, shocking the public. In 1954, the US test-exploded a hydrogen bomb on the Bikini atoll in the Pacific, and radioactive fallout affected the crew of a Japanese fishing boat operating outside the danger zone.

This incident, known as the Bikini incident, triggered an unprecedentedly broad popular movement against atomic and hydrogen bombs. The movement, initiated by grassroots women's groups collecting signatures against nuclear tests, spread like wildfire throughout the country, with tens of millions of people signing the petition. On this basis, a national coordinating center was founded, including both conservatives and progressives, eventually leading to the founding of the Japan Council against A&H Bombs (Gensuikyo).

This movement immediately decided to appeal to world public opinion under the slogan "No more Hiroshimas" and ventured to convene a World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs in Hiroshima in 1955. Five thousand people representing a broad spectrum of Japanese society participated with 50 foreign delegates from 11 countries. Survivors of the atomic

bombings (*hibakusha*), neglected for a decade, raised their voice for the first time, coming together to participate in the world conference and to demand protective legislation from the Japanese government.

The issue of nuclear bombs was thus injected into world politics for the first time on the basis of the actual experience of victims. The movement held an annual world conference in subsequent years while serving as the broadest base of the Japanese peace movement. It experienced splits over the Sino-Soviet dispute compounded by socialist/communist rivalry in the 1960s, but has survived into the twenty-first century, holding international anti-nuclear events around August 6 and 9, the dates of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.

Pacifism as Militant Value: The 1960 Anti-Treaty Struggle

Postwar pacifism organically linked with the protection of democracy showed its political edge in 1960 as Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke signed a new security treaty to strengthen Japan's military role in the US Asian strategy. Pacifist ideas had captured the people's imagination, particularly after the emergence of the anti-bomb movement. Besides, the public was on the alert because Kishi was a notorious class-A war criminal who had served as a minister in the Tojo cabinet in 1941. Sensing that the dark ages of war and fascism would return unless they resisted, millions of people stood up to oppose the treaty in the largest political mobilization in postwar Japan.

But the Kishi government railroaded the treaty through parliament while hundreds of thousands of protestors surrounded the Diet building. President Dwight Eisenhower, on his way to Tokyo to celebrate the treaty's ratification, had to cancel his trip as the Tokyo police could not guarantee his safety. Though the new treaty took effect, Kishi was forced to resign, and the ruling groups felt that it would be wise to come to a compromise with pacifism while avoiding confrontation and promising a better life through rapid economic growth.

Radical Upsurge, 1965–1975

This policy worked for some time, and peace, increasingly reinterpreted as the preservation of the status quo, seemed to have lost its militant

edge. However, the doldrums were ended with the outbreak of the Vietnam War, giving rise to a period of global radical activism with anti-war protests, radical students' revolts, a new wave of the feminist movement, and struggles for all kinds of minority rights.

In Japan, a new radical movement targeted at fundamental social change sprang up. It included a number of elements, such as a radical student movement, a new anti-Vietnam War movement, and new left political groups. Postwar pacifism in these turbulent days was revitalized, acquiring a new edge that cut into the status quo. In particular, Beheiren (Peace for Vietnam Committee), an entirely new type of peace movement founded in 1965, totally renovated the idea and style of previous Japanese peace movements. While established social movements, tamed by economic prosperity, were increasingly accepting the status quo, Beheiren, together with other radical movements of the period, criticized the status quo itself as an integral part of the American war in Vietnam and oppressive national and global realities. A loose coalition of groups and individuals, Beheiren denounced Japan's complicity in the Vietnam War by offering bases and logistics. Of the several major non-violent confrontations, the Sagami-hara munitions depot protest in 1972 was typical: thousands of citizens, joined by municipalities, effectively halted transportation of repaired American tanks from the depot to the Yokohama port from where they were to be shipped to the Vietnam front.

A self-critical review of Japan's imperial past, absent in postwar pacifism, started in this period on a socially significant scale. This radical stance stimulated and largely remade the public pacifist tradition, and the Beheiren movement spread quickly, giving rise to spontaneous initiatives and action all over the country. Beheiren surprised the public in 1968 by announcing that it had smuggled to Sweden three US soldiers who had deserted in Japan. This activity to work on American soldiers from Vietnam was continued throughout the Vietnam War period. Many non-violent mass actions were organized against military exercises, weapons transportation to Vietnam, port calls of US aircraft carriers, and the Japanese government's acts of support for the American war.

In the 1970s, after student occupation of campuses and street fights with the police, community-based actions began to spread all over the

country against nuclear power plant and other "development" projects that jeopardized people's lives and environment. In the 1980s the Cold War escalated. When one million people demonstrated in New York in June 1982 for a nuclear freeze, half a million people in Tokyo and 300,000 in Osaka turned out in huge rallies for nuclear disarmament, while a vigorous national campaign developed against the introduction of Tomahawk cruise missiles. But this was the peak for mobilization on peace issues in mainland Japan.

Post-Cold War Militarization: Okinawa Leading Pacifist Resistance

In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, the United States set out to fully mobilize Japan. This involved pressure for rapid militarization through "redefinition of the security alliance," a new process in Japan's militarization accelerated by the post-September 11 US imperial design. This process involved a series of new security arrangements with the United States at the administrative level, beginning in 1997 with new guidelines for US–Japan security cooperation and culminating in the 2005 agreement titled "Transformation and Realignment for the Future," under which the self-defense force command was practically integrated with the US command to engage in joint operations in and beyond Asia. The same process witnessed the rise of the far right in Japanese politics, aiming to abolish Article 9 of the pacifist constitution. The US and the Japanese far right, despite their different visions and motivations, concurred on this point and cooperated to uproot the postwar pacifist principle from Japanese soil.

The new scheme to strengthen US military bases all over Japan kicked off a fresh wave of anti-base action. This was again spearheaded by protest in Okinawa, where in 1995, a major anti-base struggle rocked both the Tokyo government and Washington following the rape of a 12-year-old-girl by US soldiers. Washington and Tokyo felt they had to do something in response to this situation and began to talk about "alleviating the burden on Okinawa." Under this pretense, however, the US and Japanese governments agreed to build a new US marine base to replace an old one that had to be scrapped.

Protest against the construction of the base off the coast of Henoko beach soon became a focus

of the anti-base movement. From November 2004 through September 2005, Okinawa activists and community members, with supporters from overseas as well as other parts of the country, engaged in daily non-violent action at sea, using canoes and boats to obstruct sea-bottom drilling work for the base project.

Faced by growing opposition, the Japanese government had to abandon this plan. But under the 2005 arrangement, the US and Japanese governments decided to build a larger base, of a different design, close by the original site. The struggle was resumed against this new project in 2007. The Okinawan movement is in solidarity with anti-base movements in and beyond Asia and the Pacific through its close links with a new global anti-base network formalized in March 2007 in Ecuador.

The 2005 security arrangement with the US involves reorganization and reinforcement of major US military bases in mainland Japan, too. The main US military facilities for reorganization include the Yokosuka naval base, Atsugi naval air base, Yokota air base, Iwakuni marine air base, Zama army base, and Sagami-hara army base. All of these base-strengthening steps are opposed by local communities, headed in most cases by mayors and municipal offices. Committed to the new strategic role assigned by Washington, the Japanese government is using a carrot and stick approach to impose its plans on local people.

Compared to a few decades ago, the pacifist base of Japanese society has been considerably eroded. But it continues to hold out against the far right offensive and US military demands, so much so that in opinion polls, around 60 percent of the population want to keep Article 9 intact. As the Liberal Democratic Party is pressing revision of the constitution within a few years, a major confrontation over pacifism is likely.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Campaign, Britain; Anti-Nuclear Movement, Japan; Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Anti-Nuclear Protests, Marshall Islands; Japan, Post-World War II Protest Movements; Japan, Protest and Revolt 1800–1945

References and Suggested Readings

- Dower, J. (1999) *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Gerson, J. (1995) *With Hiroshima Eyes: Atomic War, Nuclear Extortion, and Moral Imagination*. Gabriola Island, British Columbia: New Society Publishers.

- Hein, L. E. & Selden, M. (1997) *Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age*. Armonk, NY: East Gate Books.
- Hersey, J. (1985) *Hiroshima*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Ichiyo, M. (2006) Japan's Willing Military Annexation by the United States. *Japonesia Review* 2, People's Plan Study Group, Tokyo.
- Ichiyo, M. & Reiko, I. (1985) Beyond the New Left. *AMPO* 17 (2–3).
- Lifton, R. D. (1968) *Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima*. New York: Random House.
- Yamamoto, M. (2004) *Grassroots Pacifism in Post-War Japan: The Rebirth of a Nation*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Japan, post-World War II protest movements

Yohichi Sakai

The Japanese imperialist and colonial war waged against China from 1931 and expanded into Southeast Asia and the Pacific region in 1941 was brought to an end, not internally through a popular revolt or uprising by Japanese workers or soldiers, but by Emperor Hirohito's declaration of Japanese surrender and acceptance of the Potsdam Ultimatum issued by the United States, United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union on August 15, 1945.

The US military occupation began at the end of August, and the instrument of Japanese surrender was signed at the beginning of September. The domination of Japan by the General Headquarters (GHQ) under the Allied Occupation supreme commander Douglas MacArthur started as an indirect rule, with the GHQ directing and controlling the Japanese governmental administrative machinery, including the emperor. When Imperial Japan surrendered, there were two major sources of possible social explosion, the urban working masses and rural peasants under the landlord–tenant system. The response of both workers and peasants to their new, highly exploitative situation was not immediate.

Japan began to industrialize in the 1930s, growing to over six million workers in factories, mines, and transport in 1941. This new proletarian industrial workforce had no experience of generalized mass activities under Imperial Japan's despotic and repressive regime. The peak unionization rate was 7.9 percent, out of

4.67 million workers in 1931, and the highest number of workers who participated in labor dispute actions was 123,000 out of 6 million workers in 1937, when the unionization rate was 6.9 percent. Furthermore, the left-wing currents of the workers' movement were severely repressed by the state. The pro-communist union movement was virtually destroyed by the mid-1930s, and the non-communist left-wing union federation was banned in 1937.

The remaining right-wing organization, Nihon Rodo Sodomei (Labor Confederation of Japan), was dissolved in 1940 and the state-controlled Sangyo Hokoku Kai (Industrial Patriotic Federation) and its local unit organizations were established among the workers in 1941. Thus, the subjective condition of the organized workers' movement was rather challenging, even though the unorganized mass workers had a profound capacity for militant explosion and far-reaching aspirations from late 1945 to early 1947.

Japanese agriculture was marked by a specific landlord-tenant system. In 1940, tenant farmers numbered almost 1.5 million (27.1 percent) and tenant farmers with some rights to the land numbered 2 million (42.1 percent) of 5.6 million farm households. The total cultivated area was over 6 million *cho* (*cho* = 0.99 hectare), and the tenanted area was over 2.7 million *cho* (45.5 percent). It is estimated that there were 386,000 landlords, and that 1.284 million *cho* and 1.119 million *cho* of the tenant land were owned respectively by 99,000 landlords holding from 1 to 5 *cho* of tenanted land, and 287,000 landlords holding more than 5 *cho*. Of these, 220,000 were non-cultivating, "parasitic" landlords in 1940. The annual average tenant rent was 50.6 percent of the yearly harvest in the case of rice paddies. By 1939, more than 200,000 farmers were organized, and the left-wing currents were reflected in the majority in peasant unions from the mid-1920s to the 1930s. Thus, the peasant movement seemed better positioned than workers' movements at the time of the 1945 Japanese defeat in the Pacific War.

Following Imperial Japan's surrender, with a devastated economy, hyperinflation, and deepening economic crisis, the ruling institutions lost political legitimacy. The bourgeoisie and business managers were also thrown into disarray with the US occupation and the imposition of GHQ's policies over Japan. In these circumstances, the social power of workers and peasants was tested

and confronted by the US policies from 1946 to 1947.

Economic Crisis and Rise of the Working Masses

At the start of the Pacific War, the whole economy and workforce were already under heavy strain; mining and manufacturing production marked its peak in 1939-41, stagnated in 1943-4, and was damaged heavily by massive US air raids in 1945 and by the first B-29 raids of North Kyushu and Tokyo in June and November 1944. Both cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were wiped out by the US A-bombs, and another 117 cities were burned and destroyed extensively by US air raids. More than 2 million houses were burned, and about 9 million people lost their dwellings. After the war, the closure of military plants, paralysis of general production, massive demobilization of the Imperial Army, and repatriation of overseas soldiers and civilians left some 13 million unemployed out of a total Japanese population of 72 million. Concomitantly, in 1947, agricultural production dropped to 76 percent of the 1934-6 average.

The economic crisis greatly increased human misery. First, food shortages became acute, especially in urban areas. Then, the production of coal dropped sharply, and the consequent shortage of the major source of energy became a serious bottleneck for the whole economy. Just after the war, the importation of industrial raw materials was ended, and production was sustained by the stock of raw materials, which were becoming scarce in the fall of 1946. In this atmosphere, wholesale and consumer prices soared and inflation skyrocketed. The government implemented measures to freeze bank deposits, to switch over to the new bank notes, and to limit cash holdings of all the wage earners and households in February 1946. The government's fiscal policy remained inflationary, with the added burden of financing the GHQ's procurement of goods and services.

The GHQ dissolved the *zaibatsu* enterprise system, purged a considerable number of top-level managers, and liberalized trade union activities. Japanese foreign trade was monopolized completely by the GHQ, and Japanese businesses were prohibited from international commerce. When the war ended the Japanese government owed business enterprises about 96 billion yen,

and the GHQ ordered the government to nullify the obligation. The result was extremely wide-scale and radical financial restructuring of the enterprises and financial institutions. Under these circumstances, the capitalist class was in deep disarray without a definitive power structure or clear future economic prospects, and industrial workers and toiling masses were neglected and abandoned by the government and bourgeoisie.

The first workers to rise up after the defeat were Chinese and Korean forced laborers in the Japanese mining industry. About 1 million Koreans and 40,000 Chinese workers were brought to Japan under duress as forced labor during the Pacific War, mostly in coal mining. After the war Koreans and Chinese were forced to remain in coal mine internment camps; they organized themselves at the site and mobilized their colleagues in other mines.

The Koreans and Chinese were not the only workers to organize. Due to the extinction of war production, about 4 million workers were dismissed from factories, and some engaged in organized opposition to the massive dismissal. In general, however, only after the GHQ attempted to “democratize” Japan and bring about broad reforms did working masses begin exploding into struggles and founding trade unions. Mine workers began unionizing under the influence of Korean and Chinese laborers, and went on strikes in early October 1945. At the end of 1945, some 66,000 coal miners were organized into 40 unions in Hokkaido, and about 141,000 miners were organized into the 96 unions throughout Japan.

Soon after, journalists and workers of the Yomiuri Newspaper Company, one of the three major nationwide daily newspaper firms, formed a union and demanded the resignation of the firm’s president and all members of top management due to their culpability in the war, democratic reform of the management structure, and improvement of working conditions. However, the demands were rejected and five representative figures from among the journalists and workers were instantly dismissed by the company president; about 2,000 journalists and workers in the firm then declared and implemented direct control over editing and publication of the daily newspaper on October 25, 1945. Naturally, the contents of the daily became significantly more politically progressive and popular.

When the GHQ ordered the Japanese government to arrest war crimes suspects on December 2, Yomiuri’s president himself was on the list, and the dispute ended with total victory for the journalists and workers after nearly 50 days of worker control over the newspaper. The Yomiuri labor dispute and the journalist and worker control of the daily significantly influenced the broader working masses, setting an exemplary pattern for workers’ struggles to follow.

After these efforts, the working masses rose up and unionized at a phenomenal rate beginning in November 1945. The number of unionized workers increased from 1,000 at the end of September to more than 450,000 by year’s end. In 1946, about 500,000 workers were unionized anew each month in January, February, April, and May, and 1 million alone in March 1946.

The explosive labor uprising and unionization of working masses were primarily spontaneous. At the same time, the process was led and organized largely by the Communist Party (CP), and to a lesser degree by the pro-Socialist Party (SP) veteran trade unionists who had been active in the 1930s. The broad layer of newly formed militant activists flowed into the Communist Party, which grew from 1,083 members in December 1945 to over 200,000 in 1949. Thus, the CP became a powerful left-wing force spearheading the working class. The CP’s initial organizational policy was to set up blue-collar and white-collar factory committees and promote industrial unions based upon the principle of “one union at one factory/establishment” under a national federation.

The preparatory caucus for a new federation of industrial unions was established by major industrial and regional groupings of unions in February, and the Zennihon Sangyobetsu Rodokumiai Kaigi (Sanbetsu Kaigi: Congress of Industrial Unions of Japan) was founded by 21 industrial unions, with a membership of 1.621 million workers, representing 43 percent of all the unionized workers, in August 1946. Upon its founding, Sanbetsu Kaigi was already the driving force and active majority of the entire workers’ movement, and under the firm grip of militant CP trade unionists.

Concurrently with the CP’s activities among the working masses, the pro-SP group of veteran trade unionists worked for their own trade union federation. In October 1945, an organizing group of the Central Preparatory Committee

for Trade Union Organization was established by right-wing trade unionists around Komakichi Matsuoka, the former president of the Nihon Rodo Sodomei (Labor Confederation of Japan) and left-wing activists around Minoru Takano, a leading member of the banned Nihon Rodokumiai Zenkoku-Hyogikai (National Council of Trade Unions of Japan). Eventually, the group founded the Nihon Rodokumiai Sodomei (Sodomei: Japan Confederation of Trade Unions) with a membership of about 650,000 workers in August 1946, and its leadership body was dominated by the right-wing figures around K. Matsuoka, its new president. The Sodomei was structured as a centralized organization primarily through its regional components of prefectural federations, although it included several national and regional industrial unions.

The common demands of the unions were recognition and rights of collective bargaining and industrial action, a steep pay increase to account for hyperinflation, and the eight-hour workday. Unions also demanded and pressed for radical reforms of management structures, removal of high-handed management personnel, abolition of blue-collar and white-collar discrimination, revocation of dismissal, and prior agreement by concerned employees and unions on the matter of personnel changes and working conditions.

Peasants' Movement and Agrarian Land Reform

After the surrender of Japan, peasants' rice delivery to the government dropped sharply, so the government made rice delivery compulsory in February 1946. A peasant campaign for voluntary delivery developed in response. The organizing effort also called for fair and democratic allocation of delivery quotas and popular democratization of village administrative bodies and agriculture organizations. Tenant peasants also fought for a decrease in rent payments. Under the circumstances, the organization of peasants proceeded rapidly, and Nihon Nomin Kumiai (Nichino: Japan Peasant Union) was founded as a unified organization of the pro-SP and pro-CP currents, with more than 100,000 peasants in 1946, growing to over 3 million, more than half of the 5.702 million farming households, by 1947.

The Japan Peasant Union was primarily a tenant peasant organization, which initially did

not conceive of radical land reform. The GHQ project of Japanese land reform, however, called for larger changes as the most secure foundation for building a sound democracy and the most reliable barrier against the pressure of extremist ideas. Thus, the GHQ initiated its own land reform that set the general course of peasant activities thereafter, bringing the peasant masses into the GHQ's democratization program and hampering the potential for an alliance of workers and tenant peasants. The GHQ's Land Reform Law was enacted in October 1946, setting the upper limit of land holding by the resident but non-cultivating landowner at 1 *cho* (5 *cho* in Hokkaido) and providing that all the tenant land owned by the absentee landowners would be bought up by the government and sold to the tenant peasants. From 1947 to 1950, 1.74 million *cho* of farm land was bought from landowners and 1.93 million *cho* sold to peasants. The proportion of tenant land of the total farm land decreased from 45.9 percent in 1945 to 10.1 percent in 1950, and the proportion of landowning farmers increased from 32.8 percent in 1946 to 61.9 percent in 1950.

Workers' Production Control and its Potential

As for the industrial actions by unions in this period, workers' and employees' control of the production or business operation played quite an important role. Following the Yomiuri journalists' and workers' control of newspaper production, about 2,500 workers of Keisei Dentetsu, a local electric railway company, set up a union, which took control of all railway operations on December 11, 1945, leading to free transport services for four days. The union demanded recognition of the right to collective bargaining, a five-times wage increase, shorter working hours, resignation of top management officers, and establishment of a joint management council. Workers' control of the railway operation ended with the union's complete victory on December 29.

From January 10 to 29 the following year, 2,000 employees of the Nihon-Kokan Tsurumi Ironworks followed suit, winning an eight-hour workday and the elimination of management's presence on the shop floors. Large-scale organizing also ensued among production, business, and production control operations, including

Tokyo Shibaura Engineering Works (14,000 employees, January 12–29, 1946), Kanto Power Distribution (16,000 employees, January 16–26), Toho Eiga (a movie firm: 6,000 employees, March 23–April 6), Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship's coal mines (19,700 miners, April 2–June 7), Tohoku Power Distribution (50,000 employees, May 4–26), and the traffic, waterworks, construction, and other departments of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (41,000 employees, June 21–30). In all these cases, worker and employee control of production and business operation was adopted and carried out as a means of ending labor disputes combating horrendous economic conditions and high-handed or irresponsible management practices.

Hiroshi Hasegawa, CP Political Bureau member in charge of trade union activities, has argued, however, that these gains had limits. Through the production control struggles, workers obtained the right of veto on management's decisions concerning dismissal, hiring, redeployment, and matters of working conditions. They also gained the right to intervene in management decision-making in general and were able to restrain some management prerogatives. Indeed, the struggles for production control signified the beginning of working-class struggle toward the socialist revolution. The problem, however, was that the anti-capitalistic revolutionary perspective of production and business control was not defended and promoted positively, nor was the awareness of this anti-capitalist potential propagated actively among the worker activists and broader working masses.

Indeed, the production control struggles required the broader nationalization of major industries and generalized workers' control of production and the working-class struggle for its own government. But the CP's orientation upheld the moderate framework of "democratic revolution," with no room for anti-capitalist elements in its strategic program. As for Sanbetsu Kaigi, which was under the tight influence of CP activists, its platform was fundamentally "democratic" too. While those unions that fought the production control struggles mostly joined the industrial federations that were established by Sanbetsu Kaigi, and though the latter earnestly defended the struggles for control of production and business operations, its platform said nothing about nationalizing major industries and worker control of production.

GHQ's Policy Shift

In tandem with the workers' and peasants' movements, popular unrest began to spread. Street demonstrations, mass rallies, various campaigns for securing food supplies, and defense of production control spread from late 1945 through spring of 1946. Though spontaneous and embryonic, elements of the dual-power situation were emerging sporadically at the workplace and in the streets. The Japanese machinery of state and government were thrown into deep crisis with the dismantling of the military force of the Imperial Army.

On May 1, the first May Day after the Japanese surrender, 500,000 people rallied at the Imperial Palace Plaza in Tokyo, and there were 2 million participants nationwide. The popular mobilization reached its peak at the Foodstuffs May Day as 250,000 people gathered at the Imperial Palace Plaza demanding an adequate supply of food, popular control over all foodstuffs, and the formation of a democratic government by the SP and CP, based upon the democratic front of trade unions, peasants' organizations, and cultural associations.

The rising tide of massive workers' struggles entered a critical phase in which the workers' movement collided head-on with the GHQ and its global policy. The GHQ's orientation was a government system of parliamentary democracy with the social order of a capitalist economy; however, the workers' struggles for production control and the popular street mobilizations were becoming a serious threat to the GHQ's global policy, both socially and politically.

The GHQ's political project was to introduce a moderate system of parliamentary democracy after dismantling the highly oppressive *ancien régime* of Imperial Japan. The GHQ had handed its own draft of the new constitution to the Japanese government in February, and the April 1946 general election was an important step toward the new Japanese regime of parliamentary democracy. The GHQ could not allow the mass activities of working people to disturb the realization of the new parliamentary democracy and formation of a government based on the newly elected lower house. The GHQ would permit the Japanese people a democracy that was neither unconditional nor unlimited, and the mass activities of working people and workers' movements in general would be subject to US

objectives and contained within the limits of parliamentary bourgeois democracy.

Under these circumstances, George Acheson, US member of the Allied Council for Japan, an advisory body to the Allied Occupation supreme commander, denounced the CP's activities, while supreme commander Douglas MacArthur denounced the popular mobilization under the CP leadership as a major threat to the "orderly government" and "future evolution of Japan." The GHQ's tolerant policy toward the Japanese workers' movement since October 1945 came to an end in May 1946, setting off a new period of confrontation between the bloc led by GHQ with the Japanese government and the bourgeoisie against the CP-led militant wing of the mass workers' movement under Sanbetsu Kaigi.

The GHQ's policy shift to containing the radicalizing workers' movement was a crucial factor in resolving the prolonged political crisis in Japan, leading to the establishment on May 22, 1946 of a new Liberal Party and Progressive Party government under the premiership of Shigeru Yoshida. The new government sought to restrain and push back growing worker struggles, laying the basis for capitalist economic reconstruction, with GHQ's backing.

Under the Yoshida government, an imperial ordinance on the punishment of violations of the Occupation's objectives was issued on June 12, and the government decreed a "maintenance of social order" statement denying production control as a rightful means of industrial dispute. The Imperial Diet then passed a Land Reform Law restricting labor disputes in public service sectors such as transport, post and telecommunication, water, electricity and gas supply, and medical care and public health, and depriving non-blue-collar government employees of the right to undertake any worker actions. The enactment of this law was a preventive measure against the rising workers' struggles.

Concurrently in June, the GHQ raised an objection to the content of the Yomiuri newspaper, hoping to suppress its progressive editorial policy. In mid-June, the firm demanded that six leading members of the October–December struggle for control of newspaper production quit the firm, a request the union rejected. The journalists and workers split over the demand for dismissal. The firm mobilized their goon squad and the police intervened forcibly in the

dispute. In July, the firm issued relocation orders to 17 journalists, and the union took control over the printing facilities and went on strike. Publication of the paper was suspended for four days, and the factory was taken over by the firm and the pro-firm group, protected by the GHQ military police and Japanese policemen. Thus, the GHQ succeeded in eliminating progressive content from the daily newspaper through the second Yomiuri dispute, intervening in the Hokkaido-shinbun (Hokkaido Newspaper) with similar results.

Workers' Responses and the Sanbetsu Kaigi October Campaign

While workers' actions were generally based on worksites or individual enterprises from late 1945 to the middle of 1946, their actions and struggles became more organized, industrial, and nationwide in the latter half of the year, and, concurrently, strike actions became more numerous and common than the production control struggles, though the latter remained an important form of industrial action through 1947.

Workers of the Japan National Railways (JNR) and seamen fought against mass dismissal plans in September. Sanbetsu Kaigi supported the JNR workers and seamen's struggles, and several Sanbetsu Kaigi unions set up a joint struggle committee with the JNR workers and the seamen. The transport ministry planned to dismiss 129,000 JNR workers. Opposing the mass dismissal, Kokutetsu Soren decided to go on strike on September 15, 1946, but there was a fierce internal conflict between the unyielding militant current and the pro-management current. However, the militant current built up its readiness for the September 15 railway strike, and joint activities with the Sanbetsu Kaigi unions developed simultaneously. Finally, the transport ministry withdrew its entire dismissal plan on the eve of the strike action. Similarly, the shipping industry, which had been severely damaged in the Pacific War, planned to dismiss 43,000 seamen. In this case, a strike led by the All Japan Seamen's Union and the joint struggle committee of the Sanbetsu Kaigi unions prevented the entry of 80 percent of large-sized vessels and 90 percent of smaller boats, leading to a complete labor victory over the ship owners.

At the same time, the Yoshida government and big businesses were seeking to enforce a fixed

ceiling on wages and to carry out structural rationalization of major industries with mass dismissal of workers. In confrontation with the government and businesses, following the JNR workers' and seamen's struggles, Sanbetsu Kaigi and its component unions and federations waged a vigorous offensive campaign, demanding full employment, a minimum wage based on the cost of living, abolition of the wage ceiling of 500 yen a month, an eight-hour workday, end of sexual discrimination, industry-wide collective agreements, abolition of the earned-income tax, repeal the Labor Relation Adjustment Law, establishment of unemployment insurance and social security, and protection against strikebreaking.

This October 1946 campaign was successful overall: the working masses blocked the businesses' attempts at mass dismissal, and workers' job security was improved. The government's 500-yen wage ceiling was broken down, and the monthly wage rose to the level of 1,000 yen. The workers achieved better working conditions such as the eight-hour labor system, and their rights to trade union activities were secured.

Climax of Class Conflict: Attempted General Strike

The Sanbetsu Kaigi October campaign was waged mostly by the private sector unions, whose workers received considerable wage rises: 33 percent and 17 percent increases respectively from the levels of July and September 1946. However, the wages of government and public workers and employees were pegged at the level of July 1946 under the hyperinflationary situation, and their wages were roughly less than half of private sector wages in November. Thus, workers and employees in the government and public sector began taking action, becoming the main forces of battle in a direct confrontation with the government from December 1946 to January 1947, opening the way for an attempted general strike on February 1, a climax of class conflict.

In the middle of October, 8,000 delegates representing 320,000 primary and middle-school teachers held their national convention (Zenkyoso), which decided on the demands to be presented to the government and set up its national struggle committee. At the end of October, Zenteisin Rodokumiai (Zentei: Japan Postal and Telecommunication Workers' Union)

held its national congress to decide its demands, which were submitted to the government in November. In the same month, Kokutetsu Rodokumiai Sorengokai (Kokutetsu Soren: Federation of National Railway Workers' Unions) held its national congress and agreed to wage a campaign against the government jointly with Zenkyoso and Zentei. Also in the same month, Zenkoku Kanko Shokuin-Rodokumiai Kyogikai (Zenkankorokyo: National Conference of Government and Public Employees and Workers' Unions) and Zenkoku Kokyodantai Shokuin-Rodokumiai Rengokai (Zenkoren: National Federation of Public Bodies Employees' and Workers' Unions) submitted their respective demands to the government, which largely rebuffed the workers.

Finally, Zenkankocho Kyodotoso-iinkai (Zenkankocho Kyoto: Joint Struggle Committee of All Government and Public Sector Unions) was set up by those national unions and federations at the end of November. Its joint demands were for a minimum wage of 650 yen, payment of the year-end allowance, cash payment of all wages and allowances, abolition of income tax on wages, raising the exemption point of consolidated income tax to 30,000 yen, abolition of the Labor Relations Adjustment Law, elimination of discriminatory treatments, conclusion of collective bargaining agreements, payment of a "cold zone" allowance, and no wrongful discharges.

Zenkankocho Kyoto was composed of Kokutetsu Soren (533,000 national railway workers), Zentei (380,000 postal and telecommunication workers), Zenkyoso (328,000 teachers), Zenkankorokyo (83,000 government and public workers), Zenkoren (230,000 public body workers), and another eight unions and federations in the government and public sector. There were about 1.8 million workers and employees as a whole within those unions when in mid-January 1947 the joint struggle committee issued its declaration for a general strike for February 1.

The strike never materialized, but the striving for such a broad-based action was the most advanced and centralized mass worker struggle in the period following the Japanese surrender. The collapse of the February 1, 1947 general strike had damaging consequences for the centralizing momentum of the mass workers' movement in Japan, which was gaining prominence through 1946 to the aborted February 1 general strike. Subsequently, a trend toward decentralization was

evident within the workers' movement, while the spontaneous mass militancy of workers remained largely unaltered.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Japan; Anti-Nuclear Movement, Japan; Japan, Labor Protest, 1945–Present; Japan, Pacifist Movement, 1945–Present; Japan, Protest and Revolt, 1800–1945; Japan, Resistance to Construction of Narita Airport; Japan Socialist Party (JSP); Japanese Communist Party; Sohyo; Zenroren Labor Federation

References and Suggested Readings

- Carlile, L. E. (2004) *Divisions of Labor: Globality, Ideology, and War in the Shaping of the Japanese Labor Movement*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Hyodo, T. (1997) *Rodo no Sengoshi* (A History of Industrial Relations in Japan, 1945–1989), Vols. 1–2. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press.
- Inoue, M. (1997) *Shakaihenyo to Rodo* (The Labor Movement under Social Change). Tokyo: Bokutakusha.
- Oinas-Kukkonen, H. (2003) *Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility: Changing US Attitudes toward the Japanese Communist Movement, 1944–1947*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Scalapinio, R. A. (1975) *Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-War Japan: The First Attempt*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Japan, protest and revolt, 1800–1945

Janet E. McClellan

In Japan the period of the Industrial Revolution spanned two phases of critical social and political periods that included the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603–1868) and the Meiji Restoration (1868–1912). The examination of peasant, union, and labor uprisings and strikes includes the study of oppressive taxation burdens imposed by officials and the combined malfeasance of taxing authorities and ministerial officials in complicity with the social/political elites in the repression of laborers. Specifically, a series of revolts occurred from 1800 to 1884 when regional crop failures together with excessive taxation and official malfeasance threatened the livelihood and lives of the populace and effectively brought about the end of the Shogunate period and the rise of the Meiji Restoration. The Meiji Restoration was followed by a steady progression of the nation toward militarism (1912–45).

Japan Militarism and Opposition, 1874–1945

For more than 70 years Japan marched toward an ever-deepening militaristic posture. Beginning in 1874 with the Taiwan Expedition and proceeding through the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1900), the First Sino-Japanese War (August 1, 1894–April 17, 1895), Russo-Japanese War (February 10, 1904–September 5, 1905), Manchuria Invasion (1931–2), Second Sino-Japanese War (July 7, 1937–September 9, 1945), the Korean Occupation (1910–5), World War I (1914–17), and finally World War II (1941–5), Japan's cultural environment and political expectations were dominated by expansionism in the Asian theater.

Socialists, Communists, and Labor Organizations

Although a system of labor and skill guilds had existed for centuries in Japan, the emergence of the modern union movement was spurred by the encouragement and involvement of socialist intelligentsia and an emerging Japanese Communist Party. The transition of guilds to labor organization was perceived as a threat to the newly industrializing nation. The rise of a new Japanese intelligentsia, educated middle class, and socio-economic laborer class (1886–1945) took place in the expanding industrialization and modernization of the Japanese nation. However, those movements clashed with the underlying political maneuverings in the government during the Meiji Restoration. The aggressive remaking of the emperor as the head of state supported by former beneficiaries of the shogunate system, the military, and emerging industrialists during the Meiji period was the impetus to the rise of a modern military-industrial governmental complex.

Through the enactment of the Public Peace Police Law that prohibited organized and unionized strikes and banned all peaceable gatherings of groups in order to prevent the disruption of law and order, the response to any dispute, strike, or protest that was perceived as threatening to the harmony of the country was delegated for investigation and resolution by the Japanese government to the police and secret police (Kempeitai). The police forces possessed detailed knowledge of citizens (through a system of records and informers) and were respected and feared by them for their ability to enforce the laws; as such,

the prospect of police intervention, detention, and prosecution of “troublesome persons” was justifiably feared (Scalapino 1983). Moreover, the Peace Preservation Law empowered the government to maintain surveillance of citizens’ thoughts and behaviors, thereby repressing “dangerous” thoughts (e.g., socialism and communism). Restrictions on freedom of speech were thus intensified. In the 1930s under the sway of the militarists, all protests that were union or anti-war inspired were effectively smothered.

Japanese War Protests (1874–1945)

The governmental promotion of nationalism and patriotism and the increasing importance of world political influence undermined anti-war sentiments and efforts by union organizers and socialist and communist organizations. Moreover, those who did protest in small or larger ways against the government found themselves at odds with the new constitution, legislation, and police enforcement tactics, and were subjected to arrests and imprisonment. Dissenting political organizers and individuals were imprisoned or disappeared. By 1940, the trade union movement had disappeared from Japan. It was not until after World War II that labor unions and competing political parties and ideologies began to reemerge.

Labor Strikes and Insurrections

What is known as the Industrial Revolution, its spread throughout various countries, and the chronicling of its effects on economies, industries, political regimes, and the lives of laborers does not lend itself to a recitation of clearly articulated seminal events. The study and weighting of impacts of the Industrial Revolution present a non-linear assortment of stimulations and influences that frequently depended on the social, economic, and historically critical industrial base of a particular country. Moreover, the spread of the Industrial Revolution was not unaffected by other prevailing historical events (war, political and environmental events) of the periods marking various phases of the Industrial Revolution (1708–1914). In the early phases of the Industrial Revolution (1707–1850), dramatic alterations occurred in the economic prospects of workers, expanding the variety of work and employment opportunities and altering the outlook of factory and non-factory citizens.

In the Meiji Restoration, the old guilds maintained their hold on the industrial and pre-industrial workers in the skilled and semi-skilled trades (e.g., miners, woodcutters, plasterers) prior to 1884 but were dominated by the legacy of the feudal paternalistic relationship between employer and laborer that was imbued with a marked propensity for worker loyalty and deferential response to employer demands. However, as the industrialization of Japan spread, bringing new tools, equipment, technologies, and methodologies of production, workers’ obsequious responses were reduced. Transformations began to take place and unions that focused on the economic, social, and cultural well-being of laborers began to emerge. As industries altered the economic landscape of the country, the prospects of workers were similarly altered, expanding the variety of work and employment opportunities and changing the outlook of laborer citizens with educational possibilities, increased longevity, access to beneficial material goods, and rising social expectations (Cullen 2003; Gordon 2003; Rohl 2005).

In 1898, a strike occurred at the great Nippon Railway company and the strike fever spread to other industries throughout the country. A series of nearly 20 strikes in 1898 involved workers engaged in mining, iron production, furniture making, and silk dying. The most significant unions to emerge initially in Japan were the Iron Workers’ Union, founded in 1897, and the Railway Engineers’ and Firemen’s Union, founded in 1898. The first unions in Japan were industrial unions and did not spread beyond more than a few of the major industries, for example, iron workers, maritime trades, railroading, and mining. In 1900, the enactment by the Imperial Diet of the Public Peace Law effectively prohibited workers and farmers from organizing and conducting strikes. The institution of the law has been noted as the beginning of a 12-year period of systematic suppression of the labor movement. The law effectively served to redirect the attention of social activists and union organizers, who concentrated their energies toward efforts to popularize socialism among the working class to the neglect of union organizing. The near abandonment of the suppressed unions and neglect of workers’ grievances regarding work conditions erupted into riots that were quickly and vigorously put down in 1906 and 1907 (Katayama 2001).

The Ashio riots of 1907 occurred as a result of the arduous conditions of miners: all aspects of their lives were controlled by industry edicts, including the daily necessities of food, clothing, and shelter, and access to toilet facilities (Nimura et al. 1997). In 1911, a street car strike took place in Tokyo after talks between workers and management broke down. The strike, involving thousands of engineers and conductors, began on December 31, 1911 and lasted until January 4 of the following year. Because of the disruption of transportation affecting the lives of the two million citizens living in Tokyo at the time, the strike unfortunately did not enjoy popular support.

Through the enactment of the Public Peace Police Law prohibiting worker strikes, the response to any dispute, strike or threatened strike had been delegated by the Japanese government to the police. As the police possessed detailed knowledge of citizens and were able to enforce minor noxious edicts, the decisions made by the police were rarely disputed by the offending parties (Scalapino 1983). Union organizers and striking workers served long terms of imprisonment, went into hiding, or were otherwise disappeared.

In 1921, the Japan Labor Federation (Sodomei) was formed but capitulated to government demands and threats. Other labor unions and federations remained shadow institutions without effective means of intervention for the benefit of workers. By 1940, the government had established its own labor union, the Patriotic Industrial Association (Sampo), and the trade union movement disappeared from Japan. The trade union movement did not revive until after World War II with the growth of heavy industry accompanying the war boom, when a large number of workers became permanent wage-earners.

A new labor movement emerged during the American Occupation of Japan after World War II with the enactments of the Trade Union Law of December 1945 and the Labor Relations Adjustment Law of September 1946. The Trade Union Law guaranteed the right to union organization for all laborers, with the exception of public service employees including firefighters, police officers, and penal system employees. The Trade Union Law effectively outlawed company unions, outlawed employer representation in the unions, and emphasized the necessity of unions to represent employee interests rather than those of the employer (Baker 1965/1966).

Peasant Revolts

In the nineteenth century, five identifiable peasant/worker revolts occurred in Japan. The revolts were the Takeda Rising (1811–12), the Echigo Rising (1814), the Nambu Rising (1853), the Kaisei Rising (1866–7), and the Chichibu Rising (1884). The Tax Law Opposition (1949) was the first important peasant uprising to occur in the twentieth century. The first five revolts that occurred between 1811 and 1884 may be identified as peasant revolts and were regional in reach, whereas the Tax Law Opposition of 1949 involved working-class individuals and the business community in non-violent opposition to the taxes proposed by the American economic/tax specialists of the Shoup Mission during the occupation of Japan at the end of World War II (Burg 2003). An additional difference between the earlier revolts and the 1949 opposition was the absence of violence and bloodshed marking the previous five revolts. The 1949 Tax Law Opposition and resistance emerged as a broadly based national protest against the austerity programs imposed under the Dodge Plan. Crucial to the uprisings was the principal notion that “(a)n unlimited power to tax involves . . . a power to destroy” (*M’Culloch v. State*, 17 U.S. 316, 1819). In all instances, tax burdens imposed by the ruling elites were the key feature of the revolts that occurred in the 150-year period from 1800 to 1950.

It is important to note that the term peasant, in Japan or other cultures, as used by scholars varies. The most comprehensive definition combines an assortment of the understandings and application of the academic discipline or investigative interests of the scholar. Nominally, the definition of peasant includes one or more of the following characteristics: (1) they are rural cultivators; (2) they have minimal control of the land (labor) they cultivate (work performed); (3) the individuals comprise a distinctive community of cultural practices; and (4) as a group they are socially, politically, and economically subordinate to a dominant/ruling class (Kurtz 2000). Therefore, the primary difference between the structural model and definitional difference between the terms of peasant and working-class laborer may be the inclusion or exclusion of rural cultivation. Sanson (1978) remarked that although all ruling elites in the history of the world tend to concern themselves with the moral and ethical

development of their citizens or subjects, those elites fail to show concern for the economic necessities of those over whom they have power and control. The six revolts occurring from 1800 to 1950 in Japan exemplify Sanson's (1978) observation.

The study of peasant uprisings in Japan generally involves historical inquiry into oppressive taxation burdens imposed by officials and the combined malfeasance by those taxing authorities and the social and political elites. Although the successes of the uprisings occurring from 1800 to 1884 are important in contributing to the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the rise of the Meiji Restoration, the continued struggle against high taxation, high rent, and military conscription continued central features of peasant and commoner life in Japan up to the middle of the twentieth century.

Takeda Rising (1811–1812)

In the district of Bungo near the area of Takeda, a peasant uprising in late 1811 occurred after a request by peasants for a reduction in taxes was responded to by the district administrator contemptuously doubling their taxes. Peasants numbering in the thousands marched against the official and his representatives, carrying guns, swords, and torches and causing officials to flee and their demands to reach the capital. The success of the revolt led to changes in taxation policies and punishment of the miscreant officials; however, identified leaders of the revolt were also punished. Moreover, the successes of the Takeda Rising inspired similar and more violent uprisings in the Bungo district in the villages of Usuki and Nobeoka. In the case of the Usuki and Nobeoka uprisings, hundreds of thousands of peasants threatened officials, destroying homes of the elites and devastating local businesses. Most of the uprisings were eventually able to achieve significant concessions, although other local uprisings were quashed and their leaders severely punished.

Echigo Rising (1814)

The province of Echigo had suffered several years of poor harvests as a result of harsh seasonal environmental conditions, leaving little food for the peasants. However, although the crop failures and harvest reductions were the fault of bad weather, the ruling elite's expectations regarding the submission of taxes by the peasants was inflexible. Tens of thousands of rebellious peasant farmers stormed the town of Muramatsu, for-

cing the local official to flee. The rebellion lasted for weeks and encompassed more than 30 districts in the province. Ultimately, the ruling official gave rice to the peasants, dismissed the offending local officials, and punished many of the ringleaders of the rebellion.

Nambu Rising (1853)

Nambu was a fiefdom that saw over a dozen uprisings in 1853 arising from oppressive taxation and official political corruption. The uprisings were unique in their organization and the political tactics employed by the rebellious peasants, including the march of 25,000 peasants to the neighboring fief of Sendai to appeal for relief by defecting from Nambu and becoming farmers in Sendai (Borton 1968). Of the numerous demands put forward by the farmers, most were conceded and a significant crisis was averted. Borton suggests that the officials of both fiefs determined that major compromise was necessary, since a force of 25,000 determined peasants could easily march unhindered by force-of-arms or geographical barriers and ultimately pose a greater threat than the desire for mere tax relief.

Kaisei Rising (1866–1867)

Contemporary researchers (Borton 1968; Bix 1986) have suggested that the Kaisei Rising had three main causes: the introduction of additional and severe tax burdens, the conscription of peasants for military campaigns, and the continued seasonal crop failures. In November of 1866 several thousand peasant rebels marched on nearby towns and the region's castle stronghold, having failed to obtain satisfaction of their demands for tax relief. The successes of the earlier exploits were followed by the near riotous behavior of participants in the uprising, who caused destruction of property and threatened injury against various local officials, merchants, moneylenders, and landlords. The uprising and its violence spilled over into other fiefs and provinces, threatening the very fabric of the feudal system in Japan. Bix contends that the Kaisei Rising set the stage for the new form of state and governance of Japan that would emerge after the Chichibu Rising of 1884.

Chichibu Rising (1884)

Chichibu is a district in the Saitama prefecture where independent farmers were severely taxed by authorities and where control was centralized

by the emerging government under the Meiji Restoration. The Chichibu farmers had been supplementing their incomes by raising silkworms and producing silk since 700 CE (Tsuzuki 2000); indeed, the heart of that early industry continues into the twenty-first century. For the Chichibu farmers and others throughout the world, the 1880s were punctuated by calamitous events and economic hardships. Beginning in 1883, the world economies plunged into economic depression; the massive volcano Krakatoa (Krakatau) erupted and ultimately altered the northern hemisphere's climate for the next ten years; US President Garfield was assassinated and several European countries entered into war against Third World states.

In 1884 conditions worsened for the peasants of Chichibu and they joined other farmers and merchants in areas affected most dramatically by the changes in governance, tax levies, and the draconian taxation collection practices of officials. Armed rebellion broke out. At its height the rebellion evolved into a full-scale civil war against the Meiji government. The rebellion, led by a self-proclaimed Revolutionary Army, began in late October and was effectively quashed by the first week of November after facing the mobilized army of the centralized government near Mt. Yatsuga. In his detailed investigation into the October–November peasant army, Irokawa (1985) claims that the uprising was not merely a revolt in favor of tax relief and the institutionalization of enlightened governance but a full-scale rebellion against the long history of economic, political, and social stratification of Japanese culture. Thus, in his view, the rising was nothing less than a rebellion against centuries of oppression.

Tax Law Opposition (1949)

The Tax Law Opposition of 1949 involved members of the working class and the business community in opposing taxes proposed by the American tax specialists of the Shoup Mission following the end of World War II (Burg 2003). The reestablished political parties did not oppose the resistance to the new taxes and as a result their implementation was significantly delayed. Continued opposition and political maneuvering ensued over the next three years (Steiner 1973), and the taxes were never fully enacted.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Japan; Japan, Labor Protest, 1945–Present; Japan, Pacifist Movement, 1945–Present; Japan, Post-World War II Protest Movements; Japan,

Resistance to Construction of Narita Airport; Japan Socialist Party (JSP); Japanese Communist Party; Sohyo; Zenroren Labor Federation

References and Suggested Readings

- Baker, D. (1965/1966) The Trade Union Movement in Japan. *International Socialism* 23 (Winter): 19–26.
- Bix, H. P. (1986) *Peasant Protests in Japan, 1590–1884*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Borton, H. (1968) *Peasant Uprisings in Japan of the Tokugawa Period*, 2nd ed. New York: Paragon.
- Bowen, R. (1988) Japanese Peasants: Moral? Rational? Revolutionary? Duped? A Review Article. *Journal of Asian Studies* 47, 4 (November): 821–32.
- Burg, D. F. (2003) *A World History of Tax Rebellions: An Encyclopedia of Tax Rebellions, Revolts, and Riots from Antiquity to the Present*. New York: Routledge.
- Crump, J. D. (1983) *The Origins of Socialist Thought in Japan*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cullen, L. M. (2003) *A History of Japan, 1582–1941: Internal and External Worlds*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Fletcher, W. M. (1982) *The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Gordon, A. (2003) *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hoston, G. (2007) *Marxism and the Crisis of Development in Prewar Japan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inkster, I. (2001) *Japanese Industrialisation: Historical and Cultural Perspectives*. New York: Routledge.
- Irokawa, D. (1985) *The Culture of the Meiji Period*. Trans. and Ed. M. Jansen. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Katayama, S. (2001) *The Labor Movement in Japan*. Boston: Adamant Media Corporation.
- Kublin, H. (1952) The Origins of Japanese Socialist Tradition. *Journal of Politics* 14 (2): 257–80.
- Kurtz, M. J. (2000) Understanding Peasant Revolution: From Concept to Theory and Case. *Theory and Society* 29, 1 (February): 93–124.
- M'Culloch v. State*, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) Available at caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=17&invol=316.
- Nimura, K., Gordon, A., & Boardman, T. (1997) *The Ashio Riot of 1907: A Social History of Mining in Japan*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- O'Totton, G. (1966) *The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Rohl, W. (Ed.) (2005) *History of Law in Japan since 1868*. Boston: Brill.
- Sanson, G. B. (1978) *Japan: A Short Cultural History Book*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Scalapino, R. A. (1953) *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan: The Failure of the First Attempt*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Scalapino, R. A. (1983) *The Early Japanese Labor Movement: Labor and Politics in a Developing Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Steiner, K. (1973) Occupation Reforms in Local Government. In J. Livingston et al. (Eds.), *The Japan Reader*, Vol. 2: *Postwar Japan, 1945 to the Present*. New York: Pantheon.
- Tsuzuki, C. (2000) *The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan 1825–1995*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wilson, S. (1992) The Manchurian Crisis and Moderate Japanese Intellectuals: The Japan Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. *Modern Asian Studies* 26 (3): 507–44.

Japan, resistance to construction of Narita airport

Ichijo Muto

In July 1966 the Japanese government suddenly announced plans to build a new airport at Sanrizuka, a thriving farming area 40 miles from downtown Tokyo. The decision reflected the regime's overconfidence and condescension toward workers and peasants. The government did not consult the local farmers involved, who first learned about the plan from a newspaper article. The government assumed from its previous experience of land confiscation for large industrial projects that if offered money the farmers would willingly give up their land. Instead, the move sparked a prolonged movement that challenged not only plans for the airport, but Japan's hegemonic notions of development and economic growth and the supremacy of corporate power at the expense of the people, their dignity, and their environment. The movement grew to include many facets of Japan's New Left, and created alliances and organizational models new to Japan's progressive movements.

Struggle Begins

The farmers who inherited rich paddy fields from their ancestors were deeply attached to them; others who opened up fields in the post-war years with backbreaking labor felt their land was a part of them. The farmland in Sanrizuka is a very fertile area, and there was reason for farmers to fear losing their source of income. The



Members of the Zengakuren student movement march in solidarity with local farmers protesting the appropriation of their family lands for construction of a new airport in Narita, Japan, in 1967. Japanese riot police later clashed with the protesters, resulting in 43 people injured, including 19 policemen and one journalist. The conflict pit a police force of 5,000 against 1,000 helmeted and club-toting members of the Zengakuren movement. The students later attempted to storm a police barracks near the airport construction office. The protesters were repelled by police using high-pressure water hoses and nightsticks. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

struggle soon acquired a non-economic dimension as the Japanese state sent thousands of armed police into the hamlets to forcibly appropriate their land. The arrogance with which the state dealt with the farmers injured the pride of the farmers and ignited their anger.

The first major confrontation came in 1967 when the government stepped in with thousands of riot police to forcibly carry out a land survey, and the farmers blocked all roads leading to the prospective sites. The farmers clashed with the police, 3,000 of whom were mobilized for the compulsory land survey. Farmers, organized into women's, youth, and old folk's brigades, fought back using "night soil" bombs. Farm women bound themselves to trees with iron chains, and primary and junior high school children, forming their own brigade, boycotted classes, and set up their own study program with sympathetic university students as teachers. Still, by sheer force and through arresting resisters, the government completed the land survey, the first step toward land confiscation.

Major confrontation occurred again in 1971. The government stepped in during February and March to carry out compulsory land expropriation. The Farmers' League and supporters set up "fortresses" in six places along the northern side of the prospective 4,000-meter runway, dug deep tunnels where an old folk's "dare-to-die"

corps pent themselves up, braving cave-ins under heavy bulldozers, defiantly declaring that they were old and so prepared to die. The whole area was turned into a veritable battleground, the police attacking and demolishing the farmers' wooden fortresses one after another. Farmers fought in the fortresses, resisting by wielding bamboo spears, but the fortress towers, including a farmers' broadcasting tower, eventually fell with the farmer-fighters inside. In the fields around them students and workers fought the police. The police exhausted themselves before they could demolish all the resistance posts.

The second expropriation campaign began in September of the same year, causing yet more violent clashes. The police set out to take the remaining Komaino and other fortresses and destroy the home of an old widow, Ohki Yone. Students, workers, and citizens mobilized from all over the country for this confrontation, and a guerilla unit attacked a police unit, killing three policemen, while the 5,500 police with 130 heavy vehicles were attacking three farmers' forts. The 3,500 resisters used fire bombs to defend the besieged forts. Finally, Komaino Fort was brought to the ground in a sea of fire. Ohki's house was then attacked, and as the 65-year-old woman refused to move she was knocked down and beaten, her tiny house destroyed. The construction of the runway thus began, and in 1972 the Opposition League constructed a 60-meter steel tower close to the runway to disrupt flights from the airport.

Originally, the government scheduled to open the airport in 1971, but the resistance frustrated that plan. Although construction proceeded after the land confiscation, opposition spread from the site of confrontation to various new areas involving increasing numbers of citizens' groups. National support networks were organized. In 1974 Tomura Issaku, the Christian chairman of the Opposition League, stood as an independent candidate for the House of Councilors election with the slogan, "More Sanrizukas in Japan!" Though he did not win, the campaign spread Sanrizuka's message throughout the country. Other government projects were also met with community resistance. The public began to doubt if the project was viable. Irritated with the indefinite delay, the Fukuda Cabinet declared in January 1977 that the airport should by all means be opened within the year "whatever the cost." The opposition also grew, joined by new

groups including anti-nuclear power and other community organizations struggling against land confiscation and development. The largest mass rally of 23,000 people was held at Sanrizuka in April of the same year. The government responded by sending in special mission police in early May. Before dawn on May 16, police quietly surrounded the steel tower after cutting all telephone lines. They slipped through the protestors' base and pulled down symbols of resistance. This sneak attack enraged the opposition and thousands of people protested. Bloody battles followed, when the police brutally counterattacked. Higashiyama Kaoru, a young supporter caring for the wounded at the field hospital, died after he was hit by a tear gas canister fired by the police. The opening of the airport was postponed again and the final date for the opening was set for May 1, 1978.

In March 1978, 14,000 police were mobilized from throughout the country to ensure the airport opened. On March 25 clashes started as the opposition began to build an iron tower designed to impede flights from the runway. Water cannons and cranes were mobilized and the struggle continued overnight. On March 26, 15,000 supporters arrived for the final confrontation and held rallies around the airport. While the rallies were going on, several hundred paramilitary groups from three political sects made simultaneous surprise attacks on the airport. A group of commandos appeared from a manhole near the control tower, occupied it, and completely smashed the air traffic control apparatus. The slogan for the day was "Besiege, penetrate, and smash," and this slogan was literally realized. The attack shocked the government and "Control Tower Destroyed" hit the headlines. *Time* magazine made a cover story of it, using the miserable face of Fukuda for its cover photo. The airport opening had to be postponed yet again.

The airport finally opened, after 11 postponements, on May 20, 1978 and began functioning with one runway. But even after its opening the Opposition League continued, and as of the 1990s still confronted and obstructed the government's plan to build the second runway and terminal building.

Soil, Agriculture, and Life

Though this abridged chronology features the violent, confrontational aspect of the struggle,

this is in fact only one particular aspect of it. Sanrizuka has also been the wellspring of new ideas, views, imaginations, and human experiences powerful and persuasive enough to challenge the prevalent money-and-development-fetish and to allow a glimpse into alternative ways of organizing society. For activists from the various urban movements drawn to Sanrizuka, the Sanrizuka experience was an eye-opener: at Sanrizuka there was no distinction between struggling and living, they were synonymous. Sanrizuka offered the whole Japanese movement a space where activists could refresh, touch the soil, be with the community, and thus think and rethink the nature of state power, industrial society, nature, and humanity, as well as the meaning of struggle. It was indeed a school of movements. Thus, through various support networks, thousands of people came to Sanrizuka to struggle with the farmers and do farm work for the Opposition League farmers. Many settled in the village communities. Scores of solidarity huts, built by political sects and non-sect citizens' groups, were strewn over the vast area surrounding the airport, where full-time support workers were stationed, offering labor for farm work and rendering organizational support.

The farmers' struggle had the capacity to attract such a large number of supporters for several reasons. One is that at the time the struggle began, a mood of resistance had taken over the country and, in fact, much of the world. Another is that even in the early stages of the confrontation, members of the Youth Brigade began to develop unique notions of farmer, land, and soil as the basis of their struggle, thus creating and employing the collective identity that would aid in unifying those engaged in the struggle. Shima Hiroyuki, a leader of the Youth Brigade, spoke of the distinction between *nomin* (the official term for farmer) and *hyakusho* (the traditional term for farmer) and the corresponding distinction between *tochi* (land) and *daichi* (soil). The distinction between *nomin* and *hyakusho* as well as between land and soil is subtle, but it is essential. Soil is not real estate bought and sold for money but is something that the farmers' sweat and toil have been ploughed into over generations. Therefore, it is cultural, social, and historical, as well as a human reality. *Hyakusho* is a farmer attached to, and integrated with, such soil. *Hyakusho* is also part of the whole community, complete with its landscape, festivals, and com-

munity relations, and is one with the lush green of surrounding forests and fields. Soil is thus essential to life, and soil grasped in this context is *hyakusho's* life itself. It was precisely this that the state sought to wipe out. This was why the government assumption that greedy *nomin* would readily yield land for the promise of money and succumb to police intimidation was an affront to *hyakusho*. As far back as 1970 this basic understanding of *hyakusho*, soil, and nature served as the bedrock of the fierce and protracted farmers' resistance.

The Sanrizuka struggle in this sense was a struggle for the ethic and logic of the soil and agriculture as opposed to the industrialist non-ethic and logic in a country where reckless industrial expansion was fast destroying agriculture and marginalizing farmers. It is true that the struggle is *par excellence* one against state power. It had at first no explicit ecological assertions as such, nor was it a conventional farmers' movement directly addressing agricultural issues. Yet the logic of the struggle implicitly pointed to an alternative society that harmonizes with nature where farmers and agriculture are appreciated as the basis of human life.

This aspect, concealed in the first battle-only phase of the struggle, came to the fore when the government stepped into the communities in 1980 with the novel tactic of coopting the opposition farmers by offering a new irrigation system. It was a crucial time since some League members whose farms were located in swampy areas were attracted to the Airport Corporation's offer. At this juncture the League explicitly addressed agricultural matters for the first time. Opposition League members developed their own irrigation scheme without government money. Large windmills were constructed to pump water and land improvement work was undertaken. These efforts also kept the struggle going. Though undoubtedly a farmers' struggle, the Farmers' League until that time singularly lacked concern about agricultural affairs. Agriculture had been merely each household's business, and farmers were united only to fight the state onslaught.

Earlier, in 1972, members of the Youth Brigade started the Sanrizuka Organic Farm Association and its One Pack movement. At that time, most farming families in Sanrizuka used conventional agricultural chemicals and had little mutual collaboration in farming. When the Youth Brigade launched the organic farming project, there

were 17 families in the association. Participating households collectively produced vegetables with organic manure and without pesticides, regularly delivering assortments of them in "one pack" to subscribing consumers in Tokyo who supported the Sanrizuka struggle. Each pack contained a dozen different kinds of vegetables and a leaflet describing how the struggle was going. One Pack movement families formed a collective, each offering a portion of their land and doing farm work collectively. At its peak in the early 1980s the movement was supplying 1,200 families with vegetable packs twice a month. The One Pack movement can be characterized by several of its accomplishments. It can be seen as the point at which the opposition's livelihood and the struggle intersected, or as the point at which the struggle against the airport became a struggle to remain farmers. The introduction of organic farming also brought to the surface the ecological quality of the Sanrizuka struggle that had been lurking beneath tear gas fog and riot police shields. It can also be seen as an example of how new, collective, and cooperative lifestyles were being created both within the movement and between the movement and its community of supporters. Youth Brigade members, in their publications about the movement, even reported changes in familial and gender relations.

Anti-Kaihatsu Foundation

At the root of this and other contemporary people's movements, as writer Tsumura Takashi has said, was a challenge to the logic and practice of corporate supremacy that had set in by the 1970s. The reckless development of Japanese capitalism since 1955 had already turned Japan into the pollution archipelago of contemporary journalists' clichés. With the backing and protection of the state, large corporations freely disposed of the land and seas of the Japanese islands, reclaiming vast coastal sea areas for huge industrial complexes, polluting water and sky without a modicum of consideration for the environment or the people living in it. Obsessed by economic growth, the government not only did not care about these social or environmental repercussions, but fully sided with immediate corporate interests. The government in fact was the chief promoter of the National Land Planning whose purpose was to build infrastructure for

private industries with tax money. For their part, big trade unions, eager to enlarge their part of the pie of corporate earnings, were too deeply trapped in the thinking that money can buy anything and everything to protest.

The unwillingness and inability of the established parliamentary political parties and their aligned forces to face any of these crying issues gave birth to new independent and autonomous people's movements. The struggles faced a system of values that the Japanese state and big business defended and justified, sacrificing nature, human communities, and human relationships. These movements developed new value systems in opposition to legitimize themselves. The Sanrizuka struggle was especially able to do this and conveyed it in language accessible to ordinary people, emphasizing autonomy, and establishing a methodology of organization that allowed the movement itself to determine its own tactics and strategies.

One remarkable feature of Japanese people's movements since the 1970s may be found in the unique role of the struggles for survival waged by mostly peripheral communities in exposing the fundamental problems of the economic growth-oriented Japanese society. The struggles are the residents' own struggles, highly autonomous and grassroots, taking their cue from no one outside or above. Thus, the Sanrizuka struggle was not an isolated case. The decades-long struggle of farmers at Sanrizuka against the imposition of the Narita Tokyo International Airport project belongs in the broad category of community based struggles; in the 1970s, thousands of communities and citizens' groups fought against government or company projects that threatened to uproot them, undermine the basics of their lives and values, and irreparably destroy the natural environment.

Many of these struggles were classified together as anti-pollution or environmental movements. Though that was how the public recognized the issues, it is a superficial characterization. The struggles of the communities were not simply *against* pollution as an isolated phenomenon, but were fundamentally *for* their survival in the face of the imposition from outside and above of one or another "development" project.

To understand the importance of the Sanrizuka farmers' struggle it is imperative to understand that the Japanese language has two words that are translated as "development," *hatten* and

kaihatsu. *Hatten* is neutral or usually carries a positive meaning, as does the English word “development.” *Kaihatsu* is a heavily loaded word. It means economic and industrial development projects by business and the government. Though *kaihatsu* is presented as positive in official planning documents, *kaihatsu* projects gradually gained popular recognition as disasters for the communities involved. The people and communities in *kaihatsu* sites were told to vacate their land, sell fishing rights, and endure the destruction of their environment for the sake of industrial plants, nuclear power stations, nuclear waste dumping installations, or highways, all for the good of the public. In almost all cases the victims are not the beneficiaries of *kaihatsu*, for the projects in question cater mainly to the needs of big business or serve remote urban centers. The very notion of the “public” was thus called into question. Pollution was merely the end result of these *kaihatsu* processes.

With this more nuanced understanding of development in mind, Sanrizuka and the other community movements and struggles occurring in this context may be rightly characterized as anti-*kaihatsu* struggles. Since development has been generally promoted as the dominant positive value in the highly materialist Japanese society, each struggle had to evolve its own alternative universal logic and language about society, company, nature, and human virtues to counter the language of public good that told victims that they had to sacrifice their particular interests for the sake of development. *Kaihatsu* projects invariably destroyed the community with its historically developed diversities and traditional culture.

Attachment to community identity was an essential element in motivating people to resist. But it was rare that the traditional community as such became the unit of resistance. Official community organization leaders were often bought off; traditional community bosses became modernization pioneers overnight, particularly when the community and its traditional business were being pushed to the margins by the urban-based economy. For the resistance to continue, traditional values, organizations, and personal relations were often remade and recreated in order to assert that there was something more precious than cash. This struggle was in fact a matter of human dignity: it was their dignity as farmers that was at stake.

Sanrizuka Farmers and a New Left “Captured” by the People

By participating in the Sanrizuka farmers’ struggle, the New Left forged new kinds of ties with the people. The farmers were no longer anonymous masses for the New Left – they were people deeply rooted in the soil, with their families, houses, farm work, traditions, and land. Whole families joined the struggle and even children organized. These were the people state power was ruthlessly attempting to stampede by using massive police forces organized like military units. “Progress” and “development” were the impressive-sounding slogans used effectively by the government to impose giant industrial complexes on farmland, confiscate fishing grounds from fisherfolk, and destroy the lives of common people. But Sanrizuka farmers rejected the very premise of this type of thinking. They called into question the dominant, accepted pattern of “development,” declaring that they would continue to live as farmers, that the soil was their life, and that they could not be bought with money. The government thus met with tough resistance from the farmers, a radical resistance in the sense that it challenged the very premise of postwar modernization of Japanese society, with its emphasis on the supremacy of money and economic interests.

Establishing lasting relations with the farmers’ struggle meant something new to the New Left. It no longer allowed them the luxury of “issue-hopping.” They had to become a responsible partner in a protracted struggle. This would require them to reassess the simplistic notion of the unilinear development of society, for example that any kind of industrial development indicated progress. In this sense the New Left was captured by the people when it committed itself to the Sanrizuka farmers’ struggle for livelihood and dignity.

When they made their eye-catching arrival in Sanrizuka, however, New Left political groups did not grasp the theoretical and ideological importance of what they were doing. The mainstream New Left simply considered Sanrizuka an extension of its street fights against state power. They supported the farmers primarily because the farmers were fighting courageously against the government. In order to more securely link their anti-imperialist and anti-war concerns with the farmers’ cause, some New Left parties simply added the slogan, “We oppose the construction

of a military airport” to their repertoire. The logic was that the New Left should oppose the construction of the airport because it was to be used for military purposes. There were of course military implications to the Narita airport amid the escalation of the war in Vietnam, and with the US military using most Japanese civil airports for supply purposes, but that aspect did not represent the real and deepest motivations of the farmers’ struggle, nor did it point to the fundamental problems of burgeoning Japanese capitalism. The real significance of the Sanrizuka struggle would only later be conceptualized and acted on accordingly by New Left groups, which had to develop a new kind of relationship with the people through participation in the Sanrizuka farmers’ struggle.

For this marginalized community struggle against development, support groups and networks were organized in various forms which served the struggle by disseminating information, mobilizing at decisive points of confrontation, raising money, and, more importantly, bringing the issues and their implications to public attention. The support networks were generally national, horizontal coalitions of various spontaneous groups scattered all over the country; all independent groups with their respective agendas and their own activities in residential areas, unions, campuses, and other arenas that defined their proper constituencies. It is these support networks that former Zenkyoto, Beheiren, and other New Left activists created, or entered, or otherwise served effectively. Another important form of support was that of settling. In Sanrizuka, due to its severe confrontation with state power, former students and other activists set up on-the-spot organizations where supportive outsiders were stationed to work for and with the movement on a day-to-day basis.

In addition to activists’ groups, doctors, nuclear scientists, water specialists, lawyers, and other professionals joined support networks, sometimes playing key roles in identifying and exposing the nature of the issue, and offering their expertise to help strengthen the local resistance. With the participation of these intellectual activists, some of the networks established information and research centers in Tokyo and other urban settings, which played the advocacy role for the development of the struggle. These sought to create national and international coordination networks. Through these networks local struggles

like Sanrizuka have garnered national and sometimes international attention.

Thus, a dual structure of the “struggling” and the “supporting” became a common practice. This movement structure, unlike the union or political party bureaucracy, is organic rather than institutional. Its efficacy rests on constantly renewed and always strained relations between “struggling” and “supporting.” The generally accepted movement code was for the supportive side to recognize the sovereignty of the local people involved in struggle, limiting themselves to facilitating roles. Yet it is not easy to practice this code, and particularly where the New Left vanguardists were involved, relations frequently became acrimonious as “supporters” sought to dominate the struggle.

The relationship between the “struggling” and “supporting” roles poses an important problem. The outcome can be a crass vanguardist approach based on the juxtaposition of “the masses” and the “party,” in which the mass struggle is instrumental to the vanguard’s political goals. But it is also possible for people’s movements to avoid this pitfall and to achieve deeper and broader dimensions in which, with the outside support as the medium, the issue-based movement provides original and precious insights that transcend its immediacy and shows its potential to be part of a universal struggle for social change. The vanguardist claim is that such specific struggles can obtain universal significance and be part of the general political struggle only by accepting vanguard leadership. This classical approach subjugates people’s movements and siphons off their universal significance into the arena of alienated politics, which the professional parties claim they alone can handle. But support also can play a role in mediating the specific to the universal by helping those in struggle to create their own political dimensions.

Alliance, Autonomy, and Violation

A sort of agrarian anarchism underlies the long struggle. The Anti-Airport League itself was a loose organization with little procedural bureaucracy other than a chairperson, executive meeting, and secretary general. If a group of members took the initiative and proposed a new tactic, and if they were able to persuade the majority, then the proposal became the League’s. This can be said to be a farmers’ version of Zenkyoto and

Beheiren, though farmers did not just replicate these groups.

The *hyakusho* spirit and this organic structure protected the autonomy of the farmers' struggle. Before the struggle began, the farmers depended on Liberal Democratic Party parliamentarians for advice on agricultural issues. After the struggle began, they looked to socialists and communists, which resulted in a similar dependency. Eventually, the Communist Party was expelled from the movement, as it attempted to lead, instead of support, the farmers. There was disappointment with the socialists, and working with the New Left proved troublesome as well. At long last, in 1976, the Opposition League established an explicit principle of farmers' sovereignty for the joint struggle and all supporting groups promised "to consult closely with the Opposition League on all matters" and "to obtain the approval and consent of the Opposition League before undertaking any action whatsoever at Sanrizuka."

The fact is that this independence and autonomy were not easy to guard, as the Sanrizuka struggle largely rested on the symbiosis of farmers and New Left political sects. Nevertheless, the autonomy and sovereignty of the farmers was basically preserved and all the New Left sects had to collaborate by respecting farmers' decisions as long as they operated in Sanrizuka.

This symbiosis was not without problems. Though not equally true of all the political sects, their motivations were fundamentally different from those of the struggling farmers. While the farmers were fighting for their survival and dignity, the political sects engaged in the struggle for the sake of "revolution," which would be realized through their leadership, through strengthening their organization and political influence, and ultimately through seizure of state power. With the rapid waning of the New Left movement in the 1970s, most of them began to regard the Sanrizuka struggle as their private political asset which would give them prestige and help them survive. The farmers, while they knew that the sects had ulterior motives, began to depend on them for organizational work such as publishing newsletters, on the farm work done by sect members, and other services.

This difference came into the open when Chukaku began blatant violation of the farmers' autonomy. Of the several major political sects with solidarity huts and full-time staff stationed in Sanrizuka, Chukaku was by far the largest. As

Chukaku Zengakuren was the first to come and offered the largest number of combatants in the early stage of the struggle, it claimed a special "blood-sealed bond" with the Opposition League. But this sense of privilege became arrogance and a will to dominate. Considering Sanrizuka instrumental to its revolutionary agenda, and finding significance only in the anti-state power side of the farmers' struggle, Chukaku did not appreciate the Youth Brigade initiative for the revitalization of Sanrizuka agriculture. In 1982 the majority of the Opposition League farmers were angry when Chukaku openly proposed that some of the League farmers be expelled for betrayal – those who were attracted by the government's irrigation project. Many League members felt the farmers' sovereignty was being violated. The Youth Brigade members, a main force in agricultural work and important animators of the struggle, felt that carrying on the struggle without addressing fundamental issues intrinsic to local agriculture would be counterproductive, and that expelling members affected and weakened by these issues was unfair. Chukaku continued to push the issue and many farmers were offended.

Early the following year Chukaku-League relations entered into crisis as Chukaku suddenly began to vilify the League's tactical initiative known as the One Tsubo movement. In the early stage of the struggle, about four hectares of land in the airport site were divided up and sold to 700 struggle supporters, each of whom became the owner of one *tsubo* (3.3 square meters) plot. But the number of owners decreased as the years passed, and the question of protecting the plots became a problem of urgent concern for the Opposition League. The League decided to recollectivize the plots by recruiting new owners from among those who were prepared to fight for the land.

After this decision was made, Chukaku suddenly denounced the recollectivization movement as a sell-out and a traitorous act to the cause of Sanrizuka. According to Chukaku, the proposed movement intended to sell League land ultimately to the Airport Corporation. Chukaku's anti-one tsubo campaign was incredibly intense and spread all over the country. Chukaku's newspaper used a sensational headline calling Ishii Shinji, a leader of the Youth Brigade and one of the main promoters of the One Tsubo movement, a "traitor." Inside Sanrizuka,

Chukaku used threats and physical intimidation against farmers who resisted the party's high-handed, strong-arm tactics. The logic used by Chukaku persuaded no one. According to a Youth Brigade leader, the real issue was not the One Tsubo movement but Chukaku's distrust of the farmers and its fear that it would sacrifice its hegemony in the struggle. The One Tsubo campaign was initiated by the Youth Brigade with the support of the overwhelming majority of the farmers themselves, a move Chukaku could not tolerate as it symbolized the ultimate independence of the farmers' struggle.

Farmers rose up for independence and autonomy. On March 8 the League held a general assembly attended by 160 farmers and unanimously decided to sever relations with Chukaku. Those farmers who opposed the One Tsubo movement and sided with Chukaku boycotted the general assembly, held their own meeting attended by about 20 families, and decided to dismiss all anti-Chukaku officials from their posts. This decision confirmed the League's split.

Still, the overwhelming majority of the League opted for independence, recovered autonomy, and largely renewed their style of work while the splinter of the League siding with Chukaku split again in 1988. The whole issue concerning the relationship between vanguardist political organizations and the autonomy of farmers still remains unresolved. The symbiosis between the two still characterizes the Sanrizuka struggle, though Sanrizuka has certainly produced new things, showing forth new facets that people's movements are now acquiring – facets strikingly distinct from the left political culture where individual struggle is seen only as an instrument for the ultimate seizure of state power. More important than revolution was the immediate concern of nurturing the farmers' self-determination.

Sanrizuka in a Larger Political Context

When Sanrizuka farmers began their opposition to the government's usurpation of their land, it was one of a number of diverse community struggles. However, despite diversity and geographical distance, these movements were not isolated from one another. In addition to the Sanrizuka support networks, mutual support networks – most of them informal and extremely flexible – developed through the exchange of

visits and information. Some were national, but many were regional. These movements introduced a new dimension into the Japanese people's movement: the convergence of environmental and sociopolitical concerns, which prepared the ground for the emergence of an entirely new understanding of the political.

Since *kaihatsu* development was poised to destroy the values and means of subsistence of community life through destruction of the natural environment, the movement in one way or another asserted community values and ethics strictly differentiated from the obsession with money and growth – values and ethics providing for harmonious relations with nature. In the process, the idea of *chiiki* (locality, or community) entered movement thinking as central to the struggle. This was a Copernican revolution. The existing sociopolitical power structure would be dismantled, making the community the basic arena of political struggle.

The choice of arena is important. The national power structure ultimately depends on community level sociopolitical power structures operating in the midst of everyday relations, which are the real abode of power. The new emphasis on *chiiki* represented the refusal to respect the authority of the power center and its rules. It was the assertion of independence of the power base. In this sense, community movements began to pursue alternative politics of their own based on total distrust of the state and state-centered politics. The new alternative rules of the game facilitated the empowerment of the people. By transforming sociopolitical relations in a direct and tangible way, community people came to realize that they have the power to change their situation, that they can accumulate power within themselves and prevent its being sucked upward into external bodies.

As *kaihatsu* assaults were made by the state and big corporations, community struggles were forced to fight these powerful and distant enemies. The *chiiki* struggle, therefore, is not a local struggle on a local issue, even if the chosen arena is local. In this sense, this type of movement is differentiated from a movement aimed at merely changing and democratizing the local power structure as an end in itself. The important fact is that it is a new way of combating the centralized national power of the state and corporation.

Though all these community movements started by reacting to *kaihatsu* projects, the

major ones went beyond just opposing them, and developed – even if only partially – visions of an alternative society based on their sense of identity and sovereignty.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Japan; Anti-Nuclear Movement, Japan; Assembly of the Poor; Japan, Community Labor Union Movement; Japan, Post-World War II Protest Movements; Japan Socialist Party (JSP); Japanese Communist Party; Korea, Peasant and Farmers' Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Apter, D. E. & Sawa, N. (1984) *Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Chan, J. (2008) *Another Japan is Possible: New Social Movements and Global Citizenship Education*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Gordon, A. (1993) *Postwar Japan as History*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Halliday, J. (1975) *A Political History of Japanese Capitalism*. New York: Pantheon.
- Ogawa, S. (1973) *Sanrizuka: Heta Buraku* (Documentary). Ogawa Productions: Japan.
- Sasaki-Uemura, W. M. (2001) *Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in Postwar Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Japan Socialist Party (JSP)

Koji Nakakita

The Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaitō) (JSP) was the most important socialist party in post-World War II Japan. From 1955 to 1993, under the so-called 1955 system, it was the largest opposition party to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Ideologically, it advocated Marxism and pacifism for most of its existence, and was one of the most leftist parties affiliated with the Socialist International.

On November 2, 1945, two months after Japan's formal surrender, the JSP was organized by three of the main non-communist socialist groups from the prewar period: the *Shamin-kei* (Social Democratic group, right-wing faction), the *Nichirō-kei* (Japan Labor group, centrist faction), and the *Nichimu-kei* (Japan Proletarian group, left-wing faction). The early JSP was led by Chairperson Tetsu Katayama and General Secretary Suehiro Nishio, both from the *Shamin-kei*. The American

occupation forces viewed the JSP as a valuable collaborator for the “demilitarization and democratization” of Japan. In 1947 it won a plurality of seats in the Lower House and formed two consecutive three-party coalition governments headed by Katayama and Hitoshi Ashida, the president of the Democratic Party. However, these governments soon collapsed amid conflicts over economic reconstruction policies and corruption scandals, weakening the right-wing *Shamin-kei* and broadening the influence of the left-wing *Nichimu-kei*. In 1949 left-wing leader Mosaburō Suzuki was named JSP General Secretary (later, Chairperson).

The conflict between the factions was intensified by the spread of the Cold War to East Asia, particularly the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. While the *Shamin-kei* and the *Nichirō-kei* supported the West, the *Nichimu-kei* criticized US military strategy in accordance with its Four Principles of Peace: overall peace, neutralism, anti-military bases, and anti-rearmament. In 1951 the JSP split into two parties due to conflicts over acceptance of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-US Security Treaty. The left-wing Socialist Party soon established a lead over the right-wing party as a result of the radicalization of the largest national trade union Sohyo, the strong anti-war feelings of the general public, and the predominance of Marxism among leading intellectuals. In 1955 the two wings reunited into a single party around the policy of “unarmed neutrality.” The JSP together with the Sohyo worked to prevent the “Peace Constitution” from being revised and organized a massive protest against the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960.

Although the JSP effectively contended with reactionary policies by the conservative governments, it was prevented from coming to power by the formation of the LDP as a single conservative party one month after JSP reunification. In 1959 the *Shamin-kei* and a part of the *Nichirō-kei* seceded from the JSP, and founded the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) the following year based on the support of the smaller national trade union, Zenrō (later Dōmei). Shortly thereafter, the leader of the modern Marxist group (the new right-wing faction), Saburō Eda, was named Secretary General and introduced the Structural Reform theory of the Italian Communist Party in an effort to adapt JSP policies to social changes occurring under

rapid economic growth. Eda's scheme was foiled, however, by the traditional left-wing faction. Under left-wing leadership, the JSP worked to establish "progressive local governments" in urban areas in cooperation with the Japan Communist Party, but meanwhile it lost many of its seats in the Diet, and was unable to exercise significant power at the national level due to its reluctance to form a coalition with the DSP and the Clean Government Party (CGP).

In 1977 Eda and some right-wingers left the JSP and founded the Socialist Citizens League (later the Social Democratic League). Thereafter, the right-wing faction gradually regained power and finally, in 1986, the JSP adopted the New Declaration in reference to the Godesberg Program of the German Social Democratic Party, which foreswore Marxism and embraced reformist social democracy. This new policy was related to the Sohyo's effort for the unification with the Dōmei after the failure of the major strike of 1975 (the Rengō was formed in 1989); however, the JSP retained its policy of unarmed neutrality due to the persistence of the Cold War as well as the deep-rooted influence of left-wing activists. Although Takako Doi was named Chairperson in 1986 as the first female party head in Japan, and the JSP significantly increased its seats in the Diet owing to the Doi Boom, conflicts over security policy precluded a JSP-CGP-DSP coalition which would have been the JSP's only means of coming into power. The policy of unarmed neutrality prevented the JSP from coping well with the Gulf War in 1991, immediately after the end of the Cold War, and Chairperson Doi was forced to resign.

The JSP was out of power under LDP rule, but behind the scenes it was incorporated into the LDP politics of patronage. After the revelation of the Recruit corruption scandal in 1988, there emerged broad support for the view that the medium-sized constituency systems ought to be replaced by a single-seat constituency system for Lower House elections, in order to establish a two-party system with a greater possibility for a change of government. In 1993 reformist groups broke away from the LDP and the anti-LDP eight-party coalition Cabinet of Morihiro Hosokawa was formed. Although the JSP participated in the Hosokawa Cabinet and approved the electoral reform, conflicts with conservative reformists drove the JSP to form a coalition with the LDP. JSP Chairperson Tomiichi

Murayama was named Prime Minister in 1994 and declared the JSP's abandonment of the policy of unarmed neutrality, but this only aided the LDP's return to power and accelerated the JSP's decline. After the resignation of the Murayama Cabinet, the JSP reformed to become the Social Democratic Party on January 19, 1996, but the right wing seceded and joined the Democratic Party which had been newly established that same month.

SEE ALSO: Japan, Labor Protest, 1945–Present; Japanese Communist Party; Sohyo; Zenroren Labor Federation

References and Suggested Readings

- Cole, A. B., Totten, G. O. et al. (1966) *Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hrebenar, R. J. (2000) *Japan's New Party System*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Johnson, S. (2000) *Opposition Politics in Japan: Strategies Under a One-Party Dominant Regime*. London: Routledge.
- Masumi, J. (1985) *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945–1955*. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California.
- Masumi, J. (1995) *Contemporary Politics in Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Stockwin, J. A. A. (1968) *The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A Study of a Political Party and its Foreign Policy*. Carlton: Melbourne University Press.
- Stockwin, J. A. A. (1999) *Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Major Economy*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Japanese Communist Party

Janet E. McClellan

In October of 1898 a small group of Japanese intellectuals held the first meeting of the Shakaishugi Kenkyukai (Association for the Study of Socialism) in Tokyo. A variety of western socialist ideas was presented, among them the philosophies of Charles Fourier, Louis Blanc, Ferdinand Lassalle, and Karl Marx. The dominant force in the socialist leanings was marked by pacifism and a Christian humanism entrenched in the early years of the Japanese socialist faction holds historical sway over the current philosophical and political efforts of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) in contemporary Japan.

The first meeting of the Association for the Study of Socialism marks the initial historical

movement of what would ultimately become the JCP. The history leading to the emergence of the contemporary JCP was marked by internal disarray, philosophical differences, government prosecutions and imprisonments of its leaders and radicalized elements, US occupation after World War II, and the influence of Soviet and Chinese communist forces.

In the 1920s four proletarian parties emerged, creating divisions within the Japanese socialist movement. The parties that emerged represented various interests and emphases; specifically, the conservative wing was represented by the *Shakai Minshūtō* (Social Mass Party), and rural alliance interests by the *Nihon Nōmintō* (Japan Farmers' Party), the *Nihon Rōnōtō* (Japan Labor Farmer Party), which included labor and intellectual interests, and the *Rōdō Nōmintō* (Labor–Farmer Party), a party basically under communist control. Throughout the time leading up to World War II the various factions of the proletariat movements in Japan were subjected to the shattering effects of continuous arrests by Japanese governmental authorities and internal philosophical conflicts over the future direction of the party.

The Japanese Communist Party emerged shortly after the beginning of the American Occupation. On October 4, 1945, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers ordered that all political prisoners were to be released. The reemergence of the imprisoned leaders of the communist movements heralded the initial postwar political reorganization and representation of a variety of social, economic, and political interests of the Japanese people.

As in the prewar era, the contemporary JCP is opposed to the existence of the Imperial House, militarism, and nuclear proliferation. The JCP's political efforts are directed toward defending the interests of the people, establishing democratic processes, and serving as watchdog of the activities and processes of corporations. In the twenty-first century the JCP perceives the push toward neoliberalism and the supremacy of transnational corporations and international banking as a form of hazardous globalization which, without democratic regulation, subjects the world economy, environment, and monetary and financial systems to potential disaster.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Japan; Anti-Nuclear Movement, Japan; Blanc, Louis (1811–1882); Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx

Utopians; Japan, Labor Protest, 1945–Present; Japan, Pacifist Movement, 1945–Present; Japan, Post-World War II Protest Movements; Japan, Protest and Revolt, 1800–1945; Japan, Resistance to Construction of Narita Airport; Japan Socialist Party (JSP); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Sohyo; Zenroren Labor Federation

References and Suggested Readings

- Beckmann, G. M. & Okubo, G. (1969) *The Japanese Communist Party 1922–1945*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Er, L. P. (1996) The Japanese Communist Party: Organization and Resilience in the Midst of Adversity. *Pacific Affairs* 69 (3): 361–79.
- Japan Communist Party, www.jcp.or.jp/english/.
- Oinas-Kukkonen, H. (2003) *Tolerance, Suspicion, and Hostility: Changing US Attitudes toward the Japanese Communist Movement, 1944–1947*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Scalapino, R. A. (1967) *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jara, Víctor (1932–1973)

Benjamín Anaya González

One of the most influential songwriters of the Latin American Nueva Canción (New Song) movement, Víctor Lidio Jara Martínez was killed, along with thousands of Chileans, after newly appointed Army General Augusto Pinochet assaulted the Palace of La Moneda and killed President Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973. In the following days, participants of the *Unidad Popular* (the leftist coalition that supported Allende's presidency) were detained, tortured, and killed after being taken to the Chile and National stadiums. Víctor Jara, who was born in the peasant village of Lonquén on September 28, 1932, was detained in the building of the Technical University in the College of Arts where he had taught. After being brutally separated from his friends, he was ordered to sing for the crowd of detainees in the stadium in which he had performed many times. Then he was tortured. On September 15, 1973, he was killed and his corpse abandoned in the street.

Jara was a member of the Communist Party, where he joined Nobel Prize-winning poet Pablo Neruda and the great songwriter and poet Violeta Parra, both of whom influenced him. He performed in many demonstrations and strikes and

recorded memorable songs, both as a soloist and with the folk-based bands Quilapayún and Inti-Illimani. In 1971 he was named cultural ambassador for Allende's Unidad Popular. He also directed theater plays and wrote poetry.

Jara conceived folk music and revolution as one. Many of his tunes became hymns for guerillas, describing daily life in campaign, such as "Camilo Torres," "Questions About Puerto Montt," "Abre tu ventana," "I'm Going to Cochabamba," or "The Right to Live in Peace," dedicated to Vietcong leader Hô Chi Minh. His legacy is recognized by many songwriters and musicians from several genres and countries, including verses by composers Daniel Viglietti, Pablo Milanés, Silvio Rodríguez, The Clash, Pete Seeger, U2, and Fabulosos Cadillacs, and some of his tunes are very popular around the world.

SEE ALSO: Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973); Central America, Music and Resistance; Latin American Punk Rock and Protest; Music and Protest, Latin America; Neruda, Pablo (1904–1973)

References and Suggested Readings

- Foreman, S. & Smith, M. (1974) *Compañero: Victor Jara of Chile*. Film documentary. London.
- Jara, J. (1983) *Victor Jara: Un canto truncado*. Barcelona: Argos Vergara.
- Plaza, G. (1976) *Victor Jara*. Madrid: Ediciones Júcar.

Jaurès, Jean (1859–1914)

Geoffrey Kurtz

Jean Jaurès was a prominent socialist politician, orator, and writer during the period of the Second International (1889–1916) and France's Third Republic (1870–1940). A defender of Alfred Dreyfus, a proponent of democratic reformism, and an advocate for peace, Jaurès sought to reconcile Karl Marx's theory of class conflict with the liberal individualism of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. He was assassinated on the eve of World War I.

Jaurès was born to a middle-class family in Castres in 1859. Graduating third in his class from the Ecole Normale in 1879, he taught philosophy in an academic high school near his hometown until 1885, when he won a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. In his first term, Jaurès quietly supported secular democracy and modest social reforms. As he began to work with the miners'



Jean Jaurès, a French socialist politician and intellectual, was an advocate of a moderate third way merging the ideas of Karl Marx and social justice with the principles of liberal individualism. He gained prominence as a champion of Alfred Dreyfus during his trial. Jaurès was assassinated in 1914, but his philosophy lived on as an important representation of democratic socialism in France and Europe. (Getty Images)

and glassmakers' unions in his home region, he became an outspoken socialist.

Losing his parliamentary seat in 1889, Jaurès turned to scholarship and local politics. During the next four years, he served on the Toulouse city council and completed the two dissertations – one in French and one in Latin – that would earn him a doctorate in philosophy from the Sorbonne. His first dissertation sought to reconcile idealist and materialist philosophies; the second traced the roots of German social democratic thought through the works of Martin Luther, Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

Jaurès was elected to the Chamber again in 1893 and soon became prominent through his role in the Dreyfus Affair. Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish army officer, had been convicted of spying for Germany in 1894, but his innocence soon became clear and the resulting controversy

divided France. Many on the French left denied that the plight of a bourgeois army officer was of any concern to the working class. However, Jaurès argued that when Dreyfus was subjected to the injustice of an unfair trial, he was no longer a member of the privileged class but simply a suffering human being. Socialists ought to embrace Dreyfus's cause, Jaurès wrote, since socialism continued and expanded the liberal commitment to human rights. He explored this link between liberalism and socialism in his writings on the affair, published in 1898 as *Les Preuves: Affaire Dreyfus*, and in the 13-volume socialist history of modern France, the *Histoire socialiste, 1789–1900*, that he edited and for which he wrote four volumes starting in 1898.

Jaurès's efforts to ally socialists and liberals helped forge a series of center-left coalition governments in France between 1899 and 1905. The left wing of the socialist movement throughout Europe criticized these coalitions and the strategy of democratic reformism they implied. Jaurès and like-minded leaders such as Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932) in Germany argued that socialists' commitment to democracy ought to mean engagement in the give-and-take of political reform. Other socialists, led by Karl Kautsky (1854–1938) and Rosa Luxemburg (1870–1919) in Germany and Jules Guesde (1845–1922) in France, insisted that the movement should use parliamentary and electoral politics primarily as exercises to prepare for an eventual revolution.

Among the reformist socialists, Jaurès offered a distinctive argument. Socialism, for him, meant a commitment to an ethical ideal of social justice and individual rights, coupled with a realization that this ideal could only be pursued through class struggle. Socialism was not a political paradise set somewhere in the future, but a demanding ethical commitment that could deepen the meaning and extend the scope of reformist activity in the present.

Jaurès argued for this radical reformism in his prolific writings and speeches, and in 1904 founded the journal *L'Humanité* as a vehicle for these ideas. However, reformists remained a minority among Europe's socialists. When the long-divided French socialists formed a united party in 1905, Jaurès's prestige made him the new party's natural leader even though his arguments had not persuaded most of his fellow socialists. He guided the French socialists

toward a reformist strategy but was constrained by his party's official commitment to revolution.

After 1905, Jaurès increasingly turned his attention to foreign affairs, working to forestall the Europe-wide war that seemed inevitable to many. He supported an international tribunal for the peaceful arbitration of conflict and proposed that socialists lead a general strike in any country that started an aggressive war. At the same time, he argued that French socialists should defend their republic if another country attacked without provocation. In 1911, he published his final book, *L'Armée Nouvelle*, in which he proposed restructuring the French military as a purely defensive militia and argued that socialism and patriotism could be compatible in any country committed to democracy and social justice.

Jaurès's efforts for peace earned him the hatred of France's nationalists. He was assassinated by Raoul Vilain, a young right-wing activist, on July 31, 1914. Within days, the war he had sought to prevent began.

Today, Jaurès is fondly remembered in France, where many streets and public facilities are named for him. He has received less attention elsewhere. Even in France, he has often been remembered simply as a great moral figure, and his distinctive argument for radical reformism has often been neglected. Since the late 1990s, however, as French socialists have sought an alternative to the moderate "third way" or "new middle" ideas of leaders like Tony Blair in Britain and Gerhard Schroeder in Germany, there has been a revival of French scholarly interest in Jaurès's political thought.

SEE ALSO: Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932); Dreyfus Affair; Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919)

References and Suggested Readings

- Goldberg, H. (1968) *The Life of Jean Jaurès*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Kolakowski, L. (1978) *Main Currents of Marxism*, Vol. 2. Trans. P. S. Falla. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 115–40.
- Kurtz, G. (2006) A Socialist State of Grace: The Radical Reformism of Jean Jaurès. *New Political Science* 28, 3 (September): 401–18.
- Noland, A. (1961) Individualism in Jean Jaurès' Socialist Thought. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 22, 1 (January–March): 63–80.

Jewish Bund

April Rosenblum

The Jewish Bund, known in full as the General Jewish Workers' Union of Lithuania, Poland and Russia (*Der Algemeiner Yidisher Arbeter Bund in Lite, Poyln, un Rusland*), was a mass movement of Jewish workers that played an essential role in the birth of the Russian revolutionary movement. A secular organization, it opposed tsarism and capitalism, and fought both to remedy universal inequality and to defend Jewish cultural and political rights. With 30,000 active members on the eve of the Russian Revolution of 1905, the Bund comprised one of the largest socialist organizations in the Russian empire.

As a founding organization of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (RSDWP), the Bund saw its mission as strengthening and promoting the RSDWP by bringing its message to the Jewish working class. However, as the views of the Bund and the RSDWP's dominant *Iskra* faction diverged irreconcilably on party structure, the status of Jews, the role of workers, and the relationship of theory to practice, the Bund established itself as an independent party, cooperating with others where possible to advance social democracy and revolution. After folding in Russia in 1921, it found renewed vibrancy in Poland, but was forced by World War II to marshal all of its resources for armed resistance to the Holocaust.

The Bund was founded in October of 1897 by a coalition of Jewish activist-intellectuals who, after early political education in Russian populism, had embraced Marxism. In March of 1898, it helped to convene the first congress of the new Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party, out of which *Iskra*, the Bolsheviks, and the Mensheviks would soon emerge.

The Bund's early leaders were soon joined by many of the workers they served. These new leaders were intimately familiar with the pressures faced by Jews, who for a century had been confined to a "Pale of Settlement" in the empire's western border region. Ninety percent lived in or near poverty, compounded by heavy discriminatory taxes, quotas restricting education, and exclusion from many trades. Periodic pogroms unleashed mass popular violence on Jewish towns, and generations had suffered under tsarist military

policies which, aiming to undo Jewish cultural identity, enabled the regular kidnapping of children for decades of forced military service and conversion.

The Bund understood Russia's five million Jews to be not simply a religion but a "nationality," a distinct ethnic culture that had developed its own forms of expression over centuries together and among whom 97 percent spoke their native Yiddish. The Bund's rejection of contemporary views of nationhood, which defined a nationality by its natural link to geographic territory, brought it into stark conflict with both fellow socialists and the emerging Zionist movement.

Beginning in 1897, the Bund dedicated itself to recruiting and educating workers, organizing strikes, boycotts, and political protests, producing and distributing political literature, agitating within the military, and carrying on relationships with the empire's major social democratic and socialist organizations. The successes of Bund organizing gave it a membership which dwarfed that of other parties. In many cities, it was recognized as the only party with an actual mass base. Fellow revolutionaries observed its advanced level of organization with a mixture of praise and resentment, as when Vera Zasulich declared in a letter to Plekhanov: "The Jewish Bund is a marvel of pure balance . . . It is annoying that it is they who are so businesslike and not the Russians; all the same one must do them justice" (Tobias 1972: 92).

By 1901, Bund strikes drew consistent victories, demonstrations were formidable in size, and physical conflicts with police were increasing. In 1902–3, faced with a horrific wave of anti-Jewish pogroms at Kishinev and Czestochowa, the Bund took the lead in organizing the first Jewish mass self-defense units. The success of these units deterred pogromist violence and served as revolutionary preparation, providing Jewish workers with their first experience of fighting tsarist military forces.

By mid-1901, pressures were mounting for the Bund to develop a revolutionary approach to Jewish identity. Bund leaders had long hesitated to advocate for preserving Jewish culture, having been inculcated by both tsarist schools and socialist theory to see the eventual disappearance of Jews through assimilation as inevitable and welcome. But Zionism now threatened to draw followers away from the Bund by offering Jewish workers an affirmation of their culture that they

craved. The Bund determined to formulate a vision of how minority cultures could thrive within a classless socialist society that transcended national boundaries.

Drawing on the writings of Karl Kautsky, the Bund developed a platform of “national cultural autonomy” for Jews which would eventually be endorsed at its sixth congress (1905). Unlike Zionism, the Bund’s solution sought no geographic territory. Instead, it saw liberation for Jews, and for all national minorities, in the creation of a new, multinational society where socialist ideals and education would lead dominant cultures to reject ethnic hatreds, and smaller nationalities would be supported to develop their cultures. Its stance was met with strong criticism from other social democrats, who denied Jewish nationality and accused the Bund of being poisoned by nationalism.

Simultaneously, Lenin sought to centralize the RSDWP under Iskra’s control. In July 1903, at the RSDWP’s second congress, criticism of the Bund’s national thought expanded into attempts to limit Bund activities and question the organization’s long-term usefulness. Led by Iskra, delegates roundly rejected proposals that would decentralize RSDWP structure and affirm the Bund’s ability to continue operating on its own terms. Foreseeing a future as the debilitated appendage of a new, highly centralized RSDWP, the Bund resigned from RSDWP membership. In September 1904, it was recognized as the first independent Jewish party of the Socialist International.

Despite these troubles, external Bund activities continued to increase. By the revolutionary days of May 1905, it had risen to the level of a counter-institution among Jews, with Bund groups formally implementing communal taxes on Jews to fund strikes, establishing food distribution centers and hospitals for those wounded during actions, and in some instances replacing local rabbis as the destination for Jewish individuals, families, and businesses seeking to settle disputes.

In January 1905, when the “Bloody Sunday” massacre unleashed massive strikes, the Bund sounded the call for workers to drop their tasks, arm themselves, and begin the work of revolution. The coming months led to major successes in Bund-influenced areas, where as early as January tsarist advisors observed “far more serious conditions” than in major Russian cities

(Tobias 1972: 299). It was not until October that strikes in St. Petersburg and Moscow led the regime to convene a democratically elected parliament and grant broad new political freedoms. The social democratic movement cautiously accepted partial victory.

The repression that followed, including a surge in police-supported anti-Semitic violence by the “Black Hundreds,” left the Bund badly damaged. Hundreds of thousands of Jews escaped via immigration to the United States. Bund members who stayed were weakened and depressed. Throughout the next decade, the organization gradually rebuilt itself through an increased focus on proletarian Jewish cultural life. In 1917, the Bund participated actively in the February revolution. However, it opposed the Bolshevik seizure of power, and after several years of struggle was dissolved in 1921.

Operations now shifted irrevocably to Poland, where Bund activities had been allowed semi-independence since 1914. There, Bundists founded a proliferation of cultural institutions, from secular Yiddish schools and a youth sports movement to an organization for Jewish working women and a children’s sanitarium. The Bund fought Jewish exclusion from trades, shut down major sectors of Poland in a general strike against pogroms, and began to organize among the conservative, religious Jewish workers whom they had previously never reached.

The Bund’s continuing struggle against political isolation in the increasingly anti-Semitic climate of the 1920s and 1930s led it to cooperate with reformists and moderates. It participated in elections, joined the Labor and Socialist International after being rejected by the Comintern, and partnered with the Polish Socialist Party, which it had long criticized.

By 1939, Polish popular support for the Bund had reached unprecedented levels. But with the German invasion of Poland in 1939, Bund activities were forced underground. In secret, members organized education and cultural activities for youth, published newspapers, and played a leading role in organizing the network of armed Jewish resistance to the Nazis, including the massive Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of April 1943. Though a handful of Bundists survived the war, the organization shut down under Soviet pressure in 1949.

Even after the Holocaust, the Bund remained fierce opponents of Zionism, advocating instead

the concept of *do-ikayt* (“hereness”), which affirmed that wherever Jews lived, there was their homeland; there they should build permanent Jewish culture, and fight to improve conditions for all people.

The Bund’s influence extended beyond Europe, particularly in early twentieth-century mass Jewish immigration to the United States, where Bundists rose to leadership in the American Labor Party, the Communist Party, the socialist *Forverts* (Forward) and communist *Frayhayt* (Freedom) newspapers, the Workmen’s Circle, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, and the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, and helped to found the Jewish Labor Committee and Jewish Socialist Federation. In the theoretical realm, the Bund proposed a postmodern understanding of nationality at a time when Russia had scarcely emerged from medieval structures. In practical terms, the organization contributed a relatively unique example of revolutionary organizing that addressed with equal seriousness both Jewish needs for safety and self-determination and the mandate to work toward universal liberation.

Though the Bund officially still exists, drawing a small membership primarily from Jews who once took part in its European chapters, its impact is more strongly felt in the progressive movements around the world that its members joined, founded, or influenced indirectly. The Bund today remains a source of influence and inspiration for radical and progressive Jewish activists, non- and anti-Zionists, intentionally secular Jewish communities, and the Yiddish revival movement.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Jewish Resistance to Nazism; Jews and Revolution in Europe, 1789–1919; Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Marxism; Polish Revolution, 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Socialism; Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, 1943; Zionism

References and Suggested Readings

- Frankel, J. (1981) *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews, 1862–1917*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gitelman, Z. (Ed.) (2003) *The Emergence of Modern Jewish Politics: Bundism and Zionism in Eastern Europe*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Goldstein, B. (2005) *Five Years in the Warsaw Ghetto*. Oakland: AK Press.

- Jacobs, J. (Ed.) (2001) *Jewish Politics in Eastern Europe: The Bund at 100*. New York: New York University Press.
- Medem, V. (1979) *Vladimir Medem: The Life and Soul of a Legendary Jewish Socialist*. New York: KTAV.
- Mendelsohn, E. (1970) *Class Struggle in the Pale: The Formative Years of the Jewish Workers’ Movement in Tsarist Russia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tobias, H. J. (1972) *The Jewish Bund in Russia from its Origins to 1905*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Zimmerman, J. D. (2004) *Poles, Jews and the Politics of Nationality: The Bund and the Polish Socialist Party in Late Tsarist Russia, 1892–1914*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Jewish resistance to Nazism

Rabbi Yehiel Grenimann

Jewish resistance to Nazism should be seen within two contexts: the history of Jewish responses to the virulent European Christian anti-Semitism of the approximately 1,000 years which preceded the Holocaust on the one hand, and the history of religious, ethnic, and political resistance to totalitarianism in the twentieth century on the other.

In the first context, Jewish consciousness of Nazism as a qualitatively different, more radical, threat to Jewish existence came tragically late. This led to ineffective “*shtadlanut*” responses of traditional communal leaders, who chose to bargain with, negotiate with, or bribe those in power. There were also defiant expressions of religious observance, particularly among the Orthodox Jews. Passive resistance to the Nazi onslaught began in Germany under the spiritual leadership of figures such as Rabbi Leo Baeck and the philosopher Martin Buber who organized a revival of Jewish education and cultural activity in the late 1930s. In the ghettos and camps throughout Europe, self-help, medical, social, educational, and cultural institutions served to counter demoralization, focus passive resistance, and sometimes create environments from which activist rescue and armed resistance groups could work and recruit participants.

In the second context, Jews of the more ideological modern movements became increasingly aware that they were faced with an ideology that was absolutist, racist, and uncompromising in

its commitment to the total destruction of the Jewish people. The Jews, defined racially, were slated for extermination. Religious, national, or ethnic loyalties had become irrelevant. They were the prime target of Nazi totalitarianism, even at the expense of the German war effort. This realization led to organized efforts of rescue, which became increasingly desperate as the war continued. Efforts at documenting Jewish life and suffering were widespread, as were attempts at disseminating information about the Nazi genocide until it became public knowledge.

The continued postponement of armed uprising as long as some options for physical survival still seemed possible was characteristic of the behavior of most ghetto-based resistance groups. They feared mass reprisals and concluded that armed struggle could be carried out only from the forests or within general nationalist (often anti-Semitic themselves) and communist resistance movements. This approach changed when it was clear that the final liquidation of a ghetto was at hand.

The crescendo of armed resistance was reached in the Warsaw ghetto revolt of April (Passover) 1943, where the remaining thousands held out against the Nazi war machine for more than a month until the last survivors were murdered and the ghetto razed. Apart from that major revolt, incidents of organized armed revolt have been documented in 43 other ghettos, as well as a number of the major death camps: Sobibor, Treblinka, and Birkenau-Auschwitz. Unlike these, however, the Warsaw rebellion created a precedent for urban rebellion elsewhere in occupied Europe and became a rallying symbol of Jewish resistance under the slogan "Do not go like lambs to the slaughter." This impacted Jewish behavior during the immediate postwar period, leading up to the Jewish rebellion against the British mandate in Palestine in 1946 and Israel's war of independence two years later.

One reason the reaction was slow in many quarters was that ideological movements had contributed to the secularization and modernization of the Jewish masses during the early twentieth century. This had encouraged the breakdown of traditional religious authority and social structures. Mass migration to Western Europe, North America, and Palestine at the end of the nineteenth century also contributed to this tendency, at least until migration was stopped by restrictions and anti-Semitic backlash in those countries.

Amongst these movements Jewish socialism (known as the Bund), Jewish communism, and Zionism were to become agents of active and armed resistance against Nazism just before and during World War II. These ideological parties had spawned youth movements, the best known of which were Hashomer Hatzair, Betar, Gordonia, Dror-HaBonim, and Skif-Tsukumft, which played a crucial role in the ghetto uprisings of 1942–1943. Well known leaders of these groups included Mordecai Anilewicz and Mark Edelman of Warsaw, Abba Kovner and Joseph Wittenberg of Vilna, and Mordecai Tannenbaum-Tamarov of Bialystok, all of whom had been youth leaders of socialist or socialist Zionist groups in prewar years. Young women such as Roska Kurzack, Hanna Senesh, Haviva Reich, and countless others, also played heroic roles in these resistance groups, serving as couriers between ghettos and contacts on the Aryan side, as saboteurs, and, later in the war, as parachutists behind the lines for the Allies in Hungary, where the last sizable Jewish community still remained.

A particular focus of resistance activities was the rescue of children, victims of the first "aktziot" (round-ups). Children were smuggled out of ghettos and concentration camps and thrown off trains taking Jews to extermination centers. When possible, they were supplied with forged identification documents, placed with non-Jewish families, hidden in the countryside of occupied countries and smuggled across borders throughout Europe, sometimes in cooperation with local resistance groups in Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Holland, Belgium, France, Italy, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Even Polish nationalists cooperated in such efforts, unlike those in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Croatia, and Romania. The American Zionist leader Henrietta Szold organized an international effort to get children out of Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia before the outbreak of World War II. This project, called "Youth Aliya," saved thousands of children who were settled in youth villages and kibbutzim throughout Palestine during the late 1930s. Most of their families presumably perished.

Jews played a central role in the resistance against Nazism of partisans in the forests of Yugoslavia, Lithuania, Belarus, Slovakia, Poland, and Ukraine in Eastern Europe, as well as the French and Dutch resistance in Western Europe.

Thousands who had fled into the countryside to escape Nazi persecution and mass murder joined existing resistance groups, initiated new ones, and were prominent in the organization of sabotage and guerilla warfare against the German army. Figures like Jacob Glazman, Boris Greineman, Alexander Bogan, and the Bielsky brothers organized specifically Jewish resistance units, such as “Nekomma” (Vengeance) in the Naroch forest near Vilna, which not only fought the Germans, sabotaging communications and supplies on the eastern front and attacking small German outposts, but also protected and fed hundreds of Jewish civilians hidden in these forests. They infiltrated ghettos to encourage young people to flee and join them in their armed struggle.

Most such groups were disbanded by the Soviets when they took control of these areas as the tide turned against the Nazi occupiers, though many continued fighting in the ranks of the Red Army until the end of the war. In addition, more than a million Jews served in the regular armed forces of the Allies in the effort to defeat Nazism, including a contingent called “The Jewish Brigade” from British Palestine.

SEE ALSO: Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Jewish Bund; Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, 1943

References and Suggested Readings

- Bauer, Y. (1970) *Flight and Rescue*. New York: Random House.
- Dawidowicz, L. S. (1976) *The War Against the Jews, 1933–1945*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Gutman, I. (1982) *The Jews of Warsaw, 1939–1943: Ghetto, Underground Revolt*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Kowalski, I. (1969) *A Secret Press in Nazi Europe, The Story of a Jewish United Partisan Organization*. New York: Shengold.
- Levi, P. (1961) *Survival in Auschwitz*. New York: Collier Books.

Jews and revolution in Europe, 1789–1919

Howard N. Lupovitch

The interplay between European Jewry and European revolutions manifested itself in two ways during the long nineteenth century, from 1789 to 1919. First, the legal and political status of Jews, primarily in Central and Eastern Europe,

ranked among the most hotly contested and protracted debates among revolutionary elites and their antagonists. Second, from 1848 onward, Jews were among the leaders of most revolutionary movements.

The particular aims at stake during the revolutionary movements of the nineteenth century changed from liberalism in 1789, to liberalism and nationalism by 1848, to socialism and communism by 1917. Yet the centrality of the Jewish Question, as the debate over the status of Jews came to be known by the 1820s, remained throughout; the inclusion of Jews in the new states and societies that these movements hoped to build remained at the forefront of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary discourse and debate. Each of the great revolutionary dramas of 1789, 1848, and 1917 added a dimension to the debate over the fate of the Jews. The Jewish Question eventually delineated the future of a religious and ethnic minority, but also became a gauge of the success of revolutionary ideas and movements.

Jews in France

The French Revolution brought discourse on Jewish rights to the forefront. For several decades prior to 1789, public exchanges on civic amelioration of Jews in England, France, the Netherlands, and the German states remained confined to the world of academic and belletristic discourse. The consequence of the discourse on Jewish inclusion is evident in Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia’s policies, and especially in the Hapsburg monarch Joseph II’s Patent of Toleration. These initial discussions influenced subsequent debates in revolutionary settings: progressive and revolutionary movements would include Jews in a newly refashioned state and society *quid pro quo*, or permit inclusion on the condition of Jews meeting certain expectations.

The broader brush strokes of this *quid pro quo* proposition, and the complexity of translating it into an actual state policy, became clear during the early days of the French Revolution. The central point of contention was whether the Jews would be willing and able to cede corporate autonomy and social isolation in exchange for citizenship, a revolutionary concession in exchange for revolutionizing Jews’ status. This condition’s centrality was made explicit in an oft-cited statement by Count Clermont-Tonnere, a leading proponent of Jewish emancipation, in

December 1789: “The Jews should be denied everything as a nation, but granted everything as individuals. They must be citizens. . . . [But] it is intolerable that the Jews should become a separate political formation or class. The existence of a nation within a nation is unacceptable to our country.” The Jews residing in France, in other words, were expected to transform themselves into French citizens of the Jewish persuasion.

This expectation was complicated by the fact that, at the end of the eighteenth century, French Jewry was comprised of two starkly different groups: the highly acculturated, comparatively more affluent, and less numerous Jews of Bordeaux; and the unacculturated, more numerous, less affluent Jews of Alsace-Lorraine. The latter had come under French rule as part of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, but were never integrated into French society beyond a limited role as commercial intermediaries and creditors. Jews of Alsace-Lorraine were largely impoverished (except for a few affluent merchants and creditors), religiously traditional, Yiddish-speaking Jews, who were organized into self-governing, corporate communities. In contrast, the Jews of Bordeaux lived inconspicuously in France for several generations as an exception to a general ban on Jewish settlements. Sephardic Jews were largely descendants of Spanish and Portuguese Jews, who, after settling in France ostensibly as Christians during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, eventually resumed practicing Judaism openly. In contrast to their co-religionists in Alsace-Lorraine, the Jews of Bordeaux were Jewish in the modern sense, for their Jewish identity was one component of a compartmentalized identity. They had neither designs nor use for corporate status, but lived contentedly as individual Jews within French culture and society. They were Frenchmen of the Jewish persuasion a century or more before this term became in vogue.

Not surprisingly, the Jews of Bordeaux were emancipated in January 1790 with little fanfare a few months following the Declaration of the Rights of Man. In actuality, Jews had been socially emancipated a generation or two earlier; legal emancipation merely made overt a situation existing for decades. The Jews of Alsace-Lorraine were emancipated in September 1791, after nearly two years of debate. The sharp contrast between the two emancipation edicts left a profound impact on the more acculturated Jews of Alsace.

In early 1791, Isaac Cerf Berr, a leading spokesman of Alsatian Jews from Nancy, articulated his aim to prove Jews of Alsace-Lorraine worthy of emancipation, essentially by emulating Jews of Bordeaux: “I cannot too often repeat how absolutely necessary it is for us to divest ourselves entirely of that narrow spirit of corporation and congregation, in all civil and political matters, not connected immediately with our spiritual laws; in these things we must absolutely appear simply as individuals, as Frenchmen, guided only by a true patriotism and by the general good of the nation.” Cerf Berr was the first in a long series of Jewish leaders contemplating eliminating elements of Jewish distinctiveness in exchange for citizenship.

From this point onward, each revolutionary movement contemplating including Jews used the emancipation of the Jews of Bordeaux and Alsace-Lorraine as a template, to determine conditions for Jewish inclusion and distinguish worthy Jews from those first needing to meet certain conditions. This paradigm remained at the center of revolutionary discourse after 1789, especially during the revolutions of 1848.

Jews in Central Europe and Russia

While, in some ways, the revolutionary movements of 1848 reprised in Central Europe the events of 1789, two interim developments set the events of 1848–9 down a different path. First, during the half-century between 1789 and 1848, Romantic notions of culturally and historically based differences between national and ethnic groups supplanted Enlightenment notions of primacy of reason and universal equality. In the Hapsburg Monarchy, in particular, this challenged the leaders of the revolutions of 1848 to negotiate the often conflicting claims of Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Romanians, Serbs, and Croats, while eliminating social inequality between privileged and unprivileged classes, and unseating the dynasty.

The early weeks of the revolution in the spring of 1848 were characterized by a burst of idealistic rhetoric reminiscent of Paris 1789, with little nationalist sentiment. Calls for Jewish emancipation, at the forefront of revolutionary aims throughout Central Europe, echoed the rhetoric of the French Revolution with calls for universal brotherhood and equality to include Jews. Among the leaders of the Revolution in Vienna – among the most significant mid-century

revolutions – were two assimilated Jews, Adolf Fischhof and William Goldmark. Each had set aside his Jewish culture for a struggle on behalf of humanity, a tribute to the universalist idealism of the spring of 1848. After the abdication of Hapsburg Emperor Ferdinand in 1848, Fischhof, leader of the Commission on Public Safety, became *de facto* ruler of the Hapsburg Monarchy.

Within six months after the outbreak of revolution in March 1848, nationalist aims appeared alongside the transnational aims of Fischhof and Goldmark; including those of the Magyars for political independence. The Springtime of Nations and the flood of national aspirations added a dimension to the debate over Jewish emancipation. The question shifted from whether Jews were worthy of state citizenship to whether they were worthy of inclusion in a given nation. The Frankfurt Parliament, voice of German national aspirations in 1848, reiterated the promise of religious equality under the banner of the fundamental rights of the German people.

Jews responded to this new expectation accordingly, exemplified by Hungarian Jews, who embraced the Magyar cause in thought, word, and deed. The patriotism of Hungarian Jewry elicited a powerful response revealing the underbelly to revolutionary agitation as anti-Jewish riots broke out primarily in cities in Hungary and Central Europe. In Hungary, violence was provoked by the prospect of Jews joining revolutionary armies such as the Hungarian national guard (*hónvéd*). In Hungary, Sándor Petöfi and Mihály Vörösmarty and other leading figures reproached anti-Jewish agitators as enemies of the revolution.

Following the defeat of the Revolutions of 1848, conflicting images of Jews appeared, for example, through the Rothschild family's financial support for the reinvigoration of the royal and imperial armies of the Hohenzollern and Hapsburg dynasties. Political conservatives and reactionaries viewed Jews such as Fischhof as revolutionary, and progressives, particularly social democrats and those further to the political left, personified Jews as the Rothschilds, and indispensable agents of counterrevolution. These conflicting stereotypes fortified nascent political anti-Semitism in the late 1800s, reinforced in the early twentieth century by an even greater presence of Jews among the leaders of the socialist and communist revolutions in the wake of World War I.

The revolutions in Germany, Hungary, and Russia during and immediately after World

War I marked the full realization of the aims of previous revolutions with respect to Jews. The leaders of these revolutions who were of Jewish origin (notably Rosa Luxemburg in Germany, Béla Kún in Hungary, and Leon Trotsky in Russia) forged solidarity with a working class beyond their own social origin. As Luxemburg wrote in 1916: "I feel equally close to the wretched victims of the rubber plantations of Putumayo, or to the Negroes in Africa with whose bodies the Europeans are playing catch-ball . . . I have no separate corner of my heart for the ghetto. I feel at home in the entire world wherever there are clouds and birds and human tears."

This universalist outlook was realized most dramatically and en masse during the Bolshevik Revolution and the emerging revolutionary Soviet state seeking to foster class bonds of solidarity. Concomitantly the Bolshevik Revolution introduced extraordinary material and cultural possibilities for individual Jews. Just as the Revolutions of 1848 had a backlash on Jews by laying a foundation stone for political anti-Semitism, the early twentieth century revolutions fortified the tendency to equate Jews and communism.

SEE ALSO: Ethnic and Nationalist Revolts in the Hapsburg Empire, 1500–1848; European Revolutions of 1848; Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919)

References and Suggested Readings

- Baron, S. W. (1949, 1951) *The Revolutions of 1848 and Jewish Scholarship. Proceedings of the American Academy of Jewish Research* 18: 1–66; 20: 1–100.
- Haberer, E. (1995) *Jews and Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Russia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mahler, R. (Ed.) (1941) *Jewish Emancipation: A Selection of Documents*. New York: American Jewish Committee.
- Malino, F. (1996) *A Jew in the French Revolution: The Life of Zalkind Hourwitz*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Jinnah, Muhammad Ali (1876–1948)

Kunal Chattopadhyay

Born in 1876 in Karachi, Sindh, a province in the Bombay Presidency of India, Jinnah was a leading opponent of British colonialism, a representative of Muslim aspirations, and the founder

of Pakistan who was known as Baba-e-Quam (Father of the Nation). Though a Shi'ite Muslim, Jinnah was not observant. He studied law in London and was called to the bar at the age of 19. He joined the Indian National Congress in 1896 as a reformer, and from 1910 he was a moderate nationalist in the Imperial Legislative Assembly.

In 1906, Jinnah wrote a letter challenging the claims of the Aga Khan and others as representatives of the Muslim community. The same year, he attended the Calcutta Session of the Congress, and in a speech over the *Wakf* (religious endowments) question, expressed satisfaction that Muslims could stand on the same platform as other religions in India. For the next 30 years Jinnah advocated Indian nationalism while articulating Muslim grievances. After initially rejecting Muslim League communal politics, Jinnah joined the organization in 1913, becoming president at the 1916 session in Lucknow. Later Jinnah became architect of a Congress–League alliance against colonial rule, and was viewed as the ambassador of Hindu–Muslim unity. Like most moderate nationalists, Jinnah supported the British in World War I while remaining active in the home rule movement.

Gandhi's rise to power caused Jinnah's drift from the Congress. He welcomed Gandhi and invited him to join the Home Rule League as president. But Gandhi sought to portray Jinnah as a Muslim sectarian rather than as a nationalist. By late 1920 Jinnah became estranged from Congress. A constitutionalist, he objected to Gandhi's style of mass politics. Opposing Gandhi's "Hindu style" at the 1923 Muslim League Congress, Jinnah emphasized Hindu–Muslim unity in order to achieve Indian dominion status. In 1927, Jinnah convened a meeting of representative Muslims demanding one-third representation in the Central Legislature. Congress leaders ignored Jinnah and supported an alternative constitutional plan by Hindu communalists. Jinnah rejected an invitation to attend the All-India Muslim Conference in Delhi convened by the Aga Khan. At the All-Parties Convention in Calcutta, Jinnah pleaded for national unity despite communal differences, and participated in the Round Table Conference as an independent voice. Ignored by the British and by Gandhi, Jinnah moved to England to practice law.

Jinnah's political proposals prior to 1940 exposed a commitment to civil liberties. In 1918,

he told the viceroy that terrorism was a political not a criminal action, caused by discontent against British colonial policy. In 1924, Jinnah argued that violence and bomb throwing could be prevented through meeting people's aspirations, not by repressive laws.

Until the mid-1930s, as leader of the Muslim League, Jinnah aspired to a unified independent India. But his effort to compromise with Congress through power sharing was rejected by Jawaharlal Nehru, who opposed any competition with Congress in India. Following the 1937 elections, Nehru demanded a Muslim League merger with Congress. Fearing that Congress would use its majority vote to suppress Muslim aspirations, Jinnah subsequently returned to communal politics and held the view that Hindus and Muslims constituted two nations. Nevertheless, from 1937 to early 1940 Jinnah's writings and speeches alternated between urging protection for minorities and the two-nation theory. As a culmination, the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League for Muslim rights and autonomy was an ambiguous rather than absolute call for partition.

In 1941, Jinnah founded *Dawn* as the organ of the League. The following year he demanded parity of Muslim League and Congress ministers and the right for Muslim majority provinces to secede. Some historians question whether Jinnah actually sought an independent state, or whether he raised the issue as a means to gain greater autonomy and security for Muslims. Repeated negotiations between Gandhi and Jinnah in 1944 failed to yield tangible results. In 1946, the Muslim League won a large majority of Muslim seats in the Constituent Assembly of India, while Congress swept the general seats. Jinnah accepted the 1946 British cabinet mission proposal for a united India with significant autonomy for provinces and religions, a plan first rejected by Congress. After a second proposal calling for partition along communal lines, Congress accepted provincial autonomy without broader communal autonomy. Jinnah called this acceptance dishonest and withdrew the League from the Constituent Assembly.

On August 16, Jinnah called on the Muslim League to launch "direct action." Communal violence broke out throughout India, notably in Calcutta, Noakhali in Bengal, Bihar, and the United Provinces. Eventually the League–Congress coalition collapsed in the central government. Congress accepted partition, since

its conservative leaders were wary of Jinnah and popular radicalism. The new viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, and civil servant V. P. Menon promulgated a partition plan creating Muslim dominion in West Punjab, East Bengal, Baluchistan, and Sindh. The Northwest Frontier Province voted for Congress, but over 90 percent of the population boycotted a plebiscite creating an independent Pakistan.

On August 14, 1947, Pakistan became an independent dominion and Jinnah was named governor general. Speaking to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947, Jinnah called for a pluralist democracy, with equal rights for Muslims and Hindus. But the first months of independent Pakistan were diverted to address violence caused by the partition. Jinnah put his imprint on Pakistan's future in two important ways. In a trip to Bengal, he declared Urdu as the official language of Pakistan, even though the majority did not speak it. Jinnah also confronted India over the accession of the princely states of Junagarh and Kashmir. India then sent troops to ensure the incorporation of Junagarh. Pakistan supported Kashmiri rebels, leading to more than six decades of confrontation with India.

Jinnah died on September 11, 1948 from lung cancer and tuberculosis.

SEE ALSO: Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); India, Post-World War II Upsurge; Indian National Liberation; Pakistan, Protest and Rebellion; Quit India Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Ahmad, R. (1999) *The Works of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Ahmed, A. S. (1997) *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin*. London: Routledge.
- Wolpert, S. (2002) *Jinnah of Pakistan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Joshi, P. C. (1907–1980)

Shatarupa Sen Gupta

P. C. Joshi was born in in Almorā, Uttar Pradesh. He joined the Workers' and Peasants' Party in 1928 and became the joint secretary of its United Provinces unit. Alarmed at the rise of communist and trade union activities, the British launched a series of repressive measures, culminating in the arrest of 31 labor leaders, includ-

ing Joshi, on March 20, 1929; they were tried for three years in the famous Meerut Conspiracy Case. Joshi joined the Communist Party of India (CPI) the same year. He was released in 1933 and participated in the All-India Textile Workers' Strike from Kanpur, for which he was again arrested and imprisoned for two years.

Joshi became general secretary of the CPI in 1935, the period of the Comintern's turn to Popular Frontism. His period as party chief (1935–48) was marked by a combination of significant growth – both horizontally and in number of members – and a reformist orientation. Joshi was able to push the party towards penetrating civil society by forming mass organizations of students, women, and people in the creative arts. In 1943 he married another remarkable revolutionary: Kalpana Dutt, a supporter of armed revolution, who later became a party member.

After the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the CPI declared that the war was a "Peoples' War" against fascism, which led to the decriminalization of the CPI by the Indian government. Taking advantage of this moment, the CPI grew hugely, and was able to emerge as the leading party in the postwar upsurge of 1945–7, spearheading struggles like the Tebhaga movement (Bengal), Telangana struggle (Hyderabad), Punnappa Vyalar (Kerala), and the all-India General Strike of 1946; however, Joshi's nationalist line meant that the party did not try to turn the struggles into a revolution, and instead called for the Congress to take leadership.

Shortly after India won its independence, the CPI took a position of armed insurrection – a line Joshi opposed. He was denounced as a rightist and expelled in 1949. Though taken back after the change in line of 1951, he remained marginalized. In 1952 Joshi went to the World Peace Congress in Vienna. He was also elected to the Central Committee of the CPI in the Palghat Congress of 1956, eventually becoming the editor of *New Age*, the party organ of the CPI.

The Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 posed a fresh challenge to the CPI. A section within the party supported China's claim that India was the aggressor, whereas another section, in the wake of the Soviet Union's support to Nehru, wanted to steer the party closer to the Congress. When the pro-Chinese faction split from the CPI (Marxist) in 1964, Joshi remained in the CPI, but faced isolation for refusing to

approve the CPI's forming of Samyukt Vidhayak Dal (a united legislators group). Towards the end of his life, Joshi built the Socialist Ashram (hermitage) in his home town of Almora, and dedicated his remaining years to documenting the history of the CPI, and building an archive of the left movements in India at Jawaharlal Nehru University. He died on November 9, 1980.

SEE ALSO: Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964); Quit India Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Chakravartty, G. (2007) *P. C. Joshi: A Biography*. New Delhi: National Book Trust.
- Chattopadhyay, K. (1984) The Peoples' War Revisited. *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Sunday Supplement) July 1, 8 & 15: 1–4.
- Joshi, P. C. (2002) *Marxism and Social Revolution in India and Other Essays*. New Delhi: Manak.
- Overstreet, G. D. & Windmiller, M. (1960) *Communism in India*. Bombay: Perennial Press.

Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion

Gabriel Cabrera M.

The Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion was an anti-colonial and millenarian armed uprising carried out by the indigenous population of Peruvian central Amazonia during Spanish domination. It took its name from its leader, Juan Santos, named Atahualpa. Though one of the most important indigenous rebellions in the eighteenth-century Peruvian viceroyalty, and the longest, most of the facts surrounding both the rebellion and its leader are unclear. Some are mixed with legend, while others are hypotheses or possibilities. It is known that Juan Santos and his army, recruited from among different Amazonian indigenous peoples, fought the Spanish army for more than 14 years and were never defeated. While they could not chase the colonial powers out of Peruvian territory, they did manage to expel Franciscan evangelist missions from the central jungle for several decades.

Juan Santos was born around 1710. He was educated in Cusco by the Jesuits, so he was probably a member of the indigenous nobility. Santos learned Spanish and Latin and traveled with a priest to France, Spain, England, and

Angola. That trip allowed him to contrast life in Europe to that of most Indians in Peru and may have helped form his anti-colonial consciousness and influence his decision to rebel. When he did return, he built a movement calling for the expulsion of the Spanish; the eradication of social, economic, political, and cultural oppression enforced on the indigenous people; and the restoration of the Tawantinsuyu (the Quechua name for the Inca empire), of which he declared himself a representative.

In about 1740, a short time after his return to Peru, Santos penetrated into the central jungle and traveled among the indigenous people there, meeting with local caciques, or chiefs. During this time he became known as Apu Inka, descendant of Atahualpa, who was the last sovereign of Tawantinsuyu. The Ashaninka people, the largest indigenous population in the Amazonian region of Gran Pajonal, joined the rebellion, soon to be followed by other indigenous peoples such as the Yaneshas, Piros, Shipibos, Conibos, and Katataibos.

The rebellion broke out in June 1742 as Atahualpa began expelling the missionaries from the region. José Antonio de Mendoza, then viceroy of Peru, immediately sent an armed expedition to defeat the rebels. In 1743 the Spaniards established their headquarters in Quimiri, but the rebels interrupted their supplies and besieged them. The Spaniards either deserted or died, and the rebel army took the Chanchamayo valley. A larger expedition was sent by the next viceroy, José Antonio Manso de Velasco, but it was also defeated by Atahualpa, whose army knew the land well and used guerilla tactics. The rebel movement and its political influence rapidly extended to areas occupied by the current Huanuco, Pasco, Junin, and Ayacucho departments.

After the defeat of the second expedition, Atahualpa decided to advance through the Andean region and establish relations with the local indigenous leaders there. The rebel army, after taking the Sonomoro and Andamarca settlements, reached the edge of Tarma, an important Andean village, which it besieged. Yet, unexplainably, the rebel army abandoned its position after a while, retreated, and turned back to the tropical mountain region. Some sources say the cause likely involved the harsh Andean climate, unbearable for the Amazonian rebels. However, the Spaniards decided to fortify the

main settlements and did not dare to make raids into the jungle again.

No information about the rebel movement or its leader is available for the period after 1756. It is speculated that Atahualpa died that year. Some say he was killed by his lieutenant and brother-in-law, the black Antonio Gatica, or by another leader of his army, because of a power conflict. Others say he was killed when somebody wanted to prove his alleged immortality. However, he most likely died because of his age. At any rate, after his death the indigenous warriors built a monument in Metraró, where his corpse remained until being moved to the Tarma cemetery after the republican period.

There are also varying interpretations of many details surrounding the movement and its leader. In seeking to explain why the movement did not have larger political repercussions, historians have pointed out that though it threatened the colonial power for many years, it did not extend to the most important regions of the viceroy – the Andes and the coast. There is no clear answer as to why this is the case. Also uncertain is the information about a probable collaboration between Juan Santos Atahualpa and the English vice-admiral George Anson, whom Santos might have met during his trip to Europe. Apparently Anson waited with his fleet in the Pacific Ocean for many months in 1742, with the purpose of supporting the rebellion, but he decided to leave shortly before the uprising finally broke out.

The rebellion strongly influenced other uprisings. One was the 1750 conspiracy by a group of indigenous people in Lima. Encouraged by Atahualpa's successes, they planned to take the viceregal palace and expel or kill all the *chapetones* or Spaniards. After the failure of the conspiracy, one of its leaders, Francisco Inca, escaped his sentence of death and quartering to start a new uprising in Huarochiri province, but that too was soon defeated.

Perhaps the most important legacy of the Atahualpa rebellion was to unify under one emancipating project a vast population from several Indian tribes. It also preserved indigenous culture by restricting the cultural Catholic influence for many years, because until about 1780 or later, missionaries did not dare to penetrate into their territory.

SEE ALSO: Túpac Amaru Rebellion II and the Last Inca Revolt, 1780–1783

References and Suggested Readings

- Castro, M. (1973) *La rebelión de Juan Santos*. Lima: Milla Batres.
- De la Torre, A. (2004) *Juan Santos Atahualpa*. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú Press.
- Lehnertz, J. (1972) Juan Santos: Primitive Rebel on the Campa Frontier (1742–1752). *Actas y memorias del XXXIX Congreso Internacional de Americanistas 4*.

Juárez, Benito (1806–1872)

Leticia Pacheco Espejel

Known for participating in a plot to overthrow Mexican President Antonio López de Santa Anna (1794–1876) and as President of Mexico from 1858 to 1871, Benito Juárez García was born on March 21, 1806, in San Pablo Guelatao in the Mexican state of Oaxaca, a member of the Zapotecas indigenous group. His parents, Marcelino Juárez and Brígida García, died when he was 3 years old, and he was placed under the guardianship of his grandparents and uncle, Bernadino Juárez. At 13 years of age, Benito Juárez moved to the city of Oaxaca where his older sister, Guadalupe, worked as a maid for the Maza family. Some years later, in 1843, he married the Mazas' daughter, Margarita.

After arriving in Oaxaca, Juárez studied under the Catholic priest Antonio Salanueva, who taught him Castilian and instructed him in religious theology. He joined the Santa Cruz Catholic order but not did wish to dedicate himself to the priesthood. Instead, he joined the Institute of Science and Arts at Oaxaca to study and later teach law. In 1952, Juárez was designated secretary and director of the Institute. While in Oaxaca, Juárez was twice elected governor, in 1848 and 1856.

In 1853 Juárez went into exile in the United States for 18 months, during which time he made contact with other liberal intellectuals in exile like Ponciano Arriaga and José María Mata y Melchor Ocampo. This small group of intellectuals created the national plan to overthrow the Mexican president, General Santa Anna. Under the name of the Revolutionary Mexican Junta, they demanded greater equality within society and limitations on clerical power based on a strict separation of church and state.

Juárez's career can be divided into four distinct periods. The first, from 1855 to 1857, is charac-

terized by his exile to the US and participation with the plan to overthrow Santa Anna's government. In the new government of Juan Alvaréz, Juárez became minister of justice and public education and introduced the Law of Juárez (1855), which abolished specific ecclesiastic and military tribunals and promulgated the separation of church and state. Under Ignacio Comonfort's presidency the liberal constitution of 1857 was proclaimed. In the second period, from 1858 to 1861, the process of realizing the constitution was begun. Disclaiming the new constitution by the executive, the government initiated the so-called War of Reform, which finally led to the dismissal of President Comonfort. Benito Juárez was elected president in 1858.

The third period, from 1862 to 1865, was characterized by the invasion of Napoleon III of France, who decided to enter Mexico by force as Juárez had suspended payment of foreign debts. In 1864 Napoleon III established Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria as emperor of Mexico against the opposition of the Mexican people. Juárez and his cabinet retreated to northern Mexico, building a government-in-exile for two and a half years, while Maximilian remained an "undesired European intervention." In the fourth and final period, from 1866 to 1872, Juárez drove out the French, dismissing Maximilian from power and ordering his execution on June 19, 1867. He governed the nation, suppressing revolts by Porfirio Díaz and other opponents and ensuring his reelection by using the power of the presidency in 1867 and 1871. On July 17, 1872, Juárez died of a heart attack.

SEE ALSO: Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921

References and Suggested Readings

- Galeana de Valadés, P. (1989) *Benito Juárez. Benemérito de las Américas*. Mexico City: Biblioteca Americana.
- Hammatt, B. (1994) *Juárez*. London: Longman.
- Mejía Zúñiga, R. (1972) *Benito Juárez y su Generación*. Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación Pública.

Julião, Francisco (1915–1999)

Henrique Tahan Novaes

A lawyer, deputy, novelist, and socialist influenced by the Catholic Church's left wing, Francisco

Julião was leader of the Farmers' Leagues in the northeast of Brazil and a federal deputy for the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB). Julião revealed the correlation that existed between large landed property, the monoculture of sugar cane, and the proliferation of poverty in the northeast. His theory of social revolution revolved heavily around biblical and Christian principles, "according to which the land should belong to those who work on it, with their own hands and their own sweat, and not the sweat of others" (Julião 1962: 22). He believed that the real battle was that between peasants and property owners, and he thus supported radical agrarian reform. His theory, however, suffered the impact of the 1959 Cuban Revolution and the anti-communist hysteria that followed in the United States and other western countries. He was exiled after the military coup in 1964.

SEE ALSO: Latin America, Catholic Church and Liberation, 16th Century to Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Azevedo, F. de (1982) *As Ligas Camponesas*. São Paulo: Paz e Terra.
- Julião, F. (1951/2005) *Cachaça*. Recife: UFPE.
- Julião, F. (1961) *Irmão Juazeiro*. São Paulo: Editora Francisco Alves.
- Julião, F. (1962) *Que são as Ligas Camponesas?* Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.

Jumandi (d. 1578)

Viviana Uriona

Jumandi was a prestigious cacique, or Indian chieftain. He converted to Christianity and was familiar with Spanish ways. The importance of Jumandi as a figure in the history of indigenous peoples of Ecuador should be viewed in the historical context following the arrival of the Spaniards in search of wealth in gold and spices, especially cinnamon. The indigenous who fell into the hands of the Spaniards during the Spanish expeditions (from 1534 to 1560) were forced to reveal where the treasures were to be sought. If they did not respond, they were arrested and cruelly murdered. In this process, 16 cities were founded. Compared to the foundation of other cities in the Andean region, this demonstrates the interest of the conquerors in the region of Ecuador. The people from each of these regions

were subjected to the cruel exploitation of slavery and feudal court.

Faced with this situation, all warlords took up arms against the Spaniards. In 1578 the Quijos revolted to free themselves from oppression. Jumandí, in alliance with other leaders, commanded an army of 5,000 men with the military objective of destroying the cities of Ávila, Archidona, and Baeza. In this uprising the Pendes played a leading role. Pendes were sorcerers, shamans, sages, or healers, and they were highly respected by the indigenous. Beto and Guami were the first Pendes who convened all the indigenous to the first uprising in arms. The Quijos had a variety of strategies to combat the Spaniards. They guided the Spaniards through false paths, fled and penetrated into the jungle, or fought directly against the conquerors.

The indigenous chiefs, including the leader Jumandí, were captured, taken to Quito, and sentenced to death. As a result of abuses, epidemics, and clashes with the Spaniards, the Quijos, who numbered 16,000 in 1576, were down to 1,649 people in the early seventeenth century.

SEE ALSO: Artigas, Gervasio José (1764–1850); Enriquillo and the Taíno Revolt (1519–1533); Lempira (d. 1537)

References and Suggested Readings

- Costales, P. & Costales, A. (1983) *Jumande o la con-fabulación de los brujos*. Quito: Oveja Negra.
- Oberem, U. (1980) *Los Quijos: historia de la transculturación de un grupo indígena en el oriente ecuatoriano; Colección Pendones*. Otavalo: Instituto Otacaleño de Antropología.
- Ruiz Mantilla, L. (1992) Jumandí: rebelión, anticolonialismo y mesianismo en el oriente ecuatoriano, siglo XVI. *Amazonia indígena, boletín de análisis* 12, 19: 24–32.

Jung Hwa-am (1896–1981)

O. H. Jang-Whan

Jung Hwa-am was a Korean anti-imperialist and revolutionary activist with strong bonds to the activist movement. As an anarchist activist, Jung was a member of the Je-jung-kuk jo-sun mu-

jung-bu ju-eu-ja yun-meng (Korean Anarchist Federation in China). Together with the brothers Li Eul-kyu and Li Jung-kyu, Jung worked for the National Labor University in Shanghai and the Chung-Yung People's Training Center in collaboration with Chinese anarchists in 1927. Following the full-scale invasion of the Japanese army in China, Jung participated in a broad anti-Japanese front.

In 1931, at the French settlement in Shanghai, Jung organized the Hang-il gu-kuk yun-meng (Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association) with Chinese anti-imperialist anarchists to work for reconnaissance of military and police facilities, assassination of key enemy figures, purging of pro-Japanese elements, and the formation of an anti-Japanese propaganda network throughout China. He formed the Nam-wha han-in chung-nyun yun-meng (Korean Youth Federation in South China) in 1932 and established the South China Club under its control. He also organized the Huk-sek gong-po-dan (Black Terrorist Unit) to attack all Japanese elements. In 1937, when the Manchurian Incident escalated into the Sino-Japanese War and the Battle of Shanghai erupted, he organized the Han-kuk chung-nyun jun-si kong-jak-dai (Korean Youth Wartime Operational Unit) with Chinese army cooperation. After 1945 he created the Private School of Korean Studies and Commemorative School for Sin Chai Ho in Shanghai. Returning to Korea in 1950, he devoted himself to working with revolutionary political parties in South Korea, helping to found the social-democratic Minjusahoe-dang in 1955 and the Unification Socialist Party in 1961.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Education; Anarchism, China; Anarchism, Japan; Anarchism, Korea

References and Suggested Readings

- Jung Hwa-am (1982) *I jo-guk eu-di-ro gal-gup-in-ga (Where Is My Fatherland Going? My Memoirs)*. Seoul: Chayu Mun'go.
- Ming, K. & Dirlik, A. (1992) *Schools into Fields and Factories: Anarchists, the Guomindang, and the Labor University in Shanghai, 1927–1932*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Publication Committee of Korean Anarchist History (1978) *Han-kuk mu-jung-bu ju-y un-dong-sa (The History of Korean Anarchism)*. Seoul: Hyung-Sul Publishing.

K

Kabyl resistance to government

Andrew J. Waskey

The Kabyl (Kabail) are Indo-European Berber-speaking people who have lived in North Africa since the Roman empire. The Berber people of Algeria are called Kabyle from the Arabic word for tribe, *qaba'il* (pl. *qabila*). Some are also called the Chaouis, and live mainly in the Aures Mountains.

The Kabyl live in the mountains of eastern Algeria, Tunisia, and oases of the Sahara, living in the Tell and Sahara Atlas Mountains, in a region named Greater Kabylia and Lesser Kabylia. Berbers have resisted the Arabs for centuries.

When the French took control of Algeria in the 1830s they were opposed by many local Kabyl. One important resistance fighter was the Lalla, Fadhma (Fatma) n'Soumer, an inspiring leader likened to Joan of Arc, but ultimately unable to stop French advances.

In 1871 Mohamed El-Mokrani (1815–71) led the Cheikh Mokrani Rebellion in resistance to French attempts to exercise authority over the previously independent tribes before he was killed. The Kabyl arose in a mass revolt but were suppressed. The tribes that resisted had their lands taken, while others were exiled to New Caledonia in the Pacific, where the French also sent Paris Commune organizers. Through a process of suppression, the French dominated the region, but repeatedly faced resentment and recurring protests.

The French attempted to gallicize the Kabyl through various means, including disseminating the idea that they were the original Christian population. They sought to substitute French law and judges for Shari'a and Muslim judges. However, the policy failed and instead encouraged greater support for Arabic culture and Islamic faith.

After the Algerian War for Independence the Kabyl found that the Arab majority dominated the new nationalist government. Many Kabyl mastered French and were members of the bureaucracy and business class. In the post-independence era, the government sought to "Algerianize" the population. It made Arabic the official language over Berber, and imposed the language on the Kabyl and all others.

In the late 1970s and 1980s, the failure of the Algerian state to reduce poverty for the majority of the population contributed to greater religious observance of Islam and an emergent fundamentalist political movement. In the civil war that followed, the Kabyl resisted efforts to use Arabic as a means to impose Islamic strictures. In the academic year of 1979–80, Arabic-speaking students protested the benefits that French studies gave to other students, and the government responded by making Arabic the official language of education. Kabyl students sought to resist this effort to make Arabic the official language, waging a strike at the University Center of Tizi Ouzou and demanding recognition for Berber speakers on the campus and beyond. The movement quickly spread to other schools. The uprising that ensued became known as the Berber Spring.

In 1994 Kabyl students in Algeria again boycotted the public schools, demanding the teaching and use of Berber as an official language. The protest resulted in the creation of the Haut Commissariat à l'Amazighte in 1995, and Berber was taught as a non-compulsory language in the Kabyl areas.

In 2001 the Kabyl organized the Arouch Movement (Berber Citizens' Movement) to represent Algerian Berbers. Arouch is the plural of Arch, which is the traditional Kabyl form of democratic village assembly. Following a mass rebellion during the Black Spring protests of April 2001, in which 126 Kabyl protesters were killed, the Arouch adopted the El Kseur Platform,

calling for recognition of the Berber language, increased democratic rights, and greater social benefits.

Another form of Kabyl resistance was the formation of the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK). Ferhat Mehenni, a university graduate and singer, emerged as a leader of the Black Spring protests. His political music promotes Kabyl autonomy.

SEE ALSO: Algerian Islamic Salvation Front; Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962

References and Suggested Readings

- Ageron, C. R. (1964/1991) *Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
- Ruedy, J. (1992) *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Stora, B. (2001) *Algeria 1830–2000: A Short History*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kashmir, popular struggles to 1947

Kunal Chattopadhyay

Kashmiri Nationalism

Conquered by the Mughal emperor Akbar in 1586, Kashmir has experienced religious diversity which has been a source of division ever since, although the people retain a strong sense of unity known as *Kashmiriyat* (Kashmiri national identity). From the Mughals Kashmir passed to the Afghan empire of Ahmad Shah Abdali, and then to the Sikh empire of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Ranjit gave Jammu as a *jaigir* (land allotment against military service) to Dogra Rajput chieftain Gulab Singh. After Ranjit's death, Gulab Singh helped Britain to conquer the empire. As a reward, in the Treaty of Amritsar of 1846, Kashmir was given to Gulab in return for 75 lakh rupees, a token tribute of a dozen pashmina goats, one horse, and three pairs of Kashmiri shawls. Kashmiri nationalists subsequently have called Amritsar a bill of sale, not a treaty.

While Jammu-Kashmir was formally independent of British India, in fact, as with the territory of other Indian princes, a British resident

was the real power, and the Maharaja had no military or diplomatic autonomy. As bourgeois nationalist sentiment began to advance, the princely rulers sought to contain autonomous fervor. But the Indian National Congress, formally restricted to British India, did not want to intervene in the internal affairs of the princely states, up until the period preceding the transfer of power. The princes of Jammu-Kashmir were semi-feudal autocrats under British protection, and alone claimed to speak for their states when at least 13 percent franchise was used to elect the Constituent Assembly of India. On the other hand, they were under great pressure to join India or Pakistan. The ruler of Jammu-Kashmir, a Hindu, was put in a complicated position, since the majority of his subjects were Muslims, and first sought democracy and independence before deciding on the future status of the country.

Hindu-Dogra rule in Kashmir privileged religion above all identities, a highly exploitative system marked by community-linked sectarianism. Most Muslims, Buddhists, and non-Rajput Hindus, Kashmiri Hindus or Pandits were denied participation in the government. Even Sir Albion Bannerjee, a British loyalist, wrote an article in 1929 after resigning as political advisor to the Maharaja, condemning the ill treatment of Muslims like “dumb cattle.” His position was supported by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, a young teacher from the capital city of Srinagar. As nationalism was gathering momentum in British India, the Kashmiri people, frustrated by decades of Dogra oppression, pursued a democratic-nationalist path. The nationalists condemned Dogra Rajputs as non-Kashmiris ruling illegally under British protection. Abdullah took the initiative, organizing numerous meetings to advance nationalist consciousness. The Maharaja was forced to meet a delegation of Muslim representatives. But in June 1931, Qadir, an outspoken critic of the Maharaja, was arrested for supposed seditious speech. On July 13, 1931, an immense crowd assembled at the Srinagar Central Jail, protesting against Qadir's trial and seeking to gain entry to the jail. To prevent protesters from advancing, a large police squadron fired on them, killing 22 people, on a day that is observed in Kashmir as Martyrs' Day.

The July 13 murders failed to slow a growing sense of secular Kashmiri nationalism demanding working-class rights and Muslim equality. Kashmiri nationalism was more radical than

India's, spurring peasant struggles against *jaigirdars* and moneylenders in Mirpur, Kotli, and Rajouri in Jammu. By September 1931, the British armed forces stepped in to suppress the uprising. But the massive protest wave compelled the Maharaja to establish a Grievances Enquiry Commission in November 1931.

Struggle for a Constitution

In April 1932, the Commission recommended removal of the most egregious forms of exploitation, including abolition of unpaid labor by Kashmiri Muslims for the state. But these palliatives did not reduce popular agitation. In October 1932, Abdullah and his supporters formed the Muslim Conference (MC), at which time Abdullah said that the struggle in Kashmir was not to advance one community over another, but to advance the interests of common people, regardless of religion. The MC demanded representative government, ending discrimination against Muslims in education and employment.

In 1934, Maharaja Hari Singh proposed establishing the Praja Sabha (House of the Subjects), with limited powers, and 30 percent of all members popularly elected. The MC denounced the assembly as a sham, but nonetheless contested the elections. Within the Muslim community a conflict emerged between orthodox Muslims forming the Azad Muslim Conference, a conservative organization under Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah, and moderates under Abdullah. The Jammu-Kashmir Muslim Conference defeated its opponents in elections, affirming the popularity of secular nationalist politics and opposition to the communalist politics of the Azad Muslim Conference and the Hindu communal supporters of the Maharaja.

In 1938, MC leaders held discussions with the poet Iqbal and Jawaharlal Nehru, the future Indian prime minister. The discussions culminated in the Muslim Conference changing its name to the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (NC) as a conscious attempt to combat both communalisms. On the NC agenda were land reforms, sociocultural equality, and democracy. While the NC retained close links with Indian nationalists, it remained quite independent. Some Hindu activists, including Prem Nath Bajaj, joined the NC, while conservative Muslims opposed participation. In 1941, Chaudhuri Ghulam Abbas left the NC to join Mirwaiz

Yusuf Shah to revive the Muslim Conference, which kept ties with the Muslim League led by Jinnah, and campaigned primarily on communal lines.

In 1944, the NC submitted a Charter of Demands to the Maharaja, publishing a manifesto known as the *Naya Kashmir* (New Kashmir), which sought a constitution, with equal rights for all citizens regardless of religion and caste, equality for women and men, freedom of conscience, religion, and press, and freedom to hold assemblies and public meetings, and to form political parties, youth organizations, and trade unions. The NC also proposed that the right to work be recognized constitutionally, with unemployment benefits if the state failed to provide everyone with jobs. The right to education was also recognized as a constitutional right. The manifesto also called for a constitutional provision providing political asylum to foreign freedom fighters. The manifesto promised an egalitarian society, abolition of landlordism, land redistribution to peasants, food sufficiency, and the advancement of the status of women and workers.

Quit Kashmir

In 1945, a new wave of struggles emerged, and the Maharaja responded by appointing Ramachandra Kak as new prime minister. In 1946, the NC launched the Quit Kashmir movement against the Maharaja as it wanted the people of Kashmir, rather than the autocratic Maharaja, to have the power to determine Kashmir's future. At the same time, the similarity with the Quit India movement indicates the greater proximity between the NC and Congress. When the Cabinet Mission came to discuss transfer of power in India, Abdullah sent a telegram to its leader, Sir Stafford Cripps, saying that the people of Kashmir wanted complete independence from the Maharaja. In order to suppress the Quit Kashmir movement, the prime minister declared martial law. State violence led to many deaths. On May 20, 1946, Abdullah was arrested and the Indian leadership intervened. An All-India States People's Conference was created with representation of all the princely states.

In 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru was president of the conference and Abdullah vice-president. After Abdullah's arrest, Nehru rushed to Kashmir. When he was prevented entry, Gandhi and

other leaders explained to the Maharaja that Nehru's trip was not ill-intentioned. Nehru ensured that protests took a "peaceful" and "constitutional" shape. Under pressure, Sheikh Abdullah signed a statement dropping the demand to end the Dogra monarchy.

The Muslim League, campaigning for a separate Muslim state in Pakistan, sympathized with the princes, and Jinnah described the Quit Kashmir movement as a movement of hooligans. As agitations ended, a relieved Maharaja Hari Singh called new elections to the Praja Sabha, boycotted by the NC, and the Muslim Conference gained the majority. Meanwhile, as Britain transferred power in South Asia through partition according to communal majorities, the situation in India was changing. But the Maharaja did not join the Constituent Assembly, receiving support from Hindu and Muslim communalists. The Muslim League declared the princes sovereign powers, not obliged to join the Constituent Assembly.

The Hindu fundamentalists in Jammu-Kashmir declared that the state should under no circumstances join "secular" India. The Muslim Conference demanded that the Maharaja declare Kashmir independent, create a separate Constituent Assembly, and a separate state constitution.

The Maharaja, Muslim communalists, and Hindu communalists were united in opposition to Jammu-Kashmir unification with India. Of course, the Maharaja and Hindu communalist supporters sought to retain autocratic rule and thwart Kashmiri nationalism, while the Muslim Conference hoped a weak government in Jammu-Kashmir could be pushed into Pakistan. To bring the princely states under Indian control, Sardar Patel, the home affairs minister and Congress leader in charge of the process, demanded that the princely states accept Indian Union control over defense, foreign affairs, and communications.

On June 15, the All-India Congress Committee adopted a resolution opposing the declaration of independence by any princely state. But Maharaja Hari Singh refused to relent. Jinnah's personal secretary, Khurshid Ahmed, went to Kashmir and told Hari Singh toward the end of July 1947 that Pakistan would not intercede in his rule. The only organization fighting for democracy and independence was the Jammu-Kashmir NC, most of whose leaders remained in jail.

SEE ALSO: Jinnah, Muhammad Ali (1876–1948); Kashmir, under India; Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964); Quit India Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Bose, S. (1997) *The Challenge in Kashmir*. New Delhi: Sage.
- Guha Roy, S. (1999) *Kashmir: Bharater Samprosaran Banam Mukti Sangram*. Calcutta: New Horizon Book Trust.
- Puri, B. (1993) *Kashmir Towards Insurgency*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.

Kashmir, under India

Kunal Chattopadhyay

India Incorporating Kashmir

The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir had been ruled by Dogra rulers under indirect British control since the mid-nineteenth century. As British rule ended and India gained independence with partition, both India and Pakistan wanted to incorporate the princely states. Maharaja Hari Singh hoped to keep Kashmir independent, offering a "standstill agreement" for trade, communications, and other normal affairs between Kashmir, India, and Pakistan, as in the British era. Pakistan immediately signed the agreement on August 15, but India pressed for Kashmir's incorporation into India. The Maharaja had a powerful national movement and there had been demands for autonomy in Gilgit, Baltistan, Hunza, and Nagar regions, autonomous vassals of Jammu and Kashmir (Jammu-Kashmir), since the mid-nineteenth century.

In June 1947, Poonch disputes assumed a militant and separatist character. The Maharaja's armed forces responded with tremendous brutality. Within two weeks of Britain's transfer of power to India and Pakistan, the Muslims of Poonch were victims of state terror. In Jammu, Hindu and Sikh communalists, supported by the fascist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Organization, RSS) and the Sikh Akali Dal (Akali Party), attacked Muslim villages and set them on fire, displacing some 500,000 residents. By September, there was an armed uprising in Poonch, led by Muhammad Ibrahim Khan of the Pakistani-backed Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. Pakistan sent a delegate, A. B. Shah, to Kashmir's capital, Srinagar, proposing incorporation of the country.

Sheikh Abdullah, leader of the secular progressive Kashmiri National Conference (NC), was released on September 29 after months in jail. He declared that Kashmir must first receive independence and responsible government before a decision was made on its future status. Abdullah's party was committed to equal rights for Muslims, abolishing landlordism, and establishing a sovereign state, like Switzerland in Europe. Hari Singh realized that remaining independent and autocratic would be difficult. Despite his antipathy to India, he saw joining Pakistan as worse, risking the loss of his privileges as a Hindu ruler over a Muslim majority. This consideration prompted the appointment of Meher Chand Mahajan, an associate of Indian home minister Sardar Patel, as prime minister.

On October 24, 1947, a large contingent of militant tribals of the Northwest Frontier province of Pakistan invaded Jammu-Kashmir, supported by "volunteers" from the Pakistan army under the command of Major General Akbar Khan, with support from local Muslims. In Baramulla district of Kashmir, the army carried out massive looting and destruction. Faced with this invasion, Hari Singh sent deputy prime minister R. L. Batra to New Delhi. On the same day, rebels in Poonch proclaimed an Azad (Free) Kashmir. Facing imminent danger in the Kashmir Valley, Hari Singh and his administration left for the safer Jammu area, and the NC assumed the tasks of administration and resistance. On October 26, India made the signing of an "Instrument of Accession" the precondition for military assistance, and the Maharaja capitulated. The document stipulated that any Jammu-Kashmir government agreed to accept India's authority on defense, foreign affairs, and communications.

The government of India proclaimed that after restoration of law and order in Jammu-Kashmir, the will of the people would be ascertained, and only then would incorporation into India be finalized. On October 27, Indian soldiers arrived in Kashmir as NC volunteers organized resistance to protect property, especially that of non-Muslims. On November 2, 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of India, promised again, in a radio speech, that "As soon as law and order had been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the state's accession should be settled by a reference to the people" (Guha Roy 1999: 34).

A Referendum Promised and Denied

On January 1, 1948, India referred the Kashmir issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which called for a plebiscite on its future. While Pakistan and India accepted the referendum in theory, both objected practically over timing and process. On January 12, 1949, Nehru wrote to Abdullah that there was a high probability that no referendum would ever be held. In 1954, the Cold War became a new factor in the dispute. With the US assisting Pakistan militarily, India decided to station at east 21,000 troops in Kashmir and hold off a referendum vote. From 1957 on, the Soviet Union, allied with India, agreed to use its UNSC veto to block attempts to revive a referendum on Kashmir's future. Finally, Indian UN representative Muhammad Karim Chagla stated that "under no circumstances can we agree to the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir" (Guha Roy 1999: 38).

By war's end, Pakistan occupied the Mirpur, contiguous with Jammu, the Muzaffarabad near the Kashmir Valley, and Gilgit in the far north. India occupied Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, and Ladakh. While India, Pakistan, and on occasion the son of the former Maharaja evoked the people of Kashmir, all parties sought political and economic control. Hari Singh desired an independent Kashmir dominated by landlords. When he thought that Pakistan-backed aggression might end the idea of Kashmiri independence, he appealed to India, not Kashmiris. The Indian rulers were determined to fully incorporate Jammu-Kashmir, creating the fiction that integration was the popular democratic will. Initially, India and Pakistan assumed Abdullah and the NC to be pawns of India. While Nehru sidestepped the claim, he was confident that Abdullah would "deliver the goods." In time, the Indian rulers recognized that Abdullah's notion of *Kashmiriyat* (Kashmir's national identity) was not mere rhetoric.

Nehru wanted Abdullah to share power with the Maharaja rather than establish representative government. Abdullah, the most popular politician in Jammu-Kashmir, did not advance the popular will of Kashmir's future. Upon becoming prime minister in March 1948, Abdullah initiated radical reforms, including the abolition of *jaigirdari* and *chakdari* rights (pre-capitalist

landlordism) without compensation and fixing a land ceiling. In all, nearly 400,000 acres of land belonging to merely 9,000 owners were confiscated. Next, the government cancelled the debt of all peasants who had paid principal and interest 1.5 times the original loan. Access to government jobs, deprived to Kashmiri Muslims for years, was subsequently opened.

The former dominant Hindu elite sought to foment Hindu communalism, backed by Hari Singh, Queen Tara Devi, and former prime minister, Meher Chand Mahajan. In the Kashmir Valley, Hindu lives and property were protected by the NC. But in Jammu, Hindu communal violence took the lives of Muslims. Under pressure, Hari Singh abdicated in May 1949 in favor of his son, Karan Singh. The Constituent Assembly of India in October 1949 adopted Article 306(A) granting autonomy to Jammu-Kashmir with an interim arrangement until the people could decide on the final status of the region. Abdullah called for a Constituent Assembly for Jammu-Kashmir, with 25 seats in Pakistani-occupied districts and 75 seats under Indian control. But India's rulers negated nominations other than those from the NC, establishing virtual one-party rule.

Right-wing opposition to Abdullah came from the Jammu Praja Parishad (Subjects' Association), a Hindu communalist organization led by RSS activist Balraj Madhok. The Praja Parishad, supported by former bureaucrats and landlords, opposed Abdullah's reforms, protested against "special status" for Jammu-Kashmir, and from 1949 to 1951 promoted the mass murder of Muslims in Hindu-majority Jammu.

The Indian state also sought to limit Abdullah's radicalism by compelling him to accept Karan Singh as the titular head of state, or Sadr-i-Riyasat. Karan Singh overstepped his constitutional powers by referring land reforms to the president of India, violating the provisions of the Union government restricting India's responsibility to defense, foreign affairs, and communications. Under Indian pressure, the land reforms were drastically watered down.

Destroying Autonomy

According to the Indian Independence Act, 1947, Clause 7(1) subsection (b), the paramountcy of the British crown over the Indian princely states ended as of August 15, 1947. Consequently,

incorporation of the princely states into either India or Pakistan depended on new treaties, an Instrument of Accession for India. Since Jammu-Kashmir had elected an independent Constituent Assembly, popular sovereignty remained unimpaired except in defense, communications, and external affairs. Justifying the entry of Kashmir's representatives into the Constituent Assembly of India, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, secretary general of the external affairs ministry, told the UN that the Jammu-Kashmir people had the right to decide on the constitution of India, but not to "alter the Government of India's determination to abide, in the matter of accession, by the freely declared will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir" (Noorani 1993: 212).

Delhi sought to subvert the independent constitution-making process of Jammu-Kashmir. On October 17, 1949, after discussing a draft with Kashmir delegates, Sir N. Gopalaswamy Ayyanger, backed by Patel, introduced a different draft of what became Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. The text allowed Indian rulers the right to dismiss the government, a means that could later be used to depose Abdullah.

Abolition of the elected government was not permitted in Kashmir and the Indian parliament could only make laws about Kashmir relating to the three items covered by the Instrument of Accession. On other matters, the agreement of the Kashmir government was essential. Even modifications were subject to final agreement by the Jammu-Kashmir Constituent Assembly. Once the assembly concluded, no modifications or impositions by Indian law on Kashmir were permitted. But although the Constituent Assembly of Jammu-Kashmir was disbanded after 1956, Article 370 was repeatedly and illegally amended, removing all pretense of an autonomous Kashmir. In 1963, Nehru told the Indian parliament that Article 370 was eroded.

Though India ensured Abdullah's party won all 75 seats in the Constituent Assembly, Abdullah was not willing to trade away the independence of Kashmir. Thereupon, Karan Singh, with the support of Nehru, sacked and arrested Abdullah, who was replaced as prime minister by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, a member of his party. Bakshi conspired with Karan Singh and D. P. Dhar, a high-caste Hindu, to arrest opponents in the party and

force through a resolution in the Jammu-Kashmir Constituent Assembly declaring Kashmir an integral part of India.

Kashmiri Democracy

Under Indian rule, Kashmiri democracy has been repeatedly suppressed. First, the government of Abdullah, while popular, was not democratically elected. After Abdullah's arrest, governments in Jammu-Kashmir were maintained through vote rigging. In 1957, Bakshi's party won in most seats, 43 uncontested, and in 1962 won 70 seats, with five "given" to selected opposition forces. All forms of legitimate opposition, whether from the right-wing Praja Parishad or the left-wing People's Socialist Party, were denounced as anti-nationalist. After 1957, Abdullah and his supporters founded a party – the Plebiscite Front – to campaign for India to grant a vote on self-determination. In opposition, Abdullah spent years in prison or exile.

On November 17, 1956, the constitution of Jammu-Kashmir was adopted, declaring the state as integral to India. Ignoring many Kashmiri protests, India claimed incorporation to be the popular will, with no further referendum necessary. In 1958, a constitutional amendment brought Jammu-Kashmir under central Indian administration.

From 1964, Jammu-Kashmir was administered by a governor appointed by the central government, which applied Article 356 of the Indian Constitution permitting India to dissolve elected assemblies or remove provincial governments. The Sadiq faction of the NC became the provincial branch of the Indian National Congress, which in 1967 won elections through annulling nomination petitions. In 1977, after the end of a countrywide dictatorship, democratic elections were held and the NC, led by Abdullah, won 47 of the 75 seats. But he no longer demanded a plebiscite or restoration of Article 370 to its original form. In 1982 Abdullah died, and his son, Farooq Abdullah, became the next chief minister, leading the NC to another victory in 1983. Farooq then aligned with non-Congress parties, whose demands for decentralization appealed to the NC. Jagmohan, a right-wing candidate, was made governor of the province; soon after he toppled Farooq's government and ended the recognition of the NC as a nationalist organization. Farooq subsequently adapted his

politics to the policies of the Indian central government.

In the mid-1980s, a breakaway faction of the NC under Sheikh Abdullah's son-in-law, Gul Mohammed Shah, joined with Congress as popular protests grew. A curfew was imposed across the Kashmir Valley for 72 of the first 90 days of Gul's chief ministership. His policy consisted of promoting Hindu and Muslim communalism in Jammu-Kashmir Valley in opposition to secular and democratic forces. In February 1986, attacks were launched on the Hindu minority in Anantnag district. Afterwards, Kashmiri Muslims donated money to help rebuild Hindu temples. Mufti Muhammad Sayyid, a Congress leader from the Bijbehara constituency of Anantnag, was blamed by some observers for sparking the violence.

Article 356 of the Indian Constitution was promulgated in response to the communal violence, the government was dismissed, and Jagmohan ruled as Delhi's satrap through the end of the year. Afterwards the recruitment of Muslims was reduced, and although the valley had a large Muslim majority, on Hindu festival days the sale of meat was completely forbidden. The policy was aimed at splitting Kashmiri national identity along Hindu and Muslim lines.

Towards Insurrection

The Congress-NC alliance of 1987 was seen as a great betrayal, spurring the formation of an alternative alliance named the Muslim United Front (MUF) by educated youth, workers and peasants, and opponents of administrative corruption, family politics, and economic decay. Concurrently, the party provided a political voice to Jamaat-e-Islami and other communal Muslim forces. On March 23, 1987, elections for the state assembly were at last held. The Congress-NC defeated the MUF through booth capturing and driving out opposition candidates and supporters during vote counting.

After the 1987 election, Farooq Abdullah, emboldened by Delhi's support, publicly rebuked all oppositionists, swelling the ranks of MUF supporters and militant groups who crossed into Pakistan for arms and training. The leading militant organizations were divided among those advocating Kashmiri independence and those supporting accession to Pakistan. In the late 1980s, militants began assassinating NC leaders

and engaging in other acts of violence. Yasin Malik, an oppositionist arrested in 1987, subsequently became chairman of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). He and others like him, notably Asfaq Wani (who died from injuries suffered through police torture), Abdul Hamid Sheikh, Aijaz Ahmed Dar, and Javed Ahmed Mir, revived the JKLF as a militant organization.

Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

The JKLF was founded in 1964 by Maqbool Butt, a former member of the Plebiscite Front. In 1966, Butt was accused of killing a security guard in Indian Kashmir. In 1971 his associates, Hashim Qureshi and Ashraf Qureshi, hijacked and commandeered the *Ganga*, an Indian Airlines airplane to Pakistan. Initially hailed by the Pakistan regime, they were soon charged as Indian agents. India used the incident as the basis to ban overflights from West Pakistan to East Pakistan, frustrating Pakistan's effort to curb the Bangladesh freedom struggle. Hashim Qureshi provided documentation to refute the Pakistani claim that they were Indian agents. Thus, the demand for an independent secular, pluralistic, and united Jammu-Kashmir was met with determined hostility in Pakistan and India.

In 1976, after entering Indian territory, Maqbool Butt was arrested, tried, and condemned to death for the 1966 murder. Hashim Qureshi and others opposed Amanullah Khan's support for a terrorist strategy over a political solution. The politics of the Amanullah Khan group was revealed by group members' contention that those opposed to a military strategy were "traitors" and "communists." In 1986, Amanullah was ordered out of the UK, leading to the collapse of the JKLF's UK-based group. Thus the action of Yasin Malik and associates provided a new nationalist leadership to the next generation of Kashmiris.

Rising Indian Violence

In mid-1988, the situation worsened. On June 10, police fired on a demonstration in Srinagar, killing many peaceful protesters. The state government held no inquiry, viewing the demonstration as the work of anti-national elements. On June 15, a *bandh* (a general strike involving the

total shutdown of public life) was observed. In July 1988, the JKLF carried out a bomb blast in Srinagar, marking the beginning of armed insurrection in the valley. On August 15, 1988, the valley observed a *bandh* on the occasion of India's Independence Day, and black flags were hoisted in place of the Indian tricolor. On February 11, 1989, the JKLF observed the anniversary of Maqbool Butt's hanging with mass protests. On April 5, the aged father of a militant leader, Sabbir Shah, was tortured to death in police custody, giving rise to a spontaneous popular protest. Two distinct currents emerged in the uprising of 1988–9: mass popular opposition to Indian repressive measures and a faction supporting terrorism. Leaders of the Indian state willfully ignored the distinction and sought to communalize the conflict between Hindus and Muslims. On September 15, 1989, a Hindu, a Pandit (Kashmiri Hindu), and the Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party, BJP) leader were killed by two armed militants. On November 4, former judge Nilkant Ganjoo, who was responsible for sentencing Maqbool Butt to death, was killed. But the government of India spread fear among Hindus that all of them in Kashmir were targets, causing many to leave the valley. Amid the rancor, parliamentary elections were held in November 1989. The JKLF called for an election boycott, and in Baramulla and Srinagar fewer than 5 percent of voters turned out. The NC won hollow victories with a low turnout. At the all-India level, a National Front government took power under Viswanath Pratap Singh, with support on the left by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M) and the Communist Party of India (CPI), and on the right by the BJP.

On December 8, Dr. Rubiya Syed, the daughter of the new central minister Mufti Muhammad Syed, was abducted by militants of the valley, who demanded and obtained the release of five leading JKLF members on December 13. Dr. Syed was immediately released, but the peaceful resolution of the hostage crisis hardened the government's resolve not to negotiate a solution.

On January 19, 1990, Jagmohan was reappointed governor of Kashmir, despite his notorious anti-Kashmiri sentiments. On January 21, police fired on 20,000 protesters, killing at least 60 people, and the next day, police fired on another demonstration, killing over 100 unarmed civilians. On March 1, during demonstrations

by some 500,000 protesters in Srinagar, police again opened fire on demonstrators in at least three areas of the city.

When Muslim leaders tried to join hands with Hindus to combat the threat of communalism, Hindu leader Jatto was hustled off to the airport and put on an outward-bound flight by police. Protesting against Jagmohan's appointment, Farooq Abdullah resigned. With no opposition, Jagmohan became the unchallenged ruler of the valley until May 24, permitting state-organized mass killings as a legitimate form of government action. In protest, a Muslim fundamentalist women's organization, Dukhtarane-Millat (Daughters of the Nation), staged a demonstration on March 14. Central Reserve Police Force personnel attacked them with batons and followed them into a mosque, causing mayhem and raping women there. On March 7, 1990, the Central Reserve Police was accused of entering houses in the Chhanpura area and raping women. Even while Jagmohan was carrying out his suppression, Harkishen Singh Surjeet, the general secretary of the largest left party in India, the CPI-M, wrote in an article: "It is not the time to go into the causes of the collapse of the administration and how far the Central and State Government have been responsible for this. But immediate measures have to be taken . . . to firmly handle the separatists and extremists" (Guha Roy 1999: 89).

Aside from this public statement by the CPI-M, no other Indian party rose in protest. Eventually, on May 24, the government of India was forced to remove Jagmohan. But by then public opinion had turned firmly against India, with an estimated 95 percent of the population opposing the central government. To counter the opposition, India launched a furious propaganda campaign, claiming that Kashmiri Muslims were carrying out repression over Hindus. When the Babri Masjid was destroyed on December 6, 1992, Lal Krishna Advani, the BJP leader, claimed that over 40 Hindu temples had been destroyed in Kashmir without reproach, even though 21 of the 23 temples in the state were found intact. The BJP whipped up animosity, claiming that over 350,000 Pandits were forced to leave Kashmir; Evans (2002) estimates the actual figure of departures through 2001 were approximately 150,000.

However, the BJP and its supporters ignored that many Pandits continued to reside in rural

Kashmir, and the number of Pandits killed was in the dozens, not thousands. Even if the scale was grossly exaggerated, there is no doubt that some Pandits were oppressed by the rise of Muslim communalist factions. According to Hashim Qureshi, murders and rape of Kashmiri Pandit women and other violence through much of 1990 were significant factors in the mass departure of Pandits.

The target of Indian attack, however, was secular nationalists. As the movement intensified, a number of organizations other than the JKLF sprang up. They included the Hizbul Mujahadeen (Party of Freedom Fighters), Allah Tigers (Tigers of Allah), Al-Jihad, and other related organizations. A wider umbrella organization emerged, called the Hurriyat Conference, which agreed on the necessity to end Indian rule. But disagreements raged over independence, incorporation with Pakistan, or a secular or Islamic state. Both Amanullah Khan and Yasin Malik, on two sides of the border, stated that JKLF supported a secular and independent Kashmir. As a result, the Pakistan government turned against the JKLF, on one occasion killing 12 adherents by firing on a demonstration. India wanted to push militants in Kashmir towards a pro-Pakistan, pro-communist position to consolidate public opposition in India against them. But even pro-Pakistan fundamentalists have often admitted that in a free and fair plebiscite, the majority of the valley would likely vote for independence.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent support given to Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalists by the US resulted in the growth of Muslim fundamentalist forces in Pakistan. As a result, in the early years of the twenty-first century, the communalization of the Kashmir conflict intensified. India retaliated by arming and training local auxiliary forces of militants who surrendered or were captured to assist in counterinsurgency operations, outside the command structure of the Indian security forces. These groups participate in joint patrols, carry out the orders of security officers, and operate openly. For the Kashmiri people, the counterinsurgency prolonged the suffering for nearly two decades.

Kashmiri opponents of Indian rule can be distinguished clearly between Islamic fundamentalists, who are often non-Kashmiri and have been patronized by the Pakistan government,

and Kashmiri nationalists fighting for self-determination. Indian repression is targeted against ordinary Kashmiris, especially youth, even though for international consumption and diplomatic purposes India contends it is opposing Islamic fundamentalists.

SEE ALSO: Hindu Nationalism, Hindutva, and Women; India, Hindutva and Fascist Mobilizations, 1989–2002; Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964)

References and Suggested Readings

- Dasgupta, J. B. (1968) *Jammu and Kashmir*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Engineer, A. A. (Ed.) (1991) *Secular Crown on Fire: The Kashmir Problem*. Delhi: Ajanta Books.
- Evans, A. (2002) A Departure from History: Kashmiri Pandits 1990–2001. *Contemporary South Asia* 11 (1): 19–37.
- Guha Roy, S. (1999) *Kashmir: Bharater Samprosaran Banam Mukti Sangram* (Kashmir: Indian Expansionism versus Freedom Struggle). Calcutta: New Horizon Book Trust.
- Lamb, A. (1966) *Crisis in Kashmir 1947 to 1966*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Noorani, A. G. (1993) Article 370: Broken Pledges and Flawed Secularism. In G. Pandey (Ed.), *Hindus and Others: The Question of Identity in India Today*. New Delhi: Viking Penguin.
- Puri, B. (1993) *Kashmir Towards Insurgency*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
- Qureshi, H. (1999) *Kashmir: The Unveiling of Truth*. Lahore: Jeddojuhd Publications.

Katarismo and indigenous popular mobilization, Bolivia, 1970s–present

Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui

In 1974, almost 200 years had passed since the great Andean insurgency of 1780–1. The Agrarian Reform Law of 1953 had been in force more than two decades, and the peasantry seemed to have been tamed and satisfied with the distribution of land in the Andean high plateau (Altiplano) and valleys, while a new oligarchy was formed through the concentration of land in the eastern lowlands of Bolivia. In January that year, during the dictatorship of Hugo Banzer Suárez (1971–8), Qhichwa peasants in the Tolata and

Epizana communities blockaded roads in protest at a series of measures that benefited the industrial products of the landed oligarchy of the lowlands (sugar, rice, oil, and others) and froze the prices of the traditional peasant crops. More than 80 peasants were brutally killed and disappeared in the ensuing confrontations, and a wave of rage and dissatisfaction erupted in the whole western Andean region of the country.

The massacred peasants belonged to a region where there had been active markets and a multi-ethnic society since the end of colonial times. Private property, a market economy, and a *mestizo* and citizen identity were the solid bases upon which a new form of peasant organization took shape: the peasant union or *sindicato*. Unions had been promoted by the state since 1936, during the “socialist military” regimes in the aftermath of the Chaco War (1932–5), fought against Paraguay. By 1952, *sindicatos* had become the universal model of organization for rural producers, regardless of their ethnicity and ancestral organizational and productive practices.

In the Aymara Altiplano, the removal of traditional ethnic authorities by newly elected union leaders, usually young and single, was an open challenge to Aymara custom and was confronted with a mixture of adaptation and resistance. In some regions the union was organized, but it was based in the previous *cargos* and functions, and it kept the rotational shifts of authority, which allowed each and every *ayllu* (or territorial community) to serve as authority for one term, in a rotational fashion. In other regions, especially in areas where the haciendas (estates) were not dominant, the unions were resisted and were forcefully imposed. The general atmosphere of cultural modernization and rejection of the past pushed many of these Andean forms of authority and organization underground, but the ritual and moral grounds of authority remained an important feature of Aymara leadership and communal organization.

In the late 1960s the Altiplano witnessed the emergence of a second generation of leaders aware of the unfulfilled promises of the Revolutionary National Movement (MNR) and the 1953 Land Reform. Racism and discrimination were rampant in the towns and cities, even among the leaders of the MNR that had massively recruited them in the past decade. *Altiplano* peasant lands were overcrowded and subdivided into negligible

under-subsistence plots, and their access to the market put them in a disadvantageous position with regard to the industrial agricultural products of the eastern lowlands. It was precisely these uneven terms of exchange between traditional and industrial agricultural products that prompted the protest movement of Tolata and Epizana in 1974. For Aymara peoples, government dispositions were also taken as a clear discriminatory policy toward them as Indians, and not only as peasants and agricultural producers.

The Aymara leaders of the National Peasant Workers' Confederation of Bolivia, both at the national and at the state level, had links with Aymara migrants in the cities of La Paz and Oruro, as the first generation of Aymara migrants entered the university and formed part of the multifaceted student movement. These migrants formed cultural urban centers such as Centro Mink'a, Movimiento Universitario Julián Apaza, as well as political organizations such as the Túpac Katari Revolutionary Movement (MRTK) and the Túpac Katari Indian Movement (MITKA). These organizations were active during the first years of the Banzer dictatorship, but their cultural identity made them less visible than the leftist parties and organizations which were suffering repression and being forced underground.

The *katarista-indianista* movement was then a rural–urban network of intellectuals, peasant leaders, and grassroots that allowed for the circulation of more general ideologies and theories, which linked present-day grievances and claims with the structures of external and internal colonialism. The writings of Fausto Reinaga, a Q'ichwa writer and ideologue of the Indian Party of the 1960s, were discussed in rural gatherings and union meetings, and the theories of anti-colonialism were linked to the lived experience of *mestizo* racism and forced acculturation by the school system and military service. The new ideology took shape in the form of a manifesto, issued in July 1973: the *Manifiesto de Tiwanaku*, a document signed by various centers: the Puma Aymara Defense Union, the Mink'a Center of Peasant Coordination and Promotion, the Túpac Katari Peasant Center, the Bolivian Association of Peasant Students, and the National Association of Peasant Teachers. The rural–urban links were crucial to the movement, and it was the massive numbers of the rural population that gave the greatest

political impulse to the underground organizing activities of these centers and informal organizations.

The peasant union was therefore the main battleground of the *kataristas* in the period from the 1973 manifesto and the last days of the Banzer dictatorship. Forced by a massive hunger strike started by four wives of exiled miner leaders, by the beginning of 1978 the dictator was forced to decree an amnesty, call for elections, and resign. Before the 1978 elections, the unions led by the *kataristas* and their allies in other regions held a massive congress in La Paz, where they added to the name of their organization – the Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CNTCB) – the name of Túpac Katari.

The congress gathered in La Paz was the first to recognize an explicit Indian leadership as the head of a peasant organization. Genaro Flores, an Aymara leader from the Aroma province in La Paz, was elected as the executive secretary of the newly renamed CNTCB-TK, challenging the puppet organization still controlled by the military. Under his leadership the Confederation played a crucial role in the mobilizations leading to the downfall of Banzer's dictatorship. In the context of new democratic elections and a climate of peace, in June 1979 the CNTCB-TK joined with other independent peasant unions, such as the Independent Block (Bloque Independiente), a small Marxist peasant organization, to create the CSUTCB (United Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia). The congress also resolved to join the powerful Bolivian Workers' Confederation (COB) as a vehicle to participate more effectively in the brewing wider national-popular movement seeking a democratic resolution of the political crisis that followed the end of Banzer's dictatorship.

For at least five years the country sank into turmoil with three inconclusive elections marked by fraud and four coups and countercoups until October 1982, when finally the leftist coalition Popular Democratic Union (UDP) was recognized as the winner of the previous two elections and granted the government for a constitutional period (1982–5). During this period rural populations in the Andean valleys and Altiplano actively participated in the resistance against anti-popular economic measures. In response to the drastic late 1979 devaluation of the Bolivian peso, peasant road blockades virtually paralyzed the country, and after three weeks of food

scarcity in the urban consumer markets, they forced the government to issue decrees favoring some of their demands.

The ideology of the *katarista* movement, turned into a first-rank political actor through the CNTCB-TK, was based on oral traditions about the eighteenth-century anti-colonial leader Túpac Katari, who it was believed would eventually return as “thousands of thousands.” The anti-colonialism of the Túpac Katari rebellion was also linked to the memories of freedom and a just moral order of Inca times. These ancestral ideas inspired the fierce criticism against the liberal and populist state that granted the Indians only a second-class citizenship. They challenged the authoritarian, monopolistic, and monocultural nature of the Bolivian state and proposed a new form of democracy, based on the recognition of cultural diversity and the right to autonomous self-government by the Indian communities and federations within the structure of the state.

The control of the *kataristas* over the CSUTCB remained unchallenged until 1988, when a coalition of leftist parties overthrew Genaro Flores and undermined the independence and autonomous ideology of the peasant confederation. Many small political parties were formed by the *katarista-indianista* leadership and went on to participate in the 1985 and 1989 elections. *Katarista* organizations and other small Indian parties gained scant access to parliament, becoming little more than culturalist ornaments in an otherwise western, modern, and *mestizo* parliament dominated by traditional liberal and populist political parties.

The neoliberal policies weakened not only the peasant movement, but the urban workers' movement as well. The COB lost its main constituency, the Union Federation of Mining Workers of Bolivia (FSTMB), when, due to the structural adjustment Decree 21060, more than 50,000 miners lost their jobs. The waves of internal and international migration led these jobless workers, with a rich previous organizational and insurgent experience, to different destinies and occupations. While the peasant unions became largely inefficient in forcing the government to pay attention to their grievances, and the political parties that controlled them used their constituencies to gain electoral support, the Indian and *katarista* ideology was basically coopted by *mestizo* populist parties that used the

symbols and identity issues of the *kataristas* to justify their paternalistic and contemptuous positions on ethnicity.

By the mid-1990s, a new configuration of power was taking shape. In the Chapare and tropical lowlands of Cochabamba, the coca growers' movement had been supplied with fresh organizational and ideological resources from the ex-miners turned “colonizers” in the coca-growing areas. In the Altiplano, the disastrous effects of the neoliberal adjustment policies and the open support by the state of a new class of agribusiness entrepreneurs in Santa Cruz had led the traditional agricultural economy of the western highlands into a deep state of crisis. By then, Felipe Quispe, one of the leaders of MITKA, had become a peasant union activist with a virulent ethnic discourse based on the ancestral rights of the Aymara people to their autonomous territories. After being involved in a short-lived guerilla adventure, Quispe returned to the union arena and became the executive secretary of the CSUTCB in 1998, thereby taking away this important organization from the hands of the political parties (left or center-left) that had controlled it for over a decade.

The election of Quispe – who adopted the name “Mallku,” a traditional communal authority – was a result of various union currents and tendencies that opposed the control of the peasant movement by the political parties of the left or right. The coca growers' movement was already active and had won four parliamentary seats in the 1997 elections, headed by Evo Morales, then a coca grower in Chapare. On the other hand, the initial coalition of *cocalero* and valley peasant leaders was in disarray, and a new independent faction, led by Alejo Véliz from the Valle Alto, was fighting for power. Felipe Quispe became a sort of transitional candidate between these two leaders. On the other hand, the support of Quispe for the “sacred leaf” discourse of the *cocaleros* was convenient for Evo Morales, who as a minority parliamentary force was trying to enlist the support of a wider indigenous and peasant constituency.

Given the circumstances, the confrontation of Evo Morales and Felipe Quispe as leaders of two factions in the peasant movement spilled into the broader political arena. The former was a political leader and parliamentarian, with a strong base in a regional union movement (the

Six Federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba), while the latter was the head of an increasingly powerful peasant union that had regained its autonomy and political profile basically as an Indian organization. By the 2002 elections, Quispe had also jumped into the electoral arena through the MIP (Pachakuti Indian Movement), which gained six electoral seats. Along with the 35 seats that Evo Morales's party had gained, these two forces gathered a considerable parliamentary oppositional force.

The peasant mobilizations of 2000–5 saw the eclipse of the Quispe leadership by the figure of Evo Morales, who was able to capitalize on the discontent against neoliberal policies by a wider segment of the population, beyond the exclusive notion of Indian, but also including some of its features. The water war of February–April 2000 had the direct participation of the six *cocalero* federations, and the road blockades of September–October that same year were a confluence of two parallel blockades, one in the Chapare and the other in the Altiplano, the latter led by Felipe Quispe.

The notion of sovereignty, expressed in the struggle for the right to plant coca, for the right to water, and for the Bolivian state's ownership of the country's gas and hydrocarbon resources, has a deep ideological link with the notions of Indian autonomy, self-government, and dignity. The coca symbol, an Indian symbol, is rooted in the practice and in the common sense of millions of Andeans, who identify with the proposal of Evo Morales disregarding their different Indian and *mestizo* identities and ethnic affiliations. The pluri-ethnicity of Evo Morales's proposal is also expressed in the coalition between "the *poncho* and the tie" (as Vice-President García Linera considers his alliance with Evo), although many Aymara intellectuals think that the *mestizo*–Creole advisors of President Morales are drowning the best of the Indian demands and proposals implied in his plan of government. This was the case, for example, with Felix Patzi, a prominent Aymara intellectual appointed secretary of education, replaced shortly after by a more conservative appointee due to the pressure of the Catholic Church over his proposals for a lay education and the recognition of Indian "spirituality" and religious practices.

But it is the struggle against the UN classification of the coca leaf as a narcotic drug that better conveys the importance of *katarista* and

indianista ideology in contemporary Bolivia. An important argument against the criminalization of the coca leaf is its links with ancestral traditions of community well-being, natural health, and sacred wisdom. The potential universality of its health benefits is also an issue. The withdrawal of the coca leaf from the list of narcotic drugs under international guidelines established by the UN-sponsored International Narcotics Control Board could have a positive impact for the economic development and formation of community and micro and small enterprises based on the commercialization of this ancestral plant. Moreover, UNESCO, through the declaration of Oral Intangible Patrimony of Humanity to the Kallawayá healers' culture, has recognized the herbal medicinal wisdom of Indian peoples of Bolivia. Members of the Mollo culture, these itinerant healers travel through northwestern Bolivia and parts of Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru offering their naturopathic services and knowledge. At least 60 percent of Kallawayá pharmacopoeia includes coca leaves in one way or another.

On the other hand, there is an evident Indian input in the draft of a new constitution of Bolivia. The declaration of Bolivia as a multinational state, the recognition of indigenous autonomies, the legalization of indigenous systems of justice and many other features, shows traces of the *katarista*–*indianista* program of the 1970s, with the added issue of sovereignty over Bolivia's natural resources and opposition to the free trade agreements that threaten to kill indigenous ways of survival and knowledge of biodiversity.

SEE ALSO: Bolivia, Protest and Repression, 1964–2000; Bolivia, War of the Pacific to the National Revolution, 1879–1952; *Cocaleros* Peasant Uprising; Cochabamba Water Wars; Morales, Evo (b. 1959); Túpac Katari (ca. 1750–1781)

References and Suggested Readings

- Hurtado, J. (1986) *El Katarismo*. La Paz: Instituto de Historia Social Boliviana.
- Klein, H. S. (2003) *A Concise History of Bolivia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Petras, J. & Veltmeyer, H. (Eds.) (2005) *Social Movements and State Power: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador*. London: Pluto Press.
- Sieder, R. (Ed.) (2002) *Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity and Democracy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kaunda, Kenneth (b. 1924)

Immanuel Ness

Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda was a leading figure in the independence movement of Zambia (formerly the British colony of Northern Rhodesia), and from 1964 the country's first president. He remained in office into 1991, operating a single-party system headed by the nationalist United National Independence Party (UNIP). In 1991 he was defeated in open elections by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD).

The youngest of eight children, Kaunda was born in Lubwa, Northern Rhodesia on April 28, 1924. His father was a Malawian pastor who established the Lubwa Mission in Chinsali Province in the north for the Church of Scotland. In 1943 Kaunda completed his formal education, including two years of post-secondary training in Lusaka, and returned to Lubwa as a teacher, becoming headmaster at the Lubwa Mission. In 1945 he left Lubwa and joined the British army, but was relieved of duty. In 1948 Kaunda sought work in Northern Rhodesia's copper mining industry, and became a teacher and boarding director at a school for mineworkers in Mufulira, on the border of the Belgian Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). He became active in public life. He joined many groups in the region as a choirmaster at the Church of Central Africa and briefly served with the local Nchanga colonial government.

Kaunda was increasingly drawn into African nationalism, and in 1951 he became an official in the Northern Rhodesian Congress (NRC). This was the country's first real African nationalist party and had been founded in 1948 as the successor of the Federation of African (Welfare) Societies. This federation had been established in part to participate in the African Representative Council (ARC), formed in 1946 following the establishment of African Provincial Councils (APCs). The ARC and APCs provided a training ground in politics for educated Africans like Kaunda and NRC founder Harry Nkumbula. Kaunda ascended quickly through the NRC ranks, rising to the position of party general secretary within two years. Under Kaunda and Nkumbula, the party was closely linked to South Africa's African National Congress

(ANC), which was led by figures such as Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo. A major stimulus for the rise of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia at the time were proposals by whites to form a Central African Federation comprising Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland (now Malawi), and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The NRC was strongly opposed to Federation, and influenced the ARC to reject the proposals in 1951. That year, the NRC – now renamed the African National Congress (ANC) – launched a mass campaign against Federation, drawing in the unions, the urban working class, and the rural population. There were parallel struggles in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia. The campaign failed to stop Federation, but the ANC remained active despite arrests, including the jailing of Kaunda in 1955.

By 1958 the ANC was deeply divided between moderates like Nkumbula, who wanted to participate in the Federation, and younger militants like Kaunda who were opponents of compromise. Kaunda and others broke with the ANC to found the Zambian African National Union (ZANU) on an anti-colonial platform and boycotted Federation elections: it was banned, with thousands arrested, but was effectively replaced by UNIP in 1959. This had widespread African support and advocated non-violence, but was feared by the white and Asian minorities. In 1961 UNIP organized mass resistance against reforms in the Federation's electoral system, escalating into the Cha Cha Cha uprising: this was only ended by an offer to negotiate with UNIP, and from 1962 UNIP and the ANC participated in the coalition government formed in 1962. Zambia became independent in October 1964, headed by Kaunda and UNIP.

In power, Kaunda reiterated his support for anti-colonial struggles elsewhere and advocated the "African socialist" ideology called Humanism. The UNIP government provided nationalist movements like the South African ANC with a base, which placed a significant economic stress on Zambia and led to a number of armed incursions. Zambia also joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), hosting a NAM summit in Lusaka in 1970 and serving as NAM chair from 1970 to 1973.

In practice, UNIP was focused on import-substitution-industrialization (funded by copper revenues) and state-building, taking control of the unions and in 1972 establishing a *de jure* one-party

state. Kaunda contended that the turmoil in southern Africa required a strong government, that party politics promoted tribalism and secessionist movements, and that, in any event, a one-party state could still be democratic. UNIP's rule was, however, increasingly authoritarian and centralized in the hands of Kaunda.

The precipitous decline of copper prices on the international market in the early 1970s (and to a lesser extent, state inefficiencies) brought the country into economic crisis and a spiral of debt. Growing poverty and unemployment proved a growing challenge to Kaunda's one-party state, fostering union opposition, revolts within UNIP itself, and a coup attempt. In the 1980s Kaunda implemented neoliberal structural adjustment policies, leading to widespread protests and growing calls for a multi-party system. In 1991 Kaunda was forced to allow open elections, the MMD won a sweeping victory, and popular trade unionist and MMD leader Frederick Chiluba replaced Kaunda as president. Contrary to popular expectations, the MMD embarked on a sweeping structural adjustment program. This led to a sharp collapse in incomes and living standards and the very real prospect of an MMD defeat in the 1996 elections at the hands of a resurgent UNIP, headed by Kaunda. Chiluba prevented Kaunda from standing and had him arrested in 1997, following which Kaunda retired from political life.

Despite his controversial rule, Kaunda remains, for many, a symbol of African freedom struggles and enjoys a great deal of respect across southern Africa for his forthright support for struggles in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Since his retirement he has been mainly involved in charity work.

SEE ALSO: Chiluba, Frederick (b. 1943); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; South Africa, Labor Movement; Southern Africa, Popular Resistance to Neoliberalism, 1982–2007; Zambian Nationalism and Protests; Zimbabwe, Labor Movement, 1890–1980; Zimbabwe Labor Movement and Politics, 1980–2007; Zimbabwe, National Liberation Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Chan, S. (1992) *Kaunda and Southern Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Chan, S. & Clancy, C. (2000) *Zambia and the Decline of Kaunda, 1984–1998*. Ceredigion, UK: Edwin Mellen.
- Hamalengwa, M. (1992) *Class Struggles in Zambia, 1989–1989 and the Fall of Kenneth Kaunda,*

1990–1991. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

- Kabwe, F. (1997) *Kenneth David Kaunda*. Harare: SAPES Trust Staff.
- Kaunda, K. (1962) *Zambia Shall Be Free*. Oxford: Heinemann.
- Larmer, M. (2007) *Mineworkers in Zambia: Labour and Political Change in Post-Colonial Africa, 1964–1991*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938)

Jürgen Nautz

Karl Kautsky was born in Prague on October 16, 1854. In 1863 the family moved to Vienna, the capital of the Hapsburg empire. During his schooldays, influenced by reading George Sand and Louis Blanc, Kautsky became a socialist. In 1875 he became a member of the Social Democratic Party in Austria, founded the year before at Neudörfel. Greatly influenced by Ernst Haeckel's popular book *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte*, Kautsky intensified his studies in scientific materialism and Darwinism. His theories were first developed in 1876/7 in the manuscripts *Entwurf einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit* (1927) and *Rasse und Judentum* (1914). Kautsky also studied economic theorists Karl Eugen Dühring, David Ricardo, Wilhelm Roscher, and Adam Smith, philosophers John Stuart Mill and Friedrich Albert Lange, and Karl Marx, especially his *Capital* (1875/1876).

Beside his studies Kautsky published articles in the Viennese socialist newspapers. Because of his involvement in the Social Democratic Party, Kautsky came into contact with many of the prominent leaders of German social democracy. Carl Höchberg, a wealthy publisher and patron of the socialist movement, offered Kautsky the editorship of the political weekly *Der Sozialdemokrat*, which was then published in Zurich. Kautsky agreed and moved to Zurich in 1880, joining Höchberg's secretary, Eduard Bernstein, as co-editor of the weekly, which was smuggled back into Germany. Kautsky joined a group of German socialist exiles. Under their influence, Kautsky switched to Marxism.

Kautsky's attempt to complete a doctorate at the University of Jena in the early 1880s was blocked by the philosophy faculty, so he focused

his energy on party work instead. From 1885 to 1890, Kautsky lived in London and became a close friend of Friedrich Engels and Bernstein. After the repeal of the law preventing socialists from living in Germany, Kautsky moved to Stuttgart and then Berlin in 1897.

Kautsky advanced as a leading theorist of the Social Democratic Party and the Second International (1889–1916). He was editor of *Die Neue Zeit*, the theoretical journal of the Social Democratic Party and a leading European socialist periodical until September 1917. Using this journal Kautsky popularized Marx's ideas and substantially influenced the program and conception of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). In 1891 he co-authored with August Bebel and Bernstein the party's Erfurt Program, which adhered to revolutionary Marxism. With the first part of the Erfurt Program the party adopted Kautsky's interpretation of Marxism: historical determinism, crisis theory, socialism as a historical necessity, the party as leader in the class struggle, and internationalism. This was in conflict with Bernstein's more liberal ideas and political demands, including the general and equal right to vote, freedom of speech and assembly, equal rights for women, and separation of state and church. Kautsky argued that Bernstein's emphasis on electoral politics was based on a non-class approach. This went against his basic understanding of Marxism, the role of the working class within the class struggle, and party ideology and practice. At first Kautsky's theoretical position gained acceptance in the party, but he was challenged when the revisionism controversy reemerged in 1904–5.

During World War I Kautsky adopted a pacifist attitude. In 1914 he suggested that the social democratic members of the Reichstag (national parliament) abstain from the vote on war credits. During the summer of 1915 he joined with Bernstein to launch an attack against the war and the pro-war policy of the social democratic leadership. Because of the contrary positions of Kautsky and the party leaders on the war question, Kautsky left the party in 1917 for the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD), formed by social democratic pacifists. As a consequence he lost the editorship of *Die Neue Zeit*. While Kautsky did not oppose war, he remained opposed to armed revolution, leaving him in disagreement with the positions

of Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin. After the war Kautsky condemned the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and criticized the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Bolsheviks, in Kautsky's eyes, had initiated a revolution that led not to better conditions for the working class but to a new form of bureaucracy and economic need. He was attacked for this opinion by Lenin, who called Kautsky a "renegade." In October 1920, at a party convention in Halle, the USPD at the height of its power split over the controversial decision of whether or not to join the Comintern. The party's left wing joined with the German Communist Party (KPD) to form the United Communist Party of Germany (VKPD), while others returned to the SPD, Kautsky among them.

After the German November Revolution of 1918 Kautsky served as chairman of the Socialization Committee (*Sozialisierungskommission*) and as undersecretary of state in the SPD-USPD revolutionary government. During this time he edited German documents on the causes of World War I to prove imperial Germany's war guilt (*Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch*, 1919; *Wie der Weltkrieg entstand*, 1919).

Kautsky's influence in Germany and on international social democracy declined thereafter. He moved back to Vienna with his family in 1924, although he remained a productive writer, publishing several voluminous theoretical works and historical studies, including *Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung* (1927), *Grenzen der Gewalt* (1934), and *Sozialisten und Krieg* (1937). Kautsky was forced to leave Austria after the country's occupation by Nazi Germany in 1938. He fled first to Czechoslovakia, then to the Netherlands, where he died on October 17, 1938 in Amsterdam.

SEE ALSO: Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932); Bolsheviks; Class Struggle; Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); German Revolution, 1918–1923; Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Social Democratic Party, Germany

References and Suggested Readings

- Blumenberg, W. (1980) *Karl Kautskys literarisches Werk: Eine bibliographische Übersicht*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Hussain, A. & Tribe, K. (1983) *Marxism and the Agrarian Question*. Vol. 1: *German Social Democracy and the Peasantry 1890–1907*, 2nd ed. London: Macmillan.

- Kautsky, K. (1932) *Kommunismus und Sozialdemokratie*. Berlin: Dietz.
- Kautsky, K. (1960) *Erinnerungen und Erörterungen*. Ed. B. Kautsky. The Hague: Mouton.
- Kautsky papers at the International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam: www.iisg.nl/archives/en/files/k/10754000full.php.
- Lemke, M. (2008) *Republikanischer Sozialismus: Positionen von Bernstein, Kautsky, Jaurès und Blum*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
- Rogers, H. K. (1992) *Before the Revisionist Controversy: Kautsky, Bernstein and the Meaning of Marxism, 1895–1898*. New York: Garland. www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/index.htm.

Kelly, Edward "Ned" (1855–1880) and the Kelly Gang

John McQuilton

The Kelly Gang was at large in Northeastern Victoria (also known as Kelly Country) from October 1878 to June 1880. It consisted of Edward (Ned) Kelly, his brother Dan, Steve Hart, and Joe Byrne. The Kelly Outbreak began in October 1878 when a police search party and the gang fought a gun battle at Stringybark Creek. Three policemen were shot dead. Declared outlaws by the Victorian government, a reward was placed on gang's heads. A massive police hunt followed, but failed to find them. In December 1878, the gang robbed a bank in the Victorian town of Euroa. In February 1879, they crossed the border into New South Wales and robbed a bank at Jerilderie. During the robbery, Ned Kelly left what he called a "small part of my life," an 8,300-word letter setting out his side of the story (the Jerilderie Letter). The colonial governments and banks in Victoria and New South Wales increased the original reward to £8,000. Although an unprecedented sum of money, it found no takers. The Kelly Gang disappeared from sight until June 26, 1880. No longer the hunted, the gang had become the hunter.

Ned Kelly and Steve Hart captured the hamlet of Glenrowan on the main regional railway line. Sections of the line were removed. At the same time, Joe Byrne and Steve Hart appeared in the Woolshed near Beechworth where Joe Byrne shot his boyhood friend,



An outlaw to some and a hero to others, Ned Kelly was an Australian version of Robin Hood. Here he is pictured around 1870 in an armored suit made out of ploughshares. His gang was famous for wearing these homemade suits. (Popperfoto/Getty Images)

Aaron Sherritt, suspected of being a police spy. Sherritt had a police party quartered in his hut. After the murder, the two joined their companions at Glenrowan. Ned Kelly knew that Sherritt's murder would draw a large police contingent to the Woolshed by train which would pass through Glenrowan. Protected by armor fashioned from plow mold boards, the gang planned to deliver a major blow against their enemies. But the strategy failed. The police in Sherritt's hut reported the murder the next day. Disputes amongst the police in command of the hunt delayed the dispatching of the police special. Warned by the local school teacher, the police special stopped at Glenrowan at 3 a.m. on June 28. In what was described at the time (and is still described today) as the Last Stand, Ned Kelly was captured and his companions were killed. Convicted of the murder of Thomas Lonigan, one of the police at Stringybark Creek, he was hanged on November 11, 1880.

Why did the Kelly Outbreak occur? Folklore claims police persecution. The police paid particular attention to the Kelly family, perhaps for

good reason. There is little doubt that Ned Kelly and his companions were involved with stock theft, something Ned Kelly referred to as "wholesale and retail horse and cattle dealing" (Jerilderie Letter). Yet, if the record of convictions for charges is an indication, they were over-diligent. Most of the charges brought against the family failed. One that did stick, however, triggered the Outbreak. Ellen Kelly, Ned and Dan's mother, was sentenced to three years' hard labor for the attempted murder of Constable Alexander Fitzpatrick in October 1878 on evidence even the chief commissioner of police doubted. Concentration on family, however, obscures the factors that allowed the Kelly Gang to defy the police for almost two years and created the Kelly legend.

The Victorian authorities had assumed the reward would bring a speedy close to the Outbreak: it did not. Publicly, the police claimed that the reward failed because the Kellys terrorized a regional population. Privately, they blamed widespread sympathy for the gang from the region's selectors, the majority of the regional population. This triggered one of the great blunders in the hunt for the Kelly Gang. In December 1878, the police arrested over 30 men as sympathizers. All were from selector backgrounds. The arrests were meant to warn a community that support for outlaws brought with it penalties, but they backfired. After continual remands, the accused were released without charge in April 1879. Rather than weakening sympathy for the gang, police policy reinforced it.

During the 1860s, the Victorian government had embarked on an ambitious social engineering project by passing a series of land acts designed to create a nation of yeoman farmers. Men and single women were entitled to select crown land. The amount selected was limited and the land was to be used for agriculture. Previously, the land had been held under long-term leases by squatters (pastoralists) in runs that covered thousands of hectares. The squatters had no intention of relinquishing land they regarded as theirs. Using both legal and illegal means, they began alienating their runs. The legislation not only effectively pitted two rural social groups against each other for the control of rural resources – it was also flawed. The cultural agrarianism it sought to foster ignored the realities of the Australian environment. Selectors' farms were too small and the environment

was better suited to mixed farming rather than mono-agricultural land use. By the 1870s, rural society was divided into two mistrustful, sometimes antagonistic, groups. Social tension found expression in stock theft, which rose substantially during the 1870s. The principal victims were the squatters. The principal suspects were the selectors. Inevitably, the police intervened on the side of the squatters and came to be seen by the selectors as the squatters' agents.

The Kelly Gang's members all came from selection backgrounds. And all had been jailed for stock theft. This was the link that created sympathy for the gang and it was regional sympathy that allowed the gang to remain at large. Ned Kelly was certainly aware of the link. At both bank robberies, he burned mortgage papers held against selectors' farms. The Kellys became a surrogate means of expressing rural social discontent. But sympathy for the Kellys extended beyond Kelly Country. Over 32,000 people in Melbourne signed a petition for his reprieve. What is striking about Kelly sympathy was its ability to reach across the traditional ethnic, even class, divides in colonial society. It was not, as some colonial newspapers hoped, purely an Irish Catholic matter.

The obverse of sympathy is fear and the latter was clearly evident during Kelly's trial. The memory of the rebellion of miners in Ballarat at Eureka in 1854 lingered. When handing down his sentence, the judge, Sir Redmond Barry, specifically referred to the dangers posed by a frontier society where the bonds that bound society together were weak and lawlessness was common. Barry had a point for there was more to Glenrowan than derailing a police special. If the strategy had worked, Ned Kelly intended to declare a republic in Northeastern Victoria. And for seven years after Ned Kelly's execution, a new outbreak was feared. One officer described the police stationed in the region as an army of occupation. In many ways, the Kelly Outbreak matches Eric Hobsbawm's portrait of social banditry.

After Ned Kelly's execution, a Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into the police force. Witness after witness unwittingly corroborated the bushranger's allegation of police oppression, collusion with the squatters, and a force in crisis. Leading police figures in the hunt were sacked and the force was reformed. And a new land act in 1885 finally released selectors from the agrarian tyranny of the earlier acts

and recognized in legislation what selectors had turned to in the 1870s – mixed farming, which would finally bring a measure of prosperity to the yeoman farmer.

The specifics may have changed, but Ned Kelly's story lived on. He and his gang have been the subject of paintings, novels, plays, opera, film, television, and public debate. The story is a powerful narrative of loyalty, protest, rebellion, and defeat. Of greater importance, however, are the Kelly legend and its chameleon quality. Each generation has drawn something different from the legend to reflect views of their times. The diggers (Australian soldiers) during the Great War laid emphasis on Ned Kelly's loyalty to his mates. During the Great Depression, poverty, the "battler" (or underdog), and police oppression were dominant. In the 1960s and 1970s, Kelly as Australian nationalist and republican appeared. During the 1980s, the Kelly women as protagonists were foregrounded. And the Kimberley clans have woven him into their stories of resistance. It seems Australian society still has need of a man hanged for the murder of a police constable.

SEE ALSO: Eureka Stockade; Vinegar Hill/Castle Hill Rebellion, 1804

References and Suggested Readings

- Carey, P. (2000) *True History of the Kelly Gang*. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1963) *Primitive Rebels: Studies of Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Jerilderie Letter. Available at www.slv.vic.gov.au/collections/treasures/jerilderieletter/index.html.
- Jones, I. (2003) *Ned Kelly: A Short Life*. Port Melbourne: Lothian Books.
- McQuilton, J. (1979/1984) *The Kelly Outbreak 1878–1880: The Geographical Dimensions of Social Banditry*. Carlton: Melbourne University Press.
- Seal, G. (2002) "Tell 'Em I Died Game": *The Legend of Ned Kelly*. Flemington: Hyland House.

Kelly, Petra (1947–1992)

Eric F. Trump

Petra Kelly was a seminal figure of the European peace and ecology movements. She helped to found the German Green Party (Die Grünen) in 1979. Born Petra Lehmann in Bavaria, her name

changed to Kelly after her mother married an American in 1958. The family moved to the United States in 1959, and Kelly later studied political science at American University's School of International Service in Washington, DC. She later returned to Europe and in 1971 received a master's degree in political science from the University of Amsterdam. During her years in the US, the non-violent civil rights movement left a lasting impression. Also, her sister Grace's death from eye cancer in 1970 exemplified what she later called the "cancerization" of the world from nuclear pollution.

In 1972 Kelly engaged in environmentalist activity and joined Willy Brandt's Social Democratic Party. She left the party in 1979 to protest its energy policies and went on to become spokesperson for a citizens' initiative called the Bund Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz (Citizens Initiative for Environmental Protection). She collected over 5 million signatures to protest the stationing of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Europe. In the 1970s, by means of the electoral route, the Green Party, with environmental positions, steadily gained power in the local and state elections. Kelly, along with green and left activists Rudi Dutschke, Herbert Gruhl, and Joseph Beuys, sought to integrate "green" ideas and supporters into one progressive political party.

The German Green movement formed into a party in 1979. Kelly referred to the Greens as an "anti-party party" dedicated to the principles of "non-violence, ecology, social justice, and feminism." In her essay "Thinking Green!" Kelly called on the need to achieve fundamental transformative positions through the electoral arena: "Green politics must address the spiritual vacuum of industrial society, the alienation that is pervasive in a society where people have grown isolated from nature and themselves." She opposed political compromise as a betrayal of Green ideals.

Kelly was nominated to the European Parliament as a Green in 1979. A year later she was elected to the German Green Party's Executive Committee. In 1983 the Green Party won over 2 million votes. Kelly was one of 17 Greens who entered the German Parliament, where she remained a member until 1990 when she lost her seat. In her first year as a parliamentarian she organized a "war crimes tribunal" in Nuremberg to indict countries who possessed nuclear weapons. A fierce opponent of oppression in

Tibet, Kelly held the first international hearing on Tibet and human rights, and adopted a Tibetan daughter.

In a 1992 "Open Letter to the German Green Party," written a year before her death, she writes the Green Party should use "creative civil disobedience to combat every form of repression, which combines audacious imagination with efficient working methods, and which recognizes the link between world peace and peace in every individual."

Kelly was found shot dead in Bonn in October 1992 with the body of her companion of ten years, Gert Bastian, a Green Party member and former general. The death was officially ruled a murder-suicide, though its circumstances remain in dispute.

Kelly was controversial and outspoken, often embroiled in arguments with her fellow Greens, some distrustful of her celebrity status. Yet commentators credit Kelly with serving to reverse the nuclear arms race and prioritizing ecological concerns on a global basis. The Petra Kelly Foundation was founded in 1997 to promote Kelly's political messages of ecology and social justice.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Dutschke, Rudi (1940-1979); Germany, Green Movement; Tibet Uprising and Resistance

References and Suggested Readings

- Kelly, P. (1984) *Fighting for Hope*. Boston: South End Press.
- Kelly, P. (1992) *Nonviolence Speaks to Power*. Ed. G. Paige & S. Gilliatt. Honolulu: Center for Nonviolence Planning Project.
- Kelly, P. (1994) *Thinking Green! Essays on Environmentalism, Feminism, and Nonviolence*. Berkeley: Parallax Press.
- Parkin, S. (1994) *The Life and Death of Petra Kelly*. London: Harper Collins.
- Sperr, M. (1983) *Petra Karin Kelly: Politikerin aus Betroffenheit*. Munich: Bertelsmann.

Kent State student uprising

Stacy Warner Maddern

The incidents at Kent State University on May 4, 1970 would galvanize the anti-Vietnam War movement in the United States, forming solidar-

ity between colleges and universities across the nation. Responding to President Richard Nixon's announcement that US forces would invade Cambodia on April 30, 1970, students began demonstrating on the campus of Kent State University intending to "bring the war home." Beginning on Friday May 1, the protest included an effigy of burning draft cards, American flags, and copies of the US Constitution. The protest and violence would escalate and travel into the neighborhoods of Kent, Ohio, where several bars had to be closed and police were called out to quell disturbances. The following morning, after declaring a state of emergency, Kent Mayor Leroy Satrom asked Ohio Governor James A. Rhodes to assist in what was by then considered a city-wide riot.

The governor called in the National Guard, but by the time they arrived in Kent the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) building on campus had been set on fire. Standing around the blaze were about 1,000 protesters. Immediately, confrontations broke out and several students were arrested. Others were tear-gassed, and a few students were reported as being stabbed with bayonets.

By Sunday May 3, 1,000 Guardsmen occupied Kent State to protect the citizenry from what the governor called "the worst kind of people we harbor in this country." By 11.00 p.m. new protest campaigns were raging on the campus and the Guard was ordered to force students back into their dorms. When the crowds refused to move, they were tear-gassed again and many more arrests made.

Student-organized protests the next day would eventually bring the conflict to a head. In an effort to quell any further disturbance, university officials printed and distributed 12,000 leaflets indicating that all rallies, including those scheduled that day, were prohibited. But the day's activities had already begun, and a mass of 2,000 students gathered around to hear protesters speak. Lurking in the distance, some hundred yards away, close to 100 Ohio National Guardsmen armed with M-1 military rifles sat observing the protest. Shortly before noon, as the gathering began to reach its peak, a Kent State police officer, standing with the Guard, began barking orders through a bullhorn for all students to disperse. With the announcement having no effect, the officer climbed into a jeep with several Guardsmen and was driven into

the crowd, where he began telling protesters that the rally was banned and that they must disperse. The detail was met with angry shouting and pelted with rocks, causing it to retreat. Soon after, the Guard was ordered to load and lock their weapons. Tear-gas canisters were fired into the crowd around to clear the way for a unit that marched in closer, forcing the protesters to move up a steep hill, known as Blanket Hill. Once they were over the hill, students began flooding onto the Prentice Hall parking lot and an adjoining practice football field. Most of the Guardsmen followed only to find themselves somewhat trapped on the fenced-in field. Students began to yell and hurl rocks at the Guardsmen, some of whom were huddling together, while others knelt and pointed their guns, but no weapons were fired at this time. The Guard then began retracing their steps from the field back up Blanket Hill. As they arrived at the top of the hill, 28 of the 77 Guardsmen turned suddenly and fired their rifles and pistols into the air and the ground. However, a small portion fired directly into the crowd. Altogether between 61 and 67 shots were fired in a 13-second period.

Why the shots were fired at all remains under debate. Many Guardsmen claimed that they were afraid for their lives, while public opinion noted in *Time* magazine that “triggers were not pulled accidentally at Kent State.” The President’s Commission on Campus Unrest concluded that “the indiscriminate firing of rifles into a crowd of students and the deaths that followed were unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable.” In the end there was no plausible explanation.

Four students were killed and nine wounded. Of the four killed only Allison Krause and Jeffrey Miller had been participants in the protest, while Sandra Scheuer and William Knox Schroeder were walking by on their way to their next class. The uproar would solidify the anti-war movement as students on 350 campuses across the nation came out in protest. In similar demonstrations, the National Guard was called out to quell uprisings in 16 different states, resulting in the closure of 75 colleges and universities for the remainder of the academic year. Five days after the shootings, 100,000 gathered in Washington, DC to demonstrate against the war and the killing of unarmed student protesters. The event caused President

Nixon to flee the White House for the safer Camp David, where he would remain for two days. In recalling the atmosphere former counsel to the president, Charles Colson, remembers thinking to himself, “This can’t be the United States of America. This is not the greatest free democracy in the world. This is a nation at war with itself.”

SEE ALSO: Anti-Vietnam War Movement, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Bills, S. (1988) *Kent State/May 4: Echoes Through a Decade*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Caputo, P. (2005) *13 Seconds: A Look Back at the Kent State Shootings*. New York: Chamberlain.
- Michener, J. (1971) *Kent State: What Happened and Why*. New York: Random House and Reader’s Digest Books.

Kenya, national protests for independence

George Gona

Much of the 1980s witnessed a general absence of popular resistance in Kenya. While some churches criticized the state in matters concerning the structure and use of state power, civil organizations and individuals were muzzled through the party state machinery. Detentions, crackdowns on pro-democracy advocates, suspension and expulsions from the single party Kenya African National Union (KANU), intimidation of the masses into submission, and the silencing of popular leaders by the state were all employed to achieve this result. The suppression of Mwakenya (an underground movement formed to resist President Daniel arap Moi’s rule) and other opposition groups epitomized the dark ages of the party-state rule in the 1980s. Popular sections of civil society, like the labor movement, which would normally have played the role of checking state excesses, were co-opted. Genuine pro-democracy activities and oppositional views were criminalized and innocent individuals incarcerated because of associating with those implicated in this group. This, however, did not dampen the resolution of the pro-democracy forces in Kenya to continue their resistance to the Moi rule.

Popular pressure was key to bringing political change in Kenya in the early 1990s. But scholars such as Abrahamsen (1997) have also argued that external pressures ranging from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to political conditionality imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on Kenya and African states in general played a critical role in the change to multi-party democracy in Africa. The power of external donors to press for both economic and political reforms was nowhere greater than in Africa. Yet these external pressures would not have yielded much if citizens had not pushed for change. External pressures only set the context for internal forces to take the lead in forcing change in the country.

One key feature of the Moi era was hegemonic leadership characterized by a stage-managed democracy, where the party hierarchy became all-powerful even in respect of parliament. Outside parliament, church leaders and the Law Society of Kenya constantly reminded the government of the need to be tolerant of dissent. Within the ruling party there arose dissenting voices that began to challenge the developmentalist logic with which Moi had sought to control and dominate society. Thus new challenges faced Moi by 1990 from a new generation of leadership. These groups received support from those in exile, the popular masses of Nairobi, students, and workers in general. They formed the counterhegemonic forces against Moi's regime.

Heightened Protest

The period 1990–2 witnessed a heightened confrontation between various social forces and the intransigent and dictatorial government of Moi and KANU. These forces sought to “reinvent the wheel of democracy” in Kenya. Church leadership, which had for much of the 1980s been critical of the regime, provided the appropriate occasion and space for those social forces to find voice. Early in 1990, Dr. Timothy Njoya of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa's Tumutumumu parish challenged the ruling party to rethink the single-party political system in light of the events in Eastern Europe, which had seen monolithic regimes collapse. Not surprisingly, this challenge earned him the ire of KANU stalwarts. The national chairman of KANU, Peter Aloo Aringo, declared the sermon to be the highest

possible insult, absolute madness and folly (*Daily Nation*, January 3, 1990). Other ministers lambasted Njoya's utterances, some suggesting that he should be detained.

The 1990 murder of Robert Ouko, Kenya's foreign minister and defender of Kenya's reputation at home, put severe pressure on the government. Even though he had not been in favor of multi-party democracy, outraged public reactions to his murder paved the way for this kind of change. His murder was followed by “a public discussion of the nature of the political system,” while church leaders and various non-governmental organizations called for an independent investigation into his death, insisting that since the government was possibly implicated in the affair, it could not investigate itself (Sabar-Friedman 1997). Finally, the president set up an independent commission of inquiry led by Justice Evans Gicheru to investigate the death of Ouko. The commission started its work in 1990 but was abruptly stopped by the president, who claimed that it was not doing its job and instead was listening to rumors.

In May 1990, Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia, two former cabinet ministers expelled from KANU in December 1988, added their voices to the campaign for the reintroduction of multi-party politics in Kenya. They announced that they were applying for licences to hold pro-pluralism rallies in various parts of the country, including the Kamukunji grounds in Nairobi. The months of May and June 1990 saw mounting grassroots agitation in Nairobi, and Matiba and Rubia may well have been responding to these pressures from below. The provincial administration and later the president rejected their applications.

On July 3, 1990 the president issued a lengthy statement warning that the government would use all means at its disposal to maintain law and order. Following this statement, a major crackdown on multi-party advocates ensued; Matiba and Rubia were arrested, together with other pro-pluralists. However, Matiba and Rubia announced before their arrest that even without the permit they would go ahead and hold a rally at the Kamukunji grounds on July 7, 1990. For the first time since 1978, when Shikuku said in parliament that KANU was dead, a strong challenge to the Moi–KANU regime had emerged. This new group sought to challenge the iniquities perpetuated by the client-patronage system that

Moi had perfected. Opposition leaders began to draw support from the public without recourse to established patronage bosses.

At this point the government was anxious to avoid unilateral decisions that would give the opposition groups political mileage. It therefore launched a national campaign to undermine the opposition. The campaign's central objective was to argue that Kenya was not ripe for a multi-party system and that multi-partyism was a foreign ideology. In May 1990 the president warned that the introduction of many parties would be worse than in the early days of the country's independence, as people would now reach for rifles instead of the traditional *rungus* (clubs) (*Daily Nation*, May 31, 1990). The president ruled out public debate on the merits and demerits of multi-partyism: "If there should be two or three parties, then it is not now when tribalism is at its climax. Maybe it will be 40 or 50 years to come when the current generation in school now will be grown up and will have wiped out tribalism" (Gona 2003). Some cabinet ministers even invoked Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya, in the debate and charged that the late president's spirit would haunt the advocates of multi-party democracy. Yet invoking the past could not hold back the rising tide for change.

How the labor movement responded to the demands for change and the accompanying protests depended on the relationship that the labor movement had established with the state, its capacity to meet demands of members, and its mettle to formulate programmatic issues and follow them through. This was lacking at the time the pro-democracy wave was sweeping across the country. Right from independence, labor had been coerced into submitting to the state and capital. Through coercive legislation and welfarist/statist strategies, the state managed to isolate labor from participation in policy formulation and debates, and generally in the decision-making process. From its inception, the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) was straightjacketed into economic demands. Trade union leadership did not feel free to articulate any social and political agenda. It remained tied to economist unionism, making protests and raising matters to do with wages, unemployment, price increases, and so on. Such was the condition of labor at the time of demands for political liberalization: weak in leadership and inept in organization.

Local Conflict over Public Spaces: The Muoroto Episode and Related Issues

The surge for support for multi-party democracy coincided with local conflicts over urban and other spaces. In May 1990, City Commission askaris (guards) and police forcibly evicted slum dwellers of Muoroto, a shanty village in the east of Nairobi. A pitched battle followed between Commission askaris and later regular police on the one side and Muoroto residents and hawkers who joined them on the other. This battle lasted several hours and spread to Eastleigh, River Road, Gikomba, Muthurwa, Pumwani, and Tom Mboya Street. During the running battles sympathizers jeered their assailants with chants of "multi-party." Over the three days of rioting that followed the evictions, the police played a cat and mouse game with the people. Clearly, citizens were showing awareness of the need for change since every time they came across the police they flashed the two-finger salute that denoted multi-partyism.

These evictions drew various responses from the public. The church leadership criticized the heavy loss of life (eight people died) and called into question the commitment of the country's leadership, which claimed to be Christian and was supposed to be guided by the principles of love, peace, and unity. The churches' condemnation of the brutal evictions was not confined to the Muoroto case but extended to similar episodes in Mombasa as well as in some rural locations. As Anglican Archbishop Manasses Kuria asked during a sermon at St. Ann's Church in Nairobi, "who in their right minds can stand and watch such vicious destruction of poor people's lives? How can the nation stand by and watch children being battered by the City Commission askaris and hundreds of people sleeping outside in the cold because their houses have been demolished?" (*The Standard*, May 28, 1990).

Public indignation over the demolition of the shanties was also expressed in music. Related issues that touched on political repression emerged out of this protest, with some songs echoing resentment over the Muoroto evictions while others raised questions about the death of Robert Ouko. The state responded to the artistic opposition in a typically repressive fashion. In July 1990, police in Nairobi and Nakuru impounded hundreds of cassettes and

musical equipment. The cassettes featured songs like “Mahoya ma Bururi” (Prayers for the Country), “Who Killed Dr. Ouko?,” “Mathina ma Matiba” (Matiba’s Tribulations), “Nituhoje Ngai” (“Let Us Pray”), “Patriotic Contributions,” and “Thina Uria Wakorire Athini na Gicagi Kia Muoroto” (“Problems that Befell the Poor People of Muoroto”). The Muoroto resistance also questioned the moral and political authority of the city government. In a letter to the editor of the *Daily Nation*, one observer wrote: “A city authority that is not elected has neither sense of responsibility and accountability to continue acting purportedly for and on behalf of people of Nairobi” (May 29, 1990; Gona 2003).

The initial reaction from the labor movement came from its Director of Organization Francis Atwoli, who termed the evictions “very inhuman.” He appealed to the government to revoke the eviction until an alternative site was found. Atwoli’s sympathy contrasted with the attitude adopted by Mugalla and Fred Omido, the secretary general of the Amalgamated Union of Kenya Metal Workers and MP for the Bahati constituency in Nairobi. Mugalla apparently backed the demolition of kiosks and other businesses. He justified his support by arguing that in the event of “a let-up in the clean-up exercise, a slum culture would develop which would be difficult to get rid of in the future” (Gona 2003). For his part, Omido condemned the manner in which members of the public joined the Muoroto victims in fighting the City Commission askaris. He wondered why people were flashing the multi-party two-finger sign as they rioted. He did not see how the evictions were connected with the calls for multi-partyism.

Mugalla’s view was repudiated by Ambrose Adongo, the secretary general of the Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT), who described it as “regrettable” and depicted Mugalla as “unfit to lead a worker’s organization and the very antithesis of a worker’s leader” (Gona 2003). Church leaders also lambasted Mugalla, asserting that he “had lost credibility among the country’s workers because of his radical stand on the slum issue” (Gona 2003). Generally, official responses by the trade union movement reflected the extent to which the COTU leadership was out of touch with reality. Since Mugalla was not serving the interests of the workers he represented, church leaders called for his resignation. Its failure to respond to the call

to attend the Saba Saba rally at Kamukunji revealed how distanced the leadership of the formal organized labor movement was from public feeling (Gona 2003).

Saba Saba and its Aftermath

The period after Matiba and Rubia’s call for change to a multi-party democracy was of great importance to the nascent opposition. At the time, Kenya was carried along by a wave of renewal, an urban awakening in which a new mass movement was born. This was reflected by the readiness of the masses in Nairobi, including hawkers, jua kali artisans, and street urchins, to attend rallies or participate in the demonstrations called by opposition groups. The political strength of the challengers to KANU’s monopoly of power became more visible during 1990, notwithstanding the crackdown on protests. Matiba and Rubia received support for their call to attend a political rally on July 7, 1990, despite the government ban. Evidently, the state could not halt the tide of change. People defied government warnings not to attend the meeting at Kamukunji, famously known as the “Saba Saba” rally (the Swahili equivalent of 7/7, connoting the date the riots started) (Mutunga 1999).

The choice of Kamukunji grounds in the Eastlands of Nairobi was deliberate. During the struggle for independence, African politicians and those who supported their cause held their rallies there (Mutunga 1999), and it was the site of independence debates. After independence, Kamukunji was neglected. Kenyatta built Uhuru Park, where he exalted his government and the “development” achieved since independence on public holidays such as Kenyatta Day (October 20), Madaraka (Self-Rule) Day (June 1), and Jamhuri (Independence) Day (December 12). The less well-off occupied Nairobi’s Eastlands in low-income estates like Jeriko, Bahati, Ziwani, and Kaloleni. Kamukunji’s neglect symbolized the general neglect of the people of Eastlands.

By convening the meeting at Kamukunji, the pro-democracy groups were thus identifying with the impoverished and downtrodden people of Eastlands. In earlier times Kamukunji came to symbolize “Not Yet Uhuru” (Mutunga 1999). In the 1990s it symbolized “Not Yet Democracy.” Later it came to be a contested terrain, a source of legitimation and gauge of popularity between the government and the pro-democracy forces.

The contestation over the use of the grounds symbolized the continued struggles for citizens' rights to assemble and associate freely.

On July 7, 1990, about 200,000 citizens descended on the grounds. Groups of people began gathering around noon and by 2 p.m. thousands of people had congregated in the area. Many came from the neighboring slum areas, residential areas, and the Gikomba open-air market. Small groups, mostly young men, gathered in the middle of the Kamukunji grounds. Hundreds of others stood either at the edges or on the streets and among houses, shanties, and sheds around Kamukunji. No politician was in sight, nor did any prominent person address the crowd.

Pandemonium erupted after the crowd confronted a person suspected of being a policeman. The security detail (plain clothes and regular police) descended on the grounds and violently dispersed those gathered there (*Daily Nation*, July 8, 1990). This degenerated into riots in which people engaged the police in running battles. Skirmishes beginning in Kamukunji spread to the entire Eastlands, toward the city center, and extended to Ngara, Eastleigh, Pangani, Huruma, and Mathare. Similar incidents were reported in low-income estates such as Kibera, Uthiru, and Kangemi among others. Still more incidents were reported in Nakuru, Murang'a, Nyeri, and Kiambu. Rioters mounted roadblocks, stoning and burning vehicles (*Daily Nation*, July 8, 1990). The rioters also issued political statements. Flashing the two-finger salute as a sign of support for the multi-party system, they chanted anti-government slogans and called for the release from detention of Matiba and Rubia (Gona 2003).

The eruption of violence was a manifestation of the anger and tension that had built up in the city for several weeks. The detention of Matiba, Rubia, and other reformists, and the subsequent brutal dispersal of the July 7 meeting, gave focus to these feelings of liberation. Suddenly the opposition spoke with one voice: political pluralism had to be allowed in Kenya. Externally, the incident sensitized the outside world to the oppressive conditions of the Moi regime, a government that was not ready to expand the political arena.

Workers Defy their Leaders and Walk to Kamukunji

From the time Moi adopted dictatorial tendencies after his rule was challenged in an aborted

coup in 1982, to the Muoroto skirmishes, to riots associated with the death of Robert Ouko and to the Saba Saba event, the need for popular forces to come together had never been as great as this time. Mobilization efforts were crucial because of the general antipathy toward the ruling party that was reflected in the open challenges from within the party and the decreased attendances at its rallies. If COTU had concentrated on its grass-roots through its affiliates it might have been able to capitalize on the antipathy and effectively establish itself as an alternative voice to that of KANU. Yet the trade union leadership chose to ignore the revolutionary wave that was sweeping across the country. Instead it was the workers themselves who embraced the moment, protesting their inept leaders as they walked to Kamukunji.

The COTU leadership did not support the July 7 rally and assured the government, KANU, and the president that workers could not be misguided into attending. It viewed the rally as leading to potential chaos that would sabotage the already battered economy. Joseph Mugalla, COTU's secretary general, advised members not to attend the planned "illegal and devilish" meeting (Gona 2003). Such language exemplified COTU's longterm association with the ruling party. Mugalla further termed the rally and the subsequent protests "treasonable acts," even accusing the attorney general of being unworthy of the job. "People are committing crimes against the government but the AG is silent," he said (Gona 2003).

On July 8, 1990, churches throughout the country held prayers for peace and condemned the detention of the two former cabinet ministers and their lawyer, John Khaminwa. Bishop Henry Okullu of the Church of the Province of Kenya (CPK) called on the government to resign and pave the way for a new government and a new future. The churches also proposed the urgent establishment of a forum for dialogue and regular consultation. The Catholic bishops supported these sentiments. COTU rejected these calls for change, viewing the clergy's "persistent demand" for a national convention to discuss Kenya's future as "sinister." Mugalla accused the clergy of underrating the ability of KANU and parliament to handle the problems facing the country. For some, the call for multi-partyism was misplaced. COTU could not join the bandwagon for change just for the sake of it because citizens were not fighting a colonial

government. Similarly, it was argued that labor leaders were not politicians. It was not their place to attend political rallies (Gona 2003).

These warped arguments did not deter members from attending the Kamukunji rally. They walked in masses to Kamukunji, to be “with the people,” and to be part of the revolution that was unfolding in the country. As part of the majority of disenchanted Kenyans, workers perceived the call to Kamukunji as part of the campaign to secure democratic space in which citizens could participate freely in the decision-making process in the country. It was not about promises of material benefits; it was about seeking ways of instituting and expanding democratic practice in the country. To them, the call to Kamukunji was a defining moment that called on unionists and the public alike to stand up and be counted, to purge the KANU government of its ills, and to pursue a new economic, political, and social order. The workers who swamped Kamukunji grounds were expressing their indignation at the leadership of the trade union movement, which was caught in the one-party system and was denying workers the opportunity to participate in the making of a new Kenya by asking them not to attend the rally.

Disillusioned by a co-opted trade union leadership, workers recognized that the pro-democracy leaders shared the people’s struggle for unity of the long-oppressed Kenyans. Workers generally saw their leadership’s vulnerability to corruption by the ruling party KANU. At that moment Kamukunji symbolized the convergence of revolutionary ideas and voices, and people of all walks of life – a meeting on common grounds for joint action by the people. In the absence of channels of participation such as a national convention or constituent assembly, where labor could engage in dialogue or lobby for its programs to be included in the new dispensation, protests and public meetings remained, at the time, the only “legitimate” avenues through which the opposition could agitate for change. Workers were right to be there.

It was the workers and not the leadership that recognized that the Kamukunji rally was the real platform for the campaign of democracy in Kenya. For the trade union leadership to insist that trade unionists were not politicians and therefore should not be involved in the democratization agenda was to employ an inverted logic, which did not consider that such a response

was tantamount to condoning the undemocratic KANU regime. The failure in KANU was a failure in leadership. The country needed a new leadership, a type of leadership that could source the best ideas and try to implement them in the most reasonable way.

Moi’s intransigence seems to have yielded to the internal pressures mounted by the Church and oppositional voices. These social forces, best expressed and symbolized in the Saba Saba riots, succeeded in forcing the question of change onto KANU’s agenda. An indication of progress in this direction was President Moi’s appointment of the George Saitoti KANU Review Committee in July 1990, which was to collate public views on what type of political system citizens wanted (Throup & Hornsby 1998). Consequently, KANU abolished the queevoting system, a contested issue since its introduction in 1988. There was also the restoration of security of tenure of the judiciary, the attorney general, and the controller and auditor general that had been lost in the mid-1980s. Kamukunji and the subsequent Saba Saba protests had laid the foundation for further struggles. Buttressed by external support, the internal pressures finally pushed Moi into allowing the formation of other political parties to face him at the polls of December 1992, which he won easily due to division in the opposition ranks.

Conclusion

In the context of popular protest and resistance in Kenya in the 1990s, Kamukunji and Saba Saba became part and parcel of Kenya’s pro-democracy protest and revolutionary parlance. In this way, Kamukunji has remained in the minds of citizens a place to “revisit,” figuratively and literally, when repression and suppression seem to reemerge in society. Significantly, Saba Saba has been played out in many instances where again citizen rights have been trampled on and where protest methods have been used to exert pressure on the state to act responsibly toward its citizens. The “Nane Nane” riots of August 1997 (“nane” means 8 in the Kiswahili language, so “nane nane” means 8/8) were reminiscent of this phenomenon. These protests were called to bring pressure on the government to reconsider its refusal to allow for minimum constitutional changes for the 1997 elections. In the quest for constitutional reform, “kamukunjis”

and “saba sabas” were held between March and August 1997 by the opposition groups and attracted huge numbers, despite the security forces disrupting most of these rallies and protests and the government’s warning Kenyans not to attend them. Unfortunately, the reforms initiated by KANU did not come close to fulfilling the demands for pro-democracy advocates; however, they were born out of these popular struggles.

SEE ALSO: Congo, Protest and Uprisings, 1998–2002; Kenyatta, Jomo (1893–1978); Mboya, Tom (1930–1969) and the Kenya Labor Movement; Pinto, Pio Gama (1927–1965)

References and Suggested Readings

- Abrahamsen, R. (1997) The Victory of Popular Forces or Passive Revolution? A Neo-Gramscian Perspective on Democratization. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 35 (1).
- Cohen, D. & Atieno Odhiambo, E. S. (2004) *The Risk of Knowledge: Investigations into the Death of the Hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs John Robert Ouko in Kenya, 1990*. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers.
- Gona, G. (2003) *Workers and the Struggles for Democracy in Kenya, 1963–1998*. PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
- Hempstone, S. (1997) *Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoir*. Sewanee: University of the South Press.
- Holmquist, F. & Ford, M. (1992) Kenya: Slouching Toward Democracy. *Africa Today* 39 (3).
- Murunga, G. R. & Nasong’o, S. W. (Eds.) (2007) *Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy*. Dakar: CODESRIA.
- Mutunga, W. (1999) *Constitutional Making from the Middle: Civil Society and Transition Politics in Kenya, 1992–1997*. Nairobi: SAREAT.
- Payne, L. (1991) Working-Class Struggles and the Transition to Democracy in Brazil. *Comparative Politics* 23, 2 (January).
- Robinson, P. T. (1994) Democratization: Understanding the Relationship between Regime Change and the Culture of Politics. *African Studies Review* 37 (1).
- Sabar-Friedman, G. (1997) Church and State in Kenya, 1986–1992: The Church’s Involvement in the “Game of Change.” *African Affairs* 96.
- Sandbrook, R. (1975) *Proletarians and African Capitalism: The Kenyan Case, 1960–1972*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Singh, M. (1969) *History of Trade Unionism in Kenya to 1952*. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.
- Singh, M. (1980) *Kenya’s Trade Unions 1952–1956*. Nairobi: Uzima Press.
- Throup, D. W. & Hornsby, C. (1998) *Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and Moi States and*

- the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Elections*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Widner, J. (1992) *The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From “Harambee!” to “Nyayo!”* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kenyatta, Jomo (1893–1978)

George Gona

Jomo Kenyatta was a leader in the anti-colonial struggle against Britain and the first president of independent Kenya. His exact date of birth is difficult to establish because record keeping, like that of the rest of Kikuyu society, was alien to his father Muigai and his mother Wambui. He was probably born in the mid-1890s among the Kikuyu of central Kenya, and grew at a time of immense change that heralded the alienation of Kikuyu land for British settler occupation. Curiosity about the “Whiteman’s magic” (education) sent him to Thogoto Scottish Mission in 1909, thus formally entering the history of the West.

In the mid-1920s he was among a small group of progressive and educated young men who formed a political organization called the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) to challenge the colonial establishment. These men pursued their complaints through the limited channels of petition and constitutional redress. They demanded a return of African land and a stop to forced labor. Kenyatta and his group also waged a cultural battle against the British colonial government over the issue of female circumcision, which the protestant churches, with government approval, had outlawed.

In 1929 Kenyatta left for Britain, sent by the KCA to present the case of land for the Kikuyu. While in Britain he studied anthropology at the London School of Economics under the instruction of Bronislaw Malinowski, the renowned anthropologist who wrote a forward to Kenyatta’s *Facing Mount Kenya* published in 1938. This book, a treatise on Kikuyu traditional life and an assertion to be heard in their own voice, was a masterpiece that showed Kenyatta’s experience and verve in social anthropology. In Britain he also met and was briefly acquainted with Mbiyu Koinange, his latter-day confidant. Their friendship endured till the death of Kenyatta. Increasingly, he came under the influence of his



Jomo Kenyatta returns home in August 1961 after imprisonment by the British colonial authorities for his participation in the Kenyan national independence movement. Kenyatta was among the leaders of the Mau Mau insurrection that exposed the injustice of British colonial rule and settlement. Upon Kenya's independence, Kenyatta emerged as president, presiding over a quasi-democratic free market economy until his death in 1978. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

circle of left-wing friends, ranging from Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah to the West Indian trade unionist George Padmore and the famous American actor and close personal friend of Kenyatta, Paul Robeson. He was part of this group that organized the 1945 Pan African Conference in London, where a declaration for an end to colonization was made.

In 1947 Kenyatta returned to Kenya after a 16-year stay in Britain. He quickly joined the territorial Kenya African Union (KAU), becoming its president in 1948 and using it as a mobilization vehicle to talk about the "stolen lands," something that probably fanned the flames of Mau Mau. Kenyatta thus became part of the rising anti-colonial tide among the landless Kikuyu in central Kenya and the Rift Valley and the general resentment toward African political elites now in the Legislative Council. Coupled with

labor unions' protests under Makhan Singh, the momentum could not be reversed. Soon the radical changes that World War II brought to Kenya, changes that exposed the inequalities of British colonial rule and galvanized Kikuyu discontent, were channeled into a mass peasant movement called Mau Mau. On October 21, 1952, under Operation Jack Scott, Kenyatta, Paul Ngei, Fred Kubai, Kungu Karumba, Achieng Oneko, and Bildad Kagia were arrested for leading Mau Mau, which the British had branded as an unlawful organization bent on overthrowing the colonial government. At Kapenguria they were tried and sentenced to seven years in prison with hard labor.

Kenyatta was never the radical leader of Mau Mau. Earlier, he had tenuously kept the young Kikuyu militants in check who had wanted the KAU leadership to take on a more radical stance against the colonialists. In fact, Mau Mau only gained strength when Kenyatta was arrested. Overnight he became a martyr; a point on which his future fame would rely. He became a potent unifying political symbol; a point of reference for both his political friends and foes in the anti-colonial struggle. He was released from prison on August 20, 1961 into a political arena of which he had not largely been a part. He was given the position of president of the Kenya African National Union, subsequently leading it to win the 1963 elections. He became the first president of Kenya on December 12, 1963, creating a free-enterprise economy but largely skewed in favor of loyalists. He instituted bits of democratic machinery, but inequity, corruption, and tribalism ran riot during his era.

After independence Kenyatta differed with his compatriots like Kagia and Oginga Odinga on the issue of land. He wanted Kenyans to buy land from departing colonialists, while the latter wanted land to be repossessed without compensation. He baffled many Kenyans when he invited the former British colonizers back as junior partners in nation-building. His nest-feathering drew less criticism among Kenyans, however, than that of his ministers, and particularly his family, which aroused lots of rumblings. Under his rule Mau Mau veterans were completely neglected on the land issue. He instead rewarded former homeguards with plum jobs and with large parcels of land.

Kenyatta epitomized the new African political leadership that was colonial in all but name.

Catapulted onto the new Kenya by self-interest, he proceeded systemically to isolate or liquidate the pro-people nationalists from mainstream politics through detention and curtailment of their freedom of movement and association, and inhibited them from participating in the general development of the country. By 1975 he had managed to sideline many of the individuals who could boast pre-independence struggle credentials that could challenge him. At death he had become an imperial president.

During his twilight years Kenyatta was hardly in control of his government. A kitchen Cabinet of trusted lieutenants insulated him from the public and largely ran the country. Kenyatta died on August 22, 1978. His death was a mystery, just as his life had been an enigma. He was revered as much as he was loathed by many. People whispered about his death. You dared not talk about it. He was an African “Big Man” and these men do not die; they are immortal. Yet the manner in which his life history is now coming under scrutiny belies a rethinking about past iconic representations of African nationalist heroes.

SEE ALSO: Kenya, National Protests for Independence; Mau Mau Rebellion, 1952–1959; Mboya, Tom (1930–1969) and the Kenya Labor Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, D. (2005) *Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Kenyatta, J. (1938) *Facing Mount Kenya*. London: Mercury Books.
- Murray-Brown, J. (1972) *Kenyatta*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Ndegwa, D. (2006) *Walking in Kenyatta Struggles: My Story*. Nairobi: Kenya Leadership Institute.
- Patel, Z. (2006) *Unquiet: The Life and Times of Makhan Singh*. Nairobi: Zand Graphics.
- Smith, D. L. (2005) *Kenya, the Kikuyu and Mau Mau*. Herstmonceux: Mawenzi Books.

Khama, Seretse (1921–1980) and Botswana nationalism

Wazha Gilbert Morapedi

Seretse Khama was born heir to the Bangwato throne on July 1, 1921 in Serowe village, capital

of the Bangwato in the British colony of Bechuanaland (now Botswana). The Bangwato were the largest ethnic group in the country, and Seretse was the grandson of Kgosi (King) Khama III of the Bangwato. His father, Sekgoma Khama, died when Seretse was only 4 years old, and his uncle, Tshekedi Khama, acted as regent until Seretse finished his education before he could ascend to the throne.

Khama spent his early years in the royal household, beginning his primary education at Khama Memorial School in 1929. He also learned traditional outdoor skills like tending cattle and horse riding. From 1931 onwards, Khama was educated in South Africa at the missionary-run interracial Lovedale Institution in the Eastern Cape and at Tiger Kloof, Vryburg; he was active in sports, studied music, and was a prefect.

In 1941, the year he matriculated, Khama was a senior prefect at Lovedale and played a critical role in pacifying a student strike. Around this time, he showed a growing political awareness, resenting South Africa's racial segregation and discrimination. In Bechuanaland, too, he was opposed to racial and ethnic discrimination: here, discrimination was practiced in trading stores, in public places, and in trains. Khama clashed with a white station master at Palapye, and in his summer holidays of 1940–1 tried to overcome ethnic tensions at Serowe between Ikalanga- and Setswana-speaking boys.

Although he wanted to study law, Khama ended up doing a general Bachelor of Arts at Fort Hare because of his Latin grades. In 1942 he was expelled after a student strike, but was later readmitted. At Fort Hare he befriended figures like Charles Njonjo of Kenya and Joshua Nkomo of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), later prominent nationalists. In 1945 he enrolled in Balliol College, Oxford, regarded as one of the elite institutions in England, but left to undertake barrister studies at the Inner Temple in London, which he completed in 1948.

In London, Khama met an Englishwoman, Ruth Williams, and they fell in love. His marriage to Williams in September 1948 was opposed by leading elders and royal uncles, including Tshekedi. He had broken protocol, and had also chosen a non-Motswana. The marriage was denounced at a *kgotla* (assembly) in November by the majority of Bangwato, although a second meeting in December saw this position reversed.



Bamangwato tribal chief Seretse Khama founded the Bechuanaland Democratic Party in 1962 to fight for multi-racial reform and self-government. In 1966 he became the first president of the independent Republic of Botswana, a position he held until his death in 1980. Here Khama and his wife, British-born Ruth Williams, sit on a hill overlooking Bechuanaland in 1950. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

The controversial marriage turned Khama into an international figure. His mixed marriage was vehemently opposed by the white minority regimes in Southern Africa, and Britain opposed the marriage because of pressure from South Africa. Parsons summarizes the effect of the marriage thus: “The story of Ruth and Seretse, which broke into world consciousness in 1949, thus brought South Africa as well as Bechuanaland into the world spotlight” (Tlou et al. 1995: 96). The rise of apartheid meanwhile helped kindle nationalist politics in Bechuanaland.

Although Khama returned to Bechuanaland in 1949, he was called to Britain in 1950 and asked to renounce his chieftainship. He refused and was banned from returning to his homeland from 1952 to 1956. This was widely opposed across the world. In London, a Seretse Khama campaign committee arranged protests, as did Labour Party politicians. In Serowe, serious riots broke out, ending with three policemen dead: police reinforcements were sent from Lesotho and Southern Rhodesia as the Bangwato territory became ungovernable.

Politics and the Presidency

In 1956, Khama renounced the chieftainship for himself and his children and returned to Bechuanaland as a private citizen, touring the

Bangwato Reserve. Khama now saw himself as a republican nationalist leading a political party representing the whole of Bechuanaland and not only the Bangwato Reserve, and lived with his wife as a commoner (Tlou et al. 1995: 2).

Although dogged by illness, which proved to be diabetes, closely monitored, and involved also in cattle ranching, Khama was politically active. He was involved in setting up (and then heading) the elected Bangwato Tribal Council in 1957 and participating as well in the Joint Advisory Council (JAC). He advocated a multiracial Legislative Assembly, to which Britain acceded in 1960 by introducing the Legislative Council (Legco), a stepping stone to independence.

Botswana’s first mass-based political party, the Botswana People’s Party (BPP), was formed in 1960. Khama was initially sympathetic, but came to view the BPP as creating confusion and dissension: “the only way to fight the party was . . . to form ourselves into a body which would expose the falsehoods put out by the People’s Party” (quoted in Tlou et al. 1995: 194). During the November session of the Legco, Khama summoned a caucus of African members, forming with Quett Masire, Amos Dambe, and Archie Tsoebebe the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) in 1962 in Gaborone. In the Legco, Khama used his political image, and that of his new party, to position it as the representative of the intelligentsia and aspiring cattle owners.

One of his main concerns, raised in the Legco, was racial discrimination, and at his insistence a Select Committee was set up to examine ways of ending discriminatory practices in the civil service. He attended the constitutional talks in July 1963 that paved the way for general elections and then independence. Khama campaigned throughout the country for the BDP, emphasizing multiracialism rather than an exclusivist Pan-Africanism. His party won the general elections of 1965 with a landslide of 28 out of 31 seats, and he was sworn in as prime minister. In 1966, he became the first president of the new republic of Botswana.

In 1965, Khama received an honorary Doctor of Literature from Fordham University in New York, the first of the many honors he would receive, including a knighthood in Britain. He was now an international figure and stressed “the development of Botswana as a viable multi-racial democracy whose unity and independence is based on social and economic justice

for its people, regardless of race, color or tribe” (Tlou et al. 1995: 293). His foreign policy was nonaligned. He became more inclined toward Pan-Africanism, but mainly emphasized regional rather than continental cooperation.

As president, he stressed “education for self-reliance” (*Ipelegeng*) to avoid class divisions and to promote development and “pride in ourselves and our past, which in turn would lead to a greater degree of self-confidence” (Tlou et al. 1995: 313–14). He condemned colonialism for its denigration of African culture and helped establish a national university. He opposed “anti-whiteism,” and tried to prevent racial tensions, but was supportive of national liberation struggles in the white-ruled territories on Botswana’s borders.

In the mid-1970s the Rhodesian crisis was getting worse, and in 1976 Rhodesia declared its frontier with Botswana to be a war zone. Despite his country’s economic vulnerability, Khama maintained that Botswana would fulfill its international obligations by providing sanctuary to refugees seeking asylum, straining relations with South Africa. As tensions grew there was fear of war, and security was tightened around the president, who was disturbed by being thus isolated.

Throughout his presidency, Khama was dogged by poor health, and from 1979 his illness increasingly kept him at home, working from the State House, his official residence. He missed the company of his friends and relatives at parties in town and his occasional sojourns into the rural areas. Botswana was that rarity among postcolonial African regimes, a parliamentary democracy, and 1979 saw Khama campaigning in the general election against what he called the “destructive revolution” of the opposition Botswana National Front. His health came under strain and in November he was flown to London where he was hospitalized. By early 1980 it was clear he was gravely ill. His last major political action was setting the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) program of regional cooperation firmly on course: having played a key role in the preparatory talks and in the design of SADCC, he chaired the first SADCC summit in Lusaka, Zambia, in April 1980. SADCC was, consequently, initially based in Gaborone. Khama continued his normal routine over the next few months, but was diagnosed with cancer in June and died at State House in Gaborone on July 31, 1980. He was buried at the royal cemetery in Serowe. Perhaps,

as Parsons says, one of Khama’s assets was his ambiguous and interlocutory status between the different worlds of Botswana: he was both “covert chief and overt commoner” (1993: 2).

SEE ALSO: Anti-Apartheid Movement, South Africa; Botswana, Protest and Nationalism; Mpho, Motsamai (b. 1921); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC

References and Suggested Readings

- Carter, G. & Morgan, E. P. (1980) *From the Frontline: Speeches of Sir Seretse Khama*. London: Rex Collins.
- Parson, J. (1984) *Botswana: Liberal Democracy and the Labor Reserve in Southern Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Parsons, N. (1993) Seretse Khama as President of Botswana, 1966–1980: Lessons for Southern African Democracy, Non-Racialism and Unity. Seminar paper presented at the Center for African Studies, University of Cape Town.
- Tlou, T. & Campbell, A. (1997) *History of Botswana*. Gaborone: Macmillan.
- Tlou, T., Parsons, N., & Henderson, W. (1995) *Seretse Khama, 1921–1980*. Gaborone: Macmillan.
- Williams, S. (2007) *Color Bar: The Triumph of Seretse Khama and his Nation*. London: Penguin.

Khmelnysky Uprising

Andrew J. Waskey

The Khmelnysky (Chmielnicki) Uprising was a series of armed peasant revolts across present-day Ukraine that raged from 1648 to 1654, converging with a campaign to liberate the territory from Polish control. The uprisings are considered to be actions that liberated the Ukrainians and set in motion the formation of the modern nationalist movement.

The Khmelnysky Uprising was led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnysky, a Ukrainian nobleman who had been virtually expelled from his lands by Aleksander Koniecpolski, a Polish magnate. As head of the local administration of the Polish king, Daniel Czaplinski sent armed men to harass Khmelnysky so that he would be forced to leave. After two raids that destroyed agricultural property, Khmelnysky’s son, Yuri, was badly beaten. Khmelnysky now felt that his family was in such danger that he sent them away for safety.

Khmelnysky sought justice from the king of Poland, Władysław IV Vasa, and traveled to Warsaw twice to present his case. The journeys

were fruitless because the king was either unwilling or unable to remedy the situation. Khmelnytsky was a veteran of campaigns against the Ottoman empire, where he had been captured and held for ransom, and was a registered Cossack. The case of a Cossack nobleman being treated badly by the Poles became a matter of agitation for his Cossack regiment and other Cossacks. The Polish government succeeded in arresting Khmelnytsky, but he escaped with the aid of friends and sympathizers.

Had there been a rebellion of the Cossacks led by Khmelnytsky it would have failed, since the Polish cavalry would have destroyed their infantry. However, Khmelnytsky recruited the Crimean Tartar cavalry, using his diplomatic skills to overcome a century of hostility between the two groups. On January 25, 1648, Khmelnytsky began a campaign to liberate peasants in Ukraine from Polish domination. The Poles responded to the revolt by dispatching a small army, which was defeated by Khmelnytsky at the Battle of Zhovti Vody. The two sides met again at the Battle of Korsun. Shortly afterwards the Polish king died, leaving Poland leaderless.

Khmelnytsky's army marched westward across the Ukraine, freeing peasants from the Polish real estate managers, or *arendators*. The Ukrainian peasantry, comprised primarily of poor peasants who were Orthodox Christian, became incensed by the harassment of their priests and the closure of churches by the Poles, who pressured many to convert to Catholicism, and eagerly joined Khmelnytsky's campaign. Khmelnytsky and the peasants defeated the Poles at the Battle of Pyliavtski, which allowed him to turn a peasant revolt into a national liberation movement. On Christmas Day 1648, he entered Kiev as a liberator.

By 1654 the Ukrainians were allied with the Russians against the Poles and the Crimean Tartars. The war had killed perhaps a million people, at least 40,000 of whom were Jews, who were seen as agents of oppression because they had worked for the Poles.

SEE ALSO: Pugachev's Rebellion, 1773–1775; Razin's Rebellion, 1670–1671; Ukraine Orange Revolution, 2004–2005

References and Suggested Readings

Aster, H. & Potichnyj, P. J. (1990) *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

Rudnytsky, I. L. & Himka, J.-P. (1981) *Rethinking Ukrainian History*. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot

Justin Corfield

The formation of the communist movement in Cambodia goes back to the late 1920s when some of the Chinese who were resident there became involved in strike and sympathy action, undoubtedly motivated by events in China. In 1930, the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) was founded in Hong Kong by Hô Chi Minh, aiming to draw together the communists in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. However, from the start it was dominated by the Vietnamese, and members from Cambodia also tended to be ethnic Vietnamese. The first communist in Cambodia who seems to have been an ethnic Khmer (the native people of Cambodia) was Ben Krahom ("Red" Ben), a 24-year-old manual laborer who was involved in distributing leaflets in Phnom Penh on July 31, 1930. He worked at an electricity plant in the Cambodian capital, and nothing more is known about his career.

Led by Son Ngoc Thanh, Vietnamese nationalists used the opportunity provided by the Japanese in the country on July 20, 1942 to organize a large demonstration, known as the "Umbrella Revolt." Although it was put down and the leaders hunted down, it helped inspire many young Cambodians, including Saloth Sar (later better known as Pol Pot). He was 17 at the time, and his family had connections at the Royal Palace, an aunt being a minor concubine of the king. This allowed him a privileged upbringing, and he attended the Collège Preah Sihanouk, a new school established in the town of Kompong Cham. By 1947 when he moved to Phnom Penh to attend a technical school, the political landscape had changed completely and the Democrat Party, a center-left socialist party, was in power. He supported them in the 1947 elections. The only communist movement in Cambodia at the time was still the ICP, which remained heavily dominated by ethnic Vietnamese.

Soon after returning to Phnom Penh in 1947, Saloth Sar befriended another student, Ieng Sary,



On April 17, 1975, Khmer Rouge soldiers entered the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh, their victory marking the end of a five-year-long civil war. Celebrations soon ended, however, as the brutal rule of Democratic Kampuchea (1975–9) brought death to as many as one in six Cambodians (1.5 million people). (AFP/Getty Images)

who was also active in the Democrats. Both received government scholarships to study in France. While in Paris, Sar was heavily influenced by the communist movement and joined the French Communist Party (PCF). When he returned to Cambodia in 1953, he joined the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), which had been founded two years earlier after the disbanding of the ICP. By this time, as fighting in Vietnam had spilled over into Cambodia, the French were gradually losing the First Indochina War. In December 1953, Cambodia gained its independence.

With preparations under way for the Geneva Peace Conference, the Cambodian communists formed the Krom Pracheachon (People's Group) to contest the elections that were to be held in 1955, immediately after the Geneva agreements. Due to electoral fraud, the royalist movement, Sangkum, won and Pracheachon was marginalized, although one of its members, Keo Meas, did contest the 1958 national assembly elections. By this time the communists had given up on the idea of coming to power through electoral means, if they had ever believed that to be a viable plan. Many of the Cambodian communists were evacuated to Hanoi after the agreements were signed by the various sides in Geneva, and those who were left decided to mobilize quietly.

In September 1960, KPRP members reorganized themselves as the Workers' Party of Kampuchea. A Marxist-Leninist party, its leader was Tou Samouth, a former monk who had

been involved in the 1942 protest. He was from the Khmer Krom, the Cambodian minority in Vietnam. Samouth ran the Workers' Party as its general secretary, and Sar became his personal secretary. In 1962 Samouth was arrested by the police and tortured for about a week before he died, refusing to name any of his fellow communists. This event drove Sar further underground. In 1963, as the secretary of the permanent committee of the Workers' Party, he fled to the jungle and set up a guerilla base there, seeking help from China and Vietnam. Both were reluctant to help him openly, as this would have jeopardized their close relations with the Cambodian government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. By this time Sihanouk had dubbed the communists the Khmer Rouge (Red Khmers), a title they never used, and indeed rejected.

In 1967, following a downturn in the Cambodian economy and the election of a right-wing government in the previous year, the Cambodian communists tried to join a rebellion in Battambang in the west of the country. This attempt failed, and three leading left-wing members of the Cambodian national assembly, Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, and Hou Youn, fled to the jungle to join Sar. They planned for a communist revolution, but their opportunity did not arise until March 1970 when Sihanouk was overthrown by his right-wing government led by Lon Nol. The Cambodian civil war followed as Sihanouk, in China, established his government-in-exile, and the communists, including Sar, rallied to his support. The Vietcong started attacking the Lon Nol government, and the communists gradually took over much of the fighting.

By 1973 with the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty for Vietnam, fighting continued in Cambodia and in fact intensified. The communists, who were eager to take power, gradually (and secretly) took over most of Sihanouk's movement, using him as a figurehead and trying to trade off his international prestige. In 1974 the fighting became even fiercer, and it became clear that Sar and his communist hardliners wanted to establish a totally new society. They achieved this on January 17, 1975 when, on the day Sihanouk's supporters won the Cambodian civil war, the communists evacuated Phnom Penh, which had a population of about two million.

The evacuation immediately led to the communists establishing a rural-based society,

announcing the start of “Year Zero,” and proclaiming the country officially as Democratic Kampuchea. Sar transformed himself into Pol Pot, renouncing his well-to-do middle-class early life and his palace connections. In 1978 he told a visiting Yugoslav camera crew that he had been born a peasant. The figurehead leader of the Khmer Rouge was Khieu Samphan, although the exact nature of the power he wielded is hotly debated.

The agrarian society that the Cambodian communists tried to establish began to fall to pieces. Pol Pot and the people around him became obsessed with preventing plots against himself and other party leaders. Some no doubt existed, but others appear to have emerged from his paranoia and distrust of others. The few pro-Lon Nol groups that operated in parts of the countryside were quickly eliminated.

Pol Pot had already established internment and death camps all over the country. Some dealt with anti-communist enemies and people who had been, or were suspected of being, members of the Lon Nol government. These people were killed out of hand, and many hundreds of thousands of others died of exhaustion, overwork, lack of medicines, or other causes. About 20,000 party members and others suspected of involvement in plots were taken to interrogation centers. The one in Phnom Penh, S-21, survives and is now a chilling tourist attraction of a macabre sort. Leading party officials such as Keo Meas and Hu Nim were taken there, tortured, and, after confessing to crimes they could not possibly have committed, were forced to sign confessions and executed.

From April 1975 to December 1978, the Cambodian communists tried to control what was happening in the country and managed to get some support from Communist China. As the Cambodian communist movement turned in on itself, some of its members fled to Vietnam, while others remained and started to try to overthrow the government of Pol Pot. Fighting began along the Cambodian–Vietnamese border in 1977, probably instigated by the Cambodians. This led to renewed fighting in mid-1978, and in December 1978 a group calling itself the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation emerged.

As cross-border incidents increased, in December 1978 the Cambodian communists launched an attack on Vietnam. Their army was cut to

pieces, which allowed the Vietnamese to attack Cambodia, driving back the Cambodian army and easily overrunning the country. In a fortnight, the Vietnamese had taken over some 90 percent of Cambodia, installing their pro-Vietnamese People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in Phnom Penh.

The Cambodian communists who were loyal to Pol Pot fled to the Thai border. The Vietnamese might have managed to destroy them had it not been for the timely intervention of China (which invaded northern Vietnam), but Pol Pot managed to rally together his forces and they started waging a guerilla war against the Vietnamese from 1979 until 1991. During that time they had the support of the Thai government and army, which used them as a bulwark against the possibility of Vietnam invading eastern Thailand.

Pol Pot and his group realized that they had the strong support of China, and Prince Norodom Sihanouk, whom they had held under house arrest, managed to speak up on their behalf at the United Nations, where he urged against the recognition of the PRK. By this time the leadership of Pol Pot’s communists was clearly in the hands of three people: Pol Pot, Ieng Sary (his former foreign minister), and Son Sen (the security chief). Together these three, often assisted by the wives of the latter two, managed to hold their supporters together. In 1981 they formed the Party of Democratic Kampuchea as their political force, and in 1982 they joined the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, a group that brought them together with two non-communist groups, united in their opposition to the PRK led by Heng Samrin and Hun Sen, two former Khmer Rouge who had sided with Vietnam. Pol Pot and Sary were both put on trial, in absentia, by the PRK, found guilty, and sentenced to death in 1979. Building on traditional Cambodian hatred of the Vietnamese, Pol Pot and his supporters denounced the influx of Vietnamese settlers into their country and the domination of the PRK by people with “Khmer bodies and Vietnamese minds.”

For much of the period from 1979 to 1991, the warfare conducted by the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea was of a limited guerilla nature. Gradually, as it started winning clashes and seizing more land, Hun Sen brought the PRK to the negotiating table. In 1991, the Paris Peace

Agreement recognized the role of the Khmer Rouge and allowed it to participate in the running of the country. Khieu Samphan and Son Sen were appointed to the Supreme National Council, the body which symbolized the sovereignty of the country. The Party of Democratic Kampuchea was certainly going to take part in the 1993 elections, but when Khieu Samphan was nearly lynched when he returned to the country on November 27, 1991, it decided to pull out. Prior to the election, the Khmer Rouge launched a number of attacks on Vietnamese settlers, technically illegal immigrants in Cambodia, and this forced many ethnic Vietnamese to flee the country.

In 1993 Khmer Rouge supported any candidate who looked likely to defeat the former PRK officials' Cambodian People's Party. There is little doubt that this gave the royalist party FUNCINPEC a narrow but clear victory. The Cambodian People's Party, through a number of maneuvers, ensured that it remained in power by forming a coalition with FUNCINPEC. This initially marginalized the Khmer Rouge. In the run-up to the 1998 elections it looked as though FUNCINPEC might seek a political alliance with the Khmer Rouge. Amidst heightened speculation about a change in the political landscape, a Khmer Rouge leader, Son Sen, and his family were murdered on the orders of Pol Pot. Pol Pot was then put on show trial and jailed. Days later, with Prince Ranariddh, the prime minister, out of the country, the Cambodian People's Party of Hun Sen launched a preemptive strike, and in the coup d'état of July 5, 1997, turned on FUNCINPEC, murdering many of its leaders.

By this time it was clear that the Khmer Rouge movement had split. Hardliners under Ta Mok maintained their base at Anlong Veng, along the northern border with Thailand, and were supportive of FUNCINPEC. The others, under Ieng Sary, were centered at Kratie and formed a tacit understanding with Hun Sen. Evidence has emerged that the split might have been tactical, but it marked the end of the Khmer Rouge as a political force. In the immediate run-up to the 1998 elections, the Khmer Rouge carried out some small (and vicious) attacks on Vietnamese settlers, causing many of them to flee.

The 1998 election resulted in a narrow victory for the Cambodian People's Party, amidst many

documented cases of ballot rigging and many more of vote "miscounting." With the formation of the Cambodian Genocide War Crimes Tribunal, many of the surviving leaders of the Khmer Rouge have been put on trial. Pol Pot, however, died on April 15, 1998.

SEE ALSO: Cambodia, Communist Protests and Revolution; Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh) (1890–1969); Sihanouk, Norodom (b. 1922); Vietnam, Anti-Colonial, Nationalist, and Communist Movements, 1900–1939; Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954; Vietnam, Protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974; Vietnam, Protests, 1975–1993

References and Suggested Readings

- Chandler, D. P. (1991) *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Corfield, J. & Summers, L. (2003) *Historical Dictionary of Cambodia*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
Kiernan, B. (1985) *How Pol Pot Came to Power*. London: Verso.
Short, P. (2002) *Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare*. London: John Murray.

Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Mussau (1902–1989) and the Shi'ite Islamic Revolution

Lawrence Davidson

Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Mussau Khomeini was the leader of the revolutionary movement that overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty of Iran in 1979. He instituted Shi'ia-based Islamic government in that country.

Ruhollah Mussau Khomeini was born in the small village of Khomein in central Iran on September 24, 1902. The Khomeini at the end of his name simply designates his village origin. He was born into a family that traced its lineage back to the prophet Muhammad through the line of the seventh Shi'ite Imam, Musa al-Kazem. The youngest of six children, he first attended a government school as well as a *maktab*, or religious school for children. In the *maktab*, Khomeini was taught a Shi'ite version of history that emphasized the historical wrongs done to the Shi'ite community within the context of an ongoing struggle

between good and evil. All his studies past the elementary school level were of a religious nature. Intelligent, disciplined, and hard-working, in the early 1930s Khomeini became a recognized *mujtahid*, or learned interpreter of Islamic law.

Khomeini's early professional life was characterized by frustration over the corrupt and secular-oriented rule of the Pahlavi Shahs as well as the apparent passivity of the clerical establishment in the face of state repression. He remained in the background, however, out of deference to senior clerics. Meanwhile, in the course of his developing career as a teacher at various religious schools, he built up a considerable student following.

Khomeini began to be more vocal in his opposition to the government after World War II. The new and young Muhammad Reza Shah had just taken the throne, and Khomeini's seniority within the religious establishment was growing. It was at this time that he began to articulate the notion that "government can only be legitimate when it accepts the rule of God and the rule of God means the implementation of the Shari'a [Muslim law]." Soon he would become the recognized leader of clerical opposition to the Shah.

Khomeini's Worldview

Khomeini believed in an inner search for contact with God and an inner exploration of the true nature of reality. This striving carried over into a belief in the perfectibility of man and his institutions and the obligation of the enlightened leader to push the Muslim community in the direction of greater moral and social perfection. In his struggle with the Shah of Iran, he would turn this belief from theory into practice. Khomeini also saw the world in terms of a number of irreconcilable opposites. There was the division between the Islamic and the non-Islamic world, as well as that between the oppressed and the victims of injustice on the one side, and the oppressor and the perpetrator of injustice on the other. Khomeini saw the struggle against the Shah and his American ally in this context.

Indeed, in Khomeini's mind, Muhammad Reza Shah stood as a symbol of non-Islamic contamination by an exploitative alliance of westerners and upper-class Iranians who together were transforming Iran into a secular, materialistic place. In the process, he believed the Muslim



Palace employees replace the portrait of Shah Reza Pahlavi with a portrait of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini at the Niavaran Palace in February 1979. The western-backed Shah fled Iran on January 16, 1979, and on February 1, Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in Paris to become the supreme spiritual leader of Iran soon after. (© Alain DeJean/Sygma/CORBIS)

way of life was being undermined and would ultimately be destroyed. This set the stage for what the Ayatollah saw as a literal struggle of good (Islam) against evil (the Shah and the West) in which the contest for political control of Iran was key to its cultural and religious fate.

Khomeini led a group of Islamic fundamentalists who organized as the Islamic Republican Party. Their analysis of Iran's situation in some ways resembled that of Hasan al-Banna in Egypt. Indeed, Khomeini had studied the history and philosophy of the society closely. Khomeini, however, would prove much more aggressive and bolder than had al-Banna. While al-Banna had believed that the Muslim Brothers should seek political power only when the Islamic consciousness of the Egyptian people was sufficiently reestablished, Khomeini adhered to no such qualification. Perhaps this was because, unlike

al-Banna, who saw the source of sovereignty residing in the collective Muslim community, Khomeini placed sovereignty with God. The people needed to be guided by a religiously righteous government to do God's will. For Khomeini, the answer was first to overthrow the impious Shah and create a government dominated by the pious *ulama*. Then one would proceed to "purify" Iran of its "contamination."

To this end, Khomeini and his followers would develop a governmental system based on an Islamic constitution under which the Qur'an and Shari'a were to be the basis for all law. Also central to this scheme of government was the rule of the jurispudent (*velayat-e faqih*, guardianship of the supreme religious leader). As Khomeini explained, this office would function as the final arbiter within society. In the fundamentalist government that would soon rule Iran, the jurispudent would be constitutionally endowed with the power to command the armed forces, declare war and peace, control the Guardian Council that would approve or disapprove (on the basis of its Islamic compatibility) all legislation coming from the legislative assembly (*Majles*), and appoint the state prosecutor, chief of the Supreme Court, as well as other key members of the judiciary. He would also be able to dismiss the elected president of the country.

The jurispudent would not be accountable to the people of Iran, and so no mechanism would exist to prevent abuse of his power. He was to be accountable only to God. Of course, it was assumed that the jurispudent would be wise enough to make abuse of power an impossibility. The privileged position of the jurispudent stood at the apex of a system designed to ensure the dominance of the Muslim clerics (*ulama*) and those who accepted the premise that Iranian society must be thoroughly Muslim in the fundamentalist sense outlined by Khomeini. Candidates for all offices would be screened according to religious criteria. Government agents were expected to be creative and innovative only within the predetermined boundaries of accepted premises – that is, God had already revealed in the Qur'an which contained the basic legislation necessary for the good life. This legislation had long been elaborated and interpreted in the Shari'a (Islamic law). The main job of the government was to implement that divine legislation. The challenge was a tactical one.

Making a Revolution

In the early 1960s, and at the urging of President John F. Kennedy, the Shah initiated a series of secular reforms that included women's suffrage and the confiscation of clerically managed property. This began an escalating confrontation between the government and the Shi'ite *ulama* of whom Khomeini was now a militant leader. The Shah's government dealt with Khomeini's role in the growing unrest by sending him into exile. In the late 1970s, President Jimmy Carter put pressure on the Shah to rule in a less autocratic fashion. Once more the Shah felt obliged to respond at least superficially to the American president. Thus, in 1977, he moved to reduce press censorship, liberalize court proceedings (fewer secret trials before military tribunals), end the use of torture, and allow the Red Cross to visit Iranian prisons. This sudden liberalization of a longstanding repressive system emboldened the Shah's opposition. Both secular and Islamic groups came to believe that the Shah no longer had the unquestioning support of the United States and thus was no longer invincible. Coincidentally, this process of loosening the repressive bonds came at a time of economic downturn due to falling oil prices. Economic discontent fed renewed political protest.

The renewed protests of 1977 were at first non-violent and essentially reformist in their demands. The initial aim, pushed by the secular opposition, was to transform the government into a constitutional monarchy. But then, in January 1978, two Teheran newspapers published a government-inspired attack on Khomeini, accusing him of being an "agent of colonialism" and a "traitor of non-Persian descent." A peaceful protest against these accusations by theology students in the city of Qum turned violent when police arrived. Many died, and hundreds were injured in the incident. Far from deterring Khomeini's supporters, the clash with police sparked new protests in other cities. Khomeini, whom the government sought to vilify, was instead turned into a nationwide symbol of resistance.

From this point on, Khomeini, who was now in exile in France, skillfully coordinated the evolution of a united front of opposition groups. He pushed a relentless strategy of direct confrontation with the Shah. In the face of this growing movement, the Shah was neither relentless nor

direct. He vacillated between repression and compromise. Given that he had created a system of one-man rule where all others were discouraged from acting independently, such vacillation would prove fatal.

By late 1978 the continuing protests had escalated into national strikes involving the *bazaaries* (traditional business community), public employees, oil industry workers, and others. The factories shut down, public services were interrupted, and heating oil became scarce as winter set in. At this point, Khomeini, then orchestrating events from Paris, made it clear that the Shah's regime had to go. He had declared that monarchy was incompatible with Islam. The leaders of the secular opposition concurred with the demand, though not with the religious reasons Khomeini offered. There was less enthusiasm among them when Khomeini followed up his demand for the Shah's removal with the assertion that what the revolution was to put in his place was an Islamic Republic. But by this time (November 1978) Khomeini was nearly unstoppable. On December 10 and 11, 1978, massive peaceful demonstrations involving millions of people took place in all the major cities of Iran. These demonstrations applauded Khomeini's leadership and called for a new government based on the tenets of Islam. A little over a month later, on January 16, 1979, the Shah left Iran for good.

Soon thereafter, on February 1, 1979, Khomeini returned from exile to Iran. There would follow an interim period of provisional government during which Khomeini and his followers consolidated power through the creation of revolutionary Islamic institutions such as the *Komites* (vigilante committees that sprang up in neighborhoods, factories, schools, and universities), revolutionary courts, and the Pasdaran (a powerful party militia also called the Revolutionary Guards). Slowly, the secular opposition and the more moderate *ulama* were pushed aside. More forceful opposition to Khomeini, which came from organized groups on the left, was violently suppressed.

In April 1979 a national referendum asking simply "Do you favor an Islamic Republic or a monarchy?" was held. According to reported results, 98.2 percent of 15.7 million votes cast were in favor of an Islamic Republic. Subsequently, an Assembly of Experts was elected to write a draft constitution. This assembly was dominated by members of Khomeini's Islamic Republican Party.

The constitution that it created was thoroughly Islamic and contained the unique and powerful post of jurisprudent. Khomeini would be the first to hold this all-powerful position and through it rule Iran. As ruler of Iran from 1978 to his death on June 3, 1989, Khomeini strove to create an institutionally stable Islamic state. In doing so, he found that he had to make compromises with his ideal of perfection. In the realization of the Islamic state, God took a vengeful form.

Subsequent events seemed to encourage the evolving autocratic direction of the Islamic government. The American embassy in Teheran was seized by militant Muslim students in late 1979. While this was not done on the orders of Khomeini, he did decide to go along with the action after the fact. The embassy seizure had been triggered by the admittance of the Shah into the United States in October. The Shah was fatally ill with cancer at this time and, after brief stays in Egypt, Morocco, and Mexico, he sought permission to enter the United States for medical treatment. This triggered a debate within the Carter administration. The US government had reliable information that admitting the Shah would cause a crisis in Iranian-US relations and very likely lead to some form of retaliation against American citizens and property in Iran. Nonetheless, under great pressure from the Shah's friends in Congress and other influential Americans (particularly Henry Kissinger), the Carter administration granted permission for the Shah to come to the United States. In Iran, this decision was seen as a provocation and the result was the embassy seizure and the holding hostage of its 63 resident Americans. This hostage crisis lasted for 444 days.

Before the hostage situation could be resolved, Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, thereby beginning a long (1980–8) and destructive war. All of these events intensified the Islamic revolutionaries' sense of religious and national purpose and were used to label all opposition to the new Islamic regime as traitorous. By 1983 all political groups except the Islamic Republican Party and its immediate allies had been destroyed or driven underground.

Islamic Fundamentalism Comes to Power

Revolutionary Shi'ite Islamic fundamentalism is now in power in Iran. At least in this one case,

we can see how such a politically empowered Islamic society might look and act. In social and cultural terms, the Islamic Republic of Iran has sought to create a new society wherein the citizens' values, outlook, and behavior are guided by Shari'a law. To this end, the Iranians voided all non-Islamic laws created since 1907 and required that all judicial judgments had to flow from the Qur'an, accepted *hadith*, or Shi'ite-based theological precedents.

An outward public morality is enforced. The Islamic Republic established an Office for the Propagation of Virtues and Prevention of Sins, which is empowered to assure that public behavior accords with Islamic moral standards. Not abiding by the Islamic dress code (in the case of women this means wearing a full-body-length loose-fitting robe called the *chador*, and men must wear modest, loose-fitting clothing) when appearing in public or other obvious non-Islamic behavior can result in harassment or arrest. In addition, bars, discos, nightclubs, and the like have been shut down. Western films are banned or censored, modern music is prohibited, and alcohol forbidden.

In June 1989, after guiding the Islamic state for a decade, the Ayatollah Khomeini died. His death led to a fracturing of forces within the fundamentalist camp that has persisted over time. As with all revolutionary movements, what might look from the outside to be a united effort on the inside really is a multifaceted affair. Since Khomeini's death there has been an ongoing competition for power between conservative and moderate factions, with a pragmatic group of technocrats in the middle.

Whatever their political persuasion, the majority of Iranians recognize Ruhollah Khomeini's seminal role in shaping today's Iran. That he sought the well-being of the masses of Iranian people, particularly the poor, is generally accepted by most of those who study this period of Iranian history. And there can be no doubt that his legacy goes far beyond Iran, for his success continues to inspire Islamic fundamentalists throughout the Muslim world.

SEE ALSO: Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and the Muslim Brotherhood; Iranian Revolution, 1979

References and Suggested Readings

Abrahamian, E. (1982) *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Algar, H. (Trans. and Ed.) (1981) *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Iman Khomeini*. Berkeley: Mizan Press.

Bakhash, S. (1985) *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Brumberg, D. (2001) *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Martin, V. (2007) *Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Milani, M. M. (1994) *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic*, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Moin, B. (1999) *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah*. London: St. Martin's Press.

Khuda-i Khidmatgar: Pashtun non-violent resistance force (1929–1948)

Sruti Bala

Origins and Structure

The Khuda-i Khidmatgar (KK), in the Pashto language "Servants of God," was a unique formation as an unarmed resistance force with roots in an Islamic interpretation of non-violent politics. It pledged itself to non-violent resistance to British rule and to the reform of Pashtun, also known as Pathan society (the dominant ethnolinguistic group in eastern and southern Afghanistan and in the Northwest Frontier (NWF) Province of today's Pakistan). Launched in 1929 as the interventionist wing of a broader social reform and Pashtun youth movement, the KK was banned in 1948, following independence from British rule and the partition of the subcontinent. At different points in its brief 18-year history, the KK was partly the representative office of the NWF section of the Indian National Congress (Congress); at other moments it was a social welfare organization, as well as an unarmed, rurally based, anti-colonial protest force. At its peak in the 1930s, KK membership was estimated at 25,000, consisting mostly of men but also a few hundred women. Membership was open primarily to Pashtuns, but though most of the KK members and office holders were Muslims, there were also some Hindu and Sikh recruits. Despite being a voluntary

civil movement with an explicitly pacifist and reformist agenda, the KK was often referred to as an army because of its organizational characteristics and institutional structure. Yet, as evident from press reports in the 1930s, the KK was more often suspected to be allied to the Bolsheviks, as a military-like protest and resistance force.

Background to the Region's Colonization

The rising political disturbances and clan-based feuds and violence in the region at the beginning of the twentieth century was a direct consequence of colonial laws and interference with the traditional land distribution system of the Pashtuns, known as *wesh*, and its related rules of social authority and ownership. The annexation of the NWF Province region bordering Afghanistan in the second half of the nineteenth century gave way to the emergence of small landed elites, patronized and appointed by the British, who controlled and administered the province on behalf of the British in return for favors and privileges. The ruling elite emerged as a group of powerful landlords who fought with each other and increased rivalry among their clans. Ignoring traditional tribal authorities such as the *jirga* and introducing their own methods of punishment and control, including levies, fines, and even imprisonment, they gradually created a new culture of conflict and its own rules of settlement. The *jirga*'s traditional focus on limiting conflicts and blame, and the practice of resolving feuds without punishment, soon diminished in relevance.

Special regulations were introduced in the NWF Province to curb what was termed in colonial vocabulary as tribal violence, unrest, and inter-clan fighting. These regulations, such as the Frontier Crimes Regulation Act or the Tranquility Act, first introduced in 1872, directly limited civil liberties, sanctioned punishments and mass arrests without trial or legal support, and placed heavy restrictions on the free assembly of Pashtuns. With these regulations, violence and anti-British sentiment increased.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan

The founder of the movement, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890–1988), was an active member of the Congress and a close ally to Gandhi.

His political activism became prominent with the founding of reform schools, not controlled by the Muslim clergy or British missionaries and promoting education in the Pashto language. These were also the first schools open to educating girls and accessible to the rural poor in the region. The brothers Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib belonged to a well-placed landowning family, and were active in the reform movements Anjuman-I-Islah-ul-Afghana (Society for Afghan Reform, founded 1921) and the Zalmo Jirga (Youth League, formed in 1929). Abdul Ghaffar Khan became a widely respected leader, not only for his reform activities, but because he refused privileges and wealth and chose to live a simple life dedicated to the service of his Pashtun community.

He established the KK with the professed aim of creating a united, independent, secular India, along with Pashtun autonomy. As its commander-in-chief, Khan traveled to the most inaccessible villages of the Pashtun-dominated districts, addressing large gatherings of supporters, greeting new recruits, visiting schools, and consulting with local *jirga* leaders. Profoundly influenced by the striking power of the Gandhian non-violent strategy of *satyagraha*, Ghaffar Khan, as a devout Muslim, grounded his principled non-violence in teachings of Islam, without however politicizing Islam. *Satyagraha* was a program of peaceful violation of specific laws, mass courting of arrests, occasional *hartals* (general shutdown or strike), and spectacular demonstrations or rallies. He was popularly addressed as *Badshah* (Urdu) or *Bacha* (Pashto) Khan, “King of Kings,” *Khan* also being a title for members of respected landowner families. He was an outspoken and fearless critic of British policies and later bitterly opposed the idea of the Partition of India and Pakistan. For his political actions and opinions, Khan spent more than 30 years of his life in prison, both during British rule as well as following independence. When Khan died on January 20, 1988 in Jalalabad in Afghanistan, a ceasefire was announced during the raging war, and the borders to India and Pakistan were declared open to allow for masses of supporters from all parts of the subcontinent to attend the funeral of a leader whose life had by then become steeped in myth. His radical dream of Pashtun autonomy and of a society that could defend itself purely by the strength of civilian effort remains one yet to be accomplished.

Military Organization and Structure

The KK aimed at independence from British domination and the reform of Pashtun society to establish a degree of political autonomy and self-rule. Whereas the Zalmu Jirga (Youth League) mainly consisted of the educated and landed elite, the KK accommodated the peasant and rural population in a voluntary action force, particularly in protest against the civil rights restrictions imposed through the Frontier Crimes Regulation Act. Further, the KK trained its members in community work and civil service.

The movement had a militant and a social wing, each with a different set-up and division of roles and tasks. The militant wing participated in visible protest actions, where the risk to personal safety was high and direct or indirect confrontation with armed forces was a threat, such as demonstrations, blockades, or as unarmed guards. The social wing concentrated on community or educational services and social work. The KK was hierarchically organized, using a combination of both the traditional model of the *jirga* with local village elders in commanding positions, as well as colonial military structures with posts such as that of lieutenant, colonel, general, or commander. Since most of the recruits of the army were from the grassroots, including peasants and landed or landless laborers, and mobility was restricted, there were committees and branches in every village and sub-district. The KK funded itself through voluntary contributions and donations of well-placed members and supporters. An economy based on solidarity and recognition of status also played an important role in creating the cohesion and collective engagement of the KK.

The thrust of the KK activities was in visible public disobedience and disregard of colonial laws. Foot soldiers traveled from village to village, persuading influential Pashtun landlords and local authorities to resign from government posts and not accept favors from British officers. They picketed and raided courts and other colonial institutions, calling for boycotts of British goods and non-cooperation with authorities. When challenged by armed policemen, KK soldiers sought arrest *en masse*. It was also common practice for KK activists to conduct flag marches through the same areas where British police forces conducted their patrols. They held mass public gatherings throughout the NWF

Province, with speeches, poetry readings, performances of patriotic Pashto plays, and community singing. They wore uniforms made of hand-spun cloth dyed in a reddish brown color from the local leather factory, which gave them the mostly derogative title of the *Surkh Posh* (Red Shirts). Women members wore black clothes. Visibility, not camouflage, was the key characteristic of the protest acts of the KK. The presence of KK guards in red uniforms enhanced their authority and credibility in the public sphere, particularly in areas of tension and social unrest, or at the arbitration of clan feuds.

Training in Non-Violence

Regular camps were run, attended by up to 1,000 KK soldiers from several villages, who gathered for several days at a stretch, undergoing disciplinary training by way of drilling and physical exercises, parades, and regional patrols. They received schooling on the anti-imperialist struggle and the political principles of non-violence. As a youth movement, the KK sought to demilitarize and disarm an area where it was considered necessary for every respectable male Pashtun to carry a rifle. Traditionally, Pashtuns served in one of the most prestigious British army regiments, known as the Corps of Guides. The Congress Committee Reports from the NWF region document the reintegration of several ex-army men as trainers in the camps of the KK. The quasi-conversion of combatants or ex-servicemen to the fold of non-violent civilian resistance was a part of the strategy of the peace force. Rather than disqualify persons with a background in the British military, their experiences and skills were integrated into the activities of the KK camps, which placed great emphasis on physical fitness and discipline.

The KK camps were publicity events in themselves, attracting crowds of onlookers, creating a spectacle out of the military-style camps. Ritualistic aspects of the military, such as conferring ranks and badges of honor, were adapted and transformed into Pashtun emblems of dignity. Yet the omission of the most obvious part of military training, namely the use of weapons, made the protest movement into a statement of pacifist defiance.

The work profile of a “Servant of God” also consisted of a reform program including religiously endorsed practices and obligations (*Islahi*),

such as cooking for and feeding the poor. This program was extended to adopt Gandhian ideas of constructive non-violence, such as hand-spinning, weaving, prayer, and fasting, in addition to elements such as village sanitation drives, and maintenance and improvement of village infrastructure.

The *Pakhtun*, the monthly journal of the KK movement in the Pashto language, was repeatedly banned, stopped, and systematically destroyed by both the British and Pakistani rulers. No single library possesses the complete file of all issues of the journal from May 1928 to August 1947. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, his son, Ghani Khan, apart from other KK members, wrote regularly for the journal. The articles dealt with a vast array of topics, ranging from poetry to personal health and hygiene, village sanitation, educational reform, and current affairs. A search for Pashtun identity and sense of community, free from violence and oppression, marked the profile of the journal.

Servants, Servers, or Servicemen?

Importance was given to the notion of *khidmat*, or service to the community, to a cause greater than oneself, a concept with direct reference to Islamic tenets. The religious and cultural connotations of the notion of serving the community are crucial to understanding the acts of the non-violent army. The non-violent philosophy of the Pashtuns was not a matter of individual soul-searching and achievement, but an ideal and a principle for the entire community, stressing shared suffering and experience of discrimination, and hence requiring a collective effort. This is in clear contrast to the primarily individualistic approach that Gandhi adopted in his non-violent politics.

The use of the term *Khidmatgar* also describes a rewriting and punctuation of the colonial vocabulary. In government contracts or documents it was used to denote on the one hand lower-class, menial or domestic laborers, as well as civil servants, usually upper- or middle-class English-educated administrators. The term also referred to servicemen, implying army recruits. In calling the non-violent resisters by the same name as those who cooperated with the colonizers, the KK appropriated a social role, giving it a completely different meaning and relevance.

The concept of the servant or the server being devoted to a larger cause of the community is common to both the military and a religious group. Like the military, KK servicemen were required voluntarily to subordinate themselves and obey orders without question; however, being a voluntary association, they were theoretically allowed to leave without punishment. The social and peer pressure to stay in the movement was, however, extremely high, in spite of the repressive persecution by the British. Non-violent resistance was a high-risk commitment. The line between consent and coercion in maintaining membership of the army was arguably thin. Even if there were no authorities to persecute someone for desertion from service to the resistance force, families and the larger community placed immense pressure to maintain the momentum of KK agitations. This aspect is more akin to the mechanisms of a religious community, where sanctions are often indirect and subtle.

Transforming a Culture of Violence

Every recruit to the KK took an oath to become a Servant of God, to refrain from touching weapons, from taking revenge, or engaging in clan-based feuds by becoming a servant of humanity. Further, the oath committed every member to a certain number of hours of community work on a daily basis, as well as to a frugal lifestyle, sacrificing wealth and comfort for the service of the community. The oath was taken with hands placed on the *Quran* but without any reference to religious identity. There was in fact not even any mention of national independence. The oath sought to establish a new sense of Pashtun identity, using and deriving legitimacy from existing elements of Pashtunwali (Pashtun culture). Interestingly, an idea such as *nang* (integrity), which previously justified revenge and bloodshed, was reframed as a non-violent principle. So the very same culture that upheld the image of an armed Pashtun warrior was able to generate the role model of an unarmed Pashtun soldier and citizen. The pacifist praxis of the KK was not characterized by a total rejection of anything related to violent institutions. Rather, the critique of the military was performed through a reconstitution of what it meant to be a fighter, or to sign up for combat.

An Islamic Understanding of Non-Violence

A common question asked of Abdul Ghaffar Khan was how far the idea of non-violence was coherent with or derivable from Islam. When Khan used the term in his speeches, he usually meant Gandhian *ahimsa* (non-injury). However, the term used more frequently is *sabr* (patience, endurance, or self-restraint). This religiously connoted term refers to patient, individual suffering of hardships without complaint, or enduring false accusations and trouble caused by others, and steadfastness in pursuing an Islamic way of life and mission. The way in which Khan used the notion of *sabr* is probably conceptually the closest to non-violence. Adapted as a proactive idea, the concept is not just limited to non-injury of others, while it includes the idea of self-restraint and control of aggression. This also suggests a new or better form of masculinity, whereas traditionally, patience as in forbearance is a feminine attribute. Most significantly, *sabr*, as opposed to the notion of passive toleration of injustice and unwarranted suffering, is directly interpreted as a weapon, as sanctioned by Islam, and as the instrument fit to use against the weapons of the colonial power. Self-restraint and self-control in the face of aggression are also interestingly written into the discourse of trained bodily discipline, which then draws the link to military training. For a people historically marked as primitive, excessive, and uncontrollably violent, the show of discipline and control itself is a way of protesting against the stereotypes and quasi-rationalizations of repressions against them. While seeking recognition for non-violence as a method of combat, this organization involved itself in the process of religious and cultural legitimization to negotiate a new interpretation of Pashtun identity, of what it meant to “do Pashto.” In doing so, it asserted that non-violence was rooted both in Pashtun and Islamic tradition.

The model of non-violent action practiced in the army of the KK was notably different from Gandhian non-violence, often perceived as its inspiring model. While Abdul Ghaffar Khan may indeed have admired and respected Gandhi as an individual and professed affiliation to his political goals, his interpretation of non-violence within the Pashtun social set-up was closely connected to Islamic principles of service to humanity and of forbearance, as well as to

uniquely Pashtun concepts of integrity, citizenship, and social cohesion.

Local Before the National

While Islamic principles strongly influenced not only the leadership of the KK but also the kind of activities that it pursued, it was not an organization dedicated to promoting political Islam. Despite referring to themselves as the Servants of God and unhesitatingly locating their working principles in an Islamic code of social conduct and engagement, the KK did not strive to unite all Muslims. It emphasized faith-based social commitment in equal measure to resisting political oppression. In spite of its entire nationalist, anti-imperialist ethos, the KK was meant to be a local organization, aiming at the complete self-sufficiency and autonomy of the Pashtun community, which included creating a sense of solidarity and dignity, as well as economic and administrative independence.

The organization was impervious to the idea of Muslims as a separate political community and never saw Pashtunistan (the Land of the Pashtuns) as a Muslim land. This gave the KK and particularly its leadership the reputation of being a pro-Hindu lackey among Pakistani nationalists. It also saw the organization in an uncomfortable position with the Congress Party during late 1946 and 1947, when the idea of Partition had gained popularity and many Congress leaders supported the move, while Abdul Ghaffar Khan bitterly opposed the Partition and the formation of a Pakistani state. The KK became unpopular with the Muslim League and the proponents of the two-nation theory supporting the Partition of India and Pakistan. Yet Khan refused to leave his Pashtun homeland and migrate to India after Partition and opted for Pakistani citizenship.

The KK and Indian Freedom Struggle

The relationship between the KK and the all-India freedom struggle was complex. For the British, the NWF Province was a vital area, on one hand due to its role as the frontier, with Soviet Russia just beyond Afghanistan, and on the other hand because the Pashtuns were a major component of their military recruitment. They therefore tried their best to smash the movement. To do this, in 1930, during the civil disobedience

movement, they brought in upper-caste Hindu *Garhwali* troops, who however refused to fire on the unarmed *Khidmatgars*. From 1932 the involvement of women in the movement also posed a problem for the British, as many Indian officers were reluctant to use violence on women. The British, however, were undeterred, and bombed a village, as well as arresting thousands of KK activists. Close connections developed between the Congress and the KK from the civil disobedience period. Ghaffar Khan's brother Dr. Khan Saheb led the Congress to victory in the 1937 elections. In 1939 his government was one of several Congress governments that resigned. In the NWF Province this had the effect of strengthening the hands of opponents of the KK. They were aided by the British, who shifted from repression to communal propaganda, arguing that collaboration with Hindus would mean blows against the traditional Muslim and tribal culture of the region. These problems were compounded by a factional conflict inside the KK, when Ghaffar Khan wanted his son to be the leader of Pakhtun Zalemy, the youth organization affiliated to the KK, though Salar Aslam Khan had been elected. Collectively, these factors meant a relative strengthening of their opponents. However, despite this, the KK had considerable strength. In the immediate pre-Partition period, Khan wanted the option of voting for a separate Pathan state, and when this was not given, called for a boycott. Only a minority took part in the plebiscite that decided that the NWF Province would go to Pakistan. This made Khan and the KK permanently suspicious in the eyes of the Pakistan government, which eventually smashed the movement by persecution as well as support to its opponents.

SEE ALSO: Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); India, Civil Disobedience Movement and Demand for Independence; Jinnah, Muhammad Ali (1876–1948); Non-Violent Movements: Struggles for Rights, Justice, and Identities

References and Suggested Readings

- Ahmad, A. (2005) *Frontier Gandhi: Reflections on Muslim Nationalism in India*. *Social Scientist* 33 (1–2): 22–39.
- Banerjee, M. (2000) *The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and Memory in the North West Frontier*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Khan, A. G. (1969) *My Life and Struggle: Autobiography as narrated to K. B. Narang*. New Delhi: Hind Pocket Books.

- Ramu, P. S. (Ed.) (1992) *Momentous Speeches of Badshah Khan: Khudai Khidmatgar and National Movement*. New Delhi: S. S. Publishers.
- Shah, S. W. A. (1999) *Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province 1937–47*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Tendulkar, D. G. (1967) *Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is a Battle*. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.

Kim Joa-jin (1889–1930)

O. H. Jang-Whan

Kim Joa-jin (aka “Baekya”), an anarchist military leader sometimes compared to Nestor Makhno, is largely remembered as a Korean patriot, particularly for his achievements as general and commander of the Korean Independent Army in Manchuria. Born to a wealthy family, he was inspired by ideas of social justice from an early age, setting free his family's slaves at the age of 18. Entering the fight for independence from Japan, in 1919 he organized the Buk-ro gun-jung-sea (Northern Military Administration Office Army) and founded a military academy to train Korean soldiers against the Japanese army. The next year he became a national hero when his army wiped out an entire division of the Japanese Imperial Army at Chungsan-ri in Manchuria, winning the Koreans' first military victory against the Japanese army since 1876. At this time, he became increasingly influenced by the anarchist ideas of his close relative Kim Jong-jin. In 1925 he organized the Sin-min-bu (New People's Society) to build a new society along egalitarian and libertarian lines. In 1929 he formed the Han-jok chong-yun-hap-hoi (General League of Koreans) in Manchuria, supported by all Korean anarchists in China, to form a new commune-type organization. For the first time in Korean history, he attempted to put anarchist ideas into practice in rural villages in the Shinmin province of Manchuria (where some 2 million Koreans lived), establishing an autonomous region which lasted from 1929 to 1931. In 1930 Kim was assassinated by a Communist Party agent while repairing a cooperative's rice mill.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, China; Anarchism, Korea; Anarchocommunism; Makhno, Nestor (1889–1935)

References and Suggested Readings

- Publication Committee of Korean Anarchist History (1978) *Han-kuk mu-jung-bu ju-y un-dong-sa (The History of the Korean Anarchist Movement)*. Seoul: Hyung-Sul Publishing.
- Sin Young-Ha (2003) *Eu-hyung-kwa dok-lip-kun-eu mu-jang dol-lip un-dong (The Military War of the Independent Army)*. Seoul: Gi-Sik san-up-sa.

King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)

Susan Love Brown

Martin Luther King, Jr. was the most prominent leader of the modern civil rights movement in the twentieth century in the United States, largely because of his charismatic preaching, adherence to the principles of non-violence, engagement in the most important civil rights struggles, and martyrdom in the cause of human rights, peace, and freedom. Through the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) of which he was a co-founder and president, he and other religious leaders gave the civil rights movement its strong moral foundation, insisting on the use of non-violence as an overall strategy and carrying out workshops to train potential protestors. After King's assassination in 1968 the SCLC continued to carry on this work. King's family history within the Baptist ministry, his education, his adoption of a social gospel, being in the right place at the right time, and his association with a group of strong leaders all contributed to his prominence and the work of the SCLC.

Early Life and Education

King was born on January 15, 1929 in Atlanta, Georgia to the Reverend Martin Luther King, Sr. and Alberta Williams King. He was the second of three children, flanked by his older sister Christine King Farris and his younger brother, the late Alfred Daniel Williams King (known as A.D.). His maternal grandfather and great grandfather had been ministers, as was his father. His father came from a family of share-

croppers. King was educated in Atlanta at the Daniel T. Howard Elementary School, the Atlanta University Laboratory School, and Booker T. Washington High School. He has been described by some as precocious, skipping the 9th and 12th grades and graduating from high school at the age of 15. He went on to Morehouse College, where he first read about Gandhi and Henry David Thoreau, earning a degree in sociology in 1948 at the age of 19, and becoming an ordained minister and an associate pastor of the Ebenezer Baptist Church. Although King had been a mediocre student at Morehouse, he blossomed at Crozer Theological Seminary, where he read the work of Walter Rauschenbusch (*Christianity and Crisis*, 1907) and Reinhold Niebuhr (*Moral Man and Immoral Society*, 1932). He also became acquainted with Mohandas K. Gandhi in India and his non-violent philosophy. These three influences would help King formulate his own social gospel and non-violent approach.

King was class valedictorian, graduating in 1951 with a divinity degree, and earning a scholarship that allowed him to continue his studies in systematic theology at Boston University, where he rediscovered Gandhi and non-violence. While in Boston he met Coretta Scott, an Alabama native who had graduated from Oberlin College and was studying at the New England Conservatory of Music. They married on June 18, 1953. King earned his PhD in 1955.

Montgomery Bus Boycott

Although King was associate pastor of the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, his father's church, he took a job at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama in 1954 while writing his dissertation. This ministry put him in the right place at the right time for what he came to see as his destiny. He joined the local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and joined its executive committee but declined a leadership role because of his ministerial duties. He was 26 years old when the Montgomery bus boycott began. Both Jo Ann Gibson Robinson of the Women's Political Council (WPC) and Rufus Lewis, head of the Citizen's Steering Committee, were members of King's church. The Montgomery bus boycott began on December 5, 1955 when the WPC decided, upon Rosa



An icon of the American civil rights movement, the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (1929–68) relied on non-violence, patience, and optimism to win support for the cause. Here he addresses over 200,000 people on the Mall in Washington, DC, during the March on Washington of August 28, 1963. It was at this event that he delivered his famous “I Have a Dream” speech. (Getty Images)

Parks’ arrest for refusing to yield her seat to a white bus rider, that the time had come to protest the treatment of black people on the city’s buses. They sought the support of local ministers for their protest. King was named president of the newly formed Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA), largely because he was new in town, well spoken, and not a part of any faction within the local black community.

According to Ralph Abernathy, King spoke at length about the importance of non-violence the first night of the boycott at a rally held at the Holt Street Baptist Church:

That lesson was crucial. We were asking these people to go into the streets and to accept whatever punishment the white community had to offer, whether jail or beating or death, and we were asking them to take the risk without every raising a hand in their own defense. So it

was only fair that they understand thoroughly why they were being asked to do something so contrary to human nature. . . . It was absolutely essential that the decent people in the community, as well as in the nation at large, see Jim Crow for what it really was – an oppressive system maintained by the persistent threat of violence. It was that violence we wanted to expose. For only when it came out from behind the mask of legalism and respectability could people of good will fully understand our predicament and act to free us. This is the lesson Martin taught that night. (Abernathy 1989: 152)

The Montgomery bus boycott gave King the opportunity to test his ideas about non-violence in action, and its successful outcome provided the impetus for further non-violent protest throughout the South. King also reported that his life’s mission was realized during the boycott.

King and his family quickly became targets of violence by some local whites. He was arrested on trumped-up charges of speeding when he participated in the carpool set up by the MIA. He was indicted and arrested for violating an anti-boycott law, and his house was bombed with his wife and children inside. After the Supreme Court had ordered the buses to be desegregated, the violence continued, with someone shooting through the front door of King’s house, sniping at black bus passengers, and even bombing Ralph Abernathy’s house.

Move to Atlanta and the SCLC

Following the successful ending of the bus boycott, King and other civil rights activists met in Atlanta and later New Orleans and eventually formed, in 1957, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). This loosely structured organization was designed to serve as a coordinator for all civil rights actions. It had a very deep commitment to non-violent direct action as a protest strategy and always provided training workshops in non-violent techniques for potential demonstrators. With headquarters in the Savoy Hotel on Auburn Avenue in Atlanta, organized by veteran activist Ella Baker, the SCLC worked with other organizations and ministers around the country. The SCLC was run solely on donations, raised largely through King’s personal appearances around the country. Although it had some paid staff members from

time to time, especially when it hired people at the site of local protests, it was usually underfunded and often on the verge of bankruptcy, especially when funds were used to pay bail for arrested demonstrators, keeping its money constantly in short supply.

Under the auspices of the SCLC, King, Abernathy, and a host of other ministers and activists began their campaigns to desegregate the South. The movement to desegregate buses and waiting rooms for interstate travel, boycott merchants in downtown areas, and the push for voter registration were all part of the activities that SCLC supported in conjunction with national organizations such as the NAACP, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and whatever local groups sought their assistance.

In 1957 King's picture appeared on the cover of *Time* magazine, and in 1958 King's first book, *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story*, was published. During a book-signing event in Harlem, King survived a near-fatal stabbing by a mentally deranged woman, hospitalizing him. In 1959 King and his wife visited India, meeting Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and undertaking training in Gandhian non-violence. King resigned from his ministry at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church on February 1, 1960 to take up permanent residence in Atlanta as co-pastor of the Ebenezer Baptist Church and president of the SCLC.

After four students in Greensboro, North Carolina, staged a spontaneous sit-in at the segregated lunch counter in F. W. Woolworth's on February 1, 1960, and other students across the South began to follow suit, the SCLC, through the offices of Ella Baker, hosted a conference at Shaw University in Raleigh, North Carolina, that tried to capture the momentum of this movement through the formation of the SNCC. King, whom students knew about and admired because of his participation in the Montgomery bus boycott, was a keynote speaker. The SCLC and SNCC would be involved in a number of civil rights activities in the years to come, and the SCLC was successful in passing on its non-violence ideology and practice to the students. However, as the civil rights movement progressed, King and the SCLC would be perceived as too moderate in their approach. Indeed, King saw his and the SCLC's role as moderating between complacency and violence –

the only way to bring about change in a principled way.

In 1961 CORE organized Freedom Rides in order to desegregate facilities served by interstate transportation, namely buses. Members of the SNCC also participated, along with some Northern volunteers. King became directly involved in the Freedom Rides of 1961 when he returned to Montgomery for a rally on behalf of the freedom riders who had been denied further passage by the bus companies and had been attacked by white mobs. This event turned into an all-night siege at Ralph Abernathy's First Baptist Church when thousands of whites blockaded the church, burned cars, and broke windows, and US marshals were brought in to rescue the people in the church.

Following success in desegregating the buses in Montgomery, King and the SCLC also experienced setbacks. One of these occurred in Albany, Georgia, where the SCLC joined with the SNCC and the NAACP in a campaign against segregated facilities at bus stations in the wake of a ruling by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that all such facilities must desegregate. Although the ruling was made, city officials of Albany, as in many Southern cities, refused to comply. When SNCC members attempted to use the facilities, they were placed under arrest. Local supporters of the Albany movement were also arrested. The SCLC was asked to join the local movement with the hopes of gaining additional local support, but their efforts were thwarted by the arrest of more than 700 people, including King and Abernathy, who were imprisoned, found guilty, and fined several times. Lack of cooperation among the groups involved, lackluster support from the local black community, and the refusal of city officials even to meet with black leaders doomed the movement to failure. However, this encounter taught those involved the importance of focusing their attention on specific issues, presenting a united front, and the importance of outside assistance from the federal government and the news media.

Birmingham Campaign

Perhaps the most visible civil rights campaign involving King and the SCLC since the bus boycott took place in Birmingham, Alabama. At the urging of Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, one of the founders of the SCLC and pastor of the

Bethel Baptist Church, the SCLC decided to undertake the desegregation of Birmingham stores in April 1963. The protest began with lunch counter sit-ins and demands for fair hiring practices in the stores and in Birmingham city government, the desegregation of parks, and the dismissal of charges against those who had been jailed for the initial sit-ins. King and Abernathy and some of the local clergy and SCLC supporters, in defiance of local and state law, participated in the protests. They were arrested, and it was while he was incarcerated that King wrote his famous “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” on toilet paper and had it smuggled out of the jail.

King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” became one of the classic pieces of civil rights literature. Written in response to a letter written by white clergymen urging a cessation of the demonstrations, King pointed out all of the reasons why African Americans could no longer wait, the virtue in non-violent direct action, and the difference between just and unjust laws. He expressed his profound disappointment in the white clergy for not supporting the civil rights movement. The letter is a model of reason and eloquence and a strong rebuke to those who felt that it was not the role of the church to become involved in social issues.

As the protests continued, and more and more people were arrested, the movement added hundreds of young people to its ranks of demonstrators in its Children’s Crusade. The children, too, were led off to jail in buses. When the jails were full and could hold no more protestors, the police, led by police commissioner Bull Connor, used dogs and fire hoses to stop the protests. The confrontations of the protestors with police and dogs in front of television cameras, the massive number of arrests, and the stiff fines and jail sentences captured the attention of the nation and forced the involvement of the John F. Kennedy administration, whose advisors strong-armed Birmingham business people. The combination of negative national publicity, declining profits for businesses, and pressure from the rest of the country led to an agreement to desegregate store fitting rooms and lunch counters, remove signs from restrooms and drinking fountains, and to upgrade black employment.

As many as 3,000 blacks had been jailed for their participation in these protests, and their bail was paid by a donation from the United

Auto Workers (UAW) at the behest of President Kennedy. In the face of the possibility of federal involvement, Birmingham government officials eventually desegregated such public facilities as public schools, golf courses, and the library and promised to consider improvement in black employment by the city. However, the hotel that King and Abernathy were staying in was destroyed by a bomb on the day they left town, and the Reverend A. D. King’s home was bombed as well. Later that year, on September 15, 1963, one of the many tragedies of the civil rights movement occurred when a bomb at the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham killed Addie Mae Collins, Denise McNair, Carole Robertson, and Cynthia Wesley, four young girls who were attending Sunday school. At least twenty other people were injured, many of them children. King delivered a eulogy at the services held for them.

March on Washington and the Civil Rights Act of 1964

On Wednesday, August 28, 1963 members of the civil rights movement held a March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom organized by veteran civil rights leader and former Pullman porter A. Philip Randolph. The purpose of the rally was to make a show of solidarity in order to assist the passage of the civil rights bill that was before Congress. In addition to the movie stars and entertainers present at the march, there were civil rights leaders, labor leaders, and members of the clergy. It was at this event, attended by more than 200,000 people and receiving massive media coverage, that King cemented his spiritual and symbolic national leadership of the civil rights movement in general when, at the end of the day, he delivered his “I Have a Dream” speech. King’s speech differed from all the other speeches that day in its vision and optimism.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was finally passed under President Lyndon B. Johnson, although it had been initiated under President John F. Kennedy, who was assassinated in November of 1963. The year 1964 was also marked by King becoming the youngest person ever to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. King was more in demand than ever, and his busy schedule of travel and speeches left him sick and exhausted. Indeed, he was hospitalized when the news of the prize came.

Mississippi, Voting Rights, and Compromise

For King, the entire country became his operating theater, although his focus for change was in the South. One of the fissures that appeared between the SCLC and the SNCC was the result of King's perceived siding with politicians following Freedom Summer in 1964. The object of the campaign in Mississippi was to register blacks to vote. Largely under the direction of the SNCC and leader Bob Moses, and using many college students from Northern states, those participating in Freedom Summer not only organized blacks in communities for voting and conducted Freedom Schools for young people, they also organized an alternative party, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), and elected delegates to the upcoming Democratic National Presidential Convention to be held in Atlantic City in the fall. This was a direct challenge to the segregated Democratic Party.

However, Mississippi was intolerant of any changes that involved parity of blacks and whites, and its white citizens did not hesitate to use violence to maintain the status quo. This wanton attitude toward violent solutions became clear after the assassination of Medgar Evers in 1963, a number of black church burnings, and the murder with the help of legal law enforcement officers of three civil rights workers – James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner. These murders and the discovery of their bodies in an earthen dam, along with the bodies of black men who had been reported missing over the years, set off riots all over the country. King and other civil rights leaders were called upon to quell the unrest.

However, King lost face with the younger members of the movement when he accepted a compromise at the Democratic National Convention. The Convention agreed to seat two of the MFDP members as at-large members, along with the entire delegation of the all-white Mississippi Democratic state party. This compromise was brought about in order to make sure that President Johnson received support from the Southern delegations. The deed was accomplished by Hubert Humphrey and Walter Mondale. King, Bayard Rustin, and James Farmer of CORE agreed to the compromise. SNCC and MFDP delegates themselves disagreed with the compromise. After President Johnson won reelection,

he pushed through the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that reinforced the 15th Amendment, guaranteeing the right to vote to all American citizens. King and the older civil rights leaders had been practical in their support of the compromise, but the younger members saw their actions as capitulation to the political powers that be.

Selma and the Push for Voting Rights

It was not an accident that the next major campaign undertaken by the SCLC concerned the push for voting rights. Seventy percent of African Americans in the South who were eligible to vote were kept from registering to vote by a variety of ploys, including outright use of physical force. King and others wanted to encourage the passage of a Voting Rights Act that would ensure the ability of blacks to register and vote. The SCLC chose Selma, Alabama as the location of its voting rights campaign, which began following the election in January 1965, once again in conjunction with the SNCC. The campaign started out badly when King and his group registered at a previously segregated hotel, and King was attacked by a white man identified with a segregationist group. Nevertheless King was able to secure a room there.

The plan in Selma was to send blacks to the courthouse to register to vote. After organizing a march from the courthouse to Brown Chapel, King was arrested for marching without a permit. In the wake of thousands of arrests in Selma, King continued to lead the demonstrators, but they were met with police violence resulting in the shooting to death of a young man, Jimmy Lee Jackson. These confrontations with the local sheriff ultimately led to the idea of a long march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama (the state capitol) in order to alert Governor George Wallace of the police brutality the group had encountered in Selma, but the governor sent down an edict that the march was not to take place. The march took place anyway on Sunday, March 7, 1965, but King was not present because he had returned to Atlanta to conduct the Sunday services at his own church. The 500 marchers were confronted with armed police on horseback, who used whips and clubs to subdue the marchers, and it was all broadcast nationwide. The day became known as Bloody Sunday.

King then organized another march following the same route, but added to the local demonstrators were clergy from all over the country. As 1,500 protestors marched the following Tuesday with King in the lead, the police were again present and blocking their way. King's choice was to turn back, and this decision demoralized a good number of the participants, including SNCC leaders. Some have identified this and later events as the turning point in the movement away from moderate protest to more radical protest and the abandonment of non-violence and the embrace of Black Power. In addition, a white Unitarian minister, James Reeb, one of the marchers, was murdered. In response to this violence, President Johnson immediately began working for the adoption of a Voting Rights Act. Eventually, King and thousands of demonstrators were able to complete the walk from Selma to Montgomery under the eyes of the federalized Alabama National Guard on Sunday, March 21, 1965. Although Governor Wallace refused to accept the petition for voting rights that King delivered to the capital on March 25, the rally of 25,000 people, including many entertainers, was a symbolic triumph.

Shift to Broader Issues

Because the civil rights movement and the tactics of King and the SCLC were really aimed at dismantling the system of legal segregation in the South, and because of the different racial histories of the North and the South, King had almost no success outside of the South, although he became the symbol of the quest for rights for African Americans all over the country and served as a kind of elder spokesman for the black community. King realized, however, that blacks in other parts of the country had problems equally as compelling as those in the South; namely, unfair housing practices, unfair employment practices, police brutality, and poverty.

The city of Chicago had been one of the chief destinations of blacks leaving the South during the great migration at the beginning of the twentieth century. One of the main problems that Chicago blacks faced in the mid-twentieth century was discriminatory housing policies. King's attempt to call attention to and solve the housing problems in Chicago met with resistance from both white city fathers and black

officeholders. His increasingly heavy schedule meant that he could not devote the time to this project that it called for, nor did he have the same kind of constituencies that he found in the South. Indeed, King underestimated the nature of the problem in Chicago.

Nevertheless, King began with a huge symbolic gesture – an address to 35,000 people and a march to City Hall to present a list of demands to city officials. At that time, Chicago was run by Mayor Richard Daley, a democratic politician with an extremely long incumbency. King's demands were not as simple as requesting that people be allowed to exercise their rights. They included such broad issues as an end to the *de facto* school segregation that was largely the result of housing patterns, as well as budget increases for schools, mass transit, and public housing. King rented an apartment in a depressed area and was appalled at its condition, but he was so busy that he spent very little time there. He had to contend with summer riots that ignited almost spontaneously, causing him to make pleas for peace. His marches through Chicago's ethnic neighborhoods stirred up resentment, and efforts to negotiate resulted in promises officials that members of SNCC and CORE considered vacuous. Once again, the rift between King's moderate, non-violent stance and the increasing radicalism of other parts of the civil rights movement grew.

Eventually, King also became interested in the anti-war and labor movements. On April 4, 1967 he spoke out against the Vietnam War for the first time and continued to address the cause of peace in the days to come. In 1968 the SCLC decided to address the problem of poverty in the United States and planned the Poor People's Campaign to be held in April to dramatize the plight of so many Americans, black and white, and to push for some sort of relief of their plight. But before that campaign could be realized, King and his advisors decided that the SCLC should go to Memphis, Tennessee to support the sanitation workers there in their quest for recognition of their union and for wage and benefit increases. A strike and an injunction against demonstrations by the strikers meant a confrontation between the workers and city officials. Once again, King's involvement in a demonstration brought him into conflict with young people who were impatient with non-violence and engaged in looting. King's response

was to hold another demonstration exhibiting the discipline of non-violence in order to legitimate the demonstration.

When King returned to Memphis on April 3, he addressed a crowd of 2,000 people, giving his “I Have Been to the Mountaintop” speech, which some considered to be prophetic of the events that followed. On April 4, 1968, the day after the speech, Martin Luther King, Jr. was shot dead outside of his motel room in Memphis. He was 39. The news of King’s death brought riots in cities across the United States. Ironically, after King’s death (and probably because of it), the sanitation workers in Memphis settled their strike by reaching favorable terms with city officials.

King’s funeral was held at the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, Georgia, attended by some 60,000 people. His body was then transported by mule and wooden cart to Morehouse College for a eulogy read by Reverend Benjamin Mays. King is buried at the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center, which was founded by Coretta Scott King as a memorial to his life and work.

By the end of his life, King had been arrested and jailed at least thirty times. He wrote six books and won numerous prizes, honorary degrees, and awards. Following his death, many cities, streets, buildings, and public facilities were named after him. In 1986 Martin Luther King, Jr. Day became a national holiday.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; Evers, Medgar (1925–1963); Freedom Rides; Freedom Summer; Meredith, James (b. 1933); Non-Violent Movements: Foundations and Early Expressions; Parks, Rosa (1913–2005) and the Montgomery Bus Boycott; Randolph, A. Philip (1889–1979); Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

References and Suggested Readings

- Abernathy, R. D. (1989) *And the Walls Came Tumbling Down*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Branch, T. (1988) *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954–63*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Branch, T. (1998) *Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years 1963–65*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Branch, T. (2006) *At Canaan’s Edge: America in the King Years 1965–68*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Burns, S. (2004) *To the Mountaintop: Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Sacred Mission to Save America, 1955–1968*. New York: Harper San Francisco.
- Dierenfield, B. J. (2004) *The Civil Right Movement*. London: Pearson Education.

- Fairclough, A. (1987) *To Redeem the Soul of America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr.* Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Garrow, D. J. (1986) *Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference*. New York: William Morrow.
- Garrow, D. J. (Ed.) (1989) *We Shall Overcome: The Civil Rights Movement in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s*. 3 Vols. New York: Carlson.
- Honey, M. K. (2007) *Going Down Jericho Road: The Memphis Strike, Martin Luther King’s Last Campaign*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Jackson, T. F. (2007) *From Civil Right to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Struggle for Economic Justice*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Kirk, J. A. (2005) *Martin Luther King, Jr.* London: Pearson Longman.
- Kotz, N. (2005) *Judgment Days: Lyndon Baines Johnson, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Laws that Changed America*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Nojeim, M. J. (2004) *Gandhi and King: The Power of Nonviolent Resistance*. Westport, CN: Praeger.

Knights of Labor and Terence Powderly (1849–1924)

Stacy Warner Maddern

The Noble and Holy Order of the Knights of Labor, established in 1869, found prominence in the United States during the 1890s and was an important working-class institution in the late nineteenth-century American labor movement. In 1869 Uriah S. Stephens led a small group of tailors in forming the Knights as a forum of discussion that sought to end child and convict labor, while advocating equal pay for women, progressive income taxes, and a cooperative setting of an employer–employee ownership industry.

Stephens envisioned the Knights as a “brotherhood of toil” open to every laborer, mechanic, and artisan who wanted to improve his mind and condition. Their primary goal was to educate wageworkers on the nobility of labor and the evils of the present wages system. The Knights became the direct descendent of the Nation Labor Union, continuing those traditions of reforming labor during the Jacksonian era.

In 1879 Stephens stepped down as leader and was replaced by Terence V. Powderly. Powderly

was an idealist and a reformer. His sympathy for the underdog and constant desire to alleviate the conditions of the oppressed and the unfortunate made him an ideal leader for the Knights. The son of immigrant working-class parents and a laborer himself, he witnessed the devastating effects of an economy that emphasized material gain over principles of humanity. Under his leadership, membership of the Knights expanded and became more public.

The Knights changed the outlook of labor unions by serving as a counter-vision of cooperation. Pledges of equality and social responsibility resulted in economic and cultural solidarity extending beyond any given class or corporate interest. They discouraged strikes, which Powderly described as “a relic of barbarism,” preferring instead to exert pressure on employers through alternative means such as boycotting. The Knights also attempted to break “the walls of prejudice” by bringing large numbers of skilled and unskilled African American workers into what was a predominantly white labor movement. Estimates from 1886 suggest that out of a total membership exceeding 700,000, there were no less than 60,000 African American members.

In 1869 employers began importing cheap labor from Europe, inspiring a great flow of immigrants into the United States and driving wage rates down, especially in cases involving strikes. Along with other labor organizations the Knights supported the US Congress in passing the Contract Labor Law in 1885, along with the Chinese Exclusion Act to further restrict the number of immigrants into America. The Knights’ position was merely to protect the American working class. Powderly held that “corporate greed alone” was the factor most “responsible for the sweeping tide of immigration now flowing upon us.”

Powderly moved that the Knights spread into Europe in order to achieve global solidarity among all working classes. This was particularly in respect to the large influx of window glass workers in Europe, who in great numbers had immigrated to America. The Knights began to investigate why so many had come to America and accepted contracts for less than the current wages. Their main interest was to establish closer lines of communication between America and the old country in order to protect the interest of all window glass workers. This effort remains

a unique example of unifying a working class while ignoring national borders.

The strength of the Knights was their ability to tap into any and all segments of society. They were able to present themselves as a sociopolitical alternative to powerful political parties and corporate culture. However, by 1890 the order would see its international efforts decline, while their membership at home fell to fewer than 100,000. The decline began as early as 1886 as animosity between the Knights and organized trade unions started to rise. This clash of distinct and opposing ideologies drew a line through the labor movement, as the Knights sought to organize all workers into one single body, while trade unions wanted to organize workers along trade lines. This created a fundamental fracture in the ultimate objectives of the movement, one that went beyond structural or organizational differences. Each union had separate goals. The Knights’ unification of labor was in pursuit of issues both political and social, whereas the trade unions wanted only to serve as a tool for collective bargaining between worker and employer.

These ideological differences splintered the movement. The Knights continued efforts to abolish the wage system, reform society, and educate the working class. The national trade unions, on the other hand, were left alone in the economic sector, prohibiting the Knights from exercising any control over wages, hours, working conditions, or the process of collective bargaining. Herein, the aspects of trade unionism and reform unionism became separate realities.

In 1893 Terence Powderly was replaced by new leadership, and two years later the Knights’ membership fell to a mere 17,000. With the formation of the American Federation of Labor and the Industrial Workers of the World, the order became virtually non-existent as a labor union by 1917. Their collapse was indicative of larger shortcomings in late nineteenth-century modes of political association. Business enterprise hardened into a nationalist capitalist system and labor adopted wage-consciousness. Those factors were enough to defeat the idealism of collective effort which it sought. In America, labor policies would be determined by politics and the Knights’ attempt to reverse this trend ultimately failed.

SEE ALSO: *Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 1775–1900*

References and Suggested Readings

- Fink, L. (1983) *Workingmen's Democracy: The Knights of Labor and American Politics*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Foner, P. (1955) *History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol. 2: From the Founding of the American Federation of Labor to the Emergence of American Imperialism*. New York: International Publishers.
- Powderly, T. V. (1889) *Thirty Years of Labor, 1859–1889*. New York: Excelsior.

Kollontai, Alexandra (1872–1952)

Alex Zukas

The socialist-feminist Bolshevik revolutionary Alexandra Kollontai, née Domontovich, who held the distinctions of being the first woman cabinet minister and the first woman ambassador in modern history, is more often remembered for raising fundamental questions about sexual intimacy, about the relationship between love and work, and about traditional sexual and social mores that challenged orthodox socialist and feminist thought and practice. Her ideas found little resonance among her socialist and feminist contemporaries, but they became a touchstone for many socialists and feminists who came of age in the 1970s and after.

Born into a liberal upper-class Russian family, Alexandra Domontovich read avidly, became fluent in numerous languages, and developed a strong sense of independence and non-conformity. She spent summers at her grandfather's estate in Finland where she saw firsthand the plight of tenant farmers and farm laborers. In 1888 she passed an exam to become a teacher. She fell in love with a distant relative, Vladimir Kollontai. Her parents disapproved of the match and sent her to Europe where, much to their dismay, she became attracted to Marxism. When she returned she married Kollontai against her parents' wishes. Alexandra witnessed the harsh industrialization of St. Petersburg and became convinced of the importance of working-class revolution. In 1896 she became actively involved in leafleting and fundraising to support a mass strike of female textile workers and for the rest of her political career she maintained close ties to these textile workers.

Always the non-conformist, she left her husband and son in 1898 to pursue life as a student

of Marxism and as a political activist and by 1899 she was active in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) underground. In 1900 her first article on Finland appeared, to be followed by a book three years later investigating the emergence of capitalism in Finland and the condition of the working class there. For the next 20 years she was regarded as the RSDLP's expert on the "Finnish Question." On January 3, 1905 she joined the workers' procession to the Winter Palace which ended in Bloody Sunday, an experience which converted her into a full-time revolutionary holding illegal factory meetings during the Revolution of 1905. An eloquent speaker, she made a tremendous impression on workers, as she would again on a larger scale in 1917. In 1906 and 1907 she attended international conferences of socialist women in Germany sponsored by Clara Zetkin (1857–1933) and hoped, like Zetkin, to develop a proletarian women's movement. From 1905 to 1908 she organized women workers, but in 1908 her work was cut short when she left Russia to avoid arrest for assorted illegal activities. She remained in exile for the next nine years, working as a full-time agitator for the German Social Democratic Party until the outbreak of World War I when she moved to Scandinavia. Her anti-war stance drew her to join the Bolshevik faction of the RSDLP in 1915 and her presence in neutral Scandinavia helped make it a crucial base for Bolshevik agitation. During this period of exile she developed her theories of non-possessive love and erotic friendship that sanctioned the sexual liberation of men and women without regard for the institution of marriage or conventional gender-sexual norms.

Kollontai returned to Russia in March 1917 and sided with Lenin in all Bolshevik disputes in the run-up to the October Revolution and in initiating the revolution itself. She became the first woman elected to the party's Central Committee and the first woman cabinet minister (in charge of public welfare) in modern history. She resigned her post six months later to protest the Brest-Litovsk Treaty which delivered Finland to the white terror. The peak of her political activity, if not her power, came during the civil war (1917–23) when she served as commissar for propaganda in the Ukraine, organized women's conferences in Petrograd, co-founded the Women's Section of the Communist Party (*Zhenotdel*) where she helped draft laws protecting

women, drew women into Soviet life, and promoted women's equality, and she served as vice-president of the International Women's Secretariat of the Communist International. Unhappy with Lenin's New Economic Policy and with the withering of internal party democracy, Kollontai joined the Workers' Opposition, a party faction that was banned with all other factions in 1921. Her time as a Communist Party insider was over.

In the post-revolutionary period (1918–23) her writings on gender and sexual relations continued themes from her exile period: a “comradely union” of equals would replace marriage (which would wither away under communism), children would be raised collectively rather than in families, the idea of illegitimacy in offspring would be banished, restraints on pre- or non-marital sex would be lifted, and freely chosen partners would regard each other with non-possessive love, passion, and consideration. The Bolshevik (later Communist) leadership completely rejected her ideas and by 1923 she was no longer a political or moral force in the Soviet Union. She took diplomatic posts to Norway (1923–5), Mexico (1925–7), Norway (1927–30), and Sweden (1930–45), beginning what many would consider another exile. After 1943 she was ambassador to Sweden, the first woman in the modern world to hold ambassadorial rank. In 1944 she conducted the armistice negotiations that ended hostilities between the Soviet Union and Finland in World War II and for which the Finnish prime minister nominated her for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1946. She was one of the few Old Bolsheviks, and the only major critic of Soviet government, to survive Stalin's purges. She retired to the Soviet Union after World War II, wrote a final set of memoirs, and died in Moscow in 1952.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Leninist Philosophy; Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Women in the Russian Revolution; Women's Movement, Soviet Union; Zetkin, Clara (1857–1933)

References and Suggested Readings

- Carleton, G. (2005) *Sexual Revolution in Bolshevik Russia*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Clements, B. (1997) *Bolshevik Women*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Farnsworth, B. (1980) *Alexandra Kollontai: Socialism, Feminism, and the Russian Revolution*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

Naiman, E. (1996) When a Communist Writes Gothic: Aleksandra Kollantai and the Politics of Disgust. *Signs* 22, 1 (Autumn): 1–29.

Porter, C. (1980) *Alexandra Kollontai: A Biography*. New York: Doubleday.

Korea, civic movement

Won Young-su

In the early 1990s, while many radicals were disillusioned by the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new movement appeared in Korea that began to distance itself from the existing left and radical movements, criticizing the militancy and violence. This move crystallized in the birth of the “civic movement.” This movement depoliticized to an extent and confined itself to legal activities, keeping distance from other popular movements and focusing on a petition campaign for political and economic reform. Because of the movement's less radical appearance, both the mainstream media and the government regarded it as a civil junior partner. However, these civic groups were not completely depoliticized, in spite of their public image. They led a series of political campaigns, such as electoral watch campaigns and blacklist campaigns for corrupt politicians, thereby causing strong reactions from conservatives.

The movement began to lose momentum after the turn of the century and was fraught with various internal problems. First, its support base and membership remained weak. Even the largest civic groups had to be dependent upon external finance and were thus vulnerable to corruption, which in turn hurt the movement's image. Secondly, many civic leaders joined political parties, disrupting the image of political neutrality. Compounding this problem, some civic leaders not only supported the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun regimes, but also accepted government posts. In more than a few cases, they even supported neoliberal reforms and criticized the labor and popular movement.

After its existence for almost two decades, the civic movement's role and function thus became ambiguous. Historically, it was born out of the radical popular movement, but distanced from it. Thus, in spite of its success in various experiments with liberal reforms, it remained politically

and organizationally weak. It needed closer links with popular movements yet alienated popular movements by trying to influence them.

Overall, the civic movement generally succeeded in securing the space created by the popular struggles in the 1980s, but it failed to substitute the popular movement as an alternative force. The unexpected, though limited, success of the socialist Democratic Labor Party (founded in 2000) and the subsistence of popular movements put some limitation on the scope of the civic movement. Also, the alliance with institutional politics brought into question the legitimacy of the civic movement. Furthermore, because of its criticism of statism, the civil movement repeatedly showed an ambiguous attitude toward anti-worker, anti-popular neoliberal reforms.

SEE ALSO: Korea, Labor Movement, 20th Century; Korea, Post-World War II Popular Movements for Democracy; Korea, Protest against Neoliberal Globalization

References and Suggested Readings

- Cho, H. (1993) *Contemporary Social Movement and Organization in Korea*. Seoul: Han-ul.
- Hart-Landsberg, M. (1993) *The Rush to Development: Economic Change and Political Struggle in South Korea*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Korea, labor movement, 20th century

Won Young-su

The formation of an independent and democratic labor union in post-World War II Korea posed a great challenge. Labor advocates were forced to deal with recalcitrant and often violent capital at the factory level, while also facing government hostility and institutional violence. Even the labor wing focused on anti-communism in the far-right Cold War political climate under South Korea's first president, Rhee Syng-man, who used labor for his own political interests. After that, General Park Chung Hee took over and dissolved the National Assembly in 1961 and remained president until 1979. His military regime, and that of Chun Du-hwan, who was president from 1980 to 1988, suppressed any move to voice workers' interests. Though a union reform movement

surfaced in the political space created by the 1960 Revolution, efforts to build an alternative labor federation failed because of the military regime's suppression. Only anti-communist official trade unions, such as the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), were legally allowed within the framework fixed by the government directives.

Even in this climate, however, the rapid industrialization and subsequent formation of the working class inevitably caused workers to resort to spontaneous resistance sporadically as class antagonism between labor and capital emerged in the 1970s. Faced with the harsh suppression from military dictatorships, employers, and the official trade union bureaucracy, workers' resistance took two forms: one was an immediate violent response by male blue collar workers, and the other was the democratic trade union movement by female workers in the export-oriented light industries.

Independent Unionism in the 1970s

In the context of the combined development of capitalist industrialization and brutal suppression from the military dictatorship, the spontaneous form of resistance began to turn into a more organized expression of the labor movement. But the starting point of the new labor movement was the self-immolation of a young worker. On November 11, 1970 Chun Tae-il burned himself to death in protest of inhumane conditions for young textile workers in Pyunghwa Market, downtown Seoul. His death symbolized the spontaneous outburst of workers' indignation and signaled the birth of the modern labor movement for independent and democratic unionism. Shock, sympathy, and social anger paved the way for the formation of a new labor movement, different from the official government-controlled unionism. In this context, progressive churches and student activists joined the workers' struggles. Young female workers from rural areas especially began to realize the cause of their miserable conditions and the need for a trade union that would defend their interests and rights.

These new democratic unions fought for their rights against hostile managers and employers, as well as other male colleagues and, usually, against plain-clothes policemen and secret agents hired by employers and planted on the shop floor. Since most of the constitutionally legal actions

were prohibited by decree, young women workers were forced to resort to illegal means of struggle. One of the most striking examples was the struggle of women workers who occupied the opposition party office in protest of the closure of a wig manufacturing factory in the summer of 1979. In the course of brutal suppression, a young worker, Kim Kyung-sook, was killed.

Throughout the 1970s the government remained under the control of a military dictatorship that continued to suppress workers in every possible way, including kidnapping, torture, detainment, threat, and constant propaganda that depicted women workers as puppets controlled by communists. Students, activists, and priests who helped them also faced the same harsh suppression. The democratic union movement that had been initiated by the death of Chun Tae-il formed an important part of the opposition movement against the military dictatorship. Young women workers from export industries under terrible working conditions fought for their human rights and labor rights to organize for their own trade unions. But in spite of their sacrifice, their struggles were mostly confined to individual workplaces, far away from the next round of working-class militancy and radicalization.

The 1970s was a preliminary stage for the full-scale development of the labor movements. Young workers joined trade unions for better wages and humane working conditions, in the process developing a militant stance. A series of spontaneous struggles from these workers paved the way for the next stage of the trade union movement and even stronger anti-dictatorship struggles in the 1980s.

Emergence of a Militant Stance

Kwangju Uprising

On May 15, 1980 over 100,000 students and citizens gathered in front of Seoul Station, demanding the full-scale democratization of Korean society through the abolition of martial law and the elimination of the remnants of the Yushin regime, a government associated with Park's military dictatorship. In response to the uprising, the military conspirators staged another *coup d'état* by expanding martial law to the entire country on May 17 and swiftly arresting most student activists and prominent opposition leaders, including Kim Dae-jung. With the help of the United States military,

the government managed to quell the resistance, killing hundreds of civilians.

The Kwangju uprising and its brutal suppression had a significant impact on the labor movement. To that point, democratic unionism had been focused on workplace issues, mainly economic issues like wages, working conditions, plant closures, and so on. More importantly, it only covered a small section of the working class, mainly female workers from export-oriented light industries like textile, garments, and stuffed toys. The experience of Kwangju awakened the political consciousness of the labor movement, leading it to recognize the military dictatorship as its enemy and to look for the fundamental cause of the contradictions of capitalism. This gave the movement new direction and orientation for the future.

Aftermath of Kwangju and Labor in the 1980s

In the spring of 1980, after the military dictatorship collapsed, there were new attempts to revitalize the trade union movement. There were hundreds of strikes and occupations around the country, and a very strong move to reform the official union, FKTU, but soon workers were faced with another abrupt military coup. In the aftermath of the Kwangju uprising, the new military regime suppressed all the opposition, targeting student and popular movements, especially the democratic unions.

The Chun Doo-hwan regime, which had assumed power just before the uprising, reacted to Kwangju by attacking the labor movement on various levels. In the course of a so-called purification campaign, many union leaders were arrested together with gangsters and other criminals and sent to concentration camps. In addition to this physical violence and the union closures, the new military leaders revised the labor law, dismantling industrial unions and reorganizing them into company-based trade unions. This measure was meant to uproot labor resistance and democratic unionism by making it almost impossible to form a trade union at the workplace.

In the early 1980s, though most of the democratic trade unions were destroyed by the military regime, activists began efforts to revitalize the labor movement. Thus, workers and union activists, most of whom were expelled from their workplaces because of a blacklist, began to get involved in labor support groups. More significantly, student activists turned to the oppressed

people with the firm conviction that under harsh exploitation the working class would rise to lead the struggles for social and political revolution. In this situation the student movement recovered its organizational capacity. Students vigorously organized campus and street protests, confronting riot police at the risk of being imprisoned or sent to forced military service. With the growing militancy of student protests, labor activists – especially former student activists – began to focus on labor struggles.

Thus, the mid-1980s witnessed a series of important struggles. In June 1985 the nine trade unions in Kuro industrial complex in southern Seoul went on a joint strike in protest of the oppression of democratic unions. This action was the fruit of the labor struggles in the early 1980s and a monumental battle for the revolutionary labor movement. The May struggle in Incheon in 1986, in which student and labor activists converged at the opposition party's rally, symbolized the new phenomenon of worker-student alliance; however, it failed to organize the workers in large plants, where oppressive control by the state and capital was focused, with the exception of the successful strike at Daewoo Motors in 1985.

Daewoo Motors Workers' Struggle

Daewoo Motors was one of the big three auto makers, and it had a yellow union – a company union controlled by the corporation. In the early 1980s some former student activists who were employed there began in-plant organizing activities. In 1984 at the union delegates election, out of 22, 12 were democratic delegates. They challenged the collaborationist leadership, forming a commission to normalize the trade union. In the face of pressure from below, the union declared a strike on April 16 and remained on strike for six days. The management attempted to divide the workers, but failed as workers occupied the Technology Center building, armed with sticks to defend themselves from the police. Daewoo President Kim Woo-jung eventually accepted most of the workers' demands. After the strike, however, the police arrested eight strike leaders and the company dismissed one worker, imposed "voluntary resignation" on three workers, and disciplined four others with three-month suspensions.

In spite of this sacrifice of activists, the victory of the strike had a significance for the labor movement. It inspired workers in other plants and put

the government's wage guideline policy under scrutiny. Also, the active role of former student activists in organizing a strike provided an exemplary model for other activists to follow in their in-plant activities.

Kuro Solidarity Strike

Kuro Industrial Complex was a symbol of the rapid industrialization of South Korea. Hundreds of factories were concentrated in the complex, mostly labor-intensive industries like electronics and textiles. Most workers were young women from the countryside. They lived in factory dormitories with poor facilities, or in nearby small apartments called bee-hives or chicken cages. From the early 1980s many activists sought jobs there and began to organize workers. In the mid-1980s a few trade unions were formed and developed joint activities among new union leaders and activists. These organizing drives were led by former unionists of the 1970s and student-turned-worker activists.

In 1985 the Daewoo Apparel Company union had finished a collective bargaining after 40 days' negotiation, but after the wage struggle was over the police arrested three union leaders for their two all-night sit-in struggles. At this news the union leaders of nearby factories like Hyosung, Sunil Textile, and Karibong Electronics decided to initiate a solidarity strike for the arrested colleagues. They recognized that the arrest was not just against a single union, but a signal for a series of prepared labor repressions. On June 25 the workers in nearby factories like Namsung Electronic, Sejin Electronic, and Rom Korea joined the solidarity strike. On June 26 opposition groups started a sit-in in support of the Kuro strike, and that evening a street demonstration was organized around the Kuro area. In this way the struggle spread to the factories in other areas. However, on June 29 the Daewoo Apparel management, in collaboration with the police force, sent hired thugs to occupied buildings, destroying workers' sit-in camps.

The historic six-day Kuro strike was joined by 2,500 workers in ten trade unions. Solidarity was expressed by the all-plant strike, work to rule, lunch rejection, solidarity statements, sit-ins, and street demonstrations. In the course of this struggle, 43 were imprisoned, 38 legally charged, 47 held in custody, and more than 700 dismissed or forced to resign. The Kuro solidarity strike signified the new development of militant

unionism that dared to confront state power, pursuing the combination of economic and political struggle.

These battles, combined with turn-to-industry tactics, paved the way for the massive explosion of workers' struggles in July 1987. At the same time, the increasing militancy of politically awakened workers caused a fierce debate on the orientation and tactics of the labor movement. In spite of the confusion and excessive polemics, the militancy of the worker-student alliance in this period set the basic framework of the popular movement in general, and the political terrain of the labor and student movement in the 1980s.

1987 Hot Summer: Great Workers' Struggle

In spite of the huge increase in labor productivity in the 1980s, workers continued to experience relative poverty because of the ever-increasing gap between improved productivity and real wages. In this situation workers' discontent reached boiling point, but the labor control policies of the military regime suppressed the explosion of workers' anger. However, in early 1987 the illegitimacy of the military regime and its political crisis led to the June Uprising, forcing it into retreat. Thus, from July onwards, in the newly created political space, workers took to unprecedented massive struggles to fight for their rights and dignity.

From June 29 to October 31, workers went on 3,225 strikes with an average of 44 strikes per day. This wave of strikes began on July 5 when Hyundai Engine workers formed a trade union and struck in Ulsan, the biggest industrial city dominated by Hyundai chaebol. This was the first of subsequent strike waves for three months. The wave spread from the southeastern industrial belt in Ulsan, Masan, and Changwon, via big cities like Busan, Kwangju, Daegu, and Daejeon, and finally to Seoul. This huge wave of strikes passed through three stages and had an enormous impact on plants and factories all over the country. The first stage was initiated by workers in Ulsan, where Hyundai Engine workers fought for the right to form a trade union, and the workers in another Hyundai subsidiary, Mipo Shipbuilding, joined the unionization drive. The management attempt to block unionization provoked workers' anger, triggering an unprecedented explosion of working-class struggle.

The second stage of escalation was initiated by the formation of an association of trade unions

in Hyundai Group, the strike of Daewoo Shipbuilding on August 8. Massive street protests of over 40,000 Hyundai workers symbolized the escalation of labor militancy. And the death of a Daewoo shipbuilding worker, Lee Seok-gyu, killed by a tear-gas bomb, ignited workers' anger even further. In the third week of August alone, there were 880 strikes and 113 new trade unions were formed. The strike wave spread over the whole country, covering all industries, all sectors, and all local areas and regions.

The regime met this huge wave with a third stage of repression. On August 28, the funeral day of martyr Lee Seok-gyu, the police interrupted the funeral rally, arrested 993, and imprisoned 67. On the same day, the prime minister publicized "the statement for elimination of left pro-communist forces," and on September 4 riot police were sent to the sit-in camps of Daewoo Motors and Hyundai Heavy Industry, and 95 and 40 workers, respectively, were arrested. The next day the government launched a massive anti-worker campaign, with the employers' federation and their media. Thus, the strike wave began to subside.

Though the vast strike wave subsided, the hot summer of 1987 completely changed the Korean working class and society as a whole. The anger which had accumulated for more than three decades finally exploded, signaling the emergence of the working class in the proper sense of the word. It was the biggest mass struggle since the Korean War, and three months of struggle leapt over the dark age of three decades.

In these struggles the demands of workers were to guarantee a basic livelihood and labor rights, to abolish the repressive personnel management system, to guarantee trade union-building and free activities, to conclude collective bargaining, and to democratize yellow unions. Their organizing drives attempted to go beyond particular plants so as to organize different forms of joint struggles by region, industry, and chaebol groups, covering not just manufacture workers, but also diverse service workers.

In spite of its vast significance, the strike wave had some limitations of spontaneity, usually confined to a factory or a given region and mainly focused on economic demands. Thus, these spontaneous struggles were rather distant from radicalization, with little experience and weak organizational capacity. Despite such limitations, the Hot Summer of 1987 signified a new start for

a radicalized mass movement of the South Korean working class as a whole.

Labor Radicalization: Second Generation of Democratic Unionism

After the labor upsurge of 1987 the terrain of the movement and its relationship with the state and capital changed considerably as the newly formed democratic trade union movement established itself as a social and political force representing the working class. This historic process of building democratic unionism is divided into three periods or stages of development. The first period, from late 1987 to 1988, saw the formation of democratic unionism. The second, from 1989 to 1992, included the consolidation of democratic unions in the face of state repression. Finally, between 1993 and 1995 the regional, industrial, and group organizations merged to form the new KCTU.

Formation of Democratic Unionism (1987–1988)

In this formative period of independent unionism there emerged 1,361 new unions with 220,000 new members in 1987. Union membership increased dramatically from 1,036,000 in 2,675 unions in 1986 to 1,932,000 in 7,883 unions in 1989, covering research institutions, hospitals, construction, newspapers, broadcasting, hotels, and public enterprises, as well as chaebol enterprises that had been anti-union fortresses. In this period, workers' efforts were focused mainly on economic issues like wage increases and the improvement of working conditions, and building a trade union to defend their interests. Where there was already a trade union the priority was to change the corrupt leadership. Many won their struggles, but they were inexperienced in maintaining trade unions. These struggles were also confined to each plant and factory. Awakened by struggles and realizing the power of their unity, they expanded their activities for solidarity and class cooperation. Thus, around 1990, the new independent unions got together in different forms, and they were organized nationally at three levels: regional organizations, industrial organizations, and chaebol group organizations.

An important feature of the newly born independent unionism was its diversity in scope

and composition. Usually, blue collar workers formed the backbone of the labor movement, but in this formative period various white collar workers also joined the unionization drive. One of the most striking examples was the teachers' union in 1989. Upset with poor educational conditions and stale bureaucratism, many teachers wanted to build their own trade union for educational reform. Through a successful organizing drive the teacher union was formed, but the government prohibited rank and file teachers from joining, and 1,527 teachers were dismissed for their union membership.

Another important feature in the formation of the new labor movement was the convergence of labor militants and organizers, mostly former student activists. The formation of the National Association of Labor Movement Organizations (NALMO) signified the completion of a nationwide network of militant labor activists outside of trade unions. It played a key role in the founding of the militant KTUC, or Jeonnohyeop. The former student activists in NALMO got involved in the newly formed trade unions, assisting their practical activities, such as routine operations, holding rallies, and devising tactics, propaganda, and educational agendas. Many activists also began to work as trade union officials at different levels. NALMO was a loose coalition of different tendencies from nationalist to left-wing groups. On the issue of a political party it was divided, and as the trade unions as a mass organization grew, the role of activists outside the official framework of the unions lessened. Thus, in the mid-1990s, NALMO was gradually marginalized.

Consolidation of Democratic Trade Unions Under State Violence (1989–1992)

From the Workers' Great Struggle of 1987 the working class waged a resolute fight for livelihoods and better working conditions, while at the same time organizing a movement to build democratic unions independent of the state and capital. These trade unions pursued unity and solidarity with other workers by regional or occupational base. As a result of these efforts, in January 1990 the Korean Trade Union Congress (KTUC, Jeonnohyeop) was formed as the national peak organization of independent, democratic, and militant trade unionism. In the initial stage of networking and solidarity after the 1987 struggle, activists had a serious debate on long-term

perspectives, strategy, and tactics. One crucial issue was whether to build a separate organization from the FKTU or to initiate a reform drive within the framework of the FKTU.

The KTUC represented the victorious outcome of the 1987 workers' struggle organizationally, and the emergence of a full-grown labor movement politically. The slogans of the KTUC – "Build an equalitarian society!" and "Achieve working-class emancipation!" – demonstrated the political orientation of the new labor movement, even though it could not express its socialism explicitly because of the notorious National Security Law, which made communism illegal. The KTUC led the working-class struggle in most regions and staged a political struggle against the dictatorship. Though less militant white collar workers and some trade unions of chaebol companies did not join the KTUC in fear of expected government suppression, the KTUC formed a labor front with other unions and led various working-class struggles.

Inevitably, the KTUC became the arch-enemy of the Roh Tae-woo regime (1988–92) and the government constantly harassed and suppressed the union by all possible means. In fact, after a short span of hypocritical neutrality, the Roh Tae-woo government declared a war on the working class in the name of "war against crimes" in December 1989. In this brutal assault, thousands of leaders were arrested, imprisoned, and pursued, while attacks and searches of the KTUC national office and regional offices were everyday routine. In the face of incessant harassment and attacks from the state and capital, as well as ideological and psychological bombardment, the number of affiliated unions and membership under the KTUC was halved by the end of 1991. Thus, in spite of its militancy and independence, the KTUC began to lose its influence, slowly becoming isolated. At the same time, it dealt with internal dissention over militancy as democratic trade unions turned toward moderation.

On the other hand, white collar workers also organized into a separate federation of occupational unions, reflecting different social and working conditions from those of blue collar workers. In May 1990 they formed their own organization, the Korean Council of Industrial Trade Union Federations. This white collar organization was a loose coalition compared with the KTUC, forming the moderate wing of the

democratic unionism that was not resolute in terms of the separation from the framework of the FKTU. In this context the KCTU failed to develop further, and its organizational goal of building industrial unions could not be completed. Numerically, the KTUC represented less than one-tenth of the total organized workers, and most of the members were in medium- and small-sized factories, though a few trade unions in big enterprises were KTUC members or at least worked closely with it. Therefore, the major task of the labor movement – the unity of all the democratic trade unions under a national organization and the building of industrial unions beyond the company union system – was not realized. However, in spite of the suppressions, internal disputes, and failures, the KTUC played a leading role in the struggle as a symbol of working-class militancy and new democratic unionism in the 1990s.

Founding the KCTU (1992–1995)

During the early days of the Kim Young-sam regime (1993–7), a series of reform measures raised workers' hopes, and the labor movement experienced a temporary lull, especially since the new leader promised autonomy in industrial relations. However, the government implemented a wage control policy to overcome recession, and workers rapidly gave up any expectations they had of the government. In this situation the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), which had functioned as a yellow union under the military regimes, concluded an agreement with the Korean Employers Federation (KEF) to suppress wage increases. This was regarded by many unionists as a betrayal to the working class, and many member unions joined the campaign to refuse to pay union dues. In June 1993 the regime abandoned its principle of autonomy, resorting to labor oppression by sending riot police to suppress the Hyundai workers' strike.

Meanwhile, the KTUC, the Federation of Hyundai Group Trade Unions, and the Council of Large Enterprise Trade Unions, all opposed to the FKTU, formed the Korean Congress of Trade Union Representatives (KCTUR, Jeonnodaee), covering more than 400,000 members. The formation of the KCTUR was a big step forward in terms of national unity of the democratic union movement, in that it succeeded in uniting the once-scattered democratic unions into a unified organizational framework,

even though it was, at this stage, still little more than a coalition of the leaders.

Then the FKTU once again made a deal with the KEF on wage control, triggering the anger of its union members and leading to a widespread disaffiliation campaign. This incident boosted the democratic union movement, and the 1994–5 struggles for collective wage negotiations were carried out in a much more organized manner, with the workers organizing solidarity struggles and coordinating their strike schedules. Based on this heightened solidarity, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU, Minjunochong) was established in November 1995. It was initiated by KCTUR member unions and became the national headquarters of the democratic union movement, encompassing 500,000 members.

The establishment of the KCTU showed that the democratic union movement had grown into a strong force to be reckoned with, and that the democratic unions had finally achieved unity, which was the cherished dream of the democratic labor camp since the Hot Summer of 1987. However, the birth of the KCTU came with a high price: the militant elements of the democratic union movement, who had dreamt of uniting all democratic unions under the flag of KTUC (Jeonnohyeop), lost the internal power struggle and the revolutionary and militant trend, called the Jeonnohyeop spirit, was significantly weakened. As a result, it was Kwon Young-gil, a journalist union leader and initiator of the moderate trend within the democratic union movement, who became the first president of the newly launched KCTU.

As the KCTU was launched under the hegemony of the moderate wing, its orientation and methods showed new characteristics distinct from those of Jeonnohyeop, whose revolutionary orientation had been expressed in its slogans “Labor emancipation” and “Fighting for an equal society.” In contrast, the political orientation of the first KCTU leadership can be summarized in its slogan “A labor movement that moves with the people.” This was the general political line pursued by the first KCTU leadership, characterized by renunciation of a revolutionary orientation, pursuit of reform within the established system, acceptance of capitalist ideologies (such as national competitiveness and enhancement of productivity), advocacy of inter-class compromise, and a shift towards the

civil movement model. This trend was not something that was created overnight with the inauguration of the Kwon Young-gil leadership; it was an extension of the rationale of “labor movement reforms” adopted by the critics of Jeonnohyeop’s revolutionary and militant activism in the early 1990s. The reason this reform-oriented line was established as the general strategy of the first KCTU leadership was that with the expansion of the democratic union movement there was considerable participation from unionists with middle-class consciousness, who came to gain a greater say within the movement.

Major Labor Struggles, Early 1990s

The militancy and organizational strength of the new democratic unionism allowed it to overcome the challenges it faced and consolidate its forces. Capitalists and government attempted to coopt militant leaders or destroy their unions, but workers defended their unions in spite of potential death, imprisonment, lynching, and legal action.

Initially, manufacturing workers in large plants led militant struggles in industrial bases like Ulsan, Masan, and Changwon, joined by workers in medium and small companies. Soon, white collar workers in banks and financial institutions, broadcasting companies, offices, and government subsidiaries joined the unionization drive. Shipbuilding workers in Hyundai Heavy Industry and Daewoo Shipbuilding, and auto workers in Hyundai Motors, Kia Motors, and Daewoo Motors, led the major confrontations. The subway and railway workers led unprecedented strikes, but the sit-in camps were attacked and most strike leaders were imprisoned. The government firmly sided with management. Many strikes were declared illegal and most of the successful strikes ended in massive arrests of leaders. Thus, labor law revision in the interest of workers became one of the major demands of democratic unions.

Democratic trade unions resisted and fought back despite incessant provocation and legal and physical attack. In this formative period workers were militant in struggles and tactics. In time of strikes, workers occupied plants and factories. They also organized self-defense units, consciousness-raising programs such as lectures and cultural activities, and strike and solidarity rallies. At local and regional levels, solidarity

strikes were not uncommon, and rallies usually ended in physical confrontation with riot police. Thus, from workplace to national level, workers' struggles and organizing formed the basic framework of trade unions and their activities, thereby consolidating democratic unionism in the face of the class-collaborationist yellow trade unions of the FKTU.

Labor's Response to the Neoliberal Offensive

At the end of 1993 the Kim Young-sam government began to emphasize globalization and international competitiveness as the core of its policies. As part of this shift to neoliberalism the government launched the Commission for Industrial Relations Reform in April 1996. The immediate purpose of the commission was to prepare for the revision of labor laws dealing with "individual" industrial relations. This attempt to revise labor laws was the first neoliberal offensive against the working class. The KCTU leadership decided to join the commission in hopes of gaining legal status. Contrary to its promises, however, the government rushed the bill through the assembly, passing revised labor laws and secret agency laws that were worse than before, and leaving no room for concessions. The KCTU leadership, which had been heading towards compromise with the government, was forced to launch a general strike immediately.

General Strike 1996–1997

The general strike in the winter of 1996–7 was another turning point for the Korean labor movement. In the early 1990s, in the face of workers' anger and fierce resistance, capital and the state was forced to retreat, but in the context of the neoliberal turn the government strove to divert the gains won by workers and attempted to revise labor laws in the interest of international capital. Workers, however, demanded the revision of labor laws in their own interest, since the greater part of the laws were so outmoded and old-fashioned that they were meaningless.

On December 26, 1996, under orders from President Kim Young-sam, legislators gathered to pass the revised version of the labor laws and the national security agency law in the absence of the opposition party. At the news of this abrupt provocation workers immediately began a nationwide general strike. The first phase

occurred between December 26, 1996 and January 2, 1997, when the KCTU organized massive rallies that included hundreds of thousands of workers. Then, between January 3 and 14, the strike spread. The height of the strike occurred January 15–19, and the final consummation took place from January 20 to March 10.

The government was shocked at the scale of the strike and tried to coopt the FKTU to create the image of industrial peace by isolating the militant workers' struggle. However, FKTU leaders also joined the struggle, visiting Myung-dong Cathedral where the KCTU leadership remained in sit-ins. The joint struggle of KCTU and FKTU drove the government onto the defensive. It agreed to cancel the labor law revision and to revise it again. The leadership of the general strike then decided to change tactics, which caused confusion among strikers and angered militant workers. On February 27 the KCTU organized the last strike, with 131,448 workers from 107 unions. In March the government submitted the revised bill to the National Congress. Though the general strike hit the government hard, and workers won an important victory, the result was rather limited considering the scope and impact of the strike. According to KCTU statistics, 531 trade unions with 404,054 workers joined the strike more than once, while the total number of trade unions that joined the strike more than once was 3,422, and the total number of unionists was 3,878,211. On average, every day 184,498 workers of 163 unions were on strike. In addition to strikes, 1.4 million workers and protesters joined over thirty mass rallies all over the country.

However, just at the time when the solidarity struggle had reached its peak, when even conservative papers were calling on the government to yield, and it seemed that the government had no choice but to make concessions, the KCTU leadership decided to end the general strike, on the pretext of exhaustion of internal strength and respect for public opinion. It was a decision made without prior consultation with the national coalition – the National Committee to Repeal the Revision of the Labor Law and National Planning Agency Law and to Defend Democracy. It was a decision prompted by the government's hint of legalizing the KCTU.

With the end of the general strike the issue of labor law revision changed from open and direct confrontation between state and capital and labor

to political negotiation within the legislature, which was dominated by politicians. The deal was to legalize multiple union membership and to put off the immediate introduction of redundancy layoffs. Thus, the general strike paved the way for the legalization of the KCTU, but at the same time its conclusion brought despair to the rank and file unionists and created an unbridgeable gap between the union leadership and workers.

Economic Crisis and Workers' Struggle Against Neoliberalism

In the winter of 1997 an abrupt financial crisis struck the South Korean economy. The immediate impact of the crisis was immense, especially on workers: mass layoffs, massive dismissal and unemployment, worsening of living conditions, drastic wage cuts, insecure employment, and a heavier workload. The newly elected Kim Daejung government initiated a series of neoliberal structural adjustment policies, such as industrial and corporate restructuring, further privatization, mass layoffs, and labor flexibilization, all at the request of transnational and national monopoly capital.

To impose huge burdens on workers, the Kim Dae-jung government attempted to establish a social accord system in the form of a tripartite commission of government, bosses, and unions: on the one hand, the government promised to permit political activity by trade unions and legalize the teachers' union; on the other hand, it forced labor to accept the system of layoffs and flexible work time. This maneuver posed a major threat to the very existence of the labor movement, and the KCTU leadership was seriously confused, faced with the government's double tactics of propaganda and cooptation. Amid widespread propaganda about saving the country from national crisis, the leadership of the KCTU agreed to join the tripartite commission and accept the managerial right to dismiss workers. Militant workers were upset with this betrayal, however, and at the extra session of the KCTU Congress in January 1998 the KCTU leadership had to resign in a body. Thus, confusion was compounded. Under new leadership the KCTU declared its withdrawal from the tripartite commission and called a general strike in May to demand that the government cease its offensive against workers.

In July, when Hyundai Motors publicized a restructuring plan that included over 10,000

dismissals, workers responded immediately, occupying the plant for more than two months. Hyundai and the government intended to assault the workers, but as workers were so united, attacking them physically was almost impossible. However, the union leadership made a compromise with the management, accepting the temporary layoff plan in a bargain that saw the dismissal of about 300 female cafeteria workers. Though the proxy war at Hyundai Motors ended, other workers, like those in Mando Machinery, were attacked physically and dismissed en masse. In May 2000 Daewoo Motors management, in face of bankruptcy, publicized its massive restructuring plan, and in spite of over a year's struggle, thousands of workers were dismissed. In the course of the struggle the leadership was arrested and many workers kept on their sit-in struggle at a church outside of their plant.

Faced with structural adjustment and massive dismissal offensives, most workers were defenseless. Where they had a strong trade union and were united, they could resist and at least bargain with management, but unorganized workers were forced to accept the dismissal and wage cut, under bombardment from national crisis propaganda.

In general, it may not be easy to fight back in an age of economic crisis, but the Korean labor movement failed to organize a resistance. Internally, moderates failed to develop their collaborationism, and the resistance and struggles from below went on. In contrast to the lip-service paid by labor leaders, many casual workers kept on their struggle to save their jobs and livelihood. Moreover, under pressure from domestic and international capital, the government attempted to revise labor laws to adjust the international standard of labor flexibilization in the 2000s. The trade unions were against it, organizing several strikes and rallies, but in 2006 the National Congress passed the revised law, further expanding the trend of flexibilization and casualization. Thus, the Korean labor movement failed to defend the interests of the working class.

FKTU: Official Unionism and Its Long, Dark Past

Basically, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) was founded under direct supervision by the military regime, and functioned as a vehicle for state and corporate control of the

workers. Thus, its role at the national level was to support the military dictatorships, to join the state-controlled anti-communist campaign, and mobilize workers for government ceremonies. In the workplace it held the overwhelming power over rank and file workers and repressed all the moves to organize independent struggles and to form alternative unions. In a word, the FKTU existed for the government and employers, not for workers and union members.

However, the nationwide struggle for democratization in June 1987 and the Great Workers' Struggle from July to September 1987 forced the FKTU to give up its role as a yellow union. It tried to a certain extent to transform itself into an organization independent of political power and representing the interests of its member unions. During the general strike of 1997 it joined forces with the KCTU. But from a broad perspective the FKTU still seeks to compromise with government and management. It accepted the government policy of suppressing wage increases, and in the face of the neoliberal restructuring of Korean society it adopted the strategy of minimizing the damage to workers, based on its "realistic" recognition that such restructuring programs were inevitable.

In July 2000, with growing concern that the second phase of restructuring involving the public and financial sector would cause massive redundancy similar to the first phase from 1998 to 1999, the FKTU-affiliated financial workers union went on strike. It was just a one-day strike, but through this struggle the union succeeded in forcing high-ranking government officials to the bargaining table and drawing some concessions from them.

In the 1990s and 2000s the membership of the FKTU continued to decline. In 2005 the civil servants' Korean Government Employees' Union (KGEU) joined the KCTU, and the FKTU lost its status as a major union. Though the FKTU joined the tripartite commission exclusively representing workers' interests with the absence of KCTU representatives, the symbolic power of the FKTU as the largest union is gone. Historically, in time of formation of the KCTU, the FKTU proposed the merger of two federations in the name of working-class unity and a united labor front, but its real purpose was to prevent the emergence of a robust rival confederation. Thus, as the KCTU was established, the FKTU discarded its own proposal of merger.

Until recently, while the FKTU claimed numerical superiority over the KCTU, it was just nominal, because the key trade unions in strategic industries belonged to the KCTU and, in turn, the KCTU commanded the more powerful position. Furthermore, within the FKTU, when the reform movement was successful, or the reform leadership won at union elections, usually the trade unions changed affiliation to the KCTU. In that sense, the reform drive from above had a fundamental limit and dilemma. But as the moderate wing became dominant inside the KCTU, the logic of labor unity came to the surface from time to time. For example, despite a series of government attempts to coopt the labor movement leadership through the social dialogue or tripartite negotiation, the dominant moderate faction within the KCTU preferred joining the tripartite dialogue and class compromise. In this context, the merger debate has different connotations.

Overall, even the reform leadership of the FKTU cannot provide any viable alternative vision, except participation in the social dialogue as a junior partner of state and capital. The FKTU is stuck in a multiple crisis and is forced to depend on government subsidies and institutional mechanisms for its survival. In that sense the FKTU's reform is doomed to fail, and ironically, it can survive only by collaborating with the anti-worker government and hostile employers.

The DLP and the Political Representation of the Working Class

The democratic trade union movement survived in the face of brutal hostility from governments and employers. It has a very strong tradition of anti-statism. As survival itself was a priority, democratic unionism was hesitant in coping with issues of working-class representation. One reason for this was the historical anti-communism and subsequent bias against working-class politics in South Korean society. Faced with incessant government attacks and politically hostile surroundings, however, the trade union movement nevertheless began to raise the issue. The turning point was the 1996–7 general strike. Though the outcome was poor, the power of the general strike was felt widely, and workers recovered their political orientation. Thus, the KCTU decided

to run a workers' candidate in the 1997 presidential elections.

One of the important impacts of the general strike in 1996–7 was the revitalization of interest in the political representation of the working class. Thus, as the presidential election drew near in 1997, the KCTU decided to run a working-class candidate and nominated Kwon Young-gil. The other popular and social movement organizations joined this bid for political power. In this context the tactics of an independent candidate for workers and people was legitimized among unionists and activists, and its organizational expression was known as People's Victory 21, a broad electoral front for the presidential election, covering all political tendencies and shades. It appeared as a real hope for the labor and popular movement – a new momentum for working-class politics.

However, the result was a fiasco. In the course of the electoral campaign, the leadership of PV 21 leaned toward a tactical appeal to nationalist sentiment in the face of unprecedented economic crisis. For instance, the slogan of its campaign was "Rise up, Korea!" Many militants were upset with this nationalist maneuvering. As a moderate leader, the candidate Kwon Young-gil accepted it without question. The final tally from the contest was around 300,000 votes, much less than the membership of the KCTU. In that sense, the goal of implementing working-class politics was dismissed before the logic of "real politics" and electoralism. And however disastrous the election process and result were, the momentum toward institutional politics began to increase within the labor movement.

After the election, moderate leaders of PV 21 hastened to form a political party without any discussion of the electoral campaign or concrete plan for further organizing. While militants were absent from the process, the majority tendency of PV 21 began the organizational work of building an electoral party. Finally, in 2000, the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) was launched and took part in the general election in the spring. This attempt was also a total failure, and although ambitious individuals ran for election, the total vote for the DLP was less than 3 percent.

Internally, in 2002 the nationalist tendency that had been hostile to independent politics – and especially hostile toward forming an independent political party – made an abrupt political shift: the national congress of the

NFDNU – National Federation for Democracy and National Unification – decided to join the DLP. Thus, nationally, thousands of nationalist activists joined the party, leading to a struggle for inner-party hegemony. Thus, in the mid-2000s, the DLP was a mixture of social democratic reformism and nationalism. This sectarian maneuvering degraded the party's reputation, disappointing many rank and file members.

In spite of internal factional fighting and growing bureaucratism, the DLP had some luck in 2004, when newly elected President Roh Moo-hyun was impeached by the conservative and reactionary coalition and a general election was held. The people were greatly upset with the arrogant maneuvering of the opposition parties, and Roh's new party, Uri Party, enjoyed a support rate of over 70 percent. In this context there appeared some room for a third party. Progressives voted for the DLP instead of the ruling Uri Party. Thus, in the general election in May 2004, the DLP won ten parliamentary seats. It was a great success for the DLP and a historical victory for the movement for popular political representation. However, it turned into a trap for the DLP.

Though the DLP enjoyed exclusive status as representing the labor and popular movements (excluding the minority left opposition outside of the DLP), political leadership and representation were in question over diverse issues. For example, though DLP MPs played a key role in blocking the passage of anti-worker labor laws, the DLP's position on the government revision was ambiguous. Also, when there was a fierce debate on the KCTU's participation in the tripartite commission, the DLP failed to make its position clear. The KCTU leadership's decision to join the tripartite commission was radically criticized by militant workers and rank and file activists, as the government's hostility meant that the tripartite institution was a mere rubber stamp and a political means of cooption of labor leaders.

Historically, the DLP has made some progress in terms of its entry into institutional politics, as well as quantitative growth, and it enjoys prestige as a progressive mass party. However, it is not free from sectarianism and bureaucracy, and it is unable to develop more consistent alternatives to the neoliberal agenda. Though it joined the struggles of workers and oppressed people, it failed to provide political leadership and representation. This limitation was dramatically

shown in the presidential elections of 2007, in which DLP candidate Kwon Young-gil won just 712,000 votes (3 percent), less than in 2002. This electoral fiasco, together with the shock caused by the election of Lee Myung-bak, former CEO of Hyundai Construction and programmatic conservative, drove the DLP into internal crisis. In the aftermath of the election, left-wing tendencies and individuals split from the DLP, criticizing its hegemonic maneuvering, bureaucratism, and blind pro-North attitudes, and finally forming a new party to the left of the DLP.

Development of Rank and File Organizations and Political Differentiation

In the early 1990s one of the most important struggles in the workplace was the fight for democratic trade unionism against government-controlled and employer-friendly yellow pseudo-unions. Though workers won significant gains in terms of wages, benefits, and working conditions, not a few unions were still in the grip of bureaucrats or collaborators. Thus, militant activists set the new stage of struggle for democratic unions through the course of union elections at workplace level. In many cases the activists began to democratize the union structure and reform bureaucratic practices, thereby implementing union democracy at workplace level. However, once democratization was consolidated, political differentiation developed among rank and file activists. A moderate tendency emerged among union leaders, who emphasized negotiation rather than struggle. This division between the moderate and militant tendencies was important for the future course of the labor movement. The difference was a multi-faceted one over the strategy and tactics of the labor movement.

One important aspect was the collapse of socialism internationally, which demoralized left tendencies and led to an unexpected ideological and political vacuum for working-class politics. Thus, working-class politics was reduced to union politics, and the labor movement, without its political arm, had to lead the popular movements as a whole, and the political struggle was one of the most important tasks for the labor movement. In terms of plant-level politics, the democratic rank and file activist groups began to divide through political differentiation. The different tendencies developed their own organizational networks, reflecting political differ-

ences over various issues. Thus, union elections became a focal point at which different tendencies contended for the leadership. Of course, pro-company groups took part in elections, but most of them failed to win.

The real problem was that as the struggles prolonged, the moderate wing began to gain ground among the union leadership not just at the plant level, but also within industrial federations and the confederation as a whole. Many of them were politically close to the NL tendency that steadily emphasized the importance of bargaining and appeal to citizens, not workers, for social reforms. Naturally, this rightward shift caused a series of debates and conflicts within the trade union movement.

Especially after the general strike in 1996–7, militant activists felt the need to organize rank and file activists into a nationally coordinated body. As political differentiation grew sharper, each tendency developed its own organizational network. And internal struggle intensified over the major issues of the labor movement. As the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments had strong personal links with many moderate leaders, they wanted to coopt the labor movement. And the tripartite commission for social dialogue between the state, capital, and labor preferred to show off its capacity to control the labor movement. The neoliberal keynote of government policy made any compromise irrelevant, except for the means to coopt the leadership and tame labor militancy. In spite of strong opposition against the social partnership, the moderate wing persisted in joining the tripartite commission as a social partner, ignoring the bitter lesson of western labor movements' experience of such partnership.

Ideological or political differentiation was crystallized into three major tendencies within the framework of the KCTU: the moderate wing, the centrist tendency, and the left-wing militant tendency. These three tendencies contest for the leadership of the KCTU, and while the militant tendency that inherited the Jeonnohyeop's militant unionism is a relative minority, it has a nationwide network of rank and file activists fighting against the rightward shift of democratic unionism.

Aftermath of Economic Crisis

Crucially, the South Korean labor movement failed to keep up the momentum of the general

strike in 1996–7, mainly because of an unexpected economic crisis. The myth of employment for life was gone, and the issue of employment became the major concern for unionists, while a larger number of unorganized casual workers were most severely hit by the crisis. Though the labor movement resisted neoliberal offensives, most unorganized workers were defenseless. Under constant attack, most trade unions were busy with the defense of their own members. This instability accelerated the union leadership's turn to bureaucracy and collaborationism. In tandem with growing reformism and collaborationism, moderates in the bureaucracy strengthened their hegemony. Naturally, with growing discontent and apathy among rank and file unionists, the union leadership constantly felt threatened. Debate on the social partnership was a key issue over which internal tendencies were diametrically opposed.

In this context the KCTU gradually lost its prestige as leader for democracy and social progress. Its most serious problem was that it lost its strong support from the base, losing actual capacity to fight back, as well as the capacity to lead the whole struggle of the working class. In the 2000s the most important labor struggles were led by militants at small- and medium-sized factories, mostly casual workers. They were usually driven to the wall when faced not only with attacks by the state and capital, but also, more ominously, the apathy of regular workers and their unions.

In the 2000s most struggles were organized by militant casualized workers. Many of them carried on month-long or year-long struggles. For instance, casual workers in Korea Telecom waged a struggle for their right to be employed as regular workers over two years in the early 2000s. Plant construction casual workers waged militant street fights in major industrial cities in 2004 and 2005. Truck workers led a general strike and tower crane workers organized several sit-ins, occupying high-rise cranes. The workers hired by inplant subcontractors in the auto and ship-building industries organized workers' unions separately from regular workers' unions.

In 2004, based on militant struggles, casual and contingent workers organized a nationwide network of militant casual workers within the KCTU: the National Solidarity of Casual Workers' Unions. The formation of a national network of casual workers is a symbol of the new militancy of casual workers. As more than half of

the working population is in irregular employment, a series of struggles by casual and contingent workers provided some potential for revitalization of the Korean labor movement and could form another generation of democratic unionism in the near future.

On the other hand, as union machines became more and more bureaucratic, class-based solidarity is growing weaker in the face of even harsher attacks. Reformist leadership pursued "social dialogue" while avoiding confrontation with the state. The fundamental reason for this is its dubious relationship with the liberal wing of the ruling bloc. Thus, the independence of democratic unionism was seriously threatened. This led to the multi-faceted crisis of democratic unionism in South Korea.

SEE ALSO: Korea, Migrant Workers' Struggle; Korea, Movement of the Urban Poor; Korea, Peasant and Farmers' Movement; Korea, Post-World War II Popular Movements for Democracy; Korea, Protest Against Neoliberal Globalization; Kwangju Student Uprising; Student Movements, Korea

References and Suggested Readings

- Choi, Y.-G. et al. (2002) *Korean Labor Movement since 1987*. Seoul: Korean Labor Institute.
- Hart-Landsberg, M. (1993) *The Rush to Development: Economic Change and Political Struggle in South Korea*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- KCTU (2007) *Chronology of KCTU's 10 Years: 1995 to 2005*. Seoul: KCTU Press.
- Kim, S. (1997) *Korean Democracy and Working Class Politics: From Workplace to the Future*. Seoul.
- Koo, H. (2001) *Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Korean Democracy Foundation (Ed.) (2007) *A Long March for Democracy in Korea: Record of June Uprising in 1987*. Seoul: Korea Democracy Foundation.
- KTUC (2003) *White Paper: Korean Trade Union Council*. Seoul: Nonjang Publishers.
- Yu, K. (2007) *Beautiful Solidarity: Kuro Solidarity Strike in 1985*. Seoul: May Day Publishers.

Korea, migrant workers' struggle

Won Young-su

From the late 1980s, migrant workers began to work in place of Koreans who shunned dirty, dangerous, and difficult ("3D") jobs. These workers

faced low wages, inhumane working conditions, and brutal treatment by Korean employers as they became a third class within the workforce. Some churches and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) helped migrant workers in terms of wage arrears, industrial accidents, and medical care in a humanitarian effort, but this aid was small-scale. By the mid-1990s, however, some migrant workers who had become acquainted with the South Korean workers' struggle and the militant culture of the democratic labor movement began to fight for their rights in a broader sense.

The Industrial Trainee System (ITS) under which migrant workers were permitted to work in South Korea forced them to work only for designated companies and denied them the basic right to choose their own jobs. At the risk of breaking the rules, many migrant workers moved companies for better jobs and became illegal workers, and by the end of the 1990s, two-thirds of Korea's 600,000 migrant workers were illegal or undocumented. This left them vulnerable to the crackdowns of immigration officials and exploitation by employers. Many of them were deported, leaving behind a bad memory of wage arrears, industrial accidents, verbal assaults, violence, and rapes. As a result, migrant workers began to demand the abolition of the notorious ITS and the introduction of a working visa, as well as equal treatment with South Koreans. In 2001, they developed the Migrant Branch of Equality Trade Union (MB-ETU) and led a huge struggle for migrant workers' rights, organizing sit-in camps in historic Myoungdong Cathedral to oppose a Work Permit System that was to be introduced in place of the ITS.

In the course of over a year's struggle, migrant activists trained to form the core leadership of a migrant workers' movement. In early 2004 they built their own full-fledged union, Seoul-Gyeonggi-Incheon Migrant Workers' Union, and joined the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, in spite of government suppression and the deportation of migrant leaders. Thus, they reproduced the militant tradition of the independent and democratic labor movements and built an independent and democratic trade union in alliance with militant Korean trade unionists and radical activists, free from humanitarian intervention.

SEE ALSO: Korea, Labor Movement, 20th Century; Korea, Peasant and Farmers' Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Cho, H. (1993) *Contemporary Social Movement and Organization in Korea*. Seoul: Han-ul.
 Choi, Y. et al. (2002) *Korean Labor Movement Since 1987*. Seoul: Korean Labor Institute.
 Koo, H. (2001) *Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Korea, movement of the urban poor

Won Young-su

Exceptionally rapid urbanization in the 1960s and 1970s produced chaotic shantytowns in Korean cities, especially Seoul and the surrounding metropolitan areas. Poor living conditions and lack of adequate sanitary systems, basic utilities, and mass transportation were the norm for every shantytown. Thus, the popular anger of shantytown dwellers was a matter of course. In 1970, an urban poor riot broke out at Kwangju, a suburban area of Seoul, as enraged residents fought with riot police and occupied the city hall, demanding their rights for decent housing and reasonable living conditions.

This spontaneous riot ignited the struggle of the urban poor, and in the 1970s and early 1980s, many shantytown residents organized themselves, with the help of local churches and student activists. Thus, as the military regime initiated its cleansing plan for shantytowns, residents organized a coalition for their right to residence. This was an important trend of urban poor struggles. However, as most shantytowns were eliminated one by one, the poor were scattered or driven out to remote places, and the movement of urban shantytown dwellers lost its momentum in the late 1990s. A growing number of homeless appeared, signifying the phenomenon of "new poverty."

At the same time, street vendors led another important movement of the urban poor. These informal sector workers, mostly self-employed, constantly faced harassment by government officials and the police who wanted to create an image of a modern city and saw their presence as a hindrance. The vendors were forced to struggle for their very existence and organized themselves in the 1990s. They formed a national federation of street vendors, and together with

the shantytown dwellers' group they built the Korean Federation of Poor People's Movements in November 1990. After the democratization of society, however, because of its loose organization and the atypical character of its membership, the urban poor movement lost its momentum and dynamics, becoming less and less visible in the late 1990s and 2000s.

SEE ALSO: Korea, Civic Movement; Korea, Migrant Workers' Struggle; Korea, Peasant and Farmers' Movement; Kwangju Student Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

Cho, H. (1993) *Contemporary Social Movement and Organization in Korea*. Seoul: Han-ul.

Seo, J. (2007) *60 Years of Korean Contemporary History*. Seoul: Korea Democracy Foundation, Yeoksabipyeong.

Korea, peasant and farmers' movement

Won Young-su

Korea's rural communities have been continuously hard hit by imperial exploitation, industrialization, urbanization, and globalization. After the end of Japanese imperial rule, rural society was transformed into a peasant economy that was subordinated to the urban sector. As South Korean society turned from an agricultural to an industrial one, the rural population decreased from more than three-quarters to one-tenth of the whole population.

Traditionally, the rural communities had been bastions of social conservatism, even becoming a reactionary electoral base for the military dictatorships that ruled Korea in the postwar years. However, under the impact of rapid industrialization and urbanization, rural communities faced natural disasters as well as government policies of low agricultural prices and social discrimination. Recently, the indiscriminate opening of domestic markets to transnational agricultural monopoly capital has further harmed rural Korea. Thus, most peasant households are riddled with huge debts and driven to the verge of complete bankruptcy.

From the 1970s, farmers began to fight back for survival. In the initial stages of the movement, the Catholic and Protestant churches helped farmers organize. Not a few rural pastors and

former student activists helped, in spite of threats and propaganda by government officials and local authorities. Often, activists were condemned as communists, reminiscent of the nightmare of the Korean War. Because of such scare campaigns, the government's anti-farmer policy contributed to the growth of discontent and protest among farmers.

In the 1970s and 1980s, according to a long tradition, students went to the countryside to help farmers work. While there, they attempted to expose the miserable situation of rural villages and to raise the class consciousness of farmers. The summer vacation activities of these students helped lay organizational bases for the future development of the peasant movement.

In the 1980s, radicalization and mass struggle against the government influenced the farmers' movement. In the face of harsh government policies in the agricultural sector, young farmers began to join the struggles gradually, becoming a cadre of growing peasant activism. Throughout the 1980s scores of farmers' associations developed at the local level and competed with government-controlled rural organizations. But in this stage, most of the struggles were confined to the local or regional level, though church-assisted groups established a national organization.

Eventually, under the impact of a 1987 uprising and subsequent democratization, several currents of farmers' groups joined forces to build a national federation. The Korean Peasant League (KPL) was formed in April 1990, out of the merger of different peasant groups, including a Catholic and Protestant farmers' association. From this stage, the farmers' federation kept its organizational independence from religious groups.

In the 1990s, especially under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-initiated Uruguay Round talks, the opening of the local agricultural market, especially the rice market, became a critical issue for farmers' existence. In the course of the broad struggle against the Uruguay Round, farmers led the struggle for their livelihood and food sovereignty, with the KPL organizing national rallies several times, much like the national workers' rally held every November. Accordingly, by the mid-1990s, the peasant movement established itself as one of the two pillars of the Korean popular movement, along with the labor movement. Though farmers' mobilization was restricted by the farming schedule, often, after harvest every year

in November or December, the KPL had a capacity to mobilize tens of thousands of farmers nationally.

After the struggle against the Uruguay Round negotiations in the 1990s, changes in the rural community further accelerated, driving most of them to the brink of collapse. With the growing importation of cheap agricultural products, especially from China, many farmers went bankrupt. As a result, by the turn of the century Korean farmers led the national and international struggle against neoliberal globalization and the opening of agricultural markets, confronting the neoliberal regime, transnational agricultural capital, and international financial institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank. For instance, the KPL was a leading force in the anti-WTO struggle in Cancun, Mexico (2003), where a farmer, Lee Kyung Hae, killed himself in protest at the WTO's anti-farmer policy. Korean farmers led another anti-WTO struggle in Hong Kong (2005), and in struggles against the South Korea–US Free Trade Agreement in 2006 and 2007. In these protests, the Korean farmers' movement played an important role, along with Latin American peasants and indigenous farmers, in the international struggle of *La Via Campesina*.

SEE ALSO: Korea, Labor Movement, 20th Century; Korea, Migrant Workers' Struggle; Korea, Post-World War II Popular Movements for Democracy; Korea, Protest against Neoliberal Globalization; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Cancun, 2003; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Hong Kong, 2005

References and Suggested Readings

- Gray, K. (2007) *Korean Workers and Neoliberal Globalization*. London: Routledge.
- Seo, J. (2007) *60 Years of Korean Contemporary History*. Seoul: Korea Democracy Foundation, Yeoksabipyeong.

Korea, popular rebellions and uprisings, 1492–1910

Won Young-su

The Chosun Dynasty (1492–1910) was founded by the military rebellion of General Lee Sung-gye, who became the first king, Taejo. His

rebellion represented the formation of a new ruling class based on a newly emerging elite and military leaders under the auspices of Sung Confucius ideology. For a century, the Chosun Dynasty witnessed impressive developments in science, industry, and institutional reform, including the creation of Hangul, the Korean alphabet, under King Sejong. However, from the sixteenth century, the contradictions of the medieval caste regime began to harden, and divisions among the ruling class, factional struggles, and challenges from below destabilized the social structure, severely weakening the nation. Thus, Chosun was invaded by Japanese forces under Toyotomi Hideyoshi in 1592, and by the Ching Dynasty of China in 1637. These foreign invasions further destabilized the legitimacy of the Chosun Dynasty. On the other hand, the rapid development of production by means of two-crop farming and rice transplantation clashed with feudal land ownership. Thus, while a new class of enriched plebians began to grow as a social force, together with professionals like doctors and other specialists, large numbers of feudal farmers were expelled from their lands and exploited by landowners and government officials.

Centralized rule constantly evoked resistance from local oligarchies and popular classes combined with class conflicts. The deep corruption of local authorities, known as the three injustices of land, military service, and rice, was an immediate target of the ever-widening anger of farmers and various underclasses. Thus, from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, revolts and protests of plebes (mostly peasants) became more frequent in diverse forms.

The nineteenth century, the final century of the Chosun Dynasty, is called the Century of Popular Rebellions, as the whole feudal system was in crisis. As these primitive forms of popular movements and rebellions targeted feudal ruling classes and imperial forces, they were an effort from below to modernize the nation. These popular protests took two forms: popular rebellions and political revolts. Basically, popular rebellions were economic struggles of the deprived classes – mostly local struggles against government officials. In contrast, political revolts were consciously organized by intellectuals and professionals who were discriminated against by the caste system.

In the earlier period, popular protests had taken a spontaneous form, but at this point they

became more organized and persistent. In most popular rebellions, farmers and their leaders protested against local authorities, but when their demands were not met they became violent, attacking low-level officials and in some cases expelling from town appointed top officials. Protesters usually circulated appeals, held assemblies, and began collective actions, including arson, lynching, and looting. Rural intellectuals played a leading role in the early stages of protest, but as actions turned violent, militant rank-and-file farmers led the struggles.

On the other hand, the politically and economically marginalized Yangban elite led a more organized form of rebellion, and some of them even attempted a political revolt or revolution against the feudal regime. In this case, religion was important. Popular faith in a future Buda or Prodigy was an important means to mobilize the disgruntled lower classes for a utopian future.

In some cases, peasant uprisings and popular rebellions were combined. As the feudal regime lost control over its subjects, more and more disgruntled intellectuals joined forces in political plots and actively organized impoverished peasants. This meant the rebellions and revolts were politicized and revolutionized more and more, developing into a more systematic anti-feudal and anti-imperial popular movement.

At the same time, the Chosun Dynasty was severely weakened by internal contradictions and vulnerable to foreign invasions. At different times, Chosun was invaded by Japan and China. Both invasions destroyed the whole country, as the royal court was incompetent in defending the country. In contrast, oppressed people voluntarily organized themselves and fought the invaders, alongside official armies or independently waged guerilla wars. Mostly composed of Buddhist monks, lower-class people, and opposition intellectuals, these forces were called Just Militia.

Many people were angered by the cowardice of government officials who ran away in the face of the Japanese and Manchurian armies. Thus, many began to feel that Chosun was close to its demise, and disgruntled intellectuals and professionals attempted organized rebellions. In many cases they gained the support of local people and sometimes even of famous militias. Lee Mong-hak and Song Yu-jin led revolts against the incompetent dynasty.

In addition to these challenges, the dynasty also faced a number of bandits, such as Lim Keok-

jung, Hong Kil-dong, and Chang Kilsan. As they became the subjects of folklore passed down from generation to generation, these bandits stimulated the imagination of the oppressed people. Though they are categorized as bandits, they generally enjoyed broad popular support, and in some cases, when groups of bandits spread rebellious ideas, most of the oppressed people, even lower officials and some members of the lower Yangban class, welcomed what they saw as their just cause. Though the boundary is rather blurred, the thefts, robberies, and violence of these bandits represented popular anger and frustration with the corrupt regime of the Chosun Dynasty.

Besides bandits, there were secret societies that challenged the caste system of the time. The lowest classes under Chosun's caste system were private and official servants and untouchables like butchers. As the caste system began to collapse, many intelligent servants became politically conscious and organized other secret societies, like the Sword Society and the Kill the Lord Society. The existence of these secret societies showed the depth of anger among the lower classes who had been systematically discriminated against and exploited. As they watched their masters and lords from close quarters, they saw the contradictions of the caste system and its injustices.

In the final decades of Chosun, the feudal regime was faced with crisis after crisis, universalizing protests and rebellions from all strata of oppressed people. The various forms of rebellions in the nineteenth century culminated in the nationwide Imsul Rebellion and Donghak Peasant War.

Hong Kyung-rae's Rebellion (1811) occurred in the northern territory bordering China. The locals felt they were discriminated against and exploited by the central government and its local agents. Hong Kyung-rae gathered his comrades and initiated an uprising in which he confronted the government's army. At first the rebel army moved to the south, but in the face of the government army it retreated to a fortress, where it fought with the government army for over four months. In spite of heroic resistance, the revolt was crushed and more than 2,000 rebels were executed.

Of all the rebellions in Chosun, the Imsul Popular Rebellion (1862) was the first to have a nationwide scope. It covered three regions in the southern part of the kingdom. The rebellion began in Jinju in southern Keongsang

province and spread to neighboring Jeonra and Chung-cheong provinces, covering most of the southern part of the peninsular, even toward Jeju Island.

The Donghak Peasant War (1894) was the largest rebellion in the history of Chosun. The rebels were equipped with Donghak ideology, which was against western civilization, especially Catholicism, which was protected and encouraged to spread under the pressure of western imperialism. The war originated in the Kobu Rebellion and developed in two stages of massive peasant wars under the leadership of Jeon Bong-jun, a national hero of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle. In the first stage, the mass base of the movement led to peace with the government and co-governance over the region. However, as the Chosun government aligned with Japan, the peasant army rose up again. The rebel army was defeated by joint Chosun and Japanese forces, and the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist orientation of the peasant war was finally crushed. The war is an important part of the heritage of popular struggle in the Chosun Dynasty, as well as a precursor of the anti-imperialist national liberation movement in the first half of the twentieth century.

Under the final king of Chosun, Kojong, the country was in its terminal crisis. Confronted with imperialist pressure, the ruling class was divided into differing factions: pro-Chinese, pro-Japanese, and pro-Russian. On one hand, there were moves to modernize the country by opening it to diplomacy with western countries. On the other hand, popular revolt against the feudal regime and foreign forces became more frequent.

After the Donghak Peasant War, a number of revolts broke out in Pungcheon, Chilwon, Tongyeong, Ulsan, Yeosu, Jeongseon, and throughout the country. The most remarkable of these rebellions was led by Lee Pilje, who attempted revolts in four counties in Jincheon, Jinju, Yeonghae, and Joryeong. He succeeded in the uprising in Yeonghae, but failed in Joryeong, and was executed. Lee Pilje symbolized a professional revolutionary in the Chosun feudal era and enjoyed a broad mass base. Anti-feudal revolts in Jeju Island were also important. Peasants in Jeju occupied local government and fought against government forces. Lee Jesu's revolt was particularly successful and even attempted to turn the island into an independent country.

Thus, in face of a corrupt feudal dynasty and an incompetent regime, peasant and grassroots people organized rebellions and revolts that served as examples for future generations in the twentieth century.

SEE ALSO: Korea, Movement of the Urban Poor; Korea, Peasant and Farmers' Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Chua, B. H. (2004) *Communitarian Politics in Asia*. London: Routledge.
- Lee, N. (2007) *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Yi, S. (1996) *Religion and Social Formation in Korea: Minjung and Millenarianism*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Korea, post-World War II popular movements for democracy

Won Young-su

South Korea's brilliant economic performance and achievement since the end of the Korean War was built on the labor and suffering of workers, peasants, and the socially marginalized. An incessant series of popular struggles and movements reflects and represents the aspiration for democracy and popular welfare as a basic condition for humane subsistence. In the course of fierce resistance against the military dictators who have ruled Korea in the postwar years, various movements have developed a wide range of organizations and political strategies, establishing a vital social force over the diverse sectors of South Korean society.

Historical Background

For over 35 years in the first half of the twentieth century, the Korean nation was under the harsh rule of Japanese imperialism, which exploited the Korean people economically and brutally suppressed any resistance against its rule. In spite of harsh oppression, the Korean people continuously organized the struggle for national liberation, both inside Korea and abroad. On August 15, 1945, the nation was liberated from Japanese rule when Japan lost World War II to

the Soviet Union and United States. When the war was over, both superpowers advanced into the Korean peninsula, where the nationalist and left forces were already so organized as to build a government of their own. Even so, the US occupation army ruled the South, and the USSR ruled the North, thereby planting a tragic seed of permanent national division.

National Liberation, War, and National Division

Combined with the international factor of Cold War politics and internal conflict, the divided Korean nation witnessed the establishment of separate national governments in mid-1948, contrary to the popular desire to build an independent country. All the left forces moved to the North in order to escape the anti-communist violence of the Rhee Syng-man regime. In the North, however, those from the South faced purges by northern leaders. This unstable climate and hostility led to a war between North and South in 1950 – the Korean War. It was one of the fiercest and most barbaric civil wars ever fought, and the first war in the Cold War era. In the course of the war, several million Koreans were killed and many more millions were injured, separated from their families, and displaced from their hometowns.

Both the United States and China intervened, and the civil war turned into a full-scale international war. As the forces involved and weapons in use escalated, the war became protracted and neither side could claim victory. Hence, both sides finally concluded a truce agreement in July 1953. Unfortunately, the truce of the war made the national division permanent, completely destroying the popular aspiration for an independent state, democracy, and economic welfare. Two different paths of social development were pursued separately: capitalism in the South, and socialism in the North.

The Impact of the Korean War on South Korean Society

The war destroyed all of what was left, and the entire population was impoverished, with the exception of those who cooperated with the United States. The war and concurrent class and ideological conflict divided the nation and created two antagonistic class states. Thus, in the South, any opposition to the government was prohibited, and the society was absolutely inoculated from left-wing or radical ideologies, regardless of

whether it was socialism or communism. A succession of military dictators, such as Rhee Syng-man, Park Chung-hee, and Jun Doo-hwan, reproduced the same anti-communist, anti-democratic regimes for their own sake.

In the international context of the Cold War, South Korea, as an ally of the US, was at the forefront of international anti-communism. For instance, the South Korean government sent a large number of soldiers to Vietnam alongside the US forces. Also, the government blocked any kind of overseas contact for fear that any contact with North Koreans would become a direct threat to the regime, possibly engendering class-conscious grassroots opposition. Thus, South Korea was like an isolated island segregated from the international community.

For more than 40 years, the Korean people had suffered from all kinds of brutal suppression. They were unilaterally mobilized for the modernization and the nation-building project from above, without any claims to their legitimate rights. To suppress any popular resistance, successive regimes made use of anti-communist propaganda, depicting communists as non-humans.

Struggles against Dictatorship and toward Democratic Transition

Though civilian and military regimes used brutal means to suppress people, they failed to uproot popular resistance. They imprisoned tens of thousands of innocent people, on top of committed activists, but resistance sprang up incessantly, whenever and wherever possible. Thus, completely lacking political legitimacy, the dictatorships were periodically faced with internal and external crises. Under US tutelage, Rhee Syng-man's government was toppled by the student revolution of April 1960, in which students, including young middle and high school students, went against the dictatorship for its omnipresent corruption and electoral fraud. The Park Chung-hee government that came to power through a military coup d'état in May 1961 also collapsed in a royal court assassination by his own right-hand man and intelligence chief, Kim Jae-gyu. The notorious Yushin regime, which Park Chung-hee implanted under the banner of "Korean Democracy," collapsed because of its internal contradictions and popular resistance. Jun Doo-hwan, Chung-hee's successor, was forced to give up his intention of prolonging his military

regime through the mechanism of an indirect electoral system, instead stepping down from the throne. He escaped being punished for his illegal coup d'état and for brutal crimes under his rule because of the division of opposition candidates and the subsequent victory of his colleague, Rho Tae-woo. But some time later, he was faced with imprisonment along with Rho, by the hand of Kim Young-sam, his political ally. As Kim Dae-jung and Rho Moo-hyun, both stubborn opposition leaders, won unexpected victories beginning in 1997, the long historical process of democratization appeared to mature. Thus, though the reaction from the former ruling bloc is not insignificant, South Korean society is regarded as a fully grown democracy, both nationally and internationally.

However, the neoliberal turn under the democratic civil government caused not a little confusion among their own supporters, as well as a reactionary backlash from the ruling oligarchy. The combination of the failure of consistent democratic reforms and the success in the neoliberal turn erased the dynamics of the democratization struggle. Eventually, the reconquest of power by the conservative forces that criticized the rule of liberal governments as "a lost decade" was completed in the presidential election in December 2007. Thus, the long cycle of democratic transition in South Korea has finished its final span, leading to another stage of conflict.

From State-Led Capitalism to Neoliberalism

As the war destroyed everything in the South, the remnants of the colonial economy were gone for good. The South Korean economy survived through western aid, especially US aid driven by its anti-communist agenda. The military dictatorship under General Park Chung-hee introduced a state-led economic plan to compensate for its lack of legitimacy. Park Chung-hee abandoned his pledge to return to the barracks and created a political party, intended as a tool for his personal rule. He maintained the state-driven economic development policy, suppressing any possible opposition.

Heavy investment by the state, and its control over all sectors of the economy, imposed burdens and sacrifices on workers and farmers, yet in spite of huge problems, the absolute poverty that had prevailed over both urban and rural society

gave his regime some room for maneuver. In particular, the state-led rural campaign known as the New Village Campaign gave farmers some material benefits such as new roads, housing improvements, and connection to electricity. All these basic material improvements were welcomed by rural residents, who in turn became the electoral base for the military dictatorship. Also, in the course of state-led development, a small number of chaebols (conglomerate family-controlled firms) formed. Nepotism was an important source of economic success in this turbulent economic saga. The biggest victims were grassroots people, especially newly formed workforces from the rural areas and farmers in the countryside.

In five decades, the personal GDP of South Korea skyrocketed by a hundred times, from 200 US dollars in the early 1950s to 20,000 US dollars in the mid-2000s. This condensed rapid development transformed both Korean society and the economy fundamentally. But all of this was achieved within two generations, thereby causing a series of problems and contradictions. This rapid economic progress was not made in a smooth cycle but in a series of ups and downs, in particular the oil crisis in 1973–5, the economic crisis of the late 1970s, and the financial crisis in 1997–8. These terrible economic crises shifted the burdens of their contradictions to the working class, farmers, and urban lower classes. The economic transformations that were initiated in the course of the economic downturn of the late 1970s were a turning point in the march to neoliberalism, and the economic crisis in the late 1990s completed the transformation. Many big corporations went bankrupt, and many were sold to foreign enterprise hunters at artificially low prices. A huge number of unemployed and homeless were the symbols of South Korean capitalism in crisis. Under the banner of democratic reforms by civilian regimes, even under the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun regimes, neoliberal reforms such as structural adjustment, privatization, opening markets, deregulation, liberalization, and labor flexibilization were put on the permanent agenda of all the ruling blocs.

Popular Struggle: A Driving Force for Historical Development

Faced with constant economic exploitation and rigid political suppression, South Korean

people were forced to choose between silent subservience and bold resistance. The overall picture of the last five decades may be depicted as a mixture of victory and defeats, but history has shown that the other side of rapid development and subsequent popular suffering is the heroic struggles and movements to build a democratic and humane alternative to the developmentalist dictatorship.

Emerging from an ideological and political vacuum, the popular resistance rose spontaneously and developed through a series of ups and downs, finally becoming crystallized in the powerful student movement from the mid-1970s to mid-1990s, and, later, in the labor movement from the late 1980s up to the present. These movements were known for militancy and tireless struggles against the overwhelmingly hostile power of the state and capital. At their core, the originally naïve liberal movements were radicalized, creating strong left movements which aimed at the revolutionary transformation of South Korean society.

SEE ALSO: Korea, Labor Movement, 20th Century; Korea, Migrant Workers' Struggle; Korea, Movement of the Urban Poor; Korea, Peasant and Farmers' Movement; Korea, Protest against Neoliberal Globalization; Kwangju Student Uprising; Student Movements, Korea

References and Suggested Readings

- Cho, H. (1993) *Contemporary Social Movement and Organization in Korea*. Seoul: Han-ul.
- Hart-Landsberg, M. (1993) *The Rush to Development: Economic Change and Political Struggle in South Korea*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Korean Democracy Foundation, Democracy Movement of Korea, www.kdemocracy.or.kr/sub_01/engsub_03.asp.
- Seo, J. (2007) *60 Years of Korean Contemporary History*, Korea Democracy Foundation. Seoul: Yeoksa Bipeong.

Korea, protest against neoliberal globalization

Won Young-su

In recent years, a phenomenon known as globalization or neoliberal restructuring has affected nations throughout the world. The basic premise of this system is that restrictions on trade, such as tariffs, are a hindrance and that "free trade,"

or a lack of restrictions such as tariffs, is better. Opponents, however, point out that such a system leads to workers and farmers throughout the world being exploited even further while only the ruling classes profit. In Korea, as in other nations, this system has been universalized across all sectors of society. From the early 1990s, the labor movement has been hard hit, faced with a neoliberal New Management Strategy whose essence has been to implement the flexibilization of labor, employment, and labor markets. Thus, the struggle against neoliberal globalization has constituted a large part of the union movement, as public sector workers have fought against privatization, financial workers against the opening of the financial market, and other workers against worsening working conditions and precarious jobs.

In this context, the labor movement joined the anti-globalization movement in the late 1990s, waging a struggle against international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Bank that had imposed neoliberal conditionality over nation-states. Thus, many Korean labor activists and unionists joined a series of important battles like WTO protests in Seattle in 1999, Cancun in 2003, and Hong Kong in 2005. Fighting the WTO and IMF, and the more recently the South Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, has been one of the major areas of workers' struggle. Together with farmers who have been severely affected by the liberalization, workers formed a bulwark against neoliberal globalization, protesting, for example, when the Roh Moo-hyun government initiated South Korea-US Free Trade Agreement negotiations in 2006. In response, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions and other popular and social movements converged to form a broad coalition. Though two years' struggle failed to stop the negotiation, Korean workers and peasants held a national rally in July 2006 with tens of thousands joining in, and metal workers organized a general strike against the free trade agreement in July 2007.

SEE ALSO: Korea, Labor Movement, 20th Century; Korea, Peasant and Farmers' Movement; Neoliberalism and Protest; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Cancun, 2003; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Hong Kong, 2005; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999

Reference and Suggested Reading

Gray, K. (2007) *Korean Workers and Neoliberal Globalization*. London: Routledge.

Kosovo, civil and armed resistance, 1990s

Isabel Ströhle

Following the abolition of Kosovo autonomy in 1989 and the restoration of Serbian central rule in Yugoslavia by Slobodan Milošević under the “anti-bureaucratic revolution,” a broad resistance movement emerged in the region. In December 1989, the leaders of the Kosovo Albanian opposition founded the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), forming a shadow state with parallel political institutions. The LDK, organized on the basis of a broad political movement rather than a standard party, sought to prevent violent conflict, deny the legitimacy of Serbia’s rule, and encourage international intervention.

LDK activists effectively prevented the legitimate expansion of Serbian rule into Kosovo through boycotting Serbian and Yugoslav elections and censuses and operating through the political channels of the unsanctioned parallel state and institutions. On July 2, 1990, Albanian deputies of the dissolved Kosovo Assembly declared the Yugoslav Republic of Kosovo, and following the secession of Croatia and Slovenia from Yugoslavia on October 19, 1991, the nationalists sought outright independence, declaring the sovereign and independent Republic of Kosova. In a referendum on independence, clandestine parliamentary and presidential elections were held, with the LDK winning 76.5 percent of the votes, and Ibrahim Rugova being elected president of the Kosovo Republic by 99.5 percent of the vote which included almost exclusively those of Albanian descent and excluding Serbs living in the region.

The government organized parallel health and education systems replacing social services curtailed by the Yugoslav authorities. A system of secondary and university education was organized on private premises through 1997, despite shortages of trained teachers and materials. Basic medical aid was provided in clinics established in private homes and operated by the Mother Theresa Association and local humanitarian agencies. The institutions were financed

by the collection of a special 3 percent household tax, a 10 percent tax on Kosovo Albanian businesses, and donations from communities in Western Europe and the United States.

To avert any pretext for ethnic cleansing akin to Bosnia in the early 1990s, the doctrine of non-violence was advanced by a broad coalition of Kosovar sociopolitical forces, who pragmatically recognized the military superiority of the Serbian army. By advocating non-violence the LDK sought to internationalize the conflict, assuming that peaceful protest would be rewarded by furthering the goal of internationally recognized independence. But when the international community neglected Kosovo Albanians in the peace treaty of Dayton, passive resistance increasingly lost its appeal and the political leadership split into pacifist, activist, and militarist camps.

Until 1997 armed resistance was only supported by marginal, radical groups like the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which initially issued communiqués carrying out attacks on Serbian police stations, government officials, and so-called Albanian collaborators. The KLA was rooted in small, secretive, Marxist-Leninist nationalist clandestine groups that also had support from traditional clans in remote rural areas. The state collapse in Albania in 1997 and the subsequent plundering of arms depots facilitated the KLA’s acquisition of large stores of weapons, which were smuggled across the porous Albania border into Yugoslavia. The military cache made possible the growth of the KLA from a marginal guerilla organization of some 150 members in 1997 into a broad armed resistance movement. The KLA armed resistance was catalyzed by the increase in Serbian police and army violence against the rural population, in particular the Drenica massacres in spring 1998. To prevent further attacks on civilians, the KLA operated a security force in the rural region and ideologically sought to gain an internationally recognized independent state, envisaging the creation of a Greater Albania. By 1998, the KLA grew to an estimated 12,000 rebels, still outnumbered by Serbian fighters by a factor of 2:1. However, the KLA was a decentralized rebel force, lacking a unified command structure.

The April to September Serb military offensive against KLA strongholds in central and western Kosovo weakened the guerillas greatly, displacing approximately 200,000 Kosovo Albanians.

Some 98,000 Kosovo Albanians sought refugee status in nearby countries as reports of human rights violations and an impending refugee crisis mounted. In the face of the early onset of winter, the international community, led by US special envoy Richard Holbrooke, sought to force Milošević into an armistice, the so-called Milošević–Holbrooke Agreement.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) peacekeeping troops were deployed in the region as Serbian troops withdrew in a “verification mission,” permitting the return of refugees. However, the KLA seized the opportunity to reoccupy formerly lost positions, in turn provoking Serbian military action. Following a renewed Serbian offensive, peace talks continued in the spring of 1999 through the NATO-brokered peace talks in Rambouillet and Paris. The peace talks legitimated the KLA’s political position, providing the organization a prominent role in the Albanian negotiation team. However, the proposed peace agreement was signed only by the Albanian side and Holbrooke’s final negotiation attempts failed. Subsequently, NATO launched air strikes against Yugoslav targets on March 24, 1999 aiming to end the Serbian offensive and the further expulsion and exodus of Albanians from the region. On July 1, 1999, following the establishment of the United Nations administration in Kosovo, the KLA ostensibly agreed to demilitarization in the peace agreement. Although the KLA officially disbanded, the rebels were integrated into the new Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a civilian emergency service, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), and other sanctioned military structures. However, due to obscure channels of financing, alleged involvement in organized crime, and suspicion over the masterminding and organized expulsion of Serbs and Roma peoples in the months following the war, the former KLA has also come under severe criticism for human rights violations.

SEE ALSO: Anti-War Activism, Yugoslavia, 1990s; Serbia, Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution, 1987–1989

References and Suggested Readings

- Clark, H. (2000) *Civil Resistance in Kosovo*. London: Pluto Press.
- Judah, T. (2002) *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 2nd ed. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Malcolm, N. (1999) *Kosovo: A Short History*. New York: New York University Press.

Reuter, J. (2000) Zur Geschichte der UÇK (The History of the KLA). In K. Clewing & J. Reuter, *Der Kosovo Konflikt: Ursachen - Akteure - Verlauf* (The Kosovo Conflict: Causes, Actors, Order of Events). Munich: Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, pp. 171–86.

Troebst, S. (1999) The Kosovo War: Round One: 1998. *Südosteuropa* 48, 3–4 (1999): 156–90.

Kronstadt Mutiny of 1921

Christian Garland

The Kronstadt Mutiny refers to an uprising in the early part of March 1921 by Russian sailors at the Kronstadt naval base on Kotlin Island, near the Gulf of Finland, against the Bolshevik regime. The uprising remains of key historical importance to this day, drawing differing and opposing positions on the Russian Revolution, and questions of workers’ control, the nature of post-revolutionary politics, and where power should lie. Broadly speaking, left communists and class struggle anarchists almost without exception take the view that the Kronstadt revolt was an authentic proletarian uprising against an authoritarian regime, controlled by a new bureaucratic class. Leninists, by contrast, are equally firm in their belief, albeit with a few variations, that the suppression of the rebellion led by Leon Trotsky was vital – however regrettable – to the survival of the revolution.

The uprising was the culmination of a period of discontent across a country ravaged by famine and poverty, following the end of the Russian Civil War. Lenin’s policy of War Communism saw production in many sectors falling to around 20 percent of pre-World War I levels, creating intense hardship for the general population in the process. Elsewhere, in the Ukraine, Nestor Makhno’s anarchist guerrilla army would soon finally be crushed by the Bolshevik regime it had helped sustain against the counterrevolutionary White Guard throughout the bitter civil war.

The Bolsheviks had continually struggled to impose party discipline on both non-party and party members of the Baltic Fleet; however, sailors refused to accept the party’s will, despite all attempts to enforce acceptance of its directives. Measures such as “Army customs” from 1920

onwards met with opposition and outright resistance from the rank and file. Hostility to the Bolshevik hierarchy was voiced in the sailors' anger at the "dictatorial attitudes" of party apparatchik, and an atmosphere of open insubordination largely prevailed.

On February 15 the Second Conference of Communist Sailors of the Baltic Fleet had met and assembled 300 delegates who voted to condemn the Poubalt (Political Section of the Baltic Fleet) as a "a bureucratic organ" which had "separated itself from the masses," adding that it now had "no authority amongst the sailors." The second resolution condemned the "total absence of a plan or method in the work of Poubalt," adding: "There is also a lack of agreement between its actions and the resolutions adopted at the Ninth Party Congress." The third resolution stated that Poubalt had "totally detached itself from the Party masses, [and] destroyed all local initiative." The resolution also stated that Poubalt had "transformed all political work into paper work," adding: "This has had harmful repercussions on the organization of the masses in the Fleet. Between June and November last year, 20 percent of the sailor party members have left the party. This can be explained by the wrong methods of the work of Poubalt." The four resolutions concluded with criticism of the centralized bureucratic nature of Poubalt, citing "the very principles of [its] organization. These principles must be changed in the direction of greater democracy" (Mett 1967).

The Kronstadt sailors – once referred to as "the flower of the revolution" by Trotsky – sent delegates to St. Petersburg to report back on the situation; reports of repression and near-terror continued. On February 28 the crews of the the battleships *Petropavlovsk* and *Sevastopol* met and agreed a resolution issuing the following 15 demands:

- 1 Immediate new elections to the Soviets. The present Soviets no longer express the wishes of the workers and peasants. The new elections should be by secret ballot, and should be preceded by free electoral propaganda.
- 2 Freedom of speech and of the press for workers and peasants, for the anarchists, and for the left socialist parties.
- 3 The right of assembly, and freedom for trade union and peasant organizations.

- 4 The organization, at the latest on March 10, 1921, of a Conference of non-Party workers, soldiers, and sailors of Petrograd, Kronstadt, and the Petrograd District.
- 5 The liberation of all political prisoners of the socialist parties, and of all imprisoned workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors belonging to working-class and peasant organizations.
- 6 The election of a commission to look into the dossiers of all those detained in prisons and concentration camps.
- 7 The abolition of all political sections in the armed forces. No political party should have privileges for the propagation of its ideas, or receive state subsidies to this end. In the place of the political sections various cultural groups should be set up, deriving resources from the state.
- 8 The immediate abolition of the militia detachments set up between towns and countryside.
- 9 The equalization of rations for all workers, except those engaged in dangerous or unhealthy jobs.
- 10 The abolition of Party combat detachments in all military groups. The abolition of Party guards in factories and enterprises. If guards are required, they should be nominated, taking into account the views of the workers.
- 11 The granting to the peasants of freedom of action on their own soil, and of the right to own cattle, provided they look after them themselves and do not employ hired labor.
- 12 We request that all military units and officer trainee groups associate themselves with this resolution.
- 13 We demand that the Press give proper publicity to this resolution.
- 14 We demand the institution of mobile workers' control groups.
- 15 We demand that handicraft production be authorized provided it does not utilize wage labor.

In response, a general meeting of the garrison was held, attended by Bolshevik dignitaries including the commissar of the Baltic Fleet. In opposition to the Bolshevik presence, a Provisional Revolutionary Committee was formed, approving the 15 demands. On March 2 the Bolsheviks responded with an ultimatum demanding the Kronstadt rebels disband their new committee or face the consequences. The Kronstadt sailors refused. The Bolsheviks denounced the mutiny, claiming it had "undoubtedly been pre-

pared by French counterintelligence” and that the *Petrovavlovsk* resolution was a “SR-Black Hundred” resolution, referring to the Social Revolutionaries and the unrelated right-wing Black Hundreds.

The rebels by now had occupied strategic points across the naval town, taking over all government establishments, including staff headquarters, and the telephone and wireless buildings. Meanwhile, each battleship and regiment elected its own committee, modeled on the directly recallable model of the *Soviets*. By 9:00 p.m. on the evening of March 2 the majority of Red Army detachments at Kronstadt had declared their support for the rebellion. On March 3 Kronstadt published the first issue of the *Izvestia* of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee.

On March 7 Trotsky and Lev Kamenev ordered the attack against Kronstadt, dispatching around 60,000 troops under the command of Mikhail Tukhachevsky. The Red Army forces met fierce resistance, losing more than 10,000 men, not including those who joined the rebellion. The rebellion was finally crushed on March 19. Official Soviet figures put the number of rebels killed at just 1,000 but the real figure is almost certainly more, with some estimates putting it as high as 14,000–16,000. Many fled to nearby Finland, while many more were sent to labor camps.

The Kronstadt mutiny had been provoked by the depredations and miseries of a prolonged civil war, and a Bolshevik regime impervious to criticism from below. Besides the seemingly modest demands of the rebels calling for freedom of speech and free elections, there was the belief that the *Soviets*, originally organs of proletarian democracy, had been suffocated by the bureaucracy who maintained a rigid policy of top-down diktats imposed by force. Trotsky notoriously claimed that his suppression of the mutiny had “with an iron broom, rid Russia of anarchism once and for all.”

The suppression of the mutiny continues to provoke bitter argument, but what is apparent in the demands and actions of the sailors is the resolute belief that the revolutionary hopes of 1917 had been betrayed by an increasingly authoritarian party growing ever more removed from the masses it claimed to represent; the rebellion was an attempt, made from the bottom up, to confront the power of the Bolsheviks with what it saw as the power of the people.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Russia; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917

References and Suggested Readings

Avrich, P. (1970) *Kronstadt 1921*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ciliga, A. (1942) *The Kronstadt Revolt*. London: Freedom Press. Available at www.geocities.com/cordobakaf/ciligakron.html (downloaded April 17, 2008).

Mett, A. (1967) *The Kronstadt Commune*. London: Solidarity. Available at www.libcom.org/library/the-kronstadt-uprising-ida-mett (downloaded April 17, 2008).

“MK” (1997) *Beyond Kronstadt*. London: Escape. Available at www.libcom.org/library/beyond-kronstadt (downloaded April 17, 2008).

Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921)

Benjamin J. Pauli

Peter Kropotkin was one of the foremost theorists of anarchism – its principal exponent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and someone who imbued it with a philosophical and scientific legitimacy that would greatly enhance its reception in his own day and beyond. Kropotkin himself traced his anarchist sensibility back to his earliest years. He was born in Moscow in 1842 to a family that belonged to the highest stratum of Russian nobility. Kropotkin’s father was a military officer and serf owner. Though his father’s treatment of the family serfs was mild by relative standards, Kropotkin was dismayed by the extent of their oppression, and would come to sympathize deeply with their plight. After his mother died, Kropotkin and his siblings were placed almost entirely in the care of serf servants, and the loving affection and devotion the young Kropotkin received from them contributed strongly to the respect he had for the peasantry and the solidarity he felt with them throughout his life. His feelings of solidarity with the lower strata of society were further reflected in his refusal, at age 12, to be addressed as “Prince” – the beginning of a lifelong rejection of special status on account of his noble blood.

Having caught the eye of Emperor Nicholas I at a reception in the emperor’s honor, Kropotkin was shortlisted for the Corps of Pages, the most

prestigious military school in Russia, which he entered in 1857. The school was a somewhat paradoxical combination of often abusive military discipline and enlightened progressive education. While Kropotkin distinguished himself as an exceptional student, he also launched small revolts against the prevailing order in the school, including the publication of his first underground radical paper. His academic accomplishments overshadowed his burgeoning rebelliousness, however, and he was successful enough to be appointed personal page to Tsar Alexander II in 1861.

Like many Russian youths sympathetic to liberal reform at the time, Kropotkin was a constitutionalist, calling for the tsar to limit rather than renounce his power. In the tsar's presence on a daily basis, Kropotkin was at first optimistic about his seemingly reformist tendencies. The liberation of the serfs in 1861, it seemed, was a sign of considerable progress. It soon became clear, however, that hopes for reform were overblown, due to Alexander's weak temperament and his conservative circle of advisors. Disillusioned, Kropotkin left the Corps and the side of the tsar in 1862 determined to pursue reform through other channels.

Because he was unable to attend university at this time, Kropotkin enlisted in a military regiment posted in the remote Amur region of Siberia. During his time in the area, he worked on reforming prisons and local government under General Kukel, the military governor of eastern Siberia, who shared many of Kropotkin's liberal views. Kropotkin's skepticism about government was confirmed by the rampant corruption and conservatism he witnessed during this period. When St. Petersburg officially put a moratorium on liberal reform, the disappointed Kropotkin turned his attention to exploration. His several expeditions in eastern Siberia and Manchuria led to the geographical discoveries that would later make him famous in the scientific world, and his observations of animal interaction laid the groundwork for his theory of mutual aid. Furthermore, even though the working conditions that Kropotkin came across horrified him, he was consistently impressed by the resilience and solidarity of the peasants, even in the face of brutal oppression, as well as the structure of village communities.

Fed up with the army, and freshly conscious of the difficulty of reform from within, Kropotkin

returned to St. Petersburg in 1867 with the ground thoroughly primed for his burgeoning anarchist political philosophy. He finally got the chance to study math at the university level, and became known as a rising star in the field of geography. Kropotkin longed to become more politically active, however, and turned down an offer of the prestigious secretaryship of the Russian Geographical Society in 1871 in order to devote himself more fully to political causes. While he continued to write scientific articles and flesh out his principal contributions to the field, for the rest of his life Kropotkin's geographical work would take a back seat to his political activism.

In 1872 Kropotkin traveled to Switzerland to observe firsthand the Swiss groups affiliated with the International Workingmen's Association (IWA). Kropotkin was not particularly taken with the opportunistic political approach he witnessed in places like Geneva, but felt right at home in the anti-statist Jura Federation, where Bakunin's influence was heavy and relations with the General Council of the IWA were strained. Observing anarchist principles in practice among the Jurassian watchmakers was enough to definitively convert Kropotkin to anarchism. Though he considered staying in Switzerland, Kropotkin decided to return to Russia to agitate for revolution in his home country. Influenced by the growing nihilist and *narodnik* movements, he became involved with the Chaikovsky Circle, a revolutionary populist group in which he helped to distribute and produce radical literature and organize discussion groups amongst workers. For his activities, Kropotkin was arrested in the spring of 1874, and would spend two years in the Peter and Paul Fortress. The experience, which weakened him physically for the rest of his life, came to an end in 1876 when he made a dramatic escape from a military hospital and fled Russia, ultimately returning to Switzerland in 1877. Here he threw himself into the activities of the struggling Jura Federation, and founded the papers *Le Révolté* and *La Révolte*.

In 1881, Kropotkin and his wife were expelled from Switzerland at the behest of St. Petersburg and, after a year and a half in England, settled in France in 1882. Continually pestered by local authorities and Russian spies, Kropotkin was arrested within months of his arrival and sentenced to five years in prison, though he was released prematurely in 1886 after international

outcry. Banished from France, Kropotkin once again settled in England, where he focused on elaborating his anarchist philosophy. His best-known work stems from this time, including *The Conquest of Bread* (1892), *Fields, Factories, and Workshops* (1899), *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (1899), and *Mutual Aid* (1902). In part because of his ailing health, Kropotkin toned down his political activity during this period of his life, though he helped to establish the British anarchist journal *Freedom* and lectured extensively. Though his extensive writing had established him as the most famous and respected anarchist in the world, Kropotkin alienated many of his radical friends with his somewhat puzzling support for World War I, claiming that it was a war against the state and the authoritarian German tradition that worshipped it. During the revolutionary events of 1917, Kropotkin returned to Russia for the first time since the 1870s, but quickly became disheartened about the prospects for revolutionary change with the ascendance of the Bolsheviks. Kropotkin died in 1921; his funeral was widely attended in what would be the last major gathering of anarchists in Russia.

If there is one major concern that underlies Kropotkin's body of work, it is the need to ground anarchist thought in a scientific understanding of the natural world. The rise of science, for Kropotkin, represented an intellectual revolution virtually unprecedented in scope and depth, fostering mental freedom through the dissipation of metaphysical and supernatural understandings of the world, and physical freedom through the continually expanding ability of humans to shape their environment. Science tells us, Kropotkin believed, that the interaction of matter on a cosmic scale is characterized by an ever-shifting search for equilibrium, a perpetual process that cannot be captured by the rigidity of legalistic or deterministic thinking. Harmony is not pre-conceived (for example, by a divine figure), is not preordained in a rigid code, but is constantly created, undermined, and reestablished, by countless interactions. In terms of human society, such equilibrium, far from being established from above by imposed regulation, has to arise through free association. Thus the development of a new, scientific understanding of the world and its processes went hand in hand for Kropotkin with the discovery of anarchism as the appropriate mode of human organization. Anarchism represented a flexible arrangement in which new

configurations were continually sought to secure both the fullest development of individuality and the most thorough cultivation of voluntary, cooperative association. As such, an anarchist society could not be subjected to law or authority, even if instituted from below.

A scientific understanding of society would not be complete, however, without a scientific understanding of human nature. Kropotkin drew heavily from Darwin in his conception of the evolution of animal species, including the human species, but was sharply critical of the way Darwin's ideas had been appropriated by people like Herbert Spencer and Thomas Huxley, who emphasized competition and struggle as the essential mechanism of the evolutionary process. While Kropotkin conceded that competition was often central in relationships *between* species, he noted that *within a particular species*, mutual aid was by far the overriding variable in determining survival. Nature did indeed occasion the need for struggle, but this struggle was a collective struggle against circumstances rather than a war of each against all. Thus, society arises naturally from an innate tendency – present in even the minutest of animals – toward cooperation.

The instinct of mutual aid that Kropotkin observed among the animals of Siberia had its human equivalent in human beings' innate moral sense. Solidarity is the most fundamental instinct of the human species, and however oppressive the social system, Kropotkin believed that mutual aid was constantly at work in innumerable aspects of life. This intrinsic moral sense is, however, corrupted and stifled to a considerable extent by oppressive social arrangements like economic and political inequality, law, and the state's apparatus of punishment. It is further hindered by codified moral law, particularly insofar as the latter is a product of institutionalized religion. The concrete practice of mutual aid, not repression or even moral teaching, is the most effective way of maintaining the moral level of a given society. While Kropotkin consistently stressed the social nature of human beings, he refused to lose sight of the individual (though he was a sharp critic of the individualistic excesses he identified with anarchists like Max Stirner and Benjamin Tucker). Social tendencies and individual happiness, Kropotkin felt, develop in tandem. Self-realization cannot be separated from the good of the community.

If society is a natural outgrowth of instinctual tendencies, the state is an unnatural excrescence that serves the interests of a privileged elite rather than promoting equality and individual self-realization. Kropotkin thought that the idea of the state as a necessary coordinator of human activity was but another musty belief that had to go, and endeavored to bring to light the significant portion of daily life that is conducted outside of state auspices, including the rich diversity of voluntary associations that function in all spheres of human activity. Kropotkin wove a historical narrative in which the scope of voluntary association – which was broad in primitive societies and among the medieval free cities – was restricted over time by the rise of capitalism and the state. But the centralization and stratification of economic and political organization could not, of course, uproot the instinct of solidarity, and Kropotkin suggested that the modern world offered unprecedented opportunities to construct a society on this foundation.

Just as science was on the march, Kropotkin believed anarchism to be on the march; its arrival was, he thought, inevitable, though as he aged he saw it as coming further and further in the future. The contemporary advancements made in the direction of political liberty and economic equality had primed society for the introduction of anarchist communism. Anarcho-communism distinguished itself from both Proudhonian mutualism and Bakuninian collectivism by holding that the fruits of labor should be distributed on the basis of need, rather than individual contribution to the productive process. Kropotkin maintained that the eminently social character of production, especially in the modern era, rendered the notion of private property essentially incoherent, and necessitated a communist form of social organization.

Because the satisfaction of needs would be thoroughly fulfilled by communism, the groundwork would be laid for each and every individual to pursue his or her highest development. Scientific advancement, Kropotkin thought, had rendered the once-utopian anarchist ideal of social organization a concrete possibility. Most notably, the development of industrial technique, including intensive methods of food production, had made it possible to render the Malthusian notion of “scarcity” obsolete. The implication, Kropotkin suggested, was that in the modern industrial era it was possible to secure not only bread – as the title of one of his major works would suggest – but

genuine well-being for all. He envisioned a society in which industry was decentralized, town and country were integrated, and the means of production were in the hands of associations of producers. Labor would be freely chosen, but a combination of mental and manual work would be emphasized. Accordingly, education would instill both mental and manual skills, as well as respect for both kinds of labor. Such an arrangement would lead to large gains in productivity, which would allow for significant reductions in the workday, as well as regional self-sufficiency.

Kropotkin argued that this mode of economic production could not be reconciled with the centralized political apparatus that had arisen with capitalism. In an anarchist society, he proposed, customs and a network of voluntary associations would take the place of the state, law, and government. Coercion, Kropotkin believed, is both an undesirable and ineffective strategy for preventing antisocial acts. Kropotkin assumed genuinely antisocial temperaments to be extremely rare, and thought the pressures of custom and social censure would be sufficient means of regulating behavior in an anarchist society. Drawing from his extensive experience as an observer of prison life on both the outside and the inside, Kropotkin concluded that prisons failed miserably in their supposed mission to rehabilitate criminals, instead dehumanizing them and rendering them unfit to function in society, and ultimately fostering rather than alleviating crime.

Despite his emphasis on harmony, Kropotkin realized that an anarchist society could only be created through forceful and sometimes violent action. Kropotkin did not share Bakunin’s enthusiasm for destruction – indeed, he had a deep personal aversion to violence and was more ambivalent about the use of “propaganda by the deed” than contemporary advocates like his friend Elisée Reclus – but he believed that occasional violence was an unavoidable, if distasteful, necessity. Kropotkin adamantly rejected the notion that revolution could be brought about by means of the state and law. He saw peaceful, parliamentary means of change as inadequate in the face of a middle class determined to maintain its grip on power, and warned that socialists who participate in the state have the tendency to drift away from their socialist inclinations.

Kropotkin did more than any other anarchist of his time to popularize anarchist thought and imbue it with ethical respectability and scientific and philosophical depth. He is the chief repres-

entative of a major branch of anarchist thought that insists upon seeing the individual in the context of the whole and linking individual well-being to the good of society. He was one of the few anarchists willing to give some idea of what an anarchist society would look like, and the vision he formulated would have a strong influence on subsequent anarchist theorists.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Russia; Anarchocommunism; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865); Reclus, Elisée (1830–1905); Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russia, Revolutions: Sources and Contexts

References and Suggested Readings

- Kropotkin, P. (1892) *The Conquest of Bread*. Paris.
- Kropotkin, P. (1899a) *Fields, Factories, and Workshops*. London: Hutchinson.
- Kropotkin, P. (1899b) *Memoirs of a Revolutionist*. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
- Kropotkin, P. (1902) *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*. London: Heinemann.
- Kropotkin, P. (1922) *Ethics: Origins and Development*. Petrograd and Moscow: Golos Truda.
- Kropotkin, P. (1927) *Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets*. Ed. R. N. Baldwin. New York: Vanguard Press.
- Miller, M. A. (1976) *Kropotkin*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Woodcock, G. & Avakumović, I. (1990) *Peter Kropotkin: From Prince to Rebel*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

Kuliscioff, Anna (1853/1857?–1925)

Donatella Cherubini

Anna Kuliscioff was a leading Russian revolutionary and anarchist. After immigrating to Italy, she went on to become a socialist feminist, dedicating her political work to advancing the cause of women's emancipation.

Born to a wealthy family in Crimea, Kuliscioff received a university degree in philosophy at Zurich at a time when anarchist revolutionary ideas were spreading in Russia. Kuliscioff returned to Russia by order of the tsarist authorities, and there she joined the anarchist international movement as an activist. She later moved to Paris but was arrested and extradited, along with her companion, the Italian anarchist revolutionary Andrea Costa. Kuliscioff then

moved to Italy, establishing contacts in Florence with anarchists influenced by Mikhail Bakunin, and was arrested and tried. It was at this time that Kuliscioff dissociated herself from anarchism and began pursuing socialist ideals and action.

After her relationship with Costa ended, Kuliscioff returned to Switzerland and obtained a degree in medicine, beginning a professional commitment to assist pregnant women. Kuliscioff then became a companion of the future founder of the Italian Socialist Party, the gradualist reformist Filippo Turati. From the end of the 1880s Turati and Kuliscioff immersed themselves in the socialist milieu of Milan, founding Italian socialism's most important theoretical journal, *Critica Sociale*. Kuliscioff's relationship with Turati and socialism lasted throughout her lifetime. Surmounting the late nineteenth-century political crisis, Kuliscioff strengthened her commitment to welfare legislation and the absolute priority of women's suffrage. Her aspirations in favor of women's suffrage were not realized during the political turmoil in Italy following World War I as the influence of fascism was growing in the country. Kuliscioff died in 1925, as Benito Mussolini's fascist regime was gaining power. She remains a prominent figure in Italian socialism for her support of welfare rights and female emancipation and her activism in advancing these causes.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Marxism; Turati, Filippo (1857–1932)

References and Suggested Readings

- Miller, J. E. (1990) *From Elite to Mass Politics: Italian Socialism in the Giolittian Era, 1900–1914*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Schiavi, A. (1955) *Anna Kuliscioff*. Rome: Opere nuove.

Kurdistan nationalist movement and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party)

Deniz Ekici

The Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) or Kurdistan Workers' Party was one of the most radical and influential Kurdish revolutionary movements in the twentieth century. The PKK

was born out of the ashes of previous Kurdish rebellions against the modernizing Turkish state established under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk following World War I, in quest of founding an independent Kurdish state. While the majority of Kurdish movements were more traditionally nationalist in character, the PKK was unique due to its Marxist-Leninist orientation (Barkey & Fuller 1998).

The PKK utilized Marxist Leninism as an ideological basis for creating an independent and united Kurdistan against Kemalist Turkey under a democratic people's dictatorship, with the ultimate goal of creating a classless society. To achieve these goals, the PKK launched a guerilla war in the early 1980s against the colonialist Turkish state and its local "collaborators." The war lasted more than 20 years, resulting in close to 50,000 deaths.

After World War I and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, Kurdistan was divided between newly created entities, namely Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Soon after, these four states began intense campaigns to assimilate the Kurds, with the Turkish state being the most ruthless of all. Numerous local and spontaneous rebellions led by religious, tribal, and some secular nationalist intellectuals occurred after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, although they were all severely crushed. The Kemalist regime represented these revolts to the outside world as religious revolts to bring back the Caliphate system, while promoting Kemalism as a progressive and revolutionary regime (Nezan 1993).

The PKK was the result of the failure by Turkish leftist groups to address the Kurdish issue. In May 1973, a member of the Turkish left, Abdullah Öcalan, stated that the creation of a Kurdish group was necessary, arguing that Kurdistan existed as a colony under the Turkish state and Turkish leftist organizations would never be capable of diagnosing the Kurdish issue properly. According to Öcalan, the Kurds, as a separate nation, should determine their own political destiny (Gunter 1990). In addition, Öcalan felt that Kurds should struggle with their own organization based on their own dynamics (Öcalan 2004). In their meeting in the Tuzluca district of Ankara in 1974, the Kurdish leftists who were members of the Ankara Democratic Higher Education Association (ADYÖD) decided to establish a Kurdish

organization independent of the Turkish leftist movements. This would be the foundation of what was later to become the PKK.

While the majority of its membership were half-educated town dwellers and peasants, the leadership of the PKK was progressive, consisting of intellectual cadres with a Marxist-Leninist program. The program called *Kurdistan Devriminin Yolu* (The Road to the Revolution of Kurdistan) was written by Öcalan and Mehmet Hayri Durmuş between 1976 and 1977 (Öcalan 2006). It championed a Leninist notion of every nation's right to self-determination. According to this program, the armed struggle, based on the Stalinist model, was the only way to realize the revolution of Kurdistan. In this struggle the main forces of the Kurdish revolution would be based on the alliance between workers and peasants. While peasants would be the main base of the popular army, the proletariat would provide the movement with its progressive Marxist-Leninist ideology, although Marxism was anathema to the Muslim and conservative Kurdish nation.

By the end of 1978 Öcalan was confident that conditions existed to form a political party and to start a war for the liberation of Kurdistan. On November 26–7, 1978, Öcalan gathered the entire cadre's group and set a meeting in Fis (Ziyaret) village of Lice town, near Amed. This meeting would serve as the first congress of the party and the name *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*, or the Kurdistan Workers' Party, was adopted. The PKK declared its formation by attacking Mehmet Celal Bucak, a feudal landlord and tribal leader in the region of Sêrek (Siverek), who exploited the peasants and collaborated with the Turkish state. Bucak would survive the attack only to encounter several future confrontations with PKK militants.

The continued attacks by the PKK on other feudal landlords and Turkish organizations gained significant support among Kurdish peasants, young students, and the proletariat. In the beginning the PKK attacked only the big landlords, collaborators, and other rival organizations. It circulated books, brochures, and periodicals to justify its attacks on these groups and emphasized the importance of violence as the only way to achieve its goals of liberation (van Bruinessen 1988).

In December 1979, Öcalan withdrew to Syria while the rest of the militants and cadres

remained in Turkish Kurdistan. Öcalan, under the code name Ali, sought a relationship with Palestinian organizations in Syria and Lebanon. He succeeded in acquiring the help of Nayef Hawatmeh of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), who assisted in establishing a training camp in Lebanon for PKK militants. During the same period Öcalan found support for Kurdish groups in other parts of Kurdistan and in Western Europe. He also established a relationship with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Cuba. By 1982, Öcalan had developed a strong and permanent relationship with the Syrian authorities through Cemil al-Assad and Rifat al-Assad, brothers of the Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad. This allowed the PKK to form several training camps, not only in Syria but also in Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon. Beginning in 1980, the PKK deployed trained groups of between 30 and 35 militants in Turkish Kurdistan. The following year more groups were deployed as new members arrived to be trained at the camps.

In 1981, the PKK held its first conference to evaluate its practice of armed conflict with Turkish Kurdistan. The party concluded that these conflicts should be avoided and greater emphasis placed on military and political training. During the second congress in 1982, the PKK decided to make preparations to "return back to the country" (Öcalan 2003). The second congress also generated a political program promoting a weak force against a strong state in a long-term popular war. By the end of 1982, the first reconnaissance groups headed back to Turkish Kurdistan to establish contact with patriots in villages and to scout locations in the mountainous areas where guerilla forces could enter. In 1983 the PKK carried out its first significant attack on the Turkish security forces in which three soldiers died. After the attack the Iraqi government allowed the Turkish army to enter Iraq to pursue the PKK. However, they failed to find anything related to the attack.

The PKK later organized its guerilla forces under the Hêzên Rizgariya Kurdistan (HRK) or Liberation Forces of Kurdistan. On August 15, 1984, after announcing the establishment of the HRK, the PKK carried out two simultaneous attacks on the towns of Dihê (Eruh) and Şemzînan (Şemdinli) in Sêrt (Siirt). In the following months the HRK carried out more attacks on Turkish security forces based on hit-

and-run action. The HRK was the first phase in the PKK's plan to develop a powerful guerilla army. In March 1985, the PKK established the Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdista (ERNK) or Kurdistan National Liberation Front to organize "the non-Marxist and often religious Kurdish masses" (Imset 1996). The primary role of ERNK was to carry out public relations for the PKK and function as the propaganda apparatus. In 1986, at its third congressional conference, the PKK replaced the HRK with the Artêşa Rizgariya Gelê Kurdistan (ARGK) or the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan. The ARGK assumed the role of executive body for military matters with the PKK. ERNK produced recruits for the ARGK, organized mass demonstrations and riots, collected money from PKK supporters, provided logistical supplies for the ARGK, and represented the PKK in Middle Eastern and European countries by carrying out international diplomacy activities. ERNK was made up of several sub-organizations, each designed to focus on and organize different social groups with different social, economic, and ideological backgrounds.

In October 1998, Turkey accused Syria of supporting the PKK and, with the consent and support of the US, called on Syria to expel Öcalan or face a heavy attack from Turkey. Öcalan agreed with the request of Syrian officials and left the country. Thereafter, he sought asylum in many European and African countries, first going to Russia to obtain political asylum and to seek a peaceful solution for the Kurdish cause. However, he failed to secure asylum both from Russia and later from Greece and Italy. In February 1999, the Greek authorities told Öcalan that they would take him to South Africa where he could seek political asylum. However, instead he was taken to Nairobi and handed over to the Turkish military (White 2000). It is believed by Öcalan's lawyer that he was sent to Kenya because this put him outside the jurisdiction of the European Convention on Human Rights. On February 16, 1999, Öcalan was delivered to the Turkish security forces at a Greek diplomatic residence in Nairobi to await extradition to Turkey. He has been kept in a prison cell on Imralı island where he is serving a life sentence.

In 1991, Turgut Özal, former president of the Turkish Republic, stated that the PKK had 3,900 guerilla forces. Two years later the US Department of State estimated that the PKK

had around 3,000 guerillas. That same year, the *New York Times* claimed that the PKK had 10,000 guerilla forces in Turkish Kurdistan (Imset 1996). In 1995, the US Department of State estimated the total number of guerilla forces at around 15,000, supported by 75,000 active ERNK members (White 2000). According to PKK officials, the figure was much higher. In 1994, Kani Yılmaz, former PKK foreman in Europe, claimed that the PKK had 30,000 professional fighters (Gunter 1997). In 2005, the PKK declared it had around 10,000 active guerilla forces operating in Kurdistan. In addition, Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê (PJAK) or the Kurdistan Free Life Party, considered to be a hybrid of the PKK, had 2,000 guerillas conducting a guerilla war against the Iranian government (*The Economist*, 2006).

After Öcalan was captured the PKK Central Committee managed to appoint a new Ruling Council, which unilaterally declared a ceasefire that lasted from 1999 to 2005. Conflicts would resume when the PKK accused Turkish security forces of failing to obey the ceasefire agreement. In October 2006, Öcalan called for a peaceful solution and the party declared another ceasefire that is still in effect. Because the PKK had been designated a terrorist organization by both the United States and the European Union, it was necessary to change its name in order to pave the way for a more diplomatic, peaceful solution. In April 2002 at its eighth congressional conference, the PKK officially changed its name to Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasiya Kurdistan (KADEK) or the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan. In December 2003, for similar reasons, KADEK was renamed the Kongra-Gelê Kurdistanê (Kongra-Gel) or Kurdistan Peoples. This fooled no one, in particular the Turkish state, who again designated both KADEK and the Kongra-Gel as terrorist organizations. In 2004 the name PKK was restored, with structural changes within the organization. Later that year some of the substantial cadres broke away from the PKK to form the Partiya Welatparêzên Demokrat ên Kurdistanê (PWD) or Patriotic Democratic Party of Kurdistan. Hikmet Fidan and Kani Yılmaz were allegedly assassinated by the PKK soon after the establishment of the PWD.

From his prison cell on Imrah island, Abdullah Öcalan recently announced a sketchy outline for the structure of an organization called the

Koma Komelên Kurdistan (KKK) or Confederation of Kurdistan Associations (some prefer to translate it inaccurately as the Democratic Confederation of Kurdistan). The KKK is a roof organization that brings together various units of the PKK under an Executive Presidential Board headed by Murat Karayilan. The Koma Komelên Kurdistan was renamed the Koma Ciwakên Kurdistan (KCK) or Confederation of Kurdistan Societies at Kongra-Gel's fifth general assembly, held on April 16–22, 2007.

SEE ALSO: Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938); Barzani, Mulla Mustafa (1903–1979); Iran, Kurdish National Autonomy Movement; Leninist Philosophy; Marxism

References and Suggested Readings

- Barkey, H. J. & Fuller, G. (1998) *Turkey's Kurdish Question*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Bozarslan, H. (1996) Turkey: Insolvent Ideologies, Fractured State: Turkey's Elections and the Kurds. *Middle Eastern Report* 199: 16–19.
- Filkins, D. (2003) Kurds are Finally Heard: Turkey Burned Our Villages. *New York Times*, A3.
- Gunter, M. M. (1990) *The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Gunter, M. M. (1997) *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Gunter, M. M. (2004) *Historical Dictionary of the Kurds*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.
- Imset, I. G. (1996) The PKK: Freedom Fighters or Terrorists? *International Journal of Kurdish Studies* 10: 45–100.
- Kirişçi, K. & Windrow, G. M. (2003) *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict*. Abingdon: Routledge Curzon Press.
- Kutschera, C. (1994) The Kurdish Experience, Mad Dreams of Independence: The Kurds of Turkey and the PKK. *Middle East Report* 189: 12–15.
- Nezan, K. (1993) Kurdistan in Turkey. In G. Chaliand (Ed.), *A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan*. New York: Olive Branch Press.
- Öcalan, A. (1992) Kurdistan Devriminin Yolu [The Path of the Kurdish Revolution]. *Serxwebûn* 24 (24).
- Öcalan, A. (2001) *Özgür İnsan Savunması* [The Defense of the Free Man]. Istanbul: Mem Press.
- Öcalan, A. (2003) *Partîleşme Sorunları ve Görevlerimiz I* [The Issues of the Party Line and Our Duties I]. Istanbul: Çetin Press.
- Öcalan, A. (2004) *Bir Halkı Savunmak* [In Defense of A Nation]. Istanbul: Çetin Press.
- Öcalan, A. (2006) *Ziman û Çalakiya Rastiyê* [The Language and the Action of the Reality]. Istanbul: YRD Press.
- Romano, D. (2006) *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Şahan, T. & Balik, U. (2004) *İtirafçı*. Cologne: Mezopotamya Press.
- Van Bruinessen, M. (1984) State Terror in Turkey: The Kurds in Turkey. *MERIP Reports* 121: 6–12, 14.
- Van Bruinessen, M. (1988) Islam and the State: Between Guerilla War and Political Murder, The Workers' Party of Kurdistan. *Middle East Report* 153: 40–2, 44–6, 50.
- Van Bruinessen, M. (1996) Turkey: Insolvent Ideologies, Fractured State. Turkey's Death Squads. *Middle Eastern Report* 199: 20–3.
- White, P. J. (2000) *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey*. New York: Zed Books.

Kuroń, Jacek (1934–2004)

Amy Linch

One of the most influential thinkers and activists in Eastern Europe, Jacek Kuroń was a leader of the democratic opposition to the People's Republic of Poland from the mid-1950s until its demise in 1989. He co-founded the Worker's Defense Committee, was both organizer and intellectual advisor to Lech Walesa and Solidarność (Solidarity), and played a pivotal role in the Round Table negotiations that paved the way for democratic governance in Poland. During the 1990s Kuroń was twice Poland's minister of labor and social policy. Through his official capacity and as a private citizen he worked to alleviate the economic impact of the transition to market capitalism on the poorest members of society.

Kuroń began his social and political activism as a committed communist. Born into a family of socialist intellectuals in the now Ukrainian city of Lvov, Kuroń became a member of the Communist Youth League at 15 and of the Polish United Workers' Party as a young adult. He was active in the Polish Scouting Association, organizing "red" troops with the goal of teaching cooperative social values to the next generation – future Solidarność leader Adam Michnik was among his charges. During the mid-1950s Kuroń was one of the most prominent members of the Crooked Circle Club (Krzywe Kolo), a discussion group of dissident intellectuals. In 1964 he collaborated with a fellow lecturer at the University of Warsaw, Karol Modzelewski, in publishing a Marxist analysis of Polish society

entitled *An Open Letter to Members of the Polish United Workers' Party*. He argued that the central political bureaucracy, rather than creating a society in which workers were in control of their own labor, had become a new ruling class. The fundamental conflict between the working class and this new bureaucratic class was plunging the country into a social and economic crisis that could only be resolved by a true proletariat revolution that brought about worker control over factories and gave executive and legislative control to a federation of workers' councils. A multi-party system, independent trade unions, a workers' militia, and full intellectual freedom would further characterize the new political order – which would be saved from Hungary's 1956 fate by similar revolutions in other communist countries. Kuroń was expelled from the party and sentenced to three years in prison.

By 1968 Kuroń no longer believed that reform was possible through the Communist Party. Poland's participation in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia to wrest control of the country from reformers seemingly left few options for reform-minded Poles. With the party delegitimized and the prospects for direct confrontation with the regime grim, Kuroń advocated a strategy of societal self-organization. People created power when they organized, a power that broke the ideological control of the state. Each instance of engaged citizenship and "self-help" association "challenges the monopoly of the state and thereby challenges the basis upon which it exercises power." By creating new institutions, fostering new forms of public behavior, such as public protest and the use of the media, and teaching people by example to confront the state with inventiveness, courage, and energy, Kuroń cultivated the dissolution of the communist system.

Kuroń was among 13 intellectuals who established the Workers' Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR) in response to the brutal repression of striking workers in 1976. KOR was the first openly functioning opposition group in any communist country. The group united workers and intellectuals in the common cause of resistance. Kuroń's apartment was a center of the effort to organize legal and financial support for detainees and develop an international network of civic activism that drew attention to the workers' plight. This alliance began the nationwide, cross-class mobilization of the

public in the Solidarity movement. During 1980–1 Kuroń was an advisor to Lech Walesa and Solidarność; he spent numerous hours with striking workers and negotiating with the government. He was again arrested in December 1981 and imprisoned until 1984, when he was granted amnesty.

Kuroń continued his struggle for justice once Poland transformed into a democratic, market capitalist system. As minister of labor and social policy in the 1990s he sought (unsuccessfully) to bring together trade unions, employers' associations, and government agencies to negotiate social policy. Dismayed that the democratic system he struggled to bring about left people hungry, he organized soup kitchens through which he served the poor in the spirit of "mutual aid" rather than charity. In his last public speech, at the World Economic Forum in Warsaw (2004), Kuroń told activists: "It is you, my Dear Friends, who have to perform the actions which contemporary political elites cannot perform: who have to create new concepts of social cooperation, implement ideals of freedom, equality, and social justice."

SEE ALSO: Michnik, Adam (b. 1946); Poland, Committee for Workers (KOR); Poland, 1956 Uprising; Poland, Student Movement, 1968; Prague Spring; Solidarność (Solidarity); Walesa, Lech (b. 1943)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bernhard, M. & Szlajfer, H. (Eds.) (1995) *From the Polish Underground: Selections from Krytyka 1978–1993*. University Park: Penn State Press.
- Kemp-Welch, A. (2008) *Poland Under Communism: A Cold War History*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kuroń, J. (1968) *Revolutionary Marxist Students in Poland Speak Out 1964–68*. New York: Merit.
- Ost, D. (1991) *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Tismaneanu, V. (1999) *The Revolutions of 1989*. New York: Routledge.

Kwangju student uprising

Won Young-su

Though the Yushin regime (1972–9) came to an end with the assassination of President Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979, the military

conspirators had no intention of giving up power. The military coup d'état of December 12, 1979 led by Chun Doo-hwan paved the way for a new military regime. But in the following spring there was a massive upsurge for democratization in universities, factories, and mines, and an overwhelming majority of people demanded the immediate end of military rule and the realization of democratic politics. May 15, 1980 was the culmination of this Spring of Democratization. On that day, over 100,000 students and citizens gathered in a mass rally in front of Seoul Station, demanding the full-scale democratization of Korean society through the abolition of martial law and the elimination of the remnants of the Yushin regime. In response, the military imposed martial law upon the entire country on May 17 and swiftly arrested most student activists and prominent opposition leaders, including Kim Dae-jung. In response, the students and people of the city of Kwangju, a strong political base for Dae-jung, rose up.

Of course, the popular uprising brought a swift reaction. Under the name of Operation Glorious Holiday, parachute ranger troops were sent to Kwangju with the permission of the US military force. On May 18, soldiers began beating protesters indiscriminately and killing innocent and defenseless civilians, even slaying a pregnant woman with a bayonet. The people in the street began to fight back, and insurgents began to arm themselves by taking weapons from the soldiers and attacking the arsenals. On May 19, in the face of unexpected popular resistance, the troops were driven out of the city and the armed population occupied the provincial office. Finally, on May 21, the armed militia occupied the whole city and Kwangju was liberated, though the city was blocked and encircled by troops.

During the uprising the insurgents set up their own governing committee, and the militia units defended the city from the military. Every day they held mass rallies and the leadership of the uprising attempted to expand it into surrounding areas, as well as throughout the nation. But those efforts failed and Kwangju was isolated from the rest of the country while the military propaganda depicted Kwangju as a city dominated by communist provocateurs.

After ten days' occupation and uprising, the military attacked the insurgents in Kwangju. On the early morning of May 27, the troops

reoccupied the provincial hall. Eventually, the Kwangju uprising was brutally suppressed.

Student leaders were shocked at the level of violence committed by the special forces, and it caused psychological trauma and related political debates. The retreat from the mass mobilization of Seoul Station was one issue, and the leaders' decision to evade direct confrontation with the military was harshly criticized, hence militancy became an essential element for the upcoming struggles. The goal of the movement also came up for debate, and it was concluded that the complete revolutionary overthrow of the military

regime was the only way to achieve democracy. It was also decided that the movement should be targeting capitalism as well. Thus, the event in Kwangju foreshadowed a later radicalization of the whole movement, bringing about a new generation of young revolutionaries.

SEE ALSO: Student Movements, Korea

Reference and Suggested Reading

Kahn-cha, N. & Katiaficas, G. (Eds.) (2007) *South Korean Democracy: Legacy of the Gwangju Uprising*. London: Routledge.

L

La Boétie, Etienne de (1530–1563)

Abel Polese

Etienne de La Boétie was a distinguished lawyer, poet, and humanist who also translated Xenophon and Plutarch. Most importantly, his “Discourse of Voluntary Servitude” is considered the basis for modern non-violent protest movements.

De La Boétie was born in Sarlat, France, on November 1, 1530 to a family of magistrates. His father, a lieutenant, died when Etienne was still very young, so his uncle, Estienne, took responsibility for his education. Although some historians claim that de La Boétie went to the Collège de Guyenne in Bordeaux, others disagree. Historians do agree that de la Boétie studied law at the University of Orleans under the guidance of Anne du Bourg. He graduated in 1553, and six years later his mentor was burned for heresy.

During his years as a university student, de La Boétie conceived his most famous work, the “Discourse of Voluntary Servitude,” which was a reaction to the attitude of the French king, François I. In September 1579, a new regulation taxing salt (*la gabelle*) prompted popular uprisings in Bordeaux, and the government engaged in brutal repression. On this occasion, de La Boétie started asking himself why people obey rules that go against their own interest. The result was a pamphlet, circulated privately until 1576, called “Le Discours de la servitude volontaire.”

Thanks to the reputation he earned during his university years, upon completion of his law studies in 1553 de La Boétie was invited, as councillor, into the Bordeaux parliament. He was then elevated to court councillor and, after 1560, entrusted with leading negotiations in the frame of the Catholic–Protestant dispute. His career turned out to be very short since on August 18, 1563, at age 32, de La Boétie died

on his way to Médoc, where he was hoping that the healthy climate would help him recover from dysentery.

Etienne de La Boétie paved the way for the concept of civil disobedience by examining the reasons why some people obey those who command, while others resist. The state and tyrants do not force citizens, de La Boétie maintains; rather, some are simply inclined to comply with state orders out of an inclination to voluntary servitude. In explaining why tyranny occurs, Etienne de La Boétie placed tyrants into three categories – those elected, those who inherited power, and those who claimed it by force.

Regardless of how they got power, rulers who rule justly are legitimate, and those who rule badly are not and are tyrants. At the beginning, the new tyrant has to create new habits and behaviors. This is possible because collective obedience comes from a human inclination that contradicts nature. La Boétie refers to this proclivity as vice because humans are born free and each has the ability to reason and cultivate his or her innate independence, but in the end, not everybody pursues free will of thought and action. After the majority is accustomed to automatic obedience, the tyrant’s main challenge is to reduce dissent. Control of the masses rests in control of media and education, and determines the way people are formed and the information they can spread around a country. The tyrant then seeks to create a pyramidal structure, with a number of people fed by the system, through tax-funded salaries, faithful to the tyrant and willing to preserve the status quo to keep their benefits. Man’s liberty does not require the death of the tyrant but the end of the system (tyranny). The only way to liquidate the system is to destroy its power structures through non-violent resistance. A tyrant is defeated when people simply refuse to consent to their own enslavement, thus non-violent resistance and civil disobedience are the best strategies to challenge state power.

Students of collective action view this conception of power deriving from below as a central contribution to the theory of non-violent protest, and it has arrived almost unchanged to our days. Gene Sharp, founder of the Albert Einstein Institute and scholar of non-violent protest in the twentieth century, argues that Etienne de La Boétie's essay is crucial to understanding the origins of dictatorship and popular means of liberation from political enslavement.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); Non-Violent Movements, Foundations and Early Expressions; Non-Violent Movements: Struggles for Rights, Justice, and Identities; Non-Violent Revolutions; Sharp, Gene (b. 1928)

References and Suggested Readings

- La Boétie, E. de (1942) *Anti-Dictator: The Discours de la Servitude Volontaire of Etienne de La Boétie*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- La Boétie, E. de (n.d.) *Le Discours de la servitude volontaire*, available at www.forget-me.net/LaBoetie/servitude.pdf (accessed October 19, 2007).
- La Boétie, E. de & Bonnefon, P. (2007) *The Politics of Obedience and Etienne de La Boétie*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Sharp, G. (1973) *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Boston: Porter Sargent.

La Ceiba Uprising of 1924

Olga Burkert

The La Ceiba Uprising of 1924 was the revolutionary overthrow of President Antonio López Gutiérrez by several Honduran generals and politicians. López Gutiérrez had been the leader of an armed movement against former President Francisco Bertrand and was elected president in 1919 for the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal de Honduras, PLH). As the 1923 elections ended with no clear winner, López Gutiérrez imposed a state of emergency and installed himself in power as a dictator.

A civil war broke out, and several parties began trying to overthrow the López Gutiérrez regime. One of them was General Tiburcio Carías Andino, who started his campaign in the northern town of La Ceiba on the Atlantic

coast of Honduras. Carías was the conservative National Party (Partido Nacional de Honduras, PNH) candidate for presidency in the October 1923 elections. The PLH had been unable to agree upon a candidate owing to internal disputes, so it presented two candidates, Policarpo Bonilla and Juan Angel Arias. As none of the three candidates gained an absolute majority, according to the Honduran constitution parliament had to appoint a president and vice-president. However, the members of parliament were unable to obtain a quorum.

On February 1, 1924, López Gutiérrez appointed himself ruler by decree, concentrating all state powers in his person, “until the country returned to a normal situation” (Barahona 1999: 86). López Gutiérrez feared the revolutionary uprising of Tiburcio Carías's troops, even asking for US intervention to avoid a civil war in Honduras. Shortly after proclaiming a state of emergency, repression against the opposition began: 200 members of the PNH were arrested, and one was killed. Meanwhile, General Carías declared himself president because he had received the greatest number of votes in the 1923 elections.

An armed conflict broke out. On February 28, there was a battle in La Ceiba between the rebels and government troops, and 50 people were killed. Even the presence of the US Marines could not prevent the fighting. Carías and his troops headed toward the Nicaraguan border, where they gathered supporters, and they battled the government troops successfully. Other insurgent generals like Gregorio Ferrera and Vicente Tosta fought and won important battles on the Atlantic coast. Shortly afterwards, in April, the forces of the uprising controlled almost the entire Honduran territory but were unable to seize the capital.

Carías's troops were largely supported and financed by the US Standard Fruit Company based in La Ceiba. The banana export company was a large landholder in Honduras and Central America, and also the owner of much of the transport and communications systems. In the beginning of the twentieth century, the US had begun to invest in Central American countries, particularly in banana companies. Until 1930 most areas of transportation (railways, harbors) were in the hands of the fruit industry. In 1932, for example, the United Fruit Company, together with Standard Fruit and the Cuyamel Fruit Company, the three largest banana export

companies, controlled two-thirds of the worldwide banana trade and owned 96,000 square kilometers of land, a fleet with 160 ships, and 3,000 kilometers of railway all over the world. The Standard Fruit Company's headquarters were in the northern Atlántida department in Honduras. Together with the other companies they controlled a large proportion of Central American political and economic development. Because of these huge US interests, the US government intervened all through the twentieth century in the political affairs of Honduras and all Central and Latin American countries. The US ambassador in Honduras observed political developments closely in those years and tried to influence the different parties in the conflict according to US interests.

In an agreement signed in 1907 by all Central American countries except Costa Rica and the United States (and renewed in 1923), the nations confirmed that they would not accept any government imposed by coup d'état or a revolution in any of these countries. According to the terms of this agreement, and concerned about political instability in Central America, the US military intervened several times in Honduras in 1924. In total, 70 infantry battalions of the US Army disembarked in La Ceiba between February and March 1924. In March of the same year, the US embassy in Tegucigalpa called for intervention to protect US citizens. Two hundred Marines disembarked in the harbors of La Ceiba and Puerto Cortés on March 19, and a few days later they occupied the Honduran capital. At the same time, Washington made efforts to end the civil war and sent the intermediary Summer Welles to participate in the peace negotiations between all political parties. After López Gutiérrez's death in March 1924, a Council of Ministers assumed power.

On May 3, Vicente Tosta Carrasco was proclaimed interim president, agreeing to form a government with members of all revolutionary parties and a Constituent Assembly within 90 days. Presidential elections were to be held as soon as possible. The United States put pressure on Tosta to conduct a fair election, placing an embargo on arms to Honduras and preventing the interim government's access to loans. The US government made it clear that it would not accept any candidate who arose from one of the revolutionary parties. So, finally, Carías withdrew his candidacy for the coming term and the PNH

nominated Miguel Paz Barahona, who won the 1924 elections and remained president until 1929.

Revolutionary leader Tiburcio Carías Andino was elected president in 1932 and maintained power until 1949, the longest period of presidency ever in Honduras. During his administration, Honduras weathered the economic crisis of the 1930s with a dramatic fall in banana prices. Carías is remembered as the president who helped to develop the country by building infrastructure, creating a solid financial policy, and strengthening the military. On the other hand, he institutionalized his power by changing the constitution to allow his reelection, prolonging the period of office from four to six years. He also reintroduced the death penalty. Furthermore, Carías suppressed worker strikes and organizations and banned the Communist Party.

SEE ALSO: Honduran General Strike of 1954; Imperialism and Capitalist Development

References and Suggested Readings

- Barahona, M. (1999) *La influencia de los Estados Unidos en Honduras (1900–1954) del Tratado de 1907 a la huelga bananera de 1954*. Doctoral thesis. Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen.
- Canelas Diaz, A. (2001) *El estrangulamiento económico de La Ceiba*. La Ceiba: Editorial ProCultura.
- Dodd, T. J. (2005) *Tiburcio Carías: Portrait of a Honduran Political Leader*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- García Buchard, E. (1997) *Poder político, interés bananero e identidad nacional en Centro América: un estudio comparativo: Costa Rica (1884–1938) y Honduras (1902–1958)*. Tegucigalpa: Ed. Universitaria.
- Ribas, M. (2004) *Diario de la Guerra de Honduras*. Tegucigalpa: Editorial Cultura de la Dirección.

La Matanza 1932 Peasant Revolt

Edward T. Brett

Matanza, which in Spanish simply means massacre, is the name commonly used by Salvadorans for the peasant uprising of January 1932 in El Salvador and the slaughter of between 15,000 and 30,000 mostly Pipil Indians that followed.

In March 1931, with both the oligarchy and military divided and supporting five different candidates for president, a sixth candidate, the

populist Arturo Araujo, was able to win with a plurality of the vote, thereby becoming president. When he attempted to implement some modest reforms that would help peasants who were suffering from the collapse of the coffee market brought on by the Great Depression, he was overthrown in a December 2 military coup and replaced by his vice-president, General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez.

Meanwhile, the Communist Party, along with discontented indigenous peasant groups and segments of the military, had been planning an uprising. The leading force behind the plot was Agustín Farabundo Martí, the secretary general of the Communist Party. January 22 was chosen as the date for the insurrection to begin. The government discovered the plot, however, and on January 19 Martí and several other leaders were arrested. The next day the government declared a state of siege and the barracks revolt that had been planned by dissident military officers was abandoned.

Peasants in the western departments of Ahuachapán, Santa Ana, and Sonsonate, and along Lake Ilopango east of San Salvador, revolted anyway. Without any means of communication, they probably did not receive word that the leaders of the plot had been taken into custody. Armed with little more than machetes and lacking leadership, they did little harm. They were able to take some towns in Sonsonate, where they looted some warehouses and killed about a hundred people. About half of these were soldiers sent to crush the revolt; the rest were mostly exploitative storeowners and local governmental officials.

General Hernández Martínez and other high-ranking military officers, however, seeing an opportunity to make an example of the Pipil Indians so that in the future others would think twice about rebelling, and also hoping to cement their alliance with the coffee oligarchy, decided to eradicate “the communists.” Even though the uprising was over in two days, soldiers continued to roam the countryside, rounding up and killing large numbers of indigenous people by firing squad. Altogether, about 2 percent of the Salvadoran population was executed.

La Matanza has been permanently seared into the collective memory of all Salvadorans, rich and poor alike. Since people were executed solely because they were Indians, the indigenous survivors abandoned their traditional clothing

and customs and took up the ways of Hispanic culture. For the military-oligarchy power structure, a mythology was developed that depicted a “communist” revolt in which the lower classes raped, pillaged, and murdered. Thus, for them the lesson learned from 1932 is that all lower-class unrest must be nipped in the bud so that history will not be allowed to repeat itself.

SEE ALSO: Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN); Martí, Farabundo (1893–1932)

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, T. (1971) *Matanza: El Salvador's Communist Revolt of 1932*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Berryman, P. (1984) *The Religious Roots of Rebellion: Christians in Central American Revolutions*. Maryknoll: Orbis Books.
- Dunkerley, J. (1982) *The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in El Salvador*. London: Junction Books.

Labor revolutionary currents, United States, 1775–1900

Paul Le Blanc

Revolutionary currents in the labor movement of the United States can be identified in several different ways. One involves strong influences on organized workers flowing from the American Revolution and the Second American Revolution (the Civil War). Another involves self-consciously revolutionary currents – led by various socialist, communist, and anarchist elements – which at times played an essential role in the struggles to advance the interests of the working class in the United States. Yet another involves revolutionary challenges inherent in the nature of the labor movement, which sometimes finds reflection even in some of the more conservative elements of organized labor.

Working Class and Labor Movement

There has been much confusion around the terms working class and labor movement. The term *working class* refers here to those who can make a living, or can hope to make a living, only through the sale of their ability to work and to

those dependent on such “breadwinners.” This includes both unemployed and retired workers. The term *labor movement* refers to various organizations and struggles organized by and for workers to defend and advance their interests as workers.

Labor movements can include *trade unions* that focus on improving wages and working conditions in the workplace, but they can also include *reform groups*, which seek to bring about improvements, often through new laws that will result in concrete changes in workers’ conditions. Examples of such laws include those which place limits on or abolish child labor, limit the number of hours in the workday, enforce health and safety provisions at the workplace, and extend the right to vote among those who labor, to name but a few. Labor movements can also include *self-help groups* such as consumer cooperatives, health and burial societies, educational and cultural societies, and multifaceted activist organizations which engage in a variety of activities for the working class, often guided by radical or revolutionary ideologies. Finally, *political parties* which focus on electoral and other activities designed to help the working class advance its political power and, ultimately, its control of the country’s key governmental institutions are often parts of labor movements.

The working class has meant, for some, only manual wage workers, especially factory workers. This excludes many others, including various service employees (whether government workers, store clerks, social workers, maids and laundry workers), so-called “white-collar” office workers, teachers, and, historically, artisans and craftsmen, indentured servants, and slaves. Some of the first labor organizations, however, were organized by artisans and craftsmen at the journeyman level whose traditional way to evolving into master craftsmen (with the opportunity of owning their own establishments) was being blocked by the natural development of the capitalist economy.

For some labor radicals, an explicit link was made between the chattel slavery that exploited African American laborers and the wage-slavery that exploited alleged “free labor.” While some “white” labor radicals were inclined to adopt the racist argument that white workers deserved better treatment, the more revolutionary-minded labor radicals in the pre-Civil War period insisted that the abolition of black slavery was

a precondition to overcoming the wage-slavery that oppressed all of “free labor.” Similarly, many labor radicals of later years (for example, within the Knights of Labor in the 1880s and the Industrial Workers of the World of the early 1900s) had a more broadly inclusive definition of what constitutes the working class.

Nonetheless, the fragmentation of the working class among different occupational, cultural, ethnic, racial, and gender groups, which have often rejected identification with each other, has hampered labor organization. This fragmentation has been nurtured by the complex development of the market economy and has found frequent reflection in the development of workers’ consciousness and of the labor movement in the United States. For example, the incredible waves of immigration (often from impoverished agricultural populations), generated by the dynamism of a rapidly industrializing American capitalism, tended to flood the US labor market in ways that were used by employers to bring down wages, and also were detrimental to working conditions. This often resulted in anti-immigrant sentiments among native-born workers, or even among earlier immigrants or their children. The use of women by employers to undercut wages and increase the rate of exploitation was similarly one of the factors contributing to male hostility to female labor. The fact that skilled workers could more easily be organized than unskilled workers contributed, among skilled workers who were organized into unions, to the prejudice that unskilled workers were “unorganizable” and not worth worrying about.

The most consistent revolutionary currents have labored to overcome divisions within the working class – generally insisting on “solidarity” among all who labor, that “an injury to one is an injury to all,” and in some cases arguing that the entire working class should be in “one big union.” Often these revolutionary impulses have been – despite rhetorical pretenses to the contrary – blunted or compromised by more conservative, more bigoted practices. But it has generally been from revolutionaries of one kind or another that effective efforts have been made for the labor movement to embrace all sectors of the working class.

It is important to recognize that the great majority of US workers were at no time formally part of the labor movement. Union membership in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was

generally not greater (and often was much less) than 10 percent of the labor force – the highpoint being 36 percent in 1955. One could say that organized labor consisted of the working class’s “vanguard,” but often it was a militant minority with influence far beyond its numbers, helping to improve working conditions and living conditions not only of its own members but also of the working class as a whole. As already indicated, sometimes majority elements of this labor vanguard turned inward to advance only the short-term interests of those who were organized, with a profoundly conciliatory attitude to the existing social realities and power relations. Our focus here, however, will be on the more revolutionary currents in the organized vanguard of the labor movement.

Early Revolutionary Influences

The United States of America was established through the American Revolution (1775–83), which proclaimed that governments should not be ruled by powerful kings but should be based on “the consent of the governed” and exist to provide “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” for the people who live there. The merchants, plantation owners, and lawyers who were the nation’s “Founding Fathers” *were* able to prosper after independence was won from Britain – but many of them prospered at the expense of poor laboring people and slaves. In fact, the anti-democratic, immoral, inhuman institution of slavery became an essential component of US economic development and was written into the US Constitution. The Native American peoples, the Indians, were systematically driven off their land and destroyed. A dirty war was initiated against Mexico which stole half of that country and absorbed it into the United States, turning Mexican Americans from Colorado to Arizona and from Texas to California into second-class citizens. All such things were justified by a racism that stressed the Manifest Destiny of the United States as a “white man’s republic.” Bigotry was also used against many millions of immigrants – from Ireland and Germany, from China and Japan, from Italy and Poland and many other parts of the world – who were drawn to the United States for the purpose of exploiting their much-needed labor, even as they were put down by various forms of violent prejudice and pervasive discrimination.

But a powerful countervailing tendency also existed, particularly within sectors of the laboring population. There were some people who took certain Judeo-Christian values so seriously that they insisted on the humanity and dignity and rights of all people regardless of race, creed, or color. There were some who completely and consistently embraced the radical democratic principles of the 1776 Declaration of Independence:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.

Consistent reference was made – in a variety of reform struggles in succeeding decades – to this document, and to the heroic example of revolutionary struggle waged by modest farmers, small shopkeepers, and both skilled and unskilled laborers in creating a republic in which there was to be liberty and justice for all. Some people fought to implement the proposition that everyone – regardless of race, creed, color, gender, or income level – is included in the notion that “all are created equal” and deserving of equal rights. Such influences could be found among those engaged in struggles against slavery, for women’s rights, against racial and ethnic discrimination, and for the dignity of labor.

One of the most radical of the spokesmen for the American Revolution, Thomas Paine, whose 1775 classic *Common Sense* powerfully influenced the Declaration of Independence, in 1797 expressed concerns that would become essential themes of the early labor movement: “The accumulation of personal property is, in many instances, the effect of paying too little for the labor that produced it; the consequence of which is, that the working hand perishes in old age [a category, at that time, which might embrace people in their late 40s and 50s], and the

employer abounds in affluence.” While by no means an opponent of the growing market economy, the old revolutionary (aged 60) nonetheless believed that “the contrast of affluence and wretchedness is like dead and living bodies chained together.”

By the early nineteenth century, as the impact of industrial capitalism was beginning to make itself felt in the new republic, workers who organized unions for their mutual protection were often arrested for “unlawful combination.” In response, a Boston carpenter and labor agitator named Seth Luther, in the spirit of Paine, scoffed that “the Declaration of Independence was the work of a combination, and was as hateful to the traitors and tories of those days as combinations among workingmen are now to the avaricious monopolist and purse proud aristocrat.” In contrast to some male labor activists, Luther insisted that “unless we have the female sex on our side, we cannot hope to accomplish the object we have in view.” In fact, striking factory girls in Lowell, Massachusetts sounded the same revolutionary note as that articulated by the Boston agitator: “As our fathers resisted unto blood the lordly avarice of the British ministry, so we, their daughters, never will wear the yoke that has been prepared for us.” Such sentiments as these found expression among many engaged in union organizing efforts: carpenters, typographical workers, masons, shoe workers, textile workers, and cigar makers, among others.

There were also impressive efforts in the 1820s to organize independent workers’ parties. Organizers of such efforts won significant support, for a time, as they called for a check on business monopolies and the expansion of public education, at the same time thundering against the polarization of the American republic into “two distinct classes, the rich and the poor; the oppressor and the oppressed; those that live by their own labor, and they that live upon the labor of others.” Such efforts were soon drawn into (and ultimately frustrated by) the Democratic Party that was reorganized under the rags-to-riches slaveowner Andrew Jackson. Yet non-electoral reform struggles (such as that for the ten-hour workday) continued to attract working-class support. “Our cause is the cause of truth – of justice and humanity,” in the words of Seth Luther, who added: “Let us be determined no longer to be deceived by the cry of those

who produce nothing and who enjoy all, and who insultingly term us – the farmers, the mechanics, and the laborers – the lower orders – and exultingly claim our homage for themselves as the *higher* orders – while the Declaration of Independence asserts that ‘All men are created equal.’”

Much of the organized labor movement in the United States failed to rise in support of the abolition of slavery. In some cases, representatives of that movement were inclined to make common cause with agricultural pro-slavery forces against the increasing hegemony of industrial capitalism. A skilled black wage-worker who had been a slave and later became a leader of the abolitionist movement, Frederick Douglass, perceptively analyzed this problem in a manner consistent with revolutionary-democratic principles:

The slaveholders, with a craftiness peculiar to themselves, by encouraging the enmity of the poor, laboring white man against the blacks, succeed in making the said white man almost as much a slave as the black slave himself. The difference between the white slave and the black slave is this: the latter belongs to *one* slaveholder, and the former belongs to *all* the slaveholders collectively. The white slave has taken from him by indirection what the black slave has taken from him directly, and without ceremony. Both are plundered, and by the same plunderers. The slave is robbed by his master of all his earnings, above what is required for his bare physical necessities; and the white man is robbed by the slave system, of the just results of his labor, because he is flung into competition with a class of laborers who work without wages. . . . They appeal to their pride, often denouncing emancipation as tending to place the white working man on an equality with negroes, and by this means they succeed in drawing off the minds of the poor whites from the real fact that, by the rich slave-master, they are already regarded as but a single remove from equality with the slave.

On the other hand, a radical critique of slavery did find expression among some labor activists, particularly in New England. One 1846 resolution from a convention of workingmen deplored the fact that “there are at the present time three millions of our brethren and sisters groaning in chains on Southern plantations,” and two years later a similar convention resolution

asserted that “we regret the despotic attitude of the slave power at the South, and the domineering ascendancy of the monied oligarchy in the North as equally hostile to the interests of labor, and incompatible with the preservation of popular rights.”

By the late 1850s, a substantial number of Northern workers were drawn into the newly formed Republican Party. Part of the appeal stemmed from their agreement with that party’s commitment to the ultimate triumph of the free-labor system predominant in the North over the slave-labor system on which the South’s plantation economy was based. The Republicans represented a broad alliance in which proindustrial business interests were interwoven with small business and farming interests in the North, as well as certain radical sectors of the labor movement, and various other reform movements as well, most notably abolitionism and feminism.

Elements of Republican ideology that attracted, reflected, and influenced labor activists can be found in various comments of its most effective early leader, Abraham Lincoln. Most fundamental was his commitment to the revolutionary-democratic ideals of the Declaration of Independence that heralded “a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal,” and that would establish “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” Commenting in 1860 about a shoe workers’ strike in New England, he said: “I am glad to see that a system of labor prevails in New England under which laborers can strike when they want to, where they are not obliged to work under all circumstances, and are not tied down and obliged to labor whether you pay them or not.”

This defense of the free-labor system was by no means antagonistic to capitalism. Lincoln emphasized that “we do not propose any war on capital,” but simply to “allow the humblest man an equal chance to get rich with everybody else . . . in the race for life.” At the same time, influenced by the labor theory of value advanced by such classical economists as Adam Smith, he reflected: “Labor is prior to and independent of capital. In fact, capital is the fruit of labor, and could not have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor can exist without capital, but capital could never have existed without labor. Hence, labor is the superior – greatly superior to capital.” Such notions, hardly unique to Lincoln,

represented an extension of the revolutionary ideology of 1776 and permeated the ranks of organized labor in the years before and after the Second American Revolution, the Civil War of 1861–5.

Socialist Influences

There were other revolutionary influences in the ranks of organized labor, particularly those associated with modern socialist, communist, and anarchist ideologies. Among the most dramatic of these was Frances (or Fanny) Wright, who first came to the United States from Scotland in 1818 as an enthusiast of the democratic ideals inherent in the American Revolution. Along with Robert Dale Owen (the eldest son of British utopian socialist Robert Owen), she played a major role in the agitation for workingmen’s parties in the United States during the 1820s and early 1830s, enjoying a substantial following in New York and beyond.

Wright was a prominent writer, editor, and spokesperson for a number of reforms related to public education for all, women’s rights, the anti-slavery cause, equal rights for African Americans, utopian socialist experiments, and the cause of labor. In Wright’s opinion, there was now (in 1830) “a war of class” in which “now and everywhere the oppressed millions . . . are making common cause against oppression,” with “labor rising up against idleness, industry against money; justice against law and against privilege.” Regarding the 1827 founding of the interracial utopian community of Nashoba in Tennessee, she emphasized the labor theory of value, associated with the pro-capitalist economist Adam Smith, but from which – as in her case – anti-capitalist conclusions could be drawn: “Labor is wealth; its reward should be enjoyment.” While the Nashoba experiment soon collapsed, the term “Fanny Wrightism” for some time was synonymous with the term radicalism among labor reformers and their enemies. The development of the US economy, however, provided little support for the development of rural utopian communities – the wave of the future was with the rising factory system brought into being by the relentless spread of the Industrial Revolution.

An influx of German American immigrants in the wake of the failed Revolution of 1848 resulted in important new radical influences on the American scene. Among these were small but

vibrant currents which identified with the theoretical perspectives developed by such intellectuals associated with Wilhelm Weitling, Ferdinand Lassalle, and Karl Marx. Marx's influence would prove especially durable because it combined a comprehensive orientation rooted in the social sciences with a practical-minded commitment to the actually existing movements and struggles of the working class. In the 1850s, the handful of Marxist partisans, such as Joseph Weydemeyer, sought to strengthen the sporadically growing labor movement. Organized into such small groups as the New York Communist Club, their aim was to help American workers to realize that "the laboring class is the foundation stone upon which must rest the main reliance of all movements for general and special reforms," and that it was "up to the proletariat" to replace capitalism with "the rule of its own class – the class that no longer has any other class below it," in order to bring about "the abolition of all class privileges."

Yet these revolutionaries found themselves in an incredibly contradictory and fluid reality that created far too many obstacles for the consistent development of such working-class consciousness. In touch with these comrades, Marx was alert to countervailing tendencies in the United States that blocked the realization of the revolutionary socialist scenario. In analyses from the 1840s through the 1850s, he suggested that the radicalism inherent in the early working-class movement of capitalist America had little hope of being triumphant as long as slavery continued to exist and as long as the "safety-valve" of western lands remained available – which was consistent with the experiences of such German American communists as Weydemeyer. They consequently threw themselves into the anti-slavery struggle, constituting a dynamic left fringe of the new Republican Party, and did not hesitate to enlist in the ranks of the Union Army with the outbreak of the Civil War. Weydemeyer himself became a colonel leading a regiment of German Americans, rose to the rank of brigadier-general, and was assigned by Lincoln to serve as commander of the military district of St. Louis, Missouri.

Although Weydemeyer himself died a year after the Civil War's end, a significant current of German Americans, similarly influenced by Marx's ideas, went on to play an essential role in the US labor movement that grew dramatically

(as Marx had suggested it would) after the abolition of the slave system. Indeed, in the post-Civil War period, a significant interplay can be observed between the evolution of two of the most prominent "home-grown" labor radicals – William Sylvis and Ira Steward – and Marxist-influenced immigrant workers.

A Pennsylvania iron molder who identified with the radical-democratic currents that had been absorbed into the Democratic Party, Sylvis was a supporter of the Democratic presidential candidate Stephen A. Douglas (who in turn was a supporter of the continuation of the slave system), but as soon as the Civil War broke out, Sylvis's allegiance was with the North, committed to the preservation of the United States, and "from the day the first gun was fired, it was my earnest hope that the war might not end until slavery ended with it." Nonetheless, far from rallying to the ranks of the Republican Party, Sylvis and some like-minded Northern workers hoped to organize a new political party that would place "in positions of public trust men of known honesty and ability; men who know the real wants of the people and who will represent us according to our wishes; men who . . . will not become mere tools of rotten corporations and aristocratic monopolies." After being elected president of the National Molders' Union, Sylvis presented an unabashedly revolutionary orientation:

I believe that all men are "endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights" among which is the divine right to labor, the right to an interest in the soil, the right to free homes, the right to limit the hours of toil to suit our physical capacities, the right to place a valuation upon our own labor proportionate to our social and corporeal wants, the right to be in the first social position in the land, the right to a voice in the councils of the nation, the right to control and direct legislation for the good of the majority, the right to compel the drones of society to seek useful employment . . . and the right to adopt whatever means we please within the pale of reason and law to secure these rights.

With this motivation he helped to organize and lead the first federation of trade unions after the close of the Civil War, the National Labor Union (NLU). His militancy did not diminish, as he noted that "to work, to slave, and suffer, for the simple reward of what will keep body and

soul together, with no hope of a respite in old age, is the real condition of millions at this hour.”

According to Sylvis, “the cause of all these evils is the wages system. So long as we continue to work for wages, so long will we be imposed upon by those who buy our labor, so long will we be subjected to small pay, poverty, and all the evils of which we complain. . . . We must adopt a system that will divide the profits of labor among those who produce them.” With such an orientation, it is not surprising that he welcomed the 1864 formation of Karl Marx’s International Workingmen’s Association, welcomed activists associated with Marx into the NLU, and just before his premature death in 1869 sent the International a warm message:

Our cause is a common one. It is a war between poverty and wealth: labor occupies the same low condition, and capital is the same tyrant in all parts of the world. . . . Go ahead in the good work you have undertaken, until the most glorious success crowns your efforts. That is our determination. Our late war resulted in the building up of the most infamous monied aristocracy on the face of the earth. This monied power is fast eating up the substance of the people. We have made war upon it, and we mean to win.

While the NLU failed to survive Sylvis’s death (in part due to the pull of divergent electoral strategies), his ideas were absorbed by what remained of the labor movement, which in fact was spreading and deepening in the years that followed – in the mushrooming Knights of Labor, in a dramatically growing independent labor press, and in the trade unions that were proliferating, especially among skilled workers, and that would soon culminate in the American Federation of Labor (AFL).

Perhaps the most influential labor intellectual to arise in the post-Civil War period was a Boston mechanic named Ira Steward, the foremost figure in the movement for the eight-hour workday. Like Sylvis, who supported his efforts, Steward was an uncompromising foe of the “the wages system.” Emerging from the milieu of antebellum reformism and labor radicalism, he independently crafted a revolutionary critique of political economy and capitalism that in many ways paralleled that of Karl Marx.

Steward argued that just as the reason for “making a man a slave was to get his labor, or its

results, for nothing,” so “the motive for employing wage-labor is to secure *some* of its results for nothing; and in point of fact, larger fortunes are made out of the profits of wage-labor than out of the products of slavery.” In his view, the struggle for the eight-hour workday without a reduction in the workers’ income would be possible and desirable, because it would bring about the rise in workers’ living standards and freedom while driving down the capitalist’s profits. This would mean an end to the wages system, and the capitalist would “pass away with the kings and royalty of the past,” giving way to a cooperative economy and a true working-class democracy, or in Steward’s terms “a republicanization of labor, as well as a republicanization of government.”

While Marxist-influenced socialists such as Friedrich Sorge inclined toward a different terminology, they saw in Steward a kindred spirit. They shared with him an English translation of excerpts from Marx’s *Das Kapital* (Steward was positively impressed and wrote that he would “help introduce and make his name more common to our readers”), and made common cause with him in organizing a nationwide struggle for the eight-hour workday.

The Workingmen’s Party of the United States (WPUS), organized July 19–22, 1876, was the first nationwide socialist organization in the United States. While it did not last even for two years before splitting into irreconcilable factions, it was an important seedbed for future developments of the American labor movement – embracing trade unionism, labor journalism, workers’ education, struggles for social reforms, socialism, and electoral activity.

The WPUS was formed through a merger of several groupings. This included the North American remnants of the International Workingmen’s Association (the First International of which Karl Marx had been a primary leader), which included Friedrich Sorge, Carl Speyer, and Otto Weydemeyer. There was the Social-Democratic Workingmen’s Party of North America, which included Adolph Strasser, Peter J. McGuire, George Schilling, Thomas J. Morgan, and Albert Parsons. In addition, there were two smaller groups – the Workingmen’s Party of Illinois and the Social Political Workingmen’s Party of Cincinnati (Ohio). The influence of Marx was obvious within the WPUS, but there were other influences as well, including ideas of the late German socialist leader Ferdinand

Lassalle, and the analyses and agitation for the eight-hour workday by Ira Steward.

The fact that the United States was a multicultural “nation of nations” was reflected in the WPUS. The party had two official weekly German-language papers – the Chicago *Verbote* (Herald) edited by Conrad Conzett and the New York *Arbeiter-Stimme* (Labor’s Voice) edited by Otto Walster – reflecting the large number of German American members. (Germans were the largest immigrant group in the US at this time, followed by the Irish.) The party’s official English-language weekly, the *Labor Standard*, was edited by J. P. McDonnell, a former Irish Fenian and later, for a time, a secretary to Karl Marx in the First International. In addition, no fewer than 21 other newspapers around the country supported the WPUS in various languages. By the following summer the WPUS doubled its membership to 7,000, with 82 sections (of which 23 were English-language).

The WPUS faced the same divisive issues that affected the labor movement in general. Officially, the organization favored working-class unity transcending racial and ethnic divisions, yet there is evidence of prejudice among some of the members in California toward imported Chinese laborers and in Missouri toward black workers. Nor was there an appreciation in the organization of the catastrophe wrought by the Republican Party’s final betrayal of Reconstruction and black rights in the South. There were also differences over whether women workers should be organized into trade unions or instead be driven back to their “rightful place” in the home, so as not to compete with male labor. On the other hand, the WPUS did have a small number of black members (most prominently Peter H. Clark of Cincinnati) and women members (generally concentrated in “women’s clubs” or, in German, *frauenverein*), and one of its founding documents proclaimed the organization’s adherence to “perfect equality of rights of both sexes.”

The decisive event in the short life of the WPUS was what has been appropriately tagged “the great labor uprising of 1877,” a wave of militant labor insurgencies and street battles that swept through many cities as part of a nationwide strike of railway workers. In 1877 an explosion of working-class protest rocked the United States. Initiated as a more or less spontaneous railway workers’ strike, it became generalized into a nationwide crescendo of street

protests and pitched battles. Millions of dollars of property was destroyed, well over a hundred lives were lost, with many more injuries. Pittsburgh was at the explosive center of this historic upsurge, but similar confrontations and struggles wracked cities throughout the Eastern and Midwestern portions of the country. Strikers in Martinsburg, West Virginia issued a manifesto capturing the sentiments of many:

Strike and live! Bread we must have! Remain and perish! . . . A company that has from time to time so unmercifully cut our wages and finally has reduced us to starvation . . . has lost all sympathy. . . . The merchants and community at large all along the line of the road are on our side, and the working classes of every State in the Union are in our favor, and we feel confident that the God of the poor and the oppressed of the earth is with us. Therefore let the clashing of arms be heard, let the fiery elements be poured out if they think it right, but in heed to our right and in defense of our families, we shall conquer or we shall die!

In many cities, WPUS members seem to have played no visible role in the upsurge. Support meetings and rallies were organized in others – most notably in Boston, Cincinnati, Louisville, Newark, New York City, Paterson, San Francisco. In Chicago’s general strike WPUS leaders Philip Van Patten, George Schilling, and Albert Parsons were arrested for their efforts to draw the spontaneous outburst into more organized channels, and in St. Louis such WPUS stalwarts as Albert Currin and Peter Lofgreen (who later assumed prominence as a writer under the name of Laurence Gronlund) played a central role in a general strike that for a brief period put workers in control of that city and led newspapers to dub it “the St. Louis Commune.” The uprising was systematically repressed by federal troops, but its powerful impact helped to generate future labor struggles, and it also brought a flood of new members into the WPUS determined to help advance the struggle of labor against capital.

Many of the new members responded to the determination of some WPUS leaders – in contradiction to the organization’s more cautious founding documents – to accelerate the efforts to field candidates in elections. In the autumn of 1877, the working-class ferment in many US cities encouraged WPUS sections to run candidates and

rewarded them with amazingly high vote totals. They refused to turn back from this path and sought alliances and joint efforts with a massive but fuzzy-minded Greenback Labor Party effort that, within a few years, collapsed, leaving the socialist electoralists in disarray. By the 1890s, the organization came under the sway of a doctrinaire interpretation of Marxism associated with Daniel De Leon which limited its influence in the broader labor movement.

Reacting against the electoralist impulse, a substantial minority in 1877 – including Friedrich Sorge, Otto Weydemeyer, Carl Speyer, J. P. McDonnell, Adolph Strasser, a young Samuel Gompers, and others – left the WPUS. They chose instead to concentrate on trade union organizing that began with the International Labor Union and eventually evolved into the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions, later renamed the American Federation of Labor. The majority renamed the organization the Socialistic Labor Party, later simply the Socialist Labor Party (SLP).

Another split occurred in 1881, in the wake of the Greenback Labor debacle, when more revolutionary elements bolted from the SLP. Disillusioned with electoralism, they helped create the anarchist-influenced International Working People's Association (IWPA). The Chicago wing of this organization (which tended toward a revolutionary anti-statist interpretation of Marx's ideas more than toward traditional anarchist theory) gained an especially large following and foothold in the labor movement.

Also in 1881, the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada (FOTLU) was formed in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, largely guided by the trade unionist current among early socialists associated with Adolph Strasser, Friedrich Sorge, Samuel Gompers, and others. In large measure through the efforts of an indefatigable socialist organizer among the carpenters, P. J. McGuire, the Federation called in 1882 for the celebration of Labor Day on the first Monday in September, and also called for nationwide work stoppages and demonstrations on May 1, 1886 in favor of the eight-hour workday (initiating May Day, the international workers' holiday). The influence of Karl Marx was evident in the organization's preamble – which was retained in 1886 when the group was reorganized as the American Federation of Labor:

A struggle is going on in the nations of the civilized world between the oppressors and the oppressed of all countries, a struggle between capital and labor, which must grow in intensity from year to year and work disastrous results to the toiling millions of all nations if not combined for mutual protection and benefit. This history of the wage-workers of all countries is but the history of constant struggle and misery engendered by ignorance and disunion; whereas the history of the non-producers of all ages proves that a minority, thoroughly organized, may work wonders for good or evil. . . . Conforming to the old adage, "In union there is strength," the formation of a Federation embracing every trade and labor organization in North America, a union founded upon a basis as broad as the land we live in, is our only hope.

Samuel Gompers of the Cigar Makers Union was nominated to be president of the federation, but so was Richard Powers of the lake seaman's union. The *Pittsburgh Commercial-Gazette* ran an article explaining the contest in this way: "It is thought that an attempt will be made to capture the organization for Gompers as the representative of the Socialists, and if such an attempt is made, whether it succeeds or not, there will likely be some lively work, as the delegates opposed to Socialism are determined not to be controlled by it." In fact, such internal conflict was side-stepped by adept compromises, and Gompers later explained in his autobiography:

In those early days not more than half a dozen people had grasped the concept that economic organization and control over economic power were the fulcrum which made possible influence and power in all other fields. Control over the basic things of life gives power that may be used for good in every relationship of life. This fundamental concept on which the AFL was later founded was at that time not formulated in men's minds, and the lines between Socialists and trade unionists were very blurred.

At the founding convention, a controversy also arose around whether the new federation should consist exclusively of people who were already members of labor unions. In this period, and for many years afterward, only skilled workers were able to build and sustain trade unions organized on a specific craft basis. A decision to make the federation an exclusively union

organization would restrict it to skilled workers. Many delegates agreed with the comments of one that “I wish this Federation broad enough to encompass all working people in its folds,” and an African American delegate from Pittsburgh explained: “We have in the city of Pittsburgh many men in our organization who have no particular trade, but should not be excluded from the Federation. . . . I speak more particularly of my own people and declare to you that it would be dangerous to skilled mechanics to exclude from this organization the common laborers, who might, in an emergency, be employed in positions they could readily qualify them to fill.”

This inclusiveness was consistent with the orientation of the Knights of Labor, by far the largest labor organization at the time, some of whose members were present in force at the FOTLU founding. The Knights organized workers into reform struggles, social events, and educational efforts as well as trade union activities. FOTLU included members and some unions that were affiliated with the expansively reformist Knights of Labor, and it was formally on record as favoring close relations with the larger organization. But it represented in the minds of many trade unionists “a broad and enduring basis,” as FOTLU secretary Frank Foster put it, for organization because – in contrast to the Knights – it drew members together along “the trade line,” providing “greater feasibility and . . . economic soundness” in facing “the growing power of associated capital.” Rather than relying on lobbying and elections to secure gains, “in the world of economic reform the working classes must depend upon themselves for the enforcement of measures as well as for their conception,” as Foster put it. Eventually the two groups became rivals, and in the late nineteenth century the reformed AFL would eclipse the then-disintegrating Knights.

Separation of Revolutionaries From Moderates

During the 1880s, Gompers became known not as an advocate of socialism but as an advocate of what became known as “pure and simple trade unionism.” This meant organizing workers into unions that would focus on struggles at the workplace around issues of higher wages, fewer hours of work, and improved working conditions to the exclusion of radical social causes, whether

socialism or anything else. When asked what the labor movement wanted, Gompers once replied simply, “More.” Yet Pennsylvania Federation of Labor president James Maurer (himself a dedicated socialist) has left this record of one of Gompers’s many “pure and simple” union speeches:

If a workingman gets a dollar and a half for ten hours’ work, he lives up to that standard of a dollar and a half, and he knows that a dollar seventy-five would improve his standard of living and he naturally strives to get that dollar and seventy-five. After that he wants two dollars and more time for leisure, and he struggles to get it. Not satisfied with two dollars he wants more; not only two and a quarter, but a nine-hour workday. And so he will keep on getting more and more until he gets it all or the full value of all he produces.

Despite rhetoric that retained something of the ardor and implications associated with the old revolutionary orientation, however, a growing number of labor radicals in and around the AFL, including Gompers himself, began to pull in a different direction that enabled them to adapt to the prejudices of some skilled workers against unskilled workers, new immigrants, blacks, Asians, other people of color, and female wage-workers. They also entered far-reaching compromises with some of the more astute (“liberal-minded”) representatives of the capitalist system. By the early 1900s, Gompers (while still defending the memory of Karl Marx and the German American Marxists who had been his teachers and comrades) became an explicit and uncompromising foe of socialism.

In the same period that Gompers was beginning to deradicalize, however, some of the most vibrant representatives of revolutionary labor were coming to the fore. This was especially true in Chicago, where such figures as August Spies and Michael Schwab among German Americans, as well as Albert and Lucy Parsons among English-speaking Americans, rose to the leadership of the IWPA. They blended an uncompromisingly revolutionary interpretation of Marx’s ideas, which had been moderated and diluted among some of their former SLP comrades, with libertarian and anarchist ideas.

The IWPA was founded at an 1883 conference in Pittsburgh, and it produced a “Pittsburgh

Manifesto” which blended ideas from the Declaration of Independence, the *Communist Manifesto*, and anti-centralist conceptions of Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, all in an intransigently revolutionary tone. Some of the Chicago participants were uneasy with this. Spies insisted that “The Pittsburgh program is secondary, our program is the Communist Manifesto!” and he shared the book with Parsons, Gorsuch, and other Americans who worked with him in the office of the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* (Workers’ Journal), the left-wing daily he edited. Parsons went out of his way to emphasize that “the IWPA was not founded by Bakunin” and that “the IWPA is not in opposition to Marx. . . . The first publication ever issued by the IWPA was written by Marx and Engels.” This was the *Communist Manifesto* (in the first English translation by Helen Macfarlane), of which 25,000 copies were distributed in one year. Editor of the Chicago IWPA’s *The Alarm*, a lively English-language weekly with a circulation of 2,000, Parsons noted: “We are called by some Communists, or Socialists or Anarchists. We accept all three of the terms.”

The ideal society for which Parsons and his comrades were fighting, however, was one in which there would be no government ruling over the laboring majority, not even a paternalistic one dedicated to their well-being, but instead a system of self-government embedded in democratic organizations of the workers themselves, in which the free development of each person would be the condition for the free development of all. Of all the IWPA groupings, only those around Spies and Parsons had the sympathies of the German American Marxist stalwart Friedrich Sorge, whose description gives a sense of the movement there:

It is undeniably the meritorious accomplishment of the Chicago anarchists to have brought into this marvelous mixture of workers of all nationalities and languages a certain order, to have created affinity, and to have given the movement at that time unity and goals. . . . Only the Chicagoans maintained a certain agreement of views and tactics, stayed in close touch with the trade unions and other organizations, and secured themselves great respect and importance among the working population of the city. This they took advantage of on various occasions and made the bourgeois authorities very uncomfortable. . . . At the head

of the Chicago anarchists, indeed of the Chicago workers at that time, stood intelligent and energetic people. . . . To the aforementioned characteristics must also be added great courage, loyalty of conviction, and untouchable personal honor.

The IWPA leaders were at the head of the massive movement for the eight-hour workday on the first May Day, in 1886, but shortly thereafter were victimized and falsely condemned for murder in the wake of the violent Haymarket Affair, in which someone threw a bomb at police who were breaking up a workers’ rally. The subsequent repression destroyed the IWPA and threw the labor movement into disarray. Eight IWPA leaders were arrested for murder, and four (including Spies and Parsons) were executed, although it was widely acknowledged in the years following their deaths that they had been innocent of the crimes of which they had been convicted. A later governor of Illinois provided a posthumous exoneration of the martyrs who had, to a large extent, been killed because of their practical commitment to revolutionary ideas. Those ideas, the speeches and writings of the Haymarket martyrs, were circulated widely within much of the labor movement in future years. Future leaders of the American Railway Union and the Western Federation of Miners, Eugene V. Debs and William D. Haywood, are two among many who later personally attested to their profound influence.

In carrying on the revolutionary tradition represented by the Haymarket martyrs, activists such as Debs and Haywood diverged from the path followed by Samuel Gompers and others guiding the AFL, who were going in the opposite direction. Increasingly they veered away from revolutionary principles and onto the path of reformist moderation, narrowing “pure and simple” unionism and partnership with political representatives of the capitalist status quo. By 1894, when Debs’s American Railway Union (ARU) was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the railroad industry through the Pullman Strike, with federal troops coming in on the side of the corporations, Gompers and the AFL leadership gave a rhetorical salute to the “impulsive, vigorous protest against the gathering, growing forces of plutocratic power and corporation rule.” But considering it “folly” to join the ARU in its confrontation with corporate power, the

AFL leadership headed off a movement for a general strike in Chicago, the storm center of the Pullman dispute, which was the last best hope for the ARU. The AFL leadership, unsympathetic with the ARU's industrial union structure, which was at variance with the more exclusive craft union structures and skilled-worker base of most of its own member organizations, was also less and less inclined to accept the expansive militancy and combative commitment to major social change evident in Debs's own evolution. These radical/moderate fissures that developed in the US labor movement in the late nineteenth century would profoundly influence future developments in the movement.

SEE ALSO: Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Combination Laws and Revolutionary Trade Unionism; *Communist Manifesto*; Debs, Eugene (1855–1926); Douglass, Frederick (1817–1895); Haymarket Tragedy; Haywood, Big Bill (1869–1928); Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Knights of Labor and Terence Powderly (1849–1924); Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 20th Century; Lowell Female Labor Reform Association; Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; May Day; Paine, Thomas (1737–1809); Socialist Party, United States; Sylvis, William H. (1828–1869) and the National Labor Union; Wright, Frances “Fanny” (1795–1852)

References and Suggested Readings

- Buhle, M. J., Buhle, P., & Georgakas, D. (Eds.) (1998) *Encyclopedia of the American Left*, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Dubofsky, M. & van Tine, W. (Eds.) (1987) *Labor Leaders in America*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Foner, P. S. (1947–94) *A History of the Labor Movement in the United States*, 10 vols. New York: International Publishers.
- Foner, P. S. (1984) *The Workingmen's Party of the United States: A History of the First Marxist Party in the Americas*. Minneapolis: MEP Publications.
- Ginger, R. (1949) *The Bending Cross: A Biography of Eugene V. Debs*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Kaufmann, S. B. (1973) *Samuel Gompers and the Origins of the American Federation of Labor, 1848–1896*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Laurie, B. (1989) *Artisans into Workers: Labor in Nineteenth-Century America*. New York: Hill & Wang.
- Le Blanc, P. (1999) *A Short History of the US Working Class, From Colonial Times to the Twenty-First Century*. Amherst: Humanity Books.
- Le Blanc, P. (2003) The Absence of Socialism in the United States: Contextualizing Kautsky's “The American Worker.” *Historical Materialism* 11 (4).

- Lens, S. (1969) *Radicalism in America*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
- Montgomery, D. (1967) *Beyond Equality: Labor and the Radical Republicans*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Nelson, B. C. (1988) *Beyond the Martyrs: A Social History of Chicago's Anarchists, 1870–1900*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Labor revolutionary currents, United States, 20th century

Paul Le Blanc

Revolutionary challenges to capitalism are inherent in the nature of the labor movement, which sometimes finds reflection even in some of the more conservative elements of organized labor. At the same time, however, self-consciously revolutionary currents – led by various socialist, communist, and anarchist elements – have at times led key struggles to advance the interests of the working class in the United States.

The development of the labor movement of the United States in the twentieth century has deep roots in a profound division that developed in the ranks of labor between an increasingly “moderate” current and more explicit revolutionary elements. The first was represented by ex-socialist Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor (AFL). The second was symbolized by Eugene V. Debs, whose increasing radicalization – in the wake of the evolution of the American Railway Union and its destruction in the Pullman Strike of 1894 – was leading him to embrace revolutionary socialist perspectives.

Socialist Party and IWW

By 1901, Debs and others had formed the Socialist Party of America, which enjoyed considerable support among radicalized workers and intellectuals, with a base that soon gave them control of an estimated one-third of the AFL unions. Some unions, such as the locals of the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, but also unions of miners and machinists, among others, could not have come into being without the dedication and energy of socialist activists. But they now found themselves at loggerheads with Gompers, who declaimed:

I want to tell you, Socialists, that I have studied your philosophy; read your works upon economics, and not the meanest of them; studied your standard works . . . And I want to say that I am entirely at variance with your philosophy. I declare it to you. I am not only at variance with your doctrines, but with your philosophy. Economically, you are unsound; socially, you are wrong; industrially, you are an impossibility.

Debs, addressing a state convention of the AFL in Kansas, advanced the other side of the question. He called for trade union organization on an industrial basis, not a craft basis, and for the working class to organize politically as well as economically. "We have now no revolutionary organization of the workers along the lines of this class struggle, and that is the demand of this time," he argued. "The pure and simple trade union will no longer answer. I would not take from it the least credit that belongs to it. I have fought under its banner for thirty years. I have followed it through victory and defeat, generally defeat." It had served a useful function once, but it was being made obsolete by the development of industrial capitalism and the intertwining of big business corporations with the government. "The tool you worked with twenty-five years ago will no longer do. It would do then; it will not do now." Workers being organized economically in a union but then being divided in support of one or another pro-capitalist party was a recipe for defeat. "You have got to unify your forces," he insisted. "You have got to stand together shoulder to shoulder on the economic and political fields and then you will make substantial progress toward emancipation."

In Debs's view, "the labor question, which is really the question of all humanity, will never be solved until it is solved by the working class. It will never be solved for you by the capitalists. It will never be solved for you by the politicians. It will remain unsolved until you yourselves solve it." The key was consciousness, will, and organized struggle: "As long as you can stand and are willing to stand for these conditions, these conditions will remain; but when you unite all over the land, when you present a solid class-conscious phalanx, economically and politically, there is no power on this earth that can stand between you and complete emancipation." That was the purpose of the political organization to which he had now committed his life: "The

Socialist party as the party of the exploited workers in the mills and mines, on the railways and on the farms, the workers of both sexes and all races and colors, the working class in a word, constituting a great majority of the people and in fact THE PEOPLE, demands that the nation's industries shall be taken over by the nation and that the nation's workers shall operate them for the benefit of the whole people."

By 1905, Debs and other (but hardly all) Socialist Party members joined with other socialists, anarchists, and labor radicals to form a new revolutionary union – the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). It pledged to organize the entire working class on an industrial basis regardless of race, ethnicity, sex, or occupation into "One Big Union." The "Wobblies," as they were nicknamed, envisioned their organization as a revolutionary union that would fight for immediate gains as steps designed to lead, hopefully sooner rather than later, to a general strike by the entire working class capable of bringing the functioning of the entire capitalist economy and government to a standstill. With power in the hands of the working-class majority, the economy would then be owned, organized, and run by the working class.

Fired by this vision, Wobblies reached out to timber workers on the West Coast, harvest hands on the Great Plains, textile workers in New England, steelworkers in the Midwest, and other workers across the country. The IWW organized black and white timber workers in a united struggle in Louisiana. The organization proved willing and able to organize what many in the AFL had dismissed as "unorganizable," such as the thousands of immigrant workers – men, women, and children laboring in the textile mills – who joined together in what came to be called "the Bread and Roses Strike" in Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912. As James Oppenheim put it in his song, dedicated to women workers: "As we come marching, marching, we bring the greater days. / The rising of the women means the rising of the race. / No more the drudge and idler – ten that toil while one reposes. / But a sharing of life's glories: Bread and roses! Bread and roses!"

In this strike the eloquent Wobbly orator Elizabeth Gurley Flynn joined with other skilled organizers such as Arturo Giovannitti and Carlo Tresca to mobilize workers and their families, leading them to victory. Flynn explained the IWW conception of "a labor victory" by insisting

that strikes must help workers “gain economic advantage, but must also gain revolutionary spirit, in order to achieve a complete victory.” She elaborated:

For workers to gain few more cents a day, a few more minutes less a day, and go back to work with the same psychology, the same attitude toward society is to have achieved a temporary gain and not a lasting victory. For workers to go back with a class-conscious spirit, with an organized and determined attitude toward society means that even if they made no economic gain they have the possibility of gaining in the future. In other words, a labor victory must be economic and it must be revolutionizing.

In his opening remarks at the founding convention of the IWW, proclaiming the intention of “emancipation of the working class from the slave bondage of capitalism,” militant leader “Big Bill” Haywood denounced the AFL for failing to live up to its own class-struggle preamble. He noted that “there are organizations affiliated . . . with the A. F. of L. which in their constitution and by-laws prohibit the initiation or conferring of the obligation [of union membership] on a colored man; that prohibit the conferring of the obligation on foreigners. What we want to establish at this time is a labor organization that will open wide its doors to every man that earns his livelihood either by brain or muscle.” What Haywood did, for example during the Lawrence strike, was consistent with these words. “He actually loved to spend time with the workers, to talk with their women and children,” recalled tough-minded anarchist Carlo Tresca of the hulking, battle-scarred organizer. “He went to supper with strikers every night. . . . He would sleep in the houses of Italians, Syrians, Irish, Poles, Letts. People were all brothers to him.”

This approach was translated into practical organizational realities. From 1913 to the early 1920s, for example, a largely immigrant and African American local of the IWW controlled Philadelphia’s docks, led by the black Wobbly Ben Fletcher. “The organized labor movement has not begun to become a contender for its place in the sun until every man, woman and child in industry is eligible to be identified with its cause, regardless of race, color or creed,” Fletcher explained. Noting that “organized labor for the most part, be it radical or conservative, thinks

in terms of the white race,” he emphasized that this would be changed only when black workers themselves organized “to generate a force which when necessary could have rendered low the dragon of race prejudice whenever and wherever it raised its head.” The militant union he led showed how this could be done, leading to black–white unity and consequent gains for all workers.

The labor radicals *assumed* that the big business employers would be dedicated to dividing and cheating the workers and using violence against them – and IWW organizers became adept at militant and intelligent mass mobilizations to push back such attacks. Even more serious was the IWW goal of replacing the capitalist economic system with what some of them called “the commonwealth of toil,” an economic system that would be owned by all of society and democratically controlled by the working-class majority. The spirit and ideals of the IWW were captured in the great labor anthem “Solidarity Forever,” which has inspired idealistic activists in the labor movement ever since. Its last verse says:

In our hands is placed a power greater than their
hoarded gold,
Greater than the might of armies magnified a
thousandfold.
We can bring to birth a new world from the ashes
of the old,
For the union makes us strong.

Fear of this revolutionary labor union caused many mainstream politicians and some of the smarter employers to develop a more generous attitude toward reforms that would improve the living and working conditions of the working class, and even the toleration of more moderate trade unions. In order to save the existing capitalist system, it would become necessary to make growing numbers of people feel that the system – while imperfect – works well enough for enough of the people, enough of the time. And this opened up more space for the more moderate mainstream of the American labor movement, under the banner of Samuel Gompers’s AFL.

Radical Regroupment

The failure of the IWW to replace the increasingly conservative AFL highlights challenges faced by revolutionary-minded labor activists in the face of twentieth-century capitalism in the

United States. The IWW was primarily an organization of working-class revolutionaries who believed, in the words of its 1908 constitutional preamble, that “the working class and the employing class have nothing in common” and that “between these two classes a struggle must go on until workers of the world organize as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of production, and abolish the wage system.” Yet this represents the view of revolutionary workers, not all workers, and under normal circumstances most workers will not be prepared to risk all that they have for the purpose of abolishing the wages system. They are dependent on wages for their livelihood and their very survival. In fact, a function of the trade union is to increase the income and improve the conditions associated with jobs that are an integral part of the wages system. While revolutionaries can help to build strong, effective unions to advance workers’ interests, it is not the case that an organization of revolutionaries can itself function as a trade union, which must include masses of workers, many of whom may not understand or agree with the revolutionary program.

One of the clearest revolutionary critiques of the IWW orientation was developed by someone who had been active in both the IWW and the Socialist Party – William Z. Foster. Foster helped develop and lead the small Syndicalist League of North America and what later became the more substantial Trade Union Educational League (TUEL). Foster rejected the notion of breaking away from non-revolutionary trade unions in order to form revolutionary ones. “The truth is that the trade union movement acts always upon the revolutionary policy of utilizing its power to the utmost in forcing the employer to grant concessions.” He insisted that, because of their very nature, “in all trade union movements, conservative as well as radical, there is going on a double-phased process of strengthening their forces and increasing their demands accordingly, and that this process of building constantly greater power and making bigger demands inevitably pushes the unions on . . . to overthrow capitalism.” He believed that in addition to the dynamics inherent in capitalism, the class struggle, and the nature of unions, there was a need for what he called the *militant minority*, comparable to the leaven necessary to cause a loaf of bread to rise. “The militant minority is the thinking and acting part of the

working class,” Foster asserted. “It works out the fighting programs and takes the lead in putting them into effect.”

Foster and a small circle of co-thinkers immersed themselves in organizing activity with the AFL through a strategy they termed “boring from within.” They found strong allies in such people as John Fitzpatrick, president of the Chicago Federation of Labor, in a successful organizing drive among packinghouse workers, and more vacillating support from Samuel Gompers himself and the entire AFL in the effort to organize steelworkers that culminated in the momentous 1919 steel strike. The strike took place during the “Red Scare” repression of radical labor in the United States during and after World War I and in the wake of the 1917 Russian Revolution, from which V. I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and others called for global working-class insurgencies to overthrow capitalism. The primary targets of the repression had been the Socialist Party, the IWW, and the anarchists, but the steel strike was also tarred with the same brush. The strike was smashed by the combination of intransigent steel corporations, a viciously hostile press, and brutal assaults from local, state, and national authorities, with the AFL leadership backing away, once again, as it had done at the time of the Pullman Strike.

Inspired by the Russian Revolution’s establishment of a Soviet Republic, and the subsequent founding of the Communist International, segments of the Socialist Party and IWW, even some anarchists, as well as Foster and others from the TUEL, came together to establish a US branch of the Communist Party. In the early 1920s, under Foster’s leadership, the TUEL became a significant force in many of the unions affiliated to the AFL. The promising beginnings of this labor left wing were shattered by the combined effects of an anti-communist offensive orchestrated by the Gompers leadership and sectarian blunders of the communists themselves.

By the late 1920s and early 1930s, the communists’ consequent isolation from labor’s mainstream intertwined with a sectarian policy emanating from the Stalin dictatorship in the Soviet Union which called for the formation of “revolutionary trade unions,” which caused American communists to build rival unions to those of the AFL. Despite some heroic efforts under the banner of the Trade Union Unity League, communist efforts yielded few positive results.

Some left-wing socialists and dissident communists sought to maintain the “boring from within” strategy that would enable radical organizers to build up a dynamic left wing in the mainstream of the labor movement. One of the most influential figures to advance this perspective was Rev. A. J. Muste, who served as the director of Brookwood Labor College from 1921 to 1933. Hundreds of labor activists were trained at Brookwood, which was largely funded and supported by AFL unions, but within which there were strong left-wing influences – symbolized by a May Day celebration in which there were portraits of Samuel Gompers, Eugene V. Debs, Karl Marx, and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. The tensions inherent in this situation culminated in the ejection of Muste and others, who went on to form their own left-wing American Workers Party.

When the US and global economy took a disastrous downturn with the Great Depression of the 1930s, an increasing number of radicalizing young workers began organizing militant struggles and industrial unions more in the spirit of the old IWW, and the AFL proved completely incapable of overcoming its ingrained conservatism and narrowness. In 1934, there were signs that the workers could win if they had capable leaders. In Minneapolis, Vincent Raymond Dunne and other dissident communist followers of Leon Trotsky (who opposed the Stalin dictatorship that had taken over in the decade following the Russian Revolution) led thousands of teamsters and others to victory through a militant general strike that used bold new tactics. In San Francisco, mainstream communists, allied with Harry Bridges, led West Coast longshoremen to a partial victory after a hard-fought general strike. In Ohio, Toledo Auto-Lite workers, led by militants of A. J. Muste’s American Workers Party, won a similar victory.

These three victories rocked the labor movement, particularly due to the revolutionary orientation of the strikes’ leadership. “Our policy was to organize and build strong unions so workers could have something to say about their own lives and assist in changing the present order into a socialist society,” Dunne matter-of-factly commented. On the West Coast, Bridges offered the view that “the capitalistic form of society . . . means the exploitation of a lot of people for a profit and a complete disregard of their interests for that profit, [and] I haven’t

much use for that.” In “every strike situation,” Muste commented, “the policy of drawing in the broadest forces – all the unions, unemployed organizations, political parties and groups – must be carried out in order to break down trade union provincialism; to politicalize the struggle; develop class consciousness; face the workers with the problems of conflict with capitalist governmental agencies, etc.”

The Radical Rise of the CIO

This revolutionary challenge transformed the American labor movement. This is dramatically illustrated in the evolution of John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers of America. Lewis had never been a labor radical or a socialist – he had been a Republican and an advocate of the Gompers “pure and simple unionism” line. But he was convinced, along with several other top union leaders in the AFL, that the time had come to organize unskilled and semi-skilled mass production workers in the steel, auto, electrical, rubber, textile, and other industries, as well as transit workers, longshoremen and maritime workers, white-collar workers, and others. In order to do that, it would be necessary to overcome many of the racial, ethnic, and gender barriers of the AFL, to work with idealistic left-wing political radicals shunned by the traditional AFL leaders, and to organize on a more inclusive industrial union basis. This could only be done, in the 1930s, by breaking with the AFL and starting a new, more radical and socially conscious labor federation – the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).

The CIO was built by thousands of men and women who organized their co-workers into new industrial unions, went on strike and maintained picket lines, and conducted sit-down actions that took over factories. They won over and mobilized communities, facing and defying company goons, battling anti-union vigilantes and sometimes pro-company police forces and National Guard units. None of this would have been possible without the involvement of a “militant minority” of revolutionary activists – from the Communist and Socialist parties, Trotskyist and other dissident communist groups, and various independent socialist and anarchist currents.

Nonetheless, Lewis, with his stern face, his bushy eyebrows, and his militant labor oratory,

which resonated with Shakespearean and biblical tones, became a powerful symbol of the new unionism that was transforming and revitalizing the American labor movement. Echoes from the revolutionary rhetoric of more than a century could be heard in his pronouncements:

This movement of labor will go on until there is a more equitable and just distribution of our national wealth. This movement will go on until the social order is reconstructed on a basis that will be fair, decent, and honest. This movement will go on until the guarantees of the Declaration of Independence and of the Constitution are enjoyed by all the people, and not by a privileged few.

The radical editor of the *CIO News*, Len DeCaux, later described the early CIO as “a mass movement with a message, revivalistic in fervor, militant in mood, joined together by class solidarity.” The CIO’s expansive and radical idealism was captured by DeCaux in this description:

As it gained momentum, this movement brought with it new political attitudes – toward the corporations, toward police and troops, toward local, state, national government. Now we’re a movement, many workers asked, why can’t we move on to more and more? Today we’ve forced almighty General Motors to terms by sitting down and defying all the powers at its command, why can’t we go on tomorrow, with our numbers, our solidarity, our determination, to transform city and state, the Washington government itself? Why can’t we go on to create a new society with the workers on top, to end age-old injustices, to banish poverty and war.

Complications and the Triumph of Moderation

In the mid- to late 1930s, however, Lewis and other CIO leaders (including those associated with the Communist Party) turned away from the notion of launching an independent labor party in order to support, instead, the social-liberal presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal reform program of the Democratic Party. As James Matles, left-wing leader of the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America, commented, in the difficult years of the Great Depression “Roosevelt knew that this [capitalist] system had to make concessions

in order to save itself, and he proceeded on a course to do just that, to save the corporate system in America. . . . Under the pressure of the millions, he gave ground. He put through some of the outstanding labor and social legislation of our time.” In doing this, he helped to nurture a dependence of the growing labor movement, both CIO and AFL, on the Democratic Party and on institutions of the state (such as the National Labor Relations Board). When someone even as influential in labor’s ranks as John L. Lewis resisted this trend, he found himself removed from leadership of the CIO. Those inclined toward revolutionary perspectives, no less than those inclined toward trade union moderation, would feel the resulting constraints in future years, particularly as the political climate in the United States tilted in a more conservative direction.

Another complication for would-be revolutionaries in the US labor movement involved the contradictions that developed in the communist movement with the consolidation of the vicious bureaucratic regime over Soviet communism of Joseph Stalin. Those loyal to the communist mainstream, whatever their noble and idealistic intentions or their substantial and positive contributions to the labor movement, became associated with one of the worst dictatorships in human history, and with policies sometimes more in tune with foreign policy preferences of Soviet leaders than with actual revolutionary principles or the best interests of the working class.

During World War II, when the United States and the Soviet Union were allies against Nazi Germany, this seemed unproblematical. But in the late 1940s, a Cold War confrontation developed between the two countries, lasting for half a century. This helped generate a new anti-communist “Red Scare,” and the deepened dependence of labor on government supportiveness caused leaders of both the AFL and the CIO to launch a fierce assault on communists, but also on other radicals and revolutionaries in their own ranks.

The expulsion of 11 “left-wing” unions from the CIO was part of a deradicalization that enabled the two labor federations to unite into the AFL-CIO in 1955, with the consequent marginalization of the revolutionary influences that had played such an important role in the labor movement in earlier times. This was reinforced

by dramatic changes in the US economy and social reality that would erode the conditions that had provided the base for labor radicalism in earlier decades – an unprecedented, long-term prosperity that embraced most of the working class until the 1970s and 1980s, the spread of consumerism and suburbanization, the transformation of the workplace through technological innovation, a dramatic increase in the percentage of white-collar occupations in the working class, and early developments in what would eventually explode into what would later be called “globalization.”

This led to a long-term decline of revolutionary currents in the labor movement. It also caused the movement to lose much of the social vision and old idealism that had made it such an attractive force for many working people. It could be argued that AFL-CIO President George Meany, a tough-talking, cigar-chomping plumber, had an outlook in many ways no broader than that of Sam Gompers in his twilight years. A counter-argument – a variation of William Z. Foster’s old notion that the trade union movement was inherently more revolutionary than the excessively moderate stance of its leaders – was advanced by a popular socialist spokesperson, Michael Harrington, who argued that the “progressive” social policies of ostensibly pro-capitalist labor leaders such as Meany, and ex-socialist Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers, added up to the creation of new “socialist definitions of capitalism” that could pull the United States beyond the oppressive limitations of the market economy.

Radical Stirrings

One person who represented a genuinely expansive social vision in the AFL-CIO, and who never renounced his earlier socialist commitments, was the head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, A. Philip Randolph. Randolph had pioneered in forming a strong all-black union – no mean trick in the racist climate of the 1920s – a union that pushed its way into a reluctant AFL and stayed there, fighting both for black-white unity in labor struggles and for racial equality within the labor movement. An early pioneer and highly respected leader of the modern civil rights movement, Randolph’s crowning achievement was to conceive of and oversee the organization of the 1963 March on Washington – the

massive march where Martin Luther King, Jr. gave his “I Have a Dream” speech. Randolph proclaimed to the gathering that this huge demonstration represented “the advance guard of a massive moral revolution for jobs and freedom.”

In 1966 Randolph issued *A “Freedom Budget” for All Americans*, endorsed by over 200 prominent civil rights, trade union, and social activists and academic figures. He described the Freedom Budget’s meaning:

The “Freedom Budget” spells out a specific and factual course of action, step by step, to start in early 1967 toward the practical liquidation of poverty in the United States by 1975. The programs urged in the “Freedom Budget” attack *all* of the major causes of poverty – unemployment and underemployment; substandard pay, inadequate social insurance and welfare payments to those who cannot or should not be employed; bad housing; deficiencies in health services, education, and training; and fiscal and monetary policies which tend to redistribute income regressively rather than progressively. The “Freedom Budget” leaves no room for discrimination in any form, because its programs are addressed to *all* who need more opportunity and improved incomes and living standards – not just to some of them.

Randolph explained that such programs “are essential to the Negro and other minority groups striving for dignity and economic security in our society,” but that “the abolition of poverty (almost three-quarters of whose victims are white) can be accomplished only through action which embraces the totality of the victims of poverty, neglect, and injustice.” He added that “in the process everyone will benefit, for poverty is not an isolated circumstance affecting only those entrapped by it. It reflects – and affects – the performance of our national economy, our rate of economic growth, our ability to produce and consume, the condition of our cities, the levels of our social services and needs, the very quality of our lives.” In Randolph’s opinion, the success of this effort would depend on “a mighty coalition among the civil rights and labor movements, liberal and religious forces, students and intellectuals – the coalition expressed in the historic 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom.”

But the Freedom Budget was too radical for most of the Democratic and Republican

politicians – and it “didn’t sell” under the Lyndon Johnson presidency, not to mention that of his conservative successor, Richard Nixon. Since labor had no political party of its own, this closed the door on such proposals as the Freedom Budget. A bitter Randolph commented that the persistence of poverty and racism is rooted in “fundamentally economic problems which are caused by the nature of the system in which we live. This system is a market economy in which investment and production are determined more by the anticipation of profits than by the desire to achieve social justice.” This suggested, despite Randolph’s desire to appeal to moderate labor and political elements, the revolutionary implications of Randolph’s far-reaching goals.

His ally, Martin Luther King, Jr., was less inclined than Randolph to compromise with Democratic Party politicians who (at the time) prioritized the Vietnam War over any wars on poverty. King argued that “revitalized sectors of the labor movement” must join together with other social movements to “reshape economic relationships and usher in a breakthrough to a new level of social reform.”

Such developments failed to take shape in the final decades of the twentieth century. With the dramatic and relentless decline in the power, influence, and membership of the organized labor movement in the United States, those defending the “pure and simple” approach of Gompers and the relatively conservative “business unionism” of Meany increasingly lost credibility. More radical rhetoric once again found expression within labor’s leadership, and some in labor’s ranks began to look for inspiration to the movement’s revolutionary traditions.

SEE ALSO: Bread and Roses Strike; Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA); Debs, Eugene (1855–1926); Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley (1890–1964); Foster, William Z. (1881–1961); Haywood, Big Bill (1869–1928); Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 1775–1900; Marxism; Randolph, A. Philip (1889–1979); Socialist Party, United States; Unemployed Protests; US Labor Rebellions and the Rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)

References and Suggested Readings

Buhle, M. J., Buhle, P., & Georgakas, D. (Eds.) (1998) *Encyclopedia of the American Left*, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Cochran, B. (1977) *Labor and Communism: The Conflict That Shaped American Unions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dubofsky, M. & van Tine, W. (Eds.) (1987) *Labor Leaders in America*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Foner, P. S. (1947–94) *A History of the Labor Movement in the United States*, 10 vols. New York: International Publishers.
- Hinshaw, J. & Le Blanc, P. (Eds.) (2000) *US Labor in the Twentieth Century: Studies in Working-Class Struggles and Insurgency*. Amherst: Humanity Books.
- Kornbluh, J. L. (Ed.) (1988) *Rebel Voices: An IWW Anthology*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.
- Le Blanc, P. (1999) *A Short History of the US Working Class, From Colonial Times to the Twenty-First Century*. Amherst: Humanity Books.
- Le Blanc, P. (2003) The Absence of Socialism in the United States: Contextualizing Kautsky’s “The American Worker.” *Historical Materialism* 11 (4).
- Lens, S. (1969) *Radicalism in America*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
- Madison, C. A. (1962) *American Labor Leaders*, 2nd enlarged ed. New York: Frederick Ungar.
- Stepan-Norris, J. & Zeitlin, M. (2003) *Left Out: Reds and America’s Industrial Unions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Zieger, R. H. (1995) *The CIO 1935–1955*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Labor’s Volunteer Army

Stephen O’Brien

In July 1916, with Australia deeply involved in the European war, a wave of opposition to military conscription swept the country. The movement was strongest in Broken Hill, where 2,500 men swore to resist industrial or military conscription by the “capitalist military oligarchy” by signing up to Labor’s Volunteer Army (LVA).

Broken Hill, a remote town with large silver and lead mines, like most of the country had initially supported the war. However, by 1916 enthusiasm in Broken Hill and elsewhere had waned, the supply of volunteers began to dry up, and the government proposed conscription to provide fresh troops. In a context of layoffs, poor public health, and inflation, the idea of conscription galvanized public discontent, and people turned to union traditions for solutions. The miners of Broken Hill had a high level of class consciousness and many of them were

supportive of the local branches of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and the Socialist Party. In 1915 the underground miners had adopted the IWW slogan "If you want a 44-hour week take it" as their own. After a month-long strike, in defiance of their union, mine owners, and even the prime minister, they won the right to the 44-hour week. One of the leading strikers, a former seafarer from Liverpool, Percy Brookfield, brushed off accusations that they had sabotaged the war effort. Brookfield and his co-thinkers regarded talk of military conscription as a prelude to industrial conscriptions and a massive attack on workers' rights and conditions.

When the government announced a referendum on the issue, the miners decided to organize a workers' army to resist what they called the capitalist military oligarchy. They formed the LVA, and over 2,500 eligible conscriptees pledged to resist conscription until death. Thousands flocked to LVA public meetings and street demonstrations during the referendum campaign. The campaign saw fines, arrests, and jailings under the War Precautions Act, as well as street battles with loyalists and the police. Undeterred, the miners held stop-work meetings and strikes, and in their election eve rally mobilized over 10,000 people, including brass bands and women's and youth contingents.

Broken Hill was impressed with Brookfield's conviction and courage. On one occasion he fought off a patriotic mob bent on ransacking the IWW rooms, and on another he called the prime minister "a traitor and a viper," for which he spent a month in jail. When a by-election was held, Brookfield was nominated and elected as Labor member to state parliament, to be subsequently reelected twice.

Broken Hill recorded a two to one majority against conscription. The government tried unsuccessfully in a second referendum a year later. Broken Hill again voted strongly against, but the political focus had now shifted. The state government had provoked a general strike by enforcing speedups and launching a massive crackdown against the IWW. Brookfield and his allies had also become preoccupied with defending 12 IWW members who had been framed on serious charges, including arson.

In 1920, after being expelled from the Labor Party, Brookfield was reelected for the Industrial Labor Party. Holding the balance of power, he forced the eventual release of the

IWW 12, defended the first Soviet consul, Peter Simonoff, a Russian who had been a Broken Hill miner and LVA member, and helped Broken Hill miners win the 35-hour week and the best industrial conditions in the country in the Big Strike of 1919–20. Six months later, on March 21, 1921, Brookfield was assassinated while attempting to disarm a gunman at a railway station. His funeral, attended by 15,000 Broken Hill people, led by a horseman carrying a red flag, was the last great rally of the LVA era.

SEE ALSO: Australia, Anti-War Movement; Australian Labor Movement; Australian Left; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), Australia

References and Suggested Readings

- Adams, P. (2007) Labor's Volunteer Army: The Fight Against the 1916 Conscription Referendum in Broken Hill. *Australian Folklore* 22: 120–34.
- Dale, G. (1976) *The Industrial History of Broken Hill*. Adelaide: Libraries Board of South Australia.
- Kennedy, B. E. (1978) *Silver, Sim, and Sixpenny Ale: A Social History of Broken Hill, 1883–1921*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Roper, G. G., Scarfe W., & Scarfe, A. (Eds.) (1983) *Labor's Titan: The Story of Percy Brookfield, 1878–1921*. Warrnambool, Victoria: Warrnambool Institute Press.
- Turner, I. (1979) *Industrial Labour and Politics: The Dynamics of the Labour Movement in Eastern Australia, 1900–1921*. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger.

Labour Party, Britain

John McCormick

The Labour Party is one of Britain's two major political parties. It was founded in 1900, following debate about the need for a party to represent the interests of Britain's working-class population. In 1922 it replaced the Liberals as the opposition to the Conservatives, and headed its first coalition government in 1924 under Ramsay MacDonald. Labour won outright power for the first time in 1945 under Clement Attlee and set about completing construction of a welfare state and a managed economy, nationalizing key industries and creating a national health service, a social security system, and a subsidized education system. It lost power in 1951, but returned in 1964–70 and again in 1974–6 under Harold Wilson, and in 1976–9 under

James Callaghan. It went into opposition in 1979, losing four straight general elections and undergoing a crisis of confidence before finally regaining power in 1997 under Tony Blair.

Labour's difficulties in the 1980s were widely blamed on a combination of the political shrewdness of Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, "unelectable" party leaders such as the old-style socialist Michael Foot, and the unpopularity of many of its more traditional socialist policies, including state ownership of key industries, support of labor unions, and the redistribution of wealth through taxation. The depth of its internal problems was emphasized in 1981 when a group of moderate members of the party broke away to form the Social Democratic Party (SDP) (which went on to merge in 1988 with the Liberal Party, becoming the Liberal Democrats).

Tony Blair was elected party leader in May 1994, and moved to "modernize" Labour by adopting what he called a new left-of-center agenda. This included abandonment of the controversial Clause Four of its constitution, which pledged "common ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange" (thereby threatening to undo Thatcher's popular policy of privatization). It went on to promote the "third way" in politics, meaning an approach to government, politics, economics, and social issues that lay somewhere between the kind of right-wing conservatism associated with the Thatcher government and the left-wing liberalism associated with European socialist parties.

At the May 1997 general election, "New Labour" won a 177-seat majority, while the Conservatives lost half their seats in the Commons and all their seats in Scotland and Wales. Labour succeeded by capitalizing on a widely felt need among Britons for new ideas in government, and a new focus on social problems. It had also moved itself towards the center of the political spectrum (for example, promising not to raise income taxes), and benefited from internal squabbles within the Conservative Party. Furthermore, there was clearly much tactical voting in the election, with Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters voting for the other party in districts where one of them was in a strong position to challenge the incumbent Conservative. Finally, a new generation of young people who had known nothing but Conservative government was voting for the first time: 52 percent of under-25s voted Labour, up from 35 percent in 1992.

Labour under Blair went on to encroach into traditionally Conservative territory, embracing the market economy, developing a closer relationship with business, reducing the influence of trade unions in the party, making a commitment to a balanced budget, instituting a more pro-European policy (Labour was for many years hostile to the idea of European integration), and moving Labour toward foreign policy positions that were pro-globalization and aligned closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and with the United States. Perhaps his greatest tactical achievement was to prevent damaging in-fighting within the party between left wingers who preferred public ownership and intervention in the economy, were opposed to nuclear weapons, and were cool on the transatlantic alliance, and right wingers prepared to take a more pragmatic approach, favoring nuclear weapons and supporting the transatlantic alliance. Labour maintained its commanding position at the 2001 election, when its majority was reduced by just 12 seats, and its percentage share of the vote fell from 43 to 41. However, voter turnout fell to 59 percent, suggesting that enthusiasm for Labour was waning and that it was being returned to office partly because the Conservatives had failed to offer a strong alternative.

The situation changed during 2002–3 when Blair supported the US-led invasion of Iraq. Mass demonstrations against the war were held in Britain, as elsewhere in Europe, and when it became clear that the pretext for invasion – that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction – was false, and as questions were raised about the real motives behind the war and about the wisdom of British support for the US, Blair became increasingly unpopular. Labour's record on public services, crime, and asylum was also facing new criticism, as was Blair's governing style. But the strength of the economy worked in his favor, as did the unpopularity of the Conservatives, and Labour won an unprecedented third term at the 2005 general election, with a reduced but still impressive majority of 66. Blair had muddied the waters by declaring several months in advance that it would be his last election, sparking damaging debate in 2005–6 about how long he would stay in office, and generating calls from his critics for him to step down. He finally stepped down in June 2007, and was replaced as party leader – and as prime minister – by Gordon Brown, who had

served as chancellor of the exchequer throughout the Blair years.

SEE ALSO: Britain, Post-World War II Political Protest; Britain, Trade Union Movement

References and Suggested Readings

Heffernan, R. (2002) *New Labour and Thatcherism: Political Change in Britain*, reprint ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Thorpe, A. & Black, J. (2008) *A History of the British Labour Party*, 3rd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lafayette, Marquis de (1757–1834)

Annette Richardson

Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roche Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, was a wealthy French aristocrat who participated in several revolutions, including the American Revolution, the Great French Revolution (and Counterrevolution), and the July Revolution of 1830.

Lafayette was born on September 6, 1757, to Michel Roche Gilbert du Motier, also Marquis de Lafayette, and Marie Louise, a daughter of the Marquis de la Rivière. The family had served the French state since the Hundred Years' War of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Lafayette received a classical and military education, and became a proponent of liberal ideas. He inherited great wealth, married at age 17, and soon had three children. He was on friendly terms with highly placed court officials, as well as with Queen Marie, wife of King Louis XV.

In late 1776 he learned about the American Declaration of Independence, which contained ideals he espoused. That, and the fact that France had lost its North American empire to Britain in the Seven Years' War, encouraged young Lafayette to support American independence. He ventured to America, whereupon the Continental Congress granted him permission to volunteer at his own expense and gave him the rank of major general. He met George Washington shortly thereafter and they became instant friends. Lafayette used his own financial resources to ensure that his men were trained well, equipped properly, and fed.

Lafayette was involved in numerous battles, and facilitated French military and financial assistance to America, during the revolutionary period. He received letters of gratitude from Congress for his 80-mile, eight-hour journey on horseback from Newport to Boston on August 29, 1778, to assist the retreat of the American forces. In 1779 he returned to France for a six-month visit, during which time he urged French military assistance to the Americans. As a result, an expeditionary force of 6,000 French troops under the command of the Comte de Rochambeau arrived in Rhode Island in July 1780 to assist Washington.

The British General Cornwallis, following a successful battle in North Carolina on March 15, 1781, moved into Virginia and joined with Benedict Arnold, who had just defected to the British, to create a combined force of 4,000. Lafayette, in command of 1,000 infantrymen, retreated but Cornwallis pursued him and famously boasted, "The boy cannot escape me." Lafayette marched to Yorktown, however, where he established an effective spy network; consequently, the Americans knew exactly what the British were planning. Cornwallis was surrounded, and a combined Franco-American operation routed the British at Yorktown, which led to their surrender on October 19, 1781, and secured the victory of the American Revolution. In 1782, Lafayette returned to France, where he was hailed as a "hero of two worlds."

In 1784 Lafayette again returned to America and visited George Washington at Mount Vernon. He then toured Germany, where he became interested in the abolition of slavery. He stated his intention to emancipate the slaves on a large plantation he had bought in Cayenne, which greatly impressed Washington and Thomas Jefferson.

Lafayette greeted the early stages of the French Revolution with enthusiasm, and he played a prominent role in it. He served as a member of the Assembly of Notables in 1787, and was one of the signatories to the document that recalled the Estates General (after a 175-year hiatus) on May 5, 1789. On July 11, 1789, he proposed a Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, similar to the American Declaration of Rights. He became commander of the newly established National Guard on July 25, 1789, a position he held until October 8, 1791.

As the Revolution progressed, however, Lafayette found himself increasingly in opposition to

its rapidly radicalizing trend. He was a founder of the Feuillants Club, a conservative split-off from the Jacobin Club. His popularity plummeted when on July 17, 1791, troops under his command opened fire on a massive demonstration calling for the king's removal – the infamous “Champs de Mars massacre.”

In June 1792 Lafayette made an explicit attempt to militarily subdue the Revolution. Then in command of one of France's four armies, he left his troops at the front and returned to Paris to address the Legislative Assembly and demand that it suppress the Jacobin Club. When the Assembly failed to respond to his entreaties, he attempted to raise the Parisian National Guard he had formerly commanded to attack the Jacobins and eliminate them as a center of influence. Only a handful of the guardsmen responded, however, and his initiative ended in humiliating failure. Ridiculed as a would-be Julius Caesar, he returned to his army at the front.

On August 10, 1792, a powerful insurrection occurred in Paris that resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy and the proclamation of the Republic. Once again Lafayette attempted to intervene militarily, and once again he failed. He tried to lead his army to Paris to block this giant step forward of the Revolution, but his troops deserted him. On August 19 the Assembly declared him a traitor; to avoid the guillotine he fled to join the Revolution's worst enemies, the Austrians. Lafayette may have hoped the Austrians would welcome him as an ally against the Revolution, but unfortunately for him they did not. Instead they imprisoned him and he remained behind bars for several years.

Napoleon Bonaparte included Lafayette's release as a stipulation in the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797. Lafayette was freed as a United States citizen on September 23, 1797, to the United States consul in Hamburg. Returning to France, he retired to La Grange, his wife's family castle in Brie near Paris. Although Lafayette had lost most of his wealth, he declined all awards from Bonaparte and offers of political positions from the United States. He disapproved of Bonaparte's imperial title and was never supportive of the emperor's ambitions and despotic tendencies. After Bonaparte's defeat at Waterloo and his final departure from the scene in 1815, Lafayette was elected to the Chamber of Deputies, a position he held from 1818 until

1824. As a political leader of the opposition to the restored Bourbon monarchy, Lafayette consistently supported liberal causes.

Following his tenure as a deputy, Lafayette returned to the United States, accompanied by his son, and visited all 24 of the then-existing states in 14 months. Congress voted to grant Lafayette \$200,000 and 24,000 acres of land in appreciation of his services, and he celebrated his sixty-eighth birthday at the White House. After his return to France he was reelected, in 1827, to the Chamber of Deputies, a position he held until his death. During the July Revolution of 1830, Lafayette became commander-in-chief of the National Guard. Still a believer in constitutional monarchy, he was instrumental in placing Louis Philippe, the “bourgeois king,” on the French throne.

Lafayette died in Paris on May 20, 1834, and received a grand funeral. He was buried beside his wife in Le Jardin de Picpus cemetery in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine.

What was Lafayette's legacy as a revolutionary? The “hero of two worlds” made positive contributions to the American Revolution and to the French Revolution in its first year or two. By 1791, however, although he undoubtedly believed he was defending the Revolution from devolving into anarchy and chaos, it is evident in retrospect that he had gone over to the Counterrevolution by placing himself and the troops he commanded in the service of the Revolution's most implacable enemies. Another way of assessing Lafayette is as a consistent liberal who was willing to fight for democratic reforms and political equality, but just as willing to fight *against* the struggles of poor people for social justice and economic equality.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776; Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); Counterrevolution, France, 1789–1830; Estates General, France; France, 1830 Revolution; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–1793); Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794); Rochambeau, Comte de (1725–1807); *Sans-Culottes*; Washington, George (1732–1799)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bernier, O. (1983) *Lafayette: Hero of Two Worlds*. New York: E. P. Dutton.
 Bickman, P. (1977) *Lafayette: A Biography*. New York: Paddington Press.

- Gottschalk, L. R. (1965) *Lafayette at the Close of the American Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gottschalk, L. R. (1973) *Lafayette in the French Revolution: From the October Days through the Federation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gottschalk, L. R. (1974) *Lafayette Comes to America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lalor, Peter (1827–1889)

Ann Beggs-Sunter

Peter Lalor achieved fame as the leader of the gold diggers in their revolt against the British government at the Eureka Stockade, Ballarat, Victoria in 1854. Lalor was born in Ireland in 1827, the youngest of 11 sons of Patrick and Ann Lalor of County Laois, Ireland. His father sat in the House of Commons with Daniel O’Connell in the Reform Parliament, and the family became involved with the movement for repeal of the Act of Union and for land reform in Ireland. The eldest son, James Fintan, became a Young Irelander in 1848 and gave his life for the cause.

Such were the family influences on the engineer Peter Lalor when he immigrated to Australia in 1852. By October 1854, Lalor was a gold miner in Ballarat and was drawn into the protest movement against the unjust and corrupt administration of the Ballarat goldfields. On November 30, 1854, Lalor drew on his Irish nationalist heritage and stepped forward to lead the radical arm of the movement on Bakery Hill. Lalor mounted a stump under the Southern Cross flag and called on those present to swear an oath that would ring passionately down the generations:

We swear by the Southern Cross to stand truly
by each other,
And fight to defend our rights and liberties.

Lalor’s oath inspired men with revolutionary fervor. They marched away to form a defensive stockade on the Eureka Lead and commence collecting arms. With the Irish being the largest ethnic component of the militants, Lalor was elected commander-in-chief. The previously conservative youngest son had suddenly stepped into his elder brother’s shoes and become a rebel.

When the military and police made a secret pre-dawn attack on the Stockade on Sunday

morning, December 3, 1854, the defenders were caught napping and after a brief and bloody battle, the Stockade was overrun. Lalor led his men bravely but was shot and severely wounded during the battle. He was saved by comrades who hid him until a secret operation could be arranged to amputate his shattered left arm. This operation took place in the presbytery of the Catholic chapel of St. Alipius, evidence of his support base amongst the Irish community.

When Lalor had regained some strength, he was spirited away to Geelong, where his fiancée, Alicia Dunne, nursed him back to health. Although there was a reward of £200 on his head, nobody betrayed him. On April 10, 1855, Lalor published a long letter in the Melbourne newspapers, justifying his actions to his fellow colonists and to the world:

Is it to prove to us that a British Government can never bring forth a measure of reform without having first prepared a font of human blood in which to baptise that offspring of their generous love? Or is it to convince the world that where a large standing army exists, the Demon of Despotism will have frequently offered at his shrine the mangled bodies of murdered men?

A month later, with a price still on his head, Lalor boldly attended a land sale in Ballarat and successfully bid £260 for 160 acres of land near Ballarat. Four days later, on May 9, 1855, the government declared an amnesty, and Lalor was at last a free man. Later that year Lalor was elected to parliament as the champion of the diggers at Ballarat and began a long parliamentary career which culminated in his election as Speaker of the Legislative Assembly.

However, soon after his entry into parliament, Lalor confounded his supporters by voting in favor of an electoral bill that maintained property qualifications, and he defended himself in a statement published in the *Argus* on December 31, 1856:

I would ask these gentlemen what they mean by Democracy?
Do they mean Chartism, or Communism, or Republicanism?
If so, I never was, I am not now, nor ever will be a democrat.

But if democracy means opposition to a tyrannical press,
a tyrannical people or a tyrannical government
then I ever have
been, I am still, and will ever remain a democrat.

For Lalor, democracy meant opposition to tyranny, not equality for the people. It was the tyranny of a corrupt magistracy and a brutal police force that drove him to arms at Eureka, not belief in the Chartist democratic points. Thus it was not surprising that Lalor would vote with the landed interests, his own class, in parliament. Lalor became a mining capitalist, using his parliamentary position to gain advantage in mining deals. The electors of Ballarat withdrew their support for his parliamentary candidacy, and he was forced to move to a conservative rural seat. However, as Speaker, Lalor repeatedly refused the offer of a knighthood, saying that no higher honor could be bestowed on him than being “first commoner of Victoria.”

Lalor died in Melbourne in 1889, and his death unleashed a rash of memorials around the continent. Lalor was mythologized in poetry, paintings, and sculpture. Clive Turnbull wrote the first full biography of Peter Lalor in 1946. Turnbull pointed out that Lalor was an ordinary man before and after Eureka, but for a brief moment he rose to magnificent heights to become a symbol of courage, determination, and comradeship. Ian Turner’s entry on Lalor in the *Australian Dictionary of Biography* (1974) is a careful assessment, which weighs the positive and negative aspects of Lalor’s character, concluding that though “neither a profound thinker nor a skilful politician, Lalor was a good fighter and a man of rectitude” who earned the grudging respect of those whom he opposed.

SEE ALSO: Eureka Stockade; Vinegar Hill/ Castle Hill Rebellion, 1804

References and Suggested Readings

- Beggs-Sunter, A. (2004) The Apotheosis of Peter Lalor: Myth, Meaning and Memory in History. In “Remembered Nations, Imagined Republics” (special issue), *Australian Journal of Irish Studies* 4 (October): 94–104.
- Blake, L. (1979) *Peter Lalor: The Man From Eureka*. Belmont, Victoria: Neptune Press.
- Currey, C. H. (1954) *The Irish at Eureka*. Sydney: Angus & Robertson.

- Turnbull, C. (1946) *Eureka: The Story of Peter Lalor*. Melbourne: Hawthorn Press.
- Turner, I. (1974) Peter Lalor. In *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, Vol. 5. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, pp. 50–4.

Lamartine, Alphonse de (1790–1869)

Casey Harison

Alphonse de Lamartine flashed across the historical landscape during France’s Revolution of 1848. A political moderate rather than a revolutionary, the lofty rhetoric for which Lamartine was known was not matched by skills in governing. In the end, Lamartine’s fall was as grand as his rise.

Lamartine was born in Burgundy and given a Jesuit education, though intellectually he fit the Deist tradition. He spent much of his youth traveling. Unlike many Romantic-era contemporaries, Lamartine mostly rejected the influence of classical thinkers and instead was drawn to more recent authors like Jean-Jacques Rousseau. A poet and writer himself, Lamartine’s fame came early with *Méditations poétiques* (1820). Elected to the Académie française (French Academy) in 1829, his literary reputation paved the way for a political career, beginning with election to the Chamber of Deputies. During the July Monarchy (1830–48), Lamartine cultivated a reputation as a brilliant speaker who was sympathetic to the “social question.” His appeal also derived from the success of *History of the Girondins* (1846).

Lamartine’s place in history especially comes from his role in the French Revolution of 1848. A critic of the Orléanist monarchy, he was a prominent actor in the February Revolution that saw Louis-Philippe deposed, a provisional government declared, and France made a (Second) Republic. Lamartine was appointed foreign minister and was an influential figure before the June Days rebellion, lending his energy to such accomplishments as the abolition of slavery in French colonies, extending the right to vote for males, and promoting economic reforms for the lower classes.

Lamartine’s character was marked by flaws. Alexis de Tocqueville admired him as a great poet and an inspiring speaker, but in his *Recollections*

he wrote: “I do not think I ever met in the world of ambitious egoists . . . any mind so untroubled by thought of the public good as his. . . . [H]e . . . always seemed ready to turn the world upside down for the fun of it.” Lamartine courted radical elements in 1848, but temperamentally he was a moderate and in crucial moments he proved reticent. Early in the Revolution he argued in favor of the French tricolor flag and against the red flag of socialism. Lamartine’s reputation declined through the spring as tensions between workers and the middle classes grew and as Paris slid inexorably toward the June Days.

Lamartine’s career cascaded downward following the June Days. In the presidential election of December 1848, he received about 18,000 votes, compared to the winner Louis-Napoleon’s nearly 5.5 million. Likewise, Lamartine’s writing career did not revive after 1848. He died in relative obscurity and poverty in 1869.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873); European Revolutions of 1848; France, June Days, 1848; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Duveau, G. (1984) *1848: The Making of Revolution*. Trans. A. Carter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Evans, D. O. (1969) *Social Romanticism in France: 1830–1848*. New York: Octagon.
- Fortescue, W. (1983) *Alphonse de Lamartine: A Political Biography*. London: Croom Helm.
- Lamartine, A. de (1981) *Méditations poétiques*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Tocqueville, A. de (1992) *Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848*. Ed. J. P. Meyer & A. P. Kerr. New Brunswick: Transaction.

Lame, Manuel Quintín (1880–1967), Indian/peasant organization, and the struggle for land in Colombia, 1920s–1930s

Olga Burkert

Manuel Quintín Lame was the most important indigenous leader in Colombia in the twentieth

century. Born October 31, 1880 on the Hacienda San Isidro in the northwest of Colombia, Lame grew up illiterate with five brothers and sisters in a poor peasant family that belonged to the indigenous Paez people. At this time in the Colombian region of Cauca, it was common practice for indigenous people not to own land; instead, they lived as tenants on the land of large landholders whom they had to pay in hours of work. Through his uncle, Lame’s interest in reading grew and he learned how to read and write. In 1901 he entered the army of the Conservative Party, where he stayed until 1903 after the conclusion of the Thousand Days’ War. On leaving, he asked for a piece of land near his father’s house.

Over the years the situation worsened for peasants and Lame grew increasingly radical. He began studying law on his own and became an advocate for indigenous rights, presenting his demands before local, regional, and national authorities. In 1914 he started a campaign to mobilize the indigenous people of the Cauca region and founded an organization that challenged the power of the armed forces and large landowners. Later that year the armed struggle began with the participation of about 6,000 indigenous people. At the end of 1914, Lame gathered with the chiefs of Tolima, Huila, Tierradentro, Cauca, and Valle to start an uprising in February 1915 which they hoped would lead to the foundation of a free indigenous territory, the República Chiquita de Indios. The plan was discovered, however, and Lame was arrested. Throughout his fight for indigenous rights, Lame was arrested and imprisoned several times, as landowners began to put pressure on the authorities to fight him. Because of his law studies, he insisted on representing himself.

Through the 1920s and 1930s, several battles and land occupations took place. In 1924 the indigenous communities of Ortega and Chaparral named Lame, José Gonzalo Sánchez, and Eutiquio Timoté as their representatives. This started a new agitation, ending in the founding of a village, San José de Indias. In 1930, Timoté was nominated the Communist Party’s presidential candidate. Lame, a strict Catholic who never favored an alliance with the communists, broke with Timoté and Sánchez.

In 1931 San José de Indias was attacked by landowners’ troops. Lame was able to flee, but 17 indigenous people died and 40 were injured.

From 1945 on, systematic violence against the indigenous communities began. As the first to demand extensive land rights for indigenous peoples, Lame continued to emphasize that they had an ancestral right to the land because it had belonged to them before the Spaniards conquered South America. He continued this fight until his death in Ortega in 1967.

SEE ALSO: Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1960s–1970s; Colombia, Indigenous Mobilization; Colombia, Labor, Insurrection, and the Socialist Revolutionary Party, 1920s–1930s; Colombia, Thousand Days' War, 1899–1902; Quintín Lame, 1980s

References and Suggested Readings

- Castillo Cárdenas, G. (1987) *Liberation Theology from Below: The Life and Thought of Manuel Quintín Lame*. New York: Orbis Books.
- Espinosa Arango, M. (2004) *Of Visions and Sorrows: Manuel Quintín Lame's Indian Thought and the Violences of Colombia*. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Available at scholarworks.umass.edu.dissertations/AAI3152691/ (downloaded June 24, 2008).
- Fajardo Sánchez, L. A., Gamboa Martínez, J. C., & Villanueva Martínez, O. (1999) *Manuel Quintín Lame y los Guerreros de Juan Tama: multiculturalismo, magia y resistencia*. Madrid: Ediciones Colectivo Alas de Xue (Colombia), Nossa y Jara Editores.
- Lame, M. Q. (1971) *En defensa de mi Raza*. Introduction and Notes by G. Castillo Cárdenas. Bogotá: Comité de Defensa del Indio.
- Lame, M. Q. (1987) *Los pensamientos del Indio que se educó dentro de las Selvas Colombianas*. Bogotá: Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia (ONIC).

Landau, Kurt (1903–1937)

Holger Briel

Kurt Landau was born on January 29, 1903 in Vienna, the son of a wealthy Jewish wine merchant, and was an eminent non-aligned Austrian Marxist. He was elected leader of the Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (Austrian Communist Party) (KPÖ) in Vienna-Währing, but became disillusioned with the Stalinist grip on power and the persecution of Leon Trotsky. As cultural editor of the communist newspaper *Rote Fahne* (Red Flag), Landau defended Trotskyist positions,

including the notion of permanent revolution with democratic elements. Together with other rebels, Landau was expelled from the KPÖ during 1926 and 1927. In 1929, on Trotsky's suggestion, Landau moved to Germany to unify communist factions. He set up in the Berlin area of Wedding, traditionally a leftist workers' quarter, and organized the *Roter Wedding* (Red Wedding) movement. He was elected onto the Provisional National Leadership Board of the Linke Opposition der KPD (Bolschewiki-Leninisten) as the liaison to the International Bureau and wrote for the newspaper *Der Kommunist*.

As a result of possible Stalinist intervention, a rift was created within the leftist opposition between Landau and the up-and-coming Roman Well (aka Robert Soblen). Trotsky sided with Well, who accused Landau of exaggerating the danger of a possible Nazi takeover of Germany. In May 1931 the left opposition split and Landau founded the so-called Gruppe Landau or Gruppe Funke (Group Spark), named after its magazine, *Funke*, that started publishing in 1933. The group formed part of the larger left-wing party Linker Flügel der KPD/Marxisten/Leninisten.

In further opposition to Trotsky, Landau advocated alliances of national communist parties with non-communists to oppose fascism. Trotsky considered Landau's popular front proposal a prescription for failure, as it included non-communists with different agendas, and severed ties with Landau.

After the Nazis took power in Germany, Landau fled to Paris in March 1933 and established ties with French leftist groups such as *Que faire?* In 1936 some of Landau's former allies were executed following the Moscow show trials, confirming his disillusionment with the Soviet Union under Stalin. Also in 1936, the Spanish Civil War commenced, and like other liberals and leftists, Landau traveled to Barcelona to fight the fascists. He believed strongly that Spain represented the basis of the democratic reconsolidation of Marxist forces.

While war raged in September 1937, Landau, who was in hiding in several anarchist safe houses around Barcelona under the pseudonym Wolf Bertram, disappeared, apparently kidnapped by Stalinist agents. After his kidnapping, Kurt Landau was never heard from again and while his ultimate fate is disputed, sources contend that in 1937 he was either murdered by German communists or Soviet secret police.

In 1988 a memorial was inaugurated in the Central Cemetery in Vienna for Austrian volunteers killed in the Spanish Civil War which includes the name of Kurt Landau. Of the 1,500 or so Austrians who fought, about 260 were killed.

SEE ALSO: Austro-Marxism; Bauer, Otto (1881–1938); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Spanish Revolution; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- Alles, W. (2004) Zu den Anfängen des Trotzkismus in Deutschland (1930–1945). *Inprekorr* 396/397 (November/December).
- Landau, K. (2007) *Los Verdugos de la Revolución Española (1937–1938)*. Malaga: Sepha.
- Schafranek, H. (1988) *Das kurze Leben des: Ein Österreichischer Kommunist als Opfer der stalinistischen Geheimpolizei*. Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik.

Landauer, Gustav (1870–1919)

Jesse Cohn

Gustav Landauer was an anarchist organizer, theorist, and writer whose importance to a history of revolution is twofold: first, in terms of his own revolutionary practice, and second, in terms of his contribution to a radical revision of theories of revolution.

Political Practice

While best remembered as a theorist, author of a prodigious corpus of lectures, essays, translations, novels, and larger works of literary criticism, history, and political philosophy, Landauer was active in the anarchist movement throughout his life and was to pay for his radical practice with two prison terms and, ultimately, his own extra-judicial execution. German anarchists in Landauer's time were struggling to retain their place in the broader socialist movement, a place increasingly denied them by a socialist party establishment bent on maintaining its legitimacy within the parliamentary system and by a trend toward centralization in the labor movement. Thus, Landauer began his political life as a member of "Der Jungen" (or "Youth"), an anti-parliamentarist faction within the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). As the

SPD moved toward reformism and doctrinaire Marxism after the Erfurt congress of 1891, the Jungen were marginalized and ultimately expelled, forming a new group called the Verein Unabhängiger Sozialisten (Association of Independent Socialists) in 1892. After a struggle over its ideological direction, Landauer became chief editor of their journal, *Der Sozialist* (which he subsequently subtitled *Organ für Anarchismus-Sozialismus*) in May 1893. At the congresses of the Second International, first in Zurich in July 1893, and then in London in July 1896, Landauer was among the anarchists who protested their exclusion.

Landauer was active in building an anarchist-socialist movement that would present a viable alternative to reformism. Faced with the increasing co-optation of industrial unions by employers and the state, Landauer sought new avenues for resistance to capitalism, such as radical aesthetics, the formation of cooperatives, and the unionization of non-factory workers – including, significantly, peasants and women. Thus, in October 1892, he participated in the founding of the Neue Freie Volksbühne (the New People's Independent Theatre) in Berlin as an alternative to theater created by the SPD. Through this he helped to popularize the politically charged dramas of new playwrights such as Georg Kaiser. In March 1895, Landauer helped to create a worker-consumer cooperative named "Befreiung" ("Liberation") in Berlin, and subsequently intervened in the Berlin Garment Workers' Strike of February 1896 on behalf of seamstresses, mainly home workers, angry at their misrepresentation by an SPD-led strike committee.

These activities earned Landauer the increasingly hostile attention of the German government, which sentenced him to a total of 17 months in prison in 1893 and 1899 on political charges of "disobedience," "incitement," and "libel." The government also jailed several other writers and editorial staff of *Der Sozialist*, and subjected them to repeated arrests, searches, seizures, surveillance, interrogations, and trials. This led to a complete shutdown of the paper in 1899. Nonetheless, Landauer continued to write journalistic articles, philosophical works, translations, literary criticism, and novels, and to associate with some of the brightest minds in the German Jewish intellectual world, such as the theologian Martin Buber, poet and dramatist

Erich Mühsam, and language philosopher Fritz Mauthner.

In 1908, Landauer launched the Sozialistischer Bund (Socialist Federation), an association working for a non-violent revolution by building cooperative “settlements” as concrete alternatives to government and capitalism. To this end, he revived *Der Sozialist* as the Bund’s house organ. Landauer’s manifestos for the Bund combined the “mutualist” economics of Pierre Joseph Proudhon and Silvio Gesell, in which individuals and cooperative enterprises would exchange labor and goods “in justice” (i.e., without profit, rent, or interest) with the decentralist philosophy of Peter Kropotkin and Ebenezer Howard (for whom, in Landauer’s paraphrase, “the central power of the state” was to be replaced by an infinity of “organs and arrangements” serving particular, localized communities, uniting the “people” with the “land”).

The Sozialistischer Bund grew until the disruptions of World War I. Sensing the danger as early as 1907, Landauer campaigned against militarism and imperialism but found himself isolated as large sections of the German and European left joined in the call for war. In 1915, due to heightened censorship, *Der Sozialist* ceased publication.

Landauer remained active in the peace movement and after Germany’s defeat participated in the first Bavarian Räterepublik (Council Republic) of 1919. Its left-wing socialist president, Kurt Eisner, appointed Landauer Commissioner of Enlightenment and Public Instruction – a position Landauer insisted must remain “provisional” until confirmed by the vote of the assembled workers’ and soldiers’ councils. Landauer planned to institute broad curricular reforms along lines suggested by the Spanish anarchist educator Francisco Ferrer, giving priority to poetry and culture. After the defeat of the revolution, Landauer fell victim to right-wing reprisals: imprisoned on May Day, 1919, he was beaten to death by soldiers in the prison yard at Stadelheim the following day.

Theoretical Work

Landauer’s anarchism developed in contrast to three other currents in anarchism: “propaganda by the deed” or individual terrorism; anarcho-syndicalism, focused on organizing the working class via labor unions; and anarchocommunist,

refusing the wage system in favor of free distribution of goods according to need. Rejecting all violent means as inconsistent with anarchist goals, Landauer also argued against vesting revolutionary hopes solely in the urban industrial working class and did not see communism as the best alternative to capitalism. Instead, he proposed a “way to freedom” closely linked to his conception of culture and community as forms of “spirit” (*Geist*).

Landauer’s use of this concept owes much to Romantic philosophy and Judaism. Indeed, one of his major works argues that a rational critique of received ideas is compatible with “a new mysticism.” However, “spirit,” for Landauer, is not supernatural; rather, it consists of common bonds of thought, feeling, language, and identity that unite people. As he explained in his *Aufruf zum Sozialismus* (translated into English as *For Socialism*), this force is simply “solidarity,” materially codified and transmitted through repeatable signs (“symbols”) and signifying practices (“rituals”). Spirit decays when people mistake these signs and signifying practices for the social bond itself, treating them as sacred and unalterable, making their repetition into something rigid and compulsory. Without the spirit of community, cooperation becomes difficult, leading to conflict and coercive arrangements such as the state. In order to “destroy” coercive systems, then, we must “build” new communities based on solidarity.

To some extent, this conception of revolution as prefiguring the future society within the present parallels the anarcho-syndicalist conception of the revolutionary union as the organizational “embryo” of the post-revolutionary economic system. However, Landauer generalizes this project beyond the confines of the workplace to embrace every aspect of life. Thus, Landauer asserted that “the state is not a thing” but “a relationship between human beings, a way by which people relate to one another.” Landauer inverts King Louis XVI’s declaration, “I am the state,” to argue that “we are the state,” that its power to dominate comes from our willingness to submit. It can only be “destroyed” by transforming coercive, hierarchical relationships into cooperative, egalitarian ones. This transformation goes beyond governmental or economic relationships; ultimately, as he argued in his 1907 treatise *Die Revolution*, “revolution relates to the whole of the social life of men” – including

“spiritual structures and currents, art, culture and education.” All of these areas of “social life” are fields for revolutionary transformation.

Moreover, Landauer suggests, transformation need not be violent, sudden, and all-encompassing to be authentically “revolutionary.” Along these lines, *Die Revolution* presents a prehistory of the French Revolution that undermines the Jacobin conception of revolution as a single, total overturning of social relations as a consequence of the overthrow of a state. Instead, Landauer sees revolution as an endless process or “tradition”: there is “only one revolution,” advancing quickly at certain times, slowing or receding at others.

In the course of this discussion, he redefines “utopia” by contrast with “topia.” Rather than regarding utopias as mere daydreams, he suggests that while they indeed begin in individual imaginings, they also present an emergent “form of life” appearing during periods of crisis when the “topia” – i.e., “social life in a state of relative stability” – becomes intolerable and unstable. Contrary to a Marxist interpretation of history for which revolutions are the predetermined outcome of economic development (making the “utopian socialism” of individual reformers irrelevant), Landauer’s interpretation gives new validity to utopian desires as a force for change. “Socialism,” he insisted, “is possible at all times, if enough people want it.”

Legacy

While linked to avant-garde intellectual currents such as expressionist theater and language philosophy, as a champion of “tradition” Gustav Landauer was not always in tune with his times. He broke with Erich Mühsam and Margarethe Faas-Hardegger, fellow organizers of the Sozialistischer Bund, over their endorsement of psychoanalysis and their critique of marriage as a patriarchal institution. By the same token, his redemption of tradition and ethnicity as sources of solidarity and his utopian vision of self-reliant communities had considerable influence on the early kibbutz settlements in Palestine. His ethics of non-violent change forms part of the heritage of modern pacifism.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchocommunism; Anarchosyndicalism; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Non-Violent Movements: Struggles for Rights, Justice, and Identities; Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865); Social Democratic Party, Germany

References and Suggested Readings

- Avrich, P. (1974) Gustav Landauer. *The Match!* 5, 2 (December): 10–12.
- Breines, P. (1967) The Jew as Revolutionary: The Case of Gustav Landauer. *Leo Baeck Yearbook* 12: 75–84.
- Gambone, L. (2001) *For Community: An Introduction to the Communitarian Anarchism of Gustav Landauer*. Montreal: Red Lion.
- Grauer, M. (1994) Anarcho-Nationalism: Anarchist Attitudes towards Jewish Nationalism and Zionism. *Modern Judaism* 14 (1): 1–19.
- Humble, M. (2006) From “the Propaganda of the Deed” to the New Community: The Transformation of Anarchism in Germany 1880–1920 and its Reflection in Literature. In H. Chambers (Ed.), *Violence, Culture and Identity: Essays on German and Austrian Literature, Politics and Society*. Oxford: Peter Lang, pp. 185–201.
- Hyman, R. L. (1977) *Gustav Landauer: Philosopher of Utopia*. Trans. L. Infield. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Landauer, G. (1907) *Die Revolution*. Frankfurt am Main: Rütten & Loening.
- Landauer, G. (2005a) *Anarchism in Germany and Other Essays*. San Francisco: Barbary Coast Collective.
- Landauer, G. (2005b) Destroying the State by Creating Socialism [Excerpts]. Trans. R. Ludlow. In R. Graham (Ed.), *Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas*, Vol. 1: *From Anarchy to Anarchism (300CE–1939)*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Lunn, E. D. (1973) *Prophet of Community: The Romantic Socialism of Gustav Landauer*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Maurer, C. B. (1971) *Call to Revolution: The Mystical Anarchism of Gustav Landauer*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Yassour, A. (1990) *The Withering-Away of Politics in Buber and Landauer’s Utopianism*. Haifa: University of Haifa.

Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and Sri Lankan radicalism

Charles Wesley Ervin

The Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), formed in 1935, was the first broad-based anti-imperialist and socialist political party in Ceylon, officially renamed Sri Lanka in 1972. During the colonial era, the LSSP was at the vanguard in the fight for independence from Britain. Starting in 1940, the LSSP was affiliated to the Fourth International, launched by Leon Trotsky as an alternative to the Soviet Third International

(Comintern). At its pinnacle, in the late 1940s and 1950s, the LSSP had a mass following, a large trade union base, and led the opposition in parliament. For nearly a quarter-century the LSSP was arguably the largest and most successful section of the Fourth International.

The LSSP was founded, shaped, and directed by Philip Gunawardena (1901–72), a dynamic and charismatic Trotskyist, who turned toward socialism as a student in the US from 1922 to 1928. After moving to London, he joined the Communist Party of Great Britain. In 1930 he came into contact with Trotskyists in London and became a supporter of the persecuted Left Opposition in the USSR.

Given the Stalinist armed campaign against Trotskyism, Gunawardena functioned as a secret Trotskyist within the British Communist Party. Assigned to work with students from various British colonies, he secretly recruited a circle of talented young Marxists, including Colvin de Silva (1907–89), Leslie Goonewardene (1909–83), and N. M. Perera (1905–79), future LSSP leaders. In 1932 the British Communist Party, suspicious of Gunawardena's criticisms of the Comintern party line, summarily expelled him for Trotskyist sympathies.

Returning to Ceylon in October 1932, Gunawardena recruited his younger brother, Robert (1904–71), to Marxism, and they joined the South Colombo Youth League, a nascent offshoot of the All-Ceylon Youth Congress, inspired by the nationalist movement in India. As other nationalists returned from London, many joined the Youth League. Philip Gunawardena was thus building and training the nucleus of a future Trotskyist party in Ceylon, becoming known as "the father of Ceylon Marxism."

In 1933 the Youth League participated in a new protest movement, called the *Suriya Mal* campaign, in which patriotic Sinhalese sold *Suriya* (a local sunflower), rather than the official poppy, on Armistice Day (November 11) and used the proceeds to benefit Ceylonese veterans. Philip Gunawardena and his group, which now included a Youth League recruit, Vernon Gunasekera (1908–96), injected overt anti-imperialist slogans into the campaign and recruited more young nationalists to their Marxist caucus.

In December 1935 this group held a conference in Colombo that launched the LSSP. The party called for immediate independence and an

egalitarian socialist society. The small Trotskyist inner circle (hence known as the "T Group") did not publicly articulate the Trotskyist opposition to Stalinism, simply because the debate was totally alien in Ceylon. However, on many key issues of the day, such as the demand for the unconditional independence of all colonies and opposition to militarism and war, the LSSP echoed the line of the International Left Opposition. The founding conference issued a manifesto, which avoided specifically Trotskyist terms, but proclaimed that the party was committed to achieving complete national independence, nationalization of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, and abolition of inequalities arising from differences of race, caste, creed, or sex.

Shortly after the party's formation, LSSP fielded candidates for the elections to the second State Council, established in 1931 on the basis of the Donoughmore Constitution, which granted a certain measure of internal autonomy. The two popular LSSP leaders, Philip Gunawardena and N. M. Perera, were elected, and for the next four years used the council as a platform to denounce injustice, propose reforms to benefit working people, and explain the ideas of the party to the broad public. Gunawardena and Perera were consistent opponents of communalism (in the Lankan context, the conflict between the Sinhala majority and the Tamil minority), denouncing the militant Sinhala Maha Sabha movement, led by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, demanding a privileged position for the Sinhalese. They were the first Marxist campaigners to oppose division of the working people of the island on communal grounds. In particular they opposed any discrimination toward the Tamil plantation workers, resisting the call for disenfranchising the so-called "Indian Tamils," who arrived in Ceylon in the twentieth century.

Outside the genteel chambers of the council, the LSSP members organized a working-class base in Colombo. This brought the Marxists into direct conflict with entrenched labor leader Alexander E. Goonesinha (1891–1967), who had been organizing workers for more than ten years with notable success. He led workers of the Wellawatte Spinning and Weaving Mills, one of the big factories in the island, but was not actively pursuing worker democracy in the union. It took the LSSP several years and a number of bruising and bloody clashes to form strike

committees to discredit and ultimately dislodge Goonesinha. The LSSP also had an uphill fight to gain a base among Tamil plantation workers in the upcountry estates, which were dispersed, difficult to organize, and firmly in the grip of their own community-based trade unions.

The Trotskyist LSSP sought to establish contact with like-minded leaders abroad and especially with Trotsky himself, who was then in exile in Mexico City. In 1939 the party sent Selina Perera (1909–86), a prominent member of the LSSP and wife of N. M. Perera, to work with Trotskyists in London and New York. However, after leaving New York, she was stopped at the Mexican border. The authorities thus prevented Trotsky from having a direct influence on the development of what would become his largest contingent of followers after his assassination in 1940.

In 1939 and 1940 the LSSP led a wave of strikes among workers of tea and rubber plantations, which swept from one estate to the next, culminating in the famous Mooloya strike of 1940. This strike in the upcountry Mooloya Estate at Hewahetta was the focal point of unionized and militant labor activism in colonial Ceylon. The police shot a Tamil laborer, Govindan, whom the LSSP turned into a martyr, leading to direct conflict with plantation owners.

After the Stalin–Hitler Pact, the LSSP majority passed a resolution of no confidence in the Comintern, expelling the pro-Stalinist minority in the party shortly thereafter, and in early 1940 openly proclaimed solidarity with the Trotskyist Fourth International. They were the militant leaders enjoying the confidence and support of the party, due to their participation in mass struggles and in parliament, forming the United Socialist Party in November 1940, subsequently renamed the Communist Party. The British government decided that the time had come to take pre-emptive action against the LSSP. In June 1940 four senior LSSP leaders, including Philip Gunawardena, were arrested and imprisoned. However, the party, knowing that such repression was inevitable, had already planned activation of an underground apparatus, directed by Leslie Goonewardene, a confidante of Philip Gunawardena since the London days, and Doric de Souza (1914–87), an English professor who was a leading ideologue and organizer in the party.

The government cracked down on the remnants of the LSSP, confiscating the party press and

arresting party cadres. Nevertheless, the underground organization mounted strikes and held a secret party conference in April 1941, where delegates adopted a new party program based on the “Transitional Program” of the Fourth International, the canon of international Trotskyism. During the period 1939–41 the transformation of the LSSP into a specifically Trotskyist party was completed.

From the start the Trotskyist leaders of the LSSP developed links with the Congress Socialist Party and other left-wing parties in India. Unlike the Stalinist communists, the Trotskyists rejected the thesis that true socialism could be built within the confines of a single country, and certainly not in a little island that had just one large factory (the Wellawatte Spinning and Weaving Mills). The Trotskyists, applying the thesis of permanent revolution, concluded that the decisive blows against the Raj (rule) would have to be delivered in India. Therefore, starting in 1940, the LSSP dispatched organizers to Calcutta, Bombay, and Madurai to help the scattered Trotskyist groups in India unify into an all-India party.

In April 1942 the LSSP underground party freed the imprisoned Trotskyist leaders from jail. Given the repression in Ceylon, the LSSP leaders decided that the majority of the cadres should get up to India posthaste and work with the Bolshevik Leninist Party of India (BLPI), the Indian section of the Fourth International just launched in May 1942. In July 1942 the clandestine exodus began, with one contingent going to Bombay, the other to Madurai in South India. The Trotskyists arrived at a historic moment. In August M. K. Gandhi delivered his boldest ultimatum to the viceroy: quit India or face mass civil disobedience.

The government arrested Gandhi and most of the top echelon Congress leaders, triggering the historic Quit India revolt. While the Communist Party of India (CPI) actively opposed the struggle, the BLPI participated, and many were arrested during 1942–3, including several top leaders deported to Ceylon and imprisoned through the end of World War II.

With the end of the war in 1945, the government released political prisoners in Ceylon and India. Huge crowds gathered in Colombo to welcome the Trotskyists. As strikes erupted during 1945–6, the LSSP leaders reemerged in the leadership. The Trotskyists captured the Ceylon Federation of Labor and the

Government Workers' Trade Union Federation and formed new unions, notably the All-Ceylon United Motor Workers' Union and All-Ceylon Harbor and Dock Workers' Union. During the decade after World War II the ranks of Ceylonese organized labor swelled to an estimated 300,000 members and engaged in economic strikes and negotiations and two broader general strikes in 1946 and 1947.

However, the Trotskyists were unable to fully take advantage of these opportunities due to a crippling split culminating in 1945, forming the LSSP and the Bolshevik Samasamajist Party. The split resulted from accumulated personal animosities, misunderstandings, clashing ambitions, and personal factors exacerbated by the abnormal conditions of underground struggle during the war. While the two parties were virtually carbon copies of one another, their political positions differed. Colvin de Silva advocated forming a party across South Asia (the Bolshevik Leninist Party of India, Ceylon and Burma), with the LSSP as the Ceylonese branch, a position opposed by Philip Gunawardena and N. M. Perera. A generational conflict between Gunawardena and younger leaders such as Doric de Souza also emerged. Both parties fielded candidates in the elections to the first parliament in 1947, when transfer of power was imminent. To their chagrin, the conservative United National Party (UNP), which remained aloof from the freedom fight, won a solid majority. N. M. Perera of the LSSP was elected leader of the opposition in parliament.

In 1948 the British announced the transfer of power in Ceylon. While the Communist Party hailed the victory, both Trotskyist parties saw independence as a transfer from "direct rule" to "indirect rule." One of the first acts of the UNP government was disenfranchising Tamil plantation workers, robbing the Trotskyists of a critical electoral base. The Trotskyists in particular fought the disenfranchisement, demanding full citizenship rights for all and parity of the Sinhala and Tamil languages.

In 1950 the two Trotskyist parties finally reunified, keeping the name LSSP. However, Gunawardena left with his followers to form the Viplavakari (Revolutionary) LSSP (VLSSP), leaving Colvin de Silva and Leslie Goonewardene as the principal political leaders of the LSSP and N. M. Perera as popular mass leader. The LSSP contested the second general elections

in 1952 with great hopes. However, the UNP again humiliated the left, which won only nine constituencies, fewer than the 15 seats it had won in 1947. The setback caused a backlash in the LSSP, with one-third of the party splitting off to join Gunawardena's VLSSP.

In 1953 the UNP government reduced the rice subsidy, provoking criticism and popular opposition. The LSSP called for a one-day *hartal* (general shutdown, involving not only a strike but closure of schools and colleges), for August 12, 1953, which gained widespread popular support and participation. The *hartal* prevented the government from ending the rice ration and projected the revolutionary credentials of the LSSP. The LSSP hoped to reap the reward through a new wave of recruitment and more votes at the polls in 1956.

However, Philip Gunawardena outflanked the LSSP, forming an electoral front with the nationalist-socialist Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), formed by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike in 1951, called the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (People's United Front, MEP). The MEP won in a landslide that has since become known as "the revolution of 1956." Under the influence of Gunawardena, the MEP government carried out numerous popular reforms, such as a sweeping land redistribution, nationalization of certain industries, and the takeover of remaining British military installations. Concomitantly, pandering to the Buddhist establishment and rural Sinhalese, the MEP government proposed to make Sinhala the official state language. The LSSP fought to keep parity for both Sinhala and Tamil. LSSP parliamentary leader Colvin de Silva gave an impassioned but unsuccessful speech in defense of minority rights, sounding a prescient warning of the pending disaster if Tamil were relegated to second-class status: "Two languages, one nation; one language, two nations."

By 1960 some top LSSP leaders, most notably Dr. N. M. Perera, reached the conclusion that the only path to socialism was through the ballot box, and the LSSP could gain a majority only through the coalition politics that Philip Gunawardena pioneered five years earlier. In 1960 coalition with the nationalist SLFP was rejected by a narrow party majority, but the LSSP softened its policy of opposition to the government considerably.

At a historic party convention in June 1964, a majority of the LSSP endorsed Perera's

proposal for coalition with the SLFP, led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike. The LSSP's left wing, led by Edmund Samarakkody (1912–92), Bala Tampoe (b. 1922), and V. Karalasingham (1921–83) opposed the coalition and formed the LSSP (Revolutionary). When the LSSP entered coalition government, the Fourth International expelled the LSSP for “class collaborationism,” recognizing LSSP(R) as the official Ceylon section. The LSSP(R) subsequently splintered further following splits in international Trotskyism, and the organizations soon became marginal parties.

The coalition government lasted only a few months. A section of the SLFP, uncomfortable with the LSSP alliance, crossed over to the opposition and brought down the government in December 1964. The experiment in popular front politics (alliance with bourgeois parties) cost the LSSP, which lost not only the left (and Trotskyist “conscience”) but also control over the Lanka Estate Workers' Union, which represented the party's hard-won base in the plantations. Nevertheless, the LSSP leaders persisted in their quest for a broader electoral coalition.

In May 1970 the LSSP–SLFP–CP United Front reversed its fortunes at the polls. Winning the largest number of votes in its history (433,244), the LSSP had 19 members in parliament, constituting the second largest party, after the SLFP, in the United Front government, and three party leaders accepted important portfolios in finance, plantations and constitutional affairs, and transport.

In April 1971 the United Front government was faced with a youth insurrection organized by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front, JVP). The LSSP and its coalition partners, including the Communist Party, supported the brutal police and military suppression of the revolt. The LSSP organized trade unionists to assist in fighting the rebels.

Within the United Front government the LSSP pursued constitutional reforms, including the establishment of a unicameral legislature, and nationalizing plantations. The new constitution, largely the brainchild of Colvin de Silva, enshrined the preferential position of Buddhism and Sinhalese as the official language – which the LSSP had opposed for three decades. By 1974 the LSSP and SLFP were at odds over a number of issues, and the following year the SLFP pushed the LSSP out of the United Front government.

In the 1977 election the LSSP formed a United Left Front coalition with the pro-Moscow CP and the People's Democratic Party, a breakaway from the SLFP, but both the LSSP and CP failed to elect even a single candidate to parliament. The debacle extended into the labor movement. The ruling UNP, adopting “democratic socialist” rhetoric, and the SLFP started to erode the LSSP's base, particularly in government sector unions. In 1980 the UNP provoked a general strike and crushed LSSP's labor strongholds. After the election defeat radicals in the LSSP split to form a rival party, known as the Nava (New) SSP.

In 1982 proposals to seek another coalition caused yet another split in the party. Colvin de Silva, the LSSP candidate for president, received less than 1 percent of the vote and in the 1983 parliamentary by-elections the LSSP lost all its seats in parliament. Due to this string of defeats, while continuing to remain active, the LSSP became a faint shadow of its past.

SEE ALSO: De Silva, Colvin Reginald (1907–1989); Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); Gunawardena, Don Philip Rupasinghe (1901–1972); India, Post-World War II Upsurge; Internationals; People's Liberation Front of Sri Lanka (JVP); Quit India Movement; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- Abhayavardhana, H. (1982) How the LSSP Turned Trotskyist. *Lanka Guardian*, July 15: 1–23.
- Alexander, R. J. (1991) Trotskyism in Ceylon/Sri Lanka: The Rise of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party and Split and Decline of Ceylon/Sri Lankan Trotskyism. In R. J. Alexander, *International Trotskyism 1929–1985: A Documented Analysis of the Movement*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Amarasinghe, Y. R. (1998) *Revolutionary Idealism and Parliamentary Politics: A Study of Trotskyism in Sri Lanka*. Colombo: Social Scientists' Association.
- Ervin, C. W. (2006) *Tomorrow is Ours: The Trotskyist Movement in India and Ceylon, 1935–48*. Colombo: Social Scientists' Association.
- Goonewardene, L. (1978) *The History of the LSSP in Perspective*. Colombo: Leslie Goonewardene.
- Jayawardena, V. K. (1980) The Background to the Formation of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party. *Young Socialist*, new ser., 1 (March): 11–26.
- Lerski, G. J. (1970) The Twilight of Ceylonese Trotskyism. *Pacific Affairs* 43, 3 (Fall): 384–93.
- Muthiah, W. S. & Wanasinghe, S. (Eds.) (1996) *Britain, World War 2 and the Sama Samasamajists*. Colombo: Young Socialist Publication.

- Muthiah, W. S. & Wanasinghe, S. (Eds.) (2002) *We Were Making History: The Hartal of 1953*. Colombo: Young Socialist Publication.
- Richardson, A. (Ed.) (1997) *Blows Against the Empire: Trotskyism in Ceylon*. London: Porcupine Press.
- Siriwardena, R. (1999) *Working Underground. The LSSP in Wartime: A Memoir of Happenings and Personalities*. Colombo: International Center for Ethnic Studies.

Laos, protest and revolution, 19th and 20th centuries

Justin Corfield

Traditionally, Laos had been dominated by neighboring Siam (modern-day Thailand). From the late eighteenth century the Siamese conquered large parts of the kingdom of Wieng Chan (Laos), installing Chao Anou, a Lao prince who had been educated in Bangkok, as the “King of Wieng Chan,” and a vassal of the king of Siam. However the Vietnamese were also emerging as a powerful military state, and Emperor Gia Long managed to get Chao Anou to pay him tribute as well. In the 1820s Chao Anou led a revolt against the Siamese, expecting Vietnamese support. However, this did not materialize and the Siamese armies invaded, sacking Wieng Chan, and also the nearby kingdoms of Luang Prabang and Champasak (Champassac), which had maintained a degree of independence. The prisoners taken by the Siamese were sold off as slaves, and it became clear to most Laotians that domination by the Siamese was inevitable.

For that reason, with the emergence of France as a major power in the region in the late nineteenth century, the Laotians decided that it would be better to invite a European power and save the country. A similar situation had occurred in Cambodia in 1863, and King Oun Kham started negotiating with the French. In a series of treaties between the French and the Siamese, gradually the Siamese had to cede all their territory on the east bank of the Mekong River. The Laotian kingdoms were then merged and became the French Protectorate of Laos. It was an important buffer state to protect French Tonkin and Annam from the British-dominated Siam. It had also been hoped that the Mekong

would provide river access to Chinese markets, but this had already been proven not to exist. Laos was certainly too hilly to provide land for plantation agriculture. It maintained an opium industry, with small amounts of tin, coffee, and rubber. By 1940 there were only 600 French citizens in the entire country.

With the Japanese deploying soldiers in French Indochina from 1940, Laos gained a small degree of autonomy. The small Laotian elite, mainly members of the royal family and courtiers, remained largely Francophone, although there was the emergence of a small pro-communist group under Prince Souphanouvong.

In March 1945 the Japanese forced the Laotians to declare independence, and the viceroy, Prince Phetsarath, formed the Lao Issara (Free Lao) movement to urge for full independence. He managed to take power, and when a new constitution was drawn up the king refused to accept it and was deposed. Late in 1945, the French returned to Laos and deposed Prince Phetsarath, declaring Laos to still be a French Protectorate. In April 1946 King Sisavang Vong was reinstated as king, and in fact became “King of Laos.” However two days after his coronation, the French and their supporters took back control of Vientiane, and many members of Lao Issara fled to Thailand or to Vietnam where they came to support the communists, leading to the formation of the Pathet Lao in 1950. By that time there was fighting in rural Laos with Lao nationalists trying to wrest power from the French.

The right wing in Laos rallied around Prince Boun Oum of the royal house of Champasak, in the south of the country. He was closely linked with the anti-communist forces in South Vietnam and was eager for an alliance with the United States. By contrast, Prince Souphanouvong led the communist-dominated Pathet Lao, and Prince Souvanna Phouma tried to steer a neutral course. Souvanna Phouma was prime minister from November 1951 until November 1954. During that time the Pathet Lao managed to take over two provinces of the country and establish a *de facto* government there with the support of the Viet Minh. The French built a huge defensive structure at Dien Bien Phu to prevent more Viet Minh going to Laos, but in March 1954 were attacked, suffering a dramatic defeat on May 7. Trying to achieve some form of power sharing, Souvanna Phouma stood down and in August 1956 returned to power heading a

coalition government which included the Pathet Lao. This continued until 1958 when Phoui Sananikone came to power.

On August 9, 1960, General Kong Le staged a neutralist coup d'état. He ousted Prince Somsanith, the right-wing prime minister, but on August 15, a conservative counterattack led to fighting commencing again. The foreign minister Quinim Pholsena was briefly head of government to try to broker a compromise, but he was forced to hand over power to Prince Boun Oum. Quinim Pholsena was assassinated on April 1, 1963. By that time, fighting had started again. Massive US bombing, to halt the advances of the Pathet Lao, had devastated the countryside and wrecked the economy of the country. Much of the fierce fighting took place around the plain of Jars in central Laos. The fighting continued until 1974, with the United States backing the royal Lao army and the Hmong tribesmen against the communists. By that time the Hmong tribes were decimated by the war, and the Chinese had sent in about 6,000 soldiers to join the conflict.

Finally a peace agreement was brokered in 1974 and Prince Souphanouvong returned to Vientiane to help in the formation of the National Political Council, which held power until December 2, 1975. On that date the monarchy was abolished and Prince Souphanouvong became the president of the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

There was some fighting after that date but most of the right wing had already left the country. Boum Om, the younger brother of Boun Oum, and the most powerful figure on the conservative side of politics, had been assassinated on May 6, 1975, by a bomb explosion. Boun Oum himself went into exile in Paris where he died five years later. Laotian exiles tried to organize resistance to the communist government but were unable to get much support from other countries and had real problems getting access to the land-locked country.

After the overthrow of the monarchy in 1975, Laos became isolated from the international world. The Vietnamese used southern Laos for some of their forces in the invasion of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia) in December 1978. By that time many Laotians had fled as refugees to Thailand, and large numbers were resettled in the United States and other countries. In the early 1990s, the Laotian government started to soften its stance towards the rest of the world,

and gradually started allowing tourists to visit the main cities, and then soon travel at will in the countryside. By the 2000s, it had become a popular destination for many western tourists, and the communist government had implemented large-scale economic reforms and introduced the free market system along the same lines as Vietnam.

SEE ALSO: Cambodia, Anti-Colonial Protests, 1863–1945; Cambodia, Communist Protests and Revolution; Souphanouvong, Prince (1909–1995); Vietnam, Protest against Colonialism, 1858–1896; Vietnam, Protests, 1975–1993

References and Suggested Readings

- Conboy, K. (1989) *The War in Laos 1960–75*. Oxford: Osprey.
- Dommen, A. J. (1964) *Conflict in Laos*. New York: Praeger.
- Gunn, G. (1990) *Rebellion in Laos: Peasant and Politics in a Colonial Backwater*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Kremmer, C. (2003) *Bamboo Palace: Discovering the Lost Dynasty of Laos*. Sydney: HarperCollins.
- Stuart-Fox, M. (Ed.) (1982) *Contemporary Laos*. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

Latin America, Catholic Church and liberation, 16th century to present

Edward T. Brett

The modern-day progressive Catholic Church in Latin America came into full life in the 1960s, but to fully understand its nature and development one must briefly review the history of Catholicism in the southern region of the western hemisphere.

The Colonial Period

When the Spanish monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella realized that in October 1492 Christopher Columbus had encountered a world previously unknown to Europeans and populated by countless inhabitants who were ignorant of Christianity, they thought they were the recipients of an urgent mandate from God. Granada had fallen just months earlier in January, thus completing a 500-year *Reconquista*, a crusade to drive the

Muslim “infidel” from the Iberian Peninsula. Two months later, on March 30, the two monarchs had put the finishing touch on the Catholic “purification” of Spain by issuing a decree ordering all Jews to be baptized or face expulsion. Thus, it seemed to Catholic Spain that all the signs were there. Spaniards had just completed one historical epic with the conquest and Christianizing of the Iberian Peninsula, and they were now convinced that it was part of God’s divine will that their nation embark upon a similar mission in America.

Ferdinand and Isabella based their plan for the New World on the traditional medieval model. The warrior class would conquer and subjugate the indigenous population, while the regular clergy (religious orders) would convert and “civilize” the natives. Thus, from the beginning the Spanish used military power to evangelize America. Soon, however, a substantial number of clergy, led by members of the Dominican Order, most notably Bartolomé de Las Casas, protested the brutal treatment of the Indians at the hands of their fellow Iberians. Franciscans and later Jesuits also played a prominent role in defending the native population. As a result, the Spanish upper class became embroiled in a debate over the morality of its treatment of native peoples and the crown promulgated some reforms. Unfortunately, however, colonial leaders refused to enforce most of them.

Although many first-generation missionaries fought to curtail European mistreatment of the indigenous masses, they were less successful in their attempts to directly evangelize them. This is because they did not realize the importance of understanding Indian culture and mastering Indian languages. Only with the second generation of missionaries did some come to recognize the limitations of a Eurocentric mission methodology. But it was too little too late. The vast majority of Indians had little comprehension of Christianity. They converted because it was imposed on them, but in reality Christianity remained in large part a foreign entity separate from their culture.

The primary reason a substantial number of Spanish priests came to champion Indian rights was that the monarchy had chosen to use regular clergy to proselytize the indigenous population. They were better educated, more zealous, and more reformed than their diocesan counterparts (secular clergy under the direct authority of the

local bishop), and thus more inclined to conclude that mistreatment of the Indians was contrary to true Christian morality. When secular priests were sent to America, or when colonists entered the diocesan clergy, they were nearly always assigned to work with Spanish parishioners, not Indians. This policy changed, however, during the reign of King Philip II (1556–98). Although originally sympathetic to Las Casas-like reformers, when financial pressures increased due to his costly European wars, Philip’s concern for Indian welfare diminished. He came to favor a policy that condoned and even encouraged oppressive conduct toward native peoples, because it produced more gold for the royal treasury.

To reduce the power and influence of the regular clergy, Philip issued a decree in 1574 which gave colonial bishops more control over the number of friars in their dioceses and also over where they would be assigned. In 1583, he issued a second decree stipulating that secular clergy were to receive preference over religious order priests in all parish assignments. With their power curtailed, the regular clergy became less able and to some degree less willing to defend the Indians. Although the church still maintained the loyalty of the poor through the selfless service of many priests, by the mid-seventeenth century, most clergy came to prefer “a life of ease and profit to one of austerity and service” (Keen 1992). Only the Jesuits as a whole remained zealous in their commitment to Indian rights. In 1759, however, they were expelled from Portuguese Brazil and in 1767 from the Spanish colonies.

After Independence

To make matters even worse, following independence in the early years of the nineteenth century, the Latin American church became isolated from its counterpart in Europe. Almost all of its bishops and foreign priests returned to Spain, causing a severe shortage of clergy that would henceforth hinder its effectiveness. With the rise to power of the anti-clerical liberals in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the institutional church was further weakened. In many countries, religious orders and congregations were suppressed and some bishops and clergy were expelled. As a result, only about a third of the people were able to participate on a regular basis in the sacramental life of the church. Rural areas were especially affected.

Without priests, the Indians developed a type of folk Catholicism that blended the cult of the saints with elements from their pre-Christian past. The indigenous and mestizo masses had virtually no understanding of Catholic doctrine and liturgical rites. Realizing that Latin America was in large part Catholic in name only, the Vatican attempted to address the problem. Substantial numbers of missionary priests and sisters were sent in the last half of the nineteenth century from the various countries of Catholic Europe. As a consequence, improvements were made, but the situation still remained dire.

The Twentieth Century, Before the Second Vatican Council

Change, albeit on a small scale, began in the 1930s, when *Acción Católica* (Catholic Action), a movement that emphasized active participation of the laity in the religious life of the people, was imported from Europe. Prior to this time, Latin American laymen and women had been expected to be faithful but largely passive Catholics. *Acción Católica* members formed small groups which first studied and appraised the political, social, and economic realities of their countries in light of Catholic social justice principles first articulated by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical *Rerum novarum* (1891). Members next applied what they learned in an attempt to ameliorate socio-economic conditions in their region. In many ways the methodology that *Acción Católica* employed, although rooted in medieval Thomism, was not unlike the methodology used by European communist cells. Proponents of liberation theology would later employ a similar methodology and be accused of Marxist tendencies by church and state opponents.

In 1953, *Acción Católica* leaders from 20 countries met in Chimote, Peru, where they concluded that the Latin American church was in need of massive revitalization. This meeting marks the beginning of a long and at first slow transformation of the Latin American Catholic Church, which would eventually culminate in the progressive era of the 1970s and 1980s. At any rate, *Acción Católica* soon produced a substantial number of lay leaders, some of whom eventually became influential intellectuals and political founders of the Christian Democratic Party in their countries.

Another important factor leading to the creation of a more progressive church was

the development of national and transnational Latin American bishops' conferences. Prior to the 1950s, the institutional church of Latin America had been decentralized and extremely weak organizationally. Each bishop dealt directly with the Vatican. There was not only no structure in place for communication between the bishops of different nations, but also none for contact between prelates from the same country. This decentralization meant that national churches as well as local bishops lacked united strength when it came to dealing with the Vatican or the secular state. In 1955 this changed when the first Latin American Episcopal Conference (CELAM) convened in Rio de Janeiro to discuss mutual church problems. Only one thing of any consequence came from this gathering: the bishops did agree to hold ordinary meetings every year and extraordinary regional conferences every ten years. Although no one knew it in 1955, the second regional conference at Medellín, Colombia (1968) and the third at Puebla, Mexico (1979) would prove to be of unparalleled importance in the creation of a progressive Latin American Catholic Church.

Another development that helped to change the Latin American church was the influx of North American missionaries to the southern part of the western hemisphere in the 1940s and 1950s. Prior to World War II, nearly all US and Canadian Catholic missionaries were assigned to Asia. The war, however, made it too dangerous for Americans and Europeans to cross the oceans. Thus, no new European missionaries could come to Latin America, and this created a potentially even greater shortage of priests and nuns. But since American religious orders and congregations could no longer send their mission personnel to Asia, their leaders decided to redirect them southward, thereby making up for the loss of Europeans. This new policy worked well, and by 1950 most US and Canadian Catholic mission organizations had decided to designate Latin America as the primary focus for their overseas work.

But these newly arriving priests, nuns, and religious brothers, coming from countries that had long been prosperous, were unfamiliar with, and shocked by, the extreme poverty and misery they now encountered. Since they had the material means to do so, they began almost immediately to create countless developmental projects for the poor, only to find that government officials, rich landowners, or the military

often impeded their success. Such reactionary conduct by the powerful caused most North American missionaries to eventually conclude that the vast majority of Latin Americans lived in poverty because of unjust socioeconomic and political structures that were intentionally kept in place by the elite class. Developmental projects alone could not change the miserable conditions of the poor masses; only a radical progressive makeover of Latin American society could bring about justice. Thus, North American Catholic missionaries were predisposed to enthusiastically champion the “preferential option for the poor” that would result from the decrees of the Second Vatican Council and the Medellín and Puebla Latin American Bishops’ Conferences.

Pope John XXIII, Vatican II, and Medellín

Several Latin American bishops prior to the mid-1960s developed reputations for their work on behalf of the poor and oppressed. Archbishop Victor Sanabria Martínez of San José, Costa Rica, for instance, joined forces in the early 1940s with progressive President Rafael Calderón Guardia, and at least indirectly with the Costa Rican Communist Party, to create a most impressive program of labor reform. Dom Hélder Câmara, bishop of Recife, Brazil, won fame and the wrath of the elite class for his championing of the poor in his diocese. Cardinal José María Caro of Santiago, Chile, implemented social programs for the poor, while Bishop Leonidas Proaño of Riobamba, Ecuador, fought for the rights of peasants. Aside from these and a few other exceptions, however, the Latin American bishops and the churches they presided over remained quite conservative and disconnected from the poor masses until the 1960s.

More than anyone else, Pope John XXIII, who was elected to the papal office in 1958, was responsible, albeit obliquely, for the progressive transformation of the Latin American church. The new pope set the stage for change when he issued two important encyclicals, *Mater et Magistra* (1961) and *Pacem in Terris* (1963), which discussed injustices caused by colonialism and neocolonialism, while also outlining the conditions needed for their eradication.

In August 1961, the pope sent Archbishop Agostino Casaroli to the University of Notre Dame to deliver a papal message to the 1,500 male

and female religious superiors attending the second National Congress of Religious. The pope requested that the North American church send 10 percent of its religious personnel as missionaries to Latin America. Although the 10 percent goal was never reached, over the next three decades thousands of North Americans – priests, nuns, religious brothers, and lay people – answered the pope’s call. Most were sent to areas where the priest shortage was most acute. Some religious congregations, such as the Maryknoll Society, were actually placed in charge of whole departments in rural areas in countries like Bolivia, Peru, Honduras, and Guatemala.

The US church was also able to set up a language school in Cuernavaca, Mexico, and later others in Brazil and Peru, to train its recruits. It was the director of the Cuernavaca school, Father Ivan Illich, who in 1967 shook the Catholic mission enterprise to its very core and forced missionaries to reevaluate not just their methods, but their very reason for existence, when he argued in a magazine article that the American missionary movement was no more than a tool of US imperialism and therefore did more harm than good.

But Pope John’s greatest contribution to the transformation of the Latin American church was his summoning of the Second Vatican Council (1962–5) to modernize the global Catholic Church. At a time when poverty and oppression were escalating all through the developing world, bishops from rich and poor countries alike came together and produced a document on the Church in the Modern World (*Gaudium et Spes*). This document, perhaps the most significant issued by the Council, condemned the hoarding of wealth and power for the benefit of a small segment of society and warned that private property was not an unlimited right, but must be weighed against the rights of all people to the basic necessities of life. *Gaudium et Spes* also broke from a strict adherence to traditional theology by incorporating the social and behavioral sciences into a “see, judge, and act” theological methodology.

Almost 600 Latin American bishops attended the Second Vatican Council. Though few if any of them played a significant role in the production of *Gaudium et Spes*, the discussions and debates that took place opened their eyes and, consequently, they resolved to meet once they returned home to determine how they could

best apply the lessons of Vatican II to the Latin American situation.

After two years of careful preparation, 130 prelates finally met at the Second Latin American Bishops' Conference at Medellín, Colombia. Using the methodology of *Gaudium et Spes*, they changed the direction of the Latin American church from one aligned at least indirectly with the power structure to one that sided with the poor and oppressed masses. The bishops were influenced by the new controversial theology of liberation, which originated with Gustavo Gutiérrez, and was elaborated on by Juan Luis Segundo, José Comblin, Leonardo Boff, Jon Sobrino, Enrique Dussel, and others. This theology attempted to interpret Christian faith from the perspective of the poor. Although heavily grounded in the biblical prophetic tradition, it sometimes resorted to Marxist analysis in posing questions. As a result, conservative churchmen including Pope John Paul II eventually became highly critical of it. The consciousness-raising techniques used by Brazilian educator Paulo Freire in teaching literacy to the poor, as articulated in his *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, also influenced the bishops. In summary, the final documents of Medellín stated that the church itself had been sinful within a sinful society that was premised on unjust structural inequalities. Change was needed, and the church would henceforth dedicate itself to bringing about that change by siding with the poor.

To achieve its aims the church encouraged the creation of base ecclesial communities (*comunidades de base*, or CEBs), a pastoral technique emanating from the Brazilian church. Base communities comprised small groups of lay people who studied the Bible and applied what they learned to the problems existing in the society in which they lived. There were many different models for *comunidades de base*, ranging from the pietistic conservative type to a radical form oriented toward social justice. The latter, however, seemed to be more prevalent in the most conflictive Latin American nations. The more socially oriented CEBs tended to break down the fatalistic mindset of the poor and create grassroots leaders who played a significant role in the struggle for change. Some base community members, especially in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, eventually gravitated into guerilla organizations. However, they constituted only a small minority and their decision to resort to

violence was never condoned by the church. It was far more common for CEB members to eventually become involved in labor or peasant organizations, where they fought for land and labor reform.

The Medellín documents called for greater lay participation in the liturgical life and social justice work of the church. Thus, many religious leaders created *institutos para la capacitación* (institutes for empowerment) to train lay "delegates of the word," who led church services in the absence of a priest and served as catechists in their barrios and villages. In some countries *delegados* would also run radio schools that the church set up to teach literacy, religious doctrine, and social justice to the poor. Courses on social awareness based on the documents of Vatican II and Medellín served as prime components in the pedagogy of the *institutos*.

Persecution of the Church

In some countries the Latin American church's "option for the poor" had little effect on the church hierarchy. In Argentina most bishops either supported the violent conduct of the military government or remained silent. For the most part, the Colombian bishops were also indifferent or hostile to the conclusions of Vatican II and Medellín. Indeed, as preparations were being made for the Medellín Conference, Camilo Torres, a Jesuit sociology professor at the Universidad Nacional in Bogotá, became frustrated with the hierarchy's apathy toward the poor. When Cardinal Luis Concha of Bogotá attempted to silence him, he decided to join the Marxist Army of National Liberation (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) in an attempt to incorporate his interpretation of Catholic social justice into the guerilla movement. Killed in his first battle in February 1966, he became a revolutionary icon over the next two decades for many frustrated leftist Catholics throughout Latin America. Catholic religious leaders in Venezuela and Uruguay were also mostly indifferent to the church's post-Medellín emphasis on social justice.

In the vast majority of Latin American countries, however, the church's radical "preferential option for the poor" soon led to clashes with elites and military governments that had come to power throughout the continent in the 1960s and 1970s. In Brazil, where most bishops had initially supported the military coup of 1964, the church



Father Rogelio Ponselle, a Belgian priest who began work in El Salvador in 1970, teaches liberation theology beneath a poster of Óscar Romero (1917–80), “la voz del pueblo” (“the voice of the people”). (© Bernard Bisson/Sygma/CORBIS)

became the government’s most vocal critic following the Medellín Conference. Particularly effective was Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns of São Paulo, who formed a Commission of Peace and Justice in 1972. With the help of Presbyterian pastor Jaime Wright, Arns was able to secretly copy police reports of government human rights abuses and publish them under the title *Brasil: Nunca Mais*. The book became a bestseller and did much to publicize internationally the violence perpetrated by the military government. Later, in the 1990s, the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, under the direction of Bishop Juan Gerardi Condera, published a similar report, *Guatemala: Nunca Más*. As a result of his efforts, military personnel beat the bishop to death immediately following a press conference in which he announced the release of the four-volume report.

In Chile, Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez of Santiago formed the influential Vicariate of Solidarity in 1976 to monitor abuses of the repressive Pinochet regime and provide legal services to its victims. The Vicariate served as a model for other national churches to emulate. Especially notable in this regard was *Tutela Legal* (Legal Defense), established by Archbishop Arturo Rivera Damas of El Salvador in 1983. Under the able leadership of María Julia Hernández, it investigated and documented arrests, murders, disappearances, and other forms of violence. It soon developed a global reputation for fairness and professionalism, and its files became a major resource for international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Americas Watch.

In Chile, Arns’s episcopal successor, Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno Larraín, played a major role in organizing and uniting opposition to General Augusto Pinochet when the country faced an upcoming plebiscite on whether the general should be allowed to continue to rule. The bishops of Bolivia played a similar oppositional role, especially during the presidencies of Hugo Bánzer Suárez and Luis García Mesa, as did the church hierarchy in Paraguay in the latter years of the Stroessner dictatorship. The story was likewise the same in El Salvador, where Archbishop Rivera Damas, with the help of the Jesuits at the Central American University, was able to form an impressive grassroots movement that was successful in forcing the Farabundo Martí Liberación Nacional guerrilla front and the Salvadoran government to take peace talks seriously. Five of the Jesuits would later be murdered by the Salvadoran military, along with their housekeeper and her daughter.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, thousands of priests, religious sisters and brothers, lay catechists, and *comunidades de base* members were arrested, tortured, or murdered by the security forces of repressive governments.

The best known of these was Archbishop Óscar Romero y Galdámez of El Salvador. Faced with opposition from the Salvadoran oligarchy and military, as well as from all but one of his fellow Salvadoran bishops and the papal nuncio, Romero nevertheless became a most eloquent spokesperson for the poor and oppressed. So effective was he that the leaders of the security forces concluded that they had no choice but to take the unheard-of step of assassinating an archbishop. He was murdered while saying mass in March 1980; in death he became a symbol throughout the world of the post-Medellín church’s option for the poor.

The rape and killing, also in El Salvador, of four US missionary women – Sisters Maura Clarke, Ita Ford, and Dorothy Kazel, and lay missionary Jean Donovan – received wide international news coverage that resulted in a massive grassroots movement in the United States demanding that the US government terminate its support for a Salvadoran regime that had murdered tens of thousands of its people. Indeed, well over 30 priests and religious sisters and brothers were killed, along with hundreds of lay catechists, by repressive governmental forces in Central America alone in the 1970s and 1980s.

Backlash within the Church

Some clergy and laity responded to the church's "option for the poor" in ways that alarmed the vast majority of the Latin American hierarchy as well as Vatican officials. In the early 1970s in Chile, a Jesuit priest, Gonzolo Arroyo, founded Christians for Socialism, a group of as many as 100 priests who supported the Marxist government of Salvador Allende. Although at first tolerated by the hierarchy, the group was soon championing Fidel Castro's Cuba as a model for Latin America and becoming increasingly more virulent in its criticism of the traditional church. In 1973 the Chilean bishops finally condemned the group and forbade priests to be members.

But even more disturbing to the bishops were priests and lay Catholics who took up arms to bring about change. In 1967, on the eve of the Medellín Conference, a group of six US Maryknoll missionaries, led by Father Thomas Melville and Sister Marion Peter Bradford and inspired by the revolutionary priest Camilo Torres, formed a "Christian revolutionary movement" for the purpose of overthrowing the military government of Guatemala. After being discovered and exiled from Central America, Melville published an article in the *National Catholic Reporter* in which he contended that Christians were morally justified and even obligated to take up arms when repressive governments aborted peaceful attempts at social reforms. In Bolivia Néstor Paz, a young Catholic layman also inspired by Torres, penned an explanation similar to that of Melville for his decision to take up arms. After he died in battle, it was published under the title *My Life for My Friends*. In 1978 a Spanish Sacred Heart Father Gaspar García Laviana was likewise killed in combat while fighting with the Marxist Sandinista Revolutionary Front against the Somoza dictatorship. Later in the same year Father Ernesto Barrera died in a shootout with Salvadoran security forces while fighting for the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (Popular Liberation Forces) in El Salvador. In 1983 a US Jesuit missionary, James "Guadalupe" Carney, disappeared in the jungles of Honduras after becoming a member of a revolutionary guerilla group. Prior to joining the rebels he wrote his autobiography in which he proclaimed himself a Christian Marxist. These were the most publicized "revolutionary priests." Many other clergymen of less notoriety also took up arms or

joined revolutionary groups in non-combatant roles in the 1960s and thereafter.

What probably most alarmed traditionalist church officials in both Latin America and the Vatican, however, were events in Nicaragua. Like most of their fellow countrymen in the late 1970s, the Nicaraguan hierarchy, led by Archbishop (later Cardinal) Miguel Obando y Bravo, opposed the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Indeed, in May 1979 the Nicaraguan bishops were the only bishops ever in history to issue a statement justifying a revolution, when they noted that the masses had the right to take up arms against a tyrant because all peaceful means had already been tried and had failed. Nevertheless, unlike the base communities and a substantial segment of the progressive clergy, the hierarchy did not favor a Sandinista government as an alternative to Somoza, due to the Sandinistas' Marxist leanings. When Ernesto Cardenal and a handful of other pro-Sandinista priests declared themselves "Christian Marxists" and claimed that there was no contradiction between Christianity and revolution, the Nicaraguan hierarchy began to fear that the FSLN (Sandinistas) intended to create a parallel revolutionary church. When large numbers of base community members took up arms, often at the instigation of their priests, and fought with the Sandinistas against Somoza, the hierarchy's suspicions intensified. Thus, when the FSLN came to power in July 1979, it was inevitable that the institutional church and the new regime would soon clash.

Following the installation of the revolutionary government, depictions of revolutionary "martyrs" and Jesus in guerilla fatigues appeared juxtaposed with more conventional saints on murals in churches headed by pro-FSLN priests. When a confidential Sandinista position paper containing suggestions on how to undermine organized religion was leaked to the press, the hierarchy had had enough and decided to go on the offensive: led by Obando, the bishops began to openly criticize the revolutionary government. They likewise took measures to "rein in" the so-called "popular church," that is, the church of most *comunidades de base* members.

Especially irksome to the Nicaraguan bishops was the appointment in 1979 and 1980 of four priests – Ernesto and Fernando Cardenal, Miguel D'Escoto, and Edgar Parrales, all of whom had been highly critical of the hierarchy – to important posts in the Sandinista government. After

months of vituperative dialogue with the priests, Archbishop Obando finally issued an ultimatum: the four must relinquish their posts or face church sanctions. All refused and were eventually suspended from active priestly ministry.

Church–state problems in Nicaragua had previously been compounded by the election in October 1979 of Pope John Paul II. Having experienced firsthand the oppression of the Polish church by a communist government, the new pope was not inclined to tolerate a government with Marxist leanings. Thus, when the Nicaraguan hierarchy charged that priests influenced by liberation theology and backed by radical Christian base communities had created a schismatic church, the pope without hesitation publicly supported the bishops and demanded that the Nicaraguan clergy and faithful do likewise.

To make his demand more emphatic, he decided to visit Nicaragua in 1983. Upon his arrival at the Managua airport, he made the reason for his visit crystal clear when he wagged his finger in the face of Ernesto Cardenal, who had kneeled to kiss his ring, and demanded that the priest obey his bishop. Tensions mounted and shortly thereafter, while the pope officiated at an open-air mass, base community members and other Sandinistas harassed him, after he refused to condemn atrocities perpetrated by anti-Sandinista counterrevolutionaries and admonished the crowd to obey their bishops. This episode had a profound effect on Pope John Paul. Rather than view his Nicaraguan experience as something unique to that country, he seems to have equated it with liberation theology and the Latin American progressive church in general. Thus, he determined to “set things right” in Latin America by destroying the former and marginalizing the latter.

In 1984 the Vatican issued *An Introduction on Certain Aspects of the Theology of Liberation*, the so-called Ratzinger Report, which was extremely harsh in its appraisal. Although it was pressured to release a second, more nuanced and less abrasive report two years later, due to the outrage that the first report caused among both Latin American and US bishops, it was nevertheless apparent that liberation theology was anathema to Rome. This was made especially clear by the 1985 silencing of Leonardo Boff and the Vatican investigation of several other liberation theologians, including Gustavo Gutiérrez. Over the next two decades, liberationist-oriented bishops

were either marginalized by Rome or, upon their retirement, replaced by more conservative prelates. The *comunidades de base* movement was likewise deemphasized.

Other factors, however, also contributed to the weakening of the progressive church and its “option for the poor.” The murder and expulsion of so many priests on a continent already suffering from a shortage of clergymen caused many bishops throughout Latin America to wonder how the church would be able to minister effectively to the needs of the faithful if it was forced to endure continued persecution from the power structure. These anxieties were intensified by the fact that, for the first time in history, large numbers of Latin Americans, especially from the poor classes, were turning toward evangelical Protestantism. Such concerns eventually forced even some progressive church leaders to take a more low-key approach to social justice. Moreover, this attitudinal change coincided with the demise of military dictatorships throughout Latin America and the movement toward democracy. Thus, in order to remain relevant, liberation theology was forced to undergo a metamorphosis that made it more compatible with the changes of the time. Although it is not as widespread and no longer as conspicuous as in the past, the progressive church with its theology of liberation still survives in Latin America, along with its more conservative counterpart.

SEE ALSO: Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973); Argentina, Human Rights Movement; Brazil, Peasant Movements and Liberation Theology; Day, Dorothy (1897–1980); Ejército de Liberación Nacional, Colombia; Freire, Paulo (1921–1997); Gutiérrez, Gustavo (b. 1928); Marxism; Romero, Óscar (1917–1980), Archbishop; Torres Restrepo, Camilo (1929–1966)

References and Suggested Readings

- Brett, D. W. & Brett, E. T. (1988) *Murdered in Central America: The Stories of Eleven US Missionaries*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Cleary, E. L. (1985) *Crisis and Change: The Church in Latin America Today*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Cleary, E. L. (1997) *The Struggle for Human Rights in Latin America*. Westport: Praeger.
- Dussel, E. (1981) *A History of the Church in Latin America: Colonialism to Liberation*. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans.
- Dussel, E. (Ed.) (1992) *The Church in Latin America, 1492–1992*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

- Keen, B. (1992) *A History of Latin America*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Klaiber, J. (1998) *The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Latin America*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Sigmund, P. E. (Ed.) (1999) *Religious Freedom and Evangelization in Latin America: The Challenge of Religious Pluralism*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Latin American punk rock and protest

Heather Squire

Far from being a monolithic experience, scene, or movement, Latin American punk rock refers to a broad range of musical, aesthetic, and historical currents that emerged from the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking and indigenous communities of the Americas. The diversity of Latin American culture and history is reflected in the various forms of resistance that Latin American punks embraced, as well as the different conflicts that have inspired them: from struggles against dictatorships and involvement in guerilla movements, to class struggle, anarchism, Zapatismo, the anti-globalization movement, immigration policy, and the multiplicity of narratives to be found in Latin American diaspora communities across the United States. Further, whereas white punks in the United States were largely politicized through political bands in the punk scene, in Latin American communities the youth were already politicized by their everyday realities and became involved in the punk scene specifically because of its political nature.

Armed conflict, dictatorship, and resurgent democracy gave rise to the punk movement in South America. Prior to the return of democracy in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, punk rock music and culture were very much underground, as leftist and generally subversive people and movements experienced repression in the form of exile, disappearance, and often murder. The opening of political space that resulted from dictatorships ending allowed punk to flourish and shout its critical politics more out in the open. For example, in Peru, the years from 1983 to 1985 are generally considered to be the nascent period for the punk movement, the most political coming after 1985. Influenced by radical leftist organizations such as the Sendero

Luminoso (Shining Path) and Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA), as well as various anarchist groups, bands such as Narcosis, Ataque Frontal, Voz Propia, and Kaos came to the forefront.

In Chile, the punk movement got its start largely from returning exiles who brought punk music with them from other countries in the early 1980s. Early Chilean bands such as Caos and the Pinochet Boys were explicitly political, reacting to both the dictatorship and what they viewed as a status quo opposition that had developed. As in Argentina, Peru, and Colombia, punks in Chile were sent into exile and killed by death squads by the late 1980s.

In Colombia, the punk movement sprung from the cities of Medellín and Bogotá, where rapid industrialization had taken hold, leaving the urban youth alienated from political, economic, and social decisions that were shaping the city around them. In the 1980s, urban youth in Colombia forged bonds of solidarity and mutual aid through the punk scene, and in the late 1980s split into various factions in response to the rise of narcotrafficking. Some Colombian punks and red skins eventually joined the Unión Patriótica (a leftist political party founded by the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces]), with which the band *Disolución Moral* was affiliated.

Punk in Mexico has existed since at least the early 1970s, initially imported from other countries, but eventually taking on its own forms of expression. Although there had long been currents of anarchism and anti-authoritarianism within Mexican punk, the 1994 Zapatista uprising had the profound effect of politicizing a broad swath of punks, linking their identity to Spanish-language and Latin American cultures of resistance. Bands such as *Massacre 68* (México, DF) and *Disolucion Social* (Monterrey) were influential, and bands such as *Fallas del Sistema* (Guadalajara) and *Desobediencia Civil* (México, DF) continue to connect the punk scene to social movements such as the Zapatistas, as well as anarchist and autonomous movements throughout Mexico.

In the United States Latinos and Latinas had long been involved in the punk scene. However, the Zapatista uprising as well as US immigration raids in Latin American communities increased government repression of immigrant communities in general, and feelings of invisibility within a largely white-defined punk subculture led to an explosion of political Latino punk bands that

began singing about these issues in the early 1990s. The most prominent scenes were in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York City, where there are large Latino communities, but scenes sprung up all over the country from Florida, Texas, and New Mexico to Minneapolis.

Anarchism was strongly influential in many of these scenes, much of the influence coming from Mexico and South America. Bands like Los Crudos (Chicago), Huasipungo (New York City), Subsistencia (Los Angeles), Ricanstruction (New York), and Aztlan Underground (Los Angeles) have had a tremendous influence on young people, especially indigenous youth in the US. In spite of some linguistic and cultural similarities, however, the ethnic composition of Spanish-speaking punk scenes in the US (as well as immigrant generational differences) has defined the politics, local struggles, and character of various scenes. Migra punk, Chicano punk, and Afro punk are notable strands subsumed under the Latino punk label.

SEE ALSO: Bolivia, Protest and Repression, 1964–2000; Brazil, Guerilla Movements, 20th Century; Chile, Popular Resistance against Pinochet; Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1970s–1990s; FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army); Immigrant Protests, United States, 2000s; MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru); Punk Movement; Unión Patriótica; Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Alvarado, J. (2001) Teenage Alcoholics: Punk Rock in East Los Angeles. *Razorcake* 3 (August/September). Available at www.geocities.com/punkscenes/eastla.html (downloaded August 8, 2008).
- Caín y Abel (1996) “Por Los Senderos Del Rock”: Reportaje de Álamo Pérez Luna sobre Sendero Luminoso y El Rock Subterráneo. Available at cainsubte.blogspot.com/2008/08/por-los-senderos-del-rock-reportaje.html (downloaded August 8, 2008).
- Ingobernables (n.d.) El Mensaje Anarquista a Través de la Música. Available at www.inventati.org/ingobernables/textos/aenlamusica.htm (downloaded August 10, 2008).
- O'Connor, A. (2003) Punk Subculture in Mexico and the Anti-Globalization Movement: A Report from the Front. *New Political Science* 25 (1).
- Restrepo, A. R. (2005) Una lectura de lo real a través del punk. *Historia Crítica* 29 (January–June).
- Sorrondeguy, M. (Dir.) (1999) *Beyond the Screams: A US Latino Hardcore Punk Documentary* (film).

Lautaro (d. 1557)

Mauricio González Arenas

Lautaro was a Mapuche leader who fought against the Spaniards between 1553 and 1557. According to the most accepted historical tradition, Lautaro was born in the Araucanía, between the Carampangue and Tirúa rivers around the year 1535. In approximately 1550 he was imprisoned by the Spanish conqueror Pedro de Valdivia, who sentenced him to serving in the stables.

While with the Spanish, Lautaro learned a great deal about his captors' cultural and military habits. He studied their use of the horse, their use of weapons, their strategies, and their methods of combat. Later, towards the end of 1553, Lautaro fled from the Spaniards to return to the Araucanía and take part in the great revolt his people were preparing against the invaders. As a result of his natural ability and the military knowledge he acquired during his captivity, Lautaro quickly rose to be the leader of the rebellion.

Lautaro's military career began with a great victory. On December 25, 1553, in the Battle of Tucapel, he defeated and killed Pedro de Valdivia, the founder of Santiago, together with 60 Spanish soldiers who were accompanying him. In February 1554 he defeated Francisco de Villagra, successor to Valdivia, in the Battle of Mariñeñu. This victory allowed him to devastate the city of Concepción. Lautaro's victories continued. In 1555 he defeated and drove back the Spanish regiment that tried to repopulate Concepción. At the beginning of 1556 he initiated the most ambitious of his operations: to destroy Santiago. In three occasions the Mapuche commander advanced on the capital of the Spanish colony. Finally, after several indecisive battles, he was killed on April 29, 1557 in the Battle of Peteroa, on the banks of the River Mataquito. When he died he was about 22 years old.

Since 1810 Lautaro has been held up as a symbol of freedom and patriotism by the Spanish-American colonies fighting for liberation from Spain. Today, Lautaro's epic story constitutes one of the principal phases of the struggle of the Mapuche people – a continuing struggle to regain the political and territorial autonomy they enjoyed for almost 250 years, thanks to the prowess of Lautaro and his successors.



This image of the Mapuche warrior Lautaro is accompanied by text that reads: "this Indian killed the people who were with Villagrán, governor of Valdivia. This is the dress of war of the Indians – part of it made in ram cowskin." Before the arrival of the Spanish in the sixteenth century, northern Chile was ruled by Incas, while the indigenous Araucanians or Mapuches inhabited central and southern Chile. (South American Pictures)

SEE ALSO: Aracaré (d. 1542); Mapuche Indian Resistance; Túpac Amaru (ca. 1540–1572)

References and Suggested Readings

- Ercilla y Zúñiga, A. (1574) *La Araucana*. Salamanca: En casa de Domingo de Portonarijs.
- León Solís, L. (1991) *La merma de la sociedad indígena en Chile central y la última guerra de los promaucaes, 1541–1558*. St. Andrews, Scotland: Institute of Amerindian Studies.
- Vicuña Mackenna, B. (1876) *Lautaro y sus tres campañas contra Santiago, 1553–1557*. Santiago de Chile: Imprenta El Mercurio.

Le Duan (1908–1986)

Justin Corfield

Le Duan was a founding member of the Indo-chinese Communist Party in 1930, and took over from Ho Chi Minh as the first secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1960. He became general secretary in 1976, a position he retained until his death 10 years later.

Le Duan was born on April 7, 1908 in Quang Tri Province (now Binh Tri Thien Province) in central Vietnam. His father was a railway clerk. Le Duan joined the Revolutionary Youth League of Ho Chi Minh in 1928. He helped found the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) two years later. In 1931 he was arrested by the French colonial authorities for seditious activities and spent five years in prison. On his release he rose rapidly in the ranks of the ICP, and in 1939 was appointed as a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee. In 1940 Le Duan was arrested again by the French and spent the rest of World War II in a French prison on Poulo Condore.

In March 1945, with the Japanese *coup de force*, Le Duan was released and served under Hô Chi Minh in Hanoi. He was not happy with the Geneva Agreements which left the south of Vietnam in the hands of the pro-western Republic of Vietnam, and he was appointed to organize the South Vietnamese Communists, becoming secretary of the party's main bureau in the South, the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). He became active in the Vietnamese Communist Party, arguing against the partition of the country and clashing with party ideologue Truong Chinh, who felt that more effort should be put into mobilizing the southern Communists.

In 1957 Le Duan was recalled to Hanoi to become a member of the Politburo and effectively serve as first secretary of the Vietnam Workers' Party, a position which was formalized on September 10, 1960 with the demotion of Truong Chinh, who had held that role until 1956. However, Le Duan and Truong Chinh were reconciled and together sought to steer the Vietnamese revolutionary movement on a neutral course during the Sino-Soviet dispute. In 1962 Le Duan was in charge of overseeing the creation of the People's Revolutionary Party which became a major factor in the subsequent

proclamation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. Eventually, in 1975 Le Duan led the party towards a closer relationship with the Soviet Union and into a bitter dispute with China.

With the formal reunification of North Vietnam and South Vietnam on December 20, 1976, Le Duan became general secretary of the Communist Party and led the country through the confrontation with the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, and the subsequent Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. This led to the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, and Vietnam tying itself ever closer to the Soviet Union, becoming a member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. In 1979 Le Duan was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize. Le Duan tried to promote economic reform, but there was mounting criticism of him as being one of the “old men” running the country along more hard-line old-fashioned lines, with reformers wanting somebody who was more pragmatic. During continued rumors of his impending retirement, Le Duan, who was also sometimes called Le Dung or *anh Ba* (“Third Brother”), died on July 10, 1986 in Hanoi, to be succeeded briefly by Truong Chinh.

SEE ALSO: Vietnam, Protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974; Vietnam, Protests, 1975–1993

References and Suggested Readings

- Karnow, S. (1984) *Vietnam: A History*. London: Penguin.
- Turner, R. F. (1975) *Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

League of Revolutionary Black Workers

*Michael Goldfield and
Mike Hamlin*

The League of Revolutionary Black Workers (1967–71) organized and mobilized a movement of hundreds of in-plant caucuses of African American workers, one of the most significant cutting-edge militant worker actions of the

1960s and 1970s in the United States. The League (LRBW) was part of the worldwide struggle of radical, Marxist-oriented autoworkers, including those in France (culminating in the 1968 French general strike), Italy (centered at Fiat), and in South Africa, among many other locations. The LRBW was also a revolutionary, black nationalist movement in the US, influencing the course of civil rights struggles, labor struggles, and politics in general. Like other such movements throughout US history, the LRBW has been either omitted or marginalized in most historical accounts, accounts which tend to eliminate the real impact of revolutionary groups and working-class militancy on US society.

The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) labor federation, even during its heyday in the 1930s and 1940s, had a mixed record on defending and fighting for the interests of its black members. This situation worsened as left-led unions (which tended to be far more interested in such issues) were expelled and driven out from the CIO from 1949 to 1950. As major US unions consolidated a business union direction, they all but abandoned the fight for the equality of their black members. This was especially true in the auto and steel industries. In auto, where Walter Reuther – whose caucus took control of the United Auto Workers (UAW) from the left in 1947 – enjoyed an undeserved reputation for civil rights activism, black workers remained consigned to the worst jobs and virtually excluded from the skilled trades (Goldfield 1993, 1997). The contrast between lofty democratic rhetoric and the tight, bureaucratic, undemocratic control that Reuther’s UAW all-white leadership maintained in the union was vivid. Even more stark perhaps was the discrimination black workers faced in the auto plants. By the 1960s African Americans represented 25 percent of all US employees in the Big Three US auto firms (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler). While Reuther displayed a sympathetic public posture toward racial equality, evinced through marching in 1960s civil rights demonstrations, black workers in the UAW union faced significant discrimination.

In the long history of radical, militant struggle in the black community, the 1950s and 1960s were notable for the emergence of a variety of groups, including the Republic of New Africa, the Revolutionary Action Movement, Uhuru, the Deacons for Self-Defense, and in particular

Robert Williams' radical, armed, self-defense oriented National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) chapter in Monroe, North Carolina. The chapter, of which Williams was leader, was comprised of many army veterans, protected the local black community against assaults by the Ku Klux Klan. Anxious that Williams was too radical, the NAACP expelled him from the organization in 1959. The reemergence of the civil rights movement in the South during the 1950s and early 1960s gave a renewed stimulus to in-plant activities by African American youth. First, of course, was the Montgomery bus boycott, led by Martin Luther King, Jr. from 1955 to 1956. But perhaps the signal events that inspired young radical black youth in the North were the lunch counter sit-ins of Southern black college students, beginning in February 1960 in Greensboro, North Carolina, eventually involving as many as 50,000 students, spreading to over 100 cities throughout the South (Bloom 1987; Carson 1981).

Since the emergence of the automobile production industry, Detroit had been the auto capital of the world, remaining so into the 1960s. Yet the Big Three had also decentralized production to other locations, with many aging plants still located in the Detroit area. These dilapidated workplaces turned out vehicles under unsafe conditions, intense work pressure, and with racially stratified jobs. In addition, many of these plants had become majority black, with all-white, generally racist, supervision. Detroit was also a city where black radicalism had never been extinguished, with various brands of radical nationalism, and an especially vibrant Marxist tradition, which included communists, Socialist Workers Party members, and followers of C. L. R. James, all with roots in key workplaces.

In 1967 the largest urban riot (referred to by many radicals as a rebellion) took place in Detroit. In response to this event a core group of young African American radicals began publishing the *Inner City Voice* (ICV) newspaper. By the next year, one of their members, John Watson, was elected the editor of Wayne State University's daily newspaper *The South End*. The newspaper, staffed largely by both black and white leftists, became a vehicle for organizing black workers throughout the Detroit area. The masthead was changed to

read, "One class conscious worker is worth 100 students."

In 1967 and 1968 there were a series of wildcat strikes at Chrysler's Dodge Main Hamtramck plant, leading to the founding of DRUM (Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement) by several of the leaders of the ICV group working in the plant. The plant had almost 10,000 workers, almost two-thirds African American. The leader of the group was General Baker. DRUM developed a weekly newsletter, whose description of in-plant conditions, racial discrimination, and exposés of the union had an electrifying impact in the plant. DRUM not only led job actions around in-plant conditions, recruited large numbers of members in the plant, and participated in union elections. It also organized a boycott of two taverns near the plant, frequented by black workers, but which refused to hire any blacks. The boycott was overwhelmingly successful. The example of DRUM led to the formation of RUMs at workplaces all around the Detroit area, including ELRUM (Eldon Ave Drum and Axle), FRUM (Ford), and UPRUM (United Parcel). DRUM also stimulated the galvanizing of already-existing black caucuses around the country, and the creation of new ones.

The leaders of DRUM and the ICV group decided to consolidate these in-plant groups into the explicitly Marxist-Leninist League of Revolutionary Black Workers. The League's impact was far reaching. LRBW activities also influenced many white workers and activists. In conjunction with Detroit Newsreel, the LRBW produced a film, *Finally Got the News*, which was shown around the country. Along with numerous articles about the LRBW in left-wing and "movement" papers, the LRBW had a tremendous influence on the New Left, encouraging large numbers of black student groups to move from cultural nationalism to Marxism.

The impact of the LRBW on US companies and workplaces is more complex but somewhat astounding. Particularly in workplaces with significant numbers of non-white workers, black foreman and middle management were recruited in large numbers. By the mid-1970s, skilled trades jobs in auto and other industries began to open up to blacks. Upgrading of black workers – unevenly, to be sure – began occurring in select venues. These trends, so prolific today, are largely an indirect consequence of the LRBW and its activities.

The League of Revolutionary Black Workers placed its struggle and agenda in the context of a worldwide struggle of working-class people against the international capitalist system. This perspective is presented in many of its writings, as well as *Finally Got the News*. By the early 1970s the LRBW had endured many splits and ceased to exist as an organization. Yet, for a number of years, its impact on workplace radicalism and militancy was large. Like the Industrial Workers of the World, its legacy is a beacon for those seeking successful models of radical, transformative struggle.

SEE ALSO: Black Panthers; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); James, C. L. R. (1901–1989); Marxism; Uhuru Movement; Williams, Robert F. (1925–1996)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bloom, J. (1987) *Class, Race and the Civil Rights Movement*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Carson, C. (1981) *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Goldfield, M. (1993) Race and the CIO: The Possibilities for Racial Egalitarianism During the 1930s and 1940s. *International Labor and Working Class History* 44 (Fall): 1–32.
- Goldfield, M. (1997) *The Color of Politics: Race and the Mainsprings of American Politics*. New York: New Press.
- Tripp, L. (n.d.) Working Class Radicalism in Detroit, 1960–1970. Unpublished manuscript.
- Tyson, T. (1999) *Radio Free Dixie*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Williams, R. (1998) *Negroes With Guns*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Lebanese insurrection of 1958

Kristian Patrick Alexander

The Lebanese crisis of 1958 is widely viewed as an ideological struggle causing polarization between Lebanese nationalism and growing pan-Arabism. President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt became the symbol of pan-Arabism after the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1958 merger of Egypt with Syria to form the United Arab Republic. He had a great influence on Lebanese Muslims, while Christians were set on maintaining the country's autonomy and cooperation

with the West. The conflict also demonstrated the fragility of the National Pact of 1943, an unwritten agreement between the two most prominent Christian and Muslim leaders, Khuri and Sulh. The National Pact was based on the basic principle that Lebanon was to be a completely independent state, specifying that the Christian community would cease to closely identify with the West and, in return, the Muslim community would give up its desire to merge with any Arab state. The 1958 conflict between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon reinforced the notion that sectarian affiliation was politically significant, thereby hindering the development of an overarching national identity.

One of the most important internal causes of the 1958 crisis was the perception of discrimination and dissatisfaction. Many Muslims felt that the Christians predominated in senior government positions even though the Muslims were more populous. Corruption was another aspect of Lebanese politics that made politics a highly personal affair. In seeking to dominate the Muslim community, President Camille Chamoun routinely changed prime ministers and played Sunni politicians against each other in order to weaken the political strength of his Maronite rivals. By doing so, he positioned himself closer to the West and played right into Lebanese Christian sentiments that generally feared a greater Arab nationalist influence pulling Lebanon into a pan-Arab Muslim union. By accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, the Lebanese government committed itself to defending Middle Eastern countries against communist aggression. Strategic goals such as military containment of Soviet interests in the Middle East, preservation of transportation and communications routes, securing a peaceful and stable atmosphere in the region following the creation of Israel, and the growing dependence of the western world on Arab oil constituted the main themes in US diplomacy in the region. The Cold War transformed the region into a proxy battlefield for superpower rivalry. Although Christians generally supported the government's position toward the Eisenhower Doctrine, Muslims were opposed to this move. To many, President Chamoun was attempting to force out some of Lebanon's most influential leaders, both Christians and Muslims.

In the early phases of mobilization, the opposition had no intention of resorting to political violence, nor did it call for the resignation of

Chamoun. General strikes and peaceful demonstrations were quite common. After the parliamentary elections yielded results that confirmed the primacy of the government and severely weakened the strength of the opposition, outcries of foul play and vote tampering surfaced. Armed clashes between bands and security forces became daily occurrences. The ensuing patterns of violence took on the form of strikes, demonstrations, riots, subversive acts of sabotage, terrorism, and political assassinations. Lebanon also witnessed episodes and subversive actions attributed to political dissident groups, particularly Palestinians, Syrians, Egyptians, and other political refugees. In response to increasing occurrences of disorder, the government initiated repressive measures to curb infiltration and control for acts of sabotage. A new national guard was put in charge of monitoring sensitive installations as well as the porous Lebanese–Syrian border. A number of decrees were enacted by the government to suppress the freedom of the press and the mobilization of dissent.

This led to increased sectarian-based polarization on foreign policy issues amongst Lebanese and an anti-Chamoun coalition known as the United National Front (UNF). The opposition demanded Chamoun's early resignation since he failed to clarify his position on the reelection issue. Chamoun's six-year term would expire in September 1958, but there were heightened speculations that he intended to remain in the presidency beyond the end of his constitutional term. The opposition was led by Lebanese Muslims and Druzes, Kamal Jumblatt, Saeb Salam, Rashid Karami, and Ahmad el-Ass'ad, as well as a number of Maronites critical of Chamoun. A divided rebel leadership which was unsuccessful in setting up a unified command finally failed in its quest to topple Chamoun. While the call for an armed struggle was made primarily by dissatisfied political elites demanding little more than the resignation of President Chamoun, the revolt ended in the restoration of the status quo.

What triggered the insurgency was the assassination of Nassib al-Matni on May 8, 1958, an independent Maronite journalist who had been critical of the regime. Although never fully proven, leaders of the UNF accused Chamoun's henchmen of this crime. The spark that touched off and fostered organized manifestations of collective violence elsewhere in the country ignited

in Tripoli on May 10 when internal security forces clashed with demonstrators, killing ten and wounding more than 60 people. Leaders of the opposition openly called for an armed struggle. Chamoun had no choice but to fall back on the gendarmerie, which was poorly equipped and factionally splintered. As a last resort he solicited the aid of the Kataib Party and the Syrian Socialist National Party (PPS), thereby increasing the already hostile sectarian character of the conflict. President Chamoun ordered General Fuad Chehab to intervene and crush the revolt, but the army commander refused, believing that it would lead to mutiny and disintegration along sectarian lines.

Chamoun had repeatedly accused the insurgents of accepting aid from Syria, which had received arms from the Soviet Union, so he appealed to the United States to militarily intervene. Following the violent overthrow of the pro-western government of Iraq on July 14, the Eisenhower administration dispatched American forces to Lebanon to secure political stability, after having received a request for such assistance from the Chamoun-led government. The US intervention ultimately led not to Chamoun's survival but to his replacement by the commander of the Lebanese army, General Fouad Shehab. The US intervention in 1958 was bloodless, short, and successful. It was the fear of international communism, masquerading as Arab nationalism, that alarmed Washington. The US administration was concerned that unless it demonstrated a firm commitment to defending Lebanon's pro-western orientation, US credibility would be questioned by its Arab allies and non-Arab countries. Military action was viewed as an important means of sending a deterrent signal to anti-western forces in the Middle East and elsewhere. Another concern driving Washington was that the Iraqi Revolution could have spillover effects on other friendly oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf area, endangering the access of the precious oilfields.

The insurrections of 1958 were exemplified by a bewildering array of factions and shifting alliances and motives. Predominantly nonsectarian in nature at the outset, involving issues of presidential succession, constitutional amendments, foreign policy, and political grievances, the spontaneous uprisings degenerated into confessional hostility. The violence and destruction resulted in the loss of some 3,000 lives but

did not fundamentally restructure society or its political system.

SEE ALSO: Cedar Revolution, Lebanon; Hezbollah: Organization and Uprisings; Iraq, Revolution of 1958; Lebanon, Civil War, 1975–1990; Lebanon, 19th-Century Revolts; Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970)

References and Suggested Readings

- Alin, E. G. (1994) *The United States and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis: American Intervention in the Middle East*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Alin, E. G. (1999) US Policy and Military Intervention in the 1958 Lebanon Crisis. In D. W. Lesch (Ed.), *The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Gendzier, I. L. (1997) *Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hahn, P. L. (2005) *Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*. Washington, DC: Potomac Books.
- Korbani, A. G. (1991) *US Intervention in Lebanon, 1958 and 1982: Presidential Decisionmaking*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Lebanon, civil war, 1975–1990

Kristian Patrick Alexander

The Lebanese Civil War went through various phases (approximately nine) of shifting alliances and changing issues. Two broad coalitions – the Lebanese Front and the Lebanese National Movement – opposed each other during the initial phase. The Lebanese Front was made up of mainly Christian Maronite groups, such as the Tigers of Camille Chamoun and Pierre Gemayel's Phalangist Party. The Phalange or Lebanese Kataeb Social Democratic Party was established in 1936 by Pierre Gemayel, a Maronite Christian, who very much symbolized the pro-western stance and anti-pan-Arab sentiments. Its goal was to drive out the Palestinians and maintain political dominance over the state. The Lebanese National Movement blended various parties ranging from centrist to extreme left, comprised of Kamal Jumblatt's PSP (Parti Socialiste Populaire), the Lebanese Communist Party, the Syrian National Social Party, the

Murabitun (Sunni Nationalist Party), and later the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Their broad objective was to support the Palestinian cause and reallocate constitutional power. In 1975 a fishermen's strike in Saida was the precipitating episode of hostilities. Struggling fishermen in Sidon called for peaceful demonstrations to oppose the licensing of a large Kuwaiti enterprise that would mechanize Lebanon's fishing industry. The fishermen were immediately threatened by the prospect of monopolistic incursion by foreign capitalists. The demonstrations evolved into a riot that ended the life of Marouf Saad, Sidon's most popular leader. After subsequent confrontations between government troops and protestors reawakened communal hostility, the Muslim establishment, with its Palestinian allies, denounced such acts as shameful abuses of power of Maronite supremacy and accused the government of failing to protect defenseless villagers from Israeli raids. However, the Maronites not only denounced the opposition for undermining sovereignty, but also warned Palestinians not to meddle in Lebanon's domestic affairs.

The Sidon disturbances had hardly been contained before Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Christian Maronite party Kataeb, was shot at by unidentified assailants. Four men, including two of Gemayel's personal bodyguards, were killed. Later that same day a bus with 28 passengers, mostly Palestinian commandos returning to a refugee camp, had lost its way through the Christian quarter. Outraged Christian militias perceived this as another confrontation and ambushed the bus and killed all of its passengers. This was followed by more attacks both from Kataib forces, situated in the Christian quarters of Ashrafieh, and the Palestinians in the outlying refugee camps in Tel-al-Zatar. The situation only grew worse as bomb explosions, vandalism, robberies, and abductions became daily events. Gangs of local thugs rose to assert control over urban quarters and remote regions. This was a direct challenge to state authority and traditional Lebanese bosses.

The unequal sectarian distribution of power and Christian-Maronite unwillingness to concede any of their status quo are often cited as primary causes of the Civil War. However, the Lebanese political system is confessional by nature, based on a National Pact that was drawn up in 1943. The pact assigned political power and representation

on a proportional basis to the major religious communities, of which the Christian Maronites constituted a little more than half of the population, followed by the Sunnis, Shi'ites, and Druze. By means of this census the Christian Maronites were given the office of the presidency, followed by the Sunnis awarded with the position of prime minister, and the Druzes and Shi'ites were awarded minor posts. Over the years demographic changes allowed the Shi'ites to emerge as the most prominent community. However, it never translated into political capital or into quantitative preponderance in the civil service. After Christian leaders vehemently opposed holding a new population census, state institutions were depicted as serving the interests of certain segments (i.e., the Christians and particularly the Maronites, as well as the exclusive elite) while ignoring the needs of the majority (namely, the Muslims, especially the Shi'ites, and other have-nots).

Another factor that contributed to the Civil War was the presence of a strong Palestinian community that used Lebanese territory as a battleground for armed resistance against Israel. The PLO had found sanctuary in Lebanon after its expulsion from Jordan in 1971. The paralysis of the Lebanese state enabled the PLO to carve out a "state within a state" and use Lebanese territory as a launching pad for attacks on Israel. The PLO had succeeded in bringing about the Cairo agreement that legalized their armed presence in camps in southern Beirut. The influx of several thousand Palestinians disrupted the already shaky confessional balance and polarized the nation between those who supported the Palestinian cause and those who did not. The PLO was forcefully evicted from Lebanon after an Israeli invasion in 1982. Soon after, Maronite forces under the supervision of the Israeli military massacred innocent Palestinian refugees at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps.

An additional cause was growing socioeconomic cleavages coupled with sectarian rifts which led to sectarian mobilization and sectarian agitation, ultimately causing violent outbursts. Lebanon's wealth was unequally distributed, much of it concentrated in the hands of a small, predominantly Christian elite in the capital of Beirut. The unequal distribution of wealth contributed significantly to the outbreak of civil strife and the subsequent devastation of the economy. An essential element that characterizes the

Lebanese political structure is the importance of sectarian leaders. The Zaim or traditional power-brokers provide services and favors to their respective clients in exchange for loyalty and power that eventually lead to meeting particularistic rather than national needs. This has led various Lebanese political bosses to maintain a quasi-autonomous base of power and effectively curb all national attempts to assert control. Scores of militias led to a privatization of security, since the crumbling state's institutions could no longer guarantee the safety of citizens. Drawing on feelings of fear and insecurity, militia leaders effectively employed ethnic symbols, as well as threats and intimidation, to mobilize their respective constituents and provide security in homogeneous and defensible cantons. Militia leaders and agencies provided access to amenities, vital resources, information, smuggled goods, black markets, and other venues for empowerment and enhanced status. The burgeoning and informal parallel war economy, with its extortionist and protection rackets, meant that warlords and war profiteers were reluctant to give up their lifeline of power and privilege. Foreign remittances also poured in large reserves to bolster and sustain the war efforts of their respective communities.

Finally, it is widely acknowledged that various external actors interfered in Lebanese politics, either militarily or by using client militias to further their interests. Lebanon's immediate neighbors (Israel, Syria, the PLO), more remote players in the Middle East (Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Arab League), and international powers and organizations (the United States, the USSR, France, and the UN) have all had an impact on the outcome and evolution of the Lebanese Civil War. For instance, on August 25, 1982, US marines had landed in Beirut as part of a multinational peacekeeping force that was aimed at maintaining the ceasefire during the PLO evacuation from Lebanon, which was the result of the Israeli incursion into Lebanon. The Reagan administration sought to counter Soviet influence, apparent through its Syrian proxy. The marines were prematurely withdrawn after the majority of the PLO evacuated.

The PLO would later redeploy on September 29, 1982. On September 14, 1983, Christian president-elect Bashir Gemayel was killed by a bomb, upon which retreating Israeli forces reentered West Beirut and assisted Phalange militias

in their attacks on two Palestinian refugee camps, Sabra and Shatila, in which an estimated 800 to 2,000 men, women, and children were killed. This would bring back US troops to provide logistical support to the Lebanese army. However, US troops were increasingly perceived as overtly supporting Israel's objectives to the detriment of Muslim and Druze factions. This ultimately triggered a violent reprisal from Islamic Jihad, a radical Shi'ite group closely linked, if not directly controlled by, Hezbollah. Hezbollah had emerged as a significant actor in the wake of the Lebanese Civil War. In the absence of a functioning central government, material and ideological support provided by Iran would allow for a massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon which would eventually radicalize many Shiites.

The Lebanese conflict resulted in tremendous loss of life, displacement, emigration, and physical damage. According to most statistics, 144,240 persons died in the conflict and 197,506 were wounded. Close to a third of Lebanon's pre-war population of 3.1 million left the country, including an estimated 200,000 professionals. About 790,000 persons had to leave their homes and the estimated costs of damage to property reached \$25 billion. The Civil War was officially declared over with the signing of the Taif Accords on October 22, 1989. Under the auspices of a tripartite committee of Arab League states (Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco), 62 parliamentary representatives unanimously agreed a plan of reforms that would reduce the powers of the Maronite presidency and increase the influence of a Sunni prime minister and a Shi'ite president of the National Assembly.

Unlike other proposals aimed at ending the war, the Taif Accords were drafted and approved by the bulk of surviving Lebanese legislators. Sixty-two MPs, half of them Muslims, the other half Christians, were involved in the process, providing Taif with a unique political legitimacy. Parliamentarians from both sides, with the exception of Hezbollah, supported the agreement. The peace treaty was brokered by the Arab League and heavily supported by Syria. Several favorable circumstances led to the inception of the Taif Accords. For one, the peace treaty became largely possible due to the relaxation of tension at both the international and regional levels. After the downfall of communism, the United States ceased to perceive the Lebanese conflict

through the prism of its confrontation with the Soviet Union. It became more willing to concede to Syria in Lebanon and less supportive of Israeli interventionist policies. At the domestic level, the economic situation was rapidly deteriorating, increasingly jeopardizing the welfare of all sectors of society.

SEE ALSO: Cedar Revolution, Lebanon; Hezbollah: Organization and Uprisings; Lebanese Insurrection of 1958; Lebanon, 19th-Century Revolts

References and Suggested Readings

- Abul-Husn, L. (1998) *The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Haley, E. P. & Snider, L. W. (1979) *Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Khalaf, S. (2002) *Civil and Uncivil Violence: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Conflict in Lebanon*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Maila, J. (1994) The Taif Accord: An Evaluation. In D. Collings (Ed.), *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 31–44.
- Salame, G. (1986) *Lebanon's Injured Identities: Who Represents Whom during a Civil War?* Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies.
- Salibi, K. S. (1976) *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958–1976*. Delmar, NY: Caravan Books.

Lebanon, 19th-century revolts

Kristian Patrick Alexander

Throughout the nineteenth century, Lebanon experienced various uprisings resulting from a variety of grievances that were provoked by specific issues like taxation, land tenancy, conscription, and disarmament. In all cases these uprisings were reactions to attempts by the successive Ottoman pashas to impose tight controls on Mount Lebanon, and an enfeebled feudal aristocracy trying to preserve its eroding power and privilege. These uprisings were also an expression of an emancipated peasantry and clergy who were articulating a new spirit of collective consciousness. Prior to the uprising of 1820 the then Ottoman-appointed pashlik of Sidon imposed himself as ruthless ruler over various provinces by expropriating most of the land to his profit and by demanding excessive custom duties, thereby diminishing the modest economic prosperity the mountainous area had to offer.

This incensed the peasantry and with the backing of the Maronite clergy they staged what became known as the *ammīyyah* uprisings. It is vital to highlight the role of the clergy in the mobilization of peasants because, at the turn of the century, a more reform-minded clergy would emerge and become more economically independent of the notables. Monastic organizations were increasingly more active in industrial crafts such as wine, spirits, bookkeeping, and printing. Most of their growing influence can be attributed to their virtual monopolization of the school system and the printing press. The education and training provided by many of the clergy-run schools were central to the individuals, both lay and cleric, in the political and cultural awakening of Lebanon.

In protest against the outrageous taxation schemes that were being imposed, the majority of Maronite peasants adopted a specific communal consciousness that articulated a dislodged sense of personal allegiance toward their feudal lords but also an increased sense of autonomy and independence from Ottoman control. In various, largely spontaneous uprisings that erupted, many peasants and their leaders were killed, and although the overall revolts failed, the beliefs and institutions of the feudal society had for the first time been seriously challenged. The Maronite clergy had provided the intellectual and ideological justifications for the organization of the uprisings, but most had been limited to mainly Maronite-ruled areas of Mount Lebanon.

The uprisings of 1840 were triggered by the growing disenchantment with the measures of conscription, *corvée*, and taxation. Ibrahim Pasha had introduced even harsher measures by levying the poll tax for seven years in advance. However, conscription was by far the most feared since one out of three males was forcefully recruited. That meant prolonged absences from a village or town as well as a drain on the economic resources of Mount Lebanon. In order to avoid this fate, many sought immunity in baptism or conversion or even emigration. In some instances, smaller insurrections paved the way to what was to come. In 1838 Ibrahim Pasha had requested the conscription of 1,600 Druze, which sparked a major insurrection of Hawran. In response to this episode Ibrahim Pasha turned to 4,000 Christian mountaineers to assist in the suppression of the Druze rebels. As a reward for their loyalty the Maronites were permitted to

retain their arms and exempted from additional tax increases. This incident broke the long tradition of peaceful coexistence that had been in place between the various communities.

Going against his initial promise, the ruling pasha reversed his decision and insisted on disarming all Christian communities in Mount Lebanon. Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Druze temporarily suspended their differences and acted collectively to resist such conscription campaigns. The village of Dayr al-Qamar became the focal point for the covertly formed committees that were organized to allocate funds and arms. French King Louis Philippe dispatched his nephew, the Comte d'Onfroi, to assist the insurgents. Although he supplied them with ammunition and logistical support, the 10,000 insurgent fighters were no match for the 42,000 forces that Amir Bashir and the Egyptian pasha were able to mobilize. Soon thereafter, however, British forces, eager to expel the Egyptians from Syria, launched a massive naval and military campaign that led to the defeat and withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Syria. This was an example of western powers intervening in Syria to protect and promote the interest of their own protégé.

Subsequently, a scheme for partitioning Mount Lebanon into a northern district under a Christian *qa'immaqam* (sub-governor) and a southern district under a Druze *qa'immaqam* was introduced. Each was to rule over his co-religionists while being responsible to the local Ottoman governor located in Beirut. The partition of Lebanon into two separate provinces proved to be a mistake. The religious composition of the two districts was far from homogeneous, which created a problem of how to administer the mixed districts. The Ottomans decided not to thoroughly reorganize Mount Lebanon and the growing disparities between the religious communities intensified due to the external imposition.

Mount Lebanon also experienced an inevitable transition from a subsistence agricultural economy to one based on cash crops. The silk trade especially became a lucrative trade that benefited European traders but had detrimental effects on the local cottage manufacturers. Lebanon's economy was becoming increasingly affected by the growing dependence of the Lebanese economy on European production and trade. The new trading patterns deprived a large portion of rural society of its traditional sources of livelihood and rendered the economy

sensitive to external circumstances. Due to increases in Ottoman taxation on silk cocoons, many feudal families were adversely affected and passed on their increasing expenses to forced exaction from their peasants.

The aforementioned clergy incited the peasants to protest. After the notables declined to grant the peasants any concessions, a more confrontational stance was taken. Under the leadership of Tanyus Shahin of Rayfun, the movement of peasants and clergy escalated its concessions and raised its demands to entail: (1) full equality of status between the sheikhs and peasants; (2) an end to the exaction of dues and imposition of forced labor; and (3) the abolition of taxes on land already sold by the sheikhs to peasants. The riots took on a more hostile dimension and manifested themselves through episodes of evictions of local notables as well as the confiscation of property. In 1859 the peasant insurrections took on the form of social revolution, especially in the Christian districts. Druze sheikhs became weary of the peasant movements in their districts but managed to deflect the grievances and discontent of their own peasants by provoking sectarian rivalry. The two communities clashed, but surprisingly the estimated 50,000-man force succumbed to the numerically inferior 12,000 Druze forces. The Druze forces were better organized, disciplined, and fought more fiercely, while the Christians suffered from a leadership that was severely divided.

A comprehensive settlement followed, negotiated between European powers (France, Britain, Austria, and Prussia) and the Ottoman administration. An arrangement was reached whereby a governor of Lebanon, who was to be an Ottoman Christian, usually from some other part of the empire, would rule Mount Lebanon, assisted by an administrative council of 12 members from various religious communities in Lebanon. This led to a period of long peace under the system of *mutasarrifiyya* (autonomous Ottoman province).

All three uprisings were originally sparked by a sense of collective consciousness and concern for public welfare, only to be deflected by traditional leaders and external actors into confessional confrontation, indicating the importance of primordial loyalties and the inviolable attachments of faith, creed, and community. The three insurrections exhibited a high degree of mobilization. According to most accounts the first

protest movement consisted of 6,000 insurgents, reaching 20,000 by the time the 1840 uprisings occurred. Most uprisings initially used rallies, gatherings, petitions, and mass agitations as a means of protest. Only after these strategies proved unsuccessful were more contentious ones employed. In all of the insurgencies discussed above, organizational and ideological leadership was assumed by Maronite clerics to some degree, and peasants almost always received direct or moral support from external powers or Ottoman authorities that were interested in manipulating the uprisings for their own benefits.

SEE ALSO: Cedar Revolution, Lebanon; Hezbollah: Organization and Uprisings; Lebanese Insurrection of 1958; Lebanon, Civil War, 1975–1990

References and Suggested Readings

- Cobban, H. (1985) *The Making of Modern Lebanon*. London: Hutchinson.
- Fawaz, L. (1994) *An Occasion for War: Civil War in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Harik, I. F. (1968) *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711–1845*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hitti, P. K. (1957) *Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present*. London: Macmillan.
- Leeuwen, R.-V. (1994) *Notables and Clergy in Mount Lebanon: The Khazin Sheikhs and the Maronite Church, 1736–1840*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Leeward Islands, labor protests

Glen Richards

Situated in the northeastern arc of the Caribbean archipelago, the Leeward Islands consist of Anguilla, Antigua, Barbuda, Montserrat, Nevis and St. Christopher or St. Kitts, the British Leeward Islands, the British Virgin Islands, and the Dutch islands of St. Bartholomew, St. Eustatius, and St. Maarten. First occupied by the Taino and Carib aboriginal inhabitants, the islands were claimed for Spain by Christopher Columbus on his second voyage in 1493, but actual conquest by Europeans did not occur until the seventeenth century when they were seized by the English, Dutch, and, briefly, in the case of St. Kitts, the French. By the late seventeenth century the Dutch islands had become

trading posts, while the British islands had evolved as plantation colonies which produced first tobacco and, later, highly profitable sugar, utilizing imported African slaves as the main form of labor.

The abolition of slavery in the British Leeward Islands in 1834 by an act of the British parliament ushered in a new phase of free labor and opened the way for sometimes violent, at times organized, labor protests by the black workers of these territories. That year witnessed the first major labor disturbances in the island grouping. The Emancipation Act had provided for adult agricultural ex-slaves to serve six years of apprenticeship during which they would be compelled to continue working without pay on the estates for 40.5 hours each week. While the planter legislature of Antigua and Barbuda agreed to bypass this element of the act and move to "full freedom," in the belief that there would be no shortage of labor on their estates, the legislatures of Montserrat, Nevis and St. Kitts decided to enforce the system of apprenticeship. The ex-slaves on most estates in Montserrat refused to work and threatened violence against the planters, many of whom fled the estates to take refuge in the capital town. A state of emergency was declared by the colonial authorities and troops were dispatched around the island to restore peace. In St. Kitts, the ex-slaves organized a general strike, many of them taking their work tools to their estate manager's house and tossing them on the ground. After the declaration of martial law by the colonial government, a significant number deserted the estates, withdrawing into the central mountain range of the island, and, under the leadership of a known maroon, "Marcus of the Woods," resisted the military effort to force them back to the estates. The arrival of a military regiment aboard a British warship helped to break the resistance and end the strike.

The sugar islands of the British Leeward Islands were small both in size and population. The white planter population owned most of the arable land in these islands, leaving the landless ex-slaves dependent on the planters for a livelihood. Many of the free population of coloreds were small estate owners, professionals, or small businessmen and petty traders. Political life in these islands was dominated by the planters because suffrage and representation were restricted by strict property qualifications. In Montserrat,

for example, in 1837, out of a population of 7,119, only 144 persons were eligible to vote.

Planters' control of the economy and domination of the legislature placed the sugar planters and merchants in a position to unilaterally dictate terms and conditions of work. While bypassing the system of apprenticeship, the sugar planters in Antigua pushed through the legislature the Labor Contract Act which stipulated that industrial disputes should be adjudicated by a justice of the peace and that industrial indiscipline by workers, including absence from work without reasonable cause, would be treated as a criminal offense punishable by one month's imprisonment with hard labor. In 1849, the Masters and Servants Act, passed by the legislature in St. Kitts and Nevis to regulate industrial relations in that island, sought to secure continuous labor by placing all workers under a general contract of employment and making breach of contract an offense punishable by a fine not exceeding 50 shillings or one month's imprisonment. Under the act, industrial disputes were adjudicated by local magistrates. With the judiciary in the Leeward Islands being drawn almost exclusively from members of the white planter class, the industrial command of the planters remained paramount. The punishment for industrial infractions was often severe and, in Antigua, the whip and treadmill remained in use on estates until the late nineteenth century.

Labor protest in the post-emancipation period took varying forms, depending on the prevailing geographical or economic conditions in the islands, and it was often indirect. Where unoccupied land was available, many workers chose to withdraw entirely from estate labor and establish independent peasantries. The hilly terrain of Montserrat made sugar cultivation difficult, and as the sugar industry declined, more estates were abandoned or divided up and sold in small lots to laborers. The number of peasant cultivators in that island rose from approximately 400 in 1862 to 1,200 by 1897. In Nevis, where sugar cultivation had to contend with rocky soil, the number of smallholders, owning lots that seldom exceeded two acres in size, rose from 800 in 1863 to 2,135 by 1876. Even in Antigua, where sugar cultivation was more successful but had to contend periodically with drought conditions, workers were able to purchase land and create independent villages, reducing their dependence

upon the estate owners. By 1842, there were 27 independent villages in the island with approximately 1,600 residents. In St. Kitts, where sugar cultivation benefited from fertile soil and adequate rainfall, the planters owned most accessible land and refused to sell. Laborers there remained dependent on the planters, living in houses rented from the estates.

Another form of labor protest open to most workers was emigration abroad in search of better-paying work opportunities. Large-scale emigration began with the end of slavery and apprenticeship. Between 1839 and 1846, the number of male and female laborers migrating from the Leeward Islands to higher-paying jobs in the Trinidadian sugar industry totaled 5,993. Migration became even more extensive in the early twentieth century as new employment opportunities appeared in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico, with the influx of American capital into the sugar industries of these territories. High emigration rates were particularly notable in the islands where the sugar industry survived, and in 1925 there were 2,138 emigrants from Antigua while the number of emigrants from St. Kitts-Nevis in 1929 rose as high as 4,685. In Antigua, the population fell from 31,394 inhabitants in 1911 to 28,864 by 1921, while that of St. Kitts-Nevis fell from 26,283 to 22,415 over the same period.

Conflict between workers and employers did break out in direct confrontation, especially in Antigua and St. Kitts, the islands where the sugar industry survived longest. Open protests by workers took place on both an individual and collective basis, but the gross inequality of power relations in these plantation societies made protests by individuals exceedingly rare. Burning of sugar cane fields by disgruntled workers was the main form of individual protest. Canes, after they are burnt, quickly lose their sucrose content and go sour if not cut. The setting of cane fires was anonymous and easy, and it was difficult to apprehend the perpetrator. Individual workers who had a dispute with the estate management could easily resort to cane fires and would very probably be employed to cut the fired cane by the planters, who had little choice. Cane burning was also employed on a wide scale during collective labor protests in a clearly planned and organized manner and was generally directed against the most recalcitrant planters.

Workers enjoyed greater security and had a better chance of success when protest was collective. After the 1834 mass protests by the ex-slaves of St. Kitts and Montserrat, directed against the introduction of the apprenticeship system, three island-wide mass protests by workers in the Leeward Islands occurred, in 1896, 1918, and 1935. These protests exhibited certain common characteristics. First, they were limited to those islands where the sugar industry had survived intact and where agricultural workers dependent upon estate employment made up the bulk of the labor force. The 1896 mass protests took place in St. Kitts and Nevis, the 1918 protest in Antigua, and the 1935 protest in St. Kitts alone. They were spontaneous, initiated by the workers themselves, and they were organized around their specific grievances. The main cause, in each instance, was either a unilateral reduction in wages by employers or the imposition of changes in the production process that threatened to bring about reductions in wages. These protests generally had a central starting point but spread around the island and drew in the majority of the working population. In most cases, the workers who initiated the protest action actively encouraged other workers to join the protest, which took the form of general strikes, widespread burning of sugar canes on the estate, mass public demonstrations, and riots in the capital town.

The three mass protests revealed a number of things about the industrial relations system of the post-emancipation Leeward Islands. First, they show that race played a leading role. The mass labor protests also clearly illustrate the limits of spontaneity. The outcome was unpredictable, and the absence of strict discipline meant that mass protest generally deteriorated into violent riots, which usually made the employers and the colonial authorities less inclined to make concessions. Indeed, riotous demonstrations played to the racial prejudices of white employers and colonial officials who then felt compelled to teach the black workers a lesson.

The limits of spontaneity ultimately encouraged the rise of organized labor which allowed workers the benefit of collective action along with a peaceful, and often successful, avenue to pursue their labor grievances. Several factors encouraged the slow emergence of trade unions and working-class organizations in the second decade of the twentieth century. Large-scale

emigration by workers in search of employment in the Spanish-speaking Caribbean had altered the industrial balance of power between workers and employers in favor of the former. The shortage of labor gave workers in the Leewards a greater sense of security and encouraged a greater readiness to join labor organizations. Returning migrants, especially from Cuba, brought with them firsthand experiences of unionization by anarcho-syndicalist and communist agitators, and this strengthened the predisposition to join unions. The presence in the Leewards of Garveyite agitators (supporters of the ideas of Marcus Garvey), many of whom were returning migrants from America, established the ideological conditions for the rise of an organized labor movement.

The Ulotrichian Universal Union (UUU), established in Antigua in 1916, and the Universal Benevolent Association (UBA), founded in St. Kitts in May 1917, were the two main labor organizations in the Leewards during this period. The founders of these labor organizations all came from the black lower middle class of small businessmen and artisans and were all Garveyites. Both organizations claimed an extensive membership. The UUU reported a membership of 4,174 in 1917, over a third of the island's labor force of 12,253, while the UBA, registering 1,500 members in the same year, also had an extensive influence over the St. Kitts labor force, which numbered 7,908 in 1921.

The sustained and open animosity directed by the colonial authorities and the sugar planters against the early labor movement of the Leewards eventually discouraged working-class support. In St. Kitts in 1916, at the urging of that island's planters, a Trade and Labor Union (Prohibition) Ordinance was passed, which made attempts to form a trade union a criminal offense punishable by six months' imprisonment. Sugar planters in both islands refused to recognize and negotiate with the leaders of the UUU and UBA and, after 1920, wage increases became harder to achieve. Workers increasingly turned to the easier and more rewarding alternative of migration as the influence of the organized labor movement declined.

When organized labor revived in the Leewards in the 1930s, a new set of leaders emerged at the forefront. The new leaders came from the colored middle class of small estate owners and merchants. Most of them had become involved in the middle-class agitation for constitutional and

tax reform that arose in the English-speaking Caribbean in the 1920s. In their drive for popular support for these political goals, their public appeals were increasingly directed to the skilled and better-paid sections of the working class, and they assumed a greater concern for working-class issues. Unlike the World War I period, the 1930s leadership focused on industrial and constitutional matters, and racial and class issues played no role in their agitation.

The constitutional changes introduced in the Leewards in 1936, with the introduction of direct elections for a minority of the seats in the legislature, facilitated improvements in labor conditions. In Antigua, the island-wide campaign conducted by the labor leaders secured the election of Reginald Stevens, a colored jeweler, to the island legislature. The two candidates put forward by the Workers' League in the St. Kitts election, Thomas Manchester, a colored businessman, and his cousin, Edgar Challenger, also won their seats. The series of labor disturbances in the English-speaking Caribbean during the late 1930s, commencing with the 1935 labor protests in St. Kitts, persuaded the British Colonial Office to introduce reforms in labor legislation.

The repeal of the Masters and Servants Act in 1938 and the passage of the Leeward Islands Trade Union Act, legalizing and providing protection to trade unions and their members, transformed industrial conditions in the colony. In January 1939, the Antigua Trades and Labor Union was formed with Reginald Stevens as president. The following year, the St. Kitts Trades and Labor Union was formed with Edgar Challenger as president. With the formation and legal registration of these trade unions, workers and planters were now placed on a new footing of industrial equality and, from 1940, in both Antigua and St. Kitts, almost annual strikes at the commencement of the sugar crop ended in increased wages and the granting of an annual bonus to workers. The power of arbitrary dismissal by the plantation management and the practice of criminal prosecution for absence from work became things of the past.

The newly formed trade unions provided the organizational base for the nationalist campaigns for self-government and, later, independence that emerged in the 1940s and, by the end of the decade, the industrial unions of the Leewards were indistinguishable from nationalist political

parties. This political development was associated with a change in the leadership of the labor movement as the colored leaders of the 1930s were replaced by black working-class leadership. In Antigua, V. C. Bird was elected to replace Stevens as president of the union in 1943, while Robert Bradshaw, a mechanic at the central sugar factory, took over the presidency of the St. Kitts union in the following year. Both men cemented their leadership of the labor movement when they were elected to the legislature in 1946. Even in Montserrat, despite the increasingly peasant composition of its labor force, this political process was evident. With the encouragement and assistance of V. C. Bird of Antigua, the Montserrat Trades and Labor Union was formed in 1946 under the leadership of Robert Griffith, a lay Methodist preacher and, since 1943, a member of the legislature.

The joining of the trade union movement with the nationalist movement meant that, when internal self-government was granted in Antigua and St. Kitts in 1956, the labor leaders became the heads of government, with Bird and Bradshaw taking the position of chief minister, and later premier, in their respective islands. When internal self-government was introduced in Montserrat in 1961, the new chief minister was William Bramble who had supplanted Robert Griffith as president of the Montserrat trade union.

In the period of self-government and, subsequently, independence, most of the immediate goals of the labor movement were achieved. Workers received job protection, social benefits including accident insurance, social security and pension benefits, workplace representation, the prompt settlement of industrial disputes, and, most of all, higher wages. In keeping with their nationalist agendas, the labor governments in Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis both nationalized their island's sugar industries in 1967 and 1975/1976 respectively. The rule of the planter class had ended and workers in these industries now negotiated with governments that were dominated by the labor movement.

The rise of labor-led governments in the Leeward Islands since the 1950s has proved a mixed blessing for the working class of these islands. The individual worker has benefited from a vast improvement in labor conditions and regular wage increases, along with a host of other social advances including the provision of free primary and secondary education for

their children and access to modern health care. The growth of the civil service, with significant expansion in the educational and health sectors, combined with the nationalization of the sugar industry, has left the government in Antigua and St. Kitts-Nevis as the single largest employer. The discharge of their governmental duties, particularly the expansion of the island economies and opportunities for employment, means that the maintenance of industrial peace, an increase in labor productivity, and the creation of suitable conditions for overseas investors to invest, have become the primary objective of these labor governments. The achievement of these objectives has fostered the need to impose limits on industrial disputes and strikes and encouraged the labor governments to adopt wage restraint policies. The growing dependence on tourism, especially since the abandonment of sugar production in both Antigua and St. Kitts, has placed the labor governments in the contradictory role of the representatives of labor, on the one hand, and promoters of the interests of foreign employers in tourism or assembly plant manufacturing, and employers in their own right, on the other.

In their role as government ministers, labor leaders have concluded that the sectional interests of the labor movement must be sacrificed to the national interest. In a situation where political leaders are often trade union leaders or where trade union leaders are selected on the basis of their loyalty to the political leadership, the trade unions have become junior partners in the labor movement and their interests are increasingly marginalized.

Even so, labor protest has brought about significant and lasting changes in industrial conditions and in the industrial relations process in the Leeward Islands. The absolute power of management, particularly their arbitrary power of dismissal, has been brought decisively to an end. Racism no longer has an influence in industrial relations and evidence of racism is a sure way for a manager to lose his managerial position. There have been significant changes, but the political role of labor has imposed increasing limitations on the rights of individual workers. However, the militancy with which workers continue to defend their rights imposes strict limits on how far labor governments may go to contain them.

SEE ALSO: Guadeloupe, Labor Protest; Jamaica, 1938 Labor Riots; Trinidad, Labor Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Fergus, H. A. (2004) *Montserrat: History of a Caribbean Crown Colony*. Oxford: Macmillan.
- Fog-Olwig, K. (1995) Cultural Complexities after Freedom: Nevis and Beyond. In K. Fog-Olwig (Ed.), *Small Islands: Large Questions*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 100–20.
- Frucht, R. (1975) Emancipation and Revolt in the West Indies: St. Kitts, 1834. *Science and Society* 34: 199–214.
- Hall, D. (1971) *Five of the Leewards: 1834–1870*. Aylesbury: Ginn.
- Richards, G. (1995) The Pursuit of “Higher Wages” & “Perfect Personal Freedom”: St. Kitts–Nevis, 1836–1956. In Mary Turner (Ed.), *From Chattel Slaves to Wage Slaves*. Kingston: Ian Randle, pp. 275–301.
- Richards, G. (1998) Friendly Societies and Labor Organisation in the Leeward Islands, 1912–19. In B. Moore & S. Wilmot (Eds.), *Before and After 1865: Education, Politics and Regionalism in the Caribbean*. Kingston: Ian Randle, pp. 136–49.
- Richards, G. (2004) Race, Labor and the Colonial State in St. Kitts & Nevis, 1897–1922. In S. Augier & O. Edgecombe-Howell (Eds.), *Beyond Walls: Multidisciplinary Discipline. Vol. 1, St. Kitts & Nevis*. St. Augustine: UWI School of Continuing Studies, pp. 165–77.

Lemba, Sebastian (d. 1547)

Frank I. Müller

Sebastian Lemba was a Maroon leader in the first Spanish colony of Hispaniola, the island that from the nineteenth century on would be divided between the independent states of Haiti and Santo Domingo. With a force of approximately 150 fighters, Lemba raided nearby villages and plantations. Troubling the exploitative slavery system, the rebels faced permanent expeditions of colonial forces which in September 1547 finally captured and killed the leader. Yet the Spanish crown never managed to raze the whole community of insurgent Maroons.

The long history of American maronnage began on Hispaniola. Governor Nicolás de Ovando first noted the danger of “runaways” in 1503, and at that point began sending “Maroon expeditions” into the dense vegetation of the island’s hinterland to retrieve slaveowners’ “property.” Lemba’s predecessor, Enrique, began the indigenous wars of resistance in 1519, gathering a large

following of African slaves. Of Central African heritage, Lemba was the first insurgent leader who was not born on the island when he took over Enrique’s position in 1542. His guerilla-like tactics included dispersing into smaller groups and attacking rural settlements.

During his most successful raid, Lemba raided the Bahoruco valley, captured a local blacksmith, and took possession of the settlement’s metals. In addition to adding to his fame, this success was of practical use, for it provided knowledge and material needed for his guerilla war. For three years Lemba reigned over the Bahoruco valley, causing fear among local planters who wrote desperate letters to the Spanish crown demanding support against the rebels.

Although the date and exact place of Lemba’s birth are unknown, he presumably originated from the Congo, as his name has various cultural associations with this Central African region. With regard to ethnicity, Lemba’s insurgency is related to the demographic change the island and the Caribbean were undergoing in the first half of the sixteenth century. Due to the rapid genocide of the indigenous people and the substitution of their workforce by African slaves, a shift of the ethnic configuration in the Maroon camps led to the growing presence of Central and West Africans. Despite the escapes, the colonists kept demanding more slaves to be imported from Africa, and by 1542 the 1,200 white owners commanded 25,000–30,000 black slaves, while 2,000–3,000 mostly black Maroons were spread over the island.

Hispaniola’s rebel society was fragmented. Not all the leaders wanted to keep up resistance. In fact, several Maroon communities did not secure an alternative to the dominant power relations but instead joined the slave-trading business. Diego de Campo, a Maroon leader for three years, surrendered to the Spaniards and cooperated with them in capturing runaways. Others signed peace accords that protected them from attack by the Spaniards. In return, they handed over captured slaves and were rewarded with an amount of money that depended on the amount of time the slave had been gone.

Besides those Maroon camps that actually strengthened the system their members had once escaped from, secrecy provided space for a community network below the surface, encompassing the practice of the Vodou religion, knowledge based on oral history, and trade

among the groups and with the rival colonial powers, France, Portugal, and Britain. The chances of surviving secretly in the rural area depended not only on skillfully performed warfare but also on the ability to engage in agriculture, trade, and negotiation. The networks of rebel societies and their pragmatic contacts with different colonial powers allowed for the communities of both Lemba and his successors to escape the chains of slavery, creating a space of resistance that crossed the conventional borders of nation-bound colonies.

SEE ALSO: Enriquillo and the Taíno Revolt (1519–1533); Mackandal, François (d. 1758)

References and Suggested Readings

- Altman, I. (2007) The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America. *The Americas* 63 (4): 587–614.
- Landers, J. (2002) The Central African Presence in Spanish Maroon Communities. In L. M. Heywood (Ed.), *Central Africans and Cultural Transformations in the American Diaspora*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lempira (d. 1537)

Viviana Uriona

The name Lempira means “Lord of the Mountains.” He was the Lenca chief of Coquin, then called “Gracias a Dios” in Honduras. This region was inhabited by many different indigenous tribes who spoke many different languages. The Mayas were the most developed among them. After the collapse of their culture, other groups came to settle in this region, including groups related to the Toltecs and Aztecs of Mexico, the Chibchas of Colombia, and even tribes from the southwestern United States. Another population, the Lencas, lived in the western-central part of Honduras. The groups in this region had conflicts but kept trade relationships with each other and even with groups in Panama and Mexico. The aborigines were descendants of these tribes and of the Mayas. They are well known for fighting against the Spanish conquerors, and Lempira is known for struggling for freedom and autonomy for the native people in Central America.

When the Spanish conquerors arrived in March of 1524 in the region formerly inhabited

by the Mayas, they met several warring Indian tribes, such as the Lenca, Pipil, Chorotega, Jicaques, and Paya. At first, the Spaniards did not find much resistance among the indigenous groups because they were involved in fights among themselves. By October 1537, however, more than 200 indigenous tribes unified to fight against the increasing Spanish invasion. Lempira led this rebellion, which the Spanish leaders Hernán Cortés and Pedro de Alvarado tried to crush. With a force of 2,000 friendly natives, Lempira tried to attack Alvarado in the fort of Cerquín and near Gracias a Dios, but he failed. After that, Lempira set out to annihilate the invaders, initiating open war against them.

Governor Montejo ordered Captain Alonso de Cáceres to attack Lempira’s stronghold, but he was unsuccessful. Lempira organized a general mobilization. Comayagua was set on fire, and the Spanish inhabitants had to escape and take shelter in Gracias, which was also threatened by the tribes around it. San Pedro de Puerto Caballos and Trujillo were besieged, and the Spanish had to struggle to keep their position. Montejo tried to get help from Santiago de los Caballeros in Guatemala, San Salvador, San Miguel, and even Spain. Alonso de Cáceres invited the chief to a peace conference; when Lempira expressed his will to continue the war, he was shot in the head by a hidden marksman. Lempira fell from the high cliffs and after his death his 30,000 warriors either fled or surrendered.

The conquerors were mostly interested in the precious metals of the region. The wars, slavery in the mines and elsewhere, and the new European diseases killed over 1.2 million people. In 1778 only about 88,000 Indians remained in their country, and they had to work in the mines and for the colonists.

SEE ALSO: Artigas, Gervasio José (1764–1850); Caonabo (d. 1496); Enriquillo and the Taíno Revolt (1519–1533)

References and Suggested Readings

- Cáceres Lara, V. (1983) *Lempira, defensor de la autonomía nacional*. Tegucigalpa: Secretaría de Cultura y Turismo.
- Manzanares, R. A. (1958) *Fulgores de Nacionalidad*. Tegucigalpa: Tipografía nacional.
- Martínez Castillo, M. F. (1987) *Los últimos días de Lempira y otros documentos. El Conquistador Español que venció a Lempira*. Tegucigalpa: Editorial Universitaria.

Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924)


Paul Le Blanc

Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov was born on April 22, 1870 (April 10, according to the Old Style calendar then used in Russia) in Simbursk (later renamed Ulyanovsk), a provincial town on the Volga River. He was the third of six children in what was at first a relatively happy family. His father, Ilya Nikolaevich Ulyanov, was a respected director of public schools. His mother, Maria Alexandrovna Blank, was the daughter of a physician and taught her children a love of reading and music. His father died in 1886, and in 1887 his beloved older brother, Alexander, was arrested and hanged for involvement in an unsuccessful plot by revolutionary university students to assassinate Tsar Alexander III.

At the end of 1887, Lenin himself was briefly arrested for involvement in a peaceful demonstration against the oppressive tsarist regime and for membership in a radical political group. A brilliant student, he had just entered the University of Kazan, but his involvement in protest activities resulted in his immediate expulsion and banishment to a small village near Kazan, where he lived under police surveillance. In 1888 he was permitted to return to Kazan, but he was denied entry to any university and therefore embarked on his own rigorous course of study. In 1891 he passed law examinations at the University of St. Petersburg. Lenin worked as a lawyer for only a few months before becoming a full-time revolutionary.

The Making of a Revolutionary

At the time when Lenin became a revolutionary, impoverished peasants made up about 90 percent of Russia's population. An expanding class of wage-workers and their families, created through the country's substantial industrial growth in the late nineteenth century, made up another 7 percent. There was also a small "middle-class" layer of professionals and well-to-do businessmen (the bourgeoisie), and at the very top, powerful landed aristocracy capped by an absolute monarchy. The country was characterized by a complete absence of democracy, limits on freedom of expression, the persecution of all



This image of Vladimir Lenin is from a 1967 Soviet propaganda poster bearing the legend "Lenin Lived, Lenin is Alive, Lenin Will Live" by Victor Ivanov. A man of revolutionary-democratic inclinations, he rejected efforts by others to create a personality cult around him. After his death, his popularity (in Russia and internationally) was used by propagandists to legitimate the bureaucratic dictatorship within the USSR. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

religious minorities outside the official Russian Orthodox Church, severe limitations on the rights of women, and oppression of more than 100 national minorities that inhabited the Russian empire – a notorious "prison-house of nations." Such conditions generated many revolutionary currents.

Lenin was deeply influenced by earlier nineteenth-century Russian revolutionaries, especially the writer Nikolai G. Chernyshevsky, as well as by the underground revolutionary populist movement known as the People's Will (*Narodnaya Volya*). This current was made up of idealistic activists who specialized in clandestine methods and sought to organize a peasant-based revolution and to establish a socialist society that would be based largely on the traditional commune, sometimes known as "the mir," that had existed in peasant villages throughout Russia. Lenin drew

upon this tradition, especially in his underground organizational concepts, but he was most profoundly attracted to the Western European working-class orientation developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in such works as the *Communist Manifesto*, *Capital*, and *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*. This orientation had been most forcefully injected into the Russian revolutionary movement by Georgi Plekhanov. Lenin became an influential voice among Russian Marxists, through his study *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1897) and many other works.

The Marxists argued that Russia was undergoing a capitalist transformation, that industrialization was creating a factory-based proletariat, and that this working class would become the most effective force in the struggle to overthrow tsarism. Instead of engaging in terrorist activities such as assassinations against the tsar and his officials, as the People's Will had done, the Marxists argued that the working class should build trade unions to fight for better working conditions and living standards, should organize mass demonstrations to pressure for broader democratic and social reforms, and should organize their own political party to lead the struggle for a democratic revolution. Such a revolution would clear the way for the economic and political development of Russia (presumably through a capitalist economy and democratic republic). Then, when the working class became the majority, the process would culminate in a second revolution with a socialist character. The workers would take control of the economy and run it for the benefit of all. The Marxists believed that workers in other countries should and would be moving in a similar direction.

The Rise of Bolshevism

In 1898, the Marxists organized the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) to advance their orientation. Later, in 1901–2, the Populists organized the competing Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party. Both parties joined the international federation known as the Socialist (or Second) International. Lenin aimed many polemics against the SRs, but soon he also developed serious disagreements with others in the RSDLP. In the pages of the newspaper *Iskra* (“The Spark”), Lenin, Plekhanov, Julius Martov, and others criticized the so-called Economists,

who urged that workers should concentrate only on economic issues at the workplace and that leadership of the democratic struggle should be left in the hands of pro-capitalist liberals. Lenin and the other “Iskraists” argued in favor of building a strong centralized party that would draw the various layers of the working class into a broad economic and political struggle to oppose all forms of oppression, overthrow tsarism, and advance the workers’ interests.

Lenin popularized these ideas in *What Is To Be Done?*, published in 1902. The “Iskraists” won the day at the second congress of the RSDLP, held in Brussels and London in 1903. But before the congress was over they themselves had split into two organized factions – the Bolsheviks (from the Russian *bolshe*, meaning “more,” since they had gained a plurality of votes) and the Mensheviks (from the Russian word *menshe*, meaning “less”). This split was analyzed in Lenin’s *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* (1904). The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, insisted on a more disciplined party than favored by the Mensheviks, who became associated with Martov and Plekhanov. In addition, the Mensheviks favored a coalition between workers and capitalists to overthrow tsarism, whereas Lenin (for example, in his 1905 polemic *Two Tactics of the Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*) insisted that a worker–peasant alliance, and the subsequent creation of a “democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry,” would be necessary to achieve a genuinely democratic revolution in Russia.

In this period Lenin maintained a precarious existence in the revolutionary underground (where he married one of his closest comrades, Nadezhda Krupskaya, in 1898), in prison and Siberian exile, and in frugal circumstances as an exile outside Russia. He lived in Munich from 1900 to 1902, in London from 1902 to 1903, and in Geneva from 1903 to 1905. Lenin and Krupskaya played an essential role in coordinating the work of the underground Bolshevik organization of the RSDLP, also facilitating the production and distribution of such revolutionary newspapers as *Vperyod* (“Forward”) and *Proletarii* (“The Proletarian”).

From the 1905 Revolution to 1914

In 1905 a revolutionary upsurge sparked by a spontaneous uprising among the workers, after the

tsar's troops fired on a peaceful demonstration in St. Petersburg, and fueled by hundreds of strikes and peasant insurgencies forced the tsarist regime to grant a number of important reforms, including greater political liberties and the creation of a weak parliamentary body called the Duma.

Although Lenin at first rejected participation in the Duma (he changed his position in 1906), he supported participation in the soviets (councils) of workers' deputies, spontaneously formed democratic bodies arising in workplaces and workers' communities which had directed revolutionary activities. He also strongly favored opening up the RSDLP, especially its Bolshevik wing, to a dramatic influx of radicalizing workers. The political gap between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks narrowed, and the membership of the RSDLP soared. One left-wing Menshevik, Leon Trotsky, head of the St. Petersburg soviet, even advanced (in articles written from 1904 through 1906) the idea of *permanent revolution* – that is, the concept that the democratic revolution would lead to workers taking political power with support from the peasants, initiating a transitional period to socialism, with the Russian revolution helping to generate workers' revolutions in more advanced industrial countries. While Lenin did not fully accept this notion at the time, it was later reflected in his perspectives for the 1917 revolution.

In late 1905 and throughout 1906, however, the forces of tsarist conservatism were able to stem the revolutionary tide and rescind many of the reforms granted earlier. Revolutionaries were once again forced underground or into exile, and many left-wing intellectuals became demoralized.

Differences between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks once again sharpened, yet Lenin also found himself in conflict with a group of Bolsheviks led by Alexander A. Bogdanov. These “ultra-left” Bolsheviks denigrated trade union work and other reform activities (to which they counterposed “armed struggle”), and also questioned the wisdom of the Bolsheviks' running in elections and participating in the Duma. Lenin insisted that involvement in the Duma gave revolutionary socialists a powerful tool for legal agitation and education and that reform struggles enabled the working-class movement to grow in experience and political effectiveness. He wrote a philosophical work, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1909), arguing against what he saw as

serious philosophical revisions of Marxism being advanced by Bogdanov and others. At the same time, he was conducting a fierce struggle against the “Liquidators,” an influential current among the Mensheviks that wanted to replace all revolutionary underground organizational forms with strictly legal and reform-minded structures. Lenin was also sharply critical of “conciliators,” such as Trotsky and even some in the Bolsheviks' ranks, who attempted to maintain RSDLP unity. He had concluded that a cohesive and disciplined organization, based on a revolutionary Marxist program combining both legal and underground activity, could not be created by seeking compromises with socialists having a variety of orientations.

In 1912 Lenin and those who agreed with him definitively split with all other currents in the RSDLP and established their own distinct Bolshevik party. The new Bolshevik RSDLP published the newspaper *Pravda* (“Truth”). They had not only a coherent strategic orientation but, above all, a clear program, highlighted by three demands: for an eight-hour workday, beneficial to the workers; for land reform, beneficial to the peasants; and for a democratic constituent assembly. These three demands were used to dramatize the need for a worker-peasant alliance in the democratic revolution. The Bolsheviks also had a serious and disciplined organizational structure that integrated legal reform efforts with revolutionary work. Between 1912 and 1914, Lenin's Bolsheviks outstripped all other currents in the Russian revolutionary movement, enjoying predominance among the organized workers.

Bolshevik successes coincided with a new wave of radicalization among the dramatically growing Russian working class. Government violence against striking workers in the Lena goldfields in 1912, combined with population growth in the country's industrial centers marked by intensive exploitation of workers, generated considerable ferment and growing protests. By 1914 some observers concluded that Russia was on the verge of another revolutionary outbreak.

Imperialist World War

This militant upswing was checked, however, by the eruption of World War I, which was used by the tsarist authorities to suppress all dissent. The socialist movement split into “patriotic” and

anti-war fragments, not only in Russia but in all countries involved in the conflict. In Russia only the more moderate “patriotic” socialists were able to operate openly, thus managing to eclipse the now repressed Bolsheviks in the labor movement.

Lenin had moved to Krakow, in Austrian Poland, in 1912. After the outbreak of war in 1914 he was deported to Switzerland. Lenin, like many Marxists, had expected the outbreak of war. However, he was deeply shocked by the capitulation of the Second International’s mass parties before the “patriotic” demands of their respective ruling classes – in particular that of the German Socialist Party (SPD), which he had previously considered the very model of an orthodox Marxist party in a more or less democratic parliamentary system. With the exception of Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, and a few others, the bulk of the SPD leaders either endorsed German war aims or refrained from opposing the war effort. Lenin, along with Luxemburg and others on the revolutionary left, saw imperialism – the aggressive economic expansionism of the various “Great Powers” – as the underlying cause of the ensuing slaughter. He was outraged that workers of the rival countries were being encouraged to kill each other in this conflict, and he never forgave Karl Kautsky, the German symbol of “orthodox Marxism,” for rationalizing the betrayal of working-class internationalism.

In the period from 1914 to 1917 Lenin concentrated on efforts to build a revolutionary socialist opposition to the war. He joined with various anti-war socialist currents at the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences in criticizing the failure of the Second International to remain true to its uncompromisingly anti-war statements, and he called for a new, revolutionary Third International. He also produced a study that explored the economic roots of World War I, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916). In addition, he developed a critical analysis of nationalism, distinguishing between the nationalism of advanced and oppressive capitalist “Great Powers” (which revolutionaries should not support) and the nationalism (which revolutionaries should support) of peoples oppressed and exploited by the “Great Powers.”

Lenin at this time also took issue with those non-Bolshevik revolutionaries, notably Luxemburg and Trotsky, whose policies were, in fact,

closest to his own. Rejecting the emphasis of Luxemburg (in the “Junius Pamphlet”) and Trotsky (in *War and the International*) on calling for immediate peace and advocating a “Socialist United States of Europe,” he advanced the most intransigent possible slogan: “Turn the Imperialist War into a Civil War.” Though only his closest associates, such as Gregori Zinoviev, accepted this slogan, it was very important to Lenin because it would make impossible any compromise with “centrist” Social Democrats such as Kautsky and (in France) Jean Longuet, who by 1916 had retreated from their initial pro-war posture yet were quite unwilling to make a clear break with the pro-war majorities of their parties. Only by splitting revolutionary socialists away from such compromisers would it be possible, he believed, to provide leadership to war-weary masses for a genuine socialist transformation.

Fall of Tsarism and Rise of “Dual Power”

Within Russia, a growing disillusionment with the war generated a new upsurge of radicalism among the workers and peasants. A spontaneous uprising initiated by women workers on International Women’s Day in Petrograd (as St. Petersburg had been renamed in 1914) in March 1917 turned into a successful revolution when the Russian army – largely “peasants in uniform” – joined with the insurgent workers and turned against the tsarist government. A situation of “dual power” arose as the powers of the state were assumed by democratically elected councils (soviets) of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies and also by a pro-capitalist Provisional Government set up by politicians in the Duma. Many SRs and Mensheviks, and even some Bolsheviks, supported the Provisional Government. Lenin returned from exile in April 1917 to challenge this widespread orientation.

Immediately after the overthrow of the tsarist regime, Lenin had desperately sought to find ways to return to Russia. He was refused permission to travel by way of Great Britain and France, since the governments of those countries saw him as a threat to Russia’s continued participation in the war. However, the German government – for similar reasons – allowed Lenin and all other Russian exiles to travel through Germany. Later, those hostile to Lenin were to use this (and

also funds from Germany allegedly secured by the Bolsheviks) in order to slander him as a “German agent.”

Upon his arrival in Petrograd, Lenin pointed out that the Provisional Government was unable to end Russian involvement in the war, could not guarantee that the workers in the cities would have enough to eat, and was unprepared to break up the nobility’s large estates to give land to the peasants. Therefore, he argued, workers and revolutionaries should give no support to the Provisional Government. Instead they should demand “all power to the soviets” and insist on “peace, bread, and land.” The democratic revolution had to grow over into a working-class revolution supported by the peasantry. This development would stimulate the war-weary and radicalizing workers of such countries as Germany, Austria-Hungary, and France to join their Russian comrades in socialist revolution.

These “April Theses” shocked most of Russia’s socialists, including many leading Bolsheviks, but quickly won over the rank-and-file of his party, as well as such former opponents as Trotsky. By July 1917 the Bolsheviks were in the lead of a militant mass demonstration against the Provisional Government, which was now headed by Alexander Kerensky, a moderate socialist. The demonstration erupted in violence, leading to repression by the Provisional Government. Many Bolsheviks (including the prestigious new recruit Trotsky) were arrested, and Lenin fled across the border to Finland. There he began writing his classic Marxist study *The State and Revolution*, which presented a libertarian and democratic vision of working-class revolution and the socialist future. Before he could complete this study, events had evolved to the point where Lenin found it possible to issue a practical appeal to the Bolshevik Central Committee for a revolutionary seizure of power.

Counterrevolutionary opponents played a key role in bringing about this turn in events. In September 1917 General Lavr Kornilov mounted a right-wing military coup designed to oust both the Provisional Government and the soviets. The Provisional Government freed all revolutionary militants from prison and gave them arms. Bolsheviks joined with Mensheviks, SRs, anarchists, and others to defend the revolution. Kornilov was defeated, his troops melting away under the influence of revolutionary agitators.

Bolshevik Revolution and Russian Civil War

From hiding, Lenin urgently insisted to his comrades that the Bolsheviks launch an uprising to establish soviet power. Two of his own close followers, Gregori Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev, argued against so audacious a move, but they found themselves overwhelmed by revolutionary enthusiasm not only within the party but among growing sectors of the working class and peasantry. A split in the SRs resulted in a substantial left-wing faction that supported the Bolshevik demands. The soviets themselves – led once again, as in 1905, by Trotsky – now adopted the position of “all power to the soviets” and organized a Military Revolutionary Committee under Trotsky’s direction, which prepared an insurrection to overthrow the Provisional Government.

The stirring but relatively bloodless October Revolution in Russia, which was actually carried out on November 7, 1917 (according to the modern calendar), was seen as a beacon of hope by the discontented throughout the world. One of the central developments of the twentieth century, it led to the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and to the rise of modern communism.

Lenin was the leader of the first Soviet government, the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom), which consisted of a coalition of Bolsheviks (who soon renamed their organization the Communist Party) and left SRs. The new regime entered into peace negotiations with Germany to secure Russia’s withdrawal from World War I. The German government made harsh demands for territorial and financial concessions as a precondition for a peace settlement. Many revolutionaries, including the left SRs and even a left communist faction in Lenin’s own party, opposed the concessions and called for a revolutionary war against German imperialism.

Trotsky, who as leader of the Russian negotiating team at Brest-Litovsk had used the peace talks to expose German imperialist war aims and to appeal to the German masses “over the heads” of their government, took an intermediary position, hoping that German military action against the infant Soviet republic would be blocked by mutinies and strikes by the German working class. Trotsky advocated refusal either to sign the Germans’ Brest-Litovsk *diktat* or to resume the war with a virtually nonexistent

Russian army. This compromise position was initially adopted by the Soviet government, but the hoped-for mass strikes and mutinies failed to materialize, and, when the German military launched a devastating offensive, Trotsky withdrew his “neither war nor peace” proposal and sided with Lenin.

Against angry opposition among many Bolsheviks and most left SRs, Lenin insisted on Russia’s need for peace and narrowly won acceptance of what were now even stiffer German demands, resulting in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918). The left SRs withdrew from the government and assumed a stance of violent opposition. The right SRs and even some Mensheviks were openly hostile as well. Pro-capitalist and pro-tsarist forces committed themselves to the overthrow of the new regime, as did a number of foreign governments, notably those of Great Britain, France, the United States, and Japan. In all, 14 foreign countries intervened with military forces and aided counterrevolutionary Russian forces in an escalating, brutal civil war. Masses of workers and peasants joined the new Red Army to defend the gains of the revolution. Their efforts were hampered by economic collapse – hastened by premature nationalizations – and also by the inexperience and inevitable mistakes of the new government.

In 1918 some SRs carried out assassination attempts in which Lenin was badly wounded and other prominent Bolsheviks were killed. In response, a Red Terror of arrests and executions was launched against all perceived “enemies of the revolution” by the Cheka (special security forces), set up on Lenin’s initiative and directed by Felix Dzerzhinsky. Early in 1918 the Sovnarkom had dissolved what it felt to be an unrepresentative constituent assembly on the grounds that this institution had been superseded by a more thoroughgoing soviet democracy. By 1919, however, this democracy had largely evaporated. As a result of communist repression of opposing left-wing parties and the relative disintegration of the working class as a political force (because the economy itself had largely disintegrated), the soviets were transformed into hollow shells that would rubber-stamp the decisions of the Sovnarkom and the Communist Party.

Brutal communist policies were deepened in response to the murderous campaigns of anti-communist counterrevolutionaries (often known

as “the Whites” as opposed to the left-wing “Reds”). Increasingly under the leadership of reactionary and pro-tsarist army officers, the Whites often combined anti-communism with anti-democratic, anti-working class, anti-peasant, and anti-Semitic violence. Nonetheless, the Whites were given substantial material support from foreign governments hoping to put an end to what was a “bad example” to their own working classes.

Lenin and the Russian communists were convinced that the spread of socialist revolution to other countries was essential for the final victory of their own revolution. In 1919 they organized the first congress of the Communist International (the Third International), initiating the formation of communist parties in countries throughout the world. Concerned that these new parties might fall prey to “ultra-left” errors (such as attempting to seize power without majority working-class support or refusing to fight for “mere” reforms), Lenin wrote *“Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder* in 1920. At the second and third congresses of the Communist International he argued in favor of the “united front” tactic, whereby communists would join forces with more moderate socialists to protect and advance workers’ rights against capitalist and reactionary attacks. (This would also win support, among growing numbers of workers, for the communists who would prove to be the most effective fighters for the workers’ interests.) Lenin never gave up on the belief that the future of the new Soviet republic could be secured only through the spread of working-class revolution to other countries, but he never lived to see his hopes realized.

From “War Communism” to New Economic Policy

During the Russian Civil War, in Lenin’s opinion, he and his comrades had made terrible mistakes. In pushing back the foreign invaders, for example, the Red Army – with Lenin’s support but over the objections of Red Army commander Trotsky – invaded Poland in hopes of generating a revolutionary uprising among the Polish workers and peasants. Instead, a fierce counter-attack drove the Russian forces from Polish soil.

Some of the greatest mistakes involved the implementation of what was called “war communism.” Sweeping nationalizations of industry formally placed the economy in the hands

of the inexperienced state, and attempts at strict centralized planning introduced authoritarian and bureaucratic elements into the economy. Efforts were also made to pit “poor peasants” against allegedly “rich peasants” in order to establish state controls over agriculture. Such policies resulted in red tape, bottlenecks and shortages, and growing discontent among the workers and bitterness among the peasants.

These policies were even theorized by some as providing a positive “shortcut” to the ideal communist society of the future (which Marx had insisted could be achieved only after an extended period of high economic productivity, abundance, and genuinely democratic social control of the means of production). In fact, the policies of war communism could reasonably be justified only as desperate emergency measures in the face of civil war and invasion. By 1921, the experience of war communism had generated peasant revolts and an uprising of workers and sailors at the previously pro-Bolshevik Kronstadt naval base outside of Petrograd.

Lenin now led the way in adopting more realistic policies that had been urged by some communists, including Trotsky. In 1921 the New Economic Policy (NEP) was established to allow small-scale capitalist production in the countryside and the reintroduction of market mechanisms into the economy as a whole. One Bolshevik theorist, Nikolai Bukharin, became closely identified in later years with the preservation of the NEP reforms. Such changes, together with the end of the civil war and foreign intervention, led to improvements in the economy and to the possibility of implementing important health, education, and social welfare policies beneficial to millions of people in the battered Soviet republic.

Yet at the same time, the Communist Party under Lenin also took measures to strengthen its monopoly of political power and even, as an emergency measure, to curtail democracy within the party itself, for the first time banning factions. In particular, a workers’ opposition headed by union leader Alexander Shlyapnikov and feminist intellectual Alexandra Kollontai – calling for greater working-class control over the state apparatus and economy – was prevented from expressing its views. These measures established precedents and the framework for the development of a permanently narrow and repressive dictatorship.

Lenin’s Final Defeat and Legacy

Lenin grew increasingly alarmed that the Soviet republic was becoming “bureaucratically degenerated,” as he put it. Suffering from a stroke in May 1922, he recovered sufficiently in autumn to return to work, only to be felled by a second stroke in December. Throughout this period and into the early months of 1923 he focused attention on ways of overcoming the bureaucratic tyranny that was gripping the Communist Party and the Soviet government and of strengthening controls by workers and peasants over the state apparatus.

Lenin opposed the inclination of some party leaders to adopt repressive policies toward non-Russian nationalities. Chief among these particular leaders was Joseph Stalin, who became the party’s general secretary in 1922. Also, while Lenin had seen the concept of *democratic centralism* as involving “freedom of discussion, unity in action,” Stalin and others who were now in charge of the party apparatus distorted the concept – so that a bureaucratic “centralism” crowded out inner-party democracy – to inhibit questioning of and suppress opposition to their own policies.

Lenin sought an alliance with Trotsky to fight for his positions in the party, and he broke decisively with Stalin, whom he identified as being in the forefront of the trends he was opposing. In his last testament he urged that Stalin be removed from his positions of party leadership. But a third stroke in March 1923 completely incapacitated him. At his country home in the village of Gorki, outside Moscow, he suffered a last, fatal stroke on January 21, 1924. After an elaborate state funeral, Lenin’s embalmed body was placed in a mausoleum in Moscow’s Red Square.

He was mourned by millions in the Soviet Union and by communists and other revolutionaries throughout the world, but much of Lenin’s work was undone by (yet bombastically identified with) the later policies of the Stalin regime. Even in his lifetime, what he viewed as the “dictatorship of the proletariat” – political rule by the working class – had, under difficult conditions, degenerated into a one-party dictatorship. But after his death it evolved into a ruthless bureaucratic tyranny which defended above all else the material and other privileges of the bureaucratic rulers.

Those who had been closest to Lenin found their authority eliminated by Stalin's political machine, and most of them were eventually killed in the purges during the 1930s, when many hundreds of thousands of real and imagined dissidents among the communists and others were destroyed. Alternatives to this Stalinist version of "Leninism" were put forward, particularly by Trotsky and by Bukharin. But throughout the Communist International and the world communist movement, Stalin's orientation dominated. Even when Stalin was denounced in 1956 by later communist leaders, the bureaucratic system and undemocratic methods with which he was associated remained in place.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, questions arose about how much influence Lenin would continue to have as a symbol and as a theorist. Lenin concerned himself with many dimensions of political theory, but his distinctive contribution involved the conceptualization and organization of a party that proved capable of carrying out a socialist revolution in Russia in 1917. Even for many of his most severe critics, Lenin's political integrity and personal selflessness are beyond dispute, as is his place in history as one of the greatest revolutionary leaders of the twentieth century. What is hotly contested across the political spectrum, however, is his relevance for the future – which is, of course, related to how we are to interpret his life and thought and actions.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888–1938); Chernyshevsky, Nikolai G. (1828–1889); *Communist Manifesto*; Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Imperialism and Capitalist Development; Imperialism, Historical Evolution; International Women's Day; Internationals; Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Leninist Philosophy; Liebknecht, Karl (1871–1919); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918); Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russian Civil War, 1918–1924; Russian Revolutionary Labor Upsurge, 1912–1914; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and "Revolution from Above"; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); War Communism and the Rise of the Soviet Union

References and Suggested Readings

Clark, R. W. (1988) *Lenin: A Biography*. New York: Harper & Row.
Cliff, T. (1986) *Lenin*, 3 vols. London: Bookmarks.

Harding, N. (1975, 1981) *Lenin's Political Thought*, 2 vols. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Krupskaya, N. K. (1970) *Reminiscences of Lenin*. New York: International Publishers.
Le Blanc, P. (1993) *Lenin and the Revolutionary Party*. Amherst: Humanity Books.
Le Blanc, P. (2006) *Marx, Lenin, and the Revolutionary Experience: Studies of Communism and Radicalism in the Age of Globalization*. New York: Routledge.
Lenin, V. I. (1960–70) *Collected Works*, 45 vols. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Lewin, M. (1970) *Lenin's Last Struggle*. New York: Vintage.
Liebman, M. (1980) *Leninism Under Lenin*. London: Merlin Press.
Lih, L. T. (2006) *Lenin Rediscovered: "What Is to Be Done?" in Context*. Leiden: Brill.
Trotsky, L. (1972) *The Young Lenin*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Tucker, R. C. (1975) *The Lenin Anthology*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Leninist philosophy

Paul Le Blanc

As with many key words, the term "Leninism" has come to have dramatically different meanings. Associated with the ideas and political efforts of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, for many it became associated with the ideology dominated and largely shaped after his death by Joseph Stalin.

The Leninism of Stalin

After the Russian Revolution that Lenin led in 1917, and the earliest years of the embattled Soviet republic under Lenin's leadership, Stalin became an increasingly powerful figure in the organizational apparatus of the ruling Russian Communist Party. As Lenin succumbed to fatal illness in 1923–4, Stalin began to assume ever-greater control in the Communist Party and Soviet state, justifying his actions and policies – culminating by the 1930s in the most brutal of dictatorships – under the banner of what he called Leninism.

Although Lenin had been one of the earliest opponents of Stalin's consolidation of power, his authority in the new Soviet republic, the Russian Communist Party, and the world revolutionary movement made it essential for Stalin to formally embrace the label of Leninism, a term that came into existence only after 1917. (Lenin

himself referred to his ideas with other labels – Marxist, socialist, communist, etc.) While in the early-to-mid-1920s different Russian communist leaders more closely associated with Lenin – Gregory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, Nikolai Bukharin, Leon Trotsky – advanced differing perspectives on what might be summed up with the term Leninism, only Stalin’s was permitted to exist in the Soviet Union after the triumph of his dictatorship, which physically eliminated these rivals and millions more.

Because the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dominated the world communist movement, the Stalinist version of Leninism became established in communist parties throughout the world over the next several decades. Many would-be revolutionaries throughout the world, attracted to the example and glowing promise represented by Russia’s 1917 Revolution, embraced and absorbed Stalin’s conceptions as those of Lenin. The ideas associated with this particular ideology – often dubbed Marxism-Leninism – tended to combine an often stultifying and rigid set of dogmas with an amazingly opportunistic flexibility. The oppressiveness of capitalism and its inevitable replacement by communism had been scientifically explained by Karl Marx – and Lenin scientifically applied Marxism to the age of capitalist imperialism and communist revolution in the twentieth century, according to Stalin. The transition was to be brought about by the toiling masses; workers allied with peasants, led by the highly centralized and hierarchical revolutionary vanguard party of Lenin – the Communist Party. This vanguard party would lead the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, and then establish its own firm but benevolent dictatorship (the dictatorship of the proletariat). This dictatorship would oversee the transformation of society and humanity – leading to a utopia of freedom and abundance for all. Until the achievement of that final result, it would be necessary to fight against the many, many enemies of the working class and of communism. (Some of the most dangerous enemies were those calling themselves socialists or even communists but hostile to the leadership of Comrade Stalin.) Sometimes it would be necessary to make alliances with certain capitalist and imperialist enemies, or even to prevent the spread of revolutions, in order to thwart even greater enemies and dangers. The world was a complicated place – but the toiling masses,

fortunately, could rely on the leadership of its vanguard party, which had absorbed the scientific understanding and wisdom flowing in a direct line from Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, down to Lenin, down to Stalin.

Other Perspectives on Leninism

The Stalinist conception of Leninism also profoundly influenced much non-communist scholarship. In many cases – particularly during the Cold War – hostility to any serious challenge to the capitalist order strengthened the tendency among some scholars and journalists to accept the equating of Lenin with Stalin. The qualities of this Leninism were deeply authoritarian, elitist, cynical, manipulative, and ultimately murderous. As one of the most influential proponents of this view, embittered ex-communist Bertram D. Wolfe, once put it, Lenin was the “architect of totalitarianism.”

A minority current among non-communist scholars and intellectuals challenged this conception. “The theory of the vanguard party, of the one-party state, is not (repeat not) the central doctrine of Leninism,” in the words of the idiosyncratic historian and social critic C. L. R. James (1992). “It is not the central doctrine, it is not even a special doctrine. It is not and it never was.” He added: “Bolshevism, Leninism, did have central doctrines. One was theoretical, the inevitable collapse of capitalism into barbarism. Another was social, that on account of its place in history, its training and its numbers, only the working class could prevent this degradation and reconstruct society. Political action consisted in organizing a party to carry out these aims.”

Over the years, other controversies emerged among scholars as to how best understand Leninism. Alfred G. Meyer produced an influential study of Leninism in the 1950s embracing much of the Cold War anti-communist perspective but insisting that there was a fundamental difference between these perspectives and those of Karl Marx. Later influential studies by Neil Harding insisted that Lenin’s perspectives were organically connected to, and consistent with, the outlook of Marx and other Russian Marxists who later came into conflict with his Bolshevik orientation. An important work by Marcel Liebman emphasized that Lenin’s ideas evolved over time, under the impact of events, and

contained different elements – some highly democratic, some authoritarian – that were brought to the fore by specific circumstances. Paul Le Blanc produced a study arguing that the essential ideas of Lenin could best be understood as being part of an organic and coherent “revolutionary Marxist” totality – one that included not only Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, but also Rosa Luxemburg, Leon Trotsky, and Antonio Gramsci.

The Leninism of Lenin

From his earliest writings, Lenin’s starting point is a belief in the necessary interconnection of socialist ideas with the working class and labor movement. The working class cannot adequately defend its actual interests and overcome its oppression, in his view, without embracing the goal of socialism – an economic system in which the economy is socially owned and democratically controlled in order to meet the needs of all people. Inseparable from this is a basic understanding of the working class as it is, which involves a grasp of the diversity and unevenness of working-class experience and consciousness.

This calls for the development of a practical revolutionary approach seeking to connect, in serious ways, with the various sectors and layers of the working class. It involves the understanding that different approaches and goals are required to reach and engage one or another worker, or group or sector or layer of workers. This means thoughtfully utilizing various forms of educational and agitational literature, and developing different kinds of speeches and discussions, in order to connect the varieties of working-class experience, and, most important, to help initiate or support various kinds of practical struggles. The more “advanced” or vanguard layers of the working class must be rallied not to narrow and limited goals (in the spirit of “economism” and “pure and simple trade unionism”), but to an expansive sense of solidarity and common cause which has the potential for drawing the class as a whole into the struggle for its collective interests.

This fundamental orientation is the basis for most of what Lenin has to say. More than one commentator has remarked on the practical seriousness and relative lack of dogmatism in the way Lenin utilized Marxist theory to deal with a variety of issues. This came through in many different ways – such as his understanding of the

necessity for socialist and working-class support for struggles of all who suffer oppression, and in his way of integrating reform struggles with revolutionary strategy. We see it in his insistence on the necessity of working-class political independence, and on the need for working-class supremacy (or hegemony) if democratic and reform struggles are to triumph.

It came through, also, in his approach to social alliances (such as the worker-peasant alliance) as a key aspect of the revolutionary struggle, and in his development of the united front tactic, in which diverse political forces can work together for common goals, without revolutionary organizations undermining their ability to pose effective alternatives to the capitalist status quo. We can see it in his analyses of capitalist development, and of imperialism and of nationalism. It shines forth in his vibrantly revolutionary internationalist orientation that embraces the laborers and oppressed peoples of the entire world.

The dynamism of Lenin’s thought is also evident in his remarkable conception of the manner in which democratic struggles flow into socialist revolution. Another theoretical contribution involves his analysis of the nature of the state in history and class society, and in his conceptualization of triumphant working-class struggles generating a deepening and expanding democracy that would ultimately cause the state to wither away. Interwoven with the analyses and theorizations about the oppressions of today, and about a possible future of the free and the equal, we find a tough-minded practical orientation of struggle involving strategy, tactics, education, slogans, and – of course – organization.

In the devastating years of 1918–22, after Lenin’s party came to power, and marked by economic blockade and collapse, foreign invasion, and brutal civil war, Lenin’s thinking came to include new elements. These include an authoritarian strain inconsistent with the revolutionary-democratic orientation that had been more characteristic of him throughout most of his life. Some have insisted that even then his hopes, goals, and sensibilities remained profoundly democratic, and that this is reflected in much that he wrote, said, and did in his final years. Others insist that there were profoundly undemocratic elements in his organizational perspectives – and that this fatal flaw helped to set the stage for the Stalinist dictatorship that followed the revolutionary victory. This common yet controversial

assertion requires a more careful look at the organizational principles that many agree are at the heart of what we can call Leninism.

Leninist Conception of Organization

Lenin's organizational perspectives for a revolutionary working-class party (discussed at length and with extensive documentation in Le Blanc 1993) could be summarized in the following eight points:

- 1 The workers' party must, first of all, be based on a revolutionary Marxist program and must exist to apply that program to reality in a way that will advance the struggle for socialism.
- 2 The members of that party must be activists who agree with the basic program, who are collectively developing and implementing the program, and who collectively control the organization as a whole.
- 3 To the extent that it is possible (given tsarist repression, for example), the party should function openly and democratically, with the elective principle operating from top to bottom.
- 4 The highest decision-making body of the party is the party congress or convention, made up of delegates democratically elected by each party unit. The congress should meet at least every two years and should be preceded by a full discussion (in written discussion bulletins and in special meetings) throughout the party on all questions that party members deem important.
- 5 Between congresses, a central committee – elected by and answerable to the congress – should ensure the cohesion and coordinate the work of the party on the basis of the party program and the decisions of the congress. It may set up subordinate, interim bodies (such as a political committee and organization bureau) to help oversee the weekly and even daily functioning of the organization. These leadership bodies have the responsibility to keep all local units and the membership informed of all party experiences, activities, and decisions; members and local units also have the responsibility to keep the leadership informed of their experiences and activities.

- 6 It is assumed that within the general framework of the revolutionary program there will be shades of difference on various programmatic, tactical, and practical questions. These should be openly discussed and debated, particularly before party congresses. Depending on time, place, and circumstance, such differences can be aired publicly. All members should be encouraged to participate in this discussion process and should have an opportunity to make their views known to the party as a whole. Groupings will sometimes form around one or another viewpoint or even around a full-fledged platform that certain members believe the party should adopt. This provides a basis for ongoing political clarity and programmatic development that are essential to the party's health and growth.
- 7 All questions should be decided on the basis of democratic vote (majority rule), after which the minority is expected to function loyally in the party, and particularly to avoid undermining the specific actions decided on. The organization as a whole learns through the success, partial success, or failure of policies that are adopted and tested in practice.
- 8 Local units of the party must operate within the framework of the party program and of the decisions of the party as a whole, but within that framework they must operate under the autonomous and democratic control of the local membership.

Conclusion

It is likely that both scholarly and political controversies will surround the term "Leninism" for some time to come. This suggests that, in the world as it still exists in the early twenty-first century, there is much in this disputed term that continues to resonate with intellectuals, workers, and peasants. It is also likely that additional scholarship and future political developments could well generate different understandings and different versions of something called Leninism. What seems certain is that some of these would not be recognized by Lenin himself as actually reflecting his own ideas.

SEE ALSO: *Imperialism and Capitalist Development*; James, C. L. R. (1901–1989); Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924);

Marxism; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russia, Revolutions: Sources and Contexts; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”

References and Suggested Readings

- Claudin, F. (1975) *The Communist Movement, From Comintern to Cominform*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Harding, N. (1996) *Leninism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- James, C. L. R. (1992) Lenin and the Vanguard Party. In A. Grimshaw (Ed.), *The C. L. R. James Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Le Blanc, P. (1993) *Lenin and the Revolutionary Party*. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books.
- Le Blanc, P. (1996) *From Marx to Gramsci: A Reader in Revolutionary Marxist Politics*. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books.
- Lenin, V. I. (2008) *Revolution, Democracy, Socialism, Selected Writings*. Ed. P. Le Blanc. London: Pluto Press.
- Liebman, M. (1980) *Leninism Under Lenin*. London: Merlin Press.
- Lih, L. T. (2006) *Lenin Rediscovered: “What Is to Be Done?” in Context*. Leiden: Brill.
- Meyer, A. G. (1962) *Leninism*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.
- Wolfe, B. D. (1984) *Lenin and the Twentieth Century: A Bertram D. Wolfe Retrospective*. Stanford: Hoover Institution.

Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements

Barry D. Adam

Sexual themes intersect with social movement organizations on various fronts. Women’s movements, for example, have had profound influence on the development of sexuality, especially through activism around reproductive rights, gender relations, contraception, and abortion. Conservative and fundamentalist movements seek to confine sexuality to traditional social arrangements, or to restrict it to idealized visions of life as it never really was. But perhaps the central nexus between social movements and sexuality occurs among people who have organized around the implications of sexual difference. Here the focus is primarily on gay and lesbian movements, and the many subsequent related identities (bisexual, transgendered, queer, and so on) that have emerged with them.

The development of any social movement presupposes a constituency with a sufficient sense of commonality and shared grievances for mobilization to occur. People need to have social connections with each other, a sense of distinctiveness from those around them, and some degree of shared folklore and mutual communication. In the case of gay and lesbian movements, this requires a willingness to stand up for those one is attracted to, loves (or aspires to love), and prefers to live with, and therein lies a great deal of research, debate, and ongoing contention. From historical and cross-cultural viewpoints, these conditions turn out to be relatively unusual. Sexuality is most often lodged in overarching kin, gender, and age hierarchies that sort women and men into social categories that prescribe the kinds of social and sexual relations they “ought” to have with each other.

Same-sex relationships have been treated in a great many ways around the world, ranging from prohibition to valorization as ennobling and virtuous. For the most part, they have been made to fit into prevailing ideas of kinship and shaped into a few major patterns typically defined by gender or life stage. In the first instance, gender fluidity, gender mixing, or gender migration appears to be possible for some men and a few women. In these societies, homosexual relations are part of a larger pattern where men and women take up some or most of the social roles and symbols typical of the other gender, and enter into marital relations with other people with conventional gender attributes. In the second, hierarchical, military, age-graded, and mentor–acolyte relationships organize same-sex relationships between men. In these and other patterns of same-sex connection, the idea of a “homosexual” people has limited resonance.

The gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) identities that have become familiar in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have lengthy roots in the particular mix of social conditions and cultural traditions that characterize western societies. Western sexual identities owe a good deal to the historical separation of work from household and kinship that allowed for greater personal preference and independent households to characterize new relationships between individuals. They are influenced by Judeo-Christian traditions that sought to discipline sexualities over the centuries. And they are shaped by the emergence of meeting places upon which

social networks formed, and enclaves of like-minded people came to develop a sense of collective commonality. This is a historical process that continues today in the multiplication of identities, subcultures, and deconstructive tensions, but also in the global reach of networks and communication that connects once disparate sets of people.

Emergence of a Movement

The formal organization of homosexual people into a social movement entity dates from the founding of the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee in 1897 in Berlin (Adam 1995). From 1897 until 1933, Germany generated a wealth of gay and lesbian groups that flourished until the Nazi takeover that virtually obliterated sexual-identity groups, along with a vast range of other increasingly visible, “modern” identity groups from Jews to socialists. The Scientific-Humanitarian Committee, led by Magnus Hirschfeld, aligned itself with the forces of modernism – science, tolerance, and social democracy – in an attempt to carve out a safe space for gay and lesbian existence against an entrenched establishment of aristocracy, church, and authoritarianism.

It flourished in a context of a wide variety of social reform movements that were seeking political, social, and personal change in German society of the day. In the short-lived German Revolution of November 1918, when the German state suffered defeat at the end of World War I, it joined with the popular mobilization for a democratic future. In the interwar Weimar Republic, the Scientific-Humanitarian Committee joined with the Eigene (a men’s organization organized around a mentor–acolyte vision of male bonding) and the German Friendship Association (a widely popular set of social clubs for gay men and lesbians) to form a united front for legal reform. In 1921, it organized a World League for Sexual Reform, drawing together gay groups that had sprung up in neighboring countries along with other organizations interested in the liberalization of family law. It also organized a scholarly Institute for Sex Research that became a world center for research and counseling. All of this came to a sudden end in 1933 through police suppression with the ascent of the Nazis to power. Many gay men and some lesbians, including movements’ leaders, went into hiding, fled into exile, were

interned in concentration camps, or died in the Holocaust (Grau & Schoppmann 1995).

Postwar Reemergence

The homophobic intensity of the warring regimes of Nazism, Stalinism, and liberal democracies in the mid-twentieth century separates the first wave of gay movement formation from its re-founding and rebuilding in the 1950s and 1960s. The early postwar period was characterized by widespread criminalization of homosexual relations, active state persecution, and ideological vilification from churches and professionals. In this chilly social climate emerged small and cautious gay and lesbian organizations that ultimately succeeded in carving out space for LGBT existence and in chipping away at the edifice of homophobic exclusion (D’Emilio 1983).

In 1946, the Amsterdam Cultuur-en-Ontspannings Centrum (COC) revived itself, followed by pioneering organizations in Copenhagen, Oslo, and Stockholm. In the midst of McCarthyism, when gay people came to be among those named as enemies of the state by the House Un-American Activities Committee of the United States Senate, the Mattachine Society came into existence to defend gay men from state predation. Mattachine chapters gradually organized in major cities across the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. A specifically lesbian group, Daughters of Bilitis, came about in San Francisco in 1955. Similar organizations began to appear in West Berlin, Hamburg, Paris, and London. These *homophile* groups were typically small and low-profile, and faced tremendous odds in countries that subjected gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people to police suppression, psychiatric confinement, and sometimes prison. While they came to be viewed in retrospect as timid and assimilationist in their pleas for acceptance and respectability, their members showed immense courage and often suffered overt discrimination and persecution to accomplish what they did. Ultimately, they opened the way for the more open and militant movements of the 1970s.

Gay Liberation/Lesbian Feminism

It is not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that gay and lesbian mobilization took a new, more militant turn in the context of the rising social

ferment of the new left, fueled especially by the African American civil rights and the anti-Vietnam war movements in the United States and by student movements in Europe and Latin America. The new left created new political opportunities by making social change appear within reach, and it circulated new discourses of entitlement and democratic participation in its assertion that traditionally marginalized or excluded people had the right to social inclusion, and to have their voices heard. In gay and lesbian history, this shift in thinking and strategy is symbolically marked by the Stonewall Rebellion, a 1969 confrontation with police that happened in New York, but Stonewall is but one marker of a larger refusal of LGBT people in advanced, industrial societies to limit themselves to the pathological realms of sin, sickness, or crime assigned to them by heterosexist institutions (Altman 1971; Duberman 1993).

Gay liberation and lesbian feminism dreamed of new worlds freed of patriarchy and homophobia, and challenged the churches, courts, and psychiatrists who tried to confine them. Gay liberation did not so much think about homosexuality as the trait of a beleaguered minority than as a potential in everyone that had been repressed by state, church, and family. Lesbian feminism conceived of itself as the ultimate form of women's solidarity now capable of challenging the subordination of all women. Within a few years of Stonewall, this new generation of gay and lesbian organizations had swept through campuses and communities across Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as a few capitals in Latin America.

Within a decade, the exuberance and utopianism of gay liberation and lesbian feminism were faced with a new right in government, which was allied especially in the United States with a Christian right intent on reasserting moral regulation. Evangelical Protestants succeeded in the late 1970s in striking down a series of municipal human rights laws that banned discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Reagan administration, and succeeding Republican presidents, increasingly populated the courts with conservative judges who slowed or blocked equal rights for LGBT people in the 1980s and 1990s. Then in 1995 starting in Utah, a "defense of marriage" panic swept across the

United States resulting over the decade in 40 of the 50 states and the national government passing legislation (in some instances entrenching it in their constitutions) to ban same-sex marriages (Adam 2003). The United Kingdom's right-wing Thatcher government passed Clause 28, a measure which forbade "teaching . . . the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship," and police forces in Canada and Australia felt emboldened by the prevailing public climate to recommence raids on gay gathering places.

Movement Multiplication and Diversification

In the ensuing decades since Stonewall, there has been a prolific multiplication and diversification of LGBT organizations in the workplace, religion, recreation, politics, ethnic cultures, and disability and taste-based affinity groups. LGBT groups typically employ the forms and rhetoric of the local political culture (Adam et al. 1999). In a few instances where national federations are widely accepted as a legitimate organizational form, LGBT groups participate in a leading formal organization, but in many other societies the proliferation of disparate LGBT groups challenges any organization that purports to represent itself as the leading or national voice of LGBT people as a whole.

LGBT organizations tend to see-saw between solidarity-building and identity-affirming trends on one hand, and deconstructive and queer tendencies on the other (Gamson 1998). Deconstructive trends flow from several sources: some prefer an assimilationist approach that deemphasizes difference and accentuates commonality with heterosexual people, some have sought to build alliances among sexual dissidents of all kinds, and others believe that the differences among LGBT peoples outweigh any overall commonality. At the same time, there is now a historically unprecedented infrastructure of culture producers, voluntary associations, legal arrangements, and commercial ventures that reproduce LGBT sites, networks, and points of view. These tensions are shared as well in LGBT studies where, on the one hand, LGBT-affirmative scholarship documents the development of communities and innovations, recovering and calling into being histories and literatures, and reproducing a sense of commonality and identity.

On the other hand are the deconstructive, queer theories calling attention to essentializing and minoritizing tendencies that perhaps unwittingly construct LGBT people as a distinct quasi-ethnic group separating LGBT experiences – including homoerotic experiences – from cross-cutting connections over a sexual orientation “divide” that need not be.

These many social movement organizations embrace a sizable array of objectives and aspirations. On the political front in the advanced industrial nations, LGBT movement groups have typically taken up a demand for inclusion, seeking to realize the citizenship and political rhetoric of their national contexts. For jurisdictions with sodomy laws, decriminalization has often been the focal point of the first forms of gay mobilization. With decriminalization, movements often pursue equality rights seeking laws to curb discrimination in employment, housing, education, public services, censorship and media representation, policing, and personal security (Rimmerman et al. 2000).

Same-sex relationship recognition has often proven to be the next great hurdle to be overcome through the courts and legislatures. Nevertheless, civil rights make up but one facet of organizational work. Equality rights have an inherent limitation: they beg the question “Equal with whom?” and implicitly content themselves with accessing and fitting into preexisting heterosexual arrangements and institutions. Implicit in LGBT movements are larger issues of sexual politics, for example, sexual and relational freedom that exceeds the family forms presumed by law and conventional morality, including assisted reproduction, child-rearing, and multi-partner families (Adam 2004).

LGBT movements raise major questions on a variety of fronts. These include the legitimate sphere of state regulation, personal and bodily autonomy, gender expression, and the right to live with and love persons of one’s choice. They pose social challenges in seeking not just enclave or ghetto status but full civil participation. They open up new ways of living, challenging conventional gender, patriarchal power, and family arrangements (Weeks et al. 2001) and deeply alarming fundamentalists of various religious stripes. They also face questions concerning their place in a globalizing world. Corporate colonization of gay scenes produces hyperconsumerist images of how to be gay, valorizes particular

“looks” and lifestyles, and purveys these images in an increasingly global way. At the same time, international organizations such as the International Lesbian and Gay Association and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission seek to protect LGBT people from persecution around the world, using an Amnesty International model, and thereby necessarily asserting the legitimacy of a universal standard of a right to life and liberty as sexual beings.

LGBT organizations are now emerging in more and more countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, often grounded in traditions and contexts divergent from Europe, North America, and Australia. AIDS has proven a catalyst in many places for new organizations dedicated to mounting an HIV-prevention response for men who have sex with men, a population often neglected by official, state-sponsored AIDS commissions (Altman 2000). These grassroots AIDS organizations often draw on and speak to homosexually oriented people and provide a platform for and conduit to LGBT networks abroad.

Transgendered concerns are increasingly embraced by movements that have shifted from “gay and lesbian” to LGBT, as transgendered people face violence and repression from police and in the street. Transgendered people, whether transsexual, intersexed, gender-mixed, gender-defying, or queer, have been evolving new perspectives and mobilizing to challenge gender rigidity in many societies (Currah et al. 2006).

LGBT movements, then, have been increasingly proliferating and decentralizing into the twenty-first century. The single city or nationwide organization, encompassing all LGBT interests and demands, has become less and less common, replaced by the multiplication of LGBT caucuses and interest groups formed inside (or alongside): neighborhoods, political parties, labor unions, professional associations, small business federations, religious and ethno-cultural groups, youth and student movements, seniors groups, recreation and sports leagues, health and social service organizations, radio and television stations, theater, music, and the arts. LGBT movement groups have been coming about in more and more locations.

While some groups succeeded in organizing in Eastern Europe even before the fall of the Soviet state socialist system, a new wave of LGBT groups has sprung up since. New frontiers in the

twenty-first century include struggling LGBT and HIV prevention groups oriented toward men who have sex with men in African countries notable for government-sponsored homophobic rhetoric, state repression, and sodomy laws typically left over from colonial times. Another new frontier is in Islamic nations with emerging groups in Turkey, Lebanon, Indonesia, and Morocco sometimes having to take on a semi-clandestine form. Overall, LGBT movements have been succeeding in bringing their communities into full participation in civil society while changing the institutional structures of family, kinship, and personal solidarity around them.

SEE ALSO: German Revolution, 1918–1923; Hirschfeld, Magnus (1868–1935); Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements, Australia; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements, Canada; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements, Germany; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements, United States; Women's Movement, United States, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Adam, B. D. (1995) *The Rise of a Gay and Lesbian Movement*. New York: Dwayne.
- Adam, B. D. (2003) The "Defense of Marriage Act" and American Exceptionalism. *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 12 (2).
- Adam, B. D. (2004) Care, Intimacy, and Same-Sex Partnership in the 21st Century. *Current Sociology* 52 (2): 265–79.
- Adam, B. D., Duyvendak, J. W., & Krouwel, A. (1999) *The Global Emergence of Gay and Lesbian Politics*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Altman, D. (1971) *Homosexual Oppression and Liberation*. New York: Outerbridge & Dienstfrey.
- Altman, D. (2000) *Global Sex*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Currah, P., Juang, R., & Minter, S. (2006) *Transgender Rights*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- D'Emilio, J. (1983) *Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Duberman, M. (1993) *Stonewall*. New York: Dutton.
- Gamson, J. (1998) Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? In P. Nardi & B. Schneider (Eds.), *Social Perspectives in Lesbian and Gay Studies*. London: Routledge, pp. 589–604.
- Grau, G. & Schoppmann, C. (1995) *Hidden Holocaust?* London: Cassell.
- International Lesbian and Gay Association (2008) www.ilga.org.
- Rimmerman, C., Wald, K., & Wilcox, C. (2000) *The Politics of Gay Rights*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Weeks, J., Heathy, B., & Donovan, C. (2001) *Same-Sex Intimacies*. London: Routledge.

Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements, Australia

Graham Willett

Gay and lesbian politics came late to Australia. An effort in 1958 to establish an organization based on London's Homosexual Law Reform Society failed utterly. But a decade later, a flurry of independent efforts showed that the time had, at last, come. In Canberra, a small group of academics and journalists set up the Homosexual Law Reform Society. In Melbourne, half a dozen lesbians founded a branch of the Daughters of Bilitis as a social and political organization. But the real breakthrough came in 1970 in Sydney with the foundation of the Campaign Against Moral Persecution (CAMP, an acronym chosen because it was the word most homosexuals in Australia used to name themselves at that time).

The group had its origins in the deeper transformations that Australia was undergoing at the time. On the one hand, the emergence of a current within mainstream politics committed to the modernization and liberalization of national life meant that homosexuality was able to find a place on an agenda that looked to reform laws and attitudes around social issues ranging from abortion and Aboriginal affairs to welfare. In this context, it was inevitable that the criminalization of sexual acts between men would come under question. The other development, much less visible at the time, was the construction of a "scene" as it called itself – a subculture of pubs and cafés, private parties, and organized social groups in which camp women and men could meet and socialize.

When John Ware and Christabel Poll were interviewed in a national newspaper in September 1970, discussing the organization that they had set up, the effect was electrifying. Gay people willing to have their names and photographs published were unheard of, and merely by coming out these two and their organization became the focus of intense media interest. All over the country, newspapers, television shows, and radio programs reported the group's existence and activities. More importantly, they received hundreds of letters from homosexuals keen to join in their efforts. Within a year, CAMP had 1,500 members, with branches in all state capital cities

and at most universities. The organization aimed to bring together homosexual women and men around both social and political activities. Branches rented club rooms and members formed themselves into committees to take on the many forms of discrimination that camps suffered. Although the founders had imagined that it might be years before their group would follow the American example and take to the streets, in fact the first demo was held in Sydney within six months of the group's appearance. Protest, reasoned argument, education, lobbying – no method of tackling discrimination was overlooked.

Modernizing liberalism and the scene were not the only forces at work in the early 1970s, however. The anti-war movement provided inspiration, a model, and training for more radical efforts at social change. The United States had become a beacon for activists, and it is no surprise that in 1972, gay liberation ideas arrived in Australia. Here was a politics that embraced struggle, defiance, militancy; that argued for the revolutionary overthrow of sex and gender roles as a means to the liberation, not of gay people alone, but of all human beings. Gay liberation saw itself as fighting in solidarity with all the oppressed and exploited. Gay liberationists also drew on the politics of the counterculture. Consciousness raising and living differently (dressing in defiance of gender norms, sharing collectivist households, rejecting monogamy, and so on) were central to activists' political practice. Inspiring though it was, this politics made great demands upon people and the organizations were wracked with debates and splits. Radicalesbians separated themselves off from their brothers, either to work alone or with other women; some men worked to develop a politics that put women and the gender revolution first, around the slogan of "effeminism." Most of these groupings were short-lived but they had a lasting impact on those involved and on the broader left milieu in which they worked.

After 1973, gay and lesbian activism became less visible and it has been assumed that the movement went into decline. In fact, it makes more sense to see it as having changed tactics in response to a new political climate. The action group came into being. Less all-encompassing than organizations like CAMP, the action groups tended to focus on particular tasks, or issues, or constituencies. Religious and ethnic groups struck out on their own: the Gay Teachers and

Students Group worked in the teacher unions and published *Young Gay and Proud* for gay and lesbian youth; law reformers lobbied state legislators and opinion-makers and ran candidates in state and federal elections; others produced newsletters or radio programs or theatrical performances.

The effect of all this activity is clearer in retrospect than it was at the time. Homosexuality was decriminalized, beginning with South Australia in 1972 (and then again, to get it right, in 1975), and then in each of the states and territories, culminating in the bitterly fought-for reform in Tasmania in 1997 – one of the most important and successful campaigns in Australian political history. Over time, age of consent laws were amended, discrimination outlawed, same-sex relationships recognized. All of these reforms took place at the state level rather than the federal, and occurred in their own way and at their own pace. But the trajectory toward equality was clear. Today, except for the refusal of the federal government to legislate for same-sex marriage, gay people in Australia have achieved genuine equality before the law.

Public attitudes changed as well. As early as 1974 a majority of Australians were in favor of decriminalization of male homosexual acts (up from 22 percent seven years before), beginning a shift toward social acceptance and/or tolerance that has continued without serious interruption. The force behind this change was the tactic of coming out. Starting with the activists of the early 1970s, hundreds of thousands of people have come out to family, friends, workmates, driving home the point that we are everywhere, that we are just like everybody else, and that discrimination and prejudice are unfair. It was not the revolutionary transformation that the liberationists had hoped for, but it was a dramatic shift in Australian social life that has changed the lives of gay people – and indeed all Australians – for the better.

Coming out as a mass phenomenon rested in turn on the development of gay pride: a refusal of the idea that homosexuals were mad or bad or sad; an insistence that we deserved to be treated like everybody else. The clearest evidence of the development of this mindset came in 1978 with a series of police attacks on the gay community in Sydney. The first Mardi Gras, intended as a day of international gay solidarity against the rise of the right in the US, turned into a riot when the police arbitrarily withdrew the parade's

permit and arrested 53 people in the ensuing *mêlée*. Over the next six months there were more protests and more arrests. To the amazement of movement people, their activities were supported by the scene (both bar-goers and bar owners), which had displayed indifference, even hostility, to the politicians for most of the previous decade. Beneath the surface, it now seemed clear: the idea that gay people had the right to be treated fairly had taken root. The activists adapted with startling speed to connect themselves to this new constituency. As Johnston (1999) has pointed out, talk of “oppression,” “liberation,” and the “movement” was replaced by “discrimination,” “rights,” and the “community.” This fusion of activists and the scene into a community laid the foundations for lesbian and gay politics for the following quarter century. Mardi Gras continued as an annual event, becoming more and more theatrical and celebratory, though always with a political element to it. In the mid-1980s, lesbians and gay men started to work together again in ways that they had not done for a long time, around common goals, on the basis of a politics of “coalition” within the community. This was a model of attachment taken up by bisexuals, transgender people, and most recently intersex activists.

The community’s greatest achievement was perhaps its contribution to the containment of the threat of AIDS. Observing the US, activists, especially around the press, knew about AIDS well before it became a mainstream political and medical issue in 1984. Supported by a Labor Party government that was committed to cooperative forms of issue management, activists were able to deliver the behavioral change that AIDS prevention needed. Gay men adopted safe-sex practices because they were advised to by their own, accepting their advice in a way they would never have done from politicians or doctors.

In return, the government supported community-based AIDS organizations, funding through and therefore at arm’s distance remarkably explicit campaigns in which, as one activist said, “an arse was an arse and a fuck was a fuck.” The visuals were even more provocative – and effective. Infection rates peaked in 1982–3 and dropped sharply thereafter. Australia’s campaign against AIDS has been widely hailed as one of the most effective in the world, and it stands as a tribute to the politics that lesbians and gay men have constructed and nurtured over the past 40 years.

SEE ALSO: Australia, New Social Movements; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements

References and Suggested Readings

- Carbery, G. (1995) *A History of the Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras*. Melbourne: Australian Lesbian and Gay Archives.
- Hurley, M. (1996) *A Guide to Gay and Lesbian Writing in Australia*. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin.
- Jackson, P. A. & Sullivan, G. (Eds.) (1999) *Multicultural Queer: Australian Narratives*. New York and London: Harrington Park Press.
- Johnston, C. (1999) *A Sydney Gaze: The Making of Gay Liberation*. Darlinghurst, NSW: Schiltron Press.
- Reynolds, R. (2007) *What Happened to Gay Life?* Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- Sendziuk, P. (2003) *Learning to Trust: Australian Responses to AIDS*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- Willett, G. (2000) *Living Out Loud: A History of Gay and Lesbian Activism in Australia*. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin.

Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements, Canada

Gary Kinsman

Indigenous peoples in what is now Canada lived under gender and sexual codes unfamiliar to European colonizing powers. Their social organization included three or four different groupings, most commonly the male, the female, and the male-female, or “two spirited” person, who had characteristics of both sexes. Under this system, women often held important forms of political and social power, and there was widespread acceptance of same-sex eroticism. Through missionary work and state repression, however, these norms were replaced with what became a normalized male-dominated heterosexuality. These earlier practices of eroticism and gender diversity are now being reclaimed through the organizing efforts of two-spirited people of the First Nations and the resistance of queer people.

Collective forms of resistance to heterosexual hegemony emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, an unlikely time. In 1958 a national security campaign against lesbians and gay men had them classified as “national security risks” supposedly suffering from a “character weakness” that made them vulnerable to “blackmail” by “enemy agents.”

This led to hundreds of gay men and lesbians being purged from the public service and the military. Even so, Jim Egan, influenced by early homophile organizing in the United States, became Canada's first visible gay activist during this period. After he spoke out a series of homophile groups across the Canadian state began to emerge. The longest lasting was the Association for Social Knowledge (ASK) in Vancouver. ASK organized educational, social, and lobbying efforts throughout most of the 1960s. As more visible queer networks emerged in the 1960s some participants engaged in forms of resistance to the national security campaigns, not only refusing to give the names of other queer people to the RCMP (Canadian security police), but also exposing the security operatives. These practices of resistance obstructed the national security campaigns. Then, in the context of broader social changes, discussions in church and legal circles, and legal decisions, a limited decriminalization of homosexual acts between two consenting adults in "private" took place in Canada in 1969. At the same time, however, sexual policing in "public" escalated.

In the early 1970s gay liberation, influenced by the radical politics of the 1960s social movements, had an influence as gay activist groups were set up across English-Canada and Quebec. These groups saw themselves as part of a broader radical movement and organized actions to support various movements, including contingents in anti-Vietnam War demonstrations. Within these groups, lesbians, increasingly influenced by feminism, encountered sexism from gay men and set up their own lesbian groups, leading to the emergence of an autonomous lesbian feminist movement. Out of these early radical groups emerged a rights movement struggling against discrimination and for human rights protection for lesbians, gays, and bisexuals. Gay and lesbian organizing in the 1970s, targeting the national security campaigns against queers as central sites of discrimination, came under the surveillance of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, with agents doing surveillance at events ranging from the first cross-country demonstration on Parliament Hill in 1971, to the demonstrations against anti-gay campaigner Anita Bryant, to lesbians in Wages for Housework.

The organization of the 1976 Olympics in Montreal led to a major clean-up campaign against lesbians and gays in Montreal and

Ottawa, including major raids on gay and lesbian establishments. This sparked the formation of the Comité homosexual anti-repression in Montreal and a demonstration of 300 in June 1976. The police also began to use the "indecent act" subsection of the bawdy house legislation against gay bars and baths. In response to the 1977 raid on the Truax bar in Montreal, more than 2,000 gays, lesbians, and supporters closed down a major downtown street in protest. Combined with lobbying efforts, this led to Quebec becoming the first province to amend human rights legislation to include protection on the basis of sexual orientation.

The organization of an anti-gay and anti-feminist right wing in the US spilled across the border into Canada in the late 1970s, brought by Anita Bryant, who was involved in campaigns to repeal basic human rights protection for gay men and lesbians in the United States. In response, lesbian and gay activists formed coalitions to organize against the right wing and against Bryant's visits. The largest of these protests was in Toronto in early 1978 when more than 1,000 people marched in protest up Yonge Street. This also led to the formation of groups like Gay Liberation Against the Right Everywhere and Lesbians Against the Right.

Escalating sexual policing led to the massive bath raids in Toronto in the late 1970s and early 1980s and similar police operations in other cities. Using the bawdy house legislation in February 1981, more than 300 men were arrested in raids on four of Toronto's gay bath houses. This sexual policing set off some of the most profound queer protests and organizing seen across North America with the organizing of the Right to Privacy Committee (RTPC) as a defense organization for those arrested. Following the 81 raids, more than 1,000 people attended RTPC meetings and demonstrations of 3,000–4,000 people took over central downtown streets. Activists were joined by thousands of people from the bars and streets and other community networks who had not been previously involved in the movement, facilitating the expansion of queer community formation. Allies were gained in other communities also under police attack. As a result of this mass and sustained composition of struggle, most of the charges laid were dropped and the police were pushed back. While the RTPC used the liberal notion of the right to privacy against the police raids, it transformed this notion in a more

collective and social fashion to defend the social and erotic spaces men who have sex with other men had established.

By the early 1980s AIDS was having an impact. During the early years of state neglect, most of the support, education, and anti-discrimination work was undertaken by community based groups emerging out of gay and lesbian communities. By the later 1980s a new treatment-based activism emerged out of the contradiction between knowledge that there were treatments that could allow people living with AIDS and HIV to live longer and the denial of these treatments by governments and drug companies. In the US this new AIDS activism was associated with ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power) groups, and in Canada through groups like AIDS ACTION NOW! in Toronto. Through direct action protests, including the smuggling of treatments into Canada, much greater access to these treatments was opened up, allowing more people to survive. This AIDS activism, in turn, facilitated the emergence of Queer Nation organizing against anti-queer violence and the lack of queer visibility in the early 1990s.

The implementation of the equality rights section of the Charter of Rights in 1985 constituted a shift in state legal formation, creating an easier terrain for lesbian and gay rights legal struggles. Combined with movement activism, and the expansion of gay and lesbian community formation, this created the basis for human rights protection, ending official practices of exclusion from the military, and the establishment of spousal and family recognition rights. Eventually, legal challenges led to the establishment of the right to same-sex marriage in 2005. In a number of areas formal legal equality was established with heterosexuals. At the same time, since heterosexuality remains the normalized sexuality, major substantive inequalities remain, and hatred, prejudice, and violence against queers continue. Forms of sexual censorship and sexual policing also continue, and the new youth pornography law was used to target hustlers who sold sexual services to men.

The mass struggles of the 1970s and the 1980s, involving many working-class queers, ironically created the basis for the emergence of a new openly gay or queer professional-managerial stratum who could speak "for" the community and manage its relations with ruling agencies. This has led the new middle-class elite to argue for integration into existing social forms of spousal,

familial, and marriage relations and a consumer-based capitalist society. As a result the more radical dimensions of queer organizing, including sexual politics, have been eclipsed, and queers living in poverty, queer street youth, queers of color, working-class queer people, many transsexuals, and other groups find themselves excluded from new definitions of "gay" and "queer." Many radical queer activists are involved in social struggles today, but for many the gay/queer movements are so accommodated with the existing social order that they are active instead as queer activists in anti-poverty, global justice, and other movements.

SEE ALSO: ACT UP; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements

References and Suggested Readings

- Kinsman, G. (1996) *The Regulation of Desire: Homo and Hetero Sexualities*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Kinsman, G. (2004) The Canadian Cold War on Queers: Sexual Regulation and Resistance. In R. Cavell (Ed.), *Love, Hate, and Fear in Canada's Cold War*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 108–32.
- Lang, S. (1999) Lesbians, Men-Women, and Two-Spirits: Homosexuality and Gender in Native American Culture. In E. Blackwood & S. E. Wieringa (Eds.), *Female Desires, Same-Sex Relations and Transgender Practices Across Cultures*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 91–116.
- Roscoe, W. (1998) *Changing Ones, Third and Fourth Genders in Native North America*. New York: St. Martin's Griffin.
- Warner, T. (2002) *Never Going Back, A History of Queer Activism in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements, Germany

Christopher Young

The history of the gay rights movement in Germany can be traced to the mid-eighteenth century reign of Frederick the Great. In the century that followed, the movement was characterized by legal maneuvering, scientific theorization, and varied literary exploits. As the German nation was born out of the Prussian states in the 1870s, these modes of activism continued to grow and were gradually joined by more organized approaches

that were enabled by communal identification and the dialogue that had been developing for over 100 years. Despite facing death and persecution during Hitler's Third Reich, the gay rights movement managed to reappear and continually reinvent itself throughout the second half of the twentieth century and into the present day.

Historical, Legal, and Literary Foundations of the Gay Rights Movement

During the Enlightenment, although sodomy remained illegal in some parts of Germany, a gradual separation between law and morality appeared, reflected in new understandings of criminal processes and acceptable punishable offenses. Philosophers such as Cesare Beccaria (1738–94) succeeded in moving sodomy and homosexuality from a crime punishable by death to a mere infraction of socially acceptable behavior. This in turn enabled a gay community with increased self-awareness to emerge.

Frederick the Great (1712–1786)

Enlightenment theories greatly affected the personal, political, and legal development of Frederick the Great, a homosexual who ruled Prussia for over forty years in the mid-to-late eighteenth century. Contemporary sources describe Frederick the Great as an effeminate boy who displayed homosexual tendencies from a young age and who was later connected intimately with a number of men. When he came to power in 1740 Frederick brought with him the memory of a childhood and adolescence that were defined by the tension that his homosexuality and fondness for French Enlightenment thought created with his father's restrictive approach to governing. This tension challenged Frederick drastically to change the state's attitude toward homosexuality and sodomy, not only through attempts at legal change, but also through personal decrees and opinions that would mark him as one of the earliest defenders of homosexuals. Voltaire relates one particular instance during his time as the philosopher in residence in Prussia when Frederick overturned the death sentence of a sodomite, claiming that "in his states he granted freedom of conscience and of cock." This move served not only as a reaffirmation of the changes to criminalization that the Enlightenment created within modern-day Germany, but also as a rebuttal to the legislature and courts that

continued to support such severe punishments for what was now seen as a moral infraction.

Frederick's reign was peppered with instances such as these, gradual movements toward legalized change that took their shape in "committees of leading jurists" appointed by Frederick "to reform the [sodomy] laws." Although in 1988 German historian James Steakley confirmed that the new code drafted by these committees "reduced the punishment for sodomy from burning to imprisonment for a year or more, whipping, and banishment," Frederick's death in 1786 brought an unfulfilling end to the groundbreaking exploits of these committees – death was no longer a punishment, but sodomy and homosexuality remained criminal acts in the German state. Although his attempts at making sodomy a legally sanctioned act were not wholly realized, Frederick the Great is significant in the picture he offers of an evolving gay sensibility and movement in Prussia.

Paragraphs 143 and 175

Despite the late eighteenth-century changes to the Prussian penal code that removed death as a punishment for homosexuality, the law retained Paragraph 143: "Unnatural fornication, whether between persons of the male sex or of humans with beasts, is punished with imprisonment of six months to four years, with the further punishment of a prompt loss of civil rights" (Ulrichs 1994). Although Otto von Bismarck led an investigation into the legitimacy of criminalized homosexuality in 1869, his revisions to the penal code of the North German Confederation continued to punish homosexuality as the previous Prussian codes had. It was a move that would have far-reaching implications as the criminal code of the North German Confederation became the criminal code for the entire German Empire which was united under Wilhelm I in 1871, paving the road for nearly a century of legalized persecution in Germany under Paragraph 175.

Karl Heinrich Ulrichs (1825–1895)

Karl Heinrich Ulrichs was, by all modern accounts, recognized as the first open homosexual of his time. His coming out had remarkable consequences, as it led him to develop and write his theory on homosexuality in texts that would inspire and articulate the first gay rights movement of the modern world.

Ulrichs came to Berlin in the mid-1850s after resigning his post in the local government due

to threats of exposure as a sexual deviant. It was at a meeting of the Free German Foundation for Science, Art, and General Culture that Ulrichs first acknowledged his homosexual desire while presenting a paper concerning same-sex attraction. In 1862 Ulrichs affirmed and defended his homosexuality in a series of letters to his family. In his writing, Ulrichs did not use the problematic “sodomite” in his explanation of homosexuality, but instead, realizing the need to redefine those with a same-sex disposition, labeled them according to a heritage rather than the biblical term of an illegal act: Uranian (Uranism for homosexuality) – a name rooted in Plato’s discussion of Eros and the love of men in *Symposium*. With a single neologism, Ulrichs founded a new understanding of justice that would inspire his contemporaries and future generations of “Urnings.”

In 1864 and 1865 Ulrichs released a series of five pamphlets entitled *Research on the Riddle of Man-Manly Love* under the pseudonym Numa Numantius. Ulrichs expanded on legal approaches to Uranism, scientific theory surrounding “manmanly desire,” and related issues of biblical persecution and Greco-Roman praise for same-sex love. Although the initial publications faced censorship and harsh reception in most of Germany, Ulrichs was undeterred and continued to write, even dropping the pseudonym in 1868 and publicly revealing himself as a crusader of the German gay rights movement. The political climate in the German states was becoming more hostile during the time of Ulrichs’ rapid rise to notoriety, specifically as Prussia defeated Austria in 1866 during the Six Weeks War, leading to the annexation of Hanover. For Ulrichs, the possibility of German unification under a strong and anti-homosexual Prussia seemed to be becoming a reality; he was imprisoned for a short time because of his writing and upon his release began working more specifically to convince the Prussian lawmaking bodies to overturn Paragraph 143, the law criminalizing sodomy. Ulrichs brought a proposal in favor of decriminalization before the Congress of German Jurists in 1865. While this initial attempt did not even garner Ulrichs a place on the docket, his second attempt in 1867 proved more successful, at least initially. Ulrichs attempted to speak for decriminalization before the Congress, but found himself shouted down before he was able to explain his planned proposal. Undeterred, Ulrichs turned to working with the committee that was responsible

for outlining the laws of the newly formed North German Confederation, a partially unified German nation consisting of Prussia and the recently annexed northern territories. Ulrichs’ attempts were supported by a growing number of academics and medical professionals who were also calling for a society-wide ideological readjustment and sweeping legal changes to accompany it. The committee eventually concluded that their moral obligation was to continue criminalizing sodomy, a defeating blow for Ulrichs, his supporters, and the fragile gay rights movement.

Ulrichs wrote very little after Paragraph 175 was added to the German penal code. While he may not have brought an end to the legal persecution of homosexuality, his work in creating the very notion of homosexuality as a natural orientation consequentially amalgamated a community of men with Uranian identities; it is this communal identification that stands as the cornerstone of the gay rights movement in Germany.

Stefan George (1868–1933)

The work of Ulrichs was not lost on his literary contemporaries who closely identified with Uranism; in fact, the Wilhelmine era gave rise to a number of authors who wrote in support of same-sex desire. The defining player in this epoch of literary creation was Stefan George, a vaguely closeted homosexual and poet who combined his same-sex desire and adept writing skills to produce stunning poetry that gave voice to the emotions surrounding the gay rights movement.

Stefan George relied heavily on symbolism and offered a unique glance at the emergence of the homosexual individual during the Wilhelmine era through the expression of disguised homoerotic desire in his poetry. Published in 1897, *Das Jahr der Seele* (*The Year of the Soul*) ends with the protagonist waiting in a deep sleep, a metaphor that when considered within the symbolism of the overall work alludes to an atmosphere of continued silence surrounding homosexuality where the only free world is one of self-creation. Despite the impossibility of communal identification that *Das Jahr der Seele* seems to allude to, George himself turned to the actual creation of a community where the deep bond between men could be fully appreciated and explored. The George-Circle was a group of loyal male followers drawn from writers who contributed to George’s journal, *Blätter für die Kunst* (*Pages for Art*). Within the Circle, George was revered and surrounded by literary companions who were

enthralled by his work; it is the same unfulfilled desire for creation visible in *Das Jahr der Seele* that prompted George to form his Circle of followers as a means of exercising control over his world and the people in it.

George's attempt to build a community of like-minded thinkers and writers and his proactive attempts to create in a society of restriction are best interpreted as signaling a developing communal homosexual awareness. The single greatest change seen in the discourse on homosexuality from the Wilhelmine period to the dawning of the Weimar Republic in 1918 was the replacement of individual voices with organized, activist groups; this shift lent validity and strength to a discussion that had long been reliant on brave individuals setting out on their own. It was because of men like Ulrichs and George that such a shift was able to take place, and it was their ideals and beliefs that most influenced the sexual scientists and thinkers who would come to define the gay rights movement in the years surrounding the establishment of the Weimar Republic: Magnus Hirschfeld (1868–1935) and Adolf Brand (1874–1945).

From Empire to Republic

The historical importance of the life and work of Hirschfeld and Brand is twofold: while both directly shaped the homosexual culture and community that came to define Weimar Berlin, their work also reveals a great deal about how societal constructions of homosexuality were developing both positively and negatively, and how diametrically opposed self-understandings of homosexuality were beginning to appear. Additionally, it was the work of sexologists like Hirschfeld that can be partially credited with the appearance during this era of a discourse on lesbianism – the overlooked branch of the women's movement that would find a likely ally in the growing debate on homosexuality in both political and literary spectrums.

Science in the Gay Rights Movement

Although Sigmund Freud is often closely connected with issues of sexuality, he focused his work in the scientific understanding of human sexuality and adopted a heteronormative understanding as the basis of his theory. While Freud's work was science for the sake of science, Magnus Hirschfeld modeled his life and work upon the motto "through science to justice" (Bauer 2002).

Hirschfeld's work was intrinsically tied to an understanding of individuals and of society that would bring justice to homosexuals. Hirschfeld confirmed himself as a major player in the gay rights movement from his earliest writings where he explained the biological basis for the existence of homosexuality; it was this earliest publication, *Sappho und Sokrates* (*Sappho and Sokrates*), which marked the beginning of the first organized homosexual emancipation movement in the history of the modern world. Hirschfeld founded the Wissenschaftlich-humanitären Komitees (WhK, Scientific Humanitarian Committee) in 1897 with two primary initiatives in mind: the education of all people as to the biological nature of homosexuality and the campaign for the abolishment of Paragraph 175 on those biological grounds. While Hirschfeld faced difficulties because of the religious arguments of many moral purity organizations, he found a great deal of support for the many petitions against Paragraph 175 that he proposed. In 1919 his research and writing led him to open the Institut für Sexualwissenschaft (Institute of Sexology) in Berlin as a center for sexuality-centric intellectual gatherings.

Not all gay rights activists of the day agreed with Hirschfeld's scientific approach to the issue of homosexuality. Adolf Brand subscribed to a defense of homosexuality that was centered in the cultural value offered by homoeroticism and connected it to influential ancient cultures, a belief that inspired one of the first journals focused on homosexual life and culture, *Der Eigene*. While Hirschfeld contributed greatly to the gay rights movement in Germany, his theories did sometimes construe homosexuality as a natural disorder, rather than purely natural – something Brand was able to avoid with his approach. Brand's understanding of homosexuality and his approach to gay rights activism was connected to a more progressive and positive homosexual self-image. In an attempt to procure funding and support Brand formed the Gemeinschaft der Eigenen (GdE, Community of the Special) in 1903; in contrast to the circle that surrounded Stefan George, Brand and his followers formed an open community, published, held public lectures, and served as an overt and activist response to the medicalization of homosexuality.

Birth of the Lesbian Movement

The role of women in the homosexual emancipation movement was nearly non-existent through

the beginning of the twentieth century. It was the protection offered by biological arguments in support of homosexuality which led many lesbians to begin understanding the similarities between the women's movement and the gay rights movement. At a 1904 meeting of the WhK, Anna Rüling spoke on lesbian rights. As the title of Rüling's speech, *Welches Interesse hat die Frauenbewegung an der Lösung des homosexuellen Problems?* (What Interest Does the Women's Movement Have in Solving the Homosexual Problem?) suggests, the main focus of her argument was to connect the women's movement and the homosexual emancipation movement in an attempt to prove the benefits of such a relationship not only for the movements themselves, but for women like her who stood outside of both. In boldly stating that "homosexuality is an obvious and natural bridge between man and woman" (Rüling 2006: 28), Rüling underscored what the crux of her argument focused on: understanding the ways that homosexuality, specifically lesbianism, allowed for a varied and more progressive understanding of gender roles and in turn allowed for more succinct progress towards liberation for all.

German literature at the turn of the twentieth century gave birth to works that explored female relationships, lesbianism, and the women's rights movement as well. Aimée Duc's *Sind es Frauen? Roman über das dritte Geschlecht* (*Are These Women? Novel about the Third Sex*) was published in 1901. Again, much like Rüling, who had chosen to address lesbianism in light of the women's movement, rather than focusing intensely on the supposed masculinity or deformity of lesbians, Duc's novel focused on intelligent and independent women who freed themselves from societal and male-dominated constraints and, by extension, were able to embrace their friendship and homoerotic desire for one another in a positive manner.

Gay Weimar Berlin

The epicenter of gay culture in the 1920s and early 1930s was unquestionably Berlin. The rapid growth of a homosexual community during the years of the Weimar Republic signaled the culmination of the centuries-old struggle for visibility and emancipation in Germany. Berlin became the gay capital upon the Kaiser's downfall in 1919 when the promise of a democratic

constitution destroyed the moralistic restraints that had been holding Berliners back during the German Empire. Paragraph 175 remained in place, but the empirical rule and lack of a democratic voice within Germany had become a thing of the past. A generation disillusioned by a world war and a growing economic depression took stock and began to focus on entrenched human rights instead of expected moral codes; as is to be expected, the homosexual emancipation movement grew stronger than ever.

The homosexual emancipation movement thrived in Berlin. Hirschfeld's institute was operating successfully, had amassed the largest collection of research on sexuality in the world, and continued to serve as a resource for homosexuals and as a place of education for those still opposed to homosexual rights. Hirschfeld also joined forces with other activist groups, including the Bund für Menschenrecht (Association for Human Rights) which emerged from so-called Friendship Associations and claimed nearly 50,000 members by 1929. The homosexual population of Berlin in 1930 was calculated at 350,000 and the city also played host to an overwhelming number of homosexual locales, over 100 by 1933. It was Berlin and its revolutionary attitudes that created arguably the most active homosexual community to have existed in the modern world at that time.

Homosexuality in the Nazi Era

With economic depression and a fractured citizenship, Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist Party were easily able to win the 1932 election and form the Third Reich. The election, the depression, and Paragraph 175's continued existence spelled disaster for the homosexual communities that had taken root in Berlin and throughout Germany in the previous decades.

When Hitler came to power, the gay rights movement and the organizations most closely associated with it were forced to dissolve themselves or face elimination at the hands of the Nazi Party. Hirschfeld disbanded the WhK in 1933 and Brand followed suit by dismantling both the GdE and his numerous publications in the same year. The presence of Ernst Röhm, a homosexual and the leader of Hitler's Sturmabteilung (SA, Storm Troopers) from 1931 to 1934, led many falsely to believe that homosexuality would not be strongly punished by the Nazi Party.

With the destruction of Hirschfeld's institute and the burning of his library's collection in May 1934, along with Hitler's execution of Ernst Röhm and most of the SA in late June of that same year during the Night of the Long Knives, Hitler intended to punish homosexuality harshly, among other stated opponents of the government.

With the alteration of Paragraph 175 in 1935, the Nazis established new punishments for homosexuals – ten years' imprisonment and a loss of civil rights – and laid the groundwork for their internment in concentration camps. While some gay locales managed to remain open longer than others, most were shut down by Nazi officials by the time alterations were made to Paragraph 175. Within the Gestapo the Reichzentrale zur Bekämpfung der Homosexualität und Abtreibung (Central Office for the Combat of Homosexuality and Abortion) was established to seek out and punish homosexuals. By 1942 the homosexual emancipation movement, only ten years earlier stronger than ever, had vanished as homosexuals in concentration camps were facing medical experimentation, forced labor, and death.

Rebuilding in the Midst of Division

The division of Germany into Allied and Soviet sectors following World War II established the boundaries of East and West Germany, boundaries that were literally and metaphorically erected with the Berlin Wall in 1961. From that point on, contact between the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany) was minimal. Both sides faced continued problems with Paragraph 175, which although eventually nullified, led to continuing legal issues surrounding the age of consent for homosexuals; on the whole, however, the gay rights movements within East and West Germany took two very different courses.

East Germany

Despite arguments from Rudolf Klimmer, a physician who, with his *Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes (Coalition of the Nazi Regime's Persecuted)*, called for the repeal of Paragraph 175, the GDR adopted the 1935 version of the anti-sodomy law in an attempt to retain homosexual punishment, but separate it from its Nazi legacy. The 1935 version of Paragraph 175 remained in

effect until debates on whether homosexuality was actually a destructive force to the socialist state led to an end of enforcement in the late 1950s and finally the removal of the law in 1968. It was a small victory for the gay rights movement in East Germany because the GDR continued to ban all homosexual groups and publications, creating a homosexual community that existed only behind closed doors. Because of the restrictions placed on the gay rights movement by the GDR, there was very little gay rights activism visible during the Cold War in East Germany. Groups such as the Homosexuelleninitiative Berlin (HIB, Homosexual Initiative of Berlin) were able to organize and gather in private for social purposes and educational discussions. The ingenuity of these early groups was furthered by homosexuals who turned to the Protestant churches during the 1980s. Because of the connections between the church and socialism, sociopolitical issues and the people affected by those issues was left up to the church. By utilizing this loophole in the socialist system, gays in Leipzig and Berlin created so-called Arbeitskreise (Working Circles) that enabled them to assemble, publish, and sustain an emancipation movement within Protestant churches that would have otherwise been absent within the GDR.

West Germany

In the years following World War II, West Germany's gay rights movement in many ways picked up where it left off. Throughout the major cities, gay locales reappeared, as did more fervent calls for the abolition of Paragraph 175. The Homophilenbewegung (Homophiles movement) became one of the most influential movements of the 1950s and 1960s after they helped reincarnate the WhK. The group was largely responsible for influencing the 1969 decision to decriminalize consensual sexual relations between same-sex partners over the age of 21 in West Germany. Their work brought lawyers, academics, and activists together and helped move the focus of West Germany's homosexual emancipation movement beyond Paragraph 175 to the securing of constitutional protection for homosexuals.

Some of the largest movements in the 1970s were organized by radical students and groups such as the Homosexuellen Aktion Westberlin (HAW, Homosexual Campaign West Berlin), which was representative of the radicalism

that defined the 1970s throughout the western world. Groups that focused more intently on the working-class gay rights movement like Homosexuellen Arbeiter Aktion Westberlin (HAAW, Homosexual Worker's Campaign West Berlin) also appeared during this time. Soon, most cities played host to gay bookstores, homosexual publications prospered, and politically charged mass gatherings, like the first Christopher Street Day parade in Berlin in 1979, began to take place. But, as in the United States, the fervent student movements eventually faded and the birth of the 1980s brought an end to what were the most radically active and legally successful decades of gay rights activism in German history.

Reunification

While the AIDS epidemic created cause for further activism in the 1980s, the movements of the 1960s and 1970s appear to mark the last chapters of gay rights activism as it had been known in Germany. Since reunification, Germany's gay population has been quite integrated within the whole of Germany society, though admittedly the political, religious, and social attitudes of cities such as Berlin or Cologne vary greatly from those of most rural towns. Homophobia and anti-gay sentiments undoubtedly still remain, but homosexuals are no longer invisible beings and they enjoy a great deal of constitutionally protected freedom. Although full adoption and marriage rights have still not been granted within Germany, civil unions and stepchild adoptions are protected; additionally, Germany was one of the earliest countries to protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual identity within its constitution.

SEE ALSO: Brand, Adolf (1874–1945); Hirschfeld, Magnus (1868–1935); Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements; MacKay, John Henry (1864–1933); Sexuality and Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Asprey, R. B. (1986) *Frederick the Great: The Magnificent Enigma*. New York: Ticknor & Fields.
- Bauer, J. E. (2002) *Magnus Hirschfeld: per scientiam ad justitiam. Eine zweite Klarstellung*. Berlin: Magnus Hirschfeld Gesellschaft.
- Edsall, N. C. (2003) *Toward Stonewall: Homosexuality and Society in the Modern Western World*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

- Fout, J. C. (1992) Sexual Politics in Wilhelmine Germany: The Male Gender Crisis, Moral Purity, and Homophobia. *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 2, 3 (January): 388–421.
- Gordon, M. (2000) *Voluptuous Panic: The Erotic World of Weimar Berlin*. Los Angeles: Feral House.
- Hirschfeld, M. (2000) *The Homosexuality of Men and Women*. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
- Norton, R. E. (2002) *Secret Germany: Stefan George and His Circle*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Rüling, A. (2006) What Interest Does the Women's Movement Have in Solving the Homosexual Problem? In M. Lombardi-Nash (Ed.), *Sodomites and Urnings: Homosexual Representations in Classic German Journals*. Binghamton: Harrington Park Press.
- Steakley, J. (1975) *The Homosexual Emancipation Movement in Germany*. New York: Arno Press.
- Steakley, J. (1988) Sodomy in Enlightenment Prussia: From Execution to Suicide. *Journal of Homosexuality* 16, 1/2: 163–75.
- Sternweiler, A. (1997) *Goodbye to Berlin? 100 Jahre Schwulenbewegung: eine Ausstellung des Schwulen Museums und der Akademie der Künste*. Berlin: Rosa Winkel.
- Ulrichs, K. H. (1994) *The Riddle of "Man-Manly" Love: The Pioneering Work on Male Homosexuality*. Trans. M. Lombardi-Nash. Buffalo: Prometheus Books.

Lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements, United States

Tristan Cabello

The lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual (LGBT) movement in the United States encompasses several lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender social organizations that took shape in the mid-twentieth century. The Mattachine Society, the Daughters of Bilitis, the Gay Liberation Front, and Queer Nation were chronologically the most influential of these organizations.

The Mattachine Society

Founded in 1950 by eight gay men in Los Angeles, the Mattachine Society aimed to organize gay political liberation. The society arranged discussion groups for gay men to talk about their experiences and to share referrals for legal

services and psychological counseling. The group also lobbied extensively for the repeal of sodomy laws and other laws that were seen as discriminatory toward gay people. Mattachine groups started to spread across the United States in the 1950s, when the society started sponsoring social events and editing publications, such as the *Mattachine Review* and *ONE Magazine*.

Most Mattachine leaders were influenced by communist ideals and based their organization on the “cell structure” of the Communist Party USA. During the Red Scare, several members were placed under scrutiny by the federal government. Many founding members soon stepped down as conservative delegates challenged the group’s goals, including the idea that gay people were a legitimate minority group. The original founders resigned in 1953, and more conservative elements began to restructure the organization.

From that moment on, the Mattachine Society advocated accommodation and sought the support of the psychiatric profession, which they believed held the keys to reform. Following the Stonewall Riots of 1969, freshman activists began to view the organization as too traditional. Attendance at the discussion groups declined in the early 1970s and many local chapters folded quickly afterwards.

The Daughters of Bilitis

Founded by eight lesbians in 1955 in San Francisco, the Daughters of Bilitis is considered the first lesbian rights organization in the United States. The group was first conceived as a social club providing a venue for same-sex dancing. The most influential founding members, among them Phyllis Lyon and Del Martin, advised conformity to the straight mainstream, making the Daughters of Bilitis a rather conservative gay society by today’s standards. In the late 1950s, after allying itself with the Mattachine Society and *One Magazine*, the organization became more politically focused, hosting public forums on homosexuality, offering support to isolated lesbians, and participating in research activities. The organization collected some of the first statistical data on lesbians in the United States through their magazine *The Ladder*.

In the 1960s, the organization underwent a radical political shift under the direction of



Members of the Gay Liberation Front (GLF) picket Time, Inc. in New York, protesting the October 31, 1969 Time Magazine issue titled “The Homosexual in America.” The New York City GLF was the first gay liberation group to be formed, coming into being shortly after the Stonewall Riots of June 1969. (Courtesy of Diana Davies Photographs, Manuscripts and Archives Division, The New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations)

Barbara Gittings, editor of *The Ladder* from 1963 to 1966. Because *The Ladder* was the principal means of communication between leaders of the Daughters of Bilitis and its local chapters, the position of editor was very powerful. Barbara Gitting changed the editorial focus of the magazine, emphasizing the importance for lesbians to be more visible and political. In 1968, feminist activist Barbara Grier, new editor of *The Ladder*, dropped the word “lesbian” from the subheading “A Lesbian Review” to attract feminist readers. Barbara Grier doubled the size of the magazine and devoted much space to feminist ideals. Many members, discontent with the shift from lesbian rights to women’s rights, left the group. After the group disbanded in 1970, Barbara Grier was convinced that *The Ladder* could run independently, but failed to obtain funds, subscriptions, and advertisement funds to keep the magazine in publication. *The Ladder* ceased its run in 1972 due to financial difficulties.

Student Activism

In 1967, Stephan Donaldson, a Columbia University student, was forced by his school to move out of his residence hall after his roommates complained about his homosexual tendencies. In response to this discriminatory action, Donaldson founded the Student Homophile League, which

was the first student gay rights organization in the United States. Student Homophile League branches were subsequently created at Cornell University and New York University in 1968 and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the spring of 1969. By 1971, more than 175 colleges and universities had LGBT student organizations.

These organizations provided support for homosexual students, edited gay rights literature, held dances, and sponsored lectures about homosexuality. Members in GLF-type groups were generally visible and political on campuses. Many of them were involved with other militant groups such as the Black Power movement and the anti-war movement. They saw gay rights as part of a larger movement to transform society. These new LGBT activists were often committed to radical social change: their own liberation was tied to the liberation of all oppressed peoples.

Despite the fact that most of these groups supported women's liberation, many of them were dominated by men. In fact, activities were aimed at the needs of gay men, even to the point of excluding the needs of lesbians and bisexual women. By 1971, lesbians and bisexual women on campuses started to hold their own dances and social activities, and eventually created their own groups.

Gay Liberation Front

In 1969, after the police raided the Stonewall Inn, a popular gay bar in New York City, the gay community rioted in protest against the abusive tactics of the police. A call for "Gay Power" was issued by many riot participants who distributed leaflets containing an appeal for an organized response. Within weeks of these events, gay and lesbian activists around the country formed the Gay Liberation Front (GLF). The GLF defined itself as a "revolutionary organization" that hoped to transform society by dismantling social institutions such as marriage and the traditional family unit. The group spread rapidly across the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the rest of Western Europe.

The Gay Liberation Front did not limit its political actions to gay causes. Many GLF members protested with the Black Panthers, feminist groups, and anti-Vietnam War activists.

Many GLF lesbians enriched the movement with the principles of radical feminism, allowing GLF activists to argue that the institution of heterosexual families necessitated discrimination against homosexuals: homosexuality was therefore a form of political resistance. GLF activists were extremely visible in demonstrations, speeches, confrontations, organized marches, sit-ins, street theater, meetings, books, films, and "zaps" designed to disrupt events promoting homophobic values. They also engaged in the technique of "outing."

Though the GLF disbanded in 1972, its activists kept working on political issues. The GLF influenced gay activism throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially when ACT UP and Queer Nation were formed to fight homophobia. Many of the leaders of these two groups had been active in the GLF.

Transgender Activism

Transsexual activism first emerged in San Francisco in 1966, when transgender prostitutes in the Tenderloin rioted at a local cafeteria against police harassment. After the riot, transsexuals formed COG (Conversion Our Goal) in 1967, which later became the Transsexual Counseling Unit. This group was funded by a wealthy female-to-male transsexual named Reed Erickson, and corresponded with transsexuals across the nation thanks to the involvement of *Queens Magazine*, edited by famous drag activist Lee Brewster.

In the late 1960s, transgender activism joined the gay liberation movement. Transgender "street queens" played a major role in the Stonewall Riots, and Silvia Rivera, a transgender woman, was an early member of the Gay Liberation Front and Gay Activists Alliance. With Marsha P. Johnson, she founded STAR (Street Transvestite Action Revolutionaries) in 1970. The first transgender community-based organization, the Labyrinth Foundation Counseling Service, opened in the late 1960s and was founded by Mario Martino.

In California, leading transsexual figure Angela Douglas founded TAO (Transsexual/Transvestite Action Organization) in 1970, which published the *Moonshadow* and *Mirage* newsletters. In 1972, TAO moved to Miami, where it became the first international transgender community organization.

Queer Nation

Queer Nation was launched in New York in 1990 when 60 queers gathered at the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Community Services Center in New York's Greenwich Village to create an organization with the dual purpose of eliminating homophobia and increasing the visibility of gays. Within a week, several chapters were created across the US, from San Francisco to Boston.

Queer Nation influenced American sexual politics dramatically: the acceptability of gay representations in popular mass culture in the early 1990s can be dated to the creation of the organization. Queer Nation reclaimed the word "queer," which had previously only been used in the pejorative sense. While the group's use of the word in their name was first considered shocking, the reclamation was successful, as can be seen by the use of "queer" in the titles of mainstream television programs such as *Queer Eye for the Straight Guy* and *Queer as Folk*.

Not depending on any structure or leadership, the organization relied mainly on community meetings to plan cleverly named political actions, the most famous of which were "LABIA" (Lesbians and Bisexuals in Action) and "SHOP" (Suburban Homosexual Outreach Project). However, the organization preferred short-term visible actions, such as same-sex kiss-ins at shopping malls. Queer Nation regularly outed public figures. Queer Nation's political philosophy was summed up by its slogan: "We're queer, we're here, get used to it!"

SEE ALSO: Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements, Australia; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements, Canada; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements, Germany

References and Suggested Readings

- D'Emilio, J. (1983) *Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940–1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Eisenback, D. (2007) *Gay Power: An American Revolution*. New York: Da Capo Press.
- Gallo, M. M. (2006) *Different Daughters: A History of the Daughters of Bilitis and the Rise of the Lesbian Movement*. New York: Seal Press.
- Sears, J. (2006) *Behind the Mask of Mattachine: The Hal Call Chronicles and the Early Movement for Homosexual Emancipation*. New York: Routledge.

Lesotho, popular protest and resistance

Balam Nyeko

From the moment of European intervention during the late nineteenth century through the colonial period up to contemporary times, Lesotho (formerly Basutoland), a tiny southern African kingdom completely surrounded by the modern state of South Africa, has experienced popular resistance of one kind or another. While the earlier phase of this resistance tended to be spearheaded by Basotho chiefs wishing to protest the erosion of power by colonial rule, the later period was marked by growing popular, frequently spontaneous, action by the general population.

The Kingdom

The Lesotho kingdom was formed in 1818 as a comparatively decentralized entity by King Moshoeshoe I. The existence of the *pitso*, an assembly of chiefs and commoners, allowed fairly open and frank discussion of issues of major policy. The kingdom was considered among the most highly democratic in southern African precolonial societies, providing a forum for the Basotho people.

The kingdom had a tradition of meetings where commoners articulated grievances against rulers. Typically, the authorities did not engage in severe retribution in response to open criticism of the authorities at the *pitso*. On the contrary, anyone asking "awkward" questions of the chiefs usually received the admiration of the audience, though occasionally at "the displeasure of the chiefs" (Gill 1993: 49). This culture of vigorous public debate runs throughout the modern history of Lesotho.

Popular resistance took diverse forms. In 1868, following ongoing clashes with and loss of land to the Afrikaners of the Orange Free State, the country became the British protectorate of Basutoland. It was annexed to the Cape Colony in 1871, and in 1879 Chief Moorosi spearheaded a revolt, leading to his death and civil war. British attempts to disarm Africans led to the uprising called the "Gun War" of 1880–1, directed against disarmament and incorporation into the Cape Colony, which threatened Basotho economic

independence, customs, and practices. In 1884, Basutoland was transferred back to crown control, under indirect rule.

The Protectorate

The early twentieth century saw the formation of the first overtly anti-colonial protest organization by the Basotho, whose major concern was to ameliorate colonialism's social and economic inequality.

The Basutoland Progressive Association (BPA) was launched at Teyateyaneng in northern Basutoland in 1907 by commoner Basotho citizens educated by the Protestant Church. BPA's founding president, Reverend Cranmer Sebeta, was superseded by Simon Phamotse, a Mosotho educated both in South Africa and Lesotho. BPA members desired improved treatment of the Africans from the colonial state and improved agricultural facilities, trade and employment opportunities, and educational and health services. While grievances arose from the patently inferior position of the African population, mostly peasants, they were initially articulated and presented to the authorities by the newly educated elite, primarily men and women from mission stations, primary schools, the ancillary clerical staff of the colonial administration, and emerging trading centers.

The small educated elite's commitment to Basotho commoners was vitiated by their friendly disposition toward the colonial state, despite some criticism. As Rugege (1993: 172) points out, the Association "never seriously questioned the legitimacy of British rule in Lesotho." Neither could it claim to speak on behalf of the majority of the Basotho population, concerned as it was with the claims to privileges of the "educated" elite, the "Black Englishmen." The BPA couched criticism of the British colonial government in politely worded petitions and achieved no substantial concessions as a protest organization, preoccupied mainly with its campaign seeking recognition by the colonial state rather than the representation of the interests of ordinary Basotho.

In 1919, the Lekhotla la Bafo (The Council of Commons, LLB) was founded in Mapoteng by two largely self-educated brothers, Maphutseng and Josiel Lefela. The organization presented a marked contrast to the BPA. From the outset, the Basotho commoners' organization first and

foremost represented peasant grievances against colonialism and traditional authorities. LLB was concerned with countering chiefly abuse of power and ensuring representation of commoners in the Basutoland National Council (BNC), a body constituted by the British colonial administration in the early twentieth century. The BNC ostensibly permitted the Basotho to express views to their governors, but in practice it was a vehicle for advancing chiefly and colonial interests.

The LLB was not merely content to dispatch delegations to discuss multifarious grievances with colonial authorities, it was also prepared to use other avenues for protest. Unlike the BPA, the LLB organized boycotts and strikes and published fairly radical articles in the local newspaper, *Naled ea Lesotho*. With a substantially larger following than the BPA, the LLB represented a far wider area of the country, including the poor, landless, and migrant laborers.

Apart from its campaign for inclusion, as representatives of ordinary Basotho in the BNC, the LLB was also concerned with the chiefs' exploitation of *matsema* (traditional work parties) of commoners' labor in the cultivation of personal gardens. In the precolonial period, this practice was regulated to benefit the wider population: the produce from fields was shared and *matsema* restricted to specifically identified gardens. In the early twentieth century, chiefs began to take advantage of *matsema* to cultivate and harvest comparatively large personal fields, selling the produce for profit. The LLB strongly criticized chiefs for abusing the institution (Edgar n.d.; Nyeko 2001).

Similarly, the LLB bitterly attacked the excesses of the British colonial state, missionaries, and European traders. It accused the colonial administration of providing Basotho with inferior education and introducing unpopular measures such as compulsory cattle dipping to eradicate disease (Nyeko 2001). The LLB also claimed that British officials worked to advance the South African government's interests in the country, while missionaries were severely criticized for undermining Basotho culture and "spirit of independence." As Mekenye (1996: 310) writes, missionaries were, in the organization's view, guilty of encouraging Basotho to embrace European culture and "to become involved in commodity production . . . and [in] consuming European goods." All this, the organization

argued, only made the country more vulnerable to imperialism and capitalism. Among other factors, the LLB persistently condemned the missionaries in Lesotho for contributing to breakaway churches, led by Africans rather than Europeans, in Southern Africa (Nyeko 2001: 144).

The LLB was pivotal in resisting the future of the British High Commission territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland. At the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the future of these British territories was unresolved, though the new Union government expected eventual incorporation, a position Africans in the territories strongly opposed. In Lesotho, the LLB advanced the campaign to resist incorporation. Protests supplemented equally stiff opposition by the BNC and BPA. The LLB, however, went further and enlisted the support of Sobhuza II, the Swazi king, directly appealing for his support to form a common forum, The Association of Protectorates, with African leaders from all three protectorates during the 1920s and 1930s. This campaign was pursued on the basis of deep disapproval of the discriminatory policies of the Union of South Africa, such as Prime Minister J. B. M. Hertzog's Native Bills of 1936.

The broad outlook of the LLB was further reflected through its determination to forge ties with organizations outside Basutoland that also opposed imperialism and wanted to improve the life of the ordinary people. LLB established a friendly relationship with the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), which agreed to publish several LLB articles in its papers. The CPSA hoped that the LLB might join its Federation of Non-European Trade Unions (FNETU).

A critical factor in developing cross-border political networks was that many Basotho were employed in South Africa as migrant miners and farm workers. By 1920, the High Commission territories provided around 13 percent of the African mine labor force of South Africa, with the Basotho were well known as mine workers. Despite stringent restrictions by the colonial state, the LLB thrived throughout the 1930s and 1940s, successfully laying the foundation for the subsequent anti-colonial political struggle of the 1950s and 1960s.

If the first anti-colonial protests advanced the particular interests of the educated elite and were symptomatic of the "proto-nationalist"

sentiment of the Basotho, an overtly nationalist movement for independence subsequently broke out from the 1950s. In this later phase, Basotho politicians and followers displayed remarkable awareness of the importance of the pan-African context of Lesotho's own politics.

The key political organizations in the anti-colonial protests in this era included the comparatively militant and Protestant-based Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), the Roman Catholic-dominated Basutoland National Party (BNP), the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), and the small but ideologically important Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL), linked to the CPSA and its successor, the South African Communist Party (SACP).

The BCP may be seen as the direct successor of the BPA and the LLB (Nyeko 2001: 154). In subsequent years it was characterized by the militant Africanist tendencies associated with its leader Ntsu Mokhehle, who began his political activism in South Africa as a member of the African National Congress (ANC) Youth League, meeting South African contemporaries including Nelson Mandela, Robert Sobukwe, and Anton Lembede. The BCP was closely associated with the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), an exclusivist African group that broke from the ANC in 1959, citing undue white, Indian, and Communist influence. Potlako Leballo, a key PAC leader, was a founder of the BCP.

The BNP was founded mainly as a result of disillusionment among conservative Roman Catholic Basotho with BCP's militancy and Pan-Africanist perspective. Although no organization gained the status of a mass political organization, all attempted with varying degrees of success to articulate the interests of both the urban and rural poor of Lesotho. To that extent, they successfully channeled Basotho anti-colonial sentiment.

Independence and After

The BNC requested the right to legislate its own affairs, leading to a new constitution in 1959 providing the first elected legislature in 1965, followed by general elections on the basis of universal suffrage. The BNP won 31 and the BCP 25 of the 65 seats. Following Lesotho's formal political independence in September 1966 as a constitutional monarchy, the country continued the

tradition of political protest over social and economic demands.

When results from the first post-independence elections in 1970 indicated BNP's defeat, Chief Leabua Jonathan, the kingdom's first prime minister, nullified the elections and overturned the constitution. The BCP embarked on a series of pro-democracy and anti-dictatorship campaigns. In 1974, the BCP launched an unsuccessful uprising, sending cadres for military training at PAC camps. In 1979, BCP began a guerilla war via the Lesotho Liberation Army. In 1986, partly in response to political instability under the Leabua government, a military junta led by Major General J. M. Lekhanya took executive power, ruling in conjunction with Moshoeshe II (Pule 2001).

The junta faced vigorous resistance, and popular demands for restoration of democratic rule in Lesotho continued. In 1990, Moshoeshe, stripped by the junta of his powers, left into exile. Leabua purged his government and announced plans to restore multiparty democracy, but in 1991 he was ousted in an army mutiny. In 1993, a new constitution was established, severely circumscribing the king's powers, and the BCP won every seat in the elections that year.

While military rule was ended, political stability was not restored, as the army, police, and prison services mutinied. In 1994, King Letsie III dissolved parliament, an unpopular action which led to a palace coup and mass protest forcing the reinstatement of the BCP government within a month. In the following years, mass strikes occurred, and the police mutinied in 1997.

In 1997, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) broke away from BCP and formed a new government. The LCD swept the polls in 1998, but allegations of severe irregularities led to major protests. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) investigated, found no evidence of foul play, but opposition protests continued, escalating into unprecedented insurrections in August 1998, followed by an army mutiny in September.

In September 1998, South Africa intervened in Lesotho, at the invitation of the LCD government, provoking Basotho commoners into violent and widespread resistance against the invading forces and the incumbent Basotho authorities. The intervention and uprising led to large-scale destruction of the capital, Maseru,

urban centers such as Mafeteng, and smaller towns. An interim political authority revised the constitution, adding measures for proportional representation and expanding representation of opposition parties in the 2002 elections, although the LCD remained the ruling party.

In addition to political protest, however, Sotho popular resistance in the modern era was often concerned with socioeconomic grievances, as witnessed by a series of events during and since the 1990s. Over the years, Chinese presence in Lesotho has grown substantially as more investors have arrived from mainland China and Taiwan to establish textile factories, becoming Lesotho's biggest employers. Foreign-controlled factories led to the rise of strong anti-Chinese resentment, particularly as Chinese expanded into retail, even in the remotest parts of the country. In 1991, tensions against Chinese traders in Maseru and other major towns led to serious popular unrest. Protest and uprisings against Chinese businesses broke out in Maseru in November 2007, a culmination of a long-held opposition to foreign domination of the country's businesses, coinciding with China's growing economic influence in Africa.

Basotho's resentment of foreign domination was also evident in the displacement of communities in the farming area in the construction of the Mohale Dam in the late 1980s and early 1990s through the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP). As with similar projects in Southern Africa, LHWP is orientated toward serving South Africa. The popular understanding had been that displaced communities would be compensated fairly. Thousands of protesters demonstrated at Mohale, Katse, and Muela Dams in November 2001 against the LHWP's failure to compensate them adequately or fulfill promises of "development" in the region. Peasants complained that they were completely ignored and benefits were not shared between South Africa, Lesotho, the company responsible for the construction, and ordinary Basotho residents. The Basotho had resorted to their well-established and long-cherished tradition of openly expressing grievances and fearless protest when they are treated unfairly.

SEE ALSO: Botswana, Protest and Nationalism; Communist Party of South Africa, 1921–1950; Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; Southern Africa, Popular Resistance to

Neoliberalism, 1982–2007; Swaziland, Nationalist and Economic Protests; Tambo, Oliver (1917–1993)

References and Suggested Readings

- Edgar, R. (n.d.) *Prophets with Honor: A Documentary History of the Lekhotla la Bafo*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- Eldredge, E. A. (1993) *A South African Kingdom: The Pursuit of Security in Nineteenth-Century Lesotho*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gill, S. J. (1993) *A Short History of Lesotho*. Morija, Lesotho: Morija Museum and Archives.
- Mekenyé, R. O. (1996) *The African Struggle Against South African Periphery Imperialism, 1902–1966: The Case of Lesotho*. PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles.
- Nyeko, B. (2001) *The Independence Movement, 1952–1966*. In N. W. Pule & M. Thabane (Eds.), *Essays on Aspects of the Political Economy of Lesotho 1500–2000*. Roma, Lesotho: National University of Lesotho, pp. 153–72.
- Pule, N. W. (2001) *Politics since Independence*. In N. W. Pule & M. Thabane (Eds.), *Essays on Aspects of the Political Economy of Lesotho 1500–2000*. Roma, Lesotho: National University of Lesotho, pp. 173–211.
- Rugege, S. (1993) *Chieftaincy and Society in Lesotho: A Study in the Political Economy of the Basotho Chieftaincy from Pre-Colonial Times to the Present*. DPhil thesis, University of Oxford.
- Weisfelder, R. F. (1999) *Political Contention in Lesotho 1952–1965*. Roma, Lesotho: National University of Lesotho.

Li Lisan (1899–1967)

Alexander V. Pantsov

Li Lisan, whose real name was Li Longzhi, was among the most important leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in its early years. Li was born in Liling County, Hunan, to the family of an intellectual. After completing his secondary education, in 1919 he sailed from China to France to participate in a work-study program. He was arrested in France in 1920 and deported to China. He joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 and in 1922 was a leader of the famous Anyuan miners' strike. In 1923 he was appointed secretary of the Wuhan Regional CCP Committee. The following year he became secretary of the Labor Commission of the Shanghai Regional CCP Committee, and in 1925 he headed the Shanghai Trade Union Council.

In December 1925 Li arrived in Moscow for the first time to attend the Fourth Congress of the Profintern (the “Red International of Labor Unions”) and the Sixth Enlarged Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) Plenum. He reported to the plenum on the labor movement in China. In the spring of 1926 he returned to China and served as one of the top leaders of the Chinese labor movement. In 1927 he was promoted to become head of the Party’s Central Committee (CCP CC) Workers Department. In May 1927 he was elected a member of the CCP CC Politburo. After the Communist defeat by Chiang Kai-Shek’s Guomindang (Nationalist Party) forces in 1927, Li was appointed secretary of the Guangdong Provincial CCP Committee.

In June 1928 Li returned to Moscow to attend the Sixth Congress of the CCP. The following month he was elected an alternate member of the CCP CC Politburo, and became head of the CC Propaganda Department. He went back to China that summer, and through September 1930 was the *de facto* leader of the CCP CC. After the Communist armies suffered serious defeats in June–September 1930 due to their following the Comintern’s tactical course, the ECCI made Li Lisan a scapegoat by blaming him for creating the ultra-leftist “Li Lisan line,” which had called for a countrywide uprising. However, in September 1930 ECCI envoys Qu Qiubai and Zhou Enlai put together a compromise at the CCP CC Third Plenum: Li was criticized, but at the same time promoted to full membership on the Politburo. Due to the ECCI’s lack of confidence in him, however, Li was summoned to Moscow. Shortly thereafter, in the reorganization of the CCP leadership carried out by the new ECCI proconsul Pavel Mif, Li was ejected from the CCP CC Politburo.

Upon his arrival in Moscow Li participated in the discussion organized by the ECCI Presidium on the Li Lisan line, admitted his “mistakes,” and was sent to work at various industrial plants in the Soviet Union. In March–April 1931 he attended the ECCI Eleventh Plenum as a “guest.” On August 5, 1931 he entered the Russian sector of the International Lenin School (MLSh), where he would study until December 1, 1932. In 1932 he became a member of the CCP delegation to the ECCI and representative of the All-China Federation of Labor General Council to the Profintern. While in Moscow he married

a Russian woman, Elizaveta Pavlovna Kishkina. In August–September 1932 he attended the Twelfth Plenum of the ECCI. In 1934–5 he worked as a liaison between the ECCI and the CCP CC in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan. In July–August 1935 he attended the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern with full voting rights. In the fall of 1935 he became head of the Chinese Department of the Publishing House of Foreign Workers in the USSR, run by the Comintern. Shortly afterwards he was appointed editor-in-chief of the Comintern Chinese newspaper *Jiuguo shibao* (National Salvation).

However, by 1937 Li had once again fallen into deep disfavor. In February 1938 he was expelled from the CCP, accused of being a Japanese spy, and arrested by Stalin's secret police, the NKVD. On November 4, 1939 he was released and restored to his position in the Chinese Department of the former Comintern Worker's Publishing house (meanwhile renamed the Foreign Language Publishing house). In April 1945, on Mao Zedong's proposal, Li was reelected *in absentia* to membership on the CCP CC. He returned to China early in 1946 and served as a member of the CCP CC Northeast Bureau and concurrent head of the CC Urban Work Department during the civil war of 1946–9. After the Communist victory in 1949 he served in succession as deputy chairman of the General Council of the All-China Federation of Labor, minister of labor, and secretary of the CCP CC North China Bureau. At the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956 he was reelected to membership on the CCP CC.

During the Cultural Revolution Li was severely criticized (as a "Soviet agent") and beaten by *zaofans* (members of an ultra-radical Red Guard faction). Spiritually broken, he apparently committed suicide in Beijing on June 22 1967 by taking a large dose of sleeping pills. The actual circumstances surrounding his death, however, are obscure.

SEE ALSO: Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

Xiang Qing (1985) *Gongchan goji yu Zhongguo geming guanxi lunwenji* (Collection of Articles on the Relationship between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 337–42, 367–8.

Liberia, protest and revolution in the modern era

Michael O. N. Kunnuji

The uprisings that rocked the Republic of Liberia beginning in the last quarter of the twentieth century constitute a resounding case in point in studies of protest and revolution. Although it is easy to call attention to the proximate contributory factors in explaining the origin of what some have described as a complex political emergency in Liberia, the uprisings have their roots in the very foundation of the republic. The composition of the population of modern-day Liberia is not unconnected with the transatlantic slave trade and its abolition, which resulted in the settlement of freed repatriated African slaves from the Americas – Americo-Liberians – beginning on January 7, 1822. However, there are about 16 major indigenous ethnic groups in the area known as the Republic of Liberia.

The Americo-Liberians, having had a hazy idea of sovereign statehood in America, declared a republic with a constitution fashioned after that of the US in 1847. Yet full citizenship rights were not accorded the indigenous population. Indigenous people had no voting rights and the state apparatus was little more than a tool for plundering and legitimizing control over state resources. The Americo-Liberians were the lords, while the indigenous people were the slaves, in reality if not in name. The life of conspicuous consumption lived by the Americo-Liberians attests to this. The founding of the True Whig Party of Americo-Liberian elites in 1870 and its ascension to power led to the repression of all forms of dissent with the apparatus of state machinery of force.

The repressive rule of the Americo-Liberians continued unabated for a century and a decade as the indigenous people grew increasingly dissatisfied. Their dissatisfaction was in need of an outlet, and it found one in the first major uprising in the republic – the military coup of 1980, which resulted in the end of Americo-Liberian domination of the indigenous people. On the death of William V. S. Tubman, an Americo-Liberian who had served as president from 1944 to 1971, William Tolbert, his deputy,

took over. Riots broke out in April 1979, compelling Tolbert, a rather liberal leader, to apply force to maintain order. Opposition leaders were arrested and were to be tried. Tolbert's administrative schedules were, however, truncated by the military coup of 1980, and Tolbert himself was killed afterwards.

Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, the new military head, knew very little about governance and the functioning of state. As military head of state, Doe ruled from 1980 with the support of his Krahn kinsmen. They suppressed a 1985 attempted coup by Quinwonkpa, of Gio origin, and Doe extended the franchise to the indigenous people, winning the presidential election through fraud that year. There was, therefore, a good recipe for cataclysm: a state whose withering apparatuses were being replaced by kinsmen; a state without a functioning social contract; a people without a tradition of democracy and accountability; factionalism among the indigenous peoples; and a brutal ruler.

Violent protests were brewing. In an event that marked the beginning of war on December 24, 1989, a small rebel army of exiles led by Charles Taylor (an ex-minister of Doe) sneaked into Liberia from Côte d'Ivoire. By June 1990, the group – the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) – had risen to over 5,000 men from about 100 some six months earlier; nine months later, it had risen to about 10,000 men. NPFL was advancing steadily, capturing territories. All Doe could do was attack Gios and Manos, who were seen as the enemies. Taylor's NPFL retaliated by attacking Krahns and Madingos. Both sides brutally killed unarmed citizens as the violence escalated.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent in a Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to separate the warring factions and stop the bloodshed. Boas (2001: 710) has shown that the decision was not entirely altruistic. He says that, as Doe's failure to hold on to power was imminent, "Ibrahim Babangida was alarmed by the spectre of a civilian uprising overthrowing a military government." To make matters worse, other factions were emerging and Taylor's NPFL split, with the faction led by Yeduo Johnson advancing ahead of Taylor into the capital, Monrovia, to occupy part of it. Samuel Doe, perceiving that the end had come, chose to meet ECOMOG representatives to facilitate negotiations among the warring

parties but was encountered by Johnson's soldiers, who captured, tortured, and killed him. Then began the tussle between Johnson and Taylor. Taylor carved for himself a territory called "Greater Liberia," with its capital in Gbarnga, while other warlords also captured counties and plundered them. Brutality spread throughout the rural parts of the state, but ECOMOG worked hard to keep the warring factions out of the state capital, Monrovia. Eventually, however, ECOMOG became just one of the warring factions.

Access to state resources through looting contributed to the lengthening of the war by making it possible for the factions to purchase weapons and ammunitions, and by giving the warlords a taste of the great wealth they stood to control if they won the war. In explicit terms, Ross (2004) has shown how resources could lengthen a war. Liberia's timber, diamonds, iron ore, palm oil, cocoa, coffee, marijuana, rubber, and gold played this role perfectly.

While this unpleasant scenario played itself out, an Interim Government of National Unity headed by Amos Sawyer was installed by ECOMOG on April 20, 1991, yet the state could not recover from its collapse. The interim government was weak and ineffective. United Nations agencies, the European Union, and non-government organizations took over the provision of services. The stalemate prolonged the war and triggered a war in Sierra Leone and other nearby states. The Liberian war, therefore, fueled and was fueled by uprisings in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte d'Ivoire.

The revolution spread in other ways as well. As warlords became *lords* with access to state resources, they would relinquish that status only for higher status, which they were not guaranteed in the new order. Therefore, nominally independent surrogate factions were formed, which were at liberty to continue to plunder because they never signed the peace pacts. Other factors helped keep the war going as well, such as the readiness of the warring parties to continue fighting and the absence of capable and committed third-party arbitrators.

A number of attempts were made to stop the fighting. In 1994, the first Liberian National Transitional Government was installed with warlords as members. This was to be replaced by the Second Transitional Government in August 1996. The disarmament plan was far from being successful, partly because, as Sesay (1996: 406)

puts it, for many the gun had become their “credit card.” With the war in Liberia becoming a regional embarrassment, General Sanni Abacha, the Nigerian military ruler whose human rights abuses had attracted sanctions from western powers, saw an opportunity to launder his image by bringing the war in Liberia to an end. Abacha reinforced ECOMOG and elections were held in 1997. Relative calm prevailed from 1997 to 2000, yet human rights abuses continued. The secret elimination of Samuel Dokie, an opposition leader, and his family attests to this. The Abuja agreement by which ECOMOG would monitor the restructuring of the armed forces was reneged on by Taylor, whose NPFL literally metamorphosed into the National Police Force and other state apparatuses of force. Once again, the opportunity to establish a modern political culture was squandered, and Taylor joined the list of political actors validating the hypothesis that today’s obsessive freedom fighter is tomorrow’s tyrant.

Taylor’s excesses were challenged first by Liberians United for Reconstruction and Democracy (LURD), and then by the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). By May 2003, only about a third of the country was under Taylor’s control. After several pleas, Taylor agreed to step down, and on June 17, 2003, a ceasefire agreement was signed. Nigeria, having recorded great losses in terms of lives (at least 1,000 men) and resources, reluctantly redeployed peacekeepers under the aegis of the ECOWAS Military Operation in Liberia (ECOMIL). In August 2003, Taylor accepted exile in Nigeria, and a new Interim Government headed by Gyude Bryant was inaugurated on October 14, 2003. The elections that followed saw the victory of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who is faced with the challenge of reconstructing the Liberian state and uprooting the “seeds of hatred [which] were planted into the Liberian society from the outset” (Boas 2001: 702).

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, British, and the Founding of Sierra Leone; Côte d’Ivoire, Post-Independence Protest; Ghana, Nationalism and Socialist Transition; Sierra Leone, Protest and Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

Balch-Lindsay, D. & Enterline, A. J. (2000) Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992. *International Studies Quarterly* 44: 615–42.

- Boas, M. (2001) Liberia and Sierra Leone: Dead Ringers? The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule. *Third World Quarterly* 22 (5): 697–723.
- Moran, M. H. & Pitcher, M. A. (2004) The “Basket Case” and the “Poster Child”: Explaining the End of Civil Conflicts in Liberia and Mozambique. *Third World Quarterly* 25 (3): 501–19.
- Murshed, S. M. (2002) Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment: An Introduction. *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (4): 387–93.
- Outram, Q. (1999) Complex Political Emergencies. *Third World Quarterly* 20 (1): 163–73.
- Ross, M. L. (2004) How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases. *International Organization* 58 (1): 35–67.
- Sesay, M. A. (1996) Politics and Society in Post-War Liberia. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 34 (3): 395–420.

Liebkecht, Karl (1871–1919)

Michael F. Gretz

Karl Liebkecht was a German revolutionary leader, Marxist theoretician, and a main protagonist of the failed Spartacist uprising that followed Germany’s defeat in World War I. Remembered as one of the founders of German communism, he was a main figure of the post-World War I European revolutionary movement, using his oratorical skills and ability to motivate the masses to a level unsurpassed by any other communist leader outside of Russia at the time.

Liebkecht was born on August 13, 1871 in Leipzig. His father, Wilhelm, was a prominent figure in the German socialist movement and a close colleague of Marx and Engels. Wilhelm played a key role in the rise of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) during the latter half of the nineteenth century, which saw it grow to become one of Germany’s largest political parties, and in 1890 became editor of the SPD’s party newspaper, *Vörrwarts* (Forward). During this same year, Liebkecht completed his law studies and became more involved in the political work of the SPD. In 1903, he directed the legal defense of *Vörrwarts*, and later served as the chief defense attorney for the SPD in several anti-socialist trials. During this time, Liebkecht developed his skills as a public orator, often addressing audiences of thousands about the issues at stake in the trials.

In 1906, Liebknecht gave one of his most famous speeches, later published as *Militarismus und Antimilitarismus (Militarism and Anti-Militarism)*. In his speech, Liebknecht used Marxist theory to present a scathing criticism of the development of militarism, connecting it to colonial expansion and the ruling class's need to confront the growing working-class political movement. As a result of this speech, Liebknecht was charged with treason and sentenced to two years' imprisonment, and the pamphlet was banned. During his incarceration, he wrote *Studies in the Dynamic Laws of Social Development*.

Once released from prison, Liebknecht quickly returned to political activity and legal work in defense of fellow socialists. In 1912, he was elected to the Reichstag as a deputy for the SPD. When World War I broke out in 1914, despite deep reservations about supporting what he considered to be an imperialist war, he accepted party discipline, and along with all other SPD deputies voted to support the German government's war effort. However, by the end of the year, he was the only SPD deputy to vote against giving the government further war credits.

Liebknecht avoided expulsion from the SPD for his defiance of party discipline, but as the war progressed he became increasingly critical of his fellow socialists' support of the war. In 1916, Liebknecht, along with Rosa Luxemburg and other left-wing socialists, formed a new organization called Spartakusbund that openly called for the overthrow of the German Kaiser's government and an end to the war. In that same year, Liebknecht, along with Luxemburg and other Spartacists, was imprisoned once again. As the Spartakusbund moved closer to communist positions, the gap between them and the SPD grew wider. In 1918, with the war going badly for Germany, social unrest spread across the country as workers, soldiers, and sailors began to strike, many forming their own local councils that, as in Russia, challenged the authority of the central government.

In October 1918, Germany was forced to seek an armistice with the Allied Powers, and Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated. Liebknecht and Luxemburg were released from prison in the political amnesty that followed and immediately returned to their political activities with the Spartakusbund, which officially became the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) in December 1918. In that same month, with Germany in

the midst of a massive social movement growing more and more radical each day, Chancellor Max von Baden resigned and turned power over to the SPD. Faced with the growing radicalism of the working class, and the threat that the communists would try to establish a Soviet republic in Germany, the SPD government made a secret agreement with the army's General Staff to suppress the Berlin workers' and soldiers' councils. During the repression that followed, Liebknecht and Luxemburg were arrested on January 15, 1919. While the precise details remain unclear, as they were being transported to prison, both were assassinated by troops ostensibly under the command of the SPD.

SEE ALSO: Communist Party, Germany; Marxism; Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Social Democratic Party, Germany

References and Suggested Readings

- Frolich, P. (1972) *Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and Work*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Haffner, S. (1973) *Failure of a Revolution: Germany 1918–1919*. Chicago: Banner Press.
- Liebknecht, K. (1973) *Militarism and Anti-Militarism*. Cambridge: Writers & Readers.
- Nettl, P. (1969) *Rosa Luxemburg*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schorske, C. E. (1972) *German Social Democracy, 1905–1917: The Development of the Great Schism*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Stenson, G. P. (1981) "Not One Man! Not One Penny!" *German Social Democracy, 1863–1914*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Ligas Camponesas

Henrique Tahan Novaes

The Peasant Leagues (Ligas Camponesas) that appeared in 1955 are organizations that have come to symbolize the struggle for land reform in Brazil. Before the coup of 1964, Pernambuco, a state in Brazil's northeast, witnessed a process of modernization in the countryside that expelled small property owners and tenants from their subsistence cultures, seizing the land they once used and employing it in the single-crop cultivation of sugar cane, a product which has been cultivated in Brazil for more than four centuries.

In 1955 the Farming and Stock-Raising Society of Planters of Pernambuco (SAPP) emerged, later taking the name of the Peasant League of Galiléia. The SAPP was a fundraising civil society

of mutual assistance, which had as its initial goals the founding of a primary school and the purchase of small wooden coffins for the children of the region, who were dying in frightening numbers. It also wanted to acquire seeds, insecticides, agricultural tools, and governmental and technical assistance, and to create a cooperative involving 140 families and approximately 1,000 people. The sugar mill owner himself was summoned as the honorary president, but feared that such a role would brand him a “communist,” so he ordered the extinction of the SAPP. The peasants resisted, and the owner threatened them with eviction. José Francisco de Souza and Zezé dos Prazeres, an ex-militant of the PCB (Brazilian Communist Party) and one of the founders of the league, were subjected to threatening calls from the police department, the prosecuting attorney, the mayor, and the judge.

The peasants knew that Francisco Julião, as deputy at the Legislative Assembly of Pernambuco, had been defending rural workers and they looked to him to help raise the flag of radical land reform. They formed a movement that had national dimensions and international repercussions. In 1963 there were hundreds of leagues throughout the country, with more than 500,000 members in 16 Brazilian states, the main ones appearing in Pernambuco and Paraíba. The council of the State of Pernambuco alone coordinated 27 leagues with 120,000 affiliates.

With the appearance of the Peasant Leagues, the conservative wing of the Catholic Church and the labor ministry soon positioned themselves in the debate, helping to create conservative syndicates to fight them. In 1964, Brazil faced a military coup which brought back the old order, leading to the persecution of the Peasant Leagues.

SEE ALSO: Julião, Francisco (1915–1999); Movimento Sem Terra (MST); Via Campesina and Peasant Struggles

References and Suggested Readings

- Azevedo, F. de (1982) *As Ligas Camponesas*. São Paulo: Paz e Terra.
- Callado, A. (1960) *Os industriais da Seca e os “Galileus” de Pernambuco*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.
- Julião, F. (1962) *Que são as Ligas Camponesas?* Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.
- Linhart, R. (1980) *Le sucre et la faim: enquête dans les régions sucrières du Nord-est brésilien*. Paris: Minuit.
- Martins, J. (1986) *Camponeses e a política no Brasil*. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes.

Lilburne, John (1615–1657)

Soma Marik

John Lilburne, a Protestant dissenter and leader of the Levelers, was born in Sunderland to a noble family. After studying the Bible, Foxe’s *Book of Martyrs*, and the writings of the Puritan divines, he met the Puritan physician John Bastwick, who, with William Prynne and Henry Burton, was persecuted by Archbishop Laud of Canterbury in a famous case in 1637 for their anti-Episcopal positions. Involved in the printing and distribution of unlicensed Puritan books and pamphlets, Lilburne was arrested in December 1637 and brought before the Court of Star Chamber where he was sentenced to a £500 fine, whipping through the streets from prison to the pillory, punishment in the pillory, and imprisonment until he conformed. Instead of breaking down, he spoke out and distributed pamphlets concealed in his clothes, even as he was bleeding from the whipping. This courageous gesture won him the epithet “Free-Born John,” as well as further imprisonment.

Lilburne was finally released in November 1640, after a forceful intervention by Oliver Cromwell. On May 4, 1641 the House of Commons described his imprisonment as illegal, cruel, and tyrannical, and promised him compensation. In this period he married Elizabeth Dewell, who would be his staunch ally until his death.

Championing the Parliamentary Cause and Civil Liberties

During the English Civil War Lilburne joined the infantry as captain and fought at the battles of Edgehill and Brentford (November 12, 1642). At Brentford he evacuated the Parliamentary artillery but was captured. As the first ranking Parliamentary army officer captured, the Royalists planned to try him for high treason, but his wife petitioned Parliament, and the House of Commons adopted a resolution threatening to kill Royalist prisoners in retaliation. Eventually freed through an exchange of prisoners in May 1643, Lilburne became a lieutenant-colonel in the Earl of Manchester’s army with Cromwell’s support. He fought at the crucial battle of Marston Moor (July 2, 1644), when the North of England fell to

Parliament. Shortly after this he secured the surrender of the Royalist Tickhill Castle without a single death on his side. But when Parliament agreed to the Solemn League and Covenant, seeking to impose a uniform church, Lilburne resigned his commission.

Lilburne's commitment to the rights of the individual, particularly freedom of conscience, as well as to the rights of the socially weaker sections, brought him into confrontation with the conservative Presbyterian majority in Parliament. In *A Copie of a Letter to Mr. William Prynne* (January, 1645) Lilburne condemned persecution of people for differences in matters of conscience. Prynne and his supporters responded by a serious attack, resulting in his arrest and confinement in Newgate prison where he wrote *England's Birth-right Justified Against All Usurpations Whether Regal or Parliamentary*. In this work he used political texts and relied upon the concept of the Norman Yoke, or the idea that there had been an age-old freedom of the Anglo-Saxons, embodied in the sovereignty of the popular assembly, which had been destroyed by the Norman conquerors.

Released in November 1645, Lilburne was again sent to Newgate prison in June 1646 for denying the right of the House of Lords to judge and sentence commoners in criminal cases. His *The Freemans Freedom Vindicated* (June 1646) argued that the source of all authority is the voluntary agreement of sovereign individuals by terms set forth in the social contract, and that consequently popular power was inalienable. The House of Lords ordered the public burning of the pamphlet, and imposed a fine of £2,000 and imprisonment on Lilburne.

The Leveler Movement

Lilburne soon developed a following. William Walwyn defended him in *A Pearle in a Dounghill*, and Richard Overton wrote *A Remonstrance of many Thousand Citizens of England to their owne House of Commons* to articulate the constitutional principles of a democratic republican form of government. Overton and his family soon joined Lilburne in jail, followed in early 1647 by Elizabeth Lilburne. The spring of 1647 found a full-fledged democratic agitation, given the title "Leveler" by its opponents, though Lilburne always rejected the term as he was not in favor of economic egalitarianism.

Leveler proposals, which he had a big hand in formulating, included freedom of religion and press, no judgment touching life or liberty without trial by jury, no military conscription of conscientious objectors, abolition of capital punishment except for murder, and abolition of imprisonment for debt. His core demand for a new form of government, answerable to the people, became a focal point in the formation of the movement, which was the result of an alliance between the civilian democrats and democratic forces within the New Model Army, created by often lower-class volunteers. Reform of the franchise also became a key issue to these forces.

After a failed semi-insurrection at Corkbush Field, the civilian Levelers built up their party organization and launched a regular paper, *The Moderate*. Despite being repeatedly imprisoned, Lilburne conducted much of the agitation. He drafted most of a petition planned for January 1648, demanded reform of law and judiciary, a social fund to look to the needs of the poor, a progressive property tax, and the introduction of universal suffrage and a more equitable distribution of electoral constituencies. Parliament condemned him to strict isolation in the Tower, but he declared Parliament's warrant illegal and appeared before the House of Commons to urge soldiers to preserve, rather than destroy, liberties.

Released during the Second Civil War which began after Charles I fled captivity (November 11, 1647), Lilburne argued that unless a constitution was granted first, the trial of the king might lead to a tyranny by the senior army officers, or "Grandeeds." When Lilburne and his friends accepted a compromise, agreeing to drop the demand for manhood suffrage for an expanded but still limited suffrage, they found Cromwell's allies passing on the agreed text to the Officers' Council for amendment. Lilburne, offered a place on the court to try Charles, refused and labeled the trial unrestricted tyranny by the Grandeeds. His pamphlet *Englands New Chains Discovered* (February 26, 1649) described the rule of the Rump Parliament and the army officers as the vilest and basest bondage ever in England. This was followed by several protest pamphlets, particularly *The Second Part of Englands New Chains Discovered*, authored by Lilburne, Overton, and Prince. As a result, they, along with Walwyn, were arrested. All four challenged the legality of their arrests and of

the authority of the recently created Council of State. They were refused bail and sent to the Tower to await trial. While there they worked on a new draft of the *Agreement of the People*, omitting some of the concessions made earlier for the sake of a compromise with the Grandees. Meanwhile, three military Leveller mutinies, in London, Burford, and Banbury, were defeated in April and May 1649. With this ended the Leveller challenge.

Lilburne and the Protectorate

Lilburne's trial began on October 25, 1649. With his life at stake he spent two days browbeating his judges and eventually secured from the jury a verdict of Not Guilty. Bonfires were lit all over London in jubilation. But the Leveller party was finished.

Finally compensated for his imprisonment and injuries during the monarchy, he used the money to buy a house and begin practice as a legal consultant. This involved him in a serious case against Sir Arthur Haselrig, an MP who was using questionable means to amass money. Since many Parliamentarians used similar means, Parliament unsurprisingly claimed Lilburne was wrong and fined him £7,000, sentenced him to perpetual banishment, and threatened him with death if he did not leave England within 30 days. Despite attempts to detain him in England to ensure his execution, he managed to get on board a ship to Holland, but English Royalists in Amsterdam detested him, and he felt threatened. In 1653, after Cromwell dissolved the Rump Parliament, Lilburne returned to England, arguing that the dissolution of the Rump Parliament nullified its order concerning him. He was arrested and put on trial, but masses packed the courtroom. After another brilliant display of legal and political acumen, he secured a Not Guilty verdict from the jury on August 20, but was kept in prison. He converted to the Quaker faith, and after being temporarily released to rejoin his family, he died on August 29, 1657, at the age of 42.

SEE ALSO: English Revolution, 17th Century; English Revolution, Radical Sects

References and Suggested Readings

Barg, M. A. (1990) *The English Revolution of the 17th Century through Portraits of its Leading Figures*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Brailsford, H. N. (1976) *The Levellers and the English Revolution*. Nottingham: Spokesman Books.

Gregg, P. (1961) *Freeborn John – The Biography of John Lilburne*. London: George G. Harrap.

Hill, C. (1975) *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution*. London: Penguin Books.

Lin Biao (1907–1971)

Paul Le Blanc

Lin Biao or Lin Piao was, along with Zhu De and Peng Dehuai, one of the foremost military leaders in the Chinese communist movement in the 1930s and 1940s. A prominent figure in the People's Republic of China after the revolutionary victory, and leader of the People's Liberation Army throughout the 1960s, he was for a time closely aligned with Mao Zedong and was a central figure in launching the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution (1966–76). He seems to have broken with Mao in 1971, however, and died under mysterious circumstances in that year.

He was born with the name Lin Yurong and was the son of a factory owner. His father is said to have been ruined due to "extortionate taxation," but Lin was able to graduate from prep school and enter Whampoa Military Academy. There he trained under Nationalist Party (Guomindang) leader Chiang Kai-shek, graduating with distinction into a post in the Nationalist Army. Serving as a captain in the Great Northern Expedition that broke the power of China's war lords, he had risen to the rank of colonel by 1927. When the Nationalists turned against their Chinese communist allies, however, Lin joined the latter.

Lin made central contributions in the rise and the victories of the Chinese Red Army forces in the 1930s, commanding the First Field Army and – particularly with Peng Dehuai – playing a decisive role in military operations during the Long March of 1935, the desperate and costly retreat from the Nationalist military onslaught that brought Chinese communist forces to a much-needed North China sanctuary in Yanan (Yan'an). There he headed the influential Red Academy. He played a key role both in the fighting against Nationalist forces and the military invasion of Imperial Japan.

During World War II, Chinese communists and Nationalists were uneasy allies in the conflict against Japan, but soon after the war's end, conflict

between the two again erupted. Lin's role was especially important – he commanded the forces that conquered Manchuria and swept through Northern China. An initial defeat at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek's forces caused him to abandon the cities and shift to greater reliance on guerilla warfare through which, in winning peasant support in the countryside, he was able to entrap the core of Chiang's forces. This set the stage for the final battles of China's civil war, in which the Nationalists were driven from China's mainland, with the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949.

In the period of the 1950s, Lin's position in the military and party establishment was less central than it would become in 1959, when defense minister and People's Liberation Army chief Peng Dehuai sharply challenged the authority and policies of Mao Zedong. Lin stepped forward as Mao's most loyal ally, replacing Peng as the top military figure in the People's Republic of China. In the 1960s Lin oversaw the intensification of Maoist indoctrination of People's Liberation Army forces – developing what became the internationally famous “little red book” of *Quotations from Chairman Mao*, containing short excerpts from Mao's writings that many millions were to study and even memorize. He helped to initiate the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, designed to mobilize popular sentiment and action that would overwhelm and destroy opponents of Mao's policies in the Chinese Communist Party and to “put politics in command” in the form of Mao Zedong Thought.

In Lin's 1965 speech entitled “Long Live the Victory of the People's War!” he projected a global conflict, led by the People's Republic of China, in which the “rural” continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America would surround and overwhelm the imperialist “cities” of the United States and Europe – just as his own forces had done when defeating Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists in the late 1940s. Because the aging Mao had, in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, declared that Lin would be his successor, this perspective had special weight among revolutionaries throughout the world.

In 1971, however, Lin suddenly disappeared from view. In the following year it was announced that he and a clique of others were traitors who had planned a military coup to overthrow Mao, that when their plot was discovered they sought to flee in a plane to the Soviet Union, and that

their plane had crashed. The apparent issue that divided the two involved the decision by Mao to establish friendly relations with the United States (according to the old global vision of Mao and Lin, the fount of global imperialism) while deepening the hostility of a foreign policy that had already become quite antagonistic to the so-called “social-imperialist” Soviet Union. The specifics of the political break and Lin's death remain unclear.

SEE ALSO: Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Peng Dehuai (1898–1974); Zhu De (1886–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- Harrison, J. P. (1972) *The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–72*. New York: Praeger.
- Karnow, S. (1972) *Mao and China, From Revolution to Revolution*. New York: Viking.
- Milton, D., Milton, N., & Schurmann, F. (Eds.) (1974) *People's China, 1966 through 1972*. New York: Vintage.
- Schurmann, F. & Schell, O. (Eds.) (1966) *Communist China*. New York: Vintage.
- Snow, E. (1968) *Red Star Over China*, rev. and enlarged ed. New York: Grove.

Lincoln, Abraham (1809–1865) and African Americans

Orville Vernon Burton and Beatrice Burton

In 1863, after his first meeting with Abraham Lincoln, the African American activist Frederick Douglass described the president as “the first great man that I talked with in the United States freely, who in no single instance reminded me of the difference between himself and myself, of the difference of color.” Years later, at the 1876 dedication of an emancipation monument in Washington, DC, Douglass spoke of Lincoln as “a white man” who “shared the prejudices common to his countrymen toward the colored race.” He continued, “[White men] are the children of Abraham Lincoln. We are at best only his stepchildren; children by adoption, children by forces of circumstances and necessity.” Still, even in this speech, which is often cited by



This souvenir print (artist unknown) of Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was issued to commemorate his January 1, 1863 Act that freed the slaves in the rebellious states. Though the Proclamation left slavery intact in states loyal to the union, it marked a milestone in both the struggle for black freedom and the American Civil War by spreading hope throughout the African American community and opening the way for the enlistment of black troops. (Private Collection, Peter Newark American Pictures/The Bridgeman Art Library)

those who tar Lincoln with racism, Douglass was using a nineteenth-century rhetorical device. The second half of the speech praised Lincoln as the liberator of enslaved people. Later, in 1883, Douglass again referred to Lincoln as “the greatest statesman that ever presided over the destinies of this Republic.” He was “the one man of all the millions of our countrymen to whom we are more indebted . . . than to any other.” Douglass’s conflicting descriptions of Lincoln provide a succinct summation of African Americans’ changing relationship with Lincoln, but Lincoln’s views of African Americans also evolved and changed over the course of his political career.

When Lincoln entered politics he soon became a local stalwart, promoting Whig principles and contesting state offices. In 1836, announcing his candidacy for reelection to the Illinois General

Assembly, Lincoln explained to the *Sangamo Journal* that his belief in “sharing the privileges of the government” focused his political conduct. With social responsibilities went political rights, he declared, a sentiment derived as surely from the common sense of frontier life as from the philosophy of classical Athens. “Consequently I go for admitting all whites to the right of suffrage, who pay taxes or bear arms (by no means excluding females).” Lincoln’s views here suggest the limits racial prejudice imposed. His restricting the extension of voting rights to whites alone reflected the cultural prejudices of his day. Yet his belief in freedom led him eventually to deny the equation of voting rights with property holding. Just as the Whig desired to rise to a station of independence and honor by his won labors, Lincoln would not – indeed, with any honesty, could not – withhold that opportunity from others. Whether races were socially equal was not the issue for Lincoln; what he came to insist upon was a new understanding of liberty: equal opportunity in the race of life. Lincoln’s belief in equal opportunity would continue to evolve until he was ready to assert the then-astonishing claim that race was politically inconsequential, that African Americans were citizens and entitled to the suffrage and equal protection under law.

Although he adhered to the racist prejudices of the time, Lincoln’s anti-slavery commitment became evident early in his political life. Elected to the Illinois legislature in 1836, the freshman representative from Sangamon County demonstrated courage on the anti-slavery issue. Against the majority vote of 77, he was one of only six who opposed a set of resolutions that disapproved of abolition societies and that declared “the right of property in slaves is sacred to the slaveholding States by the Federal Constitution.” Objecting, Lincoln and Dan Stone, another member of the Sangamon legislative delegation, admitted that “The congress of the United States has no power, under the constitution, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the different States.” And they acknowledged that “the promulgation of abolition doctrines tends rather to increase than to abate its evils.” Nevertheless, they wanted to go on record that “the institution of slavery is founded on both injustice and bad policy.” Although Lincoln was no stranger to racial prejudice, he embraced the Golden Rule of labor’s uplift: “Let those who want slavery be the

slaves.” Put another way, he said, “As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master.”

Still, anti-slavery never meant pro-abolitionism. Lincoln never joined an abolitionist society, and he apparently had no objection to the Illinois state law that barred free African Americans from settling there and that specified that blacks could neither hold property nor wield the franchise. Indeed, in 1858, when Lincoln debated Stephen Douglas during an election for the US Senate, Lincoln defended himself against Douglas’s charge that he was in favor of racial equality. He drew cheers from the white crowd with his unequivocal stand: “I will say then that I am not nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races.” Getting very specific, he said, “I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people.” Lincoln readily admitted that “I, as well as Judge Douglas, am in favor of the race to which I belong having the superior position.”

Much of Lincoln’s growth in his perceptions of African Americans occurred while he was president, and much should be attributed to his relationship with Frederick Douglass, as well as a number of other prominent free African American leaders he met while president. Douglass and Lincoln found they had much in common, one escaping from slavery in Maryland and the other rising from poverty in Kentucky. Lincoln relied on Douglass’s council regarding issues such as the use of African American troops to fight in the Civil War, and at Douglass’s urging, Lincoln worked to secure equal pay for these soldiers. As Lincoln’s relationship with Douglass evolved – he often referred to Douglass as “my friend” – so did his views of African Americans.

Lincoln’s second inaugural was a prayer of confession for the nation. He talked about expiation of the national sin of slavery. If God willed that war continue, he allowed, “until all the wealth piled by the bondsman’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said ‘the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.’” The Civil War, Lincoln reckoned, was America’s time on the cross, poor atonement for so vast a sin.

Looking toward Reconstruction, Lincoln hoped that the states would “confer the elective franchise upon the colored man.” He announced to others, “I would myself prefer that it were now conferred on the very intelligent, and on those who serve our cause as soldiers.” This was indeed a far cry from Lincoln’s earlier objections to franchising African Americans, showing how his views evolved and expanded through his career as he pondered questions of liberty and freedom and became acquainted with African Americans such as Frederick Douglass. On April 11, 1865 Lincoln spoke from the White House Balcony and John Wilkes Booth understood where Lincoln was leading the country. He informed his companion, “That means nigger citizenship. Now, by God, I’ll put him through. That is the last speech he will ever make.” Booth was not crazy; he interpreted Lincoln correctly. Just as he had prepared the country for emancipation, he was now preparing them for black citizenship. Lincoln continued to learn and grow all his life, especially on race relations.

SEE ALSO: American Civil War (1861–1864); Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Douglass, Frederick (1817–1895)

References and Suggested Readings

- Burton, O. V. (2007) *The Age of Lincoln*. New York: Hill & Wang.
- Cox, L. (1981) *Lincoln and Black Freedom: A Study in Presidential Leadership*. Charleston: University of South Carolina Press.
- Fehrenbacher, D. E. (Ed.) (1989) *Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 1832–1858*. New York: Library of America.
- Klingaman, W. K. (2001) *Abraham Lincoln and the Road to Emancipation, 1861–1865*. New York: Viking Penguin.
- McPherson, J. M. (1992) *Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Quarles, B. (1991) *Lincoln and the Negro*. New York: DaCapo.

Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969)

Alexander V. Pantsov

Liu Shaoqi was among the best known of the Chinese revolutionary leaders, perhaps second only to Mao Zedong. At the height of his career, in the 1950s and into the 1960s, Liu was designated

by Mao to be his successor as China's undisputed leader. But during the Cultural Revolution that began in 1966 Liu fell from grace and, as Mao's chief factional opponent, became the target of one of history's greatest campaigns of vilification. Reviled as a morally corrupt counterrevolutionary traitor, Liu was stripped of power, imprisoned, and died in disgrace.

Liu Shaoqi, whose real name was Liu Shaoxuan, was born in Ningxiang County, Hunan Province, on November 24, 1898. He studied at Changsha high school, and took part in the May 4th movement in 1919, a sustained anti-imperialist mass mobilization that aimed at combating Japan's occupation of Chinese territories and the West's collusion with that occupation. It also opposed the reactionary Beijing warlord regime that had failed to resist Japan's encroachments. Initiated in Beijing, the May 4th movement soon spread among hundreds of thousands of young patriots throughout the country.

In 1920 Liu arrived in Shanghai where he enrolled in the Communist School of Foreign Languages that trained Chinese youth to study in Soviet Russia. In 1921 he was a member of the first group of Chinese communist youth who went to Moscow on a seven-month study-abroad course at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV). In the summer of 1922 he returned to China and worked in the Secretariat of the All-China Labor Union, and served as one of the leaders of the labor movement in Shanghai and Hunan. In May 1925 he was elected deputy chairman of the Executive Committee of the newly organized All-China Federation of Labor (ACFL). In 1926 he was appointed head of the Executive Committee of the Hubei Provincial Federation of Labor. At the Fifth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in May 1927 he was elected a full member of the party's Central Committee (CCP CC).

After the Communist defeat by Chiang Kai-Shek's Guomindang (Nationalist Party) forces in 1927, he worked in the Shunzhi (now Hebei) Provincial CCP Committee. He was elected *in absentia* to membership on the CCP Central Control Commission in July 1928 at the Sixth Congress of the CCP (held in Moscow). In July 1929 he was appointed secretary of the Manchurian Provincial CCP Committee. He returned to Shanghai in the summer of 1930 and

shortly thereafter was dispatched to Moscow as a leader of a delegation of more than twenty Chinese workers to attend the Fifth Congress of the Profintern (the "Red International of Labor Unions"). At the congress he was in a minority that opposed a draft resolution proposed by the Soviet Communist Party delegation on the "red" opposition within the "yellow" (non-communist) trade union movement. At the congress he was elected to the Profintern Executive Committee. He remained in Moscow after the congress as a leading CCP representative to the Profintern. In January 1931 at the Fourth Plenum of the CCP CC he was coopted *in absentia* to the CCP CC and became an alternate member of the Politburo. In March–April 1931 he attended the Eleventh Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) and participated in the discussion of Dmitrii Manuilsky's report on ECCI activity.

In the fall of 1931 Liu Shaoqi returned to China and assumed the post of head of the Workers and Peasants' Department of the CCP CC, and served as secretary of the CCP faction in the ACFL, and as a member of the Central Soviet government. In the winter of 1932 he was transferred to the Central Soviet region and became chairman of the ACFL Executive Committee and secretary of the Fujian Provincial CCP Committee. In February 1934 he was elected a member of the Second Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Chinese Soviet republic. He took part in the Long March in 1934–5. In the spring of 1936 he was appointed secretary of the CCP CC Northern Bureau, and in October 1938 became secretary of the CCP CC Central Plains Bureau. In April 1939 Liu was appointed secretary of the CCP CC Labor Movement Department. In January 1941 he became political commissar of the New 4th Army and secretary of the CCP CC Central China Bureau. Two years later, in 1943, he was appointed secretary of the CCP CC Secretariat and deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council. At the Seventh Congress of the CCP in June 1945 he was elected a CCP CC Politburo member. During the civil war in the spring of 1947 he became secretary of the CCP CC Working Committee.

After the Communist takeover in 1949 Liu Shaoqi became deputy chairman of the Central People's Government. In 1954 he was elected chairman of the Standing Committee of the

National People's Congress (NPC). In September 1956 he was elected deputy chairman of the CCP CC and stood first in line as Mao Zedong's putative successor. From 1959 on he was the chairman (president) of the People's Republic of China. During the Cultural Revolution, however, he lost a factional battle with Mao Zedong. As a result, in 1968 Liu Shaoqi was relieved of all his posts, purged from the CCP, publicly reviled, and banished to Henan Province. He died in disgrace in prison in Kaifeng on November 12, 1969, but was posthumously rehabilitated on February 29, 1980.

SEE ALSO: China, Maoism, and Popular Power, 1949–1969; China, May 4th Movement; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Mao Zedong (1893–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

Ci hai: Lishi fence: Zhongguo xiandai shi (Dictionary Ci Hai. History: Chinese Contemporary History) (1984) Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe.

Dangshi yanjiu ziliao (Study Materials on Party History) (1982) Vol. 2, 2nd Ed. Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe.

Xiang Qing (1985) *Gongchan goji yu Zhongguo geming guanxi lunwenji* (Collection of Articles on the Relationship between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe.

Locke, John (1632–1704)

Amy Hatmaker

John Locke challenged prevailing perceptions about government, human reasoning, religious toleration, and education. His influence can be seen in the theories of the Enlightenment and in the American Revolution.

Locke was born August 29, 1632 in Wrington, a village in Somerset. His father was a Puritan lawyer who served as a captain on the side of parliament when the English Civil War broke out. The patronage of his father's commander allowed Locke to attend school at Westminster in London. In 1652 he went to Christ Church, Oxford. Locke received his bachelor's degree in February 1656 and decided to pursue further studies in medicine. He was inducted into the Royal Society in 1668.

During his medical studies, Locke made the acquaintance of Lord Ashley (later Lord

Shaftesbury). Locke moved to London to be Ashley's personal physician in 1667, but he also served as his secretary and researcher. While part of Ashley's staff, Locke became Secretary of the Board of Trade and Plantations, and Secretary to the Lord Proprietors of the Carolinas. Shaftesbury left the government in 1674, at which time Locke returned to Oxford to receive his bachelor's degree in medicine. Locke spent some time in France, returning to England when Shaftesbury had a brief return to government. When Shaftesbury was implicated in a plot for armed insurrection, Locke also came under suspicion. He fled England and lived in exile in Holland until the Glorious Revolution, at which point he accompanied Princess Mary to England. He became Commissioner of the Board of Trade and Plantations and took up residence at Oates in Essex, the home of Sir Francis and Lady Masham. Locke retired from the Board of Trade in 1670 and died at Oates in 1704.

Locke published a number of letters during the course of his career, many of which were extremely controversial at the time. Two of his important works, *An Essay Concerning Human Reasoning* and *Epistola de Tolerantia* (*Letter on Tolerance*), were published while he was in exile in Holland. In *An Essay Concerning Human Reasoning*, Locke sought to understand and explain the process of gaining knowledge and the extent of human reasoning. His theories discuss how simple ideas are combined with experience to make complex ideas. In the process of working through his theories, Locke deals with a number of areas – mathematics, science, and belief in God. All of these would be instrumental in the philosophical debates of the Enlightenment. His *Letter on Tolerance* argues for toleration for other religions because he held that a church was a “free and voluntary society” formed for the purpose of worship based on faith, something he felt could never lie within government jurisdiction.

The most influential of Locke's works, *Two Treatises on Civil Government*, were written in 1679 and 1680; however, he did not publish the works until 1690 because they were so radical in nature. Locke disputed the absolute right of monarchy, arguing instead that the right to govern was provided by social contract. Locke believed, like Hobbes, that man lived in a state of nature, and that man's ability to reason made him capable of discerning the laws of nature.

He believed that the laws of nature guarantee man certain rights – life, health, liberty, and possession – which no government had the right to violate. Men formed governments as a social contract in order to protect these rights, creating laws and legislative positions to enforce them. Should those who govern violate the contract, the governed had every right to terminate the contract.

In other words, he sanctioned revolution as a safeguard against tyranny, but also as a means to protect property. Locke's *Treatises* would become the basis for representative governments. Especially in the US, they also encouraged a focus on property ownership as a means test for who could participate in such governments.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776; Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658); English Revolution, 17th Century; Glorious Revolution, Britain, 1688; Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679); Participatory Democracy, History of

References and Suggested Readings

- Dienstag, J. F. (1996) Between History and Nature: Social Contract Theory in Locke and the Founders. *Journal of Politics* 58 (4): 985–1009.
- Iverson, D. (1997) The Secret History of Public Reason: Hobbes to Rawls. *History of Public Reason* 18 (1): 125–47.
- Jolley, N. (1999) *Locke: His Philosophical Thought*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tuckness, A. (2002) *Locke and the Legislative Point of View: Toleration, Contested Principles, and the Law*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

London Corresponding Society

Michael T. Davis

The London Corresponding Society (LCS) was a political reform society founded by Thomas Hardy, a shoemaker, in January 1792 and in existence until 1799. The LCS advocated a reformist agenda, although at times its membership overlapped with shadowy revolutionary groups like the United Englishmen.

The intellectual inspiration for the LCS came through Hardy's reading in 1791 of publications from the 1780s issued by the Society for Constitutional Information. Inspired by these political texts, Hardy gained enthusiasm for establishing a political reform organization from the excitement generated in the wake of the French

Revolution and the publication of Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man*.

Built upon these solid foundations, the LCS had a modest beginning. The first meeting at the Bell tavern in Exeter Street, London, was attended by only nine men, but the Society grew rapidly in the subsequent months. Nine divisions had been established by May 1792, each comprising a minimum of 30 members, and while exact membership numbers cannot be accurately determined, contemporary estimates ranged up to 80,000 members at the Society's height. However, such estimates seem unrealistic; perhaps more accurate is a peak membership of around 5,000 recruits, while at its lowest point in mid-1794 the LCS counted some 241 paying members.

Most of the Society's members remain unknown, but some were men of social prominence. The Society attracted liberal-minded men with good educational backgrounds, including physicians and lawyers. Even Basil William Douglas, Lord Daer (1763–94) was an early member of the LCS. However, the LCS was fundamentally conceived as a working-class organization. Although there was a certain reluctance to allow those members of a higher class to dominate the Society, such men brought not only a degree of respectability to the LCS but also a sense of leadership and legitimacy. Nevertheless, the vast majority of members were artisans and skilled laborers. The low weekly membership fee of 1d. reflects this vocational profile of the group, and its political agenda was firmly targeted at the desires of the lower orders of society who did not have the right to vote.

Parliamentary reform, including annual parliaments and an extension of the suffrage for adult males, was the principal aim of the LCS and the principal method for achieving this goal was through education. The numerous booksellers and printers who joined the LCS became a strategic advantage in promoting the Society's moral force campaign. They produced inexpensive political pamphlets that advocated reform and distanced the Society, at least publicly, from revolutionary efforts. Some 80 pamphlets and broadsides were produced by the LCS between 1792 and 1798, as well as two periodicals, *The Politician* and the *Moral and Political Magazine*.

Despite this emphasis on education and moral force, the LCS was feared as a group of illiterate blackguards, who were intent on killing the

king and raising a revolution. It was a caricature of LCS members that was immensely potent in the uncertain atmosphere of the 1790s, and certainly there were some members of the Society who advocated physical force activism. Thomas Spence, who in the early nineteenth century came to lead an ultra-radical sect and was a prominent member of the LCS during the 1790s, was involved in a shadowy society known as the Lambeth Loyal Association. The membership of this association overlapped with the LCS and, while it paraded as a loyalist association, it was drilling its members for what seemed to be revolutionary intentions. Similarly, in the late 1790s, prominent members of the LCS were also engaged in the activities of the United Englishmen, who had active cells throughout London.

While these revolutionary elements existed among the members of the LCS, it is important to distinguish between the agendas of individual members and the official policy of the LCS. Indeed, recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of non-violence in the LCS mantra and demonstrates how notions of civility were critical to the Society's ability to operate in public for an extended period during the 1790s. Nevertheless, loyalists and government officials were alarmed by the LCS. A network of spies and informers was used to infiltrate the Society, and it was their evidence that largely provided the case on which the government conducted the treason trials of 1794. Leading members of the LCS and other reform societies in the metropolis were indicted for high treason in May 1794, but after three unsuccessful attempts to gain a conviction the remaining suspects were released. While no proof of insurrectionary plots could be determined, the LCS was still seen by many contemporaries as a threat to social and political stability after the treason trials.

However, the trials had dampened the enthusiasm of a significant portion of London's reformers. While the Society's membership grew during 1795, the repressive Two Acts of that year caused the Society's leaders to consider the prospects of pursuing a physical force approach. As the strategic plan of the LCS showed signs of changing, disharmony entered the Society. Splinter groups began forming and the LCS began to lose some of its momentum. A further blow to the Society's fortunes came in 1796 when financial troubles began affecting operations. The LCS was no longer as robust as it was in the

early 1790s, and when key players were arrested in April 1798 the Society's fate was all but sealed. The LCS formally ceased to exist on July 12, 1799 when legislation was passed that outlawed the Society and other radical societies by name.

SEE ALSO: Hardy, Thomas (1752–1832); Paine, Thomas (1737–1809); Spence, Thomas (1750–1814); United Englishmen/United Britons

References and Suggested Readings

- Barrell, J. (2000) *Imagining the King's Death: Figurative Treason, Fantasies of Regicide*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Davis, M. T. (Ed.) (2002) *London Corresponding Society, 1792–1799*, 6 vols. London: Pickering & Chatto.
- Davis, M. T. (2007) The Mob Club? The London Corresponding Society and Radical Civility in the 1790s. In M. T. Davis & P. A. Pickering (Eds.), *Unrespectable Radicals? Popular Politics in the Age of Reform*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Goodwin, A. (1979) *The Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic Movement in the Age of the French Revolution*. London: Hutchinson.
- Graham, J. (2000) *The Nation, the Law and the King: Reform Politics in England, 1789–1799*, 2 vols. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Thale, M. (Ed.) (1983) *Selections from the Papers of the London Corresponding Society, 1792–1799*. Cambridge: Cambridge University .

London, Jack (1876–1916)

Jonah Raskin

Emma Goldman, the Russian-born American anarchist, spoke for a generation of readers when she described Jack London as “the only revolutionary writer in America.” Many of London's literary contemporaries, like Upton Sinclair, attacked social ills, but they often fixed on reform. London, by contrast, brazenly called for revolution. A writer with a global consciousness, he denounced war and greed in *The War of the Classes* (1905) and *Revolution* (1910). At the peak of his career, he supported the abortive 1905 Russian Revolution and, in a lecture to college students, he endorsed industrial sabotage in America. More than Goldman, and perhaps more than Eugene Debs, he Americanized socialism by writing in a colloquial style and drawing on his own life, even while mythologizing himself as larger-than-life proletarian.

Born an illegitimate child to an impoverished San Francisco family, he worked in factories as a boy – a searing experience that fueled surrealistic short stories like “The Apostate.” In 1894, he traveled across the country as a hobo, served time in prison for vagrancy, and wrote about it in *The Road*. In 1896, he joined the Socialist Labor Party, and in 1901, he changed his affiliation to the Socialist Party of America, flirted briefly with electoral politics, ran for public office as a socialist, and served as the poster boy for the cause of revolution.

London, however, was an odd, eccentric radical, torn apart by contradictions. The author of tales of adventure and romance, renowned for *The Call of the Wild* (1903) and *White Fang* (1906), he was wealthy, world famous, and a convert to the fledgling Hollywood film industry. He owned a vast estate in northern California and promulgated racist ideas in essays like “The Yellow Peril.” Drawn to Nietzsche and Darwin as much as to Marx – and later to Freud and Jung – he believed in the survival of the fittest and the Superman, inhabited a world of dreams, and embraced the unconscious, even as he defended the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and advocated the general strike.

Roundly denounced for its gloomy prediction for the twentieth century when first published, his most trenchant political novel, *The Iron Heel* (1908), depicts a dictatorship that quashes human rights and civil liberties and controls news and information. Only with the coming of fascism in Europe did radicals, including George Orwell and Leon Trotsky, come to admire its prescience, and, in the 1930s, London was dubbed the father of working-class literature in the United States. During the last phase of his life, he farmed organically and became an avid environmentalist. An alcoholic, even while he endorsed Prohibition, he died at the age of 40, leaving a tangled cultural legacy that influenced writers as diverse as Ernest Hemingway, Sinclair Lewis, Jack Kerouac, and Norman Mailer.

SEE ALSO: Debs, Eugene (1855–1926); Goldman, Emma (1869–1940); Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

Abbott, L. (Ed.) (1926) *London's Essays of Revolt*. New York: Vanguard.

Foner, P. (1947) *Jack London: American Rebel*. New York: Citadel.

Raskin, J. (Ed.) (2008) *The Radical Jack London: Writings on War and Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Strunsky, A. (1917) *Memories of Jack London. The Masses*, July.

Lorenzo Zelaya Popular Revolutionary Forces

Edward T. Brett

Lorenzo Zelaya was the president and driving force of the radical peasant organization, the National Federation of Honduran Peasants (FENACH). He was killed along with six of his comrades by the Honduran military in 1965.

Following World War II, increased global demand and therefore higher prices for Honduran agricultural products spurred wealthy landowners to expand their land holdings. This, along with a sharp growth in the rural population, caused land scarcity for the first time in Honduran history. This shortage was further compounded after the Honduran General Strike of 1954, when US fruit companies began to replace workers on their banana plantations with labor saving technology, thereby reducing their work force by over 50 percent. The unemployed had no recourse but to turn to farming for survival, even though land was unavailable to them.

Encouraged by President Ramón Villeda Morales' proposal and eventual passage in 1962 of an Agrarian Reform Law, Lorenzo Zelaya and other members of the Honduran Communist Party joined forces with evicted farmers to form the National Federation of Honduran Peasants in October 1961. Organizing in the banana-growing region of the north coast, FENACH soon had about 15,000 members. Fearing the growing influence of communism among the peasant class, the Villeda government, with help from the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), created a more conservative rival union, the National Association of Honduran Peasants (ANACH), in September 1962.

Following a coup in October 1963, the new military government of Colonel Oswaldo López Arellano initiated a wave of repression that devastated FENACH. The federation's offices

were ransacked and records and property were destroyed. Its members were harassed and some were jailed. Faced with such a situation, Zelaya retreated to the countryside with several other FENACH leaders, where they attempted to form an armed guerrilla movement. On April 29, 1965, 25 soldiers under the command of Lt. Carlos Aguilar surprised Zelaya and six of his associates – Rufino López, Hermelindo Villalobos, Benito Díez, Achilles and José María Izaguirre, and Cartagena Zelaya – while they were having breakfast and killed them. A former member of the revolutionary group, Inestrosa Acquilino, had informed the soldiers of their whereabouts.

With the effective destruction of FENACH, many of its former members joined ANACH, thereby moving the organization further to the left and making it the largest and most important Honduran peasant organization. In 1967 ANACH affiliated with the Confederation of Honduran Workers, which by the 1990s had a membership of about 160,000.

In 1981 a small number of Honduran Maoist communists formed a revolutionary group, which they named the Lorenzo Zelaya Popular Revolutionary Forces (FPRLZ). Using kidnappings, bombings, and other acts of violence, they hoped to attract support among the rural population and eventually spearhead a popular uprising, as the Sandinistas had done in Nicaragua. They were unable to achieve their goals, however, and consequently played a minor role at best in Honduran sociopolitical developments in the 1980s.

SEE ALSO: Honduran General Strike of 1954; Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)

References and Suggested Readings

- Peckenham, N. & Street, A. (1985) *Honduras: Portrait of a Captive Nation*. New York: Praeger.
- Posas, M. (1981) *Luchas del Movimiento Obrero Hondureño*. San José: EDUCA.
- Volk, S. (1981) *Honduras: On the Border of War*. Boston: NACLA Report of the Americas.

Lovett, William (1800–1877)

Paul A. Pickering

William Lovett was born in Penzance, Cornwall. His father, a sailor, drowned before William was born, and his Methodist mother ensured a strict

religious upbringing and a rudimentary education for her son. At age 21 Lovett removed to London to find work as a cabinet maker and soon began attending evening classes at the Mechanics Institute. This experience sparked a lifelong commitment to the promotion of education as a tool for social advancement. Here he also met supporters of radical reform in matters of church and state and became a strident advocate of civil and religious liberty. He was also introduced to the cooperative ideas of Robert Owen and became an active member of the London Co-operative Trading Association. Subsequently, Lovett worked in the Association's store and in 1828 became secretary of the British Association for the Promotion of Co-operative Knowledge.

In 1831 Lovett gained notoriety by refusing to serve in the London Militia. In response to the punitive seizure of his goods, Lovett established the Anti-Militia Association. Under the banner "No Vote, No Musket," he forced the authorities to abandon the idea of selecting the militia by lot. Following his victory, Lovett threw his weight behind the campaign for parliamentary reform which he believed was the key to a better future for working people. He joined the National Union of the Working Classes that was actively involved in the campaign for universal manhood suffrage. He also became a member of the Owenite Grand National Consolidated Trades Union.

In 1836 Lovett joined other prominent London radical artisans to establish the London Working Men's Association. As secretary of this small but influential organization, Lovett drew up the document known as the People's Charter, which codified the radical agenda. As the campaign for reform gained pace, Lovett played an increasingly prominent part and was elected secretary of the National Convention of the Industrious Classes early in 1839. A prominent role in what was intended to be an alternative to the national parliament meant that Lovett was never far from the headlines or from controversy within and beyond the movement. In August 1839 Lovett was arrested for seditious libel following a speech in Birmingham. Found guilty, he was sentenced to 12 months in Warwick Gaol.

In prison, Lovett and a fellow Chartist inmate, John Collins, penned *Chartism, a New Organisation of the People*, a comprehensive outline of a system of national education. Following his release Lovett was feted as a political martyr and

his plan was initially well received. Soon, however, Lovett's promotion of education was condemned as a distraction and left him marginalized in the movement he had helped establish. Undeterred, he founded the National Association for Promoting the Political and Social Improvement of the People, but this merely exacerbated the divisions in the ranks and increased his isolation and effectively ended his public career. Lovett devoted the rest of his life to the development of working-class education and foreign affairs. In 1876 he wrote the autobiographical *Life and Struggles*. He continued to operate a bookshop but died in extreme poverty in August 1877.

SEE ALSO: Chartists; Owen, Robert (1771–1858)

References and Suggested Readings

- Large, D. (1982) Lovett, William. In *Dictionary of Labour Biography*. London: Macmillan.
- Lovett, W. (1876/1967) *Life and Struggles of William Lovett*. London: MacGibbon & Kee.
- Wiener, J. (1989) *William Lovett*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Lowell Female Labor Reform Association

Anne F. Mattina

The Lowell Female Labor Reform Association (LFLRA, 1845–7) is counted among the earliest organized efforts by American women to enact social change. In response to oppressive working conditions worsened by the Panic of 1837, many operatives in the country's premier industrial city sought redress through organization and petition, primarily aimed at enacting a state law mandating a ten-hour workday. In December 1844, five operatives met to discuss the situation at Anti-Slavery Hall and the LFLRA emerged. Sarah Bagley, a native of New Hampshire and a veteran operative, served as president. By January 1846, the group claimed 600 members.

The LFLRA affiliated with the New England Workingmen's Association (NEWA) and dedicated itself to advocacy of the ten-hour workday. The members of the LFLRA were active in all efforts of the NEWA, while simultaneously organizing other female associations throughout New England. Under the aegis of the LFLRA, Bagley started the Industrial Reform Lyceum

to provide a public forum separate from the existing corporation-sponsored platforms.

The operatives' primary argument focused on the need for time to hone their physical, spiritual, intellectual, and moral development, which typical workdays of 11–13 hours precluded. An excerpt from the association's constitution demonstrates the influence of perfectionism prevalent among social reform advocates of the era: "Our merciful Father in his infinite wisdom surely has not bestowed all his blessings, both mental and moral, on a few, on whom also he has showered all of pecuniary gifts. No! to us all has he given minds capable of eternal progression and improvement! It now only remains for us to throw off the shackles which are binding us in ignorance and servitude and which prevent us from rising to that scale of being for which God designed us!" The document also reveals a nascent class consciousness, which became more pronounced as the organization developed.

Bagley also served on the NEWA's publications committee and contributed frequently to the "female department" of its newspaper, *The Voice of Industry*. Eventually, the LFLRA purchased *The Voice* outright and used its pages to publicize its views, providing one of the earliest examples of female editorial control in American history. The women published a series of "Factory Tracts," written to provide a more accurate picture of working conditions than that being propagated by mill owners.

LFLRA members were instrumental in a petition drive for a ten-hour law. Gathering thousands of signatures, the women forwarded their demands to the Massachusetts legislature. Bagley, along with several other female and male workers, testified before a Special Committee formed to investigate labor conditions by the Massachusetts House, to little avail. Mill owners wielded significant influence amongst legislators, and the committee was convinced that the workers could "count on the benevolent paternalism of the mill owners for protection" (Foner 1977:164) The Massachusetts House dismissed the women's petitions. Bagley and others then decided to work toward unseating the state representative from Lowell, whom they believed betrayed their cause. They were successful, and he lost his next election campaign.

Fired by a new editor at *The Voice*, Bagley left Lowell in 1846. Much of the spirit of the LFLRA went with her. She moved to Springfield,

Massachusetts, taking a position as the first female telegraph operator in the United States. She returned to Lowell briefly in 1847 and continued individual activism around the issues of health care, prison reform, and women's rights for the remainder of her life.

The LFLRA reformed as the Lowell Female Industrial Reform and Mutual Aid Society in 1847, with the purpose of providing aid and comfort to sick members. It would be several more decades before women mill workers organized again in Lowell. Massachusetts enacted the ten-hour workday in 1874.

SEE ALSO: Bread and Roses Strike; Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 1775–1900

References and Suggested Readings

- Dublin, T. (1979) *Women at Work: The Transformation of Work and Community in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1826–1860*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Foner, P. S. (Ed.) (1977) *The Factory Girls*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Foner, P. S. (1979) *Women and the American Labor Movement: From Colonial Times to the Eve of World War I*. New York: Free Press.
- Mattina, A. F. (1996) "Corporation Tools & Time-Serving Slaves": Class and Gender in the Rhetoric of Antebellum Labor Reform. *Howard Journal of Communications* 7 (2): 151–68.
- Murphy, T. A. (1992) *Ten Hours' Labor: Religion, Reform and Gender in Early New England*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Preamble and Constitution of the Lowell Female Labor Reform Association. Available at: www.library.uml.edu/clh/All/vo102.htm (downloaded February 17, 2008).

Lu Xun (1881–1936)

Michael J. Thompson

The Chinese writer Lu Xun (born Zhou Shuren; Lu Xun was his pen name) is a central figure not only in the history of modern Chinese literature, but also in the political and cultural identity of the revolutionary period in China during the first half of the twentieth century. His literary work is characterized by an insistence on the need for cultural transformation in China, one which provides a rational humanist confrontation with the traditions and customs of what he viewed as China's backward society. He set himself to transform the cultural and spiritual values of Chinese society through the power of literature

and saw that literature had the ability to play a revolutionary role in China through its capacity for questioning commonplace traditions and customs.

Born in Zhejiang province to a highly educated family in 1881, Lu Xun's childhood and adolescence shaped his later work and political importance. He was able to witness the decline of the Qing dynasty and the feudal ways of life that had characterized China for centuries. His early education began in the late 1890s at the Jiangnan Naval Academy and the School of Mines and Railways at the Jiangnan Military Academy. At these institutions, Lu Xun was introduced to western scientific learning and western languages, but it was a more personal event that truly began to shape his education and lead to his later literary and political concerns. During his adolescence, his father died of tuberculosis. Lu Xun was persuaded from this experience to study medicine but also to distrust traditional Chinese medicine, something that he saw as a cause of his father's death. This would lead to a general theme in Lu Xun's writings: the critique of traditional Chinese society required, in his view, a transformation of consciousness. The perceived backwardness of Chinese culture and society had to be changed through a revolution of the sensibilities of people.

In 1902 Lu Xun won a Qing scholarship to study medicine in Japan, and spent two years studying Japanese before entering the Sendai Medical School in 1904. His studies there lasted only until 1906 when he abruptly left Japan. Lu Xun himself says in his preface to his first collection of short stories, *Call to Arms* (1923), that he left after seeing a photograph of an alleged Chinese spy being executed by decapitation by the Japanese. What struck Lu Xun was how the other Chinese in the photograph seemed to have no feeling toward the event: "Physically, they were as strong and healthy as anyone could ask, but their expressions revealed all too clearly that spiritually they were calloused and numb." From this point on, Lu made the decision to attempt to transform the souls of the Chinese. Literature, he felt, was the most potent way to accomplish this.

His first published story appeared in May 1918. "A Madman's Diary" is a splendid example of Lu Xun's ability to use literature to force a critical examination of China's feudal society. In it, the narrator is tortured by the fact that

rituals existed in Chinese culture of eating men's flesh. The narrator becomes mad as he tries to cope with the revelation that he stems from a race of men that eat other men: "How can a man like myself, after four thousand years of man-eating history – even though I knew nothing about it at first – ever hope to face real men?" The story continues and we realize that it is not only the paranoia stemming from the realization of Chinese cannibalism that bothers the author; others around him begin to treat him strangely because, as he writes, "everything requires careful consideration if one is to understand it." The critical faculties of the narrator are placed at odds with the custom-bound people with whom he interacts. This becomes one of the most salient themes in his writing: the confrontation with what he characterizes as an irrational, unenlightened society and cultural norms. Literature becomes, for Lu Xun, a crucial component to any kind of social revolution.

Subsequently, Lu Xun continued to publish stories such as "Medicine" and "The True Story of Ah Q" and prose poems of particular sensitivity and beauty such as "The Beggars" and "Snow." His essays are also telling of his influence on intellectual life during the May 4 period, itself a period of revolutionary activity in China. The push toward modernity in China during this period was strong, and Lu Xun saw his role as advocating a form of literature that would itself inspire critical consciousness and a new cultural sensibility. In 1917, he began to contribute to an influential new journal being published out of Beijing University called *Xin qingnian* (New Youth).

Lu Xun emphasized that literary and cultural production had a responsibility to face the actual existing conditions within society as opposed to an aesthetic escape from that reality. In his essay "Literature and Revolution," he makes this clear: "[T]ranscending the present is a form of escapism. And this is the path they are bound to take, consciously or otherwise, if they lack the courage to look reality in the face yet insist on styling themselves revolutionaries." Even though this was the case, he was equally emphatic that politics precedes art; that literature itself lacks the ability to change reality. In his essay "Some Thoughts on Our New Literature," he argues: "All literature is shaped by its surroundings and, though devotees of art like to claim that literature can sway the course of world affairs,

the truth is that politics comes first, and art changes accordingly."

Despite his radical leanings, Lu Xun's connection with the Chinese Communist Party was complex. He never joined the party but like many intellectuals who had seen the initial 1911 revolution and republic turn corrupt, he increasingly saw that radical political measures needed to be taken for there to be true change in China. In this spirit, he was instrumental in bringing many fellow intellectuals of his time to the party, despite his noncommittal politics. At the same time, Lu Xun's personality and intellectual character were cosmopolitan in nature, rather than nationalistic. Indeed, he was active in debates, lectures, and open discussions, and had an active public intellectual life – something which would have eventually been suppressed after the Communist Revolution of 1949. His intellectual spirit was one of a liberal intellectual ethic of openness, but he also saw that this ethic alone would not be sufficient to confront the feudal nature of Chinese society – hence his support of the communists.

Lu Xun's legacy in China is still as one of the forerunners of the Communist Revolution, having been, in Mao Zedong's words, "the chief commander of China's cultural revolution." He is also seen as China's greatest modern writer, having influenced many generations of writers in the tradition of social criticism through literature. Indeed, even in the late twentieth century, writers and filmmakers were working within the genre of the literary/artistic confrontation with what they see as China's power structures and irrational forms of custom. It is perhaps one of the most important legacies that Lu Xun could have left: the persistence of an Enlightenment position within the Chinese political and cultural context.

SEE ALSO: Chen Duxiu (1879–1942); China, May 4th Movement; China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911; Mao Zedong (1893–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- Lee Leo Ou-fan (1985) *Lu Xun and his Legacy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lyell, W. A. (1976) *Lu Hsun's Vision of Reality*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wang Shih-ching (1984) *Lu Xun: A Biography*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

Luddism and machine breaking


Immanuel Ness

The Luddites were secret associations of industrial workers who participated in mass uprisings against the introduction of new machinery in Britain from about 1810 to 1818. The movement began in Scotland in 1810 and quickly spread throughout England, reaching its maximum extent in 1815. The primary means of resistance was the destruction of machinery, above all by handloom weavers who saw the new power looms as a grave threat to their livelihood because they were devaluing their labor and would eventually displace them entirely. The movement took its name from messages sent in the name of a fictional General Ned Ludd to the textile manufacturers, warning them to remove their mechanized looms or suffer the consequences.

The Industrial Revolution in England brought about rapid gains in steam and other industrial technology, disrupting almost 500 years of relative labor peace. Laws dating from 1350 regulating working conditions for apprentices had remained in effect through the early 1800s, when they were increasingly considered a nuisance to an emergent class of capitalist manufacturers in the textile industries, who believed an unrestricted labor market was essential to their pursuit of profits.

The origins of Luddism can be seen in the laws, beginning in 1769, that the English Parliament passed to protect machines against abuse from workers while at the same time prohibiting workers from forming labor unions. When the Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800 banned unionization, worker organizations went underground. Unable to defend their interests collectively through legal organization, the clandestine workers' societies engaged in direct action.

Many Luddite actions were small nocturnal raids, but some, especially at the height of the movement, involved thousands of workers in daylight attacks on power-loom mills. In 1812, in the wake of powerful workers' insurrections that 12,000 troops of the British army struggled to contain, and the destruction of machinery in towns throughout northern England, Parliament enacted a law that imposed the death penalty for any worker found to be actively engaged



The Luddites began an organized social movement of British textile artisans in the early nineteenth century, protesting the introduction of new production methods ushered in by the Industrial Revolution through destroying the machines that were to replace them. This 1812 portrait shows machine-wreckers attacking machinery in a textile factory. (Mary Evans Picture Library/Tom Morgan)

in machine breaking. In January 1813 eighteen men who were identified as Luddite leaders were hanged in the town of York. Many others accused of participation in the secret societies were punished through deportation to Australian penal colonies. The movement briefly continued to spread, but eventually the repression would succeed in defeating and destroying it. The social problems that produced it continued to exist, however, so other forms of worker resistance and organization arose to take its place.

The word "Luddite" has taken on a negative connotation and is today used primarily to signify irrational opposition to new technology. But the original followers of General Ludd were far from irrational in their actions. While it is certainly true that in the long run the new technology of the Industrial Revolution would lead to a rise in the standard of living of the population in general, it is no less true that the early nineteenth-century textile workers were severely victimized by the process. E. P. Thompson, in his seminal *The Making of the English Working Class*, convincingly argued that the Luddites' actions were not aimed against new technology *per se*, but against the emergent laissez-faire economic system that was impoverishing them while enriching the factory owners. He identified the Luddites as an essential link in the chain

of historical continuity of the revolutionary workers movement in Britain, connecting the English Jacobins who preceded them with the Chartists who followed.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Corn Law Agitation, Britain, 19th Century; Brandreth, Jeremiah (1790–1817) and the Pentrich Rising; Chartists; Combination Laws and Revolutionary Trade Unionism; East Anglian Wheat County Riots, 1816; Luddite Riots in Nottingham; Thompson, Edward Palmer (E. P.) (1924–1993)

References and Suggested Readings

- Binfield, K. (Ed.) (2004) *Writings of the Luddites*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Sale, K. (1996) *Rebels Against the Future: The Luddites and Their War on the Industrial Revolution*. New York: Basic Books.
- Thompson, E. P. (1963) *The Making of the English Working Class*. New York: Vintage.

Luddite riots in Nottingham

Adrian Randall

The Luddites occupy a unique place in history, having, despite defeat, bequeathed their name to all future opponents of new technologies. Yet the original “Luddites,” the framework knitters of the east Midlands, fit the stereotype less well than those who followed them, for the “engines of mischief” which threatened the knitters’ trade in 1811–12, the “wide frames,” had long been used to make lace cloth. The problem was the innovation of using cloth made from such frames to manufacture stockings from pieces sewn up with a seam, “cut-ups,” rather than producing them “full-wrought” in tubular form on the more complex stocking frame. This change, in a background of rapidly rising food costs, growing anger at falling piece rates, and the accelerating use of “illegal” apprentices, led to violent protests.

In early 1811, knitters in the village of Arnold broke into workshops and disabled frames making cut-ups. With no concessions forthcoming, country knitters held a large demonstration in Nottingham. This passed peacefully but later 50 frames were smashed at Arnold. In the following weeks more frames were destroyed in the nearby villages and towns. Hosiers responded with immediate concessions and peace was restored.

In the autumn, however, trade worsened and wide frame production increased. In November major disorders proliferated, with frames smashed at Arnold, Bulwell, Baswell, and Sutton-in-Ashfield. The government, assuming orchestrated conspiracy, rushed troops to the county and virtual martial law was imposed. This failed to deter attacks. Small bands of well-drilled, self-styled Luddites, operating mainly at night, continued to destroy both frames and property of obnoxious hosiers, even in Nottingham itself. Direct action was supplemented by direct appeals to public opinion as Ned Lud posed as the champion of customary rights. Such propaganda proved potent. Even though large rewards were offered, no Luddite was impeached. Meanwhile, amid the disorders, knitters continued, unsuccessfully, to seek a negotiated settlement with the “honest” hosiers.

Thoroughly alarmed by the local authorities’ failure to suppress the disturbances, the government rushed through the Frame Breakers’ Bill, rendering machine breaking a capital offense. The act, ineffectual *per se*, but backed by an ever-increasing military presence, persuaded the Luddites to return to more peaceful forms of action. A United Committee was quickly established to petition parliament to regulate the trade and over 10,000 signatures were quickly solicited, but the bill was easily defeated. Thereafter protest abated, only to flare up again on a smaller scale in December 1812, September 1814, and June 1816.

SEE ALSO: Luddism and Machine Breaking

References and Suggested Readings

- Binfield, K. (2004) *The Writings of the Luddites*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Randall, A. J. (2006) *Riotous Assemblies: Popular Protest in Hanoverian England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sale, K. (1995) *Rebels Against the Future: The Luddites and their War on the Industrial Revolution*. New York: Addison Wesley.

Lugo, Fernando (b. 1951)

Stefan Thimmel

On April 20, 2008 Fernando Armindo Lugo Méndez, an explicit exponent of Latin American liberation theology, was elected president of

the Republic of Paraguay. Lugo was born on May 30, 1951 and as a member of the Steyler Missionaries (the Catholic fraternity active in Paraguay since 1910) worked until 2005 in the Department of San Pedro. From 1994 he was bishop of the Central-Paraguayan diocese, one of the poorest and most conflict-ridden in the country.

As a candidate of the Patriotic Alliance for Change (*Alianza Patriótica por el Cambio – APC*), which is composed of nine political parties and approximately 20 social movements of indigenous people, small farmers, trade unionists, and women, he was elected with 41 percent of the vote. The center-left alliance, from Christian Democrats up to communists (it can be compared with the *Frente Amplio*, the Broad Front in Uruguay), displaced the conservative Colorado Party, which ruled the country for 61 years, including the 35-year military dictatorship of the German-descended General Alfredo Stroessner, which began in 1954.

Lugo, whose parents suffered under Stroessner's terror regime and whose three brothers were tortured several times, is known in Paraguay as the bishop of the poor. He was given this nickname by his mentor, the Ecuadorian liberation theologian Leonidas Proaño, with whom he worked from 1977 to 1982, until he returned to his home country. Immediately upon his return, however, he was expelled and exiled to Rome, where he studied sociology at the Gregorian University. In 1991, two years after the collapse of Alfredo Stroessner's regime, he returned to Paraguay.

He hoped to help Paraguay break out of its isolation. His agenda included house building, land reform, the introduction of a general public health system, education reform, and investment in infrastructure. Because the Colorado Party still holds 43 of the 80 seats in the Paraguayan parliament, however, he depends on the support of dissident Colorado parliamentarians. Furthermore, he faces power struggles among the members of his heterogeneous coalition.

Land and agrarian reform have priority for President Lugo, who assumed power on August 15, 2008. In Paraguay only 5 percent of the population owns 90 percent of the agricultural land. As a consequence, the huge majority of the population did not see any benefits from a recent boom in agro-business (mainly because

of the highly increased demand for soya cultivated in Paraguay). Lugo's predecessor, Nicanor Duarte Frutos of the Colorado Party, failed to address this unjust distribution. As a result, more than 35 percent of the Paraguayan population has made no economic progress in the last ten years, and more than a million people have emigrated.

Another main focus of Lugo is the struggle against corruption. Paraguay is considered one of the most corrupt states in the world, and Lugo, who describes himself as an "outsider without party membership," hopes to change that. When Duarte tried to modify the constitution to enable his reelection, Lugo affiliated himself with the protest movement, resigned as a bishop, and asked the Vatican in December 2006 for laymanship. Although this was denied by the congregation of the Catholic bishops, he was released from his duties and rights. Lugo considers himself a center politician. While defending private property and seeking foreign investment, he is also looking for a political approach with his Latin American colleagues Evo Morales and Hugo Chávez. He is also integrating religion as a new element into the squad of center-left presidents and women presidents in South America.

SEE ALSO: Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–Present; Latin America, Catholic Church and Liberation, 16th Century to Present; Morales, Evo (b. 1959)

References and Suggested Readings

- Cardozo, E. (1991) *Breve Historia del Paraguay*. Buenos Aires: Eudeba. Available at: www.fernandolugo.blogspot.com.
 Washburn, C. A. (2001) *The History of Paraguay*. Boston: Elibron Classics.

Lukács, Georg (1885–1971)

Christina Gerhardt

Georg Lukács was a Marxist critic and philosopher. Born into a wealthy assimilated Jewish family in Budapest, he studied in Budapest, Berlin, and Heidelberg. In 1918, at the end of World War I and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he joined the Hungarian Communist Party

and in 1919 served as minister of culture and education in the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic under the leadership of Béla Kun. Afterwards, Lukács fled to and lived in Vienna, and then Berlin. When Hitler seized power, Lukács left for Moscow, returning to Hungary in 1945. Following Lukács's participation in the revolutionary communist government of Imre Nagy in 1956, when Lukács served as the minister of culture, he was sent into exile in Bucharest and placed under house arrest. In 1957, after practicing self-criticism, he was allowed to return to Hungary where he remained until his death in 1971.

Lukács's writings encompass literary criticism and political theory. His methodology – which combines Marxian political and economic theory, neo-Kantian and Hegelian philosophy with literary analysis – established Marxist cultural studies and had a lasting impact, informing, for example, the Frankfurt School. His central works include *The Theory of the Novel* (1916), *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), and *Studies of European Realism* (1948).

Lukács's work generally sought to bring literature and politics together. In 1902, as a young student at Budapest University, he began writing theater reviews and co-founded the Thalia Theater (1903–4), which brought theater to working-class and rural audiences. It performed plays by Henrik Ibsen, August Strindberg, and Gerhart Hauptmann, which often thematized social alienation. A year prior, he had joined the Revolutionary Students of Budapest, which was organized by Ervin Szabó, who introduced Lukács to the writings of Georges Sorel. Subsequently, Lukács studied in Berlin and in Heidelberg with the neo-Kantian sociologists Georg Simmel and Max Weber. Beyond Simmel and Weber, his work of this period – *Soul and Form* (1910) and *The Theory of the Novel* (1916) – shows the influences of Kant, Hegel, and Dilthey.

During World War I Lukács returned to Budapest and formed an intellectual circle frequently called the Lukács circle, which included Béla Balázs, Béla Bartók, Karl Mannheim, and Karl Polyani. In 1918 Lukács joined the Communist Party and participated in Béla Kun's revolutionary communist government. His subsequent writings are much more overtly Marxist and political, as evidenced by *History and Class Consciousness* (1923). As a result of arguments

put forth in *History and Class Consciousness* and some earlier essays, the Third International forced Lukács to perform a self-critique in 1924. *History and Class Consciousness* considers the writings and theories of Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin, orthodox Marxism, the class consciousness of the proletariat, and the problem of organization. In the chapter “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat” Lukács underscored not only that reification is a central dimension of social relation but also that it produces a reification of consciousness. That is, since society and social relations are reified, they construct a “false consciousness.” And because bourgeois interests structure society, they prevent the proletariat's consciousness from recognizing its own interests. In these ways, well before the rediscovery of Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, which argued similar points and which Lukács read in the original in Moscow in 1930, Lukács had – via Hegel – made not only alienation and reification but also the dialectic central categories of his critique.

Lukács's response to the Third International, that is, his willingness to perform self-critique, contrasts sharply with that of Karl Korsch, also an early Marxist scholar, who was critiqued by the Third International the same year. Korsch refused to change his position and stepped out of the Communist Party, while Lukács adapted. His later work, subsequent to *History and Class Consciousness*, shows a more materialist approach and Lukács later argued that *History and Class Consciousness* was too idealist and not materialist enough. Subsequent to the self-critique, Lukács's work frequently theorizes realism; for example, *Balzac and French Realism* (1945), *Goethe and His Time* (1947), *Russian Realism in World Literature* (1949), and *The Historical Novel* (1955). Whether or not Lukács adopted a Stalinist position is debated in Lukács scholarship (e.g., by Lucien Goldmann, Eric Hobsbawm, Fredric Jameson, George Lichtheim). Regardless, his role in establishing Marxism was pivotal, influencing later Marxist thinkers. His arguments would reappear and be developed further in the writings of the Frankfurt School, which drew strongly on Lukács's early writings. Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and Herbert Marcuse, for example, all analyzed the relationship between the capitalist mode of production, the culture industry, and human relations.

SEE ALSO: Adorno, Theodor W. (1903–1969); Anarchosyndicalism; Benjamin, Walter (1892–1940); Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831); Hungary, Revolution of 1956; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; Nagy, Imre (1896–195); Szabó, Ervin (1877–1918)

References and Suggested Readings

- Arato, A. & Breines, P. (1979) *The Young Lukács and the Origins of Western Marxism*. London: New Left Books.
- Bernstein, J. M. (1984) *The Philosophy of the Novel: Lukács, Marxism and the Dialectics of Form*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Gluck, M. (1985) *Georg Lukács and His Generation, 1900–1918*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Goldmann, L. (1977) *Lukács and Heidegger*. London: Routledge.
- Heller, A. (Ed.) (1983) *Lukács Revalued*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kadarkay, A. (1991) *Georg Lukács: Life, Thought and Politics*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Löwy, M. (1976) *Georg Lukács: From Romanticism to Bolshevism*. London: New Left Books.

Lumumba, Patrice (1925–1961)

Ayokunle Olumuyiwa Omobowale

Born in Wembonya village in Katoko-Kombe District of Sankuru, in the Province of Kasai, Patrice Lumumba received primary education in a Catholic school until the age of 14, when he opted for Protestant education against his father's wishes. Under Protestant tutelage, Lumumba was introduced to European liberal and socialist ideas, including the works of Sartre and Karl Marx, which may have influenced his political thought.

Lumumba began his career as a clerk in Kindu and later joined the postal service in Stanleyville (now Kisangani). His political career gradually began at Stanleyville when he founded the Post Office Workers' Society and became general secretary of the Association of Native Public Servants. After serving a one-year jail term on trumped-up embezzlement charges, he moved to Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) where he worked successfully as a manager in a brewing company. It was in Leopoldville that he came to national prominence as a nationalist in 1956, calling for immediate independence for the Congo.

Pre-Independence Political Activism

Following Joseph Kasavubu's pioneering efforts in 1956 in calling for independence on the platform of his Alliance des Ba-Kongo (ABAKO), in August 1958 Lumumba founded and led the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) to work for immediate independence. Of all the major parties in the Congo at this period, only Lumumba's MNC had a nationalist outlook, as the other parties were largely ethnically based. Lumumba's nationalist perspective must have given him an advantage over Kasavubu, since he enjoyed greater support.

Returning from the All-African Peoples' Conference at Accra in December 1958, where he met and interacted with Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, Lumumba addressed a crowd of supporters, declaring that independence and freedom were the inalienable rights of every human being and not the mere gift of colonial masters. This declaration attracted cries of support from the audience. The Congo was subsequently engulfed in waves of anti-colonial and interparty violence, which led to much loss of life, especially among the locals. Lumumba was accused of complicity in the violent protests and arrested, even though he had declared his party's intention to seek independence through peaceful means. He was, however, released by the colonial government to participate in the Belgian-organized deliberations for Congolese independence in Brussels in 1959. Lumumba, along with other nationalists, played a vital role in ensuring immediate independence from Belgium.

In the parliamentary election held in May 1960, Lumumba's MNC won the highest number of seats – 33 out of 137. However, since his party had not won a clear-cut majority, it had to form a coalition government with ABAKO. Kasavubu became president and Lumumba clinched the position of prime minister and head of government. Independence was finally granted on June 30, 1960, when Lumumba countered King Baudouin's eulogy of Belgian colonization by presenting it as inhumane and exploitative, to the bewilderment of the apparently embarrassed king. Right from the first day of independence, this singular act earned Lumumba the status of an anti-Belgium radical leader.



After helping secure independence from Belgium for the Republic of the Congo in 1960, Patrice Lumumba became the country's first prime minister. Months later he was assassinated in suspicious circumstances suggesting Belgian and US government involvement. Here women in Accra, Ghana, mourn Lumumba's death during a parade in his honor on February 19, 1961. (Getty Images)

Post-Independence and Assassination

Just five days after independence, the Congo was engulfed in anti-colonial protests, the complicated ramifications of which would eventually lead to Lumumba's death. Belgium had purposely granted a quick independence to the Congo, without putting in place the necessary measures to assimilate the Congolese into the senior cadre of the military and the civil service. Thus, with only about 30 Congolese university graduates, the country inevitably lacked the requisite qualified personnel to assume senior positions. It was rather a deliberate attempt to accentuate post-independence colonialism. If politicians required no higher qualification to attain political positions, then Congolese in the military and civil service should have the same privilege extended to them. The gravity of their dissatisfaction can be seen in a tract from non-commissioned army officers:

Mr. Lumumba judges us incapable of taking the place of the white officers. Dear Lumumba, friend of the Europeans, we guarantee you the infernal ruin of your powers as long as you insult us as ignorant and incapable of taking the place of your white brothers. (Cited in Young 1966: 35)

Indeed, this anti-colonialist feeling had begun to permeate the hearts and minds of Congolese non-commissioned officers. Having noticed a degree of indiscipline among the rank-and-file, the Belgian head of the Congolese army, General Emile Janssens, summoned a meeting of military personnel on July 5, 1960, apparently indicating the maintenance of the status quo in military command and control, irrespective of political independence. For the African officers, this was not just an admonition to abide by military codes. It was rather an indication of continued dominance by the Belgians.

That evening, Congolese non-commissioned officers mutinied, arrested their officers, and even attacked Europeans in different parts of the country. Lumumba's response was to order the sacking of General Janssens on July 6 and an immediate Africanization of the officers' cadre by July 8. As pandemonium spread throughout the country, especially among Europeans who were suddenly exposed to attacks from locals, the European community experienced a mass exodus from the Congo, while the pro-Belgium government of Katanga Province led by Moïse Tshombe declared its secession from the Congo on July 11. Belgium subsequently deployed troops to protect its citizens and support the Katanga government, where it had vast investments.

Lumumba protested against Belgian action by making a formal report to the United Nations, in which Belgian troop deployment was described as an act of aggression. Indeed, the UN passed a resolution condemning Belgian action on July 14, deploying its own troops to replace Belgian soldiers on July 15. Whereas Lumumba had requested, and indeed expected, that the UN troops would assist in subduing the secessionist province under central authority, the UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld was of the opinion that UN troops were there to keep the peace and not to fight for Lumumba. Such was the situation until August 1960, when the South Kasai Province, where Belgium also had commercial interests, seceded. Thenceforth, Lumumba decided to turn to the Soviet Union, which duly provided military hardware and personnel.

Opting for the Soviet Union presented Lumumba to the western powers as a communist apologist in Africa. In a move which Gibbs (2000) indicated may have been influenced by western governments, Lumumba was sacked under questionable circumstances by President

Kasavubu on September 5. Though Lumumba fought frantically and secured parliament's support on September 7, he was captured by a section of Congolese soldiers in November when he tried to escape to Stanleyville, where his supporters had set up a rival government. Lumumba remained in the custody of his captors until January 17, 1961, when he was murdered. Newly declassified official documents reveal the possible complicity of western governments.

SEE ALSO: Congo Armed Insurgency, Mobutu Decamps; Congo Crisis, 1960–1965; Congo, Kinshasa Protest and Revolt; Marxism; Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972); Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–1980)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bustin, E. (2002) Remembrance of Sins Past: Unraveling the Murder of Patrice Lumumba. *Review of African Political Economy* 29 (93/94): 537–60.
- Gibbs, D. N. (2000) The United Nations, International Peacekeeping and the Question of "Impartiality": Revisiting the Congo Operation of 1960. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 38 (3): 359–82.
- Hallet, R. (1974) *Africa Since 1875*. London: Heinemann.
- Sangpam, S. N. (1997) Lumumba, Patrice Emery. In J. Middleton (Ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Africa South of the Sahara*, Vol. 3. New York: Charles Scriber's Sons, pp. 61–2.
- Uwechue, R. (1996) *Makers of Modern Africa: Profiles in History*. London: Africa Books.
- Young, M. C. (1966) Post-Independence Politics in Congo. *Transition* 26: 34–41.

Luther, Martin (1483–1546)

Nora Martin Peterson

Martin Luther is one of the most important figures in the Protestant Reformation. Today it is believed that Luther's writings, ranging in scope from theological tracts, sermons, and commentaries to translations and polemics, account for approximately 20 percent of all literature printed in Germany between 1500 and 1530. The implications of his split from the Roman Catholic Church triggered the Peasants' Revolution of 1524–5 and paved the way for the Protestant Reformation. His complete translation of the Bible into German (1534) provided access

to scripture, which he believed was vital to a personal understanding of God. The standards he set by selecting each word carefully from a vast mix of Germanic dialects often lend him the title of "father of the German language."

It all began in a moment of fear when, one tempestuous night, Luther vowed to become a monk if God would spare him from the wrath of the storm. He survived, and in 1505 joined an Augustinian monastery in Erfurt. His intense interest in scholarship and theological doctrine paved the way for a doctorate in theology in Wittenberg in 1512, after which he became increasingly concerned with what he perceived to be injustices within the Roman Catholic Church. In 1517 Luther nailed his 95 Theses (which stated as many reasons why the practice of selling indulgences should be discontinued) to the castle door in Wittenberg, creating an overnight sensation and sharpening the already tense atmosphere between him and Catholic leaders. By 1520 it was clear that there would be no chance of reconciliation with the Church. He had by this point outlined much of his own doctrine and believed that the reigning ecclesiastical leadership had become "religious nihilists and that the pope himself was the anti-Christ" (Gritsch 1972: 42).

Luther's doctrine contained three main departures from Catholic beliefs. His *priesthood of all believers* holds that every baptized Christian is a priest, bishop, and pope in his/her own right, thus erecting a much more egalitarian structure than the rigid hierarchy of the Catholic Church. He also did away with many of the Catholic sacraments, which he insisted were not founded in scripture, leaving only baptism and the eucharist (as described in *On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church*, 1520). Advancing his belief in the importance of an individual relationship with God, free from structural obligations and what he believed to be unnecessary ritual, Luther published his principle of *sola fides*, or justification by faith alone (in *On the Freedom of a Christian*, 1520). He argued that good works were not necessary for Christian salvation – faith alone would make a person righteous in God's eyes. Luther's demolition of traditional institutions and doctrines turned him into a household name almost overnight, and the fact that he published and preached largely in German made his ideas accessible to the uneducated German public of the lower classes.

Wider das Papstum zu Rom vom Teuffel gestiftt/ Mart. Luther D.



Wittenberg/1545.
durch Hans Lufft.

On Halloween in 1517, Martin Luther nailed his “95 Theses of Contention” to the church door at Wittenberg, thereby announcing his distaste for the corrupt Roman Catholic practice of indulgences. This woodcut is from the title page of his 1545 anti-papal tract, *Pope at the Gates of Hell*. (*The Granger Collection, New York*)

When the peasants of Swabia collectively published their *Twelve Articles* (1525) – a list of complaints, based on scriptural quotation, against the princes and lords – Luther replied with his *Admonition to Peace; A Reply to the Twelve Articles of the Peasants of Swabia* in 1525. Here, he rebuked both sides: the peasants for taking scripture out of its intended context (17), and the princes and lords for their life of luxury and extravagance at the expense of the “poor common people, [who] cannot bear it any longer” (19). By warning both parties that God “hates both tyrants and rebels” (40–1), Luther pleaded for a peaceful resolution of an increasingly tense situation. The coming rebellion, during which Luther felt his words and beliefs were being misused by both parties, forced the theologian to face “the relationship between personal faith and socio-political evil” (Gritsch 1972: 49).

As the conflict sharpened, Luther increasingly despaired that his words were being taken

out of context by both sides (Sessions 1972: 30). Nevertheless, he was forced by his religious and political prominence to take a stand amidst the increasing violence. In *A Sincere Admonition by Martin Luther to all Christians to Guard against Insurrection and Rebellion* (1522), Luther tried again to state his beliefs about authority. He believed that because the natural state of man is Hobbesian and unruly, temporal authority and government are necessary in order to prevent utter chaos. However, Luther underscored the fact that no temporal authority could affect the inner, godly man, which should ever be fixed on scripture and God.

He urged the people not to side with rulers who follow papal authority and enforce Catholic doctrines; however, instead of following his advice in their hearts, the common people of Germany followed Luther’s advice literally and explosively. Luther, appalled that his writing had triggered the opposite effect than the one he had sought, harshly spoke out again, this time firmly coming down against the rebels: “The rulers, therefore, ought to shake these people up until they keep their mouths shut and realize that the rulers are serious . . . You have to answer people like that with a fist, until the sweat drips off their noses” (*An Open Letter on the Harsh Book against the Peasants*, 1525). The rebellion was brutally suppressed by the princes and lords, but the rhetoric of both sides of the conflict would continue to sharpen and revolve around religious doctrine until its culmination in the Thirty Years’ War.

Luther himself continued writing throughout the rest of his lifetime, but died in 1546 embittered by the split he had witnessed in the German people. He had not foreseen that his own deep religious beliefs, which he expressed so enigmatically in his texts, would not be followed with the same godly intentions as he himself sought.

Reception of Luther has varied as much as the interpretation of his written word did in his own lifetime. Heinrich Heine (1797–1856) lauded Luther’s intellectual clash with the Catholic Church as a pivotal moment in the creation of a positive national identity (*Romantische Schule*, 1836). Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), while conceding Luther’s contributions to the development of a national German language, accused Luther of being the “single greatest force that ruined Europe’s most important chance of

throwing off the Christian yoke it had borne for over a thousand years . . . he blocked the way to the Übermensch for over a century” (Bluhm 1956: 82–3), and claimed that Luther’s entire principle of *sola fides* was merely a cloak to justify Luther’s own unbridled emotions (79).

SEE ALSO: Calvin, John (1509–1564); German Peasant Rebellion, 1525; German Reformation; Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900); Zwingli, Huldrych (1484–1531)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bluhm, H. (1956) Nietzsche’s Final View of Luther and the Reformation. *PMLA* 71 (1): 75–83.
- Brandt, W. & Lehmann, H. T. (Eds.) (1962) *Luther’s Works*, 55 vols. Philadelphia: Concordia Publishing House and Muhlenberg Press, Vols. 45 and 46.
- Gritsch, E. W. (1972) Martin Luther and Violence: A Reappraisal of a Neuralgic Theme. *Sixteenth Century Journal* 3 (1): 37–55.
- Marius, R. (1999) *Martin Luther: The Christian Between God and Death*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Porter, J. M. (1981) Luther and Political Millenarianism: The Case of the Peasants’ War. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 42 (3): 389–406.
- Sessions, K. C. (1972) The War over Luther and the Peasants: Old Campaigns and New Strategies. *Sixteenth Century Journal* 3 (2): 25–44.
- Theibault, J. (1995) Peasant Rhetoric: Persuasion and Dependency in Early Modern Germany. *Carleton Germanic Papers* 23: 65–75.

Luxembourg, protest and revolution

Adam Reinherz

The long tradition of revolt and protest in Luxembourg extends from the country’s domination by the Spanish Hapsburgs (1556–1684), France (1684–97), Spain (1697–1714), Austria (1714–95), and France again in 1795 during the French revolutionary wars. Under French rule Luxembourg was divided and a Constitution of the Directory was imposed, in addition to a modern state bureaucracy. Finally in 1798, after conscription laws required Luxembourgers to enter the French army, they revolted. Because the rebellion was led by Luxembourg’s lower class, it was referred to as “the peasants war,” or “the war of the cudgels” (*Klöppelkrieg*). Luxembourgian peasants courageously resisted their adversaries, but, without sufficient arms, military expertise,

or the support of the upper class and noble Luxembourgers, they were easily defeated. In response, France executed all those peasants who had participated in the revolt.

In 1815, after the fall of Napoleon I, Luxembourg became the independent Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, with William I of the Netherlands serving as grand duke. In 1830, after long suffering the heavy tax burdens of William I, Luxembourg allied with Belgium in revolt against the Netherlands. This would eventually lead to the First Treaty of London in 1839, granting Belgium independence, and severing western and eastern Luxembourg, allowing for increased autonomy. In 1867, the Second Treaty of London granted Luxembourg full independence and neutrality.

As an independent nation, economic conditions declined as farmers suffered from famine and poor harvests, and laborers were unable to find jobs. Additionally, the working classes were heavily taxed and voting rights were granted only to the wealthy. Because of these conditions Luxembourg experienced rapid emigration between 1841 and 1891, with approximately 72,000 leaving for the United States and France. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Luxembourg economy was booming after the discovery of iron ore deposits in the southwest. By converting iron into steel, Luxembourg became a major force within the global steel industry.

In 1914, despite being independent and neutral, Luxembourg was invaded and occupied by Germany. Marie Adélaïde, grand duchess of Luxembourg, and Paul Eyschen, prime minister of Luxembourg, met *Oberst* Richard Karl von Tessmar, the German commander, on the Adolphe bridge in Luxembourg City to protest against the invasion, but eventually accepted the German terms. Because Germany permitted Adélaïde and her government to remain in office, France accused the grand duchess of collaboration. This was followed by further unrest when, despite the war, iron production decreased. By the fall of 1916, the iron and steel industries had begun to unionize, which subsequently led to the election of three independents as representative government deputies. In their opposition to the National Union Government formed during the German occupation, Luxembourgers were distrustful of the government as a means for social change. The German commander, von Tessmar, attempted to quell the

beginnings of unrest by issuing death threats against any individual who committed an act of violence. Luxembourg workers, mostly miners, reacted by coming out on strike. Because Germany desperately relied upon Luxembourgian iron, von Tessmar met the strikers with force. Though failing to implement his death threat, he arrested strike leaders and sentenced them to ten years' imprisonment.

As the armistice in 1918 approached, rebellion swept through Luxembourg as communist revolutionaries established committees throughout the duchy, declaring a new government on November 9, 1918. By November 12, socialists and liberals, united against the grand duchess, appealed for her abdication. Adélaïde turned to the French for assistance, but they refused, maintaining that she had collaborated with Germany. On January 9, 1919, a portion of the Luxembourg army revolted and proclaimed itself the army of a new republic, but France intervened, crushing the insurgents. After much consultation with Prime Minister Karl, Adélaïde abdicated in favor of her sister Charlotte on January 14, which allowed for a 1919 referendum reinforcing Luxembourg's desire to remain independent and to retain Charlotte as the grand duchess. Charlotte continued to serve as a strong, respected leader of Luxembourg for the next four decades.

During the 1930s, Luxembourg was heavily influenced by European left- and right-wing politics. In an effort to quell the communist unrest occurring in the industrial areas, Luxembourg continually turned to Nazi Germany and maintained a friendly relationship. This brought about much criticism from the international community. The Communist Party of Luxembourg was later subjected to *Maulkuerfgesetz* or the "muzzle" law; however, the law was turned down in a 1937 referendum. While combating the communist ideals espoused by the industrial communities, Luxembourg appeased the leaders of Nazi Germany.

On May 10, 1940, Germany again invaded and occupied Luxembourg, but this time the grand duchess and her government refused to cooperate, and later went into exile in London. From London, Grand Duchess Charlotte attempted to inspire her people with regular radio broadcasts. This was countered by a German propaganda campaign, spread throughout Luxembourg, to convince its inhabitants of their membership in

the Third Reich. A peaceful resistance to this campaign, led by several underground movements, included the refusal to speak German and an insistence on claiming to be citizens of Luxembourg in all attempts by Germany to collect census data.

Regardless, in August 1942, Luxembourg was incorporated into the Third Reich, resulting in 13,000 Luxembourgian males having to report for German military service. Twenty-one strikers opposed to German conscription were executed and hundreds more were sent to concentration camps. However, several resistance groups were successful in hiding many conscripted Luxembourgians, and a small group of volunteers fought alongside the Allies during the Normandy invasion that liberated occupied France.

SEE ALSO: Communist Party, France; Communist Party, Germany; German Revolution, 1918–1923; Mandel, Ernest (1923–1995)

References and Suggested Readings

- Barteau, H. C. (1996) *A Historical Dictionary of Luxembourg*. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
- Clark, S. (1963) *All the Best in Belgium and Luxembourg*. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company.
- Reid, A. (2005) *Luxembourg: The Clog-Shaped Duchy*. Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse.

Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919)

Paul Le Blanc

Rosa Luxemburg was born in a Poland divided under German and Russian domination, and she played a role in the revolutionary movement of each country. Her influence has been global, however, since her contributions place her within the very heart of the Marxist tradition.

Part of a cultured and well-to-do family in Warsaw, Luxemburg was an exceptionally bright child who was encouraged to pursue an education in Poland and then at the University of Zurich in Switzerland, where she received a doctorate in economics with a dissertation on "The Economic Development of Poland." She became active in the revolutionary socialist movement while still in her teens, soon rising into the leadership circle of the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland, a militant group whose anti-nationalist orientation caused

it to be outpaced by other currents emphasizing the cause of Polish independence. Luxemburg's working-class internationalism, however, caused her to move into Germany in order to play a more substantial role in the massive and influential German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Luxemburg soon occupied a place in the revolutionary wing of the socialist movement, gaining considerable respect and also attracting considerable hostility.

Quality of Marxism

Among Luxemburg's best-known early writings are her polemic *Reform or Revolution?* (1899) and her more reflective "Stagnation and Progress of Marxism" (1903), both of which give a sense of the quality of her Marxism. The first involves a debate with a prominent SPD theoretician, Eduard Bernstein. The revolutionary approach of Karl Marx, according to Bernstein, was no longer relevant to modern capitalism and new German realities – particularly as the trade unions, and reform efforts within the German parliament, both associated with the practice of the SPD, promised (he felt) the piecemeal elimination of various oppressive aspects of capitalism and a gradual evolution to socialism. This approach was consistent with the actual practice of the SPD, he argued, not the commitment to the old notion that the working class should take political power in order to inaugurate the socialist transformation. This was related, in Bernstein's view, to a natural tendency in capitalist development for the economy to become socially organized and therefore to evolve in a socialist direction.

Luxemburg sharply challenged this view. She scoffed at Bernstein's method of "weighing minutely the good and bad sides of social reform and social revolution . . . in the same manner in which cinnamon or pepper is weighed out." This method of analysis, in which one could select methods of historical development "out of pleasure from the historical counter of history, just as one chooses hot or cold sausages," constituted the abandonment of "dialectics and . . . the materialist conception of history" that had guided Marx for an inferior method leading in the opposite direction – pushing "the labor movement into bourgeois paths" and "paralyz[ing] completely the proletarian class struggle." Following this method, the SPD program would become "not



Rosa Luxemburg (1870–1919) is shown speaking at the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart, Germany, August 1907. Luxemburg, a leading socialist intellectual and activist, became one of the founders of the Communist Party of Germany in 1914 and a leading voice among left-wing revolutionaries during the German Revolution. (akg-images)

the realization of socialism, but the reform of capitalism." The very nature of capitalism – at the heart of the functioning of the capitalist economy – involved maximizing profits for the capitalist minority through a relentless exploitation of the working-class majority. It is true, she noted, that under capitalism "production takes on a progressively increasing social character," but the capitalist form of this "social character" – including the rise and incredible expansion of powerful economic corporations – would mean that "capitalist antagonisms, capitalist exploitation, the oppression of labor-power, are augmented to the extreme."

Luxemburg insisted Marx's insight that "capitalism, as a result of its own inner contradictions, moves toward a point when it will be unbalanced, when it will simply become impossible," remained as valid as ever. This would cause capitalism's defenders to resist and push back both social reforms and the increasingly "inconvenient" democratic forms that had been conceded in the face of previous revolutionary struggles. She was quite critical of the undemocratic limitations of Germany's parliamentary system – hobbled by the power of monarchy, aristocracy, and big business – and she dismissed Bernstein's notion that this "poultry-yard of bourgeois parliamentarism" could be utilized "to realize the most formidable social transformation of history, the passage from capitalism to socialism." It would become necessary for the workers to push past these limitations, in the direction of genuine "rule by the people" (that is, to political rule by the working class). "In a word, democracy is indispensable not because it renders superfluous the

conquest of political power by the proletariat, but because it renders this conquest both necessary and possible.”

Arguing that the socialist movement must fight for “the union of the broad popular masses with an aim reaching beyond the existing social order, the union of the daily struggle with the great world transformation” from capitalism to socialism, Luxemburg saw revolutionary Marxism as the most effective means for helping the labor movement to avoid two negative extremes – “abandoning the mass character of the [SPD] or abandoning its final aim [and] falling into bourgeois reformism.”

On the other hand, Luxemburg warned that, to a large extent, what passed for “Marxism” in the mass socialist movement was far more limited and dogmatic than the far more complex and nuanced body of thought of Marx – “his detailed and comprehensive analysis of capitalist economy, and . . . his method of historical research with its immeasurable field of application.” She argued that much of this had gone beyond the initial practical needs of the working-class movement, and that “it is not true, as far as the practical struggle is concerned, Marx is out of date, that we have superseded Marx. On the contrary, it is because we have not yet learned to make adequate use of the most important mental weapons in the Marxist arsenal,” because the labor movement had not felt “the urgent need of them in the earlier stages of our struggle.”

Luxemburg’s belief was that developments of the new twentieth century would create such an “urgent need,” and that rather than allowing the limited “orthodox Marxism” to coexist with the reformist practice hailed by Bernstein, the SPD and the world socialist movement would need to be revitalized with the more profoundly revolutionary orientation represented by Marx’s actual perspectives. At the same time, the spread of the critical Marxist approach – what she termed as “the Marxist method of research [being] socialized” – would help theorists and activists in the workers’ movement to come to grips with the new developments confronting them, with innovative analyses, strategies, and tactics.

Analyses of Capitalism and Imperialism

Applying the dialectical approach to her economic studies, Luxemburg understood capitalism as

an expansive system driven by the dynamic of accumulation. Capital in the form of money is invested in *capital* in the form of raw materials and tools and labor-power, which is transformed – by the squeezing of actual labor out of the labor-power of the workers – into *capital* in the form of the commodities thereby produced, whose increased value is realized through the sale of the commodities for more money than was originally invested, which is the *increased capital* out of which the capitalist extracts his profits, only to be driven to invest more capital for the purpose of achieving ever greater capital accumulation.

Luxemburg’s analysis of the capital accumulation process involves a complex critique of the second volume of Marx’s *Capital*. As part of her resolution of what she considers to be an underdeveloped and incomplete aspect of Marx’s analysis of how surplus value is realized, she focuses on the global dynamics of the capitalist system and argues that imperialism is at the heart of capitalist development.

In her classic *The Accumulation of Capital* (1913) she offers an incisive economic analysis of imperialism. There are several distinctive features of Luxemburg’s theory of imperialism that set it off from that of other leading Marxists. She makes a great deal of the coexistence in the world of different cultures, different types of society, and different modes of production (i.e., different economic systems). Historically, the dominant form of economy worldwide was the communal hunting and gathering mode of production, which was succeeded in many areas by a more or less communistic agricultural form of economy which she characterized as a primitive “peasant economy.” This was succeeded in some areas by non-egalitarian societies dominated by militarily powerful elites, constituting modes of production that she labeled “slave economy” and “feudalism.” Sometimes coexisting with these, sometimes superseding them, was a “simple commodity production” in which artisans and farmers, for example, would produce commodities for the market in order to trade or sell for the purpose of acquiring other commodities that they might need or want. This simple commodity mode of production is different from the capitalist mode of production, which is driven by the already-described capital accumulation process, overseen by an increasingly wealthy and powerful capitalist minority.

Three features especially differentiate the analysis in *The Accumulation of Capital* from the perspectives of other prominent Marxists.

(1) Luxemburg advances a controversial conceptualization of imperialism's relationship to the exploitation of the working class in the advanced capitalist countries. Because workers receive less value than what they create, they are unable to purchase and consume all that is produced. This underconsumption means that capitalists must expand into non-capitalist areas, seeking markets as well as raw materials and investment opportunities (particularly new sources of labor) outside of the capitalist economic sphere.

(2) Another distinctive quality of her conceptualization of imperialism is that it is not restricted to "the highest stage" or "latest stage" of capitalism. Rather, imperialism is something that one finds at the earliest beginnings of capitalism – in the period of what Marx calls "primitive capitalist accumulation" – and which continues non-stop, with increasing and overwhelming reach and velocity, down to the present. Or as she puts it, "capitalism in its full maturity also depends in all respects on non-capitalist strata and social organizations existing side by side with it," and "since the accumulation of capital becomes impossible in all points without non-capitalist surroundings, we cannot gain a true picture of it by assuming the exclusive and absolute domination of the capitalist mode of production."

(3) Another special feature of Luxemburg's contribution is her anthropological sensitivity to the impact of capitalist expansion on the rich variety of the world's peoples and cultures. The survey of capitalist expansionism's impact in her *Accumulation of Capital* includes such examples as: the destruction of the English peasants and artisans; the destruction of the Native American peoples (the so-called Indians); the enslavement of African peoples by the European powers; the ruination of small farmers in the Midwestern and Western regions of the United States; the onslaught of French colonialism in Algeria; the onslaught of British colonialism in India; British incursions into China, with special reference to the Opium wars; the onslaught of British colonialism in South Africa (with lengthy reference to the three-way struggle of black African peoples, the Dutch Boers, and the British).

No less dramatic is Luxemburg's perception of the economic role of militarism in the globalization of the market economy. "Militarism

fulfills a quite definite function in the history of capital, accompanying as it does every historical phase of accumulation," she commented, noting that it was decisive in subordinating portions of the world to exploitation by capitalist enterprise. It played an increasingly explosive role in rivalry between competing imperialist powers. More than this, military spending "is in itself a province of accumulation," making the modern state a primary "buyer for the mass of products containing the capitalized surplus value," although in fact, in the form of taxes, "the workers foot the bill."

Revolutionary Strategy and Organization

Luxemburg was profoundly critical of conservative developments in the SPD. An increasingly powerful tendency inside the party and trade union leadership was quietly moving along the reformist path outlined by Bernstein. This path, she prophetically insisted, would not lead gradually to socialism at all, but to the gradual accommodation and subjugation of the socialist movement to the authoritarian proclivities, the brutal realities, and the violent dynamics of the capitalist system.

Luxemburg's revolutionary orientation resonated throughout much of the German labor movement. There were, however, powerful trade union leaders who despised her. They were insulted by her comment, in *Mass Strike, Political Party, and Trade Unions* (1906), that trade union struggles can only be like the labor of Sisyphus (rolling the boulder up a hill, only to have capitalist dynamics push the gains back down again), and that only socialism will secure permanent gains for the working class. Of course, she added that it is *necessary* for trade unions to wage that struggle in order to defend and improve the workers' conditions in the here-and-now. But this did not make up for her barbed observation that "the specialization of professional activity as trade union leaders, as well as the naturally restricted horizon which is bound up with disconnected economic struggles in a peaceful period, leads only too easily, among trade union officials, to bureaucratism and a certain narrowness of outlook."

As Luxemburg explained it, the workings and contradictions of capitalism can sometimes result in what she called a "violent and sudden jerk which disturbs the momentary equilibrium

of everyday social life,” aggravating “deep-seated, long-suppressed resentment” among workers and other social layers, resulting in an explosive and spontaneous reaction on a mass scale – in the form of strikes spreading through an industry and sometimes involving many, most, or all occupations and workplaces in one or more regions. Such mass strikes can go far beyond economic issues, sometimes involving whole communities in mass demonstrations and street battles, and are the means by which workers seek to “grasp at new political rights and attempt to defend existing ones.” Once such strikes begin, there can occur tremendous solidarity, discipline, and effective organization. But they have an elemental quality which defies any notion of revolutionary blueprints being drawn up in advance.

Luxemburg believed that what she defined as “the most enlightened, most class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat” – among whom she included the SPD in Germany, along with organized socialist parties of other lands – should play an active role not only when such explosions occur, but also beforehand in helping to educate and organize more and more workers in preparation for such developments, which would enable socialist parties to assume leadership of the whole movement. She did not think such upsurges would necessarily result in socialist revolution, but she believed that they would become “the starting point of a feverish work of organization” that would embrace more of the working class, enabling it to fight for reforms in a manner that would help prepare it for the revolutionary struggle. “From the whirlwind and the storm, out of the fire and glow of the mass strike and the street fighting rise again, like Venus from the foam, fresh, young, powerful, buoyant trade unions.” Some segments of the working class cannot be unionized through “the form of quiet, systematic, partial trade union struggles,” she noted, and her words drive home the point that “a powerful and reckless fighting action of the proletariat, born of a revolutionary situation, must surely react upon the deeper-lying layers and ultimately draw all those into a general economic struggle who, in normal times, stand aside from the daily trade union fight.”

Luxemburg taught that in order to remain true to its democratic and socialist principles, and in order to defend the material interests of the workers and the oppressed, the socialist workers’ movement – even while fighting for necessary

and life-giving partial reforms – would sometimes find itself in uncompromising confrontation with the capitalist power structure. What she and her revolutionary-minded comrades found, however, is that the increasingly bureaucratized structure of their own socialist workers’ movement was becoming an obstacle to the internal democracy of the movement. The increasingly bureaucratic-conservative leadership of the trade unions and party more and more sought to contain radicalizing impulses of the working-class membership, to limit the ability of people such as Luxemburg to present a revolutionary socialist perspective, to deflect upsurges in the class struggle into safely moderate channels. She also gave great weight to so-called “extra-parliamentary” social struggles, and to a dynamic interplay between existing organizations and spontaneous mass action. She put it this way in her later comments in the wake of Russia’s 1917 Revolution:

As bred-in-the-bone disciples of parliamentary cretinism, these German social democrats have sought to apply to revolutions the homemade wisdom of the parliamentary nursery: in order to carry anything, you must first have a majority. The same, they say, applies to the revolution: first let’s become a “majority.” The true dialectic of revolutions, however, stands this wisdom on its head: not through a majority to revolutionary tactics, but through revolutionary tactics to a majority – that is the way the road runs. Only a party which knows how to lead, that is, to advance things, wins support in stormy times.

For Luxemburg there was a consistency between this revolutionary-democratic strategic perspective and her revolutionary-democratic vision of socialism. Here is how she put it:

Bourgeois class rule has no need of the political training and education of the entire mass of the people, at least not beyond certain narrow limits. But for the proletarian dictatorship that is the life element, the very air without which it is not able to exist. . . . Only experience is capable of correcting and opening new ways. Only unobstructed, effervescent life falls into a thousand new forms and improvisations, brings to light creative force, itself corrects all mistaken attempts. . . . The whole mass of the people must take part. . . . Socialism in life demands a complete spiritual transformation in the masses degraded by centuries of class rule.

Social instincts in place of egotistical ones, mass initiative in place of inertia, idealism which conquers all suffering. . . . The only way to a rebirth is the school of public life itself, the most unlimited, the broadest democracy and public opinion.

While she was fully supportive of the revolutionary example of Lenin, Trotsky, and the Bolsheviks in their triumphant Russian insurgency of 1917, however, there were other aspects of the example they were setting to which she responded more critically.

Democracy and Freedom

In Luxemburg's view, the socialist movement had proved to be the most consistent force for democracy in the world. More than this, she viewed socialism quite simply as an expanded, deepened, authentic democracy – genuine rule by the people in both the political and economic life of society. Her notion of a workers' state (what has sometimes been called "dictatorship of the proletariat") had nothing to do with a one-party dictatorship ruling in the name of the people. Rather, it meant what Marx and Engels said in the *Communist Manifesto* when they spoke of the working class winning the battle of democracy, what Lenin meant in *The State and Revolution* when he spoke of a thoroughgoing political rule by the working class. This was in contrast to the authoritarian political forms that began to develop all too soon in the wake of the 1917 Russian Revolution.

Luxemburg was an early critic of this development, challenging Lenin and the Bolsheviks – whom she held in high esteem – to pull back from their expansive justifications for the undemocratic emergency measures that were adopted in the face of both internal counterrevolutionary assaults and a global capitalist counteroffensive. "Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the members of one party – however numerous they may be – is no freedom at all," she insisted. "Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently." In her prophetic warning she elaborated:

Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life,

in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element. Public life gradually falls asleep, a few dozen party leaders of inexhaustible energy and boundless experience direct and rule. Among them, in reality only a dozen outstanding heads do the leading and an elite of the working class is invited from time to time to meetings where they are to applaud the speeches of the leaders, and to approve proposed resolutions unanimously – at bottom, then, a clique affair – a dictatorship, to be sure, not the dictatorship of the proletariat, however, but only the dictatorship of a handful of politicians.

The best way to help overcome such developments, Luxemburg was convinced, was to spread the revolution to more advanced capitalist countries such as Germany, helping to establish a genuine workers' democracy on an increasingly global scale. Her efforts were tragically unsuccessful, however, and her vision of socialism was overwhelmed by the forces to which she had devoted her life to overcoming. In her classic *The Crisis in the German Social Democracy*, also known as "The Junius Pamphlet" (1916), she had written that humanity stood at a crossroads – either moving forward to socialism or a downward slide into barbarism, "either the triumph of imperialism and the destruction of all culture, and, as in ancient Rome, depopulation, desolation, degeneration, a vast cemetery, or the victory of socialism, that is, the conscious struggle of the international proletariat, against its methods, against war."

Life and Death

Luxemburg was a theorist, writer, and educator in the socialist movement, teaching at the prestigious school of the SPD, writing articles for its press, and giving innumerable speeches. But she was also an organizer and activist, imprisoned more than once – by Russian authorities in the wake of the 1905 revolutionary upsurge, and by German authorities for her uncompromising opposition to World War I. Expelled from the SPD, along with others, she helped to form the Spartakusbund (the Spartacus League, named after the rebellious leader of Roman slaves), which rallied revolutionary socialists – workers as well as intellectuals – to do what the SPD had ceased to do: oppose war, imperialism, and capitalism. Along with Karl Liebknecht, she was the foremost leader of this current, which

also included Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Leo Jogiches, Paul Levi, and others. Shortly before her death, she helped to merge this current with others to found the German Communist Party.

The disastrous conditions created by World War I, and defeat of Germany, caused the German monarchy to collapse, amid an upwelling of revolutionary sentiment among German workers. Luxemburg was especially critical of secret deals made between SPD moderates and the German military to draw this energy into “safe” channels of a new Weimar Republic, which would allow for democratic reforms within a capitalist framework but also allow the old ruling classes to maintain their privileges.

In January 1919, against Luxemburg’s warnings, revolutionary euphoria led some of her comrades, led by Liebknecht, into an ultra-left collision with a better-organized, better-armed, powerful enemy. In the wake of the revolt’s suppression, paramilitary groups (which consisted largely of future Nazis) organized under the name of the Freikorps and – under the pretext of defending the Weimar Republic – systematically rounded up and murdered left-wing “troublemakers.” Luxemburg and Liebknecht were among the victims of these death squads.

SEE ALSO: Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932); Bolsheviks; *Communist Manifesto*; Dictatorship of the Proletariat; Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Imperialism and Capitalist Development; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Liebknecht, Karl (1871–1919); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Social Democratic Party, Germany; Zetkin, Clara (1857–1933)

References and Suggested Readings

- Frolich, P. (1972) *Rosa Luxemburg: Her Life and Work*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Geras, N. (1983) *The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg*. London: Verso.
- Hudis, P. & Anderson, K. (Eds.) (2004) *The Rosa Luxemburg Reader*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Le Blanc, P. (1996) *From Marx to Gramsci: A Reader in Revolutionary Marxist Politics*. Amherst: Humanity Books.
- Le Blanc, P. (Ed.) (1999) *Rosa Luxemburg: Reflections and Writings*. Amherst: Humanity Books.
- Luxemburg, R. (1968) *The Accumulation of Capital*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Luxemburg, R. (1970) *Rosa Luxemburg Speaks*. Ed. M.-A. Waters. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Nettl, J. P. (1966) *Rosa Luxemburg*, 2 vols. London: Oxford University Press.

M

M-19 of Colombia

Raina Zimmering

The Movimiento 19 de Abril (Movement 19 April) was a left-wing urban guerilla movement which converted to a political party in 1991. The ex-FARC member Jaime Bateman founded the movement after the fraudulent presidential elections of April 19, 1970.

M-19 differs from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Army of National Liberation (ELN) in its urban orientation. M-19's aim was to transform Colombian society based on principles of justice, egalitarianism, and self-determination through a Latin American Revolution rejecting Soviet, Chinese, or Albanian models of socialism at the time. M-19's ideology was inspired by other South American urban guerrillas, such as the Tupamaros in Uruguay and the Montoneros in Argentina.

M-19 tactics attracted public and media attention through highly symbolic actions such as the robbery of the sword of Simón Bolívar from a museum in 1974, commandeering milk transportation and deviating the route to the slums of Bogotá, and the armed robbery of the largest army depot in Bogotá in 1978, seizing 5,000 weapons.

In 1980 M-19 occupied the Dominican embassy in Bogotá taking hostage 14 diplomats, including a US official. The hostages were peacefully released after tense negotiations with President Julio César Turbay Ayala, and M-19 members were allowed to leave the country for exile to Cuba. Later, some returned and reactivated M-19. In 1985 M-19 was the largest guerrilla group in Colombia after FARC, with an active membership estimated at between 1,500 and 2,000.

In 1985 the most spectacular action of M-19 was the siege of the Palace of Justice in Bogotá by 35 armed rebel commandos, taking hostage some 300 lawyers, judges, and Supreme Court

magistrates to initiate legal action forcing the president to comply with the peace agreement. Refusing to negotiate with M-19, the Colombian army totally destroyed the palace building with tanks. More than 100 people were killed, among them Supreme Court magistrates and M-19 members and commanders. The archive of the Supreme Court also was destroyed in a fire. Some analysts assume that drug lords and politicians may have masterminded the operation to destroy incriminating documents of the ties between the state and drug cartels. After failure of the attempt to capture the city of Cali in 1985, M-19 lost political influence.

In 1988 M-19 disarmed and handed over weapons, received pardons, and negotiated with the government to transform into a political party. In 1990 M-19 presidential candidate and former guerrilla commander Carlos Pizarro Leongómez was murdered while aboard an airline flight. Antonio Navarro Wolff replaced Pizarro as party leader and presidential candidate. Despite the violence, M-19 founded the Party of Alianza Democrática M-19 (Democratic Alliance M-19), becoming the third strongest political force after the liberal and conservative parties in the Colombian parliament. Its candidates performed well in local elections. M-19 actively participated in framing Colombia's new constitution of 1991, replacing the 1886 constitution. Antonio Navarro was one of three co-presidents of the Constituent Assembly and later ministry of health in President Gaviera's government.

In the late 1990s, following a relatively short period of strong popular support, M-19 as a political organization lost support and power in Colombian society, though former members retained some influence in the new Independent Democratic Pole coalition.

SEE ALSO: Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements,

1960s–1970s; Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1970s–1990s; Ejército de Liberación Nacional, Colombia; FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army)

References and Suggested Readings

- Ocampo Lopez, J. (1994) *Historia Básica de Colombia*. Bogotá: Plaza & Janés.
- Palacios, M. (2006) *Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875–2002*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Vásquez, P. & Eugenia, M. (2004) *My Life as a Colombian Revolutionary: Reflections of a Former Guerrillera*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Zelik, R. & Azzellini, D. (1999) *Kolumbien – Große Geschäfte, staatlicher Terror und Aufstandsbewegung*. Köln: ISP.

Machado, popular Cuban anti-government struggle, 1930s

Mike Gonzalez

It is customary to set the origins of the Cuban Revolution in the failed assault on the Moncada barracks led by Fidel Castro on July 26, 1953. In reality this was the second assault on the armaments stores of the Cuban state. The first, which also failed, was led by Antonio Guiteras in the early 1930s and formed part of a mounting resistance to the dictatorship of Gerardo Machado. That movement of opposition to his authoritarian rule culminated in 1933 with a series of strikes and political struggles that marked Cuba's subsequent history to a profound degree; the legacy of 1933, both positive and negative, shaped the ideological and organizational environment out of which the revolutionaries of 1959 would emerge. Yet that connection has been largely unacknowledged.

It may be argued that Cuba's fight for independence was only won with the revolution of 1959. While the rest of Latin America established varying degrees of *political* independence during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, Cuba remained as Spain's last transatlantic colony. The link was only finally broken after two lengthy and costly independence wars, between 1868–78 and 1895–8. Yet the victory of 1898

was pyrrhic. Even as the Cuban fighters were driving back the Spanish armies in their war for independence, the arrival of troops from the United States signified a redefinition of the conflict, now baptized the Spanish–American War. The victory proved indeed to favor North America rather than the Cubans, providing increased access to the island's sugar production and increasing Cuba's dependence on the manufactures from the burgeoning industries of the north. This dependence, both economic and political, was reinforced by the Platt Amendment to the Cuban Constitution, "one of the defining documents of the imperial era" (Gott 2004: 110), which gave the US control over Cuban public finances and foreign policy and allowed it the exclusive right to establish military bases on the island. The republic formally declared the following year was bound hand and foot at birth. It was also a republic which had imported the racism of the controlling power, reinforcing the bigotry of Cuba's own ruling class. There is a terrible irony in the hopes of those who formed the Independent Party of Color in 1912 that a US intervention would introduce more liberal attitudes. The black rebellion of that year ended in a massacre of thousands conducted by both Cuban and US troops!

The years that followed established a pattern of political succession rooted in fraud and corruption and overshadowed always by the dominance of US interests. Mario Menocal, whose presidencies (1913–21) reflected his lucrative connections with the Cuban American Sugar Foundation, faced a series of armed rebellions by Liberals defrauded in presidential elections. Gerardo Machado, presidential candidate in 1924, continued the pattern; he had run the electricity company in Santa Clara, a subsidiary of General Electric, and was a faithful friend of US interests. The Cuba over which he took stewardship, however, was in a deep crisis when the world sugar price fell dramatically in 1921 after the boom year of 1920, called the "Dance of the Millions." The result was the collapse of the banking system and a series of bankruptcies which concentrated even more resources in the hands of US capital that bought over the repossessed lands. Machado's response to rising protests was repression and violence, and an extension of his presidential period, by a further six years, to 1934. At the same time, in an attempt to address the deepening economic crisis in the wake of the

Crash of 1929, he initiated huge public works projects to take up some of the unemployment among seasonal workers.

His corrupt and authoritarian regime merited little criticism from Washington, but it generated deepening hostility and resistance across the board. The opposition parties, while not offering any strategic alternatives, fought for access to the system in a series of rebellions; many of those parties represented the leaders of the independence movement who had been excluded from corridors of power. And there were new, more modernizing forces within the armed forces who would gather later around Fulgencio Batista. In every instance, Machado's response was repressive, generating new sections of resistance. Among students, for example, who were largely middle class, military intervention produced radical reactions; the Directorio Estudiantil Revolucionario, led by Antonio Guiteras, was one such product, becoming more radical after a ban placed upon it in 1927. It would continue to play a key role in Cuban political life until the revolution of 1959.

The largely anarchist-influenced trade union movement formed its first national organization, the National Confederation of Cuban Workers (CNOC) in 1925. Its leader, Alfredo Lopez, was later arrested and thrown into a shark-infested sea by the dictator who then made the CNOC as well as the Communist Party illegal. In the same year, the first cell of the Cuban Communist Party was formed, led by the brilliant young student leader Julio Antonio Mella. Mella would undoubtedly have come to prominence in the Latin American revolutionary movement had he not been murdered in Mexico City by Machado's agents in 1929.

Machado's harsh response to dissidence ensured that tensions would grow – and all the more so with the impact of the 1929 Crash. Its repercussions would clearly fall particularly forcefully on an economy dependent on a single export crop for its foreign earnings together with a tourist sector tied, like its sugar exports, to the United States.

In the trade unions, anarchism still had a considerable influence, while elsewhere in the resistance varieties of nationalism and anti-imperialism prevailed. In 1931, the Communist Party took control of the national confederation CNOC by bureaucratic maneuver, leaving the anarchist-dominated Havana Workers' Federation

(Federación Obrera de la Habana, FOH) to absorb the non-communist forces. The Federation's strength lay with the traditional unions, like the bakers and the tobacco workers. The role played by the Communist Party in this period is complex and its repercussions in 1933 would resonate through the following decades. Shaped by the "Third Period" line of the Communist International, with its insistence on a "class against class" policy hostile to collaboration with non-communist forces, the Communist Party held itself in isolation from the growing protest movements, which were heterogeneous in both social content and ideology.

Events reached the point of explosion in 1933. By May of that year it would be right to describe the Cuban situation as one of political crisis. While opposition activity was largely forbidden and savagely repressed, the result was in some ways to deepen the conflict even further. The more radical nationalist organizations, under conditions of clandestinity, moved toward armed actions, sabotage, and violent confrontations in the street. Important sectors of workers were also moving to direct action, most significantly the sugar workers, as more than a quarter of the workforce lost their jobs in the wake of the 1929 Crash with the collapse of sugar production (from \$200 million to \$40 million between 1929 and 1932; Gott 2004: 134). In July, bus drivers in Havana struck over tax increases and were met with brutal repression. Other groups of workers then came out in sympathy, adding their own protests over price increases and rising unemployment. By August, Cuba was in the grip of a general strike that embraced printworkers, dockers, tram drivers, and many others, and which was run by a strike committee representative of the different groups of workers. Yet the Communist Party at this critical moment chose to make a temporary alliance with Machado and collaborate with him in the attempt to break the strike. It made little difference.

By August it seemed that Cuba was on the edge of insurrection. Soviets were formed across the island, factories were taken over – the US Foreign Policy Association estimated the number at 36 (Gott 2004: 136) – and the movement was now so generalized as to make it impossible for Machado to crush it. He turned to the United States, in the customary way, for support; but Sumner Welles, by then US ambassador in Havana, held his counsel and made no move to

mobilize American troops on the island. It was Machado's downfall, and he left on August 12. The US's favored replacement, Carlos Maria de Céspedes, took over the presidency on the same day – but his government was to last only three weeks. Supported by the most right wing of nationalist forces, but enjoying Washington's approval, Céspedes could do nothing to control the situation. Machado's police wisely disappeared after his downfall, but many were lynched and others killed in the chaos that ensued. Only a government that could claim to represent the movement that had brought the dictator down could hope to give it direction.

The catalyst was a rebellion at the Camp Columbia base on September 4 led by a group of sergeants; most prominent among them was an army clerk called Fulgencio Batista. The sergeants' manifesto echoed the demands of the Directorio in particular, for an end to corruption, the promulgation of a democratic constitution that would be observed, respect for property, and the creation of a new, modern Cuba. The Directorio then lent its support and a new, more radical government was formed under the presidency of the liberal doctor Ramón Grau San Martín. Antonio Guiteras, the leader of the most radical section of the Directorio, joined the government as minister of the interior and the armed forces. In its few months of existence, the government passed a series of far-reaching measures, nationalizing two US-owned mills, refusing to service foreign loans, introducing women's suffrage, and strengthening the rights of labor. At the same time, its populism led it to pass legislation expelling immigrant laborers from Haiti and Jamaica.

Batista, while allowing the assumption that he was wholly behind the new government he had sponsored, was in fact playing an extremely clever hand. His people were executing army officers who had served Machado and replacing them with his own nominees. At the same time he was in regular conversation with US ambassador Sumner Welles. The Communist Party, for its part, withheld support for the Grau-Guiteras government and continued to organize strikes against it. Batista, meanwhile, was clearly planning its demise. It came after only four months, in January 1934, when Batista acted to bring down the government he had briefly supported and place his own people in the presidency instead. From then on Batista was the arbiter of Cuban

politics, playing the political forces against each other while reimposing the effective rule of the army. At the same time he supported progressive social legislation while dealing harshly with dissent.

It was at this time that the Communist Party changed its position completely, in response to international rather than Cuban developments, and entered into an alliance with Batista in exchange for their control and leadership of the newly formed national trade union, the CTC. Guiteras and those around him, by contrast, launched armed resistance to Batista, though without success, and Guiteras himself was killed in mid-1935, after forming his own revolutionary nationalist organization, Joven Cuba (Gott 2004: 143). Resistance on other fronts, in the working-class movement in particular, continued throughout 1934.

In 1940 Batista finally had himself elected rather than his allies, and in that year he oversaw the passing of a new and radically democratic constitution. And probably as a gesture of support, the US withdrew the hated Platt Amendment. The Batista era had begun.

What was the legacy of 1933? It was a revolutionary situation in which, for a brief period, a real potential lay with a mass movement in permanent confrontation with government. But that resistance was never tied to a clear strategy nor to any single organization, reflecting instead the diversity of Cuban political thinking. That lack of clear leadership was exploited with great skill by Batista, who played both sides against the middle, winning a progressive reputation while diverting the revolutionary impulse in a liberal democratic direction. The Directorio would continue to be a force in Cuban politics, though the loss of an authoritative political figure like Guiteras affected it as deeply as the murder of Mella did the Communist Party, which might not have followed Moscow quite so slavishly. The opportunism of the Communist Party, for its part, formed a hostile attitude toward socialist ideas on the part of those who, like Fidel Castro, saw themselves as inheritors of a nationalism that stretched from José Martí to Joven Cuba. And Batista's shadow, together with that of the American eagle, would continue to fall over Cuba for more than 20 years.

SEE ALSO: Castro, Fidel (b. 1926); Cuba, Anti-Racist Movement and the Partido Independiente de

Color; Cuba, General Strikes under Batista Regime, 1952–1958; Cuba, Struggle for Independence from Spain, 1868–1898; Cuba, Transition to Socialism and Government; Cuban Post-Revolutionary Protests; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967); Martí, José (1853–1895) and the Partido Revolucionario Cubano

References and Suggested Readings

- Carrillo, J. (1994) *Cuba 1933: Students, Yankees and Soldiers*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Gott, R. (2004) *Cuba: A New History*. London: Verso.
- Perez, L. (2006) *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Machel, Samora (1933–1986)

Justin Corfield

Samora Machel was the main Mozambican nationalist leader during the 1970s. He took over after the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, becoming the first president of Mozambique in 1975, and remaining in office until his death in 1986.

Samora Moises Machel was born on September 29, 1933 at Xilembene (or Chilembene), Gaza Province, Portuguese East Africa (as Mozambique was then referred to internationally), his family having strong military traditions – his great-grandparents and his grandparents fought the Portuguese. He attended a Roman Catholic mission school and then went on to study nursing at the township of Xai-Xai, and then to Lourenço Marques (modern-day Maputo), where he became a medic. In the meantime, during the 1950s his parents had their farmland confiscated and given to Portuguese settlers. As a result, some of the family had to go to work in South African mines; one of Machel’s brothers was killed in a mining accident there.

It was not long before Machel began to get angry about why black nurses were paid less than white nurses while they did the same work, and he soon became attracted to Marxism. In 1963 Machel left Mozambique to work in Dar-es-Salaam, and then joined the Mozambican nationalist movement, the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO), which had been formed the previous year. He was sent to Algeria to be trained

in guerilla warfare, and on his return to Tanzania he joined the revolutionary army. Machel became the commander of the FRELIMO revolutionary army, which launched the first guerilla attack on the Portuguese, and subsequently took over a part of Niassa Province in the north of Mozambique. Following the assassination of Filipe Magaia (1937–66), Machel took over Magaia’s position as secretary of defense of FRELIMO, becoming a member of their Central Committee. He sought to turn the “armed struggle” into a revolution, and from this new position he was able to reorganize the People’s Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (Fôrças Popular de Libertação de Moçambique, FPLM), and was elected to the Triumvirato, the group that shared the top executive positions.

When Eduardo Mondlane was assassinated in 1969, Machel succeeded him as president of FRELIMO. In May 1970, after a bitter power struggle within the Central Committee, Machel took over control of all the revolutionary forces, continuing the war against the Portuguese. It finally ended in 1975 when the Portuguese left and Mozambique became independent, ending ten years of bitter conflict. Samora Machel was elected president of Mozambique on June 25, 1975, and soon began the work of rebuilding the country after years of war, and many centuries of neglect by the Portuguese. Being a Marxist-Leninist, Machel introduced a socialist plan for the country which made enormous strides in health care and education. However, his nationalization of Portuguese plantations and property caused many of the Portuguese to flee the country, some destroying their machinery and equipment before they left. It also pushed Mozambique more directly into the Soviet orbit, for better or worse. Machel was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize for 1975–6.

Nationalization and Soviet influence caused consternation in neighboring Rhodesia, where Ian Smith was at war with African nationalists, and in South Africa, which viewed with concern African National Congress (ANC) bases being established in Mozambique. With many of these nationalists using Mozambique as a base for their attacks on Rhodesia and South Africa, Machel’s newfound enemies put together the Mozambican National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana, RENAMO), which led to a civil war in Mozambique, and the disintegration of the Mozambican economy. With the

end of the Rhodesian government of Ian Smith, Machel finally decided to sign the Nkomati Accord with South Africa, by which he would cease supporting the ANC, and the South Africans would stop supporting RENAMO. Machel then became more pragmatic in his foreign policy, accepting economic and military aid from Portugal, Britain, France, and West Germany.

On October 19, 1986, while flying back from a mini-summit conference on Southern Africa held in Lusaka, Zambia, Machel's plane crashed in South Africa and everyone aboard was killed. The Margo Commission of Inquiry which investigated the air crash concluded that there was no sabotage, but the Soviet delegation to the Commission dissented. It has long been alleged that the navigation system of Machel's plane was interfered with by South African intelligence, but no concrete evidence of this has been found, although it seems highly likely that this did take place.

Samora Machel has been commemorated in Mozambique with many streets renamed after him, including the road from the old Portuguese fort in Maputo to the Independence Square. He has also appeared on a number of Mozambican postage stamps, including one series in 1976 on the first anniversary of independence, and in 1988 on the second anniversary of his death.

SEE ALSO: Chissano, Joaquim (b. 1939); FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique); Mondlane, Eduardo Chivambo (1920–1969); Mozambique, Worker Protests; Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974; South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC

References and Suggested Readings

- Cabrita, J. M. (2000) *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
 Machel, S. (1975) *The Tasks Ahead: Selected Speeches*. New York: Afro American Information Service.
 Núñez, B. (1995) *Dictionary of Portuguese-African Civilization*. London: Hans Zell.

Mackandal, François (d. 1758)

Frank I. Müller

François Mackandal, deported from Guinea to Saint Domingue by the French, lived as a fugi-

tive slave, or Maroon, in the mountains of Haiti. During nightly Voodoo ceremonies he preached death to white colonizers, plotting mass poisoning against them, networked among slaves, and taught them forms of resistance. Caught by the colonists, he was publicly burned in Cap-Français (now Cap-Haitien) in March 1758.

A one-armed rebel who spoke Arabic and professed Islam, Mackandal considered himself an intermediary between the slaves and Voodoo *loas* (spirits), who showed him the way to revolution. He built a secret Maroon camp in the middle of the mountains, supporting it by trading small goods for arms with the Spaniards. A charismatic leader, he convinced his followers that he was immortal and could predict the future.

Maroon camps such as Mackandal's allowed slaves not only to escape but also to reclaim possession of their own bodies. They also provided space to overcome the economic shortages caused by leaving behind the scarce conditions on the plantations and gave collective power to the Maroons. Practicing Voodoo, performing transgression to the spirits of African ancestors, and dancing and playing drums also became important sources of collective strength and resistance. Secret communities grew all over the island and became cells for rebel networking. They facilitated a then unthinkable uprising of blacks and provided a space that was inaccessible to whites. Gaining significant political influence through their interconnection of spiritual and political liberation, the Maroon camps contributed to a continuity of resistance from the first days of slavery in the Caribbean.

Mackandal also employed poisoning as a means of resistance. Indeed, the most striking joint action he organized was the poisoning of the fresh water of every house in the provincial capital of Limbé in 1757. With their bodies weakened, whites became easy victims to the murdering insurgents. In return, whenever a rebel was caught, he was immediately hanged or burned. Mackandal himself met that fate.

During his six years of Maroon leadership Mackandal is said to have killed 6,000 people, black and white. He tolerated no sympathy for the oppressors, and condemned individual social advancement as achieved by a rising class of so-called mixed-race "mulattos." Instead, he

demanded unrestrained loyalty, convinced that only absolute unity of all non-whites could turn power over to the black people.

SEE ALSO: American Slave Rebellions; Queen Nanny and Maroon Resistance

References and Suggested Readings

- Carpentier, A. (1975) *El Reino de este mundo*. Buenos Aires: Librería del colegio.
- Heinl, R. D. & Heinl, N. G. (2005) *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492–1995*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Laguette, M. S. (1989) *Voodoo and Politics in Haiti*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Mackay, John Henry (1864–1933)

Larry W. Heiman

John Henry Mackay was a Scottish-German author chiefly known in his lifetime for his propagandistic writings on individualist anarchism and his influential biography of German philosopher Max Stirner, which introduced Stirner's philosophy of egoism outside Germany. Today, he may be best known for his poems set to music by Richard Strauss and his series of books written to attain understanding and acceptance of homosexual love.

Mackay was in his early twenties when his first poems and short stories were published. In 1888 *Sturm*, his volume of revolutionary verse, appeared. It sold well and earned him notoriety as "the first singer of Anarchy" (Mackay 1999: 2). Around this time he came under the influence of American publisher Benjamin Tucker and German philosopher Max Stirner, both proponents of individualist anarchism. Tucker had begun to publish *Libertas*, a German edition of his anarchist journal *Liberty*, and would become Mackay's American publisher. In addition, Mackay read Max Stirner's *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* (*The Ego and Its Own*), which would transform his earlier ideas on anarchism and lead to his 1898 study of Stirner.

After living in London from 1887 to 1888, Mackay moved to Switzerland, where he wrote *Die Anarchisten* (*The Anarchists*). While capitalizing on his first-hand observations of London's social movement, radical clubs, and extreme

poverty, Mackay employed fictional narrative techniques to argue the superiority of individualist anarchism over its communistic form. Its publication in 1891 made him famous in Germany and secured his reputation as an anarchic theorist.

After the success of these overtly political works, Mackay turned his writing efforts to those of a more personal nature. In 1906 the first book in his series *Die Bücher der namenlosen Liebe* (*Books of the Nameless Love*), written under the pseudonym of Sagitta, was issued. Using various literary genres, Mackay hoped through art to achieve respect and understanding of homosexual love and more specifically that practiced by Mackay, the love of men for adolescent boys. Disappointed by the lack of interest generated by these works, he decided he needed to reach a larger audience and in 1908 wrote and distributed the pamphlet *Gehoe! – Nur einen Augenblick!* (*Listen! – If Only For a Moment!*), which argued for acceptance of pederastic love. Mackay's publisher Bernhard Zack was prosecuted for publication of these works and convicted of publishing immoral literature. Mackay covered the costs of the prosecution, but his identity as the author remained unknown.

Die Freiheitsucher (*The Freedomseeker*) appeared in 1921 as a companion volume to *Die Anarchisten*. Mackay considered it a major work, but it generated little attention. In his last years Mackay devoted time to getting his earlier successes reissued.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Culture, 1840–1939; Anarchism and Gender

References and Suggested Readings

- Kennedy, H. (1983) *Anarchist of Love: The Secret Life of John Henry Mackay*. New York: Mackay Society.
- Kennedy, H. (2007) *John Henry Mackay (Sagitta)*. Hamburg: Männerschwarm.
- Mackay, J. H. (1999) *The Anarchists*. Brooklyn: Autonomedia.
- Mackay, J. H. (2002) *Dear Tucker: The Letters from John Henry Mackay to Benjamin R. Tucker*. San Francisco: Peremptory Publications.
- Riley, T. A. (1972) *Germany's Poet-Anarchist John Henry Mackay: A Contribution to the History of German Literature at the Turn of the Century, 1880–1920*. New York: Revisionist Press.
- Solneman, K. H. Z. (1979) *Der Bahnbrecher John Henry Mackay*. Freiburg/Br.: Mackay-Gesellschaft.

Madagascar, protests and revolts, 19th and 20th centuries

Luke Freeman

Popular resistance to state authority in Madagascar during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had two primary causes. First, the majority rural population had frequently been exploited by successive regimes whilst receiving few benefits in return. Second, the significant political and cultural influence of Europeans had fueled a recurrent nationalist sentiment calling for independence and a reassertion of “traditional” Malagasy authority and values.

Such values were at the heart of the women’s protest triggered in May 1822 when King Radama I, under the influence of British Protestant missionaries, had his long hair cut short and styled in European military fashion. He ordered the same for his soldiers. This was seen by the women, who traditionally were responsible for grooming and plaiting their husband’s hair, as a way of sidelining female influence and as an affront to ancestral authority. Radama’s troops surrounded the protestors, killed their leaders, and forced the remaining supporters to witness the devouring of the corpses by dogs.

In 1835 Queen Ranavalona I expelled the missionaries. They returned after her death, and European influence increased. Radama II abandoned the ancestral rituals of circumcision and the royal bath. This action, coupled with the growing poverty of the rural population as the Merina Empire degenerated, triggered the episode of resistance known as the Ramanenjana. This took the form of a contagious spirit possession causing people to dance until they dropped, to show revulsion at all things European and Christian, and even to attack missionaries. A huge procession of the possessed marched on Antananarivo bearing the imaginary baggage of Queen Ranavalona above their heads ready to reinstall her in the royal palace and to reinstate traditional authority.

In 1895 Madagascar succumbed to French military power and became a French protectorate administered by the Merina government. Traditionalists were wary of the collaboration of the government with a new foreign power. The government was unpopular due to the exaction

of forced labor from the rural population, many of whom were disaffected veterans of the Franco-Merina wars. This mixture of economic and ideological discontent led to the Menalamba uprising of 1895–1897 in the area around Antananarivo.

The uprising started on November 22, 1895. The date is significant as it was that of the ritual of the royal bath, the annual sanction of the monarch’s ancestral authority. Coalescing around the ancestral talismans suppressed by the royal family at the time of its conversion to Christianity, the rebels destroyed 750 churches and killed foreign missionaries and Malagasy proselytes. The revolt was violently suppressed by the French military. It is estimated that about 3,000 Malagasy died as a result of the uprising.

The French colonial government was the first in Madagascar’s history to establish control over the whole island. The most significant challenge to its domination was the revolt of 1947 in the fertile east of the island, where most colonial agricultural concessions were situated. The origins of the revolt lay in the oppressive wartime taxation and conscription for the war. The revolt was coordinated by young nationalist extremists and included many war veterans. However, as the rebels had no foreign support they had little military hardware and some only carried spears. They relied heavily on the mystical protection of traditional healers and diviners. The rebels killed white planters, burned their plantations, and destroyed public and mission buildings.

The colonial government made arbitrary arrests, detained suspects without trial, and executed the rebel chiefs by firing squad. Many refugees fled to the forest where thousands died from exposure and hunger, by far the greatest cause of death. It is estimated that 90,000 people died, including 550 French. The tensions and bitterness that remained in the revolt’s aftermath delayed independence significantly.

Madagascar achieved independence in 1960 but by the early 1970s there was growing popular dissatisfaction, especially in Antananarivo, at the continued presence and influence of French nationals in the administration. This led to a series of strikes in 1972, orchestrated largely by students seeking educational reform. The government arrested and deported 400 of the student leaders to a penal colony. There followed large-scale demonstrations in the capital involving a loose coalition of students, unemployed urban youth,

and laborers. The town hall was burned to the ground and security forces fired on the demonstrators, killing about 40. The events led to the demise of President Tsiranana and the First Republic, and the removal of French technicians from political, administrative, educational, and military posts.

Over six months in 1991 the “Living Forces” (*Hery Velona*) coalition instigated a long series of non-violent protests against President Ratsiraka’s socialist policies and the dire economic situation. Strikes spread throughout the civil service and commercial sector, and up to 100,000 protestors took to the capital’s streets, daily. On August 10, a peaceful march on the president’s palace was repulsed by gunfire from the presidential guard and helicopters dropping stun grenades. At least 100 protestors were killed. This cost Ratsiraka both popular and international support. Strikes continued until the army threatened intervention whereupon fresh talks led to the sidelining of Ratsiraka and a new constitution.

SEE ALSO: Francophone Africa, Protest and Independence; Non-Violent Revolutions; Student Movements, Global South

References and Suggested Readings

- Berg, G. (1988) Radama’s Smile: Domestic Challenges to Royal Ideology in Early Nineteenth-century Imerina. *History in Africa* 25: 69–92.
- Covell, M. (1987) *Madagascar: Politics, Economics and Society*. London: Frances Pinter.
- Ellis, S. (1985) *The Rising of the Red Shaws: A Colonial Revolt in Madagascar 1895–1899*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Raison-Jourde, F. (1976) Les Ramananjana: une mise en cause populaire du christianisme en Imerina. *Asemi* 7: 271–93.
- Razafimpahanana, B. (1993) *Changement de régime politique à Madagascar: les événements de 1991 à Antananarivo*. Antananarivo: Librairie Mixte.
- Tronchon, J. (1986) *L’Insurrection malgache de 1947*. Paris: Karthala.

Madera Uprising, Chihuahua, 1965

Benjamín Anaya González

September 23, 1965 marks an important date in the rise of guerilla movements in Mexico. On that day, Arturo Gámiz García and Pablo Gómez Ramírez, original members of the Mexican

General Union of Farmers and Peasants (Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos de México, UGOCM), launched an assault against the military facilities of Madera City, a large village located on the shores of the Sierra Tarahumara in the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua. The attack, carried out in the early morning, was the first guerilla operation of the 1960s. The Mexican government responded with repression, with the support of the CIA, during the so-called “Dirty War.”

The assault was part of a resistance movement that had emerged in Chihuahua, the largest state in Mexico, against the exploitation of the pine woods. The movement was led by farmers, peasants, and professors of the UGOCM, who demanded economic justice, equality, and an end to exploitation and repression. The Vallina family, which had amassed large landholdings after taking land from the Tarahumara Indian tribes, led the drive to prosecute UGOCM leaders, with the support of the government. Professors Gámiz and Gómez, as well as other members of the organization, such as the brothers Salomón and Salvador Gaytán, had tried to negotiate, preparing the First Sierra Encounter in October 1963. They also called for a Second Encounter in February 1965 to resist the repression of the federal regime as well as the local government, headed by General Praxedes Giner Durán. In resolutions prepared for that encounter and published during the early months of 1963, leaders analyzed issues such as imperialism, capitalism, colonialism, and Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) dictatorship. Their diplomatic efforts met with little success, however, and established the basis of what they called “the only way to continue” – through armed struggle.

In the September assault, 20 guerillas fought against 120 trained army soldiers. When they took the headquarters that morning, eight guerillas were killed. After the attack, the other members were prosecuted and jailed.

SEE ALSO: Mexico, Armed Political Movements, 1960s–Present; Mexico, Indigenous and Peasant Struggles, 1980s–Present; Mexico, Labor Movement and Protests, 1980–2005

References and Suggested Readings

- El asalto al cuartel de Madera, 23 de septiembre de 1965: Testimonio de un sobreviviente*, 2nd ed. (2003) Mexico City: Centro de Derechos Humanos Yaxkin and Foro Permanente por la Comisión de la Verdad.

- Montemayor, C. (2003) *Las armas del alba*. Mexico City: Ed. Joaquín Mortiz.
- Resoluciones*, 6 vols. (1965) Chihuahua: Ediciones Línea Revolucionaria.
- Santos Valdez, J. (1968) *Madera*. Mexico City: Imprenta Laura.

Madero, Francisco (1873–1913)

Felipe Arturo Ávila-Espinosa

Francisco I. Madero was a member of one of the most affluent families in northern Mexico in the early twentieth century. He is known, through his writings and political action, as an originator of the Mexican Revolution. Madero was born on the estate of El Rosario, Coahuila, on October 30, 1873. His family belonged to the rural Mexican aristocracy, with business holdings in agriculture, commerce, and industry throughout the northeast. He was educated in the United States and Europe.

In 1904 Madero decided to enter politics in his native Coahuila, unsuccessfully supporting local political opponents of the government of Porfirio Díaz. Politically he was a liberal, but his main motivation was not necessarily humanitarianism. Indeed, it was fear of a true social revolution that led him to call for concessions to peasants and workers. Such concessions, he hoped, would stem the growth of radicalism and reverberations for social transformation and create enough contentment among the laboring classes of Mexico to foster order and stability. When Díaz refused to heed his warnings, Madero became convinced of the necessity to organize a national opposition party. In 1908 he wrote *The Presidential Succession in Mexico*, a book that harshly criticized the Díaz government and introduced the Antirreeleccionista National Party. That party, in turn, nominated him as its candidate for the presidential election of 1910. In the 1910 election, the Madero campaign succeeded in attracting major sectors of the middle classes and workers in the country's main cities and urban centers. However, Díaz had Madero imprisoned and managed to win reelection. Followers of Madero contested the elections and handed over evidence of the irregularities, without success. Against this background, Madero escaped from prison and fled to San Antonio, Texas, from where he decided to lead an insur-

rection to overthrow the government of Díaz on November 20, 1910.

The insurrection did not proceed as Madero had planned, however. Instead of a movement of urban middle classes, the struggle became the very radical working-class-based rebellion he had feared all along, growing rapidly and spectacularly well beyond his means to control it, both geographically and ideologically. The rebellion indeed achieved the objective of overthrowing Díaz's government in May 1911, however, and Madero served as president of Mexico from then to 1913, when he was executed by the Porfirista military and the Mexican Revolution entered its most radical and militant phase.

SEE ALSO: Cárdenas, Lázaro (1895–1970); Casa del Obrero Mundial; Cristero Uprising, Mexico, 1928; Díaz Soto y Gama, Antonio (1880–1967); Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel (1753–1811); Magón, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922) and the Magonistas; Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Obregón, Alvaro (1880–1928) and the Sonoran Generation; Villa, Pancho (ca. 1878–1923) and the Division of the North; Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919) and the Comuna Morelense; Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Cumberland, C. C. (1969) *Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Gilly, A. (1994) *La Revolución Interrumpida*. Mexico City: Ediciones Era.
- Gilly, A. (2006) *The Mexican Revolution: A People's History*. New York: New Press.
- Hamnett, B. (1999) *A Concise History of Mexico*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Katz, F. (1981) *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Madero, F. I. (1990) *The Presidential Succession of 1910*. Trans. T. Davis. New York: Peter Lang.
- Ross, S. R. (1955) *Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Madres de la Plaza de Mayo

Stella Grenat

The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the May Square) is one of the principal human rights organizations created during Argentina's long years under military dictatorship, which

began in 1976. Thousands of people “disappeared” during those years, leaving mothers of the disappeared to wander through the corridors of the Department of Justice, police departments, and churches in search of their children. On April 30, 1977, 14 mothers who had searched in vain for their children or for information concerning their children’s whereabouts gathered in the square, located in front of the government house in Buenos Aires, to wait for the highest authority of state, Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael Videla. This action, initiated by Azucena Villaflor, was an attempt to hold the government responsible for their children’s disappearances.

At the time of this first march, the country was under a state of siege, and gatherings of three or more people had been banned. The police who patrolled the square ordered the mothers to keep walking and to do so in pairs. This is how the Madres started their walks around the pyramid in the center of the Plaza de Mayo, the first action of its kind. The Madres took on a historically important role in their efforts to rescue or locate their children, who had resisted the regime between 1969 and 1976. In order to recognize one another, the Madres wore white headscarves; even today, the symbol of a white kerchief represents them, and at 3.30 p.m. every Thursday, the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo still march around the square.

On December 10, 1977, Azucena Villaflor, María Ponce de Bianco, and Esther Ballestrino de Careaga, three of the founding mothers of the movement, were kidnapped. In spite of this, the Madres continued growing in numbers; they even created groups in the interior of the country, far from the capital. Between 1977 and 1978, their struggle received international attention as they traveled abroad to communicate what was happening in Argentina under the dictatorship and to help bring about its end, obtaining the support of Amnesty International. In 1980, they acquired a headquarters for their movement.

Beginning December 10, 1981, a new form of struggle was implemented: the Marches of Resistance. On that day, 150 mothers remained for 24 hours in the square; the following day, relatives, friends, human rights organizations, and Nobel Peace Prize winner Adolfo Pérez Esquivel joined the marches. They publicly blamed *de facto* president Lieutenant General Roberto Viola for the disappearances.

The Marches of Resistance continued during the democratic period, which began in 1983.



Hebe de Bonafini (b. 1928), a founder of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo group whose children disappeared during the Argentinian dirty war of the 1970s, leads one of the marches in Buenos Aires' Plaza de Mayo in December 1979. Bonafini is associated with the more radical factions within the group, publicly identifying as a revolutionary and with radical social justice movements in Argentina such as the piqueteros. (Eduardo di Baia/AP/PA Photos)

In this context, and largely in response to the Madres organization’s persistent demands for “truth, justice, and punishment,” the elected president Raúl Alfonsín proposed the creation of the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP). This commission established the “theory of the two demons,” which became the official explanation for the social processes experienced in 1970s Argentina. According to this theory, both the military government and the guerrillas were guilty. Implicitly, this theory ended up blaming the victims themselves for their disappearance. For this reason, the Mothers did not support CONADEP.

In 1985, the military juntas were brought to trial. Generals Jorge Rafael Videla and Roberto Eduardo Viola, Admirals Emilio Eduardo Massera and Armando Lambruschini, and Brigadier Orlando Ramón Agosti were found guilty. In 1986, a sector of the Madres organization from the city of La Plata split due to political differences, particularly in relation to laws that granted pensions for the families of disappeared persons and established economic compensation for the relatives of victims. The organization was divided between the founders’ line, which accepted the legislation, thus showing solidarity with then President Alfonsín, and the group led by Hebe de Bonafini, which took a more radical approach and was more concerned with wider social issues and struggles.

The latter group was strengthened when Alfonsín enacted the laws of Punto Final (Full Stop) and the Ley de Obediencia Debida (Law of Due Obedience) between 1986 and 1987. These laws restricted judicial action against military personnel and officers who were responsible for the actions of the junta during the dictatorship. Such impunity was reinforced when President Carlos Menem acquitted military officials who had been convicted of such crimes against humanity in the past.

In 2005 President Néstor Kirchner repealed the two laws and the faction of the Madres organization led by Hebe de Bonafini was said to become “pro-government,” merging with the founders and their kin organization, the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo. As a result of this merger, and the belief that they no longer faced an enemy government, on January 16, 2006, the Madres held their last March of Resistance. This move was highly criticized by left-wing associations and parties who had supported Bonafini and her organization.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Human Rights Movement; Argentina, *Piquetero* Movement; Argentina, Social and Political Protest, 2001–2007; Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo; HIJOS Movement, Children of the Disappeared

References and Suggested Readings

- Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (2007) *La historia de Abuelas. 30 años de búsqueda*. Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo.
- Bousquet, J.-P. (1983) *Las Locas de la Plaza de Mayo*. Buenos Aires: El Cid Editor.
- Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (1988) *Culpables para la sociedad – Impunes para la Ley*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Cels.
- CONADEP (1984) *Nunca Más*. Report of the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
- Nosiglia, J. (2007) *Botín de Guerra*. Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo.

Mafia, organized crime, and social protest

Paolo Pezzino

Some social scientists and historians who have studied the activity of the Mafia have shown

it to be not simply organized crime, but rather a collective social behavior that, while deviant to state laws, nonetheless responds to cultural honor and community social codes. Indeed, historian Eric Hobsbawm has depicted the Mafia as a primitive form of social protest. This image of the Mafia, widely reflected in the mass media, has no foundation in reality. Historical research has demonstrated, on the contrary, that the role of the code of honor has been, and still is, that of a compact among a violent elite against the external world. In the context of Mafia action, the honor of the *Mafioso* and *omertà* (conspiracy of silence) appears not as widespread subculture, but rather as a set of behaviors forcefully commanded by the violent elite, in a game in which *Mafiosi* and ruling classes both manipulate cultural codes to gain social and political dominance.

The origin of the Sicilian Mafia has not yet been completely elucidated by historical research. Criminal associations can be traced to the period before unification, although they were not named Mafia, a term that took hold only in the first years after unification. Judicial chronicles recount the existence in villages of strange groups of persons, organized along sectarian lines, that profited from the corruption and inefficiency of the Bourbon state by creating some sort of territorial domination. Under state officers' protection, they devoted themselves to larceny or to the commerce of stolen livestock, presenting themselves as defenders of social order and offering themselves to proprietors as agents to ransom loot from robberies they themselves had committed. In the insurgencies of mid-nineteenth-century Sicily, armed squads organized around leaders and took part in the uprisings, offering support to those making the best offer.

The origins of the Mafia can be traced back to armed squads, capable of enforcing violence, which used their strength and powers of intimidation not only in illegal affairs, but also for the purpose of enrichment and social ascent, by controlling crucial aspects of society, such as the local economy and public order. They are violent elites that occupy public spaces and powers in contrast to the lawful powers of the state. In order for this to happen, certain conditions are necessary. First is a modern state that is weak to the point of being unable to exercise sovereignty or maintain a monopoly on physical violence. Second is an economy freed by feudal restraints,

based on private property and the market, in a society undergoing rapid transformation, with broken traditional social balances but with no new emerging classes strong enough to exercise social control (by force or by consensus) on the downtrodden classes. Finally, there must be a situation that does not offer a chance for those who are stricken by the effects of economic crisis to avoid the worsening of economic conditions by migrating or starting new activities, but that, on the other hand, presents wide opportunities for resolute men who are able to move on illegal grounds.

The use of violence in mid-nineteenth-century Sicily has three fundamental aspects. To landowners and the aristocracy it was a factor of prestige and defense of their propriety. To the middle classes it was a resource to support processes of social advancement on a local basis. To some others, from the lower classes, it could represent an alternative – mostly the only alternative – to poverty, and conversely a chance to get rich. Extra-institutional violence proved then to be essential to the accumulation of profits and political resources.

Certain personal qualities lead those who can use violence to act upon their abilities. Such personal qualities can include courage, non-conformism, a cruel nature, and some “entrepreneurial” qualities. These qualities do not coincide with social classes: both violent actors and their victims often belong to the same social groups. For example, peasants suffer abuse from *Mafiosi* of the same social class, while some landowners can acquire Mafia protection and others pay ransoms.

In such conditions, the notion of legality remains abstract, and private violence finds no constraint in the lawful state authority. It then follows that the foundation of social relations in such a situation is violence. Mafia is therefore a real criminal power, based from the beginning on secret societies that participate in multiple illegal activities. It is prone to exercise sovereignty functions normally reserved for state authorities on a given territory, by levying some sort of taxation on legal economic activities and by producing some sort of normative system that foresees violent sanctions for those who prove deviant to it.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Italy; Italy, 17th-Century Revolts in the South

References and Suggested Readings

- Blok, A. (1974) *The Mafia of a Sicilian Village 1860–1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Hess, H. (1970) *Mafia. Zentrale Herrschaft und lokale Gegenmacht*. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1959) *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Pezzino, P. (1990) *Una certa reciprocità di favori. Mafia e modernizzazione violenta nella Sicilia post-unitaria*. Milan: Angeli.
- Schneider, J. C. & Schneider, P. T. (1976) *Culture and Political Economy in Western Sicily*. New York: Academic Press.

Magón, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922) and the Magonistas

Jens Kastner

Magonism designates a social movement as well as a certain school of libertarian theory, named after the Mexican anarchist Ricardo Flores Magón. The organizational core of Magonism was the Partido Liberal de México (Liberal Party of Mexico, PLM), founded in the US on September 5, 1905 in St. Louis, Missouri. Although the Magonists took their public discourse from liberalism, the group embraced an anarchist political philosophy and strategy. The Magonists were one of the most influential radical currents during the Mexican Revolution (1910–21).

Ricardo Flores Magón was born in San Antonio Eloxochitlán on September 16, 1874 in Oaxaca, Mexico. If the area from which he came was not the center of his activities, it nonetheless played a role in forming his thoughts and actions. The democratic, non-hierarchic organizational forms of political and everyday life in Oaxaca's indigenous communities exerted an enormous influence on Magón's ideas and philosophy. Moreover, his work and political activism were influenced by the works of the nineteenth-century anarchists Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Peter Kropotkin, and Mikhail Bakunin as well as by anarchist contemporaries such as Errico Malatesta, Florencio Bazona, Emma Goldman, and Elisée Reclus. These anarchist influences were crucial for the transformation of Magón's

political thinking from radical reformism into revolutionary anarchism.

Most studies of Flores Magón's life connect it directly to his political goals and the movement named after him. In speaking about Magón, then, it is hard to avoid speaking about Magonism. The phases of his life seem to coincide with those of the movement. Scholars have divided Magonist history into three primary periods: (1) 1904–6, when the movement constituted itself; (2) 1906–8, when the movement expanded and engaged in rebellions and uprisings; and (3) 1910–13 and the onset of the Mexican Revolution. In the first phase, when the PLM was founded, the Magonist movement fought for a socially conscious state that would intervene to improve the living conditions of workers and peasants and facilitate their exercise of constitutional rights. After 1904, Flores Magón spent most of his time in the US, much of it in a series of prisons.

The second phase, comprising the years from 1906 to 1908, saw the movement grow and instigate several uprisings, both near the US border and in southern Mexican states such as Veracruz. Both authors consider this period the peak of the movement. Organized in five sections all over Mexico, the Magonist guerilla groups initiated various uprisings in an attempt to spark a general insurgency against the Mexican dictator Porfirio Díaz. Also during this time, the radicalization from liberalism to anarchism was accomplished. Magonists were also involved in various strike activities of the workers' movement.

The third phase begins with the Mexican Revolution 1910/1911 and ends with Magón's death on November 21, 1922 at the US Federal Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1918, he had been sentenced to prison for violating the Espionage Act of 1917 ("obstructing the war effort"). Trejo (2006) points out the specific importance of Magonism's role during the first years (1910–13) of the Mexican Revolution. The slogan "Tierra y Libertad" ("Land and Freedom"), later adopted by Emiliano Zapata, first appeared in the Magonist newspaper *Regeneración* (Regeneration). In 1911, the Mexican state Baja California was temporarily under Magonist control.

Unlike liberals, the Magonists opposed private property and their fight was explicitly anti-capitalist. Unlike other anarchists, they focused on the question of land. The rural situation in Mexico was considered the key problem to be

addressed by revolutionary action, as expropriation seemed an adequate anti-capitalist measure, and peasant and indigenous organizational forms were regarded as more democratic than state institutions. Another difference from other anarchist currents, according to Trejo, was that the Magonists put their claim of "libertarian transnationalism" into effective practice. They built extensive contacts with socialists and anarchists in the US, where the PLM's headquarters were based until 1911, and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and the PLM supported each other in their particular battles.

Over the entire period, the social composition of the Magonist movement was rather heterogeneous, consisting of Mexican and American workers, peasants, indigenous people, and intellectuals. From 1913 on, the Magonist movement faltered. On one hand, the Magonists were suppressed even by the first revolutionary government under the liberal Francisco Madero. On the other, they refused to enter alliances with other radicals. Thus, Trejo contends that it is a misjudgment to classify Pancho Villa, the leader of the revolutionary northern army (División del Norte), as a "keeper of bourgeois interests." The Magonists also declined due to divisions and internecine conflict within the movement.

Even if the original Magonist movement failed, Magón's philosophy has to this day been an important component of the revolutionary history of Mexico. Today, several initiatives and activist groups, indigenous and rural as well as urban, are influenced by Flores Magón's ideas and practice their politics under his name. For instance, one of the autonomous regions controlled by the Zapatista Liberation Army (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, EZLN) in the state of Chiapas is called Ricardo Flores Magón. In the state of Oaxaca, organizations such as the Indigenous Organization for Human Rights in Oaxaca (Organización Indígena para los Derechos Humanos en Oaxaca, OIDHO) and the Popular Indigenous Council of Oaxaca-Ricardo Flores Magón (Consejo Indígena Popular de Oaxaca-Ricardo Flores Magón, CIPO-RFM) make reference to Magonist concepts. Also explicitly Magonist is the anarchist magazine *Autonomía: Periódico de Pensamiento y Crítica Anarquista*, published in Mexico City.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Mexico; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Mexican Revolution of 1910–

1921; Villa, Pancho (ca. 1878–1923) and the Division of the North; Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919) and the Comuna Morelense; Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Esparza Valdivia, R. C. (2000) *El fenómeno magonista en México y en Estados Unidos 1905–1908*. Zacatecas: Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas.
- Gruppe BASTA (Eds.) (2005) *Ricardo Flores Magón. Tierra y Libertad*. Münster: Unrast.
- Hernández Padilla, S. (1984) *El Magonismo: historia de una pasión libertaria, 1900–1922*. Mexico City: Ediciones Era.
- Maldonado Alvarado, B. (2000) El indio y lo indio en el anarquismo magonista. *Cuadernos del Sur* 6, 15 (June): 115–37.
- Trejo, R. (2006) *Magonismus: Utopie und Praxis in der Mexikanischen Revolution 1910–1913*. Lich/Hessen: Edition AV.

Mahdist Revolt

Andrew J. Waskey

The Mahdist Revolt is also known as the Mahdist War, the Anglo-Sudan War, the Sudanese Mahdist Revolt or, by the British, as the Sudan Campaign. For the Mahdists, it was a war to free Sudan from Turkish, Egyptian, and ultimately British control. The war began in the 1880s as the British Empire was nearing its zenith. In 1882 the British intervened in Egypt to suppress the Urabi (Arabi) Revolt (1879–82). British intervention in Egypt meant that it also assumed some of the military and governing problems of Egypt, including its problems in Sudan.

In the 1870s a Sudanese Sufi cleric, Muhammad Ahmad (Muhammad Ahmad ibn as-Sayyid Abd Allah, 1844–85), began to preach a message of spiritual renewal and liberation against Egyptian rule. He had been born on Dirar Island in the Nile River, which is off shore from the city of Dongola (Dunqulah). Dongola was the capital of the northern area of the Sudan. Moving to Khartoum, Muhammad Ahmad entered a course of religious training. He also studied Sufi teachings under Shaykh Muhammad ash-Sharif who was the leader of the Sammaniyya brotherhood. He soon was hailed as a very well trained Sufi. In 1871 Muhammad Ahmad moved to Aba Island on the White Nile south of Khartoum where he developed a reputation as a devoted Islamic teacher and as a spiritual mystic. He urged

his hearers to devote themselves to a strict following of the Koran, from which any departure would be understood as apostasy. Between 1871 and 1881 Muhammad Ahmad traveled widely in northern Sudan. During his travels he was joined by Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, who was a member of the Baqqara tribe of southern Darfur. His travels gave him an understanding that the people of the region hated the Ottoman Turks for their moral laxity. They also were filled with eschatological expectations for the Mahdi.

In Muslim eschatology (doctrine of the end of times) the final Day of Judgment at the end of history will be preceded by the arrival of the Mahdi who will restore righteousness to the world so that a perfect world society will come into being, and in 1881 Muhammad Ahmad assumed this role. He returned to Aba Island, declaring himself to be the al-Mahadi al-Muntazar, “the Expected One.” His declaration was seen as a necessary apocalyptic step that would prepare the way for the return of the Prophet Isa and whose return signals the end of times.

Raouf Pasha, the Sudanese governor, sent a force of two companies of troops with one machine gun to seize the Mahdi as an apostate teacher of false doctrines. They took a steam boat up the White Nile to Abba. One company disembarked and advanced on Aba Island, while the other company moved upstream until it could disembark and advance on the village from the opposite direction. Both companies arrived at the village in an uncoordinated attack in which they slaughtered one another in a crossfire. The Mahdi’s few troops were soon able to isolate and destroy the separated companies by turns. The Mahdi then declared a jihad against Egyptian rule.

The Mahdi’s army was composed of Sudanese tribesmen including the Hadendoa Beja, Arab Baggara tribe and their subjects the Fur tribesmen from Darfur. His religio-political goal was to establish an Islamic theocracy that would be pure. However, his ultimate goal was to eventually create a universal Islamic state.

A long march through the Kurdufan region gained a large number of recruits. Many Sudanese tribal leaders rallied to his cause, as did the slave traders. His party was called the Ansar (“Helpers”), which was the name originally given to Mohammed’s supporters at Medina. They were called Dervishes in the West because



The late nineteenth century saw a number of colonial wars, such as the Mahdist Revolt in Sudan. Resentful of Egyptian rule, the Sudanese rebelled under the leadership of Muhammad Ahmad, a self-proclaimed Islamic redeemer or Mahdi. In 1898, the British sent an Anglo-Egyptian army to subdue the rebels. Though greatly outnumbered, the British used modern weaponry to defeat the Mahdists under Khalifa Abdullah ibn Muhammad in the Battle of Omdurman on September 2. Painting by R. Caton Woodville. (Getty Images)

they were ascetic Sufi mystics whose zeal was enflamed by Sufi practices.

On November 5, 1883 the Dervishes destroyed an Egyptian army of 4,000 men commanded by retired British Colonel William Hicks (1830–83) near Al-Ubayyid (El Obeid) armed only with spears. Hicks Pasha commanded about 7,000 men, most of whom were Egyptians or Sudanese. Their training was unable to beat back the 40,000 Dervishes commanded by the Mahdi. With the captured weapons the Mahdists laid siege to al-Ubayyid, which Hicks' army had been sent to relieve. It surrendered after four months and was to serve as the Mahdi headquarters for the next ten years. The victory opened the way for the capture of the Darfur region which had been defended by Rudolf Carl von Slatin.

With the western half of Sudan in Mahdi hands, other Sudanese tribes began to act. The defeat of Hicks Pasha had persuaded most Sudanese that Muhammad Ahmad was indeed the Mahdi. In the vast area east of the Nile to the Red Sea the Hadendoa of the Beja people ("Fuzzy-Wuzzies") were led by Osman Digna against an Egyptian force commanded by Colonel Valentine Baker (1827–87). Baker left Suakin, a port on the Red Sea, for the more southern port of Trinkitat from which he marched inland to relieve Tokar. At the Battle of El Tib, February 4, 1884, Digna's Dervishes struck. The Egyptian troops

in Baker's command fled in terror, only to be slaughtered. The Europeans and some native contingents were able to fight their way back to Trinkitat, where Baker was met by Colonel Gerald Graham who was in command of 4,000 British troops. Graham set out for Tokar only to be attacked by the Dervishes at El Teb on February 29, 1884. During the ensuing battle, a mistake by the Black Watch led to a broken square that almost gave the Mahdi force a victory, but the battle ended with Digna's forces driven from the field.

The high point of the Mahdi's campaign was the taking of Khartoum. When Khartoum fell on January 25, 1885 General Charles George Gordon, the governor for the Egyptians, was speared to death by the Mahdists. British forces were slow in being authorized to go to Gordon's rescue because British Prime Minister William Gladstone (1809–98) was opposed to intervention in Sudan. He saw the situation as one in which the Sudanese people were struggling to be free and therefore not one that justified conquest. A relief column commanded by Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived two days after Gordon's death to find it was too late. The British and Egyptians soon withdrew from Sudan, leaving it in the Mahdi's control.

Despite his victories Muhammad Ahmad died of disease on June 22, 1885. He was succeeded by Khalifa Abdullah ibn Muhammad, a member of the Ta'aisha Baqqara tribe in Darfur. A Muslim preacher like Muhammad Ahmad, he had fought at El Obeid and had directed the siege of Khartoum. He set about organizing the new Mahdist state (Mahdiyyah).

In 1891 Father Joseph Ohrwalder escaped Mahdi captivity in Sudan. His story and that of Rudolf von Slatin, who escaped Mahdi captivity in 1895, provided intelligence on the situation in Sudan. Their respective books on the Mahdist State influenced public opinion to support a military return to Sudan, and on March 12, 1898 Major General Horatio Herbert Kitchener (1850–1916) was given command of an Anglo-Egyptian force with orders to pacify the Sudan. His force of 8,200 British and 17,600 Egyptian soldiers was armed with Maxim machine-gun artillery and was accompanied by a flotilla of gunboats. The Mahdist army, numbering 60,000, was poorly armed. Kitchener moved slowly up the Nile, building a railroad to Wadi Halfa in Sudan in order to supply his army. On June 7,

1896 his army destroyed the Mahdi garrison at Ferkeh. Two years later, on April 8, 1898, Kitchener defeated the Mahdi army at the Battle of Atbara, and fought the Battle of Omdurman on September 2, 1898. Here, the Mahdi army launched an attack only to be destroyed by machine gun and repeating rifle fire. Khalifa Abdullah fled into southern Sudan with Kitchener's forces in pursuit. On November 24, 1899 Kitchener's forces defeated Abdullah's army at the Battle of Umm Diwaykarat. Abdullah's 10,000 remaining fighters were killed during the battle, which ended the Mahdist state and the Mahdi Revolt.

SEE ALSO: Sudanese Protest in Turko-Egyptian Era

References and Suggested Readings

- Bermann, R. A. (2007) *Mahdi of Allah: The Story of the Dervish Mohammed Ahmed*. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger.
- Churchill, W. (1964) *The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan*. New York: Award Books.
- Farwel, B. (1972) *Queen Victoria's Little Wars*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Holt, P. M. (1970) *Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881–1898: A Study of Its Origins, Development and Overthrow*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nicoll, F. (2005) *Mahdi of Sudan and the Death of General Gordon*. Stroud: Sutton Publishing.
- Ziegler, P. A. (2003) *Omdurman*. Bamsley: Pen & Sword Books.

Maitan, Livio (1923–2004)

Antonio Moscato

Livio Maitan was the foremost leader of the Italian Trotskyite movement. Born in Venice in 1923, Maitan took part in the resistance movement during Nazi occupation of Italy, and was soon after a leader of the youth movement of the Socialist Party. By 1947 he was active in the Fourth International, holding leadership positions from 1951 until his death in September 2004; his militancy throughout was well documented. As a militant and a theorist he closely followed Italian and European events, but was also interested in the revolutionary processes of Latin America, gaining allegations of *guevarismo* from the more dogmatic components of Trotskyism. He later joined the Partito della Rifondazione

Comunista (PRC; Communist Refoundation Party), where he also held positions of national leadership. Beginning in 2001, Maitan was an active and critical participant in Italy's anti-globalization movement. His perennial militancy drew him into political and economic analysis, to which he devoted articles, essays, and books. He covered social classes in Italy and other countries with regard to world economic crises, the history of the Italian Communist Party, the political heritage of Gramsci, and the Chinese Cultural Revolution to name a few. Maitan edited and translated many of Trotsky's (1879–1940) works into Italian, and some of Ernest Mandel's (1923–95) as well, and was a close collaborator of the latter. In later years, while still active in politics, he wrote his memoirs, and a history of the Fourth International.

Both as a political leader and a theorist Maitan had a style of great rigor, never affected by dogmatism. He was, in the more than six decades of his political activity, keen to debate and open to dialogue with positions different from his own.

SEE ALSO: Bordiga, Amadeo (1889–1970) and the Italian Communist Party; Mandel, Ernest (1923–1995); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- Maitan, L. (1976a) *Dinamica delle classi sociali in Italia. Con una risposta di Sylos Labini*. Rome: Savelli.
- Maitan, L. (1976b) *La grande depressione (1929–1932) e la recessione degli anni '70*. Rome: Savelli.
- Maitan, L. (1976c) *Party, Army and Masses in China: A Marxist Interpretation of the Cultural Revolution and its Aftermath*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
- Maitan, L. (1998) *Tempeste nell'economia mondiale. Dal boom degli anni '50 alle crisi asiatiche*. Rome: Datanews.
- Maitan, L. (2002) *La strada percorsa*. Viterbo: Massari.
- Maitan, L. (2006) *Per una storia della IV Internazionale. La testimonianza di un comunista controcorrente*. Rome: Alegre.

Makhno, Nestor (1889–1935)

Paul Le Blanc

Nestor Makhno was one of the most heroic and, for a time, one of the most successful anarchist

figures in Russia and internationally. He led the most powerful anarchist movement during the Russian Revolution and Civil War, sometimes allied with the Bolsheviks, sometimes warring against them.

Makhno was born in the province of Ekaterinoslav, in the large Ukrainian village of Guliai-Polya, the youngest of five sons. His father, a poor peasant, died when Makhno was barely 10 months old, leaving an impoverished widow to ensure her family's survival. By the age of 7, the young Makhno began to labor as an agricultural worker, which over the next several years was mixed in with a partial education acquired in a village school, culminating in employment as a foundry worker. At the age of 17 he was drawn into the revolutionary ferment and uprisings that swept through the Russian empire in 1905. While he connected with a number of different revolutionary currents active in that period, he soon committed himself, body and soul, to a vibrant group of anarchocommunists. By 1908 he was arrested and imprisoned by the authorities for his subversive activities.

A central influence in Makhno's intellectual growth and political development was Peter Arshinov, a working-class intellectual and organizer, whom he met in prison. Arshinov was a metal worker who had been a Bolshevik until 1906, when he converted to the doctrines of "anarchist-communism." He modestly minimized his own role in describing the young anarchist's prison experience: "Although prison life was without hope and very difficult for him to bear, Makhno used it to educate himself. He showed great perseverance, and learned grammar, mathematics, literature, the history of culture and political economy. In fact, prison was the sole school in which Makhno acquired that historical and political knowledge which was a great help to him in his subsequent revolutionary activity." Arshinov adds: "Life, action, deeds were the other schools in which he learned to know and understand men and social events."

Freed from prison by Russia's February/March 1917 Revolution that overthrew tsarism, Makhno (with Arshinov by his side) hurried back to his native village, where he threw himself into organizing among the peasants – both as a revolutionary propagandist and as "a man of action." By October 1917 he was the president of the leading revolutionary bodies in his village and region: the Regional Peasants' Union, the

Agricultural Commission, the Union of Metal and Carpentry Workers, and finally the Peasants and Workers Soviet (democratic council) of Guliai-Polya. As was the case with many anarchists (and other radicalized currents in the workers' movement), Makhno was a partisan of the October/November 1917 Revolution led by Lenin's Bolsheviks. He continued to provide revolutionary leadership in his area – which was soon overrun in 1918, however, by anti-revolutionary forces from Imperial Germany. This was part of an even broader counterrevolutionary effort by many capitalist countries, in some case opponents to each other in World War I but unified in their hatred of the radicalized 1917 Revolution. In addition, there were internal forces aligned with the landowning gentry, capitalists, monarchists, and others (the so-called "White" forces) violently hostile to the Revolution. In the early stages of leading a dogged resistance to the onslaught, Makhno went to Moscow to consult anarchist militants as well as representatives of the new communist regime.

Inspired by the venerable old anarchist philosopher Peter Kropotkin, his discussions with anarchist comrades nonetheless resulted in no palpable assistance. The new communist regime seemed to have more to offer. Makhno's account of his frank discussions with Lenin suggest that the two men developed a grudging respect for each other – he quotes the communist leader as saying: "You, comrade, I regard as a man with a feeling for the realities and requirements of our times. If only a third of the anarchists in Russia were like you, we communists would be ready to work with them under certain conditions and work in concert with the interests of free organization of the producers."

While the revolutionary regime gave Makhno some initial assistance, he soon moved into angry opposition in the face of efforts to tighten state controls and ensure Communist Party predominance amidst the swirl of foreign invasions and the Civil War, not to mention repressive policies toward peasants (grain requisitions and so on) in the face of a collapsing economy. Denouncing "the Bolshevik leaders' shameful betrayal of the ideas of the October Revolution," leading to "dark days filled with bloody horrors," Makhno, Arshinov, and their comrades organized a network of anarchist-influenced peasant communes in the areas of the Ukraine under their control, defending this with their own military

force (sometimes amounting to 50,000 combatants) that carried out highly effective guerilla warfare against the Red Army, as well as against the Whites.

Makhno's efforts were legendary – although marked at times by the tragic brutality that on all sides characterized the Civil War period. He proved to be a charismatic leader who achieved a mass following, “an anarchist Robin Hood,” in the words of anarchist historian George Woodcock. This was marred by the fact that sometimes “under the influence of alcohol, Makhno became irresponsible in his actions” (according to the anarchist Voline), with “personal caprice, often supported by violence.” Then the “dictatorial antics of a warrior chief” would displace his more usual “calm reflection, perspicacity, personal dignity, and self-control in his attitude to others and to the cause.” Nonetheless, in the shifting alliances among the adventurers, bandits, semi-bandits, peasant rebels, and others who took up arms against the Bolshevik regime, Makhno stands out as being free from the corruption, the reactionary attitudes (not least of which was a virulent anti-Semitism), and the lack of liberatory vision that characterized so many of the others. For a time, he proved incredibly effective in his two-sided conflict with the Reds and the Whites.

“But ultimately,” notes historian Arno Mayer, “precisely because he exulted in the not inconsiderable support of the ambient peasantry, Makhno was blind to his weakness: lacking an overall strategic military and political vision, he remained, above all, fatally isolated.” The outstanding scholar of Russian anarchism, Paul Avrich, concurs: “He never understood the complexities of an urban economy, nor did he care to understand them. He detested the ‘poison’ of the cities and cherished the natural simplicity of the peasant environment into which he had been born.” Woodcock adds that although “the Makhnovists captured a number of fairly large towns in the Dneiper valley, they never really faced the problem of organized industry and never gained the loyalties of more than a few urban workers.” Mayer concludes that it was never clear “how he proposed to fit his anarchist peasant republic of participatory democracy into either a nascent peasant post-tsarist Russia or an at best embryonically independent Ukraine.”

As soon as the various counterrevolutionary White armies were decisively defeated by the Red Army, Makhno's forces were isolated and

crushed – facilitated by the Bolshevik government's dramatic pro-peasant measures in the New Economic Policy. Avrich comments that some of the Russian anarchists “grudgingly admitted the truth” of a thoughtful critique by Bolshevik Karl Radek, “that romanticism and their instinctive hostility towards organization prevented them from facing the realities of contemporary industrial society, with its expanding population and its intricate division of labor, and doomed them to failure and defeat.”

In an effort to break free of this problem while in Parisian exile during the 1920s, Makhno, along with the ex-Bolshevik worker Arshinov, argued for the development of a highly organized anarchist party that would struggle for “workers' democracy.” Makhno asserted that “the absence of a great specifically anarchist organization, capable of marshaling its resources against the revolution's enemies, left it powerless to assume any organizational role.” Exasperated by an anarchism “walled up inside the parameters of a marginal thinking to which only a few tiny groups operating in isolation subscribe,” Makhno advanced a devastating critique on why the Russian anarchists – who had played a not insignificant role in the events of 1917 – had been utterly defeated:

Had anarchists been closely connected in organizational terms and had they in their actions abided strictly by a well-defined discipline, they would never have suffered such a rout. But, because the anarchists “of all persuasions and tendencies” did not represent (not even in their specific groups) a homogeneous collective with a well-defined policy of action, for that very reason, these anarchists were unable to withstand the political and strategic scrutiny imposed upon them. Disorganization reduced them to impotence.

Latter-day scholar Anthony D'Agostino tells us that both “called for unified command and discipline in anarchist ranks, denouncing the study-circle character of the activity of city anarchists,” although “Makhno only dimly perceived what Arshinov had been driven to accept: that anarchism basing itself on the idea of class struggle already has a strong impetus in the direction of Marxism.” Arshinov finally decided to embrace communism and returned to the USSR in 1931 – but although “he made

reconciliation with the 1917 Lenin,” he tragically “returned not to Lenin’s Russia but to Stalin’s.” Makhno didn’t follow him, and died of tuberculosis in 1935. Arshinov died in Stalin’s purges not long after.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Russia; Anarchocommunist; Bolsheviks; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marxism, Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russian Civil War, 1918–1924

References and Suggested Readings

- Avrich, P. (Ed.) (1973) *The Anarchists in the Russian Revolution*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Avrich, P. (1978) *The Russian Anarchists*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- D’Agostino, A. (1977) *Marxism and the Russian Anarchists*. San Francisco: Germinal Press.
- Guerin, D. (Ed.) (1998) *No Gods, No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism*, 2 vols. San Francisco: AK Press.
- Makhno, N. (1996) *The Struggle Against the State and Other Essays*. San Francisco: AK Press.
- Mayer, A. J. (2002) *The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Voline [V. M. Eichenbaum] (1975) *The Unknown Revolution 1917–1921*. New York: Free Life Editions.
- Woodcock, G. (1962) *Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements*. New York: World Publishing.

Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932)

Carl Levy

Errico Malatesta was the leading Italian anarchist from the 1890s to the 1930s, with a career that encapsulated the movement’s greatest period of influence and spanned the Risorgimento, Liberal Italy, and Fascism. He lived between the era of Bakunin and Mussolini and knew them both. His unique theoretical position and his frenetic activism coincided with and helped shape anarchism from the last quarter of the nineteenth century until the 1930s. For much of his life he was in exile and in this respect he is a prime exemplar of the nomadic anarchist and syndicalist movements, which emerged in an era of globalization before World War I. Although Malatesta was a key figure in the First Inter-

national in Italy in the 1870s and early 1880s, his sojourns in Italy between 1885 and 1919 were sporadic if inevitably dramatic. The government of the day was terrified by his presence during the popular *Fasci Siciliani* movement (1893–4), the risings of 1897–8, *La Settimana Rossa* (Red Week) of 1914, and the *Biennio Rosso* (Red Biennium) of 1919–20. As a longtime exile in the capital of the capitalist world, London, for almost thirty years between the 1880s and 1919, Malatesta mixed with a cross-section of Europe’s exiled radicals and with the local progressive and radical intelligentsia and representatives of the parties of the left and trade union movement. Malatesta also spent considerable time in the Levant, the Balkans, Spain, Argentina, the USA, Cuba, Switzerland, and France. His influence on the Italian anarchist movement, even from exile, is a case study in transnational networking. Anarchist intellectuals Francesco Saverio Merlino (1856–1930), Pietro Gori (1865–1911), and Luigi Fabbri (1877–1935), as well as a larger group of artisans and exiles circulating between Italy and the diaspora, helped Malatesta retain a considerable influence within the anarchist movement as well as an immense, latent popularity within the Italian left generally and “subversive” political culture in particular (e.g., in Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna, Liguria, and Rome). Malatesta’s importance to the history of revolution can be found in his practice and equally in his revision of anarchist theory.

Political Practice

Errico Malatesta was born in Santa Maria Capua Vetere near Naples into a middle-class family. As a teenager he was engaged in Mazzinian politics, and like his fellow young Mazzinians he joined the Bakuninist First International in the wake of the Paris Commune and Giuseppe Mazzini’s (1805–72) disavowal of its politics. Although he became an atheist and anarchist, Malatesta always retained something of the ethical religiosity of the Italian republican movement. For the rest of his life he would duel with the Italian republicans, although he indeed was not adverse to forming tactical alliances with them, since they shared the mutual aim of eliminating the monarchy, as was revealed during the Red Week of 1914, when anarchists, socialists, syndicalists, and republicans formed an alliance in opposition to the Savoy monarchy and the army. Although

Malatesta was a medical student at the University of Naples, he dropped out and trained as an electrician and gas-fitter; between stints as editor of anarchist newspapers, he practiced these trades in Italy and in exile. Like the Russian *Narodniks*, Malatesta believed that middle-class revolutionaries had to “go to the people” and opposed a division of labor that deepened the rift between hand and brain workers. Even as an old man in Rome, in the 1920s, he practiced his trade, albeit shadowed and harassed by Fascist policemen.

In the 1870s anarchism (or Internationalism) was the largest movement on the extreme left in Italy, but by the 1880s it was outlawed and marginalized. In the 1870s, following the examples of Carlo Pisacane (1818–57) and Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–82), the Internationalists initiated uprisings in 1874 and 1877 to stimulate a social revolution. Social radicalism in the early years of modern Italy was founded not so much upon industrial disputes, as upon the conflict between civil society and the centralizing state. Malatesta and Carlo Cafiero (1846–92) imagined the revolution as a “social *Risorgimento*” or as a form of “propaganda by the deed,” which only later was transformed by anarchists into meaning lone assassinations or acts of terrorism. But this strategy failed. By the 1880s the anarchists became increasingly marginalized as parliamentary socialism grew in popularity and former comrades (Andrea Costa, 1851–1910) joined its ranks, with the Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party) founded in 1892. Thus between the 1880s and the turn of the century Malatesta developed a two-pronged strategy which remained constant throughout his political career. He realized that anarchism would remain a minority current on the Italian left, but the aim of the anarchists was to prod the socialists into insurrection and remain the conscience of the revolution during socialist reconstruction. He defined himself as an anarchist-socialist and later as an anarchocommunist organizer. He advocated an anarchist “party” or national organization; attempts at this failed in the 1890s, but 1919 saw the birth of the *Unione Anarchico Italiano* (Italian Anarchist Union) (UAI). This gave the anarchists a national presence during the two red years (1919–20). The UAI advocated anti-electoralism, direct action, and anarchocommunism. Nonetheless, Malatesta was not a sectarian and endorsed the concept of “anarchism without adjectives.” Malatesta hoped that the

socialists would permit the anarchists the liberty to experiment within post-revolutionary society, and during his brief stays in Italy in 1897–8 and 1913–14 he promoted united fronts for joint action with socialists and republicans; when liberties were threatened, he even promoted broader fronts against reactionary policies that included radical liberals in 1898, or dissidents on the right like the poet and novelist Gabriele D’Annunzio (1863–1938) against the rising power of Fascism in 1921–2. Indeed, in 1920 Malatesta entered into negotiation with social nationalists and interventionists (supporters of Italy’s entry into World War I) around D’Annunzio about a possible revolutionary March on Rome some twenty months before Mussolini’s in 1922. The return of Malatesta in late 1919 from exile in London sparked efforts by rank and file socialists to form united fronts, and through the charismatic moment created by his arrival (despite Malatesta’s detestation of the hero worship accompanying his triumphal tour of the peninsula), Malatesta’s efforts seemed to bear fruit; the daily newspaper that he edited in Milan, *Umanità nova*, briefly surpassed the readership of the socialist *Avanti!* As an insurrectionist, he called the bluff of the maximalist socialists who were not prepared to leave the constitutional framework even if they spoke of forming Soviets in Italy. At the same time, Malatesta warned the anarchists and the left against the politics of Leninism, which he characterized as a monopolistic Jacobin power politics which would devour its enemies and then its Bolshevik children.

Malatesta was one of the first anarchists to stress a syndicalist strategy, anticipating the better-known French movement and its leaders and theorists by a decade. His proto-syndicalist strategy was shaped by practical organizing in Florence between 1882 and 1885 and his sojourn in Argentina (1885–9), as well as being an enthralled eyewitness of the massive dockers’ strike in London (the New Unionism). The 1890s was a turning point for Malatesta. He resolutely opposed terrorism and anti-organizational theories based on spontaneity, affinity groups, and a determinist form of Kropotkinite anarchocommunism, later epitomized by his rival, Luigi Galleani (1861–1931). While he risked his life to denounce the terrorist bombers of the 1890s, his position on political assassination was far more complex, and he endorsed a form of tyrannicide,

especially in his responses to the assassination of the Italian king Umberto (1844–1900) or his later involvement in and/or support for anarchist attempts on Mussolini's life in the 1920s and 1930s.

In the 1890s Malatesta transferred the example of the New Unionism to Italy. He introduced the concepts of *ca'canny* (a work slowdown), the boycott, the sympathy strike, and the general trade union to anarchists and others in his newspaper he established in Ancona (1897–8). And from his exile in London he “converted” French anarchists to the syndicalist path. Emile Pouget (1860–1931) and Fernand Pelloutier (1867–1901) were two of his “students.” When politics in Italy and Europe liberalized after the turn of the century, the anarchists in Italy and elsewhere (for example, France and Spain) found institutional cover and fertile territory for their ideas within the buoyant international syndicalist movement. However, Malatesta sought to keep anarchism autonomous from syndicalism. Syndicalism was a tactic, but he did not believe it to be an end in itself, since it focused solely on the working class.

It should also be recalled that Malatesta was also concerned with the countryside. *Fra Contadini* (*A Talk Between Two Peasants*), first published in 1884, was translated into 11 languages. He did not promote the forced socialization of the land but plumped for the route of voluntary cooperation with anarchocommunism as the final goal, and thus he disagreed with the Italian socialists' policy of socialization of the land, which drove the sharecroppers and small farmers of the Po Valley into the hands of the Fascists in 1921–2.

Although he took several trips abroad, from 1919 Malatesta settled permanently in Italy, first briefly in Milan and then from 1921 (after his release from ten months of pre-trial imprisonment) in Rome. With the establishment of the Mussolini dictatorship in 1926, Malatesta was placed under a species of house arrest, because he was far too famous to imprison and his deportation, Mussolini feared, would only stimulate the overseas anti-Fascist opposition. In his last legal journal published in Rome (1924–6), Malatesta pondered the collapse of Liberal Italy. He argued bitterly against the Soviet model and claimed that his earlier prophecies had come true. He also denounced the hyper-organizationalist Platformist current around

the exiled Ukrainian anarchist, Nestor Makhno (1888–1934). Malatesta lived long enough to see the establishment of the Second Republic in Spain and was hopeful about the future of anarchism in its last remaining heartland, but at the end of his life he even questioned the first principles of anarchism without ever abandoning it for the ethical socialism earlier embraced by Merlino. The conundrum posed by the use of violence (for he remained convinced of the need for a violent revolution) and the authoritarian nature of violence itself, which he had denounced in his criticisms of the terrorists in the 1890s, returned in the 1920s and 1930s, but was never resolved.

Theoretical Work

Malatesta never published any self-contained volumes containing his theoretical thought. His work is scattered in his various newspapers, pamphlets, and interviews. As one of the last great theoreticians of classical anarchism (1860s to 1930s), his most important contributions were fourfold.

First were his sharp criticisms of Peter Kropotkin's form of anarchocommunism. The two men had both been exiles in antebellum London, but became enemies after Kropotkin endorsed the Allied side when war broke out in 1914; Malatesta remained neutral, advocating a social revolution to end the carnage. However, he had long been unhappy with Kropotkin's form of optimistic and deterministic anarchocommunism, which in a certain sense mirrored the positivist and determinist Marxism of the Second International. Unlike Kropotkin, who believed the basis of anarchism could be found in the superiority of mutual aid found in nature and human society, Malatesta detached human politics, political science, and sociology from biological analogies. Anarchism was not scientific; it was a form of human politics which involved will and carefully thought out programs. Thus, two of his most famous newspapers or journals were entitled *Volontà* (*Will*, 1913–15) and *Pensiero e Volontà* (*Thought and Will*, 1924–6). Malatesta wanted anarchism to be viable in the modern industrial city and therefore felt that Kropotkin's spontaneism, reinforced by his biological determinism, made light of the complex problems of keeping a modern industrial city alive in the wake of a revolution: thus, he criticized the cult of the

general strike, since a city would starve within a few days and the solidarity of the strikers would fragment. Instead, through organization, one could merely replace the authoritarian varieties for increasingly anti-statist and consensual forms of organization. Malatesta encouraged the factory occupiers in 1920 to restart the economy along libertarian socialist lines.

Secondly, Malatesta anticipated Robert Michels' (1876–1936) critique of the bureaucratization of radical organizations such as socialist parties and radical trade unions. Malatesta was wary of an uncritical form of syndicalism because for him the natural tendency for revolutionary trade union leadership was towards oligarchy and deradicalization. Thus he felt that anarchist trade unionists should act as radicalizing agents within whatever type of trade union they found themselves.

Thirdly, Malatesta criticized the emergent welfare state he witnessed in Britain before 1914 because he felt the pensions and social insurance system divided the established working class from the unskilled working class, and thus, borrowing a phrase from the unlikely personage of Hilaire Belloc (1870–1953), created a “Servile State,” thus anticipating a panoply of sociology theories about deradicalization that found favor in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Fourthly, by the 1880s Malatesta and Francesco Saverio Merlino realized that their own doctrines were too immersed in the sociology of Marx, and thus, in Merlino's monographs and Malatesta's pamphlets and newspaper articles, using telling Italian examples, they argued that bureaucracy and the state could have an independent effect on the economic structure of society.

While insurrectional anarchism faded after 1945, Malatesta bequeathed to post-1945 anarchist theory an open-ended and non-scientific approach which appealed to both “reformist” anarchists such as Colin Ward (1924–) and to critical academics in the humanities and social sciences.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchism, France; Anarchism, Italy; Anarchism, Spain; Anarchocommunism; Anarchosyndicalism; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Bolsheviks; Bourses du Travail; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI); Galliani, Luigi (1861–1931); Italian Risorgimento; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Makhno, Nestor (1889–1935); Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945); Paris Commune, 1871; Pelloutier,

Fernand (1867–1901) and the Bourses du Travail; Sacco and Vanzetti Case; Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Berti, G. (2003) *Errico Malatesta e il movimento anarchico italiano e internazionale 1872–1932*. Milan: Franco Angeli.
- Levy, C. (1998) Charisma and Social Movements: Errico Malatesta and Italian Anarchism. *Modern Italy* 3, 2: 205–17.
- Malatesta, E. (1995) *The Anarchist Revolution: Polemical Articles, 1924–1931*. London: Freedom Press.
- Marshall, P. (2008) *The Electrician of Revolution. In Demanding the Impossible. A History of Anarchism*. London: Harper Perennial.
- Nurse-Bray, P. (1995) Malatesta and the Anarchist Revolution. *Anarchist Studies* 3, 1: 25–44.
- Richards, V. (1984) *Errico Malatesta: His Life and Times*. London: Freedom Press.

Malato, Charles (1857–1938)

Constance Bantman

Charles Malato was one of the best-known publicists of pre-World War I anarchism. He left an important legacy as an anarchist essayist (*Philosophie de l'anarchie*), a newspaper editor (*La Révolution Cosmopolite, Le Tocsin*), a journalist (*Les Temps nouveaux, L'Intransigeant . . .*), and a chronicler of the movement in its heyday (*De la Commune à l'anarchie, Les Joyeusetés de l'exil*). He was also an activist who was involved in protest campaigns and possibly a few revolutionary “interventions.” The son of a Sicilian who had fought in the 1848 Italian revolution and the Commune, Malato experienced exile at an early age, following his parents in Caledonia where his father was deported.

Malato returned to France in 1881 and in 1886 he founded *La Révolution cosmopolite*, a revolutionary paper that was not decidedly anarchist, although Malato did become an anarchist in the following years. In 1890 he was included in the sentence against the anarchist paper *L'Attaque*, of which he was a contributor; he spent 15 months in prison and an expulsion order was passed against him. In 1892 he was in London, along with hundreds of French and Italian anarchists seeking to escape repression in their own countries. He lived in Hampstead, acted as a go-between linking the French, Italian, and

British militants, but also frequented well-to-do circles, working as the private secretary of the controversial exile Henri Rochefort, and even publishing an article praising the French anarchist terrorists in the renowned *Fortnightly Review*. He also edited *Le Tocsin* (1892–4), an irregular publication which condemned anarchist terrorism and adopted an early pro-union stance. His London years are recounted in *Les Joyeusetés de l'exil*, which he published in 1897. On his return to France he was active in the dominant trends of the movement, taking part in the defense of Dreyfus and supporting syndicalism. He staged a fictional general strike in his novel *La Grande grève*. In 1905 he found himself at the centre of *l'affaire de la rue de Rohan*, and was accused of having taken part in the attempted assassination of the king of Spain during his visit to France. He received support from prestigious personalities and was eventually acquitted. In 1914 he defended interventionism, and in 1916 he signed the *Manifeste des Seize*, a call to arms whereby some of the leading anarchists renounced their earlier pacifism. After a brief exile in Britain, he returned to France, hoping to be sent to the front as he had requested. However, he was only given administrative functions. After the war he became a corrector in the Chambres des Députés but still contributed to various anarchist papers.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Culture, 1840–1939; Anarchism, France; Malatesta, Errico (1853–1932); Michel, Louise (1830–1905)

References and Suggested Readings

- Maitron, J. (Ed.) (1973–7) *Dictionnaire biographique du mouvement ouvrier. Part 3: 1871–1914*. Paris: Maspero.
 Maitron, J. (1975) *Histoire du mouvement anarchiste en France*. Paris: Maspero.
 Malato, C. (1889) *Philosophie de l'anarchie*. Paris: Stock.
 Malato, C. (1894) *De la Commune à l'anarchie*. Paris: Stock.
 Malato, C. (1897) *Les Joyeusetés de l'exil*. Paris: Stock.

Malawi national liberation

Eliakim Sibanda

Historically, Malawi's population was centered in the fertile southern highlands and a thin belt along the shores of Lake Nyasa in Africa. In the nine-

teenth and twentieth centuries a smaller number and percentage of Europeans colonized the land than in nearby colonies. The 1945 census found that 99.7 percent of the 2 million residents of Malawi were African.

Like most African colonies, Nyasaland (now Malawi) was created by the late nineteenth-century European Scramble for Africa, which divided the continent among the leading European imperialist powers. The British-owned African Lakes Company secured concessions by 1891, when the Britain declared the British Central Africa Protectorate (the Nyasaland Protectorate from 1907). From 1893 to 1907 the British South Africa Company controlled neighboring Northern and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe and Zambia), which then reverted to British control.

Lacking mineral and other resources, Malawi attracted few white settlers, unlike Southern Rhodesia; mining, the mainstay of neighboring colonies, was not established. Besides missionaries, Europeans living in Nyasaland were primarily commercial farmers, concentrated in the fertile Shire Highlands. The spread of commercial farming spurred African population movements into the Highlands as wage labor expanded.

Livingstonia

The Livingstonia Mission established on Lake Nyasa in 1875 could trace its inspiration to missionary and explorer David Livingstone, with religious affiliation to the Free Church of Scotland. The mission provided medical services and education to African populations, at first primarily to the Ngoni. Over time Livingstonia became a source of new African elites, though students were increasingly unhappy with the mission's strict rules prohibiting beer-drinking, polygamy, and dancing, and the institution of a fee structure.

By 1880 the Livingstonia mission group was joined by three other missions in the Nyasaland area. Apart from acting as focal points for African community formation, the missions attracted lay people from Europe who, along with fulfilling their pious duties to the mission or, even more so, after they had left the missions, started plantations in the Nyasaland area. Much of this plantation land was acquired in the period before and during Nyasaland's transition into a protectorate.

The Shire Highlands, in the southeastern part of Malawi, were the most important sector of the economy. During the colonial period the region produced tobacco and cotton, cash crops grown mostly by smallholders, while African subsistence farmers raised sorghum, maize, rice, millet, and cassava. European cash crops replaced a more balanced, diversified, and complex traditional agrarian and exchange system.

When the British and Portuguese were vying for the territory in the late nineteenth century, the missions and European planters established a British footprint in the region. Immediately following Britain's declaration of control, a series of colonial conflicts broke out with Africans, many of whom lived around European missions. Apart from their commercial and nationalist efforts, the missions were charged with religious conversion. Europeans hoped that religious conversion would turn Africans into good British colonial citizens. But the religious meanings of European or US denominations were reinterpreted and redeployed by Africans. Religion served as an organizational force replacing traditional local organization that was breaking down. John Chilembwe's uprising in 1915 flowed at least partly from the organizational base formed by his Providence Industrial Mission.

Plantations

The plantation culture in Nyasaland expanded demand for and exploitation of African labor. Traders seeking labor in the Lakeshore and Upper Highlands regions of the protectorate returned with workers recruited for plantations. As local labor became scarce, white commercial farmers sent labor-recruiting teams into Portuguese-ruled Mozambique, and operated the *thangata* system of labor control, a form of bonded labor, to control workers from the Mulanje District in Mozambique. However, persistent labor shortages led European farmers to rent land to Africans through tenant farming.

After 1897 and 1904, the protectorate government directly encouraged Africans to work in plantations, but government involvement was quickly discouraged by the British Colonial Office. As the African economy expanded, plantations competed for labor with nearby British colonies, particularly South Africa, which frequently recruited directly from Nyasaland. Through 1910, plantation laborers were paid with bartered goods

such as cloth, blankets, farm implements, and other goods. As independent African farming increased, plantation owners reverted to recruiting migrants and even children. Labor reports from the 1920s demonstrate that children were employed as laborers on Nyasaland plantations, comprising 20–25 percent of the labor force.

Labor Conflict

The British viewed the protectorate for its suitability for large-scale commercial agriculture, beginning with cotton in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, tobacco before World War I, and then tea in the 1930s. In the early twentieth century, plantation owners were placed in competition with the transport industry, which used the protectorate to move goods or material from Central Africa to the East. Missionaries supported creation of a rail system, ostensibly for humanitarian reasons, rather than freeing up labor for their own needs. In 1908 the initial section of the railroad was completed.

At the turn of the century the colonial government sought to establish provisions to sell European-owned land lying idle back to Africans. The Land Ordinance (Native Locations) No. 5 of 1904 provision would have changed the system in Nyasaland from one of labor coercion to rent coercion, leaving at least the possibility for Africans to recover their land. But while the ordinance was passed, no action was taken and in 1928 it was repealed. European landowners held the line against the ordinance, far more interested in African labor than rent.

If the laws covering tenancy were stagnant, the situation in Nyasaland was not: between 1902 and 1909 the African population in the Shire Highlands increased from 95,000 to 210,000. The perpetuation of land insecurity contributed to the Chilembwe Rebellion against plantation owners in 1915. Following the rebellion, colonial authorities introduced indirect rule, elevating the position of compliant traditional chiefs over the emergent African business class. In response to this exclusion and the tenancy issue, mission-educated African teachers, civil servants, ministers of religion, businessmen, and farmers, as well as a few revolutionary chiefs, banded together in Native Associations from 1912 onwards to resist settler rule.

By 1926, 115,703 Africans, or about 10 percent of the protectorate's population, lived on private

estates. The plantation system disrupted African life at the most basic level. Courts considered whether or not men could bring wives to their homes or whether women could bring home husbands, typical in a matrilineal society. In a 1932 ruling, the court decided that landowners had primacy over traditional marriages. In the 1940s planters still argued that privately held estates, with Africans as tenants, were most suitable for all. The general manager of the British Central African Company argued that planters could best ensure both care of the land and Africans living on it: "We are definitely of the opinion that if the natives of this country are left to their own devices they will starve themselves in a few years."

By 1954 land acquisition reduced the percentage of estate land in Nyasaland to 3.7 percent of the total. Part of the incentive for this more egalitarian approach to land tenure was the emergence of the Central African Federation in 1953. In the 1950s and early 1960s land distribution was central to the future of the federation, and by 1962, when Hastings Banda assumed leadership, labor coercion on plantations was abolished.

Early Resistance

Africans opposed intrusive inroads into their lives, strenuously resisting white settlers and European missionaries. Most notable was the Yao and Ngoni resistance to British rule. Through documenting the Yao and Ngoni, the writer Sir Harry Johnstone helped shape British views toward the Malawian population. As adherents to Islam, Johnstone viewed the Yao migrants of the Southern Lake of Malawi as undemocratic, rude, uncooperative, and uncivilized exploiters of the Manganga people who lived in the region. He also saw the Ngoni as warlike and ferocious. Johnstone's characterizations encouraged the British colonial power to set out to suppress both the Yao and Ngoni people. Even the Livingstonia Mission was uncomfortable with the Ngoni, dissuading British colonialists from attacking them in fear that the resistance would be fierce and successful.

Despite these efforts to divide and rule the local African population through depicting the Yao and Ngoni as preying on fellow Manganga and Chewa people, Africans of all backgrounds continued to resist British settlers and missionaries.

From the late nineteenth century on, Africans in Malawi opposed missionaries, the colonial government, European plantations, and political, socioeconomic, and cultural intrusion.

A colonial hut tax, the rise of an African peasantry, and the large and growing network of mission stations and schools restructured the largely agrarian Nyasaland social system. Many Nyasas, educated and unskilled, sought work in the southern colonies. Land concessions to whites, the impact of the spread of African cash-cropping, and an influx of African immigrants into the Highlands in search of jobs and land, as well as pervasive racial discrimination, set the scene for the conflicts and struggles of the colonial period.

Independent Christianity and John Chilembwe

A key figure was John Chilembwe, who waged an uprising concurrent with millennial movements. In the period from 1909 to 1914, Africans in the region were becoming more alienated from western rule and churches, and sought return to traditional remedies or to follow the millennial theories of semi-independent African churches. In the early twentieth century, Africans educated in the mission culture were frustrated with European-dominated society.

As much as religion organized Africans during the Chilembwe rebellion, it also blunted unity. African groups in the region were pulled in different directions by foreign-imposed religious differences, whether Catholicism, Protestantism, or Islam. While a military failure, Chilembwe's rising drew Africans from a range of ethnic backgrounds in a common struggle, presaging the later history of African nationalism and foreshadowing decolonization. The rising was not a spontaneous action or millenarian movement, or an uncontrolled burst of anger, but a complex response led by Chilembwe, a western-educated African influenced by radical Christianity and abolitionism.

Early Nationalist Currents

Even before World War I, numbers of educated Africans – many employed as clerks, teachers, and businessmen – began to organize lobby groups and welfare associations to advance their economic and political concerns. Some were inspired by Chilembwe; all were responding to a colonial

situation that promised a new world but blocked entry to the African elite who desired it most. Early organizations often took an ethnic and elitist form, but many of the issues they raised were of general interest to the African majority.

The first modern nationalist movement, the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC), was formed in 1944. Frederick Sangala, a government clerk, advocated a united African party to promote African self-improvement and elimination of racial discrimination. His views were supported by NAC president Levi Mumba, a graduate of the Livingstonia Institute who advocated direct political representation for Africans. Like Chilembwe, Mumba drew on Christianity to make claims for African rights, but he was skeptical of western individualism, which he believed was divisive and at odds with African values. In 1949 political reforms provided limited African representation in the political system without fundamentally changing colonial relations. Theoretically open to all Africans, NAC was mainly a party of educated men and their wives. Matters began changing as efforts toward amalgamation of Nyasaland and Rhodesia moved forward. In part due to pressure from white settlers in southern Africa, Britain set out to establish the Central African Federation in 1953.

The moves toward Federation, seen as an attempt to entrench white authority, provided an important stimulus to African nationalism in all three colonies. Federation was seen in the two northern territories as leading to an extension of Southern Rhodesian-style white supremacy. NAC believed Africans in Southern Rhodesia lacked any political rights or educational opportunities, and feared amalgamation would place Nyasaland under direct settler control; Africans would also lose access to Nyasaland's remarkably advanced training and education system, and with this, lose privileges NAC leaders considered vital to their political project.

The Federation question therefore sparked agitation and resistance from NAC, which was transformed, for a time, into a mass nationalist movement. By 1953 NAC claimed a paid-up membership of 5,000, with a diverse social base. The organization resisted Federation through strikes, boycotts, and withholding taxes. In neighboring Northern Rhodesia, a similar campaign was waged by the Northern Rhodesian Congress (NRC).

In this unsettled atmosphere, Hastings Banda first came to prominence. The son of farmers in the Kasungu district of Nyasaland, Banda worked in South Africa in the 1910s, before studying medicine in the US and earning a medical degree in Britain. From abroad, Banda opposed Federation and supported NAC, strenuously seeking to convince its leadership to enlist African chiefs in the anti-Federation campaign.

Federation and After

On April 9, 1953 the predominantly white Southern Rhodesian electorate voted in favor of Federation, and this was followed by approval from the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian legislative councils. A petition against Federation, supported by a large majority of Africans in Nyasaland, including many chiefs, was ignored. On August 1, 1953 the Central African Federation was officially declared: a white-dominated self-governing crown realm with its own parliament and prime minister, it nonetheless provided for expanded African political representation.

The failure to stop Federation demoralized African nationalists in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, including Banda, and NAC membership fell by 90 percent. NAC was divided and weakened by its failure to stop Federation. NAC president Ralph Chinyama resigned and was replaced by Wellington Manoah Chirwa, a moderate, who, with Clement Kumbikano, elected to represent NAC as a federal minister. By the end of 1954 the number of federal seats available to NAC increased to five, and two more posts were filled by younger, more militant graduates of Fort Hare University in South Africa and Makerere University in the Uganda Protectorate: Henry Blasius Masauko Chipembere and Murray William Kanyama Chiume. Banda remained abroad, now based in the Gold Coast.

In November 1956 Chipembere wrote to Banda, requesting his to return to Nyasaland, and supporting his efforts to oust Chirwa. Banda was cautious at first, but returned in 1958, after decades abroad. On Sunday, July 6, Banda arrived in Nyasaland, hailed by a large gathering that came to greet him. In August 1958 Banda was elected NAC president and began touring Nyasaland, speaking to large gatherings throughout the country. As Banda's support grew, opposition also increased from the colonial administration and the settlers. After a racial clash, the Settlers'

Nyasaland Association threatened to take matters into its own hands. The Federation government's response – that the event was isolated and required no further action – angered settlers. Tensions escalated and police intervened against protestors. Banda was banned from Rhodesia.

An emergency NAC conference gave Banda a vote of confidence and sanctioned a strategy of non-cooperation, civil disobedience, and sabotage. The times were tense and volatile, and the administration unable to address the multitude of protests and demonstrations, a number of which were violent, including racial clashes. As in 1915, settlers and the government considered force as the best means of managing the tense coexistence of Africans and the relatively small white population. While the government was filled with anxiety, rumors of a violent African rising spread; Africans were moving rapidly towards unity. Eventually, a state of emergency was declared in March 1959 under the moniker Operation Sunrise. Banda was jailed, and after uprisings broke out, troops were deployed, killing some fifty people. By June, around 1,000 NAC supporters were jailed and the party proscribed.

In September 1959 NAC was replaced by the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). Organized by Orton Chirwa and Aleke Banda, it boasted a membership of over a thousand within two short weeks. The British government, anxious to resolve the situation, tacitly approved the MCP launch and helped organize Banda's release in Zomba, the then-capital, on April 1, 1960. Banda stepped into the leadership of a well-organized movement with an effective propaganda mouthpiece, the weekly *Malawi News*. He was elected life-president of the MCP, after Chirwa and Aleke Banda ceded the presidency. Banda quickly moved to consolidate power in the party, which grew soon to 250,000 members; his increasingly authoritarian style, and tendency to promote a personality cult, were already evident.

SEE ALSO: Chilembwe, John (1871–1915); Non-Violent Movements: Foundations and Early Expressions; Zambian Nationalism and Protests; Zimbabwe, National Liberation Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Pachai, B. (1973) *Malawi: The History of a Nation*. New York: Longman.
- Rotberg, R. I. (1965) *Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia 1873–1964*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Malaysia, protest and revolt

Collin Rajasingham Abraham

Malaysia is a multicultural society that was born in the throes of protest, largely influenced by British colonialism. The historical effect of British colonialism on Malaysia brought into sharper focus the fusion of protest and revolution into the body of social theory. Because colonial intervention, since its very inception in 1874, was accompanied by decades of both political and military anti-colonial struggles, it engendered a substantial ability to resist colonial domination through protest, ultimately leading to revolution. Indeed, such was the ferocity of the protests and uprisings that the colonial government did not enjoy a continuous period of peace for more than six months during its entire rule, up to the granting of political independence in 1957.

Located at the confluence of the main trade routes from the West, Southwest Asia, and East Asia, Malaysia was the center of trade and commerce of seafaring nations, especially prior to the initial advent of European mercantile capitalism. The country's location resulted in a range of economic and political forces converging in the town of Malacca, creating a vast transient population made up of an estimated 90 different ethnic groups. The resulting pattern of inter- and intra-ethnic relationships led to cultural assimilation that evolved into a new community known as Baba Chinese (the offspring of indigenous Malays and Chinese residents.)

In 1824, after the signing of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, the British government obtained sole and exclusive overall jurisdiction to enter into mutually acceptable treaty obligations with the Malay States, while at the same time allowing the nominal exercise of sovereignty of the local rulers. The practical application of contemporary ideals by the new colonial power became essential to the political economy in Malaysia. The demands of the industrial revolution, especially for the vital raw materials of rubber and tin, as well as the successful emergence of portfolio investment capital, radically undermined the existing local feudal-type subsistence economy. The importance and need for "good government" and law and order was paramount if British

political and economic interests were to be protected and sustained toward revenue generation and profit maximization.

Accordingly, because what was at stake was literally the transformation of villages and towns through the creation of modern institutions, the colonial government more or less issued a blank check to encourage foreign capital investment. But in practice such investment radically disrupted the feudal-type subsistence economy and especially the social structure of the indigenous people. This development crucially undermined the historical and traditional basis of interpersonal relationships and mutual responsibilities from being status-oriented to contractual-based relationships. The further maturing of the capitalist market economy through technology driven modernization, and transnational economic integration with the intervention of multinational corporations, resulted in a dependent political economy where local political and economic institutions were suppressed and became mere appendages as satellites to the colonial metropolis.

The new economic and political developments that accompanied modernization did not benefit all segments of society. Indeed, apart from the more urbanized areas centered around towns and cities that were linked to the cash nexus of the colonial economy, vast sectors of the rural economy relied almost entirely on the subsistence mode of production. Therefore, an economic dichotomy came into existence where the modern sector depended on the export of tin and rubber whereas the indigenous economy depended on agriculture. Largely, Chinese and Indian immigrants made up the workforce of tin and rubber industries, leaving the indigenous Malays confined to the subsistence sector. This factor would lead the indigenous population to resent the loss of their political sovereignty to the British as well as their economic opportunities to those imported workers.

Accordingly, a militant revolution and more widespread local resistance ensued, not only against colonial domination itself, but also, and more importantly, between the local ruling class that espoused a society based on the perpetuation of dominant vested interests, and a subject class seeking free association within democratic institutions. This ruling-class dominance was a formidable repressive force because it was in cahoots with the colonial power and took on an identity of its own, giving rise to unique patterns

of resistance against progressive social change. These developments played a pivotal role in the evolution and transformation of the entire societal structure and ushered in profound changes in inter- and intra-ethnic and race perceptions. The intertwining of these perceptions occurred, in turn, within the polarization of ethnicity and race within the class structure.

The roots of protest and revolution in Malaysia, then, can be traced to the juxtaposition of ethnic and social variables as they became intertwined with political considerations. The British literally "inherited" a society that was ready-made for ethnic division. Such divisions were further exacerbated by overlapping geopolitical factors, such as enclaves of different groups living separately in settlements, mixing only for ad hoc domestic and social purposes, but never mingling. Eventually, Malayan society would evolve around "closed" institutions that were initially highly stratified and repressive in nature, both internally and externally.

Profound transformations of these rigid institutions gradually galvanized groups to seek more flexible arrangements that in turn made demands on the colonial social structure that were inimical to the status quo and sowed the seeds for organized protest and revolution. Such protests among the different ethnic and social class groups began mainly because their specific economic interests overlapped with their identities, so that the colonial power in fact managed successfully to suppress protests through the policy of divide and rule. This happened as a reaction when the protest movements gradually evolved and expanded their scope to include more than one economic activity and on a pan-Malayan basis, so that membership became multi-ethnic and interclass in composition. This development saw protest movements being propelled into new social formations in the political arena with the emphasis now on the ideology of anti-colonialism.

In the twentieth century the British government continued its policy of indirect rule and in doing so failed to shape a constitutional ideology in Malaysia. Instead, it continued on a path that regarded the Malays as amiable but unsophisticated and rather lazy. While the British utilized them as good soldiers during World War I, in the end they deemed them incapable of self-government. As for the Chinese, the British held them as a formidable ally and foe, considering

them both clever and dangerous. In the 1920s and 1930s, with political events in China coming to a climax, the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Communist Party of China began to build their own rival clandestine organizations in Malaya. This development led to constant conflicts in the Chinese towns which further led the British to believe that there would never be any form of solidarity among such a disparate array of different races.

By the end of World War II the British government would find itself in near financial ruin as it became tied to the United States for basic support for its ailing economy. Nowhere was this scenario felt more clearly than in Malaya. Because the revenue earnings from tin and rubber exceeded that of all other colonies put together throughout the entire British Empire, the colonial government treated Malaya as the "jewel in the crown" for sustaining the British economy with the latter's essential export-driven economy. It was consequently imperative to consolidate military and political power to ensure that the revenue-earning capacity of the colony was not disrupted, and toward this end various repressive measures against local movements were adopted, such as toward trade unions where industrial strike action was damaging vital exports. In response, these movements themselves were forced to adopt militant strategies to fight back and achieve their objectives that ultimately resulted in having to fight for political independence itself. Certain other movements, such as political parties of the left, also gradually came under the influence of the ideologically committed leadership of the Malayan Communist Party. For the first time, the negative implications for the political economy became evident when a nationwide work protest *hartal* (total work stoppage) was successfully carried out that included Singapore, creating alarm in the colonial government because it established the link between the working classes and the peasantry. A final total rejection of constitutional plans for reforms in the form of a comprehensive "Peoples' Constitution" by the colonial government set the stage for the demand for outright political independence among all protest groups, including those that espoused a militant revolution.

In the light of widespread industrial unrest, and the accompanying retaliation against the provisions for colonial law and order, the government

declared a state of emergency, which in effect meant rule by the military forces, including that under the Anglo-Malayan Defense Treaty, as well as local police forces. The rationale claimed by the British was that the Malayan Communist Party had initiated complete disruption of the economy, resulting in the breakdown of law and order in an attempt to take over the government and establish a communist state. In this connection it was also submitted that the political parties of the left were legitimate targets to maintain law and order, and accordingly the British implemented widespread repressive measures, many of which violated basic human rights.

The strategy of utilizing the massive propaganda machine was intended to demolish the popular nationalist demands for constitutional reforms, leading to a popularly elected democratic and independent government. These measures, both external and internal, did in fact achieve the objective of crushing the protest and revolutionary movements in Malaysia. The central theme that runs through Malaysian protest is a "top-bottom" scenario of society, where decisions involving power and its implementation were essentially the domain and monopoly of the traditional, political, bureaucratic, and social elite groups of the main ethnic and racial communities in the country. These elite formations were the direct legacy of colonialism that would later be inherited by the government of independent Malaya and Malaysia. After independence these elite groups continued to be intertwined in the structure of the post-colonial power status quo as they further consolidated and entrenched the unequal distributive system.

Throughout its colonial domination over Malaysia the British Empire never had more than a few months of breathing space without protests being mounted against it. Protests were a natural outgrowth of the situation in which political power was devolved to a consortium of local elitist groups, within a race-based political system, anxious to protect and perpetuate their colonial interests. Despite the seeming diversity of the groups involved in the movements for political independence (Malay nationalists, trade unions, Malay left, Islamic radical parties, the MDU, and the Malayan Communist Party), however, there was absolute unanimity in the struggle for freedom in the context of national unity and national integration.

On April 1, 1946, one year after the conclusion of World War II, Britain relinquished its power over Malaya, and a Malayan Union was formed without the inclusion of Singapore, which remained a crown colony. However, local Malays opposed the union because it had loose citizenship requirements and it reduced the Malayan power to rule. After a great amount of pressure was exerted, the Union was later replaced by the Federation of Malaya on January 31, 1948. Formally, the Federation gained independence on August 31, 1957 and later consolidated with other Malayan states, including Singapore, on September 16, 1963. It was then renamed Malaysia.

SEE ALSO: China, Maoism and Popular Power, 1949–1969; Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911; Thai Communist Party

References and Suggested Readings

- Boon, K. C. (2003) *Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict During and After the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1941–1946*. Singapore: NUS Press.
- Hirschman, C. (1986) *The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya: Political Economy and Racial Ideology*. *Sociological Forum*, 1, 2.
- Hooker, V. (2003) *A Short History of Malaysia: Linking East and West*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Klitgaard, R. & Katz, R. (1983) *Overcoming Ethnic Inequalities: Lessons from Malaysia*. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 2, 3.
- Purcell, V. (1965) *Malaysia*. London: Thames & Hudson.

Malcolm X (1925–1965)

Thomas Edge

One of the most controversial figures of the American civil rights movement, Malcolm X (El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz) was an outspoken critic of racism in the United States and throughout the world during the 1950s and 1960s. His uncompromising stands on the fate of non-white people across the world, combined with his withering critiques of the mainstream civil rights movement, made him a polarizing figure in the black freedom struggle.

Malcolm X was born Malcolm Little on May 19, 1925 in Omaha, Nebraska. His parents, Earl and Louisa Little, were members of Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement

Association (UNIA). Their political beliefs faced violent resistance in Nebraska, forcing the family to move to Milwaukee and, ultimately, Lansing, Michigan. In Lansing, the family's home was burned down in November 1929; less than two years later, Earl Little was killed by a street car under suspicious circumstances. The subsequent financial strain on the family eventually drove Louisa Little to a mental institution. Malcolm briefly stayed with a white foster family before settling with his half-sister, Ella Collins, in Boston in 1941. By his eighteenth birthday, he moved to Harlem and began working as a railway porter and waiter, later committing petty crimes, running numbers, and selling drugs. In 1946, he was found guilty of larceny in Boston and sentenced to eight to ten years in Charlestown State Prison.

While in prison, Malcolm's brother, Reginald, introduced him to the teachings of Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam (NOI) in 1948. The religious conversion had a profound effect on Malcolm's life and conduct. He became a voracious reader and an acclaimed debater within the prison. On August 7, 1952, Malcolm gained early release from prison and moved to Detroit to live with his brother Wilfred. Soon, Malcolm began attending meetings of the NOI. His intelligence attracted the attention of Elijah Muhammad, who brought him to Chicago to train him as a minister. For the remainder of the decade, Malcolm became the NOI's best organizer, establishing dozens of new temples and revitalizing others. He was rewarded in 1954 with the most important ministry in the NOI: New York's Temple No. 7. His fiery oratory also gained the attention of journalists, particularly after the 1959 airing of a CBS documentary about the NOI, "The Hate That Hate Produced." Although he was always careful to acknowledge the teachings of Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm became the public face of the group by the end of the decade.

Malcolm's political message during the 1950s and early 1960s combined the racial teachings of the NOI with a pan-African call for unity among the victims of white racism. He used the NOI's unorthodox version of Sunni Islam to promote ideas of racial pride among African Americans, by both pointing to the accomplishments of Africans in the past and assailing the negative effects of racism on the black community. While Malcolm emphasized the impact



As a one-time member of the Nation of Islam, Malcolm X (1925–65) represents to many the more radical element in the US civil rights movement. After leaving the Nation of Islam in 1964, he made a pilgrimage to Mecca and became a Sunni Muslim. While in Mecca that April he met with Prince Faisal al-Saud (1906–75), who later became the king of Saudi Arabia. (Getty Images)

of racism and subsequent need for an independent black nation, he also tried to convince his black audiences that they had the power to change their own lives, particularly through the power of Allah. His rejection of white religion and culture contributed to a searing historical analysis of European colonizers and the United States, one which placed racism at the center of their dealings with Africa, Asia, and Latin America while emphasizing its intentional and essential nature. Racism, Malcolm argued, was not an exception to the otherwise democratic natures of western nations. Rather, it was essential to understanding their identity, evolution, and success over the preceding centuries. Malcolm believed that people of color had to understand this key point to appreciate the evils perpetrated by white nations and to begin the process of spiritual, mental, and political emancipation.

This internationalist approach to race relations manifested itself in a number of concrete ways during the late 1950s and early 1960s, including a July 1959 trip to Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria, and Ghana on behalf of Elijah Muhammad, and a 1960 meeting with Fidel Castro in New York. Not only was Malcolm becoming the face of the NOI within the United States, but more people around the world began to acknowledge Malcolm as a major leader within the African American community.

As Malcolm's fame increased, so too did his frustration with the NOI's rejection of political

involvement. Malcolm relished the opportunities to debate mainstream civil rights leaders in public meetings, writings, and radio and television broadcasts. Publicly, Malcolm questioned the wisdom of seeking integration with white "devils," the use of non-violence as a successful tactic, and the likelihood of any constructive change in an inherently racist society. Privately, however, he felt vulnerable to criticisms that he had never participated in a single demonstration in the South, nor had he faced violent demonstrators in his public life. For all his talk of creating a *black nation*, Malcolm thought that the NOI's proscription on political activities separated him from the very community he wanted to lead.

By the end of 1963, several factors combined to push Malcolm from the NOI and Elijah Muhammad. Within the Nation, resentment toward Malcolm's growing reputation led to rumors that he was trying to oust Elijah Muhammad as leader of the group. From Malcolm's perspective, he became increasingly aware of Muhammad's own personal failings, including his refusal to support a number of children he fathered by young women he employed. These tensions came to a head in the aftermath of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Malcolm publicly insisted that Kennedy's death represented the logical culmination of American violence at home and abroad, or "the chickens coming home to roost." Muhammad immediately suspended Malcolm for 90 days. As Malcolm came to realize that the NOI would never reinstate him, he announced his final break with the group on March 8, 1964. Within days, he organized Muslim Mosque, Inc., to serve as his organization base of operations and to begin his conversion to Sunni Islam. Just five weeks after his break with the NOI, Malcolm left New York for Mecca to complete the *hajj*, or holy pilgrimage.

Malcolm's trip to Mecca and travels in Africa in 1964 ushered in a new period of contemplation and political change. He still insisted upon the dominance of racism in the West's dealing with the non-white world and continued to harbor a distrust of whites as a group. But he was willing to acknowledge that sympathetic whites could contribute to the freedom movement, particularly by working within their own communities to change attitudes. Moreover, the presence of white Muslims in Mecca opened Malcolm's mind to the possibility that Islam could unite

all people, not just people of color, in its calls for universal brotherhood.

Upon returning home, he announced the formation of a new group, the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU), in hopes of recruiting a larger secular following. It took a decidedly black nationalist approach, emphasizing black economic, political, and cultural development and the creation of race-based institutions. Just weeks after starting this project, Malcolm once again left for Africa on July 7. During his four months abroad, he addressed the second annual conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and attempted to garner support for bringing human rights charges against the United States before the United Nations.

The last few months of Malcolm's life were marked by internal and external turmoil. He continued to make tentative overtures to the mainstream civil rights movement, including a speech in Selma, Alabama in February 1965 at the invitation of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). His conflicts with the NOI also continued, particularly when the Nation attempted to evict Malcolm from his home. On February 14, 1965, Malcolm's home was firebombed. One week later, on February 21, 1965, Malcolm was assassinated during an address at the Audubon Ballroom in Harlem by three members of the NOI. He was survived by his wife, Betty Shabazz, and their four children; later that year, Betty gave birth to twin girls. The posthumous publication of *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* (written with Alex Haley) in 1965, combined with the rise of black nationalism in the second half of the 1960s, helped cement Malcolm's legacy as a voice for radical change in the African American community.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; CORE (Congress of Racial Equality); Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism; Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

References and Suggested Readings

- Carson, C. (1991) *Malcolm X: The FBI File*. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers.
- Dyson, M. E. (1995) *Making Malcolm: The Myth and Meaning of Malcolm X*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Goldman, P. (1979) *The Death and Life of Malcolm X*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Perry, B. (1991) *Malcolm: The Life of a Man Who Changed Black America*. Barrytown, NY: Station Hill Press.

Mali, protests and uprisings, 1850s–2005

Jean-Jacques N. Sène

Mali has long been a crossroads for the Arab peoples of North Africa and for black peoples living south of the Sahara and has seen a number of protests and revolutions. It was the seat of major medieval empires. In the seventh and eighth centuries the kingdom of Ghana rose to prominence through the commerce of gold, salt, and slaves. In the thirteenth century the empire of Mali, at its zenith in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, was erected on the ruins of Ghana, which eventually collapsed and gave way to the empire of Gao in the sixteenth century.

Between 1852 and 1864, Tukulër (a branch of the Peulhs) warrior El Hadj Oumar Tall conquered most of the territory of Mali by launching his Jihad. The French subsequently pushed him out from his fortified camp near the city of Kayes in 1864 to establish the bases of the new colony of Upper Senegal. From there they engineered the occupation of today's Mali and Niger in 1857. They also captured Medina, a slave trading city, and erected a fort there. French conquest and domination was hastened with the creation of the colony of Upper Senegal-Niger in 1904 in the framework of the *Afrique Occidentale Française* (AOF, French territories of West Africa) and the amputation of the territory of Upper Volta to create the French Soudan (today's Mali). The construction of the Dakar-Niger railroad followed in 1923.

Between 1913 and 1916 the French faced the revolt of the Bobo in the South and the Touareg in the North in reaction to the "excesses of the colonial administration." Following the collapse of the federalist project with Senegal, Modibo Keita became the first president, adopted a one-party state socialist doctrine, and distanced himself from France and other francophone countries of the sub-region by rejecting the CFA franc and adopting his own currency. To guarantee state

solvency, the influence of the USSR in Mali between 1963 and 1990 was all-pervasive.

When a young lieutenant named Moussa Troaré staged a military coup that toppled Modibo Keita in 1968, he first enjoyed widespread popularity, promoted foreign investments, and integrated the zone franc; but on the political front he remained strictly hostile to democratization and quickly dented the faith of the Malians in his administration's ability to reform the country. Worker and student protests were systematically met with police brutality until the regime was swept away in March 1991 by the coalition of students, labor unions, women's organizations, human rights groups, journalists, and a multitude of other civil society groups. When the troops of Moussa Traoré fired on defenseless protesters in Bamako, killing 106 and wounding 708, during the People's Revolution, uncompromising defiance to the regime led to his arrest.

A first attempt at the "pacification of the Touareg" – the National Pact signed in Algiers – had failed in 1992, under transitional president Amadou Toumani Touré, who had himself been a general under President Moussa Troaré's dictatorial regime (1968–91). In 1990 the Touareg had taken up arms against the military dictatorship responsible for embezzling thousands of tons of international food assistance that could have alleviated the plight of the nomadic light-skinned warrior tribes of Northern Mali, Southeastern Algeria, and Northwestern Niger who were competing for scarce resources against their black Songhai agro-pastoralist neighbors after the extended periods of drought that had decimated their cattle.

On March 27, 1996, in the historic city of Timbuktu, the Touareg rebels of Northern Mali laid down their arms in the presence of the country's president, Alpha Oumar Konare and Ghanaian head of state Capt. Jerry Rawlings, then also acting as the executive chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This event came as a direct consequence of the system of multi-party democracy adopted in 1991, and was lauded as a victory for Malian civil society. Against a backdrop of restored social stability and sustainable peace, Mali has been able to honor most of its agreement package with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund ("Easement for Poverty Reduction and Growth") negotiated in 1999. However, more than 70 percent of the Malian population

still lives in poverty, and economic diversification from gold, cotton, and cattle breeding remain the only revenue-generating exports.

Although social science has established that there is a positive relationship between democracy and economic development, democracy can prosper in the absence of wealth. Mali, one of the world's poorest countries, has remained democratic since its first multi-party elections in 1992, but over the past years, political success has been continuously blemished by poor economic performance. The popular politician without a party, Amadou Toumani Touré, affectionately called "A-T-T" by his compatriots, became president in 2002 while the defeated incumbent was elected president of the prestigious African Union Commission. The country also registered a diplomatic success in the year 2003 with the liberation of 14 European hostages held in Kidal (southern Sahara) by the Muslim GSPC (Salafist Group for Combat and Predication) rebel group. The onslaught of Malian migrants from Côte d'Ivoire fleeing the civil war caused a significant reduction in financial transfers across the border and a critical drop in revenues from national activities transiting through the port of Abidjan.

SEE ALSO: Ghana, Nationalism and Socialist Transition

References and Suggested Readings

- Cervello, M. V. (Ed.) (2007) *Colonisations et héritages actuels au Sahara et au Sahel: problèmes conceptuels, état des lieux et nouvelles perspectives de recherches (XVIII^e–XX^e siècles)*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Cissé, A. (2006) *Mali: une démocratie à refonder*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Davidson, B. (1966) *A History of West Africa to the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Diagouraga, M. (2005) *Modibo Keita: un destin*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Konaté, D. (2006) *Travail de Mémoire et Construction Nationale au Mali*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Malta, protest and revolution

Emanuel Buttigieg

The history of protest and revolt in Malta is complex and intriguing, particularly given its small size (the surface area of Malta is only 122 square

miles). Such a varied history is the result of a particular interaction between geography and the actions of people. The Maltese Islands lie right in the center of the Mediterranean Sea, 37 miles to the south of Sicily and 217 miles north of Libya. The major island, Malta, gives its name to the whole of the archipelago, and the word *Malta* is used interchangeably with the phrase *Maltese Islands*. The second island, Gozo, is about a third the size of Malta, and the third island, Comino, is miniscule and practically uninhabited. Though Malta lacks any natural resources, its position at the crossroads of the Mediterranean has always made it the object of interest of the powers that vied for control of this sea.

The Hospitaller Era

Up to 1530 the history of Malta was tied to the history of Sicily. Whoever ruled the biggest island in the Mediterranean generally also ruled Malta. In this way, Sicily and Malta passed through a sequence of Phoenician, Roman, Byzantine, Muslim, Norman, Hohenstaufen, Angevin, and Aragonese administrations, all of which left a deep impact on the ethnic and cultural heritage of these islands. In 1530, through a grant made by Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire, Malta passed under the control of the military-religious Order of Saint John the Baptist of Jerusalem, whose members were also known as the Hospitallers. This order originated in the Holy Land in the eleventh century as an organization dedicated to the care of the poor and sick pilgrims who arrived from Europe. Gradually, it acquired a military character and alongside the Knights Templar it actively participated in the defense of Jerusalem to prevent it from reverting to Muslim control. When the whole of the Holy Land was lost during the late thirteenth century, the Hospitallers moved first to Cyprus and then to Rhodes, from where they maintained their incessant warfare against Islam, and in particular against the Ottoman Empire. It took all the might that Suleiman the Magnificent could muster to dislodge the Hospitallers from Rhodes in 1523.

The Hospitallers then used Malta as their headquarters from 1530 to 1798. This was a golden age for Malta, during which there was an open exchange of people, money, and ideas, making its harbor cities among the most cosmopolitan in the Mediterranean. Politically, the

islands were independent of Sicily, although the economic, social, and religious ties remained strong.

When the Hospitallers first arrived in Malta, the only maritime settlement was Birgu, which was protected by a small castle. The Hospitallers established themselves in Birgu and by the time of the 1565 Ottoman siege they had developed another city, Senglea, next to Birgu and built a fortress at the harbor's entrance. Immediately after the 1565 siege, in which the Hospitallers were victorious, the city of Valletta was developed over the years, and the rest of the harbor was built up and transformed. The presence of the rich, famous, and multi-ethnic Order of Saint John in Malta spearheaded dramatic economic, social, and cultural changes, which by 1798 had transformed Malta from an underdeveloped peripheral entity of the Sicilian crown into a significant Mediterranean maritime power.

Malta in early modern times was the site of some of the most varied and engaging acts of protest and revolt. From the 1540s to the 1580s Protestant doctrines made their way into Malta and established a following among the urban educated Maltese and among some of the Hospitallers. The establishment of the Roman Inquisition in Malta until 1798 clamped down this trickle of religious protest. Nonetheless, people, both high and low, often swerved from the official religious establishment to follow their own beliefs.

Throughout this period, clashes within the Order of Saint John were common. However, an internal revolt in 1580–2 threatened to break the order apart. The spark was the decision in 1580 by the Grand Master Jean Levesque de La Cassiere to expel all prostitutes from Valletta, to the great indignation of many Hospitallers (who were religious knights bound by the vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience). A group of rebellious Hospitallers held a council in which they deposed the Grand Master and elected the Hospitaller Romegas as lieutenant of the order. La Cassiere, escorted by jeering Hospitallers and prostitutes, was removed from his palace to the fortress of Saint Angelo for safekeeping.

La Cassiere still held the loyalty of many Hospitallers, who offered their arms to restore his power. However, fearing a fratricidal bloodbath, La Cassiere refused such assistance and instead relied upon the pope (the ultimate head of the

Order) to restore his power. The pope summoned both La Cassiere and Romegas to Rome, where he restored La Cassiere to his authority and reprimanded Romegas and the other conspirators. Though the overt cause of this revolt was the expulsion of prostitutes, there were deeper motives. The old age and excellent state of health of Grand Master La Cassiere constituted a significant obstacle to the aims and aspirations of some of the conspirators. Eager for office and power, some of the members of the Order desired to rid themselves of La Cassiere to advance their own careers. Even Romegas was in fact manipulated and used by others to obtain their ends. Both La Cassiere and Romegas died while still in Rome, which allowed the Order to start afresh.

The 1630s were a turbulent period. The Order's plans to extend Maltese fortifications necessitated increases in taxes. These taxes were to be levied on everyone, including traditionally exempt clerical estates. Malta was seething with unrest. Father Filippo Borg, a spokesperson against the violation of the rights of the Maltese by the Order and an admirer of Callus, is representative of the sentiments of the age. In the mid-1630s he established a chapter of canons for his parish of Birkirkara, a subtle move pregnant with political meaning that aroused the anger of the Grand Master. In 1636 the clerical establishment in Malta filed a protest in Rome against the new taxes. In 1637 an attempt to collect these taxes met violent resistance in the villages. In 1638 a memorial was presented to the king of Spain in the name of the Maltese inhabitants, in which the Grand Master was accused of misgovernment. In the end, the original tax proposal was amended to one that was less onerous and more acceptable to all parties.

In 1639 it was the Hospitallers' turn, particularly the younger ones, to revolt against Grand Master Jean Paul Lascaris Castellar's injunctions against balls and masquerades during Carnival. These restrictive measures were deemed a result of Jesuit influence over the Grand Master. A number of Hospitallers mocked the Jesuits, and when Lascaris arrested them, a revolt broke out in which the Jesuits' college was attacked and they were temporarily forced to leave the island.

Various forms of protests and revolts also characterized the eighteenth century. These included the spread of the Church-condemned

Masonic lodges among the Maltese elites and some Hospitallers, subtle criticisms embedded in the printed material of the age, and revolts or attempted revolts.

An infamous attempt at revolt was that of the slaves in 1749. Slavery was common throughout the Mediterranean, with Christians and Muslims preying on each other's shipping and lands. In 1749 the Muslim slaves in Malta prepared to murder the Grand Master and take over the island through an ingenious plan, which included a Muslim navy ready to invade at the appropriate time. However, their plans were foiled when a Christian Jew, Giuseppe Cohen, overheard them and reported everything to Grand Master Manoel Pinto de Fonseca. The Grand Master had all the conspirators punished and gave Cohen a reward.

As for the people of Malta, their champions at the end of the eighteenth century were the priest Gaetano Mannarino and the scholar Michele Antonio Vassalli. In 1775 Father Mannarino, together with other priests and lay people, led a revolt against the Order in which they managed to take control of two fortresses inside Valletta and raise a flag bearing the image of Malta's patron saint, St. Paul. Their grievances concerned taxation levels, the high price of basic foodstuffs, and disrespect for the rights of the Maltese. Despite initial success, the show of popular support that Father Mannarino had hoped for did not materialize, and the Hospitallers soon overpowered them. The rebels were punished, and Father Mannarino languished in prison until the French freed him after conquering Malta. Vassalli, an intellectual and patriot, was one of the first advocates of the use of Maltese as the national language. He also put forward proposals for an extensive system of primary education and for structural reforms in the way the Order functioned. In 1797 he was involved in a failed conspiracy against the Order, found guilty, and sent to prison until, like Father Mannarino, the French liberated him.

French Rule

The Hospitallers' rule in Malta reached an abrupt end on June 9, 1798 when the French force that had been assembled to attack Egypt appeared off the shores of Malta. Three days later, due to carefully constructed plans and Maltese collaborators, Napoleon Bonaparte was master of

the islands, and the Hospitallers had to leave in a hurried and humiliating manner. Napoleon stayed in Malta briefly, during which he overhauled the administrative system of the islands and introduced the revolutionary principles of republican France.

The rapid pace with which the political and economic structures of Malta were changed, and the attack on the Maltese way of life, particularly the looting of churches and disregard for the population's Catholic faith, led to an outbreak of a major and widespread revolt on September 2, 1798. Signs of restlessness had been evident almost from the very start of French rule, when, as had happened during the times of the Hospitallers, placards, papers, and graffiti appeared on the walls of Valletta criticizing the French. One such placard, pinned to the very Tree of Liberty which had been used by the French to commemorate the fall of the Bastille, read, "Tree without fruit, cap without head, little time is left for you to reign." This warning proved to be an omen. By September 3, 1798 the French had lost control of the entire island, except for the fortified harbor cities to which they retired for protection. On the top of the walls of the old capital city of Mdina, from where the Maltese insurrection had begun, a white and red Maltese flag was raised in place of the French tricolor.

The Maltese in the countryside organized themselves in a representative national assembly and sought international aid to effectively blockade and defeat the French. The national assembly sought and gained the protection of the pro-British king, Ferdinand IV of Naples and Sicily, as well as the assistance of British Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson. Underground contacts between the Maltese outside and inside French occupied cities were maintained, and under the leadership of the priest Mikiel Scerri, a detailed conspiracy was prepared by which the French would have been ousted from the cities as well. However, the conspiracy was foiled by the French, Father Scerri and the other rebels were apprehended, and some, including Father Scerri, were executed in January 1799. Despite the failure of this revolt, Father Scerri and his contemporaries captured the imagination and gratitude of subsequent generations of Maltese, and gained for themselves a place among the heroes of Malta. Two months before this episode, the island of Gozo had been liberated from its French garrison through British assistance. By

September 1799 the French had to capitulate, thereby ending French rule.

British Rule

In turn, this ushered in 164 years of British colonialism (1800–1964). Again, this was a period of dramatic social, economic, and cultural change, during which Malta's remaining links with Sicily were severed and various forms of protest and revolt followed each other with rapidity.

The British forces in Malta had negotiated the terms of the capitulation of the French and the signatories to it were the French and the British. Maltese leaders were left out. Despite the protests of the Maltese elected leaders at being excluded, their voices were hardly heard in the international situation of 1800 to 1815, dominated as it was by the British-French struggle for power. Slowly, Malta slid to the status of a British fortress colony, recognized as such by the 1815 Treaty of Vienna. Nevertheless, the Maltese were not silent, presenting a "Declaration of Rights of the Inhabitants of the Islands of Malta and Gozo" to the British government. This declaration, an eloquent synthesis of the right of self-determination of peoples, stands as a monument to the high values and aspirations of the Maltese at the turn of the nineteenth century. It did not stop the British government from treating Malta like a conquered territory, but it harbored the seed of Maltese aspirations.

The Maltese British colonial experience was characterized by an incessant struggle for the attainment of a constitution and representative government. The local elites used their culture as a shield to withstand the Anglicization of Maltese society. Gradually, a new pro-British elite arose that espoused the use of the English language as the medium of modernity against Italian, which was the language of the past. In the midst of this cultural nationalist battle, which is generally known as the Language Question, the Maltese vernacular gradually grew in importance and recognition to find its niche as the national language of Malta. It was along these linguistic lines that Maltese political parties emerged and developed from the 1880s. The British, having observed the insurrection against the French, learnt an important lesson: if they were to control Malta effectively, they had to respect the Catholic establishment therein. Though the lower

clergy always remained diffident of the British because of their Anglican religion, the upper ranks were generally supportive of the British, and under British rule the Maltese Church increased in power and status like never before.

In broad terms, protest and revolt occurred in British Malta within this setting. In this struggle for Maltese rights, many leaders came to the fore. In the 1830s Giorgio Mitrovich voiced the wish of the Maltese for a free press and an elected assembly. Freedom of the press was gained in 1839, and from then onward Maltese journalism flourished as a source through which the protests of the Maltese could be vindicated. Throughout much of the nineteenth century a particular impetus for the development of the press originated in the flow of political exiles to Malta from Italy, as that country was caught in the turmoil of the unification struggle.

The 1880s and 1890s were particularly tense, as the Language Question reached an acute peak, and as a new complicating factor, the Marriage Question, entered the scene. This latter issue concerned the validity of interfaith marriages in Malta, and British attempts to introduce civil marriage. Similar to the situation at the time of the French, an attempted transformation of Maltese society from the outside was not welcomed. The dominant Maltese politicians of the time were Sigismondo Savona, Fortunato Mizzi, and Gerald Strickland. Savona, pro-British, and Mizzi, pro-Italian, temporarily joined forces against Strickland, who, being half-British and half-Maltese, embodied the idea of British colonialism as a progressive force.

Massive anti-British demonstrations occurred in the early 1890s, and on May 6, 1891 blood was spilled when demonstrators clashed with police. Though no one was killed, many were injured. The *Sei Maggio*, as this event came to be known, further crystallized Maltese resistance to Britain and to Strickland's Anglicizing policies. The union between Savona and Mizzi, however, soon gave way and they went their separate ways in opposing British rule. Around this time, a new name came to the fore, Manwel Dimech. He equated the use of the Maltese language with nationalism, attacked British colonialism, espoused Maltese independence and the rights of women, criticized the Catholic Church for keeping the masses in subservience, and began to muster a following among the working classes. However, with World War I looming, the British could not allow

such sedition to continue in a fortress colony like Malta. The British exiled Dimech, already excommunicated by the Church, to Egypt, where he died. For long an unsung hero, modern scholars have rehabilitated Dimech's character and role in Malta's nationalistic movement.

Maltese political leaders continued in their protests to gain responsible government. In 1918 they appealed to US President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" in support of their demands. The war's end meant a reduction of British military expenditure, which led to a rise in unemployment. Coupled with the high prices of basic foodstuffs, the discontent of the political classes merged with that of the masses. University students were the first to take to the streets of Valletta in protest. On June 7, 1919, while Maltese politicians gathered to discuss what their next move should be, a popular revolt broke out in Valletta. Millers, bakers, Union Jacks, and pro-British institutions and individuals came under attack. British troops had to be called in to restore order, as the Maltese police refrained from controlling their co-nationals. Soldiers opened fire and over the course of two days at least six people were killed and dozens more wounded. This event, the *Sette Giugno*, sealed in blood the aspirations of Maltese nationalism and it led in 1921 to the granting of a constitution under which elected Maltese politicians were responsible for the internal affairs of Malta.

During the interwar period, Malta was self-governing. Elections were held regularly, even though the franchise was still a limited one. However, by 1932 this constitution had collapsed. Its demise was caused by the persistence of the Language Question, an open conflict between Strickland's Constitutional Party and the nascent Labor Party on the one hand, and the Catholic Church on the other, and the increasingly tense international situation, where the rise of Fascism in Italy was becoming more and more threatening to the British presence in Malta and the Mediterranean. With the outbreak of World War II a number of Maltese considered pro-Italian (and therefore, in those circumstances, seen as pro-Fascist) were exiled to Uganda.

During World War II many Maltese served in the British armed forces and Malta itself had to suffer incessant bombardments, making it the single most bombarded place throughout the

whole war, in terms of bomb tonnage dropped. After the war ended, Britain was exhausted and its place as a major world power had slipped into the hands of the United States and Soviet Union. The process of decolonization began with the granting of independence to India in 1947.

Independence

Similar to Britain, the Labor Party in Malta emerged as the dominant force in postwar politics. The heritage from which the Labor Party rose was a pro-British one. The rising star within the Labor Party was Dominic Mintoff, who, after his party had won a landslide victory in the 1947 general election, ended up splitting the party in a power struggle with the leader, Paul Boffa. Whereas the Nationalist Party, led by Nerik Mizzi (son of Fortunato Mizzi), came to advocate independence from Britain, the Labor Party under Mintoff advocated a policy of Integration, making Malta an integral part of the United Kingdom. It was on this Integration platform that Mintoff won the 1955 election. However, when this scheme had collapsed three years later, popular revolts once again swept across Malta.

The split within the Labor Party and its clash with the Church assured that the Nationalist Party would return to office. Under the leadership of Prime Minister George Borg Olivier, Malta became independent on September 21, 1964. This created a new set of logistics within which the people of Malta had to work and strive to secure their well-being and prosperity. The mid-1970s to mid-1980s were characterized by widespread protests against the increasingly despotic Mintoff (who returned to office in 1971). At a time when the credentials of Maltese democracy were in the balance, popular agitation and political acumen assured a mostly peaceful transition of power from the Labor Party to the Nationalist Party. The major question of the 1990s concerned whether or not Malta should join the European Union, the governing Nationalist Party being in favor and the opposition Labor Party being against. This question seeped into every level of Maltese society and stirred deep and sincere passions that saw some of the biggest demonstrations ever recorded. By means of a referendum and a general election, most voted for membership in the European Union on May 1, 2004.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); French Revolution, 1789–1794; Imperialism, Historical Evolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Abulafia, D. (Ed.) (2003) *The Mediterranean in History*. London: Thames & Hudson.
- Cassar, C. (2000) *A Concise History of Malta*. Malta: Mireva Publications.
- Fenech, D. (2005) *Responsibility and Power in Inter-War Malta: Endemic Democracy, 1919–1930*. Malta: Publishing Enterprises Group.
- Frendo, H. (1989) *Malta's Quest for Independence: Reflections on the Course of Maltese History*. Malta: Valletta Publishing.
- Gambin, K. (Ed.) (2004) *Malta: Roots of a Nation – The Development of Malta from an Island People to an Island Nation*. Malta: Heritage Malta.
- Horder, P. & Purcell, N. (2000) *The Corrupting Sea: A Study of the Mediterranean in History*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Mallia-Milanes, V. (Ed.) (1988) *The British Colonial Experience 1800–1964: The Impact on Maltese Society*. Malta: Mireva Publications.
- Mallia-Milanes, V. (1993) *Hospitaller Malta, 1530–1798: Studies on Early Modern Malta and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem*. Malta: Mireva Publications.
- Sire, H. J. A. (1994) *The Knights of Malta*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Testa, C. (1997) *The French in Malta, 1798–1800*. Malta: Midsea Books.
- Wettinger, G. (1974) Early Maltese Popular Attitudes to the Government of the Order of St. John. *Melita Historica* 6, 3: 255–78.
- Wettinger, G. (1978) The Pawning of Malta to Monroy. *Melita Historica* 7, 3: 265–83.
- Zammit, W. (2002) The Communicative Role of Visual Media in Malta, 1700–98. In T. Cortis, T. Freller, & L. Bugeja (Eds.), *Melitensium Amor: Festschrift in Honour of Dun Gwann Azzopardi*. Malta: Outlook Coop.

Mandel, Ernest (1923–1995)

David Michael Smith

Born in Belgium, Ernest Mandel became a revolutionary Marxist as a teenager during World War II and participated in the resistance to the Nazi occupation. In the decades following the end of the war Mandel became one of the most prominent intellectual and political leaders of contemporary Trotskyism. The publication of

Marxist Economic Theory (1968), *Late Capitalism* (1975), and *Long Waves of Capitalist Development* (1980) established his reputation as one of the world's foremost Marxist economists. In addition, Mandel developed a powerful critique of reformist strategies for socialism and defended the revolutionary Marxist political aims of smashing the capitalist state and creating a dictatorship of the proletariat in *From Stalinism to Eurocommunism* (1978), *Revolutionary Marxism Today* (1979), and *Power and Money* (1992). Mandel's theoretical contributions and polemics on the question of socialist transformation in the advanced capitalist societies arguably constitute the most compelling defense of the Marxist case for revolution to appear in the past half-century.

Throughout his career Mandel harshly criticized the authoritarianism, bureaucracy, and repression that had come to be associated with Marxist-Leninist regimes. But while Mandel considered existing workers' states to be deformed, he nonetheless recognized many of their economic and social achievements, and he argued that the promise of socialism would be redeemed by the workers of the world through the retrieval and renewal of the main principles of revolutionary Marxism.

Mandel acknowledged that Lenin's and Trotsky's support for the banning of other political parties and intra-party factions in 1920–1 contributed to the growing bureaucratic degeneration of the first workers' state. But Mandel argued that this momentous mistake must be analyzed in the context of the extraordinary economic and social crisis faced by the communists in the wake of the civil war. Mandel pointed out that Lenin himself came to recognize the growing problems of bureaucracy before his death in 1924. And Mandel emphasized that by the mid-1930s Trotsky had significantly modified his earlier views, embracing not only the exercise of power by workers' councils but also the imperative need for political pluralism and the defense of civic freedoms in socialist society. For Mandel, the historical experiences of twentieth-century communist regimes point to the need for revolutionary movements to reclaim workers' democracy as the heart of the socialist project – but not to any justification for abandoning a revolutionary strategy for fundamental social change.

Mandel energetically defended smashing the capitalist state as an indispensable strategic objective of a revolutionary workers' movement.

Like Marx, Engels, and Lenin, Mandel conceived of the dismantling of the various structures and institutions of the capitalist state as a profoundly and genuinely democratic process involving the masses of workers – and an essential prerequisite for socialist advance. And Mandel contended that not even the capture of parliament by a socialist party or coalition would eliminate the imperative need for the masses of workers to undertake extra-constitutional and insurrectionary actions in their workplaces, in their communities, and in the struggle for state power.

Mandel rejected the view that widespread violence or political repression are inevitable outcomes of revolutions, and he insisted that the defining feature of workers' revolutions in the advanced capitalist countries would be the destruction of the old class power and the creation of a new one – that of the working class. But Mandel argued that the political empowerment of the working class would require the abolition of the bureaucratic, military, police, and judicial institutions of the capitalist state. He emphasized that the most fundamental question in a revolution is which class possesses the general means of coercion, the monopoly of armed force. Mandel believed that the dynamic of class struggle in revolutionary situations will almost inevitably lead to counterrevolutionary violence, and he emphasized the need for the working class to be able to defend itself by armed force and deprive its class enemy of its capacity to do the same. In the tradition of revolutionary Marxism, Mandel believed that when the monopoly of armed force passes from the capitalist state to the new organs of workers' power, the working class will have conquered state power.

Throughout his career Mandel argued that the new workers' state must be a dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship of the proletariat would involve a genuinely revolutionary form of democracy in which the masses of people directly participate in the governance of their workplaces, communities, and societies and develop new forms of delegation and representation to facilitate regional, national, and international cooperation and coordination. Mandel emphasized that the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a dictatorship in the usual sense of the term and argued that proletarian dictatorship should consolidate and deepen all democratic freedoms. Mandel explicitly acknowledged that even bourgeois parties and their supporters should be free

to organize and agitate freely, so long as they do not attempt to use violence to restore capitalist property relations. Nonetheless, the capacity of the working class to effectively use the general means of coercion to defend the process of socialist transformation would be an essential feature of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Mandel's case for socialist revolution in the advanced capitalist countries has a great deal to be said for it. Mandel effectively retrieved and illuminated the radical democratic content of the revolutionary Marxist commitments to smashing the capitalist state and creating the dictatorship. In so doing, Mandel articulated a strategy for socialist transformation that would be both unabashedly revolutionary and unmistakably democratic. For many contemporary Marxists and revolutionary socialists, a strategy informed by Mandel's insistence on the centrality of workers' councils and extra-constitutional political action against capital and its state offers far greater chances of success than a strategy which confines workers' struggles within existing constitutional limits.

SEE ALSO: Dictatorship of the Proletariat; Marxism

References and Suggested Readings

- Mandel, E. (1968) *Marxist Economic Theory*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Mandel, E. (1975) *Late Capitalism*. London: New Left Books.
- Mandel, E. (1978) *From Stalinism to Eurocommunism*. London: New Left Books.
- Mandel, E. (1979) *Revolutionary Marxism Today*. London: New Left Books.
- Mandel, E. (1980) *Long Waves of Capitalist Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mandel, E. (1992) *Power and Money*. London: Verso.

Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918)

Luli Callinicos


Nelson Mandela has become the icon of South Africa's successful transition to a political democracy. A leading figure in the African National Congress (ANC), imprisoned for a quarter of a century on Robben Island, and the first president of a democratic South Africa beginning in 1994, Mandela has become the symbol and its lodestar of the struggle against apartheid.

Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela was born in 1918 in the small village of Mvezo in Thembuland to the local chief, Gadla Henry Mphakanyiswa, and his third wife, Nonqaphi Nosekeni Nkedama. The kingdom had been annexed by the British within living memory, 40 years earlier, after a century of struggle to defend the land against British settlers. The child was named Rolihlala – “pulling the branch of a tree,” a metaphor for disturbing the established order. The name was significant; Gadla lost his position and the government stipend that went with it when he refused to account to the local British magistrate for his ruling in a dispute in Mvezo over cattle. He was pointedly demonstrating that his accountability lay not with the colonial administration but elsewhere – according to an African maxim, “a chief is a chief by the people.”

The family was obliged to leave Mvezo. They moved to the district of Qunu, the home of Rolihlahla's mother. The boy took on herding duties at a young age: cattle were central to the economy of the homestead, and children were active contributors. During the long hours in the *veld*, the boys whiled away their time with stick-fighting. In these contests of strength, endurance, dexterity, and tactical sense, Mandela recalled, years later, that he absorbed values vital to the resolution of the struggles that lay ahead. “I learned that to humiliate another person is to make him suffer an unnecessarily cruel fate. Even as a boy, I defeated my opponents without dishonoring them.”

Nosekeni, his mother, was a Christian, and she and her husband agreed that their children should attend the local Methodist school, a wattle-and-daub hut. It was there that the child was given a new name, and a colonial identity. The boy's teacher, Miss Mdingane, selected for him an upright English name, and so the child came to be known as Nelson, after the great British naval hero.

Within a few years, Gadla died of tuberculosis. He had been a valued counselor to the regent Jogintaba of the Thembu, and after his death the regent adopted his mentor's youngest son, Rolihlahla. The child had to leave his mother and his extended family and live at the “Great Place” – the royal court. This also left a profound imprint: looking back, while acknowledging its gender exclusiveness, Mandela remembered the regent's council meetings as a place where “everyone was heard: chief and subject, warrior



After 50 years of struggle against apartheid in South Africa, and nearly 20 years in prison for fighting to end racial oppression, Nelson Mandela was elected president of South Africa in 1994, a year after being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Here he is pictured with F. W. de Klerk saluting the crowds in Pretoria on his inauguration day. (Photo © Juda Ngwenya/REUTERS)

and medicine man, shopkeeper and farmer, landowner and laborer . . . democracy in its purest form.” He was struck by the councilors’ “freedom to criticize the regent” – “wise men who retained the knowledge of tribal history and custom” – and by the regent’s duty to listen carefully, not speaking until the end, summing up what had been said, and suggesting a consensus for all the diverse opinions. The regent became for Mandela an exemplar – a man of insight, dignity, integrity, and compassion, committed to genuine consensus, yet ultimately not afraid to lead.

Mandela was sent to a Methodist missionary school, Clarkebury, as befitted a child of distinguished lineage, together with the son of the regent, Justice. It was here he first encountered whites, and was introduced to Christianity and western education. In later years, he was to put the accouterments of the ruling class to good use in the service of his people. Like so many other young men, Mandela had to master literature and math, and tussle with an alien moral code imposed by missionary teachers. In the process, he was learning to negotiate the relationship

between tradition and modernity. To please his benefactor, he worked conscientiously and made good progress at school, graduating to an even more prestigious school, Healdtown. Here too, while appreciating the skills that he learned and the widening of his world beyond Thembuland, he was later to believe that his education had “often required subservience” and a negation of his own traditions.

Like Oliver Tambo – the ANC leader who would become his close friend and comrade – Mandela studied at the black Fort Hare University. His social and intellectual horizons rapidly expanded. He met young black people from many parts of South and Southern Africa, and began to develop an awareness of black society beyond the traditional and ethnic horizons of his youth. He began to rethink the regent’s plan for him to become a counselor to King Sabata, at the time still a child. Elected as a student leader, he clashed openly with authority. In his final year, he decided along with his peers to boycott university procedures in protest against the poor food meted out in the residences. The authorities gave him an ultimatum to abide by the rules or leave.

He left, and returned home. The regent was outraged and decided that the young men needed to grow up, arranging marriages for both Justice and Nelson. But the two men had absorbed the western idea of having control over one’s individual fate. They helped themselves to one of the regent’s cows, sold it, and with the proceeds made their way to Johannesburg – the city of gold and destination.

Johannesburg in the 1940s was a symbol of modernity, menacing traffic, and high-rise parallel buildings. It was an urban life that challenged the manhood and dignity of young blacks, whether educated or laborers. Retracing the footsteps of the two newcomers to the city, a hidden history emerges – the third-class train ride and the segregated railway station; the mine compound, each room housing scores of black laborers in cement barracks while white miners enjoyed family homes; downtown black Johannesburg and the bustling Diagonal Street of many colors, scents, and sounds; the mines and their compounds, where he and Justice first found work; crowded black townships with their dirt roads, modest homes, and backyard shacks. There was no escaping the association of technological advancement with white culture yet the

landscape announced a white-dominated and bigoted society, racially unequal in economic and social conditions. The message was clear: black men and women were in town simply to serve the needs of the white population. Whether laborer, teacher, court interpreter, or nurse, the wages of black people scarcely varied – they were one-tenth or less of what most white workers and employees earned.

Into this world Mandela had thrown his lot, for Justice was persuaded to return home and face his destiny. He eventually found a tiny room in Alexandra Township, some 10 kilometers from the city center. With very little money, he would walk there and back. He had met an impressive estate agent, Walter Sisulu, a man without much formal education but far ahead of the university-educated tiny elite in both life experience and maturity. It was Sisulu who introduced Mandela to a widening circle of remarkable people managing to rise above the system of racial oppression, and thinking about social change and how best to achieve it for black communities. One of these was Oliver Tambo, a mathematics and physics master at the prestigious St. Peter's College in Johannesburg, also expelled from Fort Hare on a point of principle during his year of training for a teachers' diploma. Mandela also met the president of the ANC, the renowned Dr. Xuma (who had also attended Clarkebury).

With Sisulu, Tambo, and others, Mandela began to seriously discuss how the ANC – a respected movement founded in 1912 to unite and advance all African ethnic groups – could again take up the leadership of the struggle. The three friends – along with the brilliant and fiery articulated clerk and fellow Fort Hare graduate A. P. Mda and Anton Lembede – started the Youth League as a “ginger group” to stimulate the almost moribund ANC. The group attended the ANC Congress in 1944 and formed the ANC's Youth League. Its guiding ideology was then resolute Africanism, rejecting “exotic revolutionary doctrines” like Marxism (a European import whose basic notion of class struggle did not, they agreed, address race struggles and was therefore irrelevant). They were, however, interested in learning from the strategies and tactics of other organizations, including strikes, boycotts, and civil disobedience, and developed a Programme of Action that advocated a shift away from the ANC's stress on petitions to the

authorities to mass-based protest campaigns and actions.

The racially exclusive elections of 1948 heralded the victory by a slim majority of the National Party on a platform of apartheid. Building on the policies of the earlier colonial era, the apartheid regime launched a barrage of discriminatory new legislation tightening up segregation and enforcing the racial order. The internal passport system, or pass laws controlling the movement of black labor, was tightened; black workers were officially excluded from skilled jobs, oscillating migrant labor was encouraged (with families left in the rural areas); and in the city too, other daily hardships of blacks increased dramatically.

Encouraged and assisted by Sisulu, Mandela (studying at the white University of the Witwatersrand) found work as a legal clerk for a sympathetic lawyer, Lazar Sidelsky. Later he was articulated, and eventually qualified as an attorney. His intention was to use his legal training as a weapon to defend his people. He set up a law firm and was joined by Tambo, who had in the meantime also qualified as an attorney. From the start, their chambers were crowded with men and women in deep trouble, desperately seeking help from black lawyers who, it seemed, were better able to understand their predicament – facing evictions as a result of racial zoning, arrest under the pass laws (later extended to African women), endless petty discrimination, school segregation, and arrest for any number of regulations while they were going about their daily business. Convicted offenders faced the prospect of being sent to work under harsh conditions on white-owned farms. Soon, the partners had to engage clerks to assist them, and their courtroom battles often included instances of blatant racism by the magistrates against the attorneys themselves.

In the meantime, the ANC had adopted the Youth League's Programme of Action in 1949. The ANC embarked on a Defiance Campaign in 1952, in collaboration with members of the Indian Congress such as Maulvi Cachalia, Nana Sita, and Dr. G. M. Naicker. The campaign was a turning point in many ways. For the first time, the ANC worked in a multiracial alliance, and Mandela and Tambo were impressed with the non-racial, personal commitment displayed by communists. These Youth League leaders were now finding themselves in more responsible, national positions and exposed to a wider world.

Sisulu had been elected national secretary of the ANC, Tambo was the Youth League vice-president, while Mandela replaced the banned J. B. Marks as provincial president of the ANC in the old Transvaal and was also national president of the Youth League.

Mandela became “volunteer-in-chief” in the Defiance Campaign, traveling across the country urging people to defy “Six Unjust Laws”: separate and unequal public amenities, pass laws, disenfranchisement, and the Bantu Authorities Act that divided the country into tribal enclaves and left 87 percent of the land under white control. “Defiers” joined up and, moving in groups, embarked on acts of civil disobedience: they sat on whites-only park benches and entered stations or post offices through the whites-only entrances; white defiers walked into black townships; thousands were arrested, clogging up the prisons.

The apartheid government reacted with increasing repression. Following a riot, 20 African and Indian leaders, including Mandela, were arrested and convicted under the Suppression of Communism Act, and sentenced to nine months’ hard labor. This was followed by a barrage of banning orders – the “banned” were forbidden to attend “social gatherings” (defined as more than two people), make speeches, or be members of a political party. “I was made by the law a criminal,” commented Mandela, “not because of what I had done, but because of what I stood for, because of what I thought, because of my conscience.” His banning order forced him to withdraw overtly from the ANC, but he continued behind the scenes to participate in the planning of the campaigns that followed. The regime meanwhile intensified its program of implementing its apartheid design. In 1953 a Bantu Education Bill was introduced and eventually passed. Its purpose was to provide separate and inferior schools and curricula in the townships for black children, forbidding the churches or independent organizations to participate in black education.

What emerged was the Freedom Charter, a document which was to define the identity of the ANC. In his trial in 1962, Mandela called it “the most important political document published by the ANC. . . . It declares that South Africa belongs to all who live in it and that only a democratic state based on the will of the people can secure to all their birthright.” The Freedom Charter was formally adopted after it

was presented to the Congress of the People in 1955 in Kliptown, Soweto. The ANC now led a multiclass and multiracial alliance consisting of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the South African Indian Congress, the Colored People’s Congress, and the small white Congress of Democrats – the “Congress Alliance.”

In December 1956, Mandela, like Tambo, Sisulu, and communist leader Joe Slovo, was one of 156 men and women arrested and charged with high treason. He remained one of the accused after charges were withdrawn against 97 of the accused one year later. The treason trial dragged on until 1961, when all were acquitted. By then, momentous events had occurred. Sixty-seven people were shot outside the Sharpeville police station during a peaceful protest organized by a new breakaway movement opposed to the Freedom Charter – the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). Led by Robert Sobukwe, the PAC was hostile to communists, whites, and Indians and took its stand on the Africanism of the early Youth League. The massacre – followed by a second at Langa – resulted in the banning of the ANC and PAC, and the declaration of a state of emergency. Thousands of opponents were locked up without trial for five months, including Mandela. When they were released, most were banned or banished to remote rural areas, or served with house arrests.

The ANC was now an underground organization. Tambo was sent into exile to become the ANC’s international diplomat, while Mandela took up the baton internally. It was he who initiated a call for an “All-in African Conference.” The aim was to unite the oppressed and find a way forward. In March 1961, an audience of 1,400 people gathered in a small township in Pietermaritzburg, Natal. Giving the security police the slip, Mandela made a surprise appearance. After his speech to the assembly, he proposed a resolution to call for a national convention of all adult men and women, irrespective of race, color, or creed. A National Action Council was formed, and Mandela was elected its secretary.

In this capacity, Mandela called for a three-day stayaway at the end of May, to coincide with the white Republic Day celebrations. He had developed masterful public relations – he would telephone editors of the white newspapers to make public announcements from call boxes. Jittery, the government responded by mobilizing citizen forces and commando units in a huge military

operation. Police patrolled the township streets and helicopters hovered above. Black workers were warned that if they stayed away from work they would be fired and forced out of the towns. The white newspapers, the Liberal Party, and the PAC opposed the stayaway.

The general strike was by no means a failure: in Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth (the most politicized cities of South Africa) the majority of workers responded to the call; however, the ANC and the underground South African Communist Party (SACP) leadership came to a consensus that any further strikes would inevitably lead to massive clampdowns and violence. A decision was taken to opt for armed struggle. The proposal was nothing new, and had been discussed in 1958 as a possible option when peaceful tactics were exhausted.

At its inception, the newly formed *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (the “Spear of the Nation,” or MK) abjured the taking of life and opted for symbolic targets – the sabotage of sites and equipment accompanied by a call for economic sanctions. In short, MK was conceived as a weapon of “armed propaganda.” It was multiracial in composition, and its leaders included senior ANC and SACP figures. On December 16, 1961, Mandela, as supreme commander of MK, publicly announced its formation. “One of the lessons I learned from the failed Western Areas anti-removal campaign was that it is the oppressor who defines the nature of the struggle; in the end, we would have no alternative but to resort to armed struggle.”

Mandela was fast becoming an international figure. The BBC was excited to be able to report a telephone conversation with the elusive “Black Pimpernel.” In 1961, Mandela gave his first television interview to ITN – it was to be his last for 30 years. Early in 1962, Mandela left South Africa illegally. His purpose was to raise support for MK amongst the newly independent African states, and explain to the external wing of the ANC the decision to take up arms. With Tambo, he toured African countries and received some military training. Shortly after his return, on his way home after reporting to Chief Luthuli, president of the ANC and 1961 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Mandela was apprehended and put on trial. He was charged with incitement and leaving the country illegally.

On the first day of the trial, he stunned the court and the audience by exchanging his

customary three-piece suits for a traditional leopard-skin *kaross*. “I was a black African walking into a white man’s court. I was literally carrying on my back the history, culture and heritage of my people. That day, I felt myself to be the embodiment of African nationalism.” In court, his wife Winnie Madikizela Mandela and friend Albertina Sisulu also arrived wearing traditional dress. It was a clear statement of the nationalist nature of the accused’s revolutionary intent. At the start of the trial, Mandela, conducting his own defense, began by challenging the right of a white magistrate and prosecutor to judge the right of a black man to resist racial oppression and exploitation. At the end of the trial, found guilty of the charges, Mandela gave what was supposed to be a plea in mitigation but amounted to a political testament. In particular, he recalled, with the pain and nostalgia of a world that had been cruelly smashed, the functioning homestead economies, the importance of humanism (*ubuntu*) in social relations, the perceived collective values and the participatory democracy of precolonial South African societies. He was given the heaviest sentence yet for a political offense – five years’ hard labor without parole.

Less than two years later, the remaining underground leadership of MK was uncovered in a hideout on a small farm outside Johannesburg. The 1963 arrests netted most of the MK high command, and Mandela was among those charged with 222 acts of sabotage and conspiracy to facilitate a violent revolution. The charge carried with it a death sentence and reverberated worldwide. Mandela’s statement, when it came, was directed as much to South Africans and the international community as to the court. In the context of a world deeply embroiled in the Cold War, Mandela explained why the ANC, a national organization, had so readily worked in alliance with communists. At the end of his four-hour testimony, he put down his papers and faced the judge. He spoke from memory:

During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

The accused were surprised and delighted to receive a sentence not of death, but rather life with no parole. The next morning, all (except Denis Goldberg, the only remaining white accused, who was incarcerated in Pretoria) were flown to Robben Island to begin their sentence. Desmond Tutu was to write that “People might think that twenty-seven years in goal was an utter waste, but I beg to differ. That time was actually crucial in the evolution of a moral giant.” Mandela would spend a further quarter of a century in prison. Fortunate not to be separated, the Rivonia leaders formed a group and began the long process of negotiating with their jailers the terms of life in prison. Their strategy combined an uncompromising insistence on dignity with a willingness to respect their jailers as human beings. Their consistent and focused resistance eventually paid off: some of the more brutal warders were phased out, and the prisoners won small victories that made life more bearable and dignified. Mandela later recalled that his anger lasted for 14 years, which coincided with the most vicious years on Robben Island. After that, he began to reflect and develop a more creative, problem-solving approach.

The leadership continued to build the ANC within South Africa as much as possible. They were also able to find ways of communicating (albeit unevenly) with the exile movement headed by Tambo. As the years went by, thousands more political prisoners joined them: they brought with them news of the escalating conflict and the increasing use of violence and torture to contain the liberation movements, and they were in turn exposed on the Island to the elder “statesmen” of the movement, men of increasingly legendary stature. After the Soweto uprising of 1976, militant young people began to arrive and challenged the quiet diplomacy of their parents’ generation. As prisoners served their terms, they left with formal distance-learning qualifications, as well as in-house courses on political education. Many were released, only to take up the struggle again underground or in exile, where thousands of political refugees ended up in the ANC’s camps.

The apartheid regime also recognized that Mandela was the indisputable ANC leader – in style, confidence, and shrewdness – and realized the political risk of his dying in prison. Following a brief stint in a hospital on the mainland, Mandela was not returned to Robben

Island but sent to Pollsmoor Prison, outside Cape Town. It seemed clear to Mandela that this was a ploy to isolate him in the hopes of influencing him; however, a plan had slowly been developing in Mandela’s mind: his years in prison gave him time to reflect on the fears and anxieties of the whites that helped underpin apartheid. In the mid-1980s, he decided to take upon himself the responsibility and the risk of opening communications with P. W. Botha, prime minister and president of South Africa. This would help open the negotiations that would eventually end apartheid.

Mandela overcame the suspicions of those militants who feared that in his long incarceration he had succumbed to “the enemy.” Such qualms had to be seen in the context of escalation of resistance and violent reaction in the townships. However, Tambo – who managed to stay in contact with Mandela – ascertained Mandela’s strategic thinking, and endorsed it as part of a multiple strategy that did not exclude armed propaganda, mass mobilization, international pressure, and other options. This allayed the fears of many ANC supporters. Finally, in February 1990, in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ANC, the PAC, and the SACP were unbanned.

A week later, Mandela was released. From his first speech as a free man, Mandela’s message was clear: the new South Africa was to be democratic and inclusive of all races. This won over many doubters and he swiftly became an international icon, fêted internationally on his world tours. Yet the country continued to teeter on the edge of civil war. A “third force,” aided by sections of the army and police, was apparently provoking violence, and Mandela accused then-president de Klerk of failing to stop the massacres that were taking place in the townships. Negotiations took place, yet hovered on a knife-edge.

The crisis point came when the widely popular MK commander and secretary of the SACP, Chris Hani, was assassinated outside his home. It was Mandela’s national appeal on television that prevented a bloody uprising, and a renewed determination to push for general elections. A year later, the Mandela-led ANC was able to pull off peaceful elections.

The ANC came to power with over a 60 percent majority. Only too aware of the tragic history of the lurch toward violence following independence in other African countries in the

1960s, the Mandela presidency was accompanied by careful reassurance to the white civil service that their jobs would be protected and that reconciliation would prevail. At the same time, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was appointed in an attempt to heal the traumas of the past. Amnesty was granted, provided that former perpetrators revealed the full truth. A surprising number of witnesses who bared their harrowing experiences to the world forgave their tormentors.

The achievement of the Mandela presidency, often through his personal charisma, was to mobilize many South Africans across class and color. His persuasion of big business to buy in to the new democracy through individual investments in schools, clinics, and other developmental and social projects, and his enthusiastic endorsement of the white-dominated Springbok rugby team during the 1995 World Cup, are but two examples. In 1996, South Africa's constitution was finally hammered out, a remarkably enlightened document that bore the influence of the Freedom Charter and was a testament to the consensus skills of Mandela and the ANC tradition.

With regard to the economy, the Mandela government began with a Reconstruction and Development Policy (RDP), largely crafted by the ANC's alliance partner, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and influenced by Keynesian ideas. Every government department was to cooperate with a special RDP Ministry to promote redress, economic transformation, and delivery of services. Indeed, the first term of the ANC government delivered 700,000 houses, clean water to millions, clinics, schools, and recreational facilities.

But with the growing grip of neoliberalism in the post-Cold War world, and feeling the generational gap in his understanding of contemporary complexities, Mandela was persuaded by younger economists to stress international investment and liberalization: the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) policy was introduced, and Mandela championed it in the face of trade union opposition. However, GEAR's "trickle-down" approach and privatization policies arguably exacerbated unemployment and the pressures on working-class blacks. Some have also commented that the Mandela presidency failed to recognize and respond adequately to the growing threat of HIV and AIDS. Amongst blacks, too, there was an increasing feeling that whites had got

off too lightly, although the rising crime rate, both in white middle-class suburbs and in the black townships, took their toll.

In 1997 Mandela announced his decision to retire after only one term of office as president of South Africa. This set a new example in the history of liberation leaders in Africa. In his farewell to the ANC Congress, he reaffirmed his commitment to democracy, and promised to speak out as a loyal and ordinary member of the ANC. He was replaced by Thabo Mbeki in 1999, who continued the GEAR policy, stressed "Black Economic Empowerment" to build a black middle class, and centralized state power. Mandela kept his promise and became an outspoken moral symbol. He continued to work for broad, rather than narrow, ownership of South Africa's negotiated revolution; through his Children's Fund he continued to sensitize society to the needs of children and also spoke up against the silence of key ANC figures regarding the scourge of HIV and AIDS. Internationally too, he was free to speak his mind, and was scathing of President Bush when the US invaded Iraq in 2003.

Mandela became an international icon and inspiration in his lifetime. To what extent did he and the ANC achieve a revolution? Mandela himself admitted, on his release, that liberation had come in a drastically circumscribed new world order: "We are living in a world in which the project of revolutionary transformation has become a much more difficult one." His project focused not so much on the socialist class struggle that challenged many revolutionaries of the twentieth century, but on a lifelong commitment to nation-building. During his political journey, Mandela's concept of "the nation" had grown: it had traversed Thembuland, moved beyond the vision of the unity of Africans, beyond all the oppressed, beyond the multiracial democrats, to the vision of a nation of all South Africans in all their diversity. Syncretizing the values and cultures to which he was exposed, and drawing from them what was most relevant for his purpose, with the support of the ANC leadership and millions in the liberation movement, he was able to turn an aggressively racial regime into an open democracy. With the employment of his native *ubuntu*, he was able to minimize violence. Furthermore, freedom for South Africa also released the entire Southern African region from the grip of the apartheid regime.

Walter Sisulu, Mandela's close comrade and mentor, called the ANC's victory in South Africa's first democratic elections the "greatest" revolution of the twentieth century, because its democracy was inclusive and rehabilitative rather than punitive. Mandela's humanist response to racism, the scourge of the twentieth century, liberated racists as well as the oppressed. Mandela was indeed a nationalist and a revolutionary. Above all, in the five years of his presidency, he showed the world an *African* example of how a political revolution might be achieved. But it is an incomplete revolution. The equally vital task of economic and social transformation has been left to the twenty-first century and to future generations to tackle.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Apartheid Movement, South Africa; Communist Party of South Africa, 1921–1950; COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions); Hani, Chris (1942–1993); Slovo, Joe (1926–1995); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; Tambo, Oliver (1917–1993)

References and Suggested Readings

African National Congress website, www.ANC.org.za.
Callinicos, L. (2000) *The World that Made Mandela*. Johannesburg: STE.
Mandela, N. (1994) *Long Walk to Freedom*. Randburg: Macdonald Purnell.
Parkin, K. (Ed.) (2006) *Mandela: The Authorized Biography*. Riverside, NJ: Andrews McMeel.
Sampson, A. (1999) *Mandela*. London: HarperCollins.

Manifesto, II

Valentino Parlato

Il Manifesto is a daily newspaper published in Rome. Defining itself as a "communist daily," it is an independent left-wing newspaper. This makes it an anomaly, in the sense that it is neither the organ of any political organization nor does it have any strict political affiliation.

The first issue of *Il Manifesto*, under the editorship of Luigi Pintor, was published on April 28, 1971, but its origins can be traced back to June 23, 1969. At that time, the first issue of a monthly periodical under the same name came out under the editorship of Rossana Rossanda and Lucio Magri, with the support of a small number of members of the Italian Communist Party (among them Pintor, Aldo Natoli, Eliseo Milani,

Luciana Castellina, Massimo Caprara, Ninetta Zandegiacomi, Mario Catalano, Filippo Maone, and Valentino Parlato). The periodical criticized the Italian Communist Party (PCI) for its subalternity to the USSR, for the lack of internal democracy, and for its shifting to the right. It explicitly condemned the Russian intervention in Prague. An internal debate quickly arose inside the PCI, and the Manifesto group ran unsuccessfully in the 1972 general elections. The Manifesto group and a group of left-wing socialists then merged into the short-lived Partito d'Unità Proletaria (PdUP).

The original Manifesto group eventually split, and the newspaper gained full autonomy as a communist daily. It is now in its 38th year and sells around 30,000 copies every day.

SEE ALSO: Autonomism; Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Italian Communist Party; Italian Socialist Party; Italy, Anti-War Movement, 1980–2005; Italy, from the Anti-Fascist Resistance to the New Left (1945–1960); Italy, from the New Left to the Great Repression (1962–1981); Partito d'Unità Proletaria-Democrazia Proletaria; Red Brigades; Rossanda, Rossana (b. 1924)

References and Suggested Readings

Cheles, L. & Sponza, L. (2001) *The Art of Persuasion: Political Communication in Italy from 1945 to the 1990s*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Garzia, A. (1985) *Da Natta a Natta. Storia del Manifesto e del PdUP*. Bari: Dedalo.
La questione del Manifesto. Democrazia ed unità del PCI (1969) Rome: Editori Riuniti.

Manley, Michael (1924–1997)

Cheryl L. A. King

Michael Manley was a labor organizer, founder of the Jamaican anti-colonial movement, and prime minister dedicated to fighting poverty by ending western political and economic imperialism and leading the country toward democratic socialism. His dedication to a new economic path for Jamaica influenced a generation of advocates for equality and independence in the Caribbean and throughout the world from the 1960s to the 1990s.

Michael Norman Manley was born on December 10, 1924, the second son of Norman

Washington Manley, founder of the People's National Party (PNP) and chief minister of Jamaica from 1955 to 1962, and Edna Swithenback Manley, a prominent artist and sculptor. Thus, when Michael entered the political arena, his name had a rich history and legacy.

Manley attended high school at Jamaica College in Kingston, Jamaica. After high school he became a journalist, writing for *Public Opinion*, a weekly newspaper. In 1943, while attending McGill University in Montreal, Canada, Manley volunteered for the Royal Canadian Air Force. He then traveled to England, graduating from the London School of Economics, where he studied economics under Harold Laski, a leading British political theorist and chairman of the Labour Party from 1945 to 1946. For a while afterwards he worked for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in London.

Manley returned to Jamaica in 1951 and became active in the trade union movement. He worked as an associate editor of *Public Opinion* until being offered a position with the National Workers' Union (NWU) in 1953. As a union negotiator, Manley gained a keen perspective on Jamaica's working class that would benefit his future political endeavors. Reluctantly, in 1962 he accepted an appointment, by way of his father, to the Jamaican Senate. In 1967, on his own accord, he was elected vice-president of the PNP as well as representative of Central Kingston. When his father retired from active politics, Michael Manley was elected leader of the PNP on February 9, 1969. His trade union experience instilled a deep understanding of the poverty so many Jamaicans faced, and he devoted himself to advancing the condition of life for peasants and workers.

Relying on his trade union experience, Manley maintained a relationship with the country's poor black majority that would help in returning the PNP to prominence. In 1972, he ran on a platform of "better must come," giving "power to the people" and leading "a government of truth." The PNP regained the majority in parliament, and Manley was named prime minister. He then announced at the 36th annual PNP Conference that Jamaica would be converting to a socialist form of government. This revelation came as no surprise to party insiders who for years had become acquainted with Norman Manley's interest in the British Labour Party.

In the process of instituting his new government, Manley reinstated a number of civil liberties, abolished bans on left-wing publications, and authorized passports for a number of citizens who had long been denied them. Diplomatically, Manley developed close relationships with other socialist leaders including Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Olof Palme of Sweden, Pierre Trudeau of Canada, and Fidel Castro of Cuba. In particular, Manley's relationship with Castro strengthened ties between the two islands, separated only by 90 miles, but it also weakened diplomacy with the United States. In 1979, Manley, who attributed most of Jamaica's problems to colonialism, involved Jamaica in a non-aligned movement with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with the intent of fighting imperialism.

On the domestic front, Manley faced a number of challenges. He began by tackling laws such as the 1838 Master and Servants Law, a remnant of the post-slavery period of apprenticeship and British imperialism. He also implemented laws, such as one to guarantee the right of illegitimate children to inheritance. He was also insistent that Jamaica should be in control of its own economy and natural resources such as bauxite, upon which he placed a levy to benefit the country and protect the natural resource from US exploitation. His aim was to uplift the downtrodden in the society specifically through education, land reform, jobs, housing, and other social programs despite the adverse effect of the 1973 oil crisis that was crippling the economies of many nations, including Jamaica. His Facilities for Titles Law provided small farmers an opportunity to obtain financing, and he established a Small Business Loan Board to do the same for small businesses. Under his program, investment in agriculture grew as production accelerated.

The largest obstacle to his reform agenda was the existing political structure, one that had been recently dominated by the Jamaican Labor Party (JLP), which had significant ties to the business elite. His attempt to make the PNP a coalition with the poor, starving, and homeless was in direct contrast to a section of the capitalist class the party needed to get elected. In his attempt to stabilize the economy, Manley called for the nationalization of various industries and began to expand programs in both health and education. Key products were suddenly maintained by strict price controls, while consumers

were subsidized for others. These crash programs provided work for those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder, and adult literacy programs, in particular, had a direct impact on the future of Jamaica. The positive impact of the beneficiaries of these programs would be clearly observed in the long run. In the short run, however, they were costly and bankrupting the country.

Manley was reelected prime minister in 1976 and served in that capacity continuously until 1980 when the PNP was voted out of office. Shortly after his reelection, he argued that a coalition of both internal and external forces was attempting to destabilize the PNP's ability to govern. From within Jamaica, the bauxite industry suffered due to the levy and began cutting back production, which drastically added to unemployment. Additionally, the United States began to apply pressure on the PNP because the bauxite levy was affecting several US corporations. Other unsubstantiated claims suggest that a small detachment of US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives maintained a campaign that added to the undermining of the PNP.

As a result of these factors, Manley was faced with a dismal and dire economy as declining exports, along with a lack of foreign exchange investment, affected tourism and unemployment rates rose to 30–40 percent. There was now an urgent need to seek aid from international bodies, specifically the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, negotiations with the IMF failed when Manley refused to accept several stringent market-oriented measures demanded by the IMF. As such, the standard of living grew worse with unemployment rates, crime, and the food shortage increasing. Manley's "democratic socialism" fell under heavy scrutiny, and political violence developed.

In 1980, the JLP won a landslide victory and Edward Seaga was named prime minister and minister of finance. Seaga pursued a conservative economic program that included significant aid from the United States and the IMF. In October 1981, Jamaica broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba, and two years later, Seaga joined the military effort to aid a US-led invasion of Grenada. By 1983, however, as the JLP began to fail repeated IMF performance tests, Seaga's popularity diminished. In response, the JLP called for new elections but failed to implement a recent reform that required them

to update voter registration lists. Manley and the PNP, even though leading in most major polls, called for a full boycott of the election, thus creating a one-party state and handing all parliamentary seats and power over to the JLP. The move was significant in that Manley placed process over political gain. His dedication to egalitarianism put forth that reform must benefit all sectors of society and not the privileged classes.

After his reelection, Seaga implemented further IMF measures that would only push the economy into negative growth for the next two years. In May 1986, Seaga would turn away from the IMF, but the damage had already been done. In 1989, the PNP regained power and Manley returned as prime minister. This time he projected a more friendly US policy and softened his socialist stance. With Ronald Reagan as US president and Margaret Thatcher as prime minister of Britain, the global picture had changed as the tone of international policy was now reflective of their conservative politics. Three years later, citing illness, Michael Manley resigned his post.

Manley was an anti-colonial, nationalist, and egalitarian leader. His conception of the state was as an agent of change to serve the people as a method of reform and social transformation. For the most part, Michael Manley should be remembered as a leader who attempted to modify the political climate in Jamaica to break the imperialist legacy and redistribute wealth fairly among all segments of society. In his commitment to the poor and working classes, Manley was a representative voice against the interests of international capitalism. He died on March 6, 1997.

SEE ALSO: Jamaica, Independence Movement, 1950–Present; Jamaica, 1938 Labor Riots; Jamaica, Peasant Uprisings, 19th Century; Jamaica, Rebellion and Resistance, 1760–1834

References and Suggested Readings

- Keith, N. W. & Keith, N. Z. (1992) *Social Origins of Socialism in Jamaica*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- King, C. L. A. (2003) *Michael Manley and Democratic Socialism: Political Leadership and Ideology*. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock.
- Manley, M. (1974) *The Politics of Change: A Jamaican Testament*. London: André Deutsch.
- Payne, A. (1995) *Politics in Jamaica*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Mao Zedong (1893–1976)

Vera Leigh Fennell

There has never been a more appropriate illustration of the old Chinese curse “may you live in interesting times” than the life and times of Mao Zedong (Mao Tsetung). Coming of age during the first part of the twentieth century, he spent the rest of the century ensuring that others would live through similarly interesting times. He was an educator, a poet, a journalist, a military strategist, a political theorist, a revolutionary, and the official and spiritual leader of the largest communist nation the world has ever seen. He helped to found the Communist Party of China (CPC) and reinterpreted Marxism-Leninism by theorizing the revolutionary potential of rural farmers. His insight made China a beacon of revolution and made “Mao Tsetung Thought” its revolutionary polestar for communist and nationalist revolutionaries in the Third World and beyond. Movements such as the Black Panther Party of the United States, the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) of Peru, and the Communist Party of Nepal, as well as communist party organizations in India, the Philippines, and around the world were Maoist in their organization, strategy, and revolutionary ideology.

Mao’s life could be viewed as a classic tale of a poor boy born at the right time in the right place who by his own determination and good luck rose to great heights as a great ruler of a great nation. By the time of his death in 1976, Mao Zedong had spent more than a quarter of a century ruling one quarter of humankind. Yet, five years after his death, the CPC’s official assessment of his leadership was that he had been 70 percent correct and 30 percent wrong. Since then, scholars have debated which events or policies comprise the 70 percent and which comprise the 30 percent.

Early Life

Mao Zedong was born on December 26, 1893 as the eldest son in a farming family in Shaoshan, Hunan Province in a county where 75 percent of the residents shared the same surname, “Mao.” At the time of his birth, Mao’s family’s fortune was improving. His grandfather had been forced



This Chinese propaganda poster from 1949 was intended to unify Chinese people from the rivers and mountains under Mao Zedong. The establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 came after nearly two decades of civil and international war. Mao, who served as leader of the Chinese Communist Party until his death in 1976, largely depended on the peasantry to realize his ideal of socialist revolution through class struggle. (The Art Archive / William Sewell)

to sell off some of the family land and his son, Mao’s father, Mao Jensheng (1870–1920), had to leave home at 16, joining the army to pay off additional family debts. He returned to Shaoshan, lived frugally, saved carefully, and made a small fortune trading hogs and grain. After he had accumulated enough wealth, he was able to buy back the family land that his father had sold.

Mao Jensheng married Wen Chu-mei (1867–1919), a devout Buddhist from the nearby village of Tangchiato. The couple had three sons – Mao Zedong (1893–1976), Mao Tsemin (1895–1943), and Mao Tsetan (1905–35). They also adopted a girl, Mao Tsehong (d. 1930).

Mao Zedong’s warm relationship with his illiterate mother has been viewed as crucial to the formation of some of his radical social ideas, but it was his conflict-ridden relationship with his

father that ignited his radical behavior. He entered the local village school at the age of eight, but his father pulled him out of the school at age 13 and married him to Yang Tsuihua, who was 19. Mao Jensheng ordered his son to return to farming, and the younger Mao worked in the fields by day and did the farm accounts by night. By all accounts, he rejected the marriage; they never lived together.

Frustrated by his father's demands for his labor, Mao Zedong ran away in 1909 and went to live with his maternal uncle in a neighboring county. The uncle enrolled him in the Tongshan Higher Primary School. Mao was older than his classmates and was ridiculed for his unkempt appearance, ragged clothes, and "country-bumpkin" ways. Yet he excelled at school, learning about the world outside of Hunan Province. Like many young soon-to-become radicals of his day, the 1905 victory of Japan over Russia, the greatest naval force of the day, excited him. The defeat of a powerful white imperialist European nation by an Asian nation encouraged ideas of nationalism among many young men and women all over Asia.

When Mao entered First Provincial Normal School of Hunan in 1913 he structured his life around education. He read newspapers, Chinese literature, ethics, history, and geography. He raised questions in class in a Socratic manner and frequently engaged in heated political discussions. His passion for education, confrontation, and reform found expression in journalism.

May 4 Era Journalist

During the May 4 era, journalism was a means of political agitation. When the Allies negotiated the end of World War I, China was forced to sign a treaty that handed sovereignty over Shandong Province to Japan. Chinese students and intellectuals felt betrayed by Western nations. They had believed American President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" speech, where he supported national sovereignty for all nations. The Versailles Peace Treaty showed Chinese intellectuals that the bourgeois capitalist nations would act as Karl Marx had predicted.

China's own republican revolution was not going well. The uprising in Wuhan in 1911 inaugurated a representative republican government that Yuan Shikai, former general of the Ch'ing imperial army, was to immediately high-

jack. Because Yuan controlled an army and the revolutionaries, led by the founder of the Nationalist Party (KMT or GMD), Sun Yatsen, did not, Yuan was able to get himself appointed president of the Republic, replacing Sun. Over time, he dissolved the national and provincial representative assemblies and reorganized the provincial-level governments, replacing civilian with local military control. His carefully orchestrated national representative assembly unanimously endorsed a return to the monarchical system, with Yuan as emperor. By late 1915 China's period of representative republican government was over.

These betrayals, along with the successful Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia, turned China's future leaders towards socialism and Marxism. To spread the Marxist call to action, two Beijing University professors, Chen Duxiu (Chen Tu-hsiu) and Li Dazhao (Li Ta-chao) wrote and edited a radical magazine, *New Youth*. They proselytized Marxism and advocated a new cultural movement to revitalize China and save it from civilization extinction. Mao, who had worked as a clerk in the library of Beijing University, began reading *New Youth* and began to write and edit other local New Culture Movement journals. He became the editor of the *Hsiang River Review*, and wrote for *Women's Bell*, a journal that criticized the status of women in China. When a young Hunanese girl committed suicide rather than submit to an arranged marriage, Mao penned a series of articles about her death. They saw Miss Zhao's suicide as resulting from China's shameful social system that negated individual will. The series drew him attention within radical circles.

After starting the New People's Study Society, Mao became the principal of Lin Changsha Primary School in September 1920 and by October had organized the Socialist Youth League chapter there. That winter, he married Yang Kaihui, the daughter of his influential Ethics professor, Yang Chang-chi. In 1921 Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao called a meeting in Shanghai to organize a Chinese Communist Party. Mao Zedong, who had founded the Hunan Provincial branch of the party and a Socialist Youth League, attended the First Party Congress in Shanghai in July 1921. At this early stage, the CPC was directly controlled by the Communist Party of Russia.

First United Front

In 1923, following the directive of the Russian Politburo, the CPC joined military General Chiang Kai-shek and his bourgeois-democratic party, the KMT, to form a united front against Japan and the other colonial powers. Their Russian Comintern advisors urged them to join as individuals, forming a “bloc within.” After China had been reunified, this bloc within would discard the KMT. Mao was among the first CPC members to join the KMT. By the first half of 1924 he was the top ranking Communist Party member in the Nationalist Party’s Executive Bureau, and by 1925 he was the chief editor of the KMT paper, *Political Week*.

He returned to his native Shaoshan in 1924–5, in time to witness a peasant demonstration protesting the May 30 Incident. He was impressed that Chinese peasants could be motivated to engage in such demonstrations. Later, he became an active rural organizer. Mao held several fact-finding meetings in small villages and towns across Hunan in 1927. He realized that the revolutionary potential of the peasantry was greater than that of the comparatively small number of China’s industrial proletariat. He hoped that his report, “An Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, March 1927,” would quell resistance to peasant activism within the Party. However, Chiang Kai-shek’s White Terror distracted Mao from promoting peasant-led rebellion. On April 12, 1927 the KMT, with the assistance of Shanghai’s Green Gang, launched a systematic round-up and execution of the KMT left, including communists, communist sympathizers, suspected communist sympathizers, labor union activists, and feminists, including Xiang Jingyu, former head of the Communist Women’s Bureau. This slaughter ended any pretense of a “united front.”

Autumn Harvest Uprising

The Comintern advisors ordered a series of armed urban uprisings. Mao, still in Hunan, organized a small peasant army on September 7 and staged the Autumn Harvest uprising to combat both the KMT and the peasants’ main oppressors, the landlords. It was the CPC’s first organized armed uprising and it was a dismal failure. His peasant forces were defeated and Mao had to retreat to the Jinggang Mountains in Jiangxi Province.

There, in full retreat, isolated from the KMT forces, the decimated CPC and their Comintern advisors, Mao organized the first Chinese communist-controlled base area, or soviet, the Jiangxi Soviet. This brief period of relative stability, 1931–4, permitted Mao and his followers to develop guerrilla war tactics and the basic structure of political administration. When the CPC Central Committee was finally forced to leave Shanghai and relocate the Soviet, the party’s link to the urban proletariat and the Soviet advisers broke. As a result, the CPC had to develop its own strategies for expanding and controlling its base area. Most importantly, the party’s military and political strategy was being shaped by one man – Mao Zedong.

The Long March

Chiang Kai-shek launched encirclement campaigns in 1930 in order to eliminate the communists in their rural soviets. Some of these campaigns were more effective than others; the KMT was hardly more unified than the CCP and it relied on various local warlords who often did not obey instructions. Mao’s defensive strategy of mobile guerrilla warfare was successful in the first three encirclement campaigns but nearly led to the annihilation of the party in the fourth. Chiang’s fifth encirclement campaign relied on the construction of blockhouses in a diminishing circle around the Soviet. A gap in the placement of the blockhouses in the south and west allowed the remaining CPC forces to escape, fighting the KMT soldiers as they retreated. This was the beginning of one of the most important events in CPC historiography – the Long March. Beginning in October, 1934, nearly 100,000 men and 35 women walked out of Jiangxi Province and into Hunan. From there, Mao broke the Red Army into smaller groups who walked through Guizhou, Sichuan, Gansu, towards Shaanxi in northern China. When the Red Army arrived in Zhunyi, Guizhou in 1935, it had walked over 8,000 miles (12,500 kilometers) in 370 days.

In March, 1935 the procession stopped near the town of Zhunyi (Tsunyi). For 12 days they rested, recruited new members, and held an expanded meeting of the Politburo. During this meeting Mao was named chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and member of the Politburo Standing Committee. He emerged from the Zhunyi meeting as the “chairman” of the CPC.

The March continued into Shaanxi Province and ended at a small communist base area near the city of Yanan (Yan'an). Only 10 percent of the original communist forces had survived. Mao lost his youngest brother, Tsetan, and his sister-in-law. His two children by his second wife, who was pregnant but nevertheless participated in the March, were too young to make the trek and were left with peasant families. Mao never saw them again.

The Yanan Way

It was during the Yanan Period (1936–45) that Mao developed an ideology expressed through procedures and institutions that came to characterize “Mao Zedong Thought.” His interpretation of socialist government was expressed through schools, a military academy, healthcare facilities, study groups, and social clubs. A small-scale campaign of land redistribution was begun. New CPC recruits were integrated into the organization through a process of “rectification” (*zhengfeng*) and the “mass line” (“from the masses, to the masses”) was developed. These procedures and others, such as mass mobilization through the creation of organizations geared towards specific identity groups such as women and youths, enabled the party and the masses to work as a unified entity towards common goals.

A second united front (1936–41) was also developed during this period. What motivated either party to unite after the KMT's White Terror? Chiang Kai-shek was forced into it by his own troops, who kidnapped him on a December 4, 1936 trip to Xi'an. After intense negotiations he was released, having pledged to end his attacks on the communists and to fight the invading Japanese. For the CPC, participation in a second united front was an act of self-preservation. Despite the protection offered by the remote location of their soviet, there was no guarantee that the party could survive Chiang's planned sixth encirclement campaign. The Red Army was renamed the Eighth Route Army, signaling that it was now a part of the KMT military structure, and many of the CPC's socialist agenda items, like the confiscation of land from the local landlords, were modified.

Civil War Resumes

The Japanese surrender in 1945 ended another round of united front activity and the civil war

between the CPC and the KMT resumed with renewed vigor. The KMT, with American financial and tactical support, moved most of its troops to northern China and in 1947 captured Yanan. However, it lost several important battles. One of the most important battles lost was not a military one; civil war era inflation in China was very bad, especially in the urban areas that had been the source of KMT support. Financial speculation and other kinds of government corruption within the ruling KMT did nothing to enhance its reputation.

Meanwhile, the communist forces gained control over Manchuria from Japan and most of northeastern China to the Yangtze River. By April 23, 1949 the CPC had forced the KMT to abandon its capital, Nanjing, and move southward to Guangdong Province. The next day, the CPC captured Nanjing and, within a month, Shanghai. On October 1, 1949 the forces of the Communist Party of China, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, drove into the renamed capital city, Beijing, without having to fire a shot. The civil war was over and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed in a massive rally in Tiananmen Square.

Foundation of the People's Republic of China

The CPC had to establish a stable Marxist-Leninist political, economic, and social system. Victory had come so quickly that Mao knew he had not yet won the hearts and minds of the Chinese people. They had to repair infrastructure, promote industry, and curtail inflation. Land reform was implemented. In order to spread Mao's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and to establish a governmental structure that implemented the principles of a “people's democratic dictatorship” they established a state structure of dual rule whereby the governmental hierarchy was paralleled and interwoven with the hierarchical party structure. Government's role was to enact CPC policies. This was facilitated by overlapping memberships. For example, Mao was the chairman of the CPC's Politburo's Standing Committee, the highest party organization, the head of state of the People's Republic of China, and chairman of the Military Commission.

The media promoted the official and therefore the only acceptable interpretation of news and

events. The CPC promoted the correct interpretation of events by controlling the major channels of media/propaganda, including newspapers, film, and radio broadcasts.

Mao Zedong Thought and Mass Mobilization Campaigns

For Mao, the media were essential for the ideologically driven mass mobilization campaigns that enabled the CPC to accomplish its goals using limited material resources coupled with inexhaustible human enthusiasm and labor. In hindsight, perhaps, Mao's campaigns constitute the officially designated "30 percent" mistaken judgments. In the Maoist era, the CPC conducted the following campaigns:

- The Three-Antis/Five-Antis Campaign, initiated 1951–2.
- The Hundred Flowers Campaign, initiated 1956.
- The Anti-Rightist Campaign, initiated 1957.
- The Great Leap Forward, initiated 1958 (leading to the Three Years of Natural Disasters).
- The Great Sparrow Campaign, part of the Great Leap Forward.
- The Socialist Education Movement, initiated 1963.
- The Learn From Comrade Lei Feng Campaign, initiated 1963.
- The Destruction of the Four Olds Campaign, initiated 1964.
- The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, initiated 1966.
- The Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign, initiated 1973.
- "Let a hundred flowers bloom . . ."

By 1955, the people expressed some resistance to the process of mass collectivization of agriculture, handicrafts, and private business. To Mao, it seemed as if the spirit of revolution within the masses and the party was waning. To correct this, Mao inaugurated a campaign of rectification. His speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the Masses" enlisted the Chinese people, especially the intellectuals, to criticize the party. He urged them to "let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend." Mao believed that criticism of the party would strengthen socialism.

Initially, the response was mild, but then a torrent of criticism ensued. University students began to put up "big character posters" that were highly critical of the party; a Democracy Wall sprang up near the campus of Beijing University. Vigorous criticism of the party began to appear in magazine articles and in letters sent to the editor of the CPC flagship newspaper, *The People's Daily*. Peasants complained about collectivization. In the "workers' state" of Chinese socialism, workers complained about the wage system.

In light of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and the Hungarian Revolution of late 1956, Mao decided that the Hundred Flowers Campaign (*Baihua Qifang*) was out of control. In mid-1957 an amended version of the speech was published. The new sections called for limits on "antagonistic contradictions." This began the Anti-Rightist Campaign (*Fanyoupai Yundong*) that targeted those who had spoken out. It labeled somewhere between three and eight hundred thousand "rightists" who were "reformed" either through jail, prison labor, or banishment to the countryside. Some student leaders who had staged a demonstration in Wuhan were executed.

Great Leap Forward

The roots of the next campaign, the Great Leap Forward (Dayuejin, 1958–61) lay in the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Many of those within and outside the party who opposed the Leap were labeled rightists. Also, the push to decentralize during the Hundred Flowers era had been infused with the same Maoist ideological fervor that fueled the Leap Forward. The campaign was an attack on Soviet-style Leninist bureaucracy and the large integrated industrial production facilities it fostered. As a result, economic growth was to accelerate with decentralization at the grassroots level. This would allow a bold leap – a great leap – to a fully communistic society.

Ideological enthusiasm rather than technological innovation was used to jump start Marxist stages of economic development. In the rural areas, collectives were organized into larger communes. Economic decision-making was decentralized and old technologies were combined with advanced technologies, the so-called "walking on two legs." Material incentives and monetary rewards for labor were replaced by ideological commitment.

During the early phase of the Leap, economic productivity was high, still propelled by pre-Leap productivity. The state-owned industrial sector absorbed 30 million new workers and farm labor was redirected toward industrial production, including the “backyard furnaces” that produced rudimentary and unusable steel. Eventually, however, the displacement of manpower from agriculture to the industrialized production of unusable goods began to affect the economy and society. By 1960 China faced a major famine. The inland provinces were the most severely affected, with 6 percent of Anhui’s population dying from hunger. It has been estimated that by 1961, 25–30 million additional deaths were caused by the Great Leap Forward famine. Malnutrition and food shortages caused a precipitous decline in birth rates. By the end of 1962 the Great Leap Forward, driven by Mao’s ideological fervor, had produced the largest famine of the century.

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

Although Mao Zedong was still popular with the masses, many within the party blamed him for the failure of the Leap. He was forced to resign as head of state but remained party chairman. Three moderates – Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping – were appointed to run the country. They slowly disengaged from Mao’s policies and by 1962 recentralized economic control. Food and other goods were rationed, free markets were reopened in the rural areas, and crisis control policies were established. When relations with the Soviet Union were severed in 1963, Mao and the party placed some of the blame for shortages of food and materials on the Soviet’s withdrawal of assistance. Yet, as Mao’s power within the party shrank, his influence outside the party grew.

An important aspect of Mao’s growing popularity was a compilation of his sayings bound in a small red-covered book. *The Little Red Book* of Mao’s quotations was a bestseller and, along with the small metal Mao badge, became a symbol of revolutionary purity and loyalty. A cult of Mao was being developed and it only needed to be deployed for some useful purpose. That purpose was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (*Wuchan jieji Wenhua Dageming*). This campaign defies simple explanation. It

began innocuously enough with a newspaper criticism, but it rapidly escalated into a chaotic and disruptive mass mobilization instigated by Mao that unleashed widespread violence throughout China. Commonly, it is believed to have lasted ten years, 1966–76, the year of Mao’s death. But the period of wild, random violence perpetrated by Red Guard youths ended in 1969 when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invaded the sites of this violence, especially college campuses. There are some scholars who believe it was a manifestation of an inter-party power struggle between the hard-line socialist ideologues led by Mao and his fourth wife and former Shanghai actress, Jiang Qing (Ch’iang Ching) against the moderate faction led by Chou and Deng. Some say it was an attempted military takeover and trace its start to Defense Minister Lin Biao’s speech in September 1965. Some say it was the natural outcome of the identity labels used during other mass mobilization campaigns; it may have been a combination of all these things.

It certainly was a revolution against culture; “traditional” or Confucian Chinese culture was deemed “feudal” and, along with “bourgeois” Western culture, was taken as a sign of traitorous beliefs. Those who had been considered “experts” on these subjects were publically humiliated – “struggled against” – in massive public rallies led by overly zealous, teenaged Red Guards. But Mao’s real target of the Cultural Revolution was the party itself. He personally called on young people to demonstrate their loyalty to him by attacking any established authority, especially party members, teachers, and bosses. These factions used the “struggle session” to compete with other groups to see which was the most loyal to Mao’s *Little Red Book* vision. They attacked the “four olds” – old ideas, old culture, old habits, and old customs. They were encouraged to travel all over China to spread this revolution. Their unrestrained behavior coupled with unchecked authority led to widespread uncontrolled intimidation and violence at the hands of these youths, both male and female.

Within the party, the CR Small Group, consisting of Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wen yuan, and Zhanghe Chungqiao, seemed to be winning the inter-party struggle against the moderate wing until the violence was deemed out of control. Mao then allowed the PLA invasion of campuses that

ended much of the violence. By 1970 a rebuilding process had begun.

Mao's health was deteriorating. He had not attended public rallies since 1967. By the early 1970s his lucid moments were sporadic. On July 28, 1976 a major earthquake hit northeast China, near Beijing-Tianjin, and was taken by the people as an omen. On September 9, 1976 Mao Zedong died of a heart attack. He was 82. His body was immediately embalmed and placed in a crystal sarcophagus for a grand state funeral. As the people of China passed the sarcophagus, tears streaming down their faces, saying goodbye to the one man who had ruled their country since its inception, they must have thought about the "interesting times" through which they had lived.

Almost immediately after Mao's death, the CPC began to reverse his influence. One month after his death, Jiang Qing and her three associates, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, and Zhange Chungqiao, were arrested and charged as the Gang of Four for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. They were put on trial in 1981 and convicted of anti-party activities. Jiang and Zhange were sentenced to death; that sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. Wang was sentenced to life imprisonment and Yao to 20 years imprisonment. Mao's chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, was stripped of his posts by the moderates, led by Deng Xiaoping.

SEE ALSO: Black Panthers; Chen Duxiu (1879–1942); China, Maoism and Popular Power, 1949–1969; Chinese Communist Revolution: 1925–1949; Chinese Nationalist Revolution: 1911; Lin Biao (1907–1971); Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969); Lu Xun (1881–1936); Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925); Zhou Enlai (1898–1976); Zhu De (1886–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- Becker, J. (1998) *Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine*. New York: Henry H. Holt.
- Deyer, J. T. (1996) *China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Gilmartin, C. (1995) *Engendering the Chinese Revolution: Radical Women, Communist Politics, and the Mass Movements of the 1920s*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Honig, E. (2002) Maoist Mappings of Gender: Reassessing the Red Guards. In S. Brownell and J. Wasserstrom (Eds.), *Chinese Femininities, Chinese Masculinities: A Reader*. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 255–86.

- Schram, S. R. (Ed.) (2004) *Mao's Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings, 1912–1949: Volume 1: The Pre-Marxist Period, 1912–1920*. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
- Selden, M. (1970) *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- White, L. T., III. (1989) *Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Cause of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Wilson, D. (1979) *The People's Emperor: Mao, A Biography of Mao Tsetung*. New York: Lee Publishing.
- Yang, R. (1997) *Spider Eaters: A Memoir*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Zhang, X. (1998) *Grass Soup*. Boston: David R. Godine.

Maori indigenous resistance

Vincent O'Malley

The indigenous people of New Zealand had no collective term to describe themselves prior to the colonization of their country. "Maori" at first meant simply "human," but later came to refer to "normal" or "ordinary" people, as opposed to the altogether different European peoples encountered from the seventeenth century onwards. Although many Maori communities welcomed contact with the outside world, significant land loss, combined with their own political marginalization in the wake of formal British annexation in 1840, gave rise to a number of significant resistance movements. Some of these movements remain in existence today in different forms and continue to provide leadership in response to ongoing challenges.

Dutch explorer Abel Tasman's fleeting encounter with Maori in 1642 ended in bloodshed in consequence of cross-cultural misunderstandings, and it was a further 127 years before the next Europeans ventured toward the shores of New Zealand. Further conflict sometimes ensued during the visits of James Cook and other explorers after 1769. Contact with outsiders nevertheless became a regular feature from this time onwards, increasing the likelihood of eventual colonization.

By the early decades of the nineteenth century small numbers of whalers, traders, escaped convicts from Australia, and missionaries had established a permanent presence in parts of coastal New Zealand. They remained, for the most



Two of New Zealand's major protest movements centered on indigenous rights and environmental protection. On May 5, 2004, these movements converged as Maori activist Tame Iti, Maori elders, and over 10,000 Maori demonstrators in Wellington protested against proposed seabed and foreshore legislation. New Zealand police responded with anti-terrorist raids, arresting Tame Iti and about 14 others, mostly environmental activists, across the North Island on October 15, 2007. (AFP/Getty Images)

part, under the control of local tribes and their chiefs. An increase in the number of European residents by the 1830s, and Imperial government concern lest “lawless” conduct on the part of some of the settlers should provoke serious unrest among Maori, resulted in increasing British interest in the affairs of New Zealand.

This British concern, combined with other factors such as the influence of the humanitarian movement upon Colonial Office policy, prompted the decision by 1839 to seek formal annexation of the country. Yet the Treaty of Waitangi, signed by more than 500 *rangatira* (chiefs) between February 6, 1840 and September of the same year, while ceding full sovereignty to the British according to its English translation, at the same time guaranteed *tinu rangatiratanga* (“fully chiefly authority”) over their lands and affairs in the Maori-language agreement assented to by all but a handful of the chiefs. One northern *rangatira* famously stated during a signing ceremony in May 1840 that “the shadow of the land” had been handed to Queen Victoria, and “the substance has remained with us” (Ward 1968: 49). Less than a year later he revealed his fears that the substance had indeed been lost, leaving Maori with a mere shadow.

Despite such anxieties, the writ of English law was largely confined to European settlements for a considerable time, and settlers and government

officials were required to tread warily in districts still under Maori control. The consequences were sometimes fatal when they failed to do so. In 1843 an unauthorized survey of disputed lands in the Wairau district ended in a battle in which 22 Europeans and four Maori were killed. In the Bay of Islands district meanwhile, local *rangatira* Hone Heke felled the British flagstaff at Russell four times between July 1844 and March 1845, the fourth occasion marking the start of the Northern War between Heke’s followers and Imperial troops and their Maori allies. The war ended inconclusively and further campaigns were subsequently waged in the Cook Strait region.

A new constitution for the colony issued in 1852 marked the beginning of a rapid deterioration in race relations. It granted self-government to the settlers but effectively excluded all but a tiny number of Maori from voting for or participating in the new parliament as a result of a property qualification based on European-style land tenure. Influential *rangatira* pleaded with the government for the right to manage their own affairs to be recognized, but the new parliament remained more concerned with advancing settler interests through acquiring Maori lands and promoting their “assimilation” into colonial society.

Land purchasing had for most of the period since 1840 remained the exclusive right of the crown. By the 1850s increasing concern over the consequences of selling land, including the loss of control over those districts alienated, led to greater Maori resistance to sales. This in turn prompted government land buyers to resort to more underhand purchase tactics, including transactions completed secretly or with only minority support from the owners.

Maori responded to these developments in a number of ways. Older-style mechanisms of communal control known as *runanga* (tribal assemblies) were strengthened and revived in many districts alongside committees (*komiti*) based on similar principles in an effort to continue to manage affairs on a tribal basis. Meanwhile, a number of mainly central North Island tribes promoted the notion of electing a Maori king to hold their lands and serve as a symbol of strength. In 1858 the senior Waikato chief Potatau Te Wherowhero was chosen as the first king. Potatau and his chief strategist Wiremu Tamihana Tarapipipi both made it clear that they did not see the Kingitanga (King movement)

as in any way incompatible with continuing deference to the British monarch as the ultimate protector of all of the people of New Zealand or as any obstacle to ongoing cooperation with the European authorities.

Government officials chose to view the Kingitanga quite differently, however, branding it as a treasonable “land league” and a direct challenge to British sovereignty. Given this stance, most observers believed it merely a matter of time before a showdown followed. In March 1860 the government’s efforts to push through a land purchase at Waitara with only minority support from the owners prompted the start of the first Taranaki War between local tribes and Imperial troops. A truce was agreed in March 1861, but not before Kingitanga reinforcements had arrived to assist the defenders of the land. Further fighting broke out in Taranaki two years later, though the main focus of attention had shifted elsewhere by this time.

In July 1863, perhaps the most dramatic event in New Zealand race relations history, the Waikato War, commenced as Imperial troops were sent to crush the heartland of the King movement. By the end of the conflict in 1864, the Kingitanga was left seriously weakened, and much of the district had been devastated. It had not been destroyed as hoped for, however, and its leaders instead retreated south, establishing an autonomous “King Country” which remained closed to Europeans until the 1880s. The Kingitanga itself remains in existence today and continues to provide a potent rallying point for Maori from many parts of New Zealand.

The confiscation of vast tracts of land from those Maori deemed (often without due legal inquiry) to have been “rebels” followed soon after, much of it also indiscriminately taking in areas belonging to Maori who had remained neutral or even served as “loyalists.” Policies such as these provoked further resistance, and smaller conflicts continued to be fought through until 1872. Many of these later wars involved Maori who had turned to new indigenous faiths drawing in part on Christianity, such as Pai Marire (Good and Peaceful) and the Ringatu (Upraised Hand) religion founded by Turanga military leader and prophet Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki. Adherents of some of these movements were commonly deemed “fanatical” in the eyes of many Europeans, lending a harsher and more racially tinged edge to some of these later conflicts.

Increasing government control over formerly autonomous Maori districts enabled the implementation of new proposals to renew the process of land acquisition. A Native Land Court had been established by 1864 and crown preemption replaced by a free market for settlers in Maori lands. Custom dictated that lands were managed collectively by the tribe and their chiefs, but this so-called “bestly communism” was perceived as an obstacle to land alienation and assimilation. Individuals were instead enabled to sell their interests without reference to other tribal members, and land selling was further encouraged by a costly, protracted, and European-controlled process for deciding ownership.

Many Maori quickly realized the potentially calamitous consequences of such a system for their own social order. They responded, as before the wars, through reconfiguring existing bodies such as *runanga* and *komiti* to meet the new challenge, through countless petitions and appeals to parliament, and (with a handful of Maori seats established in 1867, in part because the newly individualized land titles would otherwise have entitled them to vote in European electorates for the first time) through bills introduced by their own members of the general assembly.

Such measures were in most cases largely unsuccessful. Governments periodically sought to co-opt intended mechanisms of self-government as instruments of indirect rule, notably through an official but shortlived *runanga* system established in 1861 and a similar measure introduced in 1883. The ulterior motives underlying these schemes, and the unwillingness to grant real powers to Maori to manage their own affairs, saw initial support for them quickly fade as many tribes realized the limitations involved.

Although many efforts to secure greater rights were organized along tribal lines, at the same time there was increasing recognition and acceptance of the need for Maori to cooperate more broadly around common grievances. A Repudiation movement first established in the Hawkes Bay district in the early 1870s to challenge fraudulent land purchases attracted support from a number of other centers and hosted a number of largely attended meetings. Elsewhere, unofficial Maori “parliaments” were convened.

While the work of the Land Court was widely condemned at such gatherings, the legacy of land confiscations arising from the New Zealand Wars of the 1860s also attracted attention. In

the Taranaki district local prophet Te Whiti-o-Rongomai, who is today sometimes described as New Zealand's equivalent to Martin Luther King, Jr. or Mahatma Gandhi, had led a long-running campaign of passive resistance, pulling out surveyors' pegs and ploughing confiscated land. His semi-autonomous settlement at Parihaka was brutally invaded in November 1881, its inhabitants dispersed, and Te Whiti and other leaders imprisoned for a lengthy period without trial.

These actions outraged Maori the length of the country, and in 1882 and again in 1884 the first two of several deputations of chiefs left New Zealand intent on presenting their many grievances under the Treaty of Waitangi direct to the British monarch. They were invariably referred back to the New Zealand government for a response to their concerns. That was precisely the same government which had ignored their repeated pleas for the Land Court to be abolished and for Maori to be allowed to control their own affairs, however, and in the light of this more direct action was taken. In 1892 an annual gathering known as the Maori Parliament was convened for the first time under the banner of the Kotahitanga (Unity) movement. For more than a decade it continued to meet and to press the government for official recognition. The King movement also established a *Kauhanganui*, or King's council, with its own constitution and cabinet in the 1890s.

Faced with these pressures, in 1900 the government introduced a number of shortlived reforms in an effort to defuse growing Maori unrest. A small but influential group of moderate and well-educated reformers dubbed the Young Maori Party were also important advocates in improving the often dire socioeconomic circumstances of many Maori by the early twentieth century, though it was not until after the election of New Zealand's first Labour government in 1935 that significant improvements began to be made. Labour had come to power partly on the back of an alliance with a more radical Maori movement and religion founded by Tahupotiki Wiremu Ratana in 1918. He attracted support from the poor and dispossessed and embraced an increasingly political focus from the mid-1920s, especially with his central demand that the Treaty of Waitangi be at last fully honored and upheld.

More than a century of heavy land loss had left many Maori with nowhere to go but to the cities and towns. This they did in large numbers

from World War II onwards and by the 1970s a new generation of urban, youthful, and often highly educated Maori activists had emerged to continue the struggle. One such radical organization, *Nga Tamatoa* (Young Warriors), was consciously modeled on the Black Panthers and took its inspiration from the civil rights movement in the United States.

More conservative elders sometimes opposed the confrontational tactics of groups such as *Nga Tamatoa*, which included increasingly large and sometimes violent gatherings of protestors at Waitangi each anniversary of the first signing of the Treaty of Waitangi on February 6, 1840. But they often could not disagree with the cause, and in 1975 more than 30,000 Maori, including young and old, conservative and radical, marched the length of the North Island to the steps of Parliament Buildings in Wellington to demand that not one more acre of Maori land be lost. Three years later a 506-day occupation of disputed lands at Bastion Point, close to downtown Auckland, was ended only when more than 600 police and army troops forcibly evicted the protestors from the site. The land was eventually restored to Maori, along with a golf course at Raglan which had also been the scene of a high-profile occupation.

The establishment of a Waitangi Tribunal in 1975 charged with investigating Maori grievances, and its empowerment ten years later to inquire into historical Maori claims relating to events as far back as 1840, helped to gradually defuse increasingly tense race relations. However, flash points remain. In 2004 a further *hiko* (march) to Wellington prompted by government proposals to nationalize the foreshore and seabed, thus preventing pending native title claims, attracted massive Maori support and attention, and led to the formation of a breakaway Maori Party which drew significant support away from the then governing Labour Party. The focus on settling historical Maori land claims has also diverted attention away from the question of future constitutional arrangements under the treaty. It is likely that such matters will become an increasing focus of activity and debate in the years ahead.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, New Zealand; Black Panthers; Canada, Indigenous Resistance; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)

References and Suggested Readings

- Belich, J. (1986) *The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict*. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
- Belich, J. (1996) *Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders from Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century*. Auckland: Penguin.
- Hill, R. S. (2004) *State Authority, Indigenous Autonomy: Crown–Maori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, 1900–1950*. Wellington: Victoria University Press.
- O'Malley, V. (1998) *Agents of Autonomy: Maori Committees in the Nineteenth Century*. Wellington: Huia.
- Orange, C. (1987) *The Treaty of Waitangi*. Wellington: Allen & Unwin/Port Nicholson Press.
- Ward, A. (1974) *A Show of Justice: Racial "Amalgamation" in Nineteenth-Century New Zealand*. Auckland: Auckland University Press/Oxford University Press.
- Ward, I. (1968) *The Shadow of the Land: A Study of British Policy and Racial Conflict in New Zealand, 1832–1852*. Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs.

Mapuche Indian resistance

Héctor Guerra Hernández and Raúl Ortíz Contreras

The process of integration of Mapuche territories to the administration of the Chilean state was known as the "Pacification of the Araucanía." It consisted of the effective military and, in many cases, violent occupation of the territories where different indigenous Mapuche groups resided during the colonial period and the beginning of the republic. The Mapuche were either completely erased from the map or deported. The republic sought to abolish the Mapuche people's autonomy, political integrity, territorial lands, and identity. Many were forced to live on reservations.

This decline radically transformed the social and territorial organization of the Mapuche and led to a diminished cultural subsistence. They were "integrated" into the Chilean system of jurisprudence and had no political and social autonomy. Between 1884 and 1927, 2,961 "titles of merced" (land grants) were delivered for 526,285 hectares of land (representing only 10 percent of the territories occupied before they were seized), of which approximately 85,000 Mapuche were the beneficiaries. The "titles of merced" provided territorial collective rights for the use of the land to the leaders of huge

families (*lonko*). Nevertheless, the replacement commissions granted the task of calculating the territories did not consider that the extensive Mapuche families were organized along smaller territorial units (*lof*) that did respond to the internal logic of conventional social organization, but with minor territorial units.

During the twentieth century, the Mapuche population expanded extensively. The Mapuche population had grown from 200,000 to 700,000. This population growth contributed to a severe shortage of land, as the land grants were too small and insufficient to provide for the basic necessities of life for the following generations. Instead of gaining more land, the 200,000 of the 526,285 hectares assigned to the Mapuche by the republic were expropriated by application of the indigenous laws dividing their communities from 1930 to 1990. The Mapuche were turned into day laborers in small agricultural villages, or formed part of a cheap manual labor force in Chile's flourishing towns and cities. According to Saavedra (2005), the expropriation of land and entry into the labor force transformed the Mapuche from a self-sufficient rural population into a part of Chile's urban working class and poor.

These structural consequences of land expropriation and proletarianization frame the demands and goals of the Mapuche organizations that emerged in the late twentieth century. Historically, the Mapuche communities were situated in the context of single communities. Drawn off their land and dispersed throughout Chile, the Mapuche have initiated a process of "unification" of their demands, linking local demands for land to a broader dimension aiming for autonomy, self-determination, and recovery of traditional territories.

Recent Mapuche demands include legally defined "indigenous land": formal recognition from the Chilean nation-state of identifiable Mapuche with specific land claims within the national territory. In some cases the struggles saw the use of violence by the Chilean state as well as by the Mapuche. Formerly isolated demands of rural Mapuche communities and urban organizations of the twentieth century have in the twenty-first century consolidated into demands that question the legitimacy of the traditional Chilean state.

In 2006 Mapuche intellectuals published a book, *¡Escucha, Winka! Cuatro Ensayos de Historia Nacional Mapuche* (Listen, Wink! Four Trials

of Mapuche National History), considered by many as a declaration of principles for contemporary Mapuche movements. The book defines autonomy as the aspiration to recover a sovereignty “suspended” with the invasion and conquest of the Chilean and Argentine states. For the Mapuche, autonomy represents self-government and self-determination. The declaration of these native intellectuals is solidifying a pan-Mapuche identity that is exceedingly important in consolidating political organizations. Unlike other periods in Chilean history, for the first time in the early twenty-first century, diverse Mapuche demands have unified in a shared aspiration for autonomy.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Indigenous Popular Protests; Chile and the Peaceful Road to Socialism; Chile, Popular Resistance against Pinochet; Chile, Social and Political Struggles, 1850–1970

References and Suggested Readings

- Bengoa, J. (1985) *Historia del pueblo mapuche (siglo XIX y XX)*. Santiago de Chile: Ediciones SUR.
- Foerster, R. & Montecinos, S. (1988) *Organizaciones, líderes y contiendas mapuches: 1900–1970*. Santiago de Chile: Ed. CEM.
- Mallon, F. E. (2005) *Courage Tastes of Blood: The Mapuche Community of Nicolás Ailio and the Chilean State, 1906–2001*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Marimán, P. (2006) Los Mapuche antes de la Conquista Militar Chileno-Argentina. In P. Marimán et al., *¡Escucha, Winka! Cuatro Ensayos de Historia Nacional Mapuche*. Santiago de Chile: Ed. LOM.
- Marimán, P. et al. (2006) *¡Escucha, Winka! Cuatro Ensayos de Historia Nacional Mapuche*. Santiago de Chile: Ed. LOM.
- Ray, L. (2008) *Language of the Land: The Mapuche in Argentina and Chile*. Copenhagen: IWGIA.
- Saavedra, A. (2000) *Los mapuches en la sociedad chilena actual*. Santiago de Chile: Ed. LOM and Universidad Austral de Chile.
- Saavedra, A. (2005) *Transformaciones en la sociedad mapuche en el siglo XX*. Unpublished PhD thesis. Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona.

Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–1793)

Junko Takeda

Jean-Paul Marat was the most influential of the radical journalists of the French Revolution.

Before the Revolution he had been a member of the medical profession and had gained a reputation as a maverick scientist for his experiments with heat, light, and electricity and his critique of Newtonian physics. When the political challenge to the monarchy arose in the late 1780s, however, he immediately abandoned his scientific pursuits and threw himself wholeheartedly into agitating on behalf of the interests of the Parisian *sans-culottes*. His historical significance has been disputed by biographers and historians, with some dismissing him as an accidental figure on the stage of history and others portraying him as second only to Robespierre in his influence on the earth-shaking events of the Revolution.

Marat was born on May 24, 1743, the eldest son of Jean Mara of Sardinia and Louise Cabrol, the daughter of a French Huguenot wigmaker, in the Swiss village of Boudry near Neuchâtel. In his early years, Marat studied medicine and philosophy in Toulouse, Bordeaux, and Paris, and eventually established himself as a practicing physician in London. He attracted a socially prominent clientele; by 1765 he had begun to rub elbows with distinguished members of the Royal Society of London and the Academies of Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Stockholm.

In 1773 Marat attempted to participate in the discourse of the Enlightenment by publishing a massive treatise entitled *Philosophical Essay on Man*, which drew the attention – and ire – of Voltaire, who savagely criticized it. In 1774 he turned his literary talents to political issues with a polemical work in English against tyrannical government, *Chains of Slavery*, which had been inspired by the democratic agitation of John Wilkes. There is evident continuity between the political arguments he introduced in that book and those he developed as a revolutionary journalist 15 years later. One of Marat’s biographers, Jean Massin, described *Chains of Slavery* as “the first modern treatise on insurrection.”

In 1776 Marat returned to Paris and, armed with an MD degree from St. Andrew’s University, Scotland, resumed his medical practice. In 1777, the Comte d’Artois, brother of King Louis XVI, offered Marat the post of physician to his *Garde de Corps* (bodyguards), a position he held until 1783. At the same time, he continued his private practice and his patients included a number of well-connected members of the nobility. When Marat then decided to make a thoroughgoing career change from physician to

physicist, his aristocratic contacts provided patronage for his scientific endeavors.

Although historians of science have generally not found Marat's voluminous writings on optics, electricity, and heat to be of lasting value, he was without question a legitimate scientist in the eyes of most of his contemporaries. His *Découvertes de M. Marat sur le feu, l'électricité et la lumière* gained him both positive and negative attention from the Parisian Academy of Sciences. In 1788 he published his French translation of Isaac Newton's *Opticks*, which has remained in print for more than two centuries. That same year his last scientific work, *Mémoires Académiques, ou nouvelles découvertes sur la lumière*, was published. Then the political rumblings announcing the coming of the Revolution prompted a final career change.

When Louis XVI's government called for an Estates General in 1788 to address the nation's financial crisis, Marat wrote *Offrande à la Patrie*, condemning France's finance ministers as traitors. That was the first of a large number of widely read revolutionary pamphlets that flowed from his pen. After the great insurrection of July 14, 1789, which brought a constitutional monarchy and an elected legislature into being, Marat began to publish a periodical, the *Publiciste parisien*. Later renamed *L'Ami du peuple* (the People's Friend), this journal became one of the most important propagators of revolutionary activism in Paris. Characterized by inflammatory denunciations of the Constituent Assembly, which Marat believed had only further empowered the monarchy to dominate the people, *L'Ami du peuple* called upon citizens to resist the despotic intrigues of rulers and public officials, and to maintain constant vigilance in defense of their liberty.

Marat's astute analysis of the political scene (aided by the input of a large number of well-placed informants) allowed him to predict events with uncanny accuracy and won him renown as "the prophet Marat." But always a thorn in the side of the authorities, he was frequently outlawed and forced into hiding. He disappeared from view for several months at the end of 1791 and the beginning of 1792, and may have been in exile in England. Meanwhile, he had won the affection of a young female admirer, Simone Evrard, who was to become his companion for the rest of his life and an ardent defender of his memory for decades after his death.

Marat resurfaced in Paris in March 1792 and began publishing *L'Ami du peuple* anew in April. He had become closely affiliated with the Cordeliers club, a political group whose best-known leader was Georges Jacques Danton. As the Revolution deepened and the Parisian population became ever more radicalized, Marat, it seemed, was always a step ahead of the radicalization. In early May the Legislative Assembly condemned *L'Ami du peuple* as incendiary and decreed Marat's arrest, sending him once again into hiding. Nonetheless, he was able to continue publishing his periodical, albeit with great difficulty, and his continuous agitation was a major stimulus of another powerful insurrection. On August 10, 1792, a massive uprising of the Parisian people resulted in the demise of the constitutional monarchy and the rise of the first French Republic. A new representative body, the National Convention, replaced the discredited Legislative Assembly.

The triumph of August 10 allowed Marat at last to emerge from clandestinity and to function in the open as an important political leader. The Paris Commune (city government) not only allowed him to publish his journal, it provided him the presses on which to print it. In September he ran for election to the National Convention as "the People's friend," gained the support of Robespierre, and won a seat. Although he continued to write and publish *L'Ami du peuple*, his primary focus shifted to the parliamentary arena, where he played a prominent role in the trial that condemned former King Louis XVI to death, led the successful attack against the moderate Girondin faction, and helped bring the Committee of Public Safety into being, paving the way for Robespierre's rise to power.

Marat's revolutionary career reached its zenith with another great transformative insurrection in Paris on May 31–June 2, 1793, in which he personally played a major organizational role. It represented the climax of the Revolution, ushering in the radical Jacobin Republic, which consolidated the basic gains of the Revolution and made them irreversible.

The day after the insurrection, June 3, Marat officially resigned his seat in the Convention and retired from direct political activity. He was physically incapacitated by a terrible inflammation of the skin, a condition that caused him to spend most of his time in a bathtub in order to soothe the itching. He continued to receive

visitors while immersed in his tub; on July 13 a young woman named Charlotte Corday posed as a supporter and asked to see him. Actually a fanatical partisan of the Girondin faction who perceived Marat as the devil incarnate, she plunged a dagger into his heart and killed him. His status as prophet was thus reinforced; his frequent prediction that he would be assassinated had come to pass. Corday was arrested and guillotined four days later, and the Girondins, suspected of complicity, paid a heavy price for her act. Three months later 21 of their top leaders were tried and executed.

Marat's assassination was immortalized in a famous painting by Jacques Louis David. His funeral brought hundreds of thousands of Parisians into the streets in a massive outpouring of grief. A few months later, however, after the fall of Robespierre and the end of the Jacobin Republic, the remnants of the Girondins returned to power and soon thereafter began to create an interpretation of Marat as a bloodthirsty monster. Although that view has continued to be propagated by conservative historians, thoughtful observers have been able to discern a more positive legacy. Marat's intervention at key points in the unfolding of the French Revolution was arguably crucial to its success. To the extent that this is so, Marat was the equal of any of history's most effective revolutionary leaders.

SEE ALSO: Brissot, Jacques Pierre (1754–1793); Danton, Georges Jacques (1759–1794); Estates General, France; French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution, Radical Factions and Organizations; Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794); *Sans-Culottes*; Wilkes, John (1725–1797) and the “Wilkes and Liberty” Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Baker, K. M. (Ed.) (1986) *Old Regime and the French Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Baker, K. M. (2001) Transformations of Classical Republicanism in Eighteenth-Century France. *Journal of Modern History* 73: 32–53.
- Conner, C. D. (1997) *Jean Paul Marat: Scientist and Revolutionary*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
- Lemaire, J. F. & Poirier, J. P. (Eds.) (1993) *Marat, homme de science?* Paris: Synthélabo.
- Miller, S. (2001) *Three Deaths and Enlightenment Thought: Hume, Johnson, Marat*. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press.
- Vaughan, W. & Weston, H. (Eds.) (2000) *David's Death of Marat*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marcos, Subcomandante (b. ?)

Raina Zimmering

Subcommander Marcos is the spokesman and commander of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, EZLN). He is also a representative of the Indigenous Clandestine Revolutionary Committee – General Headquarters (CCRI-CG) of the Zapatistas. In public he always appears with a mask to avoid identification, a pipe, an old kerchief, and two watches. All these symbols refer to the EZLN and the uprising on January 1, 1994 for democratization, liberty, and equality against hundreds of years of oppression of indigenous people as well as against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The mask symbolizes indigenous people made invisible by repression.

In keeping with the mask, Marcos's very identity is shrouded in mystery. The name Marcos is a pseudonym and is the name of a friend killed during a confrontation with the Mexican army. According to official governmental sources, Subcomandante Marcos's real name is Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente, and he comes from the city of Tampico in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas. Sebastián Guillén was born in Mexico to Spanish immigrants. He was exposed to liberation theology while a student at the Jesuit high school, Instituto Cultural, in Tampico. He graduated from Metropolitan Autonomous University (UAM) and received a master's degree in philosophy at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). He then returned to UAM as a professor. In the 1980s he joined the guerilla group National Liberation Front (FLN) and went to the Chiapas jungle, where he developed strong contacts with the indigenous communities. The FLN later became the EZLN.

Marcos plays a key role in the Zapatista movement as a talented writer and speaker, communicating with the public through histories and stories that include a mix of Mayan legends, Shakespeare, modern performance, pop culture, and figures created by himself, such as Old Antonio, Little Tonita, and the Beetle Durito. He uses slogans like “To command while obeying,” “Everything for everyone, and nothing for our-



Subcomandante Marcos, the self-proclaimed spokesman of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), attends the National Indigenous Forum in San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas, on January 9, 1996. The indigenous representatives at the forum agreed to press the Mexican government for autonomous territory and a new national constitution. Two years earlier, on January 1, 1994, the EZLN began a popular armed struggle for indigenous rights and opposition to free-market-driven globalization. (AFP/Getty Images)

selves,” and “Asking, we walk.” Through this cultural syncretism and absurdism in his communications and letters, Marcos has gained a wide public and attracted huge sympathy in Mexico, Latin America, and the world, especially among young people. In some places he has achieved the status of a pop star.

SEE ALSO: Latin America, Catholic Church and Liberation, 16th Century to Present; Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Henck, N. (2007) *Subcommander Marcos: The Man and the Mask*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Ramonet, I. (2001) *Marcos: La dignité rebelle. Conversations avec le Sous-commandant Marcos*. Paris: Galilée.
- Womack, J. (1999) *Rebellion in Chiapas: An Historical Reader*. New York: New Press.

Marcuse, Herbert (1898–1979)

John Bokina

Herbert Marcuse was a political philosopher, member of the Frankfurt School, whose works were very influential during the period of New

Left activism. He was born in Berlin to an assimilated Jewish family. He served briefly in the German army during World War I. At the same time he began his doctoral studies at the University of Berlin. His early political experiences date from these years. He was a member of the majority faction of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) between 1917 and 1919. He resigned to protest the SPD’s complicity in the deaths of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. After the war he participated in the Berlin Revolutionary Soldiers’ Council, but quit when he detected Russian influence in it. With his resignation from the SPD and departure from the Council, Marcuse ended his only organized political affiliations.

In 1919 Marcuse resumed his studies in German literature, philosophy, and political economy at the University of Freiburg, earning his doctorate with a dissertation on “Der deutsche Künstlerroman” (the German artist-novel). After a period of working in a Berlin publishing company, he returned to Freiburg in 1928 to work as a philosophical assistant to Martin Heidegger. The Nazi accession to power blocked his promotion to a German university professorship. In 1933 he became a member of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research at the Institute’s Geneva branch. The following year he emigrated to the United States and continued his work with the Institute at Columbia University in New York.

Between 1942 and 1950, Marcuse was a research analyst for the US government, first in the Office of War Information, then in the Office of Strategic Services, finally in the State Department. He held research fellowships at Columbia and Harvard following his government employment. In 1963–4 he was a visiting professor of history at Yale. Marcuse’s first permanent academic position was at Brandeis University, where, between 1954 and 1965, he was professor of politics and philosophy and chairman of the graduate program in the history of ideas. At the same time he held an appointment at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris (1959, 1961–2). After his retirement from Brandeis he was professor of philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He was awarded an honorary professorship at the Free University in Berlin in 1966. Marcuse attained his greatest fame during the period of New Left activism. From the mid-1960s until his death, he was both

an advocate and critic of New Left theories and practices. He died in Starnberg, West Germany.

Marcuse's first published philosophical works dated to the period of his association with Heidegger. During this period Marcuse made the first attempt to synthesize Marxism with existential philosophy. In a number of essays and the book that was intended to be his professorial habilitation (translated into English as *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*, 1987), Marcuse tried to resolve what he called "the fundamental predicament of Marxism" by fusing Marxism with elements of Heidegger's phenomenological method and existential ontology. Marcuse believed that contemporary Marxist theory was caught between the vulgar economic determinism of orthodox dialectical materialism and the overly idealistic alternative of Kantian Marxism.

When he joined the Institute for Social Research, Marcuse gave up his individual effort to reformulate Marxism and participated in the collective effort to develop a "critical theory of society." His primary task at the Institute was the philosophical articulation of the fundamental principles of this critical theory. His essay on "Philosophy and Critical Theory" defined critical theory as a fusion of Marxist social theory and idealist (primarily Hegelian) philosophy, while it hinted at the Freudian component that would be central to his later work. His book *Reason and Revolution* (1941) culminated Marcuse's efforts in this period. One of the central themes of this work was the refutation of the view prevalent in England and the United States that Hegel's glorification of the Germanic state was realized in the Nazi state. Marcuse instead emphasized the contrast between Hegelian rationalism and Nazi irrationalism. The true contemporary heir to Hegel, in Marcuse's view, was not Nazism but Marxist social theory.

When Marcuse resumed his academic career in 1950, one of the thrusts of his work was the analysis of the ideological obstacles to revolution. His book on *Soviet Marxism* (1955) traced the Soviet transformation of Marxist social theory from a form of critical thinking designed to guide revolutionary political practice into a fixed universal system that arrests and codifies Marxism as an ideological prop to the existing status quo. His controversial 1965 essay, "Repressive Tolerance," analyzed the degeneration of the liberal idea of tolerance. Historically, the demand for

tolerance was a partisan demand for the toleration of certain progressive but outlawed ideas. Contemporary tolerance had become an apparently indifferent, but actually repressive, acceptance of all ideas – social and antisocial, true and false. The masterpiece of this ideological criticism was *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), Marcuse's most famous work. Here Marcuse described the smooth and comfortable totalitarianism of advanced industrial societies. A one-dimensional society had little need for the coercive apparatus of the traditional authoritarian state. The development of the welfare and warfare state, the mass media, and modern technology has engendered a mass conformity and suppressed the development of genuine alternatives to the status quo. In *One-Dimensional Man* Marcuse duly noted the possibility of revolution, but it was the ideological, political, and technological obstacles to revolution that were emphasized.

If Marcuse's criticism of ideology emphasized the obstacles to revolution, the Freudian thrust of his postwar work raised the stakes involved in revolution. The object of a true revolution is human freedom and happiness, and the realization of this freedom and happiness required much more than the capture of political power and the socialization of the means of production. *Eros and Civilization* (1955) offered Marcuse's synthesis of Marx and Freud. With Freud, Marcuse argued that some "basic repression" of the instincts was necessary to maintain the "reality principle" of any society. But Marcuse introduced a historical dimension to repression. Stratified, competitive, economically exploitative industrial societies – whether capitalist or socialist – imposed an additional "surplus repression" upon the instincts in order to maintain their particularly onerous form of the reality principle, which Marcuse called the "performance principle." True revolutionary emancipation, therefore, went beyond political and economic change to include the social, sensuous, and sexual emancipation of the instincts that would occur with the elimination of surplus-repression.

Marcuse's critique of advanced industrial society and his vision of human emancipation exerted some influence on the protean movement of dissent associated with the label "New Left." The New Left was opposed by the old socialist and communist lefts and disavowed by most established intellectuals, including some of Marcuse's former colleagues at the Institute for Social

Research. But in *An Essay on Liberation* (1969) and *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (1972) Marcuse took a more favorable view. He never minimized the power of the forces opposed to revolutionary change, nor did he uncritically endorse the New Left in all its tactics and objectives. But Marcuse was attentive to the spark of genuine human emancipation in this movement, which threatened, for a moment, the stability of the most advanced industrial societies. Marcuse's last works explored the theme of art and revolution. Marcuse argued that art, more than any other dimension of human culture, preserved an image of human emancipation and happiness. His last book, *The Aesthetic Dimension* (1978), combatted the orthodox Marxist tendency to trivialize art by reducing it to the status of a mere ideological reflection of social classes.

SEE ALSO: Frankfurt School (Jewish Emigrés); Liebknecht, Karl (1871–1919); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marxism; Social Democratic Party, Germany

References and Suggested Readings

- Abromeit, J. & Cobb, W. M. (Eds.) (2004) *Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader*. New York: Routledge.
- Bokina, J. & Lukes, T. J. (Eds.) (1994) *Marcuse: From the New Left to the Next Left*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Bronner, S. E. (1994) Remembering Marcuse. In *Of Critical Theory and Its Theorists*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Feenberg, A. (2004) *Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of History*. New York: Routledge.
- Lukes, T. J. (1985) *The Flight into Inwardness: An Exposition and Critique of Herbert Marcuse's Theory of Liberative Aesthetics*. Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press.
- Marcuse, H. (1955) *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Marcuse, H. (1964) *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Marcuse, H. (1978) *The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Marcuse, H. (1998) *Technology, War and Fascism: Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse*, Vol. 1. Ed. D. Kellner. London: Routledge.
- Marcuse, H. (2001) *Towards a Critical Theory of Society: Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse*, Vol. 2. Ed. D. Kellner. London: Routledge.
- Marcuse, H. (2005) *The New Left and the Sixties: Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse*, Vol. 3. Ed. D. Kellner. London: Routledge.

Marcuse, H. (2007) *Art and Liberation: Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse*, Vol. 4. Ed. D. Kellner. London: Routledge.

Pippin, R., Feenberg, A., & Webel, C. W. (Eds.) (1988) *Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia*. Houndmills: Macmillan Education.

Wolin, R. (2001) *Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Marianne, French revolutionary icon

Walter R. Herscher

Since the French Revolution of 1789, Marianne has been the name of a symbolic female in a red cap representing the liberty of the French nation. Historically, rightist governments have tended to deemphasize Marianne, while leftist governments have given her more prominence. Today's version depicts a youthful female wearing a red cap, sometimes with a tricolor sash or clothing.

Borrowing from ancient Roman iconography, *Liberty* was depicted during the French Revolution allegorically as a female, usually wearing or carrying a red Phrygian cap. The inclusion of this cap has various possible origins. One is the common belief that freed slaves during Roman times wore the Phrygian cap, thus symbolizing *Liberty*. Another connects it to the 1675 Peasant Revolt in Brittany, also called the Revolt of the Red Bonnets because a red cap was the traditional headgear of Breton farmers.

After abolishing the monarchy in 1792, the new Republic needed an official image. Formerly, the state had been identified with the ruling monarch's image, but the Republic was an abstract personification. A prominent republican clergyman, Abbé Gregoire, proposed that the state seal display the image of France as a woman dressed in Greco-Roman style, standing, and with "her right hand holding a pike surmounted by a Phrygian cap or cap of Liberty." The name Marianne seems to have first been attached to the symbol in a patriotic song, "Marianne's Recovery," written in 1792 by Guillaume Lavabre. Marianne was a popular girl's name among the peasantry of the area where Lavabre wrote his song. Supporters of the Republic favored the name because of its

non-aristocratic origins, but monarchists mocked its peasant associations.

When Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the First Republic and reintroduced personal rule, representations of *Liberty* were replaced by his image. After Bonaparte's defeat, the Restoration monarchs similarly opposed personifications of *Liberty* and had their own images represent the state. The July Revolution of 1830 temporarily brought Marianne back into official favor. To gain acceptance as the new monarch, Louis-Philippe sought to appeal to diverse political groups, including Bonapartists, monarchists, and republicans. To mollify the latter, he created public works and festivities commemorating the July Revolution. It was in that revolutionary year that Eugene Delacroix produced the most famous painting of Marianne, *Liberty Leading the People*, showing her leading the charge across the barricades wearing the red Phrygian cap. But before long Marianne was again phased out as fearful politicians began to play down revolutionary symbolism. Louis-Philippe's government purchased Delacroix's painting and kept it under wraps for the duration of his tenure – a testimony to Marianne's ability to arouse passions.

A new revolution in 1848 brought the Second Republic into being and once again restored Marianne to her former position of honor. Delacroix's painting was taken from the storehouse and put back on public display, but the Second Republic also gave Marianne a makeover: she now sometimes wore a crown of laurels with a star instead of the red cap.

As the Republic's president, Louis-Napoleon, began the drive to personal power that would end with his coronation as Napoleon III, Emperor of France, liberal and radical republicans alike looked to Marianne for inspiration. Their very different depictions of her, however, reflected their differing political values. The liberals preferred Marianne to be serene, motionless, with orderly hair and her bosom covered, more mature or maternal, and without the Phrygian cap. More revolutionary minded republicans wanted their Marianne displaying vehemence, always standing or advancing, having her hair floating free, displaying an uncovered bosom, youthful, and of course wearing her red cap.

It was in 1871, with the temporary triumph of the Paris Commune, that the most revolutionary Marianne of all made her appearance. She was portrayed partially nude, with a red cap and red

clothing, and carrying the red flag of international revolution instead of the French tricolor. After the fall of the Commune, the government of the Third Republic viewed Marianne somewhat suspiciously, but her image nevertheless became commonplace and was displayed on everyday objects. The Republic's partisans portrayed her as young and attractive while its opponents depicted her as repulsive.

Following the German invasion in 1940, the Nazi collaborationists of the Vichy government banned representations of Marianne, but after France's liberation the public again embraced her. During debate over the creation of the Fifth Republic, both sides associated themselves with Marianne. As president, Charles DeGaulle altered Marianne's image to a young girl dependent upon him.

In 1969 a bust of Marianne was modeled after the famous actress Brigitte Bardot. Later revelations of Bardot's strong right-wing political leanings led many to feel that her identification with Marianne was inappropriate. Since then, various celebrities have been portrayed as the "new Marianne." Many have posed as Marianne for publicity, caricatured her, or used her image commercially. Although not an official national emblem, Marianne remains a popular symbol and appears on government stamps, currency, and logos, while busts of Marianne are displayed in every town hall in France.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873); Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); Eighteenth Brumaire; France, 1830 Revolution; France, Revolution of 1848; French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution, Radical Factions and Organizations; May 1968 French Uprisings; Paris Commune, 1871

References and Suggested Readings

- Agulhon, M. (1981) *Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789–1880*. Trans. J. Lloyd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Agulhon, M. (1989) *Marianne au pouvoir. L'imagerie et la symbolique républicaines de 1880 à 1914*. Paris: Flammarion.
- Agulhon, M. (2001) *Les métamorphoses de Marianne. L'imagerie et la symbolique républicaines de 1914 à nos jours*. Paris: Flammarion.
- Hunt, L. (1984) *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jacobus, M. L. (1992) *Incorruptible Milk: Breast-feeding and the French Revolution*. In S. E. Melzer & L. W. Rabine (Eds.), *Rebel Daughters: Women and the French Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mariátegui, José Carlos (1894–1930)

César Germana

José Carlos Mariátegui, a self-educated journalist born into poverty and raised by a single mother, was the first Peruvian thinker to conceive of the modernization of Peru as a process of socialist democracy. The uniqueness of his political proposal can only be understood by taking into account that his work was the result of an encounter between western culture, particularly Marxism, and Andean culture. In his work Mariátegui emphasized the political importance of the Andean Indian community, or *ayllu*, for any future socialist project in Peru.

Socialism was the basis of Mariátegui's thought as well as his political activity. Structured simultaneously as a class project and an intellectual project, Mariátegui's concerns encompassed a broad range of activities and interests: a careful monitoring of what he called the "contemporary scene," thorough investigation of the problems of Peruvian society, cultural criticism, political activism, and union organizing. His most important legacy to Peruvian and Latin American left-wing politics was his interest in expanding working-class concerns to include both intellectuals and the peasantry, which was central to the political and intellectual renewal of socialism in Peru and Latin America in general.

Mariátegui's lifelong pursuit of this socialist project can be considered in three stages.

The first stage covers the period of his life from 1914, when he started his career as a newspaper journalist, to his 1919 departure for Europe. In the first period, his interest and approach to socialism were galvanized both by the workers' first general strike in the history of Peru (demanding an eight-hour workday) and by the university students' movement (demanding the reform of the archaic and elitist university regime dominant at the time). Mariátegui's more militant political stance was also informed by the Indian peasant uprisings against land encroachment by expanding estates – rural movements that he compared to a seismic movement shaking the country's structures of social and political domination. Moving away from his early focus on literature, Mariátegui and another journalist founded the newspaper *La Razón* to support these

unprecedented social movements that, as a "fierce storm surge" in Mariátegui's words, marked the end of two decades of political stability under an oligarchic "aristocratic republic."

At that time, however, José Carlos Mariátegui's socialism was not accurately defined. It was rather an anti-establishment state of mind shared with other intellectuals of his generation. Mariátegui saw the oligarchic system as the root of Peru's social injustice. Against what he described as the "Creole politicking" of Peru's dominant classes, he saw socialism as the only possibility of democratizing the state and building an order of freedom and social equality.

In August 1919, the newly installed government of Augusto Leguía closed down *La Razón*. A few months later, Mariátegui left for Europe, marking the second phase of his socialist development. After brief stopovers in Panama and New York, he arrived in France. During his stay in Paris he became acquainted with Henri Barbuse and Romain Rolland – editors of the influential left-wing journal *Clarté*. In late 1919 he embarked for Italy, where he remained until the end of 1922. There he was married, as he recalled years later, to "a woman and some ideas." It was in Italy that he started his Marxist education, immersed in the intense political and cultural debates of the Italian Marxist left, shaped by the internal struggles in the Socialist Party, and inspired by the workers' mobilizations and factory occupations in Italy's northern industrial cities. It was in Italy that Mariátegui, together with a group of Peruvian friends, decided to start openly pursuing socialist activism in Peru. Before his return to Lima in March 1923 he also visited Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Later in his life he remarked that "My articles of that time point out the moments in my socialist evolution." Indeed, the articles written in Italy between May 2, 1920 and April 23, 1922 showed a new perspective of analysis focusing on class struggle.

The third phase encompassed the years from his return to Peru in 1923 to his untimely death in April 1930. During this time, Mariátegui was absorbed with the question of how to give life to a "Peruvian socialism," a project that he conceived as grounded in Marxism but at the same time free of Eurocentrism. His theoretical work and his political activity were aimed at solving the problem of how to carry out the socialist revolution in a country where the development of capitalism

was emerging, and where peasants – subjected to pre-capitalist forms of exploitation – constituted the overwhelming majority of the population.

Upon his return from Europe, Mariátegui's main concern was the consideration of the global world crisis and its impact on Peruvian workers. His reflections on the world situation were presented in conferences at the Popular University and in articles for the weekly *Varietades*, some of which were published in 1925 under the title *La escena contemporánea*. In 1924 Mariátegui suffered a leg amputation which bound him to a wheelchair for the rest of his life. At the time of his return, the worker and students' movement had experienced significant progress since its beginnings at the end of the previous decade. A crucial institution bridging these two social and political sectors was the Popular University, which was organized by the recently created Student Federation with the purpose of contributing to the intellectual formation of the working class. Mariátegui's conferences marked the beginning of his socialist proselytism among the working class, as well as his ongoing debate about the anarchosyndicalist tendency dominant at the time among Lima's workers.

By 1925, Mariátegui's main focus was directed toward the study of Peruvian problems (although he never abandoned his interest in the international situation). From September 11, 1925 until May 19, 1929, he contributed a number of essays to the magazine *Mundia*, examining the nature of Peruvian capitalism as the complex articulation between three different – and contradictory – modes of production (capitalism, feudalism, and “indigenous communism”). Unlike the European historical trajectory of capitalism – born from the evolution of feudalism to mercantilism – Mariátegui suggested that the existence in Peru of forms of collective social and economic organization among indigenous communities offered the country the possibility of a different trajectory toward socialism.

In September 1926, Mariátegui launched the journal *Amauta* as an expression of the “new generation” forged in the anti-oligarchic and democratic struggles of the previous two decades. *Amauta* was a literary and critical journal which carried articles analyzing Peruvian society and history, as well as fiction, poetry, and criticism. In addition to providing a forum for discussion of the latest European philosophy, art, and political theory, *Amauta* was one of the first

publications to focus on the problems of Peru's Indian majority. Conceived as a collective effort, *Amauta* served as a vehicle of expression for a new intellectual and political generation, and as a space to gather Peruvian intellectuals to face the challenges posed by the dominant western culture. The debates between Mariátegui and Haya de la Torre that marked the split between the emerging socialist current and the radical nationalism represented by the latter were published in *Amauta* as well. Mariátegui also contributed to further cultural and political debates with the publication of the biweekly magazine *Labor*, conceived as a political and union forum.

Mariátegui's final years were also the years of his greatest political activity, both theoretical and practical. In September 1928, Mariátegui and a small group of socialists – among them labor and peasant organizers – laid the groundwork for what would be Peru's Socialist Party. A few weeks later on October 7, the Socialist Party was officially constituted as a “peasant and working-class party.” He prepared two books during this time, *Ideología y política en el Perú* and *Defensa del marxismo*, and prepared documents for the first meetings sponsored by the Third International in Latin America: the Montevideo (Uruguay) First Labor Conference and the Buenos Aires (Argentina) First Latin American Communist Conference. In September 1928 Mariátegui laid the organizational foundations of the Peruvian Socialist Party, and during 1929 played a central role in the formation of the General Workers' Confederation of Peru (CGTP). He also published a collection of essays in 1928 called *Siete Ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana* (Seven Essays on Peruvian Reality), in which he emphasized the political importance of the Andean Indian community, or *ayllu*, for the creation of socialism in Peru. In the last year of his life, through his debate, an eventual break with Haya, and his polemic with functionaries of the Latin American Secretariat of the Third International, Mariátegui laid the theoretical groundwork for his perspective on socialism in Peru that he defined as an “Indo-American socialism.” For Mariátegui, a class alternative was the only effective solution to Latin America's national problem, entailing the simultaneous elimination of imperialist domination and oppression of the Indian majorities, exercised through a ruling-class monopoly on the land. His

death at the early age of 36, however, prevented him from giving this concept a precise shape.

Within a few weeks of his death, a decision was made by the Latin American Secretariat of the Third International, with the support of a group of Peruvian militants, to transform the Socialist Party into the Communist Party of Peru. Eudocio Ravines, a young Peruvian student educated in Moscow, was appointed as its general secretary. Following directives from the Comintern, Ravines was charged with purging Mariátegui's ideas from the party's ideology because of an alleged "populism" at odds with the ultra-leftist orientation of the international communist movement at that particular stage of the Stalinist era.

SEE ALSO: Haya de la Torre, Víctor Raúl (1895–1979); Peru, Labor and Peasant Mobilizations, 1900–1950

References and Suggested Readings

- Chavarría, J. (1979) *José Carlos Mariátegui and the Rise of Modern Peru 1890–1930*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Flores Galindo, A. (1980) *La Agonía de Mariátegui*. Lima: Descó.
- Germana, C. (1977) *La Polemica Haya–Mariátegui: Reforma o Revolución*. Lima: Cuadernos de Sociedad y Política.
- Quijano, A. (1986) *Introducción a Mariátegui*. Mexico City: Era.
- Vanden, H. (1986) *National Marxism: J. C. Mariátegui's Thought and Politics*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Marighella, Carlos (1911–1969) and the Brazilian urban guerilla movement

Henrique Tahan Novaes

Brazilian communist militant Carlos Marighella was born in Salvador, Bahia. The son of a poor family, he dedicated his life to working-class causes. During his youth, he protested against racism at school and was arrested and tortured after sending an offensive poem to the government. At 18 he entered the Polytechnic School of Bahia to study civil engineering, but abandoned his studies. A few years later he moved to Rio de Janeiro, becoming a member of the Communist

Party (PCB) in 1932. Four years later he was arrested again and tortured for 23 days by Brazilian police, remaining in prison for a whole year. Marighella then moved to São Paulo, where he began to act on two major fronts: reorganizing the revolutionary communists, hardly affected by repression, and the combat against terror imposed by the dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas. In 1939 he returned to prison and remained there for six years. Even under brutal torture he refused to give information to the police. In prison he dedicated his revolutionary energy to the political education of other prisoners.

Freed in April 1945, he engaged in the redemocratization process of the country, which included the legalization of the PCB. Getúlio Vargas's government was deposed and general elections were called. Marighella was elected deputy in Bahia and allowed to participate in the elaboration of a new constitution (1946). He was considered one of the most combative members of the Brazilian parliament, always defending workers' aspirations, denouncing imperialism, and fighting the terrible living conditions of Brazilian people. This short period of legal activity ended when President Dutra suppressed communists' political rights in 1948.

In the 1950s, a period of important popular struggles, Marighella participated actively in many ways. He defended the state oil monopoly under the slogan "the oil is ours," and fought against sending Brazilian soldiers to Korea. He also criticized the internationalization of the Brazilian economy and began to consider the plight of agrarian laborers. He was sent to China and the Soviet Union, and in later years visited Cuba. During these visits, he examined the victorious revolutionary experiences of those countries. He began to consider guerilla actions and participated in some expropriations. In 1962, he warned of the imminence of a military coup.

Supported by the US government, the coup took place in April 1964. Marighella was pursued and found by the regime's political police. He resisted and was arrested after a shooting and a fight. His resistance became a political act that had national repercussions. A solidarity movement formed, forcing the military to accept a *habeas corpus* solicitation to free him. From this moment on, Marighella intensified his struggle against military rule. The government suppressed the unions and suspended the constitutional guarantees of its citizens.

In this context of state terrorism and violence, differences between Marighella and the PCB intensified. He criticized the party leaders' immobilism and bureaucracy, comparing himself to Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. In December 1966 he left the PCB. Maintaining his disposition to fight with the masses for revolution, he founded the National Liberation Alliance (ALN) with Câmara Ferreira, with the objective of organizing the armed struggle against the Brazilian dictatorship. He believed only force could defeat it. Throughout 1968 and 1969, he organized several urban guerilla operations in order to raise money for revolutionary activities.

As the guerilla activities grew, Marighella drew considerable attention from the authorities and became public enemy number one of the regime. On the night of November 4, 1969, he was surprised by a political police ambush on Casa Branca Street in São Paulo. He was assassinated and buried as a homeless vagrant. His organization, the ALN, survived until 1974. Marighella's intellectual legacy includes the founding of the ALN as well as his "Urban Guerilla Manual," which explains everything a guerilla should know: how to act as an urban guerilla, how to survive, which books to read, what technical preparation is necessary, how to get funds, which places to attack, and how to resist military dictatorship. This book marked revolutionary movements through the 1960s and 1970s, and Marighella's works were translated into several languages.

SEE ALSO: Brazil, Guerilla Movements, 20th Century; Brazil, Labor Struggles

References and Suggested Readings

- Betto, F. (1987) *Blood Baptism: The Dominicans and Carlos Marighella's Death*. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil.
- Fernandes, F. (1999) Political Thoughts of Carlos Marighella: The Last Phase. In C. Nova & J. Nóvoa, *Carlos Marighella, The Man Behind the Myth*. São Paulo: UNESP.
- Jose, E. (1997) *Carlos Marighella: Enemy Number One of the Military Dictatorship*. São Paulo: Sol e Chuva.
- Jose, E. (1999) Carlos Marighella: Brazil Recognizes a Fighter, the State Recognizes the Murder. In C. Nova & J. Nóvoa, *Carlos Marighella, The Man Behind the Myth*. São Paulo: UNESP.
- Maestri, C. (1999) *Carlos Marighella*. In C. Nova & J. Nóvoa, *Carlos Marighella, The Man Behind the Myth*. São Paulo: UNESP.

Maripe, Knight (1927–2006)

Geoffrey Barei

Born in April 1927 at Mapoka village in the North East District of Bechuanaland (now Botswana), Knight Maripe started his education at the local community primary school before proceeding to the Dombodema Mission School in Plumtree District of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). In 1946 he finished standard six at Tonota, in the Central District of Bechuanaland, and then went on to the Ohlange Institute in Natal Province, South Africa, where he matriculated in 1951. Ohlange Institute was established by the mission school-educated John L. Dube after his return from America in 1899. Dube was one of the founders of South Africa's African National Congress (ANC). Ohlange's aim was to provide African youths with training in practical skills so that they could be of service to their own communities.

After matriculation Maripe found employment as a clerk in the African Department of Rhodesia Railways, subsequently joining the Bulawayo-based Rhodesian Railways African Workers Union (RAWU). RAWU operated in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia and had a combined membership of 22,000. Maripe moved quickly up the RAWU ladder, being appointed first organizing secretary, then assistant secretary general, then full secretary general. In 1956 Maripe organized a successful railway strike, bringing the railway system in both Rhodesias to a complete halt. The strike was reported to have been 100 percent effective in Bulawayo and 90 percent successful in the North Rhodesian towns of Ndola, Broken Hill, and Livingstone. As a result, the colonial government detained Maripe and other members of RAWU's leadership.

Maripe became active in African nationalist politics in Southern Rhodesia, and together with other colleagues created the All-African Convention in 1952. A precursor to this organization was the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU), later RICU, which had been brought from South Africa. However, the ICU was torn apart by petty differences among its leaders. The All-African Convention was yet another attempt at unity and progress, but it too

was shortlived as the leadership became constantly embroiled in squabbles.

Maripe kept in touch with political developments back home in Bechuanaland. A mid-year 1957 Federal Intelligence report revealed that earlier that year Maripe and his friend Joshua Nkomo had crossed into Bechuanaland, went to Serowe, and discussed with Seretse Khama the possibility of forming a Bechuanaland Congress that would advocate the liberation of the territory. Nkomo was a Zimbabwean nationalist of Ndebele origin. He had joined trade union politics in the late 1940s while working for the Rhodesia Railways. Nkomo and Maripe met in 1954, when the former was elected RAWU's secretary general and Maripe deputized for him. In 1957, when Southern Rhodesia's nationalists decided to form a more representative organization called the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC), they elected Nkomo as president.

In July 1954 Southern Rhodesia's trade unions moved a step forward as they were amalgamated into the giant Southern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress (SRTUC). Maripe was elected interim president. In February 1959, deteriorating political and economic conditions in Southern Rhodesia led the colonial regime there to declare a state of emergency and to arrest and detain hundreds of members and officials of the SRANC. The organization was subsequently banned. During the chaos, the SRTUC leadership was also arrested. The arrests were justified by the regime under the Unlawful Organization Act, the Preventive Detention Act, and the Public Order Amendment, which empowered it with wide powers "to maintain law and order."

Maripe's name was conspicuously missing from the detention list. His being left at liberty can be explained by his strong popularity, since the settler government feared that thousands of railworkers in Northern and Southern Rhodesia would go on the rampage if he were arrested. But it was not total victory for Maripe. He was placed in a situation akin to solitary confinement, as all his other colleagues were put behind bars and he was unable to organize with anyone. A feeling of helplessness came over him and he resigned as both secretary general of RAWU and president of the SRTUC.

Deprived of his union base, Maripe ventured into a new challenge, joining the influential newspaper group African Newspapers based in Salisbury (now Harare). He was appointed

chief industrial correspondent, wrote for the *African Daily News* as chief political reporter, and edited the *Bantu Mirror*, which was run by African Newspapers but circulated mainly in Matebeleland.

In 1961, the SRTUC had affiliated to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and received significant funding. In early 1962 ICFTU officials from Brussels visited Southern Rhodesia. Maripe seized the opportunity, struck a deal, and was made the Southern Africa representative of the organization, based in Basutoland (now Lesotho). In April 1963, Maripe was recalled to the ICFTU headquarters in Brussels where he worked for some years.

In 1965, on the eve of Bechuanaland's independence from Britain, fellow-countrymen urged Maripe to return home as the newly independent country needed skilled manpower. Accordingly, in April 1968, he arrived back in Botswana. To his disappointment, there was no job for him in the country. Despondent, he flew back to Europe at the end of 1969.

It was after this second arrival in Europe that his life took a major academic turn. Using his meager resources, in 1970 he enrolled for a two-year diploma in industrial relations at Ruskin College, Oxford University, then at the University of Bath, graduating with a diploma in development economics in 1973. From Bath, his quest for education led him to the University of Sussex where, in December 1974, he graduated with a master's degree in labor studies (industrial relations). He remained at Sussex and went on to earn a DPhil in labor studies in early 1977.

Later that year, Maripe decided to go back home. This time he found employment with the Debswana Diamond Company as an industrial relations manager at its Orapa plant. He was mainly required to create "a tolerable work situation and to produce an industrial relations program within which the trade union and the management could work amicably." However, he was dismissed from the job in November 1979. Though the reasons for his dismissal are unclear, it seems that Maripe did not see eye to eye with the management of the company and was accused of siding with the workers in any dispute, despite being part of the management team. For instance, Maripe always argued that if workers were found to be at fault, the case against them had to be proven beyond doubt. This approach earned Maripe many enemies.

Maripe then entered active party politics, joining the opposition Botswana People's Party (BPP) and being appointed its political advisor. At the party's annual conference in Mahalapye, on July 11, 1982, he was elected its president. From 1984 onwards Maripe represented the party in various constituencies, but with little success. Overall, Maripe never made any significant impact on Botswana's political landscape and under his leadership the BPP witnessed a rapid decline in its following. Prompted by both old age and his party's ailing fortunes, Maripe quit active politics after the 1999 general elections and retired to his home at Nlapkwane, where he died in 2006.

SEE ALSO: Botswana, Protest and Nationalism; South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC

References and Suggested Readings

- Ananaba, W. (1979) *The Trade Union Movement in Africa: Promise and Performance*. London: Hebst.
- Mothibe, T. H. (1993) *Organized African Labour and Nationalism in Colonial Zimbabwe: 1945–1971*. PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin.
- Nkomo, J. (1984) *The Story of My Life*. London: Methuen.
- Sibanda, E. M. (2005) *The Zimbabwe African People's Union 1961–87*. Lawrenceville: Africa World Press.
- Tutwane, L. B. B. (1998) *The Life and Times of Dr. Knight T. T. Maripe*. BA dissertation, University of Botswana.
- Uwechue, R. (1991) *Africa's Who's Who*. London: Africa Books.
- Windrich, E. (1975) *The Rhodesian Problem*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Marks, J. B. (1903–1972)

Nicole Ulrich

John Beaver Marks was born on March 21, 1903 in Ventersdorp, a small town in Western Transvaal, South Africa. He was the seventh child of an interracial family, his father an African worker on the South African Railways, his mother a white laundress and midwife. In 1919, Marks studied at the Kilnerton Teachers' Training College in Pretoria, becoming part of the small, educated, black elite. His affinities lay, however, with the working class, and in the 1920s he was involved in the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) and the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). Largely due to his

father's influence, Marks also joined the African National Congress (ANC), the main African nationalist grouping.

In 1931, Marks was barred from teaching because of his political activity, and he dedicated himself to the CPSA. He traveled to Moscow to further his political education, and was elected to the Central Committee of the CPSA in 1932. Marks was a supporter of the "Native Republic" thesis, which stipulated that communists must first struggle for a deracialized capitalist South Africa, with socialism relegated to a later stage. Actively involved in attempts to bolshevize the CPSA, Marks was also part of a communist bloc in the ANC in the late 1930s. Despite opposition from more conservative members, Marks and other communists eventually occupied leading posts in the organization, which they sought to radicalize and revive. Marks became the ANC's Transvaal president, and later treasurer general.

In the 1940s, Marks became more actively involved in trade union affairs. In 1942, he was elected president of the Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU), and soon afterwards, president of the African Mineworkers' Union (AMWU), CNETU's largest affiliate. In 1946, Marks led a major African mineworkers' strike: although 60,000 workers came out, the strike was crushed, and Marks and other CPSA leaders, like W. H. Andrews, were arrested for sedition. The defeat of the strike was followed by splits in CNETU and the decline of the AMWU.

In 1948, the National Party came to power on a platform of racial apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism, ushering in a new era of repression. The CPSA was banned, and numerous left-wing activists were driven from the unions by banning orders. Marks was subjected to frequent bans and restrictions on his activities and movements. However, he continued his activism in the ANC, and was involved with the underground South African Communist Party (SACP), formed in 1953.

The ANC was declared an illegal organization in 1960, and began to establish an underground network, including an armed group with the SACP called *Umkhonto we Sizwe* ("Spear of the Nation") and foreign missions. In 1963, Marks was instructed by the National Executive Committee of the ANC to join the headquarters of the External Mission in Tanzania. He suffered

a stroke in 1971, received treatment in a sanatorium in Moscow, and died on August 1, 1972.

SEE ALSO: Communist Party of South Africa, 1921–1950; South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC

References and Suggested Readings

- Alexander, P. (2000) *Workers, War and the Origins of Apartheid: Labour and Politics in South Africa*. Cape Town: David Philip.
- Dadoo, Y. M. (1972) Speech given at funeral of J. B. Marks, Moscow, August 11. Available from the South African Communist Party website, www.sacp.org.za (downloaded November 1, 2006).
- Drew, A. (2002) *Discordant Comrades: Identities and Loyalties on the South African Left*. Pretoria: UNISA Press.
- Harmel, M. [A. Lerumo] (1987) *Fifty Fighting Years: The Communist Party of South Africa 1921–71*. London: Inkululeko.
- Meli, F. (1988) *South Africa Belongs to Us: A History of the ANC*. Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe Publishing House.
- Sechaba* (1972) J. B. Marks Obituary (October). Available from the South African Communist Party website, www.sacp.org.za (downloaded November 1, 2006).
- South African History Online website (n.d.) J. B. Marks. Available at www.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/marks-jb.htm (downloaded November 1, 2006).

Mármol, Miguel (1905–1993)

Kerstin Ewald

Miguel Mármol co-founded the Communist Party of El Salvador in 1930. As a member of the party's Central Committee, he experienced the 1932 uprising of El Salvador's masses against the dictatorship of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez and later analyzed the critical role of the Communist Party during the insurrection process. Like thousands of other insurgents and communists, he was arrested and brought before a firing squad. He survived the execution and escaped with serious injuries. This incident and his untiring revolutionary work earned Mármol an almost legendary reputation within the Latin American left. This position was consolidated by Salvadoran poet Roque Dalton's book about Mármol and by Uruguayan historian Eduardo

Galeano, who raised him to the status of metaphoric symbol for Latin America's fate.

Mármol and his two sisters were brought up by their mother, Santos Mármol, in Ilopango, near the capital of El Salvador. Because of the family's precarious situation, he worked as an assistant at the local National Guard office. The National Guard was El Salvador's military police, and it became increasingly involved in human rights violations in the name of oligarchic regimes. Mármol's work acquainted him with the torture chambers in his country, and he was shocked by the cruelty he witnessed there.

Mármol left his work with the police and became apprenticed as a shoemaker in a workshop in El Salvador, where his master introduced him to political literature and gave him information about the Russian Revolution. Around 1920, Mármol began trade union organizing, beginning with the shoemakers. His efforts led to the founding of the Regional Workers' Federation of El Salvador (FRTS). This federation, which at one time numbered 75,000 members, initially had strong anarchosindicalist tendencies, while Mármol and those around him leaned strongly toward communist positions. Within the FRTS, Mármol started to organize fishermen, workers, small farmers, women with small businesses, and local youth. With the aim of unifying democratic forces and fighting poverty, the federation's organizational work included popular education, a popular savings bank, credits to small businesses, cultural events, and welfare measures.

In 1930, Mármol joined a group of 30 individuals, mostly craftsmen, at a remote beach on Lake Ilopango to found the Communist Party of El Salvador, serving as organization secretary of the Central Committee. A crucial item in the party's program was the preparation of a civil-democratic revolution in order to promote industrialization and rural development, basic steps that were considered requirements for a communist revolution.

Mármol represented El Salvador at the conference of the Profintern, the Red International of Labor Unions, in Moscow in 1930. On this trip he had the opportunity to experience the achievements of the Russian Revolution at first hand and became somewhat disillusioned with the country's level of development. Upon his return to El Salvador, however, he presented open-minded reports to the organized workers, who

were on the verge of an uprising. Burdened by the world economic crises that depressed the poor majority, and exposed to legal uncertainty and military brutality, the people of El Salvador witnessed the overthrow of the government of the popular president, Arturo Araujo, by a coup d'état led by Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in December 1931.

News of the uprising that ensued in January 1932 caught the Salvadoran Communist Party unprepared. Having decided to take part in the presidential elections, the Communist Party had begun its campaign. When the population started to revolt in some parts of the country, the party leadership was convinced that the time was not yet ripe for a revolution. Its first reaction was to send in party officials to calm the situation. Accordingly, Mármol was delegated to Ahuachapan, where parts of the local population had occupied the local base of the security forces. Following party orders, Mármol tried to pacify the population, arguing in favor of a general strike.

After the electoral fraud and the failure of attempted negotiations with Martínez, the uprisings continued. The Communist Party took charge of the insurrection and started to prepare for an offensive. The date chosen for concerted action was twice postponed, giving the government of Martínez the opportunity to arrest prominent party leaders, including Farabundo Martí. Nevertheless, in some parts of the country, the people carried out operations according to plan, mostly without firearms, with no means of transport or communication, and with no plan for an orderly withdrawal.

Mármol was caught by the National Guard before he could return to Ilopango. He was sentenced to death but survived the execution due to the firing squad's inaccuracy. While Mármol managed to escape into hiding and recover from his injuries, throughout the country there was wholesale persecution and killing of those who had taken part or were suspected of taking part in the rebellion. The number massacred during the 14 years of the Martínez dictatorship is estimated at over 30,000. All popular organizational structures were destroyed. Hiding in the eastern part of El Salvador, Mármol managed to contact other survivors of the uprising and build up a clandestine cell of the Communist Party. Growing in self-confidence, he began taking steps toward a new popular movement.

Mármol spent the years between 1934 and 1936 imprisoned in solitary confinement. After his release he found himself the object of resentment of several members of the Communist Party's new Central Committee, who suspected him of cooperating with the security forces. During this period the party leadership disagreed over strategy, and Mármol returned to his labor organizing efforts, founding the National Alliance of Shoemakers and the National Union of Workers (UNT). Remaining a loyal member of the Communist Party, he followed the instructions of party leaders and went into exile in Guatemala, where he worked as a lecturer for activists in the Claridad School and again engaged in organizing workers. He remained in Guatemala until 1954, when the overthrow of President Arbenz put an end to the country's Democratic Spring.

Mármol was detained again by the Salvadoran authorities in 1968. At age 76, he was refused as a combatant in the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) during El Salvador's guerilla war (1980–92). He went into exile in Cuba, returning in 1992 when the FMLN left the mountains to demobilize and sign the peace agreement. He died the following year.

SEE ALSO: Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN); Guatemala, Democratic Spring, 1944–1954; *La Matanza* 1932 Peasant Revolt; Martí, Farabundo (1893–1932); Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907

References and Suggested Readings

- Dalton, R. (1987) *Miguel Marmol*. Willimantic, CT: Curbstone Press.
- Halow, B. (1991) Testimonio and Survival: Roque Dalton's Miguel Marmol. *Latin American Perspectives* 18, 4 (October): 9–21.
- Lindo-Fuente, H. et al. (2007) *Remembering a Massacre in El Salvador: The Insurrection of 1932, Roque Dalton, and the Politics of Historical Memory*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Martí, Farabundo (1893–1932)

Tobias Lambert

Agustín Farabundo Martí was a communist leader and social protester in El Salvador. Today he is one of the most popular icons

among the Salvadoran left. While studying political science and law at the University of El Salvador, he participated in a student protest against the government of Jorge Meléndez in February 1920. Meléndez was one of the presidents during the so-called Meléndez–Quiñónez dynasty, which governed the country between 1913 and 1927. Police suppressed the protest violently and arrested 20 students, including Martí, who was deported to Guatemala. There he abandoned his studies and began work, obtaining jobs in breweries and also working as a bricklayer, a day laborer in the countryside, and a private teacher. When German coffee planters accused him of being an agitator, Martí went to Mexico, returning to Guatemala in 1923. Two years later he co-founded the Central American Communist Party, which continued until 1927.

In 1925, like many revolutionaries during this time, Martí was deported from Guatemala back to El Salvador. There, President Alfonso Quiñónez Molina banished him from the country and sent him to Nicaragua, but a few days later Martí returned to El Salvador clandestinely. He joined the Regional Federation of Salvadoran Workers (*Federación Regional de Trabajadores Salvadoreños*, FRTS), a huge Salvadoran labor union founded in 1924. Between 1925 and 1928 in particular he worked intensively inside the FRTS, earning a reputation as a powerful agitator and promoter, although he preferred to convince people in personal conversations since he was not a good speaker.

In 1927, Pio Romero Bosque became president of El Salvador, after the Meléndez–Quiñónez dynasty had ruled the country for 14 years. The new government initially brought a limited democratic opening. Under pressure from the FRTS, it decreed some moderate labor laws. Meanwhile, the organized peasant (*campesino*) movement expanded significantly.

In March 1928 Martí traveled to New York where he visited the Anti-Imperialist League of the Americas. He was arrested when police raided the office of the organization during his visit. Following this incident he returned to El Salvador. In June 1928 he traveled to Nicaragua to join the partisan army of Augusto César Sandino, who was fighting against the US occupation. Martí joined the armed combat and soon became Sandino's private secretary. In October 1929, however, he split from Sandino after traveling with him to Mexico to seek sup-

port for the Nicaraguan cause. Later he declared that in his view Sandino was neither an anti-imperialist nor a communist.

In 1930 Martí was expelled from Mexico and returned to El Salvador. There he worked as a representative of International Red Aid (*Socorro Rojo Internacional*), which supported communist prisoners and was connected to the Communist International. In March 1930 he co-founded the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS). The period was characterized by a deteriorating economic and social situation, caused by the plummeting price of coffee, the country's principal export, and by the Great Depression, which had begun in October 1929. There were a growing number of worker protests, to which the government responded with repression, imprisonment, and prohibition of communist agitation and propaganda, decreed in August and October 1930. The protests were led by the PCS and the FRTS.

Martí soon became the central figure in the popular struggle in El Salvador. In December 1930, just before the presidential elections, he was arrested. While in prison he went on hunger strike and was once more banished. He left the country on a merchant ship destined for San Pedro, California, but returned on the same ship to El Salvador, where the authorities refused him entry. Finally he went to Nicaragua and reentered El Salvador on February 20. In the meantime, Arturo Araujo of the Labor Party (*Partido Laborista*) had won the elections.

The worker protests and repression by the police continued without respite. Martí was arrested several times for "communist agitation" and "defamation of the president." Nationwide meetings of solidarity were held in aid of Martí. Once again he went on hunger strike. After 27 days, parliament granted him an amnesty. In September 1931, however, Martí was arrested again, this time for protesting the killing of 15 workers. President Arturo Araujo made an attempt to include Martí in his government, but Martí refused and was sent to Guatemala again, returning a few days later.

On December 2, 1931, Araujo was overthrown by a military coup. The former vice-president, General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez, became president, ruling the country until 1944. In January 1932, regional and parliamentary elections were held. The Communist Party participated, although the elections took place in a

climate of repression and fraud. After the failure of talks between the central committee of the CPS and General Martínez about ending the repression, the party decided to launch an uprising against the military dictatorship. Martí was to assume the military command, but on January 19, police entered the insurgents' hiding place, arresting Martí and student activists Alfonso Luna and Mario Zapata and confiscating material that proved the group's intention to revolt. On January 20 the government imposed a state of emergency. Nevertheless, two days later the uprising began with thousands of indigenous people and *campesinos*, mostly armed with machetes, occupying several cities in the western parts of El Salvador.

The military put down the rebellion within three days and killed up to 30,000 people. Martí, Luna, and Zapata were executed on February 1 for "insurgency and rebellion." Martí is the most important reference point for the Salvadoran left today. The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), which was a revolutionary guerilla group during the Salvadoran Civil War and now is one of the two principal political parties in El Salvador, was named after him.

SEE ALSO: Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN); *La Matanza* 1932 Peasant Revolt; Mármol, Miguel (1905–1993); Salvadoran Civil War, 1980–1991; Sandino, Augusto César (1895–1934)

References and Suggested Readings

- Almeida, P. D. (2008) *Waves of Protest: Popular Struggle in El Salvador, 1925–2005*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Anderson, T. P. (1971) *Matanza: El Salvador's Communist Revolt of 1932*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska.
- Arias Gomez, J. (1972) *Farabundo Martí*. San José, Costa Rica: Ed. Univ. Centroamericana EDUCA.
- Brienza, H. (2004) *Farabundo Martí, Rebellion En El Patio Trasero*. Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual.

Martí, José (1853–1895) and the Partido Revolucionario Cubano

Edward T. Brett

José Julián Martí y Pérez is considered the father of Cuban independence, but he was much more. He was a philosopher, statesman, poet,

essayist, orator, journalist, advocate of racial and class equality, and revolutionary. Martí was born in Havana, Cuba, on January 28, 1853. His father, Mariano Martí Navarro, was a native of Spain and his mother, Leonor Pérez Cabrera, was from the Canary Islands. He was the oldest of eight children and the only boy. The family was poor, and Martí was only able to attend high school due to the support of Rafael María Mendive, an enlightened thinker and school teacher whose views did much to influence Martí's early political and moral development.

In early 1869, a year after the first Cuban war for independence (the Ten Years' War) commenced, the 15-year-old anti-colonialist Martí began a newspaper, *La Patria Libre* (The Free Fatherland), and wrote his first notable poem, "10 de octubre." His short-lived newspaper was terminated, however, when the Spanish authorities closed his school in March and arrested him in October because he had authored a letter denouncing a fellow student who had pro-Spanish proclivities. Despite his youth, he was sentenced to six years of hard labor in a rock quarry. In early 1870, however, his sentence was commuted and he was exiled to Spain, where he soon penned his "El presidio político en Cuba" (Political Imprisonment in Cuba), a scathing indictment of the harsh treatment of prisoners in his homeland by Spanish colonial authorities.

He attended the universities of Madrid and Saragossa and, after graduating with a Bachelor of Arts degree and a licentiate in law, he secretly returned to Cuba, where he spent two months in 1877 and about a year in 1878–9. Aside from this short time, he spent the rest of his life, prior to his last month in 1895, in exile. Although he taught for a short time in Guatemala and worked as a journalist in Mexico and Venezuela, he spent nearly all of his years in exile in the United States.

Immediately after his arrival in New York City in January 1880, Martí joined the Cuban Revolutionary Committee and quickly rose to prominence as the Cuba Libre movement's most sophisticated thinker and foremost propagandist. Realizing that the previous revolutionary wars in Cuba had failed due to lack of preparation, unity, and proper political organization, he worked tirelessly to address these problems. He argued that independence was only one part of a larger process, one in which all Cubans, black and white, rich and poor, must strive together

to eradicate socioeconomic injustice. The future Cuba must not only be independent, he noted, but free of racial and class inequality and oppression. He also warned his fellow Cuban patriots to be weary of offers of help from the United States, contending that the real aim of North Americans was eventual annexation and economic dominance of the Caribbean island. Indeed, he argued that this was why Cuban separatists must be unified, well prepared, and well organized before embarking on another war for independence. A quick, decisive victory was essential, because a prolonged struggle would provide the United States with an excuse to intervene and mediate a solution that in the long run would make Cuba subservient to US imperial interests.

In 1892 Martí formed the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Cubano, PRC) in an attempt to bring all dissident Cubans together so that they could work in harmony for a free, independent Cuban republic. On March 25, 1895, Martí, together with General Máximo Gómez y Báez, issued the Manifesto of Montecristi, which declared Cuban independence, the termination of all racially distinctive laws, and war with those who resisted independence. Seventeen days later he and General Gómez, along with a small revolutionary force, landed in Cuba. Just before they sailed, however, US authorities confiscated the boats and weapons that Martí had secretly assembled in Fernandina, Florida. This proved disastrous for Martí in that it forced him to defer to the autocratic-minded Cuban generals who had already been fighting the Spanish in Cuba.

Martí was killed on May 19, 1895 at the Battle of Dos Ríos. The war continued for three years after his death, but revolutionary leaders for the most part ignored his political ideals. It was not until the 1920s and 1930s that Cuban nationalists resurrected his memory and his philosophical and moral concepts became a model for a new generation of Cubans, who sought to bring about a more just society.

Martí is universally recognized as one of the greatest Latin American literary talents of the nineteenth century. An astute observer of the complexities and contradictions of US society as well as of the injustices of Spanish colonialism, he wrote countless essays on these and other topics for over 20 Spanish American periodicals. In 1889 he published a magazine for children,

Edad de Oro (Golden Age), which was widely read. *Ismaelillo* (1882), a collection of poems written for his son, and *Versos sencillos* (1891) are his best-known poetic works. After his death, several verses of the latter collection were combined with music from a traditional Cuban folk melody. Called *Guantanamera*, it has become one of Cuba's most loved folksongs. His style has influenced many Spanish American poets, including Rubén Darío and Gabriela Mistral, and many scholars consider him the father of literary modernism.

SEE ALSO: Cuba, Anti-Racist Movement and the Partido Independiente de Color; Cuba, Struggle for Independence from Spain, 1868–1898

References and Suggested Readings

- Abel, C. & Torrents, N. (Eds.) (1986) *José Martí: Revolutionary Democrat*. London: Athlone Press.
 Baralt, L. (Ed.) (1966) *Martí on the USA*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
 Pérez, L. (2006) *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
 Turton, P. (1986) *José Martí: Architect of Cuba's Freedom*. London: Zed Books.

Martov, Julius (1873–1923)

Pavla Vesela

In their biography of Martov, historians Savelev and Tiutiukin (2006) argued that “Martov had in his own way become a symbol of protest against social injustice, political falsehood, and demagoguery, the personification of a splendid dream of a world without violence and war.” Martov, who entertained himself as a boy by imagining a utopian city called Prilichensk, became the leader of the Mensheviks, the non-Leninist faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). Martov's Marxism was generally marked by internationalism, moderation, and revolutionary pacifism.

Julius Martov was born Yuly Osipovich Tserdobaum on November 24, 1873 in Constantinople into a prosperous Jewish family. Although the Tserdobaums observed few Jewish customs and their children grew up in a materialistic environment, they nevertheless suffered from anti-Semitism. As a student of St. Petersburg University, Martov joined the Narodniki,

a populist organization, but his attachment was short-lived. At 19, he turned to Marxism, resulting soon after in his first arrest and exile in Vilno, where he continued to read and edit Marxist literature. He became a member of the Bund, a Jewish socialist group, and distributed propaganda among workers calling for a Jewish working-class party.

On returning to St. Petersburg in 1895, Martov became internationalist in outlook, which became a dominant characteristic of his Marxism throughout his life. He was among the founding members of the Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class, for which he was again arrested and sent into exile in Siberia. After returning in 1900, Martov joined with Vladimir Lenin and other Marxists, including Vera Zasulich, Pavel Akselrod, and Georgi Plekhanov, working for the Marxist newspaper *Iskra*, first from Russia and later from Munich, while in exile. His exceptional journalistic ability proved vital for the newspaper: between the years 1900 and 1903 he published 49 articles, including topics on the peasant question, the struggle against liberalism, economism, and nationalism.

In 1902, however, internal disputes among Marxists began, culminating at the Second Party Congress of RSDLP in 1903. Lenin's proposal for a party of professional revolutionaries and effort to assume editorial control over *Iskra* eventually split the party into the Bolshevik and the Menshevik factions. Martov became the leader of the Mensheviks. Besides calling for a party open to the masses and modeled on its western counterparts, such as the German Democratic Socialist Party, the Mensheviks generally defended gradual and moderate rather than revolutionary transition to socialism, including continuing with the essential stage of capitalism.

Although the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks cooperated somewhat after the 1903 Congress and they converged in numerous points of analysis of contemporary society, after the October Revolution in 1917 the Mensheviks were gradually more marginalized and suppressed. Martov, who was reelected to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (CEC), took a position in the Moscow Soviet, and supported the Soviet government against the Civil War (1918–22), but he continued to publish articles critical of the Bolsheviks in the Menshevik press. Eventually, he

was arrested by the Cheka (the political police) in 1918, and in 1920 went into exile. From Berlin, he published over 80 articles for RSDLP's Delegation Abroad's official periodical, *The Socialist Courier*. Until his death, Martov continued to defend the Mensheviks in the Soviet Union and criticized what he saw as the authoritarian measures of the Bolsheviks, considering the October Revolution a Bonapartist perversion. He died in 1923.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marxism; Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918); Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Zasulich, Vera (1849–1919)

References and Suggested Readings

- Geifman, A. (Ed.) (1999) *Russia Under the Last Tsar: Opposition and Subversion, 1894–1917*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Getzler, I. (1967) *Martov: A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat*. Cambridge: Melbourne University Press.
- Savelev, P. I. & Tiutiukin S. V. (2006) Iulii Osipovich Martov (1873–1923): The Man and the Politician. *Russian Studies in History* 45, 1 (Summer): 6–92.

Marx, Eleanor (1855–1898)

Marcelline Block

Jenny Julia Eleanor Marx, the sixth and last child of Karl Marx and Jenny Von Westphalen, was born in London. She formed a close bond with her father early on and shared his love for literature and fascination for drama. Karl Marx felt a kindred spirit to his gifted daughter and stated: "Tussy is me" (Florence 1975: 11).

Eleanor Marx made many literary as well as political contributions of her own. Her lifelong love of literature led her to translate into English such masterpieces as Ibsen's *The Doll's House*, *The Wild Duck*, and *Lady of the Sea* and Flaubert's *Madame Bovary*. She also edited Friedrich Engels's *Revolution and Counterrevolution* and edited and translated several of her father's works, such as *Value, Price, and Profit: Addressed to Working Men; Revolution and Counter-Revolution, or, Germany in 1848*; and *The Eastern Question, A Reprint of Letters Written 1853–1856 Dealing with the Events of the Crimean War*. After her father's death in 1883 she was responsible for

editing, translating, and publishing his unfinished manuscripts, as well as *Das Kapital*.

Her own works include *The Factory Hell* (1885), *The Woman Question* (1886), *Shelley's Socialism: Two Lectures* (1888), and *The Working-Class Movement in America* (1888), all of which were co-written with her common-law husband, Edward Aveling, and *The Working-Class Movement in England*. She also contributed many articles to *Justice*, the political journal edited by H. H. Champion, and *Commonweal*, the Socialist League's newspaper.

Marx was politically active from an early age. Before age 16, she began traveling with her father as his secretary to numerous socialist conferences, which led her to a lifelong involvement in political activism. She joined the Social Democratic Federation (SDF) in 1884 but left it soon after to found the rival Socialist League, but she rejoined the SDF in 1897. In 1885 she helped organize the International Socialist Congress in Paris. In England, she was active in the Women's Trade Union League and was a supporter of strikes such as the Bryant and May strike of 1888, the London Dock Strike, and Silvertown Strike of Rubber Workers in 1889. She organized the Women's Branch of the National Union of Gasworkers and General Labourers and attended the Second International as a British delegate.

Although Marx led a rewarding intellectual and exciting professional life, making many contributions to the causes for which she was politically active, on the personal front she experienced tragic events. First, when her father opposed her engagement at age 17 to the French activist and writer Lissagaray, who was twice her age, she faced a crisis of loyalty (Evans 1982: xviii). Eleanor also suffered from anorexia throughout her life, particularly during her mother's terminal illness in 1881. Finally, in 1884, she learned that Edward Aveling had secretly married an actress while he was living with her as her common-law husband. It is believed that this latest humiliation was the trigger that led her to commit suicide by ingesting prussic acid, not unlike Madame Bovary. Her friends and relatives blamed Aveling for her death, but he escaped punishment and enjoyed her inheritance for the six months he survived her.

SEE ALSO: *Communist Manifesto*; Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); International Socialism: Mass Politics;

Internationals; Jews and Revolution in Europe, 1789–1919; Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism

References and Suggested Readings

- Apter, E. (2007) Taskography: Translation as Genre of Literary Labor. *PMLA* 122, 5 (October): 1403–15.
- Evans, F. (Ed. and Trans.) (1982) *The Daughters of Karl Marx: Family Correspondence, 1866–98*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Florence, R. (1975) *Marx's Daughters: Eleanor Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, Angelica Balabanoff*. New York: Dial Press.
- Kapp, Y. (1972–6) *Eleanor Marx*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Tsuzuki, C. (1967) *The Life of Eleanor Marx, 1855–1898: A Socialist Tragedy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Marx, Karl (1818–1883)

Paul Le Blanc

Karl Heinrich Marx, generally acknowledged as a giant in the realms of social science and philosophy, and as an outstanding revolutionary of the nineteenth century, is perhaps the foremost representative of modern socialism.

Early Years

Marx was born in the city of Trier, Prussia, in what was later part of Germany. He was the third of nine children (although five of these siblings died at relatively early ages). Marx's parents were Jewish, but his father, deeply influenced by the Enlightenment and liberal ideas, formally converted to Protestantism in 1816–17 in order to find greater success in his law practice. The family was relatively well-to-do, making it possible to send young Karl to secondary school and then to the University of Berlin.

Marx proved to be an exceptional student, particularly interested in philosophy, and he was drawn to political currents that were critical of the Prussian monarchy and the traditional power structures of old Europe. Some among these currents were especially attracted to radical interpretations of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), whose comprehensive and dialectical approach to philosophy embraced, somewhat covertly, conceptions of freedom and transformation associated with the French Revolution. Those who sought to draw out and develop the radical implications of Hegel's philosophy



Considered by both supporters and opponents as one of the most significant philosophers of the modern era, Karl Marx (1818–83) was a social, political, and economic theorist who helped found scientific socialism, or communism. Marx sought to organize an international movement for social transformation toward equality. He co-authored the Communist Manifesto with Friedrich Engels and is author of the seminal historical critique of the modern economy, *Das Kapital*. This photo was taken in 1860. (Getty Images)

became known as the “Young Hegelians” or “Left-Hegelians,” a current that included David Strauss (who developed a secularized account of the historical Jesus), Bruno Bauer (who developed an outlook of radical atheism), Ludwig Feuerbach (who sought to go beyond abstract philosophy toward a materialistic humanism), Arnold Ruge (who pushed in the direction of liberal democracy), and Moses Hess (who reached toward the social equality of communism). In the thick of all this was Marx himself, along with a soon-to-be close friend, Friedrich Engels, and other young academic radicals of the 1830s and early 1840s. Hegel’s dialectics – seeing reality as an ever-developing totality of dynamic inter-

connections – have been labeled “the algebra of revolution.” Marx made intensive use of this philosophical orientation in the development of his own revolutionary perspectives.

A number of factors encouraged Marx’s radicalism. Upon graduating in 1841, he found that an academic career was closed to him thanks to conservative domination over Prussian intellectual life. At the beginning of 1842, however, he had assumed the editorship of a new liberal opposition newspaper, the *Rheinische Zeitung* (Rhineland Times), which quickly ran into trouble with the Prussian censors and after a year was closed down.

It was not only negative experiences with the Prussian authorities that drove Marx in a more radical direction, however. There had long been left-wing influences – including Ludwig von Westphalen, an influential neighbor and Marx’s future father-in-law who, although a nobleman, was a vocal admirer of French utopian socialist Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon. Even more important was Marx’s journalistic work, through which he became convinced of his own limited understanding of social problems and economic realities – sending him into intensive studies (dramatically reflected in his unpublished *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*) that culminated in an uncompromising belief in the need for democratic and working-class revolutions that would replace capitalism with socialism.

In this period Marx married a longtime sweetheart, Jenny von Westphalen (1814–81), herself a highly cultured woman with revolutionary inclinations. Thanks to their dangerous left-wing commitments, the couple would suffer through many years of relative poverty, with two sons, Edgar and Guido, and a daughter, Franziska, dying during their most difficult years of exile in the 1850s – although three remarkable daughters, Jenny, Laura, and the vibrant Eleanor, grew up and followed in their parents’ radical footsteps. Some years later, it was discovered by Eleanor that there had also been an “illegitimate” child (Frederick) from a union between Marx and family friend and housekeeper Hélène Demuth.

In the mid-1840s Marx also began what would be a lifelong intellectual partnership with Friedrich Engels (1820–95), whose intellectual and political development had already brought him into radical working-class and socialist circles. The two comrades created an intellectual synthesis, blending classical German philosophy,

the classical political economy predominant in Britain (through the works of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and others), and French political thought associated with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. One could trace within it elements associated with Romanticism as well, and the powerful impact of the Industrial Revolution and the conceptualizations of utopian socialists like Saint-Simon, Robert Owen, and Charles Fourier, as well as the experience and theorizations of early working-class movements in Europe and North America (early trade union formations, the British Chartists, embryonic workers' parties of the United States, left-wing educational and discussion groups among European artisans). The resulting approach developed by Marx and Engels has helped to shape almost all subsequent realms of human inquiry – ranging from philosophy and literature to the natural sciences, but particularly the social sciences: history, economics, sociology, anthropology, political science.

Historical Materialism and Class Struggle

The development of Marx's distinctive views of history and social development can be traced in a rich array of letters and unpublished manuscripts, but also in a number of major works that were published in his lifetime.

Among the earliest of these was *The Poverty of Philosophy* (1847), a critique of the theorizing offered in anarchist Pierre Joseph Proudhon's writings, which Marx considered to contain badly flawed ways of looking at how social change can be brought about. Defining society as “the product of men's reciprocal action,” Marx insisted that it would be a mistake to follow Proudhon in the simple belief that “men are free to choose this or that form of society for themselves.” He argued that elemental, material aspects of reality would naturally block certain possibilities and generate others. On the other hand, embedded in the very structure of capitalist society, Marx argued, is a force that has the capacity to be a revolutionary class – the proletariat or working class, which is necessarily exploited and oppressed by the capitalist class, or bourgeoisie. “An oppressed class is the vital condition for every society founded on the antagonism of classes,” and “of all the instruments of production, the greatest productive power is the revolutionary

class itself.” Against the view that the working class coming to power could bring about a new despotism, Marx noted that “the condition for the emancipation of the working class is the abolition of every class,” that “the working class, in the course of its development, will substitute for the old civil society an association which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will be no more political power properly so-called, since political power is precisely the official expression of antagonism in civil society.”

In the wake of the failed revolutionary upsurges of 1848, when in France a new despotism was established by an adventurer who proclaimed himself Napoleon III, Marx sought to explain events in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852). Here he emphasized: “Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted.” He sought to show how substantial obstacles could prevent the realization of the popularly desired “social republic” of the laboring classes, that “proletarian revolutions . . . , such as those of the nineteenth century, constantly engage in self-criticism, and in repeated interruptions of their own course.” Time after time, experiencing serious reverses after seeming victories, “they shrink back again and again before the indeterminate immensity of their own goals, until the situation is created in which any retreat is impossible” and revolution becomes, at last, an absolute necessity.

In his first sustained economic analysis of capitalism, *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), Marx wrote:

In the social production of their life men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At

a certain stage of their development, material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or – what is but a legal expression for the same thing – with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.

The development of industrial capitalism, according to Marx, was creating the necessary preconditions for the working-class revolution that would be capable of bringing about socialism or communism (for Marx the terms were synonymous). As in all previous forms of class society, Marx explained in *Capital*, capitalism required a large class of laborers whose labor could produce not only enough to keep them alive, but also a surplus that could be taken over for the benefit of a minority class of exploiters. “If the worker needs to use all his time to produce the necessary means of subsistence for himself and his family, he has no time left in which to perform unpaid labor for other people,” he wrote. “Unless labor has attained a certain level of productivity, the worker will have no such free time at his disposal, and without superfluous time there can be no surplus labor, hence no capitalists, as also no slave-owners, no feudal barons, in a word no class of large-scale landed proprietors.”

The advance of technology (tools and productive knowledge) was essential for economic and therefore historical development. A characteristic of capitalism that made it distinct from the ancient slave civilizations and feudalism was that its internal dynamics had generated a profound and ongoing Industrial Revolution that qualitatively increased economic productivity (more products being produced with less labor), making it possible to establish a socialist or communist society in which a decent life and a high level of free development would become possible for all. The situation of the modern working class, Marx was convinced, would push it in the direction of struggling for such a society of the free and the equal.

In an 1852 letter, Marx wrote that “no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society nor yet the struggle between them,” since historians and economists

before him had already “described the historical development of this class struggle and . . . [the] economic anatomy of the classes.” He felt that his own contribution could be summarized by three points: “(1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with *particular, historic phases in the development of production*; (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the *dictatorship of the proletariat*; (3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the *abolition of all classes* and to a classless society.”

Although contributing to considerable confusion among latter-day academics and some would-be followers, careful scholars have demonstrated that the term “dictatorship of the proletariat” was – for Marx and others of his time – synonymous with the conception of “political rule by the working class,” consistent not with any conception of small-group despotism but with the notion of working-class democracy.

The mode of analysis that sees historical development as explicable through the examination of the interplay of forces of production and relations of production, of economic and technological development with the development of and struggle between classes, has been labeled *the materialist conception of history*, a more succinct term being *historical materialism*.

Capital

In his massive and complex masterwork *Capital* (1867), Marx describes capitalism as *a system of generalized commodity production*, that is, a system in which the production of commodities (and the transformation of more and more aspects of life into commodities) becomes increasingly dominant in society’s economic life. He begins with an intensive analysis of what a commodity is. Although it must have some use for people in society, what makes something a commodity is the fact that it is produced for the purpose of exchange (for trade, to sell). What determines its exchange-value is the mystery that Marx seeks to unravel. In modern capitalism, the means of exchange – money – establishes the cost of one commodity or another. So why do certain commodities (say, pairs of shoes) have one price, and other commodities (say, loaves of bread) have another price?

In the capitalist mode of production, the modern-day capitalist is the individual who invests money-capital into productive capital

(various commodities that constitute the means of production, raw materials and tools, plus the labor-power of workers) for the purpose of producing commodity-capital that can be sold for a larger amount of money-capital than that with which he started. This increase in capital (or capital accumulation) is the source of the capitalist's profits – and it is the need to maximize these capitalist profits that causes the mighty capitalist economy to function. But what is it in the capitalist production process that increases the value of capital?

In the analytical explorations in *Capital*, Marx distinguishes between what workers do with what capitalists do in regard to money and commodities. The worker needs money to buy such commodities as food, clothing, and shelter. The worker normally has no way of getting money except by selling the one commodity that she or he owns, the ability to work (labor-power). If M stands for *money* and C stands for *commodities*, the worker provides the commodity of labor-power to secure money in order to buy commodities, represented by the formula C-M-C. In contrast, the capitalist invests money into commodities which yield money that is increased (M'), which is represented by the formula M-C-M'. According to Marx, there is an invisible link between the formulas representing what the worker and the capitalist do.

Adapting the *labor theory of value* developed by Adam Smith and others, Marx asserts that the value of any commodity is determined by the amount of labor (or, more precisely, socially necessary labor) that it contains. Shoes have a different value than bread, for example, because each contains different proportions of labor. The value of the worker's special commodity, labor-power (the ability to work), is determined by the amount of labor it ultimately takes to provide such things as food, clothing, or shelter that were required to produce and maintain the worker's ability to work. This is, roughly speaking, what the capitalist pays the worker in the form of wages.

Marx then goes on to emphasize that there is a difference between *labor-power* (the ability to work) and the *actual labor* that is squeezed out of this ability to work. The worker sells his or her ability to work for a specific length of time (for example, ten hours a day, six days a week). What the capitalist pays for is the ability to work, but what he actually gets is the actual labor. In a certain amount of time (say five or six

hours) enough commodities are produced whose money equivalent is the same as the worker's wage for that day – and these things Marx calls “necessary labor time” and “necessary labor.” But since the worker has sold *the ability to work for the entire workday*, the capitalist is able to keep the worker laboring for an additional four or five hours, for a period of “surplus labor time” amounting to unpaid labor, or what Marx labels “surplus labor.” The value produced to cover the wages of the worker is “necessary value,” but the additional value produced is *surplus-value*, which is the source of capitalist profits and the key to the capitalist accumulation process.

In order to advance the process of capital accumulation, capitalists increasingly strive to increase productivity through advancing technology and through drawing more and more workers into a cooperative production process. “The driving motive and determining purpose of capitalist production is the self-valorization of capital to the greatest possible extent, i.e. the greatest possible production of surplus-value, hence the greatest possible exploitation of labor-power by the capitalist,” Marx notes. “As the number of the cooperating workers increases, so too does their resistance to the domination of capital, and, necessarily, the pressure put on by capital to overcome this resistance.”

While Marx demonstrates considerable confidence in the ability of capitalists to find various ways to maintain and intensify their domination over an extended period of time, he explores in the pages of *Capital* an accumulation of complications and contradictions which will, in his opinion, ensure the eventual end of capitalism. The growing productivity and centralization of the capitalist economy, and the growing concentration of ownership, wealth, and power in the hands of fewer powerful enterprises, creates a situation for the capitalists that is guaranteed to whirl out of control:

other developments take place on an ever-increasing scale, such as the growth of the cooperative form of the labor process, the conscious technical application of science, the planned exploitation of the soil, the transformation of the means of labor into forms in which they can only be used in common, the economizing of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialized labor, the entanglement of all peoples

in the net of the world market, and, with this, the growth of the international character of the capitalist regime. Along with the constant decrease in the number of capitalist magnates, who usurp and monopolize all the advantages of this process of transformation, the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation and exploitation grows; but with this there also grows the revolt of the working class, a class constantly increasing in numbers, and trained, united and organized by the very mechanism of the capitalist process of production. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production which has flourished alongside and under it. The centralization of the means of production and the socialization of labor reach a point at which they become incompatible with their capitalist integument [covering]. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.

Marx comments that the creation of “capitalist private property” was “naturally an incomparably more protracted, violent and difficult process than the transformation of capitalist private property, which in fact already rests on the carrying on of production by society, into social property.” The earlier form of expropriation carried out under capitalism “was a matter of the expropriation of the mass of people by a few usurpers,” while with the coming of socialism through a working-class revolution “we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people.”

From Communist League to International Workingmen’s Association

Much scholarship has concentrated on critical or appreciative expositions of Marx’s theories, minimizing, belittling, or ignoring the practical political work on which much of his life was actually focused. Central to Marx’s outlook was the insistence that a positive future for the working class and the relevance of the socialist movement were each dependent upon their coming together. This caused him to become committed to the development of working-class organizations and struggles.

In the mid-1840s, he and Engels became immersed in a network of communist-orientated political groups that became known as Com-

munist Committees of Correspondence which in 1847 were invited to merge with a larger revolutionary group, the League of the Just, into a newly established Communist League. The League of the Just had been a secret conspiratorial society, influenced by radical social and political ideas in the decades following the French Revolution, with a base among artisans and craftsmen of various European countries who, under the impact of industrial capitalism, found themselves being transformed into wage-workers. The Communist League, in part because of the insistence of Marx and Engels, became a democratic organization that openly sought to advance the struggles of the working class. In contrast to some figures in this milieu, such as the fiery artisan-intellectual Wilhelm Weitling, they insisted that the strategy and tactics of the workers’ movement must go beyond radical-utopian rhetoric and instead be grounded in an understanding of actual social-economic forces and possibilities.

The membership of the Communist League – whose views were converging with the analytical, strategic, and tactical orientation that Marx and Engels had been developing – commissioned the two to write a *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848) for the purpose of publicly explaining the outlook and purposes of the organization. With dramatic prose and concise formulations, the *Manifesto* outlined a materialist conception of European history, a sweeping and incisive critique of capitalism against which was posed the vision of a communist future: “In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”

The *Manifesto* also offered a summary of early working-class struggles and a practical program for the working class involving the development of trade unions, the struggle for social and democratic reforms, and the development of a labor party that would help lead the working class to “win the battle of democracy,” taking political power and initiating a transition from capitalism to socialism. Marx and Engels described communists as participating fully in such developments, constituting “practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line

of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.”

The *Manifesto* appeared as the revolutionary upsurge of 1848 swept through Europe. Marx and Engels saw the German revolutionary movement as a democratic upsurge to sweep away monarchs and aristocracies, bringing into being a unified, modern republic animated by the ideal of “rule by the people.” Within this they hoped to rally a broadly democratic left wing that would push the upsurge beyond the compromises with the old order that some liberals were reaching for, and to crystallize an even more radical working-class socialist current that would be prepared to push for “rule by the people” over not only society’s political life but also its economic life. In the swirl of events, Marx became the editor-in-chief of the influential left-liberal democratic daily *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, which had a readership of 6,000.

At the same time, the Communist League was dissolved, its members becoming absorbed into broader and looser formations and activities. Marx initially favored this dissolution, but as events unfolded to block the more revolutionary developments he had anticipated, he concluded this had been a mistake. The moderation of the liberals (frightened by the radical possibilities of revolutionary mass action) helped to demobilize the upsurge and enabled the forces of the old order to reestablish their firm hold on political power. In the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, Marx serialized lectures he had given to the German Workers’ Educational Association, which later became the pamphlet *Wage-Labor and Capital* – an early analysis of how capitalists exploit workers, and how workers must organize to bring an end to the wage slavery. By the summer of 1849, the revolutionary forces had been utterly defeated, Marx’s vibrantly revolutionary newspaper was suppressed by the Prussian authorities, and he was forced into exile along with many other revolutionaries.

In exile, Marx and his comrades reorganized the Communist League, and in a March 1850 *Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League* he and Engels developed what amounted to a self-criticism of aspects of their own activity during 1848. “The relationship of the revolutionary workers’ party to the petty-bourgeois democrats is this: it cooperates with them against the party which they aim to overthrow; it opposes them wherever they wish to secure their own

position.” These “petty-bourgeois democrats” had favored the creation of a democratic republic but not radical social change – “far from wanting to transform the whole of society in the interests of the revolutionary proletarians, [they] only aspire to a change in social conditions which will make the existing society as tolerable and comfortable for themselves as possible.” An open-ended unity with such forces would mean that “the proletariat would lose all its hard-won independent position and be reduced once more to a mere appendage of official bourgeois democracy.” From this Marx and Engels developed an orientation of working-class political independence and internationalism that would have far-reaching consequences:

While the democratic petty bourgeois want to bring the revolution to an end as quickly as possible, achieving at most the aims already mentioned, it is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent until all the more or less propertied classes have been driven from their ruling positions, until the association of proletarians has progressed sufficiently far – not only in one country but in all the leading countries of the world – that competition between proletarians of these countries ceases and at least the decisive forces of production are concentrated in the hands of the workers.

In order to advance along this path, “the workers, and above all the [Communist] League, must work for the creation of an independent organization of the workers’ party, both secret and open,” providing contexts in which “the position and interests of the proletariat can be discussed free from bourgeois influence.” They must be prepared to form a united front with pro-capitalist liberal democrats in the struggle to overturn monarchy and establish a democratic republic, but must become an independent force to struggle for the interests of the working class and push forward to a socialist future.

The exiles of the failed 1848 revolution, Communist League members no less than others, found themselves in an increasingly demoralized situation. Some refused to accept defeat and prepared for an anticipated “new wave” of revolution, others drifted away from revolutionary politics, and many sank into nostalgic inertia and “tempest in a teapot” quarrels. By 1852, Marx and Engels helped to dissolve the disunited and

increasingly dysfunctional League, glad to extricate themselves from the unproductive morass of exile politics. At the same time, they continued the work of political, social, and economic analysis and workers' education, maintaining contacts with various currents in the workers' movement with an eye to the future.

By the early 1860s, the brilliant but vain Ferdinand Lassalle, a comrade from 1848, was leading an incredibly successful political campaign to extend voting rights to German workers and to form a mass working-class party. Lassalle thought highly of Marx, and the possibility of Marx playing a major role in the workers' movement and political life inside Germany seemed to open up. Yet irreconcilable political differences soon caused a break. Lassalle dismissed the value of trade unionism (due, in part, to his belief that an "iron law of wages" prevented gains being made through such means) in favor of an exclusively electoral orientation, and – with a state-orientated view of how socialism could be brought about – was inclined to make covert deals (against bourgeois liberals) with Prussia's militantly conservative leading statesman, Otto von Bismarck.

The fundamental perspectives Marx had developed and given expression to for two decades, however, soon flourished in a promising new context in the years 1864–72, during which he helped to found and lead the International Workingmen's Association (IWA, later remembered as the First International). The IWA was an important federation of working-class organizations from a number of European countries, the United States of America, and parts of South America, including representatives of trade unions, educational and activist associations, cooperatives, and embryonic parties. Although there were various currents of reformist, socialist, and anarchist thought among its several thousand members, Marx's influence was undeniable. In his "Inaugural Address of the International Workingmen's Association" (1864), he offered a seemingly moderate articulation of the profoundly revolutionary ideas that had been presented in the *Communist Manifesto*. The IWA's Provisional Rules, which Marx also authored, begins with the Marxist clarion call: "The emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves."

In another important presentation to the IWA, which became the popular pamphlet *Value, Price*

and Profit (1865), Marx laid out some of the basic ideas in his soon-to-be-published *Capital*, with which he argued (contrary to the so-called "iron law of wages") that trade union activity was worthwhile because, despite the limits imposed on it by capitalism, such struggles at the workplace for higher pay and better conditions could force the establishment of a higher standard of living (and therefore place a higher "value" on the sale of labor-power). IWA delegates discussed and adopted a number of important and educational resolutions on: the value of trade unions, the need for various reforms (having to do with ending child labor, establishing women's rights, and limiting the workday), the importance of political independence for the working class, the need for democratic rights for all, the necessity of international solidarity and cooperation among workers, the need for an independent foreign policy of the working class, and the logic of pushing beyond the exploitative wages-system.

The First International also took often influential positions on various issues in world politics: favoring Polish independence, supporting Irish Home Rule, favoring the anti-slavery cause and the preservation of the United States during the American Civil War (1861–5), and opposing the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1). In the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, which resulted in a French defeat and the abandonment of the capital city by the provisional government that succeeded the regime of Napoleon III, the working people of Paris rose up and established their own revolutionary government, which came to be known as the Paris Commune. Within three months it was drowned in blood by French troops, with the collusion of Bismarck's Prussian forces. Marx led the IWA in defending the Commune, with eloquent addresses that became the pamphlet *The Civil War in France* (1871).

Marx's detailed comments on the Paris Commune are generally seen as adding an important new dimension to his political thought. There was nothing new in his assertion that "the proletarians of Paris have an absolute right to render themselves masters of their own destinies by seizing upon the governmental power," but a new quality is added when he insists that "the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery" that had been developed by previous ruling classes. His enthusiastic exposition of the radically democratic

features of this revolutionary “workers’ state” – and his suggestion that with the progressive evaporation of the state’s apparatus of repression and the expansion of increasingly direct forms of democratic functioning, the state would (and should) begin to “wither away” – deepened the radicalism associated with Marx’s views of the state.

In the aftermath of the Paris Commune’s defeat, the IWA fell apart. In the face of fierce governmental repression, especially in France but also in other parts of Europe, some of the more moderate trade unionists and labor activists backed away from the organization. In addition, there was an effort under the influence of Mikhail Bakunin to replace anarchist perspectives for those represented by Marx. The anarchists were inclined to shrug off trade union and reform struggles, advance an anti-statism that opposed even the notion of a revolutionary workers’ state, and – despite an expansive posture of radical egalitarianism – to utilize conspiratorial methods both inside and outside of the IWA. To block what they saw as Bakunin’s destructive manipulations and debilitating in-fighting, Marx and those around him transferred the central offices and leadership of the IWA to the United States in 1872, where the remnants of the organization finally passed away in 1876, becoming absorbed into what was then a growing socialist labor movement in that country.

Final Decade and Aftermath

There has been scholarly debate about the nature and quality of Marx’s political and scholarly work in his final decade. Some picture him as being ravaged by debilitating illness, the shell of what he once was, frustrated and unproductive. Others argue that previously unpublished but now-available materials show a still profound and keen intellect continuing to develop important insights and make major breakthroughs.

Among the better known of his later public contributions was *The Critique of the Gotha Program* (1875), raising sharp criticisms of the political program of the newly formed German Social Democratic Party, formed through a merger of Lassalle’s party and one led by two of his followers, August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht. In Marx’s view, the proposed program for the new mass workers’ organization contained too much of the late Lassalle’s reformist

and statist theorizations. Restating some of the basics of his own orientation, Marx added a new notion – that the communist society emerging from the future working-class revolution would initially reflect substantial residues of capitalism and class society, and only after the passage of considerable time would a higher form of communist society (more naturally egalitarian, more free, stateless) come into being. (In *The State and Revolution* [1917], Lenin was to repeat this formulation, calling the first phase “socialism” and labeling as “communism” the projected higher phase.)

In examining realities in the United States in the wake of the 1877 labor uprising, in writing critical notes on Bakunin’s *Statism and Anarchy*, in corresponding with Russian scholars and revolutionaries, we find a lively intelligence extending the theoretical breadth of his “scientific socialism.” Of special interest was the seeming revision of the previously expressed notion that a socialist revolution would have to occur first in the more advanced capitalist countries, articulated in the 1882 preface to the Russian edition of the *Communist Manifesto*:

The *Communist Manifesto* had as its object the proclamation of the inevitably impending dissolution of modern bourgeois property. But in Russia we find, face to face with the rapidly developing capitalist swindle and bourgeois landed property, just beginning to develop, more than half the land owned in common by the peasants. Now the question is: can the Russian *obshchina* [peasant communes], though greatly undermined, yet a form of primeval common ownership of land, pass directly to the higher form of communist common ownership? Or on the contrary, must it first pass through the same process of dissolution such as constitutes the historical evolution of the West?

The only answer to that possible today is this: If the Russian Revolution becomes a signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist development.

As recent scholars have shown, these reflections on Russian realities were simply the tip of the iceberg, below which one can find immense quantities of serious scholarship (which included learning the Russian language!), correspondence with Russian activists and intellectuals, and

innovative analysis. Overlapping with this were immense efforts to study, synthesize, and develop insights from the new field of anthropology – exploring varieties of non-capitalist development in different parts of the world and reaching for a deeper understanding regarding the evolution of the family, private property, and the state.

When Marx died, Engels commented that “in every field which Marx investigated . . . he made independent discoveries.” His two most important contributions, in Engels’s opinion, involved the *materialist conception of history* and the theory of *surplus-value*:

Just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human history: the simple fact, hitherto concealed by an overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion, etc.; that therefore the production of the immediate material means of subsistence and consequently the degree of economic development attained by a given people or during a given epoch form the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal conceptions, art, and even the ideas on religion, of the people concerned have been evolved, and in the light of which they must, therefore, be explained, instead of *vice versa*, as had hitherto been the case. . . . Marx also discovered the special law of motion governing the present-day capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois society that this mode of production has created. The discovery of surplus-value suddenly threw light on the problem, in trying to solve which all previous investigations, of both bourgeois economists and socialist critics, had been groping in the dark.

Engels emphasized, at the same time, that “Marx was before all else a revolutionist. His real mission in life was to contribute, in one way or another, to the overthrow of capitalist society and of the state institutions which it had brought into being, to contribute to the liberation of the modern proletariat.” Marx’s friend emphasized that “fighting was his element. And he fought with a passion, a tenacity and a success such as few could rival.”

One complication in evaluating Marx’s theoretical legacy has been the fact that most of his writings – including important works giving insight into various dimensions of his thought

– were unpublished for many years and have until recently remained unavailable to would-be Marxists. Among the posthumously published works, in addition to an incredibly extensive and rich correspondence, were the last two volumes of *Capital* (edited by Engels) plus *Theories of Surplus-Value* (edited by Karl Kautsky), and various preparatory economic notebooks known as the *Grundrisse*. In addition, there were the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, *The German Ideology*, the recently available anthropological studies contained in the *Ethnological Notebooks*, and more.

In considering his practical political activity over the years (which involved fierce controversies with other radicals and revolutionaries, such as Proudhon, Weitling, Lassalle, Bakunin), Marx’s detractors and even some of his partisans have often missed a key aspect of what he had been doing. They tend to depict a tactless, impatient, argumentative neurotic with an inflated ego colliding time after time with those he sees as potential rivals, inevitably initiating squabbles in organizations he became involved in, lining up and manipulating various pals, hurling polemics and mobilizing cliques that were “full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.”

What more careful scholars (Riazanov, Löwy, Draper, Hunt, Nimtz) have been able to highlight is a much more consistent, coherent, principled mode of operation on the part of Marx and Engels and a numerically fluctuating current of co-thinkers gathered around them over a period of time (sometimes having characteristics of “a party”). There is a striking correspondence between analysis, strategy, tactics. Essential to the approach of Marx and his comrades was the dynamic fusion of several elements: the working class, democracy, socialism, and a scientific approach (i.e., grounding political action in an understanding of economics, sociology, political science, and history). What Marx and Engels and their various comrades hoped to accomplish was related to how they functioned, and they were able to have a profound impact in the broader organizations and movements of which they were part. Such efforts contributed to the later crystallization of socialist workers’ parties in a number of countries.

Essential in the thrust of working-class democracy in the nineteenth century were the intellectual and practical-political labors of Marx and Engels in the Communist League, in the 1848

upsurge, during the quiescent interlude that followed, and then in the years of the First International and the Paris Commune. The serious-minded political work (not just theorizing) of Marx and Engels for 20 years before the First International's founding in 1864 was essential in enabling them to play a central role in its development. Nor can one afford to underestimate the crucial importance of the First International in the larger political developments of the 1860s and 1870s, and particularly in the development of the labor movements of Europe and North America.

Throughout Europe in the 1880s and 1890s, mass socialist labor movements arose, influenced by the ideas which Marx and Engels developed and espoused, and those movements formed a Socialist International (the Second International) in 1889, which was disrupted by World War I (1914–18) and split by the Russian Revolution of 1917, but which continues to exist. Also influenced by Marx's ideas was a Third International, the Communist International (1919–43) formed under the leadership of V. I. Lenin and Leon Trotsky, although soon dominated and ultimately dissolved by the regime of Joseph Stalin. A much smaller Fourth International was established in 1938 by co-thinkers of Trotsky. Different varieties of "Marxism" collided within, between, and around each of these influential formations.

In these contexts, and beyond them as well, there have been fierce controversies over what Marx "really meant," what he actually said, and what remains relevant in his outlook. Nonetheless, his ideas and analytical approach have had a powerful impact on the intellectual life of modern times, even among those who reject "Marxism." Reacting against would-be followers whom he viewed as overly rigid and simplistic, Marx himself quipped: "As for me, I am not a Marxist." The fact remains that for well over a century, Marx's thought and example have been seriously studied by those wishing to understand and to help make revolutions.

SEE ALSO: Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Class Identity and Protest; *Communist Manifesto*; Dictatorship of the Proletariat; Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); European Revolutions of 1848; Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831); Imperialism and Capitalist Development; Inter-

nationals; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marx, Eleanor (1855–1898); Marxism; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Paris Commune, 1871; Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865); Saint-Simon, Comte de (1760–1825); Smith, Adam (1723–1790); Social Democratic Party, Germany; Socialism; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Young Hegelians

References and Suggested Readings

- Berlin, I. (1978) *Karl Marx*, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carver, T. (Ed.) (1991) *The Cambridge Companion to Marx*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Draper, H. (1977–2008) *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution*, 6 vols. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Draper, H. (1992) *Socialism From Below*. Ed. E. Haberkern. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
- Fischer, E. (1970) *The Essential Marx*. New York: Herder & Herder.
- Hunt, R. N. (1974, 1984) *The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels*, 2 vols. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Löwy, M. (2005) *The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx*. Chicago: Haymarket.
- McLellan, D. (1971) *The Thought of Karl Marx: An Introduction*. New York: Harper & Row.
- McLellan, D. (1973) *Karl Marx, His Life and Thought*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Marx, K. (1977) *Capital*, Vol. 1. New York: Vintage.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1976–2005) *Collected Works*, 50 vols. New York: International Publishers.
- Mehring, F. (1962) *Karl Marx, The Story of His Life*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Nimtz, Jr., A. H. (2000) *Marx and Engels: Their Contribution to the Democratic Breakthrough*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Rees, J. (1998) *The Algebra of Revolution: The Dialectic and the Classical Marxist Tradition*. London: Routledge.
- Rubel, M. & Manale, M. (1976) *Marx Without Myth: A Chronological Study of His Life and Work*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Riazanov, D. (1973) *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: An Introduction to Their Life and Work*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Shanin, T. (Ed.) (1983) *Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and "The Peripheries of Capitalism"*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Marxism

Paul Le Blanc

Marxism is a body of thought and a practical approach to reality based on contributions of two revolutionaries, Karl Marx (1818–1883)

and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), who were intent on developing what they called “scientific socialism.” This orientation was denounced as “Marxism” by its critics, but this would-be negative label was, after Marx’s death, embraced by those who sought to follow in his footsteps. A variety of interpretations and new – sometimes sharply divergent – paths of thought and action became associated with this “Marxism.” Some scholars have emphasized differences between the ideas Marx and the ideas of others (including his intellectual partner Engels) who have claimed to speak in his name. At the same time, it can be argued that a distinctive orientation emanating from Marx became the core around which a coherent political orientation evolved, contributed to by a number of revolutionaries, which can be termed “revolutionary Marxism.”

The Scope of Marxism

Germans by birth, Marx’s and Engels’s interests, knowledge, and commitments (and eventually their influence) were global. Alert to how the Industrial Revolution was transforming human cultures and civilization, they were also intimately involved with democratic and working-class movements struggling (as the young Marx once put it in 1843) for the “overthrow [of] all conditions in which man is a degraded, enslaved, neglected, contemptible being,” to create a better future (as the two men stated in the 1848 *Communist Manifesto*) in which “the free development of each will be the condition for the free development of all.”

Marx and Engels created a dynamic intellectual synthesis which blended classical German philosophy, classical political economy predominant in Britain, and French political thought associated with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. It was a synthesis that has impacted on almost all realms of human inquiry – ranging from philosophy and literature to the natural sciences, but especially the social sciences: history, economics, sociology, anthropology, political science. The five component parts of Marxism are:

1. A *philosophical orientation* that can be termed *dialectical* (seeing reality as a complex, evolving totality of interconnected and often contradictory components), *materialist* (the notion that people’s “ideas, views, and conceptions” or their “consciousness, change

with every change in the conditions of . . . material existence, in . . . social relations, and in . . . social life”), and *humanistic* (seeing “human nature” as a blend of needing and reaching for self-determination, or freedom, community, and creative labor).

2. A *theory of history* which sees human society evolving through economic stages, in most cases – whether under slavery, feudalism, or capitalism – involving powerful minorities becoming wealthy by exploiting the laboring majorities, a view giving special attention to the importance of technology, productivity, and class struggle.
3. An *analysis of capitalism* (a system of minority, or “private,” ownership and control of the economy, utilized to maximize profits for the minority while enmeshing more and more aspects of life in generalized commodity production) which sees incredible economic progress inseparably intermixed with a dehumanizing economic despotism, with contradictory dynamics that are amazingly creative and destructive, but which make possible a new and better society and a social force – the working class (whose labor is the basis for the creation of all wealth) – that might be capable of overcoming the problems inherent in capitalism.
4. A *political program for the working class* that calls for this increasingly majority-class (those dependent on the sale of labor-power in order to make a living) to join together in inclusive and socially conscious trade unions, struggle for social reforms to improve living conditions, to build independent labor parties and take political power.
5. A *vision of a socialist future* in which the economy is socially owned, democratically controlled, and utilized to meet the basic needs of all people and to facilitate the free development of each individual.

Ultimately, variants of this orientation struck root in every continent inhabited by human beings. Many millions of people consciously embraced aspects of Marxism and identified with its goal of a better future. It became a powerful force among those engaged in protests and revolutionary struggles from the late nineteenth century to the dawn of the twenty-first. Twentieth-century revolutions claiming to establish “Marxist states” became associated with new variations

of tyranny and failed to endure, leading to widespread disillusionment with and rejection of Marxist perspectives. Many adherents of revolutionary Marxism have argued, however, that such disasters have been rooted not in the realization but in the *betrayal* of Marx's orientation.

The Revolutionary Orientation

For Marx and others sharing his orientation, revolutionary change is not only desirable but – given the nature of capitalism – is both possible and necessary. This is so in various ways. The advance of technology and productivity – thanks to the dynamics of capitalist development – has drawn the different regions of our planet together and created a sufficient degree of social wealth, or economic surplus, to make possible a decent, creative, free existence and meaningful self-development for each and every person. Yet the dynamics of capitalist development (the relentless “accumulation process” involving the investment of money-capital into production capital to create commodities to sell for ever-larger quantities of money-capital) are so destructive of human freedom and dignity that it is necessary to move to a different form of economic life – a socialist society in which the conditions and resources necessary for sustaining human life would be under the collective control of humanity.

The natural trend of capitalist development, Marx noted, has been creating a working-class majority in more and more sectors of the world, and the nature of the working class also makes a socialist future both possible and necessary: *possible* because this majority class, essential to the functioning of capitalism, has the potential power to lay hold of the technology and resources of the economy to bring about a socialist future; *necessary* because the economic democracy of socialism is required to ensure the dignity, the freedom, and the survival of the working-class majority. Otherwise, he argued, the tendencies inherent in capitalism – subordinating all aspects of human culture, social reality, and the natural environment to the drive to maximize capitalist profits – would, even while creating material possibilities for a better world, result in a long-run decline in the quality of life, punctuated by periodic catastrophes.

The contradiction between the ever-increasing *social organization* of the economy with the

private ownership of the economy into relatively fewer and fewer hands inevitably generates conditions for revolution. Such conditions involve various problems (economic downturns and depressions, intensifying alienation, bad working conditions and living conditions) and opportunities (the increase of productivity and social wealth, the enhancement of communication and transportation systems, the drawing together of more and more people into a cooperative and interdependent labor force, the spread of education) that will radicalize increasing numbers of people who are part of the working class, as well as others who are not.

“The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority,” Marx and Engels wrote in the *Communist Manifesto*. Unlike any previous revolutionary upheaval, the working class's coming to power would naturally culminate in majority rule. For Marx socialism and democracy are inseparable: his definition of socialism involves social ownership and democratic control over the technology and resources on which human life depends, creating a “free association of the producers.” Marx and Engels say in the *Manifesto* that the working class must “win the battle of democracy” in order to take control of the economy. Both believed it would be possible to win a working-class majority to this perspective if revolutionaries develop a clear understanding of capitalist reality (which creates the possibility and necessity for socialism) and help others – especially among the growing working class – to understand that reality.

But both Marx and Engels also insisted that an essential part of this process of creating a socialist majority among the working class will involve helping to mobilize the workers themselves around serious struggles to improve the condition of the working class (a better economic situation, an expansion of democratic rights). Not only would this result in life-giving improvements for the workers, but it would also give them a sense of their power and their ability to bring about change, and their organizational and class-struggle experience would enable them to struggle more effectively in the future.

This would be necessary because the natural dynamics of capitalism will work ultimately to erode any gains the workers are able to win. Such erosion can be blocked, ultimately, only by

moving beyond capitalism to the economic democracy of socialism. In the struggles of today, it is necessary to educate more and more workers about the requirements of the future. In multiple ways, the struggle for reforms in the here and now must be linked to the struggle for revolutionary change.

In order to advance its interests, then, the working class must organize itself not only as an economic movement but also as a political movement, and it must be politically independent from the capitalists and other upper-class elements organized in various liberal, conservative, and hybrid political parties. The workers must utilize their trade unions, reform organizations, and political party to struggle not only for immediate reforms but also for political power. When they are able to win political power (which will have to be organized in more radically democratic structures than those developed by the capitalist politicians), this will constitute a working-class revolution, and they should use this revolutionary power to begin the transition from a capitalist to a socialist economy. As part of this entire process, Marx and Engels assert in various writings, the workers must ally themselves with all laboring people (especially farmers and peasants), and with all of the oppressed, whose liberation must be part of the working-class political program.

Because capitalism is a global system, the struggle of the working class for a better life and for socialism must be global, and the development of socialism can only be accomplished on a global scale. The global and exploitative expansiveness inherent in capitalism is laid out clearly in the *Communist Manifesto*, which advances a thoroughgoing revolutionary internationalism which suggests that workers of all countries will have to unite in a multifaceted international movement to bring such a future into being.

There is also the matter of organization, Marx and Engels emphasized in the *Communist Manifesto*. Communists represent the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class movement seeking to push forward all the others – because they are the most theoretically clear element within the working class, with a definite understanding of “the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.” There is a need for democratic, cohesive, effective organizations of working-class activists to play this role. There

are radical insights and militant upsurges that animate the working class in its struggles – but much serious work needs to be done to help draw together and deepen such insights into consistent class consciousness, and to sustain and broaden such upsurges into consistent class struggle that can lead to socialism.

Reformism and Bureaucracy

Marxism, as it evolved from 1848 through the last half of the nineteenth century, was inseparable from the working-class movement that was developing throughout Europe and North America (with early or embryonic beginnings on other continents as well). The first organized current associated with Marx’s perspectives was the Communist League, made up primarily of radicalized artisans, craftsmen, and laborers in Western Europe, which passed out of existence after the defeated revolutionary upsurge of 1848. Marx and Engels continued to develop their thinking, however, while continuing to interact with small groups of left-wing workers, and when the substantial International Workingmen’s Association (a federation of workers’ organizations in Europe and the Americas, later known as the First International) came into existence in 1864, Marx played a central and influential role in its leadership.

What would later become essentials of Marxist economic, social, and political perspectives first found widespread expression in the International’s deliberations and resolutions. Later scholars have noted that this influence played a significant role in struggles to build the labor movement and to democratize European political life. (Consequently, a synonym for the word “socialist” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came to be the term “social democrat.”) In the wake of the defeated working-class uprising, the Paris Commune, in 1871, the First International went out of existence due to widespread governmental repression throughout Europe and also to a flare-up of internal differences among the International’s varieties of socialists, anarchists, and trade union moderates.

In the 1870s and 1880s, however, trade union and political movements influenced by Marxist ideas slowly built up impressive organizations throughout much of Europe, culminating in the formation in 1889 of the Socialist International. The largest and most influential party in this

Second International was the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), led by August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht. Although presumably adhering to a particularly “orthodox” interpretation of Marxism, the evolving political practice of the SPD soon posed a sharp challenge to traditional Marxist assumptions.

Marx had believed that the reform struggles of the labor movement would pave the way for the workers to make a revolution (perhaps peaceful, but probably having to face and overcome violent reaction from the capitalists) – a dramatic power shift in which the working class would take control of a radically democratized governmental apparatus which would be utilized to bring about a transition from capitalism to socialism. But the relative prosperity of advanced industrial capitalist economies such as that existing in Germany (buttressed by the global economic expansionism known as “imperialism”) dovetailed with successful reform struggles to significantly improve the living conditions of sections of the working class. At the same time, the trade union organizations and the apparatus of the SPD that helped bring about such reforms became stronger, with established structures and growing full-time staff (that is, a bureaucracy) distinct from the mass of the rank-and-file working-class membership. Increasingly influential elements in this organizational apparatus were inclined to “move beyond” what they saw as outmoded revolutionary elements in the Marxist outlook.

The SPD’s leading intellectuals – Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky – soon came to represent what seemed to be the primary divergent perspectives in the movement. Bernstein argued that perspectives of revolutionary socialism should be replaced by those of evolutionary socialism, that an accumulation of reforms would be sufficient to gradually eliminate what was wrong with capitalism, that outworn Marxist theory should be revised to match the reformist policies that actually represented what the SPD was doing. Kautsky’s “orthodox” view – challenging Bernstein’s “revisionism” – was that SPD policies were indeed basically sound, but that Marxist theory was also basically sound and in no need of such fundamental revision. He argued that capitalist crises of the future would necessitate the socialist revolution for which current SPD practice was preparing the workers.

A far sharper critique of Bernstein’s “revisionism” – but also of the SPD’s increasingly

reformist orientation – was advanced from the revolutionary wing of the party by Rosa Luxemburg. Her importance as a leading Marxist intellectual was highly unusual. The position of women in the socialist movement of the time tended to be more advanced than was true in the larger society, but the relatively limited female role in the movement reflected the traditionally subordinate status of women. Karl Marx’s own daughter Eleanor had played an important role in the British labor and socialist movements in the 1890s, and Rosa’s own good friend Clara Zetkin was prominent in the women’s organizations of the German social democracy (as was Alexandra Kollontai in the Russian movement). Luxemburg’s stature as an economist and political theorist, and as a spokesperson, caused her to stand out – as did her remarkably bold and vibrant qualities of thought and expression.

Luxemburg insisted that there was no possibility, through the reformist gradualism advocated by Bernstein, of seriously advancing the interests of the working class and of achieving socialism. The very nature of capitalism would prevent the permanent consolidation of working-class gains and painless evolution to socialism which he envisioned. But for her, far more than for Kautsky, this critique of reformist theory had dramatic implications for the reformist practice of the SPD, which she saw as adapting far too much to the myopic bureaucratic conservatism of trade union and party leaders, threatening to entangle the workers’ movement in the capitalist status quo.

Luxemburg – along with Kautsky and Bernstein – was part of an impressive layer of intellectuals drawn to Marxism: her SPD comrade Franz Mehring, the brilliant French historian and reformer Jean Jaurès, the “Austro-Marxist” theorist on the national question Otto Bauer, Italy’s leading Hegelian philosopher Antonio Labriola, the acerbic social and cultural critic of Russia, Georgi Plekhanov, and his countryman David Riazanov, who became perhaps the foremost Marx scholar of the epoch. At the same time, she was in the front rank of Marxists who advanced and deepened Marxist theoretical perspectives under the impact of modern imperialism – other important representatives being Rudolf Hilferding, Nikolai Bukharin, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, and Herman Gorter.

Luxemburg viewed the social democratic movement as gathering together “the most

enlightened, most class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat” (as she put it in her classic essay *Mass Strike, Trade Union, and Political Party*). At the same time, especially based on her experience in the Eastern European revolutionary upsurges of 1905, she insisted on a decisive interplay between the organizations of the social democracy on the one hand and periodic and relatively spontaneous mass actions (what she termed “the mass strike”) on the other:

It suddenly opens new and wide perspectives of the revolution when it appears to have already carried in a narrow pass and where it is impossible for anyone to reckon upon it with any degree of certainty. It flows now like a broad billow over the whole kingdom, and now divides into a gigantic network of narrow streams; now it bubbles forth from under the ground like a fresh spring and now is completely lost under the earth. Political and economic strikes, mass strikes and partial strikes, demonstrative strikes and fighting strikes, general strikes of individual branches of industry and general strikes in individual towns, peaceful wage struggles and street massacres, barricade fighting – all these run through each other, run side by side, cross one another, flow in and over one another – it is a ceaselessly moving, changing sea of phenomena.

This collided, she found, with the natural inclinations of many trade union leaders who were immersed in “bureaucratism and a certain narrowness of outlook,” and of “socialist parliamentarians” who had “the decisive word alike in theory and practice . . . frittering away the energies of the labor movement. . . . What passed officially for Marxism became a cloak for all possible kinds of opportunism, for persistent shirking of the revolutionary class struggle, for every conceivable half measure.” Dominated by this orientation, she lamented, the bureaucratized labor and socialist movements “were condemned to pine away within the framework of capitalist society.”

The same kinds of issues – the dilemmas of bureaucracy, elitism, and revolutionary consciousness or lack thereof – were taken up in various ways by prominent academics who were sociologists and political theorists outside of the socialist movement – such as Max Weber, Robert Michels, Werner Sombart, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and Georges Sorel. Much innovation and insight in the academic “social

sciences” of the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries developed in symbiotic and competitive relationship with Marxism, though in most cases the academic political scientists, sociologists, and economists were quite unsympathetic to the revolutionary perspectives of a Marx or Luxemburg.

Even while giving lip-service to Marxist “orthodoxy,” the increasingly dominant bureaucratic and reformist elements within the parties affiliated with the Second International sought to marginalize the influence of revolutionaries such as Luxemburg, as well as the more militant and radicalized layers of the working class. This trend toward deradicalization facilitated their efforts to make deals with pro-capitalist and conservative forces in government and society for the purpose of achieving various reforms. With the imperialist explosion of World War I (1914–18), the majority leaderships of most of these parties – rather than adhering to the injunction of the *Communist Manifesto*, “workers of all countries unite” – rallied their mass memberships in support of the war effort of their different countries. Those remaining true to revolutionary socialist perspectives opposed the war, saying that this murderous conflict was for the benefit of capitalists and at the expense of the working class. The price Luxemburg paid for taking such a stand was imprisonment for the war’s duration (and being murdered in its aftermath).

From Socialism to Communism

Throughout the nineteenth century, the words “socialism” and “communism” had meant more or less the same thing. Marx and Engels called their 1848 pamphlet the *Communist Manifesto* in order to distinguish their ideas from those of other socialist currents, but later Engels wrote another bestselling pamphlet, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, in which he referred to himself and Marx as socialists. Because working-class socialists influenced by Marx saw an intimate connection between socialism and democracy, as we have seen, the terms “socialist” and “social democrat” also became synonyms. But the shock of the Socialist International collapsing under the influence of imperialist war caused revolutionaries to make increasingly sharp distinctions between themselves and those entangled with reformism.

When revolutionary socialists in the Russian empire, following V. I. Lenin and Leon Trotsky,

led a workers' and peasants' revolution that established a workers' republic in 1917, they called on socialists and workers around the world to follow their example. Because the words "social democrat" and even "socialist" had been tainted by the reformists and supporters of the war, the revolutionaries of Russia decided to call themselves communists, and labeled the Third International which they formed in 1919, with the goal of developing effective revolutionary parties throughout the world, the Communist International.

While many scholars have insisted on a dichotomy between the politics of Marx and Lenin, others have argued that Lenin's orientation was firmly grounded in the perspectives of Marx. This can be seen, they assert, in his understanding of the necessary interconnection of socialist theory and practice with the working-class and labor movement, his belief in the necessity of working-class independence and hegemony in political and social struggles, and his commitment to integrating reform struggles with revolutionary strategy.

Lenin also had a clear grasp of the unevenness of working-class experience and consciousness, and he sought the development of a practical revolutionary approach to this reality through inculcating among more and more workers an understanding of the necessity for socialist and working-class support for struggles of all who suffer oppression. Related to this, he developed a coherent conception of organization, the building of *the revolutionary party*, that is practical, democratic, and revolutionary – consistent with the perspectives we have noted in the *Communist Manifesto*, but also designed to avoid the deradicalizing developments that had afflicted many parties of the Second International. He called for an organizational approach "to facilitate the political development and the political organization of the working class" in a manner that would "ensure that these demands for partial concessions are raised to the state of a systematic, implacable struggle of a revolutionary, working-class party, against the [tsarist] autocracy" as well as "against the whole of capitalist society." Lenin insisted that "we must train people who will devote the whole of their lives, not only spare evenings, to the revolution; we must build up an organization large enough to permit the introduction of a strict division of labor in the various forms of our work."

The "Leninism" of Lenin also involved a remarkable understanding of the manner in which democratic struggles flow into socialist revolution. "Basing ourselves on democracy as it already exists, exposing its incompleteness under capitalism," he explained in 1915, "we advocate the overthrow of capitalism, expropriation of the bourgeoisie as a necessary basis both for the abolition of the poverty of the masses and for a complete and manifold realization of all democratic forms."

Related to this revolutionary-democratic approach to revolutionary strategy, especially in such a predominantly peasant country as Russia, was Lenin's insistence on the development of a *worker-peasant alliance*. "To avoid finding itself with its hands tied in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeois democracy, the proletariat must be class-conscious and strong enough to rouse the peasantry to revolutionary consciousness, guide its assault, and thereby independently pursue the line of consistent proletarian democratism," he had written amid the revolutionary upsurge of 1905. "Only the proletariat can be a consistent fighter for democracy. It can become a victorious fighter for democracy only if the peasant masses join the struggle."

As early as 1905 he was also an articulate partisan of what would later be called the *united front* tactic – which would involve "the preservation of complete independence by each separate party on points of principle and organization" in the context of "a fighting unity of these parties" in favor of democratic demands, as well as specific social and economic reforms, or even overthrow of the oppressive Russian monarchy. Lenin believed that through the united front the most revolutionary of the parties (his own) would be able to prove its superiority and ultimately win majority support for a revolutionary socialist strategy. For this reason he warned: "We must be very careful, in making these endeavors, not to spoil things by vainly trying to lump together heterogeneous elements. We shall inevitably have to . . . march separately, but we . . . can strike together more than once and particularly now," that is, when there are compelling common goals.

Central in the Leninist perspective, as it crystallized amid the fires of World War I, was an *analysis of imperialism*. Lenin argued that as capitalism evolved into its modern imperialist phase it became transformed, that while "commodity

production still ‘reigns’ and continues to be regarded as the basis of economic life, it has in reality been undermined and the bulk of the profits go to the ‘geniuses’ of financial manipulation.” He perceived that “the 20th century marks the turning point from the old capitalism to the new, from the domination of capital in general to the domination of finance capital.” Under the old capitalism the export of goods was typical, while under the new capitalism the more important dynamic is the export of capital. The logic of the capital accumulation process led him to conclude that “surplus capital will be utilized not for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given country, for this would mean a decline of profits for the capitalists, but for the purpose of increasing profits by exporting capital to the backward countries.” In his view, “in these backward countries profits are unusually high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap.” He perceived “diverse forms of dependent countries which, politically, are formally independent but, in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence.” This involved “not only agrarian territories, but even the most highly industrialized regions . . . because (1) the fact that the world is already partitioned obliges those contemplating a redivision to reach out for every kind of territory, and (2) an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several great powers in the striving for hegemony.”

This view of the imperialist evolution of capitalism shaped Lenin’s understanding of “*the national question*.” A traditional Marxist view had been that nationalism was a progressive force that had challenged feudal traditions and monarchist empires with a vision of the self-determination of a people over the land in which they lived. But the more industrialized capitalist economies of some nations, advanced by powerful military establishments, were now dominating and exploiting the peoples of other regions, rationalized by a new form of nationalism used to mobilize popular support for imperialism. Lenin believed that “imperialism is the period of an increasing oppression of the nations of the whole world by a handful of ‘great’ nations,” and emphasized the need for socialists to oppose the nationalism of “oppressor nations” and to support the nationalism – the right of self-

determination – of “oppressed nations.” He also believed that such national liberation struggles would be a key in advancing the struggle for socialism worldwide.

Lenin advanced a vibrantly *revolutionary internationalist approach* that stressed the necessity of workers and oppressed peoples of all lands making common cause. He noted that the conditions generated by World War I had “brought the whole of humanity to an impasse, and faced it with the dilemma of either permitting the extermination of more millions of lives and the complete extinction of European civilization, or handing over power to the revolutionary proletariat and achieving the socialist revolution in civilized countries.” More than this, he insisted on the need for a “union between revolutionary proletarians of the capitalist, advanced countries, and the revolutionary masses of colonial countries.” This meant the need for revolutionary forces of various countries to strengthen each other in the face of global capitalist power, but it meant something more. Capitalism as a global system must be replaced by an international socialist order – a “live-and-let-live” coexistence on the same planet of the imperialist system and socialist democracies would be impossible.

In 1920 Lenin rejoiced that the Communist International “unites white, yellow, and black-skinned working people in brotherhood.” He insisted: “World imperialism shall fall when the revolutionary onslaught of the exploited and oppressed workers in each country . . . merges with the revolutionary onslaught of hundreds of millions of people who have hitherto stood beyond the pale of history, and have been regarded merely as the object of history.” More than this, Lenin’s revolutionary internationalism involved the mutual strengthening – shared experiences and insights that would become part of the revolutionary arsenal of ideas – of revolutionary forces in each country. Victories in one sector of the world would, not only theoretically but materially, make possible victories in other parts of the world. The Russian Revolution pointed the way for the workers and oppressed of all countries, Lenin believed, but at the same time he noted that the Soviet republic was “a besieged fortress waiting for the other detachments of the world revolution to come to our relief.”

Next to Lenin, Leon Trotsky was undoubtedly the outstanding theoretician and leader in Russia’s

early communist movement. After 1917, his approach more or less coincided with that of Lenin, although his *theory of permanent revolution* – emphasizing the democratic revolution flowing into the workers (supported by the peasantry) taking political power, and then initiating a socialist transition within the context of the process of international socialist revolution – anticipated important aspects of Lenin’s later thinking. Nikolai Bukharin was also an extremely important early communist theorist whose innovative work on the questions of the state and revolution and on imperialism had influenced Lenin’s evolving outlook, and who was, in turn, profoundly influenced by – and sought to further develop (or, according to some critics, develop too far) – Lenin’s views on the worker–peasant alliance in the period after the revolution.

In the period of the incredibly violent civil war and foreign intervention engulfing the early Soviet republic immediately after the 1917 Revolution, the communist regime under Lenin and Trotsky adopted extremely brutal and authoritarian emergency measures that were inconsistent with the democratic values that had, until then, been central to the Marxist movement. While Marx and Engels had sometimes used the term “dictatorship of the proletariat” to mean *political rule by the working class* (or workers’ democracy), the term was now redefined to justify a political dictatorship by the Communist Party. Rosa Luxemburg sharply challenged this development shortly before she died in an abortive workers’ uprising in Germany. “Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the members of one party – however numerous they may be – is no freedom at all,” she insisted. “Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently.” Luxemburg’s elaboration proved prophetic: “Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element.” While some of the Russian communists may have seen the dictatorship as a temporary necessity, it helped pave the way for what many would experience as a bureaucratic tyranny.

The Communist International (or Comintern) has often been criticized as introducing

grotesque and authoritarian distortions into the early communist movement, but it is also the case that this Third International drew together an impressive number of talented theorists and activists. In the documents of the Communist International from 1919 through 1924 one finds an incredibly rich pooling of experience, analyses, and insights – almost breathtaking in their historical and geographical sweep, and impressive in their great attention to detail. Some became focal points of fierce factional polemics, as was the case with the luminous Hungarian philosopher-activist Georg Lukács, whose *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) provided groundbreaking Hegelian interpretations of Marxism that advanced and profoundly deepened Leninist perspectives. Less controversial yet perhaps even more radically innovative were the contributions of Italian communist leader Antonio Gramsci, whose Hegelian Leninism – drawing as well from the Renaissance theorizations of Nicolò Machiavelli – blended notions of a revolutionary vanguard party with richly cultural conceptions of “organic intellectuals” arising from and linked to the working class, and also a fertile conception of protracted contests for cultural and social-political *hegemony* (or supremacy) between advanced layers of contending classes.

Stalinism

Increasingly, however, the Marxism of the communist movement became flattened into crassly manipulated dogmas promulgated under the bureaucratic dictatorship that became consolidated in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, who quietly but relentlessly had accumulated considerable authority within the Russian Communist Party and government. During his last fatal illness in 1922–3, Lenin waged a struggle from his sickbed, enlisting the support of Trotsky, against Stalin’s authoritarian policies and excessive power. Yet other key communist leaders initially distrusted the brilliant and popular but arrogant Trotsky and preferred the seemingly more easy-going Stalin. After Lenin’s death, they discovered that Stalin’s control of the party’s and government’s bureaucratic apparatus allowed him to sweep aside their perspectives. Some belatedly joined with Trotsky in an ill-fated effort to overcome bureaucratic corruption

and maintain a revolutionary-internationalist orientation of the Communist International. Others who rallied around Bukharin later met with even less success in preventing the consolidation of Stalin's power and perspectives. By the early 1930s, all oppositions had been savagely repressed by the bureaucratic apparatus under Stalin's leadership, which now demanded absolute loyalty and adherence to its particular brand of grotesquely distorted Marxism. Millions of revolutionary-minded activists throughout the world, identifying with the achievements of the Russian Revolution, assumed that the perspectives of the Stalin regime were consistent with those of Lenin and Marx. In fact, this proved to be one of the greatest illusions of the twentieth century.

Contrary to the orientation of both Marx and Lenin, Stalin claimed that it was possible to build socialism in a single country – the economically backward USSR – and was inclined to manipulate the Comintern and communist parties of various countries in order to advance the narrow national interests of this “socialist motherland.” He also concluded that it would be necessary to initiate a brutal “revolution from above” in the USSR through the forced collectivization of land and rapid industrialization policies. Carried out from 1929 through the early 1930s, this involved extreme repression and violence against masses of peasants and workers who resisted the exploitative effects of his new policies. Many were killed, with many more arrested and sent to forced-labor camps. While the communist apparatus under Stalin tightened its control over the intellectual and cultural life of the country, some Communist Party members began to question Stalin's policies – and the repression intensified. A number of leading communists were arrested and subjected to a variety of pressures and tortures. Some made fantastic public confessions and asked to be shot. Thousands of other communists were arrested and executed, and many more (including friends and families) were sent to forced-labor camps. Millions of people were destroyed.

Stalin's grand claim about creating “socialism in a single country” had a powerful appeal beyond the USSR. Especially with the onset of the Great Depression, the increasing belligerence of Mussolini in Italy, and the rise of Hitler in Germany, idealistic workers and intellectuals throughout the world looked to the communist revolutionary process in the USSR as an

alternative to capitalism and a bulwark against fascism and Nazism. In 1935 the Communist International's spokesman, Georgi Dimitrov, was declaring that all communists should work to create a “Popular Front” of communist parties and socialist parties with liberal pro-capitalist parties. These were supposed to establish governments that would maintain both capitalism and political democracy, implement social reforms, and maintain a foreign policy friendly to the USSR and dedicated to “collective security” against the fascist powers. Popular Front governments were established in France and Spain, and US communists even claimed that Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal policies represented a Popular Front of sorts. On the other hand, during the Spanish Civil War (1936–9) when anarchists and revolutionary socialists sought to go beyond Popular Front limitations, Stalinist forces there repressed them with extreme violence so as not to frighten off hoped-for capitalist allies.

In 1939, after these hoped-for allies had failed to materialize, Stalin's government sought and secured a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, which freed Hitler to launch an assault on Poland, initiating World War II (1939–45). When Hitler's armies invaded the USSR in 1941, however, Stalin led his country and the world communist movement into a far-reaching alliance with “democratic capitalist” governments, and he once again became the personification of “progressive” anti-fascism in his own land and throughout the world. The defeat of German forces on the Eastern Front by the Soviet Red Army, and the prominent role of communists in the anti-fascist resistance movements of many countries, gave the Stalinist version of “Marxism” – diluted and distorted as it was – a new credibility for many.

At the conclusion of World War II, however, tensions inevitably emerged between the USSR and its wartime capitalist allies, leading to the Cold War confrontation that would last over more than four decades. In the early years of that confrontation, Stalin saw successful communist-led revolutions in several countries, and he oversaw the establishment of communist dictatorships, subordinate to the USSR, throughout Eastern Europe. The bureaucratic tyranny associated with these dictatorships, and their eventual collapse under Stalin's successors, brought considerable discredit not only to Stalinism but also to

the Leninism and Marxism of which it had claimed to be the only true representative. That this claim was false, and that Stalinism was, on innumerable points, incompatible with fundamental components of Marxism, were facts generally obscured by Cold War anti-communist propaganda and by the later conservative triumphalism that accompanied the much heralded “collapse of communism.”

Variants of Marxism

Throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America, variants of Marxism arose which added new elements to this already incredibly diverse tradition. Stalinist influences were sometimes not enough to obliterate the revolutionary nationalism that animated the Chinese perspectives of Mao Zedong or the Vietnamese perspectives of Hồ Chí Minh, although in each case there was the challenge of explicitly anti-Stalinist variants of Marxism – for example, by Chen Duxiu in China and Tha Thu Thau in Vietnam. The Communist International attracted the creative minds of M. N. Roy of India and Tan Malaka of Indonesia, just as Stalinism repelled them – but powerful currents of Marxism (in many cases not free from the hold of Stalinism) became important realities in the various regions of Asia. Marxism’s impact among African revolutionaries was advanced by such figures as George Padmore, C. L. R. James, Kwame Nkrumah, and Amílcar Cabral, and also by the influential South African Communist Party. The expansive and critical intelligence of Peruvian intellectual José Carlos Mariátegui, together with the early communist perspectives of El Salvador’s Agustín Farabundo Martí and Cuba’s Julio Antonio Mella, established a revolutionary Marxism in Latin America which was felt among several generations of Latin American intellectuals, activists, and revolutionaries – not to mention the efforts of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in 1950s and 1960s Cuba, the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, and the FMLN of El Salvador in the 1970s and 1980s, or the Zapatistas of Chiapas and the Bolivarian movement of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.

European Marxism found creative reflection among theorists of the so-called “Frankfurt School” (for example, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm), as well as among such philo-

sophical leading lights as Ernst Bloch, Henri Lefebvre, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Louis Althusser. Prominent historians of the French Revolution have also powerfully intersected with Marxism, as can be seen in the contributions of such figures as Albert Mathiez, Georges Lefebvre, Albert Soboul, and Daniel Guérin. A distinguished configuration of influential British Marxists has included such historians as Eric Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill, Victor G. Kiernan, Edward P. Thompson, and George Rudé, as well as cultural critic Raymond Williams, political scientist Ralph Miliband, and anthropologist Peter Worsley. An innovative wave of feminist theorists – such as Selma James, Juliet Mitchell, Sheila Rowbotham (and such US figures as Eleanor Leacock, Karen Sacks/Brodin, Nancy Holmstrom) – have also interacted with the Marxist tradition. Of particular note in the evolution of European Marxism, and its sometime interplay with various other Marxist traditions, has been the British journal *New Left Review*. More recent and quite substantial has been another British journal, *Historical Materialism*.

In the United States, of special importance has been the independent socialist magazine *Monthly Review*, founded by economist Paul Sweezy and labor educator Leo Huberman, which has been closely associated with a number of others contributing to Marxist thought – including Harry Magdoff and Paul Baran (both making important contributions to the study of imperialism), and an innovative theorist of the capitalist labor process, Harry Braverman. In later years the *Monthly Review* tradition was continued under the guidance of John Bellamy Foster, Michael Yates, and others. Urgent environmental concerns became a focal point for the journal *Nature, Capitalism, and Socialism* associated with such analysts as James O’Connor and Joel Kovel. Other Marxist journals of note in the United States have been *Science and Society*, published since the 1930s, and newer publications such as *Socialism and Democracy* and *Rethinking Marxism*.

A common observation in the late twentieth century was that, to a large extent in the more developed capitalist countries of Europe and the United States, Marxism had become disassociated from the mass working-class movements out of which it had arisen. The practical revolutionary orientation of its founders and prominent early adherents (Luxemburg, Lenin,

Trotsky, Gramsci) had been set aside in favor of a more intellectualized orientation that had no significant social base and no immediate practical application.

Perhaps those most consistently committed to retaining and reviving such “revolutionary Marxism” have been activists associated with the Trotskyist tradition. Among these have been figures in the various sections of the Fourth International that Trotsky and his co-thinkers established in 1938 – among the better known being US labor radical James P. Cannon, Belgian economist and political theorist Ernest Mandel, and the Italian activist-intellectual Livio Maitan. Two outstanding historians from this tradition who ended up without formal affiliation were Isaac Deutscher and Pierre Broué. Among those building influential radical organizations in Britain (and engaging in significant literary efforts) were Tony Cliff of the Socialist Workers’ Party and Ted Grant, long associated with the Militant Tendency. One of the most renowned US Marx scholars of the late twentieth century, Hal Draper, also came out of the Trotskyist tradition and continued to adhere to many of its perspectives until his death; Draper became especially well known for his notion of “two souls of socialism” – a positive revolutionary-democratic *socialism from below* represented by such people as Marx, Engels, Luxemburg, Lenin, and Trotsky, and a negative authoritarian-elitist *socialism from above* represented, in different ways to be sure, by such figures as Eduard Bernstein, anarchists Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Mikhail Bakunin, and of course Joseph Stalin. Taking more distance from major aspects of the Trotskyist tradition (dismissing the relevance of Lenin’s revolutionary party and Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution), and giving considerably more weight to the dialectical philosophy of Hegel, were C. L. R. James and Raya Dunayevskaya.

Among self-described Marxists over the past half-century there have been sharp differences on the question of the extent to which Marxism and socialism are consistent with libertarian or authoritarian tendencies. Related to this, there have been differences regarding the question of organization: should one build a revolutionary vanguard party (and if so, how democratic?); or a mass reformist party; or no party at all (perhaps trusting the spontaneous “self-activity” of the workers)? Also related to this, there have been

differences on how to analyze so-called “post-capitalist” societies: are they some variant of socialism (perhaps “state-socialism”), or degenerated/deformed workers’ states, or bureaucratic-collectivist, or state-capitalist?

There have been differences on how to understand imperialism (or even whether imperialism still exists), and how to understand globalization (or whether “globalization” is real or just another name for old-time imperialism). There have been differences on the relationship of reform and revolution – whether it is acceptable to struggle for mere reforms, whether there is a need for revolution, and whether revolution (if desirable) is still possible in today’s world. There have been differences on the validity of Marx’s theory of value, on the relationship of Marx to Hegel, and on the compatibility of Marxism with other intellectual currents (pragmatism, structuralism, Freudianism, religion). There have been differences regarding whether the working class in advanced capitalist countries continues to be a potentially revolutionary force (or whether it is shrinking or passing out of existence altogether), and differences regarding the obviously related question about how one should define the working class.

There have been differences on how to relate to peasants, students, oppressed minorities, and social movements (feminist, gay rights, environmentalist, anti-racist, anti-war, global justice) – whether these are diversions away from the working class, or whether they should become replacements for the working class, or whether they should be seen as allies of or integral sectors of the working class.

Regardless of future clarifications and revitalizations, as global capitalism continues to exist, the influence of the incredibly comprehensive body of thought that it brought into existence – Marxism – is also likely to persist. Whether a *revolutionary* Marxism will be capable of becoming the dynamic world-historical force it once was remains to be seen. What is certain is that efforts to examine and comprehend protests and revolutions in the history of modern times will necessarily make reference to this powerful and (perhaps inherently) contradictory tradition.

SEE ALSO: Austro-Marxism; Bauer, Otto (1881–1938); Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932); Bolivarianism, Venezuela; Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888–1938); Cabral, Amílcar (1924–1973); Castro, Fidel (b. 1926);

Chen Duxiu (1879–1942); Class Identity and Protest; *Communist Manifesto*; Dictatorship of the Proletariat; Dimitrov, Georgi (1882–1949); Dunayevskaya, Raya (1910–1984); Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN); Frankfurt School (Jewish Emigrés); Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1928–1967); Hilferding, Rudolf (1877–1941); Hồ Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh) (1890–1969); Imperialism and Capitalist Development; Imperialism, Modernization to Globalization; Internationals; James, C. L. R. (1901–1989); Jaurès, Jean (1859–1914); Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Kollontai, Alexandra (1872–1952); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Leninist Philosophy; Lukács, Georg (1885–1971); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Mariátegui, José Carlos (1894–1930); Martí, Farabundo (1893–1930); Marx, Eleanor (1855–1898); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972); Paris Commune, 1871; Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918); Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN); Social Democratic Party, Germany; Socialism; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Zapatismo; Zetkin, Clara (1857–1933)

References and Suggested Readings

Anderson, P. (1976) *Considerations on Western Marxism*. London: Verso.

Bottomore, T., Harris, L., Kiernan, V. G., & Miliband, R. (Eds.) (1991) *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.

Draper, H. (1992) *Socialism From Below*. Ed. E. Haberkern. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Eley, G. (2002) *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Holmstrom, N. (Ed.) (2003) *The Socialist Feminist Project: A Contemporary Reader in Theory and Politics*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Hunt, R. N. (1974, 1984) *The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels*, 2 vols. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Le Blanc, P. (1996) *From Marx to Gramsci: A Reader in Revolutionary Marxist Politics*. Amherst: Humanity Books.

Le Blanc, P. (2006) *Marx, Lenin, and the Revolutionary Experience: Studies of Communism and Radicalism in the Age of Globalization*. New York: Routledge.

Löwy, M. (1981) *The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development: The Theory of Permanent Revolution*. London: Verso.

Löwy, M. (Ed.) (1992) *Marxism in Latin America from 1909 to the Present*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Löwy, M. (1993) *On Changing the World: Essays in Political Philosophy, From Karl Marx to Walter Benjamin*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Löwy, M. (2005) *The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx*. Chicago: Haymarket.

McClellan, D. (1981) *Marxism After Marx*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

McClellan, D. (Ed.) (1983) *Marx: The First 100 Years*. Oxford: Fontana.

Mandel, E. (1968) *Marxist Economic Theory*, 2 vols. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Mandel, E. (1994) *The Place of Marxism in History*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1976–2005) *Collected Works*, 50 vols. New York: International Publishers.

Nimtz, Jr., A. H. (2000) *Marx and Engels: Their Contribution to the Democratic Breakthrough*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Ollman, B. & Vernoff, E. (Eds.) (1982) *The Left Academy: Marxist Scholarship on American Campuses*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Ollman, B. & Vernoff, E. (Eds.) (1984) *The Left Academy: Marxist Scholarship on American Campuses*, Vol. 2. New York: Praeger.

Ollman, B. & Vernoff, E. (Eds.) (1986) *The Left Academy: Marxist Scholarship on American Campuses*, Vol. 3. New York: Praeger.

Rees, J. (1998) *The Algebra of Revolution: The Dialectic and the Classical Marxist Tradition*. London: Routledge.

Robinson, C. J. (1983) *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. London: Zed Books.

Schram, S. & Carrière d'Encasse, H. (Eds.) (1969) *Marxism and Asia*. London: Allen Lane.

Sweezy, P. M. (1968) *The Theory of Capitalist Development*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Masaryk, Tomas (1850–1937)

Michael Rossi

Dr. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk was the first president of the newly established Czechoslovak state between 1918 and 1935. A distinguished academic, having served as professor in the School of Philosophy at the University of Prague since 1882, and leader of the resistance to Austrian rule during World War I, Masaryk's appointment as president was well received by both Czech and European intellectual circles. He is credited with establishing Czechoslovakia and keeping it firmly within the democratic political realm until the outbreak of World War II.

Masaryk's philosophical commitments were rooted in the works of Plato, Hume, and Comte. His first serious study, the subject of his thesis at Vienna University, focused on the Platonic

nature of the soul. Here, Masaryk was interested in examining a theoretical synthesis between moral and religious ideals and everyday practical activity. In the same spirit, he regarded the vocation of politics as an activity directed by ideals but nevertheless rooted in firm scientific understanding. Philosophy was thus a practical instruction for men's behavior, and not merely an academic discipline. The search for balance between religion and practicality deepened throughout his life, and undoubtedly influenced his abandonment of his original Catholic faith for more secular forms of Protestantism.

His doctoral thesis "Suicide as a Social Mass Movement" is widely regarded as the key to Masaryk's philosophical personality (Kovtun 1990: 4). He saw the suicidal tendency as a symptom of the disintegration of the worldview represented by Catholicism before rationalism and individualism had undermined its spiritual supremacy. In order to restore the purpose of life, congruency between modern man and a modern faith must be established. The humanistic teachings of Jesus Christ without the anachronistic mythology could be the basis of this renewal.

A year after his appointment at Prague University, Masaryk founded the journal *Athenaeum*, which was devoted to examining Czech culture and science. With several colleagues, he published a series of articles challenging the authenticity of two Czech manuscripts supposedly originating during the Middle Ages. He demonstrated that they actually dated to the first period of the Czech nationalist movement, and had been deliberately constructed to give the illusion of a distinct Czech culture extending back to the tenth century. In addition, he served as the appeal lawyer in the much publicized Hilsner trials, a series of anti-Semitic trials following an accusation of blood libel against Leopold Hilsner, a Bohemian Jew.

Masaryk served in the Austro-Hungarian parliament from 1891 to 1893 as a member of the Young Czech Party, and again between 1907 and 1914 in the Realist Party, or Czech Progressive Party. During World War I he fled to England under suspicion of treason and began to work for the creation of an independent Czechoslovak state. By 1916, convinced that the Hapsburg Empire must be dissolved, he began petitioning officials in London, Paris, and Washington for Czechoslovakia's independence. With the end of the war and the fall of the Hapsburg monarchy in 1918, Masaryk was recognized as head of a

provisional Czechoslovak government. He was formally elected its first president in 1920.

As president, Masaryk channeled his beliefs in modernization, rationality, and individualism through democratic practice. He faced considerable challenges in maintaining democratic rule given the multi-ethnic character of the new state – comprised of Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, and Hungarians – and developments in Central Europe towards the end of the 1920s and early 1930s. He served as president until 1935, resigning due to bad health. He died two years later on September 14, 1937. His successor, Edvard Beneš, largely continued Masaryk's policies until the Nazi invasion in 1938.

Masaryk's legacy was invoked during the first organized Czech resistance to Soviet control in the Plzeň demonstrations in 1953. Workers carried portraits of both him and Beneš in their rallies. His works were officially banned by the communists after 1948, but served as a critical component of freethinking during the Prague Spring, and within *Samizdat* publications following the Soviet invasion. In 1980 a renewed interest in Masaryk's works led to the publication of a 750-page *Samizdat* anthology of his essays and documents under the editorship of three former 1968 reformers.

SEE ALSO: Czechoslovakia, Resistance to Soviet Political and Economic Rule; Ethnic and Nationalist Revolts in the Hapsburg Empire, 1500–1848; Hlinka, Andrej (1864–1938) and the Slovak People's Party; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism

References and Suggested Readings

- Kovtun, G. J. (1990) *The Spirit of Thomas G. Masaryk (1859–1937)*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Masaryk, T. (1927) *The Making of a State: Memories and Observations 1914–1918*. New York: Frederick A. Stokes.
- Szporluk, R. (1981) *The Political Thought of Thomas G. Masaryk*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Van den Beld, A. (1975) *Humanity: The Political and Social Philosophy of Thomas G. Masaryk*. The Hague: Mouton.

Masses, The

Jon Bekken

Although published only from January 1911 through December 1917, *The Masses* was perhaps the American left's best-loved magazine, pub-

lishing some of the age's leading artists and writers. In an era when the American socialist press included hundreds of daily and weekly papers, published in the dozens of languages spoken by a largely immigrant working class, *The Masses* and the more agitational *International Socialist Review* were the party's most prominent magazines until they were suppressed during World War I.

After a modest beginning as an earnest exponent of an evolutionary road to socialism, *The Masses* was re-launched in 1912 with Max Eastman as editor and a core of artists and writers who ran the magazine as a cooperative. They proudly proclaimed it "A Revolutionary and not a Reform Magazine; a Magazine with a Sense of Humor and no Respect for the Respectable." The reborn *Masses* embodied a fusion of avant-garde artistic and literary sensibilities with a more radical but eclectic socialist approach. The magazine was lively and irreverent, illustrated by some of the leading artists of the day and publishing contributions by radical labor leaders and other activists, side by side with prominent writers such as Sherwood Anderson, Floyd Dell, John Reed, Carl Sandburg, and Mary Heaton Vorse. Many made their living in the commercial press, while contributing their more controversial material to *The Masses* for free. The heady editorial brew that resulted attracted a wide array of artists, bohemians, and social reformers. Indeed, the magazine relied on contributions from wealthy sympathizers to cover deficits resulting from a lack of advertising. Those sympathizers also aided *The Masses* in its many legal battles.

The Masses was suppressed in 1917 when the post office refused to deliver issues containing anti-war cartoons and commentary, and then revoked its mailing permit. The editors and selected contributors were twice tried on espionage charges, but the government could not secure a conviction. Max Eastman revived the magazine as *The Liberator*, but with the fracturing of the socialist movement and the rise of the Palmer Raids, its moment had passed. During its six-year run, *The Liberator* was a more staid, traditional political magazine. Several contributors launched *New Masses* in 1926, but as the magazine moved closer to the Communist Party, many of its liveliest contributors drifted away. It ended publication in the 1940s as *Masses and Mainstream* – a Popular Front organ.

SEE ALSO: Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA); Socialist Party, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Eastman, M. (1964) *Love and Revolution: My Journey Through an Epoch*. New York: Random House.
- Fishbein, L. (1982) *Rebels in Bohemia: The Radicals of The Masses, 1911–1917*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Zurier, R. (1988) *Art for the Masses: A Radical Magazine and its Graphics, 1911–1917*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Mau Mau Rebellion, 1952–1959

Mary Ciambaka Mwiandi and George Gona

Colonization of Kenya began with Britain's declaration of Uganda and the whole region down to the Indian Ocean as its protectorate in 1895. In the same year, with the approval of the British Cabinet, the construction of the Uganda railway began. British Empire in East Africa was opened to colonial domination with the building of what Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill described as the "political" railway, the symbol of imperial achievement and its intentions to stay (Tvedt 2004).

However, the real thrust of colonization of Kenya started in 1902 when Sir Charles Eliot, the first commissioner of the British East Africa Protectorate (as Kenya was called until 1920), surveyed the territory and its people and saw economic potential. To harness this potential, he invited his countrymen to come to settle in the country, which in 1915 was declared a "White man's country," a dream which was shattered by the Mau Mau rebellion, fifty years later. Their aims were to struggle for the return of all alienated land from the agrarian and pastoral communities by the Europeans – the Empire builders, commercial companies, and settlers. Mau Mau was a revolutionary and military response to imperial incursions, aggression, land expropriation, the exploitation of African natural and human resources, the degradation of African culture, and taxation.

Origin of Mau Mau

Between 1946 and 1952 Africans in Kenya had come to believe that their political, social,

and economic aspirations could only be attained through armed action. These sentiments were translated into the creation of a movement which later came to be called Mau Mau. Following the unrest among the Kikuyu labor tenants on white settlers' farms in 1948, colonial government became alarmed and responded by restricting Africans from all forms of organized meetings. The very words "Mau Mau" conjure up memories of something evil lurking in history's dark shadows. Mau Mau was the great horror story of Britain's Empire in the 1950s. The battle to defeat the revolt in Kenya was presented as a war between savagery and civilization, a rebellion made by men who could not cope with modernity, who reached back into a wicked, tribal past in an effort to stop the wheel of progress from turning. To some, it was impulsive savagery that was greater than anything the civilized world had encountered in two centuries. Soon, wonderful descriptions of Kenya's White highlands gave way to be the land of savages and the uncouth.

The rebellion was occasioned by the frustration, resentment, and mounting anger of Africans over the occupation and control of large tracts of land by a few Europeans. This occupation had started in the early 1900s and accelerated after the two world wars when retired British soldiers were rewarded with land. The African soldiers who had retired from the two wars were never given land for their services. The pressure on land grew fast as the population increased and political awareness spread among the Africans. In addition, long before Mau Mau, men and women protested against colonial laws such as unfair labor practices, taxation, lack of adequate education, and exclusion from politics.

On the face of it, armed rebellion seemed an unnecessary gamble in the endgame of Empire. Kenya's explosion into struggle came just as the old European empires were running out of steam. By the time of the emergency the once-mighty imperial power was contracting. In the East, Britain had already given up India and Pakistan. In Malaysia, independence was granted in 1952. The rising tide of nationalism could not be stopped. This was the new order of the postwar world. Like many resistance movements of the time, Mau Mau was part of this general wave of change sweeping across colonized areas.

Mau Mau drew its strength in the early stages from a series of political and religious awakenings



After years of imperialist rule, Africans in Kenya, led primarily by the Kikuyu, rose against the British in the Mau Mau Rebellion (1952–9), during which 11,000 Africans were killed, 80,000 members of the Kikuyu were detained in camps, and 2,000 Africans lost their lives supporting the British. While the rebellion itself failed, it ultimately encouraged Kenyan independence. In this April 1, 1954 photo, former Mau Mau leaders are protected by the British after joining forces with them in Operation Anvil to inform on suspected Mau Maus. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

such as the adaptation of traditional Kikuyu oath-taking and patriotic songs. Oath-taking was not only a unifying factor but also emphasized the use of force in achieving its ends. While the colonial government, and certainly the local settlers, viewed oath-taking as the barbaric mumbo-jumbo of the Kikuyu, the practice had logic and purpose. It was the rational response of a rural people seeking to understand the enormous socioeconomic and political changes taking place around them, while attempting to respond collectively to new and unjust realities.

On the eve of the Mau Mau rebellion, hundreds of thousands of Kikuyu took an oath of unity, pledging their lives for Mau Mau and its demand for land and freedom. The call by Mau Mau for land and freedom was clearly understood by the British as loss of "their" land and an end to their stay in Kenya. But for those Kikuyu who pledged themselves to Mau Mau, the meaning of land and freedom was less defined and much

more complex than merely throwing off the British yoke and reclaiming the land of their ancestors. In part, the specific meaning of Mau Mau tended to reflect the age, gender, and birthplace of the oath-taker. For some of them, land and freedom meant a rejection of the colonially appointed chiefs and their policies of self-aggrandizement. For the younger generation among men, it was a demand for a return of the frontier, where they could once again earn their adulthood, often with the help of an elder Kikuyu patron. For some Kikuyu women, land and freedom represented an end to the back-breaking terracing projects and other forms of forced communal labor imposed by colonialism. For others, the slogan represented a future hope of finding farms in the overcrowded reserves that were large enough to feed their children. It was as much the ambiguity as the specifics of Mau Mau's demand for land and freedom that made it so appealing to the Kikuyu masses and such a powerful and difficult movement for the British to suppress.

For Mau Mau followers, those who betrayed their movement had to be eliminated. This included not just the loyalists but also the small minority of devout Kikuyu Christians who were neither Mau Mau nor loyalist, and who suffered persecutions from both opposing factions. The local Christian missionaries fought endlessly with the colonial government to expand the official definition of loyalism, claiming that their Christian flock comprised the most loyal and western-learning Kikuyu in the colony. Their efforts did not yield much. Throughout the war these missionaries played a pivotal role, as many witnessed the atrocities that unfolded in the detention camps and barbed-wire villages. While they succeeded in "rescuing" a few missionary loyalist families from the camps, a majority of the Kikuyu were incarcerated.

There are many voices of Mau Mau – the literate, the heroic, the professional. All these voices lay claim to the Mau Mau story. However, there is no doubt about who led the forces of struggle in the forest: Dedan Kimathi, Stanley Mathenge, and Waruhiu Itote are the acclaimed generals of Mau Mau. But the stories of the subalterns of the movement – the food carriers, the couriers, the recruiting sergeants and oath administrators, the treasurers and fund-raisers, the assassins and enforcers, and the ordinary foot soldiers in the forest – are yet to be told.

Mau Mau Rebellion

Mau Mau was therefore a culmination of a myriad of local struggles over the years following World War II. It was not until October 1952 that the war properly began. The sudden turn of events was prompted by the murder of Senior Chief Waruhiu. Increasing unrest forced the governor to declare a state of emergency. Following from this, British troops were airlifted into the colony as reinforcements. With the ban on the Kenya African Union (KAU) and other political parties in 1953, Mau Mau rebellion gained more support from the masses. The rebellion lasted for over seven years and was a force whose strength was based less on military might and more on people's aspirations to regain stolen land and win political and economic freedom and human dignity.

Much of the struggle tore through the African communities themselves as an internecine war waged between rebels and so-called loyalists – Africans who took the side of the government and opposed Mau Mau. This was partly brought about by the deliberate policy of the British to cultivate an African opposition by arming vigilantes, styled as Home Guards, to protect villages from attack and to assist the police and military in operations against the Mau Mau fighters. But the opponents of Mau Mau were also those who did not share the values of the rebels, who rejected violence and armed struggle as a way forward, and who questioned the moral basis of the claims made by the rebels to rights in land and access to property. As the conflict wore on, these divisions made it appear more and more like a civil war. Among these groups were the staunch Christians of all denominations who felt that oath-taking and the killing of royalists was against their Christian ethics.

The colonial state and the British government marshaled their forces to counter the Mau Mau rebellion. The declaration of Emergency in October 1952 was aimed at crippling Mau Mau. Part of the effort to hobble the solidarity of the struggle was the banning of all African political parties by the government. The official explanation given for this drastic measure was to ensure the security of Her Majesty's subjects (British) living in Kenya Colony. The chain of privileges enjoyed by the white settlers (particularly cheap labor offered by the "natives") was now under serious threat. This, according to the

white settlers, amounted to a blatant challenge by uneducated natives to the sacrosanct white settlement on the Kenya Highlands. Mau Mau had to be nipped in the bud.

During the rebellion, state execution increasingly became a potent weapon, quite in contrast to its sparing use by the colonialists hitherto. In the Mau Mau emergency, Kenya's hanging judges were kept busy. Between April 1953 and December 1956 the Special Emergency Assize Courts tried a total of 2,609 Kikuyu on capital charges relating to Mau Mau offenses in 1,211 trials. In all, over the course of the emergency, 1,090 Kikuyu would go to the gallows for Mau Mau crimes. In no other place, and at no other time in the history of British imperialism, was state execution used on such a scale as this. This was more than double the number of executions carried out against convicted terrorists in Algeria, and many more than in all other British colonial emergencies of the postwar period – in Palestine, Malaya, Cyprus, and Aden.

Operation Jock Scott was the code name for the assault directed at Jomo Kenyatta and 180 other identified leaders of Mau Mau. In the early morning of October 21, 1952, scores of Kenyan policemen, white and black, zealously carried out their arrest orders, rousing suspected Mau Mau protagonists like Kenyatta, Paul Ngei, Fred Kubai, and Bildad Kaggia, handcuffing them, and hauling them off to Nairobi police station. Mass arrests were carried out between September 1952 and March 1953, followed by Operation Anvil of 1954, which saw men, especially from Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru, arrested and sent to concentration camps. Operation Anvil's aim was to deprive the Mau Mau of forces and hideouts, of all moral, political, and material support. Also, between 1953 and 1955, Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru communities were forced to dig trenches measuring 10–15 feet deep and 15–16 feet wide around Mt Kenya to starve Mau Mau fighters.

The colonial government was not deterred by the killings by Mau Mau. It went ahead with prosecuting Kenyatta and five of his so-called deputies: Bildad Kaggia, Fred Kubai, Paul Ngei, Achieng' Oneko, and Kungu Karumba. Kenyatta and his group were sentenced to seven years in prison with hard labor, followed by a lifetime of restriction. In other words, they were to live in isolation for the rest of their lives.

Mau Mau did not collapse with the arrest of such prominent national leaders, but instead turned more violent as the movement's leadership passed into the hands of younger men and women who had for months pushed Kenyatta and others to adopt a more radical, revolutionary course. Colonial authorities had managed to remove the one person who had been tenuously keeping the young militants in check; in fact, Mau Mau only gained strength when Kenyatta the heroic Kikuyu leader also became, literally overnight, Kenyatta the martyr. Although his political leanings were more moderate than the majority of Mau Mau, Kenyatta became a potent and unifying political symbol. Fighting continued without him. Outside of the forest, Mau Mau adherents, many of them women, organized an intricate, passive-wing operation that would provide intelligence, weapons, food, and other supplies to the forest fighters. It was the size of this passive wing that reflected the grassroots depth of the movement. Mau Mau became one of the first armed struggles of the twentieth century where superior western firepower was overcome, at least initially. The British were scared stiff of the Mau Mau due to their knowledge of the difficult forest terrain and their hit-and-run tactics.

Conclusion

Mau Mau was anti-oppression and anti-exploitation. The military superiority of the colonial government and the support it obtained from loyalists and over 20,000 Home Guards was able to defeat the Mau Mau militarily, but the Mau Mau did not lose the war. Its success can be located in the manner in which the British began politically and economically to plan for Kenyans subsequent to its end. In the final analysis, Mau Mau shattered European dreams of creating "white man's country." Mau Mau succeeded too in destroying "settlerdom" and European landlordism with far-reaching political consequences and economic ramifications.

SEE ALSO: Kenya, National Protests for Independence; Kenyatta, Jomo (1893–1978)

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, D. (2005) *Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of the Empire*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

- Berman, B. & Lonsdale, J. (1995) *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa*. London: James Curry.
- Bewes, E. J. (1953) *Kikuyu Conflict and the Christian Witness*. London: Highway Press.
- Clayton, A. & Savage, D. C. (1974) *Government and Labour in Kenya, 1885–1963*. London: Frank Cass.
- Elkins, C. (2005) *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Frost, R. (1977) *Race against Time: Human Relations and Politics in Kenya before Independence*. Nairobi: Trans Africa Press.
- Githumo, M. (1991) The Truth about Mau Mau Movement: The Most Popular Uprising in Kenya. *Trans.African Journal of History*, 20: 1–17.
- Kagia, B. (1975) *Roots of Freedom, 1921–1963: An Autobiography*. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers.
- Kanogo, T. (1987) *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau, 1905–1963*. London: James Curry.
- Leakey, L. S. B. (1952) *Defeating the Mau Mau*. London: Methuen.
- Lonsdale, J. (1990) Mau Mau of the Mind and Remaking of Kenya. *Journal of African Studies*, 31, 3: 394–421.
- Maloba, W. O. (1993) *Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt*. London: James Currey.
- Tvedt, T. (2004) *The River Nile in the Age of the British: Political Ecology and the Quest for Economic Power*. London: I. B. Taurus.

Maurín, Joaquín (1896–1973)

Andrew Durgan

Joaquín Maurín, along with his friend and fellow POUM leader Andreu Nin, was one of the outstanding Marxists in Spain in the years leading up to the Civil War. Maurín was born in the village of Bonansa in the Aragonese Pyrenees in 1896. Trained as a teacher, like many of his contemporaries, he sympathized with working-class republicanism and advanced pedagogic methods. Radicalized by the Russian Revolution he joined the CNT and became one of the union's leaders in the city of Lleida where he lived and worked. Such was his impact on the small local workers' movement that his anarchist rivals would later refer to Lleida as Mauringrad.

Maurín was one of the leading figures in the pro-Bolshevik revolutionary syndicalists inside the CNT and edited this tendency's press: *Lucha Social* (1919–22) and *La Batalla* (1922–4). In 1921 he attended the founding congress in Moscow of

the Red International of Labor Unions (RILU) as part of a CNT delegation which acted as a bridge between the syndicalists and communists present. Meanwhile the anarchist majority among the CNT's activists, alarmed by reports of the Bolsheviks' persecution of the libertarian movement in Russia, managed to get the union to disaffiliate from both the CI and RILU in 1922.

Maurín's evolution towards communism was slow; initially he was more influenced by Georges Sorel than Lenin. With the rupture of the CNT with the CI, Maurín's faction moved closer to the Communist Party (PCE) and participated with it in organizing in 1922 the *Comités Sindicalistas Revolucionarios* which defended the RILU's program inside the unions. In 1924 Maurín's group finally joined the party, forming its Catalan Federation. Maurín's relatively late evolution towards communism and the specific origins of the Catalan communist-syndicalists meant he never totally integrated into the PCE. Imprisoned for two years by the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923–30), he went into exile in Paris in 1927. Here he married Jeanne Souvarine, sister of the leading French dissident communist Boris Souvarine.

Although remaining formally part of the PCE leadership and working for *Izvestia*, Maurín criticized the party's sectarianism, bureaucratic methods, and characterization of the forthcoming revolution in Spain. Expelled from the PCE in July 1930, Maurín was followed by most of the Catalan Federation's membership eight months later into a new dissident communist organization, the *Bloque Obrero y Campesino* (Workers' and Peasants' Bloc) (BOC). As leader of the new party he proved a brilliant propagandist, orator, and organizer. Apart from editing its press and writing various agitational pamphlets, his more substantial writings showed his growing ability as a relatively original Marxist thinker. In particular, *La revolución española* (1931) and *Hacia la segunda revolución* (1935) developed his view of the historical development of Spain and the nature of its emerging revolutionary movement. Maurín's conception of the democratic, soon socialist-democratic, revolution centered on Spain's socioeconomic backwardness and need to "complete the tasks" of the bourgeois revolution. However, given the political weakness of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, this revolution could only take place under proletarian leadership, in alliance with the peasantry and

national liberation movements, and would move directly to the socialist stage. The years leading up to the Civil War seemed to confirm Maurín's thesis: the ineptness of middle-class republicanism, the reactionary intransigence of the ruling oligarchy, and the radicalization of the workers' movement opened the way to war and revolution.

Maurín's break with orthodox communism and his critique of Stalinism, combined with events inside Spain, led in September 1935 to the fusion of the BOC with the Trotskyists in the Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (POUM). Although never becoming a Trotskyist himself, Maurín sympathized with the former Bolshevik leader and his ideas. As the POUM's general secretary and its only parliamentary representative after the elections of February 1936, Maurín's status as a national political figure grew. In the weeks leading up to the Civil War he was virtually a lone voice in parliament warning about the threat of military-inspired fascism and the need to counter this with working-class revolution.

Trapped in Galicia at the outbreak of the Civil War in July 1936, Maurín spent the next ten years in jail. A series of interventions on his behalf, most notably by his cousin who was head of Franco's army chaplains, eventually saved Maurín from execution. He was released in 1946. The trauma of his years in prison, under constant threat of death, and his absence during the long-awaited revolution and its subsequent defeat understandably had a profound effect on Maurín. Rather than lead the POUM in exile in France, in 1947 he immigrated to New York to be with his wife and family. For most of the rest of his life he worked for a Spanish-speaking news agency which he set up and intervened little in politics. Letters to former comrades, before his death in 1973, clearly showed his evolution towards social democracy and militant anti-communism.

SEE ALSO: Asturias Uprising, October 1934; Bolsheviks; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Nin, Andreu (1892–1937); Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Bonson, A. (1994) *Joaquín Maurín (1896–1973). El impulso de hacer política*. Diputación de Huesca.
 Bonson, A., Barrull, J., & Durgan, A. et al. (1999) *Joaquín Maurín*. Barcelona: Laertes.
 Durgan, A. (1996) *B.O.C. El Bloque Obrero y Campesino 1930–1936*. Barcelona: Laertes.

Maurín, J. (1966) *Revolución y contrarrevolución en España*. Paris: Ruedo Ibérico.

Maurín, J. (1977) *La revolución española. De la monarquía absoluta a la revolución socialista*. Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama.

Riottot, Y. (1997/Spanish ed. 2004) *Joaquín Maurín. De l'anarcho-sindicalisme au communisme (1919–1936)*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

May Day

Chris John Agee

May Day is International Workers' Day. In what has become a major event celebrated on May 1 of every year in many countries, May Day draws millions of people around the globe to rally for workers' rights. While May 1 protests originally grew out of the late nineteenth-century American labor movement, festivities spawned around the world and have, at times, included spectacular marches accompanied with cheering crowds, triumphant music, colorful banners, and large placards. Throughout the twentieth century, the event also served as a forum for protests against war and imperialist policies and often culminated in rallies calling for social justice. Despite efforts to undermine the meaning surrounding the event by business, capitalist classes, and conservative governments, May Day festivities and protests continue to be held in countries around the world.

Originally the date of pagan festivals praising spring and the onset of summer, May 1 is marked with bonfires in Ireland and Scotland on Beltane (Bealtaine) or, as it is referred to in Northern Europe, *Walpurgisnacht*. Other cultures, such as in Egypt and India, celebrate early May with fertility festivals. In medieval England, people danced around maypoles decorated with greenery and flowers.

Notwithstanding the traditional festivals, the birth of the modern May Day celebration can be traced back to the late nineteenth-century labor struggles in the United States for the eight-hour workday. Demanding a reduction from long work shifts, nearly 350,000 workers in over 1,000 factories nationwide rallied and struck on May 1, 1886 under the banner "eight hours for work, eight hours for rest, and eight hours for what we will." The original campaign was organized by an alliance of the fledgling American Federation of Labor (AFL), local

assemblies of the Knights of Labor, and various US tendencies within the anarchist and socialist movements. In what became a defining moment in the history of the American labor movement, factory workers, artisans, merchants, and immigrants in cities and towns across the country, from Boston to Milwaukee, from New York City to Pittsburgh, from Cincinnati to Chicago, united together to demand worker rights and dignity through nationally coordinated mass marches, rallies, and strikes.

Samuel Gompers, the president of the American Federation of Labor, proclaimed that the protests beginning on May 1, 1886 would be “forever remembered as a second Declaration of Independence.” It was, however, the ensuing events that became engrained in the annals of history when, after several days of successful events, key leaders of the May Day actions were arrested and executed as a result of the Haymarket tragedy. Over the course of the three-day general strike in Chicago, Illinois, police fatally shot four strikers at the McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. plant. The next day, on May 4, toward the end of what was a peaceful rally in Chicago’s Haymarket Square, police closed in on the remaining participants. An assailant threw a bomb into the police, killing one officer instantly and wounding dozens. The police then opened fire, killing and wounding many, including some from their own ranks. Of the hundreds arrested in the aftermath, eight were selected for and put through what became one of the greatest show trials in world history. Despite overwhelming evidence proving their innocence in the Haymarket events, four of the strike leaders were hanged for their political beliefs. Within seven years, the Illinois governor issued an official apology and pardoned all eight. While the remaining incarcerated leaders were freed, the martyrs of the Haymarket tragedy remain seared in the minds of labor activists into the twenty-first century.

Consequently, May Day has become the international celebration of workers’ movements in many countries throughout the world. Since its founding, May Day has been celebrated under varying political and historical circumstances: during both World War I and II, it served as a call for peace; during the Great Depression, it served as a call for social security and increased wages; during the Cold War, May Day became a major state holiday in the Soviet Union and

other communist countries; and during the 1960s, it served as a renewed call for the working class to unite for peace and justice. In Spain, as in many countries, protesters rally on May Day against the presence of US bases in their country; in France, as in other countries, demonstrators rally against far-right candidates; in Cuba, as in other socialist countries, hundreds of thousands pour into the streets of Havana and other cities to march for international peace and worker solidarity.

Despite the fact that May Day protests received their inspiration from the American labor movement, countless attempts were made to undermine the celebration in the United States. The US Congress, for example, designated May 1 as Loyalty Day in 1958. Attempts to hold rallies in New York City’s Union Square on May Day were often derailed by so-called patriotic programs organized by local business associations: they had been granted permits to hold their own event on precisely the same day and location. Moreover, in what some believe is an effort to isolate American workers from their counterparts in the rest of the world and detract from the spirit, meaning, and ideas surrounding May Day, Labor Day in the United States is celebrated on the first Monday in September.

In spite of these efforts, a resurgence of May Day protests has proliferated throughout the United States. In recent years, widespread pro-immigrant rallies, strikes, and consumer boycotts highlight the need for comprehensive immigration reform: namely, policies that address the harsh living and working conditions 12 million undocumented immigrants face in the United States. On May Day 2006, 1.5 million foreign and US-born workers marched and demonstrated for human rights for immigrants in major cities throughout the country, including Los Angeles, where an estimated one million held a rally at the city hall.

May Day 2008, was particularly historic for the US labor movement: for the first time in 70 years, a major US trade union led marches and a systemwide strike on May Day. The International Longshore and Warehouse Union led a work stoppage at all 29 West Coast ports. It demanded an end to the disastrous and debilitating US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over 25,000 dock workers closed ports from Seattle to San Diego. They were joined by May Day protesters throughout the United States, in cities

including Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City, Philadelphia, and San Francisco and in countries around the world including Iraq, Japan, Germany, Indonesia, and Sweden, to name a few. Indeed, May Day continues to serve in varying degrees as a major annual event to mark the struggle for workers' rights, international working-class solidarity, peace, and global justice.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchism in the United States to 1945; Anarchism in the United States, 1946–Present; Class Struggle; EuroMayDay; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Haymarket Tragedy; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Internationals; Knights of Labor and Terence Powderly (1849–1924); Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 1775–1900; Socialism; Socialist Party, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Boyer, R. O. & Herbert, M. M. (1975) *Labor's Untold Story*, 3rd ed. New York: United Electrical, Radio, & Machine Workers of America.
- Brecher, J. (1997) *Strike!*, rev. and updated ed. Boston: South End Press.
- Foner, P. S. (1986) *May Day: A Short History of the International Workers' Holiday, 1886–1986*, 1st ed. New York: International Publishers.
- Green, J. R. (1998) *The World of the Worker: Labor in Twentieth-Century America*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Gutman, H. G. (1977) *Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America: Essays in American Working-Class and Social History*. New York: Vintage.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. & Ranger, T. O. (1983) *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, R. (1968) *May Day Manifesto 1968*, expanded ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Zinn, H. (1980) *A People's History of the United States*, 1st ed. New York: Harper & Row.

May 1968 French uprisings

Tariq Ali

A storm swept the world in 1968. It started in Vietnam, then blew across Asia, crossing the sea and the mountains to Europe and beyond. A brutal war waged by the US against a poor Southeast Asian country was seen every night on television. The cumulative impact of watching the bombs drop, villages on fire, and a country being doused with napalm and Agent Orange trig-

gered a wave of global revolts not seen on such a scale before or since.

If the Vietnamese were defeating the world's most powerful state, surely the people, too, could defeat their own rulers – that was the dominant mood among the more radical of the 60s generation.

In February 1968, the Vietnamese communists launched the famous Tet offensive, attacking US troops in every major South Vietnamese city. The grand finale was the sight of Vietnamese guerillas occupying the US embassy in Saigon (Hô Chi Minh City) and raising their flag from its roof. It was undoubtedly a suicide mission, but incredibly courageous. The impact was immediate. For the first time a majority of US citizens realized that the war was unwinnable. The poorer among them brought Vietnam home that same summer in a revolt against poverty and discrimination as black ghettos exploded in every major US city, with returned black GIs playing a prominent role in the upheaval.

The single spark set the world alight. In March 1968, students at Nanterre University in France came out on to the streets and the March 22 movement was born, with two Daniels (Cohn-Bendit and Bensaid, Nanterre students then, and both still involved in green or leftist politics) challenging the French lion: Charles de Gaulle, the aloof, monarchical president of the Fifth Republic who, in a puerile outburst, would later describe as *chie-en-lit*, or shit in the bed, the events in France that came close to toppling him. The students began by demanding university reforms and moved on to revolution.

That same month in London, a demonstration against the Vietnam War marched to the US embassy in Grosvenor Square. It turned violent. Like the Vietnamese, the demonstrators wanted to occupy the embassy, but mounted police were deployed to protect the citadel. Clashes occurred and US Senator Eugene McCarthy, watching the images, demanded an end to a war that had led, among other things, to the US embassy in London being constantly besieged. Compared with the ferment elsewhere, Britain was a side-show. University occupations and riots in Grosvenor Square did not pose any real threat to the Labour government, which backed the US but refused to send troops to Vietnam.

In France, the existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre was at the peak of his influence. Contrary to Stalinist apologists, he argued that



The year 1968 saw student protests across the world, most notably in France, where student agitation and a general strike of ten million workers led to the collapse of Charles de Gaulle's conservative government, ushering in an era of equality, sexual liberation, and human rights. Here students take to the streets of Paris to protest the Vietnam War and the closing of French universities. One such clash resulted in the injury of 72 policemen and an undetermined number of students, 600 of whom were arrested. (Photo © Bruno Barbey/Magnum Photos)

there was no reason to prepare for happiness tomorrow at the price of injustice, oppression, or misery today. What was required was improvement now.

By May, the Nanterre students' uprising had spread to Paris and to the trade unions. Students were preparing the first issue of *The Black Dwarf* as the French capital erupted on May 10. Jean-Jacques Lebel, a tear-gassed Paris correspondent, was ringing in reports every few hours. He reported: "A well-known French football commentator is sent to the Latin Quarter to cover the night's events and reported, 'Now the CRS [riot police] are charging, they're storming the barricade – oh my God! There's a battle raging. The students are counter-attacking, you can hear the noise – the CRS are retreating. Now they're regrouping, getting ready to charge again. The inhabitants are throwing things from their windows at the CRS – oh! The police are retaliating, shooting grenades into the windows of apartments . . .' The producer interrupted: 'This can't be true, the CRS don't do things like that!' 'I'm telling you what I'm seeing . . .' His voice goes dead. They have cut him off."

The police failed to take back the Latin Quarter, now renamed the Heroic Vietnam Quarter. Three days later a million people occupied the streets of Paris, demanding an end to the rotteness of the state and plastering the

walls with slogans: "Defend the Collective Imagination," "Beneath the Cobblestones the Beach," "Commodities Are the Opium of the People, Revolution is the Ecstasy of History." Eric Hobsbawm wrote in *The Black Dwarf*: "What France proves is when someone demonstrates that people are not powerless, they may begin to act again." One student had been planning to head for Paris before he received a late-night phone call. A posh voice said, "You don't know who I am, but do not leave the country till your five years here are up. They won't let you back." In those days, citizenship for Commonwealth citizens was automatic after five years. The student would not complete his five years until October 1968. Already Labour cabinet ministers had been discussing in public whether or not he could be deported. Friendly lawyers confirmed he should not leave the country. Clive Goodwin, the publisher of *The Black Dwarf*, vetoed the trip and went off himself.

A year later students went to help Alain Krivine, one of the leaders of the May 1968 revolt, in his presidential campaign as a candidate for the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire. The French police surrounded the plane as it touched down at Orly airport. An immigrant student was served an order banning him from France which stayed in force until François Mitterrand's election many years later.

The revolution did not happen, but France was shaken by the events. De Gaulle, with a sense of history, considered a coup d'état: in early June, he flew from a military base to Baden-Baden, where French troops were stationed, to ask whether they would support him if Paris fell to the revolutionaries. They agreed but demanded rehabilitation for the ultra-right generals whom De Gaulle had fired because they opposed pulling out of Algeria. The deal was done. Yet De Gaulle slapped down his interior minister for suggesting that Sartre be arrested: "You cannot imprison Voltaire," he ruled.

The French example did spread, worrying bureaucrats in Moscow as much as the ruling elites in the West. An unruly and undisciplined people had to be brought to heel. Robert Escarpit, a *Le Monde* correspondent, wrote on July 23 1968: "A Frenchman travelling abroad feels himself treated a bit like a convalescent from a pernicious fever. And how did the rash of barricades break out? What was the temperature at five o'clock in the evening of May 29? Is the Gaullist

medicine really getting to the roots of the disease? Are there dangers of a relapse? . . . But there is one question that is hardly ever asked, perhaps because they are afraid to hear the answer. But at heart everyone would like to know, hopefully or fearfully, whether the sickness is infectious.”

The movement was infectious. In Prague, communist reformers – many of them heroes of the anti-fascist resistance during the World War II – called for “socialism with a human face.” The aim of Alexander Dubček and his supporters was to democratize political life in Czechoslovakia. It was the first step toward a socialist democracy and was seen as such in Moscow and Washington. On August 21, the Russians sent in the tanks and crushed the reform movement.

In every West European capital there were protests. The tabloid press in Britain was constantly attacking leftists as “agents of Moscow” and was genuinely taken aback when the same student activists involved in the protests marched to the Soviet embassy, denouncing the invasion in strong language and burning effigies of the bloated Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. Alexander Solzhenitsyn later remarked that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had been the last straw for him. Now he realized that the system could never be reformed from within but would have to be overthrown. He was not alone. The Moscow bureaucrats had sealed their own fate.

In Mexico, students took over universities, demanding an end to oppression and one-party rule. The army was sent in to occupy the universities and did so for many months, making it the best-educated army in the world. On October 2 – with the eyes of the world on Mexico City ten days before the Olympic Games were due to begin there – thousands of students poured on to the streets to demonstrate. A massacre began at sunset. Troops opened fire on the crowd listening to speeches in one of the city’s main squares – dozens were killed and hundreds more injured.

In November 1968 Pakistan erupted. Students took on the corrupt and decaying military dictatorship backed by the US. They were joined by workers, lawyers, white-collar employees, prostitutes, and other social layers, and despite the severe repression (hundreds were killed), the struggle increased in intensity and, the following year, toppled Field Marshal Ayub Khan.

In February 1969, the mood of that country was joyous. A very different atmosphere prevailed in Pakistan than in Europe. There, power did not

seem so remote. The victory over Ayub Khan led to the first general election in the country’s history. The Bengali nationalists in East Pakistan won a majority that the elite and key politicians refused to accept. Civil war led to Indian military intervention and that ended the old Pakistan. Bangladesh was the result of a bloody caesarean.

The glorious decade (1965–75), of which the year 1968 was only the high point, consisted of three concurrent narratives. Politics dominated, but there were two others that left a deeper imprint – sexual liberation and a hedonistic entrepreneurship from below. There was cause to be grateful for the latter. For instance, publications like *The Black Dwarf* were consistently and severely short-funded. Sympathizers and supporters began to fund such projects themselves, a response to the utter frustrations they experienced, either toward the repressive political figures clamping down on various movements, or toward an unjust capitalist system in general.

In some ways, the 1960s were a reaction to the 1950s and the intensity of the Cold War. In the US, the McCarthyite witch-hunts had created havoc in the 1950s, but now blacklisted writers could work again; in Russia, hundreds of political prisoners were released, the gulags were closed down, and the crimes of Stalin were denounced by Khrushchev as Eastern Europe trembled with excitement and hopes of rapid reform. They hoped in vain.

The spirit of renewal infected the realm of culture as well: Solzhenitsyn’s first novel was serialized in the official literary magazine *Novy Mir*, and a new cinema took over most of Europe. In Spain and Portugal, ruled at the time by NATO’s favorite fascists, Franco and Salazar, censorship persisted, but in Britain D. H. Lawrence’s *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*, written in 1928, was published for the first time in 1960. The book, in its complete form, sold two million copies.

Following Simone de Beauvoir’s pioneering work in *The Second Sex* (1949), Juliet Mitchell fired off a new salvo in December 1966. Her lengthy essay, “Women: The Longest Revolution,” appeared in the *New Left Review* and became an immediate point of reference, summarizing the problems faced by women: “In advanced industrial society, women’s work is only marginal to the total economy . . . women are offered a universe of their own: the family. Like woman herself, the family appears as a natural

object, but it is actually a cultural creation. . . . Both can be exalted, paradoxically, as ideals. The ‘true’ woman and ‘true’ family are images of peace and plenty: in actuality they may both be sites of violence and despair.”

In September 1968, US feminists disrupted the Miss America competition in Atlantic City, an attack that served as a warning shot in a women’s liberation movement that would change women’s lives by demanding recognition, independence, and an equal voice in a male-dominated world. The cover of the January 1969 issue of *Black Dwarf* dedicated the year to women. Inside was Sheila Rowbotham’s spirited feminist call to arms.

There also existed the famed pleasure principle. That the 1960s were hedonistic is indisputable, but they were different from the corporatized version of today. At the time they marked a break with the hypocritical puritanism of the 1940s and 1950s, when censors prohibited married couples being shown on screen sharing a bed and pajamas were compulsory. Historically, radical upheavals have always challenged social restrictions.

Homosexuality in Britain was decriminalized only in 1967. Gay liberation movements erupted with activists demanding an end to all homophobic legislation and Gay Pride marches were launched, inspired by the African American struggles for equal rights and black pride. All the movements learned from each other. The advances of the civil rights, women’s, and gay movements, now taken for granted, had to be fought for on the streets against enemies who were fighting the “war on horror.”

Forty Years Later

A decade before the French Revolution, the philosopher Voltaire remarked that “History is the lies we agree on.” Afterwards there was little agreement on anything. The debate on 1968 was revived by Nicolas Sarkozy, boasting that his victory in France’s 2007 presidential elections was the final nail in the 1968 coffin. The philosopher Alain Badiou’s tart response was to compare the new president of the republic to the Bourbons of 1815 and Marshal Pétain during the war. They, too, had talked about nails and coffins. In the same way, Sarkozy declared, “May 1968 imposed intellectual and moral relativism on us all. The heirs of May ’68 imposed

the idea that there was no longer any difference between good and evil, truth and falsehood, beauty and ugliness. The heritage of May 1968 introduced cynicism into society and politics.”

Sarkozy even blamed the legacy of May 1968 for greedy and seedy business practices. According to him, the May 1968 attack on ethical standards helped to “weaken the morality of capitalism, to prepare the ground for the unscrupulous capitalism of golden parachutes for rogue bosses.” But who can connect the 60s generation to corporate corruption: Enron, Conrad Black, the subprime mortgage crisis, Northern Rock, corrupt politicians, deregulation, the dictatorship of the “free market,” a culture strangled by brazen opportunism?

Some may wonder whether the dreams and hopes of 1968 were but idle fantasies, or if a cruel historical trajectory aborted an emergent new era. Revolutionaries – utopian anarchists, Fidelistas, Trotskyists of all sorts, Maoists of every stripe – wanted the whole forest. Liberals and social democrats were fixated on individual trees. The forest, they warned us, was a distraction, far too vast and impossible to define, whereas a tree was a piece of wood that could be identified, improved, and crafted into a chair or a table. Now the tree, too, has gone.

“You’re like fish that only see the bait, never the line,” the revolutionaries would challenge in return. For revolutionaries believed that people should not be measured by material possessions but by their ability to transform the lives of others – the poor and underprivileged; that the economy needed to be reorganized in the interests of the many, not the few; and that socialism without democracy could never work. Above all, the challengers believed in freedom of speech.

Much of this seems utopian now and some, for whom 1968 wasn’t radical enough at the time, have embraced the present and now regard any form of socialism as the serpent that tempted Eve in paradise.

The collapse of “communism” in 1989 created the basis for a new social agreement, the Washington Consensus, whereby deregulation and the entry of private capital into hitherto hallowed domains of public provision would become the norm everywhere, making traditional social democracy redundant and threatening the democratic process itself.

Some, who once dreamed of a better future, have simply given up. Others espouse a bitter

maxim: unless you relearn you won't earn. The French intelligentsia, which had from the Enlightenment onwards made Paris the political workshop of the world, has retreated on every front. Renegades occupy posts in every Western European government defending exploitation, wars, state terror, and neocolonial occupations; others now retired from the academy specialize in producing reactionary dross on the Internet, displaying the same zeal with which they once excoriated factional rivals on the far left. This, too, is nothing new.

SEE ALSO: Anti-War Movement, France, 20th Century; Beauvoir, Simone de (1908–1986); Civil Rights, United States: Overview; Dubček, Alexander (1921–1992); French Revolution, 1789–1794; International Socialism: Mass Politics; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements; Marxism; Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–1980); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Urban Rebellions, United States; Voltaire (1694–1778); Women's Movement, United States, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Ali, T. & Watkins, S. (1978) *1968 and After: Inside the Revolution*. London: Blond & Briggs.
- Ali, T. & Watkins, S. (1998) *1968: Marching in the Streets*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Katsiaficas, G. (1987) *The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
- Singer, D. (2002) *Prelude to Revolution: France in May 1968*, updated ed., Vol. 9. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
- Touraine, A. (1971) *The May Movement, Revolt and Reform: May 1968 – the Student Rebellion and Workers' Strikes – The Birth of a Social Movement*. New York: Random House.

Mayekiso, Moses (b. 1948)

Nicole Ulrich

Moses Mayekiso (Moses Jongizizwe Mayekiso, Moss Mayekiso) was born on October 21, 1948 in Askeaton, Cala District, Transkei, South Africa. He was the eldest of 12 children. His father, Betwell Mayekiso, worked as a migrant miner, and later as a general laborer. His mother, Nokudama Mayekiso, ran the household in her husband's absence. Mayekiso left school early to find work, and in 1973 made his way to Alexandra

Township, Johannesburg. After three years of working as a general laborer for a number of construction companies, Mayekiso eventually secured a job at the Toyota factory, where he joined the Metal Allied Workers' Union (MAWU), linked to the Trade Union Advisory Coordinating Council, and later the Federation of South African Unions (FOSATU), formed in 1979.

Mayekiso played an active part in building the young union, and was elected shop steward. Along with other MAWU shop stewards, Mayekiso was dismissed in 1979 after the union led a series of strikes for recognition. Mayekiso continued his trade union activities by volunteering at the union. He was employed as an organizer for the eastern Witwatersrand, and in 1981 he became branch secretary of MAWU's Transvaal Region.

The eastern Witwatersrand was a hotbed of African worker militancy during the early 1980s. Mayekiso was not only involved in the strike waves that engulfed the metal industry, he also assisted with the establishment of FOSATU shop stewards' councils. These united workers from different factories and industries, and provided a forum for mobilizing around workplace and community issues. Mayekiso played a leading role in the 1984 stayaway organized by FOSATU, for which he was briefly detained, and participated in the unity talks that led to the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in December 1985.

In early 1986 Mayekiso was elected general secretary of MAWU. His interest in union affairs remained firm, but, with the upsurge in political resistance, Mayekiso argued for greater worker participation in community issues and struggles. Mayekiso was elected chairperson of the Alexander Action Committee (AAC), which was formed in February 1986 during a bloody battle between township residents and police that lasted for six days. The AAC was instrumental in organizing residents on a democratic basis and calling for rent and consumer boycotts. In June 1986 Mayekiso and four other AAC leaders (including his brother, Mzwanele Mayekiso) were arrested and charged with treason. The National Union of Metal Workers (NUMSA), which amalgamated MAWU and other metal unions in COSATU in 1987, participated in an international campaign for Mayekiso's release and elected him as secretary general in absentia. He was eventually acquitted in April 1988.

Mayekiso became a leading member of the South African Communist Party (SACP), and continued with his community activism. In 1990, he was elected a member of the Civic Associations of the Southern Transvaal (CAST) and became president of the South African National Civic Organization (SANCO) in 1992. Following the first democratic election in 1994, Mayekiso became a member of parliament for the African National Congress (ANC), but resigned two years later and became involved in business. He is now the chief executive officer of SANCO Holdings.

SEE ALSO: COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC

References and Suggested Readings

- Baskin, J. (1991) *Striking Back: A History of COSATU*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- Bozzoli, B. (2004) *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid*. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press.
- Jochelson, K. (1990) Reform, Repression and Resistance in South Africa: A Case Study of Alexandra Township, 1979–89. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 16 (1): 1–32.
- LACOM (1989) *Comrade Moss*. Johannesburg: Learn & Teach Publications.
- Lodge, T. & Nasson, B. (1991) *All, Here, and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s*. South Africa Update Series. New York: Ford Foundation, Foreign Policy Association.
- Mayekiso, M. (1996) *Township Politics: Civic Struggles for a New South Africa*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- South African History Online website (n.d.) Moses Jongizizwe Mayekiso. Available at www.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/mayekiso-mj.htm (downloaded November 1, 2006).

Mazumdar, Charu (1918–1972)

Shatarupa Sen Gupta

Charu Mazumdar joined the Communist Party of India (CPI) in 1941 and participated in the *Tebhaga* Movement of 1946 (demanding two-thirds of the crop for sharecroppers). This movement, led by the CPI-dominated Kisan Sabhas (peasants' association) in rural Bengal, petered out after independence under massive

repression. The lessons of *Tebhaga* led Mazumdar to conclude that the peasants had to be equipped to face armed state repression. During the Sino-Indian border dispute of 1962, Mazumdar was arrested for raising pro-Chinese slogans and holding the Nehru government responsible for the dispute.

By 1964 the CPI had transformed substantially from Stalinism to social democracy, abandoning all pretence to a revolution. This led to the split of 1964, whereby the Stalinists and Maoists in the CPI walked out of the Tenali Convention and formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M)). Mazumdar joined the new party in the hope that the CPI (M) would finally launch a class struggle.

In 1967 India was preparing for the fourth general elections in which both of the communist parties participated. Mazumdar did not approve of CPI (M)'s participation. As is evidenced by his article "Eight Documents," written between 1965 and 1967, he aimed at a struggle against revisionism, pushing for peasant uprisings and formation of a genuine revolutionary party which would engage in guerrilla warfare and follow the Chinese model of area-based seizures of power. Nonetheless, the elections generated non-Congress governments in eight provinces, and in West Bengal the CPI (M) formed a 14-party coalition with a medley of political parties.

During early 1967 the Darjeeling district committee of the CPI (M), of which Mazumdar was a member, provided leadership to the peasants and *adivasis* (tribals) in an anti-landowners movement (usually known as the Naxalbari movement, from its place of origin, and from which the Maoists have been called Naxalites), which was brutally subdued by the state police along with certain paramilitary forces. This outbreak was hailed by the Communist Party of China as the "spring thunder over India." The CPI (M), which had earlier promised to support any people's movement, condoned the state terror and dismissed its dissident Darjeeling committee. This paved the way for the formation of the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) in May 1968 by the Maoist dissidents of CPI (M). Within it, Mazumdar ignored proletarian class struggles, stressing only peasant armed struggles for seizure of state power. This led to the exclusion of the Andhra group led by T. Nagi Reddy. On April 22, 1969 AICCCR formed the

Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI (ML)) as the principal Maoist party in India. Mazumdar was elected the general secretary of the party in its first congress in 1970.

By this time the Naxalite movement had spread from the rural to the urban centers of West Bengal, resulting in a wave of state repression whereby many Maoists were eliminated in cold blood. Mazumdar was one of the key accused, and on July 16, 1972 he was arrested by the Calcutta police. After remaining in police custody for 12 days, he died on July 28, 1972.

SEE ALSO: Naxalite Movement 1967–1972

References and Suggested Readings

- Basu, P. (2000) *Towards Naxalbari (1953–1967): An Account of Inner-Party Ideological Struggle*. Calcutta: Progressive.
- Ghosh, S. K. (1992) *The Historic Turning-Point: A Liberation Anthology*. Calcutta: S. K. Ghosh.
- Roy, A. K. (1979) Charu Mazumdar: Man and Ideas. *China Report*, 15: 3–16.
- Sen, S., Panda, D., & Lahiri, A. (1978) *Naxalbari and After: A Frontier Anthology*. Calcutta: Kathashilpa.

Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–1872)

Elvio Ciferri

The most influential theorist and political leader of the Italian democratic Risorgimento, Giuseppe Mazzini was born in Genoa on June 22, 1805, of Giacomo, professor in the faculty of medicine, and Maria Drago, a strong influential personality who advocated Jansenism, a Catholic fundamentalist perspective counter to the Reformation. In 1827 Mazzini earned a degree in law and literature where he developed a strong criticism of the European Restoration and the view that Italy, separated by territorial divisions, should be free from foreign domination. Mazzini joined Carboneria, a secret society formed in the early nineteenth century that advocated unification of Italy through revolt and insurrection.

From 1828 Mazzini pursued journalism in the *Indicatore Genovese*, and conspiratorial activities, although growing increasingly critical of Carboneria. Mazzini suffered a first incarceration in Savona, and having to choose between confinement and exile, preferred to go to

Marseille, where he devoted himself to full-time militancy. He founded Giovane Italia (Young Italy), an entirely reshaped political association freed from the sectarian attitudes of Carboneria and fostering a program that focused on the creation of a new Italian state that would reunite the whole nation and be independent, republican, and affirmative of liberty. Mazzini, in his political writings strongly influenced by Romanticism and often worded in semi-mystical formulas, stressed the importance of individual and civic virtues, of faith in what he thought to be the “mission” of Italy, that is to pave the way to “progress” for all mankind. He borrowed from Philippe Buonarroti to argue in favor of unity versus federalism that in Mazzini’s view would only enhance the local privileges of reactionary aristocracies, and from Sismondi to extol the Italian republican traditions.

Mazzini also stressed the importance of guerrilla warfare and the role of “dictatorship” (ancient Rome-style), a temporary, provisional government that would give way, after the revolution, to a national council, a representative chamber. Previous failures of revolution in Italy were to be blamed on the elites, not on the people, so far not invested with any political role. On the contrary, the people (the multitudes) were the main actors of political and social change, and Italian revolutionaries should therefore go deeply into social issues, not just for the sake of social justice in itself but with the aim of uniting the people in the struggle for independence and a republic. Mazzini criticized Buonarroti’s “communism” and never supported any agrarian law that would redistribute land to form a class of independent peasants. Giovane Italia was nevertheless the first modern political party in Italian history and its program was explicitly democratic, fostering a republic.

The Giovane Italia movement spread in Italy and even to France. The first insurrectional attempts in Genoa (1833) and in Savoia (1834) failed. In self-exile in Switzerland, Mazzini created in Berne (1834) Giovane Europa (Young Europe), the first transnational European democratic party, articulating with Swiss, German, and Polish branches. This alarmed governments and Mazzini was expelled from Switzerland in early 1837, when he settled in London. The reorganization of Giovane Italia to which he devoted himself in 1840 stressed the importance of

popular elements, as Mazzini stated that so far *Giovane Italia* had acted “on behalf of people, not with the people.” In this new attitude Mazzini may have been influenced by the Chartist movement. The Italian revolution was now to be political and social at the same time. For a few years, newspapers like *Apostolato Popolare* and educational institutions promoted Mazzini’s ideas. The Italian Workers’ Association founded by Mazzini may well be the first example of a working-class movement in Italian history.

The European and Italian events of 1848 determined a whole new phase in Mazzini’s political project. The Risorgimento fostered more moderate orientations under Sardinian King Carlo Alberto in Piedmont, Gioberti’s liberal Catholic projects, or newly elected Pope Pius IX. Mazzini put aside his republican projects and stressed national unity and harmony among all factions of the Risorgimento, hoping that the new moderates would be, if not curbed, at least ignored by popular pressure in the events to follow. After Milan’s Cinque Giornate insurrection in March 1848 he could return to Italy, but was frustrated by the annexation of Lombardy by the Piedmont kingdom and decided again to act freely as an advocate of republic against monarchy in *Italia del Popolo*, which campaigned for a constituent assembly on a national basis and favored, when Piedmontese troops were defeated by Austria, a “people’s war.” In March 1849, after a brief stay in a Tuscany freed from the Grand Duke, he was in Rome, where he led the revolutionary Triumvirate of the short-lived Roman Republic that proclaimed a democratic constitution. After the city fell to French troops, Mazzini fled into exile. In 1850 he created the European Democratic Central Committee to continue in the footsteps of *Giovane Europa*. The 1853 insurrection failures in Milan and the disruption of the Pisacane 1857 expedition in Sapri were setbacks to Mazzini’s efforts, but he continued to operate as if Italian popular revolution was at hand. He founded a party that by its very name was intended for action, the Partito d’azione, and he formulated a more detailed program centered on social issues. Cooperatives and workers’ associations, eventually supported by state funds, would cancel class divisions and create a new social figure, the “producers,” neither capitalists nor workers, rewarded according to their contribution to social production.

The prime minister of Piedmont, Cavour, was, with the support of moderate Società Nazionale, working for an alliance with the new French emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte III, to undermine Austrian domination of the Peninsula, and Mazzini was highly critical of the “imperialistic” stance of France. When the 1859 war broke out, Mazzini kept himself idle, but when the Villafranca armistice was signed, he saw that a popular war, based on the insurrections in central Italy and on the upheaval of southern Italy, could give new momentum to his actions. The Mille expedition of Garibaldi’s volunteers to Sicily and then to mainland southern Italy was an example of people’s war, but Cavour outplayed it by sending Piedmontese troops to central Italy, annexed with a popular vote, and then to meet Garibaldi just north of Naples, so stopping his expedition. The 1861 Unification was under moderate hegemony, and coincided with the extension of the Piedmontese kingdom to Italy, completed with the conquest of Rome in 1870 when France was under Prussian troops. Mazzini had created a new organization for the liberation of Rome, the Universal Republican Alliance, but his insurrectional plans, however, were again unsuccessful and he was arrested in Palermo and jailed in Gaeta. A republic and a democracy were still out of reach. Released in October, he stayed briefly in Switzerland before going to London.

Mazzini’s attention turned then to workers’ classes. Under his initiative, the first workers’ societies were founded for the purpose of guardianship of workers and progress of the nation. In contact with the Internationalists, his last battles, however, were to safeguard the integrity of the workers’ movement against anarchism and socialism. In 1871 he promoted the Pact of Brotherhood of Workers Societies. Early in 1872 Mazzini arrived in Pisa. In the Italy now unified and free from Austrian domination but still under a monarch, Mazzini, certainly one of the makers of the Italian nation, had to live clandestinely. He died on March 10, 1872. After his death he turned into a political symbol of the democratic and republican ascendancy, inspiring the Republican Party and many non-socialist radicals to come. The house in Pisa where he lived his last days as a guest of the Rosselli family has been transformed into a cultural institution (*Domus Mazziniana*) dedicated to his name and memory.

SEE ALSO: Buonarroti, Philippe (1761–1837); Italian Risorgimento; Italy, Peasant Movements, 19th–20th Centuries

References and Suggested Readings

- Della Peruta, F. T. (2007) *Mazzini*. Varese: Arterigere-Esse Zeta.
- Mack Smith, D. (1994) *Mazzini*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Mazzini, G. (1967) *Opere* (selected works). Milan: Rizzoli.
- Oswald Griffith, G. (1970) *Mazzini, Prophet of Modern Europe*. New York: H. Fentig.
- Rosselli, N. (1967) *Mazzini e Bakunin. Dodici anni di movimento operaio (1860–1872)*. Turin: Einaudi.
- Salvemini, G. (1957) *Mazzini*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Sarti, R. (1997) *Mazzini: A Life for the Religion of Politics*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Mboya, Tom (1930–1969) and the Kenya labor movement

Andrew Kūru Gichuru

Tom Odhiambo Mboya was Kenya's consummate politician. First as a labor leader, then as a member of the legislative council, and finally as the minister for economic planning and development, Mboya was a diligent advocate for the rights of the Kenyan people in pre- and post-colonial Kenya.

Mboya was born on August 15, 1930 on a sisal estate called Kilima Mbogo (mountain of buffaloes) a few miles east from Thika. In accordance with Luo custom, he was named Odhiambo to signify the time of his birth ("evening"), and his last name, Mboya, was a traditional family name from his mother's family. Though both his parents were illiterate, his father, a farmhand, had realized the importance of education and was determined to give his children what he never had. He also viewed their education as an investment in his own future.

Like most children in colonial Kenya, Mboya began his education at a mission school where the main curriculum consisted of prayer recitals and catechism. When he reached the age of 9, his father sent him to another mission school in Kabaa, Kamba District, run by Irish fathers, where he could learn to read and write. He stayed with the school catechist who was from the

Kamba tribe and imbibed their customs and learned the language. Once finished, he went to St. Mary's mission school at Yala, in Central Nyanza, where he was an average student, preferring singing and debating to the more rigorous subjects. He became an altar boy, joined the church choir, and considered the priesthood, only to abandon the idea later when he became weary of the Church's complicit attitude with the colonialists. He successfully passed the African secondary school certificate but was unable to pursue further education as his father could not afford it.

As was the norm then, Mboya applied to the teacher training college but opted to train as a sanitary inspector at the Royal Sanitary Institute, which paid its students an allowance. The institute was later moved to the Jeanes School, approximately 8 miles from Nairobi. In just a few months, Mboya was elected president of the student council, took part in the debating society, and even started for the school's soccer team. He later joined the Nairobi city council as a sanitary inspector in 1951, where he was elected secretary of the Nairobi African Local Government Servants' Association (NALGSA) and also encountered racism.

Under the tutelage of a European inspector, Mboya was often told to remain in the car while the former went inside to inspect various premises. Angered by this, Mboya complained vehemently, bringing the relationship to an end. On other occasions he was thrown out of European premises because he was black. As secretary of NALGSA, Mboya encountered a litany of grievances that ranged from unpaid wages to wrongly calculated housing allowances. Mboya observed that the grievances were a result of deteriorating relationships between workers and their European supervisors. The situation was further exacerbated because there was no existing mechanism for the city council workers to address their grievances.

Mboya worked diligently, frequently complaining to department heads while encouraging more city council employees to join the staff association. He would raise the membership from 450 to 1,300 members. But Mboya had also realized that the organization was limited in its ability to effect change. Some of its limitations were that it was restricted to individual companies or public bodies, had no paid employees, possessed little legal immunity, and had no right to strike or raise money, which effectively denied it any

negotiating power. Mboya then proposed that NALGSA adopt a new constitution which increased its power and registered it with the Trade Union Ordinance. Such a move was much to the chagrin of the colonial government, whose attitude toward unions was that they instigated riots and were hotbeds for communism. In an attempt to pacify unionism in Kenya, the Registrar of Trade Unions would place prospective unions on probation for registration, and if they violated their own rules, would immediately cancel their registration. Yet Mboya's activities had not gone unnoticed by his supervisors, who immediately made known their displeasure with his labor and political activities. Rather than be dismissed, Mboya opted to resign to become a full-time unpaid labor organizer.

Mboya had also been busy consolidating another union, the Kenya Local Government Workers' Union (KLGWU), which was to be a nationwide union. Its formation was greatly hampered by the state of emergency in October 1952, when many of its members were subjected to movement restrictions because they were suspected of being Mau Mau adherents. However, the union endured and was soon affiliated with the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions (KFRTU). Mboya was elected general secretary of the KFRTU after its leader, Aggrey Minya, was suspended and dismissed.

Because Kenya's only political party, the Kenya African Union (KAU), had been banned in June 1953, the union movement took on greater significance as it became the *de facto* political organization agitating for African rights. With a steady stream of complaints, Mboya found himself entering the political arena as he denounced the color bar, the White Highlands Order, and the Lyttelton Constitution. He refused to denounce the Mau Mau, arguing that it was a direct result of European transgressions toward Africans. Mboya continued to build KFRTU by strengthening its relationship with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Through the ICFTU, Mboya was able to accurately recount to the British press what was going on in Kenya to counter the colonial government's anti-Mau Mau message.

The union's biggest test crystallized through the Mombasa dock strike of 1955. The workers had unsuccessfully demanded an increase in wages and the dismissal of certain supervisors. Upon his arrival, Mboya observed that the

situation was quickly spiraling out of control with the ouster of the dock workers' union leaders and the presence of the General Service Unit, with the army expected the next day. Mboya was able to convince the men to go back to work while he addressed their grievances through a tribunal set up by the Trade Disputes Arbitration Ordinance, the first of its kind. The KFRTU was able to get the workers a 33 percent increase, extra payment for handling "dirty" cargo, and improved leave conditions for regular employees. The successful resolution of the Mombasa strike thrust Mboya into the political spotlight.

After pursuing further studies at Oxford's Ruskin College and a fundraising trip to the United States, Mboya returned to Kenya to find that the colonial government had allowed Africans back into local politics, but only at the district level. Mboya ran for the Nairobi constituency against Argwings-Kodhek, Muchohi Gikonyo, and J. M. Musyoka, all of whom he beat to win the seat. Other notable winners were Oginga Odinga, Ronald Ngala, and Lawrence Oguda. Calling themselves the African Elected Members' Organization (AEMO), they quickly rejected the Lyttelton Constitution, called for the abolition of the White Highlands and an end to school segregation, and demanded universal adult suffrage. Though each of these proposals was defeated, Mboya assiduously continued to agitate for Kenya's independence through various political parties, including the People's Convention Party (PCP), the Kenyan Independent Movement (KIM), and eventually the Kenya African National Union (KANU).

With Jomo Kenyatta's release from detention and subsequent assumption to KANU's presidency, Mboya was named minister for labor. In a classic case of "poacher turned gamekeeper," Mboya found himself on the other side of the tracks as his appointment to office was a time of great labor unrest in Kenya. Many of the unions had become radically militant as they sought to address their grievances through strikes. Such actions, he worried, would greatly circumvent the country's economic progress, and he began to understand why the government had remained a staunch advocate against unions. Mboya resisted pressure to ban or nationalize unions and instead opted to scalpel his way through their many issues, eventually regaining control by the end of the year. This only served to increase his stature,

both at home and abroad, as the consummate politician. Mboya continued to be prominent in Kenyan politics, holding office as minister for justice and constitutional affairs and finally as the minister for economic planning and development until his assassination on July 5, 1969.

With his death, Kenya and Africa lost one of its best statesmen. What made Mboya unique was that his appeal cut across tribal lines. Because of his upbringing and his work as a labor organizer, Mboya adroitly avoided tribal politics and that made him a more effective politician. While many politicians would use political office to amass personal wealth, Mboya remained oblivious to the tentacles of corruption, dedicating his efforts to the social, economic, and political upliftment of Africans. Amongst his notable achievements were his appointment as chairman of the All-African Peoples' Conference at the age of 28, initiating the student airlifts that were responsible for sending many Kenyan students with full scholarships to study in the United States, and an honorary doctorate from Howard University.

SEE ALSO: Kenya, National Protests for Independence; Kenyatta, Jomo (1893–1978); Pinto, Pio Gama (1927–1965)

References and Suggested Readings

- Goldsworthy, D. (1982) *Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget*. New York: Africana Company.
- Mboya, T. (1963) *Freedom and After*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Rake, A. (1962) *Tom Mboya: Young Man of New Africa*. New York: Doubleday.

Meilidao protests, 1979

J. Megan Greene

On December 10, 1979, International Human Rights Day, pro-democracy activists attempted but failed to hold a rally in Kaohsiung in southern Taiwan. The political authorities had denied the protesters a permit and stationed riot police in the park in which the protest was to have occurred. When the demonstrators decided to go ahead with the protest in spite of their not unexpected failure to get a permit, they were beaten and arrested by riot police, and the event never took place in the way in which it had originally been planned. The state's violent reaction to the protesters, however, stimulated a much greater

wave of support and pro-democracy activity than a peaceful and state-sanctioned protest might have done. The organizers of the event were the editors of *Meilidao* (Formosa) magazine, which had been published since August 1979 by a group of non-Guomindang (GMD) politicians. The event, therefore, has come to be known by two names, the Meilidao protests and the Kaohsiung incident, and it marked the beginning of Taiwan's pro-democracy movement of the late 1970s and 1980s.

At the end of World War II, Taiwan, which had been a Japanese colony since 1895, was returned to China, and specifically to the government of the GMD, which had governed China, or at least large parts of it, since 1927. Relations between the GMD and the Taiwanese people had rapidly deteriorated, and following the February 28 incident of 1947, the governor-general of Taiwan had declared martial law. When the GMD's national government was compelled by the Chinese Communist Party to retreat from mainland China to Taiwan in 1949, it continued to govern using martial law and forbade the creation of any political parties, strictly controlled all media including the press, and censored all other sorts of publications. The GMD responded to the one brief flurry of pro-democracy activism that occurred in the 1960s, the Free China movement, with the arrest of several high-profile leaders of the movement. This episode was sufficient to remind Taiwan's public, who had already seen ample evidence of the GMD's authoritarian tendencies during the "white terror" that followed the 2-28 incident, that they were better off keeping out of politics unless their sympathies lay with the GMD. Through repressive strategies that were backed up by martial law, therefore, the GMD effectively limited political activities that it did not sanction in the decades following 1947.

By the mid-1970s, however, several changes had occurred that subtly shifted the political climate even though martial law remained in effect and the state continued to arrest and imprison its critics. In the first place, in keeping with its expressed intention of teaching the Chinese people how to operate in a democracy by allowing themselves to participate in local self-government, the GMD had allowed village, town, county, and even some provincial-level elections in Taiwan. Although the only legal political party was the GMD, non-party candidates

were permitted to run as independents. By the 1970s these candidates became increasingly well-organized and were known as “dangwai” or “outside the government” candidates. Dangwai, in essence, became a code name for an opposition party, although candidates were not supposed to be organized in that way.

Second, Taiwan’s political situation underwent a number of shifts in the 1970s. In 1971 the United Nations (UN) decided to switch recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and as a consequence Taiwan lost its UN seat. Over the course of the next decade, many major states chose to pursue a similar strategy of recognizing the PRC, but the most devastating such switch to Taiwan was the United States’ decision in 1978 to follow suit. Third, in 1975 Jiang Jieshi (Chiang K’ai-shek) died, and by that time the GMD itself had begun to absorb increasing numbers of Taiwan-born members, so that the face of the party, and to a lesser extent its priorities, were beginning to shift. These changes were sufficient to create a climate in which more Taiwanese were emboldened to protest, but the response of the GMD was nonetheless just as harsh as it might have been at any time since 1947.

Matters came to a head in the late 1970s, during which time electoral politics began to heat up, and Dangwai candidates began making exceptionally good showings in some local elections. One incident in particular showed that the Taiwanese electorate was beginning to expect a greater voice than it had previously had. In November 1977 supporters of Xu Xinliang (Hsu Hsin-liang) alleged electoral fraud on the part of the GMD in the Taoyuan (T’ao-yuan) County Magistrate’s election. In response, a massive protest erupted of roughly 10,000 people who, among other things, set fire to a police station. Stimulated by this spontaneous show of resistance to the GMD, political activists started up several new journals (though the government generally shut them down fairly rapidly) that called for democratization and criticized GMD rule. Among these journals, *Meilidao* was perhaps the most radical, and it rapidly took on the character of an actual political party rather than a mere magazine as it opened branch offices in cities around Taiwan. The GMD’s reaction included not only the violent suppression of the planned protest, but also the closure of the journal and the arrest and imprisonment of its organizers. In spite of their

long prison sentences, however, the organizers, who included Xu Xinliang, ultimately became important leaders of the opposition movement as it developed more fully in the late 1980s and after the lifting of martial law in 1987. The Meilidao protest and the events that surrounded it marked the beginning of the organized democracy movement in Taiwan, and although it ended in failure, it became an important motivational symbol for democracy activists in the 1980s and beyond, who regularly referred to the event as evidence of both GMD repression and the existence of a wave of support for democratization.

SEE ALSO: Taiwan, Anti-Imperialism and Nationalism; Taiwan, Land Reform; Taiwan, 2-28 Protests, 1947

References and Suggested Readings

- Gold, T. B. (1986) *State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle*. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.
 Roy, D. (2003) *Taiwan: A Political History*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Mein Kampf

John M. Cox

Known to history for his unprecedented crimes against humanity during World War II, Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) first came to the attention of the German public as a rabble-rousing leader of a small far-right group in Munich in the early 1920s. Hitler joined the German Workers’ Party in 1919, quickly became its central leader, and led his group (renamed the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, or Nazi Party) in the Munich “Beerhall Putsch,” an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the German government in November 1923. After the suppression of the putsch, Hitler was convicted of high treason but served a mere 13 months in prison because of the leniency of the sympathetic local courts.

The future dictator used his comfortable tenure in Landsberg prison to compose his semi-autobiographical manifesto, *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle), first published in two volumes in 1925 and 1926. Hitler’s book – his only completed work, although an unpublished sequel would surface after his death – offers great insight into his political goals and general attitude toward the world. Reflecting its author’s frame of mind, *Mein Kampf* is unsystematic, repetitious, virulently

racist, and violent in its imagery. Yet the book is consistent in its central themes and arguments: racial struggle at the center of human history; Germany's need to conquer *Lebensraum* (living space) to the east; the identification of Judaism with Bolshevism, and his desire to eliminate both. Hitler would maintain the rigid beliefs articulated in *Mein Kampf*, with no fundamental changes, until the end of his life.

The book's success followed that of the Nazi Party, which emerged from the obscure margins of Germany's far right to achieve electoral successes at the beginning of the 1930s. *Mein Kampf* sold only a few thousand copies a year through the late 1920s, but by 1932 reached annual sales of 80,000. After taking power in 1933, the Nazis heavily promoted the book and subsidized its sales. The German state itself bought many copies, and gave them, for example, to couples on their wedding day. With this assistance, *Mein Kampf* sold approximately ten million copies by 1945, when the Nazi regime collapsed and Hitler committed suicide.

Although banned in Germany, Austria, and some other European countries, Hitler's magnum opus continues to be published and sold in many countries. *Mein Kampf* exerts some influence on neo-Nazi and other anti-Semites, and sells several thousand copies a year worldwide. An unknown number of those sold, however, are for scholarly purposes, as the book retains some value for researchers and historians of Hitler and Nazism.

SEE ALSO: Germany, Socialism and Nationalism; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism

References and Suggested Readings

- Hitler, A. (1999) *Mein Kampf*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Kershaw, I. (2000) *Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Weinberg, G. L. (Ed.) (2006) *Hitler's Second Book: The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf*. New York: Enigma Books.

Menchú, Rigoberta (b. 1959)

Dima Zito

Rigoberta Menchú Tum is a Guatemalan Maya human rights activist and recipient of

the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize. As a member of the indigenous population, whose 22 ethnic groups constitute 65 percent of the total population of Guatemala, she grew up in conditions of poverty and exploitation, witnessing human rights violations committed by the Guatemalan armed forces during the civil war (1960–96). The US-backed Guatemalan military regimes followed a scorched earth policy to fight the left-wing guerilla movements. This included massacres, torture, and the “disappearing” of opponents. At least 200,000 Guatemalans were killed, most of whom were members of the indigenous population.

Still very young, Menchú started to campaign for indigenous rights, and in 1979 she became an activist in the Committee for Campesino Unity (CUC). In 1980 her father and 37 activists were killed by the Guatemalan army when a delegation of CUC members occupied the Spanish embassy to seek political support. Her mother and other members of her family were tortured and killed by government forces. In 1981 Menchú had to flee to Mexico. In exile she continued her political activities and took part in the foundation of the United Representation of the Guatemalan Opposition (RUOG), of which she became a leading member.

Menchú gained international recognition as a representative of indigenous culture and resistance with her biography, *I, Rigoberta Menchú*, in 1983. The book was later the subject of controversy; Menchú was accused of having changed and exaggerated facts in accordance with the publicity needs of the left-wing movement.

Menchú's engagement for human rights was internationally recognized with the UNESCO Prize for Education for Peace in 1990 and the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992. She was the youngest person ever to receive this distinction. She returned to Guatemala and was actively involved with signing the peace accords between the Guatemalan guerillas (URNG) and the Guatemalan government in 1996. Since then she has been UNESCO Goodwill Ambassador for the Promotion of Culture of Peace and the Protection of Rights of Indigenous People. Menchú was the presidential candidate for the indigenous political party Encuentro por Guatemala in the 1997 Guatemalan elections but received only 3 percent of the vote. She is founder and president of the Rigoberta Menchú Foundation and has received more than 30

honorary doctorates from various universities in different countries. In cooperation with a Mexican pharmaceutical company, she opened a chain of pharmacies, “Farmacias Similares,” in Guatemala, offering low-cost generic medicines and medical consultation.

As the persons responsible for crimes committed by the army during the civil war remained unpunished in Guatemala, in 1999 Menchú, together with human rights organizations, brought an action before a Spanish court. (Spanish courts can prosecute crimes against humanity and genocide in other countries.) In 2006 Spain requested the extradition of seven former members of the Guatemalan government, including ex-president Efraín Rios Montt.

SEE ALSO: Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán (1913–1971); Guatemala, Democratic Spring, 1944–1954; Guatemala, Popular Rebellion and Civil War; Guatemala, Worker Struggles and the Labor Movement, 1960s–1990s

References and Suggested Readings

- Burgos, E. (1984) *I, Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Woman in Guatemala*. New York: Verso.
- Menchú, R. (1998) *Crossing Borders*. New York: Verso.
- Stoll, D. (1999) *I, Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Mendes, Chico (1944–1988) and Amazonian rainforest protest and resistance

Michael Lömy

The Amazonian rainforest is a decisive component of the earth’s ecological equilibrium; not only is it the largest existing compound of biodiversity, but it is also a key factor in the absorption of CO₂, slowing down the process of climate change. The resistance of indigenous and peasant communities against its destruction has therefore a vital importance for humanity as a whole.

During the last years of the military dictatorship in Brazil, there began to appear a movement of protest against the local and multinational capitalist forces of agrobusiness interested in

destroying the rainforest: cattle ranchers, soy planters, wood-merchants, and various other *latifundistas* (owners of large estates) who wanted to either raze or burn the trees and expel the people. The first protesters were peasants who made their living from the small-scale extraction of natural products.

The most important of these movements was the Alliance of the People of the Forest, founded in 1986 by a socialist trade unionist, Chico Mendes. Born in 1944 in the town of Xapuri, in the Amazonian area, Francisco Alves Mendes Filho worked as a *seringueiro* (rubber tapper). He was educated by the Christian Base Communities, eventually becoming a socialist, and in 1975 founded a union of rural workers in Xapuri with his comrade Wilson Pinheiro.

Very quickly the union initiated a new form of struggle: non-violent resistance without precedent in the world, the so-called *empates* (physical blockades). Hundreds of *seringueiros*, along with women and children from the community, would join hands and confront, without weapons, the bulldozers of the landowners attempting to bring down the forest. Sometimes the peasants were defeated, but often they were able to stop tractors, bulldozers, or electric chainsaws attempting to destroy the trees. Occasionally they would even win the support of the workers on the job. They struggled against a powerful enemy, which had its political arm – the Democratic Rural Union; an armed mercenary force – *pistoleiros* (paid killers); and the complicity of local police, courts, and local governments. Wilson Pinheiro was killed soon after the struggle began, and Chico Mendes received his first death threats.

In 1985, with the end of the dictatorship, the latex collectors were able to organize the National Council of *Seringueiros*, which received support from the Catholic Land Pastoral, the Workers’ Party (PT), as well as from the newly formed Landless Peasant Movement (MST).

The next step was decisive. The resistance of the *seringueiros* and other peasants who lived from the extraction of natural products from the rainforest (chestnuts, babaçu nuts, and so on) joined with other groups: landless peasants and, most importantly, indigenous communities who have lived in the forest for centuries, together founding the Alliance of the Peoples of the Forest. For the first time, peasants and indigenous peoples, who often fought each other in the past, united their forces against a common



Environmental protection has been a major concern in the Amazon for the past few decades as indigenous peoples assert their rights over tribal lands, often coming into conflict with large corporations. One such clash brought Ecuadorian Indians into conflict with Chevron-Exxon. Carrying signs that say “Exxon Never Again,” the Ecuadorians appealed to the Superior Court of Justice in Lago Agrio, Ecuador, on October 21, 2003, hoping to force the company to clean up contamination left behind as a result of oil drilling. (REUTERS/Lou Dematteis)

enemy: the *latifundium*, rural capitalism, and agrobusiness – the destroyers of the Amazonian rainforest. Chico Mendes gave a speech celebrating this alliance: “Never more will one of our comrades spill the blood of the other, together we can defend nature, which is our home, the place where we learned to live, to raise our children, and to develop our capacities, in harmony with nature, with the environment and all the living beings who inhabit the forest.”

The Alliance proposed a sort of agrarian reform adapted to the conditions of the Amazonian rainforest, with both an ecological and socialist character: the land would become public property, while the peasants and indigenous communities would have free use of it.

In 1987, some US ecological organizations invited Chico Mendes to come as a witness before a meeting of the Inter-American Development Bank. In the name of the Alliance, Mendes denounced the projects financed by the international banks, which resulted in the destruction of sections of the Amazonian rainforest. In June 1987, Mendes was awarded the United Nations Global 500 Award, which made him an international name. The Alliance’s struggle became a symbol of the planetary mobilization to save the world’s last great rainforest.

In 1988 the National Conference of the CUT, the Brazilian Workers’ Trade Union Confedera-

tion, approved a thesis presented by Chico Mendes in the name of the National Council of *Seringueiros*, under the title “Defense of Nature and of the Forest Peoples.” Its main demand was both ecological and social:

... or the immediate expropriation of the *seringais* (latex plantations) in conflict, which should be given to the peasant communities who live from the extraction; this way nature and the culture of the rainforest peoples will not be aggressed, and a sustainable use of the natural resources will be possible, thanks to technologies developed over centuries by the people who live from the extraction of natural products from the Amazonian forest.

The Alliance of the Peoples of the Forest won two important victories at this time: (1) the establishment of the first protected rainforest areas reserved for extraction activities (*reservas extrativistas*) in the State of Acre (Amazone); and (2) the expropriation of a *seringal* (latex plantation) belonging to the *latifundista* Darly Alves da Silva, near Xapuri.

For the rural oligarchy, which had for centuries been accustomed to depose – with complete impunity – such “troublemakers” (i.e., those who dared to organize rural laborers to fight against the *latifundium*), this was unbearable. In December 1988, Chico Mendes was assassinated by a killer paid by the Alves da Silva landowners.

After Chico Mendes’s murder, the Alliance of the Peoples of the Forest continued its struggle, and is still in existence several decades later. Even if it has not been able to stop the disastrous process of destruction, it set an example by its capacity to combine social and ecological resistance, peasant and indigenous struggles, and the survival of humble local populations in the world’s largest and most species-rich tropical forest.

SEE ALSO: Brazil, Labor Struggles; Brazil, Peasant Movements and Liberation Theology; Ecological Protest Movements

References and Suggested Readings

- Gryzbowski, C. (1989) *O Testamento do Homem da Floresta, Chico Mendes por Ele Mesmo*. Rio de Janeiro: FASE.
- Mendes, C. (1989) Sindicato dos Trabalhadores de Xapuri, Central Unica dos Trabalhadores, January. São Paulo.

Meredith, James (b. 1933)

Angela D. Dillard

While not technically a member of any organization aligned with the post-World War II civil rights *movement*, James Meredith secured a significant victory for the civil rights *cause* when he became the first African American to openly enroll at the University of Mississippi on October 1, 1962. He was born on June 25, 1933 in Kosciusko, Mississippi, where he spent most of his youth before joining the Air Force in 1950. Military service in both the US and Japan within the newly desegregated armed forces was a formative experience for the aspiring, and always contrarian, activist. Before his honorable discharge, he had already begun to dream of launching a war against white supremacy in Mississippi.

Meredith's admission to the University of Mississippi was the result of over 16 months of legal maneuvering that pitted Constance Motley and other NAACP lawyers against the chancellor and administration of "Ole Miss," along with Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett and members of the anti-desegregation White Citizens' Council. Meredith's case also touched off a fierce political battle between Barnett and the Kennedy administration, forcing the latter to commit some 20,000 troops to defend Meredith and ensure his registration, which finally occurred after an evening of rioting on the university's campus. As Meredith entered the old Greek revival-style Lyceum Building that housed the Registrar's Office, tear gas still hung in the air; two men were dead, 28 federal marshals had been shot, 160 were injured.

After graduating in 1963, Meredith toured Nigeria and other African countries before accepting a scholarship to attend Columbia University's Law School. Unexpectedly, he returned to the South in 1966 to begin a 213-mile "Walk Against Fear," from Memphis to Jackson, Mississippi, to inspire blacks to overcome their fears and register to vote. Shot and badly wounded on the second day out, Meredith's individualistic crusade was transformed into "The Meredith March" as the entire apparatus of an increasingly fragmented civil rights movement converged to continue his walk. As the last of the era's civil

rights marches, it is remembered primarily as the venue for the articulation of "Black Power" as a new movement slogan.

This was not what Meredith had intended, and his relationship with the movement continued to deteriorate, especially after his 1967 decision to run against Congressman Adam Clayton Powell at the behest of the Republican Party. Meredith was literally hounded out of the race by Powell's supporters. He returned to Mississippi in the 1970s and continued his drift toward the political right. By 1989 he had joined the staff of conservative North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms. In 1991 he stunned even Helms by campaigning for ex-Klansman David Duke during Duke's run for governor of Louisiana. Still a major icon of the civil rights movement, Meredith now aligns himself with the movement against affirmative action, "forced" busing, and welfare rights.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Civil Rights, United States: Overview

References and Suggested Readings

Doyle, W. (2001) *An American Insurrection: James H. Meredith and the Battle of Oxford, Mississippi, 1962*. New York: Anchor.

Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921

Lars Stubbe

When Francisco Indalecio Madero (1990: 242) wrote in 1908 that after 32 years of Porfirio Díaz's iron rule "we do reject absolutely . . . that it may be suitable for this regime to be prolonged," this was to mark the beginning of a long-drawn-out phase of armed social struggles lasting until 1920 and making its impact well into the second half of the twentieth century. Its complex nature not only derived from the disunity in the subaltern classes and hence their lack of a clear revolutionary goal. It was also the result of a vacuum in leadership by the ruling classes, who lacked coherence in the decision about which future mode of accumulation to adopt following the elimination of the close-meshed web of repression during the Díaz years. Furthermore, it proved an expression of Mexico's contradictory entry into the world market and its future role

as an economy dependent on providing cheap raw materials and labor.

Positivist Prelude to the Revolution: The Porfirian Age

With the exception of the years 1880–4, Díaz ruled from 1876 until he stepped down in 1911 and went into exile. Díaz is credited with having created the conditions for the state's financial stability and strengthened its infrastructure, particularly the extension of the railway. Mexico's entrance into the realm of nineteenth-century imperialism is marked by impressive figures. Between 1876 and 1910 the population nearly doubled to roughly 15 million people, production of raw materials for export, such as sisal and rubber, rose by ten times, and the exploitation of silver rose by four times, although its contribution to the foreign trade balances slowly gave way to products generated by the new direct foreign investments (industrial metals, textiles). Most decisive for both the continuous prizing up of the country for capitalist relations and an enhanced communication between the distant regions was the construction of the railway. While by 1880 there were still only 1,000 kilometers of rail, by 1908 the country counted nearly 20,000 kilometers.

This enormous economic upsurge would not have been possible without foreign investments and bonds, which flowed steadily after Díaz recognized and renegotiated the payments of foreign debts in the 1880s. Of fundamental importance in this enterprise were the Científicos, a group of intellectuals who converged around a positivist, evolutionary, and organicist ideology largely inspired by an adapted version of Auguste Comte's positivist ideology and centering around the idea that progress is only possible in a strictly ordered society.

Despite considerable regional differences in living and working conditions and variegated types of surplus extraction, the economic upsurge was only feasible through the expropriation of lands for the creation of large haciendas. This went hand in hand with the development of an agrarian proletariat. Indeed, over 90 percent of the communal villages were divested of their land, and farm workers faced an enormous drop in the value of their daily wages between 1876 and 1910. The other corollary of this development was the creation of an urban proletariat which by 1910

had come to make up 16 percent of the overall workforce. The price to be paid for entry in the world market was the dispossession of communal lands of indigenous communities and the proletarianization of labor.

By strengthening an already existing tendency of monopolization of political power through local *jefes políticos* (political bosses), which held contending interests in check, Díaz had even estranged groups that were sympathetic to his general idea of a prosperous Mexico. A group of intellectuals then sowed the seeds of revolution. Madero, for instance, came from a wealthy northern family of the landed elite. The “Jacobin wing” of the revolution's precursors was formed by the anarchist Partido Liberal Mexicano, founded in 1905 by Ricardo Flores Magón and others. The lack of political democracy began to disturb even members of his own class, and Díaz, who had originally come to power with an anti-reelectionist stance, promised to step down after the 1910 elections, bringing things to a boil by creating uncertainty about Mexico's future and opening up spaces for political contenders. Likewise, the mobilization of the working class had increased, as shown by the miners' strike in Cananea (Sonora, 1906) and the textile workers' strike in Río Blanco (Veracruz, 1907), both crushed by the Porfirist forces. The political mobilizations were enhanced by the growing failure of Díaz's and the Científicos' economic precepts, which put a high pressure on workers and peasants and even affected members of the middle class.

The Revolution

Without a political solution to the impending problems and in the face of economic crisis, which to a large degree stemmed from Mexico's dependence on the world market and its foreign investments and loans, the disillusioned members of the middle and upper classes could no longer be co-opted. Hence, the opportunity to oust Porfirio Díaz was taken up by Madero.

In his Plan de San Luis Potosí he had called for an insurrection to take place on November 20, 1910, as an immediate reaction to his imprisonment upon winning the elections, which Díaz fraudulently claimed for himself. While the urban uprisings following Madero's call were quashed by Díaz's troops, the same was not the case with the rural rebellions. Here, motivation, experience,



After the assassination of Francisco Madero, often regarded as the martyr of the Mexican Revolution, Venustiano Carranza and General Alvaro Obregón attempted to overthrow Victoriano Huerta. Obregón later coordinated a large faction of indigenous peoples in the armed struggle, including Yaqui Indians, seen here being transported in box cars after enlisting in the Mexican army. (Courtesy of the Library of Congress)

and political outlook differed substantially from that of urban labor. Two quite different groups acquired lasting importance: the Ejército del Sur (Army of the South) under the leadership of Emiliano Zapata and the quickly growing División del Norte (Northern Division) led by Francisco “Pancho” Villa. Emiliano Zapata had just been voted as leader in the village Anenecuilco in the southern state of Morelos at a crucial time when the enclosures of the hacienda owners not only encroached on long-standing indigenous communities but also threatened to annihilate them. Capitalist development in the north had already created a hacienda system with many foreigners directly investing into a profitable agrarian extraction structure rendered more profitable with the advent of the railway. However, the actual peons, through a system of *tiendas de raya* (company stores), still lived in a specific kind of bondage and were less inclined to direct themselves against their masters. Hence, it was mainly the free villagers, consisting of a mixture of military colonists who had fought the Apache, indigenous people, some of whom held land titles since colonial times, and squatters, who all suffered from the attacks on their lands, who later filled the ranks of Villa’s army.

Outbreak to 1914

Madero’s upheaval received its main support in the countryside of Chihuahua where Pascual

Orozco and Villa soon became the military leaders. Even though the army, the *rurales* (rural police), and the local police were numerically stronger, they were unable to contain the spreading revolt. The United States, whose territory offered the revolutionaries a base for retreat and organizing supplies, became first officially engaged when it sent military units to its southern border and warships to Mexican ports. When the Treaty of Ciudad Juárez was signed on May 21, 1911, it was the end for Díaz, who soon left Mexico for exile in France.

Despite the overthrow, much remained the same under the interim government of León de la Barra, who sought to disarm the rebels. Likewise, Madero did not intend to realize the agrarian reform he had promised in his Plan de San Luis Potosí other than through parliamentary means. This brought him immediately into contradiction with Zapata, who by then had gathered many armed peasants. The Zapatistas insisted on an immediate solution to the land question and thus the talks with Madero faltered. As a response to Madero’s election for president in October 1911, Zapata and Otilio E. Montañón wrote the Plan de Ayala. In it, they demanded that all confiscated lands be devolved to former proprietors and that a third of all hacienda lands be compensated for and given to the landless population for the creation of *ejidos* (communal lands) and individual lots.

The Zapatista upheaval and an armed insurrection by Pascual Orozco in March 1912 in the north showed the fragility of the Madero regime. He likewise was unable to control the differences in his own political ranks. On February 9, 1913, Generals Bernardo Reyes and Félix Díaz staged a coup, initiating the *decena trágica* (ten tragic days) and claiming many lives. General Victoriano Huerta, who commanded the troops loyal to Madero, soon conspired with the insurrectionary Díaz and received support from US ambassador Henry Lane Wilson to oust the president on February 18, 1913, after which he was murdered. Thus ended a brief period of upheaval in which Madero’s aim was to depose an undemocratic ruler and establish democratic reforms without endangering the order necessary for stable capitalist development. However, the critical situation on both sides of the class divide had made it clear that competing elite interests and the attempt to create a full-blown social revolution of the dispossessed were here to stay.

His successor Huerta was supported by the old conservative elite and seemed to be able to reestablish order through his open usurpation of power. The US did not recognize the new regime and likewise the states of Coahuila and Sonora defied it. Despite Madero's death, the opposition to this kind of ruthless neo-Porfirist rule did not subside. It was the governor of Coahuila, Venustiano Carranza, who organized the resistance to restore the constitutionalist order and claimed leadership of the Constitutionalist Army in his Plan de Guadalupe, signed on March 26, 1913. But his organizational drive for the "Revolution of the North" constituted only one of three elements in the insurrectionary movement against Huerta in the states of Sonora and Chihuahua and the Northeast (Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas). Apart from the Army of the Northeast, headed by General Pablo González, and the Army of the Northwest, headed by Alvaro Obregón, Villa led his troops under the denomination *División del Norte*. His subordination to Obregón's command showed Carranza's distrust, which later produced political differences that led to an armed encounter. In line with the more developed form of capitalism in the north, the social composition of these troops was more heterogeneous than that of Zapata's troops in the south. The political goals of the Sonorans, as Obregón and the other military leaders and future presidents Adolfo de la Huerta and Plutarco Elías Calles would be called from the 1920s onwards, were much more conservative and sought not to disrupt the social order through immediate land reform.

Huerta's dissolution of Congress in October 1913, and his subsequent fake elections, not only fueled the inner opposition but made him also increasingly unreliable as guarantor of order and stability in the eyes of US President Woodrow Wilson's administration. Thus, in February 1914, the US lifted an arms embargo and in April US Marines occupied the port city of Veracruz. While this action made even people critical of Huerta rally around him, his lack of internal support and the weakness of the 100,000-man army led to his steady downfall. The *División del Norte*, which by then counted 50,000, including the female *soldaderas* (largely responsible for reproductive labor), and the Constitutionalist troops gained ground in the north, while the Zapatistas took important towns of the state of Guerrero. Far from reestablishing some kind of

neo-Porfirist rule, Huerta's coup had made evident the existing rift within Mexico's upper class and ushered in a series of factional struggles. When Huerta abdicated on July 14, 1914, this opened up the chance for the Villistas and the Zapatistas to explore the ins and outs of a possible revolutionary solution in favor of the peasants.

The Convention of Aguascalientes: An Impossible Opportunity

By the middle of August 1914 the successful Obregón and Carranza had installed themselves in Mexico City. Various immediate encounters between the Zapatistas and representatives of the Constitutionlists confirmed Carranza's negative position on the question of the distribution of lands. He opposed redistributive land reform on the basis that private property could not be taken from those who already owned it, and since the state did not own the land it thus could not give it away. This stand showed clearly the political, cultural, and class divide separating Carranza's intention from the Zapatistas' quest for justice as represented in their Plan de Ayala. With no prospect of negotiations on their terms, the Zapatistas began to implement an agrarian reform within their territories, and by March 1915 Zapata could declare the agrarian matter resolved.

However, things were not much easier in relation to Villa's forces. After the military victory, the northern coalition broke up as Carranza considered that he no longer needed them. However, given the strength and inner organization of Villa's troops, Carranza could not simply risk an all-out attack. Through Obregón, who served as intermediary for Carranza, but who also followed his own plans of creating a political base for himself within Mexico's petty bourgeoisie, a convention was negotiated which was to be held in a neutral place.

In October 1914 the Convention of Aguascalientes came together. Out of the different factions represented, Obregón's was the largest, and when he later aligned himself openly with Carranza, this proved to be decisive. The number of delegates clearly favored Carranza's faction. The deliberations of the convention were mainly centered around conflicting demands from either Villa or Carranza for the other to step down and go into exile. This stalemate and the impending confrontation which, for a lack of military strength, he would have lost, made Carranza leave Mexico

City and ultimately look for refuge in the port of Veracruz, where the US forces withdrew after a seven-month occupation. The most significant decision taken during the convention was the acceptance, at least in principle, of some of the crucial paragraphs on agrarian reform as laid down in the Plan de Ayala. For the first time after the demise of Díaz, a *de facto* governing body had adopted some of the pivotal demands which fueled this revolution.

With Carranza's retreat to Veracruz, Villa and Zapata could enter the now vacant seat of power. It was Villa's and Zapata's joint occupation of Mexico City, following their Pacto de Xochimilco on December 4, 1914, that was to mark the height of the peasant armies' strength. Yet they still had serious limitations regarding the creation of national political power and a centralized army. The peasant armies thus handed over control of the everyday operations of the state to the majority faction of the Conventionists which, however, would not undertake any effective measures to put the peasants' demands into practice. When on January 15, 1915 some Conventionist generals decided to side with Obregón, it meant the end of Villa's and Zapata's chances of realizing the demands of the peasant war. Nevertheless their occupation of Mexico City constituted the pivotal point of the revolution, as after this episode not even the Constitutionalist forces could fall short of demands promising to pacify peasants' and workers' petitions. Hence, despite their political limitations, the legacy of the insurrectionary peasants was to be felt in the struggles of the following years.

Los Batallones Rojos: Mexican Labor's Pact with Carranza

Mexican labor's history only dated back to the early 1870s, when mutualist organizations formed the Gran Círculo de Obreros de México in the wake of the Paris Commune. On the eve of the revolution, the overall population numbered 15 million people, of which the rural population made up 11 million and the workers – artisan labor still outnumbered industrial labor – numbered only slightly more than half a million, concentrated in a few urban areas. The combined system of repression and benevolent support of those organizations restricting themselves to mutualist and educational approaches under Díaz made the growth of independent unionism difficult and led to a lack of struggle experience

necessary for an autonomous participation in the revolution. After 1900, influence was exerted through contacts of railway workers with their fellows from the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). The Magonistas had some influence in the struggles of Cananea and Río Blanco and their journal *Regeneración* (1900–18) was the most enduring expression of this tendency. Nevertheless, they were unable to create a durable and ideologically steadfast political faction within the working class.

In line with his semi-rural, lower-middle-class Sonoran background, Obregón sensed the need to incorporate a growing section of the population and thus broaden the social base of the Constitutionlists. Instrumental in this was the Mexico City-based Casa del Obrero Mundial, founded in 1912. In a first move to secure labor's support against the agrarian forces, Obregón had handed its members a locale in September 1914. Despite outward anarchosindicalist appearances of many of its members, this allegiance was deepened when individual leaders, such as the electrical workers' leader Luis N. Morones, were given partial management roles to subdue labor strife. As they rejected the Zapatistas' peasant Catholicism and considered Villa a villain, it comes as no surprise that the majority of the Casa members should vote for armed support of the Constitutionalist forces, giving rise to the Pact of Veracruz signed on February 17, 1915. Obregón's tactics had paid out even though it is disputed whether the six Batallones Rojos (Red Battalions) formed thereupon with several thousand armed men were decisive for the course of the revolution in military terms.

The Revolution's Thermidor: The Civil War and the Victory of the Constitutionlists

Prior to this treaty, Obregón's forces had reoccupied Mexico City by the end of January 1915, forcing the Zapatistas to completely evacuate the Federal State of Mexico by July. To improve popular support, Carranza's Plan de Guadalupe now incorporated the demand for an agrarian reform from above. Contrary to the Plan de Ayala, this plan foresaw bureaucratic decisions based on official land titles. A guarantee that restitutions during war times could also be undertaken by authorized militaries served as a means of appropriation of lands in the hands of many of the Constitutionalist leaders, who were to

constitute the new post-revolutionary bourgeoisie. After having secured the assistance of the Batallones Rojos, Obregón took on Villa's forces against which he dealt decisive blows in the battles of Celaya in April 1915. By the end of that year, Villa's 50,000-strong forces were decimated to a few hundred men and despite a resurgence in the latter part of 1916 and 1917, following his attack on the US on January 18, 1916, he would never regain his old fighting strength and was assassinated in 1923. The three-day general strike against the deteriorating living conditions in July 1916 served as a pretext to dissolve the Casa del Obrero Mundial, which by then had served its duty in the eyes of Carranza.

When Zapata withdrew to Morelos, Carranza was free to pursue his politics. From November 30, 1916 to January 31, 1917, the Constitutionalist Convention was held in Querétaro. Several issues stand out in the constitution that was to replace the liberal constitution of 1857: agrarian reform, labor rights, the use of the subsoil, and church–state relations. Contrary to many criticisms of the constitution as full of socialist inclinations, the strength given to the state to intervene in land and labor conflicts was precisely meant as an instrument to curb unrest through state mediation in either of the productive sectors.

Carranza was elected president in March 1917. The closure of the Casa had made new forms of organizing necessary, and in May 1918 the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM) was formed with Luis Morones as one of its outstanding leaders. The politics of the CROM, which included a radical language and forceful mobilizations yet also a preparedness to negotiate with the government, imprinted an indelible mark on the labor movement in the decades to come.

While Carranza was unable to see the advantage of labor's integration, it was President Obregón (1920–4) who paved the way for labor's growth and recognition. Likewise, Carranza's agrarian policies were much more reminiscent of the interests of the class of hacienda owners, and he did undertake steps to curb the efforts to distribute *ejido* lands.

Carranza's last move before he was ousted from office in a coup staged by Adolfo de la Huerta was to have Emiliano Zapata murdered in an ambush on April 10, 1919. Tensions between Carranza and Obregón intensified when the latter nomin-

ated himself for the presidential elections. Together with Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles, Adolfo de la Huerta, deposed as governor of Sonora by Carranza, led a coup against the president, who was assassinated during his flight on May 21, 1920. After Adolfo de la Huerta's interim presidency for six months, Obregón was elected president in September of that same year.

Economy of the Revolution

Contrary to traditional assumptions about life under revolutionary conditions, the economy did not only present wreckage and pillage. There is no doubt that the one million dead and 300,000 refugees fleeing to the US were a strong burden for the post-revolutionary economy. Yet, the most drastic consequences were shouldered by the peasants working in the subsistence economy. By 1940, more than three-fifths of Mexico's farm and ranch land was still consolidated in large private holdings of 1,000 or more hectares. Two-fifths of the land remained in very large estates of 10,000 or more hectares.

Judged by the number of *sociedades anónimas* (corporations) and business associations, there can likewise be no talk of a breakdown of established forms of capitalist reproduction. As regards the value of investments up until 1930, both American and British ownership increased and despite an aggregate decrease during the Depression, American capital was able to increase its part of the cake proportionally. Neither was there a break in the dependence on the world markets: foreign trade continuously made up roughly 20 percent of the GDP with dependence on the US economy averaging around 70–80 percent.

Rather than a sharp break with prior feudal structures, Mexican capitalism, then, presented strong features of continuity. Instead of being the origin of growth as many post-revolutionary economists would have it, the Mexican economy recovered to continue its way along the course of integration into the capitalist world market adopted from the 1870s onwards. Comparable to other Latin American countries, the Mexican bourgeoisie struggled with its own constitution between popular demands and the intricacies and imponderabilities of the world market. The entry of Mexican capitalists into this contradictory realm came in the guise of a revolution, but their staying power was dependent upon the degree to which they were able to stabilize their hold over the production of exchange value.

Revolutionary Nationalism as a new Mode of Accumulation (1920–1940)

While the coup by de la Huerta marked the last successful military uprising, there is good reason to include the period up to 1940 as part of the revolutionary era. By 1920 the revolution was over, and even though Obregón ushered in a new phase of revolutionary nationalism, a new mode of accumulation was not successfully installed until two constitutional provisions, namely the distribution of *ejidos*, or communal lands, and the nationalization of oil, were set into practice under Lázaro Cárdenas, the last of the revolutionary generals. Revolutionary nationalism restored the law and order of Porfirian times by making social concessions and facilitating political integration of peasant and working classes.

As an ideological founding document, the Constitution of 1917 is of some importance. While important rights for the subalterns were codified in the articles on agrarian reform and labor rights, other fields of contention were opened with internal and external enemies. As a response to the liberalism of the Díaz era, the Catholic Church undertook an intense campaign of proselytism. The new provisions of the 1917 Constitution allowed the state to rule over the number of priests in one state, and the education system became completely secularized. This outright rejection of public influences of Catholicism led to the guerilla-style Cristero rebellion (1926–9), the sequels of which continued well into the 1930s.

The constitutional regulations concerning the use of the subsoil were to lead to strong confrontations with the imperialists' interest in the extraction of oil. Oil production had risen substantially throughout the revolution, with US and British capitals competing strongest. When a general oil workers' strike broke out in May 1937, President Cárdenas (1934–40) sided with the workers and nationalized the oil industry in March 1938 in a move to both integrate the growing workers' power in a revolutionary nationalist form of regulation and ward off undue foreign companies' claims undermining the state's authority. In this he was able to fall back on the Partido Nacional Revolucionario, founded in 1929. Renamed Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM) in 1938 and Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in 1946, this group played a key role in deciding whether to

comply with or stifle specific demands. In line with the Keynesian precepts gradually adopted from the 1930s onwards, the Mexican bourgeoisie had finally encountered its form of capitalist accumulation.

Symbolically, this meant the creation of a revolutionary family which could only be left at the price of suppression or, at times, even death as the student movement in 1968 had to discover. It was their upheaval, crushed in the Tlatelolco massacre in 1968, that brought the crisis-ridden character of this mode of accumulation back into public conscience.

The Mexican Revolution: The Subaltern's Emergency Brake?

Precisely 100 years before Madero's insurrection against Díaz, the *criollo* priest Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla led tens of thousands of peasants in a four-month crusade on Mexico City to fight Spanish rule and social injustices, which shows the longevity of the agrarian question in Mexican insurrectionist movements. The reasons for their existence persisted even after the creation of the *ejidos* under Cárdenas, to which attest the many rural armed movements in twentieth-century Mexico. Thus, while the written Zapatista program may not have been as radical as others, its praxis during their revolution from below surely was. The democratically organized agrarian community constituted the radical base of the armed Zapatistas taking over the hacienda lands. The backbone of its political organization was the *municipio libre*, the free municipality. Their autonomy and material independence based on their local production were to secure a political independence from the institutions of the federal state. Their failure to forge enduring alliances with other factions was as much due to a lack in strength and resources as it was to a lack in vision. The Zapatistas took pains to ensure that the military would not subdue the civil character of their rebellion and emphasized the necessity of a democratic people's army. By organizing the Consultation Center for Propaganda and Revolutionary Unification (Centro de Consulta para la Propaganda y la Unificación Revolucionaria), they even set up a political body, a party with grassroots democratic aspirations responsible for establishing communication channels between the army and the local population. Despite the defeat of the

revolution from below, the historical Zapatista experience shows that the yearning for justice, democracy, autonomy, and its aspiration to a life beyond capitalism and the state lingers on.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Mexico; Benjamin, Walter (1892–1940); Cárdenas, Lázaro (1895–1970); Casa del Obrero Mundial; Cristero Uprising, Mexico, 1928; Diaz Soto y Gama, Antonio (1880–1967); Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel (1753–1811); Madera Uprising, Chihuahua, 1965; Madero, Francisco (1873–1913); Magón, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922) and the Magonistas; Marcos, Subcomandante (b. ?); Obregón, Alvaro (1880–1928) and the Sonoran Generation; Tlatelolco 1968 and the Mexican Student Movement; Villa, Pancho (ca. 1878–1923) and the Division of the North; Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919) and the Comuna Morelense; Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Benjamin, W. (1978) *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 1. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Castellanos, L. (2007) *México Armado, 1943–1981*. Mexico City: Ediciones Era.
- Cockcroft, J. D. (1968) *Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1910–1913*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Gilly, A. (1994) *La Revolución Interrumpida*. Mexico City: Ediciones Era.
- Hamnett, B. (1999) *A Concise History of Mexico*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hart, J. M. (1978) *Anarchism and the Mexican Working Class 1860–1931*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Hart, J. M. (1987) *Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Katz, F. (1981) *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Katz, F. (1998) *The Life and Times of Pancho Villa*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Knight, A. (1986) *The Mexican Revolution: Porfirians, Liberals and Peasants*, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Madero, F. I. (1990) *The Presidential Succession of 1910*. Trans. T. Davis. New York: Peter Lang.
- Meyer, J. (1973) *La révolution mexicaine 1910–1940*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
- Meyer, J. (1976) *The Cristero Rebellion: The Mexican People Between Church and State 1926–1929*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Niemeyer, E. V. (1974) *Revolution at Querétaro: The Mexican Constitutional Convention of 1916–1917*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Pérez-Siller, J. (2003) *L'hégémonie des financiers au Mexique sous le porfiriat: L'autre dictature*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Quirk, R. E. (1960) *The Mexican Revolution 1914–1915: The Convention of Aguascalientes*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Rosenzweig, F. (1965) El desarrollo económico de México. *El Trimestre Económico* 22 (3): 405–54.
- Salmerón Sanginés, P. (2000) Pensar el Villismo. *Estudios de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea de México* 20: 101–28.
- Warman, A. (1990) El proyecto político del zapatismo. In F. Katz (Ed.), *Reuelta, Rebelión y Revolución. La Lucha Rural en México del Siglo XVI al Siglo XX*. Mexico City: Ediciones Era, pp. 9–23.
- Womack, Jr., J. (1972) *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Womack, Jr., J. (1978) The Mexican Economy during the Revolution 1910–1920. *Marxist Perspectives* 1 (4): 80–123.

Mexico, armed political movements, 1960s–present

Bill Weinberg

The emergence of armed revolutionary movements in Mexico in the 1960s has its roots in the erosion of the agrarian reform program, a critical gain of the 1910–21 Revolution. As early as the 1940s, the ruling party (in 1946 dubbed the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI) tilted to the right after land was massively redistributed under President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40). Strains emerged in the corporatist system which delivered peasant votes and loyalties in exchange for access to land, water, and credit. Corrupt bureaucrats and political bosses began taking over redistributed lands, known as *ejidos*, leading some among the disenfranchised to break with the system and revive the agrarian revolutionary legacy of Emiliano Zapata (1879–1919). In the 1960s, these rebels were linked to the general revolutionary effervescence of the era, making common cause with radical students. These movements went into retreat with the repressive “dirty war” of the late 1960s and 1970s, but reemerged powerfully with the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, which represented a far more profound threat to the *ejidos* and a virtual end to the corporatist state.

The link between the new armed movements and the original Zapatistas was Rubén Jaramillo (1898–1962), who had been a captain in Zapata’s

Liberator Army of the South at the age of 15. By the 1940s, he was once again organizing strikes and land occupations against the Morelos sugar barons. In 1943, the Morelos state government ordered Jaramillo's arrest, and he fled to the hills with a group of comrades to launch the first guerilla insurgency of the post-revolutionary era. Jaramillo and his band succeeded in briefly taking his hometown of Tlaquiltenango before they accepted an amnesty offer in June 1944. But when his gubernatorial bid was stolen by evident fraud the next year, and protests were met with repression, he returned to arms. After months of eluding government troops in the Sierra Ajusco, Jaramillo accepted another amnesty in 1958. With the election of Adolfo López Mateos that year, there was a slight tilt back to the left – in part, a result of the *campesino* upsurge in Morelos.

The year 1960 saw Jaramillo again leading land occupations in Morelos. New federal irrigation projects made dry rocky lands which had been parceled out as *ejidos* suddenly desirable, leading to a wave of evictions, effected through terror or fraud. Thousands of *campesinos* led by Jaramillo began “squatting” their alienated lands. On May 23, 1962, Jaramillo, his wife, and three sons were killed in a raid on his home in Tlaquiltenango by federal soldiers and police.

Before the decade was out, radical *campesinos* in Guerrero's mountains, just to the south, would pick up the torch. Lucio Cabañas Barrientos (1938–74) was a rural schoolteacher and veteran of the National Liberation Movement (MLN), founded by Cárdenas in 1961 to pressure the PRI back to the left. A year after returning to his hometown of Atoyac de Alvarez to teach, he was transferred out by the Guerrero state government to put an end to his organizing of popular peasant assemblies. On May 13, 1967, a demonstration in Atoyac demanding his reinstatement was fired upon by the federal police. Some protesters returned fire, leaving seven villagers and two police dead. Cabañas fled to the mountains, where he organized his Armed Commandos of Guerrero. In a string of executions and kidnappings, the Armed Commandos took revenge on the federal police, local political bosses, and army officers.

The following year, after being liberated by supporters from his Iguala prison cell, another radical schoolteacher, Genaro Vázquez Rojas (1933–72), launched a loosely allied insurgency. As a young militant of the Popular Socialist Party,

Vázquez had interviewed Rubén Jaramillo for the Cuernavaca paper *¡Presente!*. He began organizing *campesinos* in Guerrero in 1960 when, on December 30, one march was fired on by the state police in Chilpancingo, leaving several dead. Dozens more were killed when police opened fire on a march almost exactly two years later in Iguala. After this, his Guerreran Civil Association was outlawed and its leaders imprisoned. Upon his escape, Vázquez reassembled it underground as the National Revolutionary Civic Association (ACNR), and took up arms.

The year 1968 also saw Cabañas's Armed Commandos joined by a Campesino Justice Brigade – conceived as, respectively, the military and judicial wings of a new clandestine vanguard, the Party of the Poor (PDLP). Rumors that the PDLP received aid from Cuba are denied by Jorge Castañeda, who maintains Havana kept a fastidious distance from the revolutionaries so as to remain in the good graces of the left-tilting PRI; however, Donald Hodges (1995) asserts that some radical students who joined the PDLP guerillas received training in North Korea.

The PRI's gubernatorial candidate Rubén Figueroa Figueroa, heir to a dynasty of rightist *caudillos* who had resisted the Zapatista advance into Guerrero during the Revolution, was kidnapped by the Armed Commandos in May 1974. As a dangerous campaign stunt, Figueroa, then a federal senator, went into the mountains uninvited to negotiate an end to the insurgency. Cabañas seized him to demand liberation of political prisoners. In September, he was freed in an army raid – but Cabañas escaped. Two months later, following a military occupation of the Sierra del Sur, with *campesinos* bribed and tortured to betray Cabañas, the whereabouts of his hideout was revealed. Cabañas met his death in the resultant shootout. Rubén Figueroa Figueroa became governor.

The PDLP was shortly crushed. The ACNR declined after the 1972 death of Genaro Vázquez in a car accident – possibly while fleeing the authorities. But their insurgencies served as a crucible for numerous small guerilla efforts which remained active throughout the 1970s. One PDLP veteran, Carmelo Cortés, brought the struggle to the cities under the banner of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR). In September 1975, days after a Cuernavaca bank heist, Cortés was killed in a gun battle with the police in Mexico City.

Florencio “El Güero” Medrano took the struggle back to the heartland of Zapata. An admirer of Mao Zedong, in 1969 the young militant was invited to China to witness life on the agricultural collectives. Near Temixco, Morelos, he established a commune dubbed Colonia Rubén Jaramillo, conceived as a staging ground for a prolonged people’s war. The Armed Forces of Colonia Rubén Jaramillo launched attacks in the surrounding countryside and deep in the Sierra del Sur. In October 1978, Medrano was mortally wounded in a gunfight with the army in Oaxaca.

Another effort was the Forces of National Liberation (FLN) in Chiapas, a national guerilla group that sent cells all over Mexico, including the jungles of Chiapas, to organize the kernel of what would become the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), the most significant of the new armed movements to emerge in the 1990s.

The Sierra Tarahumara of Chihuahua, at the far northern end of Mexico’s mountain spine, was also a crucible of the 1960s guerilla movement – and can claim a lineage to the new rebels of the 1990s. The schoolteacher Arturo Gámiz witnessed a contest for disputed lands grow increasingly violent at Madera, in the Sierra’s northern foothills, not 300 kilometers south of the US border. In early 1964, after two *campesinos* were murdered on the orders of the big landholder, Gámiz organized armed raids onto the disputed property. On September 23, he launched an audacious if suicidal attack on the Madera army barracks. The attack left six soldiers and eight guerillas dead – including Gámiz. But survivors regrouped in the Sierra and kept the insurgency alive for another four years. The group, formerly the Armed Commandos of Chihuahua, became the September 23 Movement.

The name was resurrected in 1969 as the September 23 Communist League, which succeeded the Madera veterans and sought to unite Mexico’s emerging guerilla factions. Their Chihuahua cadre established contacts with radical *campesinos* throughout the mountains of Mexico and with the urban campus movement. Some joined the Guerrero insurgency of Cabañas and Vázquez. Others formed the early Chiapas FLN guerilla effort. One veteran of the September 23 Movement was apparently among a group of 12 militants who entered the Chiapas rainforest in 1983, deeming the region ripe for

revolution. This old veteran was gunned down at a police stop in Ocosingo, and one of his comrades, who stuck it out in the jungle to build the rebel army, adopted his code name: Marcos.

Subcomandante Marcos was catapulted to fame when he led the EZLN’s armed uprising of New Year’s Day, 1994 – the day NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) took effect. The EZLN’s statements called the treaty a “death sentence” for Mexico’s indigenous peoples, and made clear that President Carlos Salinas’s 1993 constitutional reform in preparation for the trade agreement – declaring the agrarian reform over and allowing the privatization of *ejidos* and other communal lands – was critical in the decision to launch an armed struggle. Emerging from the lowland Lacandon Selva, the masked Maya footsoldiers of the EZLN occupied four towns in the Chiapas Highlands: San Cristóbal de Las Casas, Altamirano, Las Margaritas, and Ocosingo – where a battle was fought with the state police. Absalon Castellanos, a hated former governor, was seized from his ranch and charged with crimes against the *campesinos* and Indians.

Indiscriminate army attacks on the Maya villages of Chiapas sparked a national outrage. On January 12, a massive march was held in Mexico City in protest of the repression. The government declared a ceasefire, and the rebels retreated back to the Selva. Marcos’s poetic communiqués kept them in the media spotlight.

A dialogue process began in March, brokered by the local Catholic diocese – and continued in fits and starts for two years. The government was barred by the congressionally approved terms of the dialogue from attacking the Zapatistas – which meant they had been effectively granted a zone of control in the Selva, as well as enclaves in the Highlands. This zone shrunk and fragmented as the army took a February 1995 breakdown in the dialogue as opportunity for an offensive, and as paramilitary groups effected evictions.

It became clear that indigenous identity was central to these new Zapatistas, and Marcos was ostensibly answerable to a Revolutionary Indigenous Clandestine Committee, which in turn consulted with the base communities before issuing orders to the army of an estimated 12,000. When the EZLN finally sat down with federal legislators at the Highland village of San Andrés Larrainzar to hash out a proposed

constitutional reform in April 1995, indigenous autonomy was the first item on their agenda. The EZLN agreed to lay down arms if this first reform package, the San Andrés Accords, was accepted. But President Ernesto Zedillo refused to sign them in early 1996, and the stalemate continued; meanwhile, the paramilitary backlash against the Zapatistas gained ground, leaving some 10,000 rebel supporters displaced, especially in the north of the state, and culminating in the massacre of 45 unarmed Maya peasants at the Highland hamlet of Acteal in December 1997.

It was another massacre which led to the emergence of a guerilla army in Guerrero. Guerrero's governor in 1995 was Rubén Figueroa Alcocer, son of Figueroa Figueroa. It was his state police that were responsible for the massacre of 17 peasant activists at Aguas Blancas on June 28 of that year. On the one-year anniversary of the massacre, a commemoration ceremony was held at the site – where masked men and women with AK-47s emerged from the brush, took over the stage, and read a manifesto in Spanish and Nahuatl. The Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) had announced its presence to the world. A series of EPR ambushes of army and police patrols in Guerrero followed.

The government claimed the EPR was controlled by the Clandestine Revolutionary Workers' Party-Union of the People (PROCUP), a deep-underground remnant of the 1970s guerilla movement. PROCUP was purported by many in the civil left to be a "pseudo-revolutionary" group, heavily infiltrated, if not controlled, by government agents. The government, in turn, blamed PROCUP for the 1994 kidnapping of banking magnate Alfredo Harp Helú, who netted his captors a \$30 million ransom.

PROCUP could claim a lineage back to Lucio Cabañas. In 1975, David Cabañas, Lucio's brother, founded the Union of the People as a successor to Lucio's Party of the Poor (PDLP). While a hardcore few nurtured the PDLP in the mountains of Guerrero, the Union of the People merged with various Maoist factions, expanded its name to PROCUP, and became an urban cell.

PROCUP outlived the various revolutionary efforts of the 1970s – but most of its exploits were against enemies on the left. In 1984, PROCUP kidnapped Mexican Communist Party leader Arnaldo Martínez Verdugo. In 1990, PROCUP killed two security guards at the Mexico City offices of the leftist daily *La Jornada*, which had

recently criticized the group. David Cabañas and Felipe Martínez Soriano, former rector of the Autonomous University of Oaxaca, were arrested in the investigation of the incident. Martínez denied any link to PROCUP – but his release was secured later that year when PROCUP kidnapped a German consular official. Martínez was arrested again two years later, following a wave of bomb attacks on US-owned business outlets in Mexico City, including Citibank, IBM, and McDonald's.

In January 1994, with the EZLN engaging government troops in Chiapas, a car bomb exploded in Mexico City's University Plaza, and power lines were bombed elsewhere in the country. PROCUP subsequently took responsibility for them, and the EZLN disavowed "any relationship or link" with PROCUP.

While initially dismissed by left opposition leader Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas as a "grotesque pantomime," the EPR dramatically demonstrated its power on the night of August 28, 1996 with coordinated attacks on military and police targets in five southern and central states, leaving 13 dead.

In April 1998, a Popular Revolutionary Democratic Party (PDPR) pronounced itself as General Command of the EPR via communiqués sent to Mexico's newspapers. But by then the movement was beginning to fracture. When a June 1998 army raid on a schoolhouse in the Guerrero mountain pueblo of El Charco left 11 dead, a breakaway faction calling itself the Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People (ERPI) came forward to claim the fallen. The ERPI's communiqués accused the EPR leadership of being undemocratic. In 1999, two supposed leaders of ERPI, Jacobo Silva ("Comandante Antonio") and Gloria Arenas ("Col. Aurora"), were arrested. They remain imprisoned, and have spent much time on hunger strike behind bars.

Attacks in the Sierra del Sur subsequently declined, but a profusion of small armed groups, which functioned more as peasant self-defense militias than as insurgents, continued to announce their existence through communiqués. An urban group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (FARP), carried out simultaneous bombings at Mexico City banks in August 2001 (claiming no casualties). Four men accused of being FARP's leaders were arrested shortly after, two of whom remain in jail today.

The guerilla movement began to reemerge with the contested presidential elections and the civil struggle in Oaxaca in 2006. In early November, when federal police were putting down the Oaxaca protests, bombs exploded at three high-profile targets in Mexico City: the national headquarters of the PRI, the Federal Electoral Tribunal, which had ruled in favor of conservative candidate Felipe Calderón, and a branch of a Canadian bank. There was property damage but no casualties. A communiqué jointly signed by five small armed groups – led by the Democratic Revolutionary Tendency–Army of the People (TDR-EP) – claimed responsibility, and warned the government against using the attacks “as a pretext to . . . continue repressing the civil, peaceful organizations and movements.”

The EPR dramatically reappeared in July 2007, bombing pipelines of the state oil monopoly Pemex in Veracruz. Communiqués said this was to press for the release of two of its leaders, Edmundo Reyes Amaya and Alberto Cruz Sanchez, who were “disappeared” in Oaxaca that May. President Calderón subsequently announced a decision to open dialogue with the EPR, and established a commission to establish contact with the guerillas.

A group of ex-guerillas from the now-dissolved PROCUP, reorganized as the above-ground Democratic Popular Left (IDP) led by David Cabañas and Italo Ricardo Díaz, charged in a July 2007 statement that the government of Calderón sought to “open a new chapter in the dirty war” that gripped Mexico in the 1970s.

The EZLN has meanwhile continued to pursue civil initiatives – without surrendering its arms. The San Andrés Accords were stripped of binding measures on indigenous control of lands by Congress after President Vicente Fox finally signed them following his 2000 election, and the EZLN does not consider the new version legitimate. It continues to build its autonomous system of self-government in the territories it still controls in Chiapas. The Zapatista movement remains cohesive, despite continued, if reduced, paramilitary pressure and violent factionalism among Chiapas peasant organizations. The government is seeking to clear Zapatista settlements from the Selva on the grounds that they are illegally within the borders of the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve.

During the 2006 presidential campaign, the EZLN sent Marcos and other leaders on a

national tour of the country, dubbed the “Other Campaign,” in a bid to unite Mexico’s popular movements. The ERPI and other armed groups publicly supported the Other Campaign, and pledged to observe a truce during its progress – pointing to the potential for dialogue and convergence between Mexico’s civil movements and armed organizations.

SEE ALSO: Cabañas, Lucio (1938–1974); Cristero Uprising, Mexico, 1928; Madera Uprising, Chihuahua, 1965; Marcos, Subcomandante (b. ?); Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Mexico, Indigenous and Peasant Struggles, 1980s–Present; Oaxaca Uprising, 2006; Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919) and the Comuna Morelense; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Bartra, A. (1985) *Los Herederos de Zapata: Movimientos Campesinos Postrevolucionarios en México*. Mexico City: Ediciones Era.
- Castañeda, J. G. (1995) *The Mexican Shock: Its Meaning for the United States*. New York: New Press.
- Collier, G. A. (1999) *Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas*. Oakland: Food First Books.
- Harvey, N. (1998) *The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Hodges, D. (1995) *Mexican Anarchism After the Revolution*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Montemayor, C. (1999) *La guerrilla recurrente* (The Recurrent Guerilla). Ciudad Juárez: Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez.
- Ross, J. (1995) *Rebellion from the Roots: Indian Uprising in Chiapa*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
- Weinberg, B. (2000) *Homage to Chiapas: The New Indigenous Struggles in Mexico*. London: Verso.
- Womack, J., Jr. (Ed.) (1999) *Rebellion in Chiapas: An Historical Reader*. New York: New Press.

Mexico, indigenous and peasant struggles, 1980s–present

Bill Weinberg

The decline of Mexico’s populist and corporatist system in the period of neoliberal reform beginning in the early 1980s saw a deepening of poverty in marginal rural areas. This immiseration led to a revival of *campesino* struggles,

especially in the impoverished and heavily indigenous south. The new movements often represented a convergence of traditional peasant demands over land rights and farm support, with demands for indigenous cultural autonomy. They also saw a tension between reformist and electoral strategies versus revolutionary imperatives. In the case of Chiapas, and then of those in the Sierra del Sur of Guerrero and Oaxaca states, the resurgence of *campesino* militancy actually led to the emergence of armed revolutionary movements which persist today.

In the 1970s Mexico's ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) engaged in both Third Worldist posturing and a grisly "dirty war" against radical student and peasant organizations. In the 1980s, with these movements in retreat, the party tilted sharply to the right. Miguel de la Madrid, Mexico's first US-educated president, launched a far-reaching process of neoliberal reform upon taking power in 1982. By the time Carlos Salinas took power in 1988, free trade orthodoxy reigned. The number of Mexican millionaires rose impressively, while a 1990 World Bank study found that 41 million (nearly half) of the population lived in poverty, 17 million in extreme poverty. In the southern states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Chiapas, 80 percent of the population was without access to potable water.

An early model of the new movements was the Worker-Campesino-Student Coalition of the Isthmus (COCEI), which emerged from the struggle of Zapotec smallholders to keep their lands at Juchitán, in Oaxaca's Isthmus of Tehuantepec. COCEI was born in 1973, staging land occupations, blockading highways, and demanding municipal autonomy. Protests and actions were modeled on traditional fiestas and ceremonial processions; banners were written in Zapotec. In 1981 COCEI won the Juchitán government in alliance with the Communist Party. This government was impeached, however, in August 1983, following violence (reportedly sparked by PRI provocateurs). COCEI called the impeachment illegal and was forcibly evicted from the *cabecera* (municipal palace) that December by the army. The group resumed power in 1986, eventually worked out a coalition with the PRI, and in 1989 returned to power outright. COCEI boasted that "Juchitán is to the Mexican government what Central America is to the White House."

The 1988 presidential race further radicalized the reemergent *campesino* movements. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, former Michoacán governor and son of the revered 1930s populist president Lázaro Cárdenas, broke with the PRI and ran as the candidate of a National Democratic Front (FDN), which briefly unified the left parties. After the revelations of "cybernetic fraud" during the count, a wave of angry protests swept the country, especially Michoacán. Followers proclaimed they were ready for a general strike to defend his victory, but Cárdenas refused the offer. This stolen election marked the first emergence of a serious electoral opposition on the left. Many of the parties which had come together in the FDN coalesced permanently as the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). In Michoacán and Guerrero, PRD militants blocked roads, seized town halls, and organized parallel municipal governments in protest of fraudulent elections.

But land rights continued to be the central demand, as agribusiness and timber interests encroached onto *campesino* territories. This was especially an issue in marginal forested areas where *campesinos* had been pushed, but never had their new lands titled. One particularly successful case of resistance was in Jalisco's Sierra de Manantlan, where Nahuatl communities organized against the timber operations denuding the mountains and illegally logging *ejidal* lands. *Campesinos* repeatedly blockaded logging roads until the government finally declared the sierra a protected area in 1987. Similar struggles were waged from the Sierra Tarahumara in Chihuahua, to the Chimalapas region in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec.

Nowhere was this dynamic of insurgency more advanced than in the Lacandon Selva, the lowland rainforest of southern Chiapas state, along the Guatemalan border. By the late 1970s militantly independent *campesino* organizations took hold as an alternative to the PRI-controlled National Campesino Confederation (CNC) in many of the Maya villages of Chiapas – and especially in the Selva, where the CNC had little presence to begin with.

The Independent Central of Rural Workers and Campesinos (CIOAC), with a support base in the Highland village of Simojovel, was linked to the Mexican Communist Party (and successor organizations after the party's 1983 disbanding). Others, such as the Emiliano Zapata Campesino

Organization (OCEZ), were rooted in community kinship networks, maintaining autonomy from any national structures as a matter of principle. The Tzotzil Maya village of Venustiano Carranza in the Highlands was by the early 1980s the scene of frequent violence between OCEZ militants and CNC *pistoleros*. In response to the rise of militant *campesino* activity, the cattle oligarchy began forming paramilitary groups known as White Guards. By 1986 Amnesty International was documenting “disappearances” and torture in Chiapas.

Cadres from radical left groups, including some from the Mexican north, provided some of the initial impetus for this organizing in Chiapas, traditionally under a closed and isolated oligarchic system, which even the post-revolutionary reforms of the 1930s had failed to break up. Maoists who rejected the Communist Party as too detached and statist found a foothold in the Selva, especially the group Política Popular. But many PP organizers found themselves assuming leadership in the Rural Associations of Collective Interest (ARICs), which began as a government development program. Ironically, these Maoists became the more reformist, with a program of pressuring the government for credit and higher crop prices, not land redistribution. They began to risk reincorporation into the “pseudo-left” outer ring of the PRI machine.

Both repression and the threat of cooptation moved some groups in the Selva, where the security forces had little presence, in a revolutionary direction. The Emiliano Zapata National Independent Campesino Alliance (ANCIEZ) was one of the key groups that joined to form the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), which dramatically took up arms in Chiapas on January 1, 1994. The emergence of the new Zapatistas provided a further impetus to the radicalization of *campesino* struggles. In Chiapas groups such as the OCEZ seized land from *caciques* (PRI political bosses) and ranchers, while indigenous councils seized the *cabaceras* or, in more remote areas, declared new “autonomous municipalities” loyal to the Zapatistas. In either case local self-government in indigenous languages, according to indigenous traditions, was established. In the agreement the Mexican government reached with the EZLN later that year, *campesino* communities were allowed to maintain control of lands occupied since the

uprising, which meant that agrarian reform was back on, at least in Chiapas. Moreover, this was agrarian reform from below, as carried out by the original Zapatistas in the Mexican Revolution, not at the hands of the bureaucratic state. Many of these lands would be retaken by ranchers or PRI-loyal peasants in the subsequent years of paramilitary backlash, but many remain effectively redistributed.

The reverberations of the Zapatista revolt were felt beyond Chiapas. In Tabasco, the oil heartland on the Gulf Coast just to Chiapas’ north, Chontal Maya peasants and fishermen launched blockades of the oil wells to demand restitution for the despoilment of their lands. The town of Tepoztlan in Morelos, the heartland of the original Zapatistas in the Mexican Revolution, just south of Mexico City, was the scene of a popular uprising in 1995 when real estate developers tried to grab village lands for a golf course and computer center. The Nahuatl townspeople seized the *cabecera*, kicked out the PRI councilors who had approved the land sale, and set up a “popular” government that persisted for two years until the developers pulled out and new elections were held.

But it was the Sierra del Sur – the mountain range spanning the states of Guerrero and Oaxaca – that followed Chiapas most rapidly towards a revolutionary situation. The Campesino Organization of the Sierra del Sur (OCSS) emerged in Guerrero’s mountains with demands for credit, fertilizers, and pesticides but, facing government repression of its protests and catalyzed by the events in Chiapas, moved to a more oppositional stance. On June 28, 1995 a truckload of OCSS militants on their way to a protest demanding the return of one of their comrades who had disappeared was stopped by a force of some 300 Guerrero state police at a place called Aguas Blancas in Coyuca de Benitez municipality. The police opened fire, leaving 17 dead. Angry *campesinos* gathered around the coffins of their slain comrades in the Coyuca *zócalo* the next day, demanding justice. PRD militants seized Coyuca’s municipal palace and the PRI authorities fled.

The Aguas Blancas massacre turned into a major scandal when a cover-up was revealed. Guerrero’s Governor Rubén Figueroa first displayed a police video of the massacre, which made it seem as if the OCSS militants had been armed and engaged in a firefight with the police. The

OCSS insisted the *campesinos* were armed only with their machetes. In August 1995 Mexico's National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) accused Guerrero state officials of hiding, altering, and manufacturing evidence in the massacre. The videotape had been manipulated and edited; guns photographed in the hands of some of the dead victims were "almost certainly" planted after the shooting. At least one and probably three of the victims were killed at close range, execution style. A special prosecutor imprisoned 28 police officers and seven high-level state officials. The controversy prompted Figueroa to step down in March 1996. He was exonerated of all crimes despite being determined responsible for "grave human rights violations" by the federal Supreme Court of Justice.

A dirty war was starting to unfold again in Guerrero. The month of the Aguas Blancas massacre had also seen the murder of three militants of the Guerrero Council of the 500 Years of Indigenous Resistance Campaign in the divided village of Tlacoachistlahuaca. The PRD claimed that 84 party followers were murdered in Guerrero during Figueroa's term. Contested municipal elections divided village after village in the Sierra del Sur. In November 1995 Mixtec and Amuzgo militants of the 500 Years of Resistance Council occupied Tlacoachistlahuaca's *cabecera*, vowing to block the elections due to PRI bosses buying the vote with "gifts" of alcohol, tortilla meal, and fertilizer. The local PRD agreed that no clean elections were possible and actually joined with the Indigenous Resistance Council in demanding a municipal government based on indigenous traditions, with no political parties – a system known locally as *usos y costumbres*.

In January 1996 the OCSS held a meeting of *campesino* groups in Acapulco to form a Broad Front for the Creation of a National Liberation Movement (FAC-MLN). This was an answer to the EZLN's call for the forging of such a movement to unite common but still-isolated struggles. Over 200 organizations were represented, including the 500 Years of Resistance Council, the OCEZ, the National Indigenous Congress, and the Zapatistas' own civilian wing, the Zapatista National Liberation Front (FZLN). There were representatives from the Tepoztlán struggle in Morelos and from urban groups such as the Francisco Villa Patriotic Front, Mexico City's largest slum organizing

committee. In May the FAC-MLN coordinated occupations of the municipal palaces in the Guerrero villages of Ahuacutzingo, Coyuca de Benitez, and Copanatoyac, where the municipal president was held to press demands on land claims, and the state government sent officials to negotiate his release. FAC-MLN, however, failed to ally with either the EZLN or FZLN. Many influential FAC-MLN militants were critical of Zapatista willingness to talk with the government.

In June, at a one-year anniversary commemoration of the Aguas Blancas massacre held at the site of the killings, the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) emerged from the hills and took over the stage, announcing the arrival of a second armed peasant movement in southern Mexico. Over the next several months, as the EPR launched repeated ambushes on security forces, the level of militarization in the Sierra del Sur predictably escalated. Guerrilla collaboration became an expedient charge against unarmed civil activists. In May 1999 Rodolfo Montiel and Teodoro Cabrera, two leaders of the Campesino Environmentalist Organization of the Sierra of Petatlan and Coyuca de Catalan (OCESP) who had blockaded local timber operations, were arrested on drug and weapons charges. The men denied any involvement in armed activity. After a campaign on their behalf the CNDH concluded that the military illegally detained Montiel and Cabrera, and extracted their "confessions" through torture. In 2001 Montiel and Cabrera were released on "humanitarian grounds" by President Vicente Fox; however, it took the October 2001 murder of the men's attorney, Digna Ochoa, to prompt Fox's action. Authorities ruled Ochoa's death was likely a suicide, but Amnesty International protested "myriad deficiencies" in the investigation. Meanwhile, other OCESP leaders have since been arrested on similar charges and remain behind bars.

In Chiapas the toll on civil movements was even greater. On December 22, 1997 a PRI-linked paramilitary group massacred 45 unarmed Tzotzil Maya peasants at the hamlet of Acteal in Chenalhó municipality. The victims were members of Las Abejas (The Bees), a Maya Catholic pacifist group sympathetic to the Zapatistas' demands for indigenous autonomy and land reform, but committed to principles of non-violence. In 2007 courts would finally sentence 34 men to 26 years each for the killings, but Las Abejas

maintains that the true masterminds are protected by the government and still at large.

While ties between PRI paramilitaries and the security forces have perhaps weakened since the one-party state was broken up in 2000, violent factionalism in the Lacandon Selva continues to claim lives. The ARICs split into pro-PRI, EZLN-sympathist, and neutral tendencies, and a profusion of paramilitary groups have emerged as PRI-loyal jungle settlements have armed against the Zapatistas. The attack that left four Zapatista sympathizers dead at the settlement of Viejo Velasco in November 2006 shows the potential for a return to the level of violence seen in Chiapas in the late 1990s.

Another significant *campesino* struggle since the fall of the one-party state is that at San Salvador Atenco, a Nahuatl village in Mexico state which, in September 2002, declared itself a rebel “autonomous municipality” to resist plans by federal authorities to expropriate village lands for a new Mexico City airport. In May 2006 Atenco was assaulted by state riot police, who beat and arrested dozens, sparking a new human rights scandal. In January 2004 Morelos state police occupied the village of Tlalnepantla with similar violence after residents had declared an “autonomous municipality” following a disputed election.

But the Oaxaca rebellion of 2006 most clearly showed the continuing power of the indigenous and *campesino* movements. The Oaxaca crisis began when the state’s school teachers went on strike that May, demanding bigger budgets for schools in poor rural parts of the state. When the PRI’s Governor Ulises Ruiz refused to meet their demands, the teachers launched a sit-in at Oaxaca City’s *zócalo*, which swelled to a tent city of several thousand. In a pre-dawn raid on June 14, state police attacked the encampment, but the teachers and their supporters beat back the police and re-took the square. The demand now became for the ouster of Ruiz, who the strikers claimed was fraudulently elected. A coalition of civil organizations congealed around the Popular Assembly of the People of Oaxaca (APPO) and seized control of the Oaxaca City center. Ruiz and his bureaucracy had to retreat to hotels on the outskirts.

Over the following weeks, small civil rebellions took place in indigenous towns and villages throughout the mountains of Oaxaca, and “autonomous municipalities” loyal to APPO were declared. The COCEI in Juchitán also

joined with the APPO. A true system of parallel power emerged in Oaxaca before the movement was broken by a federal police force sent by Fox, in one of his last acts as president that November – with at least six killed, some 150 arrested, and others “disappeared.” Ironically, the Oaxaca repression came precisely as Mexico’s former president Luis Echeverría was formally charged with genocide for overseeing the dirty war against leftist dissidents a generation earlier.

SEE ALSO: Mexico, Armed Political Movements, 1960s–Present; Oaxaca Uprising, 2006; Obrador, Andrés Manuel López (b. 1953) and the PRD; Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Barry, T. (1995) *Zapata’s Revenge: Free Trade and the Farm Crisis in Mexico*. Boston: South End Press.
- Campbell, H. (1994) *Zapotec Renaissance: Ethnic Politics and Cultural Revivalism in Southern Mexico*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Campbell, H. et al. (Eds.) (1993) *Zapotec Struggles: Histories, Politics, and Representations from Juchitán, Mexico*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Harvey, N. (1998) *The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Weinberg, B. (2000) *Homage to Chiapas: The New Indigenous Struggles in Mexico*. London: Verso.

Mexico, labor movement and protests, 1980–2005

Dan La Botz

Mexican working people participated in significant social movements in the tumultuous transition period between 1980 and 2005. The context for these movements was a profound change in politics, in the economy, in the structure of social classes, and in the character of social movements themselves. The central issue throughout this era was the struggle over democracy, but also important were fights to stop the privatization of nationalized industry and movements for a living wage. The period opened with a reorientation of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) away from a nationalist political economy and toward open markets and free trade, and

reached a turning point in 2000 with the election to the presidency of Vicente Fox of the conservative National Action Party (PAN), ending the PRI's 75-year dominance.

The Massacre of 1968: The Opening of the Crisis

The crisis of Mexico's old corporatist order opened with the student democracy movement of 1968 and the police and army massacre that year of hundreds of student activists. Those events polarized Mexican society, producing a new left that broke with the Mexican Revolution's state party and the dominant nationalist ideology. The Mexican new left, variously influenced by Eurocommunism, inspired by Trotskyism or Maoism, or modeling itself after Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, emulating the armed revolutionary tradition of the Mexican Revolution, became active in all varieties of students', poor peoples', peasants', and workers' movements. Some new leftists joined the armed rural and urban guerilla movements, while others participated in the workers' insurgency or in myriad peasant movements. Some joined with electrical workers leader Rafael Galván in the radical nationalist Democratic Tendency (TD) and the National Front of Popular Action (FNAP). Yet others joined the more ideological leftist political parties.

In 1977 the Mexican government, in order to create an escape valve for discontent, effectively legalized the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) and other leftist parties. By the early 1980s Mexican politics had become more competitive as the PRI was challenged by the PAN on the right and three small parties on the left. The communists merged with other small groups to create the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM) in 1981. Heberto Castillo played the leading role in founding the nationalist Mexican Workers' Party (PMT) in 1974. And, in 1976, the Trotskyists merged to create the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT), which ran Rosario Ibarra de Piedra as the first woman candidate for president in 1982. The PAN, adopting non-violent, confrontational tactics such as blocking the northern border, grew more rapidly than the left-wing parties, and the political system tilted to the right.

Left activists – particularly radical nationalists, Maoists, and Trotskyists – strove to combine

the many scattered movements into a force that could challenge the PRI and the Mexican state, not only politically but also economically and socially. While the far left led these broad working-class movements from below, eventually culminating in a national strike wave, the more moderate PSUM, influenced by Eurocommunism, looked toward politics as its favored sphere of activity.

During the period between the early 1970s and 1983, the far left succeeded in pulling together diverse forces of workers, peasants, students, the urban poor, and women's groups into a series of united fronts that challenged government policy. The most important were the National Front of Popular Action (1976), the National Front against Repression (1979), the National Front for the Liberation and the Rights of Women, the National Front in Defense of Wages and Against Deprivation and Austerity (1982), and the National Committee in Defense of the Popular Economy (1982), which came together to form the National Worker Peasant Popular Assembly (ANOCPE, 1983).

Even more important was the creation of three national coordinating committees. First, the National Coordinating Committee Plan de Ayala (1979), taking its name from Emiliano Zapata's plan of 1911, coordinated a large part of the independent peasant movement. Second, the National Coordinating Committee of the Urban Popular Movement brought together substantial sections of poor peoples' movements in the cities. Third, the National Coordinating Committee of Education Workers led the very large and important opposition in the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE), the Mexican teachers' union.

The PRI leadership, coming under the domination of the so-called technocrats, began to adopt measures that came into conflict with the PRI's Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM). This created an opening for the left just as high levels of inflation pushed workers and unions to demand price controls and wage increases. All of these pressures pushed the CTM leadership, the country's largest federation by far, to give the legally required strike notifications (*emplazamientos a huelga*) at tens of thousands of plants. The CTM and independent unions led a series of movements that culminated in May of 1983 in the largest strike wave in Mexican history. The movement peaked

in October 1983 when the ANOCP called a National Civic Work Stoppage. The May Day march of 1984, accompanied by a militant independent group that tossed Molotov cocktails at the Palace of Fine Arts, signaled the end of this period of labor militancy and opened a period of disarray in the labor movement and the left.

The Debt Crisis of 1982

The debt crisis of 1982 was the crucial turning point in both the economics and politics of Mexico in this period. During this period Mexico experienced falling oil prices, high interest rates, increased inflation, and an overvalued peso; these led to capital flight and the virtual disappearance of Mexico's international reserves. The government, which had already devalued the peso in 1980, did so three more times in 1982. Mexico defaulted on its debt and was forced by the New York banks and international financial institutions to accept structural adjustments. The Mexican debt crisis signaled a sea change in the politics of the PRI which, under President Miguel de la Madrid, abandoned economic nationalism in favor of neoliberalism. The technocrats took control of the party, turning it in the direction of open markets and free trade.

The Earthquake of 1985: The Rise of Civil Society

The September 19, 1985 earthquake in Mexico City marked an important shift in the character of the social movements in Mexico. While the government hesitated to act, throughout the city groups of citizens, often led by leftists, stepped forward to organize the rescue of victims. Among those hard hit by the earthquake were the women garment workers of the San Antonio Abad district who, with the aid of feminists, leftists, and the independent Authentic Labor Front, succeeded in the rare feat of winning a charter for the September 19 Garment Workers' Union.

Throughout the 1980s, civil society and its new movements changed the character of the labor movement and the left. Women played a leading role in the Urban Popular Movement (MUP), and middle-class women became involved in the feminist movement, one part of which – the Women of Union Action – oriented toward working women and the unions. An environmental movement developed to fight the

building of a nuclear reactor at Laguna Verde. Indigenous people organized to demand their rights in many areas. Middle-class professionals organized around issues of electoral reform. Taken together, these movements constituted civil society, a broad movement of the left for democracy and social justice.

The new activism was reflected in the growth of a new student movement. Students struck the National Autonomous University of Mexico in the fall of 1986 and the winter of 1987, creating a University Student Council (CEU) to negotiate with the rector and mobilize as many as 250,000 students and supporters in mass rallies. The 1986–7 student strikes produced a new layer of social movement activists.

The Election of 1988

In October 1987, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas led his Democratic Current out of the PRI and announced his candidacy for president. Within a few months he had brought together various parties and other political formations to create the National Democratic Front (FDN) as his campaign organization and proto-party. Disoriented since 1983, much of the left supported Cárdenas, and many organizations joined the FDN, including the Mexican Socialist Party, the latest avatar of the communists. Within the FDN the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), founded by Adolfo Gilly and others, became the locus of a kind of far left regrouping.

While the official labor unions backed the PRI's candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Cárdenas's 1988 presidential campaign won support from millions of peasants, workers, and public employees. Many authorities believe that Cárdenas won the election of 1988, but the PRI government decided that Salinas had. Cárdenas, saying he feared a bloodbath, hesitated to mobilize his followers to stop Salinas from taking office. Nevertheless, the Cárdenas campaign led to the foundation of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), into which the PMS, the former communists, dissolved their organization.

As president, Salinas carried out a virtual reversal of the Mexican Revolution of 1910–40. He modified Article 27 of the Constitution, permitting sale of the land of the *ejidos*. He privatized 1,000 state companies, including Telmex, the state phone company, the National Railroads, and the Cananea copper mine. To carry

out these measures he launched a series of brutal attacks on the labor movement, including armed attacks on the offices of the Petroleum Workers' Union (STPRM) and the military occupation of Cananea in order to keep the Mineworkers' Union (SNTMMRM) from acting to prevent the sale of the mine. Throughout his presidency from 1988 to 1994, Salinas led an aggressive offensive against labor unions, both official and independent.

The Mexican economy was transformed during the presidencies of de la Madrid and Salinas as they privatized industries and opened the country to foreign investment, developments which weakened and disarticulated the labor and peasant movements. In 1964 Mexico and the United States had established the *maquiladora* zone on the US–Mexico border; after 1975 this export processing zone grew rapidly until by the 1980s it had hundreds of thousands of workers. After a flurry of strikes in the *maquilas* in the 1970s, the government undertook to prevent unionization, except in some areas by loyal CTM unions. Workers in various plants along the border attempted to democratize those unions or organize independent unions, or to carry out strikes against their employers, but all such efforts were crushed by the employers, the official unions, and the labor authorities.

Beginning in the 1980s, Mexico experienced deindustrialization in other areas, as older industrial plants closed. Symbolic of this era was the closing of Fundidora de Monterrey, the steel mill founded in 1900. The steel workers demonstrated in the nude, but the symbolism of their nakedness in the face of the power of capital won them nothing. A new northern industrial zone developed along a line running approximately from San Luis Potosí to Guadalajara. New investors, Mexican and foreign, built in these greenfield areas and often escaped the labor unions or negotiated sweetheart deals with them. In 1986 Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in 1994 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). That same year Mexico, Canada, and the United States implemented the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA opened Mexico to the duty-free importation of corn and other agricultural products which by the 1990s had ruined hundreds of thousands of Mexican farmers and peasants.

Zapatistas and Chiapas Uprising of 1994

On January 1, 1994, the day that the NAFTA agreement was to go into effect, an armed guerilla group called the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) launched an uprising in Chiapas, attacking several towns and the city of San Cristóbal de las Casas. The former urban guerillas at the head of an army of displaced peasants and Mayan Indians announced that they would march to Mexico City to stop NAFTA, to overthrow the government of Carlos Salinas, and to call a constituent assembly to write a new constitution. Salinas called out the army to crush the guerillas, but throughout the country civil society protested against military repression and demanded a non-violent solution. While most Mexicans objected to the armed uprising as much as the army's intervention, they believed that the Indians' and peasants' needs must be attended to.

On the eve of the 1994 election, it seemed that three forces existed that might come together to defeat the PRI: the Zapatistas in Chiapas, the civil society movement, and the left-of-center PRD. Subcommandante Marcos, leader of the EZLN, spurned Cárdenas of the PRD, and the left divided between intransigents and accommodationists. In the election, however, Ernesto Zedillo of the PRI won, Diego Fernández de Cevallos of the PAN came in second, and Cárdenas of the PRD came in third with only 16 percent of the vote. Taking office on December 1, Zedillo immediately took economic steps that provoked the country's worst economic crisis since the great depression. El Barzón, a debtors' movement, emerged as one of the most popular and militant organizations of the late 1990s.

Zedillo negotiated the San Andrés Larrainzar Accords with the Zapatistas in February 1996 but failed to have the Congress ratify the agreement's provision. So the Zapatistas, while refraining from the use of arms, did not lay them down and remained in a state of rebellion. Another guerilla group, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), also emerged in the 1990s and engaged in kidnapping, assassinations, and bombings.

The Labor Movement Reorganizes: Founding of the UNT, 1997

With the rise of the technocrats in the PRI and the changes in the economy, the Congress of

Labor (CT), the umbrella organization of official unions dominated by the CTM, went into crisis. In November 1997, the Telephone Workers' Union (STRM), the National Union of Social Security Workers (SNTSS), and six other unions left the CT and, joined by independent unions such as the Union of Workers of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (STUNAM) and the Authentic Labor Front (FAT), created a new labor federation, the National Union of Workers (UNT). At about the same time the Mexican Union of Electrical Workers (SME) brought together a number of popular organizations to create the Mexican Union Front (FSM), largely dedicated to defending the nationalized electrical power industry and the petroleum industry. While UNT and the FSM were left of center, some unions moved to the right. In December 2005, the million-member Mexican Teachers' Union (SNTE), headed by Elba Esther Gordillo, led a breakaway of 21 out of 30 unions from the Federation of Unions of Workers at the Service of the State (FSTSE), and formed the Democratic Federation of Unions of Public Servants (FEDESSP). Gordillo's FEDESSP demonstrated a willingness to find a *modus vivendi* with the PAN.

While the unions disintegrated and then reorganized, they also declined. During the period from 1984 to 2000, Mexico's labor union density (the percentage of workers in labor unions) declined in the formal sector from 30 to 20 percent. Many unions in Mexico, however, were "ghost unions" created by management with "protection contracts" that defended the employers against real worker organizations. Some authorities believe that 80 percent of all labor union agreements may be "protection contracts." The decline of real union power during the period under consideration was therefore even more dramatic than the figures on labor union density would indicate.

In 2000 the Mexican people elected the PAN's Vicente Fox, a former Coca-Cola executive, shoe manufacturer, and rancher, to the presidency. Many left, right, and center cast ballots for Fox, desiring to break the power of the PRI and hoping that Fox would bring democracy to Mexico. Fox soon disappointed many by adopting an archly conservative political agenda. He also reached out to the PRI's CT and the CTM, creating a PAN alliance with the old PRI unions.

Faced with this challenge, the UNT called for the founding of a broad front to oppose the Fox agenda. In 2002 the UNT founded the Union, Peasant, Social, Indigenous, and Popular Front (FSCISP), made up of El Barzón (the debtors' union), the Permanent Agrarian Congress (CAP), the Countryside Can Stand No More (El Campo no Aguanta Más), and the Movement for National Unity in the Fight against Neoliberalism, as well as many other smaller unions, farmers' and peasants' organizations, and urban social movements. The FSCISP not only opposed Fox and his political agenda, it also called for a struggle against neoliberalism and its effects, attacked NAFTA, criticized the World Trade Organization (WTO), and opposed the US war in Iraq. While not a member, the FSM also worked to build the coalition. The organization of the FSCISP, with its hundreds of member organizations, provided the labor movement with a broader base and a more powerful instrument with which to challenge Fox. Still, unlike the coalitions of the early 1980s which dared to take the offensive, this was fundamentally a defensive front.

This period culminated in 2006 in three dramatic upheavals, one local, one national, and one international. The election campaign of 2006 was a battle principally between Felipe Calderón of the PAN and Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the PRD. López Obrador, the former mayor of Mexico City, proved to be a charismatic populist and won a following among the nation's working people. President Fox and the PAN attempted to block López Obrador's candidacy on a legal technicality and then engaged in illegal campaigning. When the votes were counted in July 2006 the election authorities announced that Calderón had won. Many believed that the election had been stolen. In protest, López Obrador organized massive demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of his supporters and a weeks-long sit-in by tens of thousands, blocking the major boulevards of the city. Finally, López Obrador, on November 20, with perhaps a million demonstrators in the national plaza, proclaimed himself the legitimate president and head of the legitimate government.

Felipe Calderón took office as the official head of state on December 1. While for a short period it appeared as if Mexico might have two rival presidents, this was not dual power, and López Obrador was not prepared to rule the country. His legitimate government became a permanent

opposition, a peripatetic shadow government traveling the country to organize against Calderón's conservative agenda, above all to oppose the privatization of the petroleum industry.

At almost the same time in the capital of the southern state of Oaxaca, a massive popular protest arose against Ulises Ruíz Ortiz, the PRI governor of the state. The conflict began with a strike by Local 22 of the teachers' union who as usual occupied the city's plaza. When Ruíz ordered the police to attack the teachers and their families engaged in their *planton* (sit-in), the majority of the city's population rallied in their defense. Scores of local groups came together to create the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO), which organized a kind of civic uprising, briefly controlling the city and dubbed by some the "Commune of Oaxaca." APPO also took over several radio and TV stations, broadcasting its views to the city's population. Small neo-Stalinist parties played a role in the leadership of APPO, though the movement was quite broad. Ruíz's police and death squads continued to attack Local 22 and APPO and their captured radio stations, kidnapping, torturing, and killing from June to November when President Fox sent in federal police who drove APPO from the plaza, arrested and jailed several APPO leaders, and crushed the movement. Altogether more than 20 were killed and Ruíz continued in office as governor. Still, Local 22 and the APPO survived the attacks and regrouped; they had been defeated, not obliterated.

Finally, by 2006 approximately 10 percent of all Mexicans, unable to find work in their own country, had migrated to live and work in the United States. In April and May of 2006, millions of immigrants in the United States demonstrated for immigrant rights and immigration law reform, the largest contingents being Latinos, and the largest among them Mexicans. Led by Mexican radio announcers in Chicago and Los Angeles, by home-town organizations from Michoacan and Zacatecas, by Mexican Catholic congregations and soccer teams, millions of Mexican immigrants participated in what were the largest political demonstrations in the history of the United States with the slogans "We are workers not criminals" and "No human being is illegal." Many workers participating in May Day celebrations in Mexico carried placards or chanted slogans in solidarity with their kinsmen demonstrating in the United States.

SEE ALSO: Eurocommunism; Marcos, Subcomandante (b. ?); Mexico, Railway Workers' Struggle, 1957–1960; Mexico, Worker Struggles and Labor Unions, 1950s–1970s; Oaxaca Uprising, 2006; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Anguiano, A. (1997) *Entre el pasado y el futuro: La izquierda en México, 1969–1995*. Mexico City: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana.
- Caulfield, N. (1998) *Mexican Workers and the State: From the Porfiriato to NAFTA*. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.
- Grayson, G. W. (2007) *Mexican Messiah: Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador*. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University.
- La Botz, D. (1982) *Mask of Democracy: Labor Suppression in Mexico Today*. Boston: South End Press.
- La Botz, D. (1988) *The Crisis of Mexican Labor*. New York: Praeger.
- La Botz, D. (1995) *Democracy in Mexico: Peasant Rebellion and Political Reform*. Boston: South End Press.
- Middlebrook, K. J. (1995) *The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State and Authoritarianism in Mexico*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Moguel, J. (1987) *Los caminos de la izquierda*. Mexico: Juan Pablos Editor.
- Osorno, D. E. (2007) *Oaxaca Sitiada: La Primera insurrección del siglo XXI*. Mexico City: Random House Mondadori.
- Roman, R. & Velasco, E. (n.d.) *The Oaxaca Commune: The Other Indigenous Rebellion in Mexico*. Socialist Project. Available at www.socialistproject.ca/documents/OaxacaCommune.pdf.
- Trejo Delarbre, R. (1990) *Crónica del sindicalismo en México, 1976–1988*. Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.

Mexico, railway workers' struggle, 1957–1960

Vittorio Sergi

The movement of the railway workers from 1957 to 1960 marked an important rupture in the corporative economic and political system of post-revolutionary Mexico. In the first two years of struggle the workers won significant wage increases and political autonomy within the Mexican railway workers' trade union (STFRM). Because of the rise of international anti-communist politics and its strong political influence on the

rest of Mexican society, the movement faced increasing state repression that cut off the independent leadership and discarded its demands in 1959.

During the presidency of Adolfo Ruiz Cortinez (1953–8), the Mexican peso suffered a significant devaluation in 1954 that caused widespread discontent, especially among farmers and industrial workers. In 1957 the railway workers started a protest with the objective of increasing their wages. In this process they articulated the need for an independent trade union leadership and soon began to fight against the management, which was strongly connected with the political leadership of the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) and the Revolutionary Central of Mexican Workers (CROM) trade union. The method of co-optation and control from the state of the trade union was called *charrismo* and meant the use of both corruption and open repression. Several dissident sections of the STRFM all over Mexico organized on May 2, 1958 the General Commission for the Rise of Salaries. Their demands were presented in the document called “Plan del Sureste” on June 12. The workers asked for 350 pesos more a month to regain what they had lost with the rising inflation. Facing the opposition of the management, the federal government, and the formal leader of STRFM, Ortega Hernandez, the dissident trade unionists decided to start an escalating strike. The first strike started on June 26, lasting two hours, and then was followed by another day of four hours on strike and six hours the next day.

On June 28 in Mexico City police attacked a demonstration of striking workers from the electrical company trade union, students, teachers, and workers of the telephone service. Railway workers Rafael Alday Sotelo and Andrés Montaña Hernández were killed by the police. The all-day strike continued from June 29 to 30, putting the railway and logistic system of Mexico into chaos. Because federal political elections were scheduled for July 4, the government pushed the management to negotiate and finally to agree with the strikers on a salary increase of 215 pesos a month.

In the federal elections of July 4, Adolfo López Mateos (1958–64) came to power, and on July 12 the Sixth Extraordinary General Union Convention met and chose Demetrio Vallejo to the position of general secretary of the National Railroad Council, breaking with the

governmental control over the trade union. Vallejo (1912–85), a worker from Oaxaca who led the protest of the dissident sections of the union, was elected an independent representative of the executive general committee by the majority of local sections. He was a former member of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), from which he was expelled in 1946, and was one of the founders of the Mexican Worker–Peasant Party (POCM). Both the secretary of labor and the company for which the workers operated refused to accept Vallejo in the position. The ministry of the interior demanded that the previous leader be reinstated, effectively overruling the convention vote. In defiance of the ruling, the workers called again for a strike on July 31, 1958.

The strike lasted two hours and was supported by the electrical workers' union (SME) and members of the national teachers' union (SNTE). The government responded by repressing the strikes, and on August 3, 1958, police were sent in to seize the railroad workers' union halls in Mexico City, arresting the dissident members. On August 4 a new demonstration was attacked, resulting in heavy standoffs. Four protesters were killed. The army occupied the telegraph building, which was also on strike. The management tried to break up the workers' commissions with partial concessions, but they refused. On August 6, 1958, the government agreed to hold new elections for the position of general secretary. On August 27, about 60,000 workers cast votes, with the final result of 59,749 votes for Vallejo and 9 votes for the government candidate Samuel Ortega.

A major mobilization for the new collective contract followed this success, but the government was not likely to make more concessions. Vallejo went on to present a plan to assist the railroad's financial standing. The plan consisted of raising rates and terminating subsidies given to US mining and metal companies. It was believed these changes would permit the railroad to recover money to raise wages for its workers and provide better working conditions. The plan was refused. A general national strike was then planned for February 25.

After increasing repression from the government of Adolfo Lopez Mateos, the strikers took a step back and started to negotiate. One month later, receiving no satisfaction of their demands, workers stuck all over Mexico. The strike was again declared illegal by the federal tribunal of

labor, and on March 28, 1959, the army took over the trade union offices and the whole railway infrastructure, causing heavy standoffs with the protesters. The strike and the blockades continued spontaneously until April 12. On April 15, the government confirmed the imposition of the new official trade union leaders, and more than 3,000 workers were arrested and 500 sentenced to several years' imprisonment. Vallejo was sentenced to 16 years in jail. A communist trade union leader, Román Guerra Montemayor, was killed by the police in Monterrey and on May 17, 1960, Valentín Campa, leader of POCM, was arrested as well. Although the movement was broken up, it was considered in the coming years as the starting point of autonomous industrial trade unionism in Mexico.

SEE ALSO: Mexico, Armed Political Movements, 1960s–Present; Mexico, Labor Movement and Protests, 1980–2005; Mexico, Worker Struggles and Labor Unions, 1950s–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Bruhn, K. (1999) Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico. *Canadian Committee on Labour History: Labour/Le Travail* 44 (September): 285–7.
- Handelman, H. (1976) The Politics of Labor Protest in Mexico: Two Case Studies. *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 18, 3 (August): 267–94.
- La Botz, D. (1992) *Mask of Democracy: Labor Suppression in Mexico Today*. Boston: South End Press.
- Poniatowska, E. (2005) *El Tren pasa primero*. Mexico City: Alfaguara.

Mexico, worker struggles and labor unions, 1950s–1970s

Dan La Botz

The major Mexican worker struggles of the 1950s to the 1970s grew out of the political economic system that had been established in Mexico in the post-revolutionary period. The Mexican ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), had by 1950 through a combination of political maneuvers, payoffs, gangsterism, and police and military action succeeded in taking control of virtually the entire organized labor movement.

The Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) and the other major labor federations and industrial unions had all affiliated with the PRI. In return for getting out the vote for the ruling party and supporting its policies, union officials became PRI leaders who were rewarded with political positions as governors, congressmen, and senators. Workers, when they were hired, automatically became members of the appropriate union and members of the PRI, and they were mobilized by the union to attend party demonstrations and to vote.

The PRI and the CTM dominated the Federal and Local Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration (JFCA, JLCA), in which they often collaborated with the employers. The secretary of labor policed the labor movement by denying registration (*registros*) to unions or refusing to recognize their elected officers (*toma de nota*), or refusing to grant them the right to negotiate union contracts (*titularidad*). Workers who challenged the official unions could be expelled as disloyal members under the exclusion clause (*la cláusula de exclusión*). Strikes were frequently declared illegal (*inexistente*) and broken by employers, the union apparatus, or the police. This system of state-party control of labor unions largely determined the nature of major union struggles, that is, they tended to grow into head-on confrontations with the state-party system.

During this period Mexico had a mixed economy with a large state-owned sector of over 1,000 firms, many of them in heavy industry. Among the state-owned firms (*paraestatales*) were oil, steel, electric power generation, railroads, and telephone. The Mexican state corporations and corporations owned by Mexicans or foreign investors in Mexico all predicated their investment, production policies, and profits on the state's ability to discipline labor in order to prevent strikes and to keep wages low, but to permit growth of state and employer benefit programs such as housing, government food stores, and government social security (health and pension). Mexican workers then found that the state-party was often simultaneously their employer, their union, their political party, their landlord, their health and pension plan, and their neighborhood grocery.

Given this context, Mexican workers often found that if they wanted to improve their work situations or reform the system, they came into conflict with their employer, their union

officials, and the ruling political party. There were during these years three periods of major workers' struggles: the teachers and railroad workers' strikes of the late 1950s; the workers' insurgency of the late 1960s and early 1970s centered in the auto, auto parts, and telephone industries; and the electrical workers' movement of the mid-1970s. Despite what were sometimes massive, heroic, and powerful movements, none of these succeeded, largely because of government repression and political maneuvers.

Mexican Teachers and Railroad Workers in the 1950s

The principal economic reason for the teachers' and railroad workers' strikes was the stagnation of wages. In both cases, the economic issues quickly also became issues of union democracy and both affected other unions.

The teachers' movement for higher wages began in 1956 in Local 9 in Mexico City. Leaders included a charismatic young teacher named Othón Salazar, a former Communist Youth member, and J. Encarnación Pérez Rivera, a member of the Mexican Communist Party's (PCM) political committee. In 1957 they organized the Teachers' Revolutionary Movement (MRM) and in December called for a 40 percent wage increase. The MRM, with broad support from parents, struck the elementary schools repeatedly between April and May and on June 2 the government conceded the wage increase. On September 6, 1958, however, Salazar and Pérez Rivera were arrested and charged with sedition (*disolución social*). The Mexican Teachers' Union (SNTE) leadership cleverly held elections in Local 9 while the two dissidents were jailed. When Adolfo López Mateos became president on December 1, 1958, the release of the dissident teachers was arranged, though the government insisted that it did not concede their innocence. The teachers' movement subsided.

In 1958 Demetrio Vallejo, a member of the Mexican Workers' and Peasants' Party (PO-CM), emerged as a leader in Local 13 of the Mexican Railroad Workers' Union (STFRM). Vallejo, representing Local 13 and six other locals, called for a wage increase and began a series of escalating strikes on June 26, 1958. President Ruíz Cortines intervened, granting workers a large wage increase. The STFRM convention then elected Vallejo general secretary, but the secretary

of labor refused to recognize the new leadership. The union struck to force recognition of its executive board. On August 3, the Mexican government mobilized police and soldiers to seize the railroad workers' union halls throughout the country. The union responded by a general strike by 100,000 workers, paralyzing the national railroad system. The government then agreed to a new union election and Vallejo again won election to the office of general secretary.

The union struck the National Railroad on February 25, but the government labor board immediately declared the strike illegal. President López Mateos then intervened, agreeing to the union's demand for a pay increase, and it seemed the crisis had passed. It had not. Vallejo called for a general strike over issues at the smaller railroads. The strike began on March 25, 1959, the beginning of Holy Week, and the government responded with the militarization of the railroads (*requisita*). The police and army also took over union halls, killing several workers, and within a few days the strike was broken. The company fired at least 9,000 workers. The government arrested thousands, and about 500 workers were tried. Several leaders received sentences of 11 years, while Vallejo was sentenced to 16 years. The government restored a loyal leadership to power in the union. The railroad workers' movement was broken, the left suffered a serious defeat, and the workers' movement was relatively quiet for a decade.

The Workers' Insurgency

A new generation of activists appeared in the late 1960s. The student demonstrations of August 1968 and the Tlatelolco Massacre of October 1968, where police killed hundreds of students, polarized the country. Radicalism and militancy spread to the workers' movement.

The workers' insurgency (*Insurgencia Obrera*) refers to a wave of localized union activism in Mexico in the late 1960s and early 1970s. While this movement, sometimes led by Maoists and Trotskyists, existed in mines, steel mills, and other industries, the insurgency was particularly notable in the auto parts plants and in the Mexican Telephone Company (Telmex). The Authentic Labor Front (FAT), a Catholic union federation inspired by the theology of liberation, and Independent Worker Unity (UOI), a leftist union led by a radical lawyer, both led militant

strikes in auto and auto parts plants. Both were involved in strikes in the early 1970s at Nissan and Volkswagen, while the FAT led a long militant strike at Spicer. In Telmex, it was Francisco Hernández Juárez who organized an important strike in 1975 and then led a movement for a better contract in 1976. Creating the Democratic Committee of Telephone Workers, he won election to general secretary in 1976, by 86 to 10 percent. Mexican President Luis Echeverría succeeded in co-opting the UOI and Hernández Juárez, though the FAT remained independent.

The Democratic Tendency

Rafael Galván, the left-wing leader of the electrical workers' union STERM, joined in 1966 with the CTM and other state-dominated unions to create the Congress of Labor (CT). However, he soon found himself at odds with CTM leader Fidel Velázquez, who supported a rival electrical workers' union, SNE. Soon the two unions came into conflict and Velázquez expelled Galván's STERM from the CT. President Echeverría intervened in the union conflict to force a merger of Galván's STERM and the SNE, creating a union called SUTERM, headed by Francisco Pérez Ríos, a *charro* loyal to Velázquez. In response, Galván organized the Democratic Tendency (TD), a movement within the SUTERM but with other labor allies, and published the Declaration of Guadalajara, a call for a democratic union movement and social reform to fight for the original goals of the Mexican Revolution. He also organized the National Front of Popular Action (FNAP) with the participation of 300 unions, peasant organizations, poor peoples' groups, and students. When on July 16, 1976 Galván called a strike against the Federal Electrical Commission (CFE), the government responded by sending in army units supplemented by hired gangsters to break the strike. Thousands of workers were fired and replaced by scabs.

SEE ALSO: Mexico, Labor Movement and Protests, 1980–2005; Mexico, Railway Workers' Struggle, 1957–1960

References and Suggested Readings

Caulfield, N. (1998) *Mexican Workers and the State: From the Porfiriato to NAFTA*. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.

La Botz, D. (1988) *The Crisis of Mexican Labor*. New York: Praeger.

Middlebrook, K. J. (1995) *The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State and Authoritarianism in Mexico*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Michel, Louise (1830–1905)

Gabriel Kuhn

Louise Michel was an unapologetic anarchist agitator and internationalist heroine. Throughout her 74 years, Michel was a fearless warrior and leader of the Paris Commune, a loud voice on behalf of workers, an incorrigible prisoner and defendant (many times over), a libertarian educator, a nemesis of imperialism, and a champion of social revolution. Her poetry and letters (published posthumously), as well as odes and essays written in her honor, are a testament to the profound impact she had on the movements she was a part of.

Michel was born in the village of Vroncourt, in northeastern France. She was the daughter of Marie-Anne Michel, an unmarried maid in the house of a wealthy landowner. There is some speculation as to the identity of Michel's father, but evidence seems to point to Laurent, son of Marie-Anne's employers. Tension between Louise and Laurent's wife apparently drove her out of the house and to the university where she studied to be a teacher. Thereafter, Michel experimented with avant-garde education methods highly critical of prevailing methods in small intimate settings until, in 1865, she moved to Paris to open her own school. Although Michel had a propensity for justice and compassion from an early age, it was the struggle for the French Republic of the 1870s that radicalized her.

In Paris, Michel came into contact with revolutionary thinkers, artists, and activists who further informed her radical politics. She was involved with public demonstrations, protests, and petitions against the French empire at first, quickly moving on to more militant actions against the conservative French Government of National Defense. Michel was active both as a medic and as an armed militant in Montmartre. She belonged to the most radical factions of the people's battalions and became known as one of the Commune's most resolute defenders.



Louise Michel (1830–1905) was a French revolutionary, teacher, lifelong labor activist, and leader in the Paris Commune of 1871. Following the defeat of the Commune, Michel was deported to New Caledonia, a French penal colony. In exile, she supported the education and anti-colonial struggle of the indigenous Kanak population. (Roger Viollet/Getty Images)

Within the Commune, Michel organized women's groups, daycare for children, and even organized sex workers to work as medics – a move considered quite radical, even by the standards of some of her fellow (male) communards.

After the fall of the Commune and the execution of many of her comrades, including her close ally Théophile Ferré, Michel was imprisoned and finally deported to New Caledonia, a French penal colony at the time. During the voyage to the overseas territory, Michel befriended Nathalie Lemel, who was also deported for her involvement in the Commune. Michel's increased interest in and subsequent lifelong dedication to anarchism is commonly attributed to this acquaintance.

During her seven years in New Caledonia, Michel – unlike most deported communards –

actively sought contact with the Kanaks (the local Melanesian population), started educational projects in their communities, and supported the independence struggle. Michel is still considered a popular anti-colonial hero in New Caledonia, which remains a French colony (or “overseas territory”) as of 2008.

After amnesty for the communards was granted in 1880, Michel returned to France and continued her revolutionary activity. In 1883, she reportedly refused to display the red flag at a political demonstration in order to distance herself from what she considered to be authoritarian socialists, choosing to display a black flag instead. The incident is often cited as the origin of the black flag as an anarchist symbol.

Over the following years, Michel was imprisoned several times. From 1883 to 1886, she served a three-year sentence for her involvement in a demonstration of unemployed workers that resulted in the looting of some bakeries. Michel's contempt for authority is evidenced by her statement to the court during her sentencing: “When we are told that we are enemies of the republic, we have only one answer: We found it upon 35,000 of our corpses . . . that is how we defended the republic.” This type of impassioned harangue against the court and other state officials was typical of Michel from the time of the Paris Commune, and throughout the rest of her life.

From 1890 on, she spent extended periods of time in England where she was mainly involved in alternative education projects. In France, she remained a tireless agitator and traveled the country as a speaker. During a speaking tour in January 1905, Michel died of pneumonia. Her funeral in Paris drew a crowd of over 100,000. The most popular amongst Michel's numerous writings – which include poetry, fiction, and political commentary – became her *Mémoires* (1886).

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Gender; Anarchism, France; Hugo, Victor (1802–1885); New Caledonia, Protest and Revolt; Paris Commune, 1871

References and Suggested Readings

- Maclellan, N. (Ed.) (2004) *Louise Michel: Rebel Lives*. New York: Ocean Press.
- Michel, L. (1981) *The Red Virgin: Memoirs of Louise Michel*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Thomas, E. (1980) *Louise Michel*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

Michnik, Adam (b. 1946)

Amy Linch

Adam Michnik was one of the most charismatic and influential figures in the democratic opposition to state socialism in Poland. His intellectual activism and organizational talent were critical to the success of the *Solidarność* (Solidarity) movement. Through the influence of Jacek Kuroń he became an outspoken critic of the gap between ideology and practice under the communist regime before he had even finished high school. While a student at Warsaw University he worked with a group of nonconformist intellectuals to foster political engagement among students, encouraging them to challenge authority and interrogate the ideological verities espoused by the Communist Party. His role in the student protests of March 1968 led to one of several prison terms he served over more than two decades of activism, and permanent expulsion from university. During the 1970s he was an active member of the Workers' Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR) and a lecturer for the Flying University. He became an advisor to Lech Wałęsa and the Solidarity movement, and participated in the round table negotiations that ended the Communist Party's dominance of political life in Poland.

Like many student leaders of 1968, Michnik was the child of communist intellectuals. His father was a revolutionary activist before the war and served as the first secretary of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine. His mother, an author of children's books, was also a loyal communist. As a child Michnik was a member of a Walterite scouting troop led by Jacek Kuroń, which sought to transmit the values that informed the communist revolution to subsequent generations. The experience cultivated in him a commitment to social justice and an understanding of socialism as the practical manifestation of equality and freedom that informed his lifelong activism. As a secondary school student in 1961, Michnik was a founding member of the Club of Seekers after Contradictions (*Klub Poszukiwaczy Sprzeczności*), which read and analyzed leftist works. Later that year he was introduced to the Club of the Crooked Circle, a discussion group of prominent Warsaw artists

and intellectuals, of which Kuroń was also a member. His made his debut as a formidable voice of opposition in a speech about school reform – at the age of 15. He was expelled from school for “illegal activities” but continued to attend the club's meetings until it was banned by the communist authorities the following year.

Michnik entered the history department at Warsaw University in 1964 where he continued to participate in debates about communist ideology, despite the increasing government suppression of discussion clubs. He was suspended for distributing Kuroń and Modzelewski's 1964 “Open Letter to the Party,” and again in 1966 for organizing discussion groups with philosopher and historian Leszek Kołakowski, who had earned the party's censure for advocating a humanist interpretation of Marx and criticizing party leaders. Michnik's writing was banned from publication by the Communist Party in 1965, prompting him to begin using a pseudonym, a practice he would continue throughout his life.

During 1968 he was one of the most visible organizers of student demonstrations against the government's termination of the enormously popular production of Mickiewicz's classical drama *Dziady* (*Forefathers*). In the anti-Semitic charged crackdown on student resistance that followed the March events of 1968, Michnik was expelled from the university, arrested, and sentenced to three years in prison. He was granted amnesty a year later but barred from finishing his degree until the mid-1970s. After he was released from prison he worked as a welder in the Rosa Luxemburg Light Bulb factory before becoming personal secretary to the experimental poet Antoni Słonimski.

Michnik's writings during the 1970s laid the intellectual foundations for what would later become the Solidarity movement. His 1976 essay, “The New Evolutionism,” drew upon the lessons of 1956 and 1968 to articulate a strategy and justification for political opposition. Both the Revisionists of the 1960s, who sought national reform within Marxist ideology, and the Neopositivists of the previous generation, who saw the USSR as an inescapable reality but rejected Marxism and socialism, had failed because they relied upon change from the top. These strategies ultimately affirmed the power of the state and promoted complicity between reformers and their oppressor. In the 1960s and 1970s, Michnik argued, social conflict had grown more

pronounced, and open conflict required clear allegiances. Under such conditions one must clearly state whose side one is on – that of those being beaten up or that of those doing the beating. Non-violence, furthermore, was an effective strategy only where clear boundaries delineated the scope of governmental power. The first task of the opposition under totalitarian rule was to practically establish a distinction between the society and the state. Social solidarity was a means of generating power by establishing such distinctions and undermining the government as the fundamental point of reference (Michnik 1985: 142).

The society rather than the state was the target for a program of reform. People could exert pressure on the state by acting independently in society and taking responsibility for their own actions. Michnik argued that pressure from the working class was essential to the development of a democratic political culture. The secular intelligentsia and the Catholic Church furthermore had reason to overcome their historical animosity and combine forces in resisting authoritarian rule by defending human freedom and dignity and creating space for independent expression. The pursuit of truth within civil society was a powerful transformative tool: “In searching for truth, or to quote Lech Kolakowski, ‘by living in dignity,’ opposition intellectuals are striving not so much for a better tomorrow as for a better today. Every act of defiance helps us to build the framework of democratic socialism, which should not be merely or primarily a legal institutional structure but a real day to day communality of free people” (1985: 148).

The Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR), formed to help the workers and their families who were victimized by the authorities for their participation in the 1976 strikes, was a practical manifestation of the societal self-determination Michnik recommended in his essay. During the first few months of the organization’s existence Michnik was a spokesperson for KOR, generating international support for the initiative during an eight-month stay in Paris. He became an active participant in its day-to-day fundraising, organizing, publishing, and distribution of information and legal advice to workers upon his return to Poland in the spring of 1977. In anticipation of the Solidarity movement a few years later, KOR actualized the ideals of self-management, tolerance, and pluralism that

Michnik argued were the essence of a democratic society. An independent public life would not be delivered to society by the state but created by people acting in solidarity.

When General Jaruzelski imposed martial law in 1981, Michnik was arrested and held without charges for three years for refusing to sign an oath of loyalty and go into exile. He went on a hunger strike while incarcerated to insist that he be designated a political prisoner. He was granted amnesty in 1984, and arrested again in 1985 for organizing a strike in the Gdańsk shipyard. He was again sentenced to a three-year prison term, of which he served one year before being granted amnesty. During his periods of freedom in the 1980s he continued to advocate democracy and promote civil society. While in prison he wrote numerous essays and open letters, many of which were smuggled out and circulated in the underground.

In 1989 Michnik participated in the round table negotiations between representatives of the communist regime and the Solidarity movement. When Solidarity was re-legalized that April, Michnik became the editor-in-chief of *Gazeta Wyborcza* (Electoral Gazette), the first independent opposition paper in the Soviet bloc, which he established in conjunction with Helena Luczywo. He was elected to parliament in the first free elections (1989–91), but did not pursue political office after serving one term. In 2008 Michnik continues to be one of Poland’s leading journalists and public intellectuals.

SEE ALSO: Kuroń, Jacek (1934–2004); Poland, 1956 Uprising; Poland, Student Movement, 1968; Poland, Trade Unions and Protest, 1988–1993; Solidarność (Solidarity); Soviet Union, Fall of; Walentynowicz, Anna (b. 1929); Walesa, Lech (b. 1943); Women in the Solidarity Movement, Polish Underground

References and Suggested Readings

- Bernhard, M. H. (1993) *The Origins of Democratization in Poland*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Falk, B. (2003) *The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Kennedy, M. (1992) The Intelligentsia in the Constitution of Civil Societies and Post-Communist Regimes in Hungary and Poland. *Theory and Society* 21, 1 (February): 29–76.
- Michnik, A. (1985) *Letters from Prison and Other Essays*. Trans. M. Latynski. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Michnik, A. (1993) *The Church and the Left*. Ed. and Trans. D. Ost. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Michnik, A. (1998) *Letters from Freedom: Post-Cold War Realities and Perspectives*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Tighe, C. (1997) Adam Michnik: A Life in Opposition. *Journal of European Studies* 27 (September).

Micronesia, nationalist and labor protests

Justin Corfield

The imperial powers have used the islands of Micronesia for military bases since the nineteenth century and for nuclear testing since the World War II era. Naturally, the indigenous residents of these islands have often protested such use of their homeland.

Guam

The first contact Guam had with Europeans occurred in 1521 when Ferdinand Magellan landed there. In 1565 the Spanish officially claimed the island and used Guam as a base for ships plying the Pacific. In 1668 the Spanish tried systematically to colonize the island, establishing a Jesuit mission, but this effort met resistance. By 1690 the indigenous Chamorro population had fallen – mainly through disease rather than fighting – from 100,000 to 5,000. With Spanish and Filipinos settling on the island, the population balance changed forever.

Since then, Guam has been ruled by several imperial powers. In 1898 with the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the United States took Guam. During World War II the Japanese took over, but after the war the US seized about a third of the island, and, in spite of considerable opposition from some of the Guamanians, created large military bases, which were important in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Although the initial protests failed to prevent the establishment of the bases, legal battles continued, with the US losing a lawsuit in 1986 and being forced to pay compensation to the dispossessed landowners. This landmark judgment had many repercussions, the most important of which was that the protest movement moved from the streets to the

courts. In February 1994 the US government promised to close down large parts of its naval base and return much of the land to the original landowners.

Marshall Islands

The Marshall Islands in the Pacific were ruled by Germany until World War I, when they were taken over by Japan and ruled under a mandate from the League of Nations. After World War II the US navy took control of them, with the United States controlling them as a United Nations Trust Territory from 1947. Between 1946 and 1958 the United States used the Marshall Islands for nuclear tests at Bikini Atoll and at Eniwetak.

The first major political protest in the Marshall Islands took place in 1982, when over 1,000 landowners who had been dispossessed from Kwahjalein Atoll took part in Operation Homecoming, fighting for four months against missile testing on their atoll. This led to other protest groups campaigning against US nuclear tests, although the Marshallese held back from introducing an anti-nuclear constitution as was the case in nearby Palau.

There were a number of protests against the use of the Marshall Islands for US nuclear tests, but there was little publicity for these until 1985 when the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior* sailed to Rongelap Atoll to help relocate some of the people away from the nuclear waste. There was a large protest in 1996 when the people from Bikini Atoll commemorated the 50th anniversary of their forced evacuation so that the US could conduct nuclear tests. They had been moved to Rongerik Atoll where many fell ill from eating poisonous fish, while others nearly starved from food shortages. Following protests later that same year, and reports by German scientists hired by the people from Bikini Atoll, much of the residual nuclear radiation in the lagoon was removed to allow the people to return. This successful protest was followed by another by the people of Eniwetak Atoll who had been exiled for 33 years. The Nuclear Claims Tribunal awarded \$578 million in compensation to these people and another \$73 million to the people of Rongelap Atoll, where people had been exposed to radiation some 20 times the rate that the US government had previously claimed.

Federated States of Micronesia

There has been little political ferment in the Federated States of Micronesia, which has a population of 108,143 (2003 estimate) from nine Micronesian and Polynesian ethnic groups. There were strikes in the early 1970s by teachers and cannery workers, with strikes by government employees banned by law.

Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas

The Northern Marianas covers 14 islands in Micronesia that were first settled in about 1500 BCE by the Chamorro people and “discovered” by Ferdinand Magellan in 1521, with the Spanish establishing a Jesuit mission on the islands in 1668. The Jesuits were not welcomed, and there were a number of attacks on them and their encampment by the Chamorros. As a result, by the 1680s, the Spanish had to put a small army garrison on the island. There was a dramatic change in Spanish policies in the 1690s when the Spanish decided to establish “reductions” and rounded up the Chamorros to work in colonial plantations on the island of Guam. There were a few sporadic attacks on the Spanish, with many Chamorro on the island of Rota managing to hide from the Spanish. It also left many of the islands unpopulated.

Plantations remained successful in this area. Though Germany bought the Northern Marianas from the Spanish in 1899, being interested in developing the copra industry, the Japanese returned to sugar cultivation when they took over at the start of World War I. This move was financially successful, and by the 1930s some 60 percent of all Japanese revenue from Micronesia came from the sugar industry. It was also a period when a number of Japanese settled at Saipan. By World War II there were 45,000 Japanese and other migrants and only 5,000 Micronesians.

After World War II the Northern Marianas were administered by the United States as a Trust Territory. In 1948 half of Saipan was turned into a secret US military base in spite of protests by some of the Micronesians who lived on the island. Others saw the building of the base as helpful to the economy. In July 1975 the people of the Northern Marianas voted in a referendum to withdraw from the Trust

Territory and become a US Commonwealth. This took effect in January 1978 and in November 1986 a new constitution ensured that the people of the Northern Marianas became US citizens.

Palau

In April 1978 the Congress of Micronesia, the legislature for the islands which included Palau, agreed on the Statement of Agreed Principles for Free Association, giving the United States control over security and defense. On January 7, 1981 Palau approved its own constitution, which explicitly prohibited the introduction of nuclear weaponry into Palau’s territory and restricted the ability of the US to acquire land for military purposes. However, on August 26, 1982 the governments of Palau and the United States signed the Compact of Free Association, which gave the United States the right to station its military in Palau, including nuclear weapons, in return for internal sovereignty and economic aid. Most of the political protests in Palau since then have been over this Compact of Free Association and its clear conflict with the provisions of the constitution of Palau.

A referendum to amend the constitution of Palau to allow for the approval of the Compact of Free Association required a majority of 75 percent. There have been many referenda held since 1983, with the government of President Haruo Remilik claiming that a simple majority should be sufficient to ratify the compact, but this was rejected by the Palau Supreme Court. Again in a referendum held in February 1990, there was not enough of a majority to alter the constitution to ratify the compact, with the US maintaining its United Nations trusteeship. On November 4, 1992 the people of Palau elected a new government and accepted a proposal to allow the constitution to be changed by a simple majority. After various legal challenges, on November 9, 1993 the electorate voted in favor of the Compact of Free Association by a majority of 5,193 to 2,415 (68 percent majority). Palau then became independent on October 1, 1994, and in December 1994 it became the 185th member of the United Nations. Most of the protest movements that surrounded the Compact of Free Association have now finished, although there are some moves to end it when it expires in 2009.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Protests, Marshall Islands; French Polynesia, Protest Movements; Guinea-Bissau, Nationalist Movement; Solomon Islands, Protest and Uprisings; Vanuatu, Land Reform Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Bendure, G. & Friary, N. (1995). *Micronesia*. Melbourne: Lonely Planet.
- Cockrum, E. E. (1972) The Emergence of Modern Micronesia. PhD thesis, University of Colorado, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor.
- Coulter, J. W. (1957) *The Pacific Dependencies of the United States*. New York: Macmillan.
- Joseph, A. & Murray, V. F. (1951) *Chamorros and Carolinians of Saipan: Personality Studies*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rogers, R. F. (1995) *Destiny's Landfall: A History of Guam*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Yamazaki, J. N. & Fleming, L. B. (1995) *Children of the Atomic Bomb: An American Physician's Memoir of Nagasaki, Hiroshima, and the Marshall Islands*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Migration struggles and the global justice movement

Manuela Bojadžijev

“Autonomy of migration” names a concept whose methodology enables a series of questions to be asked about the relationship between migration and capitalism, opening the horizon for a range of political perspectives on migration struggles taking place around the world and in the context of the alter-globalization movement. The persistence of movements of migration in the face of the militarization of borders and an elaborate, if not always coherent, migration regime in the United States and Europe constitutes a component within the analysis, to the extent that it focuses on the agency of migrants. The concept opens up the possibility to question the contemporary formation of capitalist socialization and its imperial, postcolonial, and, therefore, global foundations.

The term autonomy of migration had, for a long time, a hidden presence in an interview with the French political economist Yann Moulier Boutang, published in Italian in 1992 and later translated into German. Through the concept, he spoke first and foremost of the “subjective factor” that had long been suppressed in many

theoretical and political analyses and public debates about migration. Moulier Boutang insisted that the experts and agencies that concentrated on immigration failed to notice the autonomy of migration and instead attributed it to economic policy, insisting it was a matter of administrative regulation. As a result, “the objectivity of politics and economic policy in particular are grotesquely overestimated, and it is forgotten that there is a momentum to emigration.” He concluded that “One can confront emigration by means of repression, ‘demanding’ the return of immigrants, but one cannot open up and block the flows according to programming and estimation.”

Although a broad academic debate, which even extended into official policy analyses for American and European migration management, this theory recognizes that migrants do not simply constitute a disposable quantity which can be turned on and off through economic policy; the discourse of the autonomy of migration has long had, and continues to have, the function of transforming the perspective *on* migration into the perspective *of* migration. What Moulier Boutang and others after him have drawn attention to is that migrants do not passively follow investments of capital, but rather there is a co-determination between the two processes. The consequence of migration not being reducible to the mobility of labor-power is manifested in the correlation between governance and migration policies, both of which are directed toward the entire population rather than simply the administration of migration movements. On this point, the concept follows Michel Foucault’s considerations on biopolitics. In terms of the political dimension of the concept, this means that the right to work always needs to be connected to the right to life.

The appearance of the term fulfilled the historically and politically necessary role of allowing migration to be rethought. Migration – according to the theory – opens a field of social and political conflict, although the resultant social antagonism, rather than becoming a challenge requiring theoretical and analytic reflection, is often blamed upon the migrants. A view of migrants emerges like a picture puzzle, sometimes regarded as villains (as they are thought by the right), and sometimes as victims (as in the left-wing and liberal-left tradition). The concept of the autonomy of migration unseats this image,

which has appeared in numerous different forms and had historically proven itself resistant.

Migration never occurs in the same way more than once; it has numerous causes and rarely only takes place in one direction. It is not the project of individuals, but rather a process which rests upon transnational networks and a global movement. To name it a social or political movement, as some approaches to the autonomy of migration suggest, challenges us to question our understanding of the political. To adopt the perspective of migration means rethinking the limits to national organization, whether that be in the form of national migration policies or the work of national trade unions, as well as reconsidering conceptions of local and global, tight disciplinary boundaries, and most of all, the absurd idea that without migration, the national society would – or could – exist as a space free from antagonism.

The Relation between Movement and Organization

The European alter-globalization movement – and two groups in Germany, Kanak Attak and Keim mensch ist illegal (No one is illegal), in particular – took up the term toward the mid-to late 1990s in their work on the politics of migration and anti-racism. Later, the concept was picked up on the European level by the No Borders and Frassanito networks, where it was discussed and elaborated, becoming established in numerous European countries. Following the logic that migration cannot be dealt with as something reducible to its relevance to domestic politics, migration struggles have begun to be addressed within the Social Forum process. At the first European Social Forum, in Florence in November 2001, the Italian movements – which had already dedicated the opening demonstration of the protests against the G8 summit in Genoa to the issue – made migration a central topic. In 2004, migration became, for the first time, an explicit theme at the World Social Forum (WSF) in Mumbai, India. In the meantime, the 2005 WSF in Porto Alegre, Brazil, and a follow-up event the following year in Madrid, Spain, created the World Social Forum on Migration.

At the latter, around 1,000 participants from 84 countries gathered, adopting the Rivas Declaration (Rivas is a location near Madrid). At the meeting, numerous analyses were devel-

oped, ranging from the critique of border policies to the identification of new forms of discrimination against migrants. Demands were levied, ranging from the legalization of those without documentation, to the defense of the right to asylum, to demands for nation-states to sign the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families. The gathering announced as its goal the development of a World Charter for Immigrants and committed itself to global days of action and the organization of a thematic focus on migration at the WSF in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2007.

The international theoretical debates within the alter-globalization movement resonated with theoretical approaches to slavery, waged-labor, and the *lumpenproletariat*, as well as numerous feminist, migration theory, and postcolonial contributions, alongside artistic and cinematic productions. Through their “situated knowledge” (Donna Haraway), each of these approaches produced a discreet understanding of what can be understood as *autonomy* in the context of migration and addressed the tension generated by the question of the relation between movement (in its material conditions as well as its consequences) and organization (with its ideological aspects).

Political and cultural networks, historically, have always been established in migration. They precede both political organizations and theoretical conceptualizations. They are repeatedly faced by great challenges, with which every cross-border organization is confronted: the difficulty of translation, both in terms of its “simple” linguistic sense and in relation to political concepts, contexts, and theories. Other challenges include the conception and the (limits of) transferability of forms of political organization and communication, as well as human movement over borders in conditions of restrictive immigration laws. The struggles of migration include conflicts around the conditions *of* migration, as well as the conditions *in* migration. In some cases, even the struggles include advocating conditions that bring an end to migration (i.e., that either render it unnecessary in the first place or successfully end the process of settlement).

Theoretical Ambivalences

The concept of the autonomy of migration, which is fundamentally influenced by autonomous

Marxism, is without a doubt contested. The approach is criticized as creating difficulties in recognizing migrants as the victims of the international division of labor, from relations of exploitation, colonialism and postcolonialism, from war, gender relations, racism, and from American or European regimes of migration management.

On the conceptual level as well, the term is in need of clarification. As with many terms, both its strengths and its weaknesses lie in the fact that it remains ambivalent, always running up against its limits. With the autonomy of migration, this ambivalence results from three elements that do not all have the same meaning. For one, the concept presents the obstinacy of the migration process as a social phenomenon resulting from an irreducible multiplicity of individual acts. To a certain extent, processes of migration can have intended consequences; but there is also a series of unintended consequences for the societies being emigrated from and immigrated to. Because the subjective dimension is obscured in these unintended instances, however, arguments have been made that they do not, therefore, reflect an autonomy. The concept of the autonomy of migration connects to the persistence of movements of migration and to the impulse toward mobility within social networks. In the process of migration, migrants unseat existing forms of sociality. However, there is a dialectic to every aspect of the autonomy of migration. For example, mobility is the source of exploitation, insofar as capitalism relies on the mobility of labor power; while at the same time, mobility constitutes the ability to flee from relations of exploitation and oppression. The perspective of the autonomy of migration is about the materiality and the resistance of the governed. Migration is neither free from existing forms of socialization, nor does it allow itself to be entirely channeled.

This point touches upon a further methodological aspect as to whether migration even exists as an object of scientific scrutiny, or whether extremely heterogeneous phenomena are brought into a unity for disciplinary or political motivations. In particular situations, for example, there is a point where migration dissolves itself into something else (the refugee becomes a migrant worker who becomes the object of integration policy and so on). An example of this could be the ways in which discussions around urban

uprisings, which take place in Great Britain or the French *banlieues* with a certain regularity, have debated whether the rebellious youth should be regarded as migrants or as more generally deprived or marginalized.

In a second sense, autonomy can be understood as the practice of resistance by migrants who refuse, who unseat social relations, break with convention, flee, take off, leave, modify, communicate, transfer, and perhaps even genuinely take part in forms of collective resistance. This aspect relates to both the conditions *of* migration and the conditions *in* migration, and sometimes even the conditions to end their status of migration altogether. The issue here is a political question of the relation between movement and organization. Or, in terms of methodology: there is the need for a more precise differentiation between struggle and non-struggle, and moreover the form of the struggles of migration. Here, the central question is whether flight from particular circumstances can also be recognized as creating something positive, or rather, being something constitutive.

Thirdly, migration can be seen as an autonomous interrelation, as a network of reciprocal aid within families, clans, or city districts – with all the ambivalence that such a situation brings with it. Autonomy arises in social conflicts, in the new forms of cooperation and communication they produce, in the constitution of new lives. Processes of migration generate new forms of sociality. They can lead to particular structures within households, political organizations, and modes of economic production, ranging from precarious working conditions to capitalist enterprises. Social networks can cultivate closed communities with recognizable identities. This has to do with the inevitable coexistence of different autonomies and the necessity for political dialogue. Autonomy and heteronomy are as such never isolated from one another. And not infrequently, autonomy is presumed in a situation which ultimately leads to its destruction. Taking all three standpoints into consideration, what Louis Althusser would call an “over-determination” can be postulated in relation to migration; in other words, an irreducible complexity of the social totality, which neither has one cause nor only one meaning.

Migration, precisely because of these all-encompassing and over-determined aspects, forces us to consider society in its global dimension.

The concept of the autonomy of migration focuses on the conditions of movements of migration; not *for* migrants as such, but rather to take up the challenge presented by the struggles of migration as they transgress numerous boundaries in search of a better life. Migration, seen from this perspective, is an ephemeral component of every society – both internally and externally, simultaneously. It remains in the status of *l'avenir* (the future) and repeatedly involves the momentous promise, “*to come.*” As John Berger and Jean Mohr wrote in their book *A Seventh Man*, migration is immortal: “So far as the economy of the metropolitan country is concerned, migrant workers are immortal: immortal because continually interchangeable. They are not born: they are not brought up: they do not age: they do not get tired: they do not die” (1975: 64).

SEE ALSO: Autonomism; Foucault, Michel (1926–1984); G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Italy, from the New Left to the Great Repression (1962–1981); Negri, Antonio (b. 1933); World Social Forums

References and Suggested Readings

- Balibar, E. & Mezzadra, S. (2006) *Borders, Citizenship, War, Class: A Discussion with Etienne Balibar and Sandro Mezzadra* by Manuela Bojadžijev and Isabelle Saint-Saëns. *New Formations* (January): 10–30.
- Berger, J. & Mohr, J. (1975) *A Seventh Man: The Story of a Migrant Worker in Europe*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Bojadžijev, M. (2008) *Die Windige Internationale. Rassismus und Kämpfe der Migration*. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.
- Bojadžijev, M. & Karakayali, S. (2007) *Autonomie der Migration. 10 Thesen zu einer Methode*. In: Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe, *Turbulente Ränder. Neue Perspektiven auf Migration und den Rändern Europas*. Bielefeld: Transcript, pp. 209–15.
- Foucault, M. (2008) *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979*. Trans. G. Burchell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2001) *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mezzadra, S. & Neilson, B. (2003) *Né qui, né altrove – Migration, Detention, Desertion: A Dialogue*. *Borderlands* 2 (1).
- Moulier Boutang, Y. (1992) *Razza Operaia*, intervista a Y. Moulier Boutang a cura di Roberto Ulargiù. In *Movenze, Diciotto Dodici*. Padua: Calusca Edizioni, pp. 1–34.

Milosz, Czeslaw (1911–2004)

Colleen K. McQuillen

Upon receiving the Nobel Prize for literature in 1980 Czeslaw Milosz became a public icon, gaining a wide readership in the West and in Poland where his poetry had been banned from publication for thirty years. The award came two years after Karol Wojtyła was elected Pope John Paul II, and only one month after Solidarity emerged as the first non-communist trade union in Poland and as a force in opposition politics headed by Lech Walesa. This historical coincidence magnified Poland’s visibility in the world and amplified Milosz’s reputation as a political dissident, a reputation rooted in his exile (1951–81) from communist Poland.

Prior to seeking political asylum in France, Milosz demonstrated his strong sense of moral and historical responsibility by participating in the Resistance against Nazi occupation of Poland during World War II. Out of this experience arose his anthology of anti-Nazi poetry, *The Invincible Song* (1942), which circulated underground.

Milosz was a political and aesthetic philosopher, essayist, and poet who examined humankind’s historical condition through the lens of moral responsibility. Milosz’s poetry from his university years (such as his first volume, *Poem on Frozen Time*, 1933) reflects his association with the Zagary (retrospectively called the Catastrophists), a group of poets that expressed apocalyptic anxiety and foreboding of the horrors that would sweep Europe. In contrast, Milosz’s postwar poetry is more hopeful in its exploration of universal questions. It displays the poet’s wonderment and his deep appreciation for natural beauty.

Milosz’s poem “You who have wronged” (1950) is immortalized on a monument to the shipyard workers killed in a 1970 protest in Gdansk. The monument, built by the Solidarity Union, bears the lines: “Do not feel safe. The poet remembers. You can kill one, but another is born. The words are written down, the deed, the date.” These lines reveal the poet’s sense of power and duty as a witness of history. Milosz’s expository *Captive Mind* (1953) likewise expresses his social engagement by examining the various responses of intellectuals living under a totalitarian regime.

While Milosz considered himself a Polish poet because he wrote in Polish, he was born in Szetejnie, Lithuania (then part of the Republic of Poland), and earned a law degree in 1934 from Stefan Batory University in Vilnius. Because he believed that language shaped thought, he composed verse in Polish throughout his life even though he lived in the United States from 1960 to 2000. Milosz spent the first 18 of those years as a professor of Slavic literatures at the University of California at Berkeley. In 2000 he returned to Poland, settling in Krakow, where he spent the remainder of his life.

SEE ALSO: Poland, Trade Unions and Protest, 1988–1993; Solidarność (Solidarity); Walesa, Lech (b. 1943)

References and Suggested Readings

- Haven, C. L. (Ed.) (2006) *Czeslaw Milosz: Conversations*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi.
- Milosz, C. (1981) *Native Realm: A Search for Self-Definition*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mozejko, E. (Ed.) (1988) *Between Anxiety and Hope: The Poetry and Writing of Czeslaw Milosz*. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press.

Ming Rebellions, 1600s

Justin Corfield

After the Manchus defeated the Ming Dynasty and took control of China in 1644, some Ming loyalists fled to safety in southern China where several groups held out for many years, becoming known as the Southern Ming. The Southern Ming rebellions started soon after the overthrow of the Ming Dynasty by the Manchus, which essentially took place in 1644.

The first of the rebellions which became known as the Southern Ming revolts was led by Chu Yu-sung, better known as the Prince of Fu. Like all the main claimants of the Southern Ming, he was descended from Emperor Wan-li (r. 1573–1620). Chu Yu-sung assumed the imperial title Emperor Hung-kuang and reigned in Nanjing for a year. When news reached Nanjing that the Manchus had captured Beijing in 1644, it was initially uncertain whether Chu Ch'ang-fang, the Prince of Lu, or Chu Yu-sung should be proclaimed the next emperor. With the Ming military in Nanjing supporting him, Chu Yu-sung became the choice of the court and on June 19, 1644 he was proclaimed emperor.

The new emperor, Hung-kuang, decided that his first move would be to send emissaries to the Manchus, thanking them for defeating the warlord Li Tzu-cheng, and also to get a report about the actual situation in Beijing. The emissaries offered the Manchus much gold and silver, and also an annual subsidy of 100,000 silver taels a year if the Manchus would retire to behind the Great Wall, leaving the Ming to reclaim the Forbidden City. However Dogon, the Manchu regent, rejected this entirely and countered that he would not invade the South if Hung-kuang would recognize the Manchus as overlords. The Ming claimant rejected this, and war became inevitable.

The fighting began badly for the Southern Ming. Hung-kuang concentrated his forces far too much, leaving the provinces of Anhwei and Kiangsu unprotected. This allowed the Manchus under the command of another member of their new imperial family, Dodo, to seize the city of Yangchow and then pursue the forces of Hung-kuang to Wuhu, Anhwei. Nanjing was taken by the Manchus and Hung-kuang captured and held as a prisoner by one of his own generals, who then handed him over to the Manchus. Hung-kuang was then taken to Beijing where he died in captivity in the following year, 1646.

The defeat and capture of Hung-kuang left the Southern Ming forces to rally around Chu Yu-chien, a distant cousin. He was a descendant of Chu Ching, who was the first prince of Tang, and the 23rd son of Emperor Hung-wu, making him a relatively remote claimant to the throne, but nevertheless one with a genuine imperial ancestry. Born in 1602, he had grown up on his family estates in Honan, spending some time in prison with his father – his father having been involved in a minor dynastic problem resulting in his jailing. In 1632 Chu Yu-chien had become the 9th Prince of Tang, and two years later he was nearly involved in his first military operation when he wanted to use 3,000 men from a local militia against bandits. However the Ming court refused to allow this as they feared that such a large force could be used against them. As it turned out, in 1636 when Beijing was under attack, Chu Yu-chien led a number of soldiers who went to defend the city. They were not needed, and Chu Yu-chien was not thanked but instead, with the Ming suspecting that the action was possibly an attempted rebellion, they reduced Chu Yu-chien to the rank of a commoner.

Following the capture of the city of Nanjing by the Manchus on June 8, 1645, Chu Yu-chien moved to Hankow where he tried to establish a new Ming court. However, this did not last long and the Manchus were able to capture Hankow. This forced Chu Yu-chien to flee again, this time to Foochow. There he was appointed "administrator of the realm," the title devised as Hung-kuang had just been captured.

When it became clear that Hung-kuang could no longer serve as a rallying force against the Manchus, on August 18, 1645 Chu Yu-chien was proclaimed Emperor Lung-wu and his brother, who then succeeded to the title of Prince of Lu, became the "administrator of the realm." Together, the brothers tried to make a stand against the Manchus by gaining the support of the remnants of the army of Li Tzu-cheng whose forces had been driven south by the Manchus. Interestingly, this was the same Li Tzu-cheng to whom the leader of the first of the Southern Ming rebellions had congratulated the Manchus for defeating. However, with them supporting this new rebellion, Lung-wu did make a spirited resistance and even issued a number of copper coins with his name on them. He tried to hold out against the Manchus, but his forces were always militarily much weaker than those of his opponents. The Manchus captured Foochow and then pursued Lung-wu's forces which fled, with Lung-wu himself being captured and then killed. He was always a keen reader and writer and his baggage train, when he was finally captured and killed, included a significant library.

The Southern Ming then chose to rally around Chu I-hai, the Prince of Lu who assumed the title of Regent Lu and "administrator of the realm." He was descended, through ten generations, from the first Ming emperor, becoming the 13th Prince of Lu after his brother committed suicide when the Manchus captured Yenchow. This new rebellion tried to hold out against the Manchus for as long as possible, with Chu I-hai even being invited to run the Ming court at Chekiang, although he declined to become an emperor. He saw his first task as being to rally all the forces who were loyal to the Ming. This was difficult as, in defeat, they were scattered throughout remote parts of southern China. He had tried to reach reconciliation with the court of Lung-wu at Foochow before the latter was killed, but this attempt had failed. Also, early in

his regency, he had relied too heavily on General Fang Kuo-an who retreated, allowing the Manchus to cross the Chientang River which had provided a natural defense for the Southern Ming. His distrust of Fang was later to be proved correct because Fang surrendered his forces to the Manchus.

After Lung-wu was killed, Chu I-hai realized that a direct military confrontation with the Manchus was not going to be a good strategic move. Instead, he decided to retreat and concentrate his depleted forces in Fujian province, moving his capital to a small town called Minan. From there he thought he would be safe from the Manchus. However, they quickly attacked the town and Chu I-hai fled with his increasingly dwindling band of retainers. They took refuge on boats, and as a result their headquarters were known as the Water Palace. He then took up residence at Chusan, and in 1653 he renounced his title of "administrator of the realm," supporting the claim of Chu Yu-lang.

The next Ming claimant to the imperial throne was Chu Yu-lang, a first cousin of Chu Yu-sung, and grandson of the Emperor Wan-li. He had been involved in some of the political intrigue and machinations that had fragmented the Ming in the early 1640s, and in 1646 was made the Prince of Kuei. When Lung-wu was captured by the Manchus, Chu Yu-lang took on the symbolic mantle of being "head" of the Ming imperial family. However, he had been forced to be on the run for a long period as the Southern Ming faced military defeat after defeat. He was cornered in Kueilin on April 18, 1647, but managed to escape to Hunan. The forces which he left behind were able to defend the city, using cannons provided by the Portuguese, and this managed to turn the tide of the battle in their favor and resulted in the Manchus losing their first battle against the Southern Ming. It also allowed the Ming to regroup their forces and recover some parts of the Southwest of China.

In 1650 the Manchus launched a large attack on the Southern Ming and succeeded in capturing a large number of cities and towns in February of that year. On November 24, 1650 the Manchus finally managed to capture Guangzhou and on April 5, 1651 they also took Wuzhou. This left Chu Yu-lang, who by now had been proclaimed the Emperor Yung-li, in retreat, waging a defensive war against the Manchus, before having to turn to guerilla tactics. This group of

Southern Ming finally were forced to retreat into northern Burma.

Yung-li was finally betrayed while at Ava, and taken as a prisoner to Yunnanfu on April 30, 1662. There he was held for several days and then was strangled with a bowstring. His mother and his main wife were also said to have been killed in the same manner. Although this meant that the last of the Ming claimants was now dead, the coastal raider Cheng Ch'eng-kung, better known as Koxinga, and his family held out on Taiwan Island until 1683. Many Chinese in Southeast Asia also continued their loyalty to the Ming Dynasty for many centuries; after the success of the Taipings in the 1850s, some adherents harked back to the period of the Southern Ming.

Several historians have tried to postulate why the Southern Ming were able to hold out for so long. This seems to have been largely because of the rapid collapse of authority throughout southern China, and the Manchus suddenly finding themselves in control of so much of China. It also owes much to the manner in which the Ming had ruled the country. One historian, Lynn Struve, saw the fact that the rebellions had lasted for so long as largely in response to the genuine pride many people had in the Ming institutions of government and that they had managed to rule successfully for three centuries, maintaining a Han Chinese court after the period of Mongol rule, and prior to the long period of Manchu rule. Thus the Ming Dynasty had represented a period of Chinese rule over China, and this in turn led many Chinese to support the various rebellions even though several of them seemed to have little hope of success.

SEE ALSO: China, Peasant Revolts in the Empire; China, Protest and Revolution, 1800–1911

References and Suggested Readings

- Dennerline, J. (1981) *The Chia-ting Loyalists: Confucian Leadership and Social Change in Seventeenth-Century China*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hummel, A. W. (Ed.) (1943) *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period 1644–1912*. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.
- Parsons, J. B. (1957) The Culmination of a Chinese Peasant Rebellion: Chang Hsien-chung in Szechwan, 1644–46. *Journal of Asian Studies* 6, 3 (May): 387–400.
- Struve, L. A. (1984) *The Southern Ming 1644–1662*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Mirabeau, Comte de (1749–1791)

Junko Takeda

Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, Comte de Mirabeau, was an influential revolutionary during the early stages of the French Revolution. Although an aristocrat, Mirabeau sided with the bourgeoisie and common people against the French monarchy and the system of privileges that characterized French society during the old regime.

Mirabeau was born in Bignon on March 9, 1749. After receiving a military education in Paris, he joined the cavalry. His life prior to the French Revolution, however, was characterized by amorous escapades, exile, and debauchery. Mirabeau's father carried on a very public quarrel with his son and, armed with *lettres de cachet* from the king, had him jailed on numerous occasions in an effort to curb his libertinism. Nonetheless, even the younger Mirabeau's 1772 marriage to an heiress failed to end his waywardness. Extramarital affairs and the subsequent desertion of his wife prompted him to go into exile in Switzerland; in May 1777, he was imprisoned and sentenced to death. The sentence was overturned in 1782, but further misadventures forced him into a period of exile in England and Holland, where he spent time mingling in literary and political circles, and writing several pamphlets denouncing the abusive practices of the French monarchy.

In 1788, Louis XVI called the Estates General (a body of delegates from the three estates, or orders, of French society: nobility, clergy, and commoners) to resolve mounting financial and political crises plaguing France. Mirabeau's reputation as a dissident writer and effective orator prompted his election as a delegate for the Third Estate in his district of Aix-en-Provence.

When the delegates gathered in Versailles in the summer of 1789, a deadlock occurred over two related issues: whether to convene jointly as a whole group or separately by orders, and whether to vote by "order" or "head." Because the allied first two orders, the nobility and clergy, outnumbered the commoners of the Third Estate two to one, the delegates of the Third Estate knew that voting by order would effectively disenfranchise them. Maintaining that the Third Estate represented more than 90 percent of the

population, bore the brunt of France's financial burdens, paid most of its taxes, and were its most productive citizens, Mirabeau and the Abbé Sieyès declared that the Third Estate *was* the nation. They led the Third Estate's delegates in deciding to call themselves the National Assembly and to withdraw from the Estates General.

When they found themselves locked out of their meeting room in Versailles, the delegates of the National Assembly gathered in a nearby tennis court. Upon the king's order to disband, Mirabeau famously retorted that the delegates would scatter only "by the force of bayonets." On June 20, 1789, the National Assembly took what has become known as the Tennis Court Oath, swearing to remain in session until a new French constitution was drafted. Soon after, the king made a political retreat and ordered the delegates of the first two orders to join the National Assembly.

Despite his radical stance in the first weeks of the Revolution, Mirabeau envisaged the creation of a constitutional monarchy not unlike that of Great Britain. In the long months during which the new constitution and the Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen were drafted, Mirabeau worked tirelessly to promote the king's executive powers, including his right to veto the Assembly's legislation and to declare war.

Mirabeau hoped his efforts on behalf of the monarchy would win him the office of prime minister, but that was denied him by a motion in November 1789 that excluded members of the Assembly from the cabinet. Despite that setback, Mirabeau went on to play a prominent role in the founding of the National Guard, and in the ongoing struggle over the relationship between the Catholic Church and the new nation. Those debates culminated in the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which weakened the pope's hold over the French clergy, made clergymen civil servants of the nation, and nationalized church land.

Mirabeau's attachment to the monarchy led him to enter into clandestine relations with the court, and in May 1790 the king began secretly paying him for advice on political matters. As the Revolution radicalized, Mirabeau's moderate leanings and closeness to the court brought him under increasing criticism. His last major political role in the Revolution was as president of the National Assembly, which he held from January 30, 1791. Plagued by failing health,

often attributed to his overindulgent youth, Mirabeau died on April 2, 1791. He was honored with burial at the Pantheon, but his remains were removed and his memory disgraced when documentary evidence proved he had secretly been in the pay of the royal regime.

SEE ALSO: Estates General, France; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Sieyès, Abbé (1748–1836); Tennis Court Oath, France, 1789

References and Suggested Readings

- Baker, K. M. (Ed.) (1986) *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Luttrell, B. (1990) *Mirabeau*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Vallentin, A. (1948) *Mirabeau*. Trans. E. W. Dickes. New York: Viking.
- Welch, O. J. G. (1951) *Mirabeau: A Study of a Democratic Monarchist*. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press.

Modernismo

Roxanne Schroeder-Arce

Modernismo is a Spanish-language literary movement which spanned the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries and transformed poetic expression by opponents of despotism and colonialism. Originated by Nicaraguan poet Rubén Darío, the movement stemmed from a desire to break away from the conservative structures and literary influences of the French Symbolists, the Parnassians, and even the Catholic Church, and advanced an idea of poetry rooted in the material world. The poets who formed part of the Modernismo movement in Spain and Latin America opposed autocratic rule and advocated liberal political ideals. In Latin America, José Martí, the late nineteenth-century Cuban revolutionary leader, was among the first leading Modernismo poets, whose ideas of freedom and justice are clearly found in his writings.

The term "modernista" relates mostly to Spanish and Latin American poetry and prose authors whose work can be characterized by the use of free verse, metaphor, and imagery. The Modernismo movement freed authors, as they began to write with more liberty in style and content. Speaking of one of Darío's first works, *Azul* (Blue), George W. Umphrey explains: "we

find flexibility, delicacy, fine shading, clarity and precision of expression; rhythmical flow of language, absence of provincialism and of all local color, characteristic of the prose Modernistas.”

Beyond its literary evolutions, Modernismo offered great promise for social and political change. Guillermo Díaz-Plaja (1965) states that Modernismo works offered “more than a subject-matter of swans and of princesses.” One of the most radical of the Modernismo movement was Argentinean poet Leopoldo Lugones, who has been referred to as anarchist, socialist, and fascist.

Although the Modernismo movement ended in the early twentieth century, its influences can be recognized in Latin American poetry and prose far beyond that time. Gwen Kirkpatrick (1989) views Modernismo as having evolved into a wide variety of genres and experimental methods that are a valuable contribution to modern poetry. While Modernismo is most widely recognized in the literary context, the term has also been used to refer to Latin American visual art. Jacqueline Barnitz (2001) uses the term as a form of symbolism and implies that the label can also refer to a Spanish and Latin American form.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Barnitz, J. (2001) *Twentieth Century Arts of Latin America*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Díaz-Plaja, G. (1965) El Modernismo, Cuestión Disputada (Modernism, Disputed Question). *Hispania* 48, 3: 407–12.
- Gicovate, B. (1964) El modernismo y su historia (Modernism and its History). *Hispanic Review* 32, 3: 217–26.
- Gonzalez, M. & Treece, D. (1992) *The Gathering of Voices*. London: Verso.
- Kirkpatrick, G. (1989) *The Dissonant Legacy of Modernismo*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Umphrey, G. W. (1919) Spanish-American Poets of Today and Yesterday: I. Ruben Dario. *Hispania* 2, 2: 64–81.

Mondlane, Eduardo Chivambo (1920–1969)

Justin Corfield

The “father of the Mozambican nationalist struggle,” Eduardo Mondlane gave up an academic

career in the United States to help with the formation of the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO), but was assassinated as the nationalist war in Mozambique intensified.

Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane was born on June 20, 1920, the fourth of 16 sons of a chief-tain of the Tsonga tribe in Portuguese East Africa. Mondlane worked as a shepherd looking after the family cattle and other livestock until about the age of 10 or 12, and attended a few local primary schools. He then went to a Swiss Presbyterian missionary school, where he quickly gained the attention of a Swiss missionary. Mondlane was not allowed to attend secondary school in Mozambique, so the missionary and his family sent him to a church school at Lemana, Transvaal, South Africa, where he excelled academically. He attended the Jan Hofmeyer School of Social Work for a year, and four years later gained a scholarship to study at Witwatersrand University, Johannesburg in 1948. With apartheid measures brought into force, however, Mondlane was dismissed from its student body for being a “foreign national” after a year, and was forced to return to Lourenço Marques, the capital of Portuguese East Africa.

Back in Lourenço Marques, Mondlane was arrested and questioned over his political activities in South Africa, but released soon afterwards. He was then awarded a scholarship from the Phelps-Stokes Fund of New York to study in the United States; however, he decided to study at Lisbon University in Portugal, where he met with Agostinho Neto (1922–79) and other Portuguese African student activists. Mondlane was unnerved by the level of police surveillance in Lisbon and the discrimination against African students, and finally decided to take up the offer from the Phelps-Stokes Fund to go to the United States. In 1951 Mondlane, aged 31, enrolled at Oberlin College in Oberlin, Ohio (United States), where three years later he graduated with a degree in anthropology and sociology. While there he became keenly interested in basketball and football, and attended conservatory concerts. He then moved to Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, where he completed his MA in sociology. He continued his studies there, and during this period married Janet Rae Johnson, an American from Indiana, with whom he eventually had three children. After leaving Northwestern University, Mondlane spent

a year researching at Harvard University, where he completed his doctorate.

In 1957 Mondlane was appointed as a research officer in the Trusteeship Department of the United Nations, which allowed him to visit many parts of Africa to research the social and political changes in trust territories. When he visited Mozambique in 1961, he was greeted by thousands of Mozambicans who saw him as a possible leader of the nationalist movement; however, as UN officials were not allowed to engage in political activity, he resigned his position with the UN and accepted a position at Syracuse University in New York, where he helped with the development of their East African Studies Program. Mondlane admired the passive resistance of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, but realized that the only way the Portuguese would leave Mozambique would be through armed struggle.

In 1962, Mondlane was elected the first president of FRELIMO with the initial goal of uniting small nationalist groups. Some were worried about Mondlane's time in the United States, but others saw his political background as an asset that challenged the traditionalists who relied on tribal loyalties. In the following year he established a FRELIMO office in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, and resigned from his professorship at Syracuse University. Mondlane used his contacts in academia to garner support from the English-speaking world and wrote extensively on the Mozambican nationalist movement. Gaining assistance from some western sources as well as the Soviet Union, Mondlane started to wage a guerilla war against the Portuguese.

In 1968 FRELIMO managed to hold its Second Congress in a liberated area of Mozambique, and Mondlane was reelected as its president. The following year, Portuguese agents from Gladio, a secret NATO operation, mailed Mondlane a parcel bomb, disguised as a book, which was sent to the FRELIMO secretariat in Dar-es-Salaam. Mondlane was killed in the resulting explosion on February 3, 1969. A state funeral was organized in Tanzania by Julius Nyerere, a longtime supporter of FRELIMO. Mondlane was replaced as commander of FRELIMO by Samora Machel. Mozambique achieved independence in 1975, and soon after the University of Lourenço Marques was renamed the Eduardo Mondlane University, to honor Mondlane's commitment to the nationalist cause.

SEE ALSO: FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique); Machel, Samora (1933–1986); Mozambique, Worker Protests; Neto, Agostinho (1922–1979)

References and Suggested Readings

- Chilcote, R. H. (1972) *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa: Documents*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
- Cornwall, B. (1972) *The Bush Rebels: A Personal Account of Black Revolt in Africa*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston.
- Henriksen, T. H. (1983) *Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Mozambique's War of Independence 1964–1974*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Mondlane, E. (1969) *The Struggle for Mozambique*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Mondragón Collective

Heather Squire

The Mondragón Cooperative Corporation (MCC) is the largest worker-owned and controlled cooperative in the world, and the seventh largest corporation in Spain. Originally started as a 24-member worker-owned and controlled factory in the Basque region of Spain, MCC has grown to encompass more than 80,000 workers in 86 cooperatives throughout the country, 44 educational institutions, various consumer, service, and agricultural cooperatives, and a credit union, with well over a billion dollars in assets. The profitability, growth, and innovative management style of the MCC has drawn researchers from both the business and social science fields. At the same time, students of anarchism, mutualism, and workplace democracy continue to be impressed by it, albeit critically, as what Benello (1996) calls “an example of liberatory organization which, like its predecessors in the Spanish Civil War, has achieved success on a scale unequaled in any other part of the world.”

MCC was founded by José María Arizmendiarieta, a young Catholic priest who came to Mondragón, a city in the Guipuzkoa province near Bilbao, Spain, in 1941 to support young parishioners suffering from the social and economic consequences of the Spanish Civil War (1936–9). In 1943, Father Arizmendiarieta started the Professional School (later called Mondragón Unibersitatea), the first graduates of which went on to form Talleres Ulgor (now called Fagor Electrodomésticos), a small worker-

owned factory. Over the next 15 years, Talleres Ulgor grew and more cooperatives were developed by graduates of the Professional School, who were educated in both technical skills and the values of solidarity and communitarianism (rooted in a progressive Catholicism). In 1959, Father Arizmendiarieta proposed creating a financial institution to fund and research the creation of new cooperatives; this became the credit union Caja Laboral Popular (CLP), which also functioned as the central node of all of the cooperatives. By the end of 1970, nearly 9,000 people were employed by Ulgor and the associated/spin-off cooperatives, several of which merged to form more sustainable cooperatives (such as the Eroski grocery store). Lagun-Aro was also created to guarantee members social security benefits in this early stage.

The first-degree (manufacturing and industrial) and second-degree (services) cooperatives continued to diversify and grow, finally coming together as the legal entity of MCC in the 1980s. While their organizational model has shifted toward what the MCC considers “a more business-like and less sociological approach,” they have maintained their commitment to ten basic principles: open membership, democratic organization, worker sovereignty, instrumental or subordinate nature of capital, participation in management, wage solidarity, cooperation between cooperatives, social transformation, universal nature, and education. Additionally, MCC members are paid through a system of internal accounting (through the CLP) whereby 70 percent of the profit brought in by a particular cooperative is distributed to individual accounts, and the remaining 30 percent goes into a common capital account for expansion, as well as to the community; a 1 to 6 wage differential was set between the highest- and lowest-paid workers; and each new member is obligated to pay a \$3,000 membership fee and remain on probation for their first year (to develop technical as well as management skills). Today the MCC continues to spread member cooperatives throughout Spain, as well as to other parts of the world, opening an average of four new cooperatives a year at a higher level of productivity than most capitalist factories, and creating thousands of new jobs.

In spite of its commitment to the sovereignty of labor and economic success, the MCC has been criticized on a number of points. As Cheney (2002) argues, high rates of growth, bureau-

cratization, and innovation at MCC have undermined some of its democratic underpinnings and replaced it with a technocratic system of management similar to that of a capitalist corporation. More pointedly, Kasmir (1996) contends that the MCC is conspicuously capitalistic, using a cooperative management model to undermine labor unions and working-class solidarity. Other critiques include its focus on export-oriented production, lack of commitment to exporting its cooperative system among the overseas factories it creates, the increase in wage differential (from 1 to 3 initially to 1 to 6 currently), and the lack of bottom-up participation in the election of the top management. While these criticisms may be valid, it has been argued that these features and pragmatic shifts of the MCC were the reason for its spectacular growth, and not its commitment to communitarianism or democracy – which are viewed as aged byproducts of Arizmendiarieta’s egalitarian Catholic ethos.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Spain; Anarchosyndicalism; Anti-Franco Worker Struggles, 1939–1975; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Benello, G. (1996) *The Challenge of Mondragon*. In H. Ehrlich (Ed.), *Reinventing Anarchy Again*. San Francisco: AK Press.
- Cheney, G. (2002) *Values at Work: Employee Participation Meets Market Pressure at Mondragon*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Errasti, A. M., Heras, I., Bakaikoa, B., & Elgoibar, P. (2003) The Internationalisation of Cooperatives: The Case of the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics* 74, 4 (December): 553.
- Kasmir, S. (1996) *The Myth of Mondragon: Cooperatives, Politics, and Working-Class Life in a Basque Town*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Whyte, W. F. (1991) *Making Mondragon: The Growth and Dynamics of the Worker Cooperative Complex*. Ithaca: ILR Press.

Montesquieu, Baron de (1689–1755)

Yves Laberge

Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu was a prolific French author whose writings helped to spark the great

ideological revolution known as the French Enlightenment. Montesquieu's fame as a *philosophe* rests above all on two important books, *Lettres persanes* (*Persian Letters*, 1721) and *De L'esprit des lois* (*The Spirit of the Laws*, 1748). The latter is recognized as one of the most influential works of modern political thought for having articulated the theory of separation of governmental powers.

Montesquieu was born into a wealthy family of wine producers at the Château de la Brède, not far from Bordeaux, in 1689. After studying at the Catholic College of Juilly, he married Jeanne de Latrigue, a Calvinist. Shortly thereafter, he inherited a fortune upon the death of his uncle, together with the title Baron de Montesquieu and Président à Mortier in the Parliament of Bordeaux.

Montesquieu achieved literary success with his *Persian Letters*, a satire based on the invented correspondence of two Persian observers commenting on the absurdities of everyday life in France in the early eighteenth century. Those observations, purportedly from an external perspective, were in fact a subtle critique of the Catholic religion and the French monarchy, among other things. Following the publication of *Persian Letters* in 1721, he wrote *Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans* (1734). In the interim, in 1728, his status as a man of letters was confirmed by membership in the Académie française.

Montesquieu's *The Spirit of the Laws* was originally published anonymously after 15 years of research, traveling, and writing. Although it met with great opposition in France from both supporters and opponents of the Old Regime, *Spirit of the Laws* received high praise elsewhere in Europe, particularly in England. Montesquieu promoted a natural religion without any church. Consequently, the Catholic Church placed the book, along with many of Montesquieu's other works, on its Index of Forbidden Books.

Montesquieu participated in the great literary project of the Enlightenment, the *Encyclopédie* edited by Denis Diderot and Jean d'Alembert, by contributing its entry on Taste. His political writings were informed by extensive travels throughout Europe, which took him to Hungary, Austria, Italy, and England. During his later years he was plagued by poor eyesight, eventually becoming blind. He died from a fever in 1755.

Montesquieu believed that the best form of government was a monarchy based on the British

model. Although he would never have thought of himself as a political revolutionary in any sense, Montesquieu's political views in fact contained revolutionary implications, because in France the transition to constitutional monarchy "on the British model" would require a profound social upheaval.

Montesquieu's legacy is enduring. His political ideas influenced the American Revolution as the source from which the framers of the US Constitution derived the division of government into three separate branches. *The Spirit of the Laws* continues to be studied in political science and history of law courses, and numerous twentieth-century authors, from sociologist Raymond Aron to philosopher Louis Althusser, expressed their admiration for his writings. Emile Durkheim credited Montesquieu (along with Jean-Jacques Rousseau) with being the founder of sociology.

SEE ALSO: Diderot, Denis (1713–1784); Enlightenment, France, 18th Century; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778)

References and Suggested Readings

- Montesquieu, C. (1989) *The Spirit of the Laws*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pangle, T. (1989) *Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on The Spirit of the Laws*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schaub, D. J. (1995) *Erotic Liberalism: Women and Revolution in Montesquieu's "Persian Letters."* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Shklar, J. (1987) *Montesquieu*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Montessori, Maria (1870–1952)

Suzanne Stewart-Steinberg

In the late nineteenth century Maria Montessori was one of Italy's foremost feminist activists and theorists. She became an international celebrity after 1907 when she opened her first "Children's Home" in Rome and subsequently developed her "scientific pedagogy" for the instruction of children between the ages of 3 and 6. This revolutionary pedagogical method was spelled out systematically in 1909 in her *Method* and was predicated on the idea that 3-year-old working-class children not only could but indeed did – under the dictate of an inner compulsion –

become literate and calculating or computing subjects, capable of taking on the requirements and demands of modern, urban culture. Children arrived to this position with the aid of Montessori's didactic apparatus with remarkable speed. Montessori referred to this learning experience as an "explosion," a choice of language that links her to avant-garde circles in Rome, including the futurists.

Up until she became immersed in the struggle for a reformed pedagogy, Montessori tirelessly fought for Italian women's right to vote (something not granted them until 1948) and to gain access to institutions of higher learning. She herself was the second woman to earn a medical degree in 1896, with a specialization in psychiatry. Montessori's feminism distinguished itself by its particular blend of scientific knowledge and social philanthropy. Her "practical feminism" or "philanthropy as politics" gave rise to a movement in Italy that combined the scientific training of women with well-entrenched Catholic activity in the social sphere. For Montessori, women's organizations were to valorize positively traditional feminine characteristics; they were to involve themselves in matters of education, hygiene, and the moralization of the family. It was on the basis of such a platform that Montessori represented the cause of women both in Italy and abroad.

While Montessori herself would eventually refocus her efforts in the direction of educational reforms for handicapped and then all elementary school children, her impact on Italian feminism was profound, to the extent that it updated Catholicism for modern life and helped the Church to return as a major political player through its alignment with women's social activism.

SEE ALSO: Italian Risorgimento

References and Suggested Readings

- Babini, V. & Lama, L. (2000) *Una "donna nuova": il femminismo scientifico di Maria Montessori*. Milan: Franco Angeli.
- Bravo, A. (2001) Madri fra oppressione ed emancipazione. In Bravo, A., Pelaja, M., Pescarola, A., & Scaraffia, L. (Eds.), *Storia sociale delle donne nell'Italia contemporanea*. Bari: Laterza, pp. 77–125.
- Montessori, M. (1964) *The Montessori Method*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Stewart-Steinberg, S. (2007) *The Pimocchio Effect: On Making Italians (1860–1920)*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Moplah Revolts

Kunal Chattopadhyay

The Moplahs or Mappilas are located in Malabar, the northern part of present-day Kerala. Their ancestry is often traced to Arabs and converts to Islam among natives of Malabar. Islam came to this region through trade and pilgrimage, and was well established by the ninth century. Nineteenth-century British colonial rule identified them as "fanatics." Moplahs formed a major portion of the *Kudiyyan* (landless farmer) population in Ernaad and Walluvanad *taluks* (an administrative unit beneath a district) where the landlords were mainly upper-caste Hindus.

The British conquest of Malabar in 1792 was followed by a land settlement whereby one category of superior right holders, the *jenmis*, were recognized as absolute proprietors in land. This worked to the advantage of Brahmanas and Nayars, and against the interests of the Moplahs. As soon as the *jenmis*, backed by the police, the law courts, and revenue officials, tightened their grip on the subordinate classes, the Moplah peasantry in turn started rebelling (from 1836), with a religious dimension. Sometimes attacks on the *jenmi* or his officials would be accompanied by the burning or defilement of temples: 22 similar risings continued until 1854. The revolt of 1849 included grievances about how the government had encroached on *waqf* (Islamic tax-free) land as well.

The *Thangals* (Moplah priests), invested with powers to protect the collective interests of the community, sought to increase the number of Moplahs through proselytization, as a means of self-defense. This was particularly effective among the Hindu slave caste, the *Cherumars*, who were shown a life of upward mobility. Forms of resistance included the dropping of deferential forms of speaking, refusal to eat the left-over food of the Hindu upper castes, and refusal to work on Fridays (the Muslim weekly day of prayer).

In 1875 the government of Madras appointed William Logan to inquire into land rights. Logan's massive work shows that of 2,200 petitions, 1,876 came from Ernaad, Walluvanad, Palghat, and Ponnai; 2,608 of the 4,021 petitioners were Moplahs. His plea for tenurial security not only of the intermediate *kanamdars* but also those below them led to piecemeal legislation providing

compensation for eviction. No comprehensive tenancy legislation was passed until 1929.

In 1896 a large-scale Moplah peasant uprising occurred when a band of about twenty Moplahs attacked and killed Hindu landlords, looted their houses, forcibly converted Hindus to Islam, and burned temples. They took their last stand in a captured temple, where they fought to the death.

With further pressure on land, through evictions, rack-renting, excessive lease renewal fees, and poor compensation between 1910 and 1921, a tenancy agitation developed in the second decade of the twentieth century. This was followed by the *Khilafat* movement in 1920–1 demanding restoration of the powers of the *Khalifa*. The joint Congress-Khilafat movement attracted a large number of Moplahs. One of the main leaders of the Khilafat agitation in Malabar was Ali Musaliar, who preached “*Khilafat*, tenancy, and *Smaraj*” as the solution for the problems of the Moplah peasantry. There were also more militant leaders, like Kunju Muhammad Haji, who had been implicated in a number of earlier conflicts. After the revolt broke out, Congress-Khilafat leaders K. P. Kesava Menon, K. Madhavan Nair, E. Moidu Moulavi, and Muhammad Abdul Rahman Sahib visited Pookotoor and Thirurangadi. On February 16, 1921 British police arrested Yakoob Hassan, Madhavan Nair, Gopala Menon, and Moitheen Koya, and clamped a curfew on Walluvanad and Ernaad *taluks*, leaving the campaign in the hands of local militant leaders.

In August 1921 a full-scale rebellion broke out when police surrounded Mamparam mosque and houses of many Khilafat workers, raided the mosque and Khilafat committee office, and arrested three people. The initial hostility of the Moplahs was clearly directed at the police and the government, along with the *jennis*. Railway and telegraph lines were cut; post offices, banks, and police stations were either looted or burned. Initially, the aim was to establish a stronghold and demolish all symbols of British rule. By the end of August the interior of southern Malabar, excepting Palghat, was under the control of the rebels. A pitched battle was fought at Pookotoor on August 26, with over 250 rebels dying. There were attempts by leaders like Ali Musaliar to control instances of murder and loot. Musaliar surrendered on September 3, but the rebellion could not be stamped out till the end of 1921. More than 1,000 Moplahs were killed and more

than 14,000 were arrested during the revolt. Musaliar himself was subsequently hanged. A particularly notorious incident occurred on November 17, 1921, when around 200 prisoners were packed into a wagon that started from Tirur for Coimbatore. Prisoners began to suffocate and cry out even before the train started, and at Podanur, 64 of them were found dead, while more died soon after.

A degree of religious frenzy characterized the later part of the uprising, and what had been a peasant struggle against exploiters displayed anti-Hindu tendencies. But the first case of forcible conversion occurred on September 10, weeks after the rising, and the total number of conversions was not over 900. This number was small in comparison to the size of the Hindu population in the areas controlled by the rebels. Agrarian discontent and religious expression cannot be fully separated in the history of the revolt. Militant Islamic egalitarianism created Moplah solidarity, but at the same time it also created the potential for occasional anti-Hindu expressions.

SEE ALSO: India, Non-Violent Non-Cooperation Movement, 1918–1929

References and Suggested Readings

- Dale, S. (1980) *Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier: The Mappilas of Malabar, 1498–1922*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Dhanagare, D. N. (1994) The Moplah Rebellion. In D. N. Dhanagare (Ed.), *Peasant Movements in India, 1920–1950*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Logan, W. (1989) *Malabar*, 2 vols. New Delhi: Asian Educational Services.
- Namboodiripad, E. M. S. (1952) *The National Question in Kerala*. Bombay: People's Publishing House.
- Panikkar, K. N. (1989) *Against Lord and State: Religion and Peasant Uprisings in Malabar, 1836–1921*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Wood, C. (1987) *Moplah Rebellion and Its Genesis*. New Delhi: People's Publishing House.

Moraes, Irineu Luís de (1912–1994)

Lalo Watanabe Minto

Brazilian communist Irineu Luís de Moraes, better known as “Índio,” was one of the most

important militants of São Paulo's interior. His life was dedicated to organizing and defending the rural population. In the 1930s he joined the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) and years later moved to Ribeirão Preto in order to establish the PCB in that region. In 1945 he organized the Peasant League of Dumont, the first in Brazil. At the end of the 1940s he had his first experience of armed struggle in the north of Paraná. Irineu sometimes disagreed with the direction taken by the PCB, complaining of its inadequate support of the agrarian question and its "distance" from people.

After the 1964 coup, Irineu was arrested many times. In 1969, while participating in Marighella's National Liberation Alliance, he was tortured almost to the point of death and abandoned in a train. Later, he was condemned to two years in prison. Liberated in 1974, he returned to PCB activities, finally leaving the party in 1986. The following year he entered the Workers' Party, and then the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), which was a splinter group from the PCB.

SEE ALSO: Brazil, Labor Struggles; Brazil, Peasant Movements and Liberation Theology; Ligas Camponesas

References and Suggested Readings

- Bagatim, A. (2006) *Characters, Trajectories and Histories of the National Armed Forces Liberation*. Dissertation. Campinas: Unicamp. Available at www.libdigi.unicamp.br/document/?code=vtls000376452 (downloaded May 2, 2008).
- Welch, C. & Geraldo, S. (1992) *Peasant Struggles in São Paulo's Interior: The Memories from Irineu Luís de Moraes*. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra.

Morais, Clodomir de (b. 1928)

Lalo Watanabe Minto

Brazilian communist militant Clodomir Santos de Moraes was born in Bahia. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s he was an important Peasant Leagues' leader and a Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) militant. In 1955, he was elected deputy in Pernambuco. As a member of a group that defended the centrality of the agrarian question, Moraes was expelled from the PCB

in 1962. His position in favor of armed struggle also led him to a rupture with Francisco Julião in 1962.

In 1963 Moraes supported the Leagues' transformation into an effective political organization that was able to oppose the reformist PCB. This took place in January 1964, but a military dictatorship obstructed its continuation. Moraes was arrested and tortured, and his political rights were suppressed. Years later he became UN counselor for Latin America on agrarian reform subjects, directing many projects for the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). He was also a consultant for technical missions in several continents.

Morais earned his PhD at the University of Rostock (Germany) and wrote more than 20 books. His text on organization theory has been published in more than 300 editions in 43 countries, and his method of mass capacitation has influenced important movements such as the Brazilian Landless Workers' Movement (MST).

SEE ALSO: Brazil, Peasant Movements and Liberation Theology; Julião, Francisco (1915–1999); Ligas Camponesas; Movimento Sem Terra (MST)

References and Suggested Readings

- Azevedo, F. A. (1982) *Peasant Leagues*. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra.
- Rolleberg, D. (2001) *Cuban Support to the Armed Struggle in Brazil: The Guerrilla Training*. Rio de Janeiro: MAUAD.

Morales, Evo (b. 1959)

Thomas Purcell

In Juan Evo Morales Ayma, a football-addicted Aymara Indian, the spirit of Che Guevara lives on. "Evo," as he is popularly known by his followers, embodies the fusion of ethnic and leftist politics. Born in 1959 near the tin-mining city of Oruro, high in the Bolivian Altiplano, Evo was one of seven siblings, but as is common among poor indigenous families, four died within a year of birth. Despite working from a very early age, Evo managed to get a formal education, organize football teams, and play the trumpet in the Royal Imperial Band, leaving school at the age of 17 to complete military service. In the wake of

widespread mine closures, economic depression, and the terrible drought on the Altiplano in 1980, Morales's family followed many in the migration to the more fertile Chapare lowlands. Here they became farmers, mainly of the coca leaf.

In 1981, after the brutal burning alive of a coca farmer, Evo declared "to fight tirelessly for the respect of human rights . . . for the free cultivation of the coca leaf . . . for the dignity of Bolivians and for our freedom" (Morales 2006). In this same year, under the umbrella of the *cocaleros'* (coca leaf growers') struggle, his political journey began. First he was secretary of sports in the coca union of San Francisco; then, in 1985, he was named general secretary of his union and in 1988 became executive secretary of the Tropical Federation (Federación del Tropic). During this time he experienced persecution, torture, and jail, coming close to death in 1989 after a severe beating from the UMOPAR (Rural Mobile Police Patrol Units) forces.

In 1995 Morales helped found the Political Tool for the Sovereignty of the Common People (IPSP), and in 1996 he was made president of the Coordinating Committee of the Six Federations of the Tropics of Cochabamba. Running in coalition with the United Left (IU), he was elected to the Bolivian Congress in 1997, receiving 70 percent of the vote from the provinces of Chapare and Carrasco de Cochabamba. In 1999, the IPSP transformed into the MAS (Movement Toward Socialism), achieving legal status in order to compete in local elections, eventually providing its new leader, Morales, the route to national politics.

Despite, or perhaps because of, his expulsion from Congress in 2002 (because he spoke outwardly against the US "war on drugs" and continued to support the coca farmers' right to self-defense, through force if necessary), MAS received 21 percent of the national presidential vote, becoming the biggest opposition party with clear majorities in indigenous strongholds. The wave of popular struggle against the government's energy policies culminated in the premature resignation of Sanchez de Lozada in 2005. This opened the door to the radical indigenous leader, and under the slogan "We are the People, We are MAS," Morales won the presidency with 53.7 percent of the vote. He has pursued policies of "no to the eradication of coca and yes to the nationalization of hydrocarbons."

However, in the context of imperialist pressures and heightened social tensions, the story of Bolivia's first indigenous president is far from over.

SEE ALSO: Bolivia, Protest and Repression, 1964–2000; Bolivian Neoliberalism, Social Mobilization, and Revolution from Below, 2003 and 2005; *Cocaleros* Peasant Uprising; Guevara, Ernesto "Che" (1928–1967)

References and Suggested Readings

- Albro, R. (2005) The Indigenous in the Plural in Bolivian Oppositional Politics. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 24 (4): 433–53.
- Morales, E. (2006) *Cocalero*. Available at www.evomorales.net/paginasCas/perfil_Cas_cocal.aspx.
- Navia, R. & Pinco, D. (2007) *Un tal Evo: Biografía no Autorizada*. Bolivia: La Paz.

Morant Bay Rebellion: overview and assessment

Smithin Wilmot

The Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865 in Jamaica represented a clash between a decaying white plantocracy and the black freed people who were assertive of their new rights and opportunities in the post-slavery period from 1838. By 1865, several of black people's expectations and initiatives had been frustrated and undermined by strong continuities between the period of enslavement and the decades after emancipation. Whites maintained their near monopoly of the island's economic resources and dominated local political arrangements. Furthermore, the "aristocracy" of white skin buttressed their social privileges and the first generation of black adults in freedom was returned to dependence on the plantation and to a standard of living that was not far removed from their experiences of enslavement.

Nonetheless, the formal end of slavery was an event of major importance to the 311,070 enslaved people in Jamaica since it removed the most horrendous abuses of slavery and opened up the possibility of constructing new lives beyond the boundaries of exploitative plantation labor. For the first time in Jamaica's history, the mass of the people of African descent could attempt to direct their own life and to make choices that suited them.

The former enslaved in Jamaica responded in a variety of ways. In the first decade of freedom they constructed new settlements beyond the plantations, as well as churches and schools, often in partnership with the evangelical missionaries. These new communities and institutions revolved around the freed people's appetite for the acquisition of land, which was one of the most important badges of freedom as it facilitated varying degrees of autonomy and choice that were at the heart of their new status as free citizens. Also, since the island's politics was governed by a property franchise, land formed the basis of social power and influence, and the few freedmen who acquired land of sufficient value to qualify for the property franchise enthusiastically embraced this privilege of participating in politics, which was another important emblem of their newly acquired freedom.

For the majority of the freed people who lacked the means to buy land, the plantations remained their main source of livelihood. The new class of Jamaican workers were acutely conscious of their new status and their labor power and therefore demanded qualitative changes in their day-to-day work lives. They expected a new order of labor relations characterized by freedom of movement, just and equitable wages, and flexible labor arrangements, including undisturbed access to estate cottages and provision grounds (small plots for growing food) that they had used during their enslavement. Importantly, the freed women, who at emancipation made up the majority of field laborers in Jamaica, also expected to devote more of their time to their families and to involve themselves in provision growing and marketing, choosing to sell their labor to the plantations only when it suited their families' interests.

However, by the 1850s, the initial period of optimism among the former enslaved had significantly diminished. Deaths from cholera and smallpox in 1851 and 1852, respectively, left several families destitute. Moreover, the plantations, already in decline before emancipation because of high costs and outdated methods, were further undermined by Britain's new free trade policies that led to the closure of several estates, depressing wages and depriving laborers of steady employment. Despite the growing pool of landless and dependent laborers, the planters successfully expanded immigration schemes that were subsidized from the public purse, so much so that by the 1860s the planter class had largely

restored the command over labor it had initially lost after emancipation. The hardships of the people increased further in the first half of the 1860s, when the prices of imported staples soared during the American Civil War and protracted droughts followed by floods undercut local food production, increasing the state of desperation among the majority of people who were poor. As the social and economic crisis deepened, the local white and colored (of mixed European and African ancestry) political elite were more preoccupied with feuding over office and status than with providing relief for the poor, and the British governor, Edward Eyre, was as incompetent and inept as he was uncaring and insensitive to the people's sufferings.

Against this island-wide background of protracted hardships, over 400 men and women, freed people and their descendants, in the parish of St. Thomas-in-the-East, confronted by the partisan and oppressive administration of justice, exploitative working conditions, low and irregular wages, simmering disputes over access and ownership of lands, and the curtailment of their political rights, rebelled at Morant Bay on October 11, 1865. The leader of the rebellion was Paul Bogle, who was born into slavery in Jamaica sometime between 1815 and 1820. He, along with other black artisans and small farmers in the 1840s, had settled the hilly area in St. Thomas-in-the-East known as Stony Gut, bordering Spring Garden and Middleton sugar estates and about three miles from Morant Bay, the capital town of the parish.

Literate and articulate, Paul Bogle occupied an important position among the freed people in St. Thomas-in-the-East for he was among the less than 1 percent of the population in the parish who qualified for the restrictive male property franchise. In hotly contested elections for the island's Assembly in 1860, 1862, and 1863, Bogle supported George William Gordon, a radical free colored who battled against the political hegemony of the deeply entrenched plantocracy in the parish. Indeed, by 1862, Bogle emerged as one of the chief political organizers for Gordon, and it was largely because of Bogle's mobilization of the small freeholders of Stony Gut and other post-slavery settlements in the parish that in 1863 Gordon won seats to the Jamaica Assembly in Spanish Town and to the Vestry, the unit of local government that was dominated by the local white and magistracy

and which was meeting in Morant Bay on the day of the rebellion. Paul Bogle remained steadfast in his support of Gordon, despite the political machinations of the planters in the parish and of Governor Eyre, whom Gordon frequently castigated for his incompetence and his neglect of the people's pleas for help as their hardships and destitution increased. Indeed, in early 1865, the relationship between the politically embattled Gordon and Paul Bogle was further cemented when Bogle was ordained a deacon by Gordon in the mainly black Native Baptist Church, which had a more radical agenda on social issues than the European-directed religious groups in the island.

In the two months leading up to the Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865, Bogle had organized meetings of laborers and small farmers, men and women, through the network of Native Baptist chapels and meeting houses in St. Thomas-in-the-East. At these gatherings two burning issues that affected the former enslaved population were highlighted: access to land, which would have provided autonomy from the estates that paid low and irregular wages, and the chronic injustice in the lower courts, where magistrates discriminated against the blacks. In August 1865, Paul Bogle addressed a public meeting in Morant Bay organized by Gordon as one of a series of meetings that were held throughout the island to underscore the people's social and economic hardships and the denial of their political rights. Further, the meetings also protested against the insensitivity of the callous political administration, which blamed the people's poverty on their supposed indolence and mocked their requests for access to unused lands held by the crown. Indeed, when Paul Bogle led a deputation of small farmers from the Morant Bay meeting to Spanish Town, the island's political capital, a distance of nearly 40 miles, to present their grievances, Governor Eyre refused to meet them.

Shortly afterwards, in September 1865, the planters in St. Thomas-in-the-East secured the transfer from the parish of Thomas Witter Jackson, a colored magistrate, whose presence on the bench had mitigated the partisan administration of the law by magistrates who were planters. When on October 7, 1865 Lewis Miller, Paul Bogle's cousin and co-religionist, was brought before the court in Morant Bay for trespassing on property he thought he owned, Bogle led his followers into Morant Bay in a show

of solidarity for Miller. Before Miller's case was tried, Bogle and others prevented the police from arresting another man whose comments against the ruling of the magistrates in another case had interrupted the court.

Arising from that incident, the police went to Stony Gut on October 9 with a warrant for Bogle's arrest, but they were resisted by his supporters who had gathered there to protect him. On October 11, Paul Bogle led over 400 men and women into Morant Bay, where they clashed with the militia who were guarding the courthouse where the magistrates were meeting. Eight of Bogle's followers were shot by the militia, who then took refuge in the courthouse. Bogle ordered the building to be set on fire to flush out the militia and magistrates: 18 were killed, including Baron Maximilian von Ketelholdt, the chief magistrate of the parish, George William Gordon's implacable political opponent and a personal friend of Governor Eyre.

Governor Eyre proclaimed martial law and the rebellion was swiftly and brutally suppressed. Over 400 were hanged, including Bogle and several of his close associates, as well as Gordon who, despite any dispassionate evidence linking him with either the planning or execution of the rebellion, was accused by Governor Eyre of promoting political discord in St. Thomas-in-the-East. Accordingly, Eyre arranged for Gordon's arrest in Kingston, which was outside the area of martial law, and transported him to Morant Bay, where he was summarily tried, found guilty of high treason, and hanged on October 23, 1865. Martial law continued until November 13, 1865, by which time several hundreds were indiscriminately whipped and many villages were burned, driving home Eyre's intent to intimidate the blacks against any future attempt to raise their hands against white authority.

Significantly, in the wake of the rebellion, the majority of the Jamaican Assembly, panicked by paranoid fears of an island-wide rebellion, voted to surrender Jamaica's 200-year-old constitution, which had a modicum of representation, thereby opening the way for the introduction of crown colony government in 1866 with its authoritarian political arrangements. Essentially, the new constitution slammed the door on the small openings in representative politics which freed men like Paul Bogle had created, thereby buttressing the white planters' social and economic

influence against further inroads that emancipation had wrought.

SEE ALSO: African American Resistance, Reconstruction Era; Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Caribbean Islands, Protests against IMF; Caribbean Protest Music; Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism; Haiti, Protest and Rebellion, 19th Century; Jamaica, Independence Movement, 1950–Present; Jamaica, 1938 Labor Riots; Jamaica, Peasant Uprisings, 19th Century; Jamaica, Rebellion and Resistance, 1760–1834; Radical Reconstruction, United States, Promise and Failure of

References and Suggested Readings

- Bakan, A. (1990) *Ideology and Class Conflict in Jamaica: The Politics of Rebellion*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press.
- Beckles, H. & Shepherd, V. (1993) *Caribbean Freedom: Economy and Society from Emancipation to the Present*. Kingston: Ian Randle.
- Besson, J. (2002) *Martha Brae's Two Histories: European Expansion and Caribbean Culture-Building in Jamaica*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Bryan, P. (1991) *The Jamaican People, 1880–1902*. London: Macmillan Caribbean.
- Cross, M. & Heuman, G. (Eds.) (1988) *Labour in the Caribbean: From Emancipation to Independence*. London: Macmillan Caribbean.
- Heuman, G. (1994) "The Killing Time": *The Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica*. London: Macmillan Caribbean.
- Holt, T. (1992) *The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832–1938*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Mintz, S. (1974) *Caribbean Transformations*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Sheller, M. (2000) *Democracy After Slavery: Black Publics and Peasant Radicalism in Haiti and Jamaica*. London: Macmillan Caribbean.
- Stewart, R. J. (1992) *Religion and Society in Post-Emancipation Jamaica*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Moravian Brothers

Rady Roldan-Figueroa

The Moravians can be traced back to the United Brethren (*Unitas Fratrum*), a branch of the fifteenth-century followers of John Huss. After the death of the Bohemian reformer on July 6, 1415, the Hussites divided into two main factions. The aristocratic Utraquists had their seat in

Prague. They derived their name from the practice of serving communion in both bread and wine (*sub utraque specie*). The radical and more democratic faction was known as the Taborites. Although these factions were divided by bitter strife, they formed a common military front under the leadership of John Zizka.

In 1433 the Council of Basel granted the main claims of the Utraquists, effectively breaking apart the fragile Hussite alliance. The next year the Taborites were devastated by the Utraquists at the battle of Lipan. The United Brethren emerged in part from the ashes of the Taborites. Yet they represented a combination that included Utraquist and even Waldensian elements. They took their inspiration from the New Testament and the writings of Peter Chelcický, especially his *Net of the Faith* (1440). Their main aspiration was to emulate early Christian egalitarianism. They also discarded the violence of the Taborites and they themselves were pacifistic.

In 1627, during the course of the Thirty Years' War, large numbers of United Brethren were forced to leave Bohemia or face recatholicization. John Amos Comenius was the leading figure of the movement during this time of trouble. Comenius lived in exile for most of his life after 1628. He became an important reformer in the area of education and the last presiding bishop of the United Brethren. In 1648 the Peace of Westphalia brought the institutional apparatus of the Bohemian United Brethren to its demise, although their faith remained vibrant. By the eighteenth century the explosion of Lutheran Pietism made the German lands a fertile ground for the reemergence of the United Brethren. In 1722 a group of Brethren settled in the lands of Count Nikolaus Luwig von Zinzendorf in Saxony. There they founded a village called Herrnhut, "the Watch of the Lord."

Under the leadership of David Nitschmann, who in 1735 became the first bishop of the Renewed Moravian Church, Herrnhut became the center of a significant missionary movement. Inspired on the heritage of figures like Comenius, the Moravians opened schools where possible throughout Europe, spreading in this way the primitive values and ideas of the Bohemian United Brethren. Prominent anarchist figures were inspired if not directly touched by the Moravians: Kropotkin admired the United Brethren, Leo Tolstoy read the writings of Chelcický, and Jacques Elisée Reclus attended a Moravian school.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchism, Germany; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Reclus, Elisée (1830–1905); Tolstoy, Leo N. (1828–1910)

References and Suggested Readings

- Verbeek, J. W. (1862) *A Concise History of the Unitas Fratrum, or, Church of the United Brethren*. London: Mallalieu.
- Wagner, M. L. (1983) *Petr Chelěický: A Radical Separatist in Hussite Bohemia*. Scottsdale: Herald Press.

Moro national liberation

Herbert Docena

Moro nationalism refers to the ideology or sentiment held by people who self-consciously and deliberately identify themselves as “Moros” as opposed to “Filipinos,” believe in and appeal to a history and culture distinct from that of the rest of the Philippines, and consequently demand independence or greater autonomy from the Philippine state.

“Moro” identity was initially articulated by and designated for Muslims, who currently make up about 4 percent of the Philippine population, most of them in what is now the southwestern Philippines. Coming from three major and ten minor ethnolinguistic groups, they invoke Islam as the unifying collective marker to distinguish themselves from “Filipinos,” where a majority of the population is Christian.

Moro nationalism has been embraced and advanced by a people who believe themselves to have been illegally and unjustly incorporated into what became the Philippines without their consent, whose lands and resources have been encroached upon and exploited by migrants, multinational corporations, and other outsiders as sponsored or allowed by the Philippine state, whose culture and traditions have been threatened by this state’s assimilationist and centralizing policies, and who have become marginalized and dispossessed minorities within the Philippines and within the territory they consider to be their homeland.

The Colonial Legacy

Prior to the formation and consolidation of the Philippines, the area that would eventually encom-

pass its territory included various communities and settlements of diverse cultures and social and political organizations that were culturally and economically part of precolonial Southeast Asia (Abinales & Amoroso 2005). Among these were the sultanates in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago whose peoples, as in other areas elsewhere in the region, had earlier been converted to Islam.

When the Spanish colonizers arrived in the sixteenth century, they managed to consolidate their rule and convert locals to Christianity only in the northern and central parts of what would become the Philippines. For more than 300 years, the communities in the southern areas successfully managed to fend off the Spanish, maintain their sovereignty, their cultural and religious practices, and their control over their lands and resources (Majul 1999; Abinales & Amoroso 2005). Moro nationalists appeal to their history and see their modern struggle for independence as a continuation of this resistance and as proof of their historic difference from the Christianized Filipinos from the north. It has been argued, however, that those who fought the Spanish in various instances during that period did not as of yet conceive of themselves as belonging to one collective political entity. Though most professed Islam, the Muslims at that time were divided by ethnolinguistic and political divisions and were oftentimes in bitter internecine conflict (McKenna 2000). A “Moro nation” had not yet emerged.

It was only at the twilight of Spanish colonization in the late nineteenth century that the Spanish managed to make inroads into the unpacified areas in the south. By the time Filipino revolutionaries in the north were on the verge of expelling them, however, the Spanish still did not exercise as much sovereignty in the south as they had in the north. Despite this, when the Spanish sold the Philippines to the United States for \$20 million in 1897, they also handed over control over the southern areas to the Americans. Filipinos, having just declared independence from Spain and formed a republic, resisted the new colonizers but were vanquished. Had Filipino revolutionaries and Muslims agreed to form a common front against Spain and the Americans – as had in fact been proposed by the former but rejected by Muslim leaders (Majul 1999) – and had they succeeded in defeating the colonizers, the Filipinos and

the Muslims could conceivably have come to an arrangement different from that ultimately decided by the new colonizers.

After pacifying the country, the Americans proceeded to establish a colonial state, administered with Filipinos in powerful but subordinate roles. For a time, the Americans governed the Muslims separately from those in the north; some even entertained the idea of separating the provinces inhabited by Muslims from the rest of the colony. American settlers who had begun cultivating land in these areas supported such separation in the belief that the south should be “white man’s country” (Abinales 2000). Colonial rulers encouraged the development of a collective Muslim identity and it was in this effort, it has been argued, that the beginnings of a Moro nationalism that transcended ethno-linguistic barriers first took root (McKenna 2000). Filipinos in power, however, insisted on integrating the Muslims within the Philippines (Abinales 2000).

Muslims, for their part, resisted the Americans sporadically if fiercely; hobbled and internally divided under occupation, Muslim leaders eventually came to an accommodation with American rule. Encouraged by the Americans’ apparent openness to the idea of separation and increasingly self-conscious of the pan-Muslim identity that the Americans themselves inculcated, Muslims accepted the new order on the assurance – or in the hope – that the Americans would not force them to be part of a new Philippine state to which they promised to give independence (Abinales 2000). In various instances, some Muslim leaders reiterated their demand to have their own state, or else to be part of US territory rather than of the Philippines (Che Man 1990). They were rejected. As Americans and Filipinos decided their fate, the Muslims were not included in the discussion and decision-making (Abinales 2000). Ultimately, the Americans, with the approval of Filipinos and a few Muslim leaders in power, decided to include the Muslims and their territories in the newly independent Philippine state that came into being in 1946.

Dispossession

Claiming all unregistered lands as subject to the ownership and control of the state, the Philippine government continued the process started during colonization of parcelling out

lands in the south to foreign and Filipino-owned corporations as well as to migrants from the north. As much as 90 percent of all lands in the south, considered “ancestral domains” by Muslims and other indigenous people who lived in the area, was considered “public” and, therefore, up to the state to allocate as it deemed fit (Che Man 1990; May 1992; Tan 1995; Abinales 2000; Ahmad 2000a; Gutierrez & Borras 2004).

By that time, the Filipino elites who dominated the state, many of them coming from powerful landed families, were facing growing unrest from landless peasants in the north. An uprising fueled by rural misery and discontent was gaining strength, posing the most serious internal challenge to the political order. Faced with this explosive situation, the Philippine government accelerated resettlement initiatives and enacted laws that offered land in the south to settlers as well as to northern and foreign business interests. Seen not only as a solution to the problem of landlessness in the north, the resettlement programs were also conceived as a way to “civilize” the Muslims and the indigenous people in the south (May 1992).

Tens of thousands of poor, landless, mostly Christian families took the offer, driven less by government prodding than by desperation. The middle classes and bureaucrats looking for opportunities also joined. So did wealthy elites and capitalists, lured by the untapped agricultural, timber, and mining wealth (Tan 1995; Gutierrez & Borras 2004). By the early 1960s, as many as 3,200 migrants were arriving in Mindanao each week, dramatically shifting the demographic balance. In Koronadal Valley, one area that saw the biggest influx of migrants, to cite an example, the Christian population rose from 18 in 1939 to 30,000 in 1960 (May 1992). It was the largest movement of people in Philippine history, believed to be the most important social change in the country after the war (Abinales 2000).

In the ensuing competition for limited land, the laws that were supposed to govern the registration of lands worked against the Muslims. Imposed by the north and implemented by bureaucrats from the north, they served as instruments to perpetrate and legitimize what a 1963 Philippine Senate report described as “landgrabbing” (Tan 1995). Under one law, for example, settlers were allowed to apply for

up to 24 hectares of land while non-Christians could apply for only 10. In other instances, settlers were reserved 16 hectares, while the locals were given only 8 (Tan 1995; Gutierrez & Borrás 2004). Huge tracts of lands had earlier during American colonization been given to corporations and individuals for plantations of export crops such as pineapple, rubber, and coconut, for logging, and for mining; more were awarded after independence (Che Man 1990).

Uninformed of the intricacies of the laws issued by the north, impeded by the tedious bureaucratic procedures, unable to pay fees, or in defiance of what could have been seen as foreign, illegitimate edicts from an unrecognized authority, Muslims were, for their part, unable or unwilling to register for land. When land disputes arose, bureaucrats in many cases were at best unresponsive to the Muslims or were inclined to rule in favor of settlers. The best lands often ended up in the hands of Christian settlers (McKenna 2000: 117); Muslim plots were small (Che Man 1990). By 1972, it is estimated that only 30 percent of the Muslims had land registered in their name, reduced to 17 percent by 1982 (Tan 1995). But it was not the landless settlers who took most of the lands: like the Muslims and the indigenous people, many Christian settlers remained poor and landless (Tadem 1992; Ahmad 2000a; Abinales 2000). By the late 1980s, it was the export-oriented plantations, multinational corporations, and logging concessionaires that controlled more than half of Mindanao's lands (cited in Collier 1992). Lands owned by wealthy families became the basis for the rise of new, powerful political families.

While the opening of the south provided a safety valve that undermined the burgeoning communist movement (Abinales 2000), allowed the landowning elites in the north to hold on to their lands, and opened up economic opportunities for capitalists, the Muslims and the indigenous people were not only dispossessed of their ancestral domain, they also became a minority in what they considered their homeland (Gutierrez & Borrás 2004). In 1918, Muslims accounted for 49 percent of the population in Mindanao. By 1970, they stood at only 19 percent of the count (Tan 1995). That they have become a minority in their own claimed homeland has been described as a kind of "low-intensity ethnic cleansing" (Gutierrez 2000).

Marginalization

Relative to its land area and population, a disproportionate portion of the income and wealth derived from natural resources contributing to the Philippine economy came from the south: At one point, it was estimated that Mindanao provided half of the resources being exported by the country, with 14 out of the top 20 dollar-earning commodities coming from the region. Coconut products, for example, were at one point the Philippines' most important export commodity; half of the total land area planted to them were to be found in Mindanao. Over half of commercial forest lands from which timber, another important commodity, comes, were likewise in the region. The seas in the south accounted for an estimated half of the country's total commercial catch. As much as 90 percent of total fruit exports were also from the south (Tadem 1992; Tan 1995; Ahmad 2000a).

As shown by economic and social indicators that have consistently rated the provinces in the south, especially those where Muslims account for the majority, as among the poorest and most miserable, the wealth from the extracted resources did not accrue to the Muslims (Tadem 1992). Profits from businesses in the region flowed back to capitalists from outside; what Muslims as well as Christian settlers earned came from compensation for their labor (Tan 1995). At the same time, with the commons such as the lands as well as the seas increasingly enclosed, Muslims and others lost access to resources for their subsistence. A 1985 study showed that the incidence of poverty was higher in the south than the national average (Tadem 1992). Recent measures show not only that Muslims are among the poorest in the country, they also have the shortest life expectancy, the lowest adult literacy rates, and the least access to education, health, electricity, transportation, water, and sanitation (Gutierrez & Borrás 2004).

In its effort to construct a Filipino nation, the Philippine state, with the help of Filipino nationalists, implemented policies that were seen as undermining Muslim cultural values, institutions, and practices (Brown 1988). A national language, based on one of the languages in the north, was officially adopted and used as the medium of instruction in public schools all over the country, including in the Muslim regions. The educational system was thought of as having

been designed to bring children away from Islam (Majul 1985). Under a political system which formally adopted secularism, or the separation of religion from the state, Christian missionaries were allowed to establish schools and churches in the south but the state itself did not deliberately set out to convert Muslims. Official Philippine history and discourse were seen as prioritizing those of the north while marginalizing that of Muslims. Northern Filipino revolutionaries, for instance, were glorified in the official version of the Filipino struggle against Spanish and American colonialism, even as the Moros' protracted and mostly successful resistance went unrecognized. Though the Philippines itself officially invoked communal differences as an intrinsic part of Filipino nationhood (Abinales 2000) and its policies affected all the ethnolinguistic groups, and even though the state's cultural policies were arguably less aggressive and assimilationist than those adopted by other states, Muslims perceived themselves as being culturally under siege.

Armed Resistance

While Muslim grievances had been welling up for some time, it was not until the late 1960s that Moro nationalism, as a self-conscious collective identity with a mass constituency, emerged and armed resistance against the state began.

By then, land disputes in the fast-filling frontier were escalating (Abinales & Amoroso 2005). Christian gangs attacked and killed Muslim farmers and set their homes on fire in various incidents. Muslims struck back. The clashes were perceived as ethnic conflicts and consequently heightened communal divisions. A review of the cases of violence, however, showed that they were mostly class-based: between ordinary Christian settlers and Muslim elites, ordinary Muslims against Christian elites, or elites of either religion set upon each other (McKenna 2000). The Philippine military and police as well as politicians from among the settlers, however, were perceived as being on the side of the Christians and were accused of organizing gangs and militias that committed atrocities against Muslims (Che Man 1990; May 1992; Ahmad 2000b).

In this period, a new generation of young educated Muslims had begun articulating ideas of Moro nationhood and self-determination.

Immersed in Manila, where nationalism and left-wing ideas were by then becoming more and more influential, or in Cairo, where Arab nationalism, communism, and Islamism competed for influence, the young Moros put forth radical proposals departing from those advocated by traditional Muslim elites: neither compromise with the Philippine state nor a return to the old aristocratic sultanates. Castigating the traditional elites for their cooperation with the Philippine state, this new generation of self-professed Moros gained growing influence and an expanding following (Gutierrez 2000).

It happened that around this time as well, attempts by the Philippine state to centralize power reached their apogee in the dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos. In seeking to concentrate power in the state, Marcos's authoritarianism undermined the traditional Muslim elites and local strongmen on whom the state had relied to control the south. Having come to an accommodation with the state in exchange for the political and economic benefits their status within it accorded them, these elites' and strongmen's authority was undermined and, consequently, their capacity to keep the lid on Muslim discontent weakened. Cut off from their sources of power, with their standing in Muslim communities contested by the new activists, but still seeking to employ the threat of secession to extract leverage from the state, some of the traditional elites turned against the state (Abinales 2000; McKenna 2000).

Together, the new generation of politicized Moros along with sections of the old elite began organizing new political formations and organizations calling for a Moro republic independent from the Philippines. In 1972, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed. Sparked by a series of atrocities against Muslims, Marcos's declaration of martial law, and the government's attempt to confiscate arms, armed resistance against the Philippines erupted.

At that time, Marcos's authoritarian government was flush with increasing amounts of military assistance from the United States, given in exchange for Marcos's assurance to keep important US military bases in the country. Facing the most serious military challenge to the state since the Huks in the 1950s, Marcos unleashed the full force of the Philippine military against the Moros. The Moros, for their part, took arms and received training and political

support from Libya, Malaysia, and other Muslim-majority countries. Though motivated by various grievances – the idea of Moro nationhood just one of them (McKenna 2000) – Muslims universally supported and fought on the side of the Moro nationalists (Ahmad 2000a). Though loose, disorganized, and with no combat experience, the MNLF managed to unify Moros and to mobilize up to 30,000 fighters under its banner (Che Man 1990; McKenna 2000).

At the height of the war from 1972 to 1976, an estimated 10,000 to 60,000 were killed. Between 200,000 to as many as a million were displaced (May 1992; Mercado 1992; Abinales & Amoroso 2005). In the end, it was a stalemate. Both sides were pressured by the mediating party, the Organization of Islamic Countries, to reach a negotiated solution to the war: the MNLF gave up its demand for its own independent state while Marcos agreed, on paper, to grant autonomy to the Moros on his terms (Noble 1980).

In the first of similar failed agreements in the future, Marcos would interpret and implement the agreement on his own terms without giving meaningful autonomy to the Moros, while the MNLF would subsequently denounce the agreement. Fighting resumed after 1977, punctuated by various rounds of negotiations and the signing of more peace agreements that would likewise subsequently collapse. The intensity of the fighting during the 1970s, however, has not to date been matched. Since then, the Moro movement has evolved.

The Politics of Independence

Moro nationalism was conceived as an anti-colonial struggle against what was perceived as an illegitimate and oppressive authority. Like many anti-colonial struggles however, the Moro movements, at the outset, were also internally divided primarily along class and ideological lines. It was along these lines that they split and fragmented after the war, shattering the united front that for a time allowed the Muslims to fight the Philippine military to a stalemate and force the Philippine government to the negotiating table.

On one side were the founding stalwarts of the MNLF whose politics was of a secular, if left-leaning, nationalism characteristic of many national liberation movements that swept the world after World War II. The aim behind the

struggle for a Moro nation, the MNLF's manifesto stated, was the establishment of a "democratic system of government which shall never allow or tolerate any form of exploitation and oppression of any human being by another or of one nation by another" (quoted in Che Man 1990).

One of the founders of the MNLF and its eventual figurehead, Nur Misuari, did not come from the traditional or wealthy Muslim families and was reported to have once been a member of a group linked with the Communist Party of the Philippines. Misuari was, in fact, subsequently accused by one of his rivals, eventual Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) founder Hashim Salamat, of moving the MNLF toward "Marxist-Maoist orientations" (Che Man 1990). This was denied by Misuari's followers and the MNLF was said to hold the view that communism was antithetical to Islam, a cornerstone of Moro nationalism (Noble 1980; Che Man 1990). Not until 1982 would an openly leftist organization be formed: the Moro Revolutionary Organization, which was allied with the Communist Party of the Philippines but which affirmed the Moros' option to secede from the Philippine state (Che Man 1990). For either ideological or practical reasons, the MNLF's model was said to have been that of "Libyan socialism" (Tan 1995), whose proponent, Muammar al-Qaddafi, also happened to be the most powerful foreign patron of the Moros. Reflecting its orientation and contradictions, the MNLF was also supported by the Arab socialist regime of Syria but also by the shah of Iran (Che Man 1990).

As with many national liberation movements, the MNLF has had to struggle with the need to bring together the broadest possible unity among members believed to be part of the "nation" while dealing with the competing class interests and uneven power relations among them. At first, in fact, some of the key leaders of the MNLF sought to distance the movement from the traditional elites who were perceived to have betrayed their cause in collaborating with the Philippine state for their own interests. Left out in the cold by Marcos, some of these elites joined the movement with the aim of controlling and moving it away from its demands for a transformation of Moro society.

Should the war be won, these traditional elites could expect to be the new elites of a newly independent nation, replacing the Filipino elites from the north. Even if it didn't, the threat of

secession was a powerful leverage to demand more power from the center. The MNLF welcomed some of them into the movement and made use of the economic and political power they offered. But as the war drew to a stalemate, they were also among the first to split from the movement, founding their own rival and more conservative organizations. Enticed by Marcos's offers of powerful and lucrative government posts and repelled by Misuari's left-leaning rhetoric, virtually all of the traditional elites had walked away from the movement by 1980 (Che Man 1990; McKenna 2000).

Another group that broke away from the MNLF were the religious and conservative Moros who were opposed not only to Misuari's allegedly leftist inclinations but to his secularism as well. As in other political movements in Muslim countries, one source of enduring cleavage that has gained more salience among the Moro movements through the years has been the question of the role of Islam. The Moro nationalist movements have commonly appealed to Islam as a defining identity, mobilizing ideology, and source of legitimation (Che Man 1990; Mercado 1992). Indeed, it is Islam that binds the various ethnolinguistic groups that are considered as belonging to the Moro nation (Gutierrez 2000). But while the MNLF manifesto stated its commitment to the "preservation and growth of Islamic culture among our people," it did not call for the establishment of an Islamic state nor was its vision of a new nation based on Islamic theology. Founded in 1984 by Salamat and his allies in order to move the Moro movement toward a more Islamic, less secular, more conservative orientation (Che Man 1990), the MILF has since grown to be the most powerful armed resistance group in Mindanao (Liow 2006).

Though the MILF is evidently more religious in its rhetoric than the MNLF, whether it is determined to establish an "Islamic state" is unclear, its position on this question has been inconsistent, and its specific vision of the shape this Islamic state would take remains vague (Abinales & Amoroso 2005). It is believed that the MILF's ideologues have not as of yet thought through the specific contours of their post-independence state and the MILF's former leader himself has signified that the question can be decided on later (Liow 2006). Even among MILF's rank-and-file fighters and high-ranking officials, there are questions as to what extent

the official religious views of the leadership are shared; many see their struggle less as a war for an Islamic state than as a war for national liberation (Vitug & Gloria, 2000; Wright-Neville 2004).

Rather than a pan-Islamist movement, the MILF remains primarily a nationalist movement concerned with gaining its own independent state, or else more political autonomy from the Philippines. Like the MNLF, the MILF accepts the compatibility of Islam with the existence of the nation-state system, contrary to the view of other Islamists advocating a global pan-Islamic movement. Unlike the Abu Sayyaf, which also initially emerged as a breakaway group from the MNLF after it signed a peace agreement with the government, or the Jemaah Islamiyah, an organization thought to have members in various parts of Southeast Asia, the MILF's agenda does not go beyond the Moros' relations with the Philippine state (Liow 2006).

Weaknesses

Over 30 years since its emergence, Moro nationalism has so far failed to achieve its stated goal of securing an independent state or greater autonomy for Moros.

Once vowing never to "agree to any form of settlement short of . . . total freedom and independence," the MNLF has entered into a series of peace agreements with the government. All of them have so far collapsed. The Philippine government had consistently refused to enter the notion of seeing its territory reduced. Their own power threatened, politicians and powerful Filipino political families from among the settlers in Mindanao had opposed and diluted measures aimed at giving more political power to Moros.

As the plebiscites creating the autonomous regions for the Moros reflected the demographic changes caused by migration, the territory that was eventually allocated for Moro autonomous rule turned out to be smaller than what had been demanded. Of the autonomy that was granted, Muslims were given only curtailed powers over resources, revenues, or legislation. With the limited power they were permitted and their decision to enter into alliances with traditional Filipino politicians, the Moro leadership's record in office had been blotted by accusations of inefficiency, patronage, and corruption. Despite the peace agreements and the arrangements

they put in place, Moros remain among the poorest in the Philippines and continue to be dispossessed of land and resources. The once universal support for the MNLF had dwindled and had given way to widespread disillusionment and disenchantment.

The MILF had likewise entered into protracted negotiations with the government. But the talks have so far foundered on the question of Moro control over their claimed ancestral domain and its resources. Even if a peace agreement is eventually concluded, there is no assurance that it will not meet the same fate as those with the MNLF. The Abu Sanyaf, for its part, has not only dissolved into factions – with some identified more with criminality and banditry than with secessionism – all of which remain small, isolated, and with little popular support. Meanwhile, southern Mindanao remains among the most militarized places in the country, with on-and-off but frequent military operations against Moro rebels and fighters and numerous abuses against civilians.

Apart from class, ideological, as well as ethnolinguistic cleavages which have made the Moro movement vulnerable to the Philippine government's divide-and-rule strategies, other factors may account for its failure to achieve its goals.

Part of the explanation has to be accounted for by the Moros' dependence on external assistance for material and political support. Assistance from Libya, Malaysia, and others was driven by their own geopolitical and internal domestic interests and these did not always necessarily converge with those of the Moros. Once Libya and Malaysia reached an accommodation with the Philippine government, Moros found that they had little choice but to follow their patron's demands. When Malaysia decided to stop giving sanctuary to Moros and to cut off arms supplies to the Moro fighters, the Moros' military capacity weakened. But because the Moro leaders prioritized mobilizing external support – with the Moro leadership more often abroad than at home during the fighting – alternative sources of support could not be mobilized internally.

Perhaps a more fundamental weakness speaks to the limits of identity politics in struggles for self-determination. As proven by divisions among the groups and classes designated as comprising the Moro nation, collective Moro identity as a bond for collective action has proven to be tenuous (Abinales 2000). At the same time, it has

proven to be a vulnerable basis for articulating grievances and demanding change. Faced with demands for greater recognition of Moro cultural and religious practices, the Philippine state has often readily consented to giving such concessions even as it held off giving in to more fundamental demands for greater control over lands and resources. This allowed the Philippine state to project itself as a benevolent authority that was able to attend to the needs of all Filipinos regardless of their religion and ethnicity even as it perpetuated the economic marginalization of Muslims. Marcos, for example, ordered the building of more mosques, declared Muslim holidays as legal holidays, established Islamic cultural institutions, codified Muslim laws, allowed the use of Arabic for teaching, and so on (Che Man 1990). And yet, it was telling that the autonomy agreement that temporarily put an end to the fighting in 1977 singled out control over Mindanao's mines and mineral resources as among those powers not to be given to the Moro autonomous government.

The Moros had also found that collective identity and the notion of a shared and distinct history are not something that they alone could invoke. Moro identity has had to face and respond to the sharpening of the collective identities of other peoples living within the area claimed by the Moros as their homeland. Starting in the mid-1970s, the non-Muslim and non-Christian indigenous people in Mindanao also began asserting their own identity and claims. Some organized their own resistance groups to protect themselves from the onslaught of migration or to fight for the restoration of their ancestral lands (May 1992; Rodil 1992). In some areas, their claims to their own ancestral domains conflict with those of the Moros. With new generations from settler families being born in Mindanao, another identity – a "Mindanaoan" collective embracing those who claim to have roots in the region, including the descendants of those who migrated from elsewhere – has also recently emerged. Invoking this new identity, some have, like the Moros, also called for independence or for their own state in a federal system. Apart from these, there has been a rise in so-called "tri-people" movements that seek to bring together people with different identities – Moros, indigenous peoples, and Christian settlers – on socioeconomic and political issues, as well as on the question of self-determination.

These other identities and their corresponding political projects have challenged the Moros' claim to a nation founded on a "Moro" identity. In the process, the construction of such an identity has been evolving. For some, this identity is defined by but not limited to Islam; in other words, it appears to be more of a cultural than an exclusively religious identity. Reflecting this, the MNLF has since indicated that the term "Moro" also includes Christians and other non-Muslim indigenous people who inhabit the territory they claim as their homeland and who choose to be part of the Moro nation (Gutierrez 2000). Though the MILF has also taken this position, it is unclear whether non-Muslims would be given rights over lands they consider their ancestral domains (Liow 2006).

Prospects

Despite its failure to achieve its objectives, Moro nationalism remains resonant. In fact, as a reference for an identity, "Moro" has gained more traction through the years: more people now identify themselves as "Moros," in addition to or in place of "Filipino" than in the past (Wadi 2006). Helped in no small measure by continuing military offensives and abuses against Moros and by their relative misery compared to others, support for the goals of Moro nationalism remains widespread. Its armed component significantly degraded and assistance from external supporters diminished, the Moro movements, particularly that of the MILF, have since shifted to mass mobilization and building institutions in an attempt to consolidate and expand their internal sources of power.

In spite of its failure, Moro nationalism's achievements in bringing attention to the Moros' marginalization and in mobilizing Moros to attempt to change their condition and status cannot be underestimated. But while the Moro nationalist movements, as anti-colonial struggles, have challenged the Moros' relations with the Philippine state, whether they would eventually lead to the transformation of Moro society is another question altogether.

At the outset, the Moro vision for a new nation did not advance specific plans for overturning the concentration of wealth and power within Moro society. While Misuari and Salamat had both advocated the abolition of precolonial traditional institutions and structures, they have

since implicitly accepted and retained their existence (McKenna 2000). Neither the MNLF nor the MILF have had concrete proposals on whether and how to allocate lands claimed as the Muslims' ancestral domain or how to distribute the gains from their natural resources. The land issue was neither raised nor resolved during the MNLF's peace negotiations with the government (Gutierrez & Borrás 2004). Even when they assumed limited power as part of the autonomous government established as a result of the peace agreements, addressing issues of social justice was not among the priorities. In fact, Misuari and the MNLF leadership later chose to join a coalition led by the conservative Philippine ruling party that included among its ranks many Filipino elites and politicians opposed to progressive reforms. That the new Moro elites had only set out to replace the Filipino elites in oppressing Muslims – that they are more "counter-elites" than "revolutionaries" – has been a standing apprehension.

So far, Moro nationalists have only sought to prove that the emancipation of Moros within Moro society is not possible within the context of Moro subordination within the Philippines. That independence or autonomy could subsequently lead to Moro emancipation within Moro society remains, depending on where one stands, both a threat and a promise.

SEE ALSO: Huk Rebellion, 1946–1954; Qaddafi, Muammar al- (b. 1942)

References and Suggested Readings

- Abinales, P. N. (2000) *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Abinales, P. N. & Amoroso, D. J. (2005) *State and Society in the Philippines*. Pasig City: Anvil.
- Ahmad, A. (2000a) Class and Colony in Mindanao. In K. Gaerlan & M. Stankovitch (Eds.), *Rebels, Warlords, and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines*. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy.
- Ahmad, A. (2000b) The War against the Muslims. In K. Gaerlan & M. Stankovitch (Eds.), *Rebels, Warlords, and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines*. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy.
- Brown, D. (1988) From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations: Separatism in Southeast Asia. *Pacific Affairs* 61, 1 (Spring): 51–77.
- Che Man, W. K. (1990) *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of*

- Southern Thailand*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Collier, K. (1992) The Theoretical Problems of Insurgency in Mindanao: Why Theory? Why Mindanao? In M. Turner, R. J. May, & L. Respass Turner (Eds.), *Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise*. Quezon City: New Day.
- Gaerlan, K. & Stankovitch, M. (Eds.) (2000) *Rebels, Warlords, and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines*. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy.
- George, T. J. S. (1980) *Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Gowing, P. (1979) *Muslim Filipinos: Heritage and Horizon*. Quezon City: New Day.
- Gutierrez, E. (2000) The Reimagination of the Bangsamoro: 30 Years Hence. In K. Gaerlan & M. Stankovitch (Eds.), *Rebels, Warlords, and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines*. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy.
- Gutierrez, E. & Borrás, Jr., S. (2004) The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies. *East-West Center Policy Studies* 8.
- Liow, J. C. (2006) Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion Ideology and Politics. *East-West Center Policy Studies* 24.
- McKenna, T. M. (2000) *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*. Pasig City: Anvil.
- Majul, C. A. (1985) *Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*. Berkeley: Mizan Press.
- Majul, C. A. (1999) *Muslims in the Philippines*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
- May, R. J. (1992) The Wild West in the South: A Recent Political History of Mindanao. In M. Turner, R. J. May, & L. Respass Turner (Eds.), *Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise*. Quezon City: New Day.
- Mercado, Jr., E. R. (1992) The Moro People's Struggle for Self-Determination. In M. Turner, R. J. May, & L. Respass Turner (Eds.), *Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise*. Quezon City: New Day.
- Noble, L. (1980) The Philippines: Muslims Fight for an Independent State. *Southeast Asia Chronicle* 75 (October).
- Rodil, B. R. (1992) Ancestral Domain: A Central Issue in the Lumad Struggle for Self-Determination in Mindanao. In M. Turner, R. J. May, & L. Respass Turner (Eds.), *Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise*. Quezon City: New Day.
- Tadem, E. C. (1992) The Political Economy of Mindanao: An Overview. In M. Turner, R. J. May, & L. Respass Turner (Eds.), *Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise*. Quezon City: New Day.
- Tan, S. K. (1995) The Socioeconomic Dimension of Moro Secessionism. *Mindanao Studies Report* 1.
- Turner, M., May, R. J., & Respass Turner, L. (Eds.) (1992) *Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise*. Quezon City: New Day.
- Vitug, M. D. & Gloria, G. M. (2000) *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao*. Manila: Institute for Popular Democracy and Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs.
- Wadi, J. M. (2006) Islamic Nationalism and Philippine Politics. In T. Encarnacion-Tadem & N. M. Morada (Eds.), *Philippine Politics and Governance: Challenges to Democratization and Development*. Quezon City: Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines.
- Wright-Neville, D. (2004) Dangerous Dynamics: Activists, Militants, and Terrorists in Southeast Asia. *Pacific Review* 17, 1 (March).

Morocco, protests, 1600s–1990s

Justin Corfield

At the time of the fall of Granada, the Wattasid dynasty that controlled northern Morocco saw its power challenged by the Portuguese who had taken the port of Ceuta in 1415, and were capturing other ports along Morocco's coast, such as Ksar-es-Seghir, which they held from 1458 until 1550. Portuguese power continued to grow, capturing Tangier in 1471 and the Atlantic port city of Asilah (or Arzila), both major strongholds in Morocco. In 1478 the Portuguese sacked the city of Casablanca, building a new city on the same site a hundred years later, calling it Casabranca; and nine years later they established a castle at Larache but only managed to hold it for one year. They also managed to take Mogador (modern-day Essaouira), where the Portuguese fort was built in 1506; the ports of Safi which was captured in 1508, Mazagan (modern-day El Jadida) which was taken in 1513; and Agadir, captured in 1515, in which year they also attacked Marrakesh but failed to take the city.

The loss to Morocco of so many of its ports was not only humiliating but caused a massive fall in the revenue of the Wattasid dynasty, which was overthrown in 1554 by a rival group of Berbers, with the Saadi dynasty coming to power. Their power base was in the south of Morocco, which they had controlled since 1509. They also claimed descent from Fatima Zahra, the daughter of the

Prophet Mohammad, and Ali ibn Abi Talib, her husband – their son, the Prophet's grandson, being al-Hasan bin Ali, resulting in the dynasty being known as Hasanis.

The Saadi dynasty was able to rally the Berbers and use them to resist the Portuguese better than their predecessors. They started attacking isolated Portuguese bases and in 1541 were able to take back both Agadir and Mogador, and forced the Portuguese to abandon the port of Safi. The Portuguese attacked again and retook Agadir, and then reinforced the city of Asilah, which served as their military headquarters for the region. In 1578 King Dom Sebastian of Portugal landed his large expeditionary force at Asilah and from there struck out to attack the Moroccans at Fès (Fez). In many ways the young King Sebastian wanted to become one of the leading warriors for Christian Europe in the same way as Don John of Austria had become famous around Europe after defeating the Turkish navy at Lepanto in 1571.

The military and political aims of the Portuguese were to seize Fès and to depose the sultan, Abdel Malik, and replace him with Mulai Mohammed, the former ruler of Fès, who became a claimant to the Moroccan throne. His force never reached Fès, but met 8 miles north of Ksar-el-Kebir where the 20,000-strong Portuguese force, which included English artillerymen, and also allies of Mulai Mohammed, faced 50,000 Moroccans under Abdel Malik. The battle, which became known as the Battle of the Three Kings, took place on August 5, 1578, and resulted in a crushing defeat for the Portuguese, who were overwhelmed by the Moroccan infantry, many recruited from families originally from Andalusia, and also the cavalry, which included horsemen from the Middle Atlas. Sebastian, Mulai Mohammed, and Abdel Malik were all killed in the battle. For Morocco, it led to Ahmed el Mansour ascending the throne. For the Portuguese, Sebastian had no children, so the throne passed to his great-uncle Henry. He was a cardinal and also had no children. This meant that when he died, King Philip II of Spain inherited the Portuguese throne. Philip was keener to expand his realms in the New World, and the Moroccans took advantage of this to attack the Portuguese and Spanish. The Moroccans recaptured Asilah in 1589 and used Mazagan as their main trading base to refit ships heading towards Asia. The Portuguese kept this until it was taken

by siege in 1769. Ceuta and Melilla were to be taken over by the Spanish and remain with them to the present day.

Ahmed el Mansour, "The Victorious," reigned from 1578 until 1603. He managed to expand the Kingdom of Morocco until it controlled some of the goldfields in West Africa, and was able to model his kingdom on that of the Ottoman emperors. Loyalty to the dynasty was more important than religious persuasion and Ahmed el Mansour included in his army many Christians, as did the Ottomans. The El Badia Palace in Marrakech was another of Ahmed el Mansour's achievements.

In 1603 Ahmed el Mansour died, beginning a bitter succession war that destroyed much of the country and suppressed the sultans of the Saadi dynasty, who spent most of their reigns in their palaces in Marrakech, unable to exercise any real power. From 1627 until 1666 there was a short-lived Republic of Bou Regreg which operated from the cities of Rabat and Salé. The assassination of the last Hasani Sharif who ruled as sultan of Morocco, in 1653, led to a renewed power struggle that saw Mohammad al-Sharif taking control of much of the country. He had been sultan of Sijilmasa until 1646, when he was expelled from there, and as sultan of Rafilalt gradually emerged as the major power in the country. In 1659 his son, styled Mohammad II, took control of Morocco, founding the Alaouite dynasty. However, he died soon afterwards and his brother al-Rashid was proclaimed the sultan of Morocco in Fès on October 22, 1664 and established a dynasty which lasts to the present day. In 1672 al-Rashid's brother or half-brother, Mulay Ismail al-Samin, the viceroy of Fès, became sultan of Morocco and reigned until 1727. During the period of his rule Morocco went through a new era of prosperity.

Mulay Ismail al-Samin restored the power and prestige of the Moroccan monarchy. He managed to eject the Portuguese from most of their forts – Portugal having broken from Spain in 1640–1. The English, who had taken over Tangier in 1661 – it was part of the dowry of the Portuguese princess, Catherine of Braganza, when she married the British king, Charles II – were forced to evacuate the city in 1686. Mulay Ismail also drove back the power of the Ottomans in the east, back to the modern-day border between Morocco and Algeria. He also led his forces against rebellious mountain tribes. Many of the Moroccan

castles were refortified, and new bridges were built and towns founded. Mulay Ismail also cracked down on many cults which operated in Morocco, spending money on approved mosques and shrines.

One of Mulay Ismail's most lasting legacies was the move from the existing capitals of Fès and Marrakech to Meknes, where he built a large palace to base his enormous army. It maintained law and order throughout the country, with stories about the place being safe for travelers. Mulay Ismail is also credited with building up one of the largest harems in modern history. In 1703 one account stated that he had 525 sons and 342 daughters, with another noting that he had 40 sons born during four months of 1704. By 1721 some authorities claim that he had fathered 700 sons, and the last child, acknowledged by the baby's mother as being a son of Mulay Ismail, was born 18 months after the death of the king in 1727. This led to much rivalry in court, with palace intrigue being reported on a daily basis.

Largely on account of his enormous family, when Mulay Ismail died in 1727 the country was torn apart by civil strife. There had been revolts during his lifetime, with one son, Mulay Abd al-Malik, being beheaded in 1696 for plotting against his father. In total seven of his sons served as kings, with one of them, Mulay abd Allah, reigning as king on four separate occasions. His son Sidi Mohammed succeeded him, reigning from 1757 until 1790. He ruled wisely and led his forces to victory against the Portuguese, who were finally ejected from the port of Mazagan. Sidi Mohammed concentrated on establishing an important trading base at Mogador, rebuilding the finances of the kingdom. His main efforts were spent in trying to prevent European powers from becoming too strong in the country. This he achieved largely by playing them off against each other, and preventing access to him by any one power.

However, when Sidi Mohammed died, his eldest son Mulay al-Yazid only ruled for two years. Mulay al-Yazid was killed in battle in 1792, and was succeeded by his half-brother Mulay Hisham, whose reign saw a continued civil war, ending with Mulay Suleiman ascending the throne in 1796. He restored law and order throughout the country and reigned until 1822. Mulay Suleiman tried to isolate Morocco from European powers and was frightened by the power unleashed by the French Revolution. He

imposed an import duty of 50 percent and banned exports. When he was offered the Spanish bases of Ceuta and Melilla he refused when it meant that he would have to recognize Joseph Bonaparte as king of Spain.

Confining all European consuls to Tangier, Mulay Suleiman established a system which was to continue for much of the nineteenth century. While Europeans were able to get into some Moroccan ports, Tangier became the center of European influence, and as a result the sultans never returned to their palaces in that city, with the royal representative there, Si Mohammed Torres, doing his utmost to delay any approaches to the Moroccan sultan. During this time the sultans moved court between Fès, Meknes, Rabat, and Marrakech.

The French were the first European power since the Portuguese to be eager to seize Morocco. They had had great success in Algeria and modern-day Tunisia, and sought to replicate this in Morocco. The French destroyed a Moroccan army at the Battle of Isly, near Oujda, on August 14, 1844, and bombarded Tangier and Mogador. Some tribes sensed that the sultan, Mulay abd al-Rahman, nephew of Mulay Sulaiman, was powerless, and they rose up in revolt. The sultan realized that he had little hope of defeating the French in battle and decided that his best form of resistance was to encourage jealousy among the other European powers. This worked to a certain extent, but in 1856 the Treaty of Tangier removed all restrictions on trade, except for the sultan's monopoly over the buying and selling of tobacco and firearms. A flat 10 percent rate of customs duty was also introduced, as were consular courts which existed to try foreigners and people under foreign protection. The initial aim of the latter was to help middlemen working for European powers, to prevent them being attacked in time of crisis. However, it led to open abuses, with some European consuls selling "protection." Many European consuls started charging local businessmen and farmers in exchange for offering protection. The Portuguese and Brazilian ministers were the most notorious in terms of selling protection and this abuse by consuls quickly led to protests from the Moroccans. The Moroccan court lost much-needed revenue as those under foreign protection were exempted from paying taxes. Some also flouted Moroccan laws. However, the Moroccan court was helpless. It had

formed into factions, with some supporting one or other European power, and others urging for a total break with the Europeans and Americans.

In October 1859 Spain declared war on Morocco in a dispute over the borders of the Ceuta enclave, with tribesmen protesting the encroachment of the Spanish into their lives. Spanish soldiers captured Tetuan in February 1860, and after British mediation, peace was agreed in return for an expansion of the enclave, and also the payment of a massive indemnity of 100 million pesetas by the Moroccans to the Spanish, draining the Moroccan treasury. Spain was also able to take over land on the Atlantic coast which became the Ifni enclave, ceded on April 26, 1860. As the Spanish wanted payment before they handed back Tetuan, they negotiated a loan with the British who, in return for lending the money, insisted that the customs revenue of the Kingdom of Morocco be controlled by them and Spain.

Over the next forty years there was a massive increase in the number of Europeans and Americans who, by 1900, numbered 10,000. Soon they controlled almost every port in the country, although most of the population remained in Tangier and Casablanca. Sultan Mulay Hassan (r. 1873–94) started to introduce modernizations to try to rebuild the finances of the kingdom and prevent runaway inflation. His reform program ran into protests from conservatives who did not like the idea of students being sent to European universities to study western ideas on medicine, engineering, and military science. He also tried to stabilize the currency, and at the Conference of Madrid in 1880 he tried to limit the influence of foreign consuls giving protection. Most of the American and European countries did not respect the new regulations he had introduced.

With the European powers vying for influence in Morocco, it was only the intense rivalry of these powers that stopped any single country annexing Morocco. The French certainly wanted to take over the kingdom, as they had done in neighboring Algeria. However, the Spanish were nervous at having France in control of the other side of the Straits of Gibraltar. The British were worried about the influence of both the French and the Spanish, and the main Italian aim became getting the other powers to recognize their claim to Libya.

All this infighting, as well as the lack of power of the sultans, led to the gradual collapse of the

central administration, with tribal chiefs taking over sections of the country, especially in the High Atlas Mountains, a problem that was to hamper the French and Spanish only after they had taken control of Morocco. In 1902 an English missionary, David Cooper, was murdered in Fès. In one of the most celebrated incidents, in 1904 an American millionaire, Ion Perdicaris, was kidnapped near Tangier, leading to the United States sending in its navy.

In 1904 Sultan Abdul Aziz borrowed 50 million francs from a consortium of French banks, and they imposed strict conditions that allowed the French greater access to the country. In 1905 nine Europeans were murdered in Casablanca and in the following year, at the Conference of Algeciras, the Moroccans were forced to make further concessions, with the French able to seize more of the oases along the western border with Algeria. Many of the Moroccans did not like these developments and in 1907 some Europeans in Marrakech and Casablanca were lynched by city mobs. The French immediately landed soldiers to protect their citizens, and in the fighting which followed, neither side took prisoners.

At this juncture the Germans tried to intervene and used protests against one of their companies as an opportunity to send a warship to Agadir in July 1911. In what became known as the Agadir Incident, the Germans eventually climbed down, anxious to avoid a war with France which they were to welcome three years later. The French and the Spanish then forced the sultan of Morocco to sign the Treaty of Fès on March 30, 1912. This divided Morocco between the two European powers. The French ended up with all the major ports, with the Spanish left with the northern coast of Morocco, centered on Tetuan, some desert south of the Draa Valley – what was going to become known as the Spanish Sahara – and also the enclave of Ifni. Legally, the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla remained parts of Spain, as did Cape Juby (which was later sold to the sultan of Morocco) and Ifni (which was held until 1969).

The Treaty of Fès was heavily opposed by many Moroccans who rose up and in Fès some eighty Europeans were lynched, with anti-French nationalists seizing control of some of the city. Tribal leaders in southern Morocco raised an army estimated at 12,000 to oppose the French, but the French were easily able to overcome this, and by September 1912 had occupied

Marrakech. The French also used the Glaoui brothers, former court officials, to arm a local militia and take control of most of the rest of the country. The outbreak of World War I prevented the French sending in any more soldiers.

The most sustained attempt to eject the French from Morocco during the 1920s was the Rif Rebellion, which saw tribesmen led by Abdel Krim resisting both the French and Spanish forces. Initially, the European powers did not take the rebellion seriously. It started with tribesmen contesting Spanish control over Melilla and quickly spread. On July 22, 1921 the whole nature of the war changed when the Rif were able to defeat a Spanish army at the Battle of Annual. At this point the Spanish, and also the French, decided that they would need to launch larger and better-equipped expeditions against the Rif. Eventually, large numbers of French and Spanish soldiers were deployed to Morocco where, in combined operations, they were able to drive back the Rif. Marshal Pétain controlled many of the French forces, which included large numbers of French Foreign Legionnaires. On the Spanish side, the Spanish army and the Spanish Foreign Legion fought under General Manuel Silvestre, with Lieutenant Francisco Franco distinguishing himself at a number of engagements and leading the Spanish Foreign Legion.

The war saw the Spanish use chemical weapons against the Rif, with neither side taking prisoners. The ferocity of the Spanish Foreign Legion and the better discipline of the French eventually proved too much for the Rif, but it was not until 1936 that the Rif Rebellion ended. Later that year the Spanish bases in Morocco were to be used as a launching pad for the Spanish Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War.

The French exploited the great agricultural and mineral wealth of Morocco, with French banks involved in financing the public works programs which saw the infrastructure of the country vastly improved. Railways, roads, ports, and dams were built, as were hospitals and schools, although many of the latter catered largely for the growing European population. In terms of land ownership the French and French companies owned much of the fertile land in Morocco. The numbers grew so much that by 1951 there were 325,000 Europeans in Morocco, of which 5,000 served as a ruling minority, with 80,000 being poor.

The fall of France in 1940 led to the installation of a pro-German Vichy regime in southern

France and also in many colonial possessions, including Morocco. In Morocco, with its large Jewish population, Sultan Mohammad V protected all of them from persecution. Many of them had been among the court's most loyal subjects for centuries, and there had always been a significant Jewish presence at the Moroccan court.

In November 1942 the British–American landings known as Operation Torch led to the Allies taking control of Morocco, which was then placed in the hands of the Free French government-in-exile of Charles de Gaulle. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Franklin Roosevelt expressed his views in support of Moroccan independence after World War II to Sultan Mohammad V. Large numbers of Moroccan soldiers served with the Free French and participated in the storming of the monastery at Monte Cassino in Italy, and also the breaking of the Gustav Line in central Italy.

After World War II the French were clearly not going to grant independence to Morocco, and the Spanish were also keen on retaining control over their zones and enclaves. The Moroccans urged for independence, starting protests around the Istaqlal nationalist movement. The French responded by arresting hundreds of nationalists in January 1952. In 1953, with Mohammad V so clearly supporting the moves for independence in Morocco, the French deposed him and put his father's first cousin, Muhammed Ben Aarafa, on the throne. Mohammad was exiled to Madagascar where he continued to agitate for independence. In 1954 war broke out in Algeria as Algerian nationalists started fighting the French, and in the summer of 1955 widespread civil disobedience protests took place all over Morocco urging for the return of the sultan and the ejection of the French.

The French finally decided to leave Morocco, and also Tunisia, and focus their attention on Algeria. The Spanish also agreed to end their occupation of the Spanish zone, but decided to hold on to the Spanish Sahara, and also their enclaves of Ceuta, Melilla, and Ifni. The international authorities who had maintained the city of Tangier as an international settlement since 1923 also agreed to give that up, and in November 1955 Mohammad V returned to Morocco where he received a tumultuous welcome. On March 2, 1956 Morocco gained its independence from France, and on April 7, from Spain.

Although Mohammad V had determined that the monarchy should remain in control of Morocco, Istaqlal, the only national political party in the country, which had taken such a prominent role in pushing for independence, tried to resist. Things came to a head when Mohammad V insisted that the monarchy, and not the Cabinet, should control the army and the ministry of the interior. The result was that in 1959 a left-wing faction of Istaqlal broke away and under the leadership of a nationalist firebrand, Ben Barka, they formed the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), which gained support from some of the trade union movement to form an alliance with the Moroccan Workers' Union (UMT), the main labor union. While the king had the support of the Berbers, Istaqlal started to gain support in the cities. As a result, the *Mouvement Populaire* was established to rally support for the monarchy.

At this juncture there was a rebellion in the Rif, and with tribal chiefs in the Sahara and Middle Atlas challenging central control, the royal army was placed under the leadership of Crown Prince Hassan, and campaigned with great success. On February 26, 1961 King Mohammad V died and Hassan II became king. He immediately distanced himself from the UNFP and formed a coalition government with members drawn from the *Mouvement Populaire* and Istaqlal. On December 7, 1962 a referendum was held and Morocco's first democratic constitution was approved by a very large majority (3,733,816 to 113,199 votes). The constitution was promulgated on December 14, 1962. King Hassan II then reshuffled his Cabinet on January 4, 1963, sacking the members of Istaqlal from his government, and then went to the polls.

On May 17, 1963 the first parliamentary elections were held in Morocco, with the *Mouvement Populaire* obtaining strong support from Marrakech, the Berber hinterland, and the area along the border with Algeria. Istaqlal won support in the old cities and wealthy farming areas such as Doukkala, Tadia, and the Rharb, while the UNFP gained its support from Casablanca, Agadir, and Rabat. Municipal and communal elections were held on June 28, and elections for the House of Councillors (the Upper House) were held on October 4.

With the UNFP supporting the socialist and republican policies of Egypt and Algeria, after the royalists won a victory in the local elections

in July 1963 – amid allegations of rigging – the king arrested some 130 UNFP leaders and they were charged with treason. There had been border incidents from July until October 1962, and in October 1963 war broke out between Morocco and Algeria. Ben Barka, in exile in France, urged the Moroccan soldiers to mutiny. There was consternation in Morocco and he disappeared soon afterwards. Two French officers were later sent to prison for their role in his kidnapping, and several Moroccans were accused of his murder.

King Hassan II proclaimed a new constitution in August 1970 – it had been approved in a referendum on July 24 boycotted by Istaqlal and the UNFP. The constitution increased royal power and influence over parliament. Although there were protests organized by Istaqlal, in July 1971 there was the first of two coup attempts, with some of the military launching an attack on the king. It began with 1,400 cadets under the command of Colonel Abadou moving from Fès to Rabat. They attacked the king while he was holding a party at Skhirat, with guests attending an informal function which included most of the civil and military leaders in the country, as well as the foreign diplomatic corps and Habib Bourguiba Jr, the son of the president of Tunisia. When the shooting started, General Mohammed Oufkir persuaded the king to retire to a room in the royal palace and General Medbouh, a close advisor of the king, left the royal party to treat with the rebels. He was shot dead by accident – it subsequently became clear that he was one of the rebels – and soon afterwards Colonel Abadou and many of the other rebels withdrew, trying to take power in Rabat. The rebellion, without its leader, was quickly crushed and four generals, all of whom had served in the French army in World War II and in Indochina, five colonels, and a major were court martialled, found guilty, and executed. General Oufkir was immediately appointed as the minister of defense.

Although the coup was widely covered by the press, the truth about who was behind the July 1971 attack was not revealed until the following year, when there was another coup attempt. This took place on August 16, when the personal aircraft of King Hassan was flying back from Barcelona to Rabat. Crossing the Moroccan coast at Tetuan, four Moroccan air force fighters intercepted his plane and opened fire. Two of the three engines of the royal jet were damaged, and

the pilot sent out deliberately false broadcasts that the king had been killed. This persuaded the fighters to call off the attack. When the king's plane landed, the fighters attacked Rabat Airport after realizing they had been fooled and had lost their main attempt to kill the king. Jet fighters then attacked the royal palace where the king had sought refuge. One of the pilots, with his plane running out of fuel, parachuted into the sea, where he was captured, and two others escaped to Gibraltar by helicopter, and were quickly deported to Morocco in spite of there being no extradition treaty between the British and Morocco.

Rapid investigations by an enraged King Hassan led to the discovery that General Mohammed Oufkir, the minister of the interior, had been behind the 1971 assassination attempt and was heavily involved in the new coup attempt. It appeared that Oufkir had gone to the airport's control tower to call on the fighters to continue their attack on the king. The revelation of Oufkir's involvement surprised many observers, as the general was close to the king and had been the man accused by a French court of the abduction and murder of Ben Barka seven years earlier. Oufkir himself had been responsible for cracking down on protestors and enforcing royal power in the country.

Oufkir's family were thrown into prison and only emerged in 1991, with his daughter Malika writing *La Prisonnière* about her experiences. Although she suggests that her father wanted to introduce a more liberal government to Morocco, given his previous record most commentators suggest that General Oufkir wanted to preside over a military dictatorship. On the day after the air attack, the Moroccan government announced that Oufkir had committed suicide "out of shame," although it was later revealed that he was shot dead, possibly by the king, angered that one of his former closest confidants had turned against him.

In March 1973 some armed men crossed the Algerian–Moroccan border with the hope of inspiring a left-wing insurrection against King Hassan. This failed disastrously when nobody rose up to support them. Some of the insurgents were captured and put on trial.

Moroccan soldiers fought on the Golan front in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and also fought in Zaire on the side of the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, who later fled to Morocco when he was driven from the country.

In November 1975 King Hassan launched a nationalist movement which became known as the Green March. Gambling on Spanish uncertainty following the death of General Franco in November 1975, Hassan sent 350,000 civilians into the Spanish Sahara to wrest control from Spain. Ifni had already been returned to Morocco on June 30, 1969. The Spanish Sahara had been an economic liability to Spain for many years, and the Spanish did not resist. However, the annexation of the Spanish Sahara by Morocco was not unopposed. Some of the tribal groups in the Sahara formed the Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro), a political movement that gained support from Algeria, Mauritania, and Libya and started what became known as the Saharan War.

Morocco responded by building up garrisons in the region between 1981 and 1987. Using massive sand walls, regularly patrolled by the Moroccan military, they were able to prevent the Polisario guerillas from infiltrating into the former Spanish Sahara. In 1989, under the auspices of the United Nations, King Hassan met the leaders of the Polisario Front in Marrakech for talks, and three years later the "foreign minister" of the Polisario government-in-exile defected to Morocco.

The cost of the Saharan War – about \$1 billion a year – strained the Moroccan budget. However, King Hassan had gained much popularity. The first major protests of the late 1970s were not against him but followed the arrival of the shah of Iran at Marrakech on January 22, 1979. This led to teachers and students, who saw the shah as representing dictatorship, marching in the streets alongside Islamic fundamentalists who supported the new regime in Iran. After a month in Morocco, King Hassan had to ask the shah to leave, and the demonstrations quickly died down.

In June 1981 Morocco had to call on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for money to bail out a faltering economy. The IMF insisted that in return for their loans, state subsidies had to end. Protests erupted against the austerity measures, with demonstrations in some Moroccan cities turning into insurrections, leading to confrontations with riot police.

Although the royalists won the June 1983 local government elections, the subsequent parliamentary elections were cancelled by the king who, in October 1983, assumed emergency powers.

He formed a Cabinet from a broad coalition, dividing his opponents. However, with the economy suffering badly, another IMF loan was sought, and this led to the Moroccan government having to drive through a harder austerity plan. Rioting became worse but ended with the arrest of leading dissidents.

In the summer of 1984 the Moroccan government held fresh parliamentary elections, with a turnout of 67.4 percent. A moderate government took office soon afterwards. By this time the tourism industry was flourishing on the basis of cheap flights from Europe. The economy stabilized and in 1989 the Maghrebi Union Treaty was signed which saw a strong alliance between Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, and Tunisia.

In August 1990, with the outbreak of the Gulf War following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, King Hassan initially promised soldiers to the Allied side, but massive protests throughout Morocco – some of the largest in favor of Saddam Hussein in the entire Arab world – led to the Moroccan government deciding later to call back their 13,000 soldiers. In 1991 Amnesty International published a report highlighting 350 political prisoners in the country, although noting considerable improvements in human rights since the 1960s. Parliamentary elections were held on November 14, 1997 with a relatively high turnout, in spite of Islamist groups urging for a boycott of the polls. In a significant move, on July 14, 1999 the Moroccan army joined the Bastille Day Parade in Paris, an event previously unimaginable.

The death of King Hassan on July 23, 1999 led to his only son becoming King Mohammed VI. The new government was even more openly pro-western. It also made moves towards loosening its control over the country. Parliamentary elections were held on September 27, 2002. Bombings in Casablanca on May 16, 2003 led to the deaths of 45 people, 12 of whom were the bombers. Mohammed VI's firm stance after the bombing gained him much support from the people, and he continued with his reforms.

On September 8, 2006, when the next elections were held, there were blatant irregularities and subsequently 67 people (including some parliamentarians) were arrested for electoral fraud, a move unprecedented in Moroccan politics. The Moroccan parliament has been involved in debating the abolition of capital punishment.

Although engaging more closely with the West, Morocco is however still angered by the Spanish continuing to hold on to Ceuta and Melilla, with nationalists regularly demonstrating over these enclaves.

SEE ALSO: Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962; Francophone Africa, Protest and Independence; Tunisian Independence Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Bidwell, R. (1973) *Morocco Under Colonial Rule: French Administration of the Tribal Areas 1912–1956*. London: Cass.
- Burke, E. (1976) *Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco 1860–1912*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Entelis, J. P. (1989) *Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Hassan II (1978) *The Challenge: The Memoirs of King Hassan II of Morocco*. London: Macmillan.
- Oufkir, M. (2000) *La Prisonnière*. London: Doubleday.
- Porch, D. (1986) *The Conquest of Morocco*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Sater, J. N. (2007) *Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco*. London: Routledge.
- Woolman, D. (1994) In Spanish Morocco, Two Berber Brothers Became a Legend in their Guerrilla War Against Two European Powers. *Military History* 10 (part 6): 12–16, 84–5.
- Woolman, D. (1997) Did Theodore Roosevelt Overreact When an American was Kidnapped in Morocco? Were Seven Warships Really Necessary? *Military History* 14 (part 4): 16 & 79.
- Yahya, D. (1984) Morocco in the Sixteenth Century: Problems and Patterns in African Foreign Policy. *Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines* 18, 1: 252–3.

Morones, Luis Napoleon (1890–1946)

Leticia Pacheco Espejel

Luis Napoleon Morones was born in Tlapán, a section of Mexico City. In Mexico City he worked at the Telephone Company of Mexico (now Telmex – Telefonos de México), where he remained until he became involved in politics in 1923. Unlike most anarchosyndicalists, who focused on direct action, Morones put his faith in the reform process.

Morones played an important role in Mexico's labor movement. In 1918 he helped found the

Regional Mexican Workers' Confederation (Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana, CROM), which was the first Mexican confederation of workers. This group later became the Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos, CTM). In 1919, Morones's participation in the creation of the Panamerican Federation of Labor (PFL) was fundamental. The PFL foundation had an enormous influence on the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in the US, and Morones was in contact with the AFL during his visits to Laredo in 1918. The presidency of the PFL was occupied by the North American Samuel Gompers, who was a member and founder of the AFL. This situation was heavily criticized by Mexican politicians, who considered it an intrusion by the United States into internal affairs. Morones was also founder and an active member of the Casa del Obrero Mundial. In 1922 he founded the workers' newspaper, *El Sol*.

Morones was known for his reform ideas, which were related to the constitutional ideas of Mexican President Venustiano Carranza, who defended the Constitution of 1917. This constitution contained labor provisions such as the right to strike and the eight-hour workday. Morones remained true to Carranzismo throughout the presidency, which lasted from 1917 to 1920.

When Carranza was murdered by party followers of Alvaro Obregón in 1921, Morones, who was minister of defense, joined Obregón, who served as president of Mexico from 1920 to 1924. Morones became head of industrial plants of the ministry of defense and mines. Under Obregón's successor, Plutarco Elías Calles, he became minister of industry and commerce. After Lázaro Cárdenas assumed the presidency in 1934, Morones, along with Calles's other supporters, known as "Callistas," were exiled to the United States.

In 1937 Morones returned to Mexico and resumed his activity with the CROM. He died in Mexico City in 1964.

SEE ALSO: Anarchosindicalism; Cárdenas, Lázaro (1895–1970); Casa del Obrero Mundial; Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Obregón, Alvaro (1880–1928) and the Sonoran Generation

References and Suggested Readings

Diccionario Porrúa de Historia, Biografía y Geografía (1976) Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa.

Retinger, H. & Hieronim, J. (1926) *Morones of Mexico: A History of the Labor in that Country*. London: Labour Publishers.

Morris, William (1834–1896)

Jason M. Kelly

William Morris was a writer, designer, and political activist. One of the early exponents of the aesthetic approach, later known as the Arts and Crafts movement, his intellectual breadth was seemingly boundless. His father, William Morris (1797–1847), was a speculative investor, and his success provided the young William with a luxurious childhood and a financially secure life dominated by the romantic medievalism of the age. He devoured the works of Sir Walter Scott and even had his own suit of armor. His fascination with medieval literature and history fed his imagination, and probably contributed to his embrace of the Oxford Movement, which dominated the teaching at Marlborough College, his school between 1848 and 1851.

The Oxford Movement was a high-church movement that criticized the secularism of nineteenth-century Anglicanism. It emphasized the continuities between Roman Catholicism and the Church of England, both theologically and liturgically, and attempted to steer the church towards its origins. He entered Exeter College, Oxford in 1853, hoping to join the clergy and continue the reform of the Church of England begun by the founders of the Oxford Movement.

At Oxford, Morris found a friend in Ned Jones (later Edward Burne-Jones), who was also drawn to Anglo-Catholicism and shared his desire for the transformation of Victorian society. It was through the writing of John Ruskin that Morris and Burne-Jones found their model for reform. Morris, already disaffected with the art of industrial Britain, read Ruskin's *Stones of Venice* (1851–3) soon after it was published, taking note of Ruskin's observation that the Industrial Revolution had sapped British workers of their creative energy. Not only were their labor and social conditions atrocious, but repetitive and mindless factory work had robbed them of their humanity. Ruskin argued that while labor was a necessary element of life, the manufacture of goods need not be oppressive.

After taking his degree at Oxford, Morris devoted himself to the arts, joining his friend Burne-Jones in London, where they associated themselves with the Pre-Raphaelites. Under the influence of Dante Gabriel Rossetti, they committed themselves to painting, even as Morris experimented in the fields of poetry and the decorative arts. Through Rossetti, Morris met Jane Burden, whom he married in 1859. After that, he began a new phase in his life as the patron-employer to the Pre-Raphaelites and the nascent Arts and Crafts movement.

In 1859–60 he worked with his friend Philip Webb to design the medievalist Red House in Kent. Unwilling to furnish it with products of modern industry, he called upon his friends to design the furnishings. This was the germ of Morris, Marshall, Faulkner, & Co., founded in 1861. “The Firm,” as Morris called it, was devoted to traditional craft techniques and the gothic revival. Products ranged from stained glass to tapestries to pottery to bookbinding. Traveling to the Continent and studying books and manuscripts in libraries, Morris experimented and rediscovered numerous preindustrial manufacturing techniques. In effect, he took Ruskin’s criticism and applied it in practice.

Morris’s success in the decorative arts was coupled with success in literary endeavors. Between 1868 and 1870 he published his poetic masterpiece, *The Earthly Paradise*, to positive reviews. Around the same time, however, Jane and Rossetti began a love affair to Morris’s stoic, but melancholic chagrin. Morris, who believed that the marriage contract should not limit natural affection, tolerated their relationship and even leased Kelmscott Manor with Rossetti, leaving Jane, their children, and Rossetti to live together for extended periods of time. Tensions between Rossetti and Morris heightened in the mid-1870s, in part due to Rossetti’s laudanum addiction and increasingly prickly personality. Morris cut his ties to Rossetti in 1877.

In 1876 William Morris began the public, political phase of his career. Angered by British policy in the Balkans, he joined the Eastern Question Association, publishing a number of newspaper articles and organizing protests. In 1877 he formed the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings, or “Anti-Scrape.” Founded on principles developed from Ruskin, the organization attempted to prevent the “restoration” of architectural antiquities in Britain. By 1879 he

became treasurer to the working-class National Liberal League. But it was in 1883 that his belief in the improvement of working-class conditions found him a member of the Democratic Federation (later the Social Democratic Federation). Marxist in inspiration, it became the most prominent voice for socialism in Britain between 1881 and 1884.

Marx’s involvement in the SDF was short-lived. He and nine other members of the Executive Council resigned in late 1884, due partly to Henry Mayers Hyndman’s “arbitrary rule” of the SDF, and founded the Socialist League. The manifesto of the new organization was profoundly anti-capitalist and internationalist. Joined by Edward Aveling, Eleanor Marx-Aveling, Andreas Scheu, and a number of other prominent socialists, the group never consolidated into a unified body. Morris was part of a faction that denounced parliamentary compromise, but, on the other hand, he denounced the random violence of the anarchists in the League.

During the late 1880s Morris became more convinced of the imminence of an international revolution. He edited the League’s journal, *The Commonweal*, and spoke at protests throughout Britain. An economic crisis in Britain had led to increased interest in socialism by the British working class, and the events of Bloody Sunday 1887 proved the intransigence of the Liberal government. Nevertheless, the influence of anarchists within the League, such as Peter Kropotkin, defections to the SDF, and the growth of Fabianism suggested to Morris that the socialist revolution would be a more protracted endeavor than he had initially imagined. By 1890 the League finally split, and Morris joined the newly founded Hammersmith Socialist League.

The last years of Morris’s life saw a continued interest in socialist politics, and in 1890 he published one of his most important literary works in serial. *News from Nowhere* was a utopian fantasy set in the future that outlined a socialist, agricultural society in which labor was edified through meaningful work. In it Morris answered objections to the practicalities of socialism and rejected the technological society outlined in Edward Bellamy’s *Looking Backward* (1889). Additionally, Morris began taking a more active role in the various arts and crafts societies and guilds, including the Arts and Crafts Exhibition Society and the Art Workers’ Guild. His final endeavor was the foundation of the Kelmscott

Press, devoted to hand printing. He published the famed Kelmscott Chaucer, illustrated by Burne-Jones, as well as a printing of John Ruskin's "Nature of the Gothic."

SEE ALSO: Bloody Sunday Demonstration, 1887; Britain, Trade Union Movement; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Marx, Eleanor (1855–1898)

References and Suggested Readings

- MacCarthy, F. (1994) *William Morris: A Life for Our Time*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Parry, L. (1996) *William Morris*. London: Philip Wilson and the Victoria & Albert Museum.
- Salmon, N. (1992) *William Morris: The Political Vision 1883–1890*. Reading: University of Reading Press.
- Salmon, N. (Ed.) (1996) *William Morris on History*. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.
- Stansky, P. (1985) *Redesigning the World: William Morris, the 1880s, and the Arts and Crafts*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Thompson, E. P. (1977) *William Morris: Romantic to Revolutionary*. London: Merlin Press.
- Thompson, P. (1991) *The Work of William Morris*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Moscow fire and protest, 1547

Yury V. Bosin

A major protest broke out against Ivan IV following a large fire that engulfed the city of Moscow over two days in June 1547, killing 4,000 people and displacing many residents. Rumor spread among the urban dwellers that the Glinskiy family, a noble clan in the tsar's entourage, was responsible for setting the fire. Some 42 years earlier, in 1505, Anna Glinskaya, Ivan IV's grandmother, whom many thought had the capacity to transform herself into a bird, was strangled for witchcraft. According to popular mythology, Muscovites believed that on June 21 Anna metamorphosed into a bird, spilling blood that set the city alight. This deep-seated superstition fueled popular protests for the execution of Glinskiy family members.

On June 28, in a failed effort to calm the discontent, the Glinskiy family invited protesters to a liturgical mass at the Assumption Cathedral on the Kremlin grounds, the site of the imperial compound. The tactic failed just as the uprising was reaching its climax: the masses sacked Glinskiy mansions, killing members of the family.

On June 29, insurgents rushed to the Sparrow Hills on the outskirts of Moscow, where 17-year-old Tsar Ivan had gone to escape the fire. The view of a huge crowd scared Ivan, who was forced to give generous promises to pacify the protesters. The riot lost momentum and ended in early July. Intimidated by the scope of the rebellion, Ivan instituted government reforms to reduce the influence of noble families and established a special council, known as "Izbrannaya Rada," to permit representatives of the lower classes to advise the tsar on political and economic issues.

SEE ALSO: Bulavin's Rebellion, 1707–1708; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Pugachev's Rebellion, 1773–1775

References and Suggested Readings

- Buganov, V. I. (1986) *Moscow Chronicles: Popular Uprisings in the 11–18th Centuries*. Moscow (in Russian).

Mossadegh, Mohammad (1881–1967)

Nandini Bhattacharya

Mohammad Mossadegh, an Iranian nationalist, democrat, socialist, and leader of foreign imperialism, was born in Tehran. His father was the finance minister under the Qajar king, Naser al-Din, and his mother was a granddaughter of Crown Prince Abbas Mirza. His marriage to a Qajar princess strengthened the linkage with the royal family. Before entering politics Mossadegh, who received higher education in Paris and Switzerland in law and economics, taught at the Political Science Institute of Tehran. In fact he was the first Iranian to have a law degree. His exposure to Europe had its influence in the making of his liberal political outlook.

Though elected to the first *Majlis* (parliament) in 1906 as a representative for Isfahan in central Iran, Mossadegh refused to accept it as he was too young. Between 1917 and 1923 he served as minister of finance, governor of Azerbaijan, and finally as minister of foreign affairs. When reelected to the *Majlis* as a representative for Tehran in 1923, Mossadegh voted against the selection of the prime minister, Reza Khan, as the new Shah of Persia. But by 1926 Reza Khan took the crown for himself


as His Imperial Majesty Reza Shah Pahlavi after deposing the royal Qajar dynasty. In 1925 Mossadegh retired from politics into private life in disgust and despair.

During World War II, Iran seemed to have evolved towards a parliamentary system. Reza's son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was made a limited monarch in a constitutional regime. In 1944, following Reza Khan's abdication, Mossadegh returned to public life, regaining a seat in the *Majlis* as the first deputy for Tehran. He established the *Jebhe-ye Melli* (National Front), a loose coalition of diverse groups ranging from the secular nationalists or even ultra-nationalists, to the Tudeh Party (Communist Party of Iran), to religious and Islamic fundamentalist groups. As a prominent advocate of Iranian nationalism this party sought to establish democracy and eliminate foreign presence in Iranian politics, especially the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's (AIOC) operations in Iran.

During the phase of oil politics in Iran Mossadegh acquired remarkable prominence in the public sphere. His opposition to foreign interference and his demand for nationalization of the oil industries became the rallying point for nationalist propaganda. It was during this glorious moment of nationalization of the oil industries that Mossadegh was regarded as a national hero and was duly made prime minister when the Shah had to respond to popular demand. But this was also the beginning of his downfall, as his nationalism reached a level of frenzy and crossed all limits of pragmatism. He could not provide practical viability to his policy of oil nationalization. Sensing the difficulties of a worsening political and economic climate, he asked the Shah to grant him emergency powers. The Shah refused, and Mossadegh announced his resignation.

Ahmad Qavam, the new prime minister, announced his intention to resume negotiations with the British to end the oil dispute. This blatant reversal of Mossadegh's plans sparked massive public outrage across categories from communists to radical Muslims. Frightened by the unrest, the Shah dismissed Qavam and reappointed Mossadegh, granting him the full control of the military he had previously demanded.

Mossadegh and oil nationalization were widely popular until his landslide victory in 1953, while the British were widely hated. His attempt to



Mohammad Mossadegh, the popular Iranian prime minister from 1951 to 1953, enters the court at Saltana Tabad military prison, Iran, November 8, 1953. In the wake of his efforts to nationalize the Iranian oil industry, Mossadegh was removed from power in a coup d'état sponsored by the British and United States governments. (STR/AP/PA Photos)

uphold a nationalist regime against western imperialism without the use of political Islam marked a unique era in Iranian history. But his oil politics also entangled Iran in the Cold War when a Soviet connection was cultivated through the Tudeh Party. During post-nationalization Anglo-US powers were preparing for a coup by means of the CIA, constructing an anti-Mossadegh combination that included monarchists, military leaders, and rich Iranians to put pressure on his National Front. They also circulated false propaganda against Mossadegh, who began to lose his composure and started to move against parliamentary politics, which so far had provided the backbone to his political career. This great liberal leader now organized a national referendum to win approval for the dissolution of parliament. This marked a major shift in his principles. Moreover, Mossadegh's popularity was eroding as promised reforms failed to materialize and his policy of collective farming was a disaster. The British boycott

of Iranian oil was damaging to the interests of the propertied class and the anti-Mossadegh propaganda was gaining ground, with the fear of communist influence implying Soviet linkage.

Ultimately, the combination of royalist conservative factions including landowners, clerics, and merchants, and the pro-Shah army, made the foreign-aided coup a success on August 15, 1953. On August 19 a direct attack on Mossadegh's residence led to his arrest, military trial, and imprisonment for three years. He was replaced as prime minister by pro-US General Zahedi. Mossadegh was kept under house arrest at his estate of Ahmad Abad near Tehran until his death on August 5, 1967.

SEE ALSO: Iran, the Mossadegh Era: Democratic Socialists and the US-Backed Coup; Iranian Revolution, 1979

References and Suggested Readings

- Diba, F. (1986) *Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh; A Political Biography*. London: Croom Helm.
- Gasiorowski M. J. & Mohammad M. B. (2004) *Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Hertz, N. (2003) *The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Katouzian, H. (1999) *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*. New York: I. B. Tauris.

Mother Jones (1837–1930)

Elliott Gorn

Mother Jones was one of the most famous women in America during the early years of the twentieth century, although by the early twenty-first century she is nearly forgotten. "Pray for the dead, and fight like hell for the living," she used to tell her audiences, and her fiery words inspired thousands of men and women to join unions and the Socialist Party. Her friend Upton Sinclair described her in a lightly fictionalized account about the struggle to organize the Colorado coalfields in 1913:

There broke out a storm of applause which swelled into a tumult as a little woman came forward on the platform. She was wrinkled and old, dressed in black, looking like somebody's

grandmother; she was in truth the grandmother of hundreds of thousands of miners . . . Hearing her speak, you discovered the secret of her influence over these polyglot hordes. She had force, she had wit, above all she had the fire of indignation – she was the walking wrath of God. . . . Asked for where she lived while testifying before a congressional committee, she declared "my address is like my shoes, it follows me wherever I go." (Sinclair 1976: 88–90)

And it was literally true; for 25 years, in her sixties, seventies, and into her eighties, Mother Jones traveled all over the United States, organizing workers and a range of trades and beating the drum for the socialists.

Mother Jones was born Mary Harris in Cork, Ireland, in 1837 (though around the turn of the century she began to exaggerate her age, heightening her venerability). As a child, she witnessed the horrors of the potato famine, and her family came to North America as a result of the Great Hunger. They settled in Toronto, Canada, where Mary's father was a laborer on the railroads. Mary attended Toronto's Catholic schools, and by the time she was a young adult she had acquired a dressmaker's skills, but she also trained to be a teacher. She left home for Monroe, Michigan, where she taught in a convent school, then she stayed briefly in Chicago before settling in Memphis, Tennessee in 1861. There she taught school but soon married a skilled tradesman, an iron-molder named George Jones. They weathered the American Civil War, and by 1867 had four children. A yellow fever epidemic in the fall of 1867 took the lives of George and all four children. Totally bereft, Mary Jones returned to Chicago and took up her old dressmaking trade.

She was all but invisible to the public for the next 30 years. We know that the Chicago Fire of 1871 burned out her small dressmaking business. Her autobiography claims that she was active in the 1877 Railroad Strike, and in the Haymarket uprising of 1886, but at most she was a bit player. She became visible – and then only locally – with the march of Coxey's Army for jobs in 1894, and then in organizing Pennsylvania's anthracite fields by the fledgling United Mine Workers (UMW) as the nineteenth century waned. But suddenly, around 1900, Mary Jones burst on the scene in the persona of "Mother Jones." Exactly how she came up with the moniker is unclear.

After 1900, however, she signed her letters that way, union leaders, governors, presidents, and captains of industry addressed her as mother, and especially her admirers knew her by that name. As an elderly working-class woman, Mary Jones had neither voice nor influence, but as Mother Jones, she claimed the mantle of sacred motherhood, which empowered her to make claims for the family of labor.

Over the course of 25 years, from the end of the nineteenth century through the early 1920s, she organized coal miners in Appalachia, the Middle West, and the Rocky Mountains, brought new recruits to the Socialist Party, orchestrated a dramatic strike of mill children from Philadelphia to President Theodore Roosevelt's summer home on Long Island, became one of the founders of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), aided the radical Western Federation of Miners, and raised money for Mexican revolutionaries living in exile in the United States. Her greatest victories came in coal country.

On the eve of World War I, three-quarters of a million men mined coal, and the UMW had become by far America's largest and most successful industrial union. Much of the credit goes to Mother Jones, the UMW's most successful organizer. She walked the Rockies and the Appalachians, organizing the men, facing down armed guards, and surviving repeated imprisonments; she even organized miners' wives into "mop and broom brigades" that walked the picket lines and confronted scabs. After many spectacular, bloody battles which she helped lead in West Virginia, Colorado, and the Midwestern states, hundreds of thousands of miners had joined the union and received higher pay and safer working conditions than ever before.

True, she lost as many battles as she won. Her stance against women voting (she mostly considered politics to be a distraction from labor organizing) seems terribly backward today. Though she usually viewed unions as inclusive of all workers, she occasionally backslid into the racism and nativism of her day. But she accomplished much, and she did it by creating and performing her role. By becoming Mother Jones, she constructed an amazing life of courage and commitment, one that metaphorically rejected capitalist individualism for the family of labor. The union was a culture, a way of life, one that rejected America's worship of individualism

and embraced instead the community of labor. Above all, she gave working people hope and told them that their aspirations for change were in the best traditions of patriotism and religion. With her black dresses and white hair, Mother Jones tailored her appearance to match every sentimental cliché about womanhood. Then behind her genteel cover she made galvanizing, profane, electric speeches. Women – especially old women – were not supposed to have opinions about politics and economics; they were too delicate for controversy. Yet there she was, haranguing workers, berating politicians, attacking the "pirates" and the "plutocrats," and telling women to take to the streets, all under the cover of sacred motherhood. And that was her real legacy – out of nothing but courage, passion, and commitment, she created a unique voice, a prophetic voice, and raised it in the cause of renewing America's democratic promise.

SEE ALSO: Coxe's Army and the Unemployed Movement; Haymarket Tragedy; Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Knights of Labor and Terence Powderly (1849–1924); Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 1775–1900; Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 20th Century; Populism; Sinclair, Upton (1878–1968); Socialist Party, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Gorn, E. J. (2001) *Mother Jones: The Most Dangerous Woman in America*. New York: Hill & Wang.
 Mother Jones (1925) *The Autobiography of Mother Jones*. Ed. M. F. Parton. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.
 Sinclair, U. (1976) *The Coal War*. Boulder: Colorado Associated University Presses.

Motsoaledi, Elias (1924–1994)

Lucien van der Walt

Elias Motsoaledi was born in Sekhukhuneland, South Africa, in 1924, the third of eight children. Coming to Johannesburg for work at 17, Motsoaledi worked in a leather factory from 1943, joined the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) in 1945, the African National Congress (ANC) in 1948, and the Leather Workers' Union in 1949, and was fired for his union work. The ANC, the country's main African nationalist organization, was adopting an increasingly

confrontational position and developing into a mass-based party, and Motsoaledi was one of several CPSA members elected to its Transvaal executive. He was involved in the Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU): formed in 1941 with 100,000 members, CNETU was led by CPSA activists and reached perhaps 150,000 members by the close of World War II (Alexander 2000). CNETU split in 1947 in the wake of the failed general strike launched by its affiliate, the African Mineworkers' Union, but played an important role in the national day of protest against the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950. Motsoaledi was elected CNETU chairman in 1953. The CPSA meanwhile dissolved, and was replaced by the underground South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1953.

The 1950s saw the "Congress Alliance" – ANC, the Colored People's Congress, the (white) Congress of Democrats, and the Indian National Congress – organize civil disobedience campaigns, including the Defiance Campaign of 1952, in which Motsoaledi was active. The 1950s also saw substantial realignments in the local labor movement. In 1955, the remaining CNETU unions and the left-wing faction of the South African Trades and Labor Council, which had been splintering from 1947, formed the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in 1955. SACTU started with 31 affiliates and 32,000 members (Lambert 1988). Motsoaledi was a key figure in the federation, which had close links to the Congress Alliance and promoted interracial unionism, organized general strikes in 1957 and 1958, and claimed 53,000 members by 1961.

The 1950s were characterized by growing repression, and Motsoaledi was among those affected. He was banned from holding union office in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act, and detained during the large-scale arrests of the state of emergency declared in the aftermath of the Sharpeville Massacre of March 21, 1960, and imprisoned for four months. The ANC was declared an unlawful organization and banned in April, SACTU playing a key role in organizing a general strike in protest. In June 1961, the ANC and the SACP shifted from their previous emphasis on non-violence and organized an armed group, *Umkhonto we Sizwe* ("Spear of the Nation"), which undertook various acts of sabotage from December onwards. SACTU was

not banned, but the climate of repression and the growing involvement of key SACTU figures like Motsoaledi in *Umkhonto we Sizwe* contributed to its virtual collapse inside the country by the mid-1960s. Motsoaledi was detained in 1963 under new 90-day detention laws, and was sentenced to life imprisonment at the 1963–4 Rivonia trial for his underground activities. When the ANC was legalized in 1990, Motsoaledi was elected to its national executive in 1991, having served 26 years on the Robben Island prison. He died in 1994.

SEE ALSO: Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), 1921–1950; COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions); Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC

References and Suggested Readings

- Alexander, P. (2000) *Workers, War and the Origins of Apartheid: Labour and Politics in South Africa*. Oxford: Cape Town: David Philip.
- Lambert, R. V. (1988) *Political Unionism in South Africa: The South African Congress of Trade Unions, 1955–1965*. PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand.
- Luckhardt, K. & Wall, B. (1980) *Organise or Stare! The History of the South African Congress of Trade Unions*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Movement of Recuperated Factories, Argentina

Peter Ranis

Contemporary Argentine factory and enterprise worker cooperatives were essentially born in the runup to and the massive popular societal demonstrations of December 2001. They owe much of their momentum to the social and economic crisis that offered little alternative to laborers and employees but unemployment and poverty. Factory and enterprise bankruptcies and employer abandonment of places of work forced the laborers and employees to seek redress of their grievances. One of the measures to which they turned, inspired by two non-governmental organizations (NGOs), was the formation of worker cooperatives, which are sanctioned by historical Argentine law. Forming cooperatives became only the first step in the

often long legal, community, and political struggles that gave the workers temporary rights to reenter the factories and enterprises and initiate or continue production and services.

The Argentine worker-occupied and managed factories and enterprises represent a novel on-the-ground departure among social movements that have the authenticity to flourish, embedded as they are in the survival responses of laborers and employees and the moral authority of maintaining national production through working-class employment. The 1990s, under the Carlos Menem presidency, had dramatically accentuated the devastating deindustrialization in Argentina that began during the military regime of 1976–83. Within the first several years of his government, the country sold at bargain-basement prices the national enterprises of petroleum, gas, electricity, railways, hydroelectric dams, banks, the subway system, maritime and airline fleets, the most traveled commuter highways, and radio and television stations. The demise of industrialization had a nefarious impact on domestic enterprises with a concomitant increase of unemployment, poverty, and inequality symptomatic of a dual society. The partial financial default of Argentina in 2001 sharpened these conditions. The collapse of peso convertibility severely affected smaller firms with higher levels of indebtedness, those that produced for the domestic market but often depended upon imported raw materials and supplies for their production.

During the Argentine recession of 1998–2002, the societal indicators hit rock bottom. Poverty and unemployment soared to unparalleled historical proportions, reaching three-fifths of the population as poor or indigent and a third without full-time employment. The crisis accentuated preexisting patterns and behavior among the owners of small- and medium-sized Argentine industrial firms and commercial establishments. The worker-occupied factories and enterprises did not proliferate in a vacuum. They are a direct result of the Menem governmental policies that allowed workers to be fired and laid off, with limited severance packages, if management could prove to the Ministry of Labor that the firm's viability was endangered. In essence Argentine labor flexibilization laws allowed the owners of these firms to reconfigure the workplace to enhance productivity and to restructure their workforce based on market rationales. These policies combined with the recession that began

in 1998 and the default crisis of 2001 created a miasma in the world of work.

Many of these firms started procedures that would end in default to their creditors and outright declarations of bankruptcy. Invariably, in the cases in which workers chose to occupy their factories and enterprises, there was overriding evidence that the industrial recession was often fraudulently used by the owners to decapitalize their firms, attain millions of dollars in government credits for non-production-related financial speculation, and, ultimately, to deprive the workers of their earned wages as they broke the labor contracts and often simply walked away from the factory or enterprise. As a response to these conditions, a portion of the Argentine workers seized on the methodology of taking control of factories and enterprises that were being decapitalized by their owners and/or were in various stages of debtor insolvency or outright bankruptcy. Worker-occupied factory and enterprise cooperatives became a clear alternative to unemployment and poverty.

In the wake of these abhorrent conditions, two Argentine NGOs were founded which attempted to organize and motivate workers to take over their factories and enterprises and then use legal strategies, political pressure, and moral suasion to maintain control over their means of production and provision of services. The *Movimiento Nacional de Empresas Recuperadas* (MNER) was founded in 2002 and the *Movimiento Nacional de Fábricas Recuperadas por los Trabajadores* (MNFRT) was founded in 2003. Though their strategies and tactics differed considerably, their goals were similar: to create a belt of worker-producer cooperatives throughout the country. The MNER, the MNFRT, and various other independent social movement organizations continue to create and sustain worker cooperatives as a model for achieving worker employment and avoiding poverty. The MNER has more national entities while also being heavily represented in the capital city of Buenos Aires. The MNFRT is more ensconced in Greater Buenos Aires, which includes the surrounding industrial suburbs in the Province of Buenos Aires.

According to the Argentine Ministry of Labor there were 213 recuperated factories and enterprises employing approximately 10,000 workers; 65 percent of these worker-owned and managed enterprises were situated in the Province of

Buenos Aires, the capital city of Buenos Aires, and the Province of Santa Fe. The areas of cooperative production were very broad and extended to all sectors of the economy. The five most heavily represented industrial areas consisted of metal parts factories, food processing plants, construction sites, slaughterhouses and meat processing plants, and textile industries. Among the cooperatives devoted to services, there are hotels, health clinics, schools, supermarkets, publishers, transportation services, restaurants, and bakeries. The majority are small-scale enterprises consisting of less than 50 workers, though there are many significant exceptions. Women make up 25 percent of the workforce in these recuperated enterprises. Almost three-fifths of these worker enterprises were founded during the immediate crisis years of 2002–4, but they continue to grow significantly through 2008.

Moreover, the recuperated factory and enterprise movement has served to stimulate a general explosion of worker-producer cooperatives throughout Argentina in the twenty-first century. Forming cooperatives remains a viable alternative for the Argentine working class despite the macroeconomy's turnaround. Even the positive growth rates since 2003, averaging 8 percent, have not impacted on 80 percent of the Argentine population. In 2007, the top 10 percent of income earners still earned 30 times the bottom 10 percent, earning 35.2 percent of national income while the bottom 10 percent earn but 1.2 percent. The Gini index of inequality has climbed in Argentina from 0.36 in 1974 to 0.49 in 2007. Data in March 2008 from INAES (Instituto Nacional de Asociativismo y Economía Social) indicate that there are close to 23,000 cooperatives, of which over 50 percent are worker-managed producer cooperatives, as opposed to more traditional cooperatives found in the housing, agriculture, consumer, credit, and public service areas. These cooperatives, by and large, are formed by unemployed workers who take over abandoned buildings and public spaces, form cooperatives, and then initiate negotiations with municipal governments to grant them minimal funding to sustain them in the early stages of production. These cooperatives are found in every venue of economic activity but particularly in areas that serve immediate community needs such as in construction, food processing, restaurants, and bakeries.

In visits to 17 recuperated factories and enterprises and in interviews with several of the leaders of the cooperative movements between 2004 and 2007, it became clear that they have much in common in their critiques of the neoliberal economy and irresponsibility of both the corporations and the Argentine government. They recognize the conundrum of a surplus-labor economy and an increasingly competitive international environment that puts major downsizing and race-to-the-bottom pressure particularly on small- and medium-sized capitalist enterprises. But while the MNER made the connections between the United States Treasury, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund as the originating source of the austere, corporate-driven Argentine national economic policy, the MNFRT and others take a more task-oriented, case-by-case approach that applies various legal and self-help measures to initiate the enterprise-recuperating process.

The experiences of the recuperated enterprises, whether relatively large factories and enterprises such as Fasinpat/ex-Zanón, Yaguané, Vieytes/ex-Ghelco, IMPA, Renacer/ex-Aurora, 18 de Diciembre/ex-Brukman, Hotel Bauen or the thousands of small community-based cooperatives that sprung up after the crisis of 2001, have almost all demonstrated a visible and meaningful change in their understanding of human capital, approaches to productivity, redemocratization of the workplace, greater equity among the workforce, and sensitivity and responsibility to the surrounding community. In fact, it has been where conflict with the former owner was greatest and the antagonism deepest that the cooperatives demonstrate the strongest sense of collective commitment and solidarity after the initial events. Worker-managed enterprises end the super-exploitation of the workforce and workers share in the good times as well as the economic downturns in equal measure. And in most cases when there are cooperative salary differentials based on seniority and/or worker specialization capacities, the differences are greatly attenuated compared to capitalist firms. Though they obviously need to respond to market signals and requisites, they depart from typical capitalist firms by the absence of former owners and managers. Within these parameters the worker-controlled and worker-managed cooperatives symbolize a different work culture that represents a subversive challenge to normal

capital-worker relationships and have helped considerably to demystify the supposedly central role of the capitalist.

Thus far it is mainly the Fasinpat ex-Zanón ceramic worker cooperative in the city of Neuquén, a large, productive, and efficiently run factory with its committed trade union and coherent leftist leadership, that has helped frame this debate. The Zanón workers have fully taken the maximal step to commit the material, societal, and cultural resources of that factory on behalf of the disadvantaged working class of the province and city of Neuquén. The Zanón workers have extended their economic argument to social and political issues and, by way of theorized and intellectual pedagogy, have established positive relationships with the provincial public school teachers, the students and faculty of Comahue University, public employees, nurses, and the *piquetero* movement (unemployed workers who have used road stoppages/pickets to make their case). The Zanón workers argue that it is state power and responsibility that is required to turn the tide against the capitalist class. Individual worker cooperatives can only be a means of highlighting that essentialist struggle. Zanón workers want to use the recuperated factories as a wedge to develop a larger social movement. They are battling “not just to be another factory but to be a vanguard of social change against the capitalist system.”

The Argentine cooperatives have ensconced themselves into the capitalist system without capitalists and without managers – no mean achievement and in itself a major and considerable critique of capitalism and its originating and guiding principle. The cooperative workers’ product no longer belongs to the capitalist but to the productive workforce itself. They no longer simply sell their labor power but they now also appropriate their own capacities on their own behalf, although they are still beholden to the tyranny of the marketplace itself. They are now subject not to the rule of their former capitalist owner but to the rules of the capitalist system at large.

Wages are no longer tied to the capitalist truism that they are merely based on a minor subtraction from profits. Rather, wages belong to a complicated mixed system subtracted from the surplus achieved and coordinated with fairness and solidarity among all workers. And what is more, the decisions are made collectively by

regularly held worker assemblies. Working thus collectively, workers do enhance their labor power and productivity. Cooperatives control the levels of exploitation allowed in achieving this enhanced productivity by undermining the separated individual ethic of the capitalist enterprise. Through combining and cooperating, workers mitigate the separation and competition inherent in a capitalist-run firm.

Cooperative experiences contain the seeds of rebellion. However, they remain just that without a massive working-class support belt derived from workers’ autonomous rights as a class. Workers must insist upon their claims that they, as laborers and employees, should control and manage the major productive enterprises of the economic system. They must come to believe this and feel it in their bones that this is their right. And here the recuperated enterprises and cooperatives can provide workers with positive experiences and a sense of entitlement.

SEE ALSO: Argentina, Grassroots Workers’ Movement: Villa Constitución, 1975; Argentina, Labor Unions and Protests of the Unemployed, 1990s; Venezuela, Solidarity Economy, Social Property, Co-Management, and Workers’ Control; Workers’ Self-Management, Yugoslavia

References and Suggested Readings

- Cafardo, A. & Font, P. D. (2003) *Autogestión obrera en el siglo XXI*. Buenos Aires: Centro Cultural de la Cooperación.
- Fajn, G. (2003) *Fábricas y empresas recuperadas*. Buenos Aires: Centro Cultural de Cooperación.
- Kulfas, M. (2003) El contexto económico: Destrucción del aparato productivo y reestructuración regresiva. In *Empresas recuperadas: Ciudad de Buenos Aires*. Buenos Aires: Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Secretaría de Desarrollo Económico.
- La Vaca Collective (2004) *Sin Patrón: Fábricas y empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores. Una historia, una guía*. Buenos Aires: Lavaca editora.
- Magnani, E. (2003) *El cambio silencioso: Empresas y fábricas recuperadas por los trabajadores*. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros.
- Ranis, P. (2006) Factories Without Bosses: Argentina’s Experience with Worker-Run Enterprises. *Labor Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas* 3, 1 (Spring): 11–23.
- Rebón, J. (2004) *Desobedeciendo al desempleo: La Experiencia de las Empresas Recuperadas*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Picaso.
- Rebón, J., Salgado, R., & Totino, L. (2007) *Los desafíos de la autonomía en el proceso de recuperación*

de empresas. 8° Congreso Nacional de Estudios de Trabajo (July).

Ruggeri, A., Martínez, C., & Trincherro, H. (2005) *Las empresas recuperadas en la Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires.

Movimento Sem Terra (MST)

Zulma Amador

The agrarian question in Brazil became a social and political problem in the middle of the twentieth century. Two important factors helped to make this question visible: the revitalization of the Peasant Leagues (Ligas Camponesas) in the northeast in the 1950s, and several conflicts between the indigenous people and the tenant farmers in the Amazon region in the 1960s. These events marked contemporary Brazilian history. They disrupted four centuries of the peasantry's oppression and silence. First, the historical make-up of the country and the distribution of land had become an urgent national issue on the social and political agenda. Second, the movements forced the state to recognize and deal with these social and agrarian demands.

Background to Brazilian Land Issues

In the colonial period, the Portuguese crown divided the country into 12 *capitanias*, state land given to relatives or loyal families. These families divided thousands of hectares of land among other families of the same type, and so on. This was the foundation of the social and economic organization based on the system of land possession that characterized the colonial and post-colonial periods of Brazilian history. The sugar cane plantation owners (*senhores de engenho*) and the military elite, called *coronéis*, became the new economic elite. The possession of large extensions of land (*latifúndio*) became the basis for social and economic organization.

The agrarian question is a residual issue of slavery in Brazil and an expression of the contradiction of capitalism. This contradiction involves the question of private property and the problem of land distribution. During the colonial period the peon was characterized by work, con-

ditioned by and excluded from possession of private property. The industrialization process and the social inequality of the twentieth century made the complex agrarian issue in Brazil visible. It was in this historical context that the agrarian movement in Brazil emerged.

Agrarian reform is one of the most important questions in contemporary Brazilian history and is characterized by a long process of confrontations. Brazil experienced a number of political initiatives addressing land reform in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but the most important agrarian movement confronting this social problem occurred in the twentieth century with the Peasant Leagues in the northeast.

Peasant Leagues (1954–1964)

The Peasant Leagues (Ligas Camponesas) constituted the most important social and agrarian movement in Brazil in the middle of the twentieth century. They were organizations of peasants and rural workers in the northeast of Brazil, which had been a sugar cane plantation region since the colonial period and had remained one of the poorest regions in the country.

Between 1940 and 1950 the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) organized the Peasant Leagues around the country. Workers' associations (*sindicatos*) were legal and experienced relative freedom during that period, but rural workers' associations suffered restrictions, since governments were hand in glove with landholders. However, civil law allowed free associations, and the PCB used that liberty to organize rural workers between 1945 and 1947 into hundreds of Peasant Leagues. The PCB logic was to attract votes and elect municipal and state representatives. As the PCB centralized the peasant movement, the Leagues became dependent for their organization on the party structure, following the party tactic of accumulating forces for a proletarian movement. Rural workers, small land tenants, and farmers constituted the membership of the rural organizations.

In 1947 the PCB lost its legal status as a political party. The Peasant Leagues were dispersed and their leaders were persecuted or assassinated, although a few clandestine groups managed to resist. The historical memory of this first series of rebellions continued in other parts of Brazil and had repercussions for the peasant movement in the following years, encouraging

the Porecatu guerilla movement in 1950 in São Paulo, the Dona Naca revolt in Maranhão in 1951, the free territory of Formoso, established by peasants and farmers in Goiás, and the First Northeastern Congress of Rural Workers (I Congresso Nordestino de Trabalhadores Agrícolas) in 1954 in Limoeiro, Pernambuco. The Congress represented the peasants' legal effort to reconstitute their association, but it was violently suppressed.

Between 1948 and 1954, the peasants experimented with various ways of acting and mobilizing. A few leagues resisted repression and continued to use the name "league," for example the Peasant League of Iputinga, headed by José dos Prazeres. A charismatic leader who contributed to the rural workers' mobilization in Pernambuco, he played an important role in establishing contacts between different ideological forces, local governments, and politicians. The most important effort was the foundation of the Rural Society of Planters and Cattle Breeders of Pernambuco (SAAP), which merged with peasants from the sugar mills of Galiléia. Oscar Beltrão, owner of the Galiléia property, was chosen to lead the group, but he declined and helped the police to persecute the peasants and rural workers. So the SAAP and Prazeres began to seek intellectual and political support for the Leagues in Recife. Prazeres had sympathy from urban politicians, as well as from representatives of different political parties, who gave political and public support by visiting the core leaders of the movement, helping to calm violent repression and thus expanding interest in the peasants' movement to the urban sector.

These leaders later formed the Regional Council of Peasant Leagues (CRLC), which played a crucial role in the modern Brazilian agrarian movement. In the beginning, the CRLC strategy was to build a peasant organization with a regional structure and obtain regional federation status and the support of progressive urban sectors whose leaders had upheld the peasants' rights to seize and defend land. Prazeres was fundamental in the elaboration of the Leagues' strategies and methodology. Liberal intellectuals and politicians who were friends of the peasant movement joined the CRLC, including militants of the PCB, Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), and the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB). Between 1956 and 1964, under the governments of Juscelino Kubitschek and João Goulart, democratic protection for

organizing helped to expand and institutionalize the Leagues.

Between 1954 and 1964 peasants and rural workers, together with intellectuals, Catholics, and politicians, organized several demonstrations in Recife, the capital of Pernambuco. They occupied plantations and confronted landlords to demand the distribution of land for the people who worked it. Over a period of ten years this local/regional agrarian movement had had a national impact and become the reference point for subsequent popular social and agrarian movements in Brazil. The famous slogan of the Leagues was "agrarian reform by law or by force." PSB member Francisco Julião served as honorary president of the Peasant Leagues until 1964, when a military regime came to power and national protection was ended. Under the military repression, all the League leaders were persecuted or assassinated, and Julião was exiled to Mexico.

The Landless Movement

The Peasant Leagues became part of the historical memory of the agrarian movement in Brazil, serving as inspiration for a movement that emerged in the south in the 1970s and 1980s. Political and historical conditions in the south of Brazil, where political persecution existed but was not as harsh as in the northeast, made it possible to integrate several agrarian movements.

One of the most important ideological sources of the agrarian movement was religious. Ecclesial base communities (CEBs) became promoters of social conscience and social change. The CEBs based their reflections about poverty and social conditions on the Second Vatican Council (Concilio Vaticano II) and on the Bishops' Conferences that took place in Medellín, Colombia in 1968.

The Pastoral Land Commission (Comissão Pastoral da Terra, CPT), created in Goiânia in 1975, worked to create social consciousness among popular sectors. The CPT started in the north and central west with bishops from the Amazonian region and later expanded around the country. Its ecumenical perspective encouraged its growth and the reconciliation of different religious beliefs. This perspective is characterized by seeking social justice and combining faith and politics to liberate the poor.

In the 1980s, many social movements and forces reacted against the military regime and the structure of social domination characterized

by *coronelismo*. In this national political context, the Landless Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST) emerged as a rural movement to fight for agrarian reform between 1979 and 1984. Mobilizations of rural workers increased in several regions of the country, and hundreds of hectares of farm land were occupied.

In 1984 the MST was officially created at the First National Encounter of Landless Rural Workers in Cascavel, Paraná. The meeting institutionalized the movement and defined both its political and general tactics. The general tactic was a familiar one – land occupations by parents, children, and the elderly. The general objective was the struggle for agrarian reform and in favor of a society without exploitation.

Within the social and cultural diversity of the movement it was possible to unify social demands for agrarian reform. One unifying event was the expulsion of settlers by Kaingang indigenous in the Nonoai reservoir, which was originally Kaingang land, in May 1978. This “reconquest” was preceded by a number of occupations of Macali and Brilhante *fazendas* (landholdings) in Ronda Alta and the Sarandi reservoir. The occupations of huge extensions of land began in 1979, but the first organized visible occupation was in 1981. It is remembered as the Encruzilhada Natalito in Rio Grande do Sul. It lasted for one year and marked the foundation of MST as a social movement with its own political identity.

Simultaneously, there was a series of events related to the occupation of landholdings in Paraná, São Paulo, and Santa Catarina, as well as the creation of several organizations and associations, some with the help of CPT. These events found themselves in concert in their search for justice and agrarian reform. In this context the MST expanded, not as a unique agrarian movement but as a large part of that effort.

From 1984 to the present, the MST has evolved into a broad movement. In 1988 the MST reaffirmed its autonomy from other agrarian movements and organizations, defining its symbols, flag, and anthem. It also created an organizational structure and adopted a national direction with various sectors, including education, health, human rights, and production. This structure spread gradually to regions, states, and micro regions. Each sector has two representatives, one woman and one man. The MST’s main leader since its foundation is João Pedro Stedile.

At the present, the MST has representation in every state apart from Amazonas and Acre. According to its Fifth National Congress in June 2007, the MST has 17,500 militants. The movement organizes familiar occupations in non-productive landholdings, builds settlements, and negotiates with the Brazilian government to legalize settlements through the National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA). The occupation of land is usually a conflictive process. MST settlements are culturally, socially, and ethnically diverse, and not all militants come from agrarian movements.

Over the last two decades the movement has seen the development of a political-pedagogical project (*projeto político pedagógico*), which orients all development and educational projects. The aim is to develop a critical consciousness and reflection on the sociohistorical context and meaning of the struggle for land and agrarian reform. “Transform transforming” is the pedagogical principle of the movement, so every meeting, political action, or social organization of settlements is seen as a learning process. In January 2005 the MST opened the Florestan Fernandes National School in Guararema, São Paulo. The school is used to train MST militants and other popular social movements from Brazil and other countries.

Currently, the MST is considered the largest organized popular social movement in Brazil. In 24 years it has spread throughout almost the entire country, consolidated its organizational structure, and created a newspaper (*Jornal Sem Terra*) and magazine (*Revista Sem Terra*). MST has relationships with other social popular movements in the country and around the world and is part of Via Campesina, an international network that brings together millions of peasants. It is also seeking Latin American integration through the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) and has militants studying in Cuba and Venezuela as a part of solidarity agreements.

In 2002, the MST, along with organizations such as the Workers’ Central Union (Central Única dos Trabalhadores, CUT), CPT, and other left-wing parties, expressed support for Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) presidential candidate. One of Lula’s campaign promises was agrarian reform, so his election, and reelection for the 2007–11 term, represented a victory for

the popular Brazilian classes and the defeat of the elites. However, that victory was not enough to generate significant changes in the agrarian reform and agricultural model. On the contrary, the MST and peasant organizations currently face national policies that promote agro-industrial business, and agrarian reform has not progressed.

SEE ALSO: Brazil, Peasant Movements and Liberation Theology; Julião, Francisco (1915–1999); Latin America, Catholic Church and Liberation, 16th Century to Present; Ligas Camponesas; Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula da (b. 1945); Via Campesina and Peasant Struggles

References and Suggested Readings

- Martins, J. (1995) *Os camponeses e a política no Brasil*. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes.
- Martins, J. (2000) *Reforma Agrária. O impossível diálogo*. São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo.
- Pereira, A. W. (1997) *The End of the Peasantry: The Rural Movement in Northeast Brazil, 1961–1988*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Stedile, J. P. (Ed.) (2006) *História e Natureza das Ligas Camponesas, 1954–1964*. São Paulo: Editora Expressão Popular.

Mozambique, worker protests

Beata Mtyingizana

Twentieth-century colonial and post-colonial regimes in Mozambique (formerly Portuguese East Africa) have been characterized by authoritarian labor relations that denied ordinary Africans the very modernity and progress they held out. Colonial labor, characterized not just by racially discriminatory laws, but also coercion, forced labor, and paternalism, left a deep imprint on the post-independence Marxist regime, hampering the rise of an independent labor movement before the liberalization of the 1990s. The roots of this striking continuity between Portuguese colonialism and radical nationalism can be argued to lie deep in the period of mercantilism dating back to the seventeenth century.

From the *Prazos* to the Modern Period

Despite Portugal's early explorations in southern Africa, it failed to establish a modernizing

colonial presence in East Africa before the late nineteenth century. Initial contacts at Delagoa Bay and along the Zambezi centered on trade, including slaving. There was very limited control over territory, and African intermediaries and allies were critical to the success of the colonial enterprise. A critical breakthrough was the agreement of the Monomatapa kingdom to pledge vassalage to the Portuguese throne in the mid-seventeenth century. The crown was then able to make semi-feudal land grants (*prazos*) to European lease holders (*prazeros*). The *prazeros* were meant to defend Portuguese interests, exercise judicial authority, and administer estates based on slavery and vassalage. Lacking military and other support from Portugal, the *prazeros* were generally autonomous and dependent on alliances with African and Indian notables, including marriage. By the late nineteenth century the *prazeros* were typically of mixed descent, heavily involved in African cultural practices and society, in control of personal armies, heavily involved in the slave trade, and locked in fierce combat with one another. The more powerful the *prazeros*, the more slaves they needed for their estates: slave raids were commonplace, and slavery relied heavily on violence.

The *prazos*, like other estates based on unfree labor, were characterized by intermittent revolts, but labor resistance was largely informal, involving desertion and sabotage and so forth: this is a history that is not, unfortunately, well documented. However, it is clear that the *prazos* were locked into pre-capitalist modes of labor control that were unable to develop into modes suitable for capital accumulation. The *prazos* resisted modernizing initiatives by Portugal, and were indifferent to capitalist enterprise. Portugal's inability to control the *prazeros* was embarrassing, and it came under great pressure for the continued existence of slavery. Ironically, perhaps, the *prazeros* offered the fiercest military resistance to Portugal's attempts at extending direct control over the East African interior in the wake of the Berlin Conference of 1885, and growing British claims.

Backward Portugal was unable to modernize Portuguese East Africa even after reconquering the interior, and established, instead, four chartered land companies. These operated plantations and paid rent to the authorities; in return, they were meant to provide infrastructure. Portugal abolished the slave trade in 1832 and enacted the

Native Labor Code in 1878, which was meant to allow African workers more rights by enabling them to choose their employment. Very little infrastructure was actually constructed by the chartered companies, and very little capital was invested. Moreover, the chartered companies demonstrated continuities with the old *prazos*, including coerced labor. The Niassa Company in northern Mozambique used forced labor, withheld food from offenders, and even executed workers. The Mozambique Company punished workers who sought employment elsewhere with sentences of forced unpaid labor.

Colonial Modernity and Labor Resistance

Under the António Enes regime which came to power in the 1890s there was a concerted effort to modernize the Portuguese colonies. Enes wanted a profitable colonial project through the systematic use of native labor. He sought foreign direct investment and missionary aid. Hostile to rival centers of power like the chartered companies, the centralized labor administration promulgated the revised *Regulamento do trabalho indigena*, or Native Labor Code: this effectively obliged all Africans to enter wage labor in order to become civilized Portuguese subjects. Africans deemed adequately assimilated to Portuguese culture – the *assimilado* elite – were exempted from the provisions of the *indigenato* code, including conscription into forced labor (*shibalo*). Coerced labor remained common, although overt slavery was removed.

At the same time, the limited amount of investment and the precarious financial position of the colonial state ensured that developments in neighboring South Africa, which had been industrializing rapidly since the 1880s, were critical. In the regional economic context Mozambique became embedded as a supplier of labor, and by the 1920s supplied nearly half of the African mine labor force in South Africa. Along with the rise of capitalism in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), this created opportunities for evading and sabotaging the *indigenato*, and desertion from labor contracts. The colonial administration inherited a situation where there was already extensive movement of labor, over which it never managed to establish real control. Mozambicans were already migrating for work before Portugal exerted its authority. Migration

was more than escape: it was often a rational if risky strategy, with calculated desertions to the relatively better conditions in Lourenço Marques used as a means of avoiding conscription for cotton production, and as a stepping stone to work in South Africa or Southern Rhodesia. Migration or desertion were silent, often unorganized resistance strategies that employers often struggled to detect or suppress.

Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) was another destination providing better conditions than the agricultural sector: the economic hub of Mozambique, it grew rapidly as an important port complex, largely as a result of a railway connection from 1895 to South Africa's Witwatersrand region, as well as substantial South African investments in shipping and handling, utilities, and in financial services. The city's population grew rapidly, and there was a substantial degree of European immigration: the urban African population was certainly not less than 10,000 by 1915; the white population of the whole country was perhaps 15,000 a decade later. South African capital was displaced from the port and rail complex by the colonial government from 1910 onwards.

White immigrants formed the first trade unions in the territory in Lourenço Marques from 1905. These retained some links to Portuguese socialism and anarchosyndicalism, but in practice were often indifferent to African workers and overwhelmingly white in membership. The Port and Railway Employees Association, the most important union, led a strike wave from 1917 to 1921 in the face of increasing repression that escalated into martial law. A number of Africans joined the strikes, but were routinely marginalized in the settlements that took place. By 1925 the Port and Railway Employees Association had recovered and launched a large railway strike: this was broken when the railways were militarized, with strikers evicted from their homes, hundreds fired, and leaders deported. This shocked all workers in the city, white and black alike, effectively ending labor action until 1932, when a strike by electricity workers and railway workers was crushed in a similar way; unionism was thereafter defeated for the remainder of the colonial period.

The unions were lambasted by the *assimilado* intellectual Joao Dos Santos, who advocated interracial labor unity and African rights. Born in Mozambique, he formed the Liga Africana in

Lisbon and established the newspaper *O Africano* in Lourenço Marques. With the help of his brother, José, he edited and directed the successor paper *O Brado Africano*, an organ of the Grêmio Africano circle. Notwithstanding their base in the small *assimilado* and mulatto middle class, the papers criticized the *indiginato* as discriminatory, humiliating, and flawed, and as a barrier to true civilization, and provided extensive and supportive coverage of both African and white worker grievances, struggles, and demands. The circle never recovered from the death of João Albasini, nor did African workers manage to unionize at this time despite the abortive formation of the União Africano (African Union).

The António de Oliveira Salazar fascist dictatorship started in 1926 and later consolidated into the *Estado Novo* (new state) in 1930. It attempted to increase metropolitan control of the colonies (now deemed provinces). Unions were dismantled and replaced by state-run sindicatos, restricted to whites and *assimilados*; and strikes were prohibited. Resistance to growing pressures for Africans to assimilate provoked, on the contrary, a nationalist affirmation of Africanness among both workers and the elite. Nationalism, influenced to some extent by Marxism-Leninism and the Portuguese Communist Party, increasingly provided the core of African resistance, with a number of groups coming together to form the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) (FRELIMO) in 1962.

Post-Independence Labor Regime

FRELIMO waged a largely successful armed struggle and formed the first independence government in 1974. Its struggle had been primarily rural, labor was not represented in party structures, and the legacy of the *Estado Novo* and the weakness of the colonial economy meant there was no powerful working-class movement to shape the post-colonial regime. FRELIMO adopted Marxism-Leninism as a modernizing ideology, stressed nation-building, and viewed democratic politics as an impediment to development. FRELIMO set up Grupos Dinamizadores-GDs (“dynamizing groups”), committees of eight to ten people in villages, urban neighborhoods, and workplaces: initially, GDs were to prevent sabotage, but their role

became workplace management and control over labor. In GD-run enterprises, workers were organized into production councils from 1976 (called unions from 1984), which focused on combating “indiscipline” and raising productivity. The objective of these structures was to ensure the working class acted in support of the state’s development effort.

Thus, the Organization of the Mozambican Workers (OTM) provided FRELIMO with a transmission belt for party-state control and was the only “union” organization permitted during the one-party years. It had no autonomy, strikes were banned, wage increases were restricted (prices were not), and ever-greater demands were made on wage earners and peasants. Unlike Zambia and Zimbabwe, where the official unions were able to establish some autonomy from the state, the OTM was firmly subordinated.

Pluralist Labor Regime

In 1984 Mozambique joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and in 1987 the first *Programma de Reabilitação Económica* (economic readjustment program) (PRE) was introduced. This marked a clear shift towards a deregulation of the economy and increasing reliance on an open market. There were large-scale retrenchments and the membership of the OTM’s 14 affiliates fell from 300,000 members in the early 1980s to 90,000 in 2003. Mozambique today has one of the weakest and most unpoliticized labor movements, and is among the most flexible labor markets in Southern Africa, with widespread casualization and poverty.

Mozambique suffered two major wars: against colonialism in 1964–74 and civil war in 1976–92. Hostilities between FRELIMO and the Mozambican National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana) (RENAMO) ended in 1992, leading to the first democratic elections in 1994, when FRELIMO won 53 percent of the vote and RENAMO 34 percent. As part of the political liberalization the OTM was declared independent of FRELIMO in 1990, but remains centralized, with most top positions in the organization’s hierarchy occupied by FRELIMO loyalists, and for years it remained suspicious of workers’ direct action. This situation contributed to the breakaway of unions representing workers in the hotel and tourism sector, construction

and mining, and transport in 1992. These formed the alliance called the Free and Independent Trade Unions (Sindicatos Livres e Independentes) (SLIM), which was legally constituted in 1997 into a union federation called the National Federation of Free and Independent Trade Unions of Mozambique (Confederação Nacional do Sindicatos Independentes e Livres de Moçambique) (CONSILMO). CONSILMO criticized the OTM for remaining too close to the ruling party and for being “a top-down federation” (Webster & Mosoetsa 2001), and aimed to establish a more democratic and effective labor movement based on autonomy. Nonetheless, the OTM remains the largest federation. Of the 20 unions that exist in Mozambique, 14 are OTM and four CONSILMO, with two others independent. In response to the pressing demands for workers’ protection, the OTM sought to create a platform of joint union action through the creation of a Forum for Union Coordination (Fórum de Concertação Sindical) (FCS) in 1995. It also sought to coordinate and assist the activities of its affiliates, to represent the affiliates in tripartite forums, and to participate in policy formulation.

Today, the differences in OTM and CONSILMO seem slim; not only are both represented in the tripartite Consultative Labor Commission (Comissão Consultiva Do Trabalho) (CCT), but they also meet beforehand in a lengthy joint strategy session. They also share a lack of capacity in collective bargaining and in bargaining over policies, notwithstanding support and aid from unions abroad. Links with labor in Southern Africa and South Africa in particular have also become increasingly significant, and the OTM is part of the Southern African Trade Union Coordinating Council (SATUCC) launched in 1983. The OTM is affiliated to this council and is also a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Grassroots links were established between metal workers in MOZAL and their counterparts at Hillside Aluminum in Richards Bay, South Africa after a lengthy strike at MOZAL in 2000. The strikers wanted to be paid in US dollars at South African wages.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Apartheid Movement, South Africa; Chissano, Joaquim (b. 1939); COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions); FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique); Machel, Samora

(1933–1986); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; South Africa, Labor Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Abrahamsson, H. & Nilsson, A. (1995) *Mozambique: The Troubled Transition*. London: Zed Books.
- Allina-Pisano, E. (2003) Borderlands, Boundaries, and the Contours of Colonial Rule: African Labor in Manica District, Mozambique, c. 1904–1908. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 36, 1: 59–82.
- Christie, I. (1989) *Samora Machel: A Biography*. London: PANAF.
- Duffy, J. (1962) *Portugal in Africa*. London: Penguin Books.
- Egero, B. (1987) *Mozambique: A Dream Undone. The Political Economy of Democracy, 1975–84*. Uppsala: Norddiska Afrikaninstitutet.
- First, R. (1983) *Black Gold: “The Mozambican Miner, Proletariat and Peasant”*. Centre of African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University. Brighton: Harvester.
- Hall, M. & Young, T. (1997) *Confronting the Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence*. London: Hurst.
- Henriksen, T. (1978) *Mozambique: A History*. London: Collins.
- Hoile, D. (1989) *Mozambique, A Nation in Crisis*. London: Claridge Press.
- Hoile, D. (1994) *Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment*. London: Mozambique Institute.
- Isaacman, A. (1992) Coercion, Paternalism and the Labor Process: The Mozambican Cotton Regime 1938–1961. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 18, 3: 487–526.
- Isaacman, A. & Isaacman, B. (1983) *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution*. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.
- Macamo, E. (2002) The Denial of Modernity: The Regulation of Native Labor in Colonial Mozambique and Its Postcolonial Aftermath. Paper presented at CODESRIA 10th General Assembly, December 8–12, Kampala.
- Manning, C. L. (2002) *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992–2000*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- O’Laughlin, B. (2002) Proletarianization, Agency and Changing Rural Livelihoods: Forced Labor and Resistance in Colonial Mozambique. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 28, 3: 511–30.
- Opello, W. (1973) Internal War in Mozambique: A Social-Psychological Analysis of a Nationalist Revolution. PhD thesis, University of Colorado.
- Penvenne, J. M. (1984) Labor Struggles at the Port of Lourenço Marques, 1900–1933. *Journal of the Fernand Braudel Centre for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems and Civilizations* 8, 2.
- Penvenne, J. M. (1995) *African Workers and Colonial Racism: Mozambican Strategies and Struggles in*

- Lourenço Marques, 1877–1962. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
- Pitcher, A. (2002) *Transforming Mozambique: The Politics of Privatization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pretorius, L. (2000) Regional Integration and Development in Southern Africa: A Case Study of the Mozal Project and its Implications for Workers. Paper No. 4, March. International Labor Resource and Information Group (IRIG).
- Rinehart, R. (1984) "Historical Setting." In Secretary of the Army: United States Government, *Mozambique: A Country Study*. Washington, DC: United States Government.
- Stiftung, F. E. (2004) *A Survey of Trade Unionism in Contemporary Mozambique*. Maputo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Vail, L. & White, L. (1983) Forms of Resistance: Songs and Perceptions of Power in Colonial Mozambique. *American Historical Review* 88, 4: 883–919.
- van der Walt, L. (2007) The First Globalization and Transnational Labor Activism in Southern Africa: White Labourism, the IWW, and the ICU, 1904–1934. *African Studies* 66: 223–51.
- Webster, E. & Mosoetsa, S. (2001) *Connecting and Disconnecting: An Introductory Review of Labor in Selected SADC Countries in the Era of Globalization*. Johannesburg: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Webster, E., Wood, G., & Mtyingizana, B. (2004) A Survey of Industrial Relations Practices in Mozambique. In P. Coughlin (Ed.), *Labor Relations in Mozambique: Law, Praxis and Economic Implications with International Comparisons*. Maputo: EconPolicy Research Group.

Mpho, Motsamai (b. 1921)

Wazha Gilbert Morapedi

Motsamai Mpho, a key nationalist figure and champion of social justice, was born to a Bayei peasant family on February 3, 1921, in Maun, northwestern Bechuanaland (now Botswana). The Bayei were a non-Setswana-speaking ethnic group, subordinate to the Batswana majority, themselves dominated by the traditional nobility, the *dikgosi*, or chiefs. At the time of Mpho's birth, Bechuanaland was a British protectorate, based on indirect rule with a colonial administration that was dominated by the small white population.

Although he was from a minor tribe, Mpho was well educated by the standards of Bechuanaland. He attended primary school in Maun, and proceeded to Tiger Kloof, Vryburg, in South Africa,

where he matriculated in 1944. He returned to Bechuanaland that year, and was offered a job as telegraph operator. Instead he took a job at Crown Mines at Johannesburg in South Africa in 1948, as secretary to the Reverend Anderson, his former schoolmaster, who was now employed as a welfare officer at the mine.

Mpho also worked with the Reverend Arthur Blaxall, secretary of the South African Council of Churches. Blaxall was an advocate of the non-racial and democratic ideals of the African National Congress (ANC), and this introduced Mpho to the local African nationalist movement, which he joined in 1952. The ANC's ideals resonated with Mpho, and he was active in the Congress movement's campaigns against apartheid in the 1950s. The ANC was head of the Congress Alliance, which was formed in 1952 and comprised the ANC, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the Colored People's Congress, the white Congress of Democrats, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU).

Increasingly radicalized, Mpho was active in forming and activating ANC branches in the African townships of the western Transvaal, and became secretary of the ANC's Roodepoort branch in 1953. He also served as organizing secretary of the Consultative Committee of the Congress of the Peoples of the West Rand, which was linked to the ANC. He also worked as a freelance writer and journalist, contributing articles to newspapers such as *The Hobbies* and the *New Age*, edited by ANC figures as well as by members of the underground South African Communist Party (SACP), like Ruth First.

In 1954, the Congress Alliance developed the Freedom Charter and renewed its campaign of civil disobedience and labor action. Mpho contributed significantly to the Freedom Charter, which became the ANC's most important document, articulating the goals and aspirations of the South African democrats. In 1955, Mpho participated in defying the Group Areas Act which demarcated areas according to race. Such campaigns were followed by massive police crackdowns on ANC activists, including Mpho.

Mpho was also strongly opposed to British colonialism in his homeland, and was one of the leaders of the Bechuanaland Protectorate National Assembly in Johannesburg, which organized Batswana migrants. His politics led him to be branded as a "communist," as did

his encounters with figures like First and Joe Slovo. After the Sharpeville and Langa massacres of 1960, Mpho was amongst the ANC activists and leaders, among them Nelson Mandela, who were arrested. He was charged with treason and detained for five months. He was then discharged and deported on April 19, 1960. He married Onalepelo Macheng, a Motswana ANC activist who lived with her uncle in South Africa, in 1960.

Mpho's political experience in South Africa would prove invaluable in his activities against British colonialism in his homeland. He settled in Palapye, and together with Kgalemang Motsete formed the radical Botswana People's Party (BPP), the first mass-based political movement in Bechuanaland. The aims of this party, which Mpho served as secretary-general, were independence and democracy. Many members, including Mpho, adored Kwame Nkrumah's pan-Africanism, but Mpho himself was closer to the South African ANC's non-racialism than the racial nationalism of its rival, the breakaway Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).

Using his experience from South Africa, Mpho campaigned vigorously to raise consciousness among the Batswana about their rights, and was continually under surveillance by the Special Branch. The BPP campaigned against the lack of economic development in Bechuanaland, white domination of land in areas like the northeast, and racial discrimination.

The BPP was hostile to the *dikgosi*, critical of Britain's constitutional reforms in the colony, and wanted immediate independence based on adult suffrage. Mpho himself particularly stressed the importance of ethnic equality amongst Africans. The BPP also influenced the Botswana Trade Union Congress (BTUC) in the early 1960s. The BTUC worked closely with the BPP in political rallies, and demanded the unity of all workers, irrespective of color, ethnicity, or creed, in line with ANC and SACTU policies.

Mpho had become a member of the World Peace Council (WPC) in 1955, campaigning for peace and human rights even beyond Africa, and became Bechuanaland's goodwill ambassador to the WPC. He accommodated South African refugees fleeing apartheid in 1962, and was their staunch spokesman.

The BPP split in 1962 and Mpho was expelled from the party. The split was linked to allegations of financial mismanagement and personal

rivalries in the leadership. Mpho then formed the BPP No. 2, subsequently the Botswana Independence Party (BIP). This party's platform did not differ from that of the BPP, since the split was not caused by ideological differences. When Bechuanaland became independent Botswana in 1966, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) of Seretse Khama won 28 seats, and the BPP three; the BIP did not win a single seat. However, Mpho became an opposition member of parliament in 1969, when the BIP won the Ngami constituency.

In parliament, Mpho continued fighting for democracy and civil rights. In 1982 he received the Presidential Order for Meritorious Service, Botswana's highest honor for meritorious service to the country. He strove continually to unite opposition parties, and in 1999 the BIP joined forces with the Botswana Freedom Party. He also campaigned against the corruption that was rampant in some institutions. While Mpho is now advanced in age, he remains a staunch advocate of the rights of the downtrodden in Botswana and elsewhere.

SEE ALSO: Botswana, Protest and Nationalism; Communist Party of South Africa, 1921–1950; Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918); Maripe, Knight (1927–2006); Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972); Slovo, Joe (1926–1995); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC

References and Suggested Readings

- Campbell, A. & Tlou, T. (1997) *History of Botswana*. Gaborone: Macmillan.
- Edge, W. (1996) *The Autobiography of Motsamai Mpho*. Gaborone: Lebopo Productions.
- Picard, L. (1987) *The Politics of Development in Botswana: A Model for Success?* London: Lynne Rienner.
- Ramsay, J. & Parsons, N. (1998) The Emergence of Political Parties in Botswana. In *Botswana: Politics and Society*. Pretoria: J. L. van Schaik, pp. 134–50.

MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola)

Madalina Florescu

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de

Angola, MPLA) was created in 1956 in Luanda by a group of *mestiços* and Catholic intellectuals who claimed responsibility for the attacks of February 4, 1961, on the prisons in Luanda. Other versions of its history deny that in 1961 the MPLA existed as a movement capable of organizing such action, insisting the MPLA was created in 1962 by Agostinho Neto in Leopoldville. In December 1962 the MPLA acquired its first political structure at a party conference in Leopoldville, creating a political and military committee and a steering committee and nominating Neto as leader. One year later, at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, where Holden Roberto represented the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), Jose Edoardo dos Santos declared the MPLA "the only authentic Angolan movement."

In the 1960s decolonization did not mean the same thing to all African nationalist movements. The two dominant ideological trends were represented by the Casablanca group (with Algeria) and by the Monrovia group (with Congo-Leopoldville). Algeria gave preference to the MPLA, while the government in Congo-Leopoldville gave preferential support to the Union of Angolan Peoples (União dos Povos de Angola, UPA) (later FNLA). In 1963 the two trends were brought together in the Organization of the African Union (OAU), and the various Angolan parties in Leopoldville joined to form the government in exile (GRAE) which the OAU recognized as the exclusively legitimate representative of the anti-colonial Angolan nationalist struggle. The MPLA did not become part of the GRAE, and the OAU did not recognize the MPLA because it lacked adequate military power for an anti-colonial campaign.

At the time the MPLA did not yet have a clear political identity. While the faction of the leadership that was favorable to joining GRAE followed the line of the French communists, Neto sought to broaden the range of potential sources of financial, military, and diplomatic aid by not adopting an ideological line. Although the leaders of the three main nationalist movements were all the product of a combination of Portuguese colonial policy and Protestant missionary education, the project of a common nationalist front failed because of the division between Catholic and Protestant missionaries' approach to evangelization, which enforced a town/rural divide and a divide between the

old Europeanized elite ("Old Creoles" or "Afro-Portuguese") and the new African elite. These tensions played out within the MPLA, where those of Protestant origin who joined the MPLA always maintained strong ties to their churches, unlike the Catholics who joined the MPLA as a rejection of their Catholicism.

The repercussions of the divisions concerning the alliance with GRAE led to high-level defections within the party. The president of Congo-Brazzaville received Neto, Roberto, and the leaders of four Bakongo groups at a round table he organized after the OUA had recognized GRAE. Upon his return to Leopoldville, Neto declared he had formed an alliance with Bakongo parties and the FDLA (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Angola), and that the MPLA was in a stronger position to negotiate its adherence to GRAE. Viriato da Cruz "dismissed" the FDLA and founded his own MPLA group with a Sovereign General Assembly. The two groups accused one another of factionalism (Neto) and of contracting secret alliances with Portuguese businessmen (da Cruz).

In June and July 1963, when a commission of OAU met in Leopoldville to reconcile the Angolan nationalist movements, Neto and da Cruz presented their request for admission separately as representatives of FDLA and the "Provisional Executive Committee" respectively. Failing to present their request as a unified MPLA, and failing to bring evidence of solid military activity, both requests were rejected. On the basis of military activity, the OAU recognized the FNLA as the exclusively legitimate representative of Angolan nationalism and recipient of military aid. To contemporary observers, the OAU decision had annihilated the MPLA.

When Cruz's MPLA was later admitted to the ranks of the FNLA, Neto's faction was forced to close its offices in Kinshasa. Neto sought refuge in Brazzaville, whose new government was an ideological ally. In Brazzaville, the MPLA was resuscitated, adopting the Marxist-Leninist ideology of its host. In exchange, it received military equipment and bases and access to Angolan territory through the Cabinda enclave. Its new military status further changed its relationship to the OAU, which not only recognized the MPLA but allocated to it one-third of its resources. In 1964 Mario d'Andrade returned to form part of the leadership, and Neto's group avenged the "treason" of Viriato's adherence to

the FNLA/GRAE by arresting and executing two of its leading figures during a transit through Brazzaville. Viriato da Cruz would never recover from this episode, retiring from political life.

With support from the USSR and Cuba, Neto's MPLA was the sole representative of Angolan nationalism at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in 1966. The MPLA also strengthened its contacts with PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) and Frelimo, and extended its guerilla warfare from the Dembos forests of Cabinda to the eastern front along the border with Zambia, and increasingly the nationalist movement acquired a tripartite ethnic basis.

In 1972 the MPLA entered a new phase of internal conflict, aggravated by the 1974 coup in Lisbon. A faction based in Brazzaville issued a manifesto, the *Revolta Activa*, calling for a party congress to resolve the question of leadership. By then, the revenues of Cabindan oil had become a major stake in the struggle for control of the Angolan state. The second national conference of the MPLA was held in a military camp outside Lusaka, with 165 delegates for the "present leadership" (Neto), 165 for the *Revolta do Leste* (Chipenda), and 70 for the *Revolta Activa* (Mario d'Andrade). Neto walked away, rejecting what he called a "negation of the spirit of unity."

Under the pressure of African presidents (Nyerere, Ngouabi, Kaunda, Mobutu), the representatives of the factions met again in Brazzaville to recognize Neto as the president of a unified MPLA for the benefit of a population that was in acute need of leadership. D'Andrade and Chipenda were nominated vice-presidents, and the central committee was reorganized by quotas: 16 "present leadership," 13 *Revolta do Leste*, 10 *Revolta Activa*. Each faction had three representatives elected from the central committee on a nine-member political bureau. Daniel Chipenda, however, defected to establish his own faction of a Tchokwe MPLA in Kinshasa and assume a pro-rural development and traditional rule of the land political agenda. But in October 1974 Lisbon signed a ceasefire with Neto, thus recognizing his faction as the exclusive legitimate MPLA. In November 1974 the MPLA opened its office in Luanda, with the help of financial support and military equipment from the Soviet Union. Neto regained control of the eastern front where the soldiers who had remained faithful to his leadership were renamed the Popular Armed

Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forças Armadas Popular para Libertação de Angola, FAPLA). Subsequently a conference was held in the Moxico bush at which the MPLA was restructured, with the election of a 35-member central committee headed by a ten-member political bureau. Jose Edoardo dos Santos was one of the members as the head of the MPLA's office in Brazzaville. The elected members were *mestiços*, assimilados, or Mbundu.

The new Portuguese government granted independence to all its African colonies and in January 1975 the leaders of the three Angolan nationalist movements met in Alvor under Portuguese supervision to sign the Agreement of Independence. The three movements would share power in a government of transition until November 11, the date chosen for the elections. The nationalist movements, however, had already decided not to compromise on national unification and demilitarization. The ethnic transformation of the conflict that followed was rooted in the mass displacements effected under the economic policies of the Estado Novo which had generated "ethnic cleavages."

Some authors argue that the mass return from Kinshasa of the Bakongo of the 1961 exodus was "one of the most fundamental changes to postcolonial Angola." For others, the most important agent of the post-independence changes was the Cuban intervention. The role of the Cubans was decisive in determining the power structures of the post-independence state by giving Neto privileged control over the internal divisions of the MPLA, while Soviet delivery of military equipment enabled the MPLA to arm the civilian population as early as 1974. The transformation of the colonial state into a strong presidential system was mediated by a regime of terror.

After independence, the MPLA was again internally divided by competition for the leadership. In 1975 a new police force was set up (a FAPLA-directed militia) and two autonomous committees were dissolved and their leaders jailed. A new body of laws further enforced MPLA control of the labor force by preventing strikes and the formation of autonomous groups through such means as the Labour Discipline Law and the Economic Sabotage Law of 1976. The 1976 elections revealed very weak popular support for Neto's MPLA, while a new dissident faction led by Nito Alves had gained strong support

within the *musseques* as well as among high ranking party members. Its attempted coup was violently repressed. At the first party congress held in December 1977, the MPLA established a one-party state, officially adopted Marxist-Leninism as its ideology, and was renamed MPLA-Partido do Trabalho. The chairman of the party was also head of state, and a central committee of 90 members, headed by a political bureau of ten members, constituted the organs of the government. A resolution was also adopted to secure the party's power by preventing any form of legal political opposition. The ministry of defense had "the task of inquiring into the moral and political conduct of those who are accused of deviations in line and destructive propaganda, and the measures which are judged necessary be taken against them" (ARC 1977/78: B 500). A party policy of "zero tolerance" was applied to both internal and external opponents.

In 1979 Jose Edoardo Dos Santos succeeded Agostinho Neto and pursued a politics of enforcement of the presidential power. In 1982 the central committee granted the president "special powers" and another decree in 1983 empowered the president to appoint regional military councils. Further, in 1984 the Defence and Security Council, chaired by the president, became the effective executive organ of power. Shortly before the second party congress, held in December 1985, Dos Santos replaced Neto's nomenclature with his own. The new president also secured his personal power as head of Sonangol, which was created in 1976 as the unique concessionaire for oil production. In 1978 the state was declared by law the sole owner of the oil reserves of the country, and the first reform for the liberalization of the market in 1987 did not affect the ownership of Sonangol, which remained a state-owned company, while the state was increasingly controlled by a system of patronage.

In 1987, the MPLA officially shifted from a state-controlled to a liberal market economy. But throughout the 1980s the MPLA played the "socialist" card in the political sphere and the "capitalist" card in the economic sphere. In the 1980s, while the MPLA was not recognized by the US government, the US company Gulf Oil was the main producer of oil in Angola and a principal source of foreign exchange. Further, while the US supplied arms to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), Cuban troops that supported the MPLA also

defended the Gulf Oil Company against UNITA. And in 1993, when UNITA took control of the port of Soyo which gives access to the offshore oil fields, the MPLA hired the services of Executive Outcomes, a South African private military company which had worked for UNITA. The aura of legitimacy gained on the international scene with the battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1988, where revolutionary socialism (Cuban troops) defeated apartheid (South African troops), secured the MPLA international recognition throughout the various agreements signed with UNITA during the resource wars of the 1990s.

The Bicesse Accords in 1991 established that the contending nationalist movements would disarm and compete politically at democratic elections to be held in 1992. But this clause contrasted with the 1976 resolution on "popular power," according to which elections would not be held without previously eliminating any possible form of both internal and external dissidence. The departure of the Cuban troops (1991) was compensated for by new private security forces, including the Policia de Intervenção Rapida, popularly known as "ninjas," who were employed to carry out the "cleansing" of UNITA supporters.

Between 1975 and 2002 the MPLA controlled the most profitable economic sector which accounted for 80 percent of total export earnings. But between 1990 and 1996, while the household expenditure of the top wealthiest families increased from 9 to 27 times that of the poorest, government expenditure on public services was halved; expenditure on defense and public order accounted for 39 percent of total government expenditure between 1996 and 1998, and unclassified expenditure tripled (from 12.7 percent in 1997, to 42.3 percent in 2000).

The signature of the Memorandum of Luena with UNITA in 2002 legitimized the MPLA as the democratically elected government of 1992.

SEE ALSO: Angolan National Liberation, 1961–1974; Neto, Agostinho (1922–1979); Women and National Liberation in Africa

References and Suggested Readings

- Africa Contemporary Report* (1977/1978).
 Birmingham, D. (2002) Angola. In P. Chabal (Ed.),
A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa. London:
 C. Hurst.
 Comerford, M. G. (2005) *The Peaceful Face of Angola*.
 Luanda.

- Ferguson, J. (2006) *Governing Extraction: New Spatializations of Order and Disorder in Neoliberal Africa*. In *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Guimarrães, F. A. (1998) *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict*. Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Hodges, T. (2004) *Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State*. Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute.
- MacQueen, N. (1997) *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Revolution and the Dissolution of Empire*. London: Longman.
- Marcum, J. A. (1978) *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare*, Vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Péclard, D. (1998) Religion and Politics in Angola: The Church, the Colonial State, and the Emergence of Angolan Nationalism, 1940–1961. *Journal of Religion in Africa* 28 (2): 160–86

MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru)

Robin Stock

The Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru) (MRTA) is a guerrilla movement in Peru. After playing a central role in the internal armed conflict in the 1980s and 1990s, and aiming to overthrow the government in order to establish Marxist-Leninist socialism, today the MRTA is no longer militarily active.

The MRTA was founded on March 1, 1982 as a product of the unification of the left-wing parties Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria – El Militante) (MIR EL) and the Revolutionary Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Revolucionario – Marxista Leninista) (PSR ML). The name Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement refers to the indigenous leader Túpac Amaru II who led an indigenous uprising against the Spanish forces in Cusco (Peru) in 1780, who himself adopted the name from Túpac Amaru, one of the last Incas to fight against the Spanish conquerors in the mid-sixteenth century.

Just two years after democracy was reestablished after a 12-year military government, the MRTA refused to follow the democratic path to obtain its goals. The aims of the group were

to take over power in Peru by force in order to fight against imperialism and capitalism and to install a socialist system based on popular power. Following a Marxist-Leninist ideology, the MRTA was inspired by Latin American strategies of guerrilla warfare based on the experience of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the development of revolutionary movements in Central America, and the success of the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua in 1979. Despite being a clandestine guerrilla group, the MRTA preserved close links to civil organizations and political parties from the left (for example, the United Left – Izquierda Unideal) (IU) in order to find political ways to obtain its aims and gain influence on other parts of the left.

The first actions carried out by the MRTA under the command of its secretary general Victor Polay Campos were several robberies in order to obtain weapons and money for its struggle. In 1982 and 1983 the group gained public attention by forcibly taking over several cities in the department of San Martín. In 1984 the MRTA launched bomb attacks against government authorities and infrastructure as well as against buildings and persons they considered to be part of the imperialist and capitalist system. While these actions were first focused on the urban areas, especially the Peruvian capital Lima, later they expanded into the rural areas of the country. From 1984 the MRTA was recognized as one more actor in the armed conflict between the Peruvian government, paramilitary groups called Rondas Campesinas, and the Maoist guerrilla group Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) (SL). While the MRTA and SL were both founded at the beginning of the 1980s, and both wished to overthrow the government in order to install a socialist state, the MRTA disassociated itself from the SL and even engaged in combat with the Maoist group whose ideology, structure, and strategies it rejected. In April 1985 the MRTA announced a truce after the candidate of the left Alan García won the presidency. But hope for the beginning of a political dialogue was disappointed, and in May 1986 the MRTA restarted its attacks. In 1987 the MRTA was involved in several kidnappings in order to free its prisoners and receive ransom.

The MRTA is believed to have had several hundred active members at its height, mainly recruited from the indigenous population. At

the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s the MRTA suffered many casualties and arrests in fights with government troops, and in February 1989 Secretary General Victor Polay was imprisoned but freed again by a spectacular liberation in July 1990. After Polay was arrested again in 1992, Néstor Cerpa Cartolini took over the command of the MRTA.

In April 1990 Alberto Fujimori won the presidency and began a strong offensive against the guerrilla groups. Committing enormous human rights violations, he was successful in stemming the activities of the MRTA and SL. At the beginning of the 1990s the international and domestic conditions for the MRTA grew worse. At the same time, internal conflicts led to the split-off of the MIR from the MRTA. Many members had been captured already, and an amnesty program by the Fujimori government resulted in a further decimation of the MRTA. The already weak group launched one last spectacular operation that attained international recognition. On December 17, 1996 a group of 14 MRTA members under the command of Néstor Cerpa Cartolini attacked the Japanese embassy in Lima and took all 483 guests as hostages. The aim was to extort the government to release all MRTA prisoners, especially their leader Victor Polay. The taking of hostages lasted 126 days and was finally ended by Peruvian special military forces on April 22, freeing the remaining 71 hostages but killing all 14 MRTA fighters. This defeat marked the beginning of the end of the MRTA.

While the MRTA was considered a terrorist organization by the Peruvian state and by the government of the United States, its political aims were supported by several leftist groups around the world. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación) installed to investigate crimes during the internal conflict in the 1980s and 1990s concluded in its final report in 2003 that the MRTA was responsible for about 1.5 percent of the nearly 70,000 victims in the conflict, while the Shining Path was held responsible for about 50 percent and the military 28 percent.

SEE ALSO: Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Peru, Armed Insurgency and the Dirty War, 1980–1990; Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN); Túpac Amaru (ca. 1540–1572); Túpac Amaru Rebellion II and the Last Inca Revolt, 1780–1783

References and Suggested Readings

- Carranza Polo, G. (2003) *Tomar por asalto el siglo XXI. Biografía y documentos del comandante obrero MRTA Néstor Cerpa Cartolini*. Bolivia.
- Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (2003) Reporte Final. Available online: www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/. Accessed May 26, 2008.
- Jiménez Bacca, B. (2000) *Inicio, Desarrollo y Ocaso del Terrorismo en el Perú*. Peru.
- MRTA (1982) Las resoluciones del 1 de Marzo. Available online: www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/mrta/. Accessed May 26, 2008.

Mugabe, Robert (b. 1924)

Eliakim M. Sibanda

Born in 1924 at Kutama Mission in Zvimba Reserve, west of the Rhodesian capital of Salisbury (Harare), Robert Mugabe spent his formative years under the tutelage of an Irish Jesuit, Father Jerome O'Hea, founder of a teacher training center and hospital at the mission. Mugabe graduated from Kutama with a teaching diploma in 1945, and in 1951 earned a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Fort Hare in South Africa. In 1958, while at Takoradi Teacher Training College in Ghana, Mugabe was a witness to that country's independence from Britain. Under Kwame Nkrumah's leadership, Ghana was an exemplar of radical African nationalism, anti-colonialism, and liberation. Ghana reinforced Mugabe's view that liberation for Africa under Marxist principles was a necessity, and he emerged as a leading nationalist figure on his return to Rhodesia in 1960.

In 1960, Mugabe was elected publicity secretary of the National Democratic Party (NDP) under party president Joshua Nkomo. After Nkomo agreed to the constitution of 1961, which fell short of gaining majority rule for the NDP, Mugabe was approached by party executives concerning his interest in forming an alternative party. While nothing materialized, Mugabe soon after became more vocal and militant in opposition to British rule.

In 1961, the Rhodesian government banned the NDP for violence and destruction of property against the white settlers. Undeterred, Nkomo formed the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), a militant anti-colonial party, to fight for national liberation. After ZAPU was banned in

September 1962, it organized a guerilla warfare campaign against the white-dominated Rhodesian government, and was later forced underground. Mugabe and others separated from Nkomo and ZAPU, forming the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1963, intermittently leading to suspicions, hostilities, and clashes, and strengthening the Rhodesian government's white-dominated government, which banned both parties in 1964.

In the same year Mugabe was arrested for "subversive speech" and sent to prison in Salisbury along with all other nationalist leaders. There Mugabe taught classes to other nationalists and earned three degrees in law and economics by correspondence from London. While still in prison, Mugabe was elected as the new leader of ZANU, replacing Ndabaningi Sithole, who was also imprisoned.

In 1976, Mugabe left Rhodesia for neighboring Mozambique, leading a guerilla force against Ian Smith's British-Rhodesian forces. After three years of intense warfare, Britain, under pressure from the international community, decided that white rule must end, leading to the September 1979 Lancaster House Conference in London to end the insurgency and create an independent Zimbabwe.

After a ceasefire was agreed, negotiations attended by Smith, Mugabe, Nkomo, and others began at Lancaster House. At the meeting agreements were made for a new constitution for the Republic of Zimbabwe, with elections to be held in February 1980. During the negotiations Mugabe conceded 20 seats in the new parliament for whites and a ten-year moratorium on constitutional amendments. After the agreement was struck, Mugabe returned to Zimbabwe a hero and gained enormous popular support.

During his election campaign Mugabe promised gradual rather than revolutionary change, speaking of equality and humanitarianism for all Zimbabwe, as whites were planning to leave en masse. Although Mugabe was by self-definition a Roman Catholic, he considered himself a Marxist-Leninist and ZANU received the full support of Moscow. In the end ZANU won a decisive majority over ZAPU in the elections, with Mugabe emerging as prime minister. Through democratic elections, Mugabe became the first African leader of Zimbabwe in nearly 100 years.

Mugabe gained the initial respect of the country's white population when he appeared

on television as articulate, thoughtful, and willing to compromise, maintaining that "there is no intention on our part to use our majority to victimize the minority; we will ensure there is a place for everyone in this country. . . . Let us deepen our sense of belonging and engender a common interest that knows no race, color or creed."

Shortly after taking power and making promises of reconciliation and democracy, Mugabe exercised a forceful authoritarian rule enacted through his great distrust of opposition. He sought to incorporate ZAPU into the ZANU government, giving Nkomo a number of cabinet positions. However, in 1983, Mugabe ousted Nkomo from his cabinet, triggering bitter infighting. In 1987, a peace accord was negotiated that merged ZAPU and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). In the same process the position of prime minister was abolished and Mugabe took the new office of president with Nkomo as vice-president.

Throughout the 1990s Mugabe emerged as a more outspoken nationalist, charging the 75,000 white Zimbabweans who were a dominant economic influence as the main reason for the country's collapse during that decade. In turn, the white population accused Mugabe of racism. As HIV/AIDS reached crisis proportions in Zimbabwe, Mugabe initiated a moral campaign against homosexuality, making "unnatural sex acts" illegal and punishable with imprisonment. Mugabe was also harshly criticized himself for intervening in the Second Congo War in 1998 when he sent 6,000 troops to assist those of Laurent Kabila against troops from Uganda and Rwanda. The Congo invasion was regarded by many as a wasteful colonial-style intervention and later prompted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to cancel Zimbabwe's relief funding, further eroding the economy.

By 2008, the ZANU-PF has come to dominate what some consider a one-party state by holding 147 of the country's 150 parliamentary seats. Discontent grows in Zimbabwe over the failing economy as inflation and unemployment soar to record levels and Mugabe's promise to hand over to blacks large tracts of fertile, white-owned land remained unresolved. In 2008, Mugabe lost elections to Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai (who was a leader in the labor movement) by 43 percent to 48 percent. But because neither candidate had

obtained the necessary 50 percent majority vote, a run-off election was held. The MDC later suggested that the official results had been rigged to force a run-off vote, claiming their returns suggested Tsvangirai had received 50.3 percent of the vote. The run-off election eventually secured a victory for Mugabe by a margin of 56.2 percent to 41.9 percent.

In the wake of the 2008 elections, violent protests broke out throughout Zimbabwe against Mugabe's reelection to the presidency. The results led to international condemnation.

SEE ALSO: Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972); Southern Africa, Popular Resistance to Neoliberalism, 1982–2007; Zimbabwe, Labor Movement and Politics, 1980–2007; Zimbabwe, National Liberation Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Chan, S. (2003) *Robert Mugabe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Meredith, M. (2007) *Mugabe: Power, Plunder, and the Struggle for Zimbabwe's Future*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Nkomo, J., Mugabe, R., & Zvobgo, E. (1978) *Zimbabwe: The Final Advance. Documents on the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement*. Richmond, BC: LSM Information Center.
- Sibanda, E. M. (2005) *The Zimbabwe African People's Union, 1967–87: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia*. Trenton: Africa World Press.

Muhammad 'Ali (1769–1849)

Andrew J. Waskey

Muhammad 'Ali Pasha (Mehmet Ali) was born in Kavala, a fishing village on the Macedonia coast. Probably of Albanian ethnic origin, he was reared by the governor of Kavala after his father Ibrahim Agha died. He entered the Greek tobacco trade, which taught him the importance of commerce for financing the development of an army and a political system. His growing success opened the way for him to marry one of the daughters of the governor. She eventually became the mother of five of his 95 children.

In 1798 Muhammad 'Ali joined an Ottoman expeditionary force that sailed to Egypt. Its mission was to drive the French out of Egypt and return control to the Ottoman Sultan. As a young officer he fought against the French

and British. The French withdrew from Egypt in 1801, creating a power vacuum. Muhammad 'Ali exploited the situation as an opportunity to gain control of Egypt. In the chaos he used the Albanian forces under his command to take control. His success was rewarded in 1805 by the Ottoman Sultan with the titles of *wali* (viceroy) in Egypt, with the rank of Pasha (ruler).

During the eighteenth century Egypt had become a poor and neglected province of the Ottoman Empire. Muhammad 'Ali's mission was to turn it into the most powerful province in the Ottoman Empire with a strength that would allow it to be independent in all but name. To accomplish his goal he developed the Egyptian army and used it with ruthless cunning to destroy the power of the Mameluks, hereditary warrior slaves that had ruled Egypt for centuries. In 1811 he invited several hundred Mameluk Beys to a dinner where they were surrounded and slaughtered. The survivors fled up the Nile to Dongola in the northern Sudan where they established themselves as slave traders. With the Mameluks out of the way, Muhammad 'Ali took over their farm lands. He then began a series of reforms aimed at making Egypt powerful and prosperous. He abolished the Mameluk system of tax-farming, replacing it with direct payment of taxes to the state. He instituted a new land survey so that taxes could be more efficiently collected. The reforms in taxation and other areas were aimed at increasing the tax revenues of the Egyptian state. One primary use of the tax spending was to increase the strength of the Egyptian army. Agricultural reforms were introduced so that irrigation was improved. Long fiber cotton from the Sudan was introduced into Egypt where it became an important cash crop. Tobacco and indigo were also introduced as cash crops to supplement the traditional wheat crop. With stable tax revenues Muhammad 'Ali developed a reformed and salaried civil service. He promoted new industry and improved the agricultural system, the irrigation system, and the administrative system in order to strengthen his position within Egypt.

In 1818 Muhammad 'Ali was ordered by the Sultan in Constantinople to destroy the Wahhabi movement in Arabia. He retook Mecca and Medina from the Wahhabi and razed the Al-Saudi capital of Diriyah. The victory opened the way

for Egyptian merchants to develop trade with Arabia and from Red Sea ports to India and beyond.

In 1821 Muhammad ‘Ali conquered the northern river provinces of Sudan. His goal was to gain control of the slave trade and Sudanese gold. The slaves were often bought as warriors to be trained for the army. He destroyed the remnants of the Mameluks at Dongola and began to introduce agricultural improvements in the Sudan. The invasion was to have long-term consequences for the Sudan and Egypt.

Muhammad ‘Ali fought against the Greeks in their War of Independence, but his fleet was destroyed at the Battle of Navarino, on October 20, 1827. He then fought two wars against Sultan Mahmud II (1831–3 and 1838–41). He defeated an Ottoman army at the Battle of Nezib (June 24, 1839); however, the European powers stopped his expansion, keeping him from making Egypt into an independent country.

In 1841 Muhammad ‘Ali’s family became an Egyptian dynasty, lasting until King Farouk was dethroned and exiled in July 1952. Muhammad ‘Ali died on August 2, 1849 at Alexandria.

SEE ALSO: Egypt, Peasant Rebellion of 1824; Egypt, Revolution of 1952; Urabi Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Dodwell, H. (1931/1967) *The Founder of Modern Egypt: A Study of Muhammad ‘Ali*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fahmy, K. (1997) *All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goldschmidt, A. (2008) *Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation State*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Muir, Thomas (1765–1799)

Michael T. Davis

Thomas Muir was a Scottish political reformer and one of the first political transportees to Australia. He was born in Glasgow on August 24, 1765, the son of a Presbyterian grocer and hop merchant. Muir was well educated, beginning his adult education at Glasgow University before completing his studies in law at Edinburgh University. He was admitted to the Faculty of

Advocates on November 24, 1787 and embarked on a moderately successful career as a legal practitioner. However, following the outbreak of the French Revolution, Muir’s attention was diverted by radical politics. By 1792, he was a leading protagonist in the Scottish democratic movement and a driving force behind the establishment of the Association of the Friends of the People in Edinburgh, a reform society whose membership comprised mainly liberal-minded middle-class men and artisans. Muir was soon in the center of Scottish reform activity, promoting the radical cause throughout Scotland and forming links with the United Irishmen.

At a convention of delegates from Scottish reform societies held in Edinburgh in December 1792, Muir was responsible for reading an address from the United Irishmen. Although the address advocated moderate political reform, alarmed authorities saw it as much more inflammatory, and Muir was arrested on charges of sedition on January 2, 1793. He was released on bail and subsequently went to France where he fraternized with local expatriates and Girondin politicians. When France declared war on Britain in early February 1793, Muir was unable to leave the country without a passport and consequently missed his trial scheduled for that month. He was outlawed, but it appears that Muir had no intention of returning to Britain. He boarded an American ship bound for Baltimore, but when the ship arrived in Belfast in July 1793, Muir disembarked and proceeded to Dublin where he was greeted by United Irish activists. However, by the end of the month, Muir had returned to Scotland and was quickly taken into custody.

Muir was tried for the outstanding charges of sedition on August 30, 1793 before the High Court of Justiciary where the so-called “hanging judge,” Lord Braxfield, dominated proceedings. Muir defended himself before a biased court and a jury empanelled with known loyalists from the Goldsmiths’ Hall Association. He was found guilty on August 31, 1793 and was sentenced to 14 years’ transportation. He was subsequently imprisoned in Edinburgh for three months, before spending time on a prison hulk on the Thames. On May 2, 1794, along with three radical compeers, Maurice Margarot, Thomas Fyshe Palmer, and William Skirving (a group later known as the Scottish Martyrs), Muir was transported to Botany Bay.

Muir arrived in Australia after an eventful voyage that involved accusations of an attempted mutiny involving members of the Scottish Martyrs. In Australia, Muir was permitted to purchase a small farm but soon he was plotting his escape. In February 1796, he was smuggled out of the colony on an American trading ship, which sailed to Nootka Sound. After making his way to Havana via California and Mexico, Muir boarded a Spanish ship to Cadiz in March 1797. One month later, off the coast of Cadiz, the Spanish ship was attacked by British naval forces and, in the ensuing battle, Muir lost an eye. He was detained by Spanish authorities as a British prisoner of war, despite being wounded while on board a Spanish ship. However, in September 1797, he was released after diplomatic efforts by the French.

In November and December 1797, when Muir arrived in France, he was warmly welcomed. Despite failing health, Muir remained politically active and was moving in circles of United Irishmen domiciled in Paris. The last few months of his life remain obscure. He died in Chantilly on January 26, 1799, and while the location of his grave remains unknown, his memory is enshrined in the obelisks erected in the Old Calton cemetery in Edinburgh and Nunhead cemetery in London that were erected in the nineteenth century to commemorate the Scottish Martyrs.

SEE ALSO: French Revolution, Radical Factions and Organizations; United Irishmen

References and Suggested Readings

- Bewley, C. (1981) *Muir of Huntershill*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dickinson, H. (2005) Thomas Muir and the "Scottish Martyrs" of the 1790s. *Historian* 86: 23–31.
- Donnelly, M. (1975) *Thomas Muir of Huntershill, 1765–1799*. Glasgow: Bishopbriggs Town Council.
- Earnshaw, J. (1959) *Thomas Muir, Scottish Martyr*. Sydney: Stone Copying.
- Insh, G. P. (1949) *Thomas Muir of Huntershill*. Glasgow: Golden Eagle.
- Leask, N. (2007) Thomas Muir and "The Telegraph": Radical Cosmopolitanism in 1790s Scotland. *History Workshop Journal* 63: 48–69.
- Mackenzie, P. (1831) *The Life of Thomas Muir*. Glasgow: W. R. M'Phun.
- MacMillan, H. (2005) *Handful of Rogues: Thomas Muir's Enemies of the People*. Glendaruel: Argyll.
- McVey, D. (2004) Thomas Muir: Restoring a Radical. *History Scotland* 4 (1): 45–9.

Mujeres Libres

Charlie Geoghegan-Clements

Mujeres Libres (Free Women) was an anarchist organization dedicated to the education and greater participation of women in the Spanish Revolution of 1936. The group was founded in Madrid in September 1936 by Lucía Sánchez Saornil, Mercedes Comaposada, and Amparo Poch y Gascón in response to the way in which many women during the Spanish Revolution felt relegated to the sidelines by mainstream anarchist groups. At the time of the group's peak activity in August 1937 there were approximately 30,000 members throughout Spain.

During the revolution women enjoyed many advantages they had not previously known. They had more access to factory jobs and were more able to leave the home as unions attempted to increase employment. Where previously men were paid a far greater wage, agricultural collectives in some areas began paying men and women the same rate. Nevertheless, women were left with the burden of the household and raising of small children and were thus unable to go to union meetings and organize.

In 1935 the Grupo Cultural Feminino CNT was founded within the larger anarchist union CNT (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo). This early group focused its activity on working for a larger role for women within the existing anarchist movement. Some members of Grupo Cultural Feminino CNT soon realized, however, that the Spanish anarchist movement was less willing than desired to include women. Thus they founded the Mujeres Libres in the belief that women's participation in the revolution should stem from their own experiences and that being in control of their own work was more powerful than a union apparatus behind them.

The fundamental philosophy of the Mujeres Libres was the idea of a double struggle. They saw the liberation of women and social revolution as being of equal importance and thus believed that they should be fought for at the same time. To this end, they used the anarchist idea that the means of revolutionary activity contribute to the form of the ends, in this case, post-revolutionary society. It followed, for the Mujeres Libres, that women's liberation must, thus, be an intrinsic part of that revolution itself.



This poster from the Spanish Civil War represents the anarchist women's organization Mujeres Libres, which fought with the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) labor union and other leftist organizations to empower working-class women. During the Spanish Revolution and civil war, the struggle for women's liberation emerged as an integral component in the contest for the broader goals of freedom, liberty, and social transformation.

They refused to be absorbed by the male-dominated anarchist groups in Spain, and they further refused to identify with feminism, as they associated it with the bourgeois goals of equality with men in an already flawed society.

The group pursued a two-pronged strategy of "captacion" or participation and "capacitacion" or preparation. In participation with the revolution the women of the Mujeres Libres sent food to the militias throughout the nation, set up kitchens to feed the poor, and helped to collectivize farms in Aragon and Catalonia. Women were also the organizers of hospitals and medical care for the anarchist militias. They set up a school for nurses and emergency medical clinics along the front. In Barcelona the Mujeres Libres ran a hospital which provided birth and post-birth

care for anarchist and poor women in addition to classes on women's healthcare in general. One project which the group never completed due to the failure of the revolution was the *Liberatorios de Prostitucion*, which attempted to provide housing for former prostitutes.

The second prong of the Mujeres Libres activity, *capacitacion*, consisted largely in education and consciousness raising. The women organized shooting ranges and held gun classes for women joining the militias. They had technical classes, traveling libraries, apprenticeship programs with radical unions, literacy programs, and classes in basic education, contemporary issues, and politics. During December of 1938 at the Casa de la Dona school in Barcelona there were between 600 and 800 women attending classes organized by the Mujeres Libres every day.

Another of the major areas of work within the Mujeres Libres was its journal, *Mujeres Libres*, the first issue of which was published on May 2, 1936. At its outset the journal did not overtly declare itself as anarchist for fear of alienating women who were not in the movement. While many men ignored the journal, there were many who offered to help with distribution and articles, but this was refused because the women felt it more apt to have all the content be by women. In the journal women reported on their daily activities, such as union caucuses or daily life, as well as more typical cultural articles on daily goings on and movie reviews.

In 1937 the Mujeres Libres called their first national conference in Valencia and at it the group decided to adopt a federal structure. They also sent observers to the CNT and other unions to attempt greater communication within the movement. Many men remained highly skeptical, though the CNT did allow the women of the Mujeres Libres to participate in union apprenticeship programs and to speak at CNT controlled factories.

In the end, as with all aspects of the anti-fascist Spanish Revolution, the Mujeres Libres lost momentum as the republican government, composed largely of CNT leadership, focused on forming a popular front which excluded the Mujeres Libres and which aimed only at replacing the fascist leaders rather than continuing the revolution they began. Though the revolution was betrayed by its supposed leadership, Spanish society was changed by the Mujeres Libres and their work.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Spain; Confederation Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Spanish Revolution; Women's Movement, Spain

References and Suggested Readings

- Acklesberg, M. A. (1985) "Separate But Equal?" *Mujeres Libres and Anarchist Strategy for Women's Emancipation. Feminist Studies* 1, 11 (Spring): 63–83.
- Acklesberg, M. A. (2005) *Free Women of Spain: Anarchism and the Struggle for the Emancipation of Women*. San Francisco: AK Press.
- Hogan, D. (1999) Free Women of Spain. *Workers Solidarity* 57 (May): 12–15.

Multitude

Michael Hardt and Paolo Virno

Multitude describes an internally heterogeneous social subject that is capable of political action. The term has been used since the 1990s to refer to the new conditions and strategies of political organizing and political action, particularly those involved in the global justice movements.

The concept "multitude" should be understood first in contrast to the more familiar concept of "the people" insofar as the people refers to a unitary representation of the population. "The people," of course, is not an empirical category and it is not a natural or spontaneous formation. "The people" is constructed through a hegemonic operation to represent a heterogeneous population as one. As a unity, "the people" is capable of sovereignty insofar as the theory of sovereignty is based on the premise that only the one can decide. All sovereign subjects – including the people, the party, and the state – exercise a monopoly of decision-making. The unity and sovereignty of the people, therefore, links it fundamentally to the politics of the party and the state.

The multitude, in contrast, is and remains internally plural. The multitude resists the political operations of representation and hegemony that would reduce its multiplicity to unity and render its heterogeneity homogeneous. This means that the multitude does not and cannot exercise sovereignty. The political effect of the multitude instead is a disaggregation of sovereignty, posing an obstacle to any monopoly of political decision-making. The multitude is thus fundamentally antagonistic to the party-form and state-form insofar as they are conceived

in terms of sovereignty, that is, a monopoly of decision-making. Posing the multitude against sovereignty, however, does not imply that the multitude is incapable of decision-making; rather, it marks an opposition to any monopoly in that realm. The concept of the multitude is based instead on the premise that not only the one but also the many can make political decisions.

Once the multitude has been contrasted conceptually from the people, then, it should also be distinguished from a series of other concepts that traditionally designate social multiplicities, such as the crowd, the mob, and the masses. These social multiplicities are fundamentally passive, not in the sense that their activities do not have effects, but rather insofar as they are incapable of making political decisions. To say that the crowd, the mob, and the masses are passive means that they are susceptible to manipulation and, even, that they must be led. Multitude, in contrast, since it has the power to make decisions, is capable of autonomous political action.

These two conceptual distinctions, then, give a preliminary definition of the multitude. On one side, the contrast with the people emphasizes its internal multiplicity. On the other side, the contrast with the crowd, the mob, and the masses emphasizes its capacity for autonomous political action and decision-making.

Many contemporary authors working on the theory of the multitude draw inspiration, particularly regarding these conceptual distinctions, from use of the term in seventeenth-century European political thought. The Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza's work provides the most fully developed theory of the multitude in this period (Negri 1993). The term multitude is also widespread in seventeenth-century English political thought, although its usage there is by no means uniform. Among many English revolutionary writers multitude "had almost a technical meaning when used to refer to those, without distinction of rank, who had originally gathered together to form a body politic" (Wooten 1986: 273). The mixing of different social ranks in the multitude make it resistant to being represented as a unity and charged with sovereignty. "The people," in contrast, primarily refers to those with sufficient property to elect members of parliament, and thus indicates explicitly those of a relatively uniform social rank. This social context that links the unity of the people to social rank helps us understand

why reactionary philosophers of the period, such as Robert Filmer and Thomas Hobbes, express such fear and hatred of the multitude (Hobbes 1949: Chap. 12, Sec. 8). For them, the multitude not only poses a threat to order and sovereignty but also imperils the privileges of rank and property.

Contemporary Conditions of the Multitude

Recent social and economic transformations contribute to the possibility of a politics of the multitude. The essential characteristics are the heterogeneity of social subjectivities and the widespread social circuits of cooperation and communication that provide the bases for collective decision-making. These characteristics are most easily recognizable through an analysis of the contemporary composition of the working class. The working class today, in other words, bears the traits of a multitude, not a people.

Under the contemporary economic conditions of post-Fordism, the working class is radically heterogeneous and cannot be represented in unitary form. In the previous period, during the era of Fordism, the industrial working class played a hegemonic position in capitalist production as well in the dominant streams of socialist and communist politics. This hegemony was not quantitative (the majority of workers have never been located in the factories), but qualitative. The qualities of industrial production, including its mechanical methods, its technical organization, and the temporalities of its working day, were progressively imposed over other sectors of production and over society as a whole. During this period industrial labor was able – to greater or lesser degrees in different national contexts – to serve as a unitary representation of labor as a whole. The Fordist working class, in other words, could at some times and in some places function as a people.

In the contemporary post-Fordist economy, industrial production no longer occupies a hegemonic position. This does not mean, of course, that there are no more factory workers or even that their numbers have decreased globally. (Their quantity has probably increased as factories have gradually been shifted from the dominant to the subordinated parts of the world.) In post-Fordism instead the hegemonic position is tending to be taken by immaterial forms of pro-

duction, that is, cognitive, linguistic, problem-solving, and affective activities, the products of which are at least in part immaterial, such as ideas, information, images, knowledges, affects, and the like. This notion of immaterial production thus includes a variety of sectors of labor, from software designers, advertisers, and educators to healthcare workers, caregivers, call center workers, and service industry workers.

One should note, first of all, that this configuration of labor is radically heterogeneous. No single figure can subsume all the others to represent the subject of labor, as the industrial worker did at times in the previous period. In post-Fordist conditions, the subject of labor, if it still makes sense to use such a term, is a plural multitude.

Secondly, the qualities and capacities implied by these forms of immaterial production are different than those generally involved in industrial production. These newly hegemonic forms of production are largely *performative*. This means, on the one hand, that their activity, for its fulfillment, does not require being objectified in a material object and, on the other, that their accomplishment does require the presence of others. Like speech acts, in other words, the performance of these kinds of production has immaterial (but nonetheless very real) effects as long as they are conducted in the appropriate social context. Language capacities and linguistic performance thus increasingly not only are central in laboring activities but also serve as a general model for understanding the nature of contemporary production whether language is involved or not. The production of affects, ideas, codes, and the like must be performed in the presence of, or, at least, in conversation with, others.

This immaterial production, of course, is no less exploitative than work in the Fordist factory. In certain respects, in fact, its forms of exploitation might be thought to be worse. There is something horrible about our capacities to produce affects, our linguistic abilities, and our power to communicate with others commanded at work and reduced to waged labor.

We should also recognize, however, the great potential contained in these forms of production. Insofar as it is performed in the presence of or in conversation with others, immaterial labor carries immediately a potential for political action. What it produces ultimately is social

relationships, circuits of communication, and modes of social cooperation. This type of productive activity, in other words, can function as training in collective decision-making. Such capacities are often impeded, redirected, or suppressed at work, but they are nonetheless present in the performances of post-Fordist production and thus can potentially serve as the basis for the political activity of the multitude.

The heterogeneity of the multitude and its political capacities should not be thought of only in economic terms. Other axes of social difference, including race, gender, and sexuality, define the internal plurality of the multitude. Multitude, with respect to all of these axes, indicates that social difference does not have to be reduced to unity in order for political action to be possible.

The term multitude has been used recently, for example, by a group of scholars in Bolivia to describe the powerful social movements that erupted in 2000 and led to the election of Evo Morales in 2005. The movements, in particular the so-called water wars centered in Cochabamba in 2000 and the war of gas in El Alto in 2003, were characterized by plurality along at least two axes. On the one hand was the heterogeneity of labor engaged in struggle. Whereas from the 1950s to the 1980s Bolivian miners had been able to provide a unitary representation of the working class, with the destruction of the great mines there is now no one form of production that is able to represent the others. A process of “reproletarianization” in Bolivia has resulted in a wide heterogeneity of labor, from agricultural work to small industry and service sector jobs. On the other hand, the movements also involved a wide racial heterogeneity. Non-indigenous social groups participated with indigenous groups, and in Bolivia there is a wide plurality of indigenous groups, Aymara and Quechua the most populous among them. Calling the organization of these movements a multitude, then, refers to both the economic and the racial heterogeneity of those involved. Indeed, one cannot say that the struggles were only about economic or racial issues: they were aimed at both at once and along each axis there was a multitude (Gutiérrez et al. 2000).

Ambivalence and Organization

Contemporary social conditions and the conditions of post-Fordism do not immediately lead

to a project of liberation. On the one hand, the heterogeneous singularities of the social field do not spontaneously articulate to form a political subjectivity capable of political action and decision-making. And, on the other hand, there is no guarantee that such political activity will be anti-systemic or revolutionary. The capacities for cooperation embedded in cognitive-linguistic labor, affective labor, and the other forms of immaterial production provide the means for both capitalist domination and liberation from capital. Contemporary conditions are, in this sense, profoundly ambivalent and thus require a project of political organization.

Current theories of the multitude divide into two rhetorical strategies for marking this ambivalence. One strategy identifies multitude with this ambivalent contemporary condition and thus insists on the negative as well as the positive poles or faces of the multitude. The negative multitude manifests servile and self-destructive tendencies, in which social singularities not only remain separate but also conflict antagonistically with each other. There are elements of this negative multitude in all contemporary political actions, even the most liberatory ones. To pull the multitude to its positive pole requires a process of political organization that is able to articulate the singularities in a common project and orient them toward their own liberation (Virno 2004).

A second rhetorical strategy reserves the term multitude for the positive pole and emphasizes in that way that the multitude does not arise spontaneously from the contemporary conditions. The multitude, then, according to this version, does not yet exist. What do exist are the sufficient conditions for a political project to bring the multitude into being (Hardt & Negri 2004). What both rhetorical strategies emphasize, then, are the insufficiency of spontaneity and the need for political organization of the multitude.

What form of political organization is adequate to the multitude remains an open question. Such an organizational project would have to articulate social subjectivities of various kinds in a common project without reducing their multiplicity to a unity. It would also have to activate and develop their capacities for collective self-determination and decision-making. Such organization, finally, would have to guarantee the continuity of the political project over time. Many contemporary social movements, particularly those associated with the global justice

movement and the social forums, constitute experiments aimed at addressing the questions of multitude organization. Their methods include network forms of organization, horizontal structures, and practices of autonomy.

SEE ALSO: *Cocaleros* Peasant Uprising; Cochabamba Water Wars; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Negri, Antonio (b. 1933); World Social Forums

References and Suggested Readings

- Gutiérrez, R., García, A., & Tapia, L. (2000) *La forma multitud de la política de las necesidades vitales*. In A. García, R. Gutiérrez, R. Prada, & L. Tapia (Eds.), *El retorno de la Bolivia plebeya*. La Paz: Muela del Diablo, pp. 133–184.
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2001) *Empire*. London and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2004) *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. New York: Penguin.
- Hobbes, T. (1949) *De Cive*. New York: Appleton Century Crofts.
- Negri, A. (1993) *The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Virno, P. (2004) *A Grammar of the Multitude*. New York: Semiotext(e).
- Wooten, D. (Ed.) (1986) *Divine Right and Democracy*. New York: Penguin.

Munda, Birsa (ca. 1872–1900)

Debi Chatterjee

Birsa was the leader of the Munda Rebellion, one of the significant tribal movements waged against colonial rule in India. Different estimates place his year of birth between 1872 and 1876. As for his birthplace, the claims lean toward Ulihatu in Ranchi District and Bamba in Singuri, adjacent to Chalkad. Study at missionary schools made Birsa receptive to Christianity.

Birsa rose from the lowest ranks to mobilize his people against appropriation of their lands, destruction of their economy, and onslaught on their culture by outsiders. His struggle was for land, forest resources, and identity. He led the Munda community in the Chhotanagpur region in an armed struggle against the exploiting classes and the British colonial rulers, giving a call for *Ulgulan* (revolt). The uprising aimed at non-payment of taxes to the *zamindars* (landlords), assertion of the Munda's rights as the real pro-

prietors of the soil, and reestablishment of the Munda's traditional rights in respect of the jungles. The movement sought to expel the middlemen and intermediaries, the *Dikus* (non-tribal landowners), and the *Sahebs* (British), and establish Birsa *Raj* (rule) in the region. In 1899 and 1890, over 300 Mundas, under his inspiration, attacked the Khunti police station, killing a constable and setting houses on fire. In the police action that followed, more than 200 Mundas were killed. Birsa was arrested later on February 3, 1900. On June 9, 1900, he died in Ranchi jail under mysterious circumstances, raising speculations about his having been killed by the British authorities.

Birsa and his followers held secret meetings, composed prayers, and practiced rituals aiming to destroy their enemies and the British Raj. To enhance the strength of the people, Birsa emphasized the need for a total reconstruction of tribal life. He urged his men to worship one god, whom he called *Sing Bonga*. His projected religion was, at the same time, a mixture of Hindu and Christian faiths and a challenge to them. He forbade the worship of spirits and idols, developed a code of morals opposing polygamy, deception, theft, and drunkenness, and emphasized cleanliness, wearing of the sacred thread, sacred paste, and wooden sandals. Birsa, the "healer," "preacher," and a "prophet," was able to mobilize a large following amongst the Mundas, drawing both men and women into the struggle. They called him *Birsa Bhagwan* (God) or *Dharti Abba* (Father of the Earth). The Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act of 1908, which provided for certain concessions for the tribal communities of the region, is seen as an important outcome of the Birsa movement.

SEE ALSO: Indigo Rebellion; Rampa Rebellions in Andhra Pradesh; Santal Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Adas, M. (1979) *Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements Against the European Colonial Order*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Fuchs, S. (1965) *Rebellious Prophets*. Bombay: Asia.
- Mathur, L. P. (2004) *Tribal Revolts in India Under British "Raj"*. Jaipur: Aavishkar.
- Singh, K. S. (1983a) *Birsa Munda and His Movements (1874–1901): A Study of a Millenarian Movement in Chhotanagpur*. Calcutta: Oxford University Press.
- Singh, K. S. (1983b) *Tribal Movements in India*, 2 vols. New Delhi: Manohar.

Munday, Jack (b. 1929)

Verity Burgmann

Jack Munday, environmentalist and trade union activist, achieved prominence as principal leader of the green bans movement in Sydney from 1971 to 1974. Munday has remained a public figure, identified with working-class action in defense of the environment and progressive social movements. His dream is to achieve a socialist and sustainable society “with a human face, an ecological heart and an egalitarian body” (Munday 1981: 148).

Reared in North Queensland, Munday moved to Sydney in 1951 to play rugby league and, as a manual worker, became a trade union activist. He joined the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) in 1955, was elected president of its Sydney District Committee in 1966, and remained a member until it disbanded in 1989. In 1957 he joined the New South Wales Builders’ Laborers’ Federation (NSWBLF) and was important in the rank-and-file movement to remove its corrupt, conservative leadership. In 1968 he became acting secretary and was elected secretary in 1970. His organizational reforms included limited tenure of office for union officials. He adopted a militant approach to industrial relations and supported moves toward workers’ control. He encouraged the NSWBLF’s other radical positions: against racism and the Vietnam War, and support for women’s rights, Aboriginal land rights, and homosexual liberation.

During Munday’s secretaryship, the union became especially famous for its refusal to demolish significant buildings or to build on natural reserves. As public spokesperson for this controversial movement, Munday asserted the builders laborers’ right to insist their labor be used only in socially useful and ecologically responsible ways. Residents and radicals enthusiastically supported the bans; the media, politicians, and business interests berated the NSWBLF and Munday in particular.

Munday did not seek reelection in 1973 and returned briefly to work as a builder’s laborer. He has continued to forge links between environmentalists and working-class activists. He argues that working-class power is necessary to achieve environmental objectives; and success in these objectives is especially important to the working class, which suffers disproportionately

from ecological problems. He points out that the fight for a decent environment creates employment opportunities, despite media and corporate propaganda that it increases unemployment.

A regular speaker on public platforms, his official positions have included membership of the National Council of the Australian Conservation Foundation (1973–93) and Chair of the Historic Houses Trust of New South Wales (1996–2001). He has been awarded honorary doctorates from the University of New South Wales and University of Western Sydney and an honorary Master’s of Environment from the University of Sydney. In 2000 he was made an Officer in the Order of Australia for service to Australia’s natural and urban heritage. In recent years he has supported anti-corporate globalization campaigns. In 2007, a street in the historic Rocks area of Sydney was renamed Jack Munday Place, in recognition of his leadership of the movement that prevented its destruction – and that of many other parts of Sydney.

SEE ALSO: Australian Left; Communist Party of Australia; Green Bans Movement, Australia

References and Suggested Readings

- Burgmann, V. & Burgmann, M. (1999) “A Rare Shift in Public Thinking”: Jack Munday and the New South Wales Builders Labourers’ Federation. *Labour History* 77 (November): 44–63.
- Leach, M. (2008) Jack Munday: The Global Responsibilities of Labour. In G. Stokes et al. (Eds.), *Global Citizens: Australian Activists for Change*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
- Munday, J. (1981) *Green Bans and Beyond*. Sydney: Angus & Robertson.

Müntzer, Thomas (ca. 1489–1525)

Helen Bluemel

Thomas Müntzer was a revolutionary theologian, reformer, and peasant leader. He was born in Stolberg, central Germany, and began his theological studies in Leipzig in 1506. In 1513 he became a collaborator, or an assistant spiritual teacher. Around 1513 or 1514 he was ordained a priest and took office in Braunschweig. He became a member of an anti-clerical and mystic circle that aimed for a spiritual, moral, and social renewal of the church. Thus, Müntzer’s reformist direction

became discernible years before he was introduced to Martin Luther's ideas.

Around 1517–18 Müntzer left Braunschweig for Wittenberg, where he met Luther and both men discovered their mutual desire for reformation of the Christian church. After further theological studies, Müntzer assumed a ministry in Zwickau in 1520. There he was confronted with the consequences of a growing social divide which had left a large part of Zwickau's citizens impoverished. Therefore, a social element became part of Müntzer's developing theological theories. His sermons began to include direct anti-clerical elements, as it was his belief that God was to be experienced internally (God speaking directly to the believer), not externally (indirectly through reading of the Bible or the preachings of a learned class of clergyman).

When these controversial views resulted in unrest, Müntzer was forced to leave Zwickau. He turned to Prague where he laid out his theological theses in the *Prague Manifesto* in November 1521. In this manifesto he called for a new church, as the old one had been made "a whore by the adultery of the clergy" (quoted in Matheson 1988). He also declared that the dead letter of scripture would not lead to God. This denunciation of the Bible marked the break between his and Luther's ideas of reformation; indeed, Luther was to become a strong critic of Müntzer and would later speak out against him.

In Prague itself the manifesto was ill-received, and Müntzer was forced to leave the city shortly after. A period of wandering followed, which eventually saw him take up office in Allstedt in 1523. Here he revolutionized the liturgy by introducing services and church songs in the German language, a clear break with the Catholic Latin tradition.

Müntzer's views of the ruling classes and wider society were laid out in his *Sermon to the Princes* in 1524. Müntzer argued that all rulers were given their powers by God to act in the interest of believers (for Müntzer, the common people) against non-believers. Those rulers who did not fulfill this duty were to be struck down by God. This conviction went against Luther's opinion that the spiritual and the secular spheres of life (i.e., the church and the crown) should be viewed as separate. For Müntzer, a reformation of the church went hand in hand with a reformation of society as a whole. It was for this purpose that he founded the Eternal League in

1525 – a military alliance to strike down all that was ungodly, bringing down the mighty to render power to the common people. With this league he joined the peasants in Frankenhausen and fought alongside them in the Peasants' War that had by then engulfed South Germany. His troops were defeated and he was captured and executed in May 1525.

Müntzer's ideas and the man himself received varying and sometimes conflicting interpretations. Whereas modern socialism views him as a social revolutionary, others see him as a mere spiritual enthusiast or even a fanatic. Müntzer's life and beliefs contained both aspects – the desire for spiritual as well as social reform. He believed that the inner spiritual revolution could not happen without the outer societal revolution.

SEE ALSO: German Peasant Rebellion, 1525; Luther, Martin (1483–1546)

References and Suggested Readings

- Baylor, M. G. (Ed.) (1991) *The Radical Reformation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dixon, C. S. (2002) *The Reformation in Germany*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Goertz, H.-J. (1993) *Thomas Müntzer: Apocalyptic Mystic, and Revolutionary*. Edinburgh: T&T Clark.
- Lindberg, C. (Ed.) (2002) *The Reformation Theologians*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Matheson, P. (Ed.) (1988) *The Collected Works of Thomas Muntzer*. Edinburgh: T&T Clark.

Muralista movement

Leonel Sagahón Campero

Mexican muralism is an artistic movement that spans the first half of the twentieth century. It is characterized by the decoration of the walls of public buildings with figurative and realist paintings that have a social and ideological content and marked didactic intentions. According to the principle that art would act as an educational medium to teach the "people" and thus strengthen national identity whilst complying with the ideals of the revolution, the movement began during the post-revolutionary period and successfully constructed the nationalist image with which Mexico embraced modernity. Thus, with art sponsored by the state, at the time considered revolutionary, the movement exalted the nation's indigenous origins and illustrated the epic events of national history while proclaiming

the continuation of the ideals of the Mexican Revolution under Marxist ideology, an ideology which nevertheless formed no part of the revolution, or the resulting state.

The artistic nationalism that emerged, according to Octavio Paz, “from the cosmopolitanism of the twentieth century” and distinguishes the Mexican school of painting marks the beginning of “modern art in Mexico, and even, as a movement, the American Continent” (Paz 1987: 21, 24). Its principal figures are David Alfaro Siqueiros (1896–1974), Diego Rivera (1886–1957), and José Clemente Orozco (1883–1949), though other important muralists participated, such as Roberto Montenegro, Carlos Mérida, Fernando Leal, Ángel Zárraga, Jean Charlot, Xavier Guerrero, Amado de la Cueva, Desiderio Hernández, Fermín Revueltas, and Pedro Nel, along with Juan O’Gorman and Rufino Tamayo, though the latter kept a distance between himself and the movement.

Historically, the movement began during the 1920s, after the Mexican Revolution (1910–1921), though its roots were formed at the turn of the century when the country began to question not only its sociopolitical structures (inequality, misery, and the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz), but also its philosophical view (pertaining to identity) and aesthetics (with regard to the social function of art, the sources of national inspiration, and its forms and expressions).

The direct pictorial antecedent of the movement had a temporal phase prior to the outbreak of the revolution, following the centenary independence festivities celebrated, paradoxically, with a grand exhibition of Spanish painting, provoking strong protests by Mexican artists and sculptors. The protest culminated in an exhibition of works by Mexican artists financed by the Secretaría de Instrucción Pública (Education Ministry), leading to the formation of a group named Centro Artístico which proposed painting murals on the amphitheater of the Preparatoria Nacional (National Preparatory School); however, the outbreak of the revolution delayed the project.

Furthermore, Mexican art of the period was nourished by a series of phenomena, both external and internal. First of all, artists such as Rivera and Siqueiros spent lengthy periods in Europe exposed to “classical art” (including medieval and Renaissance Italian frescoes), post-impressionism, expressionism, fauvism, and



Emerging after the 1910–21 Revolution, the Muralista movement preserved the scenes of the revolution and everyday life in Mexico before the Spanish conquest. Through the movement, artists like Diego Rivera, José Clemente Orozco, and David Alfaro Siqueiros played an important role in preserving Mexican political and social history. Here Rivera works on one of his murals on December 31, 1944. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

the vanguardists, whose turmoil inspired them. Then, on their return home, they were exposed to a series of thematic rescues of the “Mexican tradition” and indigenous custom. The exaltation of the popular engravings of José Guadalupe Posada, the development of the drawing technique of Adolfo Best Maugard, which some considered might lead to the rebirth of indigenous art, and the paintings of Francisco Goitia with scenes of Mexican landscapes are, to name but a few, characteristic phenomena of the Mexican school of painting of which the muralist movement is a visible result.

Formally, the year 1922 may be considered the starting point of the movement currently denominated as muralism. Following the “triumph” of the revolution, José Vasconcelos (1882–1959), named as education minister, invited Mexican artists, as part of a new cultural policy of the state, to decorate the walls of public buildings with the aim of constructing a national art that would propose “the creation of the character of an indigenous Hispano American culture.”

This initial moment, or initial muralism, was characterized by the plurality of the tendencies that converged in the reevaluation of the culture of traditional Mexican arts. Traditional images were painted, including carnivals and scenes from everyday life, in a style which many identified with religious frescoes.

The second muralism can be traced back to 1923, after these artists congregated in the *Sindicato de Trabajadores Técnicos Pintores y Escultores* (Technical Painters and Sculptors' Union), a group which denoted their political, Marxist-based intentions. The principal activist within the movement was Siqueiros, who drew up its manifesto, the *Social, Political, and Aesthetic Declaration*, which not only stated the political intentions of painting ("to socialize artistic expression"), but also reaffirmed Mexican identity within art, based on the idea of the Mexican race, in particular the indigenous aspect, from which the artists rescued a supposed artistic tradition that served as a beginning. The document also repudiated easel painting and "all art from the ultra-intellectual circles," considered as aristocratic, and glorified "the expression of Monumental Art, because it is public property" (Tibol 1969: 270).

Not all the muralist artists created political art based on the Marxist doctrine; some merely utilized the imagery of nativism. That said, with regard to Orozco, Rivera, and Siqueiros, Marxism certainly had a fundamental role which aesthetically led them along the path to realism and to a clearly figurative style, expressed on the walls of public buildings and some private locations (such as hotels or museums) in a highly personalized manner.

SEE ALSO: Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921

References and Suggested Readings

- Paz, O. (1987) *Los privilegios de la vista*. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Reed, A. (1960) *The Mexican Muralist*. New York: Crown.
- Siqueiros, D. A. (1950) *El muralismo de México*. Mexico City: Ediciones Mexicanas.
- Tibol, R. (1969) *David Alfaro Siqueiros*. Mexico City: Empresas Editoriales.
- Various Authors (1999) *Crónicas: el muralismo producto de la Revolución mexicana*. Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Estéticas, UNAM.
- www.analitica.com/va/hispanica/5713376.asp
- www.bc.unam.mx/murales.htm#6

Music and protest, Latin America

*Paula Rodrigues Pontes and
Diogo L. Pinheiro*

From the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s much of Latin America was marked by intense political and social instability. This instability had a profound impact on the arts and culture of the region, and nowhere was this impact more visible than in the music composed at the time.

Just like many western nations, Latin America witnessed a boom in the number and popularity of singer-songwriters who emphasized political themes in their songs. It is possible to distinguish between two parallel but distinct types of Latin American protest songs: the more explicitly left-wing *Nueva Canción* or New Song movement, with its emphasis on traditional folk musical elements, and the more countercultural form of protest song, with its criticism aimed more directly at the traditional conservative moral values of the elites of the region.

The *Nueva Canción* movement was a pan-Latin movement that coupled a strong emphasis on a common Latin identity with a critique of North American imperialism and the dominance of its pop music over the local mass media. This is a reflection of the political turmoil of the time, inspired by the Cuban Revolution and US support for the Bay of Pigs invasion, the 1964 intervention in the Dominican Republic, and the 1964 military coup in Brazil. Musically, *Nueva Canción* mixed local folk elements with more traditional commercial music. The adoption of folk elements symbolized both a form of regional pride and an affirmation of solidarity with the poorest segments of society, while the commercial element reflected the middle-class background of most of its composers. A number of different factors contributed to the popularity of *Nueva Canción* in Latin America: the emergence and popularity of the Festival; the growth in the number of students in universities; and, perhaps more importantly, legislation passed by a significant number of nations in the region establishing that a certain percentage of airtime of all radio stations should be reserved for nationally produced songs.

Despite these similar sources of inspiration, significant differences between each nation's

movements remain. Not only were these movements influenced by different folk traditions, but they also developed under very different political situations and institutional arrangements. In Argentina, the Nuevo Cancionero movement was influenced by the immensely popular Perón government, while musically it was inspired by the Argentinian *milongas*, *zambas*, and the *chacarera*. In Brazil, the Música Popular Brasileira musicians faced repression from the military dictatorship established in 1964, while being heavily influenced by the Samba and the Bossa Nova. In Chile, the Nueva Canción reacted to very different situations in a short span of time – frustration with the Populist government of Eduardo Frei, close ties and affiliation with Allende's Unidad Popular, and the violent repression following the 1973 CIA-backed coup and ensuing dictatorship. Musically, it was heavily influenced by the music of the Amerindians of the Andean Altiplano, such as the Cueca and the Huapango. The Cuban Nueva Trova received the official support of the Castro government. These significant differences require that individual attention be paid to each case.

It is important to note that Nueva Canción was not the only form of protest song to emerge out of Latin America during the period discussed here. In some nations, more notably Brazil, a more countercultural form of protest song, one with less emphasis on traditional left-wing themes and more on a critique of traditional mores and culture, also became popular during the 1960s and 1970s.

Argentina

The main Argentinian protest singer-songwriters were the hugely influential Atahualpa Yupanqui (1908–92) and the members of Movimiento del Nuevo Cancionero, the local version of Nueva Canción, founded by Armando Tejada Gómez (1929–92) and Mercedes Sosa (b. 1935), among others. In what has become a recurring theme in Latin American culture, these singer-songwriters looked to the culture and music of the impoverished Amerindian peoples as the source of a true Latin identity. In the case of Argentina, its main influences were the *zamba*, a sort of folk dance music with a 6/8 beat that is similar to the Chilean *Cueca*, and the *milonga*, a musical style that is generally considered to be the precursor to the tango with certain African elements. Politically, its common theme was a strong

empathy with the poorer segments of society, although some significant differences remained, especially with regards to the relationship with the popular Perón governments. Even though Perón's governments were not strictly, or even mainly, left wing, his nationalism and strong support among the working class led some of the members of the Nuevo Cancionero movement to support him, despite his persecution of communists.

One of the people persecuted by Perón was Atahualpa Yupanqui. Born Héctor Roberto Chavero Haram in 1908, he is generally considered the most influential Argentinian folk singer of the twentieth century. In his formative years, Yupanqui traveled through the Altiplanos of Argentina extensively, studying its folklore and culture. In the process, he adopted his stage name of Atahualpa Yupanqui in homage to two Inca kings. These travels also inspired him to join the Communist Party and participate in 1931 in a failed communist uprising. He was imprisoned and his work was censored numerous times, especially during the first Perón government. It was only after his break with the Communist Party in 1952 that he was able to replicate domestically the success he had achieved in his several tours of Europe. In the 1960s, his work became the source of inspiration of several Nuevo Cancionero musicians, who were fond of the folk element of his compositions. He passed away in 1992, after having penned seven books and numerous songs.

The Movimiento del Nuevo Cancionero was founded in 1963 in a manifesto signed by a number of notable folk musicians. In this manifesto, these singer-songwriters explicitly recognized Atahualpa Yupanqui as an important predecessor. It also claimed that the true national identity of the Argentinian people could be found in the cultural expression of the folk songs of the Amerindian populations. Very popular during the late 1960s and early 1970s, most of the members of this movement were exiled following the 1976 military coup. Only after the return to democracy in 1983 did most of its members return to Argentina, where they remained politically active, strongly opposing the economic liberalization of the 1990s.

Brazil

Protest song in Brazil has a distinct history. Both the inspirations for and the origins of the

protest singer-songwriters were different from those of the rest of the continent. Musically, the main source of inspiration was the African-derived rhythms of Brazil, mainly the Samba.

Politically, most of the singer-songwriters were college-educated middle-class students who were reacting to the growing polarization of Brazilian politics, particularly in light of the failed coup attempt of 1961 and the successful one in 1964. Several of these musicians saw the arts, especially music, as a means of communication that had the potential to transform people's consciousness of their situation in society, and therefore saw these arts as a way of transforming society itself. This can be seen in several concerts like "Opinião," theater plays like "Roda Viva," and especially the activities of the Centro Popular de Cultura (Popular Center of Culture) created by the National Students' Union. Also important at this juncture were the festivals created by the expanding television stations, which served as one of the main ways that protest songs reached the public.

Protest song in Brazil was at its most popular and influential from the start of the military dictatorship in 1964 until the sanctioning of Institutional Act number 5 in 1968, which strengthened the repressive apparatus of the federal government, outlawing most forms of protest and driving most socially conscious musicians into exile. The fact that protest songs in Brazil developed under a dictatorship explains some of the key differences between Brazil and other nations. The dictatorship prevented singer-songwriters from writing the sort of manifesto that marked the style in other nations, and it also meant that politically charged songs had to be disguised, usually as love songs, instead of being more openly political, as was the case in the rest of Latin America.

Although Brazil never had an organized version of the Nueva Canción movement, several musicians were deeply influenced by it. The two most notable examples are Chico Buarque (b. 1944) and Geraldo Vandré (b. 1935). Chico Buarque is one of the most influential artists of the Música Popular Brasileira (Popular Brazilian Music). A singer-songwriter, writer, author of many plays, and one-time member of the Communist Party of Brazil, Buarque first gained national popularity in 1966 with the song "A Banda," a song of protest disguised as a song about a quotidian event, the passage of a march-

ing band through a city. Several of his compositions of the time followed a similar pattern of using popular rhythms such as the Samba to convey thinly veiled criticisms of the dictatorship disguised as songs about more mundane events. Also a prolific playwright, one of his plays, "Roda Viva," generated much controversy at the time, to the point where reactionaries that supported the dictatorship invaded the theater to attack the performers.

With the recrudescence of state repression in 1968, Buarque went to Italy, where he lived for a few years. Geraldo Vandré was also persecuted by the dictatorship. Not as prolific an artist as Buarque, his 1968 song "Pra Não Dizer que Não Falei de Flores" became an instant hymn against the dictatorship, and it was soon censored and Vandré exiled. Unlike Buarque, Vandré never wrote about political themes after his persecution.

If protest song did not constitute itself as an organized movement in Brazil, a number of more countercultural artists formed a musical movement called Tropicália. Among these artists were Caetano Veloso (b. 1942) and Gilberto Gil (b. 1942). Although some of its songs were political in nature, the movement itself was a critique of traditional Brazilian culture. Its use of electric guitars and incorporation of rock-and-roll led to tensions with both the conservative support base of the dictatorship and the more radical militants of the Brazilian left wing. Nevertheless, Tropicália has remained an influential cultural presence that has transposed national boundaries, with notable artists such as David Byrne and Beck releasing modern versions of some of the movement's compositions.

Chile

Nowhere else on the continent was the Nueva Canción movement more popular than in Chile. The existence of laws that established that a significant portion of the music played on the radio should be of national origin, coupled with increasing urbanization and unemployment, made Chile a fertile ground for the emergence of socially conscious singer-songwriters such as Víctor Jara (1932–73) and Violeta Parra (1917–67). The musical style of these singer-songwriters became known as Nueva Canción after the Primer Festival de la Nueva Canción Chilena (First Festival of the New Chilean Song) organized by the Universidad Católica de Chile in 1969.

They were at the height of their popularity from the period that immediately preceded the election of Salvador Allende until the 1973 CIA-backed military coup, when most singer-songwriters associated with this style were either driven into exile or arrested and murdered for their close association with Allende's Unidad Popular party.

The founding figure of the movement was Violeta Parra, who infused the traditional music of the Andean Amerindians, such as the Huapango and the Cueca, with political messages. But her influence went far beyond her own unique compositions and her involvement with the Chilean Socialist Party. She, along with her children, Ángel and Isabel Parra, helped organize many of the institutions and places that became central for the movement. In 1964, Ángel and Isabel created the first *Peña*, a coffeehouse where folk musicians could play their own compositions. Their place, la Peña de los Parra, ended up becoming a model widely followed in Chile, reaching its apex during the Allende government, with hundreds of *Peñas* actively disseminating protest songs. They also founded La Carpa de la Reina (The Queen's Tent) in 1965, a large folk music center installed in a big circus tent in the suburbs of Santiago which gave many of the later Nueva Canción singers a place to start their careers. Violeta Parra committed suicide in 1967, but her children continued her work throughout the years. And it was from these organizations founded by the Parras that Chile's best-known protest singer, Víctor Jara, emerged.

Víctor Jara was born in 1932 to a family of poor peasants. He spent much of his youth in a seminary and later on in the army. Deeply influenced by Yupanqui and Violeta Parra, Jara started his career in music in the 1950s singing with the folk group Cuncumen. In the beginning of his artistic career he dedicated himself to folk theater, receiving a degree in acting and directing from the Universidad de Chile. For the following years, he became director of a number of plays and taught at the university level. It was after 1966 that he decided to dedicate himself to music more fully. That year he became musical director of the folk music group Quilapayún, and it was also around this time that he started to perform solo at la Peña de los Parra. He won the Primer Festival de la Nueva Canción Chilena with the song "Plegaria a un Labrador."

Politically, his career reflects the changes that happened to the protest songs under other governments. Early in 1969 he started to actively campaign for Allende's Unidad Popular coalition.

With Allende's election, Jara, like many others of his generation, went on to become a part of the administration. Jara accepted the role of cultural ambassador for the Chilean government, composing songs for the Chilean national ballet and teaching at the Universidad Técnica del Estado. When the military took power in 1973, Jara was arrested and taken to the Santiago Stadium, where he was tortured and killed. A similar fate was reserved for many of the Nueva Canción musicians. Those who were not immediately arrested were forced into exile, such as the groups Inti-Illimani and Quilapayún. Besides persecuting most of the protest song performers, the Pinochet regime placed strict restrictions on what type of music could be played, going so far as to outlaw folk musical instruments, like the *quena*, that were associated with progressive musicians.

Despite the brutality of the Pinochet regime, a few more oblique forms of protest song were eventually created. The most significant of these was the Canto Nuevo movement, which pushed the boundaries of what was allowed under Pinochet.

Cuba

Protest song in Cuba developed under conditions that were very distinct from the rest of the continent. The most significant of these differences was the official support of the communist government for protest musicians, to the point where it organized the First Protest Song Meeting in 1967, which was attended by many of the musicians that later on would help spread the Nueva Canción movement throughout the region. Cuba's own version of Nueva Canción was called Nueva Trova, in reference to the importance of the *trova* and the troubadours for Cuban music. While musically diverse, the Nueva Trova included many traditional elements of Cuban music, including the *son* and the *rumba*. These musical styles were coupled with revolutionary lyrics. Because of this, musicians associated with this style received generous support from official institutions, such as the Casa de Cultura and the Instituto Cubano del Arte e Industria

Cinematográficos. Some of the more notable Nueva Trova musicians include Silvio Rodríguez (b. 1946) and Pablo Milanés (b. 1943). The trajectory of Rodríguez is exemplary in that it shows the strong connections between Nueva Trova and the Cuban government. He started playing guitar while in the Cuban army, and through the Casa de Cultura achieved national recognition. Currently, he is a member of the Cuban parliament and still enjoys great prestige within the Cuban government.

Protest Songs in Other Nations

Other nations also had protest song movements, although generally not as popular as the cases outlined above. The Uruguayan Daniel Viglietti (b. 1939), the American Roy Brown (b. 1950), the Puerto Rican Antonio Caban Vale (b. 1942), and the Spanish Joan Manuel Serrat are all examples of musicians from other nations who had close contact with the Nueva Canción movement.

SEE ALSO: Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973); Caribbean Protest Music; Central America, Music and Resistance; Jara, Victor (1932–1973); Latin American Punk Rock and Protest; Primera, Ali (1942–1985); Rodríguez, Silvio (b. 1946)

References and Suggested Readings

- Dunn, C. (2001) *Brutality Garden: Tropicalia and the Emergence of a Brazilian Counterculture*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Manuel, P. (1988) *Popular Musics of the Non-Western World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Napolitano, M. (2001) *Seguindo a Canção: Engajamento Político e Indústria Cultural na MPB (1959–1969)*. São Paulo: Anne Blume.
- Tumas-Serna, J. (1992) The “Nueva Canción” Movement and its Mass-Mediated Performance Context. *Latin American Music Review* 13, 2 (Autumn–Winter): 139–57.

Music, songs, and protest, France

Yves Laberge

Because of a long tradition, French music remains exceptionally rich and diversified. Until recently, popular refrains from the era of the French Revolution, like the joyful song “Ah! Ça ira, ça ira, ça ira” (“It’ll be okay, be okay, be okay”),

containing the lyrics “The aristocrats, we’ll hang them!,” were taught in French schools and sometimes adapted to new situations and contemporary conflicts. Even the French national anthem *La Marseillaise*, which means “The Woman from Marseilles,” refers to the elimination of tyrants by the people, united against a common enemy: the foreign oppressor. It was first composed in 1792 in Strasbourg as a war song against the Austrian army by an officer from Alsace, Claude Joseph Rouget de Lisle (1760–1836). It became the official French national anthem on July 14, 1795, but was banned a few years later, until being rehabilitated in 1830. Nowadays *La Marseillaise* is famous: even the Beatles quoted its opening in the famous introduction to their song “All You Need Is Love” in 1967.

Themes of protest and revolution have frequently been present in various French songs, and French culture has remained open to all kinds of musical influences. Jazz and blues artists have always had a privileged reception in Europe. For instance, African American artists like Louis Armstrong and Miles Davies suffered discrimination in their own country, having to live in specific hotels even in the 1940s and 1950s, but were often surprised to be treated as “normal” people while touring in France, Denmark, and Sweden.

Songs from the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s

One major influence in French popular music is jazz. During the 1940s, many French artists and orchestras created songs in French based on a swing or bebop rhythm. The jazz influence was banned (like most of American culture) during the Nazi occupation of France, and some French jazz lovers were given the insulting nickname “Zazous” (in imitation of jazz singers’ scat). The jazz influence was even more popular in France during the 1950s, with contributions by novelist and songwriter Boris Vian (1920–59), who as a trumpet player and singer recorded many subversive songs while working for Philips Records in Paris. His most famous composition was “Le Déserteur” (1954), a powerful anti-war song in which a man writes to the president to explain that he refuses to go to war; finally, he says that if soldiers want to force him to go to fight, they will have to shoot him. Released during France’s

conflict in Indochina (later to be called Vietnam), the song referred to soldiers as victims, losing their wives and souls on the front line. It was banned for a time on French radio because it was considered an insult to the French army.

Vian created many more anti-war songs, such as "Le Petit Commerce" (1955), in which a merchant explains how he made a fortune by selling arms and tanks but lost all his friends who were sent to war. In another parodic song, "La Java des bombes atomiques," he tells the story of an inventor who wants to show his new A-bomb to all the presidents of the world, brings them together for a secret meeting, then throws a small A-bomb among them. Boris Vian composed dozens of subversive songs that were mostly sung by other artists after his untimely death in 1959, for example Philippe Clay's song "Je n'peux pas m'empêcher," about a man who, whenever he sees a police officer, cannot help but imagine him at the morgue.

Another fine composer and guitar player, Georges Brassens, composed ironic songs that questioned moral attitudes to marriage and sex ("Le pornographe," "La femme d'Hector," "Fernande"). An intense composer born in Brussels who lived in France for most of his career, Jacques Brel sang many ballads attacking the bourgeoisie. In "Ces gens-là" he describes hypocritical bourgeois people who think they are right because they count their profits and pray. In a waltz entitled "Les Bourgeois," which seems like a farce, Brel compares the bourgeoisie to pigs, who grow uglier as they grow old.

Among many memorable protest songs from the 1960s is Jean Ferrat's sad song entitled "Pauvre Boris" (1966), which refers to the life of songwriter Boris Vian. Defining himself as a communist, Ferrat created other songs about solidarity like "Potemkine," "Camarade," and "La montagne," in which he contrasted the beauty of nature to inhuman cities and suburbs.

By the late 1960s Jacques Dutronc, a young singer and sometime actor, wrote a number of fine comic songs with Jacques Lanzmann, some of which were suspicious of the French government and consumer society. In "On nous cache tout, on nous dit rien," he questions the political system, raising untold mysteries evoked in the newspapers. In another song, "L'opportuniste" (1968), a man proudly explains his secret for being successful: he always chooses the side of the winner.

An Exceptional Figure: Léo Ferré

One of the best exponents of French protest songs in the twentieth century was singer-composer Léo Ferré (1916–93). Defining himself as an anarchist, Ferré began by writing light songs or adapting poems by Rutebeuf, Verlaine, Rimbaud, Baudelaire, and Apollinaire. In the late 1950s some of his songs became disrespectful, like "Chanson vulgaire (T'as voté)," in which he included anarchist slogans about the uselessness of voting: "if you voted, it's because you thought you had some choice, so don't complain." In his antimilitary song "Regardez-les" (1961), Ferré dares to mock soldiers, using a rhythm based on a military march, at a time when France was actually fighting in Algeria. In 1962 Ferré wrote a controversial song about the president of France, Charles de Gaulle, entitled "Mon général," in which he protests against the French army's use of torture in Algeria during the civil war. Many other subversive songs were released during the decade, like "Merde à Vauban," "Madame la misère," "La révolution," and "Le conditionnel de variétés" (in which Ferré argues that revolution is just a variety of politics).

In 1964 Ferré released a provocative song with a Spanish title, "Franco, la muerte," in which he attacks the president of Spain, General Francisco Franco (1892–1975), accusing him of eliminating his opponents, killing the soul of Spain, and representing the opposite of poet Federico García Lorca. Ferré wrote another song against Franco, entitled "L'Espoir" (1974), in reference to the 1937 book and film of the same title about the Spanish Civil War, both by André Malraux. In that song, backed by a symphonic orchestra, Ferré explains that hope is like an arm in the womb of future mothers in Spain, who are waiting for political change while listening to the lyrical music of Manuel De Falla.

In 1967 Ferré attacked a powerful symbol with his song "La Marseillaise." This had nothing to do with the French national anthem since the lyrics referred to a whore from Marseilles. After the May 1968 revolts in France, Ferré wrote a few violent songs related to rebellion, including "L'Été 68," which refers to the 1789 Revolution and quotes the "Ah! Ça ira, ça ira, ça ira" chorus, and "Comme une fille."

During the 1970s Ferré wrote more intense lyrics, in songs which often had a rich orchestral accompaniment. In the nihilistic song "Il n'y a

plus rien” (1973), which lasts almost 20 minutes, Ferré criticizes the political system in which he lives and creates many political slogans inspired by anarchist thought, for instance that disorder is like order, without being controlled by power. In the same year Ferré recorded “L’Oppression,” which described hands that do good and evil, and can only be stopped by oppression. Since 1970 Ferré’s albums have often paid tribute to anarchy: *Amour et Anarchie* (1970) or *Ni Dieu ni Maître* (1965, 1969, and 1974). Almost a theoretician of anarchy with a strong capacity for inventing effective formulas, Ferré once declared (in his song called “Preface”) that in the school of poetry, students do not learn, they fight.

Although a talented singer and accomplished musician, Ferré was sometimes criticized for his lifestyle, driving a luxurious sports car and living in a large estate in Tuscany. However, he remains the most prolific French songwriter and the most coherent in terms of protest and rebellion, recording more than 20 albums.

The 1970s to the Present

Various French artists released protest songs in the 1970s. Among them was a fine composer, Georges Moustaki, who might be compared to Hughes Aufray. Moustaki wrote the French lyrics for a tribute to Sacco and Vanzetti that was included in the Giuliano Montaldo film soundtrack under the title “Here’s To You” (in French: “Marche de Sacco et Vanzetti,” 1971). The young Moustaki also wrote songs for Edith Piaf, releasing some of the first ecological songs (“Il y avait un jardin”).

From the 1980s a popular singer and one-time supporter of the French Socialist Party, Renaud Séchan, used Parisian argot to criticize French society from a leftist perspective. Among the many protest songs he wrote is his 1985 song “Miss Maggie,” which attacked British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Sung in French, this ode explained that no woman could ever like war, encourage violence in sports, or be macho, except “Madame Thatcher.” In early 2006 Renaud released another song about a politician, entitled “Elle est facho” (“She’s a fascist”), in which he describes a young right-wing woman voting for the conservative but popular French minister Nicolas Sarkozy, who was to win the French presidential elections in 2007.

Other less memorable songs about protest and rebellion were released in the 1980s and later, but none had the quintessential artistic quality of works by Boris Vian and Léo Ferré.

SEE ALSO: French Revolutionary Theater; May 1968 French Uprisings; Punk Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- De Waresquiel, E. (Ed.) (1999) *Le Siècle rebelle: Dictionnaire des hommes, des idées et des attitudes d’opposition au 20^e siècle*. Paris: Larousse.
- Fayard, J.-F., Fierro, A., & Tulard, J. (1987) *Histoire et dictionnaire de la Révolution française 1789–1799*. Paris: Robert Laffont.
- Ferré, L. (1980) *Testament phonographe*. Paris: Plasma.

Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945)

Paolo Nello

Benito Mussolini was the founder and leader of Italian fascism, a right-wing populist current in opposition to the growing tide of working-class organization and efforts to build a more just society. Mussolini, who aligned with the German Nazis, was defeated by the Italian partisan resistance, many seeking to establish a democratic and socialist state at the end of World War II.

Mussolini ruled Italy from October 1922 until World War II. He was born near Forlì on July 29, 1883. His father was a socialist blacksmith and his mother a Catholic elementary school teacher. He was named Benito after the Mexican revolutionary Juárez, and Amilcare and Andrea after the Italian socialists Cipriani and Costa. Like his father, he grew up an atheist with strong anti-clerical and anti-religious feelings. He was a difficult, undisciplined, and violent student. Though he trained to become an elementary school and French teacher, he preferred politics and journalism.

To avoid military service, in 1902 he emigrated to Switzerland, where he lived until 1904, experiencing intense socialist activity and collaborating with Angelica Balabanoff. His revolutionary socialism was based on the idea that “force is the only midwife of history.” Influenced by Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805–81), Max Stirner (1806–56), and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) rather than by Karl Marx (1818–83), Mussolini believed that history was modeled

by the violent action of “heroic elites” and “supermen.” The conquest of power was therefore the only way to prove socialist superiority.

In Switzerland Mussolini was arrested as a subversive and for loitering, and in Italy he was sentenced to jail for deserting. Thanks to an amnesty, in 1904 he returned to Italy and served as a conscript. After teaching for a while, in 1909 he became the secretary of the socialist trade unions in Trento. Arrested and expelled by the Austrian authorities, he went back to Forlì where he soon took the lead of the local socialists with his violent opposition to the war for the conquest of Libya. In July 1912 Mussolini was elected to the national directorate of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), and in November he became the director of the PSI's official newspaper, *Avanti!* (Forward!), and moved to Milan.

Mussolini battled for an intransigent program of no compromise with the bourgeoisie and criticized the socialist trade unions for concentrating on economic issues which removed the Italian proletariat from the target of revolution. He strongly opposed parliamentary democracy and reformist socialists who were ready to cooperate with “bourgeois” progressive parties. After World War I began, Mussolini changed his mind about his previous anti-militarism and internationalism, adopting a “national-revolutionary” line.

Soon war veterans replaced the proletariat in Mussolini's revolutionary plans. Fascism was founded in Milan on March 23, 1919, combining a small group of war veterans (Mussolini himself was a demobilized army sergeant), futurists, and revolutionary interventionists, and adopting a radical, syndicalist political program considered “national-Bolshevik” by conservatives. This kind of fascism did not go very far: in spite of significant anti-socialist squad actions in the first year of the Biennio Rosso, Mussolini collected fewer than 5,000 votes in the political elections of November 1919. He therefore reoriented fascism from the left to the right, seeking the support of the nationalist middle classes who disliked both liberals and socialists. This strategy was successful. The regular use of violence by the action squads, the support of the agrarians, and the frequent, if not systematic, connivance of the authorities were all decisive in destroying socialist, communist, and anarchist organizations and in giving fascism full control. In May 1921, Mussolini and a further 35 fascists were elected MPs in a coalition list. Immediately after, how-

ever, Mussolini switched to the left again and in August 1921 signed a “Pacification Pact” with the PSI. In October 1922 Mussolini organized the March on Rome, mobilizing for the conquest of power.

King Victor Emmanuel III appointed him prime minister in an effort to avoid civil war. Many influential people suggested the king use Mussolini to normalize, or constitutionalize, fascism, and Mussolini, “the Duce,” formed a coalition government with liberals, democrats, and Catholics, which was approved by parliament. As radical fascism refused to be normalized and required a “second wave” to establish a dictatorship, Mussolini could not fulfill his promises to the king and hoped to give his government stability through electoral reform. In April 1924 Mussolini's coalition of fascists, nationalists, liberals, and democrats obtained nearly 65 percent of the vote, but the murder of the social democratic leader Matteotti by a fascist squad in June increased instability. In the following months Mussolini seriously risked falling from power, but on January 3, 1925, he was pushed by the radicals of his party to give the speech that is conventionally considered the beginning of his dictatorship, though this in fact was established between 1925 and 1927. In this period the Duce underwent four assassination attempts, one of which was nearly successful.

Mussolini accused the anti-fascists of terrorism and built up a police state, which succeeded in preventing or repressing any anti-fascist initiative. Many anti-fascists were exiled, confined, imprisoned, or deprived of Italian citizenship. Some of them, like Antonio Gramsci, died in jail. Compared with the regimes of Stalin or Hitler, however, Mussolini's dictatorship was much milder: in practice, between 1927 and 1943, fewer than 5,000 sentences were passed by the Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State, with “only” 42 death penalties. Unlike Stalin and Hitler, Mussolini wanted the Fascist Party to be fully subordinate to the state, but like them he wanted it to become an army of obedient believers with no possibility of free debate and political initiative. All fascists who did not accept this line were expelled or marginalized, and Mussolini took his revenge for all his previous troubles with the radicals.

In February 1929 Mussolini signed the Lateran Pacts with the Vatican, regulating the position of the Catholic Church in Italy. The Duce did

not forget his anti-clericalism, and tensions with Pope Pius XI continued, especially because Catholic Action was the only non-fascist mass movement remaining in Italy. But Mussolini knew the strength of Catholicism in Italy and appreciated the consent of Italian Catholics to his dictatorship. He therefore engaged in some battles to maintain positions, but never thought of adopting anti-Catholic policies like those of Hitler, not to mention Stalin's systematic persecution of religions.

In 1929 Mussolini's dictatorship was fully stabilized and most Italians supported it or got used to it. The Duce, however, wanted fascism to survive him and lead to permanent changes. For this purpose he needed "new men," able to "believe, obey, and fight." Fascism had to become an organized cult, a secular religion, with its own system of myths, symbols, and liturgies. A school of fascist mysticism was established in Milan, with fascist youth organizations playing an important strategic role. The Vatican did not like this "pagan statolatry" but avoided any official condemnation of fascism in order to preserve Catholic Action, which was crucial for the church's influence on Italian society and prevented the "integral fascistization" of Italian youth, and of Italians in general.

When the Great Depression hit, Mussolini blamed individualism and materialism for the decadence and economic fall of Europe and wanted to replace them with nationalism, imperialism, and the Roman ideal of a sober rural life, all spent in service of the mother country. Mussolini saw corporations as bureaucratic obstacles to production, but his policies of ruralization proved unrealistic, as it was impossible to limit industrialization and urbanization and prevent people moving from the south to the richer north. Convinced that a declining birth rate would be fatal to any nation, he also promoted a "demographic battle," but without results.

As it proved difficult to implement totalitarianism by domestic policies, Mussolini relied increasingly on foreign policy. The conquest of Ethiopia in 1936, the pro-Franco intervention in the Spanish Civil War, and the alliance with Hitler were all meant to be "revolutionary" moves toward totalitarianism rather than simply imperialism. The anti-bourgeois campaign and the anti-Semitic laws of 1938 had the same aim. When Mussolini intervened in World War II, in June 1940, he thought that Germany was going

to win and that he could exploit its victory with just 1,000 deaths. However, he was again thinking of a revolutionary war for a more fascist and totalitarian Italy. His regime collapsed, however, on July 1943, after the Allies' invasion of Sicily.

Arrested by the king, Mussolini was liberated by the Germans and ended his career as the head of the Italian Social Republic (RSI), a satellite state of Hitler, mainly operating against the resistance movement. In February 1944 his government approved a bill to "socialize" firms, introducing workers' councils and profit-sharing, but the initiative had no effect as it was opposed both by the Germans and the industrialists. Arrested by an Italian resistance unit after the collapse of the RSI, Mussolini was executed in the area of Lake Como on April 28, 1945.

SEE ALSO: Blanqui, Louis Auguste (1805–1881); Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bosworth, R. J. B. (2002) *Mussolini*. London: Arnold.
 De Felice, R. (1965–97) *Mussolini*, 8 vols. Turin: Einaudi.
 Lepre, A. (1995) *Mussolini l'italiano*. Milan: Mondadori.
 Mack Smith, D. (1981) *Mussolini*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
 Milza, P. (1999) *Mussolini*. Paris: Fayard.
 Parlato, G. (2001) *Mussolini*. Asti: Gribaudo.

Mzingeli, Charles (1905–1980)

Timothy Scarnecchia

Charles Mzingeli was a leading labor activist and organizer in present-day Zimbabwe. Born in 1905, Mzingeli spent his childhood living on a Catholic Mission near Plumtree, Southern Rhodesia. His father had been a military leader under the famous Ndebele leader, Lobengula, whose men fought the Europeans after finding out they had deceived him in the treaties they had him sign. After the defeat of the Ndebele by the British South Africa Company forces, Mzingeli's father moved onto mission land and raised his children as Catholics. Mzingeli started primary school late, and spent one year studying in South Africa before returning home because of poor health. He ran away from his parents'

home at the age of 14 and went to work on the railroads as a young apprentice. He would later move to Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia's second largest city, where he came under the political influence of Clement Kadali's Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU). Mzingeli was trained as an ICU organizer, and in 1929 he was sent to Harare Township, Salisbury, as the ICU's organizing secretary.

Mzingeli had some initial success with the ICU in the early 1930s, but the depression and police surveillance and harassment made organizing difficult. In addition, the great cultural and economic differences in the township, between long-term residents with families and the majority of relatively short-term single men, made organizing even more arduous. The ICU eventually faded in Harare Township, but Mzingeli continued to remain active in township affairs. He tried a number of different businesses, including playing the guitar at dances he arranged and running a restaurant for Africans in Salisbury's Pioneer Street, but these ventures met with difficulties from the police and his business partners.

It was during World War II that Mzingeli began to reorganize an African political movement. Mzingeli joined the European Southern Rhodesian Labor Party (SRLP) and managed to form his own African Headquarters Branch of the SRLP, which he ran out of his grocery store in Harare Township. Between 1941 and 1946, Mzingeli wrote numerous letters asking the British parliament to use its veto powers over legislation affecting Africans in Southern Rhodesia. These efforts were in vain, although he did manage to develop links to organizations in the United Kingdom that would prove useful in later years.

After the 1945 African railway workers' strike, Mzingeli reconstituted the ICU as the Reformed ICU (RICU). RICU became the main community political organization in Harare Township for the next ten years, and while it was not strictly a trade union, Mzingeli incorporated a wide range of community and workplace issues into RICU campaigns. In the early 1950s, Mzingeli and RICU carried out successful protests and civil disobedience against the Southern Rhodesian state's attempts to further segregate and regulate the movement of township residents. Its defense of township women's rights to the urban areas brought particular

success to RICU, with a membership of over 7,000 in the early 1950s.

Mzingeli was a prolific and talented writer, and by all accounts a witty and effective speaker. He used his knowledge of township life and his own experiences growing up to make a populist claim to leadership. He also used the small room adjacent to his grocery store as an office and political library for young township students. George Nyandoro, in particular, would read the literature on politics from South Africa and Great Britain, and Mzingeli would mentor young leaders particularly by way of example. On the other hand, there were limits to his cooperative spirit. He was in constant competition with more educated African leaders, particularly those of the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress, whom he portrayed as out of touch with the realities of working-class people. Mzingeli also jealously guarded his leadership role, often lashing out in the press against younger men who attempted to start any new political organization in Salisbury. His intransigence often stood in the way of national unity, as on a number of occasions he campaigned against national-level political organizations.

During the mid-1950s a younger generation of leaders, including George Nyandoro and James Chikerema, began to publicly criticize Mzingeli's lack of cooperation and started to take over RICU meetings. Mzingeli remained opposed to the new generation of nationalists, joining the European United Federal Party to campaign against them. At one point in the early 1960s he suggested in the press that should these young men ever become leaders, they would change their tune from "one man, one vote" to "one vote, for one man, forever."

SEE ALSO: South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; Zimbabwe, Labor Movement, 1890–1980

References and Suggested Readings

- Ranger, T. O. (1970) *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898–1930*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Scarnecchia, T. (2008) *The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940–1964*. Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press.
- Vambe, L. (1976) *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- West, M. O. (2002) *The Rise of an African Middle Class: Colonial Zimbabwe, 1898–1965*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

N

Nagy, Imre (1896–1957)

Annette Richardson

Imre Nagy was prime minister during the Hungarian Uprising in 1956. He favored the “New Course” calling for gradual reforms to Communist Hungary, which put him in confrontation with the leadership of the Soviet Union and led to his execution.

Nagy was born in Kaposvar, Hungary on June 7, 1896 into a poor peasant family. During his teenage years he was a locksmith’s apprentice, later becoming a soldier in the Austro-Hungarian Army. Nagy was captured in 1915 by the Bolsheviks and became a prisoner of war in Siberia. He then fought in the Soviet Union’s Red Army and became a communist. He studied agriculture at the Moscow Institute. After World War I he returned to Hungary and briefly served in Bela Kun’s government. In 1929 he returned to the Soviet Union where he worked in the Hungarian agricultural research section of the Comintern. He also became a secret agent for the Soviets.

Nagy returned to Hungary in 1944 and stopped security work shortly thereafter. He became minister of agriculture and excelled in his work on peasants. Due to the strong influence of Soviet deputy premier Matyas Rakosi, Nagy was prime minister from 1953 to 1955. Nagy favored a New Course, a more liberal type of communism that would reform Hungary. He slowed Hungary’s fast-paced industrialization, decreased police powers, allowed public control over the media, encouraged open discussion on state issues, let peasants leave Soviet-style collective farms, and discussed holding free elections. Nagy essentially wished to improve the economic situation and raise the standard of living. The Soviets forced Nagy’s resignation on April 18, 1955 on the grounds of his “rightist deviation.” He also lost his Communist Party membership.

In February 1956 Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev denounced Joseph Stalin in a speech to the 20th Communist Party Congress, causing the de-Stalinization process across Soviet-sphere countries. The Hungarian Uprising began on October 23 when the Technical University’s students and members from various social institutions, eventually totaling 100,000 people, demonstrated against the Soviet Union’s policies. The protestors called for true socialism and demanded that the Soviets leave Hungary. Soviet tanks fired upon protestors in Parliament Square. To appease the situation, the Hungarian Communist Party installed Nagy as prime minister the same day. He believed the Soviets when they told him they would not crush the uprising.

Nagy revoked the one-party political system and allowed former political parties to regroup. He allowed trade councils and national councils to form. Nagy negotiated Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary. On October 30 he amnestied all the political prisoners in Hungarian jails who had objected to Soviet authoritarianism. Stalin’s victims received reburials. Following the discovery of Soviet deception, Nagy withdrew from the Warsaw Pact on October 31. On November 3 Nagy publicly stated that he would form a coalition government. He asked the United Nations and the major western powers to recognize Hungary’s neutrality. However, the West was involved in the Suez Crisis and refused to intervene in affairs of nations that were not allies. In response to the numerous developments aiming at multi-party democracy, the Presidium of the Soviet Party in Moscow took a strong stance against Hungary, perceiving it as a challenge to the power of the Soviet Communist Party in Eastern Europe. On November 4 Khrushchev sent the Red Army into Hungary with 6,000 tanks to crush the uprising. Some 20,000 Hungarians died, while the Soviets lost 2,500 men.

Nagy refused to support the new government under Janos Kadar, who followed Soviet orders.

Nagy, along with other prominent dissenters, took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy. He was arrested on November 22 while under a safe passage agreement guaranteed by Kadar. The Soviets took him to Romania and in June 1957 he was returned to face a secret trial that found him guilty. He was hanged. Nagy was buried in the Municipal Cemetery outside of Budapest. He was rehabilitated after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 and reburied by anti-communist Hungarians.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Hungary; Hungary, Anti-Communist Protests, 1945–1989; Hungary, Protests, 1815–1920; Hungary, Revolution of 1848; Hungary, Revolution of 1956

References and Suggested Readings

- Congdon, L. (1995) *The Ideas of the Hungarian Revolution: Suppressed and Victorious, 1956–1999*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Dornbach, A. (1994) *The Secret Trial of Imre Nagy*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Méray, T. (1956) *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin*. New York: Praeger.
- Unwin, P. (1991) *Voice in the Wilderness: Imre Nagy and the Hungarian Revolution*. London: Macdonald.

Naidu, Sarojini (1879–1949)

Soma Marik

Sarojini Naidu was born in Hyderabad City on February 13, 1879. Her father, Aghorenath Chattopadhyay, was an eminent educationalist and scientist, and her mother, Varada Sundari Devi, was involved in women's education. Her brother Virendranath Chattopadhyay was a revolutionary nationalist who became a communist and died during the Moscow purges. Sarojini went to school in Hyderabad, and after matriculation studied at King's College, London, and Girton, Cambridge. But she fell ill and returned to India in 1898. In the same year she married Dr. Muthyala Govindarajulu Naidu. At that time this was very unusual, since it meant an intercommunity as well as intercaste marriage (the Chattopadhyays were Bengali Brahmins, while Naidu was a non-Brahmin from Andhra Pradesh).

In 1904, Naidu attended a session of the Indian National Congress for the first time. In the Congress she was attracted chiefly to Gopal Krishna Gokhale, the moderate leader. An advocate

of women's rights without distinction of community, Naidu moved an amendment in the Indian Social Conference in Calcutta in 1906, calling for changing the word "Hindu" to "Indian" with reference to female education.

In 1917, Sarojini joined the Women's Indian Association, launched by Margaret Cousins and Annie Besant. Cousins mooted the idea of sending a women's deputation to Edwin Montagu, the British secretary of state for India. Eventually, a delegation of 14 women, led by Naidu, met Montagu on December 19, 1917, demanding votes for Indian women on equal terms with men, and also supporting the scheme for reform drawn up by the Congress and the Muslim League, which had demanded separate electorates, representative government, and dominion status. In 1918 she was instrumental in having a resolution passed supporting women's suffrage at the special Congress Session in Bombay. In 1919, she went to England to give evidence before a Joint Parliamentary Committee, where she put the case for women's suffrage. Also in 1919, she became a campaigner for women's *satyagraha* (literally desire for truth, in effect a program of peaceful violation of laws, mass courting of arrests, occasional shutting down of industries, shops, and markets, and spectacular demonstrations or rallies), traveling all over India to propagate the cause.

Sarojini Naidu's public lectures and her consistent campaign of women's rights brought many other women into politics. A strong advocate of Hindu-Muslim unity, Sarojini used her lectures and other meetings to make demonstrative gestures, such as calling on Rani Narendra Nath and Lady Zulfikar Ali to join hands, an event that left a deep impression on the minds of observers. Her championing of Hindu-Muslim unity was also reflected in her biographical appreciation of Muslim League leader M. A. Jinnah, which she wrote in 1918.

In 1925, Naidu was elected president of the Indian National Congress. As its first woman president, Sarojini thanked the Congress but also called for the formation of women's sections. During 1926–7, in fact, many women's conferences were held. In October 1926, the All India Women's Conference (AIWC) was formed, holding its first meeting in January 1927; however, it represented a more conservative wing of nationalism, oriented to reformist activity. Naidu herself, though very active in the AIWC,

represented a more militant current by that time. One dimension of the AIWC activities was the passing of the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929.

In 1930, Sarojini took an active part in the civil disobedience movement. No woman had been included by Gandhi in his chosen list of 71 marchers. The Congress Committee also decided to exclude women from the salt *satyagraha* as a whole. Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay, a Gandhian and relative of Sarojini, met Gandhi on his way to Dandi and asked him to make a special appeal to women to join the movement. This she took to the Congress Committee, which then withdrew its veto on women's participation. On the last day of the salt march, Sarojini Naidu joined it at Dandi, and was the first woman to be arrested in the salt *satyagraha*. Thousands of women all over India joined in. In May, after the arrest of Gandhi, she led a massive salt-raid in Dharasana, which was met with unusual ferocity by police. The impact of the mass participation of women in the nationalist movement was also to transform the AIWC, which in the past had elected upper-class women as presidents. In 1931, Naidu was elected AIWC president. In the same year, she participated in the Round Table Conference, where she opposed reservation of seats for women, arguing that women wanted equality, not protection.

Naidu was arrested several times for her participation in the freedom movement, in 1930–1, and again afterwards. In 1942, she was arrested after the Quit India resolution. In 1945–7, she campaigned across the country as a Congress leader. In March 1947, she presided over the Asian Relations Conference, held in Delhi. In independent India, she was the governor of Uttar Pradesh, the largest province, till her death on March 2, 1949.

Apart from her political work, Naidu was a well-known poet, friendly with W. B. Yeats and Rabindranath Tagore, earning the title "Nightingale of India." Her first book of poems, *The Golden Threshold*, was published in 1905. This was followed in 1912 by *The Bird of Time*, and in 1917 by *The Broken Wing*. Though a passionate campaigner for women's equality, she rejected the term feminist applied to herself. Her public role challenged politics as a male bastion. But she remained within the framework which held that domestic duties belonged to women.

SEE ALSO: Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); India, Civil Disobedience Movement and Demand for Independence; India, Non-Violent Non-Cooperation Movement, 1918–1929; Quit India Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Baig, T. A. (1974) *Sarojini Naidu*. Delhi: Publication Division, Government of India.
 Banerjee, H. (1998) *Sarojini Naidu: The Traditional Feminist*. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi.
 Sen Gupta, P. (1974) *Sarojini Naidu*. New Delhi: Sahitya Academy.

Namibia, struggle for independence

Tilman Dederling

The dispossession and disempowerment of indigenous people in South West Africa/Namibia spans a century of colonial rule, extending from the heyday of the imperialist scramble for Africa in the 1880s to the period of superpower proxy wars in southern Africa in the late twentieth century. Namibia was the last colony on the continent to gain national independence in 1990. The colonial history of Namibia is marked by some of the worst excesses which European colonialism and racism inflicted on Africans, ranging from genocide to systematic discrimination under apartheid. The final collapse of colonial rule was not only the result of the global power shifts which impacted on the region in the last decades of the twentieth century. Throughout the different phases of colonial rule, from the German period (1884–1915) to the South African occupation (1915–90), indigenous resistance to colonial domination covered a wide range of options, ranging from local rebellions and various acts of non-compliance and protest to the organized diplomatic and military struggle for national self-determination.

German Colonial Period

For most of the nineteenth century the arid and agriculturally unsuitable regions of southern and central Namibia were the untamed hinterland of colonial South Africa. The territory north of the lower Orange River, which was thinly populated mainly by transhumant Nama (Khoekhoe)

hunterpastoralists ("Hottentots" in colonial usage), was unattractive for white settlers from South Africa. During the first half of the nineteenth century marginalized bands of acculturated Cape Khoekhoe, so-called Oorlam, moved away from the advancing colonial frontier in South Africa and settled among the Nama. The Oorlam had come into contact with Christianity, acquired the colonial vernacular, Cape Dutch, and they possessed firearms and ox-wagons. Their new cultural and technological skills and their close ties with the Cape economy facilitated their thrust into the interior. Pushing the raiding, trading, and hunting frontier northwards, they founded Windhoek, which later became the capital of the German colony. The economic base of Oorlam power increasingly centered on the extraction of cattle from the Herero pastoralists, who occupied the central parts of Namibia. The Afrikaner Oorlam dominated a network of alliances among both Nama and Herero which was geared towards exporting large herds of cattle to the Cape. The supremacy of the Afrikaner Oorlam was broken as a result of violent conflict between the southerners and the Herero in the 1860s. Consequently, the Herero enjoyed a much stronger position as intermediaries in the trade which connected the Cape and the far north of Namibia. In the late nineteenth century powerful Herero chieftaincies emerged which assembled their followers near major settlements, such as Okahandja, Omaruru, and Otjimbingwe, which later became important population and administration centers during the German period.

The Nama and Herero communities historically dominated smaller population groups in southern and central Namibia. The Nama-speaking Berg Damara practiced hunting and gathering but also were involved in cultivation and pastoralism. They lived dispersed in subordinate positions among both Nama and Herero; in the 1860s the Herero controlled the supply of Berg Damara migrant laborers to the Cape via Walvis Bay. The small bands of San hunter-gatherers (Bushmen) roamed on the northeastern and northern margins of the country; some of them hunted and herded cattle for the Herero and the Ovambo. The so-called Basters assumed a special position in the relations among the different groups. These colored pastoralists had fled from frontier warfare in the Northern Cape to settle with their missionary at Rehoboth,

south of Windhoek, in 1870. In order to safeguard their precarious position among the feuding Nama and Herero they later aligned themselves with the Germans, to whom they provided military aid against the indigenous population.

Apart from experiencing the effects of the expanding economic frontier, indigenous ideas and customs were also gradually transformed through the encounter with Christianity. The Nama were in close contact with European missionaries from various mission societies from the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1842 the Rhenish Mission Society began to establish stations in the central regions of Namibia. The economic and cultural aspects of mission Christianity made a lasting impact, especially on the loosely structured Nama and Oorlam groups; many accepted baptism and adopted European names and other insignia of acculturation. The Herero proved to be more resilient to the evangelical message; many chiefs and commoners feared its disruptive effects on traditional authority and social structures. Apart from offering spiritual support, mission stations became hubs of economic subsistence where impoverished hunters and pastoralists could temporarily obtain goods and shelter. Mission schools were important centers of education and cultural change for children and adults. Like Africans in other parts of the continent, indigenous Namibians developed their own interpretations of Christian ideas and later used them to articulate resistance to colonial rule.

North of the so-called police zone of the southern and central regions, which the Germans declared to be open for white settlers, lay the dwellings of the different agro-pastoralist Ovambo groups. It was not before the advent of the South African occupation in 1915 that Ovamboland was more effectively penetrated by colonial rule.

The German Empire annexed the territory between the Orange and Kunene rivers in 1884 under the pretext of protecting the interests of a merchant who had coaxed Namibian chiefs into signing dubious concessions. The whole of German South West Africa comprised 835,100 square kilometers, which was one-and-a-half times the size of Germany. Initially, the German presence in Namibia was negligible, consisting of only three German officials. Their promises of support for the Herero against the Nama and Oorlam raiders induced the Herero chief,

Maharero, to sign a "protection treaty" with the Germans. In the face of continuing attacks, however, the Herero chief expelled the ineffective representatives of German colonial aspirations. He also sternly reprimanded the Rhenish missionaries because they had connived with the Germans. Herero opposition to the German presence wavered, however, when a small force of 23 German soldiers, who had been sent to the territory in 1889, succeeded in disrupting the trade in firearms with the Herero. The arms embargo exposed the different Herero polities to the ferocious attacks of the Nama and Oorlam. Consequently, the lapsed treaty between the Germans and the Herero was reactivated in 1890.

One of the most determined opponents of the German intruders was Hendrik Witbooi. The charismatic leader of the Witbooi Oorlam had been educated by missionaries. Before the arrival of the Germans, the hardened guerrilla fighter had begun to aspire to a hegemonic position in the raiding-trading network which was the hallmark of Nama-Herero relations. In the 1880s Hendrik Witbooi donned the mantle of a Christian prophet, taking his men on the "holy mission" of shifting the Witbooi base from Gibeon in the south closer to the Herero in central Namibia. In 1885 the Witbooi chief almost succeeded in establishing a formal alliance with Maharero. After the sudden eruption of skirmishes between the two parties, however, the Herero chief signed the treaty with the imperial commissioner, Heinrich Göring (the father of the Nazi air marshal Hermann Göring). When his dreams of securing a supreme position by diplomacy were shattered, Witbooi relocated to Hornkrans, west of Rehoboth, to continue his attacks on the Herero.

Witbooi was one of the few indigenous leaders who tenaciously refused to accept any agreement with the Germans. In contrast to other chiefs he foresaw that the German presence would result in unprecedented and disastrous consequences for the self-determination of all indigenous groups in Namibia. The Germans perceived Hendrik Witbooi as the main obstacle to consolidating their tenuous grip on their colony. A military attack on Hornkrans in 1893 left many women and children dead, but failed to put a stop to Witbooi's independence. In 1894, however, the new colonial administrator, Theodor Leutwein, succeeded in defeating the Witboois. Consequently, the chief grudgingly

and pragmatically accepted his cooptation as a military ally of the Germans, which allowed him to safeguard a considerable degree of influence among his people.

Exploiting internal divisions among the Herero, Leutwein militarily supported Samuel Maharero's bid for paramount power, although Herero tradition did not automatically entitle Samuel to succeed his father Maharero. Samuel Maharero collaborated with the Germans in order to consolidate his own disputed position among the Herero. Conversely, his dependence on Leutwein frequently compelled him to throw his weight behind German policies. This provided Leutwein with many opportunities to interfere in internal squabbles and to grind away at African independence. Leutwein's intercessions aimed at depriving the Herero of their economic resources – land and livestock – in order to undermine traditional means of assembling followers and consolidating chiefly authority. Thus, Leutwein not only disrupted indigenous mechanisms of decision-making, but he also used his campaigns of "pacification" to change the demarcations of Herero territory for distribution among the growing numbers of German settlers.

South West Africa was the only German colony that, to an extent, matched popular perceptions of a settler colony which supposedly offered "living space" for the surplus population of the motherland. The number of white farms increased from about 500 in 1907 to about 1,300 in 1913. It was the mining sector, however, which increasingly gained economic importance. The exploitation of copper from 1907 and especially the discovery of diamonds in 1908 marginalized the agricultural sector. Until the end of German colonial rule in Namibia, two thirds of colonial revenue was generated by the export of diamonds. The German administration tried to resolve the resultant labor shortage by importing thousands of colored and black workers from the Cape who often toiled under harsh conditions. According to colonial estimates, by the turn of the nineteenth century a minority of 4,682 whites faced 15,000–20,000 Nama and Oorlam, 3,000–4,000 Rehoboth Basters, 70,000–80,000 Herero, 40,000 Berg Damara and San, and 90,000–100,000 Ovambo in the yet-unexplored far north. The German colonizers were incapable as yet, however, to subjugate effectively the African population

and they had to rely on a combination of force, persuasion, and economic attrition to consolidate their rule. The anti-colonial war from 1904 to 1907 ushered in a new and more intense phase of colonial oppression.

On January 12, 1904 the Herero rebelled against German colonial rule. After the Germans defeated the bulk of the Herero forces in August 1904, the Nama also opened armed hostilities against the colonizers in October 1904. This colonial war escalated into a genocidal campaign which resulted in the killing of thousands of Africans. These staggering human losses were not only the consequence of German military action, but also the outcome of herding survivors into concentration camps where many of them succumbed to the appalling conditions. The first genocide of the twentieth century was accompanied by other patterns of mass violence as they would become characteristic of the "age of extremes." In the aftermath of the war the Germans employed harsh measures with a view to obliterating the socioeconomic independence and cultural identity of the disempowered indigenous population, ranging from deportations of groups of people and forced labor to the use of identification tags on prisoners and "scientific" research conducted on severed heads and other body parts of Africans.

There were short-term reasons for the eruption of violence, such as the devastating consequences of the *rinderpest*, which ravaged southern Africa in the 1890s. Soon after the disease broke out among the Herero herds in central Namibia in 1897, two thirds of the cattle were wiped out, leaving many communities destitute. These losses seriously damaged the economic structures and the cultural matrix of the pastoralist Herero society and made it more vulnerable to further colonial interference. The colonial pressure on indigenous resources of land and livestock, increasing interference of the colonial state in Herero politics and chiefly authority, and the rising debts which many Herero accumulated with European traders contributed to an explosive situation. The outburst of open hostilities in 1904 manifested the exacerbation of the socioeconomic tensions and political struggles which marked the relations between the Germans and the indigenous population.

During the initial phase of the war the Herero attacked farms in the Okahandja district, which was occupied by a small contingent of German

soldiers. The killing of more than 100 German civilians and soldiers during the first phase of the war sent shockwaves through the colony and the German Empire. In contrast to contemporary depictions of savage hordes that indiscriminately slaughtered whites, the Herero made a deliberate effort to spare the lives of women, children, missionaries, and non-Germans, presumably in order to preempt the military involvement of British and Afrikaner residents in the colony. For a short period the African insurgents put some of the most important settlements under siege. The German settlers fled to the safety of military forts and other fortified structures. The Herero quickly adapted to German tactics and avoided being drawn into open battles where they could be exposed to the firepower of the German soldiers. An overall strategy, however, seemed to be lacking.

The German *Schutztruppe* (protection troops), which initially consisted of about 800 soldiers apart from small numbers of indigenous auxiliaries such as the Witboois and the Rehoboth Basters, was continuously reinforced. By March 1904, 1,567 soldiers, 100 horses, six machine guns and ten pieces of light artillery had been shipped to Namibia. When the Germans officially announced the end of the war in 1907 they had transferred a total of about 14,000 soldiers to the colony.

Leutwein intended to force the Herero to acknowledge defeat by military and diplomatic means in order to avert an economically disastrous loss of Herero livestock and labor. When the bulk of the Herero under Samuel Maharero withdrew with their families and their herds to the Waterberg area, 280 kilometers north of the capital Windhoek, Leutwein believed that his opportunity had arrived to push the insurgents into a final battle. In June 1904, however, he was replaced by General Lothar von Trotha, who had gained a reputation for employing harsh methods in the Wahehe Uprising in German East Africa (1894–7) and in the Chinese Boxer Rebellion (1900). Under Trotha's command the military campaign turned into a deliberate attempt at killing as many Africans as possible. He conceptualized the battle which developed at the Waterberg in August 1904 as the final swoop to encircle and to annihilate the Herero. After having received more reinforcements from Germany, he threw 4,000 soldiers, 10,000 horses and oxen, 36 pieces of artillery, and 14 machine

guns into the battle. On the side of the Herero there were an estimated 6,000 warriors with their women, children, and livestock. The Herero began to flee in panic towards the weakest section in the imperfectly drawn ring of encirclement and pushed into the so-called Sandveld (sand field) of the Omaheke desert. The battle at the Waterberg ended with the final military defeat of the Herero. Chased by German patrols, they now tried to cross the Omaheke desert for the safety of British Bechuanaland but large numbers of them perished. Trotha ordered that survivors be prevented from returning from the desert. His infamous Herero Proclamation of October 4, 1904 announced that the Herero had to leave German territory, or all of them would either be shot or driven back into the desert.

The ensuing debates in the German leadership about the appropriate measures against the Herero took place against a background of mounting criticism of Trotha's methods among officers and Rhenish missionaries. Moreover, indigenous armed resistance escalated. Although Witbooi had fulfilled his military obligations to the Germans until the battle at the Waterberg, settler opinion clamored for his elimination. The final straw was the appearance of an itinerant colored Christian prophet, Shepherd Stuurman, from the Cape Colony, whose millenarian message of the impending end of white rule seemed to push the Witbooi chief over the edge. The Germans were compelled to assemble thousands of soldiers against an enemy who was merely a few hundred strong, to the point that officials in South Africa speculated whether the Germans were in reality plotting against the British Empire. Eventually, in December 1904, Trotha was ordered to rescind his Herero Proclamation and to stop the indiscriminate killing. While military raids on the dispersed Herero continued, the Rhenish missionaries made concerted efforts from November 1905 to channel Herero survivors to collection camps first and then to concentration camps – a designation borrowed from the British camps for Afrikaner and African civilians during the South African War – from where Herero prisoners were distributed as workers on the railway and among white settlers. By April 1905 about 6,000 Herero were placed in concentration camps. About a year later their numbers had risen to 17,000. Only about a third of these prisoners were males. Before these

camps were officially closed in August 1906 several thousands of insufficiently fed and clothed Herero had died of diseases and malnutrition. Sexual exploitation of the female prisoners in the camps was rife, to the extent that the military worried about the massive spread of sexually transmitted infections among the *Schutztruppe*. The Africans who were imprisoned near Swakopmund and Lüderitzbucht could not withstand the cold and wet coastal climate. The missionaries reported that in Swakopmund alone 729 prisoners out of 2,000 died within a period of six months. Conservative calculations suggest that at least one third of the Herero people did not survive the war; others present figures of up to 80 percent.

On October 29, 1905 Hendrik Witbooi died of his wounds after a skirmish with German soldiers, but pockets of indigenous resistance remained. Another important military leader was Jacob Marengo (Morenga/Marinka). He was of mixed Nama-Herero descent and assembled an ethnically diverse fighting force of several hundred men, who troubled the Germans by conducting guerrilla raids in the southeast of the colony. After being temporarily detained in the Cape Colony, Marengo resumed the armed struggle until he was killed by the Cape police on British territory on September 20, 1907. The chief of the Fransman Nama, Simon Kooper, escaped with a small band of followers to British Bechuanaland where he eked out a living on the border of the Kalahari. The Germans were so worried about his activities that they covertly paid him a pension until his death in 1913.

When the Nama guerrillas capitulated many of them were transferred to Shark Island at Lüderitz and other camps where they shared the fate of the Herero prisoners. Some of the Witboois were deported to the German colonies of Togo and Cameroon – more deportations to German Samoa were discussed – until their high death rates required colonial officials to repatriate them. By March 1907 the Germans counted 450 survivors out of a total of 2,000 Nama prisoners on Shark Island. The German census after the war stated there were only 15,130 Herero left out of a total of 80,000, and 9,781 Nama out of an original population of 20,000.

The harsh measures which the Germans implemented after 1907 in order to contain the socioeconomic and political self-determination of Africans reflected an almost totalitarian vision

of colonial domination. Africans were legally barred from owning cattle, and their mobility was rigidly restricted in order to keep them subservient as cheap laborers. Africans did not cease, however, actively to resist colonial oppression. Since the Germans proved to be logistically unable to monitor the movement of indigenous people across the vast expanses of the insufficiently policed territory, many Africans exploited niches in the colonial economy and worked towards the reconstruction of their livelihood. Herero herders gradually recouped cattle by working for colonial farmers, who were forced by the scarcity of laborers to offer Africans better working conditions than those prescribed by the colonial administration.

South African Occupation until World War II

In 1915 South African military forces invaded and conquered the German colony on behalf of the British Empire. Until Namibia gained national independence in 1990, South Africa pursued various strategies in order to incorporate the territory. While the peace negotiations in Paris were still in progress, the South African government felt the need for gaining approval of the occupation of the former German colony from the international community. The Imperial Blue Book of 1918 compiled a list of settler atrocities in order to discredit German methods and to prove that the new administration was in line with the Covenant of the League of Nations. About half of the German settler population was repatriated after the war. Africans obtained vague promises of having their land restored. Once mandatory powers had been transferred to the Union in 1920, however, the appearance of liberal methods was replaced by a more robust approach to establishing control of the indigenous population. A government-appointed land commission recommended in June 1921 that existing reserves were not only to be preserved but that new ones must be established. The administrative structure was centralized in order to control the reserves more efficiently under a chief native commissioner, who was to be recognized by Africans as their chief. The commission also recommended a more efficient use of previously established German practices, such as strict pass laws and written labor contracts. A strong segregationist component was reflected in the

commission's proposal that African reserves should be located as far away as possible from white settlement areas. The treaties between Africans and the former German colonial rulers were acknowledged by the Union and used to demarcate the land rights of specific groups, such as the Bondelswarts, the Berseba people, and the Berg Damara community at Okombahe. The Union administration was unwilling, however, to fulfill any indigenous expectations regarding the restoration of land that had been lost as a consequence of German intrusion. The consolidation of South African rule necessitated a rapprochement of all white groups. At the request of the rehabilitated German settlers the Blue Book was officially withdrawn by 1926 and remaining copies were destroyed.

The extent of some of the native reserves may have looked impressive in reports to the League of Nations, but the scarce distribution of water and grazing resources, especially in arid southern Namibia, made for a different picture on the ground. About half of the territory was reserved for 3,000 white settlers; a quarter of Namibia, much of it unsuitable for farming, was demarcated for about 200,000 Africans. Limiting stock numbers became an essential tool in the control of indigenous Namibians. Apart from managing an arid environment which did not allow for huge carrying capacity in terms of livestock breeding, such constraints did not only prevent economic independence but also stunted the social and cultural life of African herding societies. Many indigenous Namibians were evicted from white-owned land and were barred from entering the undersized reserves. A series of repressive laws constrained mobility and created harsh labor conditions, leaving the options of illegally squatting on white farms or entering the labor market. Africans did not obtain citizenship; they were treated as stateless subjects who were nominally under the protection of the mandatory power.

A postwar recession combined with severe drought and other natural disasters in the 1920s. The mining of diamonds and other minerals dropped, and markets for agricultural produce shrank in the 1920s and early 1930s. Despite these negative economic trends the Union administration encouraged an increasing number of white settlers from South Africa to apply for land grants and financial aid. Pretoria regarded Namibia as a welcome outlet for "surplus" migration of impoverished whites from South

Africa. Pursuing the incorporation of the mandated territory into South Africa, the Union government integrated Namibia into the Southern African Customs Union and into its network of railways and harbors. During the interwar years the remote northern parts of Namibia, which the Germans had never penetrated but where about half of the Namibian population lived, gained significance as a reservoir of migrant labor. This trend had already started in the German era. Despite the increasing intervention of the colonial state, however, the agro-pastoralist Ovambo, unless forced through droughts and famines, were reluctant to leave their homeland in substantial numbers before the early 1940s. The South African occupation exerted increasing pressure on the Ovambo headmen to pry males away from the traditional socioeconomic context in order to employ them predominantly in the mines during the peak periods of mining profitability, but also on the railways and in public construction. On the eve of World War II, however, agricultural exports began to recover to the extent that they constituted almost 80 percent of total exports. This reversal of the economic dominance of mining versus agriculture also resulted in a shift of the flow of migrant laborers from the mines to farms, a trend which started to reverse again from the late 1940s.

The South African occupation was followed by several strikes, especially among mine workers. This period also saw several instances of armed resistance to the new white rulers. In the northern region of the territory the chief of the agro-pastoralist Ovambo, Mandume, successfully defended his realm against an invading Portuguese army which tried to explore opportunities in the face of the impending end of German colonialism in Namibia. In 1917 Mandume was killed in an uprising against the South Africans. After his death he acquired mythical status as an anti-colonial hero fighting against several white powers.

Once the Union administration began to tighten its grip on local communities, other instances of open defiance followed. In 1922 the Bondelswart Nama in the south rose again against colonial rule. Among their grievances was the introduction of a dog tax, which the Nama saw as an attack on their hunting rights, and concerns about the restrictive land policies of the new administration. Unrest was also fomented by the reappearance of Abraham Morris, a renowned

guerrilla leader, who had a record of fighting against the German colonizers and who had previously assisted the South African invasion troops. The assimilation of Namibia by South Africa had a negative effect on the tactics of resistance fighters because, in contrast to their military strategy during the period of German colonial rule, the Bondelswart fighters could no longer withdraw across the colonial Cape boundary in order to seek refuge in foreign territory. Armed conflict came to an end after a week of bloody fighting during which the South Africans used aircraft to bomb the Bondelswarts. Because of South West Africa's status as a mandate territory, however, the killing of about 100 Africans reverberated not only in southern Africa but also in the international arena.

The prime minister of the Union of South Africa, J. C. Smuts, initially viewed the Bondelswart Rebellion as an internal affair. Responding to pervasive white fears of a general indigenous uprising, he was concerned to suppress it before it spilled over into the Union. Spokesmen of the black opposition in South Africa also reminded him of the international dimension of the uprising. The leader of the colored African Peoples Organization at the Cape, Dr. Abdullah Abdurahman, took up the cudgels on behalf of the Bondelswarts and threatened to appeal directly to Geneva. Such protests from coloreds or Africans could not jeopardise the Union's status of a mandatory power. They had the potential, however, of tainting Smuts's projected image of South Africa as an important member of the new world order which was capable of handling its "backward" population groups in a civilized manner. In retrospect, the Bondelswart Rebellion may be seen as the first instance of indigenous resistance in South West Africa which attracted the attention of international critics of South African rule in Namibia. This incident foreshadowed the disputes which the South African presence in Namibia generated at the United Nations after World War II.

African defiance in the aftermath of World War I was not confined to the rural areas, where the vast majority of the population continued to live. The South African Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) established a branch at Lüderitz in 1920. This harbor town was the center of the diamond mining and fishing industry. Colored South Africans such as Jimmy

La Guma were prominent in organizing workers' resistance. La Guma had moved to German South West Africa as one of the so-called Cape Boys who labored under harsh conditions. In 1918 he organized a strike at the Pomona diamond mine. He became the assistant general secretary of the ICU in Cape Town in the 1920s. The union focused on wage issues and working conditions, but this organization, like a couple of others which mainly voiced the grievances of a small colored section of the working population with a South African background, seems to have expired after a few years.

In the aftermath of World War I global avenues opened up which facilitated communication among dependent peoples and which spurred the emergence of Black Nationalism in its various guises. The early 1920s saw the arrival of Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). The nucleus of the Lüderitz branch was formed by people of West African and Caribbean origin. At the Paris Peace Conference, Garvey (and his rival W. E. B. Du Bois of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) had unsuccessfully tried to present ideas for integrating the former German colonies into an internationalized zone under independent black tutelage. In 1918 Garvey demanded self-determination for all Africans at a mass meeting in Harlem, including the restoration of land rights for black South Africans. Rumors of Garvey and his Black Star Line seem to have reached South African shores by 1920. After the Bondelswart Rebellion had been crushed in 1922, the flamboyant leader of the UNIA announced that he would send black fighter pilots to South West Africa, thus connecting the idea of black empowerment with a potent contemporary symbol of technological modernity. In the same year rumors circulated in the territory that disaffected Africans were secretly meeting with African Americans in Namibia to prepare for the impending struggle with the whites. These ideas linked up with an older history of connections between black South Africans and African Americans which extended back into the nineteenth century. The UNIA slogan "Africa for the Africans," with its millenarian connotations, not only reverberated among black people but also intensified white paranoia in the 1920s. Settler confidence was severely shaken by the apparent accumulation of African resistance which always seemed to hold the potential of escalating into a more centralized

uprising. Africans openly showed their defiance by carrying UNIA badges and by appearing armed and on horseback in the streets of Windhoek. Members of the Herero elite, such as Hosea Kutako, became temporarily involved with UNIA, and there was considerable overlap between leading ICU and UNIA members. The organization extended its reach to the rural areas, where rumors of the impending landing of African American auxiliaries acquired millenarian significance among the Herero. When the anticipated fleet of Garvey's ships did not appear at Lüderitz, this accelerated the demise of a movement which had already been eroded by internal tension between the predominantly urban and foreign elite on the one hand and the indigenous Namibian proselytes on the other. By 1923 the influence of the Garveyite movement started to wane.

The year 1923 also saw the burial of the former chief of the Herero, Samuel Maharero, in Okahandja with the permission of the South African authorities. After his flight from German South West Africa he had been living in exile in South Africa and in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. For the Herero, Maharero's funeral was the largest sociopolitical event since the Herero-German war. The Herero used the funeral to lay claims to the recovery of their ancestral lands and to reoccupy public space where the reconstruction of Herero identity could unfold with pomp and circumstance. Significantly, Maharero's coffin was escorted by Herero *Truppspieler* (troop players), who were clad in German-style uniforms and reenacted an indigenous version of Prussian military drill. The emergence of a Herero organization in the aftermath of the genocide, whose members emulated German militaristic manners and addressed each other with German-sounding titles, baffled contemporary observers and generated much debate among academics. Beyond the emphasis on military symbolism, however, the *otrupa* (troops) or *otjiserandu* (Red Band or Red Flag Organization) provided a section of the dispossessed Herero pastoralists with an organizational framework for articulating their grievances. The members of the organization reshaped symbols and practices from the pre-colonial Herero culture to position themselves against the colonial state but without provoking the authorities through open defiance. Participation in this movement also provided a platform for expressing dissent with traditional leaders,

whose incorporation into South African indirect rule as members of advisory councils and reserve boards sometimes clashed with the more millenarian expectations of the *otjiserandu* rank and file. Initially derided as a childish imitation of European symbols of power, the South African administration observed the activities of the *Truppspieler* with a great deal of anxiety. In the 1930s similar activities were also reported from Ovamboland.

The Rehoboth Rebellion of 1925 showed again that African resistance in the period after World War I possessed an international dimension which complicated South African policies in Namibia. The so-called Rehoboth Basters, colored descendants of mainly indigenous Khoekhoe and Dutch settlers at the Cape, had played a special role in the Namibian network of political relations since they immigrated to South West Africa in the nineteenth century. Partly in acknowledgment of their "racially" mixed heritage, the Germans had rewarded them with special concessions for their military collaboration against other indigenous groups. Despite their privileged position, however, the Rehoboth people could not prevent the increasing encroachment on their land during the German period. When South African troops invaded the colony in 1915 the Germans responded harshly to the refusal of the community to guard South African prisoners of war, and some Basters were killed in the ensuing clash. The South African administration made vague promises of honoring the special political status and the land rights of the increasingly impoverished Rehoboth community, which fostered hopes of preserving an ambiguous position of political semi-independence. These uncertain conditions facilitated the existence of a substantial presence of African rent-paying tenants from other population groups, for the most part Herero, in the Rehoboth area. In 1925, 2,500 Africans shared the Rehoboth territory with 3,500 Basters, apart from a small minority of white farmers. The Union administration had banned squatting in Namibia with the aim of mobilizing African labor for the colonial economy. Because of the special status of the Rehoboth reserve these African tenants could evade repressive colonial laws which restricted indigenous access to land. The administration was extremely worried that the uncontrolled cohabitation of different African communities in the Rehoboth area could encourage indigenous resistance. Official reports frequently com-

plained about African "insolence." In 1923 the Union signed a treaty with the Rehoboth Council which intended to bring African tenants in the Rehoboth *Gebied* (territory) more firmly under the control of the colonial state. This agreement triggered an open split within the community which was divided by class differences and by opposing views on political strategy in dealing with the colonial administration. These internal conflicts led to the emergence of a rebel council which had, at least initially, the backing of a majority of the inhabitants. In open defiance of the Union administration, the so-called New Council explored various strategies of non-cooperation which escalated into an open confrontation with the South Africans in April 1925.

The South African administration had noted with great concern that members of the Rehoboth New Council had begun to petition not only the prime minister, Barry Hertzog, but also the League of Nations in Geneva from June 1924. The statutes of the Permanent Mandates Commissions prohibited direct correspondence between petitioners in the mandate territories and the League of Nations, but the communication between Rehoboth and Geneva was reluctantly tolerated by Pretoria in order to avoid censure from the international body. Hertzog and his National Party had remained remarkably silent at the time of the brutal suppression of the Bondelswart Rebellion, but now he was concerned not to repeat the mistake of his predecessor, Smuts, and infuriate the League of Nations and the world public by the mass killing of Africans. The colonial state displayed a massive show of force, which included demonstration flights of three airplanes. After the Rehoboth Rebellion was terminated without bloodshed in April 1925, the Union administration was able to remove the Herero tenants from the Rehoboth reserve, which resulted in serious financial losses for the Rehoboth community.

Petitions from the Rehoboth community continued to reach Geneva until the 1930s. As late as 1961 one of the signatories of the submissions made to Geneva in the 1920s and 1930s continued to send complaints about the South African occupants to the chairman of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, in New York.

Since the South Africans had defeated armed resistance under Mandume, they had continuously undermined the authority of traditional leaders and increasingly coopted Ovambo chiefs into an economic system which was geared

towards procuring migrant laborers. When the South African authorities had aircraft circling over Rehoboth to intimidate the community into submission in 1925, they used the opportunity to stage a similar display of their military might in Ovamboland. In 1932 a substantial military expedition, including aircraft and armored cars, deposed the chief of the Uukwambi, Ipumbu ya Tshilongo, whose aggressive conduct towards his own subjects had earned him the enmity of the Finnish missionaries and provided the Native Commissioner with a pretext for getting rid of an unruly headman.

End of World War II and Independence

The dissolution of the League of Nations and the founding of its successor, the United Nations (UN), after World War II encouraged the South Africans to pursue their goal of incorporation more actively, demanding the discontinuation of trusteeship. In 1946 the South West African Legislative Assembly recommended the formal incorporation of the territory into the Union of South Africa. In response to growing international pressure the ruling National Party in South Africa issued the South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act in 1949, which gave the white minority representation in the South African parliament. The strong opposition against incorporation, however, which evolved among the UN delegates and in Namibia, as reflected by the petitioning campaign which the Reverend Michael Scott conducted on behalf of the Herero until the 1950s, indicated that the end of World War II heralded a new phase in the history of the resistance to colonial rule in Namibia. In contrast to previous protest and rebellion, which struggled to transcend local boundaries and parochial concerns, the period after World War II marked a gradual process of more efficient amalgamation of the various anti-colonial forces in the territory. The Cold War and decolonization also provided the Namibian independence movement with new sources of financial, diplomatic, and military support from the new independent states in Africa and from the communist bloc.

An increasingly isolated apartheid South Africa refused to accept international status of Namibia under the tutelage of the UN, although the case was presented to the International

Court of Justice in 1949, 1955, and 1956. In 1966 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) declared that South Africa had lost its status as a mandatory power in Namibia. More UN resolutions followed which confirmed that South Africa's occupation of the territory and the implementation of apartheid laws were illegal, such as the balkanization of the territory into ethnically segregated "Bantustans." Petitioning the UN and conducting international diplomatic campaigns became a major focus of the activities of the Namibian independence movement.

The increasing demand for labor in the growing areas of mining and the fishing industry and the dependence of white commercial farmers on cheap labor intensified the migrant labor system and thus sharpened its concomitant negative effects on socioeconomic conditions among Africans. Conversely, the breaking up of traditional socioeconomic and cultural constraints in conjunction with the process of intensified urbanization and modernization contributed to the emergence of new political networks among Namibian workers and intellectuals. The shared experience of exploitation and poverty in Namibian towns created a heightened sense of political awareness among Africans from different backgrounds and it provided new incentives for political mobilization. The late 1940s also saw an intensified drive by South African trade union activists to organize workers in Namibia. Ray Alexander Simons of the Food and Canning Workers Union extended union activities from the South African west coast into the fishing industries at Lüderitz and Walvis Bay until the apartheid government stepped up its persecution of the opposition under the banner of anti-communism and temporarily silenced organized labor in Namibia. Despite these setbacks, however, the ongoing contacts between Namibians and members of the South African opposition were instrumental in giving rise to a more centralized nationalist movement. Various South African trade unions and opposition groups extended their struggle against apartheid by petitioning the UN in order to protest against the incorporation of Namibia.

South West Africa People's Organization

The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) was formed in the 1950s and 1960s

as an anti-colonial liberation and independence movement under the leadership of Sam Nujoma and nationalist leaders seeking the end of South African occupation. SWAPO's leadership in exile successfully established linkages with international organizations and formed a global solidarity movement for decolonization of the territory. Under the leadership of Nujoma the organization built a strong internal and external network of supporters for SWAPO's independence struggle.


By 1966 SWAPO initiated a guerrilla war through the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) to liberate the territory that did not engage in mass confrontation, and by the late 1970s established the organization as the most legitimate liberation group of the people in Southwest Africa. The political activities included mass meetings, boycotts of elections, and strikes in key mines, the port city of Walvis Bay, and beyond.

In 1978 the PLAN armed force directly engaged South African troops who were stationed on the northern border to combat the Angolan MPLA government and Cuban auxiliaries. After more than ten years, on March 21, 1990, Namibia was granted independence, and a SWAPO government took power with Sam Nujoma the first president of the new state.

Post-Independence

Until 1990 the history of the struggle of Namibians against colonial rule was described by scholars, activists, and politicians within a generally accepted discourse of national liberation and national unity. The South African apartheid regime stood for brutal oppression of human rights, which seemed to make critical questions about the liberation movement's democratic credentials and moral legitimacy irrelevant or even counterproductive. However, Namibia after independence has not been exempt from critical scrutiny.

Independent Namibia depends on the South African economy in terms of trade ties and financial links. Subject to contractions in the various industrial and commercial sectors, unemployment is relatively high. After independence, experts warned that small domestic markets, limited employment opportunities in the commercial agricultural sector, and the prospect of exhausted mineral deposits contributed to



Independence Day, March 21, 1990 was a milestone in the resistance struggle for Namibian autonomy from South African rule. The new country gained its freedom and elected as president Sam Nujoma, leader of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) liberation front. Here South African President F. W. de Klerk visits Nujoma during the independence ceremony. (AFP/Getty Images)

a declining GNP. By 1997 unemployment was estimated to affect between 30 and 40 percent of the population. Mining constitutes the largest share of the national revenue, and the tourism industry has grown to become a major pillar of the economy. The majority of the population is still engaged in the different agricultural sectors. Some experts have bemoaned the slow progress of land reform in order to redress the imbalances of a highly unequal system of landownership, with 4,500 commercial farmers occupying 43 percent of agricultural land. Government policies have largely focused on attracting foreign investment and on stimulating the private sector. While there have been indicators of economic growth after independence, trade unions and critical observers articulated at an early stage their concerns about the disparities in post-colonial Namibian society. Similar to Namibia's neighbor South Africa, critics have condemned crime, unemployment, unequal access to social services, and the advantages enjoyed by a privileged new elite.

The history of the armed struggle was not only marked by determined resistance to colonial oppression, but also by a lack of democratic transparency and procedure, which the leadership justified on the grounds of strategic and military pragmatism. This created obstacles for the transition from a militant liberation movement to a democratic state bureaucracy. Traditions

of authoritarian decision-making, as they are common in military structures, grate with the exigencies of a transparent modern democracy.

SWAPO's brutal treatment of hundreds of its own detainees during the struggle era, who were accused of spying for South Africa, attracted a lot of international attention. Nujoma's successful bid for a change of the constitution to allow him a third term as president in 1999, and his subsequent maneuvers to install a specially selected successor, Hifikepunye Pohamba, in 2005 also made him the target of critics who accused him of following in the footsteps of other authoritarian African statesmen. Other comments made by Nujoma in public, for example derogatory remarks about homosexuals, or threats of a Zimbabwe-style land reform, have also been criticized. The recent attempt made by the Herero to sue Berlin for reparations for the genocide during the German colonial period has resuscitated academic debates and political polemics about the Namibian colonial past and the dark side of German history. Discussing the refusal of the Namibian government to support these claims, some argue that the Ovambo-dominated SWAPO government faces problems in establishing a historical continuity between the colonial mass murder of the Nama and Herero on the one hand and the SWAPO-led resistance against the South African occupation on the other. The history of indigenous anti-colonial resistance unfolded in such a diversified manner that all contemporary attempts to construct a homogenized national identity based on a common struggle for independence are fraught with difficulties.

SEE ALSO: Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism; Nujoma, Sam (b. 1929); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; SWAPO (South West African People's Organization); Toivo ya Toivo, Andimba (b. 1924); Witbooi, Hendrik (ca. 1825–1905)

References and Suggested Readings

- Beinart, W. (1987) Jamani: Cape Workers in German South West Africa. In W. Beinart & C. Bundy (Eds.), *Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: Politics and Popular Movements in the Transkei and Eastern Cape 1890–1930*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press
- Bley, H. (1996) *Namibia under German Rule*. Hamburg: Lit.
- Brown, S. (1995) Diplomacy by Other Means – SWAPO's Liberation War. In C. Leys & J. S. Saul (Eds.), *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword*. Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Dederer, T. (1993) Hendrik Witbooi, the Prophet. *Kleio* 12: 54–78.
- Dederer, T. (1999a) A Certain Rigorous Treatment of All Parts of the Nation: The Annihilation of the Herero in German South West Africa, 1904. In M. Levene & P. Roberts (Eds.), *The Massacre in History*. Oxford: Berghahn.
- Dederer, T. (1999b) The Prophet's "War against Whites": Shepherd Stuurman in Namibia and South Africa, 1904–7. *Journal of African History* 40, 1: 1–20.
- Dierks, K. (2002) *Chronology of Namibian History: From Pre-Historical Times to Independent Namibia*. Windhoek: Namibia Scientific Society.
- Drechsler, H. (1980) *Let Us Die Fighting: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against German Imperialism (1884–1915)*. London: Zed Books.
- Emmet, T. (1999) *Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915–1966*. Namibia Studies Series 4. Basel: P. Schlettwein.
- Erichsen, C. W. (2005) *The Angel of Death Has Descended Violently Among Them: Concentration Camps and Prisoners-of-War in Namibia, 1904–1908*. Research Report 79. Leiden: African Studies Center.
- Gewald, J.-B. (1999) *Herero Heroes: A Socio-Political History of the Herero of Namibia, 1890–1923*. Cape Town: D. Philip.
- Gewald, J.-B. & Melber, H. (2005) Genozid, Herero-Identität(en) und die Befreiungsbewegung an der Macht (Genocide, Herero Identity(ies) and the Liberation Movements in Power). In H. Melber (Ed.), *Genozid und Gedenken. Namibisch-deutsche Geschichte und Gegenwart (Genocide and Commemoration: Namibian-German Past and Present)*. Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel.
- Gottschalk, K. (1978) Namibian Workers under Colonial Rule: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. *South African Labour Bulletin* 4, 1–2: 75–106.
- Gründer, H. (1995) *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien (History of the German Colonies)*. Paderborn: Schöningh.
- Hayes, P. (1993) Order out of Chaos: Mandume Ya Ndemufayo and Oral History. Special Issue, *Journal of Southern African Studies* 19, 1: 89–113.
- Hayes, P., Silvester, J., Wallace, M. et al. (1998) *Namibia under South African Rule: Mobility and Containment, 1915–1946*. Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Hill, R. A. & Pirio, G. A. (1987) Africa for the Africans: The Garvey Movement in South Africa, 1920–1940. In S. Marks & S. Trapido (Eds.), *The Politics of Race and Class in Twentieth Century South Africa*. New York: Longman.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1994) *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991*. London: Abacus.
- Katjavivi, P. H. (1988) *A History of Resistance in Namibia*. Paris: Unesco.
- Köbler, R. (2006) *In Search of Survival and Dignity: Two Traditional Communities in Southern Namibia*

- under South African Rule. ISSA Wissenschaftliche Reihe Informationsstelle Südliches Afrika, Vol. 31. Frankfurt am Main: IKO for Interkulturelle Kommunikation.
- Krüger, G. (1999) *Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein. Realität, Deutung und Verarbeitung des deutschen Kolonialkriegs in Namibia* (Remembrance of War and Historical Consciousness: The Reality, Interpretation and Commemoration of the German Colonial War in Namibia). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- La Guma, A. (1997) *Jimmy La Guma*. Ed. M. Adhikari. Cape Town: Friends of the South African Library.
- Leys, C. & Saul, J. S. (1995) *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword*. Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Melber, H. (Ed.) (2005) *Genozid und Gedenken. Namibisch-deutsche Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Genocide and Commemoration: Namibian-German Past and Present). Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel.
- Nuhn, W. (1997) *Sturm über Südwest. Der Hereroaufstand von 1904* (Storm over South West: The Herero Uprising of 1904). Bonn: Bernard & Graefe.
- Werner, W. (1990) Playing Soldiers: The Truppenspieler Movement among the Herero of Namibia, 1915 to ca. 1945. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 16, 3: 476–502.
- Werner, W. (1998) *No One Will Get Rich: Economy and Society in the Herero Reserves in Namibia, 1915–1946*. Basel Namibia Studies Series 2. Basel: P. Schlettwein.
- Werner, W. (2005) *Land Reform in Namibia: The First Seven Years*. NEPRU Research Report. Windhoek: Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit.
- Zimmerer, J. (2001) *Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner. Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia* (German Rule over Africans: Colonial Namibia between Imperial Ambition and Reality). Münster: LIT.
- Zimmerer, J. & Zeller, J. (Eds.) (2003) *Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika. Der Kolonialkrieg (1904–1908) und seine Folgen* (Genocide in German South West Africa: The Colonial War (1904–1908) and Its Consequences). Berlin: C. Links.

NAP (*Nuclei Armati Proletari*)

Emilio Quadrelli

In the late 1960s, European mass social movements had achieved a remarkable moral victory over the ruling state and corporate establishment through street demonstrations, strikes and factory seizures, student occupations, and random dissent. To a large extent, resistance to state

policies of repression against workers and students was through civil disobedience and protest within the confines of the rule of law.

While the social movements had shaken society in Italy, Germany, and throughout Europe and achieved modest reforms, the more extensive goals of reforming or transforming the state and corporate apparatus did not come to fruition. Concomitantly, the institutional left parties and unions that putatively represented the working class remained stodgy bureaucratic organizations, frequently incapable of transforming their bureaucracies into mass-based militant organizations.

As the left moved closer to the political establishment and accepted major compromises with the capitalist states, the despondent social movements in Italy and elsewhere broke with the establishment to form independent revolutionary organizations, seeking to radicalize the organizations representing workers or to build their own institutions of class solidarity. In the 1970s, in the wake of continued state violence, the political landscape in Italy shifted dramatically with the emergence of a radical left committed to social transformation as militant new organizations formed to advance the interests of workers through armed struggle and urban guerilla warfare against government and corporate officials and installations.

The *Nuclei Armati Proletari* (NAP), a Marxist guerilla organization, was among the most notable and strikingly unique of the new organizations, in part due to its strategic effort to organize among unemployed workers and prisoners. NAP's goal was to generate an armed communist revolution in Italy through recruiting members in prisons and among the unemployed. Originally, many of NAP's members came from the Lotta Continua movement, an extraparliamentary group that sought to develop a strong base in the prison system. In 1970, Lotta Continua created the Prisons Commission, and the following year its daily newspaper began running stories on prison-related issues in the specific column "The Damned of the Earth." A group called the Red Panthers represented the backbone of Lotta Continua's Prisons Commission, later evolving into the NAP.

By 1974, NAP established a mass base through organizing Italian prisoners through kidnapping and forms of direct action. NAP's boldest actions occurred in May 1975 when members of the organization kidnapped a judge and detailed prison guards in an attempted

prison break. On May 6, 1975 in Rome, NAP kidnapped Judge Giuseppe di Gennaro, director of Office No. 10 of the senior management of the national prisons department in the ministry of justice. Three days later, Giorgio Panizzari, Pietro Sofia, and Martino Zicchitella, all activists in the organization, unsuccessfully tried to escape from the Viterbo Prison through taking prison guards hostage. During negotiations for the release of the guards, the three prisoners claimed responsibility for the judge's kidnapping, with a photo showing his detention in a "people's prison." On May 10, after negotiators guaranteed the prisoners' personal safety, and after obtaining an assurance that their message defending the conditions and rights of prisoners would be disseminated, the three NAP members surrendered and released the hostages. The next day, Judge Di Gennaro was also released.

In 1976, an intense confrontation with the Red Brigades (*Brigate Rosse*) led the two organizations to agree to operational unity, and that spring they attacked the barracks and vehicles of the Carabinieri (military police). On April 22, a mixed commando carried out an assault at the headquarters of the district's inspectorate of Milan's prisons department. In December 1977, Pasquale Abatangelo, Domenico Delli Veneri, and Giorgio Panizzari, three NAP militants, drafted a document in the Asinara Special Prison evaluating the experience of NAP, concluding that the organization did not have the resources to operate as a coordinating arm for small collective direct actions in the face of growing state military repression, and decided to join the Red Brigades directly. This choice was shared by the rest of the organization, with the sole exception of the very early activists. After 1977, NAP ceased to exist as an independent organization, but its legacy of organizing unemployed workers and prisoners represents a striking example of the shift to political militancy and a genuine effort to build a mass base from among the most oppressed classes in society.

SEE ALSO: Italy, from the Anti-Fascist Resistance to the New Left (1945–1960); Italy, from the New Left to the Great Repression (1962–1981); Negri, Antonio (b. 1933); Red Brigades

References and Suggested Readings

Invernizzi, I. (1973) *Prison as a Revolution School*. Turin: Einaudi.

The Memory Project: Written Words (1996) Rome: Sensibili alla foglie.

The NAPs, Armed Proletarian Groups (1975) Milan: Controinformazione, Bulletin No. 1.

A Process to Revolution: The Word to the NAPs (1976) Milan: Collettivo Editoriale Libri Rossi.

Rosso, S. (1976) *The NAPs*. Milan: Collettivo Editoriale Libri Rossi.

Napper Tandy, James (1737?–1803)

Karen Sonnelitter

James Napper Tandy gained fame as a flamboyant radical during the era of the United Irishmen and the Great Rebellion of 1798. He was born in the late 1730s – the exact year is unknown – into a Protestant family in Dublin; his father was an ironmonger. In adulthood Napper Tandy at first made his living as a land agent and rent collector.

He joined the Corporation of Dublin and gained popularity for his denunciation of municipal corruption. He was an early recruit to the Dublin Volunteers, a branch of the extragovernmental military movement inspired by the American Revolution that exerted armed pressure on the Irish government to make political concessions. He was an active opponent of Poynings' Law and the Declaratory Act, both of which limited the autonomy of the Irish parliament. As a popular advocate of parliamentary reform, he became widely admired for his opposition to aristocratic dominance of the Irish parliament.

Napper Tandy enthusiastically greeted the French Revolution. While he did not play a part in the formation of the Society of United Irishmen, he did join the organization soon after its formation, becoming the first secretary of its Dublin branch. His outspokenness made him a target of government repression, forcing him into exile. He joined Wolfe Tone in Philadelphia in 1795, and then traveled on to France. When the Great Rebellion erupted in 1798, the French government gave him a ship, arms, and ammunition to lead a small expeditionary force to join the rebels in Ireland. It arrived too late, however, to influence the outcome of the Rebellion. His ship was eventually captured and he was handed over to British custody. When tried for high treason in 1800, he was at first acquitted on a technicality, but a subsequent

trial ended in a conviction and a death sentence, which was afterward commuted to banishment to France. He died in Bordeaux in 1803.

Historians have frequently dismissed Napper Tandy as merely a “colorful” radical, and less charitably as a drunkard and blabbermouth (terrible traits, obviously, for anyone engaged in revolutionary endeavors that demand secrecy). But assessing the value of a revolutionary’s contribution to history is complicated by the fact that controversy “goes with the territory,” and biased characterizations by political opponents often unfairly distort the record of their activities. Was Napper Tandy a competent leader who advanced the cause of Irish independence, or was he more blarney than substance? It would seem in retrospect that his achievements as a United Irishman were fairly meager, and that he did not play a central role in the Rebellion or in events leading up to it. Nonetheless, there is no indication that he was not sincere in his revolutionary convictions, and his enduring popularity – evidenced by the many Irish pubs, both in Ireland and the United States, that today bear his name – testifies to his prominence as a tribune of the oppressed in Ireland in the era of the Great Rebellion.

SEE ALSO: Fitzgerald, Lord Edward (1763–1798); Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798; O’Connor, Arthur (1763–1852); Tone, Theobald Wolfe (1763–1798); United Irishmen

References and Suggested Readings

- Curtin, N. J. (1998) *The United Irishmen: Popular Politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791–1798*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Elliott, M. (1982) *Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Knox, O. (1997) *Rebels and Informers: Stirrings of Irish Independence*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Packenham, T. (1972) *The Year of Liberty: The Great Irish Rebellion of 1798*. London: Granada.

Narayan, Jayaprakash (1902–1979)

Debi Chatterjee

Jayaprakash Narayan was born on October 11, 1902 in a middle-caste Hindu family in Sitabdiara, a village in Balia District of Uttar Pradesh. He refused to attend a British-style college in protest

against the Rowlatt Act and the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, and in response to the call issued by the nationalists to quit state institutions, he left college. In October 1920 Jayaprakash married Prabhavati Devi, a freedom fighter in her own right. Two years later, he went to the United States and studied political science and economics at the universities of California, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Ohio State.

On his return to India in 1929, Jayaprakash joined the Indian National Congress and became its secretary. Though an ardent follower of Gandhi, he was unwilling to remain confined to the non-violent path. More profound was the impact of Marxism, though Jayaprakash did not accept the Soviet model of regimentation. In protesting British policies during World War II he led massive strikes which sometimes turned violent. He felt that the Congress’s policies were inadequate in addressing the needs of the oppressed masses. In 1934, he took the initiative of forming a socialist group in the Congress. His book, *Why Socialism* (1936), was a scathing criticism of Gandhi and a plea for socialism. Later, in 1948, he led this group out of the Congress and named it the Socialist Party of India. In 1954, he spoke of the limitations of parliamentary democracy in India and joined Vinoba Bhave’s *Bhoodan* movement, a movement for voluntary distribution of land to *Harijans* (untouchables). He decided to renounce electoral politics and pursue *Lokniti* (polity of the people) instead of *Rajniti* (polity of the state).

Although seriously ill, Jayaprakash returned to politics in 1974 to oppose the regime of Indira Gandhi. He led massive movements against governmental corruption in Bihar and stood up for the protection of civil rights. To stem the opposition, Indira Gandhi announced a national emergency and ordered the arrest of a large number of opposition leaders and activists. Jayaprakash was arrested and imprisoned for a short duration. He remained the uniting force behind the Janata Party and led the opposition in bringing down the government of Indira Gandhi in the 1977 elections.

His ideal of *Sampoorna Kranti* (total and permanent revolution) aimed at motivating people to radical reforms and at weeding out various social evils, including corruption, dowry, caste distinctions, untouchability, and communalism. He also argued for “partyless democracy” and greater decentralization of power.

Jayaprakash died on October 8, 1979. He was posthumously given the Bharat Ratna award in 1998 for his invaluable contribution to the freedom struggle and upliftment of the poor and downtrodden.

SEE ALSO: Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); India, Civil Disobedience Movement and Demand for Independence; Quit India Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Chandra, B. (2003) *In the Name of Democracy: JP Movement and the Emergency*. New Delhi: Penguin.
- Prasad, B. (Ed.) (1980) *A Revolutionary's Quest: Selected Writings of Jayaprakash Narayan*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Prasad, B. (2003) *Jayaprakash Narayan: Quest and Legacy*. New Delhi: Rupa.
- Ranjan, S. (2006) *Jayaprakash Narayan: Prophet of People's Power*. New Delhi: National Book Trust.
- Scarfe, A. & Scarfe, W. (1975) *JP: His Biography*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.

Nasir, Hassan (1928–1960)

Farooq Sulehria

Hassan Nasir is an icon of the student movement in Pakistan who is remembered for his struggle, sacrifice, and bravery. Born on August 2, 1928, Hassan Nasir hailed from Hyderabad, a princely state during the British *raj* (rule). His well-off family was famous for its commitment to nationalist politics. After his Senior Cambridge at Grammar School, he moved to Aligarh, a famous seat of learning for the Muslim elite during those days. As Hassan began college in Aligarh, India was rocked with mutinies, strikes, and student unrest. Hassan participated in the student movement launched for the release of Indian National Army (INA) leaders, but it was the communist-led revolutionary peasant uprising in Hyderabad state in 1947 that radicalized him. He joined the communist movement and moved to Pakistan in December 1947. The left-wing People's Publishing House in Karachi became his abode and he dedicated himself to organizing the workers in unions. Nasir gained attention and established himself as a student leader when he played a key role in founding

the All Pakistan Students Organization. In 1951 he was arrested in connection with the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case, launched by the Pakistan government in order to suppress the emerging Communist Party, and was released in 1952. His release proved short-lived, as he was arrested again in 1954 and was exiled. He returned to Hyderabad, and in 1956 he moved to Pakistan yet again, becoming the National Awami Party's (NAP) office secretary in Karachi. It is suspected that he was also the general secretary of the illegal Communist Party. As the military imposed its first dictatorship in 1958, Hassan went into hiding, and the government announced a reward for his arrest. It is likely that one of his close associates betrayed him, leading to his arrest in 1960. He was sent to Lahore Fort where he was tortured to death and his body hastily buried by the authorities.

SEE ALSO: Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1911–1984); Iqbal, Muhammad (1877–1938); Jalib, Habib (1928–1993); Pakistan, Protest and Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Ahmed, S. H. & Asmi, S. (2008) Student Movement Revisited – Setting the Record Straight on DSF. *Daily Dawn* (April 5).
- Anonymous (1998) *Weekly Mazdoor Jeddohudh* (Workers' Struggle), *Hassan Nasir Number 45* (November 12–18).
- Mohsin Z. (1974) *Inqlabi Shaheed Hassan Nasir* (Revolutionary Martyr Hassan Nasir). Karachi: Shaheen Packages.

Nasrallah, Sayed Hassan (b. 1960)

Andrew J. Waskey

Hassan Nasrallah is the current secretary general of Hezbollah, a Lebanese political party. Hezbollah's members are Shi'a Muslims. Its defining philosophy is Shi'a theology as applied to current political conditions.

Nasrallah was born in Lebanon, in the East Beirut neighborhood of Bourj Hammoud on August 31, 1960, the ninth of ten children. Prior to Hassan's birth, his father Abdul Karim worked as a vegetable peddler in Jabal Amel in southern Lebanon near the city of Tyre. Neither

Karim nor his family was especially religious; however, Hassan showed an early interest in religion. He first attended Al-Najah School but later transferred to a public school in the East Beirut neighborhood of Sin el-Fil.

The violence of the civil war in Lebanon in 1975 forced Hassan's family to flee to their ancestral home in Bassouriyeh. While Hassan was finishing his secondary education in Tyre he joined the Amal movement, which had been founded in 1975 as the militia wing of the Movement of the Disinherited founded in 1974 by Musa al-Sadr. The Amal movement's goals were to win greater respect for the Shi'a of Lebanon and greater resources for the large displaced Shi'a population living in southern Lebanon. The ultimate objective was to gain control of southern Lebanon for the Shi'as. With the aid of the Syrian government, the movement grew in popular strength.

In the late 1970s Nasrallah attended a theological school in Baalbek, a Beqaa Valley town. The curriculum of the school was heavily influenced by the teachings of Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, founder of the Dawa movement in Najaf, Iraq, in the 1960s, where Nasrallah studied theology for a short while before he and a large number of other Lebanese Shi'a were expelled by Saddam Hussein. Upon returning to Lebanon, Nasrallah began teaching at a school run by Amal's leader, Abbas al-Musawi. He was soon inducted into the Amal movement's inner circle.

After the 1982 occupation of southern Lebanon by the Israeli army, Nasrallah joined Hezbollah, a group founded by Iranian Shi'a agents operating in Lebanon. His preaching skills attracted the attention of other Lebanese Shi'as, who joined Hezbollah as well. Followers of the Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Mussaui Khomeini (1902–89), they were seeking to establish a Shi'a theocracy in Lebanon.

In 1987 Nasrallah went to Qom in Iran to study theology for nearly three years. In 1991 Musawi was chosen to be the secretary general of Hezbollah. Later that year he and his family were killed by the Israelis, and Nasrallah became the secretary general of Hezbollah. In 1989 he denounced the Taif Agreement, which based Lebanese parliamentary representation on the old demographic numbers of Christians and Muslims.

Nasrallah was active with Hezbollah throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In the late 1990s, the Israelis had to fight an ongoing battle with Hezbollah. They ended their occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000, hailed in the Arab world as Nasrallah's victory. It also raised the level of respect of many in Lebanon for Nasrallah as a liberator. In 2004 Nasrallah played a major role in exchanging prisoners between Israel and Hezbollah. Hundreds of Lebanese and Palestinians were exchanged for the Israelis they held. Also exchanged was Nasrallah's son's body. In 2006 an agreement was reached with the Lebanese Christian organization, the Free Patriotic Movement, led by Michel Aoun, who was the former premier of Lebanon. The ten-point compact included an agreement to pardon and return members of the South Lebanon Army in exchange for which the Free Patriotic Movement agreed to work for parliamentary reforms that would lead to representation on the basis of one-man-one-vote instead of representation on the basis of the demographics of Christians, Muslims, and Druze in Lebanon. Aoun claimed that the agreement meant that the political process was disarming Hezbollah without the losses a war would entail. Critics claimed that it gave legitimacy to the Shi'a with little in exchange.

As the leader of Hezbollah, Nasrallah remained a highly visible spokesman, especially during the 2006 Lebanon War (August 14–September 6), called the Second Lebanon War by the Israelis and the July War by the Lebanese, which ended in a stalemate.

SEE ALSO: Hezbollah: Organization and Uprisings; Islamic Political Currents; Israeli Settlers Movement; Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Mussaui (1902–1989) and the Shi'ite Islamic Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Harik, J. P. (2005) *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism*. New York: I. B. Tauris.
- Noe, N. (Ed.) (2007) *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayed Hassan Nasrallah*. New York: Verso.
- Norton, A. R. & Eickelman, D. F. (Eds.) (2007) *Hezbollah: A Short History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Saad-Ghorayeb, A. (2005) *Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion*. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.

Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970)

Andrew Kurt

Colonel Nasser was a leader in the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 which ended British imperial dominance and the Egyptian monarchy. As Egypt's president for 14 years, he was a proponent of Arab socialism and pan-Arabism. While his economic program is viewed as a mixed success for Egypt, and his military record against Israel was one of failure and disappointment, he was the foremost Arab leader of his day. The secular political order he instituted continues today in Egypt and has been copied in other Arab nations.

From a poor family, Nasser rose through the army. Egypt was technically independent from Britain since 1922, but in fact remained a quasi-colonial state. Throughout the 1940s the monarchical government's corruption and weakness became a source of profound dissatisfaction in Egypt.

In 1949 Nasser helped to found the Free Officers movement. In July 1952 it spearheaded a revolution which forced King Faruq to abdicate, abolished parliament, then established a republic in 1953. General Muhammad Neguib became the first president. But as the true head of the Free Officers, Nasser became prime minister briefly in 1954. Elected as president in 1956, he was also head of the Revolutionary Command Council. Nasser later wrote of his leadership in the coup in a book entitled *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (1959): "I always imagine that in this region in which we live there is a role wandering aimlessly about in search of an actor to play it."

The officers' coup also ended British imperialism in Egypt, when two years later Britain evacuated the Suez Canal. In 1956, after the United States refused Nasser's request for arms, his decision to turn instead to the Soviet Union and to nationalize the Suez Canal Company – in majority British control since 1869 – led to the so-called Suez Crisis. In the end Nasser stood up to invasion by British, French, and Israeli forces, who abandoned the mission to take back the Canal. This anti-imperialist stance quickly led to a heroic reputation, not only in Egypt but in the wider Arab world as well. The influence of



Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–70) was a leader in the Egyptian Officers' Revolution that deposed King Farouk I in 1952 and went on to become the nation's second president in 1956. As a pan-Arabist, Nasser led the United Arab Republic, which unified Egypt and Syria. This August 1, 1956 photo was taken as the Egyptian president returned from Alexandria after announcing his takeover of the Suez Canal Company. (Getty Images)

Nasser's example was soon apparent, as Jordan's King Hussein dismissed the British officer in command of his army, then in 1958 officers in Iraq's army led a coup which took down the Hashemite monarchy installed and propped up by Britain.

Nasser was not against Islam, but Egypt now pursued a secularist, modernist program. As part of his authoritarian approach, he established control of mosques and religious organizations. He championed a secular nationalism steered in the direction of state-run socialism. The economic foundation of the old landowning elite was broken as his government increasingly limited landholdings. Banks were nationalized and industry promoted. The Aswan High Dam (opened in 1964) expanded agricultural development significantly.

Nasser established the Arab Socialist Union as the single political party which, though bereft of real power, permitted new forms of political participation. He was originally tolerant of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist society that played a major role against British presence in Egypt and in the coup. But in 1954 he attempted to remove the political threat it posed by banning it and waging a bloody campaign against its members. Nasser allegedly made false accusations against the Brotherhood, a group popular among many Egyptians, including army

officers. Brutal reprisals continued later as it became more militant.

Egypt's example and encouragement of African and Arab independence from the West came to be known as Nasserism. Also in favor of Arab unity and Palestinian victory against Israel, Nasserism possessed considerable strength. Nasserist movements continued in the Arab world even after the humiliating defeat by Israel in the 1967 War; in Libya Nasserists staged a successful coup in 1969. Nasser stood almost alone in his ability to win pan-Arab approval. Yet he was unable to achieve lasting political union, and economic crisis in Egypt starting in 1965 dampened the assessment of his economic program. As Nasser became increasingly distrustful of opponents, he increased surveillance and control by police and the secret service, and did not resolve the tension of secular dictatorship versus a semi-democratic Islamism. Despite these difficulties in governing the country, Nasser remained enormously popular among Egyptians. Several millions attended his funeral procession in 1970. He was succeeded by Vice-President Anwar al-Sadat, a member of the Free Officers' revolution.

SEE ALSO: Arab Left and Socialist Movements, 1861–1930; Egypt and Arab Socialism; Egypt, Revolution of 1952; Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) and the Muslim Brotherhood; Iraq, Revolution of 1958; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Gordon, J. (1992) *Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hopwood, D. (1993) *Egypt, Politics and Society, 1945–1990*, 3rd ed. New York: Routledge.
- Stephens, R. H. (1971) *Nasser, a Political Biography*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Vatikiotis, P. J. (1978) *Nasser and His Generation*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Vatikiotis, P. J. (1991) *The History of Modern Egypt*, 4th ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University .

Nat Turner Rebellion

Anthony E. Kaye

Nat Turner led the last of the great slave rebellions in the United States. In the dark of a summer morning in 1831, he set out with just six comrades. As they marched across Southampton

County, Virginia, their ranks grew to about sixty, and an equal number of white people lay dead. The revolt was swiftly crushed but shook slavery in Virginia to its foundations.

Although Turner is often remembered as a hero, his relations with slave contemporaries were fraught. Born on October 2, 1800, he changed hands among four different owners and lived on three different farms, all within a few miles in Southampton. Family, fellow slaves, and many white people believed him to be bright beyond his years. A seemingly preternatural ability to recount events before his birth convinced some that God communicated through him. Turner was ambivalent about such attentions and withdrew from other slaves to cultivate a persona of mystery and evangelical piety. He could often be seen in prayer, even in the field, and he engaged in exercises of self-restraint, such as fasting, showing himself unmoved by petty temptations such as alcohol and theft.

When Turner was in his twenties a series of mass revivals, known as the Second Great Awakening, swept the South. An egalitarian theology stressed direct contact with God and that he was no respecter of persons, high or low. Turner contemplated passages of scripture and began to converse directly with God. "The Spirit," as he called God, told Turner, "Seek ye the kingdom of Heaven and all things shall be added unto you."

Around 1822 Turner began to intimate to other slaves "something was about to happen" to fulfill some "great purpose" the Spirit had in store for him. But after a run-in with an overseer, Turner ran away for 30 days, only to return quoting an admonition from the Spirit: "For he who knoweth his Master's will, and doeth it not, shall be beaten with many stripes, and thus have I chastened you." Many slaves in Turner's neighborhood assumed he had run away for good, as his father had years before, and were disappointed by what sounded suspiciously like a pro-slavery catechism when he returned.

At the nadir of his neighborhood stature in 1825, Turner had his most striking revelations yet: a battle in the sky between black spirits and white spirits, a prophetic vision complete with streams of blood and peals of thunder. When he saw drops of blood fall upon a corn field he was plowing, Turner shared the vision with whites and blacks, but few were impressed. When he waded into a creek with one new disciple, an alcoholic

former overseer, the Spirit baptized them, but onlookers merely “reviled us.”

Turner’s rise and fall reflected the social complexity of the neighborhood terrain. Slave neighborhoods, recent research suggests, were the primary arena of slave society, where slaves worked, socialized, formed families, praised God, and struggled against slaveholders. The tensions of the neighborhood worked to Turner’s advantage to an extent. To be sure, his rebellion suffered from lack of planning. It is not clear he formulated any plans beyond taking the county seat of Southampton, where he mistakenly believed a large cache of arms could be had. Yet he kept his plans largely to himself, relying only upon a select number of confidants from his own neighborhood. Conspiracies organized by Gabriel, a slave artisan, in 1800 and another by Denmark Vesey in 1822 were discovered before they came off after months of extensive recruiting in Richmond and Charleston, respectively, and rural hinterlands. According to Turner, however, when he was at last ready to act, the people “in whom I had the greatest confidence” numbered just six nearby friends. Hark Travis lived on Joseph Travis’s place with Turner; Will Francis, Henry Porter, and the other three men who set out with them all lived on farms nearby.

The insurrection also played out on a neighborhood grid. On Sunday afternoon, August 21, Turner and his six neighbors met at Cabin Pond on a farm adjoining the Travis’s and steeled themselves with a feast of roast pig and drams of brandy. In the dark hours of the morning on the 22nd, they sneaked into the Travis house quietly, where Turner’s comrades insisted he draw first blood. In the Travis’s bedroom he landed only a glancing blow with his axe, and Will Francis swiftly disposed of the Travis family. After leaving the house, it dawned on the rebels they had left behind an infant in the family, and Porter and Francis returned to kill the child. The rebels proceeded apace through the neighborhood, striking at one farm after the next, killing whites and picking up recruits. The insurgents numbered 15 by the time they reached the Turner home, one of Nat Turner’s former owners; the dead numbered 15 by the time they left Whitehead’s.

Turner evinced some ambivalence about the bloody business of the rebellion. Not only did he hesitate to make a death strike back at the Travis’s, he killed only one person during the

entire rebellion, a daughter in the Whitehead family. As Turner rode to rejoin his forces at the Francis place, he had a curiously difficult time catching up and only rejoined them several farms further on.

Turner issued new orders for the new terrain outside the neighborhood. Until this point, the rebels had persisted in their advance by stealth. Now, he ordered them to burst onto farms at a crescendo, “to carry terror and devastation wherever we went.” As the rebels proceeded east toward the county seat of Jerusalem, the force grew to 50 or 60 men from different neighborhoods, and its cohesion began to unravel. When they reached the Parker farm 3 miles from town, a debate broke out. Turner wanted to go to Jerusalem directly, but the majority wanted to recruit in the Parker quarters. While they went recruiting, he stayed behind at the gate with a half-dozen men.

Meanwhile, white men were massing in overwhelming numbers. Over the course of that day and the next, over 850 militiamen from Southampton and adjoining Isle of Wright County mustered against the revolt – a massive force, given the rebels’ maximum strength of 60. A contingent of 18 caught up with the rebels at Parker’s gate, their first skirmish with militia. Half a dozen rebels were wounded, many dispersed, and 20 rode on with Turner to approach Jerusalem from the south but were met by militia again at Cypress Bridge over Nottoway River. Turner assumed the men who had fled “would make back to their old neighborhood,” and resolved to regroup there and enlist new recruits for another march on Jerusalem.

Turner’s path back to Cabin Pond was circuitous, as his retreat was deflected by militia enveloping the insurgents. Along the way, Turner’s ranks were growing again, to about forty when they rested for the night in woods on the edge of a farm, but dropping to 20 after another attack. He backtracked in hopes of gaining more new recruits, but to no avail. Gunfire greeted him on one estate, and he arrived at the next with just two men. He instructed them to reconnoiter with the neighbors he had set out with back at Cabin Pond. Turner arrived there Tuesday night, August 23 alone, waited until the following evening, and then secreted himself in a hovel under a pile of fence rails. For ten weeks Turner remained at large. White people speculated he was far off, 180 miles west on the road

to Ohio, east in the Dismal Swamp, but he hid in his neighborhood for the duration.

In the meantime, militia suppressed the rebellion in operations partly military, partly vengeance. They took prisoners and shot down bystanders and rebels alike. Among Turner's neighbors, the militia took Hark Travis into custody and killed Henry Porter, who was beheaded. The militia killed far more men – 120, by one conservative estimate – than those participating in the revolt. The violence became so indiscriminate a newspaper editor condemned it as “hardly inferior in barbarity to the atrocities of the insurgents.”

Turner was captured at gunpoint by a lone white man on October 30. He entered Jerusalem in chains, under a small guard, through a phalanx of hostile white people. Awaiting trial, he told his story in his cell during three days of interviews with a lawyer representing Hark Travis, Thomas Gray. His pamphlet, *The Confessions of Nat Turner*, sold as many as 50,000 copies and remains the best single source testimony on the revolt.

Turner was among the last of the 50 accused rebels tried between August 31 and November 21 in the Southampton Court of Oyer and Terminer. Authorities used the trials to demonstrate they had regained control of the county as well as bring rebels to account. The court, the standing venue for trials of capital cases against slaves, made a show of according defendants due process provided for slaves by law, which included a right to counsel. The court dismissed charges or returned verdicts of not guilty in 13 cases, but found 30 men guilty and condemned 19 to hang, including Turner. His trial lasted one day, presided over by ten justices of the peace instead of the usual complement of five, attended by an unusually large guard to deter agitated citizens from seizing him. The court found Turner guilty and valued him at \$375 for the purposes of compensating his owners for executing their slave. As many as 200 people died in the rebellion and its aftermath, 60 killed by the rebels, the lion's share by the militia.

In the state legislature, Turner's revolt provoked a wide-ranging debate about the future of slavery in 1832. One measure came within 15 votes of abolishing slavery. In the end, arguments that slavery was an economic necessity carried the day, and Virginia passed new laws requiring slaves to receive religious instruction solely from their owners and prohibiting all black

people, bond or free, from preaching. Free black people lost the right to trial by jury, and as many as 300 agreed to migrate to Liberia under the auspices of the American Colonization Society. Lawmakers in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana passed legislation against imports of slaves in the aftermath of the revolt, although the measures were quickly repealed and easily evaded in the interim.

SEE ALSO: Gabriel's Rebellion; Vesey's Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Greenberg, K. S. (Ed.) (1996) *The Confessions of Nat Turner and Related Documents*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's Press.
- Greenberg, K. S. (2004) *Nat Turner: A Slave Rebellion in History and Memory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kaye, A. E. (2007) *Joining Places: Slave Neighborhood in the Old South*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Oates, S. B. (1990) *The Fires of Jubilee: Nat Turner's Fierce Rebellion*. New York: Harper Perennial.

National Guard, Montmartre, 1871

Pamela J. Stewart

The association between the National Guard of Paris and the area of the city known as Montmartre did not become distinct or linked with revolution until 1871. The Marquis de Lafayette created the National Guard of Paris, a militia made up of Parisian middle-class (bourgeois) men, and served as its commander from 1781 to 1791. By 1848, its members supplied some of the leaders of the insurrection known as the June Days, encouraging Emperor Louis-Napoleon III to disband the National Guard in 1852.

In 1860, historically independent Montmartre, a village formerly outside the boundaries of Paris, officially became part of the city. Montmartre's population grew with the migration of workers from the city's center, pushed out with the emperor's reconfiguration of the city. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1 and its siege of Paris called for the reestablishment of the National Guard, its members then called *fédérés*, and Montmartre's enlistments came from the working classes. During the war, as Paris endured siege, starvation, and bombardment for more

than four months, government leaders and many bourgeoisie fled Paris. This exodus, and the draw of National Guard pay, meant that the popular classes of men and women remained to defend Paris and increasingly filled the ranks of the Guard, altering its composition to one leaning toward revolutionary change.

The Franco-Prussian War ended in defeat for France in January 1871, and the following month brought both municipal and national elections. Parisians, believing themselves to have been underrepresented in the national political picture, resented having to pay France's reparations to Germany despite their valiant defense of the city during the siege. In addition, new laws made rents and other debts, put on hold during the siege, due within the month, moving tens of thousands of Paris artisans and shopkeepers toward bankruptcy. As a result, workers, their allies, and National Guard troops, who remained armed after the war, increasingly agitated against the republican government. On March 15, members of the National Guard voted for their own municipal representatives, creating an elected body in opposition to the national government. Early on March 18, troops representing the republic entered Paris, attempting to seize cannons stored in Montmartre that had been paid for by Parisians during the siege.

By the end of the day, two generals lay dead and the national troops had retreated, leaving the National Guard and its elected committee to oversee the city and direct new municipal elections that created the revolutionary Paris Commune. The National Guard, now made up almost exclusively of workers and other non-bourgeois men and women, resisted France's army at the ramparts and barricades in and around the city. Women enlisted in medical and supply-line positions (*ambulancières* and *cantinières*) and received equal pay with male Guards. Many women also armed themselves, despite official disapproval of the Commune leadership, defending barricades within the city, firing artillery from the city's gates, and engaging in hand-to-hand combat.

The final demise of the Commune occurred during May 21–8, 1871, what came to be known as the Bloody Week, in which troops of the republic killed 20,000 to 30,000 women, men, and children. In the Commune's aftermath, Parisian men and women in the possession of National Guard uniforms were subject to arrest, military

trial, prison, deportation, or even summary execution. After the Commune, the National Guard fell into official disrepute and disuse.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873); European Revolutions of 1848; France, June Days, 1848; Lafayette, Marquis de (1757–1834); Paris Commune, 1871

References and Suggested Readings

- Shafer, D. A. (2005) *The Paris Commune: French Politics, Culture, and Society at the Crossroads of the Revolutionary Tradition and Revolutionary Socialism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- The Siege and Commune of Paris, 1870–1871. McCormick Library of Special Collections, Northwestern University Library. Available at www.library.northwestern.edu/spec/siege/ (updated June 17, 2005).
- Tombs, R. (1981) *The War Against Paris, 1871*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

National Organization for Women (NOW)

Cayo Gamber

Founded in Washington, DC in 1966, the National Organization for Women (NOW) is one of the best-known feminist organizations in the United States. The organization was founded by 28 women and men who attended the Third National Conference of the Commission on the Status of Women. With 300 members and an annual budget of \$1,500, its primary mission was “to take action to bring women into full participation in the mainstream of American society now, exercising all the privileges and responsibilities thereof in truly equal partnership with men.”

A primarily liberal feminist organization, NOW seeks to enact incremental change through legislative and governmental channels. While, on the national level, NOW would be characterized as liberal feminist, many of the state and local chapters would be characterized by radical feminists' decidedly vocal, non-hierarchical, grassroots activism. Over the years, NOW has focused on reproductive rights, civil rights, environmental law, disability rights, age discrimination, affirmative action, and judicial nominations. During that time, among the organization's many accomplishments, NOW took on the newspaper industry

by forcing them to stop sex-segregated “Help Wanted” ads (i.e., Help Wanted Male and Help Wanted Female), challenged the lifting-limits of 30+ pounds that prevented women from taking many higher-paying jobs, helped create shelters for battered women, founded rape-crisis centers, claimed women’s rights to the night and the streets in “Take Back the Night” actions, won the right for young girls to compete in sports and to have access to sports scholarships, endorsed the Equal Rights Amendment, and promoted the passage of Title IX laws. In spite of such successes, during its formative years NOW was criticized for catering to white, middle-aged, heterosexual, middle-class, educated women. In addition, during those years the organization was criticized for widespread homophobia. In the early 1970s the organization finally addressed lesbian rights by issuing a resolution declaring that lesbians were doubly oppressed, both as homosexuals and as women.

Even though today an increasing number of women claim they support feminism, in 2002 NOW’s entire budget had dropped from over \$12 million to approximately \$4 million. Currently, 500,000 members strong, this membership-based voluntary association maintains its role in the feminist movement.

SEE ALSO: Friedan, Betty (1921–2006); Women’s Movement, United States, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Barakso, M. (2004) *Governing NOW: Grassroots Activism in the National Organization for Women*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Gilmore, S. (2003) The Dynamics of Second-Wave Feminist Activism in Memphis, 1971–1982: Rethinking the Liberal/Radical Divide. *NWSA Journal* 15, 1 (Spring): 94–117.
- Scott, E. K. (2005) Beyond Tokenism: The Making of Racially Diverse Feminist Organizations. *Social Problems* 52, 2 (May): 232–54.

Native American protest, 20th century

Steven E. Silvern

Native Americans form distinct political and cultural communities within the United States. Sometimes referred to as “nations within a nation,” native homelands or reservations are

semi-autonomous territorial enclaves located inside the United States. Today, many Native Americans have left reservations, living in nearby towns and large urban centers throughout the United States. Both on and off the reservation, Native Americans struggle to preserve their cultural identity and heritage, develop reservation economies, and maintain their semi-autonomous sovereign political status. These struggles are set against an American society that historically has sought to eliminate native peoples as distinct political, cultural, and geographic communities. History shows us that Native Americans have engaged in armed resistance, protest occupations, demonstrations, legal activism, and political lobbying to avert the loss of land and natural resources, resist displacement from their homelands, and prevent the erosion of native cultures through government-sponsored programs of reeducation and assimilation.

Native American struggles for sovereignty and self-determination have changed over time and involved different forms of resistance, political activism, and political protest. Native protest movements have developed at different spatial scales – from the local to the national. They have emerged in specific reservation communities and sought to address the needs and demands of specific communities. There has also developed a national, supra-tribal protest and activist movement that has brought attention to the common needs, grievances, and demands



Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the American Indian Movement (AIM) protested the treatment of Native Americans in the United States. On July 17, 1978 in Washington, DC, members of AIM march at the Capitol on the last leg of their five-month cross-country walk to protest a wave of anti-Indian legislation passed in the US Congress. The march began on February 11 on Alcatraz Island off San Francisco, California. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

of native peoples all across the United States. Today, native political activism and protest activities exist at both local and national scales.

Background of Twentieth-Century Protest

The dawn of the modern native protest movement may be traced to tribal-based political protests in the 1950s that focused on the protection of reservation lands and the restoration of treaty rights. During the 1950s the Hohenosaunee (Iroquois) of New York protested government waterway, dam, and reservoir projects that would result in the loss of portions of their upstate New York reservations. The Tuscarora, for example, resisted the construction of a reservoir on their reservation, blocking land surveyors from entering their lands and pulling out surveyors' stakes marking the boundaries of Tuscarora lands targeted for condemnation.

In the early 1960s, tribes in the Pacific Northwest and the Great Lakes challenged state government efforts to restrict and prevent off-reservation hunting and fishing. Tribes claimed they had reserved the right to hunt and fish off-reservation in nineteenth-century treaties in which they had ceded most of their homelands to the United States government. In the Pacific Northwest, protests challenging the authority of Washington State to prevent off-reservation fishing were organized by local tribes with the assistance of the Survival of American Indians Association and the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC). These protests took the form of marches and demonstrations at the Washington state capital in Olympia. They also organized protests at boat landings along rivers that were called "fish-ins" and were modeled after the "sit-ins" of the African American civil rights movement. Tribes in the region received support from nationally known figures such as Marlon Brando and Dick Gregory. The presence of these entertainers brought national media attention to tribal claims and grievances. These organized protests were accompanied by tribal legal activism in which tribes filed successful law suits in the federal courts for protection of their off-reservation hunting and fishing treaty rights.

Rise of the Red Power Movement

The reservation-based and local-scale protests of the Iroquois and the "fish-ins" of the Pacific

Northwest set the stage for the rise of what would become a highly visible, national-scale native protest movement in the late 1960s known as the Red Power movement. The rise of the Red Power movement must be understood within the larger context of the rise of other social and protest movements during the 1960s and changes internal to native communities during the same time period. The 1960s was a decade that witnessed the rise of political activism and social movements that employed protest, demonstration, and protest marches as well as more conventional political tactics. Native communities, leaders, and political activists were influenced by the political activism and protest of the civil rights movement, Vietnam War protest movements, and the Chicano/Chicana movement. The protests and political activism of these movements set the external social context for the rise of native political activism.

Native political activism, however, must also be seen as arising from a unique set of internal circumstances. Native goals and tactics, while set in the context of 1960s social movements, reflect the specific historical experience of native peoples within the United States. Unlike other minority groups, native communities have a sovereign political status that is reflected in the history of the treaty-based relationship with the United States. They have reservation homelands and are self-governing. In the 1950s the United States put in place a policy called Termination that sought to eliminate these homelands and the tribes' political status. Termination, viewed as a threat to the very existence of tribes, stimulated the formation of a number of reservation-based anti-Termination political groups and intertribal activist organizations.

At the same time, reservations lacked economic development and native communities suffered from high rates of poverty. Along with Termination, the government instituted a program of relocating native people to urban centers in an effort to eliminate reservations and assimilate native people. As on the reservations, in the cities native people suffered from lack of economic opportunity and experienced continued poverty and discrimination. In many cities, intertribal community support organizations formed to provide support to urban Indians. These urban community centers would become places for native peoples from different tribes to meet, talk, and discuss how to solve the social problems

confronting all native peoples. Many who met in the urban centers were in college or were college-educated and brought with them ideas and the energy to develop an Indian political movement. Thus it was especially in urban centers and on college campuses that the more activist and militant Red Power movement emerged.

Alcatraz and the Rise of a Red Power Movement

All that remained for the development and spread of a visible and national-scale Native American protest movement to arise was a catalyst. It came on November 1969 with the native protest occupation of Alcatraz Island. Located in San Francisco Bay, Alcatraz Island was the site of a federal prison until it was closed in 1963. In 1964 and 1969 Indians from the San Francisco Bay area briefly occupied the island. They claimed it under the terms of the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Sioux. The first occupiers wanted to use the island as an Indian university. Their brief occupations failed to establish a permanent Indian use for the island.

On November 20, 1969, a group of about 89 Indians, calling themselves Indians of All Tribes, occupied the island. The occupiers, many of whom were students, claimed they wanted to use Alcatraz as a center of Indian and environmental studies. The occupation, which lasted for 19 months, ended on June 11, 1971, when federal agents peacefully removed the remaining 15 Indian occupiers. The Indian and environmental centers were never built. But, the occupation of Alcatraz was significant for both the non-Indian public and for native people across the United States. For the non-Indian world, the occupation drew national media attention for the first time to the social and economic conditions of native peoples in cities and on the reservations.

The occupation of Alcatraz inspired native people throughout the United States to become politically active and to take pride in their culture. Alcatraz stimulated protest occupations, marches, and demonstrations across the United States. This “Red Power” protest movement, as Indian political activism between 1969 and 1980 came to be called, sought to gain public and government attention to the history of cultural repression and the social and economic injustice that native peoples experienced in the United States. The goals of the protest movement may be summarized as:

- to promote Indian self-determination and sovereignty;
- to end poverty on Indian reservations and urban centers;
- to end discrimination against Indian people;
- to preserve Indian identity and culture and promote ethnic pride;
- to challenge negative and stereotypical images of Indians;
- to restore land and draw attention to land claims;
- to honor, protect, and restore treaty rights.

Indian political activists learned from Alcatraz that visibility and media attention were key to gaining the public’s and government’s attention. Thus, the tactics of the Red Power movement involved protests, marches, demonstrations, and property takeovers of highly visible and symbolic locations, including government offices, military bases, national park sites, and national monuments. Between 1969 and 1978 native peoples were involved in over 70 property protest occupations of variable duration. Some of the protest occupation sites include: Fort Lewis, Fort Lawton, a US Coast Guard station in Milwaukee, and other US government military installations. Government buildings, such as the regional headquarters of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Cleveland and Denver, were the targets of protests and demonstrations during this period. Protesters established “protest camps” at Mt. Rushmore and Badlands National Monument. Plans were made, but never successfully implemented, to occupy Ellis Island.

For some tribal activists, well-organized demonstrations and marches coupled with political lobbying were essential ingredients in their political strategies during the 1970s. One example of this is the Wisconsin Menominee’s successful effort to repeal the federal government’s termination of their status as a recognized tribe in 1961. Upset with the failure of Termination to improve the life of the tribe and the loss of reservation lands, tribal members in Milwaukee and Chicago organized Determination of Right and Unity for Menominee Shareholders (DRUMS). DRUMS organized numerous demonstrations, including a 150-mile march of several hundred tribal members to the state capital in Madison to gain public support for repeal of termination. DRUMS also extensively lobbied Congress and the Nixon administration to repeal the Termination Bill.

In 1973, Congress restored the Menominee to tribal status by passing the Menominee Restoration Bill.

The American Indian Movement (AIM)

Instrumental to many of these protest occupations, marches, and demonstrations was the American Indian Movement or AIM. AIM was created in Minneapolis in 1968 by Ojibwe Indians, including Dennis Banks and Clyde Bellecourt, in response to discrimination against Indians and police harassment of Indians in Minneapolis. AIM initially provided social services, health care, and housing assistance to Minneapolis's native community. It also established a street patrol that sought to reduce the arrest and police abuse of Indians living in the Twin Cities.

After Alcatraz, local AIM chapters sprung up around the country. Working with urban Indian centers and Indian social and family networks, AIM organized many protests and protest occupations throughout the country. Its leaders were skilled in gaining media attention to publicize treaty rights, discrimination, and the poor economic conditions of urban and reservation Indian communities. Initially, these protests were short-term and non-violent. For example, in one its first national protests, AIM along with members of 25 tribes occupied a replica of the *Mayflower* and poured sand over Plymouth Rock on Thanksgiving Day in 1970. Later actions and protests organized by AIM during the 1970s would be more militant and violent in nature.

Perhaps one of the most famous and symbolic of the protests organized by Indian political activists was the 1972 Trail of Broken Treaties. This protest, organized by AIM, began as a caravan of Indian protesters in Seattle and San Francisco that wound its way across the country, stopping at reservations and in cities on its way to Washington, DC. Meeting in St. Paul, Minnesota, protest leaders held a series of meetings and wrote a "Twenty Points" position paper they would present to the federal government on arrival in Washington in early November prior to the presidential elections. The Twenty Points communiqué emphasized that treaty rights and sovereignty were fundamental to the Indian relationship with the federal government. Among its demands, the Twenty Points called for the

restoration of treaty making, creation of a commission to review treaties and treaty violations by the federal government, the abolition of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the repeal of Termination legislation.

Upon arrival in Washington, DC in early November 1972, several hundred protesters peacefully entered the BIA building to negotiate the terms of their demonstration and present their Twenty Points program. When promised meetings with government officials and accommodations did not materialize, and when government security guards tried to forcibly remove them from the building, Indian protesters forced the guards out and barricaded all entrances into the building. A small number of protesters were clubbed by guards. With riot police surrounding the building, many protesters believed they were going to be attacked and could die in the building. The protesters renamed the occupied BIA building the "Native American Embassy." Angry and scared, they destroyed office furniture, broke windows, and plastered graffiti on walls. Many BIA files and Indian artifacts were removed from the building and made their way back to reservations. The occupation was widely covered by the media. While the media labeled the protesters "militants" and "activists," the unplanned occupation gained national attention for the protesters' grievances and the Twenty Points program. With federal marshals and riot police surrounding the building, a negotiated agreement peacefully ended the occupation after one week. Federal officials promised not to pursue criminal charges, provided funds to transport Indians home, and promised to form a group or commission to study the Twenty Points.

After 1972, AIM shifted much of its confrontational political activism and strategy from large-scale symbolic protest actions to reservation-based protest and activism that emphasized treaty rights, land claims, protecting Indian civil rights, reducing Indian poverty, and eliminating corruption in tribal government. Protests and political activism became more inward-directed, revealing divisions within native communities, and they became more violent in nature. Perhaps the most famous of AIM's reservation-based political actions is the 1973 violent standoff between AIM, the Pine Ridge tribal government, and the FBI known as Wounded Knee II.

Wounded Knee began as a local confrontation between traditionalists and tribal government

on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota. The traditionalists (Oglala Sioux Civil Rights Organization) objected to the corruption and nepotism of Dick Wilson, the elected tribal chairman. Wilson organized a paramilitary group, called the Guardians of the Oglala Nation (GOONs), to intimidate and harass his political opposition. Efforts to impeach Wilson failed and Wilson instituted a ban on all political meetings and organizing on the reservation. The traditionalists then invited AIM to the reservation to help them negotiate with Wilson. When these efforts failed, 250 AIM members and the traditionalists planned a press conference in the village of Wounded Knee, site of the 1890 massacre of Lakotas at the hands of the US 7th Cavalry. Their goal was to use this symbolic site to draw attention to the political corruption and abuses of the tribal government. An armed standoff ensued between AIM and the traditionalists and the GOONs who had set up roadblocks around Wounded Knee to prevent the press conference. BIA police and the FBI responded and sought to remove AIM from Wounded Knee.

The standoff and siege of Wounded Knee lasted for 71 days. The area around the village became a zone of armed engagement between the two camps, with roadblocks manned by the GOONs and federal law enforcement intended to keep out AIM supporters and supplies of food, medicine, and weapons. Negotiations ended the siege and occupation on May 7, 1973. In the end, two people were killed, 12 wounded, and 1,200 arrested.

Although the siege of Wounded Knee did not substantially change politics on the Pine Ridge Reservation, it did stimulate similar protest occupations by reservation groups protesting tribal government corruption and seeking to bring public attention to treaty rights violations and poor socioeconomic conditions on reservations. In May 1974, a group of armed Mohawks occupied an abandoned girls' camp on Moss Lake in the Adirondacks of New York State. Calling their encampment Ganienkeh, they claimed the land had been illegally taken from their ancestors. In 1975, a group of armed Menominee, calling themselves the Menominee Warrior Society, occupied a Catholic novitiate near their northeastern Wisconsin reservation for five weeks. Similarly, AIM members occupied a Fairchild semi-conductor assembly plant on the Navajo Reservation for eight days in 1975,

protesting low pay, sexual harassment, and the layoff of Navajo workers at the plant.

The last large-scale political demonstration of the Red Power era occurred in July 1978 with the Longest Walk. Unlike the armed occupations that followed Wounded Knee, the Longest Walk was organized as a spiritual and peaceful event. Symbolizing the forced removal of Indians from their homelands, the Longest Walk began in San Francisco and ended with a demonstration by several thousand Indians and non-Indians on the National Mall in Washington, DC. Like other Red Power protests, the Longest Walk was designed to attract the public's attention to the problems that Indian communities continued to experience. It was also intended as a challenge to a growing anti-Indian backlash movement in Congress and legislation that AIM and other Indian leaders viewed as a threat to treaty rights and tribal self-government.

Following Wounded Knee, the United States government actively sought to repress and neutralize AIM and the Red Power movement. The leadership of AIM became the target of extensive federal, state, and local enforcement investigation, harassment, and arrest. Faced with indictment, arrest, and court battles, AIM members were left with little time, energy, or financial resources to organize protests and demonstrations. In addition to government repression, AIM suffered from internal divisions and a resulting decline in its organizational capacities. In the early 1990s, AIM would split into the National American Indian Movement and the International Confederation of Autonomous Chapters of the American Indian Movement.

Native American Protest and Activism Today

Native American political activism and direct or overt protests did not, however, disappear. While the political tactic of seizing and occupying politically and symbolically significant government property came to an end, local AIM chapters continue to organize political demonstrations and activities in cities and reservation communities. The locus of Indian political and protest activity became centered in specific Indian communities. Reservation activists and elected tribal government leaders became more active in the mainstream political process. This involved lobbying state and federal legislatures about the

needs of reservation communities. Many tribes pursued legal action and sought legal solutions to the problems of treaty rights, land claims, protecting the environment, and promoting political self-determination and economic development. Tribal legal activism resulted in a number of significant legal decisions which recognized longstanding tribal land claims and treaty rights. Today, two broad areas of concern dominate Native American political activism and protest across the United States – cultural issues such as discrimination and the persistence of racial stereotypes, and environmental protection and environmental justice.

Cultural Respect and Identity Politics

One of the concerns of the Red Power movement during the 1970s and 1980s that continues to be a focus of protest and political activism today is anti-Indianism: prejudice, racism, and discrimination against native peoples. While a great deal of contemporary protest and activism against anti-Indianism is local or reservation based, two protests in particular have gained national attention as expressions of the desire of American Indians for greater cultural respect. These are native-organized protests and demonstrations against Columbus Day and Thanksgiving.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s AIM and Native American activists across the country organized protests and demonstrations designed to disrupt celebrations in 1992 of the 500th anniversary of Columbus's "discovery" of America. One of the first modern protests against the celebration of Columbus Day occurred in Denver, Colorado in 1989. Colorado was one of the first states to make Columbus Day a state holiday in 1905 and Denver's annual Columbus Day parade became a focal site of Indian protest. In 1989, AIM activist Russell Means and about 150 protesters gathered at the statue of Columbus in Denver's Civic Center Park to protest the celebration of Columbus as a hero and discoverer of America. They poured animal blood and parts and pieces of plastic Indian dolls over the statue. Columbus should not be celebrated, they said, because he was a slave trader and a murderer who was comparable to Hitler. They called for the end of Columbus Day as an official state holiday, an end to the Columbus Day parade, and the removal of the statue to Columbus in the Civic Center Park.

Protests of Columbus and Columbus Day were widespread throughout American cities in 1991 and 1992. For example, protests and demonstrations occurred in Syracuse, San Francisco, Alcatraz Island, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Boston, Seattle, Portland, Oregon, Columbus, Ohio, and Chicago. As in Denver, the protesters' goal was to disrupt the celebration of Columbus and challenge the mythology of Columbus as a heroic figure in American and world history. He was not, they argued, a great discoverer but a colonialist who brought disease, death, and genocide to the Americas.

By all accounts, the protest and opposition of native peoples to the celebration of Columbus was successful. Unlike 1892, when Columbus was celebrated in a monumental fashion as a hero who discovered America at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago, the commemorations of the 1992 Columbian Quincentenary were muted and more subdued than the 1992 celebration planners had originally hoped. Some signs of native success in transforming Columbus Day include South Dakota's changing Columbus Day to Native American Day in 1990 and Berkeley's renaming their Columbus Day to Indigenous Peoples' Day. Other signs of the impact of the protests in changing the interpretation of Columbus include the recognition in textbooks and the media that Columbus initiated a complex "encounter" or "contact" between Europe and indigenous peoples that had a tremendous negative impact on native lives and cultures.

Protests and demonstrations of the celebration of Columbus Day continued in many American cities after the 1992 Columbian Quincentenary. Denver, Colorado has remained the focal point of demonstrations by the American Indian Movement of Colorado (AIM-Colorado) and the Transform Columbus Day Alliance (TCDA). TCDA is an international coalition of progressive groups opposed to the celebration of Columbus. Between 1992 and 2000 the Columbus Day parade in Denver was cancelled by its organizers in response to the protests of AIM-Colorado and its supporters. The parade was resumed in 2001. AIM-Colorado and TCDA organized rallies, marches, and brief blockades of the parade route from 2004 to the present. For example, in 2004, approximately 600 protesters blocked the parade route. In 2007, more than 500 protesters blocked the parade route. Fake blood and parts of baby

dolls were poured on the street and police arrested 83 protesters for illegally blocking the parade route. AIM-Colorado and TCDA organized their own counterparade and rally called the All Nations/Four Directions March. The goal of the rally and march is not only to protest Columbus Day, but also to offer a way to celebrate the diversity and multiculturalism of the United States. AIM-Colorado and TCDA have offered to end their protests if the city agreed to end the Columbus Day parade and initiate changes in the city's school curriculum that would offer an American Indian perspective on Columbus. The city refused.

The first protest by Native Americans of Thanksgiving Day in Plymouth, Massachusetts, the site of the first Pilgrim Thanksgiving, occurred in 1970. The protest was organized after Frank James, a Wampanoag Indian, was not allowed to give a speech critical of the oppression and mistreatment of American Indians in American history at an annual Thanksgiving dinner in Plymouth. Organizers of the event asked him to edit his speech to make it less critical of the historical mistreatment of American Indians. James refused and instead, accompanied by members of the Massachusetts Wampanoag Indians and members of the American Indian Movement, led a protest of Thanksgiving on Cole's Hill overlooking Plymouth Rock. Speaking near a statue of Massasoit, a Wampanoag Indian leader at the time of the first Thanksgiving, James and AIM leader Russell Means were critical of what they called the mythology of Thanksgiving. James declared that Indians had only suffered since the arrival of the Pilgrims and that Thanksgiving was not a day to be thankful and happy for. Following speeches on Cole's Hill, James and the Indian protesters proceeded to bury Plymouth Rock with sand and briefly boarded a nearby replica of the *Mayflower*.

Since 1970, Indians and non-Indian supporters have gathered on Cole's Hill in Plymouth on Thanksgiving Day to commemorate what they call a "National Day of Mourning." Protesters gather at Cole's Hill and parade through the center of Plymouth to bring public attention to the lack of historical truth in the Thanksgiving story and the continuing discrimination of American Indians. According to the United American Indians of New England (UAIN), the organizer of the event, the Day of Mourning is dedicated

to "mourning our ancestors and the genocide of our peoples and the theft of our lands."

While most of the Day of Mourning protests have been peaceful, the 1997 protest resulted in a clash between police and demonstrators. Police tried to stop a protest march through the town because protesters did not have a proper permit. They arrested 25 of the protesters but dropped the charges and negotiated a settlement after protesters accused the police of racism, brutality, and excessive use of force. All charges against the protesters were dropped and the town agreed to allow future protest marches without a permit. The town also agreed to pay UAIN \$135,000. Part of the funds would pay the protesters' legal fees and go into a fund for promoting American Indian history. Fifteen thousand dollars were used to create two plaques. One plaque, located near the town post office, is dedicated to the memory of Metacombet or King Philip and describes his resistance to English colonialism. The second plaque is located on Cole's Hill and explains the purpose and meaning of the Day of Mourning.

American Indian Environmental Activism

The environment is a critical issue for most American Indian communities. Indian reservations are small islands within the larger territory of the United States. Reservations are threatened by industrial development, resource extraction, and a range of environmental hazards from toxic waste to air and water pollution. Many reservations contain natural resources such as oil, coal, minerals, water, and forests that are of interest to multinational corporations and developers. Access to natural resources and maintaining a clean environment are critical for the health of Indian communities, for economic development, and for the exercise of religious and spiritual practices. Indian communities have engaged in environmental activism and political struggle against federal and state governments and corporations in efforts to protect their environment and ensure community survival. Most Indian environmental activism is local and grassroots in nature and often involves coalitions with non-native environmental groups. A national and international umbrella organization, the Indigenous Environmental Network, formed to assist communities in local environmental struggles.

One local struggle occurred on the Akwesasne Mohawk Reserve. Home to 8,000 Mohawk Indians,

this 25-square-mile reservation is located along the St. Lawrence River and straddles the international border between the US and Canada. Traditionally, the Mohawk relied upon the river for clean water and fish for food. In the last 100 years, the region around Akwesasne has experienced extensive industrial development. Aluminum and other metal manufacturing has released toxic chemicals such as fluoride and heavy metals into the river, contaminating the water and fish and animal species that live in or near it. General Motors, located adjacent to the reservation, produced polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and stored them in lagoons and storage pits on their property. PCBs were banned in 1978 and are known to cause various medical disorders and cancer in humans. PCBs from the GM site have made their way into the ecosystem and have been found in fish, plants, and people in this region. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) fined GM for illegal dumping of PCBs and the site was placed on the EPA's Superfund Site list. GM has resisted cleaning up the site because of the high cost associated with proper cleanup and disposal of PCBs.

Mohawk mothers, concerned with the potential impact of PCBs on their children, began the Mother's Milk Project in 1985. They initiated an epidemiological study that found that Mohawk women who ate fish from the St. Lawrence River had high concentrations of PCBs in their breast milk. In 1987, the Akwesasne Task Force on the Environment, a community-based grassroots organization, was formed. With the evidence collected by the Mother's Milk Project, the Task Force and Mohawk tribal governments continue to pressure the EPA to force GM to clean up PCB contamination on its factory site. By the summer of 2007, GM had capped a contaminated landfill, dredged and removed PCB-contaminated sediments from the St. Lawrence River, and removed PCB-contaminated sludge from on-site lagoons.

The Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation, located in southeastern Montana, was the site of a similar struggle. It is situated in the Powder River coal basin, an area of rich, low-sulfur coal beds that are accessible through strip mining. In the 1970s the BIA negotiated coal-mining leases for the tribe with mining companies. The royalties for the coal were fixed and priced well below the market value of the coal at the time.

No environmental safeguards were included on the leases. The tribal government fought against the leases to end what they considered the threat to their community from coal development. Through legal research of the leases they discovered a large number of violations of federal leasing rules. Gail Small, a Northern Cheyenne environmental activist, helped to lead the tribe's fight against the leases, founding Native Action, a reservation-based non-profit dedicated to preserving the environment and culture of the Northern Cheyenne. They won the first stage of the "Coal Wars" when Congress voided all the leases in 1988, but the fight continues as the threat of development still looms.

The current threat to the Northern Cheyenne is from the proposed development of coal-bed methane gas (natural gas) mining in the Tongue River Valley adjacent to the reservation. One development plan could result in an estimated 75,000 methane gas wells. Mining companies drill down into a coal seam releasing coal-bed methane water and coal-bed methane gas. The methane or natural gas is piped off for use in homes and power plants. The water, which is highly saline, is waste water and is dumped into nearby rivers and streams. The discharge of this water results in a drop in groundwater and may lead to the loss of reservation wells. In 2002 the State of Montana sold coal-bed methane leases to the Fidelity Exploration and Production Co. In 2003, the Northern Cheyenne, Native Action, and the Northern Plains Resource Council legally challenged the adequacy of an environmental impact study for coal-bed methane production in the lease area. In September 2007, a federal appeals court ruled in favor of the tribe and its allies. The court limited future exploration and development until the federal government addressed the shortcomings of its original environmental impact assessment.

In addition to using the legal arena and legal activism to protect the reservation environment from coal-bed methane mining, the tribe is using cultural-based arguments. According to Gail Small, pumping water out of ground to extract natural gas will harm the spirits that inhabit the springs and streams where the Northern Cheyenne worship. She has argued that the pollution caused by such mining will result in the genocide of her people. "We'll have a wasteland here. That's what's at stake here. Where will the Cheyenne go?"

The Ojibwe continue to face similar challenges. In 1975 the Exxon Corporation discovered a large zinc-copper ore body near the town of Crandon in northeastern Wisconsin. The ore body is 1 mile upstream from the Mole Lake Ojibwe Reservation, 5 miles from the Forest County Potawatomi Reservation, and around 40 miles upstream (on the Wolf River) from the Menominee Indian Reservation. Exxon abandoned its plans to develop a mine in 1986 due to low metal prices, but with Rio Algom as a partner, Exxon returned in 1993 and initiated the permit application process for the "Crandon Mine" with the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. Toxic mine waste from the proposed Crandon Mine would threaten the Mole Lake's wild rice lake. Wild rice and the lake are a central part of the Mole Lake tribe's economy, culture, and religion. Air and water pollution from the Crandon Mine might also affect the other tribes in the area. The Mole Lake tribe joined forces with three other tribes (Forest County Potawatomi, Menominee, Stockbridge-Munsee) to form the Nii Win Intertribal Council to coordinate the tribes' resistance to the proposed Crandon Mine. The Council hired lawyers and technical experts to assist with their challenge to the mine-permitting process.

The tribes worked with the Wolf Watershed Educational Project, an educational outreach group, to educate non-Indians about the environmental threats posed by the mine. Representatives from the tribes went on anti-mining speaking tours around the state. This outreach effort was crucial in persuading fishing groups and sportsmen's clubs to join the anti-mining effort and work with the tribes to lobby the state legislature to pass a mining moratorium bill in 1998. The legislation required that any proposed new mine in the state must show an example of a safe metallic sulfide mine that had operated for ten years and then closed for ten years with no acid mine pollution elsewhere in North America. In addition to speaking tours, the tribes organized a number of protest marches and demonstrations against the mine in the state capital in Madison, at the company's headquarters in Rhinelander, and at the entrance to the mine site in Crandon.

The mine property was purchased by Billiton in 2000. In 2003 Billiton sold the mine to the Northern Wisconsin Resource Group. With the mining moratorium in place and mounting

opposition and protest of the mine, the Group saw little prospect of developing the mine and negotiated a sale with the Mole Lake Ojibwe and Forest County Potawatomi. In October 2003 the Forest County Potawatomi and the Mole Lake Ojibwe jointly purchased the 5,939-acre mine site for 16.5 million dollars. The tribes have vowed never to construct a mine on the site.

While much American Indian environmental activism is grassroots and local in nature, there is networking, sharing of information and expertise, and sharing of support between different communities.

The Indigenous Environmental Network (IEN) is one of the few umbrella organizations that serves to facilitate this sharing of information, expertise, and support between communities. IEN was formed on the Navajo Indian Reservation in 1990. Its principal goal is to educate and empower indigenous peoples to help them develop strategies for environmental protection. It also seeks to support and promote environmentally sustainable economies and lifestyles and to protect indigenous religious rights and spiritual beliefs since they are intertwined with the environment. IEN hosts an annual conference that is usually located in an indigenous community and that focuses on the environmental issue confronting that community. For example, in 2002, the IEN conference was held at Mole Lake and focused on the impact of mining on indigenous peoples in North America. Today, IEN is involved in the following indigenous environmental campaigns that are designed to promote and enhance the capacity of native communities to protect their environments: youth leadership training program, toxics and environmental health, resistance to unsustainable mining, renewable energy, climate justice, water protection, biodiversity, protection of indigenous traditional knowledge from biopiracy, food security, and a sustainable communities initiative.

Consequences of American Indian Protest and Political Activism

American Indian political activism and protest movements resulted in a number of significant changes. Since the late 1960s federal Indian policy shifted from terminating Indian tribes to supporting self-determination, self-governance, and sovereignty. Today, the federal and many state governments work with tribes on a

government-to-government basis. This means that tribes manage and run many programs that were once administered and controlled by the federal government. It also means that the tribes are consulted about legislation and programs that may affect reservations lands and tribal members. Significant tensions and conflict remain, but tribal governments have been significantly empowered and become more self-governing since the rise of the Red Power movement.

Perceptions of Indians and understanding of Indian history have also been transformed since the rise of Indian political activism. Indian protests of Columbus and Thanksgiving, for example, have changed the way in which many non-Indians think about Indian identity and culture. Indian history and perspectives are given more attention in many textbooks and schools. While much work remains to dispel caricatures and stereotypes of Indians, American society is much more sensitive and accepting of Indian culture and religious practices than in the past.

Native peoples have been successful in organizing to protect their lands and environments. American Indian environmental activists have been successful in forming coalitions with non-Indians to prevent environmentally harmful economic development. Indian tribes are pursuing culturally appropriate economic development that will also preserve the environmental quality and health of their reservations. They serve as a model for other communities seeking to achieve sustainable economic development.

While American Indian protest and political activism brought Indian social, environmental, and economic problems to the attention of the public and government officials, it also led to significant cultural and social changes within native communities. The Red Power movement and American Indian political activism helped to stimulate cultural renewal and a cultural renaissance in native communities. Activists challenged the negative images of the Indian as a devalued, helpless, and powerless victim. Instead they projected a positive image of the Indians as active and having a valued cultural heritage. Activists thus helped to promote ethnic, cultural, and community pride. Individual Indians, in urban and rural settings, reconnected with tribal traditions and heritage and became more willing to self-identify as American Indian. The Red Power movement stimulated the expansion, diversity, and vitality of cultural expression and

cultural forms in native communities. This is reflected in the increase in native newspapers, radio shows, popular music, arts and crafts, native-written and directed films, art, fiction and poetry, non-fiction, and powwows. These different forms of cultural expression include traditional and popular culture forms and in many cases represent syncretism of the modern and traditional. Finally, one cannot imagine the construction of the National Museum of the American Indian on the mall in Washington, DC without the rise of Red Power and Indian political activism. The museum is a symbol of recent native cultural renewal and pride and the larger society's acceptance of and respect for American Indians.

SEE ALSO: Alcatraz Uprising and the American Indian Movement; Anti-Vietnam War Movement, United States; Civil Rights Movement, United States: Overview; Ecological Protest Movements; Peltier, Leonard (b. 1944)

References and Suggested Readings

- Alcatraz Is Not An Island, www.pbs.org/itvs/alcatrazisnotanisland/.
- American Indian Movement, Grand Governing Council, www.aimovement.org/.
- American Indian Movement of Colorado, www.colorado-aim.blogspot.com/.
- Cornell, S. E. (1988) *The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gedicks, A. (2001) *Resource Rebels: Native Challenges to Mining and Oil Corporations*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
- Hauptman, L. M. (1986) *The Iroquois Struggle for Survival: World War II to Red Power*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Homeland: Four Portraits of Native Action, www.katahdin.org/films/homeland/intro.html.
- Indigenous Environmental Network, www.ienearth.org/.
- Johnson, T. (1996) *The Occupation of Alcatraz Island: Indian Self-Determination and the Rise of Indian Activism*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Johnson, T., Nagel, J., & Champagne, D. (Eds.) (1997) *American Indian Activism: Alcatraz to the Longest Walk*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- LaDuke, W. (1999) *All Our Relations: Native Struggles for Land and Life*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
- LaDuke, W. (2005) *Recovering the Sacred: The Power of Naming and Claiming*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
- Loew, P. (2001) *Indian Nations of Wisconsin: Histories of Endurance and Renewal*. Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society Press.

- Midwest Treaty Network, www.alphacdc.com/treaty/content.html.
- Nagel, J. (1996) *American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence of Identity and Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Southwest Research and Information Center, www.sric.org/index.html.
- Transform Columbus Day Alliance, www.transform-columbusday.org/.
- United American Indians of New England, www.uaine.org/.
- Wilkinson, C. F. (2005) *Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Naxalite movement, 1967–1972

Shatarupa Sen Gupta

The Naxalite movement loosely refers to a series of tribal and peasant uprisings based on which Maoism in India took on an organized shape in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with a sizeable following among urban youths. The name is derived from Naxalbari in the Darjeeling district of North Bengal, where an uprising was considered to mark the beginning of a revolution.

Historical Background

Despite much talk of socialism and development, by the early 1960s the project of Indian nationalism failed to live up to its pre-Independence promises, with ambitious Five Year Plans not bearing fruit, and unemployment growing. Industrial growth was threatened by economic crises and a devaluation of the currency. Educated youth were victims of a dwindling job market. The education system neither had social relevance nor job potential. Nehru's death initiated an era of uncertainty, as the rhetoric of nation-building started unraveling, and the hegemony of the Congress Party was challenged. In rural India land reforms had been minimal because liberal capitalism was in alliance with landlordism. Poverty among the rural masses was marked. There emerged a vast difference between the fortunes of the few big landlords and large numbers of small peasants, sharecroppers, and agricultural laborers.

A specific factor was the evolution of the Communist Party of India (CPI) between the late 1940s and the early 1960s. At Independence



Guntoor, India, October 11, 2004: Supporters of the Communist Party of India–Marxist Leninist (People's War) wait for the start of a public meeting in Guthikonda. Three days after this meeting, the party merged with the Maoist Communist Center of India to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist). Although numbers are difficult to verify, the military wing of the combined parties comprises between 10,000 and 20,000 armed guerrillas. (AFP/Getty Images)

the CPI had three currents. P. C. Joshi was a supporter of cooperation with the progressive national bourgeoisie. B. T. Ranadive, taking his cue from the Soviet Communist Party, advocated a rapid transition to an armed insurrection. And in Andhra, in the Telengana region, armed struggle had been going on against the ruling prince of what was then the princely state of Hyderabad, the *Nizam* (ruler), and local communists like C. Rajeswara Rao (later CPI general secretary), T. Nagi Reddy, C. P. Reddy, and others were supporters of a Maoist-style agrarian revolution and “people’s war.” By 1951 the Ranadive line had been discredited and the Andhra communists forced to call off their struggles after the incorporation of Hyderabad into India and Soviet pressure to adopt a line of peaceful revolution. But in Andhra, Maoism remained a strong current.

Between 1951 and 1964 the CPI evolved in a social democratic direction. Work in a democratic environment, coupled with the strategy of two-stage revolution (the idea of collaboration with a “progressive” bourgeoisie in the first stage), required searching for bourgeois allies in the electoral arena. The election and subsequent dismissal of a communist government in Kerala brought about an intensification of the search for allies. It also meant a debate over whether to support Indian foreign policy, once Prime Minister Nehru distanced himself from the US. The process of de-Stalinization added to confusions,

as those who wanted a lesser Stalinist party also tended to be reformist, while radicals tended to support the Chinese Communist Party (CPC). Over the Sino-Indian dispute, the radicals accused the Nehru government, while the moderates sought to differentiate between Nehru and “reactionaries in the government.” Party resolutions show attempts to paper over internal differences rather than principled positions. Radicals grew increasingly impatient and felt that in all these ways a deep degeneration was occurring in the party.

Finally, the Stalinist wing of the leadership, along with Maoist militants, calling for a program of People’s Democratic Revolution, split from the parent body in the Tenali Convention and formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist) – the CPI(M) – in April 1964. In the formative period, mass arrests of left-wing activists enabled moderates like E. M. S. Namboodiripad and Jyoti Basu to steer party policy carefully in the direction of electoralism. The radicals within the CPI(M) therefore felt a need to continue and deepen the ideological struggle. Nagi Reddy, Chandra Pulla Reddy, and others had a majority in the Andhra State Committee and in a majority of District Committees. Kanu Sanyal in north Bengal, or the *Chinta* group in south Bengal (Amulya Sen, Kanai Chatterjee, and Sujit Ghosh), tried discussing alternative lines. Charu Mazumdar, a peasant leader with experience of the *tebhaga* (two third shares) movement of 1946–7, was influenced by Lin Biao’s “Long Live the Victory of People’s War.” He argued that Mao Zedong’s thought was Marxism for the present and that India was in a potentially revolutionary situation that could be realized through area-based seizure of power via guerrilla strategies.

Ideological Struggle within the CPI(M)

In 1966–7 many mass struggles developed, including (notably in Calcutta) a Food Movement, a mass students’ agitation demanding the inclusion of Marxism in their syllabus, and a growing campaign of solidarity with the people of Vietnam. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of China, which began in 1966, further influenced the radicals, who felt that the CPI(M) was paying lip-service to revolution. Mazumdar in his “Sixth Document” (eight of his early essays have been compiled as “Eight

Documents”) urged the establishment of a genuine revolutionary party through struggle against revisionism.

Around the same time in north Bengal the tea garden workers’ general strike to demand a rise in their wages was supported by the *adivasi* (tribal) peasants of Naxalbari area under the leadership of Kanu Sanyal and Munshi Tudu. However, the police with the help of the CPI(M) and Gorkha League leaders pacified it, leading to an unconditional withdrawal of the movement.

In 1967 the fourth general elections were held amid anti-Congress sentiment and in eight out of sixteen provinces non-Congress ministries were formed. In West Bengal and Kerala the CPI(M) became partners in United Front (UF) governments. Identifying the CPI(M) as a revolutionary party, the rulers wanted to get rid of governments where it was present. The radicals within the CPI(M) wanted to boycott elections, and the leaders averted the boycott by using demagogic rhetoric about how this would be the last election. Charu Mazumdar’s “Seventh Document” advocated the building of liberated zones through armed struggle, and denounced the CPI(M)’s call for an alternative non-Congress government. Generally, the party’s entry into governments led radicals to question the split of 1964, arguing that the split had been merely organizational and not ideological.

Spring Thunder Over India

In early 1967 a mass peasant revolt, targeting *jotedars* (the dominant rural class in West Bengal), broke out in Naxalbari under the leadership of the radicals in the Darjeeling committee of the CPI(M). By May 1967 they had established substantial control in parts of the Naxalbari, Kharibari, and the Phansidewa Police Stations. Initially, the radicals saw this as a revolutionary form of peasant struggle. But *People’s Daily* of China called the outbreak spring thunder over India, and argued that Mao’s line was applicable for India. This strengthened the hand of Mazumdar, who saw this as a vindication of his line.

By July 12, 1967, using paramilitary forces, murdering and arresting at random, the state had brought the rebel areas back under control. Subsequently, leaders like Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal were arrested. But the movement put the CPI(M) between the militancy of the

party left wing and the conservative UF partners. They had finally to assert their true allegiance. Desperately seeking to avert the dissolution of the government, the CPI(M) denounced the peasant struggles and decided to disband its dissident Darjeeling District Committee. Reacting to this open betrayal of the cause of Maoist revolution, the radicals formed the All India Coordination Committee of Revolutionaries (AICCR), bringing together revolutionaries from Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Orissa, and West Bengal for a common plan of action on November 13, 1967. *Deshabrat* (Committed to the Nation), a Bengali weekly, *Liberation*, a monthly journal in English, and *Lokyudh* (People's War) a Hindi weekly were assigned the job of dissemination of their ideas. Meanwhile, the Congress engineered defections from the UF, but no stable alternative was possible. The province came under central rule for some time, followed by elections in 1969 that saw a triumphant return of the UF, with the CPI(M) as the largest partner.

Formation of the CPI(ML)

By 1968 the split within the CPI(M) had become irrevocable. The Burdwan Plenum of the party saw the last battle. The Central Committee Draft presented in this Plenum tried a balancing trick between expressing solidarity with the CPC and differing with its interpretation of US–Soviet collaboration. Apart from this, organizational manipulations were attempted so as to avoid state-level discussions and rejection of the Draft by the radicals in many states. Nonetheless the Draft was discarded by Jammu and Kashmir, while alternative drafts were presented by Nagi Reddy, C. P. Reddy, and Kolla Venkiah of Andhra, as well as by some Bengal delegates. This section of the delegates, led by Nagi Reddy of Andhra and Saraf of Jammu and Kashmir, walked out when the central leadership rejected alternative drafts. They subsequently attended the All India Coordination Committee of Revolutionaries meeting in May 1968. Here also they differed with Bengal radicals over tactics. The Andhra leaders believed that a revolution in India was only possible when the different exploited classes and strata could be simultaneously mobilized. Charu Mazumdar and his supporters stressed a purely rural armed struggle, aiming at seizing state power without the active

participation of the urban proletariat. Later, the AICCR renamed itself as the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR), while one Andhra group under Nagi Reddy formed the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee (APRCC) and the *Dakshin Desh* group under Kanai Chatterjee and Amulya Sen formed the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in October 1969.

On April 22, 1969, the birth anniversary of Lenin, the AICCCR formed the Communist Party of India Marxist-Leninist [CPI(ML)]. The formal announcement came on May 1 in Kolkata. Charu Mazumdar's article "Why Must We Form the Party Now?" in *Liberation* explained that a revolution could not develop if dependent only on local initiatives and thus an all-India party was needed which would overthrow US and Soviet imperialist exploitation. The party program identified these two, along with the "comprador bourgeoisie" and the "semi-feudal" landlords in India, as the enemies to be overthrown. There was much uncertainty regarding tactics and strategy. A central assumption was that the masses were poised for revolution and only a reformist leadership was holding them back. Charu Mazumdar called for the annihilation of class enemies as the means to create liberated zones, and this soon became the dominant line. By 1969 guerrilla zones had been formed at Debra-Gopiballavpur in West Bengal, Musal in Bihar, Lakhimpur Kheri in Uttar Pradesh, and Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh, which had been a venue of *Girijan* tribal unrest since 1959 owing to their continual displacement by moneylenders and merchants. Amid this growing turbulence and state repression the first Congress of the party was held in 1970 in which Mazumdar was elected as its general secretary.

Rise and Fall of Guerrilla Tactics

The CPI(ML) was opposed to trade union work, work in mass organizations, and mass movements generally, assuming that these shifted attention away from the real revolutionary struggle. It sought to build a party of professional revolutionaries, mainly in fact urban student-youth who were to provide leadership to the peasants. "Work in the cities" essentially meant recruiting for revolutionary work in rural areas. This revolutionary work was to proceed by stages from resistance against eviction by sharecroppers,

forcible occupation of the landowners' crops and land, and finally elimination of class enemies through guerrilla struggle. Mazumdar warned that guerrilla struggle would in turn unleash the state's repression and thus the armed squads should be ready to tackle the police force as well as landowners. While the proclaimed goal was the seizure of political power, they had totally underestimated the military as well as political powers of the Indian state and the Indian ruling class. Moreover, the rapid transition to the annihilation of class enemies led to many unnecessary killings, rendering the movement unpopular to many. The areas where party work received greatest support were among ethnic minorities, whom the process of "development" had bypassed and indeed evicted from their traditional ways of living. But the party, fixated on its "Chinese path," was unable to grasp the complexity of caste, tribal, and other dimensions of class society in India.

A large number of women came into the movement. Initially, women found relatively little difficulty in streaming in, for the belief that the Indian revolution was going to occur by 1975 (Mazumdar's prediction) stiffened their resolve. But when the party turned to guerrilla warfare, women found work difficult. A few, like Jayasree Rana and Krishna, did take part in such work. Women then became couriers, provided shelters, and reverted to traditional "feminine" roles. Some middle-class women also took part in productive work in small towns in a bid to identify themselves with toiling people. The party did not organize women separately, and though formally women had equality, in fact there was negligible representation of women in the upper echelons of the party.

By 1970 the movement had spread to Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and the Terai region, though its effect was felt most severely in West Bengal and Andhra. In West Bengal, notably Calcutta, Maoism took a strongly radical petty bourgeois orientation, with the elimination of real or supposed class enemies, including heads of educational institutions, businessmen, petty officials, lower-rung policemen, and all those whom they perceived as representatives of an imperialist-dominated order. They also started defacing pictures and sculptures of nationalist leaders and historical figures considered "compradors." Mazumdar did not wholly approve of this, but refrained from expressing disapproval as he

felt that it would enhance the movement. Saroj Dutta, another important leader, strongly welcomed many of these tactics.

Meanwhile, the state had launched its counter-offensive. Paramilitary forces in Srikakulam attacked Girijan villages and arrested many tribals. Their leaders, Vempatapu Satyanarayana and Adibatla Kailasam, were killed in police firing, and strategic hamlets (emulating the US in Vietnam) were established and autonomous tribal settlements were wiped out.

In Kerala the first uprising occurred in 1968 when a few communist revolutionaries under the leadership of Varghese attacked a police camp at Pulpally, killing two police officials. The Kerala government – much like the UF in West Bengal – had set the police upon the farmers when they began resisting the government's attempts at evicting them. Nonetheless the revolutionaries were arrested and among them was K. Ajitha, the daughter of the leading communist revolutionaries Kunnikal Narayanan and Mandakini Narayanan. Here also the movement petered out with the death of Varghese in a police "encounter" in 1970.

In West Bengal the army was deployed to enclose Naxalite strongholds and eliminate the leaders. This led to a diffusion of the movement and many tribal revolutionary followers were sent to jail. Meanwhile, the office of Deshabrati Prakashan, which published *Liberation* and its sister journals, was attacked and the CPI(ML) was forced underground. Many revolutionaries lost their lives to wanton police firing and torture, often passed off as "encounters." By 1970 the second UF ministry in West Bengal had fallen again and the central government took charge of the administration and invoked the anti-terrorist laws of the colonial period, as well as new laws to violate all civil liberties and murder and arrest Naxalites with impunity. The CPI(ML) retaliated with increased violence against police officials, which in turn led to more killings.

Violence marked the elections of 1971 in West Bengal. The CPI(ML) called for a boycott of elections and threatened violence. The Congress took advantage of the CPI(M) and CPI(ML) rivalry to settle its own scores and pass off election-related crimes as that of the CPI(ML). Around this time the Naxalites had begun failing in the rural areas and moved their base to the cities, where they carried on their policy of annihilation of class enemies. But far greater

violence was inflicted on them. On August 12–13, 1971 the Cossipore–Baranagore area in the northern outskirts of Kolkata was cordoned off by armed killers of anti-Maoist parties, who hunted down and murdered well over a hundred young Maoists. In prisons, too, mass killings of Maoists were carried out. The party was dealt another blow when the CPC distanced itself from the CPI(ML), with reservations about Mazumdar's line of annihilation. Sourin Bose, the CPI(ML) envoy, returned from China with a report that the CPC had opined that since conditions in each country varied, there could be no globally applicable strategy of revolution. They criticized the CPI(ML)'s policy of subduing the urban resistance to the rural struggles, and questioned the practice of hailing Mao Zedong as the leader of Indian revolutionaries. The top echelon must have felt that the CPC's exuberance of 1967 at the time of Naxalbari was rhetorical, not genuinely revolutionary internationalist.

By the end of 1971 Nagi Reddy, Rabi Das of Orissa, S. N. Singh of Bihar, and S. K. Misra of Uttar Pradesh opposed Mazumdar's annihilation line as they felt it lacked popular support and also doubted whether the time for armed revolution had in reality arrived. The Bangladesh struggle for liberation also created rifts, with Mazumdar supporting the liberation struggle, and some erstwhile lieutenants taking their cue from the CPC and supporting the Pakistani regime of Yahya Khan. Internal relations in the party degenerated, with comrades on opposite sides being labeled "agents" and "deviationists." Several Central Committee members were arrested and some murdered. The final blow came with Mazumdar's arrest and death in prison in July 1972, raising suspicions about how he was treated in police custody. With this, the first phase of the CPI(ML), or the Naxalite movement proper, came to an end. By 1973 most of the revolutionaries were in jail and the movement had been reduced to a mere shadow of itself.

SEE ALSO: India, Post-World War II Upsurge; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Mazumdar, Charu (1918–1972)

References and Suggested Readings

- Banerjee, S. (1980) *In the Wake of Naxalbari: A History of the Naxalite Movement in India*. Calcutta: Subarnarekha.
- Basu, P. (2000) *Towards Naxalbari (1953–1967): An Account of Inner-Party Ideological Struggle*. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers.

- Brass, P. R. & Franda, M. F. (1973) *Radical Politics in South Asia*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Ghosh, S. K. (1992) *The Historic Turning-Point: A Liberation Anthology*. Calcutta: S. K. Ghosh.
- Ram, M. (1969) *Indian Communism: Split Within a Split*. Delhi: Vikas Publications.
- Sen, K. (2001) Paschim Banglar Naxal Andolane Meyera (Women in Naxal Movement in West Bengal). In M. Chattopadhyay (Ed.), *Eso Mukto Karo* (Come, Liberate). Kolkata: Peoples' Book Society.
- Sen, S. et al. (1978) *Naxalbari and After: A Frontier Anthology*. Calcutta: Kathashilpa.

Nechaev, Sergei (1847–1882)

Jeff Shantz

Sergei Gennadiyevich Nechaev stands as an influential Russian anarchist who was controversial, and repudiated by many. Born under conditions of extreme poverty in Ivanovo, Russia in 1847, as a young adult Nechaev moved to Moscow, where he emerged in anarchist circles as a radical with charismatic appeal. For a short time, Russian anarchist leader Mikhail Bakunin found Nechaev's fervor, energy, and revolutionary zeal appealing. More nihilist than anarchist, Nechaev's most influential work is his notorious pamphlet of 1869, the *Catechism of a Revolutionary*, a primer on political violence and assassination.

The *Catechism* justifies every act, no matter how heinous, that might contribute to the realization of revolution. The pamphlet implores all revolutionaries to abandon established societal norms and devote themselves entirely to a cold passion for pitiless destruction. For Nechaev, the revolutionary must abandon sentiments, attachments, and associations marking their lives in mainstream society, allowing no other concern to surpass revolution in importance. For Nechaev, making the revolution was "the work of extermination," suggesting that lists of candidates to be targeted be drawn up. The *Catechism* takes the time to detail some of the means by which such work might be undertaken, including poison, the knife, and the rope. The revolution "sanctifies everything alike" and even fellow revolutionaries are to be regarded as merely "revolutionary capital."

Nechaev's writings were used to discredit anarchist ideas and to brand anarchism as a

terrorist ideology. Concomitantly, his works allowed some to justify personal acts of violence as contributions to the cause of anarchist revolution. Though Nechaev's subsequent influence on anarchists is minimal, with some disavowing his perspectives and connection to anarchism, he remains historically noteworthy in comprehending the bitterness and resentment among the vast Russian peasantry and nascent working class toward the violent and intransigent Russian tsarist government. While anarchists had disdain for Nechaev, his work had admirers among revolutionary organizations throughout the world well into the twentieth century. His call for revolutionary self-sacrifice and a vanguard of secret societies gained traction among Russian revolutionaries and his readers include some members of the Black Panther Party in the US.

Arrested in 1872 in Zurich and transferred to Russia, Nechaev was sentenced to 20 years in the Peter and Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg. He died in 1882, having refused to cooperate with authorities despite being subjected to torture. Though many consider Nechaev through the prism of violence, one can also view the use of terrorism as the only source of transformation. As the confrontational tactics of the peasant Narodnik movement failed to end the tsarist state, activists within the movement known as Land and Freedom (*Zemlya I Volya*) began to advocate violent means for overthrowing the system.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Russia; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918)

References and Suggested Readings

- Avrich, P. (1974) *Bakunin and Nechaev*. London: Freedom Press.
- Geifman, A. (Ed.) (1999) *Russia Under the Last Tsar: Opposition and Subversion, 1894–1917*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Pomper, P. (1979) *Sergei Nechaev*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Negri, Antonio (b. 1933)

Timothy S. Murphy

Antonio Negri has been a prominent and controversial political philosopher and activist, as well as a cultural critic, for over 40 years. Born

August 1, 1933 in Padua, Italy, the younger son of a militant communist couple, he excelled in school, completing his doctorate and earning an academic post in “state doctrine” (equivalent to the Anglo-American field of philosophy of law) at the University of Padua by age 25. Along the way he studied philosophy in the UK, France, and Germany, lived on a kibbutz in Israel for a year, and became politically active in the Catholic Youth Action movement and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). His doctoral thesis became his first book, *Stato e diritto nel giovane Hegel* (State and Right in the Young Hegel) (1958); this was soon followed by other works on German philosophy and social theory. Negri's overall project in these early works up to and including *Political Descartes* (1970) was to demonstrate how the disciplines of philosophy, law, and social science had legitimated the capitalist state from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries.

At the same time that Negri was building his scholarly reputation, he was also becoming involved in politics outside the university. In the early 1960s he left the PSI to work directly with factory militants in the Italian chemical industry near Venice, while at the same time helping to establish the pioneering “workerist” journal *Quaderni Rossi* (Red Notebooks). Workerism (*operaismo*) is the most important strain of Italian Marxism aside from Gramsci's legacy, and its originality is found in its demonstration that working-class resistance to control drives capitalist development. In 1969 Negri helped to found the militant group *Potere Operaio* (Workers' Power), which challenged the largely Stalinist Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the reformist unions by demanding worker control of production and a “social wage” unconnected to labor time. It was one of the first manifestations of the Italian militant counterculture, which was to play a major role in Italian social life for the next decade. *Potop*, as it was widely known, dissolved in 1973 to make way for the more broadly based movement *Autonomia Operaia* (Workers' Autonomy), which struggled to incorporate unemployed, feminist, queer, immigrant, and other new social movements into the workerist framework; much of Negri's writing and activism during the 1970s was collaborative and centered on the search for an organizational form that would adequately reflect the subjective complexity and self-determination of the new

movements. His 1979 book *Marx Beyond Marx* provided a theoretical rationale for his focus on the constitutive role of militant subjectivity in revolutionary struggle.

As an indirect result of the success of the Italian radical movements in challenging the political status quo, in 1979 Negri was arrested on unfounded, politically motivated charges of kidnapping, assassination, and insurrection, and imprisoned for almost four years before his trial began. He wrote several books while in prison, including an important study of Spinoza, *The Savage Anomaly* (1981). As his trial commenced in the summer of 1983, on charges unrelated to those that originally justified his arrest, he was elected to parliament and freed, but he soon sought asylum in France when the legislature voted to strip him of his immunity. He remained in France for 14 years without being offered citizenship, earning a precarious living as an instructor at the University of Paris and as a sociological researcher for the French government; during that period he became involved in the intellectual circle around Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and wrote more than a dozen books, including a major study of the western revolutionary tradition, *Insurgencies* (1992).

While in Paris Negri began to collaborate with American Michael Hardt; their partnership has produced three books, including the influential critique of globalization *Empire* (2000) and its sequel *Multitude* (2004). Their suggestion that the new global order is characterized by a decentered, supranational structure of power that can only be contested by similarly decentered, non-national resistance movements has been both lauded and condemned by critics spanning the entire political spectrum. In 1997 Negri voluntarily returned to Italy to serve his remaining prison sentence; in 2003 he was released, moved back to Venice, and began to travel the world to investigate and encourage militant social movements engaged in the struggle over globalization.

SEE ALSO: Deleuze, Gilles (1925–1995), Guattari, Félix (1930–1992), and the Global Justice Movement; Disobbedienti/Tute Bianche; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Italian Communist Party; Italian Socialist Party; Italy, From the New Left to the Great Depression (1962–1981); Italy, Operaism and Post-Operaism; Multitude; Red Brigades

References and Suggested Readings

- Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2000) *Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lotringer, S. & Marazzi, C. (Eds.) (2007) *Autonomia: Post-Political Politics*. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
- Murphy, T. S. & Mustapha, A.-K. (Eds.) (2005, 2007) *The Philosophy of Antonio Negri*, Vols. 1 and 2. London: Pluto Press.
- Negri, A. (1958) *Stato e diritto nel giovane Hegel*. Padua: CEDAM.
- Negri, A. (1981/1990) *The Savage Anomaly*. Trans. M. Hardt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Negri, A. (1992/1997) *Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State*. Trans. M. Boscagli. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Negri, A. (1997/2005) *Books for Burning*. Trans. T. Murphy. London: Verso.
- Wright, S. (2002) *Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism*. London: Pluto Press.

Négritude movement

Jennifer Westmoreland Bouchard

In the 1930s, Aimé Césaire, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Léon Damas, Gilbert Gratiant, Léonard Sainville, and Paulette and Jane Nardal – seven young intellectuals from various parts of the Francophone world – met as students at the Sorbonne in Paris. They founded a student journal, *L'Étudiant noir*, that served as a forum for writings on anti-colonialism and a new form of identity politics based on a common “African” or “black” experience. The articles in *L'Étudiant noir* served as a foundation for the early conceptualization of Négritude. Though Césaire, Senghor, and Damas are typically credited as “*les trois pères*” (“the three fathers”) of Négritude, it is important to note that the writings of all of the aforementioned scholars helped to shape one of the largest anti-colonial literary and artistic movements of the twentieth century.

Négritude is based on the notion that locating a sense of solidarity in a common black diasporic identity is necessary in order to overcome the social and political rhetoric of French colonial racism and domination. More specifically, the Négritude movement is characterized by Marxist ideals, a denunciation of European colonial rhetoric and practice, and a valorization of African history, traditions, and beliefs. Césaire started to conceptualize the language of

Négritude in a short work entitled “Négreries,” published in a 1935 issue of *L’Étudiant noir*. Here, he appropriates the offensive and pejorative French term *nègre* and infuses it with a positive connotation. The actual term *négritude* was used for the first time in print in Césaire’s poem, *Cahier d’un retour au pays natal* (*Notebook of a Return to My Native Land*), in 1939.

Négritude quickly became a diasporic movement, reciprocally communicating with African, black liberation, and anti-colonial movements throughout the world. There are clear thematic and stylistic affiliations between the authors of Négritude and the writers of the Harlem Renaissance, particularly Langston Hughes and Richard Wright. In addition, the Negrismo movement in the Spanish-speaking Caribbean was in many ways united with the goals of Négritude. Another source of inspiration for the Négritude writers came from Haiti. Referring to the revolt led by Toussaint Louverture in 1790 and other revolutionary activity on the island, Aimé Césaire wrote of Haiti as the place where the principles of Négritude appeared for the first time.

From an aesthetic perspective, European and South American manifestations of the surrealist movement provided inspiration to the writers and artists of the Négritude movement. In particular, Martinican Négritude writers including Aimé Césaire, Suzanne Césaire, and René Ménil eventually turned to the use of surrealist techniques as a highly political and revolutionary way in which to critique the “rationality” of European culture. They formed the *Tropiques* journal in the early 1940s, which featured their work along with that of André Breton, Lucie Thésée, and Aristide Maugée. During this time, Aimé Césaire also collaborated with Cuban surrealist painter Wifredo Lam.

In 1948, Jean-Paul Sartre analyzed Négritude in his essay “Orphée noir” (“Black Orpheus”), which served as the introduction to a volume of Francophone poetry called *Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre et malgache de langue française* (*Anthology of New Black and Malgasy Poetry in the French Language*), compiled by Senghor. Sartre characterizes Négritude as the opposite of colonial racism in a Hegelian dialectic. According to him, Négritude promoted an “anti-racist racism” that was essential for the ultimate goal of racial unity.

Négritude ideology was eventually split between Césaire and Senghorian interpretations. Césaire viewed the unification of diasporic, black communities as an ongoing phenomenon that began with the African slave trade and the various political systems created by European colonial practice. Therefore, Césaire’s interpretation of Négritude offers a useful model for a constantly evolving process of black liberation that can be applied in a multiplicity of contexts. Conversely, Senghor espoused a more essentialist conceptualization of Négritude that eventually limited the movement’s growth, acceptance, and applicability. Beginning in the 1940s and throughout his political career, Senghor argued for the existence of a fundamental and unchanging core to black existence and identity.

In the 1960s, Négritude philosophy was criticized by many black writers and politicians as being insufficiently militant for the grand task of decolonization at hand and too essentialist to stand the test of time. Along these lines, South African poet and political activist Keorapetse Kgotsile argued that the movement relied too much on a white aesthetic to celebrate blackness, and was unable to put forth a new kind of black perception that would free black intellectuals and artists from white conceptual paradigms. Despite multiple criticisms, the ideals of the Négritude movement have continued to serve as a foundation for liberation and revolutionary movements throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

SEE ALSO: Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (b. 1953); Cabral, Amílcar (1924–1973); Césaire, Aimé (1913–2008); Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961); Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); Harlem Renaissance; Jackson, Jesse (b. 1941); Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918); Nyerere, Julius (1922–1999); Senghor, Léopold (1906–2001); Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution, 1796–1799

References and Suggested Readings

- Arnold, J. A. (2000) *Modernism and Négritude: The Poetry and Politics of Aimé Césaire*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Bâ, S. W. (1973) *The Concept of Négritude in the Poetry of Léopold Sédar Senghor*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Césaire, A. (2001) *Notebook of a Return to My Native Land*. Trans. C. Eshelman. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.

- Césaire, A., Césaire, S., & Mènil, R. (1997) *Tropiques 1941–1945: Collection Complète*. Paris: Jean-Michel Place.
- Damas, L.-G. (1947) *Poètes d'expression française*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
- Jones, E. A. (1971) *Voices of Négritude: The Expression of Black Experience in the Poetry of Senghor, Césaire, and Damas*. Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press.
- Markovitz, I. L. (1969) *Léopold Sédar Senghor and the Politics of Négritude*. New York: Heinemann Educational.
- Masalo, D. A. (1994) *African Philosophy in Search of Identity*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Popeau, J.-B. (2003) *Dialogues of Négritude: An Analysis of the Cultural Context of Black Writing*. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
- Richardson, M. (1996) *Refusal of the Shadow: Surrealism and the Caribbean*. London: Verso.
- Sartre, J.-P. (1948) Orphée noir. In L. S. Senghor (Ed.), *Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie nègre et malgache de langue française*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Senghor, L. S. (1988) *The Collected Poetry*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
- Sharpley-Whiting, T. D. (2002) *Négritude Women*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Vaillant, J. G. (1990) *Black, French and African: A Life of Léopold Sédar Senghor*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964)

Kunal Chattopadhyay

Jawaharlal Nehru was an influential nationalist political leader during the freedom movement, who subsequently became the first prime minister of India. Often called Pandit Nehru or *chacha* (uncle) Nehru, he was also a writer whose historical writings influenced nationalist ideology.

Jawaharlal was born in Allahabad and was the son of a wealthy barrister and nationalist leader, Motilal Nehru. The Nehru family was of Kashmiri Hindu (also called Pandit) Brahmin origin. Motilal brought up his children in a very westernized manner. Jawaharlal was educated at Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge, then admitted to the bar through the Middle Temple in London, becoming a barrister, and he practiced law for a few years in India. He was attracted to democratic and socialist ideas from an early age, unlike his father's very moderate

constitutionalism within the colonial framework. He combined the attitudes of a young socialite with a potential for radicalism, being active in Indian student politics in the UK.

On his return to India he married Kamala Kaul, also of Kashmiri origin, on February 8, 1916, when he was 27 and his bride 16. They had only one child, a daughter who was named Indira (born 1917) and who would be the recipient of a series of letters collected as *Glimpses of World History*. Attracted to the Home Rule movement during World War I, Nehru was increasingly disillusioned with the westernized and liberal-colonial position of the moderate-dominated Congress. In the late 1910s and early 1920s his wanderings took him among the peasants of United Provinces, whose movements made him aware of the vast potential for mass struggles in India beyond the horizons of the Congress.

Young Leader

It was due to his own observations about the peasantry, along with a sense of his own limitations, that Nehru was attracted to Gandhi's leadership. As a modernist himself, Nehru never entirely accepted Gandhi's philosophy. At the same time, he had seen the appeal of Gandhi to the Indian peasantry, and recognized a power that he himself lacked. Gandhi, also trained originally as a lawyer, had practiced in South Africa before returning to India. In India he had organized a number of local struggles – against indigo cultivation by peasants at Champaran in Bihar, that of peasants in Kheda against oppressive revenue policies, and that of mill workers in Ahmedabad. Gandhi's strategy involved what he called *satyagraha* (desire for truth), involving mass civil disobedience with complete non-violence and a readiness to accept any punishment meted out for the violation of an unjust law. Gandhi's strategy cut through the dilemma of Indian nationalism, moving from moderate politics of meetings, petitions, and speeches in powerless legislative assemblies on one hand, and minority violence and extremism on the other. He had a strategy that could involve the masses, yet keep them strictly bound to the leadership. This made it possible for him to garner bourgeois support to his movement and at the same time organize huge peasant masses. His simple clothes and his habit of traveling third class in trains made him a mass

leader with a national appeal, surpassing anyone else in India. Having met Gandhi and learned of his ideas, Nehru would assist him during the Champaran agitation.

Following Gandhi's example, Nehru and his family abandoned their western-style clothes, possessions, and wealthy lifestyle. Wearing *khadi* (homespun) clothes, Nehru emerged as a young and dynamic supporter of Gandhi. Under Gandhi's influence he studied the Bhagavad Gita and practiced yoga. He would increasingly look to Gandhi for advice and guidance in his personal life, and would develop a strange relationship according to which, even though he would often differ with Gandhi's political positions, till the moment of transfer of power, he would always surrender to Gandhi when they differed.

From the time of the Rowlatt Satyagraha, launched to protest the imposition of draconian anti-civil liberties laws, Nehru traveled across India, speaking against the colonial government and addressing India's youth. He was fully secular, and strongly advocated Hindu-Muslim unity. He supported the Khilafat movement (a pan-Islamic movement which was anti-imperialist in nature) and advocated the eradication of untouchability, poverty, ignorance, and unemployment. Nehru's work in the rural areas, as well as in urban activities, soon made him one of the most influential younger leaders, especially across what was coming to be called the Hindi belt of United Provinces (after independence, Uttar Pradesh or Northern Province), Bihar, and the Central Provinces. During the Non-Cooperation movement of 1921 he grew in stature, especially after many of the more senior leaders were arrested. He himself was also to be arrested and kept imprisoned for many months, as were his mother and his wife.

When, on February 4, 1922, peasants angered by their terrible repression attacked the Chauri Chaura police station and killed 22 policemen by burning them to death, Gandhi called off the movement unilaterally. Many nationalists found this an excessive reaction, as well as high-handed behavior. Many Muslim nationalists in the Khilafat movement in particular felt let down because they had not been consulted. Nehru remained loyal to Gandhi and supported him publicly. In the aftermath there was a debate inside the Congress over strategy. Though Jawaharlal, unlike his father Motilal, was not an advocate of entering the slightly enlarged

legislative councils under the system known as dyarchy, he did take part in local body elections, becoming, in 1924, the mayor of the Allahabad municipal corporation for two years. Like C. R. Das and Subhas Bose in Calcutta, Nehru launched schemes to promote education and sanitation, expand water and electricity supplies, and reduce unemployment. Achieving some success, Nehru was dissatisfied and angered by the obstruction of British officials and the corruption of civil servants. He resigned from his position within two years.

Early in his marriage there had been a gulf between the westernized Jawaharlal and the traditionalist Kamala, compounded by the political activism of the Nehrus, father and son. Kamala had to balance domestic work with travels with her husband, addressing public meetings and seeking to support nationalist activities in her hometown. In the late 1920s the gulf between the two disappeared. In 1926 Nehru took her and Indira abroad so that she could receive medical care. The family traveled and lived in England, Switzerland, France, and Germany. Continuing his political work, Nehru was to get in touch with diverse socialist currents, and to attend the Congress Against Imperialism organized by Willy Munzenberg, and was associated with the League Against Imperialism. He was also to visit the Soviet Union, and was impressed with the idea of a planned economy, but not with the increasingly authoritarian political system developing there.

Rise to National Leadership

In the 1920s Nehru was elected president of the All India Trade Union Congress. He and Subhas Chandra Bose were the two noted rising young left leaders in the Congress. They were both in favor of complete independence, a demand that was passed by the 1927 session of the Congress at Madras. In 1928 Jawaharlal criticized the Nehru report, prepared under the stewardship of his father Motilal, which had asked for dominion status. During the Calcutta Congress of 1928 Gandhi opposed the snap resolution of 1927, and managed to have his way. The Nehru report, which was both a step back from full independence and included important concessions to Hindu communalists and a rebuff to liberal Muslims like Jinnah who were opposing the Muslim minority communalists, was

approved subject to the condition that if the British did not grant dominion status by the end of 1929, the Congress would be free to commence civil disobedience and *purna swaraj* (total independence). Bose's amendment calling for immediate reiteration of the complete independence objective was backed by Jawaharlal, Satyamurti of Tamilnadu, a large number of Bengal delegates, and two communists from Bombay, Nimbkar and Joglekar, but defeated by 1,350 votes to 973.

The failure of talks with the British caused the December 1929 Lahore session of the Congress to be held in an atmosphere charged with nationalist, anti-imperialist passions. Jawaharlal Nehru was elected president, the first of four times he would be elected in pre-independence India. The election of Nehru was part of Gandhi's strategy. A majority of provincial Congress committees had wanted Gandhi, and Vallabhbhai Patel had received more support than Nehru. Gandhi accepted that Nehru was a radical, but urged his election on the grounds that "steam becomes a mighty power only when it allows itself to be imprisoned." In other words, Gandhi wanted to tap the radical charisma of Nehru, but also to control it by organizational means. Even Nehru was reluctant, but the choice of Nehru was an indication that – albeit at a pace dictated by Gandhi – the movement was still peaking. Viceroy Irwin made an offer in October 1929, promising a Round Table Conference after the publication of the Simon Commission Report. Gandhi, Motilal, and Madan Mohan Malaviya joined the Liberals in accepting the offer, subject to certain preconditions. Bose refused to sign, but Jawaharlal first signed and then developed hesitations. Negotiations soon broke down.

The Lahore Congress heard the first of Jawaharlal Nehru's stirring presidential addresses, boldly presenting a radical, internationalist, and republican perspective. He attacked Gandhi's pet trusteeship theory, according to which owners of factories were merely trustees. But control remained with Gandhi. Though Nehru as well as Bose had envisaged a civil disobedience that would have culminated in general strikes, the Congress left details of the program in the hands of Gandhi. Bose's proposals for immediate non-payment of taxes were voted down, and the door was left open for future negotiations. But after all this, when on December 31, 1929 the Congress adopted the resolution of *purna swaraj*, and hoisted the tricolor to the slogan, not only

of *Bande mataram*, but also *Inquilab Zindabad* (long live the revolution), the freedom movement did take a step forward. It was resolved that January 26, 1930 would be celebrated as Independence Day, with the hoisting of the tricolor everywhere.

With the launching of the civil disobedience movement, focusing on the violation of the salt tax, Nehru traveled across much of the country, campaigning for mass participation in the agitations. Despite his father's death in 1931, he continued to take a vigorous part in the struggles. He was arrested in April 1930, released in October, then rearrested. In the course of the struggle he led an agrarian movement in UP, and was arrested and sentenced to two and a half years imprisonment. He was arrested once again in 1934 and sentenced for two years. On being released in 1935 he left for Germany, where Kamala Nehru was ailing. Kamala died in 1938. In this period, he also met the Communist International leader Dimitrov, who discussed with him the proposed Popular Front line that Dimitrov was shortly to unveil at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International.

Nehru's Leftism and the Bourgeoisie

In 1936 Nehru was again elected Congress president. He presided over its Lucknow session. His Lucknow Congress and Faizpur (1937) Congress speeches were extremely radical, marking the most leftward position in his life. In his speech at Lucknow he declared that his goal was socialism, stressing that by this he meant scientific socialism. This considerably upset the right wing of the party. It upset even more large sections of the Indian bourgeoisie, some of whom started proposing that they should move away from the Congress and give support to a much more openly capitalist party. It required the shrewdest of them, G. D. Birla, to explain that it was not fitting that those who had property should be seen as defenders of a system of property. He wanted to let Gandhi do the work of opposing Nehru. Nehru, for his part, despite theoretical or ideological reservations, at crucial junctures always deferred to Gandhi. As a result, though his talk about scientific socialism electrified the left and shocked the right, it did not go beyond talking. When mildly Marxist elements in the Congress who were critical of the Soviet Union, such as

Jay Prakash Narayan, Narendra Dev, and others, took the initiative in launching the Congress Socialist Party, they had hopes that Nehru would side with them and give them a national leadership. Nehru stood aside. While they had the satisfaction of passing a resolution proclaiming socialism as the model for the future, in practical terms, in 1937, the Congress decided to go in for Assembly elections under the new constitution. Nehru was reelected the following year and oversaw the Congress national campaign for the 1937 elections. It was a case of the left shouldering the brunt of the campaigning, but the right setting the agenda in putting up candidates, as well as deciding policy inside the governments, for in several provinces Congress-led governments were formed. Although he did not contest elections himself, Nehru was seen by the national media as the leader of the Congress.

In 1938, still on a left-wing wave, Subhas Chandra Bose was elected president. One of his achievements was to initiate discussions on planning for future Indian development, leading, after independence, to the concept of the Five Year Plans and the Planning Commission. But in 1939, when Subhas was reelected with left support, but against Gandhi's wishes, most members of the Congress Working Committee resigned. Astonishingly, so did Nehru. The right, seizing the moment at the Tripuri Congress session, adopted a resolution confirming Congress adherence to Gandhi's politics and insisted that Bose must select his leading team in accordance with Gandhi's wishes. Nehru and the Congress socialists kept quiet against this onslaught. An embittered Bose resigned a little later. He was hounded out of the Congress within months. Nehru took a very hostile stance towards him.

War and the Quit India Struggle

At the outbreak of World War II the British entered India on the Allied side without any reference to the wishes of the Indian people. Indian capitalists were relatively willing to enter the war. By 1942 Indian banking capital had outstripped British banking capital, excluding the imperial bank. Public opinion was otherwise not pro-war. All elected congressmen resigned from their offices. But while Bose thought in terms of the transitional policy of seeking help from the enemies of the British, Nehru, like other sections of the left, like the Communist

Party of India (CPI), was in a dilemma. Especially after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, he saw the war as one between progress and reaction. Unlike the CPI, he did not call for supporting the British openly, but he was uncomfortable with the idea of India being at the mercy of a two-pronged German and Japanese attack. Along with Maulana Azad, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, and others he called on the British to make a commitment to granting full independence after the war, and a national government now, in return for Indian support. Gandhi, by contrast, argued that Japan was less likely to invade India if Britain no longer remained in India. This of course showed Gandhi's lack of understanding of imperialism, but it also showed his practical opposition to British rule.

The man in charge of Britain at this point was Winston Churchill, the most aggressively imperialist prime minister for some time. So the desultory negotiations collapsed, and the Congress began heated debates on the nature of resistance to the British. Nehru was initially opposed to Gandhi. In the first years of war the CPI had called for a struggle, while Gandhi had only sanctioned an "individual *satyagraha*," so moderate in form that it put no pressure and carried out no mobilization. In 1942 the CPI called it a People's War and urged support to the Allies to defend the USSR. After intensive debates and heated discussions, the Congress leaders called for the British to quit India. Though the resolution of 8 August said that otherwise the British could face mass rebellion, once again the final decision was in Gandhi's hands, and his subsequent letter to the viceroy showed he might have used the resolution as a bargaining counter. Instead, the British swooped on the Congress leadership and arrested them. Despite his hesitations, Nehru had gone along with Gandhi and campaigned for the struggle. He was arrested along with other Congress leaders on August 9, 1942, and kept incarcerated till June 1945. His daughter Indira and her husband Feroze Gandhi would also be imprisoned for a few months. Nehru's first grandson, Rajiv, was born in 1944.

Towards Transfer of Power

Nehru and his colleagues had been released just as the British government sent a Cabinet Mission for negotiations. Nehru was elected Congress president and became one of the key negotiators.

The elections to the Constituent Assembly came up as transfer of power was mooted. The Constituent Assembly was elected indirectly by the members of the provincial legislative assemblies. The Congress secured an overwhelming majority in the general seats, while the Muslim League managed to sweep almost all the seats reserved for Muslims. The Congress had a majority of 69 percent. There were also members from smaller parties like the Scheduled Caste Federation, the CPI, and the Unionist Party of Punjab. Nehru headed an interim government, which had limited power. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, demanding the independent Muslim state of Pakistan, launched communal violence. Hindu communalists hit back. By giving up the earlier demand for a Constituent Assembly elected by universal adult suffrage, Nehru and the Congress had hobbled themselves, and now they had to accept Muslim League claims that it represented India's Muslims, though this claim was never proved in a democratic election. So India was to receive freedom with Partition, on August 15, 1947. Nehru became the first prime minister of independent India.

Prime Minister

This period was marked by intense communal violence that swept across the Punjab, Delhi, and Bengal. Weak government led to a steady escalation of violence by Hindu and Sikh communalists, as well as Muslim communalists. The Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh were openly fighting for a very authoritarian form of government to pursue their Hindu chauvinist agenda. What halted them was the shock produced by the murder of Gandhi. It was only then that Nehru and his home minister Sardar Patel acted to ban the RSS, arrest a large number of its cadres, and for a time halt communalism.

There was an evident contest for power and influence between the more left-leaning Nehru and the more conservative Patel. It was also a tussle over policy and strategy. Nehru ignored Patel in his policy towards Kashmir. The King of Kashmir was compelled to sign an instrument of accession with India when Pakistan sent its army, dressed as volunteer forces, to Kashmir. Indian help came, but with Kashmir joining India. However, Nehru promised a referendum to finalize the issue, which never materialized.

The India-Pakistan war was ended by UN intervention and the creation of a ceasefire line that has become the *de facto* border. Patel objected to Nehru sidelining home ministry officials in the Kashmir and Hyderabad policy. In Hyderabad the Nizam was trying to create an independent state. Patel was however not to get Gandhi's support either, for Gandhi's last hunger strike was over a number of issues, including the demand that India should not renege on the promise of transferring funds to Pakistan. Nehru felt offended by Patel's decision-making regarding the states' integration without consulting either him or the Cabinet.

Gandhi was assassinated on January 30, 1948. Nehru and Patel put up a show of unity in that difficult moment. The media accused Patel's home ministry of failing to protect Gandhi. He offered to resign, but Nehru turned it down. At the same time, their differences persisted. When China claimed Tibet in 1950, Patel wanted Nehru's intervention, but Nehru refused. Nehru was repeatedly defeated by Patel, whose grip on the organization remained, and who ensured that Nehru's choices did not get into the position of Congress president. After the death of Patel, however, Nehru was able to defeat the right wing and take control of the organization.

Economic Policies

Nehru took over the Bombay Plan, also called the Tata-Birla Plan after the two leading capitalists who were its initiators. While in recent years his policy has been attacked as socialist, the reality is different. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 suggested that core sectors would be under state control. This corresponded to the needs of the Indian bourgeoisie. They did not have the massive capital needed for building up infrastructure, power, and heavy industry. These also created jobs and therefore kept a sizable part of the population satisfied. At the same time, by talking about Five Year Plans and the "socialistic pattern of economy," Nehru also stole the thunder of the left, which was important in view of the fact that despite a phase of banning in independent India, the Communist Party had emerged as the second biggest party, with a significant presence in parliament. Increasing business and income taxes, Nehru looked for a mixed economy, where the state sector would develop strategic industries such as mining, electricity, and

heavy industries. It was also to provide major services, creating a welfare state. Land reform, the essential precondition for the mass of rural people, was left in the hands of provincial governments, and it was only in provinces where the left had a strong presence that any radical land reform was considered. Nehru's own drive was in the direction of gigantic mega-projects. He pioneered the building of mega-hydroelectric power projects such as the Bhakra-Nangal Dam, and patronised Homi Bhaba's search for nuclear power. Birla later said he liked Nehru's socialism. This was quite understandable, for by 1958 four families, including the Birlas, controlled companies worth one quarter of India's stock market.

For most of Nehru's term as prime minister, India would continue to face serious food shortages despite progress and increases in agricultural production. This resulted in a renewal of the imperialist stranglehold. In particular, much of India's agricultural policy was guided by World Bank-IMF advice along with direct inputs from US imperialist institutions like the Rockefeller Foundation. While there was a degree of economic growth, poverty and chronic unemployment continued. As a result, even though Nehru's personal popularity remained high, the Congress started losing elections and seats. The first communist government was formed in Kerala in 1957, though Nehru, with advice from his daughter Indira, who was functioning as his political secretary, had it dismissed using the powers given to the president and the provincial governor.

Education and Social Reform

Nehru was a very strong advocate of education for the youth of the country, and this was reflected in strong state intervention in education. His government was responsible for the establishment of many institutions, including the prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology, the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, and the Indian Institutes of Management. Nehru was committed to the eradication of illiteracy, but unlike post-revolutionary societies, in India this effort was undertaken essentially in a bureaucratic manner and was not very successful. The same was true of efforts like food and milk distribution for children.

One area where some social legislation was carried out was in women's rights. The antiquated

and highly discriminatory Hindu laws were for the first time modified during Nehru's tenure as prime minister, though much of the credit goes to Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, for some time the law minister. The oppression of former untouchables was tackled by legally abolishing untouchability and by reserving educational seats and jobs in educational institutions and government for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Nehru also supported secularism, and repeatedly warned against the dangers of ultra-right Hinduism as the main form in which fascism was likely to come to India.

Nehru and Indian Foreign Policy

Nehru's foreign policy combined a defense of Indian national interests with left-wing rhetoric. On the issue of Kashmir the rhetoric was to create a problem for the Indian acquisition of Kashmir. Kashmiris were at that time probably more willing to be with India than with Pakistan, but given the option, they would have chosen independence. Nehru's promise of a plebiscite was never carried out. This made Kashmir an issue Pakistan could internationalize at will, and this dictated many aspects of his policy.

Realizing that India's best interests were served by allying with neither of the two Cold War power blocs, Nehru was one of the architects of the "Bandung Spirit" and then the Non-Aligned Movement. Its anti-imperialist rhetoric enabled India to benefit considerably from Soviet patronage, without foreclosing US aid in food, agriculture research, and other matters. He recognized the People's Republic of China and hoped to act as a bridge between the hostile camps. However, some of his actions were bitterly condemned by the West; for example, his condemnation of the Anglo-French-Israeli War against Egypt in 1956 was not balanced by condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Suspicion and distrust cooled relations between India and the US, which suspected Nehru of tacitly supporting the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, India also allowed the CIA to use India as a base to train anti-communist Tibetan guerrillas in 1956.

Nehru's greatest failure was his China policy, due to the extreme instability as well as military and political weaknesses. On one hand, he had proclaimed that India and China were like brothers (*Hindi-Chini bhai bhai*). On the other hand, he did not take peaceful steps to resolve the major

border disputes with China. These had been created because the British had made border agreements with Tibet, but China had never accepted these since China considered Tibet to be a part of China. India and China grew increasingly tense over this issue, especially after Nehru gave political asylum to the Dalai Lama. Moreover, in 1961, emboldened by his Goa success, Nehru started developing a “forward” policy in the China border, getting military units to set up camps even beyond the McMahon line decided upon by Tibet and the English. These provocations caused the Chinese to retaliate, in what was officially not a war, since neither side formally declared war and neither side used the air force, but which resulted in the annihilation of the Indian 4th Division and the Chinese incursion up to Tejpur, after which they unilaterally withdrew to the positions they claimed as theirs. Nehru’s minister V. K. Krishna Menon had to resign, and Nehru also faced much criticism.

Final Years

In 1957 and 1962 Nehru had led the Congress to election victories, but the opposition parties were gaining. In 1951 the communists and their allies had 23 seats, the socialists and the KMPP, who soon merged, had 21 between them, and the Hindu right wing had 7, apart from other parties. In 1957 the Hindu right had 5 seats, the socialists 19, and the CPI and its allies 33 seats. In 1962 the Congress vote fell to 44.72 percent, though it still won 361 out of 545 seats, down from 364 out of 489 in 1951. This time too the CPI and its allies won 33 seats, the fragmented socialists 18 seats, the Hindu right 17 seats, the liberal right Swatantra Party 18 seats, and the Republican Party, a dalit, Ambedkarite party, 10 seats.

Nehru’s health was steadily declining. He had a prolonged illness, recovering in Kashmir. Returning to Delhi, he suffered a stroke and died early on May 27, 1964.

Legacy

Nehru was an able and modernist bourgeois leader. Strongly committed to secularism and progress, he was able to give the post-independence development of India a considerable personal imprint, so that this model of growth is often called the Nehruvian model. Given his back-

ground in the national movement, he was also genuinely concerned about a measure of social justice, as long as the basic structures of capitalism were not overturned. That is why welfare policies comprised a considerable aspect of government work, as well as rhetoric.

Nehru has been a repeated target of Hindutva fundamentalists and fascists for his alleged appeasement of Muslims. What this means is that in a post-Partition, post-riot India, he refused to impose a Hinduized common code on Muslims. The right-wing parties have also criticized his foreign policy as hypocritical, as it was a closet communist act. In fact, his foreign policy well served Indian capitalism. It enabled India to maintain a neutral image and gain a position among third world states. It also enabled India to develop its own military and nuclear policies. There is an ambiguous line but not an absolute opposition between Nehru’s declaration of atoms for peace and the eventual testing of nuclear weapons, first under his daughter Indira and later under the Bharatiya Janata Party, a Hindu right party.

Nehru’s greatest achievement, however, can only be seen in a comparative perspective. If he is blamed for much of the legacy of early independent India, he must also be praised for certain positive developments. If leaderships matter in history, then the fact that India retains a measure of democracy, a measure even of the right to protest against state violence when it occurs in Kashmir or the Northeast, it is partly due to the leadership provided by Nehru, in contradistinction to the authoritarianism of Pakistan and other former colonies.

SEE ALSO: Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); India, Armed Struggle in the Independence Movement; India, Civil Disobedience Movement and Demand for Independence; India, Nationalism, Extremist; India, Post-World War II Upsurge; Indian National Liberation; Quit India Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Akbar, M. J. (1889) *Nehru: The Making of India*. London: Viking.
- Ali, T. (2005) *The Nehrus and the Gandhis: An Indian Dynasty*. London: Picador.
- Brecher, M. (1959) *Nehru: A Political Biography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gopal, S. (1976–84) *Jawaharlal Nehru*, 3 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nehru, J., Gopal, S., & Iyengar, U. (Eds.) (2003) *The Essential Writings of Jawaharlal Nehru*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Neoliberalism and protest

Heather Squire

Neoliberalism refers to an economic model, a political methodology, and a socio-ethical ideology that came to dominate capitalist market relations beginning in the 1970s. It is predicated on the neoclassical economic belief that the market is best regulated by itself, and that government intervention into national economies should be discouraged, save for the protection of property rights, the facilitation of capital flows, and the creation of new markets. Harvey (2005) argues that neoliberalism is a “*political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites.*” Normative usage of the term neoliberal tends toward the pejorative, and it is thus rarely used in a self-referential way to affirm one’s support for ostensibly neoliberal policies.

While neoliberalism finds its theoretical roots in the eighteenth-century writings of liberal theorists such as John Locke and Adam Smith, the twentieth-century economists Friedrich August von Hayek (1899–1992) and his protégé Milton Friedman (1912–2006) are considered to be the progenitors of neoliberalism as an ideology and practice. In 1944, von Hayek wrote *The Road to Serfdom*, which argued that collectivism (which he saw as inherent in the Keynesian economic policies popular at the time) and socialism would ultimately lead to tyranny and fascism by crushing individual liberty and dismantling the free market. In 1947, von Hayek and a few philosophical peers from the academic and business world formed the Mont Pelerin Society to advocate for the “central values of civilization” as they called them in their founding statement: human dignity and freedom.

These ideas mostly festered in academia and well-funded think tanks, especially at the University of Chicago and the Institute for Economic Affairs in London, until the early 1970s when the “Keynesian compromise” between labor and capital began to break down. After the Great Depression, the economic policies of John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) gained popularity among many western governments, who opted for intervention to mitigate the booms and busts of capitalism and for a redistribution of productivity

gains from owners to workers. Massive military spending by some countries, first for World War II and later for the Cold War, allowed for full employment and some gains for the working class; however, countries that could not (or were discouraged from) deficit-funding their military (such as Japan, West Germany, and the Asian “tigers”) instead invested in their manufacturing sectors and experienced high rates of economic growth as their export markets began to expand across the globe – such trade-related economic growth did not go unnoticed by the ruling class of Keynesian states, who were feeling increasingly constrained by demand-side economic policies and increased working-class power at home.

The stagflation of the 1970s, when slow economic growth was accompanied by high prices (sometimes called the “crisis of capitalism”), was spawned in part by Keynesian economic policies and the 1973 OPEC oil crisis (which raised oil prices all over the world). Chiapello and Boltanski (2006) argue that a “disruption of production by workers in industrialized nations” during the 1960s led to an increase in spending on management (to police such insurrections) that far outpaced economic growth. Whatever the complex of causes of the economic slowdown of the 1970s were, neoliberalism as a theory consolidated at this time and gained respectability as a way to deal with the stagflation, respond to rapidly increasing world trade, and as a means to reign in working-class concessions that had been won over the previous four decades.

The first experiment in neoliberal development is usually considered to be the economic reforms imposed two years after the 1973 coup in Chile that deposed the democratically elected Salvador Allende and installed the dictator Augusto Pinochet. The coup was supported by domestic as well as US business elites, the CIA, and Henry Kissinger (the US secretary of state at the time). From 1975 to 1978, the “Chicago Boys” (Chilean technocrats educated in free-market economics at the University of Chicago) were at the forefront of implementing neoliberal reforms to meet International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions for receiving a loan. Placed at the helm of the economy by Pinochet, the Chicago Boys proceeded to annul all nationalizations that occurred under Allende (except for copper), open up natural resources (oceans, forests, and farms) to exploitation, eliminate all protectionism, and adopt policies that were

favorable to free trade. This worked in tandem with Pinochet's brutal repression of the working class and the left, whose leaders were tortured and who were dispossessed of any collective bargaining power via a "flexible" labor system.

SEE ALSO: Bolivian Neoliberalism, Social Mobilization, and Revolution from Below, 2003 and 2005; Chile, Popular Resistance against Pinochet; Colombia, Unions, Strikes, and Anti-Neoliberal Opposition, 1990–2005; Korea, Protest against Neoliberal Globalization; Locke, John (1632–1704); Peru, Neoliberalism and Social Mobilization, 1990s–2000s; Senegal, Anti-Neoliberal Protests; Smith, Adam (1723–1790); Southern Africa, Popular Resistance to Neoliberalism, 1982–2007; Uruguay, Labor and Populist Movements, 1965–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Boas, T. C. & Gans-Morse, J. (2006) From Rallying Cry to Whipping Boy: The Concept of Neoliberalism in the Study of Development. Paper presented at the August 2006 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. Available at www.allacademic.com/meta/p152852_index.html (downloaded May 16, 2008).
- Chiapello, L. & Boltanski, E. (2006) *New Spirit of Capitalism*. New York: Verso.
- Harvey, D. (2005) *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2006) *Spaces of Global Capitalism: Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development*. New York: Verso.

Nepal, Maoists' rise

Sushovan Dhar

The Communist Party of Nepal, founded in 1949, won four seats in the first elections in Nepal in 1959 and was the foundation of the Maoist movement in the country. Until the adoption in 1990 of a new constitution guaranteeing a multiparty system, most communist politicians had been in exile or operated underground. As part of an effort to form a multiparty opposition, known as Jan Andolan (People's Movement), some communist factions unified under the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) (CPN-UML).

In April 1990, collective action for the restoration of democracy shook Nepal. Tens of thousands of Nepalese marched on the royal palace in Kathmandu, demonstrating against

King Birendra, who was traditionally revered as an incarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu. Various communist parties formed a United Left Front and cooperated with the Nepali Congress Party (NCP). From this united front emerged the Communist Party of Nepal in 1991, through the merger of the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist Leninist).

Though police and army fired on the crowds and killed many demonstrators, the militant protest compelled the king to scrap the *panchayat* system (non-party assemblies), lift the ban on political parties, and form an interim government under the premiership of oppositionist NCP leader Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, thereby paving the way for a constitutional monarchy.

The interim government was directed to conduct free and fair elections within a stipulated period under a new constitution that was framed by an independent constitutional commission appointed by the Council of Ministers – the Constitution Recommendation Commission. Although the constitution was proclaimed from the throne, it had been developed, unlike previous constitutional edicts, through a consultative process in which the interim Council of Ministers served as a legislature. Nepal's human rights record – poor before the pro-democracy movement's success – also improved, since the new constitution guaranteed basic rights and Nepal signed various human rights treaties and understandings.

After the constitution of 1991, a new phase of parliamentary politics and unstable coalition governments was unleashed. Parties were often personality based, and, apart from the communists, mostly elitist. Social policies were minimally articulated. In 1991 the NCP won a narrow majority under Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala. The communists grew in strength, and the president of the Nepali Congress and interim prime minister, K. P. Bhattarai, was defeated in the elections by CPN-UML leader Madan Bhandari. In 1992, the NCP won the local elections.

Maoist Shift to Guerilla Struggle

Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the leader of the Communist Party of Nepal (Mashal), an organization popularly known in Nepal as Prachanda, was fundamentally opposed to parliamentary politics. In coalition with several left-wing political groups, Prachanda founded the United People's

Front (SJM) in early 1991. The SJM was active in Nepal's parliamentary system, and in 1991 was the third-largest party in the Nepalese House of Representatives. By 1993, however, the SJM began to splinter, and in 1995 Prachanda left the SJM to form the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M), which remained firmly opposed to electoral and parliamentary politics and initiated plans for guerilla warfare against the governing monarchy.

In 1993, CPN-UML leader Madan Bhandari was killed in a mysterious car crash and violent demonstrations followed, aiming at the overthrow of Koirala's government. Koirala resigned in 1994 and called for new elections after losing a parliamentary vote when 36 Nepali Congress members abstained. Elections in November resulted in a hung parliament and a minority CPN-UML (the single largest party) government. In 1995, a parliamentary vote of no confidence replaced it with a coalition government formed by the Nepali Congress, Rashtriya Praja Party (RPP), and Sadhvabana (representing the national minority Madhesi population). However, Prachanda and other communist organizations rejected this arrangement, turning their attention to mass struggles and guerilla warfare. It was in this context that the CPN-M was formed in 1995.

In September 1995, the Central Committee of the CPN-M asserted the centrality of a protracted people's war against the state to free the country of the repressive monarchy and drastically improve living standards among Nepal's workers and peasants. The Maoists' strategy was to encircle the capital of Kathmandu from the countryside and wage a people's war and revolution to transform the society.

Baburam Bhattarai, a prominent leader of the CPN-M, subsequently called on the Nepalese coalition government of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba (a member of the NCP) to respond to 40 demands or face a people's insurrection. The primary CPN-M demand was Nepalese abrogation of the 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty between India and Nepal and the Mahakali River treaties with India which provided for the sharing of water on the western frontier. The CPN-M also called on the Nepalese government to cancel work permits for foreign (Indian) workers in Nepal; end royal privileges; draft a new constitution through a Constituent Assembly; nationalize the property of "comprador and bureaucratic capitalists";

declare Nepal a secular nation; provide villages with roads, drinking water, and electricity; and guarantee freedom of speech and publication.

The ultimatum called on the Nepal government to initiate positive steps toward fulfilling these demands by February 17, 1996. However, when the government failed to respond to the 40-point plan, on 13 February, four days before the deadline, Maoists struck in six districts, initiating a nationwide uprising that led to the Nepal People's War.

SEE ALSO: April Revolution, Nepal 2006; Nepal, People's War and Maoists

References and Suggested Readings

- Bhattarai, B. (2005) *Monarchy vs. Democracy: The Epic Fight in Nepal*. New Delhi: Samkaleen Teesari Duniya.
- Bhattarai, B. (2008) Maoist Approach in Nepal. Available at *Radical Notes Journal*, www.radicalnotes.com/journal/2008/05/12/maoist-approach-in-nepal-baburam-bhattarai/ (downloaded May 19, 2008).
- Himal Books for the Center for Investigative Journalism (2004) *People in the "People's War."* Kathmandu: Himal Books.
- Hutt, M. (Ed.) (2004) *Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Rebellion*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Thapa, D. & Sijapati, B. (2003) *A Kingdom under Siege: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003*. Kathmandu: Pilgrims Book House.

Nepal, people's war and Maoists

Sushovan Dhar

The Maoist strategy of a people's war in Nepal combined guerilla attacks and negotiations. During nationwide Maoist attacks in July 2001, over 60 police personnel, specifically in the Banke and Rolpa districts of West Nepal, were killed, injured, or abducted, eventually forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Koirala. The newly appointed prime minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, called upon the Maoists on July 25, 2001 to end violence and negotiate an end to their six-year insurgency.

The Maoists (known as Prachanda) responded by announcing a four-month ceasefire and negotiations. On November 25, 2001, the Maoists broke the ceasefire, striking Surkhet

Airport and nine other points, including police outposts and district development offices in Dhankuta, Shankhuwasabha, Chitwan, and Khotang districts. Dismayed by three rounds of fruitless peace talks with the government, the Maoists declared a central People's Revolutionary Government, with Baburam Bhattarai as chief convener of the parallel government, and a network of village governments in more than 40 districts throughout the country. The following day, the government responded by declaring an emergency, blaming Maoists for the crisis. By late 2001, the Maoist insurgency had spread to nearly all of Nepal's 75 districts.

In a bid to strengthen control of Western Nepal, on February 17, 2002 Maoists attacked Mangalsen, the district headquarters of the remote hill district of Achham (northwest of Kathmandu), and an airstrip in nearby Sanfebagar at about midnight, killing more than 120 people including police officers, soldiers, and local government officials. The rebels also mounted attacks on government buildings, a military barracks, and an armory.

After the royal takeover of October 4, 2002, the Maoists opened the way to a dialogue with the state, suggesting a round table of all political forces, including the king and security forces, and the formation of an all-party interim government with general elections for a Constituent Assembly to draw up a new constitution. The next ceasefire of January, 29, 2003 was short-lived, collapsing on August 27, 2003. The Maoists' strategy was to alternate armed revolutionary struggle with a willingness to talk, thereby exposing government negotiation efforts as a sham.

The government's encouragement to landlords to unleash anti-peasant squads to fight the rebels further intensified class polarization in the countryside, which in the long run helped the Maoists' cause. In March 2004, the declaration of 17 days' economic embargo in Chitwan, Nawalparasi, Rupandehi, Palpa, Syanja, Kaski, Tananun, Parwat, Lamjung, Gorkha, Gulmi, Myagdi, and Manang districts brought life to a standstill. The same month witnessed one of the most massive offensives against security forces since the insurgency was launched in 1996, with an overnight attack on the district headquarters of Myagdi district at Beni that inflicted heavy casualties. A month later, civil servants and security personnel captured by the Maoists during the Beni attack were released.

The Maoist rebels also attacked joint security forces in Bhojpur, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. On February 1, 2005, the king dismissed the government and declared a state of emergency, seizing power and effectively suspending all civil liberties. Immediately thereafter, an anti-Maoist rampage in Kapilavastu district, assisted by police personnel, resulted in the displacement of 20,000 to 30,000 people to the Indian border.

Meanwhile, differences in the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) leadership caused it to take action against Baburam Bhattarai, Dinanath Sharma, Mani Thapa, Hisila Yam, and Devendra Poudel on March 1, 2005. Bhattarai was reinstated in July after months of suspension caused by major differences in outlook. In the meantime, the CPN-M organized elections for local bodies in ten districts of Western Nepal described as their "special zone." The Maoists had called on mainstream political parties to take part in the elections. However, none of them participated in the elections in a formal way. From September 2005, the CPN-M declared a four-month unilateral ceasefire.

New Course and a Strategy

February 2006 marked a shift in CPN-M politics when Prachanda stated it was willing to accept the results of the election of the Constituent Assembly and the Seven Parties Alliance (SPA), with CPN-M signing a memorandum of understanding in March. After the CPN-M's declaration of a three-month unilateral ceasefire in April, peace talks between the government and Maoists took place on May 26, with the signing of a 25-point Code of Conduct governing the ceasefire and emphasizing the commitment to hold Constituent Assembly elections. On June 15, 2006, the government and the Maoist rebels reached a four-point agreement to hold a summit talk between Prime Minister Koirala and Prachanda, to form a truce-monitoring team (Ceasefire Code of Conduct National Monitoring Committee), to request the UN to assist the truce-monitoring team and to monitor human rights, and to hold further talks in the presence of observers.

After agreeing to manage weapons under the joint surveillance of their respective commanders, the government of Nepal and CPN-M signed the historic Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA)

on November 21, 2006, declaring a formal end to the ten-year insurgency. The main features of the ten-point CPA are the formal termination of the people's war, the abrogation of the king's political rights, and the nationalization of the king's property under public trusts. The SPA and the CPN-M agreed to promulgate an interim constitution and create an interim parliament of 330 members, with the Maoists obtaining 73 seats. Following this, Prachanda announced the dissolution of the parallel governments set up during the insurgency, signifying the end of the people's war in Nepal.

Maoist Electoral Triumph

The Maoists emerged as the single largest party (220 seats out of 601) when elections to the Constituent Assembly were finally held on April 10, 2008, while the Nepali Congress Party (NCP) got 110 seats and the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) (CPN-UML) 103. The CPN-UML originally seemed to have a bright future, with considerable support among the working class. But it was compromised by forming a government under the world's virtually last semi-feudal monarchy and forging opportunistic coalitions for power, which assisted in the process of betraying its promising revolutionary development.

The CPN-M, by contrast, rejected the hobbled parliamentary system of the 1990s. By making the demand for a Constituent Assembly its central slogan, and by linking this to popular socioeconomic concerns, including treaty revisions with India, highlighting the national minority Madhesis' lack of equal rights, and agrarian reform, it pushed forward its revolutionary development. The increased representation of women is also a consequence of Maoist demands, and the CPN-M leader, Comrade Parvati, has written an important essay stressing the need to integrate an agenda for women's liberation with the revolutionary program.

Electoral triumph, however, put the CPN-M in a difficult situation. It called upon the king to step down, in conformity with its stand, but it was clear that it would have to collaborate with other parties in the Constituent Assembly, both to run the country and to adopt a constitution.

There are difficult socioeconomic problems to address as well. A fresh convert to the ideology of the free market, the Nepalese government

had dedicated itself to creating wealth in urban areas. Trying to boost private investment in Kathmandu, it neglected agriculture, on which over 80 percent of the population depended for a living. Not surprisingly, absolute poverty continued to increase in the late 1990s, while Kathmandu Valley benefited from the growth in the tourist, garment, and carpet industries. Millions of Nepalese have swelled the armies of cheap labor that drive the global economy, serving in Indian brothels, Thai and Malaysian sweatshops, and, most recently, the war zones of Iraq. In 2002, Dalits (low-caste marginal members of Hindu society) had an annual per capita income of only \$40, compared to a national average of \$210, and fewer than 10 percent of Dalits were literate. These social and economic exclusions were addressed only so far by the CPN-M.

In a small state surrounded by China and India, any government would face the reality of economic construction. According to Stalinist theory, the CPN-M is accomplishing a bourgeois democratic revolution. But if the government tries to push class struggle forward, it would face resistance from its bourgeois and social democratic partners, as well as foreign pressure and limits on capital investment. Baburam Bhattarai's statement welcoming foreign capital could be interpreted in this way. At the same time, in a different interview, Bhattarai has explained that his party is well aware that Nepal was to have a non-socialist transitional government, including members from opposition classes. One section of the party would strictly avoid government participation, seeking to mobilize the masses, leaving open the option between deepening the revolution and co-optation of the revolutionary party.

SEE ALSO: April Revolution, Nepal, 2006; Nepal, Maoists' Rise

References and Suggested Readings

- Bhattarai, B. (2005) *Monarchy vs. Democracy: The Epic Fight in Nepal*. New Delhi: Samkaleen Teesari Duniya.
- Bhattarai, B. (2008) Maoist Approach in Nepal. Available at *Radical Notes Journal*, www.radicalnotes.com/journal/2008/05/12/maoist-approach-in-nepal-baburam-bhattarai/ (downloaded May 19, 2008).
- Himal Books for the Center for Investigative Journalism (2004) *People in the "People's War."* Kathmandu: Himal Books.

- Hutt, M. (Ed.) (2004) *Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Rebellion*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Karki, A. & Seddon, D. (2003) *The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspectives*. Delhi: Adroit.
- Onesto, L. (2004) *Dispatches from the People's War in Nepal*. London: Pluto Press.
- Pradhan, P., Ojha, G., & Bista, P. P. (2008) An Interview with Comrade Baburam Bhattarai, April 26. Available at groups.google.com/group/OrissaToday/msg/8013a78cd954bf31 (downloaded May 16, 2008).
- Thapa, D. & Sijapati, B. (2003) *A Kingdom under Siege: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003*. Kathmandu: Pilgrims Book House.

Nepal, protest movements, 19th and 20th centuries

Sushovan Dhar

Rule of the *Ranas*

The Himalayan kingdom of Nepal emerged from the *Gorkha* state, founded in 1559 by King Dravya Shah. Prithvi Narayan Shah (reigned 1743–75) conquered the valley and created a single autocratic state.

In 1845, Fateh Jang Chautaria became prime minister. Following a massacre in the palace armory, he launched a purge, killing off many aristocratic rivals and initiating a century-long dictatorship of the royal family. He repressed the entire nation, leaving the society utterly primitive through maintaining the semi-feudal economy, while eliminating the factional fighting at court and introducing innovations into the bureaucracy and the judiciary.

In return for supporting the British during the Indian revolt of 1857 the royal family received staunch colonial patronage. In 1858 King Surendra sought to advance an invincible image through bequeathing to himself the honorific title of *Rana*, denoting martial glory, used by Rajput princes in northern India. He then became Jang Bahadur *Rana*, and all subsequent prime ministers of his family added the designation "Jang Bahadur *Rana*," in his honor, and their line became known as the house of the *Ranas*. Generally, *Rana* rule insulated Nepal from changes elsewhere, stripped the monarchy of

any real power, and maintained a late medieval administrative framework. Nepalese support for British imperialism in World War I brought an annual payment of one million Indian rupees, and a Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship was signed in 1923. With modifications, this has governed relations between Nepal and India even since India became independent.

After World War I, several small political initiatives were undertaken by progressive Nepalese. In 1935, the Praja Parishad (People's Council) was formed by exiles in India as the first Nepalese political party, through establishing cells inside Nepal. In Bihar the party published a periodical, *Janata* (The People), advocating a multi-caste, democratic government and the overthrow of the *Ranas*. The *Rana* police managed to infiltrate the organization and arrested 500 people in Kathmandu. Four leaders, including Sukra Raj Shastri and Gangalal Shrestha, were executed (they were still commemorated as martyrs in 1991), and others received long prison terms, but the survivors escaped to India to carry on political agitation.

In Benaras in October 1946, a group of Nepalese exiles formed the *Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Rashtriya Congress* (All-India Nepali National Congress). During its council in Calcutta in January 1947, the new organization dropped its "All-India" prefix and merged with two other groups, the *Nepali Sangh* (Nepalese Society) of Benaras and the Gorkha Congress of Calcutta, which had closer connections with lower-class *Ranas* (children of concubines and low-caste wives, having lesser social status and a lower administrative-economic position). The Nepali National Congress (Nepali Rashtriya Congress, NNC) was officially dedicated to the peaceful ousting of the *Rana* dictatorship and the establishment of "democratic socialism." One of its first mass actions was participation in a labor strike in the jute mills of Biratnagar in the Tarai. B. P. Koirala (1914–82), an early leader of the NNC influenced first by Gandhi and then by the Congress Socialist Party in India, promoted non-violent confrontation through general strikes, using force as the last resort. He advocated a constitutional monarchy as a transitional political form in Nepal.

The strong-willed, conservative Juddha Shamsheer resigned as prime minister in November 1945, succeeded by Padma Shamsheer. In early 1948, despite severely repressing the Biratnagar

strike, Padma Shamsher was forced to make political concessions and, beset by opposition, he resigned.

The King Returns

The Nepal Democratic Congress (Nepal Prajatantrik Congress), formed in 1948, advocated the overthrow of the *Ranas* by any means, including armed insurrection. B. P. Koirala and others were arrested in October 1948. The NNC absorbed the Nepal Democratic Congress in March 1950 and was renamed the Nepali Congress Party (NCP), with a program including armed struggle. As armed attacks by 300 members of the NCP's Mukti Sena (Liberation Army) initiated an anti-*Rana* revolution in Nepal, King Tribhuvan (reigned 1911–55) escaped from the palace and appealed for asylum in the Indian embassy in Kathmandu, on November 6, 1950. Negotiations between India and the *Ranas* led to a proclamation on January 8, 1951 by *Rana* Mohan Shamsher, promising to restore the king, amnesty for all political prisoners, and elections based on adult suffrage by 1952. The interim constitution of March 1951 established a separate judicial branch, transferred all executive powers back to the king (including supreme command of the armed forces, and power to appoint government officials and manage finances), called for a welfare state, set forth a bill of rights, and started procedures for the formation of *panchayats* (local-level assemblies). But the king was opposed to functioning under the new constitution. Successfully maneuvering between democratic popular aspirations, the elitist Nepali Congress, and the *Ranas*, the king was able to push out the NCP as well as the *Ranas* by November 1951. The king engaged in military suppression, including police armed fire on a student demonstration, killing one student.

Among the parties operating in the early 1950s, the NCP was the most influential, claiming to stand for the democratic will of the people, but often led by elitists. The Communist Party of Nepal, established in 1949 in Calcutta, refused to participate in the "bourgeois" system. In the Kathmandu valley, other leaders excluded from power reconstituted the Praja Parishad. Opponents of the "anti-democratic" and pro-India character of the Nepali Congress leadership broke away to form a revitalized Nepali National Congress. The period between November 1951

and February 1959 was marked by a succession of short-lived governments, while the king postponed the formation of any constituent assembly in order to ascertain the popular will. The faction of the NCP led by B. P. Koirala had no chance of forming a government.

King Mahendra, son of King Tribhuvan, reigned from 1955 to 1972, with immense opposition to political parties. In 1959, Mahendra presented a new constitution, with plans for elections. In the first national elections in the country's history, the Nepali Congress won 74 out of 109 seats. B. P. Koirala became the prime minister. The new constitution included two legislative houses: a Maha Sabha (upper house) of 36 members, half of them elected by the lower house and the rest nominated by the king; and a Pratinidhi Sabha (lower house) of 109 members, all elected through adult suffrage. The leader of the majority party in the lower house would become prime minister, governing with a cabinet of ministers. The king could act without consulting the prime minister, and could even dismiss him. The king also had control over the army and foreign affairs and could suspend all or part of the constitution.

The Koirala government abolished *birta* tenure (tax-free landholding of the aristocracy) in October 1959 and the autonomy of the western hills principalities. In 1960 the government revised a crucial Trade and Transit Treaty with India and also negotiated another agreement on the Gandak River Project, guaranteeing territorial jurisdiction and free provision of water to Nepal. The government also planned a relatively populist Second Plan (1962–65). The king publicly opposed democracy in principle and upheld his supposed divine rights. Backed by the army, the aristocracy, and conservative landowning groups, on December 15, 1960, he imposed emergency powers to dismiss the cabinet and arrest its leaders, including B. P. Koirala, who spent eight years in prison and another eight years in exile.

On December 26, 1961, King Mahendra appointed a council of five ministers to help him run the administration, and several weeks later political parties were declared illegal. The NCP leadership called for struggle against the new order and formed alliances with other parties, including former critics, the Gorkha Parishad (Gorkha Council) and the United Democratic Party. In late 1961, violent actions, organized by the Nepali Congress in exile, erupted along the Indian border.

On December 16, 1962, a new constitution created a four-tier *panchayat* system, with 4,000 village assemblies, then *zilla* (district) assemblies, town assemblies, zonal assemblies, and a Rashtriya (National) Panchayat, in Kathmandu, without political parties. The Rashtriya Panchayat, consisting of about 90 members, could not criticize the royal government, debate the principles of party-less democracy, introduce budgetary bills without royal approval, or enact bills without the king's approval. The army, judiciary, and the Public Service Commission were controlled by the king, who could amend the constitution at any time. Over a ten-year period, the king restored the absolutist monarchy of Prithvi Narayan Shah.

Elections to the Rashtriya Panchayat in March and April 1963 brought a large number of members formerly associated with the Nepali Congress to power. However, a conciliatory NCP leadership began announcing its faith in democratic ideals under the king's leadership. In 1968, as a three-way split developed in the NCP, the king began releasing political prisoners, including B. P. Koirala on October 30.

Some land reforms were carried out, mainly at the cost of the *Ranas*. A new legal code promulgated in 1963 replaced the Muluki Ain (Law of the Land) of 1854. The new code proclaimed legal equality of all persons, abolishing caste-based legal discrimination as well as formal gender inequality.

King Birendra and the *Panchayat Raj* (Rule)

King Birendra succeeded Mahendra in 1972. Students at Tribhuvan University called an indefinite strike in August supporting a ten-point charter of demands. That month, 100 armed men attacked an eastern Tarai village, killing a constable in a revolutionary act supposedly linked to B. P. Koirala. In June 1973, terrorists hijacked a Royal Nepal Airlines airplane to India, escaping with 30 million Indian rupees, and in 1974, armed attacks and assassination attempts continued.

On December 30, 1976, Koirala and his associate, Ganeshman Singh, were arrested on returning to Kathmandu. After considerable public agitation, Koirala was released in June 1977, due to ill health. Student protests continued through 1977 and 1978 against the *panchayat* system and for human rights.

In a national referendum on maintaining the *panchayat* system, held in May 1979, King Birendra won 54.7 percent of the 4.8 million votes cast. But realizing that popular opposition was strong, the king accepted the principle of freedom of speech and political activity, forming an 11-member Constitution Reforms Commission. The constitution was amended to establish direct elections to the Rashtriya Panchayat. In elections held on May 9, 1981, all political parties refused to participate, aside from pro-Moscow factions of the Communist Party of Nepal and a "Group of 38" from the Nepali Congress. Fifty-two percent of voters turned out, choosing 111 representatives to the Rashtriya Panchayat. Surya Bahadur Thapa was made prime minister.

In 1983, a serious food crisis and charges of corruption caused the fall of Surya Bahadur Thapa's government. Lokendra Bahadur Chand and Thapa led rival factions. The second general election to the Rashtriya Panchayat in 1986 was boycotted by most parties, including the Nepali Congress, though communists and several small parties participated. With a 60 percent voter turnout Marich Man Singh Shrestha became prime minister, with 60 percent support in the *panchayat*.

From 1987–8 to 1988–9, economic growth fell substantially from 9.7 percent to 1.5 percent, sparking mass unrest. Indian economic pressures causing a decline in Nepalese exports were a major factor in this economic downturn, and popular anger was directed at both India and the monarchy. In September 1988 the NCP organized a National Awakening Week during which 3,500 party members committed non-violent civil disobedience. Anti-India student demonstrations began to assume anti-government tones, and all campuses in Kathmandu closed for two months. The stage was set for the upsurge of the 1990s.

SEE ALSO: April Revolution, Nepal, 2006; Nepal, Maoists' Rise; Nepal, People's War and Maoists

References and Suggested Readings

- Burghat, R. (1996) *The Conditions of Listening: Essays on Religion, History and Politics in South Asia*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Chatterji, B. (1980) *Palace, People and Politics: Nepal in Perspective*. Delhi: Ankur Publishing House.
- Gupta, A. (1964) *Politics in Nepal: A Study of Post-Rana Political Developments and Party Politics*. Bombay: Allied Publishers.

- Rose, L. E. & Fisher, M. W. (1970) *The Politics of Nepal – Persistence and Change in an Asian Monarchy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Saha, R. (1978) *Nepali Politics – Retrospect and Prospect*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Whelpton, J. (2005) *A History of Nepal*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Neruda, Pablo (1904–1973)

Heather Squire

Pablo Neruda was a Chilean poet, activist, communist, and diplomat. His poetry – which has sold millions of volumes in many languages and earned him the 1971 Nobel Prize in Literature – took on many forms and subjects, but became patently more political in the 1930s as a result of his encounters with radical leftists during the Spanish Civil War. Neruda's provocative and passionate verses have inspired resistance and love, supported struggles against capitalism and for justice, and elucidated the suffering and oppression of poor people throughout the world.

Neruda was born in Parral, Chile to a railway worker father and a teacher mother. His mother died soon after his birth and he and his father went to live in Temuco, where he met his mentor and friend, Gabriela Mistral (who would become the 1945 Nobel Laureate for Literature). Neruda published his first work at the age of 13, and would publish his best-known work by the time he was 20 – *Veinte poemas de amor y una canción desesperada* (“Twenty Poems of Love and a Song of Despair”). He traveled a great deal throughout the following years, eventually ending up in Spain in the early 1930s. As Spain descended into civil war, Neruda became politicized, thanks in no small part to his radical friends, as well as his horror at the execution of one of them – Federico García Lorca – by Franco loyalists. He would consider himself a communist for the rest of his life.

Neruda returned to Chile in 1943 and soon after visited Peru, recording his thoughts and observations in *Alturas de Macchu Picchu* (“The Heights of Macchu Picchu”), a 12-volume collection of poems which celebrated the achievements of the Incas, while condemning the slavery and suffering that made these achievements possible. It is considered to be his preeminent work

of political poetry. In 1945 he became active in the Chilean Communist Party, serving as a senator and then campaign manager for González Videla, who eventually betrayed the party. Neruda went into exile after he denounced Videla, and did not return until 1952, at the request of Salvador Allende and the Chilean Socialist Party to support their campaign for presidency (Neruda was a very popular and explicitly left-leaning literary figure by this time). Allende did not win the 1952 election, but would eventually triumph in 1970.

On September 11, 1973, a coup d'état led by the Chilean military would depose Allende and install General Augusto Pinochet, signaling the beginning of almost 20 years of political repression, human rights violations, a massive privatization of state industries, and a rollback of the existing social safety net. Suffering from terminal cancer, Neruda died of heart failure just 12 days after the coup. Neruda's funeral, although heavily policed, became the first major public protest against the Pinochet regime; thousands of people openly defied the imposed curfew and prohibition of public mourning. Because of his political and cultural influence, Neruda's poetry was banned in Chile until 1990.

SEE ALSO: Allende Gossens, Salvador (1908–1973); Chile, Popular Resistance against Pinochet; Chile, Protests and Military Coup, 1973; Chile, Social and Political Struggles, 1950–1970

References and Suggested Readings

- Bloch, E. (1996) Marxism and Poetry. In T. Eagleton & D. Milne (Eds.), *Marxist Literary Theory: A Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Eisner, M. (Ed.) (2004) *The Essential Neruda: Selected Poems*. San Francisco: City Lights.
- Feinstein, A. (2004) *Pablo Neruda: A Passion for Life*. New York: Bloomsbury.
- Neruda, P. (1977) *Confieso que he vivido, memorias* (English). Trans. H. St. Martin. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.

Netherlands, protests, 1650–1800

Michael F. Gretz

Following the successful Dutch Revolt against Spain, the United Provinces of the Golden Age

in the Netherlands continued. However, tension between the rising merchant class, whose political power was embodied by the States General, and the old military nobility, symbolized by the House of Orange, persisted and formed the basis for most of the unrest and protest from 1650 to 1800. While internal political and social conflict was far from absent, the Netherlands did not experience another major rebellion in the period from the 1650s to the 1740s. The foremost rebellion was the Patriot Revolt led by enlightened professional classes seeking to end the domination of the House of Orange. The Netherlands, like much of Western Europe, was influenced by the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and Napoleonic wars.

In 1747 William III of Orange captured the office of Stadholder, using the position to curb States General power. Most of William III's actions were supported by the popular classes, who perceived the States General as an oppressive power ruling in the interest of the propertied classes. The Orangists held power until the early 1780s, when the Patriot Revolt broke out to challenge the power of the Stadholder. The Patriot Revolt was led predominantly by members of the urban professional classes, who used democratic political theory influenced by the Enlightenment and the American Revolution to call for popular control of government. The Patriots organized local militias and seized control of municipal councils in many cities across the Netherlands. Their stated goals were to restore the liberties of the Dutch people lost as a result of Habsburg domination, and in this they saw themselves as continuing the unfinished work of the revolt against Spain two centuries earlier.

Despite early success, the Patriot Revolt was eventually defeated by an Orangist counter-revolution, and the leaders of the revolt fled into exile, mostly to France, where they joined the tide of democratic agitation in that country. When democratic revolution broke out in France in 1789, many Dutch Patriot exiles witnessed it firsthand, and many joined the French armies that carried their revolution across their borders in the 1790s.

In 1795 the French revolutionary armies reached the Netherlands, rekindling the Patriot fervor of the previous decade. Helped to power by the French, a new Dutch Revolution established the Batavian Republic in 1795. Although the new

republic functioned essentially as a satellite of revolutionary France, it implemented a series of internal political reforms, centralizing the government, abolishing privileges of the provinces, and curtailing the authority of organized religion. The Dutch Batavian Republic realized its ambitious goals without the level of violence and repression that took place in revolutionary France. The Batavian Republic was an important ally of France in its struggle with Britain and the other monarchical powers of Europe. In 1799 British and Russian troops invaded the Netherlands, but were resisted by the Dutch population and eventually defeated by the French army.

When Napoleon Bonaparte seized power in France, he initially respected the Batavian Republic's independence. However, repeated Dutch violations of his continental policy banning British imports to the European mainland led Napoleon to install his brother, Louis Bonaparte, king of Holland in 1806, marking the end of the Dutch Republic after more than two centuries of survival. Following Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, the victorious powers, meeting at the Congress of Vienna, established the Kingdom of the United Netherlands, remaining in place as a constitutional monarchy with limited powers, under the House of Orange-Nassau.

The Patriot Revolt and the Batavian Republic are generally regarded by historians as part of the wider democratic revolutionary wave of the late eighteenth century primarily influenced by the intellectual developments of the Enlightenment. Some historians regard the Batavian Republic as an artifact of French influence; however, the Patriot Revolt, preceding the French events of 1789, demonstrates the specifically Dutch aspect of this broader European and Atlantic movement.

SEE ALSO: Dutch Revolt, 1568–1648; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Netherlands, Protests, 1800–2000; Pamphleteering and Political Protest, Dutch Republic, 1672

References and Suggested Readings

- Arblaster, P. (2006) *A History of the Low Countries*. New York: Palgrave.
- Israel, J. I. (1995) *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jacob, M. C. & Mijndhardt, W. W. (1992) *The Dutch Republic in the Eighteenth Century: Decline,*

Enlightenment and Revolution. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kossmann, E. H. (1978) *The Low Countries, 1780–1940*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Prak, M. (2005) *The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: The Golden Age*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Netherlands, protests, 1800–2000

Michael F. Gretz

The Netherlands escaped most of the social upheavals that devastated much of Europe during the nineteenth century. The revolutionary wave of 1848, even though it came as close as Belgium, did not extensively disrupt the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Similarly, during the Paris Commune in 1871, Dutch cities remained relatively quiet, due in part to the substantial revolutionary process the country had endured centuries earlier. The republican form of government was already in place in the Netherlands, well before most other European countries. Moreover, while industrial development proceeded apace throughout much of Western Europe, the Dutch economy, predicated for centuries on commerce and finance, was slow to adopt manufacturing.

It was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that industrial class conflict broke out in the Netherlands, albeit in the form of strike activity rather than efforts to overthrow the state. The Dutch workers' movement, like those in less industrially developed nations, was originally dominated by anarchism rather than the Marxist socialism taking hold in Germany, and to an extent in France and Belgium. Nevertheless, a fledgling socialist movement emerged in the late nineteenth century rooted in the Socialist Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP), which formed an important part of the wider European socialist movement before and after World War I.

When Dutch railway workers engaged in a wildcat strike against harsh working conditions in 1903, the Dutch socialist movement produced a frenzy of theoretical work to try to understand the cause of the events. A more radical wing of the socialist party developed, centered on a current known as the *Tribunisten*, after the

title of the faction's newspaper. The *Tribunisten*, particularly the astronomer Anton Pannekoek, were active in the political and theoretical debates within European social democracy before World War I. Pannekoek, like German left-wing socialist Rosa Luxemburg, argued that the development of industrial capitalism created a mass working class, and the tactics of its struggle against capitalism could no longer be confined to the arena of bourgeois parliaments. Pannekoek, like Luxemburg, championed the mass strike like those sweeping the Netherlands in 1903, and the mass worker insurrections during the Russian Revolution of 1905–7.

Even before the onset of World War I the *Tribunisten* broke with the reformist SDAP, creating its own Social Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP was active in opposing the decision of most European socialist parties to support their governments when World War I finally broke out in 1914. However, the Netherlands did not engage in hostilities during the war, and the intensity of working-class militancy experienced in Russia and Germany did not materialize to the same degree.

Still, in November 1918, a year after the Russian Revolution and with Germany in social chaos, the Dutch working class gained militancy and some workers and soldiers formed the same type of workers' councils that had been the hallmark of the Russian and German revolutions. Nevertheless, the SDAP, with which most Dutch workers sympathized, was opposed to a revolution and worked behind the scenes to calm the tensions and diffuse working-class anger. Despite the inability of the Dutch working class to launch a revolt, the country's communists were among Europe's most radical movements. The main figures behind the *Tribunisten* – Pannekoek, Henrietta Roland-Holst, and Herman Gorter – were central in founding the new Communist Party of Holland (CPH), later the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN).

Lenin and the Bolsheviks recognized the CPN as one of the more serious communist parties in Western Europe. When the Communist International was founded in 1919 as an international organization dedicated to spreading the Russian Revolution across the world, the decision was made to locate its Western European branch in Amsterdam. Although the Communist International quickly abandoned the idea of an Amsterdam Bureau, during its brief existence it

was a central element in the controversy that sprang up in the international communist movement regarding the phenomenon of “left-wing communism.” The Dutch communists were central figures in a movement within the Communist International that argued that in Western Europe the revolution would proceed along a different path than it had in Russia. Because the Western European working class, unlike in Russia, had been exposed to decades of parliamentary democracy, communists would have to fight a more patient battle than had been necessary in Russia in order to raise workers’ class consciousness to the point of launching a revolution. They argued that revolutionaries in Western Europe would have to fight first against the cultural and psychological attachment the workers had to democracy in order to make them understand the necessity of revolution. Therefore, the left-wing communists shunned participation in parliaments and the trade unions. This earned them Lenin’s ire in his 1920 pamphlet *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*, where he lambasted them as failing to understand the basic essentials of communist revolution.

During the interwar period the Netherlands remained mostly calm, although a small left-wing communist movement continued, which rivaled both the socialists and the official Communist Party. Building on the left-wing communists’ aversion to trade unionism, the “council communists” sought to create a new workers’ movement centered on the working-class’s ability to form workers’ councils in times of intense conflict. The council communists perceived the workers’ councils as an alternative to the party hierarchy of the official communist movement and the class collaborationism of the Socialist Party. Following Hitler’s rise to power in Germany in 1933, the Dutch Council Communist movement was strengthened by the arrival of like-minded dissident communists fleeing Nazi repression.

When World War II broke out in Europe in 1939 the Netherlands initially remained neutral. However, the Nazi Blitzkrieg overran the country in 1940 and the Dutch experienced most of the remainder of the war as an occupied nation. Individual acts of resistance to the Nazis were numerous, and the Dutch had an exceptional record of resisting Nazi anti-Semitism. The Netherlands had long been an important destination for European Jews fleeing persecution elsewhere, and while sympathy for the Nazis

was not absent, many Dutch engaged in heroic individual actions to help hide their Jewish fellow citizens from Nazi authorities.

In perhaps the most dramatic expression of the Dutch resistance to Nazism, in 1941 a protest movement led by students angered by the persecution of the nation’s Jews engulfed many Dutch cities. Before long, the student protest movement had become a massive strike that also spread to most of the major cities in the nation. While rejection of anti-Semitism was an important impulse to the strike, the Dutch workers were also protesting against the harsh wartime labor conditions and the deportation of Dutch workers to Germany. Despite the breadth of the strike, the German army was able to regain control of the situation with severe repression, resulting in the deaths of many workers. While the CPN was instrumental in initiating the strike, it spread with a rapidity few expected, and the remaining left-wing communist groups also sought intense resistance against the Nazis.

Following World War II, the Netherlands, like much of the rest of Europe, was in desperate shape. Food rationing was common in the immediate postwar years. However, spurred on by massive aid under the Marshall Plan of the United States, the Netherlands quickly recovered, and entered a period of great prosperity and national renewal. Massive social changes consumed the nation, with women gaining a more equitable role in social life, and education becoming increasingly available to the children of the working class.

In the 1950s and 1960s a consumer society was taking shape that challenged traditional social mores, and posed the possibility of a life of self-definition and self-exploration. During this period a youth-based social movement developed known as the Provos that challenged traditional morality and advocated a communal, yet hedonistic, society in which individuals could experience the fullness of their human potential. The Provo movement advocated for such things as looser drug laws, a liberalization of sexual morality, and greater respect for the environment. In many ways the spirit of the Provos, although initially regarded with skepticism by mainstream Dutch society, was slowly integrated into Dutch culture, evidenced today by the nation’s progressive social mores and generally libertarian culture.

During this same period the Netherlands, like most other European nations, experienced a severe

labor shortage and began to encourage immigration, mostly from Muslim countries in Africa and the Middle East. Immigration from parts of the former Dutch colonial empire also increased, making the Netherlands a multi-ethnic society in the latter part of the twentieth century. The growing diversity of the Netherlands has led to strong tensions in Dutch society in the twenty-first century, with some politicians arguing that immigration should be curtailed, and the Dutch Muslim population closely watched with increasing fears of terrorism following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Others who oppose immigration and the Muslim presence in the Netherlands have claimed that many Muslim immigrants do not share the same progressive values that define Dutch society, and that they are too prone to violence against women and homophobic acts.

Tensions over Muslim immigration to the Netherlands have come to a head in recent years, with two notorious acts of violence. First, in 2002, the openly homosexual politician Pim Fortuyn, who was harshly critical of Muslims and argued in favor of curtailing immigration, was assassinated by a Dutch activist for animal rights who claimed he was acting on behalf of Dutch Muslims. Then, in 2004, filmmaker Theo Van Gogh was killed by a Dutch Muslim angered over a film he had produced that was perceived as anti-Muslim. This murder led to a series of protests in many Dutch cities and Muslim religious sites were vandalized.

Social and political tensions regarding the status of the Dutch Muslim population continue, as evidenced by the 2006 decision of the Dutch immigration minister Rita Verdonk to strip Ayann Hirsi Ali, a Somali immigrant and member of the Dutch parliament, and herself a strong critic of Muslim misogyny, of her citizenship due to an inaccuracy in her asylum petition.

Today, the Netherlands is still overall one of the world's most open and tolerant societies. However, the recent social and political tension regarding the status of immigrants, many of Muslim origin, threatens realignment in Dutch politics, with the possibility that a more organized and politically active right-wing anti-immigrant movement could develop.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Dutch Revolt, 1568–1648; Immigrant and Social Conflict, France; Lenin, Vladimir

Ilyich (1870–1924); Netherlands, Protests, 1650–1800; Pamphleteering and Political Protest, Dutch Republic, 1672; Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917

References and Suggested Readings

- Arblaster, P. (2006) *A History of the Low Countries*. New York: Palgrave.
- Kossmann, E. H. (1978) *The Low Countries, 1780–1940*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sniderman, P. M. & Hagendoorn, L. (2007) *When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and Its Discontents in the Netherlands*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tilly, C. (1993) *European Revolutions, 1492–1992*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Warmbrunn, W. (1963) *The Dutch Under German Occupation, 1940–1945*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Neto, Agostinho (1922–1979)

Justin Corfield

António Agostinho Neto was an Angolan nationalist leader who fought against Portuguese colonialism and became the first president of the People's Republic of Angola on November 11, 1975. He was born on September 17, 1922, in the village of Kaxikane, Icolo e Bengo, some 40 miles southeast of Luanda, the capital of the Portuguese colony of Angola. His father was a Methodist minister, and his mother was a teacher. He studied at Salvador Correia High School, and from 1944 to 1947 he worked in the Luanda Public Health Service. During this time he befriended Reverend Ralph Dodge, an American Methodist bishop. Through Dodge he gained a scholarship to the University of Coimbra in Portugal to study medicine, and later transferred to Lisbon University Medical School.

Neto became an *assimilado* – that is, one of the tiny minority of colonial Africans and mulattos who were granted Portuguese citizenship on the basis of having been assimilated into Portuguese culture. Even so, he became interested in politics, gaining recognition as a notable nationalist poet and advocate of separatism. His poetry rapidly gained him the attention of writers and literary figures around the world. His first poems were published in book form in *Quatro*

Poemas (Four Poems), published in 1961, followed by *Con Occhi Aschiutti* (With Dry Eyes) and *Sagrada Esperanza* (Sacred Hope), published in 1974.

Because of Neto's nationalistic political activities, he was arrested in 1951 by the police of the Estado Novo regime and sentenced to three months in Caxias prison. This led to protests from prominent figures like Jean-Paul Sartre, François Mauriac, Diego Rivera, and others. In 1955 he was arrested again and was sentenced to two years in prison, but was released a year later following more international protests. He was also suspended from his studies until 1957, delaying the completion of his medical degree until 1958. In the following year Neto returned to Angola as a doctor but continued to take part in nationalist politics. He was arrested on June 8, 1960, despite local protests, and held in Cape Verde and later Lisbon.

Released, Neto was rearrested in the following year and held at Aljube prison, then put under house arrest. The Portuguese again succumbed to international protests for his release, but decided not to let him leave Portugal. With the aid of members of the Portuguese Communist Party he escaped via Morocco, eventually returning to Angola and being elected president of the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, MPLA) in 1962. The MPLA had been formed in 1956 from a merger of the Angolan Communist Party and Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola (PLUA).

From 1960, the MPLA organized an insurgency against Portuguese rule. Neto, a Marxist, gained support from the Soviet Union and helped ensure that the MPLA emerged as the main national liberation party. It captured Luanda from the forces of Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, FNLA) and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, UNITA). The collapse of the Estado Novo in 1974 saw Portuguese colonialism in Africa draw to an end. Power in Angola was to be handed to a transitional coalition government, including the three main independence forces, but the coalition collapsed.

With Cuban and Soviet military aid, Neto was proclaimed the first president of the People's

Republic of Angola on November 11, 1975; a large part of the Portuguese population fled, as did UNITA and FNLA supporters. The MPLA secured control of other major urban centers for a time too. Neto was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize for 1975–6, and the MPLA was declared Marxist-Leninist. However, Neto's continued refusal to compromise with the FNLA and UNITA prolonged the civil war in independent Angola that was fed by Cold War rivalries and South African actions. In spite of the immense mineral wealth of Angola, the country remained poor and heavily divided.

Neto, suffering from cancer of the pancreas, went to Moscow for medical treatment and died on September 10, 1979. His body was embalmed by the team who worked on Lenin's body, but in 1991, in accordance with the wishes of Neto's widow, it was finally buried. Neto's birthday is a public holiday celebrated as National Heroes Day in Angola, and the main university is named after him.

SEE ALSO: Angolan National Liberation, 1961–1974; Imperialism, Historical Evolution; Leninist Philosophy; MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola)

References and Suggested Readings

- Burness, D. (1977) *Fire: Six Writers from Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde*. Washington, DC: Three Continents Press.
- Marcum, J. A. (1978) *The Angolan Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Núñez, B. (1995) *Dictionary of Portuguese–African Civilization*. London: Hans Zell.

New Australia movement

Anne Whitehead

In 1893 approximately 500 white Australians, rebelling against perceived inequalities and injustice in the system at home, set off for South America with their ideological leader, an English journalist William Lane (1861–1917), to attempt to live out his vision of a socialist utopia in the Paraguayan wilderness. The Australian poet Henry Lawson, tempted to go with them, wrote that it was “the hope of something better than the present or the past” that would “save us in the end” (*New Australia Journal*, March 1894). But the settlers

soon divided into two rival camps and the scheme ultimately failed, as had been predicted back in Australia. The second commune, Colonia Cosme, actually persisted for 16 years along broad socialist principles, although it fell dismally short in terms of gender equality, while the notion of racial equality was never contemplated and actively opposed. Today, a few thousand descendants of that socialist experiment still live in Paraguay; a few were even candidates for the Colorado Party of the infamous right-wing dictatorship of General Alfredo Stroessner (1954–89).

The plan was put into action on July 16, 1893, two years after the collapse of a bitter five-month-long shearers' strike in the northern colony of Queensland. William Lane and the first shipload of 220 emigrants set sail from Sydney Harbor, hundreds of people lining the foreshores to see them off, with well-wishers bobbing on the waves in launches and dinghies. Government authorities condemned the venture and the press generally mocked it. The Sydney *Bulletin* described it as "one of the most feather-headed expeditions ever conceived since Ponce de León started out to find the Fountain of Eternal Youth, or Sir Galahad pursued the Holy Grail." A second batch of 199 emigrants left in December of that year, and was followed by other groups making their independent way to Paraguay, in the heartland of the South American continent.

It was considered baffling, even then, that over 500 people should leave Australia in the 1890s, a time when the continent's enormous agricultural potential was being recognized and exploited, the first Labor Party members were being elected to colonial parliaments and modest social reforms effected, and political theorists from Europe were arriving to study a system where ordinary working people had the chance to reach the top politically and economically – a system that some described as a "social laboratory" for the world. It was seen as absurd, outrageous, that the deserters were leaving for a tiny, war-ravaged land, where revolutions and dictatorships were endemic, social reforms virtually unknown, the climate inhospitable, amenities of life few, transport difficult, and the language incomprehensible to the newcomers.

But they went, principally because of the vision of that one man, William Lane: slight, bespectacled, prematurely balding, and physically unprepossessing with a crippled left foot, but with an electrifying ability to compel listeners and enthuse

people to his cause. The immediate impetus for the expedition was the decisive crushing of the 1891 shearers' strike, which meant workers were ready to listen, but the records show that Lane had entertained a dream of establishing a commune in South America – specifically Argentina – for at least two years before that.

Lane was born in Bristol, England, the eldest son of a mother from Gloucestershire and an Irish Protestant father, a landscape gardener whose alcoholism impoverished the family. Young William was only 16 when, after the death of his mother, he left to try his luck in Canada and the United States, where he lived and worked – as a printer, compositor, and journalist – for eight years (1877–85). Here his political ideas were formed. He arrived in time to experience the controversy of the Great Railway Strike of 1877 in the US and the violence of its suppression. He joined the Order of the Knights of Labor in Detroit and absorbed the movement's principles on cooperative institutions and, nominally, on gender equality. He read Henry George's *Progress and Poverty* (1879) and took in the arguments for a "single tax" and the notion that, once freed from the tyranny of privilege and the stranglehold of poverty, humankind could become a creative force. But, most significantly, in the 1880s the US for a century had experienced the greatest flourishing of communitarian experiment the world had ever seen; there were literally hundreds of communal ventures, both religious and secular – Fourierists, Rappites, socialist Owenites, Icarians, Ruskinites, Oneidans, Amanans, Shakers, and Mormons – with scores more communities being implemented during Lane's eight years' residence. Some were set up with nostalgia for a pre-industrial past, others with millenarian expectations – a sense that the world was being reshaped in preparation for an apocalyptic future in which humankind would discover its true destiny. Lane was undoubtedly influenced by this ferment of ideas and the optimistic and abundant literature of nineteenth-century utopianism, shaping his dream of taking part in a community someday, somewhere, to be defined by his own developing ideas.

By 1885 William Lane was disillusioned with America, with the imbalance of wealth, economic turbulence, and bitter tensions between the haves and have-nots. With rapid urbanization and new technological advancements, white Americans resented the disappearance of accessible cheap

land, the influx of blacks from the South, and shiploads of immigrants from southeastern Europe. Lane ceased to believe he was in the land of “the brave and the free” and left for another, which he thought still could be. In 1885 he traveled to Australia with his American wife Anne (*née* Macquire) and younger brother John, who later recalled William talking on shipboard about his utopian dream: “whenever my brother organized his colony we were to throw in our lot with it and him.” William took in his luggage Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*, Henry George’s *Progress and Poverty*, Ricardo’s *Principles*, and Gronlund’s *Co-operative Commonwealth*. It is recorded that he also carried Marx’s *Das Kapital*, but if so it was the German edition and there is no evidence Lane could read in that language. Undoubtedly Lane later attempted *Capital* after it was published in English translation in 1887, but he decided “to the everyday man, Marx is unreadable.” While he certainly viewed himself as no “everyday man” and became familiar with Marx and Engels’s *Communist Manifesto*, the term “communism” for Lane always harked back to a romantic view of the secular socialism of the Knights of Labor and the intentional communities he had admired in the United States.

The Lanes arrived in Brisbane, capital of the northern colony of Queensland, in late 1885 and William was soon famous for his fiery, eloquent journalism. In 1890 he became editor of the colony’s first labor movement newspaper, the *Worker*, and offered his readership of shearers, shedhands, drovers, and fencers his ideas on socialism and the rights of trade unionists.

Lane came to idealize the independence and toughness of the Australian Bushmen – he sought to mythologize them, just as the gauchos of Argentina were being mythologized – but he deplored the harsh conditions in which the men lived and labored. After a financial crash in 1890, employers sought to reduce their wages and conditions even further and to bring in non-union labor. At the commencement of the 1891 shearing season, union shearers and shedhands went on strike. Lane supported their cause in passionate editorials – and he in turn became known as the “Bushman’s hero.” In Central Queensland 10,000 men held out in makeshift strike camps for almost five months, with government forces ranged against them with Gatling guns and Nordenfeld field pieces. The situation

was explosive. Newspapers in southern colonies sent “war correspondents” and it has been argued that Australia came as close as it has ever been to civil war.

At last in May 1891 the union shearers capitulated – because of hunger, exhaustion, and the privations for their families – in the face of the overwhelming firepower of the Queensland government. But with the strike over, hundreds of men found they were on employers’ blacklists and unable to obtain work. It was then that they listened to William Lane, who had rekindled his dream of founding in South America *The Workingman’s Paradise*, the title of a polemical novel he was then writing for recruiting purposes and to raise funds for imprisoned strike leaders.

“Come out from this hateful life,” Lane called to them, promising instead a life of mateship, sharing, and equality. “The first duty of each to be the well-being of all and the sole duty of all to be the well-being of each.” The New Australia Cooperative Settlement Association was formed and over 2,000 prospective colonists signed up in 1892, 600 of them subscribing the required £60, for most of them all their life savings. The women, denied the franchise in Australia, were promised: “The Association maintains for women absolute equality with man, and regards marriage as inviolable. Both married and single women vote and share equally with men” (Lane 1892). Single women of good character between 18 and 25 years of age were offered membership free of charge. When £30,000 was collected the ship the *Royal Tar* was purchased. Lane’s ambition was grandiloquent. Their own ship was needed to carry the thousands who would soon join them. He did not plan to create a mere village in the backwoods but a functioning model of socialism that would be a vanguard for working-class people in all lands. “We will write the history of humanity,” he was fond of saying, “on the rocks of the Andes.”

His reference to the Andes, rather far from swampy Paraguay, indicates Lane’s preferred initial location for his utopian enterprise. The majority of men among his intending colonists were sheepworkers, and he knew that the plains of Patagonia were being opened up for extensive sheep farming by English landowners and Scottish crofters, thereby providing a bulwark against Chile’s plans to expand eastwards. He was convinced the Argentine government would be eager to offer the Australians a large tract of land

in the south and leave them to run it according to their own laws. In 1891 he dispatched three of his lieutenants to formally submit this request and to prospect for suitable land. As it turned out, the government of Carlos Pellegrini left the prospectors in no doubt that any sheep farming land in the south was available only at market price and strictly subject to Argentina's laws. However, the prospectors *were* authorized, as a strategy against Chile, to select from public lands in the provinces of Río Negro, Chubut, and Neuquén. The Australians envied the Welsh their farming success in the Chubut, but found all the fertile land in this region occupied.

In July 1892 they hired horses and gloomily set off further west, targeting for investigation land on the southern shore of Lake Nahuel Huapi near the Chilean border. But they despaired of the desert landscape they passed through, and, after riding over 622 miles (1,000 kilometers) across difficult terrain, they gave up and turned back. The land they had rejected and never saw, with its alpine meadows and forests of cypress, cedar, and beech bordering the lake, was some of the finest on the continent, today the ski and boating resort of San Carlos de Bariloche.

The prospectors were about to return, dejected, to Australia when they received a promising invitation from the government of land-locked Paraguay. They traveled north to Asunción and were overwhelmed to find government ministers only too anxious to accommodate them. They were offered soft green pasture land, watered by streams and interspersed with pockets of rainforest with massive trees and ferns, among which flittered hummingbirds and butterflies. After their 90 days in the arid wastes of the south, they felt they had stepped into a Garden of Eden. On January 19, 1893, Lane received a cablegram: "Found splendid land in Paraguay."

Paraguay welcomed the colonists, offering them a generous land grant of 187,000 hectares or 463,000 acres, because it was still recovering from the devastation of its population just 20 years before. During the War of the Triple Alliance (1865–70), still the bloodiest in Latin America's history, the fiercely patriotic Paraguayans, driven by the Napoleonic fantasies of their military dictator, Francisco Solano López, battled the combined armies of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. At the end of the five-year war the country's destruction was almost total. Paraguay had lost a staggering 90 percent of its male popu-

lation. Sir Richard Burton wrote that the world had rarely seen such a tragedy, "this unflinching struggle maintained for so long a period against overwhelming odds, and to the very verge of racial annihilation" (Burton 1870). Starving women and children begged for food as they struggled to cultivate land. It became a country of widows, old men, and orphans. For at least two generations, the women of Paraguay resigned themselves to be laborers and share the few men polygamously, while the church looked the other way. The country desperately needed new immigrants and fresh bloodstock.

But the Paraguay government was unaware that its generosity was to be betrayed. All intending Australian colonists were required to sign pledges not only to observe teetotalism, but "the Color Line." Fraternization with Paraguayans was forbidden. Lane's concept of social justice was exclusively for Europeans.

Despite Australian press derision and bureaucratic obstruction, on July 16, 1893 the *Royal Tar* – a 598-ton barque-rigged sailing ship just 31 feet wide and 171 feet long – was ready and the first batch of 220 colonists set sail. There were 46 bachelors who were mainly bushworkers, 37 married couples, and 93 children; but except for a nurse and a few adolescent girls traveling with their families, Lane had excluded single women until the settlement was established. The pioneers voyaged across the Pacific, perilously around Cape Horn (passing whales spouting, icebergs in the distance), then sailed up the South American continent's east coast and at Montevideo transhipped to a river boat. Another journey 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers) upriver brought them to Paraguay's capital Asunción, then a steam train ride into the heartland of the country, and finally a trek in covered wagons into the dense rainforest to reach the site of their land grant, 109 miles (176 kilometers) southeast of the capital. Colonia Nueva Australia was founded by the pioneers on September 28, 1893 in torrential rain. One of Lane's first actions was to evict over 1,000 Guaraní Indians living on the site, their traditional land. The Indians were described as "squatters" and told to move. Reluctantly, as the colonists had government authorization, they submitted.

At Nueva Australia there was to be no racial mixing, "the Color Line" was to be rigidly observed, with everyone signing the pledge: "We refuse to mix with colored races; we want our children to be as white as we are, capable of

upholding our principles and understanding our ideals." The country was peopled mainly by women, famed for their attractiveness, and the Australian colony was predominantly single men, young and virile. It was all testing the faith rather too sternly.

But William Lane had high hopes of a recruiting drive for women in Australia and Great Britain. A few British families and bachelors actually made the journey to join the movement, but the Anglo single women stayed away in proverbial droves. Most Australian socialist women, like the majority of their male colleagues, believed that the battle against capitalism needed to be fought at home and nothing could be achieved by running away.

At Nueva Australia the bachelors were not able to drown their frustrations in alcohol, having all signed the other pledge to teetotalism. Before long three men broke loose, went into the nearby village, took some wine with the priest and flirted with some local women. When they returned to the colony, Lane insisted on the expulsion of the three for "persistent violation of the clause relating to liquor drinking." The men were forthwith expelled, with Paraguayan soldiers summoned to see them off the land; this resulted in uproar, many resentful colonists siding with the dissidents.

It was all a recipe for disaster. The factional intrigues at Nueva Australia escalated into ructions, fistfights, more expulsions, and desertions. Despite dire warnings sent back to friends and relatives in Australia advising intending colonists to abandon plans to make the trip, the next batch of 200 departed from the southern city of Adelaide in December. They arrived to a scene of chaos, finding many of their comrades besieging the British consulate in Asunción, unsuccessfully pleading for assistance with passages back to Australia. Some of the stranded men went to Patagonia to earn their way home as sheep shearers.

In April 1894, just seven months after the arrival in Paraguay, there was a split at the colony. William Lane and 63 faithful followers walked out and, thanks to the indulgent Paraguayan government, were able to form a second commune, Colonia Cosme, 45 miles (72 kilometers) to the southeast, near the village of Caazapá, but in an unpromising location, a fork between two rivers which tended to flood. Lane called it "a quiet, safe start on bedrock."

And yet intending colonists continued to arrive at Nueva Australia, making their way independently: the feminist and labor organizer Rose Summerfield, her husband Jack Cadogan, and trade union official Gilbert Casey and two family groups from England, the Kennedys and the Smiths. But in 1899 the Nueva Australia colony reverted to separate title and private enterprise, although holding together in a loose cooperative described as an "Industrial Co-Partnership." Most of the communards departed, and those who remained divided the lush land between them. Today a few of their descendants are wealthy cattle *estancieros*.

But at the second settlement of Colonia Cosme, the 64 "true believers" were determined to hold to the original aims – except for the ideal of gender equality, which was preemptorily abandoned in Cosme's new charter. Patriarchy prevailed, meshing comfortably with the wider culture where *machismo* was entrenched. The men cleared the forest (known as *monte* in Paraguay) and put up mud and sapling huts with thatched grass roofs. They cleaned and stumped the land and planted vegetables and saw most of them fail. For the first year they were obliged to buy a supply of beans and maize, supplemented for protein by the occasional monkey, but they were often stalked by the prospect of starvation. Gradually, however, some of their crops, those suited to the climate, came good, and batches of like-minded optimists made independent journeys from Australia to join them. One of these was the 30-year-old school teacher Mary Cameron; she married one of the colonists and later became famous in Australia as the long-lived poet and social justice activist Dame Mary Gilmore (1865–1962).

The Cosme colonists needed commercial industries for economic survival and focused on a sugar cane crop and timber from their forests. A sawpit was constructed, then a barn and a sugar cane crusher with railway tracks laid to trolley the crop in from the fields; but with both industries they were thwarted by the distance from the market in Asunción and the tendency of the surrounding rivers to flood and isolate them.

Nevertheless, they were upheld by a strong community spirit, huddling together on logs as dusk fell for readings from "Cosme Evening Notes" and from Shakespeare, Tennyson, and Robert Burns. They had a library of 600 volumes and the thatch-roofed dining hall for games

of draughts and dominoes, Spanish lessons, lectures on poetry, and debates on Marxism, Darwin's *Origin of the Species*, "The New Woman," and "The Perfectibility of Man." The hall, illuminated by flickering oil lamps, was the location for dances long into the night, couples whirling to the Schottische, the Caledonian, and the Lancers, the women with fireflies sparkling in their hair, a Paraguayan custom they adopted. They gathered in the large wooden barn for singalong corn-husking sessions and the whole community for dramatic productions and "black-face" minstrel shows. Occasional cricket matches were also held against a scratch team, the Englishmen of Paraguay – but never against their rivals at Nueva Australia, with whom relations continued to be acrimonious.

The colonists communicated with other like-minded secular socialist communities in the Americas, including the Ruskin Colony of Tennessee (later of Georgia), founded almost at the same time as Nueva Australia by a similarly charismatic leader, Julius A. Wayland; they also kept in touch with Topolobampo, a cooperative settlement established in Mexico in 1886 by some 400 Americans and Canadians. It was a depressing omen when Topolobampo collapsed ignominiously a decade after its inception.

Increasingly there were community disputes at Cosme, often concerning new recruits from Britain, most of whom soon left. More and more, Lane's abrasive personality and inflexible approach to community affairs were resented. When two men were expelled in May 1898 for betraying the communal spirit by independently raising two piglets and having a private barbecue with friends, 40 colonists resigned in outrage. One of them complained that Lane was "a knave seized with the madness of ambition, overpowered with a sense of the divinity of himself and his mission, and for that he will barter truth, justice and the whole world plus the handful of bigots he terms the faithful." Lane by then was exhausted by illness, disillusionment, and stress. He blamed the failure of his dream on the inadequacy of the human material with which he had tried to implement it. "The devil of the Labour movement," he wrote, "is having to work with dirty tools." Finally in August 1899, Lane and his family departed from Cosme, without the benefit of a farewell social. It was a muted, bleak scene as their cart trundled out of the village, the site of the great communist city he would never build. He settled in New Zealand where he

became a journalist, then editor, of a conservative newspaper, the *New Zealand Herald*. He became notorious for his right-wing, rabidly imperialist editorials. But he also spent much of his remaining life attempting to repay debts to followers in Australia who had lost their life savings in support of his dream. One of them wrote with sorrow: "He is still incorruptible, disinterested in motive, and unswerving in pursuit of what he conceives to be the truth; but the mental outlook has narrowed, something of bitterness has entered in his soul." When Lane died in August 1917 a former supporter lamented: "Billy Lane is dead – dear old Billy Lane. And he died in the camp of the enemy!"

However, Colonia Cosme continued to operate on broad socialist principles for another decade, so surviving 16 years from its inception. (This can be contrasted with the six years – 1839–45 – that Queenwood lasted, the officially endorsed community of the much better known Owenite socialist movement in England.) Finally, in 1909, the Cosme land was carved up into private title and the assets divided, with considerable wrangling and two sets of lawyers for the nine remaining families.

The Sydney *Bulletin* in 1893 had predicted: "There will be a few hundred people digging and fencing in a dreary hopeless fashion out in the great loneliness, and living on woe and unsalable vegetables and dreams of home." By the end this was perilously close to the truth. But it did not end in some terrible immolation. It simply dwindled away. For years the Cosme colonists had tried to hold together, they worked hard, they did not drink, they rarely philandered, and they were fanatics for education. But the ideology underpinning their movement – mainly the ideology of their leader – had been white supremacist and male chauvinist. The future for the remaining colonists' children was to make an accommodation with the wider community of Paraguay.

That first-born colony generation was torn in a sense of identity. They were all accustomed to communicating in Spanish and in the Guaraní language spoken by almost everyone in the country, but some still confessed to preferring "a chat in English." They had lived in Paraguay all their lives, but used antiquated Australian expressions such as "tucker" and "smoko," recited the nineteenth-century poetry of Henry Lawson, and regularly enjoyed "damper" (the unleavened bread of the Australian bush) with their afternoon tea. None of that first generation had any

memory of Australia. Bill Wood, or “Don Guillermo,” the eldest of the Wood brothers, known as the last “Patriarch of Cosme,” was 6 months old when his family left Sydney. His seven siblings were all born in Paraguay. But they admitted to not feeling completely Paraguayan and quoted their mother, who said she had been “beached on a foreign shore by William Lane’s dream.” They themselves felt they had suffered from a scrappy education. As a toddler Bill had sat in on Mary Gilmore’s classes, and they all remembered William Lane’s brother John as a good teacher, but after that they had a succession of English instructors sent up by the bishop of the Falkland Islands, each of whom “took fright” and only stayed a few months.

When World War I broke out in 1914, Paraguay was not involved, but 16 young men from Cosme and Nueva Australia enlisted in the British army. They were defending the empire – all the “pink bits” of the map – they had learned about at school. Some of them fought against the Turks at Gallipoli and met Australians in great numbers for the first time. But although at the end of the war they were offered repatriation and free passages to Australia or Britain, they all chose to return to Paraguay. And at last, in 1926, a rigid colony restriction was broken at Cosme with the first marriage to a Paraguayan. Other mixed marriages soon followed.

In 1932 Paraguay became engaged in its own terrible conflict using modern weaponry, the Chaco War against Bolivia. The issue was the arid land of the Chaco dividing the two countries, which Bolivia had claimed since colonial days, but also crucially it was about the oil deposits suspected beneath. The three-year war offered the tragic spectacle of two poor and largely Indian-populated republics striving to exterminate one another. Five young men from Colonia Cosme and ten from the former colony of Nueva Australia volunteered or were conscripted to defend their country. Paraguay was awarded the bulk of the disputed territory in the peace treaty of 1938. No oil in viable quantities was ever found in the wastelands where almost 100,000 soldiers had died. Six were colony descendants who had made the ultimate commitment to Paraguay.

From 1954 to 1989 the Australian colony descendants lived under the brutal regime of General Alfredo Stroessner. In a grim irony in the early 1980s, the site of Lane’s original colony, Nueva Australia, was renamed Distrito Hugo Stroessner in honor of the dictator’s

Bavarian father, with a Mussolini-style heroic concrete monument to him in the village park. A tiny bronze plaque in the corner mentioned “*los Colonos Precursores*,” the colonial precursors who arrived in 1893, but omitted to mention they were socialist Australians. In the old colony cemetery, the headstones of the pioneers were smashed, almost all the inscriptions obliterated.

Just 45 miles (72 kilometers) away – but almost a day’s travel along rutted roads by four-wheel drive – is the site of the remote rival settlement of Colonia Cosme. This poor and infinitely beautiful village is still laid out with wide red-dirt avenues according to William Lane’s vision for a great communist city. Many of the houses are traditional mud and thatch, sheltered by blue gums and white cedars planted by the colonists. A cement-block police station occupies the site of the old social hall, where colonists once danced to fiddle and accordion with oil lamps in brackets along the walls.

A historic function in Asunción in July 1993 celebrated the centenary of the Australian colonists arriving in Paraguay, hosted by the Australian embassy based in Buenos Aires. Some 200 descendants of the two rival colonies of Nueva Australia and Colonia Cosme came together as a group for the first time in 100 years. They were only a fraction of the few thousand Paraguayans with Australian blood in their veins, but they were the ones acknowledging a connection and an interest in the land of their forebears.

They encompassed the political spectrum and every contradiction. Some were redheaded and freckled, in appearance classic Irish Australian, but spoke no English. Others, with coppery Hispanic complexions, were devoted followers of English cricket. They ranged from people still eking out a near subsistence living at Cosme, to one of the wealthiest businessmen in Paraguay; from cattlemen on *estancias* out in the Chaco to a real estate agent in Australia and a writer of comic books with an audience of millions in Spain and Latin America. Not all of them were celebrating the 1989 coup in which General Stroessner fled to Brazil. But one descendant, Enrique Wood, had been arrested by Stroessner’s secret police three times, once merely for wearing a blue shirt, the color of the opposition Liberales Party. He said he was proud to call himself a socialist, but not at all proud to be descended from such a racist colony as William Lane’s. Also present at the gathering was Roger Cadogan, who continues

the work of his father Leon Cadogan, an internationally respected anthropologist, who placed himself at great personal risk by speaking out against the Stroessner regime's complicity "in the enslavement and genocide of the Guyaki forest Indians," as officially reported to the United Nations in 1974 (Arens 1976).

One of the descendants said of his forebears: "They ended up in Paraguay because they were a romantic bunch of lunatics. Their downfall was a lack of reality . . . but from the failure and the waste they survived. . . . If those old boys were in Australia today, they'd be asking for a republic. I know they marched off and left the country, but their fight wasn't with Australia – it was with the regime of the time" (Whitehead 1997: 549).

SEE ALSO: Australian Left; Communist Party of Australia; Knights of Labor and Terence Powderly (1849–1924); New Harmony; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Paraguay, Protest and Revolt, 1954–1989; Paraguay, Protests in the Liberal Era and the Triple Alliance; Utopian Communities, United States; Utopian Intentional Communities

References and Suggested Readings

- Arens, R. (Ed.) (1976) *Genocide in Paraguay*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Burton, R. (1870) *Letters from the Battlefields of Paraguay*. London: Tinsley Brothers.
- Lane, W. ["John Miller"] (1892) *The Workingman's Paradise: An Australian Labour Novel*. Sydney & Brisbane: Edwards, Dunlop & Co. and the Worker Board of Trustees (Online at Project Gutenberg).
- New Australia: Journal of the New Australia Cooperative Settlement Association*, setis.library.usyd.edu.au/rare/newoz/.
- Ross, L. (1935/1980) *William Lane and the Australian Labor Movement*. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger.
- Scates, B. (1997) *A New Australia: Citizenship, Radicalism and the First Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Souter, G. (1968/1991) *A Peculiar People: The Australians in Paraguay*. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.
- Svensen, S. (1989) *The Shearers' War: The Story of the 1891 Shearers' Strike*. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.
- Whitehead, A. (1997) *Paradise Mislaid: In Search of the Australian Tribe of Paraguay*. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.
- Whitehead, A. (2003) *Bluestocking in Patagonia: Mary Gilmore's Quest for Love and Utopia at the World's End*. London: Profile Books.
- Wilding, M. (1984) *The Paraguayan Experiment: A Documentary Novel*. Ringwood: Penguin.

New Caledonia, protest and revolt

Justin Corfield

Since annexation by France in 1853, New Caledonia, an island chain in Melanesia, east of Australia, has experienced a tumultuous history of protest and rebellion rooted in the struggle for indigenous rights and the French use of the island to exile prisoners for punishment to a penal colony. Situated in the Pacific Ocean, New Caledonia was formally annexed by the French on September 24, 1853, with France eager to take the islands before the British. In 1862, after nine years of the island being controlled by commandants, the French appointed their first governor, Charles Guillain, but New Caledonia remained under military control for the rest of the nineteenth century.

English and French explorers had visited the island since Captain Cook landed there in 1774. He had discovered an island which he named the Isle of Pines (Île des Pins), where he found enough pine to replace some of the worn timbers on his ship, the *Resolution*. The French under the Comte de la Pérouse arrived in the late 1780s, as did more British and American whalers, and then French and British missionaries. The Melanesian society that they found was tribal, with chiefs holding islands, and some local conflicts.

The French decided to use New Caledonia as a penal colony and in May 1864 shipped the first group of convicts from France, via the Cape of Good Hope, to Port-de-France (modern-day Nouméa). These convicts were kept on Île Nou, in Nouméa's harbor, and they were used to work on the building of many of the public buildings in Nouméa, as well as St. Joseph's Cathedral, and many roads on the island of Grande Terre, the main island in New Caledonia. The French also established another penal colony at Camp Brun for those considered most threatening to the regime.

In 1871 large numbers of political prisoners were exiled to New Caledonia following the ending of the Paris Commune. A total of 4,300 Communards, as they were known, found themselves in the Pacific, most on the Île des Pins, with most active insurrectionists taken to the Ducos Peninsula, near Nouméa. The initial plan involved deporting the entire population of the

Île des Pins, but Queen Hortense, leader of the local Kunies, refused to force her people from their island. Eventually, a compromise was reached whereby the locals would leave the western part of the island of the convict settlement. The Communards deported to the Île des Pins included Henri de Rochefort, who had been a radical parliamentary leader and newspaper editor; and Louise Michel, nicknamed the Red Virgin during the Paris Commune. Henri de Rochefort managed to escape from Ducos and reach Australia on March 19, 1874, whereupon he went to the United States and Britain to campaign for the release of fellow Communards. Many of the intellectuals deported to the Île des Pins died in despair and some committed suicide. They were buried in a cemetery, Cimetière des Déportés, near Kuto Bay, where there are no carved headstones, as none of those who died wanted any religious symbolism on their graves. A general amnesty for the Communards was granted in 1879 and Michel remained in Nouméa, where she worked alongside the local Kanak population against the French colonial rule.

Another group of political prisoners taken to the Île des Pins were Berbers who had staged a revolt against French rule in Algeria in 1871. Many died, but some survived their 50-year sentences to return to North Africa in their old age, and others settled in New Caledonia. Convicts continued to be sent to New Caledonia until 1897, by which time some 21,000 male and female convicts had been taken there.

Some freed convicts sympathized with the Kanak population, making common cause for those dispossessed when nickel was found in New Caledonia. The first governor, Charles Guillain, seized Kanak lands which he then sold to French settlers, dismissing Kanak chiefs and setting the scene for rising discontent. A Kanak revolt started on June 25, 1878. Kanaks attacked French settlers and their families, killing about 120 of them – men, women, and children – on the first two days. The revolt lasted for seven months and 200 French and 1,200 Kanaks were killed. The rebel leader Chief Atai was killed and some 800 of his surviving supporters were deported to Iles Belep of the Île des Pins. The French authorities then set about trying to destroy whatever power the Kanak still possessed, forcing some into reservations which they could only leave with police permission. Indeed,

a reward of 10 francs was offered for anybody who found a “native in an irregular situation.” The number of Kanaks fell from 42,500 in 1887 to 28,000 in 1901.

When Paul Feillet became governor on June 10, 1894 the French started a program of encouraging migrants from France to settle in New Caledonia, giving them between 15 to 25 hectares, on which they had to grow at least 5 hectares of coffee. Convicts initially provided free labor, but after 1897 this had to be replaced by Kanaks, and also indentured laborers from the Netherlands East Indies, Vietnam, and even Japan.

During World War I, some 5,500 Caldoche (settlers) and Kanaks formed the French Pacific Battalion, serving in North Africa, Italy, and in parts of France, with a quarter dying, including 372 Kanaks. In 1917 Chief Noël staged a revolt in the Koné-Hienghène part of northern Grande Terre. This time the French were better prepared and only 11 French and 200 Kanaks died. In 1923 the teaching of French in schools became compulsory, and the economy of the island started to stagnate.

With the Fall of France in June 1940, most of the French in New Caledonia offered their support to the London-based Free French government of Charles de Gaulle, but the French administration supported Vichy. It was ousted with the help of an Australian cruiser, HMAS *Adelaide*, with Henri Sautot becoming the French Resident Commissioner. Consequently, the US set up a large military base on Grande Terre with 40,000 Americans and some New Zealanders posted there. There were also some connections between wartime New Caledonia and Australian radicals, with left-wing journalist Wilfred Burchett writing about the colonial presence in the Pacific in *Pacific Treasure Island – New Caledonia* (1941). The Kanak nationalists often highlighted the US presence as one that eroded the power of the French settlers and helped the French government give the Kanaks French citizenship. At the same time the Japanese workers were deported, and most Indonesian and Vietnamese workers went home.

The Kanaks formed their first political movement, the Union Calédonienne (UC), in 1953 with support from white small landowners, some missionaries and trade unionists. The leader was Maurice Lenormand, who had stayed in New Caledonia after being sent as a French soldier

20 years earlier. When elections were held for the Territorial Assembly, the UC won 25 seats, with 9 held by Kanaks. Roch Pidjot, one of those who won a seat, was later to become the first Kanak elected to the French National Assembly.

The rise in nickel production in the 1950s and 1960s brought migrants from the New Hebrides (modern-day Vanuatu) and the Kanaks lost more land as Tahitians and migrants from the Wallis and Futuna Islands came to New Caledonia. In 1969 Nidoish Naisseline, a student who had returned from attending university in France, formed the Foulards Rouges (Red Berets), and in 1975 the Caledonian Multi-Racial Union (UMNC) demanded full independence. They changed their name in 1977 to the Front Uni de Libération Kanak (FULK), allying to the Parti de Libération Kanak (PALIKA) and intensifying demands for independence. Five pro-independence parties formed a political alliance in June 1979 with the Front Indépendantiste. In the run-up to the 1981 French presidential elections there was tension in New Caledonia, with a Nouméa newspaper, *Nouvelles Calédonniennes*, publishing on November 27, 1980, and again on January 15, 1981, claims that the French had supported the separatist movement on nearby New Hebrides (Vanuatu). In February 1981 former Australian prime minister Gough Whitlam urged for the United Nations to move on New Caledonia to ensure that it could gain independence.

In May 1981, following François Mitterrand's election as the first socialist president of the Fifth Republic, his party offered self-determination if elected, but the Kanaks were to be disappointed. The Caldoches had supported the Rassemblement pour Calédonie dans la République (RPCR), founded in 1977, which was allied to the RPR in France of Jacques Chirac, and led by Jacques Lafleur, a millionaire mining magnate. As protests started, on September 19, 1981 Pierre Declercq, the UC general secretary, was assassinated, and two years later two riot police were killed. This led to a series of massive protests, reaching a peak on November 11, when some 25,000 protesters urged "peace and fraternity" in a large show of unity against violence in Nouméa, paving the way for round-table talks. On June 18, 1982 the Front Indépendantiste won a majority in the new government council.

In 1984 the French government raised their Lemoine Plan offering five years of internal autonomy with a vote on self-determination in

1989. Upset at the delay in the referendum, Kanak separatist groups merged to form the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS). In the elections held in 1984, answering a boycott from the FLNKS, only half the electorate cast their votes (as against 75 percent in the previous election). The FLNKS then set up their Provisional Government of Kanaky, with Jean-Marie Tjibaou, the president of the UC, as the president. Ten days later, on December 5, some settlers attacked a group of Kanaks, killing ten, including two of Tjibaou's brothers, with the island seeming to be heading for civil war.

Edgard Pisani, the Special High Commissioner of New Caledonia, on January 7, 1985, outlined a new French plan which would have a referendum on July 1, 1985 offering a choice between independence (which would be granted on January 1, 1986) and self-government in association with France. The Kanaks were angered that the voters would only have to fulfill a three years' residency before being able to vote. The settlers were keen on any French citizen, including those who had arrived up to two months earlier, should also be allowed to vote. Violence then rocked New Caledonia with a seven-year-old Caldoche boy shot dead by Kanaks, and then Eloi Machoro, one of the radical FLNKS leaders, being killed by paramilitary gunmen after he had taken control of the nickel-mining town of Thio. Riots immediately broke out throughout New Caledonia, with the French sending paratroopers from metropolitan France and maintaining a state of emergency for six months, the first time these laws were invoked since the end of French Algeria in 1961. Bomb attacks resulted in an immediate downturn in tourism, and the French had to accommodate more of the demands of the Kanaks. Pitted against them, Jacques Chirac and French National Front leader Jean Marie Le Pen both flew to New Caledonia to lead the campaign against the new plan of French Prime Minister Laurent Fabius which would introduce land reforms and four regional councils. The FLNKS won control of three of the councils, with the RPCR winning in Nouméa.

In May 1986 the RPR won the French parliamentary elections and Jacques Chirac became prime minister. He supported the RPCR but allowed a referendum on independence to be held in late 1987. One of the demands of the FLNKS was to reduce the electorate to those who were

born in New Caledonia and who had one parent also born there. If this was not granted, they threatened to boycott the referendum. However, pro-independence supporters split, with one of them, Yann Uregei, going to Libya to attend a conference on liberation movements. With the United Nations putting on pressure for a move to independence and placing New Caledonia on the “list of non-self-governing territories,” the referendum was held on September 13, 1987, boycotted by the Kanaks, resulting in a vote of 98 percent against independence. However, with the trial of the people charged with the murder of the ten Kanaks in 1984, the leader of the FLNKS, Yeiwene Yeiwene, was arrested but quickly released.

Jacques Chirac offered the Pons Plan in January 1987 with an election to be held for the four regional councils to coincide with the French parliamentary elections on April 24, 1988. The boundaries were redrawn with the result that it seemed likely that the Kanaks would lose one of the councils to the settlers. Just before the election itself, some militant Kanaks on Ouvéa killed four policemen and captured a number of others who were taken to a cave where they were held for several days. Three days before the election, Chirac sent in commandoes who freed the captive police and killed 19 Kanaks, in a move to prove his toughness to the French public. The French rejected this, electing the socialists, and the new prime minister, Michel Rocard, introduced the Matignon Accords with FLNKS leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou and the RPCR leader Jacques Lafleur signing an agreement whereby the FLNKS accepted that independence would be delayed, but the RPCR came to admit the inevitability of independence.

On May 4, 1989, while Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwene Yeiwene were on Ouvéa to attend a tribal gathering at the end of the period of mourning for the 19 Kanaks killed there three years earlier, the two pro-independence leaders were both assassinated by radical Kanaks who felt that the Matignon Accords had sold out the independence cause.

The French response was to plough more money into the New Caledonia economy and there has been a promise of a referendum after 2014. In 1990 the leader of the RPCR, Jacques Lafleur, sold his mining company, the Société Minière du Sud-Pacifique, to the Kanak govern-

ment of the northern part of New Caledonia. With better relations with Australia, restrictions on the importation of Australian goods were lifted in January 1992, and two years later there were industrial protests and strikes as the lower nickel price started to affect the economy of New Caledonia. However, the nickel price rose in 1995, and even though Jacques Chirac was elected president in 1995, he promised to implement the Matignon Accords – Lafleur supporting the presidential candidacy of Edouard Balladur.

The elections of July 1995 saw a decline in support of both FLNKS and the RPCR, the latter losing votes to the Nouvelle Calédonie Pour Tous (NCPT) led by Didier Leroux, a businessman involved in importing pharmaceutical products. Leroux quickly built up a support base around Nouméa, reducing the RPCR to 22 of the 54 seats in the legislature, with FLNKS having 12 seats, and its allies another 7. Pressure built up on the FLNKS not to compromise in negotiations with the Chirac government, with the Nouméa Accord being supported by a referendum on November 8, 1998. This allowed for an independence referendum in between 15 and 20 years, but increasing the amount of autonomy in New Caledonia.

As a result of the Nouméa Accord, executive power was exercised by the head of government of New Caledonia, a territorial congress was established, and a concept of New Caledonian “citizenship” was introduced with only these “citizens” being able to vote in elections. This saw Jean Lèques become the first president of New Caledonia, succeeded by Pierre Frogier on April 5, 2001. Elections for the territorial congress were held on May 9, 2004, which saw the RPCR gain 24.5 percent of the vote, with 16 seats, and the Avenir Ensemble (Future Together) with 22.8 percent, also with 16 seats. The FLNKS gained 13.7 percent, winning 8 seats, and the Union Calédonienne with 11.9 percent, won 7 seats. The far-right Front National won 7.5 percent, with 4 seats, and the last three seats went to three minor parties. Currently New Caledonia, with a population of 210,798 (2003 estimate), has a unique status between that of an independent country and an overseas part of France.

SEE ALSO: Fiji, Parliamentary Insurrection; French Polynesia, Protest Movements; Michel, Louise (1830–1905); Micronesia, Nationalist and Labor Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Burchett, W. (1941) *Pacific Treasure Island – New Caledonia: Voyage Through Its Land and Wealth, The Story of Its People and Past*. Melbourne: Brown, Prior, Anderson.
- Chesneaux, J. (1981) Can Two Opposite Views of the Past Be Turned Into One in the Future? *Pacific Islands Monthly*, December: 24–7.
- Lawrey, J. (1982) *The Cross of Lorraine in the South Pacific – Australia and the Free French Movement 1940–1942*. Canberra: Journal of Pacific History.
- Ray, C. (1992) On the Way Up: A UDI for New Caledonia in September '82? *Pacific Islands Monthly*, January: 13–18.
- Salmon, M. (1981) New Caledonia: Paris Faces a Testing Time. *Pacific Islands Monthly*, November: 19.

New Harmony

Richard Goff

In 1825 British utopian socialist Robert Owen announced, “I am come to this country [the United States] to introduce an entire new system of society; to change it from an ignorant, selfish system to an enlightened social system.” While these words seem unlikely to come from a wealthy Welsh industrialist, few individuals are so closely associated with early socialist experimentation than Owen. Born to a family of modest means during the revolutionary turmoil of the 1770s, Owen quickly moved up through the economic ranks of industrial Manchester. After acquiring the New Lanark Mills in the early 1800s, Owen began construction of a model industrial town for the express purpose of bettering the poor and working classes.

Growing up during the Age of Democratic Revolution and being an active participant in the English Industrial Revolution clearly left an impression on Owen. Manchester was a lively city full of liberal debate and Owen was intrigued by classical liberalism and, in particular, the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham. As a factory manager and owner, Owen viewed the new industrial economy as pregnant with new social possibilities and as an arena for social experimentation.

It was during this time that Owen solidified his belief that human vices were largely environmental and that the gulf between workers and elites could be closed through social planning. His first attempt to test this theory was at his

New Lanark factory. Along with his business partners, Quaker philanthropist William Allen and Jeremy Bentham, Owen limited child labor in his mills, improved housing for his workers, and supplied them with cheap coal during the winter. He also provided money for medical care and devised innovative education techniques that encouraged active learning for the workers' children. Owen's benevolent capitalism seemed to yield results and Owen published his conclusions in his *Report to the County of Lanark* (1820). Moving beyond a simple paternalistic approach, Owen argued for the correctness of the labor theory of value and that workers are entitled to their fair share of that value. Owen considered planned cooperative communities, based on egalitarian principles, to be the only solution to the immorality and inequality of society.

Owen's conclusions inspired him to advocate more aggressive and innovative community building. Owen lacked the funds to construct a community in England, but fate intervened in 1824 when Richard Flower of George Rapp's Harmony community offered to sell him the cooperative. Owen agreed, dubbed the village “New Harmony,” and officially opened the community in 1825.

As fortuitous as the situation seemed, New Harmony was beset by problems from its beginning. Owen had issued a relatively open invitation to all who were interested in creating a society of equals; however, the heterogeneous crew of farmers, drifters, workers, adventurers, and idealists that responded was not easily led. Owen presented the motley group with a vaguely worded constitution that provided for free medical care, education, and housing, but still allowed individuals to keep their own property. Labor and profits would be divided equally with the expectation that over time a collective society would evolve. Although the idea was attractive, the plan was quite nebulous and conflicts emerged among the recruits.

Even with New Harmony's difficulties, similar communities, based on Owenite principles, dotted the American landscape in the late 1820s. The most ambitious of these was the Nashoba community started by Frances Wright. Wright believed that socialist communities could solve the problem of slavery by providing slaves an opportunity to work for themselves, thus acquiring the skills necessary for freedom. By 1828, however, the interracial community was in

crisis. Charged with advocating “free love” and miscegenation and suffering economic difficulties, Wright emancipated the slaves and dissolved the community in 1830.

Owen’s New Harmony suffered a similar fate due to the general lack of planning. Production was erratic and uneven. Some industries were overstaffed and others barely functioning. Housing was not adequate for the over 800 members, several hundred more than the Rappite population. Although equality of the sexes was an important feature of the community, the underrepresentation of women generated problems in allocating domestic labor. Religion was also a major area of conflict. Although Owen supported religious freedom, he also supported the right to criticize religious doctrine, which many members found problematic. Although cultural and intellectual life were relatively vibrant, community morale continued to decline over 1826. By 1827 the original optimism of Owen and the New Harmony community had been replaced by a dire realization that their experiment was failing. In May Owen decided to quit the community, liquidating its assets and selling off the property.

By 1830 all 19 Owenite communities had collapsed. Although it would be easy to label the Owenite experiment as a failure, Owen’s influence continued to be felt throughout the nineteenth century. A second wave of experimental communities (Icaria and Brisbane’s phalanxes) emerged in the United States, Canada, and England in the 1840s. Although none of them survived the nineteenth century, the communities did implement many of Owen’s innovative educational methods, fostered individual development and intellectual freedom, practiced sexual equality, and offered rationalist critiques of organized religion.

Arguably, the failed utopian experiments radicalized Owen and many participants, prompting them to work closely with the nascent labor movement. Owen supported the Grand National Consolidated Trade Union and formed the Association of All Classes and All Nations in the 1830s. Owen also worked with labor organizations for the 8-hour day. His son, Robert Dale Owen, remained in the United States and became a labor leader and abolitionist. Also, Fanny Wright, sponsor of the Nashoba Owenite community, became increasingly involved in the labor movement, a supporter of the Working-

men’s Party of New York, and a proto-feminist. Although frustrated with the failure of these communities and many of his political campaigns, Robert Owen continued to work for his “new moral world” until his death in 1858.

SEE ALSO: Cooperative Commonwealth; Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony; Icaria Utopian Community; Oneida Perfectionist Utopians; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Shakers Utopian Community; Socialism, Britain; Utopian Communities, United States; Utopian Intentional Communities; Wright, Frances “Fanny” (1795–1852)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bestor, A., Jr. (1950) *Backwoods Utopias: The Sectarian Origins and the Owenite Phase of Communitarian Socialism in America, 1663–1829*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Hayden, D. (1976) *Seven American Utopias: The Architecture of Communitarian Socialism, 1790–1975*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Pitzer, D. & Elliot, J. (1979) New Harmony’s First Utopians, 1814–1824. *Indiana Magazine of History* 75 (1979): 225–300.

New Jewel movement

Immanuel Ness

The New Jewel movement (New Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation), or NJM, was a liberation movement that staged a revolution in the 1970s in Grenada, a small island-nation located in the far south of the Windward Island chain of the Caribbean Sea. The vast majority of Grenada’s population in the 1970s, especially former slaves of African heritage, endured widespread poverty and scarcity of basic living necessities. In the 1970s the NJM transformed into a political party with a platform of nationalization of the island’s major infrastructure, redistributing land to peasants, and to recover a greater share of revenues derived from the tourism industry, which was providing a growing share of the national gross domestic product.

As a founder of the New Jewel movement, Maurice Bishop was a charismatic leader and dynamic orator who rallied the masses to support land reform and generating economic resources in the island-nation, which was dependent on the export of cloves as a cash crop. In 1974, following 300 years of colonization, Grenada gained

independence from Britain at the same time as the NJM was gaining wider support among the working class and peasants through Bishop's comprehensive plan to transform the country. However, Sir Eric Matthew Gairy, Grenada's first prime minister, engaged in political repression and violence against his radical opponents to undermine growing labor and peasant unrest on the island. Gairy formed an infamous internal security force known as the Mongoose Gang to kill workers and political opponents of the government. Bishop's own father, Rupert, was among those murdered by the paramilitary organization. In the country's formative years of independence the Gairy government was charged with massive electoral fraud to prevent the NJM from taking power.

In 1979 tens of thousands of the island's small population of about 100,000 were mobilizing against Gairy's failure to improve living conditions. To counteract the protests, Gairy mobilized the Mongoose Gang to kill the NJM leaders. NJM discovered the plot timed during Prime Minister Gairy's visit to the United Nations in New York. To prevent bloodshed the NJM seized government power with the support of the majority of the country's population. Upon taking leadership, Bishop reaffirmed the party's commitment to democracy and egalitarianism. He promised elections without fraud, protection of political and religious freedoms, and that the people's revolution was "for work, for food, for decent housing, and health services" for all Grenadian people.

The NJM leaders sought to create a democratic society with greater equality through land reform and redistribution of wealth. As the Cold War was coming to an end, and neoliberal policies expanding in the US, UK, China, and a growing number of other countries, popular support for socialism in Grenada propelled Bishop and the NJM to power. Once in power the NJM sought to align with socialist forces such as Cuba, which provided vital foreign technological and economic assistance, and the Soviet Union. In the 1980s Bishop's political support expanded dramatically among the island's working class and poor population, as economic reforms were implemented by Bishop and the NJM government.

As a poor economy with few natural resources and isolated by the United States, Bishop turned to Cuba to provide medical assistance and help

in advancing the nation's economy through promoting tourism and trade. To expand Grenada's economic base, Cuba began assisting in building an airport capable of accommodating large commercial aircraft for foreign travel and tourism, while providing foreign funding through trade. While the airport included an airstrip that could accommodate military aircraft, as is the case in virtually any modern airport, Grenada did not possess military aircraft that may be used for aggression against any regional state, and surely did not pose a threat to US interests in the region. Some worried that Cuban military aircraft could use Grenada as a regional base. But Bishop and the New Jewel government denied that the airport would be used for military purposes.

Grenada never posed a military threat to US hegemony in the Caribbean, but the NJM was considered a thorn in the side of the US, especially as the country drew closer to Cuba for medical, educational, and military assistance. In 1981, in the wake of the election of the right-wing Republican Ronald Reagan as president of the US, steadfast critics committed to overthrowing Bishop and the NJM were appointed to key posts in the US State Department.

Indeed, historians have found documentary evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US orchestrated a political crisis in Grenada in 1982 and 1983, staging a coup d'état against Bishop by arming military supporters of Bishop's former law partner, Bernard Coard, who was also former deputy prime minister. On October 13, 1983 Coard seized power and six days later mass demonstrations against the military coup fomented a national crisis. Bishop was placed under house arrest and the Grenadian army seized control of the major military and communications installations. However, popular support for Bishop broke into mass demonstrations and overwhelmed the military government, setting Bishop free on September 16. Three days later the military overpowered the masses that were protecting Bishop and the NJM and executed the former leaders without trial.

SEE ALSO: Aristide, Jean-Bertrand (b. 1953); Bishop, Maurice (1944–1983); Caribbean Islands, Protests Against IMF; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Cuban Revolutionary Government; Grenadian Revolution, 1979–1983; Rodney, Walter (1942–1980); Trinidad, Anti-Colonial Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Crandall, R. (2006) *Gunboat Democracy: The United States Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Meeks, B. (2001) *Caribbean Revolutions and Revolutionary Theory: An Assessment of Cuba, Nicaragua and Grenada*. Kingston: University of West Indies Press.
- Payne, A., Sutton, P., & Thorndike, T. (1985) *Grenada: Revolution and Invasion*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Newport Rising, Wales, 1839

Christopher Frank

An unsuccessful Chartist revolt, the Newport rising of 1839 was the last large-scale armed action of citizens against the state in mainland Britain. It occurred during the evening and morning of November 3–4, 1839, when approximately 5,000 miners and ironworkers from communities throughout southwest Wales descended upon the town of Newport. On arrival, the rebels, many of whom were armed, surrounded 30 soldiers who had positioned themselves and their Chartist prisoners inside the Westgate hotel. A brief gun battle ensued, killing 22 Chartists, wounding 50, and dispersing the rest. After the rising, over 200 participants were arrested. Most were soon released or convicted on minor charges, but 21 were charged with treason. The three principal leaders, John Frost, Zephania Williams, and William Jones, were convicted and sentenced to death. The sentences were later commuted to transportation. The nature and intent of the Newport rising are shrouded in mystery and have been the subject of debate, but the current historical consensus suggests that the rising was not a protest or demonstration, but a planned insurrection, and one that might have had loose ties with similar plots for rebellion that were developing in other parts of the country.

The Newport rising has both a national and a local context. On July 12, 1839 the Chartist National Convention presented its first petition to Parliament, containing nearly 1.3 million signatures, only to have it rejected by a vote of 235 to 46. The Convention spent the remainder of the summer attempting to find an appropriate

response. By the time the National Convention dissolved in failure in September 1839, many of the most important national Chartist leaders were in jail or awaiting trial, and the initiative had passed to local leaders and advocates of “physical force” Chartism.

The coalfields of southern Wales were characterized by bitter and highly polarized class relations. English or Anglicized coal and ironmasters exercised considerable economic and political power over an isolated and largely Welsh-speaking workforce. Wild economic fluctuations, dangerous work, payment of wages in truck at company-owned stores, and aggressive employer union-busting efforts all contributed to hostile industrial relations and strikes that sometimes resulted in military intervention. Polarized class relations and geographical isolation resulted in a high degree of class solidarity. In addition to widespread membership in friendly societies, mutual assistance clubs, nascent unions, and dissenting chapels, the working class in South Wales also had strong traditions of secret organizing and action. The Chartist movement in South Wales generally, and the Newport rising in particular, was built upon the foundations of these working-class grievances and traditions of secret organizing and action.

Chartism developed a large following in southwest Wales, as demonstrated by the rapid establishment of over fifty active lodges in Glamorgan and Monmouthshire, representing 25,000 committed Chartists. Thousands of Welsh men and women attended public meetings to sign the Chartist petition and hear speeches by popular “missionaries” such as Henry Vincent, who expressed openness to any means for acquiring the Charter and defended the right to resist oppression by taking up arms.

A number of factors came together in the autumn of 1839 to push Welsh Chartists in a more radical direction. These included the arrest of Vincent and other Chartist leaders and reports of their treatment in prison. The rejection of the Chartist petition, the failure of the National Convention, and the growing repression by local authorities against Chartist activity and public meetings also contributed to disillusionment with petitioning and the mass platform. These factors combined with the realities of economic, cultural, and social polarization and traditions of secret organizing to produce the conditions for rebellion.

In southwest Wales during the fall of 1839 preparations for the rising were undertaken in great secrecy, a fact which has since hindered historians' ability to fully uncover the origins of the rebellion. Since early 1839, Chartist men had been organizing themselves into small "classes" under the leadership of "captains," and by autumn the pace of this organizing had increased noticeably. By mid-October Welsh Chartists had clearly begun preparations for some type of rising, recruiting ironworkers and miners, purchasing guns, constructing homemade pikes, and holding secret meetings. Increasingly, information about the continually evolving strategy was restricted to a small number of delegates, and precautions such as oaths of secrecy, passwords, and intimidation were taken to prevent discovery by authorities. Many Chartists prepared for a rising without fully knowing the plan, only that Frost had promised it would result in obtaining the Charter in under three weeks. There is some evidence of communications between the Welsh leaders of the rebellion and northern Chartists, and that a successful rising at Newport was to be the signal for other insurrections in Newcastle and the West Riding of Yorkshire. Active preparations for such a rising were being made in Yorkshire, and abortive risings did take place in Sheffield, Dewsbury, and Bradford in January of 1840.

On the evening of November 3, 1839 Chartists converged upon their meeting places and marched through a rainy night in different columns led by Frost, Williams, and Jones toward Newport. Six hundred marchers were armed with guns, and hundreds more carried pikes and knives. The weather caused delays that prevented the Chartists from entering Newport until 9 a.m. on the morning of November 4, by which time the mayor of Newport had had time to swear in special constables, and the soldiers had been given the opportunity to reposition themselves and their prisoners in the hotel. The result was a defeat of the rebels by a small force of disciplined government troops.

At the subsequent trial of the Chartist prisoners, legal counsel of the defendants attempted to downplay the seriousness of the event, referring to it as a "riot" or even a demonstration that went wrong. The silence of many participants, the questionable testimony of state witnesses, and the desire of an embarrassed government to deflect attention away from its lack of preparedness, all over time caused the

seriousness of this rising to be under-appreciated. Most historians now agree, however, that the events of November 3–4, 1839 had insurrectionary intent.

Far from killing Chartism, the failed rising injected new life into the movement, as efforts to raise money for Frost's defense, and later to win him a pardon, became uniting rallying cries for Chartists during the 1840s. For many, however, the event did cause a shift in the movement's direction. Some Chartists interpreted the failed rising as a lesson in the great power of the state and the impossibility of successful rebellion, and therefore redirected their energies toward "moral force" initiatives, such as the National Charter Association, renewed petitioning, "New Move" Chartism, and the Complete Suffrage Union. The state, as well as local authorities, encouraged such notions through propaganda and by the acceleration of a number of reforms already well underway, such as the introduction of local police forces and the strategic deployment of troops. The British government, however, also responded with strategic concessions throughout the 1840s, such as investigations into social and working conditions in Wales, and national reforms like the Ten Hours Act, and the relaxation of the Poor Law's most hated provisions. Although radicalism and industrial action continued to thrive in Wales, Chartism never again achieved the same level of participation, energy, intensity, and optimism that it had in 1839.

SEE ALSO: Chartists; Lovett, William (1800–1877)

References and Suggested Readings

- Jones, D. J. V. (1985) *The Last Rising: The Newport Insurrection of 1839*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Thompson, D. (Ed.) (1971) *The Early Chartists*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Wilks, I. (1984) *South Wales and the Rising of 1839: Class Struggle as Armed Struggle*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Williams, D. (1959) Chartism in Wales. In A. Briggs (Ed.), *Chartist Studies*. London: Macmillan.

Ngo Dinh Nhu (1910–1963)

Justin Corfield

The younger brother of Ngo Dinh Diem, the president of South Vietnam from 1955 to 1963, Ngo Dinh Nhu was his brother's closest

confidant, serving as minister of the interior until they were both assassinated in 1963. Ngo Dinh Nhu was born in 1910, in Hue. His father, Ngo Dinh Kha, was an important figure at the Vietnamese Imperial Court. Nhu, the fourth of the six Ngo Dinh brothers, was educated in France where he attended university and became interested in the French philosopher Emmanuel Mounier (1905–50), who had developed his own political concept of “personalism,” which would later become the state ideology of South Vietnam – although some of Mounier’s adherents were to decry any connection between the French philosopher and the concept of personalism in Vietnam. On his return to Vietnam, Nhu became active as an organizer of the Vietnamese Federation of Christian Workers, the Catholic labor union movement.

With the rise to power of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1955, Nhu became the driving force behind the new government, managing to engineer the sacking of General Nguyen Van Hinh as commander of the South Vietnamese Army. Nhu, as minister of the interior, also helped establish the Personalist Labor Party, the Can Lao Nhan Vi – a secret party which was closely organized along the cell structure design of the Communist Party, its bitter enemy. Nhu was also the man most closely associated with the Strategic Hamlets program, designed to isolate villagers from the communist guerillas and bolster support for the government. He was also said to have been behind the parcel bomb assassination attempt on Prince Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia in 1959.

Wielding enormous power in South Vietnam, Nhu and his wife, known as Madame Nhu, became the most stalwart defenders of the government. However, this also made Nhu unpopular, not only in parts of Vietnam, especially among the Buddhists, but also with Americans, who saw him as a malign influence on his older brother. Nhu believed his government had to be tough with the communists, but he also sent out feelers to them in mid-1963, a move which caused consternation in the US administration.

On September 2, 1963, in a high-profile television interview by Walter Cronkite, US President John F. Kennedy urged Diem to have his brother sacked, but Diem declined, and the American government then signaled that they would support a coup d’état to bring about the overthrow of the brothers. It took place on November 1, 1963, with Diem and Nhu managing to escape the soldiers who captured the Gia

Dinh Palace, which was serving as the presidential palace. The two brothers spent the night in Cholon and then went to the Cha Tam Chinese Roman Catholic Church in Cholon, where they attended mass and then handed themselves over to the coup leaders, who bundled them into the back of an armored car and killed them both. Although the coup leaders claimed that Diem and Nhu had committed suicide, both were buried in the main Roman Catholic cemetery, showing that this was widely disbelieved.

SEE ALSO: Sihanouk, Norodom (b. 1922); Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954; Vietnam, Protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974

References and Suggested Readings

- Blair, A. (1995) *Lodge in Vietnam: A Patriot Abroad*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
 Bouscaren, A. (1965) *The Last of the Mandarins*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
 Karnow, S. (1984) *Vietnam: A History*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s

Robert Sierakowski

The Sandinistas of the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979 stand out in Latin American history as the only successful guerilla movement of the numerous revolutionary organizations that formed in the wake of the Cuban Revolution. To understand both the roots and outcomes of the revolutionary struggle to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship, it is necessary to understand Nicaragua’s political and economic development, as well as its long history of relations with the United States.

Emerging as a relative backwater of the Spanish Empire, for much of the post-Independence nineteenth century Nicaragua was torn by warfare between two elite factions: the Liberals and Conservatives. Nicaragua’s strategic location as a transit point between the Atlantic and Pacific would soon draw the imperial gaze of the United States. In 1855 North American adventurer William Walker (1824–60), who was brought to fight by the Liberals, promptly declared himself president of Nicaragua, legalized slavery, and had his government duly recognized by the United States. Though Walker was soon forced out of power by a combined

Liberal-Conservative force, the attention of the United States would not fade. In the second half of the century coffee emerged as the country's main export crop, leading to an expansion of capitalism and dependence on the international economy. When the government of José Santos Zelaya (1853–1919) considered the development of an inter-oceanic passage to compete with the Panama Canal, the US backed an armed conspiracy that overthrew his government in 1909.

In 1912 a contingent of US Marine Corps arrived in Nicaragua to maintain the more pliable Conservatives in power. Aside for a nine-month hiatus, the Marines would remain in Nicaragua until 1933. This period saw the development of an armed guerilla insurgency led by Augusto César Sandino (1895–1934) fighting against “Yankee imperialism” and its local quislings. To combat Sandino, the Marine Corps developed the National Guard of Nicaragua, a supposedly “apolitical” military body that would rise above the divisive and violent regional struggles of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

When the Marines departed Nicaragua they left the better part of the country's armament and coercive power of the state in the hands of one man – Anastasio Somoza García (1896–1956), their hand-picked director of the National Guard. Using force to become president in 1936, Somoza ruled for the coming two decades, with the Guard and the US support serving as the dual bulwarks of his power. In Somoza the US found a loyal anti-communist ally who would maintain order over his local fiefdom, or as President Franklin Roosevelt is said to have put it, “Somoza is a son-of-a-bitch, but he's *our* son-of-a-bitch.” Through outright corruption as well as manipulation of the state apparatus, the dictator accrued the largest fortune in the country, including dozens of coffee farms, as well as major interests in mining, beef, dairy products, cement, textiles, and sugarcane. When Somoza García was gunned down in 1956 by the young poet Rigoberto López Pérez (1929–56), he would be followed in the presidency by his sons Luis and Anastasio Somoza Debayle. While Luis was known as something of a reformist, Anastasio the West Point graduate would prove to be more willing to use military violence and state terror to maintain power.

Structuralist theorists of revolution have attempted to identify the regime type that is

most susceptible to revolutions, referring to these systems as “neo-patrimonial” or “sultanistic.” The Somoza regime, with the rule of a single family for half a century, accruing vast personal wealth while personally controlling the means of coercion, closely approximates an ideal case. At the same time, for much of the family's tenure they could count on the support – at times tacit, at times explicit – of much of the Nicaraguan ruling class, as they carried out capitalist development policies which greatly benefited these groups. The Conservative “oligarchy” of elite families maintained a certain “gentlemen's agreement”-style antagonism towards the dictator, periodically cutting power-sharing agreements in order to assure their quota of the spoils.

During the entire Somoza period, Nicaragua was linked into the international division of labor following the path of exporting primary products such as coffee, cotton, beef, and bananas. Each successive wave of export crop expansion, particularly cotton production in the 1950s and 1960s, would create increasing pressure for land. Though Nicaragua possesses a relative abundance of land in comparison to neighboring countries, small farmers were compressed into progressively smaller holdings as cash crops expanded during the Somoza period. For instance, between 1963 and 1971 the share of the national land in the hands of small farmers decreased from 3.6 to 2.2 percent. Amid the economic modernization and export bonanza of the Somoza period, much of the population was left marginalized, with incredibly high rates of malnutrition, illiteracy, and infant mortality found in both the countryside and the expanding urban slums.

Search for a Revolutionary Strategy

The Somozas' rule never went completely unchallenged by the Nicaraguan people, with “revolutionary” movements abounding among the opposition from the initial rise of the regime. After the death of Somoza García, this only increased. During the first years of the presidency of Luis Somoza, there were numerous coup d'état attempts, as well as armed invasions from Honduras to topple the regime. They were largely formulated within the National Guard itself or the traditional Liberal and Conservative opposition parties. With neither a broader vision of social change nor organic links to Nicaragua's

impoverished majority, this armed opposition appeared to be simply another faction of elite power usurpers. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 would shake this status quo as it sent Latin American political perceptions into a tailspin. In Cuba, a leftist guerilla army that developed outside of the traditional party structures had overthrown the US-backed dictator Batista (1901–73) through rural warfare, and had begun carrying out social reforms for the poor. FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) founder Tomás Borge (b. 1930) later remarked that the Cuban example meant the “the lifting of innumerable curtains, a flash of light that shone beyond the simple and boring dogmas of the time.” That two more unsuccessful invasion attempts took place in Nicaragua in 1959 suggests that the paradigm shift implied by Cuba had yet to completely set in. At the end of July the National Guard attacked unarmed protesters in the university city of León, killing four students and two spectators, igniting further anger against the regime.

After the martyrdom of these students, universities would increasingly reemerge as centers of regime opposition and the source of the most radical propositions. The initial formulation of that which would become the FSLN was conceived in 1961 by young student activists and members of the Socialist Party of Nicaragua (the local Soviet-backed communist party) who felt stifled by the reformist approach of their party. Carlos Fonseca Amador (1936–76), Tomás Borge Martínez, and Silvio Mayorga felt that armed struggle would be the only manner to topple the entrenched Somoza regime. In addition to this initial nucleus, various student and youth organizations of Marxist, Liberal, and Conservative backgrounds would come to serve as feeder organizations for the rank and file of the FSLN, which only took that name in 1962 or 1963.

The Sandinistas’ ideological framework drew upon Marxism in their understanding of class struggle and exploitation, as well as the specific example of Cuba as a model for action. They demanded an end to the dictatorship, the redistribution of land and wealth, and the promotion of healthcare, education, and housing for all Nicaraguans. Given the United States’ historical role in Nicaragua, and its contemporary support for the Somoza dictatorship, their demands for social revolution had a particularly nationalist and anti-imperialist tone. Most novel to their

approach was the reappropriation of the mythic figure of Sandino as a “proletarian guerilla,” largely the work of Fonseca, who insisted on the necessity to include the historical figure in the organization’s name. In this way, the naming process generated the illusion of a historical sequence of resistance to foreign influence and social inequality running from the anti-imperialist movement of Sandino to the contemporary Marxist-led struggle. As FSLN leader Humberto Ortega (b. 1947) later declared, “through his struggle and his action, Sandino created the theory, and it is that which we have taken up.”

In the 1960s the Sandinistas would alternate between underground urban political organizing and a number of halting attempts at a rural guerilla insurgency, remaining largely unknown by most Nicaraguans. Receiving guidance from Colonel Santos López, who had fought with Sandino as a youth, they attempted to recreate their hero’s approach in the Ríos Coco y Bocay region in 1962. Yet they found little reception from the peasants and, hungry and sick, were crushed by the National Guard. The surviving members of the FSLN returned to the urban sphere to continue work with nascent labor unions and a coalition known as the Republican Mobilization, which served as a front for the Communist Party. During this period, the United States was pushing Latin America governments through the Alliance for Progress to carry out programs to lessen poverty and political authoritarianism in order to prevent “other Cubas.” Yet this reformist opening was short-lived. When the traditional elite opposition parties appeared headed for victory in the presidential election against Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1967, the regime responded with violence. An opposition march in downtown Managua in January was fired upon by the National Guard, leaving hundreds of unarmed civilians dead and wounded, and exposing for many the regime’s truly militaristic nature below the veneer of compromise. Likewise, when peasant unions were formed, particularly in the cotton regions of Chinandega, deaths and disappearances of activists suggested the government’s willingness to use state terror to quiet all threats to the status quo.

The Sandinistas returned to the mountains of northern Nicaragua in 1967, and in Pancasán established a guerrilla *foco* along the lines established by “Che” Guevara (1928–67), under the

belief that a handful of committed revolutionaries deposited in a rural area could single-handedly spark a revolution through military actions. Though the Pancasán *foco* was able to generate greater support from the local peasant population, it was still unable to match the National Guard's firepower and FSLN leaders Silvio Mayora and Rigoberto Cruz were killed. After much debate, the Sandinistas decided to abandon the purely military strategy, switching instead to a joint political-military strategy that would combine mass mobilization with armed actions. Many of the FSLN cadres returned to the cities in order to work in what was later known as "the silent accumulation of forces."

Tectonic Shifts

On December 23, 1972 a devastating earthquake rocked Managua, leaving over 10,000 people dead, flattening the city center, and prompting an outward exodus of refugees. It was claimed that millions of dollars of foreign aid money was pocketed by Somoza Debayle while the people of Managua were left in utter penury. Likewise, the reconstruction process provided an opportunity for Somoza's personal businesses to corner the market on real estate and expand into the realm of finance capital long controlled by the traditional elite. Wealthy opponents, feeling themselves boxed out of their fair share of the spoils, began withdrawing their support from the regime, and even actively supporting opposition movements. Some of the more socially conscious of the elite opponents would form the Democratic Union of Liberation (UDEL), led by Pedro Joaquín Chamorro (1924–78), the editor of *La Prensa*, the main opposition newspaper. This new grouping united bourgeois and middle-class parties, trade unions, and the Communist Party. They demanded the exit of Somoza and the institution of a modern capitalist state which would serve some welfare functions, hoping to preempt a radical revolution along the lines promoted by the Sandinistas.

The years prior to the traumatic earthquake also witnessed new cultural developments which would have long-term effects on Nicaragua. The Catholic Church had historically played a conservative role, bolstering the power of the wealthy and consecrating the reigning forms of oppression. Following the Second Vatican Council of the early 1960s with its reordering of church

priorities, however, some Latin American bishops began moving in a more progressive direction. At the 1968 regional conference at Medellín, the church agreed to begin promoting a "preferential option for the poor" and with an emphasis liberation theology, a rereading of the Bible that emphasized the links between poverty, oppression, and the teachings of Jesus Christ. Rather than simply aspiring towards personal salvation, liberation theology called on women and men to create the kingdom of God in their own lives and societies. In organizational terms this meant the promotion of grassroots Ecclesiastical Base Communities (CEBs) which brought lay parishioners together to read the Bible and interpret their own lives. It has been argued that many of these religious base communities would be drawn into the revolutionary struggle, particularly following the regime's response to the earthquake and its intense use of violence in the 1970s.

Another major turning point in the Sandinista struggle came with the December 27, 1974 takeover of the Managua house of Somoza ally José María "Chema" Castillo while a party was being held in honor of the US ambassador. Though the ambassador had left before the guerilla commandos arrived, the FSLN held many important regime figures hostage and negotiated their release directly with a shocked Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The detained Somocistas were exchanged for US\$5 million, the freedom of imprisoned Sandinistas (including future president Daniel Ortega), and the public broadcast of a revolutionary manifesto. This dramatic and audacious attack catapulted the FSLN to a prominent position in the debate over the future direction of the country. Following this major blow against the image of regime invulnerability, Somoza declared a state of siege and with complete press censorship began exacting his revenge. The National Guard carried out a major "scorched earth" campaign against the peasantry of the isolated regions in which the guerillas were operating, using bombs and napalm to destroy peasants' homes and fields and leaving an estimated thousands dead. The 33 months of the state of siege would also witness the killing of students, labor unionists, and religious activists.

Pressed deeper underground in the battle against Somoza, the Sandinistas split into three distinct factions, divided over both the analysis of the revolutionary situation and the strategy for

opposing the regime. The Prolonged Popular War tendency, led by Tomás Borge, Bayardo Arce, and Henry Ruiz, supported the development of a wide-based rural insurgency based in the peasantry which would surround the cities and bring down the regime, closely modeled on the Chinese and Vietnamese examples. A second group was known as the Proletarian Tendency, led by Jaime Wheelock, Luis Carrión, and Carlos Núñez, which argued that urban mass organization and labor unions should be emphasized as the central axis of the revolutionary movement. The final faction, known as the *Terceristas* or the Insurrectional Tendency, was led by brothers Daniel and Humberto Ortega, as well as Victor Tirado. They suggested that both rural and urban modes of resistance were needed, as well as the creation of a broad-based national coalition – including sectors of the business class opposed to Somoza – to build support for a mass insurrection. When Sandinista founder Carlos Fonseca returned to Nicaragua in 1975, he attempted to bring the various tendencies together before heading back to the mountains to participate in the guerilla struggle. He and two other Sandinistas died at the hands of the National Guard in an ambush in Zinica, Matagalpa. The death of the FSLN founder on November 8, 1976 was greeted with much elation by Somoza.

Insurrectionary Cycle

Since its foundation in 1936 the dictatorship had been largely maintained in power through the support of the United States. Throughout the 1970s, US aid for the Nicaraguan government had been climbing ever higher in support of elaborate carrot-and-stick counterinsurgency programs. The arrival of Jimmy Carter to the United States presidency in 1976 meant a new foreign policy vis-à-vis foreign regimes, based squarely upon universal concepts of human rights, rather than anti-communism and pro-American stances. Carter attempted to link respect for the human rights of the population to American aid, making the Somoza regime a test case due to its use of state terror. Between 1977 and 1978, economic assistance for the Nicaraguan government fell 75 percent and military aid precipitously dropped 43 percent.

When the state of seige declared following the hostage-taking was lifted, a flurry of opposition

activity began to take shape. The dictator's longtime opponent, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, published a backlog of exposés in *La Prensa* regarding the human rights violations in the countryside and the regime's corrupt behavior following the earthquake. Hoping to catalyze this widespread disdain in a revolutionary direction, the *Tercerista* faction of the FSLN launched attacks on various National Guard barracks throughout the country in October 1977. Though the insurgents were overpowered, it marked the launch of an insurrectionary cycle which would continue until the dictator was overthrown. At the same time, a circle of prominent middle- and upper-class FSLN allies – including writers, intellectuals, clergy, and businessmen – known as the Group of Twelve began agitating against the regime and denouncing its violence.

In January 1978 Pedro Joaquín Chamorro was assassinated on his way to the newspaper in downtown Managua. With the major opposition figure of the upper class murdered, the business elite of Nicaragua carried out a national strike calling for Somoza's exit. A month later, youth in the indigenous *barrio* of Monimbó in the city of Masaya – catching even the FSLN off guard – spontaneously rebelled. With burning tires and cobblestone barricades, young people hurled homemade contact bombs and Molotov cocktails against Somoza's National Guard.

In May the two leading upper- and middle-class opposition nuclei, the Group of Twelve, the UDEL, and others united to form the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) calling for a negotiated exit for the dictator. This was the method preferred by the United States, which hoped to isolate the leftists and maintain the status quo while pressuring Somoza to leave. After two fruitless months, the Group of Twelve left this group to form the United People's Movement (MPU) with the various FSLN mass organizations in demanding Somoza's exit. On August 22 a commando team of 25 Sandinistas, led by Edén Pastora (b. 1937) and Dora María Téllez (b. 1947), posed as an elite National Guard battalion and infiltrated the National Palace while the Congress was in session. The 2,000 captured government employees, including many important regime figures, such as the dictator's brother-in-law, were exchanged for 70 imprisoned Sandinistas and safe passage to Panama. The roads to the airport were lined with cheering supporters.

The following month, the FSLN prompted mass rebellions in five major cities, temporarily overpowering the National Guard. “We went with the September insurrection because of the political situation that existed, in order not to let the people be massacred,” FSLN strategist Humberto Ortega recalled. “Because the people, just as they had done in Monimbó, were rising up alone.” In the cities, Civil Defense Committees were formed to organize barricades and the distribution of ammunition, supplies, and food within the “liberated” urban spaces. The military reconquered the urban zones one by one, carrying out mass executions of suspected supporters. Many young people initiated into armed struggle during the September insurrection ballooned the membership of the guerilla fronts, which became true armies virtually overnight.

It is important to note that much of the impetus of the insurrection came not from the long-organized guerilla cadres but young men and boys (*los muchachos*) who spontaneously threw themselves into pitched street battles with government troops. According to sociologist Carlos Vilas’ investigations, those that died fighting the regime were overwhelmingly male and between age 15 and 24. A relatively small number were members of the industrial “proletariat” and even less were “peasants” – the two social groups on whose behalf the Sandinistas led the revolution. While a large number were high school and university students – the social base of FSLN cadres and the source of the leadership – many were what Vilas calls “urban tradespeople,” including artisans and unsalaried workers in the informal economy.

As it increasingly appeared that the government’s collapse would leave a power vacuum into which the leftists would step, the United States continued pushing for what would be denounced as *Somocismo sin Somoza*, grasping for a negotiated exit which would leave the essential structures of the regime – particularly the National Guard – in place while pressuring the most odious figure to leave the scene. Negotiations between the Somoza and the FAO, mediated by the the US, Guatemalan, and Dominican ambassadors, in October failed completely. When in January 1979 the United States proposed the idea of an Organization of American States peacekeeping force to enter Nicaragua, only Somoza’s delegate voted in favor. Backing the Sandinistas were regional govern-

ments such as Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba, and Venezuela, which were eager for the dictator to leave and the bloodshed to end.

As the revolutionary energy reached its zenith, many moderate opposition groups united with the MPU to form the Patriotic National Front in February 1979. In March the various FSLN tendencies formally reunited forming the National Directorate made up of nine members drawn from each of the three tendencies. In April another insurrection exploded in the city of Estelí which drew an incredibly violent response from the regime, and unleashed a bombing campaign from the air against innocent civilians. From May to June the guerilla armies marched onward in collaboration with urban insurrections. When a national strike was called by Nicaraguan capitalists, the dictator promptly bombed his business competitors’ factories. As city after city fell to the FSLN guerillas and mass insurrection arrived for the first time in Managua itself, Somoza finally relinquished control. When he boarded a plane to Miami on July 17, approximately 50,000 Nicaraguans had died in the bloodshed of the civil war. Given the personal control exercised by Somoza over the National Guard, his exit led the remaining military power to fall like a house of cards. On July 19 the Sandinista forces commandeered tanks, trucks, and jeeps poured into the capital, where an enormous celebration rally was held in the Plaza de la República.

Revolution in Power

Officially in control of the government was the Junta of the National Government of Reconstruction, a body that included Daniel Ortega, representing the FSLN; Sergio Ramírez and Moisés Hassan, former members of the Group of Twelve and the MPU; and, representing the private sector, *La Prensa* owner Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the widow of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, and Alfonso Robles, a prominent businessman and Somoza opponent. The various Junta members had agreed upon a common agenda including political pluralism and the avoidance of a one-party state, a mixed economy combining private business and public enterprise, and non-alignment in international relations, steering a middle course between the Cold War opponents. Indeed, the leadership headed in September to Washington, DC, where the

olive-green uniformed Sandinistas exchanged hugs with President Carter and received pledges of aid and support. In reality, power was concentrated in the hands of the National Directorate, “the supreme body of the Revolution,” run by the nine Sandinista *comandantes* from the various tendencies. Barrios de Chamorro and Robles would leave the Junta after a frustrating period of disagreement, as the secretly Sandinista Hassan and Ramírez consistently voted with Ortega. Likewise, the Council of State, a corporative semi-legislative body founded in May 1980, was heavily stacked in favor of the FSLN-affiliated organizations, alienating participation by non-Sandinista parties and organizations.

In the economic sphere the new government announced far-reaching goals of redistributing wealth and promoting independent economic development. The properties of Somoza and his allies were taken into state control by some of the first decrees, forming the People’s Property Area. Though these properties accounted for nearly 20 percent of the arable land, as well as numerous important businesses, most of the economy would remain in private hands. Even at the height of government control, only 40 percent of industry, 30 percent internal commerce and 23 percent of agricultural production was in state hands. The new government began promoting private economic reactivation with low-interest loans and other subsidies. Though they nationalized the banking system and foreign trade, Sandinistas never developed a completely socialized economy. In addition, the dictatorship had bequeathed an onerous \$1.6 billion foreign debt which they decided to continue paying off in order to maintain creditworthiness on the international market. At the same time, the new National Institute of Agrarian Reform began distributing the nationalized holdings to cooperatives and state farms, cutting large private farms from 52 percent to 26 percent of the total while redistributing the 2.7 million acres of land seized from the administration. Credit for small farmers increased 400 percent in these years and state farms provided their workers with health clinics, daycare, schools, and subsidized stores. With increasing demands, a 1981 Agrarian Reform decree allowed all idle, abandoned, or poorly managed land to be expropriated by the government.

In addition to these economic changes, the Sandinistas began carrying out social reforms

in favor of the majority of poor Nicaraguans left out of the progress. The Somoza years had left Nicaragua with more than half of the population unable to read and write. Using FSLN founder Carlos Fonseca’s advice to “also teach them to read” as a slogan, much of the country mobilized in 1980 around the National Literacy Crusade with the goal of reducing these outrageous levels of illiteracy. The normal school year was postponed and 60,000 students were trained and traveled to live in the countryside to teach basic literacy for nearly five months. Another 25,000 worked in the poor barrios of the cities, where many adults remained functionally illiterate. The massive voluntary participation that the National Literacy Crusade received was only possible in the atmosphere of elation and euphoria following Somoza’s fall. In addition to the educational accomplishments, the literacy campaign served a dual political function for the new government. On the one hand, the program’s pedagogy was built around revolutionary political themes, causing some to denounce it as political indoctrination. On the other hand, by living in rural communities, the literacy brigades were brought face to face with the realities of Nicaraguan poverty and social exclusion. Many of those who participated were permanently politicized by their experience in the campaign. Directed by Jesuit priest and Sandinista Fernando Cardenal, the campaign reduced illiteracy from approximately 50 to 13 percent and received wide international acclaim, including a prestigious United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization award for single best program of 1980. Building upon the success of the literacy campaign was a burst of cultural awakening, as books, magazines, and newspapers became widely read and debated. National dance, music, and handicrafts were revived and heavily promoted by the government, while poetry and art workshops were held throughout the country.

In addition, the Sandinistas built on the Cuban model for public health, another area in which pre-revolutionary Nicaragua was highly deficient. The Somoza era had bequeathed high levels of malnutrition and death of children by curable disease, while the rich received quality care in private hospitals. With the unification of the national health system, hospitals were built, doctors were trained, and clinics spread to distant corners of the republic that had never

before been given attention. In addition, the FSLN placed a major focus on primary health-care and preventative medicine. Popular Health Days followed the model of the literacy campaigns, mobilizing volunteer health brigades to carry out vaccinations and raise awareness. Diseases such as polio, measles, diphtheria, tetanus, and whooping cough, which had previously plagued the population, were brought down precipitously or eliminated. As a result, national averages of infant mortality dropped as life expectancy increased. In 1981 the United Nations Children's Fund noted that the health programs of Nicaragua represented a model for the developing world. Like the literacy crusade, it was not massive injections of aid money that began solving these social problems, but political will and the energy of mass mobilization.

US Intervention

If a fortuitous series of circumstances allowed the revolutionaries to come to power, an entirely different panorama would face the new government with the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan as president of the United States. Reagan's worldview was one of a dichotomous struggle against the Soviet Union's "evil empire," and he developed a strong antipathy to the Sandinistas. The Reagan administration announced a laundry list of distinct reasons for their subversion of the Nicaraguan Revolution, including its military build-up, "totalitarianism," "human rights violations," and support for leftist guerillas in El Salvador. In retrospect, the decision to intervene seemed to be based on the threat to regional hegemony that the "threat of a good example" represented. To many Nicaraguans, Reagan's attempt to destroy the Sandinista Revolution was simply the modern extension of policies that extended from William Walker through the US occupation of 1912–33 and the half century of Somoza dominance.

As the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had previously done in Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1970–3, various means were used to prevent the possibility of a genuine revolution. Militarily, it began arming and training former National Guard members, known as counterrevolutionaries or the *Contras*, to carry out guerilla attacks and massacres from Honduras on "soft targets," such as agricultural cooperatives, health clinics, and schools. As the deaths mounted, continued and sporadic military conflict began spiraling into

a new civil war, the direct hands of the CIA behind the *Contras* became increasingly apparent. US support for these groups, widely considered "terrorists," would bring a great deal of condemnation. It was the October 1983 mining of the harbor of Corinto by CIA agents that led the International Court of Justice to condemn the United States for acts of aggression and terrorism.

In 1981 the Reagan administration cut off all economic support and aid that had previously gone to Nicaragua and attempted to prevent the FSLN from receiving international development loans. In 1985 Reagan went one step further and declared a total trade embargo against Nicaragua, depriving the country of its traditional export markets and sources for many of its inputs and replacement parts. As a result of these continued acts of aggression by the United States, Nicaragua moved closer into the sphere of Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the communist bloc countries which provided economic support and trade.

Elite Domestic Opposition

In addition, the Sandinistas were resisted by powerful local opponents. Given the Sandinistas' socialist orientation and Marxist origins, it is perhaps not surprising that relations with the private sector turned acrimonious quickly. Sandinistan attempts to structure investment priorities, control prices, and redistribute wealth were greeted with widespread disapproval. The nationalization of a number of firms announced on the first anniversary of the Revolution sparked a wave of opposition by Nicaraguan capitalists, grouped in the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP). In addition, antipathy to FSLN economic policy led many to decapitalize, scale back production, and invest abroad. Voicing elite opposition to the Sandinista regime was *La Prensa*, the same major newspaper that had opposed Somoza, with headlines screaming of communism, totalitarianism, and shortages of goods. Denunciations of the *Contras* and the US aggression did not figure prominently in their coverage, and it was later revealed that the paper itself formed a part of the CIA strategy to destabilize the regime.

In addition to the economic elite, the Catholic Church quickly became a most outspoken opponent. Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo attempted to bring the grassroots activism of the liberation theologians that had been so

instrumental in the revolutionary movement back under control of the church hierarchy. This was a local articulation of an international campaign against liberation theology led by Pope John Paul II. The FSLN was considered communist and atheist, though many Sandinistas had come to social activism by way of their Christian faith. The participation of Jesuit priest Miguel D'Escoto as foreign minister, as well as the brothers Fernando and Ernesto Cardenal (a Jesuit father and Trappist monk, respectively) in cabinet-level positions, particularly rankled church authorities. Highly political interpretations of the Bible became anathema to the church leadership, which supported the reassertion of a more traditional order. The church-Sandinista conflict reached its zenith when Pope John Paul II visited Managua in 1983 and made strong statements in favor of the hierarchy and refused to denounce the United States for the attacks of the *contras*. In response, Sandinista crowds began chanting over the pope's speech, disrupting and angering the pontiff. Relations would remain tense for the rest of the decade.

Campefino and Indigenous Opposition

The peasants or *campesinos* of the country's agricultural frontier and the indigenous people of the Atlantic coast also came to oppose the Sandinistas. These groups had largely been left alone during the Somoza regime and participated very little in the struggle to overthrow the dictatorship. The FSLN Agrarian Reform, with its emphasis on the promotion of state farms and agricultural cooperatives, angered many peasants who dreamed of being able to own a piece of land. The state monopolization of the distribution system and price-setting infuriated *campesinos* who demanded the right sell to whoever they wanted at the best price they could receive. This general discontent allowed the CIA-backed *Contra* guerrillas to develop networks of rural collaboration and recruitment in their war. The mistreatment of local populations by the Sandinista Popular Army, now carrying out a counterinsurgency campaign against the *Contras*, also alienated many peasants.

A similar instance of alienation occurred in Nicaragua's isolated and culturally distinct Atlantic coast, despite the intention of the Sandinistas to respect cultural and ethnic diversity. The region was inhabited by six different ethnic groups:

Spanish-speaking Mestizos, Miskito Indians, Creoles (Afro-Caribbean population), Mayanga Indians (previously known as Sumu), Garifunas (Central American Maroons), and Rama Indians. Throughout history, the ethnic hierarchy of the Atlantic coast was fluid. The Sandinistas were unable to deal with the resultant interethnic domination and tension. Among the mistakes made by the Sandinistas from the beginning was their intent to distribute collective land titles. To many Miskito Indians this was seen as robbery because they didn't feel that the Sandinistas had the authority to distribute their land. Another mistake the Sandinistas made was not considering the indigenous languages or Creole English within their alphabetization campaign on the Atlantic coast, instead carrying out the campaign in Spanish (as on the Pacific coast).

While the smallest least-powerful ethnic groups in the hierarchy supported the Sandinistas, their relationship with the Miskito and others became more and more strained. The indigenous – but mainly Miskito – organization MISURASATA (Miskito, Sumo, and Rama All Together) radicalized its demands, and in February 1981 the Sandinistas detained 33 members of the leadership of MISURASATA, accusing them of “separatism.” All but one were released two weeks later. Most of them fled to Honduras and started to build an indigenous *Contra*. After the first major Miskito *Contra* military offensive, which began in November 1981, the Nicaraguan government ordered the forced relocation of the Miskito border population: 8,500 were relocated to a new settlement, while 10,000 fled to Honduras. While fighting the *Contras*, abusive Sandinista treatment of indigenous Miskitos left many dead, especially between 1981 and 1982.

In Honduras an indigenous *Contra* under the leadership of Steadmen Fagoth, named MISURA, was built and integrated into the FDN *Contra*. It split in 1982 when a faction under the leadership of Brooklyn Rivera accused Fagoth of crimes against civilians and criticized their alliance with the most right wing of former Somoza followers. A rival indigenous *contra* organization (MISURASATA) emerged, and joined the more moderate *Contra* Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ARDE) in Costa Rica. The CIA intervened, directly offering arms to the Miskitos and pushing them to go to war.

In the Southern Atlantic coast the FSLN did not recognize the organization of the Creole population, the Southern Indigenous Creole

Community (SICC), since it was openly against the Sandinista government. After huge protests in Bluefields in late September and early October 1980 against the “Cuban presence” (mainly doctors and teachers), the FSLN engaged in a process of dialogue and managed to slowly dissipate tensions. Nevertheless, the majority of the Creole population remained apathetic towards the Sandinista revolution, as well as towards the Contras.

The Sandinista politics towards the Atlantic coast changed from 1983 on, as noticed positively by many human rights organizations. The FSLN declared various amnesties for Miskito prisoners, and after the elections in 1984 the resettled Miskitos were allowed to decide if they wanted to return to their communities – most of them did by 1985. In 1987 an an Autonomy for the Atlantic Coast provision was introduced into the new constitution, effectively signaling an end to the Miskito Contra.

As the decade stretched on, FSLN policy began shifting dramatically in certain ways. Rather than denouncing all of the private sector, they began more intensely emphasizing collaboration with the “patriotic producers” or “national bourgeoisie” – those businesspeople willing to work with the regime. In relation to the Atlantic coast, the Sandinistas began voicing support for a form of autonomy and self-governance for the region that would be enshrined in the new 1987 constitution. Most dramatically, the entire Agrarian Reform plan, with its cooperatives and state farms, would be shelved due to military expediency. A new strategy of direct titling of small farms to individual *campesinos* was launched in 1984, with the hopes of pacifying rebellious regions. Regardless, US funding of opposition – political and military – continued throughout the 1980s.

Sandinista Democracy

The Sandinista promise of a socialist government with an emphasis on democracy provoked great hopes among the international left, which had grown disillusioned with the authoritarianism of the various “revolutionary” regimes which had seemingly transposed the Soviet dictatorship into new contexts. Although having great reverence for the Cuban experience, the FSLN hoped to avoid its undemocratic errors and isolation. In 1984 the Sandinistas made good on their promise for democratic elections. These multi-

party elections were accepted as relatively free and fair by multiple international electoral observers, though the United States called them a “farce”. With the last-minute exit of the main opposition candidate, Sandinistas Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramírez won an overwhelming landslide victory with 65 percent of the vote. An increasing degree of institution-building followed with the writing of a new constitution in 1985 and 1986 by the elected National Assembly. The final document attempted to combine the civil and political rights of the western democracies with the guaranteed social rights and commitment to equality of the Eastern European constitutions.

Rather than merely the habitual exercise of elections, the FSLN promised to promote a grassroots democracy in which average citizens could participate constantly in the decisions that affected their daily lives. Mass organizations were to engage the population, including the Sandinista Worker Federation (CST), the Association of Rural Workers (ATC), the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG), and the Luisa Amanda Espinoza National Women’s Association (AMNLAE.) In theory, these organizations were to allow these important sectors of national life to receive direct representation and voices for the first time. The largest of these mass organizations were the Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS), which had formed out of the insurrection itself. These block committees were founded throughout the country, where they played a key role in mobilizing the population for education, health, housing, and cultural projects. They also distributed scarce resources directly to the population and established popular militias which greatly reduced crime and prevented acts of sabotage.

At the same time, these mass organizations quickly developed a reputation as “conveyor belts” for the top-down decisions of the Sandinista Party, which was recognized as the “vanguard of the Revolution.” Indeed, an early revolutionary slogan was “National Directorate, give us your orders!” Thus emerged a strange situation in which groups that “represented” women or workers were expected to steer clear of divisive issues like feminism or the struggle for better wages. This verticalism was accentuated by US aggression. Many CDS block committees gained great notoriety for “spying” on communities and generally behaving in an authoritarian and arbitrary manner towards neighbors. Providing

an opportunity for poor and marginalized Nicaraguans to participate for the first time ever in the day-to-day management of society was an accomplishment of the revolutionary mass organizations. In the end, however, the inherent tension between centralized decision-making and the dream of a self-managing society meant the latter could not materialize.

Continuing Civil War

Despite democratic elections, US opposition continued unabated. As the Contras mobilized increasing numbers of *campesinos* to participate in their armies, their ability to effect damage to the country and economy increased. Opposition figures that had once participated in the government, like Alfonso Robles and Arturo Cruz, were recruited to provide a civilian face to the armed insurgency. As a result of the war, nearly 30,000 people were killed and 180,000 displaced from their homes. Farming in the north was greatly disrupted, infrastructure destroyed, and an estimated \$50 million lost each year. As a result of both the war and Sandinista mismanagement, shortages of basic goods were common and many items of daily consumption were rationed. With the *La Prensa* accused of endorsing the Contra forces, the Sandinistas shut down the newspaper, silencing the main voice of opposition to the FSLN in the country.

To continue isolating the Contras and defend the Revolution, the Sandinistas constructed an incredibly expensive and large military force, allocating 62 percent of its budget to defense, starving the coffers for health and education programs. To supply the 40,000 soldiers necessary to meet the American challenge, the FSLN instituted a highly unpopular military draft known as Patriotic Military Service. While the wealthy were able to send their children abroad to escape the draft, the burden fell overwhelmingly upon the children of peasants and the urban poor.

In the United States the violence in Nicaragua provoked a great deal of debate and Congress passed an amendment forbidding lethal aid to the Contras. When an American mercenary plane was shot down over Nicaraguan airspace while delivering aid to the Contras, investigations began into the role of the White House in secret supply networks. Though funding to the Contras

was restored by Congress in 1986, the crimes committed during the interim became the subject of the so-called Iran–Contra scandal. It was revealed that members of the Reagan administration, particularly Oliver North of the National Security Council, had funneled money to the Contras, earned through secret weapons sales to Iran. Though Reagan and Vice President George H. W. Bush avoided any punishment, the irony of selling weapons to a regime denounced by the US as “terrorist” to fund armed groups widely considered “terrorists” was lost on few.

With the Reagan administration’s policy of getting the Sandinistas to “cry uncle” universally repudiated, a pathway to a negotiated solution was opened by the Latin American governments known as the Contadora Group, which linked solutions to the various conflicts of Central America, including Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Building upon these efforts, further negotiations between the Central American heads of state led to the 1987 Esquipulas Accords, in which they collectively resolved to promote national reconciliation, demobilize “irregular armed forces,” and transition to elected systems of governance. Though his negotiation plan was opposed by the US, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. In Nicaragua this diplomatic process bore fruits: *La Prensa* was permitted to begin publishing again while negotiations were opened between the Nicaraguan government and the Contras. The Sapoa ceasefire agreement of 1988 and other agreements would be signed between the Nicaraguan government and the Contras, providing a blanket amnesty for the insurgents, the demobilization of their forces, and guarantees for land and economic opportunities to ease their transition into civilian life.

Revolution’s Defeat and Its Legacies

With the actual threat of the Contras brought to a conclusion, the peace treaties did not represent a panacea for the Revolution. The war, embargo, mismanagement of state enterprises, and conflict with the private sector had left the country in a difficult position. Galloping inflation soared to 30,000 percent, setting records even in a region known for high levels of inflation. With the economy in shambles and poverty increasing, the

Sandinistas embraced a version of the neoliberal policies being forced upon countries throughout the region by the International Monetary Fund. These austerity programs, including a devaluation of the *córdoba*, layoffs, and cutbacks in credit fell hardest upon the poorest among the population.

In the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the FSLN agreed to hold multiparty elections to once again ratify the popular support for the Revolution, with Daniel Ortega again as their candidate. Running against him was Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, *La Prensa* owner, with the backing of 14 political parties from across the political spectrum. Assuring a united front against the Sandinistas, the US government was acting through the National Endowment for Democracy to fund and organize the electoral campaign against the Sandinistas. It was later revealed that the US gave millions of dollars in both covert and public aid to the National Opposition Union (UNO) coalition. An ultimatum was laid by the superpower before the Nicaraguan people: if the Sandinistas were voted out, funding for the Contras would end and the embargo would end. The invasion of nearby Panama by the United States in 1989 increased this threatening atmosphere. When the vote was held (February 1990), Nicaraguan voters voted the Sandinistas out of office and ended what had been 11 years of high hopes and difficulties; Chamorro received 55 percent of the vote to Ortega's 40 percent. With tears in his eyes, Ortega accepted the results of the elections and insisted on cooperation as the way to preserve democracy through the transition.

Many of the social gains of the Sandinista Revolution in the spheres of health, education, housing, and culture were rolled back over the course of the next two decades of neoliberal economic policy. Poverty, inequality, and migration grew. Perhaps the greatest irony of the Sandinista Revolution is that its greatest achievements were not among the FSLN's goals. The Sandinistas changed the agrarian structure of the country – not into modern state farms as the Sandinistas dreamed – but into a society of small producers, greatly decreasing the land held by vast estates. Also, by overthrowing a dictatorship, developing democratic institutions, and handing over power following defeat at the ballot box, the Sandinistas in many ways carried out an effective “bourgeois democratic revolution.” The suc-

cessors of the Sandinistas' mass organizations, now freed from their fetters as mere subsidiaries of the FSLN, have developed into vibrant independent community groups and national organizations. Neighborhood councils, feminist organizations, and indigenous communities have played a role in constructing a new civil society. Finally, a discourse of human rights and an understanding of the inequalities and injustice of society filtered throughout the popular consciousness, where they remain until this day.

SEE ALSO: Borge, Tomás (b. 1936); Fonseca, Carlos (1936–1976); Martí, Farabundo (1893–1932); Ortega, Daniel (b. 1945); Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN); Sandino, Augusto César (1895–1934)

References and Suggested Readings

- Black, G. (1981) *Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua*. London: Zed Books.
- Booth, J. A. (1985) *The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Cabezas, O. (1985) *Fire From the Mountain: The Making of a Sandinista*. New York: Crown.
- Gilbert, D. (1988) *Sandinistas: The Party and the Revolution*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Gould, J. (1990) *To Lead as Equals: Rural Protest and Political Consciousness in Chinandega, Nicaragua, 1912–1979*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Hodges, D. (1986) *The Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Hoyt, K. (1997) *The Many Faces of Sandinista Democracy*. Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Kampwirth, K. (2002) *Women and Guerrilla Movements: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas, Cuba*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Ortega Saavedra, H. (1979) *Cincuenta años de lucha sandinista*. Mexico: Editorial Diogenes.
- Spalding, R. (1994) *Capitalists and Revolution in Nicaragua: Opposition and Accommodation, 1979–1993*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Vanden, H. E. & Prevost, G. (1993) *Democracy and Socialism in Sandinista Nicaragua*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Vilas, C. M. (1986) *The Sandinista Revolution: National Liberation and Social Transformation in Central America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Walker, T. W. (1991) *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Zimmerman, M. (2000) *Sandinista: Carlos Fonseca and the Nicaraguan Revolution*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900)

Stacy Warner Maddern

Born in 1844 in the small town of Ruecken, Prussia, Friedrich Nietzsche would challenge the normative forces of morality in the dawn of the twentieth century. Through his thesis on the death of God, Nietzsche sought to identify the complicity between morality and Christianity that perpetuated the denial of life. As a child, Nietzsche's life would be altered, at the age of 4, by the death of his father, who had been a Lutheran minister. The event seemed to spark what would later result in his questioning the existence of God, initiating an important philosophical anti-religious current in the nineteenth century that burnished the value of individual rights.

At 15, Nietzsche entered Schulpforta, a Lutheran boarding school, where he prepared for university studies. After graduation he attended the University of Bonn in 1864 as a theology and philology student. At Bonn, Nietzsche indulged in a more hedonistic lifestyle and it is believed he contracted syphilis there. After growing tired of such endeavors he left Bonn for the University of Leipzig, fixing all his attention exclusively on philology – a discipline which then centered upon the interpretation of classical and biblical texts. As a student of philology, Nietzsche attended lectures by Otto Jahn (1813–69) and Friedrich Wilhelm Ritschl (1806–76). In 1865, at the age of 21, Nietzsche discovered Arthur Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* (1818) in a local bookstore. Schopenhauer's work fed his yearning for philosophical inquiry and quickly immersed him into the metaphysics of nihilism.

In 1868, after a brief stint of military service, Nietzsche returned to the University of Leipzig, where his talent and published writings in philology earned him a doctorate degree, without having to write a dissertation, and also a professorship at the age of 24 in classical philology at the University of Basel. At Basel he would befriend composer Richard Wagner (1813–83), with whom he shared an enthusiasm for Schopenhauer. Nietzsche, who had been composing piano, choral, and orchestral music since he was a teenager, admired Wagner's musical genius. At 27,

he authored his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), which he would later claim was a product of the impact of Schopenhauer and was inspired by the music of Wagner. While it was hailed by intellectuals, most classic philologists panned it for lacking a “scientific” premise.

During his time of residency at Basel, Nietzsche expounded upon his frustration with contemporary German culture by completing a series of studies. *Unfashionable Observations* (1873–6) was an examination of David Strauss, a historian of religion and a cultural critic, in which he raised issues concerning the social value of historiography, marking Schopenhauer and Wagner as the standards for new developing ideas. In 1879, at 34, while he was a respected professor at Basel, Nietzsche's health was deteriorating. Suffering from prolonged migraine headaches, eyesight problems, and vomiting, he resigned from the university.

From 1880 to 1889, Nietzsche maintained a wandering existence, never residing in any place longer than a few months at a time. These years would produce his primary works, including *Daybreak* (1881), *The Gay Science* (1882/1887), *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883–5), *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886), and *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1887). In 1888, he would complete *The Case of Wagner* (May–August 1888), *Twilight of the Idols* (August–September 1888), *The Antichrist* (September 1888), *Ecce Homo* (October–November 1888), and *Nietzsche Contra Wagner* (December 1888). It was through these works that Nietzsche's fascination with individualism began to develop. In particular, *On the Genealogy of Morals* accuses the ideals of traditional Christian morality of being mired in self-deception because of its practice of turning an “evil eye” toward the natural inclinations of humanity. As such he goes on to qualify priests as essentially weak people who advise and counsel weaker people as a means of gaining power for themselves. Because of such developments in Christian faith, Nietzsche concluded that the individual had no alternative than to fall back on himself. Herein, the danger of Christian morality, according to Nietzsche, was the disparity that it eventually enforced on individuals, causing them to embrace a nihilistic dilemma on the meaning of life.

Nietzsche attempted to identify the devastating effects that could be wrought by Christian morality in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. He utilized his own personal prophet in

Thus Spoke Zarathustra to express the coming of a new age, one that would exist on the premise of creativity and a culture of truthfulness. In such an age he creates *Übermensch*, an overman who has mastered individualism and sets this as the ultimate goal of man. The particular point he makes is not the goal of man at the end of life, but the realization that life is a journey placing the realization of the self above all else. With *Übermensch*, Nietzsche identifies a fundamental component of human nature as the reliance on expression through self-enhancement. It becomes the essential meaning of life to experience, and for every single individual that experience is different. By this, Nietzsche seemingly rejects the virtues contained in mass values and mass movements.

In 1889, Nietzsche had a mental breakdown, most likely the result of his early contraction of syphilis, leaving him an invalid for the rest of his life. After being hospitalized for a brief time in Basel, he spent most of 1889 in a sanatorium in Jena until his mother was able to take him back to Naumburg in 1890. After his mother's death in 1897, his sister Elisabeth assumed responsibility for Nietzsche's welfare. In Weimar she rented a small cottage, which later became known as the Villa Silberblick, where she attempted to promote her brother's writings. On August 25, 1900, Nietzsche died shortly before his fifty-sixth birthday of an apparent stroke.

During his lifetime Nietzsche's work went apparently unnoticed; however, he never doubted that it would have a lasting cultural effect. In large part the responsibility for this lay upon his sister, Elisabeth, who as a dedicated Nazi tried to unleash his work as a treatise in support of Hitler, which ultimately led to the interpretation of Nietzsche as an anti-Semite. In reality Nietzsche became one of the first philosophers to declare war on a long-standard western tradition relating to the fundamental principles of morality. He also called into question the logical standards underlying European reason, which would have a great impact on philosophical intellectuals in the later half of the twentieth century. As the twentieth century progressed, his thinking would provide inspiration to avant-garde artists teetering on the periphery of conventionalism. Nietzsche's practice of seeking explanations for accepted morality in contrast to acceptance of animal instinct is believed to have been crucial in Sigmund Freud's development of psychoanalysis.

It was not until the 1960s in France that Nietzsche began to appeal to writers and artists through his declaration of "God is dead." It was through his own emphasis upon power as the most relevant explanation for people's actions that Nietzsche's thought began to inspire new mechanisms for challenging the establishment and launching new methods of effective social critique. At the heart of his work lies a premise that the goal of life should be to find oneself and that knowledge and strength are much greater virtues than humility and submission.

SEE ALSO: Bernstein, Eduard (1850–1932); Camus, Albert (1913–1960); Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Socialism; Zionism

References and Suggested Readings

- Allison, D. (2000) *Reading the New Nietzsche*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Clark, M. (1990) *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gillespie, M. (1996) *Nihilism Before Nietzsche*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1979) *Nietzsche, Vol. 1: The Will to Power as Art*. Trans. D. F. Krell. New York: Harper & Row.
- Heidegger, M. (1984) *Nietzsche, Vol. 2: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*. Trans. D. F. Krell. San Francisco: Harper & Row.
- Heidegger, M. (1986) *Nietzsche, Vol. 3: Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics*. Trans. J. Stambaugh & F. Capuzzi. San Francisco: Harper & Row.
- Nietzsche, F. (1967a) *The Birth of Tragedy*. Trans. W. Kaufmann. In *The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner*. New York: Random House.
- Nietzsche, F. (1967b) *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Trans. W. Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale. In *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*. New York: Random House.
- Nietzsche, F. (1968) *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Trans. W. Kaufmann. In *The Portable Nietzsche*. New York: Viking Press.
- Nietzsche, F. (1974) *The Gay Science, with a Prelude of Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*. Trans. W. Kaufmann. New York: Random House.

Niger Delta, protest movements

Adebusuyi I. Adeniran

The Niger Delta – the heart of Nigeria's oil economy – is traditionally composed of six states (Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Edo, Delta, and Rivers) comprising the South-South geopolitical zone of Nigeria. In 2000 three other oil

producing states of Abia, Imo, and Ondo were to be included as members of the newly established Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). Paradoxically, however, with the region accounting for nearly 90 percent of Nigeria's gross export earnings, it is the least developed in Nigeria. Environmental degradation, air pollution, and general deprivation are highly prevalent.

Agitation for social justice has been always quite potent since oil exploration began in the region in 1956, but contemporary clamor for local resource control began taking militant undertones in the early 1990s, with pockets of social action – protests, demonstrations, and intermittent disruption of oil production – throughout the region. Due to the flagrant ineptitude of Nigerian ruling aristocrats, these hitherto non-violent displays of discontent metamorphosed into an armed struggle between Niger Delta militants and the Nigerian federal state. Indeed, militancy in the Niger Delta region has remained the greatest threat to the continued existence of Nigeria as a unified nation.

In the 1990s, after nearly fifty years of oil exploration, Nigeria, especially the oil producing region of Niger Delta, had not modernized its economy, and the region has fallen deeper into poverty. In spite of the wealth brought about by the oil deposits, the majority of residents in the Niger Delta had become poorer over time, abandoning traditional agricultural endeavors mainly as a consequence of destruction of the ecosystem by oil spills and related social incongruence without corresponding compensation. The Niger Delta, with an annual population expansion of 3 percent, accounts for an estimated 25 percent of Nigeria's more than 140 million inhabitants. In the two decades from the late 1980s to early 2000s, conspicuous changes have occurred in the social and economic structures of the region without necessary accompanying opportunities for the citizenry.

Protest Movements and Social Unrest

Commencing from the early 1990s, various groups began to emerge protesting the injustice meted out to the Niger Deltans by the Nigerian state and their foreign oil partners. In 1992 the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) came into being basically as the platform for projecting to the entire world the agonies of the minorities of the Niger Delta region. Playwright

and social activist Ken Saro-Wiwa became MOSOP leader. The Nigerian government and Shell Oil Company were its chief targets. The antagonism between MOSOP and Shell (ably represented by the Nigerian military) took a violent turn in December 1992. MOSOP was "pushed" to issue a timeframe within which all the oil companies operating on Ogoniland (Shell, Chevron, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) had to remit an estimated \$10 billion in compensation for the unbridled exploitation of their resources and environment. MOSOP promised large-scale social unrest if its demand was not met. The federal government reacted by prohibiting public protests and moved to criminalize "insubordination" of any kind in the process of oil production within the region. This act led to a series of intermittent violent clashes between MOSOP and government forces. An escalation of these conflictual exchanges took place on May 21, 1994 with the entrance of Nigerian military personnel into most Ogoni settlements. Four factional MOSOP leaders were murdered, ostensibly by the military. However, Saro-Wiwa, who was outside Ogoniland at the time of the killings, was declared wanted for complicity. He was subsequently arrested and found guilty of murder by a tribunal put in place by the military government. He was eventually executed by hanging with eight other Ogoni rights activists (the Ogoni 9) in 1995. Meanwhile, by the end of the siege in June 1994, well over 2,000 people had lost their lives and an estimated 120,000 internal refugees had been created.

In 1998 the Ijaw Youths Council (IYC) was formed with the sole aim of agitating for indigenous people's rights. The Ijaw people are the largest ethnic group in the region. The bid by the IYC in December 1998 to launch its Operation Climate Change in reaction to the activities of the oil companies operating all over the region was met with stiff resistance from about 20,000 Nigerian military personnel. Consequently, hundreds of IYC members and sympathizers went on violent protests all over Bayelsa state. Scores of protesters were maimed, while tens were caged. Another protest organized for the release of the arrested IYC members turned bloodier with the killing of more protesters by government troops. The Nigerian military government declared a state of emergency throughout Bayelsa state. The period of the curfew was marked with massive looting, beating, rape, and undocumented killings.

Two Ijaw settlements – Ikiyan and Opia in Delta state – came under severe attack on January 4, 1999 for what the military authorities termed anti-state propaganda by the IYC. Scores of indigenes, including the Ikiyan traditional ruler, were maimed, while many remained missing months after the siege ceased. Entire communities were set ablaze by the military forces. Regardless of this state ruthlessness, IYC's Operation Climate Change campaign persisted, as could be seen in the disruption to oil production and distribution for much of 1999. Consequently, the new “democratic” government ordered the invasion of Odi in Bayelsa state where almost 3,000 inhabitants were massacred.

Rise of Militarized Struggle

Persistent environmental degradation and unbridled social injustice have provided the impetus for continued militarization of the region, as seen in the activities of various environmental rights groups and the military. The emergence of both the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari and the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) in 2003 sent an array of small militant groups into oblivion in the region. The primary goal of the groups, which operate from the regional creeks that are extremely difficult for the Nigerian military to access, was to assume the control of oil resources within the region. Both the NDPVF and NDV do this by the illegal tapping of oil pipelines, that is, “bunkering,” and the intermittent destruction of oil facilities. Although the government criminalized the activities of these militant groups, they in turn claim to be taking what rightfully belongs to them. The ensuing altercation climaxed on September 25, 2004 when Dokubo-Asari declared a total war on the Nigerian government and the foreign oil corporations (oil installations were flagrantly vandalized) in reaction to the envisaged extermination agenda of the federal government directed at the Niger Deltans. Eventually, Dokubo-Asari was arrested and convicted of treason.

The existence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was acknowledged in April 2006 when it publicly claimed responsibility for the bombing of an oil facility. MEND thereafter called for the immediate release of the imprisoned NDPVF leader and other Niger Delta emancipation advocates,

and warned all foreign oil companies to leave with immediate effect. The group emphasized that “the Nigerian government cannot protect your workers or assets . . . our aim is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil.” Various intense altercations between the government and MEND have resulted in the loss of numerous lives on both sides over the years.

The activities of these militant self-determination groups have clearly turned out to be the greatest challenge to the existence of Nigeria as a unified state. In June 2008 Nigerian-born United Nations Under-Secretary General Ibrahim Gambari was rejected as the head of the proposed Niger Delta summit. His rejection was a popular means for Nigerians to let the government know what they thought of its insensitivity towards the Niger Deltans. The kidnapping of key state functionaries and their families and foreign oil workers have continued unabated.

SEE ALSO: Jamaica, Peasant Uprisings, 19th Century; Nigeria, Protest and Revolution, 20th Century; Saro-Wiwa, Ken (1941–1995)

References and Suggested Readings

- Adeniran, A. (2005) *Poverty and Political Stability in Nigeria*. Lagos: Department of Sociology, University of Lagos.
- Human Rights Watch (1999) *The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Independent* (2006) Nigeria: Shell May Pull Out of Niger Delta after 17 Die in Boat Raid. *Independent*, January 17.

Nigeria, 1993 political and electoral protest and conflict

Olayinka Akanle

Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa. Endowed with human and natural resources, it is also the continent's oldest federal polity and has great ethnic, religious, class, and linguistic diversity. Nigeria experienced one of the most popular pro-democracy revolts in the history of contemporary African governance following the annulment of the free and fair presidential

elections of June 12, 1993, which were presumed to have been won by Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola.

Prior to the June 12 elections, Nigeria had spent 24 of the 33 years since its independence under repressive military regimes. During that period, human rights violations, corruption, unemployment, and poverty were widespread. Popular yearnings for democracy were audibly expressed, both nationally and internationally. It was in this context that the military government of General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida (1985–93) initiated a transition to civilian rule.

General Babangida's commitment to democratic transition was initially perceived as genuine and encouraged policy dialogue between the military and influential civilian political and economic elites, including Abiola. After the investment of a great deal of money, manpower, and time in the democratic process, the elections were brought abruptly to an end when results showed Abiola leading in almost all the states of the federation. The 1993 election was noteworthy in Nigeria's political history as strong ethnic and religious sentiments were replaced by support for Abiola, the popular candidate, who was emerging as the clear winner.

In annulling the election, a systematic process was followed by Babangida and the military junta culminating in the hurried promulgation of decrees to incapacitate and prevent revolts and possibly legalize the military's suspension of the elections. Decree 39 of 1993 (Basic Constitutional and Traditional Provisions) repealed the constitution, Decree 40 of 1993 amended the transition program, and Decree 41 completely annulled the election on June 23. Unlike previous electoral crises, for example Operation Wetie of 1965 in southwestern Nigeria, which was sparked by ethnic divisions, the 1993 electoral protests and violence were spontaneous, coordinated, and widely supported by progressives.

Against the backdrop of poverty, wide class divisions, hopelessness, and a repressive military dictatorship, Abiola represented the popular expectations of the masses, especially among the poor, in part due to his philanthropy prior to entering politics. His effort to appeal to the poor was encapsulated in his election slogan, "Hope 93," which became a popular catchphrase in Nigeria. Abiola sought to bridge class differences, end national divisions, and engender hope for a more affluent future. When

the elections were annulled, scores of people marched on the streets of Nigeria's major cities in revolt. Babangida was subsequently forced to step down and hand over power to Chief Earnest Shonekan as interim president. Shonekan was subsequently overthrown in November 1993 by General Abacha, then minister of defense.

One year after the elections, on June 12, 1994, Abiola declared himself president based on a popular mandate, but was arrested and detained on June 23, leading to an outbreak of protest, violence, loss of life, and general turmoil. Official estimates place the number of deaths in the hundreds, but unofficial counts are significantly higher, as the period almost led to a second Nigerian civil war. However, opposition from the media and political activists was galvanized and resources were devoted to ousting the military from power. The National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) and Campaign for Democracy (CD) led the call for a return to civilian rule.

Rallies and demonstrations were consistently organized while international media houses were established as a window on the international community. The efficacy of these "pro-democracy activists," as they came to be known, was deemed such that the military junta, through the State Security Service (SSS) and other government agencies, resorted to closing down media houses such as the *Concord* newspaper, which belonged to Abiola, and to arrest, detain, maim, and assassinate its opponents. These atrocities forced many prominent political activists into exile. In July 1994, a national strike by the National Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers union (NUPENG), under the leadership of Frank Kokori, brought the protest to a new climax as fuel deliveries were suspended, facilitating the democracy movement's ability to coordinate protests and demonstrate solidarity against the military government.

As the operating base of Abiola and the focal point of Nigeria's political economy, Lagos was the epicenter of the protest. Similar protests were witnessed in Ibadan, reflecting Ibadan's distinguished legacy of popular resistance to illegitimate regimes with its historical origins in the Yoruba Mekunnu and the Agbekoya movements. The electoral protests and subsequent labor strikes are considered largely responsible for returning democracy to Nigeria.

The sustained momentum of national and international pro-democracy groups maintained pressure on General Abacha until his death on

June 8, 1998, after which General Abdusalam Abubakar handed over power to a democratically elected government on May, 29, 1999, fulfilling popular aspirations.

SEE ALSO: Agbekoya Peasant Uprising and Rebellion, 1968–1969; Nigeria, Protest and Revolution, 20th Century; Nigeria, Separatist Agitation, Contemporary; Revolution, Dialectics of

References and Suggested Readings

- Adamolekun, L. & Kincaid, J. (1991) *The Federal Solution: Assessment and Prognosis for Nigeria and Africa. Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 21 (Fall).
- Osaghae, E. E. & Suberu, R. T. (2005) *A History of Identities, Violence and Stability in Nigeria*. CRISE Working Paper No. 6 (January). Oxford: University of Oxford.
- Vaughan, O. (2005) *The Crisis of the Nigerian State in the Global Era*. In O. Vaughan, M. Wright, & C. Small (Eds.), *Globalisation and Marginalization: Essays on the Paradoxes of Global and Local Forces*. Nigeria: Sefer Books, pp. 112–35.
- Wilmot, P. (2007) *Nigeria: The Nightmare Scenario*. Nigeria: Book Craft and Farafina.

Nigeria, protest and revolution, 20th century

Ayokunle Olumuyima Omobowale

Militant Protests in Colonial Nigeria

Like most societies under European occupation, Nigeria has experienced violent protests and revolts from the colonial to post-independence era. The history of the colonization of Nigeria is marked by a history of militant conflict and European occupation and subjugation that precluded the capture and surrender of some local authorities, including the Sokoto Caliphate, the Ijebu, and Benin Kingdom.

The system of indirect rule introduced by the colonial regime following the defeat of local rulers served European interests, ensuring social order through administration by regional officials. The first major protest against this system was the Aba Women's Revolt of October 1929, in which some 10,000 women rebelled against the

plan of British officials to tax women directly, independently of men. The women attacked native courts, warrant officers, and European factories. The British colonial authority decided to quell the revolt by force, causing the death of dozens of protesters. Though the revolt was suppressed, the imperial government abolished plans for the Warrant Chief System that would have taxed women (van Allen 1972).

The Aba Women's Revolt bore the characteristics of economic and political protest from citizens, but ethnic and communal disturbances have also been a common feature in Nigeria during the twentieth century. The first major upheaval was the October 1945 Hausa-Ibo Riot in Jos, a tin-mining production hub in central Nigeria. The inter-ethnic insurrection lasted for two days, with many civilians injured, property destroyed, and two deaths. About seven years later, in May 1953 in Kano, another clash broke out between Hausas and Ibos, leading again to the destruction of life and property (Plotnicov 1971). These two ethnic/religious riots apparently formed the foundation for violent clashes which shook Nigeria for the next fifty years.

Protest in Post-Colonial Nigeria

Nigeria's post-independence period started with mutual suspicion between its three regions, with the southern regions of the West and East suspecting and trying to resist the dominance of the predominantly Hausa-Fulani North. The political terrain remained that of acrimonious relations between the three regions until 1966, when more than 30,000 southerners (mostly Ibos) were massacred in Kano, a large city in northern Nigeria. Fearing their safety could no longer be assured, the Ibos subsequently migrated *en masse* to the eastern region. The decision of the Ibos to secede and form the sovereign state of Biafra, with Colonel (General in Biafran Army) Ojukwu as the head of state, resulted in a civil war from 1967 to 1970 with about 2 million casualties. The secession struggle was defeated by Nigerian federal forces, while the military head of state, General Gowon, extended an olive branch with a program of reintegration, reconciliation, and reconstruction. This attempt at reintegration and building trust in the Nigerian federation has not yielded the expected result. The country has failed to achieve national unity due to incessant ethnic/religious resentment

and insurrection. Hence, in December 1980, a religious uprising led by Mallam Muhammed Marwa left 4,177 civilians dead alongside 100 policemen and 35 military officers (Aluko 1985). Subsequently, in March 1987, a conflict among Christians and Muslims at the Kafanchan College of Education also spread to other towns in the north-central region, including Zaria, Kaduna, Katsina, and Funtua, leading to even more deaths (Ibrahim 1989). In February 2000, as the Northern states introduced the Shar'ia traditional Muslim legal system, an attempt by about 2,000 Christians peacefully to protest the law in Kaduna resulted in yet another bloody clash in which many were killed, leading to reprisal killings in other parts of the country. Aside from these prominent communal uprisings, other ethnic conflicts worthy of mention include the Tiv-Junkun, Aguleri-Umuleri, and Ife-Modakeke conflicts.

Nevertheless, upheavals in post-colonial Nigeria also occur in civil society beyond the confines of ethnic/religious conflict. There have been popular revolts against government policies. Thus, for example, in September 1969 the Agbekoya Parapo (Farmers Resist Suffering Society) revolted against the imposition of an £8 per farmer tax rate, among other grievances against the system of trade, intensifying as the state responded to dissent with mass arrests. Though the ensuing conflict resulted in the death of government officials and farmers, the farmers were able to force the government to a compromise (Adeniran 1974).

Likewise, following General Babangida Regime's decision to introduce the neoliberal International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment Program in 1986, the attendant deplorable socioeconomic condition led to widespread revolt organized and led by university students in April and May 1988 and May 1989. The government initially responded with the closure of universities and proscription of the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS). However, the government eventually implemented a SAP relief package, which was meant to alleviate the effect of the structural adjustment plan, though not nearly enough to reverse the rising poverty and socioeconomic hardship among peasants and workers (Shettima 1993).

Furthermore, following the cancellation of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, of which Chief M. K. O. Abiola was the presumptive winner, the nation was thrown into another

round of crises in which lives and property were destroyed. Whereas General Babangida eventually handed over power to an interim government led by Chief Shonekan, the government lasted for just about 90 days, toppled by General Abacha. When Abacha decided to hold on to power, the opposition formed the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) in May 1994, which organized protests against the Abacha government, which nonetheless remained in power until his sudden demise on June 8, 1998, thus paving the way for a transition to democratic governance.

Since the 1990s, the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has attained a higher degree of socioeconomic class consciousness against injustice and environmental degradation brought about by oil exploration by large foreign multinational companies. The 1990 uprisings occurred in reaction to the Abacha government's policies directed against Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of the Ogoni people, who protested his arrest and execution in November 1995. Saro-Wiwa's execution by the Nigerian military government did not crush the Niger Delta revolt, but had the reverse effect of expanding social protest. By the early twentieth century the Niger Delta was replete with myriad militant groups, including the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF), among many others, some of whom have taken up arms against the Nigerian state.

The resistance to government and military repression and growing class and regional inequality in Nigeria has expanded in the early twenty-first century. In 2004 and 2005 the Peace and Development Project (2006) reported and reviewed over 400 violent conflicts throughout Nigeria, most caused by injustice and inequality.

SEE ALSO: Agbekoya Peasant Uprising and Rebellion, 1968–1969; Ife-Modakeke Conflict; Oke-Ogun Uprising; Saro-Wiwa, Ken (1941–1995); Women's War of 1929

References and Suggested Readings

- Adeniran, T. (1974) The Dynamics of Peasant Revolt: A Conceptual Analysis of the *Agbekoya Parapo* Uprising in the Western State of Nigeria. *Journal of Black Studies* 4 (4): 363–75.
- Aluko, O. (1985) The Expulsion of Illegal Aliens from Nigeria: A Study in Nigeria's Decision-Making. *African Affairs* 84 (337): 539–60.

- Ibrahim, J. (1989) The Politics of Religion in Nigeria: The Parameters of the 1987 Crisis in Kaduna. *Review of African Political Economy* 45/46: 65–82.
- Peace and Development Project (2006) *Report on Violent Conflicts in Nigeria*. Lagos: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Plotnicov, L. (1971) An Early Nigerian Civil Disturbance: The 1945 Hausa-Ibo Riot in Jos. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 9 (2): 297–305.
- Shettima, K. (1993) Structural Adjustment and the Student Movement in Nigeria. *Review of African Political Economy* 56: 83–91.
- van Allen, J. (1972) Sitting on a Man: Colonialism and the Lost Political Institutions of Igbo Women. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 6 (2): 165–81.

Nigeria, separatist agitation, contemporary

Adebusuyi I. Adeniran

Nigeria gained independence from British colonial domination on October 1, 1960 as a fusion of well over 250 ethnic nationalities. Intense competition for political power among postcolonial leaders has given rise to stiff divisions and suspicion among various nationalities, ethnic groups, and, indeed, religious associations within the country. By 1967, the bid to declare a state of Biafra by the Igbo secessionists of Eastern Nigeria had led to the outbreak of a fatal civil war, which lasted until 1970 and claimed an estimated three million lives.

All along the evolutionary path of contemporary Nigerian society, secessionist agitations have been largely restricted to the southern bloc of the country. In the southwest, the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) emerged and has been holding sway as a reactionary movement against the perceived political injustice being meted out to the rest of the country by the northern oligarchy. The group's assertion is typified by the unjust annulment of the presidential election of June 12, 1993 (won by Chief Moshood Abiola – a southerner) by General Ibrahim Babangida – a northerner.

In the southeast, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) emerged in response to the contemporary alienation of the Igbo people in the political permutations of Nigeria. It promptly resuscitated previous platforms within which the

Biafran secessionist struggle was pursued against the Nigerian state in late 1960. Also in the south, cogent self-determination groups have emerged seeking full control of the region's resources – which provide nearly 90 percent of the country's gross national income. Prominent among such ethnic militias are the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), the Ijaw Youths' Council (IYC), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA). However, a major defining characteristic of contemporary separatist agitation in Nigeria has been the marginalization of the southern parts of the country by the northern Hausa-Fulani oligarchy.

Primarily, the emergence of secessionist ethnic militias in the country has reflected the inability of the ruling class to ensure equitable distribution of social resources, that is, political power and economic opportunities, among the country's regions. The origin of the OPC dates back to 1994 when a group of Yoruba elites decided to form a grassroots organization that would serve as a platform for charting a new existence for the region outside the Nigerian project. In the view of its founding president, Dr. Fredrick Fasehun, the OPC was established to “defend the right of every Yoruba person on earth.” The more militant faction of the group has engaged the Nigerian police and military in a running battle over the years. Such clashes have resulted in the loss of more men and military hardware on the side of the government forces. In July 2008, a violent clash between the OPC and Hausa settlers at Sagamu, Ogun state, resulted in the death of over 50 people. A retaliatory ambush against Yorubas in Kano, Kano state, led to over 100 people being maimed. Bloody altercations were thereafter reported between members of the OPC and the police in Ilesha, Osun state, and Ajegunle, Lagos state, where nearly 30 lives were lost.

MASSOB appears to be the most vocal ethnic separatist group within the southeast region. The group is in favor of a separate state of Biafra for the Igbo ethnic group; indeed, its leader – Chief Ralph Nwazurike (now imprisoned) – made an unsuccessful attempt to declare a state of Biafra on May 27, 2002. The movement recently designed a separatist flag and a “national” symbol for the proposed Biafran state, while promising to launch its own “national” radio broadcasting

station. Intermittent clashes between MASSOB and government forces have often resulted in the loss of several lives on both sides.

Militant groups of Ijaw descent (the largest ethnic group in the south-south geopolitical zone) have often been the most prominent of all campaigners for self-determination within the Niger Delta region. In December 1998, the All-Ijaw Youths' Conference ended in the creation of the IYC and the release of the Kaiama Declaration of self-determination. As the IYC was preparing to launch its Operation Climate Change campaign in December 1998, the Nigerian military deployed two warships and nearly 15,000 troops in the region. Subsequently, hundreds of IYC members and sympathizers staged a demonstration in Bayelsa state protesting the high level of military occupation of the zone. About ten protesters were killed by troops, while others were imprisoned. A follow-up protest to call for the release of those arrested after the previous demonstration resulted in more injuries to protesters.

The federal government eventually declared a state of emergency in parts of the state. At various military road blocks, residents were mercilessly beaten, raped, and maimed. Soldiers guarding an oil facility at Escravos proceeded to invade both Ikiyan and Opia (Ijaw villages) in Delta state, killing several inhabitants and setting the communities ablaze. In spite of this intimidation, Operation Climate Change went ahead with disruptions to Nigerian oil production for the better part of 1999. Pipeline valves were turned off intermittently throughout Ijaw territory.

The massacre at Odi, Bayelsa state, where over 2,500 people were killed, has remained the hallmark of the unending altercation between the Ijaw nation and the Nigerian government. MEND claimed responsibility for the bombing, which took place at an oil facility located within the region in April 2006. It emphasized that foreign interests would continue to be targets of attack if the region's resources continued to be exploited. Since its inception, the group has carried out a series of disruptions to oil production relatively unhindered. Its actions include pipeline vandalization and the kidnapping of foreign oil workers. The government has reacted by jailing MEND members, including its leader, but the attacks have continued.

With the emergence in 2003 of such massive militant groups as the NDPVF, led by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, and the NDV, led by Ateke Tom,

the context and nature of self-determination struggles within the region have been considerably altered. Previously, all such struggles were concentrated on Warri, Delta state. Related conflicts are now synonymous with Port Harcourt, Rivers state, and its suburbs. The primary goal of both groups, which operate from the extremely inaccessible regional creeks, is to assume control of oil resources within the region as an independent nation. Both the NDPVF and the NDV execute their agenda through the illegal tapping of oil pipelines, that is, "bunkering," and the intermittent destruction of oil facilities. Although the government has criminalized the activities of these militant groups, they have been prompt in claiming to take what rightfully belongs to them. Hostilities reached a climax on September 25, 2004 when Dokubo-Asari declared total war on the Nigerian government and the foreign oil corporations in reaction to the envisaged agenda of extermination of federal government directed at the Niger Deltans. Eventually, Dokubo-Asari was arrested and convicted for treason by the government. He was, however, released in early 2008.

The activities and goals of the EBA have remained similar in scope and context to those of other self-determination groups within the Niger Delta region. The EBA represents the militant wing of the Ijaw Youth Movement, which has resisted the exploitation of the region's oil resources by the Nigerian state and oil multinationals. In its dream of actualizing an independent nation, the group has often carried out attacks on crucial oil installations and police stations and has kidnapped oil workers within the region.

SEE ALSO: Agbekoya Peasant Uprising and Rebellion, 1968–1969; Niger Delta, Protest Movements; Nigeria, 1993 Political and Electoral Protest and Conflict; Nigeria, Protest and Revolution, 20th Century; Saro-Wiwa, Ken (1941–1995)

References and Suggested Readings

- Ake, C. (2001) *Democracy and Development in Africa*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
- Babawale, T. (2003) *Urban Violence, Ethnic Militias and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria*. Lagos: Malthouse Press.
- Coleman, J. S. (1958) *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Nnoli, O. (1980) *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension.

Nin, Andreu (1892–1937)

Andrew Durgan

Andreu Nin was one of the many founders of the Communist movement who would later rebel against the strictures of a degenerated revolution. Although best known as a victim of Stalinism after his murder during the Spanish Civil War (1936–9), Nin stands out in his own right as a Marxist revolutionary activist and theoretician in the prewar epoch.

Nin was born in the Catalan town of El Vendrell in 1892, where as a teenager he became active in left nationalist and republican politics. He showed at a very young age his ability as a political commentator, publishing regularly in the local and Catalan liberal press. In 1911 he joined the *Unió Federal Nacionalista Republicana*, becoming a leader of its youth wing. Trained as a teacher, he proved to be a talented pedagogue, writing and lecturing on the latest developments in the field. In 1913 he joined the Socialist Party in Barcelona. His defense of Catalan national rights led him into conflict with the party leaders' centralism. His interest in social issues pulled him further to the left. Radicalized by the Russian Revolution and the postwar strike wave in Catalonia, he joined the CNT in 1918. At the CNT's legendary Madrid Congress in December 1919 he announced he had left the Socialist Party and defended the union's affiliation to the new Communist International. Nin was soon one of the leading pro-Bolshevik syndicalists inside the CNT. With more experienced syndicalists victims of the employer-backed gunmen of the *Sindicatos Libres*, younger militants took over the leadership of the CNT, Nin becoming its national secretary in 1921. In July he traveled to Moscow as part of the CNT delegation to the founding Congress of the Red International of Labor Unions (RILU). Unable to return to Spain, where he was unjustly accused of being involved in the assassination of Prime Minister Eduardo Dato, Nin returned to Moscow to work for the RILU. As assistant general secretary of the RILU he was heavily involved with the day-to-day running of the International and traveled to France, Holland, and Italy as its representative. Nin also joined the CPSU and was elected to the Moscow Soviet, but

by 1927 he fell into disgrace having sided with Trotsky. He was one of the last oppositionists to speak in public in the USSR when he addressed the RILU Congress in March 1928. Nin lived in Moscow under house arrest until 1930, when he was allowed to return to Barcelona with his Russian wife, Olga Taréeva, and their two daughters.

A talented linguist, Nin survived economically by translating Russian classics, many for the first time, into Castilian and Catalan. He became leader of the Spanish Trotskyist organization the *Izquierda Comunista de España* (Communist Left) (ICE). Nin was one of a group of outstanding propagandists in the ICE, and wrote extensively on the political situation in Spain, and the strategy and tactics of the workers' movement. His writings on fascism and on the national question stood out. In Moscow in 1923 he had written one of the first Marxist analyses of fascism, expanded later in his book *Las dictaduras de nuestro tiempo* (1930). His *Los movimientos de emancipación nacional* (1935) is an eloquent popularization of the Leninist position on the national question.

Nin's independent mind soon led him into conflict with Trotsky. The refusal of the ICE to "enter" the Socialist Party in 1934, its fusion with the *Bloque Obrero y Campesino* (Workers' and Peasants' Bloc) in 1935, and the signing by the unified party (POUM) of the Popular Front pact in January 1936 led the international Trotskyist movement to break with Nin and his comrades. The foundation of the POUM gave Nin the possibility of playing a more significant role inside Spanish labor politics. Nin was editor of the party's theoretical journal, *Nueva Era*, and in May 1936 was elected general secretary of its trade union federation, the *Federación Obrera de Unidad Sindical*.

With the outbreak of Civil War and revolution in July 1936, and in the absence of his friend Joaquín Maurín, Nin became the principal leader of the POUM. His speeches and writings during his brief time at the center of the revolutionary maelstrom posed more clearly than most the dilemmas facing the insurgent masses. For Nin and the POUM, the war and revolution were inseparable, but victory for both needed the construction of a new revolutionary state. With the CNT's refusal to take power, the POUM felt obliged in September 1936 to follow the anarchosyndicalists into the newly reorganized

Catalan government (*Generalitat*) and Nin became minister of justice. Nin introduced sweeping reforms in the field of civil rights and established a system of Popular Tribunals that put an end to arbitrary repression in the rearward. In mid-December 1936 Nin was ejected from the *Generalitat* at the behest of the Soviet consulate.

The Stalinist campaign of slander against the POUM singled out Nin as a direct “agent of Hitler.” When the party was made illegal in June 1937, Nin was abducted and taken to a secret prison in Alcalá de Henares where he was murdered by Soviet agents once it became clear he would not confess to being a fascist agent. A clumsy attempt to fake Nin’s rescue by German Nazis convinced few outside Communist ranks. Nin’s refusal to “confess” and the international scandal that his murder provoked saved the rest of the POUM leadership from a similar fate.

SEE ALSO: Asturias Uprising, October 1934; Bolsheviks; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Leninist Philosophy; Maurín, Joaquín (1896–1973); POUM (Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification); Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Alba, V. & Durgan, A. et al. (1998) *Andreu Nin i el socialisme*. Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona.
- Bonomusa, F. (1977) *Andreu Nin y el movimiento comunista en España (1930–1937)*. Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama.
- Nin, A. (1985) *Socialisme i nacionalisme (1912–1934)*. *Escrits republicans, socialistas i comunistas*. Barcelona: Edicions de la Magrana.
- Nin, A. (2008) *La Revolución Española*. Barcelona: Viejo Topo.
- Pagès, P. (1975) *Andreu Nin: su evolución política*. Bilbao: Zero.
- Solano, W. (1974) *The Spanish Revolution: The Life of Andres Nin*. London: Independent Labour Party. Revised and corrected version available at www.fundanin.org/solano29.htm.

Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972)

Olusanya Olumide

Kwame Nkrumah was a nationalist, African socialist leader, and anti-imperialist president of Ghana. He was among the most influential,

charismatic, and controversial leaders of newly independent sub-Saharan Africa from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s.

Kwame Nkrumah was born on September 21, 1909 in Nkroful, a fishing village in the British colony of Gold Coast, his father a blacksmith and his mother a retail trader. Nkrumah attended a Roman Catholic elementary school and Achimota College, where he graduated in 1930, after which he taught for some years in elementary schools before traveling abroad for further studies.

Early exposure to politics motivated and sparked his quest for further studies. He went to the United States in 1935 and enrolled at Lincoln and Pennsylvania universities where he obtained degrees in sociology, theology, philosophy, and education. He worked briefly as an instructor and teaching assistant at Lincoln University before proceeding to London to complete his education. During a two-year stay in



Kwame Nkrumah (1909–72), a leading pan-African and anti-colonial leader, helped end British rule over the West African colony of the Gold Coast, declaring the new country of Ghana independent on March 6, 1957. An advocate of African socialism, he was elected president in 1960. Here Nkrumah is pictured with Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II in 1961. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

London, Nkrumah engaged in the anti-colonial struggle in West Africa through the West Africa National Secretariat (WANS) of the Pan-African movement.

Nkrumah started his political and revolutionary activities in the US while in school. The knowledge of Protestant theology and Marxism he acquired there prepared him for entry into political and revolutionary activities against colonialism and set in motion a dream of African unity. Nkrumah became the president of the African Student Organization of the US and Canada. In England, Nkrumah was a pioneer of the Pan-African Congress, established in 1945 with the aim of providing a platform for Africans to unite and present a common front against colonialism without undermining African traditionalism and egalitarian structure.

Nkrumah returned to the Gold Coast in 1947 to become general secretary of the newly established United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), founded by and under the leadership of J. B. Danquah. As general secretary, he helped build a mass following of supporters for the new movement through large-scale campaigns, revolutionary speeches, and enlightenment campaigns throughout the Gold Coast. He left the movement in 1949 due to irreconcilable differences between middle-class leaders of the UGCC and his own radical supporters, and formed the Convention People's Party.

His campaign strategy and slogan of "positive action," which described his program of non-violent protest, strikes, non-cooperation, and civil disobedience against the British colonial government, created crises for the government. This sparked massive political unrest throughout the country in 1950. His Africanization policy also created better career opportunities for Ghanaians.

A firm believer in traditionalism and the establishment of a socialistic society (dubbed African socialism), Nkrumah was a socialist revolutionary philosopher who was very critical of capitalism, which he described as a refined form of feudalism, and thus a form of slavery. He believed that traditional African society was not capitalistic but egalitarian and communalistic. Capitalism, he argued, was irreconcilable with the egalitarianism and communalism of traditional African society.

Domestic and external difficulties and problems precipitated Nkrumah's eventual fall from power

in the mid-1960s. Shortly after proclaiming Ghana a republic, his administration became involved in magnificent but ruinous development projects. Contraction of the economy led to widespread labor unrest and a general strike in 1961. The economy of Ghana deteriorated after he borrowed a large amount of money abroad for the development projects. At the same time, he became autocratic, proclaiming himself president for life and leading Ghana to become a one-party state. His dream of African unity was also suspicious to many and was seen as an attempt to weaken fellow African states. With enemies in both Africa and the West, he survived many assassination attempts.

His eventual fall from power took place on February 24, 1966. His regime was overthrown in a military coup led by military and police officers, with the active connivance of western powers, especially the US. Nkrumah was on a trip to Russia, Burma, and the Far East during the coup and went into exile in Guinea where President Sékou Touré made him co-president. He died of cancer in 1972 in Bucharest in Romania.

SEE ALSO: Ghana, Nationalism and Socialist Transition

References and Suggested Readings

- Daniels, Y. & Joseph, S. (1998) *Except from Commanding Heights*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Marika, S. (1996) *Kwame Nkrumah: The Years Abroad 1935–1947*. Legon, Ghana: Freedom Publications.
- Omoregbe, J. (2005) *Knowing Philosophy*. Lagos: Joja Press.

Non-interventionists, 1914–1945

Stacy Warner Maddern

The non-interventionist movement in the United States serves as a foundation for dissent in America where involvement in international conflicts is concerned. In 1917, as the United States grew closer to entering the war in Europe, voices of dissent could be heard inside Washington circles.

Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette proclaimed: "Every nation has its war party. It is not the party of democracy. It is the party of autocracy. It seeks to dominate absolutely. It is

commercial, imperialistic, ruthless. It tolerates no opposition.” The first woman in the House of Representatives, Jeannette Rankin of Montana, joined La Follette. As a committed pacifist, she cared little about the damage her beliefs may cause her political career. While some male representatives joined her in voting against the war, a majority of citizens cast her as a woman who could not handle the pressures of national leadership.

When the US Congress finally declared war, it was the Socialist Party of America that organized the largest anti-war campaign, calling an emergency convention in St. Louis. The Socialist Party held that entering the war was “a crime against the people of the United States.” The party’s most prominent voice was Eugene Debs, who gave several anti-war speeches, the most memorable of which was delivered outside a prison in Canton, Ohio, where three socialists were serving time for opposing the draft. Debs proclaimed: “The master class has always declared the wars; the subject class has always fought the battles. The master class has had all to gain and nothing to lose, while the subject class has had nothing to gain and all to lose – especially their lives.”

The government’s response to what it considered treasonous activity was to enact laws to quell such behavior. In 1917–18, the US Congress created both the Espionage Act and the Sedition Act (1918) as the remedy. The Espionage Act made it illegal to do anything that caused insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by a member of the armed forces, and to do anything that willfully obstructed recruitment or enlistment service. The Sedition Act forbade Americans to use “disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language” about the United States government, flag, or armed forces during war time. The Espionage Act would claim Debs as its most prolific casualty, sentencing him to ten years in prison for making speeches and for counseling young workers to refuse military service. Helen Keller, a persistent voice against militarism, reacted to Debs’s sentence by stating: “I should be proud if the Supreme Court convicted me of abhorring war, and doing all in my power to oppose it.”

Regardless of the government’s repressive techniques, resistance to the war effort prevailed, resulting in nearly 900 people imprisoned for speaking against the war, while an additional

15,000 men declared themselves conscientious objectors. The Socialist Party joined forces with the International Workers of the World (IWW) to create a “Working-Class Union” of draft resisters to march on Washington. The march resulted in 450 members arrested and sentenced to prison. Not deterred, an additional 8,000 later marched in Boston against the war. After men failed to respond to the call of duty, a draft was instituted, but still an additional 330,000 would be classified as draft evaders.

By the 1930s, as the United States tried to recover from the Great Depression, Americans began to call for more isolationism and non-intervention when it came to international conflicts. Veterans who had served in World War I had become increasingly cynical about the nation’s motivations for entering the war. The Bonus Army protests of 1929 had only heightened the fervor over the government’s treatment of veterans who had fought for their country. US General Smedley Butler, after a 33-year military career and twice a recipient of the Medal of Honor, reflected on his military career as being “a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism.”

As the nation pressed toward involvement in World War II, organizations like the American Peace Mobilization (APM) came out in opposition to the war. The APM would find support from veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade who urged Americans to “Fight for democracy at home. Be a Volunteer for Peace. Join the APM.” In 1940, a Yale University law student, R. Stuart Douglas, Jr., coordinated the America First Committee (AFC) in an attempt to mobilize pressure on President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to honor his pledge of keeping the United States out of the war. The AFC held that the only way to preserve democracy at home was by staying out of what it considered a “European war.” The Catholic Worker movement, founded by Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin in 1933, was also instrumental in a large mobilization effort that opposed the war. One of its members was Ammon Hennacy, who during World War I had been imprisoned for two years for resisting conscription. Again, as the new war approached, he refused to sign up for the draft and pledged not to pay taxes in protest of the government’s position. Even the media seemed to be wholeheartedly supporting resistance to the

war, which seemingly gave some credence to the opposition. In 1939, the *Chicago Tribune* opined, “The frontiers of American democracy are not in Europe, Asia or Africa.” However, all of that would change on December 7, 1941, when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor. After this catastrophic event, any mention of opposing the war effort seemed un-American.

While the anti-war effort was quelled and the United States declared war on Japan, dissidents were still justified by their position. After deciding to disband on December 11, 1941, the AFC issued the following statement: “Our principles were right. Had they been followed, war could have been avoided. No good purpose can now be served by considering what might have been, had our objectives been attained.” Such words would only resonate as again America was at war. In the end, the morality of World War II was politically unable to be questioned.

SEE ALSO: Abraham Lincoln Brigade; Bonus Army Unemployed Movement, 1932; Day, Dorothy (1897–1980); Debs, Eugene (1855–1926); Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)

References and Suggested Readings

- Butler, S. (1935) *War is a Racket*. Los Angeles: Feral House.
- Cole, W. (1953) *America First: The Battle against Intervention, 1940–41*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Freeberg, E. (2008) *Democracy's Prisoner: Eugene V. Debs, the Great War, and the Right to Dissent*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Lasswell, H. (1971) *Propaganda Technique in World War I*. Boston: MIT Press.

Non-violent movements: foundations and early expressions

Daniel Ritter and Christopher Pieper

Contempt for abusive power is one of the most salient features of politics in world history. Examples of violent responses to such power abuses are numerous, and much of our written history revolves around the clash between rulers and ruled, challengers and insiders, indigenous and invaders. The most common result of these

clashes has been asymmetrical suffering visited upon challengers, particularly when their main tactic is violent reprisal. However, throughout the ages, individuals and groups have also resisted oppression by non-violent means, defined as “a general technique of conducting protest, resistance, and intervention without physical violence” (Sharp 2005).

To take just one sector of social life, religion, virtually all of the world’s major faith traditions offer ambivalent and polysemic messages regarding the use of violence in social affairs. In the historical record one can readily find non-violent uprisings of Jews against the Romans in the first century, alongside tales of the Zealots and their impatient desire for blood and liberation. Similarly, a long tradition of pacifism and non-cooperation runs through world religions of the premodern era, as well as the majority of secular ethic systems. For the study of protest and revolution then, it is essential to delimit the survey to only those cases that have engaged in what Tilly has called “collective action,” or “the joint pursuit of common goals” (Tilly 1978), through the deliberate use of non-violent means of struggle.

While the human use of non-violence is as ancient as our perpetration of violence (according to Gandhi, non-violence is “as old as the hills”), the strategic use of collective non-violence is a fairly recent addition to the world’s socio-political landscape. From the early experiences of Christian groups in Europe and the United



Non-violent protest has figured in social movements throughout the world, often modeled after Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's efforts to secure Indian independence from Britain. Here United Auto Workers' Union (UAW) members employ non-violent tactics through a sit-down strike in 1937 at the General Motors Fisher Body Plant in Flint, Michigan. (Getty Images)

States, via the discoveries and challenges of Mahatma Gandhi and Ghaffar “Badshah” Khan in Southeast Asia, to the non-violent challenges to states and invaders in South America and Scandinavia, non-violence has a long history.

From Pacifism to Non-Violence: Early Developments

Most scholars in the field trace the origins of non-violence in its contemporary conception to Mohandas Gandhi and the mass, organized non-violent campaigns in South Africa in 1906. The justification for this genesis point is provided through Gandhi’s unprecedented synthesis of large-scale collective action with a set of methods and tactics which, while deceptively powerful, ruled out physical harm to an opponent’s person or property. Prior to Gandhi, mass movements directed against authorities or policies were largely spontaneous, non-strategic, fragmented, and often used or finally degenerated into violence. To the extent that “non-violent” methods were used prior to the twentieth century, they were generally employed by *individuals* who identified as pacifists, and were frequently motivated by religious or ethical values.

Among the first in the modern era to apply non-violent tactics against social ills was the Society of Friends, or Quakers. Though active throughout Anglo-American countries (including Ireland, where they refused to fight in the Protestant–Catholic Wars), the Quakers made their presence felt most directly in Colonial America and during the Revolutionary period. As tensions between England and the colonies escalated and many urged a forceful overthrow of the king’s local rule, Quakers stood virtually alone as voices for peaceful resistance. Many vocally opposed the use of violent or disruptive tactics, including the famous “Boston Tea Party,” as unChristian, and instead advocated boycotts of English products and widespread acts of non-cooperation. The choice of passive resistance and overt pacifism rather than non-violent direct action sharply distinguishes pre-Gandhian collective action repertoires from those of the twentieth century. For example, many Quakers in the Pennsylvania Assembly chose to resign rather than acquiesce to calls for armed reaction against Native American stirrings in the colony, and many more observed strict neutrality and

non-participation in the Revolutionary War of 1776. Still others urged reconciliation with the English and refused to pay taxes to finance the war. Quakers during this period faced violent reprisals for their choices, including attacks on their homes, exile, and specious arrests.

The tradition of Anglo-American pacifism continued into the nineteenth century in the struggles against slavery, as well as a more general diffusion of non-violence as a life philosophy assisted by the widely read literature of Thoreau, Emerson, and Tolstoy. In the religious sphere, Quakers, Anabaptists, and members of the so-called “peace churches” (Brethren, Mennonites, and Shakers) began in the 1830s to “reframe” slavery as a national sin, and rally toward abolitionist action, the majority of which was non-violent. The most famous of these non-violent abolitionists was William Lloyd Garrison, who, though a vocal critic of organized religion, was converted to the cause of “immediatism,” or immediate abolition, by Quaker Ben Lundy. For the rest of his life until the order of the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863, Garrison fought without violence for an end to slavery. In lieu of violence, Garrison and his many followers used “moral suasion” aimed at slaveholders, churches, and individual Christians.

Abolitionists also engaged in a variety of atomized “non-resistant” efforts, such as tax and vote refusal, open disobedience of segregation laws in public facilities, aiding those escaping via the Underground Railroad, and what contemporary sociologists would label “sit-ins.” Boycotts of segregated school and slave products such as cotton and sugar, though fragmented and largely symbolic, prefigured the emergence of these tactics as staples of twentieth-century non-violent mass action and emphasized the centrality of economic self-sufficiency, much like Gandhi would do half a century later. Abolitionists also helped what some consider the first national social movement in the US through the American Anti-Slavery Society, which boasted 250,000 members by 1838. It is necessary to stress, of course, that the abolition movement, whether through its non-violent face or its violent side epitomized by John Brown’s attack on Harper’s Ferry, did not directly end slavery in the US. Undoubtedly, though, abolitionists, particularly the huge proportion who were non-violent, created and sustained the necessary political attention and shift in public opinion

to make the issue salient on the national moral agenda. Salient enough, ironically, that many Americans felt the crisis could no longer be resolved non-violently, resulting in the deadliest war in American history.

Following in the footsteps of the abolitionists, a new and energized class of non-violent activists was challenging cultural codes and pressing state authorities for expansion of political rights, this time for women's suffrage. In fact, many of those who had fought slavery also fought well into the twentieth century for suffrage, including Garrison, Lucretia Mott, Susan B. Anthony, and Harriet Beecher Stowe. Both US and British suffragists borrowed directly from the playbook of non-violent abolitionists, regularly employing tactics such as hunger strikes, marches, demonstrations, civil disobedience, disruption, and silent vigils. As a result of their efforts, women obtained the right to vote in the US in 1920 and in the United Kingdom in 1928.

Non-Violent Protest and Social Movements in the Early Twentieth Century

Non-violent resistance was not new to the world in the early twentieth century, but the idea of sustaining a non-violent campaign in the manner of a military campaign was indeed novel. Drawing primarily on the writings of Thoreau and Tolstoy, but also finding inspiration in the sacred texts of several religious traditions, Mohandas K. Gandhi invented a method of struggle in 1906 that has since been used by protesters and revolutionaries on virtually every continent. Dissatisfied with terms such as "civil disobedience" and "passive resistance," Gandhi eventually termed his new method *satyagraha*, literally meaning "holding, or clinging, to truth." While this spiritual and religious aspect of non-violent resistance has diminished over time, the essential characteristics of the methods have only developed and matured, as Gandhi predicted they would. Nowadays, the most popular term corresponding to Gandhi's *satyagraha*, minus the spiritual, or principled, overtones, is "non-violent action." This more pragmatic term reflects recent scholarship's focus on the methods and strategies, rather than the moral and philosophical justifications, associated with contemporary non-violence. While this shift from principled to pragmatic non-violence is important,

so are the origins of non-violent protest and social movements, which began on the southern tip of Africa.

Mohandas K. Gandhi and the Birth of Non-Violent Collective Action

Unable to find employment as a lawyer in India upon the completion of his studies in London, Gandhi accepted an offer to assist with a court case in South Africa, at the time a British colony and member of the same commonwealth of British nations as India. Having experienced British culture and sophistication, Gandhi expected South Africa to be governed by the same enlightened principles he had encountered as a student. However, South Africa was at this point in time, about half a century before the official introduction of apartheid, already an incredibly racist society, something Gandhi experienced first-hand almost immediately upon arriving in South Africa in May 1893.

In a story remarkably similar to that of civil rights champion Rosa Parks, Gandhi was thrown off a train in the middle of the night for occupying a first-class seat, for which he held a valid ticket. Refusing to move to the van compartment simply because of his skin color, Gandhi was literally tossed off the train at the next station, Pietermaritzburg, his luggage following close behind. After this incident, Gandhi became increasingly aware of the racist injustice that pervaded South Africa.

Although Indians often outnumbered whites in South African towns, they rarely enjoyed the same rights as their European counterparts. Indians were allowed to enter South Africa as indentured laborers, and after several years of service they could buy themselves the right to work as free laborers or merchants. However, the cost of occupational freedom was high, and very few former indentured laborers could afford it. Furthermore, all Indians were forced to carry special passes with them at all times that had to be presented to police officials upon demand. These passes constrained Indians' ability to travel and were designed not only to control the movement of the Indian population, but also to give white merchants significant business advantages over their Indian competitors. During his more than 20 years in South Africa, Gandhi organized non-violent resistance against laws and practices such as these. He did it through marches, demonstrations, petitions, letter-writing

campaigns, burning of passes, and other tactics associated with what is now known as non-violent action. Gandhi experienced both defeats and triumphs during his time in South Africa, neither of which could compare to the ones he later experienced in India.

While South African diamonds and other minerals provided the British government in London with important revenue, India was indeed the “Crown Jewel” of the empire. The British had come to India in the sixteenth century, not as invaders but as traders and merchants. Over time, however, they had begun to exert increasing influence over the subcontinent. Following north Indian rebellions in 1857 that took the British well over a year to quell, India officially became part of the British empire.

Although the British had used similar tactics to rule India as they had employed in most colonies, India was decidedly different. No other British colony had a population of a staggering 300 million people. By comparison, controlling the native Africans and immigrant Asians in South Africa was relatively straightforward. In India, on the other hand, the British relied heavily on the cooperation of the native population. More specifically, the British practiced a strategy of recognizing and supporting local rulers, giving these leaders status and financial rewards in exchange for obedience and partial remittance of real political power.

It was this relationship between colonizers and colonized that Gandhi’s independence movement sought to exploit. During the campaign for “self-rule,” Gandhi discovered the simple truth that would become the hallmark of non-violent movements all over the world – without the cooperation of the ruled it becomes impossible for a regime to govern effectively. The key thus became to motivate Indians of all walks of life to “non-cooperate” with the British colonial government. In some cases this was naturally easy to accomplish, as when encouraging the average citizen to stop paying his or her taxes to the colonial government, but there were also many Indians who had benefited, and continued to benefit, from British governance. Through an array of tactics and strategies, including different types of labor strikes, petitions, demonstrations, marches, civil disobedience, boycotts, and the *hartaal*, or general strike, these beneficiaries were slowly but surely persuaded to give up both titles and offices. While some Indians

remained loyal to the British to the end, many became strong supporters of the movement.

Upon his return to India in 1915, Gandhi was approached by the Indian National Congress (INC, sometimes referred to as the Congress Party), whose leaders asked him to join their thus-far unproductive effort to achieve independence. Gandhi, who had lived in South Africa for over 20 years, considered himself a stranger to his native land, and set upon a nationwide tour in order to rediscover India. As a result of his journey Gandhi became aware of the oppression his fellow citizens faced.

One of the earliest struggles he engaged in was aiding the indigo farmers in Champaran. Similarly to other farmers and workers in India, the indigo growers were being exploited by British landowners who demanded that the farmers cultivate crops of British choice rather than those necessary for survival. As a consequence the farmers produced harvests that could be purchased cheaply by the British landlords, which frequently led to dire conditions for the farming community in terms of food shortages. The core of Gandhi’s effort to help the farmers was to catalogue the abuses committed by the landlords. Eventually this effort led to his arrest, which in turn triggered massive demonstrations against the British authorities. Consequently, the landlords were forced by the central British government to reduce their oppression of the farmers, and Gandhi won his first victory on Indian soil.

Perhaps the single most monumental non-violent action engaged in during the independence movement was the Salt March of 1930. Protesting the British monopoly on salt, Gandhi set out to march 241 miles from his Sabarmati ashram (an *ashram* is a type of communal farm) outside of Ahmadabad to the coastal town of Dandi, where he planned to break the law that prohibited Indians from freely making salt. While the monopoly on salt was not an essential source of income for the British, it symbolized the absolute dominance of colonizer over colonized, as salt is crucial to survival in the tropic and subtropic climate of India. By controlling salt, Gandhi reasoned, the British controlled life in India. He therefore left his camp in the morning of March 12, accompanied by 78 other volunteers on a walk that would last for 24 days. On the way to Dandi they were joined by thousands of marchers, and Gandhi took the

opportunity to deliver speeches in villages they passed along the way, thus raising awareness for his non-cooperation campaign. Once they reached their destination, Gandhi made salt by boiling seawater from the Indian Ocean. In one seemingly insignificant act, Gandhi had challenged the entire system that permitted the British to rule India. Within days thousands of Indians were making their own salt, and Gandhi soon found himself behind bars once again, but not before showing India how to resist British imperialism.

The practice of non-violent non-cooperation made it increasingly difficult for the British to rule India. As Gandhi once put it, 100,000 British simply could not control 300 million Indians once those Indians had decided to cease cooperating. Although other developments independent of the Indian context helped bring an end to British rule, the role of non-violent resistance can hardly be overstated – in the end, Indian independence was won by non-violent means. Following the Salt March, it would take an additional 17 years of continued non-violent struggle for India to gain independence. Although Gandhi felt that his movement ultimately had been a failure (he could not stop the partition of India that resulted in one Hindu and one Muslim state), the methods he developed in South Africa and India have been diffused throughout the world, resulting in the achievement of previously denied rights, and in the falls of numerous oppressive regimes.

Early Non-Violent Action Beyond Gandhi

Doubtless due to their proximity and personal networks, the first to benefit from the global diffusion of the Gandhian non-violent repertoire was the population of Pashtun Muslims in the Northwest Frontier Province of British India (today Afghanistan). Led by the revered Abdul Ghaffar “Badshah” Khan, the Pashtuns quickly coalesced into a formidable social and political force. Khan’s early work focused on social reform, such as school-building, spreading the ideas of non-violence and economic self-sufficiency, and Hindu–Muslim unity. In 1929, Khan refashioned the growing Pashtun organization into a “non-violent army,” the Khuda-i Khidmatgar (Servants of God). This military-modeled group trained all recruits in intensive camps where they participated in physically demanding work and took a ten-point vow emphasizing non-violence, purity, loyalty, poverty,

and obedience to prepare them for the imminent clash with British colonizers. The Khuda-i Khidmatgar, or “Red Shirts” as they were dubbed by the British due to their crimson uniforms, viewed themselves as part of the larger Indian independence movement led by Gandhi, and Khan himself was often referred to as the “Frontier Gandhi.” The two leaders enjoyed mutual admiration and friendship. Khan formally forged an alliance with the Indian National Congress in 1931, by which time the Red Shirts had grown to 100,000 members.

Certainly the most infamous and decisive event in the history of the Pashtun movement was the Kissa Khani Bazaar massacre on April 23, 1930, in which more than 200 Pashtuns, many of them Khuda-i Khidmatgars, were killed by British soldiers. While British authorities investigated the matter, public favor and moral credibility shifted to the Pashtuns. Khan’s followers attempted to calm outraged and often violent tribal groups. These uprisings led to a massive crackdown on all resistance, violent and non-violent, which had the very common yet paradoxical effect of revealing the dark, inhumane side of the regime and turning an increasing number of locals to the side of non-violent resistance. Though Badshah Khan spent much of this period in prison for sedition, the sacrifice and efforts of his non-violent army were instrumental in securing stability and limiting bloodshed during the transition to independence in 1947.

Halfway around the world, social change activists in Latin America were reaping benefits from the widespread use and fine-tuning of a staple of non-violent resistance: the strike. Patricia Parkman (1990) tallies no fewer than 80 separate countergovernment work stoppages, walkouts, suspensions, and strikes between 1931 and 1946 across Cuba, Nicaragua, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Haiti. A wide variety of social groups participated in these strikes, including students, professionals, publishers, bus drivers, healthcare workers, and shop-owners; in many cases the linking of diverse economic groups in strikes resulted in total shutdown of the country. Five of these movements resulted in regime changes, though certainly many of the new rulers were scarcely an improvement over their predecessors.

Similarly, non-violent tactics played significant roles in US labor struggles during the 1930s as well. The Congress of Industrial Organizations

(CIO) and the United Auto Workers (UAW) organized massive sit-down strikes in key auto component plants in Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana during late 1936 and early 1937. According to estimates, approximately 400,000 workers participated in these protests; many were shot, arrested, tear-gassed, and beaten. As a specific tool of contention, the sit-down has several unique advantages, outlined by Walter Linder. First, since strikers are inside the factories, it is more difficult for owners to bring in “scabs” or engage in violent repression, which might also damage factory equipment. Second, the close-in factory environment heightens solidarity and protects workers from inclement conditions. Finally, defectors are easily noticed by their refusal to stop work. This repertoire, though perhaps not originated by American labor, was certainly perfected to stunning effect by these pioneers, and subsequently mimicked around the world.

World War II Resistance Movements and Postwar Social Reform

Though it may be difficult to imagine the 1940s as a period of non-violent social change with the dark shadow of World War II coloring every facet of life in the period, a surprising amount of peaceful protest and direct action is found in the historical record. In the early months of 1940 Germany invaded Denmark and Norway. As both nations were militarily inferior to the Nazi war machine, their surrender occurred almost immediately. This did not mean, however, that the occupied nations would not resist their invaders. Through various strategies of non-violent resistance, and with varying levels of success, the Danes and Norwegians managed to interrupt the German plans of exploiting the natural resources and the workforces of their new satellites.

Germany invaded Denmark on April 9, and resistance commenced almost immediately. After early experiments with violent resistance and sabotage, it soon became clear that these forms of action were ineffective against the Germans. In addition, resisters caught engaging in disruptive activities were often sent to concentration camps or even executed. The Germans needed weapons and other supplies essential to the war effort from the Danes. These supplies were manufactured in Danish factories by Danish

hands. It thus became clear to resistance leaders that the most effective way to counter the Germans was to slow down the speed of production. Strikes were combined with occasional work stoppages and factory slow-downs. When the Germans responded to Danish strikes with sanctions, Danes found new ways to work less. For example, when curfews forbade Danes to leave their homes between 8 p.m. and 5 a.m., workers left the factories at 1 p.m., telling their supervisors that they were not on strike, but that they had to take care of their gardens before the curfew went into effect. Through non-violent resistance, the Danes did what they could to interrupt the Nazi war effort and make the occupation as costly as possible.

In Norway, armed resistance to German occupation lasted for two months following the April 9 invasion. Vidkun Quisling, a Norwegian Nazi sympathizer, was installed as the nation’s leader and set out to create his own fascist society without delay. From the very beginning, however, it was clear that Quisling did not have the support of the Norwegian people. While many different types of protest were organized in response to Quisling’s measures, the teacher strike of 1942 was one of the most fundamental.

Protesting Quisling’s attempt to introduce fascist education, 8,000–10,000 of Norway’s 12,000 teachers went on strike. Facing threats of dismissal, teachers taught classes in private homes as the government closed all schools in response to the strike. Eventually about 1,000 teachers were arrested and about half of them were sent north to the Soviet Arctic front where they had to assist German troops. While conditions were harsh, only one teacher died and another three were injured. Meanwhile, Quisling faced enormous pressure from parents of schoolchildren, and he eventually had to capitulate and bring the teachers back to their homes. Welcomed as heroes, the teachers had shown their countrymen how to resist both the invader and the puppet regime it had installed.

Although the Danish and Norwegian cases may constitute the most successful examples of non-violent resistance to the Nazis, they were not the only ones. In the Netherlands, outraged citizens resisted the German invaders through strikes and demonstrations, but with limited success. Perhaps the most fascinating case of non-violent opposition to the Nazis occurred in

Berlin where hundreds of non-Jewish women protested the arrests and planned deportation of their Jewish husbands and children. Risking their own lives, the wives of the arrested Jews demonstrated outside police stations where their husbands were being kept. After several days of sustained protest the authorities yielded and released the Jewish husbands. In the face of open criticism, one of the most brutal governments of the twentieth century was forced to give in. The Nazi regime could not risk increased public opposition, because like any other government, it depended on its subjects for support. While some 1,700 Jewish men were saved by their wives, millions of others perished in the concentration camps. Some have argued that non-violent action could not work against the Nazis, but the experiences of occupied nations and enraged German wives suggest that such an assertion needs to be approached with significant skepticism.

Conclusion

This progression from small-scale dissent to nationwide independence movements and resistance to foreign invasions constitutes a distinctive chapter in the evolution of non-violent action. A significant part of this evolution of non-violent struggle has been the separation of non-violent action from its religious roots. Many instances of non-violent struggle were either explicitly or implicitly guided by religious and/or moral motivations in the minds of its agents, and the inclination of activists to associate non-violence with religion and moral superiority has often served proponents of non-violence well, but in an increasingly secular world scholars and activists of non-violence frequently attempt to dissociate non-violence from its religious roots. The reason is the fear that its religious undertones may dissuade certain groups from applying non-violent action in contemporary struggles. Although this might be a well-founded reservation against evoking the religious elements associated with non-violent action, there is little reason to assume that religion constitutes a hindrance to the proliferation of non-violent methods of struggle. On the contrary, religious activists have often appeared in the front lines of demonstrations and been the first to challenge oppressive opponents face to face.

Two recent examples of religion playing a crucial role in non-violent attempts to interrupt the status quo took place in Burma and Tibet in 2007 and 2008. In Burma, thousands of Buddhist monks initiated protests against the ruling Burmese military junta in the fall of 2007. Initially the motivation for the unrest was increasing food and oil prices, but as the general population joined ranks with the monks, the protests soon developed into an all-encompassing criticism of the dictatorial leadership of the nation. Because of the uncontested place of the monks in the social hierarchy of Burmese society, the state did not immediately crack down on the protesters, but as the severity of the challenge to the generals' rule increased in this "Saffron Revolution," the military eventually intervened and restored order.

In a similarly monk-led challenge in Lhasa in the spring of 2008, the populace joined the ranks of protesting monks to challenge what they perceive to be the Chinese occupation of Tibet. However, the original motivation of the monks' demonstrations was not to challenge Chinese rule, but rather to protest religious restrictions enforced by the Chinese authorities. As the protests coincided with the anniversary of the failed 1959 Tibetan uprising that resulted in the Dalai Lama fleeing into exile, the demonstrations grew as the laity joined the monks and caused the protests to take a decidedly anti-Chinese turn, which in turn triggered repression and riots. Commentators have called the 2008 demonstrations the most significant challenge to Chinese rule in Tibet since 1989. Only time will tell if the influence of religion in non-violent movements will increase or fade off in an increasingly secularized world. What is more certain, if history is any guide, is that the evolution of non-violent protest will proceed, with or without religious guidance.

SEE ALSO: Anthony, Susan B. (1820–1906); Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); Garrison, William Lloyd (1805–1879); India, Civil Disobedience Movement and Demand for Independence; India, Non-Violent Non-Cooperation Movement, 1918–1929; Khuda-i Khidmatgar: Pashtun Non-Violent Resistance Force (1929–1948); Non-Violent Movements: Struggles for Rights, Justice, and Identities; Non-Violent Revolutions; Parks, Rosa (1913–2005) and the Montgomery Bus Boycott; Sharp, Gene (b. 1928)

References and Suggested Readings

- Ackerman, P. & DuVall, J. (2000) *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Appleby, R. S. (1999) *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Berglund, L. (1993) *Experiences of Civil Resistance: The Case of Denmark, 1940–1945*. Uppsala: University of Uppsala.
- Chernus, I. (2004) *American Nonviolence: The History of an Idea*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Easwaran, E. (1999) *Nonviolent Soldier of Islam: Badshah Khan, A Man to Match his Mountains*, 2nd ed. Tomales, CA: Nilgiri Press.
- Fischer, L. (1950) *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Goodwin, J. (2001) *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1977) *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jack, H. A. (Ed.) (1956) *The Gandhi Reader: A Sourcebook of His Life and Writings*. New York: Grove Press.
- Johansen, R. C. (1997) Radical Islam and Nonviolence: A Case Study of Religious Empowerment and Constraint Among Pashtuns. *Journal of Peace Research* 34 (1): 53–71.
- Mabee, C. (1970) *The Nonviolent Abolitionists from 1830 through the Civil War*. New York: Macmillan.
- Mekeel, A. (1982) *The Relation of the Quakers to the American Revolution*. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Parkman, P. (1990) *Insurrectionary Civic Strikes in Latin America: 1931–1961*. Cambridge: MA: Albert Einstein Institution.
- Payne, R. (Ed.) (1969) *The Life and Death of Mahatma Gandhi*. New York: Smithmark.
- Pietrow, R. (1974) *The Bitter Years: The Invasion and Occupation of Denmark and Norway*. New York: William Morrow.
- Schock, K. (2004) *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Sharp, G. (1973) *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 3 vols. Boston: Extending Horizons.
- Sharp, G. (2005) *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th-Century Practice and 21st-Century Potential*. Boston: Porter Sargent.
- Stoltzfus, N. (1996) *Resistance of the Heart: Intermarriage and the Rosenstrasse Protest in Nazi Germany*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Tilly, C. H. (1978) *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
- Zunes, S., Kurtz, L. R., & Asher, S. B. (Eds.) (1999) *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Non-violent movements: struggles for rights, justice, and identities

Christopher Pieper

The overriding interest in mere survival for many countries from 1939 to 1945 cast aside concerns typically categorized as social movement aims, such as independence, redistribution of material resources, or moral reform. World War II was its own unprecedented type of mobilization, activating every mode of societal energy in dozens of nations toward the objective of military victory. As contemporary historians are increasingly observing, however, war is frequently a stimulus for a wide array of consequences touching dimensions of social life far removed from the battlefield.

World War II, as a global phenomenon, exposed millions to new social practices and identities. This cross-cultural pollination inadvertently aided in creating the conditions for a flourishing of movements in ensuing decades emphasizing the human, civil, and social rights of marginalized groups. Scholars of the American civil rights movement attribute the timing of that struggle with the shift in attitudes among former GIs returning from battle having fought alongside men of all races and backgrounds. For some soldiers, this was their first experience of extended interaction with people of another race. Upon return to the States, many found it difficult to support beliefs or social customs that discriminated against people they were prepared to die for only a few months prior.

From a military-historical perspective, too, World War II was a singular event in human history. The presence of systematic genocide in the form of the Jewish Holocaust in Europe, alongside the detonation of the world's first atomic weapons in Japan, revealed to the world community in unequivocal terms that modernity did not equate necessarily to civilization, and certainly not to peace. Such shocking acts of violence led gradually to the formation of groups, movements, and ideologies designed to prevent their occurrence again, such as the United Nations in 1945, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and global disarmament

and nuclear freeze activism throughout latter decades.

As the postwar period extended and a longer interlude of domestic peace settled in around the world, non-violent social movements again returned to the public sphere. This time, however, their aims were qualitatively different in the main than those of previous generations. Activism after World War II has been dubbed “post-materialist,” “identity politics,” or tagged with the label “new social movements.” Common to each of these terms is concern with human and civil rights; legal and social recognition; ethnic, racial, religious, or sexual identity; and struggles for “causes” which cannot be reduced to group or self-interest, such as anti-nuclear and anti-globalization campaigns. Strategically speaking, the vast majority of this postwar activism, which captured headlines for decades and often led to life improvements for millions, was undertaken non-violently.

The Blossoming of American Non-Violence

The foundation upon which the American civil rights movement would rise to prominence was built during the 1940s, originating from hard-fought battles against racial discrimination in Chicago. What would become the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in 1942 began as 12 individuals involved in a “race-relations cell” of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), a Christian pacifist organization, at the University of Chicago. Members of Chicago CORE were frustrated by the lack of direct, grassroots action by other civil rights organizations, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and Urban League. Chicago CORE began building a national non-violent organization using direct action to combat discrimination, using FOR cells as local bases.

CORE’s first efforts targeted Chicago businesses that practiced open or *de facto* race discrimination. Only after prolonged periods of negotiation failed would CORE turn to more confrontational action, such as sit-ins and civil disobedience. Many of CORE’s actions in the 1940s did not succeed, however, likely due to over-reliance on persuasion to the exclusion of intervention. In 1942, CORE relaunched itself as a national organization, with James Farmer as chairman. It grew in visibility and stature

throughout the 1950s, remaining committed to its principles of non-violence and interracialism. CORE’s finest hour came in 1961, when it was instrumental in organizing the Freedom Rides to Alabama and Mississippi.

Beginning in the late 1950s, the American civil rights movement matured and broadened its scope, growing from the important skeletal framework provided by CORE and building upon the momentum gained from a crucial convergence of historical events. These included the *Brown v. Board of Education* Supreme Court decision in 1954, which ended segregation in public facilities; the highly publicized bus seat defiance of Rosa Parks in 1955; and a growing sense in the American mind that the black men who died for and defended the US in World War II should be able to share equally in its freedoms. Parks’s action soon led to a hastily organized bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama which, in addition to achieving a Supreme Court ruling deeming Montgomery’s policies illegal, cast a young Baptist minister named Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. into the national spotlight for the first time. Inspired by the success of the Montgomery action, King and other Southern black ministers met in early 1957 to found a larger, regional organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), dedicated to ending segregation through non-violent means.

The heavy intellectual and spiritual imprint of Mohandas Gandhi on King is well documented. King himself noted as much, saying of the movement: “Christ furnished the spirit and motivation, while Gandhi furnished the method.” SCLC tactics show clear signs of this influence, with frequent use of lunch counter sit-ins, retail boycotts, jail-filling, and most famously, large-scale demonstrations and marches.

King, more than any other non-violent leader, understood and mastered the most essential facet of any aspiring modern movement: publicity. His skill at organizing and turning out massive displays of humanity, along with the unrivaled ability to hold thousands enraptured with his oratory, proved the ideal combination for social movements in the age of television. The 1963 March on Washington drew an estimated crowd of 250,000, and millions more via the media.

Such events, conducted completely non-violently, accomplished several important movement goals. First, the numbers themselves conveyed in unequivocal terms that the movement was

credible, formidable, and of a scale not likely to quickly fade. This facet had significant impacts not only on public opinion regarding segregation, but on politicians who would ultimately make policy on the issue. Second, the peaceful, law-abiding manner in which the movement conducted itself helped assure white Americans that reacting with fear, apprehension, or hatred was unnecessary and unwise. This strategy assisted in generating financial and personnel resources from the general public, as well as helping to reveal the police and the government as unfairly repressive and racist. Finally, the movement's pervasive Christian themes of liberation and justice cut through boundaries of class, race, and religion, forcing many to consider anew the moral implications of segregation, discrimination, and poverty. King also appealed to American "civil religion" in his rhetoric, noting frequently that not only was God's will being violated when civil rights were denied, but also that the other "sacred text," the US Constitution, was being disobeyed.

King and the SCLC were just one of several important non-violent groups working for civil rights in this period. Another was the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which actually formed as a spin-off of the SCLC in 1960 to lead non-violent action in new regions. SNCC also assisted in organizing the Freedom Rides, the March on Washington, and Freedom Summer, which it spearheaded. From 1960 to 1966, SNCC was led by a series of volunteers (including future US Congressman John S. Lewis) committed to the non-violent methods of the SCLC. In later years, though, internal quarrels and external events combined to alienate many in SNCC from the non-violent path, as well as the prospect of interracialism, especially after SNCC president Stokely Carmichael shifted strategy abruptly in 1966. First he excluded whites from membership. Then he embraced violence as a self-defense and revolutionary tactic. By the mid-1970s, SNCC was no longer a viable organization.

The remainder of the decade of the 1960s saw an unprecedented flowering of social and political movements around the world, many of them non-violent. While African Americans were working to realize their constitutional rights, for example, Latinos in the US were also beginning to organize politically, primarily around issues of labor exploitation and inhumane conditions

for workers in border states such as California, Texas, Arizona, and Florida. The key figure in this effort was César Chávez, who had adopted the political organizing methods of Saul Alinsky but combined them with his own deep Roman Catholic beliefs and a commitment to non-violent tactics. Chávez ingeniously incorporated religious rituals such as fasting and pilgrimages for social movement ends. In 1968, Chávez went on a 25-day fast during which he lost 35 pounds but gained 4,000 followers. He also organized a walking pilgrimage from Delano to Sacramento, California to protest the pesticide spraying of 300 union workers and as a demonstration of non-violent action.

Chávez led a number of successful grape-picker strikes, the most public of which began in 1965 and lasted a remarkable five years. Grape boycotts organized by Latino labor groups succeeded in getting near-instant attention from both growers and the state government and capturing national headlines. In addition to concessions from growers, these actions resulted in the creation of the United Farm Workers of America (UFWA), which was an alliance of two large, already existing farm worker organizations. Over the years, UFWA secured significant improvements for Latino workers, including pensions, health care, safety protection, and collective bargaining.

The war in Vietnam initiated by Eisenhower in 1954 grew increasingly unpopular domestically and internationally throughout the 1960s. Eleven years later, opposition was at a fever pitch, leading to the largest demonstration in US history to that point, an anti-war protest in Washington that drew 25,000. The anti-war movement collected energy from the student, free speech, and counterculture movements to the extent that the boundaries between them were often difficult to discern. A loose coalition of these groups, called "Mobilization," gathered in Washington, DC in November 1969 (and simultaneously in San Francisco) for what would ultimately dwarf all previous demonstrations, with more than 500,000 in attendance. Opposition was also going global, with a number of significant protests in London, Paris, and other European capitals. The Paris demonstrations in May 1968 were particularly historic, as they combined massive crowds of students with successful general strikes by more than 9 million workers.

In fact, most social movement scholars and 1960s historians agree that the majority of anti-Vietnam War activism was non-violent. Common yet innovative peaceful tactics included draft card burnings, stuffing rifle barrels with flowers, teach-ins, mock funerals, fasting, and student walkouts, many of which have been emulated and become standard features of movements since.

The general non-violent character of Vietnam activism should not diminish the very real presence of physical harm and loss of life as well during the period, however. Activists such as the Weather Underground and factional student groups viewed violence, including terrorist-style bombings, against government facilities and symbols as necessary steps toward stopping the war. A number of Quakers and Buddhists self-immolated in protest against the war, which, although involving only self-inflicted violence, reveals that the domestic front was also increasingly becoming a battle zone in its own right, a fact underscored by the shocking shootings of four student protesters by National Guardsmen at Kent State University in 1970.

It seemed the number and diversity of social movement organization dynamics were growing daily during the 1960s. For example, a brief but representative list of key social activist groups that used primarily non-violent methods would include: Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), Free Speech Movement, Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam, War Resisters' League, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and the SNCC, along with hundreds of local and state-based organizations. War Resisters' International (WRI), founded by American and British veterans of World War I, non-violently opposed every war of the twentieth century in both individual and collective forms, and the Vietnam conflict was no exception.

Liberation Theology and Non-Violent Social Change in Latin America

In 1968, CELAM, the Episcopal Conference of Latin America, composed of the Roman Catholic bishops in Central and South America, met in Medellín, Colombia to address the conditions and futures of their dioceses. The results were historic and far-reaching. First and most significantly, the bishops agreed to endorse the writings of Gustavo Gutiérrez, Leonardo and Claudius

Boff, and Paulo Freire, among others, which had been summarily labeled "liberation theology." Liberation theology stresses as a central idea the "preferential option for the poor," which in practical terms meant the formulation of policy that first addressed the needs of those in society who suffered most. Proponents advocated a combination of biblical wisdom and sociological insight to best attack this entrenched deprivation. The bishops also approved the creation of "base ecclesiastical communities," small Christian groups often connected to parish churches but sometimes independently formed. CBEs, as they were called, focused on prayer, singing, sharing of stories, and most of all, reflection on scripture and the translation of biblical passages through the prism of their daily experience. Liberation theology provided the cultural resources and moral visions for a new radical, and overwhelmingly non-violent, wave of social change throughout Latin America. El Salvador, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina were particularly afire with the movement, contributing not only rich new theological perspectives but also significant tactical innovations for fighting poverty and marginalization.

One of the most stirring products of this new Latin American ferment in the 1970s was the brave symbolic non-violent resistance of the Argentinian mothers of La Plaza de Mayo beginning in 1977. Since the installation of a military regime in 1976, all Argentinians lived in constant fear of "disappearance," the nighttime kidnapping and presumed murdering of civilians by soldiers. Disappearances most often were reprisals for resistance to the regime, but frequently innocents were randomly chosen to enhance the climate of terror. As a result, hundreds of Argentinian women had seen their children, grandchildren, and other family members taken from them, never to be seen or heard from again.

These mothers responded on April 13, 1977 when a group of 14 relatives of the disappeared took to the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires, marching in a circle and carrying photos and personal effects of their disappeared loved ones. By the fall of that year and with the assistance of national media attention, the international community was becoming aware of the mothers, their cause, and the ongoing atrocities inside Argentina. The number marching grew to several hundred. The state responded in kind and escalated the repression throughout 1978, only amplifying world attention, but also striking

near-fatal blows into the movement. Police and soldiers beat, arrested, tear-gassed, entrapped, and murdered dozens of the women and their families. By early 1979, the Plaza marches had almost completely stopped, and it appeared the violent repression of the state had succeeded in stifling the mothers.

What seemed on the surface to be a slow and painful death was actually at deeper levels a fundamental strategic decision and reorganization effort. While the external visibility of the movement subsided, the mothers moved their planning and organization inside the safe walls of parish churches, strengthening their resolve with prayer in addition to formulating their next, and bravest step. Finally, in the summer of 1979, the mothers once again marched on La Plaza de Mayo, just as before, but this time committed to not leaving under any circumstances, be it intimidation, reprisals, or even death. The movement had also taken on a formal institutional character, with legal recognition, membership structure, newspaper, and most importantly a bank account to receive support from followers around the world. The worldwide media were once again ready to hear their stories, and with each account published, new members flocked to join. By the early 1980s, registered supporters numbered in the thousands.

Though it is difficult to make plausible direct links between the actions of the mothers of La Plaza de Mayo and the 1993 democratic regime change in Argentina, many scholars have argued that this early rousing of “people power” among the ordinary citizens (in this case, perhaps the most politically marginalized class) was crucial. The mothers proved that non-violent action can bring world attention to sites of oppression and human rights violations. Perhaps most importantly, their bravery showed other Latin Americans that silence and fear are the lifeblood that feeds repressive dictatorships, and therefore liberation can be obtained only through the raising of their own, ordinary voices. By finding the courage to stand up, speak out, and tell others, these ordinary voices can realize their own freedom.

Fighting Militarism and Apartheid Non-Violently in the 1980s

The 1980s will almost certainly be remembered as the decade when the Cold War heated to as high a level as it could reach before becoming a

full-blown “hot war.” Undoubtedly the nuclear arms race that accompanied the escalated tensions between the US and Soviet Union during this period contributed to the exhaustion of the Soviet economy, and subsequently the demise of the USSR. By the early 1980s, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimated that the US had a nuclear stockpile of 25,000 weapons, and the USSR a supply of more than 35,000. Meanwhile on the domestic front, the period witnessed an explosion in the number of electricity-producing nuclear power reactors, increasing from 42 in 1973 to 96 in 1985 in the US alone. These developments propelled a new sector of non-violent activists into the global sphere, dedicated to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and stopping the spread of nuclear power. Many veterans of 1960s–1970s activism became involved in these movements, but new organizations were formed as well, and novel tactics were disseminated as a result.

Among the most visible and active in the various anti-nuclear campaigns were SANE (Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy), the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, Women’s Pentagon Action, the Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition, Plowshares, and the Committee on Non-Violent Action. Nearly without exception, anti-nuclear social movements were decidedly non-violent, and generally reflected the radical pacifist and anti-war philosophies that undergirded their activism. Peace camps, usually composed entirely of women, were established at various military bases, missile silos, and construction facilities around the world, most famously at Greenham Common, England, home of US cruise missiles, and at the Puget Sound. These camps employed classic civil disobedience tactics to draw public attention to the social and moral hazards of nuclear arms. However, they are also “prophetic” in the Weberian sense as they present an exemplar or model, in miniature, of what an alternative society might look like, at the very physical site of the transgressor. This is much in keeping with the tradition of intentional and utopian communities common from the 1870s to the 1930s.

Anti-nuclear activism was also one of the most significant early global non-violent movements, especially in Europe and Southeast Asia. The Filipino *welgang bayan* (people’s strike) of 1985 mobilized 22 national anti-nuclear organizations against the country’s expansionist nuclear energy policy. A diverse group of 10,000

protesters demonstrated at the main nuclear plant, while thousands of students and transit workers walked out or went on strike. This action persisted for three days and remained virtually absent of violence, despite constant harassment and hundreds of arrests by state police. During its peak, the people's strike had immobilized the functioning of nearly the entire nation.

Similar efforts occurred halfway around the world in West Germany during the 1980s, as thousands of members of the non-violent Grassroots Network blockaded military bases around the country to prevent the installation of US nuclear missiles. In democratic nations, social movement organizations also became increasingly active in pushing their anti-nuclear agendas in the public policy arena, particularly in the form of resolutions and non-proliferation treaties.

President Ronald Reagan's foreign policy served as the historical launch point for a number of non-violent social movements that one can roughly categorize under the philosophical heading of "peace" or "anti-militarism." These included the aforementioned anti-nuclear movements, but also a series of somewhat lesser-known but equally interesting movements against Reagan's military involvement in Central America. Key organizations in this largely US-based activism included the Pledge of Resistance, Witness for Peace, Sanctuary, and Nicaragua Exchange. Members of these groups participated in massive non-violent demonstrations at federal buildings in Washington, DC, as well as military bases and CIA offices throughout the early 1980s. The School of the Americas Watch still maintains a perpetual presence at Fort Benning, Georgia, which they claim is a training facility for Latin American soldiers, primarily for purposes of assassination and civilian terror. Other groups, such as Sanctuary and Nicaragua Exchange, focused more on humanitarian effects of US intervention in the region, offering safe harbor to war refugees and working to increase the bonds of solidarity between North and Central American citizens.

As hostilities between Israelis and Palestinians intensified during the late 1970s and early 1980s, non-violent campaigns and interventions likewise arose with surprising speed and commitment. A fascinating yet little-known example of one such effort was the mobilization of the ethnic Druze population in the Golan Heights against Israeli occupiers in 1981. Rather than

accept Israeli annexation and forced citizenship, the indigenous Druze peacefully fought back with multi-week strikes, large-scale demonstrations, and symbolic curfew violations. Perhaps most interesting was the calling of a "reverse strike," wherein Druze families refused to work or go to school, and instead built a sewer pipeline that the Israelis had been delaying work on. Long, sustained periods of civil disobedience, non-cooperation, and refusal to react violently to police abuse ultimately resulted in significant concessions from the occupiers.

The first Palestinian intifada followed directly on the heels of this non-violent success, and can be understood as an indirect consequence of the success experienced by peaceful campaigns throughout the region, as well as the rise at that historical moment of the non-violent motif in Islam. The civilian uprising known as the intifada was called to oppose Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and later, on a larger, political level, for Palestinian self-determination. Despite popular representations to the contrary, the preponderance of activism during the first intifada, which began in December 1987, was deliberately non-violent. The greatest share of tactics employed was similar to those of previous successful movements: boycotts, strikes, rallies, tax refusals, and creation of parallel institutions. In addition to its political successes, not the least of which was the reclamation of authority over the West Bank from Jordan in 1988, the movement fundamentally reshaped the internal practices of the Palestinian struggle, perhaps its most significant accomplishment. For example, the intifada's proven record led the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to formally renounce violence in the late 1980s, and the movement's historic mobilization of huge sectors of the population established models of non-violent, participatory self-governance that future governments could have built upon and extended. Instead, violent countermovements ultimately undermined the peaceful achievements of the intifada and derailed resolution of the conflict indefinitely.

In what has been called "probably the largest grassroots eruption of diverse non-violent strategies in a single struggle in human history" (Wink 1987), the 1980s witnessed the movement that would eventually end the longstanding South African apartheid system. Though armed

resistance was ever present and a regular threat to undoing the work of non-violent activists, the South African anti-apartheid movement was remarkable in its resolute commitment to peaceful tactics, despite appalling acts of brutality by the military and police against them. It is also significant for its clear depiction of the power of the international community (particularly through economic sanctions) to effect social change in transgressive states.

Led by now-legendary figures such as Nelson Mandela, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and an impressive coalition of tribal heads and religious leaders, the indigenous anti-apartheid movement based its non-violent strategy on a classic tenet of Gandhian political thought: dependency. South African apartheid relied upon an entrenched system of exploiting the black majority for labor and society's everyday functioning. Importantly, however, South Africa was a valuable, fully enmeshed member of the network of global capitalism, on good trading terms with most western industrial powers. The movement reasoned that depriving the white minority of the acquiescence of the black majority – through strikes, boycotts, and non-cooperation – would seriously compromise their ability to manage the nation. By combining such strategies with symbolic, highly visible, and purposely provocative non-violent action, such as demonstrations, rallies, marches, and the like, the movement elicited the attention of much of the world, including crucial economic trading partners in the West. Solidarity and consciousness-raising movements arose in these nations as well, resulting in sanctions and divestment in 1986. The conjuncture of these powerful factors proved insurmountable for apartheid, which was finally legally abolished in 1990.

Non-Violence in “New Social Movements” and Globalization

The rise of so-called “post-material” values and the decline of Marxist-inspired ideologies around the world since the early 1990s accompanied an increase in what analysts have termed “new social movements.” Such movements, in contrast to those of previous decades, emphasize issues such as identity, recognition, and abstract values rather than the securing of collective benefits, rights, and material resources. Almost without

exception, non-violent beliefs and tactics have been among the defining features of these new social movements.

A clear example of such a model of collective action is the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) movement. The direct action and advocacy face of the LGBT movement emerged in the mid-1980s, most notably in the form of ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power), though its political rights and consciousness-raising component dates back to the Gay Liberation Front of the late 1960s. As one of the leading AIDS activist organizations, ACT UP innovated and perfected an array of non-violent tactics specifically geared to the idiosyncrasies of this modern pandemic. Central to its repertoire was the use of massive civil disobedience, particularly jail-filling and disruptive demonstrations. ACT UP is perhaps most known for its creative and provocative cultural action, such as its slogan “SILENCE = DEATH,” the DIVA TV project to document lives lost to AIDS, and the throwing of cremated remains on the White House lawn, all designed to generate public outrage and increase knowledge about the disease.

Globalization, the master trend in sociopolitical affairs for the twenty-first century, has emerged as both a target and a medium of non-violent collective action. A promising body of literature has grown in the last decade analyzing the unique dynamics and structure of global social movements. One of the consensus views of this preliminary line of inquiry has been the overwhelmingly non-violent character of transnational social movements. For example, the 1999 anti-World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle are widely held in the public imagination as dominated by riots, property destruction, and ugly conflicts between police and black-masked protesters. In truth, only a fraction of the 40,000 protesters were involved in violent activities. Most of these were anarchists not allied with the main organizing network, who began destroying property and inciting violence well before the WTO meetings. By all accounts, Seattle police either overreacted or instigated suppression in many cases, using tear-gas, rubber bullets, and batons without adequate cause.

Around the world, the anti-globalization movement has been characterized by remarkable restraint and the use of highly creative,

even festive non-violent tactics, such as street plays, oversized puppets, and elaborate, traffic-disrupting dances. These have proved successful on several occasions, prohibiting delegates from conducting business or even conferring. The movement's scale and internal diversity, ranging from trade unions to students to communists, however, have complicated efforts to control episodes of violence, most recently witnessed in Prague, Genoa, and Melbourne.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States and the build-up to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 by a coalition of American-led forces set the stage for the next chapter in global non-violence. Poignantly, the 9/11 attacks occurred exactly 95 years to the day after Gandhi began his South African *satyagraha*, and forever changed the face of social activism. However, in early 2003, as the prospects for diplomatic resolution to tensions between US President George W. Bush's administration and that of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein evaporated, anti-war activists around the world began their own twenty-first-century *satyagraha*.

The extraordinarily long lead time before the actual invasion allowed for organizations around the world to create transnational networks, made possible by the Internet and cell phones. An unprecedented global coalition was assembled, consisting of groups such as Stop the War, Global Resistance (both from the UK), United for Peace and Justice, ANSWER, MoveOn.org (all from the US), members of the World Social Forum, and hundreds of trade unions and religious groups. Finally, on February 15, 2003, history's first synchronized global anti-war non-violent protest took place, with more than 800 cities in nearly 60 countries – even McMurdo Station in Antarctica – participating. Estimates of the number of protesters varied wildly, but even conservative numbers placed the figure well above 8 million. Demonstrations were largest in European capitals, such as Rome (1 million), London (750,000), Madrid, and Berlin (500,000 each). Incredibly, despite the massive human scale of these protests, virtually no episodes of violence were reported. Though critics have countered that the demonstrations ultimately failed to stop the invasion of Iraq, the effect of the protests on molding the global public opinion about the war almost certainly played a role in the gradual withdrawal of key allies only a few months into the conflict. It is also likely

that this overwhelming display of public outcry made it impossible for political leaders to ignore the deep misgivings within their nations about the wisdom or necessity of military action.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Apartheid Movement, South Africa; Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Anti-Vietnam War Movement, United States; Chávez, César (1927–1993) and the United Farm Workers; Civil Rights Movement, United States: Overview; Freedom Rides; Freedom Summer; Freire, Paulo (1921–1997); Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo; Gutiérrez, Gustavo (b. 1928); Intifada I and Intifada II; Kent State Student Uprising; King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements; Parks, Rosa (1913–2005) and the Montgomery Bus Boycott; Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC); Students for a Democratic Society (SDS); World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999

References and Suggested Readings

- Abreu Hernandez, V. M. (2002) The Mothers of La Plaza de Mayo: A Peace Movement. *Peace and Change* 27, 3 (July): 385–411.
- Chernus, I. (2004) *American Nonviolence: The History of an Idea*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Cockburn, A. & St. Clair, J. (2000) *Five Days That Shook the World: Seattle and Beyond*. London: Verso.
- Epstein, B. (2003) Notes on the Anti-War Movement. *Monthly Review* 55, 3 (July–August): 109–16.
- Jasper, J. M. (1990) *Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, Sweden, and France*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Meier, A. & Rudwick, E. (1969) How CORE Began. *Social Science Quarterly* 49, 4 (March): 789–99.
- Nepstad, S. E. (2004) *Covictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture, and Agency in the Central America Solidarity Movement*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Parkman, P. (1990) *Insurrectionary Civic Strikes in Latin America: 1931–1961*. Cambridge, MA: Albert Einstein Institution.
- Simonson, K. (2003) *The Anti-War Movement: Waging Peace on the Brink of War*. Geneva: Center for Applied Studies in International Negotiation.
- Smith, C. (1996) *Resisting Reagan: The US Central America Peace Movement*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Stoper, E. (1977) The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee: Rise and Fall of a Redemptive Organization. *Journal of Black Studies* 8, 1 (September): 13–34.
- Wink, W. (1987) *Violence and Nonviolence in South Africa: Jesus' Third Way*. Philadelphia: New Society Publishers.

- Wirmark, B. (1974) Nonviolent Methods and the American Civil Rights Movement, 1955–1965. *Journal of Peace Research* 11, 2 (Spring): 115–32.
- Zunes, S. (1999a) The Role of Nonviolent Action in the Downfall of Apartheid. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 37 (1): 137–69.
- Zunes, S. (1999b) Unarmed Resistance in the Middle East and North Africa. In S. Zunes, L. Kurtz, & S. B. Asher (Eds.), *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Zunes, S., Kurtz, L. R., & Asher, S. B. (Eds.) (1999) *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Non-violent revolutions

Daniel Ritter

In the last three decades, activists have applied non-violent action in previously untested terrains. Beginning with the Iranian Revolution of 1977–9, non-violence has been employed in popular uprisings against domestic dictators and oppressive regimes. What distinguishes these non-violent revolutions is not merely the scope of the protests, but also the eventual outcome. While non-violent protest movements have been successful in shaping national policy, resisting invasions and occupations, and extending rights to groups of individuals previously excluded, non-violent revolutions have managed to transform entire political systems, and sometimes even society as a whole.

As sociologist Jeff Goodwin (2001) notes, the emergence of non-violent revolutions can be dated back to the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s. While the Iranian Revolution and other subsequent revolutions that followed it are qualitatively different from previous revolutions, such as those of France, Russia, China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Nicaragua (the last of which occurred in the same year as its Iranian counterpart), Goldstone et al. (1991) found that non-violent strategies have been a component of virtually all revolutions throughout history, but the non-violent revolutions of the late twentieth century are historically unique because their success did not depend on the accompanying use of violence. While violence is frequently a part of political and social change, the non-violent revolutions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries suggest that the role

played by violence in such processes can be kept at a minimum.

Islamic Non-Violence and the Iranian Revolution

As a result of what turned out to be the first non-violent revolution of the late twentieth century, Shah (King) Muhammad Reza Pahlavi was forced into exile by massive protests in Teheran and many other cities throughout Iran in the period between 1977 and 1979. The shah had ruled the nation from 1941, with the exception of a brief interlude in 1953, following a short-lived challenge on his power. American and British covert agents helped the shah to regain power later that year, and until the late 1970s he appeared virtually untouchable on the throne. However, the shah's connection in the West and domestic perceptions of him as a crony of the regime in Washington eventually played a major part in his fall from power.

The Iranian economy blossomed in the early 1970s, mainly due to rising oil prices. While the government profited from this development, its economic policies were naïve and unsophisticated, which led to high rates of inflation. The regime's inability to cope with this economic development resulted in widespread hardship, especially among poor Iranians, and discontent grew. It was not, however, the faltering economy that would be the primary cause of the subsequent revolution.

Rather than applying his enormous oil revenues to meet the nation's needs, the shah preferred to spend a large portion of the national budget on highly sophisticated American weapons. Ironically, these weapons were oftentimes so sophisticated that the Iranian military lacked the capabilities necessary to operate them. The shah's passion for American weaponry reinforced the perception of him as a westernizer and as a leader who had abandoned Iran's Islamic tradition, and it was under these allegations that various opposition groups could unite. For example, while the religious leaders, the *ulama*, and the traditional bazaar merchants differed in their primary complaints against the current regime, they agreed in their perceptions of the shah as a modernizer who had gone too far and caused their distress.

It was the discourse of Ayatollah Khomeini, an exiled Shi'i cleric, and other religious leaders

that allowed protesters to unite under an Islamic banner of discontent. Khomeini did not reveal all his plans for post-revolutionary Iran, and while some of his allies cooperated reluctantly, they all assumed that they would be able to deal with Khomeini, already an old man, once the shah had been defeated. Fueled by Khomeini's skillful propaganda and speeches, which drew on both Iran's and Shi'i Islam's rich tradition of resistance to secular power, religious leaders mobilized Iranians in protest after protest. Several large and near-general strikes were also conducted, which further weakened the already faltering Iranian economy. Throughout the revolution, the opposition made masterful use of religious symbols and rituals in conducting non-violent protests against the regime. In December of 1978, two protests that reportedly drew over a million demonstrators to the streets made it clear that the era of the shah was quickly coming to its end.

While the last few days of the revolution did turn violent as the opposition fought for control over the armed forces, the ousting of the shah had been accomplished with overwhelming reliance on non-violent methods of struggle. Military confrontations only occurred a month after the shah had fled into exile, and the armed part of the revolution only lasted for a weekend.

People Power and the Philippine Revolution

In late February 1986, hundreds of thousands of Filipinos took to the streets of Manila in protests against fraudulent election results that had favored the incumbent president, Ferdinand Marcos. Marcos's rule, which had lasted over 20 years, had not always been dictatorial, but the last 14 years of his governance had been characterized by repression and martial law. The story of Filipino non-violence, or People Power as the phenomenon became known, is a textbook example of a non-violent revolution.

Although the political system of the Philippines under Marcos can only be described as an authoritarian dictatorship, Marcos, like many modern dictators, wished to give the appearance of heading a democratic society. In November 1985 on live American television, partly as a consequence of the desire to appear as a protector of Asian democracy, Marcos called for a presidential election to be held in early February

of the following year. By calling a snap election and not allowing the opposition sufficient time to organize, Marcos felt certain to renew his mandate, either by winning the election fairly, or by rigging the vote.

As in many other countries under dictatorial rule, the Philippine opposition was plagued by internal division and appeared unable to unite behind one viable presidential candidate. Cardinal Jaime Sin, the archbishop of Manila, provided the opposition with a much needed consolidating presence. In the first of several important acts by the highest representative of the Catholic Church on the Philippines, Sin managed to convince prominent opposition leaders to agree upon the nomination of Cory Aquino. Aquino, the wife of martyred opposition politician Benigno Aquino, who had been shot at the airport as he returned to the Philippines after several years in exile, reluctantly agreed to run for president. The presidential election thus became a race between two main candidates, President Marcos and the widowed wife of his main critic.

As state employees counted the votes, security forces loyal to Marcos entered into the election authority's headquarters and interfered with the work of the technicians in charge of inputting the election results into computers. In protest, the technicians walked out on their still uncompleted task. Around the same time, several high-ranking military officers, along with the troops under their command, defected from the armed forces and barricaded themselves in two camps on Manila's main street, Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). In desperation, the military officers called upon Cardinal Sin for help. After careful consideration, Sin in turn called upon the Filipino people to protect the military defectors in an attempt to prevent a civil war. The popular response to his call for action exceeded Sin's wildest expectations.

In reaction to Marcos's attempt to steal the election and heeding Sin's call, hundreds of thousands of Filipinos arrived at the two camps on EDSA, thus building a human wall in front of the defectors. As loyalist troops tried to get through to the camps, they were faced with the choice of massacring thousands of their fellow citizens or holding their ground. Armored personnel carriers ultimately stopped in front of kneeling, praying Filipinos, and at the sight of this massive expression of disapproval of the regime, which lasted for four days, troops steadily began

to defect to the people. Marcos's power, which was always grounded in the military and security forces, was waning quickly, and after discussions with the American government he and his family decided to flee. People Power had succeeded and Cory Aquino was sworn in as the new president of the Philippines.

Revolutionary Change in Chile: The Ousting of Pinochet

On September 11, 1973, Chile's socialist president, Salvador Allende, was ousted in a military coup. While generals and admirals of all branches of Chile's military partook in the overthrow, it was the head of the army, General August Pinochet, who eventually became the junta's leader. After several skillful moves that eliminated some of his most potent opponents, Pinochet soon declared himself president, thus clearly violating his and the junta's promise to return power to democratically elected officials. Instead, it would take almost two decades for democracy to return to Chile.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s Pinochet held several referenda with the intention of passing laws that would secure his place in power for decades to come. Although the voting processes were less than regular by democratic measures, the Chilean opposition was too divided for any meaningful resistance to be realized. Protected by a prospering economy, Pinochet managed to keep the opposition in disarray. However, in 1982 the economy took a turn for the worse, and opposition to the dictator began to emerge. Strikes became commonplace but were unable to place any real pressure on the government. Shielded by the US government by virtue of being a staunch anti-communist, Pinochet put an effective end to many strikes by branding the protest leaders communists, banishing or even exiling them. Opposition forces lacked a clear strategy and strong organization, making themselves easy targets for suppression. Furthermore, Pinochet's rule was characterized by assassinations, disappearances, and other forms of terror. Consequently, fear became the greatest obstacle for the opposition.

In the mid-1980s, however, the tide began to turn against the dictator. American personnel changes in both Washington and Santiago initiated political opportunities that benefited the opposition and ultimately impaired the Chilean

government. At the same time, resorting to guerilla warfare and other violent tactics, communist and socialist groups attempted to fight the government on its own terms. Not only was this approach destined to fail, but it gave Pinochet an excuse to remain in power – clearly the country, if left to its own, would spiral into chaos and destruction.

Realizing that non-violent resistance constituted the only viable option, opposition groups united under a common banner. According to Pinochet's design of Chilean democracy, 1988 would be the year for a plebiscite in which the Chilean people would decide whether or not there would be a presidential vote. Voting yes meant giving Pinochet one's blessing for another long term, while voting no meant that one preferred the scheduling of a presidential election. In a country held under siege by fear, the task of the opposition became to encourage people to vote. Through innovative methods that increased voter turnout, coupled with large protests that helped people shed their fears, the "No" side managed to win the election. The dictator's mandate had not been renewed, and in presidential elections a year later Patricio Aylwin, the opposition candidate, swept the vote, thus becoming Chile's first elected president in almost two decades. Democracy had returned to Chile, and it had done so ultimately through non-violent resistance.

Solidarity and the Polish Revolution

Shortly after World War II and the Nazi occupation of the country, the Communist Party assumed control of the Polish polity. Promising the Poles a society based on equality, and glorifying the position of the worker, the communists eventually managed to monopolize the country's political space by outlawing all competing parties. While "elections" were still held, these displays of democracy were ultimately meaningless, as there was only one party to vote for.

With the inherent problems associated with a planned economy came public discontent. The Polish laborers were forced to work harder and longer hours than most workers in neighboring countries, yet they made less money and encountered more expensive goods on frequently half-empty store shelves. Strikes and demonstrations were common, but the government,

aided by the Polish army and backed by the Soviet leadership, always managed to suppress political unrest.

Secular change would, however, be set in motion by religious forces. In 1978 Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyła was elected as the 264th pope of the Roman Catholic Church. The new pope, who assumed the name John Paul II, immediately began planning for a visit to his home country. When he celebrated mass in Warsaw in early June of 1979, a huge crowd attended, and on his last stop before returning to Rome, visiting his native Krakow, three million Poles, the largest public gathering in Polish history, joined him in an outdoor mass. In a supposedly atheist country under communist rule, this was naturally an astonishing turnout that indicated a turn of tides.

While the pope's visit was an important psychological turning point for the Polish nation, it was the dismissal of an outspoken factory worker, Anna Walentynowicz, from her workplace at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk that sparked what would become the most serious challenge to Polish communism since its inception. On August 14, 1980, Walentynowicz's colleagues went on strike in protest of her dismissal, but in contrast to many earlier Polish strikes that had focused on increasing wages or reducing food prices, organizers decided to take the opportunity to instigate more fundamental change. The most important demand presented to the authorities was the creation of independent unions that would replace the existing government-sponsored ones.

After days of negotiations and sustained strikes, not only by workers at Lenin Shipyard but also by workers at over 500 other enterprises that ceased work in solidarity with their shipyard comrades, state authorities agreed to the workers' demands. Lech Walesa, an unemployed former shipyard worker, had represented the workers and would eventually become Poland's democratically elected president.

As a result of the negotiations, 500 representatives of 36 newly formed labor unions convened a month after the end of negotiations to form Solidarity (*Solidarność*), an umbrella organization that would represent ten million workers in a nation of 30 million people. Over the next few years Solidarity became a force to be reckoned with, calling numerous strikes and serving as the

primary counterpoint to the communist regime. Economic and political circumstances eventually caused the government to declare a state of emergency, and Solidarity was forced underground. Although the state of emergency ended in 1983, Solidarity did not resurface until 1986 when political prisoners were released. In the following years, Solidarity continued to organize different types of strikes, and when economic and geopolitical conditions were ripe in 1988, the government invited Solidarity officials to roundtable talks. Economic reforms were negotiated and free elections reinstated, and by the end of the summer of 1989, a small coalition of political parties led by Solidarity formed a new democratic Polish government. Without resorting to violence, the workers' movement led by Solidarity had ended a 40-year-long era of communist rule.

Eastern European Revolutions: Tearing Down the Communist Wall in 1989

The Solidarity movement helped usher in non-violent transformations in other Eastern European states. Hungary, the Baltic States, and the USSR all experienced popular non-violent protests demanding change, but the most dramatic events unfolded in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Following the collapse of Polish communism and the message sent from Moscow that the Soviet Union would not use its troops to protect vulnerable communist regimes, popular movements that had been brewing for decades recognized the time for change had come.

Democracy came first to Hungary, with that nation opening its borders to the West on September 11, 1989. Previously, Eastern Europe had been sealed off from the West while travel between communist countries had been fairly unproblematic. As Hungary opened its borders to the West, East Germans could now get to West Germany via Hungary and Austria. Sources estimate that 50,000 East Germans escaped in the first month.

As the government began to make concessions to popular demands, protests against the regime increased. During the summer and early fall of 1989, protesters gathered every Monday at the Karl Marx Platz in Leipzig after "prayers

for peace” in the Church of St. Nicholas. In an attempt to quell the protests, Erich Honecker, leader of the Communist Party, ordered a “Chinese solution” (referring to the Tiananmen Square massacre a few months earlier) to the Leipzig demonstrations of October 6. Due to timely intervention by prominent community leaders, a potential bloodbath was avoided, and the 70,000 protesters could proceed with their peaceful demonstration.

The culmination of events occurred in East Berlin where Honecker resigned on October 18. Massive demonstrations continued, with 500,000 people protesting in Berlin on November 4, and another 500,000 demonstrating in Leipzig two days later. By this time the East German leadership was deteriorating rapidly. On November 9 authorities decided to let a few people pass through the Berlin Wall into West Berlin. The “few” soon became many, and the era of the Wall was over. Within six months, as the result of free elections, communists no longer controlled East Germany, and within a year Germany was reunited.

Events in East Germany served as a catalyst for the already existing resistance movement of Czechoslovakia. On November 17, 1989, a group of students gathered to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the death of Jan Opletal, a student who had been killed by the Nazis. Following the ceremony, the students marched on Wenceslas Square where security forces waited for them. Despite offering the police flowers and holding up their empty hands to show they meant no harm, the students were attacked with dogs and truncheons.

News of the assaulted students caused Czechoslovakia to erupt in non-violent demonstrations and protests. The turn of events that had been set in motion by student protests was now carried on by several civic groups. These groups united under the name Civic Forum and assumed leadership of the movement. Following a week of continuous demonstrations and negotiations between Civic Forum and the Communist Party, the Politburo and the party’s Central Committee resigned. More protests and demonstrations followed. A gathering at the Letna soccer stadium drew 500,000 people, and two days later a general strike took place. Twenty-three days after the student demonstrations that sparked “the Velvet Revolution,” the government had

resigned, and a few weeks later Václav Havel took the presidential oath of the new Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Ousting Milošević: The Non-Violent Revolution of Serbia

Since 1987, Slobodan Milošević had been the political leader of Serbia. He had survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in Eastern Europe, and once his term as president of Serbia had expired in 1997, he changed the title to president of Yugoslavia, rewrote the constitution to allow himself to remain in power for another eight years, and managed to win the election needed to secure his position as the leader of Serbia. A strong suspicion of election fraud hovered over Milošević’s latest political success, but the opposition was divided, and to many Serbs the political alternatives to Milošević were almost as bad as the dictator himself.

In 1996 Milošević had tried to deny the opposition key victories in municipal elections all over Serbia, which had led to protests and demonstrations. Eventually Milošević was forced to concede, allowing the opposition to grow stronger. In an attempt to counter this trend, Milošević, much like Marcos in the Philippines, decided to call for early presidential elections in 2000, anticipating that the opposition would not have time to unite and promote one viable candidate to oppose him.

This strategy might have worked had it not been for several student and civic organizations, the most famous of which went by the name Otpor (Serbian for “resistance”). Otpor helped unite the numerous opposition parties under one banner. The newly created coalition, DOS, or the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, agreed to promote one consensus candidate against Milošević in the upcoming elections. After careful research it was determined that Vojislav Koštunica would be the ideal nominee, and other opposition leaders began to campaign on his behalf.

Otpor and other organizations helped with the opposition campaign, but also ran a parallel campaign against Milošević. Using non-violent strategies and relying heavily on the use of humor, Otpor has been partially credited for mobilizing 80 percent of the Serbian voters. A high turnout had been considered crucial for opposition victory, and when the first unofficial

reports of the election held in late September of 2000 were released, the projections of the opposition were verified: the large turnout had propelled them to certain victory.

As the opposition announced its triumph, government sources remained silent. Days later it was officially announced that neither candidate had received the needed 50 percent of the popular vote, and a run-off election was scheduled. Realizing that such a process would only give Milošević a second chance to steal the election, the opposition planned for a carefully devised non-violent campaign to force Milošević out of office. A few days before the protests were scheduled to commence, coal miners at the nation's largest mine went on strike in an effort to aid the opposition. Workers in other professions soon joined, and the country came to a standstill. On October 5, citizens from all over Serbia gathered in the capital of Belgrade. Despite numbering in the hundreds of thousands, the protesters managed to sustain non-violent discipline, thus pacifying the security forces. Two casualties were reported; one elderly man died from a heart attack during the protests, and another person was killed in a traffic accident.

The massive display of protest and disapproval forced Milošević to resign the very next morning, and the Serbian Revolution of 2000 had come to its conclusion. It is believed that the size of the protests caused police and army commanders to withhold orders to attack the crowd as they realized that Milošević had been defeated. The armed and security forces had no intention of sharing Milošević's fate. Once again non-violence had been used to oust a dictator.

Recent Developments: The Color Revolutions

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, several "Color Revolutions" occurred in the former Soviet Union. In three consecutive years, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan all ousted political leaders more or less non-violently after fraudulent elections.

On November 2, 2003, parliamentary elections were held in Georgia. The allegedly fraudulent results heavily favored the government of the sitting president, Eduard Shevardnadze, which triggered severe opposition criticism against the regime and popular protests in the capital of

Tbilisi. Shevardnadze had been ousted from his presidential post during a bloody coup in 1992, but was reinstated three years later. From 1995 he had again been the president of Georgia. However, criticisms against him had mounted after substantiated rumors of corruption and nepotism, and these personal accusations were coupled with a negative trend in the Georgian economy in the time leading up to the election.

As exit polls and official polls reported contradictory election results, citizens began to congregate in public places all over Georgia, but especially in Freedom Square in central Tbilisi, heeding the call of both civic groups and politicians. Modest crowds in the square during the first few days following the election grew to 50,000 protesters two weeks after the election. Less than three weeks after the election, on November 21, 120,000 protesters took over the parliament building and interrupted Shevardnadze in the middle of a speech. With the help of his bodyguards the president fled the scene, and two days later, after discussions with opposition leaders, he signed his resignation. The protests that led to Shevardnadze's resignation had been deliberately and successfully non-violent. Named after the roses worn by protesters to symbolize the non-violent nature of the protests, the ousting of the president became known as the Rose Revolution.

Almost exactly a year later, in the aftermath of a run-off vote for the Ukrainian presidency, hundreds of thousands of people gathered in the streets of Kiev to protest the allegedly fraudulent victory of government-supported candidate Viktor Yanukovich over opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko. As in Georgia, Ukrainian exit polls had shown the opposition nominee to be on his way to a clear victory, but when the official results were presented the government candidate had won the run-off election. Yushchenko, backed by several civil and student groups as well as national and international NGOs, called on the people to non-violently protest the election result. Assuming Yushchenko's campaign color, orange, as their symbol, his followers participated in massive protests, while strikes occurred in many parts of Ukraine.

In the face of the protests, the Ukrainian Supreme Court decided that the election results were invalid and called for a second run-off election. This time, with the help of careful national

and international electoral supervision, Yushchenko won a clear victory and was sworn in as the country's new president. As in Georgia, non-violent protests had forced the government to eventually admit defeat.

Inspired by events in Georgia and Ukraine, opposition leaders tried to mount a similar attack on the Kyrgyz regime after fraudulent parliamentary election results in March 2005. The elections favored the regime of Askar Akaev, the president of Kyrgyzstan, and large protests followed in what became known as the Tulip Revolution, a name coined by Akaev himself in a speech warning the nation of trying to replicate events in Georgia and Ukraine. While the Tulip Revolution did not exhibit the same level of non-violent discipline and sophistication as its predecessors – looting and significant violence did occur – the revolution was still relatively non-violent, and is therefore commonly associated with events in Georgia and Ukraine.

Conclusion

Recent history has demonstrated that large-scale, revolutionary social and political change can occur without the agents of change resorting to violence. In many cases the sheer number of people protesting the national leadership while maintaining non-violent discipline can be enough to topple dictatorial regimes. Although non-violent revolutions are a real and important part of the landscape of contentious politics in the twenty-first century, the phenomenon itself remains understudied.

One of the major questions that must be answered by scholars of non-violent social change concerns the sudden emergence of non-violent challenges to the very existence of oppressive states in the last 30 years. The use of non-violence for political purposes was not a novelty in the late twentieth century, but the realization that non-violence could be used to challenge the totality of state power certainly did constitute a new facet of non-violent action. Thus far social scientists and other scholars interested in non-violent social change have placed the burden of explanatory power of the success of non-violent challenges in general on the techniques and tactics used by non-violent movements. However, the sudden explosion of non-violent revolutions suggests that we may perhaps have to look

at structural explanations as well, a conclusion reached by Lester Kurtz and Stephen Zunes, two of the most prominent scholars of non-violent social change.

Furthermore, Zunes has attempted to identify some of the specific reasons why non-violence has become the method of choice of revolutionaries on every continent. He hypothesizes that the dramatically increased costs from counterinsurgency warfare, the recognition that unarmed methods are more effective, and a growing concern over the impact of militarism on post-revolutionary society which harms efforts at unity, democracy, independence, and development, may be some of the reasons why contemporary revolutionaries and other challengers of the status quo choose to resort to non-violent methods of struggle.

The emergence of non-violent revolutions constitutes a promising development in contentious politics. Historical evidence seems to suggest that by avoiding violence, protesters and revolutionaries alike improve their chances of success in the face of an oppressive opponent. Nonetheless, the ability of non-violent challenges to bring about concrete changes should not be overestimated. Although non-violent action has been used to topple many oppressive regimes, few of these revolutions have been able to bring about lasting socioeconomic changes benefiting the citizens of the countries in which the revolutions took place. It is therefore important to be realistic about the potential of non-violent challenges – to topple a regime and establish a new political system is one thing; to improve the life of every citizen is a completely different one. One is highly realistic and well documented, while the other might remain the utopian dream of Mohandas K. Gandhi.

SEE ALSO: Cedar Revolution, Lebanon; Chile, Popular Resistance against Pinochet; Color Revolutions; Havel, Václav (b. 1936); Iranian Revolution, 1979; Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Mussaui (1902–1989) and the Shi'ite Islamic Revolution; Serbian Revolution of October 2000; Sharp, Gene (b. 1928); Solidarność (Solidarity); Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan; Ukraine Orange Revolution, 2004–2005; Velvet Revolution 1989; Walesa, Lech (b. 1943)

References and Suggested Readings

Arjomand, S. A. (1988) *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Ash, T. G. (1983) *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity 1980–82*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Bleiker, R. (1993) *Non-violent Struggle and the Revolution in East Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Albert Einstein Institution.
- Bujosević, D. & Radovanović, I. (2003) *The Fall of Milošević: The October 5th Revolution*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Constable, P. & Valenzuela, A. (1991) *A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Forest, J. & Forest, N. (1988) *Four Days in February: The Story of the Non-violent Overthrow of the Marcos Regime*. Basingstoke: Marshall Pickering.
- Goldstone, J. A., Gurr, T. R., & Moshiri, F. (Eds.) (1991) *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Goodwin, J. (2001) *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnson, B. (1987) *The Four Days of Courage: The Untold Story of the People Who Brought Marcos Down*. New York: Free Press.
- Kandelaki, G. (2006) *Georgia's Rose Revolution: A Participant's Perspective*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Katz, M. N. (2006) Revolutionary Change in Central Asia. *World Affairs* 168 (4): 157–71.
- Keddie, N. (2003) *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Krushelnicky, A. (2006) *An Orange Revolution: A Personal Journey Through Ukrainian History*. London: Harvill Secker.
- Ost, D. (1990) *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Schock, K. (2004) *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Sharp, G. (1973) *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 3 vols. Boston: Extending Horizons.
- Smithey, L. & Kurtz, L. R. (1999) "We Have Bare Hands": Nonviolent Social Movements in the Soviet Bloc. In S. Zunes, L. R. Kurtz, & S. B. Asher (Eds.), *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Spooner, M. H. (1994) *Soldiers in a Narrow Land: The Pinochet Regime in Chile*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Taras, R. (1995) *Consolidating Democracy in Poland*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Wheaton, B. & Kavan, Z. (1992) *The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia, 1988–1991*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Wilson, A. (2006) *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Zunes, S., Kurtz, L. R., & Asher, S. B. (Eds.) (1999) *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Nordic revolts and popular protests, 1500–present

Kimmo Katajala

The five Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden – have a closely entwined history, with some major changes in the mutual combinations. From the end of the fourteenth century three Nordic kingdoms – Denmark, Norway (ruling Iceland), and Sweden (including the Finnish territory) – were united under the same king. In the collapse of this so-called Kalmar Union (1397–1520) two separate states, Denmark–Norway (and Iceland) and Sweden (sometimes called Sweden–Finland in historical literature), were born. These two kingdoms lasted as states until the beginning of the nineteenth century.

As a result of the Napoleonic Wars, Finland was annexed to the Russian Empire in 1809 as an autonomous Grand Duchy with its own senate, legislation, and customs borders. In 1814 Danish rule in Norway came to an end and the Dual Monarchy of Sweden and Norway was formed. Norway had its own constitution, government, administration, finances, high court of justice, parliament, and army. These two realms were equal to one another and shared foreign policy and the same king. In 1905 the Dual Monarchy was dissolved and after that Norway



Known as the father of modern Sweden, Gustavus Vasa often compared himself to Moses as a liberator of his people. An autocratic ruler and efficient bureaucrat, he introduced a more effective central government, as well as Protestantism, to the nation. His efforts were not always appreciated and he faced a series of rebellions, one of which was led by Nils Dacke in 1542. (Mary Evans Picture Library)

and Sweden formed two sovereign and separate states. Finland gained its independence in 1917 and in 1918, Iceland, belonging to the Danish kingdom, gained an autonomous status. As the last of the Nordic states, Iceland became independent after World War II, in 1944.

Compared to the history of Central Europe, to say nothing of South and Central America, the Nordic countries appear as a quite calm region during the early modern and modern periods. Medieval times, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, were restless ones in Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, but the sixteenth century saw the last large-scale peasant revolts in all Northern countries.

Sixteenth Century: Era of Last Great Peasant Revolts

The beginning of the sixteenth century was very turbulent in Scandinavia. Sweden was trying to leave the Kalmar Union and therefore many wars and war-like situations occurred in the borderlands of Sweden in Småland and Danish Scania, Halland and Blekinge (the southernmost provinces of present-day Sweden). In these provinces lots of peasant unrest occurred during the 1510s and 1520s. The background to these tumults varied. Generally, the peasant riots in Danish provinces were directed against war-taxes. The peasants also took part in politics, supporting some candidates for the Danish throne. In the Swedish borderlands war had ruined the peasant economy, in part due to the more antagonistic attitudes of leaseholders. These were the causes of the local tumults that occurred in the province of Småland in the 1520s.

The last large-scale uprising of Denmark was the revolt of Skipper Clement in 1534. The event was closely entwined with the complex struggle for kingship in Denmark after the collapse of the Kalmar Union. Discontentment among the burghers and peasantry with the rule of King Christian III was widespread. The party supporting the restoration of the former King Christian II to the throne sent a privateer – Skipper Clement – to the town of Aalborg. The task of Clement was to raise a revolt. This succeeded well and the revolt spread from Aalborg to the surrounding countryside. The wealthiest peasants whom the king's taxes had hit hardest took the lead. However, soon the revolt turned

against the local nobility when the peasants and burghers armed themselves and begun rob and burn local manors. The king had to organize a large army to meet Clement's troops. After a few battles, the army of little less than 1,000 peasants and burghers was defeated. The soldiers ransacked the town and executed the lesser leaders immediately. Those parishes that had joined the revolt had to pay high collective fines to save the lives of the rebels. Clement himself was tried and executed in 1536.

After the collapse of the Kalmar Union the Kingdom of Norway was left under the dominion of the Danish king. Discontentment with the rule of King Christian II was widespread in Norway. Heavy taxation and political maneuvers against the king resulted in rioting along the Norwegian west coast in 1518–20. In 1508, as a viceroy of Norway, Christian II had got into trouble with the Hedmark peasantry. The peasants were opposing the king's bailiffs and taxation. The king's troops beat the armed peasants in a battle and took many prisoners. The bishop of Hamar had a big role in organizing the uprising against the viceroy. In a fierce attack, the king's troops stormed the bishop's castle, which was then looted.

Despite some smaller violent skirmishes between the peasantry and authorities, Norway seems to have been a rather peaceful territory during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However, if we scratch the surface a little deeper, we find such legal peasant protests as petitions to the king and court cases between the peasantry and authorities. Unrest was present in many parts of Norway. The crucial reason for the rise of the protests did lie in the confiscation of church lands during the Reformation in 1537. Before the Reformation, the church owned about 40 percent of the arable land. The crown took most of these lands and gave them to local governors and bailiffs, who treated these lands as fiefdoms. This led to many confrontations with peasant societies. Although no big battles between the authorities and armed peasants took place, the non-violent protests of the peasantry were treated as illegal revolts.

Sweden and Finland were the territories where the last and biggest old-style violent Nordic peasant revolts took place. The Reformation, especially the confiscation of church properties in 1527 and the new Lutheran liturgy, caused several peasant protests. The bishops were in the lead of some of these revolts. They tried to restore

the Catholic faith and their once-considerable authority in society. The most famous of these revolts is the Bell Revolt in 1530 against the king's new tax that parishes had to pay for church bells. King Gustavus Vasa put an end to these uprisings with a brutal hand. However, the new policies of the king evoked a new and dangerous revolt in the southern part of Sweden, in Småland.

The reasons for the unrest in Småland were the Reformation and the local economy. The new king had introduced many innovations that did not please the peasantry. New controls on the border with Denmark hindered the traditional local trade and the peasant economy. There was competition for land between the peasantry and the manorial system. King Gustavus needed funds for his warfare and therefore taxes rose. Moreover, the new Lutheran liturgy did not please the peasantry: they complained that it was so simple that in one hearing a shepherd boy could whistle it through. The peasantry wanted the old days back: trade unhindered, fewer manors, lower taxes, and the Old Catholic liturgy. Because the king turned a deaf ear to their petitions and complaints, in the summer of 1542 the peasants armed, robbed some manors, and mistreated the crown's bailiffs. They also founded a kind of self-government for the county.

The name of the revolt – the Dacke War – comes from the name of the leader of the rebels, Nils Dacke. King Gustavus sent troops to put down the revolt in Småland, but they were beaten back. The king had to negotiate an armistice with Dacke and to promise to take the demands of the rebels into consideration. This was only a pretence; the aim of the armistice was to gain time for another military expedition. In 1543 the territory was first isolated and then the rebellious peasants were beaten by a big army. The Dacke War was the last major peasant rebellion in Sweden proper.

The eastern half of the Swedish Realm, Finland, was not as turbulent as Sweden in the sixteenth century. Although peasant discontent with local crown officials and manors was widespread, only small-scale open skirmishes occurred. During the 25 Years War between Sweden and Russia (1570–95) the Finnish peasants had to bear the weight of provisioning the army with food supplies and taxes. This caused local riots in several places around the country. The interests of peasants seeking to protect their own property and those of soldiers demanding provisions clashed. Although the war ended in

1595, the commander of the army, Klaus Fleming, kept the soldiers armed for political reasons. Sigismund, the king of Sweden and Poland, struggled for the Swedish crown with his uncle Duke Charles (later King Charles IX). Fleming was the main supporter of Sigismund and he feared an attack on Finland. The peasantry, who had suffered from the exploitation of the troops and several years of crop failure, had waited for relief, but their hopes were dashed. Soldiers earning their livelihood from the peasants remained in the countryside. Waiting for support from Duke Charles, the peasants of Ostrobothnia began the last great peasant uprising in the Northern countries, the Club War (1596–7).

At Christmas 1595 small attacks against groups of soldiers occurred in some villages in the counties of Savonia and Ostrobothnia. The peasants killed some soldiers and drove the others to flee. The situation was calmed for a while, but in autumn 1596 a great peasant army gathered in Ostrobothnia. Messengers spread the word of the uprising to other provinces. The peasant army was divided into three main detachments and they began to roam to south towards the castle of Åbo, where the troops of Klaus Fleming were. The main battle between Fleming's 2,500 men and about 3,000 peasants took place at Christmas 1596 near the village of Nokia. The result was a total rout and about 500 peasants were killed. The peasants lost all their other battles, too. However, they were not yet suppressed. Soon, 3,000–4,000 peasants from northern parts of the province had armed themselves and had begun to march south. Troops engaged with them in the Battle of Santavuori in Kurikka village. Many peasants were killed and about 500 were taken to prison. Estimates of casualties in the Club War vary a lot, but about 2,500–3,000 peasants were killed.

Seventeenth Century: Non-Violent Protests and Local Riots

Although there were no major peasant revolts in the Nordic countries during the seventeenth century, tensions existed between social classes. Sometimes new payments demanded by the crown gave birth to local riots. For example, in Sweden proper, the new customs fee set for peasant products brought to towns – the so-called small toll – led to local skirmishes in several places and in Stockholm, especially in the 1620s. The nobility had increased in power and enlarged its manorial holdings at the cost of peasant

lands. In the 1630s and 1640s the nobility in southern parts of Sweden feared travel to the countryside because of the hostile peasantry. At the same time, in several Finnish parishes, peasants protested heavily – demanding their rights in local courts, organizing tax strikes and other demonstrations, and sending supplications to the king against local landlords.

A small uprising of about 300 peasants occurred in the woods of central Sweden in 1653. The insurrectionists aimed to plunder the manors, kill the nobles, and establish a commonwealth. Their ideological inspiration clearly came from France and Britain. The revolt is named the Uprising of the Morning Star, after the main weapon of the peasants, a thorn-headed club, resembling a star-figure. The uprising was easily suppressed and the leaders were brought to Stockholm and executed in a public display as a means to prevent other possible uprisings by terrifying the contentious peasantry.

In peace treaties agreed in the first half of the seventeenth century, Denmark ceded to Sweden the provinces of Scania, Halland, and Blekinge. During periods of war with Denmark in the late seventeenth century the province of Scania experienced continuing guerilla actions (known as the Snapphane movement) from the local peasantry against the Swedes. Viewed as a local campaign for rejoining the province to Denmark, the actions are also interpreted as a social peasant protest against harsh Swedish rule.

In the easternmost corner of the realm, in Karelia (the province of Northern Karelia of present-day Finland), a violent food riot occurred at the end of the seventeenth century. In Christmas 1696 and January 1697, after several years of crop failures, conflict between peasants and landlords erupted into open peasant attacks on local manors. Three manors were plundered and destroyed, but only one person was killed in the attacks. A detachment of about fifty soldiers sent to the territory severely suppressed the riot. Many peasants were killed in the forests and about fifty rioters were brought to trial, with forty death sentences handed out.

Eighteenth Century: Protest Marches and Campaigns for Property Rights

As was the case in Sweden and Finland, seventeenth-century Norway experienced no major revolts, although peasant protests and con-

flict were widespread on the local level. A major subject of contention was the obligation of conscription. In 1611 the Norwegian attack on Sweden was abandoned due to mass desertion.

In the eighteenth century, popular protests were most notable in Norway and Sweden. In Norway protest movements emerged in opposition to taxation and in connection with fishing and trade. In Sweden protests were closely entwined with political upheavals. The burghers of Norwegian coastal towns promoted their own business by hindering peasants' free trade. In the town of Arendal, local restrictions on peasants' rights to trade with skippers and boats in the harbour led to an armed gathering of peasants and soldiers in 1725. The protestors forced their way into the bailiff's house and demanded their traditional rights, and the impasse was peacefully resolved. A similar protest occurred in 1752 when peasants' rights to trade in Arendal were again restricted. Some 300–400 people gathered in the town with muskets, sticks, and whips. They broke into some houses and the burghers had to escape through the windows. However, nothing much more happened.

One of the most famous events in Norway's eighteenth-century history is the Striler War in 1765. "Striler" was a nickname for peasants in the territory around the town of Bergen. Despite its name, the event itself was not at all bloody. A new poll tax had irritated the peasantry and some 2,000 peasants gathered in Bergen. The governor was given some cuffs to the cheek and to save his own and his bailiff's skin he had to pay back the collected tax to the peasants. A warship was sent from Copenhagen to Bergen to calm down the situation and the leaders of the rebels were tried. The sentences were lenient, with only three of the peasant leaders sentenced to penal servitude for life.

The Lofthus Uprising in 1786–7 was a mixture of protests against restrictions on trade, high prices of wares in burghers' stores, new taxes, and the abuses of local officials. The leader of the uprising was skipper Kristian Lofthus. He brought the complaints and demands of the peasants to the crown prince in Copenhagen. To promote their demands about 2,000 armed peasants of Agder and Telemark gathered together. The government in Copenhagen sent a detachment of troops to meet the peasant army, but no battle occurred. Lofthus himself died in prison and 13 peasant leaders were condemned to penal servitude.

In Sweden the political system had turned from a king's absolute power to the dominance of the Diet at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Four political estates were present in the Diet: the nobility, clergy, burghers, and peasants. While the form and status of the Diet had been established by the early seventeenth century, its role in politics was limited as long as the monarchy remained strong. In the aftermath of the disastrous Great Northern War (1700–21) the role of the king in political affairs was diminished to a minimum. The Diet had a crucial role in governing the country. The peasantry, although they usually had a minor role in the work of the Diet, participated in state politics for over a hundred years. The main opponent of the peasantry in the Diet was the nobility. The peasantry searched for allies in this combat and placed hope in a strong king, willing to limit the power of the nobility.

The most notable Swedish peasant protest of the eighteenth century, the so-called Dalecarlian Dance, is entwined in this political constellation. The War of Hats (1741–3) against Russia was very inauspicious for the Swedes. The king of Sweden had no heir and as a prerequisite for peace, the Russians demanded that a German prince be nominated as successor to the Swedish throne. The Swedish peasantry – waiting for a strong king – did not accept this and protested. They wanted the generals to be tried for their responsibility for the failure of the war and the successor to the throne to be taken from the Danish royal house. To give weight to their demands, peasants in the province of Dalecarlia organized a large march to Stockholm. In the capital, 4,500 peasants met a detachment of troops that opened fire. Official records refer to over fifty deaths and over eighty badly wounded. About 3,000 peasants were captured and 300 died in the dungeons of their captors. Six leaders of the march were sentenced to death and executed. The result of this massive and peaceful protest march had turned into a catastrophe.

Denmark was the calmest country in the Nordic region in the aftermath of the Revolt of Skipper Clement of 1534. No large-scale public revolts occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The common explanation for this is that the manorial system in the villages ruled local societies so effectively that no open protests could be organized. This manorial system was based on a mild form of servitude called

Vornedskab. This made it possible for manorial lords to forbid their peasants from leaving the yards of the manor. From the late fifteenth century, royal rights were transferred to the landowners. Therefore, in many areas, the manorial lord replaced royal bailiffs in matters of policing and justice. Abandoned in 1702, the *Vornedskab* was followed in 1733 by the *Stavnsbånd*, forbidding males of conscription age from moving away without the consent of their lords. Presumably, although local control was strict, passive forms of peasant resistance like working slowly or inadequately, sabotage, and not least the refusal to understand, continued in use.

Nevertheless, large-scale peasant unrest was also rare in Denmark during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The best-known and perhaps largest of the conflicts took place in Nordfalster in 1768. In 1766 the local manors, ruled by the crown, were sold in auction, but peasants were not offered the right to purchase the yards to their property because they were not admitted to the auction. The manor with its yards was sold to a merchant in the town of Nykøbing. In a 1768 proclamation the king promised to sell the yards to the crown's peasants for their own property at a low price. Therefore, about two hundred peasants in Nordfalster sought to annul the former auction as illegal, sending several petitions to the king. Although the case was lost for the peasants in court, protests continued until 1769. In Dallunds manor near the town Odense conflicts on land-use and day-labor erupted. Peasant resistance took the form of public strikes and demonstrations. In court, two leaders were sentenced to one-year's penal servitude and seven peasants to four-days' prison on bread and water.

Iceland: Island without Protest or Conflict?

The history of Iceland is usually presented as a continuous campaign of poor, classless, and unified Icelanders against the suppression of Norwegian and then Danish supreme powers, and as a logical process towards independence. This does not examine the nature of protest in the country. It is true that open and large-scale peasant revolts never occurred in Iceland. However, Icelandic history can still be viewed from the perspective of conflict and protest.

The main causes of Icelandic conflicts during the *ancien régime* were the foreign trading monopolies, taxes, and rents on land and cattle. In the fifteenth century the English became partners with the Icelanders in the fishing industry. The English living in Iceland employed so great a labor force that Icelandic landowners lacked servants and peasants to work their farms. At the beginning of the sixteenth century the English were denied the right to remain in Iceland over the winter. In 1602 the Danish crown established a trading monopoly of three Danish towns in Iceland. The Icelanders protested heavily. All through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they sent complaints against the monopoly to Copenhagen. In addition, violent confrontations between the Icelanders and the Danish merchants occurred in Icelandic ports.

In the seventeenth century there were several attempts to introduce new taxes in Iceland. The Icelanders sent letters and supplications about the new taxes to the Danish king. The protests were quite successful in rejecting the attempts of the Danish crown to impose additional taxes. Iceland was very far away and Danish power very weak, with little possibility of using force. The land in Iceland was owned by a small class of elites. Most farmers were tenants who cultivated their plots and raised sheep and cattle. The rents paid for land and on cattle were a continuous cause of discontent through the centuries. In addition, famine caused food protests and hunger uprisings in the beginning of the eighteenth century.

The Long Nineteenth Century: From Agrarian Protests to Workers' Movements

In wars in the eighteenth century Sweden had lost large areas of territory in Eastern Finland to Russia. The Russians called these ceded territories Old Finland. After ceding the whole of Finland to Russia in 1809, the territory of Old Finland was annexed to the new autonomous Grand Duchy in 1812. During the eighteenth century the Russian tsar had donated vast territories from Old Finland to the Russian nobility. According to old Swedish laws kept in force in Old Finland, owners of the donation had rights only over land-rents and the day-labor of their tenants, whereas the Russian nobility was used to treating tenants as serfs. This contradic-

tion caused much contention between the peasants and their proprietors in Old Finland. In the 1780s this developed into open violence between tenants and troops. In the 1830s the confrontation between tenants and proprietors was extreme. Tenants tried to protect their rights in lengthy legal cases. The tenants burned alive a crown's sheriff in a tumult that occurred in Salmi parish. These conflicts in Old Finland were finally solved in 1867, when the Diet of Finland bought the donated lands and tenants were able to buy their tenant-farms.

Because of the 1905 General Strike in Finland, with its roots in Russian revolutionary movements, the old four-estate Diet was abolished and a new parliament elected with universal suffrage was established. Because of the revolutionary situation in Russia, the grip of Russian governance loosened in Finland and the country declared itself independent in December 1917. However, the radicalized labor movement had organized a voluntary civil militia, the Red Guard, and the non-socialistic parties raised a White Guard to keep order. In January 1918 the tensions between the political groups broke into civil war and the two Guards formed the basis of the competing parties.

The country was divided in two. The southern and industrialized parts of the country – where the biggest towns were situated – were left on the side of the socialist army, the Reds. The non-socialistic Civil Guard, the Whites, ruled the vast but sparsely populated northern part of Finland. The Finnish government moved from Helsinki to the area of the Whites, to the town of Vasa in Ostrobothnia. The Reds had the support of the leftist intelligentsia, factory workers and landless cottagers, agricultural workers, and tenants in some parts of the country. The backbone of the Civil Guard were the wealthy landowning peasants and the bourgeoisie of the towns. The White army was better organized and armed and had some officers trained in Germany. On the other hand, the Reds obtained some support from Russian troops that still were present in the country.

The White army started to march southwards. The battles were harsh and about 5000 Reds and 3,500 Whites were killed. In acts of terror committed during the war the Reds killed about 1,400 people and the Whites summarily executed about 7,300 people. At the end of the Civil War, in May, about 13,000 men from the German army came to help the Whites and they seized the

capitol of Helsinki from the Reds. Many Reds fled to Russia, but about 80,000 were imprisoned and sent to concentration camps. During the summer of 1918 some 11,000–13,500 prisoners died in these camps from starvation and disease. Only 113 Reds were executed after examination in court, but punishment had already been severe by means of acts of terror during the war.

In Sweden many smaller skirmishes occurred at the end of the eighteenth century. The reasons were many: the bitterness of the crowd against the aristocracy and well-off was behind most of the unrest in the capital, Stockholm, while the need to sell seed to distilleries in the years of crop failure in 1799 and 1800 caused several turbulent hunger-riots in many small towns.

The last large-scale peasant unrest in Sweden was the Klågerup Trouble in the southernmost part of Sweden in 1811. Peasants and agricultural workers had protested against the king's order to take 15,000 men for the army from the province of Scania. Soon, criticism was directed against the nobles and clergy. The peasants saw that they had to bear the burden of the continuing war. Demonstrations began peacefully, but soon turned to strikes, proclamations, and plundering of manors. There were about 1,500 people in peasant troops. Soldiers were commanded to calm the rebellion, but instead opened fire. About 30 rioters died and 395 were captured, of which 135 were taken to prison. Twenty rioters were sentenced to death and 43 were sentenced first to a severe corporal punishment and then to six-years' forced labor.

Several smaller skirmishes between crowds and police occurred in nineteenth-century Sweden. In 1810 Count Axel von Fersen was lynched by a mob during a funeral procession. The situation escalated into unrest and several people were killed when the military struck back against the crowd. In 1838 there were several days of street fighting in Stockholm because people wanted to free a writer named M. J. Crusenstolpe who had been jailed because of his criticisms of the king. Two people were killed in these actions. Ten years later, in 1848, the revolutionary situation in the whole of Europe could also be seen in the streets of Stockholm. In early March a large crowd went onto the streets and demanded reforms, the right to vote, dismissal of the king, and the founding of a republic. The unrest continued for several days. Finally, the king ordered

a detachment of troops to open fire on the rioters. The result was tens of dead and wounded.

The climate in the North is severe and years of crop failure were common, especially in the mid-nineteenth century. The shortage of food caused remarkable food riots in many Swedish towns, for example in 1855 and in 1868. In the same year, 1868, in southernmost Sweden in the province of Skåne there were skirmishes between tenants and their landlords. The protests took such forms as day-labor strikes and court cases, but also violent clashes.

The strike of sawmill workers in Sundsvall in 1879 is seen as the start of the labor movement in Sweden. Workers in 18 sawmills went on strike and there were about 5,000 men in the largest crowds of strikers. With King Oscar's permission, the local governor ordered troops to the area. The eviction of strikers from their homes and the presence of armed soldiers finally put an end to the strike. There were lots of smaller strikes and unrest at the end of the nineteenth century and riots and protests at the end of World War I. These usually resulted from food shortage.

Norwegian society also saw some protest movements in the nineteenth century. A new silver tax and crop failure gave rise to a peasant march from Østlandet to Oslo in 1818. The leader of the peasant march was a wealthy peasant named Halvor Hoel from the county of Hedmark. The protest was stopped halfway by force; the leaders of the movement were fined and sentenced to prison.

In the mid-nineteenth century there occurred a significant movement of cottagers and landless people led by Marcus Thrane, the son of the director of the Bank of Norway. Influenced by pre-Marxist socialist ideas from Germany and Britain, he became the spokesman of Norwegian cottagers and landless people. Thrane founded local unions to promote the demands of the cottagers for better terms in their contracts with landowners. In 1850 there were 273 local unions with more than 20,000 members. A delegation of 100 participants took a petition to the government and parliament in Oslo. The main topics of the petition were manhood suffrage, restricting the cottager's obligation for day-labor to a maximum of four 11-hour days a week, and the possibility for a cottager to obtain his own holding. The government ignored the petition so that, finally, the situation was so inflamed that the military was sent into Oslo. The result was that 117 people were sentenced to prison.

The conflict between the Sami people – the original inhabitants of Lapland – and the Norwegian colonizers developed into a serious and violent skirmish in Kautokeino in 1852. A group of Sami attacked the Norwegian colonizers. The rebels killed the local merchant and police chief, burned the merchant's house, killed his servants, and whipped the priest and his servants. Violence was not generally accepted by the Sami. Therefore, the Sami people themselves seized the rebels. Two of the rebels were killed, and five men were taken to court. Two of the Sami rebels were executed; three were sentenced to forced labor. This Kautokeino Revolt is the biggest of the few violent responses of the Sami people to colonizing policies in Lapland and the only confrontation between the Sami people and Norwegians that led to loss of life.

Denmark was an absolutist constitutionalist state in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The king was an absolute ruler who made the law and took decisions. Liberal thought, however, entered Denmark in the first half of the century. The demands for liberalization of political society culminated in the turbulent year of 1848. The heated political situation in Copenhagen led the city government to march to the royal palace in a large crowd. A new government was elected according to the demands of the liberals. A constitutional assembly was founded and it prepared a new liberal constitution, which the king approved in 1849. Absolutism vanished virtually almost overnight.

Twentieth Century: From Right-Wing Protests to Leftist Sympathies

The Civil War meant that the new independent republic of Finland was sharply divided into two hostile camps. The Social Democratic Party, which had now adopted a reformist ideology, was able to take part in politics and the work of parliament. The revolutionary left had founded the Finnish Communist Party in Moscow in 1918, but it was prohibited in Finland. In the 1920s and 1930s there was a right-wing campaign against communist underground activities. The Lapua movement was founded to organize right-wing activities: the peasant march to the capital Helsinki in 1930 is perhaps the best-known event. Sometimes activities were violent:

communist-bashing, assaults on leftist politicians, and deportations of political enemies by car across the Russian border were common Lapua movement activities. However, deportation of former president K. J. Ståhlberg in 1930 aroused so much condemnation that this activity was stopped.

The Great Depression of the 1930s hit the Nordic countries hard. In Finland right-wing movements were able to suppress most of the protests of the labor movement. The so-called Mutiny of Mäntsälä in 1932 became a turning point in these right-wing activities. The Lapua movement claimed that the government had not done enough to hinder communists in the country. The mutiny started as a spontaneous event. Armed men began to gather in Mäntsälä village. Their aim was no less than to overthrow the government and replace it with a right-wing dictatorship. In Mäntsälä more than 500 men were armed, but in many other small towns armed men gathered as well. The situation was highly charged and a military coup d'état was near. However, the speech of President P. E. Svinhufvud, a well-known right-wing politician himself, saved the situation and the army in Mäntsälä was disbanded. Over fifty leaders of the movement were sentenced to imprisonment.

In other Nordic countries the dissatisfaction of workers with unemployment and the lowering of wages brought about many social and political protests. Many strikes, in Sweden and Norway especially, led to violent clashes between protesters and the military. In Norway the strikes were most common in 1921 and 1931. At Mensted near Skien, military forces were needed to restore order because of serious disputes between the strikers and employers at a dock facility. In Ådalen in northern Sweden, bringing in strike-breakers created a remarkable protest movement in the spring of 1931. Troops were brought in and for some unknown reason they opened fire on a protest march. Four strikers and a woman bystander were killed. The event shocked the Swedish general public. Rules for settling disputes in the labor market between employers and unions were agreed in Norway in 1935, in Sweden in 1938, and in Finland in 1940.

At the beginning of the twentieth century issues of defense were stirring people to collective action in Sweden. This was part of a political turn to the right among the agrarian peasantry. Conservatives demanded strong national defense and the lengthening of military service, which

was anathema to social democrats. More than 30,000 farmers demanding strong defense policies gathered in the capital. The king's statement to demonstrators that the defense question should be solved immediately led to a political crisis. Despite a counter-demonstration of 50,000 workers, the government had to resign. Throughout the twentieth century social democratic governments channeled contention into political reforms and no significant protest movements arose.

The second half of the nineteenth century was a period of political stagnation in Denmark. The strong position of the Conservative Party in government blocked every attempt at democratization. Lower-class unrest was put down by means of legislation, use of the police, and censorship. Representatives of the Social Democratic Party entered "parliament" in the 1880s and the conservatives were pushed from power in 1901. The result was the democratization of Danish society. In 1915 a new constitution was established. It included universal suffrage, proportional representation, and the possibility of plebiscites.

Syndicalism was supported inside the Danish trade union movement. Therefore, strikes were very common in 1919 and 1920. Continuing demand for greater democratization led to a heated political situation in the spring of 1920. Dissatisfaction among the political left led the social democrats and communists to organize large-scale protests and demonstrations in Copenhagen, including outside the royal palace. Revolution was feared and establishing the republic was the topic of the day. The government had to bring troops in from the countryside to assist the police to keep the peace in Copenhagen. However, the Easter Crisis of 1920 – as it is called – was resolved without violence by means of long negotiations. The government resigned and new electoral law was established. A new government made several political reforms which strengthened the position of the common people in politics.

The Great Depression of the 1930s caused significant hardship for industrial workers and farmers in Denmark. Sometimes, as much as 40 percent of the workforce was unemployed. In Copenhagen there were large-scale demonstrations of workers and the unemployed, which the police sometimes broke up with force. Another significant protest was led by the right-wing LS movement (*Landtbrugernes Sammenslutning*) of farmers. Many farms were auctioned off in the early 1930s and most of the rest were in serious

economic trouble. In 1935 the LS movement helped organize a massive protest in Copenhagen. Although the king and the government received a deputation from protesters, no specific help was offered. Farmers' protests continued with a dairy strike, but without much result.

In Iceland, threatened job cuts in the public sector led to violent riots in Reykjavik in 1932. Over twenty police officers were injured when rioting workers took over the town. Another clash occurred in 1949, when about 15,000 people protesting against Nato attacked the parliament building with eggs, mud, and stones. This led to hand-to-hand fighting with the police in the middle of Reykjavik. Protests in Iceland against the Nato military base in Keflavik continued until US forces withdrew in 2006.

In the aftermath of World War II, leftist parties and communists gained support in all Nordic countries, but this was a short-term reaction to the war. In Finland the support of Soviet diplomats for communist activities made the situation even more turbulent. In the town of Kemi in the northern part of Finland a demonstration by striking workers was met by armed police. In the chaos induced by violence and police gunshots two people were killed. Later, around 150 leaders of the strike were tried.

In Denmark, Sweden, and Finland the most significant post-World War II protest movements were probably those of the early 1970s, when political forces ranging from the center to the extreme left in all three countries found common ground in opposing the EEC. In Finland the agricultural politics of the European Union provoked a very uncommon and provocative protest march of about 5,000 farmers in Helsinki in 1999. Otherwise, Scandinavian welfare state politics have dampened social protest in all five Nordic countries.

SEE ALSO: Britain, Strikes, 1905–1926; European Revolutions of 1848; Food Riots; German Peasant Rebellion, 1525; Reformation; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Adolfsson, M. (2007) *Bondeuppror och gatustrider. Svenska Uppror 1719–1939* (Peasant Revolts and Street Fights. Swedish Revolts 1719–1939). Stockholm: Natur & Kultur.
- Alapuro, R. (1988) *State and Revolution in Finland*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Barton, H. A. (1975) *Count Hans Axel von Fersen: Aristocrat in an Age of Revolution*. Boston: Twayne.

- Björn, C. (1981) *Bonde, herremand, konge. Bonden i 1700-tallets Danmark* (Peasant, Gentry and the King: The Peasant in Eighteenth-Century Denmark). Copenhagen: Gyldendal.
- Casanova, J. (2000) Civil Wars, Revolutions and Counterrevolutions in Finland, Spain and Greece (1918–1949): A Comparative Analysis. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 13, 3: 515–37.
- Cederholm, M. (2007) *De värjade sin rätt. Senmedeltida bondemotstånd i Skåne och Småland* (They Enshrined Their Rights: Late-Medieval Peasant Resistance in Scania and Småland). With English summary. Malmö.
- Derry, T. K. (1973) *A History of Modern Norway 1814–1972*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Derry, T. K. (1994) *A History of Scandinavia: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Gustafsson, H. (1994) *Political Interaction in the Old Regime: Central Power and Local Society in the Eighteenth-Century Nordic States*. Lund.
- Gustafsson, H. (2004) The Nordic Countries, So Similar and Yet So Different. In K. Katajala (Ed.), *Northern Revolts: Medieval and Early Modern Peasant Unrest in the Nordic Countries*. Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society.
- Johansson, K. (2004) “The Lords from the Peasants or the Peasants from the Lords”: The Dacke War and the Concept of Communalism. In K. Katajala (Ed.), *Northern Revolts: Medieval and Early Modern Peasant Unrest in the Nordic Countries*. Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society.
- Jones, W. G. (1986) *Denmark: A Modern History*. London: Croom Helm.
- Júliusson, A. D. (2004) Peasant Unrest in Iceland. In K. Katajala (Ed.), *Northern Revolts: Medieval and Early Modern Peasant Unrest in the Nordic Countries*. Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society.
- Karlsson, G. (2000) *Iceland’s 1100 Years: History of a Marginal Society*. London: Hurst.
- Katajala, K. (2004a) Against Tithes and Taxes, for King and Province: Peasant Unrest and Medieval Scandinavian Political Culture. In K. Katajala (Ed.), *Northern Revolts: Medieval and Early Modern Peasant Unrest in the Nordic Countries*. Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society.
- Katajala, K. (2004b) The Changing Face of Peasant Unrest in Early Modern Finland. In K. Katajala (Ed.), *Northern Revolts: Medieval and Early Modern Peasant Unrest in the Nordic Countries*. Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society.
- Kirby, D. G. (1979) *Finland in the Twentieth Century*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kirby, D. G. (2004) *A Concise History of Finland*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kujala, A. (2000) Finland and the Russian Revolution 1905. In *Ethnic and National Issues in Russian and East European History*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 103–20.
- Libæk, I. & Steineren, Ø. (1995) *A History of Norway: From the Ice Age to the Age of Petroleum*. Oslo: Grøndahl Dreyer.
- Lockhart, P. D. (2004) *Sweden in the Seventeenth Century*. New York: Palgrave.
- Maarbjerg, J. P. (1992) The Economic Background to “The War of Clubs.” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 17, 1: 1–24.
- Njåstad, M. (2004) Resistance in the Name of the Law: Peasant Politics in Medieval and Early Modern Norway. In K. Katajala (Ed.), *Northern Revolts: Medieval and Early Modern Peasant Unrest in the Nordic Countries*. Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society.
- Nordstrom, B. J. (2000) *Scandinavia since 1500*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Paaskoski, J. (1997) The Russian Empire and its Western Borderland – Some Dimensions of Eighteenth-Century Russian Finland. In L.-F. Landgren & M. Häyrynen (Eds.), *The Dividing Line: Borders and National Peripheries*. Helsinki: University of Helsinki Press.
- Roberts, M. (1973) *Swedish and English Parliamentarism in the Eighteenth Century*. Belfast: Queens University Press.
- Sennefelt, K. (2004) Marching to Stockholm: Repertoires of Peasant Protest in Eighteenth-Century Sweden. In K. Katajala (Ed.), *Northern Revolts: Medieval and Early Modern Peasant Unrest in the Nordic Countries*. Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society.
- Sundin, J. (1986) Bandits and Guerrilla Soldiers: Armed Bands on the Border between Sweden and Denmark in Early Modern Times. In G. Ortalli (Ed.), *Bande armate, banditi, banditismo e repressione di giustizia negli stati europei di antico regime*. Venice.
- Upton, A. (1980) *The Finnish Revolution 1917–1918*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Ylikangas, H. (1991) The Historical Connections of European Peasant Revolts. *Scandinavian Journal of History* 16, 2: 85–104.
- Zorgdrager, N. (1989) *De Strijd der Rechtvaardigen, Kautokeino 1852. Religieu Verzets van Samen Tegen Intern Noors Kolonialisme* (Campaign for Rightness: The Resistance of the Sami People against Norwegian Colonialism). Groningen.

Northern Ireland peace movement

Nada Halloway

The Northern Ireland peace movement began as the result of a tragedy and developed as a resistance to the violence that had gripped Northern Ireland. On August 10, 1976, Mairead Corrigan

Maguire, one of the founding members of the peace movement, experienced a personal tragedy when two of her nephews and one of her nieces were killed in a street in Belfast. The children paid the price for the constant battle between the British and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). On that day, a British army patrol spotted Danny Lennon, an IRA gunman, driving down a street in Belfast. The patrol shot and killed Lennon, whose car then plowed into the sidewalk, killing the children and severely injuring their mother and Corrigan's sister, Anne, who committed suicide in 1980. The deaths of the children shocked the people of Belfast and they realized that the killings had to stop. Betty Williams, who had witnessed the accident, contacted the *Irish News* and talked to its veteran reporter, Tom Samways. Williams's actions led to her friendship with Maguire and the development of the peace movement. Maguire also visited the Ulster Television Studios where she delivered an appeal for an end to the violence.

The two women met Ciaran McKeown when they were invited to take part in a current affairs program to be broadcast by Ireland's RTE, and organized weekly peace marches and demonstrations against the violence. The first rally, according to Maguire, was not a huge success as only about 1,000 people attended the rally. "But the astounding thing about it was that busloads came over from the [Loyalist] Shankill into the heart of [Republican] Andersonstown to participate. People came from very troubled areas" (Gilchrist 2006). It was obvious from the response to the rallies that people were in general getting tired of the daily violence. These weekly marches led to the formation of the Community of Peace People. The impact of these marches could be seen in the fact that the level of violence in Northern Ireland dropped by 70 percent after August 1976 and never returned to its previous levels.

The organization's platform then and now is "to build a just and peaceful society through non-violent means – a society based on respect for each individual" which "has at its core the highest standards of human and civil rights" (www.peacepeople.com). The aim of the Community was to help the Northern Irish people envision an alternative to the violence that had shattered their lives. While they experienced success, they were also attacked for their intervention in the public discourse. They were threatened and one

member, Bridget McKenna, was shot in the face. Maguire's car was also torched in West Belfast. But Maguire and Williams continued their work. As Maguire has observed, she did not fear for their lives because she was "never a member of a political party . . . so [she] had no fear in that community" (Gilchrist 2006). Her apolitical stance continues to characterize the peace movement.

In 1976, Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan Maguire were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The acknowledgment from the Nobel committee was quiet satisfaction that their vision for the future was one that was shared by many. One of those visions – the rejection of "the use of the bomb and the bullet and all the techniques of violence" (www.peacepeople.com) – rose from the genuine belief that their lives and neighborhoods had become battlefields and that they needed to regain a sense of normalcy. Today, Mairead Corrigan Maguire continues to work for peace. She remains an honorary president of the Peace People and has campaigned on behalf of Mordecai Vanunu, the Israeli "nuclear weapons whistleblower," and Aung San Suu Kyi. Betty Williams resigned from Peace People in 1980 but continues her humanitarian work.

In the end, it was the work of two women and their concern for their children, families, friends, and neighbors that highlighted the brutality of the campaigns in Northern Ireland. In creating a resistance movement that was community based, Mairead Corrigan Maguire and Betty Williams were able to appeal to their communities in ways that had not been done before. They offered their people an alternative to the daily cycle of violence.

SEE ALSO: Ireland, the Troubles; Irish Nationalism; Irish Republican Army (IRA); Irish Republican Army Resistance Campaign

References and Suggested Readings

Gilchrist, J. (2006) *The Scotsman*, July 28, p. 18.
www.peacepeople.com.

Norway, protest and revolution

J. Laurence Hare

Like much of Scandinavia, Norway's transformation into a modern nation-state witnessed relatively few of the violent revolutionary up-

heavals that rocked Western Europe. In explaining this phenomenon, some Norwegian scholars have pointed to the absence of catalysts for revolutions and polarizing forces such as strong class divisions and ethnic tensions. Others have cited the agrarian nature of Norwegian society or the country's long-standing liberal traditions. Yet there remain a number of unique aspects of the history of Norwegian protest that draw the interest of scholars, such as the impact of the pre-industrial Thrane movement on the development of European socialism and labor protest. Others include the integral role of the Norwegian independence movement not only to the emergence of Norwegian nationalism, but also to the development of liberal democracy, the labor movement, and the push for women's rights. Finally, the history of Norwegian resistance to the Nazis during World War II stands out as an important example of coordinated non-violent resistance and symbolic protest.

Until 1814, Norway was ruled by Denmark, first through the Kalmar Union of 1397, and from 1536 through a personal union with the Danish monarchy. Norway was thus deeply involved in the turmoil surrounding the insurrections against Denmark's King Christian II (1481–1559) in the early sixteenth century, which occurred alongside the advent of the Protestant Reformation in Scandinavia. In Norway, the convergence of these events sparked a war in 1529 between members of the Norwegian nobility and the church leadership, in particular Archbishop Olav Engelbrektsson (1480–1538). The struggle stemmed in part from local land disputes, but both sides viewed the broader Scandinavian conflict as a chance to pursue Norwegian independence within the Danish union. It was, in effect, the lack of a common vision for an independent Norway that prolonged the struggle and ultimately compelled Engelbrektsson and the nobility to take sides in the contest for the Danish throne. This was especially the case during the Count's Feud (*Grevens Fejde*) of 1533, which pitted the ousted Christian II against a new contender, Christian III (1503–59). Due to Christian III's well-known Lutheran sympathies, Engelbrektsson allied himself with Christian II, who had pledged to support the Catholic Church. By 1536, however, Christian III emerged as the winner, forced Engelbrektsson into exile in Holland, and mandated Lutheranism as the state religion of both Denmark and Norway.

One of the key consequences of the Reformation-era wars was a marked decline in the Norwegian nobility. As a result, there was little opposition to the continued union between Denmark and Norway aside from occasional and localized peasant disturbances directed at local officials. Indeed, it was not until the defeat of Denmark in the Napoleonic Wars that a new opportunity for independence arose. Under the terms of the Treaty of Kiel of 1814, the Danish king ceded Norway to Sweden. The Norwegians rejected the treaty and on May 17, 1814, held a constitutional convention in the town of Eidsvoll, where they named the Danish prince Christian Frederik (1786–1848) king of Norway. The moment of freedom was short-lived, as Christian Frederik fell short in his attempt to enlist foreign aid for the Norwegian cause from Great Britain and the United States. With little support, he was forced to abdicate in the face of a Swedish attack at the end of July. Although it was forced to accept the union, Norway nevertheless retained much of its constitution and kept its parliament (Storting). It also won the right to manage its own affairs on the local level. In practice, the Storting had little authority, and real power rested with the local bureaucracy. Such an arrangement favored the growth of liberalism in Norway and permitted middle-class officials to advance a program that included economic modernization and the extension of political rights.

The process of change, of course, was uneven at best, and the poor harvests and economic crises of the late 1840s fostered the emergence of a pre-industrial protest movement led by the journalist Marcus Thrane (1817–90). As the revolutions of 1848 swept continental Europe, Thrane organized a workers' association in the small town of Drammen. In the next year, the Thrane movement grew to almost 30,000 members across eastern and southern Norway. Modern scholars have since been interested in the movement not only because of the scale of its initial success, which drew support from nearly 10 percent of the adult male population, but also because of its broad social appeal. In addition to the well-documented links among Thranites from both the agrarian and urban sectors, Pryser (1993) has highlighted the strength of the movement's middle-class followers, which included large numbers of artisans and independent farmers.

The Thranites made a fairly moderate set of demands, including educational and legal reform

and measures aimed at improving the standard of living of the lower peasant classes. More radically, they also demanded universal manhood suffrage. Following the example of the British Chartists, the Thranites directed petitions for reform to the Swedish king, a move that reflected the popular royalism of many lower-class Thranites and revealed the sense of paternalism indicative of the movement's pre-industrial character.

When the king rejected the petition, the movement grew increasingly radical, as more ardent members such as Halsten Knudsen (1805–55) began promoting socialist ideas and advocating revolution. By this time, the euphoria of revolution in Europe had diminished, and the more violent tone of the Thranite movement alienated many middle-class members. In 1851, the government felt strong enough to dismantle the movement and imprison Thrane and his closest associates. The Thranite era ended for the most part peacefully, but there were some violent final episodes, most notably in the town of Ringerike, where Knudsen's followers battled with police in the so-called Hatter's War.

Debate continues as to the relationship between the Thranites and the modern Norwegian labor movement. While some scholars have suggested connections between the demographic cores of the two movements, others have argued that the memory of Thrane's failure may have in fact hindered the development of organized labor in Norway. Among the first signs of the resurgence of left-wing ideology was with the appearance of the anarchist journal *Fedraheimen* (Home of the Forefathers) in 1877. The anarchist and communist movements maintained a presence in Norway until the twentieth century, reaching their intellectual apogee following the publication of *Anarkiets Bibel* (The Anarchist's Bible) by Hans Jæger in 1906, yet they never managed to achieve mass appeal. Socialist organizers struggled as well, in part because of the belated process of industrialization in Norway, which did not fully mature until after 1905.

Indeed, liberal groups such as the Venstre (Left) Party, which grew from a coalition of the rural and urban middle class, proved more successful at mobilizing workers. Venstre dominated Norwegian politics in the late nineteenth century with a platform that included government reform and a stronger Storting. As early as 1884, they organized both industrial and agrarian

workers under liberal auspices with the formation of the United Norwegian Labor Association, and in 1898 with a successful drive to introduce universal manhood suffrage. As a result, the liberals managed to deliver many of the reforms desired among the working classes, which stymied efforts to lure workers into more radical groups. Above all, it was Venstre that led the push for Norwegian independence from Sweden in 1905, which Terjesen (1990) has claimed "acted as an obstacle to the advance and influence of the labor movement."

The rise in Norwegian nationalist sentiment had a more positive impact on the early feminist movement, which had been comparatively weak before the turn of the century. Women's emancipation initially appeared most prominently as a theme in literary circles, particularly in the work of Camilla Collett (1813–95), who raised the question of women's social roles in her 1854 novel *The Governor's Daughters* (*Amtmandens Døttre*), and later in the plays of Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906). In the public sphere, women had been creating independent charity and missionary organizations since the 1840s, although these groups at first had few political ambitions. The first political group appeared in 1884, when Gina Krog (1847–1916) led the way in founding the Norwegian Association for the Rights of Women (Norsk Kvinnesaksforeningen). Two successor groups emerged a short time later: the Association for Women's Suffrage (Kvindestemmeretsforeningen) in 1885 and the more radical National Association for Women's Suffrage (Landskvindestemmeretsforeningen) in 1898.

The breakthrough for these groups came in 1905 through an alliance with Venstre liberals in support of independence. The Norwegian suffragettes managed to enlist the aid of apolitical women's groups, in particular the Norwegian Women's Public Health Association (Norske Kvinners Sanitetsforeningen), to provide assistance in the event of an armed conflict with Sweden and, when the threat did not materialize, to use their mutual networks to support petition drives for separation from Sweden. Consequently, women made themselves visible as part of the political life of the new nation, and won complete voting rights in 1913.

Despite some tense moments, the negotiations between Sweden and Norway proceeded without bloodshed, and Norway became formally independent in the autumn of 1905. That

same year, Norwegians held a plebiscite in which they elected to invite Prince Carl of Denmark (1872–1957) to take the throne as king of Norway. Taking the name Haakon VII, the new king assumed the throne in November. Even before its resurgence, the monarchy had been a key rallying point for building support for independence. In 1898, Sigurd Ibsen (1859–1930), who published the anti-Union journal *Ringeren*, authored an article calling for the establishment of a national monarchy as a way to win over both conservatives and liberals to the notion of separation from Sweden. It has been argued that the article changed the dynamics of the debate over the Union by offering the institution of monarchy as the solution to both the foreign and domestic impediments to independence.

Four decades later, the monarchy once again became an important national symbol as Norwegians faced German occupation during World War II. In the course of the initial attack on Norway on April 9, 1940, the king had managed to escape north and finally make his way to Great Britain. His flight at first engendered feelings of bitterness among Norwegians, but his refusal to abdicate transformed public opinion and allowed him to play an important role as a unifying force for the resistance and a tangible alternative to the pro-Nazi government of Vidkun Quisling (1887–1945). The Nazis inadvertently helped the resistance movement appropriate the king as a symbol of protest by prohibiting pictures or public references to the monarch. This led to one of the largest anti-Nazi demonstrations in August 1942, when thousands of Norwegians wore flowers in their lapels as a public commemoration of Haakon's seventieth birthday.

Such protest tactics were typical of the largely non-violent character of the Norwegian resistance following the country's military capitulation in June 1940. As in the case of occupied Denmark, the strategy was effective because it countered the Nazis' hopes for peaceful cooperation with Scandinavia. This was especially the case for the Norwegian resistance, which did not have to contend with an elected government and could apply the same tactics to both the Nazi administration of Josef Terboven (1898–1945) and the puppet government led by Quisling's Nasjonal Samling Party. Consequently, many protest activities, including the demonstration on the king's birthday, involved broad displays of



Vidkun Quisling, the Norwegian politician and government official who supported Nazi Germany's occupation of Norway during World War II, was a fascist whose name became synonymous with Nazi collaboration. This cartoon, from the cover of the Norwegian family magazine Norsk Ukeblad of February 20, 1943, depicts a father teaching his son to ice skate. The boy, who resembles Quisling, cannot stand up on his own without the assistance of his father, resembling Adolf Hitler, who props him up like a puppet. (Courtesy of Norske Ukeblad)

national solidarity. Others were aimed at preventing the Nasjonal Samling administration from achieving legitimacy. Large numbers of Norwegian teachers, for example, signed a declaration in which they refused to join a new government association, leading to the detention of as many as one in ten teachers. Many civil servants, meanwhile, refused to swear oaths of loyalty to the regime, while judges resigned their posts to protest the politicization of the judiciary, and labor unions began staging strikes as early as 1941. There were also opportunities for ordinary Norwegians to resist by using a strategy known as the "Ice Front," which involved "quarantining" Nazis and Norwegians deemed to be collaborators by visibly shunning them in public places. These tactics depended on a well-organized network of coordinators and civilian leaders who maintained ties to the exile

government, as well as an active underground press and access to broadcasts from Britain. Their success was measured not in their capacity to liberate Norway from within, but in their ability to hinder the normalization of the occupation regime while preserving the legitimacy of the prewar government.

The end of the war brought renewed strength to the Norwegian peace movement, which had long been a feature of national politics. As Norway cautiously revised its policy of neutrality and reconsidered its place in the international community during the Cold War, the numbers of Norwegians seeking exemption from military service as conscientious objectors increased to over 5 percent of the eligible population. The numbers spiked a second time during the late 1960s in the context of the student movement, which in Norway largely involved peaceful protests by both university students and concerned citizens against the Vietnam conflict and the threat of nuclear war. The same period witnessed a resurgence of anarchism through the writings of Jens Børneboe (1920–67), which became an important inspiration for new anarchist and syndicalist groups such as the Norwegian Syndicalist Federation (Norsk Syndikalistisk Føderasjon) and for the Norwegian squatters' movement in the following decade.

In more recent years, Norway has been the target of protests related to its whaling industry. Since the mid-1990s, Norway has permitted whaling in defiance of international bans and has joined Japan and Iceland in pushing the international community to lift restrictions. Although the move has spurred few protests within Norway, it has drawn criticism internationally from environmentalists and human rights activists and has led to formal protests from a number of western countries.

SEE ALSO: Denmark, Insurrection and Revolt; European Revolutions of 1848; Nordic Revolts and Popular Protests, 1500–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Bjørklund, O. (1970) *Marcus Thrane. Sosialistleder i et u-land*. Oslo: Tiden.
- Blom, I. (1987) Women's Politics and Women in Politics in Norway since the End of the Nineteenth Century. *Scandinavian Journal of History* 12 (1): 17–33.
- Pryser, T. (1993) The Thranite Movement in Norway 1849–1851. *Scandinavian Journal of History* 18 (3): 169–82.

- Stokker, K. (1996) Hurry Home, Haakon: The Impact of Anti-Nazi Humor on the Image of the Norwegian Monarch. *Journal of American Folklore* 109, 433 (Summer): 289–307.
- Terjesen, E. A. (1990) Norway. In M. van der Linden & J. Rojahn (Eds.), *The Formation of Labour Movements, 1870–1914*. Leiden: Brill.
- Tønnesson, K. (1988) Popular Protest and Organization: The Thrane Movement in Pre-Industrial Norway. *Scandinavian Journal of History* 13 (2–3): 121–39.
- Wehr, P. (1984) Nonviolent Resistance to Nazism: Norway 1940–1945. *Peace and Change* 10 (3–4): 77–95.

Notting Hill Riots, 1958

Christian Hogsbjerg

Summer 1958 saw mass racial violence perpetrated by whites against black people in two areas of Britain, the city of Nottingham and, more seriously, in the area of “Notting Hill” in west London. The underlying causes were many and complex, but critical in working-class areas of London was a housing crisis due to “Rachmanism,” unaccountable racketeering slum landlords. Besides overcrowded, poor quality housing, black immigrants to Britain faced a “color bar” – racist discrimination in employment and public places. When the threat of unemployment raised its head in 1958, newly arrived migrant workers trying to make homes for themselves provided an easy scapegoat for racists.

By 1958, racist attacks were quite a common part of the black experience in London as groups of armed violent young whites went “nigger-hunting” in groups. Fascist organizations such as Oswald Mosley's Union Movement, the White Defence League, the League of Empire Loyalists, and the British National Party were active in Notting Hill. The dangerous rising tide of white terror reached a critical mass in August and September 1958, by which time serious attacks on black individuals, family homes, cafés, and community centers had become a daily occurrence. When warnings to black families to “clear out” and leave their homes were followed up with fire bombings, the failure of the authorities to act forced black militants to collectively organize resistance in self-defense. One night a local fascist headquarters was successfully hit, and the battle between black and white was joined.

Things reached a critical mass after August 31 when the police let an almost 400-strong “Keep Britain White” mob go on the rampage, smashing windows, and leaving five black men unconscious. From then on the police were ordered to keep the streets in the local area free of crowds, but white racists were able to continue their attacks in other areas of London. Eight months later, on May 17, 1959, Kelso Cochrane, an Antiguan carpenter, was stabbed to death in Notting Hill itself.

The British government’s response to the riots of 1958 was not to challenge the racism behind the riots but to institutionalize it, and in 1962 immigration controls were introduced in the Commonwealth Immigration Act. Yet the response from the black community to the white riots remains an inspiration. In 1958, Claudia Jones, a Trinidadian communist, had launched the *West Indian Gazette*, and the following year was to organize the now world-famous and celebrated Notting Hill Carnival. In the wider tumult of decolonization, formerly “British” subjects from the Caribbean found themselves forced to assert their West Indian identity in Britain and in the process led the way in imagining and shaping a new “postcolonial” culture.

SEE ALSO: Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Britain, Post-World War II Political Protest; Brixton Riots, 1981

References and Suggested Readings

- Pilkington, E. (1988) *Beyond the Mother Country: West Indians and the Notting Hill White Riots*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Schwarz, B. (2003) Claudia Jones and the *West Indian Gazette*: Reflections on the Emergence of Postcolonial Britain. *Twentieth Century British History*, 14 (3).
- Sherwood, M. (1999) *Claudia Jones: A Life in Exile*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Nu, U (1907–1995)

Justin Corfield

U Nu (Thakin Nu) was a leading independence politician in Burma, and its first prime minister from 1948 until 1956, and then again from 1957 until 1958, and from 1960 until 1962. He was born on May 25, 1907 at Wakema and attended the University of Rangoon, where he gained his BA in 1929. Nu then turned to teaching and became the headmaster of the National High School in Pantanaw. In 1934 he returned to the University

of Rangoon to study law and began his involvement in politics as president of the University of Rangoon Students’ Union, with Aung San (1915–47) as his secretary. The two were expelled from the university after an article critical of British rule appeared in their union magazine. The expulsion led to a massive university students’ strike in February 1936. This made Nu known all around Burma, and in 1937 he joined the Dobama Asiayone (We-Burmans Association), which had been formed in 1930. The members were known as the Thakins and Nu became known as Thakin Nu – in 1952 he announced that he would prefer to be known as U (Mr.) Nu.

In 1937 Nu founded, with Thakin Than Tun (1911–168), the Nagani (Red Dragon) Book Club, which was used to circulate Marxist classics around the Burmese literary community. Nu also founded the People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP), which was later reformed as the Socialist Party, and came together with other groups to form the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). In 1940 the British arrested and jailed Nu for sedition, but he was released when the Japanese invaded Burma in December 1941. During the Japanese Occupation, Ba Maw (1893–1977) headed a pro-Japanese government with U Nu as his foreign minister. However, it was not long before he realized that the Japanese had no intention of giving real independence to the Burmese. This saw him ally himself with Aung San and the AFPFL. When Aung San and six of his cabinet ministers were murdered on July 19, 1947, the British were desperate for somebody to lead Burma to independence and with Aung San’s main rival, U Saw, arrested for organizing the assassinations, Nu was the obvious choice. As a result, when Burma was granted independence on January 4, 1948, U Nu became the first prime minister of Burma.

As prime minister, U Nu was an able and effective statesman; however, his government had problems with communist insurgents and ethnic minorities that wanted independence. The Pyidawtha (Welfare) program of 1948 included a Land Nationalization Act, but this was undermined by the low standard of living that resulted from the massive war damage sustained by Burma, and a decline in rice exports, which had been one of Burma’s main sources of foreign exchange.

U Nu managed to win the general elections in 1952 and again in 1956; however, on June 12, 1956

he stood down in favor of Ba Swe. On March 1, 1957 U Nu became prime minister again, but stood down for a second time on October 28, 1958, in favor of Ne Win. He regained the prime ministership on April 4, 1960, holding that office until March 2, 1962, when he was deposed in a military coup d'état organized by Ne Win. He was then held in an army camp near Rangoon for four years. On the pretext of going to India for a pilgrimage, and ill-health, U Nu left Burma in 1969 and went to India, and then to London. In the British capital, on August 27, 1969, U Nu held a press conference in which he declared that he was the legal prime minister of Burma. He then formed the Parliamentary Democracy Party and started leading an armed resistance against Ne Win. It never had more than a few thousand supporters at its peak, and eventually dwindled to several hundred. U Nu was eventually granted an amnesty and he and his wife returned to Burma on July 29, 1980.

U Nu, always a devout Buddhist, became a monk and kept a low profile until 1988 when he supported the pro-democracy demonstrations that came close to toppling the Ne Win government. However, the military remained in control of the country, cracking down on the pro-democracy activists led by Aung San Suu Kyi. U Nu died on February 14, 1995 in Yangon (the new name for Rangoon).

SEE ALSO: Aung San (1915–1947); Burma, Democracy Movement; Burma, National Movement Against British Colonial Rule; Saya San (Hsaya San) Movement of the 1930s

References and Suggested Readings

- Brooke-Wavell, D. (1995) Obituary: U Nu. *Guardian* (February 15): 17.
- Butwell, R. (1963) *U Nu of Burma*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Tinker, H. (1967) *The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nuclear-Free New Zealand, 1987

Heather Squire

Nuclear-Free New Zealand was a campaign and social movement involving both government and civil society that succeeded in passing the

New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987. Nuclear-Free New Zealand was part of a global movement against nuclear proliferation that emerged in reaction to the Cold War arms race in the early 1980s.

Since the 1950s, peace activists in New Zealand had been mobilizing mainly around two issues: fallout from nuclear testing (by the US, the Soviet Union, and France) in the South Pacific and US warships carrying nuclear weapons docking at ports in New Zealand. New Zealand condemned nuclear testing in the United Nations in 1959 in response to popular concern. Fairly regularly, protest fleets made of kayaks, boats, and surfboards would confront incoming US navy ships and submarines in an attempt to keep them from entering New Zealand ports. In 1979, such a protest fleet (organized by Peace Squadron) met the US submarine *Haddo* in Auckland port, and although it was not able to turn away the submarine, its spirited protest caught the imagination of the country and reinvigorated the anti-nuclear movement.

As the Cold War continued into the 1980s and Reagan's hawkish foreign policy (which included a naval build-up) took shape, New Zealand became more lucrative as a port of call for the US navy in the South Pacific. The prospect of increased nuclear activity in New Zealand's ports, as well as high-profile activism by groups such as Peace Squadron, Greenpeace, and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), spread through the country, resulting in the formation of anti-nuclear groups within unions, universities, and local communities. A host of professional organizations, such as Scientists Against Nuclear Arms, emerged as well.

In 1980, the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone Committee was founded by Larry Ross, and a year later Peace Movement New Zealand was formalized as a central hub of information and some coordination for the host of anti-nuclear groups across the island. Together, these two groups helped to coordinate the two main actions of the anti-nuclear movement: declaring towns and municipalities (and eventually all of New Zealand) a "nuclear-free zone," and mass protest and direct action against the warships, both on land and in the water. Peace Squadrons continued to blockade ports and public protest continued to draw thousands of supporters. In 1982, tens of thousands of workers struck to prevent the nuclear warship *USS Truxton* from

docking, and in 1983, 25,000 women staged an anti-nuclear rally in Auckland to support the International Women's Day of Action for Nuclear Disarmament. Maori groups participated in protests as well, seeing the nuclear issue as another appropriation of their independence, self-determination, and sovereignty by a colonial power. New Zealanders responded with enthusiasm, declaring homes, churches, and neighborhoods "nuclear free," and by 1984 more than 65 percent of the population lived in areas declared "nuclear free."

The year 1984 was also an election year, and the conservative National Party that had been in power lost to the Labor Party, which ran an explicitly anti-nuclear campaign. Newly elected Prime Minister David Lange immediately barred nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships from using New Zealand ports or entering New Zealand waters.

As a member of ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty), New Zealand was expected to cooperate with the US in matters of defense in the Pacific Ocean; however, in 1985, New Zealand's staunch anti-nuclear stance led to a suspension of the treaty by the US over New Zealand's refusal to allow the docking of *USS Buchanan*, a US warship capable of launching nuclear depth bomb-equipped anti-submarine rockets. When the US refused to confirm or deny whether it had nuclear weapons on board the *USS Buchanan*, thousands of activists and workers sprung into action, fearful that the Labor government would succumb to pressure from the US. Some 15,000 anti-nuclear activists converged on Auckland, and the following day Lange refused entry to the warship. This bold move by Lange, coupled with the sinking of the Greenpeace protest vessel *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland Harbor later that year and the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant explosion, further emboldened the Labor government and garnered the support of the general population.

By 1986, an opinion poll revealed that 92 percent of New Zealanders opposed nuclear weapons in New Zealand, 69 percent opposed warship visits, 92 percent wanted New Zealand to promote nuclear disarmament through the UN, and 88 percent supported the promotion of nuclear-free zones (Dewes & Ware 2004). In 1987 the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act was

passed, which effectively made New Zealand nuclear free. The bill prohibited the entry into the internal waters of New Zealand within a radius of 12 miles (22.2 km) of any ship whose propulsion was wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power, and banned the dumping of radioactive waste within this nuclear-free zone. It also prohibited any New Zealand citizen or resident from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, or having any control over any nuclear explosive device.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Campaign, Britain; Anti-Nuclear Movement, Japan; Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Anti-Nuclear Protests, Marshall Islands; Greenpeace; Maori Indigenous Resistance

References and Suggested Readings

- Dewes, K. & Ware, A. (2004) *Aotearoa/New Zealand: From Nuclear Ally to Pacific Peacemaker*. *Disarmament and Security Center*. Available at www.disarmsecure.org/aotearoa_New_Zealand:From_Nuclear_Ally_to_Pacific_Peacemaker.html (downloaded August 11, 2008).
- Franks, D. (2007) *Nuke Free New Zealand: The Real Heroes*. Workers' Party (NZ). Available at workersparty.org.nz/spark-archive/nz-labour-party/nuke-free-new-zealand-the-real-heroes/ (downloaded August 12, 2008).
- Giugni, M. G., McAdam, D., & Tilly, C. (Eds.) (1999) *How Social Movements Matter*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Smith, P. M. (2005) *A Concise History of New Zealand*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wittner, L. S. (2003) *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971–Present*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University .

Nujoma, Sam (b. 1929)

Tilman Dederig

Sam Daniel Shafishuna Nujoma was born on May 12, 1929 at Etunda in Ongandjera district in the north of Namibia. Growing up in a traditional Ovambo household, the young boy tended the family's livestock and fulfilled other domestic duties. It was not before he was ten years old that he began to obtain a formal education by attending a Finnish missionary school. According to Nujoma's own account, he generally seems to have experienced his childhood as relatively undisturbed by disruptive outside influences. This changed when he moved to

Walvis Bay in 1946. There he was not only able to immerse himself into the harbor town's cosmopolitan environment, but he also witnessed the harsh realities of migrant contract labor while working at a general store and at a whaling station. In 1949 he relocated to Windhoek, where he worked as an office cleaner for the South African Railways and complemented his rudimentary education by attending evening classes. In 1956 he married Theopoldine Kovambo Katjimune, with whom he would have three surviving children.

Windhoek exposed him even more unambiguously to the demeaning South African system of racial segregation. Conversely, his job with the railways also provided Nujoma with a degree of mobility, and he was able to visit Cape Town by 1955. Here he gained access to a wider world of communication networks and of political activists which alerted him to contemporary trends in decolonization in the Third World.

A number of politicized Namibians lived illegally in Cape Town where they had established contact with black and white members of a number of opposition groups. When the South African authorities found out that the group's spokesman, Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, had petitioned the United Nations (UN) to protest against the South African occupation, Toivo was deported back to Namibia in 1958. From this closely knit network the Ovamboland People's Organization (OPO) emerged in 1957. According to Nujoma, he decided in 1957 to become more actively involved in politics, although the precise circumstances of his political commitment during the period prior to the formation of OPO are not entirely clear.

The shift of OPO from Cape Town to Namibia coincided, however, with Nujoma's intensified political activities in Windhoek. In 1959 he became the organization's president. In the same year he joined the executive committee of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), which was regarded as an umbrella organization for various Namibian opposition groups. Nujoma consolidated his leadership role when OPO was transformed into the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in 1960. Nujoma tapped into the political network which was at the time still dominated by traditional leaders, such as the veteran of the anti-colonial struggle, Herero Chief Hosea Kutako, and Nama Chief Hendrik

Witbooi, the descendant of the renowned leader of the Witboois during the German colonial period. Inspired by their tenacious efforts in submitting complaints to the UN, Nujoma espoused the strategy of petitioning this international body. Submitting grievances to the UN in order to alert the world public to Namibia's occupation by South Africa became a mainstay of SWAPO's diplomatic campaigns. Circumventing the repressive pass laws, which hampered the unrestricted movements of Africans, Nujoma traveled all over Namibia. Apart from calling for a transfer of trusteeship from South Africa to the UN, he targeted the disruptive effects of migrant labor on the social fabric of indigenous communities. His activities not only attracted the attention of the police, but he also established a reputation for criticizing those chiefs who collaborated with the South African authorities.

After 11 protesters were shot during demonstrations against the forced removal of Windhoek's black population to Katutura Township in 1959, South African pressure on the opposition intensified. Nujoma left Namibia in February 1960 to commence what turned out to 29 years in exile. After a difficult journey all across the continent he arrived in New York, where he appeared for the first time before a UN committee in 1960 to report on conditions in Namibia. He set up the first SWAPO office in the Tanzanian capital, Dar-es-Salaam, in 1961. Nujoma built up a network of international contacts which extended from Africa to Western and Eastern Europe by the 1970s, attending international conferences and meeting representatives from the yet few independent states in Africa. In 1965 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognized SWAPO as the only representative of the people of Namibia, eight years before the status of the sole authentic representative was also conferred on SWAPO by the UN.

The period of decolonization presented Nujoma with an increasingly wider range of political and diplomatic possibilities, including international support for armed struggle. By the early 1960s SWAPO guerrillas were trained in Algeria, Egypt, Tanzania, and China. The year 1966 was an important date in the history of the activities of Nujoma and his collaborators. Nujoma tried to return to Namibia to disprove South African allegations that he had voluntarily chosen to leave the country, but he was put

back on the plane by the South African police, who did not dare touch him. In the same year a small number of fighters of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) launched their first strike at Omugulug-Ombashe, initiating a prolonged military confrontation with South Africa. In 1966 the General Assembly of the UN called for the termination of South Africa's mandate for Namibia. In 1971 Nujoma became the first African leader of a liberation movement to address the UN Security Council. Through a combination of internal armed and political resistance and international diplomatic campaigns, Nujoma succeeded in consolidating SWAPO's preeminence in the struggle for Namibia's independence. During this period SWAPO relocated its main base to Lusaka in Zambia, but Nujoma pursued a busy schedule of shuttle diplomacy, constantly traversing large distances to keep the effort for national liberation on the internal agenda. Riding on the global wave of anti-colonial struggles, he was instrumental in transforming SWAPO from a marginal African movement that focused on petitioning the UN to a recognized player on the world stage.

In the wake of the sudden collapse of Portuguese colonialism in 1974, SWAPO was able to launch military strikes from Angolan territory. This period saw thousands of young Namibians fleeing into exile in order to join SWAPO, following a call to arms which Nujoma had broadcast from neighboring Botswana. After the Portuguese withdrawal, regional conflicts and global Cold War rivalry intermeshed and turned Angola into a battle zone of several warring parties, including South African and Cuban troops. SWAPO was drawn into an increasingly complex situation which pitted PLAN combatants against the South African army and against fighters of the rival Angolan National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The ferocious battles between the different parties in the 1980s finally led to a stalemate from which all the exhausted participants wished to escape. While SWAPO was largely excluded from the ensuing bargaining among the superpowers and their proxies, Nujoma and his associates succeeded in preserving the status of their organization as a key player in the international arena, without whom peace was impossible to establish. When peace negotiations finally led to the UN-supervised elections, SWAPO won a clear victory in the November 1989 elections to the

constituent assembly. On March 21, 1990 Sam Nujoma became the president of the independent Republic of Namibia. In 1994 he was returned to the country's helm by an overwhelming majority. In 1999 he won a third five-year term as president after changes had been made to the constitution. After the presidency shifted to Nujoma's successor, Hifikepunye Pohamba, in 2005, Nujoma kept the influential position of the president of SWAPO until his retirement from that position in 2007.

Throughout his long and remarkable career Nujoma's politics were motivated by a visceral rejection of institutionalized racism and injustice, rather than by some ideological agenda. His leadership style, however, has been frequently criticized as authoritarian. Internal dissent which erupted among the ranks of SWAPO fighters during the 1970s was brutally crushed. The death and disappearance of large numbers of these dissidents, which became public in the early 1980s, is still a major concern among human rights activists in Namibia. In his autobiography Nujoma glosses over the dark side of the liberation struggle and gives short shrift to critics within the liberation movement who are routinely denounced as disloyal. During his terms in office Nujoma reacted swiftly to any challenges to his leadership. Critics have also argued that his outbursts against homosexuals grate with contemporary trends in democratic societies which prize minority protection. There is no doubt that Nujoma still enjoys enormous popularity in Namibia, but these and other ill-tempered comments in public reflect some of the problems which affect the transformation of African liberation movements into post-independence political parties.

SEE ALSO: Namibia, Struggle for Independence; SWAPO (South West African People's Organization); Toivo ya Toivo, Andimba (b. 1924); Witbooi, Hendrik (ca. 1825–1905)

References and Suggested Readings

- Hopwood, G. (2006) *Guide to Namibian Politics*. Windhoek: Namibia Institute for Democracy.
- Leys, C. & Saul, J. S. (1995) *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword*. Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Nujoma, S. (2001) *Where Others Wavered: My Life in SWAPO and My Participation in the Liberation Struggle of Namibia. The Autobiography of Sam Nujoma*. London: Panaf.

Nyerere, Julius (1922–1999)

Ayokunle Olumuyiwa Omobowale

Julius Nyerere emerged on the Tanganyika political landscape in the mid-1950s as the British prepared the country for political independence. Born on April 13, 1922 in Butiama village, Nyerere's father, Nyerere Burito, was recognized as a visionary who predicted the coming of the Europeans. And thus, when the first white man arrived, he was taken to Nyerere's father who confirmed that the white man was part of the new people he had talked about. Nyerere Burito was subsequently appointed a traditional chief by German colonial officials. After completing primary education in Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere went on to receive a diploma from Makerere University College in Uganda. From Makerere, Nyerere enrolled in the University of Edinburgh, where he earned a master's degree in the arts.

Though he had western training, Nyerere's ideology diverged from the oppositional capitalist and socialist worldviews of the Cold War. The system evolved around what he termed African socialism. Since the 1960s, Nyerere's initiative was quite novel in the context of global politics to the extent that Tanganyika (later Tanzania) became first and foremost associated with Nyerere as the personification of the nation. Thus, in the words of historian Ali Mazrui, "A major element in the mystique of Tanzania is, of course Julius K. Nyerere himself." Hence, starting from his ascension to power in 1961, to his voluntary relinquishment of power in 1985 after a 24-year rule, and to his eventual death on October 13, 1999, as well as afterwards, Nyerere remained a relevant factor in Tanzanian social and political development. Subsequent sections discuss Nyerere's nationalism and his transformation of Tanzania to a one-party state, an instrument he used to achieve his *Ujamaa* (community) socialism.

Ujamaa: African Socialism, Self-Reliance, and Non-Alignment

Nyerere's socialism was principally contained in two documents: *Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism*, released in 1962, and the *Arusha Declaration* of 1967. For him, African socialism

had nothing to do with Marxism or with Soviet or Chinese socialism. Prior to the thoughts of Karl Marx, Africans had practiced their own form of socialism. Nyerere's socialist agenda was hence framed in the policy of the *Ujamaa*. It sought to ensure equality, cooperation, self-reliance, and Tanzanian development through collective production and ownership. Hence, the government nationalized multinational corporations, especially finance institutions, while also limiting the number of properties government officials could own. Furthermore, scattered settlements were brought together to form villages where collective production and ownership were encouraged.

At the level of international diplomacy, Nyerere appreciated the schism in international politics, with conflicting powers seeking allies while working against the interests of opponents. Not wanting Tanzania to be caught in the quagmire of international conspiracy, Nyerere opted for a policy of non-alignment while giving full support to the United Nations. Indeed, non-alignment might mean isolation from much needed foreign aid. Nevertheless, Nyerere opted for self-reliance, which required hard work, moderation, and forgoing luxuries as a means to reverse the country's poverty and underdevelopment. In short, Nyerere saw no hope in aligning with any of the Cold War superpowers. Rather, he preferred an inward-looking philosophy of development, which would be based on African ways of life, discard unfavorable aspects of the local culture, and adopt favorable innovations from abroad. Of course, *Ujamaa*, which eventually emerged as recourse to African socialism, was meant to be an indigenous way of channeling an independent course to development through self-denial and hard work by the entirety of the mobilized population, restructured into a classless whole, irrespective of political or bureaucratic positions held.

As laudable and seemingly workable as Nyerere's policy was, it began to fail soon after the beginning of the 1970s. Widespread poverty, a food crisis, and exploitation of peasants by government officials, as well as the nonchalance exhibited by the targeted peasantry, all contributed to the failure of the *Ujamaa*. Hence from a stance of self-reliance and cooperative ownership, the government of Tanzania started receiving several hundred million dollars in foreign assistance. In 1978, Tanzania received as much as US \$800 million as foreign aid while also expecting as much as 50 percent of the US

\$4 billion allocated for financing its 1977–82 development plan from foreign countries. In addition, the country invited 5,000 expatriates to the country and the private sector was permitted more active participation in the provision of services, while the government sector was dramatically eroded.

SEE ALSO: Charismatic Leadership and Revolution; International Socialism: Mass Politics; Kenyatta, Jomo (1893–1978); Tanzania, Protest and Independence; *Ujamaa Villages*

References and Suggested Readings

Ergas, Z. (1980) Why Did the Ujamaa Village Policy Fail? Towards a Global Analysis. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 18 (3): 387–410.

Hallet, R. (1974) *Africa Since 1875*. London: Heinemann.

Linton, N. (1968) Nyerere's Road to Socialism. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 2 (1): 1–6.

Mazrui, A. A. (1997) Tanzaphilia. *Transition* 75/76: 162–73.

Nyerere, J. (1961) The Transition Profile: Julius Nyerere. *Transition* 2: 21–4, 30.

Pratt, C. (1999) Julius Nyerere: Reflections on the Legacy of His Socialism. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 33 (1): 137–52.

Stoger-Eising, V. (2000) Ujamaa Revisited: Indigenous and European Influences in Nyerere's Social and Political Thought. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 70 (1): 118–43.

Tordoff, W. & Mazrui, A. (1972) The Left and the Super-Left in Tanzania. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 10 (3): 427–45.

O

Oaxaca uprising, 2006

Gerardo Rénique

For almost six months in 2006, an unstructured coalition of workers, students, peasants, women, youth, indigenous peoples, and urban poor brought the government of the southern Mexican state of Oaxaca to a virtual standstill. Their massive campaign of non-violent civil disobedience – the biggest urban uprising in Latin America in the last 20 years – was sparked by outrage at the June 14 police offensive against an encampment (*plantón*) which striking teachers had set up three weeks earlier in the capital city's historic central square. Following the attack, Oaxacans came together to demand the resignation of Ulises Ruiz Ortiz, the latest in a series of famously corrupt governors from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Although the Oaxacan resistance was galvanized by the police offensive, distrust of Ruiz had been building since his appointment by the PRI-dominated state legislature, following an election in which federal electoral authorities had found clear evidence of fraud. His first year in office was marked by an aggressive campaign of political containment in which at least 36 opposition, community, indigenous, and grassroots leaders and activists were assassinated.

Since 1989, the teachers had staged a *plantón* each year as a negotiating tactic during the union's annual collective-bargaining drive. Spreading over 50 square blocks, the 2006 *plantón* – which served as a temporary home for some 50,000 teachers, many accompanied by their families – was the largest in many years. Familiar with the disruptions in commerce and traffic caused by the annual *plantón*, most city residents were initially either hostile or indifferent to the teachers' strike. But public opinion shifted rapidly after the violent attack on June 14, when the governor sent 3,000 police to beat and tear-gas sleeping teachers and residents in the *plantón*.

Contrary to its intended goal of isolating the teachers, the police repression generated an unforeseen outpouring of public outrage against Ruiz's government. After police destroyed the teachers' radio station during the attack, students occupied the university radio station (Radio Universidad) and opened the microphones around the clock. A week after the police attack activists called for an open assembly to rally support for the teachers' union. In the meeting, a broad array of popular organizations, including neighborhood associations, unions, indigenous communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), ecologists, artists, women, youth, and media activists coalesced to form the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO). From that point forward, what began as an act of solidarity with a teachers' strike transformed into a broad-based mobilization.

Following the formation of APPO, the teachers' *plantón* expanded to include a broad spectrum of political, religious, neighborhood, and social organizations. Thousands of Oaxacans from diverse walks of life joined teachers in sit-ins and human chains targeting local government institutions. Through such actions, APPO emerged as the central space for coordinating popular discontent and for defending neighborhoods, organizations, and activists from government repression and, in particular, from the *caravanas de la muerte* – death squads composed of government goons patrolling the city in police pickup trucks.

Eschewing traditional forms of vertical authority, APPO quickly took shape as a space for discussion and coordination among its various participating organizations and individuals. Although members differed in their assessment of strategies and goals, most agreed that APPO should function as a space within which its members could maintain their political autonomy. In this way, APPO – which brought together indigenous organizations, labor unions, human rights organizations, artists, anarchist collectives, feminists, ecologists, and street youth as well as a variety

of communist and socialist groups and organizations – has contributed to a renewal of Oaxacan political culture. It has done so, in part, by creatively incorporating indigenous political forms like the consensual assembly, the philosophy that authorities should “rule by obeying” (*mandar obedeciendo*), and an agreement that no single leader or group should speak for or represent the movement. More than a governing body, the 30 *consejeros* (advisors) who sit on APPO’s Provisional Coordinating Council organize actions and disseminate ideas and information.

Among the more important forms of protest drawing together diverse participants were the “mega-marches,” which brought whole communities and organizations from across the state to Oaxaca city. With a crowd estimated at more than 400,000, the march on June 28, 2006 attracted the largest multitude ever in Oaxaca’s political history. Since then, despite government violence and assassinations, some occurring during the marches themselves, APPO has coordinated at least 12 other mega-marches.

During the early months of the insurrection, when Oaxacans still held out hopes that the federal government might intervene to unseat Ruiz, APPO launched several mass political actions designed to highlight the Ruiz administration’s inability to govern. Demonstrators closed Oaxacan state government offices and occupied the municipal police headquarters, padlocking its doors. Police forces vanished from the city streets.

Outside the city’s historic center, residential neighborhoods formed barricades at key intersections throughout the city to protect themselves from both the paramilitary “caravans of death” and thieves emboldened by the absence of state and municipal police. Established as a means of self-defense and security, the barricades quickly emerged as a crucial space for political discussion. Many were defended by workers, women, and youth who had never before participated in mass political actions.

Closed out of their offices and unable to move easily around the city, legislators and other government officials held furtive meetings in private residences and hotels where they felt safe from the daily mass mobilizations demanding an end to their hold on power. Ruiz eventually fled to Mexico City, where he set up office in a hotel and worked to guarantee federal government support. With both state and municipal authorities in hiding, APPO assumed *de facto*

responsibility for the control and policing of public space. To counter delinquency and to control for government infiltration, APPO decreed its own laws on public order and security, festivities and celebrations, and mass mobilizations. In a bold move, popular organizations agreed to boycott the Guelagueta, an annual state-sponsored celebration of Oaxacan culture widely viewed as a cornerstone of the city’s tourist industry. Declaring culture a common good, the teachers’ union, with APPO’s support, organized an alternative and free Guelagueta in July 2006 and again the following year.

On August 1, 2006, thousands of women took part in a “pots and pans” march demanding that the governor resign. After women activists were denied airtime at the government-controlled radio and TV stations, they took them over. For almost three weeks they reconfigured public television to educate listeners about Oaxacan history and the ongoing struggle, to coordinate mass actions, and to broadcast the whereabouts of government goons and paramilitary patrols. Renamed Radio Cacerola (Radio Pots and Pans), the public radio station joined Radio Universidad in opening its microphones to callers. With the support of those involved in the media initiative, women coalesced to form the Coordinating Committee of Oaxacan Women (COMO). After government goons violently evicted the women from the TV and radio station and destroyed the publicly owned equipment, other APPO activists retaliated by briefly occupying all 12 of Oaxaca’s commercial radio stations.

Outside the city of Oaxaca, more than 30 communities recovered control of their municipal governments from corrupt authorities imposed by Ruiz. In indigenous regions with long histories of resistance, authorities and communal organizations pledged their support to the democratic struggle. In different parts of the state, APPOs were established at community, municipal, and regional levels. Abroad, organizations like the Binational Indigenous Oaxacan Front (FIOB), which has a strong base in California and elsewhere, joined with exiled members of the Indigenous Popular Committee of Oaxaca (CIPO) and Canadian supporters to establish an APPO in Vancouver. In late September 2006, in an attempt to gain momentum from growing public disapproval of Ruiz’s handling of the conflict and to pressure the Mexican Supreme Court to rule in favor of a legislative decree that would

have unseated Ruiz, APPO organized the March of Dignity from Oaxaca to Mexico City. Along the lengthy route to the national capital, thousands lined the road to cheer, feed, and assist the marchers. In the city of Oaxaca, lawyers, doctors, artists, and intellectuals, as well as a number of businesspeople, voiced their support for APPO's democratic demands.

Bogged down in its own electoral scandal, the rightist PAN (National Action Party) government of then president Vicente Fox turned a deaf ear to Oaxacan demands and moved to consolidate its strategic alliance with the PRI by showing unwavering support for Ruiz. Finally, in late October, Fox mobilized the military and federal military police to repress the Oaxacan insurrection. In response, APPO launched a 48-hour strike and blockaded the main roads across the state. Paramilitaries descended on the barricades in an especially violent attack, during which Indymedia video maker Brad Will and two members of APPO were killed. On October 29, a force of 4,000 federal policemen, nine helicopters, 70 troop carriers, 15 combat vehicles, and at least ten anti-riot vehicles distributed in two columns destroyed many barricades, while elements of the army and the navy set up checkpoints in the most conflictive areas of the state. Two people were killed and more than 100 detained.

Defying the siege, members of Oaxaca's indigenous groups convened the Forum of Indigenous Peoples of Oaxaca, representing for the first time the state's 14 different indigenous peoples. The Forum called for peaceful resistance and the strengthening of APPO. Two days later, about 10,000 people marched to protest the federal police occupation. On November 2, as the federal police descended on the university, thousands rallied to successfully defend Radio Universidad. Four days later, with indigenous authorities at the front of the demonstration, thousands of APPO supporters again marched. Finally, during yet another mega-march on November 25, government agents who had infiltrated a demonstration provoked a fight with the federal police, leading to a bloody confrontation. More than 400 activists were detained and many others were forced to flee. The police randomly and indiscriminately beat, detained, and raped people in the streets. Teachers and activists were picked up from their classrooms and labor centers in broad daylight and sent to distant high-security prisons in northern Mexico.

Despite the government's massive display of force, APPO quickly regrouped. After a few days of cautious retreat, 5,000 APPO supporters marched on December 1, 2006, and again a week later, to demand the release of all Oaxacan political prisoners. Under the slogan "The fear is over," APPO organized its ninth mega-march to demand an end to the military occupation of Oaxaca. Then, in July 2007, APPO and Section 22 again organized a festive, participatory, and well-attended Guelagueta Popular, despite the government's refusal to allow the event to take place in the public auditorium.

The continuing resilience and creativity with which Oaxacans have met and moved past the paramilitary violence and police repression suggest that APPO, and the many other groups that make up the Oaxacan movement, will continue to play an increasingly important role in shaping the political ideals and aspirations of the region. Perhaps even more significant than the occasional public marches are the impressive number of meetings, discussions, assemblies, exhibitions, and workshops in which Oaxacans reflect upon their experiences and assess the challenges ahead. In the months since June 2006, Oaxacans throughout the state have met to discuss media politics, rights to water and other natural resources, cultural resistance, and the need for a new constitution.

In this respect it is important to remember that Oaxacans have not only actively contested the abusive policies of their current PRI governor, they have also launched a debate regarding the political future of Oaxaca. In this debate, APPO and other Oaxacan groups have insisted on moving beyond the limited temporal horizon of the electoral *sexenio* (six-year presidential term) to create forms of autonomous action and organization that can avoid being captured by either political parties or the state.

Driving this rejection of "politics as usual" is an understanding, gained from experience on the barricades and in the *plantones*, that politics is rooted in the social and ethical responsibilities of daily life, and in promoting new forms of social engagement, media activism, art, and democratic participation. The diversity of such initiatives, and the proliferation of spaces within which "politics" unfolds, represents a move away from vertical, party-like organizations. Instead, the discussions and political initiatives constitute the "spider's web" – as the Peoples of the Isthmus Regional Assembly aptly calls it – that binds together

the diverse movements, initiatives, individuals, collectives, and organizations that give life to Oaxaca's democratic resistance.

This new approach challenges the network of PRI caciques, or political bosses, who "govern" through a combination of clientelism and violence. Following a call by APPO to cast a "punishing vote" against the ruling parties, the PRI was soundly defeated in the July 2, 2006 national elections by a margin of four to one in favor of the center-left opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters did not, however, hand the PRD a blank check. In the local elections of 2007, popular disillusionment with the Oaxacan PRD's support for federal police intervention and its failure to respect voters' preferences in the municipal primaries led to a record-setting 70 percent electoral absenteeism in the state. Although the PRI walked away with a pyrrhic victory, it had retained its control of state government with only a small percentage of the popular vote.

The Oaxacan struggle also speaks of the unique resilience and creativity of Mexico's popular political movement. Rather than taking power, APPO seeks a new mode of governance and a new constitutional regime that respects "human rights, indigenous communal life, and municipal autonomy." At the same time, it also struggles to build modes of political autonomy that do not depend on either state handouts or government recognition. It is here as well that the indigenous histories and cultures of Oaxaca come into play. As the state with the largest indigenous population in the country, the importance of the Oaxacan movement for understanding emerging popular politics resides in its ability to unite around principles of autonomy that are not restricted to either "identity politics" or the politics of recognition.

Although the defense of indigenous territorial and political autonomy, cultural rights, customary authority, and cultural patrimony is central to the Oaxacan political struggle, Oaxacan demands for autonomy are not restricted to indigenous communities or organizations. Like the EZLN in Chiapas, the Oaxacan movement goes well beyond the traditional domain of "ethnic politics" by acknowledging and incorporating indigenous political traditions and philosophies as a source of political renewal. Oaxacans have a centuries-long history of rebelliousness grounded in local struggles for municipal and territorial autonomy.

SEE ALSO: Indymedia Global Justice Campaign, 2000s; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Esteva, G. (2007) The Asamblea Popular de los Pueblos de Oaxaca, APPO: A Chronicle of Radical Democracy. *Latin American Perspectives* 152.
- Martínez, V. R. (2007) *Autoritarismo, Movimiento Popular y Crisis Política: Oaxaca 2006*. Oaxaca: Universidad Autónoma Benito Juárez.
- Osorno, D. (2007) *Oaxaca Sitiada: La Primera Insurrección del Siglo XX*. Ciudad de México: Grijalbo.
- Rénique, G. (Ed.) (2007) The Uprising in Oaxaca. *Socialism and Democracy* 21 (2), special section.

Obrador, Andrés Manuel López (b. 1953) and the PRD

Leticia Pacheco Espejel

Andrés Manuel López Obrador was born November 13, 1953 in Tepetitán, Tabasco, Mexico. He studied political science and public administration at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). In 1977 he assumed office as director of the Instituto Indigenista (Indigenous Institute). Relocating to Mexico City in 1984, he became director of social promotion at the government's Instituto Nacional del Consumidor (National Consumers' Institute). At the same time he published his first books: *Los primeros pasos* (The First Steps) and *Del Esplendor a la Sombra* (From Shine to Shadow). After participating in the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) since 1976, he decided to join the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in 1989.

López Obrador gained fame in 1987 when he organized a social and political march to Mexico City known as *el éxodo por la democracia* (the March for Democracy) to protest election fraud when Salinas de Gotari (PRI) defeated the leading candidate, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (PRD), in an apparently fraudulent election. In 1995 López Obrador ran unsuccessfully for senator for the state of Tabasco. Between 1996 and 1998 he was president of the PRD. In 2000 he was elected head of government of the Federal District. The most important actions of his government were to promote neighborhood

committees to strengthen citizens' self-administration, create a food program and free medical care for senior citizens, and provide scholarships for children from under-privileged families. The government also established breakfasts in schools, scholarships for the unemployed, and crime prevention programs, and coordinated an interinstitutional alliance with the Commission of Human Rights of the Federal District. It also founded Mexico City University and 16 preparatory schools in marginal areas of Mexico City.

In 2004, the PRI fought to undermine López Obrador's candidacy for president. López Obrador responded with a campaign of civil resistance and published his book, *Contra el desafuero: Mi defensa Jurídica* (Against the Lifting of Executive Immunity: My Legal Defense). López Obrador, with the Coalition for the Good of All and Felipe Calderón (PAN), were the most significant candidates for the presidential elections in 2006. The result gave victory to Calderón with a margin of 0.58 percent, in an election that was found to have irregularities in the voting process. López Obrador, with the majority of the population, insisted on a recount. Numerous protests formed and thousands of citizens remained for 48 days with López Obrador at the Zócalo (Main Plaza) of the city. At a National Democratic Convention, it was decided not to accept Felipe Calderón for president, and on November 20, 2006, López Obrador was proclaimed the "legitimate president" of Mexico.

SEE ALSO: Mexico, Labor Movement and Protests, 1980–2005; Mexico, Worker Struggles and Labor Unions, 1950s–Present

References and Suggested Readings

Revelez Vázquez, F. (2004) *Partido de la Revolución Democrática. Los problemas de la insitucionalización*. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

Obregón, Alvaro (1880–1928) and the Sonoran generation

Bill Weinberg

The rise of the Sonoran dynasty represented the Mexican Revolution's Thermidor. It was a

textbook case of Saul Alinsky's famous formulation: the have-nots being exploited as cannon fodder by the have-a-little-want-mores. It was led and typified by men of petit-bourgeois origins who resented the domination of the dictator Porfirio Díaz (1830–1915) and his favored oligarchs and administrators. The 1910 Revolution which toppled Díaz and brought Francisco Madero (1873–1913) to power was a balance between merely reformist and truly revolutionary forces. The second phase of the Revolution, beginning in 1913, would be characterized by an open contest between the "Constitutionalist" forces of Venustiano Carranza (1859–1920) and his Sonoran allies on one hand, and the peasant armies of Pancho Villa (ca. 1878–1923) and Emiliano Zapata (1879–1919) on the other.

This second phase opened after army commander General Victoriano Huerta (1850–1916), a reactionary holdover from the Díaz regime, ousted and killed Madero in a February 1913 coup d'état, establishing a counterrevolutionary dictatorship. A "Constitutionalist" army rose in the north to restore a legitimate regime, led by Coahuila's Governor Carranza. Proclaiming himself First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army, Carranza issued a "Plan of Guadalupe" – as narrowly focused on removing Huerta as Madero's 1910 "Plan of San Luis Potosí" had been on removing Díaz. Carranza was joined by Alvaro Obregón, the *caudillo* of Sonora and leader of the group later known as the Sonoran dynasty.

Obregón rose from modest origins to become Sonora's "Garbanzo King," with a hacienda and a factory where he manufactured a garbanzo harvester of his own invention. He entered the army with the Revolution of 1910, and fought for Madero against the counterrevolutionary Pascual Orozco insurgency in Chihuahua. Appointed by Carranza as commander of the Army of the Northwest, he seized nearly all of Sonora as well as parts of neighboring states by the end of 1913. The other major figure in the Sonoran group was Plutarco Calles (1877–1945). The scion of a great if declining Sonoran landowning family, Calles was a colonel in the Army of the Northwest, and won distinction by seizing the strategic railroad town of Agua Prieta on the US border.

The Sonorans were, from the beginning, clear on the limited nature of their revolution. "We have no *agraristas* here, thank God," Obregón said of his Sonoran domain, in a clear reference to

Zapata's Liberation Army of the South, then seizing Morelos state. "We are doing what we're doing out of patriotism and to avenge the death of Sr. Madero."

But in Chihuahua, the third northern state to join the rebel alliance, a very different kind of revolutionary came to power. Francisco "Pancho" Villa raised the Constitutionalist Army's Division of the North – attracting legions from among the disenfranchised and expropriating the vast holdings of the state's cattle barons. While officially recognizing Carranza's leadership, Villa, with a far more radical program, soon became the real master of Chihuahua. His army of peasants and peons was the backbone of the northern revolutionary forces.

The Constitutionalist government established its headquarters at Hermosillo, the capital of Sonora, and began pushing south into Durango and toward Mexico City. In February 1914, Woodrow Wilson, alienated by the crude Huerta, lifted the Mexican arms embargo. US war matériel started flowing to the Constitutionlists. Soon, Huerta was besieged – by Zapata in the south and by Villa and the Constitutionalist Army in the north.

The fall of Huerta in August coincided with Villa's long-building break with Carranza and Obregón. Fearing the growing power of his peasant army and agrarian agenda, Obregón beat Villa to the capital by halting coal deliveries to the commandeered freight trains which moved Villista troops across the desert. But with the Constitutionalist alliance crumbling, governing would be more difficult.

The Aguascalientes Convention of October brought together delegates from revolutionary forces throughout Mexico to hash out a common government. Carranza and Zapata both stayed away, while Villa camped outside the city, only appearing at the convention's end to sign the final agreement. Obregón was the most prominent figure on the floor. Yet it was the Villista and Zapatista delegates who prevailed. The Sovereign Revolutionary Convention government declared in the final agreement, under the interim presidency of Eulalio Gutiérrez (1881–1939), embraced most points of Zapata's Plan of Ayala – most prominently, redistribution of lands from oligarchs to peasants. However, Obregón shrewdly remained neutral rather than sticking up for Carranza – the first sign of his astute tilt to the left.

In November, Carranza's isolated government evacuated Mexico City as the new Army of the Convention – made up mostly of the Villista and Zapatista forces – advanced on the capital. The US, which had been occupying Veracruz since April, pulled out of the Gulf Coast port just in time for Carranza, Obregón, and the Constitutionalist Army to take refuge there.

In December, the Villistas and Zapatistas took Mexico City. But after their troops had been masters of the capital for mere days, they withdrew. By the end of January, the Constitutionlists were back in the capital. Obregón, pursuing the Villistas northwards into El Bajío at the head of a newly dubbed "Operational Army," had learned the lessons of the trench warfare then underway in Europe. At the April battle of Celaya, Villa's waves of horsemen, who had been so effective against Huerta's federal forces at Juárez and Torreón, were cut down by Obregón's machine guns. The badly beaten Villistas retreated to Chihuahua – only to find that Constitutionlists had assumed control there and placed a price on Villa's head. He was reduced to guerilla insurgency.

Carranza had learned that maintaining power would entail more than mere fealty to Madero's liberal Plan of San Luis Potosí. But his "agrarian reform," which empowered military chieftains to distribute land ("fee simple" rather than as village property), was openly corrupt. As Friedrich Katz points out, the old landed elite of the Díaz era was increasingly replaced by a "new Carranza bourgeoisie," as Constitutionalist generals accrued new rural empires. Meanwhile, Calles, who had been left as military governor of Sonora, successfully defended Agua Prieta from Villa's attempt to take it in November. He also employed repression against the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and like-minded radical unionists in Sonora's mines, farms, and factories.

Back in Mexico City after his Bajío victories over Villa, Obregón was Carranza's real political chief. He deftly consolidated Constitutionalist gains, playing the urban workers against the insurrectionary peasants. He reopened the Casa del Obrero Mundial, an organization founded by anarchosyndicalists in 1912 and closed by Huerta. Casa militants were recruited by Obregón into "Red Battalions" to fight Villa and Zapata. Obregón, who had lost an arm fighting Villa's forces, portrayed the Villistas and Zapatistas as "reactionaries." The Casa accepted this line,

despite the best efforts of Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama, Zapata's liaison to the urban movement.

The movement was betrayed in the summer of 1916, when the Casa called a general strike to press the Constitutionals on their promises. The strike was broken, the leaders threatened with execution for violating "public order." Martial law was declared in Mexico City and the Casa was crushed. "As soon as Carranza felt himself the master of the situation, he kicked overboard his old friends, the working men," remarked the anarchist Enrique Flores Magón from exile. The strategy, however, had really been the fruit of Obregón's mind.

Carranza's new constitution, adopted in 1917, was nonetheless shaped by the pressure of populists and the left. Article 27 declared the nation as original owner of all lands and waters, including subsoil rights. *Ejid*os and other public or communal properties were protected as "inalienable and imprescriptible." Article 123 guaranteed the eight-hour day and minimum wage, abolished child and debt labor, and upheld the right to strike. Carranza simultaneously dispatched General Pablo González to finally crush the "Zapata rabble," waging a counter-insurgency war in Morales as brutal as that of Huerta before him. On April 10, 1919, Zapata was gunned down in a treacherous ambush. With the populist forces in retreat, Carranza started returning much confiscated land to former owners throughout Mexico. The "new Carranza bourgeoisie" was closing ranks with surviving elements of the old Díaz bourgeoisie.

This – together with Carranza's mobilization of federal troops to Sonora to put down labor unrest and the ongoing Yaqui Indian revolt, in what was perceived as an affront to states' rights – finally brought an open split between Carranza and Obregón, who left Mexico City for his home state in early 1920. In April, he pronounced the Plan of Agua Prieta – as single-mindedly focused on Carranza's removal as Carranza's own Guadalupe Plan had been on Huerta's. In a "strike of the generals," regional military commanders came over en masse to Obregón. Carranza was ousted by Obregonistas in May 1920, and killed in flight to Veracruz.

An interim government led by Adolfo de la Huerta – Obregón's appointee, and another son of Sonora's landowning class – made offers to the forces still in rebellion. The Zapatistas laid down their arms with promises of being able

to keep all occupied lands. Obregón became president in September elections – the first in Mexico since Madero was fraudulently denied the victory by Díaz a decade earlier, sparking the Revolution.

Obregón was still proving himself adept at exploiting populism. A pact with the new Regional Confederation of Mexican Labor (CROM), and a stepped-up agrarian reform, helped secure his victory. "The principal purpose of socialism," he declared, "is to extend a hand to the downtrodden in order to establish a greater equilibrium between capital and labor." In other words, historian James Cockcroft notes, "it could be co-opted for other than its avowed purpose." The machine being consolidated through such politics was the foundation of the one-party state that would rule Mexico through the end of the century.

Meanwhile, the secretive Bucareli Accords gave back to US investors much of what the "revolutionary" government appeared to take away. As the price of US recognition, Obregón agreed to minimum reimbursements on expropriated US properties, and to refrain from expropriating oil companies as long as they developed their leases instead of speculating. De la Huerta, now Obregón's finance minister, sat down with Mexico's foreign creditors – represented by Thomas Lamont of JP Morgan – to sign the Lamont-de la Huerta Treaty, in which Mexico recognized a debt of the then-enormous sum of \$700 million.

In 1923, Obregón chose Plutarco Calles, his interior minister, as his favored successor – sparking a short-lived military rebellion by the bypassed de la Huerta and some generals who followed him. The seesawing between left and right continued under Calles – with Obregón still in the background, although ostensibly retired to his Sonora hacienda.

In 1926, Calles supported the liberal Juan Sacasa (1874–1946) against the conservative Adolfo Díaz (1875–1964) in Nicaragua, who was then being backed by US Marines, and even sent ships in a token effort to defend Nicaragua's coast from US gunboats. Yet in 1927, he approved a force of federal troops – personally led by Obregón – to finally put down the Yaqui rebellion in Sonora. This constituted a grave betrayal, as the Yaquis had been lured into fighting for the Constitutionals on promises of having their traditional lands titled.

Calles slowed the agrarian reform and launched the National Revolutionary Party, marking the official beginning of Mexico's one-party system. His zealous anti-clerical measures resulted in the Cristero Rebellion, a rural Catholic insurgency centered in the Bajío region, which ended with a truce in 1929 after considerable bloodshed.

In 1928, Obregón announced his intention to run for the presidency again – and succeeded in getting the constitution changed to allow him to do so, suspending the “no reelection” provision (seen as a key gain of the Revolution) for a candidate who had been out of office for a term. But in July, he was assassinated by a Catholic militant while campaigning in Mexico City. There were inevitable rumors that Calles was behind the assassination, but he wisely declined to remain in power, agreeing with his top generals to support Emilio Portes Gil (1890–1978), the former governor of Tamaulipas, as president. But Calles remained the real power behind Portes Gil – more blatantly than Obregón had been the power behind Calles.

As so-called “Jefe Maximo,” Calles controlled a succession of three puppet “interim presidents” – Portes Gil, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, and Abelardo Rodríguez – while reliable electoral mechanisms were established. Ortiz Rubio's 1932 resignation was apparently on Calles's orders, and followed his being wounded in an assassination attempt which popular rumor blamed on Calles.

The ruling machine, now renamed that Mexican Revolutionary Party, was still ten years away from its final appellation of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI, adopted 1946). But the basic elements of the PRI state were established in the 1930s. The system would eventually be formalized around six-year presidential terms, with no reelection, but a presidential succession determined by the party elite in a ritual known as the *dedazo*, or “fingering,” then legitimized in a thoroughly controlled election. With the formal trappings of democracy, the PRI state would become known as “the perfect dictatorship.” Calles established another presidential tradition by becoming one of the richest men in Mexico.

But Calles's real chosen successor (formally elected, not merely “interim”) surprised him by moving sharply to the left – and truly crafted the centralized leviathan. The final indispensable

element of the PRI state was corporatism – “incorporation” of popular struggles into the apparatus of the ruling party. The architect of PRI corporatism, Lázaro Cárdenas (1895–1970) – a Constitutionalist general who had fought the Villistas in Sonora, occupied the Tampico oil fields, and served as governor of Michoacán – became president in 1934. Cárdenas really reinstated the agrarian reform, finally breaking up haciendas and turning them over to *ejidos*. He also oversaw the founding of the Mexican Workers' Confederation (CTM), the mammoth industrial union, and the National Campesino Confederation (CNC) – built on the armed peasant organizations surviving from the Revolution, but now an instrument for delivering *campesino* votes and loyalties to the ruling party in exchange for access to land and credit.

These measures alienated Calles, who was then moving in precisely the opposite direction. While Cárdenas was one of the few world leaders to support the Loyalists when the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, Calles denounced the Spanish Republic on anti-communist grounds, and increasingly flirted with fascism. Cárdenas dispatched him into exile in California. Although he was allowed to return to Mexico when the PRI tilted back to the right again under Manuel Avila Camacho in 1941, this exile marked a final end of the Sonoran dynasty. Together with the 1938 nationalization of the oil industry, Cárdenas's populist programs effected the final “institutionalization” of the Mexican Revolution – and marked a break with the Sonoran dynasty's opportunist legacy.

SEE ALSO: Cárdenas, Lázaro (1895–1970); Casa del Obrero Mundial; Cristero Uprising, Mexico, 1928; Díaz Soto y Gama, Antonio (1880–1967); Madero, Francisco (1873–1913); Magón, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922) and the Magonistas; Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Villa, Pancho (ca. 1878–1923) and the Division of the North; Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919) and the Comuna Morelense; Zapatismo

References and Suggested Readings

- Aguilar, C. & Lorenzo, M. (1993) *In the Shadow of the Mexican Revolution: Contemporary Mexican History, 1910–1989*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Cockcroft, J. (1990) *Mexico: Class Formation, Capital Accumulation, and the State*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Gilly, A. (2005) *The Mexican Revolution: A People's History*. New York: New Press.

- Hamilton, N. (1982) *The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Katz, F. (1982) *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution*. Chicago: University Press of Chicago.
- Knight, A. (1986) *The Mexican Revolution*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Krauze, E. (1997) *Mexico: Biography of Power*. New York: HarperCollins.

O'Brien, Bronterre (1805–1864)

Paul A. Pickering

Radical journalist James O'Brien was born in County Longford, Ireland and educated at a progressive school in Lovell Edgeworth and Trinity College, Dublin. After studying law at King's Inns, he removed to England where he was soon drawn into the world of politics. He joined the Radical Reform Association and met the leading radicals of the day, Henry Hunt and William Cobbett. Under the pseudonym Bronterre, he began contributing articles to the *Poor Man's Guardian*, a popular radical newspaper edited by Henry Hetherington.

When Hetherington was imprisoned in the struggle for a free press, O'Brien, who was influenced by the French Revolution, especially the nascent socialist ideas of the Parisian revolutionary Gracchus Babeuf, took over the editorship of the *Guardian* and began publishing his translations of Babeuf's writings there. He also published an English translation of Philip Buonarotti's account of Babeuf and the Conspiracy of Equals. Believing that cheap newspapers were a vital weapon in the campaign for political reform and an essential source for the political education of the people, O'Brien also helped Hetherington to produce other unstamped newspapers, including *The Destructive* and the *London Dispatch*. In 1837 O'Brien began his own venture: *Bronterre's National Reformer*, avoiding prosecution by presenting opinion rather than reporting the news.

In 1838 O'Brien became one of the "Irish O's" (the other was Feargus O'Connor) at the head of the Chartist campaign for democratic political reform. After the *National Reformer* ceased publication, O'Brien began contributing leading articles to O'Connor's *Northern Star*. He also published his own Chartist newspaper, *The Operative*, and

undertook numerous speaking engagements throughout Britain, leading to his first serious brush with the law. In 1840 he was arrested, convicted of sedition, and sentenced to 18 months in Lancaster Prison.

When O'Brien was released he publicly disagreed with O'Connor over both strategy and policy. In 1841 the two leaders disagreed over election tactics, and they bitterly clashed after O'Brien lent his support to the Complete Suffrage Union, a rival campaign for political reform based on an alliance with the middle class.

O'Brien continued to publish newspapers, including the *British Statesman* in 1842 and a revival of the *Poor Man's Guardian* with Hetherington in 1843. In 1844 he revived the *National Reformer*. After the failure of these newspapers O'Brien concentrated on writing for other publications and became a familiar figure on the metropolitan lecture circuit. In 1851 he opened the Eclectic Institute in Soho which became a home for adult education as well as advanced ideas in politics and religion. He died in poverty in December 1864.

SEE ALSO: Babeuf, François-Noel (1760–1797) and the Conspiracy of Equals; Cobbett, William (1763–1835); Hunt, Henry "Orator" (1773–1835); O'Connor, Feargus (1796–1855)

References and Suggested Readings

- Plummer, A. (1971) *Bronterre: A Political Biography of Bronterre O'Brien*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Taylor, M. (2004) O'Brien, James [Bronterre O'Brien] (1804–1864). In *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

O'Connell, Daniel (1775–1847)

William H. Mulligan, Jr.

Daniel O'Connell, a member of the traditional Gaelic aristocracy, was an Irish patriot and nationalist. He emerged as one of the leading Irish political leaders during the first half of the nineteenth century. O'Connell advocated non-violent nationalism and furthered attempts to mobilize the Catholic community as a political force for independence.

O'Connell was born on August 6, 1775, at Carhan, Cahirciveen, County Kerry, Ireland.

His Uncle Daniel was a general in the French army and another uncle, Maurice, was The O'Connell, head of the name in the old Gaelic aristocracy. The O'Connells had managed to hold onto their land despite confiscations and the penal laws. As a child, O'Connell lived for a time with peasant families, as was customary among the old Gaelic elite, becoming fluent in the Irish language and familiar with the condition of the landless peasantry.

Because of restrictions on the education of Roman Catholics, O'Connell went to France to study, first at St. Omer and then at Douai. The French Revolution interrupted his studies, and by all accounts the violence of the Revolution deeply affected young O'Connell. Relaxation of the restrictions on Roman Catholics allowed him to read law, first at Lincoln's Inn in London, and then at the King's Inn in Dublin. In 1798, he was called to the Irish bar as a barrister. He quickly established a successful practice, and his Uncle Maurice named him as heir to his title and income, making him financially independent.

Because the authorities suspected him of United Irish sympathies following the Great Rebellion of 1798, O'Connell withdrew to the relative safety of Kerry until the situation in Ireland stabilized. Again, the violence of the Rebellion on both sides appalled O'Connell, who does not appear to have played an active role in the rising. In 1800, however, he was a very visible opponent of the Act of Union, which ended even nominal independence of Ireland, and became increasingly active politically. By 1805, he was a prominent supporter of Catholic emancipation – equal political and civil rights for all, regardless of religious affiliation – and was the leading opponent of what was known as “the Veto” – the British crown's right to veto appointments of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Ireland. The debate over the Veto split opponents of the Act of Union, as well as Catholics in Ireland. O'Connell emerged from the debate as the clear leader of Catholic Ireland.

In 1823 O'Connell formed the first of several mass membership organizations, the Catholic Association, which was the prototype for others that followed. Roman Catholic priests received free membership, and dues were collected after mass. Full membership was priced at one guinea, which for the most part limited it to the emerging Catholic middle class. Associate membership,

however, was available for a penny a month, making it possible for the masses to join. Within a year, the Association had nearly 960,000 members. The income funded the Association's activities and allowed it to assist members who had been victimized (often by being evicted from their land) for their involvement. When the Catholic Association was outlawed in 1825, a New Catholic Association, organized in the same way, was in place within a few months.

In 1828 O'Connell stood for parliament in County Clare and received two-thirds of the vote, but was denied his seat because he was a Roman Catholic. He won reelection, which stimulated the passage of the Roman Catholic Relief Act of 1829 allowing Catholics to sit in parliament. By 1832, O'Connell was the leader of a loosely organized faction within parliament of 39 members pledged to repeal the Act of Union.

With Catholics sitting in parliament, the central demand of Catholic emancipation had been won, whereupon O'Connell turned his attention to repeal of the Act of Union. In 1840 he organized the National Repeal Association, following the model of the Catholic Association, to mobilize popular support. The principal tactic was large outdoor meetings that brought hundreds of thousands of people together to demand repeal. O'Connell would begin addressing the rallies in English and then switch to Irish to confound the government agents in the crowd. O'Connell's “monster meetings” drew huge crowds and alarmed the authorities. The National Repeal Association was suppressed and quickly replaced by the Loyal Repeal Association. In 1843 O'Connell announced a monster meeting to be held at Clontarf, the site of the battle in 1014 where, according to popular belief, Irish King Brian Boru drove the Vikings out of Ireland. Amid fears of violence, O'Connell gave in to pressure from the government and cancelled the meeting.

The cancellation of the Clontarf meeting brought the conflict between O'Connell and the emerging Young Ireland movement to a head. There were a number of differences between O'Connell and Young Ireland, but the two most important were Young Ireland's refusal to disavow violence as a potential tool for Irish freedom, and its advocacy of an Irish nationalism that included all religious traditions. While O'Connell never explicitly linked Irishness and Catholicism, much of his base was built on advancing

Catholic interests. The longer he served in parliament, the more committed he became to a political, rather than an armed, solution to Irish freedom. His support for separation from England was weakened by a growing respect for the British constitutional system during his service in parliament. He also came to perceive the cause of Irish Catholics for civil liberties as part of a larger struggle for human freedom, leading him to advocate the abolition of slavery, among other reforms.

In 1844, in spite of his efforts at conciliation, O'Connell was arrested for sedition and imprisoned. After three months the House of Lords reversed his conviction, but the period of incarceration had broken his health. After 1844, O'Connell was no longer fully committed to repeal, arguing that the Westminster parliament could provide the reforms needed in Ireland. In 1846, O'Connell demanded that all members of the Loyal Repeal Association renounce violence. His break with Young Ireland was complete.

O'Connell's heroic legacy is secure; he is widely revered in Ireland as "the Liberator" for his role in winning Catholic emancipation. Nationalists of a radical stripe, however, view him in a more critical light, echoing the denunciations leveled against him not only by the Young Ireland militants, but also by the Irish leader of the powerful working-class Chartist movement in England, Feargus O'Connor. James Connolly, for example, in his seminal *Labour in Irish History*, entitled his account of O'Connell's career "A Chapter of Horrors: Daniel O'Connell and the Working Class," and charged that O'Connell "gradually developed into the most bitter and unscrupulous enemy of trade unionism Ireland has yet produced" as he "attracted to himself more and more of the capitalist and professional classes in Ireland, and as he became more necessary to the schemes of the Whig politicians in England."

In 1847, with Ireland in the grip of the Great Famine, O'Connell traveled to Rome to seek assistance from the pope for the Irish people. He died on May 15, 1847, in Genoa, Italy, and is buried in Glasnevin Cemetery in Dublin in an elaborate tomb, topped by a round tower.

SEE ALSO: Catholic Emancipation; Chartists; Connolly, James (1868–1916); Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798; Irish Nationalism; O'Connor, Feargus (1796–1855); United Irishmen; Young Ireland

References and Suggested Readings

- Connolly, J. (1910) *Labour in Irish History*. Dublin: Maunsel.
- McCaffrey, L. J. (1966) *Daniel O'Connell and the Repeal Year*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
- McCartney, D. (1980) *The World of Daniel O'Connell*. Dublin: Mercier Press.
- MacDonagh, O. (1988) *The Hereditary Bondsman: Daniel O'Connell, 1775–1829*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- MacDonagh, O. (1989) *The Emancipist: Daniel O'Connell, 1830–1847*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Nowlan, K. B. & O'Connell, M. R. (Eds.) (1984) *Daniel O'Connell: Portrait of a Radical*. Belfast: Appletree Press.
- O'Connell, M. (1990) *Daniel O'Connell: The Man and His Politics*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.

O'Connor, Arthur (1763–1852)

Clifford D. Conner

Arthur O'Connor is the most important Irish revolutionary most people have never heard of. As one of the central leaders of the United Irishmen at the time of the 1798 Rebellion, he played a significant role in the origins of Irish republicanism and Irish nationalism. But for an accident of weather – a storm preventing a French army led by General Lazare Hoche from landing at Bantry Bay in December 1796 – English domination of Ireland would have received a severe challenge from a liberation army commanded by General Arthur O'Connor. Today, however, his name and reputation are not nearly as well remembered as are those of Theobald Wolfe Tone, Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Robert Emmet, and several others of his United Irish colleagues.

Hoche's attempted French invasion of Ireland was the pivotal event leading up to the Rebellion of 1798. Although Wolfe Tone has traditionally received the credit for negotiating that expedition, Tone's own memoirs reveal that he was not taken seriously by the French government, the Directory. The invasion plans became a reality only when O'Connor and Fitzgerald joined the discussions. It can be fairly said that Wolfe Tone initiated United Irish diplomacy with France, but O'Connor and Fitzgerald – with O'Connor in the lead – transformed it and gave it substance.

Although the attempted invasion was a failure, it had powerful consequences. In Ireland the rebellious population, far from being discouraged, was invigorated by the expectation that its powerful military ally would surely return soon for another try. But as the spirit of revolution rose among the people, so did the determination of the authorities to crush that spirit with all the repressive means at their disposal.

The United Irishmen

An analogous assessment can be made regarding the respective roles of Wolfe Tone, Fitzgerald, and O'Connor in the creation of the United Irishmen. In 1791 Tone was the guiding spirit behind the founding of the United Irish Society in Belfast. The original United Irish Society of 1791 was not, however, the United Irish Society that was to provide the organizational framework of the Rebellion of 1798. From a small propaganda group devoted to the goal of reforming the Irish parliament by peaceful and legal means, the United Irishmen became a mass underground army dedicated to overthrowing the Irish government and breaking the connection with England by military force.

O'Connor and Fitzgerald joined the movement in 1795, bringing a large measure of credibility to it. Gaining these two highly influential figures as leaders greatly enhanced the prestige of the United Irish and gave it an appearance of authenticity and social breadth that it had previously lacked. By 1796 the United Irish Society had superimposed a military organization onto its civilian structure and was training its troops in clandestine nocturnal drilling sessions throughout the country. In February 1798 a United Irish assessment of its own troop strength counted 279,698 men in arms in three of Ireland's four provinces.

Fitzgerald possessed personal charisma of legendary magnitude, but O'Connor was considerably more gifted in the essential qualities of political leadership. He was a powerful orator, an accomplished writer, an able political organizer, and a diligent student of military strategy and tactics. As the most philosophically inclined of the United Irish leaders and arguably the most intellectually gifted, O'Connor became the movement's leading theoretician. (See *The State of Ireland* for a good example of his theoretical writing.) Fitzgerald was attracted to O'Connor as someone who could articulate his own political feelings better than anyone else. At the crucial

moment of the United Irishmen's transformation into a mass revolutionary organization, it was Arthur O'Connor who was playing the primary leadership role.

O'Connor was born on July 4, 1763, to a wealthy landowning family in County Cork, Ireland. He first came to public notice as a member of the Irish parliament, to which he had been admitted in 1790. The culmination of his parliamentary career was a passionate speech he made on the floor of the Irish House of Commons on May 4, 1795, calling for Catholic emancipation – full political rights for everyone regardless of their religion. He utilized the occasion as a forum to address the nation and present a case for resolving Ireland's social ills by revolutionary means. That speech ended any possibility of advancement in a conventional political career, but laid the basis for a revolutionary political career. Although O'Connor (like Wolfe Tone, Fitzgerald, and most of the other United Irish leaders) was of the Protestant persuasion, he rapidly became internationally renowned as a champion of the downtrodden Irish Catholics.

Imprisonment

On February 2, 1797, O'Connor – by then public enemy number one in the eyes of the British and Irish governments – was arrested and imprisoned in Ireland on charges of high treason. An effective international protest campaign on his behalf, however, pressured the Irish authorities into releasing him at the end of July. Once out of prison, O'Connor planned a renewed attempt to negotiate a French invasion of Ireland, but on February 28, 1798, in England en route to Paris, he was arrested by the British authorities and once again charged with high treason.

When the Rebellion erupted in Ireland in the following months, O'Connor was incarcerated and thereby denied the opportunity of being put to the ultimate test of revolutionary leadership. The outcome of the Rebellion was largely determined by the fact that he and most of the other top leaders of the United Irishmen had been removed from the scene of action by a successful campaign of government repression.

The Pitt ministry's determination to hang O'Connor was thwarted by the wholehearted support he received from his many friends among the Foxite parliamentary opposition, especially from Charles James Fox himself. The list of

powerful men who took the stand at his trial to swear that they knew O'Connor well, and that they knew him to be completely incapable of any treasonous act or intent, could hardly have been more impressive: Fox, Richard Brinsley Sheridan, Thomas Erskine, the Earl of Suffolk, the Earl of Moira, the Earl of Thanet, the Earl of Oxford, the Duke of Norfolk, Henry Grattan, Michael Angelo Taylor, Lord John Russell, and Samuel Whitbread. The parade of important men had the desired effect: the jurors were awed and the judge sufficiently intimidated to assure O'Connor's acquittal.

But Pitt had anticipated the possibility that O'Connor might be acquitted and had taken steps to block his release. O'Connor was immediately rearrested and scheduled for extradition to Ireland to stand trial there on yet another charge of high treason. Pandemonium erupted in the courtroom. After several minutes of bedlam, however, the uproar subsided and O'Connor was sent back to jail to await being transported to Ireland. By the end of May 1798 when he arrived in Dublin in chains, the Rebellion had been defeated and his comrade-in-arms, Fitzgerald, had been killed in the struggle.

One of the most remarkable facts about O'Connor's life is that it did not end in 1798. With the insurrection crushed, an estimated 30,000 rebels already dead, and the surviving insurrectionists disarmed, local authorities throughout Ireland were carrying out wholesale executions of their vanquished foes with little pretense of adhering to the rule of law. The Protestant ultras were thirsting for vengeance, and O'Connor, their most hated enemy, was apparently at their mercy. In Dublin, however, the imprisoned leaders of the United Irishmen were in an international spotlight that required the government to at least pay token respect to legal formalities before hanging them.

The new lord lieutenant and military commander-in-chief of Ireland, Cornwallis, was sufficiently politically astute to understand that gratuitous brutality against the now disarmed and defenseless populace and their imprisoned leaders would only breed a new generation of rebels, which would perpetually undermine Britain's governance of Ireland. That O'Connor was eventually exiled rather than executed was the result of the Kilmainham pact, an agreement he and other imprisoned leaders made with the British government. Although the deal

required substantial political concessions on their part, they maintained that it entailed no betrayal of principle.

French Exile

One reason O'Connor's part in the revolutionary events of 1798 has remained in relative obscurity is that although Irish nationalists have traditionally done a splendid job of keeping the names of martyrs to their cause alive, O'Connor – unlike Wolfe Tone, Fitzgerald, and Robert Emmet – did not die a martyr's death. He survived the Rebellion and lived for more than a half-century after 1798. After being released from prison in 1802, he spent the rest of his long life in comfortable exile in France.

In exile, O'Connor did not abandon the quest to free Ireland from English rule. On August 31, 1803, Napoleon Bonaparte decreed the formation of an Irish legion as a military force for the liberation of Ireland, and O'Connor was given its highest rank: lieutenant general. For more than a decade O'Connor continued preparations to lead a French invasion of Ireland under Bonaparte's auspices. Although the emperor was undoubtedly serious about launching such an expedition, none of his plans ever reached fruition, and General O'Connor was thus left perpetually on the sidelines, never to smell powder in real military action.

O'Connor's half-century in French exile amounted to considerably more than half of his lifetime. His marriage to the daughter of the renowned *philosophe* Condorcet gave him entrée into leading French social and intellectual circles. As hopes of a French expedition to Ireland faded, he turned to more private pursuits. He devoted a great deal of literary effort to defending the legacy of the United Irishmen as he understood it, which often brought him into conflict with radicals of the younger generation – most notably his own nephew, the Chartist leader Feargus O'Connor – and with reformers such as Daniel O'Connell.

O'Connor's Legacy

Arthur O'Connor died on April 25, 1852, a few months short of his eighty-ninth birthday. G. D. H. Cole, in *Chartist Portraits*, described the English revolutionary Ernest Jones as “by all ordinary standards, an unsuccessful man.” The

same could be said of Arthur O'Connor. He was educated to become a lawyer but never practiced law. He was a parliamentarian whose career was cut short by his inability to tolerate the corruption it entailed. He was a central leader of an Irish revolution that failed to take power. He was Bonaparte's anointed king-in-waiting whose coronation never came to pass. And for half a century he was a general who never saw battle.

Nonetheless, like Ernest Jones, Arthur O'Connor led a remarkable life of considerable historical significance. He did not succeed in his primary objective of liberating Ireland from British domination, but the movement he helped to create and lead – the United Irishmen – had a powerful impact on his own era and left an important legacy of revolutionary precedent for subsequent generations of Irish republicans and nationalists.

SEE ALSO: Emmet, Robert (1778–1803) and Emmet's Rebellion; Fitzgerald, Lord Edward (1763–1798); Fox, Charles James (1749–1806); Ireland, Age of Revolutions 1775–1803; Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798; Irish Nationalism; O'Connor, Feargus (1796–1855); Sheridan, Richard Brinsley (1751–1816); Tone, Theobald Wolfe (1763–1798); United Irishmen

References and Suggested Readings

- Cole, G. D. H. (1989) *Chartist Portraits*. London: Cassell.
- Curtin, N. J. (1985) The Transformation of the United Irishmen into a Mass-Based Revolutionary Organization, 1794–6. *Irish Historical Studies* 24: 463–92.
- Elliott, M. (1982) *Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hames, J. H. (2001) *Arthur O'Connor, United Irishman*. Cork: Collins.
- MacDermot, F. (1966) Arthur O'Connor. *Irish Historical Studies* 15: 48–69.
- Madden, R. R. (1916) *Lives and Times of the United Irishmen*. Ed. V. F. O'Reilly. New York: Catholic Publication Society of America.
- O'Connor, A. (1798/1998) *The State of Ireland*. Ed. J. Livesey. Dublin: Lilliput Press.
- Packenham, T. (1972) *The Year of Liberty: The Great Irish Rebellion of 1798*. London: Granada.

O'Connor, Feargus (1796–1855)

Clifford D. Conner

Thomas Carlyle remarked that writing a biography of Cromwell required first of all removing

a mountain of “dead dogs” that hostile writers had heaped upon his memory. The same is true of many of history's controversial revolutionaries, and Chartism's principal leader, Feargus O'Connor, is certainly among them. Most of the early historians of Chartism denounced O'Connor as an unprincipled demagogue, but more recent studies have produced a much more positive assessment of the quality of his leadership.

The powerful mass working-class movement known as Chartism gave rise to a number of competent radical political leaders, but Feargus O'Connor was by far the best known and most important of them. When assailed as a demagogue by his contemporary political rivals and enemies, he met the charge head on: “I say, I am a Demagogue,” he wrote. “The word is derived from the Greek words, ‘demos, populos,’ the people; and ‘ago, duco,’ to lead; and means a leader of the people.”

Demagoguery was a natural accusation to hurl against a leader who rose to public attention on the strength of powerful platform oratory and immense charisma. A contemporary observer described “the melodious voice, the musical cadences, the astonishing volubility, the imposing self-confidence of the man, and the gallant air of bold defiance with which he assailed all oppression and tyranny,” all of which combined to produce an electrifying effect on the crowds he addressed. Add to that O'Connor's unerring feel for the concerns of working-class audiences – his ability to give voice to their grievances – and his overwhelming popularity needs no further explanation. But O'Connor's contributions to the creation of the historically unprecedented Chartist movement went far beyond his oratorical talent.

Widespread working-class radicalism was not new to England in the 1830s, but it had always previously been localized and fragmented, consisting of innumerable isolated groups of activists organizing around many different causes. What made Chartism different and unprecedented was its character as a *unified national* working-class movement aiming to take political power. O'Connor's popularity was itself a unifying factor as he became a symbolic focus of nationwide protests. During the critical period of Chartism's rise he energetically crossed and recrossed the country on a nonstop speaking tour, leaving behind at every stop, like a radical Johnny Appleseed, new local groups that were

to become the organizational framework of Chartism. O'Connor's unwavering focus on a single issue – extension of the right to vote to the working class – helped consolidate the disparate forces of working-class politics into the massive movement to confront parliament with a “People’s Charter” demanding universal manhood suffrage.

The *Northern Star*: Communication, Agitation, Education

O'Connor must also be credited with creating the indispensable unifying element of the Chartist movement: its national newspaper, the *Northern Star*. The weekly publication provided the necessary means of communication to connect the revolutionary-minded activists throughout England, Scotland, and Wales, making concerted action possible. One of its important functions was to report the news from a working-class perspective – to break the monopoly and counter the “spin” of the establishment press. Its pages served as the main textbook of the workers’ political education. The *Northern Star*’s most significant role, however, was as the primary organizing tool of the Chartist movement. It had the geographical scope and the authority necessary to mobilize the ranks of the movement and call them to action.

The *Northern Star* laid the groundwork for the Chartist movement. Its first issue was dated November 18, 1837, almost a year before the official proclamation of the People’s Charter at a massive demonstration in Birmingham on August 6, 1838. Previously, it had been assumed that leadership of a national working-class movement would necessarily be centered in the country’s populous capital, London. But the faction-ridden atmosphere of radical politics in the metropolis made it highly unlikely that organizational unity would ever be possible there. O'Connor challenged the “Londoncentric” presumption by publishing his revolutionary organ in Leeds, in the industrialized north of England. By calling it the *Northern Star* he was making the point that radical activists all over the country should look to the militant workers of the north for leadership.

Earlier attempts had been made to launch a national working-class press, but the *Northern Star* was the first to succeed in any meaningful sense.

That the journal was successful in attracting the working population to its banner is evidenced by its circulation figures. Its original press run of 3,000 was soon raised to 10,000, a phenomenal number for an anti-establishment newspaper. By mid-1839 as many as 50,000 a week were being sold. But the numbers of copies printed only begin to suggest the extent of the *Northern Star*’s influence. Every copy, on average, reached as many as eight to ten readers as they were passed around in coffee houses, taverns, and workplaces. In 1838 the journal claimed a readership of 100,000; a year later, 400,000.

After only a month in operation, the newspaper began to return a profit to O'Connor, who then plowed the surplus funds back into extending the paper’s coverage and influence. His paid reporters functioned not only as news-gatherers and journalists but also as movement organizers in localities throughout the country. The significance of O'Connor’s ownership of the *Northern Star* in consolidating his leadership of the Chartist movement is obvious.

Hostile historians have charged that O'Connor ran the paper undemocratically, used it to promote his views alone, and excluded those of his opponents within the movement. The injustice of those accusations, however, is easily revealed by a perusal of the *Northern Star*’s pages, wherein O'Connor’s positions were routinely challenged and debated. Indeed, the paper’s broad appeal was largely due to its nonsectarian nature. Friedrich Engels, although critical of O'Connor, described the *Northern Star* as “the only sheet which reports all the movements of the proletariat,” and Karl Marx shared his positive appreciation of the paper. Engels himself served as a foreign correspondent for the *Northern Star* on occasion.

Political Origins

Feargus O'Connor was born on July 18, 1796, into a highly radicalized political environment. His father, Roger O'Connor, was a fervent partisan of the Irish struggle for national independence and his uncle, Arthur O'Connor, had been one of Ireland’s foremost revolutionary leaders. In 1822, at the age of 26, Feargus chose the name of his uncle’s best-known book, *The State of Ireland*, as the title of his own first radical political publication. In 1832, running as a member of Daniel O’Connell’s party, he scored a stunning

upset victory in winning election to the British parliament as the representative of Cork, Ireland's largest county. Daniel O'Connell's son later wrote of Feargus's election: "Without money and without previous influence, personal or political, an unknown and not overwealthy squire of an obscure part of the country, set out to attack and overturn the influence and sway of the most powerful and richest landed aristocracy in Ireland, and, thanks to his indomitable energy and audacity . . . he succeeded."

Although Feargus would continue to support Daniel O'Connell's crusade for Irish independence, he would not long remain in the fold of the Liberator's party. O'Connell's conservatism with regard to working-class issues – above all his antipathy toward trade unionism and his staunch support of free-market economics – made a split inevitable between him and the radical movement in England. Upon his arrival in London in 1833, Feargus had immediately gravitated toward the radical workers and soon emerged as their most prominent spokesman. In autumn of 1836 the split came into the open when O'Connell launched a public political attack against O'Connor. By then, however, Feargus had been ejected from parliament.

As a tribune of the people in the parliamentary arena, Feargus had gained popularity in both Ireland and England. He easily won reelection at the beginning of 1835, but in June of that year a Tory challenge resulted in his disqualification on a technicality. The involuntary interruption of his parliamentary tenure allowed him to concentrate his energies on extraparliamentary organizing efforts that had already been under way.

In September 1835, 3,000 radicals attended a public meeting in London chaired by O'Connor and formed the Great Marylebone Radical Association – an important initial step, in O'Connor's estimation, toward an independent political party of the working class. English politics had traditionally taken the form of a two-sided struggle between reactionary Tories and progressive Whigs, but O'Connor and like-minded radicals believed that the pro-capitalist Whigs, no less than the aristocratic Tories, had proven themselves the enemies of the working class. A reporter for the *Bolton Free Press*, describing a public speech by O'Connor in February 1838, wrote that "he divided society just into two classes – the rich oppressors and the

poor oppressed. The whole question resolved itself into the battle between labour and capital." O'Connor therefore devoted his efforts to building an independent working-class movement that could wrest political power from both the traditional aristocratic landowning class and the newly dominant "middle class" of industrial capitalists.

The movement spread rapidly. In the nine months following the founding of the Marylebone group at least eight more Radical Associations (RAs) sprang up in various parts of the metropolis, with a Central Committee and occasional all-London meetings to coordinate their activities. Meanwhile O'Connor also met with success in organizing RAs in other parts of England and Scotland. In December 1835 he embarked on an energetic three-week speaking tour of the industrial north that produced new RAs in at least a dozen cities and towns, including Manchester, Leeds, and Sheffield. A year later another tour brought forth new RAs in Nottingham, Newcastle, Glasgow, Edinburgh, and elsewhere. His efforts to fuse the RAs into a unified party temporarily faltered as the radicalization declined in 1836, but economic depression in 1837 sparked a revival. Eventually the local groups that O'Connor helped bring into being would coalesce into the nationwide Chartist movement.

Reformist or Revolutionary?

O'Connor's focus on the demand for universal manhood suffrage does not mean that he was essentially a reformist rather than a revolutionary. The demand that parliament extend the franchise to the working class was one of simple justice that O'Connor believed the overwhelming majority of the population would be willing to fight for. The workers were not particularly interested in the abstract right to vote, but it was widely believed that gaining the franchise would lead to redressing their economic grievances. Winning control of parliament, and therefore the machinery of the legislative process, would, they thought, put an end to their brutal exploitation by the factory owners and thereby allow them to rise out of their wretched poverty.

But neither O'Connor nor most of the other Chartist leaders thought that working-class power could actually be achieved via the ballot. They expected parliament to reject the Charter out

of hand. To back their petition with political muscle, the Chartists planned to call a National Convention which, in emulation of the French Revolution, would establish an organ of political power to rival that of parliament and lead to a revolutionary showdown. The Convention would present the Chartist petition to parliament, and unless the government surrendered without a fight, the next step would be a general strike, which would probably compel the workers to use “physical force” in self-defense against military attacks. Radical activists throughout the country were therefore preparing for armed struggle.

When the showdown came, however, the political and social stability of the British capitalist order in the mid-nineteenth century proved sufficient to withstand the massive popular challenge, and it was O'Connor and the Chartists who ultimately backed down. O'Connor's critics among the historians have blamed that retreat – and the ultimate decline and fall of Chartism – on his leadership, but a more fair-minded assessment would recognize that the Chartists' struggle had been unwinnable no matter what O'Connor had done. That he did not issue a call to arms and lead the workers into a bloodbath should perhaps be attributed to good sense rather than to cowardice.

Despite the strategic retreat, in late 1839 the workers' frustrations boiled over into widespread riots and risings that required military force to suppress. A wave of arrests of Chartist leaders and rank-and-file members ensued, sparking more abortive local risings. O'Connor was imprisoned from May 1840 to late August 1841, but the *Northern Star* kept his voice before the public, and the “martyred patriot,” as he portrayed himself, emerged from his cell with his control over the Chartist movement intact and his following stronger than ever.

The Land Scheme

But when the petitions, the counter-parliaments, the general strikes, and the armed struggle all proved incapable of accomplishing the Chartists' objectives, the obvious question confronting the movement was: *What do we do now?* O'Connor's unfortunate answer was a turn to agrarian utopianism. He believed it would be possible to create a means whereby the workers could leave their factories, return to the land, and prosper as independent farmers. It was an echo of Robert

Owen's utopian socialism, but minus the socialism. Whereas Owen hoped to build a socialist civilization on the basis of cooperative societies, O'Connor tried to turn the workers into individual peasant proprietors.

In 1845 he founded a company, the Chartist Cooperative Land Society, that was to accumulate money donated in small weekly amounts by poor workers, each of whom, when their total contribution reached a specified amount, would own a share in the company. The money would be used to purchase large estates that would then be divided into one- to four-acre parcels and distributed to the shareholders, who would prosper through the practice of intensive agriculture. O'Connor had even co-authored a book entitled *Practical Work on the Management of Small Farms*.

The idea that the misery of the English working class could be ameliorated by converting factory workers and miners into happy, healthy peasants did not seem as ludicrous in the 1840s as it does today. It is understandable that the oppressed “industrial slaves,” only a generation removed from the land, would have been receptive to O'Connor's Land Scheme. Due to the great authority he had earned as the movement's foremost leader, O'Connor succeeded in convincing a substantial section of the radicalized workers to give his proposals a try. In 1847 his Land Society purchased its first estate and populated it with pioneering settlers. Five more estates were added soon thereafter and a few hundred shareholders began farming their small plots.

Even if it had not been an essentially backward-looking project, O'Connor's Land Scheme was doomed from the start. As the movement gathered momentum it encountered growing hostility from the authorities, who promptly used their legal powers to derail it. In August 1848 it was officially declared illegal and although the individual proprietors were allowed to continue farming their small plots, the Chartist Land Scheme as a whole ended in bankruptcy. O'Connor had been accused by political foes of somehow using the Land Scheme to enrich himself, but the official inquiry proved the opposite: that he had gone deeply into personal debt in a futile effort to keep it afloat.

The Tragic Ending

The great revolutionary wave that swept across the European continent and crested in 1848 was

felt in England as well. The radicalization was reflected in O'Connor once again being elected to parliament, representing Nottingham, in July 1847. The British state, however, ultimately proved stable enough to weather the storm, and the Chartist movement entered a phase of inevitable decline. O'Connor's personal decline was unfortunately accelerated by mental illness.

He may have been afflicted by a congenital condition; his father had also apparently descended into insanity at the end of his life. In 1852 Feargus's increasingly bizarre behavior culminated in a tumultuous incident in the House of Lords that led to his being committed to a mental institution, where he remained until shortly before his death in August 1855. An estimated 50,000 mourners attended his funeral, an echo of the love and admiration he had formerly inspired among working people.

SEE ALSO: Chartists; European Revolutions of 1848; Newport Rising, Wales, 1839; O'Connell, Daniel (1775–1847); O'Connor, Arthur (1763–1852); Owen, Robert (1771–1858)

References and Suggested Readings

- Cole, G. D. H. (1989) *Chartist Portraits*. London: Cassell.
- Epstein, J. (1982) *The Lion of Freedom: Feargus O'Connor and the Chartist Movement, 1832–1842*. London and Sydney: Croom Helm.
- Thompson, D. (1984) *The Chartists: Popular Politics in the Industrial Revolution*. New York: Pantheon.

Ogé's Revolt, 1790

Stewart R. King

The 1790 rebellion of the free people of color of the northern province of Saint-Domingue (the modern Haiti) was the first organized outbreak of violence in what became the Haitian Revolution. The rebels were led by Vincent Ogé, a prominent free person of mixed race, living in Cap Français, Saint-Domingue, before the outbreak of the war. He was a merchant and landowner. Another important rebel leader was Jean-Baptiste Chavannes, a free mixed-race planter from the nearby canton of Sainte-Suzanne.

Ogé was the son of a white man, a small planter, and his mixed-race wife. Ogé was educated in France and trained as a goldsmith, but became a merchant and urban land developer.

By 1790 he was the most prominent free colored merchant in the city of Cap Français and one of the foremost merchants of any color.

Cap Français had a fairly large population of free people of color. Many of these people were free blacks or, if mixed-race, without many white relatives or friends. They formed a tight-knit community, tied together by shared suffering under discriminatory laws. Many of the men of this community served in the colonial militia or as rural constables, giving them contact with white officers as possible patrons but also reinforcing their separation from the wealthier mixed-race free planters, since the units were segregated by race. Ogé, though a city dweller, was closer to the wealthy planter class from which he sprang. He had many white relatives and friends, as well as business associates. He lived in a wealthy neighborhood with mostly white neighbors.

For American readers, one shocking feature of the lives of wealthy free people of color in the Americas is the relationship they had with slavery. Ogé is a remarkable example: he and his family owned more than two dozen slaves, some of whom worked in the coffee groves under difficult circumstances. In 1783 he gave his free colored housekeeper a 12-year-old girl slave, newly imported from what is now Guinea or Sierra Leone in Africa, in lieu of cash payment of two years' salary owed her. The following year he gave her a 28-year-old woman from today's Togo or Benin and her 3-year-old daughter to pay the next two years' salary. He was a merchant who participated in transatlantic trade as well as owning ships trading between ports in the Americas. Though his ships were not slave ships in the sense of carrying hundreds of slaves from African ports to the Americas, it would not be unreasonable to assume that slaves occasionally traveled on his ships from one port in the islands to another to be sold. His ships also carried the products of slave labor to North American and European markets, closing the third side of the infamous triangle trade. He was deeply involved in the economy of Saint-Domingue, a slave society. It would have been impossible for anyone of his social status and wealth not to be involved in slavery in some way. He did not appear to have any moral or ethical concerns about slavery.

Chavannes' parents were free people of mixed-race. The Chavannes family was large, as was

common with free coloreds in Saint-Domingue; Jean-Baptiste had at least three brothers and one sister who survived to adulthood. As the oldest son, after his father's death sometime between 1777 and 1783, he managed the family plantation. It was big enough to provide small but respectable farms for each of the younger children upon their marriages and have enough left over to rent for 15,000 *livres* a year in 1786, the equivalent of \$375,000 in today's terms. Chavannes does not appear to have been a very successful planter; the rental in 1786 was apparently forced on him by his creditors. The plantation had slaves, naturally – about thirty in 1786. Unlike many free colored planters, Chavannes had good relations with poorer free blacks. He often was a godfather for newly freed people or the children of poor blacks in his neighborhood. He was also a militia sergeant and built relationships both with the largely black militia non-commissioned officer corps and also with the white militia officers, one of whom rescued him when he got in financial difficulty in 1786. His militia comrades supported him in his rebellion and many of them went on to support the larger rebellion led by Toussaint Louverture.

Chavannes volunteered for the French army in 1779, persuaded by the charismatic French Admiral Count D'Estaing, who was organizing an expedition to Georgia. D'Estaing recruited more than 1,000 free colored men from the north province. Many of them were relatively poor free blacks, some with unclear titles of liberty. Few of the wealthy planter class signed up for the expedition, but Jean-Baptiste was an exception. He fought in the Savannah campaign of 1779, distinguishing himself during the free colored regiment's only major battle, covering the French retreat from the English fortifications. He returned to the colony in 1783. He and his comrades were very disappointed by the lack of response by white society to their service. They and D'Estaing had hoped that military service would help overcome prejudice against free coloreds. Neither the government nor white public opinion responded. Free people of color had experienced increasing racial prejudice since the 1760s and this would only get worse as the revolution approached. In fact, as the political situation heated up in France, Ogé, Chavannes, and his fellow wealthy free coloreds saw an opportunity not to overthrow a system based

on racial slavery, but to find a place at the top of that system for themselves. Ogé went to France to try to resolve a legal dispute related to his family's plantation as the Estates General, an ancient parliament, was being elected in 1788. The meeting of the Estates General became the spark that ignited the French Revolution, and Ogé could see that the revolutionary climate offered a chance to improve the lot of wealthy free coloreds. He thought of the free people of color, along with native-born whites, as the natural citizens of the colony. He hoped that a revolution that was calling for more democracy and the end of inherited privilege and unequal treatment of people might allow him and his class more freedom than the royal government was prepared to give them.

Ogé first approached the Club Massiac, a group of white planters living in France who had been elected to the parliament. He hoped to forge an alliance among the wealthy native-born citizens of the colony that might lead to greater autonomy and a race-neutral society. The planters rejected the plan, and Ogé turned to the Société des Amis des Noirs, an anti-slavery group. The Amis des Noirs included several parliament members who agreed to introduce a proposed law that would give voting rights to wealthy free coloreds. The proposed law was not passed, but civil rights for free people of color became the central colonial issue debated in the parliament and the French press in 1790. The rules for the election of colonial assemblies that were passed by the parliament did not mention race, specifying instead that all male citizens who paid a certain amount in taxes and were over a certain age were to be permitted to vote. That was enough for Ogé, who returned to the colony in October 1790.

Ogé had never served in the militia, as wealthy planters were able to evade service or send substitutes. However, while living in Paris he had been very much impressed by the fervor of the Parisian revolutionary National Guard. He had befriended the Marquis de Lafayette, their commander, and even obtained a commission as colonel in the guard. Upon his return to Saint-Domingue, Ogé began wearing his colonel's uniform and connected with Chavannes and other free colored militiamen. They made an attempt to put the demand for free colored voting rights before the government, sending a letter to the governor on October 21, 1790.

However, they also began to gather armed free colored men around them on a camp established in a plantation in the remote region of Grande-Rivière, in the mountains near the Spanish border. Other free colored militiamen across the colony expressed similar demands on hearing of Ogé's actions, though there was no immediate fighting anywhere else. The police, who were free people of color, would not do anything to stop the movement.

On October 27, 1790 an attempt was made by regular troops from the Cap Français garrison to arrest Ogé and Chavannes. The soldiers, who numbered only a few dozen, retreated without confronting the hundreds of armed free people of color in the camp. The next day, Ogé and his men went to all the neighboring plantations and collected their weapons, handing them out to their supporters. On October 30 a force of about 800 soldiers, militiamen, and constables from Cap Français, probably at least half free coloreds, confronted Ogé's 400 free coloreds in a battle that lasted most of the morning. The government troops were forced to withdraw to the town.

Ogé's men celebrated, but their leaders knew that the next attack would be even more powerful. They built field fortifications at the camp. The other rebel leaders, including Chavannes, encouraged Ogé to enroll slaves in his army, promising them their liberty in return for their services. Chavannes even brought 30 male slaves from his own plantation, it is said, though it is doubtful he actually owned that many slaves at the time; they may have been runaways or else the numbers have been exaggerated. Ogé refused to enroll slaves, though, even with the permission of their masters. He did not want the movement for free colored civil rights to lead to a hugely disruptive slave rebellion, though he had accepted the idea of gradual, compensated emancipation of slaves in discussions with the *Amis des Noirs* and the *Club Massiac* in Paris the year before.

When the colonial governor came in person the next day with 3,000 men and artillery, the small force at Ogé's command could not resist them. They fled into the hills, with many returning to their homes. Ogé and 24 of his closest supporters, including his four brothers, Chavannes and two of his brothers, and two free black militia sergeants, fled across the border to the Spanish side of the island. In the past, the Spanish had sheltered runaway slaves, and in later

years they would provide refuge for Toussaint Louverture's slave rebel army, but in 1790 they were trying to remain on good terms with the French and so they extradited Ogé and his men to Cap Français. Ogé was questioned by the colonial government, tried, and sentenced to death on February 21, 1791. The sentence was carried out the following day. Both leaders suffered terribly, and Ogé's cries gained the sympathy of the onlookers, including the well-known lawyer and Enlightenment figure Moreau de St.-Méry.

When the execution became known in France it provoked outrage there. The supposed crimes of Ogé and Chavannes did not seem so terrible in retrospect, as by 1792 the slaves had burned most of the sugar plantations in the north province and slaughtered hundreds of planters (and hundreds of slaves had been slaughtered in their turn). Ogé's movement did not lead to a colony-wide uprising either by free coloreds or slaves, at least not immediately. The care they took not to involve slaves appealed to moderates. The French parliament responded by passing a law on April 4, 1792 that gave equal citizenship to free people of color. The revolutionary commissioner Léger-Félicité Sonthonax was sent to the island to enforce this decree, and it was he who ultimately declared the abolition of slavery and recruited Toussaint Louverture to lead the colony's armies.

After the end of the Haitian Revolution, both Ogé and Chavannes were recognized as heroes of Haiti's struggle for independence. Ogé was a figure much more popular among the new nation's wealthy mixed-race population than among the black descendants of the slaves he refused to permit to join his movement. His movement is seen today as marking a division in Haiti's ruling class that offered the slaves an opening for successful rebellion. Chavannes is a less ambiguous figure, both because of his close relations with blacks before the war and his desire to include slaves in the movement. A prominent Haitian peasant activist has adopted his name in tribute. The experience of the pair also showed other free people of color that they had little to hope for from the white ruling class. In the end, most of the colony's free people of color supported the revolutionary forces rather than the French.

SEE ALSO: Haiti, Protest and Rebellion, 19th Century; Haiti, Revolutionary Revolts, 1790s; Haiti,

Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath; Haiti, Saint-Domingue and Revolutionary France; Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1801–1804

References and Suggested Readings

- DuBois, L. (2005) *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution*. New York: Belknap.
- King, S. (2001) *Blue Coat or Powdered Wig: Free Coloreds in Colonial Saint-Domingue*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

O'Higgins, Bernardo Riquelme (1778–1842)

C. Andrés Gamboa

Bernardo Riquelme O'Higgins was a leading figure in the Chilean independence movement. He is known as the “father of the fatherland” for his contribution to the establishment of the newly constituted free republic. Along with other American patriots, such as José de San Martín and Simón Bolívar, O'Higgins is considered a liberator of America.

Bernardo O'Higgins was born in 1778, an illegitimate son of the governor of Chile and posterior viceroy of Peru, Ambrosio O'Higgins, and the Chilean Isabel Riquelme. His father took care of his education and he studied at a Franciscan school and then at San Carlos College in Lima before completing his education in London and Cadiz. Previously known as Bernardo Riquelme, he began to use the name “O'Higgins” after his return from Europe in 1802, a year after his father's death, through the intervention of the courts. Back in Chile, he took possession of his inheritance, the *hacienda* Las Canteras. Once installed there, he was appointed mayor (1804) and then Maestre de Campo (1806), a gubernatorial title of the Spanish crown, just below captain general.

His commitment to freeing America from Spanish rule was tightly connected with his education in London. There he came to know Francisco Miranda, an active promoter of the emancipation movement financed by the British Empire, who introduced him to the idea of independence as an American issue and not just a local concern for each province of the New World. However, before the arrival of Bernardo from the Old World, a pan-American emancipation movement was already beginning to form.

In September 1810 the first National Board of government was formed. The objective of this council was to govern Chile in the name of the king and keep his authority while he was a prisoner of Napoleon. O'Higgins offered his services to the board and was appointed as one of its deputies in 1811, replacing Juan Martínez de Rozas.

In 1812, José Miguel Carrera, a member of the local aristocracy, through a coup d'état came to be chief of a new government marked by separatist intentions, which contrasted with the previous government of the National Board which was still loyal to the king. Carrera broke with Spanish authority and began an autonomist government that lasted until a second coup d'état and the patriots' defeat in the battle of Rancagua, which in 1814 reinstated the Spanish Empire with the arrival of a new governor. In Rancagua, O'Higgins and his soldiers resisted bravely, but the superiority of the monarchical forces was enough to decide the battle on behalf of the king's followers.

The triumph of the royalists forced the patriots to escape and cross the Andes to Argentina, where they formed the “liberator army.” They obtained the support of José de San Martín who planned to liberate Chile first and then march to Peru.

More than two years later, O'Higgins came back as leader of the liberator army and defeated the monarchical forces in Chacabuco on February 2, 1817. Only two days later, he and San Martín entered the capital city of Santiago in triumph. The final hour of the colonial dominion of Spain in Chile was near. The definitive encounter was on the plains of Maipú on April 5, 1818. San Martín assumed command of the troops. O'Higgins then arrived on the battlefield and once the victory was achieved they embraced each other as a signal of union in the fight against tyranny.

As supreme director of the newly proclaimed republic, appointed the day after the battle of Chacabuco, O'Higgins governed for six years. He was inclined toward military dictatorship, seeing it as a way of educating and preparing citizens to enjoy their rights and reach full emancipation. Unlike San Martín, O'Higgins was not a partisan of monarchy, and he forbade the use of shields of arms and abolished nobility titles. He also created the first Chilean navy and the Military School.

The opposition of the aristocracy to his regime and the hostility of the Catholic Church forced him out of power in 1823, and he went into exile. He went to Peru and lived in Lima until his death in 1842.

SEE ALSO: Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); Chile, People's Power; Latin America, Catholic Church and Liberation, 16th Century to Present; Venezuelan War of Independence

References and Suggested Readings

- Amunátegui, M. L. (1853) *La Dictadura de O'Higgins*. Santiago: Imprenta de Julio Belin y Cía.
- Collier, S. (1967) *Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence, 1808–1833*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Eyzaguirre, J. (1973) *Ideario y ruta de la emancipación chilena*, 4th ed. Santiago: Editorial Universitaria.
- Eyzaguirre, J. (1989) *Historia de las instituciones políticas y sociales de Chile*, 9th ed. Santiago: Editorial Universitaria.
- Martínez, M. (1848) *Memoria histórica sobre la revolución de Chile*. Valparaíso: Imprenta Europea.
- Vicuña, B. (1860) *El ostracismo del Jeneral don Bernardo O'Higgins*. Valparaíso: Imprenta y Librería del Mercurio.
- Villalobos, S. et al. (1974) *Historia de Chile*, Vol. 3. Santiago: Editorial.

Oka crisis

Robyn Bourgeois

In the summer of 1990 the police and Canadian military clashed with indigenous protestors at a blockade outside of Oka, Quebec. The standoff, which lasted 78 days and resulted in the death of a police officer, brought national and international attention to indigenous land claims in Canada. As a colonial nation, Canada has a long history of conflict with indigenous peoples over land ownership. Through land claims and treaties, federal and provincial governments have attempted to negotiate settlements with many of Canada's indigenous tribes. However, many land claims remain unresolved (particularly in British Columbia), the result of which is that indigenous and non-indigenous communities often find themselves in conflict over parcels of land.

The Mohawks of Kanesatake reserve have a history of contestation over land use in and around Oka, Quebec; however, it was the proposed expansion of a golf course that directly



Tensions between the Quebec town of Oka and the nearby Mohawks of the Kahnésatake Indian settlement erupted on July 11, 1990 over land rights. On September 1 the Canadian military moved into the settlement and surrounded the Indians. Here one of the last Mohawk warriors to hold out stares down a Canadian soldier after telling him "You're going to die today." The crisis ended on September 26 and led to the development of Canada's First Nations Policing Policy. (AFP/Getty Images)

precipitated the Oka crisis of 1990. In 1961 building began on a nine-hole golf club on land the Mohawks believed belonged to them (including a burial ground and a grove of sacred pine trees). A legal protest was launched, but by the time the case was heard, much of the land had been cleared and the golf course built. In 1977 the Kanesatake tribe filed an official land claim with the federal government for this land. After nine years and additional research, the land claim was rejected for failing to meet key criteria.

In the summer of 1989 the mayor of Oka, Jean Ouellette, announced plans to clear the sacred pine grove to expand the golf course and construct luxury condominiums. After some protests by the Mohawks, the federal government and the municipality of Oka agreed to undertake

negotiations with the Kanesatake tribe. With talks going nowhere, the Mohawks established a barricade blocking access to the golf course on March 11, 1990. Throughout the spring, the three parties continued negotiations, but the municipality headed to court to obtain an order to remove the blockade. On June 29, 1990 an injunction was issued for the blockade to be removed. The Mohawks ignored the injunction and the barricade remained in place.

On July 11, 1990 Mayor Ouelette asked the Sûreté de Québec (the provincial police) to intervene. After some failed discussion, the police fired tear gas and flash bang grenades at the blockade. Though it is unclear who shot first, a gun battle began, which resulted in the death of a police officer. Unable to control the violence, the police abandoned their position and retreated.

Natives from across Canada and the US began to join the Kanesatake protest, and additional blockades were established around Quebec, most notably the Kahnawake blockade of the Mercier Bridge in Montreal. Indeed, a special assembly of 100 chiefs from across Canada was held at Kahnawake, and they agreed to support the Kanesatake in their protest.

Negotiations continued during the standoff. On July 15 a tentative deal was reached, with the federal government agreeing to give the land to the Kanesatake reserve, withdraw the police, and hold a public inquiry into the crisis; however, the deal fell through on a technicality. Tensions rose as the standoff continued. The Mohawks and the police played games of intimidation with one another. Media coverage and frustration over road blockades fueled racial prejudices, with non-indigenous residents facing off against indigenous protesters. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police were brought in to assist, but like the provincial police, they were soon overwhelmed by the situation.

On August 14 Quebec premier Robert Bourassa, believing that the police had lost control of the situation, asked the federal government for the assistance of the Canadian military in ending the blockade. Though Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was hesitant to deploy troops, it was the right of Premier Bourassa to ask for the assistance. On the morning of August 20, 33 Canadian troops were deployed to Oka. Three of the smaller blockades leading to the major blockade quickly fell to the military. Trip lines and

razor wire were set up around the major blockade site to contain the Mohawks, and helicopters performed surveillance of the blockade site.

Despite increasing tensions and the presence of the military, negotiations continued. In late August the federal government agreed to purchase the contested land and hand it over to the Kanesatake reserve as soon as the blockades ended. On August 29 the Kahnawake ended their sister blockade in Montreal. Negotiations continued with the Kanesatake, who ended their blockade on September 26. With a ceremony, the Mohawk laid their weapons down and agreed to end the hostilities.

The Oka crisis resulted in a number of changes for all those involved. Internal conflict among the Mohawk during the crisis resulted in changes to tribal governance, including democratic election of governing members. Non-indigenous owned land within the Kanesatake reserve was bought up to solidify the Mohawk land base. For the media, who had flocked to Oka to document the crisis, the events clearly demonstrated the power of media to impact the destiny of an event. Indeed, media coverage of the Oka crisis has been hotly debated by journalists, academics, and others. The crisis led the federal government to produce the First Nations Policing Policy. In response to the failure of policing at Oka, this policy laid out culturally appropriate practices to improve relations between policing agencies and indigenous communities throughout Canada.

With many land claims yet to be resolved, Aboriginal communities across Canada have used Oka-type blockades to draw attention to land issues. Various tribes throughout British Columbia have used blockades around popular ski resorts to draw attention to their land claims. In Caledonia, Ontario, the Mohawks of Six Nations have maintained a blockade of a proposed subdivision development since February 2006. Recently, Mohawk activist Shawn Brant from the Tyendinaga reserve (near the Bay of Quinte, Ontario) was arrested and charged for his role in leading blockades of the Canadian national railway.

SEE ALSO: Canada, Indigenous Resistance; Riel, Louis (1844–1885)

References and Suggested Readings

Goodleaf, D. (1995) *Entering the Warzone: A Mohawk Perspective on Resisting Invasions*. Penticton: Theytus Books.

- Grenier, M. (1994) Native Indians in the English-Language Press: The Case of the Oka Crisis. *Media, Culture and Society* 16, 2 (April): 313–36.
- Obomsawin, A. (1993) *Kanehsatake: 270 Years of Resistance*. Toronto: National Film Board of Canada.
- Westra, L. (1999) Environmental Racism and the First Nations of Canada: Terrorism at Oka. *Journal of Social Philosophy* 30, 1: 103–24.
- York, G. (1999) *People of the Pines: The Warriors and the Legacy of Oka*. Toronto: McArthur.

Oke-Ogun Uprising

Mofeyisra Olumatoyin Ojoawo

Prior to the advent of colonial rule, the system of government prevailing among contemporary Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria was rooted in reciprocity between rulers and subjects. A standard system of accepted forms of checks and balances prevailed. Within this system, many towns in the Yoruba kingdoms were considered superior politically and received homage from lesser villages. Colonialism set the normative system of stratification into disarray, bringing into the system several changes which were alien and not accepted by the people of the region. The introduction of indirect rule and the institution of a new court system after the amalgamation of Nigeria, denying and marginalizing some chiefs, resulted in the uprising of Oke-Ogun (especially at Okeho and Iseyin) between 1916 and 1917. The uprising was brutally suppressed.

Before colonialism in Yorubaland it was clear that each Yoruba town was in a way a kingdom, though many of these kingdoms still acknowledged their subservience to other powerful kingdoms and paid regular tribute to them. Many towns in Yorubaland acknowledged the sovereignty of the Oyo kingdom, but this did not prevent them from being in control of their own communities. They were at liberty to a large extent and they also maintained their authority. However, the advent and spread of colonial administration toward the end of the nineteenth century and the subsequent amalgamations of Nigeria by Lugard in 1914 meant that many of these chiefs and/or kingdoms were divested of their powers, while the Alaafin of Oyo was over-empowered by the colonial administration, to the dissatisfaction of the people. This deprivation amounted to cutting away the chiefs' sources of livelihood. They were therefore at loggerheads with the new socioeconomic and political

structures and rebelled against the system that had belittled them and led them into poverty. This was one of the causes of the 1916 Oke-Ogun Uprising.

Another cause stems from the Alaafin's imposition of Red Cross Funds on the people, which was misunderstood as a tax. The Alaafin of Oyo enjoyed special privileges and was seen as a puppet overlord whose office was used to relegate Oke-Ogun chiefs and exploit the people. The uprising broke out in Okeho, a large settlement in the Oke-Ogun area, in October 1916 and led to the killing of the Onjo (the king) of Okeho and his household by Okeho Baloguns (warrior class) due to his supposed support for the Alaafin. His palace was also subsequently burnt. It is important to note that the king was rather unpopular and the chiefs and townsmen had repeatedly asked for his removal since 1909. They were oftentimes repressed by the British administration in Nigeria. After the brutal killing of the Onjo, the furious warlords also descended on African clerks, who fled but were eventually caught and killed. Government property, including court rooms, telegraph offices, and rest houses in the district, were also destroyed. The revolting warlords also attempted to blow up the bridge leading to Oyo but were unsuccessful. The revolt subsequently spread to Iseyin, another Oke-Ogun town, where a chief and some native officials were also killed on October 21, 1916.

The backbone of the rebels was broken when government troops mercilessly suppressed the rebellion and finally gained victory by killing significant numbers of war chiefs, who represented a set of people held in awe and high esteem in Yoruba folklore. Many followers of these chiefs were disorganized, and by the beginning of November 1916 the rebellion had been crushed after the killing of over 200 men. Thereafter, a number of arrests were made in a raid jointly carried out by the Alaafin's men, British officials, and soldiers. Ring leaders, chiefs, and commoners including the Aseyin (the king of Iseyin) were arrested, tried by a court martial, and sentenced to death. One of the shocking results of the uprising was the order given by Lord Lugard that the sentences be carried out publicly to serve as a warning to other rebels, without any consideration for Yoruba culture, which forbade the king being killed in such manner. In addition, delegates were invited from all over Oyo province to witness the killing, to put fear into them.

The uprising resulted from the indirect rule and draconian style of administration of the colonial rulers and the Alaafin, which set him against his own people. The scars of the rebellion still linger even in contemporary Yorubaland, as the Oke-Ogun area in present-day Oyo state is still marginalized in sociopolitical terms, with a rundown infrastructure in spite of its status as the food-basket of Oyo state and surrounding areas. Furthermore, Oke-Ogun kings and chiefs remain subservient to the Alaafin of Oyo, who hold consenting authority over them and therefore remain the overlords of Oke-Ogun.

SEE ALSO: Agbekoya Peasant Uprising and Rebellion, 1968–1969; Ife-Modakeke Conflict; Nigeria, Protest and Revolution, 20th Century; Revolution, Dialectics of; Yoruba Wars, 19th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Adediran, B. (1998) Ibadan Imperialism. In G. O. Ogunremi (Ed.), *Ibadan: A Historical, Cultural and Socioeconomic Study of an African City*. Lagos: Oluyole Club Lagos, pp. 37–53.
- Fadipe, N. A. (1970) *The Sociology of the Yoruba*. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press.
- Johnson, S. (1921) *The History of the Yorubas*. Lagos: CSS Bookshops.
- Osuntokun, A. (1971) Disaffection and Revolt in Nigeria During the First World War, 1914–1918. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 2: 171–92.
- Raji, A. O. & Danmole, H. O. (2004) Traditional Government. In N. S. Lawal, N. N. O. Sadiku, & P. A. Dopamu (Eds.), *Understanding Yoruba Life and Culture*. Trenton: Africa World Press, pp. 259–70.

Oneida Perfectionist Utopians

Richard Goff

One of the more fascinating utopian experiments of the nineteenth century was the Oneida Community of New York. The “Perfectionist” religious group, organized along the teachings of John Humphrey Noyes, intrigued observers and scholars with their practice of complex marriage and communal living. Founded in 1848, the Oneida Community’s membership peaked at 300 in 1878 before dissolving in 1881, eventually becoming Oneida Limited, a popular flatware manufacturer.

The Oneida experiment was the brainchild of John Humphrey Noyes, son of Vermont

congressman John Noyes. During the peak of the Second Great Awakening, John Humphrey experienced conversion, coming to the conclusion that God demanded true spiritual perfection rather than good works. Noyes’s Perfectionism prompted him to reexamine all aspects of his life and the world around him. Of particular interest to Noyes was the issue of sex. Noyes viewed pregnancy and childbearing to be the greatest burden that women endured, and an unfair one. Nevertheless, procreation was necessary and the sex act enjoyable. Noyes concluded that one’s attitude towards sex was more important than the act itself and that sexual impulses were essentially good, when channeled correctly. Noyes publicly argued for the creation of a holy Christian community based on spiritual love, sexual expression, and communal values.

Noyes and his followers experimented with what would become the tenets of the Oneida community in the early 1840s before establishing the community in 1848. Central to the community’s beliefs was the practice of male continence. In this way, couples could enjoy sexual activity to a degree, but the complications of having children were avoided. Noyes thought that children should be a conscious choice of the individuals involved, not an inevitable outcome of sexual intercourse. In order to avoid selfish love, monogamous marriage was eliminated in favor of “complex marriage,” where individuals were free to pursue sexual relationships with anyone in the community. Therefore, sexual activity and “free love” could liberate women and provide greater equality between the genders.

The second component of the Oneida community was called mutual criticism. In groups of ten to fifteen, individuals would freely discuss each other’s faults and characteristics. The purpose was to build a sense of community and to establish social norms. Noyes also hoped that mutual criticism would diffuse tension and allow for personal growth, ensuring the long-term viability of the community.

Noyes’s perfectionism was based on his particular interpretation of the Bible and Christian teachings. Noyes believed that Christ had returned in AD 70 and thus humankind was free of the worldly moral prescriptions of the Bible. Noyes hoped to replicate a “Heaven on Earth” in preparation for the Lord’s final return. Following Jesus’ assertion that there is no marriage in heaven (Matthew 22:30), Noyes believed

“complex marriage” to be the closest worldly institution to Christ’s mandate. Noyes saw this as restoring a divine relationship between the sexes. Although Noyes still maintained that women were inferior to men, they were generally free to participate in all aspects of the community and functioned equally with men. Children were raised communally by both men and women and all members were encouraged to develop their particular capacities to the fullest extent possible.

Additionally, Noyes used apostolic communism to establish the proper economic and social relations in the community. Social life took place at the Mansion House, which was comprised of lawns, trees, a library, and communal sitting and sleeping rooms. Initially, the group attempted to sustain itself through collective farming. They soon expanded into sawmilling, blacksmithing, furniture production, and the manufacturing of silk and animal traps, the latter becoming the economic backbone of the community. A complex layer of committees administered all aspects of life. Also, in contrast to many Christian communes, members were allowed, and encouraged, to engage in a wide variety of recreational activities.

Like many utopian communities, Oneida depended heavily upon the leadership and teachings of its professed leader, which contributed to its undoing. The charismatic and spiritual leadership of Noyes had always been central to the group’s cohesion, but as Noyes aged, no leader with similar qualities surfaced. As the Perfectionist fervor of the founding cohort was not felt by the younger generation, more members came to question the practices of the community. Also, the community began to experiment with selective breeding, in theory to produce children with the best qualities, but which generated hard feelings among many of the members who were not selected to procreate. And finally, public outcry against the unconventional sex practices of the community eventually forced Noyes to flee to Canada to avoid criminal prosecution. The community disbanded in 1881, forming the joint-stock company Oneida Limited.

The Oneida community continues to fascinate primarily due to their unconventional sex practices. This should not overshadow the relative success of the community and its interesting attempts to reconcile the desire for practical communal living with sexual enjoyment. Whereas communities like the Shakers and Rappites

solved the problem of jealousy and “selfish love” by doing away with sex, Oneida went in the opposite direction, embracing sex, but doing away with marriage.

SEE ALSO: Amana Inspirationist Utopians; Cooperative Commonwealth; Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony; Icaria Utopian Community; New Harmony; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Shakers Utopian Community; Utopian Communities, United States; Utopian Intentional Communities; Wright, Frances “Fanny” (1795–1852)

References and Suggested Readings

- Foster, L. (1981) *Religion and Sexuality: Three American Communal Experiments of the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hayden, D. (1976) *Seven American Utopias: The Architecture of Communitarian Socialism, 1790–1975*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Jacoby, R. (1999) *The End of Utopia*. New York: Basic Books.
- Klaw, S. (1993) *Without Sin: The Life and Death of the Oneida Community*. New York: Penguin.

Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP)

John Clarke

From the late 1980s through the first decade of the twentieth century, the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP) has mobilized communities suffering under neoliberal policies of the Canadian and provincial government. The organization’s work is dominated by two major political factors – countering the aggressive agenda of corporate capital in dismantling the social infrastructure and the growth in poverty. OCAP sees itself as filling a decisive lack of opposition to the neoliberal attack in view of the ineffective challenge mounted by labor and older social movements rooted in earlier forms of compromise.

Initial protests were held against the Ontario Liberal government of David Peterson, the province’s premier in 1989, who responded slowly in expanding social entitlement during a period of economic crisis. Economic restructuring had undermined the industrial sector, unemployment insurance had been eroded, and more people were forced onto welfare. The

Peterson government viewed the mounting cost of provincial income support with alarm, but was equally concerned about the implications of forcing so many into a system of legislated poverty.

Peterson's response was to establish a show-piece public inquiry, the Social Assistance Review Committee. It was a stalling tactic but it created public debate and raised expectations. Its report called for reforms and increases in welfare rates. Unions of unemployed workers in Toronto and London, Ontario were demanding a 25 percent increase in social assistance rates and began to call for major action to press for serious improvements for those on welfare. A range of social organizations, trade unions, and the Provincial Caucus of the left-leaning New Democratic Party (NDP) joined to organize a March Against Poverty.

In the spring of 1989, three groups of marchers traveled over a two-week period from Ottawa, Sudbury, and Windsor to converge on the Ontario legislature in Toronto. The march drew large-scale support along its routes and a crowd of some 4,000 to the culminating rally at Queen's Park in Toronto. The level of support influenced the government in increasing welfare rates by approximately 9 percent. Many who had participated felt that a long-term anti-poverty coalition was necessary and possible.

The new organization had to make an immediate choice about the direction it would take. Two models were advanced at the founding conference in November 1990. On the one hand, some wanted a "concerned citizens" organization to recruit people across the social spectrum to educate the public and lobby governments. The opposing idea was a militant organization of the poor to mobilize resistance in low-income communities. The debate was extremely sharp, but the notion of a poor people's organization won over the majority and OCAP came into being.

As OCAP was formed, the first NDP government in Ontario took office. Bob Rae and his Agenda for People were voted in following an election marked by social mobilization against the Liberals. The NDP spent a short while vacillating and then veered sharply to the right, creating a difficult environment for organizing as people had placed great hopes in the new government and were demoralized by its betrayal. Slowly, OCAP sought to challenge this backsliding regime as it abandoned promises, leading to a new movement.

The NDP moved from its pledge to "end the need for food banks" to freezing welfare rates, hiring dozens of investigators to crack down on welfare recipients. OCAP held demonstrations to confront government leaders and took over a public meeting called by the social services minister to promote "welfare cops." After the minister fled, OCAP led the meeting instead. OCAP began to focus on mobilizing to defend individuals and families facing attack. Mass delegations were brought to welfare offices. Landlords were picketed, immigration offices were invaded to defend people facing deportation, and OCAP engaged in what it called "direct action casework."

The election of the Mike Harris Tory regime in 1995 marked a turning point. A hard-right government now held power, imposing a "Common Sense Revolution" on the poor with particular fierceness. One million people on welfare had their benefits cut by 21.6 percent, social housing construction was terminated, the minimum wage was frozen, and tenants' rights were eliminated as homelessness and poverty soared. OCAP began mobilizing, marching on Queen's Park and from Toronto's poor community of Regent Park to the mansion of the lieutenant governor of Ontario in affluent Rosedale, who was about to sign the order to slash welfare rates.

After some hesitation, a movement against Harris emerged. Unions and social movements combined for the Ontario Days of Action. Citywide strikes and protests were held that showed the power of workers and the anger of communities. However, the bureaucracy remained in control, and the Days of Action did not become a province-wide challenge. Harris rode them out, knowing that the Labor leaders feared serious social mobilization more than they disliked his government.

When the Days of Action ended, OCAP continued fighting, resisting the attacks on the homeless with two mass delegations to the federal parliament that helped increase spending on emergency shelters and prevent closures of homeless hostels. OCAP occupied a downtown park to demand provision for the homeless and an end to police harassment. For four days OCAP held the park until a massive police mobilization broke it up. The level of support in the homeless community, however, was expanded by this action, including a huge feast provided by allies from the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte.

On June 15, 2000, OCAP brought 1,500 people to the Ontario legislature to demand that it receive a delegation of the homeless. The police used horses and riot police to clear the grounds and a pitched battle followed in which dozens on both sides were injured. Dozens of arrests followed and serious charges were laid. The media denounced the “Queen’s Park Riot,” but support continued to increase in poor communities.

OCAP continued to organize a fight against the Tories that culminated on October 16, 2001, when 2,500 people marched into Toronto’s financial district and disrupted its operations in defiance of a massive police mobilization. Harris stepped down and his replacement would lead the Tories into a defeat in the 2003 election by a Liberal regime, under Dalton McGuinty, dedicated to reducing the political temperature while quietly consolidating the work of the Tories.

By the time McGuinty took office, welfare rates had lost some 40 percent of their spending power. OCAP held several actions to demand an increase, including a raid on an upscale grocery store, removing food and distributing it in a poor neighborhood, and then took the bill to McGuinty’s office.

OCAP used a provision within the welfare regulations called the “Special Diet,” under which a medical provider could fill in a form giving a person on assistance up to \$250 a month for food deemed medically necessary. This provision was largely unknown and, in any case, welfare offices would simply reject applications. OCAP disseminated information about the benefit and organized medical clinics to enable people to obtain it. In 2005, a huge campaign got underway that saw thousands pass through clinics and a sustained mobilization to challenge welfare offices that blocked the applications. Some 8,000 attended OCAP clinics and other organizations held their own. Word of mouth in poor communities, however, took the situation much further. In 2005, spending on the Special Diet doubled and an additional \$40 million went to low-income households.

At the end of the year, the Liberals brought out a new form that limited the Special Diet, but OCAP continued to hold clinics to provide benefits to poor families. OCAP mobilized specifically low-income and immigrant communities, including the Somali community. Support was strong enough to form a body called OCAP

Women of Etobicoke led by Somali women, which continues to stand against racism and poverty confronting that community.

The agenda of social cutbacks has combined in Toronto with a process of upscale redevelopment that sharpens the attack considerably. By the end of the first decade of the 2000s, OCAP continued mobilizing the homeless to confront a drive to force them from the central area of the city through failing to provide basic repairs for public housing in Toronto.

OCAP has sought to go beyond the role of an “activist” organization, building a Toronto poor people’s movement rooted in the communities under attack and redefining the notion of resistance to neoliberal capitalism, which has worsened poverty in Ontario.

SEE ALSO: Canada, Law and Public Protest: History; On-to-Ottawa Trek

References and Suggested Readings

- Piven, F. F. & Cloward, R. (1978) *Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How they Fail*. New York: Vintage.
- Shantz, J. (2003) Fighting to Win: The Ontario Coalition Against Poverty. In Notes from Nowhere (Ed.), *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism*. London: Verso, pp. 134–9.

On-to-Ottawa Trek

Molly Pulver Ungar

The On-to-Ottawa Trek began on June 3, 1935 and ended with the Regina Riot on July 1. It was one of the flashpoints of social discontent in Canada at the height of the economic and unemployment crisis during the Great Depression of 1929–39. Although the participants in the trek did not achieve their specific goals, this event is considered an important factor in the defeat of the Conservatives in the election of 1935. The legacy of the trek is also linked to the subsequent closing of federal relief camps and amendments to the Criminal Code. The experience of the trek heightened labor and left-wing solidarity while showing that the most effective avenue for social action in the future would be representation in government.

Over 1,300 unemployed men, most of them inmates of government-run relief camps in

British Columbia, boarded east-bound freight trains in Vancouver with the intention of traveling to Ottawa. The men had gone on strike two months earlier, refusing to participate in a federal program of make-work projects for 20 cents per day plus meagre room and board. Organized by the communist-inspired Workers' Unity Party and led by Arthur "Slim" Evans, the strikers wanted to explain their grievances to Conservative Prime Minister W. B. Bennett in the nation's capital, and to present their demands for improved conditions in the camps, work for fair wages, and increased funds for relief.

Initially, the federal government promised not to intervene, but soon it became involved in disputes with municipal and provincial authorities over the issue of who would bear responsibility for feeding and sheltering the men. As the freight train made its way through Alberta and toward Saskatchewan, more men joined, and the trek attracted supporters from the public and organized groups. The government's anxiety grew, and representatives increasingly expressed the conviction that the trek was a communist-led revolutionary movement meant to overthrow the country's legally elected authorities. By June 11, the federal government decided that the trek would be forcibly halted in Regina with the aid of local police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP); the railway companies immediately agreed not to carry trekkers past Regina.

When the 50-car freight arrived in Regina, it carried about 2,000 men who were greeted by thousands of well-wishers and sympathizers, but who were barred from proceeding further. After fruitless negotiations with two federal cabinet ministers, the trekkers agreed to send a delegation of eight men to Ottawa for a face-to-face meeting with the prime minister. This acrimonious, one-hour encounter solved nothing and strengthened the positions of each side: the federal government remained adamant that the men should return to relief camps, and the trekkers continued in their assumption that they would proceed to Ottawa.

The week that followed the June 26 return of the trekker delegation to Regina was filled with uncertainty and confusion. Many possibilities were discussed as options became fewer; rallies and demonstrations were held to raise money for food, and the trek leadership offered to end the

journey if they were allowed to leave Regina. However, the RCMP insisted that the men first go to a holding camp outside the city. Arthur Evans and a small party in private vehicles even attempted to cross the border into Manitoba, but were turned back.

On the evening of July 1, a national holiday, the trekkers organized a fundraising rally in Market Square, drawing between 1,500 and 2,000 city residents as well as the unemployed marchers. As the first speaker began his address, a whistle blew and about 500 RCMP and Regina police armed with baseball bats and truncheons rushed to arrest four of the trek's leaders. A five-hour battle resulted as trekkers fought police with rocks and bricks in Market Square and adjoining city streets. Police used tear gas and finally firearms to end the confrontation. There were 120 arrests, and an equal number sent to hospital with injuries; one plain-clothes detective died, beaten to death. Authorities as well as trekkers recoiled from the violence and four days later the federal government allowed the unemployed to leave Regina on passenger trains, at the government's expense. During the trials that followed, mass protests in favor of the trekkers were held in cities across Canada, and perhaps contributed to the relative leniency of the sentencing: eight of those arrested received prison sentences of up to 14 months. At the completion of the trials, the provincially appointed Regina Riot Inquiry Commission began investigations, and released its findings in May of 1936.

The Commission's report established the first interpretation of the meaning and significance of the events of July 1. It concluded that the actions of the federal government, the RCMP, and the Regina police were justifiable and without blame, while Arthur Evans and the trekkers were accused of instigating the riot with the help of communist agitators, and of plotting to overthrow the Canadian government. About 40 years passed before scholars began to reexamine the trek and the Regina Riot, in light of emerging first-hand accounts and increasing interest in labor and left-wing history. New interpretations of the events of the summer of 1935 point to an authoritative, intransigent Canadian state, unwilling to consider the welfare of citizens caught in hard times. Contemporary scholars have argued that if the contempt of the police toward the unemployed had been restrained,

or their eagerness for confrontation had been discouraged, the riot could have been avoided. The image of the Regina Riot has therefore changed from a trekker riot to a police riot.

SEE ALSO: Canada, Labor Protests; Canada, Law and Public Protest: History; Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP); Regina Riot; Unemployed Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Bright, D. (1997) The State, the Unemployed and the Communist Party in Calgary, 1930–5. *Canadian Historical Review* 78 (4): 537–65.
- Brown, L. (1987) *When Freedom Was Lost: The Unemployed, the Agitator and the State*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Howard, V. (1985) “*We Were the Salt of the Earth*”: *The On-to-Ottawa Trek and the Regina Riot*. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center.
- Liversedge, R. (1973) *Recollections of the On-to-Ottawa Trek*. Ed. V. Howard. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
- Waiser, B. (2003) *All Hell Can't Stop Us: The On-to-Ottawa Trek and Regina Riot*. Calgary: Fifth House.

Ortega, Daniel (b. 1945)

Robert Sierakowski

Daniel Ortega Saavedra was a guerilla *comandante* of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) who served as the president of Nicaragua on two occasions, most recently being elected in 2006. Born in La Libertad, Ortega was the son of a former collaborator of Augusto César Sandino, the nationalist guerilla leader who fought against the US occupation of Nicaragua. Ortega attended the best private schools in Managua, where he and his younger brothers were involved with Christian organizing and Bible lessons in slums. From his teenage years, Ortega was involved with political organizing against the Somoza regime, finding himself arrested on numerous occasions. He entered the law program at the University of Central America, only to drop out to focus on anti-regime activities and join the FSLN, a leftist guerilla organization that modeled itself upon the example of the Cuban Revolution.

In 1967 he played a role in the assassination of Gonzalo Lacayo, the infamous regime torturer, and was captured and jailed for seven years. In December 1974, a Sandinista commando team took a large number of Somoza allies hostage, and

Ortega was freed in the prisoner exchange. With the Sandinistas split along tactical lines, he and his brother Humberto became the leaders of the *Tercerista* (the “Third Way,” the insurrectionist faction of the FSLN). His younger brother Camilo was killed in the 1978 rebellion in Monimbó, while during the Final Offensive of 1979, Ortega served as a *comandante* in the northern front.

When the revolutionaries came to power on July 19, 1979, Ortega became the most public face of the new government, serving on both the Junta of National Reconstruction and the National Directorate of the FSLN. His brother Humberto headed up the Sandinista Popular Army at the same time. In 1984, Daniel became the presidential candidate for the Sandinistas, winning 65 percent of the vote. In his role as president of Nicaragua, Ortega was forced to confront the US government of Ronald Reagan, which attempted through military, political, and economic means to overthrow the Revolution. With spiraling inflation and an incredibly unpopular military draft blamed on Ortega, he lost a 1990 presidential election to Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, whose candidacy was backed by the US.

Ortega ran again for the presidency, unsuccessfully, in 1996 and 2001, before winning again in 2006. His stepdaughter's allegations of two decades of sexual abuse further damaged support for Ortega among Sandinistas. His control over the FSLN political party and willingness to form pacts with the right have raised many eyebrows. As he returned to office in 2007, there was widespread skepticism that the revolutionary spark of Daniel Ortega had long ago been extinguished.

SEE ALSO: Fonseca, Carlos (1936–1976); Martí, Farabundo (1893–1932); Nicaraguan Revolution, 1970s–1980s; Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN); Sandino, Augusto César (1895–1934)

References and Suggested Readings

- Arias, P. (1980) *Nicaragua: Revolución. Relatos de combatientes del Frente Sandinista*. Mexico City: Editores Siglo XXI.
- Borge, T. et al. (1982) *Sandinistas Speak: Speeches, Writings, and Interviews with the Leaders of Nicaragua's Revolution*. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Ortega Saavedra, H. (2004) *La epopeya de la insurrección*. Managua: LEA Grupo Ed.

Ortiz, Fernando (1881–1969)

Rhawn Garrick Jooste

Fernando Ortiz was a Cuban musicologist, lawyer, ethnologist, philosopher, and writer considered the third discoverer of Cuba, due to his research into Cuba's African heritage, and the disseminator of a transcultural Cuban identity. His work centers on Afro-Cuban folklore and music. He founded the Sociedad del Folklore Cubano (1923) and the Sociedad de Estudios Afrocubanos (1937), as well as periodicals such as *Revista de Administración Teórica y Práctica del Estado, la Provincia y el Municipio* (1912), *Archivos del Folklore* (1924), *Surco* (1930), and *Ultra* (1936). However, his main repute stems from his publications engaging with both religious and non-religious Afro-Cuban musicology, sociology, law, and folklore. His work ranges from critiques and jurisprudence to ethnology and linguistics.

Ortiz escaped the Ten Year War in Cuba with his family, moving to the Balearic Island of Menorca. He relocated to Spain, where he earned a BA from the University of Barcelona (1895) and completed his studies in penal law at the University of Havana (1895–9). HE returned to Barcelona for his law degree (1900) and finally achieved a doctorate in law at Madrid University (1901). He returned to Havana and received the title of Doctor of Civil and Public Law (1902). He was in the Cuban diplomatic service from 1903 to 1906. From 1906 he was district attorney for Havana and assistant professor at the School of Public Law at Havana University. He exerted influence over Cuban cultural events as a member of the Grupo Minorista.

His interest in musicology originated in his student days; he was a self-taught musician and an authority on Cuban folklore. Initially, he specialized in racial positivism of penal law. His research furthered the recognition of the influence of transculturation, a cultural change induced by foreign cultural elements, within the formation of the Cuban identity, as described in his book *Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y del azúcar* (1940).

Ortiz taught summer courses at Havana University covering political science, law, and Cuban ethnography. During these lectures the next

generation of ethnologists – such as Argeliers León, María Teresa Linares, and Isaac Barreal – were introduced to his ideas that informed their work. He created his own cultural language clarifying Cuban identity. These neologisms denote a vernacular language elucidating Cuba in a Cuban way. This identity was not insular but a sensation of belonging to the land, *Cubanidad* – a part of the state – which Ortiz transforms into *Cubania*, a state of mind, and a will to belong to what is available for all.

Ortiz's first book, *Hampa Cuba: Los Negros bruños*, dealt with the underworld of Cuba, and is considered a milestone in Afro-Cuban cultural studies. He developed a theory calling for the incarceration of all “black” criminals for their primitivism and advocated the banning of their religion. From this early beginning, arguing for racial positivism, Ortiz reached the conclusion in his 1945 essay *The Fraud of Race* that race itself constituted a xenophobic terminology. Thereafter, he argued in opposition to racial discrimination. He finally championed the African distinctiveness in Cuba and is the originator of the term *Afrocubano*.

SEE ALSO: Cuba, Anti-Racist Movement and the Partido Independiente de Color; Cuba, Struggle for Independence from Spain, 1868–1898; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Martí, José (1853–1895) and the Partido Revolucionario Cubano

References and Suggested Readings

- Font Mauricio, A. & Quiroz, A. W. (Eds.) (2004) *Cuban Counterpoints: The Legacy of Fernando Ortiz*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Perez, L. A. (1999) *On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Rodriguez-Mangual, E. M. (Ed.) (2004) *Lydia Cabrera and the Construction of an Afro-Cuban Cultural Identity (Envisioning Cuba)*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Ōsugi Sakae (1885–1923)

David G. Nelson

Ōsugi Sakae, Japanese anarchist intellectual leader, was a prolific writer and translator of the works of anarchists including Kropotkin, Bakunin, and Goldman. Born in Shikoku, Ōsugi attended

Nagoya Cadet School until his expulsion for disorderly conduct in 1901. Thereafter he moved to Tokyo to attend middle school, where he buried himself in his studies and embarked on a spiritual journey, ultimately turning to anarchism after his mother's death. Anarchist Kōtoku Shūsui discovered Ōsugi and recruited him as a contributor for Kōtoku's paper, the *Heimin shimbun*. Ōsugi eventually became central to the Japanese anarchist movement as an ardent, vocal activist.

The years 1906 to 1910 were formative; Ōsugi spent much of this time imprisoned for press law violations and participation in demonstrations. Ōsugi served two years after the 1908 Red Flag Incident, in which he was arrested for arguing with police over the display of red flags inscribed with anarchist slogans. In prison he learned several European languages and became well-read in sciences and political thought. In addition, Ōsugi avoided implication in the 1910 High Treason Incident when a foiled plot to assassinate Emperor Meiji served as pretext for the execution of 12 anarchists, including Kōtoku and his ex-wife Kanno Suga. After this tragic event, Ōsugi foreswore the use of violent tactics in his attacks on Japan's sociopolitical system. Through his writing, Ōsugi assumed a leading role in the anarchist movement. Police efforts to silence him were futile; when they shut down one of a series of periodicals, Ōsugi merely published another, keeping the movement in the forefront of public awareness.

Ōsugi's translations of western anarchist literature shaped not only the anarchist movement in Japan, but also his personal life. Enamored with egoism and free love embedded in the literature he translated, the married Ōsugi carried on an affair with anarchist Kamichika Ichiko. In 1916, he also moved in with feminist anarchist writer Itō Noe. While Itō shared Ōsugi's views on free love, the other two women did not – his wife divorced him and Kamichika attempted to kill him.

Through correspondence and his continued translation work, Ōsugi kept the Japanese anarchist movement in close contact with larger world events. Invited to participate in the 1923 IWA meeting in Berlin, he smuggled himself out of Japan in order to attend. In transit, however, he attended a May Day rally in France where authorities arrested and subsequently deported him. Two months later, Ōsugi's career came to

a tragic end. Using the ensuing turmoil of the 1923 Tokyo earthquake as justification, police arrested several political activists, including Ōsugi and Itō. Likely under orders from government superiors, police strangled Ōsugi and Itō in their cells.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Gender; Anarchism, Japan; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Goldman, Emma (1869–1940); Itō Noe; (1895–1923); Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921)

References and Suggested Readings

- Garcia, V. (2000) *Three Japanese Anarchists: Kotoku, Osugi, and Yamaga*. London: Kate Sharpley Library.
- Ōsugi, S. (1992) *The Autobiography of Ōsugi Sakae*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Stanley, T. A. (1982) *Ōsugi Sakae, Anarchist in Taishō Japan: The Creativity of the Ego*. Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University.

Owen, Robert (1771–1858)

Christian A. Griggs

Robert Owen was a nineteenth-century reformer, spiritualist, and utopian socialist who believed a person's character was the product of their environment. Known as the founder of socialist ideals in Britain, throughout his life he strived to improve the condition of the working class during the earliest stages of the Industrial Revolution.

Owen was born in Newtown, Montgomeryshire in Wales to parents of humble origins and experienced a happy childhood in his large family. He excelled in school, showing a love of reading, but his formal instruction ended prematurely when sent to work at age nine. He found employment in the cloth industry, initially as the apprentice of a draper in Stamford, Lincolnshire before taking jobs in London and then Manchester. Owen was educated in industry and business and showed potential, in 1792 taking a position as factory manager for Peter Drinkwater in Manchester, overseeing 500 employees at a salary of £300 per year. The factory prospered under his guidance, known for the quality of its thread and efficiency of its workers. By 1796 Owen was an established businessman and joined the Manchester Board of Health and the Literary and Philosophical Society,

placing him in contact with humanitarians helping him to develop ideas for reform.

In 1798 Owen traveled to the mill of New Lanark in Glasgow and met with the owner, David Dale. The next year, he and a group of partners purchased the factory for £60,000 and Owen married Dale's daughter, Caroline. It was at New Lanark that Owen would establish his reputation as a socialist. Owen began managing the factory on January 1, 1800 and immediately introduced a system of reform. His years toiling and then managing industry gave Owen awareness of working-class misery, and he thought he could rescue workers from their wretched conditions through changing their surroundings. He introduced an improved working environment, reducing reliance on child labor, decreasing hours, and rewarding worker achievement. He then sought to improve workers' lives outside the factory through establishing schools, constructing habitable housing, making available quality food at lower prices, and assessing fines for immoral behavior. The reforms improved worker lives and the factory remained profitable. By 1816 New Lanark gained a reputation throughout Europe as a viable socialist utopian community under capitalism.

Using the recognition and profits from New Lanark, Owen sought wider reform throughout Britain and began disseminating his message worldwide. Hoping to replicate the success of New Lanark he met with leaders of church and state in Britain, presenting his ideas on ending poverty in the country and seeking parliamentary passage of a factory reform bill. Owen visited the United States in 1824, and after meeting with leading American politicians he established the Community of Equality at New Harmony, Indiana in 1825, another utopian community. New Harmony failed within two years, as the inhabitants never accepted the Owenite philosophy. Although New Harmony's failure tarnished Owen's reputation, throughout his lifetime he continued to publicize the philosophy on visits to Mexico, the West Indies, Ireland, continental Europe, and on his return trips to the US. In the 1830s Owen joined the British trades union movement, eventually becoming grand master of the Grand National Consolidated Trades

Union. However, in 1834, the union disbanded without unifying British workers throughout the nation. Soon thereafter, Owen formed the Rational Society to propagate his socialist ideas through publications and lectures through 1844. Owen's final years were spent traveling to promote his vision of utopian socialism and turning to spiritualism in 1853 before his death in Newtown in November 1858.

Owen was considered a radical and revolutionary in Britain during an era of rapid industrialization. He sought to transform the lives of workers through rationally improving the workplace and local communities. Owen's ideas were influential in reforming government policies on labor, education, and care for the poor through his core belief that environment shaped individual character. By the 1820s he was among the first advocates to openly espouse socialist ideals in Britain. But Owen's socialism, disparagingly labeled utopian socialism, did not demand a violent revolution as did the scientific socialism of Marx. Instead, it sought to share the profits of industrial capitalism with those whose labor made the system work. While Owen's socialism was soon overshadowed by Marxist notions that capitalist society was inherently malevolent and unalterable, his practice was crucial in advancing intellectual knowledge of utopian communities.

SEE ALSO: Britain, Trade Union Movement; Cooperative Commonwealth; Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony; Icaria Utopian Community; Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Oneida Perfectionist Utopians; Shakers Utopian Community; Socialism, Britain; Utopian Communities, United States; Utopian Intentional Communities; Wright, Frances "Fanny" (1795–1852)

References and Suggested Readings

- Claeys, G. (2004) Owen, Robert. In H. Matthew and B. Harrison (Eds.), *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cole, G. (1966) *The Life of Robert Owen*. Hamden: Archon Books.
- Owen, R. (1857–8/1967) *The Life of Robert Owen Written by Himself*, 2 vols. New York: August M. Kelley.
- Pollard, S. & Salt, J. (Eds.) (1971) *Robert Owen: Prophet to the Poor*. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press.

P

Padilla, Juan de (ca. 1490–1521)

Sean T. Perrone

Juan de Padilla was an important military leader in the Comunero Revolt (1520–1) in Castile. He was born in 1490 to a prominent *hidalgo* (lower nobility) family in the city of Toledo. By the late 1510s Padilla was disgruntled, feeling slighted after the new king passed him over for public office. In 1519 he used his position on the city council of Toledo to rally opposition to Charles V's policies and to initiate a petition among the cities demanding that Charles not leave Spain or appoint foreigners to public offices, or use Castilian revenues in his bid to become Holy Roman Emperor.

In April 1520 Padilla and his supporters seized control of Toledo, proclaiming a *Comunidad* (autonomous city). In June the city of Toledo convened a *Cortes* (parliament) and most cities slowly rallied to the Comunero cause, except for those in the south, while many nobles were initially ambivalent. In August 1520 Juan de Padilla secured Tordesillas, residence of Queen Juana (Charles's mother), and assembled a junta to govern Castile in her name. In a political move to bind the nobility to the movement, the junta removed Padilla from military command and appointed the nobleman Pedro Girón captain-general in October. This move offended Padilla, who returned to Toledo with his troops. It also marked a turning point in the movement, which gradually began to splinter between moderate and radical elements.

By December the Comuneros were on the defensive, having lost Tordesillas and witnessing Girón's defection. So the junta summoned Padilla from Toledo to lead the military again. Under his command the Comuneros won several victories, most notably capturing the castle at

Torrelobatón on February 28, 1521. Padilla's victory, however, was short-lived. He had to withdraw from Torrelobatón in April before a royalist advance, and his troops were overtaken during their retreat. At the Battle of Villalar (April 23, 1521), royalist forces crushed his militia. Padilla and the Segovian leader Juan Bravo were executed the next day (April 24).

Padilla's defeat at Villalar has long been seen as turning point in Castilian history, bringing an end to the liberty and independence of the Castilian municipalities and ushering in royal absolutism. Yet many of the Comuneros' demands were incorporated into royal policy after the *Cortes* of 1523, and the cities continued to hold sway on issues of taxation. More interestingly, the rhetoric of the Comunero revolt, emphasizing the common good, continued to play a central role in early modern Castilian political and legal thought and to shape the political action of urban elites.

SEE ALSO: Comunero Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Haliczer, S. (1981) *The Comuneros of Castile: The Forging of a Revolution 1475–1521*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Owens, J. B. (2005) "By My Absolute Royal Authority": *Justice and the Castilian Commonwealth at the Beginning of the First Global Age*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press.
- Seaver, H. L. (1928) *The Great Revolt in Castile: A Study of the Comunero Movement of 1520–1521*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Paine, Thomas (1737–1809)

Stacy Warner Maddern

Writing of "the times that try men's souls" in his essay *The Crisis*, Thomas Paine issued the

battle-cry of the American Revolution. Paine communicated ideas of revolution to peasants and intellectuals alike, creating prose that would both inspire passion and receive tremendous ridicule. Paine would incite revolution in America, Britain, and France, addressing every class of people without discrimination, envisioning a society that was free of slavery, advocating world peace, and demanding security for both poor and elderly.

Born in England in 1737, the son of a Quaker corset maker, Paine's empathy for the poor came from childhood observations of suffering and violence at the hands of the state. These experiences would leave deep scars on Paine, manifesting distaste for excessive wealth and compassion for the poor. By the time he came to America, Paine had discovered a distinct relationship between affluence and distress. On January 10, 1776 he published anonymously a pamphlet entitled *Common Sense* that made a persuasive argument for the American colonies to separate, politically and economically, from Britain. He began by defining the "origin and design of government" in order to show Americans that they were a people with exceptional purpose and promise. In drawing a line between society and government he claimed "society in every state is a blessing, but government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil." Paine's flare for words created prose that every common farmer could comprehend and established a new form of political grammar for hundreds of thousands of Americans. *Common Sense* initially issued in 150,000 copies, but by the end of the American Revolution nearly half a million had been printed. Declaring that "a government of our own is our natural right," Paine sought to open eyes and empower ambition in the young country.

He succeeded in pushing colonial leaders toward revolution, but he also aroused fears of anarchy and democratic tyranny. John Adams, emerging as Paine's primary rival, was suspicious and fearful of any call for revolution. Initially, Adams supported the call for independence and republicanism, but was distrustful of anyone who questioned too closely the English Constitution. The confrontation of ideas between Adams and Paine illustrates the larger ideological battles of American political culture, as one side tried to limit democracy while the other consistently sought to expand it. Adams' apprehension of Paine grew from a fear among political elites that radical

democracy inspired working classes. By the spring of 1776 local councils and provincial assemblies began passing resolutions that adopted the principles contained in Paine's pamphlet, pressuring delegates in Philadelphia to follow suit and call for independence from, rather than reform within, the English government. Between 1776 and 1783 Paine continued his support of the revolutionary cause by issuing 16 *American Crisis* papers. Through these pages he reaffirmed those patriotic arguments he began in *Common Sense*, reinvigorating Americans in time of war and recharging their patriotic spirit with messages of destiny and sacrifice.

Paine's writings extended beyond America, inspiring a rising generation of European radicals. After the war Paine returned to England in 1787, only to be confronted with the outbreak of revolution in France. He again supported the revolutionary cause, claiming it to be a continuation of events that had begun in America. He viewed the system of government throughout Europe as outdated, now facing movements that were grounded in rationality and moral fortitude.

When Britain's leading statesman, Edmund Burke, published *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Paine was appalled. Burke denounced the revolution in France by elevating Britain's political system over the popular politics that led not to progress, but to chaos, violence, and tyranny. Burke's attack infuriated Paine, who responded by writing his own defense of the French Revolution with the *Rights of Man*. At the heart of *Rights of Man* lay Paine's belief that a sensibly run society would eliminate misfortune and that revolution was a justifiable means to establishing such a rational order. He challenged Burke's thesis on the evolution of society and its inability to improve on a rational basis. He also challenged the legitimacy of the authority of government, arguing that natural rights existed prior to civil society and on this basis legitimate societies were the product of such. By the same course, illegitimate societies could be reformed according to independent measures seeking to correct the violation of these rights. Paine held that equality was a natural state and as such any civil right that violated equality was held accountable to natural right. This argument served an important function in proving the inefficiency of hereditary monarchies. Paine's assertion for a republican form of government eliminated

a tyrannical monarch since the administration of government, set to the task of flourishing society, was to be elected by the people. This, for Paine, was their natural right, as was the ability to remove from office those administrators who proved incompetent in the task at hand. *Rights of Man* also advocated measures beyond Burke. He called for free education, old age pensions, welfare benefits, and child allowances in order to show the poor and working classes that a better life was possible and certainly attainable.

The response in England was overwhelming among the working classes, who were willing to scratch together whatever means they had to buy the book. Beginning as what might be considered a radical manifesto, *Rights of Man* was an instant sensation even after it became a crime to possess it. Paine maintained that America had “made a stand, not for herself only, but for all the world,” and it was now up to others to advance the cause. “If universal peace, civilization, and commerce, are ever to be the happy lot of man,” he wrote, “it cannot be accomplished but by a revolution in the system of governments.”

Throughout his life Paine had witnessed monarchial regimes taxing the productive classes, transferring wealth to parasitic royals and aristocrats, and punishing working people and the poor. Because of this he had come to view non-democratic governments, not markets, as the fundamental cause of social inequality and oppression. Consequently, he proposed the liberation of the market and expansion of commercial activity. He stood by revolution as a means of acquiring change. Paine held government accountable to ensure that the “poor are happy; neither ignorance or distress is to be found among them; my jails are empty of prisoners, my streets of beggars; the aged are not in want, the taxes are not oppressive; the rational world is my friend because I am a friend of happiness.” When these things could be said, “then may that country boast of its government and constitution.” Such words elevated his reputation as a revolutionary and continue to echo around the shores of the Atlantic world.

In 1793 Paine was imprisoned in France because he opposed the execution of King Louis XVI. During his imprisonment he wrote *The Age of Reason*, which praised the Enlightenment and scorned organized religion. The book was not well received in America, as critics accused him of being an atheist, but in 1803 he returned to

America by invitation from Thomas Jefferson. Three years later in 1809 he died in New York City. One newspaper reported, “He had lived long, did some good and much harm.”

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776

References and Suggested Readings

- Foner, E. (2005) *Tom Paine and Revolutionary America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fruchtman, J. (1994) *Thomas Paine: Apostle of Freedom*. New York: Four Walls Eight Windows.
- Kaye, H. (2005) *Thomas Paine and the Promise of America*. New York: Hill & Wang.
- Paine, T. (1995) *Common Sense*. New York: Fall River Press.
- Paine, T. (1999) *The Rights of Man*. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.

Paisley, Ian (b. 1926) and Unionism, Northern Ireland

Kathleen Ruppert

Ian Richard Kyle Paisley is a fundamentalist preacher and an extremist right-wing politician in Northern Ireland. He won a large following among the majority Protestant population by demagogically appealing to its fear of being subjugated by the Catholic majority of the rest of Ireland. His oratorical and organizational skills thus brought him to the fore of the Unionist movement, which is devoted to preserving Northern Ireland’s union with Great Britain and resisting compromise with the Republic of Ireland. He utilized anti-Catholic bigotry – he famously declared that Catholics “breed like rabbits and multiply like vermin” – to create and lead a mass movement that waged strikes, street demonstrations, and other forms of militant protest, as well as paramilitary action, on behalf of the Unionist cause. The great influence he gained as a mass leader eventually elevated him above his more moderate rivals within the Unionist movement to the highest levels of political power in Northern Ireland.

In the late 1960s when a civil rights movement emerged in Northern Ireland – in emulation of the American civil rights movement – to defend the rights of the Catholic minority, Paisley was its most vociferous opponent. The organizations

he created, the Ulster Constitution Defense Committee (UCDC) and the Protestant Volunteers, took the lead in staging counterdemonstrations against civil rights marches. The analogy with the social situation of blacks and whites in the American South is not inappropriate. The Protestants of Northern Ireland constitute a relatively privileged community, whereas the Catholics are socially, politically, and economically disadvantaged. The turbulent mass movement that looks to Paisley for leadership is devoted to maintaining the Protestants' privileged position, and like their American counterparts the Paisleyites have frequently had recourse to mob violence to keep the Catholics "in their place." Provocation is one of the hallmarks of Paisley's leadership style; he has frequently staged triumphalist "parades" through Catholic neighborhoods as a means of intimidating the minority community.

Although union with Great Britain has always been a cornerstone of Paisley's strategy for maintaining Protestant privilege, his ultraconservatism has frequently led him to bitterly oppose certain British social policies. Following the British parliament's partial decriminalization of homosexual acts in 1967, for example, he mobilized a homophobic "Save Ulster from Sodomy" movement to resist the extension of the British legislation to Northern Ireland. (Northern Ireland calls itself Ulster, although three of the nine Irish counties that constituted the historic province of Ulster are not part of it.)

Paisley was born in County Armagh, one of the North's six counties, in 1926. Shortly after his birth, Paisley's family moved to Ballymena, County Antrim, where his father became pastor of a Baptist church. Paisley received religious training at the South Wales Bible College and the Reformed Presbyterian Theological College in Belfast, and was ordained to the Baptist ministry in 1946. He became pastor of the Ravenhill Evangelical Mission Church in Belfast, but left to help form the Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster in 1951. As a leading spokesman of the new conservative evangelical denomination, Paisley launched a vociferous campaign against religious liberalism, modernism, and ecumenism. He was charged with disturbing the peace on more than one occasion in the late 1950s in connection with his militant anti-Catholicism and anti-modernism.

Paisley first attracted widespread public attention over an issue that for him had both religious and constitutional significance. When Pope John XXIII died in June 1963, Northern Ireland's prime minister, Captain Terence O'Neill, sent a message of condolence, and the Lord Mayor of Belfast lowered the Union Jack at City Hall to half-mast. Claiming that any recognition of the papal authority represented a threat to Protestant civil liberties, Paisley organized a raucous protest march and rally in response. He was arrested and fined for his part in the demonstration, but an anonymous donor paid his fine.

The following year, Paisley once again challenged authorities by threatening to remove the tricolor, the flag of the Irish Republic, from the window of the West Belfast office of Sinn Féin, an Irish republican political party. Paisley warned that if the Ulster police (the Royal Ulster Constabulary) (RUC) would not get rid of the offensive flag, he would do so himself. When the RUC moved in to seize the flag, their actions triggered some of the worst rioting in Belfast's history.

In the mid-1960s Paisley became an even more vociferous opponent of the more moderate Unionist political establishment, and particularly of Prime Minister O'Neill. Paisley accused O'Neill of betraying Protestant interests in his efforts to appease Catholic nationalist opinion. When O'Neill invited the Taoiseach (prime minister of the Republic of Ireland), Séan Lemass, to Stormont in January 1965, Paisley launched an "O'Neill must go" campaign to protest O'Neill's liberal reformist policies.

Amid mounting sectarian tensions in Northern Ireland, Paisley won a seat in the Stormont parliament at the Bannside by-election of April 1970. In general elections to the British parliament two months later, he won the North Antrim seat, which he has continued to hold for more than three decades.

Paisley joined with other Unionist dissidents in October 1971 to form a new party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which he has led since 1973. Following the suspension of the Stormont parliament in March 1972, Paisley and the DUP opposed direct rule from London and rejected all power-sharing alternatives, including the Sunningdale Agreement of December 1973. Paisley played an active role in the Ulster Workers' Council strike that toppled the power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive in

1974. In 1977 he attempted to replicate that success when he and Ernest Baird, leader of the Democratic Unionist Movement, organized a general strike under the auspices of the United Unionist Action Council. Known to the public as "Paisley's strike," the protest had as its main goals a return to majority-rule government at Stormont and the introduction of more stringent security measures against the Irish Republican Army. The strike itself was a failure, but the DUP gained considerable strength in the district council elections that immediately followed.

The DUP continued to grow in electoral strength throughout the 1970s. In June 1979 Paisley was elected on a strong popular vote to the European parliament, a seat he would hold until voluntarily relinquishing it in 2003. In the early 1980s Paisley and his followers vied with the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) for control of the Unionist vote. He boosted his standing within the Unionist movement by leading a massive protest campaign against talks between British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the Republic of Ireland's Taoiseach, Charles Haughey.

Paisley's DUP and its main Unionist rival, the UUP, temporarily put aside their differences in order to protest the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, which set up cross-border cooperation in security matters and gave the Republic of Ireland a consultative role in Northern Ireland's affairs. Relations between the two parties began to deteriorate, however, with the emergence of the peace process in the early 1990s. When Paisley walked out of all-party talks in 1997 the breakdown of the Unionist front was complete. Since April 1998, when the Anglo-Irish Agreement was supplanted by the Good Friday Agreement, Paisley has been at the forefront of opposition to the latter accord as well. In 2005 the DUP surpassed the UUP and emerged as the largest of the Unionist political parties, and on May 8, 2007 Paisley was elected First Minister of Northern Ireland.

SEE ALSO: Ireland, the Troubles; Irish Republican Army (IRA); Northern Ireland Peace Movement; Sinn Féin

References and Suggested Readings

Boyce, D. G. & O'Day, A. (Eds.) (2001) *Defenders of the Union: A Survey of British and Irish Unionism since 1801*. New York: Routledge.

Bruce, S. (1989) *God Save Ulster! The Religion and Politics of Paisleyism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cooke, D. (1996) *Persecuting Zeal: A Portrait of Ian Paisley*. Dingle: Brandon/Mount Eagle.

The extent and content of Ian Paisley's anti-Catholic message is on full display at the website of his European Institute of Protestant Studies: www.IanPaisley.com

Pakistan, Bengali nationalist struggles

Muntassir Mamoon and Zarina Rahman Khan

Movement against Partition of Bengal (1905–1911)

From 1900 to 1947 there were various types of movements in the Indian subcontinent, some local and others national. Two political parties became prominent: the Congress and the Muslim League. These two political parties became the symbol of hopes and aspirations of the ordinary people, particularly the Hindu and the Muslim middle class. The Communist Party of India (CPI) also flourished in this period and became strong in the 1930s and 1940s. In particular the CPI organized the movement of the peasants and workers.

The influence of the national movements also affected eastern Bengal or Bangladesh. Prominent among these movements were the *Swadeshi*, which emphasized production and consumption of indigenous goods and rejection of British goods, Non-cooperation, the *Khilafat*, and the Pakistan movement. Many of the armed resistance or "terrorist" movements starting from 1900 to 1930 took place in East Bengal. Perhaps the most dramatic was the struggle over the partition of Bengal (1905–11).

Prior to 1905 Bengal meant a large part of India. The area of present Bangladesh or East Bengal, and several states of present India, Orissa, Bihar, Jharkhand, Assam, and West Bengal, were all within the territory of the Bengal Presidency. The size of this unit of land became a hindrance to proper administration. Plans for limiting the area of Bengal started with the creation of the post of lieutenant-governor of Bengal in 1854. Also, during the late nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries, Bengal became an important center of the anti-British movement. The initiative to divide Bengal into two provinces, separating the Bengali people in order to end the political cohesion among them, was given close attention in the beginning of the twentieth century. One reason for this was that East Bengal was a Muslim-predominant region. The home secretary to the government of British India, H. H. Risley, stated that Bengal united is a power. So its division would pull in several different ways.

There were strong movements both in support of and against the partition scheme, with the people divided into two camps. A Kolkata-based movement grew in opposition to the *bangabhanga* plan. Poets and writers joined this. In fact, an independent style of patriotic songs emerged and flourished on this movement. It was during this period that Rabindranath Tagore wrote *Amar shonar bangla ami tomae bhalobashi* (O my golden Bengal, I love you), which was adopted later as the national anthem of Bangladesh. Between December 1903 and October 1905 several thousand people participated in nearly 3,000 meetings all over Bengal to protest the British move to partition the country. Early Congress leaders like Surendranath Bandopadhyay and Bipin Chandra Pal provided leadership in these initiatives and a number of Muslims were also associated with them. The majority of the common people in East Bengal, however, did not support this urban middle-class movement.

The movement in favor of a divided Bengal was given leadership by the *Nawab* of Dhaka, Salimullah, and supported by the British. Almost 90 percent of the Hindu peasantry also supported the *bangabhanga*, as did most Muslims. Some other religious communities supported the Divide Bengal Plan as well. The new province of East Bengal was created in 1905, and the anti-British sentiment that was created during the movement against the partition started to surface in different ways, so that in 1911 the whole project had to be reversed by the British. And with this move the capital of India was shifted from Kolkata to Delhi.

The *Swadeshi*, or movement to boycott British goods and use local products, started almost parallel to the *bangabhanga* movement. It spread quickly, not only in Bengal but also outside its territory. However, with the trend in religion influencing politics since 1905, public opinion in

India started to divide along these lines. Muslim participation was relatively low in this movement for two reasons. First, the relatively higher cost of indigenous goods meant that for poor Muslim cultivators it became an imposition that they did not like. Second, the growth of Hindu cultural nationalism, with its use of Hindu icons and symbols, alienated many Muslims.

Tebhaga Movement (1946–1950)

The peasant movement in Bangladesh expanded and reached its maturity in 1946–50. At this time it was estimated that in 19 districts over 6,000,000 peasants joined the movement called the *tebhaga* (three-parts). The districts were Dinajpur, Rangpur, Pabna, Dhaka, Mymensingh, Khulna, Jessore, Faridpur, Bogra, Chittagong in present Bangladesh and in West Bengal, Medinipur, 24 Parganas, Howrah, Hooghli, Nadia, Bankura, Birbhum, Malda, and Jalpaiguri. There was solid unity between Hindus, Muslims, or *Adivasis* (“tribal” people) involved in the movement.

The *zamindars*, or landlords, established their proprietary rights with the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793. The peasants paid taxes to cultivate the land, and gradually their conditions worsened. During the late nineteenth century the provision of security to tenure-holders created one more layer of well-to-do sub-proprietors, the *jotedars*. Formally, they were tenants of *zamindars*, but they did not cultivate land. Instead, they let it out to poor or landless peasants who became sharecroppers under unregulated agreements with various names, but generally called *barga*.

World War II, economic depression, and famine made the conditions of the peasants intolerable. The price of crops fell and the peasants lived in hunger. In 1940 the government constituted the Floud Commission to report on the peasants’ situation. It reported that in Bengal 3,000,000 out of 7,500,000 peasant families had no rights on land. Peasants labored as sharecroppers to cultivate land controlled by *jotedars*. To pay taxes many had to take loans at very high interest rates from moneylenders known as *mahajans*. *Zamindars* also collected *abwabs* from them, and most peasants had to leave behind their share of the crop as *abwab* after the harvest. For sharecropping, the condition was 50 percent to the cultivator, but the Floud Commission recommended that it should be

divided into three shares, with two going to the cultivators and one to the landlord. This was known as the *tebhaga*, and the movement that supported it was called the *Tebhaga* movement.

Political parties also worked among the peasants, but the initiative to lead the movement was organized by the Peasant Front of the CPI, the Bangiyo Pradeshik Krishak Sabha (Bengal Provincial Peasant Association). Under the slogan "Land to the Tiller" (or "Land to the Owner of the Plough"), peasants demanded that the cultivator retain rights to the land that he tilled. They also insisted that the crop after harvest go only to the silos of the cultivator and not to the *jotedar*. They wanted two shares of the crop to go to the cultivator and one to the *jotedar* and for the lending rate of the *jotedar* or *mahajan* to be reduced to 12.5 percent. They also wanted the levying of *abwab* abolished and for the cultivator to be entitled to a receipt from the owner on delivery of the crop.

The first stage of the movement continued from 1946 to 1947. The peasants started to organize from 1946 and resolved to resist attempts to prevent taking their share of the crop to the courtyard of the *jotedar*. In some areas peasant leaders requested that every family contribute one young man, a bamboo stick, and a rupee to the movement. The peasants responded to this enthusiastically. Outside the traditional bases of the Peasant Association it was popular pressure – not imposition by party from above – that created a groundswell. About 4,000,000 peasants fought directly against the stick-wielding *lathiyals* of the *jotedars* and the police.

At the beginning of 1947 the cultivators harvested paddy in their own regions and took it to their own silos. Naturally the *jotedars*, *lathiyals*, and police tried to prevent this. The first clash with the police occurred in the village of Khanpur in Dinajpur district on February 20, 1947. In one incident, the police fired 131 bullets, killing 22 persons. The movement spread to about nineteen districts, taking the form of an organized uprising. Forty peasants were killed in Dinajpur, one in Rangpur, two in Khulna, and four in Mymensingh. Of these, four were women. According to the Peasant Association, 68 were killed in the *Tebhaga* movement of 1948–9. The number of wounded was 10,000, and 1,200 were arrested. Haji Muhammad Danesh, Altaf Ali, Abdul Kader, Nur Jalal, Kamparam Singh, Rupnarayan Ray, Lalit Sarkar, and

others led the *Tebhaga* movement in what was then known as East Pakistan.

As a result of this movement many of the *jotedars* ran away from their own land. In many regions, especially in Dinajpur, the peasants declared the locations as "liberated" or *Tebgha* areas. However, this movement was suppressed brutally in Jalpaiguri and the 24 Parganas. Many peasants and their leaders were arrested. Despite this, the movement was successful in many of the regions. Many *jotedars* were compelled to give two shares of the crops to nearly 40 percent of the sharecroppers. *Abwab* was abolished.

The second phase of protest was from 1948 to 1950. The center shifted to the predominantly indigenous area of Nachol in Chapainawabganj in Rajshahi. At this time the Muslim League was in power in Pakistan. Ramendranath Mitra, son of a Nachol *jotedar*, was a member of the Communist Party of East Pakistan. He and his wife Ila Mitra, respectfully called Rani Ma (Queen Mother) by the *Santals*, started to motivate the peasants to take up the *Tebhaga* system. The movement began to jell towards the end of 1949 as the peasants started to demand seven *ari* (a measurement unit of weight) of paddy. They received three *ari*-worth of paddy for cutting and trashing 20 *ari*. In addition, they demanded two shares of crop. The movement began to get organized. The *zamindar* of Mahipur acceded to the *Tebhaga* demand, but on January 5, 1950 news circulated that the police were coming to the village to confiscate the paddy from the peasants. In fact, only three policemen came to inquire about *tebhaga*. Agitating peasants besieged and beat them to death. On receiving this information, one whole platoon of police and *ansars* (a semi-governmental force) surrounded the area. The fight continued for at least seven days. The *santals* used bows and arrows and sticks. The police used firearms. Many *santals* fled to India to save their lives, and 195 were arrested. Ila Mitra was arrested and brutally tortured. Consequently, she became a legendary figure in the history of the peasant uprising in Bengal. After her release from jail she left for India.

Because of this movement, the East Pakistan government was compelled to pass the Land Acquisition Act of 1950. With this Act the *zamindari* system created by the Permanent Settlement was abolished in East Pakistan. This established the right of the peasants to their land.

Nankar Protest Movement (1922–1950)

In Urdu *nan* means bread. In this context a person working in return for food only was known as a *nankar* and the system as the *nankar* system. It is very likely that this system was in vogue since Mughal times. A *nankar* had to give compulsory labor for food only. It was known as *hod begari*. The term *begari* is derived from the Persian word *begar* meaning “servant without salary.” In 1947 there were about 4,000,000 *nankars*, which was one-tenth of the entire population of Sylhet, the northeast part of Bengal bordering Assam. The slightest protest by the *nankars* would result in severe punishment from landowners.

In the subcontinent changes were becoming evident in land relations after World War I. In this context the *nankars* rose in spontaneous protest in different regions of Sylhet. Noteworthy among these are the *Sukhair* uprising (1922–3), the *Kulaura* uprising (1931–2), and the *Vanu Bil* uprising (1933–5). All these were suppressed by the *zamindars* with the help of the government. After this the CPI initiated an organized movement under the aegis of the *Krishak Sabha* (Peasant Association). In 13 regions of Sylhet the *nankars* stopped *hod begari*, inspired by the initiative of the *Krishak Sabha*. This continued from 1937 to 1940. Although they were successful, in some areas the oppressive system could not be stopped totally. Under the changed circumstances after World War II and inspired by the *Tebhaga* movement, the *Nankars* rose in *Saleshwar*, *Mohakal*, and *Lauta-Bahadur* in 1946–7. The system of *Hod Begari* was discontinued in these regions.

Since this system was not abolished totally, *nankars*’ dissatisfaction remained and spontaneous protest movements continued in different areas of Sylhet. The Muslim League government supported the landowners. There were repeated clashes in different areas, and by 1950 it became evident that the system would not prevail. In this context the government was forced to abolish the *nankar* system.

Tanka Uprising (1937–1950)

In the valley of the Garo Hills in Mymensingh a movement against a system whereby cultivators had to pay tax in the form of crop, known as the

Tanka system, continued from 1937 to 1949. Through this system landowners could easily exploit the peasants, so the peasants wanted to pay in cash and not in crop. Communist leader Moni Singh, a member of the Susanga *zamindar* family, led this movement. He was arrested in 1930 but was released in 1935 and went to Susanga, where he came into contact with the *Tanka* peasants and witnessed their conditions. In Susanga the rate of tax was 7–15 *maunds* of paddy per one and quarter acre. If this was in cash the peasants could save 11–17 rupees, a substantial amount for them.

Moni Singh started to organize the peasants from 1937. He exempted the *Tanka* payments for his land and decreed that no one should pay *Tanka*. However, there was no uprising because the government reformed the system slightly without abolishing it. In the All India Peasant Conference, held in Netrokona in Mymensingh in 1945, a resolution was passed for the abolition of the *Tanka* system.

The second phase of the movement was initiated by a public meeting called at the Hajong-dominated area of Susanga-Durgapur in December 1946. Those attending the meeting were confronted by the police but still proceeded to resolve to abolish *Tanka*. In the meantime police forces camped in different areas. Boherotoli is a village in Birishiri (in Susanga-Durgapur) where the Hajongs and the Garos are predominant. On December 31, 1946 five policemen came to this village to search some Hajong houses. Enraged at this, the Hajongs chased away the police. After the incident a magistrate came back with 25 police. In the clash that ensued, Surendranath was killed. The government took to a policy of extreme repression and filed against the leaders, forcing Moni Singh underground. The hearing of the case started in 1948 after the creation of Pakistan, but was dismissed because no witnesses could be found.

In 1948 the CPI again took the initiative to start a movement. On January 15, 1949 the third phase of the movement started. It ultimately turned into a guerrilla war and continued for one and a half years. There were casualties on both sides. Government repression and arrests continued. Ultimately, in 1950, the government was forced to abolish the *Tanka* system along with the *nankar* system of Sylhet.

Language Movement (1948–1952)

India was divided in two on August 14, 1947. Pakistan was formed in the territories with a Muslim majority. The Muslim League under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah was successful in mobilizing huge public opinion among the Muslims in favor of Pakistan. The eastern part of Pakistan was known as East Bengal, which later became East Pakistan. Its capital was in Dhaka. Nearly 1,200 miles of Indian territories lay between East and West Pakistan. Although Pakistan was a Muslim-majority country, people of diverse languages and cultures comprised the population. There was homogeneity in the eastern wing where the language and culture of both Hindus and Muslims were the same. Over 56 percent of the population of Pakistan resided in this part, and their common language was *Bangla* (Bengali).

The federal capital, Karachi, was in West Pakistan and the majority of the central administration was non-*Bangalis*. From the beginning, the West Pakistanis looked at the eastern part as a hinterland and a colony. Later, the parliamentary form of government was replaced by military rule (1958–71). As a result, protests against the Muslim League and West Pakistan started to form among the *Bangalis* from the very outset. From 1958 to 1971 movements on language, education, economy, and autonomy developed the concept of *Bangali* nationalism. This culminated in the liberation war of 1971. Movements affiliated with this drive were the language movement, the movement for national autonomy, and the people's movement of 1969.

A long debate in Pakistan on the question of the national language of the *Bangalis* began in 1947. The majority of the population of Pakistan was Muslim, and a tendency had developed to equate Urdu and Arabic with the Muslims. From ancient times in India the official language was different from the language of the people. Sanskrit, Persian, and English had respectively been official languages in different eras. But *Bangla*, the language of the ordinary people, gathered importance and was revitalized in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Ziauddin Ahmed, vice chancellor of Aligarh University, proposed that Urdu be accepted as the state language of Pakistan. Dr. Muhammad Shahidullah, the renowned *Bangali* linguist, like many scholars before him, opposed

this and proposed that *Bangla* be adopted since the majority of the people of Pakistan spoke this language. Regardless of the debate, the Pakistan government started to use Urdu and English as the state languages without any official declaration.

Urdu was the mother tongue of only 3.27 percent of the population of Pakistan, so Dhirendranath Dutta of the Pakistan National Congress party brought an amendment proposal in the parliament on February 23, 1948 in which he stated that since *Bangla* is the language of the majority of the population of Pakistan it should be adopted as the state language. The Muslim League and the central leaders of Pakistan smelled conspiracy in this proposal, as Dhiren Dutta was a Hindu. They considered *Bangla* a Hindu language and perceived Bengalis as Hindu-minded. Dutta's proposal was rejected.

At this point Dhaka University students formed the State Language Movement Council and started mobilizing public opinion about *Bangla* as the legitimate state language. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the "Father of Pakistan," visited Dhaka and in a public meeting held on March 19, 1948 declared emphatically that "Urdu and Urdu alone shall be the language of Pakistan." The movement in favor of *Bangla* intensified with the death of Jinnah in 1948, and from 1950 Urdu was once again proposed as the state language in parliament. Students and ordinary people vehemently resisted. The Council for State-Language Movement was formed in Dhaka University in 1951 under the leadership of Abdul Matin.

In a public meeting in Dhaka, held on January 27, 1952, Pakistani Prime Minister Khwaja Najimuddin made a declaration for Urdu as the state language. In response the Council for State-Language Movement called for a strike on January 30. This started a new phase of the language movement.

Bangalis felt violated not only by the language issue but by other issues as well. Different political and civil society organizations started to express their resentment against the repression meted out by the Muslim League. All this culminated in huge resentment against the central government. The student and other organizations continued a vigorous agitation from January 30 to February 20, 1952. And the government responded with relentless repression. On February 21, 1952, when police opened fire on a protest procession of students and ordinary

people, a college student, Rafiquddin, and a university student, Abul Barkat, government employees Shafiur Rahman and Abdus Salam, a tailor Abdul Jabbar, and a nine-year-old child, Azizulla, were killed. Many more were killed but only six casualties were officially recorded because other dead bodies were quickly disposed of. The movement spread all over East Bengal, but the language issue was not resolved yet.

The Muslim League was completely defeated in the 1954 Provincial Elections. In its place the Jukta (United Front) came to power. It was the United Front which was formed by a coalition of many political parties following the popular protest that started from 1952. The new government adopted proposals to declare February 21 national Martyr's Day, build a Martyr's Monument in the spot where Abul Barkat, a martyr for the Bengali Language Movement, had been shot and killed in 1952, and to establish *Bangla* as the principal state language. The *Bangla* Academy was established for the development of *Bangla* language and *Bangla* literature. On May 9, 1954 *Bangla* was given recognition as a national language.

The Language Movement of 1952 had a long-term effect on Bangladesh because there were political, economic, and constitutional issues involved. People of all professions supported this movement, and the leaders succeeded in strengthening a secular politics by replacing the communal politics of the Muslim League. Perhaps most importantly, *Bangali* nationalism developed and attracted large numbers of students. Indeed, it is held that the Language Movement inspired the liberation war of Bangladesh. When the Constitution of Sovereign Bangladesh was adopted in 1972 it was declared that *Bangla* should be the state language of the republic. In 1999 this language received international recognition when UNESCO declared February 21 as the International Language Day, which is now observed worldwide.

Mass Uprising of 1969

The language movement of 1948, which started as a protest against state repression and exploitation of the *Bangalis* as a nation since the creation of Pakistan, gradually culminated in the mass uprising of 1969. This started with the student movement against the autocratic rule of the military dictator President Ayub Khan in 1968.

Around the same time the Six Point Demand of the Awami League (a nationalist party established in February 1950, with Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardi as its leader) was discussed in the Annual Council session of the party. These demands, proposed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the most important leader of the Awami League, in 1966, emphasized the need for a federal constitution with a great degree of autonomy for East Pakistan. Consequently the student wings of these two parties; the East Pakistan Students League and the East Pakistan Student Union (Motia Group) jointly started the anti-Ayub student movement. From October 6–29, 1968 different political parties organized general strikes and shutdowns known as *hartals* and *gherao* (besiege) programs. On December 8 almost all political parties called a countrywide *hartal*.

On January 4, 1969 the East Pakistan Student League and the two factions of the East Pakistan Student Union (Motia Group and the Menon Group) set up the Student Struggle Council and declared the Eleven Point Demand. This included the Six Point Demand as well as issues concerning students, teachers, and workers. The Dhaka University Central Students Union (DUCSU) and the Student Struggle Council joined the Eleven Point Movement. The political parties also joined the movement.

To thwart the movement Ayub Khan started the Agartala Conspiracy Case in 1968, naming Sheikh Mujib as the principal accused. Several *Bangali* civil and military officials and politicians were arrested. The central government accused Sheikh Mujib of going to Agartala (capital of Tripura, India) and conspiring with the Indian authorities to dislodge the central government and create an independent state. At one point the release of Sheikh Mujib and the withdrawal of the Agartala Conspiracy Case became the central issue of the movement.

The movement was not restricted to Dhaka, but spread to remote corners of East Pakistan. Students and teachers of schools, colleges, and universities declared their solidarity. Most of the local government representatives resigned at the call of the student leaders. Some of them were killed by angry masses. A few of the opposition members of the National Assembly resigned. On January 20, 1969, when a leading student leader, Asaduzzaman Asad, was killed by police firing on a protest procession, the ongoing movement turned into a massive people's uproar.

On January 28, when Motiur Rahman, another student, was killed by the police, the situation in Dhaka went virtually out of control of the government. Even imposing a curfew and arresting important political leaders could not restore peace and order. On February 15 Sergeant Zahurul Huq, an accused in the Agartala Conspiracy Case, was killed by the army firing in Dhaka Cantonment where he was held in custody.

The anti-Ayub mass movement took a serious turn when a professor of Rajshahi University, Shamsuzzoha, succumbed to a bayonet injury received from Pakistani forces on February 18. To restore order, President Ayub was compelled to declare that he would not contest the next election. Ayub Khan also withdrew the Agartala Conspiracy Case on February 22, and released Sheikh Mujib and all others accused in the case. Sheikh Mujib's release instilled a new spirit into the movement. On February 23 Sheikh Mujib was given a gala reception in Dhaka, where he was given the title of *Bongobondhu* ("Friend of Bengal") on the proposal of a noted teacher and folklorist, Tofail Ahmed. The slogan of *Joi Bangla* (Long Live Bengal) was also coined in this reception program and became the call to arms for an independent Bangladesh during the Liberation War.

With the objective of settling the issues through discussion, Ayub Khan called a Round Table Conference in Lahore after the release of Sheikh Mujib. Sheikh Mujib attended the Round Table but Moulana Bhasani, a leader of the National Awami Party (formed in 1957 by the left-wing dissidents of the Awami League led by Moulana Bhasani, the Pakistan National Party of West Pakistan, and the Communists from both parts of Pakistan) boycotted it. In the conference Sheikh Mujib proposed the implementation of the Awami League's Six Point and the students' Eleven Point Demands, but both were rejected. Consequently, Sheikh Mujib started an all-out movement against Ayub Khan. On the other hand, the right-wing parties accepted two of the reforms proposed by Ayub Khan, namely, a federal system of democracy and adult franchise.

The people supported the decision of Sheikh Mujib and turned the anti-Ayub Movement into a mass uprising. The uprising even started to spread in West Pakistan and forced Ayub Khan to resign on March 25, 1969 and hand over power to the army chief General Yahya Khan. Martial law was once again declared in the country. However, Yahya Khan promised a

parliamentary system of government by elections on the basis of adult franchise.

The 1969 mass movement came to a halt with the imposition of martial law, but as a result the struggle for independence of Bangladesh had moved one step ahead. The demand for *Bangali* nationalism was strengthened by the mass movement of 1969, and the aspiration among the *Bangalis* for the establishment of an independent, sovereign state was created.

SEE ALSO: Bangladesh, Struggle for Liberation, 1971; Bengal, Popular Uprisings and Movements in the Colonial Era; India, Civil Disobedience Movement and Demand for Independence; Jinnah, Muhammad Ali (1876–1948)

References and Suggested Readings

- Anonymous (1999) *Bangladesh Documents*. Dhaka: University Press.
- Hussain, S. A. & Mammoon, M. (Eds.) (1986) *Bangladeshe Shosotra Protirodh Andolon* (Armed Resistance Movement in Bangladesh). Dhaka: Bangladesh Asiatic Society.
- Islam, S. (Ed.) (1992) *History of Bangladesh*, Vol. 1. Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh.
- Kamal, M. & Chakraborti, E. (2006) *Nacholer Krishak Bidroho, Somokalin Rajniti O Ila Mitra* (Peasant Revolt of Nachol, Contemporary Politics and Ila Mitra). Kolkata: Progressive.
- Khan, M. A. (1984) *History of Fara'idi Movement*. Dhaka: Islamic Foundation.
- Rahman, M. (1998) *Bangladesher Itihas* (History of Bangladesh). Dhaka: Somoy.
- Ray, J. K. & Mammoon, M. (1996) *Civil Society in Bangladesh*. Kolkata: Firma KLM.
- Ray, S. (1972) *Bharater Krishak Bidroh O Ganatantrik Sangram* (Peasant Revolt and Democratic Movement in India). Kolkata: DNBA Brothers.
- Roy, D. (Ed.) (2000) *Tebhaga Andolon* (Tebhaga Movement). Kolkata: Ananda Publishers.
- Sengupta, K. K. (1974) *Pabna Disturbances and the Politics of Rent*. New Delhi: Peoples' Publishing House.
- Umar, B. (1980) *Purbabanger Bhasa Andolon O Tatkalin Rajniti* (Language Movement of East Bengal and Contemporary Politics). Dhaka: Mowla Brothers.

Pakistan, protest and rebellion

Farooq Sulehria

Pakistan was declared independent on August 14, 1947. Its first government was sworn in on

August 15. A constituent assembly, elected on the basis of general elections in British India in 1946, became the parliament of the new country. At that time, Pakistan consisted of two wings: East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan). Political power was concentrated in West Pakistan, while East Pakistan had 60 percent of the total population.

The new state was predominantly agrarian, with agriculture accounting for 60 percent of total output and 70 percent of total employment (industry accounted for 6 percent of total output and 10 percent of total employment). Pakistan inherited from British India only 1,414 of 14,677 registered factories (only 9.6 percent of the total). West Pakistan inherited only 2.6 percent of undivided Indian industry and 6.5 percent of the workforce. In 2002 the population of Pakistan was estimated at 145.96 million, with a labor force of 41.84 million. Out of that, 18.54 million (48.42 percent) are employed in the agricultural sector, where workers have no legal means to form unions and are largely unorganized. In 1951 there were 209 registered trade unions with 393,137 members. In 2001 the number of trade unions had gone up to 7,204 with over 1 million members. Despite this phenomenal rise in membership, organized workers comprise only 3 percent of the labor force. Only 1,905 unions have collective bargaining agent (CBA) status. The CBA unions have a membership of 478,698, while non-CBA unions have a membership of 1,040,303 – thus only one-third of union members enjoy CBA status.

During the Cold War, Pakistan entered into military pacts with the United States. Because the ruling elite, mostly from Punjab, feared Bangali (Bengali) domination, it avoided holding general elections. In 1958 inflation on essential goods coincided with crop failures. Strikes became the order of the day. Police repression and private armies of thugs were employed to break these strikes. Peasants had also been mobilized under the left-wing banner of the Kissan Committee and thousands of peasants marched on the roads of Lahore as a token of solidarity. On May 8 police attacked Lundo, a village of Sindh, because peasants were defying local landlords. On June 20 police shot dead six workers in Lyallpur and injured another 21 as workers tried to take over a factory. These worker-peasant protests were largely due to the absence of political representation and resulted in the government announc-

ing the first general elections, to be held in March 1959. However, those elections were later postponed until November 1959. To make matters worse, on October 7, 1958 General Ayub Khan imposed the first martial law.

The political temperature began to rise in Pakistan as a growing democratic movement was inspired by the popularity of the left-wing National Awami Party (NAP). Leftist politics in Pakistan can be traced to Indian origins, with the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) as an offshoot of the Communist Party of India (CPI). The CPI, at its Second Congress held in Calcutta in February 1948, decided to divide the party in two – CPI and CPP.

In 1948 the All Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was founded on the premise of making Pakistan a union of free socialist republics. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was elected its first president and G. M. Sayyid its general secretary. Ghaffar Khan was a prominent nationalist leader from the Frontier province who adhered to Gandhi's principles of non-violence – he was popularly known as Frontier Gandhi. Khan and his son, Abdul Wali, were arrested along with other PPP members such as Qazi Ata Allah Khan and Abd al-Samad Achakzai in June 1948. A month later Khan's Khuda-i-Khidmatgars (Red Shirts), a volunteer force organized by him, were banned by the government. On August 12 police opened fire at a Red Shirts meeting in the village Babra in Charsada district, leaving many dead. After these events the PPP disbanded.

Punjab province would later find radical expression in the Azad (Independent) Pakistan Party (APP) in November 1950. The party was founded by Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, a parliamentarian known for his Marxist views. He was a strong opponent of government policies and was expelled from the Muslim League for five years in 1950. In its manifesto the APP demanded abolition of the feudal system, fresh elections on the basis of an adult franchise, and a "people's revolution in Kashmir." However, the APP failed to establish itself beyond Punjab and won only a single seat in the provincial parliament in 1951. In 1956 the APP would merge with a new left party, the Pakistan National Party (PNP).

The PNP was a combination of radical nationalist and Marxist forces, including remnants of the Kalat National Party, Asthman Gal of Prince Aga Abdul Karim, Wrore Pakhtoon (Pakhtoon Brotherhood) of Abd al-Samad Achakzai, the

Red Shirts of Abdul Ghaffar Khan (NWFP), Sindh Awami Mahaz of G. M. Sayyid, the Sind Hari Committee of Haider Bux Jataoi, and the Azad Pakistan Party of Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din. The CPP had been banned following the 1951 Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case, which resulted in the arrest of Secretary General Sajjad Zaheer and Central Committee (CC) member Sibte Hasan. Later, all the CC members, a number of army officers, and famous left leaders such as the poet Faiz Ahmad Faiz were arrested for conspiring a coup d'état in association, allegedly, with General Akbar Khan. The intent of the case was seriously to damage the Communist Party. In 1954 other organizations affiliated with the CPP were banned as well, including the Pakistan Trade Union Federation, the Democratic Students Federation, the Association of Democratic Women, and the Progressive Writers Association.

At the time of the ban the membership of the CPP in West Pakistan was 200, which was determined by the Partition of India, as the Punjab and the rest of West Pakistan were never a stronghold for the CPI. Most CPI members in Punjab who migrated to India after division in 1947 were either Hindu or Sikh. But the low membership in no way reflects the influence communists had on students and the trade union movement. In 1947 the left gained an additional advantage with the establishment of Progressive Papers Limited (PPL) by Mian Iftikhar ud Din. The PPL published an English daily newspaper, *Pakistan Times*, an Urdu daily, *Amroz*, and later a weekly, *Lail o Nehar*. All three soon became the largest circulating newspapers in West Pakistan.

In East Pakistan the Communist Party of East Pakistan (CPEP) was more connected to the CPI than it was with the CPP. After Indian communists followed an ultra-left line of insurrectionism noted at the conference of the Communist Information Bureau in September 1947, launching an armed struggle just after achieving independence, the CPEP followed suit. Though they managed to seize a few police stations in East Pakistan, they were soon effectively isolated and crushed. Between 1948 and 1954 there were around 3,000 political prisoners in East Pakistan, the majority of whom were communists.

Soon, ideological debates started unfolding within the CPI and the CPEP, with Moscow intervening to settle disputes. The Muslim East

Pakistani communists were instructed to "enter" the Awami Muslim League, which had split from the Muslim League in 1949, while non-Muslim communists were asked to work in front organizations. The election results for the East Pakistan parliament in 1954 speak of the communists' success: 22 communists were elected, 18 as Awami League members (in 1955 the word Muslim was dropped from the name of the party), and four as independents. Following the ban on the CPP, the CPEP went underground and advised its cadre to work inside radical organizations.

CPEP members became active in the Awami League in East Pakistan, while in West Pakistan, CPP members entered the ranks of the APP, followed by members from both parties entering the National Awami Party (NAP). The formation of the NAP came into being when a radical faction of the Awami League, led by Maulana Bhashani, split with the party and joined hands with the PNP to form the NAP. Founded on July 25, 1957 at a Workers' Convention held in Dacca, NAP was the first ever radical formation that represented East as well as West Pakistan.

General Ayub Khan, the first Pakistani commander-in-chief of the Pakistani army, had helped Iskandar Mirza to declare martial law in 1958. In that year, using his military powers, he ousted Mirza in a bloodless coup and became president of Pakistan, after which he set to the task of modernizing the country by introducing land reforms, progressive family laws, and a constitution in 1962. While Khan was responsible for secularizing the country into a republic instead of an Islamic republic, he ruthlessly curbed trade union activity, banned political parties and peasant organizations, and took over a chain of newspapers run by the PPL. In addition, Hassan Nasir, a left-wing student leader, was tortured to death at the Lahore Fort. While the PPL takeover symbolized press censorship, the brutal murder of Hassan Nasir became a symbol of state repression and resistance in the 1960s.

In 1963 Khan allowed some political freedoms and lifted the ban on political parties, although the NAP took another year to become public. However, when the NAP did reemerge in public its new manifesto declared socialism as its aim. It was later reorganized at its National Council meeting in 1965 when Maulana Bhashani was elected president and Mahmud ul Haq Uthmani general secretary. NAP split into separate groups, one pro-Moscow and the other pro-Beijing. The

formal split occurred in December 1967 when the pro-Moscow faction set up a separate NAP in East Pakistan under the leadership of Professor Muzaffar Ahmed. In April 1968, at a national meeting, NAP elected Khan Abdul Wali Khan as its all-Pakistan president. By 1968 the CPEP had also split in two with a pro-Moscow faction led by Moni Singh and a pro-Beijing faction led by Toha.

The two NAP factions were also divided on the question of support to General Ayub's military dictatorship. While the pro-Moscow faction was opposed to Ayub, the pro-Beijing faction was lending support to the president in line with Beijing's cordial relations with the Pakistani government. In 1965 Ayub's misadventure in attempting to capture Kashmir resulted in his downfall. Moreover, the gulf between rich and poor had increased dramatically, as wealth had become concentrated in the hands of 22 families who owned 66 percent of industrial capital.

On November 7, 1968 an anti-Ayub movement began and lasted for five months. The movement started with student unrest and was joined by industrial workers and professionals. It spread across Pakistan and united the masses in two wings for the first and last time. The movement had begun as a protest against a hike in sugar prices. Students joined the protest in Rawalpindi, where a Rawalpindi Polytechnic College student, Abdul Hameed, was shot dead. In November 1968 there were four deaths and over 1,000 arrests. December 1968 saw 11 deaths and 1,530 arrests. In January 1969 there were 57 deaths and 4,710 arrests. February saw 47 deaths and 100 arrests. In March 1969 the figures rose to 90 deaths and 356 arrests. By the time industrial workers joined the movement it was out of control. In the industrial district of Faisalabad, the district administration had to seek permission from local labor leader Mukhtar Rana for the supply of goods by truck. All censorship had failed. Trains were carrying the revolutionary messages across the country. Workers had invented new methods of communication. It was indeed a new phenomenon. Industrialization, exploitation, and oppression that widened the gulf between rich and poor had brought about the protest.

In 1967 railway workers were the first to take action by going on strike. This was important for three reasons. First, their official union had opposed the strike. Second, the unofficial union controlled by communists had also opposed it,

since they were supporting "anti-imperialist" Ayub Khan. Third, the railway workers formed workers' committees to take action on their own. The government resorted to all kinds of repression, but it had to accept some of the demands before the strike could be called off. On March 26, 1969 Ayub resigned, but instead of handing power to the speaker of the national assembly, as required by his own constitution, he instead named General Yahya Khan as the new military ruler.

On March 30, 1970 Yahya issued a Legal Framework Order (LFO) that called for a national assembly with 313 seats, of which 13 were reserved for women. The left during this period was following the line of popular frontism, aligning with working-class parties to combat fascist rule or military dictatorship. When this began in 1968-9, Pakistan swept away the Ayub dictatorship and the Pakistan People's Party began to rise. Formed on September 1, 1967, the PPP had a radical socialist program. Its charismatic leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, once a minister in Ayub's cabinet, appeared in the political arena to challenge the Ayub dictatorship. Bhutto, an intelligent bourgeois politician, introduced socialism and joined hands with some leftists to form the PPP.

When the Ayub dictatorship started targeting Bhutto, he became a symbol of resistance, strengthening his popularity and his grip on the party. Also, the popularity enjoyed by the PPP was a sequel to the 1968-9 revolutionary movements. A new layer of radicalized labor leaders joined this party. In 1970 the major players in the general elections were the right-wing Muslim League, fundamentalists Jamaat Islami, Jamiat Ulema Pakistan, and Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI), the left-wing National Awami Party, the PPP, and the Awami League led by Shaikh Mujibur Rahman, demanding autonomy for East Pakistan. The Awami League had a clean sweep of East Pakistan, while the PPP emerged as the largest party in West Pakistan, but had no support in Balochistan where the left-wing NAP and fundamentalist JUI had won most seats. The Awami League had won 160 out of 300 seats. The PPP won 81 seats.

The results meant the Awami League, which entirely represented Bangalis, would form the government. This was not acceptable to the military-led ruling class, since East Pakistan was systematically discriminated against. Yahya decided to ban the Awami League and fill the

vacated seats by means of new elections. However, he met resistance from East Pakistani people and Bengali paramilitary forces. In September a government in exile was set up in India as a Revolutionary Council consisting of four representatives of the Awami League and one each from the Bangladesh National Conference, NAP(W), NAP(B), and the Communist Party. A large number of East Pakistanis, particularly Hindus, fled to East Bengal in India. India would later claim 9 million refugees in its territories.

In panic, Yahya attacked India on the West Pakistan front, causing India to send its army to East Pakistan where, in alliance with the Mukti Bahini, it was given a savior's welcome. Yahya's forces were humiliated on the western front and on December 16 surrendered to East Pakistan. In this process East and West Pakistan would separate again, with East Pakistan becoming Bangladesh. Bhutto was now called on to act as civil martial law administrator. Upon assuming power he claimed to have done more to combat communism in Asia than the Americans in spite of all the resources and the money they had piled into that part of the world. Before he was formally elected he believed that Pakistan was in a position to choose between communism and capitalism. At the same time, he continued to claim that he was a socialist of the Willy Brandt variety.

In 1971 a faction of the left declared that Bhutto was a social fascist. Of the notable communists who joined the Bhutto government there was the former president of the National Students Federation, Meraj Muhammad Khan. The Bhutto period offered both the best and worst of Pakistan's trade union movement. Its peak was reached when a record number of unions were registered, membership witnessed an upsurge, a number of industrial actions took place, and some pro-trade union reforms were introduced. However, at the same time, Bhutto unleashed a reign of terror against trade union leadership and workers.

Bhutto also undermined the influence of big feudal lords through land reforms and reduced the economic power of big industrialists through his nationalization of 31 industrial concerns in 10 basic industries. His regime deliberately used its pricing policy as an instrument of urban pacification. Bhutto, as a minister in the Ayub government, had learned that as long as economic growth was accompanied by stable prices there would be no social unrest. Inflation and the

substantial fall in real wages that followed the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 had meant the Ayub regime had to face urban unrest and was eventually overthrown. Bhutto, on the other hand, was not merely faced with inflation resulting from the war in 1971, but also a steep currency devaluation of about 139 percent in May 1972. In the same month the working class took to the streets in Karachi, demanding better wages and payments. The government decided to crush the movement by firing at protesters on June 7-8, 1972, leaving a dozen dead. This angered the communists who had joined the government. Some of them resigned in protest, including Bhutto's minister Meraj Muhammad Khan, who went on to form the Qaumi Mahaz e Azadi (National Liberation Front) in 1974.

In Kot Lakhpat, the industrial area in Lahore, industrial workers were so well organized that it had become a state within a state, known as the Chicago of Lahore. There, workers' organizations administered justice, maintained law and order, and had rendered the police relatively ineffective. Strikes, factory takeovers, and violence continued in a sporadic fashion throughout 1973-5 across Pakistan. On April 30, 1975 labor leader Abdul Rehman was shot dead. Factional infighting was considered a possible reason behind the murder. On May 1 there was a mammoth demonstration, prompting Bhutto to post his infamous Federal Security Force throughout Lahore.

Following the division of Pakistan, with East Pakistan achieving its independence to become Bangladesh, the NAP Bhashani in West Pakistan reorganized itself as the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party was founded in Karachi on March 23, 1971, at the first Socialist Workers' Conference. In 1986 it split into two factions, one led by Abid Hassan Manto forming the Workers' Party, which later merged with Qaumi Inqilabi Party (QIP or National Revolutionary Party), and the other was the Qaumi Mahaz e Azadi in 1992, later to become the Awami Jamhoori Party (People's Democratic Party). In 1999 the Awami Jamhoori Party and the Socialist Party merged again, along with a faction of the PNP, to form the National Workers' Party (NWP).

The federal government headed by Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) dissolved the NAP government in Balochistan, causing the NWFP government to resign in protest. The NAP was banned in 1975, only to reemerge as the

National Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP refused to accept the communists in its fold, hence the Communist Party (still underground despite the Bhutto government's promise to lift the ban) formed the Progressive National Democratic Party as its mass political front at a convention held in Peshawar on December 7, 1975. The Progressive National Party was renamed the National Progressive Party, appointing prominent communist leader Aizaz Nazir as the president and Afrasiab Khattak as secretary general.

With the consumer price index soaring throughout 1972–5, Bhutto devised a system of wage-price packages in an attempt to link prices with wages. For instance, in 1975, increases in the price of wheat, vegetable *ghee* (clarified butter), and sugar were accompanied by an adjustment in wages. Almost 60 percent of state subsidies were offered on essential goods like wheat. This was a huge factor in Bhutto being reelected in 1977's general elections. However, shortly afterward he was overthrown by his protégé General Zia ul Haque, who imposed a third martial law on July 5, 1977.

The workers and masses did not welcome the military takeover, which proved to be the most repressive in Pakistan's history. In January 1978 Zia's police fired at the workers of Colony Textile Mills in Multan, which according to some accounts left 900 dead in the largest massacre of workers in Pakistan's history. Following this, on April 4, Bhutto was hanged. Zia remained in power for another 11 years, as he was able to gain the support of the United States, whose diplomatic efforts needed Pakistan to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The United States provided \$3.2 billion in aid over six years, with an additional \$25 billion in overseas remittances.

From 1977–8 to 1985–6 Pakistan's per capita income increased by 34 percent and continued to rise, while US-supported and Pakistan-based Afghan Islamic fundamentalists fought the secular pro-Moscow regime in Afghanistan. It was also a period when the masses made heroic sacrifices for democracy with the establishment of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD, an alliance of opposition parties), which forced Zia to make some concessions. In 1985 general elections were held on a non-party basis to keep the PPP out of the election process, which the MRD boycotted.

On August 17, 1988 Zia died in a mysterious plane crash. His military successors decided to

stay away from the presidency and allow democracy a chance to rule. The chairman of the Senate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, as provided by the constitution, became Pakistan's next and interim president. Fresh elections were held and the PPP emerged as the largest party. Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, became prime minister in 1988, only to be deposed 20 months later by the president.

The Pakistan Muslim League, led by industrialist Nawaz Sharif, came to power. In 1993 Bhutto's PPP again emerged as the leading party; once again, after she formed a government, the president, Farooq Leghari, dismissed it on charges of corruption, using the controversial Eighth Amendment, which gave the president the right to dissolve the national assembly if he believed that government could not be carried out according to the constitution. Bhutto was again succeeded by Muslim League leader Nawaz Sharif. Then, in 1999, General Pervez Musharraf deposed Nawaz Sharif and imposed the fourth martial law on October 12.

Prior to the death of General Zia several new developments occurred on the Pakistani left. In 1986 the NDP, PNP, Awami Tehreek (People's Movement), and the Mazdoor Kissan Party (Workers Peasants Party) (MKP) merged to form the Awami National Party (ANP). The MKP, PNP, and Awami Tehreek would later split with the ANP and in fact a major PNP faction did not join at all. In 1989 the CPP had its Third Congress that led to a split, with the minority forming Pakhtoonkhwa QIP, while the majority, led by Imam Nazish, merged with the MKP in 1994 to form the Communist Workers Peasants Party (CMKP). The CMKP split in 1999, and a faction led by Qazi Imdad and Maula Bux Khaskhaili formed the Communist Party.

Also in 1986 a new group called the Struggle Group, comprising activists who supported the monthly Mazdoor Jeddoujhd (Workers' Struggle), was established. The Struggle Group was working inside the PPP as an entryist group affiliated with the Trotskyist Committee for a Workers International (CWI), which later split in 1990–1, followed by the splitting of the Struggle Group over the question of continued entryist work inside the PPP. One faction continues to follow the entryist policy inside the PPP and is organized around the fortnightly *Class Struggle*. One of its members, Chaudhury Manzoor Ahmad, was elected to the national parliament on a PPP

platform. The other Struggle Group faction, led by Farooq Tariq, ended the entryist policy in view of its analysis that the working class would leave the PPP if there were other alternatives. To build an alternative party it launched Jeddohud Inqilabi Tehrik (Struggle Revolutionary Movement) in 1993. In 1997 it formed the Labor Party of Pakistan, incorporating the Struggle Revolutionary Movement.

Pakistan's trade union movement was influenced by the movement in British India that comprised the All India Trade Union Congress – attached to the Communist Party of India – and the reformist Indian Federation of Labor. Both were reorganized in Pakistan as the Pakistan Trade Union Federation (PTUF) and the Pakistan Labor Federation, which later became the All Pakistan Federation of Labor (APFOL). The former, affiliated to the Communist Party of Pakistan, had 38 affiliated unions with 20,000 members, mainly concentrated in railways. APFOL had 95,000 members in its 49 affiliated unions, with a strong presence among port workers. The PTUF's communist nexus and its relations with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) led to much suspicion by the Pakistani government.

In 1996 class struggle returned to the political map in Pakistan as the tenants of the Okara Military Farms were threatened with evictions. Of these tenants, thousands were peasants who started a movement against possible evictions by the Pakistan army. Under the banner of Anjuman-i-Muzaireen Punjab (Punjab Tenants Organization), the tenants held sit-ins and other peaceful demonstrations. In response, military violence left a half-dozen dead. The tenants' demand to own the land remains unresolved, however, while military management has not been able to implement new legislation to evict the tenants.

In June 2005 workers at Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Limited (PTCL) made headlines all across the world with their struggle against privatization and an occupation of headquarters and weeklong strike that compelled an indefinite postponement of privatization. The PTCL, employing 65,000 workers, is the third largest state enterprise in Pakistan after the railways and the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). As soon as the government announced the date to sell 26 percent of PTCL shares on June 10, nine major PTCL unions

formed an Action Committee and announced a strike. A shocked military government announced a postponement of the plan and accepted all 28 Action Committee demands, which included a pay rise.

During the PTCL protest more than a thousand workers were arrested and charged under draconian anti-terrorism laws. In a form of state kidnapping, police and security forces seized the relatives of some union officials and militant workers who evaded arrest. The PTCL management also fired at least 28 union leaders and threatened to dismiss thousands of workers on short-term contracts if they did not break ranks with the strike. In response, two Action Committee leaders came on state television and called off the strike. They were later accused of "selling-out" by the rest of the Action Committee. The government added additional measures through a vicious propaganda campaign launched against the striking workers that seemingly made matters worse. Further strike actions scheduled for June 15 were postponed until June 18, but this strike did not succeed as the government was able to sell 26 percent of PTCL to a Dubai-based company and netted \$1.5 billion.

In 2003 doctors and teachers formed the Joint Action Committee in Punjab province against privatization, forcing the government to give up on its policy of privatizing colleges and hospitals. This reemergence of class politics and social movements was further seen in late March, 2006 when 40,000 delegates thronged the arena of the World Social Forum held at Karachi to form the Awami Jamhoori Tehreek (People's Democratic Movement) (AJT). The AJT is comprised of the National Workers' Party (NWP), the Labor Party Pakistan (LPP), Awami Tehreek (AT People's Movement), the Pakistan Mazdoor Kissan Party (PMKP), the Pakistan Mazdoor Mehaz (Workers' Front) (PMM), and the Meraj Mohammed Khan Group (MMKG). After the murder of Benazir Bhutto and the crackdown by President Musharraf, the AJT called for a boycott of the January 2008 elections.

SEE ALSO: Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1911–1984); Ibrahim, Mirza (ca. 1906–2000); Iqbal, Muhammad (1877–1938); Jalib, Habib (1928–1993); Nasir, Hassan (1928–1960)

References and Suggested Readings

Afzal, M. R. (2001) *Pakistan: History and Politics 1947–71*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

- Afzal, M. R. (2002) *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947–1958*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Ali, T. (1991) *Can Pakistan Survive?* London: Verso.
- Anonymous (1984) *Pakistan National Party*. Democratic Organization Series No. 3. New York: Pakistan Democratic Forum.
- Anonymous (n.d.) *Janabi Asia Main Mazdoor Tehreek*. Karachi: PILER.
- Anonymous (n.d.) *Pakistan Main Bain Bazo ki Jeddojuhdi or Kirdar* (The Struggle of Leftists in Pakistan). Lahore: Jeddojuhdi Publications.
- Anonymous (n.d.) *Pakistan Main Socialist Tehreek ka Mukhtasar Jaiza* (A Review of the Socialist Movement in Pakistan). Lahore: Socialist Party.
- Sayyed, K. B. (1980) *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change*. New York: Praeger.
- Talbot, I. (1999) *Pakistan: A Modern History*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Palmares slave revolts, 1602–1603

Gregory R. Smulewicz-Zucker

Palmares was a *quilombo* (in English, a “maroon society”) or settlement founded by runaway slaves in Pernambuco, a state in northeast Brazil. At the height of its power, it consisted of a vast network of villages, ruled by a king in Macaco, the *quilombo*’s capital. Because the king was elected and his power was checked by a council of elders, Palmares is often labeled a republic, but one with distinctively traditional African features. Its name derives from what the Portuguese called the generally uncharted and largely uncolonized interior of Pernambuco, filled with palm trees and marked by inhospitable mountain ranges beyond the official Portuguese coastal settlements. The *quilombo* of Palmares existed for close to a century, during which time it resisted assaults led by both the Portuguese and Dutch regimes in Pernambuco’s capital, Recife. Because of its longevity, Palmares has fascinated scholars of slave resistance and come to symbolize resistance to oppression for peoples of African descent.

At the outset, the murkiness of facts about the origin of the *quilombo* and the nature of life there must be appreciated. The success of Palmares was an embarrassment for colonial authorities and most records were destroyed in an effort to suppress its memory. The records that do survive primarily give the Portuguese or Dutch side of the story. Until recently, the year

of Palmares’ establishment was contested, with estimates ranging decades apart. Only since the seminal research of R. K. Kent in the 1960s do scholars agree that Palmares was established around 1605–6, if not slightly earlier – the time that the earliest records exist of Portuguese settlers complaining of raids on their farms by the Palmarinos (inhabitants of Palmares). It was most likely founded by a core group of approximately 40 escaped slaves originally from the broad part of Africa that was called Guinea, which at that time could have referred to nearly all of West Africa. The earliest slaves who came to Palmares were Bantu-speakers from around the modern Angola region, but as the society evolved and the population grew, it eventually consisted of Africans with diverse ethnic and geographic origins. There is also evidence suggesting that indigenous peoples and poor Portuguese farmers also lived in the *quilombo*. It is perhaps one of Palmares’ most remarkable qualities that Africans who came from different tribes and ethnic groups and spoke different languages were able to live together, let alone with indigenous Brazilians and poor European settlers, relatively as equals.

The first enslaved Africans were brought to Brazil by the Portuguese in the 1530s to work on the sugar plantations. Sugar production in the states of Bahia and Pernambuco supplied nearly one-half of the world’s sugar. There was a lower mortality rate among slaves during the sea voyage from Africa to Brazil than there was during voyages from Africa to the Caribbean, making the entire enterprise in Brazil cheaper. Because transporting slaves was relatively inexpensive, slave owners often worked slaves to death in their effort to answer the world market’s growing demand for sugar. They would simply buy new slaves rather than incur the greater cost of keeping a slave alive. By the mid-seventeenth century, somewhere around 4,000 slaves were arriving per year in Pernambuco alone. From the outset, enslavement and the brutality of slave owners bred resistance among the Africans. Slaves who escaped the plantation moved into the uncolonized interior of Brazil and founded their first *quilombos*.

Palmares was among the earliest of the *quilombos* and certainly among the most successful. Abundant natural resources fed and housed the *quilombo*’s inhabitants while the mountainous terrain provided natural defenses against the

Portuguese authorities. Word of Palmares' thriving society spread to the plantations, encouraging enslaved Africans to escape plantation life and attracting freed slaves. While Palmares probably began as a scattered and disorganized array of small village communities or *mocambos* (derived from a word meaning "hideout" in Ambundu – a Bantu language spoken by the Ovimbundu people of Angola) with weak ties to each other, by the 1640s it had evolved into a republic with power centralized in the capital. It is interesting to note that throughout Palmares' existence, the Portuguese never referred to it as a *quilombo* but always called it a *mocambo*, perhaps because the latter referred to smaller-sized fugitive slave communities and seemed less threatening.

As best they could, the escaped slaves recreated the West African forms of government into which they had been born and from which they were stolen away. A complex societal structure emerged: the republic was divided into *mocambos*, each of which was ruled by a chief to whom the citizens could voice their grievances. The chief was responsible for upholding laws that punished murder, theft, adultery, and desertion. The chief, in turn, answered to the king in the capital *mocambo*, Macaco. Regular meetings of all the chiefs were held before the king in Macaco to discuss issues pertaining to the general interest of Palmares, such as the ongoing war with the Portuguese. The king's legitimacy was probably derived from royal African ancestry, but, following the model of many West African societies, he ruled with the advice and sanctions of a council. As in most West African models of government, the council probably retained the right to depose kings whose rule was seen as tyrannical. Thus, there was a system of checks and balances on power. In stark contrast to life on the plantation, the escaped slaves living in Palmares were subject to rulers whom they recognized as legitimate and who recognized them as their subjects.

Life in Palmares was not a complete replica of life in an African kingdom. The escaped slaves had assimilated some of the culture and religion that they encountered under Portuguese rule. Particularly in the case of religion, they adopted some aspects of Catholicism and reinvented them by mixing them with the religious practices and beliefs of their homelands. The citizens appealed to Catholic saints for help, but these saints were identified with the traditional African gods, goddesses, and spirits who per-

formed similar roles. Thus, traditional African and Christian religious figures and rituals were syncretized. Portuguese and Dutch reports also suggest that there was a chapel in Macaco and that the inhabitants of Palmares wore European-style dress.

The population in the capital of Macaco was large even by colonial European standards. Estimates by colonial authorities vary from 5,000 to 15,000 inhabitants in Macaco, with a possible total of 30,000 inhabitants if all of the other *mocambos* were to be included. From the capital, the king governed over the villages which extended for somewhere around 100 miles. The success and growth of the republic was due in no small way to the able efforts of its farmers, who worked a land that was fertile and could satisfy the needs of its inhabitants. The farmers built stores of food for the winter and in preparation for wartime.

The citizens of Palmares were extremely capable warriors. They led regular raids on neighboring plantations and farms for supplies. These raids helped contribute to the growth of the republic's population as people were often captured and taken back to the republic. Yet the status of African slaves captured during these raids helps shed light on class structure in Palmares. Only those escaped slaves who made their way to Palmares by their own means were considered free within the republic. Those slaves who were captured by citizens of Palmares during raids on the plantations remained slaves within the republic. Thus, there was a distinction between the slave class and free class in Palmares. However, the form of slavery that these twice-enslaved persons were subjected to in Palmares was certainly less brutal and more familiar to them, even acceptable by traditional African standards, than that which they faced on Portuguese plantations.

For almost the entire first half of the seventeenth century, Palmares was an accepted reality of life for its nearby neighbors. Many of the indigenous people living near Palmares recognized its strength and chose to make treaties with the republic. Poor white farmers living nearby also chose to cooperate with the republic rather than aid the Portuguese in their failed attempts to destroy it. This relatively peaceful and quiet status quo was interrupted by the Dutch takeover of Pernambuco in 1637. At first, the fighting between the Portuguese and the Dutch only helped the population grow. The fight for

Pernambuco gave slaves greater opportunities to run away and become citizens of Palmares. Once the Dutch solidified their control over Pernambuco, their new governor, Johan Moritz van Nassau, began ordering attacks on Palmares. Throughout the 1640s the citizens of Palmares faced Dutch invaders, but the Dutch offensives were unable to overtake the republic. Eventually, the Dutch had to focus their military resources on the Portuguese who were attempting to regain control of their lucrative colony. The Portuguese ultimately succeeded and in 1654 Pernambuco was restored to Portuguese domination.

Upon their return to power in Pernambuco, the Portuguese government in the capital of Recife once again had to deal with the existence of Palmares. Official reports express Portuguese frustration at being able to oust the Dutch, but not being able to defeat Palmares. As long as Palmares existed, it threatened Portuguese interests in Pernambuco. Word of its prosperity could only spread among slaves, engendering acts of rebellion. In 1678, the then king of Palmares, Ganga Zumba, sued for peace and the Portuguese responded with a proposal for a peace treaty. Ganga Zumba had just fended off a devastating attack led by the Portuguese commander Fernão Carrilho. At the time of the Portuguese proposal, it seems that both Pernambuco's new governor, Aires de Souza Castro, and King Ganga Zumba had grown weary of the ongoing war. The Portuguese would recognize Ganga Zumba's sovereignty on the condition that he return all captured slaves to the Portuguese and move the republic to the Cucaú Valley. Ganga Zumba accepted the peace terms. Disagreement with the terms of the peace agreement and speculation that the Portuguese offer was disingenuous prompted the creation of a rival faction under the leadership of the military leader Zumbi (Ganga Zumba's nephew). Ganga Zumba was ultimately overthrown by Zumbi and his followers. Ganga Zumba died soon after his return from the Cucaú Valley. Legends abound about the circumstances of his death, some of which suggest that he was killed by Zumbi while others suggest that he may have taken poison as a patriotic gesture in order to further enflame the Palmarinos against the Portuguese.

Under Zumbi's leadership, the war between Palmares and the governing authority in Pernambuco resumed. From 1680 to 1693, Palmares

faced a reinvigorated, but largely unsuccessful, Portuguese offensive. In 1693, the Portuguese finally sought assistance from a group of *bandeirantes*, or frontiersmen, led by Domingos Jorge Velho. As shown in a 1693 agreement, the governor granted Velho and his forces land in Palmares for settlement. The agreement also stipulated that the governor would not grant pardons nor show mercy to any of the captured Palmarinos. Velho's forces were more accustomed to fighting on the harsh mountain terrain, but it took months to defeat the large network of villages that were ruled from the capital. The siege on the capital took over a month and required 3,000 Portuguese soldiers in addition to the *bandeirante* forces. In February 1694, Velho and his forces broke through the heavily fortified walls of Macaco. When it finally became clear that the city was lost to Velho and the Portuguese, hundreds of Palmarinos chose suicide over re-enslavement, many of them jumping off nearby cliffs. Zumbi was taken alive. He was decapitated on November 20, 1695 and his head was put on display to discourage future slave uprisings.

The Portuguese effort to banish Palmares and Zumbi from historical memory failed. Word of Palmares continued to inspire slaves throughout South America and the Caribbean to escape plantations and found "maroon societies." In Brazil, the date of Zumbi's execution is celebrated as Black Consciousness Day. Even today, Palmares has left its mark on Afro-Brazilian intellectual life as the Unipalmares University in São Paulo bears the name of the famed republic. The *quilombo* and its final leader, Zumbi, have also been the subject of two films by the noteworthy Brazilian film director Carlos Diegues and songs written by the internationally renowned Brazilian musician Gilberto Gil.

SEE ALSO: Zumbi (ca. 1655–1695)

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, R. N. (1996) The *Quilombo* of Palmares: A New Overview of a Maroon State in Seventeenth-Century Brazil. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 28, 3, Brazil: History and Society (October): 545–66.
- Chapman, C. E. (1918) Palmares: The Negro Numantia. *Journal of Negro History* 3, 1 (January): 29–32.
- Curtin, P. D. (1990) *The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Diggs, I. (1953) Zumbi and the Republic of Os Palmares. *Phylon* 14, 1 (1st Qtr.): 62–70.

- Fausto, B. (1999) *A Concise History of Brazil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Genovese, E. D. (1979) *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
- Kent, R. K. (1965) Palmares: An African State in Brazil. *Journal of African History* 6 (2): 161–75.
- Levine, R. M. & Crocitti, J. J. (Eds.) (1999) *The Brazil Reader: History, Culture and Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Robinson, C. J. (2000) *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Palmer raids

Tom Collins

Between November 1919 and February 1920, the US Department of Justice carried out raids against suspected radical organizations, rounding up more than 6,000 “alien agitators” with the intention of deporting them. Many were arrested without warrants, denied legal counsel, and detained for months. Ultimately around 800 individuals, identified as communists or anarchists, were expelled from the United States.

A. Mitchell Palmer, the politically ambitious attorney general in the Woodrow Wilson administration, oversaw the raids. He was spurred by public alarm about a perceived “red threat” following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and violent domestic incidents such as the bombing by radicals of Palmer’s own home in June 1919. Palmer drew upon the Immigration Act of 1918 as his mechanism to launch the raids. This Act stipulated that aliens were subject to deportation if they belonged to an organization that espoused political violence. Under the immigration laws, deportation was regarded as an administrative function, in which the alien had no constitutional protections. The Justice Department could thereby target radical aliens without needing to prove their criminality through court proceedings.

In November 1919, Palmer acted against members of the Union of Russian Workers. The headquarters in New York City operated primarily to provide basic social services for workingmen, most of whom had no knowledge of the organization’s radical goals. With orchestrated precision, a riot squad descended on the building, catching the workers unawares, beating

them with clubs, smashing typewriters, and carting off “several tons” of literature. All but 39 of the 650 workers arrested were eventually released for lack of evidence. In December, 249 alien radicals, including Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, were deported on a ship derided in the press as the “Soviet Ark.” In January 1920 the Justice Department undertook a dramatic series of raids in 33 cities, netting more than 4,000 suspects, including most of the country’s communist leadership. Palmer described his prisoners with language that reflected prevailing anti-immigrant prejudices: “Out of the sly and crafty eyes of many of them leap cupidity, cruelty, insanity, and crime; from their lopsided faces, sloping brows, and misshapen features may be recognized the unmistakable criminal type” (quoted in Murray 1955: 219). Most of the American public lauded his efforts, but historians view the Palmer raids as one of the most egregious violations of civil liberties in the nation’s history.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism in the United States to 1945; Anarchism in the United States, 1946–Present; Berkman, Alexander (1870–1936); Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA); Goldman, Emma (1869–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- Coben, S. (1963) *A. Mitchell Palmer: Politician*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Murray, R. K. (1955) *Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1929*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Theoharis, A. G. & Cox, J. S. (1988) *The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Pamphleteering and political protest, Dutch Republic, 1672

J. M. F. Daudeij

The political pamphlet gives us an insight into seventeenth-century ideas about the relation between citizens and their government in the Dutch Republic and the use of language in political protest. Although the relationship was like that of master over servant, inhabitants of the towns who were able to obtain formal citizenship

were more than just subjects. Citizenship, to quote Charles Tilly, may be defined as the “continuing series of transactions between persons and agents of a given state in which each has enforceable rights and obligations” (1995: 8). Besides paying taxes, citizens had duties such as defending the town or restoring order as members of the militia. This gave them a certain power because the regents who governed the cities relied on their loyalty. In return, those in power had to protect the rights of the citizens and foster their interests. A citizen also had access to a guild, an institution that offered protection against the uncertainties of the capitalizing society.

The most important function of late medieval institutions like the guilds, the militia, and the restricted form of citizenship was that in times of protest, citizens could claim to have certain legal rights, including influence in the election of regents (van Zanden & Prak 2006). Protesters saw themselves not as a rebellious mob, but as defenders of their legal rights against tyrannous oligarchic regents. Relations between citizen and regent were usually peaceful, and there were only a few occasions when citizens actively participated in the political process by protesting. One such instance was in 1672, when protesters succeeded in obtaining a change within the government. To understand why this happened, it is important to take a closer look at the political structure of the Dutch Republic.

The Dutch Republic consisted of seven autonomous provinces, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Brabant, Gelderland, Groningen, and Friesland. At the local level, the balance of power between the nobility, the cities, and the provincial councils differed slightly by province. In the more agrarian provinces the nobility had the strongest voice, but in Holland and Zeeland, which were more urbanized, it had almost no power. In these provinces the *regenten* were the power-holders. Their primary job was to defend the interests and historical rights and privileges of the cities. In theory every respectable legal citizen could be elected as a regent, but in practice only members of families belonging to the aristocratic elite of extremely wealthy merchants and *regenten* were chosen. This meant that a successful political career in the republic depended on the power of one’s family. If a regent was sent as a deputy to one of the provincial or national councils, his primary obligation was not to the province or the republic but to his own town. This

fragmented sovereignty may be compared to the type of government system that operated in Flanders, Northern Italy, and in some parts of Germany. This decentralization and the strong connection between aristocratic families and rich merchants was one of the main causes of the city-states’ economic power (Price 1994). However, these elites became increasingly oligarchic. The only outsider able to influence the election of new regents was the *stadhouder*, which was why the *regenten* of the rich merchant towns of Holland decided to abandon this function in 1666 (Israel 1995).

The seven provinces organized themselves on a national level and built a strong military force. Administrative functions were undertaken by the *Staten-Generaal* and the *Raad van Staten*. Officially, every province was equal and decisions in the *Staten-Generaal* had to be carried unanimously, but this occurred only once in the history of the republic, and most of the time a majority was sufficient. As the richest province, Holland paid 53 percent of the total cost of the army. Its interests lay in the merchant activities of the cities and differed from those of the inland provinces. Holland could only be overruled when a majority of the provinces was able to form a faction that included some of the cities of Holland and the *stadhouder* against it. In 1672, the term oligarchy (*staatsgezinden*) specifically referred to those *regenten* of Holland and Zeeland who were in favor of a less powerful *stadhouder*.

The function of *stadhouder* was a strange monarchical element in the republic. When it was ruled by the Hapsburg empire, every monarch had a representative to govern the Low Countries and to mediate in conflicts between rival cities. As the representative of the sovereign, he had the power to elect the *regenten*. Although the Seven Provinces had rejected Philip II as their sovereign, the function of *stadhouder* remained as part of the *Staten-Generaal*. This led to the strange situation whereby the *stadhouder*, being able to elect *regenten*, indirectly chose his own principals. Having the right to sit in the *Staten-Generaal* and to command the army meant that he was very powerful. Occasionally the *stadhouder* could profit from ongoing rivalries between the provinces’ individual towns or *facties*, especially when Holland and the other provinces were in conflict. The *stadhouder* could, and did, make a difference in these situations (Prak 2005). Because the function of *stadhouder* was closely

related to the House of Orange, the people and *regents* who were in favor of him were known as *orangisten*. Those in favor of a less powerful *stadhouder*, the oligarchy, were called the *staatsgezinden*. These labels developed from the textual framework of the pamphlets.

Compared to countries such as France, England, or Germany, the government seemed more reluctant to use harsh restrictions to control the content of print. This was not so much due to a belief in the freedom of speech as it was an unintended effect of the high degree of decentralization. Because of the independence of the provinces and towns, restrictions on certain books or pamphlets were imposed in a very random fashion. Some unfortunate writers suffered time in prison, while other radical political writers and printers went unpunished. The republic became a safe haven for many radical writers from all over Europe (Israel 1995). One genre in particular that flourished because of the loose censorship was the pamphlet. Pamphlets were easy to produce, cheap to buy, and always offered readers a sensational reading experience. They did not print the latest news but gave readers a witty reflection on current events. Because of the high degree of literacy in the towns, pamphlets attracted a broad audience. Pamphleteers often used an entertaining approach and endeavored to sell as many copies as possible. Only 10 percent of pamphlets were sold at official bookstores; the rest were sold by poor people at market or door-to-door. For unemployed people it was an easy way to earn money (Harline 1987). The content was often offensive to the government and frequently labeled as filth. However, neither the *orangisten* nor the *staatsgezinden* took them seriously enough to hire pamphleteers to try to win the public's favor. Most of the political pamphlets in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic focused on the conflict between the *staatsgezinden* and the *orangisten*. These writings not only shaped political thought in the Republic, they were also involved in serious acts of protest.

In 1672, the combination of a hate campaign conducted through the radical pamphlets and several civic disturbances led to one of the most traumatic events in the history of the Dutch Republic. On August 6, citizens of The Hague murdered two of the leading figures of the ruling oligarchy, Johan and Cornelis de Witt. After killing them they mutilated the corpses, cut

off the fingers, and roasted and ate some other body parts. The militia, who were present and should have restored order, were clearly on the side of the protesters and did nothing to prevent the murder.

The immediate cause of the hate campaign and the violent climax was the successful invasion by France, England, and Münster, who captured several provinces of the Republic in less than three months. The oligarchy had failed dismally to defend the private property of those they governed – clear evidence of their incompetence for the pamphleteers who already opposed them and who sought to have them replaced. Many citizens thought William III should become *stadhouder*, as his father had been. After William II's death in 1652, William III was too young to govern and the republic was ruled by *regenten* in his stead. Because his father had tried to solve an internal conflict by sending the republic's army to attack the city of Amsterdam, the *regenten* of Holland decided in 1666 that their province would never again have a *stadhouder*. After the invasion by France, England, and Münster, those in favor of William III became more vocal, but the oligarchy refused to grant him any office of substance.

Many pamphleteers claimed that the oligarchy's leaders were selling the republic to the French king. An overwhelming majority of them believed that the republic could only be saved by installing William III as *stadhouder* and giving him supreme command of the army. Very few pamphleteers supported the oligarchy. The success of the conspiracy theory concerning the oligarchy's treason, especially that of Johan and Cornelis de Witt, arose through a process known as plotting. Certain topics or popular stories were reprinted or copied by other writers, with the result that rumors became the truth (Raymond 2003). At the same time, some of the pamphleteers demanded that citizens should have more influence in the election of the regents. Every town that was taken by the French caused greater social unrest in the other towns. Soon after the killing of other regents, William III was acknowledged as *stadhouder*. After his installation, he restored the hierarchical distance between citizen and regent.

The fact that it was not only the mob but also middle-class citizens who protested against their governors over more than two decades reveals clearly that the ruling oligarchy had lost its legitimacy. The murder of Johan and Cornelis de Witt

marked the rise of William III as the *stadhouder*. The man whom the oligarchy was determined should not be allowed the political power of his famous ancestors ultimately became one of the most powerful figures of the Dutch Republic. In none of the pamphlets was there a direct order to kill Johan or Cornelis de Witt. However, the majority of pamphlets, filled with arguments based on the ideology of citizenship and combined with accusations against the oligarchy, did have their effect on public opinion. These events show that premodern print could play an important role in the battle between opposing factions. There is still much research to be done on the role of print in the Dutch Republic. However, recent interest in the role of print in the process of state-making and the emphasis on the concept of citizenship in Dutch historiography will deepen our knowledge in the years ahead.

SEE ALSO: Dutch Revolt, 1568–1648

References and Suggested Readings

- Bickle, P. (Ed.) (1997) *The Origins of the Modern State in Europe: Resistance, Representation, and Community*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Dekker, R. (1989) Some Remarks about Collective Action and Collective Violence in the History of the Netherlands. *Tijdschrift voor Sociale geschiedenis* 15: 335–65.
- Frijhoff, W. & Spies, M. (Eds.) (2004) *1650: Hard-Won Unity*. Assen: Royal van Gorcum.
- Harline, C. E. (1987) *Pamphlets, Printing and Political Culture in the Early Dutch Republic*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Israel, J. I. (1995) *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477–1806*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Prak, M. R. (2005) *The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: The Golden Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Price, J. L. (1994) *Holland and the Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century: The Politics of Particularism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Raymond, J. (2003) *Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sawyer, J. K. (1990) *Printed Poison: Pamphlet Propaganda, Faction Politics and the Public Sphere in Early Seventeenth-Century France*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Tilly, C. (1995) Citizenship, Identity, and Social History. *International Review of Social History* 40 (Suppl. 3): 1–19.
- Van Zanden, J. L. & Prak, M. (2006) Towards an Economic Interpretation of Citizenship: The Dutch

Republic between Medieval Communes and Modern Nation-States. *European Review of Economic History* 10: 111–45.

Zaret, D. (2000) *Origins of Democratic Culture: Printing, Petitions, and the Public Sphere in Early-Modern England*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Panama, Cemaco's anti-colonial resistance, 1510–1512

Inga Töller

Cemaco was an indigenous leader in Darien Province in sixteenth-century Panama who led his men in the struggle against the Spanish colonialists under the leadership of Vasco Nuñez de Balboa. In 1510 Cemaco and around 500 of his men clashed with the Spanish in an attempt to defend their territory. In this violent battle Cemaco lost a lot of his men and had to abandon his main town, which the Spaniard Vasco Nuñez de Balboa then called Santa María La Antigua, and which became the first Spanish town on the American mainland. Cemaco's first defeat was to mark the beginning of continuous battles by one of the most important Darien *caciques* (headchiefs) who, to defend the land against the Spanish, allied himself with other regional *caciques* such as Abenamaque, Abibeiba, Abraiba, Dabaiba, Eclava, and Zururiaga. On several occasions Cemaco and his allies attacked colonial expeditions in the area, who were on the search for gold.

There are three larger battles recounted in the chronicles in which Cemaco and 400 fighters attacked colonial expeditions. In one, Francisco Pizarro was injured, and on another occasion in 1512 Cemaco organized his allies in the area of Río Negro to ambush the colonialists and attack them so violently that they retreated to La Antigua.

Cemaco's last documented attempt to reconquer his capital, at night by sea and land with 5,000 fighters, was in 1512. They installed their camp in Tichirí, from where they planned to recapture the city. For strategic reasons Cemaco had sent 40 of his men to live in the town conquered by Nuñez de Balboa, as Cemaco wanted him to imagine himself safe. They were supposed to kill Nuñez de Balboa, but as this was not successful, Cemaco decided to overrun the

town and the conqueror. The night before the action, a vassal of Cemaco informed his sister, who was living in the town and who was in a relationship with Nuñez de Balboa. It is said that she told Nuñez de Balboa about Cemaco's plans, and her brother was caught and had to lead the colonialists to Tichirí. But Cemaco was already informed and saved himself. There is no record that he was captured, enslaved, or tortured by the Spanish crown, though King Ferdinand urged Cemaco's enslavement.

There is very little information available on Cemaco, besides the chronicles of Fernández de Oviedo and Fray Bartolomé de las Casas and the letters of Vasco Nuñez de Balboa, all from the perspective of the Spanish. Cemaco is not considered a national hero in the official Panamanian history books, and is only noted in the margins, but one district in Darien Province in Panama bears his name.

SEE ALSO: Agüeybaná I (d. 1510) and Agüeybaná II (d. 1511); Aracaré (d. 1542); Caonabo (d. 1496); Guauhtémoc (1502–1525); Hatuey (ca. 1400s–1512); Jumandí (d. 1578); Lautaro (d. 1557); Lempira (d. 1537); Rumiñahui (d. 1535); Sepé Tiarajú (1722/3–1756); Tisquesuzá (d. 1537); Túpac Amaru (ca. 1540–1572)

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, C. L. G. (1970) *Life and Letters of Vasco Nuñez de Balboa*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
De Coll, J. O. (1980) *La resistencia indígena ante la conquista*. Mexico City: Siglo veintiuno editores.

Panama, nationalism and popular mobilization, 1947–2000

María Ximena Álvarez Martínez

Panama's twentieth-century history is scarred by US intervention and aggression against the country's sovereignty. On November 18, 1903, only 15 days after its independence from Colombia, the Treaty of Hay-Bunau Varilla with the US was signed. This treaty granted the Americans the right to construct an inter-oceanic canal, military occupation of the zone, and the prerogative to grant its independence, an element used to justify US interventions in Panama's internal affairs. In 1941 a new consti-

tutional article was approved that removed its authority for military intervention, but this was generally ignored.

Hoping to maintain military bases outside the Canal Zone, in December 1947 the US sought approval of the Treaty of Defense Sites in the Panamanian National Assembly that would have extended a war measure passed in 1942. In spite of the frustrated efforts of President Enrique A Jimenes to convince the population that the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR, September 1947) would give the country the advantage of security, the people's opposition was quickly demonstrated. Members of Panama's Students' Federation (FEP), the Youth Patriotic Front, and other organizations took to the streets on December 12 to protest the treaty, which was seen as an insult to the country's already vulnerable sovereignty. This social upheaval with nationalistic undertones forced the National Assembly to reject the project.

The American flag fluttering in the Canal Zone became for many the grotesque visualization of US occupation, so on May 12, 1958, students of the University's Students' Union (UEU) planted 75 Panamanian flags along the canal. This movement, known as the "Sowing of Flags," was followed by more violent actions, ending in a major confrontation on January 9, 1964. A new protest with flags took place on the day of the commemoration of the country's independence on November 3, 1958, when politicians and intellectuals, such as Deputy Aquilino Boyd, joined with students and other social organizations. Violent repression by the police and the US Army ended the event and several people were injured. The National Assembly expressed protest and stated it would not rest until the Panamanian flag was raised over the Canal Zone. In 1960, US President Dwight Eisenhower determined that to avoid further protests, both flags would be raised in the zone.

A new popular manifestation took place in October 1962 at the inauguration of the bridge that crosses the Pacific entrance to the canal. On this occasion Maurice Thatcher, an American member of the Isthmian Canal Commission and civil governor of the Canal Zone from 1910 to 1913, was prevented from delivering his speech. At the same time, the bridge's name was changed from the provocative Thatcher Ferry Bridge to the more Latin American Bridge of the Americas.

The conflict reached its peak on January 9, 1964, setting a milestone for nationalistic Panamanian movements against the United States. On that day, due to US students' failure to comply with the measure to raise both flags, students of the National Institute attempted to raise the national flag while singing the national anthem. This students' confrontation was used by the police and the US Army to launch a display of violence with machine guns and tanks against the Panamanian population, who faced them with sticks, stones, and hunting rifles. In spite of the Panamanian government's request to cease fire and the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the US, the violence did not end until January 11. Official sources stated that 25 people were killed and 500 injured. Through the Organization of American States (OEA), diplomatic relations between the countries were re-established only three months after the incident.

The 1960s were characterized by constant protests, strikes, and mobilizations among broad social sectors who were unhappy with the government's economic policy and the abuse of power by their unpopular president, Marcos Robles (1964–8), nicknamed Marcos Rifle in an allusion to the repression he had instigated. A new "Three to One" treaty designed to regulate the United States' relations to the canal was widely rejected by the population in 1968, as with the Treaty of Defense Sites in 1947.

The popular mobilizations were neutralized by a coup d'état in 1968. General Omar Torrijos Herrera became head of the military government in 1969 and began his "modernist revolution," signing a new treaty with US President Jimmy Carter (the Torrijos–Carter Treaty) that established the return of the Canal Zone to Panama on December 31, 1999, in exchange for permanent neutrality. This left the door open for a US military intervention if its safety was threatened, but the success of having achieved Panama's sovereignty over the Canal Zone was presented by the government as a continuation of the martyrs' struggle of January 1964, and any demonstration of opposition was forbidden.

Like an ill-fated prophecy, the US invaded Panama on December 20, 1989, with the pretext of overthrowing Panamanian president and former CIA official Manuel Noriega. Intending to keep troops there until after 2000, US President George Bush sent military troops against a population that offered no resistance. Thousands

of people, especially in Panama City's shantytowns, were killed. An investigation into how many Panamians died because of the invasion was obstructed by the new Panamanian president, Guillermo Endara, and the United States Southern Command, and the existence of common graves was never admitted. The United States Conference of Catholics Bishops declared that there were about 3,000 victims; other sources report a total of over 4,000.

Operation Just Cause, as the invasion was called, led to a deep economic and social crisis in Panama. It is remembered every December 20 by the population of Chorrillo, one of the communities along the water's edge in Panama City. Small wooden houses are built, filled with explosives and black flags tied to pieces of meat, and then set on fire in remembrance of the the victims whose bodies were burned on the night of the invasion. The place had been built for workers on the canal and overnight was set on fire, leaving it unrecognizable.

In 1992 during President Bush's visit to the country, anti-American protests filled the city. Despite the efforts of Mayor Omayra "Mayín" Correa, who organized the event known as the "Meeting with Friends," the president was booed, called a murderer, and forced to dodge stones and coconuts on Porras Square in the city of Panama. He was finally evacuated by security forces. The protesters – students, popular organizations, business organizations belonging to the National Council of Private Enterprise (CONEP), and some politicians – were denounced by the US embassy as a minority of Noriega supporters and relatives, who resented the loss of their property because of the invasion.

When the zone was returned to Panamanian control on December 31, 1999, neither US President Bill Clinton, Vice-President Al Gore, nor Secretary of State Madeleine Albright attended. The day that was called "the biggest day in Panama's history" was promoted as the end of the US occupation and the beginning of absolute sovereignty, but US military "safeguarding" of the canal continues according to the stipulations of the Treaty of Neutrality of 1977. Nevertheless, it has been underlined by many Panamanians that Panama is the only country in the twentieth century to have peacefully expelled the world's most powerful army from its territory. This act has a strong symbolic value for the whole of Latin America.

SEE ALSO: Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán (1913–1971); Hawaii, Resistance to US Invasion and Occupation; Mossadegh, Mohammad (1881–1967); Philippines, Protest during the US Era; Torrijos, General Omar (1929–1981)

References and Suggested Readings

- Arosemaena, J. et al. (2003) *En el centenario de la Segunda República*. Panamá: ARTICSA.
- Azcárate, F. (2006) *Panamá, su andar en el tiempo*. Panamá: ARTICSA.
- Comisión Universitaria del Centenario de la República (2004) *Panamá cien años de República*. Panamá.
- Montiel Guevara, M. & Tack, J. A. (1998) *Hitos históricos de la lucha generacional por la consolidación y perfeccionamiento de la nación y el estado panameño*. Panamá: Imprenta Universitaria.
- Perigault Sánchez, B. (1998) *Cronología comparada del Canal de Panamá*. Panamá: Editorial Universitaria.
- Ramírez, L. E. (2002) *Panamá y su Historia*. Panamá: ARTICSA.

Pankhurst, Emmeline (1858–1928), Christabel (1880–1958), and Sylvia (1882–1960)

June Purvis

The Pankhurst women, suffragettes and social reformers, are the most important feminist family in British history. Emmeline Goulden, the spirited eldest daughter of a cotton manufacturer, was born in Manchester, England, where she met and married Richard Marsden Pankhurst, a well-known radical barrister. Their three daughters – Christabel Harriette Pankhurst, Estelle Sylvia Pankhurst, and Adela Constantia Mary Pankhurst (1885–1961) – were brought up in a household where their parents supported advanced causes of the day, especially women’s suffrage and socialism. From an early age, the girls were taken to political meetings and encouraged to work for the good of the people.

The death of Richard in 1898 was a devastating blow. When Emmeline heard that the hall built in her husband’s memory was to be used by a branch of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) that would not admit women she was so indignant that she formed the Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU) in 1903 to campaign for the parliamentary vote for women. The



Known for public displays and radical efforts to gain the vote for women in Britain, suffragettes often found themselves at odds with the police. In June 1914, Emmeline Pankhurst is taken away by authorities after leading fellow suffragettes in an effort to deliver a petition to the king. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)

WSPU, with the motto “Deeds, not words,” limited its membership to women and engaged in daring and courageous tactics that became newsworthy.

For the next 11 years the charismatic Emmeline Pankhurst and the charming, witty Christabel, her favorite daughter, led the so-called “militant” campaign. Emmeline, whose oratory could move an audience to tears, was its inspirational yet notorious figurehead. Her courage and resolute determination became legendary as she endured 13 imprisonments in an attempt to wrest the vote from an obdurate Liberal government. Christabel, the WSPU’s chief organizer as well as its key strategist, believed that militant action was necessary for women to gain dignity in a society that regarded them as inferior and subordinate beings. She emphasized the importance of women working together in sisterhood, irrespective of social class or political affiliation.

Initially, the WSPU engaged in peaceful forms of civil disobedience such as heckling MPs and deputations to Parliament. But gradually these forms of protest were extended to include destruction of property, especially from 1912 when mass window-smashing of shops in London's West End took place, empty buildings were set on fire, pillar boxes vandalized, and art treasures attacked. The aim was always to damage property, never to endanger life.

Throughout these years, Sylvia and Adela were active in the WSPU too but, as socialist feminists, became increasingly unhappy with the direction of policy. Sylvia in particular was deeply upset when, in 1907, Emmeline and Christabel resigned their membership of the ILP and sought to recruit middle-class women. Seeking to fuse her socialism and feminism she eventually founded a grouping among the working classes in London's East End. Although formally affiliated to the WSPU, the East London Federation of the Suffragettes followed its own independent line in that, contrary to WSPU policy, it would not attack the Labour Party, advocated mass rather than individual protest, and included men as well as women members. The differences in policy led Emmeline and Christabel to expel Sylvia from the WSPU in January 1914. Later that month, Emmeline sent the unsettled Adela to Australia, since she believed that she might join forces with Sylvia to form a rival grouping to the WSPU.

World War I heightened the political and personal tensions between the Pankhurst women. Emmeline and Christabel called a halt to militant action and became patriotic feminists, supporting the war effort and encouraging women to enter war work as a way to earn their enfranchisement. Sylvia and Adela became pacifists, supporting non-conscription, strike action among trade unionists, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and internationalism. Anticipating the franchise reform of 1918, when certain categories of women over the age of 30 would be granted the parliamentary vote, the elder Pankhursts re-launched the WSPU as the Women's Party in 1917. The following years, Christabel stood unsuccessfully for Parliament on a Women's Party ticket. She converted to Second Adventism, eventually settling in the United States where she became a successful writer and preacher of the Second Coming of Christ. She was awarded a DBE in 1936.

Emmeline Pankhurst too went to North America in the 1920s, eventually settling in Toronto where she became a lecturer on social hygiene. After a failed attempt (together with Christabel and Mabel Tuke) to run a tea-shop on the French Riviera, she returned to England in 1925 and offered to stand as a parliamentary candidate for the Conservative Party. When campaigning in April 1928 she heard news that had been carefully kept from her: Sylvia had given birth out of wedlock. The shock hastened the failing Emmeline's death two months later, a few weeks before women were finally granted the parliamentary vote on equal terms with men.

During the 1920s both Sylvia and Adela had moved further and further to the left, each becoming founder members of the Communist Party in Britain and Australia, respectively. Although Sylvia was expelled from the Party, she was never reconciled with her mother, unlike Adela, who had come to reject trade unionism and socialism and, many years later, would convert to Roman Catholicism.

SEE ALSO: Britain, Women's Suffrage Campaign; Women's Movement, Britain

References and Suggested Readings

- Coleman, V. (1996) *Adela Coleman: The Wayward Suffragette 1885–1961*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Harrison, S. (2001) *Sylvia Pankhurst: A Crusading Life 1882–1960*. London: Aurum Press.
- Mitchell, D. (1977) *Queen Christabel: A Biography of Christabel Pankhurst*. London: MacDonal & Jane's.
- Pugh, M. (2001) *The Pankhursts*. London: Penguin.
- Purvis, J. (2002) *Emmeline Pankhurst: A Biography*. London: Routledge.
- Purvis, J. (2007) The Pankhursts and the Great War. In A. S. Fell & I. Sharp (Eds.), *The Women's Movement in Wartime: International Perspectives, 1914–19*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Paraguay, Archive of Terror

Christina Turner[†]

General Alfredo Stroessner took control of Paraguay in 1954. He and the Colorado Party ran the country until 1989, when the Movimiento del 2 de Febrero, led by General Andrés Rodríguez, ousted Stroessner. During his 35 years in power,

Stroessner consolidated and maintained his position through arrests, torture, and intimidation of his enemies and awards for his allies. Despite the regime change, the Colorado Party remained in power under the leadership of Rodríguez, who called for a move to democracy and open elections.

In 1992 the government of Rodríguez elected a National Constitutional Assembly that promulgated a new Constitution. Article 135 of the new Constitution allows citizens the right of *habeas data* to access state information about themselves. A former political prisoner, Dr. Martín Almada, secured a writ of *habeas data* to search for information about his own incarceration and torture during the Stroessner regime. He had been imprisoned from 1974 to 1977 and later exiled from Paraguay. Acting on behalf of Almada, a judicial team led by judges of the Second and Third Criminal Courts, José Agustín Fernández and Luíz María Benítez Riera, surrounded the Departamento de Producciones de la Policía in Lambaré, a suburb 4 kilometers from the capital of Asunción on December 22, 1992. The judges were acting under the *habeas data* provisions of the Constitution looking for documents pertaining to Almada, but they found much more. There were stacks of documents from the secret archives of the political police, the Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policía de la Capital (DIPC). The judges alerted the media (as witnesses) and began the movement of the confiscated documents to the eighth floor of the headquarters of Paraguay's judicial branch, the Palacio de Justicia in Asunción.

During the next several weeks there were more *habeas data* raids on police stations resulting in additional papers from the police's Departamento Judicial. This department was responsible for the repression of the Christian Agrarian Leagues in the 1960s and 1970s. Along with documents concerning the Agrarian Leagues, there was information about the case of the longest-held political prisoner of the Stroessner period, Captain Napoleón Ortigoza, accused of conspiracy against the government and murdering an army cadet to cover up the plot. He confessed under torture, but later retracted his confession.

Judge Benítez Riera directed another team to surround the Dirección Nacional de Asuntos Técnicos, better known as La Técnica. The

United States helped fund La Técnica as a means to fight communism in Latin America after the Cuban Revolution. Many of the documents found were confiscated political tracts or books considered subversive. Some of the documents found indicated that the work of seeking subversives continued after the fall of Stroessner. Unfortunately, after uncovering the first archives, the directors of the agency, Antonio Campos Alúm and Felipe Nery Zaldívar, destroyed some incriminating evidence before absconding.

On March 26, 1993 the Paraguayan Supreme Court passed Resolution No. 81 that officially created the Center of Documentation and Archives for the Defense of Human Rights with the charge of preserving the discovered documents, ordering them, and making them available as resources for magistrates, journalists, students, and the general public in search of information. Effectively, the archive has two primary divisions. One part of the archive contains documents that pertain to the pre-Stroessner era dating back to the 1930s. The remaining documents form the major part of the archive. These documents cover the Stroessner years from 1954 to 1989.

Alfredo Boccia, Myrian González, and Rosa Palau helped document and classify the documents found. They report 700,000 pages of documents, 8,000 prison records, 1,800 identity cards and passports, and over 10,000 photographs. There are arrest records, release records, and transcripts of interrogations of prisoners. The archive includes volumes of internal documents of the DIPC. There are letters from real and presumed communists, letters from informers denouncing individuals, and letters from concerned international citizens about human rights abuse. There are official memos from the United States government noting the movements of people and indicating knowledge of tactics against subversives. The archives also include books, newspapers, and pamphlets considered to be of interest due to their content. Police records indicate how the search for the assassins of exiled Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle in the 1980s proceeded, as well as the tracking of known or suspected communists and other political dissidents.

Despite the fact that many important documents have since disappeared, including a CIA document, "How to Keep Torture Victims Alive,"

the archives are helping investigators document and prosecute human rights abuses not only in Paraguay, but also throughout the Southern Cone countries of Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Brazil. These countries were in a compact known as Operation Condor, a secret agreement between the respective military regimes to cooperate in the arrest and exchange of individuals across national boundaries by the secret police. The United States government was aware of Condor and many of the military officers involved trained at the School of the Americas.

The archive is open to the Paraguayan public and international scholars. In 1996 the Paraguayan Congress passed a Law of Reparation of Victims of the Dictatorship (Law 838) to pay indemnification for people unlawfully imprisoned and tortured by the police during the Stroessner period. This law has suffered some difficulty in implementation, but it spurred a concentrated effort to document names with events to use as evidence before the Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo).

In 2002 a new “archive of terror” was uncovered in the Sixth Precinct by Ombudsman Manuel María Páez Monges and Adjunct Ombudsman Raúl Marín. The Sixth Precinct is located near the Mburuvicha Roga or Presidential Residence. The two ombudsmen sealed ten packets of documents in plastic and left them in charge of the precinct chief while they sought legal access to them. Judge Jorge Bogarín certified the action. On February 15 officials of both the Ombudsman’s office and of the judiciary, along with the original archives discoverer Almada, recovered the sealed bags and searched several other municipal police stations and discovered hordes of brittle and yellowing papers, further documenting the repression during the Stroessner years. In the papers were reports, archives of people persecuted by the regime, and photographic albums of presumed terrorists. They also found tape recordings of Almada’s torture sessions in the 1970s. The newly discovered documents were sent to the Centro de Documentación del Poder Judicial, to be classified and added to the original Archive of Terror. Although not all the documents are catalogued, some newly discovered documents indicate that suspected opponents of the current Colorado Party regime are still being monitored. These include politicians, journalists, and activist priests.

These discoveries brought to light what the victims and their families had known, but which they had been unable to investigate. Thousands of documents that tell of violations and persons responsible for those actions, as well as others that relate the everyday life of citizens in the most intimate detail, illustrate what the Stroessner regime was capable of in order to maintain control. Today, documents are available that show evidence of how Operation Condor with its key strategic concept of national security beyond national frontiers was implemented, producing thousands of victims throughout Latin America.

Due to the richness of the information, the archive spurred the hope of bringing former government officials to justice for the perpetration of human rights crimes committed in Paraguay. There were calls for Stroessner, who fled to Brazil, to be brought to justice and tried for human rights violations. Several organizations worked together to initiate the process to constitute a Truth and Justice Commission in Paraguay. To this end, on February 3, 2004 the National Assembly enacted legislation known as Law 2225.

Another result of the discovery of the Archive of Terror was the planning of a memorial museum in the building where La Técnica operated. Ironically, the opening of the Museum of Memory, the Dictatorship and Democracy coincided with the death of Stroessner in Brazil on Wednesday, August 16, 2006 at the age of 93.

SEE ALSO: Paraguay, Protest in the Post-Stroessner Era; Paraguay, Protest and Revolt, 1954–1989

References and Suggested Readings

- Boccia, A., González, M., & Palau, R. (1994) *Es mi informe: los archivos secretos de la policía de Stroessner*. Asunción: Centro de Documentación y Estudios.
- Centro de Documentación y Archivo and UNESCO (2006) *Centro de documentación y archivo para la defensa de los derechos humanos, Corte Suprema de Justicia de Paraguay, Asunción*. Available at: www.unesco.org/webworld/paraguay/index.html. Accessed August 26, 2007.
- Nickson, R. A. (1995) Paraguay’s archive del terror. *Latin American Research Review* 30, 1: 125–9.
- Zoglin, K. (2001) Paraguay’s Archive of Terror: International Cooperation and Operation Condor. *University of Miami Inter-American Law Review* 32, 1: 57–82.

Paraguay, popular resistance to the rise of the military (1936–1954)

Brian Turner and Christina Turner[†]

The Chaco War (between Paraguay and Bolivia) lasted from 1932 to 1935. Mobilization for the war and conscription of troops strengthened the national state at the expense of patron–client ties in both the rural and urban sectors. This experience with protracted modern warfare led by professional soldiers unleashed revolutionary forces in both Bolivia and Paraguay. In February 1936, liberal president Eusebio Ayala, elected in 1932, was overthrown by elements within the nationalist military and the Association of Ex–Combatants and replaced by war hero Colonel Rafael Franco. This is known as the Febrerista Revolution.

There were several intellectual currents evident within the Franco regime which consisted of scholars as well as military men. The Febrerista regime lasted 18 months. During that time the reformist elements initiated a land redistribution program, expropriating some 68,325 hectares, including 20,000 from La Industria Paraguaya. The state's role in regulation of the economy increased. The reformist elements were sympathetic with organized labor and although there was very little labor action during the Chaco War, the Febrerista Revolution gave rise to popular pressure for social reform and fueled labor militancy after the war. Tactical differences between socialists and anarchists diminished, and together they formed a new unified labor confederation, the National Workers' Confederation (CNT). The first significant labor legislation and the first national labor department were created under Franco. Unions organized strikes in the yerba forests and in the tannin factories, provoking pressure on the government from private foreign investment and some in the military with sympathies for the fascist governments in Europe. Franco responded to these reactionary forces with his anti-union Decree Law 152 of March 1936. Labor support for Franco diminished and later in that year the army attacked CNT headquarters and arrested many trade unionists.

A Liberal Party–military alliance overthrew Franco in a 1937 counter-coup. The Liberal Party was restored to office but the military was now in power. The commander of the armed forces during and after the Chaco War, General José Félix Estigarribia, was elected president in 1939 on the Liberal Party ticket in an uncontested election. Estigarribia declared the definite end of the liberal period by proclaiming a new constitution in 1940, which dramatically expanded presidential power. Estigarribia, however, died in an airplane accident later that year and was replaced by his minister of defense, a former chief of staff of the army and anti-political, Higinio Morínigo.

During the previous decade, communists had infiltrated the trade unions, and by 1940 the union leadership was largely communist. The CNT changed its name to the Workers' Confederation of Paraguay (CPT). Morínigo made every effort to repress the unions during his early years in office, and then moved to co-opt them as World War II came to a close and pressure from the United States for political liberalization of the dictatorship increased; however, his efforts to create a Labor Party were met with fierce resistance from within the military. In 1946, Morínigo reorganized his government and formed a new cabinet with representation for the Colorado and Febrerista parties and from the armed forces. This allowed some breathing room for the labor movement, especially for unions affiliated with the Febreristas, who controlled the Department of Labor. The Communist Party met openly and an anarchosyndicalist group was revived. There were several successful strikes that garnered a shorter workday for printing–trade workers and higher pay for some hospital workers. This period of relative liberty of action was short-lived. By 1947 Morínigo was forced by his Colorado Party allies to purge the Febreristas from the government. The president imposed a state of siege and drove the Communist Party underground.

Febreristas, communists, and liberals began planning an invasion to overthrow the Morínigo regime. A military–civilian revolt erupted in March 1947, known as the bloody “Revolution of '47.” This civil war was caused by the politicization of the military into different partisan camps since the Febrerista Revolution of 1936. Factions of the army under the command of Colonel Alfredo Stroessner and the Colorado

Party supported Morínigo, while the factions of the army that responded to Colonel Franco and the liberals, Febreristas, and communists led the insurrection. The rather minor involvement of the Paraguayan Communist Party was sufficient for Morínigo to retain the support of the United States government.

From the beginning of the revolt there was an intellectual schism between the military and civilian insurrectionists. The military leaders were career soldiers who were opposed to the increasing influence of the Colorado Party over the military. However, they were not interested in seeing a different political party replacing the Colorado Party, so cooperation was limited with the civilians representing the Liberal and Febrerista parties. Because of this, the military failed to take advantage of potential civilian volunteers, even though some had fought in the Chaco War. This is not a mistake made by the government forces, which relied on the civilian militias of the Colorado Party. These militias were made up largely of peasants, called *py nandi* (barefoot ones), who managed to defeat a major portion of the armed forces. Doing so was not easy, though; losses are estimated at 50,000 dead. This event was the gravest internal clash in the post-independence history of Paraguay and laid the groundwork for political dominance by the Colorado Party for the rest of the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries.

The forces of the government held, and in April 1947 Morínigo emerged victorious, although he held a tiger by the tail in the Colorado Party. The government set about purging the country of opponents. It arrested some 200 union members, students, and political opponents of every persuasion. As many as 400,000 Paraguayans fled the country, mostly to Argentina, especially trade union militants. Repression in the countryside by Colorado militias continued for many months, displacing thousands of families from their home communities.

Following their victory in the Revolution of '47, the Colorados strengthened their control over the trade union movement through the party-dominated Organization of Republican Workers (ORO), replacing the power of the communists, many of whom, because of their positions as trade union leaders, had been killed or exiled. The Ministry of Justice and Labor was created in 1948 in order to strengthen state control over labor affairs.

On February 15, 1948, Morínigo's preferred Colorado candidate, the nationalist ideologue Natalicio González, was elected in a one-candidate election. Despite the support, González's civilian and military allies removed Morínigo from office on June 3, 1948, placing Dr. Juan Manuel Frutos as the caretaker president, because they did not trust him to transfer power on the national holiday of August 15. González was duly sworn in but was overthrown on January 30, 1949 by an opposing coalition of Colorado civilians and military. Once again, as in 1912 and 1922, party factions found allies in the armed forces to resolve internal tensions through a coup d'état. Instability would continue throughout 1949. Two more presidents, Raimundo Rolón and Felipe Molas López, were installed and removed before the year was out. Finally, civilian Federico Cháves maneuvered to replace Molas López as president.

President Cháves was a liberalizing force in Paraguay, not only allowing but actually encouraging the expansion of the unions. Various unions across the country reorganized and began fighting to win wage increases, especially because of increasing inflation. In 1950 the ORO demanded a 50 percent wage increase for all workers. The ORO was supported in this demand by the Governing Junta of the Colorado Party (the party's leadership body) and eventually Cháves's government followed through with a 40 percent increase. In 1951 the ORO called a Second Labor Congress of Paraguay. During that meeting the organization renamed itself the Paraguayan Confederation of Workers (CPT). At the Third Labor Congress in 1953 there were approximately 119 unions participating. Membership was expanding beyond Colorado Party members. One of the most important union attendees was the Catholic Labor Youth (JOC), whose 30 to 40 delegates took an active part. By the time of the next Labor Congress in 1955, membership increased by affiliations from various labor and youth groups not only in Asunción but from throughout the countryside as well. For the first time, both factory and agricultural workers in the interior of the country affiliated in significant numbers with the national union confederation.

SEE ALSO: Paraguay, Archive of Terror; Paraguay, Protest in the Post-Stroessner Era; Paraguay, Protest and Revolt, 1954–1989; Paraguay, Protests in the Liberal Era and the Triple Alliance

References and Suggested Readings

- Alexander, R. J. & Parker, E. M. (2005) *A History of Organized Labor in Uruguay and Paraguay*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Bray, D. (1991) "Defiance" and the Search for Sustainable Small Farmer Organizations: A Paraguayan Case Study and a Research Agenda. *Human Organization* 50: 125–35.
- Flecha, V.-J. & Martini, C. (1994) *Historia de la Transición: Pasado y Futuro de la Democracia en el Paraguay*. Asunción: Última Hora.
- Lambert, P. & Nickson, R. A. (Eds.) (1997) *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Nagel, B. (1999) "Unleashing the Fury": The Cultural Discourse of Rural Violence and Land Rights in Paraguay. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41 (1): 148–81.
- Nickson, R. A. (1993) *Historical Dictionary of Paraguay*. Metuchen: Scarecrow Press.
- Paredes, R. (2002a) *El sindicalismo después de Stroessner*. Asunción: Diseño y Arte: Juan Flores.
- Paredes, R. (2002b) *La lucha de clases en el Paraguay (1989–2002)*. Asunción: Diseño y Arte: Juan Flores.
- Turner, B. (1993) *Community Politics and Peasant–State Relations in Paraguay*. Lanham: University Press of America.

Paraguay, protest in the post-Stroessner era

Brian Turner and Christina Turner[†]

Even though the Colorado Party continued in power in Paraguay, the overthrow of General Alfredo Stroessner opened up the political system dramatically. Many MOPOCO members became advisors to the new Rodríguez government, most prominent among them Miguel Ángel González Casabianca and Waldino Lovera, although Rodríguez artfully exploited divisions within the party to maintain his power, and MOPOCO soon disappeared as a movement within the party. Rodríguez was elected president in May 1989 with almost 74 percent of the vote, to complete the term until 1993. The National Accord dissolved into its constituent parts to contest these elections, although the opposition was at an extreme disadvantage after many years of repression. Domingo Laíno finished second in these elections with 18 percent of the vote. Laíno would run second again in 1993 and 1998.

Elections to a constitutional convention were held in 1991 and a new democratic constitution was promulgated in 1992. In 1993 Colorado Party politician Juan Carlos Wasmosy was elected to serve as the first civilian in the presidency since Federico Chaves was overthrown almost forty years earlier. The election was marred by fraud, but it did produce the first truly pluralistic Congress in Paraguay's history. Civil and political liberties were largely respected, although excessive use of force in confronting social protest, judicial incompetence and corruption, and private use of intimidation against social movements and journalists limited Paraguay's democratization. These are still problems today.

While the Rodríguez government worked to establish a new political arrangement for the defense of elite power, society exploded with pent-up demands for redress of long-festered social problems. In 1989, 402 new unions were recognized after the coup, representing over 75,000 workers. An independent and combative national labor organization, the United Center of Workers (CUT), was established in 1989 after the coup. Within a year its affiliated unions represented 37,422 workers, compared to the 24,459 represented by the CPT, which had been entirely coopted during the Stroessner regime. By one count there were 44 strikes and 1,100 workers fired for union activity just in 1989. Some 4,000 workers at Yacyretá, a second huge hydroelectric project on the Paraná border with Argentina, affiliated with the CUT and went on a successful 84-day strike in March 1989. This strike is considered one of the most important in Paraguay's trade union history. Filizzola, a CUT leader, raised his public profile with his work on behalf of these workers. However, divisions within the labor movement itself, the weakness of the Paraguayan economy (per capita annual growth rate for the 1990s was minus 5.4 percent), and the fact that only 3 percent of the workforce is unionized undermined the effectiveness of labor mobilizations over the last decade of the twentieth century.

Students also mobilized for greater freedom on the country's two major campuses, the National University of Asunción and the Catholic University. The Federation of University Students of Paraguay (FEUP) organized in 1987 to contest the regime-controlled University Federation of Paraguay (FUP). FEUP activists cut their teeth a year earlier during the mobilizations in support

of the Hospital de Clínicas staff. After the coup, FEUP activists seized FUP headquarters at the National University. The FUP was dissolved shortly thereafter.

Paraguay's indigenous population, which represents approximately 1.5 percent of the total population, had been the subject of paternalist control, impoverishment, and genocidal policies during the Stroessner era. Indigenous groups and their allies joined the protest environment after February 3, 1989, with encampments in Asunción.

The largest social movement after 1989 came from the landless peasantry. In spite of land colonization and resettlement programs in place since 1963, corruption, poor planning, and lack of integrated assistance left hundreds of thousands of peasant families without secure access to land. Land invasions at Tavapy II in Alto Paraná beginning in 1983 before the fall of Stroessner foreshadowed the land conflicts that were to come. Some 73 land invasions took place in 1989, mostly in the eastern and northern departments of Alto Paraná, Itapúa, Caaguazú, Concepción, and San Pedro. Invaders were often removed by military force, with leaders taken to local prisons. By 1991 the government organized the Special Operations Police trained to remove peasant invaders from the land they were seeking. After a forced removal and imprisonment of leaders, peasants would then mobilize in protest at the prisons until their leaders were released, while their families remained encamped along public right-of-ways near the lands they sought. The first lands invaded were those granted illegally to regime allies, but soon many tracts of forest owned by foreigners and Paraguayans were also invaded.

Peasants reorganized regionally and nationally in the 1980s after the repression in the 1970s. The Paraguayan Peasant Movement (MCP) was joined by other efforts to create a national organization. The National Coordination of Agricultural Producers (CONAPA), established in 1985, was formed out of a variety of regional organizations, including the Association of Agriculturalists of Alto Paraná (ASAGRAPA). These organizations mobilized land invasions and protest marches to push the government to resolve the problems of the countryside. The MCP and CONAPA affiliated with the CUT, forming the rural wing of a broad movement for justice for workers. Other groups, often supported by the

church, mobilized using less confrontational tactics, and gained considerable public sympathy. A march on Asunción, beginning with 300 peasants in the southern department of Misiones, took place in November 1990. Several thousand peasants entered the city later that month to favorable news accounts. However, the demands of the peasants from Misiones were not met by the government.

The Rodríguez government and the subsequent civilian governments never produced a comprehensive policy to address the problem of landlessness in the countryside. Over the next decade, some peasant groups were successful in resisting forced removals, murder of leaders, and judicial orders against them and were able ultimately to lay claim to significant lands. Others were removed but given land in still more remote parts of the country, repeating the cycle of marginalization and landlessness begun in the colonization policies of the 1960s. Still others were ultimately defeated in their efforts to obtain land.

After 1989 the Plaza of Congress became the symbolic center of protest in Paraguay. Marches on the Plaza, and rallies in and occupations of the Plaza, are central tactics of many movements, including peasants, students, workers, and even occasionally Colorado Party hardliners. The government requires permits for groups to use this space for protests, but many groups challenge this requirement, especially when permits are denied. The Cathedral of Asunción faces the Plaza and its verandas provide an alternative space for protest. In the early 1990s these verandas were almost permanently occupied by peasant and indigenous groups, occasionally engaging in hunger strikes. Workers tend to congregate at the Plaza Italia, up the hill from the Congress building, for marches on the Plaza of Congress.

The Plaza of Congress was the scene of two major mobilizations to defend democracy in the 1990s. In April 1996 President Wasmosy attempted to remove the ambitious commander of the army, General Lino Oviedo. Oviedo was one of the key allies of Rodríguez in the overthrow of Stroessner and had been instrumental in the (illegal) use of military resources to see to Wasmosy's election in 1993. Oviedo refused Wasmosy's request that he resign and threatened to attack the presidential palace. Wasmosy took refuge in the residence of the US ambassador

and even submitted a statement to Oviedo that the president would request a “leave of absence” from the Congress. Oviedo rejected this, and Wasmosy found a bit more nerve and resolved to remain in office. On the morning of April 23, 1996 the Plaza filled with thousands of citizens, especially students, in support of the president. Wasmosy now sought to pacify Oviedo by offering him the Defense portfolio, which Oviedo reportedly accepted. Now the students in the Plaza mobilized in protest against Wasmosy’s betrayal of democratic progress. Wasmosy was forced to renege on his offer to Oviedo after Oviedo had already resigned as army commander. The military court subsequently indicted Oviedo for insubordination.

Oviedo ran for and won the nomination for president from the Colorado Party in 1997, defeating Luis María Argaña. President Wasmosy engineered Oviedo’s conviction on charges related to 1996 in military court, and the electoral courts subsequently ruled Oviedo ineligible for the 1998 elections. Oviedo’s running mate, Raúl Cubas Grau, was declared the Colorado candidate for president, and Argaña was named the vice presidential candidate. The Colorados managed to win the 1998 elections against the united opposition ticket of Domingo Laíno and Carlos Filizzola. Cubas Grau ordered a pardon of Oviedo, and refused to abide by a Supreme Court decision declaring the pardon unconstitutional. As Congress was beginning impeachment proceedings against Cubas Grau, Vice President Argaña was assassinated on the morning of March 23 in a bloody attack on his vehicle on Asunción’s streets. The Plaza of Congress, already occupied by some 25,000 protesting peasants, filled with “Young People for Democracy” and many other citizens in protest against Oviedo and Cubas and in defense of democracy. Supporters of Oviedo attempted to retake the Plaza by force, and the peasants and students resisted with “human barricades against bullets.” Seven protesters were killed over the next six days, but they held the Plaza until both Oviedo and Cubas fled the country.

In the early twenty-first century rural protest has increasingly focused on the negative impact peasant communities suffer from the expansion of soy fields, often owned by Brazilians. Due to the sometimes indiscriminate use of pesticides and the massive deforestation in the soy fields, and the foreign ownership of these fields, the

peasant movement has become more ecological and nationalistic. Access to land is still the central focus for peasants. Peasant protesters have increasingly used the tactic of road blocks, especially since the explosion of social protest in Argentina in 2001. Excessive use of force against rural protests continues to be a human rights problem reported by Amnesty International and the US Department of State.

In a pattern well known in Paraguay’s history, struggles among political elites lead to open conflict. Supporters of Lino Oviedo, who returned to Paraguay in 2004 and was placed in a military prison, periodically mobilize at the Supreme Court building or near the military prison demanding Oviedo’s release. Duarte Frutos purged the Supreme Court in 2003 and placed allies on the bench who have ruled favorably on some of his constitutionally questionable political maneuvers, such as standing for election to the presidency of the Colorado Party in 2006. Opposition leaders, important leaders in the Catholic Church, and ordinary citizens mobilized in March 2006 in large demonstrations in defense of the constitution. The role of citizen protest is the newest innovation in a wide repertoire Paraguayans have used to protest over the last century.

SEE ALSO: Paraguay, Archive of Terror; Paraguay, Protest and Revolt, 1954–1989

References and Suggested Readings

- Flecha, V. & Martini, C. (1995) *Historia de la Transición: Pasado y Futuro de la Democracia en el Paraguay*. Asunción: Última Hora.
- Lambert, P. & Nickson, A. (Eds.) (1997) *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Paredes, R. (2002) *El sindicalismo después de Stroessner*. Asunción: Diseño y Arte Juan Flores.

Paraguay, protest and revolt, 1954–1989

*Christina Turner[†] and
Brian Turner*

The forces unleashed by the Chaco War, the professionalization of the military, and modest industrial growth culminated in the long period of rule in Paraguay by General Alfredo

Stroessner. The *stronato*, as it was called, eventually achieved the pacification of the elite factions within the ruling Colorado Party, but periodic episodes of rural and urban protest and armed insurrection were met in turn with brutal repression.

Federico Chaves' government was overthrown on May 6, 1954 by the recently installed commander of the army, General Stroessner. Within a month and against no opposition, Stroessner was elected president, a position he would retain for almost 35 years. Initially, Stroessner appeared sympathetic to continuing labor reforms. The month before he was elected president he approved another general 40 percent raise. However, inflation continued unabated and the government was forced to work out a stabilization plan with the International Monetary Fund, which in turn led to a rapid loss in income in 1955. Stroessner shifted his support to a 10 percent raise in salaries, much less than was requested by labor. An additional 10 percent general raise did not assuage labor as inflation was increasing much more rapidly.

Tension mounted between the government and labor leaders in the next few years. The tension was exacerbated by a new schism in the government between the traditional civilian leaders in the party, led by Epifanio Méndez Fleitas, aligned with the Colorado leaders of the CPT, against the Colorado members of the armed forces, their allies, and President Stroessner. This political and economic showdown came to a head in 1958. That year the CPT called for a general pay raise of 50 percent. The government stonewalled the petition. Labor leaders were exiled or killed and union members harassed. In response, the CPT called for a general strike and selected a four-man strike committee. The government countered with an offer of a 15 percent general increase in wages that the CPT rejected, even after a personal meeting with President Stroessner. The CPT moved forward with the strike but encountered resistance almost immediately from the police. The police and military surrounded the CPT headquarters and began to arrest anyone who attempted to enter. Once again labor leaders were forced to flee the country to avoid arrest. Those arrested were accused of being "communists." The Stroessner government organized a new leadership for the CPT, in effect taking over the labor movement in Paraguay. The labor leaders who escaped the

country established their own CPT in Exile based in Montevideo, Uruguay.

The crushing of the strike and the purging of dissident factions in the Colorado Party led to a new era in Paraguayan history. The regime was now based on the "granite-like unity" between the armed forces, whose officers were required to be members of the party, the civilian elites in the Colorado Party, and the dictator Stroessner, who intervened decisively to resolve squabbles within the elite. The glue for the regime became Stroessner's control over patronage, financed by impressive levels of corruption. To control those left outside of this arrangement, Stroessner declared a state of siege, beginning in 1954 and dutifully renewed every three months by the rubber-stamp Congress. The state of siege was only lifted on election day every five years, as Stroessner was reelected president in 1958, 1963, 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, and 1988. Under the state of siege, Stroessner organized his cadres of military police, separate from the army, and began to arrest political dissenters and hold them indefinitely and without charge. Stroessner developed an extensive web of informants, called *py ragüe* or hairy feet, to search out those dissidents. This created a pervasive atmosphere of fear and suspicion in the country, as no one knew who might be an informer or who might be arrested next. Key tools for the regime were the laws Defense of Public Order and Liberty of Persons, passed in 1955, and Defense of Democracy, passed in 1970. These laws restricted free expression, the rights to assembly, and petition for demands, and criminalized much opposition activity as "communist."

Stroessner effectively domesticated the unions and kept them under the strict control of the Colorado Party. The new secretary general of the CPT, Rodolfo Echeverría, was the chief of police of the town of San Bernadino. His executive committee was nicknamed the "seven policemen" due to its composition. For the next 20 years union control was constant and consistent. Wages remained stagnant and during one seven-year period, 1964–70, did not change at all.

In 1959 a guerilla movement, the 14th of May movement, attempted to overthrow the Stroessner regime. It was formed by competing groups, one faction of the Liberal Party and one faction of the Febrerista Party. This led to conflict in leadership that weakened the movement. Inspired by the success of the Cuban

Revolution, the United National Liberation Front (FULNA) hoped to provoke a peasant uprising. The first invasion attempt was foiled by intelligence penetration of the movement's plans by security forces. A second invasion attempt several months later was also unsuccessful. In June 1960 the movement suffered a serious loss when the military's counterinsurgency campaign attacked the main body of the movement at Tavaí in the department of Caazapá. There was a third attempt on Asunción that was abandoned in process due to lack of tactical support. The peasant uprising never materialized. Captured prisoners were tortured and killed and thrown in the Paraná River to discourage potential future insurgents. Colorado leaders in the interior unleashed a wave of repression against Liberals, settling old scores and enforcing Stroessner's power through terror.

Also in 1959, Stroessner faced opposition from within his own party, known as the Colorado Popular Movement (MOPOCO). This movement began in response to Stroessner's suspension of Congress and dissolution of the Government Junta in retaliation to a motion of censure on the part of the Chamber of Deputies condemning police repression against student protesters. Many opposition Colorado members had to flee into exile or face imprisonment. MOPOCO was founded in Clorinda, Argentina on September 11 and it continued a campaign against Stroessner for the next two decades. Like other Paraguayan organizations, this association suffered from internal divisions which seriously undermined its effectiveness.

A comprehensive labor code was enacted in 1961. Like all of Stroessner's actions, this was meant to increase his control of the unions. The labor code permitted only unions officially recognized by the ministry of justice and labor and made it difficult for the recognized unions to actually go on strike. Non-recognized unions were not legal and government employees were prohibited from striking.

During this period independent trade unionism was controlled through the CPT by three state institutions. The ministry of justice and labor served as a gatekeeper to vet union membership. It also recognized fictitious unions manned by Colorado loyalists in order to control elections to the CPT governing board. Dissident unionists were dealt with in a manner similar to the treatment meted out to political dissidents;

they were arrested and sometimes tortured by the Labor Affairs section of Stroessner's new Investigations Department of the police. In addition, the Labor Affairs section of the Colorado Party used patronage and cronyism to maintain control of the CPT board.

The CPT in Exile (CPTE) moved its regional headquarters to Posadas, Argentina, across the Paraná River from the Paraguayan town of Encarnación. The CPTE remained active throughout the Stroessner years, affiliating itself with international labor congresses and with the Colorado Party in Exile and Resistance, led by Méndez Fleitas.

During this period of the *stronato* the only strong union alternative to the Colorado-controlled CPT was the independent Christian Confederation of Workers (CCT), an outgrowth of the JOC after Vatican II and the rise of liberation theology throughout Latin America. The CCT organized the first Congress of the Christian Peasants Federation (FCC) in 1968. The FCC organized Christian Agrarian Leagues (LACs). A more radical rural movement, also called the Christian Agrarian Leagues and organized into the National Federation of Christian Agrarian Leagues (FENALAC), was founded in the 1960s by progressive Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries. The roughly 10,000 families organized into the LAC by 1970 were evenly divided between the FCC and the FENALAC.

The reformist elements in the Catholic Church were largely outside the control of Stroessner, and the church was often in conflict with the regime, especially in those areas where the FENALAC and the FCC were active. The CCT had its biggest impact in the countryside where, starting in the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the agrarian leagues mobilized peasants to start cooperatives, establish education programs inspired by the writings of Brazilian educator and activist Paulo Freire, and develop various types of social services, all outside of government or party channels. This was the first time that subsistence farmers led their own independent political movements, a fact that did not remain unnoticed. There was a marked deterioration in relations between Stroessner and the Catholic Church by 1969 and increased repression in the countryside. Agrarian league peasants were arrested and sometimes tortured. The grassroots communities were harassed and the Catholic clergy purged and deported, especially the

foreign priests who were most likely to preach self-help and grassroots development. There was a national media campaign, especially over the important medium of radio on the Voice of Coloradism station, linking progressive clergy and agrarian leagues with communism.

In response to repression, the FCC and FENALAC joined together in a national organization, the National Coordination of Christian Grassroots Farmers (KOGA). The regime responded with increased hostility. Not only were the agrarian leagues outside of the control of the Colorado Party and growing, but they were draining the traditional support from the party, support the Colorado regime needed to survive. Repression intensified and some groups began to meet secretly at night. In areas where the numbers were strong, groups could still meet in public and sometimes could secure release for arrested members by congregating at the local church and protesting. However, the repression continued to escalate and in 1975 the armed forces destroyed the experimental base community at Jejuí in the department of San Pedro. As in 1960, there were reports of league members being taken and thrown out of airplanes over the Yvytyruzu Mountains.

Most parish priests, and many bishops, were in fact allies of the regime. In many cases the church served to demobilize peasant organizations by coopting them while providing some possibility for the redress of grievances from the government. In other cases, parish priests collaborated willingly with the local Colorado bosses in the manipulation of peasant organizations. Such divisions within the church allowed the government to differentiate between “good Christians” and those inspired by alien, Marxist ideologies.

The government accused the agrarian leagues members of being part of a terrorist movement called the March 1st Organization (OPM). Radical students at Catholic University and National University formed the OPM in the early 1970s and Stroessner claimed it had links with Argentine guerilla organizations. The OPM was infiltrated by both Paraguayan and US security forces (Central Intelligence Agency) and never actually initiated any guerilla actions. The OPM and the agrarian leagues were both crushed by mid-1976 with the arrest of 2,000 peasants, 200 students, and the expulsion of seven foreign Jesuit priests. Twenty members of the OPM, including two of its leaders, died while in prison. The

agrarian leagues were dissolved after an organized meeting of the surviving leaders of both the FENALAC and FCC at Ypacaraí in late 1977. The police raided the meeting and arrested 19 league leaders.

Supposedly acting with Argentine guerilla organizations, MOPOCO was accused of fomenting an assassination plot against Stroessner. Because of a secret agreement between the military governments of the Southern Cone known as Operation Condor, MOPOCO members could be arrested across borders and so they had to flee from their Argentine exile for safety. One leader was arrested in Posadas, Argentina by Paraguayan police. He later died under torture. In 1977 after a further split in the MOPOCO ideology, a portion of the group joined the National Accord opposition front in Paraguay and was allowed to return from exile. These returnees nevertheless continued to be monitored and harassed until the downfall of Stroessner.

The National Accord was a loosely knit association of four opposition parties: the Christian Democrat Party, the Febrerista Revolutionary Party, the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA), and the splinter MOPOCO, which formed in 1978. The PLRA, the true heir of the traditional Liberal Party, was the largest component of the National Accord, and the PLRA leader Domingo Laíno was the most prominent opponent of the Stroessner regime at this time. The National Accord issued a 14-point declaration calling for the lifting of the state of siege, open elections, the release of political prisoners, and an independent judiciary. The National Accord clearly benefited from the change in the international environment with the election in 1976 of Jimmy Carter as president of the United States.

The labor situation and the human rights situation in general improved somewhat in Paraguay during the Carter presidency. Carter’s strong stand in support of human rights and his willingness to withhold military funding from Latin American countries that regularly abused human rights had a definite effect on Stroessner and events occurring in Paraguay. During Carter’s term many political prisoners were released and the regime was forced to permit opposition political activity without resorting to the well-known pattern of harsh retribution.

Former members of the Agrarian Leagues who probably were feeling the opening political

winds founded the Paraguayan Peasant Movement (MCP) on December 25, 1980. The MCP reinvigorated the landless farmers in the eastern border region with Brazil. It developed a 13-point program calling for dramatic social and political changes to benefit the landless masses of the country. These proposals included land reform and repatriation of land in the hands of foreign owners.

One of the first actions of the MCP was to commandeer a bus near Puerto Presidente Stroessner on the eastern border to travel to the capital to protest army involvement in removing squatters in land disputes. An army patrol randomly stopped the bus near Caaguazú but the protesters managed to escape without harm coming to the passengers. Now alerted to the protest and armed with the evidence of the crime of hijacking, the government launched 2,000 troops to hunt down the hijackers who were hiding in the countryside. Over 300 people were initially arrested and 13 of those were tried in the incident. Tragically, 12 of the hijackers who surrendered to the police were shot on the spot and buried at San Antonio-mí, 17 kilometers from Caaguazú. This incident helped structure the future of the MCP. The organization decided against further belligerent confrontations in preference for non-violent mass mobilizations. In 1985 a group of 5,000 peasants met in Caaguazú to celebrate the reemergence of the rural voice ten years after the repression of the agrarian leagues. The organization was 11,000 strong at the fall of Stroessner in 1989.

Stroessner's power was at its zenith in the late 1970s. Political opponents had mostly been eliminated, and the Carter administration's support of the initiatives by the National Accord was counterbalanced by cooperation and support from military governments in all of the neighboring states. Indeed, the security forces of these states collaborated in Operation Condor to investigate, torture, and assassinate the regimes' opponents. Paraguay's economy was enjoying a "miracle" of sustained high growth rates, with GDP per capita growing at an average annual rate of 5.07 percent between 1971 and 1981. When the favorable regional political and economic environment turned sour in the 1980s, protest against the regime increased.

The two sectors accounting for the economic boom in the 1970s were agriculture and energy production. Cotton became the single most

important agricultural product. By 1978 cotton accounted for 38.9 percent of Paraguay's export earnings, making Paraguay the most cotton-dependent country in Latin America. World cotton prices were high, and the huge expansion of cotton production, mostly in the hands of peasants, meant that cash income was expanding through much of the countryside. However, the government maintained a dual exchange-rate policy that allowed it to keep farm-gate prices for cotton artificially low while agro-exporters could sell cotton on the international market at high prices. When international cotton prices dipped in the 1980s, the regime's ability to depend on peasant support waned.

Construction on the Itaipú Dam, located on the Paraná River that forms the border between Paraguay and Brazil, began in 1975. The dam is the world's largest-capacity hydroelectric plant, although China's Three Gorges Dam will produce more energy once all of its generators come on line. Massive investments, primarily from Brazil, during the construction of the dam fueled economic growth in Paraguay's relatively small economy. Major civil works were concluded in 1981, contributing to poor macro-economic performance across the 1980s. Average annual GDP growth per capita was -0.66 percent, and resources for patronage and corruption began to dry up.

The stagnant economy promoted opposition protest and dissension from those inside the regime who were being squeezed out of their previously comfortable position. In 1986 the medical staff of the public Hospital de Clínicas, led by Dr. Carlos Filizzola, struck against poor pay and working conditions at the facility. The protest had larger political overtones and received much popular support. Filizzola would go on to win election as mayor of Asunción in 1991 and to run unsuccessfully for vice president in 1988.

Stroessner was forced to purge the Colorado Party and the military in the late 1980s, as opposition to his continuance in power and to the possible succession of his son Gustavo to the presidency increased. On August 1, 1987 the "militant" faction of the party made up of Stroessner's closest allies removed the "traditionalist" faction, those with roots in the party independent of Stroessner, from control of the Governing Junta. The militant faction encouraged the retirement of various high-ranking officers in the armed forces to consolidate their power.

General Andrés Rodríguez, commander of the First Army Corps and the father-in-law of Stroessner's son Hugo, allied with civilian "traditionalists" such as Luis María Argaña, who would become foreign minister in the new government, and other high-ranking officers to overthrow Stroessner on the night of February 2, 1989. The violent coup killed at least 100 soldiers. In the immediate aftermath of the coup the Colorado Party was reunited with the military in power and only the narrow circle of militants and Stroessner family members were either arrested or sent into exile. Stroessner himself spent the rest of his life in exile in Brasilia until his death in 2006.

SEE ALSO: Anarchosyndicalism; Paraguay, Archive of Terror; Paraguay, Protest in the Post-Stroessner Era

References and Suggested Readings

- Alexander, R. J. & Parker, E. M. (2005) *A History of Organized Labor in Uruguay and Paraguay*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Flecha, V.-J. & Martini, C. (1994) *Historia de la Transición: Pasado y Futuro de la Democracia en el Paraguay*. Asunción: Última Hora.
- Lambert, P. & Nickson, A. (Eds.) (1997) *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Nagel, B. (1999) "Unleashing the Fury: The Cultural Discourse of Rural Violence and Land Rights in Paraguay." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41, 1: 148–81.
- Paredes, R. (2002) *La Lucha de Clases en el Paraguay (1989–2002)*. Asunción: Diseño y Arte: Juan Flores.

Paraguay, protests in the liberal era and the Triple Alliance

Brian Turner and Christina Turner[†]

Paraguay gained independence from Spain in 1811 under the leadership of Dr. José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia. Francia ruled the country from 1814 to 1840. During this period Francia closed the borders and isolated Paraguay from its neighbors and the world. The economy shifted fundamentally from colonial elite control to state control, opening land for farming by the *campesino* class.

After the death of Francia in 1840, Carlos Antonio López became dictator from 1844 until

1862. López opened the country to trade and economic development. One of the first railroads in Latin America was built in Paraguay during this period and several new industries were encouraged to develop, including a new steel industry. His son, Francisco Solano López, who ushered in a disastrous period in Paraguayan history, succeeded López at his death.

The younger López had international aspirations, visiting Europe and bringing home an Irish mistress whom he met in Paris. In 1864 López initiated war against Brazil in an effort to defend the losing faction in a civil war in Uruguay. This was followed in 1865 by a declaration of war against Argentina. The War of the Triple Alliance against the combined armies of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay lasted five years. López refused to admit defeat until he himself was killed in battle at Cerro Corá in 1870. The war crippled the economy and left a nation of women to repopulate the country. Many of the rail ties were destroyed. Social and economic recovery was slow. Various immigrant groups from Europe and Australia were invited to repopulate the country, but few did. Small numbers of Italian immigrants did arrive by way of Argentina, as well as some people from Germany, Spain, France, England, and Australia.

Paraguay's two traditional political parties – the National Republican Association-Colorado Party (ANR-Partido Colorado) and the Liberal Party – emerged after the war. The Colorado Party held power from 1878 until 1904, when the Liberal Party seized control of the government. This important political revolt occurred when the president of the Liberal Party, Benigno Ferreira, and his party allies Adolfo Soler and Cecilio Báez, organized an invasion by a newly reunited Liberal Party. The Paraguayan merchant elites with partial funding from La Industrial Paraguaya, a company owned by Argentine and Paraguayan investors which held vast tracts of *yerba mate* forests in the eastern part of the country, supported the invasion.

Although the first labor union in the country was founded in 1886, labor confederations emerged in the first decade of the twentieth century. Anarchist ideas brought by the new immigrants spread among labor activists during the early liberal period. The Liberal elites encouraged increased foreign investment, especially Argentine investment, and the concomitant increase in the size of the working class helped spread

anarchist ideas from the skilled artisans in Asunción's cottage industries to the new industrial workers in the railroad sector, slaughterhouses, and tannin factories. Despite the new industrial sector, Paraguay remained primarily rural as the main exports were tannin, wood, *yerba mate*, and sugar. A Spanish anarchist, Rafael Barrett, was instrumental in the formation of the first trade union confederation in 1906, the Federación Obrera Regional Paraguaya (FORP). The confederation initiated the first May Day celebration in Paraguay with the launching of its newspaper, *El Despertar*.

Divisions among factions of the Liberal Party reemerged almost as soon as the party took power. Intensified rivalries led to a violent armed uprising known as the Revolution of 1912, aided by armed revolt led by sectors of the armed forces. It marked the end of four years of political intrigue within the party. Benigno Ferreira, who led the successful takeover of the government in 1904, was the leader of the moderate faction, known as the *civicos*. He was elected president in 1906. The other faction, the *radicales*, returned to power after Ferreira was overthrown in 1908 after a revolt led by Colonel Albino Jara. The vice president, Emilio González Navero, favored by the *radicales*, took over the presidency until he too was turned out in favor of *radical* Manuel Gondra in 1910.

In a pattern similar to events in the 1940s and 1990s, Colonel Jara turned on Gondra and made himself president in a coup in 1911. Jara lasted barely six months until he was removed in a palace coup. After another year of intrigues involving shifting alliances between the factions of the Liberal Party with the Colorado Party and Jara, Jara was killed in fighting. This led to the relative pacification of the country and the election of Eduardo Schaerer, civilian leader of the *radicales*, to the presidency in August 1912. Schaerer managed to keep factional struggles within the Liberal Party peaceful until the next explosion of elite warfare in the Civil War of 1922–3. This period allowed for a revitalization of commercial activity that had suffered throughout the previous eight years.

The Civil War of 1922–3 marked the most serious political conflict of a party riven with political conflicts. The divisions had shifted from the earlier *civicos* versus *radicales* to competing elements of traditionalism versus modernization. Eusebio Ayala came to the presidency

as a compromise candidate with the support of the army, pending elections scheduled for 1922. Ayala thought that the military leader who had supported him, Colonel Adolfo Chirife, might align with the Colorado Party and the traditional forces. Because of this, Ayala cancelled the elections. Chirife responded by launching a military uprising that led to the Civil War despite the re-institution of the call for elections. The war lasted 14 months and devastated the entire country. Eusebio Ayala resigned in 1923 and Eligio Ayala (Eusebio's cousin) became provisional president. A final failed invasion of the capital by the traditionalists on July 9, 1923 brought an end to the conflict. The Civil War marked the beginning of the professionalization of the armed forces as well as increasing the deep divisions within the Liberal Party.

World War I spurred an increase in labor movement activity because of the increased global demand for Paraguayan products. In the late 1920s social unrest caused socialist ideas to begin to challenge the anarchosyndicalist roots of the workers' movement. This is reflected with the constitution of both the National Independent League and the Paraguayan Communist Party in 1928.

SEE ALSO: Anarchosyndicalism; Paraguay, Protest and Revolt, 1954–1989;

References and Suggested Readings

- Alexander, R. J. & Parker, E. M. (2005) *A History of Organized Labor in Uruguay and Paraguay*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Bray, D. (1991) "Defiance" and the Search for Sustainable Small Farmer Organizations: A Paraguayan Case Study and a Research Agenda. *Human Organization* 50 (1991): 125–35.
- Flecha, V.-J. & Martini, C. (1994) *Historia de la Transición: Pasado y Futuro de la Democracia en el Paraguay*. Asunción: Última Hora.
- Lambert, P. & Nickson, A. (Eds.) (1997) *The Transition to Democracy in Paraguay*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Nagel, B. (1999) "Unleashing the Fury": The Cultural Discourse of Rural Violence and Land Rights in Paraguay. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41, 1 (1999): 148–81.
- Nickson, R. A. (1993) *Historical Dictionary of Paraguay*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.
- Paredes, R. (2002a) *El sindicalismo después de Stroessner*. Asunción: Diseño y Arte: Juan Flores.
- Paredes, R. (2002b) *La Lucha de Clases en el Paraguay (1989–2002)*. Asunción: Diseño y Arte: Juan Flores.

Turner, B. (1993) *Community Politics and Peasant-State Relations in Paraguay*. Lanham: University Press of America.

Paris Commune, 1871

*Michael Kline and
Micheline Nilsen*

The ten weeks of the Paris Commune of 1871 resonate beyond its brief life. For some historians, it marks the end of the cycle of French revolutionary activity begun with the Revolution in 1789, while for others it was the event that guaranteed the survival of France as a republic. Its detractors saw it as a menacing uprising fomented by the worst and most radical elements in Parisian society. Its supporters saw it as a heroic high point in the struggle for democracy and workers' rights. Today, the Commune remains a touchstone event in French history that has entered the collective consciousness of the nation, particularly revered by the political left in France and in many other countries.

Born in War

The immediate antecedent to the Commune was the disastrous French defeat at the hands of the Prussians on September 2, 1870, when Emperor Napoléon III and his army were surrounded at Sedan. The glittering Second Empire, founded by Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte (a nephew of the great Napoléon I Bonaparte) in a coup d'état in 1851, came to a crashing halt in a war that Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had engineered. The once proud French army, quickly and ignominiously beaten by the larger and better-organized Prussian forces, had represented the nation's nationalistic impulses and the emperor's desire to be a dominant force in Europe.

On September 4, 1870 deputies of the French legislative body declared a republic, the third since the French Revolution of 1789. By mid-September the Prussians had begun to encircle Paris, preferring to lay siege to the capital rather than try to force its formidable defenses. France was now in the hands of a provisional administration, the Government of National Defense, headed by men who were constitutional republicans, but not of the revolutionary left. After elections for a National Assembly on February 8,

1870, royalists returned in far greater numbers than republicans did. Adolphe Thiers, a conservative republican, became the chief executive of the government.

In November 1870, 60,000 men tried to break out of Paris in order to end the Prussian siege. Another attempt was made in January 1871, again unsuccessful and costly in terms of casualties. By the end of January the Thiers government announced an armistice and began negotiations to end the war with Prussia. France signed a preliminary peace treaty on February 26, 1871, ceding most of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine in eastern France. France would also pay 5 billion francs in war indemnities.

The new government had agreed to increase the National Guard of Paris and to pay each man one and a half francs per day, an important means of livelihood during the siege. The ranks of the Parisian National Guard soon swelled to 340,000 armed men. The news of the peace treaty was not taken well in Paris, because it offended many who wanted to continue the war by calling upon the revolutionary, patriotic fervor that had saved the country from invasion during the French Revolution in 1792. Determined to continue to resist the Prussians, the Paris Guard seized 200 cannons that had been paid for by popular subscription.

The National Assembly, originally convened in Bordeaux during the war, decided to move to Versailles, outside of Paris, because it feared disruption if it reconvened in the capital, given the unpopularity of the peace settlement among many republican Parisians and the Assembly's royalist predilections. Fearing an insurrection in the capital, Thiers sent troops of the remaining regular army into Paris to recapture the cannons on March 18, 1871. Discovered in the early morning, the troops were dissuaded from their mission, often fraternizing with the Parisian crowds. Nonetheless, two regular army generals, Thomas and Claude Martin Lecompte, were seized and executed by the crowd. It is from this date that the Commune began.

Rise and Fall of the Commune

Determined to return later in strength to better deal with the insubordinate Parisians, Thiers ordered the remaining members of the government and regular army troops to remove to Versailles. On March 3 elections for a Central Committee of the Republican Federation of the

Paris National Guard sat 11 of 12 new members from the radical republican left. This committee coordinated actions of the National Guard battalions, whose popular name, *Fédérés*, evoked the independent federations of volunteers who rose up against the forces of the crowned enemies of the French Revolution.

On March 20 the National Assembly arrived in Versailles from Bordeaux. The majority was intent on a restoration of the monarchy. The elections on March 26 in Paris for a new city council ended any chance of reconciliation with the monarchist-dominated National Assembly at Versailles because the newly elected mayors of the 20 Paris *arrondissements* mainly represented the revolutionary left. Two days later the new city council took the title *Commune de Paris*, recalling the independent, insurrectional Paris Commune of 1792 during the French Revolution. Thiers and the national government could not abide the local autonomy and self-governance of its latter-day namesake.

On April 3, 1871 *Fédérés* mounted an abortive attack on Versailles, signaling the beginning of civil war in earnest. Versailles troops began to bombard Paris on April 6. Both sides began to seize hostages. As the Versailles continued to edge their positions closer to Paris, a Committee of Public Safety took the reins of governance within the Commune. Fearful of the precedent established by the Committee of Public Safety that ran the Terror in 1793, the Commune leaders split over its creation. On May 10 Thiers signed the formal peace treaty with Prussia. On May 21 the first Versailles troops breached the southwestern defenses of the city. Soon over 130,000 soldiers were sweeping from southwest to northeast within Paris. Communards began frantically to build barricades on the city streets, but the renovations to the old city that had been part of Louis-Napoléon's modernization projects allowed the Versailles army to outflank them. Many Communards – men, women, and children – died on the barricades, but the real savagery was to follow during what became known as the Bloody Week (*La Semaine sanglante*). Many Versailles were outraged by the execution of hostages, including the archbishop of Paris, Monsignor Darboy, although the Commune leaders did not order it. Under orders to mop up quickly and to sweep up the Parisian “rabble,” soldiers began a massacre of the defenders, shooting Communards and suspected Communards

on sight. By May 28 the fighting fizzled out, but not without leaving an estimated 10,000–25,000 Communards dead, many of whom were herded together, shot, and dumped into common graves. Courts hastily convicted over 4,000 of the survivors, who were deported to the penal colony in New Caledonia. It was only in 1880, when republicans gained control of the National Assembly, that an amnesty was granted to them.

The Commune's Program

The names of leading Communards are not well known today, and although they represented different variations on a theme, people like Benoît Malon, Félix Pyat, Léo Fränkel, Edouard Vaillant, Charles Delescluze, and Louise Michel all stood for a regeneration of society in search of the uncompleted agenda of liberty, equality, and fraternity promised by the French Revolution. Communards were at odds with a propertied bourgeoisie that had grown conservative with its wealth, and with a rural, provincial population suspicious of Parisian autonomy and extremism. The main supporters of the Commune were not proletarian, unskilled workers from industry. They were skilled workers and artisans of the Parisian craft industries, who believed that social progress and economic justice could be achieved by revolutionary activity. They were responding to the conditions that had moved the bourgeoisie and the working classes to opposite ends of the political, economic, and social spectrum.

Communard ideology centered on the free association of individuals whose sovereignty would regulate their interests. Their answer to France's authoritarian, centralized regimes was decentralization, federation, and workers' control. In this, the Commune was not communistic because it did not promote state ownership. It reopened the Paris stock exchange and refused to pillage the resources of the Bank of France. Within its loose, general structure, the Commune legislated during its short life to create more just political institutions intended to promote economic and social justice. One of its first acts on April 2, 1871 was to declare the separation of church and state (church-state separation was made permanent in 1905). Separation carried over into education, where clergy were removed from teaching, reflecting the principle that religion perpetuated ignorance and authoritarianism. The Commune sought to relieve the burdens on

Paris's working classes by extending payment of debts (but not abolishing them), establishing rent control, abolishing military conscription (replacing it with "voluntary" participation in the National Guard), and prohibiting sale of pawned objects, particularly tools needed for work. The Commune members capped their own salaries, raised teachers' salaries to include equality in pay for both male and female teachers, and created workshops for women that would pay a decent wage. Given the Commune's short duration and the pressures it faced in conducting a war, as well as in providing everyday services to the city, many of the reforms were not carried out.

Much has been said about the participation of women in the Commune. Many women volunteered as ammunition and food bearers (*les cantinières*) during the siege and on the barricades. Some, like Louise Michel, known as the Red Virgin, adopted the armed struggle and fought with the men. Others, like Elizabeth Dimitrieff, founder of the Union des Femmes, sought reforms concerning long hours of work, equal pay for equal working hours, and an end to discrimination in the workplace. Léodile Bréa Champseix, who took the pen name André Léo, was the Commune's most notable female voice. In her journalism she vociferated against the conceptions of work and marriage of the time as nothing more than slavery for women. Historians differ in their interpretations of the Commune's receptivity to female emancipation, but the participation of women in the Commune upset bourgeois notions regarding the stability of the social order. Unfounded rumors spread among those hostile to the Commune concerning the role of the *pétroleuse*, or female incendiary bomber, particularly during the Commune's last days, when a number of buildings were set on fire due to fighting, or to cover a retreat.

Marx and Engels on the Paris Commune

The Paris Commune was formed in March 1871, when Adolphe Thiers, head of the French government following the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1), ordered the evacuation of Paris and removed executive functions to Versailles. A socialist government known as the Commune was established to rule the city on March 26. Despite divergent ideologies and rivalries

between factions, the Commune attempted to create an egalitarian government. It was unable to levy a military challenge against Thiers and the Versailles forces took back the city between May 21 and 28, progressing eastward against strong resistance during the Bloody Week. The Commune remains an enduring symbol of heroic revolutionary action.

Karl Marx's *The Civil War in France, 1871* collects three addresses of the International Working Men's Association (IWMA) pertaining to the events of the Paris Commune. The first two, dated from London on July 23, 1870, and September 9, 1870, deal with the Franco-Prussian War. The third and lengthier, "Address of the General Council of the IWMA on the Civil War in France, 1871," is dated London, May 30, 1871.

The Civil War in France claimed that class conflict had produced the Commune. Although he later tempered his views on the Commune's socialism, for Marx, the Commune foretold proletarian activism and social democracy, which explained for him the hostility and repression by bourgeois forces. Dissemination of these documents created a complex genealogy of publications and translations. Friedrich Engels, an influential social theorist and frequent collaborator with Marx, translated the third address into German for publication in July 1871. He also wrote a substantial introduction dated March 18, 1891 on the twentieth anniversary of the Paris Commune for the third German edition published in 1891. This introduction is usually included in subsequent publications of *The Civil War in France, 1871*.

In the first two addresses, Marx exhorted workers to retain a spirit of international solidarity by refusing to participate in the capitalist Franco-Prussian War. The third address, written right after the end of the Paris Commune, gave an account of events from the institution of a republic in Paris on September 4, 1870 to the end of the Commune. Marx related the abuses of the Thiers forces and hailed the fallen Communards as heroes. He refuted allegations of subversive activities by the IWMA within individual countries and reaffirmed the workers' international solidarity, which placed them at the forefront of class struggle. Marx's contacts with the members of the Paris International before and during the Commune escape scrutiny. Extant communications show Marx consistently discouraging

premature revolutionary activity by advocating international solidarity and stressing the foolishness of challenging the new French government within the context of the Franco-Prussian War. However, once revolutionary action had broken out, Marx did lend full support.

Engels' introduction summarized the political implications of Marx's addresses in Europe and highlighted all revolutionary actions in Paris since the French Revolution as proletarian. He also reasserted the message of international solidarity by lauding the Prussian forces who allowed fugitive Communards to pass through their lines. As a result of the Commune, Marxism supplanted the divisive socialist factions (Blanquist and Prudhonist) which had vied for power during the Commune. The short-lived equalitarian government of the Paris Commune continues to provide a model for a "dictatorship of the proletariat" or government by and for the working class. The Commune also demonstrates to many activists the possibility of building a more democratic and egalitarian society.

Nearly fifty years later, Russian revolutionaries Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky demonstrated that the Commune was representative of working-class power. They felt that it failed because, if anything, it was too moderate in its attempt to build bridges across social classes. The Soviet Union for years honored the Commune as a revolutionary forerunner. Contemporary historians have adopted varying stances with regard to the Commune. Many are sympathetic to its republican, democratic, popular program, and in the neoliberal era a growing number of scholars espouse the class conflict view of its intents and purposes. Today, it remains a model for many of patriotic fervor, courageous action and fraternal solidarity, and working-class power.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon (1808–1873); Dictatorship of the Proletariat; Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Marx, Karl (1818–1883)

References and Suggested Readings

- Boime, A. (1995) *Art and the French Commune: Imagining Paris after War and Revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Draper, H. (Ed.) (1971) *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: Writings on the Paris Commune*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Gullickson, G. L. (1996) *Unruly Women of Paris: Images of the Commune*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Horne, A. (1966) *The Fall of Paris: The Siege and the Commune, 1870–1871*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Lissagaray, P. (1976) *History of the Paris Commune of 1871*. Trans. E. Marx. London: New Park Publications.

Marx, K. (1934) *The Paris Commune*. Intro. F. Engels. New York: New York Labor News.

Shafer, D. A. (2005) *The Paris Commune*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tombs, R. (1999) *The Paris Commune, 1871*. New York: Longman.

Parks, Rosa (1913–2005) and the Montgomery Bus Boycott

Susan Love Brown

Rosa Parks became a national symbol of the civil rights movement when on Thursday, December 1, 1955 she refused to give up her bus seat to a white passenger in Montgomery, Alabama. Her subsequent arrest sparked the beginning of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, which is widely considered to be the beginning of the modern civil rights movement. The boycott, originally meant to last only a day, continued for more than a year and resulted in a Supreme Court decision outlawing segregated seating on public buses.

Background of the Boycott

The segregated bus system had been a source of humiliation for the black citizens of Montgomery for some time. The Montgomery City Code, Section 10, "Separation of the Races – Required," specified that the bus companies had to provide separate seating for blacks and whites. The exception was made for blacks who took care of white children or elderly white persons. Section 11 of the City Code also specified: "Any employee in charge of a bus operated in the city shall have the powers of a police officer of the city while in actual charge of any bus."

In obedience to these laws, it was customary for black people to pay at the front of the bus, get off, walk to the back, and board from the back door. As white passengers boarded and filled up the front seats, if they filled the white section, the black passengers in the front of that section were expected to give up their seats and move back. Blacks and whites could not sit in the same row,

not even across the aisle from each other. When Parks refused to yield her seat to a white male passenger, the bus driver, J. P. Blake, summoned the police, and two officers arrested Parks. A trial date was set for December 5, 1955.

Parks was born on February 4, 1913, in Tuskegee, Alabama, to James McCauley, a carpenter, and Leona Edwards, a teacher. However, she grew up on her maternal grandparents' farm outside of Montgomery. Although she attended both the Industrial School for Girls and the lab school at Alabama State Teachers' College for Negroes, Parks did not finish high school until she was an adult at the suggestion of her husband, Raymond Parks, a barber whom she married in 1932. She worked at a number of different jobs, including domestic work and sewing, and volunteered as the secretary to E. D. Nixon, president of the local National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) branch, which she had joined in 1943. At the time of her arrest, she had been working as a seamstress at the Montgomery Fair Department store. It was Nixon and attorney Clifford Durr who arranged her release from jail on bail.

In spite of the key role she was to play, Rosa Parks was not the first person to refuse to give up her seat. Several others before her had done so, only to face arrest and fines. But Parks was a deeply respected member of the black community, a 42-year-old woman with no prior run-ins with the law, making her a good test case.

The Women's Political Council (WPC), a black community organization that had often negotiated with the bus company and city officials, decided to plan a boycott for that day. On December 2, Jo Ann Robinson spread the word through mimeographed leaflets delivered to schools and other locations. The WPC then approached the black clergy, and an organizing meeting was held at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church, where the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., had begun to preach just three months earlier.

On Monday, December 5, the day of the boycott, the Montgomery buses were 90 percent empty. That evening 6,000 people attended a mass meeting at the Holt Street Baptist Church for worship services and inspirational speeches, and the decision was made to continue the boycott. The Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) was formed at that point, with Martin Luther King, Jr. as president.

Since black passengers in Montgomery made up 75 percent of the business, their absence meant that the bus company was losing money. Since it was the Christmas shopping season as well, downtown merchants also began to endure losses. Once the bus company and city officials agreed to meet with the representatives of the boycotters, the boycotters asked for only three things: that the bus drivers be more courteous, that blacks "sit from the rear toward the front and whites from the front toward the rear until all seats were taken, with no one having to surrender a seat once taken, and no one having to stand over an empty seat, and that black drivers be hired." All three requests were denied. The bus company also canceled bus services in some black neighborhoods. The refusal of the city officials and the bus company to meet what were rather modest proposals only forced the black community to make the decision to hold out for total desegregation of the bus system.

The MIA then proceeded to organize free transportation to help people get to work. In addition to walking and using taxi cabs (which were forced to stop offering their services at a discount to boycott members when city officials penalized them), the MIA organized carpools in which people with cars drove others to their jobs and picked them up. According to Robinson (1987), the carpool system was organized with 325 private cars picking up passengers from 43 dispatch stations and 42 pickup stations every day. Drivers were given gasoline at black-owned stations, and the stations were reimbursed from monies collected by the MIA on a weekly basis.

The Boycott Continues and Violence Begins

In reaction to the boycott, Montgomery whites made great efforts to expand the White Citizens' Council in order to maintain segregation on the buses. Enthusiasm for the boycott among blacks was beginning to wane, but it was renewed when on January 6, 1956, it was announced that the police commissioner had joined the White Citizens' Council. This organization of white, middle-class men who were against desegregation was then joined by the mayor and the third city commissioner on January 24. This move, meant to intimidate the black citizens of Montgomery, had the opposite effect. Angry and drawing

inspiration from their nightly church rallies, blacks decided to continue the boycott and settle for nothing less than total integration of the bus system.

Violence against blacks in Montgomery was inevitable as the boycott continued. On January 26, Martin Luther King, Jr. was arrested on a charge of speeding. On January 30, his house was bombed. Two days later, the home of E. D. Nixon was bombed. On February 21, Rosa Parks and 92 other blacks participating in the boycott were indicted for violating Alabama's anti-boycott law and arrested. Violence and intimidation were also used against any whites who appeared sympathetic to the cause of integration.

Although there had been some attempts at negotiation, these came to an end when the mayor refused to meet with blacks. City officials, invoking a "get tough" policy, endorsed police actions against loitering, and police began to harass black drivers by charging them with traffic violations that never occurred. Some boycotters were actually physically assaulted. The mayor encouraged business owners to fire employees thought to be complicit with the NAACP. Groups of young whites drove through black neighborhoods, accosting anyone on the streets with water balloons, urine, rotten eggs, and even bricks. Others kept up telephone harassments against the boycott leaders, and crosses were burned on front lawns.

The Legal Battle Begins and the Boycott Ends

Because of the violent conditions in Montgomery and the failure of negotiation, the MIA decided to file suit against the city of Montgomery to integrate the bus system. Using five women – Aurelia Browder, Claudette Colvin, Susie McDonald, Jeannetta Reese, and Mary Louise Smith – as the plaintiffs, Attorney Fred Gray, with the assistance of attorneys Clifford Durr and Charles Langford, filed a civil suit against Mayor W. A. Gayle, police commissioner Clyde Sellers, and Commissioner Frank Parks, the chief of police, the bus company, and the bus drivers who had been involved in the cases of the plaintiffs. The case, *Browder v. Gayle*, was filed in Federal District Court. On June 5, 1956, the court held that segregation on Montgomery's buses was unconstitutional. The City appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

On November 13, 1956, the City of Montgomery obtained a temporary injunction against the carpools that had supported the boycotters. The car service was never restored, but this became moot when on December 20, 1956, more than a year after Rosa Parks had refused to give up her seat, the Supreme Court order was delivered. On December 21, Rosa Parks and other members of the boycott returned to ride the buses, taking the seats that had previously been denied to them.

Results of the Boycott

The Montgomery Bus Boycott served as the inspiration for other civil rights actions that were to take place for two more decades, but in its immediate aftermath, violence against blacks in Montgomery continued. In 1956, the state of Alabama banned the NAACP. On January 10, 1957, six bombings of houses and churches took place. Even though men were arrested and tried, they were all found not guilty by an all-white jury. Other violence, such as accosting blacks who rode the buses and random shootings, also occurred. Nevertheless, the bus system was permanently integrated, and the move to desegregate bus systems spread from one city to the next.

In a more positive light, the boycott had united the black community of Montgomery across class lines, and it had also united the various religious sects within the black community. Many new leaders, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., emerged on the national scene. The boycott proved that blacks could effect change through peaceful and lawful means and that non-violence as a strategy was extremely effective in the segregated South. Since the boycott had nearly bankrupted the bus company and resulted in a major loss of sales to white merchants, it also demonstrated that black economic power was an effective tool in the process of desegregation. The Montgomery Bus Boycott was only the beginning of more than a decade of struggle to desegregate the South, obtain voting rights, and achieve full citizenship.

Rosa Parks participated in the voting rights march from Selma to Montgomery in 1965 but eventually moved to Detroit, Michigan, with her husband and mother to be near relatives. She resumed work as a seamstress but eventually became a secretary in the office of Congressman John Conyers, retiring in 1988. Later in life, Parks received much recognition and many awards,

including the NAACP Spingarn Medal (1979), the Presidential Medal of Freedom, and the Congressional Gold Medal, which referred to her as “The Mother of the Modern Civil Rights Movement.”

Parks died on October 24, 2005 at the age of 92. She was the first woman to lie in state in the Capitol Rotunda in Washington, DC, and buses in both Montgomery, Alabama, and Detroit, Michigan, marked front seats with black drapes in her honor. She was buried at Woodlawn cemetery in Detroit, Michigan, and flags were flown at half-mast in the US and abroad on the day of her funeral, which thousands of people attended.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; Freedom Rides; Freedom Summer; King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Non-Violent Movements: Struggles for Rights, Justice, and Identities

References and Suggested Readings

- Abernathy, R. D. (1989) *And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: An Autobiography*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Brinkley, D. (2000) *Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory: The Life of Rosa Parks*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Burns, S. (Ed.) (1997) *Daybreak of Freedom: The Montgomery Bus Boycott*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Garrow, D. J. (Ed.) (1989) *The Walking City: The Montgomery Bus Boycott, 1955–1956*. New York: Carlson.
- Kohl, H. (2005) *She Would Not Be Moved: How We Tell the Story of Rosa Parks and the Montgomery Bus Boycott*. New York: New Press.
- Parks, R. & Reed, G. J. (1994) *Quiet Strength: The Faith, the Hope, and the Heart of a Woman Who Changed a Nation*. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.
- Robinson, J. A. G. (1987) *The Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Women Who Started It: The Memoir of Jo Ann Gibson Robinson*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Walker, R. J. (2007) *Let My People Go! The Miracle of the Montgomery Bus Boycott*. Lanham, MD: Hamilton Books/Rowman & Littlefield.

Parnell, Charles Stewart (1846–1891)

William H. Mulligan, Jr.

Charles Stewart Parnell, known as the “uncrowned king” of Ireland, was an Irish nationalist leader who gained great popularity among Irish patriots

in both Ireland and America. He was instrumental in developing the Irish National Land League, which waged a protracted campaign for land reform known as the Irish Land War. Parnell also emerged as the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, actively agitating for home rule.

Parnell was born at Rathdrum, Avondale, County Wicklow, on June 27, 1846. The Parnells were an established Anglo-Irish gentry family into which his mother, who was from New Jersey, had married. His grandfather, William Parnell (1780–1821), had been a member of the Irish parliament and an opponent of its abolition by the Act of Union in 1800. The Parnells were known as nationalists and as good landlords who were friendly to Catholics and the Roman Catholic religion. In all of this, they were not at all typical of their class.

Parnell attended Cambridge University, but left without taking a degree. He was expelled for punching a train conductor who had mocked his Irish accent. Such conduct was considered unbecoming of a gentleman, who was expected to ignore the behavior of his social inferiors.

In 1875 Parnell was elected to the British parliament from County Meath and joined a faction led by Isaac Butt that was committed to home rule for Ireland. Butt was a veteran of Irish politics, having debated Daniel O’Connell and (in his capacity as a barrister) defended William Smith O’Brien after the 1848 Rebellion. In 1870, he had founded the Home Rule Association (initially the Home Government Association) following organizational precedents set by Daniel O’Connell, with an associate membership of a shilling a year. Butt was not an aggressive leader, however, and the Irish parliamentary faction lacked discipline and direction. Butt’s rival was Joseph Biggar, a former member of the Fenian organization, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, who had been elected to parliament in 1874. While Butt sought to work within the system, Biggar advocated obstructionism – bogging parliament down in procedural maneuvers with the aim of thus aggravating it into granting Ireland home rule. Pressure built within the Association for more aggressive action.

Parnell allied himself with Biggar, but was reluctant to challenge Butt for leadership of the Home Rule Association. Parnell, however, was viewed as potentially a more effective leader than Biggar, and he was approached by the Fenian organization in the United States, Clann na Gael, about an alliance, if he would promise to

aggressively pursue land reforms and home rule. Clann na Gael was very influential in the United States and had substantial financial resources, but it was strongly opposed by the Irish Catholic hierarchy because of its links to the Fenians' violence of the late 1860s. Parnell dealt cautiously with Clann na Gael, and refused to challenge Butt even after the latter was censured by the Home Rule Association convention in 1879 for lax leadership. Parnell's path was cleared, however, by Butt's death in May 1879.

Parnell allied himself with Michael Davitt and the two formed the Irish National Land League in 1879. The Land League had three goals, which were expressed in an alliterative slogan: fair rent, fixed tenure, and freedom of sale. The organization was prepared to use aggressive tactics, primarily ostracism and boycott of those who failed to accept their demands. (The word "boycott" entered the English language as a result of an 1880 Land League campaign against a landlord's agent named Captain Charles Boycott.) While Davitt remained in Ireland to organize, Parnell went to the United States to negotiate with Clann na Gael and to raise money for the Land League.

On April 26, 1880, Parnell was elected leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, which he managed to transform into a disciplined bloc. Parnell would become the most popular political leader in Ireland and the Irish diaspora for the next decade – hence his sobriquet as "uncrowned king" of Ireland.

The Land League's aggressive tactics caused the period of Irish history from 1879 to 1903 to become known as the Land War. Ostracism – refusing to speak or interact with those who took up land from which members had been evicted – and the boycott – refusing to work for landlords who evicted tenants – sometimes led to violence. Using that violence as justification, parliament passed a Coercion Bill in 1881 making it illegal to boycott an English landlord in Ireland. Parnell vigorously opposed the bill, as did the Land League's paper, *United Ireland*. The government suppressed the Land League, and Parnell was imprisoned in Kilmainham Gaol. Outrage in Ireland, and increased obstructionism by Parnell's party in parliament, forced the government to negotiate with Parnell and resulted in the Treaty of Kilmainham.

The Treaty of Kilmainham confirmed Parnell's position as Ireland's most influential political leader and pledged the government to address

Land League concerns. The Land Act that resulted enacted the Land League's main demands into law. Parnell, who was released from prison on May 2, 1882, agreed to try to restrain agrarian violence, which subsequently did indeed decline. A process of returning the land of Ireland to the Irish people and ending landlordism had begun, but it would take another 28 years to complete.

On May 6, 1882, just four days after Parnell's release from Kilmainham Gaol, a Fenian splinter group succeeded in assassinating the newly arrived chief secretary for Ireland, Lord Cavendish, and his undersecretary, T. H. Burke, in Dublin's Phoenix Park. The government responded by passing a Crimes Act that threatened the entire reform movement. When Parnell opposed the repressive legislation he was accused of supporting terrorism, but his political star nonetheless continued to rise.

In the 1885 elections, Parnell's Irish Party won every Irish seat except for eastern Ulster and the University of Dublin, giving him enough votes to hold the balance of power at Westminster. When the Liberal Gladstone government pushed for renewal of the Crimes Act in Ireland, Parnell and the Irish Party joined with the Tories and brought the government down. The 1886 election led to a reinstatement of the alliance between the Liberal Party and the Irish Party, and the price for the alliance was home rule for Ireland. When Gladstone's own party deserted him on the issue, the government fell again. It was clear that Parnell had a powerful position within parliament and that the demand for home rule would have to be met if there was to be a stable government.

Before a second Home Rule Bill could be brought forward, however, *The Times* of London in 1887 published a series of sensational articles accusing Parnell of complicity in murder and other acts of violence related to the Land War, as well as condoning the Phoenix Park murders. The articles were based on documentary evidence provided by a self-styled Irish nationalist named Richard Piggott. The uproar against Parnell that ensued seemed to ensure that home rule would be a lost cause. An official inquiry was launched, however, resulting in an admission by Piggott that he had forged the letters allegedly signed by Parnell that *The Times* articles had cited. Piggott committed suicide and Parnell was vindicated. A subsequent surge of sympathy for Parnell extended to the home rule issue as well. British public opinion had come to view home rule for

Ireland as a moral imperative, and Gladstone was prepared to use his considerable political skill and moral gravitas to affect it. The century-long struggle to repeal the Act of Union seemed on the verge of success.

But alas, before a bill could be brought forward, in late 1889 one of Parnell's allies, Captain William O'Shea, filed for divorce on the grounds of adultery. Parnell was named as the co-respondent and did not contest the charge. Katherine (Kitty) O'Shea and Parnell had enjoyed a ten-year relationship and he was the father of several of her children. Parnell vigorously denied having acted dishonorably, but the Catholic bishops denounced him and the scandal made him a pariah. His party was thrown into disarray; when he refused to step down as its leader, it split and became ineffective for a decade. Gladstone quickly dropped the home rule issue and it was not to be revived for 20 years.

Parnell married Katherine O'Shea in June 1891, but his health was broken. He died at Brighton, England, on October 6, 1891. His funeral attracted a huge crowd of 150,000 and he was buried in Glasnevin Cemetery in Dublin, not far from O'Connell's grave. His memory is honored annually in Ireland with Ivy Day, a commemoration of the day he died.

SEE ALSO: Davitt, Michael (1846–1906); Fenian Movement; Irish Nationalism; O'Connell, Daniel (1775–1847); Young Ireland

References and Suggested Readings

- Bew, P. (1980) *C. S. Parnell*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.
 Boyce, D. G. & O'Day, A. (Eds.) (1991) *Parnell in Perspective*. London: Routledge.
 Foster, R. F. (1976) *Charles Stewart Parnell and His Family*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
 Hurst, M. (1968) *Parnell and Irish Nationalism*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
 Lyons, F. S. L. (1977) *Charles Stewart Parnell*. New York: Oxford University Press.
 O'Brien, C. C. (1957) *Parnell and His Party*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Parrot, Jean-Claude (b. 1936)

David Bleakney

Jean-Claude Parrot had a marked and influential history as a trade union leader. For 21 years he was a national officer of the Canadian Union

of Postal Workers (CUPW) during a period of labor disputes and wildcat strikes. For 15 of those years (1977–92) he was the national president. He spent 18 years as a chief negotiator, winning a series of improvements for his membership that influenced the entire labor movement and society at large. The most notable was the achievement of paid maternity leave in 1981, the result of a 42-day strike. Today, most working Canadians are entitled to paid parental leave.

The oldest of four children, Parrot was born in Montreal, Quebec to Gilles Parrot and Marie-Anne Boucher on July 24, 1936. Spending his youth in Montreal, he dropped out of school in the 10th grade, attended business college, and worked in a bank. He began working at the post office on July 24, 1954.

In the early 1960s the Canadian post office was a place of paternalism, nepotism, discrimination, poor working conditions, and a top-down military approach to labor relations. Almost all (97 percent) of full-time jobs were held by men, and 97 percent of part-time jobs were held by women. Intimidation and harassment were rampant, and seniority was not given much consideration. Management had visual observation galleries from where they would monitor workers, even when they went to the washroom. When in 1965 postal workers defied the government and their own postal association to win full collective bargaining rights for the federal public sector, Parrot was a strike organizer. By 1977 Parrot was national president.

Parrot believed in a democratic organization with workers often filling elected positions normally reserved for appointed experts and hired staff. He was keenly involved with the evolution of the union structure. This made the CUPW somewhat unique in the Canadian labor movement, consolidating its reputation as a militant and democratic organization of 55,000 members based all over Canada and Quebec. The preamble of the CUPW constitution notes that the CUPW actively commits itself to the objective of transforming the present social and economic order, and rejects all forms of trade unionism that fail to pose the basic division between the interests of workers and the interest of the employer, while pursuing the class interests of its members.

Parrot was a vocal proponent of the right to free collective bargaining and expressed regular frustration and anger over interference by governments that imposed back-to-work legislation. He believed that employers had very little

incentive to negotiate in good faith under such circumstances. Parrot was sent to jail for defying an act of parliament to return postal workers to work during the 1978 strike, believing the government never had any intention of negotiation and had prepared the legislation in advance. He served two months of a three-month sentence. He was a formidable and unpredictable strategist and tactician who employed various strategies – from rotating strikes to direct action – to keep the employers and governments off guard. Because of this, Parrot was frequently criticized by the news media, politicians, and occasionally other labor leaders for being too radical and giving trade unions a bad name.

In order to reduce political interference in labor relations Parrot successfully advocated that the post office become an independent publicly owned corporation rather than a branch of the federal government beholden to the whims of the minister of the day. He believed that it was the labor of workers that paid for new technology in the workplace, and so the workers were entitled to the benefits of job security and a shorter work week. Other major initiatives included the conversion of part-time and casual work into full-time and permanent employment, as well as the inclusion of women both in the workplace as equals and in positions of influence in the union structure. The proportion of female workers rose from 6 percent in 1965 to 42 percent 20 years later. Parrot was elected vice president of the Canadian Labor Congress in June, 1992, the same body that had publicly criticized him years earlier. He retired in 2002.

SEE ALSO: Anarchosyndicalism; Canada, Labor Protests; Winnipeg General Strike of 1919

References and Suggested Readings

- Parrot, J. C. (2005) *My Union, My Life: Jean-Claude Parrot and the Canadian Union of Postal Workers*. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing.
- White, J. (1990) *Mail and Female: Women and the Canadian Union of Postal Workers*. Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing.

Participatory democracy, history of

Michael Menser

Participatory democracy (PD) is that view of politics which calls for the creation and prolifer-

ation of practices and institutions that enable individuals and groups to better determine the conditions in which they act and relate to others. Because it stresses the role of individuals as agents, PD is often contrasted with liberal democratic models of governance because of the latter's reliance on representation. In both theory and practice, the application of PD is not limited to the political sphere but potentially encompasses all areas of human activity, including the public and private, the sociocultural and economic – again in contrast to liberal democratic models. Although a minor tradition within political philosophy and democratic theory, PD has enjoyed a resurgence in both practice and theory since the 1990s, especially with the emergence of the Zapatistas in 1994, but also due to the successes of an array of municipality-based projects in Latin America and India, and more broadly the innovations made by actors that identify with the global justice movement and/or participate in the World Social Forums. In the current period, PD approaches are most frequently found amongst anarchist, indigenous, feminist, ecological, and “solidarity economy” movements.

History

The phrase “participatory democracy” gained currency in 1962 after Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) issued their groundbreaking Port Huron statement, which, among other things, laid out a conception of democracy that called for citizens to seize their collective political fates by reclaiming the public sphere as self-determining agents. (University of Michigan professor Arnold Kaufman coined the phrase in his “Human Nature and Participatory Democracy,” and his student, SDS member Tom Hayden, drafted the Port Huron statement.) However the concept of participatory democracy, especially as self-governance, is much older. Inklings of such an approach can be found in Aristotle's *Politics* and more robustly in the egalitarianism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Both stress the importance of collective deliberation for three reasons. First, it cultivates the production of the emotional bonds that form the basis of a political community. Second, it better enables the pursuit of justice. And, third, it advances individual and collective citizen capability. But PD approaches usually go beyond debate, deliberation, and policymaking to include forms of

collective ownership and co-management. A key concept in this regard is the notion of the “commons” as applied to everything from land, surplus value (for example, worker cooperatives), and software on the World Wide Web (such as the open source movement).

As for the *practice* of PD – as numerous anthropological studies have shown – not only are hierarchical and authoritarian societies to be found amidst a diverse array of periods and locales, so too are traditions espousing much more egalitarian and democratic practices of self-governance. Well-known historical examples of PD include indigenous societies such as the Haudenosaunee (or Iroquois Confederacy), medieval European cities, and town hall meetings in New England from the eighteenth century to the present. A key figure who discusses PD in such various venues was the nineteenth-century Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin, especially in his work *Mutual Aid*. Indeed, it was not until the rise of Utopian socialism and Marxism that political philosophers and movements forwarded the claim that “the people” themselves should control the institutions and mechanisms of governance. Proponents of such a view included anarchists, anarchosyndicalists, council communists, and guild socialists.

Building upon these earlier views, contemporary proponents of participatory democracy argue that *any* sphere of human activity could and should be made more “participatory,” not just the formally political (legislatures, courts, bureaucratic departments), but the social and economic realms as well (families, neighborhoods, communities, schools, associations, firms). The academic *locus classicus* for this current phase is Carole Pateman’s participation and democratic theory, although the municipality-focused “social ecology” of anarchist Murray Bookchin was influential especially for many activists. According to George Katsiaficas’s study *The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968*, PD as “self-management” was crucial for many 1960s radicals, especially feminists, both in the United States and in Europe.

Types of Participatory Democracy

Although a wide range of efforts may be classified as PD, there are strong differences of opinion among theorists and practitioners with respect to the relationship between PD and the state and PD and capitalism. Some argue that the state

is a necessary but insufficient part of the PD project. Others claim that the state is essentially hierarchical and coercive and thus must be dismantled or bypassed altogether. Since the late 1990s, however, more theorists and practitioners are opting for complex and even seemingly contradictory mixes of the first two positions. This is in part due to the failure of liberal democracy and the changing nature of the state under neoliberal globalization.

The first group aims to “reclaim the state” so as to bring it more under the control of communities and/or associations. The state then plays a crucial role in fostering PD even if it is not the central political actor – as it had been for liberal democrats and state socialists. Instead, government is used to foster broad-based participation with respect to policymaking and/or the administration of services. Of the more influential contemporary proponents of this view are associationists. Associationists Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers (1995) argue that the state must more actively *integrate* multiple groups in policymaking, especially those that are underserved or discriminated against for reasons of both efficacy and fairness. In his *Associative Democracy*, Paul Hirst builds upon the guild socialism of G. D. H. Cole and argues that the state should actually *devolve* many of its functions – especially social welfare agencies – to citizen-based groups in order to improve service delivery, develop citizen capabilities, and increase freedom. Other associationists, like guild socialists before them, stress the importance of democratizing the economy. Here an array of views, sometimes antagonistic to one another, abound from the “economic democracy” of David Schweikart, to Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, to the more bottom-up anti-market views of Michael Albert’s *Participatory Economics*. (During the Cold War, Yugoslavia was often studied as such an alternative to authoritarian state socialism and inequality-fomenting capitalist liberal democracy.)

The second group considers the state to be essentially (and historically) hierarchical and coercive and thus stresses the importance of forming self-governing communities that are outside of or against the state. Many anarchists hold such a view, but so do a number of peasant and indigenous groups, as can be seen in the Chipko movement in India, the Zapatistas in Mexico, and a multiplicity of movements in Bolivia. John Holloway’s *How to Change the World Without Taking Power* is one of the more

influential articulations of this view, but there are others that depart from his ontology.

In the last decade, a third grouping has offered an array of hybrid models that stress the centrality of civil society or the “social,” but these groups relate to the state in more instrumental and contradictory ways. Here, the focus is on democratizing a wide array of existing institutions such as the family, household, neighborhood, workplace, schools, and arts and media. Examples of such practices include intentional communities, polyamory, affinity groups, collective households, community-sponsored agriculture, worker and consumer cooperatives, credit unions, free schools, indymedia outlets, and the “theater of the oppressed.” A municipal version of this framework is the well-studied case of “participatory budgeting,” which allows for community control of a city’s budget and operates within a redistributive social justice framework. Participatory budgeting started in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1989 and has spread to more than 1,000 cities globally. Many of these mixed models integrate PD with ecological, feminist, or labor movements, and some are dedicated to subverting hierarchies such as patriarchy, racism, imperialism, and capitalism. Increasingly, many of these intimately local efforts are interlinking with other groups and practices in order to “scale up.” One increasingly popular rubric for this interconnection of participatory economic alternatives is called “solidarity economy,” which according to Allard, Davidson, and Matthaëi’s *Solidarity Economy*, aims to interconnect these diverse local efforts. Among the most innovative and robust global expressions of this view is La Vía Campesina, a transnational association of small farmers made up of more than 130 organizations in 60 countries now counting more than 200 million members.

Frequent criticisms of PD include: such efforts tend to be short-lived, are not adequate for large-scale, technologically complex societies, and/or are too communitarian and not inclusive enough. However, since the early 1990s, as D. L. Sheth argues in his “Micro-Movements in India” (in Santos 2005), many PD perspectives and efforts have created an array of innovations to grapple with these difficulties, especially as the state form and political parties have, for many, lost their monopoly on what counts as efficacious politics. Also, venues such as the World Social Forum increase the possibility of articulating PD approaches from the local to the global.

SEE ALSO: Anarchosindicalism; Chipko Movement; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Grassroots Resistance to Corporate Globalization; Indymedia Global Justice Campaign, 2000s; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Marxism; Multitude; Shiva, Vandana (b. 1952); Students for a Democratic Society (SDS); Via Campesina and Peasant Struggles; World Social Forums; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Albert, M. (1991) *The Political Economy of Participatory Economics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Allard, J., Davidson, C., & Matthaëi, J. (Eds.) (2008) *Solidarity Economy: Building Alternatives for People and Planet. Papers and Reports from the 2007 US Social Forum*. n.p.: ChangeMaker Publications.
- Bookchin, M. (1995) *From Urbanization to Cities: Towards a New Politics of Citizenship*. New York: Cassell.
- Cohen, J. & Rogers, J. (1995) Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance. In J. Cohen & J. Rogers (Eds.), *Associations and Democracy*. London: Verso, pp. 7–98.
- Fung, A. & Wright, E. O. (Eds.) (2003) *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance*. New York: Verso.
- Hirst, P. (1993) *Associative Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Holloway, J. (2002) *Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today*. London: Pluto Press.
- Menser, M. (2005) The Global Social Forum Movement, Porto Alegre’s “Participatory Budget,” and the Maximization of Democracy. *Situations: A Journal of the Radical Imagination* 1, 1 (Fall): 87–108.
- Santos, B. de Sousa (Ed.) (2005) *Democratizing Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon*. New York: Verso.
- Shiva, V. (1993) *Monocultures of the Mind: Perspectives on Biodiversity and Biotechnology*. London: Zed Books.
- Wainwright, H. (2008) The Commons, the State, and Transformative Politics. *Red Pepper*, January 3.

Partito di Unità Proletaria-Democrazia Proletaria

Attilio Manganò

Partito d’Unità Proletaria (Proletarian Unity Party, PdUP) and Democrazia Proletaria (Proletarian Democracy, DP) were two party organizations created in the 1970s in Italy as part of the process of transforming Italian new left movements into political organizations that sought

to create a stable political space in the political system.

In 1975, *Democrazia Proletaria* was the name originally given to an electoral alliance that aligned the organizations *Avanguardia Operaia* (Workers' Vanguard, AO) and *Partito di Unità Proletaria per il Comunismo* (Proletarian Unity Party for Communism), with support from *Lotta Continua* and other Italian new left groups. In the 1976 general elections, the alliance won 1.5 percent of the electoral vote and elected six deputies, the first members of the new left to hold seats in the Italian parliament. The electoral showing was diminished by the Italian Communist Party (PCI) competition for votes from the far left and internecine political dissension among organizations in the coalition. The alliance was comprised of AO, a political current rooted in the factories of northern Italy that split from Trotskyism and sponsored rank-and-file worker committees (*comitati unitari di base*); PdUP, the result of a merger of the socialist left (*Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria*, PSIUP) led by Vittorio Foa, a Catholic leftist; *Movimento Politico dei Lavoratori* (Workers' Political Movement), led by Livio Labor; and the *Manifesto* group. *Lotta Continua*, under Adriano Sofri's leadership, was the most prominent of the movement-oriented organizations to emerge from the 1968–9 protest era. *Lotta Continua* was an extra-parliamentary organization that abstained from the electoral arena and remained dedicated to stimulating and sustaining progressive social conflict. However, while it did not take part in the alliance, *Lotta Continua* supported it.

The PdUP's history is a complex pattern of shifting political alliances and splits, which to a degree reflect the internal divisions of the Italian left. In 1974 PdUP aligned with the *Manifesto* group under the banner "PdUP per il comunismo" ("PdUP for communism"). The purpose of founding a party to the left of the PCI was to create a new working-class organization that would unify all the "revolutionary" political groups. But the result of this unification process paradoxically created significant political splits along different perspectives in the party's position toward the PCI.

Tactically, PdUP was split between organizations seeking a critical alliance with the PCI and others opposing any cooperation with the PCI's "regime" and its alliance with the Christian Democrats. Soon after its formation, the effort

to forge and consolidate a new party out of the emergent social movements of the late 1960s with a revolutionary strategy took a critical turn. The explosion of renewed radicalism represented by the movement of 1977 was critical of new left parties that stressed movement politics (sometimes in concurrence with armed struggle politics), and contributed to even greater tensions within the party and its constituent organizations. *Lotta Continua* disbanded and dissolved.

On April 13, 1978, *Democrazia Proletaria* decided to form a new party, with the merger of many fractions among leftists, labor unionists, activists, and communists. But in the 1979 general elections the new electoral alliance, *Nuova Sinistra Unità* (New Left Unity), polled just 0.8 percent of the vote and no deputies were elected to parliament. Two weeks later Mario Capanna was elected to the European parliament and emerged as leader of *Democrazia Proletaria*. In 1984 he was elected secretary of the party, and *Democrazia Proletaria* consolidated its position with representatives in parliament, regional councils, and many local municipalities. Although it was able to conduct mass campaigns, it remained a small party and could not substantially increase its electoral presence. The other new left party, the PdUP, once highly critical of the PCI, merged with it in 1984.

In the 1980s *Democrazia Proletaria* was the only independent party of the Italian new left. In 1987 Capanna resigned as secretary and was replaced by Giovanni Russo Spina. Two years later he, along with Edo Ronchi, promoted a split to form a Green–Rainbow alliance. Although this did not influence *Democrazia Proletaria*'s presence in the political arena, the party suffered from internal conflicts between Russo Spina's eco-pacifism and Luigi Vinci's strictly class struggle stance.

In 1991 *Democrazia Proletaria* merged into the new *Partito della Rifondazione Comunista* (Communist Refoundation Party), led by Armando Cossutta, which brought together all those who did not support the new communist secretary Achille Occhetto's dissolution of the PCI to establish a *Partito Democratico della Sinistra* (Democratic Party of the Left). In the *Rifondazione* party most of *Democrazia Proletaria*'s militants and leaders continued their political activity, some in positions of leadership or political visibility. Eventually the *Rifondazione* party became a meeting point for political leaders of

PdUP, for former communists under Cossutta's leadership, and for some Trotskyists.

SEE ALSO: Italian Communist Party; Italian Socialist Party; Italy, from the New Left to the Great Repression (1962–1981); *Manifesto, II*

References and Suggested Readings

- Degli Incerti, D. (Ed.) (1977) *La sinistra rivoluzionaria in Italia*. Rome: Savelli.
- Di Scala, S. (1988) *Renewing Socialism: Nenni to Craxi*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Garzia, A. (1985) *Da Natta a Natta. Storia del Manifesto e del PdUP*. Bari: Dedalo.
- Hine, D. & Vassallo, S. (2000) *Italian Politics: The Return of Politics*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Mangano, A. (1978) *Autocritica e politica di classe*. Milan: Ottaviano.
- Protti, D. (1979) *Cronache di nuova sinistra. Dal PSIUP a DP*. Milan: Gammalibri.
- Weinberg, L. (1995) *The Transformation of Italian Communism*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Paterson Silk Strike of 1913

Anne F. Mattina

On January 27, 1913, four men were fired by the Doherty Silk Mill in Paterson, New Jersey for asking management for a meeting to discuss the increase of their responsibilities from two looms to four. Eight hundred of their fellow workers walked off the job in protest, leading to a massive strike in which 24,000 workers went out and nearly 300 mills were idled for 6 months. National organizers from the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), fresh from a victory among woolen workers in Lawrence, Massachusetts, immediately entered the fray. Despite a massive effort by local organizers and strikers, the workers were unsuccessful in their attempt to affect change in their working conditions.

As the mills emptied, the city of Paterson acted swiftly in closing down public spaces to the strikers. The police and private security hired by the mill owners were called into action to enforce laws against loitering, effectively shutting down parades and driving the workers off of city streets. Nightly meetings helped rally the strike force. The IWW's "Big Bill" Haywood and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn spoke constantly to workers urging them to remain true to the

cause. In addition, Gurley Flynn held weekly meetings with the women throughout the strike. These gatherings empowered the women, creating an atmosphere for female strike leaders to emerge. Gurley Flynn served as an inspiration to the women, both strikers and strikers' wives, a group she specifically sought out as she felt that they were essential to success.

The strike continued throughout the spring, the workers remaining steadfast in their conviction. Pressure from the manufacturers caused the police and the private security forces to increase their aggressiveness with the strikers. On April 17, during an altercation between strikers, "scabs," and a private security force engaged to protect the mills, Valentino Modestino, a bystander, was hit by a bullet fired by the security force. He died three days later. Sensing an opportunity for generating public sympathy, strike leaders organized a massive funeral. Thousands of strikers formed a silent parade of mourners, led by Bill Haywood, through the streets of Paterson. Strikers demonstrated solidarity by wearing red carnations and waving red flags. There was little change in the mill owners' response.

Starving and recalcitrant, the workers continued to press their case but manufacturers were not desperate for their return, as they had the option to send the work over state lines into Pennsylvania. Owners did, however, want to maintain control over their workforce and did so by any means necessary. Violent, repressive measures resulted in mass jailing of the strike force, as workers jammed city cells and courts. The deadlock compelled the strikers to become more creative in their protests.

A series of Sunday meetings was held at the home of Pietro and Maria Botto in nearby Haledon, New Jersey, a town governed by a sympathetic socialist mayor. Speakers addressed the crowds in a multitude of languages from the balcony of the Bottos' second floor. These rallies were enormously important to the solidarity of the strikers. The crowds grew weekly as the strike dragged on in Paterson. The Sundays at Haledon drew many curious observers as well, including reporter John Reed, who brought word of the events to radical comrades in Greenwich Village.

"The Strike Pageant" was an idea born of frustration and starvation. Desperate for publicity for the strikers, Reed, Haywood, and others decided to mount a huge pageant, a dramatic

retelling of the events of the strike using the strikers themselves as “actors.” On June 7, a crowd of nearly 15,000 people thronged to Madison Square Garden to witness the spectacle. One thousand workers took part in the show, chronicling the events of the previous months in Paterson – including the murder and funeral of Modestino. The pageant did not turn a profit, and some historians have pointed to it as the reason why the strike ultimately failed. However, work by Stephen Golin (1988) argues convincingly that conventional wisdom on the lack of financial success of the pageant fails to identify what did happen for the strikers: political transformation. By creating and participating in the telling of their own story, he asserts, they “transformed the telling into a political action” (178). The physical reenactment combined with the public spectacle of the pageant provided yet another outlet for dissent. The strike fund, however, was no richer for the effort and solidarity began to fray.

Additional resistance would need sustenance. Food was becoming an increasingly scarce commodity and though the organizers worked desperately to sustain the workers, they could not. By the end of June the strike was beginning to fall apart, and by early August, it was over. The workers had gained nothing from the mill owners, but they had empowered themselves to fight again, another day.

SEE ALSO: Anarchosyndicalism; Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley (1890–1964); Haywood, Big Bill (1869–1928); Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Reed, John (1887–1920)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bird, S., Georgakas, D., & Shaffer D. (1995) *Solidarity Forever: An Oral History of the IWW*. Chicago: Lakeview Press.
- Dubofsky, M. (1969) *We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Foner, P. S. (1965) *History of the Labor Movement in the United States: The Industrial Workers of the World, 1905–1917*. New York: International Publishers.
- Golin, S. (1988) *The Fragile Bridge: Paterson Silk Strike, 1913*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Osborne, J. D. (1978) Italian Immigrants and the Working Class in Paterson: The Strike of 1913 in Ethnic Perspective. In P. Stellhorn (Ed.), *New Jersey's Ethnic Heritage*. Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission.

Tripp, A. H. (1987) *The IWW and the Paterson Silk Strike*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Paul, Alice (1885–1977)

Carol Klimick Cyganowski

Alice Paul brought to the US woman suffrage movement many radical tactics of the British movement: marches, outdoor public meetings, disruption, picketing, refusal to pay fines to avoid jail terms, prison disobedience, hunger strikes, and holding responsible the party in power. Acting to influence US circumstances, Paul developed prototype strategies for civil rights protest: non-violent demonstrations, passive resistance, picketing the White House and Congress, using media coverage to provoke public opinion over assaults against demonstrators and brutality against prisoners. Thanks partly to this awakening, public outrage repeatedly pushed forward the Nineteenth Amendment. After suffrage, Paul's National Woman's Party (NWP) pursued women's equality through federal and state laws. She authored and fought for the first US Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and worked for women's rights internationally.

Born into an affluent Quaker family committed to social good, gender equality, and education, Paul was raised by a mother who was a member of the largest national suffrage association (NAWSA). Her grandfather was a founder of co-educational Swarthmore College, which Paul attended, graduating in 1905. She went on to the University of Pennsylvania for an MA in sociology (1907), joining NAWSA but intending to pursue change through social work. Paul began professional life as a child of her class, trained in a model of assimilating immigrant working-class clients to the values of upper-class social workers. In postgraduate work in England she was far more engaged by further graduate study at the (then young and socialist) London School of Economics. Moved from remedial action to political action for social change, Paul began to see oppression on a wider scale.

Paul joined the WSPU, the radical woman's suffrage organization of Emmeline Pankhurst. As the organization moved to more civil disobedience and property destruction, Paul took an active part and was jailed along with other WSPU militants. Demanding classification as political prisoners and being refused, WSPU members

refused to cooperate, starved themselves in hunger strikes, froze rather than wear prison garb, and destroyed property whenever they could. Their intransigence was a badge of honor, a refusal to be complicit with a system that denied them a hearing.

Returning to the US in 1910 with her suffragist reputation, Paul was quickly integrated into NAWSA, even as she completed a PhD in sociology. Paul cut out her own position as head of the Congressional Committee, focusing on Washington and a federal constitutional amendment. Along with Lucy Burns, Paul wrested attention to women's demands with public demonstrations, beginning with elaborate pageants and a parade during Woodrow Wilson's inauguration. Press coverage of marchers attacked by bystanders, seemingly condoned by the police, created strategic martyrdom. Public interest and outcry moved suffrage activism into mainstream consciousness and brought the first favorable report from a Senate committee.

As NAWSA failed to exploit the new energy, staying with a state-based campaign and supporting the Democratic Party, Paul, Burns, and others formed the Congressional Union (CU). CU later became the National Woman's Party (NWP), the longest-lasting US woman's rights organization. The inaugural parade had served notice on Wilson, and as he refused support, NWP organized auto and train tours of suffrage speakers, used limited woman suffrage in western states to press on the party, developed a sophisticated lobby database (card file), demonstrated, and bore silent witness in front of the White House with increasingly provocative banners. The pickets were tolerated until World War I. As they compared Wilson with European tyrants and pointed to lack of suffrage as lack of democracy, NWP banner holders were met with mob violence and arrest. Refusing to pay fines, conform to prison rules, or eat prison food, the suffrage prisoners were brutally treated and forcibly fed. Again, public protest rallied the cause, and former prisoners toured the country in prison garb to promote suffrage.

After passage of the Nineteenth Amendment (1920), Paul returned to the Seneca Falls resolution for the next step in the fight for equality under the law, the Equal Rights Amendment. Paul obtained three law degrees during the ERA fight. Unlike ERA stalwart Ethel M. Smith, who focused on working women and unions, Paul engaged professional women, challenging gender

roles and the economic effects of legal inequality. Along with the ERA, the NWP worked for justice on matters ranging from citizenship through child custody, property, and divorce. Paul herself moved to international women's issues, starting the World Woman's Party (WWP) which brought about a gender equity provision in the UN Charter and the UN Commission on the Status of Women. In the US Paul helped to assure that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination on account of sex. She lived to see the 1970s US women's movement reintroduce the ERA. The NWP lasted through 1999; it is memorialized through the Sewall-Beimont House and Museum and leadership development programs of the Alice Paul Institute.

SEE ALSO: Britain, Women's Suffrage Campaign; Non-Violent Movements: Struggles for Rights, Justice, and Identities, Pankhurst, Emmeline (1858–1928), Christabel (1880–1958), and Sylvia (1882–1960); Seneca Falls Convention; Women's Movement, United States, 19th Century; Women's Movement, United States, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Alice Paul Institute*. www.alicepaul.org (downloaded February 2, 2008).
- Butler, A. (2002) *Two Paths to Equality: Alice Paul and Ethel M. Smith in the ERA Debate, 1921–1929*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Ford, L. (1991) *Iron-Jawed Angels: The Suffrage Militancy of the National Woman's Party, 1912–1920*. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Lunardini, C. (1986) *From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 1912–1928*. New York: New York University Press.

Paulus, Petrus Jacobus "Arrie" (b. 1930)

Wessel P. Visser

Petrus Paulus was a renowned leader of the segregationist South African Mineworkers' Union (SAMWU), and the personification of the union in apartheid South Africa during the 1970s and early 1980s. Born in 1930 in Pretoria, he completed his high school education at Hercules High, in a white working-class Pretoria suburb. After his studies, he worked as a clerk at the Hercules Municipality, and thereafter for seven years at ISCOR, the state steel company.

In 1954, Paulus enrolled at the West Rand Mining School as a learner miner. A year and a half later, he started work underground at the West Rand Consolidated gold mine as a stoper, and later as a developer. He also worked at the Luipaardsvlei and Libanon gold mines and the Rustenburg platinum mine. As a rock breaker, he earned a large salary due to the incentive system applied at the time to white workers and foremen.

In 1964, Paulus came to prominence as secretary of an Action Committee formed within the ranks of the SAMWU. The Action Committee was formed to oppose an experiment in work restructuring that would improve the incomes of white miners, but also entail the substitution of certain categories of white underground supervisors by Africans. A period of bitter instability and infighting ensued in SAMWU ranks, which almost caused the collapse of the union. However, Paulus's group, which took its stand on SAMWU's traditional support for the job color bar, was victorious, and he became the union's general secretary in 1967.

Unlike his predecessors Charles Harris and Daan Ellis, Paulus's administration was free of charges of maladministration and corruption. His tenure lasted 20 years – the longest of any SAMWU general secretary – and the union flourished. Paulus was a staunch advocate and defender of the rights and privileges of white employees on the mines: he favored a controlled capitalism compatible with the traditional racial hierarchy.

Paulus took an uncompromising stand against any attempts to introduce racially mixed unions, or to scrap job reservation. He was also revered by SAMWU members for using brinkmanship tactics to enforce job reservation – even in the nominally independent African homelands – and managed to negotiate considerable increases in the incomes of SAMWU members.

When the National Party began to reform the industrial relations system after 1977, the cordial and longstanding relationship between the apartheid government and SAMWU began to break down. There were bitter exchanges between Paulus and the minister of labor, Fanie Botha. In 1979, Paulus forced a showdown with the government by calling a national strike by SAMWU members in defense of job reservation. The strike failed when the Chamber of Mines threatened summary retrenchment and the loss of fringe benefits. The failure tarnished Paulus's image, and put SAMWU in a weak position.

As relations with the government deteriorated, Paulus began to associate increasingly with the white right wing, attacking the reforms and liberalization of the late apartheid government from the platforms of the Conservative Party (KP) and the Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted National Party). In 1987, Paulus resigned his union post. Successfully contesting the mining constituency of Carletonville for the KP in the general election, he became the first SAMWU general secretary elected for parliament. Regarded in some circles as an uncompromising racist, Paulus was nonetheless a formidable union leader. Currently retired in Krugersdorp, Paulus is not involved with the SAMWU's successor, the union federation Solidarity.

SEE ALSO: Ellis, Daniel Edward “Daan” (1904–1963); Harris, Charles (1896–1939)

References and Suggested Readings

- Barnard, A. H. J. (1991) *Die Rol van die Mynwerkersunie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Politiek, 1978–1982*. Master's thesis, Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit.
- Coetzee, J. A. (1976) *Industrial Relations in South Africa*. Cape Town: Juta.
- Cooper, C. (1979) The Mineworkers' Strike. *South African Labour Bulletin* 5 (3): 4–11.
- Friedman, S. (1987) *Building Tomorrow Today: African Workers in Trade Unions, 1970–84*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
- Hamilton, D. F. (1977) *The Role of the Mine Workers' Union in the Gold Mining Industry (A Present and Future Perspective)*. MBL thesis, University of South Africa.
- Lang, J. (1986) *Bullion Johannesburg: Men, Mines and the Challenge of Conflict*. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.
- Leach, G. (1989) *The Afrikaners: Their Last Trek*. Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers.
- O'Meara, D. (1996) *Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948–1994*. Randburg: Ravan Press.
- Ries, A. & Dommissie, E. (1982) *Broedertwis: die verhaal van die 1982-skeuring in die Nasionale Party*. Cape Town: Tafelberg-Uitgewers.

Pearse, Patrick (Pádraig) (1879–1916)

William H. Mulligan, Jr.

Patrick Pearse, also remembered by the Irish form of his name, Pádraig, was the most visible of the

leaders of the 1916 Easter Rising. His mystical sense of Irish nationality, his literary skill in articulating it, and his willingness to embrace martyrdom have made him a central figure in the Irish republican tradition.

Pearse was born in Dublin on November 10, 1879. His father, James, was an English stonemason who had emigrated to Ireland because of the boom in church construction there; he converted to Catholicism in 1870. James married Patrick's mother, Margaret Brady, his second wife, in 1877. Patrick's mother's family included a number of native Irish speakers from County Meath. That influence, and his education by the Christian Brothers, developed a love for Irish language, culture, and history early in his life. In 1896 he joined the Gaelic League and became editor of its newspaper, *An Claidheamh Soluis* (The Sword of Light), in 1903. Pearse, like many in the Gaelic League, believed that the Irish language was essential to the preservation of Ireland's distinctive culture and nationality.

Pearse earned a degree in modern languages and law in 1901 and was called to the bar, but his heart was not in it. His father's death in 1900 provided an inheritance that allowed him to pursue his interests in Irish language and culture rather than practice law.

In 1908 he founded a bilingual school, St. Enda's, at Ranelagh, County Dublin, to put his ideas into practice by offering an alternative to what he saw as an English-dominated educational system that was raising young Irish men to be culturally English, or at least submissive to English rule of Ireland. Pearse also helped establish a similar school for girls, St. Ita's. In 1910, he moved St. Enda's to Rathfarnham, County Dublin, in large part because of the site's connection to the Gaelic past. St. Enda's curriculum was based on the Irish language and Irish culture and incorporated Pearse's cultural nationalist views. He went to the United States in 1914 to raise funds for St. Enda's, and there he met John Devoy, among other Irish American leaders.

By 1913 he had joined the Irish Volunteers, organized to counter paramilitary organizations formed in Northern Ireland to oppose Home Rule, and the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). He rose rapidly in both organizations and was the highest-ranking Irish Volunteer in the IRB, and part of its Supreme Council by 1915. He also played a major role in the IRB's gaining control

of the Volunteers and was a central member of the military council that planned the 1916 rising. Thomas Clarke, the principal leader of the IRB, chose Pearse to draft formal statements and serve as spokesman because of his writing and speaking skills. Pearse's 1915 oration at the grave of the Fenian leader Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa had attracted considerable national attention for its eloquence and passion, as had his writings on nationalism. Thus it was Pearse rather than Clarke or another of the more senior leaders who on Easter Monday (April 24), 1916, stepped outside the General Post Office (GPO) in Dublin as president of the provisional government and read the Proclamation of the Irish Republic, in Irish and in English, to those gathered outside.

Pearse's nationalism was based on an almost mystical sense of the Irish people and nation and embraced sacrifice and martyrdom to raise the consciousness of the Irish people and inspire them to seek freedom and independence. The repression of the 1916 Rising and the execution of its leaders galvanized support for independence and Sinn Féin, and was followed by an increased level of public support for complete separation from Great Britain.

Pearse was taken into custody when IRB forces at the GPO surrendered, and he was convicted of treason by a military tribunal that perceived him as the leader of the rebellion. He was executed on May 3, 1916, at Kilmainham Gaol and buried with other leaders in a common grave at Arbour Hill. His younger brother Willie, although not among the Rising's leaders, was executed the following day.

SEE ALSO: Collins, Michael (1890–1922); Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War; Fenian Movement; Irish Nationalism; Irish Republican Army (IRA); Sinn Féin

References and Suggested Readings

- Carty, X. (1978) *In Bloody Protest: The Tragedy of Patrick Pearse*. Dublin: Able Press.
- Edwards, R. D. (1990) *Patrick Pearse: The Triumph of Failure*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Moran, S. F. (1994) *Patrick Pearse and the Politics of Redemption: The Mind of the Easter Rising, 1916*. Washington: Catholic University of America Press.
- Murphy, B. P. (1991) *Patrick Pearse and the Lost Republican Ideal*. Dublin: James Duffy.
- Pearse, P. (1979) *The Literary Writings of Patrick Pearse: Writings in English*. Ed. S. O. Buachalla. Dublin: Mercier Press.

Walsh, S. P. (1979) *Free and Gaelic: Pearse's Idea of a National Culture*. Dublin: Coiste Chomórach an Phiarsaigh.

Pelloutier, Fernand (1867–1901) and the Bourses du Travail

Jean-Philippe Zanco

Fernand-Léonce-Emile Pelloutier was born to a middle-class, Christian, monarchist family in Nantes. While he was still a pupil at the seminary of Saint-Nazaire, in 1885, he began writing for a radical newspaper, *La Démocratie de l'Ouest*. He became the editor in 1892. In the same year, he joined the French Parti Ouvrier (Worker's Party) founded by Jules Guesde, and he helped create the Bourse du Travail of Saint-Nazaire. In September he was made a representative for the Bourse of Saint-Nazaire to the General Congress of Tours, where he called for the general strike. Because of this clearly revolutionary conception, he broke with parliamentary socialism and was classified as a "dangerous revolutionary" by the sub-prefect of Saint-Nazaire. Leaving for Paris, Pelloutier quickly made contact with anarchists such as Paul Delesalle, Pierre Monatte, and Jean Grave, editor of the anarchist paper *Les Temps Nouveaux*, and soon was personally engaged in action: in July 1894 he stood against the police with militant workers defending the Bourse du Travail of Paris against a government closure order. Because of his youth and enthusiasm, he soon gained influence throughout the syndicalist world: in June 1895 he became the secretary of the Fédération des Bourses du Travail.

Pelloutier was a Proudhonian: he believed that the workers' goal is not to rule the state, but to build up a self-governing, federal organization of production. For that purpose, Pelloutier believed in direct action. Moreover, he understood that society, to be changed, had to be studied. Distrusting sociologists, "who generally feed more on books than on observation," he tried to gather the workers' testimonies, contributions from physicians and economists, and official reports to build up a general inventory of the laborers' conditions of life (Pelloutier 1921). With his brother Maurice, he published the results as *La Vie ouvrière en France (Working-Class Life In France)* in 1900.

After creating the revolutionary syndicalist Confédération Générale du Travail in 1895 and popularizing anarchist ideas within all labor unions, Pelloutier tried to unify the laborers in a single organization. However, he died at age 33 and thus did not live to see this work.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, France; Bourses du Travail; Confédération Générale du Travail and Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire; Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865)

References and Suggested Readings

- Dubief, H. (1969) *Le Syndicalisme révolutionnaire*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Jennings, J. R. (1990) Fernand Pelloutier and Revolutionary Syndicalism. In *Syndicalism in France: A Study of Ideas*. London: Macmillan. Available online at www.fondation-besnard.org/article.php3?id_article=124.
- Julliard, J. (1971) *Fernand Pelloutier et les origines du syndicalisme d'action directe*. Paris: Le Seuil.
- Pelloutier, F. (1895) *Qu'est-ce que la grève générale?* Paris: Librairie socialiste.
- Pelloutier, F. (1895/2005) Anarchism and the Workers' Union. In D. Guérin (Ed.), *No Gods No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Pelloutier, F. (1921) *Histoire des Bourses du Travail: origine, institutions, avenir*. Paris: Alfred Costes.

Peltier, Leonard (b. 1944)

Heather Squire

Leonard Peltier is an American Indian Movement (AIM) activist who was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences for the alleged murder of two FBI agents in 1975. During and since the trial, a number of inconsistencies in testimony and evidence have come to light; however, Leonard Peltier remains in prison as of 2008. Peltier is considered a political prisoner by Amnesty International, the National Congress of American Indians, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and other national and international groups.

Peltier was born in Grand Forks, North Dakota in September 1944. When he was 4 he went to live on Turtle Mountain Reservation in Belcourt, North Dakota with his grandparents. He spent his early years at Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) schools and attended his first political

meeting in 1958 regarding the BIA's plans to "terminate" Turtle Mountain Reservation. Inspired by the Alcatraz occupation and other actions, Peltier continued to become more politicized about the plight of Native Americans in the US, and finally joined AIM in 1972. Peltier went on to join AIM's "Trail of Broken Treaties" caravan to Washington, DC, and would end up spending five months in jail soon after for alleged attempted murder after an altercation with police. Those charges were dropped in 1978.

After the 1973 Wounded Knee siege that was planned by fellow AIM activists, a paramilitary group at Pine Ridge that called itself the Guardians of the Ogala Nations (GOONs) began its "Reign of Terror" against local Indian traditionalists and AIM members. At the same time, a large number of FBI agents were dispatched to South Dakota to quiet any Indian unrest. A large number of unexplained and uninvestigated Indian deaths resulted, which caused the Lakota elders of Pine Ridge Reservation to enlist the help of AIM.

Peltier and 17 other AIM activists went to Pine Ridge and set up an encampment on a secluded end of the reservation with the hope of warding off any further GOON violence. On June 26, 1975, two plainclothes FBI agents entered the reservation, allegedly chasing a thief in a red truck. Soon after, a host of FBI agents, BIA officials, and GOONs converged and a firefight erupted. Two FBI officers were shot to death in the mêlée. Peltier was indicted, tried, and convicted of the murders in Fargo, North Dakota in 1977. There is a great deal of controversy surrounding the case, including but not limited to: specious claims that a recovered A-15 rifle belonging to Peltier killed the FBI agents (although the shell casings found at the scene did not match that gun and there was no evidence that Peltier owned the gun); the murder of Anna Mae Aquash, an AIM activist who was slated to testify on behalf of Peltier; the false testimony (later recanted) under duress of Myrtle Poor Bear, alleging she was Peltier's girlfriend and saw him shoot the FBI agents; testimony from the original prosecutor, 15 years later, that the government still does not know who really killed the FBI agents; and the acquittal of all others indicted with Peltier, in spite of an "aiding and abetting" charge. The campaign to free Leonard Peltier continues, and new evidence continues to sur-

face in his favor; however, he remains in prison without parole.

SEE ALSO: Alcatraz Uprising and the American Indian Movement; Native American Protest, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Churchill, W. & Vander Wall, J. (1988) *Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret War Against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement*. Boston: South End Press.
- Matthiessen, P. (1992) *In the Spirit of Crazy Horse: The Story of Leonard Peltier and the FBI's War on the American Indian Movement*. New York: Penguin.
- Peltier, L. (1999) *Prison Writings: My Life is My Sun Dance*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Peltier, L. (2007) When the Truth Doesn't Matter. *Counterpunch*. January 9, 2007. Available at www.counterpunch.org/peltier01092007.html (downloaded April 20, 2008).

Peng Dehuai (1898–1974)

Paul Le Blanc

Peng Dehuai or P'eng Teh-huai was, along with Zhu De and Lin Biao, one of the foremost military leaders in the Chinese communist movement in the 1930s and 1940s. A prominent figure in the People's Republic of China after the revolutionary victory, he was also one of the first Chinese communist leaders to openly challenge the authority of Mao Zedong, in 1959.

Evolution of a Revolutionary Fighter

Born in humble conditions, as a child Peng rebelled openly against oppressive, opium-ridden realities in his own home of well-to-do peasants, from which he was consequently banished at the age of 9. He worked variously, for six years, as a cowherd, a coal miner, and a shoemaker's apprentice, finally being taken into the home of a rich uncle. Soon he had to flee once more when – in the midst of a terrible famine – he led hungry crowds in the invasion of the home of a wealthy merchant who was hoarding rice. Finding refuge in the army, he was swept up in the nationalist revolution of 1911 and became

active in the radical wing of Sun Yat-sen's Nationalist Party (the Guomindang).

As he rose in the ranks of the Nationalist military, becoming a battalion commander, he wrestled with the question of "what could we do to give purpose to our struggles and bring about permanent change." After a flirtation with anarchism, he turned to Marxism – reading such works as Marx and Engels's *Communist Manifesto*, Kautsky's *The Class Struggle*, and Bukharin's *The ABC of Communism*. "After reading the *Communist Manifesto*," he later recalled, "I dropped my pessimism and began working with a new conviction that society could be changed." The Chinese Nationalists and communists had been allies in the great Northern Expedition to free their country from the fragmentation and violence imposed by a variety of warlords. Nonetheless, in 1927, Peng chose to switch his allegiance from the Nationalists to the Communist Party – just as Nationalist military forces under their new leader Chiang Kai-shek turned murderously against their communist allies.

In 1928, Peng brought his considerable military forces into the new Red Army that was crystallizing at the rural base where the bulk of the Chinese communists were regrouping and building support among peasantry. While his inclination to be blunt and argumentative contributed to conflicts among the communist military leaders, Peng's abilities as a military leader resulted in his rise to the position of deputy commander-in-chief of the Red Army in the 1930s, and he was instrumental in the organization of the First and Second Field Armies, becoming the commander of the latter. In 1935, under the impact of a concerted Nationalist onslaught headed by Chiang Kai-shek, he along with all the other Red forces carried out the long and brutal retreat known as the Long March. The remnants of the communist forces ended up in Yanan, from where they conducted resistance against the Nationalists and (after 1937) the invasion of Imperial Japan. No less than Mao, Peng was instrumental in developing the far-reaching tactics of guerrilla warfare.

World War II brought an alliance between Chinese communists and Nationalists against the Japanese invaders, but soon after the war's end, the civil war resumed, culminating in the Chinese communist victory in the declaration of the People's Republic of China in 1949. A year

later, when the Korean War (1950–3) erupted and the US military offensive swept up through northern Korea toward China, the Chinese counterattacked. Peng served as the supreme commander of the People's Volunteer Army that drove back the offensive and stalemated US forces. In the same period he was defense minister of the People's Republic of China, and also a member of the ruling Politburo of the Communist Party. In 1955, Peng was made a marshal of the People's Liberation Army.

Evolution and Fate of an Oppositionist

In the period after the Korean conflict, Peng became increasingly critical of the personality cult being built up around Mao Zedong. He also opposed certain policies that Mao was formulating and pushing through – particularly the so-called Great Leap Forward, 1958–60 (designed to utilize extreme political enthusiasm to mobilize masses for the purpose of making dramatic economic breakthroughs in agriculture and industry).

At the beginning of a two-month meeting of the top communist leadership at Lushan in 1959, Peng initiated an angry and uncompromising attack on the Great Leap – denouncing it as "petty-bourgeois fanaticism," and that the notion of "putting politics in command" was generating "a fever on the brain" that violated the laws of economics and science, generated waste and illusions, and would do terrible damage to China. A number of others joined Peng in this critique, also pressing for greater internal democracy in the party, accusing Mao of being "despotic and dictatorial" along the lines of Joseph Stalin, who had recently been criticized by the new leadership of the USSR. Peng was also critical of Mao's orientation to break with the Soviet Union, whose assistance he saw as crucial in terms of both the country's economic development and military defense.

Mao counterattacked vigorously and effectively. According to knowledgeable sources, he "threatened that if his policies were overthrown he would return to the hills to mobilize a new peasant army to fight those in power." Able to muster a majority, he was able to defeat the oppositionists and even force them to recant. Even so, Peng was stripped of his top positions and denounced for leading an "anti-party clique."

He was replaced as defense minister and leader of the People's Liberation Army by a longtime rival of Peng's, Lin Biao, who was very closely aligned with Mao. Nonetheless, it is clear that there was significant dissatisfaction among a number of Chinese communists over Peng's treatment – particularly after it became clear, and was generally acknowledged, that the policies of the Great Leap Forward had been as disastrous as he had indicated. For some he became the symbol of an alternative to Mao's policies, and there were stirrings in influential quarters to return him to his positions in the Communist Party.

When Mao, with the assistance of Lin Biao, initiated the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966 in order to attack and destroy those in the Communist Party who differed with him, Peng's defenders were special targets of the pro-Mao Red Guards that were unleashed against so-called "counterrevolutionaries." Peng himself was the object of attack and abuse. He was characteristically honest and defiant when a group of Red Guards arrested him in 1966: "I was no executioner of the masses. I was half-right and half-wrong. I made mistakes, but I rendered meritorious service as well." Disappearing from sight in 1967, he died in 1974.

In 1978, two years after Mao's death, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party reexamined Peng's case, exonerating him of all charges and reaffirming his contributions to the Chinese Revolution.

SEE ALSO: Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911; *Communist Manifesto*; Lin Biao (1907–1971); Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Zhu De (1886–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- Harrison, J. P. (1972) *The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–72*. New York: Praeger.
- Karnow, S. (1972) *Mao and China, From Revolution to Revolution*. New York: Viking.
- Milton, D. & Milton, N. (1976) *The Wind Will Not Subside: Years in Revolutionary China, 1964–1969*. New York: Pantheon.
- Milton, D., Milton, N., & Schurmann, F. (Eds.) (1974) *People's China, 1966 through 1972*. New York: Vintage.
- Snow, E. (1968) *Red Star Over China*, rev. and enlarged ed. New York: Grove.
- Snow, H. F. (1979) *Inside Red China*. New York: Da Capo Press.

People's Liberation Front of Sri Lanka (JVP)

Balasingham Skanthakumar

Origins

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front) (JVP), Sri Lanka's largest self-defined left party and third largest parliamentary bloc, led two armed insurrections of Sinhala youth in 1971 and 1987–9. Both uprisings were brutally crushed with enormous loss of life, but the JVP has been described as "phoenix-like" and "hydra-headed" for its astonishing capacity to regenerate itself thereafter. Its origins lie in the schism within the Ceylon Communist Party in 1963 provoked by the Sino-Soviet dispute as well as tensions over the parliamentary road to socialism and accommodation to the "national-bourgeois" Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).

Rohana Wijeweera, drawn to Maoism while studying in the Soviet Union, joined the Communist Party (Peking wing – CP) of Sri Lanka in 1964 and quickly became leader of its youth front. Wijeweera's criticism of the CP of Sri Lanka's orthodox leadership and conceptions of revolution and class put him at odds with party leaders. He was expelled in 1965 after organizing an independent faction within the party.

Until 1970 Wijeweera and co-thinkers, swelled by smaller groups of Maoists, conducted clandestine educational classes particularly among school-leavers, university students, and naval ratings of rural origin. The "five lessons" as they became known were analyses of the social and political order; Indian hegemony over Sri Lanka; the reformist left and coalition politics with the SLFP and parliamentary road to socialism. Training in the handling of shotguns and manufacture of explosive devices was also carried out. Their objective was the revolutionary seizure of state power and socialist transformation of society, though by design they were still nameless and without public identity. Internal democratic processes were absent; Wijeweera handpicked the leadership and party conferences were unknown until 1980. Aside from the strategy of armed

struggle, the nascent organization differed from the "Old Left" in Sri Lanka in attributing revolutionary agency to the poor and oppressed of rural origin; animosity towards Up-Country Tamil plantation workers who were regarded as fifth-columnists for Indian expansionism or hegemony because of their recent Indian origin; opposition to coalitionism (popular-front politics) with the SLFP; and unembarrassed Sinhala Buddhist nationalism.

In the 1970 general election the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, as it now revealed itself, campaigned for "progressive" candidates in the United Front coalition that grouped the SLFP with the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and CP (Moscow). A wave of rising expectations for radical social and political reforms, solutions to the employment crisis, and access to higher education, land reform, and trade union rights, lifted the coalition to government. The worldwide radicalization of youth inspired by anti-imperialist struggles in Indo-China, the Cuban Revolution, and critiques of Stalinism and official communist parties exerted their influence.

Once the United Front took office, frustration at the slow pace of reform and fear of a right-wing military coup that would decimate the left as in Indonesia, gathered pace among broad sections of youth eager for rapid, radical, and decisive measures towards socialism.

1971 Insurrection

The 1971 insurrection was the most significant protest movement in post-colonial Sri Lanka since the August 1953 *Hartal* (General Strike). It was to be a "one-day revolution" loosely modeled on that in Zanzibar in 1964, involving a few hundred armed men and executed over a few hours. The participants were almost exclusively Sinhala youth, of Buddhist faith, and mainly male, drawn in Marxist parlance from the rural petit-bourgeoisie. Women cadres had an auxiliary role of tending to injured male comrades. Locally described as Che Guevarists, there is little evidence of familiarity with Guevara's theoretical contributions and political practice beyond the romance of his life and tragic death and path of armed struggle. Oppressed castes such as the *Vahumpura* and *Batgama* were over-represented in their ranks, but so too were the elite *Govigama*, and the JVP leadership (including Wijeweera) was predominantly from the pro-

sperous *Karava* caste. Though caste undertones were always present, the JVP has never overtly mobilized on caste lines.

Commencing on April 5, 93 police stations mainly in the southeast were attacked by insurgents with the aim of seizing weapons and ammunition. There was an abortive attempt to kidnap and possibly assassinate Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike. An attempted jail break to free Wijeweera, who had earlier been incarcerated in Jaffna, was unsuccessful. Colombo was virtually cut off from the rest of the country.

Poor planning and even worse implementation enabled the government to swiftly apprehend JVP leaders and physically eliminate members and supporters. However, in some "liberated" areas it took security forces several months to regain full control. Military and political support for the government came from Britain and the United States, India and Pakistan, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and most painfully to the insurgents, from China.

The government officially admitted 1,200 killings, but the true number is believed to be between 6,000 and 10,000. Anywhere between 14,000 and 18,000 more were arrested and detained, including leftists unconnected to the JVP but critical of the government, such as CP (Maoist) General Secretary N. Shanmugathasan and LSSP parliamentarian Vasudeva Nanayakkara.

By-passing the normal courts of law, and to legitimize the counterinsurgency campaign, an extraordinary Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) was created to indict the JVP leadership: 365 prisoners received criminal convictions ranging from 2 to 12 years of rigorous imprisonment, while remaining detainees were progressively released over five years. The state of emergency declared on the eve of the insurrection in March 1971 was maintained long after, strengthening the repressive powers of government.

In his legal defense Wijeweera was assisted by Bala Tampoe from the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (R) – LSSP(R) – a left-wing split from the LSSP affiliated to the Trotskyist Fourth International, which spearheaded an international campaign for the amnesty. Other JVP leaders were directly defended by lawyers working for the Ceylon Mercantile Industrial and General Workers Union (CMU) that was politically influenced by the LSSP(R).

Legalization and Backlash

In the 1977 general elections the right-wing United National Party (UNP) was elected while the United Front coalition split and was resoundingly defeated. "Open Economy" policies favoring the private sector, foreign direct investment, and market-led mechanisms were introduced. The UNP government released all political prisoners and lifted the ban on the JVP, which swiftly adopted open and mass work.

Imprisonment provided opportunities for political interaction and debate among JVP leaders, to study Marxism, and to acquaint themselves with the rising militancy of Northeastern Tamil youth. Thus, after 1977, the JVP defined Sri Lanka as a multinational state. For a while, it defended in principle the Tamil nation's right to self-determination up to and including secession, although in practice it opposed the movement for an independent Tamil *Eelam* (homeland).

The JVP's estrangement from the mainstream left intensified in this period following its abstention from participation in the 1980 strike movement, leading to a split with the Ceylon Teachers Union led by H. N. Fernando. The strike was defeated and 40,000 workers – mainly branch leaders and militants – were sacked: trade unions have since never recovered.

The left was divided too in the 1982 presidential election campaign. Rohana Wijeweera, the JVP candidate, outpolled his rivals on the left and received the third highest number of votes. Nevertheless disappointment at the modest tally, 273,428, relative to expectations of between 800,000 and 1 million votes, combined with the shrinking democratic space and increasing political authoritarianism, hardened opinion within the JVP against electoral strategies.

Communal riots against the Tamil minority in July 1983 were the bloodiest ethnic pogrom since independence and plunged Sri Lanka into an ongoing war. Although state-sponsored, the violence was blamed on the CP (Moscow), the Trotskyist Nava Sama Samaja Party, and the JVP, all of whom were proscribed. And the ban was never lifted on the JVP. Once again an underground organization, the JVP began preparing itself for armed revolution. Its ideology mutated too, from Marxist inflected nationalism to unbridled Sinhala chauvinism. Some leaders, including general secretary Lionel Bopage, resigned in protest.

By the mid-1980s the JVP had grown in influence and numerical support especially among university and school students, the rural and urban lower middle class, low-ranking police and military personnel, Buddhist monks, and to some extent among the public service and state corporation employees. Its greater appreciation for the working class stemmed from realization that without industrial action and pressure in strategic economic sectors it would be unable to cripple the government. To a significant degree the leadership void at workplace level caused by the government's mass sacking during the 1980 strike was filled by the JVP. Through 1986 and 1987 the JVP conducted bank robberies and raids on police stations and army camps as it accumulated funds and weapons to overthrow the UNP.

1987–1989 Insurrection

The Indo-Lanka (July 1987) Accord seeking to end the war through addressing some Tamil grievances and offering devolution of power through provincial councils was bitterly opposed by the JVP as a strategic alliance between "Indian expansionism" and "[Tamil] *Eelamist* separatism." In this tinder-box conjuncture the JVP successfully mobilized anti-government feeling, patriotism, and anti-Tamil sentiment among rural youth aggrieved by unemployment, widening income inequalities, landlessness, and rising levels of poverty. JVP strategy was to undermine confidence in the government through assassinations of senior politicians and UNP supporters, acts of sabotage, "mini-*hartals*," "curfews," and administration of "justice" to petty criminals. Many of these actions were in the name of its military wing, the *Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparaya* (Patriotic People's Movement). Nevertheless, it never militarily engaged the Indian Peace Keeping Force or Tamil militant groups and it has never been implicated in racist violence against Tamil civilians. Terror was also used by the JVP to force boycotts of presidential and parliamentary elections in December 1988 and February 1989, respectively, that returned the UNP to power. Leftists, whom the JVP despised as traitors for supporting the Indo-Lanka Accord, were among its estimated 2,500 victims, including the actor turned politician Vijaya Kumaranatunga.

The state responded with greater violence through paramilitaries, through "disappearances,"

and extra-judicial killings of 60,000 JVP activists, including women and schoolchildren. These paramilitaries were either army or police personnel in camouflage and in other cases hired assassins and criminals. Their victims were tortured and bodies burned either on the roadside or thrown into rivers as a public warning. The tide turned against the JVP in August 1989 when it rashly issued death threats to families of service personnel and began killing them. By November the top leadership of the JVP, including Rohana Wijeweera, had been detained and summarily executed. Leaderless, fueled by fear and mindless rage, and bereft of popular support, the insurgency petered out by 1990. Only one member of its politburo survived through escape to India. Somawansa Amarasinghe has since returned to Sri Lanka and is now its paramount leader.

Resurrection

Defeated and underground, the surviving cadre and sympathizers had their own internal debates on this second tragedy but in a transformed geopolitical situation. Some abandoned the JVP for postmodernism, others for environmentalism and Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, but the JVP began resurrecting itself. Still illegal, the JVP took advantage of political liberalization, following President Ranasinghe Premadasa's assassination by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 1993, to contest the August 1994 parliamentary elections on the platform of the Progressive Front. One candidate was elected from its southern stronghold in Hambantota district. Since then its political fortunes have soared in the form of increasing seats in parliamentary elections between 2000 and 2004, with four Cabinet-level ministerial portfolios in 2004–5. Apart from governing Tissamaharama local authority, the JVP occupies several local government and provincial council seats.

While remaining overwhelmingly Sinhala in composition, with no representation of minorities or women in its politburo and meager representation elsewhere, three of the JVP's 38 parliamentarians are from minority communities including one of only two Muslim women in the 225-member legislature. Though the party unequivocally supports Tamil estate workers' restoration of citizenship it denies the option of

self-government to Tamil-speaking areas. It offers instead equality for all communities with residual issues deferred to after attainment of socialism. Outside parliament, the JVP has used a broader alliance known as the Patriotic National Movement as a vehicle for its militant struggle against foreign governments, United Nations agencies, and international and local NGOs, all of whom are perceived to be sympathetic towards the LTTE and federal reconstitution of Sri Lanka.

Its leftist identity is projected symbolically by the red flag with the hammer and sickle, positive references to Marx, Engels, and Lenin, criticism of neoliberalism and imperialism, and fraternal relations with several communist parties, including Cuba. Its front organizations of workers, peasants, women, university students, and Buddhist monks are visible during its annual May Day procession. The JVP is contemptuous of feminism as a western ideology and conformist on traditional gender roles. It underlines its Buddhist affinities through regular meetings with senior prelates and performance of religious rites. Internal democracy is undeveloped and delegate conferences resemble rallies with unanimous approval of resolutions.

SEE ALSO: Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and Sri Lankan Radicalism; Tamil Nationalist Struggle for Eelam; Wijeweera, Rohana (1943–1989)

References and Suggested Readings

- Alles, A. C. (1990) *THE J. V. P. 1969–1989*. Colombo: Lake House Investments.
- Chandraprema, C. A. (1991) *Sri Lanka – The Years of Terror: The JVP Insurrection 1987–1989*. Colombo: Lake House Investments.
- Gunaratna, R. (1990) *Sri Lanka – A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP*. Kandy: Institute of Fundamental Studies.
- Halliday, F. (1971) The Ceylonese Insurrection. *New Left Review* 1, 69 (September–October): 55–91.
- Moore, M. (1993) Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka. *Modern Asian Studies* 27, 3: 593–642.
- Rampton, D. (2003) Sri Lanka's "Many-Headed Hydra": The JVP, Nationalism and the Politics of Poverty. In CEPA, IMCAP, SLAAS (Eds.), *Poverty Issues in Sri Lanka: Towards New Empirical Insights*. Colombo: Centre for Poverty Analysis.
- Senaratne, J. (1997) *Political Violence in Sri Lanka 1977–1990: Riots, Insurrections, Counterinsurgencies, Foreign Intervention*. Amsterdam: VU University Press.

Peoples' Global Action Network

Simon L. Lewis

Peoples' Global Action Network (PGA) is a global-scale network of grassroots groups, social movements, and trade unions. It was formed in 1998 to oppose neoliberal policies and institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) using extraparliamentary action. Estimates are that 1,500 organizations have participated in PGA-inspired days of action and conferences (Wood 2002). The participants are mostly large peasant/farmer organizations and indigenous peoples' movements from income-poor countries, and autonomous, environmental, and direct action-oriented groups from income-rich countries.

PGA was instrumental in the upsurge of critique and protest around economic globalization and institutions of global governance, such as the WTO and the Group of Eight leading industrialized nations (G8), which were accompanied by large-scale civil unrest in Seattle (November 1999) and Genoa (July 2001), respectively. PGA provided a framework of communication and coordination for radical groups against globalization on capitalist terms. However, by the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, many of the innovations and aspirations of the network were being fulfilled elsewhere.

History

The emergence of PGA can be traced to August 1996 and the rainforests of southern Mexico. The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) called an international meeting of groups and social movements to discuss common problems and alternatives to neoliberal capitalism. From these 3,000 people emerged a call for a second similar "encounter," in Spain in August 1997. Some of those attending stressed that a more focused campaign against a specific key institution of neoliberalism was necessary. Thus, activists from ten of the world's most innovative social movements, including Nigeria's Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, Brazil's Movimento Sem Terra, and India's Karnataka State Farmers' Association, formed Peoples' Global Action against the World Trade Organization and "Free" Trade (note: Peoples'

Global Action, i.e., global action of many peoples, not People's Global Action, i.e., global action of the people).

Peoples' Global Action was born in February 1998, with a conference in Geneva, Switzerland attended by approximately 300 delegates from 71 countries. Those present included Mozambican farmers, the Canadian Postal Workers' Union, and Bangladeshi fisherfolk. The conference was designed to build a global network of grassroots groups and movements to delegitimize the WTO and work toward alternatives to neoliberal capitalism. This network of "coordination and communication" was envisioned to work similarly to the Internet, which was then revolutionizing communication among the world's radical movements. Just as the Internet has protocols to allow computers to connect with one another, so PGA operated analogously, and participation in the network required agreement with five hallmarks:

1. A very clear rejection of the WTO and other trade liberalization agreements (such as APEC, the EU, NAFTA) as active promoters of socially and environmentally destructive globalization (altered in September 2001 to: "A very clear rejection of capitalism, imperialism, and feudalism; all trade agreements, institutions, and governments that promote destructive globalization").
2. A rejection of all forms and systems of domination and discrimination including, but not limited to, patriarchy, racism, and religious fundamentalism of all creeds.
3. A confrontational attitude, since members did not think that lobbying could have a major impact in such biased and undemocratic institutions in which transnational capital was the only real policymaker.
4. A call to non-violent civil disobedience and the construction of local alternatives by local people, as answers to the action of governments and corporations (altered in September 2001 to: "A call to direct action and civil disobedience, support for social movements' struggles, advocating forms of resistance which maximize respect for life and oppressed peoples' rights, as well as the construction of local alternatives to global capitalism").
5. An organizational philosophy based on decentralization and autonomy.

The earliest public form of expression of the network was to call for participation in decentralized global days of action against the WTO and other transnational bodies of governance. The first was to coincide with the second ministerial meeting of the WTO in Geneva from May 18 to 20, 1998, and the G8 meeting in Birmingham, UK, a few days earlier. This call to action resulted in protests and demonstrations in 25 countries, including major riots in Geneva, 200,000 people on the streets of Hyderabad, India, and 50,000 people in Brasilia. Thousands more took part in Reclaim the Streets events – blocking traffic, taking over city streets and transforming them into carnivalesque protest zones – in 29 cities, including Birmingham, whilst the G8 were meeting.

Inspired by the success of this first global day of action, a second was called for June 18, 1999. On this day, protest focused on financial centers and coincided with the G8 Summit in Cologne, Germany. Protests occurred in 26 countries, including a siege of London's financial center by over 10,000 people. Six months later, the third WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle was paralyzed by over 50,000 activists whilst anti-WTO events were held in a further 70 countries. These major events inspired many others across the world, often only loosely connected to PGA or movements within the network, to confront the political and economic elite wherever they met. Protests flourished from as far north as Quebec City, Canada (against the Free Trade Area of the Americas talks, in April 2001) to as far south as Melbourne, Australia (against the World Economic Forum, September 2000), via Chiang Mai, Thailand (against the Asian Development Bank annual meeting, March 2001) and Cancun, Mexico (against the fifth WTO ministerial meeting, September 2003).

Politics and Organization

The PGA hallmarks have been utilized in a number of ways. Initially, they were regarded by most as simply describing the properties of the PGA network itself. In other words, whilst the PGA network rejected lobbying in favor of civil disobedience and direct action, this was not necessarily the case with all its constituent parts. And whilst the network was to have an organizational philosophy based on autonomy and decentralization, participating groups were free

to decide upon their own organizational forms and structures.

However, a number of groups, predominantly in high-income countries, would later come to use the hallmarks as a means of excluding groups from participating in PGA-inspired networks. This was done primarily by parts of the counterglobalization movement whose political ethics were closest to those of the hallmarks. They tended to argue, for example, that those with more “traditional” (i.e., hierarchical or centralized) structures should not be allowed to participate in the network because they failed to espouse the hallmarks as “core values” in their everyday political practice. The adoption of the PGA hallmarks by the Dissent! Network in the UK, who were organizing against the 2005 G8 Summit in Scotland, was an explicit attempt to prevent hierarchically arranged organizations and those planning on lobbying the G8 from participating.

Beyond the hallmarks, there are two other official PGA documents, the “Organizational Principles” (OPs) and a longer document, the PGA Manifesto. The OPs explain the organizational structures of PGA, which, set out in 11 short statements, are minimal. Essentially, PGA's goal is coordination. It is not an organization (OP #1), it has no membership (OP #3), and nobody can officially represent it (OP #4). It has never had paid staff, offices, or a bank account, nor does it have any legal standing (OP #8). All actions are taken by participating groups or movements (rather than the entire network), often using the phrase “inspired by Peoples' Global Action.”

The adoption of this model can be viewed in three ways. Firstly, the OPs code the political ideals of maximum respect for autonomy, diversity, and voluntary cooperation. Secondly, for some they expressed a desire for collective organization and action without invoking “representational politics.” Thirdly, for others this was largely pragmatic, with the structure specifically designed to avoid a common problem with international networks: the fact that those with resources dominate. Often with international or global campaigns this has involved (more radical) low-income-country social movements bowing to the demands of (less radical) high-income-country non-governmental organizations.

Coordination is provided by global conferences (OP #5). These occurred in Geneva, Switzerland (February 1998), Bangalore, India (August 1999), and Cochabamba, Bolivia (September 2001).

Since 2001, no network-wide global meetings have taken place, although other meetings have occurred (for example, PGA International Consultation Meeting, India, 2005; Europe-wide PGA conference, France 2006). Decisions about when and where to hold global conferences, and other necessary interim decisions, such as endorsing specific calls to action, are made by a Convenors' Committee. This committee is composed of groups involved in the network – between one and three per continent – who must stand down at each new global meeting. In addition to the Convenors' Committee, a Support Group assists with the logistics of organizing conferences.

The PGA Manifesto, written in 1998 and updated in 2001, begins with two quotes. The first is from Eduardo Galeano: "We cannot take communion from the altars of a dominant culture which confuses price with value and converts people and countries into merchandise." The second is from an unnamed Aboriginal woman: "If you come only to help me, you can go back home. But if you consider my struggle as part of your struggle for survival, then maybe we can work together." Both capture the spirit of the document: economic globalization is causing more of life to be subject to the discipline of the market, and coordinated grassroots resistance is the best form of attack.

The Manifesto continues with a preamble on capitalism and economic globalization, followed by 11 sections on specific themes: economic globalization, power, and the "race to the bottom"; exploitation, labor, and livelihoods; gender oppression; indigenous peoples' fight for survival; oppressed ethnic groups; onslaught on nature and agriculture; culture; knowledge and technology; education and youth; militarism; and migration. These sections deal succinctly with the impacts of globalization, place current problems in a historical context, and assert political stances. For example, the section on onslaught on nature and agriculture states: "Climate change is a result of capitalist resource exploitation. It reinforces existing global inequalities initiated by colonialism. As the climate warms, essential resources will further become the privilege of the elite, who will use increasingly military force to acquire them." However, the Manifesto does not suggest any solutions to the problems posed. It is designed to be a "living document," reappraised at each global conference to maintain a changing "global consensus" on the manifestations and solutions

to economic globalization in particular and capitalism more generally.

Beyond Global Days of Action

Alongside promoting decentralized days of action, PGA was also used to organize "Intercontinental Caravans," the idea being to bring those at the forefront of resisting free-trade agreements to the governments, institutions, and transnational corporations that design and implement these policies. The most ambitious of these was the arrival in Europe of almost 500 peasant farmers, mostly from India, for a one-month, nine-country, mass protest tour (May–June 1999). However, the logistical size of such an operation, time and money investment, and cultural conflicts meant that Caravans did not become the widely copied replicable model for action that decentralized actions coinciding with summits became.

More recently, PGA has attempted to move from global days of action to a series of sustained campaigns based around the following issues:

1. state militarism and paramilitarism;
2. self-determination and land sovereignty;
3. against privatization;
4. construction of alternatives.

However, these sustained campaigns have largely failed to progress from a theoretical contemplation as to how to move beyond the limits of single-day protests or events.

PGA has acknowledged a number of difficult problems relating to the vast resource gap between participants from income-rich and income-poor countries, differing cultures, and expectations and experiences of involvement in international networks. Many of these are obvious: people from Europe and North America can generally more easily attend conferences than those from Africa or Asia. This was addressed by allowing only 30 percent of the total attendance at the 2001 global conference in Bolivia to be from income-rich countries.

Between 2002 and 2008 there have been no network-wide global conferences. This is likely due to a combination of three factors. Firstly, the small number of individuals who had formed the Support Group had previously provided indispensable logistical support. With few of these individuals willing or able to commit to organizing another conference, a huge challenge

was presented to the network. Secondly, the 2001 conference emphasized further decentralization, proposing a focus on organizing continental as opposed to global activities in the near future. Finally, by 2003 when the next PGA conference had been tentatively scheduled, many of the functions the network had earlier fulfilled were now taking place elsewhere. The World Social Forum – which has attracted up to 150,000 participants – had become the central location where the alter-globalization movement discussed strategy, tactics, and action plans. Similarly, the PGA news bulletins, which had been instrumental in circulating information and inspiration for action in the early days of the network, had been superseded by the global Indymedia network of alternative, radical news producers (www.indymedia.org). So whilst some (in parts of Latin America, Europe, and South Asia in particular) concentrated upon building continental networks, others utilized the World Social Forum and similar events as a replacement for PGA global conferences.

By linking resistance movements on all continents and across many sectors, from the environment-focused to trade unions and landless farmers' organizations, PGA has arguably been more influential than any other network in the contemporary rise of alter-globalization and anti-capitalist politics. However, the importance of PGA is often understated because its sole purpose was to promote increased communication and coordinated action amongst the world's radical social movements, rather than the innovations and successes of PGA itself.

SEE ALSO: G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; Global Day of Action Against Capitalism, June 18 (J18), 1999; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Indymedia Global Justice Campaign, 2000s; Reclaim the Streets; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999; World Social Forums; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Notes from Nowhere (Eds.) (2003) *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism*. London and New York: Verso.
- Peoples' Global Action, www.agp.org.
- Turbulence Collective (Eds.) (2007) *What Would it Mean to Win? 14 Essays from the Movement of Movements*. Available at www.turbulence.org.uk.
- Wall, D. (2005) *Babylon and Beyond: The Economics of Anti-Capitalist, Anti-Globalist and Radical Green Movements*. London: Pluto Press.

Welsh, I. & Chesters, G. (2006) *Complexity and Social Movements: Protest at the Edge of Chaos*. London: Routledge.

Wood, L. J. (2002) *Bridging the Divide: The Case of Peoples' Global Action*. Available at www.agpna.revolt.org/ljwood.html.

Peronist resistance

Ernesto Salas

The term *resistencia peronista* refers to the actions carried out by thousands of Peronist sympathizers in the five years following the 1955 coup d'état that aimed to achieve the return of President Juan Domingo Perón. On June 16, 1955, military planes bombed the Casa Rosada, the Argentinian government headquarters, and its surrounding area in the Plaza de Mayo with the purpose of killing Perón. The uprising failed, but the bombing, witnessed by the city in the middle of the day during work hours, left a death toll of 300. Three months later, a new coup attempt that had the support of the political opposition and the Catholic Church succeeded. A military government, known as the *Revolución Libertadora*, displaced the democratic government. Thus began a period of 18 years during which Peronism was proscribed.

After a brief initial period, General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu was designated president in November 1955. The navy kept the vice-presidency in the person of Admiral Isaac Rojas. The new government's policies reflected the demands of its social base. The General Confederation of Labor (*Confederación General del Trabajo de la República Argentina, CGT*) was banned from politics and every organization linked to the Peronist Party was made illegal. Through Decree 4.161/56, anyone mentioning Perón or his late wife Eva, carrying any Peronist symbol, or singing Peronist songs was threatened with prison. The *Alzaga Unzué* palace, the former residence of Perón and Eva, was demolished. Public works that had begun under Perón were interrupted. Eva Perón's corpse was stolen from the CGT headquarters and hidden by army intelligence agents for 17 years.

The military dictatorship judged the control of unions to be a priority. During the September 1955 coup, army and navy forces surrounded many union buildings to prevent workers' mobilization. Unions close to Perón were attacked by



On September 16, 1955, President Juan Perón of Argentina is overthrown by a nationalist Catholic group in a coup d'état commonly referred to as the "Liberating Revolution." After the successful coup, a group of activists in Buenos Aires burn Peronist propaganda. (Cornell Capa/Magnum Photos)

civilian commandos supportive of the *golpista* military. Banning individual unions as well as their central organization, the CGT, Aramburu managed to control organized labor while isolating its leaders from their bases: 11,000 union leaders at all levels were proscribed. The void was filled by military auditors as well as by some socialist and radical union leaders close to the government. In the meantime, a multifaceted resistance was being organized in neighborhoods and factories.

Resistencia in the Neighborhoods

The first *resistencia* commandos were organized by neighbors and co-workers with no necessary previous political experience and with a high risk of being detected. At the beginning they met in private homes, creating local networks and adopting different names to accompany the term commando. This took place in most of

Argentina, especially in the cities. Some known groups were: Comandos Coronel Perón in the Buenos Aires province; Comando Nacional Peronista, which coordinated several other commandos in the city of Buenos Aires; the Frente Emancipador in the Santa Fe province; and the Comando 17 de Octubre, in the provinces of Tucumán and Santiago del Estero (Salas 2003). Commandos disseminated clandestine propaganda using rudimentary methods that were later perfected. Most of them also carried out a number of urban attacks using homemade bombs constructed from pieces of tube, filled with gunpowder and incorporating a basic timing device. Bombs were placed in the houses of political leaders who were complicit with the military coup, in public offices and private companies. Members of the government were also targeted. In the years following Perón's overthrow, there were no fewer than five attacks a day using *caños* ("tubes"). In parallel, there was a continuous increase in factory sabotage and deliberate fires abounded in rural areas.

On June 9, 1956, a pro-Peronist coup attempt was led by General Juan José Valle and was supported by a number of commandos. Aramburu's dictatorship knew about it in advance and the rebellion was crushed. The government decreed the death penalty for 27 people, including Valle and the other leaders. On the night of the uprising, a group of neighbors were detained by the police and taken to an empty plot, where five activists were illegally executed by being shot in the back; others were murdered behind a police station after being subjected to irregular summary trials. Those in the military were subjected to a court martial and executed in prison, despite their families' requests for clemency (Ferla 1983).

While in exile, Perón had chosen John William Cooke, a lawyer with strong nationalist and anti-imperialist views, as the tactical chief of the movement and his personal heir in the event of his death. Cooke, who had been in prison in the south since the end of 1955, was only able to assume his new responsibilities in April 1957, after escaping with other Peronist leaders and settling in Chile. By then, the general order to resist launched by Perón at the end of 1956 (Perón & Cooke 2007) had been implemented through an inorganic network of *resistencia* commandos and union grassroots, since the Peronist Party structure had not survived the coup and Perón's exile.

Resistencia in Factories

Confident that the Peronists had been displaced, from the end of 1956 the navy auditor in charge of the CGT allowed salary negotiations and union-controlled elections. Against all expectations, by 1958 a new generation of Peronists had been elected to lead most industrial labor organizations. Strikes and conflicts rose sevenfold in comparison to 1955, and continued escalating in the three following years. Workers went on strike to demand salary rises and oppose the productivity clauses that companies tried to incorporate in collective bargaining agreements (James 1981). In the industrial sector, most strikes and similar measures were decided against the pro-military administrators in charge of the unions and were strongly supported by the workers. Toward the end of 1956, a strike of metal workers that lasted for more than 60 days was suppressed by army tanks going around the neighborhoods calling workers to work.

In 1957, a strike of trash collectors in the city of Buenos Aires lasted for more than 30 days, despite the decision of the socialist auditor to lift it. Finally, after many conflicts, the military government realized that strikes could only be lifted by negotiating with parallel organizations (Salas 1994). Toward mid-1957, some younger Peronist activists elected as union leaders allied with communist peers to form a Comisión Inter-sindical (Inter-Union Commission). In August the auditor of CGT called a summit, confident that by manipulating the system of assigning seats the government could control the majority of representatives. However, the alliance between independents, communists, and Peronists frustrated the dictatorship's plan in the summit and the CGT remained banned.

Toward the end of the year, the Córdoba branch of the CGT, led by Atilio López, called a meeting of normalized unions and Peronist grassroots organizations. The outcome was the Programa de La Falda, which had a strong nationalist, combative, and revolutionary content. The program called for "liquidating foreign export and import monopolies," achieving "state control of foreign trade," nationalizing "foreign meat-packing plants," for "worker control of production," and for strengthening the popular state "to destroy anti-national oligarchic groups and their foreign allies." According to the document, the working class was "the only Argentine force

whose interests represent the wishes of the country itself" (Baschetti 1987).

That same year, Argentinians voted in elections for a Constituent Assembly to replace the 1949 Peronist Constitution. All Peronist candidacies were banned. After confronting hardcore sectors promoting abstention, Perón ordered his followers to vote blank. The result, even though far from the numbers obtained in previous elections, gave Perón victory with a majority of blank votes. However, in view of the presidential elections called for 1958, Perón decided to ally with the Intransigent Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente), a breakaway group from the Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical). Thanks to this support, Arturo Frondizi was elected president on February 23, 1958. With this political change the Peronist *resistencia* movement experienced less severe repression, gaining access to legal forms of participation in unions and holding off the prospect of armed insurrection to promote Perón's return. Nevertheless, many clandestine commandos, resolute in their insurreccional positions, disobeyed Perón's orders to vote for Frondizi.

Frondizi's policies toward unions exposed divisions between union leaders who accepted the government's integrationist position and those who placed their struggle in the strategic perspective of Perón's return. The president's proposal in regard to union leadership was embodied in a law regulating labor organizations according to the Peronist model. In the view of such leaders, the only alternative to Frondizi's government in the short term was a new military government. Thus, when President Frondizi announced a law authorizing foreign capital to extract oil, contradicting his initially nationalist position, the Peronist union leadership disapproved a strike by Mendoza workers protesting the passing of the law.

The situation changed toward the end of 1958 when Frondizi implemented a stabilization plan recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The immediate consequence was a strong economic adjustment experienced by waged labor in the first three months of 1959. Massive dismissals were accompanied by a 30 percent decrease in salary purchasing power. Annual inflation reached 13.69 percent in a year. In mid-1959, tensions between the government and the larger Peronist unions increased when Frondizi ordered the use of force to expel 9,000

workers who had occupied the meatpacking plant that supplied meat to the city.

The Seizure of Lisandro de la Torre Meatpacking Plant

At the beginning of 1959, Congress began to debate a new law that would allow the privatization of the city of Buenos Aires' meatpacking plant, which livestock producers were interested in buying. At the time many in the Mataderos neighborhood, where both farmyards and the meatpacking plant were located, either worked at the plant or had relatives employed there. The plant had just voted in favor of a new combative Peronist leadership with close ties to the area's commandos.

Hearing the news, workers led by union leader Sebastián Borro protested en masse in front of Congress against the law. According to Borro, the president of the lower chamber of deputies had promised a response for the next day. But during the night, both legislative chambers approved the sale of the meatpacking plant to the Argentine Corporation of Producers. In the afternoon of the following day, after the news had spread across the factory, the union leadership called an assembly, which decided by a large majority to occupy the meatpacking plant until further notice.

The following day, Borro and the rest of the leadership asked President Frondizi to veto the law. In response, just before leaving on an official visit to the United States, Frondizi designated the chief of police as mediator in the conflict. On Friday at midnight, the ministry of labor declared the strike illegal and called on occupants to vacate the building before Saturday at 3 a.m. Repression began an hour later.

During the early hours of January 17, a force of 2,000 policemen, supported by assault vehicles, army trucks, soldiers carrying machine guns, and four tanks, surrounded the meatpacking plant, which still had most of the workers inside. At the time, Borro and other leaders were in a meeting with representatives of other Peronist unions to ask for their support. At 4 a.m., a tank smashed through the plant's front door and policemen through tear gas entered the central patio.

A group of workers reached the patio, turned back, and in front of the tank began singing the national anthem while others caused the livestock to stampe. After that people scattered in all

directions. Most of the workers abandoned the plant, jumping over the surrounding walls, but a small group resisted on the fourth floor until 7 a.m. The police recaptured the building and arrested 95 workers, several of them injured. That night, learning what had happened, the leaders of the large Peronist unions, under pressure from the combative group including Borro, decided to call an indefinite general strike (Salas 2006).

To stop the insurrection the government resorted to repressive measures. During the first two days of the strike more than 400 union and political Peronist leaders were arrested, including Cooke, who had been displaced from the movement's leadership a month earlier by Perón. The areas of La Plata, Berisso, and Ensenada, the main enclave of foreign meatpacking plants and the cradle of Peronism, were declared a military zone under the custody of army and navy troops occupying the city distillery.

In response, *resistencia* commandos from the city of Buenos Aires, greater Buenos Aires, and the city of La Plata carried out hundreds of attacks with explosives to show not only that their operative capacity was intact but also that their power had grown from the early days of the *caño* to the acquisition of explosives such as trotyl. The government threatened to implement the Conintes (Conmoción Interna del Estado) Plan, which allowed the trial of civilians by military tribunals.

The general strike was declared illegal on its first day while the "military mobilization" of transportation workers was ordered. That night, some non-Peronist as well as Peronist union bus drivers abandoned the struggle, thus weakening the power of the strike. The next day, Tuesday, communists also left, as did the group of 62 Peronist organizations, alleging that they did not want to encourage a new military coup. In this way, the so-called revolutionary general strike, called for an indefinite period, was dissolved in 72 hours.

In Mataderos, however, neighbors and workers continued to resist. After the police occupied the meatpacking plant, the struggle moved to the neighborhood. Every day columns of protesters occupied the center of the neighborhood and confronted the police, stopping and burning streetcars or building barricades out of paving stones. During the night, neighbors cut down public lighting and threw stones at police patrol cars. It was a week of street fights, with a general strike

and attacks in the background. The recently created Peronist Youth also participated. Despite the end of the general strike, the strike of the meatpacking plant workers continued. For several months it was difficult to assemble the personnel necessary for dealing with the daily needs of the meat industry. Finally, the meatpacking plant was sold to CAP in 1960. Half of the 9,000 workers were fired and did not find new jobs (Salas 2006).

During 1959, the reaction of Peronist unions encouraged by their hardcore groups inspired worker organizations to defend themselves from the offensive launched by Frondizi's government. In the city of Buenos Aires alone, 1,400,000 workers went on strike. In Argentina as a whole, 10 million labor days were lost, the highest number in the decade. Five national strikes were held that year. On April 14, a long strike of white-collar bank employees began, eventually leading to thousands of dismissals. In July, a sugar cane worker strike affected the Tucumán province. Long columns of protesters marched to the city through the sugar cane plantations; in a violent reaction, police killed two sugar cane workers. Nevertheless, sugar cane workers were the only group whose strike ended in victory. Metal workers went on strike from August 25 to October 7. In most conflicts protesters engaged in fights with the police in city centers.

In October 1959, in Tucumán, the Comando 17 de Octubre sent an armed group into the mountains, the Peronist Liberation Movement-Army of National Liberation (Movimiento Peronista de Liberación-Ejército de Liberación Nacional), known as Uturuncos (Tiger-Men), which held out until the police dismantled the guerilla settlement in June of the following year. During Christmas 1959, 21 Tucumano and Santiagueño guerillas attacked police headquarters in the city of Frías, taking arms and uniforms back to the jungle in southern Tucumán.

In the first months of 1960 a wave of *resistencia* attacks demonstrated that commandos had both the capacity and the resources to carry out large actions even in military neighborhoods. On February 15, a Peronist commando blew up the oil tanks of Shell-Mex in Córdoba city, burning four million liters of gas and killing 13 people. On March 11, a powerful trotyl bomb destroyed the home of Army Mayor David Cabrera, a member of the state intelligence service SIDE. Even though Cabrera and his wife were not hurt,

the attack claimed the life of their 3-year-old daughter. Army commander General Toranzo Montero declared his intention to "execute anybody discovered *in flagrante*" and persuaded Frondizi to implement a counterinsurgency plan – CONINTES – to halt subversion.

On March 13 an army corporal, Manuel Medina, was detained in a police station and thrown from a window for cheering for Perón. The army and police searched thousands of homes throughout the country, shutting down all Peronist and Communist Party offices. Thousands of people were arrested under the CONINTES plan and were brought to military courts. More than 2,000 activists were sent to prison and became known as "CONINTES prisoners" (Salas 2003).

Violent repression and the government's refusal to negotiate with strikers caused popular resistance to disintegrate. Some Peronist union leaders accepted the alliance offered by Frondizi. Access to legality, which had been insinuated in 1958, became tangible in the "integrationist" proposal of the *desarrollista* (economic development-oriented) government. Leaders from larger Peronist unions understood themselves as necessary spokesmen in an effective post-Peronist political order. The persistence of a Peronist political identity transformed labor power into political power every time they were called to negotiate with the state and the business sector in their dual labor and political capacities.

Some commandos tried to form guerilla organizations, the majority of which ceased operations toward the end of 1960. The last attempt at a civic-military coup was led by General Iñiguez on November 30, 1960, when military groups and commandos attacked several regiments around the city of Rosario. No social mobilization accompanied this last Peronist uprising. Learning about the defeat of the movement, Iñiguez and other leaders fled the country.

In 1960 there was a decline in workers' struggles, and strikes reached their lowest point in five years. A new generation of activists were fired from the factories, blacklisted, and were unable to return to work. According to Secretary of Labor Galileo Puente speaking in May 1960, the time when "those who had to obey commanded" was over, and the "arbitrariness of factory internal commissions" could no longer be admitted since "businessmen must retake command of the factories" (Salas 2006).

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Argentina; Argentina, Armed Struggle and Guerilla Organizations, 1960s–1970s; Argentina, Worker Actions, October 17, 1945

References and Suggested Readings

- Baschetti, R. (1987) *Documentos de la Resistencia Peronista 1955–1970*. Buenos Aires: Puntosur Editores.
- Ferla, S. (1983) *Mártires y verdugos*, 4th ed. Buenos Aires: Peña Lillo.
- Galasso, N. (1997) *Cooke: de Perón al Che. Una biografía política*. Rosario: Homo Sapiens.
- James, D. (1981) Racionalización y respuesta de la clase obrera: contexto y limitaciones de la actividad gremial en la Argentina. *Desarrollo Económico* 83, 21 (October–December): 321–49.
- Perón, J. D. & Cooke, J. W. (2007) *Correspondencia Perón–Cooke*, 2 vols. Buenos Aires: Ed. Colihue.
- Salas, E. (1994) Institucionalización, legalidad y límite de la democracia obrera en Argentina (1957). In P. Berrotarán & P. Pozzi (Comp.), *Estudios inconformistas sobre la clase obrera argentina 1955–1989*. Buenos Aires: Letra Buena.
- Salas, E. (2003) *Uturuncos. El origen de la guerrilla peronista*. Buenos Aires: Ed. Biblos.
- Salas, E. (2006) *La Resistencia Peronista. La toma del frigorífico Lisandro de la Torre*. Buenos Aires: Ed. Retórica/Altamira.
- Walsh, R. (1972) *Operación Masacre*. Buenos Aires: De la Flor.

Peru, armed insurgency and the Dirty War, 1980–1990

Summer D. Leibensperger

Beginning in 1980 and lasting into the 1990s, the Partido Comunista del Perú en el Sendero Luminoso de Mariátegui (PCP-SL or the Communist Party for Peru for the Shining Path of Mariátegui) engaged in guerilla warfare against Peru's central government. Guided by Maoist ideology, PCP-SL planned to overthrow the Peruvian state, replacing it with a New Democracy, leading the way to a socialist society. PCP-SL engaged in thousands of rebel attacks in the 1980s against possible collaborators of all social backgrounds. The government's response was brutal. First it ignored PCP-SL and the factors that led to its rise, which PCP-SL exploited to gain territory and followers, and then responded by inflicting indiscriminate violence both on PCP-SL members and peasants.

President Fujimori is credited with capturing the leader of PCP-SL, which incapacitated the organization, but at a terrible price: repeated violations of human rights. His military is charged with committing massacres and extrajudicial executions, raping women, and affecting disappearances. Fujimori, convicted of abuse of power in December 2007, was indicted as a war criminal for human rights violations during his presidency, for which he came to trial in 2008.

Additionally, in the mid-1980s, the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA or Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) began an attack on the central government while simultaneously battling PCP-SL for territory in the countryside. While the impact of this group was never as great as PCP-SL, it is noteworthy as another group that was engaged in armed insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s.

Factors Leading to Armed Insurgency and Dirty War

In the years leading up to the insurgency, the Andes Mountains could be considered a visual marker of a great social and economic divide in Peru: on one side, Lima, the rich capital city near the coast; on the other, small villages with unrelenting poverty. Lima contained most of the wealth and population (largely of European ancestry) of the country; by comparison, the southern highlands contained widespread poverty and a high percentage of indigenous Indians who often faced discrimination and prejudice. Highland residents had been neglected by Peru's central government and were without basic services. Very few residents of Ayacucho, for example, had running water and electricity, and there were few paved roads. Malnutrition and infant mortality rates were high.

Peru was under military rule from 1968 to 1980. As civilian rule returned, members of the southern highlands hoped that leftist political parties (whose power rose with the return to civilian rule) would develop reforms that would help them, but reform measures in the 1960s and 1970s might have left them wary. Economic reform, specifically agrarian reform, was attempted by Fernando Belaúnde Terry (elected in 1963), Juan Velasco Alvarado (who led a coup d'état in 1968 and ruled for seven years), and General Francisco Morales Bermúdez Cerutti (who oversaw a five-year transition back to civilian rule). Few

of the benefits of reform efforts reached the rural areas, especially Ayacucho.

In the early 1960s the hacienda system was still in place, though in decline since the 1930s, in many rural areas. Alvarado's government expropriated land from hacienda owners in 1968, but peasants in rural areas did not see immediate changes in land ownership. Indeed, more than five years later, the only action peasants had seen were hacienda owners exploiting the situation by selling assets. Cooperatives were formed in the early 1970s, but seemed designed to fail – few funds were provided and the effort was disorganized. Ultimately, poorer areas were low on the government's list of priorities and received little in terms of resources and assistance, further increasing peasant resentment.

At the same time that rural peasants were dealing with failed government reform efforts, other changes were occurring among the leftist political parties. In 1964 the Peruvian Communist Party split between the pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet factions. The pro-Soviet faction had the majority support, but the pro-Chinese faction was devoted to armed struggle. The members of the pro-Chinese faction in Ayacucho found a leader in Abimael Guzmán Reymoso, who, in early 1970, formed PCP-SL.

Also in the 1960s and 1970s, the *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria* (or Revolutionary Left Movement) was undergoing changes, splitting into multiple factions, one of which merged with the *Partido Socialista Revolucionario* (or Revolutionary Socialist Party) in 1982 to form the *Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Aman*.

PCP-SL

The PCP-SL's decade-long campaign of terror began in the rural Andean highlands as a radical guerilla movement that was guided by Maoist principles of rural class struggle expounded by the intelligentsia.

Abimael Guzmán Reymoso was a philosophy professor at the National University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga. He arrived in Ayacucho in 1962, but within six years he and his followers had gained control of the university. Most first-year courses were taught by Guzmán's followers (*Senderistas*), and when those followers taught Marxism, they taught PCP-SL's version of it. Guzmán and his followers had a five-step pro-

gram that intended to end in the siege and collapse of the state. His program began with establishing rural bases and support to prepare for guerilla war. The rural bases would then expand, encircling the city. Guzmán anticipated that the "People's War" would take at least fifty years. In 1978 PCP-SL went underground (perhaps because Guzmán lost power at the university), and on May 17, 1980 it attacked a polling station in Chuschi, an Andean village, in a demonstration of anti-democratic sentiment.

PCP-SL was initially successful in gaining peasant recruits by exploiting to its advantage the area's poverty, government's neglect, and peasants' disappointed hopes in failed government reforms. PCP-SL activities in the early 1980s included those that helped the poor: PCP-SL members would target members of the bourgeoisie (or petit bourgeoisie) and threaten them; those who didn't leave were often murdered. PCP-SL would then distribute their land and resources. These actions seemed more reasonable to peasants when compared to police actions; police were often indiscriminate in their violence, in part because they had difficulty distinguishing between PCP-SL members, PCP-SL sympathizers, and other peasants. Researchers also speculate that, for a price, PCP-SL helped protect the coca-growing peasants from government officials who aimed to end the drug trade. Many of these coca-growing peasants chose to grow coca because it was more productive than other crops grown in the Upper Huallaga Valley. So, when officials tried to end the drug trade, these peasants saw the government as trying to take away their livelihood, and PCP-SL as trying to protect it.

Essentially, PCP-SL worked to eliminate the government's relationship with peasants (e.g., burning ballots, killing police, intimidating elected government officials), and some villages were left without government and police representatives, enabling PCP-SL to expand its territory. As PCP-SL started enforcing harsher measures on peasants (e.g., establishing growing restrictions on food in order to limit the amount sold to larger cities, closing local markets in an anti-capitalist measure, and killing respected local leaders), it began to lose peasant support, and, indeed, some peasants were among the first to organize an attempt to fight PCP-SL (generally using *rondas campesinas*, peasant patrols).

Ultimately, in the 1980s and early 1990s, PCP-SL was responsible for thousands of terrorist attacks. At first, its acts were limited to Ayacucho, but they eventually spread across the country and into Lima. PCP-SL destroyed rural cooperatives and closed local markets, slaughtered or sold livestock that belonged to peasants, bombed buildings (both public and private), disturbed (or skewed) municipal elections, and caused blackouts in both rural areas and Lima. At various points in its decade of terrorism, PCP-SL attacked transportation, communications, and energy facilities. PCP-SL members also tortured and murdered peasants (especially rich peasants, who they believed were informing on their activities, or who attempted to fight PCP-SL in *rondas campesinas*), government officials or local public figures, and members of the local police and armed forces. Several massacres have been attributed to PCP-SL, including one in Lucanamarca where 69 peasants were killed. Notably, PCP-SL rejected conventional human rights standards, seeing such standards as a bourgeois method to obstruct inevitable class struggle.

Guzmán and key leaders were captured on September 12, 1992 in Lima, after which the group steadily declined.

Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru

The MRTA's ideology is founded in Marxism and Leninism. Leaders criticized imperialist influences in Peru and wanted to establish a communist state. The movement was led initially by Victor Polay Campos, and the group clashed violently with PCP-SL over territory. After 1994 the MRTA engaged in bank robberies and kidnappings, carried out assassinations, and attacked embassies in Lima, the military, and police. Its last major action (and best known) was the 1997 Japanese ambassadorial hostage crisis. MRTA members held 72 hostages for four months at the ambassador's home. In April 1997 Peruvian forces raided the building and ended the crisis. The government (under President Fujimori) was condemned for executing MRTA leaders after they surrendered. MRTA's impact is not comparable to PCP-SL's; its membership was estimated to be only in the hundreds.

Government and Military Reaction

The central government did not begin counter-insurgency efforts until December 1982 when it declared seven provinces a Military Emergency Zone. By 1984 the zone had expanded to 13 provinces and in 1995 to 26. In early 1986 Lima itself was declared a state of emergency as PCP-SL violence hit the city in a series of bombings. Prior to the declaration of emergency military zones, the battle against PCP-SL was fought by the ill-equipped Guardia Civil (one of Peru's three police agencies); the police had little training in counterinsurgency methods and was divided from the rural population, in culture and language. Further, it was also battling an enemy without a defined front (and in the early 1980s, an enemy with peasant support), which meant it was often on the defensive. Police had difficulty identifying members of PCP-SL (in part because members were able to disappear into the supportive peasantry) and were at times indiscriminate in their violence, not distinguishing between peasants and armed insurgents. Hundreds of police officers were killed by PCP-SL, and the police's ineffectiveness allowed PCP-SL to occupy larger and larger areas.

The armed forces were hesitant to step in, seeing the insurgency as a matter for the police, and in the 1970s most of Peru's military purchases were intended to prepare against border wars with Chile and Ecuador, not internal insurgencies. After the provinces were declared military emergency zones, however, the military stepped in, and the period that later became known as the Dirty War began. The military's tactics surpassed the cruelty of PCP-SL. Suspected members of PCP-SL, peasants, journalists, and political prisoners were tortured and executed. Women were sexually assaulted. Several massacres have been attributed to the military, including the 1985 massacre of 74 men, women, and children in Accomarca.

Improved intelligence and counterinsurgency initiatives were brought about by President Fujimori in the early 1990s. Fujimori is credited with successfully dealing with the terrorist threat (Guzmán was captured, after all, and the 1997 embassy crisis ended with minimal loss of life of the hostages), but his government has been charged with corruption and with violating human rights. Many of these charges relate to Fujimori's

head of intelligence, Vladimiro Montesinos, who threatened political opponents, bribed government officials, embezzled government funds, accepted payment from drug traffickers, and controlled Peru's television stations. Many believe that Montesinos and Fujimori established Grupo Colina, a death squad, to which at least three massacres are attributed. One of these is the 1991 execution of 15 people (including an eight-year-old child) who were sharing a meal in Lima's Barrios Altos neighborhood. The death squad was attempting to target a PCP-SL meeting. Additionally, in 1992, nine students and one professor from Lima's La Cantuta University were abducted, tortured, and executed. Grupo Colina believed they were linked to a PCP-SL bombing. In the latter case, some members of Grupo Colina were later sentenced to prison, but Fujimori's 1995 Amnesty Law enabled the release of members of the police and military who were convicted of or charged with crimes fighting the terrorist threat. (The law was repealed in 2000, after Fujimori's government fell.)

Fujimori also granted the military broad powers in the emergency zones: military courts were established in which judges wore hoods to protect their identity (and some argued, to prevent them from becoming targets), but suspected PCP-SL members were tried in these courts with few legal rights.

Conclusions

The toll on human life was extreme. The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in a 2003 report, found that in the 1980s and 1990s nearly 70,000 people died as a result of the insurgency and the resulting Dirty War. Moreover, the events shed light on several unpleasant aspects of Peruvian society, including the dramatic social, economic, and political divides between the capital city and the rest of the country. These divides enabled Fujimori (and other leaders) and the military to conduct a counterinsurgency that put down the PCP-SL, but they simply did not care about the peasants who got in the way. PCP-SL's desire to change the bitter plight of peasants may have been laudable, but its actions were repressive. In the end, PCP-SL demonstrated little more understanding of the group it wanted to save than the government it was trying to save it from.

Fujimori's legacy is complex and paradoxical. On the one hand, he improved Peru's economy and put down an insurgency. On the other, he committed terrible violations of human rights and perpetuated an environment of corruption. It may be telling that in 2001, when Fujimori (having fled to Japan) attempted to resign, his Congress would not accept the resignation; instead, it voted to remove him from office on the grounds he was "morally disabled."

Perhaps the most positive result of these terrible events is the improvement in the way human rights were viewed by politicians and the military. However, in the early twenty-first century, abject poverty remained pervasive in rural areas and the class divide was widening.

SEE ALSO: China, Maoism and Popular Power, 1949–1969; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Mariátegui, José Carlos (1894–1930); Marxism; MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru); Peru, Neoliberalism and Social Mobilization, 1990s–2000s; Peru, "People's War," Counterinsurgency, and the Popular Movement; Velasco Alvarado, Juan Francisco (1910–1977)

References and Suggested Readings

- Cameron, M. A. (1997) *The Peruvian Labyrinth: Polity, Society, and Economy*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (n.d.) *Final Report. General Conclusions*. Available at www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/conclusiones.php. Accessed July 18, 2008.
- Conaghan, C. M. (2005) *Fujimori's Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Gorriti Ellenbogen, G. (1999) *The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Masterson, D. M. (1991) *Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru from Sanchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Palmer, D. S. (1992) Peru, the Drug Business, and Shining Path: Between Scylla and Charybdis? *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 34, 3: 65–88.
- Ron, J. (2001) Ideology in Context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso's Tactical Escalation. *Journal of Peace Research* 38, 5: 569–92.
- Stern, S. J. (Ed.) (1998) *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980–1995*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Taylor, L. (2006) *Shining Path: Guerrilla War in Peru's Northern Highlands, 1980–1997*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Peru, labor and peasant mobilizations, 1900–1950

Paulo Drinot

Labor and peasant mobilization in Peru in the first half of the twentieth century was shaped by, and helped shape, the country's insertion into the world economy as an exporter of largely unprocessed primary products such as sugar, cotton, wool, rubber, metals, and petroleum. This varied export quantum, fueled by a combination of national and transnational capital, reflected the development of regional economies geared toward the export of commodities that produced distinctive labor arrangements. Labor and peasant mobilization responded to various forces in this context, some bottom-up, but many top-down. In addition to the emergence of political parties and elite organizations purporting to represent, lead, and – in the case of the Andean indigenous peasantry – redeem workers and peasants, the first half of the twentieth century saw the formation of a state apparatus that sought to shape labor and the peasantry through social policy. Labor and peasant mobilization in Peru, as this suggests, was the outcome of a dynamic interplay of various forces.

Peru's laboring peoples were largely concentrated in the export economy. In sugar and metal mining, on the northern coast and in the central highlands, respectively, a system of debt peonage gradually gave way to a settled proletarian workforce. In cotton, in the valleys north and south of Lima, a combination of tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and a rural proletariat made up an ethnically diverse workforce (Chinese, Japanese, Afro-Peruvian, Andean, and European). In the southern highlands the expansion of the wool economy was based largely on Andean peasant family labor performed both by indigenous communities and peons tied to haciendas. In a system sometimes likened to feudalism, Andean wool producers came under the increasing control of wool merchants through a relationship often characterized by deceit and violence. Violence was even more integral to the labor relations that developed in the Peruvian Amazon, where indigenous peoples were forced into what we could call without exaggeration a cultural economy of terror based around rubber. In the small oil

fields of Peru's far northern deserts, a largely proletarian workforce dominated.

Although outnumbered by export workers, a diversified urban workforce had begun to emerge in the early decades of the twentieth century. It was concentrated in Lima, but other cities such as Arequipa and Cuzco also witnessed the growth of urban labor. It was not primarily an industrial workforce, although textile mills and food processing industries concentrated the largest numbers of workers. Most urban workers, however, worked not in factories but rather in small workshops or in their homes. Arguably, the "typical" worker was not an overall-wearing, spanner-wielding, machine operator but rather a seamstress or a female domestic worker. Some males were employed in relatively skilled artisanal occupations as bakers, carpenters, or printers, but most of the male urban workforce toiled in construction. Similarly, industrial workers were numerically outstripped by white-collar workers, or *empleados*, who manned offices and retail establishments. In fact, there were considerably more workers employed in various transport activities, such as train workers, bus and taxi drivers, and sailors and port workers, than in properly industrial establishments.

Artisans seeking protection from free trade policies, the rise of "dishonorable trades," and incipient industrialization organized the first mutual aid societies as early as the 1860s. The hardships brought about by the War of the Pacific (1879–84) boosted mutual aid membership and by the late 1880s there were mutual aid societies throughout the country. In 1911 there were 62 societies in Lima alone, with an average membership of 200. They ranged from those that restricted their membership to a specific trade, to umbrella organizations like the Universal Union Artisan Confederation or the Assembly of United Societies. Mutual aid societies established close ties with elite politicians, particularly the oligarchic Partido Civil, and some artisans joined the party. Some benefits accrued from these relationships, including limited labor legislation as well as patronage and financial support for some mutual aid organizations. The 1911 Worker Accident Law, for example, was the culmination of a long process of negotiation in congress in which worker-deputies played an important role.

Despite the gains, many workers came to see the ties between the mutual aid societies and elite

politicians as benefiting only the politicians and the leadership of the mutual aid societies. A wave of strikes in the 1890s and early 1900s suggested that confrontation, as opposed to accommodation, could produce results. Anarchists were both the staunchest critics of the mutual aid leadership and the staunchest proponents of confrontation. The spread of anarchism in Peru has often been seen as a teleological process that culminated in the general strikes of 1919. Certainly, anarchist workers led both the 1919 8-hour day movement and the Committee for the Cheaping of Subsistence Goods, which sought to address price inflation. However, anarchism's overall influence on the working class was limited. Both repression and the presence of political leaders such as President Guillermo Billinghurst (1912–14) and President Augusto B. Leguía (1919–30), who wooed working-class support by providing improvements in workers' living conditions and basic social legislation, undermined support for the anarchists' proposals. The 8-hour day law of 1919, for example, was shaped as much by elite ideas about the links between modernity, industrialization, and social policy as to labor agitation, as it was by anarchist mobilization.

In the early 1920s urban workers took advantage of new labor laws and the political opening of the early phase of the Leguía regime to organize collectively. Countless unions and federations were set up in quick succession, including the Regional Workers Federation of Peru (FORP), the labor confederation which provided the organizational template for many other unions and labor federations. By the end of the 1920s Peru had acquired an organized labor "movement," with as many as 20,000 "organized" workers. However, the early years of labor organization were far from smooth. Labor was deeply divided. In addition to conservative mutual aid organizations, three ideological currents split radical labor: anarchism, revolutionary syndicalism, and socialism. The conflicts between these groups reflected real divisions over the ideological orientation and type of organization the labor movement should adopt. The First Workers' Congress, held in 1921, debated whether to adopt anarchism as its ideological orientation. Though anarchists controlled the top positions at the congress the debate was postponed to a later congress as no agreement could be reached – evidence, some suggest, of anarchism's waning

influence. Following the congress, the FORP was reorganized into two local labor federations, the Local Workers Federation of Lima (FOLL) and the Local Workers Federation of Callao (FOLC).

The debate over the González Prada Popular Universities (UPGP) confirmed the anarchists' increasing isolation from the mainstream labor movement. The UPGPs were an outgrowth of the brief student-worker alliance established during the 8-hour day movement in which Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre (1895–1979), the later leader of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), played a decisive role. The UPGPs took on a political role when they led the opposition to Leguía's plan to consecrate the nation to the Sacred Heart of Jesus in 1923. The protests mobilized much of Lima's labor movement. Repression was swift and clinical: Haya de la Torre, the UPGPs' dean, was exiled and the UPGPs closed down. In early 1924 the government allowed the UPGPs to reopen, perhaps in the belief that, with Haya de la Torre in exile, the UPGPs were no longer a threat. Anarchists began a campaign against the UPGPs, claiming that the schools were little more than a vehicle for Haya de la Torre's ambitions and amounted to an unsolicited meddling of intellectuals in working-class affairs. In this context many workers came to see the anarchists' methods as counterproductive, and, in light of the Russian Revolution, at odds with the labor movement that was beginning to flower elsewhere.

The formation of an organized labor movement in urban contexts and in the export industries was not matched by an equal level of organization among Peru's largely indigenous peasantry. Subject to similar pressures resulting from Peru's growing insertion into the global economy, in the first few decades of the twentieth century Peru's indigenous peoples were increasingly the focus of state attention and intellectual debate. Most contemporary observers agreed that Indians were culturally backward and morally and biologically degenerate, a pale semblance of the great Inca Empire to which the increasingly nationalistic Peruvian elite chose to trace the country's origins. However, there was significant disagreement regarding to extent to which the indigenous populations of Peru could usefully contribute to the country's march towards progress. Some, the so-called *indigenistas*, came to view indigenous culture as capable of regeneration and the Indian

as amenable to cultural redemption. Organizations such as the Pro-Indigenous Association (Asociación Pro-Indígena) were created by intellectuals with such goals in mind.

As pressure over grazing land increased in the south as a consequence of favorable prices for wool and alpaca fiber, indigenous communities and haciendas clashed over what were becoming increasingly valuable resources. Some historians view in such clashes the makings of peasant “rebellion” and, in some cases, of a millenarian political project. Others have argued that landowners seeking the intervention of a repressive state force were interested in framing peasant protest as rebellion. In the early 1920s peasant unrest was increasingly channeled by an organization that, in contrast to many *indigenista* organizations, was run by non-indigenous Peruvians, but was largely indigenous in its composition. The Committee for the Rights of the Indigenous (Comité Pro-Derecho Indígena) took advantage of the moderately favorable political climate of the early years of the Leguía administration to mobilize the peasantry in various parts of the country. Such efforts were short lived. By the mid-1920s the Leguía dictatorship began to repress severely, if selectively, both urban and rural social movements. State-backed *indigenista* organizations, such as the Indian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Development and the Patronage of the Indian Race, did little to address the problems faced by Peru’s Andean peasantry.

In 1919 early attempts to build a socialist party had failed in the face of strong opposition from anarchist leaders. By the mid-1920s, however, socialist ideas began to make inroads in the labor movement. Socialists rejected the apolitical line dictated by syndicalists (who favored negotiation with the state) and anarchists (who did not). In 1927 the Second Workers’ Congress was dominated by a discussion over the ideological orientation that a new labor *central* should take. A number of workers pointed to the limits of syndicalism and argued that it was time for the labor movement to adopt a political role. Some even proposed the creation of a political party to promote class consciousness among workers. The syndicalists argued that it was necessary to separate discussion on the “methods of struggle” from the “ideology” of the proposed *central*. The debate was cut short when, under the pretext that a communist plot was being hatched, Leguía closed down the congress, banned the

FOLL, and exiled many labor leaders. Significantly, the repression of the FOLL leadership paved the way for the growth of socialism and particularly of José Carlos Mariátegui’s (1894–1930) influence within the labor movement.

Upon his return from exile in Europe, Mariátegui became a lecturer at the UPGP and editor of *Claridad*, the newspaper of the student federation, which he turned into the organ of the FOLL. Mariátegui used both positions to establish strong links with labor leaders and to disseminate socialist ideas. Later, through periodicals such as *Amauta* and particularly *Labor*, Mariátegui was able to reach a small but influential working-class audience. In 1928, along with a small group of intellectuals and white and blue-collar workers, Mariátegui founded the Peruvian Socialist Party and set about organizing a new labor *central*: the General Confederation of the Workers of Peru (CGTP). Mariátegui tried to free labor from what he perceived to be its dominant apolitical ethos. Though he took special care to situate the struggle of the Peruvian working class in a global and theoretical context, Mariátegui placed socialism firmly within the historical development of the Peruvian working class and labor movement. *Labor* served as a tribune for new ideas on syndicalism, socialism, and revolutionary events abroad. The CGTP and its member unions would seek to work within legality in the short term, but, crucially, labor towards a revolution in the longer term.

The 1930s were marked by an acute political polarization and the rise of various political forces claiming to represent the interests of organized labor. On the right, the Revolutionary Union mobilized urban lower-class groups and was successful in the 1931 elections. On the left, three political organizations – the Peruvian Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and APRA – sought to represent and mobilize urban labor, and to a lesser extent, the Andean peasantry. Of the three, APRA was most successful, possibly because at least initially it approached urban labor as an ally in a front of intellectual and manual laborers. For many workers, including Arturo Sabroso – a textile worker, a key worker cadre in APRA, and a former advocate of apolitical syndicalism – such an arrangement guaranteed a degree of union autonomy vis-à-vis the party. The socialists proved successful in gaining the allegiance of the oil workers in the far north of the country. The communists,

responding to the ultra-leftism of the Third International, found few supporters among organized labor, despite gaining control of the CGTP, and focused their energies on moving labor and the Andean peasantry, quite unsuccessfully, towards an insurrectionary strategy.

The links between labor and the new political forces of the left (and indeed the right) were shaped by a climate of political repression throughout the 1930s that forced many political leaders and many labor leaders into exile or into prison. For the most part repression was selective, but in some cases, as in the central highlands in 1930 and in Trujillo in 1932, it resulted in massacres of workers and peasants. Union activities were severely curtailed. In this climate unions saw many of the gains obtained through collective work contracts in the early 1920s rolled back by employers. Still, organized labor, particularly the larger unions such as railway workers and textile workers, proved adept at using whatever mechanisms were available to resist such attacks. More generally, urban labor benefited from a “corporatist” turn during the administration of General Oscar Benavides (1933–9). Motivated both by an attempt to neutralize the left’s appeal and by a belief that the social and moral “improvement” of labor was necessary to the nation’s progress, Benavides initiated a series of public works and created institutions aimed at labor, including worker housing, worker restaurants, and a worker social security law. These did little to address the problems faced by urban labor, but they helped to place labor at the center of state policy.

The governments of the 1930s gave far less attention to the countryside, and yet it was there that the most important change was occurring. During the 1930s and particularly the 1940s demographic pressure and the increasing mobility that resulted from state road-building projects led to the beginnings of a process of rural to urban migration that would radically alter the character of Peruvian society from the 1950s onwards. The 1940s saw a degree of political aperture, first during the Manuel Prado administration (1939–45) and particularly during the Manuel Bustamante y Rivero government (1945–8), which allowed APRA to finally shape government policy. The creation of a new labor *central*, the Confederation of the Workers of Peru (CTP), largely controlled by APRA, gave the party increasing influence over organized

labor, which experienced significant growth and consolidation. But the Bustamante government, undermined by postwar inflation and the political tensions within the ruling coalition, was short lived. In 1948 Manuel Odría’s coup brought to an end one of Peru’s few democratic governments in the twentieth century, and a period of significant labor mobilization.

SEE ALSO: Haya de la Torre, Víctor Raúl (1895–1979); Mariátegui, José Carlos (1894–1930)

References and Suggested Readings

- Blanchard, P. (1982) *The Origins of the Peruvian Labor Movement, 1883–1919*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.
- Burga, M. & Flores Galindo, A. (1994) Apogeo y crisis de la República Aristocrática. In A. Flores Galindo, *Obras Completas II*. Lima: SUR.
- Jacobsen, N. (1993) *Mirages of Transition: The Peruvian Altiplano, 1780–1930*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Stein, S. (1980) *Populism in Peru: The Emergence of the Masses and the Politics of Social Control*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Sulmont, D. (1975) *El movimiento obrero en el Perú 1900–1956*. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
- Tejada, L. (1988) *La cuestión del pan: El anarcosindicalismo en el Perú 1880–1919*. Lima: Instituto Nacional de Cultura.

Peru: neoliberalism and social mobilization, 1990s–2000s

Gerardo Rénique

On May 19, 1987, ten years after the historical 1977 stoppage that opened the door to the return of the military to their barracks after 12 years of dictatorial government, Peru was once again paralyzed by a massive general strike spearheaded by the General Workers’ Confederation of Peru (CGTP). Supported by a large number of popular organizations, including two peasant federations, shantytown associations, the recently created regional Popular Defense Fronts (FDIPs) and the left-wing parties coordinated under the umbrella of the United Left (IU), the strike surpassed the sphere of organized labor. Road

blockades, marches, and demonstrations took place in cities in each of the 24 departments in the country. In the southern department of Puno more than 200 indigenous communities took over almost 990,000 acres of land from several associative enterprises under the control of state functionaries to be reorganized as communal democratic enterprises.

Staged at a moment of a deepening economic crisis with most of the country under a state of emergency and Lima and many other cities under a strict curfew, the May 1987 strike represented a serious challenge to President Alan Garcia's (1985–90) unpopular and anti-democratic policies. Elected as a center-left candidate espousing vaguely social democratic positions and vowing to reject International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies, during his first 18 months in office Garcia's conciliatory policies toward industrialists and workers managed to take the economy out of the recessionary cycle. Lacking a sound economic strategy, however, by the end of 1986 his erratic economic policies and *caudillo* style eventually undermined his initial relative success and led to a fast depletion of the country's economic reserves, a hiking inflation, and rising unemployment. His heavy-handed counterinsurgency policies, military massacres of peasants and Communist Party of Peru–Shining Path (Partido Comunista del Perú–Sendero Luminoso, PCP-SL) prisoners, anti-labor policies, and the involvement of his Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) party with paramilitary groups targeting both popular leaders and supporters of the PCP-SL added to Garcia's unpopularity. The demands of the popular movement in the May 1987 strike represented a contrasting democratic alternative to both Garcia's unclear perspectives and the market democracy and increased repressive state favored by the right.

The political success of the strike deepened the crisis of Garcia's government and gave to the left and the popular movement the political momentum needed to emerge as the most important oppositional force. The IU demanded the resignation of Garcia's cabinet and the end of his economic policy favoring monopolies and militaristic and authoritarian strategies. The success of the left, however, was extremely short-lived. Garcia's popularity plummeted further while the economy continued to deteriorate. Facing a staggering yearly accumulated inflation of over

1,700 percent in September 1988, Garcia resorted to orthodox shock treatment. The Peruvian currency was sharply devalued; consumer prices doubled, or in some cases tripled, overnight; and wage increases were kept proportionately lower than the rising cost of living. The measures were greeted with outrage and widespread rioting and looting in Lima and other cities.

The shock treatment, however, was unable to contain hyperinflation. Further adjustment measures and the lifting of price controls on basic foodstuffs deepened the misery of the large majority of the population. By 1989 the annual inflation rate hit a numbing 2,776 percent and the GNP contracted by 12 percent. As a result, real income for the same year dropped to 1960s levels. By 1990, 70 percent of the labor force was either unemployed or underemployed. By the end of the decade, union membership dropped dramatically to represent barely 12 percent of the labor force while Lima's informal sector represented almost half of the economically active population. Under these dire circumstances, facing the uncertainties of escalating violence and repression, and fearful of losing their jobs or sacrificing a day's wages, workers and the poor gave a tepid response to the October and December 1989 general strikes called by the CGTP. The retrenchment of the popular movement, however, cannot be attributed exclusively to the deteriorating material and social conditions of the popular classes. It was due also to the unraveling of their relationship with the left and the rapidly evolving political landscape overdetermined by the escalating cycle of insurgency–counterinsurgency, the collapse of “really existing socialism,” and the ideological neoliberal offensive of global capitalism.

The IU was caught between its institutionalization as the most important parliamentary oppositional force and the demands of a mobilized and increasingly militant popular movement. The first national congress in January 1989 was unprecedented both in the number of participants and in the procedure of selecting delegates through democratic elections. With more than 3,500 participants, the congress also included 2,000 delegates elected nationwide through secret ballots. The congress decided to elect both the municipal and presidential slates for the upcoming electoral process through primary elections with the participation of all IU militants. But the IU leadership did not respect the results of the primaries.

Assassinations and extrajudicial executions of popular leaders, by both the armed forces and the PCP-SL, also had a devastating impact on the popular organization. To counter the expanding PCP-SL actions, the armed forces launched a new campaign of selective elimination, targeting its broader network of supporters. In the regions where it was unable to compete with the organizational strength of the peasant federations, the PCP-SL resorted to a campaign of bombings and murders against the left, the church, and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that supported the peasant movement.

In 1989, in the midst of the PCP-SL campaign, the powerful Federation of Mining, Metallurgical, and Steel Workers (FNTMMSP) came under fire from various quarters. Faced with a general strike in the large central highlands mining towns of Morococha, Casapalca, La Oroya, and Cerro de Pasco, mine managers, government functionaries, and the right-wing press launched a campaign accusing union leaders and the FNTMMSP rank and file of terrorism. In one of its first actions, in February 1989 a right-wing paramilitary assassinated Saul Cantoral, the FNTMMSP general secretary, and Consuelo Garcia, a women's organizer, in the mining camps. Over the following four months the PCP-SL followed suit with the murder of three prominent union leaders. Several other union activists and organizers of miners' wives also received death threats. Before a July regional congress of miners in Morococha to plan their upcoming strike, the PCP-SL destroyed machinery and installations and threatened union leaders. Amidst accusations of terrorism, the military intervened during the miners' strike, arresting workers and raiding union offices. Military presence in the mining towns in the central highland provinces – and elsewhere in the country – became almost permanent during the next years.

Lima's industrial corridors and shantytowns also became an important theater of operations for the escalating urban offensive sanctioned by the first PCP-SL congress in early 1988 to be carried through "armed strikes." For the PCP-SL, communal work parties, food assistance programs, cooperative workshops, and self-management enterprises were all part of the "revisionist" strategy. The IU local elected officials that controlled almost every single municipal government in Lima's poor and working-class neighborhoods.

The oppositional and militant stance of the left and the popular movement was also undermined by the right-wing ideological and political offensive spearheaded by Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa in response to Garcia's July 1987 plan to nationalize the banks. With the participation of prominent members of Lima's elites, Vargas Llosa founded a "new freedom movement" (Libertad) with the intended goal of replacing Peru's decrepit right-wing parties. Over the following months demonstrations against Garcia's ill-fated nationalization policy resuscitated the right and launched Vargas Llosa as one of Latin America's leading advocates of a "neoliberal revolution."

Unlike the elitist disdain toward the popular classes, Libertad hoped to win the support of an expanding informal sector of micro-entrepreneurs and the self-employed. In courting this sector, the Libertad movement resorted to the romantic fable of "popular capitalism" promoted by Peru's leading neoliberal intellectual, Hernando de Soto. In his vision Peru's poor are poor because they have been constrained by bureaucratic paperwork, price controls, wage stabilization, and consumer subsidies.

Facing the upcoming elections, Libertad joined the Christian Popular Party to create the Democratic Front (FREDEMO) with Vargas Llosa as its presidential candidate. A previously apathetic upper class took to the streets in support of Vargas Llosa's "neoliberal revolution." Upper-class youth and women went to the poor neighborhoods to do social and charity work, contesting the left on its own terrain. The Institute for Legal Defense (Instituto de Defensa Legal, IDL) and Libertad also launched an aggressive propaganda campaign in defense of neoliberalism through publications, public meetings, and seminars.

In the worst performance of their brief electoral history, the divided slates of the Socialist Left (IS) and the IU obtained a meager 4.3 and 6.8 percent respectively. Vargas Llosa obtained 35.1 percent – far less than the 50 percent required to take the presidency in the first round. Despite the stigma of Garcia's disastrous administration, APRA won 14.8 percent. Alberto Fujimori of Cambio 90, the dark horse in the race, won a surprising 26.9 percent of the vote. Formed as a non-partisan electoral movement, Cambio 90 mobilized the emerging non-*criollo* elite of micro-entrepreneurs, small businesspeople, technicians, and professionals. Fujimori's electoral

message differed both from the harsh shock measures of FREDEMO and the party-centered traditions of APRA and the left.

Vowing to be free of partisan and ideological agendas, Fujimori instead promised an honest, technical, and efficient administration. He also pledged to end violence and eliminate poverty and lack of opportunities. Finally, he proposed to confront narcotics production through local alternative development programs and crop substitution. As economic advisors Fujimori called professionals and academics known for their stance against the IMF strategies of structural adjustment. With the backing of the left and APRA, Fujimori won clear majorities in the traditional left-voting southern departments and Lima's popular neighborhoods, and in APRA's northern department stronghold.

During his visits to the US and Japan as president-elect, Fujimori took a radical turn to the very policies he had campaigned against. Convinced of the necessity of toeing the IMF line, upon his return he reaffirmed the need of drastic economic readjustment. He put together a cabinet made up of former ministers and technocrats well connected to international banks and multilateral lending agencies. Surprisingly, two prominent economists from the IS and a scholar and educator from IU accepted positions in Fujimori's cabinet, adding to the crisis and discrediting the parliamentary left.

Fujimori's stabilization program, urged by the IMF as a precondition for Peru's "reinsertion" into the international financial community, unfolded in two stages. A severe austerity program, known as "Fujishock," announced in early August 1990, eliminated price subsidies and social spending and drastically raised interest rates and taxes. Overnight food prices rose 500 percent and gasoline prices 3,000 percent. Early next year real wages were worth only a third of what they had been six months before, and the industrial recession continued unabated. A majority of Peruvians were thrown into absolute poverty, and only 8 percent of the adult population was fully employed. The second step of Fujimori's neoliberalization entailed the liberalization of all forms of economic, financial, and labor regulation, the drastic reduction of public sector programs and services, and the privatization of the state-controlled sector and public resources.

The social costs of structural adjustment were horrendous. Malnutrition and child labor

to supplement dwindling family income were responsible for the 50 percent drop in school attendance by the end of the 1991 academic year, and 10,000 schoolteachers left teaching due to salary constraints imposed by budget cuts. Following a three-month failed strike of public health workers 3,500 out of 5,000 trained public sector nurses left the country to accept work offers abroad. Furthermore, new legislation enabled employers to fire striking workers, eliminated job security, and curtailed collective bargaining. Land reform was overturned, paving the way for new large landholdings. A new banking law deregulated interest rates, opened banking to foreign investment, and eliminated development banks such as the Agrarian Bank. State-owned mining and oil companies, ports, railroads, and public airlines were slated for privatization. The scrapping of national development banks, together with hiking interest rates, caused widespread bankruptcy of businesses and unemployment, as well as a severe cut in food production. With no alternative sources of credit, farmers in the northeastern tropical valleys turned from rice and corn to growing coca for the expanding foreign demand for narcotics. Fujimori's May 1991 anti-narcotics agreement with the US, drafted by Hernando de Soto on the basis of a Heritage Foundation report, expanded the conflict into areas of coca cultivation for traditional use.

Beginning in January 1991 the economic measures were confronted by a wave of strikes and demonstrations. In Lima the 9,000 Milk Committees took over City Hall demanding increased funding and direct autonomous management for the food assistance program. The Interunion Confederation of State Workers (CITE) and workers in state enterprises protested payroll cuts and the privatizations in energy, oil, and mining. Strong opposition came also from the provinces, frustrated by Fujimori's reneging on his electoral promise to promote decentralization and autonomous regional development. Regional strikes in different parts of the country linked local demands with a broader political challenge to Fujimori's neoliberal strategy. Mounting discontent climaxed in early June with a Civic Day of Struggle in support of prolonged strikes by health workers and teachers, against the neoliberal transformations, and in opposition to the controversial anti-narcotics agreement with the United States. The marches

and strikes met with violence from the security forces and won only symbolic concessions. Several people were killed and hundreds imprisoned during the unrest, while some peasant leaders and teachers' union representatives were disappeared by the army. When the government did agree to talks with the protest movements, it made vague promises it later refused to honor. Faced with the new anti-strike legislation and increased repression and frustration at the government's unwillingness to consider even minimal demands, the popular movement began to lose momentum.

The popular movement retrenchment coincided with one of the worst moments in the internal war. While the PCP-SL tried at all costs to increase its actions in urban settings, particularly in Lima, the armed forces increased their selective actions against PCP-SL supporters, leftists, and popular activists. After the defeat of its supporters in several union and shantytown communal elections in Lima and surrounding areas, the PCP-SL increased its attacks on popular organizations. During the "armed strike" of February 14, 1992, the PCP-SL murdered Maria Elena Moyano, a women's organizer and elected official of the Urban Self-Managed Community of Villa El Salvador (CUAVES). By the end of 1989 PCP-SL annihilation squads had murdered 21 plant managers and more than 50 union leaders. Most of the PCP-SL's victims, however, were peasants and peasants' leaders, particularly those affiliated with Peru's Peasant Confederation (CCP). In 1990 alone, over 60 percent of the PCP-SL's 1,249 recorded victims were peasants. Nearly 27 percent were slum dwellers. Fewer than 5 percent were police or military personnel. The armed forces, on the other hand, conducted a campaign of selective killings and disappearances. In June 1991, 35 university students in the University of Huancayo were executed and/or disappeared by paramilitaries. In this highly adverse climate, when a national strike was called by the CGTP in July 1991, it failed to take hold.

Emboldened by the popular opposition, temporary retreat, and collapse of the institutional left, Congress granted Fujimori extraordinary legislative powers. More than 70 decrees relating to economic reform eliminated all barriers to foreign investment, dismantled the entire state sector, and privatized all public and social services. All restrictions on exports of capital and profits

by foreign companies and multinationals were removed, as were such basic rights as the eight-hour working day and job security. All international development aid and NGOs were placed under direct government control.

Unwilling to accept even minor modifications to his decrees, and angry with the investigations on human rights abuses and government corruption launched by the legislature, on April 5, 1992, with the support of the armed forces, Fujimori launched an *auto-golpe* (self-inflicted coup). In his televised message to the nation he announced the dissolution of Congress, the reorganization of the judiciary, the disbanding of the 12 regional governments, and the suspension of all articles of the constitution "not compatible with the government goals." The product of a political project of the armed forces, worked out between 1987 and 1990, the new regime had as its ultimate intention to replicate the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile. Fujimori centralized all the intelligence services under the National Intelligence Service (SIN), a new structure under the control of his henchman, Vladimiro Montesinos, and responsible only to the authority of the president himself. The role of the SIN, however, was not restricted to controlling the left and the popular movement but extended to the whole of society through a network of informants and agents among both popular and elite organizations and associations, universities, government officials, high-ranking members of the military, Congress, and even the church. It also financed the publication of popular newspapers and magazines, and through bribery and extortion recruited journalists, newscasters, and entertainers to act as operatives of the psychological propaganda operations devised by SIN. Acting as the political arm of the high command of the military and the technocracy, SIN not only kept close control of the population and the opposition but also maintained a tight oversight of parliament, the judiciary, the electoral authority, and the cabinet. The 1993 Constitution, approved with the votes of Fujimori's followers and FREDEMO, gave legal status to the president's hardline strategies and ultra-liberal policies.

During the rest of the decade, thanks to the support of the US, the waning of the PCP-SL, and the absence of an organized popular resistance, the Fujimori regime consolidated its despotic nature as a military-technocratic dictatorship disguised under the covers of a liberal state

and economy. His fraudulent bid for reelection for a third consecutive period in 2000, however, galvanized the social discontent of wide sectors of the population – workers and peasants, the most severely hit by unemployment, impoverishment, and social polarization; urban middle sectors and professionals who in ten years had suffered a dramatic drop in their incomes and opportunities; and entrepreneurs who had suffered the severe contraction of the internal market. Elected opposition members of Congress pushed for a government in which they could have a voice. Representatives of the country's political and economic elites converged to put pressure on the Organization of American States (OAS), the US, and other international observers.

The popular sectors were indeed the first to react against Fujimori's decision in December 1999 to launch his campaign for a third (unconstitutional) term. On January 6, after almost a decade of rather spontaneous and unarticulated mobilizations, workers' unions, peasant federations, students' organizations, retirees, war veterans of the 1995 conflict with Ecuador, regional movements, and left-wing organizations carried on a national day of protest. Over 30,000 persons gathered in a central plaza of Lima in three columns and marched in the downtown area. Elsewhere in the country, similar marches and demonstrations, regional strikes, and road blockades punctuated an unprecedented mobilization under the slogan "The Fear is Over!" Two months later the recently formed *Coordinadora Nacional de Frentes Regionales*, with the support of labor and popular organizations, prepared a two-day national protest on March 12 and 13. This event again drew large numbers of people into the streets. When the three major opposition candidates failed to agree on a single unity candidate, the popular movement increased its pressure against Fujimori's reelection through a successful civic strike (*paro cívico*) on March 23. On May 18 the peasantry of Andahuaylas (department of Apurímac) called an agrarian strike (*paro agrario*). The week-long strike, which was supported by the Apurímac Regional Front, demanded better prices for their crops, regulation against imported agricultural products, and an effective government agrarian policy. Led by the CCP and the National Agrarian Confederation (CNA), the peasants carried on regional strikes, highway blockades, and marches.

Together with these more familiar forms of protest, new types of organizations were formed. These women's organizations, human rights groups, artists, intellectuals, and (especially) youth developed creative forms of participatory protest in the main plazas and public spaces of Lima and provincial cities. Human rights organizations carried on national campaigns against impunity laws and for full revelation of the human rights violations that had occurred during the 1980s counterinsurgency war. Civic or citizen organizations, such as the Democratic Forum, Transparency, and the Peace Council, served as advocates for democratic and constitutional rights, freedom of the press, and fair elections. Finally, ad hoc collectives made up of professionals, artists, youth, intellectuals, and students organized periodic public and highly symbolic piecemeal actions whose defiance and irreverence played an important role in eroding the aura of invincibility and omnipresence so cautiously cultivated by the unprecedented intelligence and surveillance apparatus backing Fujimori.

In this increasingly contentious atmosphere, the proclamation of a Fujimori victory the evening of the April 6 election – against both predictions of the exit polls and the official counting of the electoral board – was met with a massive and spontaneous demonstration in Lima's downtown attended by approximately 50,000 people. During the next three days, with the participation of students and youth, the country witnessed the largest demonstrations against Fujimori up to that moment. Similar actions were also staged in different parts of the country during the Independence Day holiday from July 26 to 28, as President Fujimori's loyal followers geared up for his highly contested third inauguration. Throughout the week leading up to his "auto-inauguration" on July 28, a series of demonstrations took place in Lima. Particularly impressive were the two large women's marches against the fraudulent reelection, one of which was brutally repressed by the national police. On the evening before Fujimori was scheduled to renew his mandate, a huge march drew more than 100,000 people from all over Peru to Lima's central plazas, while numerous simultaneous marches and rallies were held in provincial cities and towns for those who were not able to travel to Lima. Called by the CGTP and the regional fronts and with the participation of

a number of other popular organizations, the march was also joined by the civic and citizens' organizations and non-leftist oppositional parties.

Following the inauguration, public attention focused on the OAS-sponsored negotiations between government and opposition representatives. In contrast to the popular movement's demand for the immediate resignation of the president – a demand that was supported in all opinion polls – the parliamentary opposition maintained its support for a negotiated transition. As negotiations dragged on, the mobilizations momentarily calmed down until mid-September, when new disclosures of direct government involvement in the electoral fraud and bribing of oppositional congressmen to switch sides pushed popular organizations once again to the streets. Riding a wave of almost daily spontaneous mobilizations in different parts of the country, the CGTP demanded the immediate resignation of the corralled president, the creation of a national emergency government, and new general and regional elections. Its demands also included punishment of corrupt functionaries and the establishment of a new economic strategy focused on job creation and living wages. On the basis of this platform, popular organizations coalesced in a new wave of protest that included a national day of struggle in October with demonstrations and marches in Lima, regional strikes in ten departments, and a two-day peasant strike. As the Fujimori regime unraveled the country witnessed, within a few days, the resignation of Fujimori's vice-president, the desertion of a number of his supporters in Congress, and a rebellion by a small military garrison in the southern region of Peru. The spontaneous outpouring of popular support acted as a deterrent for an already morally weakened and unpopular army. Further desertions allowed the opposition to replace the Congress president – one of Fujimori's staunchest supporters. Finally, on November 13, Fujimori left the country, purportedly to attend the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) conference in Brunei. In his absence popular organizations staged another successful day of national protest followed by a 72-hour peasant strike. They also announced a general strike to be started November 25, which was to last until the fall of Fujimori. On November 19, Fujimori announced his resignation from Tokyo.

SEE ALSO: Peru, Armed Insurgency and the Dirty War, 1980–1990; Peru, "People's War," Counterinsurgency, and the Popular Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (2004) *Informe Final, Perú: 1980–2000*. Lima: UNMSM/PUCP.
- Crabtree, J. & Thomas, J. (Eds.) (1988) *Fujimori's Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere*. London: Institute of Latin American Studies.
- Haworth, N. (1993) Radicalization and the Left in Peru, 1976–1991. In B. Carr & S. Ellner (Eds.), *The Latin American Left: From the Fall of Allende to Perestroika*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Poole, D. & Rénique, G. (1992) *Peru Time of Fear*. London: Latin America Bureau.
- Poole, D. & Rénique, G. (2000) Popular Movements, the Legacy of the Left and the Fall of Fujimori. *Socialism and Democracy* 14 (2): 53–74.
- Poole, D. & Rénique, G. (2003) Terror and the Privatized State: A Peruvian Parable. *Radical History* 85: 150–63.
- Quijano, A. (2000) Fujimorism, the OAS, and Peru. *Socialism and Democracy* 14 (2): 41–51.
- Taylor, L. (1990) One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Peruvian Izquierda Unida 1980–1990. *Journal of Communist Studies* 6 (3): 108–19.

Peru, "people's war," counterinsurgency, and the popular movement

Gerardo Rénique

By any reckoning, the 1980–92 war between the Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL) and the armed forces marked a radical transformation in the country's political landscape. Set against the transition to an electoral democratic regime after 12 years of military government, the rapid urbanization of the country and rising popular expectations favored the expansion of the left. By the mid-1980s the left-wing coalition of the Izquierda Unida (United Left, IU) was the second largest electoral force. Labor unions, peasant federations, shantytown dwellers' associations, women's collectives, and students' organizations gave life to a powerful and expanding grassroots movement. The parallel escalation of the armed conflict at the same time created the conditions for the normalization and incorporation of counterinsurgency principles and

mechanisms into the new governance demanded by the neoliberal reconfiguration of the Peruvian state and society in course during that same decade. A perverse combination of counterinsurgency doctrine, coastal *criollo* racism, and disdain for human rights characterized the escalating militarization of Peruvian society during this fateful decade. Starting with the administration of Fernando Belaunde de Terry (1980–5) – the first president after 12 years of military government – each of the next democratically elected presidents gave an increasingly free rein to the Peruvian military.

Among the most remarkable and disturbing aspects of this changing political scenario were the new levels of violence displayed by both the armed forces and the PCP-SL against civilians, and the new relationship between violence and state power. During the 1980s the state use of arbitrary detentions, occasional killings in mass actions, torture, exile, and deportation of opposition leaders was displaced by harsh and widespread forms of exemplary and punitive violence aimed against men, women, and children in the civilian population, popular organizations, and grassroots and left-wing parties. In a perverse and curious resemblance to other Latin American "dirty wars" in rural areas, military "death caravans" carried out rape, torture, and execution; college professors and students disappeared from dormitories; peasant villagers were corralled into strategic hamlets; thousands of citizens suffered daily police harassment and arbitrary detentions; journalists, lawyers, and relatives of alleged subversives were executed, arrested, or disappeared. According to estimates from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) between 1980 and 2000, at least 69,280 persons had been killed or disappeared as a consequence of the conflict.

As the PCP-SL intensified its activity in different parts of the country, the conflictive zones were declared as emergency zones where basic constitutional rights were suspended and the military displaced democratically elected authorities. New legislation defined terrorism as a special crime subject to military jurisdiction. Any perceived act of "apology or support" for terrorism was prosecutable as terrorism. Those accused of terrorism were subject to relaxed rules of evidence and received summary trials in front of masked military judges. Grassroots leaders and elected officials from the United

Left coalition were charged as sympathizers or terrorists. Anti-terrorist legislation also provided justification for rounding up all the dark-skinned *cholos* and *indios* whom the state perceived as the "natural" allies of Sendero Luminoso.

By January 1989, 56 out of a total of 185 provinces, including the capital city of Lima, were under military rule. More than half the Peruvian people were denied their constitutional rights. Between 1989 and 1990, one-third of Lima's population, or 2.5 million people, were subjected to forced searches by police or military; 9,000 people in Lima were detained under Peru's sweeping anti-terrorist laws. Migrants from the Andean highlands, street vendors, students, and any dark-skinned or Indian-looking people were specially subjected to such abuses.

On the other hand, the PCP-SL also exceeded the tradition of class-based vindictive violence that had characterized earlier left-wing forms of revolutionary violence. In a radical shift from the armed propaganda, bank "expropriations," sabotage against infrastructure, and occasional military engagements previously employed by Peruvian revolutionary organizations, the PCP-SL also turned its violence against leaders of popular organizations, elected officials, priests and nuns, NGO members, and state functionaries associated with left-wing parties or the government; in short, they targeted all those who did not pledge allegiance to the PCP-SL "people's war." On April 3, 1983, for example, a force of 100 members of the PCP-SL staged "people's trials" in the Ayacucho towns of Huancasancos and Lucanamarca, charging the townspeople with having resisted their presence on several previous occasions. They ended the trials by executing 45 peasants in Lucanamarca and 35 in Huancasancos. During the following two weeks the PCP-SL killed 50 more peasants in punitive actions against the villagers in the neighboring province of Cangallo. PCP-SL combatants also carried out random bombings and shootings of passers-by and bus and cab drivers to enforce the party's "armed strikes." In one of its bloodiest actions, the PCP-SL set off a powerful car bomb in July 1992, destroying apartment buildings in a residential middle-class neighborhood in Lima and killing over 20 people. Leaders and organizers identified with the most militant sector of the United Left and the popular movement like Aymara peasant leader Porfirio Suni, Enrique Castilla, general secretary of the textile workers'

federation, and Maria Elena Moyano, a popular leader from the Urban Self-Managed Community of Villa El Salvador, were among dozens executed by the PCP-SL "annihilation squads."

Founded in the early 1970s, the PCP-SL had its origins in one of the splinter Communist Party groups that emerged in the aftermath of the schism between Moscow and Beijing followers. The PCP-SL was established as a militarized cadre organization, which rejected electoral politics and any form of legal struggle as "parliamentary cretinism" and "pacifism." Both were considered to have their origins in the "revisionism" that Abimael Guzmán saw as dominating the rest of the Peruvian left. While Maoism has always concerned itself with ideological purity, Guzmán took this discourse to an extreme. He described the party as a body that had to be cleansed and purified of the "cancer" and "filth" of revisionism, or of any influence questioning the inevitability of the armed struggle. His metaphors of disease and purification conveyed an ideology whose simplicity proved extremely compelling for the predominantly young and provincial followers who supported the PCP-SL's armed struggle. As a worldview that divided everything neatly into absolute good or absolute evil, it provided simple answers to the problems of Peru and its largely futureless youth. For Guzmán and his followers, the armed struggle represented a purging mechanism for the attainment of absolute purity, perfection, and truth. As such, violence constituted a means to intervene in the cosmological battle between good and evil. This Olympian struggle was to be fought at all levels of existence, from the universe to the individual soul. "The problem," asserted Guzmán, "is the presence in each soul of two flags, one black and one red. We are [the] left, let us make a holocaust with the black flag; it is easy for each to do it; if not, the rest of us will do it for them."

Since Guzmán believed the opposition between the red and black poles to be irreconcilable, the "black" or impure pole required total annihilation, leaving no remains. It was the mission of the PCP-SL and its leadership to carry out this task of excising the impure through a process Guzmán referred to repeatedly as "sweeping" or "burning." Led by its revolutionary party, the people then had to eradicate all physical trace of the "revisionists" so that the "cancer" would not once again reproduce itself. "The people,"

wrote Guzmán, "will tear the reactionaries' flesh, convert it to shreds and sink the black scraps of meat into the slimy mud; what remains, [they] will burn and scatter to the winds of the earth so that nothing remains except the evil memory of that which must never return because it cannot and must not return."

This black-and-white vision of political struggle derives from Guzmán's idiosyncratic understanding of the Maoist and Marxist concept of contradiction. According to Marx, contradiction manifests itself through the struggle between opposing classes in society. In capitalist society, the principal contradictions are those between wage labor and capital, and between money and the commodity form. They are fundamentally and characteristically dialectic because both terms of each contradiction presuppose the other. As such, social contradictions imply a form of inclusive opposition that must be worked out through the concrete actions and struggles of human beings. It is this human agency and struggle that is, for Marx, the motor of history. All ensuing Marxist tradition follows Marx's interpretation of contradiction as a unity of opposites.

Drawing in part on his studies of Kant, Guzmán rejected the basic Marxist principle of the unity of opposites. He instead constructed his theory of contradiction to parallel Kant's concept of real or exclusive oppositions, resolvable only through the intervention of a supra-human agency (the divine). For Guzmán this meant that the two poles of a contradiction remain in essence different from and external to each other, rather than being viewed, as in the Marxist dialectic, as two aspects of one and the same force. Guzmán concluded that the necessary and only resolution of the antagonism or contradiction between such irreconcilable (because exclusive) poles would be through the eradication of one of them. It is this conclusion that leads to his conception of the "armed struggle" as a universal purging mechanism – the supra-human force – that would rid both society and the party of all traces of the evil pole of "revisionism" and the "reaction." The inevitable outcome of this process would be a society purged of all antagonism, contradiction, and difference – what Guzmán called the "society of great harmony."

Guzmán also presented the PCP-SL's struggle as an act of destiny because of its inevitability. Building on Kant's theory of causal necessity, Guzmán saw the party and its armed struggle

as the necessary consequence of all past events leading up to this moment. For him, the party had the supreme task of systematizing the force of violence in Peru into the "people's war" that would end the third stage of contemporary Peruvian history, or the "general crisis of bureaucratic capitalism." Bureaucratic capitalism, wrote Guzmán, "is born sick, rotten, tied to feudalism, and subjected to imperialism." Its destruction was therefore both inevitable and a goal of an armed struggle that would unfold – with the help of Guzmán's party – in three predetermined stages. The first entailed the development of guerilla warfare and the establishment of bases of support among the peasantry. For Guzmán the PCP successfully carried on this stage during the first 11 years of its struggle. The second stage involved the deployment of larger military units in frontal engagement with the enemy forces and the establishment of a "strategic equilibrium" between Sendero and the armed forces. The bombings of energy pylons, executions of popular leaders in the strategic shantytowns surrounding the capital city, and intensification of actions of armed propaganda in Lima during May 1991 were all designed to mark the beginnings of the final state of the people's war. This third stage – the "strategic counteroffensive" – was to be followed by a general urban insurrection, the retreat of the enemy, the final victory, and the establishment of the "New Democracy."

What made Guzmán's vision of history-as-armed-struggle compelling was precisely its combination of cosmic inevitability and armed agency. By participating in the PCP-SL's armed struggle, its cadre believed to be participating in a cosmological unfolding of world history. Such a metaphysical view of history made inquiries into causes or historical processes irrelevant. Thus, for Guzmán and his followers, there was no need to look back into history and question why, or what if – to look for reasons that might provide a moral justification for violence. Rather, morality, like history, was simply not an issue. "The done is done," Guzmán taught his followers. "It cannot be reopened. Are we to revoke written time, the fact engraved in matter? How can the grains detain the millstone? They will be reduced to dust." As in other fundamentalist ideologies (e.g., religious, nationalist, fascist), individual agency and life were similarly dismissed as irrelevant to the sweeping course of history.

"One [person] is worth nothing, the masses are everything. If we are to be something it will be as part of the masses." Thus deprived of human agency, morality, or will, the historical movement toward the armed struggle was graphically depicted in Guzmán's fiery rhetoric as a "storm," "bonfire," or "earthquake" – as natural forces impossible for the individual to resist.

For Senderistas then, violence represented the irresistible force moving history forward. Guzmán taught his followers that violence constituted a natural and universal fact that needed to be elevated into the guiding principle for political action, revolutionary praxis, and the reorganization of a "new society." "We reaffirm ourselves in revolutionary violence as the universal law to take power and as the essence for substituting one class for another," proclaimed Guzmán. "We will attain communism only with revolutionary violence and while there remains a place on earth in which exploitation exists, we will finish it off with revolutionary violence." For this reason, Guzmán continued, "we communists must empower ourselves ideologically, politically, and organically to assume [violence] properly."

The majority of the left, on the other hand, took the democratic transition as a challenge to its political gains and expansion during the previous decade. Since the early 1980s the most important left-wing parties, social movements, and popular organizations had coalesced under the banners of the United Left. Established as a "revolutionary mass front," by the late 1980s it became the second largest electoral force. Paradoxically, this electoral success also marked the beginning of the IU's then unforeseen rapid decline. Under the challenge posed by the growing PCP-SL armed struggle and an increasingly militant popular movement – prodded by a deepening economic crisis – the IU struggled to find a balance between its avowed role as a "revolutionary mass front" and its parliamentary activities. Set against the collapse of "really existing socialism" and a mounting neoliberal ideological offensive, the crisis of the Peruvian left was deepened by an increasing divide between the political parties and the popular organizations, leaders and militants, and between those favoring a more centrist and conciliatory political strategy and those inclined toward a more radical one. Sectarianism, opportunism, and anti-democratic practices – problems that the IU had pledged to overcome – resurfaced

among its ranks, engulfing the front in the infighting that led to its disintegration.

Another relevant political force acting during the 1980s and 1990s was the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, MRTA), formed in 1984 as an armed organization and conceived as part of a front in which popular organizations, unions, and parties would combine political, electoral, and armed actions with mass mobilizations. Because it viewed itself as part of the national left and popular movement, the MRTA supported the efforts of popular organizations and the IU parties. In line with its politics, the MRTA aimed its armed actions at police and military installations, banks, and US interests. MRTA members also "expropriated" food and clothing for redistribution to poor shantytown dwellers. While in its early actions the MRTA for the most part avoided execution and indiscriminate use of force, it was less scrupulous in dealing with internal differences. Several dissident members were executed and the MRTA was also troubled by conflicts between factions in the leadership. In a widely condemned action, in late December 1989 MRTA members executed an Ashaninka indigenous leader whom they accused of collaboration with the army in the death of an MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement) guerilla in 1965. In the ensuing backlash by the Ashaninka, the MRTA was expelled from the Gran Pajonal Region and lost important support from the Ashaninka. Later the MRTA was also engaged in hostage taking and kidnapping for ransom of senior army officers and businessmen.

From Guzmán's perspective, the MRTA like the IU constituted expressions of "revisionism," the ideological deviation that questioned the PCP-SL's idiosyncratic armed struggle. For Sendero the United Left (as well as the armed insurgency of the MRTA) was but another class enemy to be eliminated. Thus, because of its political alliance with the United Left, the large majority of grassroots and social movements were also considered as "enemies of the people."

Its disdain for the culture of Quechua- and Aymara-speaking peasants deemed as an archaic survival of a feudal past that had to be eliminated in the construction of the party's envisioned "New Democracy" also constituted a galvanizing factor of the PCP-SL's anti-popular stance. In many towns the PCP-SL banned the celebration of religious *fiestas* and rituals regarded as

"archaic superstitions." It also attempted to disband the traditional political-religious indigenous authorities and replace them with party-sanctioned governing bodies called "Popular Committees." According to a PCP-SL spokesperson at the time, Andean religious practices were "irrationalities which continue to have influence over the most backward inhabitants of Peru. This [Andean] cultural tradition has nothing to do with the war and the revolutionary struggle." Intellectual or political programs that took account of Andean indigenous traditions were similarly disparaged by the pro-PCP-SL newspaper *El Diario* as "magical whining nationalisms" that were condemned to extinction as "the residue of a moribund bourgeois ideology."

In September 1992, the capture of Abimael Guzmán marked the beginning of the end of the PCP-SL's insurgency. As police operatives burst into his safe house in a middle-class neighborhood in Lima, the much-feared "Fourth Sword of Marxism" waited calmly. On confronting his captors, he is said to have told the commanding officer: "Sometimes you win; sometimes you lose. This time it's my turn to lose." The most important loser, however, was the popular movement, undermined as much by the repressive "anti-terrorist" legislation as by the bullets of the PCP-SL "annihilation squads" which, together with extrajudicial executions carried out by the armed forces and the police, ended the lives of many prominent popular leaders and organizers.

SEE ALSO: MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru); Peru, Armed Insurgency and the Dirty War, 1980–1990; Peru, Neoliberalism and Social Mobilization, 1990s–2000s

References and Suggested Readings

- El Diario* (1988) IU con la Perestroika y la Utopia Andina: Residuos de la Moribunda Ideología Burguesa. In *Cresta Roja*, Suplemento Dominical. Lima, Año II, No. 62 (July).
- Fokkema, A. (1990–1) Interview with Luis Arce Borja. *NACLA Report on the Americas* 24 (4).
- Guzmán, A. (1989a) Por la Nueva Bandera. In L. Arce Borja (Ed.), *Guerra popular en el Perú: El pensamiento Gonzalo*. Brussels: Borja, p. 145 (author's translation).
- Guzmán, A. (1989b) Somos los iniciadores. In L. Arce Borja (Ed.), *Guerra popular en el Perú: El pensamiento Gonzalo*. Brussels: Borja, p. 145 (author's translation).

- Poole, D. & Rénique, G. (1991) The New Chroniclers of Peru: US Scholars and their "Shining Path" of Peasant Rebellion. *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 10 (2): 133–91.
- Poole, D. & Rénique, G. (1992) *Peru, Time of Fear*. London: LAB.
- Stern, S. (Ed.) (1998) *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society, 1980–1995*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Peterloo Massacre, 1819

Christian A. Griggs

The Peterloo Massacre occurred on August 16, 1819 in Manchester, England. A group of approximately 60,000 workers gathered in a peaceful political protest and the local magistrates, fearing a riot, sent cavalry into the crowd to disband them, causing chaos and leading to the massacre.

Since the French Revolution in 1789 the British government had been uneasy about the presence of radical political movements in the country. Parliament passed repressive laws to limit the rights and influence of radical groups, though they continued to grow in size and number. The great fear was that Britain would have its own violent revolution and overturn the state. Britain at the time was in the midst of an industrial revolution, causing substantial social and economic change and creating a volatile political environment where radical ideas often found a welcoming audience. By 1815 the urban working class faced many hardships: food prices were high, labor was harsh, wages were low, and the workers had no political power. They began to turn to protest to effect reform, feeding the fears of the conservative British government. The response was not reform but further repression. Seditious meetings were outlawed, habeas corpus was suspended, and the government increasingly used informers and spies to root out radicals. The protests and gatherings continued, though they were held more cautiously.

In this context a protest was organized by the Patriotic Union Society of Manchester to be held in the city at St. Peter's Field in August 1819. In early July Joseph Johnson, the secretary of the society, invited "Orator" Henry Hunt to be the chief speaker at the gathering. Hunt was known throughout England for his radical ideas and, in agreeing to come to Manchester, he expressed the



The Peterloo Massacre, also known as the Battle of Peterloo, occurred in Manchester, England, on August 16, 1819 when between 60,000 and 80,000 people assembled at St. Peter's Field to demand parliamentary reform and representation. Eleven people were killed and about 400 were injured after yeomanry were ordered to disperse the crowd. Unidentified artist. (Mary Evans Picture Library)

desire to make the meeting especially impressive in order to attract national attention to the cause. As preparations moved ahead it became evident that the protest at St. Peter's would be impressive in size. Word spread to the local magistrates and they became concerned that the meeting might become violent. The magistrates, including William Hulton and Charles Ethelston, were loyal High Tories who supported the repressive measures of the government. They were certain that the protesters would come armed and prepared to fight, leading the magistrates to attempt to stop the meeting completely. Communications regarding the proposed protest were opened between the British Home Office in London and the magistrates in Manchester. Though both groups believed the radicals were planning a revolution, it became evident that there was no legal foundation to prevent the gathering. Once the meeting began, however, the magistrates could disperse it immediately if they believed it posed a danger.

The day of the protest, August 16, arrived, and the crowd began to amass on St. Peter's Field around 9 a.m. Hunt urged them to come armed with only a "self-approving conscience" and not with weapons, advice which was followed. The protesters flocked to Manchester from outlying regions such as Royton, Oldham, and Middleton. As they marched they carried with them banners that proclaimed their cause: "Parliaments Annual," "Liberty and Fraternity," and "Suffrage Universal." The people also wanted political representation in the industrial towns of northern England and relief from the artificially high price of corn. By the time the meeting began around 1 p.m., the crowd numbered approximately 60,000. But the reformers were not the only ones who had gathered in Manchester; the magistrates had brought in a substantial military force. A total of seven cavalry troops and seven companies of infantry were in the city under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Guy L'Estrange, with additional troops stationed in nearby towns.

Almost immediately after Hunt began to address the crowd, the magistrates decided to disband the gathering and arrest the leaders. The cavalry was sent in to assist in the arrests, with the Manchester Yeomanry the first group to arrive. This was a poorly trained and inexperienced volunteer cavalry force. The Yeomanry charged the crowd, building speed as they moved through the masses. Chaos ensued as the people scrambled to get out of the way. The arrests were made, after which the Yeomanry turned on the protesters. In an attempt to clear the field, they began waving their swords as they marched through the fleeing crowd, assisted at this point by four experienced cavalry regiments from the British army. After ten minutes the field was cleared and the massacre was over. Eleven people were killed and more than 400 injured, primarily from crushing.

In the immediate aftermath of the massacre the British government gave full support to the magistrates' actions. In December, parliament passed the Six Acts to further limit radical influence in the country. The leaders who had been arrested at Peterloo were put on trial the following year and most were incarcerated, weakening the radical working-class movement. But the implications of Peterloo were not entirely negative. The story of the massacre spread across Britain in the newspapers and there was

widespread shock at the violence used against the workers. Numerous meetings were arranged to protest the massacre, and members of the middle and upper classes attended. Despite the Six Acts, Britain in the 1820s was a more liberal country and the 1830s brought significant reform. The Peterloo Massacre is viewed as a significant step in the process of reform because it helped publicize and build sympathy for the reform movement. It can also be considered an early example of class warfare, with the middle-class yeomanry attacking the working-class protesters. As such, the massacre helped in the formation of class identity in early industrial society.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Corn Law Agitation, Britain, 19th Century; Chartists

References and Suggested Readings

- Marlow, J. (1969) *The Peterloo Massacre*. London: Rapp & Whiting.
 Read, D. (1958) *Peterloo: The "Massacre" and its Background*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
 Reid, R. (1989) *The Peterloo Massacre*. London: Heinemann.

Pham Van Dong (1906–2000)

Justin Corfield

Pham Van Dong was a senior member of the Vietnamese Communist Party and prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) from 1955 until 1976. Following the defeat of the US and South Vietnamese, in 1974, Pham Van Dong was chairman of the Council of Ministers of a unified Vietnam until retiring in 1987.

Pham Van Dong was born on March 1, 1906, in Duc Tan village, Mo Duc district of Quang Ngai province in central Vietnam. His father was chief secretary to the Vietnamese Emperor Duy Tan. Pham Van Dong attended the National Academy in Hue, and when he was 18 he joined a demonstration organized at the school to mourn the death of Phan Chu Trinh, the eminent anti-colonial scholar. He then went to the University of Hanoi. In 1926 he traveled to Guangzhou (Canton), China, to join the Revolutionary Youth League (RYL) and enrolled in the Whampoa Military Academy for training in

the Chinese Nationalist army, then in coalition with the Chinese communists. Soon after, Pham Van Dong returned to Vietnam and served as a member of the RYL's regional committee in the south of the country. In 1931 Pham Van Dong was arrested by French colonial authorities in Vietnam. He was jailed on Poulo Condore Island, and was not freed until the election of the Popular Front government in France in 1936, which gave amnesty to political prisoners.

During the late 1930s Pham Van Dong formed ties with Vietnamese communists in southern China, using the alias Lam Ba Kiet (Lin Paichieh), and serving under Hô Chi Minh during World War II. In 1946, he was named minister of finance of the newly formed Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and, in 1951, member of the Politburo of the Vietnamese Communist Party. He was appointed minister of foreign affairs and vice-premier in 1954, leading the Vietnamese communist delegation to the Geneva Peace Talks in 1954. He became prime minister on September 20, 1955 at the fifth session of the First National Congress of the DRV.

Throughout the Second Indochinese War (US military invasion and occupation) Pham Van Dong remained administrator, reconciling the often conflicting interests of the Vietnamese Communist Party and the North Vietnamese government. He participated in the peace talks with US presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon and was engaged in foreign policy and Vietnam's gradual alliance with the Soviet Union. On July 2, 1976, following reunification of North Vietnam and South Vietnam, Pham Van Dong was appointed as chairman of the Council of Ministers, a position he held until June 18, 1987.

Pham Van Dong governed Vietnam during the invasion of Cambodia in December 1978. He was interviewed by Stanley Karnow for the television series *Vietnam: A Television History* in 1981, during which he put forward the Vietnamese communist case persuasively and concisely.

Pham Van Dong resigned from the Politburo of the Vietnamese Communist Party at the Sixth Party Congress in December 1986 owing to "advanced age and ill health." With 32 years as prime minister, he was one of the longest-serving leaders in the world at his retirement. He died at the age of 94 on April 29, 2000, the day before the 25th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War.

SEE ALSO: Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh) (1890–1969); Vietnam, Anti-Colonial, Nationalist, and Communist Movements, 1900–1939; Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954; Vietnam, Protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974

References and Suggested Readings

- Karnow, S. (1984) *Vietnam: A History*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
 Turner, R. F. (1975) *Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.

Phan Boi Chau (1867–1940)

Justin Corfield

One of the major figures in the Vietnamese anti-colonial and nationalist struggle, Phan Boi Chau was born on December 26, 1867, in a village in the north-central province of Nghe An. His father was from a family of scholars who had long since fallen on hard times, and Phan Boi Chau was brought up in some poverty. However, his father was able to teach him the Confucian ethics and the Analects. As a boy, Phan Boi Chau saw the emergence of French colonial control that compelled the Vietnamese emperor, Tu Duc, to sign a treaty supporting their commercial concession. He watched the defeat of the Can Vuong movement against the French, with the emperor, Ham Nghi, forced to flee the Imperial Palace and settle in Nghe An. Phan Boi Chau met him there and became active in the fight against the French.

With the French sending soldiers into the region, Phan Boi Chau decided to sink into obscurity and try to look after his aging father. However, he continued his studies and, in 1900, passed the examinations to become a government employee. Four years later he formed the Vietnam Duy Tan Hoi (Vietnam Modernization Association) and became its general secretary, with another nationalist, Cuong De, as president. Seeing the great hope for the anti-colonial struggle in Tokyo, Phan Boi Chau went there to seek help in fighting the French. Phan was also keen to start training Vietnamese in the revolutionary struggle. The French put pressure on the Japanese, and in 1909 they finally decided to expel Phan Boi Chau. From Japan he went to Hong Kong where he continued to work with

Cuong De, and the two of them moved to Siam (Thailand). Seeing himself as part of a movement like that of Sun Yat-sen, he was in Thailand when he heard news of the outbreak of the rebellion led by Hoang Ha Tam in Vietnam. Although anxious to help, he was unable to do so.

The 1911 Revolution in China encouraged the Vietnamese nationalists, and Phan was soon surrounded by many anti-colonial leaders who had moved to Thailand to associate with him. This led to the formation of the Vietnam Restoration League in 1912. Going to China to study the revolution there, Phan was arrested and jailed until 1917. By this time he was writing prolifically on the independence struggle, producing a number of works such as one entitled “France–Vietnamese Harmony,” which urged some compromise with the French.

When traveling through the French concession in Shanghai in 1925, Phan Boi Chau was arrested by French agents and brought back to Vietnam, where he was tried for treason and convicted. Because he was in ill health, he lived out his life sentence under house arrest, and died on October 29, 1940.

SEE ALSO: Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925); Vietnam, Anti-Colonial, Nationalist, and Communist Movements, 1900–1939; Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954; Vietnam, Protest against Colonialism, 1858–1896; Vietnam, Protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974

References and Suggested Readings

- Marr, D. G. (1970) *Vietnamese Anticolonialism 1885–1925*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Vinh Sinh (1988) *Phan Boi Chau and the Dong Du Movement*. New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies.
- Vinh Sinh & Wickenden, N. (Eds.) (1999) *Overturned Chariot: The Autobiography of Phan Boi Chau*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Philippines, colonial protests during the Spanish era

Pierre Rousset

At the end of the nineteenth century, the Philippines was the first country in Asia to be

liberated from colonial power. The first anti-colonial revolt against Spanish rule occurred from 1896 to 1898, further extended by the resistance to the American conquest. Ultimately, at the turn of the twentieth century, the US replaced a defeated Spain, initiating a new colonial cycle.

The Philippines is comprised of an archipelago composed of 7,107 islands, the vast majority of whose population lives on 20 islands. The geographic dispersion of the Philippines has greatly influenced the history of popular struggles in the country. But one unparalleled historical factor explains the distinctiveness of the Philippines in Asia: an early and prolonged character of direct colonial domination.

Colonialism in the Philippines began in the sixteenth century, as in Latin America – 300 years earlier than most Asian countries. The process of formal decolonization was not complete until the aftermath of World War II, as in most of the rest of Asia, but 100 years later than in Latin America. Thus, the Philippines’ colonial era lasted an exceptionally long four centuries. Another particularity of the country was that Spain reigned as the dominating colonial power before the archipelago became one of the few direct colonies of the United States, a unique succession for Asia.

Colonial powers of the archipelago were not confronted with a mature pre-capitalist state, as in China, Vietnam, Cambodia, or Thailand. Although the Philippines ultimately did not become a colony of settlement, colonization facilitated western cultural penetration and drastic societal change. The country became the primary Christian territory in the region – in many ways, the Philippines today remains Latin Asia.

Ferdinand Magellan disembarked in 1521 on an island which later became the Philippines, but it was only after the expedition of Miguel Lopez of Legazpi in 1565 that the process of colonization seriously began. At the time, the archipelago’s population was less than one million, composed of various linguistic groups. The basic social unit, usually the *barangay* (village), was small in size.

Magellan was not the first to “discover” the territory. Before the arrival of Christian Europeans, communities living along the coast and the rivers were already in contact with Chinese, Indian, and Arab merchants. In the south, Islamization of the archipelago was well underway and the sultanates were established.



This portrait of the Battle of Paeo in Manila depicts Philippine rebels struggling to create an independent republic. The battle took place on February 4–5, 1899 against United States forces. While Filipino nationalists declared independence on June 12, 1898, following the end of the Spanish–American War in 1899, the country was recolonized by the US and did not receive formal independence until June 4, 1946. (Courtesy of the Library of Congress)

Apart from the Islamized regions of the south, social differentiation and institutional representations were poorly developed at the time of Spain's arrival. It was Spain that introduced private ownership of land, previously considered common property. The polarization of classes was only asserted with the onset of the colonial framework. For two centuries Spain did not attempt to "develop" the archipelago, remaining content to use the port of Manila in the galleon trade between China and Mexico. The Spanish hoped to use the Philippines as a rear base in the conquest of China, and the archipelago became a religious and military post of the empire. Administered through Mexico, Spain's presence in the Philippines helped control its global commercial route against the English, Portuguese, and Dutch, who were often at war in the European Continent.

The country was not only Christianized through colonization. The friars became central politically, and the church was a source of economic power. The Spanish empire was built in the name of "two majesties" – God (or rather the pope) and the king. The friars, who received salaries from the king of Spain, maintained a direct relationship with the crown as well as serving as the representatives of Rome. They were present everywhere except in the Muslim south, knew the country, spoke the local dialect, organized people around the church, and remained

in the archipelago when civil servants returned to Spain. The clergy was the first beneficiary of the privatization of land, becoming the Philippines' largest landowner. It invested in international and local trade and controlled banks and insurance companies by means of foundations.

The friars constituted the most important power network in the entire archipelago. On an economic level, they were challenged by private capitalist competition quite late in the empire. The church's political influence was significant because friars became agents and guarantors of pacification, with religion legitimating the colonial order. The union of church and state afforded friars considerable administrative responsibility. Friars incarnated spiritual and temporal powers, but when the regime entered a crisis, they were enmeshed in the social and political tensions as principal channels of colonial exploitation and appropriation.

Social Stratification and Regional Differentiation

For a long time the Spanish, Chinese, and indigenous economies intermingled. Feudal practices and institutions were imported from Spain, but European feudalism, as such, did not develop in the Philippines. The impact of commercial capitalism was felt rapidly; under the influence of the world market and of Chinese trade, the precolonial relationships of production were gradually dissolved. With the increase in mixed marriages, the influence of Chinese *mestizos* increased. As a result of privileges granted traditional dignitaries, a class of propertied Filipinos, called the *principales*, was formed in association with the colonial power.

The colonial era gave birth to a peculiar social hierarchy, dominated from top to bottom by Spaniards, the *mestizos* (particularly Sino-Filipinos, as Hispano-Filipino was less common), the indigenous *principales*, and finally the people. Private appropriation of land resulted in new social polarization between landlords and tenants, and friars often became absentee landlords. The clergy competed with the Chinese for the control of local trade and, in the villages, with *ecomenderos*, Filipinos given the status of subjects of the Spanish crown. In light of the theopolitical characteristic of Spanish colonialism, tensions often turned violent between the clerical hierarchy and civil servants.

The social, economic, political, and linguistic unification of the country was never completed by the administrative and religious structures of the colonial power. With the decline of the Spanish empire and rise of Britain in the seventeenth century, the British and Chinese played an important role in developing and integrating the Philippines into the global market. While the archipelago's social formation remained deeply marked by the Hispanic clerico-commercial order, Chinese immigration proved more widespread and durable than that of the Spanish. At the onset of the seventeenth century, more than 20,000 Chinese lived in Manila and the surrounding areas and played an increasingly important role in commercial activity.

The Philippines' complex historical heritage is combined with the particular geography of the country. In the archipelago maritime and land communication is often difficult; the ocean separates the islands and the mountain chains isolate the plains from one another. These factors strengthened considerably the forces of regional differentiation in the country and bear witness to its linguistic diversity. Tagalog, which obtained the status of the national language, is the mother tongue of only 30 percent of the population and is spoken primarily in the capital of Manila. Other languages and dialects are spoken in the rest of the archipelago. For many Filipinos, Tagalog remains a second language, the diffusion of which was promoted in the late twentieth century by television.

Political life too remained regional, with large provincial families exerting remarkably important influence. The deep-rootedness of the church, the shaping of social class through a colonial framework, the strength of regionalism, the presence of a non-Hispanic population in the south and in the mountain ranges of the archipelago were factors weighing strongly upon the birth of a national conscience and social struggles. These factors also shaped the degree of identification of Filipinos with their Asian region. In the Philippines, more westernized than its neighbors and mostly Christianized, the sentiment of belonging to a Southeast Asia of Islamic, Buddhist, and Confucian cultures is not instinctive.

Early Resistance

Colonial expeditions were confronted with armed resistance, like that carried out by Lapu-lapu

which cost Ferdinand Magellan his life, or that of Lakandula and Soliman against Legazpi. In 1587, many traditional chiefs were condemned to death for instigating a revolt in Manila. Many uprisings were later carried out against exploitation imposed by the friars, such as those in Samar Island in 1649.

Abolition of the tribute, a collection that led to many brutalities, and the end of forced labor and conscription, often keeping villagers from fully harvesting their crop, were the most widespread demands during Spanish rule. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, rebellion often took the form of native upheaval against Christianity and its representatives. But Catholic rituals also sometimes combined with traditional beliefs as proof of the early ideological domination of colonial rule. In the center of Luzon, where social structures were most developed, as early as 1660 resistance was less religious, non-native, and more directly political.

Certain regional upheavals acquired large mass bases and long resisted military expeditions sent to crush them. This was the case of the struggle initiated in the Province of Bohol by Francisco Dagohoy, lasting 85 years from 1744 to 1829. Deep-rooted socially, this struggle continued in spite of the death of Dagohoy. The popular upheaval first took advantage of the conflict between Spain and the Netherlands, then of the world decline in Hispanic power and the repercussions of the Seven Years' War in Europe: the British even occupied Manila in 1762 and the center of Luzon Island became the scene of numerous struggles in the following years.

Resistance: Late 18th to Late 19th Centuries

The process of the 1896–8 revolution was deeply influenced by the amplitude of sociopolitical transformation engaged in from the middle of the eighteenth century. The weal and co-optation of the elite sharpened class polarization within the Philippine communities. A direct commercial route was opened toward Spain, and trade diversified to Europe and Asia. With a higher degree of integration into the world market, cash crop production intensified.

With the creation in 1781 of the monopoly on tobacco (abandoned in 1883), then in 1785 of the Royal Philippine Company (abolished in 1834), the colony gained financial and commercial

independence from Mexico. Trade liberalization, pursued with the end of the galleon trade in 1813, stimulated the development of the monetary economy of the Philippines. Banking houses were created, foreign companies (especially British but also American) were authorized to operate in the Manila region, and competition between Chinese–British and Spanish firms became fierce.

In the mid-nineteenth century, the social pyramid still followed the ethnic constitution of the country with, from top to bottom, the *peninsulares* (Spanish holding positions in the Philippines), the *insulares* or creoles (Spanish born in the archipelago and considering themselves real Filipinos), the *mestizo* Spanish, the *mestizo* Chinese, the natives, and the Chinese. Chinese immigration was mostly male and the number of Sino-Filipinos increased considerably; it gained importance especially after the eviction of the non-Catholic Chinese in 1755. Among a population of four million, 250,000 were Chinese *mestizos*, 20,000 Spanish *mestizos*, and 10,000 Chinese.

In 1850, the Philippines again opened up to Chinese immigration. The Chinese subsequently regained their position in trade and finance as Sino-Filipinos switched to agriculture, becoming more Filipino than Chinese and often adopting Philippine names. Sino-Filipinos integrated into large provincial families and into what was to become the national elite. Land concentration progressed rapidly throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, giving birth to the hacienda system, which combined an active integration in the world capitalist market with quasi-feudal forms of exploitation inherited from the church.

The national market was consolidated – although without abolishing regional powers – and new elites emerged who were sensitive to the ideals of the Enlightenment and who sent their children to study in Spain. The elites faced limitations imposed by colonial rule and strong social resentment. The Cadiz Constitution, proclaimed in Spain in 1812 and the following year in the Philippines, resonated with people's aspirations for equality. The quick abrogation of the constitution in 1814, with the advent of the absolutist regime in the colonial metropolis, sparked the 1815 revolt of Sarrat during which the *cailianes*, or common people, attacked the *principales*, or rich Filipinos. Class antagonisms

proved stronger at this time than during opposition to colonial rule.

As rice production declined and competition grew fiercer from foreign textile producers, the socioeconomic situation of many Filipinos deteriorated due to foreign control over the import–export market. Many contradictions undermined the established order: between rich and poor, peasants and landlords, within the elite, between the *principales* and creoles, but also between the *peninsulares* and creoles, considered akin to the rebels in Latin America. Within the church, an equality movement was formed as native priests demanded that Filipinos join the clergy long dominated by the Spaniards. The authoritarian tightening of colonial administration provoked a brief mutiny in Cavite in 1872, after which three Filipino priests, Fathers José Burgos, Mariano Gomez, and Jacinto Zamora, were executed. The brutality with which a resulting minor revolt was crushed unified various components of the Philippine society, all the more so because one priest who had three-fourths Spanish blood was nevertheless considered an *indio* by the authorities.

The term “Filipino” was originally reserved for creoles or Spaniards born and residing in the Philippines, but its usage came to denote the social elite, including Chinese *mestizos* and the culturally Hispanicized urbanized natives.

Culture, Class, and Nation

The constitution of the international market, the evolution of the Philippine social formation, and the growing rejection of the colonial order fostered the assertion of a national conscience and a modern conception of a nation in the second half of the nineteenth century. The *ilustrados*, influenced by European liberalism and the ideals of the French Revolution, shaped its ideological formulation. Consequently, the dominant conception of the nation reflected their social status, not simply the cultural identity of the country. The paternalistic contempt for the people legitimized the domination of a class, but it also implied that the archipelago was not yet ready for independence. It announced many future compromises with the more “advanced” western powers.

The country's cultural identity was more profoundly marked by its colonial heritage than is usually the case in Asia, at least partly because of the lengthy colonial domination. The dances,

songs, poems, and popular legends of the Philippines reflect a Hispanic influence. An “imaginary” memory was established in which the history of the Spanish royalty intermingled with indigenous themes. The church contributed to this by translating into vernacular languages an edifying metropolitan literature. This mythical history fed on the stories of the European wars against the Moors, which had consequences on the relationship of Christianized Filipinos with the Muslims in the south.

This process of cultural integration permitted the creation of an original culture combining oriental and western (Spanish, then American – but also Arab) traditions. The “authentic” Filipino is the fruit of these successive blends.

The Revolution of 1896–1898

The revolution of 1896–8 resulted from the convergence of movements against colonial administration and against large landlords; thus it targeted the Spanish Catholic Church. The revolution simultaneously addressed the questions of independence, the republic, social justice, and the emergence of an indigenous church – within and without Catholicism.

The *ilustrados*, both in Spain and in the Philippines, launched in 1889 a magazine called *La Solidaridad*, through which the new propaganda movement made itself known. The latter did not question the colonial framework but fought for democratization. On July 2, 1892, La Liga Filipina was formed to enlarge the social base of the movement, demanding reforms. Four days later, José Rizal, the most well known among the founders of the Liga, was arrested and deported to Dapitan in the south of the archipelago. The Liga was dissolved, but gave birth to two organizations: the Cuerpo de Compromisarios with the affluent *ilustrados* supporting *La Solidaridad* on one side, and, on the other side, the Katipunan, which was a secret society established by militants, admittedly educated but from more modest origins, like Andres Bonifacio, a figurehead of the association. The members of the new intelligentsia were not necessarily rich. Marcelo H. del Pilar, who wrote in Tagalog and whose ideas, more radical than those of Rizal, influenced Bonifacio, died in a state of poverty in Spain in 1896.

The Katipunan fought for separation from Spain and not for a deeper assimilation. It

promoted peaceful agitation as well as armed revolution. It embodied the radicalization of a socially intermediary sector, exercising generally skilled or liberal professions, but peripheral to the elite. The Katipunan was sensitive to the indignity of the colonial condition and reacted against the opportunism of the wealthy and the class polarizations at work within the greater Philippine society itself.

The revolutionary movement focused its attention on eight Tagalog provinces of Luzon where the urban influence on the countryside was the strongest, and where the commercialization of agriculture and the concentration of land in the hands of the church were most advanced.

In August 1896, the colonial administration, which had learned of the existence of the Katipunan, launched a wave of arrests, which triggered the start of the revolt. The governor-general proclaimed a state of war, ordering the execution of detainees, including José Rizal, in spite of the fact that he had, from detention, repudiated the revolution. Rizal exemplified the reformist *ilustrados*, opposing the rationality of the Enlightenment in favor of the superstition of the people. He was nevertheless much respected before his death and considered a healer in the Tagalog regions. His assassination after a mock trial plunged the reformist policies of the elite into a dead end. The popular milieu, for their part, likened the execution to the martyrdom of Christ. The armed struggle spread rapidly to provinces throughout Luzon Island and some other islands.

Political and personal conflicts soon appeared within the revolutionary cadres. The influence of Andreas Bonifacio declined because of successive military defeats against colonial forces. The influence of Emilio Aguinaldo, son of an affluent Chinese *mestizo* family, was reinforced. Regionalism and provincialism contributed to the weakening of the revolutionary movement. The turning point came in early 1897. A government was established; led by Aguinaldo, it was composed of provincial dignitaries. Bonifacio, who refused to recognize it, was arrested, summarily tried, and executed. The leadership of the revolution fell under the control of the elites.

The Aguinaldo government led without glory. After new military defeats, he signed an agreement with the colonial powers denouncing as bandits those who had pursued the armed struggle. Later, Aguinaldo and his followers went

into exile in Hong Kong, where they pocketed 400,000 pesos as “indemnity” given by the Spanish government; 200,000 more pesos were given to the leaders of the Republic of Biakna-bato, which remained in the archipelago.

From One Enemy to Another

In spite of the assassination of Bonifacio, the crisis of Katipunan, and many self-proclaimed leaders’ desertions, the popular rebellion was revived in Luzon and other islands like Cebu and Panay. But the emergence of the United States as a new world power and the 1898 Spanish–American War radically changed the framework of the struggles.

In May of that year, American Marines destroyed a Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. Washington had already negotiated with the Hong Kong-based Filipino exiles who, on May 9, returned under their protection to Cavite. Five days later, Aguinaldo formed a new government and on June 12 proclaimed independence from Spain, placing the country under the protective umbrella of the United States. Through this proclamation, he succeeded in rallying local leaders of the resistance and presenting himself again as president.

The Philippine revolutionary forces easily won over the Spanish. The US immediately took control of the capital, with more than 10,000 expeditionary corps. Meanwhile, the Filipinos won battles in the Visayas, in the center of the archipelago, and in the Negros region Hispanophile landlords turned against their masters. On January 23, 1899, the first Republic of the Philippines was proclaimed. Still, two developments raised uncertainty over the success of the revolution. On social issues, the elite ascertained its control over the new regime: the land of the friars was seized – but was to be distributed to dignitaries and landowners rather than to the peasants who supported the war efforts. On the international front, secret negotiations between Madrid and Washington plotted the annexation of the country by the new imperialist power.

At the time of the Treaty of Paris, signed on December 10, 1898, Spain controlled only isolated positions in the Philippines – this fact did not keep it from selling a country that it no longer possessed. On December 21, President McKinley issued a proclamation of Benevolent Assimilation, commanding the expeditionary corps to conquer

the whole of the archipelago. In a move largely unexpected by the Philippine nationalist movement, Aguinaldo gave ambiguous instructions – to take up once more the struggle for independence, but prepare to accept an American protectorate or annexation if this objective seemed out of reach. The US opened hostilities on February 4, 1899. After two years of fighting, on March 23, 1901 its forces captured Aguinaldo, who on April 19 called an end to the armed resistance. The rallying of *ilustrados* for the new occupying forces increased, although the popular resistance continued. Those who were opposed to conciliation, like Apolinario Mabini – a former prime minister in the Philippine government – were cast aside, if not assassinated. Such was the destiny of General Antonio Luna, considered the best military leader of the revolution.

A Battle of Memory

Independence from Spain gave way to a new colonial order. It was defeat within victory. The first major revolutionary experience of the modern Philippines presents characteristics that will be again found in the future, every time such struggles gain ground. The central questions of degree of independence, who shall hold power, and who shall benefit from reforms, are interconnected. The class cleavage affirmed itself again and again within the anti-colonial movement. The propertied elites tended to compromise with the foreign power, particularly with the United States. The economic and military superiority of the US does not alone explain the outcome of the war. The divisions within the nationalist movement itself also played an important role.

History is written by the conqueror. In the pantheon of leaders of the anti-colonial movement, it is José Rizal who has officially been named the national hero. Surely, he was the subject of a truly popular cult. But he was also an emblematic figure acceptable to the propertied elite as well as to the new dominant power. For their part, the left and the labor movement celebrate Bonifacio Day every year on November 30. A century after, the revolution of 1896–8 and the war that followed remain the focus of a never-ending battle of memory.

SEE ALSO: Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897); Huk Rebellion, 1946–1954; Philippines, Protest during the

US Era; Philippines, Protests, 1950s–1970s; Philippines, Protests, 1980s–Present; Rizal, José (1861–1896)

References and Suggested Readings

- Agoncillo, T. A. & Guerrero, M. (1973) *History of the Filipino People*, 4th ed. Quezon City: R. P. Garcia.
- Ahmad, A. (2000) Class and Colony in Mindanao. In K. Gaerlan & M. Stankovitch (Eds.), *Rebels, Warlords, and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines*. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy.
- Constantino, R. (1975) *History of the Philippines: From the Spanish Colonization to the Second World War*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Fast, F. & Richardson, J. (1979) *Roots of Dependency: Political and Economic Revolution in 19th-Century Philippines*. Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies.
- Ileto, R. C. (1998) *Filipinos and their Revolution: Event, Discourse, and Historiography*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Rizal, J. (1887/1961) *Noli me tangere*. Trans. L. Ma Guerrero. London: Longman.
- Schirmer, D. B. & Shalom, S. R. (1987) *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance*. Boston: South End Press.
- Scott, W. H. (1974) *The Discovery of the Igorots: Spanish Contacts with the Pagans of Northern Luzon*, rev. ed. Quezon City: New Day.

Philippines, protest during the US era

Pierre Rousset

The United States ruled the Philippines for nearly 50 years from 1898 to 1946, one of the few American colonies. At the inception of the colonial era, for the US as for Spain, control of the Philippines was geographically and strategically linked to access to China and to the maritime commercial routes in the Pacific and Indian oceans. As the colonial status of the Philippine archipelago developed importance, the US government found itself in the contradictory position of responding to domestic economic interests seeking to open the region for capital investment and other economic sectors within the colony seeking protection from global markets. To consolidate control over the Philippines, the US engaged in military suppression of popular resistance, co-optation of social elites, and upon independence, providing ideological legitimacy for the new regime.

The US goal never sought to build a classical colonial empire but to create a new form of imperialism through modern economic and geopolitical domination. To ensure maintenance of the system, reformist elites in the Philippines and US found common ground for an orderly transition to independence instead of autonomy driven through national liberation. In December 1935, the US granted the Philippines commonwealth status, creating an institutional framework for granting full independence 11 years later in 1946: a process that radically influenced the course of national and social struggle in the archipelago.

Lasting less than 50 years, the American colonial period was a fraction of the more than 330 years of Spanish imperial control from 1565 to 1868, but it left a particularly profound and durable stigma on the Philippines.

The early twentieth century was dramatically different than the Spanish conquest, as American colonization was already confronted with a society of entrenched class inequality and class domination that it could subordinate to its political and economic needs. The US colonial government co-opted the traditional elites in the Philippines, even at the cost of perpetuating pre-capitalist, “feudal” forms of overexploitation of the popular majority. Concomitantly, the US opened the Philippines to the capitalist world market through modernizing the agricultural sectors on the southern island group of Mindanao for agribusiness and cash crops, radically transforming the status of much of the peasantry into a rural working class.

Under American control, the Philippines economy was restructured through replacing Spanish–European firms with their own corporations, creating a system of severe economic dependency on the US. As the plantation of cash crops expanded, the new “Manila-Americans” gained greater domination over agriculture and trade with the US, though not in manufacturing. In 1934, the US accounted for 65 percent of imports and 80 percent of exports. The Philippines became a major source of sugar, tobacco, hemp, coconut oil, and other agricultural goods and natural resources. Restrictions and quotas were imposed on Philippines commodities to protect American producers, but local production became dependent on the import of US manufactured goods and marginalized local production.

Under Spanish rule, the Catholic Church had been the principal factor in the pacification of Filipino society. Under US rule, the public school served as the most influential force in Americanizing the population, especially through English-language instruction. Spoken in public and official discourse, English eventually emerged as the primary language, facilitating the penetration of the new US colonial culture and displacing the memory of the Spanish past. Since English became the medium in education, business, and institutions, mastery of the language was necessary to advance in society. In 1911, English was adopted as the official language in courts of law.

Within the revolutionary and protest movements, the linguistic split was not easy to overcome between progressive intellectuals and the popular stratum.

Under American colonization, the separation of church and state became official and Protestantism penetrated the Philippines. However, Catholicism remained dominant, comprising 84 percent of all religious adherents in the early twentieth century, followed by other Protestant, Anglican, or independent Christian churches at 10 percent, Muslims at 5 percent, and animists at 1 percent.

To preserve itself from revolution, the Philippines Catholic Church actively intervened in support of the US conquest of the archipelago and in opposition to independence. In the 1930s, its most conservative sectors contributed to the foundation of the fascist movement of the *Phalanges*, composed mainly of Spaniards, Spanish *mestizos*, and members of the religious orders. Despite the official separation of church from state, religious institutions retained important political influence in Filipino society.

In 1916, the US replaced the Philippine Assembly with an American-style House of Representatives and Senate, elected through limited suffrage. While the democratic electoral tradition in the Philippines is deeply rooted, the system operates on the basis of formalisms that limit electoral participation to the elite, dominated by leading family clans. Far from reflecting genuine programmatic differences, party alliances and affiliations shift on the basis of power relationships and popular participation.

The American occupation forces opened the way to a triple process of colonization in the Muslim south: political and cultural subordina-

tion, appropriation of local agriculture and natural resources, and mass migration of Christian peasants from the northern and central island groups of the archipelago. With support from the US and the Philippine regime, Mindanao became an "internal" colony of settlement. The government used emigration to Mindanao as a means to reduce the agrarian economic crises in Luzon (northern) or the Visayas (central), making the Moro Muslim population a minority in their own region, outnumbered by Christian settlers and their descendants. The indigenous Lumad population now comprised a small minority of the population concentrated in the mountainous region of southern Mindanao. In the US colonial era, the conquerors and upper classes created a situation in which each of the three communities were forced to compete for control of territories and economic resources, creating the conditions of the conflict in the 1970s that culminated in mass bloodshed in the south of the archipelago.

The Emergence of New Popular Movements

No popular movements formed following the end of the Philippine–American War from 1899 to 1902 until the emergence of a diverse opposition in the 1920s. The movements of the 1920s revealed themselves through mystic secret societies and more open peasant associations and labor unions. While the desire for independence continued, the overriding mobilization emerged through efforts to improve conditions of life and work. Social movements directed their opposition against exploiters in peasant communities or industry, typically Filipino, rather than against US imperialism more generally. Through the formation of new left political parties, a link was established between social emancipation and national liberation.

In 1938, an estimated 3.5 million of approximately 4 million people were employed in the agricultural sector. Subsistence agriculture continued to decline and rice production fell, while sugar cane, coconut products, tobacco, abacá, and other export sectors grew dramatically. The process of land concentration continued in favor of haciendas and absentee landlords. In a growing number of plantations, paternalist forms of protection by landlords were less capable of mitigating relations of exploitation. Even independent

peasants became sharecroppers or agricultural laborers, trends that continued into the 1940s and 1950s, but which as early as the 1920s provoked a new wave of struggle in rural areas.

In many provinces, among the urban and rural poor, secret *Colorum* religious organizations influenced by syncretism, unifying Catholicism and local superstitious beliefs, became powerful forces of radical protest. For example, the *Colorum* revived the cult of José Rizal and Apo Ipe Salvador. Revolts broke out in 1923–4 at Surigao, Samar, Leyte, Agusan, Nueva Ecija, and elsewhere, and again in 1927 revolts spread to the Visayas. As many as 10,000 to 25,000 protesters joined the religious uprisings, but due to violent repression most movements did not survive the arrest or death of their charismatic leaders.

Protest movements were most politicized in Central Luzon, where the rate of tenancy was exceptionally high and proximity to Manila permitted numerous contacts with urban workers. Mutual aid societies were created but, because of the influence of political clientelism, peasant movements frequently split among supporters of the Nacionalista and Democrata parties.

The first Tenant Congress was held in the capital in 1922, marking the foundation of the National Confederation of Tenants and Farm Laborers of the Philippines (Katipunan ng mga Manggagawa sa Pilipinas). The second Tenant Congress, held in 1924, issued a call to the American progressive forces to assist the independence struggle. Jacinto Manahan was its president and Juan Felco vice-president. Manahan met Chinese communist leaders in Shanghai in 1927. A year later, the organization took the name of the National Confederation of Peasants of the Philippines (Katipunan Pambansa ng mga Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, KPMP), affiliated with the Christentern or Peasant International. However, in 1930 the main organization remained the National Peasants' Union (Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid, PKM). The PKM assisted members in obtaining bank credits to purchase plantation land to sell back plots at low prices to tenants. This organization sought to "humanize" the relationships between owners and tenants of the land.

Labor Unions

The first non-religious labor unions were founded by the *ilustrados* to pursue the nationalist propa-

ganda of reforming capital–labor relationships, promoting mutual assistance, and fulfilling tasks of civic education. In 1902 Isabelo de los Reyes, which soon changed its name to Union Obrera Democratica (UOD), then Union del Trabajo de Filipina, pursued a course of class accommodation before dissolving in 1907, making way for organizations that were influenced by European socialist and anarchist currents.

The class character of militant unions strengthened progressively in the early twentieth century. In 1906 the Union of Ipresores de Filipinas (a split-off from the UOD) adopted the slogan: "The emancipation of the workers shall be realized by the workers themselves." Felipe Mendoza was president and Cristo Evangelista secretary general. In 1907 the unions prohibited employers from being members. But independence did not yet assume a political nature, and union leaders continued to support one of the major large Filipino clientelist parties.

During World War I, as industrial production advanced, unions gained a degree of power. In 1913, the Congress Obrero de Filipina (COF) was established and May 1 was officially celebrated for the first time. COF demanded legislation for the eight-hour workday, protection of women and children, and employers' liability for injuries. In 1917, the union was split again over support for Nationalists or Democrats.

While the broader labor movement was divided, tethered to the major parties and often corrupt, a left tendency nevertheless asserted itself. Cristo Evangelista, a unionist since 1906, founder of COF, and a middle-ranking cadre in the Nacionalista Party, was radicalized after a trip to Washington, DC in 1919 on the occasion of an independence mission. In 1924, Evangelista created the Workers' Party of the Philippines (Partido Obrero de Filipinas) with Cirilo Bognot. In 1927 COF affiliated with the Red International of Labor Unions in Moscow. During the return trip, Evangelista and Bognot met the Chinese communist leader Zhou Enlai in Shanghai.

In 1929, Evangelista split with COF, founding the Congreso Obrero de Filipinas (Proletariat), known also as KAP (Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis ng Filipinas). Under Evangelista as first executive secretary and Jacinto Manahan as vice-president, KAP sought to unify urban and rural workers, advance social progress, national independence, internationalism, and a government

of the people, and establish a Soviet system in the Philippines.

Birth of the Communist Movement and Social Struggles

The communist movement of the Philippines was not an artificial creation, although it was not widespread in the country. Communists were rooted in the authentic radicalization of popular forces. By 1924, Marxist influences were already prominent in the Workers' Party of the Philippines, a precursor of the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP). The PKP was officially proclaimed on November 7, 1930. Most officers of the KAP became central committee members. KAP quickly faced repression, especially following a wave of strikes in Negros Occidental and Iloilo. One of the leaders, Antonio Ora, died in a car accident after being arrested in dubious circumstances. More than 10,000 people demonstrated in protest on January 25, 1931. In February the members of KAP were victimized by a new wave of arrests and condemnations for sedition, and subsequently the party was declared illegal. The majority of communist leaders were liberated in December 1936 and PKP began again to function legally in October 1937, running two candidates for election.

The Socialist Party (PS) was also founded in 1929 by Pedro Abad Santos, son of a landowner from Central Luzon. Santos participated in the resistance against the American conquest, was arrested, and was liberated in 1902. In 1917 Santos was elected to the Philippine Assembly. Santos was quite popular in the peasantry through his blend of radical and realist traditions. In 1938, when the Socialist Party merged with PKP, Santos became vice-chairman. At the end of 1940, he led or influenced around 40 militant workers and peasant organizations, including the General Workers' Union (AMT), Philippine Confederation of Peasants (KPMP), and KAP, totaling no fewer than 200,000 members. Rooted essentially in Central Luzon and the capital, it was still far from reaching a national scale. On an organizational level, the merger between PS and PKP allied two very different traditions.

Other progressive political currents had a larger influence in the 1930s than the communists, in particular the Sakdalistes of Benigno Ramos, with a radical anti-colonial program that was critical of the educational system and opposed to US

military bases and US control of the Philippines economy. Sakdalistes won important electoral victories, politicizing popular peasant and working-class sentiment. But Ramos eventually broke with his radical base and the movement was short-lived. However, the PKP is historically the most significant revolutionary movement of the 1930s.

Popular struggles developed during the years that followed the world economic crisis of 1929. On May 1, 1935, 30,000 workers demonstrated for the Republic of Soviets. However, these struggles were often led by semi-religious and messianic movements, or otherwise led on a purely economic program. The crushing of strikes could provoke cases of armed resistance, with urban cadres having to flee into the mountains, as Teodoro Asedillo had done; he was killed in 1935. Growing sectors of the peasantry were demanding the distribution of land, and the organization of agricultural workers spread in the plantations.

The Philippine president, Manuel Quezon, responded to social agitation by adopting a Social Justice Program, with reference to the American New Deal of Roosevelt, leading to greater freedom of association for labor unions. Otherwise, as in the past, the powerful provincial families blocked the implementation of progressive laws. The landlords had independent private armies and links within the police and judiciary. Conflicts led sometimes, as in 1940 in Central Luzon, to triangular tension between the socialist-communist left, political forces favorable to Quezon, and the hard-line right-wing sectors of the church, Phalanges, and wealthy members of the dominant classes.

World War II

During World War II, Philippine progressive organizations tested the limits of the diverse national liberation movement for independence. Although incapable of protecting the archipelago, the prestige of the US, and in particular General Douglas MacArthur, was enhanced by Japanese occupation. In the Philippine national movement as a whole, the position of those passively waiting for independence to be granted (in 1946) was strengthened. The communist movement was forced to respond to the radicalism of the social struggles in its Central Luzon strongholds as it simultaneously sought to implement a United Front policy with Moscow.

The Philippine pre-war government was allied to the US, but after the defeat at the hands of Japan, many dignitaries of the Commonwealth and members of the elite sided with the Japanese administration for tactical or more complicated reasons. The Catholic Church did not oppose Tokyo, with whom the Vatican was on friendly terms, while the Protestant churches of American origin were suppressed. Japan was thus positioned to rapidly create a Philippine Executive Commission and proclaim the Republic in October 1943. Japan favored the development of Tagalog literature and secondary education.

Even before the Pacific War broke out, the Spanish embassy played the role of agent for the Axis forces, in liaison with Philippine Phalangists. Thus the extreme right, including its (semi-)fascist wing, had roots in the archipelago, and as in other Asian countries, some nationalists turned to Tokyo. However, as a whole, the population rejected Japanese occupation and its violence, repression, exploitation, and cultural shock. Most Filipinos sympathized more with the US, considering themselves superior to the Japanese, and resisted the Pan-Asian nationalist ideologies.

The Japanese invasion of December 1941, the Battle of Bataan, and the Death March that followed provoked a strong emotional identification of Filipinos with Americans. In many Asian countries, the western defeats against the Japanese (since 1905) weakened the prestige of the imperialist metropolis, reinforcing revolutionary nationalisms. Despite strong nationalist sentiment in the Philippines, World War II refocused attention away from restoration of a radical national conscience.

In 1941, the merged Communist and Socialist parties (PKP-SP) formed a popular front with trade unions and left peasant organizations, the Aglipayan Church (independent Catholics), and professionals. Moscow was then allied with the US. Consequently, the PKP projected a policy of a larger anti-fascist front. In December 1941, it issued a declaration claiming its loyalty toward the Commonwealth and Washington in the name of anti-Japanese national union. But simultaneously it announced the will to organize its own guerilla forces and its liberated zones.

In fact, the policy of anti-Japanese national union could never become concrete. The American command, which had the upper hand against the Philippine resistance, never considered the

Communist Party and its networks as allies. No other significant guerilla force cooperated politically with those of the PKP.

The Birth of the Huks

The main leaders of the merged party, Evangelista and Abad Santos, were arrested by the Japanese in January 1942. The former was executed and the latter died in a guerilla zone in 1943, soon after his liberation. That did not stop the creation of the People's Anti-Japanese Army in Central Luzon, the Hukbo ng bayan Laban sa Hapon, better known under the acronym Hukbalahap or Huks for short. The Huks were officially formed on March 29, 1942 from armed groups operating in the provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan, and Nueva Ecija. Its military committee was composed of Luis Tarac (chairman), Casto Alejandro (vice-chairman), Felipa Culala (Dayang-Dayang), Bernado Poblete (Banal) as members, with Mateo del Catillo as political advisor.

Two main documents were embraced: "The Fundamental Spirit" (guiding principles) and "The Iron Discipline" (duties and privileges of a Huk soldier). Equality between officers and soldiers was proclaimed, and the link with and respect of the population were considered absolutely compulsory. The implementation of such principles was not automatic – Felipa Culala (Dayang-Dayang) was executed for corruption and robbery, and recruitment was sometimes too rapid to assure the quality of members. The Huks published a clandestine weekly called *Katubusan ng Bayan* (Redemption of the People), and theatrical groups helped build political consciousness. Self-defense units, local government bodies (in the villages, the town, and up to the provincial level), and a judiciary system were established. The Chinese Communist Party was a model for the Huks (one of their military units was composed of Chinese living in the Philippines).

The problem remained how to reconcile class struggles in Central Luzon's countryside and the policy of a united front against Japan. According to the official line, it meant attacking landlords collaborating with Japan while proposing an alliance with the others. Likewise, the Huks renounced the creation of a central popular government, but preserved their independence of action in the regions under their control. The pressure of a radical trend was felt in Central Luzon's strongholds, where peasants and local

military units often refused to renounce their social objectives in the name of national union. However, the situation remained much less tense in most other regions. As long as the occupation persisted, the leadership of PKP and the Huks kept these contradictions under control. However, it did not prepare itself politically for the new conflicts that emerged after victory, and which were in fact already shaping in early 1945: clashes became frequent between the Huks and the guerilla units linked to the command of MacArthur, which wanted to take control right away of “communist” territories.

Aftermath of the War

The Hukbalahap movement was an exception as a protest movement in the archipelago and Filipino resistance to Japanese occupation was mostly passive. Except for rare cases, the other guerilla groups linked to MacArthur’s command entered effectively into action only at the time of the American reconquest: the US forces landed on the island of Leyte in October 1944 and triumphantly entered Manila on February 3, 1945, in an atmosphere of exaltation and rejoicing, even in Central Luzon.

It seems that then the PKP leadership really hoped that the Hukbalahap and the party would be integrated into the political life of the country. It adopted a program that was radically anti-fascist and anti-collaborationist, but otherwise moderate. It presented itself as a popular pressure group. To manifest its goodwill, it handed over to the US command a list of guerilla members. Faced with the intransigence of MacArthur, it placed its hopes on Roosevelt. Nothing happened. In the name of the “communist danger,” a huge bloc of established interests opposed the PKP, including the American military services, the upper classes of Luzon, the police constabulary and guerilla forces, former collaborators, and the elites that Washington wanted to spare to prepare independence.

In January 1945, Huk units, having accepted disarmament after the arrival of Americans in their region, were massacred. National leaders like Luis Taruc were arrested and detained several times. The PKP retorted by organizing mass demonstrations, then by creating a Democratic Alliance with other small groups. But the repression in Central Luzon intensified, and civil war erupted in 1946.

Independence

While the US administration refused any compromise with the Hukbalahap and the PKP, it was quick to support Filipino elites who collaborated with Japan. Thus MacArthur chose Manuel Roxas, a former minister in Salvador Laurel’s pro-Japan government, as first president of an independent Philippines. Washington preferred restoration to revolution and primarily sought an indefectible ally to negotiate conditions of independence. The Bell Trade Act guaranteed the maintenance of quotas protecting the agricultural sector in the US, fixed a favorable exchange rate between the peso and the dollar, and granted US citizens and firms equal rights as Filipinos in the exploitation of natural resources. The Military Base Agreement gave the US the freedom to use 23 sites for its military for 99 years.

With the support of MacArthur, Roxas won the legislative elections of April 28, 1946 and became president, with the proclamation of independence on July 4. He knew how to show his gratitude. In a speech at the American National Congress he declared that Filipinos were not “from the East apart from geography. We belong to the Western World by reason of culture, of religion, of ideology, and of economy. Although the color of our skin is brown, the temperament of our spirit and hearts are nearly identical to yours. . . . You have within us a partner of your political and economic system – a radio station broadcasting Americanism.”

Is it possible to imagine a Thai prime minister or an Indonesian general making a declaration so degrading for the national identity? This speaks volumes for the degree of “Americanization” of the Philippine elites.

SEE ALSO: Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897); Huk Rebellion, 1946–1954; Philippines, Colonial Protests during the Spanish Era; Philippines, Protests, 1950s–1970s; Philippines, Protests, 1980s–Present; Rizal, José (1861–1896)

References and Suggested Readings

- Abaya, H. J. (1970) *Betrayal in the Philippines*. New York: A. A. Wyn.
- Agoncillo, T. A. & Guerrero, M. (1973) *History of the Filipino People*, 4th ed. Quezon City: R. P. Garcia.
- Ahmad, A. (2000) Class and Colony in Mindanao. In K. Gaerlan & M. Stankovitch (Eds.), *Rebels, Warlords, and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines*. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy.

- Aluit, A. J. (1995) *By Sword and Fire: The Destruction of Manila in World War II, 3 February–3 March 1945*. Makati (Metro Manila): Bookmark.
- Constantino, R. (1975) *History of the Philippines: From the Spanish Colonization to the Second World War*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Constantino, R. (1978) *Neocolonial Identity and Counter Consciousness: Essays on Cultural Decolonization*. London: Merlin Press.
- George, T. J. S. (1980) *Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Go, J. & Foster, A. L. (Eds.) (2003) *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Gowing, P. G. (1983) *Mandae in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos 1899–1920*. Quezon City: New Day Publisher.
- Ileto, R. C. (1998) *Filipinos and their Revolution: Event, Discourse, and Historiography*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- McCoy, A. (Ed.) (1994) *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- San Juan, Jr., E. (1988) *Only by Struggle*. Quezon City: Kalikasan Press.
- Schirmer, D. B. & Shalom, S. R. (1987) *The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance*. Boston: South End Press.
- Yu, R. & Bolasco, M. (1981) *Church–State Relations*. Manila: St. Scholastica's College.

Philippines, protests, 1950s–1970s

Pierre Rousset

After the defeat of the Huk's revolutionary struggle in the Philippines, progressive politics focused on the moderate nationalism of Claro M. Recto. However, in the late 1960s, with a new wave of youth radicalization, communist groups took back the political initiative, before they split sharply over the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Nationalism of Claro M. Recto

In the 1950s a moderate, unstructured, nationalist movement formed around the lawyer Carlo M. Recto and progressively radicalized. He introduced a critical vision of the subordination of the Philippines vis-à-vis the United States beyond the groups traditionally influenced by the left. He adopted the theme cherished by

Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru – “Asia for the Asians” – identifying internationally with the non-aligned camp. Recto entered into conflict with the Catholic Church when he urged that the works of Jose Rizal (which contained attacks against the friars) be part of the compulsory syllabus of universities and colleges.

In a time of repression, Recto helped create a space within which social resistance could be expressed. Nevertheless, radical unions such as the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) suffered when conditions were created to favor a unionism of class collaboration with the adoption of the Minimum Wage Act in 1951, the Industrial Peace Act in 1954, and procedures of collective bargaining centered on enterprise. A Jesuit, Father Walter Hogan, initiated the constitution of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) in 1950 and the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) in 1953. With the help of American institutions, the Asian Labor Education Center (University of the Philippines) was founded in 1954, and later the Institute of Social Order (Ateneo de Manila University).

In September 1954 the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was signed in Manila. The Philippines and Thailand were the only founding members from the region of SEATO. Recto abstained on this issue in the Senate. He opposed sending troops to Vietnam and denounced, in the Philippines, the extraterritorial *de facto* right benefiting the Americans.

During the presidency of Carlo P. Garcia (elected in 1957 after the accidental death of Magsaysay), the Philippine capital was able to consolidate in various sectors like pharmacy, food, and wood. However, in 1961, Diosdado Macapagal became president. He attacked the nationalist legacy of Recto and Garcia. He announced the restoration of free enterprise, reestablished good relations with the United States, and ended protectionist measures. It was the start of “dependant industrialization” under the tutelage of the IMF and World Bank. At the same time, in order to reduce social tensions, Macapagal launched an agrarian reform program: it included progressive measures, but also many exemptions, legal loopholes, and lack of financing, which considerably reduced its significance. The political impact of this program was nevertheless felt. Without a sufficiently solid

popular base, the nationalist current of Claro M. Recto was unable to pass the test.

Birth of New Militant Organizations

The American hold over the Philippines, the social upheavals provoked by capitalist development, and the direct implication of the country in the Indochina war gave way to a new wave of radicalism with a strong anti-imperialist character. Beginning in the 1960s, new militant organizations emerged in all the main social sectors: wage earners, peasants, and youth (not only student youth). They denounced American imperialism. They closely linked national and social issues. They combined cultural nationalism (the difficult search for Philippine identity), political nationalism (against foreign interference), and popular nationalism (mass struggles were considered a prerequisite to the creation of a relationship of forces favorable to liberation). Revolutionary nationalism was seen as a field where unity between movements and sectors could be achieved.

With the revival of communist influence, an intense political conflict developed within the left around three emblematic personalities: Jose Lava (who was freed from jail in 1970) of the PKP (Filipino Communist Party), Luis Taruc (freed in 1968) – who then identified with social Christianity – and a young newcomer, Jose Maria Sison, who was born in 1939 and quickly appeared as one of the main figures of the 1960s militant generation. The adoption by Luis Taruc, and later by Jose Lava, of the “peaceful” or “parliamentary” road was initially a tactical answer to the decline and defeat of armed struggle. The evolution of the international situation helped give a more general ideological content to this political choice. The bloody repression in 1965–6 of the Indonesian Communist Party and of all progressive movements had a deep impact in the Philippine left, not only because of the geographical proximity of the two archipelagos, but also because the PKI had been a key reference for the militants. The Indonesian bloodbath contributed to the demoralization of former PKP leaders, while it convinced many revolted youngsters of the absurdity of peaceful means.

Significant developments occurred in the labor and peasant movements. However, contrary to

the political passivity of students in the 1950s, youth were a key element of the radicalization of the 1960s and early 1970s. Mobilizations began in the University of the Philippines (UP) on the occasion of a nationalist and anti-clerical campaign. New militant organizations were created during this whole decade. At first, they often embodied all the components of the Philippine left, which was then in contact with its radical counterpart in Europe and the United States. More than in the past, it was a pluralist left, with the presence of anti-Stalinist Marxists or Christian socialists.

The PKP – the “old” Communist Party – was hoping to take advantage of this militant revival to reorganize itself, but part of its youth sector, led by Jose Maria Sison, split off. The principal confrontation was then the Kabataan Makabayan (KM, Patriotic Youth) of Sison and the Samahan ng Demokratikong Kabataan (SDK, Union of Democratic Youth) of Sixto Carlos on one side, and the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino (MPKP, Free Association of Filipino Youth) and the Bertrand Russell Foundation (Philippine Council), with Francisco Nemenzo Jr. as chairman, on the other.

Ideological confrontation was progressively framed by the Sino-Soviet conflict: the PKP eventually joined the pro-Moscow camp, while Jose Maria Sison won over the radical left to Maoism. In 1968 his new party was officially founded on Mao Zedong’s birthday (December 26). Its full name was Communist Party of the Philippines Marxist-Leninist Mao Tsetung Thought (CPP-MLMTT). To differentiate it from the “former” Communist Party – PKP in Tagalog – it is known under the English initials of CPP. Beginning in 1969, Bernabe Buscayno brought to the CPP a group of young Huks of the second generation.

From FQS to Martial Law

Two years after the French May ’68 events and the uprisings on US and Mexican campuses, the student struggle took a radical turn in the Philippines. A rally was brutally suppressed on January 26, 1970. On January 30 four students were killed and many more wounded during a demonstration: the Battle of Mendiola (from the name of the bridge leading to Malacanang Palace, the presidential palace) initiated three months of occupation of campuses and repeated

demonstrations with tens of thousands of militants – three months of intense mobilization known in the history of the archipelago as the First Quarter Storm (FQS).

The student struggles knew other high points, like the Diliman Commune, a one-week occupation of the campus of the University of Philippines in Quezon City, in February 1971. The KM attracted student radicalism, but it also oriented it outside the university. It enjoined students to go to the masses, to learn from them and to prepare for a rural armed struggle. This did not constitute an option for the student movement as a whole. The FQS was thus followed by a period of stagnation during which the radical left lost numerous positions in university elections. The movement represented by Sison was on the rise, but political space still remained open to other trends on the left.

Everything changed on September 21, 1972. Already elected twice, Ferdinand Marcos should have given way to another presidential candidate: the Philippine constitution did not allow a president to present himself for a third consecutive mandate. To stay in power, he chose to impose martial law. Thus, he opened a new chapter in the history of the country and of the popular struggles.

SEE ALSO: Huk Rebellion, 1946–1954; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Philippines, Colonial Protests during the Spanish Era; Philippines, Protest during the US Era

References and Suggested Readings

- Agoncillo, T. A. & Guerrero, M. (1973) *History of the Filipino People*. Quezon City: R. P. Garcia.
- Constantin, R. (1965) *The Recto Reader: Excerpts from the Speeches of Claro M. Recto*. Manila: Recto Memorial Foundation.
- Constantin, R. & Constantino, L. R. (1978) *The Philippines: The Continuing Past*. Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies.
- Lacaba, J. F. (1986) *Days of Disquiet, Nights of Rage: The First Quarter Storm and Related Events*. Manila: Asphodel Books.
- McCoy, A. W. & De Jesus, E. C. (Eds.) (1982) *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations*. ASAA Southeast Asia Publication Series. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- San Juan, E., Jr. (1988) *Only by Struggle*. Quezon City: Kalikasan Press.
- Schirmer, D. B. & Shalom, S. R. (1987) *The Philippines Reader. A History of Colonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance*. Boston: South End Press.

Philippines, protests, 1980s–present

Pierre Rousset

Martial Law Regime

The imposition of martial law in the Philippines on September 21, 1972 had very deep consequences quite different from those foreseen by its promoters. Far from being a one-off measure, it was lifted formally only in 1981 – and only after the 1986 February Revolution brought to an end more than 13 years of what opponents called the “Marcos dictatorship.”

The purpose of martial law was not initially to implement a policy of counterinsurgency. No revolutionary movement seriously threatened the established order. It aimed at more specific goals: to stop social radicalization and prevent the left from reorganizing after the failure of the Huks, to ensure that no disturbances interfered with the renegotiation of the agreement for US military bases on the archipelago. Washington was particularly concerned that nationalist pressure was making itself felt in institutions, far beyond anti-imperialist circles. Senator José Diokno was leading an investigation into the operations of oil multinationals and the Supreme Court was facing up to the American business lobby. Everything had to be done to ensure that the Philippines remained one of the main pillars of the US security system in Asia.

In the longer term, the US wanted the martial law regime to create a strong, centralized state as a means to “modernize” the country – to end the fragmentation of power between the state and provincial political families and their private armies. The duly reinforced government army was one of the key elements of this policy of “nation building.” Ferdinand Marcos seemed to Washington to be the man for the job. Already elected president in 1965 with support from Washington and reelected in 1969 in a violent and fraudulent election, he was no longer eligible to run for the presidency, since the constitution only allowed two successive terms. Under martial law, Marcos could remain in power and the suspension of civil liberties would give him a free hand.

However, the US strategy of “modernization” of the Philippines was flawed from the outset,

relying as it did on the Marcos clan which, during a seven-year presidency, had developed an efficient clientelist network. With the proclamation of martial law, Marcos was quick to privatize the public treasury and the national state to his and his cronies' advantage. By way of modernization, Ferdinand Marcos and his wife Imelda imposed a "conjugal dictatorship," perhaps the most corrupt and nepotistic regime ever in the Philippines.

The imposition of martial law represented a major turning point for the archipelago, placing the army at the heart of the political regime. Within the social elite, martial law upset relationships among oligarchic families, while conditions for leftist activity were radically altered. Minority populations were prompted into armed resistance. All sectors of the opposition were affected by a wave of repression. Thousands of opponents and activists were arrested and torture against detainees was widespread. Congress was closed, the media were censored, and judges were forced to hand over undated letters of resignation to the president.

War in the South

The south of the archipelago, inhabited by the Moros (Muslims), was considered by the government in Manila as an economic frontier to be taken over. The Philippine state had never recognized the Moros' or Lumads' (non-Muslim hill tribes) ancestral domains. Marcos issued a ruling that almost 90 percent of property in the south was "public," and therefore could be allocated as he saw fit. The internal colonization of Mindanao by mostly Christian peasants was encouraged to reduce the agrarian crisis in the center and north of the country while marginalizing the Moros, who ultimately found themselves a minority in their own land. Powerful Philippine families and US or Japanese multinationals created vast fruit plantations, developed mining activities, or freely logged forests.

Richly endowed with natural resources, Mindanao provided an increasing share of exports, including fruit, coconut, and wood. But the local population had not benefited from this economic boom. Poor peasants who settled in the promised land of Mindanao generally remained poor, while rich Filipinos and foreigners investing in the island became richer. However, the policy of internal colonization gave an interconfessional

and intercommunity twist to the many agrarian and territorial conflicts. The Philippine establishment denigrated Moro culture, while Christian missionaries became active. Moros and Lumads were oppressed and exploited, enduring extreme poverty, illiteracy, lack of health care, and shortened life expectancy and facing numerous armed attacks to drive them from their lands.

Territorial dispossession and cultural or religious oppression sparked a revival of armed resistance, and in the late 1960s Moro nationalism began to assert itself. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed in 1972, the year Marcos declared martial law, receiving international support in Malaysia and Libya among other Muslim countries. The MNLF managed to recruit up to 30,000 combatants. The bulk of the Philippine army was mobilized against it and war raged from 1972 to 1976, with later periods of negotiations interspersed with fighting.

The Left: Baptism of Fire

The martial law regime ruthlessly suppressed the left, including the Philippine Communist Party (PKP). The dictatorship physically eliminated PKP cadres that opposed the government, while few members within academia retained influence in theoretical debates. While the PKP maintained international links with the pro-Moscow communist parties worldwide, in the Philippines it ceased to be an active component of the left.

Leaders of the PKP, like Francisco Nemenzo, and rural units of the party (in Central Luzon) that refused to surrender were unable to rebuild a significant organization. This was also true for Christian Socialists and independent Marxist intellectuals. Many leftist organizations disintegrated, including a small Trotskyist group, or were paralyzed, while the social democrats (SDs) in the Philippines remained bound to the Jesuits.

National Democratic Movement

The national democratic movement was politically in a better position. Structured by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), from the start it sought to initiate armed struggle.

Only 14 delegates participated in the CPP Congress, which had only 20 or so founding members and some 75 close sympathizers. The New

People's Army (NPA) was formally established in March 1969 with about 65 members, equipped with 35 firearms (including only nine automatic rifles). But the new party was a promising starting point. The chairman, José Maria "Joma" Sison, alias Amado Guerrero, was a figurehead for radicalized youth who identified with Maoism in the late 1960s. He was joined by Sixto Carlos (from the Union of Democratic Youth, SDK) and Rodolpho "Rudy" Salas (aka Bilog).

To a large extent the CPP was the product of a fusion between José Maria Sison and the insurgency organizations of Bernabe Buscayno (*Kumander Dante*), who had headed an armed group in the peasant uprising of the 1940s and 1950s and then a group of second-generation Huks who had severed links with the PKP – the "old" Communist Party. Buscayno offered the new party military experience and roots in rural Central Luzon. He became commander in chief of the NPA, while Sison was head of the party military commission. In 1970, a group of young army officers led by Victor Corpuz rallied the movement. Four years after its inception in 1972, the "new" Communist Party had 2,000 underground activists, often living in slums and villages.

The National Democratic Front (NDF) was established in April 1973, using the shock of martial law to convince various organizations and personalities to join the movement. In 1977, Horacio "Boy" Morales, the executive vice-president of the Development Academy of the Philippines, made front page news when he announced that he had joined the underground.

Christians for National Liberation

Father Ed de la Torre favored a theology of struggle and in February 1972 founded Christians for National Liberation (CNL). CNL members were essential participants in the national democratic movement, both in public life and underground. Philippines communism included secular, atheist, and anti-clerical tendencies. Before martial law, Sison's *Kabataang Makabayan* (Nationalist Youth) had fought in the universities against the Catholic student movement led by Christian Social Democrats. However, in their mass activism – among workers, villagers, and poor urban communities – communists worked with priests, seminarians, and religious activists who rejected the dictatorship. By linking with religious groups, the CPP strengthened its roots and recruited new cadres.

CNL's relationship with the NDF was, however, ambivalent. From the outset CNL provided the NDF with a broader basis than either the CPP or the NPA. Pushed underground by the dictatorship, CNL was logistically dependent on the Communist Party, which never allowed the Front to develop an independent national structure.

Failure of the Philippine "Yan'an"

Less than four years after its foundation, the CPP needed to expand under a harsh dictatorial regime, an arduous task. From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, the CPP took the momentous decision to concentrate on building up a few stable NPA base areas in Central and Northern Luzon, most significantly in the provinces of Tarlac, Isabela, and Bicol. These isolated revolutionary groups were brutally suppressed by the government army and most of the NPA survivors sought refuge in the cities.

The CPP wanted to create a Philippine "Yan'an," referring to the base area where Mao's Red Army had settled after the legendary Long March. It was a misinterpretation of the Chinese experience: the Red Army had been born out of mass revolutionary uprisings and the Long March was a forced retreat rather than a free choice. Joma Sison had unsuccessfully sought to reproduce a strategic Chinese model in the Philippines. His response to this failure was *Specific Characteristics of Our People's War* (1974), which took into account the peculiarities of the Philippines experience. Focusing mainly on geographic data (the fact that the Philippines was a mountainous archipelago) and the fact that it was dominated by US imperialism, he concluded that the armed struggle had to begin simultaneously in various parts of the territory to disperse enemy forces from the beginning. The updating of the CPP's strategy continued with the adoption by its Central Committee of a resolution, *Our Urgent Tasks* (1976), stressing the need to undertake mass action in all popular sectors and give greater importance to semi-legal and urban activities.

The reorientation of the mid-1970s was only partial as the party's ideology remained a version of Maoism from the period of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Joma Sison adhered to a simplified vision of the history of the Chinese Communist Party, often far removed from reality. He did not seek to assimilate the experience of

other liberation struggles (in Vietnam, Cuba, or elsewhere) and blurred the originality of the Philippines social formation by defining it as “semi-feudal” or “semi-colonial” without using the word “capitalist.” Sison’s 1970 book *Philippine Society and Revolution* remained the party’s Bible, which stressed the primacy of rural work and the armed struggle.

However, the mid-1970s reorientation (and the great courage of the national democratic activists) was sufficient for the CPP to regain the initiative. Its timing was appropriate. After several years of inactivity, social struggles resumed while the bulk of the government army remained entrenched against the MNLF in the south of the archipelago. In October 1975, a strike by 5,000 workers at La Tondeña distillery in Manila opened a brief period of workers’ struggles.

Armed Struggle and Social Resistance

The early years of martial law proved difficult for the Communist Party. After the destruction of the initial guerilla units, the bulk of the leadership was arrested in 1976–7, including José Maria Sison, his wife Juliet, and Bernabe Buscayno. Nevertheless, the party redeployed its forces, expanding its social base and creating guerilla fronts in a growing number of islands. In 1980 social protests erupted again in factories and slums, which helped the CPP to strengthen its semi-legal networks, its trade union influence, and its community organizing among the urban poor fighting eviction, such as in the giant slum Zone One Tondo (ZOTO). Thus the CPP was able to promote the creation of new sectoral popular organizations, sometimes national in scope.

The Philippine agrarian structure remained highly diverse. In the mid-1980s about 10 million people were employed in agriculture, of whom 15 percent had a land title, 15 percent tilled public sector land and did not have a land title, 20 percent rented their land from landowners, and 50 percent were permanent or seasonal agricultural workers. While unreliable, these statistics give an idea of the nature of rural labor, although they conceal the complexity of the relationships of domination. For example, a small farmer under contract to a multinational company might be in a state of dependence worthy of a landless peasant, while a farm worker subjected to exploitation and hunger might aspire

to become a farmer. The situation was different where the capitalist market had grown widely, as in Luzon, and where, as in the particularly poor island of Samar, agricultural self-sufficiency and traditional village structures were still important.

The peasantry was usually directly organized by the NPA around a gradual land reform program. In large plantations, however, the CPP supported the creation of unions. Thus, in the same region and in the same economic sector, producers could be organized differently. For example in Negros, small sugar cane producers living on the mountain slopes were under the NPA while workers in large plantations were organized by the National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW).

The Communist Party adapted to local conditions. The perspective of overthrowing the Marcos dictatorship through armed struggle gave a common purpose to urban and rural organizing in the various social sectors and islands. Because of the primacy of armed struggle, the CPP sometimes radicalized workers’ strikes to the point that union activists had to go into hiding to escape repression. By joining the NPA, the CPP contributed, in the words of the party, to the “proletarianization” of the guerillas. The CPP’s policy provoked tensions among trade unionists seeking to consolidate their social base in the factories. However, the May First Movement (Kilusang Mayo Uno, KMU) was founded in 1980 to defend class struggle unionism against the official Philippine labor confederation, the TUCP, which collaborated with the dictatorship although it was recognized internationally by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

The legal component of the national democratic movement grew considerably during the first half of 1980. The women’s umbrella organization GABRIELA was created in 1984, and in 1985 the Peasant Movement of the Philippines (Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, KMP). The multi-sectoral coalition Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (New Patriotic Alliance) – Bayan for short (a Tagalog word meaning both nation and people) – brought together all the organizations identified with the national democratic bloc, as well as a few others, including the League of Filipino Students (LFS), the Medical Action Group (MAG), and the Alliance for Concerned Teachers (ACT).

The underground component of the movement also strengthened significantly. According to the

CPP publication *Ang Bayan*, the party had 10,000 members in 1980 and around 30,000 in 1983. The number of military fronts increased from 28 to 45, the number of rifles from 4,000 to 10,000, the number of full- and part-time NPAs from 8,000 to 20,000, and the number of provinces where guerrillas operated from 43 to 53.

The Decisive Years: 1983–1987

In the early 1980s, the dictatorship was clearly in crisis. In the aftermath of World War II, the Philippines had been seen as the best-placed Southeast Asian country in the race for development. It was now the poor man of the region – and the only one where a communist guerilla was growing. The Marcos dictatorship was not the only culprit in this failure: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank were clearly implicated as well. The authority of the regime and of the international financial institutions declined, while contradictions within the ruling class became more acute.

It was at this point that Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino decided to return to the Philippines. A key figure of the moderate bourgeois opposition, he represented a major clan that had been excluded from power by the dictatorship. He was murdered on August 21, 1983 on the tarmac of Manila international airport, which now bears his name. For all sectors of the opposition, this assassination represented a declaration of war, signaling that the Marcos regime was not ready for any concessions.

Mobilizations against the dictatorship rose rapidly. The urban middle classes took to the streets in their thousands. Sectors of the Philippine left that had been marginalized as a result of martial law found a new political space. Contacts were established between a Christian Socialist movement represented by Ronald Llamas (which had some popular roots in poor urban districts), cadres who had previously broken away from the PKP (among them Francisco Nemenzo), and independent Marxist intellectuals (such as Randolph David). These contacts led in 1986 to the creation of Bisig, an independent socialist organization.

The manner in which the Marcos regime descended into crisis did not correspond with the CPP blueprint. Its leadership’s vision was for a “gradualist” strategy, in which a military stalemate had to be reached before the question of

power could be raised. This was far from being the case in the mid-1980s. Thus, a decisive section of CPP’s leadership failed to recognize the depth of the regime’s crisis, which was developing under unanticipated conditions with mass mobilization in the cities at its center rather than rural armed struggle.

The political experience of the CPP and the national democratic movement was much richer than the official program would suggest. But it was no longer sufficient to “adapt” the line to regional conditions, as several territorial or sector leaderships had already done. The emphasis had to be shifted to the national level, which could not be achieved without the agreement of the executive committee.

The issue of united front policies and alliances was posed in new terms with the revival of pluralism on the left. Underground, the NDF began opening up, proposing to include political organizations independent of the CPP. But in 1982 the movement was dealt several serious blows: the murder of the highly regarded Edgar Jopson by the military, and the arrests of Isagani Serrano, a member of the party’s executive secretariat, Boy Morales, chairman of the NDF, and Ed de la Torre, the founder of CNL. The transformation of the NDF did not occur.

Similar developments occurred above ground. Broad ad hoc coalitions were created, and some party members wanted the umbrella organization Bayan to include a wide range of non-CPP-led movements. But, although it was the largest coalition of popular movements ever in the Philippines, politically Bayan was the narrowest of all those formed after 1983. Almost all the groups were not part of the national democratic bloc – with the notable exception of former senator Lorenzo Tañada.

The political situation quickly evolved when Marcos, eager for legitimacy, called snap elections in February 1986. Corazon “Cory” Aquino, the widow of Benigno, and Salvador Laurel (from the classical right) ran against Marcos in the presidential race. Most of the democratic movement supported Cory Aquino. Sharp divisions appeared in the Communist Party. Traditionally, the CPP boycotted elections but many wanted to engage in the electoral battle this time, or at least did not want to oppose participation. Nevertheless, the executive committee voted for an active boycott by a very tight margin: 3 in favor of a boycott and 2 against. The party was placed

in a very awkward position in the face of the anti-dictatorial upsurge.

February Revolution, 1986

Ferdinand Marcos was sure he would once again control the elections, as did the majority of the Communist Party leadership. They were both wrong. Within the US administration, many wanted the dictatorship to reform itself, but it was too late. The powerful anti-dictatorial mass movement upset predetermined scenarios. Under its pressure, all the regime's contradictions reached breaking point. The Catholic hierarchy withdrew its support for the presidential couple, as did business and many provincial oligarchic families, giving notice to Washington to choose its allies. The army was divided, with a small fraction preparing a coup d'état.

The election campaign took on a strong extra-institutional flavor, with a "parliament of the street" imposing its legitimacy against a rump National Assembly. When Marcos declared himself reelected, rebel soldiers occupied their barracks, led by two "repentant" members of the military: Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile and Acting Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos (two of the key architects of martial law). The church called on the population to protect them. A huge crowd blocked the approach of loyalist regiments. The military rebellion should have been easily crushed, but the mobilization of millions of people in the capital and the provinces made all the difference. On February 26, 1986, the presidential couple fled into exile in Hawaii: it was the victory of "People Power" and the "EDSA uprising" (from the acronym of a major thoroughfare, Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, which runs alongside the rebel army barracks near the gathering of demonstrators).

A remarkable alliance had thus occurred between a fraction of the army, the Catholic hierarchy, sectors of the bourgeoisie and the traditional oligarchy, the urban middle classes, popular sectors, and the organized left. But the weight of the latter was considerably weakened by the paralysis of the Communist Party. The CPP and the national democratic movement had played a key role in bringing the Marcos regime to crisis (together with the MNLF in the Bangsamoro land). But at the decisive moment, when millions of protesters invaded the streets and demanded the departure of the dictator, the Communist Party was busy preparing guerrilla

camps for an offensive that it expected to launch after the presumed reelection of Marcos. Many of its activists undoubtedly participated in the mobilizations (and did not boycott the election), but the national democratic movement was unable to significantly influence the course of events.

The February Revolution was a composite affair. Above all, it was anti-dictatorial (despite the presence of a military faction planning a coup d'état). Populist, religious, and Marxist ideas were represented. The expression of anti-imperialism proved marginal, although US President Reagan was booed for his support of Marcos, and there was evidently an element of restored national pride: the overthrow of the dictatorship had been carried out by the people and not granted by Washington, as had been the case for independence. On yellow T-shirts (the color of the Aquino supporters), "People Power" was written on one side and "I am proud to be Filipino" on the other.

In the aftermath of the February Revolution, the balance of power was still unstable. The forces ousting the dictator had sharp political differences. The government included individuals from the repressive right (Juan Ponce Enrile) and others from the left, such as lawyer José Diokno, who had been a stalwart in fighting martial law. The balance between civil administration and military power also remained uncertain. February 1986 began a period of transition that lasted for about two years.

Given the marginalization of the national democratic current, the elites were able to resolve the crisis in their best interests. The accession to power of Aquino, herself a member of the oligarchy and very close to Archbishop Sin, fostered a virulent ideological offensive against the CPP and the Marxist left by the Catholic hierarchy and the apostles of economic liberalism. In 1988, the Aquino regime finally took shape and the coalition government became narrower. The extreme rightist elements (Enrile, Vice-President Salvador Laurel) joined the opposition. However, after the death of José Diokno and the departure of many figures of the left, the center of gravity of Aquino's cabinet shifted rightwards, to the delight of Washington. A precarious agreement was negotiated with the armed forces, stabilizing the country, and economic growth resumed after several years of recession and stagnation.

Nevertheless, the structural crisis of the Philippines regime was not overcome. The return to

democracy meant above all the return of political provincial families and the resurgence of the elitist and clientelist system of the 1960s. There was one notable difference, however: under Marcos, the army had entered politics. The attempted coup d'état in December 1989 demonstrated that the military was not content to return to the barracks. In 1992, retired General Fidel Ramos succeeded Aquino as president. Military factions are now part of the Philippines political landscape.

Developments on the Left

Political prisoners were freed after the fall of the dictatorship and took part in the lively post-February 1986 debates. Ed de la Torre and Boy Morales distanced themselves from the official Communist Party line, launching the Popular Democratic (PD) current. Other activists from the national democratic tradition joined the newly constituted socialist organization Bisig. Both PD and Bisig presented a much more democratic vision of socialism than that offered by the CPP.

The national democratic movement itself seemed ready to innovate. Former detainees, including José Maria Sison, constituted a legal political party in 1986, the Partido ng Bayan (People's Party, PnB), which ran in the elections. Within the CPP, substantive discussions took place, including publicly in the journal *Praktika*, on a wide range of issues.

Post-February 1986 Debates

In May 1986 the communist leadership criticized itself publicly over its decision to actively boycott the elections. However, questions remained over how an executive committee of five could have taken such a decision without referring to the political bureau and the central committee, against the advice of many cadres. The February Revolution cast new light on already existing ideological differences and raised other issues.

Seen from outside, the CPP appeared to be an ideological monolith. But there was real diversity in its political practice and conceptions. In 1978, the CPP in the capital had participated in elections in spite of the official boycott policy; the experiment was a failure and the regional leadership was sanctioned. During the 1980s, in Mindanao, the CPP had incorporated the notion of a general territorial strike (*welgang bayan*) in its overall perspectives. The tumultuous events

of 1983–6 confirmed that the strategic blueprint elaborated in 1968–70 was far too rigid. Cadres such as Nathan Quimpo (aka Marti Villalobos) proposed drawing lessons from Latin American revolutionary experiences and from the flexibility of Vietnamese practice, arguing that success depended on the practical ways of combining forms of struggle depending on particular circumstances.

Cadres involved in mass organizing did not systematically subordinate themselves to the armed struggle and sought to address the immediate needs of their social base in more practical ways – what others denounced as reformism. These divergent approaches ultimately led to a sharp disagreement on how to use (or refuse) the official land reform program to advance the peasants' struggle.

While these issues – and many others – were debated in much wider activist circles than before, members of the CPP gradually discovered that paranoid purges were taking place within their own party.

Militarization and Purges

Under martial law, human rights deteriorated in the Philippines as the use of torture became routine. Above ground, activists were abducted and summarily executed by paramilitary groups, including death squads, “vigilante” civilians armed for counterinsurgency, anti-communist religious sects (particularly Protestant), and landowners' and bosses goons. The civil war sometimes took horrific forms, as in the Davao region, where the army “cleaned up” the Agdao slum using religious fanatics against guerillas. Terrible acts were committed, such as the disemboweling of pregnant women, the mutilation of corpses, and torture.

Militarization affected all sectors of society. Paramilitary groups did not cease operating after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship and leaders of legal organizations were not spared. In 1987, death squads assassinated Rolando Olalia (KMU chairman) and Lean Alejandro (head of Bayan), among others.

Controlling the violence became a problem even in the NPA, as evidenced by the Digos incident. In this remote Mindanao village, a Protestant sect created an anti-communist militia. On June 25, 1989, during fighting with the guerillas, 37 villagers were killed. Medical care was given by the victorious NPA to the wounded –

but two corpses were beheaded. The NDF set up an inquiry commission requesting the indictment of the NPA unit and two guerillas for beheading the corpses.

Within the Communist Party, the situation dramatically deteriorated. In the 1980s, a succession of secret purges was launched to eliminate agents who had supposedly infiltrated the revolutionary movement. In some places only a few members of the leadership were killed. But in other provinces hundreds of activists were sentenced to death and the mass base of the party was decimated. Several thousand CPP members were murdered, but it was uncertain whether there were any military agents among them.

Torture was used systematically to force suspects to admit to crimes they had never committed. Innocent people confessed and gave the names of nonexistent accomplices: with the infernal logic of torture, purges became rampant in many provinces. The bonds of trust between the CPP-NPA and the population were severed. The 1980s purges raised serious questions, such as how such violations could have been committed by the revolutionary movement, which for so long had won the moral high ground, and how it could have used the same methods as the dictatorship it so vigorously denounced. These and other questions were addressed in the book *To Suffer Thy Comrades* by Robert Francis “Bobby” Garcia, a survivor of the purges who had been tortured in Southern Tagalog NPA camps.

1992–1996 Splits

After 20 years of struggles, the failure of its boycott policy, and the traumatic experience of its paranoid purges, in the context of a changing national and international climate, the Communist Party was forced to take stock and call for a congress, only the second since its foundation in 1968.

Any reassessment of the CPP line had to take a critical look at the legacy of José Maria Sison. He was the only CPP leader whose writings are authoritative and published (apart from the official resolutions). In this the CPP is quite different from most other revolutionary parties in Asia. This peculiarity is all the more notable because Sison was jailed from 1977 to 1986 (during which time the movement expanded most rapidly), and since 1987 has been living in Utrecht, subject to major restrictions on his movement.

Joma Sison and his allies within the leadership (Benito and Wilma Tiamzon) refused any questioning of the party’s original orientation. The debate therefore set the Reaffirmists against the Rejectionists: those who “reaffirmed” the validity of the 1968–70 documents against those who “rejected” them. In addition, the paranoid purges became *a posteriori* part of the factional fights, Sison blaming his opponents for the disaster, while in reality the whole party was responsible. In this context, the holding of a congress was refused.

A split in the party was unavoidable. In 1992–3, important leaders, territorial units, and commissions left the CPP or were expelled: Ricardo “Ric” Reyes (Politburo and Mindanao Commission member), Romulo “Rolly” Kintanar (head of the NPA), the United Front Commission, the Peasant Department, the International Desk (Home Bureau), the Manila-Rizal (Capital) Regional Committee with Felimon “Popoy” Lagman, part of the Visayas Commission with Arturo Tabara, and the Central Mindanao Region, among others. The General Command of the NPA and the National Organizing Commission were also officially disbanded. Because the complete name of the party was the Communist Party of the Philippines–Mao Zedong Thought (CPP-MLMTT), many Rejectionists deleted the MTT (Maoist) reference, retaining the ML, which is why in the Philippines, unlike most other countries, Marxist-Leninist is not Maoist.

Rejectionists were not the only victims of the factional fights. Rudy Salas was expelled while he was CPP Chairman in 1977–86 – during the time Sison was in jail. In 1997–8, another split/expulsion occurred in Central Luzon in spite of the fact that this regional leadership had reaffirmed its Maoist reference. A whole generation of activists had been organized in the struggle against martial law by the national democratic movement. This great Philippine revolutionary tradition was now split, but its legacy could still be felt in a range of varied political and social organizations.

The Future of the Philippine Left

Many members of the national democratic movement ceased their activism on account of the 1980s purges and the 1990s CPP crisis. Some organizations disintegrated, such as the PD, and a number of left leaders joined mainstream political

parties. Nevertheless, the Philippine left remains the strongest in Southeast Asia.

Among the left, the CPP remains the largest underground organization and, most importantly, the best armed. New communist parties were constituted, initially rooted in one or a few regions only, but later becoming more widespread: the Revolutionary Workers' Party-Mindanao (RPM-M) from Central Mindanao; the Revolutionary Workers' Party-Philippines (RPM-P), mostly from the Visayas; the Workers' Party of the Philippines (PMP), mostly from Manila-Rizal; and the Marxist-Leninist Party of the Philippines (MLMPP) from Central Luzon. Akbayan (Citizen's Action Party) was established as a broad political party of the left. The socialist organization Bisig, a small left social democratic organization, and a number of former CPP members participated in its foundation.

Mass organizations have been influenced by the political upheavals. Out of the KMU a new union center, the Solidarity of Filipino Workers (BMP), was created in the Manila-Rizal region. The Alliance of Progressive Labor (APL) was founded in 1996 and Akbayan was closely related with this national labor center. The peasant movement KMP split, giving way to the Democratic-KMP (DKMP). Many women's organizations distanced themselves from GABRIELA and new organizations, such as Sanlakas, appeared alongside Bayan. There are many independent NGOs and associations, especially peasant associations, in the Philippines, but the most important progressive social movements are usually either part of the Reaffirmist bloc or the Rejectionist bloc, and/or are linked to Akbayan.

New Directions

Elections to the Philippine National Assembly (Congress) are mostly controlled by elite political clans. But new legislation gave a limited number of seats to "party lists" representing popular sectors. Various components of the Philippine left took the opportunity to run, with some success. The Reaffirmist bloc launched several lists (including Bayan Muna, GABRIELA, and Anakpawis) and was the most successful, thanks to CPP backing. Among the Rejectionists, AMIN in Mindanao (with the backing of the RPM-M) and the Workers' Party (PM) – mostly in Manila-Rizal – won seats. Akbayan benefited from a national network and won one to three representatives in each election. Gradually, however, that democratic

space has been commandeered by political fronts linked to the elite (against the spirit of the legislation) and it is unclear how long it remains open to the militant left.

The renewal of left activities and ideologies concerned many fields of activities, three of which are discussed here.

Indigenous Peoples

Minority populations live in strategic areas for a guerilla group like the NPA: mountain ranges where military bases can be established and from where it is possible to operate in several provinces. Indigenous peoples in the Philippines are often warring tribes and many NPA fighters were recruited from among them.

Various hill tribes were allied with the CPP-NPA against the Marcos dictatorship to protect their habitat from mining, logging, and major infrastructure works; for example, Igorots (Kalinga and Bontoc tribes) from Northern Luzon struggled against the World Bank-funded construction of dams on the Chico River.

The Communist Party incorporated these areas of struggle into its national strategy, but it refused to recognize the self-governance of the tribes in their ancestral domains: the right of self-determination was to be exercised only after victory. This issue probably explains, at least in part, the April 1986 split within the NPA, when Conrado Balweg founded the People's Liberation Army of the Cordillera (CPLA).

During the 1990s, some Rejectionists adopted a new approach. The RPM-M operates in areas populated by Lumads (indigenous peoples of the island). It felt it necessary to recognize the right to self-determination of the minority populations, respecting their decisions concerning the struggles to be carried out. This is all the more important because, in part of Mindanao, some Lumad ancestral domains are located within the perimeter of other ancestral domains claimed by Moro tribes. Thus the peace movement, which is very much alive in the south of the archipelago, has to find a way for two combined rights of self-determination to be respected in order to overcome the war situation there.

Feminist Networks

On issues of morality, the CPP is traditionally conservative. It issued strict rules prohibiting sex before marriage (although some leaders had more freedom than members). In addition to the

authoritarian Puritanism shared by many Asian Maoist movements, the influence of religious members (especially priests) was notable. The CPP monitors courtships, marries its members, and serves as marriage counselor, thus combining the roles of the family, the church, and the state.

Since the 1980s feminist networks have grown and diversified. But they face the influence of the churches in the archipelago. Legislation does not permit divorce or abortion, and campaigns for birth control face many obstacles. The political left is reluctant to confront the churches in this area because it depends on the religious authorities to protect them from repression. Thus, defending the rights of women is often not considered an immediate priority.

Participation in the Movement for Global Justice

Thanks to its Christian organizations and the presence of Filipino political exiles in many countries, including the US, the Netherlands, and Australia, the national democratic movement has established an extensive network of international solidarity and funding. The NDF opened an international office in Utrecht.

Other components of the Philippine left have played an active role in the global justice movement, with key personalities such as Walden Bello from Focus on the Global South and Lidy Nacpil from the Freedom From Debt Coalition (a member of Jubilee South). Philippine social movements are also internationally active through other broad networks, including Stop the War Coalition and Stop the New Round Coalition (against the World Trade Organization). The role of migrants – and especially women migrants – is also important. At least 8 million Filipinos (10 percent of the population) work abroad. The Philippine social fabric would crumble without the \$US14.5 billion they send home each year.

Pluralism

Over the last 15 years, the Philippine left has evolved in two opposite directions on the important issue of pluralism.

The Transformation of the CPP

At the time of the 1992–3 splits, the CPP leadership pronounced a death sentence on the main figures of the opposition. For a time, only middle-ranking cadres of other underground organizations were silently targeted by the NPA. In January

2003, however, Romulo Kintanar was shot dead in a Manila restaurant by his former comrades. For the first time, a well-known personality had been executed in the capital city, with maximum publicity.

The CPP justifies such killings by claiming that the victims are in fact “enemy agents” or “criminals.” But in its official organ *Ang Bayan*, it denounced as “counterrevolutionary” all other organizations of the progressive and radical left, and many left personalities. Any “counterrevolutionary” may one day be sentenced to death. Dozens of activists have already been executed (sometimes after being tortured) by units of the NPA. In some provinces, such as in Bondoc peninsula, the situation is dire: peasant cadres related to Akbayan have fallen victim to both landowners’ goons and the NPA. In January 2005, many organizations participating in the Porto Alegre World Social Forum issued a “Letter of Concern,” urging the CPP to renounce its policy of threat and assassination against other components of the Philippine left.

A Plural Left

Much of the Philippine left has followed the opposite trajectory to the sectarian development of the CPP, recognizing the legitimacy of pluralism in the people’s movements and the need for unity. This question of pluralism (and democracy) has become most central for the Philippine progressive and revolutionary left. Unification of the various Rejectionist organizations formed after the 1992–3 CPP split proved difficult. But they have engaged in many broad networks with Akbayan and other organizations, giving rise to a new political coalition: Laban ng Masa (Struggle of the Masses).

Despite remaining one of the most vibrant in Southeast Asia, the Philippine left has been unable to regain the political initiative. Every time the regime enters a crisis, it is still the elite that imposes a solution – as when President Joseph “Erap” Estrada was overthrown in January 2001 under the pressure of street demonstrations. Philippine military factions are still in the political game. The situation is nonetheless challenging. Social movements face the consequences of capitalist globalization and government neglect, while the closure of many factories has weakened militant unions.

The various peace negotiations between the government and the CPP-NDF, the RPM-M,

and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, which replaced the MNLF) have been inconclusive. The US was forced to abandon its military bases in 1991 under pressure from the anti-war movement and after a nationalist vote in the Senate (helped, it must be said, by the eruption of the Pinatubo volcano, which heavily damaged some of the bases). But the US military are back thanks to agreements allowing the deployment of their forces throughout the archipelago.

Under the presidency of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, corruption is draining public resources and the human rights situation has deteriorated considerably. In 2007, death squads murdered hundreds of lawyers, journalists, and activists (from the Reaffirmist bloc as well as from other organizations). As the situation in the Philippines goes from bad to worse, the struggle of the left has lost none of its relevance.

SEE ALSO: Huk Rebellion, 1946–1954; Moro National Liberation; Philippines, Colonial Protests during the Spanish Era; Philippines, Protest during the US Era; Philippines, Protests, 1950s–1970s

References and Suggested Readings

- Abinales, P. (2001) *Fellow Traveler: Essays on Filipino Communism*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
- Abinales, P. (2004) *Love, Sex and the Filipino Communist*. Manila: Anvil.
- Abinales, P. (2005) *State and Society in the Philippines*. Manila: Anvil.
- Abuilar, D. (1998) *Toward a Nationalist Feminism*. Quezon City: Giraffe Books.
- Anderson, B. (1988) Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams. *New Left Review* 1, 169 (May–June).
- Bello, W., Docena, H., De Guzman, M., & Malig, M. (2005) *The Anti-Development State: The Political Economy of the Permanent Crisis in the Philippines*. Quezon City: Department of Sociology, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines.
- Bonner, R. (1987) *Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy*. New York: Times Books.
- David, R. (2001) *Reflections on Sociology and Philippine Society*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
- De la Torre, E. (1986) *Touching Ground, Taking Roots: Reflection on Theology and Struggles in the Philippines*. Quezon City: Pastoral Institute.
- Estrada-Claudios, S. & Santos, A. (n.d.) *The Women's Movement(s) and Social Movements: Conjunctionures*

- and Divergences. Available at www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?page=auteur&id_auteur=302.
- Garcia, R. F. (2001) *To Suffer Thy Comrades: How the Revolution Decimated its Own*. Manila: Anvil.
- Jones, G. R. (1989) *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippines Guerrilla Movement*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Morales, H., Jr. & Putzel, J. (Eds.) (2001) *Power in the Village: Agrarian Reform, Rural Politics, Institutional Change and Globalization*. Quezon City: Project Development Institute and University of the Philippines Press.
- Permanent People's Tribunal Session on the Philippines (1981) *Philippines: Repression and Resistance*. Utrecht: KSP.
- Pimentel, B. (2006) *U.G. – An Underground Tale: The Journey of Edgar Jopson and the First Quarter Storm Generation*. Manila: Anvil.
- Rocamora, J. (1994) *Breaking Through: The Struggle within the Communist Party of the Philippines*. Manila: Anvil.
- San Juan, E., Jr. (1994) *Allegories of Resistance: The Philippines at the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
- Scipes, K. (1996) *KMU: Building Genuine Trade Unionism in the Philippines, 1980–1994*. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.
- Sison, J. M. (1989) *The Philippine Revolution: The Leader's View*. Washington DC: Crane Russak.
- Third World Studies Center (Ed.) (1983) *Political Economy of Philippine Commodities*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
- Third World Studies Center (Ed.) (1984) *Marxism in the Philippines: Marx Centennial Lectures*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
- Third World Studies Center (Ed.) (1988) *Marxism in the Philippines*, second series. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
- Weekley, K. (2001) *The Communist Party of the Philippines 1968–1993: A Story of its Theory and Practice*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.

Pilsudski, Józef (1867–1935)

Amy Linch

A leader of Polish revolutionary activity against tsarist Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Pilsudski was almost single-handedly responsible for the reunification of Poland after its 123 years of partition. He began his career as a socialist and was a leader of the national insurrection in 1905, during which he trained and directed the combat forces of the

Polish Socialist Party (PPS). In the wake of the failed attempt to liberate Poland from Russian domination, he developed an army of revolutionaries that was 10,000 strong by the outbreak of World War I. His political and military maneuvering during the war set the stage for Poland's recognition as an independent state. He was chief of state (1918–22) and commander of the armed forces (1919–21) of Poland's Second Republic. He withdrew from politics in 1923 in the face of political opposition, only to return to power in a coup d'état two years later (1926–35). Throughout his career as an activist and statesman he sought to break up the Russian empire and achieve independence for all captive Central and Eastern European nations.

Pilsudski was born in Żulów (Zalavas, Lithuania) to an impoverished Polonized Lithuanian noble family (*szlachta*) during the period of intense Russification and military occupation that followed the failed national insurrection of 1863–4. As a child he was captivated by the romantic poetry of Slowack and Mickiewicz and the forbidden history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that his mother read to him in secret. His resentment of the complete suppression of his culture grew while he was in secondary school in Wilno (Vilnius), and he became involved in the underground resistance movement in his late teens. In 1887 he was implicated in a plot to assassinate Alexander III (which also involved Lenin's older brother) and sentenced to five years in Siberia.

While living in Siberia, Pilsudski studied Marx and Engels as well as Russian populists Mikhailovsky and Pisarev. He met exiles who had been involved in 1863–4 and witnessed the breadth and diversity of the Russian empire in the 4,000-mile journey from his home. He returned to Wilno in 1892 with the conviction that socialism was a potent force for economic and political liberation of the oppressed nationalities of the "tsarist prison of nations." Cooperation between proletariat parties and radical democratic groups across the empire could promote its dissolution; the fate of any one nation was tied to the whole.

Pilsudski joined the incipient PPS and became the editor of its clandestine newspaper, *Robotnik* (Worker). He published articles in various socialist journals appealing for collaboration between Polish and Lithuanian socialists and endorsing unconditional national self-determination. In 1900 the

discovery of *Robotnik* by Russian authorities led to his arrest and imprisonment, but he managed to escape by feigning mental illness. At the start of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 he traveled to Tokyo, where he solicited Japanese support for a Polish uprising against the Russians. He failed to achieve the alliance for which he had hoped, but managed to get ammunition, which he employed in the guerilla warfare he directed over the ensuing two years.

Pilsudski's political and military activities were guided by the conviction that the proletariat must be disciplined and organized in order to profit from the revolutionary opportunities availed them by historical events. The workers' uprisings that occurred during the 1905 Revolution were effective in seizing power, but without a trained military to preserve and direct that power success would be ephemeral at best. His emphasis on strategic operations, including raids on trains and government concessions to secure the resources to enhance the movement's military capacity, were opposed by younger socialists who favored wide-scale social disruption to provoke the collapse of the Russian state. The conflict between the younger "left" socialists and older "right" led by Pilsudski resulted in a split within the party in 1907. Pilsudski organized one last train raid in 1908 – the only one in which he actually participated – and used the over 200,000 rubles acquired in the heist to build what he regarded as the nascent Polish army. He anticipated a war that would envelop Europe, generating chaos that would create an opportunity for reconstructing an independent Poland.

Pilsudski saw the Austro-Hungarian empire as the likely victor in its war against Russia and an ally in achieving his objective of bringing about Russia's demise. His cadres of "Sharpshooters" joined World War I under the Austro-Hungarian flag. The unit he led maintained a national character in uniform and manner of address and was imbued with a radical democratic spirit. Equal pay was given to all officers and many of the soldiers came from leftist political groups. Pilsudski organized rudimentary elements of a Polish state to be ready when the war ended with the collapse of the Central Powers, which had declared an independent Polish state in 1916. Pilsudski and many of his troops were arrested in 1917 for refusing to take an oath of loyalty to the German and Austrian authorities. He spent the rest of the war in a German prison camp.

Upon his return to Poland after the war Pilsudski resumed control over the military, and the Regency Council – the puppet government established by the Central Powers – dissolved itself and handed him control over civilian affairs. He was reappointed as both head of state and commander of the military by the newly elected Sejm (parliament) and led a coalition government until 1922. He implemented an essentially socialist program including an eight-hour workday, free education, and women's suffrage. In international affairs he sought to establish a multinational federation that encompassed the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. His proposed federation was rejected by both prospective member states and Allied powers. The independence of Central and East European nationalities guided his often risky and unorthodox foreign policy decisions.

The reduced power of the president under the Polish Constitution of 1921 made the office unattractive to Pilsudski and he did not run for reelection. He remained within the government as Chief of General Staff until the assassination of the elected president by a member of the right wing whose original target had been Pilsudski. Disillusioned with democracy, he retired from politics. Conditions of hyperinflation, mounting unemployment, and economic crisis plagued subsequent governments and Pilsudski's supporters encouraged him to return to political life. He took control of the government in May 1926 in a coup d'état supported by the PPS, Liberation, Peasant, and Polish Communist Parties. The Sejm elected him president but he refused the office for its too limited powers. As *de facto* dictator he initially used propaganda to advance his agenda, but in 1930 he imprisoned his political opponents on the eve of the elections. The Brest Trials that followed, and his establishment of prisons for political prisoners in the early 1930s, brought international condemnation. He greatly feared the rise of Nazi Germany and is said to have proposed a joint invasion of Germany to France in 1935.

SEE ALSO: Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Poland, Revolutions, 1846–1863; Polish Revolution, 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917

References and Suggested Readings

- Dziewanowski, M. K. (1969) *Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 1918–1922*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Jędrzejewicz, W. (1982) *Pilsudski: A Life for Poland*. New York: Hippocrene Books.
- Pilsudski, J. (1937–8) *Pisma zbiorowe* (Collected Writings), 10 vols. Warsaw.
- Plach, E. (2006) *The Clash of Moral Nations: Cultural Politics in Pilsudski's Poland, 1926–1935*. Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Rothschild, J. (1967) *Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wandycz, P. (1974) *The Lands of Partitioned Poland 1795–1918*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Pinto, Pio Gama (1927–1965)

Zahid Rajan

Pio Gama Pinto was independent Kenya's first martyr. Journalist, freedom fighter, and political activist, he was a socialist who dedicated his life to liberation and justice for the Kenyan people. He was assassinated on February 24, 1965.

Born in 1927 in Nairobi, Kenya, Pinto completed his education in India where he took an active interest in sports and joined the fight for freedom in Goa against the Portuguese. On his return to Kenya, he joined the East African Indian Congress, the Kenya African Union, and the trade union movement. He became actively involved in the Land and Freedom Army, better known as the "Mau Mau," which engaged in armed struggle against the colonialists. He supplied the freedom fighters with weapons, funds, and information and cared for the families of those killed or arrested by the British colonial forces. He helped to set up a Mau Mau War Council in Nairobi and played a key role in sending out information to, and sourcing support from, foreign countries, especially India.

Because of his activities, Pinto was detained from 1954 to 1959, just five months after he got married. During this time his father, who had served the colonial government loyally, passed away. Pinto was not allowed to visit his father on his deathbed nor attend the funeral.

Upon his release he worked ceaselessly for the Kenya African National Union and its electoral victory in 1961. In 1963 he was elected as member of the Central Legislative Assembly, and the

following year he was appointed as specially elected member of the House of Representatives in the Kenya parliament.

In 1964 he worked late hours to establish the Lumumba Institute where cadres would be trained. He kept in close touch with African liberation movements and worked to “decolonize” the Portuguese-orientated Goans in Kenya. With funding from India he set up the Pan-African Press, which published *Sauti Ya Afrika*, *Pan Africa*, and *Nyanza Times*. He also helped to form the Kenya African Workers’ Congress, a trade union organization that was independent of the US-dominated International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. This move led the imperialists to classify Pinto as a “leftist firebrand” and “a man to be watched very closely.”

It was the parliamentary coup that he masterminded which proved to be the last straw for the government. Tom Mboya had prepared Sessional Paper No. 10 on African socialism. Pinto and his group of progressive leaders had written up their own blueprint on African socialism in which they demanded a ceiling on land ownership, a more equitable distribution of wealth, and just rewards for the Mau Mau freedom fighters. These demands were anathema to the ruling class.

Pio Gama Pinto was the man who came closest to organizing a real political revolution in Kenya. He was Jaramogi’s foremost tactical advisor and link-man with eastern embassies. A prolific writer and tireless worker, he was known to keep appointments at 5.00 a.m. after working till 2.00 a.m. “Decent, straightforward, fearless, and honest” are just some of the epithets accorded to this remarkable patriot who devoted his mind, his body, and his soul to Kenya. Though gunned down at the young age of 38, Pinto inspired, and continues to inspire, many Kenyans who yearn for a socialist Africa where justice and democracy will prevail.

SEE ALSO: Kenya, National Protests for Independence; Mboya, Tom (1930–1969) and the Kenya Labor Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Kaise, P. J., Ohumu, F. W., & Kaiser, P. J. (2004) *Democratic Transitions in East Africa*. London: Ashgate.
- Nugent, P. (2004) *Africa Since Independence: A Comparative History*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Press, R. M. (2006) *Peaceful Resistance: Advancing Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms*. London: Ashgate.

Pisacane, Carlo (1818–1857)

Niall Whelehan

One of a few Risorgimento Democrats whose views were genuinely socialistic, Italian patriot Carlo Pisacane unreservedly advocated fundamental change in the relationship between the lower and privileged classes in Italy. Max Nettlau has labeled Pisacane one of the “great libertarians,” and he certainly was one of the most advanced thinkers in the Risorgimento, yet Pisacane left no movement behind him, and historians are still divided on his role in the genesis of the Italian left.

Born into a fallen noble family in Naples, Pisacane was chosen for a military career that he soon found incompatible with his worldview. After spending time in Paris and London, he returned to Italy in 1848. After fighting in the Veneto and Lombardy, he played a role in the 1849 Roman Republic ending in arrest, imprisonment, and then exile. The disappointments of 1848 led Pisacane to publish, in the 1850s, *La Guerra combattuta in Italia negli anni 1848–49*, *Saggi storici, politici, militari sull’Italia*, and the *Testamento politico*. Although Proudhon influenced these works, Pisacane downplayed French socialist doctrines, insisting that only a program developing organically in response to specific Italian grievances would encourage the serious work of reconstruction needed to solve gross inequalities. Central to his work was a criticism of Mazzini, who he believed had blundered by sacrificing the social question in the name of national unification.

Pisacane believed Italian independence should be won through an army of the masses, rather than the regular Pietmontese army: revolutionaries had only to provide a spark and peasants would then continue the revolution of their own volition, creating “the only just and secure form of government: the anarchy of Proudhon.” These convictions led to the ill-fated expedition of 1857. Determined to provoke a rising in the Italian South, Pisacane and two dozen poorly armed volunteers liberated prisoners on the

island of Ponza and sailed to Sapri, Campania. The expected uprising failed and Pisacane died, apparently committing suicide.

Pisacane is often credited with being the originator of the “propaganda by the deed” approach to revolution. While he believed ideas came from action, not vice versa, and called revolutionary theorizing a “chimera,” this should not be viewed as an open endorsement of guerrilla warfare or assassination. Pisacane believed such tactics were only effective in “sparking” revolt: guerrilla warfare was dangerous, as it could lead to a cult of leadership in different regions. Only a popular army, he asserted, can create and sustain a revolution.

The early Italian anarchist movement of the 1870s is widely viewed as a continuation of the Risorgimento: in this context, Pisacane was Italy’s first anarchist. He viewed government as unnecessary, and there is little doubt that he helped create an environment congenial to the arrival of Bakunin. Among those who worked with Bakunin in Naples, Giuseppe Fanelli, Atanasio Dramis, and Carlo and Raffaele Mileti had been Pisacane’s collaborators. It is difficult to pinpoint Pisacane’s direct impact on early Italian anarchism, as his works were not circulating between 1866 and 1875; however, by 1877 the influence of his *Testamento politico* on the writings of Errico Malatesta and Carlo Cafiero was unmistakable.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Italy; Fanelli, Giuseppe (1826–1877); Italian Risorgimento

References and Suggested Readings

- Pisacane, C. (1942) *Testamento Politico*. Turin: Einaudi.
 Pisacane, C. (2005) On Revolution. In R. Graham (Ed.), *Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas, Vol. 1: From Anarchy to Anarchism (300 CE to 1939)*. Montréal: Black Rose Books.
 Rosselli, N. (1977) *Carlo Pisacane nel Risorgimento italiano*. Turin: Einaudi.
 Russi, L. (1994) *Carlo Pisacane: vita e pensiero di un rivoluzionario senza rivoluzione*. Milan: Il saggiatore.

Place, Francis (1771–1854)

Victoria Arnold

Francis Place, known as “the radical tailor of Charing Cross,” was a radical reformer whose impressive organizational skill placed him at the

center of political and social reform movements of the nineteenth century.

Place was born in Vinegar Yard, London, in November 1771, the son of Simon Place, a bailiff, and Mary Gray. Despite a difficult childhood, Place was educated from the age of 4, although he himself admitted that he learned little before the age of 11. Between the ages of 13 and 17, Place was apprenticed to a leather breeches-maker but also continued his education, teaching himself many subjects, including French and algebra. In 1790 Place married Elizabeth Chadd, with whom he had 15 children, five of whom died in infancy.

Place first involved himself in political action in 1793 when he took a leading role in a strike of his fellow breeches-makers. The endeavor left him unemployed for eight months, during which time he read Hume, Locke, Adam Smith, Paine, and Godwin. He turned his back on religion, becoming an agnostic, and in June 1794 joined the London Corresponding Society (LCS), quickly rising through its ranks and becoming chairman in September 1795. However, by 1797 Place had resigned his membership, disapproving of the increasingly radical direction the LCS was taking.

Between 1799 and 1806 Place took a step back from politics and focused on building up his tailoring business, opening his own shop in April 1801. In 1807 Place returned to the political arena, playing an important role in organizing the campaign to elect a radical candidate, Sir Francis Burdett, to Westminster. Over the following years the library above Place’s shop in Charing Cross became a meeting place for London’s reformers.

By 1817 the success of Place’s business had allowed him to retire, leaving him free to devote his time to political and social reform. He was dedicated to improving the lives of working men, campaigning for improvements in working conditions, and playing a leading role in the repeal of the Combination Acts in 1824. Place believed that educating the people was an essential part of the parliamentary reform process; he therefore helped to establish the London Mechanics Institute in 1823 and the London University in 1826. Place also supported the Lancastrian Association, which was designed to provide cheap elementary education.

Place played a major role in the reform agitations of the 1830s, managing public meetings,

lobbying for parliamentary support, and helping to organize reform societies. He regarded the 1832 Reform Act as a step on the road to more extensive reform. In the 1830s Place became an active member of the Chartist movement, helping to draft its famous “People’s Charter.” He was also active in the Anti-Corn Law League of the 1840s and became manager of its London branch.

Place spent much of the last decade of his life in poor health and in financial straits; he suffered a debilitating stroke in 1844 and died in 1854. Throughout his political life, Place remained in the background of the reform movement. He never sought publicity and refused to stand as a parliamentary candidate. As a thoroughly moderate reformer, he steadfastly opposed the revolutionary or “physical force” currents that cropped up in the movements he was associated with. Although radicals thus frequently perceived him as a retarding influence, the positive significance of Francis Place’s contribution to the organization and direction of those movements is undeniable.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Corn Law Agitation, Britain, 19th Century; Burdett, Sir Francis (1770–1844); Chartists; Combination Laws and Revolutionary Trade Unionism; London Corresponding Society; Reform Acts, Britain and Ireland, 1832

References and Suggested Readings

- Miles, D. (1988) *Francis Place 1771–1854: The Life of a Remarkable Radical*. Sussex: Harvester Press.
- Thale, M. (Ed.) (1972) *The Autobiography of Francis Place (1771–1854)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thompson, E. P. (1963) *The Making of the English Working Class*. New York: Vintage.
- Wallas, G. (1898) *The Life of Francis Place, 1771–1854*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918)

Pavla Vesela

Plekhanov began his revolutionary career as a populist, but emerged as the first major theoretician of the early Marxist movement in Russia, responsible for introducing the country to important western Marxist texts and participating in political activism. Plekhanov’s own voluminous

works address such diverse fields as politics, sociology, history, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and the natural sciences.

Georgi Valentinovich Plekhanov was born on November 29, 1856 in Gudalovka, about 275 miles southeast of Moscow, into a military family loyal to the tsar. Plekhanov enrolled in 1873 in St. Petersburg’s Konstantinovskoe Military School, but soon transferred to the Mining Institute. He was radicalized by the cosmopolitan, university atmosphere, and young Plekhanov joined the populist movement. He gradually abandoned his studies and became an enthusiastic activist in the organization Land and Freedom, writing for its periodical, organized factory workers, and participated in strikes and demonstrations. During this period Plekhanov was drawn to the works of Marx and believed – along with other populists – that in the predominantly agrarian Russia the revolution would be brought about by the peasants. Bypassing the capitalist stage, the newly emergent society, Plekhanov imagined, would be a decentralized federation of peasant communes.

In the late 1870s, in response to the failure to throw the tsarist system into turmoil, Land and Freedom engaged in terrorism against the system. When the organization dissolved in 1879, Plekhanov emerged as leader of the anti-terroristic faction, Black Repartition, in opposition to the terroristic wing, the People’s Will. Populism, however, was significantly weakened.

The waning of Russian populism in the 1880s contributed to Plekhanov’s intellectual transformation toward Marxism. In addition, his belief in the revolutionary character of the peasant commune was shaken by the inability to transform traditional forms of land tenure. In exile, where he lived from 1880, Plekhanov studied Karl Marx’s work in greater depth and established contacts with several major international Marxists, gradually abandoning populism for Marxism. He was founder of the Emancipation of Labor Group in 1883 and later, in 1898, played a central role in the formation of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). He also began to write prolifically. In two major works, *Socialism and the Political Struggle* (1883) and *Our Differences* (1885), Plekhanov repeatedly argued against populism’s revolutionary potential, emphasizing that Russia did not constitute a unique case in history and therefore, in order to achieve socialism, the country had to first

develop an urban proletariat and pass through the bourgeois stage – which became the basis of intellectual exchange with the young Marxist theoretician Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. While Lenin considered Plekhanov's work crucial to an understanding of communism, he regarded the peasantry as an integral part of the Russian revolutionary working class. During the 1890s, in such works as *On the Development of the Monistic Conception of History* (1895) or *Essays on the History of Materialism* (1896), Plekhanov continued to defend orthodox Marxism against populism, economism, and revisionism.

In 1900, together with other Russian Marxists such as Lenin, Julius Martov, and Alexander Potresov, Plekhanov launched the newspaper *Iskra*. The close cooperation of the editorial board members, however, was short-lived, as RSDLP split at the Second Party Congress in 1903 into the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. Although Plekhanov held a centrist position and until the outbreak of World War I strove to unite the two factions, he eventually drifted toward the Mensheviks. Following the February Revolution of 1917, he returned from exile, considering the events the long-awaited bourgeois revolution. When the Bolsheviks seized power during the October Revolution, Plekhanov was highly critical of what he viewed as a premature step. He retired to Finland, where he died several months later on May 17, 1918.

Plekhanov's major works in his later years include *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* (1908) and a crucial Marxist text on art and literature, *Art and Social Life* (1912), where he analyzed social conditions responsible for the conflict between “art for art's sake” on the one side and utilitarian attitudes toward art on the other. In 1909 Plekhanov also started the monumental *History of Russian Thought*, which by the year of his death reached only the eighteenth century. There, among other things, he argued that Russia was torn between the West and the East – at times leaning towards European culture and at other times falling into Eastern despotism and autocracy.

According to some critics, such as Plekhanov's biographer Samuel Baron, Plekhanov was excluded from the mainstream as a result of his faithful – albeit rigidly orthodox – Marxism, critical of both the revisionist and Bolshevik alternatives. Others, for example the historian Stanislaw Tiutiukin, contend that Plekhanov

became an armchair scholar for whom Menshevism was a comfortable choice. Plekhanov's authoritarian, stubborn, and compulsive personality alienated him from people and contributed to the unpopularity of his philosophical thought. While he failed to remain within the center of events, his contribution to the emergence of Russian Marxism is undeniable, and therefore Plekhanov is remembered as the Father of Russian Marxism.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Leninist Philosophy; Martov, Julius (1873–1923); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917

References and Suggested Readings

- Baron, S. (1963) *Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Geifman, A. (Ed.) (1999) *Russia Under the Last Tsar: Opposition and Subversion, 1894–1917*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Mayer, R. (1997) Plekhanov, Lenin and Working-Class Consciousness. *Studies in East European Thought* 49: 159–85.

Poland, Committee for Workers (KOR)

Amy Linch

From 1976 until the legalization of *Solidarność* (Solidarity) in 1981 the Committee for Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotników) (KOR) inspired and nurtured oppositional politics within Poland. Although its actual membership was relatively small, and initially drawn exclusively from the Warsaw intelligentsia, KOR became a focal point and organizing force for social resources across class and milieu. Its philosophy and practice of opposition challenged totalitarian rule by promoting social solidarity and creating realms of independent social action. It sought to transform social values and liberate public space by reclaiming the language and ideals of community appropriated by what Lipinski called “this socialism of mismanagement and inefficiency . . . this socialism of prisons, censorship and police” (Celt & Sabbat 1981: 2). Over its five years of existence KOR propagated a disciplined, cohesive, non-violent oppositional practice that was critical to the formation and success of the

Solidarity movement. As Anna Walentynowicz, one of the leaders of Solidarity, asserted in March 1981, “without KOR there would be no Solidarity in Poland” (Celt & Sabbat 1981: 6).

KOR’s members saw the material and conceptual centrality of the state as an obstacle to the development of opposition in Poland. Fear, inertia, and individual opportunism were further challenges to generating the sort of collective action that could effectively undermine the power of the communist system. KOR sought to demonstrate by example the power of individual ethical action and mutual support. Its work began in response to the brutal suppression of striking workers in 1976. Members and fellow activists distributed assistance to workers and their families, publicly decried their treatment, and exposed the crimes of the state to the larger population. As they institutionalized their reform efforts, the structure of the organization self-consciously reflected the members’ theory of opposition. Their activities and membership were deliberately public, thereby asserting the social right to organize and petition the government. The members took full responsibility for the actions of the group; they justified its existence in legal terms drawing on domestic law and international treaties to which Poland was a signatory, and ran its internal affairs with the norms of equality and transparency that they sought to realize in the larger society.

Prehistory

KOR reflected the experience of dissident intellectuals and (formerly) revisionist Marxists over nearly three decades of communist rule. The majority of the committee’s older members had been activists in the prewar Socialist Party (PPS) and/or soldiers in the underground Home Army (AK). Many of KOR’s members had struggled to come to terms with the gap between the socialist ideals to which they were committed and the travesty of their implementation. Reform-oriented discussion groups in Warsaw, such as the Crooked Circle Club (1956–62) and the Club of the Seekers of Contradiction, provided forums for intergenerational exchange of ideas and promoted critical analysis of the regime. The Kolakowski lecture series, organized by Adam Michnik, who became a member of KOR, was also an important factor in developing the theory of opposition that KOR sought to

actualize. The failed student protests in 1968 and brutal suppression of workers in 1970 led many students and leading intellectuals to abandon hope that reform was possible within the communist system. Jacek Kuroń and Michnik in particular argued that previous challenges to the regime had failed because they relied upon change at the top; real change within a totalitarian system could only come through pressure from below. Society must organize itself to undermine the hegemonic position of the party. By acting in accordance with the norms of a free society, Polish citizens could create one.

Precipitating Events

In December 1970 Polish workers in the industrial centers on the Baltic coast responded to drastic increases in the price of basic food items with mass demonstrations, strikes, and attacks on the communist centers of power. The ruling Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) had maintained food prices at a disproportionately low level with respect to other commodities as the legitimacy of the “people’s republic” was based on the economic quality of life it availed citizens. But in the face of looming economic crisis these prices were no longer tenable. The sudden and apparently arbitrary price increases severely compromised the standard of living of most people. The government responded to the mass demonstrations and work stoppages with armed repression. Police opened fire on crowds, while tanks and machine guns were brought into the cities to disperse the protesters. Official sources pronounced 1,165 people wounded and 45 killed in the protests, but the actual numbers are likely to have been greater. Recognizing the threat of a full-scale workers’ revolt, the regime rescinded the price increases, raised wages, and undertook reforms to modernize industry and increase the availability of consumer goods. Gierek, who replaced Gomulka as first secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party, met with unions and promised political renewal.

Fearing further worker mobilization, Gierek’s regime maintained a price freeze for the next five years. In June 1976 another round of increases raised basic food costs 30–100 percent, 70 percent on meat and 100 percent on sugar. People throughout the country expressed their anger and frustration with strikes and street demonstrations. In the industrial center of Radom, where

the largest protests occurred, police responded with exceptional brutality, indiscriminately assaulting and arresting workers. The police refrained from the use of firearms to avoid the escalation of 1970, but wielded wire-covered rubber clubs against the crowd: 2,000 people were detained, many of whom were tortured at the police station. In Ursus workers removed sections of rail line to ensure that news of the strike would reach other areas of Poland. They stopped a food train and distributed the goods among the crowd. Police watched from helicopters overhead but did not intervene until the protesters began to disperse after a speech by the prime minister revoking the price increases. Unions cooperated with the police in helping them to identify participants in the hold up of the train from aerial photographs. The repressive measures enacted in Radom were repeated in Ursus, with many suffering brutal treatment at the hands of the police. In the wake of the protests the police continued to maintain a military-like occupation of the cities, harassing workers on their way to and from work, searching homes, and interrogating family members. The party meanwhile initiated a public relations campaign to cast the protesters as hooligans committed to wanton destruction of the Polish state.

Although the strikes and protests in 1970 had been larger than those in 1976, the scale of the police crackdown and prosecution of participants during the latter was unprecedented. The utter lawlessness of the police inspired a group of students and intellectuals to extend support to the workers and their families in an initiative that developed into one of the most significant independent civil society organization in the Soviet bloc: KOR. Recognizing that division between the workers and the intelligentsia served the interests of the Communist Party by making it easier to contain the discontent of either group – evident in the abortive student uprisings of 1968 in which the workers did not support the students and in the easy coopting of the workers post-1970 – several prominent intellectuals organized financial, medical, and legal assistance for detainees and their families, and publicized their plight.

Founding of KOR

Jacek Kuroń and Antoni Macierewicz were leaders of the collective initiative to assist the workers. They began by attending the Ursus trials where

Małgorzata Łukasiewiczówna's expression of sympathy to the families opened communication between the two groups. Jan Józef Lipski provided the initial funds for legal assistance from money he had received from a church organization. Scouts from Black Troop No. 1 provided child-care for families while they attended the court proceedings. Medical care was arranged for those who needed it, a critical intervention as many suffered health problems due to police brutality, but lost their state insurance when they were fired from their positions for participating in the protests. The volunteers, primarily scouts and affiliates of the Club of the Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK), arranged legal counsel for the workers facing prosecution and used the funds secured by Lipski to pay their fees.

In September the relief effort was extended to Radom, where the strikes and riots had been larger and repression was even more severe. Reprisals against relief workers by the security forces, already present in Ursus, grew more intense. Young volunteers were harassed and occasionally arrested and detained. A formal committee was proposed in order to protect the volunteers by putting them within the aegis of a larger social authority, including that of the Catholic Church, which was a major visible source of support.

KOR was formally established in September 1976 with 14 official members, largely drawn from Warsaw's intelligentsia. Nine others who had been involved in the work of the committee since its beginning officially joined later that year or early the next. The organization's first communiqué, issued on September 29, 1976, provided information about its work in Radom and Ursus and the police reprisals it had suffered. The names and telephone numbers of the members were clearly listed. Over the next several months KOR sent open letters of protest to the communist government and issued a newsletter, *Komunikat*, that kept the public informed of the workers' situations and its own activities. KOR members also edited *Biuletyn Informacyjny* (Information Bulletin), which played an important role in chronicling the relief effort and promoting public life, but unlike *Komunikat* was not the official voice of KOR. Its purpose was to break the information monopoly held by the party-state and foster independent critical thinking about political and economic reform. This initially primitive publication developed into the first

periodical of the movement, and a powerful networking tool.

Transformation to the Committee for Self-Defense

On February 3, 1977 the Council of State recommended an “act of clemency” that reduced or rescinded the sentences of most of the protesters. With the practical realization of their stated objective many associate organizations felt that KOR should disband. But in the face of continued harassment of those who were originally arrested and intensified reprisals against KOR and its associates, KOR opted to expand the tasks of the committee to encompass a broad campaign against political oppression and support for its victims. Several months later, the (undoubtedly) state-sponsored murder of student and KOR activist Stanislaw Pyjas, who was gathering evidence for a report about police brutality, propelled KOR to become a full-scale opposition movement.

Students responded to Pyjas’s death with spontaneous street protests and organized memorials. Undeterred by the potential of arrest and detention, thousands of people participated in masses and public marches in his memory. Students distributed obituaries and demanded to know who was responsible for his death. KOR’s active role in these protests and public ceremonies resulted in arrests, beatings, and searches of members’ apartments later that month. Many committee members and several important activists were arrested and charged with harming the interests of the Polish People’s Republic by disseminating false information. The organization responded by publicizing the arrests both domestically and abroad, issuing a statement of collective responsibility for the actions of KOR, and demanding the individuals’ release. In cooperation with the Catholic Church and other non-KOR activists they coordinated protests, including a collective fast, and issued an open letter to the government with over a thousand signatures.

The imprisoned KOR members and activists were finally granted amnesty in July 1977, along with five workers who were still being held from the 1976 protests. In his comprehensive treatment of KOR’s development in *The Origins of Democratization in Poland* (1993), Bernhard marks this as a watershed moment of internal recognition of the strength of the movement generated

by KOR, and the real possibilities of resistance. The committee had survived in the face of repression and attempts at isolation by the party-state and new parts of society had become more practiced in self-organization and advocacy. KOR members reorganized to promote this emergent capacity for “social self-defense” against the communist regime and develop the position it had come to occupy as the focal point for political opposition.

In line with its commitment to practicing the ideals that it sought to actualize – in this case transparency and accountability in public organizations – KOR subjected its finances and activities to review by a citizens’ committee before deciding how to best fulfill the social role its actions had generated. It changed its name to the Social Self-Defense Committee (Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej), but retained KOR in the title. The reorganized KSS-“KOR” resolved to struggle against repression on the basis of politics, race, religion, or worldview and support victims of such repression; to struggle against violation of the rule of law and work to institutionalize civil rights and freedoms; and to support and defend all social initiatives aimed at realizing human and civil rights. The organization asserted a positive program of action in the “Declaration of the Democratic Movement” in which it identified the entwinement of state and society as the key problem to address in achieving their objectives. Extension of basic freedoms was the solution. They asserted co-responsibility for the future of Poland, calling on citizens to take initiative in promoting reforms, and on the authorities to observe the international human rights treaties to which they were signatories.

KSS-“KOR” provided training in organizing and advocacy to workers. It facilitated the creation of peasant and artisan cooperatives and helped to coordinate the reform initiatives of various organizations from all aspects of society. From 1977 until its voluntary dissolution in 1981, organized opposition in Poland grew to a size unprecedented in the Soviet bloc. The dynamic redefinition of public life during this period extended to groups and organizations well beyond the Warsaw intellectual milieu that first gave rise to KOR. The organization helped to create independent groups of worker activists with tools to demand democratic representation and institutional guarantees of the rights they were claiming through organized collective action.

One of the critical functions of KSS-“KOR” was information distribution. Its Intervention Bureau collected and publicized information on human rights violations. KSS-“KOR” supported the publication of *Robotnik* (Worker), which specifically addressed the concerns of workers, as well as the *Komunikat* and *Biuletyn Informacyjny*. Some of its members published the journal *Głos* (The Voice), edited by Macierewicz, although over time this group increasingly prioritized nationalism and independence over human and civic rights. KSS-“KOR” presented the first rigorous analysis of the economic situation in Poland, produced by professional economists and distributed as a booklet in the spring of 1978. It conducted a campaign against censorship, arguing that a secret dossier on the operations of the censor’s office demonstrated its harmfulness to both the public and the state. In August 1979 the underground press published the “Charter of Workers’ Rights” developed by the nascent labor movement under the auspices of KOR, which was the basis of the demands presented to the Polish government by the Interfactory Strike Committee in Gdansk a year later.

KSS-“KOR” also organized financial support for people who suffered for speaking out against the regime. The Social Self-Defense Fund provided assistance to those who had lost their jobs because of affiliation with KOR, while another fund provided financial support for students who were denied study grants for their political activities. Many KSS-“KOR” members were also active in organizing and providing courses for the Flying University. They established contacts with members of the democratic opposition in other countries – notably Andrei Sakharov of the Soviet Union, Václav Havel and other representatives of Charter 77 from Czechoslovakia, and prominent Hungarian dissidents – and facilitated international cooperation in challenging state socialism. When the strikes began in Gdansk in 1980 KSS-“KOR” immediately established itself as a strike information agency. It became a contact center for strike committees and many of its members served as expert advisors to the strike leaders. KSS-“KOR” publications played a critical role in connecting Poland during this period, so effectively raising popular awareness of the events on the Baltic coast that the government press could no longer ignore the fact that labor unrest had engulfed Poland.

KSS-“KOR” voluntarily disbanded at the Solidarity Congress in Gdansk in 1981, nearly five years to the day after its inception. With the creation of *Solidarność* the previous year many of the activists and members increasingly directed their energy toward the union. The alliance between workers and intellectuals cultivated by KOR laid the foundation of *Solidarność*, which had grown to a country-wide social movement, 10 million strong. In Kuron’s words at the moment of KOR’s dissolution, “With Solidarity on the scene, it became superfluous” (Celt & Sabbat 1981: 2). The workers, who were now well trained in self-organization and advocacy, would take the helm over the next decade of struggle.

SEE ALSO: Kuroń, Jacek (1934–2004); Michnik, Adam (b. 1946); Poland, 1956 Uprising; Poland, Student Movement, 1968; Poland, Trade Unions and Protest, 1988–1993; *Solidarność* (Solidarity); Walentynowicz, Anna (b. 1929); Walesa, Lech (b. 1943); Women in the Solidarity Movement, Polish Underground

References and Suggested Readings

- Bernhard, M. (1993) *The Origins of Democratization in Poland: Workers, Intellectuals and Opposition Politics, 1976–1980*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Celt, E. & Sabbat, A. (1981) KSS-“KOR” Disbands: Five Years in Retrospect. RAD Background Report 284, Poland. Open Society Archives. www.files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/46-2-11.shtml (includes a full list of KOR members and their biographies).
- Lipski, J. J. (1985) *KOR: A History of the Workers’ Defense Committee in Poland 1976–1981*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Zuzowski, R. (1992) *Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland*. London: Praeger.

Poland, 1956 Uprising

A. Kemp-Welch

Poland first rose up against communist rule in 1956, when popular pressures obliged the authorities to reform the discredited Stalinist system. These forced concessions helped to stabilize the mono-party system for another decade.

Khrushchev’s “secret speech” denouncing Stalin at a closed session of the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress (February 1956) soon leaked out. It divided the communist movement

into different roads to socialism, named by the Italian Togliatti "polycentrism." Within particular countries, notably Poland, it caused a collision between the friends and foes of change. Poland's leader Boleslaw Bierut died in Moscow shortly after the Congress. The surviving Polish Stalinists found themselves challenged by a revisionist faction which sought to open political debate to a wider public. Polish communists, uniquely in the bloc, published Khrushchev's revelations in full. They were read to mass meetings of both party and non-party members up and down the country. In the ensuing discussions, which sometimes lasted into the early morning, audiences raised thousands of questions about communist rule. The public's agenda soon moved from issues of Soviet history to ones of current Polish politics. Workers criticized the over-centralized and mismanaged economy; farmers called for the return of their confiscated land. All demanded a more equal relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union. Alarmed by the mass response, the party leadership tried to rein in the debate, but it was too late.

The industrial city of Poznan erupted on June 28. Workers at the giant Stalin Factory (ZiSPO) declared a general strike. Thousands formed up outside the gates and marched into town to present their material grievances to local party officials. They were joined by housewives and school children en route. As the column passed the cathedral its leaders knelt down to receive blessings from priests on the steps. At this stage, the atmosphere was relaxed. The mood soon changed when it became clear that local officials were unwilling or unable to meet the demonstrators' demands. Faced with this impasse, the economic agenda widened. In a few hours it became a national uprising against Polish communists seen as little more than lackeys of a foreign power. The protest became an insurrection. The insurgents considered themselves to be "the Nation" and began to assume that the rest of the country was rising up with them. In response, the Soviet-trained minister of defense, Marshal Rokossovsky, was given a free hand to suppress "adventurists who attack state institutions." His deployment of 400 tanks and armored vehicles left 73 dead and many hundreds seriously wounded. Seven soldiers were also killed.

De-Stalinization in the Soviet Union was halted immediately afterwards. Moscow declared

that the United States had instigated the "disturbances" in Poznan. In reality, policy-makers in Washington had recently concluded that the Soviet bloc was stabilized by ten years of Sovietization. It was surprised by the Poznan rising. But the Polish public was unconvinced by the official newsreel calling the event an isolated instance of vandalism against public property by now-repentant hooligans. Public opinion was enflamed and assumed that, after the summer vacation, protests would resume.

While the Polish party elite hid its factional struggles behind a façade of unanimity, there was uproar from its rank and file. The lower echelons now sought a real input into decision-making. They sent thousands of resolutions to Warsaw. A new demand now appeared: the return of former party leader Gomulka, who had headed the first stage of socialist rule (1944–8) before being removed, on Moscow's orders, as a "right-nationalist deviator." By early October Gomulka was restored to the Politburo. Criticizing the repression of Poznan, he argued that the party should reconnect with the working class and the wider nation through radical measures. Central government should be cut and the much-hated Soviet "advisors" in key ministries be sent home. He added that Poland's relations with the Soviet Union had become too subservient and should be placed on a more equal footing. The response of Marshal Rokossovsky was to order three Soviet armored columns, stationed in the north and west of Poland, to begin a march on Warsaw. Soviet warships took up positions in the bay of Gdansk. Rokossovsky put trusted units on alert to seize strategic buildings in the capital, without informing the Politburo. But some Polish leaders, notably the Warsaw city party leader Staszewski, considered counter-measures.

At the height of this very tense stand-off, two Soviet planes arrived in Polish airspace, requesting permission to land. They contained key members of the Politburo, led by Khrushchev. In crisis talks, Khrushchev threatened to "intervene brutally" in Poland to defend Soviet interests. Gomulka remained calm and managed to persuade the visitors of his unshakeable loyalty both to the fundamentals of the Soviet system, above all mono-party rule, and to the Warsaw Pact. In return, he was reinstated as party leader and given a free hand to calm the public down.

Gomulka's famous oration to 300,000 citizens in front of Warsaw's Palace of Culture is mainly

remembered for his sensational announcement that Soviet troops had halted their advance on Warsaw and would return to barracks. He promised a new version of socialism, based on a greater enterprise autonomy and worker self-management. He invited Polish Catholics to take a patriotic part in rebuilding the economy and social life. Finally, he told the crowd that the time for demonstrations was over: they should now return to work for the good of the socialist state.

In the confused aftermath, sporadic demonstrations continued. The Polish public showed what solidarity they could with their Hungarian “brothers,” whose own violent uprising against communist rule was being bloodily suppressed. As anti-Russian demonstrations took place in Poland, Gomulka flew to Moscow. Bilateral talks resulted in the withdrawal of many Soviet “advisors,” above all Rokossovsky who was pensioned off, and agreement of rules regularizing the stationing of Soviet troops on Polish soil. Within the country, the balance sheet was mixed: 1956 brought most benefit to private farmers. Spontaneous de-collectivization emptied the state and collective farms; 90 percent had disbanded by Christmas. In accordance with his promise, Gomulka restored the Catholic Church to a legitimate though restricted role in public life. In return for eschewing high politics the church was allowed to resume its cultural and pastoral duties. For intellectuals, however, the promise of much greater openness glimpsed in the Polish October was disappointed. Censorship, which had lifted, was soon reimposed and independent discussion clubs were closed down. They did not recur until the later 1960s. Above all, the working class, which had done most to press for political change, was let down. The promise of greater input in factory management soon evaporated and the economy settled into a decade of stagnation. The renewal of working-class protests in 1970 finally toppled Gomulka.

No adequate histories of 1956 appeared during the communist period. All focused on narrow factional struggles within the ruling elite. Once archives were opened, Pawel Machcewicz produced a magnificent study of the period “from below.” Using declassified Ministry of Interior reports, he shows that 1956 was a popular uprising, strongly nationalist and anti-Russian. This changed in subsequent protests. Learning from the repression of Poznan that open demonstrations are an easy target, in 1970

shipyard workers on the Baltic Coast preferred occupational strikes.

SEE ALSO: Poland, Student Movement, 1968

References and Suggested Readings

- Kemp-Welch, A. (2008) *Poland under Communism: A Cold War History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Machcewicz, P. (1993) *Polski Rok 1956*. Warsaw: Mowia wieki.
- Persak, K. (2008) The Polish-Soviet Confrontation in 1956. In T. Cox (Ed.), *Challenging Communism in Europe: 1956 and its Legacy*. London: Routledge.
- Toranska, T. (1987) *Oni: Stalin's Polish Puppets*. London: Collins Harvill.

Poland, Revolutions, 1846–1863

Amy Linch

The failure of the November Uprising in Congress Poland (1830–1) was by no means the end of Polish ambitions to unify the territories of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, partitioned among Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary at the turn of the nineteenth century. Russia's brutal reprisal in the wake of the 1830 Revolution resulted in a large émigré community – concentrated in Paris – that plotted from afar to recapture the partitioned territories through diplomatic, military, and conspiratorial action. Among the Polish democrats the previous revolt was widely regarded as having failed, not because of Russia's greater military power, but because the Poles did not free the serfs and thus lacked their support in the military campaign. Social reform therefore came to be seen as critical to the struggle for national independence.

The émigré community was divided into two camps. The conservatives, who followed Adam Czartoryski, the military leader of 1830, anticipated liberating Poland through a military defeat of Russia with the help of Britain and France. The more broadly representative Polish Democratic Society (PDS) envisioned the abolition of class privilege and overthrow of the monarchy through mass insurrection. Initially conservatives sought an independent constitutional monarchy and eschewed radical social reform, but by the 1840s they came to endorse emancipation as well, recognizing both the

strategic importance of the peasants and the popular appeal of PDS's program.

Krakow Revolution, 1846

The PDS and secret revolutionary organizations planned a series of uprisings in every territory of Partitioned Poland beginning February 1846. The campaign would commence in Poznań and Galicia and then progress eastward to seize control of Congress Poland, eventually restoring the pre-partition boundaries. A local landowner in Poznań foiled the plan by betraying the conspirators to the Prussian authorities. Austrian troops invaded the Republic of Krakow to prevent the outbreak of revolution there and arrested several conspirators, but peasants and miners rose up against the Austrian troops and drove them from the region. Fighting broke out in the city of Krakow as well, largely driven by urban workers and artisans intent upon eliminating local aristocrats and the wealthy bourgeoisie as well as the Austrians. The insurgents seized power and proclaimed the National Government of the Polish Republic. They issued the *Manifest do Narodu Polskiego* (A Manifesto to the Polish Nation), calling on Poles in all of the territories to rise up in support of Polish independence. The Manifesto promised enfranchisement of peasants, abolition of serfdom without compensation to landlords, and distribution of land to peasants who participated in the revolt. It further promised protection for the poor, national workshops, and complete equality with Christians for Jews.

The National Government drew support from the urban and rural working classes and a large section of the Jewish community. Within three days over 6,000 people had joined the revolutionary forces. Jan Józef Tyssowski dissolved the government after several days and declared himself dictator. He refused to conscript all of the volunteers and pursued a compromise with the local conservative nobility. Edward Dembowski led a group of miners into Krakow and managed to revive the revolution by taking control as Tyssowski's secretary. He formed a revolutionary club and promised in Tyssowski's name the establishment of national workshops with high wages, an end to taxes on basic items, and harsh measures for any who delayed emancipation.

Dembowski tried to extend the revolution to Western Galicia, to little avail. Peasants lived

under harsh conditions of servitude and were mistrustful of the local elites who sought their support against Austria. Poverty was widespread as a result of the agrarian crisis in Europe and much-needed reforms had been stymied for some time by conflict between the Austrian and Polish reformers (Hahn 2001: 172). Austrian forces fomented opposition to the democrats among the peasantry with promises of reform and incentives for capturing or killing seditious landlords. Austrian efforts to direct peasant antagonism against Polish nationalist landowners resulted in a brutal peasant uprising against the local nobility. Peasants attacked manor houses, indiscriminately murdering, looting, and burning them to the ground. In Tarnow nearly 90 percent of the nobles and gentry were killed and their homes destroyed. An estimated 2,000 aristocrats died in the peasant uprising, most of whom had nothing to do with the revolution (Wandycz 1974: 135).

With the assistance of the peasants Austrian troops defeated the insurgents in Galicia within a few days. Prussian authorities disarmed Tyssowski and more than a thousand revolutionaries as they fled Krakow without a fight. On March 4, 1846, Russian and Austrian forces occupied Krakow. The Krakow Republic was dissolved and annexed by Austria in November of that year. Austrian institutions replaced Polish ones, with German established as the language of education and public affairs. An ensuing economic crisis resulted in an increase in poverty and further peasant unrest, and the Austrian authorities harshly suppressed peasant efforts to eliminate feudal obligations. The independence conspiracy continued but it was severely weakened by the failure of 1846. Emigré leaders lost influence among Poles within the territories, international support for Polish independence was not forthcoming, and the democrats' romantic image of the peasants as the soul of the nation had been shattered.

Despite its ignominious defeat at the hands of Galician peasants, the Krakow revolution was honored by the European left for its placement of social reform at the core of the struggle for national independence. The mass trial of 254 conspirators held in Berlin provided seven months of publicity for the Polish revolutionary goals and linked the Polish struggle to the German Revolution of 1848 (Wandycz 1974: 137). Marx and Engels declared that German freedom was

only possible with the liberation of Poland. The eight sentences of death and 97 of imprisonment were never executed due to the outbreak of the March Revolution in 1848.

Poznań Uprising, 1848

Polish patriots in the Grand Duchy of Poznań seized the opportunity created by the 1848 Revolution in Berlin to advance their goal of national independence for the Polish section of the province. As news of the revolution reached the region, the Poznań National Committee was formed to organize a delegation to petition the king for Polonization of public affairs and the creation of a Polish army. The king granted the request under the condition that law and order prevail during national reorganization. Meanwhile, under the leadership of Walenty Stefanski and newly freed conspirators of 1846, including Ludwik Mieroslawski, the committee began organizing a volunteer militia as the basis of a Polish national army. It established Polish administration in the provinces, abolished feudal obligations, and granted full equality to the Jews. The Prussian forces tried to rouse local German people to resist the Polish assumption of power and in some places provoked open conflict between the two groups.

Initially most Germans supported the Polish cause, particularly German democrats. However, as clashes between the two communities increased and the threat of a Russian invasion did not materialize, German national interest trumped solidarity under liberal ideals. Frederick Wilhelm IV secretly ordered his army to suppress the Poles (Wandycz 1974: 140) and curtailed the promised autonomy to areas that were “purely Polish.” The “Polish” region ultimately excluded nearly 75 percent of Poznań region and the city itself. In the face of such pronounced injustice, armed resistance by the Poles seemed unavoidable.

Mieroslawski and much of the Polish leadership preferred a negotiated route to Polish independence and were loath to employ their 6,000–7,000 troops in battle against the Prussians. Their plan had been to support a war against Russia, not to engage in partisan warfare, which they thought suicidal for their poorly armed volunteers. The more radical wing of the leadership, however, wanted to continue the struggle for independence and social reform through guerilla warfare. Fearing the Poles’ con-

solidation of power, the Prussian authorities declared martial law on April 4, 1848. They intended to dissolve the administrative committees but were restrained by orders from Berlin to await the arrival of General Wilhelm von Willisen, who was sent to mediate the conflict. Despite being a supporter of both the Poles and the war against Russia, Willisen ordered the dissolution of the Polish armed forces in exchange for autonomy – which he knew to be disingenuous. A convention at Jaroslawiec on April 11 reduced the army to several hundred troops consolidated into four units. The National Committee signed the agreement reluctantly, to the chagrin of the soldiers, who regarded their compliance as betrayal of the revolutionary cause.

After Willisen left the region the Prussian authorities violated the agreement, dissolving the local administrative committees and sanctioning brutal treatment of the insurgents. To quell the rebellious spirit still alive among many Poles, the conservative-dominated National Committee ordered the remaining troops to disband. They refused and elected Mieroslawski to remain their commander in chief. On April 25 the Prussian authorities restricted the scope of Polish autonomy more dramatically and unleashed a campaign of terror against the Polish population. The National Committee issued a public statement to beware the treachery of the Prussians and dissolved itself. Volunteer troops led by Mieroslawski defeated the Prussians in two battles but sustained heavy losses. The insurgent forces gradually dwindled, in part because the gentry officers refused to continue fighting. By the beginning of May the remaining troops had formed guerilla units but were soon defeated by the Prussian forces. They formally capitulated on May 9, 1848 with a guarantee of amnesty for those involved from the Prussian authorities. The agreement was soon broken, however. Over 1,500 insurgents were arrested and imprisoned; where prisons were overcrowded, peasants were branded on the ears and hands and released.

The defeat of the Poznań uprising was the first success in the counterrevolution against the “Spring of Nations” in 1848. The uprising was the first conflict between the German and Polish nationalities in Poznań. It undermined confidence in the Prussian authorities and awakened national consciousness among the Poles. The failed revolution further deepened divisions between the émigrés and local Polish leaders who were

resentful of the émigrés' attempts to control the revolution. In the face of grim prospects for independence, many Poles in the Poznań region focused on economic and cultural advancement rather than armed struggle. The ensuing period of "organic work" saw the development of the Polish League and efforts to promote economic rationalism and a Polish national identity among peasants.

1863 Uprising: The January Insurrection

The mass insurrection envisioned by Polish conspirators in 1846 came to fruition nearly two decades later in the Russian sector of Partitioned Poland. Also known as the January Insurrection, the 1863 uprising in the Congress Kingdom, Lithuania, Belarus, and parts of Latvia and Ukraine was the largest and most consequential of the armed struggles for Polish independence. Over 200,000 peasants, workers, and landowners united in guerilla warfare against the Russian army for more than a year, provoking profound socio-economic transformation of the region (Wandycz 1974: 179). Peasant emancipation, decreed by Alexander II in 1861, became a practical reality during the struggle, and the brutal Russian reprisal against the aristocracy hastened the decline of the feudal social structure. But the devastating consequences of the revolution's failure, in death, dispossession, and mass exile, led many Poles to abandon the idea of liberating their country through armed resistance.

Russia responded to the exposure of the 1846 conspiracy in Partitioned Poland by fortifying the regions under its control with additional troops to prevent the outbreak of revolution. Conspiratorial networks remained active but resistance was kept underground by intense tsarist suppression of civic life. In the late 1850s, with Russia economically and politically weakened by the Crimean War and the beginning of liberalization under Alexander II, Polish independence once again became the subject of open political debate.

Warsaw was infused with new intellectual energy as political prisoners from 1831 were allowed to return from exile, and students came to study in universities newly established under Alexander II's more relaxed policies. Students and young people inspired by both the heroes of 1831 and leftist intellectuals such as Herzen,

Marx, Engels, and Bakunin began organizing patriotic protests; the School of Fine Arts and the Medical-Surgical Academy in Warsaw became centers of conspiratorial activity. Landowners, organized under the leadership of Andrzej Zamoyski as the Agricultural Society in 1857 to promote agricultural innovation and reform, also turned to the question of Polish independence. A "moral revolution" was well under way within the larger society by 1861, involving resistance to Russian authority, new associations at all levels of society, and interfaith and inter-class fraternization. The tsar's willingness to entertain reforms to avert a peasant uprising did not extend to full liberation of Poland, however, and divisions arose both among the landowners and across social classes as to the best means to realize growing patriotic ambitions.

In 1861 clashes between the police and demonstrators intensified as people demanded liberation of the serfs and Polish autonomy. When Russian forces opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators in February, killing five people, a delegation of representatives from every class and faith in Warsaw petitioned the viceroy for relief. In the face of this united Polish front, Viceroy Gorchakov withdrew the troops from the streets and sought an alliance with Polish liberals in maintaining peace. The liberal camp was divided between Zamoyski, leader of the Agricultural Society who feared social revolution but was unwilling to collaborate with the Russians, and Wielopolski, who embraced Russia as a partner in real reforms. Wielopolski successfully negotiated the revival of local self-government along with badly needed educational, religious, and land reforms, but his statist approach was hostile to the church hierarchy and the Agricultural Society as leaders in social revival and resulted in alienation of public opinion. His April 6 dissolution of the Agricultural Society and the City Delegation that had responded to the first deaths at the hands of Russian troops resulted in huge crowds of protesters in front of the viceroy's residence two days later. Despite his efforts to stop the massacre of over 100 protesters by Russian troops, the event branded him a traitor in the public eye, especially among left-leaning students and workers.

With the dissolution of the Agricultural Society the churches became a major center of the "moral revolution." National hymns were sung at special masses that became patriotic ceremonies

open to all faiths (Wandycz 1974: 166). The movement spread to Lithuania and Volhynia where singing protesters clashed with Russian troops. In October a Russian attack on two churches in Warsaw resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of thousands of people. Russia declared martial law and summoned Wielopolski, who resigned from his position as head of Poland's Civil Administration, to Moscow.

Polish society was divided into two major groups: the "Reds," comprised of left-leaning petty nobles, students, and workers, and the "Whites," who were largely liberal-minded landed nobles and gentry. By the end of 1861 and early 1862 the divisions between the two groups began to soften. Wielopolski's return from Moscow with approval of a separate Polish administration won the support of some Whites, but the feeble gestures toward land reform raised the ire of the Reds. His order of the public hanging of three young Reds for attempting to assassinate Grand Duke Constantine upon his arrival in Warsaw as viceroy further eroded public confidence in him and created martyrs for the revolution. Zamoyski moved the Whites closer to the Reds by refusing to collaborate with the Russians in the absence of a Polish army, a constitution, and restoration of the former eastern territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. By the end of 1862 the Reds' newly organized National Central Committee had the financial support of much of the gentry and lower clergy in its preparations for insurrection. The Committee, which presented itself as a *de facto* national government, demanded national independence for Poland, equal rights for men regardless of class or religion, transfer of land ownership to the peasants who cultivated it with compensation to landlords from state funds, and abolition of compulsory labor.

The Reds regarded their revolutionary goals as part of a larger struggle for social emancipation anticipated in Russia where abolition of serfdom had not alleviated the plight of the peasants. They intended to await the outbreak of insurgency in Russia before initiating their own revolution, but as the Russian conspiracy appeared increasingly incapable of waging military action, Wielopolski moved to neutralize the Reds through selective conscription into the army. He excluded landowners and farm workers from the draft in favor of the urban youth who were the core of the Red organization. The National Central

Committee declared that the draft would be resisted with force, and against the judgment of several committee members Zygmunt Padlewski began the insurrection, without preparation or a concrete military plan, in the middle of winter.

The Committee issued a manifesto declaring its political goals and calling for support from the nations under Russian control. Priests and leaders of the insurrection read a declaration of the end of serfdom to the peasants and appeals were issued to the Jews and Ukrainians to gain their support. Thousands volunteered and in the first month managed to drive out three-quarters of the occupying Russian troops, despite being outnumbered 20 to 1. But they lacked strategy and command.

Napoleon III's indication that he supported the revolution gave the White leadership the pretext they needed to join the insurrection in April 1863. They contributed financial resources as well as military and political experience to the cause, and quickly gained substantial influence over both the insurgency and the government. Throughout 1863 the Reds and Whites cooperated in running a full-fledged shadow state centered in Warsaw. The Reds mobilized peasants in Lithuania and Belarus and the revolution developed a broad social base of support in these regions. The National Government was less successful in extending the revolution to Ukraine, where peasants regarded the insurgent leaders with suspicion. Poles in Prussia and Galicia also lent financial and military support, and many volunteers from other European nations fought and died for the ideal of social equality represented by the Polish struggle.

The insurgents were far outnumbered by the Russian forces and were ultimately able to do little more than disrupt the Russians' efforts to regain control of the region while waiting for assistance from the European powers. The expected aid from France was not forthcoming, and diplomatic intervention from Sweden merely emboldened Russia in stamping out the revolution. Romuald Traugutt temporarily revived the revolutionary spirit and worked aggressively to engage the peasants when he took control of the insurgency in October 1863. In February and March 1864, however, Alexander II issued emancipation decrees, ending feudal obligations and granting peasants ownership of the land they cultivated. By co-opting the reforms instituted by the National Government the Russians

neutralized peasant support for the revolution. The arrest and execution of Traugutt and four other members of the Polish government in August 1864 precipitated the collapse of the resistance later that year.

Russia imposed harsh reprisals in the wake of the uprising. Over 70,000 people were arrested and imprisoned or deported and the government confiscated over 3,000 estates between Poland and Lithuania. Church lands were appropriated and monasteries and convents were abolished. Former government functionaries were banned from government positions and Polish autonomy was completely reversed. An intense policy of Russification was imposed in schools and public administration. The vision of national independence that had been sustained over three decades in the partitioned territories and Polish diaspora was abandoned as Poles focused on cultural and economic survival under intense Russian repression. Historians regard the failure of the January Uprising as a critical turning point in the development of “Warsaw positivism,” which emphasized identity and structure over agency in the construction of the nation. As Brian Porter describes, the nation became society rather than a cause, constituted by the laws of nature rather than the actions of revolutionary patriots (2000: 44).

SEE ALSO: Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); European Revolutions of 1848; Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Polish Revolution (Sejm), 1788–1792; Polish Revolution of 1830; Polish Revolution, 1905–1907; Women in the 1848 Revolution, Poland

References and Suggested Readings

- Hahn, H. H. (2001) *The Polish Nation in the Revolution of 1846–49*. In D. Dowe et al., *Europe in 1848: Revolution and Reform*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Kisluk, E. J. (2005) *Brothers from the North: The Polish Democratic Society and the European Revolutions of 1848–1849*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs.
- Kramer, L. S. (1988) *Threshold of a New World: Intellectuals and the Exile Experience in Paris, 1830–1848*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kutolowski, J. F. (2000) *The West and Poland: Essays on Governmental and Public Responses to the Polish National Movement, 1861–1864*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs.
- Porter, B. (2000) *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wandycz, P. (1974) *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1779–1918*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Poland, student movement, 1968

A. Kemp-Welch

Activist Adam Michnik, veteran of 1968, later reflected to a fellow-radical, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, that “the late sixties were interesting because a few friends and I managed to function as a legal opposition group within a system that didn’t admit the existence of a legal opposition. It’s thanks to the University [of Warsaw] that we were able to exist.” Students debated and argued at the Club of Seekers after Contradictions and sang songs of the Russian “dissidents” Galich and Okudzava. Sometimes they sallied forth to ask difficult and embarrassing questions at meetings of their elders: about the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact or the fate of Polish soldiers at Katyń. As the Prague Spring emerged, they chanted: “Poland demands its own Dubček.”

Imprisoned activists Jacek Kuroń and Karol Modzelewski were role models for these youthful rebels and many actions were attempted in their defense. Michnik sent copies of Kuroń and Modzelewski’s 1964 “Open Letter to the Party” to Paris, where it was widely circulated by students occupying Paris universities in May 1968. Soon after the authors’ release from prison, a new issue presented itself in which the twin themes of national independence and cultural freedom were neatly entwined.

Mickiewicz’s classical drama *Dziady* (*Forefathers*) was staged at the National Theater to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. It is not clear why its subject, Poland’s struggle for freedom under the Russian partition, was thought suitable by the theatrical censorship, but performances began on November 25, 1967, and high dignitaries of the party and state attended. During the play’s run, audiences grew increasingly responsive to the anti-Russian passages. This alarmed the authorities, who banned the play on January 30, 1968, which happened to coincide with a favorable review in *Pravda*. The last performance was packed and the audience frequently expressed its enthusiastic support. As the curtain fell, Modzelewski called from the gallery: “Independence without

Censorship!" Afterwards, about 300 members of the audience marched out to the nearby Mickiewicz statue, festooning it with flowers and banners, demanding more performances. This first street demonstration in more than a decade shocked the party leadership.

In the next few days, Warsaw University students collected signatures for a two-sentence petition to the Sejm (parliament): "We, Warsaw youth, protest against the decision to ban performances of Adam Mickiewicz's *Dziady* at the National Theater in Warsaw. We protest against a policy cutting us off from the progressive traditions of the Polish nation." There was strong support throughout the university, particularly in the departments of philosophy, history, and political economy and in residence halls. By February 5 the students had gathered 400 signatures; by the time the petition was presented to parliament on February 16, they had 3,000 signatures. The students' demand became an international issue when two of the "commandos," Michnik and Henryk Szlajfer, were interviewed for *Le Monde* by Bernard Margueritte. Their account of current events was widely reported abroad and broadcast back to Poland on Radio Free Europe.

Some students managed to travel, despite a banning edict at train and bus stations and even road blocks. Warsaw student Jan Gross reached Kraków on March 10 where his organizing meetings were monitored by the secret police. The first posters went up early that morning: "Help Warsaw" and "Down with Censorship." Five hundred Kraków students were demonstrating at the Mickiewicz statue by midday. One thousand attended a mass meeting and passed a resolution in support of Warsaw students. The rector's appeal for calm discussion of the matter in hand was initially well received. He withdrew his offer to negotiate, however, when the students presented a much more extensive reform agenda. The students put forth five demands: adherence to the constitution; release of the detained students and researchers; full public disclosure with respect to the course of events; a special commission to establish the facts which would proceed in public; and autonomy for higher education in Poland. They called for publication of the above within 48 hours.

The initially mild reaction by the Kraków authorities was later ascribed to the comparative liberalism of the local leaders, who did not wish

to inflame tensions. But it is also attributable to the sheer speed of events, which took the secret police and militia by surprise. The authorities had not experienced such protests since 1956 and were thus slow to respond. This did not deter them from considerable brutality thereafter, however. A "pacification" operation took place over four days, during which raids with gas and water were conducted on the university campus and 128 students were arrested.

The next revolt was in Lublin, home both to the Catholic University (KUL) and the state university named after Maria Skłodowska-Curie. Having heard the Radio Free Europe broadcast, students circulated fliers "in solidarity with the young students of Warsaw." According to official estimates, about 1,000 young people (including schoolchildren) assembled on March 11. Their behavior, deemed "aggressive" by official propaganda, was countered by a 300-strong group of workers backed by militia with batons: 43 demonstrators were arrested, including 20 students from KUL. Thereafter, student protests became nationwide.

Two hundred students met in the Łódź University Library to choose a delegation to the rector. The rector responded merely by closing the building. In Gliwice, some 200 students from the Silesian Polytechnical University sang patriotic anthems, the *Internationale*, and laid flowers at the Mickiewicz statue. Four hundred students from Poznań's Adam Mickiewicz University demonstrated peacefully at his statue. Four and a half thousand students from all higher education institutions in Wrocław declared a 48-hour occupation strike. They issued an 11-point resolution, including the establishment of a Sejm Commission to review their demands, and appealed for solidarity from the working class. Their slogans stated: "Workers, we are with you," "Workers, support our interests," "Workers, we're your children," "Workers and peasants!!! We are waiting for your support!"

Official placards responded: "Students Back to their Studies," a sentiment widely echoed in Western Europe during student protests later in the year. Massive counter-rallies were held by the authorities. Their size and organization far outnumbered anything the students could muster. One such event in Kraków passed 80 resolutions, all unanimous in their support of the party and its leadership. Student leaders were portrayed by the party as the "golden youth," living at home,

feeding on bananas (an unobtainable luxury), and smoking American cigarettes. In addition to abusing free higher education, they were sponging off their parents, many of whom had retired from or still occupied high positions. How could their parents have brought up such “parasites”? And then came a more insidious charge. Building on the thesis that the “commandos” were mainly Jewish, the students were accused of using Mickiewicz to disguise their true, Zionist, interests.

The public had yet to hear from party leader Gomulka. His 11-day silence was broken on March 19 with an address to 3,000 party activists in the Congress Hall of the Palace of Culture that was broadcast live throughout the country. Gomulka stated that the student protests had not been spontaneous, but rather had been incited by writers and academics in the humanistic faculties of Warsaw University, such as Professors Brus, Baczek, Morawski, and Bauman, long known within the party for their revisionist views. He then presented a more sinister charge: “An active part in the events was played by young academics of Jewish origin.” Jews, he argued, fell into three categories: Zionist, cosmopolitan, and those loyalists “who regard Poland as their only fatherland.”

Shortly after Gomulka’s speech the rector of Warsaw University announced the abolition of the faculties of economics, philosophy, sociology, and psychology; the third year of mathematics and physics was also disbanded. Some 1,616 students were dismissed from their studies in Warsaw alone, and the purge extended to other university cities. In Wrocław Technical University, 1,553 students were expelled from three departments. An even more dramatic purge – of alleged Zionists – took place in the high offices of state. Between March and May 1968, 483 senior officials were summarily sacked, including four ministers, 14 vice-ministers, seven director-generals, and 51 departmental heads. These measures were replicated with greater severity outside the capital. The reasons for dismissal were charges of “pro-Zionist” views, Jewish origin, or both. As a result of these purges, Poland lost about 15,000 citizens through emigration.

Though quickly suppressed, the student rising of 1968 had long-term consequences. Gomulka’s rule received its first serious challenge: he was overthrown by a workers’ uprising two years later. A large cohort of dispossessed students

struggling to complete their studies part-time or in distant locations, including Michnik, became permanent oppositionists. They helped create the political movement in the 1970s that led to the birth of Solidarność (Solidarity).

SEE ALSO: Dubček, Alexander (1921–1992); Kuroń, Jacek (1934–2004); Michnik, Adam (b. 1946); Poland, 1956 Uprising; Prague Spring; Solidarność (Solidarity); May 1968 French Uprisings; Student Movements

References and Suggested Readings

- Eisler, J. (1991) *Marzec 1968: Geneza, przebieg, konsekwencje* (March 1968: Origins, Course, Consequences). Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
- Michnik, A. (1998) *Letters from Freedom: Post-Cold War Realities and Perspectives*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Raina, P. (1978) *Political Opposition in Poland, 1954–1977*. London: Poets & Painters Press.
- Suri, J. (2003) *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Poland, trade unions and protest, 1988–1993

Tibor T. Mezzmann

In contrast to other communist states behind the former Iron Curtain, trade unions in Poland were central actors both during the events preceding the fall of communism in 1989 and during the first transition years to the promising world of market democracy. Trade unions’ political involvement between 1989 and 1993 rested on a legacy of workers’ protests and union activism during communism, most importantly the much-celebrated “self-limiting revolution” (Staniszki 1984) of the Solidarity trade union in 1980–1. The particularly active and rebellious nature of Polish society during the transition was largely due to trade union involvement (Ekiert & Kubik 1999; Ost 2002). Union involvement expressed both hope and rising social expectations and, amid great economic hardships, social apathy and defensive employee protest.

At once a trade union and a broad-based democratic social and political movement, Solidarity was the dominant union from 1988 to 1993. It spawned new political parties and was the main social force behind the first post-communist

government in Poland. Its all-encompassing role was compared to that of the Catholic Church and the former Polish Communist Party. Solidarity attracted activists with strict trade unionist orientations as well as those interested in wider political activism, opportunities for career advancement, or the betterment of the country. At a minimum, worker protest and activism through trade unions played a foundational role in the constitution of many new social and political identities and institutions in late communist and early post-communist Poland.

The political and economic process of leaving communism behind started in Poland with worker strikes in May and August 1988. The strikes resulted in a widely watched TV duel in November 1988 between two competing trade union leaders: the chairman of the then-illegal Solidarity, Nobel laureate Lech Walesa, and Alfred Miodowicz, chairman of the freshly consolidated pro-communist trade union federation OPZZ. The duel led to the historic Round Table negotiations, involving representatives of the communist government, OPZZ, and Solidarity as both political opposition and as a trade union. Agreements were reached on all-encompassing economic reforms and democratization, as well as the re-legalization of Solidarity as a trade union in April 1989.

The trade union scene was divided ideologically, geographically, and economically into two rival camps: those stemming from the original Solidarity (from 1980–1) and those linked to the reformed (post-)communist OPZZ, a loose federation of economic branch-based unions. The Solidarity camp included several more radically anti-communist organizations, including Fighting Solidarity, Solidarity 80, and the worker movement led by Andrzej Gwiżdża. In addition to differing attitudes towards communism and the government, a crucial point of disagreement among unions was their approach to economic reforms. In the late 1980s there was a consensus among economists that Poland needed radical economic reforms and restructuring. Only the pace of reforms – whether to implement them by shock therapy or more gradually – was up for debate. As industrial workers would bear the brunt of the reforms, the main challenge for trade unions was reconciling responsibilities towards their members in state-owned enterprises facing restructuring with state demands that unions be patriotic, socially responsible, and reform-

legitimizing organizations. Severe economic recession and rapidly rising unemployment in the early 1990s triggered a large number of workers' protests and strikes, putting further pressure on trade unions.

Strikes in 1988 and 1989 were largely political, their main goal being Solidarity's re-legalization. After 1990 workers initiated strikes to demand more equitable distribution of state funds and amelioration of the impact of restructuring on particular sectors of the workforce. The strikers initially came from the privileged sectors of the economy that were losing monopolistic positions: railway/transit workers and miners. By the end of 1991 the collapse of the Soviet market and decrease in the competitiveness of industrial exports due to institutionalization of strong monetarist policies had taken a significant toll on the economy. A broad base of industrial workers was mobilized in response to the deteriorating economic situation. In the beginning of 1992 teachers began organizing coordinated strike actions, followed by workers in the aerospace and military industries. With renewed strikes by railway workers, the cycle began again. At the peak of industrial conflict, in December 1992, there was an 18-day strike in the Silesian coal mines involving 300,000 miners in 65 mines (Kramer 1995: 102). The following spring there was a general strike in the light industry sector and a massive nationwide protest by public sector employees.

Although they were the most visible and best organized form of protest, strikes represented only about 10 percent of industrial conflicts (Kloc 1992: 139). The Law on Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining passed in May 1991 eased restrictions on organizing relative to those in place during communism but nonetheless imposed burdensome conditions on industrial action and did not protect workers in the private sector. The new law coincided with the nadir of economic recession, and workers responded by embracing new modes of protest. From the second half of 1991 non-institutionalized forms of protest intensified. Among these were hunger strikes, sit-ins, road blockades, occupation of public buildings, long-term rotational strikes, and nationwide protests organized by the two leading, national-level organizations, Solidarity and OPZZ.

While struggling to adjust their complex organizations to the new environment, Polish trade unions positioned themselves differently *vis-à-vis*

reforms and the manner of protest and industrial action. The reformed post-communist OPZZ defined itself strictly as a trade union, accepting general social responsibility for reforms but attacking specific economic measures. The smaller trade unions that had split off from Solidarity refused to legitimize the Round Table political agreement or accept economic reforms. Solidarity 80 became especially prominent in organizing militant workers' actions. The OPZZ was less militant, but had access to negotiations with key decision-makers. Continuing its strategy of working within the establishment from the late 1980s, OPZZ gained seats in the Polish parliament in the 1991 and 1993 parliamentary elections in coalition with the reformed post-communist party. Solidarity followed suit and ran independently, winning some seats, but only in 1991, and developing ties with liberal and right-wing parties as well as those that had grown out of Solidarity in the first place.

At the point of its re-legalization, Solidarity was in a weak and fragmented state. Trade union activism was hampered by economic conditions: skilled workers and activists were leaving or had already left industrial jobs for the private sector, weakening the movement's base in the factories. The old territorial organizing principle was inadequate for optimal representation and reconciliation of differing interests among the workforce. From its re-legalization up until early 1991, the union's development was uneven, differing across regions and sectors of the economy. The regional distribution of membership was skewed with a much larger number of members and activists in 6 of 38 regions. This unsynchronized organizational development coincided with disputes and conflicts within the leadership.

Solidarity was initially a protective umbrella against the shock therapy reforms of 1990, but its viability as a real political alternative quickly declined. After 1990 Solidarity had no unified position or straightforward answer to the reforms, nor did it have an accepted and well-defined program. At Solidarity's Second Congress organizational reforms were sidelined in favor of discussions about the union's identity and its political strategies. Walesa was reelected as the chairman. In May 1990 Walesa's "war at the top" for political pluralism caused another serious split within the union and the movement: the liberal wing and those more supportive of the

government were pitted against those favoring greater union autonomy and a more pronounced anti-communist ideology. The friction was severe, and many veteran activists left the union either because of conflict with the chairman or to become involved in party politics or government service. After Walesa became the president of Poland at the end of 1990, steps were taken to democratize decision-making and professionalize the union, but the central authority and cohesive force of the trade union were weak. The union was plagued by a steady departure of its most talented leaders.

After 1991–2 Solidarity continued to act as a buffer between the government and the workers, albeit with increasingly non-transparent and non-coordinated strategies. Solidarity was often characterized as an ungovernable organization, and its lack of organizational discipline undermined its political efficacy within the parliament and as a civil society actor alike. Parliamentary representatives were originally expected to monitor the authorities and influence legislation without taking part in the government, yet some deputies acted as representatives rather than delegates, claiming to be independent of the central leadership. Such behavior resulted in open conflict among the delegates themselves, and with union headquarters. At the plant level, through pressures from the rank and file, union leaders increased their autonomy from the center and conducted independent strikes, ultimately forming a parallel structure. The leadership's attempts to moderate these fragmenting "anarchic" tendencies were only partly successful.

Retrospectively, the success of such deep democratic and economic reforms in Poland is hardly imaginable without the intense involvement of trade unions. However, trade unions paid a high price for their active role. The main weakness of the Polish workers' movement was that they had neither a programmatic vision of the role of trade unions after transition, nor a strategy to cope with a privatized economy. Furthermore, the attempt to compensate for the structural vulnerabilities of trade unionism in a liberalizing economy by engaging party politics in fact backfired. Thus, contemporary trade union membership fell to the lowest levels in post-communist Central Europe. Although trade unions have now grown into professionalized and responsive organizations, some observers have proclaimed the death of worker solidarity in Poland.

SEE ALSO: Kuroń, Jacek (1934–2004); Michnik, Adam (b. 1946); Poland, Committee for Workers (KOR); Solidarność (Solidarity); Walesa, Lech (b. 1943)

References and Suggested Readings

- Adamski, W. W. (1993) Conflict in Trade Union Affiliation: Continuity and Change. In W. W. Adamski (Ed.), *Societal Conflict and Systemic Change: The Case of Poland*. Warsaw: IFiS.
- Ekiert, G. & Kubik, J. (1999) *Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989–1993*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Grabowska, M. (2006) Jako błyskawica: problemy z polityczną instytucjonalizacją ruchu Solidarności (Like Lightning: Problems of Political Institutionalization of Solidarity). In *Solidarność: wydarzenie, konsekwencje i pamięć* (Solidarity: Emergence, Consequences, Memories). Warsaw: IFiS PAN.
- Hausner, J. (1996) Models of the System of Interest Representation in Post-Communist Societies: The Case of Poland. In A. Ágh & G. Ilonszky (Eds.), *The Second Steps: Parliaments and Organized Interests*. Budapest: Hungarian Center for Democracy Studies Foundation.
- Jackiewicz, I. (1994) Solidarity in a Double Role: Political Representation and Pressure Groups 1991–1994. *Working Paper 120*. Budapest: Hungarian Center for Democracy Studies Foundation.
- Kloc, K. (1992) Polish Labor in Transition (1990–92). *Telos* 92: 139–48.
- Kramer M. (1995) Polish Workers and the Post-Communist Transition, 1989–1993. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 28 (1): 97–8.
- Marciniak, P. (1992) Polish Labor Unions: Can They Find A Way Out? *Telos* 92: 149–57.
- Ost, D. (2002) The Weakness of Strong Social Movements: Models of Unionism in the East European Context. *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 8 (1): 33–51.
- Staniszki, J. (1984) *Poland's Self Limiting Revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ujadowski, K. M. & Rafał, M. (1993) *Równi i Równiejsi. Rzecz o Związku Zawodowych w Polsce* (The Equal and the More Equal: On Trade Unions in Poland). Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm.

Polish Revolution (Sejm), 1788–1792

Richard Butterwick

The “Polish Revolution,” also known as the Four Years’ Sejm (Diet or parliament), refers to the period between October 1788 and May 1792 during which the Sejm transformed Poland’s

institutions of central and local government. The Constitution of May 3, 1791 was the first modern constitution in Europe and the second in the world, coming between the American and French constitutions. The accompanying ferment in political culture affected metropolis and provinces, nobles and burghers, laity and clergy. The first “revolutionary” act of the Four Years’ Sejm was to cast off Russian tutelage. The Sejm then governed the Commonwealth as the embodiment of its sovereignty until a Russian invasion installed a counterrevolutionary regime in the summer of 1792.

The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (founded by the Union of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1569, by the eighteenth century generally referred to as “Poland”) had been one of Europe’s great powers. However, it was debilitated by decades of warfare on its own soil after 1648. Its form of government, delicately balanced between the noble citizens’ liberties and the considerable influence that remained to the elective monarchs, was completely paralyzed by the mid-eighteenth century. Behind “republican” slogans, politics was essentially rivalry between magnate coterie for the fruits of royal patronage and dominance of the law courts. From about 1720, the Commonwealth was part of the Russian sphere of influence. After Catherine the Great arranged the election to the throne of her ex-lover, Stanisław Poniatowski, in 1764, the degree of Russian control on Polish affairs intensified. It deepened again after the First Partition of 1772. The Russian ambassador in 1772–90, Otto von Stackelberg, was compared by Frederick the Great to an ancient Roman proconsul.

Russia’s switch of allies from Prussia to Austria in 1780–1 heralded further attacks on the Ottoman empire, following the victories and conquests of 1768–74. In the spring of 1787 King Stanisław August Poniatowski traversed Poland to meet Catherine as she sailed down the Dnieper River to inspect her new provinces. He proposed a military alliance between Poland and Russia in advance of the expected war with the Turks. This would entail an increase in the Commonwealth’s risibly small army of 18,000 men to 45,000 men, as well as the necessary taxes. The king counted on the support of noblemen of middling means. Catherine denied him an immediate answer, but her dismissive treatment of the opposition magnates who paid their own

court to her led some of them to seek a new protector in Berlin.

As the months passed without an answer to his proposal for an alliance, Stanisław August was increasingly troubled by what he called a “ferment of minds” among the nobility. In part this was the outcome of his own policies in education and the arts, which promoted an “enlightened,” reformist patriotism, but it was also the effect of a cultural sea-change which produced nostalgia for a glorious and virtuous past. Among the nobility there was little appetite for war with the Ottoman empire, and resentment at Russian hegemony, expressed in the “guarantee” of the Commonwealth’s form of government that was written into the partition treaties.

The “ferment” was voiced in the instructions issued by the local assemblies of the nobility – the sejmiks – which elected envoys to the Sejm in August 1788. But they were not much affected by the Enlightenment. The proposal to expand the army was immensely popular – one factor was the rise in the noble population and the need to find employment for impoverished, idle young men. But the nobles were reluctant to tax themselves, and calls upon the clergy to pay for the army were often accompanied by demands that monks should make themselves useful by educating youth traditionally in Latin (for legal and rhetorical purposes). Suspicion of irreligious metropolitan manners was reflected in demands to ban travel abroad and to make the wearing of national costume compulsory. The opposition called for neutrality in the Russo-Turkish war and was critical of the Permanent Council (the limited central government imposed by Russia in 1775). A significant number of opposition candidates were elected, although the king was still expected to have a majority when the Sejm met.

Too late, Catherine II consented to a scaled-down military alliance. The Sejm opened on October 7, 1788, and promptly “confederated” itself. This was crucial, as under the aegis of a confederacy (a time-hallowed form of legalized insurrection) the Sejm could dispense with the usual requirement of unanimity and take decisions by majority vote. The alliance was scuppered by a note from the king of Prussia, read out to the Sejm on October 13. His offer to help Poland maintain its independence, liberty, and security, couched in the respectful tone of a concerned friend, convinced the members of the Sejm that they were now masters of their own destiny. A

week later, they joyously acclaimed an army of 100,000 men, with little thought of how the troops were to be recruited, equipped, and paid. Republicans traditionally feared a standing army in the hands of a monarch, so the question of command also had to be resolved.

The opposition turned on the military department of the Permanent Council, and in a series of tumultuous debates the royal majority evaporated. The dependence of the court party on patronage was exposed by the Sejm’s decision in secret voting to abolish the military department and replace it with a military commission elected by and directly subordinated to the Sejm. The king warned against angering Russia by abrogating the form of government stipulated by the treaty. But to many excited minds, his caution seemed like cowardice, and was ignored.

At this critical juncture, Stanisław August refused Stackelberg’s advice to leave Warsaw and form a counter-confederacy against the Sejm, rightly fearing that such a step would provoke the opposition to invite in Prussian troops. Prussia would then be able to demand Polish territory – either from the Poles or from the Russians. Frederick William II had to wait longer, before cashing in his growing pile of chips. The opposition again attacked the Permanent Council and in a decisive vote on January 19, 1789 it was abolished. Having prolonged itself indefinitely (the usual term for a Sejm being six weeks), the Sejm was now effectively a “ruling Sejm,” and the king little more than a cipher.

This first stage of the Polish Revolution – the overthrow of the system in which the king and his party managed Russian hegemony – was linked to a revolution in political culture. A profusion of mostly anonymous pamphlets and treatises discussed what should be done. Apart from ideas for raising revenue, some put forward programs for an overhaul of the system of government, and in a few cases (notably the works of Reverend Hugo Kołłątaj) even redefined the idea of the “nation” to include all inhabitants of the Commonwealth, with propertied nobles and burghers as the active participants in the body politic. Politically charged sermons, often printed “at the demand of the public,” were an effective way of reaching provincial audiences.

Aristocratic ladies fêted the leading orators of the opposition at balls and parties. Ladies took the lead, too, in the cheering and jeering from

the Sejm's public gallery, which spurred on the opposition and demoralized the royalists. The Sejm's procedural rules (until the reform of March 1791) permitted the introduction of new material at almost any point in proceedings, and required that all proposals be considered and decided clause by clause. No speaker could be halted in mid-flow. These conditions indulged windbags, but they also provided endless opportunities intentionally to bog down deliberations.

The wing of the opposition led by Franciszek Ksawery Branicki was increasingly suspected of doing just that. Branicki's predecessors as Grand Hetman of the Polish crown had enjoyed extensive powers prior to 1776 and he was determined to get them back. Branicki's wife Aleksandra was the favorite niece of Grigorii Potemkin and his morganatic wife, Catherine II. For years Branicki and his allies had been the channel through which Russia had stunted Stanisław August's ideas of reform, although they had never been trusted by the empress to exercise power themselves. It escaped no one's notice that Branicki's supporters took the lead in denouncing Russia. Branicki explained to his "dear uncle" Potemkin that he could not be seen to resist the clamor, if he was "one day to be able to be useful to Russia as a good Pole."

Not only royalists but Branicki and his clients as well were lampooned in the verses and riddles that circulated in Warsaw's streets, squares, gardens, taverns, and salons (the city's population grew in these four years from about 90,000 to 115,000). In the spring of 1789 Branicki was suspected of exploiting fears that the peasants of the Ukraine, allegedly incited by Potemkin's emissaries, would again rise and slaughter the nobles and Jews. Branicki would then rally nobles to the colors and extinguish the rebellions. Having made himself master of the Commonwealth, he would return it to the Russian sphere of influence. So ran the theory. One cannot be certain.

The "Ukrainian rebellions" came to nothing, but the alarm focused attention on the eastern reaches of the Commonwealth, where a social and religious chasm separated peasants from their masters. The Sejm moved slowly to defuse confessional grievances: in July 1790 it bolstered the status of the Uniate Church by admitting the Uniate metropolitan to the senate, and in May 1792, despite opposition from Rome, it agreed to a fully fledged Orthodox hierarchy,

independent of the Orthodox Church in Russia. Protestantism, strongest among the burghers, did not present the same political dangers. A self-consciously "enlightened" policy of toleration for all faiths, without challenging the dominance of Roman Catholicism, caused relatively little controversy.

It was the Roman Catholic Church that felt the brunt of the Sejm's search for revenue and insistence on exercising sovereignty. In March and April 1789, the bishops were bullied into "offering" twice the 10 percent per annum that was volunteered from noble estates. That was in addition to the clergy's existing *subsidium charitativum*. In July 1789, following what the papal nuncio called "intrigues and simonies" regarding the vacant bishopric of Cracow, the Sejm seized the revenues of the Commonwealth's richest see for the army, leaving the future bishop a salary of 100,000 zlotys. Following this step, unprecedented for a Catholic state in peacetime, schism with the Holy See loomed. The tactful diplomacy of the nuncio, and the good sense of the deputation appointed by the Sejm to turn the resolution into a reform, allowed a face-saving compromise to be reached. Bishops would each draw their 100,000 zlotys from landed estates in their possession. Even Branicki played a part in easing the passage of the measure through the Sejm. Despite the prominence of calls for a root and branch reform of clerical incomes and duties, appetite for radical change was limited, without an overwhelming political or fiscal motive.

In the summer of 1789 the king's fortunes reached their nadir. His closest ally and younger brother, Michał Poniatowski, the primate of Poland, who had hoped to retain the administration of the bishopric of Cracow, left the country in dismay. Yet in the aftermath of the Cracow debacle tentative feelers were put out between the king and the more enlightened part of the opposition, led by the Czartoryskis and the junior branch of the Potocki clan. They were suspicious of Branicki's intentions, and feared that he would prevent their vision of an "enlightened" Commonwealth from becoming reality. Due to mistrust between them and the king, cooperation did not begin in earnest until the end of 1790.

The first obstacle was cleared when the king accepted the Prussian alliance, which was ratified in March 1790. Then the opposition became bogged down in drawing up a "republican"

form of government. When the *Project of the Form of Government*, largely drafted by Ignacy Potocki, was discussed in September 1790, royalist envoys mounted a devastating attack on “magnates” and “aristocrats” as the oppressors of ordinary nobles, casting the king as their natural defender. The royal prerogative to nominate members of the senate, lost in 1775, was duly restored. Finally, the sejmiks of November 1790 – needed to elect a second complement of envoys to sit alongside the original ones – chose many royalists. The sejmiks also drew up instructions still more “unenlightened” than those of 1788. Ignacy Potocki, who had served for years with conviction and energy on the Commission for National Education, was appalled. He now believed that in the short term, a “limited monarchy” was the only way forward. In December 1790 he handed the king the initiative in drafting the new constitution.

Before the constitution was sprung on the Sejm, the question of the burghers’ place in the Commonwealth was resolved. In the autumn of 1789, the chief “royal towns” (as opposed to towns owned by nobles or the Catholic Church) came together to present their demands to the king and the Sejm. Their delegates’ “black procession” to the Royal Castle in December 1789 provoked fears that the burghers might follow the lead of the Third Estate in France. In fact their priorities were fuller self-government and personal liberties like the noble privilege of immunity from arrest without trial. It was Reverend Kollataj who encouraged them to petition for representation in the Sejm.

The work of the deputation appointed by the Sejm to look into the burghers’ grievances stalled in 1790, while an anti-Jewish riot in Warsaw set back their cause. As in many royal towns, Jews were normally prohibited from living within the city limits, but in Warsaw they were allowed in during the Sejm, for the nobles’ convenience. But most Sejms lasted weeks, not years. Tension boiled over in May 1790, although without fatalities. The burghers’ foes in the Sejm (some of whom were engaged in industrial enterprises) used these disturbances to contrast their arrogance with the modesty and docility of the Jews. A deputation was established by the Sejm to consider the reform of Polish Jewry, but the problems of devising and getting agreement to a reform which could successfully integrate Jews into municipal life proved intractable.

The law which the Sejm eventually passed on April 18, 1791 gave royal towns – henceforth “free towns of the Commonwealth” – 21 (later 24) plenipotentiaries with a merely advisory role in the Sejm. On the other hand, it opened the doors to some of the Commonwealth’s executive and judicial bodies, and gave the burghers all they wanted in terms of personal liberties and self-government, liquidating noble, ecclesiastical, and Jewish exceptions to municipal jurisdiction. Careers in the army, Catholic Church, and administration were opened to them, and ennoblement was greatly facilitated. It was enough for the burghers to celebrate gratefully. For their part, nobles could now engage in all trades without losing noble status, and the last year of the Polish Revolution saw many displays of fraternization between nobles and burghers.

On May 3, 1791 the people of Warsaw thronged the streets in anticipation. The new constitution, called the *Law on Government*, was to be passed straight after the Easter recess, when most of its likely opponents would still be away from Warsaw. Following the reading out of diplomatic despatches, carefully edited to create a sense of threat, it was announced that salvation was at hand. The proposed constitution was read out, but too many protests were heard for it to be acclaimed at once. Only toward evening, after many passionate speeches, did the pressure become overwhelming. The king swore an oath to the new constitution, and almost all present followed his example in the neighboring church. To fortify the dubious legality of the procedure, two days later the Sejm adopted a unanimous resolution endorsing the Constitution of May 3, declaring that attempts to subvert it were rebellion, and ordaining national thanksgiving.

The constitution provoked strong feelings among traditionally minded republicans. The sacred cow of royal election was sacrificed, and the elector of Saxony was invited to found a new dynasty. Perhaps even more shockingly, “executive power” was consigned to the king in the Custodial Council, called a “Guard of the Laws.” In the Council the monarch’s wishes were to “prevail.” The primate was set to return home and join the Council as “head of the clergy” and chairman of the educational commission. Envoys to the Sejm were declared “representatives of the entire nation,” in British fashion, and so unbound by instructions from the sejmiks. Why then, most convincingly of all at

the sejmiks held in February 1792, did a critical mass of the nobility endorse the constitution? These same nobles had passed the unenlightened instructions of 1788 and 1790.

In the first place, the tone and much of the contents of the constitution were reassuringly conservative. While toleration was assured to all, apostasy from the dominant Catholic religion remained forbidden. Noble privileges were expressly confirmed. The Law on Towns, incorporated into the constitution, formally preserved the noble monopoly on lawmaking. The peasants were granted little more than verbal recognition of their place in the “nation”; no noble would be compelled to emancipate his serfs. The senate, nominated by the king but confined to a suspensive veto, was far weaker than the chamber of envoys. Although a Montesquieuvian division of powers was endorsed, so was a Rousseauvian supremacy of the “will of the nation.” Ministers were responsible to the Sejm for their countersignatures of the Council’s resolutions.

Second, the reams of subsequent legislation, filling out the gaps in the constitution, made it clear that no further move toward monarchism or centralization was intended. The Sejm could interfere in the work of the central commissions of police, the military, the treasury, and education, whose members it elected. The Sejm would vote by qualified majorities, rising to a requirement of three-quarters for new taxes. Fears for the separate status of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were assuaged by the “Mutual Assurance of the Two Nations,” passed in October 1791, which guaranteed the Lithuanian representation in the central commissions and accorded every third Sejm to the Grand Duchy.

Third, nobles, after so many depressing decades, could bask in an aura of success. The festivities were certainly orchestrated in form, with a strong ecclesiastical contribution and an emphasis on the favor of Divine Providence. But through the template of the press reports emerges evidence of local initiatives and spontaneous enthusiasm. A key factor here was the participation of thousands of local worthies in the “civil-military commissions of the peace,” established in November 1789. This was among the most successful of the Sejm’s reforms. The commissions received the Sejm’s proclamations and resolutions, and were charged with imple-

menting many of them. In a real sense they linked the center with the provinces, and constituted the most effective local government the Commonwealth had known.

Fourth, the emancipation of middling nobles from aristocratic patrons was largely completed by the restriction of active participation at sejmiks to propertied nobles of the district. This measure has been condemned by many historians as anti-democratic, but previously magnates had often carted in inebriated rabbles of landless (and mostly illiterate) nobles in order to intimidate their opponents. The discourse of “ordered liberty” articulated by the Revolution’s propagandists was practiced in the unusually orderly conduct of the February 1792 sejmiks. Finally, the nobility had come to trust Stanisław August, whose slogan, “the king with the nation, the nation with the king,” expressed a deeply felt national mood.

The downside of this euphoria was that it blinded most supporters of the Revolution, from the king downwards, to the realities of the international situation. War between Austria and Prussia had been averted by the Convention of Reichenbach in July 1790. Leopold II admired the constitution but was preoccupied with holding the Hapsburg monarchy together, and by events in France. Prussia, having been denied the coveted cities of Danzig (Gdańsk) and Thorn (Toruń) by the Sejm in 1790, no longer had any interest in aiding its Polish ally. The Saxon succession was a non-starter, because the elector would not accept the offer without Russian permission. Russia had concluded peace with Sweden in August 1790, seen off British threats in the spring of 1791, and was on the verge of bringing its war against the Ottoman empire to a victorious conclusion.

There was no question of Catherine accepting the constitution, even when the throne was desperately offered to her grandson Constantine. She invited the principal Polish-Lithuanian malcontents to St. Petersburg and dictated their program of restoring the ancient “liberty” overthrown by the “revolutionary” Sejm. On May 14, 1792, the counterrevolutionary confederates crossed into Poland and Lithuania in the baggage trains of two Russian armies, totaling 100,000 men. The Polish forces, not more than 45,000 in the field, managed a creditable fighting retreat. However, the king, like most of the leadership, did not believe in the possibility of military victory. He

capitulated on July 24, in the hope he might yet save something from the wreckage. It was not to be. The confederates' slogans of faith and liberty were contradicted by widespread intimidation and plunder. Faced with the confederates' failure to restore stability to the Commonwealth, and the need to keep Prussia fighting revolutionary France, Catherine offered Frederick William II a new partition in January 1793. By the end of 1795, the Commonwealth was but a memory.

May 3 has since been celebrated as a national holiday whenever Poland has enjoyed independence. When national sovereignty was denied, the day often sparked protests against occupying and collaborating regimes. Targowica, the place to which the formation of the Polish confederacy of 1792 was postdated, has become an enduring symbol of treason.

The Four Years' Sejm has rarely been called the "Polish Revolution" by historians, but the term was often used by contemporaries. Initially, it was a "revolution" in an older sense of the word: the sudden replacement of one "system" in international affairs by another. Poland jumped out of the Russian frying pan into a fire stoked by Prussia, blazed with a brilliance that astounded the enlightened world, only to be forcibly returned in a charred and diminished condition to that frying pan in 1792–3. The next attempt to leap from the pan, led by Tadeusz Kościuszko in 1794, resulted in complete incineration in 1795. If a revolution must include social upheaval and popular violence, then the 1794 insurrection seems a better candidate. But we speak of cultural revolutions, sexual revolutions, administrative revolutions, financial revolutions, and so on. A revolution brings change which is both substantial and swift. Contemporaries saw not only the Constitution of May 3, 1791 but also the Four Years' Sejm as a whole as "revolutionary." Its opponents meant that in a derogatory, "Jacobinical" sense. Most of its defenders and admirers, including Edmund Burke, contrasted the mildness of the "Polish Revolution" with the violence of the French Revolution.

The Four Years' Sejm passed laws which amounted to roughly a tenth of all the statute law of the Kingdom of Poland and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, issued over four and a half centuries. Other candidates for the "Polish Revolution," with the signal exception of *Solidarność* (Solidarity) in 1980–1, were primarily risings for national independence.

Although the Four Years' Sejm ended with a lost war for independence, it had first brought about revolutionary changes, which would give the lie to the partitioning powers' claims that the Commonwealth was an irremediably anarchic failure.

SEE ALSO: Poland, Revolutions, 1846–1863; Polish Revolution of 1830; Polish Revolution, 1905–1907; *Solidarność* (Solidarity)

References and Suggested Readings

- Butterwick, R. (1998) *Poland's Last King and English Culture: Stanislaw August Poniatowski, 1732–1798*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Butterwick, R. (2005) Political Discourses of the Polish Revolution, 1788–1792. *English Historical Review* 120 (487): 696–731.
- Fizman, S. (Ed.) (1997) *Constitution and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Poland: The Constitution of 3 May 1791*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Gierowski, J. A. (1996) *The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the XVIIIth Century: From Anarchy to Well-Organised State*. Cracow: Polska Akademia Umiejętności.
- Lord, R. H. (1915) *The Second Partition of Poland: A Study in Diplomatic History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lukowski, J. (1991) *Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century*. London: Routledge.
- Lukowski, J. (1994) Recasting Utopia: Montesquieu, Rousseau and the Polish Constitution of 3 May 1791. *Historical Journal* 37 (1): 65–87.
- Lukowski, J. (1999) *The Partitions of Poland: 1772, 1793, 1795*. Harlow: Longman.
- Stone, D. (1991) Jews and the Urban Question in Late Eighteenth-Century Poland. *Slavic Review* 50 (2): 531–41.
- Zamoyski, A. A. (1992) *Last King of Poland*. London: Jonathan Cape.

Polish Revolution of 1830

Amy Linch

Also known as the November Insurrection, or the Cadet Revolution, a conspiracy to depose an unpopular agent of the tsar generated a year-long campaign to restore Poland's independence. The uprising began with a group of cadets from the Imperial Russian military academy in Warsaw under the leadership of Piotr Wysocki, and quickly drew the support of all aspects of

society. The Poles were ultimately defeated by the Russian forces, resulting in mass migration of political elites from the Polish territories.

The Polish territories under Russian rule in 1830 constituted the Congress Kingdom of Poland, established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Under Tsar Alexander I, the Congress Kingdom was originally semi-autonomous, with its own parliament, constitution, and military. By the time Tsar Nicholas I took the throne in 1825 much of the kingdom's independence was already compromised in practice but repression intensified under his rule. In 1830, the constitution of 1815 was a dead letter, secret police were everywhere, and censorship was severe. Polish organizations were persecuted and Russians had largely replaced Poles in administrative positions.

The tense situation in the kingdom was ignited by Russia's mobilization of the Polish army to suppress revolutionary uprisings in France and Belgium. On the night of November 29, 1830, the cadets attacked the residence of Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, the governor general of Poland appointed by Alexander I. Their goal was to capture and kill the hated Russian aristocrat and head of the Polish army. The attack on the castle was a failure but with the help of Polish civilians the conspirators seized the arsenal and drove the Russian troops out of Warsaw by the following day.

The cadets had no plan for how to deal with the uprising's success. Executive power rested in the hands of the Administrative Council, the members of which opposed any military action. The citizens of Warsaw and the leaders of the uprising forced the Council to dismiss itself and a temporary government was formed. The new government, opposed to the uprising, allowed Russian troops and Prince Konstantin to leave Poland and began negotiations with Tsar Nicholas I. The tsar was not interested in talks, however, seeing the uprising as a good excuse to completely abridge the Congress Kingdom.

On December 18, the parliament (Sejm) declared a "national uprising" and troops of the Congress Kingdom prepared for war against Russia. In January Nicholas I and the Romanov dynasty were dethroned. A new government formed by Czartoryski on January 30 began an international diplomatic campaign to seek help. The government hoped for Prussian neutrality, Austrian support, and material assistance from the western countries. Yet aside from expressions

of solidarity in France, the German states, Hungary, and Belgium, support was not forthcoming. Poles were left alone in their struggle against Russia. On the domestic front the government's failure to free the peasants – who were still serfs – automatically excluded a large section of the population as a potential resource in the war effort.

In February Russian Field Marshal Dybicz crossed into the Congress Kingdom with an army 115,000 strong and 348 cannons to face 56,000 well-trained Polish soldiers with 140 cannons. A regular war ensued. Polish troops won initial victories, at Stoczek on February 14 and at Dobre and Wawer a few days later. Five days later Russian troops had suffered heavy losses and failed to take Warsaw. Polish troops won the battles of Wawer (March 31), Dębe Wielkie (March 31), and Iganie (April 10). The uprising spread to Lithuania, soon covering most of its territory with partisan warfare. The end of April and beginning of May saw a change of fortune for Poland: General Dwernicki's army ran out of supplies and had to leave the Polish territories for Austria, where they were disarmed. On May 5 Polish troops suffered a heavy defeat at the battle of Ostrołęka.

During the spring and summer of 1831 Polish generals refused to attack Russian troops, even when they were well positioned militarily. Commanders were replaced several times, and some generals were accused of betraying the uprising. In mid-August a Warsaw mob seized several commanders and lynched them from street lamps. General Krukowiecki attempted to regain order but the military situation continued to worsen. On September 6 Russian troops attacked Warsaw with three times the manpower and twice the artillery of the Poles. Thousands of Warsaw civilians participated in the defense of their city, but to no avail.

Russia captured Warsaw after two days of bloody struggle. The remnants of the Polish forces headed toward Modlin, where additional Polish troops were based. At the end of September about 70,000 Polish troops remained scattered throughout the territory but the Polish military commanders assessed the cause as futile. On October 5 about 20,000 Polish soldiers crossed the Prussian border and were disarmed. Modlin and Zamość, the last strongholds of Polish control, capitulated to the Russians on October 9 and 21 respectively. The uprising was over.

Almost 9,000 Poles emigrated from the Polish territories in the wake of the uprising. The majority went to France, England, or the German states, but many went to the United States and Turkey as well. The émigrés were largely nobles, whose return to the Congress Kingdom was ill advised under the extreme repression of the tsar. Especially in France, the émigré community formed a vibrant center of opposition and protest (A. Czartoryski's Hotel Lambert in Paris), coordinating various anti-Russian actions in the Polish territories and in the Balkans.

The November uprising of 1830 facilitated the success of the insurgency in Belgium as the Russian troops could not be used to suppress it. After the uprising Nicholas severely curtailed the autonomy of the Congress Kingdom; he liquidated the Polish army, confiscated the property of the participants, and exiled them to Siberia.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Napoleonic Wars of Liberation (1813–1815); France, 1830 Revolution; Poland, Revolutions, 1846–1863; Polish Revolution (Sejm), 1788–1792

References and Suggested Readings

- Kisluk, E. J. (2005) *Brothers from the North: The Polish Democratic Society and the European Revolutions of 1848–1849*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs.
- Leslie, R. F. (1969) *Polish Politics and the Revolution of November 1839*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Plenkos, A. (1987) *The Imperfect Autocrat: Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich and the Polish Congress Kingdom*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs.
- Porter, B. (2002) *When Nationalism Began to Hate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Thackeray, F. (1980) *Antecedents of the Revolution: Alexander I and the Polish Kingdom, 1815–1825*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs.

Polish Revolution, 1905–1907

Amy Linch

By the turn of the twentieth century opposition to tsarist domination of Congress Poland had consolidated into two camps: the National Democrats and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). The National Democratic Party had its roots in the Polish League, a secret society formed in 1886 to

resist Russification and build a united Poland based on liberal principles. The League was reorganized in 1891 by Roman Dmowski into the National League, which rejected liberalism in favor of national autonomy through whatever means were necessary. By 1905 the League was established as the National Democratic Party. Among the various factions that formed the broad coalition of socialists represented in the other camp, many originally rejected nationalism in favor of anarchist cosmopolitanism. As the PPS was consolidated under the leadership of Boleslaw Limanowski, however, many among the socialist leadership were persuaded toward support for Polish independence. Marx and Engels's anti-tsarist views and prescription of the necessity of an independent Poland were more compelling than their economic ideas for many socialists. Initially there were strong sympathies between the two factions given the shared ideal of national independence and socialist leanings among several of the National Democratic leadership. The National Democrats ultimately represented the middle classes, however, while the PPS drew its base from among the workers. The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 exacerbated these differences and the two groups worked at cross purposes during the ensuing period of revolutionary action.

The PPS saw the war as an opportunity to exploit Russian weakness and immediately issued an anti-war appeal in all of the Polish territories. It organized mass strikes and partisan activities against the Russian state, causing a diversion of 300,000 troops to Congress Poland to suppress the rebellion. Józef Piłsudski, who would become the ruler of Poland's Second Republic after World War I, traveled to Tokyo to negotiate an alliance between Japan and Poland against Russia. He argued that the Poles, among many oppressed nationalities in Russia, were experienced in rebelling against Russia and could be of great use to Japan by fomenting unrest – they only sought assurance of support from Tokyo. Dmowski, the leader of the National Democratic Party, also went to Tokyo to present the opposite case. In the end Japan only provided the PPS with limited ammunition, rather than the backing for which it had hoped.

The PPS had an active militia by the fall of 1904, which engaged in armed demonstrations throughout Warsaw that soon spread to other cities. They used the ammunition from the

Japanese to damage bridges and otherwise sabotage Russian interests. The image of armed Poles resisting the tsarist forces after many decades of passivity bolstered support for PPS, whose membership grew to over 55,000 by 1906.

Membership within other socialist groups, notably the Jewish Bund and the Social Democratic Movement of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL), also increased during this period. The SDKPiL grew from a few hundred members in the late 1890s to approximately 40,000 in 1906, while the Bund represented about 8,000 in Congress Poland alone (Wandycz 1974: 311). Both organizations were ideologically committed to internationalism and considered themselves in common cause with the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party after its inception in 1898. The SDKPiL was influenced by the leadership of Rosa Luxemburg, who had opposed the PPS motion at the London Congress asserting the necessity of national independence for Poles as well as the international proletariat. Luxemburg argued that the Polish bourgeoisie benefited from incorporation into Russia, and that Polish independence ran counter to the logic of capitalist development. An independent Poland could at best be a poor capitalist state, with maximum worker oppression. Only a socialist revolution could relieve the plight of workers. While a compromise position of loosely worded broad support for national self-determination was eventually agreed upon, the split between socialists who sought a Polish homeland and those who wanted to transcend national boundaries in establishing a socialist homeland grew more pronounced as the socialist resistance within Russia gained ground.

The massacre of Russian protesters in front of the royal palace in Moscow on January 22, 1905 that came to be known as “Bloody Sunday” had profound reverberations in Congress Poland. Józef Kwiatek, head of the Warsaw organization of PPS, regarded the event as the beginning of revolution in Russia and, in conjunction with SDKPiL, announced a general strike that grew to 400,000 people and lasted over a month. Strikers emphasized political as well as economic demands, carrying placards declaring, “Down with autocracy! Down with the war!” and demanding an eight-hour workday and a 16 percent increase in wages (Ascher 1994). The Polish Union of Socialist Youth (ZMS) declared a school strike in Warsaw that was soon joined by the National Democratic Youth and teachers’

associations. They boycotted high schools and universities and demanded elementary school education in Polish. Over the next two years, 1.3 million Poles were involved in nearly 7,000 strikes demanding better working conditions, civil and political freedoms, and the right to conduct public life in Polish (Davies 2005).

On May Day 1905 there were demonstrations against the authorities in nearly every town and city. Economic activity was completely shut down and public order began to disintegrate. The PPS leadership undertook formal organization of the militia in June 1905, creating cadres of instructors and studying revolutionary tactics to bring order to the guerilla warfare that was underway and ensure that violence was strategically directed. Piłsudski was chosen to oversee training of the fighting squads and coordinate their activity. The Combat Organization waged attacks on gendarmes and on tsarist spies and officials, and conducted raids on government monopoly stores and payroll trains to fund the revolutionary struggle. By the fall of 1905 they were operating in secret, essentially independent of oversight by PPS.

Renewal of the general strike in Łódź, a major industrial center and socialist stronghold, resulted in a mass violent uprising when Russian police opened fire on a crowd of protesting workers. Clashes between angry demonstrators and Russian cavalry at the workers’ funerals on June 20–1, 1905 escalated into several days of spontaneous insurrection. The PPS supported the protests in Łódź but it had little influence on their course. The tsar instituted martial law and the Russian military largely regained control of the city by June 25, but clashes between the police and insurgents continued episodically throughout the summer.

Tsar Nicholas II made several concessions to the nationalist demands but they did nothing to quell the revolutionary spirit unleashed among the workers. Private teaching of Polish and Lithuanian was permitted and the use of Polish was authorized in some public capacities. Limited local self-government institutions were introduced in Congress Poland. The workers nonetheless persisted in striking and demonstrating. The socialist leadership, which shared the objective of overthrowing the tsarist regime despite its disagreements about the best strategy, continued to press its advantage in the face of Russian political and economic chaos.

Fear of a socialist-led revolution and growing perception that Germany was their real enemy led Dmowski and the National Democrats to adopt a conciliatory position toward Russia. Dmowski argued that even if political and economic unrest advanced Polish independence in the short term, revolutionary policies in Congress Poland were suicidal (Wandycz 1974). The National Democrats sought to influence workers by forming the National Workers' Union. The Workers' Union, which grew to 16,000 members during 1905, opposed strikes and mass demonstrations and echoed the softened demands of the National Democrats in seeking Polish autonomy within the Russian empire rather than an independent Polish state.

A railway strike in October 1905 developed into a general strike demanding a constitution in Warsaw and St. Petersburg. Armed conflict occurred between the National Workers' Union and the combined forces of the PPS, which sought a representative assembly in Warsaw, and the SDKPiL, which wished to integrate the Polish struggle into the larger Russian socialist revolution. Russian Premier Witte issued Tsar Nicholas II's "October Manifesto" declaring Russia a constitutional monarchy and promising a parliament and extension of political liberties.

With a meeting between Nicholas II and Wilhelm II raising the specter of a German–Russian rapprochement, Dmowski offered to cooperate with Witte in suppressing the socialists – arguing (unsuccessfully) that only an autonomous kingdom could manage to restore order.

The Polish socialists boycotted the elections to the Duma, regarding participation as an affirmation of Russia's right to rule Poland. Dmowski also felt that Polish participation contravened his party's goal of independence, but he regarded it as a tactical necessity. The PPS, on the other hand, called for a general struggle against the Russian authorities and continued to organize both mass action and selective strikes on government officials. The Combat Organization conducted raids on payroll trains and government concessions to secure funds to further organize revolutionary forces. On "Bloody Wednesday" in August 1906 they assassinated or wounded 80 tsarist officials and conspirators in a one-day action across 20 cities. Several hundred agents of the Russian government were assassinated during 1906, and in Ostrowiec a "people's republic" was established for a short period.

Divided sympathies among the socialists ultimately led to a split in the PPS. The older members, led by Pilsudski, wanted an organized and disciplined revolutionary force that engaged in violence only to the degree that it advanced their political goals. The younger members were more interested in bringing about an international revolution and supported mass terror and spontaneous disruptive action. A train raid near Rogów in November 1906 brought the condemnation of the primarily "young" Central Committee of the PPS, who accused the Combat Organization of ignoring orders. At the Ninth Party Congress in Vienna a few weeks later, members voted to expel the members responsible for the raid, resulting in a split between the younger "left" and the older "right" led by Pilsudski. Pilsudski's faction was a minority of the membership but represented most of the Combat Organization and the party's primary vehicle of communication, the newspaper *Robotnik* (Worker).

National Democrats attempted to advance Polish interests by creating a bloc within the Duma. The Stolypin crackdown on political dissidents and the Duma's lack of real political power led to dissatisfaction with this conciliatory strategy, leading to division within the movement. A new populist group that emerged in 1907 with clear commitments to both national and socialist ideals attracted the support of the peasantry, who were disillusioned with the National Democrats.

The events in Congress Poland were echoed in many of the other Polish territories but differences in infrastructure and economic development influenced the intensity of nationalist uprisings and degree of support for the socialist movement. In Prussian Poland spontaneous school strikes opposing religious education in German drew support from across the socioeconomic spectrum. Galicia was host to both the PPS Combat Organization training facility – in Kraków – and party conferences, and had a vibrant socialist movement. Socialists in Galicia responded to the activities in Congress Poland during 1905 with strikes, an increase in trade unions, and political debates in the Polish press. Galician Poles also participated in strikes sponsored by the Austrian Social Democrats demanding universal suffrage.

The Russian military ultimately regained control over Congress Poland through force.

The young faction of the PPS, renamed “PPS Left,” was incorporated into the Russian Socialist Party. In its first party congress in 1907, Pilsudski’s faction adopted a program of pursuing an independent Polish republic while maintaining unity with the proletarian revolution. Pilsudski declared the revolution of 1905 a failure, reflecting: “one cannot make uprisings, which depend on circumstances which we are unable to create, but it is necessary that the proletariat and indeed all working people profit from these circumstances” (Wandycz 1974: 321). Henceforth he devoted his energy to ensuring that a trained military would be ready to seize the opportunity when such circumstances arose again.

SEE ALSO: Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Jewish Bund; Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Pilsudski, Józef (1867–1935); Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907

References and Suggested Readings

- Ascher, A. (1994) *The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Blobaum, R. (1988) The Revolution of 1905–1907 and the Crisis of Polish Catholicism. *Slavic Review* 47, 4 (Winter): 667–86.
- Davies, N. (2005) *God’s Playground: A History of Poland*, Vol. 2. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 273–8.
- Wandycz, P. (1974) *The Lands of Partitioned Poland 1795–1918*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Poor Law, Britain, 1834

Carl J. Griffin

Dramatic reform of the Old Poor Law (ca. 1598–1834) had been on the philosophical and political agenda since at least the 1780s. The collapse of the English rural economy in the aftermath of the cessation of hostilities in continental Europe in 1815 and the central role played by the Poor Laws in motivating activists in the Swing Riots of 1830 raised such calls to a fever pitch. The result was the Poor Law Amendment Act, or New Poor Law (NPL) of 1834, which arranged all parishes into workhouse-focused unions answerable to the London-based Poor Law Commission (PLC). The NPL thereby broke with over 300 years of parochial independence in the provision of statutory welfare. The Act also intended to enforce the principle of “less eligibility” – that the workhouse should be less desirable than the

conditions experienced by the poorest laborer – and attempted to forbid relief to those who refused to enter the workhouse.

The first NPL union was founded at Wallingford, Berkshire, on January 1, 1835. By the 1839 publication of the Fifth Annual Report of the Poor Law Commission, 95 percent of all English and Welsh parishes had been placed into 583 functioning unions. The PLC encountered considerable opposition from the local authorities in their attempts to found unions. In the south, this mainly came from urban incorporations that refused to dissolve – Brighton and Exeter, for instance, never did – and from Gilbert’s Unions – created under the enabling Gilbert’s Act of 1782 – who similarly refused to disband until forced to do so by parliament in 1869.

In the north, the first unions were not created until 1837. Organizational opposition here was driven by structural factors in the industrial labor market. Infamously, John and Joseph Fielden, owners of a large textile mill at Todmorden, Yorkshire, threw all their employees out of work as soon as the Act was imposed to show that the workhouse system would not cope with seasonal and trade-cycle fluxes in unemployment.

Southern and northern opponents alike were given considerable support – and publicity – by the London-based *Times*. Editor Thomas Barnes used his position as, according to Lord Lyndhurst, “the most powerful man in the country” in reporting opposition to the NPL and in exposing inconsistencies and inhumanities in NPL unions. Barnes’s successor, John Delane, continued in a similar vein, famously giving unprecedented blanket coverage to the unfurling of the bone-crushing scandal in the Andover Union which ultimately led to the replacement of the PLC with the Poor Law Board in 1847.

Popular opposition to the NPL was particularly vehement and sustained in the north, something driven by the coalition between radicals, Chartists, industrialists, some magistrates, and anti-centralizing Tories. Such was the success of this Anti-Poor Law movement that most northern workhouses were not built until the 1850s and 1860s. As such, the less eligibility test could not be applied there. Popular opposition in the south was more fractured and certainly less successful in preventing the operation of the Act. However, as Wells (1997) has suggested, the combination of initial mass mobilizations

followed by a sustained resort to the weapons of covert protest made sure that the Act operated under something like a cloud of terror well into the late nineteenth century.

Ultimately though, it was opposition from Liberal social reformers that led to the collapse of the NPL. Notwithstanding continual innovations and concessions toward comfort in the workhouse and the provision of more tailored facilities for the vulnerable outside of the workhouse, on March 31, 1930 all Poor Law Unions were disbanded. Responsibility for the provision of welfare passed to the newly established local authority-controlled Public Assistance Committees.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Corn Law Agitation, Britain, 19th Century; Chartists; East Anglian Wheat County Riots, 1816; Newport Rising, Wales, 1839; Swing Riots

References and Suggested Readings

Knott, J. (1986) *Popular Opposition to the 1834 Poor Law*. London: Croom Helm.

Wells, R. (1997) Resistance to the New Poor Law in the Rural South. In J. Rule & R. Wells, *Crime, Protest and Popular Politics in Southern England 1740–1850*. London: Hambledon.

Popelin, Marie (1846–1913) and the Belgian League for Women’s Rights

Julie Carlier and Cathérine Jacques

Marie Popelin, the first Belgian woman doctor of law, was the “founding mother” of Belgian feminism. The “Popelin Affair” – the Belgian courts’ denial of her request to be called to the bar in 1888 and 1889 – was the catalyst that triggered the transition from an educational proto-feminism to an organized women’s movement. By 1892, Popelin and her lawyer, Louis Frank (1864–1917), had founded the first Belgian feminist organization, the Belgian League for Women’s Rights (*Ligue belge du droit des femmes*), which would remain the engine of the Belgian women’s movement until World War I.

Belgium was the first country on the European continent to industrialize during the nineteenth century but one of the last to introduce

compulsory education and social laws. A large part of the industrial workforce was made up of women, whose legal position was dictated by the Belgian civil code, which was based on the Code Napoléon (1804). Marital authority was not abolished until 1958. Women were granted the vote for communal elections in 1920, but had to wait until 1948 for parliamentary suffrage.

From the 1860s onwards, early Belgian feminists had focused upon women’s access to education, but by the end of the 1880s the refusal to allow Marie Popelin, LL.D., to exercise the profession of lawyer painfully showed the need for feminist organizing to press for legal reform. In the formative years between 1888 and 1892, Popelin and her allies entered into contact with leading foreign feminists, particularly Wilhelmina Drucker (1847–1925) from the Netherlands and Léon Richer (1824–1911) in France. As a result of the “Popelin Affair” and the political transfers through Drucker and Richer, the Belgian League for Women’s Rights was founded in 1892.

The League was made up of men as well as women from the capital’s French-speaking progressive intellectual elite, social reformers coming from the anti-prostitution movement, free-thinkers’ associations, freemasonry, and pacifism. It was a politically neutral, non-militant study and lobby group, whose preferred means were media campaigns, petitions, and the drafting of bills, often introduced in parliament by socialist representatives supporting women’s rights. Following a moderate political strategy, the League privileged the demand for civil equality over suffragism. Prioritizing marriage law reform and access for women to all professions and the civil service, the Belgian League for Women’s Rights could claim several successes by the eve of World War I, such as limited married women’s property rights.

Marie Popelin, initially head of the legal section, became secretary general by 1896 and remained so until close to her death in June 1913. During this time she was able to establish a firm international reputation for herself and the League as the main representative of the movement for women’s rights in Belgium. As early as 1893 she was appointed honorary vice-president of the International Council of Women, designated to found a Belgian affiliation. From 1902 onwards, she set out to unite the independent and socialist women’s associations, as well as a new

small group of Catholic feminists. In a political climate of growing denominationalism, which would dominate Belgian society well into the twentieth century, this proved no sinecure. When the Belgian National Council of Women was finally founded in 1905, socialist and Christian feminists refused to join. Under the presidency of Popelin the Council's activities blended with those of the League for Women's Rights.

Popelin never witnessed the admittance of women to the bar (1922), but she did live to see the foundation of the Belgian Federation for Women's Suffrage (*Fédération belge pour le suffrage des femmes*) in February 1913. During World War I, this coalition between Catholic and independent/liberal feminists was continued in the Patriotic Union of Belgian Women (*Union patriotique des femmes belges*, 1915), which developed relief efforts directed toward women. The activists of the Belgian League for Women's Rights played a leading part in the Patriotic Union, but the war marked the end of an era. After 1918, the prewar feminist associations stagnated and new organizations came to the fore.

SEE ALSO: Belgium, 20th-Century Political Conflict; Britain, Women's Suffrage Campaign; International Congress of Women at The Hague

References and Suggested Readings

- Aerts, M. (2005) Feminism from Amsterdam to Brussels in 1891: Political Transfer as Transformation. *European Review of History* 12 (2): 367–82.
- Aerts, M. & Everard, M. (1999) Forgotten Intersections: Wilhemina Drucker, Early Feminism and the Dutch–Belgian Connection. *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* 77 (2): 440–72.
- De Bueger-Van Lierde, F. (1972) A l'origine du mouvement féministe en Belgique. L'Affaire Popelin. *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* 50: 1128–37.
- Gubin, E. (1993) Signification, modernité et limites du féminisme en Belgique avant 1914. *Sextant. Revue du Groupe Interdisciplinaire d'Etudes sur les Femmes* 1: 39–56.
- Gubin, E. (1999) Du politique au politique. Parcours du féminisme belge (1830–1914). *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* 77 (2): 370–82.
- Gubin, E., Jacques, C., & Piette, V. (1997) Les féminismes belges et français de 1830 à 1914. Une approche comparée. *Le Mouvement Social* 178: 36–68.
- Jacques, C. (forthcoming, 2009) La Ligue belge du droit des femmes. In E. Gubin, C. Jacques, V. Piette, &

J. Puissant (Eds.), *Encyclopédie de l'histoire des femmes en Belgique*. Brussels: Racine.

Nandrin, J.-P. (2006) Marie Popelin. In E. Gubin, C. Jacques, V. Piette, & J. Puissant (Eds.), *Dictionnaire des femmes belges XIX^e et XX^e siècles*. Brussels: Racine.

Populism

Lawrence Goodmyn

The Populist Revolt in late nineteenth-century America was the connecting link between two huge organizing achievements – the Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union and the People's Party. These two organizing feats broadly test conventional ideas about how independent political action can be an instrument of social change in modern societies. It is a test many have not managed to pass: populism stands as one of the least understood political movements in American history. As for the movement, so for the word itself: in its modern usage, "populism" is one of those vague terms of description that can be easily molded into whatever partisan shape its user may wish it to have. A fair measure of explanation is required to sort through this maze.

Historical Context

One begins with a brief review of the economic grievances the agrarian movement endeavored to address. A series of self-help economic experiments created experiences that over time generated a number of political proposals. In finding a way to place these political ideas before the nation, the farmers painstakingly constructed the populist agenda.

What was to become the National Farmers' Alliance first came into existence in the late 1870s as a rural cooperative. Located on the southern fringe of the western farming frontier that stretched from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, it arose in Texas at a time when the era of industrialization and transcontinental railroad building had created a national market economy in America. Farmers found themselves caught in elaborate structures of exploitation – by banks and other lending institutions that charged high interest on chattel mortgages and by rural credit merchants who exacted usurious rates on food and supplies advanced to farmers during the

growing season. The merchants held liens on the farmers' crops in what was called, straightforwardly enough, "the crop lien system." After the Civil War, the crop lien became the dominant commercial arrangement for southern cotton production, while the chattel mortgage proliferated in the western granary from Kansas and Iowa to the Canadian border. Both the crop lien and the chattel mortgage proved to be highly profitable for lending institutions: the fruits of the labor of western and southern farmers were harvested not by farmers but by the institutions financing agricultural production. In a phrase popularized by agrarian organizers, creditors were "farming the farmers." The social result was massive debt peonage that slowly engulfed agricultural America in the 1870s and 1880s. Hundreds of thousands and eventually millions descended into landless tenancy.

This catastrophe was not restricted to those advanced societies where capitalism was fully emerging in the late nineteenth century. Rather, among disparate human communities around the globe, peonage has existed in one form or another since pre-Roman times. Whatever the degree of exploitation inherent in each "form," the practice itself became the means through which capital to build cities was extracted from rural people who had no means to feed themselves during the long growing seasons that necessarily preceded income-yielding harvests. As is now becoming somewhat better understood, the culture of capital accumulation that developed in the United States in the late nineteenth century rationalized widespread exploitation of workers and farmers as a given, whether it occurred on the land or within the emerging factory system. Under these circumstances, the continuing interest in American populism is fueled by the vivid example it provides of sustained self-activity on the part of the victims. American farmers did not go quietly into peonage.

Yet it would be a mistake to see populism as some sort of spontaneous act of mass defiance, or even as a kind of naked expression of the kind of politics that surfaced because "times were hard." Rather, the People's Party was a product of patient organizing that activated upward of two million rank-and-file American farmers. Coming to terms with populism requires a sustained focus on these organizing experiences, for they explain how a broad popular movement materialized in America.

Agrarian Organizing Resistance Movement

After some fruitless experiments from 1878 and 1884 in small-scale cash cooperatives along the lines pioneered by the earlier Grange movement, Alliance organizers slowly shaped a recruiting tool that was so massively appealing to debt-ridden farmers through offering the prospect of transforming the American countryside. The idea was a broad-gauged credit cooperative. It was a concept that took into account the economic weakness of debt-ridden small farmers and landless tenants. In 1885, organized farmers successfully pioneered what they called the "bulking" of cotton, pooling their product in a cooperative marketing plan designed to produce harvest-time sales direct to British and East Coast American cotton buyers. Mass sales of this kind succeeded in attracting competing buyers, a circumstance that soon brought marginally higher returns to cotton producers. The euphoria was immediate: some celebrating farmers flew blue flags from their wagons as they went home, and word spread throughout rural districts that the Alliance was "doing something" for the dirt farmer. In little more than six months during the fall and winter of 1886, the Alliance credit cooperative attracted 250,000 Texas farmers desperate to escape the clutches of the crop lien system.

Confident in their now-proven organizing capabilities, advocates of cooperatives fashioned elaborate plans for a multistate organizing campaign throughout the South and West in 1887–8. The objective was to create structures for cooperative purchasing as well as cooperative marketing. Alliance organizers had learned how to create large-scale co-ops, and they had learned how to explain it: wherever Americans grew cotton, corn, or wheat, membership in the Alliance soared – from Florida to the Dakotas. Inevitably, the newly organized cooperatives were to be opposed by the financial and commercial institutions that had benefited from exploiting farmers. These ranged from Chicago Livestock Commission houses, trunk-line railroads, and hundreds of country banks in the West to the manufacturers of jute bagging for cotton bales as well as thousands of credit merchants throughout the South. But while the propagandists of commercial America might regale the population about the virtues of self-reliance, self-help farmer cooperatives were perceived

as impolite attacks on corporate profits. The resulting tensions that developed between big business and the activities of Alliance co-ops gave organized farmers a first-hand view of how the economy of the late nineteenth century had changed for small farmers. The system was rigged against them.

American populism did not emerge via “rising consciousness,” but through education and shared experiences. The “education” gained by large-scale credit cooperatives emerged very early in the founding alliances in Texas and then was repeated as the cooperative movement spread throughout the western granary and the southern cotton belt. Farmers learned who their commercial enemies were. The experiences generated within the Alliance cooperative politicized the farmers it had recruited. For example, in 1885 when the fledgling alliances were first experimenting in mass cotton sales, the state organization designated an “Alliance Purchasing Agent” to contact agricultural equipment manufacturers and offer a mass market in exchange for lower prices for plows and other agricultural necessities. The agent, an energetic organizer named William Lamb, was outraged to discover that officials of America’s leading farm equipment companies treated him with disdain and contempt. They told him to go back and tell his members to place their orders through the company’s nearest retailers. There would be no discounts. William Lamb pondered the long-term implications of this attitude and decided to make a few plans of his own.

The nation’s fledgling labor movement provided Lamb and other cooperative advocates with the kind of opportunity they were looking for. After some difficult organizing experiences in the West, Knights of Labor officials won what they considered to be a breakthrough victory over Jay Gould’s Missouri-Pacific Railroad. In 1885–6 they employed the slogan, “We made Jay Gould recognize us,” to pyramid national membership from 100,000 to 700,000. In the spring of 1886, however, Gould moved to crush the union by instigating a conflict. The railroad abruptly fired an employee for missing work while attending a union meeting – after having been given permission to do so. The union’s members, their very right to existence challenged, rallied to defend their organization.

From beginning to end, the Great Southwest Strike was a series of minor and major battles

between armed workers and armed deputies and militiamen, interspersed with commando-like raids on company equipment by bands of workers. In Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, and Kansas, thousands were indicted, hundreds were jailed, and many died. Major newspapers denounced the workers, said their grievances were imaginary, praised the railroad’s “magnanimity,” and repeatedly predicted the imminent return of the men to their jobs. It was within such emotional currents that the political awareness of the early Farmers’ Alliances began to take root.

In the West, it was hard to distinguish farmers from workers; they dressed alike, attended the same churches, read the same newspapers, and often hailed from the same families. To William Lamb, the relevant fact was that farmers and workers were held in equal contempt by commercial America. They worked hard and had nothing to show for it. Both groups realized it was time they could work together. As president of the Montague County Farmers’ Alliance, Lamb issued a boycott in support of the Knights of Labor in order, he said, to “secure their help in the future.” This act produced an internal conflict in the Alliance to define the meaning of the farmer movement, provoking a struggle that would be repeated with slight variations as the Alliance swept across the South and West in the next half-dozen years. The Alliance state president, Andrew Dunlap, denounced Lamb’s boycott, declared it “null and void,” and officially denied that the Alliance “had anything to do” with the spreading boycott. The editor of the young order’s official newspaper warned against “busy bodies in other men’s business.”

Something else happened: Alliance organizers referred to as “lecturers” were changed by the opposition they encountered – by their daily duties in building the cooperative movement. Day after day, the local lecturers traveled through the remote farmlands. The stories of personal tragedy they heard in their country meetings could be repeated at the next meeting a few miles down the road where, in an atmosphere of shared experience, they drew nods of instant understanding. If the Alliance was changing farmers by offering a new kind of tangible hope, the farmers were changing the lecturers who were, in effect, seeing too much and learning too much. The very duties of an Alliance lecturer, like the duties of its state purchasing agent, William Lamb, were driving home the need to

“do something.” Repeated often enough – and inside the Alliance cooperative lectures were routinely repeated again and again – these experiences had a powerful emotional effect: a nucleus of deeply committed activists was created from the daily experiences found in the cooperative movement.

The self-assured organizers were convinced that they grasped the grassroots temper of the movement better than their own high-ranking Alliance functionaries did. When Alliance President Dunlap denounced William Lamb’s “unblushing impudence” and was supported by the journal editor who charged the boycott was “putting burdens on the farmers that they cannot bear,” Lamb quietly outlined the specifics of monopolistic practices being “waged against us.” A farmer–labor coalition was more than an idea: it was a way to act. With lofty confidence Lamb remarked, “I feel satisfied I know more about what is going on against us than the state president or our editor either.”

Cooperative Movement

After the Great Southwest Strike ended in demoralizing defeat for the Knights of Labor, the significant growth in the organization’s membership that appeared in 1885 declined, never to regain its strength in numbers. For its part, however, the Alliance underwent an internal revolution in which its lecturer–organizers moved into positions of leadership at every level of the organization, replacing, among others, the state president and its journal editor. The order’s new flagship journal became the *Southern Mercury*, an aggressive advocate of farmer–labor coalitions as well as a supporter of a new, more democratic theory for organizing the monetary system.

In the summer of 1886, the Alliance issued a provocative manifesto titled the Cleburne Demands. In notable anticipation of the Populist platform of 1892, the Cleburne document called for the recognition of trade unions and co-ops and proclaimed the need to alter the basic rules of trade through the creation of a new federally administered national banking system based on the creation of a flexible currency. In the spring of 1887, the Texas Alliance launched a national organizing campaign by dispatching over 100 lecturers to organize in the South and West. The effort proved remarkably successful. Within two

years, the National Farmers’ Alliance counted over a million members and cooperative experiments in both marketing and purchasing began to proliferate across the continent.

The lessons of the cooperative movement generated two levels of political understanding within the Alliance. From the western plains to the Carolina coast, local, county, and regional lecturers became transformed by their continuous association with the demeaning poverty they found as a pervasive feature of rural life. In short, their attention was directed inward in a new way. Secondly, the attention of the Alliance’s marketing and purchasing agents was directed outward – as a function of their institutional contacts with the commercial world. As was the earlier case with William Lamb, the cooperative experience caused people to think more critically about the existing structure of the American economy and their own exploited condition within it.

Although these dynamics worked everywhere that the Alliance movement was able to put down sustaining roots, this awareness necessarily appeared first where the movement was most grounded in experience. In 1888, even as the cooperative movement was first getting organized in new states, the Texas Alliance started a bold venture in large-scale cooperation. The objective was nothing less than to market the entire cotton crop of the state through a single centralized State Cooperative Exchange. The plan of the Alliamcemen was the most creative in the annals of American agricultural organizations and led directly to the one pathbreaking political concept of the agrarian revolt – a new democratic national banking system called the Sub-Treasury Land and Loan System. It also led to the formation of the People’s Party.

The marketing and purchasing plan, necessarily a bit complicated, turned on a simple discovery: the underlying problem hurting individual farmers – lack of access to low-interest credit – was also the problem haunting the Alliance cooperative itself. The attempted remedy was called the “joint-note plan.” Landowning farmers were asked to place their individual holdings at the disposal of the group, including their tenants. Smallholding farmers and tenants alike would collectively purchase their supplies for the year – on credit – through the centralized State Exchange, the landowners signing the joint note. For collateral, they would put up their land

and attempt to protect themselves against loss by taking mortgages on the crops of the tenants.

Alliancemen would sink or swim together; the landless would begin the process of escaping the crop lien, too, or none of them would. As the joint notes flooded into the State Exchange in Dallas, the cooperative planners moved to sell the notes through bank loans. After exhaustive efforts, however, they were forced to report to the sub-alliances that "those who controlled the moneyed institutions of the state either did not choose to do business with us or feared the ill will of a certain class of businessmen who considered their interests antagonistic to those of our order." The effort to borrow money in sufficient quantity failed.

The Exchange was suddenly in serious trouble. In response, the Alliance mobilized all of its collective resources and knowledge gained from five years of cooperation. In probably the most dramatic single day in the course of the entire agrarian revolt, county alliances convened in some 200 Texas courthouses on June 9, 1888 in a desperate effort to raise additional funds to keep alive the cooperative dream.

Awed townspeople were astonished at the turnout: more than 200,000 farmers flooded the courthouses of the state. Observers were also startled by the passionate discussions that went on for hours in the summer heat. The Alliance had asked each farmer at the outset to contribute \$2 to the joint-note undertaking, and this appeal was a centerpiece of the June 9 mobilization. A letter to the *Southern Mercury* had earlier portended the outcome of the effort: "We voted the \$2.00 assessment for the exchange, and as soon as we are able, will pay it, but we are not able to do so at present." The dignity with which the admission was made, and the willingness of the *Mercury* to print it without comment, indicates that everyone recognized the prevailing poverty among many people participating in the Alliance movement. The implications for the movement were serious: the co-ops had precisely the credit problem that individual farmers did. Throughout the South and West where the Alliance movement had spread, farmers held their breath while the Texas Exchange collected funds, collected even more pledges, and, in so doing, fought for its life. For the moment, the Texans sent an ominous signal: the Exchange announced it was moving to a temporary cash-only relationship with its members.

The Alliance had a more promising outcome defending itself in the South against a bona fide national "trust." In 1888, a newly constructed combine of jute manufacturers announced that the price of jute bagging used for cotton bales would rise from 7 cents a yard to 12 and even 14 cents, levying "a tribute of some \$2,000,000" that the nation's cotton farmers were forced to pay under duress. Alliance leaders from six cotton-producing states hurriedly met in Birmingham, Alabama, fashioned arrangements with a dozen cotton mills to manufacture cotton bagging, and, thus armed, announced a boycott of jute bagging. After a tense period, the combine, suddenly awash in its own jute, was forced to concede that the price-rigging scheme had failed.

Despite such encouraging defensive successes, broad-scale co-op plans continued to run headlong into concentrated corporate power. An ambitious livestock marketing arrangement fashioned by Kansans and cooperatively extended to Missouri and Nebraska farmers challenged corporations that dominated livestock marketing in the region. The farmers called their co-op the American Livestock Commission Company. Within a six-month period in 1889, the co-op had amassed over \$40,000 in profits to distribute to members. But as the businessmen who operated the Chicago Livestock Commission, a commodities exchange, began to realize what the success of co-ops could mean, they abruptly terminated all marketing relations on the grounds that the farmer co-op "violated the anti-rebate rule" of the Chicago Commission. That proved to be the end of cooperative marketing of livestock in America.

Meanwhile, in Texas the State Alliance Exchange eventually was able to raise \$80,000 to underwrite the expenses of the elaborate joint-note plan, but it was not enough to cover the credit crisis. In the summer of 1889, the Texas State Alliance Exchange went under, unable to market its joint notes in banking circles, and therefore unable to respond to insistent payment demands from its creditors. The tantalizing prospect of freeing everyone from the clutches of Texas merchants in one dramatic season danced out of reach.

Opposition to the Sub-Treasury System

Into this situation stepped one of the most creative and enigmatic personalities brought forward

by the agrarian revolt – Charles Macune. Born in Wisconsin and orphaned at 10, Macune roamed the West and arrived on the Texas frontier in 1870 at the age of 19. In the custom of the era, he “read” for the professions and in time came to practice both medicine and law. Macune, however, had untapped talents as a lucid writer, as a sonorous, authoritative public speaker, and as a movement diplomat. A strikingly handsome man, he also possessed a subtle eye for the strategic demands of organizing. He put all these gifts to good use during the tensions that surrounded the Cleburne Demands of 1886 and succeeded Andrew Dunlap as state president prior to the great organizational expansion of the following year. Above all, Charles Macune was a creative monetary theorist. He participated actively in each evolving stage of the joint-note plan of 1887–8, pondered the implications of the cooperative crisis in 1888, and in 1889 conceived of an ingenious and sweeping new national monetary structure called the sub-treasury system.

Macune’s proposal carried the agrarian agenda to a new level of advocacy. The federal government would underwrite the cooperatives by issuing greenbacks (paper money) to provide credit for the farmers’ crops at the moment they were harvested and marketed. In the process, this influx of funds would create the basis of a flexible national currency. The necessary marketing and purchasing facilities would be achieved through government-owned warehouses, or “sub-treasuries,” and through federal sub-treasury certificates paid to the farmer for his produce. In short, the sub-treasury system formed the instrument of credit that would remove furnishing merchants, commercial banks, and chattel mortgage companies from American agriculture. The sub-treasury certificates would be government-issued greenback money – “full legal tender for all debts, public and private,” in the words of Alliance platforms in the years to come.

The structural implications of Macune’s sub-treasury system were large: in the first instance, the plan financially backed the centralized Alliance marketing and purchasing co-op. In sustaining the co-ops, the sub-treasury sustained the popular movement. Beyond this critical democratic achievement, however, the greenback dollars that made possible America’s annual agricultural harvest also formed the workable basis for a new and flexible national currency outside the exclusive control of eastern

commercial bankers. It also provided the US Treasury with broad new options in giving private citizens access to reasonable credit. The line of nineteenth-century advocates of a flexible currency – one that included such businessmen as Edward Kellogg in the 1830s and such labor partisans as Andrew Cameron in the 1860s – culminated in the 1890s in the farmer advocate, Macune.

As Macune foresaw, the agrarian-greenbackism underlying the sub-treasury system united southern and western farmers. As he did not foresee, it also provided political cohesion for a radical third party. Within three years of the appearance of Macune’s sub-treasury plan, the People’s Party was to begin waging a frantic campaign to try to take over control of the American monetary system from the nation’s commercial bankers and restore it, “in the name of the whole people,” to the US Treasury. It was a campaign that was never to be waged again.

Organizing vs. Speechmaking

Nineteenth-century Alliance populism is worth studying because it starkly illustrates the total lack of impact of speechmaking on popular social consciousness. The historical value of the agrarian revolt lies not in rhetorical display but in the substantial alternative evidence of how social experiences of farmers participating in their own cooperative organizations shaped the way they perceived their plight and framed a new political worldview.

For example, populism was viewed in Kansas as building on the foundation of so many early Kansas settlers’ abolitionist ideas. Orators such as “Sockless Jerry” Simpson and Mary Elizabeth Lease testify to how quickly colorful language can find a prominent place in historical accounts and in later newspaper stories, but the egalitarian heritage animated the much more central role of Henry and Cuthbert Vincent in introducing and explaining the cooperative marketing system in the farming regions of Kansas. Although Henry Vincent came to be one of the most articulate populist editors in the nation, he fully understood that it was the social experiences gained from working with the Alliance cooperative – far more than the driving language of his own deeply involved newspaper – that altered the politics of Kansas farmers between 1888 and 1892.

Similarly, Evan Jones, the popular and modestly influential president of the National

Alliance in 1889, could catch journalistic attention with his vivid critique of price-gouging railroad freight haulers: "These iron rails are binding us in iron chains." But he, like Vincent, knew that the social bonds of the movement came from the cooperative bonds forged between farmers rather than in evocative language. Jones also knew that the long-term unity of populism depended upon finding some way to keep the co-ops going. That is why he, along with other informed agrarian radicals, became such an energetic defender of the sub-treasury system.

Although social experience was critical in shaping the populist movement, this is not to say that words and language are necessarily irrelevant to the evolution of insurgent democratic movements. Of course ideas dramatically spoken can be important – but only if an audience has previously been recruited to hear the ideas. Significant insurgent political movements happen when they are organized. They can happen no other way. Thus, the cooperative crusade of the Alliance was the cornerstone of American populism because it not only recruited people but also brought them together into shared activities for common goals in the future. Such, of course, is the operative meaning of the phrase "political consciousness." The concrete lessons farmers learned from their cooperative experiences taught them to see the economic realities defining their relationship with commercial America. Indeed, it was precisely those economic and cultural insights that produced the political language that would eventually become known as "populism."

The most important reform proposed by the populists was the fundamental redesign of the nation's monetary system. The goal was to change the way money was created, thus reducing the excessive power of creditors over debtors. Had it ever been enacted into law, a democratic system of money and credit would have created a substantial increase in economic growth as an enduring feature of a fundamentally reformed economy in America. As such, the populist sub-treasury system would have materially benefited working Americans in factories as well as farmers. Needless to say, the reorganization of the monetary system would not have foreclosed the need for industrial workers to organize collectively and form trade unions to improve their conditions. These ideas, however, were not only heretical to the economic notions of industrializing America; they were crisply at odds with the

self-interested assumptions among bankers that prevail to the present day. The so-called "sound money" theories prevailing in both major parties in the late nineteenth century significantly impeded economic growth in America. Not only working Americans but also the economy as a whole – informed modern economists now concede – would have been far better off in the twentieth century had the sub-treasury system been enacted.

Accordingly, when Macune appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee in 1890 to explain the sub-treasury system, the *New York Times* took it upon itself to offer the thought that Macune's plan was "one of the wildest and most fantastic projects ever seriously proposed by [a] sober man." Democratic and Republican congressmen on the committee responded to the Alliance spokesman with something less than respectful attention.

Clearly, the democratic dream of a national farmer-labor party was grounded solely in the practical task of organizing. Therefore, managing this task was the core challenge of the agrarian revolt.

SEE ALSO: Chávez, César (1927–1993) and the United Farm Workers; Knights of Labor and Terence Powderly (1849–1924); Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 1775–1900; Sylvis, William H. (1829–1869) and the National Labor Union

References and Suggested Readings

- Goodwyn, L. (1976) *Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kuzminski, A. (2008) *Fixing the System: A History of Populism, Ancient and Modern*. New York: Continuum.
- Nugent, W. T. K. (1963) *The Tolerant Populists*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Palmer, B. (1980) *Men Over Money: The Southern Populist Critique of American Capitalism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974

Andrew J. Waskey

The Carnation Revolution (*Revolução dos Cravos*) is a popular name for the almost peaceful revolution that began on April 25, 1974. It was

the first step in transforming Portugal from a dictatorship to a democratic country.

In the 1960s and early 1970s Portugal was engaged in costly battles in Africa and elsewhere to maintain its colonial possessions. The drain on Portugal's resources was high and inhibited internal development. The military, as well as civil society, was divided on whether to continue to strive to maintain the colonies or to abandon them. In 1973 unrest led to the formation of a secret military organization called the Movement of the Armed Forces (Movimento das Forças Armadas) (MFA). Most of the members of MFA were younger officers who were veterans of the African wars. On December 1, 1973, 86 delegates from across the spectrum of military units met at Obidos. Their discussions were centered on how to overthrow the authoritarian regime that had ruled for over forty years. When the Portuguese minister of defense learned of the meeting he was stunned; however, paralyzed by uncertainty, he did nothing. The MFA discovered an ally in General Francisco da Costa Gomes, chief of the general staff. His influence was increased when General Antonio de Spínola was appointed his deputy. General Spínola was the former governor of Guinea. He published *Portugal and the Future* (1974) almost immediately. He argued in the book that the colonial wars could not be won except through a political solution. Soon thereafter Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano dismissed both Costa Gomes and Spínola. He replaced them with a hard-line veteran of fighting in Angola, General Joaquim da Luz Cunha. A number of MFA officers were arrested or transferred.

In March a group of soldiers from the garrison at Caldas de Rainha attempted a brief revolt in armored cars. When they arrived in Lisbon they were soon arrested without a shot being fired. This incited the leaders of the MFA to urgency. Early in the morning of April 25, 1974 a signal was broadcast for the revolution to begin when a disk jockey at a Lisbon radio station played *Grandola, vila morena*. The coup had been planned by Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. The key installations were soon in MFA hands. The main opposition came from the secret police headquarters (Directorate General of Security); when four people were killed, the headquarters soon surrendered. The president and prime minister were taken into custody and exiled to Brazil a month later.

When the news of the revolution spread, the Portuguese people were euphoric. Red carnations were distributed to the troops in the revolution. Soon so many people wanted a red carnation to wear that the Portuguese supply ran out and thousands more had to be imported from the Netherlands.

In the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution many supporters of the old regime were dismissed from the government. The oligarchic families that had held most of the wealth of the country had their monopolies abolished. As politically inexperienced military officers tried to govern life with the three "Ds" – Democratization, Decolonialism, and Development – land was redistributed and other changes made to the old order. On April 25, 1975 democratic elections were held and a new civilian government was installed soon afterward.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Monarchy Protests, Portugal; Portugal, Protest and Revolution, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Graham, L. S. & Wheeler, D. L. (1983) *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and Its Consequences*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Mailer, P. (1977) *Portugal: The Impossible Revolution*. New York: Free Life Editions.
- Sobel, L. (1976) *Portuguese Revolution 1974–76*. New York: Facts on File.

Portugal, protest and revolution, 20th century

Javier A. Galván

Portugal experienced three main forces of protest and revolution in the twentieth century. First, the general population forced the king to abdicate in 1910. However, the first attempt to establish a republic failed rather quickly, and an authoritarian government took over in 1928. Second, following a long dictatorship of almost 50 years, the Portuguese led by a workers' movement toppled fascism with a massive populist revolution. Third, one of the largest sources of economic and political tension for Portugal in the late 1900s was the overseas colonies in Africa and Asia, which it formally retained longer than other major European imperialist states. The

constant revolts in the colonies contributed to the coup d'état that deposed the dictatorship in 1974.

Portugal began the twentieth century with a revolution that deposed its king in 1910. In 1908, revolutionaries had killed King Carlos I and his son in Lisbon to put an end to the power of the abusive monarchy in the nation. The king's youngest son, Manuel II, took over the throne, but he was overthrown by revolutionary movements in 1910. The main drive to remove the king was a general feeling of economic stagnation, the deterioration of the infrastructure, and overall lack of opportunities in Portugal. The result was a new government in the form of a republic in which people could elect their leaders. However, the new political system of government did not necessarily solve the nation's economic problems.

A conservative ideology emerged after the start of World War I in 1914. Conservative proponents supported religious-based values, despising liberal social, economic, and political ideals. The right-wing movement became known as the Integralismo Lusitano (Lusitanian or Portuguese Integralism), which developed a strong nationalistic ethic among the masses, especially among the youth. The Integralism movement metamorphosed into Portuguese fascism following examples offered by the legacy of Italy and Spain. By the late 1920s, fascism became increasingly popular among the middle and upper classes and intellectuals. Portugal's first experience of democracy failed as political leaders faced numerous minor revolts, both within civil society and among military officers.

The decades of the 1920s and 1930s were dominated by the actions of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, the Portuguese politician and dictator. A military coup in 1926 overthrew the civilian government and brought Salazar into political leadership posts, including minister of finance. He served in different political positions and was elected premier in 1932. He quickly developed the Constitution of 1933, establishing a powerful federal government and creating the foundations for the longest dictatorship in Europe. Salazar called his authoritative politics the "New State," in which he proposed a strong alliance with the goal of national identity. The new government favored the wealthy class, with the tangible result that poverty increased during his dictatorship.

Salazar strengthened the executive powers and ventured into systematic repression of social and political freedom. The new totalitarian

government abolished all political parties and workers' unions, claiming that they created a divisive force within the nation. It also approved oppressive censorship of all forms of public media and individual writers. It tightly controlled the radio waves, television programming, and all newspaper and magazine content. Yet Salazar claimed that this was all being done on behalf of the "national interest." Thus, in 1933, he approved the creation of the *Estatuto do Trabalho Nacional* (National Labor Statute), which controlled the organization of all workers at the industrial and agricultural levels. The government defined this as being like a national union for the benefit of all Portuguese workers. For almost 40 years, this structure developed a system in which workers became increasingly dependent on the state, and consequently sustained the need for the military dictatorship in Portugal. To control dissenters, the state created a secret police force in charge of coordinating what was called "order on the streets." However, the average Portuguese citizen did not initially suspect that peace could only be achieved by opening civilian prisons, concentration camps, and clandestine operations of systematic torture and intimidation of the general population.

The New State had inherited a financial crisis when it assumed power in 1928, a state of affairs that continued for nearly 20 years. Remaining neutral during World War II, Portugal benefited financially and could sell exports to every nation in Europe following the war. Salazar used the revenue to retain political power and pacify the public. The 1940s brought economic prosperity and the 1950s were also extremely profitable during Europe's economic reconstruction. Using its newfound wealth, Portugal supported huge public infrastructure programs, including bridges, roads, railroads, port facilities, tourism, and factories for machinery production. However, the education of the masses remained a distant priority.

The prosperity experienced in Portugal in the 1940s did not lead to transparent government or social benefits. The 1950s provided the initial stages for rebellion in Portugal against the dictatorship as the general population experienced signs of economic progress, and the government ideology shifted. Several high-ranking officials postulating a more liberal agenda formed a coalition against Salazar in 1949. The struggle for more liberal government policies erupted in

1959 when student protests became common on the streets and around university centers. A group of liberal Catholics also organized a rebellion in Lisbon in March of 1959, arguing that the church openly supported the masses against government abuses. Salazar responded with another wave of repression, targeting students, college professors, communists, and liberal Catholics. Almost 400 people were arrested, tortured, and summarily convicted. Several leftist public employees were fired from jobs in schools or city management. While the rebellion was controlled, public sentiment for more freedom remained.

During the early 1960s the Portuguese government faced an additional challenge: revolts in its remaining overseas colonies in Asia and Africa. These possessions were actually called overseas provinces after 1951 to make them sound less like colonies being exploited by a European power. Nevertheless, rebellions occurred in Portuguese Guinea in 1963, Mozambique in 1964, and Macao in 1966. Indian troops also forced Portugal to give up its possessions in India in 1961. All these colonies were challenging Portuguese domination of these lands at a time when most countries around the world were already independent of European colonizing nations.

During the 1960s, the numbers of white Portuguese migrants moving to the colonies in Africa and Asia increased, since greater freedoms and a more privileged position were offered abroad than at home. Since the Portuguese government could not attract enough volunteers to conscript for military service to bring the colonies under control, Salazar imposed a military draft, which created further public resentment and discontent. Declining living standards among the working class also posed a potential threat to Salazar's dictatorship, and he sought to repress labor organizing activities.

But workers continued to fight the government by creating clandestine labor unions to improve their own economic conditions. By the late 1960s, Portugal spent about 35 percent of its annual budget on military forces to contain rising anti-colonial protests and revolts in Africa. The independence movements led to thousands of deaths among Africans and Portuguese as economic conditions declined further. To fund the war, Portugal cut social services, and inequality grew increasingly disproportionately.

Salazar suffered an incapacitating stroke in 1968 and died two years later, to be quickly replaced by Marcello Caetano as premier of Portugal. Caetano initially created a façade of concern for the masses and reduced the intimidation and oppression tactics used by the previous regime. But Caetano maintained the general conservative ideology, leading to growing mass agitation. Demonstrations broke out throughout Portugal, labor strikes were common, and political gatherings attracted hundreds of thousands.

Young working people were the primary force behind overt acts of civil disobedience. This was a remarkable achievement, especially considering that Portugal did not have a tradition of cohesive labor unions, and yet they created impromptu unions to organize themselves. Student protesters with a socialist ideology gained widespread support from the public which spread to a large number of military officers as well, prompting the leadership to increase government repression.

The Revolution of 1974 (Carnation Revolution) took place over just one day: April 25, 1974. Almost 50 years of dictatorship were overturned in less than 12 hours. Overall, the revolt was organized by military officers with the purpose of ending the dictatorship that had been in power since the 1930s. Even though the revolution was known as the Armed Forces Movement (AFM), soldiers actually walked together with the workers in their massive protests. The military in revolt secured key installations throughout the country, including military barracks, airports, and government offices, and all ministers were arrested. The AFM took immediate steps to dismantle the secret police, and opened the way for the creation of political parties.

The AFM created a temporary government called the Junta de Salvação Nacional (Junta of National Salvation), and General Spínola and Costa Gomes were appointed to govern. The new government declared itself pro-working class and supportive of the underprivileged. The people poured out by the thousands into most city squares to celebrate the end of the totalitarian fascist government. They were all involved in this revolutionary fervor, even though the new government had not yet offered any concrete proposals about how to run the nation. Consumed by their emotions, people handed out red carnations on the streets, which became the symbol of this successful and bloodless revolution. The revolution eventually became known as the

“Revolution of Flowers,” or Carnation Revolution. The overthrown leader, Marcello Caetano, was exiled to the Madeira Islands and was eventually granted asylum by the military dictatorship in Brazil.

However, Portugal continued to face the crisis in its colonies. Since maintaining troops in its colonies was an immense economic drain, the new government promised to withdraw troops from Portugal’s territorial possessions. From 1974 to 1976, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Sao Tomé were all granted independence, and East Timor was seized militarily by Indonesia. The only remaining colony was Macao, near Hong Kong, which Portugal administered with little opposition until handing it over to China in 1999.

The temporary government run by the military stepped aside after a year, and Portugal finally held its first open and free elections on April 25, 1975, exactly one year after the revolution. This was the second attempt to establish a republic. The voters turned out in a massive showing, with almost 90 percent of registered voters actually exercising their renewed right to vote. All political parties participated in this new process of democracy, even though most parties were not too liberal. The Communist Party, for example, attempted to force the national rhetoric to the extreme left, but it did not have enough members to create a meaningful impact at the national level. The first joint task of all the political parties was to create a new constitution, which eventually granted its citizens freedom of speech, religion, and the press. As a result, voters over 18 years of age can now select a parliament and vote for a president. There is also a prime minister, usually the leader of the political group that dominates the parliament. Most political parties have found it necessary to join forces and create coalitions to control a large number of seats in parliament.

The period following the overthrow of the dictatorship was not necessarily peaceful in Portugal. Social and economic unrest developed into a potential social disaster following leftist ideals. A massive agrarian reform took place almost immediately in 1974 after the revolution. Most banks were nationalized. University students refused to participate in entrance exams in the belief that they should not have to be dominated by repressive authorities. People without homes simply took over empty and abandoned propert-

ies. Workers on the railroads, in subways, and in textile industries went on strike demanding higher wages. This all happened at a time when the new government had inherited an economic crisis from its predecessors. Some issues were slowly resolved with smaller gains than expected by the general population. Eventually, between 1976 and 1980, a group of moderate and centralist political parties emerged into the national political environment.

In the early twenty-first century Portugal had many registered political parties. While the military forces ushered in the new era of democracy, they gave up their advisory role in 1982 and currently no longer have control over any aspects of political life. Today, the two most powerful parties are the Portuguese Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party. In 1986, the Social Democratic Party won presidential elections under the leadership of Anibal Cavaço Silva. This was a political party with a centrist ideology that was beneficial in establishing a balance in the nation. In addition, 1986 was also the year in which Portugal was accepted into the European Union. Portugal revised its constitution in 1989 to favor political stability and to encourage economic reforms aimed at attracting foreign investment and a more suitable business environment. The standard of living had also increased to levels higher than before the revolution, and the nation has matured politically into a better manager of economic and social needs. Since the Revolution of 1974, the new republic has changed hands many times among different political parties, showcasing the triumph of democracy in Portugal.

SEE ALSO: Angolan National Liberation, 1961–1974; Cape Verde, Independence Struggle; Costa, Afonso Augusta da (1871–1937); FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique); Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, J. M. (2000) *The History of Portugal*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Birmingham, D. (1993) *A Concise History of Portugal*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- De Figueiredo, A. (1976) *Portugal: Fifty Years of Dictatorship*. New York: Holmes & Meier.
- Marques, A. H. de Oliveira (1976) *History of Portugal*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sobel, L. A. (Ed.) (1976) *Portuguese Revolution, 1974–1976*. New York: Facts of Life.

Postcolonial feminism and protest in the global South

Lorna Lueker Zukas

Postcolonial feminism is a theoretical and activist project for societal transformation. Through analysis of entrenched power structures in formerly colonized nations, postcolonial feminism explains how economic and political institutions and social practices in those nations often oppress and marginalize women. In addition, it demonstrates how women around the globe struggle for equality and independence for themselves, their families, and their nations. The terms postcolonial and feminism are not universally accepted.

Feminism is criticized by many postcolonial writers as a western ideology too narrow to incorporate the concerns or activism of women worldwide. The term has been given anti-family and anti-male connotations, causing some activists to reject the label and argue that while women resist, rebel, and protest, there is no essence of woman, and sisterhood is not a global phenomenon. Postcolonial is criticized by many social theorists and activists as a term saturated with multiple, ahistorical, and sometimes incoherent meanings. Despite criticism of its constituent terms, postcolonial feminism engages important discussions around hierarchies of knowledge, assumed universalistic categories, and the impact of race, class, ethnicity, religion, and sexuality on women's well-being. Postcolonial feminists are not a coherent group. Nevertheless, their work exposes the long-term and far-reaching nature of women's struggles to live sustainable lives, to overcome adversity, to protect the environment, to save their families, and to end the harmful effects of globalization, the damaging exploitation of the South by the North.

In the two decades from 1975 to 1995, women's conditions captured global attention and a series of international conferences focused on women's issues ensued. The United Nations' conferences in Mexico City (1975), Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985), and Beijing (1995) were watersheds in the development of feminism in general and postcolonial feminism in particular. Looking at these developments, Chandra Talpade Mohanty

published her now famous essay, "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses" (1986), to demonstrate how some western feminist writing was self-serving and collapsed all women in the "third world" into "a singular monolithic subject," an "Other" without contextualization, history, personality, or spirit. Postcolonial feminists rebelled against this brand of western feminism, against the ideal of universal womanhood, and have since 1986 produced a body of work in which women from the global South analyze their own circumstances and critique the West for racist, gendered, neocolonial policies and the subjugation, subordination, and exoticization of people and places non-western.

In the global South, primarily, but not wholly countries lying between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn, a postcolonial feminist agenda emerged in opposition to neocolonial and patriarchal hegemonies which often marginalized women. Postcolonial feminism highlighted the struggles of women who sought political, economic, and social inclusion in their societies and actively worked to eliminate conditions that subordinated women to men in both the public and private spheres. The fact that postcolonial feminism arose as a result of anti-colonial and postcolonial struggles is not surprising. As anti-colonial struggles were won nationalist leaders rejected the ideologies of the first world and the socialist world and defined themselves as the third world, claiming a non-aligned and independent status. With the same spirit of originality and independence postcolonial feminists attempted to create new spaces for women. Their struggles ranged from rewriting national constitutions to developing laws bestowing on women a legal age of majority, the right to work, equal pay for equal work, family leave-time, rights to education, domestic violence safeguards, and anti-rape protections. These feminists also sought to protect their traditional spaces from neocolonial abuse, fighting for land-use rights and environmental protections. In a deliberate epistemological move, postcolonial feminists provincialized western perspectives, illuminating micro-experiences, female subjectivity, and struggles while explaining macro-global economic issues and political systems with indigenous voices. Their retelling of US and European histories detailing the consequences of imperialism, capitalism, and globalization on local places decried the Eurocentric production of knowledge,

the universalizing of women's experiences, and past and present dominations. By highlighting women's experiences, postcolonial feminists created an arena for discussion of women's activism in a global context.

Since the late twentieth century, postcolonial feminist protest in the global South has strengthened the women's movement on a global scale. Vandana Shiva is among the leading postcolonial feminists in India. Her work focuses on women as food producers, healers, and guardians of biodiversity in society. She argues that small-scale female farmers provide food security for most countries in the South, yet they are invisible as their work is outside the market-driven, export-led businesses that dominate the global economy. As unseen producers, women's value is not acknowledged and their means of production are often expropriated, polluted, or made inaccessible through international trade agreements. Shiva founded the Navdanya movement and the eco-feminist movement Diverse Women for Diversity to undo the harm of globalization and the Green Revolution, to advocate against monocropping, to protect the biodiversity of crops for food security, to defend local knowledge from transnational corporate bio-piracy, and to establish ecologically sustainable agriculture in which food security and health and safety of the people outweigh corporate profits. Postcolonial feminists involved in these movements maintain that corporations and the people who run them, as well as the shareholders who profit from them, have a responsibility to the communities in which they operate and cannot ruin the land and destroy people's livelihood with impunity.

Also protesting land pollution and corporate greed, a coalition of 600 Nigerian women occupied a Chevron-Texaco export terminal and flow station in 2002–3, shutting down the 450,000 barrels per day production facility. Utilizing a long tradition of women's power and protest in Nigeria, and reminiscent of the Women's War of 1929, women put their lives on the line in an effort to save their community and improve their lives. This postcolonial feminist protest motivated over 1,000 other women to occupy six additional Chevron-Texaco facilities throughout Nigeria, sparked labor strikes by men, and engendered anti-oil protests on all seven continents. Women demanded an end to the land pollution and poverty in their communities generated by the political economy of multinational oil business.

In writing about the postcolonial feminist movement in the Bahamas, Jacqui Alexander demonstrates the efforts of feminists within a larger Caribbean movement to articulate the connection between the public and private sphere. During the 1980s and 1990s, Bahamian postcolonial feminists showed that women's problems were societal problems and created a mass-based movement for social change, working to protect the family by ending violence against girls and women. The movement fostered an understanding of colonial and postcolonial nationalist practices that inscribed women as subordinate to men and enabled pervasive sexualized violence, including rape and incest of wives and daughters, and other forms of domestic violence. Women upheld the sanctity of the family and the safety of the home, and maintained that the ongoing violence put the future of the family at risk. In this case, the postcolonial state supported the postcolonial feminist movement, but instead of protecting women from domestic violence developed a weak law that did nothing to stop the brutality. Alexander shows that feminist movements need government intervention to create macro-level societal changes, but this action must be accompanied by micro-level ideological changes that insist women are not property and sexual abuse of any individual is intolerable.

By the early twenty-first century, rapid globalization shifted the discourse of postcolonial feminism; some Northern women moved South and some women from the South created lives and careers in the North, enabling ongoing cross-cultural dialogue. Recognizing and experiencing this shift, Mohanty revisited her landmark article "Under Western Eyes" in 2003 and asked all feminists to embrace a transnational feminism that acknowledges their differences but builds coalitions and develops solidarities across borders. With an internationalist vision she encourages women around the world to continue to struggle to improve their life conditions and their communities. She contends that by comprehending the points of contestation, by understanding the terrains on which the battles are fought, and by knowing what approaches create successful outcomes and which are co-opted by larger political forces, feminists can build a network of solidarity to support people's struggles.

Transnational feminism is concerned not only with women's development and gender and racial equality, but also with challenging

how transnational corporations and multilateral institutions have restructured lives, destroyed environments, and marginalized and silenced communities of people. This transnational feminism inspires solidarity between the peoples of the North and the South, rebukes capitalism's excesses, refuses to be co-opted by development funding, and charts an anti-globalization course to protect family, community, and local self-determination, and ensure freedom from exploitation by ending discrimination. Transnational feminism challenges prevailing social structures, militarization, religious fundamentalism, classism, sexism, and racism that privilege some over others. These feminists support local struggles and continue to challenge nation-states and the role of multilateral agencies whose agenda is the creation of a uniform capitalistic world order.

SEE ALSO: Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961); Shiva, Vandana (b. 1952); Women and National Liberation in Africa; Women's Movement, Anglophone Caribbean; Women's Movement, India; Women's Movement, Latin America; Women's Movement, Southern Africa; Women's War of 1929

References and Suggested Readings

- Alexander, M. J. (2005) *Pedagogies of Crossing*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Alexander, M. J. & Mohanty, C. T. (1997) *Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures*. New York: Routledge.
- Basu, A. (Ed.) (1995) *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Ferree, M. M. & Tripp, A. M. (2006) *Global Feminism: Transnational Women's Activism, Organizing, and Human Rights*. New York: New York University Press.
- Hawkesworth, M. E. (2006) *Globalization and Feminist Activism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Mann, H. S. (1995) Women's Rights versus Feminism? Postcolonial Perspectives. In G. Rajan (Ed.), *Postcolonial Discourse and Changing Cultural Contexts: Theory and Criticism*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Mills, S. (1998) Post-Colonial Feminist Theory. In S. Jackson & J. Jones (Eds.), *Contemporary Feminist Theories*. New York: New York University Press.
- Moghadam, V. M. (2005) *Globalizing Women: Transnational Feminist Networks*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Mohanty, C. T. (2003) *Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Rajan, G. (Ed.) (1995) *Postcolonial Discourse and Changing Cultural Contexts: Theory and Criticism*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Ramdas, K. N. (2006) Nothing Short of a Revolution: Reflections on the Global Women's Movement. *Conscious Magazine*, Washington, DC.
- Ricciutelli, L., Miles, A., & McFadden, M. H. (2004) *Feminist Politics, Activism, and Vision: Local and Global Challenges*. London: Zed Books.
- Smith, B. G. (Ed.) (2000) *Global Feminisms Since 1945: Rewriting Histories*. New York: Routledge.
- Stachel, L. A., Kofman, E., & Peake, L. (2004) *Mapping Women, Making Politics: Feminist Perspectives on Political Geography*. New York: Routledge.
- Suleri, S. (1994) Woman Skin Deep: Feminism and the Postcolonial Condition. In P. Williams & L. Chrisman (Eds.), *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Poulantzas, Nicos (1936–1979)

Christos Boukalas

Born in Athens, Greece in 1936, Nicos Poulantzas, sociology professor at Vincennes University, is considered as one of the most original post-war Marxist thinkers, and was an outstanding contributor to the theory of the state and socio-political struggles, theoretical areas crucial for revolutionary practice. His work provides indispensable means for the analysis of sociopolitical dynamics, and the development of revolutionary strategy.

While Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and Antonio Gramsci are constant influences in his work, his first book, *Political Power and Social Classes* (PPSC), is heavily informed by the structuralism of the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser. In PPSC Poulantzas attempts to establish politics and the state as a distinctive field of study while insisting that the state does not "have" power of its own but is a crucial mediator of class relations/dynamics. Thus, state functions are determined by class struggle and, in the context of the capitalist state, tend to systemically reproduce capitalist hegemony.

PPSC offers an elaborate set of notions (e.g., "type of state," "state form," "type of regime") that are henceforth essential for state-theoretical analysis (and historical materialism more generally), while the notion of the power bloc, is crucial for articulating class interests with state

power. Nonetheless, because of its structuralist emphasis in establishing the state as a separate subject of analysis, PPSC ultimately fails to inscribe class struggle in the formation and operation of state apparatuses, which is also a failure to inscribe the impact of state power on class struggle.

At this stage Poulantzas engaged in a debate with British state theorist Ralph Miliband. As the latter was postulating the capitalist character of the state from the class origin of top political personnel, Poulantzas counter-argued that capitalist bias is inscribed at the very structure of the state, making indifferent who occupies its summit.

Underlying Poulantzas's theoretical output was his political commitment. He was a communist militant, active in several parties and organizations in France and Greece. This is evident in his approach, choice of subjects, and in a deep methodological premise to construct theory so that it is able to accommodate political phenomena, rather than "deriving" the latter through pre-established theoretical formulas. Accordingly, he would seek to reframe his theoretical approach in the light of political developments. Thus, as May 1968 came soon after the publication of PPSC, Poulantzas perceived structuralism as a hindrance in accounting for social dynamics.

His second book, *Fascism and Dictatorship* (FD), focused mainly on class dynamics, hence privileging Gramscian categories over structuralism. Studying the rise of fascist states in 1930s Italy and Germany, FD sought to help develop a popular strategy against the military dictatorship in Greece. It is concerned with exceptional forms of the capitalist type of state. Fascist states are exceptional because representation of class interests does not occur through the channels (e.g., parliamentarism) or within a framework (e.g., rule of law) pertinent to normal forms of capitalist state. They are nonetheless forms of capitalist state inasmuch as the economy is instituted as a separate field, and the state is charged with reproducing the capitalist relations of production. This account contradicts the dominant conceptualization of fascist/totalitarian states as the opposite of capitalist/pluralist ones.

FD describes in detail the complex interplay of class dynamics (strategies, alliances, movements) that concluded in the rise of fascist parties to power. Furthermore, given that exceptional forms imply a radical break with institutional normality, FD shows class dynamics as deter-

mining not only state power and functions, but also the very structure of the state.

In the same line, *Social Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (SCCC) develops a sophisticated set of categories for class typology, and produces an account of the complicated, antagonistic process through which specific class strategies are promoted by the state, and define the modality and orientation of state power. It discusses normal contemporary state forms, and is concerned with the development of left strategies for resisting monopoly capitalism and imperialism.

The *Crisis of Dictatorships* (CD) was prompted by a strategic surprise: the Greek junta did not fall as a direct result of popular struggles. Poulantzas's conclusion was that popular struggles impact the state even when carried out at a distance from it, and, being unable to accommodate them, exceptional state forms are inherently fragile. Furthermore, the Portuguese revolution against the dictatorship was an actual opportunity to develop a democratic/socialist strategy. In its context, Poulantzas moves from a Leninist "dual power" position to a newly defined "eurocommunist" one, where popular pressure to the state from the "outside" is combined with intensification of struggles inside the state. This implies a reviewed perception of the state, not as monolithic, but as riven with internal contradictions and antagonisms.

Poulantzas's last book, *State, Power, Socialism* (SPS), brings his previous achievements together in a study of normal state forms, under renewed theoretical impetus deriving from an uncomfortable relationship with Foucault's theory of power. Poulantzas criticized Foucault for producing mere metaphysics of power, since for him power was not grounded in any social relation other than itself, would not combine to any general direction, and would be exercised always, everywhere, and at random. Nonetheless, under the influence of Foucault, SPS questions the fundamental premise that the capitalist state would always and necessarily serve capitalist interests, and privileges a conjuncture-specific analysis of the dynamic articulation between classes, strategies, state mechanisms, and state power. The outcome is an account of the state as a complex, internally contradictory institutional matrix, whose powers are mobilized by different strategies of classes/fractions occupying different state mechanisms. Whether a relatively coherent general line of power can be developed is uncertain.

When it does, it is the result of a certain class-fraction's hegemony in the power bloc, and a subsequent predominance of the mechanism occupied by the hegemonic fraction among state mechanisms. Thus, the state is defined as a *material condensation of a relationship of social forces*. Duplicating Marx's definition of capital, Poulantzas declares the state to be a *social relation* – in contrast to hitherto prevailing approaches that conceptualized it either as an “actor” informed by its own interests and exercising power to their pursuit, or as an “object,” a neutral power container to be used by any social force occupying it.

In this framework, Poulantzas examined contemporary Western European state forms. He argued that, to counter political and economic crisis resulting from acute popular struggles, the state was acquiring a new form: “authoritarian statism.” Its key feature is augmented statal control over all aspects of social life, combined with exclusion of the population from political control. Specific expressions include concentration of power to the summits of the executive; reversal of the parties' role; inflation of the political importance of state bureaucracy; disruption of the rule of law; development of a draconian policing arsenal to deal with acute expressions of popular resistance; and augmentation of a parallel network of interests' representation in the state that bypasses the normal parliamentary channels of bourgeois democracy. Poulantzas emphasizes that authoritarian statism is not an exceptional (fascist) form, but a normal form of capitalist state, which nonetheless organically incorporates authoritarian elements into the institutional framework of the bourgeois republic – hence rendering them permanent.

His untimely death in Paris by suicide in 1979 prevented Poulantzas from developing the outlook of SPS any further. Nonetheless, the relational approach constitutes a watershed regarding perceptions of the state; and the hardening of state power in the early twenty-first century resulted in renewed interest in authoritarian statism as a basis for political analysis. In all, Poulantzas's theoretical contribution is essential for the strategic orientation of democratic, revolutionary forces.

SEE ALSO: Eurocommunism; Foucault, Michel (1926–1984); Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Greece, Anti-Dictatorship Protests; Marxism

References and Suggested Readings

- Jessop, B. (1985) *Nicos Poulantzas: Marxist Theory and Political Strategy*. London: Macmillan.
- Martin, J. (Ed.) (2008) *The Poulantzas Reader*. London: Verso.
- Poulantzas, N. (1973) *Political Power and Social Classes*. London: New Left Books.
- Poulantzas, N. (1974) *Fascism and Dictatorship*. London: New Left Books.
- Poulantzas, N. (1975) *Social Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*. London: New Left Books.
- Poulantzas, N. (1976) *Crisis of the Dictatorships*. London: New Left Books.
- Poulantzas, N. (1978) *State, Power, Socialism*. London: New Left Books.

POUM (Workers' Party of Marxist Unification)

Andrew Durgan

The Spanish Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (Workers' Party of Marxist Unification) (POUM) was the most important of the dissident communist groupings that emerged internationally in the 1930s in opposition to Stalinism. It played a leading role in the Spanish Revolution of 1936–7 before becoming victim of the Soviet government's first intervention against a foreign revolution

The POUM was founded in September 1935 with the fusion of the Bloque Obrero y Campesino (Workers' and Peasants' Bloc) (BOC) and the Izquierda Comunista de España (Communist Left of Spain) (ICE). The origins of the BOC lay in the pro-communist faction of the CNT led by Joaquín Maurín. This group formed the nucleus of the Spanish Communist Party's Catalan Federation which in 1930 broke with the party in opposition to its ultra-leftism and its increasingly bureaucratic methods. In March 1931 the Catalan Federation united with another dissident communist grouping which had emerged from sectors of left Catalan nationalism in 1928, the Partit Comunista Català, to form the BOC.

The BOC was the largest workers' party in Catalonia, with some 5,000 members by 1935. It also had branches in the Valencia region and elsewhere. Politically and socially it was squeezed between the mass anarchosindicalist movement, the CNT, and the left nationalist party, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. Its main base was in the Catalan provinces, particularly among peasants

in Lleida and Girona, in smaller industrial centers and, in Barcelona, among white collar workers. The BOC championed the necessity for workers' unity and helped establish various trade union united fronts in Catalonia and the Workers' Alliances, which would have a decisive role in the rebellion of 1934. The BOC argued the forthcoming revolution in Spain would be "socialist-democratic," whereby an alliance of the peasantry, national liberation movements (Catalonia, the Basque Country, etc.), and the working class, under the hegemony of the latter, would both carry through the "unfinished" democratic revolution, which the petty bourgeoisie was incapable of carrying out, and move directly onto the socialist stage. The inability of the Republic (1931–6) to satisfy either demands for social justice or deal with the growing threat of the extreme right appeared to confirm the BOC's prognosis.

The ICE was formed in 1930 as the Spanish section of the International Left Opposition (Trotskyists). Like the BOC, it included in its ranks many founding cadres of Spanish communism, in particular Juan Andrade and Andreu Nin. With 800 members, the ICE's most important nuclei were in Madrid, Seville, Extremadura, and the North. The Trotskyists' theoretical level compared favorably with the paucity of much of Spanish Marxism. Initially, the ICE was very critical of what it saw as the confused politics of the BOC.

The BOC were never followers of Bukharin as has often been asserted. In fact, by 1933, Maurín's organization had adopted a critique of Stalinism closer to Trotskyism. The ICE, in turn, had distanced itself from the international Trotskyist movement, in particular rejecting the turn towards "entrism" in the socialist parties in 1934. This evolution in the two organizations, combined with working closely together in the Workers Alliances and the general clamor for unity following the defeat of the October 1934 uprising, led to the convergence of the BOC and ICE.

The new party represented a synthesis of the programs of the two organizations rather than just an extension of the BOC as has been claimed. Both adversaries and historians alike usually label the POUM as Trotskyist, but this was never the case. The POUM shared with Trotskyism its critique of the theory of socialism in one country, its defense of working-class and party

democracy, and its internationalism. However, the POUM's decision to sign the Popular Front pact led to a breakdown of the tenuous relationship that still existed between the former ICE members and the international Trotskyist movement. The POUM, in fact, denounced the Popular Front both before and after the elections as class collaboration and defended their decision to participate in the electoral pact in order to "defeat the Right at the polls" and assure an amnesty for the thousands imprisoned after October 1934.

The POUM participated actively in opposing the military uprising in July 1936 in Barcelona and elsewhere. In Catalonia its influence grew significantly, and it played an important role in many of the local revolutionary committees and in the first militia columns to leave for the Aragon front. However, the POUM was plainly in a minority in a revolutionary movement dominated by the CNT.

The party grew from some 6,000 members on the eve of the war to a claimed 40,000 by the spring of 1937, the majority in Catalonia. During the first ten months of the war it published five daily and numerous weekly newspapers, as well as having radio stations in Barcelona and Madrid. It organized over 6,000 militia in the Lenin (later 29th) Division on the Aragon front, mainly around Huesca, the experience of which was described in George Orwell's classic *Homage to Catalonia* and depicted in Ken Loach's film *Land and Freedom*. The party also had battalions on the Madrid and Teruel fronts.

The POUM argued the war and revolution were inseparable; that the urban and rural working class were not fighting just to defend republican democracy but to carry through the social revolution that had erupted in July 1936. Andreu Nin, who had become the party's central leader in the absence of Maurín, would claim that the working class had "solved" in five days what the Republic had been unable to do in five years: the distribution of the land, the destruction of clerical power, and a profound socioeconomic transformation in benefit of the working class. By subordinating both the military and social struggle to winning middle-class support, the POUM argued, the Republic would be defeated. Nevertheless, unlike the anarchists and many left socialists, the POUM did not dismiss the need, at least, to neutralize petty bourgeois hostility towards the social revolution.

Thus the party opposed forced collectivization and arbitrary measures against small businessmen and shopkeepers.

Basing itself on the experience of the Russian Revolution, the POUM defended the need for the establishment of a new proletarian power: a Workers' and Peasants' Government elected by an assembly of delegates from workers', peasants', and fighters' committees. Such a government would in turn organize a unified revolutionary army, the Red Army under Trotsky being the model, and centralize the collectivization of industry and the land.

Without the CNT, the POUM was incapable of imposing a new revolutionary power, but the anarchosyndicalists were opposed in principle to the building of any new form of state structure. Having failed to persuade the CNT to take power through the Catalan Militia Committee, the POUM felt it had little choice but to follow the anarchosyndicalists into the newly reorganized Catalan government (Generalitat) in late September 1936. The new regional government served to both "legalize" the revolution and to eventually undermine it. The dissolution of the revolutionary committees in favor of municipal councils meant both the POUM and CNT lost much of their power base at a local level. Trotsky and his followers would severely criticize the POUM for participating in a Popular Front government and accuse the party of having betrayed the revolution. The POUM itself was divided internally over this and other questions.

The reconstruction of the republican state and the undermining of the revolution were paralleled with the rapid growth in influence of the communists. Stalinist methods and demonology soon became a central part of the republican counterrevolution. The POUM were identified as Trotskyist and thus by extension as fascist. The fact that the POUM denounced the Moscow Trials and reclaimed the mantle of the Bolsheviks was particularly irksome for the communists. Moreover, as the weaker sector of the revolutionary left, the POUM was a far easier target than the CNT.

The CNT initially refused to take sides in the growing divisions between the POUM and the communists, seeing it as a "family" affair between Marxists. Worse still, for the POUM, the anarchosyndicalists were prepared to enter a pact with their trade union rivals the socialist UGT, which was firmly under Stalinist control

in Catalonia, on the basis that this was a sindical and not political-based collaboration. The POUM itself had lost its trade union base during the summer of 1936. Faced with the Generalitat's decree making trade union membership obligatory and the growing polarization between the anarchist CNT and the "Marxist" UGT, the dissident communists decided to join the latter. The POUM had organized its own union federation in May 1936, the *Federación Obrera de Unidad Sindical* (FOUS), as the first step towards trade union unity. With around 50,000 members the FOUS had briefly challenged the hegemony of the Catalan CNT in the weeks leading up to the war. Given the relative weakness of the local UGT and the difficulties of working inside the CNT since the BOC-led unions had been expelled in 1932-3, the POUM thought they could use the socialist union as a platform from which to argue for unity with the anarchosyndicalists. Instead, the massive and rapid growth of the Catalan Stalinist party, the *Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya* (PSUC), which united local communists and socialists, meant the UGT provided an important mass base for the POUM's adversaries.

The Stalinist campaign against the POUM began in earnest first in Madrid, where the party was weaker. In October 1936 members of the unified Communist-Socialist Youth, the *Juventud Socialista Unificada*, assaulted the headquarters of the POUM's youth organization, the *Juventud Comunista Ibérica*. Under pressure from the Soviet ambassador the POUM was denied representation on the Madrid Defense Junta and its press in the capital was heavily censored and eventually suppressed altogether. Its troops, which had been decimated at the front during the battle for Madrid, denied arms and supplies, were absorbed into the CNT-led 38th Mixed Brigade in January 1937 to avoid complete obliteration. Meanwhile in Catalonia, also a result of direct Soviet interference, the POUM was ejected from the Catalan government in December 1936. By early 1937 verbal and, increasingly, physical attacks on the POUM by the communists were intensifying. Calls were repeatedly now made for the POUM as a "fascist" organization to be repressed. Excluded from the UGT and with its militia denied arms on the Aragon front, the POUM tried desperately to persuade the CNT to take a stand against the counterrevolution.

An exception to the lack of unity on the revolutionary left was the formation of the Frente de la Juventud Trabajadora Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Young Workers' Front) by the POUM and CNT youth organizations in February 1937, which mobilized thousands of young workers to demonstrate in defense of the "conquests of the revolution." But this experience was short-lived, as the CNT soon blocked this collaboration with a "political" organization.

The attempts to undermine the revolution finally provoked an armed uprising of CNT activists in Barcelona in May 1937. The POUM had sided with the workers on the barricades, but rather than see this insurrection as an opportunity to seize power, the party saw it as a way of halting the assaults on "the gains of July 1936." Having failed to persuade the CNT leadership to bring the entire city under their control, the POUM felt it had little option but to follow the anarchosindicalists when they abandoned the streets for the sake of maintaining anti-fascist unity. Accused of having organized an insurrection against the Republic, the POUM was made illegal on June 16, 1937. For the communists, the May events were the definitive proof of the fascist character of the POUM and they called for its arrested leaders to be shot. Andreu Nin was abducted and murdered by Soviet agents. Several hundred POUM members were imprisoned and dozens more murdered. The party continued to operate clandestinely, bringing out its press and its members fighting at the front in units usually controlled by the CNT. At the trial of the POUM leadership in November 1938, unable to prove the Stalinist accusation that the party was a fascist spy organization, the defendants were instead sentenced to long prison sentences for having aimed to overthrow the Republic. The international outcry over the murder of Nin guaranteed, in part, that a Moscow-style show trial could not be mounted in republican territory.

In the late 1940s the POUM was reorganized clandestinely in Catalonia and played an active role in the anti-Francoist movement. The advent of the Cold War, the indifference of the democracies and subsequent consolidation of Franco's regime soon undermined most of this opposition. The POUM was undermined by a split in 1945 which led to the founding of the social democratic Moviment Socialista de Catalunya. By the early 1950s the POUM had become principally

an exile organization based in France and Latin America. With the democratization of Spain in the 1970s the remnants of the POUM attempted to reorganize in Spain. It attracted some new younger members but a failed attempt to unify with other small revolutionary groups really marked the end of the party. The last issue of the POUM's by now bi-monthly paper, *La Batalla*, came out in May 1980.

SEE ALSO: Asturias Uprising, October 1934; Bolsheviks; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Leninist Philosophy; Maurin, Joaquín (1896–1973); Nin, Andreu (1892–1937); Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Alba, V. (Ed.) (1977) *La revolución española en la práctica. Documentos del POUM*. Gijón: Ediciones Júcar.
- Alba, V. & Schwartz, S. (1988) *Spanish Marxism versus Soviet Communism: A History of the POUM*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Bolloten, B. (1991) *The Spanish Civil War: Revolution and Counterrevolution*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester/Wheatsheaf.
- Broué, P. & Témime, E. (1972) *The Revolution and Civil War in Spain*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Durgan, A. (1996) *B.O.C. El Bloque Obrero y Campesino 1930–1936*. Barcelona: Laertes.
- Durgan, A. (2006) Marxism, War and Revolution: Trotsky and the POUM. *Stalinism, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Revolutionary History* 9, 2: 27–65.
- Durgan, A. et al. (1992) The Spanish Civil War: The View from the Left. *Revolutionary History* 4, 1/2.
- Iglesias, I. (2003) *Experiencias de la revolución. El POUM, Trotsky y la intervención soviética*. Barcelona: Laertes.
- Orwell, G. (2001) *Orwell in Spain*. London: Penguin.
- Pagès, P. (1978) *El movimiento trotskista en España (1930–1935)*. Barcelona: Ediciones Península.
- Solano, W. (1999) *El POUM en la historia*. Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata.
- Trotsky, L. (1973) *The Spanish Revolution (1931–1939)*. New York: Pathfinder Press.

Prabhakaran, Velupillai (b. 1954)

Charan Rainford

Velupillai Prabhakaran is the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the foremost rebel organization seeking *Eelam* or an independent homeland for the Sri Lankan Tamils. He was born on November 26, 1954 in Jaffna,

Sri Lanka as the fourth child to T. Velupillai and V. Parvathi, a well-respected family in the coastal village of Velvettiturai. Velupillai was a clerk and district land officer. By dint of his father's occupation, Prabhakaran's early schooling was in the Eastern town of Batticaloa, and later in Jaffna. He was said to be a studious boy and a loner by nature. In 1958, during the first major anti-Tamil riots, he witnessed a Hindu temple priest caught and burnt to death by a rampaging Sinhalese mob.

These events are said to have had a strong impact on Prabhakaran, who was of a generation that did not witness pre-colonial Sri Lanka. He veered away from a quiet childhood and became more politically aware and radically inclined in his mid-teens. While he was influenced by India's struggle for freedom, it was not by non-violence but by Subhas Chandra Bose, whom he described as his "special hero". Prabhakaran began to take to violence in the early 1970s, forcing him to stay away from home so as to prevent guilt falling on his family, but it was in 1975 that he undertook his first major killing. Leading a group of eight youths, Prabhakaran shot dead former Jaffna mayor and chief organizer for the governing party, Alfred Duraiappah, as he headed to temple.

In May 1976 Prabhakaran formed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in succession to the Tamil New Tigers. From 1979 through the early 1980s Prabhakaran and his senior colleagues based themselves in Madras, where they also met for the first time with Anton Balasingham, who would provide the group with an ideological background via socialism, though it is fair to say that the LTTE is essentially driven by nationalism and pragmatism, reflecting Prabhakaran's own mindset. In May 1982 Prabhakaran and a colleague were arrested by the Indian police after their involvement in a fight with a rival leader and ex-colleague. Even as the authorities prepared to deport him to Sri Lanka, the Indian government, under pressure from Tamil Nadu politicians and also for its own strategic reasons, chose to release them to live in custody in Tamil Nadu. On November 27, 1982 Shankar became the first LTTE guerrilla to die in action, an event since commemorated annually by Prabhakaran with his Heroes Day speech. The following month, Prabhakaran escaped and returned to Jaffna.

The riots of July 1983 would set Prabhakaran firmly on the quest for a separate state, an ideo-

logical goal that he has never renounced. In 1984 he would accede to the LTTE's cadres being trained covertly by the Indian government, and offer his first press interview, one of many granted to the Indian journalist Anita Pratap. In October Prabhakaran married Mathivathani with whom he would have three children. The period from 1985 to 1991 was a critical period in Prabhakaran's life, as it led from negotiations mediated by India to open conflict with the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF). In July 1989 the Indian newspaper *The Hindu* prematurely pronounced that Prabhakaran had been killed. Again, in 2005, a persistent rumor that he had perished was given credence by government pronouncements. He came close to capture when the IPKF belatedly stormed his jungle hideout. The episode with the IPKF ultimately led Prabhakaran to order the successful assassination of former Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. The repercussions of the assassination still reverberate, with an outstanding warrant for his extradition.

In April 2002, during a peace process with the government, Prabhakaran gave his first international press conference. While affirming his commitment to Eelam, he acknowledged that another solution was possible if the fundamental Tamil demands of homeland, nation, and self-determination were met.

Prabhakaran is viewed as a master military strategist and regarded as the supreme Tamil leader by a large proportion of the Tamil population. This also reflects the tight central control with which he leads the LTTE, something that has drawn strong criticism from moderates and opponents alike. Prabhakaran remains condemned for his resort to terrorism, suicide bombings, and child recruitment and even while he continues the struggle for Eelam, he is wanted by Interpol and the Sri Lankan government.

SEE ALSO: Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945); Tamil Nationalist Struggle for Eelam

References and Suggested Readings

- Narayan Swamy, M. R. (1994) *Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas*. New Delhi: Konark.
- Narayan Swamy, M. R. (2003) *Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran – The First Profile of the World's Most Ruthless Guerrilla Leader*. New Delhi: Konark.
- Pratap, A. (2001) *Island of Blood*. New Delhi: Penguin.

Prague Spring

Kieran Williams

The upheaval in Czechoslovakia in the second half of the 1960s conventionally referred to as the Prague Spring was one of the greatest challenges to the Soviet model of political economy and social control. The centerpiece of this challenge was an effort by the ruling Communist Party (Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ) to combat growing disaffection by relaxing the limits on speech and association, curtailing surveillance by the secret police, introducing market elements into the planned economy, federalizing the unitary state to put relations between the two constituent nations (the Czechs and the less numerous Slovaks) on a more equal footing, and preparing the KSČ for semi-competitive elections. Alongside the official efforts, ferment in universities, trade unions, and intellectual circles exceeded the bounds set by the KSČ and greatly alarmed the Soviet Union, which led an invasion in August 1968 to restore Leninist orthodoxy. The ensuing week of non-violent civil resistance to that invasion is also an important part of this episode.

Although the Prague Spring is normally associated with 1968, it neither began nor ended in that year. Its first stirrings can be found five years earlier, when economic recession coincided with a new round of revelations about political crimes committed after the KSČ seized power in 1948; it ended in August 1969 when protests to mark the first anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion were brutally suppressed by the Czechoslovak police and army. Apart from federalization, which Slovaks managed to push onto the agenda in 1968, most of the necessary conceptual breakthroughs concerning the state, the representation of social groups, the balancing of interests, and the role of the market had already occurred between 1963 and 1967 (Golan 1971; Kusin 1971). At that time artists, philosophers, and jurists, who were the backbone of the socialist establishment, transcended both the Stalinism of their youth and the searingly self-critical impulses of early de-Stalinization. They were shifting toward a view of humankind that was much more subjective and contingent, expressed in “a language that effectively reconfigured Marxism as existential and moral philosophy, a language made up more of questions than of answers” (Shore 1998: 439).

Many strands of the “polysemic” Prague Spring (Rubès 1999) were woven into the Action Program, the KSČ’s reform manifesto announced in April 1968 (for a translation of the text, see Remington 1969). At once audacious and contradictory, it was the product of input from dozens of institutions, inquiries, and commissions, and drafted over three months by many hands, some more conservative than others. It can be read as potentially revolutionary in its implications, envisioning a leap to a novel political and economic arrangement with a family resemblance to contemporaneous corporatist experiments in Yugoslavia or to ones advocated by West European communist parties. At almost every step, however, the program curbs its ambition by insisting on the supremacy of the KSČ as guarantor of socialist fundamentals. Like the KSČ leader at the time, Alexander Dubček, the Action Program embodies the fuzzy boundaries of the Prague Spring reforms that made them an exceptionally exciting project, but for the Soviets a deeply worrying one.

Dubček, a Slovak with a long record of loyal service to the party and to the Soviet Union, favored a controlled, centrist liberalization of the Leninist system, and as 1968 passed he grew uneasy. The collapse of censorship in March, owing more to party neglect than conscious decision, had permitted public space for a much broader discussion of the political system than was intended or desired; the playwright Václav Havel, for example, had gone well beyond the Action Program in arguing for a competitive opposition party (Remington 1969: 64–71). Havel and dozens of other intellectuals were setting up discussion clubs beyond the party’s control, and were planning to revive the liberal daily newspaper of the interwar republic, *Lidové noviny* (The People’s Paper), in October. When Soviet leaders alerted Dubček to their displeasure at these and other developments, he rarely disagreed. He differed, however, in his belief that the best approach would be to let the KSČ hold a special congress in September 1968, at which new people would be elected to its topmost institutions. In private, Dubček assured Moscow that the congress would be the moment when the party elite could shed both its Stalinist holdovers and its more radical elements; the resulting leadership would be more united and authoritative and thus better able to keep the next stage of reform under effective control.

Unconvinced that Dubček was either sincere in his pledges or skilful enough to manage the congress, on August 17 the Soviet leadership decided to invade Czechoslovakia three days later with the assistance of other socialist states that shared their alarm – East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Although commonly referred to as a Warsaw Pact invasion, it technically took place outside the framework of the communist military alliance; Romania, a member of the pact, was considered unreliable and was not invited to participate. In the first wave, starting late on the night of August 20, around 165,000 soldiers and 4,600 tanks crossed Czechoslovakia's borders; within a few days the numbers had swelled to around 500,000 soldiers and 6,000 tanks. The overwhelmed Czechoslovak army was ordered by the defense minister not to resist.

The purpose of the invasion was not to install a government of foreign military occupation, but to deter or squash any armed resistance to a takeover of party and state institutions by Czechoslovak collaborators. Many officials who had started out at Dubček's side had decided to break with him and signal to Moscow their willingness to reverse the reforms in the ways preferred by the Soviets. Working with the Soviet embassy in Prague and consulate in Bratislava, these conspirators hastily plotted a coup d'état by forcing, on the night of August 20, a vote in the KSC leadership on a motion to declare the country to be in crisis, request outside military assistance, and sideline the best-known reformers. Instead, two secondary but nonetheless necessary conspirators balked at the last minute, sided with the reformers, and voted to condemn the invasion. The text of that condemnation was then telephoned to the central radio studio, from which it was broadcast before the collaborators there were in full control. The original plan fast unraveling, the Soviets had to improvise. Before dawn Dubček and other reformers were arrested and eventually taken to the Soviet Union. On August 23 talks began in Moscow between the Soviets and their captives, resulting in the reformers' safe return to Czechoslovakia four days later.

During the week following the invasion the people of Czechoslovakia were almost unanimous in their opposition to it. Initial reactions were confrontational, as youths pelted tanks with rocks and bottles, used buses to erect barricades,

congregated in squares near historical monuments, and sometimes formed human chains. In several instances, invading military units panicked and opened fire, killing dozens of civilians (17 were killed in front of the main radio studio on the morning of August 21). As days passed and little news trickled out of the negotiations in Moscow, there were hints of public readiness to move to methods reminiscent of partisan warfare against German occupation during World War II if the Czechoslovak delegation did not return soon (or at all). Bolder members of the party's municipal committee for Prague wanted to push for an indefinite general strike and perhaps an armed rising at a clandestine meeting of delegates to the KSC congress on August 22. Recent historical scholarship demonstrates several instances of army units caching weapons before they could be confiscated by the Soviets, and that an embryonic partisan command post was set up at the military academy in Brno, the third largest city. There were also many civilians with access to weapons not under the control of the neutralized army: the party's paramilitary wing, the People's Militia, had 78,283 members, based in more than 2,000 workplaces, and the civil-defense and hunters' societies had thousands of recreational shooters.

Cooler heads prevailed and the country engaged instead in what became a textbook example of non-violent civil resistance. Outrage was channeled into graffiti, placards, petitions, jokes, songs, and poems, the composition of which was often coordinated at local "slogan centers" staffed by students, educators, artists, and actors. Journalists and their editors, displaced from their primary workplaces on August 21, quickly regrouped in auxiliary outposts or apartments, from which they printed and circulated newspapers, and managed to resume radio broadcasts after only two hours of dead air. By August 24, to allow exhausted radio staff time to rest, a relay system had been set up, coordinated from the western Czech city of Plzeň, whereby regional studios took turns managing the broadcasts. Army units put mobile transmitters at their disposal, while sympathizers in the interior ministry thwarted Soviet efforts to jam the frequencies. The widespread presence of loudspeakers in factories, originally installed for indoctrination, also came in handy, since workers could stay on the job (working extra "Dubček shifts" on Sunday, August 25, to offset some of the economic damage caused by the invasion) but

still hear underground broadcasts. State television was likewise kept on the air by staff hiding in 72 secondary workplaces in Prague alone, but with fewer reserve transmitters at its disposal, it was more prone than radio to localized interruptions.

Much of the content of these broadcasts comprised the reading of resolutions adopted by countless chapters and branches of every legal organization, declaring their refusal to recognize a KSC or government led by anyone other than the reformers whom the Soviets had abducted. The media also guided citizens on how to interact with the invading forces. In the first 48 hours after the invasion began, citizens had spontaneously fraternized with the soldiers to undermine their belief that a counterrevolution was taking place, and to reduce their willingness to fire on civilians. In subsequent days the media advised the public simply to ignore the soldiers and go about daily life as normally as possible; when the invading armies' supply lines broke down, Czechs and Slovaks withheld food and water. As rumors spread of foreign intelligence officers arriving to arrest prominent reformers still at large, radio directed residents to take down street signs, house numbers, and any plaques that could identify a government building. Finally, the media helped bring the country to a standstill during brief general strikes (for two minutes on August 21, for one hour on August 22, and again for one hour on August 23).

When the country's leaders returned from Moscow on August 27, with Dubček still at the helm of the party, the people felt that they had won. Most were therefore devastated by what followed. While in captivity some leaders put their names to a secret protocol supporting rollbacks Dubček had privately promised before the invasion, such as restoration of censorship, banning of new organizations, and removal of prominent radicals from high office. In October the Czechoslovak government signed a treaty consenting to the stationing of 60,000 Soviet soldiers in the country "temporarily" (they remained until 1991). Bewildered by the elite's refusal to capitalize on the authority vested in them by the civil resistance, the great majority of citizens retreated into the subdued, dutiful compliance that Dubček and his colleagues were tirelessly requesting; a small minority, however, pushed back.

The resistance to what was known euphemistically as "normalization" moved in three

phases, each with a defining method. The first was street protests, for which the major autumnal anniversaries – Independence Day on October 28, the Bolshevik Revolution on November 7 – provided ample opportunity. Crowds in Prague and other cities swelled to several thousand on these occasions, and were dispersed violently by the police with help from the Czechoslovak army and the party's militia; hundreds of students and young workers were arrested, and one died of his injuries. To avoid further casualties the second phase moved the protests indoors, as university students launched a nationwide sit-in strike around International Students' Day (November 17) to demand resumption of the reforms and respect for civil and political rights.

The third phase, starting at the end of 1968, united the students and trade unions. The latter had been quietly establishing their independence, in that KSC cells within the unions were defunct by the autumn and unable to influence the enormous turnover taking place in the unions' personnel. Almost 900 local union committees signaled their sympathy for the students and their demands in November by organizing 15-minute strikes in workplaces. The highpoint of worker-student solidarity came in December, when rumors spread that Josef Smrkovský, the popular (and populist) chairman of the national legislature, was to be unseated as part of the impending reorganization of the unicameral assembly into two chambers to reflect the federalization of the state. The students' national union sealed a pact with the metalworkers' union (KOVO) to call a general strike should Smrkovský fall. The Soviets had told Dubček that Smrkovský had to go, but rather than confront the matter head-on, Dubček characteristically let the situation deteriorate to the point where Smrkovský offered to settle for a deputy speaker's post in order to prevent a social explosion.

Smrkovský's self-relegation allowed the metalworkers to stand down without seeming to have reneged on a commitment. Doing so bought the embattled and internally divided KSC leadership only a few days of peace, as it was quickly followed on January 16, 1969 by the self-immolation of a student, Jan Palach, on a busy square in central Prague. Palach subjected himself to the agony of a slow death from severe burns in a bid to jolt the country back into the forms of resistance practiced in August. His deed, however, inspired horror and veneration, not action; fellow students organized

a well-attended commemoration and funeral procession, and a few individuals emulated Palach's method of suicide in the coming weeks. The grand outcome, however, was the intensification of conflict inside the party elite. A faction that had originally opposed the Soviet-led invasion, or at least had not been involved in the conspiracy to take power during it, now emerged as a "realist" alternative to the ill, irresolute Dubček. This faction's intrigues, which included consultation with Soviet leaders, resulted in the replacement of Dubček by fellow Slovak and arch-realist Gustáv Husák in April 1969.

Soon thereafter the party targeted the students and the trade unions for reconquest. The unions had held a landmark congress in March 1969, only weeks before Dubček's downfall, at which a seemingly bold coordinating council was freely elected without party supervision. The congress conceded that the party exercised a "leading role" in society, but that it would be respected only if reforms continued. As a first test of the trade unions' resolve, the KSČ leadership under Husák decided in May 1969 to ban the university students' union and begin building up a new, complaisant one by recruiting cadets in military academies. The students got wind of this and tried to fight back by invoking their pact with the metalworkers' union, KOVO. On June 23 KOVO members at a vital engineering works in Prague agreed that they would call a general strike if they were not given a satisfactory reason for the abolition of the students' union. At this point the limits of the union leaders' radicalism were exposed; under relentless pressure from the party and Soviet counterparts, they were undergoing the same conversion to "realism" as had many reformers in the Dubček team. They found procedural excuses to avoid a general strike, and the wildcat stoppages that did occur lacked official blessing. A meeting of the KOVO central council on July 2 bitterly denounced the party's new policies and reiterated past demands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and for guarantees of union independence, but again stopped short of coming to the rescue of the students. One week later, the revived party cell attached to the coordinating council of the trade unions held its first meeting, a sign that a significant number of leaders were willing to submit to the party's tutelage.

The last hurrah of the Prague Spring came on the first anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion,

when millions of Czechs and Slovaks reenacted many of the forms of civil resistance of the year before. Thousands also assembled in the main towns and cities to protest the country's drift away from reform socialism, whereas in August 1968 the media had urged people to avoid large concentrations as they might invite violent dispersal by jittery foreign soldiers. In August 1969 Soviet units stayed in their new garrisons, while the tasks of crowd control and suppression were handled by Czechoslovak army and police forces. Thousands were arrested, dozens injured, and five killed in a security operation coordinated by the very prime minister, Oldřich Černík, who had stood by Dubček throughout 1968, had been abducted to Moscow a year before, and had since evolved from reformer into "realist."

The consequences of the defeat of the Prague Spring were enormous. First, it soured many Czechs and Slovaks (and socialists elsewhere) on the possible reclamation of the party and Marxism-Leninism, although most were not yet committed to the liberal capitalism that would be pursued after the end of communist rule in 1989. Second, it destroyed or eroded Slavophil sentiments long felt in Czech and Slovak society, and led to a steady reconstruction of national identity as firmly "Western" and "European." Third, it froze the country in Soviet-style federalism, the only significant formal change to come out of 1968, albeit much amended in 1970 to be very centralized in practice. Once the KSČ disappeared as its essential glue, the tangled skein of institutions and procedures proved unworkable in a multiparty democracy, and the country was dissolved at the end of 1992. A critical juncture that framed the union in terms that left Slovaks very dissatisfied, the Prague Spring was as much the beginning of the end of Czechoslovakia as it was of socialism.

The Prague Spring is one of the most extensively documented and analyzed moments in postwar European politics. As one of its first and finest observers, Vladimir Kusin (1999: 76) has noted that scholarship on the Prague Spring can be divided into three generations. The first, in which Czech and Slovak émigrés figured heavily, simply tried in the years immediately after 1968–9 to record as fully as possible what had happened. These accounts comprised straight political narratives and wider-ranging group analyses, detailing the changes and turmoil in Czechoslovakia's social strata and economic

sectors. Golan's two volumes (1971, 1973) and Skilling's (1976) encyclopedic study made the most comprehensive use of the material available at the time, and remain invaluable. The second generation, from the late 1970s into the mid-1980s, tried to find new ways to interpret the material that the first generation had accumulated and to integrate the subject into mainstream political science. Explanation of Soviet decision-making in 1968 remained a high priority, especially in view of the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and reluctance to intervene in Poland during the Solidarity trade-union crisis of 1980–1. Dawisha (1984) produced the best possible reconstruction of the Soviet response to the Prague Spring, while Eidlin (1980) published a sophisticated analysis of the Czechoslovak response to the invasion.

The third generation of scholarship has benefited from the end of communist rule in 1989 and the resulting declassifying of documents. The Czechoslovak and Slovak governments quickly set up teams of historians to work through the domestic archives, negotiate the release of relevant files from Moscow and other East European capitals, and produce summaries of their findings. Drawing on the documents those teams obtained and on ones he uncovered himself, Mark Kramer published two pathmarking articles on the Soviet decision to invade in the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* in 1992 and 1993, followed by monographs by Pauer (1995) and Williams (1997). Several surviving participants of the events, including Dubček, published their memoirs, while others could now be properly interviewed by journalists or questioned by prosecutors exploring treason charges for collaboration with the invasion. These new sources have steered recent research to political narrative, elite decision-making, and diplomacy, but also contain ample material on wider developments in Czechoslovak society as recorded by the party and the secret police.

SEE ALSO: Czechoslovakia, Resistance to Soviet Political and Economic Rule; Dubček, Alexander (1921–1992); Hável, Vaclav (b. 1936); Solidarność (Solidarity); Yugoslavia, Marxist Humanism, *Praxis* Group, and Korčula Summer School, 1964–1974

References and Suggested Readings

Dawisha, K. (1984) *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Eidlin, F. (1980) *The Logic of "Normalization": The Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia of 21 August 1968 and the Czechoslovak Response*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs.
- Golan, G. (1971) *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement: Communism in Crisis, 1962–1968*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Golan, G. (1973). *Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubček Era, 1968–1969*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kusin, V. V. (1971) *The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring: The Development of Reformist Ideas in Czechoslovakia, 1956–1967*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kusin, V. V. (1999) Review of the Prague Spring and its Aftermath. *Slavonica* 5, 1: 76–7.
- Pauer, J. (1995) *Prag 1968. Der Einmarsch des Warschauer Paktes. Hintergründe, Planung, Durchführung* (Prague 1968: The Warsaw Pact Invasion. Background, Planning, Execution). Bremen: Temmen.
- Remington, R. A. (Ed.) (1969) *Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Rubès, J. (1999) La Polysémie du Printemps de Prague. In F. Fejtö & J. Rupnik (Eds.), *Le Printemps tchécoslovaque 1968*. Brussels: Éditions Complexe.
- Shore, M. (1998) Engineering in the Age of Innocence: A Genealogy of Discourse Inside the Czechoslovak Writers' Union, 1949–1967. *East European Societies and Politics* 12, 3: 397–441.
- Skilling, H. G. (1976) *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Williams, K. (1997) *The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics 1968–1970*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, K. (2006) The Prague Spring: From Elite Liberalization to Mass Movement. In K. McDermott & M. Stibbe (Eds.), *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe*. Oxford: Berg.

Prasertkul, Seksan (b. 1949)

Pierre Rousset

Seksan Prasertkun (or Prasertkul) was among the most visible student leaders in the demonstrations of October 1973 that toppled the Thai military regime. He was also among the first groups who joined the fighters of the Communist Party of Thailand when it became clear that a new coup d'état was underway. He was one of the militants who actively opposed CPT leadership support for

the People's Republic of China and the Khmer Rouge during the Sino Indochinese conflict of 1978–9. After losing this ideological campaign in the Thai communist movement, Seksan permanently returned to civilian life. Marcel Barang, who translated many of Seksan's writings, summarized his exceptional journey in one sentence: "Child of the poor, great student speaker, outcast underground fighter, highly quoted professor, renowned writer, witness and actor of his century." In this way he became an emblematic figure of the radical generation of the 1970s.

Seksan Prasertkun had a poor childhood. Son of a technician of small trawlers and a fruit and vegetable vendor, he became an excellent student in a monk school of his village of fishermen, at the mouth of Bang Pakong, on the Gulf of Thailand. In 1967, at the age of 18 years, Seksan had the fifteenth highest score at the national university entrance examination, opening the doors of the prestigious Thammasat University in Bangkok. Seksan received a scholarship to travel to the US to learn English in 1968 at the time when mobilizations against the war in Vietnam were at their height, and returned to Thailand politicized.

In the late 1960s the military regimes of Field Marshals Thanom and Praphas were highly unpopular and nationalist and democratic demands expanded dramatically. In 1972 the National Center for Student Action (NSCT) launched a campaign to boycott Japanese products. Seksan became known by his university and polemical writings. On October 6, 1973, when student "leaders" were arrested by the police, Seksan avoided arrest. A talented speaker with charisma, Seksan led mass demonstrations to demand the release of students and a national constitution. From October 13–14, Thai armed forces fired on demonstrators, killing more than 1,500 democracy protesters. The civilian demonstration and military crackdown forced King Bhumibol to order the dismissal of the field marshals.

Seksan founded the Federation of Independent Students of Thailand (FIST), one of the principal components of the radical wing of the movement. Faced with the deadly rise of violence of the extreme right, he decided, earlier than most others, to join the fighters of the Communist Party. He left the country in 1975 with three student activists for France, China, Vietnam, and Laos (where he obtained political and military training).

In October 1976, when the army seized power in a bloody coup, Seksan joined the People's Liberation Army of Thailand (PLAT) to fight in the Rongkla mountain range in Northern Thailand until the beginning of 1978. Seksan returned to Thai Communist Party outposts in Northern Laos at a time when the triangular conflict between communist China, Vietnam, and Khmer Rouge-led Cambodia worsened. The CPT leadership sided with the Chinese and the Khmer Rouge over Vietnam, a position Seksan vehemently opposed. In 1979 Seksan left for Laos to a base in the province of Phayao where his first son, Chang, was born in July.

Despite Seksan's criticism of the CPT position, the party refused his request to leave the movement, and he and his family were sent to the Burmese border, in the district of Umphang, where they were in political quarantine. But Seksan clashed with the provincial leadership of the party, in the framework of the preparation of the fourth congress of the CPT. He was opposed to the mode of authoritarian designation of delegates, declaring later in Bangkok: "We had to fight for democracy all over again in the jungle." Now in opposition to the CPT, many former students were demoralized and averse to pursue the internal battle under exceptionally difficult conditions. At the end of 1980 Seksan and other dissidents in the party were finally permitted to leave the jungle. In his writings he wrote about his difficult journey.

Like many students who "came back from the jungle" Seksan resumed his studies. He received a doctorate degree in political science from Cornell University in the US; his thesis was on the evolution of the state and Thai economy. He embarked on a new lifestyle as a professor, rising from 1993 to 1995 to dean of the political science faculty at Thammasat University. From 1984 to 1993 Seksan authored numerous articles highly critical of upper-class privilege and repressive Thai society, including an autobiographic screenplay for the film *Moonhunter* (2001).

Seksan Prasertkun is a generous man, whose self-assurance and frankness meant he always had his say in a culture where ignorance of societal inequality was a virtue. No less than that of the student generation, his own history reflects the radicalization of a university circle socially transformed by the arrival of a number of working-class students, shocked by the corruption of the regime and the Indochinese war, and

in contact with campuses beyond the Pacific. Engaged fully in the struggle for a fair society, such students were profoundly disillusioned by the Thai Communist Party. The difficulty lay in pursuing this initial engagement after the end of the armed struggle in a country without a militant tradition or alternative to the CPT.

SEE ALSO: Thai Communist Party

References and Suggested Readings

- Prasertkul, S. (2001) 14 October, People's Fight. Screenplay for film *Moonhunter*.
- Zimmerman, R. F. (1974) Student "Revolution" in Thailand: The End of the Thai Bureaucratic Polity? *Asian Survey*, 14, 6: 509–29.

Prestes, Luís Carlos (1898–1990) and Prestes, Olga Benário (1908–1942)

Paula Rodrigues Pontes and Diogo L. Pinheiro

Luís Carlos Prestes was a Brazilian communist and leader in the movement for democratic reform. Born in Porto Alegre, Brazil on January 3, 1898, Prestes was a central figure in the Tenentismo (lieutenants' movement) demanding greater electoral democracy in Brazil during the first half of the twentieth century. He was married to Olga Benário Prestes, a German revolutionary born Olga Gutmann Benário in Munich on February 12, 1908.

Prestes came from a poor family. His father, Antônio Pereira Prestes, was an army captain, and his mother, Leocádia Felizardo Prestes, was a schoolteacher. In 1904, Prestes and his family moved to Rio due to his father's failing health. After his father's death in 1908, the family was driven into poverty. Prestes was home schooled until 1909, when he joined the military school and started his career in the armed forces. In 1920, he graduated from military school with a degree in engineering and the rank of second lieutenant.

Soon after graduating, Prestes was promoted to first lieutenant and started working in the Companhia Ferroviária (Railroad Company). It was during this period that he became acquainted with the Tenentista movement. Tenentismo

did not follow any particular ideology, focusing instead on demanding the implementation of certain democratic measures, such as secret voting and educational reforms. In 1921, newspapers published letters by the then presidential candidate Arthur Bernardes that were offensive to the military. This led to the Revolt of the Copacabana Fort 18, the first revolt of that movement. Prestes did not participate in this revolt, as he was ill with typhus at the time, but because he was sympathetic to the movement he was transferred as a punishment to his home state of Rio Grande do Sul. Despite governmental repression, the Tenentista movement grew in strength, and in 1924 a series of revolts erupted around the country. While these revolts were initially successful, and the rebel troops were able to control some important cities and towns, troops loyal to the central government quickly suppressed them.

Prestes, then a captain, led a revolt in the small town of Santo Angêlo. He led rebel troops north from Rio Grande do Sul, meeting with other rebels in Foz do Iguaçu, Paraná, creating the *Coluna Prestes* (Prestes Column). The Prestes Column, comprising about 1,500 men, held together for two years and five months, marching throughout the Brazilian hinterlands. Because of his leadership role in this movement, Prestes gained an international reputation, and in Brazil he earned the nickname *O Cavaleiro da Esperança* (The Knight of Hope). By 1927, Prestes had lost about half of the men who had set out on the journey, most of them dying of cholera. Loyal troops, together with troops assembled by rich farmers, drove the surviving members of the column, including Prestes, into exile in Bolivia.

During his period in exile Prestes became acquainted with communism. In 1928 Prestes relocated to Buenos Aires. There he met with notable Argentinian communists such as Rodolfo Ghioldi and Abraham Guralski, members of the Comintern who had a significant impact on his thinking, and in 1930 he wrote his first manifesto in favor of communism.

In 1930 Prestes returned to Brazil. That same year, the more conservative element of the Tenentista movement decided to align itself with Getúlio Vargas's bid for power. Despite being invited to lead the military movement in favor of Vargas, Prestes and his group strongly opposed his dictatorship, and the Tenentista movement split. In 1931, Prestes was invited

by the Soviet Union to move to Moscow, an offer he accepted. He remained there until 1934, working as an engineer. It was in Moscow that he met his wife, Olga Benário Prestes.

Olga Benário Prestes's father was a social democrat lawyer and her mother a member of the Bavarian elite. At age 15, she joined the Communist Youth International. Soon afterwards she moved to Berlin with her then boyfriend, Otto Braun. Active in the communist movement, both were arrested. After planning Braun's escape from prison, they moved to Moscow in 1928, where she attended the Lenin School of the Comintern and became an instructor for the Communist Youth International. Olga and Otto Braun parted ways in 1931.

In 1934, Prestes was elected member of the executive commission of the Comintern. Through Moscow's pressure, he was finally accepted by the Brazilian Communist Party. In Moscow, plans were drafted for a communist insurgency in Brazil, with Prestes as its leader. Olga was assigned to help him with this mission, and by the time they reached Brazil in 1935, they were already married. In Brazil, Prestes assumed a leadership position in the newly formed Aliança Nacional Libertadora, a left-wing popular front that opposed the Vargas government. It sought to promote democratic and national reforms, not to establish communism outright, as it believed that communism could only be achieved after a bourgeois revolution that would free the nation from imperialistic exploitation.

When the Prestes returned to Brazil, preparations for the insurgency intensified, and in November a military rebellion broke out. Various groups, led by non-commissioned officers, rebelled in Natal and Recife in the northeast, and in Rio de Janeiro. While the rebellion in Rio was crushed within a few hours, those in the northeast were more successful, managing to take over Natal and establish a temporary government. However, after a few days they too were put down, having failed to gain the support of the general population. These uprisings gave Vargas the opportunity to intensify his repression of communist organizations, and in 1936 the Prestes were arrested. Luís was stripped of his military rank and jailed for nine years. Olga, pregnant, was turned over to the Gestapo. She spent the next six years of her life in a number of different labor and concentration camps, before dying in a gas

chamber in the Ravensbrück concentration camp in 1942. Their daughter, Anita, was handed over to his family after intense international pressure.

Prestes was released from jail in 1945, with the end of the Vargas dictatorship. He was elected senator that year, a position he held until 1948, when once again the Brazilian Communist Party was considered illegal. With the 1964 military coup, Prestes lived clandestinely in Brazil until 1971, when he once again returned to the Soviet Union. In 1979, he received amnesty from the military dictatorship and returned to Brazil. He was expelled from the Brazilian Communist Party in 1980, as the surviving members of the party considered his beliefs "archaic." He then joined the Partido Democrático Trabalhista and supported Leonel Brizola, a friend of Vargas, for president in 1989. Prestes died on March 7, 1990, in Rio de Janeiro.

SEE ALSO: Brazil, Guerilla Movements, 20th Century; Brazil, Rebellions from Independence to the Republic (1700s–1889); Leninist Philosophy; Marxism

References and Suggested Readings

- Löwy, M. (Ed.) (1992) *Marxism in Latin America from 1909 to the Present*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
- Morais, F. (1990) *Olga: Revolutionary and Martyr*. New York: Grove.
- Prestes, L. C. (1992) Manifesto, May 1930. Reprinted in R. Levine (Ed.), *The Brazil Reader: History, Culture, Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Prima Linea

Emilio Quadrelli

Prima Linea was formed in autumn 1976 by former members of the extraparliamentary group Lotta Continua and by activists from the organization Workers' Power. In total, the Italian government convicted 923 people for active membership in Prima Linea. For more than a year, the organization used at least ten different names, the most common of which were: Armed Struggle for Communism, Fighting Workers' Squads, and Proletarian Armed Patrols. Prima Linea was a leading organization of the Italian revolutionary movement, and was dominant during 1977.

In its 1977 declaration of “total antagonism between the system of needs,” the organization presented the theoretical and organizational aspects of its program. Prima Linea’s major objective was to provide an organized answer to the call for power expressed by large parts of the metropolitan proletarian classes, a goal it attained with a great deal of success. Prima Linea had an unorthodox Leninist approach: that a hierarchical organization was necessary to unify the working class in preparation for an armed proletarian revolution.

The organization sought to gain acceptance of all segments of the metropolitan proletariat with special attention to factories. On July 29, 1979, Prima Linea guerillas assassinated Emilio Alessandrini, a public prosecutor who dedicated his legal career to cases of “terrorism,” ostensibly in retaliation for his prosecutorial role and for what they considered a betrayal of the causes of workers as a member of the institutional left. In the same year, responding to a debate arising from its “Alessandrini operation,” Prima Linea stated that it was “organizing in a revolutionary army the advanced workers’ sectors and the communist proletarians” and “building the party for a long-lasting civil war.”

Shortly thereafter, within little more than a year, language on arming workers for a long civil war disappeared from the organization’s documents, to be replaced by a theoretical-analytical apparatus apparently inspired by French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, or, to be more precise, by an unscrupulous use of his concepts. Prima Linea soon discovered that the transformations affecting society as a whole had not only shattered class and its dominant figure, but had also created a model of society in which the role of the revolutionary was no longer possible in view of the disparate identities beyond social class that included issues of race, gender, and beyond. A meticulous definition of the working class was therefore impossible.

Prima Linea ideologists thus adopted the theorization of the *end of finalizations*, a perspective that no final identification or condition exists among humans as the self is constantly fluctuating without a specific situational end or status. The idea itself of a minority that constantly aims to become the majority is dismissed by Prima Linea, in favor of “being lesser,” not aiming to become the state but continuously deconstructuralizing state territories or spheres. Hence, two

typical concepts of Deleuze – *nomadism* and *war machine* – became part of Prima Linea’s discourse. In other words, guerilla struggle for Prima Linea became a sort of exercise in *becoming*, the place of the *between*, the line of flight, always able to produce a constant process of de- and reterritorialization, thus permanently destroying the assets of the state’s machine.

Not much later the war machines disappeared, postulating the continuation of the struggle on different grounds, from which the instrument of *war* was definitively banned. This shift was shared almost by the entire organization in its last declaration: “You must have a damned wall in your head,” written in the Turin prison of Le Vallette in 1983. After this statement Prima Linea decided to dissolve, focusing on the juridical fight for the passage of a law on “dissociation,” which was intended to reduce sentences for former combatants who gave up armed struggle without collaborating with police and courts.

SEE ALSO: Italy, from the Anti-Fascist Resistance to the New Left (1945–1960); Italy, from the New Left to the Great Repression (1962–1981); NAP (Nuclei Armati Proletari); Negri, Antonio (b. 1933); Red Brigades

References and Suggested Readings

- Boraso, G. (2006) *The Wild Bunch: Rise, Apotheosis and Fall of the Organization Prima Linea*. Rome: Castelvecchi.
- Segio, S. (2005) *Short Fuse: A Story About Prima Linea*. Rome: Derive Approdi.
- Segio, S. (2006) *A Life Spent in Prima Linea*. Milan: Rizzoli.
- Various Authors (1996) *The Memory Project: Written Words*. Rome: Sensibili alle foglie, pp. 263–81.

Primera, Ali (1942–1985)

T. M. Scruggs

Ali Rafael Primera Rosell was born October 31, 1942 in Coro, Falcón State, Venezuela, and died in Caracas, November 16, 1985. Despite his untimely demise at the age of 43, Ali Primera remains the foremost singer-songwriter of music with social comment in Venezuela in the last quarter of the twentieth century and one of the most prominent and influential in Latin America.

The broad appeal of his music and lyrics and his non-sectarian politics helped propel Primera as a symbol of uncompromising struggle that was embraced throughout the Venezuelan left and sympathetic social movements. His indefatigable energy and tremendous talent stimulated a politically oriented musical movement whose dependence on his leadership became clear when it essentially dissipated after his death. Ali Primera's music, however, has achieved a remarkable renaissance of interest and popularity in recent years due to the growth of popular movements linked to the election of Hugo Chávez Frías in 1998.

Primera's class and national consciousness grew early both from his family's humble economic condition and radical political orientation and the stark social inequities of his native impoverished Falcón peninsula. He abandoned his chemistry studies at the Central University of Venezuela in Caracas when his powerful, direct lyric message and the musical quality of his songs combined with a dynamic presentation on stage to vault him to the position as the primary singer at political events. His growing national reputation earned him the title *El Cantor del Pueblo* (The People's Singer). In 1969 he began a sojourn through both Western and Eastern Europe, returning to Venezuela permanently in 1973.

While the *Nueva Canción* or New Song movement of both Chile and Cuba clearly initially inspired much of his lyrical approach, even early in his career Primera never attempted to musically replicate or even substantially borrow stylistically from other socially committed musical movements. His musical aesthetic consistently fell between the general pan-Latin American ballad style so common even today to much of New Song, and the wealth of Venezuelan folk traditions. Venezuela's impressive diversity of folk and folk-rooted musical styles results from regional variants of European, African, and indigenous cultural resources and offered Primera and others a wide choice of stylistic directions. He gradually moved from guitar to the consistent accompaniment of himself with the Venezuelan *cuatro*, a small four-stringed guitar often hailed as the "national instrument," to create both an aural and visual marker of his dedication to a Venezuelan identity.

Primera's broad appeal, especially among the popular classes and university milieu, came despite extreme censorship during the "democratic"

regimes of the 1970s and 1980s: he was totally banned from television and almost totally banned from radio. He cultivated personal relationships with some disc jockeys to achieve some sparse radio exposure, but he was forced to create his own label, *Cigarrón* (Big Cigar). Primera released 13 LPs on this label, together with a handful of titles by other musicians. Despite the growing popularity of the musical movement that Primera almost single-handedly created, dubbed *El Canto Necesario* (Necessary Song), the monopolized music industry denied *Cigarrón* significant distribution, a deficiency Primera tried to balance with near constant performance tours. Cassette duplication helped make his music well known in and outside Venezuela (for example, he was very popular among the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in El Salvador), and he performed to great acclaim at the New Song festivals throughout the 1980s. Several of his songs were popularized by the Caracas quartet *Los Guaraguaos*, and their version of "Los Techos (or Casas) de Cartón" (Roofs [or Houses] of Cardboard) became a major continental commercial hit in the mid-1970s, since covered by many other Latin American groups.

Primera's output can be divided into: songs written as homages to regions within Venezuela; odes to specific personages; international solidarity; his many denunciations of injustice and calls for action; and a remarkable and increasingly appreciated group of love songs and lyrics of personal attachment. His success can be measured by the several attempts on his and his family's life in the early 1980s by government operatives, and he perished in a possibly suspicious car accident.

The tremendous upsurge of the leftist popular movement in recent years has propelled Ali Primera's music to a possibly higher level of popularity than it ever enjoyed during his lifetime. Hugo Chávez aided this reemergence through his repeated references to Primera's legacy, often singing fragments of his songs in speeches and media broadcasts. Currently Ali Primera's repertoire is a major source of music for the over 300 new community radio stations founded since 2004, and his face has taken on an iconic power within Venezuela not dissimilar to that of Che Guevara.

SEE ALSO: Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954); Music and Protest, Latin America

References and Suggested Readings

- Martin, G. (1998) *El Perfume de una Época* (The Aura of an Epoch). Caracas: Alfadil Ediciones.
- Musku, Z. & Vásquez, J. (2004) *Los Personajes en las Canciones de Ali Primera* (The People in the Songs of Ali Primera). Varela: Fondo Editorial Arturo Cardozo.
- Primera, A. (1992) *Que Mi Canto No Se Pierda* (So That My Song Will Not Be Lost). Caracas: Euroamericana de Ediciones.

Prince Edward Island protests, 1830s

David L. Bent

In the 1830s the tiny British colony of Prince Edward Island (PEI) was racked by protest. This protest, known as the Escheat movement, was dedicated to overhauling the colony's system of land ownership in favor of Island residents. The threat of armed rebellion hovered over the movement, but it was primarily a political protest. While it enjoyed strong support at the ballot box, it failed to realize its goals, although it provided PEI with an enduring culture of popular protest.

Protest against PEI's landlord system began with British settlement. Britain gained sovereignty over the Island through the Treaty of Paris of 1763, and, not wishing to resettle it on the public purse, opted to privatize its settlement. Thus large tracts of land were awarded to worthy Britons on the condition that they encouraged settlement, provided for the settlers' needs in tools and implements, and paid the Crown annual rents. The settlers, for their part, were bound to clear and improve the land they settled upon and pay their landlords an annual rent. In this vein 1.4 million acres of the Island were divided into 67 lots of roughly 20,000 acres each, and given to around 100 landlords.

However, this system did not provide the desired results. By the 1790s only a handful of the landlords had made attempts to fulfill the conditions of their grants, and even these came up short. As a result, the landlords' claims came to have a questionable legal basis. The system also left the settlers it did provide deeply in debt. PEI gained a settler population despite this, as following the American Revolution thousands of United Empire Loyalists migrated to the Island. The Loyalists, coming from lands where freehold tenure was the norm in property laws,

were reluctant to settle under the landlord scheme, but often they had little choice. Calls quickly emerged for the landlords' claims to be escheated, a process by which property awarded by the Crown reverted to public ownership due to its grantees' failure to live up to the conditions of their grant. Those calling for escheat hoped that the landlords' former property could be resold to permanent Island residents. Such arguments colored early Island politics. The Island's elected politicians largely favored escheat, but the appointed imperial officials and their local elite allies, grown hostile to calls for populist reforms in an age of revolutions, favored the status quo. Escheat had become moribund politically by the turn of the nineteenth century, but it persisted as an electoral issue, reappearing in nearly every election for the Island's House of Assembly in Charlottetown.

By the 1830s escheat had developed into a powerful, Island-wide rural protest movement. Apart from the persisting sentiments of injustice surrounding the land system, this can partially be attributed to a recent influx of Scottish and Irish immigrants (both being lands that had suffered under similar landowning systems), and the achievement of Catholic emancipation in 1829 which gave many of these newcomers the vote. The reform drive, now known as the Escheat movement, found a leader in William Cooper, an English immigrant whose time working as an agent for a PEI landlord made him appreciate the grievances of the Island's farmers. Like previous escheat advocates Cooper believed that those who worked the land had greater claim to its ownership than those who simply held its title. He argued that an escheat would end the system of rents and dues imposed on Islanders and thus encourage economic development in a depressed colony. Cooper's rhetoric was similar to that of other reformers in the Atlantic world of the 1830s pushing for reform against the entrenched interests they deemed repressive. These included the leaders of the rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada, and those of the Chartist movement in Great Britain.

Cooper published his positions in several Island newspapers, setting the stage for mass popular organization around the issue. The Island's burgeoning newspaper medium played a key role in the popular agitation of the 1830s as it allowed the arguments of Escheat leaders to reach a wider audience, and for greater

discussion and organization around the issue than had previously been possible. The popularity of the Escheat Party was manifested in public meetings, speeches, pamphlets, squatting, and petition campaigns that centered on the issue. This trend culminated in a grand open-air meeting in November 1837 in eastern PEI that counted over 2,000 spectators, making it the Island's largest mass demonstration to that date. Several spectators at that meeting were also armed, reflecting another growing theme of the Escheat movement: the formation of community "agreements" to resist their rent payments, violently if necessary. Groups of farmers frequently used violence and intimidation to prevent law officials from collecting rents or seizing property in the 1830s, but despite extensive use of mild violence, no deaths were reported. But by 1837 rebellion was raging in Canada, and the authorities worried that similar action would take place on PEI. The Island government strongly considered using the militia to restore order to an increasingly unruly countryside. However, the Escheat leaders, fearing the consequences of armed insurrection, managed to contain the passions of their followers, and the government resisted the temptation to use force, knowing that PEI's lack of ice-free ports could leave them isolated from help for half a year.

Escheat's strength was revealed in the election 1838 when its party won a majority of seats in the House of Assembly. Cooper's government worked extensively for land reform, but its experience revealed the limitations of PEI's democracy. All real power lay with the imperial government, whose disdain for reform politics had only been strengthened by the Canadian revolt and the Chartist riots in Britain. Cooper traveled to London and appealed to the Colonial Office, but to no avail. By 1842 his movement had lost the House and its momentum, but the campaign for land reform continued. Despite its failure, the Escheat movement left a legacy, an ideological framework of grievance and protest that future reformers used in their struggles for land reform. The challenge to the legitimacy of the landlords' claims shaped how Islanders viewed their politics and their history. When the landlord system was finally abolished in 1875, it was largely due to the ideas of the Escheat movement.

SEE ALSO: Canada, Law and Public Protest: History; Canada, Rebellion of 1837–1838; Chartists

References and Suggested Readings

- Bittermann, R. (2006) *Rural Protest on Prince Edward Island: From British Colonization to the Escheat Movement*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Bumsted, J. M. (1987) *Land, Settlement, and Politics on Eighteenth-Century Prince Edward Island*. Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Printing press and protest

Stacy Warner Maddern

Well into the mid-fifteenth century, books remained printed by hand, and were thus harder to obtain. Exposure to books was predominantly a privilege of the wealthy, that is until Johannes Gutenberg invented the printing press. Gutenberg was a German metalworker, who had begun the process in the 1440s of making movable type to replace handwritten letters. At the time, Europe began to enter a new age of exploration and scientific discovery in addition to political and religious changes. Gutenberg's invention would certainly revolutionize western culture in ways that would help shape the Renaissance, spread political and ideological change, and encourage revolution. A new and important epoch would be marked by the end of scribes and the dawn of mass printing.

Just by an increase in quantity, the average sixteenth-century reader would be able to consume at least three times that of his or her fourteenth-century counterpart. As the printing press impacted the culture of technology, so did it provide an indelible voice in the exchange and development of ideologies challenging the status quo. From this perspective the printing press can be viewed as an elemental tool that would change the course of protest and revolution.

Certainly, in Europe, the advent of movable type helped to insure that ideas, technologies, and beliefs could reach a wider audience. In addition, the limited educational centers and the restrictions of few libraries, universities, and monasteries hampered the spread of knowledge until the invention of the printing press. By the end of the eighteenth century, explosions in publishing throughout Europe would make impressions on all classes of people as the power of knowledge was no longer filtered through government agencies. Along these lines, the printing

press not only recorded but also helped to shape revolutionary events as public opinion began to contribute to a new democratic political culture.

The print revolution coincided and possibly introduced the modern era of Europe as it made ancient and medieval texts available to a broader audience. This would impact the existing conditions of communication with vast qualitative improvements. Herein, the transition from oral tradition to the written word allowed for a phenomenon that has been growing ever since: the introduction of formal scholarly works. The enhanced form of scholarship was made possible exclusively by the printing press in that it opened up the availability of source material. Previously, in the scribal culture of the Middle Ages, dependence on a grueling and time-consuming process of copying manuscripts prevented any large-scale duplication and, considering the feudal social structure, made it impossible for those texts to be made available to mass culture.

The period from 1448 to around 1968 – what might be referred to as from the Gutenberg Revolution to just before the rise of television – is a period Régis Debray considers to be the “age of reason and of the book, of the newspaper and political party.” As such, writing is utilized as a collectivization of memory and reading as that which individualizes collective memory. This exchange allows individuals to claim their own understanding of history through interpretations, thought, and attitudes that they have gained from the present.

In considering the role of revolutionaries like Che Guevara, Thomas Paine, Malcolm X, and countless others, it is vital to mention that all were compulsive readers. Their devotion to books and printed materials was what eventually shaped their thought and consciousness. Their Hegelian approach is relative to a prescription of reading as it leads to critical detachment in order to understand the past by rehearsing the future. The creators of modern thought are only able to gain perspective by integrating an understanding of the past, thus recycling past events, lineage, and previous revolution. Christopher Columbus was able to discover America by studying arcane texts and geographic sketching. Thomas Paine was influenced by reading Voltaire and Rousseau, Che Guevara by Albert Camus, Franz Kafka, and Karl Marx.

The printing press is also the invention that allowed for the preservation of history through the simple measure of archives. Every revolutionary occurrence, whether it be communism, utopianism, war, or peace, has been the work of archivists. History is the record of archives that can only flourish because of our ability to store the written word. Only by such preservation can ideas, sometimes far ahead of their time, remain and exist for another period where they may serve their original intentions. There is no greater example of this than the *Communist Manifesto*. First published in German in 1848, its impact hardly elicited excitement. Later it would become a mild curiosity amongst certain scholarly circles in Europe. However, in 1872, some 24 years after its initial publication, it was translated into French by Marx’s daughter, Laura Lafargue, and by 1885 began to achieve historical success.

In the colonial period, before the establishment of the United States, Americans began to inform others about the notion of independence by going to the local printer and getting these ideas printed in pamphlets. Pamphlets were the easiest way to get one’s point across as they could be handed out, read aloud, or nailed to the town bulletin board. It was after independence and the creation of the United States Constitution that the first amendment was written specifically to protect the voice of the “pamphleteers.” Thomas Paine, the most well known of the American pamphlet writers, would bring his revolutionary prose back to Europe in order to spread the cause of revolution throughout France, where again the pamphlet communicated new ideas and a means of direct action.

Regarding formal means of protest, the printing press should be considered not only as an invention that enhanced the spread of ideas to a wider audience, but also as a technological advancement in the archiving of influence. Certainly, it gave new movements a means by which to get their arguments across. Without the printing press, ideological changes may have been restricted to geographic locales. With the advent of the Gutenberg Revolution, the impact of socialism, anarchism, utopianism, and countless other underground movements was communicated around the world.

SEE ALSO: Catholic Worker Movement; *Communist Manifesto*; Debord, Guy (1931–1994) and the Spectacle;

French Revolution, 1789–1794; *Manifesto, II; Masses, The*; Paine, Thomas (1737–1809); Pamphleteering and Political Protest, Dutch Republic, 1672

References and Suggested Readings

- Chappell, W. & Bringhurst, R. (2000) *A Short History of the Printed Word*. Vancouver: Hartley & Marks.
- Childress, D. (2007) *Johannes Gutenberg and the Printing Press*. Minneapolis: 21st Century Books.
- Debray, R. (2007) Socialism: A Life Cycle. *New Left Review* 46.
- Eisenstein, E. (1980) *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Eisenstein, E. (2005) *The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Proal, Herón (1881–?) and Red Revolutionary Tenants

Frank I. Müller

Herón Proal was a founder of the Veracruz Revolutionary Syndicate of Tenants. Born in Tulacingo, Hidalgo, on October 17, 1881, Proal joined the Mexican Communist Party and co-organized rent strikes during the early post-revolutionary period. His agitation fused the tenants' direct actions into a movement that demanded radical housing reform.

Proal's political career began when he was elected to the executive committee of the Preliminary Workers' Congress. In the Libertarian Torch (*Antorcha Libertaria*) reading club, Proal and other radicals discussed the libertarian and communist theories of thinkers such as Mikhail Bakunin, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, and Peter Kropotkin. The plight of tenants soon gained their attention.

At that time, those who could not afford homes rented single rooms that shared a common courtyard, a *patio de vecindad*. Between 1910 and 1922, the rent for a single room had risen from 10 to 35 pesos. Deteriorating conditions and abuse by landlords created a conflict situation in the major cities of the state of Veracruz. Inadequate water and electricity supplies in the city's poorest area, the port, contradicted the attempts at modernization made by planners in other parts of the city. Harassment of tenants who were unable or unwilling to pay became a common practice of rent collectors. In this

atmosphere, tenants developed a set of demands that included the cleaning of patios by landlords, the substitution of individual contracts by agreements mediated by the union, and the limitation of rents to a maximum of 2 percent of the estate's cadastral value. Proal helped articulate these demands at a meeting on February 3, 1922. At the same meeting he declared the founding of the Veracruz Revolutionary Syndicate of Tenants. That spring, resistance spread throughout Mexico.

In Veracruz, the movement incited events such as sex workers' direct actions against landlords. After a speech Proal gave to a female audience on February 27, they attacked their most hated rent collector. A group of women around Maria Marín initiated a general alarm that would be sounded as soon as any tenant was attacked by a landlord. Organizing a blockade of the city's markets by female workers and inciting the burning of rented furniture in the streets of the port neighborhood on March 3, Marín mobilized a collective commitment to Proal's union. By the end of May, 40,000 tenants, or two-thirds of Veracruz's population, had stopped paying rent.

Within a month of a general strike initiated by outraged dock workers, federal security forces injured, killed, and arrested hundreds of tenant union members, including Marín and Proal. The two leaders were released from jail in May 1923, but the street fights continued and there were more arrests. When Proal refused to remove from his door the forbidden red banner that symbolized the syndicate's fight, he was expelled from the state on January 12, 1926.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchism, Mexico; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Food Sovereignty and Protest; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865)

References and Suggested Readings

- Mora, R. de la (2002) *Sociedad en crisis: Veracruz 1922*. Xalapa: Universidad Veracruzana.
- Mundo, O. G. (1976) *El movimiento inquilinario de Veracruz, 1922*. Mexico City: Sepsetentas.
- Trejo, A. B. (1959) *La rebelión de mujeres: Versión histórica de la revolución inquilinaria de Veracruz*. Veracruz: Editorial "Kada."
- Wood, A. G. (2001) *Revolution in the Street: Women, Workers, and Urban Protest in Veracruz*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources.

Protest and revolution, stages in

Paul Rubinson

Amid the passionate throes of a revolution, it may not appear to a revolutionary that he or she passed through a distinct set of stages in order to arrive at this moment. Indeed, a systematic analysis of stages and struggles leading to protest and revolution threatens to rob the events of their romantic appeal. Thus only relatively recently – as compared to the long history of protest and revolution – have scholars attempted to outline a coherent process that protests and revolutions go through. The first scholars to investigate collective action theorized that a mere accumulation of sufficient grievances would spur protest, thus oversimplifying the arduous process of collective action. Those closer to the ground, on the other hand, have long recognized that – even for the most moderate change – letting grievances naturally take their course rarely, if ever, works.

In the late twentieth century, scholars began to treat protest and revolutions as more sophisticated events. Many scholars (most notably Piven & Cloward 1979) have recognized that disruptive protest is frequently a last resort at creating social change, while revolution is an even rarer and exceedingly difficult method of collective action. Still, protests and revolutions succeed just often enough to prove their feasibility. Since revolutions are difficult to achieve, it stands to reason that their success depends upon several factors. And since modern revolutions generally seek the same end (a change in leadership), it also stands to reason that there can be numerous stages and struggles that generally apply in each case.

There exists, however, no definitive list of stages or struggles that inevitably lead to protest in the sense of providing a blueprint that builds – or treasure map that leads to – a successful revolution. At any time, a disruptive protest movement can seem poised for dramatic social change, and then suddenly dissipate into the void. At best, scholars have identified a number of factors that in combination can lead to revolution.

The main achievement of scholars has been the descriptions of various stages and struggles of protest and revolutions. The identified stages are indicators that conditions for action are favorable,

and not instructions for success. For example, one of the more crucial stages involves opportunity, which is often a mistake by the state, rather than one created by a movement. The stages described are not goals in themselves, but states the movements attain in their evolutionary progression. Scholars' ability to identify stages and struggles common to most protest movements and revolutions indicates that although movements differ, their interaction with society and politics often repeats itself.

Stages and Struggles of Protest Movements

In some sense, revolutions are simply large-scale protest movements, or protest movements that culminate in the ultimate ending. Though they do have a lot in common with protest movements, this essay covers them separately. The following section roughly outlines the various stages and transitions that present movements with crucial choices that shape their trajectory.

Opportunity

Most scholars agree that grievances such as deprivation are always high, but protest occurs only rarely. This indicates that a movement needs an opportunity before it can act on the deprivation. Opportunities can be thought of broadly as changes in political factors that create incentives to collective action by increasing activists' expectations of success. Although out of activists' control, opportunity serves as the first stage of a movement.

Tarrow (1998) identifies five different ways in which opportunities can arise. First, protest is more likely when access to political institutions increases, especially when access is already low. The entrance of new actors into the political arena often forces political elites to respond, consequently creating further opportunities. Second, electoral instability can result in shifting political alignments. Piven and Cloward (1979) point to the Great Depression as an example. The economic turmoil of the crash reshuffled political loyalties, meaning that the entire electorate was essentially up for grabs. During his campaign, Franklin D. Roosevelt made "promises to everyone who would listen," and his victory marked the establishment of the New Deal coalition of workers, African Americans, farmers, intellectuals, and liberals who held power until the 1970s. The

eruption of political protest during the Great Depression, combined with electoral and economic instability, dissolved traditional party loyalties. Political uncertainty creates opportunity by encouraging challengers, forcing political elites to appeal to previously untapped groups to gain or maintain power, and alerting other protesters to the new opportunity.

Third, Tarrow writes that the division of elites encourages normally oppressed or quiescent groups to begin collective action. In this instance, elites seeking to gain or maintain power often take up the people's cause, again in the hopes of tapping a new source of electoral power. Fourth, allies can create opportunity. Allies among the elite classes can side with challengers, lowering the cost of collective action. At the same time, allies among other movements can offer aid and encouragement. Finally, the state (as long as it holds power) can decide at any time to repress dissent or facilitate a movement. Repression raises the costs of collective action, while a refusal to repress creates a huge opportunity. Tarrow points to Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement that the Soviet Union would not use military force to suppress dissent in the eastern bloc. Some theorists argue that severe repression also encourages radical dissent and activism, though recent years have shown scant evidence of this. The common factor in all opportunities is, far from a buildup of grievances, a change in the state's social, economic, and political well-being.

Opportunities do not necessarily create change, according to Tarrow. Instead, they provide movements with information about the odds of success of collective action. The above factors indicate that collective action would have a better chance of succeeding. At the same time, a raise in the costs of inaction can spur protest as well. Charles Tilly (1978) has argued that threats can serve as stimuli to collective action, as both elites and subalterns mobilize in defense of their interests when threatened.

Because opportunities do not last long, protest movements need to seize them quickly. Of course, opportunities can go unexploited, but protesters and would-be rebels who take advantage of opportunities, Tarrow argues, can be catalysts for larger movements (and sometimes revolutions). Opportunities explain how the potential for mobilization transforms into action. Again, Tarrow points to the USSR in the late 1980s, when the government began to implement

reform. When the USSR stopped repressing dissent, people seized the opportunity to organize. Collective action by some groups spurred further protest by other groups, and collective action served as a model for other groups and the Soviet regime soon crumbled. At the same time, collective action can create opportunities for opponents and countermovements.

Development of Tactics

As a movement seizes an opportunity, it must decide which tactics to adopt. Tarrow identifies three types of tactics that protest movements use: violent, disruptive, and conventional. The easiest method is violence, which can be conducted by small groups with a minimum of organization and resources. Violence makes for an ineffective tactic, however, as it frightens away would-be allies and practically begs for repression from the state. The growing acceptance of non-violence, as practiced by most movements in democratic nations, has largely phased out the use of violence. Less extreme than violence is the simple threat of violence or instability embodied by disruption. Disruption, including non-violent resistance such as marches and sit-ins, allows protesters to demonstrate solidarity and righteousness, invites allies, and often forces a confrontation with authority. Disruption has often proved powerful but unstable and hard to sustain, as authorities learn to adapt to and neutralize such tactics. Finally, protesters often choose conventional actions, such as strikes and petitions.

These stages of tactical development need not occur sequentially, but some movements pass through each type. The new left of the 1960s evolved from teach-ins to building occupation to bombings favored by the Weathermen. Some movements use all three at once, as when the US civil rights revolution encompassed lawsuits, marches, sit-ins, boycotts, urban riots, black nationalism, and the armed resistance of the Black Panthers. On the other hand, as Piven and Cloward point out, many groups have little or no choice what tactics they use. They explain the prevalence of black urban riots in the 1960s as the only way poor African Americans had to create disruption in the oppressive ghetto environment. Piven and Cloward see disruption as the most effective tactic, as it interrupts the functioning of the economy or politics, thus drawing the attention of elites. But poor African Americans, unemployed and stuck in ghettos,

could not strike or boycott (for example), meaning the normal disruptive and conventional tactics could not be applied. Thus violent disruption was their only option.

Tarrow also identifies a process where movements alter their repertory. Movements find the disruptive phase of a movement hard to sustain because police learn to control it. The costs of trying to sustain disruption eventually split a movement, usually into a minority faction that prefers violence, and a majority that prefers conventional tactics. The conventional faction often turns to negotiation and compromise and settles for conventional change, perhaps becoming a political party or interest group. According to Tarrow, only the discovery of new forms of protest spurs a new round of contention.

The Process of Mobilization

Opportunities and tactics explain when and how protest occurs. The process of mobilization entails its own stages and struggles. Different scholars explain mobilization in different ways, emphasizing different factors and models. The continual evolution of the study of individual mobilization reflects its complex nature.

The Free-Rider Problem

First elaborated upon by Mancur Olson in 1965, the free-rider problem is perhaps the biggest struggle that movements face. The free-rider problem arises when a movement pursues a public good that, if achieved, would be shared by everyone regardless of whether they participated in the movement. A clean air campaign serves as the most common example: since everyone breathes, there would be no way to limit the clean air only to movement participants. Free riders, then, enjoy a benefit without contributing any costs. Almost paradoxically, however, theorists have struggled to explain how movements occur – as they indisputably do – despite the free-rider problem. McCarthy argues that “conscience constituents” feel compelled to donate to movements, even though they do not stand to directly benefit, while McAdam observes that movements provide members with selective incentives to overcome the free-rider problem.

Micromobilization

Other theorists have examined “micromobilization” to explain how movements overcome the free-rider problem. The examination of micromobilization processes shows how people devote

themselves to a cause by illuminating the way movements mobilize people on an individual level. Frame alignment theory, as propounded by Snow et al. (1986), explains how movements overcome the free-rider problem by making people want to participate. The theory builds on Erving Goffman’s concept of frames as interpretive devices through which people see the world. The alignment of frames simplifies the “outside world” by emphasizing certain factors and excluding others. For example, successful frame alignment can redefine a previously tolerable situation as immoral or unjust. With frame alignment, movements harmonize individual interests, values, and beliefs with the movement’s activities, goals, and ideologies.

Snow et al. identify four types of alignment processes. The first, frame bridging, links two or more unconnected frames to a specific issue or problem. Frame bridging draws a connection between two unrelated but complementary issues, for example when a peace group solicits members from a liberal magazine subscription list. Second is frame amplification, the clarification or invigoration of a frame relating to a specific problem or issue. Amplification can relate to a value frame (by appealing to a specific value, such as justice or equality) or a belief frame (connecting two things, such as policy A is to blame for group B’s oppression). This step helps overcome apathy and makes change seem possible. The third process is frame extension, where a movement extends its boundaries to include new points of view in order to appeal to new potential adherents. This explains the adoption of seemingly tangential issues, such as when anti-nuclear groups mobilized against the Vietnam War. The final type is frame transformation, where new values replace old ones and an individual’s point of view is reframed and experienced in a new way. Often, a previously tolerable situation now becomes intolerable. Through the shared process of struggle, frame alignment helps movement participants learn shared values, and obscures their differences.

Political Process

In his political process model, McAdam describes a slightly different model. McAdam sees a social movement as a fluid process from generation to decline, rather than a linear journey through discrete stages. Nevertheless, the ways in which individuals become adherents of a movement involve specific changes. Participants, according

to McAdam, undergo a “subjective transformation of consciousness.” As with Tarrow, this process begins with opportunity. Activists and insurgents act upon an opportunity, some sort of change in the political system, to reduce the power discrepancy between them and their opponents. Once the insurgents have more power, the costs of repression are raised for the state. Next, organizations have “indigenous” strength – that is, four resources that aid their efforts: members, incentives (that help overcome the free-rider problem), a communication network, and leaders. Finally, adherents experience “cognitive liberation,” when people realize that they can take action. Thus consciousness is transformed.

Organizations

All movements have at least some semblance of organization. Organization marks one of the earliest stages of movement evolution. But debate exists over the merit of organization, especially formal organization of a bureaucratic type. Marx believed that the revolutionary power of the proletariat lay in the way capitalism had organized society into distinct classes. The formation of working-class political parties, in his view, was an essential step in the empowerment of the proletariat. Many Marxists believe that without organizations, protest movements remain primitive. Accordingly, many scholars of various theoretical schools argue that organizations are essential to movements. McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) resource mobilization theory, for example, placed organizations at the center of social movement research. On the other hand, Piven and Cloward argue that organizations stifle movements. In their view, movements are most powerful as spontaneous and disruptive forces. Formal organizations, on the other hand, are more concerned with perpetuating the organization rather than furthering the movement. The organization stage, they argue, is to be looked upon ruefully. Tarrow bridges the gap by arguing that the most effective type of organization is autonomous local units connected to and coordinated by formal organizations. He points to the US abolition, temperance, suffrage, and populist movements as examples of umbrella organizations coordinating, but not internalizing, grassroots constituents.

Cycles of Protest

Tarrow’s model of movement cycles comes closest to detailing the lifespan of a movement.

To succeed, Tarrow argues, contention must broaden into a cycle. Widespread challenge forces the state to respond, and produces change. The cycle, as Tarrow envisions it, begins with the mobilization phase, when “early risers” take advantage of opportunities. If these claims resonate with others and coalitions are formed, the challenge can create instability among elites. If the state rejects the claim, as usually happens, the claims can spread to others. Such claim making demonstrates that the time is right for a challenge, awakens other contenders, and provides master frames for other challengers to use. The second phase of the cycle consists of the diffusion of collective action into less mobilized areas, leading to an increase of conflict, as contention spreads into new areas of demographics. The third phase sees the transformation of repertoires and frames, as activists create new tactics and form new frames for collective action. The fourth stage consists of the growth of new organizations and the adaptation of old ones. Finally, the cycle creates increased information and interaction between challengers and authorities. In this phase, new alliances can form, strengthening the challengers.

The cycle inevitably culminates in movement decline – the demobilization phase, in Tarrow’s words. A cycle’s decline begins as the costs of activism catch up with the challengers, often resulting in exhaustion. A split between moderate and radical movement factions can polarize the movement, hastening its decline. Movements that split, Tarrow argues, often divide over tactics, especially the use of violent as opposed to conventional means. A disruptive movement is hard to sustain, often causing its followers to split into a minority that favors violence, and a majority that chooses conventional tactics. The civil rights movement underwent such a split in the late 1960s. As young activists became increasingly disaffected with non-violent resistance, they adopted the combative rhetoric of “Black Power” and embraced the militant self-defense tactics of Malcolm X and the Black Panthers. Finally, the state’s response also determines a movement’s lifespan, through either the granting of claims or the repression of challengers.

Stages and Struggles of Revolutions

A revolutionary struggle can be long and brutal, such as the decades-long Chinese Revolution,

or fairly swift, as with Fidel Castro's Cuban Revolution. Despite the vast differences in the shape of revolutions, scholars have identified similarities in the revolutionary process. Like protest movements in general, revolutionary movements do not erupt spontaneously or naturally. Instead, they progress through various stages and endure numerous struggles. As scholars have studied revolutions, they have found that the stages of a revolution depend as much on the political context of the revolution itself as on the efforts of revolutionaries. This section summarizes significant theories and syntheses that explain the relationship between the development of revolutions and political, social, and economic structures.

Marx

Karl Marx, convinced of the inevitability of revolution, provided one of the first modern outlines of the revolutionary process. Indeed, his *Communist Manifesto* (written with Friedrich Engels) was an exhortation of the highest quality, written to inspire revolution across Europe. The idea that revolutions need encouragement indicates (somewhat contradictorily) that revolutions are far from inevitable, however.

Indeed Marx himself points out that revolutions are the result of constant class struggle. The proletariat, from the moment of its creation at the dawn of industrialization, struggles incessantly with the bourgeoisie. The *Manifesto* predicts that the struggle begins on an individual level, spreading in turn to workers at an individual factory, in one specific trade, and in one specific geographic area. The struggle Marx and Engels describe is a literal one – workers begin by destroying the very machines of production that robbed them of their labor. At this stage, Marx and Engels write, the working class resembles an “incoherent mass.”

The *Manifesto* continues to outline the growing struggle of the proletariat. Industrial capitalism reduces all workers to doing similar work for similar wages. Facing obsolescence because of machines, workers form trade unions and workers' associations, who take part in political organization as well as the occasional riot. Soon after unionization occurs, workers become a class and a political party with political influence. Through their struggle, the proletariat achieve the stage of class consciousness, as they recognize themselves as a distinct class with common interests.

The triumph of the proletariat, Marx and Engels write, is inevitable in part because of the workers' ability to overcome internal divisions. “This organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party,” they write, “is continually being upset again by the competition of the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier.”

The organization of the working class by its very nature threatens the ruling power of the bourgeoisie, since the bourgeoisie weaken themselves through internal struggle as well as against foreign bourgeoisie. Consequently, when faced with the proletariat's power, the bourgeoisie divide. Inevitably, part of the bourgeois allies with the proletariat against the ruling classes, and revolution sweeps the country – a model derived from Marx's study of the French Revolution. Although revolution often threatened the ruling order of Europe, especially in 1848, the *Manifesto*'s prediction of working-class rule did not come to pass. Such a failure did not wholly discredit Marx's theories, but rather led scholars of later years to revise the study of revolutions.

Revolutionary Situations and Revolutionary Outcomes

From an analytical viewpoint, near-revolutions, such as the eruptions of 1848, bear a great resemblance to true revolutions, such as Russia in 1917, in most ways but the eventual outcome. Since both successful and unsuccessful revolutions share similar processes, scholars now make a distinction between revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes. Tilly's model and Tarrow's synthesis of the late twentieth century offered a new way to understand the development of revolutions.

Tarrow defines a revolutionary situation as a fragmentation in state power – essentially a serious challenge to the ruling power. A revolutionary outcome, on the other hand, is the transfer of state power to new actors. A “revolution” occurs when a revolutionary outcome consolidates the upheaval created by the revolutionary situation. If multiple groups vie for power, a revolution then takes place in sequence: a situation followed by an outcome, a new situation followed by a new outcome, and so on, until one challenger fends off other challengers to maintain power.

Like protest movements, Tarrow argues, a revolutionary movement begins with opportunity. In this case, the state loses its ability to maintain

essential functions, and at least two contenders struggle for control – Tarrow offers Russia in 1917 as an example. A revolutionary challenge follows essentially the same path as a protest cycle, though with a goal of regime change rather than reform. An initial challenge advertises to others that the state is vulnerable, provides a model for others to follow, identifies allies, changes power relations in society, and mobilizes other challengers.

In a revolutionary situation, the state's refusal to offer concessions and willingness to use harsh repression encourages the solidarity and halts the polarization of the challengers. Repression often convinces challenging movements to embrace radical views and tactics, and weakens conciliatory movement factions. Furthermore, any defection of elites to the movement exacerbates a revolutionary situation. A revolutionary situation becomes a revolutionary outcome simply if the challengers gain power and hold off new challengers.

Tilly offers a slightly different model of revolutions. According to Tilly, revolutionary situations might be thought of as rebellions, only elevated to the status of revolutions once they succeed. Tilly builds upon Leon Trotsky's idea that revolutionary potential begins with divided sovereignty – that is, when two blocs exercise control over a part of the state. Instead of just two blocs, however, Tilly argues that a revolutionary situation begins with multiple sovereignty, when any number of blocs, or polities, struggle for power.

Tilly explains that multiple sovereignty can occur in four ways. One polity might try to subdue a weaker polity, or a subordinate polity might attempt to assert greater sovereignty. Outsiders might win control over a portion of government, or the ruling polity might fragment into different power segments. Regardless of how multiple sovereignty begins, it takes place in three stages. First, challengers offer alternatives to the existing polity. These alternatives become revolutionary either by being inherently revolutionary (as radicals, reactionaries, and anarchists are), or by turning contenders to new, revolutionary objectives – for example, Marx's idea that class consciousness would encourage workers to overthrow capitalist oppression. This change draws new challengers and refocuses old ones. Second, more groups begin to accept the challengers' claims. This process takes place as

existing challengers are further mobilized or as other groups accept the alternative claims. This second method most often occurs when the state fails to meet its obligations to the people, failing to provide welfare, jobs, and justice, or making unexpected demands for the people's resources, such as a tax increase. At these times people are most likely to listen to alternatives to the ruling polity. Finally, the state's inability or reluctance to silence challengers can bring on multiple sovereignty.

The revolutionary situation which begins with multiple sovereignty can only end with single sovereignty, or in Tilly's words, "the displacement of one set of power holders by another." Either the revolution fails and is aborted (becoming a mere rebellion in the nation's memory), or successfully creates a revolutionary outcome. Tilly identifies three causes of revolutionary outcomes. First, a high degree of severity in the revolutionary situation increases the likelihood of a revolutionary outcome. Second, coalitions between challengers and members of the ruling polity influence the chances of success. Any penetration of, or alliance with, a member of the ruling polity can achieve this coalition. A coalition can then give the challengers power and influence. If the coalition is too heavily tied to the ruling polity, however, the new alignment will basically replicate the status quo. Finally, the control of violence often determines the winner in a revolutionary situation. If the state retains control of the military, a revolution cannot win.

Tilly offers a revolutionary sequence that outlines the steps of a revolution. Revolutionary mobilization starts with contenders making claims unacceptable to the state. Momentum builds as the numbers of people accepting the contenders' claims increase. The state then fails to repress alternate claims and coalitions of challengers. Then, Tilly writes, "the revolutionary moment arrives when previously acquiescent members of that population find themselves confronted with strictly incompatible demands from the government, and form an alternative body claiming control over the government, or claiming to *be* the government . . . and those previously acquiescent people obey the alternative body." In the fourth stage, an alternative coalition gets control over a portion of government, and struggles to maintain control of the government. Next, a single polity is constructed. This could be the victory or defeat of rebels, a truce between revolutionaries

and reactionaries, or the breakup of the revolutionary coalition. Finally, governmental control is established, by either a new or old regime.

Goldstone and the Confluence of Events

Building off of his study of revolutions in the pre-modern era, political scientist Jack Goldstone (1991) argues that the confluence of three events creates a revolution. Like many scholars of revolution, Goldstone focuses on the ruling elites rather than the challengers themselves. The first event that signals the beginning of state breakdown is a decline of state resources. Most often, an economic crisis forces the state to find new areas of funding. If the state's commitments to its citizens are not met, elite classes could abandon the state. The second event occurs when the elites divide over various interests. Elite paralysis over the direction of the state can encourage a revolutionary situation. The final factor is the eruption of mass mobilization. Challengers need to overcome rivals in the state and military by mobilizing allies in different classes and geographic areas. Although each of these events can occur on its own, Goldstone argues that only the simultaneous occurrence of these three combines to create a revolution.

Conclusion

No movement, reform-oriented or revolutionary, can take hold without an opportunity. Since the state by definition dominates power relations through its control of the means of violence, only the state directly or the socioeconomic system indirectly can create an opportunity. The opportunity stage, then, is the primary and most crucial stage – without which protest and revolution will never occur. Because the state creates – or fails to prevent – opportunity, no study of protest and revolution can ignore the state. Movements also undergo an organization stage. The choices made at this stage often determine its trajectory. Will the organization be formal or unstructured? Will its ideology be radical or conciliatory? Will it attract allies or alienate adherents? After organizing, a movement shifts into the tactical phase, where it determines what sort of methods it will use. Disruptive tactics are effective but difficult to sustain, while conventional tactics have broad appeal but create little change. Of course, if a movement seeks revolution, violence is all but inevitable. The stages of

protest and revolution do not lead inevitably to change, but rather lead a movement to a crossroads, where the choices made can mean successful social change.

Scholars have shown that social movements and revolutions are products of the political and economic environment in which they erupt. Yet social movements have a special tie to democracies, creating something of a ubiquitous presence in democratic societies. Ideas such as the consent of the governed and ideals of freedom and equality encourage a particular type of reform movement in democracies; today many western movements model themselves on the non-violent American civil rights movement. The adoption of marches, rallies, petitions, and other non-violent methods has spread across all old and nascent democracies, and these movements face similar stages, struggles, and lifespans.

Revolutions, on the other hand, are an idea as old as the stratification of people into rulers and ruled. Yet they too are dependent on and products of the socioeconomic system in which they take place. Industrialization, capitalism, fascism, socialism, communism, and monarchy – each system creates a different situation for rebels. For example, Castro's method of launching sporadic guerilla attacks from the Sierra Maestre worked against the corrupt puppet government of Fulgencia Batista, but one would envision a different method would be needed to overthrow Castro's authoritative state that replaced it. Another example, the 1917 Russian Revolution, brought on by the retrograde monarchy, the chaos of World War I, and the Bolshevik movement, differed greatly from the peaceful movements that broke apart the Soviet Union in 1991.

At the same time, scholars have identified commonalities across revolutions of different eras. As with protest movements, scholars stress the importance of opportunity, a weakening of the state, the state's use of violence and repression, and allies. Each revolution thus fights its own battle, yet at the same time undergoes the same process experienced by revolutions of the past and future.

SEE ALSO: Black Panthers; Bolsheviks; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911; Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; *Communist Manifesto*;

Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; European Revolutions of 1848; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; Revolution, Dialectics of; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Soviet Union, Fall of; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- Goldstone, J. A. (Ed.) (1986) *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Goldstone, J. A. (1991) *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- McAdam, D. (1982) *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McCarthy, J. D. & Zald, M. N. (1977) Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. *American Journal of Sociology* 82, 6 (May): 1212–41.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1998) *The Communist Manifesto: A Modern Edition*. London: Verso.
- Olson, M. (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Piven, F. F. & Cloward, R. A. (1979) *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New York: Pantheon.
- Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Jr., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986) Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. *American Sociological Review* 51 (August): 464–81.
- Tarrow, S. G. (1998) *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, C. (1978) *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.

Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865)

Alex Prichard

The influence of the anarchist writer and political philosopher Pierre Joseph Proudhon on his times, and his importance within and for understanding the two centuries since his birth, has been the subject of major controversy, due to three main features of his life and writings. First, Proudhon was the first to openly declare himself as an anarchist and to articulate precisely what he meant by this. Second, Proudhon's own descriptions and opinions changed and evolved. Third, the sheer novelty of his thinking may have

made him difficult to understand. As Alexander Herzen, one of the most preeminent Russian revolutionaries of the late nineteenth century and a comrade of Proudhon's, once wrote: "The French seek experimental solutions in him, and, finding no plans for the phalanstery nor for the Icarian community, shrug their shoulders and lay the book aside . . . Proudhon is the first of a new set of thinkers. His work marks a transition period, not only in the history of socialism, but also in the history of French logic."

Proudhon's Anarchism

In his first and perhaps most notorious extended monograph, *What is Property?* (1840), Proudhon made two famous proclamations. The first was that "property is theft" and the second was "I am an anarchist!" With regard to the first proposition, he argued against natural law theories of property as legitimate in favor of a labor theory of property, holding that *private* property was "impossible" because of the collective nature of its production. Any system based on private ownership of land, labor, or machinery is inevitably exploitative precisely because it expropriates the surplus created by collective effort and remunerates on an individual basis. Labor, the producer of value, is undercut by the capitalist, producing a conflict between labor and property. The young Marx, utterly unknown at the time, remarked that this was one of the first scientific treatments of the question of property – and a huge success at that. However, Proudhon's anarchism, the second aspect of his early philosophy, would forever separate him from other traditions of the newly emerging left.

Proudhon refused all brands of socialism that sought to set down blueprints for society assuming natural or inevitable hierarchies between peoples and groups with intellectual or political elites at the forefront of history. He refused the Icarian communism of Etienne Cabet, the communalist Phalanstries of the Fourierists, and the Jacobin or statist communism of Louis Blanc. When Marx reached out to Proudhon for support for his own brand of communism, Proudhon offered Marx his help on the condition that Marx turned away from setting down new dogmas of politics and economics, and opened up working-class possibilities while respecting working-class and peasant traditions. It is telling that Marx's next publication was a polemical tract

that criticized Proudhon's political economy not on its own terms – terms which Marx now believed were flawed anyway – but in terms of Marx's historical materialist dialectics. This schism on the left may be significant for our own times, but at the time it drew no published retort from Proudhon, nor did Proudhon ever engage with Marx's works, despite commenting on nearly every other social theorist of the century.

Proudhon's anarchism rejected dogmas, appeals to "natural orders," social hierarchy, and property relations that were anything other than fully consensual. Proudhon realized that attaining this consensus in a political system in which the freedom of speech was radically curtailed, where the state executed or exiled political opponents, and in which the dogmas and power of the church weighed heavily on the conscience of the people, would be near impossible. He thus had to show two things. The first was where contemporary society came from, and based on this analysis, how we might move towards something better. Having stated anarchism as his solution, and outlined cogently a key element of the problem, Proudhon spent the rest of his life developing his ideas and taking them in new and original directions.

Intellectual Development

Proudhon often argued that his intellectual development was shaped by his provincial background, but it was also inevitably shaped by some of the key philosophical and political theories of his time. Proudhon was born in Besançon, on the eastern border of France and Switzerland. The city had a fiercely regionalist and independent spirit, not becoming part of modern France until after Napoleon's siege of the city in 1813. Proudhon's ancestors, critics and active opponents of a centralizing France, had a mythical status in the family. Proudhon's brother also died under suspicious circumstances during non-active military service, which, he claimed, made him "an irreconcilable enemy of the status quo." His father was an unsuccessful cooper who refused to profit from his customers and regularly struggled to make ends meet. This contradiction between moral conscience and the material workings of capitalism is said to have vexed him throughout his life. His mother, a cook and housewife with a proud peasant background, exercised a strong and moralistic role in

the Proudhon household. Growing up in relative poverty, without shoes or books for school, herding cattle in the hills of the Jura during vacations, Proudhon nevertheless acquired considerable learning and intellectual influence.

Proudhon's first education was, unavoidably, in the dogmas of Catholicism. Despite lapsing in adolescence, it remained a strong moral compass throughout his life. In later life, armed with the humanistic theories of Feuerbach, Proudhon argued that in fact Catholicism or Christianity more broadly was simply the transhistorical manifestation of our own sublime human natures. Armed with the tools of Auguste Comte's new sociological positivism, Proudhon felt better able to argue that society had itself changed over time and that therefore core tenets of the Catholic faith had long lost their social utility. For example, it was no longer necessary to believe in God, the religious hierarchies, or the religious view of history. Nevertheless, since the Bible was a manifestation of the human, some of its teachings would inevitably endure. What were needed in the positive, scientific age were moral precepts derived not from an asocial reason or from the word of God, but from human experience and the discoveries of science.

The discoveries of science were, of course, not always welcome. The discoveries of science led to industrialization and to technocratic social ordering based on abstract principles. These twin processes continually clashed with French tradition. France had as yet seen little of the industrialization experienced by England in the early part of the nineteenth century; it was not until after the coup d'état of Napoleon III in 1851 that the consolidation of mines and railways by industrialists and the state, and national building projects such as that undertaken by Haussmann in Paris, that "modernization" took hold. Thus traditional, artisanal, and agricultural ways of life in France were overturned at the same time as the building of the absolutist and imperial nation-state and the rise of capitalism. It was thus natural for workers to look to Proudhon, the foremost critic of the state and capitalism in France, and one of the few from a working-class background.

From the revolution of 1848 to his death in 1865, Proudhon's fame and infamy grew and grew. It was not until 1865, however, that Proudhon's anarchist political philosophy became enmeshed with a proletarian movement. Indeed, prior to this

date, no such self-conscious movement existed in France, explaining the failure of Marxism to take hold here until much later. In 1863 a group of workers headed by Henri Tolain, soon to become the president of the first International Workingmen's Association, approached Proudhon for his opinion on the desirability of working-class representation in the French Assembly. In his last work, *De la Capacité Politique des Classes Ouvrières* (*On the Political Capacity of the Working Classes*), Proudhon restated quite unequivocally what he had been arguing now for some twenty years: namely, that the workers ought to self-organize and run their own affairs, retaining and redistributing surplus as they see fit and delegating representatives rather than electing legislators. Politics ought to be a bottom-up process rather than a centralized and top-down one.

To return to his reasons for this advice, Proudhon argued, as did most revolutionaries, that the French Revolution had promised much but delivered little to the workers of France, and by implication, the world. From Robespierre's deliberate policy of Terror to cajole a recalcitrant non-Jacobin France into line, through to the entrenchment of the bourgeoisie as the new power-holders in France, the state had failed to deliver emancipation to the working classes. This was repeated after the 1848 revolution, where Louis Blanc's Luxembourg Commission, designed almost entirely on Blanc's state communist principles, failed to deliver on its promise of a right to work (a ludicrous ambition anyway, to Proudhon's mind), and produced nothing more than systematic alms to the indigent. Moreover, Proudhon argued that the championing of nationalism as a force for working-class emancipation was simply leading workers to the slaughterhouse and relegitimizing the state as the bearer of national identity when in fact state boundaries and ethnic identities rarely matched. From the French Revolution itself, through to the Crimean War and the Italian Risorgimento, from the "Polish question" to the issue of French colonies, and France's disputed rights to Alsace and Lorraine, Nice and Savoy, the Papal States and Northern Italy, what the trumpeting of national identity actually produced was imperialism.

Proudhon did not propose chaos, although it is common for many to confuse chaos with anarchy. If order is the genus, as Proudhon himself put it, anarchy is a species. What Proudhon argued for was a removal of all claims to perman-

ent or transcendental authority, derived either from law, power, and property, the manipulation of superstition and false information, or from ignorance. Anarchy, as he noted, simply implies "no leader." The reasons for why we have come to have so many can be found in human history, in the emergence of systems of power and social organization that are justified in such a way that is convincing to the populace. Where it is not, brute force is used and there, at this point, is where we see how *unnatural* the social order is.

Proudhon argued that lamenting the place of force in society was futile. Force has important (if historically specific) roles to play. No one would deny the right of force against fascism, for example. What Proudhon wanted was to recalibrate social forces so that they would balance one another harmoniously, and the only way he could see this coming about was from the discoveries of the real origins of force, which meant a critique of the prevailing views which were either rationalist, religious, or statist.

For Proudhon, forces originate with humans, becoming embedded in and sustained by institutions, legitimized by moral norms and legal edicts, and none can exist alone for very long. His was a relational ontology which sought to understand how the material and the ideational forces that sustain society emerge and collapse over time. War, he argued, was a key vehicle of change, while order was far harder to isolate.

Proudhon believed the central feature of any stable order was justice. Justice, in his view, was a contingent and temporary balance of forces in society – one on which all could agree. When this balance breaks down because someone sees it as unjust, the process of recalibration begins anew. Proudhon believed that the best way to ensure that this inevitable process continued benignly was to ensure that working-class force was calibrated properly in society, which meant socializing property and making the wishes of all heard and acted on – which meant radical and participatory democracy. Thus, he argued that all the "natural groups" of society – be they towns, regions, workshops, industries, reading groups, or states (not to be confused with society) – ought to federate into a number of autonomous but overlapping international confederations. These would rise and fall as needed, but crucially, would do so with the active, participatory consent of those involved.

Proudhon believed it was utopian to deduce historical trajectories from first principles or

seek to establish utopian communities somehow “outside” society. He also believed and argued passionately for human “self-government” and the principles of “respect” that ought to underpin it.

Criticisms

Much has been made of Proudhon’s anti-Semitism since World War II. Much less has been made of his anti-feminism, though the latter far outstrips the former. Proudhon’s anti-Semitism is something of a myth, virulent and often disgusting statements against the Jewish people in his unpublished notebooks notwithstanding, propagated in large part by those desiring to tie socialism to fascism, such as Georges Sorel. Proudhon’s anti-feminism, on the other hand, was an intrinsic aspect of his thought, and it is impossible to take account of Proudhon’s anarchism without understanding the subversive and extra-political and largely extra-social role he ascribed to half the world’s population. Proudhon’s view of women has been variously attributed to his “repressed homosexuality” by Daniel Guérin, to his provincial background by others, and to his defense of the patriarchal family by Celestin Bouglé. Proudhon’s anti-feminism, however, was largely a political response to the sensualist pantheism of the Utopian socialists, the destruction of the family implied in their critique of marriage, and the widespread if not quite endemic prostitution in France. Each of these forces had one origin for Proudhon: feminism. It ought also to be recalled that quite unlike in our own period, the most prominent feminists in nineteenth-century France were men, who had a vested sexual and material interest in emancipating women from the shackles of bourgeois marriage contracts. Proudhon was almost devoutly provincial in his approach to the family and his attitude to women overall is far from misogynistic. He was devoted to his mother and his wife (despite having her painted out of Courbet’s family portrait of the Proudhons) and his daughters. He nevertheless asserted that women were three times less than a man, physically, intellectually, and morally.

Proudhon’s thought is often criticized for being contradictory, confusing, and polemical. However, commentators such as Steven Vincent argued that Proudhon articulated “a consistent vision of society and its needs, a vision which is preeminently moral, and which revolves around

his desire to install a federal arrangement of workers’ associations and to instill a public regard for republican virtue.”

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, France; Anarchism and Gender; Anarchocommunism; Anarchosyndicalism; Blanc, Louis (1811–1882); Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians

References and Suggested Readings

- Guérin, D. (1978) *Proudhon oui & non*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Hauptmann, P. (1980) *La Philosophie sociale de P.-J. Proudhon*. Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble.
- Hauptmann, P. (1987) *Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, sa vie et sa pensée 1849–1865*. Paris: Relié.
- Jackson, J. H. (1957) *Marx, Proudhon and European Socialism*. London: English Universities Press.
- Noland, A. (1968) History and Humanity: The Proudhonian Vision. In H. White (Ed.), *The Uses of History: Essays in Intellectual and Social History*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Proudhon, P. J. (1840/1994) *What Is Property? Or, an Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Proudhon, P. J. (1846/1996) *System of Economical Contradictions: Or, the Philosophy of Misery*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Library.
- Proudhon, P. J. (1863/1979) *The Principle of Federation*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Proudhon, P. J. (1969) *Selected Writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
- Proudhon, P. J. (1989) *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century*. London: Pluto Press.
- Thomas, P. (1980) *Karl Marx and the Anarchists*. London: Routledge.
- Vincent, K. S. (1984) *Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican Socialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Puerto Rican independence movement, 1898–present

Michael Staudenmaier

For more than a century the movement for independence from the United States has been a prominent feature of political life among Puerto Ricans. The uniqueness of the movement relative to other nationalist efforts lies partly in the way Puerto Rico straddles North America and Latin America: it is a Caribbean island sharing

common historical and cultural roots with the former colonies that make up the vast territory of Spanish-speaking Latin America, but those paths diverged after the Treaty of Paris in 1898 ceded control of the island from Spain to the United States. The subsequent diaspora, which eventually resulted in a situation where half of all Puerto Ricans live in the US, has only added to the complexity. As a result, the Puerto Rican independence movement has long synthesized a set of disparate elements more commonly associated with protest struggles in the United States or with revolutionary efforts in Latin America.

The historical antecedents of the independence movement lie in the struggle against Spanish rule, especially during the last half of the nineteenth century. Resistance to colonialism was continuous among the indigenous Taino population from the earliest arrival of the conquistadors, and the introduction of African slaves only increased the necessity and opportunity for struggle, particularly through the creation of maroon communities in the mountainous center of the island. But a specifically Puerto Rican identity did not develop until sometime during the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century, following the general pattern among Spain's new world colonies described by Anderson (2006). This emerging national identity produced a movement for independence fraught with all the contradictions that plagued parallel – if more successful – movements throughout Latin America. The drive for bourgeois home-rule coexisted uneasily with broad demands for freedom and equality. The most prominent early advocate for the latter option in Puerto Rico was Ramon Emeterio Betances, who led the unsuccessful 1868 uprising against Spanish rule known as the Grito de Lares. More than two decades later, sections of the local bourgeoisie successfully negotiated substantial autonomy from Madrid, only to see this short-lived experiment nullified by the Spanish–American War and the subsequent handover to the US.

1898–1920: Rise and Fall of the Early Bourgeois Independence Movement

Puerto Rico at the end of the nineteenth century was contested terrain in multiple ways. On one level, the war resulted in a new colonial power and a military occupation. This was opposed by

some sectors of the local population, although as Pico (2004) notes, reports of armed resistance to US occupation seem to have been exaggerated. Some of the strongest challenges to the incoming regime came from among the leading intellectuals and industrialists of the time, because this segment of the population faced the most immediate risk when autonomy under Spanish rule gave way to direct military occupation by the United States. The US quickly outlawed Spanish for use in official business and imposed English as the language of instruction in schools. In a society where literacy rates hovered below 10 percent, the small literary community produced most of the early pro-independence sentiment, often dramatizing its position with vivid depictions of oppression and the assault on Puerto Rican cultural identity. At the same time, however, there was necessarily a striking disconnection between the well-documented political and literary agitation of the educated classes and the limited record of the activities of the great bulk of the population, which is much more difficult to reconstruct.

The intentions of the US government in regards to Puerto Rico were ambiguous from the time of the war until the passage of the Jones Act in 1917, which mandated citizenship for all Puerto Ricans and signaled official intent to retain permanent possession of the island. One result of this temporary uncertainty was a cautiously experimental approach to politics within the elite spheres of Puerto Rican society during the first two decades of US rule, with some sectors advocating “annexation” as a state within the US, others arguing for an “autonomist” vision of home rule, and smaller numbers demanding full independence. Unifying these diverse proposals was a willingness to work within the limitations imposed by the new colonial reality.

At the same time, class struggle was no stranger to the island at the turn of the century. The largest labor union of the time, the Free Workers Federation (FLT), routinely positioned itself in opposition to the perspectives of the bourgeois political class, but often did so from the right rather than the left. Since the FLT was strongest among skilled craft workers like typesetters and bricklayers, and weakest among the much more numerous sugarcane workers, it was unable to capitalize on the contradiction between the bourgeois proposals and the aspirations of the

Puerto Rican working class. After aligning itself with the American Federation of Labor in 1901, the FLT took a militant but increasingly conservative approach to labor struggle. For example, it supported the Jones Act, which the nascent independence movement opposed, as did most other factions of the local bourgeoisie. When citizenship was mandated by the US Congress in 1917, the failure of the early bourgeois independence movement was as obvious as the complicity of the labor leadership with US rule, and both movements fell into decline.

1920–1960: Rising Nationalist Sentiment

The eclipse of these movements cleared the stage for the emergence of a new political force, Puerto Rican nationalism. Embodied by (but not limited to) the Nationalist Party, nationalism combined militant struggle for full independence with the promotion of a specifically Puerto Rican national identity that was intended to unify popular sentiment around separation from the United States. The result was a distinctive revolutionary ideology that forever changed the Puerto Rican political landscape. An unintended but similarly important consequence was the intense repression visited upon the movement by the US government, which used Puerto Rico as a proving ground for later repressive efforts both within the US and throughout Latin America.

The Nationalist Party began as a modest effort, focused largely on the same cautious and deferential approach that also marked the other bourgeois parties of the era. Beginning in 1930, however, under the leadership of Pedro Albizu Campos, the party shifted gears and began to emphasize the importance of self-determination by the Puerto Rican people, as opposed to the endless effort to persuade the US government to grant polite requests. Given Albizu Campos' encounters with Irish republicanism in the United States, the extensive parallels between the two movements are unsurprising: both emphasized the cultural distinctiveness of their island societies and the moral grounding offered by Catholicism, both encouraged militant struggle and sponsored the formation of paramilitary formations within the movement, and both embraced an ethic of self-sacrifice on behalf of the struggle, up to and including martyrdom. Of course, there were significant differences, not the

least of which was the well-established character of the Irish movement as contrasted with the novelty of the nationalist approach within the Puerto Rican context. Furthermore, the rise of the US and the decline of the British state on the world stage in the early twentieth century created a profoundly different set of circumstances, and the nationalists were fully aware of the uniqueness of the Puerto Rican situation.

During the 1930's the Nationalist Party developed a theory of *retraiamiento* (non-collaboration), rejecting electoral participation and embracing armed struggle as a right of all peoples pursuing self-determination. The party engaged in an escalating series of confrontations with the US government and US-based business interests, including support for militant strikes by sugarcane workers and longshoremen, as well as gun battles with the police, and even assassinations. These activities generated sympathy and support for the nationalists from broad sectors of the Puerto Rican population, both on the island and in the ever-growing diaspora. The most high-profile victim of assassination was E. Francis Riggs, an unpopular police commissioner. The US response included not only the summary execution of Riggs' killers, but also the broad repression of the nationalist movement. Albizu Campos and several others were arrested, charged, and convicted of conspiring to overthrow the government of the United States. Mass gatherings and marches of nationalists were suppressed, and on March 21, 1937 an unarmed march of several hundred nationalists, including dozens of women and children, was attacked by police in the southern city of Ponce. Twenty people were killed and as many as 200 were injured in what became instantly known as the Ponce Massacre. As the cycles of violence continued, nationalist sentiment gained in popularity even as government repression limited the ability of the Nationalist Party to function with much of its leadership in prison.

At the same time, the party attempted to sharpen the focus of the developing national consciousness. It romanticized the pre-1898 era of Spanish control, highlighting the autonomy agreement reached in 1897 and deemphasizing the undeniable brutality of the Spanish regime. It promoted an idealized notion of Puerto Rican culture as Spanish-speaking, Roman Catholic, and, above all, European, while obscuring not only the indigenous influence on Puerto Rican music,

food, and language (among other cultural forms) but also the successive waves of immigration that brought French, Italian, Irish, and especially African influences into the equation. This conservative cultural nationalism, along with the paramilitary aspect of the Nationalist Party, have led commentators such as Lewis (1963) to describe the party as fascist, but this categorization is false. Not only was the party internally anti-racist (a significant portion of the membership, including Albizu Campos himself, was black) and heavily oriented toward the working class, it was also broadly internationalist in outlook, sympathizing with anti-imperialist struggles from Algeria and Ethiopia to India and China. Further, the party's cultural conservatism was complicated by the leadership roles assigned to women, and by its advocacy of an activist Catholicism that in retrospect is more reminiscent of later developments in liberation theology than of the reactionary clericalism then prominent in Spain. Again, as Ayala and Bernabe (2007) argue, the model for the Nationalist Party was not fascism but Irish republicanism. Nonetheless, a substantial cult of personality did develop within the party around Albizu Campos as a consequence of his charisma and the repression visited upon him personally.

Other political formations influenced by nationalism included the Puerto Rican Communist Party and the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP). The communists built a strong organization with members both in New York and on the island, but were limited by their strict adherence to the dictates of Stalin's Third International. The PIP was founded in the 1940s with a mandate to achieve its stated goal legally and peacefully. While adopting the cultural approach promoted by the nationalists, it rejected *retramiento* as an organizing principle and participated in island-wide elections. At the same time, the stark colonial repression and economic depression of the 1930s had given way to postwar economic growth and the expanded home rule arrangement known as the Freely Associated State (ELA), backed by the newly created Popular Democratic Party (PPD) under the leadership of former independence activist Luis Munoz Marin.

After a relative lull in activity during World War II the party began to formulate a precise strategy for independence when Albizu Campos returned to Puerto Rico after serving his first sentence. Perhaps drawing upon the Irish

experience of the Easter Rising, the nationalists prepared for an armed insurrection against US rule. The goal was to create both a domestic crisis for the newly inaugurated Puerto Rican government and an international embarrassment for the United States. But with the Ponce Massacre a receding memory, much popular support shifted from the nationalists to the PPD, and the Nationalist Party was left to plan its uprising in a context where support for independence on the island was falling rather than rising, and where pro-independence sentiment was now divided between the nationalists and the PIP.

What had been a long-term strategy for a multi-faceted insurrection became an emergency plan in October 1950, when the party leadership became convinced that mass arrests of independence activists were imminent. On October 30 nationalist militias attacked police stations in several smaller communities, as well as the governor's mansion in the island capital of San Juan. Party members in New York traveled to Washington, DC and unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate President Harry Truman. Only in the small mountain town of Jayuya did the combatants have any success, fighting on for four days, after which it was clear that the uprising had not gained popular support. In the interim, party militants in Jayuya had declared the establishment of an independent republic in Puerto Rico, the second time (after the Grito de Lares) that independence had been publicly proclaimed in the island's history. The insurrection as a whole has become known within the independence movement as the Grito de Jayuya (Cry of Jayuya).

In the aftermath the entire repressive apparatus of the US government was brought to bear on the independence movement generally and the Nationalist Party in particular. The leadership of the party was again incarcerated, with Albizu Campos destined to spend all but a few months of the rest of his life in prison. The US government's Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), later to be made infamous in the context of domestic surveillance and disruption of the US left, was initially devised by FBI agents in Puerto Rico in order to cripple the Nationalist Party structure. The party was thus unable to respond to the massive changes then sweeping Puerto Rico: the new ELA status, the major influx of US business interests under the

development plan named Operation Bootstrap, and the consequent explosion of outmigration from the island to industrial cities like New York and Chicago.

In 1954 members of the Nationalist Party fired shots at the ceiling of the US Capitol while the House of Representatives was in session. No one was injured, and the nationalists responsible claimed that their goal was to call public attention to the many party members languishing in prison four years after Jayuya. Ironically, the four shooters, Lolita Lebron, Andres Figueroa Cordero, Andres Flores, and Rafael Cancel Miranda, would themselves spend the next 25 years in prison, joining the surviving would-be assassin of President Truman, Oscar Collazo, as longtime political prisoners whose continued incarceration would help inspire a future generation of independence activists in the 1970s. But at the time of Albizu Campos' death in 1965 the Nationalist Party was a shell of its former self, and the plight of "the Five," as Lebron and her comrades were later known, was largely forgotten by Puerto Ricans both inside and outside the independence movement.

1960–1990: Independence and Socialism for Puerto Rico

The Nationalist Party never identified with any precise class struggle ideology, although it had cordial relations with a variety of socialists and communists, including several who were at times key members of the party. One of these was Juan Antonio Corretjer, who was convicted with Albizu Campos in 1936 and later became an ardent if unorthodox Leninist. Corretjer and others like him throughout the independence movement were profoundly influenced by the Cuban Revolution at the end of the 1950s. The success of the revolution seemed to validate the possibility of armed struggle in the Caribbean, despite the obvious differences between mass opposition to the despotic rule of Bautista in Cuba and the broad popularity of Munoz Marin in Puerto Rico. More important, however, was Fidel Castro's public embrace of Marxism-Leninism, and his broad support for anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist revolution in all corners of the developing world. In Puerto Rico, with its direct historical and cultural ties to Cuba, a new generation of activists was drawn toward the twin goals of independence and socialism that would

guide the most militant sectors of the movement for decades to come.

The most prominent group to emerge during this period was the Movement for Independence (MPI), which grew rapidly during the second half of the 1960s, embracing a socialist and eventually Marxist-Leninist approach to struggle. In the early 1970s the MPI transformed itself into the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP), which became a major force on the Puerto Rican left for the next decade. Heavily involved in both student and union organizing, the MPI/PSP also published the newspaper *Claridad* (Clarity). Following the tradition of the Nationalist Party, it rejected electoral participation, but emphasized the necessity for mass struggle that had been neglected by the nationalists in later years. The growth of the MPI/PSP was facilitated by an upsurge of labor activity beginning at the end of the 1960s, and by the stagnation of Puerto Rico's economy in the aftermath of Operation Bootstrap.

The rise of the New Left in the United States, along with the rapid growth in the Puerto Rican population on the mainland during the 1950s, also contributed to the unique character of the independence movement during the 1960s and 1970s. Puerto Rican radicals living in New York, Chicago, and elsewhere were witness to the emergence of the black civil rights movement in the US, and to the expansion of student and anti-war struggles. As these movements became increasingly radical in outlook, independence activists in the diaspora adopted a similar trajectory. Thus, the Young Lords Organization, initially a Puerto Rican street gang in Chicago, adopted a militant community organizing framework inspired by the Black Panther Party in the late 1960s. This attracted a number of Puerto Rican student radicals in New York City, who merged with the Chicago grouping under the name Young Lords Party (another nod to the Panthers). The Chicago grouping was eventually expelled for political reasons, and the New York branch declined into sectarian obscurity, but the effect on the movement both in the mainland and on the island was significant.

As long as the broader movements of the 1960s maintained their vitality, the PSP and other groups continued to thrive. But the mass organization aspect of the PSP's politics left the question of armed struggle unresolved. Some activists within the PSP wished to distance

themselves from what they viewed as the adventurist legacy of the Nationalist Party, while others began highlighting the plight of the five nationalist prisoners as an organizing tool within the Puerto Rican community. Around the same time, the question of armed struggle ceased to be merely historical as several small clandestine organizations initiated armed campaigns for independence. The most prominent of these were the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), which operated primarily on the mainland from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, and the *Macheteros* (literally, the machete wielders), which was active largely on the island from the late 1970s until the late 1980s. The notoriety of the FALN in the mid-1970s forced a discussion of armed struggle within the independence movement, especially in the diaspora, leading to the creation of the Movement for National Liberation (MLN), which was strongest in Chicago but included sections in New York and other cities. The MLN also incorporated a unique dual nationalism that tied the struggle for Puerto Rican independence to the radical Chicano demand for “socialist reunification” of Mexico on the basis of the border prior to the Mexican-American War of 1848, when California and several other southwestern states had been part of Mexico. The MLN was always small compared to the PSP, but the group’s legacy within the diaspora was in many ways out of proportion to its limited size.

The MLN’s respect for the Nationalist Party was only augmented when it also came under intense government repression on the basis of its vocal support for the FALN. Within a year of the MLN’s founding, its entire leadership was incarcerated for failure to testify before a federal grand jury investigating the activities of the FALN. The grand jury resistance campaign became one of the main organizing areas for the MLN, along with public support for the release of the five nationalist prisoners. This effort bore fruit in the late 1970s, as broad sectors of Puerto Rican society embraced the campaign for their release on humanitarian grounds. President Jimmy Carter first released Andres Figueroa, who was dying of cancer, in 1978, and subsequently pardoned the remaining four prisoners in 1979. During this period the MLN and other groups were also invited to testify before the United Nations Decolonization Committee on the colonial status of Puerto Rico. This was a major

breakthrough because the island’s ELA status had previously satisfied much of the international community that Puerto Rico was no longer a colony. As the 1970s progressed, it became increasingly clear that the colonial status persisted.

The FALN was especially active in the latter half of the decade, claiming responsibility for more than 100 bombings of government and corporate offices. The *Macheteros* group did not limit itself to bombings, engaging in assassinations and armed expropriations as well, including a major armored car robbery in Connecticut in 1983. The two groups, and the other assorted armed organizations of the same era, had political differences with one another, but they did occasionally collaborate on armed actions, and they agreed on the legitimacy of armed struggle in general. While the armed groups lacked a broad base of mass support, they did have sizable peripheries they could call upon for support, as indicated by Fernandez (1987). In this sense it is wrong to equate the Puerto Rican armed struggle with the actions of white clandestine armed organizations in the United States, such as the Weather Underground, which were far more marginal. The communiqués of the armed organizations indicate a two-pronged strategy: embolden the Puerto Rican people with a sense of their untapped potential for radical action, and create a crisis of control that could force the US government to rethink its colonial policies. There is little evidence that either outcome was achieved, although the armed struggle can be thought of as a productive error, insofar as it advanced discussion among Puerto Rican revolutionaries and helped inspire several lasting social movements on the island and in the diaspora.

The MLN developed relationships with island-based groups as well. Smaller organizations dotted the left landscape outside the orbit of the PSP, and one of these was the Puerto Rican Socialist League (LSP) founded by Corretjer. The LSP supported many of the same mass struggles as the PSP, but it viewed the latter’s equivocation on the question of armed struggle as a fatal flaw in strategizing for revolution. Corretjer wrote an influential essay entitled “Problems of People’s War in Puerto Rico,” which situated the island’s independence within the broader context of the revolutionary upsurge then sweeping Latin America. The pamphlet included a favorable introduction by the Spanish/Argentine anarchist Abraham Guillen, an advocate for the

urban guerrilla movement in the southern cone of South America. The LSP was strongly supportive of the emergence of the FALN on the mainland and as a result came into contact with the MLN. The groups established a formal fraternal relationship, with the LSP operating on the island and the MLN working within the diaspora communities. Both organizations were involved in the campaign against forced sterilization of Puerto Rican women, an ongoing crisis abetted directly by the US government.

The LSP gained its greatest notoriety during protests on Vieques, a small island off the eastern coast of the main island that is considered part of Puerto Rico. For decades, the vast majority of Vieques was occupied by the US navy, which used it as a training ground for aerial and amphibious combat. Local residents had opposed the occupation from the beginning, but in the mid-1970s the movement gained some traction within the broader Puerto Rican left and the independence movement in particular. The LSP was one of the organizations most heavily involved in pushing for militant direct action to actively disrupt the training activities, and when a group of protesters was arrested in 1979 for trespassing on navy property, one of those convicted was Angel Rodriguez Cristobal, a young militant of the LSP. Rodriguez was subsequently killed in a federal prison in Florida while serving his sentence. This came on the heels of the cold-blooded murder by police in 1978 of two young independence activists who were lured to a mountaintop, and the two events again shocked the mainstream of Puerto Rican society into awareness of the repression visited upon the independence movement.

During the 1980s, however, the strain of repression and of internal divisions in the movement began to show and the organized independence movement began a significant decline. The PSP split over the question of electoral participation and alliance with one of the larger parties; by 1985 it was a shell of its former self. The Puerto Rican Independence Party remained what it had always been, a relatively large but still marginal political party committed to avoiding confrontation. Groups like the MLN and LSP survived for a time, but as the broader social movements of the 1970s shrank, so did the ability of such smaller groups to influence them. The armed movement suffered significant losses, including the capture of more

than a dozen combatants each from the FALN and the Macheteros, and by the end of the 1980s both organizations had effectively ceased to exist. One major legacy of this period, however, was the cause of the prisoners, all of whom identified themselves as prisoners of war or as political prisoners. Just as the five nationalist prisoners had created a link between the independence movements of the 1950s and the 1970s, so did the plight of the new set of prisoners beginning in the early 1980s eventually inspire a generation of activists a decade later.

1990–Present: New Directions

In the aftermath of the 1980s the independence movement regrouped both on the island and in the diaspora. Instead of prioritizing the reconstruction of the organizations of the previous era, many independence activists focused their energy directly on involvement in the rising social movements of the time, of which three stand out: the rising anti-privatization movement, the campaign to free the political prisoners and prisoners of war, and the struggle around the navy's continued use of Vieques.

In 1992 the pro-statehood party gained control of the island government, promising to push for Puerto Rico's admission as the 51st state. One important aspect of this effort was the imposition of neoliberal economic measures designed to move the island rapidly toward parity with the mainland. These changes were actually more reflective of the neoliberal craze then sweeping the rest of Latin America than they were of any economic policies in place within the United States at the time. Nonetheless, in a context where President Bill Clinton was dismantling welfare programs domestically and enacting free trade agreements internationally, it was politically savvy for statehood advocates to privatize as quickly as possible the massive public sector in Puerto Rico. While these maneuvers may have been popular in Washington, they prompted massive resistance among Puerto Ricans.

The battles around privatization came to a head in 1997 and 1998, in a struggle over the sale of the Puerto Rican Telephone Company. Resistance came from a variety of sectors, including unions, student groups, the independence movement, environmentalists, and more, who collaborated in staging strikes and protests aimed

at stopping the sale. The guiding slogan of this campaign, “Puerto Rico no se vende,” had strong pro-independence implications, since it translated as both “Puerto Rico is not for sale” and “Puerto Rico doesn’t sell out.” But while the independence movement devoted considerable resources to the struggle, the real backbone of the resistance was organized labor, which did not take a formal position on independence. The campaign culminated in a massive general strike in the summer of 1998, but when disagreements emerged among the unions involved, the effort floundered. In the end the phone company was privatized as planned, and the independence movement was not strong enough to change the outcome.

A more successful arena for the movement in the 1990s was the campaign to free the remaining political prisoners and prisoners of war from the FALN and the Macheteros. This campaign was spearheaded almost entirely by radical independence activists, and once again Puerto Ricans in the diaspora were centrally involved. The prisoners had received outrageously long sentences, in some cases as much as 100 years, although none of their convictions had been for crimes of violence. Seizing on the human rights aspect of their continuing incarceration, the campaign to free the prisoners gained momentum as the decade progressed, drawing support from religious organizations and professional associations both on the mainland and in Puerto Rico. The seditious conspiracy charge, which produced the bulk of the prison sentences meted out to the prisoners, had been used exclusively against Puerto Ricans during the twentieth century, beginning with Albizu Campos himself. This only heightened the sense that the prisoners were being punished for loving their homeland, which in turn broadened support for their release among all sectors of Puerto Rican society.

Building upon this expanding popular mobilization, the campaign to free the prisoners petitioned the Clinton administration to release them unconditionally. In doing so, they deliberately downplayed the armed struggle aspect of the prisoners’ history, focusing instead upon the humanitarian issues raised by their continued incarceration and the non-violent nature of the crimes for which they were convicted. This narrative was difficult to sustain in discussions with the same US government that had declared the prisoners “terrorists” when they were first

captured, but the growing support for the campaign from religious, legal, and humanitarian groups made it possible. In the end, President Clinton approved the release of most of the prisoners in the summer of 1999. This constituted a massive victory for the independence movement, although it was clear that the road to success required jettisoning, at least temporarily, the more militant forms of rhetoric and action that had been traditionally associated with the movement.

A few months before the release of the prisoners, the small island of Vieques again became a flashpoint for social struggle in Puerto Rico, when, during combat training for the US navy, a bomb accidentally killed a Puerto Rican civilian named David Sanes. The independence movement, having been involved consistently in the struggle against the navy, was well positioned to respond to the sudden and broad-based public outrage. But once again there were other contributors to the struggle: environmental activists opposed the ecological devastation visited on Vieques, while pacifists and anti-militarists campaigned against combat training as a precursor to wars abroad. But community control was the dominant discourse of the movement, and in this arena the independence movement’s demand for self-determination throughout Puerto Rico drew increasing support from others involved in the struggle.

Immediately after Sanes’ death the navy shut down the training grounds while it investigated the situation. Protestors from throughout Puerto Rico subsequently occupied the naval property, establishing dozens of squatter encampments designed to prevent the resumption of activity by the navy. Some of the squatters were independence activists, but others came from student and environmental movements well-steeped in the tactics of militant direct action. These same movements helped coordinate a rally in San Juan in 2000 demanding the immediate departure of the navy from Vieques; with an estimated 150,000 people, it was one of the largest demonstrations in the history of Puerto Rico. With virtually the entire island siding against the navy, the US government eventually agreed to withdraw from Vieques within four years, while insisting that combat training would continue during that time. This extended timetable satisfied no one, and direct action and civil disobedience continued until the final cessation of training in

2003. Once again, the independence movement was integral to the victory, this time in large part due to its embrace of direct action.

Throughout these various campaigns the independence movement was also involved in a variety of other struggles, from anti-gentrification efforts in diaspora communities such as Chicago and New York, to environmental and community struggles in various parts of Puerto Rico. The preservation of historical awareness was also a continuing concern, and the movement coordinated annual commemorations of events like the Grito de Lares, the Ponce Massacre, and the Grito de Jayuya. On September 23, 2005, while many independence activists were attending activities in Lares, the FBI killed Filiberto Ojeda Rios, a leading *Machetero* and a longtime fugitive, at his home in western Puerto Rico. As had happened several times before, the repression of the independence movement by the US government stimulated an outpouring of sympathy for the movement among broader sectors of Puerto Rican society. The murder of Ojeda Rios refocused the attention of Puerto Ricans on the historical legacy of the independence movement, while inspiring the movement itself to regroup and move forward in the twenty-first century.

Conclusion

The independence movement in Puerto Rico has contributed significantly to a broad range of social struggles both in Puerto Rico and in the United States over the past 110 years. This legacy has been addressed by historians from a variety of perspectives, although no comprehensive history of the movement exists in English or in Spanish. Many general histories of Puerto Rico engage such major figures as Albizu Campos, within the context of broader trends. The recent work of Ayala and Bernabe (2007) represents the most sophisticated contextualized analysis of the independence movement's historical trajectory currently available in English. Other works in English address thematic or chronological aspects of the movement, either in the diaspora or on the island itself, including Quintero-Rivera (1976), Flores (1993), Fernandez (1994), Ramos-Zayas (2003), Rivera (2003), and Pico (2004), among many others.

The future of the independence movement is uncertain. The longer colonial status continues, the less likely full independence seems from a

geopolitical perspective. But the fortunes of the movement as such are more likely to be tied to the ebb and flow of the broader social movements of the coming years, as has been the case historically. If and when these movements resurge, the demand for independence from the United States will almost certainly gain support. But the political content of the independence argument, which in the past has evolved from bourgeois home rule to populist nationalism to revolutionary socialism, will determine the ability of the movement to surpass the limits of previous incarnations.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Puerto Rico; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Easter Rising and the Irish Civil War; Imperialism, Historical Evolution; Irish Nationalism; Student Movements, Global South; Vieques; Women's Movement, Latin America

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, B. (2006) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso.
- Ayala, C. J. & Bernabe, R. (2007) *Puerto Rico in the American Century: A History Since 1898*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Fernandez, R. (1987) *Los Macheteros: The Wells Fargo Robbery and the Violent Struggle for Puerto Rican Independence*. New York: Prentice-Hall.
- Fernandez, R. (1994) *Prisoners of Colonialism: The Struggle for Justice in Puerto Rico*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
- Flores, J. (1993) *Divided Borders: Essays on Puerto Rican Identity*. Houston: Arte Publico Press.
- Lewis, G. K. (1963) *Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Pico, F. (2004) *Puerto Rico 1898: The War After the War*. Princeton: Markus Wiener.
- Quintero-Rivera, A. (1976) *Workers' Struggle in Puerto Rico: A Documentary History*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Ramos-Zayas, A. Y. (2003) *National Performances: The Politics of Class, Race, and Space in Puerto Rican Chicago*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rivera, R. Z. (2003) *New York Ricans From the Hip-Hop Zone*. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Various Authors (1979) *Toward People's War for Independence and Socialism in Puerto Rico: In Defense of Armed Struggle: Documents and Communiques from the Revolutionary Public Independence Movement and the Armed Clandestine Movement*. Chicago: Committee in Solidarity with Puerto Rican Independence.
- Wagenheim, K. & Jimenez de Wagenheim, O. (1994) *The Puerto Ricans: A Documentary History*. Princeton: Markus Wiener.

Pugachev's Rebellion, 1773–1775

Yury V. Bosin

Under the rule of Catherine the Great, Russia was rapidly modernizing as the Russian elite embraced western technological advances, fashions, food, and art, at great financial cost to the entire country. Landowners increased the tax burdens on their serfs to counterbalance their expensive standard of living. Peasants in turn engaged in mass protests and rebellions through escaping, rioting, and engaging in insurrections against the aristocracy. From 1762 to 1772, some 160 popular uprisings were recorded in the Russian empire, but the profligate ruling classes were not prepared for the fierce rise in peasant discontent that ignited Pugachev's Rebellion from 1773 to 1775. The peasant uprising was sparked by a rumor that Peter III, the grandson of Peter the Great, had escaped assassination in 1763 and was living in hiding among the Cossacks on the Yaik River, renamed the Ural River in the aftermath of the rebellion.

The rumor alleged that Catherine II sought revenge against Peter III who was seeking to emancipate peasants from serfdom. In reality, Emilian Pugachev, a Cossack born in the village of Zimoveyskaya where, a century earlier, Stepan Razin was born, was the self-proclaimed Tsar Peter. After joining the military at age 17, Pugachev fought in the Prussian and Russo-Turkish Wars of the 1760s and was promoted to the lower officer rank of *khорунжий*. Soon after, Pugachev deserted the Russian military, spending several years wandering along the Don, Yaik, and Volga rivers and associating with "Old Believers" from the early Russian Orthodox Church who were said to have advised him to embrace the legend of Peter III, who was revered for his religious tolerance. Although Pugachev, an athletic, dark-faced man with a black beard, bore little physical resemblance to Peter III, Cossacks, Old Believers, serfs, and factory workers were drawn to his charismatic leadership. He gained personal popularity among non-Russian populations of the Volga steppes, who enlisted in his rebel army in large numbers. Pugachev's rebel army was comprised mostly of Tatars, Bashkirs, and Kalmyks who suffered economic deprivation and resented Catherine



Claiming to be Tsar Peter III, Emilian Ivanovich Pugachev (1742–75) led the last Cossack rebellion in Russia in 1773. In what is considered by historians as the most significant peasant rebellion in Russian history, Pugachev encouraged peasants to join the revolt by promising to free serfs from their lords and redistribute the land. This engraving of him in prison is from an unknown eighteenth-century artist. (akg-images)

II's demand for mandatory conversion to Christianity. Pugachev opposed the order and, promising religious freedom, gained even greater popularity.

Pugachev's initial insurgency encountered no resistance among residents on the banks of the Yaik River, and townspeople greeted the rebels by ringing bells. At the beginning of 1773, Pugachev's army besieged Orenburg, the major population center on the Volga River in southern Russia. In October 1773 when news of the rebellion reached Saint Petersburg, Catherine appointed Major General Vasily Kar to intervene on behalf of Imperial Russia. However, Kar, primarily seeking to disperse the insurgents rather than engage them in battle, critically underestimated the size and tenacity of Pugachev's forces. As a result, Pugachev soundly defeated General Kar's expedition, and the rebellion gained

unparalleled power, posing a significant threat to the stability of the Russian throne.

While Pugachev's Rebel Army consolidated power near Orenburg through March 1774, the Russian government made serious preparations to launch a new attack. The Russians dispatched an army under the command of General Alexander Bibikov, who forced Pugachev's armed detachments to lift the siege on Orenburg and retreat from the city. However, the Russian troops could not quell the uprising, which was already spilling over into nearby provinces. Following military losses, Pugachev's army rapidly recovered and by July 1774 approached Kazan, a large town at the confluence of the Volga and Kazanka rivers. The insurgents took the town after a fierce clash, but six hours later Colonel Ivan Ivanovich Mikhelson pushed them out with a large cavalry squadron of hussars. The defeat forced Pugachev to flee with a handful of Cossacks to the right bank of the Volga as Mikhelson pursued the remnants of his army with indefatigable tenacity. But it was not until late August 1774 that government troops cornered Pugachev's rebels near Tsraitsin in the Ukraine, inflicting a decisive final defeat on the rebel insurrection. While Pugachev escaped capture, he was arrested by Cossacks and turned over to the Russian authorities. On January 10, 1775, he was executed in Moscow before a large assembly of Russians.

To wipe out the memory of the rebellion, in 1775 Catherine the Great ordered Pugachev's birthplace Zimoveyskaya to be renamed Potemkinskaya, and the Yaik River henceforth was identified as the Ural River.

SEE ALSO: Bulavin's Rebellion, 1707–1708; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Razin's Rebellion, 1670–1671

References and Suggested Readings

- Avrich, P. (1976) *Russian Rebels, 1600–1800: Four Great Rebellions Which Shook the Russian State in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Buganov, V. I. (1986) *Moscow Chronicles: Popular Uprisings in the 11–18th Centuries*. Moscow (in Russian).
- Gessen, S. Y. (1961–70) *Peasants' War in Russia in 1773–1775: Pugachev's Rebellion*, Vols. 1–3. Leningrad (in Russian).
- Peasants' Wars in Russia in the 17–18th Centuries* (1966) Moscow and Leningrad (in Russian).

Puig Antich, Salvador (1948–1974)

Yannick Beaulieu and Pedro García Guirao

Catalan anarchist Salvador Puig Antich was part of the military branch of a small revolutionary organization called the *Movimento Ibérico de Liberación/Grupos autónomos de combate* (Iberian Liberation Movement/Autonomous Combat Groups) (MIL/GAC). He participated in bank robberies (“expropriations”) meant to finance clandestine propaganda and support striking workers. After a series of such robberies, in September 1973 Puig Antich and comrade Xavier Garriga were ambushed by police; in the melee, Puig Antich was injured and deputy inspector Francisco Anguas Barragán was shot to death. There are still different explanations of what happened at that time; independent researchers suggest the policeman died from shots fired both by his own colleagues and by Puig Antich. Before the tribunal took place, however, the prime minister was assassinated by Basque ETA (*Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna*) separatists, and subsequent desire for revenge on the part of the authorities, together with a summary military trial, full of irregularities, produced two death sentences. Despite an international solidarity movement against Puig Antich's death penalty, he was executed by garrote on March 2, 1974, setting off protests and strikes in Barcelona, foreshadowing the end of the Franco dictatorship in 1975.

A 2006 biographical film, *Salvador*, and a 2007 decision by Spain's Supreme Court not to review Puig Antich's conviction have reopened controversy over his death and its meaning, which constitutes just part of Spain's ongoing “memory wars.”

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Spain; Anti-Franco Worker Struggles, 1939–1975; Catalan Protests Against Centralism; ETA Liberation Front (*Euzkadi ta Askatasuna*) and Basque Nationalism; Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Anonymous (2006) The Great Swindle: “This Is Not the Tale of Salvador Puig Antich.” *Bulletin* of the Kate Sharpley Library 46–7: 1–2.

- Anonymous (2007) Spanish Court Rejects Appeal to Review Anarchist's Trial. Agence France Presse.
- Duhourcq, J.-C. & Madrigal, A. (2007) *Mouvement Ibérique de Libération. Mémoires de rebelles*. Toulouse: Editions CRAS.
- Escribano, F. (2001) *Cuenta atrás: la historia de Salvador Puig Antich*. Barcelona: Ediciones Península.
- Gutiérrez, J. (2004) Salvador (Puig Antich). *Viento Sur* 88: 124.
- Sanz, C. (2004) Reflexiones 30 años después del asesinato de Salvador Puig Antich. *Solidaridad Obrera-Cuadernos de Pensamiento* 3 (Winter): 1–4.
- Tajuelo, T. (1977) *El Movimiento Ibérico de Liberación, Salvador Puig Antich y los Gari: Teoría y Práctica, 1969–1976*. París: Ruedo Ibérico.
- Tellez Solà, A. (1994) *El MIL y Puig Antich*. Barcelona: Virus.

Punk movement

Stacy Warner Maddern

The punk movement cannot be relegated to just a genre of music or dismissed as simply a passing fad. Punk gave a generation an ideology that was meaningfully their own, one that represented a counterculture to the counterculture. For those who began to come of age in the dwindling era of non-violent cooperation, representative of the 1960s hippie culture, punk was fast, bizarre, and often outrageous. By the late 1960s, revolutionary changes in music were bringing Nico and the Velvet Underground, the New York Dolls, and Television to the forefront of pop culture. Iggy Pop and the Stooges began to communicate the violent contortions of a population that had been raised in a materialistic and violent society. Attitudes amongst the younger generation, mostly working class, no longer represented an interest in peaceful protest. In New York City, as the 1970s arrived, the Ramones, MC5, Television, and Patti Smith began to pave a new path and a new philosophy.

By the mid-1970s, punk found even more traction among London's working-class youth, where poor social conditions invoked feelings of anger and frustration. The movement would be further amplified by the emergence of the Sex Pistols and The Clash, whose music cranked out lyrics of hatred and despair, advocating nonconformity. Questioning existing modes of mainstream thought soon became a motivating characteristic behind punk attitude. Challenging

the elements of work, sex, race, government, politics, rules, and laws that were never questioned by mainstream culture became for punks the process by which they defined themselves as different and through it created a reality that was their own.

With a staple of anti-authoritarian posture as their badge of honor, punks maintained a creed that only those inside the mainstream obeyed the dictates of authority figures. However, as they deemed themselves individualists, mainstream culture regarded them as deviant and, as such, criminal. As the Dadaists before them, punks were looked down on and regarded as crude, uneducated, and dangerous. Like Dada, punk rejected the aesthetic and structural values of mainstream culture. Punk musicians were far from classically trained, and in some respects were without any formal training at all: anyone who could play more than one chord on a guitar was probably in a punk band. They broke the societal norms of performance by vomiting on stage, spitting at the audience, and mutilating themselves with broken bottles, knives, and hooks. By the same standard their audience would likely participate by throwing blunt objects at them. The “mosh pit” below the stage where “slamdancing” or “moshing” occurred was a physically altercating style of dancing where fists and leg kicks were thrown to inflict bodily harm. These actions were not so much in the name of hatred or even violence as a means of breaking convention. A punk show was a deviation from the norm and as far away from the mainstream as one could get.

As an ideological movement, the political philosophy of punk is most closely related with anarchism. Most punk activism supports anarchist goals. While not all punks claim to be anarchists, most share a discontent with their respective government. Too often the political activism of punks is described as progressive or leftist; however, nothing could be farther from the truth as most are disenchanted with the organizational efforts of liberalism and conservatism. Their mode of protest is direct action, particularly the use of sabotage. More radical punks have been involved in gas station bombings and the destruction of animal research laboratories. Vandalism is a popular form of protest amongst punks, mostly the altering of billboards into political messages. As a group that holds materialism in disdain, punks generally deem the

destruction of private property a powerful way of conveying their message without hurting people.

The punk movement has embraced several subsequent causes, such as animal rights, anti-war, and anti-globalization. On these particular stands punks generally take alternative views than what exists inside the mainstream. Punks generally do not trust elected representatives or government agencies to do anything to further their cause. For example, during protests against the 1990 Gulf War, punks were explicit in their refusal to support the troops, believing it a contradiction to support militarism in an effort to promote peace. During the “war on terror,” punks have led the anti-war movement and participated in counterrecruitment drives to keep recruiters out of the public schools. Punks insist on what they consider a do-it-yourself (DIY) philosophy, something that began in the early 1980s and continues to this day.

This is especially true on the music scene with a number of bands refusing to sign or record with companies that are immersed in corporate culture. The same applies to most punk magazines and publications maintaining a preference to operate on an independent basis. What is evident in the DIY ethic is a consistent value amongst punks to go against the grain of what is normally accepted in mainstream culture.

Increasingly, throughout the 1980s and continuing in the present, punk culture, especially the music, has drifted into a faster pace, what some may consider “hardcore.” However, what remains is a lyrical commitment to challenge the status quo. Beginning with 1970s bands like MC5 to the 1980s sounds of The Dead Kennedys, Black Flag, and Suicidal Tendencies to the present Anti-Flag, the lyrical content of punk music has grown in its message to endorse a political agenda that denounces established government. On this basis the DIY ethic applies to all things relating to change.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Britain; Anarchism and Sabotage; Anarchism in the United States, 1946–Present; Counterrecruitment; Dada; Latin American Punk Rock and Protest; Situationists

References and Suggested Readings

- Colegrave, S. & Sullivan, C. (2001) *Punk: The Definite Record of a Revolution*. London: Da Capo Press.
- Dorling Kindersley (2006) *Punk: The Whole Story*. London: DK Publishing.
- McNeil, L. & McCain, G. (1996) *Please Kill Me: The Uncensored Oral History of Punk*. New York: Penguin.
- O'Hara, C. (1999) *Philosophy of Punk: More Than Noise*. Oakland, CA: AK Press.
- Savage, J. (1991) *England's Dreaming: Anarchy, Sex Pistols, Punk Rock and Beyond*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Q

Qaddafi, Muammar al- (b. 1942)

Benjamin P. Nickels

Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi (variously spelled) has ruled Libya since coming to power in the September 1, 1969 coup d'état that deposed Libya's King Idris I. He retired from public office in 1979, but continues to rule under the ceremonial title "leader of the revolution."

Born to Bedouin nomads in a tent in the Sirte Desert, as Axis and Allies battled over North Africa, Qaddafi began his formal education at age nine in 1951, the year Libya attained independence under a pro-western monarchy. At age 14 Qaddafi saw his idol, Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970), nationalize the Suez Canal in neighboring Egypt, and the teenager was expelled for leading anti-colonial demonstrations that same year. Qaddafi enrolled in university and military academy in 1963 and secretly organized a group of student revolutionaries. His return from studying communications in England coincided with the Arab defeat in the 1967 June War. Two years later, the 27-year-old sublieutenant announced his coup over Libyan radio. Qaddafi hoped Nasser would incorporate Libya and confront Israel after reviving Arab unity, which was lagging following the failed Egypt–Syria merger as the United Arab Republic (1958–61). The ascent of Qaddafi heralded a regional trend toward durable nationalist dictators, with Syria's Hafiz al-Asad and Iraq's Saddam Hussein emerging soon after.

Qaddafi banished foreign residents, closed foreign military bases, and nationalized foreign assets before Nasser's 1970 death, which initiated the decline of Arab nationalism. As Arab unity projects degenerated into minor wars and subversive intrigues, Qaddafi advocated for his unique Islamic *Jamahiriyah* ("state of the masses"),

which included popular authority through people's congresses, socialism funded by petrol profits, and social harmony via a "Third Universal Theory" (neither western capitalism nor eastern communism). He laid out this revolutionary political philosophy in *The Green Book* (1975). The title's allusions to Islam (green) and China (Mao Zedong's 1966 *Little Red Book*) symbolize the decision to trade Arabism for a wide-ranging neo-Third Worldism, and throughout the 1980s Qaddafi supported resistance to western governments in far-flung Ireland, Palestine, the Philippines, South Africa, Nicaragua, and Argentina. Qaddafi increased internal repression as western powers combined covert plots with overt attacks, notably the US's 1982 trade embargo and 1986 air strike assassination attempt that killed Qaddafi's adopted daughter. In 1992 the UN imposed sanctions because Qaddafi sheltered suspects from the 1988 airline bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland.

Diplomatically isolated, economically crippled, and domestically challenged by Islamist rivals, Libya recently swung toward conciliation, with an aging Qaddafi surrendering the Lockerbie suspects in 1999 (and compensating Lockerbie families), cooperating in the US-led War on Terror since 2001, renouncing terrorism, and abandoning weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in 2003 once the Iraq War began. In 2003 the UN lifted sanctions and the US began progressively normalizing relations.

SEE ALSO: Egypt and Arab Socialism; Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970); Mao Zedong (1893–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- El-Kikhia, M. (1997) *Libya's Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
- Gadafi, M. & Jouve, E. (2005) *My Vision: Conversations and Frank Exchanges of Views with Edmond Jouve*. London: John Blake.
- Tremlett, G. (1993) *Gadafi: The Desert Mystic*. New York: Carroll & Graf.

Qin Bangxian (1907–1946)

Alexander V. Pantsov

Qin Bangxian was an important early leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He was born on June 24, 1907 in the city of Wuxi, Jiangsu. He studied at the Suzhou Special Industrial School and was chairman of the Suzhou student union. In 1925 he was one of the publishers of the patriotic magazine *Wuxi pinglun* (Wuxi Review). That same year he joined the CCP.

In December 1926 Qin went to Moscow to study at Sun Yat-Sen University of the Toilers of China (UTK). He graduated in the fall of 1930 and in December returned to China where he became head of the Communist Youth League of China (CCYL) Propaganda Department. In April 1931 Qin Bangxian was concurrently appointed as CCYL secretary. In September he was recruited into the party's Central Committee (CCP CC) and became a member and executive head of the CCP CC Provisional Politburo. In January 1934 Qin was elected general secretary of the CCP CC. The next month he was elected to membership on the Second Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Chinese Soviet Republic and to the Presidium of the Soviet Government. During the Long March he was blamed for the Communist defeat in Eastern China, and in February 1935 he was forced to yield his post to Zhang Wentian.

At the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in August 1935, Qin Bangxian was elected *in absentia* as an alternate member of the Comintern's Executive Committee (ECCI). In December 1936 he was appointed head of the Organization Department of the CCP CC. In August 1937 he became secretary of the CCP CC's Southern Bureau, and in December of that year he was appointed head of the Organization Department of the newly organized Changjiang (Yangzi) Bureau. In 1941 he was transferred to the CCP CC headquarters in Yan'an to lead the editorial board and the publishing house of the CCP CC newspaper *Jiefang ribao* (Liberation Daily) and the information agency *Xinhua* (New China).

In May 1945 Qin was elected a full member of the CCP CC. He participated in peace nego-

tiations with Chiang Kai-Shek's Guomindang forces in February 1946 in Chongqing. Returning to Yan'an by plane, he was killed in an air crash in Shaanxi on April 8, 1946.

SEE ALSO: China, Maoism and Popular Power, 1949–1969; China, May 4th Movement; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925); Zhang Wentian (1900–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

Deng Liqun (Ed.) (1994) *Zhonggong dangshi renmu zhuan* (Biographies of the Chinese Communist Party History Activists), Vol. 53. Xian: Shanxi renmin chubanshe.

Pantsov, A. (1982) The Life Given to the Struggle for Freedom: On the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the Birth of Bo Gu. *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* (Far Eastern Affairs) 4: 35–8.

Qiu Jin (1875–1907)

J. Megan Greene

Qiu Jin is the best-known woman revolutionary of the late Qing period in China. The last several decades of the Qing, from the 1870s to 1911, were a period in which China's weakness vis-à-vis foreign powers became increasingly evident, and in response many young Chinese began looking for ways to strengthen the nation. Born in 1875 in Fujian province, Qiu Jin grew up during this tumultuous time in Zhejiang province, not far from the growing cosmopolitan city of Shanghai. She was married young in an arranged marriage and had two children, but in 1904, having, like many other young Chinese, developed a strong feeling of Chinese nationalism in response to the Boxer Uprising, she abandoned her husband and children and traveled to Japan to study.

In Japan, Qiu Jin enrolled in the Practical Women's School, a vocational school for girls with a curriculum that was especially designed to serve Chinese women students. There she was educated in practical domestic virtues and given basic instruction in pedagogy so that she would be equipped to teach upon her return to China. At the same time, like many of her peers, she interacted with other young revolutionary-minded Chinese students and became a political and feminist activist. She wrote numerous speeches and essays that were critical of the Chinese practices

of foot binding, arranged marriage, and the cult of chaste widowhood. She also developed her skills as a public speaker and in 1904 founded a public speaking training society in Tokyo. In that same year she became the head of the Humanitarian Association for Practical Action, a society that called upon Chinese women to travel to Japan to study and become involved in anti-Qing revolutionary activities. While in Japan, Qiu Jin also developed the habit of dressing in men's clothing, learned how to make bombs, and established contacts with Sun Yat-sen's anti-Qing political group, the Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui).

Qiu Jin returned to China in 1906 to teach Japanese language, hygiene, and science at the Xunqi Girls' School in Zhejiang province, one of a small number of new girls' schools that had been established in the previous few years. In Shanghai she helped to found the women's magazine *Chinese Women's Journal* (*Zhongguo nu bao*), which sought to unite women on behalf of the feminist cause. She felt that an essential step toward the construction of a strong China was the liberation of women, and the journal was dedicated to this end. As men had failed to lead the nation well, women, Qiu Jin argued, should take over that leading role and guide China toward a better future. In 1907 she took further steps toward the goal of preparing young women for this new role by founding her own physical education school for girls. In July of that same year, however, she attempted to start an uprising against the Manchu Qing Dynasty, for which she was rapidly arrested and beheaded.

SEE ALSO: China, Protest and Revolution, 1800–1911; Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

Judge, J. (2001) Talent, Virtue, and the Nation: Chinese Nationalisms and Female Subjectivities in the Early Twentieth Century. *American Historical Review* 106, 3 (June): 765–803.

Qu Qiubai (1899–1935)

Alexander V. Pantsov

Qu Qiubai, whose real name was Qu Shuang, was one of the most prominent leaders of the first generation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Qu was born in the town of Changzhou,

Jiangsu Province, on June 18, 1899. In 1916 he entered a special Russian-language school in Beijing. He soon became a cofounder of the patriotic magazines *Xin shehui* (New Society) and *Rendao* (Human Path). He went to Moscow in January 1921 as a correspondent for the Beijing newspaper *Chenbao* (Morning), and in that capacity attended the Third World Congress of the Comintern in June–July 1921.

While in Moscow Qu enrolled in the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV) and served as a student-translator and an assistant in the Social Studies Department. He joined the CCP in Moscow in 1922. In November–December of that year he attended the Fourth World Congress of the Comintern as an interpreter for the Chinese delegation. He returned to China in the spring of 1923. In June 1923 he attended the Third CCP Congress in Canton and afterwards became editor-in-chief of the CCP Central Executive Committee (CEC) magazine *Xin qingnian* (New Youth) and a new journal, *Qianfeng* (Vanguard). Beginning in January 1925 he was a member of the Central Committee of the CCP (CCP CC). He was one of the organizers of the labor movement in Shanghai, and in 1925 he founded the CCP CC newspaper *Rexue ribao* (Hot Blood Daily). In April 1927 he became head of the Propaganda Department of the CCP CC. In May 1927 he was elected to the CCP CC's Politburo.

After the Communist defeat by Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang forces in 1927, Qu Qiubai was elected head of the CCP CC Provisional Politburo at the August 7th Party Leadership Conference. At the same time he served as head of the CCP CC Propaganda Department, secretary of the Peasant Movement Committee, and editor-in-chief of the CCP CC magazine *Buersaiweike* (The Bolshevik). In June 1928 he went to Moscow for the second time to attend the Sixth Congress of the CCP at which he was reelected to the Politburo. He remained in Moscow after the congress as head of the newly organized CCP delegation to the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI), and he represented the CCP in the ECCI along with Zhang Guotao. In July–September 1928 he attended the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern with full voting rights, and served as a member of the Program Commission. He was elected to the congress Presidium and also to the ECCI. The ECCI Plenum in turn elevated

him to membership on the ECCI Presidium. On September 3, 1928 he was also elected full member of the Political Secretariat of the Comintern – the first Chinese to join this highest organ of the world communist movement. In July 1929 he attended the Tenth Plenum of the ECCI and was again elected to the Presidium of the Plenum. Between 1928 and 1930 he also taught at the International Lenin School (MLSh) and the Communist University of the Toilers of China (KUTK). In the beginning of 1929 he became a member of the editorial board of *Problemy Kitaya* (Problems of China), a publication of the Institute on China at KUTK.

In May 1929 Qu Qiubai took part in the discussion on so-called Chen Duxiuism organized by the Comintern (Chen Duxiu had begun to reflect Leon Trotsky's criticisms of Stalin's positions with regard to China). In the fall of 1929 along with Huang Li, Qu visited Paris, where he attended a Congress of the Anti-Imperialist League. The next summer he traveled to Berlin and participated in a demonstration by unemployed Berliners. During his stay in the Soviet Union he actively participated in the process of exposing and severely repressing the clandestine Chinese Trotskyist organization within the Soviet international schools. He also supported Stalin's position in the struggle against Bukharin's line. In this connection, he closely cooperated with Stalin's secret police and the International Control Commission of the Comintern.

At the same time he became involved in the factional battles at Sun Yat-Sen University where one group of Chinese students struggled against the dictatorial leadership that Wang Ming, supported by the university rector Pavel Mif, exercised over the student community. Along with most other members of the CCP delegation to the ECCI, Qu Qiubai backed the students opposed to Wang Ming. In late 1929 and early 1930, during the ECCI purge of foreign communists resident in the Soviet Union, Pavel Mif accused Qu of being a "supporter" of the Trotskyists. A meeting of the CCP delegation to the ECCI took place in the spring of 1930 during which the ECCI technical secretary Bodzinsky accused Qu Qiubai of supporting Liu Renjing's plan to visit the exiled Leon Trotsky at Prinkipo in Turkey. In the spring of 1930 the ECCI Political Secretariat adopted a secret resolution concerning the "mistakes" of the CCP delegation, as a result of which Qu was removed from his

position as delegation head. In July he participated in the Comintern discussion on the Chinese question that focused on the extreme-leftist "Li Lisan line."

In the summer of 1930, along with Zhou Enlai, he returned to China and led the Third Plenum of the CCP CC in exposing Li Lisan's "mistakes." This plenum ended in a compromise that balanced criticism of Li Lisan with the latter's promotion to full membership on the Politburo. In December 1930 the ECCI Presidium severely criticized Qu Qiubai for "collaborationism." In the beginning of 1931 he was removed from the Comintern Political Secretariat and replaced by Huang Ping. In February 1931, following the Fourth Plenum of the CCP CC that promoted Wang Ming to the leading party position, Qu was criticized in a CCP resolution concerning the activity of the CCP delegation to the ECCI, and removed from the CCP CC Politburo. Shortly after that, on March 25, Qu was dismissed from the Presidium of the Communist International. Nonetheless, he remained a member of the ECCI until his death.

Between 1931 and 1933 Qu worked in the left-wing Writers' Association. While in Shanghai in November 1931 he was elected *in absentia* to membership in the First CEC of the Chinese Soviet Republic and appointed People's Commissar of Popular Education. In 1933, as leftists in Shanghai were targeted by the White Terror, he moved to the Central Soviet Region. After the beginning of the Long March in October 1934 he remained in Eastern China as one of the leaders of the local communist movement. In February 1935 he was taken prisoner by the Guomindang and executed shortly thereafter.

SEE ALSO: China, Maoism and Popular Power, 1949–1969; Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911; Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925)

References and Suggested Readings

- Xiang Qing (1985) *Gongchan goji yu Zhongguo geming guanxi lunwenji* (Collection of Articles on the Relationship between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe.
- Pantsov, A. (1994) From Students to Dissidents: The Chinese Trotskyists in Soviet Russia (Part 1). *Issues & Studies* 3: 113.
- Yu Jundao (1986) *Zhongguo gemingzhongde gongchan guoji renmu* (Comintern Activists in the Chinese Revolution). Chengdu: Sichuan chubanshe.

Québécois nationalism and Lévesque, René (1922–1987)

Bryan D. Palmer

Quebec, Canada's French-speaking, largely Catholic province, had not, in the long post-Confederation history of the country, exhibited much in the way of revolutionary ferment. It harbored radicals, of course, among them members of the Communist Party of Canada and the social democratic Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. Anarchists were as evident in Montreal as they were in other metropolitan Canadian centers, but they were by no means a major political force. The province had long been governed by fairly conventional and often quite conservative political forces; Maurice Duplessis and his Union Nationale Party in the 1930s and 1940s are indicative of the ways in which the Quebec state, aligned with the clergy, brokered an arrangement within Canadian federalism. This ceded to the Ottawa-based centralized federal government the power to charter national economic policy, while the local Quebec state controlled the hegemonic institutions of everyday life, among them those bodies that ordered educational, legal, cultural, and religious activities. As a consequence Quebec remained, into the 1950s, a bastion of traditionalism, with church and state linked and the influence of the countryside and its parishes evident in ways that would have seemed quite antiquated elsewhere in Canada.

Quiet Revolution

This began to change in the late 1940s and 1950s as Quebec experienced a wave of secularization. An opening salvo in what would come to be known as the Quiet Revolution was fired in 1949 at a strike in the mining community of Asbestos. Trade unionists, an emerging reform-minded intelligentsia, and journalists came together to oppose Duplessis's anti-labor regime and corporations whose bosses spoke English but whose language of the workplace was overwhelmingly French. Among those who championed the civil rights of the Asbestos workers was a young Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Like others who

cut their teeth on the 1949 picket lines, Trudeau found himself in Montreal in the 1950s, where he espoused reform in a journal named *Cité Libre*. By the end of the decade those clamoring for change were in a position to unleash the forces of modernization in Quebec. They were given their opportunity in 1959–60 as Duplessis's death left his old party, the Union Nationale, demoralized and Jean Lesage's Liberals swept to an electoral victory. The resulting years of 1960–5 *rattapage*, or catching up, saw Quebec leapfrog ahead of the rest of Canada in its spending on education, health, and welfare, and the nationalization of key economic sectors, which led to the creation of "crown corporations" such as Hydro-Quebec.

The Quiet Revolution restructured Quebec's political economy, but it also opened the floodgates of increasingly radical social criticism. French-speaking residents of the province, known as Québécois, had lived for generations within Canada as an oppressed nation. That oppression registered in many ways: franco-phones controlled less than 20 percent of Quebec's economy; with 27 percent of Canada's population, the predominantly French province nevertheless had 40 percent of the nation's unemployed; French Quebecers' average income was 35 percent lower than that of English-speaking Canadians; in terms of ethnic groups and their annual income, Québécois ranked 12th of 14 identifiable categories, with only Native peoples and Italian Canadians poorer. Rural poverty was widespread, while in urban settings such as Montreal as many as one-third of families lived in dwellings that lacked basic necessities, many of them judged uninhabitable. It was for all of these reasons that Pierre Vallières entitled his manifesto of Québécois revolutionary nationalism, published in French and English in 1968, *White Niggers of America*.

To be sure the Quiet Revolution alleviated much of the economic malaise that had been suffocating French Canada for decades. In doing so it perhaps encouraged rising expectations among the poor. And no longer were they so rigidly constrained by the Catholic Church which, while it survived as the major religious influence within Quebec, certainly lost much of its authority among the masses of poor and working-class Québécois. The result was that the push for a revolutionary nationalism soon challenged the reform-oriented forces led by Trudeau, who



Founder of the Parti Québécois and the province's twenty-third premier, René Lévesque is known for his efforts to help secure Quebec's autonomy and independence from Canada. Here he addresses supporters on October 29, 1973, provincial election night, at the Paul Sauvé arena. (Duncan Cameron/Library and Archives Canada/PA-115039)

championed taking the ideas of the Quiet Revolution out of Quebec and translating them into the corridors of federal power, where the Liberal Party afforded non-nationalist francophones a platform to promote a new accord between Quebec and Ottawa based on bilingualism and multiculturalism. Trudeau's success, which would see him catapult into national prominence in the 1965–8 years, winning election to Parliament, becoming the minister of justice, and then riding the wave of Trudeaumania into the prime minister's office, would be countered by a revolutionary nationalist movement in Quebec that argued for national independence and socialism. This latter mobilization, vehemently opposed by Trudeau and many in English Canada and Quebec, would culminate in the terrorism of the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ). Always a subterranean, clandestine body of discrete cells, the FLQ, as much myth as it was substantive political organization, nevertheless galvanized thousands and by the late 1960s was as well known in global revolutionary circles as the Irish Republican Army or the Black Panther Party, both of which provided it with inspiration.

Rise of Québécois Separatism

By the early 1960s radical views on the Quiet Revolution's limitations were surfacing among discontented Québécois. Socialists such as the poet Gaston Miron and the ex-Communist Party editor of *La Revue Socialiste*, Raoul Roy,

began promoting the necessity of Quebec achieving independence and socialism at the same time. Bodies such as the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN) publicly endorsed what now came to be known as separatism, while smaller, more radical organizations such as Action Socialiste provided a milieu for a small, if growing, corps of revolutionaries. The growing anti-colonialist movement of these years, which resonated directly in Quebec through coverage of the Algerian struggle for independence, meant that francophone militants read the works of Frantz Fanon and compared their own situations to those of national liberation advocates in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and parts of Europe, such as the Basque country. They also studied Quebec's history, regarding the *Patriot* rebellions of 1837–8, waged against British colonial domination, as particularly worthy of emulation.

It was in this climate that a secret underground of FLQ cells formed in 1962–3. Recruits to the cause were, for the most part, young males in their twenties, but one of the leading figures was a Belgian, Georges Schoeters, who, as a teenager, had joined the anti-Nazi resistance. These clandestine groups regarded the RIN as the legal, above-ground movement, but saw the FLQ as a direct-action wing of independence agitators. They planted explosive devices at various symbolic sites of Quebec's subordination to English Canada, including military recruiting centers, large Anglo-capitalist enterprises being struck by workers, federal tax buildings, mailboxes in the well-to-do English neighborhood of Westmount, and historical monuments commemorating the English presence in French Canada. One such bombing resulted in the accidental death of a night watchman, Vincent Wilfrid O'Neill, and it led to a vigorous police repression. Exposed by an informant, the FLQ cells were soon raided and 23 arrests resulted in 11 independence advocates receiving jail time totaling 68 years.

New recruits to the cause of the FLQ soon reproduced the underground cells. This time they formed an army of liberation, established training camps, and put out a propaganda bulletin entitled *The Axe*. Supplementing such developments was the rise of a legal cultural publication, *Parti Pris*, that, although not affiliated with the FLQ, was defiant in its promotion of independence, socialism, and secularism.

First published in 1963, and edited by Pierre Matheu, this left-wing monthly was soon complemented by *Revolution Québécois*, which united a new corps of revolutionary advocates drawn from a fragmenting milieu of left political organizations that included communists, Trotskyists, and social democrats. Developments like this, in conjunction with major strikes at mainstream newspapers such as Montreal's *La Presse*, brought figures such as Vallières and his close friend and political ally Charles Gagnon into the movement for revolutionary independence. By 1965, with the repression of the revolutionary ranks by the police ongoing (the offices of *Revolution Québécois* were raided in June and Vallières was fired from his job at *La Presse*), Vallières and Gagnon had joined the FLQ underground and were writing for *The Axe*.

As the FLQ underground developed ties with the Black Power movement in the United States, and as the general climate of protest in Quebec heated up with anti-Vietnam War mobilizations and interest in youth radicalization (evident in the growth of Students for a Democratic Society), countersubversive forces on both sides of the 49th parallel linked the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and municipal anti-terrorist squads together in targeting the rising revolutionary nationalist forces in Quebec. With preparations for Expo '67, a World's Fair that coincided with the Canadian Centennial, the FLQ, increasingly influenced by Vallières and Gagnon, directed much of its oppositional violence at work sites immobilized by strikes. Bombs exploded at the Montreal Lagrenade shoe factory, at the Dominion Textile plant in Drummondville, and during strikes of construction workers and longshoremen. In the spring and summer of 1966 two deaths resulted, as a 64-year-old secretary at the Lagrenade factory, Thérèse Morin, and a young *Felquiste* courier, Jean Corbo, were fatally injured by FLQ explosives. As the police moved decisively against the FLQ underground, charging Vallières and Gagnon in the Morin and Corbo deaths, the clandestine movement was clearly under siege. Arrests abounded, with Vallières and Gagnon evading the dragnet and surfacing in New York City, where they protested the political repression in Quebec by launching a hunger strike and picketing the United Nations. After an interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation the duo

were promptly arrested by New York police and transported to the Manhattan House of Detention, colloquially known as the Tombs.

It was there that Vallières wrote *White Niggers of America*, an inflammatory Molotov cocktail of a book that was part autobiography, part manifesto, part lament, part history, and part philosophy. Published in French and English, as well as in other languages in West Germany, Italy, and Mexico, the book made the case for Quebec's independence, not by arguing that Québécois society was different, but by suggesting that it was impaled on the same capitalist contradictions that produced exploitation and oppression everywhere in the modern world. Demanding the overthrow of the established order, Vallières posed the issue of the organization of the oppressed in terms that extolled the virtues of revolutionary violence. No party, no union, no technology, and no program could free Quebec's workers and oppressed masses. Rather, *White Niggers of America* promoted the view that "Revolutionaries . . . organize the people's violence into a conscious and *independent* force."

Such views sealed the defeat of the FLQ. They also insured that Vallières and Gagnon would find the justice meted out to them in 1967–8 rather rough. Successful in their legal battle to avoid extradition, the two prominent *Felquistes* were released from the Tombs in mid-January, after having been confined for almost four months. No sooner were they freed, however, than United States Immigration officials illegally kidnapped them, put the dissident duo on a plane to Montreal, and delivered the two into the hands of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Slapped in handcuffs, Vallières and Gagnon were hauled before a judge on charges of murder, bombing attacks, and hold-ups. They would each spend more than three years in jail before they were eventually acquitted.

The FLQ seemed, predictably, demoralized by these developments, and the underground appeared to be in a state of collapse. *The Axe* no longer published, and radicals in all walks of life found their movements monitored by a wide-ranging network of spies and informers; such meetings and clandestine cells that remained were constantly on guard against the presence of *agents provocateurs*.

Yet the powerful idea of the FLQ could not quite be killed. A committee to defend Vallières and Gagnon was formed. Charles de Gaulle's-cry

of “Vive le Québec Libre!” seemed to resonate in more and more Québécois ears. By May of 1968, with the world erupting in youthful revolt, Québec seemed to be flowing with the global historic tide of left insurgency. As a more mainstream sovereigntist movement emerged, led by former Liberal Party figures such as René Lévesque, revolutionary nationalist groups and organizations mushroomed. Trade unions in Quebec moved decidedly to the left, embracing anti-imperialist opposition to the Vietnam War and calling for a broad coalition of revolutionary forces to unite in struggle to overcome racism, poverty, and exploitation. A militant *Mouvement de libération du taxi*, founded in September 1968, was immediately precipitated into a violent confrontation with the Murray Hill Company, which monopolized transporting passengers to the Montreal airport. Thousands demonstrated, 250 cabs surrounded one airport and brought traffic to a snarling stop, and a bus was destroyed. A year later, Murray Hill was assailed again, with Molotov cocktails tossed under buses, gunshots fired, and vehicles seized and driven into concrete walls. When the smoke cleared, an undercover police officer lay dead. Students at universities and colleges linked arms with striking workers and underground *Felquistes*. Arrests of course continued. A November 1968 Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam attracted 2,000 militantly anti-war activists to Montreal, and delegates from the Vietnamese National Liberation Front, the Latin American Solidarity Organization, the Black Panther Party, the Cuban government of Fidel Castro, and the Palestinian Resistance movement linked arms with Quebec’s increasingly radical *indépendantiste* advocates. After a dramatic bombing of the Montreal Stock Exchange in February 1969 that injured 30 people and caused over a million dollars in property damage, Pierre-Paul Geoffroy was charged with 129 criminal counts relating to 31 separate explosions; he received an extraordinarily punitive 124 life sentences. “Terrorists didn’t create violence,” thundered a fiery leader of Montreal’s Central Council of National Trade Unions (CNTU), Michel Chartand, “it created them. . . . We must destroy the capitalist system and reorganize the economy to meet the needs of the people.” Chartand called for a united front of all “demonstrators, protestors, and revolutionaries whose aims are the same as ours.”

By 1969, Montreal’s two English-speaking universities, Sir George Williams and McGill, faced unprecedented student uprisings. At Sir George Williams racism was the match that lit protest conflagration, with black students occupying the university computer center. When police barricaded doors and looked to be preparing an assault on the sit-in, the students trashed the space and tossed computer files out of the windows. McGill, a bastion of anglophone power in Montreal, was rocked by a movement to make the institution French-speaking. Stan Gray, a leader of McGill Français, was eventually fired from his teaching post. He soon occupied a post of prominence in the *Front du libération populaire*, developing ties to the Black Panthers and cultivating revolutionary ideas in proletarian neighborhoods such as St. Henri, where a radical newspaper, *Worker’s Power*, circulated widely.

Once again secret collectives of FLQ advocates formed. Some cells bankrolled their activities by robberies. At the Université du Québec à Montréal, an FLQ communications nucleus gathered around a 25-year-old professor, Robert Comeau. A common front of workers was advocated, urged to wage terror against “the violence of the existing system.” Countering the mild social democratic politics of Lévesque’s Parti Québécois, these underground forces demanded both socialism and national liberation. Workers under attack were “supported” with bombs. The Lapalme mail truck drivers who lost their jobs because of the federal government’s restructuring of work relations in the postal sector were particularly favored as symbols of the exploitation of the working class and the oppression of the French-speaking. It was in this period and context that the FLQ underground, aware of how kidnappings were increasingly utilized as a means of protest in Latin America and Europe, began to advocate hostage-taking as a way of pressuring the state to release political prisoners. All told, there were not likely more than 50 *Felquistes* underground, but their support networks and those advocating their cause encompassed thousands.

October Crisis

Late in the summer of 1970 an underground FLQ cell headed by Paul Rose and Jacques Lanctôt fractured in two over disagreement about the need to launch an aggressive new initiative. Lanctôt

pressed for immediate action, and he and his allies concocted Operation Libération, which would culminate in the October 5, 1970 kidnapping of James Richard Cross, the commercial attachée on the staff of the British high commissioner. The Cross kidnapping, the first of its kind in North America, was followed by the public release of an FLQ manifesto. It demanded the release of 23 political prisoners, the rehiring of *les gars de Lapalme*, air transport of the kidnapers to Cuba, and a \$500,000 tax to be used to aid Quebec's struggle for national liberation. Further, all Québécois "terrorized slaves" were called on to join "the Quebec Revolution."

Governing authority in the municipality of Montreal, the province of Quebec, and the seat of federal power in Ottawa was never decisively of one mind as to how to respond to the Cross kidnapping. Trudeau maintained an absolute refusal to concede anything to the FLQ members engaged in hostage-taking except safe passage to another country. This spurred Paul Rose, his brother Jacques, and others in what was now known as the Chernier cell to target Pierre Laporte, acting premier of Quebec and a cabinet minister. He was seized outside his home on October 10, 1970, and the promise was made that he would be executed if the Libération cell's prior demands were not met.

At this point two counterposed developments unfolded. First, the state, led by Trudeau but backed by Montreal Mayor Jean Drapeau's Combined Anti-Terrorist Squad, dug in its heels of refusal to countenance kidnapping and political blackmail. Second, the silent forces of sympathy for the FLQ were galvanized by the realization that however repugnant the acts of the underground, commitment to making Quebec an independent state unquestionably demanded support. Thousands rallied to the banner of the FLQ. Three thousand people crammed the Paul Sauvé Arena to hear Vallières and Gagnon, now out of jail; Michel Chartrand and FLQ lawyer-negotiator Robert Lemieux there defended socialist independence and denounced the state of siege marshaled by governing authority. As Vallières captured the growing mythology of the FLQ by thundering from the podium, "The FLQ is each of you. It is every Québécois who stands up," the crowd chanted in unison, "FLQ! FLQ! FLQ!"

All of this changed at 4:00 a.m. on the morning of October 16, 1970. Trudeau's governing

Liberal Party, with support from a broad array of political quarters (as well as staunch opposition), proclaimed the War Measures Act, a World War I-era bylaw that permitted the government to arrest and search people without a warrant, and to detain such suspects for up to 21 days without providing any reason. The War Measures Act thus suspended the Canadian Declaration of Rights and Freedoms and dispensed with the legal rights of Canada's citizens. This was done, ostensibly, because Canada and Quebec were in a state of "apprehended insurrection." Within hours of the declaration of the War Measures Act, some 500 individuals were rounded up, and 31,000 searches were conducted by police forces and the army, almost 5,000 of which ended in the seizure of property of some kind. Vallières and Gagnon, of course, were among the incarcerated.

As the state upped the ante, so too did the FLQ with tragic consequences. Laporte's body was found one week after his kidnapping, strangled and stuffed in the trunk of an abandoned car near an air base. The politician's death, one week after his kidnapping and one day after the proclamation of the War Measures Act, sealed the fate of the FLQ. General condemnation ensued, sympathy for the underground cause waned, and advocates of law and order gained the upper hand. The tone of political and sociocultural life in Quebec changed as the mythology of the FLQ succumbed, and the cause of socialism and national independence was collapsed into the more moderate sovereignty association campaigns of Lévesque and the Parti Québécois. The 1960s, a decade of tumultuous and creatively challenging dissent, wound down as Quebec, and those who demanded its independence, entered a new decade.

In the aftermath of Laporte's execution, James Cross was eventually released after spending 59 days as an FLQ hostage. His captors were allowed to flee to Cuba. Paul and Jacques Rose, along with almost twenty others, received prison sentences ranging from six months to life. Agents provocateurs now riddled the FLQ underground. The War Measures Act, and a subsequent piece of public order legislation, hung over Quebec and Canada until the end of April 1971. Once-implacable advocates of the FLQ's program of revolutionary violence, such as Pierre Vallières, packed up their incendiary politics and traded them in for advocacy of the Parti Québécois.

Gagnon went on to play a leadership role in a Quebec Maoist grouping, continuing his commitment to a revolutionary transformation of society.

Something of the politics of challenge survived into the 1970s, however, as Quebec became in the period 1971–2 a center of syndicalist, working-class upheaval in North America. A momentous 1971 strike at the newspaper *La Presse* culminated in a 15,000-strong rally that was attacked by Drapeau's police. Hundreds were injured and a young female student, Michele Gauthier, killed. A Common Front of Quebec unionists organized in the CNTU, the Quebec Teachers Corporation, and the Quebec Federation of Labor, jelled over the winter months of 1972. A General Strike of public sector workers galvanized the province in March–April–May 1972. With the forces of state repression in high gear, union leaders were faced with injunctions, fines, and other forms of intimidation and discipline. Legislation was passed that ultimately broke the back of the workers' revolt, and three militant workers' leaders were jailed. Yet before the uprising had been quelled, workers had occupied factories and hospitals, seized community radio stations, blockaded roads, and produced a series of manifestos advocating socialism and independence.

Quebec's Quiet Revolution, in the making since the 1940s and before, thus gave way, in the 1960s, to not-so-quiet demands for revolutionary change. Revolutionary terrorism proved a resilient, but ineffective, vehicle of socialist and nationalist aspiration in the years from 1963 to 1970. Its inability to mobilize a mass movement in support of the socioeconomic transformation of Quebec notwithstanding, the FLQ nevertheless for a time captured the imaginations and support of thousands of Québécois. The values they espoused took new forms in the aftermath of 1970, but they continue to this day to be raised anew in struggles for equality, social justice, and political change.

SEE ALSO: Canada, Law and Public Protest: History; Canada, Rebellion of 1837–1838; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Quebec City, 2001

References and Suggested Readings

- Bergeron, L. (1971) *The History of Quebec: A Patriote's Handbook*. Toronto: NC Press.
- Black Rose Collective (1972) *Quebec Labour: The Confederation of National Trade Unions Yesterday and Today*. Montreal: Black Rose.

- Cardin, J. F. (1990) *Comprendre Octobre 1970: Le FLQ, La Crise et Le Syndicalisme*. Montréal: Meridien.
- Chodos, R. & Auf der Maur, N. (Eds.) (1972) *Quebec; A Chronicle, 1968–1972*. Toronto: James Lewis & Samuel.
- Coleman, W. (1984) *The Independence Movement in Quebec, 1945–1980*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Drache, D. (Ed.) (1972) *Quebec: Only the Beginning – The Manifestoes of the Common Front*. Toronto: New Press.
- Fournier, L. (1984) *FLQ: The Anatomy of an Underground Movement*. Toronto: NC Press.
- Godin, P. (1991a) *La Fin de la grande noirceur: la révolution tranquille*, Vol. 1. Montréal: Boréal.
- Godin, P. (1991b) *La Difficile recherche de l'égalité: la révolution tranquille*, Vol. 2. Montréal: Boréal.
- Hodgins Milner, S. & Milner, H. (1973) *The Decolonization of Quebec: An Analysis of Left-Wing Nationalism*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
- Morf, G. (1970) *Terror in Quebec: Case Studies of the FLQ*. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin.
- Reid, M. (1972) *The Shouting Signpainters: A Literary and Political Account of Quebec Revolutionary Nationalism*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
- Roussopoulos, D. (Ed.) (1974) *Quebec and Radical Social Change*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Savoie, C. (1963) *La véritable histoire due FLQ*. Montréal: Editions du Jour.
- Smith, B. (1963) *Les résistants du FLQ*. Montréal: Les Editions Actualité.
- Trudeau, P. E. (Ed.) (1956) *La Grève d'amiante*. Montréal: Editions Cité Libre.
- Trudeau, P. E. (1968) *Federalism and the French Canadians*. Toronto: Macmillan.
- Vallières, P. (1971) *White Niggers of America*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
- Vallières, P. (1977) *The Assassination of Pierre Laporte: Behind the October '70 Scenario*. Toronto: James Lorimer.
- de Vault, C. & Johnson, W. (1982) *The Informer: Confessions of an Ex Terrorist*. Toronto: Fleet Books.

Queen Nanny and Maroon resistance

Joshua Kwesi Aikins


Queen Nanny (birth unknown, died post-1741) was the political and military leader of the Windward Maroons in Jamaica, a group of runaway enslaved Africans who fled the plantations and established independent communities, modeled on West African polities, in Jamaica's mountainous interior. Their relentless 85-year-

long resistance could not be crushed by the British Empire, which eventually signed peace treaties with them. Jamaican Maroon communities have retained an autonomous status as well as their unique cultural identity to this day.

Nanny of the Maroons (also called Granny Nanny or Queen Nanny) and her brothers Johnny, Kojo (sometimes spelled in its anglicized version Cudjoe) Accompong, Cuffy, and Quao were themselves enslaved Africans who were able to flee from the plantation and decided to found and lead different Maroon communities. Their origin is made evident through their names, which are common in the Twi language, itself part of the larger Akan group of languages and cultures which are shared by different peoples in what is today Ghana. People of Asante and Fante origin were enslaved and gathered in a coastal town called Koromantee before being deported to the Caribbean. In Jamaica the term “Koromantee” to this day denotes both the culture and language of Maroon communities, who were able to keep and defend much of their Akan heritage.

Almost all Jamaican slave rebellions from 1650 to 1830 had leaders of Akan descent. They gained such notoriety that the French banned slaves of Akan origin from their colonies in the Caribbean. Akan culture thus provided a very effective basis for Maroons in organizing sustained resistance, and as a matrilineal culture it also conferred authority on women. The political and military system Queen Nanny presided over was fashioned after the Akan political system, in which a queen mother played a crucial role as female co-leader who, together with her male counterpart, exercised joint authority and responsibility in all state affairs. This dual line of authority was accentuated by the fact that queen mothers were older than their male co-rulers. The cultural distinction and authority of seniority created a duty to seek the queen mother’s advice in all matters of importance to the community.

Nanny’s name indicates that she had such a position of authority in her community, for “Nanny” is most likely derived from “Nana,” a chieftaincy title given to male and female authorities in Akan cultures. Asante Queen Mother Nana Yaa Asantewaa provides a historical example of female anti-colonial leadership in West Africa with many similarities to her Jamaican counterpart: Queen Nanny and Nana Yaa Asantewaa presided over similarly structured societies and displayed political and military leadership



Queen Nanny was a well-known leader of the Jamaican Maroons, runaway slaves who fought the British during the eighteenth century. Most of what is known about Queen Nanny has been passed down through oral tradition, but it is believed that she and her family escaped and went on to organize other Maroon communities. (National Library of Jamaica)

in their fight against the British Empire. This diasporan continuity of Akan political and value systems is in itself a great achievement and a resounding act of defiance against a dehumanizing plantation system that sought systematically to strip enslaved Africans of their culture.

Another important source of Queen Nanny’s authority was her knowledge in the spiritual system of “obeah” or “myal” which enabled privileged communication with the ancestors, affording insights into past, present, and future. This knowledge in the realm of the spiritual, an analogy to the concept of personified wisdom, played a large part in granting Asante queen mothers a central role in decision-making. It is on the basis of these conceptions of authority that Queen Nanny was able to provide leadership to her community for over fifty years.

Situated in the Blue Mountains, Jamaica’s highest peaks, the terrain was used very effectively for guerrilla tactics. Using their knowledge of the rainy forest for traps, camouflage, and

ambushes, the Maroons were able to hold their position against a much greater, much better equipped and better supplied British army. During the 1730s, the period of most intense fighting, only about a hundred Maroons were recorded as killed. The British lost thousands of lives in the same period of time. The power that the Windward Maroons exerted can be gathered from archival sources which state that in 1734, a total of 27 plantations had been abandoned on the Windward side of Jamaica. The threat they posed to the plantation slavery system is also evident in a petition by the colonial government to the king for assistance against the threat Maroons posed to the sustainability of slavery in Jamaica:

Their success has had such influence on our other slaves that they are continually deserting to them in great numbers and the insolent behavior of others gives us but too much cause to fear a general defection, which without your Majestie's gracious aid and assistance must render us a prey to them. (Gottlieb 2000)

The only battle which recorded Maroons suffering significant losses occurred in Nanny Town in 1734, when soldiers led by British Captain Studdart were able to reach and open fire upon the town. Nanny and the majority of the community escaped and founded a new settlement, Moore Town, in close proximity to the old location.

Eventually, the emissaries of the largest colonial empire in history had to sign a treaty with the Maroon communities whose guerrilla tactics they could not defeat. In skillful negotiations, which she led through emissaries, Nanny was able to secure the autonomy of her community. Contracts dated to 1739 and 1741, respectively, secured the Maroons' autonomy from British colonial authorities and granted them land rights. The self-perception of the Maroons as victors, not vanquished, is evident in the way they dealt with payments for the land rights that the British demanded in the treaties. In accordance with a view that their land and their freedom had been earned through resistance and could not be conferred on them by their adversaries, the land was never paid. The mutual non-aggression treaty also included an obligation to send away or return runaway slaves to the plantations, a clause that decreased the number of Maroons despite the fact it was not always adhered to.

The treaties were meant to appease, but they were not the end to Maroon resistance in Jamaica. Other Maroon communities also entered into treaties with the British to transform the stalemate of continuous guerrilla warfare into a state of peace with guaranteed freedom and autonomy of their communities. But instances like the Second Maroon War (1795) and the Akan-led Tacky Rebellion of 1760, which is seen as the bloodiest slave uprising in Jamaican history, illustrate that resistance against slavery continued unabashed. Maroon communities provided an important symbol of the real possibility to resist, escape, and lead a life of self-determination. Queen Nanny's leadership also provided an important symbol of female authority that signified the continuity of a matrilineal Akan conception of authority and leadership, in defiance of the patriarchal structures of the European plantation system.

For the Maroon community that has been able to retain its autonomy from the Jamaican government and its land rights based on the treaties negotiated by Queen Nanny, she is to be considered the symbolic, ancestral "Mother of the Maroons." But she is commemorated in wider society as well: Queen Nanny has been named one of the national heroes of Jamaica, and her portrait is on the Jamaican \$500 bill, the most valuable note of the currency. Her leadership and the extraordinary achievements of the Jamaican Maroons serve as symbols of resistance against slavery and the unbroken will of Africans for cultural and political self-determination, for a life in communities governed by their own value systems.

SEE ALSO: Jamaica, Rebellion and Resistance, 1760–1834

References and Suggested Readings

- Gottlieb, K. (2000) *The Mother of Us All: A History of Queen Nanny, Leader of the Windward Jamaican Maroons*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
- Harris, C. L. G. (1992) Maroon Cultures in the Americas. Catalog of the 1992 Festival of American Folklife, Center for Folklife and Cultural Heritage of the Smithsonian Institution. Available at www.folklife.si.edu/resources/maroon/tour/visit/e2.htm.
- Zips, W. (1999) An Alternative Historical Outline of Akan-Related Chieftaincy in Jamaican Maroon Societies. In Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, E. A. B. & van Dijk, R. (Eds.), *African Chieftaincy in a New Socio-Political Landscape*. Hamburg: LIT.

Quintín Lame, 1980s

Tathiana Montaña Mestizo

In 1974 in the south of Colombia, an indigenous peasant group known as Quintín Lame (CQL) emerged. This group, which received military training from the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (PC-ML), was formed after the killing of regional indigenous leaders in Cauca by repressive forces of the state and large landowners. The CQL was thus constituted as a military self-defense group. Thanks to an organization created years earlier by the indigenous leader Manuel Quintín Lame (1880–1967), the group had the support of many indigenous communities in the region of the Valle del Cauca, Huila, Tolima, and parts of the departments of Meta and Caquetá.

The founders of the Quintín Lame armed group distinguished themselves from other armed groups of the time by their multicultural approach. The group included mestizos such as Gustavo Mejía, Pedro León Rodríguez, and Edgar Londoño; foreigners such as the Hungarian Pablo Tattay, Gabriel Soler from Argentina, and Teresa Tomish from Chile; and indigenous people from different ethnic communities in the south of the country. Until the early 1980s the CQL acted in self-defense of traditional territories and only used arms when territorial and political autonomy was threatened.

The group's first military offensive took place in 1984 with an assault on Castilla, a small town in the Cauca department, and the takeover of the village of Santander de Quilichao, during which the CQL made its manifesto public: "The Quintín Lame is a force organized in the service of the indigenous communities of Cauca, for support during conflicts, and to defend their rights and combat their enemies." The group also planned operations of armed propaganda in rural and urban areas, working together with other guerilla organizations such as M-19 and forming an offshoot, the Quintín Lame Armed Movement (MAQL). The MAQL joined the Guerilla Coordination Simón Bolívar (CGSB), created in 1987 to bring together armed insurgent organizations in Colombia such as the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and M-19, a militant group founded primarily by students.

In 1990, with the consolidation of the National Constituent Assembly process, the MAQL initiated negotiations with the government of President Virgilio Barco. By May 31, 1991, final disarmament was complete. The demobilized representative of the MAQL, Alfonso Peña Chepe, was elected to the Assembly as spokesperson for the ideals of the indigenous struggle: respect for the earth, punishment of those who commit crimes against the indigenous population, and the struggle for the liberation of the country.

From this moment on the Quintín Lame Indigenous Movement (MIQL) supported and worked to consolidate civic movements with the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC), the Regional Indigenous Council of Tolima (CRIT), the Regional Organization of Embera Waunan of Chocó (OREWA), and the Indigenous Organization of Antioquia (OIA). These and other organizations constituted the political movement known as the Indigenous Social Alliance (ASI).

SEE ALSO: EPL Maoist Guerilla Movement; FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army); Lame, Manuel Quintín (1880–1967), Indian/Peasant Organization, and the Struggle for Land in Colombia, 1920s–1930s; M-19 of Colombia

References and Suggested Readings

- Caviedes, M. (2002) *Antropología y movimiento indígena*. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Departamento de Ciencias Humanas.
- Espinosa Arango, M. (2003) El indio lobo. Manuel Quintín Lame en la Colombia moderna. *Revista Colombiana de Antropología* 39. Bogotá.
- Gamboa, J. C. (1999) *Manuel Quintín Lame y los guerreros de Juan Tama*. Santafé de Bogotá: Madre Tierra.
- Herrera Ángel, M. (2004) *Manuel Quintín Lame*. Bogotá: Biblioteca Virtual del Banco de la República.

Quit India movement

Kunal Chattopadhyay

War, Congress, and Indian Politics

In 1935 the Government of India Act was promulgated by Britain and elections were held in 1937. The Indian National Congress, the dominant nationalist party, won a majority of provinces. The Congress victory emboldened the masses, who fought militantly for greater

equality and redistribution of resources. But the Congress right wing, linked closely to Indian capitalists, quickly established dominance in the organization and the governments. The left-wing leader Subhas Chandra Bose was eventually pushed out of the party and formed the Forward Bloc (FB), a small political organization. In view of Congress's compromise with the British colonialists to restrain struggles, and its periodic complicity in repressive policies, the party's popularity began to fall, its membership declining from 4.5 million in 1938–9 to 1.4 million in 1940–1.

On September 3, 1939 Viceroy Linlithgow unilaterally associated India with Britain's declaration of war on Germany without consulting the provincial ministries or any Indian leaders. Congress leaders made offers of cooperation in the war effort subject to certain conditions like the promise of a postwar constituent assembly to determine the political structure of a free India and the immediate formation of a responsible national government at the center. The viceroy's offer fell far short of this, leading to the resignation of the Congress ministries and the compromises opposed by the masses. The leftists were in favor of militant struggles, but their power by now was much reduced. A Defense of India Ordinance restricting civil liberties was decreed the day war was declared. In Britain a National Coalition Cabinet was formed in May 1940, dominated by arch-imperialist Winston Churchill as prime minister and Clement Attlee and Labor Party leaders, promising an Indian constituent assembly. British wartime imperialist strategy encouraged the Muslim League to split with Congress and demand concessions on behalf of religious adherents.

During the early war years Gandhi and the right wing were opposed to any all-out struggle against imperialism. Wartime demand initially cut off imports and expanded the profitability of Indian industry. There was a small rise in agricultural prices, welcome to the mass of peasants after a decade of depression. The left, by contrast, was pressing for action on independence, with only the small group around M. N. Roy calling for support to Britain against fascism. The Ramgarh Congress's (March 1940) decision for individual civil disobedience (volunteers personally chosen by Gandhi) created a token movement which neither presented the government with difficulties nor gave Viceroy Linlithgow pretext

for a crackdown. Gandhi's aim was to tame the movement to forestall radical struggles, and he lamented the appeal of communism to Indian youth. By June 1941 about 20,000 communists were jailed.

Two changes came about from 1941. The German invasion of the USSR compelled a reluctant Stalin to turn against Hitler, and the Communist Party of India (CPI) to call for full support to the anti-fascist "people's war." When Trotskyists argued that only by overthrowing the imperialists could the Indian working class really aid independently the Soviet workers' state, the CPI general secretary P. C. Joshi told party members that Trotskyists were "traitors" to be driven out of political life and "exterminated." The other change was Japanese invasion and rapid military victories in Southeast Asia. Singapore fell on February 15, 1942 and Rangoon on March 8. Indian public opinion was turning hostile due to a scarcity crisis and awareness of growing racism. Racism was displayed most crudely when, in the wake of Japanese victories, Indians in Southeast Asia were left to fend for themselves, often forced to return to India under terrible conditions. A "denial policy" resulted in damage to boats, the main transport of East Bengal. American troop arrivals were followed by complaints of rape and racist harassment.

In response to the growing resentment, in March 1942 the War Cabinet agreed to a draft declaration promising postwar dominion status for India with right of secession and a constitutional body to which the princely states would be invited to send representatives and to which provinces might have the right not to join. Sir Stafford Cripps, a leftist British Labor Party leader, went to India to negotiate. Within the Congress, Jawaharlal Nehru and other leftists supported the war effort to oppose the Nazi war on the Soviet Union. But no agreement was reached in the negotiations, partly because of lack of interest among Congress leaders, but mainly because of machinations by Churchill and Linlithgow.

Quit India

The failure of the Cripps Mission brought about realignment in the Congress. Nehru and the CPI found themselves in the same camp as Bhulabhai Desai and C. Rajagopalachari, the

extreme moderates. Rajagopalachari and the CPI both argued in favor of an accommodation with the Muslim League through recognition of the right of the Muslim majority provinces to secede through plebiscite after independence had been achieved. Gandhi and the right, aligned with the Congress Socialist Party (CSP), called for a more militant struggle. Gandhi contended that if the British withdrew from India, the Japanese could invade and conquer the country. He also stressed that Indians should tackle their own problems. Gandhi's hard line was accepted at a Congress Working Committee (CWC) session of April-May 1942. The Wardha CWC (July 1942) resolution introduced a previously absent note of social radicalism when it stated that princes, *jagirdars*, *zamindars* (varieties of landlords), and the propertied classes derive their wealth and property from workers in fields and factories, to whom power and authority must eventually belong.

The All India Congress Committee on August 8, 1942, meeting in Bombay, adopted the famous Quit India resolution calling for non-violent mass struggles on the widest scale, leaving Gandhi to decide when to launch the struggle. The call was enough to invite repression, which freed Congress leadership from responsibility for protests. Indeed, Congress leaders stated that if they were arrested, every Indian was to be their own guide. Surprisingly, for the only time, Gandhi was willing to sanction the general strike and on this occasion delivered his famous "Do or Die" speech, proclaiming the final battle was at hand. The CPI members of the CWC opposed the resolution. Trotskyists of the Bolshevik Leninist Party of India (BLPI), by contrast, distributed leaflets calling for all-out participation in any anti-imperialist struggle, while warning that Gandhi would compromise.

The subsequent arrest of Gandhi and the entire top leadership on August 9 was followed by a mass upsurge which overwhelmingly surpassed calculations made either by the British colonial powers or Congress. Over the previous decades diverse forms of radicalism had produced a litany of critiques of Gandhian non-violence. Leftists of various shades, the CSP, the CPI at other times, the AITUC (All India Trade Union Congress), the All India Kishan Sabha (peasant organization) (AIKS), all had campaigned for militancy. Gandhi and the Congress enjoyed a symbolic legitimacy, but diverse

movements formed and protested in ways that they could not control. Gandhi's speeches suggest he did not provide any clear direction for protests. Just a few days earlier, he had said adoption of the Quit India resolution would necessitate all-out struggle and sent a letter to the viceroy awaiting a reply to avoid recrimination for the violent struggles to come. The British tried to paint the entire struggle as a "fifth-columnist" act, as did the CPI, firmly opposing the upheaval. The British repeatedly attributed a pro-Axis sympathy to Congress to gain world anti-fascist support for the brutal repression of the popular rebellion. But Congress had a record of supporting anti-fascist causes, including Spanish republicans, and Congress sent a mission to China during the Japanese invasion.

The Quit India resolution was intended more as a bargaining chip than a call for social revolution. A confidential report of the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee, dated July 29, 1942, told Congress members to be ready, but by no means act, until Gandhi decided. The most radical official Congress documents only discussed stopping trains, traveling without tickets, and no-tax as the last stage.

In the initial phase of the Quit India movement urban revolts broke out in Bombay and spread to numerous cities throughout the country with different intensities. As the news of the Congress leadership arrests spread, crowds gathered in Bombay. Police were pelted with stones and bottles and buses were forced to halt. Government buildings were set on fire, compelling authorities to call out the army. CSP leaders met secretly in Bombay and decided to go underground, and with the high command jailed, leadership was now in their hands. But they deliberately decided to dissolve their own party and carry out the struggle simply in the name of the "underground Congress." Usha Mehta ran a clandestine radio station. In Patna on August 11 a mass upsurge developed. In Jamshedpur and Dalmianagar working-class strikes broke out.

The CPI sought to restore order and end strikes and submitted secret reports to Sir Reginald Maxwell (home member, viceroy's executive council) documenting efforts to prevent strikes and *hartals* (shut-downs) in Kanpur, Bombay, Jamshedpur, Calicut, Lahore, and Madras. As a reward, the party was allowed to hold pro-war rallies openly in Bombay, as reported with

satisfaction by *People's War*, the CPI weekly. The BLPI, by contrast, issued a series of leaflets stressing the compromising nature of Congress, sought to build a revolutionary organization, and called on soldiers not to fire on demonstrators. The BLPI sought to unify revolutionary organizations and a leaflet of August 7 called for no-tax and no-rent campaigns in the countryside and general strikes in urban areas. The director of the Intelligence Bureau wrote that traces of Fourth International Trotskyists were discernable in many illegal Congress bulletins and pamphlets. In the General Motors factory, a vital war industries unit, Bombay Trotskyists and the CSP carried out sustained organizing activities.

The Quit India movement was concentrated in a wide area across northern India, stretching from Bombay, Satara, and Ahmedabad in the west, through the United Provinces (UP) and Bihar in the north, to Bengal and Orissa in the east and Karnataka in the south. After the initial urban upsurge was beaten back, struggles shifted to the countryside where peasants rose up, destroyed railway tracks and stations, telegraph wires and poles, looted treasury buildings, and killed a number of European officers. Isolated police stations were taken over and destroyed, followed by the formation of Jatiyo Sarkar or Prati Sarkar (national or parallel governments). They ruthlessly repressed the rural movement by burning down entire villages. The next phase was the creation of underground structures and struggles, divided into three major streams: (1) a Gandhian stream led by Sucheta Kripalani, (2) urban militants under Aruna Asaf Ali mobilizing sabotage activities, and (3) a guerrilla group organized by Jayaprakash Narayan in the State of Bihar.

The Quit India movement gained support from many regions and groups, but was not sustained throughout India. In Ballia (Eastern UP) for a few days, and in Satara (Maharashtra) and Midnapore (Bengal) for a longer period, parallel governments continued functioning. In Satara a new generation of non-Brahmin (Hindu priestly caste) leaders, close to the CSP, emerged. Madras, by contrast, was relatively quiet, in part due to opposition from Rajagopalachari and other Congress leaders. In Kerala the CPI opposed the movement. In the princely states, where Congress had always been wary of launching movements, confrontation was sporadic. The Punjab and the Muslim areas of north-

western India mainly remained silent. The Quit India movement revealed that Muslims shifted from the Congress position even in regions of mass upsurge. Regions dominated by Hindu communalists remained quiescent. The "untouchables" or *dalits* and classes of poorer peasants and landless laborers were hesitant to join affluent peasants, landlords, and students from prosperous families who were the driving force of the uprising.

Despite the war, the British used 57 army battalions to crush the uprisings. By the end of 1943 the official statistics report 91,836 arrested, 332 railway stations and 945 post offices destroyed or severely damaged, 664 bomb explosions, and the storming of 208 police stations. Some 216 policemen defected to the rebels. As early as August 15, 1942 Linlithgow ordered the use of machine-guns from the air against crowds in the states of Bihar, Bengal, and Orissa.

With the CPI categorically against Quit India, BLPI was the only communist organization supporting the movement. In Calcutta, BLPI joined a United Socialist People's Front including the RSP, the FB, and the CSP in distributing tens of thousands of leaflets. Within the bloc the BLPI opposed burning trams as tactically adventurist but called for agitation in industrial areas and the army. The British arrested and imprisoned key BLPI leaders and Trotskyists for long periods. Murray Gow Purdy, a South African Trotskyist living in India, was arrested and sentenced to ten years "rigorous imprisonment" by a special jury, after being found not guilty by an ordinary jury. Interestingly, Purdy's fate foretold how the Congress would look upon the Quit India movement once it ended. Purdy, among the last Quit India prisoners, was released and deported to South Africa by the Congress government in December 1947.

Aftermath of Revolt

Formally, the British had quelled the Quit India movement, but at a high price. For the first time since 1857 the struggle was led by leaders who were opposed to compromises with imperialism. However, this was a relatively heterogeneous and scattered leadership, unable to wrest hegemony away from the Congress. The CSP, despite providing a measure of national leadership, was committed to the principle that the Congress and Gandhi would lead. As a result,

while the Congress and its symbols would be appropriated during the struggles, once the Congress repudiated the struggles there was a crisis. The Congress leaders sought on the one hand to claim the revolt as their own and thereby to appropriate the credit that flowed from it, especially during elections in 1946 and 1952. On the other hand, they sought to distance the Congress from “excesses” and “non-Gandhian” tactics. The British recognized that only wartime special powers and the use of the army had suppressed the revolt, and this was a major reason why during the postwar upsurge of 1945–6 they sought a means of negotiated transfer of power, to stave off a more militant revolution. Meanwhile, a CWC resolution of September 14, 1945 congratulated the nation for the courage and endurance with which it withstood the onslaught of British power, but then went on to register sorrow at the fact that in some places people had abandoned the path of non-violence. In his *Discovery of India*, written in 1946, Nehru talked of a “frenzy of the mob.” This language, usually found in the writings of colonialists, indicates that the Congress was now on the way to becoming the *Raj* (state power), rather than fighting the *Raj*. In January 1947 right-wing Congress leader Sardar Patel wrote to G. B. Pant, premier of UP, that Pant should

not have inaugurated a Congress exhibition in Benaras that showed pictures of police atrocities in 1942. Patel, who would be the first home minister of independent India, told Pant categorically that this was likely to affect the morale of the police force.

SEE ALSO: Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); Narayan, Jayaprakash (1902–1979); Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bandyopadhyay, S. (2004) *From Plassey to Partition*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
- Chakrabarty, B. (1997) *Local Politics and Indian Nationalism: Midnapur, 1919–1944*. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Erwin, C. E. (1989) Le trotskysme en Indépendant la guerre. *Cahiers Léon Trotsky* 39 (September): 77–111.
- Gupta, P. S. (1997) *Towards Freedom: Documents on the Movement for Independence in India, 1943–44*. 2 vols. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Hutchins, F. G. (1973) *India's Revolution: Gandhi and the Quit India Movement*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Pandey, G. (Ed.) (1988) *The Indian Nation in 1942*. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi.
- Sarkar, S. (1983) *Modern India, 1885–1947*. New Delhi: Macmillan.

R

Rabuka, Sitiveni Ligamamada (b. 1948)

Justin Corfield

Lieutenant Colonel Rabuka, the Fijian military commander who led the May 14, 1987 effort which brought down the government of Dr. Timoci Bavadra, staged a second coup on September 25, 1987, resulting in Fiji becoming a republic the following year.

Sitiveni Ligamamada Rabuka was born September 13, 1948, at Nakobo, on the island of Vanua Levi, Fiji, the son of Kolinio Epeli Vanuacicila Rabuka and Salote Lomaloma. He was educated at Provincial School Northern, Queen Victoria School in New Zealand, and New Zealand army schools, and completed postgraduate work at the Indian Defence Services Staff College until 1979, and the Australian Joint Services Staff College until 1982. He then joined the Fijian military. He served with the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) where he was Senior Operational Plans Officer from 1980 to 1981. Returning to Fiji in July 1981, he was appointed chief of staff, a position he held for several months. He was then SO1 for operations and training from 1982 to 1983, and again from 1985 to 1987, spending the intervening period as commander of the Fiji Battalion in Sinai.

Rabuka was clearly angered by the election in April 1987 of the coalition government of Dr. Timoci Bavadra. This led him to stage the coup on May 14, overthrowing the Bavadra government. His coup d'état was well-planned and bloodless. He then started running Fiji, championing the rights of the ethnic Fijians. This new administration saw many members of the Alliance Party's government, who had lost the April 1987 elections, returning to power with Rabuka as a military member of the council

of ministers, holding the position as advisor on home affairs and head of security. This move was supported by the Great Council of Chiefs, although it was criticized by much of the world, including the British Commonwealth.

There were many discussions about how to go about holding fresh elections, but the Taukei movement, which had the support of ethnic Fijian nationalists, opposed any compromise on the Indians being able to vote in elections. What followed were a series of violent protests. Rabuka handed over power to the governor-general Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, whom he had expected to support the interests of ethnic Fijians. However, this did not happen, and on September 25, 1987 Rabuka led a second coup d'état, imposing martial law, and on October 7 he declared Fiji a republic, with himself as head of the interim military government. He held that position until December 5. Retaining the position of minister of home affairs, in charge of security and the armed forces, he finally resigned from the Cabinet in 1990. In the following year he was deputy prime minister and minister of home affairs. In the May 1992 legislative elections, Rabuka led the Fijian Political Party, which won an overwhelming victory. Rabuka became prime minister on June 2, 1992 and continued until May 19, 1999, when he lost the election to Mahendra Chaudry, the first Indian to become prime minister. Rabuka was then elected chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs.

Rabuka was clearly not happy with Chaudry becoming prime minister, and his involvement in the George Speight coup of May 2000 has long been rumored but never proven. Rabuka has strongly denied the link, although the former attorney-general Sir Vijay Singh said that Rabuka had admitted involvement in the coup, but that the target was not Chaudry but the president, Sir Ratu Mara. In the wake of the coup, Rabuka became chairman of the Cakaudrove

Provincial Council from May 24, 2001, and was reelected to that position on April 13, 2005 for a third term.

On May 11, 2006 Rabuka was arrested and charged with having incited Lieutenant Colonel Viliame Seruvakula to commit a military mutiny on November 2, 2000, after Speight seized power. Owing to the seriousness of the charges, the trial was moved to the Fiji High Court, but on December 11, 2006 Rabuka was found not guilty on the two counts of inciting a mutiny. The assessors in the court were split, with the judge giving his casting vote for Rabuka. Sitiveni Rabuka continues to be a powerful figure in Fijian politics.

SEE ALSO: Fiji, Parliamentary Insurrection; New Caledonia, Protest and Revolt

References and Suggested Readings

- Bain, K. (1989) *Treason at 10: Fiji at the Crossroads*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
- Dean, E. & Ritova, S. (1988) *Rabuka: No Other Way*. Sydney: Doubleday.
- Sharpham, J. R. (2000) *Rabuka of Fiji: The Authorized Biography of Major-General Sitiveni Rabuka*. Rockhampton: Central Queensland University Press.

Radical Reconstruction, United States, promise and failure of

Orville Vernon Burton

The story of Reconstruction has been told ably and often, but historians have basically bookended American history with the Civil War, ignoring the fact that Reconstruction cannot be separated from the war any more than Sectional Conflict can. Reconstruction is part and parcel of the whole era. In South Carolina, men who were too young to fight in the Civil War but who fought in terrorist paramilitary groups to overthrow and then maintain white Democratic Party control in 1876 and 1878 even applied for the state's Confederate War pension. Clearly, they believed Reconstruction was part of the Civil War. While most textbooks date the end of Reconstruction with the 1876 presidential election, or the withdrawal of federal troops stationed in the South, in the lives of those at the time, Reconstruction

did not end and should not be considered over until 1896 with *Plessy v. Ferguson* and the adoption of former Confederate State constitutions legally disfranchising and segregating African Americans. Put in this frame, Reconstruction can be understood more accurately as part of "the long Civil War."

In recounting it here, a point historians have ignored deserves special notice. The essential character of Reconstruction was profoundly conservative, with parties on all sides concerned less with defining vague and abstract freedoms than with establishing local systems of workable order in their own communities, according to their own notions of justice and fair play. As with the antebellum conflict between enslaved and master, abolitionist and planter, free soiler and slaveholder, the conservative drive to resolve practical problems at the local level in Reconstruction generated tremendous, unforeseen conflicts which propelled events along a startlingly revolutionary course. This interplay of conservatism and revolution, this interweaving of concerns with order and freedom, define Reconstruction in its achievements and failures both. At Reconstruction's start, only one certainty prevailed: there were thousands with reason to optimistically anticipate its advent and thousands with reason to dread it, and the former had more cause for hope than the latter.

Most optimistic of all was the political course hundreds of thousands of African Americans took in the years after slavery ended. Abraham Lincoln's conservative republicanism was taken up anew by freed people at the local level across the South. It is fitting that in the years after 1865 those most newly arrived on freedom's doorstep held the clearest sense of its precepts, as they saw them. The freedoms they fought for grounded citizenship in self-mastery and independent property. From Plato to Thomas Jefferson, from James Harrington to Abraham Lincoln, republican theorists had emphasized that the political duties and opportunities of citizenship were founded on the conservative basis of property ownership. Emancipation marked not only the birth of African American freedom. It sparked an African American rebirth of republicanism, argued and defended more cogently and fervently than at any time in American history. Reconstruction is the story of the emergence and the destruction of that promise.

No one knew what the end of bondage might bring in its wake. Slavery's death did not

automatically confer any positive rights upon African Americans. It only liberated them from the control of the master, eliminating at the same time the latter's motive for self-interested benevolence, which enslaved blacks had tried to use to their benefit under bondage. Between the captivity they had known and the freedom they dreamed of, African Americans found themselves suspended in a limbo of social and political uncertainty. While the president and Congress worked to reconcile states within the Union after Appomattox, on the local level former slaves and rebels could do little except feel their way forward tentatively, staking claims to new ways or old habits in their own communities, defending their choices on a daily basis against those they ran up against in the course of the experience of labor and community life. In this way, ordinary Americans reconstructed their nation according to their own uncertain, conflicted ideas in the course of daily practice. The passage of new laws played a central role in shaping the contours of that struggle, but Reconstruction was a far more diverse, all-pervasive process than legislation alone. The effects of the tensions it created crept into all aspects of everyday life, and persist in common behaviors and social values down to the present day.

The tasks which confronted the nation after the war were enormous and multi-faceted. Reconstruction was political: rebellious states required loyal governments and representatives deemed fit to serve in Congress. Congressmen thought the problem of postbellum Southern race relations was how to integrate the former slaves into freedom and citizenship; they totally missed the actual problem – how to integrate the former Confederates into a new nation with freedom and justice for all. Reconstruction was economic: with the destruction of chattel bondage, former masters and former slaves alike would have to undertake new ways of wage labor, and a mode of production laid waste by four years of war would somehow have to be set in motion and made profitable again. Reconstruction was religious: granted the freedom to worship as they wished for the first time, African Americans would have to decide whether to kneel before God in prayer alongside their former enslavers or to establish their own churches. Defeated whites would have to ponder whether to turn the other cheek or to pray for deliverance and smite their oppressors when the chance presented itself. Reconstruction was legal: as thousands of African

Americans troubled themselves to record marriages long since consummated, or paid taxes, or set their mark on a labor contract, or simply called the sheriff in time of trouble, they asserted their right to live in peace among their fellows, under the shade of the Constitution and all subsequent acts of legislation. They were not chattels or dependents, interlopers or charity-seekers; they claimed rights, endured responsibilities, enjoyed freedoms guaranteed by the power of “the people.” If the Civil War was the period in which American freedom was expanded for African Americans, it was the Reconstruction era which established institutions and bureaucracies that determined or undermined this freedom.

Most of all Reconstruction was indeterminate. Reconstruction was a blank slate to be drawn on by federal resolve, African American self-determination, and the toxic stew of emasculated masters and embittered white yeomen. The world had been turned upside down, and would continue topsy turvey at least twice the number of years the Union and Confederacy had fought and killed one another during the official Civil War.

In the most practical, confounding, head-scratching sense, Reconstruction was a social process, a daily working-out, white or black, male or female, rich or poor, with how they ought to treat each other in these changed times. In some cases these social dramas played themselves out over old ties sundered or renewed – or reversed, as when freed people brought food to “old massa,” now steeped in poverty. In others, they were enacted through new behaviors: a white man hauled before a black judge, African Americans defending their homes with rifles, a black militia instead of a white slave patrol, interracial crowds of “Union League” supporters whooping it up on Independence Day. Other changes were smaller: when a former slave held his former master's gaze a second too long, when a freedman rode by in a newly bought buggy, when a poor black or white child learned to scratch out his ABCs on a dearly bought slate. Of such seemingly insignificant things mighty revolutions are made; against such dreaded changes the forces of reaction will launch their strongest battalions. So it was in the Reconstruction South.

From the moment of liberation, most former slaves saw freedom in conservative terms: they focused, with careful self-regard, on building strong families, obtaining property, and accumulating wealth. They expressed the republican

virtues of the Founding Fathers themselves as they set out to balance self-interest with the well-being of local communities. African Americans realized immediately that political rights were essential for their economic and social health. In the summer and fall of 1865 African Americans called conventions to discuss how to make ideals of liberty their own.

At the end of 1865, when President Andrew Johnson announced that the Union was restored, the 39th Congress disagreed. Stating that it alone had the power to seat delegates, Congress refused to seat officials elected from the former Confederate states, Democrats and secessionists as they were. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 defined citizenship and included African Americans, now legally allowed the “full and equal” benefit of law enjoyed by white citizens. With Southern legislatures recalcitrant, and bloody race riots perpetrated against black communities, Congress took stronger steps.

The Reconstruction Act of 1867 divided the South into five military districts. The United States government supervised voter registration, and 1868 saw mighty changes throughout the states of the former Confederacy as overwhelming numbers of former slaves voted, passed new constitutions, instituted republican education, and some rights for women. A thriving interracial democracy took hold at the local level in many locales, where new grassroots alliances flourished. Southern states were developing an open and progressive political process where law applied equally, all male citizens had access to due process, and the courts were open to blacks as well as whites. However small and conflicted, changes promised to liberate Southern white consciousness from the chains of racism itself.

Despite difficulties and challenges, African American voters across the South joined with enough white voters to form majority coalitions and elect Republican-dominated legislatures. Thus, one of the major promises of Reconstruction was fulfilled. Between 1867 and 1877 about 2,000 freedmen held federal, state, and local office. They won elections and served in various appointments as cabinet officers, superintendents of education, justices of the peace, city council members, sheriffs, judges, and numerous other posts. Fourteen African Americans won election to the US House of Representatives. Two African Americans from Mississippi won election to the US Senate.

To continue to secure the right to vote nationwide, congressional leadership mobilized members of Congress to propose a Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, providing that “the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” While the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution provided another fulfilled promise of Reconstruction, the period also had two fatal failures. Federal and state Republican administrations truly failed on the question of land. Economic disparity in land distribution was a major flaw of Reconstruction strategy. No issue was of more profound concern to former slaves and masters alike, and across the board the results for African Americans were deeply disappointing. While it was not preordained – the potential for meaningful change existed – freedmen came out of Reconstruction as they went in: landless and poverty stricken. Almost uniformly, specific programs to foster land ownership failed dismally, and taxation policies which aimed to transfer acreage into the hands of poorer whites and blacks only succeeded in arousing racial animosity. As white Southerners were permitted to enact a variety of measures that prevented blacks from owning land and from leaving agricultural areas to seek jobs in towns, the majority of freed people continued to live in rural districts and engage in agricultural day labor. Few former slaves confused wage labor with freedom. Real freedom, as republican ideology understood it and religious expectation framed it, required autonomy. In an agricultural economy that meant living off one’s own land, or at least working with the expectation of acquiring property.

Although most agents of the understaffed Freedmen’s Bureau attempted to establish fair terms of contract between white landowners and black labor for the 1866 crop year, collusion, violence, and their own prejudices subverted equity. Ultimately, the Freedmen’s Bureau coaxed and bullied most former slaves into pitiful wage labor contracts. These contracts, sanctioned by law, assured landowners that workers would be in the fields. The Freedmen’s Bureau was short-lived, but it set the precedent of contract wage labor that became the social order of the rural New South.

Another flaw of Radical Reconstruction was the government’s inability to quell the insurgent

violence. For white conservatives, changes made the South seem almost unrecognizable, and increasingly they determined to turn back the clock. Throughout the South, as blacks and whites negotiated new political, social, and labor arrangements in the postwar period, rage and violence could flare up at any moment. Terror became more methodical in the early summer of 1866, when Nathan Bedford Forrest, infamous for his massacre in 1864 of African American soldiers under a white flag at Fort Pillow, became the Grand Wizard of a new organization, the Ku Klux Klan.

At certain times throughout history the public gets concerned about political corruption and other times it appears to ignore it. While hardly unique or even more widespread than after Reconstruction, corruption during Reconstruction received extensive press. And yet the destruction of black voting rights, the only weapon former slaves had to protect themselves from white supremacists, attracted comparatively little attention, except in one respect. As corrupt government became a symbol of Reconstruction, interracial democracy and black voting rights became implicated in the public's perception of widespread political malfeasance.

Eventually, the Southern white conservatives regained political control and worked to undo what Reconstruction had established. Those in power at the end of the nineteenth century slowly stripped away the rights of African Americans, and the federal government would not enforce the Reconstruction Amendments in the South for nearly another century. Yet it was the very success of Reconstruction that drove white Democrats and their vigilante lieutenants to acts of terrorism.

SEE ALSO: American Civil War (1861–1864); American Civil War and Slavery

References and Suggested Readings

- Blight, D. (2001) *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory*. Boston: Belknap Press.
- Burton, O. V. (2007) *Age of Lincoln*. New York: Hill & Wang.
- Foner, E. (2002) *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877*. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics.
- McPherson, J. M. & Hogue, J. (2000) *Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction*. New York: McGraw-Hill Humanities.
- Stampp, K. M. (1967) *The Era of Reconstruction, 1865–1877*. New York: Vintage.

Raditsela, Andries (1956–1985)

Nicole Ulrich

Andries Raditsela's early life, including his place of birth, is not well documented. He became an active member of the Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU), an affiliate of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), in 1982. At this time he was working for the Dunlop factory in Benoni on the eastern Witwatersrand.

Raditsela was elected a shop steward in 1983 and, soon after, a senior shop steward at the Dunlop plant, where he led a number of battles around wages and working conditions. Raditsela strove to improve the position of women workers, and was involved in a campaign against sexual harassment, in which he exposed a practice in which women traded sex for jobs. He also participated in negotiations for a maternity agreement.

Raditsela held a number of positions in the CWIU and FOSATU. He was elected chairperson of the national CWIU Dunlop Shop Stewards Council, and played a key role in coordinating the 1984 Dunlop strike at the Benoni, Ladysmith, and Durban plants. He served in the branch executive of the CWIU, of which he was elected vice-chairman in 1984, and also served on the national executive of the union. The FOSATU Transvaal Region relied on his leadership, and he was elected chairperson of the region in 1984, then vice-chairperson in the following year. Raditsela also served on FOSATU's executive committee and central committee.

On the morning of May 4, 1985, police arrested Raditsela in Tsakane Township. He was held in police custody under section 50 of the Internal Security Act, which allowed for 48 hours' detention without trial. On the Saturday night, Raditsela was admitted to hospital, and he died the next afternoon of severe injuries to his head. Thousands of workers attended Raditsela's funeral, some carrying banners and placards stating "Kill Apartheid, Not Detainees" and "Army and Police Out of the Townships." In other parts of the country up to 100,000 workers held stoppages at their factories to mourn his death. Raditsela was a major martyr of the growing African and interracial union movement.

SEE ALSO: South Africa, Labor Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Death of a Militant: Andries Raditsela 1956–1985 (1985) *South African Labour Bulletin* 10, 7 (June): 1–2.
 Detained by Police – Dead 3 Days Later (1985) *FOS-ATU Worker News* 38 (June).
 Over 100,000 Mourn the Death of Raditsela (1985) *FOSATU Worker News* 38 (June).

Rampa rebellions in Andhra Pradesh

Kunal Chattopadhyay

Andhra Pradesh is a large state in south India. In colonial times it was divided between the princely state of Hyderabad and the Madras Presidency ruled by the British. The Agency Area of Andhra Pradesh included the districts of Srikakulam, Visakhapatnam, East and West Godavari, Khammam, Adilabad, Warangal, and Mahaboobnagar. In 1961 there were 4,346 *adivasi* (tribal) villages. In all, *adivasis* formed a small part of the population, but were historically the most exploited. Major groups among them, both in the Agency Area and in the plains, included Gonds, Koyas, Hill Reddis, Savaras, Valmiki, Yerukalas, and Yanadis. Over half the *adivasi* population consist of Koyas, Gonds, Yanadis, and Yerukalas.

Rebellions by *adivasis* in Andhra have broken out repeatedly, mostly in Srikakulam, Visakhapatnam, and East and West Godavari. At the time of the permanent settlement in 1802–3, the Rampa country was ignored, and subsequently the mansabdar Rambhupati contested the authority of the British. This has sometimes been considered the first revolt. As a result of the eventual settlement in 1813, villages he had taken over were given to him free of tax provided he maintained peace there. He leased the land to *muttadars* (petty tribal chiefs), for an annual payment of Rs. 8,750. On his death his daughter and son clashed over who would inherit the villages, and ultimately the son succeeded. The *muttadars* accepted him on condition that he reduce the rent to Rs. 1,000. After first agreeing to do so, the son began rack-renting and imposing new taxes, including a tax on drawing *toddy* (fermented palm juice) from palm trees, the use of property foreclosure for a small amount of non-payment of debt (so that eight Muttas were added to his own domains), and several other hitherto

unknown taxes. To this were added the British impositions, in the form of Forest Acts that took away the tribal right to use common land in the forests. Finally, law courts and their use by traders to cheat the hill people also contributed to a growing hatred of British rule. These factors drove the *adivasis* to revolt in 1879.

The second revolt occurred in March 1879, when the *adivasis* captured six policemen under the leadership of Thammandora near Boduluru, kept them in custody for several days, then took them to Kodigandi, where a head constable and a constable were kept tied under a tamarind tree. Thammandora cut off their heads as a sacrifice to a goddess in the presence of 200 tribesmen. The protesters then attacked the Chodavaram police station and burned down the station at Addatigala. The movement spread to Golugonda hills in Visakhapatnam in April and Rekapalli country in Bhadrachalam in July. Here the immediate cause of the revolt was the Madras Government's sudden threefold increase in the assessment of *Podu* (shifting cultivation) lands, which had been only four *annas* (a quarter of a rupee) an acre previously. The *adivasis* waged guerilla warfare, and the government had to send six regiments of the Madras infantry, two companies of sappers and miners, a squadron of cavalry, and several hundred policemen. The war lasted till November 1880 and was put down with tremendous brutality.

The Madras Forest Act of 1882 was formulated to further deprive the *adivasis* of their natural rights. It placed restrictions on their free movement in forest areas, and prevented shifting cultivation and the felling and tapping of trees for firewood and *toddy*. In addition, British contractors exploited and oppressed the tribal communities. In Visakhapatnam district, a young man named Alluri Seetha Rama Raju took up their struggles in 1921, when forced labor was being exacted without payment in order to construct a highway from Narsipatnam to Chintapalli. His struggle against the contractors eventually brought him into conflict with the police. This culminated in the third Rampa rebellion.

Seetha Rama Raju's campaigns were conducted in East Godavari and Visakhapatnam districts. He began by advising the peasants to follow Gandhian methods of non-cooperation, which they accepted; but the brutality of the rulers convinced him that armed resistance was necessary. The phase of armed struggle began from August 1922. Many police stations were raided in and around

Chintapalli, Krishnadevipeta, and Rajavommangi, and guns and powder were snatched. The government retaliated by posting Keene, Dawson, Saunders, and Coward at different points. Raju's forces continued their attacks and several British army officers were killed. Interestingly, Raju gave instructions that Indians were not to be killed. Between August and October 1922, his forces attacked several police stations including Rampa-Chodavaram, Rajahmundry, and Addatigala. Eventually, the British deployed a large contingent of the Assam Rifles. Raju, assisted by Mallu Dora and Gantam Dora, continued the resistance, and the forests and hilly tracts enabled them to conduct successful guerilla warfare. On September 23, 1923, Raju raided the Annaram police outpost. Subsequently, Mallu Dora was arrested and, by late 1923, Raju's campaigns had petered out. Seeing the demoralization among his followers, Raju thought that giving himself up would improve their conditions. But after his surrender the British rulers shot him dead without trial, on March 7, 1924.

SEE ALSO: Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); India, Non-Violent Non-Cooperation Movement, 1918–1929; Santal Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Arnold, D. (1982) *Rebellious Hillmen: The Gudem-Rampa Risings, 1839–1924*. In R. Guha. (Ed.), *Subaltern Studies 1: Writings on South Asian History and Society*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Arnold, D. (1985) Sitarama Raju's Rebellion: A Response. *Social Scientist* 13, 4 (April): 44–50.
- Atlury, M. (1984) Alluri Sitaram Raju and the Manyam Rebellion of 1922–24. *Social Scientist* 12, 4 (April): 3–33.
- Atlury, M. (1985) Manyam Rebellion: A Rejoinder. *Social Scientist* 13, 4 (April): 51–6.
- Raghavaiah, V. R. (1979a) Unrest in Andhra Pradesh. In A. R. Desai (Ed.), *Peasant Struggles in India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Raghavaiah, V. R. (1979b) Sreerama Raju's Uprising – 1922–24. In A. R. Desai (Ed.), *Peasant Struggles in India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Randolph, A. Philip (1889–1979)

Joseph Wilson

A. Philip Randolph was the most influential African American labor leader in the twentieth

century. He was the founding president of the all-black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) industrial union, established in 1925 after years of organizing efforts.

The BSCP was America's first national African American industrial union; it organized black service workers, particularly the sleeping car porters, who tended white passengers on the Pullman sleeping car trains. The porters faced deplorable working conditions and organized along racial lines because they were excluded from joining the racially segregated, all-white railway brotherhoods. Randolph and the porters faced the wrath of the powerful Pullman Company, which used thugs and firings as forms of anti-union intimidation.

The young Randolph, son of a Methodist minister, was a fiery orator and militant organizer influenced by and attracted to Marxism, socialism, the Pan-African movement, and the anti-colonial struggles of the twentieth century. Randolph rejected the narrow nationalism of Marcus Garvey during the first third of the century and was more sympathetic to the politics of W. E. B. Du Bois.

Randolph became an important leader in the AFL-CIO, the nation's labor federation, where, for decades, he was the most visible advocate of racial equality within the American trade union movement. As the highest ranking black leader in organized labor, Randolph consistently put forward racially conscious policies and resolutions at the AFL-CIO's national conventions.

With the labor movement as his base of operation, particularly the BSCP which grew to 18,000 members at its height, Randolph rose to become one of the main leaders of the civil rights movement. He organized the 1941 march on Washington, resulting in the emergence of the Fair Employment Practices Committee, which was instrumental in breaking down segregation in government and industrial employment. Along with Martin Luther King Jr., Bayard Rustin, and a few others, he played a crucial role in organizing the historic 1963 march on Washington, made famous by Dr. King's "I have a dream" speech, at which King was flanked by Randolph on the dais. The march and underlying social movement led to passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, along with various voting rights acts, and eventually led to affirmative action policies under President Lyndon B. Johnson.

As a young intellectual and later as union president (1925–68), Randolph created his own

path of politics and social activism. For over 50 years at the helm of the BSCP, Randolph articulated the concerns and defended the rights of black workers nationwide. He skillfully confronted racial segregation inside the house of labor and eliminated the legal barriers to African American union membership. In the 1930s he was labeled as “the most dangerous radical in America.”

As the elder statesman of the once powerful American labor and civil rights movements, Randolph’s critics felt he had lost his youthful militancy and represented more conservative tendencies within the activist community. He evolved from a young man who penned articles for radial newspapers, including the Communist Party’s *Daily Worker*, and became an opponent of the Soviet Union and communism in the late stages of his career. Ironically, even as Randolph was heralded as a peaceful, trusted labor leader, bestowed with the Medal of Freedom by President Lyndon Johnson in 1964, the FBI was actively targeting Randolph and his associates with wiretapping and subterfuge, to derail the civil rights agenda and to prevent integration and progressive politics within the AFL-CIO.

Militant leaders in the Black Power movement, such as Stokely Carmichael of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and H. Rap Brown of the Black Panthers, publicly clashed with Randolph, who appeared on radio and television as the “voice of reason” calling for calm, after outbreaks of civil unrest and urban rebellions that swept the US in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Significantly, he refused large sums of money offered by industrialists to sell out the workers’ struggles. He died without any accumulated wealth.

Randolph’s legacy is closely associated with the linking of black union and workers’ struggles to a larger civil rights agenda. A museum in Chicago and a high school in New York City have been named in his honor. His statue is exhibited in Washington, DC’s Union Station, a once important hub of the Brotherhood’s activism.

SEE ALSO: Brown, H. Rap (b. 1943); Carmichael, Stokely/Kwame Turé (1941–1998); Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Du Bois, W. E. B. (1868–1963); Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism; Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, J. (1973) *A. Philip Randolph: A Biographical Portrait*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Bates, B. (2001) *Pullman Porters and the Rise of Protest Politics in America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kersten, A. E. (2006) *A. Philip Randolph: A Life in the Vanguard*. New York: Rowan & Littlefield.
- Wilson, J. (1986) *Tearing Down the Color Bar: A Documentary History and Analysis of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ranters

Ian Morley

The Ranters were a fervently religious radical utopian organization in England from the 1640s to the mid-1650s drawn together by a common revulsion for the dominant puritanical values of the country. At their peak the Ranters had several thousand commoners scattered throughout urban and rural England. Unlike other utopian movements where members collectively work toward a common objective within a rigidly organized structure, the Ranters comprised numerous people unified by a common passion of aversion to the dominant society.

The group reached its pinnacle following the English Revolution at the midpoint of the Interregnum, from 1649 to 1660, after the monarchy was overthrown and the parliament and military controlled government administration. The Ranters’ faith was rooted in a pantheistic belief that God lives within every living person and creature. Casting aside popular English ideas and values, the Ranters clashed with the ideological and political ruling classes. The Ranters maintained unorthodox and litigious religious values, including a denial of the authority of scripture, the view that heaven and hell did not exist, and antinomianism – the belief that exempts individuals from the obligations of moral law, a doctrine commonly perceived as heretical. Credited with making a significant contribution to the propagation of radical religion in Britain, Baptists and Quakers depicted Ranters as immoral deviants who surrendered to seventeenth-century propaganda and myth-making and whose behavior threatened social order.

Historian J. C. Davis suggests that the Ranters were disparaged by rival religious groups who

sought to establish acceptable boundaries of behavior for their own followers and society as a whole. The Ranters represented a threat to the conservative imagination bent on sanctioning traditional values and suppressing radicalism. As a loosely knit group founded in England, when the Ranters' popularity waned in England in the early 1670s some adherents were still gathering in the US, according to records of their meetings. The strength of the Ranters is evident in the opposition to the movement. The passage of the Adultery Act and the Blasphemy Act in 1650 was used to imprison and punish adherents. To stem militant thought and action, the government burned the tongue of Ranter Jacob Bauthumley, a former military preacher, after the publication of his book, *The Light and Dark Sides of God*, and imprisoned Abiezer Coppe, a preacher who used curse-filled tirades.

SEE ALSO: Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658); English Revolution, 17th Century; English Revolution, Radical Sects

References and Suggested Readings

- Corns, T. N. (1992) *Uncloistered Virtue: English Political Literature, 1640–1660*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Davis, J. C. (1986) *Fear, Myth and History: The Ranters and Their Historians*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ellens, G. F. S. (1971) The Ranters Ranting: Reflections on a Ranting Counterculture. *Church History* 40, 1 (March): 91–107.

Raspail, François-Vincent (1794–1878)

Melanie A. Bailey

Although known as much for his contributions to natural science and medicine as for his revolutionary political activities, François-Vincent Raspail determinedly sought to establish and consolidate a republican regime in France. Despite suffering poor health and reduced economic circumstances due to time spent in jail for opposing non-republican regimes, Raspail continued to pursue the betterment of living conditions for his fellow citizens into the final years of his life.

Born in Carpentras in the Vaucluse, Raspail benefited from the tutelage of a priest who

enthusiastically supported the Revolution and the Republic. The Jansenist leanings of this first teacher and mentor disposed Raspail to oppose established religion and the political influence of the Jesuits. Although he discovered in late adolescence that he could not sustain the religious faith required for ordination as a priest, his activism was nonetheless inspired by many of the principles shared by social Christianity.

Having gained notoriety for a speech praising the domestic policies of Napoleon with regard to the relationship of church and state and the institution of equality before the law, Raspail suffered reprisals from royalists after 1815. Upon arriving in Paris to pursue his interest in natural science and to seek a living outside of the church, he became involved in agitations against the Bourbon monarchy of the Restoration. As a freemason, as a member of the Carbonari, and as a leader of various “secret” organizations, Raspail sought to reestablish a democratic republic in France.

More akin to a twentieth-century social democrat than Auguste Blanqui, he nonetheless collaborated with him during the 1830s. Unlike Blanqui, Raspail rejected conspiracy or coups d'état if the regime acknowledged popular sovereignty; instead, he preferred to rely upon the spread of propaganda and improvements in public education. To that end, he founded newspapers such as the *Réformateur* (The Reformer) (mid-1830s) and the *Ami du Peuple* (Friend of the People) (1848). Given its desire to control the press and its fears of revolution, the government of Louis-Philippe arrested Raspail several times on charges of conspiracy or sedition and he was sentenced to periods in jail during the 1830s. Not surprisingly, perhaps, prison reform appeared prominently on his political agenda.

Having been a supporter of the Second Republic and having garnered thousands of votes as a candidate for president, Raspail again found himself in prison and then in exile during the early years of Napoleon III's reign. An elderly man at the time of the Franco-Prussian War, he opposed at once the ineptness of the Communards and the violence used by the government to suppress the Paris Commune in 1871. He spent yet another year in prison after writing in favor of amnesty for the Communards.

Raspail ended his political career as a legislator under the Third Republic, where he continued to advocate improvements in education, public

health, and the penal system in France. What had once been cast as revolutionary agitation had become legal and even mainstream in France by the end of the nineteenth century.

SEE ALSO: Blanqui, Louis Auguste (1805–1881); Paris Commune, 1871

References and Suggested Readings

- Duveau, G. (1948) *Raspail*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Lemoine, Y. & Lenoel, P. (1984) *Les Avenues de la République: Souvenirs de F.-V. Raspail sur sa vie et sur son siècle, 1794–1878* (Avenues of the Republic: Memories of F.-V. Raspail of his Life and Century). Paris: Hachette.
- Ligou, D. (1968) *Raspail ou le bon usage des prisons* (Raspail, or the Appropriate Use of Prisons). Paris: Martineau.
- Weiner, D. B. (1968) *Raspail: Scientist and Reformer*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Razin's Rebellion, 1670–1671

Yury V. Bosin

Razin's Rebellion occurred in 1670–1 along the lower Don River in southern Russia in a heterogeneous community dominated by Cossacks, but also including runaway serfs who were considered fugitives. The Cossacks did not practice agriculture but lived off tribute levied on merchants passing along the Volga. The Russian government was interested in the Cossacks as a military force to guard the southern frontier, tolerating their freedom and *de facto* independence in the Don River region and even providing economic assistance and financial allowances.

From 1650 to 1660 during the Russian wars with Poland and Sweden, the rise in epidemics and crop failures led to the impoverishment of the Russian masses, and serfs fled in large numbers to the Don region. When the Russian government insisted on searching for and returning the serfs to their masters, the Cossacks resisted, provoking a major conflict. When the government cut food supplies and allowances, the Cossacks as professional warriors organized a fierce opposition that threatened to spill beyond the Don boundaries.

Stepan (Stenka) Razin was a 40-year-old Cossack from an upper-class family whose

godfather was Kornila Yakovlev, the *ataman*, or high commander, of the Don regional army. A tall imposing man, Razin traveled extensively with the Cossack diplomatic mission throughout Russia, visiting Moscow, Astrakhan, and other Russian towns. Due to his popular influence in the Don region, in 1667 Razin successfully organized a regiment of 800 Cossacks to counter the embargo imposed by the Russians. In mid-May, Razin and his army ambushed and pillaged a merchant caravan in the Volga region that belonged in part to the tsar and Patriarch Nikon. Incensed by Razin's daring robbery, the Russian Duma in Moscow denounced him as a criminal. Since Razin did not intend to engage in a battle with the government, he looted Persian settlements along the Caspian shore instead. By the fall of 1669, when Razin returned to the Don, his popularity became legendary, and he organized 7,000 rebels to advance the rights of peasants throughout Russia. Razin was determined to attack Moscow to "eliminate nobles and officials who obstructed common people." Some argue that Razin sought revenge for the killing of his elder brother Ivan, who was executed by the Russian government in 1665.

In May 1669, Razin seized Tsaritsin and Astrakhan, two large urban centers on the Volga River. In both cases townspeople opened the gates and Russian officials, noblemen, and officers were killed in the ensuing attack. After their initial success, Razin's forces moved to Simbirsk, where Cossacks entered the town but could not take the Kremlin (the local fortress). Meanwhile, popular uprisings of some 200,000 people spread the rebellion throughout the vast southern and southeastern Russian territories. Peasants formed bands and attacked landowners and government officials.

Tsar Alexey appointed Duke Baryatinskiy, a ruthless military commander, to suppress the rebellion, and by early October he defeated the Cossack rebels near Simbirsk, where Razin was wounded but escaped by boat on the Volga River. Baryatinskiy's victory was followed by bloody government reprisals against peasants, including mass executions in the Nizhniy Novgorod region, some 250 miles east of Moscow; in all, more than 100,000 insurgents were killed. By early 1671 the uprising was suppressed. Razin was captured on April 14 and executed by quartering in front of St. Basil's Cathedral in Moscow on July 6, 1671.

Razin remains a symbol of a free and courageous spirit and his life and acts are invoked in Russian folklore, songs, and legends.

SEE ALSO: Bulavin's Rebellion, 1707–1708; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Pugachev's Rebellion, 1773–1775

References and Suggested Readings

- Avrich, P. (1976) *Russian Rebels, 1600–1800: Four Great Rebellions Which Shook the Russian State in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Field, C. (1947) *The Great Cossack: The Rebellion of Sten'ka Razin against Alexis Michaelovitch, Tsar of all the Russias*. London: H. Jenkins.
- Lebedev, V. I. (1955) *S. T. Razin's Rebellion (1667–1671)*. Moscow (in Russian).
- Peasants' Wars in Russia in the 17–18th Centuries* (1966) Moscow and Leningrad (in Russian).

Reclaim the Streets

John Jordan

Merging the radical ecology of Britain's powerful anti-road-building movement and the carnivalesque nature of the countercultural rave scene of the early 1990s, Reclaim the Streets (RTS) became a catalyst for the global anti-capitalist movements that came to light during the Seattle World Trade Organization (WTO) protests of 1999. Combining a radical ecological and social critique with creative forms of direct action and a dedication to non-hierarchical organization, the group's innovative tactics inspired a new generation of radical activists in the global North.

The Anti-Roads Movements: A Prehistory

As part of Britain's brutal neoliberal restructuring, Margaret Thatcher dismantled public transport and launched a colossal road-building program, claiming that nothing must obstruct "the great car economy." As new road schemes spread across the country, a small group of individuals got together in 1991 and set up RTS, which claimed on its flyers that it was "FOR walking, cycling, and cheap, or free, public transport, and AGAINST cars, roads, and the system that pushes them." Beginning with the capitalized "FOR" was a clear declaration from a group

that would go on to build forms of politics that prioritized creating visions of the world they wanted over protest and confrontation. An exemplary action became the guerilla, nighttime painting of cycle lanes on the city's roads.

The group temporarily dissolved as its participants became immersed in the anti-roads movement, which first emerged with the protests against the M3 motorway extension at Twyford Down, Hampshire (1992–3). Protesters disrupted the road building by non-violently blockading the bulldozers with their bodies and setting up camps in the way of the contractors. This experience of mass direct action was then taken to the campaign against the M11 link road in East London (1993–4), which was due to destroy 350 houses and several ancient woodlands. The campaign became a laboratory of direct action. Imaginative tactics were developed to delay the contractors and increase their financial costs – including building tree houses and digging tunnels which literally embedded the activists in the earth they were protecting.

A key event that was to heavily influence the later tactics of RTS was the squatting of an entire street of 35 houses, Claremont Road, due for demolition. Claremont Road became known as a "Festival of Resistance," and the occupied street was traffic free for six months. A series of imaginative barricades was created to stop the inevitable eviction by the Department of Transport. These ranged from carcasses of cars filled with flower beds to a 100 ft scaffolding tower rising from the roofs with a sound system on top of it. At the time, the eviction was the longest and most costly in British history, at over £2 million and involving 700 riot police and 700 bailiffs. But this temporary reappropriation and transformation of public space, the meeting of different political cultures, and merging of art and activism, party and protest, were to become hallmarks of RTS.

In 1994, the Conservative UK government introduced a piece of legislation known as the Criminal Justice Act. This made the unlicensed playing of rave music to more than ten people in a public place illegal and many direct action protests, which previously had been covered under civil law, became criminal offenses. It restricted the right to silence upon arrest, increased police stop and search powers, and made the selling on of football match tickets an offense. Primarily aimed at destroying the UK's countercultures

with their DIY (do-it-yourself) philosophy, the legislation targeted a wide range of people from so-called New Age travelers to fox hunt saboteurs and anti-nuclear campaigners. It catalyzed a diverse movement of opposition, which peaked during the London Hyde Park riot of October 1994, out of which sprang many of the new relationships that would form the basis of the relaunched RTS.

RTS Reemerges with the Street Party Form

Following the demolition of Claremont Road in December 1994, RTS was reformed. Realizing that the struggle against new roads had succeeded (between 1994 and 1996 the roads program was axed from £24 billion to £1.5 billion), it sought to recreate the experience of a liberated car-free street, but this time as a proactive act rather than one of reaction and protest. The tactic of the street party was developed as a subversion of the traditional British events that were historically used to mark establishment celebrations such as royal weddings.

On Sunday May 14, 1995, the first street party took place on Camden High Street, North London. Using tactics learned from rave culture, the actual location was kept secret until the last moment and participants were led from a public meeting point through the Underground to emerge at the street party location before the police had time to gather forces. The event began with an exquisite piece of theater involving two cars crashing into each other at the top of the street. As the drivers jumped out in mock road rage and began to destroy one another's cars with hammers, 500 people emerged from the Underground station into the traffic-free street which the crashed cars had blocked.

So began the first street party. Free food was handed out, a children's climbing frame set up in the crossroads, and people danced all day. Reclaiming the street from the privatization of the car and commerce and transforming it into public space for people and pleasure, RTS had developed what was to become an irresistible new form of protest.

With political and philosophical influence drawn from social ecologists such as Murray Bookchin, as well as "situationist" theory (primarily developed in France around 1968 by theorists such as Raoul Vaneigem and Guy

Debord), RTS wanted to infuse protest with pleasure, to create events that were politically effective in terms of civil disobedience as well as effective in creating adventures that were both convivial and deeply attractive to participants. The other key principle was that of prefigurative politics. The street party was not simply a protest against cars but the creation of a vision of what city streets could be like in a system that prioritized people over profit and ecology over the economy.

The next street party took place on July 23, 1995, on Upper Street in Islington, London. It saw 3,000 people dancing, this time to a large sound system hidden inside an armored personnel carrier. Several tons of sand were dumped in the middle of the street, creating a sandpit for children to play in, and "tripods" blocked the traffic. Made from three pieces of scaffolding joined at the top and erected in the middle of the street with someone sitting on top, these "intelligent" barricades blocked the street from cars and yet opened it for pedestrians. The police were unable to move them without risking serious injury to the climbers.

The autumn and winter of 1995 saw street parties spread across the UK, with local groups organizing autonomously in numerous towns including Birmingham, Brighton, Manchester, Leeds, Bristol, and Leicester. Despite organizing street parties, none of the groups called themselves RTS: the London group name had simply become a verb, a form of action.

Recognizing the value of audacity to inspire social movements, London RTS decided to up the ante in the summer of 1996 and to have a street party on a motorway. On a hot July afternoon, on the M41 near Shepherds Bush, West London, an enormous street party erupted. Over 8,000 people swarmed through police lines to reclaim the baking tarmac. Giant banners that combined political messages, party decoration, and swings for children stretched across the six lanes. Huge carnival figures, 25 ft high women with hooped skirts, were pushed up and down the road. Underneath the skirts, hidden from view, activists were drilling into the tarmac with jack hammers and planting saplings, saved from the route of the M11 link road, into the motorway. This act of sublime imagination symbolically turned the motorway into a forest.

The M41 also saw the distribution of RTS's first propaganda, a beautiful pink and black

poster that folded down into numerous different panels. A key passage pointed toward the group's future anti-capitalist position: "We are about taking back public space from the enclosed private arena. At its simplest this is an attack on cars as a principal agent of enclosure. It's about reclaiming the streets as public inclusive space from the private exclusive use of the car. But we believe in this as a broader principle, taking back those things which have been enclosed within capitalist circulation and returning them to collective use as a commons."

The Network Widens and Clarifies its Anti-Capitalist Spirit

The story of the trees being planted in the tarmac reached the ears of the Liverpool dockers, whose dismissal for refusing to cross a picket line led to a global solidarity movement and a two-and-a-half-year strike. Inspired, they suggested working together, and in autumn 1996 an event entitled Reclaim the Future took place in Liverpool. Despite severe police repression, members of RTS together with the Liverpool dockers were able to occupy the docks, cranes, and company headquarters triggering a 24-hour strike by tugboat captains. No vessels entered or left the docks.

The bringing together of working-class struggle, anarchism, radical ecology, and rave culture had enormous potential. A March for Social Justice was co-organized in London on April 12, 1997, with 10,000 people from a spectrum of traditional political leftist movements partying with the new generation of direct activists. This combination clearly proved threatening to the state. RTS's propaganda, 25,000 spoof copies of London's notoriously right-wing *Evening Standard* newspaper, entitled *Evading Standards*, was seized by the police and organizers preemptively arrested. One thousand police were mobilized and the day ended in confrontations in Trafalgar Square.

The summer of 1997 saw the evolution of the street party into a global phenomenon, with Australia and Finland taking the lead. Meanwhile, a delegate from RTS participated in the Second *Encuentro* (Spain, July–August), a Zapatista-instigated gathering bringing together 3,000 activists from 50 countries to weave a global network of resistance against neoliberalism. Out of the *Encuentro* emerged the idea of devel-

oping a concrete campaign against the WTO, which was to become the Peoples' Global Action (PGA) Network. RTS would play a key role in PGA as their first European convenors.

The RTS delegate returned from the *Encuentro* inspired, and convinced the London group that its anti-capitalist tendencies should become more explicit and that it could become a key player in the rising global movements, especially given the increasing use of the Internet as an activist tool. A global street party, part of a PGA Global Day of Action Against Capitalism, was called for in May 1998 to coincide with the meeting of the G8 (Group of Eight, most industrialized states) in Birmingham, UK, and ahead of the WTO's Second Ministerial Conference in Geneva, Switzerland. Under the banner "Our Resistance is as Transnational as Capital," a call was sent out and parties and actions took place in 70 cities in the first globally coordinated actions against these multilateral institutions by grassroots groups demanding their abolition rather than their reform.

Buoyed by the success of the first Global Day of Action, a call for an "International Day of Protest, Action, and Carnival Aimed at the Heart of the Global Economy: The Financial Centers and Banking Districts" was sent out by RTS and the PGA networks. Coinciding with the G8 meetings in Cologne, Germany, on Friday June 18, 1999, the event became known as "J18." From Nigeria to Uruguay, Seoul to Melbourne, Belarus to Dhaka, simultaneous actions took place. London RTS organized a Carnival against Capital, bringing 10,000 people into London's financial district. Eight thousand carnival masks were distributed, doubling up as propaganda and tools for choreographing large crowd movements using colored flags. To the surprise of the authorities, the crowd split into four different groups that made their separate ways to the London International Financial Futures Exchange (Liffe). Whilst live bands played and people danced to samba, hackers were trying to enter the Liffe computers and traders fought off attempts to physically occupy the building.

Live reports from around the globe were uploaded to the Internet using a system that was later to become the global Indymedia network. In a report following the London action, which caused £2 million damage, the police admitted that their communication system failed to cope



Demonstrators plant a garden in Parliament Square (London, UK) during May Day 2000 Guerilla Gardening actions by Reclaim the Streets (RTS). A shared ideal of community ownership of public spaces by RTS activists inspired this and other direct action events by the group. Corporate globalization, private property, and the various negative aspects of car culture (pollution, highway construction, alienation) are the most common targets of RTS. (© Gideon Mendel/CORBIS)

with what they said was one of the most highly organized actions they had ever experienced. The front page of the *Financial Times* declared: "City of London Besieged by Anti-Capitalists." Meanwhile, activists from RTS traveled to Seattle to help train members of the Direct Action Network, encouraged by the audacity of J18, who were busy organizing for the WTO blockades.

The Final Months of RTS

With the November 1999 Seattle actions blasting the movements into the global spotlight, RTS found it had lost its momentum. An action to coincide with the Seattle protests failed to mobilize numbers. Heavy police intimidation and increasingly hysterical British media coverage created strains within the group.

Organizing London's May Day protests as part of the third Global Day of Action Against Capitalism the following year, RTS tried to redirect itself and called for a mass guerilla gardening action with a leaflet claiming, "This is not a protest." The aim was to turn Parliament Square into an urban vegetable allotment. On the eve of the event, the *Evening Standard* front page claimed "Army on Standby for May Day Riot," and the police planned their largest mobilization in 30 years. Three thousand people turned up to garden and, despite 14,500 police, a McDonald's restaurant was left suspiciously unguarded. Inevitably, the media reported its broken windows rather than the thousands of planted vegetables and flowers.

RTS disbanded but many participants went on to become key participants in the global anti-capitalist summit convergences and organizers of numerous groups including the Genetic Engineering Network, the Wombles, Dissent!, the Rising Tide Network, the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army, and the Climate Camp.

During May Day 2000, a stunning subversion of Winston Churchill's statue took place. A strip of green turf placed on his bald head transformed him into a Mohican-coiffed punk. An iconic image that was perhaps an appropriate epitaph to a movement whose cheek and creativity helped sow the seeds for a new form of global grassroots politics which celebrated autonomy and direct action, and never wanted to take power but to break it into little pieces for all to share.

SEE ALSO: Debord, Guy (1931–1994) and the Spectacle; Earth First!; Global Day of Action Against Capitalism, June 18 (J18), 1999; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Indymedia Global Justice Campaign, 2000s; May 1968 French Uprisings; Peoples' Global Action Network; Situationists; Vaneigem, Raoul (b. 1934); World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999; Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Anonymous (1997) *Reclaim the Streets. Do or Die: Voices from Earth First!* 6: 1–14. Available at www.eco-action.org/dod/no6/index.html (downloaded September 24, 2007).
- Hamm, M. (n.d.) *Reclaim the Streets: Global Protest, Local Space*. Available at www.republicart.net/disc/hybridresistance/hamm01_en.htm (downloaded September 21, 2007).

- Klein, N. (2000) Reclaim the Streets. In *No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies*. New York: Picador, pp. 311–23.
- Mckay, G. (Ed.) (1998) *DIY Culture: Party and Protest in Nineties Britain*. London and New York: Verso.
- Notes From Nowhere (Ed.) (2003) *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism*. London and New York: Verso.

Reclus, Elisée (1830–1905)

Benjamin J. Pauli

Perhaps the most important figure in French anarchism after Proudhon, Elisée Reclus made significant contributions to anarchist theory and practice in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Reclus was born in 1830 in the village of Sainte-Foy-la-Grande in southwest France. As the son of a pastor, he received a Protestant education and upbringing, and the Christian values he was imbued with at an early age colored his thinking for the rest of his life. Reclus went to school in Sainte-Foy and Montauban in France and attended a Moravian school in Neuwied, Germany, where he also taught. Nominally a theology student, Reclus in fact gravitated toward the sciences. During his term at the University of Berlin in 1851 he attended lectures given by the renowned geographer Carl Ritter, which sparked what would become a lifelong passion for geography.

It was as a student that Reclus began to develop his radical political ideas; his objections to Napoleon III's coup of 1851 forced him to flee France with his brother Elie. After working as a teacher and a farm laborer in England and Ireland, Reclus spent several years traveling through North and South America. Not only did the trip have a major impact on his geographic sensibilities, it helped to shape his political sentiments as well. His hatred of slavery was emboldened during his employment as a tutor for a slaveholding family in Louisiana, and he tried his hand at establishing a cooperative agricultural community in present-day Colombia. After the failure of the latter venture, Reclus returned to France in 1857, where he began to build his reputation as a geographer and where his political involvement began in earnest.

Throughout the 1860s, he and Elie were involved in numerous activities associated with the cooperative movement. They helped to direct a cooperative credit society from 1863 to 1868, helped to found the first Rochdale-type cooperative in Paris in 1864, and published the cooperativist journal *L'Association*. Elisée, more than his brother, had mixed feelings about the viability of this strategy of social reform, though he would not come to repudiate cooperativism until later. The brothers also came into contact with Bakunin during this time; they are reputed to have been involved with his secret International Alliance of Social Democracy. They also participated in the International Workingmen's Association and in Bakunin's efforts to radicalize the League of Peace and Freedom.

Perhaps the most significant political event of Reclus's life, as was the case for a generation of radicals, was the brief existence of the Paris Commune (though his personal contribution was somewhat limited and he later downplayed his role). During the Franco-Prussian War, he joined the National Guard in defense of Paris, fearing that the destruction of the French Republic would hinder his more radical goals for society. Reclus served in the balloon corps, under the direction of the famous photographer and balloonist Nadar. In the elections of February 1871, he even went so far as to run as a candidate, despite his anarchist sympathies. Reclus's column was captured in April 1871 by Versailles troops, and he was sentenced to transportation for life. After almost a year in prison, however, Reclus's sentence was commuted and he was released, thanks to international pressure stemming largely from his reputation as a scientist of considerable renown. Upon leaving prison in 1872, Reclus promptly fled to Switzerland, where he would spend the next two decades of his life.

It was only after the experience of the Commune that Reclus definitively rejected reconciliation with the parliamentary political process and fully fleshed out his anarchist philosophy. Reclus gradually became involved with the flourishing anarchist movement in Switzerland, the ranks of which were filled with political exiles from the Commune and around the world. He became a prominent member of the Jura Federation and contributed substantially to fellow exile Peter Kropotkin's journals *Le Révolté* and *La Révolte*. Reclus was one of the

earliest advocates of what came to be known as anarchocommunism, and his efforts helped to secure its official acceptance by the Swiss anarchists. During these years, Reclus occasionally found himself embroiled in controversy. The decidedly untraditional joint marriage of his two daughters in 1882, fully supported (and in fact presided over) by Reclus, caused a considerable storm, including demands that he be expelled from Switzerland (though Reclus would remain in the country for another eight years). In Switzerland, and after his return to France in 1890, Reclus also continued his geographic work, composing his two principal contributions to the field, *La Nouvelle Géographie universelle, la terre et les hommes*, 19 volumes (1875–94), and *L'Homme et la Terre* (completed shortly before his death). During the last ten years of his life, Reclus worked as a professor of comparative geography at the Université Nouvelle in Brussels, dying of heart disease in 1905.

In its emphasis on science and progress, Reclus's thought is clearly a product of its time. He portrays science as a liberating force, sweeping aside the cobwebs of ignorance and superstition that have historically plagued humanity and ushering in a new era in which humankind is able to understand its environment and consciously manipulate it. The course of history, as he saw it, pointed toward a future in which archaic forms of authority are dissolved, individual freedom and initiative are liberated from all constraints, and centralized political and economic organization is overcome by advancements in productive capacity and grassroots solidarity. Mentally, Reclus believed that the modern man, conditioned by the freedom of thought necessary for the scientific enterprise, was eminently receptive to anarchism's radical social critique. Materially, Reclus believed that technological development made it possible to increase production to such an extent that scarcity could be overcome and the utopian society once thought to be a dream could be concretely attained. The measuring stick of human progress for Reclus was not, however, merely technological or economic, but consisted more importantly of individual self-realization and spiritual fulfillment: in his vision of the ideal society, every individual is able to fulfill his or her potentiality through the natural unfolding of innate capabilities.

The trajectory of progress, Reclus suggested, consists of alternating periods of evolution and

revolution, in which evolutionary changes produce an ever-increasing build-up of pressure that eventually bursts forth in the form of drastic, revolutionary change. Despite his optimism that the general course of history would ultimately culminate in an anarchist society, Reclus's conception of progress was not overly simplistic. Historical movement is not, he realized, a matter of straightforward evolution: progression in some areas is accompanied by regression in others, and self-conscious historical subjects are faced with the task of encouraging the progressive trends and discouraging the regressive. Evident historical trends suggested to Reclus that the coming anarchist society was inevitable, but he saw it as something that would only be realized in the distant future, especially later in life after he had witnessed the disheartening inefficacy of the anarchist movement in the 1890s.

While Reclus always stressed the unique significance of human self-consciousness, he saw profound continuities between the human and the natural world, and located human beings within a natural order regulated by natural laws that transcend the man-made laws of society. While he saw submission to the ordinances of the state as a kind of enslavement, Reclus believed that submission to natural law was compatible with human freedom. Reclus visualized the natural order as characterized by a profound organic unity. Accordingly, situating human beings within their natural context helps to reveal the vast network of interdependencies within which individual initiative is operative.

Reclus drew important connections between his scientific work as a geographer and his radical political philosophy. His thought is colored by an overriding concern with the implications of the relationship between human beings and their natural environment for human organization. He saw the territorial boundaries established by states as artificial impositions that fail to accurately demarcate the natural settings of human association, thus impinging upon the innate tendencies toward cooperation that are strengthened by shared conditions. Emphasizing the perpetual interactions between human beings and their natural environment helps to reveal the ways in which the well-being of the former is bound up with the well-being of the latter. Reclus laments the destruction of the natural world in the name of "progress," and attempts to expand the sphere of human concern

and respect beyond a narrowly anthropocentric worldview, while at the same time emphasizing the consequences of environmental destruction for humans themselves. Particularly in his later work, Reclus envisions humans working to modify the environment to suit their needs, while preserving and even amplifying its beauty rather than conquering and destroying it.

Reclus's concern with the subjection of nature is one aspect of his effort to expand the critique of domination to new dimensions. Reclus condemned racism for its undermining of human solidarity and equality, arguing against the contemporary inclusion of race as a factor in historical development, and maintaining that differences between groups of people are primarily the cause of their environmental setting. He also opposed the oppression of women, challenging the patriarchal model of the family, championing sexual equality, and advocating extralegal "free unions" that would be entered into voluntarily and on the basis of mutual affection. Furthermore, Reclus believed that animals, too, were entitled to the utmost development of which they are capable, and opposed their use for meat and scientific testing. He even went so far as to condemn the constrictions imposed by clothing, praising nudity and the beauty of the natural body. For Reclus, ushering in a free society meant challenging domination on every level, and effecting a transformation of everyday life.

Despite his radicalism in these areas, Reclus's thought evidences values that are striking in their traditionalism, which may be seen as legacies of his Christian upbringing. Distinguishing religious values from institutionalized religion – which he bitterly opposed – Reclus believed that anarchism could better fulfill the ideals of Christianity than the religion itself. Central to this endeavor was the linking of individual self-realization to a commitment to love and care for others. Liberty and individuality, Reclus argued, must be seen as inextricably intertwined with community and solidarity. He cautioned against regarding liberty as an end-in-itself, arguing that it was but a means of securing the ultimate ends: love and universal brotherhood. Emphasizing love, Reclus felt, would help to avoid the egoism likely to spring from an overemphasis on liberty. Reclus greatly valued diversity but wanted all of humanity to see itself as involved in a grand collective project. He based his ethics on the primacy of the individual conscience,

which he believed gravitated naturally to the consideration of the interests of others, as manifest in human beings' innate tendency toward mutual aid. Rejection of a codified moral law was not, for Reclus, commensurate with amorality or nihilism – in fact, he saw the ability to cultivate feelings of genuine responsibility toward others as dependent upon moral autonomy. When morality is presented in the form of commands which we are bound to obey, it fails to assimilate itself into our very manner of being. God was absent from Reclus's worldview, but the moral order over which He once presided was largely integrated into Reclus's naturalistic understanding of instinctive human proclivities.

The specific vision of anarchism which Reclus saw as embodying his various concerns was, as it came to be known during the 1870s, anarcho-communism. The doctrine was adopted by the Congress of the Jura Federation in 1880 and Reclus, along with Peter Kropotkin, was one of its principal exponents. Anarchocommunism differed from Proudhon's mutualism and Bakunin's collectivism by maintaining that distribution should be managed in accordance with need, rather than the extent to which an individual is able to contribute to society. Reclus, however, preferred to describe the arrangement as distribution according to *solidarity* rather than need, for this better captured the interrelations between the individual and the whole and the context in which individual needs had to be evaluated.

The proper way of bringing such a social order about was a subject of much dispute during Reclus's time, and he counted himself among the most enthusiastic advocates of "propaganda by the deed." Though he never personally engaged in acts of violence, Reclus believed that a measure of violence was a regrettable necessity in any effort to overhaul the social order, and tended to emphasize the inevitability and nobility of intent that underlay exemplary actions of terrorism rather than their occasionally unsavory consequences. Reclus also urged the expropriation of the products of human labor, holding that this was "restoration" rather than theft – a controversial argument at the time. As these positions suggest, in Reclus's view revolutionary activity had to be directed against the existing order. After his experiences with the cooperative movement, he came to see efforts to construct alternative communities as counter-revolutionary diversions. The targets of Reclus's

revolutionary activity were both the state and the socioeconomic order; he did not believe that the abolition of the former was sufficient to effect a conversion of the latter. The preeminent form of resistance in which Reclus himself engaged was the development of consciousness through the dissemination of revolutionary propaganda, which he thought would incite the workers and peasants to rebellion.

Reclus was well known for putting his anarchist beliefs into practice in his personal life. To his ethical objection to the slaughter of animals he joined a lifelong vegetarianism; his opposition to racism was illustrated by his marriage to a woman who was half Senegalese; his rejection of patriarchy was evidenced by his entrance into "free unions" with two women and the extension of such a right to his daughters; and his belief in the existence of a natural morality and the importance of ethical, cooperative behavior is reflected in his reputation for being a consistently generous and kind person. Given his international stature in the scientific world and the high regard in which his personal qualities were held, Reclus, like his friend Kropotkin, helped bring to anarchism a measure of respectability. He helped to ground anarchism scientifically and philosophically, offering a complex and ambitious vision of a profoundly holistic universalism, in which self-realization necessarily encompassed consideration of other human beings, animals, and the natural world, in which instincts of solidarity and love took primacy as the cornerstones of the social order, and in which technological development and expanded critical consciousness provided human beings with both the ability and will to combat domination in all of its many manifestations.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, France; Anarchocommunist, Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Paris Commune, 1871; Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809–1865)

References and Suggested Readings

- Clark, J. P. & Martin, C. (Eds.) (2004) *Anarchy, Geography, Modernity: The Radical Social Thought of Elisée Reclus*. Lanham, MD Lexington.
- Dunbar, G. S. (1978) *Elisée Reclus: Historian of Nature*. Hamden, CT: Archon Books.
- Fleming, M. (1988) *The Geography of Freedom: The Odyssey of Elisée Reclus*, 2nd ed. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Ishill, J. (1927) *Elisée and Elie Reclus: In Memoriam*. Berkeley Heights, NJ: Oriole Press.

Red Brigades

Dario Azzellini

Brigate Rosse (BR) or Red Brigades, founded in Milan in 1970, were an Italian armed communist organization. The BR formed out of neighborhood collectives and committees at the Pirelli, Sit-Siemens, and Michelin factories in the Milan region at the end of a mass labor upsurge from 1968 to 1969. In 1969 the committees joined together under the coordination of the Metropolitan Political Collective (CPM). In the aftermath of the December 12, 1969 bombing in Milan, which killed 16 civilians in what many considered a state-sanctioned action, the popular movements concluded that conventional forms of dissent were ineffective in reversing state repression, and decided that armed struggle was necessary in response to the class war declared by the ruling class. For many Italian movements, the presumption that the state was unresponsive to popular non-violent protest created a sense of anguish and despondency, especially since the partisans had defeated the fascists in World War II, only to be once again repressed in the postwar political compact, for all practical purposes, invalidating legal means to advance working-class power.

In September 1970 the Sinistra Proletaria (SP; Proletarian Left), an offshoot of the CPM, dissolved as an organization of lawful dissent and political struggle and in November 1970 militant ex-members reconstituted themselves as the first Red Brigade in Pirelli. The founders of the BR concluded that armed actions and political-military struggle were a requirement "to show the way to take over power and install the dictatorship of the proletariat." The organizers considered Italian Fascism and Nazi occupation during World War II were substituted in the postwar era by an imperialist state operating in the interest of multinational corporations. On a global scale they saw themselves as organizationally committed to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian Cultural Revolution analogous to corresponding urban guerrillas such as the Tupamaros of Uruguay, Black Panthers in the US, and Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF; Red Army Faction) of West Germany. At their inception, the BR found sympathy among workers and a wide range of leftists, despite considerable ideological differences. While many leftists were opposed to the Italian Communist Party (PCI), the BR saw PCI as

a broad progressive party with a bureaucratic leadership that betrayed the ideals of the anti-fascist communist partisans. In turn, PCI condemned the BR as fascist, calling on workers to report recognized members of the armed front to the police. It was not until 1979 that a BR militant denounced by a PCI member was arrested.

Armed Propaganda


Among the founding members of BR were Renato Curcio, Maria Cagol, Alberto Franceschini, and Prospero Gallinari. In 1971 Mario Moretti, a Sit-Siemens industrial worker, joined the BR, later becoming a notable leader of the organization. As a result, BR expanded a political presence at Sit-Siemens and proletarian neighborhoods of Milan. They supported worker struggles with small attacks on automobiles, factory department foremen, and members and adherents of fascist organizations and causes. The BR had significant support in factories and two proletarian neighborhoods. On April 25, 1971 and 1972, the anniversary of the victory over Italian Fascism (1945), the residents of the communities raised more than 200 self-made BR flags on their roofs in celebration. Militant action was viewed as a means to advance specific industrial struggles. In March 1972 the BR kidnapping and interrogation of a high-level Siemens engineer for a few hours was intended to comprehend how the company's plans to restructure a factory would deleteriously affect workers. From 1970 to 1975 the BR attacks did not include intentional killings or injury.

Following the Uruguayan Tupamaros urban guerrilla model in 1973, the BR expanded its presence and organized into two columns in Milan and Turin, each with several brigades operating in factories and neighborhoods. In late 1973 the work of the columns was subdivided into three sectors, or fronts: (1) organizing large factories, (2) struggle against counterrevolution, and (3) logistical and strategic planning. In Turin BR recruited new members at the Fiat automotive plant and other factories. In December 1973 BR kidnapped Fiat staff director Ettore Amerio for nine days. In early 1974 the BR took the strategic decision to slow down the activities in factories and direct attacks against leading politicians and representatives in Italian government.

The first national action was carried out on April 18, 1974, kidnapping Judge Mario Sossi in

Genoa. The BR demanded the courts reexamine the evidence against militants of the armed organization Gruppo XXII Ottobre, on trial in Genoa. Sossi was released on May 23 after authorities agreed to their demands. The new direction toward political action led to reorganization of the BR structure. The large factory and anti-counterrevolution fronts were refashioned to coordinate activities on a national level. In 1973 and 1974 BR expanded with the founding of new columns in the Veneto region, organizing workers from the Breda shipyards and petrochemical industries in Mestre; and construction of BR columns in the Liguria and Marche regions. In the summer of 1974 a logistic front was built. Curcio and Franceschini were arrested. On June 17, 1974 two people were killed when the BR stormed a section of the fascist party Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) in Padua. The killing, even if not intentional, was claimed as militant anti-fascism. On May 15, 1975 the BR carried out their first intentional armed attack on a person by shooting a local representative of the ruling Christian Democracy (DC) in the legs. A column in Rome was built and the first kidnapping for financing was carried out. On June 5 Maria Cagol and a member of the military police (Carabinieri) were killed in a shooting.

The first intentional killing carried out by the BR was of public prosecutor Francesco Coco, who broke the agreement that put an end to the kidnapping of Sossi. Coco and two bodyguards were killed on June 8, 1976. The same year the front of the big factories was integrated into the front against counterrevolution and the whole organization concentrated on the attack at the heart of the state. In December 1976 the Milan BR militant Walter Alasia and two policemen were killed in a shooting, and the Milan column adopted his name. On February 2, 1977 the Roman column in its first action wounded a high exponent of the ministry of justice as part of a campaign to impede the first big trial against BR militants in Turin. On April 28 the BR killed the president of the Turin lawyers association. The trial was suspended several times until 1978. In June 1977 the BR started a campaign against "counterrevolutionary" journalists, wounding and killing various of them in the forthcoming months. In 1978 they started a campaign against the penal system that had turned more repressive with the opening of high security prisons in July 1977 and killed



Aldo Moro, twice prime minister of Italy, was kidnapped by the Red Brigades on March 16, 1978 to protest the compromise of the Italian Communist Party with the Christian Democrats. In exchange for Moro's release, the Red Brigades demanded the government free imprisoned members. This photograph was taken on April 20, 1978 during Moro's captivity. After the Italian government refused to release jailed Red Brigade members, Moro was found dead on May 9, 1978. (AP/PA Photos)

four employees and representatives of the penal system.

On March 16, 1978 the BR kidnapped the DC chairman Aldo Moro, who was the central figure for an opening of the government towards the PCI (the historic compromise). Five of his bodyguards were killed. The BR asked for the liberation of 13 prisoners. Many government representatives shared an interest in avoiding the historical compromise. For the first time the state refused to negotiate and Moro was killed 55 days later by the BR. In 1978 the BR started a campaign against the anti-terror units in answer to their shoot-to-kill policies, killing 12 agents up to 1980. The BR made numerous attacks at large factories. In this context on January 24, 1979 they unintentionally shot and killed a PCI member and labor unionist who had been responsible for the arrest of a BR militant. While the police repression led many people

from the movements and other armed organizations to join the BR, with the killing of Moro and the trade unionist and the high level of state militarization, BR popular support waned.

Disintegration and Division

In July 1979 the collective leadership of BR prisoners at the high security jail on Asinara Island near Sardinia sent a 120-page document to the BR strategic director detailing their view of a new politics to follow. The document proposed steps to initiate a popular war. The director disagreed with the position of the inmates without specifying his reasons, and in October the prisoners demanded his resignation.

Renato Curcio and Mario Moretti, two leading members of BR, offered assessments of the era. Curcio (Curcio & Scialoja 1993), among the Asinara inmates, later said the director recognized the political weakness of the BR that had to be overcome by a general debate and process of convergence with other armed groups. Moretti, at that time part of the directory, argues in a look back at the time (Rossanda, Moretti, & Mosca 1994) that given the isolation of the inmates, the proposal was too remote from the reality of life in Italy. Moreover, he said, the inmates were upset because they had asked the BR to organize escapes, but the BR failed, due to lack of organizational capacity. While the kidnapping of Aldo Moro created an impression of a strong military organization, in reality the BR had limited armed capacity for major actions, and as a consequence members were rapidly arrested and captured. Moretti also notes that other armed organizations and the movement as a whole were significantly less extensive than imagined by prison inmates.

On October 2 the Asinara inmates decided to destroy the prison. After a night of fighting with firearms, bombs, and direct confrontations, the prison was in ruins. The Milan column also asked the director to cease criticism of the lack of factory politics. On January 19, 1980 the BR killed the vice director of the petrochemical industries in Mestre as a last attack in the factory context.

The arrest on February 21 and later collaboration of the BR militant Patrizio Peci led to hundreds of arrests. Several deadly BR attacks on representatives of the judiciary and the penal system followed. A new BR column in Naples

started to act. But the BR was unable to respond to the restructuring of Fiat at the end of 1980 which led to a total defeat of the labor movement. On November 12 the Milan column Walter Alasia carried out a deadly attack, signing as his own organization BR-WA. All initiatives to reconcile positions failed. On December 12 the BR kidnapped the director of the penal division of the ministry of justice and liberated him on January 15, 1981 after the Asinara prison was closed.

The political differences among the columns and fronts of the BR became irreconcilable in April 1981. The Naples column and the prison front started to operate together on their own. And while the kidnapping of the director of the petrochemical industries in Mestre (May 20 to July 5) was still signed as BR, some militants of the Veneto column, responsible for the operation, split off and formed a group disbanded a few months later. In October 1981 the BR strategic director decided on the kidnapping of US General James Lee Dozier and to operate further on as BR-Partito Comunista Combattente (PCC; Communist Combatant Party). The BR as such ceased to exist. Beside the BR-PCC and the BR-WA, the BR-Partito della Guerriglia (PG; Party of the Guerrilla) also emerged.

Between 1973 and 1988 a total of 911 people faced charges as members of the BR. In January 1987 many prisoners from different BR organizations, including Curcio and Moretti, declared collectively that the historical experience of the BR had ended and the new struggle was to reach a political solution of the conflict, liberation of all prisoners, and return of those exiled. However, the Italian government did not respond to the initiative.

BR-Walter Alasia

After one year of dissent with the BR the Milan column decided to act autonomously and killed the director of staff of the Magneti Marelli factory on November 12, 1980. On November 28 they killed the technical director of Falk, which led to their official expulsion from the BR. The BR-WA were supporting a strategic intervention in factories and social services (they had a hospital brigade) to fight capitalist restructuring. Until 1982 the BR-WA carried out a series of deadly attacks, kidnappings, and other activities in factories. From December 1980 to 1982 five

militants were killed during police operations, many were arrested, and the BR-WA ceased to exist in January 1983. Between 1982 and 1985, 113 members of BR-WA faced charges.

BR-Partito della Guerriglia

The BR-PG emerged primarily out of the prison front and the Naples column and split from the BR in 1981. They carried out the kidnapping of Christian Democratic politician *Ciro Cirillo* on April 27, 1981, killing one bodyguard and driver, releasing him on July 24 in exchange for money. On June 10 they kidnapped former BR militant *Roberto Peci* (brother of *Patrizio*), a collaborator with the police in 1976 and 1979 whose information led to many arrests. Peci was interrogated, sentenced to death, and killed on August 3.

The BR-PG became known on December 1981 when the organization published its founding thesis that Italian society was destined for civil war requiring revolutionary forces and confrontation. In January 1982 numerous militants and leaders of the BR-PG were arrested, after which the organization carried out several deadly attacks and armed robberies. On October 21, 1982, during a bank robbery in Turin, the BR-PG killed two unarmed guards, which focused more attention on their declaration. Most BR prisoners cut relations with the BR-PG, and the organization was disbanded following further arrests in November and December of 1982. Between 1982 and 1985, 147 members of the BR-PG faced criminal charges.

BR-Partito Comunista Combattente

On December 17, 1981 the BR-PCC kidnapped US General James Lee Dozier, who was freed on January 28, 1982 by Special Forces of the police after a member collaborated with the police. The government arrested suspects and was accused of torturing militants, which led to confessions and hundreds of arrests. In May 1982 the BR-PCC debated the possibility of strategic retreat but continued to carry out one deadly attack a year up to 1988. They participated with French *Action Directe* (AD), the Belgian *Cellules Communistes Combattantes* (CCC; Communist Combatant Cells), and the RAF in "buildup of an anti-imperialistic front in Western

Europe.” On February 15, 1984 the broad front killed US diplomat Leamon Hunt in Rome. In October 1985 the BR-PCC split, with the formation of the independent BR-Unione dei Comunisti Combattenti (UCC; Union of Combatant Communists). Many BR-PCC prisoners joined a debate on a political solution in June 1987. Militants opposing this view were responsible for a deadly attack on an Italian general in April 1988. In September/October 1988 most active militants were arrested and the BR-PCC disappeared. Between 1982 and 1989, 93 members of the BR-PCC faced criminal charges.

BR-Unione Comunisti Combattenti

BR-UCC criticized the BR for not developing strong internal leadership after 1978. Thus, “the foundation of a new political group became necessary that orientates itself in Marxism-Leninism.” They saw their main task to place the BR-UCC “at the top of the proletariat and fight its struggle till takeover of power.” In their first attack on February 21, 1986 the BR-UCC killed the head of the economic department of the presidency of the council, an attack in which one member of the organization was also killed. In Rome on March 20, 1987 the BR-UCC committed their second and last attack, killing air force General Licio Giorgeri. After numerous arrests in May and June 1987 the organization disbanded. Between 1986 and 1988, 73 members of the BR-UCC faced charges.

(New) BR-per la costruzione del Partito Comunista Combattente

As an instrument to reinitiate armed struggle the BR-PCC sponsored the Nuclei Comunisti Combattenti (NCC; Communist Combatant Cores). In the early 1990s the NCC claimed responsibility for two relatively small bomb attacks, but after several arrests the organization disappeared and assumed the name BR in 1999. On May 20, 1999 Massimo D’Antona, consultant of the ministry of labor, was shot dead by the new BR-PCC. In February 2000 they declared that “with reassuming the revolutionary attack the fighting avant-gardes took over the strategic task to raise the level of confrontation in the context of a long-lasting class war.”

On March 19, 2002 the new BR-PCC killed Marco Biagi, economic advisor of the Berlusconi

government and an architect of a labor law dismantling workers’ rights. On March 3, 2003 two militants of the new BR-PCC were involved in a train shooting in which a railway policeman and one of the gunmen were killed. The discovery of information related to the organization led to a new round of arrests in October. One of those arrested collaborated with police, who then arrested several BR-PCC militants who were later sentenced to life imprisonment. The court established that there were no organic links between the old and new BR-PCC, and from 2003 to 2007 no BR-PCC actions have been documented.

SEE ALSO: Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Germany, Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Group); Italian Communist Party; Marxism; Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945); NAP (Nuclei Armati Proletari)

References and Suggested Readings

- Curcio, R. & Scialoja, M. (1993) *A viso aperto*. Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori.
- Progetto Memoria (Eds.) (1994) *La mappa perduta*. Rome: Sensibili alle foglie.
- Progetto Memoria (Eds.) (1996) *Le parole scritte*. Rome: Sensibili alle foglie.
- Red Notes (Eds.) (1978) *Italy 1977–78: Living With An Earthquake*. London: Red Notes.
- Rossanda, R., Moretti, M., & Mosca, C. (1994) *Brigate Rosse. Una storia italiana*. Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori.
- Tarrow, S. (1989) *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965–75*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Red Scotland and the Scottish radical left, 1880–1932

William Kenefick

In January 1880, in a lecture presented by the Statistical Society in London on “The Strikes of the Last Ten Years,” it was stated there had been some 2,352 strikes across Britain in that year, and that 473 strikes took place in Scotland. Indeed, Glasgow topped the league of the “Top-Ten Strike Towns” in Britain, with Edinburgh/Leith and Dundee in fourth and eighth position, respectively. The report stated that wage demands were “in ninety percent of cases” the major source of dispute, but that north of the border

other forces were at work, with labor leaders in Scotland fostering a “constant spirit of opposition” in the collieries and mines.

The report gave no detail as to the cause of this “spirit of opposition,” but it nonetheless demonstrates willingness on the part of Scottish workers to campaign on wider political issues rather than just economic ones. This period also coincides with the foundation of socialism in Scotland, although it was not widespread. But the absence of socialism does not preclude the influence of other forms of political action on trade union formation. The radical campaign to overturn elements of the Criminal Law Amendment Act – introduced in tandem with the 1871 Trade Union Act (which made picketing illegal, rendering a strike almost impossible to enforce) – and a growing “distrust of middle-class Liberal politics” politicized many workers and trade unionists across Scotland.

This political impulse clearly derived from radical liberalism and emerged from within the ranks of the skilled artisans or “labor aristocracy.” During the 1870s the Scottish labor movement was small and somewhat isolated from the majority of working men and women. By the following decade, however, it broke free from this isolation at the same time that international socialism was undergoing a renaissance. Socialism had taken root in France and many other areas in Europe from the 1860s and 1870s onward, but only emerged in England in the early 1880s with the formation of the Marxist Social Democratic Federation (SDF).

The appearance of socialism in Scotland had a similar provenance, but its influences were rather less Marxist than in England. It was derived mainly from “ethical socialism” and in particular the theories of American land reformer Henry George. George published *Poverty and Progress* in Britain in the early 1880s and widely toured Scotland lecturing on the issue of land reform. At a simple level, he proposed a land tax on the rich and propertied class and this financial burden could only be reduced through the redistributing of property. In Scotland land reform became closely associated with the issue of home rule, and together they impacted Scottish politics greatly in the 1880s, pushing the Scots to the forefront of international socialism.

Henry George became an important influence on the nascent socialist movement in Scotland, and his theories helped reestablish an older his-

toric link with a radical “anti-landlord” tradition that stretched back to the days of Chartism. Thoughts of socialism may rarely have troubled the average workingman in Scotland, but support for land reform and home rule was popular and widespread, and through the agitations of the labor movement, “nationalist and internationalist sentiments” – so clearly articulated by Scottish-born Irish nationalist James Connolly as depending one on the other – “developed hand-in-hand.” This was clearly seen at the time of the Battle of the Braes in Skye in 1882, when the Scottish highland peasants took on the might of the British landowning class. Copying the tactics of the Irish Land League, the crofters initiated and extended the use of rent strikes and the occupation of sheep farms. They also destroyed fences and mutilated livestock. It was a sophisticated political movement and an important turning point in the struggle over the land question in Scotland.

The immediate short-term result was the establishment of the parliamentary inquiry into the “Conditions of Crofters and Cottars in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland” in 1883, and it created an atmosphere profoundly sympathetic to the crofters’ cause and roused great hostility toward the landlords. According to Richards (2002), the Crofters’ War was clearly “a great triumph for popular protest,” producing “a revolution in land tenure and social condition in the Highlands” and leading to “the creation of the first independent ‘labour’ party in the British parliament, the Crofters’ party.” The resulting Crofters Act of 1886 “was a decisive and unambiguous piece of class legislation on behalf of the common people: it was specifically designed to prevent clearance.”

The crofters’ “popular protest” inspired other groups, particularly Scottish highland migrants and Irish emigrants who worked cheek by jowl in Glasgow and urban and industrial west Scotland. This was evident at the time of the formation of the National Union of Dock Labourers (NUDL) in Glasgow in February 1889 – the first mass union of general dock workers in Britain. The Catholic Irish-dominated dock workers in western Scotland and Protestant Scottish highlanders formed the next biggest group (about 60 percent and 20 percent respectively). They coalesced around the issue of land reform and Irish and Scottish home rule in the 1880s and were led by two prominent Irish-born land

reformers, trade unionists, and early socialists, Edward McHugh and Richard McGhee. They took a lead from the activities of the Irish Land League in pioneering the use of the rural boycott as a new industrial strategy (whereby the union cut off the supply of labor to an employer or shipping line). They also used the “go-slow” (known as *Ca-canny* – where dockers worked at the same rate as strike breakers or “scab labor”). With the assistance of Charles Kennedy and Hugh Johnson, two other prominent Irishmen in Glasgow, the NUDL went on to organize the entire west of Scotland and leading east coast ports, the western English seaboard, much of eastern Ireland including Belfast, Derry, and Dublin, and Cork in the southwest.

This movement gathered pace just under two years after Michael Davitt, leader of the Irish Land League, visited Skye in May 1887 to commemorate the passing of the Crofters’ Holding Act the year before. Indeed, the Irish Land League helped unite rural Ireland and consolidate Irish opinion across industrial Scotland, and when linked to the crofters’ agitations a strong bond of unity was established between the Scottish highlanders, Ireland and the Irish in Scotland, and a broad swathe of workers across industrial Scotland.

In the meantime, the independent labor movement was beginning to grow and socialism was taking root in Scotland. The SDF first formed a branch in Edinburgh in 1884, and the breakaway anti-parliamentary Socialist League (SL) was formed shortly afterwards. All these groups became firmly established across many areas of Scotland and their early influences were the English Marxist William Morris, American land reformer Henry George, Austrian socialist Andreas Scheu, ex-Paris Communist Leo Melliet, and the Rev. John Glasse of Edinburgh. But the Scots also acted independently when they formed the Scottish Land and Labour League (SLLL) in 1884, and the Scottish Labour Party and the Scottish Socialist League in 1888. The Rev. Glasse was deeply influential within the SDF and later organized the SLLL in Scotland. Along with James Keir Hardie and J. Bruce Glasier, he helped establish the Independent Labour Party (ILP) in Scotland after its formation in 1894 in Glasgow.

Scotland and Scots were receptive to many cosmopolitan influences, but they also asserted their independence of spirit on many occasions,

for example, the split from the SDF in 1903 to form the Scottish-led and Edinburgh-based Socialist Labour Party (SLP), and their rejection of political action in favor of industrial action as advocated by American Marxist Daniel De Leon. Scottish members of the SDF were involved in gun-running in support of Russian revolutionaries between 1905 and 1906, and contacts with class-conscious Russian, Lithuanian, and Irish workers in Scotland maintained close links between the Scottish and the international socialist movement.

As dawn broke on the new century, a sharp economic downturn plunged industrial capital into crisis, leading to high unemployment, lower wages, deskilling, and a considerable degree of poverty. From 1909 economic conditions improved, however, and over the next four years, and despite facing a formidable employer class, there was a rapid upsurge in unionism. Fueled by socialist and syndicalist ideas, a widespread and intensive period of industrial and social unrest began. World War I brought the unrest to an end, but the experience of war on the home front played a critical role in further incubating workers’ grievances and reawakening the prewar spirit of rebellion that ushered in the era of Red Clydeside. The Scots responded gallantly to the call to arms, but a dedicated minority opposed the war and the resulting military and civil conscription, and in doing so established Scotland as the main center of the anti-war movement in Britain. The events of the October Revolution in Russia 1917 also fueled the fires of class consciousness and further inspired a growing band of industrial radicals, socialists, and revolutionaries to convert Glasgow into the Petrograd of the North – regarded as a revolutionary storm center second to none.

There was a clear transformation in the Scottish working class, as more workers than ever before – and disproportionately so among the lesser skilled – flocked to join trade unions. There was a palpable and growing class consciousness among Scottish workers, and this drew them away from the politics of the Liberal Party toward the radical left in Scotland. Scottish Labour and the ILP were to be the main political beneficiaries, and between 1922 and 1929 the political map of Scotland was redrawn. The period signaled the rise of Scottish Labour and the decline of Liberalism; while the Communist Party had much less electoral impact, it was strong in the

mining areas of Lanarkshire, Fife, and Stirlingshire, and was well represented in Aberdeen, Dundee, Greenock, and the Vale of Leven.

While many of Scotland's war resisters were deeply involved with the troubles on the Clyde, others worked tirelessly in Dundee and Aberdeen to proclaim the anti-war message and give the people of Scotland the opportunity to consider a critique of the war at a time when few dissenting voices were heard. International socialism failed when war was declared in 1914, but the actions of Scotland's war resisters did provide a stirring example for the left in Scotland. There were clearly other nerve centers of discontent forming beyond the west of Scotland in such places as Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh, and the mining districts of Fife.

The example of Scottish war resisters clearly demonstrates that they were politically active across much of Scotland, and that the impact of the Russian Revolution only added an impetus and further momentum to the development of the radical left throughout the country. Dundee was to become the main center of the anti-war activities of the No-Conscription Fellowship and the ILP during the war. It was also a stronghold of communism in the 1920s and 1930s. There was a pacifist majority on Aberdeen Trades Council's executive committee by 1918, and in relation to its size and population Aberdeen was considered "More Red Than Glasgow" by the early 1920s (Kenefick 2000). In Edinburgh, the "Hands off Russia" campaign united political radicals across the capital and drew the Trades Council into closer contact with left radicals. In January 1918, Willie Stewart, ILP activist and editor of the ILP propaganda organ *Forward*, argued that if a revolution were to occur in Scotland, it was as likely "to start on Tayside or the North East Coast as on the banks of the Clyde." Stewart clearly saw the bigger picture: it was not simply about the Clyde, it was about the country as a whole. It was about Red Scotland (Kenefick 2007).

The 1920s would prove to be a difficult decade for Scottish workers and the trade union and labor movement in Scotland generally. It began in hopeful mood, but as the economy slipped into depression and returning soldiers and sailors swelled the growing ranks of the unemployed, hope turned to desperation. Trade union membership swelled massively between 1910 and 1920 but thereafter declined rapidly.

Levels of industrial militancy declined, and the failure of the Triple Industrial Alliance in April 1921, and the General Strike in May 1926, severely weakened the trade union movement and workers' confidence. The Communist Party of Great Britain was formed in 1920, and for a time was closely allied to the ILP. But from 1921 this relationship soured and continued to deteriorate thereafter. The ILP was also caught up in an ideological struggle with the Labour Party, which came to a head after the fall of the Labour government in August 1931. Scottish Labour won half of Scotland's 74 parliamentary seats in 1929, but the party was left with only seven in 1931.

The 1930s would prove to be a difficult time for the Scottish working class, and the demise of the ILP, its brand of community-based activism, and its infectious enthusiasm for socialism could not have come at a worse time. The ILP was to fall into political decline and, as its influence waned, grassroots activism diminished and membership of Scottish Labour fell away. Indeed, it presaged the decline of a left radical and socialist tradition in Scotland that could trace its roots to the closing decades of the nineteenth century.

Given the extent of the Scottish diaspora between 1860 and 1930, when in excess of two million Scots left their homeland, the Scots arguably made a significant contribution in promoting international socialism, syndicalism, communism, and anti-imperialism across the globe, and not simply at home. This is clearly a matter for further investigation. In the final analysis, however, some of the more important aspects of Scottish political radicalism may be better revealed in the context of how well left radical ideas were received by the imperial working class.

SEE ALSO: Chartists; Connolly, James (1868–1916); Glasgow General Strike, 1820; Labour Party, Britain; Socialism; Socialism, Britain

References and Suggested Readings

- Devine, T. M. (1994) *Clanship to Crofters' War: The Social Transformation of the Scottish Highlands*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Gall, G. (2005) *The Political Economy of Scotland: Red Scotland? Radical Scotland?*. Cardiff: Welsh Academic Press.
- Kenefick, W. (2000) *Rebellious and Contrary: The Glasgow Dockers, 1853–1932*. East Linton: Tuckwell Press.

- Kenefick, W. (2007) *Red Scotland! The Rise and Fall of the Radical Left, c.1872 to 1932*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Kenefick, W. & McIvor, A. (Eds.) (1996) *Roots of Red Clydeside 1910–1914: Labour Unrest and Industrial Relations in West Scotland*. Edinburgh: John Donald.
- Knox, W. (1999) *Industrial Nation: Work, Culture and Society in Scotland, 1800–Present*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Richards, E. (2002) *The Highland Clearances: The People, Landlords and Rural Turmoil*. Edinburgh: Birlinn.

Red Summer, United States, 1919

Timothy M. Neeno

In the summer and fall of 1919, mass rioting broke out in 26 US cities, including Chicago, Illinois (July 27–August 2), Omaha, Nebraska (September 28), and Longview, Texas (July 10–18). Serious rioting also occurred that year in Washington, DC; Norfolk, Virginia; Knoxville, Tennessee; and Elaine, Arkansas. James Weldon Johnson dubbed the violence, which included at least 76 lynchings and 25 race riots, “Red Summer” for the blood that was shed by African Americans who were attacked throughout the country. This rioting must be seen in context of the growing tensions brought on by the “Great Migration” of Southern blacks to Northern cities, the rising expectations and disappointments of the World War I years, and the birth of the more assertive “New Negro.”

Causes of the Violence

During World War I, war industries began hiring on a massive scale, while immigration from Europe slowed to a trickle. The lure of employment, better wages, and an escape from segregation and discrimination led thousands of African Americans to leave the rural South for Northern cities, in what became known as the Great Migration. Between 1916 and 1919 nearly half a million African Americans moved north or west, increasing the black population in Detroit by 611 percent, Cleveland by 308 percent, Chicago by 114 percent, and New York by 66 percent. This meant 65,500 new black residents in Chicago and 61,400 in New York (Painter 2007: 191–2). These new residents moved north for

wartime jobs and hopes for more opportunity and less racism. Still, though Northern cities did not have legal segregation, *de facto* or unwritten segregation was prevalent in housing, schools, and jobs. In some cases this fostered resentment, but in others members of the black community preferred to live and work together, seeing safety and security in numbers.

At the same time, some 380,000 African Americans served in the military in World War I. When the United States first entered the war, African Americans were divided in sentiment. Many wondered why they should fight for a country that had shown them nothing but discrimination, segregation, and lynching. Others, however, saw the war as a chance to prove their patriotism and earn respect as Americans and as men. After fighting in this war to “make the world safe for democracy,” they came back ready to challenge existing racial discrimination. Writers reporting on this change spoke of the assertive “New Negro” who was unwilling to accept segregation and second-class status and more likely to fight for his or her rights as a US citizen.

In the face of these changes, 1919 brought economic troubles on a number of fronts. As millions of men were demobilized, unemployment rose, just as war industries began laying off workers. By mid-January, Chicago had 75,000 unemployed. Pent-up consumer spending, kept in check by rationing during the war, now fueled inflation. Strikes increased. Fear of socialism was widespread in the “Red Scare” of that year. For farmers, World War I brought prosperity, but after the war recovering European nations moved to protect their own farmers by imposing tariffs on American farm products. Farm prices fell, even as the trend toward the mechanization of agriculture continued. Small farmers found themselves squeezed out by big farm operations that could afford the increased capital investment. It was in the period of 1910–19 that the balance between urban and rural populations permanently shifted. By the end of the decade, for the first time more Americans lived in cities and towns than on farms. Rural communities saw their income and their way of life slipping away.

Finally, this period was the heyday of overt racism. In 1915 the Ku Klux Klan was reestablished and spread rapidly across the South and Midwest. In that same year, D. W. Griffith’s feature-length movie, *Birth of a Nation*, was released. Widely popular (President Woodrow

Wilson even showed it in the White House), it extolled the virtues of the "Old South" and made night-riding Klan terrorists its heroes. In this climate, black veterans returning in their military uniforms often met resistance, rage, and violence at the hands of white supremacists.

Chicago

The worst violence of Red Summer occurred in Chicago. African Americans were crowded into a long, narrow strip running south from the downtown Loop district, known as the "Black Belt." In the sweltering July heat of 1919, thousands of Chicagoans sought relief at the city beaches on Lake Michigan. An unwritten line separated the "white" 29th Street Beach from the "colored" 26th Street Beach just to the north. Hate crimes by white "athletic clubs" against lone African Americans had been on the rise since the spring. In June, two lone African Americans were murdered by white gangs.

On the afternoon of Sunday, July 27, 1919, a group of African Americans tried to enter the 29th Street Beach and were driven off by a rock-throwing mob after a see-sawing brawl. Later that day, an African American youth, Eugene Williams, was playing on a railroad tie with his friends at the 26th Street Beach when the undertow carried Williams south toward the "white" beach. Whites began pelting Williams with rocks and bottles. A rock struck Williams in the head, and he slipped from the railroad tie and drowned. A crowd of African Americans advanced to the 29th Street Beach, but the white police officer present refused to arrest the man identified as the rock thrower and tried to arrest an African American instead. A *mêlée* erupted and turned into a general riot across the South Side that lasted well into the night.

The next day began quietly, as people went off to work Monday morning. But as African American workers left the Union Stockyards in the afternoon, they were attacked by white mobs and stoned, dragged from streetcars, and beaten bloody. Mobs broke windows, tore street cars loose from their electric trolleys, and set fire to African American homes in mixed neighborhoods. African Americans retaliated as word of the attacks spread. As night fell, chaos exploded in mass rioting. Gangs of whites drove down State Street in automobiles, shooting at African Americans at random. African Americans sniped

from the rooftops, cut phone lines, or pelted cars with rocks and bottles. The police lost all control. That evening, Mayor William Hale Thompson asked for assistance of the Illinois National Guard but refused to deploy them from their armories onto the streets.

All through Wednesday the fighting raged. Violence spread to the downtown Loop as mobs of whites, including soldiers and sailors, attacked African Americans. In that one day 65 fires were reported, 40 in a 4-square-mile area of the South Side. At 10.30 that night, the mayor finally sent in 6,000 National Guard troops. By dawn on the 31st, order was restored. But in the early hours of August 2 a fire swept the Lithuanian portion of the Back of the Yards neighborhood, destroying 49 buildings and leaving nearly 1,000 people homeless. Blame was never set, but a grand jury pointed to a white arsonist. In all 15 whites and 23 African Americans were killed in the rioting. At least 537 were injured, and thousands were left homeless in the worst race riots in Chicago's history.

Omaha

The violence in Omaha resulted from a familiar theme that had been made popular in the Reconstruction South. On September 24, 1919, a 19-year-old white woman in Omaha, Nebraska claimed to have been attacked by an African American male. Police arrested Will Brown, a 40-year-old African American who lived with a white woman. After one failed lynching attempt, a mob of youths assembled at a south Omaha school on September 28 and marched on the Douglas County Courthouse, where Brown was awaiting trial. By 4 p.m. a mob surrounded the courthouse but then seemed to calm, so the police chief sent 50 reserve police home. An hour later, however, the crowd swelled again and 4,000 people attempted to storm the courthouse. Police trained fire hoses on the mob, but the rioting only worsened. Rioters then cut fire hoses and swarmed inside the building, driving the police and sheriff's deputies back. Mobs also looted pawnshops and hardware stores, seizing guns and ammunition, and by evening a mob of 5,000 swarmed outside the courthouse.

By 8 p.m. the military at Ft. Omaha had been notified, but bureaucratic delay prevented their deployment. At roughly the same time, the mob set the courthouse on fire, trapping the police,

sheriff's deputies, and 121 prisoners inside. When the mayor tried to negotiate with the rioters, he was swarmed on, dragged to a street corner, and only narrowly saved by city detectives from being lynched. The police were trapped on the roof as flames engulfed the courthouse, and rioters scaled the roof with ladders to get to Brown, who was handed over to them. The mob lynched, burned, and mutilated Brown's body, dragging it behind a car through the streets in triumph.

Shortly afterward troops from Ft. Omaha finally arrived and took control of the center of the city, the vanguard of some 1,300 federal troops sent by Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. Over the next three days the military arrested 100 people for arson, murder, and other crimes.

Longview, Texas

Not all of the Red Summer violence occurred in the North, however. In the agricultural areas of the South a number of tensions were exacerbated by crop failures, brought on largely by boll weevils. This was the case in Longview, a town of 5,700 people in northeastern Texas. Tensions had risen when African American leaders called on black cotton farmers to sell their crops directly to cotton brokers in Galveston, bypassing local white brokers. On June 17, 1919 an African American was handed over to a mob by the Gregg County sheriff and lynched. A local black teacher reported the lynching to the *Chicago Defender*, a prominent African American newspaper, which printed an article on the incident. On Thursday, July 10, two white men attacked the teacher. Later that night, a mob attacked the teacher's house, but was driven off by gunfire. The rioters rang a fire bell to summon help, broke into stores to seize guns, and attacked the African American community. It wasn't until Sunday, July 13, that 250 Texas National Guardsmen, backed by Texas Rangers, were able to disarm the mobs and restore order.

Connections

The rioting shared a number of commonalities. Throughout Red Summer, the worst mob violence was committed by whites. Also, when violence erupted, local authorities were unable or unwilling to control it. After the Chicago riots, for example, a Commission on Race Relations concluded that police often sided with the

white rioters and that twice as many African Americans as whites were arrested. Chicago police were also afraid to arrest politically connected white gang members, especially since a number of the most violent "athletic clubs," such as the Hamburg Club (Richard J. Daley, later mayor, was a member) and Ragen's Colts, were sponsored by prominent local politicians. Indeed, members of Ragen's Colts bragged that police tipped them off before arrests were to be made. In a similar vein, the violence only stopped in Longview when the National Guard and Texas Rangers disarmed *everyone*, including the local police. Another similarity involved the age of the rioters. In Omaha a 16-year-old youth was identified as a leader of the mob, and in Chicago most of the rioters were ages 16–21. Finally, the media played a key role throughout the summer. Mass-circulation newspapers stoked rage and spread hysteria by grossly exaggerating the number and extent of violent acts during the rioting.

Results and Conclusions

After the Omaha riots, *de facto* racial segregation developed in housing that persists to an extent to this day. In Chicago, the riots reinforced the deep racial divide on the South Side. African Americans formed their own gangs in the city. The fundamental grievances of African Americans were not resolved, while the fear in the white community continued to fester and fed the rise of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s.

SEE ALSO: Urban Rebellions, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Adero, M. (Ed.) (1993) *Up South: Stories, Studies, and Letters of This Century's Black Migrations*. New York: New Press.
- Painter, N. (1987) *Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877–1919*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Painter, N. (2007) *Creating Black Americans: African-American History and its Meanings, 1619 to the Present*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Tuttle, W. M. (1996) *Race Riot: Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Reed, John (1887–1920)

Timothy Dean Draper

American-born communist writer and journalist John "Jack" Silas Reed took part in several

principal, international radical events of the early twentieth century. Reed is perhaps best remembered for his works on the Mexican and Russian Revolutions, including the widely popular account of the Bolshevik Revolution, *Ten Days that Shook the World*, published in 1919. He was the subject of the award-winning 1981 film *Reds*, which revitalized interest in his life and career. As a journalist and writer, Reed circulated and befriended leading socialites, artists, poets, and radicals, including Mabel Dodge Luhan, Eugene O'Neill, Max Eastman, and Bill Haywood. He also became a close friend of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

Born on October 22, 1887 into a privileged upper-class family in Portland, Oregon, Reed was educated in boarding school and then Harvard University, where he studied literature and was active in leftist organizations. During his years at Harvard, Reed developed contempt for upper-class and elitist social standards and organizations. While attending Socialist Club meetings at Harvard, he developed a friendship with Walter Lippman (1889–1974), the American social critic. Graduating in 1910, Reed visited Europe before moving to New York City in 1911.

Although interested in poetry, Reed's greater successes came in journalism. *The Masses* editor Max Eastman (1883–1969) asked Reed to join in 1913. His most notable article of that time, "War on Patterson," detailed the New Jersey mill strike. The events he covered there radicalized him, and he concluded that socialists and labor were more interested in electoral politics than the class struggle. Later that year, Jack Reed traveled to Mexico to cover the Revolution for *Metropolitan Magazine*. Reed's coverage of the Mexican Revolution, particularly Pancho Villa's operations, culminated in the publication of *Insurgent Mexico* in 1914.

After wartime travels in Europe, Reed returned to the United States and married writer Louise Bryant; he found himself disaffected with the strong pro-war sentiment of many Americans in 1917, and traveled to Russia. It was during this period that he collected the materials that would result in his short history of the Bolshevik Revolution, *Ten Days that Shook the World*, and fully embraced left-wing politics. During the next few years he used journalism as a means of advancing his leftist political convictions, participating both in the Russian revolutionary institutions and in the nascent American com-

munist movement. After being expelled from the Nationalist Socialist Convention in 1919, Reed and other radicals formed the Communist Labor Party (CLP).

Facing criminal indictment and hoping to strengthen CLP ties with Moscow, Reed returned to Russia in late 1919, where he continued his political activity. Despite some conflicts with Russian officials and rumors of disillusionment with some Bolshevik policies, Reed was given a hero's funeral and buried beside the Kremlin wall in October 1920, after his death from typhus.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Eastman, Max (1883–1969); *Masses, The*; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917

References and Suggested Readings

- Hicks, G. (1968) *John Reed: The Making of a Revolutionary*. New York: Benjamin Blom.
- Homberger, E. & Biggart, J. (Eds.) (1992) *John Reed and the Russian Revolution*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Reed, J. (1922) *Ten Days that Shook the World*. New York: Boni & Liveright.
- Rosenstone, R. A. (1975) *Romantic Revolutionary: A Biography of John Reed*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Reform Acts, Britain and Ireland, 1832

Gordon N. Pentland

Three Reform Acts (for England and Wales; Ireland; and Scotland) were passed between June and August 1832 and made fundamental changes to the structure of the political system in the United Kingdom by altering both the distribution of parliamentary seats and the qualifications for voting in parliamentary elections. They were only passed after a long parliamentary struggle and a sustained extraparliamentary agitation for reform. Debate has tended largely to focus on both the causes and the consequences of the legislation.

From the second half of the eighteenth century there had been intermittent efforts to secure measures of parliamentary reform from individuals and groups both inside and outside of parliament. The explanation for the Reform Acts should be rooted firmly in a short-term constitutional crisis, which involved both the

internal dynamics of parliamentary politics and their interaction with extraparliamentary events and movements.

The political crisis began when Lord Liverpool, who had been prime minister since 1812, suffered a debilitating stroke in 1827 and threw party politics into flux. His ministry was followed in quick succession by those of George Canning and then Viscount Goderich before the Duke of Wellington took the reins of power. His ministry unwittingly initiated a constitutional crisis by supervising the enactment of the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts (1828), which had been intended to preserve a monopoly on office for members of the Church of England, and, more seriously, Catholic emancipation (1829).

This legislation had a crucial bearing on the question of parliamentary reform. First, by repealing or altering fundamental facets of the revolutionary settlements of the late seventeenth century, a prime ideological resource of opponents of parliamentary reform – that parliament should not attempt to amend Britain’s “perfect” constitution – was overturned. Secondly, by riding over the objections of vociferous “high” or “ultra” Tories, the passage of Catholic emancipation split the Pittite regime that had been in power for over 40 years and elicited the first substantial reform motion of the crisis from the ultra-Tory Marquis of Blandford in February 1830.

Alongside this dynamic political situation other events were creating an environment that would prove conducive to the passage of some measure of parliamentary reform. First, the relative economic prosperity of the 1820s came to an abrupt halt in 1829, and 1830 witnessed a period of severe and, at times, violent agricultural unrest, known as the “Swing” disturbances, which caused dismay and alarm among landowners and members of parliament. Second, the death of George IV brought both the assurance of a general election and a successor in William IV who, if he was not a reformer, was certainly less implacably hostile to reform than his predecessors. The general election saw Wellington’s ministry under severe pressure in those constituencies where contests were held and where the electorate was large enough to act as a barometer of public opinion. Finally, during this election, another revolution occurred in France. The revolution of 1830, while it contained notable revolutionary violence, was a more moderate affair than its predecessor and demonstrated for many in Britain that con-

stitutional reform and bloody social revolution were not synonymous.

These parliamentary and extraparliamentary factors combined to bring to power a Whig-dominated coalition ministry, headed by Earl Grey (an aristocratic Whig and veteran parliamentary reformer), which was pledged to bring in a measure of parliamentary reform. It brought in its bill in March 1830 and proposed a measure far more substantial than many had expected and which was designed, as far as Earl Grey was concerned, to act as a final settlement of the reform question.

There was a long and complicated process before the measures were enacted. The bill passed its second reading by a single vote (302 to 301), which ensured that it would be defeated by amendments and ultimately that the ministry would have to ask the king to call a general election. After the election, the House of Commons contained a pro-reform majority, but the continued opposition of the House of Lords and its rejection of reform bills in October 1831 and April 1832 created fraught political situations throughout the UK. There was serious rioting in Derby, Bristol, and Nottingham in October 1831. Political unions, the first of which had been formed in Birmingham in January 1830, were established in many places and continued to agitate for reform. In the crisis following the House of Lords’ second rejection of reform and the resignation of Grey’s ministry, known as the Days of May, the political unions reached the height of their power and influence: there were discussions about arming, an attempt to orchestrate a run on the Bank of England, and what, to contemporaries and some subsequent commentators, appeared to be a revolutionary situation.

In the face of civil disorder the king had to call Grey’s ministry back to power and to promise to make enough peers to force the measure through the House of Lords. While there were very significant regional and national variations within the final legislation, it established the £10 household qualification for voting in parliamentary elections (so that approximately 1 in 5 adult males qualified for a vote in England; 1 in 8 in Scotland; and 1 in 20 in Ireland) and redistributed parliamentary seats from boroughs with small electorates to counties and urban constituencies.

The Reform Acts have spawned a range of interpretations. To Whig historians (the dominant historical mode in England in the nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries) the Reform Acts were a far-sighted act of statesmanship, which brought the urban middle classes within the pale of the constitution and became a watershed in Britain's evolutionary and progressive path toward parliamentary democracy. A similar interpretation was pushed by Chartists and some later historians, who argued that the middle classes had indeed been the beneficiaries of reform but had used the working classes to extort these concessions before betraying them and opposing further reform thereafter. Recent accounts have been less concerned with examining class conflict and focused instead on the importance of the reform debates in enshrining the idea of a middle class in political debate. Other revisionist approaches interpreted the legislation as essentially conservative in intention and effect. By these interpretations, reform was intended to and succeeded in prolonging aristocratic dominance of the political system. While this may certainly be true of the intentions of many of the parliamentary architects and sponsors of reform, other work has continued to emphasize the impact of reform on subsequent politics, the importance and scale of the popular mobilization for reform, and the extent to which it was revolutionary.

SEE ALSO: Chartists; Cobbett, William (1763–1835); France, 1830 Revolution; Glorious Revolution, Britain, 1688; O'Connell, Daniel (1775–1847); Place, Francis (1771–1854); Swing Riots

References and Suggested Readings

- Brock, M. (1973) *The Great Reform Act*. London: Hutchinson.
- Cannon, J. (1972) *Parliamentary Reform 1640–1832*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Evans, E. J. (1994) *The Great Reform Act of 1832*, 2nd ed. London: Routledge.
- Hamburger, J. (1963) *James Mill and the Art of Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- LoPatin, N. D. (1999) *Political Unions, Popular Politics, and the Great Reform Act of 1832*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Moore, D. C. (1966) Concession or Cure: The Sociological Premises of the First Reform Act. *Historical Journal* 9: 39–59.
- Thomis, M. I. & Holt, P. (1977) *Threats of Revolution in Britain 1789–1848*. London: Macmillan.
- Trevelyan, G. M. (1920) *Lord Grey of the Reform Bill*. London: Longmans.
- Wahrman, D. (1995) *Imagining the Middle Class: The Political Representation of Class in Britain, c.1780–1840*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Reform Bills, Britain, 1867 and 1884

Michael Rutz

The British Reform Bills of 1867 and 1884 continued the expansion of the parliamentary franchise begun with the Great Reform Bill of 1832. Neither bill passed as a result of extensive social or political unrest; rather, they were the result of parliamentary leaders' measured responses to the changing social and political climate of the mid- to late Victorian periods.

The decline of the Chartist movement and the conservative nature of Prime Minister (Henry John Temple) Lord Palmerston's views on political reform had stalled, driving further agitation for changes to the electoral system. Palmerston's death in 1865, however, presented a new opportunity for radicals and reformers to take up the issue. The leader in parliament was John Bright, a Quaker and free trader who encouraged the new prime minister, William Gladstone, to introduce a new reform bill in 1866.

A number of organizations with trade union and middle-class support, among them the National Reform League, the National Reform Union, and the Northern Reform Union, organized meetings and rallies featuring Bright and other speakers. A march on Hyde Park in July drew an estimated 200,000 protesters, who stormed the park entrances that had been blocked by the police. The threat of social unrest posed by economic troubles and rising unemployment led some leading politicians to conclude that some measure of parliamentary reform was required.

The bill introduced by Gladstone and Lord John Russell proposed to extend the franchise to all borough residents occupying homes worth seven pounds per year in rent, creating about 300,000 new urban, working-class voters. While Gladstone argued that workingmen had proven themselves morally entitled to political participation, many within his party still feared the consequences of extending the vote to the ill-educated. Thus, the bill only narrowly passed the House of Commons and immediately became tied up in committee.

Russell's resignation in June of 1866 seemed to ensure the failure of the reform initiative. However, seeing an opportunity to enhance their party's popular appeal, the leaders of the new

Tory administration, Lord Derby and Benjamin Disraeli, introduced a reform initiative of their own. Disraeli's 1867 bill sought to balance democratization with efforts to preserve the influence of the middle and upper classes. While extending the vote to all urban ratepayers, it also gave additional votes to university graduates, professionals, and the like. Extensive debate and amendments stripped away most of the complexity of Disraeli's scheme and produced a final result far more democratic than either of the previous versions. The bill created a simple household franchise that increased the total electorate from 1.4 to 2.4 million registered voters.

Despite its democratic nature, the consequences of the Reform Bill of 1867 were far from revolutionary. While the bill greatly expanded the urban franchise, the relatively minor changes to the distribution of seats preserved much of the influence of rural areas. Workingmen did not begin to vote for the Tories in significant numbers as Disraeli had hoped, and they did not, at first, organize their own political party. The bill did, however, instigate a series of additional social and political reforms, the most significant being the introduction of the secret ballot in 1872.

The Reform Bill of 1884 was the most significant achievement of Gladstone's second ministry. The bill itself produced very little ideological debate. Even those who remained skeptical of the desirability of democracy recognized the political impracticality of opposing reform. The primary achievement of the bill was to extend the franchise to the rural working class, which had been excluded from the reform of 1867. As a result, the number of county voters tripled, and the total electorate increased from 3.2 to 5.7 million.

In 1885, a bipartisan committee produced a second bill to redistribute seats that approximated the Chartist demand for equal electoral districts. The modern single-member district largely replaced the old two-member county and borough constituencies. Together, the reform bills of the mid-Victorian era resulted in the establishment of near universal male suffrage in Britain by 1884.

SEE ALSO: Chartists; Reform Acts, Britain and Ireland, 1832

References and Suggested Readings

Cowling, M. (2005) *1867: Disraeli, Gladstone, and Revolution: The Passing of the Second Reform Bill*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Finn, M. C. (2004) *After Chartism: Class and Nation in English Radical Politics, 1848–1874*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, F. B. (1993) *The Making of the Second Reform Bill*. London: Ashgate.

Reformation

Rady Roldan-Figueroa

The Reformation of the sixteenth century can be seen as a series of localized and yet interdependent reactions to major shifts that marked the end of late medieval society. Among these the emergence of modern nation-states, the rise of vernacular languages, and the reemergence and spread of urban centers are but a few of the best-known markers of the early modern period. But the Reformation also signaled the demise of a powerful construct that dominated the minds of many in the higher rungs of medieval society. The medieval notion of the *corpus christianum* presupposed the existence of a seamless overlap between church and society. To be sure, it was never a stable construct. In fact, it was subject to a rather tenuous balance of power between the two most important institutions of medieval Europe, namely the papacy and the medieval monarchy, especially the Holy Roman Empire.

Historical Background

The theological foundations for this cultural representation of medieval society were laid in the course of the fourth and fifth centuries with the advent of the Constantinian era. From Constantine I (r. 324–37) to Theodosius I (r. 392–5), with a brief interlude under Emperor Julian the Apostate (r. 361–3), Christianity experienced a major shift in its position within the Roman Empire. It moved from the position of a marginal and persecuted religion to that of the sanctioned religion of the Empire. A glorious portrait of rising Christianity was collectively crafted by scores of historians and theologians. Of singular importance in this regard was the historian Eusebius of Caesarea (fl. fourth century). In his *Ecclesiastical History* (312–24) he concocted the image of a triumphant Christianity which, guided by the providential intervention of God, ascended to a position of power and prestige in the Empire. The sack of Rome by the Visigoths in 410 alerted Augustine of Hippo (354–430)

about the frailty of the lofty vision of the previous century. In his *De civitate Dei* (413–426/27) he provided a reformulation of the Constantinian ideal; one in which the moral ordering of society according to the principles of the heavenly city of God assumed paramount importance.

After the collapse of the western half of the Roman Empire in 476, the Constantinian ideal was revived by the Carolingians. The crowning of Charlemagne (r. 800–14) as emperor of the Romans on Christmas Day 800 represents a milestone in the history of the West, as it marks the beginning of the Holy Roman Empire. The so-called Carolingian Renaissance consisted of an unprecedented level of administrative standardization never before seen in the West since the fall of the Roman Empire. In the ecclesiastical sphere, Carolingian theologians embraced the triumphant view of Christianity that characterized the theology of the fourth century. Alcuin (ca. 732–804), the architect of the Carolingian Renaissance, was emblematic of the political theology of the day. According to Alcuin, Charlemagne's monarchical role included the functions of royal leadership and priestly teaching (*praedicatio*) that he associated with the biblical figure of King David.

The death of Charlemagne precipitated a period of political instability in the lands of the empire. It was not until the Treaty of Verdun of 843 that a significant level of political stability was achieved for the lands of Central Europe. The old ideals of the Constantinian era were once more revived by the Ottonians in the course of the tenth and eleventh centuries. Otto I, or Otto the Great (r. 962–73), was crowned by Pope John XII (r. 955–64) as emperor of the Romans in 962. In 963 the *Privilegium Ottonianum* of 962 was redrawn. This time it included a provision requiring newly elected popes to take an oath before imperial legates, undermining in this way the claims of the Roman pontiff to be the supreme head of the church.

The pretensions of the Ottonians over the church engendered in its due time a highly successful reaction in Rome that is today better remembered as the Gregorian Reform, after its most ardent advocate, Pope Gregory VII (r. 1073–85). Already in 1059 the papacy asserted its independence from the emperor by adopting the papal election decree. The decree instituted the election of the pope by means of the College of Cardinals. Gregory VII himself was behind the

infamous *Dictatus Papae* of 1075, advocating the absolute rule of the papacy over secular rulers. The papalist offensive began by the Gregorians reached its high point early in the fourteenth century, as Pope Boniface VIII (r. 1294–1303) promulgated in 1302 his bull *Unam Sanctam*. According to Boniface, “submission on the part of every man to the bishop of Rome is altogether necessary for his salvation.” It should be noted that Boniface included the emperor and all secular rulers within the purview of his declaration.

No major challenges to the imperial or papal constructions of the societal ideal of the Constantinian era emerged until the fifteenth century. In fact, the only major theological and military challenge to the Constantinian ideal materialized in the medieval kingdom of Bohemia (modern-day Czech Republic), among the followers of Jan Hus (aka John Huss, ca. 1369–1415). Hus was deeply influenced by the Oxford-trained theologian John Wycliffe (ca. 1330–84). Wycliffe, who in his political theory tended to favor secular power, argued in works like *De dominio divino* and *De civili dominio* (1375–6) that ecclesiastical authority was a gift from God and that it was conditional upon worthiness and merit. Accordingly, the church hierarchy could be disendowed and secular power had the obligation to take such corrective actions.

Hus came in contact with the writings of Wycliffe in 1401. At the time he was dean of the faculty of philosophy at the University of Prague and preacher at Bethlehem Chapel. Through his preaching he became an important leader of an ecclesiastical reform movement that denounced the abuses of the higher clergy which controlled roughly half of the land throughout the kingdom of Bohemia. On account of his teaching and preaching activity he was eventually declared a heretic and finally burned at the stake in July 1415 while attending the Council of Constance (1414–18).

By 1420 the Hussites were in open conflict with King Sigismund, who inherited the kingdom of Bohemia in 1419 after the death of his half-brother, King Wenceslas IV (r. 1363–1419). Sigismund, who was largely responsible for the burning of Hus, obtained a bull from Pope Martin V (r. 1417–31) declaring a crusade against the Hussites. The Hussites were able to overcome important theological and political differences among themselves and successfully repelled Sigismund's successive military campaigns until

1433. In that year the Council of Basel sided with the aristocratic faction of the Hussites, the Utraquists – who derived their name from the practice of serving communion in both bread and wine (*sub utraque specie*). The radical Hussite faction known as the Taborites were defeated in 1434 at the Battle of Lipan by a joint army of Catholic and Utraquist forces. The Taborites had articulated an anti-feudal program of revolutionary proportions. Their communalism, however, reemerged in the pacifistic *Unitas Fratrum* (United Brethren), a utopian religious body largely influenced by the thought of Petr Chelčickýca (1390–1460).

Martin Luther and Peasants' War

Religious fervor and social unrest in the course of the sixteenth century made medieval conceptions of social order no longer tenable as alternative projects emerged with a radically different view of society. In 1517 the Augustinian monk Martin Luther (1483–1546) drafted his legendary *Ninety-five Theses* against the selling of indulgences. In the next few years he gave more coherent expression to his reform program until he was finally excommunicated in 1521 by Pope Leo X (r. 1513–21). By then, however, his theological ideas and stern criticism of Rome had spread throughout the Holy Roman Empire, setting it ablaze with religious strife and dissent.

Among those who welcomed the religious ideas of Luther was the German peasantry. Peasants began replacing parish clergy in their villages with preachers of the new gospel, committed to the theology of Luther and ready to preach from the scriptures. The first uprisings took place in 1524 in Forchheim (Franconia) and the Black Forest. Soon, peasants throughout southern Germany were up in arms carrying out their own revolution in the Peasants' War (1524–6). At its height the Peasants' War encompassed several regions including the Black Forest, Franconia, Swabia, Allgau, Thuringia, Alsace, and Tyrol. Peasants came together in their own military organizations such as the Christian Union of the Allgau formed in March 1525, and several other local bands. They gathered under the symbol of the *Bundschuh*, the laced peasant boot. The most popular peasant program is best known as the *Twelve Articles of the Upper Swabian Peasants* (February–March 1525). It was drafted by Sebastian Lotzer, a tanner, and Christoph

Schappeler, an evangelical pastor, in the city of Memmingen. The Swabian peasants argued against taxes paid on the yield of grain, refused to pay taxes on animals, abolished serfdom, refused to pay lords a compensation for their dead “serfs,” and reclaimed the right democratically to elect their clergy.

Martin Luther reacted to these developments by withdrawing his support and even condemning the peasants. In his *Admonition to Peace* of March/April 1525, Luther adopted a conciliatory position, acknowledging that the claims of the peasants were just and calling the nobility to moderate their demands. Around a month later, however, in his *Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants*, he was stern in his condemnation of the peasants and even assured that whoever died suppressing the rebellion would have a martyr's death. The peasants were successively defeated in the months of May and June; at Frankenhäusen on May 15, at Zabern on May 17, and at Ingolstadt on June 4. It is estimated that around 75,000 peasants were killed.

Thomas Müntzer

Thomas Müntzer (d. 1525) was among those who fought for the cause of the peasants at Frankenhäusen. He survived the battle only to be summarily executed by beheading on May 27, 1525. His death was the tragic conclusion of his increasing involvement with miners and peasants. He arrived at Wittenberg in 1518/19, attracted by the evangelical teaching of Luther and his fellow faculty at the university. But his theology quickly developed in a radical direction. In 1521, while apparently residing in Prague, he composed his *Prague Protest*. It was not incidental that in the first lines he invoked the memory of Jan Hus. In his *Protest* he condemned the clergy and the church hierarchy for their exploitation of the common people. He concluded his manifesto by announcing the emergence of the new apostolic church after a violent uprising under his leadership. In 1524, while he was still pastor in Allstedt, Müntzer preached his sermon on the second chapter of the book of Daniel, or the *Sermon to the Princes*. Müntzer admonished the nobility to use the power of the sword to reform the corrupted church, full of hypocrites who denied the Holy Spirit. Otherwise, God would take the sword away from them and hand it to the new Daniel (i.e., Müntzer himself). He would then

execute the needed purification of the clergy. Almost a full year later Müntzer was leading the peasants in the fateful Battle of Frankenhausen.

Anabaptists

Finally, the next major episode of revolutionary proportions in the history of the German Reformation took place in the city of Münster in Westphalia. The left wing of the Reformation consisted of a diversity of anti-Trinitarian, spiritualist, chiliastic, and Anabaptist groups. Anabaptists were best known for their rejection of the baptism of infants and their belief that only adult believers should be baptized. Rebaptism was condemned throughout the Empire with the death penalty. Such harsh punishment was first adopted by Emperor Valentinian I (r. 364–75) in an edict of February 20, 373. Recent scholarship has tended to distinguish three branches of Anabaptists: Swiss Anabaptism, South German/Austrian Anabaptism, and North German/Dutch Anabaptism.

Developments in the city of Münster fall within the history of the latter branch of Anabaptism. The most influential leader of the North German/Dutch Anabaptists was Melchior Hoffman (1495/1500–1543). However, it was one of his followers, Jan Matthijs (d. 1534), who took control of the city and proclaimed it the New Jerusalem. The city was besieged by Catholic and Protestant forces for 16 months, from February 27, 1534 until June 25, 1535. Upon Matthijs' death in April 1534, Jan van Leyden (d. 1536) assumed control of the city. He introduced the community of goods and polygamy. The siege proved to be ineffective, in spite of the many deaths on account of hunger and illnesses. However, the New Jerusalem was betrayed by two of its citizens. The ensuing bloodbath lasted for two days, with only the women and children spared.

SEE ALSO: Anabaptist Movement; English Reformation; German Peasant Rebellion, 1525; German Reformation; Luther, Martin (1483–1546); Moravian Brothers; Müntzer, Thomas (ca. 1489–1525)

References and Suggested Readings

- Baylor, M. G. (Ed.) (1991) *The Radical Reformation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Blicke, P. (1981) *The Revolution of 1525*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
 Canning, J. (1996) *A History of Medieval Political Thought (300–1450)*. London: Routledge.

Hillerbrand, H. J. (2007) *The Division of Christendom: Christianity in the Sixteenth Century*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press.

Snyder, C. A. (1995) *Anabaptist History and Theology*. Kitchener: Pandora Press.

Regina Riot

David L. Bent

The Regina Riot took place in the capital city of Saskatchewan on Dominion Day, July 1, 1935. The confrontation between striking relief camp workers and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was the culmination of the On-to-Ottawa Trek, a protest that was intended to travel from Vancouver to Ottawa to carry the grievances of the unemployment relief camp workers to the federal government.

The Great Depression made unemployment an acute economic and social problem in Canada. Because they were not usually eligible for local relief, many single men became drifters looking for work, putting considerable strain on existing relief programs. One of the solutions proposed for dealing with this problem was a system of state-run, non-compulsory relief camps that would provide unemployed men with work until the economy recovered. It was also hoped that these camps would reduce urban unrest and lessen the influence of the outlawed Communist Party of Canada (CPC) among the unemployed. The Conservative government of R. B. Bennett authorized the establishment of the relief camps in October 1932, under the administration of the Department of National Defense. Camps were opened across Canada and more than 170,000 men were accommodated in them over the course of their short history.

Workers were given food and shelter and a token wage of 20 cents a day. The camps were mainly located in relatively remote locations, where workers cleared land and prepared sites for the construction of airfields, military bases, and roads. However, the meagre wages, hard labor, isolation, and military discipline of camp life and continuing lack of non-camp employment caused considerable worker discontent. Grumbings and protests were seen in many camps, but the situation in British Columbia was exacerbated by patronage scandals in camp management, poor camp conditions, and the exploitation of workers by private lumber interests. The problems in

BC came to a head in April 1935 when the Relief Camp Workers Union, an illegal body under CPC influence, called for the province's camp workers to leave the camps and gather in Vancouver to go on strike for better conditions. But after two months of striking in Vancouver it was becoming apparent that the strike was not having its desired effect. Strike leadership, particularly veteran union organizer Arthur "Slim" Evans, then decided to escalate the strike by taking their demands to the seat of the Dominion government in Ottawa.

The On-to-Ottawa Trek started in early June, when strikers boarded boxcars heading east, gathering greater numbers of fellow camp workers as they went and numbering about 2,000 men by the time they reached Regina. Bennett was alarmed by this, fearing that it represented the beginnings of a communist revolution. Worried that large numbers would potentially join the Trek in Winnipeg, he ordered that the trekkers be stopped in Regina, where there was a large RCMP contingent. While the trekkers were camped in Regina's Exhibition Grounds, he invited strike leaders to Ottawa for discussions. However, the meeting in Ottawa produced no results as Bennett was not willing to concede to the strikers' demands for a guaranteed minimum wage, union recognition, and unemployment insurance. He also accused Evans and his fellows of being CPC agents who were more interested in stirring up unrest than in securing employment or improved conditions for their followers.

The strike leaders then returned to Regina, where tensions were rising. The anticipated confrontation with the RCMP took place at a public meeting on Market Square on the evening of 1 July when the police blocked exits from the square and waded into the crowd in order to arrest the Trek leaders. This event triggered fierce street fighting that continued for several hours and soon reached the Exhibition Grounds, where most of the trekkers were still housed. The police were mounted and armed with weapons and teargas, while the strikers had only rocks and their fists and anything else that came to hand. The violence was brought under control by midnight, but it cost two lives, including city detective Charles Miller and a trekker, Nick Schaack, who died from his injuries in August. Hundreds of others were injured, 120 people were arrested, and Regina's downtown was severely

damaged. In the following days the provincial government agreed to disperse the trekkers back to their camps or their homes.

Although short, the riot was the most violent event of the Canadian Great Depression and had both an immediate and a lasting impact. It was one of the many issues that brought down Bennett's government in the fall election of 1935. Among the first actions of the new Liberal government of W. L. Mackenzie King was the abolition of the relief camp system. The wider influence of the riot was on public opinion. The trekkers had enjoyed considerable public support, and their plight galvanized many to press for unemployment insurance and union legality, both of which would become foundations of Canada's postwar social policy.

SEE ALSO: Canada, Labor Protests; Canada, Law and Public Protest: History; Cooperative Commonwealth; Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP); On-to-Ottawa Trek

References and Suggested Readings

- Horn, M. (Ed.) (1988) *The Depression in Canada: Responses to Economic Crisis*. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman.
- Howard, V. (1985) "We Were the Salt of the Earth!" *A Narrative of the On-to-Ottawa Trek and the Regina Riot*. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, University of Regina.
- Liversedge, R. (1973) *Recollections of the On to Ottawa Trek*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
- Waiser, W. A. (2003) *All Hell Can't Stop Us: The On-to-Ottawa Trek and Regina Riot*. Calgary: Fifth House.

Reichstag Fire of 1933

Ingo Schmidt

On January 30, 1933 Adolf Hitler was appointed as chancellor of the Weimar Republic. On February 27, 1933, in the midst of an election campaign, the German parliament building, the Reichstag, went up in flames. The next day, a decree on the Protection of the People and the State declared a state of emergency that suspended most civil rights (Kühnl 1987: 193–4). By the end of March, the Enabling Act (Kühnl 1987: 196) transferred all decision-making power from parliament to the government. In July the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) was declared the only legal party in Germany

(Kühnl 1987: 200–1). Within a few months, the Weimar Republic had given way to the Third Reich. The Reichstag Fire was a turning point in the transformation of a representative democracy into a terrorist dictatorship.

Just three months before Hitler was appointed chancellor by the president of the German Reich, Paul von Hindenburg, the NSDAP had suffered an electoral setback. Its share of the total vote in the election of November 3, 1932 went down to 33.1 percent from 37.4 percent in the previous election. Conversely, the communist KPD had gone up from 14.5 to 16.9 percent, while the social democratic SPD lost slightly from 21.6 to 20.4 percent (Winkler 1990: 774). To many in the ruling class, these elections indicated a strengthening and radicalization of the labor movement.

When General Kurt von Schleicher failed to cobble together a stable bourgeois majority for his government, Hitler was seen as the one person who could overcome the stalemate among the bourgeois parties and put labor on the defensive. However, Hitler's government was as weak as its predecessors had been under von Schleicher and Franz von Papen. To consolidate his power, Hitler announced another election with the aim of winning enough votes for the NSDAP to legally transfer power from an inefficient parliament, denounced by the Nazis as *Schwatzbude* (Chatter House), to the determined leadership of the NSDAP government. To attain the desired election results, the Nazis terrorized working-class neighborhoods and labor organizations. They also banned KPD and SPD newspapers.

The Reichstag Fire was presented as the beginning of a communist-led coup and used as the pretext to intensify the terror campaign against labor, particularly KPD members. False accusations and terror against the communists stirred up fear among the propertied class, and thus built support for the Nazis as the self-acclaimed defenders of the capitalist order, leading SPD and trade union leaders to stress the constitutional order and law abidance. Insinuating communist involvement in the Reichstag Fire was, given the animosity between communists and social democrats, just another roadblock toward a united labor front, which might have been able to stop the emergence of the Nazi dictatorship.

Despite aggravated Nazi terror and splits within the labor movement, the results of

the March 5 elections were dissatisfying for the NSDAP. With 43.9 percent it failed to win the absolute majority it wanted to use to suspend the rights of parliament. Moreover, KPD and SPD still won 12.3 and 18.3 percent of the vote, respectively. The Enabling Act could only be passed because the KPD seats were denied and all bourgeois parties voted with the NSDAP.

The Reichstag Fire led to charges against one individual, Marius van der Lubbe, who had no open political affiliations, and three communists, most prominently among them Georgi Dimitrov. During the trial, which took place from September 21 to 23, 1933 and was accompanied by a massive international propaganda campaign by the communists, Dimitrov exposed lies and contradictions in the charges against him and his comrades. After it had become obvious that no communists were involved in the Reichstag Fire, charges against them were dropped, largely because Nazi leaders were still nervous about reactions from other countries at that time. However, van der Lubbe was sentenced to death and executed. The communists had turned the charges against them around and claimed that van der Lubbe was a Nazi puppet. Until today this is a controversial issue among historians. There is no doubt, however, that the Nazis used the Reichstag Fire to install their regime of terror in the name of the defense of property, law, and order.

SEE ALSO: Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism

References and Suggested Readings

- Kühnl, R. (1987) *Der deutsche Faschismus in Quellen und Dokumenten*. Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein.
- Petzold, J. (1984) *Faschismus – Regime des Verbrechens*. Frankfurt am Main: Röderberg.
- Schneider, M. (1999) *Unterm Hakenkreuz – Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung 1933–1939*. Bonn: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf.
- Von Freyberg, J. & Hebel-Kunze, B. (1977) Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie in der Zeit des Faschismus. In J. Von Freyberg et al., *Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1863–1975*. Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, pp. 180–241.
- Wehler, H.-U. (2003) *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1914–1949*. Munich: C. H. Beck.
- Winkler, H. A. (1990) *Der Weg in die Katastrophe – Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung 1930–1933*. Bonn: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf.
- Winkler, H. A. (2002) *Der lange Weg nach Westen – Deutsche Geschichte, Vol. II*. Munich: C. H. Beck.

Resistenza

Claudio Pavone

In the European countries occupied by Nazi Germany during World War II, resistance movements arose that were characterized, to different degrees, by four essential factors: (1) a patriotic war against the occupying forces; (2) a civil war against local fascists or collaborators; (3) a class war against capitalists, aimed at social renewal; and (4) unarmed civil resistance. The common objective of all these factors was to drive fascism from Europe.

All four of these factors were present in Italy, which holds a central position for two main reasons. First, Italy had been the birthplace of fascism and was under fascist rule from 1922 to 1943. During those years an anti-fascist minority was active in the underground, in prisons, or in exile. Second, Italy had fought the first part of the war (from June 1940 to September 1943) as an ally of Nazi Germany, occupying parts of France, Greece, and the southern Balkans (Yugoslavia). After its military defeat the fascist government was overthrown by the kingdom and the military. The new executive, led by Marshall Pietro Badoglio, signed an armistice with the Anglo-Americans, who already occupied Sicily and had landed on mainland Italy, which was made public on September 8, 1943. German troops reacted harshly, occupying all of Italy north of Salerno, where on the same day Allied forces attempted a new landing. The entire Italian army dissolved and Germans in Italy and other occupied territories captured more than 600,000 men and deported them to Germany.

In each country occupied by fascists, a minority of the population joined the resistance. Acqui Division, a garrison of thousands on the Greek island of Cefalonia which had attempted to resist, was completely exterminated by German troops. In Italy, the king and Badoglio's executive fled to the south, which was under Allied rule, and on October 13 declared war on Germany. Mussolini, freed by German troops, formed a new fascist government under their protection called the Italian Social Republic (*Repubblica Sociale Italiana*), with Salò on Lake Garda as its capital. Italy was thus divided in two. In the part that remained under fascist and Nazi control, resistance arose in fierce opposition. In Naples just before the arrival of the Anglo-Americans, four

days of insurgency lasted from September 28 to October 1.

The resistance fought both Germans and fascists of the Salò Republic. Partisan groups were formed by young people who revolted against Nazi and fascist rule and sought to prevent forced enlistment of Italians who were self-proclaimed anti-fascists. Resistance groups grew in number and strength and were transformed into brigades, which operated in the Alps and the Apennines, while in the cities the Patriotic Action Groups (*Gruppi di Azione Patriottica*, GAP) remained active in opposing the fascists. Both in cities and in the countryside, the organized resistance received significant popular support and solidarity as it carried out major economic and political actions.

The civil war in Italy was considerably more bitter than other civil wars in Europe. There were several scores remaining to be settled that stemmed from the years immediately following World War I (1918–22), when violent fascist squads (*squadristi*) attacked and destroyed the seats of popular organizations with impunity, encountering little resistance from popular forces or the old ruling classes, who mostly colluded with fascism. The Italian civil war was radical in character, and some among the working and agricultural laboring class considered it a class war, sharing the Third International's view that fascism was a creation of capitalism.

However, patriotism was also an important motivation in resistance participation, as was liberation from the Germans, who had been a traditional "enemy" since the time of the Italian Risorgimento. Many Italians who had heroically refused to participate in the fascist regime were deported to Germany. When offered the opportunity to return to Italy to join the army being organized by Mussolini, some refused, motivated by faithfulness to the motherland or (especially amongst officials) to the oath sworn to the kingdom.

The political consciousness of the Italian masses reflected the influence of a wide range of social forces in society, from the far right to the far left. Italy's civil society largely supported the armed resistance, which numbered about 220,000 and itself formed a small minority of the population. Like the resistance fighters, doctrinaire fascists were also a minority of the population. Less dogmatic fascists occasionally undermined their superiors and provided assistance

to members of the resistance. But the Italian state apparatus remained mostly under fascist control, reflecting the presence of a long-term passive collaboration.

The resistance brought together diverse groups: old anti-fascists from prison and exile, anti-fascists who had remained silent during the 20 years of fascist rule and who retained personal memories of the outrages committed at that time, young people of the new generation who were born and educated under fascism – who had often been soldiers in fascist wars and were now revolting against their class milieu, discovering new horizons of liberty.

The resistance organized itself politically and militarily. The National Liberation Committees (Comitati di Liberazione Nazionale, CLN) reunited the main anti-fascist parties: the Communist Party, the Socialist Party (now called the PSIUP), the Partito d'Azione (Action Party, a republican liberal party), Democrazia del Lavoro (Workers' Democracy), the Christian Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party. There was a CLN Central Committee in Rome and a Committee of National Liberation of Upper Italy (CLNAI) based in Milan in northern Italy.

Communists had been the most active among the underground anti-fascists and were better prepared for the renewed period of political struggle. The Socialist Party, which had been disbanded with its members operating underground and in exile, reconstituted itself and clandestinely set about educating a new rank-and-file contingent of activists. The new Partito d'Azione was established along with other movements of a liberal socialist persuasion, including Giustizia e Libertà (Justice and Liberty), a movement founded in France by leading political theorist Carlo Rosselli, who was murdered with his brother Nello by Mussolini's agents. Christian Democracy was the party of Italian Catholics. In late 1943 it brought together former members of the Partito Popolare (Popular Party), which had been dismantled by fascism, and university students who were members of Azione Cattolica (Catholic Action), a young militant organization. Democrazia del Lavoro was a small group that was present only in Rome and the south, while the Liberal Party contained former members of the pre-fascist-era liberal ruling class.

Despite their differing ideals and programs, the parties came to a suitable agreement, deciding to postpone until after the end of the war elections

to a future Constituent Assembly that would debate and resolve the essential problems of building a new democratic country.

Militarily, partisan groups formed spontaneously or on behalf of parties and continued to grow in number. They united into a Freedom Volunteers Corps (Corpo Volontari della Libertà, CVL), which was established on June 9, 1944. However, each party retained strong links with the partisan brigades it had helped to form. The stronger Garibaldi Brigades and Giustizia e Libertà Brigades were linked respectively to the communists and to the Partito d'Azione. Only a handful of partisan groups, some monarchists, and a few members of the extreme left remained outside the CLN and the CVL.

In some liberated zones of the Alps and Appennines a few "partisan republics" were formed. They were short-lived, due to the disproportionate military force of the Italian fascists and Germans, but set an important example of the capacity of Italians to establish forms of self-government.

With the collaboration of Italian fascists, the Nazis carried out merciless repression. Villages were destroyed, people were deported, hostages were shot, and corpses were publicly exposed or hung on butchers' hooks. Reprisals such as that at Fosse Ardeatine in Rome on March 24, 1944, when 335 victims were murdered in retaliation for a partisan attack, and massacres such as those in Sant'Anna di Stazzema or Marzabotto demonstrated a ferocity that may be properly referred to as a "war on civilians."

Jews were deported by Germans on the basis of lists prepared in Italy after the 1938 race laws and subsequently updated, and on the basis of arrests made by Italian police. On October 16, 1943, 1,022 Jews in the Rome ghetto were sent to Auschwitz; only 17 returned.

Resistance was conditioned by the slow advances made by the Allied forces. In the winter of 1943 and 1944, the front line stopped at the Garigliano River south of Rome, and in the following winter it halted at the Appennines north of Florence. The Allies were not expecting resistance of this sort in an enemy country and seriously underestimated its strength. Incredulity turned into growing acknowledgment as the resistance grew in force and prestige, but there was also increasing concern for the political relevance it was assuming. This concern was shared by the monarchist government formed

in the south, which was transferred to Rome after the city's liberation on June 4, 1944. These problems were dealt with in a series of agreements between leading bodies of the resistance, Allied Headquarters, and the executive in Rome.

In the last days of April 1945 a national insurrection broke out in northern Italy and in many cases cities were liberated by partisans before the Allies arrived. Mussolini, sentenced to death by the CLNAI, was executed by partisans. The legacy of the resistance was to constitute the basis of the new Italian constitution on January 1, 1948. It remains a powerful source of inspiration among Italians into the twenty-first century.

SEE ALSO: Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Giustizia e Libertà, Partito d'Azione; Italian Communist Party; Italian Risorgimento; Italian Socialist Party; Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945); Rosselli, Carlo (1899–1937)

References and Suggested Readings

- Cooke, P. (1998) *The Italian Resistance: An Anthology*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Peli, S. (2004) *La Resistenza in Italia: storia e critica*. Turin: Einaudi.
- Pugliese, S. G. (2003) *Fascism, Anti-Fascism, and the Resistance in Italy: 1919 to the Present*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Quazza, G. (1982) *Resistenza e storia d'Italia. Problemi e ipotesi di ricerca*. Milan: Feltrinelli.

Revolution, dialectics of

Peter Hudis

Since the mid-nineteenth century, numerous political theorists and activists have considered dialectical philosophy to be “the algebra of revolution.” The efforts on the part of social struggles to overcome external and internal barriers to liberation have led many thinkers and activists to view dialectics as the expression of the immanent rhythm and self-movement of revolution itself.

Although the concept of “the dialectics of revolution” arose in association with modern political developments, “dialectics” has its origin in ancient Greek thought. The ancient Greeks viewed dialectics as the critical examination of an opinion through a process of mutual dialogue and questioning. They held that through the “dialectical” clash of contrasting views it

became possible to discover a higher, transcendent truth. According to Aristotle (in *Sophist*, a lost work quoted by ancient writers), the dialectical method was invented by Zeno of Elea and systematically developed by Plato in his Socratic dialogues. Plato and Aristotle's view of dialectics as the method of proper reasoning and the way to grasp “the nature of things themselves” held great sway in the ancient and medieval world, impacting both the history of philosophy and the development of Christianity and Islam. In the European Middle Ages dialectics become equated with logic, and as one of the seven liberal arts it was a required course of study for generations of students and scholars.

Dialectics took on an altered meaning in the modern world, beginning with Immanuel Kant. Kant viewed dialectics as the study of categories that are internally contradictory and do not admit of synthesis or resolution (referred to by him as “antimonies”). Since Kant viewed these antimonies as *a priori* categories that ground the possibility of experience, he gave dialectics an *objective* foundation – in contrast to the earlier view of dialectics as the subjective exchange of differing views and standpoints. G. W. F. Hegel, following Kant, also viewed dialectics as ontologically grounded in human experience, but he differed from Kant in affirming the possibility of such contradictions leading to synthesis and transcendence. Hegel's concept that *freedom* is achieved through the dialectical transcendence of contradictory and apparently mutually exclusive realities and ideas greatly influenced a number of later nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers.

Hegel was strongly impacted by the French Revolution of 1789. It led him to conceive of conflict and dialogue as occurring *within* and *between* social forces and cultural formations. This is especially evident in the section on the “master/slave dialectic” in his *Phenomenology of Mind* (1807). Hegel argued that although slavery undermines the slave's sense of self, the fact that the slave performs labor, while the master enjoys a mere life of leisure at its expense, leads to a situation wherein the slave develops a higher, independent consciousness by negating its conditions of oppression. The *Phenomenology* as a whole presents a “journey of discovery” from consciousness to self-consciousness to reason, and from spirit to religion to “absolute knowledge.” These stages of thought correspond to

specific historical and cultural formations. The movement from one stage to another consists of a development through contradiction in which barriers to the realization of freedom are overcome at the time as the accomplishments of each preceding stage are absorbed. However, the resulting *transcendence of alienation* is not achieved simply by negating *external* obstacles to self-development. Negation, Hegel noted, is dependent upon the object of its critique; the act of negating external obstacles still leaves one beholden to them in some way. The full transcendence of alienation, he argued, is achieved by negating the initial act of negation itself – what he called “the negation of the negation.” In presenting a movement that advances beyond “bare” or “first negation” to second or “absolute” negation, the subject achieves not only a destruction of the old but also the creation of the *new*. As Hegel wrote in the *Science of Logic*, “in all this, care must be taken to distinguish between the *first* negation as negation *in general*, and the second negation, the negation of the negation: the latter is concrete, absolute negativity, just as the former on the contrary is only *abstract* negativity” (Hegel 1967: 115–16).

Although in a number of writings Hegel critiqued the nature of labor in the modern factory system, he never called into question the existence of capitalism. Nevertheless, his linking of dialectical concepts with specific stages of human social and cultural history greatly influenced later radical figures, from Herzen, Bakunin, and Proudhon to Marx, Lenin, and Lukács.

Marx took the concept of dialectical contradiction into the terrain of political economy, centering it in the process of social change engendered by class struggle. In so doing he adopted Hegel’s notion that the transcendence of alienation occurs through “the negation of the negation.” His *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* critiqued not only existing society but also “crude communism” for presuming that the abolition of private property and the “free” market suffices to abolish capitalism. Marx held that the negation of private property was a necessary but *insufficient* condition for liberation, since it is still dependent upon the object of its critique. For Marx, replacing private property with collective property does not liberate humanity from the idea that ownership or *having* is the defining principle of society; it just reaffirms it on another level: “How little

this annulment of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilization, the regression to the *unnatural* simplicity of the poor and crude man who has few needs” (Marx 1975b: 295). Marx held that genuine communism (which he also called “humanism”) could be reached only if the negation of private property is followed by a *second* negation that abolishes alienated labor. He wrote: “Communism is the position as the negation of the negation, and is hence the *actual* phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation” (306). On this basis Marx transformed Hegel’s dialectical philosophy into a dialectical concept of revolution.

Marx was critical of Hegel for centering the dialectic upon the self-movement of concepts instead of upon the actual human subjects striving for liberation. He wrote in 1843: “Hegel makes the Idea into the subject, whilst the genuine real subject . . . is turned into the predicate” (Marx 1975a: 11). A similar critique appears in the Postface to the second edition of *Capital*, where he wrote that Hegel “even transforms into an independent subject” the “life process of the human brain.” However, Marx never disavowed his debt to Hegel. In *Capital* and elsewhere he referred to himself “as the pupil of that mighty thinker . . . The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner” (Marx 1976: 102–203). Marx’s continued debt to Hegel is reflected in the closing pages of *Capital*, where he made use of the concept of “the negation of the negation” in discussing the abolition of capitalism. The expropriation of the English peasantry during the birth of capitalism, he held, is “the first negation of private property”; subsequently, through the creation of a revolutionary working class, capitalism “begets its own negation.” “This,” he wrote, “is the negation of the negation” (929–30).

Following Marx’s death, Friedrich Engels in *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1886) developed a perspective on dialectics that continues to be embraced by orthodox currents in Marxism. Engels argued that while Hegel’s philosophic system is conservative and reactionary, his dialectical method is progressive and revolutionary. Engels also

sought to apply dialectics to nature, viewing dialectical method as a conceptual tool for unlocking the dynamic character of natural and historical phenomena. This greatly influenced the work of Georgi Plekhanov, a founder of Russian Marxism, who coined the phrase “dialectical materialism” (the phrase nowhere appears in Marx’s work). Plekhanov argued that dialectics consists of an immanent progressive movement in nature and history that is independent of human will and volition. In his “The Meaning of Hegel” (1891) he wrote: “Marx drove idealism out of this, its last refuge. Like Hegel, he viewed the history of humanity as a lawful process, independent of human will . . . he tried to trace to a single universal *source* all acting and mutually interacting forces in social life” (Plekhanov 1949: 155). This perspective reflected the tendency of those in and around the Second International to comport “dialectics” with the evolutionist and determinist outlook of European positivism. Such a reduction of dialectics to the expression of fixed laws of nature tended to detach dialectical thought from the process of actual revolution and revolutionary forces.

There were exceptions to the tendency of many radical thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to separate dialectics from actual revolutionary processes, as seen in the work of Antonio Labriola and Rosa Luxemburg. Arguing against Bernstein’s reformism in *Reform or Revolution* (1899), Luxemburg held that Marx’s use of the dialectical method enabled him to decipher the nature of capitalist value production. However, she did not enter into a direct study of dialectics. A rebirth of interest in the dialectics of revolution did not show itself until the collapse of established Marxism at the outbreak of World War I in 1914 and the Russian Revolution of 1917.

In 1914–15 Lenin engaged in a direct study of Hegel’s *Science of Logic*. In his “Abstract of Hegel’s *Science of Logic*” Lenin separated himself from the photocopy theory of knowledge of his earlier *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1890), writing, “cognition not only reflects the objective world, but creates it” (Lenin 1961: 212). He also modified some aspects of the dominant form of dialectical materialism, as in critiquing Plekhanov: “Plekhanov criticizes Kantianism (and agnosticism in general) more from the vulgar materialist than the dialectic materialist point of view” (179) and “Plekhanov

probably wrote nearly 1,000 pages . . . on philosophy. There is in them *nil* about the Larger Logic, *its* thoughts (i.e., dialectics *proper*, as a philosophic science) *nil!*” (277). Lenin also questioned making a rigid separation between idealism and materialism. Several studies have argued that Lenin’s 1914–15 embrace of such Hegelian concepts as “transformation into opposite” and “dialectical self-movement” proved of critical importance in his preparation for the 1917 Russian Revolution and its aftermath.

Georg Lukács independently sought to connect dialectical thought to the dialectics of revolution in his *History and Class Consciousness* (1923). He sharply critiqued the prevailing “dialectic materialism” for neglecting the role of revolutionary subjectivity. He wrote of Engels: “But he does not even mention the most vital interaction, namely, the dialectical relation between subject and object in the historical process” (Lukács 1971: 3) Lukács later wrote of the impact of *History and Class Consciousness*: “the revival of Hegel’s dialectics struck a hard blow at the revisionist tradition. . . . For anyone wishing to return to the revolutionary traditions of Marxism the revival of the Hegelian traditions was obligatory” (xxi). In 1923, Karl Korsch critiqued established Marxism along similar lines in *Marxism and Philosophy*.

The publication of Marx’s *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* in German in 1932 (a Russian edition appeared in 1927) as well as the *Grundrisse* in 1939 led to an outburst of interest in the relation between the Hegelian dialectics and revolutionary transformation. Herbert Marcuse of the Frankfurt School published *Reason and Revolution* in 1941, the first English-language study of the Hegel–Marx relation to appear since the publication of the 1844 Manuscripts. This was followed by the appearance of Raya Dunayevskaya’s *Marxism and Freedom* (1958) and Erich Fromm’s *Marx’s Concept of Man* (1961). Both argued for a return to dialectics in light of revolutionary struggles emerging in the post-World War II period. Their work also took issue with the prevailing view of “dialectical materialism” propagated by Stalin and his followers, who denied that the “negation of the negation” was a principle of dialectics.

The emergence of workers’ revolts and revolutions against the single-party dictatorships in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, especially

in Hungary 1956 and in Czechoslovakia 1968, led to new efforts to explore the relation between dialectics and revolution. Marx's 1844 critique of the insufficiencies of stopping at the "communist" abolition of private property seemed especially relevant to many thinkers in Eastern Europe in the post-World War II era, as seen in the work of Karel Kosik in Czechoslovakia, the early work of Leszek Kolakowski in Poland, and Gajo Petrovic of the Praxis school in Yugoslavia. The issue of dialectics and alienation was also of much concern in Maoist and post-Maoist China, leading to intense debates during and after the Cultural Revolution. In the 1980s, the Chinese philosopher Wang Ruoshui explored Marx's 1844 Manuscripts and Hegelian dialectics in light of China's claim to have created a socialist society freed from class oppression and alienated labor. He concluded that alienated labor and human relations, as discussed in Marx's works, still prevailed in "Communist" China. As a result, he was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party.

Latin American thinkers such as Silvio Frondizi, Rodolfo Mondolfo, and Adolpho Sanchez-Vasquez, as well as European philosophers such as Antonio Gramsci, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, also sought to connect dialectics issues of alienation and human subjectivity. In the Caribbean and Africa, Frantz Fanon focused on Hegel's dialectic in relation to the problems of race and colonialism in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961). *Black Skin, White Masks* explored Hegel's master/slave dialectic in light of racism, arguing that the "additive of color" produced a profound quest for a revolutionary consciousness of self that had been underestimated by many European thinkers. Fanon's work greatly influenced many political movements on the African continent (including in South Africa in the 1980s); his work is also the basis of postcolonial studies. C. L. R. James, also of Caribbean origin, developed a concept of dialectics centered on a notion of a multiple revolutionary subjectivities including but not limited to the traditional working class. James and others (such as the French independent Marxist group Socialisme ou Barbarie, led by Cornelius Castoriadis) argued that the focal point of class struggles was no longer the unequal distribution of the products of labor but rather the effort to overcome the alienated character of work itself

— a matter that was of central concern to Marx in his 1844 Manuscripts and *Capital*. On similar grounds, tendencies such as the French Situationists argued that the dialectics of revolution centers on a transformation in the conditions of everyday life, both inside and outside of the factory.

The modern women's liberation movement has provided an especially important perspective on the dialectics of revolution. A resurgence of interest of the role of women in revolutionary struggles has been a major feature of the past several decades. One reflection of this is the continued interest in the work of Rosa Luxemburg, as seen from recent conferences on her work in Brazil, Japan, South Africa, and China. Raya Dunayevskaya related Hegel's concept of "absolute negativity" to contemporary feminism, arguing that the rise of the modern women's liberation movement from out of a critique of the male chauvinism of the left gives new life to Hegel and Marx's notion that forward movement proceeds through "the negation of the negation." The discovery over the past three decades of many of Marx's unknown writings on the peasantry, Native Americans, and "Third World" societies from 1875 to 1883 has also sparked new interest in the relation of dialectics to issues of gender and multiculturalism.

Despite the widespread assertion that "there is no alternative" to capitalism, the dialectics of revolution remains a major component of today's political and ideological debates. As Bertell Ollman, among others, has emphasized, dialectics does not consist only of a negative critique of the present; it also consists of a positive anticipation of an emancipatory future. The effort to breathe new life into the concept of revolution in the twenty-first century may therefore lead to yet another rebirth of interest in dialectical philosophy.

SEE ALSO: Dunayevskaya, Raya (1910–1987); Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Fanon, Frantz (1925–1961); Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831); James, C. L. R. (1901–1989); Lukács, Georg (1885–1971); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918); Situationists; Socialisme ou Barbarie

References and Suggested Readings

Anderson, K. (1995) *Lenin, Hegel, and Western Marxism: A Critical Study*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

- Dunayevskaya, R. (1958) *Marxism and Freedom*. New York: Delacorte.
- Dunayevskaya, R. (2001) *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Dunayevskaya, R. (2002) *The Power of Negativity*. Ed. P. Hudis & K. B. Anderson. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Fanon, F. (1961/1973) *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove.
- Fanon, F. (1952/1979) *Black Skin, White Masks*. New York: Grove.
- Fromm, E. (1961) *Marx's Concept of Man*. New York: Ungar.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1967) *Phenomenology of Mind*. New York: Harper.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1969) *Science of Logic*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- James, C. L. R. (1980) *Notes on Dialectics: Hegel, Marx, Lenin*. Westport, CT: Lawrence & Hill.
- Lenin, V. I. (1961) *Philosophical Notebooks*. In *Collected Works*, Vol. 38. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Lukács, G. (1923/1971) *History and Class Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Luxemburg, R. (2004) *The Rosa Luxemburg Reader*. Ed. P. Hudis & K. B. Anderson. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Marcuse, H. (1941) *Reason and Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Marx, K. (1975a) *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*. In *Collected Works*, Vol. 3. New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (1975b) *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. In *Collected Works*, Vol. 3. New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (1976) *Capital*, Vol. 1. New York: Penguin.
- Plekhanov, G. (1891/1949) The Meaning of Hegel. *Fourth International* 10, 4, 5 (April, May): 119–25 and 152–7.
- Rees, J. (1999) *The Algebra of Revolution: The Dialectic and the Classical Marxist Tradition*. London: Routledge.

Revolutionary Action Movement

Ernest A. Amador

Disgruntled by the ineffectiveness of the peaceful strategy of the early civil rights movement, black college students formed the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) in 1963 in Philadelphia. RAM, the first black organization in the United States to call for a Marxist revolution, initiated a seven-year militant campaign against what it

identified as the African American's uncompromising, "incurable" enemy: a white-dominated capitalist society. By 1967, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's COINTELPRO program and state law agencies incarcerated RAM's leadership, oftentimes unlawfully, which encouraged disunity. RAM dissolved in 1968.

In an effort to combat police brutality, high black unemployment, and racist practices still rampant in the early 1960s, Max Stanford, who later changed his name to Muhammad Ahmad, helped form the Revolutionary Action Movement in Philadelphia and was named the national field chairman. His group pushed for a revolutionary black nationalist movement as it tried to convert, by infiltration, the pacifist civil rights movement organizations, such as the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Malcolm X, after breaking away from the Nation of Islam, became the spokesperson of RAM's "freedom by any means necessary" message. Although RAM's footwork was carried out by its secret political chapters, its cry to overthrow the capitalist white-dominated government was spread through its periodicals *RAM Speaks* and *Black America*. RAM's membership was comprised of expelled or disgruntled students, members of the poor black working class, and even street gangs, but it also focused on recruiting black youth to carry out its revolutionary goal by creating a department specially designed for younger members called the Black Guards.

RAM's ideology was revolutionary for its time. It adopted Malcolm X's encouragement of self-determination and Robert F. Williams's endorsement of armed self-defense and urban guerilla warfare (Williams was also named international chairman, even while he was exiled in Cuba and China); it also asserted that a successful black socialist revolution could be obtained only by operating underground (as opposed to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and SNCC, which relied on their high visibility to gain momentum).

The combination of RAM's secretive operations, its leadership's growing momentum, and its radical objectives (which sanctioned the use of violence) prompted federal and state law agencies to conduct surveillance of the organization. Under the direction of the FBI's illegal COINTELPRO operation, many RAM leaders – including Malcolm X, Stanford, and Williams (upon his

return from exile) – were jailed on fraudulent charges, effectively silencing them. With RAM's leaders distanced from the organization, internal conflicts regarding the direction and future headship of the organization soon followed. RAM, the first black militant revolutionary organization, disbanded in 1968.

SEE ALSO: Black Panthers; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA); CORE (Congress of Racial Equality); Malcolm X (1925–1965); Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC); Uhuru Movement; Williams, Robert F. (1925–1996)

References and Suggested Readings

- Lazerow, J. & Williams, Y. (Eds.) (2006) *In Search of the Black Panther Party*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- O'Reilly, K. (1989) *Racial Matters: The FBI's Secret Files on Black America*. New York: Free Press.
- Stanford, M. C. (1986) *Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM): A Case Study of an Urban Revolutionary Movement in Western Capitalist Society*. Atlanta University. Available at www.ulib.csuohio.edu/research/portals/blackpower/stanford.pdf.

Riel, Louis (1844–1885)

Ron Bourgeault

Louis Riel played a central role in the Red River (1869–70) and Northwest (1885) Rebellions and founded the province of Manitoba in 1870. He was born on October 22, 1844 at St. Boniface, Red River colony, and was executed for high treason on November 16, 1885 at Regina, Northwest Territories. A much maligned figure in Canadian history, Riel has been often categorized as a religious mystic and political fanatic. A political leader, visionary, and poet, Riel was a nineteenth-century radical liberal democrat, though also influenced by Roman Catholicism and Marxism. Educated first by the missionary Oblates at St. Boniface, in 1858 Riel was sent to Quebec to study for the priesthood at the Collège de Montréal (1858–64).

While in Quebec Riel was exposed to two opposing ideological views of the social and political world. The Collège de Montréal was strongly influenced by Ultramontanism, which was anti-Enlightenment and opposed to the rising secular ideas and politics in Quebec,

advocating instead a theocratic state. In 1864, upon the death of his father, a central figure in the Red River colony's political struggles against British colonialism, he left the college to study law with Rodolphe Laflamme (1864–8).

It was with Laflamme that Riel was introduced to the radical liberal politics of the Parti Rouge. The Rouge, ideologically opposed to the Ultramontane Church, demanded the separation of church and state, popular democracy, land reform, citizenship for Indians, and opposition to the inferiority of Quebec in the confederation of British North America (1867). Influenced by the radical liberal ideas of the Rouges, in 1868 Riel returned to the Red River colony and the anticipated annexation of Rupert's Land (Western Canada) to Canada.

What emerged as the Rebellion of 1869–70 was a culmination of many previous political struggles and nationalism in the Red River colony against British colonialism going back to the 1830s. It was the view of Riel and his followers that the wealth derived from the exploitation of lands in the West would be directed primarily toward banking and railroad interests in Canada, with little or no benefits to the poorer Métis and Indian classes. If there was to be fundamental political and economic change, it could only come about with responsible democracy and the creation of a state and territory over which they held power.

On December 8, 1869, Riel and his supporters overthrew the colonial governing authority, and in its place established a provisional government. The strategy was to establish an interim of colonial independence, nationalize the Northwest Territories under the political control of the provisional government, and then negotiate the terms and conditions for the entry of the colony and the Northwest Territories into Canada with the status of a province.

Fearful of radical nationalists in alliance with poorer classes who held control over a provincial state (Manitoba) and its vast lands and resources, Ottawa dispatched military troops to displace the provisional government and cease control of the territory. In turn, Riel, fearing for his safety, fled into exile in the United States. Once Riel and the provisional government were politically neutralized, Ottawa set about gaining control over Manitoba as a province and opening the lands to commercial speculation. The exodus of landless, disenfranchised, poorer Métis classes into the

Northwest Territories took place, which, along with Indian treaties and reservation system in Manitoba, constituted a form of ethnic cleansing. Banished into exile in the US, Riel found his way to Chicago and met with Quebec Rouges and exiles from the Paris Commune, then snuck quietly into Quebec where apparently he suffered a nervous breakdown and was hospitalized (1876–8). Upon his release Riel migrated to Montana, taught school, joined the Republican Party, and became an American citizen in 1883.

The marginalization of Métis and Indians that Riel foresaw 15 years earlier in Manitoba had unfolded in the Northwest Territories. Issues of access to land as a means of production against corporate interests, responsible government, and policies toward the Indian peoples to whom the Métis were intimately connected all combined to create an insurrection against the federal government. In 1884 Riel was called from Montana to help address these issues. In March 1885, open rebellion took place at Batoche against the federal government, fought out as a blood putsch knowing they could not win. Their purpose was to establish resistance for the future.

The struggle of the Métis and Indians with Riel in 1869–70 and 1885 was similar to that of the *mestizos*, mulattos, and Indians with Simón Bolívar in Latin America at the turn of the century. They were national democratic struggles, the culmination of many previous rebellions against colonialism, and were as much an internal civil war as they were external, anti-colonial conflicts.

It is unfortunate that Riel has been maligned as a religious mystic and political fanatic. Riel was first and foremost a nineteenth-century radical liberal democrat and a modernist in the tradition of nineteenth-century liberalism. As a modernist he understood the inevitability of the encroaching economic system and tried to incorporate Métis and Indian interests into it for their betterment. His differences with Roman Catholicism were a struggle to reconcile outdated, ultra-conservative religious dogma with current liberal democratic ideals. His demand for equitable inclusion into capitalism and liberal democracy, together with his religious beliefs, made him an early liberation theologian. For his beliefs and actions he was killed on November 16, 1885.

SEE ALSO: Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); Canada, Indigenous Resistance

References and Suggested Readings

- Bowsfield, H. (1971) *Louis Riel: The Rebel and the Hero*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Braz, A. (2003) *The False Traitor: Louis Riel in Canadian Culture*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Right-to-work protests, France, 1848

Pamela Pilbeam

The organization of work and the right to work became major issues after the Revolution of 1848 in France, but the notion that the state had some responsibility for the workless was no socialist “Trojan horse” as some conservatives suggested. Since the time of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Louis XIV’s minister in the mid-seventeenth century, municipalities and the state, the latter a major employer of labor on civil engineering projects, were accustomed to finding extra navvying and other rough work for the unemployed in ad hoc *ateliers de charité* in times of crisis. When he was *intendant* in Limoges and comptroller-general in Paris in the 1770s, Turgot, referring to past practice, had established public workshops to employ the jobless in road and canal building and other projects.

During the Great French Revolution, 15 million livres were allocated in 1790 as emergency funding for workshops. Both the Girondin and Jacobin draft constitutions of 1793 affirmed, for the first time, that the state had a legal and constitutional obligation to the poor. Reformers quoted the Jacobin constitution in 1848. Article 21 stated that “Public assistance is a sacred debt” and that society should provide for its poor, “either in obtaining them work, or in ensuring a means of existence for those who are out of work.” Thus, a social obligation had been transformed into a constitutional imperative. A duty had become a right.

Neither Napoleon (1799–1814), nor the two constitutional monarchies (1814–48) gave credence to such notions, and municipalities and the state continued the traditional practice of temporary emergency help. However, every ten years or so, harvest, banking, and commercial failures led to repeated serious food and work shortages. Socialists suggested a variety of associative methods to “organize” work. Charles

Fourier and Étienne Cabet dreamed of ideal communities, while others suggested autonomous or state-financed worker cooperatives. Victor Considérant, the Fourierist leader, closely followed by Louis Blanc, also demanded the “right” to work. By 1848 there was conflict between those, mainly socialists, who sought radical cooperative solutions to unemployment and those well represented by the *Journal des Économistes* who were determined to maintain *laissez-faire* “freedom of industry.”

On February 28, 1848, following pressure from Louis Blanc, the provisional government decreed that their most pressing problem was how to guarantee the people the legitimate product of their labor and the right for all to work. Blanc was made head of a “Parliament of Industry” consisting of workers’ and employers’ representatives meeting at the Luxembourg Palace to advise the Provisional government on unemployment. Meanwhile, in Paris, the government set up “national workshops” and other towns followed suit. Despite their name and socialist hopes, these proved to be traditional charity workshops. Only navvying work was found, and most of the over 100,000 unemployed in Paris merely received a dole of 3 francs, later reduced to 1 franc a day.

In May 1848 the newly elected Constituent Assembly established a work committee, which included Considérant, but not Blanc, to draft clauses about the organization of work. The Parliament of Industry was dissolved, as were the national workshops. Unemployed artisans who had joined the workshops were appalled; many had dreamed that socialist ideas about work would be included in the new constitution. In June 1848 barricades went up in worker quarters and the predominantly conservative Constituent Assembly sent army units to repress the uprising.

Although the Assembly debated the organization and right to work at length in the autumn of 1848, most of the speeches were hostile and the final constitution published on November 4, 1848 talked of the importance of work, but not the right to work. Article IV stated that the basis of the republic was family, work, property, and public order. Article VII laid out a universal duty to work, save for the future and help others, while Article VIII summarized what was left of the state’s obligation and what the individual could expect as a right. Only the freedom to work

and not the right to work was guaranteed. The state promised fraternal help to the needy, either by finding work for them, within the constraints of their budget, or succor to those who could not work: “Society will encourage work through free primary education and professional training, good relationships between workers and employers, savings and credit institutions, voluntary association and public works programs to help the unemployed.”

For a few more months some worker associations were subsidized, but the hopes of socialists such as Charles Proudhon that worker cooperatives might replace *laissez-faire* capitalism were soon dashed. It was left to employers to “organize” work to their best advantage.

SEE ALSO: Blanc, Louis (1811–1882); Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); France, June Days, 1848; France, Revolution of 1848; French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution, Radical Factions and Organizations

References and Suggested Readings

- Blanc, L. (1911) *Organization of Work*. Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati Press.
- Forrest, A. (1981) *The French Revolution and the Poor*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- McKay, D. (1965) *The National Workshops: A Study in the French Revolution of 1848*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Pilbeam, P. (2001) *French Socialists Before Marx: Workers, Women, and the Social Question in France*. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.
- Sewell, W. H. (1980) *Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Woloch, I. (1994) *The New Regime: Transformations of the French Civic Order, 1789–1820*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Ríos, Filiberto Ojeda (1933–2005)

Fernando Artavia Araya

Puerto Rican nationalist and pro-independence leader Filiberto Ojeda Ríos was born in Naguabo in 1933. He spent his adolescence between Puerto Rico and New York and showed a special talent for music. During the 1950s Ojeda combined his studies and work in New York factories with political activism, joining the Cuban 26th of July Movement (Movimiento 26 de Julio) and the

Puerto Rican Liberation Movement (Movimiento Libertador de Puerto Rico), which exposed him to the political and social history of US colonial rule over the island.

In 1961 he moved with his family to Cuba, where he studied political science at La Havana University and continued his political activism, joining organizations like the Pro-Independence Movement of Puerto Rico (Movimiento Pro Independencia de Puerto Rico), the Organization in Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the Association of Puerto Rican Residents in Cuba.

After his return to Puerto Rico in 1969, Ojeda took part in several revolutionary activities and organizations, such as the Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement (Movimiento Independentista Revolucionario en Armas) and the Armed Forces for National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas para la Liberación Nacional). For this he was persecuted by the local police and the FBI and was forced to go underground for the rest of his life.

In 1976 Ojeda founded and became commander in chief of Los Macheteros (The Machete Wielders), a pro-independence organization composed of an armed section, the Boricua Popular Army (Ejército Popular Boricua), and a political section, the Puerto Rican Workers' Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Puertorriqueños). In 1985 the organization divided, but Ojeda continued as commander in chief of the clandestine Boricua Popular Army-Macheteros (EPB-M). During the 1970s and 1980s, both Ojeda and the EPB-M were linked with dozens of bomb attacks against US commercial, industrial, military, and government targets, including the destruction of nine airplanes of the National Air Guard in Puerto Rico. In September 1983, they were also involved in the \$7.1 million assault of a Wells Fargo truck in West Hartford, Connecticut.

In 1985, after a major operation in which hundreds of FBI officers broke into the residences of Puerto Rican pro-independence supporters, Ojeda and many others were arrested and incarcerated in different local and US prisons until 1989. In August of that year, Ojeda was released on condition he wore an electronic fetter, but he removed it and returned to his clandestine condition, becoming one of the FBI's Most Wanted Fugitives. On September 23, 2005, the day of the Grito de Lares when Puerto Ricans commemor-

ated a rebellion that occurred in 1868 against the Spanish crown, Ojeda spoke out for Puerto Rican independence. He was killed that night by the FBI in his residence in Hormigueros. Those identified with the independence movement saw the killing as "political murder," especially given the great significance of the day chosen by the FBI to kill the Macheteros leader.

SEE ALSO: Puerto Rican Independence Movement, 1898–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Fernández, R. (1993) *Los Macheteros: El Robo a la Wells Fargo y la Lucha Armada por la Independencia de Puerto Rico*. Rio Piedras: Editorial Gil.
- Fernández, R. (1994) *Prisoners of Colonialism: The Struggle for Justice in Puerto Rico*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
- González, M. (2006) *Nacionalismo revolucionario puertorriqueño: la lucha armada, intelectuales y prisioneros políticos y de guerra*. San Juan/Santo Domingo: Isla Negra Editores.

Riot Grrl

Michael McKee

Originating in the Pacific Northwest and Washington, DC in the early 1990s, the Riot Grrl (or Riot Grrrl) movement centered around a radical feminism and do-it-yourself ethic, drawing on the cultural traditions of the punk rock and independent underground while challenging the sexism and homophobia entrenched within those subcultures. Despite a swift ascendance and distortion in the mainstream media, Riot Grrl embraced a multitude of varying, and sometimes conflicting, voices via bands such as Bikini Kill, Bratmobile, Team Dresch, Heavens to Betsy, Excuse 17, and Huggybear, as well as fanzines like *Girl Germs*, *Jigsaw*, *Gunk*, and *Chainsaw*. The name Riot Grrl (or Grrrl) can be attributed to *Red Rover* zinester Jen Smith, who reacted to race riots in the Mt. Pleasant neighborhood of Washington, DC in 1991 by calling for a "girl riot" in the coming summer. Her wording was eventually fused with a phrase culled from *Jigsaw* fanzine (published out of Olympia, Washington, by Tobi Vail), "angry grrls," to name the nascent movement.

Uncensored and direct, Riot Grrl zine editors wrote about their own experiences with day-

to-day sexism, body image, sexual abuse and assault, gender dynamics, and sisterhood. While many of Riot Grrl's early communiqués came chiefly from a handful of women-produced zines from the Pacific Northwest and the nation's capital, consciousness-raising networking through these publications quickly crystallized calls for "Revolution, Girl Style, Now" and "Encouragement in the Face of Insecurity" into a non-hierarchical, regional chapter-based movement across the United States and Britain.

The International Pop Underground Festival held in Olympia, Washington, in the summer of 1991 served as a meeting ground for many early organizers. Although more established alternative groups such as Fugazi, Nation of Ulysses, L7, and the Spinanes performed at the festival, the first night featured an intentional all-female bill, with bands and artists such as Bratmobile, 7 Year Bitch, Nikki McClure, Lois Maffeo, and Suture, featuring vocalist Kathleen Hanna who would soon front one of the movement's most prominent bands, Bikini Kill.

Regular meetings of autonomous Riot Grrl chapters began in Washington, DC shortly thereafter, attracting many women who would become active musicians in bands such as Slant 6, Bikini Kill, Helium, Quix*o*tic, Casual Dots, and Cold Cold Hearts. The city hosted one of the first Riot Grrl conventions in the summer of 1992, with other regional conferences gathering in cities such as Philadelphia throughout the next two years. Although both groups vehemently deny any leadership status, Bikini Kill and Bratmobile served as two of the most prominent bands in the mainstream media's coverage of the movement.

Riot Grrl concerts were at odds with the popular grunge fad of the early and mid-1990s, often deliberately confrontational, designed to challenge punk's default norms. Sympathetic bands frequently invited female members of the audience up to the front of the stage, disrupting slamdancing and aggressive "moshing." Some concert organizers insisted on an inflated admission price for males, emphasizing their events as women-oriented spaces. Heckling, intimidation, and threats were common from some male-dominated crowds.

By 1996, the movement had lost steam, due in part to personal conflicts, media misrepresentation, and a shift toward new strategies in art and activism on the part of the early organizers.

Riot Grrl's legacy directly informs the landscape of third-wave feminism as well as phenomena such as the Ladyfest musical festival and activist groups such as Bands Against Bush. Several high-profile participants of the movement have since gained notoriety as musicians and artists, as in the case of Corin Tucker and Carrie Brownstein of Sleater Kinney, Kathleen Hanna's electro-punk band Le Tigre, and film director Miranda July.

SEE ALSO: Latin American Punk Rock and Protest; Punk Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, M. & Jenkins, M. (2001) *Dance of Days: Two Decades of Punk in the Nation's Capital*. New York: Soft Skull Press.
- Koch, K. (Dir). (2005) *Don't Need You: The Herstory of Riot Grrl*. New York: Urban Cowgirl.
- Raha, M. (2004) *Cinderella's Big Score*. Berkeley: Seal Press.

Rizal, José (1861–1896)

Atoy M. Navarro

José Protacio Rizal Mercado y Alonzo Realonda was a Filipino patriot, physician, and polymath, considered the most prominent propagandist and reformist in the Philippines during the Spanish colonial era. He is recognized as one of the martyrs of the Philippine Revolution and the anniversary of his death is commemorated as a national holiday called Rizal Day.

Rizal was born to a middle-class family in Calamba, Laguna, Philippines, on June 19, 1861. His father, Francisco Engracio Rizal Mercado, was a prosperous landowner and sugar planter of Filipino-Chinese descent from Laguna, while his mother, Teodora Morales Alonzo Realonda, was a well-educated woman from Manila. Rizal was the seventh of 11 children. His only brother, Paciano Rizal Mercado, and a number of his sisters also participated in the Filipino revolutionary movement.

After earning a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1877 at the Ateneo Municipal de Manila, Rizal continued his education there and finished a land surveyor's degree. He enrolled in medical school at the Universidad de Santo Tomás but did not finish due to Spanish discrimination against Filipino students. In 1882, he traveled to

Madrid where he studied medicine and took art courses at the Universidad Central de Madrid.

While studying in Madrid, he became the most prominent member of the Circulo Hispano-Filipino, a small community of Filipino students in Spain who campaigned for social reforms in the Philippines. Rizal obtained a Licentiate in Medicine from the Universidad Central de Madrid in 1884. The following year, he finished the graduate courses for a Doctor in Medicine degree and obtained a Licentiate in Philosophy and Letters from the same university. Rizal continued his studies, specializing in ophthalmology under Dr. Louis de Weckert in Paris, and later working under Dr. Otto Becker in Heidelberg. In Berlin, he was inducted as a member of the Berlin Ethnological Society and the Berlin Anthropological Society under the patronage of Dr. Rudolf Virchow.

Rizal was an anthropologist, architect, artist, educator, ethnologist, farmer, historian, linguist, ophthalmologist, psychologist, scientist, sociologist, sportsman, theologian, and writer. Having traveled extensively in Asia, Europe, and North America, he was a polyglot conversant in Tagalog, Spanish, French, German, English, Dutch, Greek, and Latin, and was knowledgeable in 14 other languages.

Aside from contributions to these various fields, Rizal was best known as a propagandist and reformist who wrote two famous novels, *Noli Me Tangere* (Berlin, 1887) and *El Filibusterismo* (Ghent, 1891), which depicted the injustices committed by Spanish authorities against Filipinos. He also annotated Antonio de Morga's *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas* (Paris, 1890) and contributed articles to the newspaper *La Solidaridad* (Barcelona, 1889–90). These works inspired both reformists and revolutionaries in the Philippines while making Rizal a prime target for the Spanish authorities there.

When he returned to the Philippines in 1892, Rizal founded La Liga Filipina, a socio-civic organization that advocated social reforms through legal means. The group was immediately disbanded by the Spanish authorities, and Rizal, considered an enemy of the state, was deported to Dapitan, Zamboanga del Norte, Philippines. While a political exile, Rizal built a boys' school and conducted classes in English and Spanish. He also maintained a hospital and installed a water supply system, as well as going into business, farming, and fishing.

On June 21, 1896, an emissary of Andres Bonifacio, leader of the secret society Katipunan, visited Rizal and informed him of the society's plan to launch a revolution. Rizal objected to this plan, since he deemed a revolution premature, although he suggested ways to prepare for its possible outbreak. Although he was not part of the Katipunan, the Spanish authorities linked him with the Philippine Revolution that began on August 24, 1896. They charged him before a court martial for rebellion, sedition, and conspiracy. Rizal refused a Katipunan offer to help him escape. After a mock trial, he was convicted and sentenced to death. On December 30, 1896, he was executed in Bagumbayan, Manila. With the end of Spanish rule in the Philippines, subsequent American and Filipino governments regarded Rizal as a national hero.

SEE ALSO: Philippines, Colonial Protests during the Spanish Era

References and Suggested Readings

- Coates, A. (1968) *Rizal: Philippine Nationalist and Martyr*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Guerrero, L. M. (1963) *The First Filipino*. Manila: National Historical Commission.
- Guerrero, M. & Schumacher, J. (1998) *Kasaysayan: The Story of the Filipino People*, Vol. 5: *Reform and Revolution*. Hong Kong: Asia Publishing Company.
- Ocampo, A. (1995) *Rizal Without the Overcoat*, 2nd ed. Pasig City: Anvil.

Robeson, Paul (1898–1976)

Michael Zeitler

As much as anyone in the decades following World War I, Paul Robeson helped to redefine black male identity in America and throughout the world. Born in Princeton, New Jersey, on April 9, 1898, the son of an ex-slave minister father and school teacher mother, Robeson's career achievements seem the raw material of legend. As an actor, he starred on Broadway in Eugene O'Neill's *All God's Chillun Got Wings* and *The Emperor Jones*, Shakespeare's *Othello*, and Jerome Kern's *Showboat*. On screen, he pioneered the way for black actors in films like *Song of Freedom* (1937) and *The Proud Valley* (1940), and fought against the dehumanizing black

stereotypes commonly portrayed in American films. As an athlete, he won 15 sport letters and All American recognition at Rutgers University and excelled in the early days of professional football. As a singer and recording artist, he was equally at home performing classical arias, African American spirituals, and folk songs, and his renditions of “Old Man River” and “The Ballad for Americans” remain icons of American popular culture. As a linguist and scholar, Robeson spoke multiple languages, earned Phi Beta Kappa status and Rutgers valedictorian honors, and graduated from the Columbia University School of Law.

Yet Robeson’s most enduring legacy was not as an artist but as a political activist and social thinker. He realized early in his career that the role of the artist must transcend the stage, screen, or concert hall to engage contemporary political and economic conditions. Robeson had always fought for civil rights in America, speaking out against lynching and refusing to perform before segregated audiences. By the early 1930s, however, his international film career brought him in contact with young Pan-African student leaders like Jomo Kenyatta and Kwame Nkrumah, connecting for him the domestic struggle for social justice to the international struggle against colonialism. In 1934 a trip to the Soviet Union further radicalized Robeson, increasing his interest in Marxism and socialist political and economic theory. Throughout the 1930s Robeson committed himself to the fight against fascism; he spoke and performed at fundraising rallies for the Spanish Republic and sang at the front for the troops in the International Abraham Lincoln Brigade.

During the Cold War, Robeson’s defense of the Soviet Union, together with his attacks on European colonialism, American racial injustice, and McCarthyism, made him a prime target for conservatives, both in and out of government. Right-wing groups violently interrupted his concerts and organized boycotts of his recordings, and the US government revoked his passport by executive order, although he was never charged with any crime. His professional career at a standstill, he continued to speak out against injustice and published his autobiography, *Here I Stand*, in 1958. After the restoration of his passport that same year, he began a triumphant three-year world concert tour. By 1963, illness forced his retirement, and he spent his remain-

ing years largely in seclusion, living with family in Philadelphia. He died on January 23, 1976. In Harlem, 5,000 mourners attended his funeral.

SEE ALSO: Abraham Lincoln Brigade; African American Resistance, Jim Crow Era; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; Harlem Renaissance; Kenyatta, Jomo (1893–1978); Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972)

References and Suggested Readings

- Duberman, M. B. (1988) *Paul Robeson*. New York: Knopf.
- Foner, P. S. (1978) *Paul Robeson Speaks: Writings, Speeches, Interviews 1918–1974*. New York: Brunner/Mazel Publishers.
- Robeson, P. (1988) *Here I Stand*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Robeson, P., Jr. (2001) *The Undiscovered Paul Robeson: An Artist’s Journey, 1898–1939*. New York: Wiley.
- Wright, C. (1975) *Robeson: Labor’s Forgotten Champion*. Detroit: Balamp.

Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794)

Soma Marik

Maximilien Robespierre was the most important leader of the French Revolution during its most radical phase, and therefore arguably the most important historical figure of the Revolution in its entirety. As the principal organizer of the political party that dominated the Convention and created the Jacobin Republic in 1793–4, his was the guiding hand in the Revolution’s most deeply transformative events. For the most part, however, his historical reputation has not been that of a revered revolutionary hero. The conservative Thermidorians who overthrew him condemned him as a dictatorial tyrant, and successfully transmitted that image of Robespierre to later generations. One positive aspect of his reputation survived, however. Robespierre had been widely known as “the Incorruptible” and even the Thermidorians were unable to refute that characterization.

Robespierre was born on May 6, 1758, in Arras, a town in the province of Artois in northern France. He became a lawyer and a talented writer, and though relatively poor and without an aristocratic patron, he was elected in April

1789 to the Estates General as a representative of the Third Estate from Artois. As a passionate admirer of the Enlightenment *philosophe* Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Robespierre made democratic principles the cornerstone of his political outlook.

The Revolution rapidly transformed the Third Estate from its originally intended role as a mere advisory body to the monarchy to a center of political power in its own right. Robespierre also became a member of a successor legislative body, the Constituent Assembly, which took up the challenge of drafting a constitution for France. Not all of the Assembly's members wanted a constitution, but those who did formed a political organization called the Society of the Friends of the Constitution, popularly known as the Jacobin Club. Robespierre led a left-wing minority within the Jacobins and appealed to the growing radicalized sector of the Parisian population as a base of support.

During the debates over the constitution Robespierre opposed the provision that would have allowed for a royal veto and criticized the idea of creating a two-tiered definition of citizenship that divided citizens into more-privileged "active" and less-privileged "passive" categories. He opposed decrees restricting the freedom of action of grassroots political societies, supported the abolition of slavery in Saint Domingue, championed the inclusion of full equality of blacks in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, and argued against the death penalty.

In June 1791 the king and his family secretly fled Paris to join an émigré army that aimed at defeating the Revolution and restoring the monarchy to full power. Although the attempt was foiled, it greatly deepened the political divisions in the country. The ensuing departure of moderates from the Jacobin Club strengthened Robespierre's position within it.

As the Constituent Assembly prepared to dissolve and turn the reins of power over to a successor Legislative Assembly, Robespierre supported a "self-denying ordinance" that prohibited members of the Constituent Assembly from sitting in the Legislative Assembly. The measure passed, and although it made Robespierre himself ineligible for election, it meant that the composition of the new legislative body would be less aristocratic and more bourgeois, and therefore more likely to give radical Jacobin proposals a hearing. Robespierre's political

energy during this period was devoted to developing the Jacobins' influence within the Legislative Assembly.

The monarchs of Austria and Prussia, worried that the rising tide of democracy might spill over into their domains, were threatening to wage war on France in order to crush the Revolution. Jacques Pierre Brissot, a prominent Jacobin, led a section of the radical bourgeois forces within the Assembly in calling for "revolutionary war," that is, for a preemptive strike against the counter-revolutionary forces. Brissot formulated his call to war in ultraradical terms, as a revolutionary crusade of liberation to overthrow the crowned heads of Europe.

Robespierre was one of two major figures among the revolutionaries who opposed the call to revolutionary war. The other was Jean-Paul Marat, who added his voice to Robespierre's through his influential periodical *L'Ami du Peuple*. Marat saw the call to war as a trap the counterrevolutionary forces were setting and warned that it would surely end in disaster for the revolutionary armies. Robespierre added that even in the unlikely event that the revolutionary forces were victorious, it would awaken militarism and lead to a dictatorship of the generals. He and Marat both believed that dangerous counterrevolutionaries at home, in their midst, were using the external threat to divert attention from their own nefarious activities.

The call for revolutionary war was extremely popular among the Parisian radicals, however, which meant that Robespierre became increasingly isolated at the Jacobin Club. Revolutionary France did indeed declare war on Austria on April 20. Robespierre resigned the post of public prosecutor at the tribunal of Paris and started a journal, *Le Défenseur de la Constitution*, to promote his own political positions.

On July 25 Prussia declared war on France and on August 1 news reached Paris that the Duke of Brunswick, commander of the coalition armies arrayed against France, had issued a manifesto explicitly threatening to raze Paris and massacre its inhabitants. In response, the Paris Commune (city government) called the populace to insurrection on August 10. The discredited Legislative Assembly was swept aside and replaced by a more democratically representative body, the National Convention, which when it met a few weeks later immediately abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the first French Republic.

Although Robespierre did not play a major role in the insurrection, the upsurge in radicalization had raised his popularity higher than ever and restored his influence within the Jacobin Club. When he took a seat in the reconstituted Paris Commune, most of its leaders welcomed him as an ally, but he soon found himself locked in political combat with the relatively moderate Girondin faction led by Brissot.

The Convention: Early Battles and the Execution of the King

Robespierre was elected to the National Convention as the first deputy for Paris, and 20 of the 24 Parisian seats were won by Jacobins, including Marat, George Jacques Danton, and Camille Desmoulins. Robespierre and his allies in the Convention occupied the higher tiers of seats at the back of the Convention hall and therefore came to be known as the Montagnards (Men of the Mountain). In a speech on November 5, 1792, Robespierre sharply denounced the Girondins' attempts to promote a "federalism" that would pit more conservative parts of France against revolutionary Paris.

In December 1792 Robespierre called for the execution of the erstwhile king as a traitor, and argued that the Girondin proposal for a referendum on the issue was a ruse to gather sympathy for the ex-monarch. It was the voices of Robespierre, Louis Antoine Saint-Just, and the other Montagnard leaders that swayed the Convention. The Girondins' call for a referendum was defeated by 141 votes and on January 21, 1793, the man formerly known as Louis XVI was guillotined.

The Reign of Terror

Robespierre is often portrayed as the creator of the "Reign of Terror," but a study of the interplay of relations between the Parisian masses and the various state and party institutions reveals a more complex picture, with considerable autonomy and initiative possessed by the *sans-culottes*, who were not simply creatures of the Jacobins.

After the king's execution, Montagnard influence increased at the expense of the Girondins. The official ministers of state had been rendered less powerful through the creation of two new governmental bodies, the Committee of Public Safety and the Committee of General Security,

which were established to defend the Revolution against its powerful internal and external enemies. The struggle within the Convention came to a head when its acting president, a Girondin deputy named Isnard, unwisely threatened Paris with destruction if the Paris Commune made a move against the provincial deputies. That set the stage for another great insurrection in Paris, May 31–June 2, 1793, which resulted in the destruction of the Girondins and the elevation of Robespierre and the Jacobins to full governmental power.

Robespierre wielded his power as a member of the Committee of Public Safety, which he joined in July 1793. The Jacobins' inability, or unwillingness, to meet the most radical *sans-culotte* demands quickly resulted in protests organized by extreme left wingers who identified themselves as *Enragés* (Madmen). Appealing to the need for absolute social unity in the face of the wartime emergency, the Jacobins brutally suppressed the *Enragés'* protests and jailed and executed their leaders. The independent popular societies of the *sans-culottes* were forcibly disbanded.

By executing the Girondins and the *Enragés*, the Jacobins eliminated the political rivals who attacked them from both left and right, but then similar struggles erupted *within* the Jacobin party itself. Robespierre was challenged from the right by a moderate faction led by Danton, and from the left by a radical faction led by Jacques René Hébert. Robespierre allied himself with Danton to defeat the Hébertistes, but after Hébert and his principal followers were guillotined on March 24, 1794, he immediately turned against the Danton faction and defeated it as well. Danton was arrested, tried, and executed less than two weeks later.

From Personal Dictatorship to Decline and Fall

In June the Convention passed the infamous law of Prairial 22, year II (June 10, 1794), which in the name of streamlining revolutionary justice denied accused persons any effective right to legal defense and eliminated all sentences other than acquittal or death. The period of the Great Terror had begun. From then until Robespierre's fall from power, 1,285 victims were guillotined in Paris. Distrusting anyone who opposed him, Robespierre's rule increasingly took on the appearance of a personal dictatorship.

Robespierre's desire for revolutionary change extended well beyond the ordinary sphere of politics. On May 7, 1794, he had the Convention pass a decree institutionalizing a religion of his invention, the Cult of the Supreme Being, which was publicly inaugurated by a massive, state-sponsored celebration on June 8. Robespierre, as president of the Convention, addressed the celebration to explain the theology of the new religion. The Supreme Being, he said, is a radical democrat who did not create kings and priests but who decreed liberty for the people. However well intentioned this effort of Robespierre's may have been, it backfired and mainly created resentment among people who did not want a new creed imposed upon them.

Even at its height, Robespierre's power was far from absolute. It depended on his ability to carry the votes of the Convention majority, which he was able to do only as long as the external military threat remained imminent. The French victory in the Battle of Fleurus, June 26, 1794, ended the threat of Austrian troops on French soil. When the wartime emergency eased, the numerous personal enemies Robespierre's harsh and high-handed methods had earned him succeeded in turning the Convention against him. The bourgeois majority of the Convention's deputies longed above all for a return to peace and normalcy, and they were happy to abandon Robespierre's austere regime at the earliest opportunity.

On July 26 Robespierre took the rostrum to denounce an unnamed group as traitors hatching "a conspiracy against liberty." In the context of the Terror, it is understandable that many of the Convention deputies perceived this as a threat to their own lives. In any event, Robespierre's opponents were able to rally a majority of deputies against him, and the following day – the 9th of Thermidor on the French revolutionary calendar – one after another of the deputies rose to speak against him. Robespierre and his closest allies were arrested and imprisoned. Troops loyal to the Paris Commune rescued them from prison and took them to the Hôtel de Ville (city hall), but the Convention met again and declared him and his defenders to be outlaws. National Guard troops were sent to the Hôtel de Ville to arrest them. In the ensuing mêlée, Robespierre sustained a serious gunshot wound to the jaw. It has generally been believed that this was a botched suicide attempt, but the evidence

is inconclusive. In any event, he was retaken into custody and the following day, July 28, 1794, was guillotined without trial on the Place de la Révolution. His supporters attempted to rally the *sans-culottes* in yet another Parisian insurrection to save his life and restore him to power, but the response was feeble. Ironically, Robespierre's own policies, including the guillotining of the *Enragés* and the Hébertistes, had demoralized the mass movement that might otherwise have come to his defense.

Robespierre's fall – known as Thermidor after the month in which it occurred – marked a decisive turning point in the history of the Revolution. Because his successors, the Thermidorians, demagogically used ultraradical language to disguise their intentions to reverse the revolutionary process, it was not immediately obvious that the Revolution had ended, but it had. The identification of Robespierre as the most important individual leader of the French Revolution is further strengthened by the fact that the revolutionary tide receded immediately following his fall.

Confirming the familiar dictum that history is written by the victors, the Thermidorians succeeded in turning Robespierre into a villain, and that portrayal has by and large persisted through the centuries. A more judicious evaluation, however, would recognize him as one of humanity's greatest benefactors for his crucial role in the historic transformation of France – and by extension Europe and the world.

SEE ALSO: Brissot, Jacques Pierre (1754–1793); Counterrevolution, France, 1789–1830; Danton, Georges Jacques (1759–1794); Estates General, France; French Revolution, 1789–1794; French Revolution, Historians' Interpretations; French Revolution, Radical Factions and Organizations; Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–1793); Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778); Saint-Just, Louis Antoine (1767–1794); *Sans-Culottes*; Sieyès, Abbé (1748–1836)

References and Suggested Readings

- Hampson, N. (1974) *The Life and Opinions of Maximilien Robespierre*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Jordan, D. P. (1989) *The Revolutionary Career of Maximilien Robespierre*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mathiez, A. (1928) *The French Revolution*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Mathiez, A. (1931) *After Robespierre: The Thermidorian Reaction*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

- Schama, S. (1989) *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*. New York: Alfred A Knopf.
- Soboul, A. (1964) *The Parisian Sans-Culottes and the French Revolution, 1793–94*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Tackett, T. (1996) *Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789–1790)*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rochambeau, Comte de (1725–1807)

Eric Martone

Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, Comte de Rochambeau, was a French aristocrat, a military leader, and a Marshall of France who participated in the American and French Revolutions. Leading his own French troops in the early 1780s, Rochambeau joined forces with General George Washington in support of American independence. During the French Revolution in the 1790s, however, Rochambeau defended the royal government of King Louis XVI in France.

Rochambeau was born in Vendôme, Loir-et-Cher, on July 1, 1725. Originally destined for a career in the Church, Rochambeau enlisted in a cavalry regiment following the death of his elder brother. He served with distinction in regions throughout Central Europe, including Bavaria and Bohemia, during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–8).

In 1743 Rochambeau was promoted to captain and moved to court, where his mother became lady-in-waiting to the Duchesse d'Orléans. Rochambeau became the aide of her husband, the Duc d'Orléans, whom he accompanied into battle in Flanders in 1746. He was promoted to colonel in 1747 and participated gallantly in the 1748 siege of Maastricht. In 1749, Rochambeau married Jeanne Thérèse Tellez d'Acosta, daughter of a wealthy merchant, and became governor of Vendôme.

During the Seven Years' War between France and England (1756–63), Rochambeau was promoted to major-general following his performance in the 1756 battle of Minorca. He fought most of the war stationed in Central Europe, where he distinguished himself as a commander and was wounded several times, notably in the 1760 battle of Clostercamp. In 1761,

Rochambeau became brigadier-general and inspector of the cavalry, positions that established him as an expert on technical matters of warfare. Following the 1763 peace treaty that ended the Seven Years' War, Rochambeau introduced military reforms to improve the functioning and training of the French army. He did his best to avoid court intrigue and received the Grand Cross of the Order of St. Louis in 1771.

By 1776, Rochambeau had become governor of Villedieu-en-France and collaborated with another general, the Comte de Vaux, to prepare an army for an invasion of England. These plans were cancelled, however, and in 1780 Louis XVI promoted Rochambeau to lieutenant-general and assigned him French troops to assist George Washington in America against the British during the American War of Independence. Rochambeau landed in Newport, Rhode Island, on July 10, 1780, with more than 5,000 men. He refused to abandon the French fleet blockaded by the British in Narragansett Bay and, consequently, was detained in Newport for about a year. Rochambeau and Washington met in a series of conferences at various locations to discuss strategy. In June 1781, Rochambeau and his men embarked on a march through Connecticut to join Washington on the Hudson River. Rochambeau placed himself at Washington's disposal and commanded his French troops as part of the American Continental Army. In September, Washington and Rochambeau met up with the French forces of the Marquis de Lafayette and Admiral de Grasse. These combined Franco-American forces laid siege to Yorktown, eventually forcing the British commander, Cornwallis, to surrender on October 19.

The United States Congress presented Rochambeau and his men with two cannons seized from the British. The cannons were brought to Vendôme, where they were requisitioned in 1792 during the French Revolution. On Rochambeau's return to France in 1783, Louis XVI awarded him the Cordon Bleu of the Order of the Saint Esprit and appointed him commander of the Northern District.

Rochambeau was stationed in Alsace in northeastern France, where he witnessed mass rioting following news of the July 1789 storming of the Bastille in Paris. During the early days of the French Revolution, he commanded the Northern Army in defense of the royal government, and in 1791 was appointed Marshal of France, the last

person to receive that high honor under the *ancien régime*. He resigned the post in 1792 when such honorifics were under sharp attack.

Rochambeau returned to Vendôme where he found his property ravaged and many of his friends killed. In 1794 he was arrested during the Reign of Terror and was scheduled to be guillotined, but was granted a stay of execution due to poor health. The overthrow of the Terror's architect, Robespierre, just days before Rochambeau's rescheduled execution date, saved his life. In 1801, Rochambeau met Napoleon Bonaparte, who granted him the Legion of Honor in 1804.

Rochambeau died in Thoré-la-Rochette in 1807. His memoirs were published posthumously in 1809. In 1902, France presented the United States with a statue of Rochambeau, which was unveiled in Lafayette Square in Washington, DC.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776; Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); French Revolution, 1789–1794; Lafayette, Marquis de (1757–1834); Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794); Washington, George (1732–1799)

References and Suggested Readings

- Davidson, M. (1984) *The Landing of Rochambeau*. Providence: Burning Deck.
- Lomask, M. (1965) *Rochambeau and Our French Allies*. New York: P. J. Kenedy.
- Rice, H. C. & Brown, A. S. K. (Eds.) (1972) *The American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Selig, R. A. & Donahoe, M. M. (2004) *En Avant with our French Allies: Connecticut Sites, Markers, and Monuments Honoring Comte de Rochambeau's French Troops for Contributions to American Independence, 1780–1782*. Hartford: Connecticut Commission on Culture and Tourism.
- Weelen, J. E. (1936) *Rochambeau, Father and Son*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Whitridge, A. (1965) *Rochambeau: America's Neglected Founding Father*. New York: Macmillan.

Rodney, Walter (1942–1980)

Roderick Bush

Walter Rodney grew up in Guyana in the wake of the labor uprisings of the late 1930s when national independence via constitutional decolon-

ization was on the agenda and political parties and trade unions were organizing the Indo-Caribbean and Afro-Caribbean masses. As a child of working-class activists in the leftist People's Progressive Party in Guyana, the young Rodney's involvement in distributing party literature gave him a sense of the dawn of a new historical force. Rodney then was part of a new generation which, by the 1960s, would come to question the attitudes of the post-independence governments toward the plight of the Afro-Caribbean and Indo-Caribbean working classes. Caribbean political novelist George Lamming lamented the manner in which the world division of labor, complicated by colonialism, has created an educated group that is contemptuous of the ordinary people of the Caribbean's adherence to non-western cultural forms, despite their otherwise anti-colonial stance (Bogues 2003: 127–8). While studying at the University of London, Rodney had been a member of a Marxist study group led by C. L. R. and Selma James. From the Jameses, Rodney took the urgent necessity to pay attention to the concrete historical context and its nuances, and the need to grapple with human creativity in the political domain (Bogues 2003: 129).

After graduating from the University of the West Indies (UWI) in 1963, Rodney entered the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London to study for his PhD, which he obtained in 1966. After a year teaching in Tanzania, Rodney returned to take a faculty position at UWI. Viewing the Rastafari as the leading expression of black consciousness in the Caribbean, Rodney thought it imperative to attach his own intellectual and political work to this force. He identified himself with them as a man of the working class who was using the education that he had obtained from "Babylon" for the good of the ordinary man, who should know about Mother Africa and who should reject the cultural imperialism of the white world. "Bro Wally," as he was known among the Rastafari during the 1960s, engaged in a process of "grounding" with the working class and underprivileged in Jamaica, and was banned by the governing Jamaican Labor Party in 1968, who viewed this activity as a threat. This set off what have come to be called the Black Power Riots in Jamaica in October 1968 (Bogues 2003: 130).

Rodney returned to Tanzania where he remained from 1968 to 1974. One year after his banishment from Jamaica, Rodney published *The Grounding with My Brothers* in which he assails the black elite in Jamaica as agents of neocolonial control and criticizes the patronizing attitudes of the black middle class toward the lower strata of Jamaican society, while hailing the role of these lower strata in the production of knowledge and culture. For Rodney, the masses did not need a political party of radical intellectuals to assist them, as in the Gramscian conception; rather, the radical intellectuals needed to attach themselves to the masses in motion. While in Tanzania, Rodney published *A History of the Upper Guinea Coast* (1970) and *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (1972).

Rodney ultimately was called upon to return to Guyana in 1974, where he wrote *The History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881–1905* (1981). In this work, Rodney points out how capitalists sought to use African and Indian workers against one another. As a member of the newly formed Working People's Alliance, he sought to oppose this strategy. It was for his activism within this organization that the government rescinded his faculty appointment at the University of Guyana, and that Rodney was assassinated in Georgetown on June 13, 1980.

SEE ALSO: Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Class Identity and Protest; Class, Poverty, and Revolution; Class Struggle; Guyana, Protests and Revolts; Imperialism and Capitalist Development; James, C. L. R. (1901–1989)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bogues, A. (2003) *Black Heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals*. New York: Routledge.
- Campbell, H. (1987) *Rasta and Resistance: From Marcus Garvey to Walter Rodney*. Trenton: Africa World Press.
- Rodney, W. (1975) *The Grounding with My Brothers*. London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications.
- Rodney, W. (1980) *A History of the Upper Guinea Coast, 1545 to 1800*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Rodney, W. (1982) *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Washington, DC: Howard University Press.
- Rodney, W. (1990) *Walter Rodney Speaks: The Making of an African Intellectual*. Trenton: Africa World Press.
- Wallerstein, I. (1986) Walter Rodney: The Historian as Spokesman for Historical Forces. *American Ethnologist* 13, 2 (May): 330–7.

Rodríguez, Silvio (b. 1946)

Benjamín Anaya González

The most influential songwriter of the Nueva Trova Cubana (Cuban New Song), Silvio Rodríguez Domínguez was born November 26, 1946 in San Antonio de Los Baños, Cuba. The triumph of the Cuban Revolution (1959) led to improvements in arts and education, and Rodríguez, who had served in the military from 1964 to 1967, played an important role after being invited by Mario Romeu, former director of the Cuban Institute of Broadcasting, to appear in the popular TV program *Música y Estrellas* (Music and Stars). As he sailed around the Atlantic and Africa in 1969, he composed 62 songs, among them “Playa Girón” and “Ojalá.”

When he returned to Cuba, he became a member of the Group of Sound Experimentation (GESI) at the Institute of Cuban Cinema, where he contacted composers such as Leo Brouwer and guest lecturers such as Fred Smith. The GESI brought him into contact with other composers and songwriters and allowed him to experiment further in his music. His friendship with Vicente Feliú, Noel Nicola, and especially Pablo Milanés exposed him to new ideas about Cuban music, the role of the composer in society, the future of popular music, and social change. This prompted the group to start the Nueva Trova Cubana movement, which combined social concerns with the use of romantic verses about love. Rodríguez has since then traveled around the world, playing to crowded stadiums and in public plazas. His success, however, has more to do with the development of social struggles in Latin America and Europe than with broadcasting companies' promotional activities. Despite considering himself as a critical voice within the Revolution, his support for the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) has been remarkable. He has made over 80 recordings.

SEE ALSO: Music and Protest, Latin America

References and Suggested Readings

- Casaus, V. & Noguerras, L. R. (1993) *Silvio: Que levante la mano la guitarra*. Havana: Letras Cubanas.

Rodríguez, Simón (1769–1854)

Karolin Weinzierl

Simón Rodríguez was a philosopher and pedagogue who advocated progressive education. He is perhaps best known as the mentor of Simón Bolívar and author of a revolutionary concept of education for postcolonial Latin America.

Rodríguez grew up as a founding in the family of a priest named Simón Carreño Rodríguez. In 1791 he became a teacher in a primary school in Caracas, where Bolívar was one of his students. Impressed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau's ideas, he developed a thesis that education forms one of the few central elements of political emancipation. This led him to demand the opening of schools for all boys, not just white boys. As a teacher, his goal was to educate, not to instruct. Thus he used not only books but also less traditional methodology such as play and experimentation. In 1797 he was suspected of participating in the insurrection of Gual y España and was forced to leave Venezuela, never to return.

While in exile, first in Jamaica and then in the US and France, he changed his name to Samuel Robinson and met up with Bolívar again in 1804. He spent time with his former student, who credited him with forming his appreciation for justice and liberty, as they traveled through France and Italy, attending the coronation of Napoléon Bonaparte as king of Italy. In Rome on the Monte Sacro, Bolívar swore to Rodríguez that he would dedicate his life to the liberation of Latin America. Rodríguez continued his pilgrimage alone in Prussia, Polonia, and Russia, spending a total of more than 20 years in Europe.

Returning to Latin America he founded the first school-workshop in 1824 and, called upon by Bolívar, became the director of public education. In 1826 in Chuquisaca he founded the second school-workshop, which closed soon after due to political pressure.

Rodríguez died in 1853 while on a journey with his son. After years of being portrayed as nearly crazy, 100 years after his death his remains were transferred to the pantheon of his native city. Though he was once reduced to his role as an important teacher of Bolívar, he came to be seen as an important figure in Latin American education of liberation of the 1980s. Under

Chávez he became one of the most important national heroes, besides Bolívar and Ezequiel Zamora.

SEE ALSO: Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); Bolivarianism, Venezuela; Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–Present; Freire, Paulo (1921–1997); Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778); Saint-Simon, Comte de (1760–1825); Venezuelan War of Independence; Zamora, Ezequiel (1817–1860)

References and Suggested Readings

- Rodríguez, S. (1840) *Sociedades americanas en 1828: Primera parte: Luces y virtudes sociales*. Valparaiso: Imprenta del Mercurio. Facsimile in HTML available at www.mipagina.cantv.net/t6435bm/SA_Valp/index.html. Accessed May 30, 2008.
- Rodríguez, S. (1842) *Sociedades americanas*. Lima: Imprenta del Comercio. Facsimile in HTML available at www.mipagina.cantv.net/t6435bm/SA_Valp/index.html. Accessed May 30, 2008.
- Rodríguez, S. (1975) *Obras completas*. Caracas: Universidad Simón Rodríguez.
- Rodríguez Rojas, P. (n.d.) *Simón Rodríguez y la educación: Enlas (sic) nuevas repúblicas americanas*. Available at www.monografias.com/trabajos40/bolivar-y-rodriguez/bolivar-y-rodriguez2.shtml. Accessed May 30, 2008.
- Rumazo González, A. (1976) *Simón Rodríguez, maestro de América*. Caracas: Universidad Simón Rodríguez.
- Twickel, C. (2006) *Hugo Chávez: Eine Biografie*. Hamburg: Nautilus.

Romania, mineworker protests, 20th century

Ion Bogdan Vasi

Jiu Valley miners of Romania have participated in among Eastern Europe's most powerful labor strikes throughout the twentieth century. Labor strife has appeared under both private ownership and state control. The first major conflict began when the mines were under private control in the summer of 1929, when workers from Lupeni went on strike demanding shorter workdays and higher salaries. A radical group of miners occupied the power station controlling the mines' pumping machinery, threatening to flood the mines. The authorities sent in troops to restart the power station and break the strike; in the ensuing confrontation between the soldiers and the miners, approximately 22 miners were killed and 58 wounded by government forces.

After World War II, when the Communist Party took political power over Romania, the mines were nationalized and transformed into joint Soviet–Romanian companies (*Sovroms*). After 1965, the mines were intensively exploited as a means of paying off the country's foreign debt. Under the rule of Nicolae Ceaușescu, while the Jiu Valley region underwent dramatic industrialization and development, miners' working conditions remained harsh and strenuous. Protesting conditions and eroding wages, in August 1977 miners in the Jiu Valley staged a major strike. More than 30,000 miners gathered in the main yard of the Lupeni mine protesting a state decree raising the retirement age and reducing miner pensions. After miners had taken the prime minister hostage, President Ceaușescu reluctantly acquiesced to their demand that he visit the mines in the Jiu Valley and inspect the working and living conditions. Upon concluding the visit, Ceaușescu agreed to the workers' demands.

After the 1977 strike, fearing Jiu Valley miner militancy, the Communist Party relocated about 4,000 workers out of the region while transferring large numbers of workers into the region. Most of the strike leaders were imprisoned or disappeared, while large numbers of plainclothes security police were hired as workers in the mines as a means to contain and limit mineworker organizing. The Romanian government sought to suppress information of the miners' strike and it was largely unknown beyond the Jiu Valley.

In December 1989, after the fall of the Ceaușescu regime, approximately 200,000 people lived in the Jiu Valley and nearly 80 percent of all workers were employed by the mining industry. In the first decade after the collapse of Ceaușescu's eccentric leadership, miners mobilized six major protests, known in Romania as *mineriade*, or the *miners' epopeia*.

The first three miners' protests occurred in 1990. In January 1990, more than 5,000 miners came for the first time to Romania's capital, Bucharest, following televised communiqués from Ion Iliescu, the new leader of the first post-socialist governing party called the National Salvation Front (FSN). Their declared mission was to "protect the fragile newborn Romanian democracy" and end the conflict between the FSN and the political opposition, which organized protests against the greater democracy and free-market economic policies favorable to the West. The miners returned a month later to "rescue"

the government from anti-communist demonstrators. Though the police had already dispersed the street demonstrators, approximately 4,000 miners expressed support for the new government. On June 13, a few thousand miners from the Jiu Valley returned again to help the police "clean up" the University Square, occupied by students and anti-communist demonstrators. As a result of their violent actions, 560 people were hospitalized, six died, and more than 1,000 anti-communist demonstrators were arrested.

In 1991, the miners returned again to the capital to protest their wages and working conditions. In September 1991, Miron Cozma, head of the mineworker union, led thousands of miners from the Jiu Valley to the capital to overthrow the government that refused to meet their demands to increase wages. After two days of street fights in Bucharest resulting in hundreds of injured and three deaths, the miners occupied the national deputies' meeting room and successfully demanded the resignation of the prime minister.

In 1997 and 1999, the miners engaged in two final strikes, or *mineriade*, before the end of the twentieth century. In 1997, more than 10,000 miners from Jiu Valley staged a peaceful strike. In January 1999 Jiu Valley miners went on strike again, traveling to Bucharest on buses owned by the miners' union or on foot. After clashes with the police, more than 15,000 miners, supported by hundreds of local citizens, took nearly 2,000 police hostage to restrain further government armed action. The government conceded to negotiate with the miners, who reached agreement with Radu Vasile, Romania's prime minister.

The government has sought to restrict the power of mineworkers through the legal system. In February 1999, the government sentenced mineworker leader Cozma to 18 years in prison for leading subversive anti-state demonstrations in 1991. Cozma, supported by the leaders of the Jiu Valley miners' union, condemned the verdict as politically motivated and started new protests. While more than 4,000 miners sought to reach Bucharest by bus, they were stopped by special police forces. During these violent clashes, more than 100 people were injured and one miner was killed, while many workers were arrested. Cozma remained incarcerated from 1999 to December 2007.

A number of factors have contributed to the potent force of Jiu Valley miners' protests in

the post-socialist period. In the Jiu Valley, worker organizing benefits from the dense social networks that unify mines and neighborhoods and accentuates workplace and community activism. Miner leaders are also experienced organizers with significant resources to mobilize a few hundred dedicated followers to act as a “praetorian guard” to prevent government infiltration. Under the Ceaușescu regime, the Romanian Communist Party created a network of informants and collaborators in an effort to control the miners. However, miners sought to oppose this through forming bonds of solidarity to counteract government efforts to spy on the workers. Finally, the miners strongly believed that their actions were legitimized because they were fighting against opponents labeled by their leaders and political allies as “corrupted officials” or “traditional class enemies,” and they shared the participant identity of “the fist of the working class.”

SEE ALSO: Romania, Protest and Revolution, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- City of Lupeni website, www.jiuvalley.com/eng/cities/lupeni/subcat.asp?categ=27&subcateg=46 (accessed December 2007).
- Crowley, S. & Ost, D. (2001) *Workers after Workers' States: Labor and Politics in Postcommunist Eastern Europe*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Vasi, I. B. (2004) The Fist of the Working Class: The Social Movements of Jiu Valley Miners in Post-Socialist Romania. *East European Politics and Societies* 18 (1): 132–57.

Romania, protest and revolution, 20th century

Jolan Bogdan

Modern-day Romania was established in 1858 by the joining of Moldavia and Wallachia and recognized as an independent state in 1878 by the Treaty of Berlin. Romania began as a monarchy, under the reign of German Prince Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, who became King Carol I in 1881 following the short reign of Alexandru Cusa, a reformist who quickly lost support among the wealthy after introducing land reform.

During World War I, Romania fought on the side of the Entente and the US, receiving a

sizable reward after the war in the form of substantial territories with Romanian populations, namely Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina. Romanians in those regions, already engaged in the struggle for independence from their respective rulers, finally achieved unity with the newly formed Romanian nation. However, Bessarabia and Bukovina would eventually be returned. Transylvania, the largest of the three, was alone in remaining a Romanian territory, signaling an end to centuries of struggle. The Romanian national holiday, Unification Day, marked the date of December 1, 1918, celebrating Transylvania's unification with Romania.

Peasant Uprising of 1907

A large peasant revolt swept through Moldavia and Wallachia in 1907, protesting unfair land ownership and distribution. While peasants comprised over 80 percent of the population, more than half owned no land. Wealthy landowners, living in towns rather than villages, left managers called *arendasi* to supervise the peasantry. The conflict began when Mochi Fisher, from an Austrian Jewish family who managed a substantial part of Moldavian land, refused to enter into an agreement with the local peasants in the village of Flamanzi. The people panicked, fearing they would remain without resources to support their families if Fisher did not provide them with work. In turn, they attacked Fisher, who managed to escape to a neighboring village. The peasants, still without work, revolted and discontent quickly spread throughout the region, leading to the killing of many local *arendasi*. The mostly Romanian peasantry clashed with the predominantly Jewish *arendasi*, resulting in suspicions of ethnically motivated violence. The government soon declared a state of emergency, and mobilized well over 100,000 men to suppress the uprising by opening fire on the peasants. King Carol I, of Germanic origin, ordered evidence of the number of casualties. While the precise number of deaths remains unknown, the figure of 11,000 is most often cited.

Iron Guard, Antonescu, and World War II

The Iron Guard, an anti-Semitic and ultranationalist group active in Romania between the late 1920s and early 1940s, is also sometimes

known as the Legion of the Archangel Michael, and occasionally as the Greenshirts. Founded by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the group differed from other fascists due to its strong religious leanings and popularity among peasants and students. The legacy of the Romanian propaganda machine may have its roots in the Iron Guard, who were adept at organizing nationalistic campaigns, demonstrations, and gatherings. In response to consistent aggression, Prime Minister Ion Dunca banned the anti-liberal group in 1933, a move that he paid for with his life shortly thereafter. King Carol II assumed the role of royal dictator in February 1938, arrested Codreanu the following April, and ordered his execution in November. A new government formed in early 1939, but the Iron Guard assassinated the newly appointed prime minister in September.

At the onset of World War II, King Carol II attempted to remain neutral, but Romania's neighbors forced a lean toward the Axis alliance. France and Britain, too weak and far away, could not offer substantial support to Romania, while Soviet territorial interests made them a dubious ally. Hoira Sima, the new leader of the Iron Guard, formed an alliance with the military figure Ion Antonescu, establishing a joint government that forced the abdication of King Carol II in 1940. The king's son Mihai replaced him, but Antonescu wielded all the power effectively as dictator. Under Antonescu's authority, the Iron Guard launched a series of pogroms and executions, rivaling the atrocities committed by the Nazis in Germany. However, Antonescu repeatedly refused to grant the Iron Guard any real political power, and instead continued to use the organization as eager anti-Semitic pawns in his military campaign.

Antonescu served as prime minister and *Conducător* of Romania from 1940 to 1944, forming an official alliance with Nazi Germany in 1941. Through this connection, the dictator hoped to regain Northern Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina. According to the 2004 special investigative commission led by Elie Wiesel, Holocaust survivor and Nobel laureate, Antonescu bore direct responsibility for the deaths of between 280,000 and 380,000 Jews and 25,000 Roma. In 1944, recognizing a possible Russian victory, King Mihai ordered Antonescu arrested after the general refused to surrender. In 1946, as communist power in Romania emerged dominant, Antonescu was sentenced and executed and King

Mihai was forced to abdicate in 1947, being replaced with a new communist dictatorship.

Communism and Resistance

In 1947, in response to the collectivization of land, small pockets of resistance emerged from landowners and as many as 80,000 were jailed for refusing to sign over their land. A few small groups armed themselves and fled to the mountains. With their land collectivized and their status as anti-patriotic fugitives, the army, police, and Securitate (the communist government's secret police) pursued and captured most rebel landholders. News of the last survivor's arrest surfaced in the late 1970s.

Poorly armed and few in number, the resistance posed little threat to the communist government, although authorities viewed opponents of collectivization as damaging to the unity and popular support they were attempting to construct. Since the 1989 revolution, the government has focused more attention on rebels, in part to revise the perception of limited resistance to the communist regime. In contrast to other eastern bloc countries, for example Poland and Hungary, Romanian resistance is viewed as fairly limited, perhaps due to the larger police state apparatus.

The Protests of 1956

The 1956 uprising in Hungary again ignited the spirit of protest in Romania, not least among the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. More research is emerging concerning the impact of the 1956 revolution and its effect on Romania, though a lack of clear synthesis between the two ethnic groups remains, pointing to persistent tensions in the region. Research sponsored by ethnic Hungarians or Romanians neglects the involvement of the other, but when compared side by side, an image emerges that both were actively engaged in opposition to the Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceaușescu government.

One Hungarian historian indicates that in the 1970s the Romanian government was prosecuting former university students in Timișoara and Cluj who were involved in the 1956 uprising. The events in Cluj are becoming known, partially due to the involvement of the students of Babes-Bolyai University, the only Hungarian University in Romania, subsequently closed by the communist government during the 1970s. According to historian Sandor Pal Antal, in the Tirgu Mures

region, which has a large ethnic Hungarian population, over 11,000 were arrested between 1956 and 1965, and over 800 of the detainees were sentenced to prison. In predominantly Romanian regions, 1956 student and worker demonstrations in Cluj, Timișoara, Iași, and Bucharest opposed compulsory teaching of Russian in schools and universities, while both workers and students demanded better food supplies and a higher standard of living. The revolutionary anti-Russian events in Hungary that year undoubtedly stirred protests among Romania's population, and the government dealt with the protesters swiftly and brutally, as it had done with the anti-collectivization movement a decade earlier.

Ceaușescu during the 1960s

The 1960s saw the death of the first communist dictator Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and the rise of Nicolae Ceaușescu, who strategically cast himself as a pro-western and anti-Soviet benevolent communist dictator. Western powers, eager to form alliances with a rogue eastern bloc state, provided Ceaușescu with international credibility and some respect and admiration among Romanians. Perhaps this brief period of optimism heralding the beginning of Ceaușescu's regime explains the lack of protests during that decade. However, Ceaușescu's questionable economic decision-making lowered the country's economic production, while increasing foreign debt. The dictator gradually began to implement increasingly drastic consumption restrictions on food, heating, and use of electricity in the home. By the late 1970s, the dire conditions contributed to worker mobilizations in mining and other sectors.

Miners of the Jiu Valley

The most significant threat to the communist regime came from groups of organized miners, whose long history of popular protest had consistently challenged the powers of the ruling class since the 1920s, distinguishing them from other special interest groups and securing their place in the Romanian history of protest. Jiu Valley's mines opened in the 1840s, under private ownership, and have undergone a myriad of economic and political transformations over the past 150 years. Following the communist takeover of 1947, the state-appropriated mines and their resources were shared with Russia in an attempt to make retribution for the World

War II German alliance. After Ceaușescu took power, Soviet–Romanian economic partnerships ceased, and for a brief period the miners felt the economic benefits of their labor.

Proletarian unrest in the region began as early as the 1890s, with the first violent clash occurring during the Lupeni strike in August of 1929, following severe pay cuts and joblessness in the region. The police responded to the strikes with violence and opened fire on the crowd of demonstrators, killing over 30. This unprecedented hostility against the miners would carry over into future regimes, as would the workers' commitment to defending their labor rights. It is a little known fact that Ceaușescu spent time in the mines of the Jiu Valley, and even attempted to instigate a strike in 1941. The story of his subsequent arrest at the hands of the (actual) fascist police would later serve him well in establishing the myth of his status as oppressed proletariat hero extraordinaire.

No documented popular protests occurred under communist rule after the 1956 uprising until the miners' strike of 1977, in the southwestern region of the Jiu Valley, which was the first major public demonstration to take place during Ceaușescu's career. The miners protested ever-declining working conditions and benefits, and demanded a meeting with Ceaușescu, perhaps feeling justified in this request due to the leader's personal connection to the region. Ceaușescu attempted to assuage the workers, but showed a reluctance to make a personal appearance. Only after the miners brutalized his representatives did the dictator himself emerge on the scene.

His defensiveness further agitated the miners, who teetered on the edge of a full-scale riot. But Ceaușescu's advisor managed to calm both parties, and the dictator finally agreed to meet some of the workers' demands, which included the retirement age to remain at 50, better pay and working conditions, shorter workdays and workweeks, a trained medical professional on site, and more opportunities for miners' wives and daughters who, not working in the mines, had few employment prospects in the region. However, after Ceaușescu returned to Bucharest, he immediately withdrew all his offers and instead dispatched the Securitate to flush out and deal with the organizers of the strike. Within a few days, following interrogations and intimidation of the miners, the Securitate identified key activists and relocated them to distant parts of the

country. Of the 35,000 miners present at the protest, 4,000 were transferred. Informants, some of whom went on to assume roles of leadership within the mining community, replaced a number of these displaced miners.

Following this incident, miners have gone on to compose an enigmatic part of Romania's political landscape. Various other strikes occurred through the 1980s, including miners in the Maramures region in Transylvania in 1983, factory workers in Braşov in 1987, and substantial miners' strikes even as recently as 1999. Workers in heavy industry have repeatedly served as serious threats to the government. However, in the 1990s they took on a particularly intriguing role, acting alternately in defense of and in opposition to the new government. Amidst the heavy anti-communist protests of 1990 against the new post-Ceauşescu (but not necessarily post-communist) government, President Ion Iliescu appealed to miners to go to Bucharest and defend the capital against the so-called fascist invasion. Iliescu used the miners as a policing body to carry out the will of the state in matters where official involvement would appear unacceptable in a democratic nation, such as the suppression of a popular protest. Yet, despite their illicit involvement in questionable government operations, the miners' uprisings constituted a real, consistent, and organized threat to the government over the past 170 years. Their current position, with a strike in 1999 boasting the involvement of 15,000 miners, is further complicated by the modernization and transformation of the industry itself, which is becoming increasingly superfluous to the Romanian economy, and even an economic burden.

Romanian Revolution, December 1989

The western city of Timişoara, near the Hungarian and Yugoslav borders is recognized as a diverse and ethnically peaceful city, with a long history as a center of tolerance and progressive politics. Germans, Serbians, Croats, Hungarians, and Romanians have lived peacefully side by side in Timişoara for centuries, unlike other ethnically diverse regions of Transylvania. Due to their geographic distance from Bucharest, Ceauşescu's political oppression did not shape the lives of residents as elsewhere in the country. With greater access to foreign media, western

influences infiltrated the closed Romanian system and provided crucial information during the late 1980s as Eastern European communist regimes were collapsing.

Press coverage during December of 1989 would prove crucial after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November, as all over the region countries were undergoing non-violent revolutions and overthrowing their previous communist regimes. Despite drastic transformations in the region, Ceauşescu continued to cling to power.

Laszlo Toekes, a priest of the Timişoara Reformed Church since 1986, openly criticized Ceauşescu and the communist regime during the 1980s. Unlike the bishops of the Reformed Church, boasting over 700,000 parishioners (all of them Hungarian), Toekes openly criticized the government in his sermons. On May 1, 1989, Toekes received notice of his transfer from Timişoara to a small village in a non-Hungarian region. The date of his eviction, set for December 15, prompted congregants to rally around his residence supporting his refusal to relocate.

The first clash between police and protesters occurred on the eve of December 15, when police attempted to arrest one demonstrator. More than 1,000 people participated in the protest as the other residents of the city gradually outnumbered the original congregation members. The following day, the mayor, trying to disperse the crowd, persuaded only a few to leave, assuring that Toekes would be permitted to stay. By then, the gathering had grown beyond the scope of its original intent.

On Saturday December 16, large numbers of students from the local universities joined in, and many marched toward the city center in opposition to the communist government. To quell the uprising, government reinforcements arrived with fire trucks to spray demonstrators with water and prevent the march on the town center. However, the forces could not stop approximately 5,000 protesters from reaching the downtown area and vandalizing the Communist Party headquarters. The protesters attempted to pursue non-violence in opposition to the army, and no firearms were used nor deaths reported while the demonstration grew in number.

The next day, Toekes was beaten by the Securitate at his home and arrested. Despite the imposing military presence, protesters continued gathering in large numbers, requesting a meeting

with authorities. The army again sprayed them with water as they headed back to the Communist Party building, but protesters managed to take over several of the army's vehicles, and many troops fled. The crowd continued to advance, occupied the building, and displayed the now-famous flag without the communist coat of arms. A demonstrator waved the flag from the balcony to the delight of the crowd gathered below. Soon groups of armed soldiers arrived with rifles and bayonets and attacked the crowd indiscriminately, killing some women and children.

In Bucharest, the government called a meeting to address the situation. Ceaușescu, furious that the army had not taken greater action against the demonstrators, was convinced of foreign involvement, repeatedly citing the West's desire to overthrow Romania and other socialist nations. In a rage, Ceaușescu threatened to resign, but concluded the meeting with the order for the army and the police to kill protesters without hesitation.

In Timișoara the army opened fire on unarmed demonstrators, killing and wounding protesters and dispersing the crowd. Many troops shot into the air or at the ground, presenting a reluctance to follow orders. Moreover, despite the shooting, the crowds refused to disperse permanently, regrouping and calling for non-violence. The army continued to open fire on the unarmed groups. On December 18, the government disabled civilian communication and assembled a greater number of police. Many protesters were detained and tortured, and dead bodies were even stolen by the Securitate in an attempt to conceal the death count, which varied in its estimates in the months following the protests. Ceaușescu, reluctant to cancel previous plans for a state visit to Iran, went ahead with his schedule and flew to Teheran on December 18. By the time he returned, the army had joined the people of Timișoara and the demonstrations had spread throughout Romania.

Bucharest

Ceaușescu returned from Iran on December 20 and addressed the nation via the country's sole national television station, condemning the actions of the "hooligans" in Timișoara while implicating Hungary, and asking Romanians to defend the territorial sovereignty of the nation. He also called for a rally in Bucharest, which

would become the final catalyst in the revolution. On the afternoon of December 21, the people of Bucharest gathered in Palace Square, below the balcony of the Central Committee building, as they had so many times before, to hear Ceaușescu address the nation. However, on this occasion, the streets contained a heavier than usual police presence, with residents of Bucharest well aware of the protests throughout the nation. When Ceaușescu addressed the crowd, loud shouts and commotion interrupted the usual cheers, and some even yelled out the name "Timișoara," indicating solidarity with the residents of that city. The dictator and his wife Elena, looking visibly disturbed, eventually left the balcony, events that were broadcast live throughout the country.

As people began to leave the square, some of the crowd regrouped a few blocks away, then vandalized government propaganda on the streets and chanted anti-communist slogans. The military quickly intervened to intimidate the protesters. While the army gathered reinforcements and strategically positioned itself, the popular assembly formed an even larger non-violent demonstration. By nightfall, the army began pressuring demonstrators through intimidation tactics, assaults, arrests, and occasional shots into the air. Fire trucks again sprayed water on demonstrators, seeking to subdue them. Nevertheless, the crowds remained, and the people responded by building a barricade to protect themselves against the army. Tanks entered the city after midnight, summoned to break through the barricade, and opened fire on the people; some demonstrators were killed and many more arrested, causing the crowd to eventually disband.

On the morning of December 22, the residents of Bucharest awoke to a state of emergency and the announcement that Minister of Defense Vasile Milea had committed suicide. The previous day Milea had disobeyed orders, refusing to instruct his troops to fire into the crowd. Consequently, some viewed the circumstances of Milea's death with skepticism and once again regrouped in large numbers to demand Ceaușescu's resignation. When the dictator appeared on the balcony again to address the people, they chanted anti-government slogans and began to infiltrate the Central Committee building. At that point, the Ceaușescus headed for the roof, where a military helicopter awaited

them. The crowd below watched as the helicopter took flight, signaling the end of the regime.

To the Television Studios

After Ceaușescu fled the city, political chaos ensued in the capital, with hoards of individuals and special interest groups vying for power. Speaker after speaker addressed the crowd below the Central Committee building, seeking to fill the power vacuum left behind by the former leader. The television channel, renamed Free Romanian Television, broadcast many of these events live to the nation.

Among the speakers on the newly liberated media was popular dissident poet Mircea Dinescu, an open critic of Ceaușescu's regime who was trusted by many Romanians. Appearing before the cameras with a group of activists occupying the television station, Dinescu declared victory for the Romanian nation. This broadcast marked the beginning of several consecutive days of continuous coverage that many, both inside and outside Romania, would call the first truly televised revolution. Of course, the coverage began after much of the violence had ended, both in Timișoara and in Bucharest, and after Ceaușescu had fled. Nevertheless, the Bucharest television studio became the political focal point where the powers-to-be converged and decided the fate of the nation. Demonstrators occupying the station asked Ion Iliescu, who would become president the following year, to make his way to the television station. When he arrived, the others present spoke to him with a great amount of deference. Though few members of the television audience knew him, Iliescu was viewed as a popular figure on live television during the broadcasts in the final days of the revolution.

The political maneuvers inside the television station, while maintaining the rhetoric of the revolution, lost the clarity of the initial goals. The decisions and motives of those occupying the building became anything but transparent. Gradually, nationalist rhetoric replaced the revolutionary impetus of the original demonstrations.

One particularly murky development involved the continued fighting with supposed terrorists. After the army joined the people, a new and mysterious enemy emerged, whose identity remains in question. Nor have any of the governments that came to power following Ceaușescu attempted to investigate the matter. All reports state merely that for several days following Ceaușescu's depart-

ure, an invisible enemy attacked the nation, destroying buildings and killing hundreds of people. Speculation as to the identity of these attackers varies from any number of foreign nationals, from Russian to Iranian to Hungarian, to members of the Securitate itself, or perhaps another elite security force under Ceaușescu's command. No Romanian government has thus far conducted an investigation to determine the nature of those responsible for the attacks.

Aftermath

Given the brutal political climate in Romania prior to the revolution of 1989, it is perhaps understandable that political officials would have inevitably been connected to Ceaușescu and the Romanian Communist Party. Iliescu, in particular, was not just a member of the party, but a leading activist. The new government contained many such figures. That politicians could not distance themselves from Ceaușescu is understandable. But were communists reelected because they too remained steadfast believers in the system, or because no viable non-communist candidates were available? The answer is not clear. Iliescu was elected by an overwhelming majority, but then fiercely opposed as a communist. His liberal successor, Emil Constantinescu, was vehemently opposed for his rapid market-driven agenda of reform, and proved that a non-traditional approach was equally problematic. At the close of the twentieth century, the tension between traditionalist and reformist governance stood at an impasse.

SEE ALSO: Hungary, Revolution of 1956; Romania, Mineworker Protests, 20th Century; Romania, Protests and Revolts, 18th and 19th Centuries; Romania, Student and Worker Protests, 1956

References and Suggested Readings

- Deletant, D. (1995) *Ceaușescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965–1989*. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.
- Friedman, J. R. (2005) *Furtive Selves: Proletarian Contradictions, Self-Presentation, and the Party in 1950s Romania*. Available at www.journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=360120.
- Gallagher, T. (2005) *Theft of a Nation: Romania Since Communism*. London: Hurst.
- McDermott, K. & Stibbe, M. (Eds.) (2007) *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule*. New York: Berg.

- Ratesh, N. (1991) *Romania, the Entangled Revolution: The Washington Papers*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Roper, S. D. (2004) *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*. London: Routledge.
- Roustel, D. (1999) Bitter Victory for Romanian Miners. *Le Monde diplomatique*. Available at www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/62/462.html.
- Verdery, K. (1991) *National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Romania, protests and revolts, 18th and 19th centuries

Jolan Bogdan

Romania's turbulent history of struggle and revolution dates back as far as the first century. The legacy of recent history, however, begins in the eighteenth century, when Romanians, swept up in the waves of nationalism and ambitions of self-rule washing over Europe, began their struggle for establishing an independent Romanian state, free from foreign interference. The nationalist goal was to unite under one rule the three principalities in the Balkan region, which contained the majority of Romanians; they were Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania. The Romanians in these three regions each labored under a different foreign ruler. Even in the early twenty-first century, Romania is mired in territorial disputes. Transylvania, the most contested region, receives special attention due to its vocal Hungarian minority. The Romanians in independent Moldavia, on the other hand, seek unification with Romania. These territorial disputes, along with worker struggles, constitute much of Romania's history.

Transylvanian Protest in the 18th Century

Moldavia and Wallachia, vassal states to the Russian and Ottoman empires respectively, housed the native Romanian elite known as the boyar class, namely wealthy landowners, but the peasantry constituted the majority of the population. Transylvania, on the other hand, belonged at the time to Hungary, which was united with Austria under Hapsburg rule and free

from Turkish influence. The Austrian Hapsburg dynasty ruled over numerous people of Central Europe at points along its long history, and the kingdom of Hungary was a welcome addition. The formerly powerful kingdom containing Transylvania, with its own tradition of multiethnic rule, served as merely another like-minded foe to vanquish and appropriate into the Hapsburg empire, along with the likes of Lombardy and Bohemia. However, while Western European influences moved closer to Hungary and Transylvania, the Ottoman empire entered its long decline and the Romanian lands ruled by the Turks remained undeveloped relative to the diversity of Transylvania. For the Hapsburgs, Transylvania served a purpose primarily because of its military advantages, the Carpathian Mountains acting as a natural barrier against the Turks and Russians. Economically, it remained small and underdeveloped compared to the western regions of the empire.

The ethnic constitution of Transylvania through history stirs much debate, specifically between differing accounts of Hungarian and Romanian national lore, and different interpretations have occasionally led to ethnic clashes. Much of the debate is not yet settled. However, both sides agree that by the middle of the eighteenth century Romanians comprised over 60 percent of the population. At that time the ruling three nations of Transylvania were the Hungarians known as Magyar, the Hungarians known as Szekely, combining to form approximately 25–30 percent of the population, and the German Saxons, who approximated to 10–15 percent. A far greater percentage of the Romanian population lived as serfs than other ethnicities. These disproportions during the Ottoman era resulted in the rise of ethnic tensions in the age of nationalism.

Transylvania was a diverse land and it responded dynamically to the stimulus of becoming part of Western Europe via the Hapsburgs. Its large Romanian population complemented an even larger mass of nationals living in Moldavia and Wallachia under Ottoman and Russian influence, where many Romanians looked to Transylvania as a place of prospects and prosperity. A fair degree of economic and cultural cross-pollination occurred between the Romanians living in the three lands. Regarding the growing national sentiment and newly developing political ideas and yearnings, Transylvania inevitably took on the leadership role due to its higher rate of development, the result of the historically western

political orientation of the Hungarian rulers of Transylvania. Many Romanians from the Ottoman regions came to Transylvania for a better life, and some returned to Moldavia and Wallachia with new ideas of Romanian progress and unity.

Peasant Uprisings

Historically, revolts and uprisings were ignited by struggles against the feudal system. But in the new age of nationalism, ethnic identities started entering the fray. The large peasant revolt in the mainly Romanian-populated southwestern Transylvania led by Horea, Closca, and Crisan in 1784 had a feudal grounding and reflected the concerns of the rights of serfs, but its participants and leaders happened to be Romanians. The Austrian military arm responsible for security in that region of the empire, aided by some local Transylvanian Hungarians, eventually crushed this widespread and relatively significant peasant revolt and publicly tortured and executed its leaders. For many Romanians, the revolt marked a moment of national pride, indicating an increasing willingness to rise up, aided by a growing and able leadership, some of whom were themselves liberated serfs. The fight for the “liberation” of serfs entailed an incremental struggle for more rights regarding labor, land-ownership, pay, education, and other freedoms and general life options for the peasant classes, though the actual revolt itself broke out over the entangled issue of military conscription. In the months and years leading up to the breakout of violence, Horea and Closca took their case all the way to Vienna, lobbying the governing powers for various increased legal rights, some of which had already begun developing, albeit at a slow pace. While the revolt was primarily a peasant revolt, it was also partly a Romanian uprising, for it took on elements of ethnic conflict with the peasants attacking the mostly Hungarian nobility and government officials as well as Hungarian villages. Conversely, some of the powerful Hungarian nobility took it upon themselves to organize resistance to the uprising without waiting for the Austrian military units, and so in some areas of Transylvania local Hungarians and soldiers fought the Romanian peasants.

In 1790–1, the Transylvanian Diet convened to discuss the political issues most pressing to the ruling three nations, still considered as the two groups of Hungarians and the Saxons,

and not including the Romanian majority. As a significant addition, however, it also witnessed the introduction of a Romanian document reflecting the concerns of the majority population, the unrecognized fourth nation with the fewest economic, political, and religious rights. The *Supplex Libellus Vallachorum* became the single most important political document affecting the fate of Transylvanian Romanians through the nineteenth century. It demanded political and religious rights equal to the other nations, partly inspired by the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. Even the Hapsburg emperor received a copy of the document and its demands for greater rights. Unfortunately, since the ruling Hungarians and Saxons harbored no desire to share their institutions, lands, and political power in any meaningful way with the Romanians, they rejected the petition in all quarters. The Hungarians and Saxons ascribed the relative backwardness of the Romanian population to the incompetence of their priestly class, and dismissed the major demands for reform.

Cultural Developments in the 19th Century

At this time, the growing cultural awareness and participation of Transylvanian Romanian elites developed essentially in Hungarian Catholic and Protestant schools in Transylvania. Basic Romanian-language education also spread across the region. Through the early 1800s, Buda (not yet unified into Budapest) became an important center for Romanian development and literature, publishing the first Romanian periodical along with numerous books advancing the Romanian national cause and detailing the history of the nation. The Transylvanian School of Romanian intellectuals set for itself the goals of freeing the Romanian Orthodox Church from Serbian Orthodox domination, Moldavia and Wallachia from Ottoman domination, and Transylvania from Austro-Hungarian domination. The famous Daco-Roman historical theory, hypothesizing the continuity of Romanian cultural presence in the three Romanian lands (but especially Transylvania) from the time of the Roman colonies, spread considerably and grew to serve as a popular and useful political justification for demanding increased rights and eventual self-determination. Its actual historical merit continues to spark debate, but it answered questions

of national origins in a way that satisfied common sense and greatly helped to empower the national aspirations of educated Romanians.

Through the 1830s, reform-minded Hungarians moved toward the growing liberal democratic trends of the West, formulating plans and desires for their own expansion of freedoms within the Austrian empire as well as expressing concern about the existence of the ethnic minorities ruled by the Hungarian crown. These minorities comprised a majority within the total population of the Hungarian political units for which the Hungarian ruling class was responsible. Eventually, the Hungarians would gain official co-rulership status with the Austrians, but even before the granting of that privilege the Hungarian elite essentially ruled numerous peoples, such as the significant populations of Slovaks, Romanians, Croatians, and others within the traditional boundaries of the Hungarian kingdom. Concern about these minorities grew as the progress of liberal trends advanced through this age of nationalism. Each of the minorities grew ever more aware of their second-class-citizen status, and resented being ruled by an emerging Hungarian nation. As people all over Europe evolved and coalesced into that distinct and powerful cultural and psychological state of national awareness, they expressed desires of a singular nature: self-determination within a nation-state based on their ethnic identity. Fulfilling this impossible wish would require genocide, ethnic cleansing, massive population shifts, forced assimilation, or at the least voluntary assimilation. Providing an ethnic minority with full and equal protection of legal rights provided a more direct path toward peaceful, voluntary assimilation than any other, yet this option clashed most with the newly developed idea of national self-determination. The long tradition of European militarism, however, sympathized with these trends of nationalist feeling, as Napoleon demonstrated when he harnessed the great emotional power of this new age to spectacularly glorify France, and himself, and served as an example for many nations wishing to do the same, including the emerging Romanians.

Romanian Resistance Against the Ottomans

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Moldavian and Wallachian Romanians witnessed

firsthand the decline of the Ottomans and the growth of Russian aspirations over the Balkans and other traditionally Ottoman territories. The year 1821 saw one of the seminal events of Romanian revolutionary history, known as the Wallachian Uprising. Led by a member of the steadily emerging Romanian middle class named Tudor Vladimirescu, native Romanian boyars rose in protest against the Greek-led administrative system of the Ottoman empire. Vladimirescu spent the years leading up to the rebellion liaising with almost every major power in the Balkans (Greeks, Russians, Ottomans, as well as the native boyars) and by 1820 had convinced each of them of his loyalty against the others. The death of the Ottoman regent in 1821 brought the short-lived window of opportunity Vladimirescu had waited for. With the help of his boyar compatriots, he raised a small army and occupied Bucharest before Istanbul could designate a successor to the Wallachian throne. He used this brief moment of power to betray each of the interest groups he had manipulated, and thus to create a small space for Romanian self-rule by introducing drastic tax and land reforms. While the Greek landowners (who divided evenly into Ottoman-appointed administrators and wealthy ultranationalist revolutionaries), the Russian armies of the Holy Alliance, and the Ottoman authorities each scrambled to respond to the situation in Bucharest, the Romanian boyars themselves rejected and ultimately undermined Vladimirescu's reformist demands. After being forced to compromise with the Ottomans, Vladimirescu's own Greek allies arrested, tortured, and executed him, while his radical reformist program was for the most part quickly dismantled under the renewed, and now heavily garrisoned, Ottoman administration. The Wallachian Uprising is perhaps the clearest example of the "nexus effect" recurrent in Romanian history. Revolutionary, nationalist, and anti-imperialist struggles in Romania usually seem to progress by a balancing act wherein the major powers of Southeastern Europe temporarily deflect each other's influence for long enough to allow for an increase in Romanian autonomy. Vladimirescu seems to be the first to have adopted and actively cultivated this geopolitical strategy in the name of the Romanian people. Though he met with limited success in his own time, his example was massively influential in later struggles.

Romanian Resistance Against the Hungarians

Hungary preferred the method of forced assimilation as an answer to the questions of non-Hungarians about the future of the Hungarian nation, and so Romanians, along with other minorities, grew ever more resentful, resilient, and resistant to assimilation and continuous minority status. Transylvanian Romanians, particularly humiliated, continued their status as an unrecognized (merely tolerated) nation. When the Hungarians staged their own national revolt in 1848, they envisioned a Danubian Confederacy which maintained the Hungarian kingdom as a democratic ruler, a system which was desirable for Hungarians since they were by far the largest nation within the kingdom, though overall a minority in each of the outlying regions. For the other nations, this arrangement seemed less preferable to their own conception of a future in which they ruled themselves. The issue of minority language, its limits and freedoms in matters official and educational, provided a major focus for national concerns. The language of a nation acted as the carrier of its nationhood, the historical and cultural heritage that defined nationhood. The ethnicities attempting to hold on to territory did so by holding on to language. One method of assimilating an ethnic group therefore manifested in attempts to severely curtail its language rights, including place-names and personal names. Forcing a group to exchange its language for another would result in exchanging national identities as well.

In the years leading up to the 1848 revolts the Romanian elite were increasingly working to lay the foundations of uniting the indisputably Romanian Moldavia and Wallachia into a viable nation-state, and adding Transylvania as a crowning bonus. The Vladimirescu revolt gave their cause hope, in addition to aggravating the serious problems the Ottomans were having with Russian expansionism. From their position as Ottoman vassals, Romanians preferred their fellow Eastern Orthodox Russians to help them as much as possible, but many realistically knew that to truly guarantee their security in the neighborhood of warlike behemoths, they needed to look to liberal western powers. Therefore, they turned to popular and powerful France, their fellow Latins, for aid. With the help of the diplomatic influence of Napoleon III, along with

the fortuitous expulsion of Russian forces from Romania during the Crimean War, none of the great powers of Southeastern Europe was strong enough to block the path of the Romanian people toward nationhood.

SEE ALSO: Romania, Mineworker Protests, 20th Century; Romania, Protest and Revolution, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Giurescu, C. C. (1969) *Transylvania in the History of Romania: An Historical Outline*. London: Garnstone Press.
- Rady, M. C. (1992) *Romania in Turmoil: A Contemporary History*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Sowards, S. W. (2004) Lecture 8: National Revival in Romania, 1848–1866. In “Twenty-Five Lectures on Modern Balkan History: The Balkans in the Age of Nationalism,” Michigan State University, November 16. Available at www.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/.

Romania, student and worker protests, 1956

Dennis John Deletant

The Hungarian uprising of October 23, 1956 allowed the Romanian leadership to amply demonstrate its fidelity to the Soviet Union. Its repercussions were quickly felt in Romania. Convergence of interest with the Soviet Union and not just slavish obedience determined the stance adopted by the Romanian Communist Party leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and his colleagues. They had two main concerns: a successful revolt in Budapest against communist rule might spread to the 2-million strong Hungarian community in Transylvania, thus sparking an anti-communist rising in Romania; and a non-communist Hungary might lay claim to parts of Transylvania, which had been restored in its entirety to Romanian rule by Stalin in March 1945.

On October 24 some 300 students from the Romanian Babeş and the Hungarian Bolyai universities in Cluj, spurred on by the events in Hungary, gathered at the Institute of Fine Arts to protest at the demanding timetable of classes, compulsory attendance at lectures, and criteria for awarding student bursaries. The leaders of the protest were arrested on the following day. Two

students, Baláys Imre and Aristid Târnovan, were accused of the crime of public agitation and sentenced by a military tribunal to five years' imprisonment. In Timișoara a group of polytechnic students, Caius Muțiu, Teodor Stanca, Aurel Baghiu, and Ladislau Nagy, backed by Gheorghe Pop, a professor, held a secret meeting on October 28, 1956 at which they decided to convene a general assembly of students from all the educational establishments in the city to discuss the meagreness of food in the student canteens and shortcomings in the teaching. The meeting was arranged over the heads of the polytechnic administration and the Party organization and took place at the faculty of mechanical engineering on October 30. Some estimates put the number of students present at around 3,000. It was attended by senior Party officials, headed by Petre Lupu and Ilie Verdeț, who heard criticism of the presence of Soviet troops in Romania and calls for the abolition of compulsory classes in Russian. The Party officials promised to convey the students' complaints to Bucharest but immediately after their departure army units were called in to seal off the polytechnic campus and more than 2,000 arrests were made. Of these, 30 were sent for trial, where they were given sentences ranging from three months to eight years imprisonment.

Gheorghiu-Dej and a Romanian delegation cut short a visit to Yugoslavia on October 28 to address the crisis. Some foreign correspondents reported that on October 29 railwaymen at the Grivița yards in Bucharest held a protest meeting calling for improved conditions of work, while in Iași there were street demonstrations in support of better food supplies. Two medical students, Alexandru Ivasiuc and Mihai Victor Serdaru, tried to organize a protest in Bucharest's University Square on November 5 by distributing leaflets calling for the removal of Russian and Marxism-Leninism from the university curriculum, but the authorities swooped to arrest the ringleaders, thus stifling the protest.

The anti-Soviet protests in Romania in 1956 were driven largely by students who had a predominantly – but not exclusively – student agenda; there is little evidence of workers rallying to their support. This lack of solidarity between students and workers enabled the regime to suppress any opposition rapidly and remove any threat to its stability. Khrushchev himself alluded to the student protests in an address to

the Moscow Komsomol on November 8, 1956 when he said that there were “some unhealthy moods” among students “in one of the educational establishments in Romania” and he congratulated the RCP on having dealt with them quickly and effectively (Ionescu 1964). On October 30 the Timișoara, Oradea, and Iași regions were placed under military rule as Soviet troops were brought in across the Romanian border in the East and concentrated on the frontier with Hungary in the West. To placate the workers the government announced on October 29 that the minimum wage would be raised, and on November 2 Politburo member Gheorghe Apostol addressed a railwaymen's meeting and promised help in the form of free travel for them.

One day earlier, Khrushchev and Malenkov paid a secret visit to Bucharest to discuss the Hungarian crisis with Romanian, Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak leaders and, according to some Western reports, Khrushchev demanded that Romanian troops be used to crush the Budapest revolt. Gheorghiu-Dej allegedly replied that, owing to a large Hungarian minority in the Romanian army and general sympathy for Hungary, the army could not be relied upon for such an operation. Romanian reluctance to play a direct military role could also have been attributed to the fear of irreparably antagonizing the Hungarian minority in Romania, but such a stance is contradicted by the memoirs of Khrushchev, who claimed to have received offers of military assistance from the Romanian and Bulgarian leaders (Verona 1992).

One thing is clear. Gheorghiu-Dej pushed for firm military intervention against Imre Nagy's government and the Soviet troops based in Romania had been among the first to cross the Hungarian border on October 26 to reinforce the Soviet presence. A key figure in the Romanian Party's support for Soviet intervention in Hungary was Emil Bodnăraș. During the Hungarian uprising, he was appointed minister of transport and communications and in this capacity he supervised the widening of roads of strategic importance to Soviet troops for their transit through Romania. He was probably instrumental in making arrangements for the detention of Imre Nagy in Romania, for on November 21 he and Gheorghiu-Dej paid a visit to Janos Kadar, the new first secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, and on the following day Nagy was abducted by KGB officers and flown

to Bucharest, where he was granted what the Romanian foreign minister Grigore Preoteasa termed “asylum.” In fact, he was held, along with other members of his government, in a *Securitate* (Romanian secret police) safe house in a locality just north of Bucharest, where their interrogation was coordinated by Boris Shumilin, chief KGB adviser “for counterrevolutionary affairs,” and not allowed visits from UN officials promised by Preoteasa to prove that he was not under duress (Andrew & Gordievsky 1991). Shumilin permitted Valter Roman, a senior RCP member, to question Nagy’s associates. Many other prominent supporters of Nagy were interrogated in Romania, among them the Marxist critic Georg Lukács.

Gheorghiu-Dej’s concern over the reaction of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania to the uprising led him to pursue a policy of integration and his first step was to dilute the provision for Hungarian-language teaching in schools, making it more difficult to receive a Hungarian-language education up to university level in Romania. After 1956, Hungarian-language instruction began to be moved from single-language to dual-language schools.

Romania was the Soviet Union’s most active ally during the Hungarian crisis. Its support of the Soviet Union went beyond the political arena into the domain of practical assistance and open encouragement. Gheorghiu-Dej and Bodnăraș were the first foreign leaders to visit Budapest after the Soviet invasion and in their official communiqué they opined that the Soviet action “was necessary and correct” (Verona 1992). The Romanian government echoed Soviet propaganda, denouncing the “counterrevolution” as the work of “reactionary Fascists” provoked by “Western imperialists.” Additional bases were provided on Romanian soil to the Soviet forces, roads were widened, and railway traffic interrupted to carry military transport. Soviet satisfaction with Romania’s role during October and November 1956 stood to the country’s advantage two years later when Khrushchev decided to withdraw Soviet troops.

SEE ALSO: Hungary, Revolution of 1956; Romania, Protest and Revolution, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

Andrew, C. & Gordievsky, O. (1991) *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev*. London: Sceptre Books.

- Bottoni, S. (2007) *Transilvania rossa. Il comunismo romeno e la questione nazionale (1944–1965)*. Rome: Carocci editore.
- Deletant, D. (1999) *Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, 1948–65*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Ionescu, G. (1964) *Communism in Romania, 1944–1962*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tismăneanu, V. (2003) *Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Tismăneanu, V., Dobrinu, D., & Vasile, C. (Eds.) (2007) *Comisia prezidențială pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste din România. Raport final*. Bucharest: Humanitas.
- Verona, S. (1992) *Military Occupation and Diplomacy: Soviet Troops in Romania 1944–1958*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Romero, Óscar (1917–1980), Archbishop

Edward T. Brett

Óscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdámez, born on August 15, 1917 in the remote town of Ciudad Barrios in the Department of San Miguel, El Salvador, in the 1970s became a leading figure in the Catholic clerical movement for an end to dictatorship in El Salvador and an advocate for the ideals of liberation theology, founded on principles of eliminating poverty through equalization of wealth. At the age of 13 he entered the minor seminary in San Miguel, and in 1937 graduated to the National Seminary in San Salvador. He evidently showed promise, because after only a few months the local bishop sent him to Rome to study at the Gregorian University, where he earned his licentiate degree in theology *cum laude* in 1941 and was ordained a priest on April 4, 1942. He remained in Rome to work toward a doctorate in ascetical theology, but in August 1943 was required to return to his native country before completing his degree due to complications resulting from World War II.

After a few months in a rural parish, he was transferred to the diocesan see of San Miguel, where he was named pastor of the cathedral parish and diocesan secretary, a position he retained for 23 years. During this time he developed a reputation as a gifted preacher, but also as a theological traditionalist and a staunch conservative on sociopolitical matters.

In 1966 he was appointed secretary of the Episcopal Conference for El Salvador, a post that required his transfer to the capital city. In 1970 he was made auxiliary bishop of San Salvador, a position that was also held by the more progressive Arturo Rivera y Damas. He became editor of the archdiocesan weekly, *Orientación*, in 1971. Under his tutelage the paper took on a more conservative bent; he used it to attack the policies of Bishop Rivera, as well as the Jesuits who ran the seminary, Catholic University, and most prestigious high school in the capital.

In 1975 Romero was named bishop of Santiago de María, where he served for three years. It was during this time that he began to realize that social oppression in El Salvador was widespread. He wrote articles in the diocesan weekly, *El Apóstol*, criticizing the local coffee oligarchy for refusing to pay just wages to their employees. He also allowed seasonal coffee workers to use church buildings for shelter and provided them with food. Nevertheless, he retained his suspicion of activist priests and after his appointment in 1975 to the Pontifical Commission for Latin America, used his newly acquired influence with the Vatican to criticize the “Marxist tendencies” of the Jesuits.

Although Archbishop Luis Chávez y González, upon his retirement in 1977, recommended that Rivera succeed him, Vatican officials ignored his request and instead chose the more conservative Romero. A pivotal step in the new archbishop’s radical transformation occurred, however, almost immediately after his episcopal installation. It was then that he went to Aguilares to preside at the funeral of Rutilio Grande, a Jesuit who had been working with sugar cane laborers since 1972. Grande’s Jesuit team had supported the Aguilares peasants who were striking against the local sugar refinery and as a result he was assassinated along with two peasant companions. Although Chávez and Rivera had encouraged Grande’s work, Romero had felt that the Jesuit endeavors in Aguilares were too political and were fanning the flames of discord. He had said as much in Rome at a meeting of the Pontifical Commission for Latin America.

After returning from the funeral, Romero asked government officials to investigate the Aguilares killings. When no action was taken, the new archbishop took to the pulpit at his Sunday masses and began castigating the government and military for their perpetration of violence and

injustice. His homilies were broadcast over the archdiocesan radio station and soon they became the most listened to radio program in El Salvador. Romero’s support came primarily from the poor and oppressed people of his country and from the Salvadoran clergy, who dubbed him “the voice of the voiceless.” His fellow bishops, however, denounced him to the Vatican, calling him a naïve tool of Marxist revolutionaries. Indeed, during his three-year tenure as archbishop, Bishop Rivera was the only Salvadoran prelate to stand with him in his fight for social justice.

By 1978 Romero had become internationally known for his prophetic voice. He received honorary degrees from Catholic universities in both the United States and Europe, and in 1979 was even nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Such fame came with a price, however, and by mid-1979 six of his priests had been assassinated by right-wing death squads; many others were jailed, tortured, or expelled from the country. When Romero wrote an open letter to President Jimmy Carter asking him not to increase US military aid to the Salvadoran government, his fate was sealed. A few days after delivering a Sunday homily, in which he implored Salvadoran soldiers to obey God’s higher law rather than the violent commands of their military superiors, he was assassinated while saying mass. The date of his death was March 24, 1980. Years later, a 1993 United Nations investigation would confirm what all had long suspected, when it identified army major Roberto D’Aubuisson as the mastermind behind Romero’s assassination. Even though his murder caused international outrage, the newly installed Reagan administration decided to greatly increase US military aid to the Salvadoran government. Consequently, over the next decade, Salvadoran security forces and government-sponsored death squads killed about 70,000 Salvadorans. Included were several priests and nuns, but the overwhelming majority were impoverished Salvadoran peasants.

SEE ALSO: Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS); Latin America, Catholic Church and Liberation, 16th Century to Present; Salvadoran Civil War, 1980–1991

References and Suggested Readings

Brockman, J. R. (1989) *Romero: A Life*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

- Erdozain, P. (1991) *Archbishop Romero: Martyr of Salvador*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Sobrino, J. (1990) *Archbishop Romero: Memories and Reflections*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Roshaniya movement and the Khan Rebellion

Yury V. Bosin

The Roshaniya, or “enlightened,” was a populist nonsectarian movement that arose among Afghan tribes in the mid-sixteenth century. Roshaniya was founded by Bayazid Ansari, who challenged inequality and social injustice practiced by the ruling powers. The Roshaniya promulgated egalitarian codes and tenets within Islam.

Born to an orthodox Muslim family, Ansari educated and instructed Afghans’ religious practices through a new radical teaching that questioned basic Islamic canons and propagated egalitarian and even communist principles. Ostracized by his family, Ansari spent several years wandering through the hills of Afghanistan disseminating this egalitarian ideology. In the ensuing years, Ansari’s teachings resonated among the Afghan tribes of Afridi, Orakzai, Khalil, Mohmand, and Bangash.

The ideology of egalitarianism broadly expanded the power of Ansari, who became widely known throughout Afghanistan as Pir-i Roshan (apostle of light), and his growing followers called themselves Roshaniya (enlightened). The rapid expansion of the Roshaniya movement alarmed Muslim clergy and the Moghul authorities. This official opposition deepened as Ansari’s influence expanded. He inveighed against the Moghul empire and mobilized partisans for armed struggle against the empire. Roshaniya defeated the Moghul army in a series of engagements in the mid- to late fifteenth century, establishing control over key cities and regions including Nangarhar, Ghazni, and Kabul. Adherents of the sect gained control of the Khyber Pass, which they blocked. While the Moghuls eventually defeated the Roshaniya movement militarily, pockets of resistance continued through the seventeenth century. In 1638, with the killing of Karimdad, Ansari’s grandson, the Roshaniya were defeated.

Khushhal Khan’s Rebellion against the Moghuls

Political and military instability continued to fester into the 1600s under the leadership of Khushhal Khan (1613–89), chief of the Khattak tribe and ruler of the Akora principality, which was a protectorate of the Great Moghuls’ empire. The Khattaks maintained strategic control over the vital transportation network in the Peshawar region and a high status in the Moghuls’ hierarchy. Their loyalty to the Moghuls was, however, volatile and the tribal settlements around Peshawar were always a source of turbulence. Suspected in the anti-Moghul activity, Khushhal Khan was arrested in 1664 and spent four years incarcerated in a Moghul fortress. Upon his release he began fervently rallying against the Moghuls. Using his eloquence and poetic gifts, he soon mobilized his tribesmen to start a guerilla war against Moghul rule. By 1675 he had more than 300,000 active supporters and won a series of skirmishes against the Moghul army. The Moghul emperor, Aurangzeb, pursued a strategy of sticks and carrots to foment tribal feuds and to split the rebellion. After some prominent chiefs left the movement, it gradually ebbed. Khushhal Khan died in 1689. His grandson Afzal, who inherited the Akora throne, recognized Moghul supremacy, although the Moghul influence in Khattak territory shrank and was merely nominal.

A prolific poet, Khushhal Khan is famous for his contribution to Pashtu literature and is one of the most revered figures in the Afghan cultural heritage.

SEE ALSO: Afghanistan, 1978 Revolution and Islamic Civil War; Afghanistan, Resistance to 19th-Century British Invasion; Bacha-i Sakkao’s Movement; Bin Laden, Osama (b. 1957) and al-Qaeda; Durrani Empire, Popular Protests, 1747–1823; Taliban, 1996–2007

References and Suggested Readings

- Briant, P. (2002) *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*. Trans. P. T. Daniels. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Masson, V. & Romodon, V. (1964) *A History of Afghanistan*, Vols. 1–2. Moscow: Nauka (in Russian).
- Sykes, P. (1940) *A History of Afghanistan*. London: Macmillan.

Rossanda, Rossana (b. 1924)

Anna Simone

A key figure in the political and cultural debate of the Italian left, Rossana Rossanda was born in Pula in Istria (now Croatia) in 1924. A few years later she moved to Venice where she spent most of her childhood. Her family gave her a lay education. In the early 1940s she attended the University in Milan, where she met Antonio Banfi, an anti-fascist activist and professor of history of philosophy and aesthetics. Attending his courses, she engaged in studies and researches on Karl Marx's works, read through the lens of Italian "historicism." In the same period, the impending World War II led her to embrace the cause of militant anti-fascism and the Italian Resistance, together with her university professor. After the Italian liberation from fascism in 1945, she joined the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and was later put in charge of its cultural department. In 1963 she was elected deputy to the Italian parliament. In 1968 she wrote her first successful book, *L'anno degli studenti* (The Students' Year), but in the summer of that year, following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, she developed a critical position toward the imperialist policies of the USSR and tried to shift her attention to the forms of class struggle in the West. In June 1969 she founded and, with Lucio Magri, became co-editor of the political review *Il Manifesto*, which was then in opposition to the ideas of the PCI. More specifically, the review criticized the Soviet model of real socialism and its imperialist policies over Prague. Together with Aldo Natoli and Luigi Pintor, who also worked for the review, Rossanda was expelled from the PCI for joining its critical left wing. In 1971 *Il Manifesto* became a daily paper, the only independent paper of the Italian left. Rossana Rossanda was its editor only for a short period, but through its columns and several important books such as *Appuntamenti di fine secolo* (Issues of the End of the Century, written with Pietro Ingrao and others) and *Brigate Rosse: Una Storia Italiana* (The Red Brigades: An Italian History) she sparked off and animated the political and cultural debate in the Italian left. For many years she has been a keen observer of Chinese communism as well as of

Italian and French political and cultural processes. A friend of important intellectual figures such as Simone de Beauvoir, Jean-Paul Sartre, and others, Rossanda has always taken a critical stance on justicialist policies in opposition to representatives of the Italian movement of the 1970s (such as Antonio Negri, Franco Piperno, and others). Her positions, however, have always differed from those of Italian workerism and autonomism in general. Together with the *Il Manifesto* group, she attempted to combine the new subjectivities of the movement, emerging all over the world in the 1970s, with the tradition of the workers' movement connected with the PCI. In recent years Rossanda has been at the forefront of the Italian political debate thanks to the publication of her first autobiography, *La ragazza del secolo scorso* (The Girl from Last Century), which quickly became a bestseller. In it she describes her communist history, arguing that it is the only possible history of the twentieth century.

SEE ALSO: Autonomism; Italian Communist Party; Italy, from the Anti-Fascist Resistance to the New Left (1945–1960); Italy, from the New Left to the Great Repression (1962–1981); Marxism; Negri, Antonio (b. 1933); Red Brigades

References and Suggested Readings

- Rossanda, R. (1968) *L'anno degli studenti*. Bari: De Donato.
 Rossanda, R. (2005) *La ragazza del secolo scorso*. Turin: Einaudi.
 Rossanda, R. & Ingrao, P. (Eds.) (1995) *Appuntamenti di fine secolo*. Rome: Manifestolibri.
 Rossanda, R. & Mosca, C. (2001) *Brigate Rosse: Una storia italiana*. Milan: Baldini e Castoldi.

Rosselli, Carlo (1899–1937)

Donatella Cherubini

An Italian intellectual, economist, journalist, and political leader, Carlo Rosselli was committed to the anti-fascist struggle in Italy and in the Spanish Civil War. A leading political theorist of liberal socialism, Rosselli was killed by fascist assassins.

Rosselli was born in 1899 in Rome to a wealthy Tuscan Jewish family and moved to Florence during his childhood. He was strongly influenced by his mother, Amelia Pincherle, who diffused

to the family the republican tradition of Giuseppe Mazzini during the process of Italian unification (Risorgimento). Rosselli supported Italy's entrance into World War I as a means of democratic rebirth and joined the Italian armed forces fighting in the Alpine campaign. Despite the pacifist positions of the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI) in the postwar era, Rosselli supported its gradual (reformist) component. He received university degrees in the social sciences at Florence and law at Siena and began a university career in economics, establishing ties with, among others, the liberal Luigi Einaudi and the young socialist liberal Piero Gobetti, who was killed in a fascist assault.

Rosselli's political formation and ideals led to his early opposition to fascism, and he joined young intellectuals in Florence who rallied around the historian Gaetano Salvemini. Active in the protest following the assassination on June 10, 1924 of Giacomo Matteotti, the young secretary of the new reformist United Socialist Party, Rosselli continued in his opposition to fascism. In 1926, Rosselli joined forces with Pietro Nenni, socialist and future leader of the PSI, founding the review *Quarto Stato*, a publication banned a few months later. In 1926, Rosselli organized the escape to France of Filippo Turati, the prestigious reformist socialist leader, but was himself captured and sentenced to confinement on the island of *Lipari*, off Sicily.

While in prison, Rosselli began elaborating a new political theory of liberal socialism, based on non-Marxist socialism of liberal ascendancy, overcoming class struggle and embracing the experience of British labor unionism – a perspective influenced by Mazzini's political and social ideals and principles. In 1929 Rosselli escaped to France, where he promoted the *Giustizia e Libertà* (Justice and Liberty) movement, inspired by liberal socialist principles, and participated in the *Concentrazione di Azioni Antifascista*, a federation of non-communist political groups of Italian emigrants in Paris. The movement sought to establish the conditions for Italian anti-fascist revolution through the creation of a qualified, modern, and what it considered a realizable model for advanced democracy, based on ideals inherited from the Risorgimento that would overcome the old liberal order and promote social justice.

Rosselli was particularly disappointed by Italian socialism's inability to arrest the rise of fascism,

as witnessed by his political activity and writings. Actively committed to underlining the dangers of fascism, which was spreading throughout Europe by the mid-1930s, Rosselli proposed a federal Europe and was convinced that only a democratic war could defeat fascism.

Rosselli considered the Spanish Revolution and the subsequent civil war following Francisco Franco's pro-fascist/monarchical coup against the republican Popular Front government as an important test bench for the future of socialism. He was actively involved in the organization of anti-fascist and republican forces and was critical of the political neutrality of democratic France and Great Britain, especially because Benito Mussolini's Italy and Adolf Hitler's Germany were sending arms and soldiers to support Francoism.

Together with the *Giustizia e Libertà* movement, Rosselli organized volunteer brigades to fight on the side of the Spanish Republic, heading in person the *Battaglione Matteotti* composed of Italian anarchists, liberals, socialists, and communists. In a talk on Radio Barcelona during this campaign, Rosselli articulated the famous slogan evoking the democratic war against fascist regimes throughout Europe: "Today Spain, tomorrow Italy [*Oggi in Spagna, domani in Italia*]." Rosselli returned to Paris severely ill, but continued to fight fascism and was even receptive to hypotheses for popular fronts with communist participation, albeit remaining critical of Stalinism and Soviet communism. His steadfast anti-fascist commitment made him one of the principal targets of fascism in Europe, even when the Spanish Republic was declining and republican volunteers were withdrawing.

In June 1937, while on holiday in Bagnoles-de-l'Orne in France, Rosselli was assassinated with his brother Nello by *cagoullards*, militants of the French fascist group *Cagoule*, who were probably emissaries of the Italian fascist regime.

SEE ALSO: Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Italian Risorgimento; Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805–1872); Mussolini, Benito (1883–1945); Salvemini, Gaetano (1873–1957); Spanish Revolution; Turati, Filippo (1857–1932)

References and Suggested Readings

- Di Scala, S. (Ed.) (1996) *Italian Socialism between Politics and History*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Garosci, A. (1945/1973) *Vita di Carlo Rosselli*, 2 vols. Florence: Vallecchi.

Roumain, Jacques (1907–1944)

Matthew J. Smith

Jacques Roumain was born in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on June 4, 1907. One of the Caribbean's foremost novelists, radical thinkers, and poets, Roumain achieved a great deal in a remarkably short life. His best-known and final work, the evocative *Les Gouverneurs de la rosée* (*Masters of the Dew*), remains a landmark in Caribbean literature.

After an elite upbringing in Haiti's capital, Roumain left for Europe, where he spent his formative years studying in Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland, before returning to US-occupied Haiti in the 1920s. Barely in his twenties, Roumain was absorbed by the revolutionary nationalism of the period. He channeled his protest against the occupation in his writings. Inspired by his contemporaries, in particular Jean Price-Mars, as well as by the Négritude movement and the Harlem Renaissance, Roumain helped found the indigenous movement, which privileged native Haitian aesthetics and folklore over European traditions.

Although best known for his literary achievements, Roumain was also a fervent Marxist, political organizer, and distinguished statesman. He participated in the 1929 student strike against the US Marines in Haiti. In 1934 he formally organized the Haitian Communist Party (Parti Communiste Haïtien, PCH) with his associate, Christian Beaulieu. The PCH represented the culmination of two years of immersion in Marxist theory. At a time when most elite radicals distanced themselves from communism for fear of state reprisals, Roumain, disenchanted with the nationalist movement, bravely embraced the doctrine. In the party manifesto, *L'Analyse Schématique*, Roumain critiqued bourgeois control of the Haitian state and argued that Marxism offered the best solution to the country's economic problems and recurrent dictatorships.

This position made him a target of President Sténio Vincent. Roumain was arrested at least twice in the 1930s. An international outcry from colleagues in the United States, among them Langston Hughes and the Friends of Jacques Roumain society in New York, led to his release and eventual exile from Haiti in the late 1930s.

Roumain spent much of this time in the United States, devoting his attention to studies at Columbia University.

With a change in the Haitian government in the spring of 1941, Roumain returned to Haiti with the intention of reforming the PCH. Once again the party was unable to find an urban base and faced strict censure from the new president, Élie Lescot. Although Roumain gave up hope of rebuilding the party, he remained strong in his Marxist beliefs. He accepted an invitation by Lescot to be the director of the newly formed Bureau d'Ethnologie, where he oversaw several important projects on the collection of Haitian artifacts. In 1943 he became Haitian chargé d'affaires in Mexico, where he wrote *Masters of the Dew*. Roumain never lived to see the book published, or return to his beloved country, dying from cirrhosis on August 18, 1944.

SEE ALSO: Haiti, Resistance to US Occupation

References and Suggested Readings

- Fowler, C. (1980) *A Knot in the Thread: The Life and Work of Jacques Roumain*. Washington: Howard University Press.
- Trouillot, H. (1981) *Dimensions et limites de Jacques Roumain*. Port-au-Prince: Editions Fardin.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778)

Annette Richardson

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was an Enlightenment philosopher whose revolutionary ideas had a great impact on the French Revolution. His ideas also influenced the development of socialist theory and nationalism. Rousseau's outlook was based on the notion of the "noble savage" – that humankind was naturally good, but became corrupted by the development of society, which gave rise to property, inequality, slavery, and poverty.

Rousseau was born in Geneva on June 28, 1712, to a clockmaker and his wife, who died from childbirth complications. Rousseau was raised by his father, who taught him to read classical literature. In 1722 his father abandoned him and he went to live with an aunt and uncle. Rousseau obtained an apprenticeship with a notary, who later dismissed him, and then with an engraver, whom he disliked and left. Throughout his life, Rousseau

would have serious difficulties with authority figures.

He left Geneva and moved to Savoy in 1728, where he met the Baroness Louise de Warens and became her student. Although she was 12 years his senior, they also became lovers. His education improved under her guidance and she persuaded him to convert to Catholicism, resulting in the loss of his Genevan citizenship. He worked as a music teacher and tutor to support himself, eventually moving to Paris in 1742 hoping to earn his livelihood as a composer.

In 1745, he met Thérèse Levasseur, an uneducated chambermaid who, though scarcely literate, was to become the great man of letters' life companion. They had a number of children – five, according to Rousseau – but all were placed in an orphanage upon birth. When Rousseau later propounded theories about how children should be raised, his rivals and enemies cited his abandonment of his own children to discredit him. Nonetheless, the educational innovations he proposed in a work of fiction entitled *Emile* have been credited with greatly influencing modern educational methods.

In 1749, he met Etienne Condillac and Denis Diderot, who were to become prominent *philosophes* of the Enlightenment. Diderot, one of the principal creators of the *Encyclopédie*, invited Rousseau to contribute articles to it, which he did. Relations between them soon became tense, however, which often happened in any relationship involving the psychologically complicated Rousseau.

In 1750, Rousseau entered an essay contest on the subject of “morals” sponsored by the Academy of Dijon. Rousseau's prize-winning entry was his *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, in which he first put forward the proposition that humankind is good in its natural state, but has been corrupted by society. His bold thesis sparked controversy and earned him a reputation as an important thinker. He would continue throughout his life to develop the theory that humankind was happy, free, and healthy before society emerged, and that vices and immorality only arose following the imposition of a false social contract based on inequality.

Rousseau returned to Geneva in 1754, where he renounced Roman Catholicism, reconverted to the Protestantism of his youth, and reclaimed his Genevan citizenship. In 1761, he published the popular novel *Julie, or the New Heloise*,

which strongly influenced the emerging Romantic movement. As a leading progenitor of Romanticism, and due to his bitter rivalry with Voltaire, Rousseau is sometimes said to have initiated a “counter-Enlightenment,” but it is probably more useful to think of him as representing a tendency *within* the Enlightenment offering a corrective to the sterile notion that human behavior can be reduced to pure rationality.

In *The Social Contract*, published in April 1762, Rousseau famously declared, “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” His theories of civil society based on political liberty and the people's “general will” rather than on submission to the arbitrary authority of individuals inspired the generation of revolutionaries that included Maximilien Robespierre and Jean-Paul Marat. Rousseau was also one of the first modern writers to attack the institution of private property, foreshadowing the development of socialist and communist ideology.

In May 1762, he published *Emile, or On Education*, which argued for the cultivation of a student's natural tendencies. His treatment of organized religion as a hindrance to the development of genuine morality created an uproar both in Paris and in Geneva, prompting him to move to Britain, where he was the guest of the Scottish philosopher David Hume. He lived with Hume for a year and a half, but they eventually had a falling out, apparently caused by a persecution complex on Rousseau's part. It was later suspected that his growing paranoia had been fed by years of opium use.

Rousseau returned to Paris in 1770, but was restricted from publishing his works, which were deemed subversive. From 1771 to 1788 he worked on his autobiography, *The Confessions*, which was posthumously published. Although Hume, among others, felt that no one knew Rousseau less well than Rousseau himself, his autobiography was remarkable for its apparent frankness with regard to his own failings and character defects, and has thus been hailed as a milestone in the development of modern autobiography.

Throughout his life, Rousseau had great difficulty with relationships. He seemingly quarreled with everyone, especially those who did their utmost to help him in his various struggles. Toward the end of his life, Rousseau was staying at the country home of the Marquis de Girardin at Ermenonville, just outside of Paris.

By this time, his mental condition had severely deteriorated. While out for a walk, Rousseau suffered a hemorrhage and died on July 2, 1778. He was buried on the Ile de Peupliers, and in 1794 his remains were reburied in the Pantheon in Paris.

SEE ALSO: Diderot, Denis (1713–1784); Enlightenment, France, 18th Century; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–1793); Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–1794); Voltaire (1694–1778)

References and Suggested Readings

- Cooper, L. (1999) *Rousseau and Nature: The Problem of the Good Life*. University Park: Pennsylvania University Press.
- Cranston, M. (1991a) *Jean-Jacques: The Early Life and Work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1712–1754*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cranston, M. (1991b) *The Noble Savage: Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1754–1762*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cranston, M. (1999) *The Solitary Self: Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Exile and Adversity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dent, N. J. H. (2005) *Rousseau*. London: Routledge.
- Melzer, A. (1990) *The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau's Thoughts*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rousseau, J.-J. (2000) *Confessions*. Trans. A. Scholar. New York: Oxford University Press.

Roy, Manabendra Nath (1887–1954)

Kunal Chattopadhyay

Manabendra Nath Roy was an Indian revolutionary nationalist, communist, and radical humanist, born Narendranath Bhattacharyya, on March 21, 1887. Influenced by the Anti-Bengal Partition Movement, he joined the struggle for national liberation, entering the militant wing, and attempting to organize an armed uprising against British rule in India. He became a follower of the legendary Jatindranath Mukherjee or Bagha Jatin (“tiger” Jatin). The duo were arrested and kept imprisoned for a year during the Howrah-Sibpur Conspiracy Case in 1910–11. They planned for an all-India uprising and contacts abroad.

During World War I Bagha Jatin and other revolutionaries, taking advantage of the small number of European soldiers posted in India, planned to organize an armed uprising. Bhat-

tacharyya, using the pseudonym of Charles A. Martin, left India, first for Batavia, and then Shanghai, seeking German help for procuring arms. Though the effort failed, he traveled to the Philippines, the US, and Mexico, hoping to procure arms for Indian revolutionaries. In Manila he learned of the death of his leader Bagha Jatin in an armed encounter in 1915, in a botched delivery of arms.

Naren Bhattacharyya arrived in the US amid newspaper articles declaring him a dangerous Hindu revolutionary. He sought help from Professor Dhanagopal Mukherjee of Stanford University, brother of a fellow revolutionary. The latter changed his name to Manabendra Nath Roy, and introduced him to Dr. David Jordan, progressive president of the university, where he also met Evelyn Trent, who he later married in New York, where he was steeped in Marxism studying in the New York Public Library. When the US declared war on Germany in April 1917, Indian revolutionaries were arrested as alleged enemy spies. Roy fled to Mexico, helped by Dr. Jordan, and became friendly with Mexican President Carranza, joined the Socialist Party, and eventually became its general secretary. He came in contact with the Russian communist Mikhail Borodin and the two became instrumental in the formation of the Mexican Communist Party. In 1920 he attended the Second Congress of the Communist International as a leader and representative of the Mexicans. One of the items on the agenda of this Congress was a discussion on the National and Colonial Question. Roy presented supplementary theses, and debated with Lenin. The Lenin-Roy debate was very important, for it also made Lenin acknowledge that there was a need to differentiate between revolutionary nationalists and bourgeois reformists in the more developed colonies, such as China or India. Roy’s theses were also adopted by the Comintern Congress after a number of important modifications introduced in them by Lenin. After the Congress, Roy became an important figure in the Asian Bureau of the Comintern.

On October 17, 1920 Roy, Evelyn, and five others founded the émigré Communist Party of India in Tashkent. From this time, he attempted to influence Indian politics through two channels. On one hand, using his old nationalist credentials, he tried to recruit younger socialistically inclined radicals to communism. For this, he published



Bengali political theorist, communist, and radical humanist Manabendra Nath Roy is considered, along with Gandhi, as one of the two most influential Indian political philosophers of the twentieth century. Roy was an Indian delegate to the fifth Comintern Congress in Moscow and member of the Presidium, July 1924. Disillusioned with the Soviet-dominated Communist Party, Roy embraced radical humanist philosophy and in 1948 founded the Radical Humanist Association. (Getty Images)

a stream of books, pamphlets, and for many years, from 1922 to 1928, a journal, first named the *Vanguard of Indian Independence* and subsequently *Advance Guard* and *Masses*. He also sent communist emissaries to India, like Gopen Chakraborty and Nalini Gupta. On the other hand, he also tried to make contacts with the Indian National Congress, following the line developed by the Communist International. He wrote important books and pamphlets like *One Year of Non-Cooperation*, *The Aftermath of Non-Cooperation*, *The Future of Indian Politics*, and most important, in collaboration with another revolutionary nationalist turned communist, Abani Mukherjee, the study *India in Transition* (1922), the first attempt in the twentieth century, from a Marxist standpoint, to analyze the evolution of India under colonial rule.

Roy also played an important role in the Communist International. He became a candidate member to the Executive Committee of the

Comintern at the Fourth Congress in 1922, becoming its full member and a candidate member to the Presidium at its Fifth Congress in 1924. In 1926 he was elected as a full member of the Presidium. He was one of the chief representatives of the Comintern to China, and stood, though quite ineffectually, to the left of Borodin. He sided with the Comintern leadership during its purge of left-wing oppositionists. Broadly speaking, at this point he was aligned with the Bukharinists, though then and later he had great respect for Stalin. In 1929, as a result of opposing the political line of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (1928), Roy was expelled from the organization, while in Germany.

Roy returned to India in 1930, hiding under the pseudonym of Dr. Mahmud. In July 1931 he was arrested, tried in Kanpur on the charge of sedition, and sentenced to transportation for 12 years, subsequently reduced on appeal to six years' imprisonment. While in prison he wrote a massive manuscript provisionally entitled *The Philosophical Consequence of Modern Science*. Out of his prison writings emerged a number of books between 1937 and 1945, including *Materialism, The Historical Role of Islam, Heresies of the Twentieth Century, Science and Philosophy, Science and Superstition*, and *The Philosophy of Fascism*.

He also tried to organize his political followers, many of whom were to emerge as important trade unionists and left-wing political activists. He joined the Indian National Congress and was a recognized leader of a part of the left-wing currents. The Royists, along with the Congress Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and the supporters of Subhas Chandra Bose, joined forces in 1939 to elect Bose as Congress president in the teeth of opposition from Gandhi and the Congress right wing. Roy had hopes that Bose would invite him to join the Congress Working Committee, but the Congress right wing hit back. First, most members of the old Working Committee resigned, including Jawaharlal Nehru. Then, in the Tripuri, Govind Ballav Pant brought a resolution which affirmed Congress loyalty to Gandhian politics and told Bose to nominate his new Working Committee in accordance with the wishes of Gandhi. Gandhi challenged Bose to nominate a Working Committee of his own choice, but Bose backed down. While Bose was subsequently hounded out of the Congress, Roy and his supporters also left, and they

formed the Radical Democratic Party in 1940. His differences with the Congress leadership were substantially over the issue of supporting Britain during the war. At the beginning of World War II he advocated collaboration with British imperialism in order to defeat fascism. Throughout the war he supported the Allied Powers with the argument that declining imperialism was a lesser evil compared to fascism. During the period 1940–6 he published a number of books, including *INA and the August Revolution* and the *Draft Constitution of Free India*. In 1946 he advocated elections to a constituent assembly on a non-party basis, and called for a federal constitution and guarantees for minority communities and regions. He also advocated significant decentralization of power.

In 1947–8 he revised his conceptions about Marxism formally. This involved writing a number of books, like *The Russian Revolution*, *Beyond Marxism*, and *New Humanism*. In 1948 he argued that what independent India needed was not another political party, but a social movement for humanism. He therefore disbanded the Radical Democratic Party (though one current continued, first as the Democratic Vanguard and then as the Workers' Party, a small Stalinist formation). Roy formed the Radical Humanist Association in 1948 and founded the Indian Renaissance Institute. He was also the editor of the quarterly journal *Humanist Way*. On January 24–25 (midnight), 1954 Roy died of a massive attack of coronary thrombosis. He was, along with Gandhi, one of the two most original and significant political thinkers of India in the twentieth century, but while Gandhi has been officially iconized, Roy has been a fairly marginal figure outside the circle of specialists, particularly of communism. Roy's study of medieval Islam as a progressive force, his strong arguments for secular rationalism, and his commitment to liberty, remain valuable in an era when in his own country, communalism, obscurantism, and attacks on civil liberties were on the rise.

SEE ALSO: Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945); Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); India, Nationalism, Extremist; Indian National Liberation; Internationals; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924)

References and Suggested Readings

Haithcox, J. P. (1971) *Communism and Nationalism in India: M. N. Roy and Comintern Policy 1920–1939*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Ray, S. (1998–2007) *In Freedom's Quest: Life of M. N. Roy*. 4 vols. Calcutta: Minerva Associates.
- Ray, S. (Ed.) (2000) *Selected Works of M. N. Roy*. 3 vols. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Roy, M. N. (1964) *M. N. Roy's Memoirs*. New Delhi: Allied Publishers.
- Roy, M. N. & Spratt, P. (1946) *New Orientation*. Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers.
- Roy, S. (1970) *The Restless Brahmin: Early Life of M. N. Roy*. New Delhi: Allied Publishers.
- Roy, S. (1986) *The Twice Born Heretic: M. N. Roy and the Comintern*. Calcutta: Firma KLM Private.
- Roy, S. (1997) *M. N. Roy: A Political Biography*. New Delhi: Orient Longman.

Rumiñahui (d. 1535)

Viviana Uriona

Rumiñahui (in Kichwa language “stone face” or “stone eyes”) was an Inca military leader and one of the most important chieftains under Atahualpa (the last sovereign emperor of the Inca Empire). After Atahualpa's execution by the Spanish conquistadores, Rumiñahui put up resistance in the north of the Inca Empire. He was also involved in the fratricidal war between Atahualpa and Huascars on the side of Atahualpa (1527–32).

In the first half of 1532, Quizquiz, Caracuchima, and Rumiñahui pacified the Tahuantinsuyo (the Inca Empire) and moved to Cuzco. After Francisco Pizarro executed Atahualpa in Cajamarca on July 26, 1533, Rumiñahui withdrew to the north of the Inca Empire (today the Andean region of Ecuador) and organized resistance against the Spaniards. He tried, without success, to stop the advance of conquistador Sebastian Moyano de Benalcázar (also known as Belalcázar or Belaicázar) and his 200-man army, reinforced by the Cañari (the Indian people in the Ecuadorian province of Cañar) auxiliary forces residing in Quito.

Between 1534 and 1535 he undertook sporadic attacks on the now-Spanish Quito, which had been reestablished by Benalcázar. Benalcázar won an internal battle among Spaniards, namely between Benalcázar, Diego de Almagro, and Pedro de Alvarado, and had 800 soldiers under his command. This allowed him to divide the troops and facilitate the search for Rumiñahui.

Rumiñahui was finally arrested in mid-1535 and sentenced to death. Some references say that he was killed immediately, while others argue that he was tortured for a long time because

the Spanish wanted to know where his people were hiding the treasures the Spaniards sought. What is certain is that he hampered the Spanish conquest considerably.

SEE ALSO: Agüeybaná I (d. 1510) and Agüeybaná II (d. 1511); Aracaré (d. 1542); Caonabo (d. 1496); Cuahtémoc (1502–1525); Hatuey (ca. 1400s–1512); Jumandi (d. 1578); Lautaro (d. 1557); Lempira (d. 1537); Sepé Tiarajú (1722/3–1756); Tisquesuza (d. 1537); Túpac Amaru (ca. 1540–1572)

References and Suggested Readings

- Chacón Izurieta, G. (2004) *Rumiñahui*. Ecuador: Comisión Nacional Permanente de Conmemoraciones Cívicas Editorial Pedro Jorge Vera.
- Hemming, J. (1970) *The Conquest of the Incas*. London: Pan.
- Miño, R. (1990) *Rumiñahui, defensor de Quito*. Quito: Confederación de Trabajadores del Ecuador.

Russell, Bertrand (1872–1970)

Stephen Heathorn

Bertrand Russell, distinguished British philosopher and public intellectual, devoted the greater part of his life to peace activism. Born into an aristocratic family, until 1914 Russell largely concerned himself with his academic career at Cambridge. However, his opposition to British entry into World War I, and then against the policy of conscription, cost him his academic career and pushed him into a life of protest. During the war he was twice prosecuted for sedition; the second offense earned him a six-month prison term.

By the end of the war Russell had embraced a libertarian form of socialism. Although he denounced the Bolsheviks after visiting the Soviet Union in 1920, his bohemian lifestyle and advanced views on science, education, and marriage made him popular with the progressive left and a gadfly to the establishment. He became the third Earl Russell in 1931, yet continued his attacks on conventional morality, militarism, nationalism, and unrestrained capitalism, which he regarded as significant threats to western civilization. Indeed, for most of his life Russell advocated for some form of world authority to take civilization-threatening weapons out of the hands of national governments. The advent of nuclear weapons only strengthened this belief.

Although never an absolute pacifist, in the 1930s Russell rejected armed opposition to the rise of fascism, a position he regretted and renounced in 1940. After World War II, Russell's prestige as a public intellectual was at its height, capped by winning the Noble Prize for Literature in 1950. However, Russell's peace activism was also reinvigorated by the escalation of the nuclear arms race. His 1954 radio broadcast, "Man's Peril," resounded with the emerging anti-nuclear movement, and he was thrust into its leadership. Russell was instrumental in arranging the anti-nuclear Russell–Einstein Manifesto in 1955 and the Pugwash Conference of Concerned Scientists in 1957. He became the first president of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in 1958, but subsequently formed the Committee of 100, which used the tactic of strict non-violent civil disobedience – mostly mass sit-down protests – to push forward the unilateralist "ban the bomb" cause. In 1961, in advance of one of these demonstrations, Russell was preemptively arrested and jailed for a month. He was 89. During the remainder of the 1960s Russell lent his name and pen to a large number of protest causes, most particularly against the Vietnam War through the International War Crimes Tribunal in 1967. He died three years later at age 97.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Campaign, Britain; Anti-Vietnam War Movement, Britain

References and Suggested Readings

- Bone, A. (Ed.) (2003) *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, Vol. 28: *Man's Peril, 1954–55*. London: Routledge.
- Clark, R. (1975) *The Life of Bertrand Russell*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Monk, R. (2001) *Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness, 1921–1970*. London: Vintage.
- Rempel, R. et al. (Eds.) (1995) *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell*, Vol. 15: *Pacifism and Revolution, 1916–18*. London: Routledge.
- Ryan, A. (1988) *Bertrand Russell: A Political Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Russia, cholera riots of 1830–1831

Yury V. Bosin

The Russian cholera epidemic of 1829–31 was the cause of widespread popular unrest that developed in response to government checkpoints to prevent

its spread and the perception that poor peasants and workers disproportionately suffered from the disease. Cholera reached Russia for the first time in September 1823 but soon ebbed due to the winter frosts. Six years later, in 1829, cholera reappeared in the southern cities of Astrakhan and Orenburg. According to official historic accounts, the disease was brought to Russia by Kyrghyz nomads. But in the fall of 1830 cholera spread even more extensively into the Russian heartland, reaching the edges of St. Petersburg, then Russia's capital. In response the government set up numerous quarantines, but it could not contain the epidemic. Subsequently the government set up checkpoints stopping merchant caravans, which in itself caused popular antagonism and disarray as the severity of the disease intensified among all social classes. Those who fell victim to the disease included upper classes, dukes, duchesses, generals, and the tsar's brother, Prince Konstantin. The death toll among the lower classes reached epidemic proportions, taking the lives of some 100,000 people.

Despair and popular resentment toward the government quarantine and checkpoint enforcement broke out into a vast popular protest. Once again, rumors that the aristocracy and upper classes were responsible for the plague set off insurrections, as those who were poorest were least able to ward off the disease. The rumor that doctors poisoned the wells sparked a wave of bloody riots throughout Russia, with large crowds sacking affluent households, smashing quarantines, and killing medical personnel.

The epidemic peaked in mid-1831 as about 600 people a day in the capital fell victim to the disease. Government offices, schools, businesses, and theaters were closed. Incited by the rumors that the disease was a result of deliberate contamination, insurgents destroyed ambulance carriages and sacked hospitals. On June 22, 1831, demonstrators in St. Petersburg gathered at the main cholera hospital located on Sennaya Square and went on to ransack the building, murdering several doctors. The arrival of two regiments with cannons halted the crowd's progress. Emperor Nicholas I personally addressed the insurgents and convinced them to leave, ending the riot considered by Alexander Pushkin as "senseless and merciless."

SEE ALSO: Bulavin's Rebellion, 1707–1708; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Moscow Fire and Protest, 1547; Pugachev's Rebellion, 1773–1775

References and Suggested Readings

- Bazilevich, K. V. (1936) *Urban Uprisings in Moscow State in the 17th Century*. Moscow and Leningrad (in Russian).
- Buganov, V. I. (1986) *Moscow Chronicles: Popular Uprisings in the 11th–18th Centuries*. Moscow (in Russian).
- Gessen, S. Y. (1932) *Cholera Riots (1830–2)*. Moscow (in Russian).
- McGrew, R. E. (1965) *Russia and the Cholera: 1823–1832*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907

David Mandel

The Revolution of 1905 was the first to occur in Europe since the Paris Commune of 1871, when the workers and other "little people" of the French capital rose up to establish a popular, grassroots democracy in that city. The Revolution of 1905, which came on the heels of three decades of rapid growth of the trade union and socialist movements in the industrialized world, opened what would turn out to be the most revolutionary century in the history of humanity. This is something rarely recalled today, when capitalism in its brutal, neoliberal form is once again triumphant across the world.

Lenin referred to the revolution that began in 1905 and was fully suppressed only in 1907 as the "dress rehearsal" for the revolutions of 1917. It was a period of intensely active political life that greatly accelerated the political education of all classes of society. Thanks to this concrete experience, they were able to shed the illusions they held about each other's interests and intentions and understand more clearly who were their real allies and enemies. Without 1905, there would not have been a socialist revolution in October 1917. The lack of this kind of revolutionary experience in the West was one of the reasons why the postwar labor upsurge there failed to realize its revolutionary potential. In Germany and Austria, in particular, the postwar revolutions did not go beyond capitalism.

On the Eve

In 1901 and 1902 student revolutionaries assassinated the ministers of education and the interior respectively, marking a revival of the student movement after the major strikes and

demonstrations of 1899. In 1902 peasant disorders broke out anew in the central Volga region and in the Ukraine. Meanwhile, the workers' movement was also gaining momentum. In the summer of 1903 a strike wave of unprecedented proportions, in which social democratic committees played an active role, swept the southern part of the empire, provoking regional governors to call in an unparalleled number of troops – 160,000 in all. The strikers addressed both economic demands to their employers and political demands to the state. So great was the unrest, which also affected the national minorities, mostly the Poles and Finns, that by 1904–5 the greater part of the Russian empire was under some form of martial law.

It was in this turbulent context that war broke out between Russia and Japan in January 1904. Not long before that, V. von Plehve, the arch-reactionary minister of the interior, had suggested to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces that “in order to hold back the revolution, we need a small victorious war.” But when war became imminent, he apparently changed his mind. And rightly so. The disastrous military campaign, quite unexpected in that Russia was viewed in the world as a great white European power opposing a mere Asiatic upstart (a Russian slogan at the start of the war was “All we have to do is throw our hats at them”), only intensified the domestic crisis. For the defeats brought no change in the government's repressive, reactionary domestic course. As a result, even some liberals began to favor defeat in the war, hoping it would spur internal reform. As for von Plehve himself, he was killed by a Socialist Revolutionary (SR) bomb in mid-July 1904.

Von Plehve's assassination, which was greeted with semi-public rejoicing, caused a certain change of heart in the tsar, who appointed in his place the moderate aristocrat Svyatopolk-Mirsky. This opened a period of relative political liberalism, known as “the spring in the fall.” Among the measures introduced were a partial amnesty, abolition of corporal punishment, and cancellation of certain peasant dues. Meanwhile, while workers continued to demonstrate and strike and terrorists threw bombs, the urban liberals, mostly professional people, took a leaf from their French counterparts in 1848 and organized banquets, which they use as forums semi-publicly to express their opposition to the regime and call for democratic reform. The rural liberals, professionals, and members of the gentry involved in



This satirical depiction of Tsar Nicholas II lampoons the Russian leader's lack of understanding of domestic and international developments during his reign. As the Russian Revolution of 1905 unfolded, shaped by the events of the Russo-Japanese War and Bloody Sunday, Nicholas's reaction was to remain aloof, as expressed by this cartoon. (David King Collection)

the *zemstva*, organs of local self-government, held a national conference in November 1904 that called for democratic freedoms but stopped short of demanding a democratic government. None of this, however, moved the tsar.

Bloody Sunday

The revolution was set off by the massacre of workers in St. Petersburg on Sunday January 9. Along with their spouses and children, workers marched 200,000 strong to the Winter Palace to present the tsar with a petition for economic and democratic reforms. At the head of the procession was a priest, Georgi Gapon, who had been involved in missionary work among the capital's workers when the police enlisted him, seeking to direct workers away from politics to a path of purely economic reform. In 1904, the authorities even allowed him to organize an Assembly of Factory Workers of St. Petersburg, a combination mutual aid society and trade union that established units in most of the larger plants.

But matters got out of hand when four members of the Assembly, workers at the giant Putilov Works (which employed 13,000 people), were fired and management refused Gapon's request to reinstate them. The priest then organized a strike which by January 3 shut down the entire plant. The strikers' initial demands, besides the reinstatement of their dismissed comrades, were economic, but they soon called for democracy too. The strike spread quickly to other factories, and by January 8, 111,000 workers in the capital had downed tools. Gapon then drew up a petition, an incongruous mixture of humble pleading to the "good tsar" led astray by his bad officials and radical social and democratic demands, but based on a sober portrayal of the workers' situation. Gapon informed the tsar of the impending march and of its peaceful intentions. But the tsar's only reply was to call troops into battle readiness and station them at key points around the city. On Sunday January 9, 1905, starting out from different districts of the city, the workers were cut down without warning by the sabers of Cossack cavalymen (an ethnic minority closely related to the Russians, Cossacks served as the tsar's political shock troops) and repeated infantry volleys. More than a thousand people were killed or wounded.

This single bloody act of repression dispelled any lingering legitimacy the tsar had still enjoyed among the workers and it alienated to varying degrees much of the rest of society. As Lenin remarked, "The revolutionary education of the proletariat made more progress in one day than it could have made in months and years of drab, humdrum, wretched existence." It was also from that moment that strong links between the workers and the socialist parties began to be forged.

From the capital the strike movement spread across the empire, drawing in workers from non-industrial sectors that had never taken collective action before. For more than two years, Russia would be rocked by strikes, demonstrations, pitched battles that opposed barricaded workers to the forces of order, peasant uprisings, military mutinies, student riots, and, of course, terrorist assassinations.

The tsar very reluctantly came to the conclusion that he could no longer avoid concessions. Yet what he proposed was exceedingly modest. He authorized the election of delegates from the factories to a commission to make proposals

for improving the workers' situation. But most of the elected delegates turned out to be social democrats or workers leaning in that direction and they demanded freedom of speech and assembly and the release of the delegates who had already been arrested. When this was rejected, they boycotted the commission and called on the workers to continue the fight for the eight-hour workday, health insurance, democracy, and an end to the war. The next day, the government dissolved the commission, putting an end to the autocracy's only attempt to establish contact with the workers' movement. Later, in February, the tsar indicated some willingness to allow representatives of the people to participate in drafting laws, but nothing came of that either.

The peasants did not react immediately to Bloody Sunday, partly because of their isolation and partly because they were waiting to see just how much the government's repressive capacity had been weakened. But by the summer, almost 500 disturbances, mostly labor and rent strikes and illegal timber-cutting and cattle-pasturing, were recorded, along with some cases of arson. The pillaging of estates and seizure of land were yet to come. In July a recently formed Peasant Union held its national conference, attended by delegates from 22 provinces. It resolved that the land should be the common property of all the people and called for the election of a constituent assembly. This was the first time the peasants had ever acted as an organized political force on the national level.

The liberals also underwent radicalization. In May 1905, various professional and national groupings formed the Union of Unions, which now called for establishing democracy by any means, even terrorism. The rural liberals also shifted, calling now for a constituent assembly, though one that would share power with the tsar.

Even the industrialists, shaken by the regime's inability to contain the strike movement and to maintain civil order, became disillusioned with police repression as the answer and urged the government to seek conciliation with the workers in order to avoid a popular revolution. They called for a constitutional regime, but stopped short of demanding democratic government.

In response to this opposition from almost all quarters of society, the tsar issued a decree in August 1905 establishing a Duma, a consultative body to participate in the preparation of laws

and to monitor the state's finances. It was to be elected by unequal suffrage and exclude people who owned neither house nor other property, in other words, the greater part of the urban and rural proletariat and even much of the intelligentsia. Moreover, the Duma could be summoned and dismissed on the sole decision of the tsar.

This very limited concession, which came as peace was being concluded with Japan (among other things, the end of the war freed new troops for domestic repression) and during a lull in the strike movement, had an impact on the mood of the industrial bourgeoisie, which showed signs of returning to its traditional support for the regime. It even caused some wavering among the liberals, who were divided over whether to reject the decree outright or to cooperate with the tsar with a view to extracting more concessions. At bottom, this wavering was rooted in a deep-seated fear of popular revolution, which would put too much political power in the hands of mobilized, victorious workers and peasants. To the extent that the industrialists desired political change, it was in order more effectively to maintain order, to protect their assets and profits, and to strengthen their own political influence. Although the liberals aspired to more radical reforms than the industrialists, they also shared fear of the "unbridled masses" and also sought to take power for themselves.

The October Manifesto and the "Days of Freedom": Deepening Class Divisions

But a month later, a new wave of labor protest swept Russia and seemed to reverse this incipient split within the ranks of the opposition. Indeed, the immediate effect of the new labor upsurge was more than ever to unite the politically active elements of society against the autocracy. But not for long.

On September 19, 1905, Moscow's printers went on strike. Police repression soon provoked other sectors of Moscow's working class to join. In St. Petersburg, the printers declared a sympathy strike and were joined by workers of a number of other industrial enterprises. Just as this strike wave seemed to be dying down, a railroad strike began on October 7 that soon paralyzed virtually all train traffic in the empire. From the railways, the strike movement spread to workers in all sectors of the economy, drawing in

also students and professional people. Political, democratic demands were now in the forefront, economic concerns taking a second place. The strikers sought arms, built barricades, engaged in pitched battles with the forces of order. But the logical next step, which could only have been armed insurrection, did not happen.

The initial impact of this new popular upsurge was to further radicalize the liberals and the industrialists. The Kadet Party proclaimed its complete solidarity with the strikers at its founding congress held at that time. And the Union of Unions helped to organize participation of the intelligentsia in the strike movement. As for the industrialists, they opened their factories to the striking workers for meetings and they even continued to pay wages while the workers were on strike.

The scope and force of the movement paralyzed the regime. It had to choose between repression, whose outcome was uncertain and risked provoking a full-scale insurrection, or further concessions. The tsar very reluctantly chose the latter, and on October 17, 1905 he published a manifesto granting political freedoms, extending the franchise to groups previously excluded, and transforming the Duma from a consultative to a legislative body. His government also declared an amnesty, canceled the peasants' redemption dues, and liberalized the press laws.

These concessions, however, were merely tactical. The tsar was determined to retract them at the first opportunity. Almost simultaneously with the publication of the manifesto, the government instigated, organized, or otherwise tolerated a vast wave of anti-Jewish pogroms (riots), which were accompanied by the cry "Hit the Kikes: Save Russia!" The idea was to deflect popular dissatisfaction from the state onto a powerless minority. The pogroms, which usually began with a patriotic procession led by clergy and overseen by the police, resulted in the murder of several thousand people and the wounding of many thousands more in the cities and towns across the Pale of Settlement, the outskirts of the empire, to which the regime had restricted most Jews. At the time, the tsar wrote to his wife that "the impertinence of the socialists and revolutionaries has angered the people once more; and since nine-tenths of the trouble-makers are Jews, the people's anger turned against them." The pogroms were a signal to the most reactionary elements of society, which had remained relatively

silent until then, to start organizing. In the fall of 1905, under semi-official patronage, they formed the Union of the Russian People, a proto-fascist organization.

But the regime was still in no position to mount a genuine counteroffensive. This standoff between the forces of revolution and reaction, which lasted into December 1905, produced what became known as the “Days of Freedom.” For the first time in the history of the modern Russian state, people could freely assemble, form organizations, and write and speak out publicly.

The new concessions reopened and deepened the divisions within the opposition forces. The workers were clearly not appeased, though their strike movement did somewhat abate temporarily. They still aimed at nothing short of full political liberties and a democratic republic based on universal and equal suffrage, the eight-hour day, and land reform for the peasants. The peasants, too, would not be satisfied with less than the free distribution of the landed estates. On the other hand, the concessions had an impact on the industrialists. A new Octobrist Party, with links to the industrial bourgeoisie, was founded in November on a platform that in essence was satisfied with the concessions granted by the October Manifesto. Many among the liberal gentry were now also disengaging themselves from the opposition, demanding firm action from the state against peasant violence. As for the Kadets, they still called for a democratic government, but to achieve it through the Duma, not by revolution. And they took their distance from the workers’ strike movement.

It was during this period that workers’ soviets (councils) first appeared. Their origins were in the strike committees elected in the factories. Since these were mass strikes embracing many enterprises, even entire towns and cities, the workers felt the need for broader coordination. They therefore elected deputies from their enterprises to city-wide soviets, usually on the ratio of one deputy per 500 workers. The most important soviet, which served as a model for the 40 to 50 other workers’ soviets, but also for soviets of peasant and soldiers’ deputies, was that of St. Petersburg. It met first on October 13, 1905, on the initiative of the Mensheviks, to prepare the general political strike.

But the soviets, which did not disband after the strikes had ended, were more than strike committees. Any workers’ organization that aspires

to represent the entire class, as opposed to only a section of it (such as an individual enterprise, a single profession or industrial sector, or only unionized workers), is by its very nature political. Over the course of the history of the labor movement, general strikes have often given rise to representative bodies that act as alternatives to the official authorities, since the workers, once they withdraw their labor, take *de facto* control of the economy. It is the strike committee that gives authorization for the production and delivery of essential goods and services. In St. Petersburg, for example, the soviet ordered printers not to print newspapers that submitted their copy to the censors. It gave permission to an engraver to make a seal for the Union of Post and Telegraph Workers although the union was illegal. It intervened in labor disputes. Petitioners and plaintiffs of all sorts visited it daily. In many cities, worker and student militias under soviet supervision patrolled the streets to keep civil order. Both workers and the reactionary press referred to the St. Petersburg soviet as the “workers’ government.” Lenin, among others, saw in the soviets, to which he hoped the soldiers, peasants, and intelligentsia would eventually also send deputies, the future provisional revolutionary government.

In its highly democratic, if not much formalized, functioning, the soviets resembled the Paris Commune of 1871, whose deputies were subject to immediate recall by their electors. (In the Russian case, these were the general assembly of the different factories.) Deputies reported back often to their electorate, and in the heated political atmosphere of the period, the workers followed closely the soviet’s activities, quite often recalling deputies that no longer reflected their positions and electing others in their place. This ensured strong democratic control of the soviet, whose positions evolved closely with those of the workers.

And the workers’ revolutionary temper was approaching its apogee. Strikes were now overwhelmingly political; they spread quickly and tended to become general. They were often called in solidarity with other strikers or in support of groups who were being subjected to repression. Armed clashes with the authorities became increasingly frequent during strikes. Everywhere workers sought arms, both for self-defense and to prepare for the armed rising they judged inevitable.

The regime's retreat during the "Days of Freedom" also gave a further impulse to the peasant movement, which now turned to full-scale rebellion in south-central Russia, including looting and burning of manor houses – actions accompanied by the cry "the red rooster is crowing!" – and the expulsion or murder of landowners. In contrast to the last large-scale peasant revolt, the Pugachev Rebellion of 1773–5, this one was characterized by a significant degree of organization; it bore some elements of a political ideology; and it was directly linked to a revolutionary movement in the cities. The Second Congress of the Peasant Union in early November rejected the October Manifesto. The majority of delegates still opposed violent methods but continued to demand the immediate transfer of the estates without compensation to the communal property of the entire people, to be used only by those who worked it themselves. However, if this was not forthcoming, the Peasant Union declared that it would organize a general peasant strike that would be decided "by agreement with the working class." This situated the Peasant Union on the far left of the mostly liberal Union of Unions. Thus, while the liberals were taking their distance from the workers' movement, the Peasant Union was moving increasingly closer to the workers' soviets.

The "Days of Freedom" also saw a marked increase of agitation in the armed forces. On October 26, a mutiny broke in the island fortress of Kronstadt in the Gulf of Finland near St. Petersburg in response to the arrest of sailors for insubordination. It took two days for forces brought in from the outside to put it down. Mutinies also occurred at the Baltic naval bases of Sveaborg and Reval, in Sevastopol on the Black Sea, and Vladivostok on the Pacific coast. Although the navy was the most affected, unrest also grew in the army, which saw 26 mutinies in November alone.

Not far behind were the nationalist movements in the Caucasus, Poland, the three Baltic provinces, and Finland (in addition to, and sometimes combined with, militant worker and peasant movements). These demanded self-rule and, in some cases, outright independence. In Finland, the struggle assumed particularly violent forms, forcing the tsar to restore rights he had suppressed seven years before when he undertook his Russification campaign.

Shift in the Balance of Forces

The revolution seemed on the upswing. But despite the calls for insurrection, despite the efforts of the socialist parties and soviets to form armed units and the mutinies in the armed forces, the regime, in particular its repressive apparatus, though weakened, was still largely intact. And its leaders were busy planning a vicious counteroffensive. They were temporarily held back only by the strength of the popular movement and the related fear that repression would provoke an insurrection and the regime's overthrow.

The major shift in the political balance of forces in favor of the government occurred not as a result of an armed confrontation but as a consequence of action taken by St. Petersburg's industrial employers, who locked out their workers. Workers were naturally eager to translate their political victories into economic gains. In one of the capital's districts, the workers decided to enforce the eight-hour workday on their own without waiting for a law to be adopted. The eight-hour day had been a longstanding demand of the Russian and international labor movements and was considered an integral part of the democratic revolution by workers. Taking up this local initiative, the St. Petersburg soviet voted overwhelmingly on October 29 to call on all workers to follow the example. In response, some employers made partial concessions, but most resisted, some by docking pay, others by threatening to shut their plants. But their mood was uncertain, and their responses uncoordinated.

In the midst of this campaign on November 2, the soviet called a general strike to prevent the execution of the participants of the Kronstadt mutiny and the introduction of martial law in Poland. This was a magnificent display of worker solidarity, a measure of the workers' intense politicization and revolutionary spirit. Participation in the strike, which lasted five days, was massive, even stronger than after the massacre on Bloody Sunday. The government was forced to retreat on both issues. This was a significant victory for the revolutionary forces, but one of their last.

The employers were very alarmed by the eight-hour campaign. Unlike the strikes of October–November that had been directed against the autocracy, this action was aimed at their profits and managerial prerogatives and – who knew?

– maybe ultimately at their property. For who could predict, they asked themselves, where this increasingly radical workers' movement would take the country? On the other hand, the industrialists were quite satisfied with the concessions granted by the October Manifesto, which gave them increased political influence while leaving the tsar's repressive capacity intact to deal with the "unbridled masses," if they got out of hand.

And so on the heels of the November general strike, the St. Petersburg industrialists organized a general lockout of the workers which they conducted in close coordination with the government, which was the first to close the state-owned factories, showing the way to the private sector. Tens of thousands of workers were thrown into the street without any means of livelihood. This was a major blow to the morale in the capital, especially since the workers were unable to find a response to this challenge. To open the plants on their own would have been tantamount to a socialist revolution, something that was far from their practical thinking at that time. And even if they did open the plants, lacking the support of a revolutionary state, they would not be able to keep them functioning for long. At a dramatic meeting of the soviet on November 12 lasting four hours, a majority of the deputies reluctantly voted for a "temporary" retreat.

But the lessons were not lost on the workers. One of them was that insurrection and state power were ultimately the only answer. But an even more important lesson for the longer term was that in the struggle for democracy, they would find the bourgeoisie on the other side of the barricades.

Meanwhile, the government, sensing the time ripe, shifted its repressive apparatus into high gear. Its initial thrust was directed against the rural rebellion, since repression against scattered peasant villages posed the least risk. "Pacification" campaigns by military units, led by generals with quasi-dictatorial powers, were unleashed against the six main provinces of the peasant uprising. Moving from village to village, they meted out summary, public, and often brutal punishment, meeting only occasional resistance. But the most savage expeditions took place in the Baltic provinces, where the rebellion against the landlords, aristocrats of German origin, had been extremely intense. Here alone, more than 2,000 peasants were executed. (This helps to explain

why the Lettish sharpshooters became the most stalwart unit of the future Red Army during the Civil War of 1918–21.) By the beginning of 1906, the government had gained the upper hand in the countryside.

In the cities, however, it had to proceed in a more cautious, probing manner. Increasingly, the police dispersed meetings in an effort to demoralize the workers. On November 14, they arrested the leading members of the Peasant Union in Moscow. On November 25, in the midst of their national strike, the leadership of the Congress of Post and Telegraph employees was taken. The next day it was the turn of the chairman of the St. Petersburg soviet.

The soviet's immediate response was only to declare that preparations for armed insurrection were continuing. Then on December 2, in conjunction with an initiative by the Peasant Union, it declared "financial war" against government, calling on the population to stop paying taxes, to refuse to accept paper money and to demand gold for all but minor transactions, and to withdraw deposits from government banks. This move, which eventually did hurt the near bankrupt government, immediately prompted the arrest en masse of the soviet on December 3, some 250 people in all, including most of its executive. The members of the executive still at large, supported by the representatives of the socialist parties in the soviet, called for a nationwide political strike to begin on December 8.

At this point the initiative shifted to Moscow, where the mood was firmer. Moscow's workers had not experienced the massacre of January 9 or the lockout of November. Another difference was that St. Petersburg had an enormous garrison, with loyal elite guard regiments as its backbone. Therefore, the mood in St. Petersburg was more cautious – the workers wanted to see if the rest of the country would join an insurrection before acting themselves. But the Moscow soviet decided to begin the strike on December 7 and to do everything to transform it into an armed rising. The strike in St. Petersburg began the next day but was far less unanimous even among the factory workers. It began to collapse after the 12th.

In Moscow, by contrast, the strike enjoyed the support of virtually the entire society and did transform itself into an insurrection. Barricades appeared, and by the third day, bloody clashes erupted between armed workers and the army, which brought into action machine guns and

artillery. By December 14, loyal troops, despite their superior numbers, were refusing to fight an enemy that seemed constantly to escape their grasp. Their commander, Admiral Dubasov, appealed desperately to St. Petersburg for reinforcements, and the next day the Semyonovsky guards regiment arrived – the capital’s workers had been unable to cut the railway line, which had been occupied by troops. With hope of a quick victory gone, revolutionary morale in Moscow weakened. But the working-class district of Presnya, submitted to merciless, unceasing artillery, fought on until January 17.

The insurrection in Moscow had lasted nine days. The revolutionaries probably counted no more than a few thousand armed fighters, but they enjoyed the support of the rest of the workers, the intelligentsia, and the petty bourgeoisie. Armed resistance continued elsewhere for days, sometimes weeks. In the Siberian towns of Chita and Krasnoyarsk, the workers’ and soldiers’ soviets actually took power and held out for many weeks.

With the uprising broken, punitive expeditions took over. Trotsky, second chairman of the St. Petersburg soviet, cited figures to the effect that the government killed over 14,000 people between January 9, 1905 and April 17, 1906 (the opening of the first State Duma), wounded more than 20,000 (many of whom later died), and arrested, exiled, and imprisoned 70,000. These figures, however, were a gross underestimate. As the St. Petersburg soviet had stated in its “Financial Manifesto,” the government was acting toward its people as a conqueror in a foreign land.

Everywhere workers were disarmed, soviet deputies and strike leaders arrested, local administrations purged of revolutionary sympathizers, newspapers closed, revolutionary meetings and outdoor assemblies of any kind banned. In this repressive activity, the authorities enjoyed the active support of employers, who hit the capital’s workers with a second concerted lockout in December. Many factories did not reopen for weeks, and when they did the “troublemakers,” the most active, committed workers, were not rehired.

The Triumph of Reaction

The December rising was not the last word of the revolution, neither in the cities nor in the countryside. In the capital, for example, workers thrown onto the streets by the lockouts organ-

ized a Soviet of the Unemployed, to which employed workers in the factories made monetary contributions and also sent delegates. This was another impressive manifestation of worker initiative and solidarity, all the more so as it was opposed by the socialist parties (though Lenin personally supported it), who feared the soviet would become the target of new arrests of the workers’ leaders. But this new soviet so frightened the municipal government that it allocated large sums for public works, some of which the soviet used to support strikes. It also provided cover for illegal party activities.

But though the revolutionary flame flickered on into 1907 and occasionally flared up, the forces of revolution never regained the initiative, and the balance of power continued to shift against them. The number of strikers in 1906 was only a third of that of 1905, and in 1907 it was less than a sixth. The decline of strike activity was only partially the result of intensified repression. A recession set in in 1906, and accompanying unemployment and economic insecurity also undermined workers’ willingness to take strike action.

When the laws were finally published, the new State Duma that had been announced by the October Manifesto turned out to be a legislative body with limited powers and still under the supreme authority of the tsar. Suffrage had been extended, but 90,000 workers still had the same representation as 2,000 landowners, that is, one deputy for each group. The electoral law, and indeed the entire political system, served to reinforce class consciousness among workers. For in tsarist Russia one was not a citizen with formal political rights equal to those of all other citizens but rather a member of a class-based estate with separately defined rights and limitations.

The opening of the first State Duma on April 27, 1906 again revealed the rift that separated the workers, who met the event with indifference, from the liberal elements of society, who were jubilant. The capital’s workers even refused the employers’ offer to pay wages for the day off. On May 1, too, when working-class St. Petersburg went on strike and some of the more liberal employers again offered to pay wages, the workers refused. By this remarkable display of class dignity and independence they announced that they desired no bourgeois participation in their holiday of international solidarity. As historian N. Mikhailov noted in his *Soviet bezrabortnykh* (Soviet of the Unemployed, 1998), “the two

political holidays celebrated by the Petersburg opposition, liberals and workers, with an interval of only three days between them, clearly demonstrated that the abyss separating people into two hostile camps, both opposed to autocracy but not together, was so deep that even their celebrations could not find common ground.”

The composition of the first Duma, despite the gross underrepresentation of workers and peasants and its boycott on the part of the socialist parties, proved no comfort to the tsar. Of 497 deputies, only 45 belonged to the right, and 340 were patently of the opposition (though overwhelmingly non-revolutionary), including 180 Kadets, the largest party. The others were mainly peasants who adhered to no party but often voted with the opposition. Already in mid-May, the government decided to dissolve the Duma, awaiting only a suitable occasion. This arose over the land question: while the Duma discussed the forced alienation of private lands, the government would hear nothing of it. The Duma's dissolution on July 9, 1906 provoked no visible popular reaction.

The successful dissolution of the Duma, the suppression of a series of naval mutinies in the Baltic area and of an attempted strike in St. Petersburg, opened the way for a more thoroughgoing policy of repression under the leadership of the prime minister, Petr Stolypin, a man already infamous for his cruelty in putting down the peasant movement in the Volga region. New legislation provided for summary courts martial of civilians in any region under martial law with no possibility of appeal and with immediate execution of sentence. Between August 1906 and April 1907, field courts martial executed more than a thousand people. But ordinary courts martial were also active, executing 2,319 people between 1905 and 1908. This bloody repression was met by a rise in revolutionary terror, one of whose victims was the hated Stolypin himself. The first attempt was made at his residence in August 1906 and failed, forcing him to move into the tsar's Winter Palace for security. He was finally killed at the opera in 1911, which the tsar and his daughters were also attending.

Despite government interference in the elections, the political composition of the second Duma that convened in February 1907 was even more radical than the first. Having abandoned their boycott, the socialist and allied parties now formed the largest group of deputies with

200 (65 social democrats, each one of which had experienced arrest, prison, or exile; 37 SRs; and 98 unattached peasants and intellectuals of the more moderate Trudovik faction). The right wing was also stronger now, growing from 32 in the first Duma to 94. Meanwhile, the liberal center, the Kadets, had shrunk from 184 to 99. Lenin remarked on this deepening political polarization that the most reactionary electoral law in the most backward country of Europe had yielded the most revolutionary popular representative body.

The tsar dissolved this Duma, too, on June 3, 1907. This was a veritable coup d'état, as it was followed by a radical revision of the electoral law that skewed representation in the third Duma, convened on November 1, 1907, even more in favor of the propertied classes. The revolution was over.

Drawing Lessons from the Defeat

The various classes and parties all drew their own, quite different, conclusions from the revolutionary experience. The nobility situated itself firmly in the camp of reaction, its liberal wing now seriously weakened. The industrialists, too, were again closely allied with the regime. And the liberal opposition definitively abandoned its flirtation with revolution. In the dark period of reaction that followed the revolution, most of the liberal intelligentsia retreated into private concerns.

Similar processes were at work among the socialist intelligentsia. In his study of the SR Party, *The Sickle under the Hammer* (1963), Oliver Radkey observes “a metamorphosis of . . . the populist intelligentsia from insurrectionists in 1905 to jaded democrats in the period between the revolutions and then to . . . devotees of the cult of the state in the coming war. They clung to the old SR label even though the faith was gone, aside from the residue of interest in political liberation.” Menshevik observers also note a wholesale withdrawal from politics and social concerns among the radical intelligentsia, which recoiled from the underground struggle. Bolshevik workers complained of the shortage of intellectual support. The retreating radical students and professionals were gradually replaced, though not entirely, with “worker-intellectuals,” people with calloused hands, a developed intellect, and continuous ties with the workers.

Within the revolutionary parties, the social democrats in particular drew conclusions from the defeat. (Theory was never a particular concern of the populists.) Three distinct positions emerged. The central issue was revolutionary strategy and, specifically, what combination of social forces would make the revolution when the opportunity next arose. It was only now that the issues separating the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, still officially fractions of a single party, became clear.

As noted earlier, both currents assumed that the coming revolution in Russia could only be liberal democratic. Indeed, not only would the revolution leave capitalist property relations intact, but by sweeping away the vestiges of feudalism it would open the way for the full development of capitalism. Russia had to pass through this stage before the conditions for socialism would be ripe, since socialism in a poor, overwhelmingly peasant country was impossible, according to the Marxist analysis. What divided the two currents was rather the role that the liberals, representing at least the progressive wing of the bourgeoisie, if not the entire class, would play in the democratic revolution.

As far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, the experience of 1905–7 had not only confirmed the fundamentally reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie. They considered its tiny liberal wing of no political significance. Moreover, the revolution had shown that the liberals themselves feared revolution to such an extent that, if it threatened again, they would seek accommodation with the autocracy. The Bolsheviks, therefore, called for an alliance of workers and peasants, a “revolutionary dictatorship of the peasantry and working class,” to carry through the revolution, even against the opposition of the bourgeoisie and the liberals.

The Mensheviks, for their part, felt that the leadership role of the liberals, as representing the bourgeoisie, was essential to the success of the democratic revolution. It would fail, as it had in 1905, if the bourgeoisie turned against it. The revolution needed the support and participation of at least the progressive part of the bourgeoisie. And Mensheviks believed that the liberal elements of the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia, despite their wavering, could be nudged along the path of revolution. As for the peasants, with whom the Bolsheviks proposed a revolutionary alliance, the Mensheviks did not believe them capable of becoming a conscious, organized, revolutionary

force. They could serve as a kind of revolutionary battering ram against the autocracy if led by another class. But that class could not be the workers, as the Bolsheviks proposed. For if a workers’ party found itself at the head of a revolutionary government, it would be driven by its supporters to take radical, collectivist measures that would prove utopian in the context of Russia’s backwardness. Socialist measures would alienate not only the bourgeoisie but also the peasants, who wanted land reform but were wedded to the free market and private enterprise. Politically isolated, the workers would be crushed along with the revolution. It was, therefore, imperative that the revolution bring the liberals to power, as the representatives of the progressive bourgeoisie. But for that to happen, the workers had to “show tact,” as Menshevik theorist Georgi Plekhanov put it. They had to restrain their economic demands so as not to frighten the bourgeoisie into the arms of reaction.

There was also a third position that differed from both the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. It argued that the coming revolution, to be victorious, could not remain within a capitalist-democratic framework but would have to transform itself into a socialist revolution, overthrowing the bourgeoisie and private enterprise along with the tsar. These “maximalist” views (from the “maximum” or long-term program of the socialist parties) were especially prevalent among certain sections of the SR Party, which were not encumbered by the Marxist analysis according to which political institutions, to be viable, had to correspond at least roughly to the existing level of socioeconomic development. But Bolshevik and even Menshevik party members were not immune to “maximalist” views either, despite their parties’ official position.

These views were given a boost by the lockouts of the end of 1905, when the industrialists, followed shortly by the liberal intelligentsia, turned against the revolution. During a discussion in the summer of 1906, a Bolshevik worker shocked the assembled social democratic intellectuals when he asked: “Are we really going to shed our blood two times – once for the victory of the bourgeois revolution and another for the victory of our workers’ socialist revolution? No, comrades, whatever the party program says, if we are going to shed our blood, it will be at once for freedom and for socialism.”

But it was Trotsky, a social democrat who belonged to neither fraction, who provided the

analysis to support this position. Building on the insights of A. Parvus, a Russian-born member of the German Social Democratic Party, Trotsky found major contradictions in the analyses of both the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. He fully agreed with the Bolsheviks' assessment of the liberals: they would not be allies but adversaries in the revolution. But he considered the Bolsheviks' alternative of a "revolutionary dictatorship of workers and peasants" equally unrealistic. In this, he agreed with the Mensheviks: the peasants were incapable of becoming an independent, organized political force on the national stage; they could be a revolutionary force but only when led by another class. History, and not least the history of Russia, had amply demonstrated the political limits of the peasants as a class. And so, revolutionary leadership would necessarily fall to the working class, which in 1905–7 had shown what it was capable of as the most powerful, determined, and cohesive democratic force, whose radicalism had been able to draw the peasantry behind it.

But the problem was – and here Trotsky again agreed with the Mensheviks – that a workers' party at the head of a revolutionary government would be forced to take measures that undermined capitalism. He cited, as an example, the struggle for the eight-hour day, a social reform that workers considered part and parcel of the democratic revolution. What if the industrialists reacted, as they had in November and December 1905, with a lockout? Mobilized by the revolution and holding political power in their hands, the workers would certainly not stand by idly, as they had in 1905, if locked out. They would open the factories and force their government to support them. And since it was workers who were opening the factories, they would naturally run them on a collective basis. The same thing would happen if the economy went into recession, throwing masses of workers onto the street. Once again, the workers would force their government to open the closed factories and run them collectively.

In sum, the democratic revolution in Russia could win only under the political leadership of the working class, but a democratic revolution under working-class leadership would necessarily go beyond the limits of the private enterprise system, transforming itself into a socialist revolution. However, as all Marxists, Trotsky recognized that Russia lacked the conditions

for socialism. He argued that even before the government's socialist measures stumbled over the technical backwardness of Russia, the revolutionary regime would come up against insurmountable political obstacles. For the peasants, having already obtained the land they coveted, would not support the workers in collectivization measures. They would turn against them. Once the workers' government was thus isolated, it would either be crushed from the inside by the forces of domestic counterrevolution, supported by the peasants, or from the outside by the intervention of the capitalist powers, who would perceive the revolution as a mortal threat.

According to this analysis, the revolution in Russia seemed doomed. But that was only if the analysis remained confined to Russia itself. If, however, it was extended to the international level, the situation appeared differently. By the end of the nineteenth century, capitalism had become a highly integrated, interdependent world system, one, moreover, that was racked by explosive contradictions. The most serious was the intense imperialist competition among the great industrial powers. But war was merely one of the more probable scenarios that could unleash pent-up revolutionary forces in the West. There were others. Indeed, the very example of revolution in Russia could spark revolutionary conflagrations abroad, especially in the countries of Central Europe that, like Russia, were still dominated by semi-feudal monarchies.

This is how Trotsky saw the way out of Russia's dilemma – in the support of revolutions in more developed capitalist countries. These would come to the aid of the Russian revolution, enabling a workers' government to find an accommodation with the peasantry and quickly to overcome Russia's economic backwardness. In his pamphlet *Results and Prospects* (1906), Trotsky concludes: "Left to its own resources, the working class of Russia will inevitably be crushed by the counter-revolution the moment the peasantry turns its back on it. It will have no alternative but to link the fate of its political rule, and, hence, the fate of the whole Russian revolution, with the fate of the socialist revolution in Europe. It will cast onto the scales of the class struggle of the entire capitalist world the colossal state-political power given it by the temporary conjuncture of circumstances in the Russian bourgeois [liberal democratic] revolution. With state power in its hands, with counter-

revolution behind it and European reaction in front of it, it will send forth to its comrades the world over the old rallying cry, which this time will be a call for the last attack: 'Workers of all lands, unite!'

As a revolutionary Marxist, Trotsky was by nature optimistic. Subsequent history was not as kind to the Russian revolution as Trotsky had hoped. Nevertheless, his analysis captured with remarkable insight the underlying dynamic of the future revolution and, indeed, of the international class struggle at the end of World War I, a struggle in which the Russian revolution would indeed play a central role.

SEE ALSO: Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Bolsheviks; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marxism; Paris Commune, 1871; Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918); Pugachev's Rebellion, 1773–1775; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russia, Revolutions: Sources and Contexts; Russian Civil War, 1918–1924; Russian Revolutionary Labor Upsurge, 1912–1914; Soviet Union, Fall of; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); War Communism and the Rise of the Soviet Union

References and Suggested Readings

- Kochan, L. (1978) *Russia in Revolution, 1890–1918*. London: Grenada.
- Harcave, S. (1970) *The Russian Revolution of 1905*. London: Collier Macmillan.
- Radkey, O. H. (1963) *The Sickle under the Hammer: The Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Smele, J. & Haywood, A. (Eds.) (2005) *The Russian Revolution of 1905: Centenary Perspectives*. New York: Routledge.
- Treadgold, D. (1955) *Lenin and His Rivals*. New York: Praeger.
- Trotsky, L. (1970) *The Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects*. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Trotsky, L. (1981) *1905*. New York: Vintage.

Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917

David Mandel

The February Revolution overthrew the absolute monarchy of Tsar Nicolas I. (The Julian calendar then used in Russia was 13 days behind the

Gregorian calendar used in most other countries. By the Gregorian calendar, which the Soviet government later adopted on January 31, 1918, the revolution occurred in March. All dates here follow the Julian calendar.) It was followed only eight months later by another revolution that led to the overthrow of capitalism.

Both revolutions of 1917 had deep roots in the history and social and political structures of Russia. But they must also be understood in the context of World War I (1914–18). Whatever the immediate cause of this war, the most horrible mass slaughter in history until that time, it was the logical outcome of a quarter-century of intense military buildup and imperialist rivalry on the part of the major capitalist powers, pursuing a combination of goals that included territorial aggrandizement and colonial conquest, acquisition and defense of spheres of influence, control of sources of raw materials and markets, and geopolitical advantage.

The Second International founded in 1889 and which included the major socialist and workers' parties of Europe had been very much aware of the danger. A resolution adopted unanimously by its congress in 1907, to the accompaniment of lengthy, tumultuous, and repeated applause, ended with the following paragraph: "If a war threatens to break out, it is the duty of the working classes and their parliamentary representatives in the countries involved . . . to exert every effort in order to prevent the outbreak of war by the means they consider most effective. . . . In case war should break out anywhere, it is their duty to intervene in favor of its speedy termination, and with all their powers to utilize the economic and political crisis created by the war to rouse the masses and thereby hasten the downfall of capitalist rule." This paragraph had been proposed as an amendment by Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin, and Julius Martov, three left social democrats who had all participated in the Revolution of 1905–7. They, therefore, had first-hand knowledge of the role that war could play as a catalyst to revolution.

Among the tsar's advisors, opinion was divided, however, as to the impact a war would have on the internal situation. In an interview in 1912, General Krivoshein, minister of agriculture, told a journalist that certain people were telling the tsar that war would bring revolution, a view he rejected: "On the contrary, it is peace at any price that, in my opinion, can bring on revolution." And while the moderate right in

the Duma favored the alliance with France and Britain (the Triple Entente) against Germany and Austro-Hungary (the Central Powers), P. Durnovo, the minister of the interior who had overseen the bloody repression of the 1905 Revolution, was opposed to a war. He argued, with some foresight, that no matter who won, "there must inevitably break out in the defeated country a social revolution, which, by the very nature of things, will spread to the country of the victory." This view was also shared by the extreme right in the Duma, which, in addition to fearing the internal consequences of a war, did not like the idea of Russia fighting alongside liberal democracies and against semi-feudal monarchies like itself.

Be that as it may, the tsar was finally won over to war, and not least by the argument that the internal political situation dictated it. As two of his grand dukes explained to him, "Russia, if it did not mobilize, would face the greatest dangers, and peace bought with cowardice would unleash revolution at home."

At first, the war did have a calming effect on the internal situation. The mobilization, the severe repression, the threat of losing one's military deferral and being sent to the front, put an abrupt halt to the workers' agitation. But the upsurge of patriotic feeling that swept the propertied classes, the intelligentsia, and to some extent the peasantry, had little effect on workers, for whom there seemed little difference between the Russian autocracy and a regime of foreign occupation. In at least one case, 17,000 textile workers in the central industrial region who were already on strike when the war began stayed out until mid-September despite the intensified repression.

Russia along with Italy and Serbia were the only warring countries in which the socialist deputies in parliament did not vote to jettison their previous internationalist commitments and vote for war credits in the name of "national defense." From his exile in Zurich, Lenin's first reaction was to think that the newspaper reports of these betrayals were forgeries, a plot by the bourgeois press to disorient Europe's workers.

The other deputies in Russia's Duma, unlike the socialists, unanimously proclaimed their readiness "at the summons of their sovereign, to stand up in defense of their country, its honor and its possessions." Only a small group of socialist "defensists," including Georgi Plekhanov, one

of the founders of Russian social democracy, and the anarchist patriarch Prince Kropotkin supported the war.

Resurgent Worker Protest

It did not take long – a matter of months – for government mismanagement, bureaucratic confusion, corruption (Rasputin's influence over government affairs was at its height), and military incompetence to revive active opposition to the regime. By February 1917, there was not a single group of any significance in Russian society that was prepared to come to the defense of the autocracy. And it fell like an overripe fruit with a minimum of violence.

Besides the regime's weaknesses, Russia entered the war with serious economic and geographical handicaps. Its relative industrial backwardness meant that its economy could not fully equip its army on its own. For example, domestic industry could supply only one in three rifles needed. But the empire was easily blockaded by German control of the Baltic and by Turkey's closing access to the Black Sea through the Dardanelles. Only ports on the Arctic and the Pacific Oceans remained available, but their use contributed to overloading an already inadequate rail system. Along with manpower shortages due to conscription, this put an increasingly heavy strain on Russia's industrial capacity. Agriculture, too, suffered, since peasants could not obtain common tools and fertilizers. As a result, the army was seriously underequipped, and in the later stages of the war the cities suffered increasingly from food shortages, aggravated by the flood of refugees from the western provinces fallen under German occupation.

By the end of 1914, 6.5 million men were under arms, and by the time of the October Revolution in 1917, 15 million had been called up. Of these, between 7.2 and 8.5 million, 45–55 percent, were killed, reported missing (both categories amounted to 2.3 million men), or wounded. Even from a purely military point of view, this unspeakable slaughter was in vain, since despite some local victories, the major campaigns were catastrophic failures. But these defeats were not the sole responsibility of Russia's military command, since Russia's strategy was subordinated to that of its western allies: major Russian offenses were undertaken to take pressure off the Allied forces on the western fronts, with little consid-

eration given to Russia's real capacity. However, the Russian government did not have much choice, in view of its heavy financial and material dependence on the allies.

Despite the sacrifices that the war demanded from society, especially from the laboring classes, the government displayed no willingness to reach an accommodation with it. While governments in England, France, and even Germany made concessions to their labor movements and gave at least token recognition to the workers' sacrifices in return for the collaboration of their leaders in the war effort, Russia's autocracy merely stepped up the repression, which was directed first of all against the Bolsheviks, who were calling the workers to transform the imperialist war into a civil war. At the end of 1914, the five Bolshevik Duma deputies were sentenced to Siberian exile for anti-war agitation. So efficient was police repression that worker activists could count on no more than a few months of underground activity before being arrested. Meetings were banned, trade unions and the labor press suspended, strikes outlawed, movement from one factory to another restricted.

Meanwhile, material conditions continued to deteriorate, martial law was extended to most large factories, overtime was unlimited, and laws protecting female and child labor were abrogated. Freed of all restraint and enjoying the state's active backing, management responded to workers' complaints with the very real threat of sending them to the front, jail, or Siberia. This intensified repression was only partially counterbalanced by the shortage of labor – the industrial workforce of Petrograd (the capital's name was Russified from the too German-sounding "St. Petersburg") swelled by almost 60 percent between 1914 and 1917 – a factor that favored worker militancy. As the war dragged on and inflation rose, real wages declined. From 1916, long lines in front of bakeries and food shops became a usual sight.

Unlike preceding years, 1915 witnessed no demonstrations or strikes on the anniversary of Bloody Sunday 1905 or on May 1. But strike activity resumed in the spring and summer of 1915, mostly to press economic demands. In the town of Ivanovo-Voznesensk, 33,500 textile workers went on strike in May for economic demands and to win liberation of two workers who had been arrested. (This town would experi-

ence two more general strikes here before the February Revolution.) In June, the workers of the linen mills of nearby Kostroma went out on an economic strike that ended in barricades and pitched battles with the police. Several dozen workers were killed or wounded. Thirty thousand workers in the capital struck to protest the massacre, demanding at the same time the release of the exiled Bolshevik Duma deputies, freedom of the press, and withdrawal of the Cossacks from their factories. Political unrest was further sparked by the premature closing of the Duma in September and by arrests among workers of the Putilov factory. If, in the first year of the war, less than a third of the worker-days lost in the capital were in political strikes, in the second year, a full half of the 596,000 days lost were in political stoppages. In Russia as a whole, only 170,000 working days were lost in the first six months of the war. But in 1915, that number increased tenfold. In 1916, it reached 4.7 million.

The anniversary of Bloody Sunday drew 100,000 strikers in Petrograd in 1916 and 145,000 in 1917. In February 1916, the Putilov factory workers struck for economic demands but soon added the "three whales" of the social democratic minimum program: a democratic republic, land reform, and the eight-hour day. Over 100,000 others struck in solidarity with them. In the fall of 1916, 120,000 struck to protest the court martial of Baltic sailors, accused of belonging to an underground Bolshevik organization. Locked out, the workers responded with yet another strike.

Liberal Opposition: Parallel but Opposed to the Opposition "from Below"

Growing labor unrest, the government's inability successfully to prosecute the war, and the tsar's extreme reluctance to tolerate any independent organization of society to aid in the war effort (he relented on this as the military situation deteriorated) could not help but revive opposition among the liberal intelligentsia and the propertied classes. In mid-1915, the opposition parties in the Duma formed a Progressive Bloc that rallied a majority of the deputies, including the Kadets, Octobrists, and the moderate Nationalists (the right), behind the demand for a ministry "enjoying confidence of the public." While this bloc firmly supported the war, it

called for measures of political liberalization to gain popular support, including certain collective rights for national minorities, political amnesty, equal rights for peasants, trade union rights, and a labor press for the workers.

The demand for a "government of public confidence" was a far cry from the liberals' program in 1905, when they called for a government responsible to an elected parliament. This was an indication of how far the Kadets had shifted to the right in the meantime. In practice, the Progressive Bloc did not go much farther than purely verbal opposition to the regime. It was paralyzed by fear of harming the war effort and, even more, by fear of revolution. Its members knew that a serious struggle for power on their part would inevitably draw in the masses, and the last thing the liberals, let alone the elements more to the right, wanted was a popular revolution.

In September 1915, not only did the bloc passively acquiesce to closure of the Duma, but Moscow's mayor, himself a Kadet, denounced the workers who struck to protest the tsar's action. D. Sazonov, the minister of foreign affairs, took full measure of the liberals' pusillanimity when he told his fellow ministers that if the Kadets were offered a loophole, they would be the first to reconcile themselves with the government. "Milyukov [leader of the Kadets] is the greatest bourgeois of them all and fears a social revolution more than anything else. Yes, and the majority of Kadets are trembling for their investments."

Some liberals who were more to the left than Milyukov, including some industrialists, reproached the Kadet leadership its fear of the popular democratic forces. They opposed the liberal alliance with the Duma right in the Progressive Bloc and argued for an alliance to the left, with the Mensheviks and Trudoviks (moderate populists). But they were a small minority among the liberals and even a smaller one within the business class. Milyukov accused them of playing with fire when they suggested taking the anti-government struggle outside of the Duma and into the streets. Right-wing Kadet V. Maklakov summed up the liberals' dilemma in a famous article entitled "A Tragic Situation." He compared Russia to a car moving along a mountain road. The driver was incompetent, endangering the passengers and the car itself. But the passengers who knew how to drive could not decide to seize the wheel from him for

fear that the car would plunge into the abyss in the course of the struggle. The abyss, of course, was the popular revolution.

Socialist Positions

One of the goals that the Progressive Bloc did achieve was the creation in the summer of 1915 of a special council of national defense, which included representatives of the government, of the Duma, and of trade and industry. At a lower level, the Congress of Representatives of Trade and Industry created war industry committees, and liberal industrialists convinced the tsar to let the workers elect their representatives to "workers' groups" that would be attached to these committees. These elections, which proceeded in two stages, offered workers their only legal opportunity since the start of the war to discuss publicly the government's domestic and foreign policies.

The Bolsheviks and the left Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) opposed worker participation in the committees, since it would mean support for the government and the war. But they nevertheless decided to take part in the first stage of the elections in order to exploit the legal opportunity for anti-war and revolutionary agitation. The Menshevik-Internationalists (the left majority of the Menshevik Party that opposed the war) favored participation in the committees, but only to use them as tools for organizing the anti-government forces and improving the workers' conditions. Finally, the Menshevik-defensists, who recognized the imperialist character of the war, nevertheless supported the defense effort while at the same time calling for the overthrow of the autocracy, which they viewed as the main obstacle to successful defense.

The first stage of the elections in Petrograd gave the Bolsheviks a majority of 90 out of 171, a significant indicator of the strength of the workers' hostility to the regime and the war, since to vote for the Bolsheviks meant giving up the unique opportunity for at least some form of legal worker organization. The debates at the meeting of the workers' electors brought out the political differences between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. As always, they revolved around their respective evaluation of the liberals and the bourgeoisie.

A Menshevik-defensist worker from the Petrograd Pipe Factory defended participation in

the committees with the following arguments: “We disagree with our opponents in their evaluation of the active forces: they put all their faith in their own forces for the revolution; we strive to rally all those strata of Russian society that are able to aspire to democratization of the public order and that want to fight. . . . Our opponents say that we betray the cause of the revolution and they say so chiefly because of our evaluation of the bourgeoisie. Our bourgeoisie cannot reconcile itself to the rule of autocracy and it strives for power, but it does so in a slavish and cowardly manner. We shall criticize and push it towards a decisive battle with the obsolete regime. In the final battle [for socialism], we must depend on our own forces. But in the struggle for political freedom, we must proceed in contact with the bourgeoisie.”

To this a Bolshevik worker replied: “The Military-Industry Committees are an institution of the liberal bourgeoisie – so say our opponents. We can march arm-in-arm with them. It follows that Guchkov [an industrialist, leader of the Octobrists in the Duma and chairman of the Central War Industry Committee] will march arm-in-arm with us against the contemporary Stolypins, this same Guchkov, who together with the deceased Stolypin, hanged our comrades. . . . Female and child labor is now being widely used. Who sought the abrogation of the miserable rights of women and children? The aristocracy? No, it was the Guchkovs, Konovalovs and Ryabushinskiis [liberal businessmen]. The factory owners pressed the buttons, and the workers’ rights were suppressed. . . . Where are our comrades from the Lessner, Phoenix and other factories? They were sent by messieurs the liberal factory owners to the front and to the jails. This is the honored company, with whose help you want to organize the working class. Our opponents say we rely on our own forces, while they desire to struggle in concert with all revolutionary forces. Fine. Where, then, did you seek allies? Did you go to the peasantry? . . . No, you went to the Military-Industry Committee and acted in the backyard of a bourgeois organization. This is where you seek allies for yourselves, in the organization of the bosses, who organized lockouts before the war and who are now stuffing their pockets on war orders.”

According to the noted diarist N. Sukhanov in his *Russian Revolution 1917: A Personal Record* (1984), the “[Workers’] Group [of the War

Industry Committee] enjoyed no popularity among the worker masses. The overwhelming majority of the conscious proletariat of the capital and also in the provinces took a staunchly anti-defensist position and were strongly opposed to the cooperation of the small group of Social Democrats with the plutocracy.”

Not even those right-wing Mensheviks who favored collaboration with the bourgeoisie in the war effort could deny the antagonistic interests that opposed the workers to that bourgeoisie. In a letter to the workers of Petrograd two months before the February Revolution, the leaders of the Workers’ Group wrote: “The propertied classes have always feared the people, but now, having lost faith in their own forces, they are turning to the popular movement and especially to action by the working class. Of course, they would like this intervention to take place on their own terms, for their own interests – to obtain the most for themselves and to give as little democracy as possible to the workers. But the working class is conscious enough not to let that happen. The bourgeoisie wants political reform, a liberal regime; we will secure our goal of the maximum democratization of the country. The bourgeoisie wants a government responsible to the Duma; we – a provisional government based not on the Duma but on the organized people. The bourgeoisie will try to maintain the current forms of cruel exploitation; the working class will demand a series of social reforms that will facilitate their struggle against exploitation and exploiters. The bourgeoisie wants to give freedom to its annexationist appetites; the proletariat and democracy [i.e., the peasants and socialist intelligentsia] will protest decisively against all military coercion and strive for a peace acceptable to the workers of all countries.”

Lenin Changes His Mind about the Revolution

All the main socialist currents in Russia were still thinking in terms of a liberal democratic revolution, one that would not threaten capitalism. But the war prompted Lenin to move closer to Trotsky’s “maximalist” position. Lenin now argued that the revolution, despite Russia’s backwardness, would be socialist, not merely liberal democratic. Along with other Marxists, he argued that armed imperialist rivalry was the inevitable expression of capitalism at its

contemporary (he felt it was the “highest”) stage, marked by the concentration of enterprises into monopolistic trusts. National boundaries had become too narrow for these huge capitalist associations, which now roamed the earth in search of new profitable fields of investment, sources of raw materials, and markets. In these efforts, they were supported by their respective states. The problem was that different countries developed at different paces. By the time countries like Germany and Japan had finally industrialized and become economic powers toward the end of the nineteenth century, they found the world was already divided into spheres of influence among the existing empires, like France and Britain, which had developed earlier. This called for a new division of the world that would reflect the current relative strength of the different powers. But such a new division could be achieved only by force of arms.

The current war was, therefore, an imperialist war, a war of pillage and enslavement, on the part of all the belligerent states, and it did not matter who started it. All the participants were equally guilty. They had all long been preparing for war and were pursuing imperialist goals. None of them could claim legitimate defense. Hence the Bolshevik slogan: “Transform the imperialist war [among nations] into a civil war [between classes].” War and imperialism could only be stopped by revolutionary means, by the overthrow of capitalism. And this included Russia, too, despite its economic backwardness.

This is where Lenin linked up with Trotsky. He argued that the war was creating a revolutionary situation – that is, a situation in which revolution was becoming an objective possibility, if not an inevitability. He offered what is considered a classic definition of a revolutionary situation: when the ruling classes find they can no longer dominate society with the old form of government; and when the subordinate classes, subjected to unusual levels of oppression and suffering, become active and refuse to tolerate the old forms of domination. The two crises, the one of the elites and the other of the masses, must occur simultaneously to make revolution possible. And the imperialist war was creating such a situation in all the warring countries. The generalized revolutionary crisis meant that a socialist revolution in Russia would be able to count on the economic and political support of more developed socialist states.

Lenin further argued that because Russia was backward, because it was still ruled by a semifeudal monarchy, it was the “weakest link” in the imperialist chain, the place where it could mostly easily be broken. Russian society had accumulated more explosive, revolutionary material than the more advanced countries. The outbreak of revolution would therefore be easier in Russia, which could begin and provide the spark for the others, the example of how to end the imperialist horror. But Russia would be able to consolidate her revolution, to bring it to fruition, only with the support of socialist revolutions in the West. In Lenin’s estimation this was a realistic scenario, and, in any case, the only way to avoid new mass slaughters.

The slogan “transform the imperialist war into a civil war!” was adopted by the entire Bolshevik Party. But Lenin’s idea of a socialist revolution in Russia, which he developed in exile in the course of 1915, was not widely known in Russia. No doubt some workers and even some intellectuals, in both the Bolshevik and left SR parties, had been thinking independently along such “maximalist” lines, even as far back as 1906. But theirs was now a minority position, largely unspoken even among the Bolsheviks. Trotsky himself (also in exile) belonged to a small independent social democratic fraction that stood aloof from both the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks until after the February Revolution, when his group merged with the Bolsheviks.

The Insurrection

In January 1917, Lenin ended a lecture to young workers in Zurich on the Revolution of 1905 with the prediction that the coming year in Europe, because of the war, would see uprisings led by the working class against the power of capital. These upheavals, he said, could not end otherwise than with the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, the victory of socialism. He added, however, that “we of the older generation may not live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution.” This last sentence is often cited as evidence that Lenin did not foresee revolution in Russia. In fact, anyone with even limited political awareness understood that revolution was not far off, though no one seems to have expected it to break out specifically at the end of February. In January 1917, the Bolsheviks’ Petersburg Committee, taking note of the

massive participation in the strike to mark Bloody Sunday – between 200,000 and 300,000 by various estimates, the biggest strike of the war – reported that “the mood in the factories is very buoyant and politicized; this opens up broad revolutionary possibilities.” In the six months preceding the February Revolution, over a million worker-days were lost to strikes in the capital, three-quarters of these political. In Russia as a whole, 676,000 workers took part in strikes in the two months preceding the revolution. But the Petersburg Bolshevik organization, decimated by repression, was thinking more in terms of a May 1 strike to trigger the revolution.

The peasants, in contrast to the workers, were still largely calm. The scarcity of labor had created advantageous terms for renting additional land from the big owners and the military mobilization had removed much of the surplus labor from the countryside. The rising price of food put more money in the pockets of those peasants able to produce a surplus, though there were fewer and fewer manufactured goods that they could buy with this money.

On the other hand, the sons of the peasants, the most literate and socially active part of the peasantry who formed the great mass of the army, were showing disquieting signs in the winter of 1916–17. The minister of the interior reported receiving “horrrifying” reports of troop morale. Generals reported that new reserves reaching the front at the end of the summer of 1916 “were, from the point of view of morale, far worse than all their predecessors,” that their minds had been “poisoned by propaganda.” Nevertheless, discipline was still generally good; there were few cases of refusal to obey orders. The revolution would not start from the army, where a failed mutiny in wartime meant the firing squad.

Meanwhile, among the propertied classes, disaffection from the regime was also reaching its height. The British military commander Sir Henry Wilson, who visited Petrograd in early February, found that “everyone – officers, merchants, ladies – talked openly of the necessity of doing away with them [the emperor and the empress].” Russian General Krymov told a meeting of Duma deputies that the army would welcome “the news of a coup d’état.” Milyukov openly denounced the government in November 1916 from the tribune of the Duma. Still, the Octobrists and the Kadets continued to insist on legal, parliamentary means of struggle. Only

the left fringe of the liberals, the Progressives, called for “action on the part of society.” But they did not know what action. The only really concrete political action was undertaken, in fact, by members of the royal family who assassinated Rasputin, the news of whose death caused great jubilation in polite society. (Legend has it that Rasputin had to be poisoned, shot four times, and then drowned in the icy Neva River before finally expiring.)

It was again the workers who led. The general strike that resulted in the overthrow of autocracy grew out of two distinct actions. On February 17, one of the shops of the Putilov factory struck for higher wages and to obtain the return of dismissed activists. They were soon joined by workers of other shops, and when the administration locked the strikers out on February 22, the entire 36,000-person workforce declared a strike. They elected a strike committee and dispatched delegations to the other factories to solicit support. One worker who spoke to Alexander Kerensky, a Trudovik Duma deputy, suggested that this could be the beginning of a big political offensive. But no one guessed quite just how big.

The other action was undertaken by women textile workers to mark International Women’s Day (March 8 by the Julian calendar), which fell on February 23. None of the socialist parties had planned action for that day, but the women were in militant mood, angered by the high prices, the long lines in front of the food shops, and the recent disappearance of bread from several bakeries. In a series of textile mills of the Vyborg district, a center of machine building which had become the radical heart of the labor movement during the upsurge in 1912–14, the women held meetings and decided to strike. They then gathered in the streets outside the neighboring metalworking factories. “On the morning of February 23,” recalled a worker of one of those factories, “you could hear women’s voices in the lane: ‘Down with the war! Down with the high prices! Down with hunger! Bread for the workers!’ Several workers ran to the window. When the women saw them, they began to wave and shout: ‘Come out! Stop work!’ Snowballs flew through the window. We decided to join. . . . We held a brief meeting outside the main office near the gates, and then we poured into the street. . . . The women grabbed the comrades who were in front by the arm, shouting ‘Hurray!’ And we set

off with them down Bol'shoi Sampsion'evskii Prospekt [the main local thoroughfare].”

That day the strikers concentrated their efforts on drawing in the rest of the working class. On their way, they disabled trams and attacked isolated policemen. Their ultimate goal was Nevskii Prospekt, the main avenue running down the center of the city, location of the government institutions and well-to-do dwellings. To reach it from the surrounding industrial districts the workers had to cross the river, and as usual during such “disturbances,” the authorities raised the bridges to stop them. But it was February, and the Neva River was frozen. That day 87,500 struck.

On the morning of February 24, the workers appeared at work as usual but after brief meetings again downed tools and took to the streets. The strikers now numbered 200,000. Anti-war and anti-government slogans began to take predominance over yesterday's calls for bread. Some of the army units and Cossacks – the 170,000-man garrison had recently been reinforced with new, supposedly reliable troops and police – behaved in a friendly manner to the strikers.

On February 25 the strike became general. The police were on the run, moving only in groups. White-collar workers, members of the intelligentsia, and artisans joined the strike, creating an atmosphere of general sympathy that spurred on the workers, who had by now taken over Nevskii Prospekt, shouting anti-war slogans and demanding a democratic republic and the eight-hour day. It was on that day that the workers became convinced that this was a revolution and that it would be victorious. Their sense of certainty soon infected the garrison, helping the soldiers to make the perilous decision to mutiny. Although they still hesitated, patrolling army units in several districts did not bother the crowds and in some cases they prevented the police from taking action against them. But the shooting and the casualties that did occur did not deter the workers. They scattered only to regroup at once.

February 26 fell on Sunday. That day sacking and burning of police stations began (a primary goal was to destroy archives containing information on activists). Isolated cases of mutiny occurred in the garrison. February 27 marked the revolution's victory. Virtually the entire working class was in the streets. From the morning, crowds of workers went to the barracks to

persuade the soldiers to join them. By the afternoon, the mutiny was a mass phenomenon. The rest of the day was spent destroying police stations and liberating political prisoners. That night the tsar abdicated. From the capital, the revolution traveled by telegraph to the rest of Russia. In the industrial centers, the workers, upon receiving the news, went on strike and, on their own or together with representatives of propertied classes, bloodlessly pushed aside the tsarist authorities. The peasants, too, easily dislodged the local representatives of the autocracy and the local self-governments dominated by the big landowners.

Dual Power

On February 26, the day the military mutinies began, the tsar dissolved the Duma. That is how he responded to pleading by the Duma's chairman to form a “government of public confidence.” After some hesitation, the majority of the Duma decided to meet anyway, but only in “private session,” since the tsar had dissolved the Duma and even at this late date they were still reluctant to defy the autocrat. They made one last effort to persuade the tsar's brother, Michael, to impose a military dictatorship and to demand the tsar appoint a responsible ministry. But when that too failed, they were left with no choice: either they tried to take power themselves or else they would be swept aside by the popular revolution. Even so, Milyukov admitted that he would have much preferred to receive power “not from below, but from above.” To this end, the leaders of the non-socialist parties of the Duma formed a Provisional Committee of the State Duma.

Meanwhile in another section of the same building, the Tauride Palace, the two Menshevik deputies who had not been arrested met with the Menshevik leaders of the “workers' groups” of the War Industry Committee (who had just been freed from arrest) and several independent social democratic intellectuals. This group took the initiative in forming a Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviet, inviting the workers and soldiers to elect delegates to form a soviet. (As early as February 25 workers in some factories had already discussed the creation of a soviet.) The norm was one delegate for every 1,000 workers and one from factories with fewer than 1,000, and one delegate per military company, regardless of

size, a rule that resulted in strong overrepresentation of the soldiers.

A similar model was followed in the rest of Russia, reaching eventually down to the villages. Deputies were everywhere chosen by direct election, mostly at places of work or in the military units, and they were subject to immediate recall. And recall occurred frequently as the situation and attitudes evolved. Until the First All-Russian Conference of Soviets at the beginning of April elected a Central Executive Committee, the Petrograd soviet served as the supreme authority of all worker and soldier soviets.

On the night of February 28–March 1, the soviet's Provisional Executive, speaking for the workers and soldiers (the latter being overwhelmingly peasants in uniform), and the Duma Committee, speaking for the propertied classes, agreed on the formation of a provisional government consisting exclusively of liberal Duma deputies. The Duma Committee, for its part, accepted the socialists' conditions: full political freedoms, political amnesty, immediate measures for the convocation of a constituent assembly, a people's militia to replace the police, and no victimization of troops that had mutinied. On March 2, the Petrograd soviet met in full session and resolved by a vote of 400 to 19 to support the provisional government. However, it qualified its support with the condition that the government faithfully carry out the soviet's program. And to make sure of that, it set up a "monitoring committee" to keep an eye on the government.

That committee was not the idea of the moderate socialists of the soviet leadership. The formula of conditional support for the provisional government, that is, to support it "inasmuch" as it respected the soviet's program, was proposed from "below" and reflected the workers' mistrust of the liberals. Indeed, even now Milyukov, through the tsar's brother, was making a last-ditch attempt to save the monarchy. The soviet, however, would hear nothing of it. On the whole, however, Milyukov was quite surprised and gratified by the soviet's accommodating position on power. After all, the soviet could have formed the government itself.

Milyukov should not have been so satisfied. For what had been created was "dual power," an inherently unstable political arrangement. Real power, control of the means of violence, was in the hands of the soviet, since the soldiers' loyalty went to it alone, not to the provisional

government. And the soviet's "Order Number 1," issued on March 1, freed soldiers from political control by their officers, thus greatly reducing the danger that the army might be used against the popular classes. That order instructed soldiers to elect committees from their ranks to control all arms, which should under no circumstances be given to the officers. In all non-military, political actions, the soldiers were to be guided only by the soviet and by their own elected committees. Off duty, soldiers enjoyed all civil rights, and officers were to address them at all times in the polite second-person plural.

Milyukov, of course, knew that the liberals did not enjoy support among the popular classes. That is why he tried to persuade members of the soviet's executive committee to participate in the provisional government. They, however, refused, fearing they would be compromised. Failing that, Milyukov insisted that they at least obtain a public expression of support for the government from the soviet. This, as we have seen, they did, though that support was conditional.

If, in the eyes of the workers and soldiers, the role of the provisional government was merely to carry out the will of their soviet, why did they agree to the formation of a liberal provisional government in the first place, rather than have the soviet itself form the government? This is even more surprising on the workers' part, when one recalls their recent bitter experience with the industrialists' close collaboration with the autocracy against them. Before the revolution the workers had rejected the Menshevik strategy of a worker alliance with the liberals, lending their support to the Bolsheviks.

Several factors explain popular support for the dual power arrangement in February. For one thing, soldiers, not workers, predominated in the Petrograd and in most other soviets. In addition, there were many newcomers to industry among the workers, people drawn to the factories by the wartime expansion. (In the capital, the industrial working class had grown from 242,000 to 385,000. The total industrial working class of Russia in 1917 was 3.6 million.) The newcomers had limited experience or understanding of political struggle. And finally, the Bolsheviks, the party that rejected any alliance with the liberals, had been more hurt by the repression than the Mensheviks and SRs, many of whom, especially among the intelligentsia, now resumed political activity.

But, in fact, all those factors are of secondary importance in explaining popular support for dual power. For even most of the Bolshevik deputies in the Petrograd soviet, who were few in early March, voted together with the majority to give conditional support to the provisional government. The Bolshevik Petersburg Committee was only slightly more guarded in its support for the government. Its resolution called "not to oppose" (rather than to support) the provisional government "inasmuch."

The main reason for the support for dual power was that the February Revolution appeared to have vindicated the Menshevik strategy: the bourgeoisie had after all been pushed by the workers into supporting the democratic revolution. As Alexander Shlyapnikov, a Petrograd metalworker and member of the Bolshevik Central Committee, observed, "What had begun as a proletarian movement had taken on an all-national character." This was shown not only by the adherence, however reluctant, to the revolution of the Duma parties but also by the genuine sympathy that members of "respectable society," who were sporting red ribbons in their lapels and on their hats, showed for the workers and soldiers in the streets. As the left SR paper noted, "the events of February made people forget what only a few days earlier had been their irreconcilable differences with the landowners and capitalists. It seems like all were united."

The victory over the autocracy, achieved with relatively little bloodshed, had an intoxicating effect on workers that can hardly be exaggerated. This was the holiday of the oppressed and the exploited, which had finally risen up, thrown off their chains, and wrested power from the centuries-old autocracy. People who had always been the object of the will of others now suddenly wielded power themselves, having taken their collective destiny into their own hands. It was a time to celebrate the incredible victory, the new, free life that was opening. No one wanted to think that terrible struggles still lay ahead.

Yet, that is what the soviet's direct assumption of state power would have meant: it would have pushed into the camp of the counterrevolution the bourgeoisie and its supporters, including most of the educated elements of society, those who knew how to run the economy and the state machinery. Could workers run the country without them? This was a frightening prospect for people who had spent all their lives on the

receiving end of orders from management and state officials. Besides, Petrograd was not all of Russia. One had to consider the provinces and the army: would they follow the capital's workers?

In the euphoric atmosphere of the victorious revolution, workers did not want to contemplate these dangers, especially since there seemed no need to, as the bourgeoisie, perhaps unwillingly, but all the same, had rallied to the democratic revolution. There was no reason to disturb this new national unity, especially since the soviet held real power and was monitoring the provisional government to make sure it did not deviate from the program of the revolution.

These attitudes were shared by workers in most of Russia. Everywhere they elected soviets, but nowhere did the soviets try to take power. In Moscow and in much of the provinces, the soviets willingly participated in "committees of public organizations" that assumed power and were dominated by representatives of the bourgeoisie. This was true even in the Ivanovo-Voznesensk area, long a Bolshevik stronghold. There was apparently some opposition to that position, as there was in Petrograd, but it was minor. The paper of the Kostroma soviet wrote in early March that "In a number of places, including Kostroma, protests are heard against participation in those organizations that have taken power with representatives of the *zemstva* [nobility-dominated rural self-government] and the city [government, dominated by the bourgeoisie]. . . . If we push them away, they will go against us. Maybe that is not so frightening, but all the same it will cause severe complications in the struggle for our ideals. We need to use our time not for struggle but for organization. There will be enough struggle in the future."

The principal exception to this view was the Vyborg district of the capital, where workers' meetings expressed extreme hostility to the Duma Committee and called on the soviet to declare itself the provisional revolutionary government. The Bolshevik organization of the Vyborg district (500–600 members in March) was the only one in Petrograd to adopt that stand. The Petersburg Committee had to ban the distribution of the Vyborg district's leaflet calling for a soviet government. It is possible that some workers outside the Vyborg district also supported that position but that they refrained from expressing it in view of the almost unanimous popular support for dual power. No one apparently knew that

Lenin, still in his Swiss exile, shared the position of the Vyborg workers. Within six months, practically the entire Russian working class would be won over to that position.

The peasants, no less than the workers and most of the rest of society, welcomed the February Revolution. A Duma report on the provinces noted that the “widespread conviction that the Russian muzhik [peasant] is attached to the tsar, cannot live without the tsar, was clearly refuted by the unanimous joy, the sigh of relief, with which they learned that they will henceforth be living without the one without whom they [supposedly] could not live.” But, for the most part, the villages remained calm in the first weeks. Only a small number of districts reported disorders, mostly small incidents.

However, the peasants wasted no time in replacing the old organs of rural self-government, dominated by the nobility with elected peasant committees, which they sometimes called soviets, but more often simply “provisional executive committees.” The provisional government and all the parties, with the exception of the Bolsheviks, opposed the class (that is, exclusively peasant) composition of these committees. (In this, the peasant committees resembled the urban soviets, which were also class organizations – the propertied classes were not represented in them.) But the peasants ignored that and in many places tried to exclude even wealthy peasant farmers, the kulaks (Russian for “fist” – farmers who used hired labor) and other peasants who had left the communes to take private possession of their land.

The peasants made no move as yet to expropriate the large estates. But the committees were soon forcing the big landowners to rent land to the poor and middle peasants – though not the kulaks – on advantageous terms. They often took measures to prevent the big landowners from working their land, for example, by forcing away their hired laborers and requisitioning their inventory. The land would then be handed over to the peasants to work under the pretext that the landowners had not sown in time.

All this was opposed by the provisional government, which insisted that nothing could be changed until a constituent assembly adopted a land reform. Meanwhile, the provisional government was in no rush to call elections to that assembly. One of the reasons was that it knew that peasants’ deputies would form the majority and would vote for the peasants’ version of land

reform. On this there could be no doubt: all the district and regional peasant congresses in the weeks and months following the February Revolution called for expropriation without compensation of state, church, and noble lands. Most of the congresses even included in the list of land to be expropriated that owned by the kulaks.

The Revolution in the Factories

The workers, like the peasants, were also not willing to wait for a constituent assembly to legislate changes in their relations with management. These included the eight-hour day (without loss of pay), a decent wage “as befits free citizens,” and the right to elect delegates to represent them collectively in the factories and to limit managerial despotism. All of these changes were seen by the workers as integral parts of the democratic revolution. None of them were intended to threaten, or, in fact, did threaten, private property and the capitalist system. Whatever workers thought of the bourgeoisie, even in the Vyborg district, they saw the February Revolution as “bourgeois democratic.” The ultimate goal was socialism, but that was for a more or less distant future.

On March 5, the Petrograd soviet discussed the question of terminating the general strike that had begun on February 25. The debate was very heated. The soviet’s chairman, N. Chkheidze, a Menshevik, spoke for an immediate return to work, promising that the soviet would begin work immediately on improving the workers’ economic situation once production resumed. But worker deputies argued that they could not call their comrades to end the strike without having won the eight-hour day and better work conditions. The soldiers, on the other hand, were worried about war production and supported Chkheidze. The vote was 1,170 to 30 to resume work on March 7, but the soviet committed itself to present economic demands at once to the employers.

This decision proved very unpopular among the capital’s workers. For one thing, they protested against its undemocratic character, since there had been no preliminary discussion. The workers’ idea of democracy was based upon them giving their deputies obligatory (imperative) mandates on all major issues. This conception of democracy contrasted with the more or less blank check that representatives in liberal democracies typically

enjoy. But apart from the way it was taken, the decision itself was unacceptable. One of the soviet's spokesmen who was sent to explain the decision to workers recalled: "I felt in my heart that we could not do this: the workers cannot win freedom and not use it to ease the burdens of their labor, to fight capital." Of 111 factories reporting to the Petrograd Society of Factory Owners, only 28 had resumed work on March 7, and those workers explained that they were doing so only out of consideration for the soldiers and the need to maintain unity among the popular revolutionary forces. Most of the other factories resumed work soon after, but only once the workers had introduced the eight-hour day on their own without waiting for the soviet to reach an agreement with the owners or for the government to legislate: they simply stopped working after eight hours.

It will be recalled that when the capital's workers had tried to do this in the fall of 1905, the employers responded with a lockout that dealt a severe blow to the revolution. Now, however, the correlation of class forces was such that the employers could not even contemplate such a move out of fear of provoking the workers. And so, on March 10, the soviet and the Petrograd Society of Factory Owners reached an agreement on the eight-hour day without loss of pay (effectively an hourly pay raise of 20–8 percent). Overtime (at double pay) in certain sectors was allowed with the consent of the workers' elected committees. However, a week later at a meeting with the employers, Minister of Trade and Industry A. Konovalov, a left liberal and a big industrialist, agreed with the assembled businessmen that the measure was only a temporary concession that would be rescinded at the first opportunity.

Outside of the capital, employers' opposition was often more vigorous. In Moscow, for example, the employers' organization flatly rejected the eight-hour day. However, most gave in after the Moscow soviet, reacting to struggles already occurring in the factories, finally called on the workers on March 18 not to wait for an agreement but to end work on their own after eight hours. In the provinces, similar scenarios played themselves out into April. The workers in small factories and workshops, where the correlation of forces is always more strongly in the owners' favor, were less successful. Those workers needed a law, but the provisional government, attentive

to the interests of the employers, refused to legislate the eight-hour day.

Having won freedom, the workers were naturally determined to use it to obtain better wages. Even before the war wages had been meager and they had since been further eroded by inflation. Returning to work, the workers immediately presented wage demands. On March 20, a delegate from the Putilov factory, whose economic strike a month earlier had triggered the events leading to the revolution, told the soviet: "Now that we workers have awoken from our sleep of toil, we demand a just wage and put forth our demands, while the entrepreneurs cry: 'Help, they're robbing us!' Comrades, I am sure you don't share their horror." Appeals from the moderate socialists for restraint had little impact. Wages had been held back by the combined repressive efforts of the employers and the tsarist police; the workers had made the revolution; it was now up to the employers to show good faith, especially since they had been making huge profits from the war. On the matter of wages, too, the employers had no choice but to yield, although the workers found that the increases were soon eaten by inflation.

Having been forced to make these concessions, the owners counterattacked indirectly through the non-socialist ("bourgeois") press, which in mid-March began a concerted campaign against the workers, accusing them of pursuing narrow, egoistical interests at the expense of the war effort. The "honeymoon" period of national unity had indeed been short-lived! The aim of the press campaign was to exert pressure on the workers through the soldiers, who were naturally concerned about military supplies. But the workers easily saw what was at stake: "The enemies of democracy spread discord among us, since they fear the united strength of the workers and soldiers in the soviet," declared one factory meeting. And they took measures to reassure the soldiers, inviting delegations from the garrisons and from the front to visit their factories and see for themselves that they were prepared to work as much as was needed and that their wages were not excessive.

In reality, productivity rose in many factories in the weeks following the revolution. Where it declined, it was due to supply problems, since the transport system was overburdened. N. Kutler, a leading industrialist and Kadet, even noted a certain "enthusiasm for work" following the

revolution. In the end the press campaign backfired on the employers, reinforcing solidarity between workers and soldiers against the propertied classes. By the middle of April, the press dropped the campaign.

The workers' conception of the democratic revolution also included the right to elected representation in the factories. Russian management style under the autocracy had been especially arbitrary, despotic, and degrading. In addition, management had worked hand in glove with the tsarist police to repress union and party activists. It will be recalled that the 1912 convention of the St. Petersburg Society of Factory Owners specifically rejected elected representation of the workers in the enterprises. Now they had to yield on this too, however reluctantly. Their March 10 agreement with the soviet provided for elected factory committees whose function was to represent workers in relations with management as well as with government and public organizations.

In most cases, this merely formalized what the workers had already done of their own accord to end "autocracy in the factories," as one of their resolutions put it. In many cases, the first thing they did, even before resuming work, was to throw out the most tyrannical of the managerial staff, sometimes riding them out of the gates in wheelbarrows with sacks over their heads, a mark of disgrace. They also elected factory committees to which they entrusted the task of "overseeing the internal life of the enterprise," which included matters such as the length of the workday, the system of pay, hiring and firing, resolution of conflicts, enterprise security, and work discipline, which included abolition of the hated system of fines.

The workers thus gained a significant amount of power but not more than trade unions have wielded at different times in other capitalist countries. The workers' intention was to correct the worst abuses of the past, not to run the factories. And they did not in practice interfere with the administration's right to run the technical and economic dimensions of production.

Only in some state-owned enterprises did the workers go further and claim the right to manage. This was often a reaction to the disappearance during the revolution of the higher managerial personnel who were army officers. But these workers soon gave up these claims and retreated to mere monitoring of the administra-

tion, declaring that workers' management of the factories was for socialism sometime in the future.

But even if the workers were not thinking in terms of self-management and socialism, there were already signs of how things might develop. Workers had not forgotten that lockouts had been a favorite weapon of the employers. The older workers and the more politically aware youth knew of the mass lockouts of November and December 1905 in St. Petersburg. As early as March 1917, the minister of industry observed that workers in Petrograd "suspect management of holding up the production of defense goods" as part of a campaign to turn the soldiers against them. At the soviet's meeting on March 20, some worker deputies called for an investigation into the reasons for unused productive capacity and into the claimed shortages of raw materials in certain plants. They wondered out loud if the difficulties might not be politically motivated. In some factories, the elected workers' committees themselves decided to investigate the causes of stoppages.

These were, in fact, the first, still rare, moves toward "workers' control." They occurred where workers suspected production problems might have their source in the ill-will of management. As such, they were defensive reactions to a perceived threat to the enterprise, to jobs, and so to the revolution, since mass unemployment would weaken the working class, as it had in the Revolution of 1905–7. Only in the state enterprises did workers assert the right to control (in the sense of oversight, surveillance) as a matter of course. Their thinking was that these plants belonged to the state and so, after the democratic revolution, their management should be democratized like the rest of the state apparatus.

What the above does make clear is that the workers were not going to sit by idly, as they had in 1905, if faced with an overt or covert lockout. The difference was that now the workers held real political power through their soviets. The scene was thus set for a radicalization of the revolution, as Trotsky had predicted back in 1906 on the basis of his analysis of the defeat of the Revolution of 1905.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Internationals; Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Martov, Julius (1873–1923); Marxism; Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918);

Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russia, Revolutions: Sources and Contexts; Russian Civil War, 1918–1924; Russian Revolutionary Labor Upsurge, 1912–1914; Soviet Union, Fall of; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); War Communism and the Rise of the Soviet Union

References and Suggested Readings

- Burdzhalov, E. N. (1987) *Russia's Second Revolution: The February Uprising in Petrograd*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Chamberlin, W. H. (1935/1965) *The Russian Revolution*, 2 vols. New York: Grosset & Dunlap.
- Frankel, E. R. et al. (1992) *Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gill, G. (1979) *Peasants and Government in the Russian Revolution*. London: Macmillan.
- Kaiser, D. (1987) *The Workers' Revolution in Russia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kochan, L. (1978) *Russia in Revolution, 1890–1918*. London: Grenada.
- Lih, L. (1990) *Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914–21*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mandel, D. (1983) *The Petrograd Workers and the Fall of the Old Regime*. London: Macmillan.
- Miliukov, P. (1962) *Russia and Its Crisis*. New York: Collier.
- Mstislavskii, S. (1988) *Five Days Which Transformed Russia*. London: Hutchinson.
- Shlyapnikov, A. (1982) *On the Eve of 1917*. London: Allison & Busby.
- Sukhanov, N. N. (1984) *The Russian Revolution 1917: A Personal Record*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Trotsky, L. (1967) *History of the Russian Revolution*, 3 vols. London: Sphere Books.

Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917

David Mandel

The Russian Revolution of October 1917 is arguably the most influential event of the twentieth century. The revolution occurred only eight months after the February Revolution, as a workers' insurrection in the capital, supported by the garrison, overthrew the absolute monarchy with the objective of establishing a democratic republic.

In the course of the February Revolution the workers and soldiers (who were mostly peasants) elected deputies to city-wide soviets (councils).

These soviets held real power, since they alone could command armed force, the soldiers having pledged their allegiance to them. But since the liberal politicians who had come to represent the propertied classes after much hesitation finally rallied to the revolution that had already become an accomplished fact, the Petrograd soviet, which assumed national leadership, decided temporarily to entrust the running of the government to them, until a constituent assembly could be convened.

Nevertheless, mindful of the past antagonism of the propertied classes to the aspirations of the workers and peasants, the soviet made its support for the provisional government conditional upon the latter's adherence to the soviet's program: convocation of a constituent assembly to establish a democratic republic, land reform to distribute the large estates to the peasantry without compensation, the eight-hour workday, and an energetic diplomacy aimed at concluding a speedy, democratic peace without annexations or reparations.

Thus was dual power established, a situation by its very nature unstable. Yet it was supported by all the socialist parties, including most Bolsheviks, the more radical wing of Russian Marxism, who in the first months after February were only a minority in the soviets, which were dominated by the more moderate socialists, the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs).

Lenin's Return: The April Theses

On April 3, Lenin arrived together with 32 other political exiles at Petrograd's Finland Station in a train provided by the German authorities, who thus hoped to contribute to undermining the Russian war effort. The next day Lenin summarized his political position in his famous "April Theses," which placed him at odds with the policy his party had been pursuing since February.

Lenin argued that the February Revolution had not changed the nature of the war on Russia's part. "Revolutionary defensism," that is, support for the war in the name of defending the revolution against the Central Powers, although popular among the people, had to be rejected. The war could not be defensive as long as the liberals were in power because the liberals, who represented the bourgeoisie, continued to pursue imperialist goals. For that reason, the Bolsheviks could not support the provisional government.



The October Revolution of 1917 began with a labor uprising and armed insurrection in Petrograd, now St. Petersburg, which later overthrew the Russian provincial government. Here a Bolshevik organizer hands out newspapers to the crowd, spreading the message of creating a revolutionary government led by the working class. (David King Collection)

However, given the conditions of freedom reigning in Russia – Lenin observed that Russia was the freest of all the countries then at war – the party’s task was to win over majorities in the soviets by patient persuasion to the necessity of taking power themselves. The war had put socialist revolution on Russia’s agenda. This meant, not a liberal, parliamentary republic, but the complete dismantling of the state apparatus inherited from tsarism – the army, the police, the bureaucracy – and their replacement by a genuine popular democracy, a soviet republic of workers’ and peasant’s deputies, based on the egalitarian, participatory principles of the Paris Commune of 1871.

As for the program of the soviet government, considering Russia’s level of economic development, the task could not be the immediate introduction of socialism, but rather regulation of the economy by the soviet state. To this end, Lenin called for amalgamation of the banks into a single institution to be placed under government control. He also called for nationalization of the land, to be distributed to the peasants by the peasant soviets. This was, in essence, the peasants’ own program, traditionally promoted by the SR Party. Lenin only added to it the creation of model farms on part of the land of the large estates to be managed by soviets of poor peasants who would be most interested in cooperative production.

Finally, in view of the revolutionary situation maturing abroad, Lenin called for a decisive

break with the socialists who supported the war and their governments. He later proposed that revolutionary socialists abandon the discredited name “social democrats” in favor of “communists,” a term used by Marx and Engels.

Lenin’s theses were rejected by the party leadership in both Petrograd and Moscow. This was a measure of the party’s democratic nature at that time. Lenin was, in fact, proposing a break with the position the party had defended for years concerning the nature of Russia’s revolution. His opponents argued his position would isolate the party from the mass of workers, who supported “revolutionary defensism” and, at least conditionally, the provisional government too. But events would soon show that Lenin, though he had spent the last decade abroad, had a better grasp of the internal dynamics of the revolution than most party leaders in Russia.

The War and the “April Days”

According to Sukhanov, a left Menshevik who had participated in putting together the agreement between the soviets and the liberals at the end of February on the formation of a provisional government, both sides consciously sidestepped the question of the war, knowing it would lead to a collision. That is also one of the reasons why the moderate socialists refused the invitation to participate in the government: they feared they would be discredited by its war policy. That fear was justified. The bourgeoisie and the liberals, now the main party of the bourgeoisie, fully supported the Entente’s imperialist aims, which were spelled out in treaties kept secret from the public. These secret treaties promised to Russia, in the event of victory, that it could annex the Dardanelles, Constantinople, Galicia, Armenia, and take back that part of Poland that the Central Powers had occupied during the war. Meanwhile, France would get Alsace-Lorraine, parts of western Germany, Syria, and parts of Asia Minor, and Britain would take Germany’s African colonies as well as Mesopotamia. Italy would annex the Tyrol and Trentino and territories in the Balkans. Even had the Russian liberals not wanted to pursue these goals, to renounce the imperialist war aims, as the Russian people demanded, would have signified a break with the Entente allies to whom Russia was deeply indebted and from whom the liberals hoped to

obtain further credits. The allies, on their part, exerted intense financial and diplomatic pressure on the provisional government to carry out the tsar's promise to launch an offensive in the East in 1917 to coincide with their planned offensive in the West, this despite reports from the Russian command of poor morale and supply problems.

But there was a much more cogent domestic internal reason for the liberals' continued support for the war. As the moderate SR leader Viktor Chernov (who supported the provisional government and later served in it) explained: "The propertied classes regarded a military victory and the accompanying chauvinism [it would arouse] as the only way to avoid radicalization of the social revolution." Sukhanov put it most bluntly in his diary: "If the revolution did not finish the war, then the war would strangle the revolution."

As for the workers and soldiers, they were prepared to support the war if that was necessary to defend their revolution against the armies of the Central Powers. But they took for granted that the soviet would force the government to renounce the tsar's imperialist war aims. After all, the Petrograd soviet on March 14 unanimously issued an appeal to the peoples of the world to "take into their own hands the resolution of the question of war and peace" and urged the people of the Central Powers, in particular, to follow Russia's revolutionary example. For this reason, in the early weeks of the revolution the workers were unable to understand the Bolsheviks' call for an end to the war. For it was inconsistent with the party's conditional support for the provisional government. Workers felt they had something to defend. And, in fact, when Stalin and other exiled leaders returned from their Siberian exile in mid-March, they changed *Pravda's* editorial line from "down with the war" to "revolutionary defensism," the same position as the moderate socialists.

But the limits to the workers' "revolutionary defensism" were already demonstrated in early April when they rebuked the moderate socialist majorities in the Petrograd and Moscow soviets for endorsing the government's "Liberty Loan." Factory meetings condemned the loan, demanding instead a special tax on the capital and on the war profits of the bourgeoisie who had instigated the war. At the same time, they demanded that the provisional government exert pressure on the allies to renounce their imperialist aims.

This was the first occasion on which workers recalled deputies they had elected to the soviets, replacing moderate socialists with Bolsheviks or Bolshevik sympathizers. The Bolsheviks, unlike the moderate socialists, opposed the Liberty Loan.

But in response to popular pressure, the soviet pressed the provisional government to renounce the tsarist war aims. This was fiercely resisted by the liberal leader Milyukov, minister of external affairs. But on March 28 his government finally published a compromise document that declared that Russia sought no domination, annexation, or occupation, only peace based on the self-determination of peoples. At the same time, however, the government reaffirmed its intention to carry out "all obligations assumed toward our allies." As if this ambiguity were not enough, Milyukov sent a secret note to the allies on April 18, affirming Russia's determination to pursue the war to a victorious conclusion and to fulfill all treaty obligations.

The note became public through the press on April 20 and provoked a spontaneous explosion of indignation among the workers and soldiers of the capital, Moscow, and some other industrial centers. This took the form of meetings and street demonstrations that demanded Milyukov's resignation. Calls for the soviets to take power from the provisional government were still rare. Meanwhile, Milyukov's Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party organized counterdemonstrations in the capital and in Moscow in his support. The Menshevik paper reported on the situation in Petrograd: "Everywhere, in the streets and in the trams, passionate, heated arguments over the war. The caps and kerchiefs are for peace; the derbies and bonnets – for war." According to one eyewitness, "On April 21, the women of these [three textile mills] moved with the demonstrators on the odd-numbered side of Nevskii Prospekt. The other crowd moved in parallel fashion on the even side – well-dressed women, officers, merchants, lawyers, and the like. Their slogans were 'Long live the Provisional Government!' 'Long live Milyukov!' 'Arrest Lenin!' At Sadovaya, a clash occurred. A hail of curses descended on our workers: 'Whores! Illiterate rabble! Filthy scum!' Romanova couldn't control herself: 'The hats you're wearing are made from our blood!' A fist fight broke out. The bearer of the mill's banner was knocked off her feet and the banner torn. . . . In response, our workers tore

off the fancy hats and scratched the faces of the bourgeois women. At that moment a detachment of sailors approached, led by an orchestra, and the Kadet demonstration retreated."

Not all the clashes ended so well. Provocateurs, firing from the midst of the "proper public," killed several workers and soldiers. This was the first blood spilled since the February Revolution, a foretaste of the civil war to come. It left a deep impression on the capital's workers. "That day opened everyone's eyes," recalled one of them. "The repressed hatred toward the bourgeoisie intensified." This violence was a major spur to the workers to seek arms and create their own red guards, despite the opposition of the moderate leaders of the soviet.

These events also helped to swing the Bolshevik Party behind Lenin's position. At a national party conference at the end of April, the overwhelming majority of the 149 delegates, representing 79,000 members (as compared to 20,000 at the time of the February Revolution), condemned the provisional government and demanded the speedy transfer of power to the soviets.

Formation of a Coalition Government

The liberals' reaction to the crisis was to try to broaden support for the provisional government by persuading the leaders of the soviet to join a coalition. The soviet's executive committee rejected this proposal by a narrow majority. But the sudden resignation of Milyukov as minister of war convinced the Menshevik and moderate SR leaders of the soviet that they had to prop up the liberals, whose continued support for the revolution they considered crucial for its survival and for avoiding civil war. The Bolsheviks, Menshevik-Internationalists, and the left SRs opposed this move, but they constituted a minority of only 10 against 44 moderates in the executive committee who favored the coalition. On May 5, five prominent socialists (six including Kerensky, who had already joined the government in February without the soviet's approval), entered a coalition government. As a concession to popular opinion, Milyukov was ousted from the government, over the protests of his party's central committee. On May 13, the Petrograd soviet expressed overwhelmingly its confidence in the new government. Trotsky's

resolution opposing the coalition government gathered few votes.

Most workers thus accepted the new arrangement. They were moved by the argument that they were thus avoiding civil war, something they obviously did not want. But more than that, they believed that now, with the soviet's own people inside the government, popular control over the liberals would be more effective. Trotsky, who had recently returned from exile abroad, saw it quite the other way around: the formation of a coalition government marked the "capture of the soviet by the bourgeoisie."

Again, the main center of rejection of the coalition government was the Vyborg district, whose workers called for the soviet to take power. They were now less isolated than in February. Analogous positions were put forward by the Tailors' and Upholsterers' Unions, and by a few factories in other districts, as well as in Moscow and the provinces. On April 24, the soviet of the textile town of Teikovo in the central industrial region denounced the government as "imperialist, tied hand and foot to Anglo-French and Russian capital," and demanded the transfer of state power to the soviets. The soviet of the nearby city of Ivanovo-Voznesensk, also a textile center, followed suit a couple of weeks later, declaring that the provisional government, "given its bourgeois essence," could not keep its promises. On May 13, the soviet of workers' and soldiers' deputies of the Kronstadt naval base outside of Petrograd went so far as to declare itself the sole power on the island.

But these voices constituted a minority. The moderate socialists seemed still to have the mass of workers and soldiers behind them. However, this apparent unity hid profound differences. The workers and soldiers believed the soviets' representatives were entering the government to ensure it carried out the popular will; the moderate socialists were, in fact, concerned first and foremost to keep the liberals in power, and that at any cost. This effectively made them prisoners of the liberals, as Trotsky had observed, not the other way around, as the workers and soldiers believed.

It did not take long for most workers to see their mistake. The soldiers and the unskilled workers with ties to their villages of origin took somewhat longer. The peasants would formally come around only after the October Revolution, though on the ground they had long since been

in opposition to the government. In Petrograd, after most workers had recalled the moderate delegates and elected Bolsheviks in their place, the Workers' Section of the soviet already on July 3 demanded the transfer of power to the soviets. By the end of September, most workers' and soldiers' soviets in Russia had adopted that position.

The provisional government's policy on the war was only one factor in this radicalization. The other issues were the government's refusal to act decisively to halt and reverse the deepening economic crisis and its inactivity on land reform. To make matters worse, when the workers and peasants took matters into their own hands, the government did its best to block their efforts. But the overarching factor was the growing threat of counterrevolution. The provisional government was not only perceived as doing nothing to oppose it, it was considered to be facilitating its realization.

The Economic Crisis and Workers' Control

In early May, the Menshevik-Internationalist paper wrote: "Of late, one observes cutbacks in production at a whole series of enterprises. So far this has shown up only in small and medium ones, but all the same it is starting to alarm the worker masses. The advanced workers are beginning to ask if there might be a relationship between their new economic gains and the curtailment of production that follows." Even the right-wing Menshevik paper, which supported the provisional government, observed in mid-May that the industrialists' fear in the initial period of the revolution, which had made them make concessions to the workers, had worn off. "They have now decisively passed over to the defensive and are rapidly making ready to shift to the offensive." But the working class was still too menacing a force to be assaulted frontally. Rather, the employers were attacking from the rear. "Of late, more and more often one hears of an 'Italian [slowdown] strike' here and there by the entrepreneurs. Factories are not being repaired, worn-out parts are not being replaced, production is being managed in a slipshod manner. . . . In other cases, they cut back on production, lay off workers under the pretext of lacking metal, fuel, orders, or because of the competition of imports. We have before us a different means of struggle – the hidden lockout. In the soviet's Labor Department we daily come across facts that

confirm the existence of a definite plan on the part of the industrialists."

Even before the February Revolution, serious supply problems had arisen. But at that time the employers blamed them on the war and on the government's incompetence. Now, however, businessmen like N. Kutler, a Kadet leader, decided that it was the workers' fault. They were making "inordinate demands" that were "rendering the management of the enterprises impossible." Commenting on Kutler's speech, the Kadet newspaper predicted in mid-May that "two or three weeks will pass, and factories will start closing one after the other."

Meanwhile, because of strong opposition from the employers, the provisional government took no serious measures of economic regulation, a policy adopted by all the other warring countries. The liberal banker Ryabushinskii explained that such a policy was not suitable for Russia because "our government itself continues to be in a position of being controlled." He was alluding to the power of the soviets. If the government were allowed to intervene in the economy under conditions where the soviets had such influence, the regulation that resulted might hurt industrialists' interests. Two days after the soviet executive committee approved a plan of broad economic regulation, Konovalov, a leading liberal industrialist, resigned as minister of trade and industry, explaining that state regulation was only possible if the government exercised full authority – another allusion to the power of the soviets. At a congress of industrialists a few days later, he warned that "if in the near future there is not a sobering of minds, we will witness the closing of tens and hundreds of factories." The All-Russian Congress of Representatives of Trade and Industry in early June decisively rejected any form of state regulation of the economy.

It is not surprising, then, that one of the first important workers' organizations to demand the transfer of state power to the soviets was the Petrograd Conference of Factory Committees that met at the end of May. For the factory committees were the front line of the workers' fight to save their jobs. The conference's resolution on measures to fight economic disorganization and forestall the looming crisis, which gathered two-thirds of the 568 votes (really three-quarters, if one includes the anarchists, who would not vote for any resolution that mentioned the state), concluded that "the coordinated and successful

execution of the above measures is possible only on condition of the transfer of power to the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies." On June 12, the founding conference of the Textile Workers' Union of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk region voted by an overwhelming majority for the transfer of power to the soviets as the only hope of avoiding "the [economic] catastrophe of unprecedented proportions" that was approaching.

In the meanwhile, however, the workers, through their factory committees, did what they could to defend their jobs. At this point they did not aspire to take over management. That was not part of their idea of the democratic revolution. But, on the other hand, they were not going to give management a free hand to cut production and lay off workers, if they suspected bad faith. And both past and present experience pointed in that direction. It is difficult to judge how often the production problems were really objective in nature and how much they were a result of conscious sabotage or negligence by the owners and their managements. But the workers' suspicions proved justified in a sufficient number of cases to raise doubts whenever problems arose. An inquiry in the spring by a business newspaper found that of the 75 (mostly small and medium) plant closures that had occurred in the capital, 54 had been motivated by the owners' desire to break the workers' collective pressure and 21 by supply problems. In Ivanovo-Voznesensk after the Easter holiday a number of textile mills did not reopen, the owners citing lack of fuel or raw materials. But when the soviet decided that the owners would have to pay the workers full wages anyway and when it set up a control commission to oversee the industry, the owners suddenly resumed production. The soviet observed that the owners were not making efforts to obtain the fuel that was available and that their desire to close was directed at starving the workers in order to take back the freedom they had won.

It was this situation in the spring and early summer of 1917 that gave rise to the demand for "workers' control," a term that in Russian means "monitoring" or "oversight," not management, something that the workers connected with socialism. In fact, the factory committees explicitly rejected responsibility for management of their enterprises under a capitalist system. Very rarely did they try to take over their plants, and then only when it was the only alternative to

closure. And even then, they turned to the state for support, demanding that it sequester the factory. "Workers' control" meant the right to investigate the reasons for production problems, including access to company stocks, documents, and financial records. Workers' control was essentially a defensive response on the part of workers to threats to their jobs and so ultimately to their revolution itself.

Because of its defensive nature, workers' control developed unevenly. As a rule, workers did not try to establish control where they did not perceive any threat. And in the face of the owners' resistance, those that tried to establish control were usually able at best to achieve only partial results before the October Revolution. The committee activists understood only too well the limits of what could be done without state support when layoffs or closure threatened. That is why they were among the first to demand soviet power. They also understood that the war had seriously disrupted the economy and that this called for economic regulation on the national level, something that only a state could do. In the meanwhile, however, they made heroic efforts, with the support of the Central Council of Factory Committees that their conference elected, to maintain production and defend jobs. To this end, they were willing to cooperate with management in seeking supplies of fuel, raw materials, orders, even financing, but only if they were convinced of the management's good will.

It should be clear, therefore, that the movement for workers' control was not a blind revolt of workers against any and all authority, as the owners and their supporters claimed. Nor was it inspired by anarchist ideals, as historians have often argued. The demand for workers' control was new to the labor movement. It was the workers' practical response to a real problem they faced, a problem they had already faced in 1905 but to which they were then unable to find a response. Like the soviets in 1905, workers' control in 1917 arose "from below." It had not figured in the program of any of the parties. But the Bolsheviks took it up enthusiastically, and Bolshevik workers were soon elected to most of the committees.

The moderate socialists, on the other hand, condemned workers' control as an anarchistic infringement on property rights that had no place under capitalism. They called instead for state regulation of the economy. The problem was that

the provisional government, which the moderate socialists supported, rejected state regulation. On the other hand, the government managed to incense the capital's workers with a plan to "unload" the city of its industry, to evacuate the factories to the provinces, where, it was claimed, they would be closer to supplies. Even the moderate socialists considered that this plan lacked any economic justification. For one thing, it would have taken months before the evacuated factories resumed production. Meanwhile, the government was calling the workers to show restraint in the name of the war effort. The workers immediately saw in this a politically motivated design to scatter the vanguard of the revolution. On May 31, the Workers' Section of the Petrograd soviet adopted a resolution declaring that what was needed was not to ship out the capital's industry, but to end the war and mount a genuine struggle against the looming economic collapse. But the latter was "possible only through regulation and control of all production by state power in the hands of the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies." Under intense popular criticism, the government discreetly shelved the plan, for the time being.

The Peasant Revolution

The workers' leadership in overthrowing the autocracy made possible the peasant revolution. But without the peasants on their side, the workers, regardless of their political prowess and their strategic geographic and economic locations, would inevitably have been crushed. But the provisional government's failure to take action on the issues of peace, to which we shall return presently, and land ensured the workers the peasants' at least passive support.

Under pressure from the Kadets, the socialists in the coalition government – the SR leader V. Chernov was minister of agriculture – failed to adopt measures that might have reassured the peasantry. The Kadets insisted that any changes in property relations in the countryside had to await the constituent assembly, while they did everything in their power to postpone the convocation of that assembly. After several delays, elections were finally set for November 12 (the Kadets tried for December but failed). But by then, however, the provisional government had been overthrown.

The peasants continued to identify with the SRs, the traditional peasant party, whose program corresponded to their aspirations, despite the fact that the party's leaders were betraying it. The party itself was increasingly divided between its right and left wings. The left wing was close to the Bolsheviks' positions but was reluctant to break with the party. The Bolsheviks, as Marxists, considered the SR land program to be utopian. It called for "socialization" of the land and its egalitarian distribution to the peasants, who were to work the land without using hired labor but still on an essentially individualistic, free market basis. Such an arrangement could only rather quickly lead to the opposite of the egalitarian dream that inspired it: the land would inevitably become a commodity that would be bought, sold, and rented, and the peasants would become differentiated into a class of wealthy farmers, on the one hand, and landless rural laborers, on the other. Lenin felt that the peasants did not share the SRs' utopia. Rather, in calling for "socialization" or "nationalization" of the land, they really wanted to clear away the remnants of feudalism from property relations and begin capitalist relations in agriculture from zero. Their program was bourgeois democratic, not anti-capitalist. Yet in Russia's conditions it was revolutionary.

As noted, the Bolsheviks' agrarian program in 1917 read very much like that of the SRs. The major difference was that the Bolsheviks took it seriously, urging the peasants to act immediately on their own to put the land under the control of their democratically elected soviets without waiting for the constituent assembly. The law would result from their revolutionary initiative. If they waited, they would get neither a law nor the land. Although most peasants had never seen a Bolshevik, they were, in fact, increasingly acting along the lines the Bolsheviks were recommending, especially once they realized they could do so with impunity, since the government lacked the force to repress them. Indeed, it was often soldiers returning from the front who stirred things up in the villages. According to incomplete data, 34 districts were affected by disorders in March, 174 in April, 236 in May, 280 in June, and 325 in July.

The All-Russian Soviet (or Congress) of Peasant Deputies that met in May, with an equal number of delegates from the villages and from the army, was a significant milestone in the

peasant revolution. On purely political issues, such as support for the provisional government or the war, a majority still followed the lead of the moderate SRs, although, as one of the SR leaders admitted, "the congress more than once suffered from acute bouts of Bolshevik attitude," which the SR leaders managed to liquidate only with the greatest difficulty. But on the land question, the delegates who represented the soldiers and the peasant poor (the vast majority of peasants) demanded that the soviet immediately transfer all the land to the peasantry. A constituent assembly could formalize that later in law. They reacted with hostility to any suggestion of the need to oppose land seizures and they said they could not understand why the land could not be declared national property at once, especially as that would have a calming effect on the peasants and help to discourage land seizures. But the only response that Chernov and other SR leaders provided was that these matters were the exclusive prerogative of the constituent assembly.

In the end, a compromise was reached. The left SRs yielded on their demand for immediate nationalization of the land and its transfer to the peasants, and the right SRs agreed to a resolution stating that all land should be placed under the control of the land committees, which should have the right to decide how the land would be worked. (The land committees had been established by the provisional government but with a mandate only to collect statistical information.) They should also have the right to requisition inventory for collective use, to regulate rental relations, the harvesting and storing of grain, and to ensure that no property transactions in land occur before the constituent assembly met. (The latter measure was aimed at stopping big landowners from making fictitious sales and transfers of land in the hope of avoiding expropriation.)

This resolution was adopted almost unanimously. But once again, while the peasants took it seriously, as a done deed, a guide to practical action, the SR leaders, always looking over their shoulder at the liberals, tried to interpret it as merely an expression of the peasants' wishes for government legislative action. But that was action the government would not take. All of Chernov's attempts to change the legal status quo in land relations met with a sharp rebuff from the Kadet ministers. But, in fact, Chernov did not insist too much. According to the Kadet

minister F. Kokoshkin, he "very quickly made concessions and was, in general, harmless." Whatever changes Chernov was able to push through, such as prohibiting the legal registration of any changes to ownership and supporting the land committees in reducing rents, taking over unused land, and removing prisoner-of-war labor, it was far less than what the peasants wanted and was what they were already doing anyway.

A typical report from Simbirsk province in central Russia in the weeks following the Peasant Congress stated that it had become "completely impossible" to fight against the movement for seizure of the land "as all the peasants, basing themselves on the words of the peasant delegates [to the Peasant Soviet], know that the resolutions . . . were worked out with the participation of the Minister of Agriculture V. M. Chernov. At present, a large part of the privately owned land has, in one form or another, come under the control of the peasants." K. Lunev, a member of the executive committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasant Deputies who visited several provinces after the congress, reported that "the Bolshevik idea of transferring the land to the peasantry without awaiting the constituent assembly was finding growing sympathy among the peasants." Peasant soviets, which sprang up everywhere after the Congress had called for their election, insistently demanded that the provisional government immediately adopt a law transferring control of the land to them. Summarizing the rural situation between March and July, the minister of justice noted that "the agrarian movement is assuming an organized, conscious character. But it would be wrong to think that it corresponds to the government's own plans." In June and July, he continued, 46 percent of the peasant actions had an organized character, thanks to the influence of the local peasant soviets, which were directing the peasants to solve the agrarian question without waiting for the constituent assembly.

By the summer of 1917 there was no significant region of rural Russia that was not in a state of upheaval. As before, the peasants, through various means, concentrated on taking control of privately owned land and property (as opposed to land belonging to the peasant communes). Before September, there was little incidence of terror, sacking of estates, incendiary activity, or murder, although lesser forms of violence occurred. Meanwhile, the SR Party was already

in the process of formally splitting in a number of provinces. The right SRs, however, maintained control of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of Peasant Soviets. This was an indication of the difficulty peasants had in finding their way in national politics and in exercising effective control over their elected representatives. In these matters, the workers showed their political superiority.

The July Days and the Specter of Counterrevolution

A virtual ceasefire had prevailed on the eastern front since the February Revolution. This, of course, corresponded to German interests, since it enabled the German army to concentrate efforts on the western front. But the Russian soldiers – nine million men were under arms – although still willing to defend the revolution if it was threatened by a German offensive, had no interest in ending the *de facto* armistice.

The western allies, on the other hand, did have such an interest and exerted unrelenting pressure on the Russians for a new offensive. But even apart from allied pressure, the moderate socialists in the coalition government favored an offensive as the only way to stop the incipient disintegration of the army, which consisted mainly of young peasants increasingly under the influence of Bolshevik ideas and obsessed with the idea of getting home to take part in the land reform. From February to May, 86,000 desertions were registered; everywhere soldiers elected their committees, and a chasm of mistrust emerged with the officers.

As for the liberals and the generals, they counted on a successful offensive to put a stop to the radicalization of the popular classes and perhaps even to help defeat the revolution. And, of course, they still supported the imperialist war aims. At the Kadet Party congress in May, Milyukov was given a standing ovation when he declared that “possession of the Straits [the Dardanelles – exit from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean] is the most essential and vital necessity for our country.”

Preparation for reactivating the southwestern and Romanian fronts began in mid-May. The offensive was launched on June 18. That same day a demonstration in Petrograd, called by the moderate socialist leaders of the soviet who hoped to obtain a show of popular support for

their policies, turned into a massive demonstration of workers and soldiers – between 300,000 and 400,000 participated – against the provisional government and for the transfer of state power to the soviets. This occurred on the background of growing food supply problems and conflicts over wages, which had been eroded by inflation. But most alarming to the workers was the growing threat of counterrevolution, of which the June 18 offensive was seen as an integral part, in addition to their suspicions of a planned hidden lockout by the employers supported by the government.

In the midst of all this, well-known representatives of the propertied classes were speaking out with increasing boldness against the soviets. Their principal refrain was that the government was prisoner of a pernicious force, the soviets, from which it had to be liberated. Translated into plain language, this meant that the revolution had put too much power in the hands of the popular classes, the vast majority of the population. This had to be corrected, and the workers and peasants disciplined. Especially provocative were the “private” meetings of the State Duma and State Council that began right after the April Days. Not only did these discredited tsarist institutions have no right to continue to exist in the workers’ eyes, but they were being used as a public tribune to denounce the soviets. And these denunciations evoked rapturous applause from those assembled. “Keep yourselves at the ready,” urged M. Rodzyanko, a big landowner, leader of the Octobrists and chairman of the last State Duma, “for soon the time will come for your intervention into the life of the country.”

The workers of Petrograd were becoming increasingly impatient with the moderate socialists at the head of the CEC of Soviets of Workers’ and Peasants’ Deputies elected at the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in June. They wanted action. When the Bolsheviks discussed the results of the June 18 demonstration, they concluded that, despite the massive protest, nothing changed. Some called to abandon peaceful tactics, but others objected to this call as a potential precursor to using force against their own comrades who still supported the “conciliationist” politics of the moderate socialists. The task was still to win over the workers and soldiers who still supported the “conciliators,” to convince them of the need for soviet power. Only then could the working class join battle with the

bourgeoisie. They decided to refrain from further demonstrations but to use the growing pressure coming from below for action to press the soviet leadership to take power.

The Bolsheviks, however, did not control the situation. It was soldiers who began. In addition to feeling betrayed by the offensive, various units in the garrison had learned that they were to be disbanded and shipped to the front. On July 3, these soldiers went around to the factories to call out the workers. The latter needed little coaxing. The CEC's prohibition on demonstrations had no effect. The Bolsheviks opposed the demonstration, but as they were unable to prevent it, they tried, rather unsuccessfully, to provide it with some leadership. Lenin feared, rightly as it turned out, that it would give a boost to the reactionary forces.

That night a huge column, led by armed soldiers, arrived at the Tauride Palace, seat of the CEC of Soviets. The demonstrators declared they would stay until the CEC took power. After being told that they would receive a reply the next day, they went home late at night. After considerable hesitation, the Bolsheviks called to continue the demonstration the next day, stressing that it should be peaceful. With women and children in the crowds, the workers' only intention was to exert moral pressure on the CEC to take power. The essence of the movement was summed up by a worker inside the Tauride Palace, who shook his fist at Chernov, shouting: "Take power, you son of a bitch, when it is given to you!"

The CEC leadership, however, insisted that the workers and soldiers asking it to take power were, in fact, counterrevolutionaries. "It is strange," explained a worker, delegated from 54 factories, "to read the CEC's appeal: it calls workers and soldiers counterrevolutionaries. But you see what is written on our placards. These are decisions adopted by the workers. . . . We are threatened with hunger. . . . We trust the soviet but not those whom the soviet trusts. Our comrade socialist ministers have taken the road of conciliation with the capitalists . . . our blood enemies. We demand that all the land be seized at once; that control over production be established immediately. We demand a struggle against the hunger that is threatening us."

Since no one was thinking of using force against the CEC, the movement ended on its own on the night of July 4. But during the two days of demonstrations, some 400 people had been

killed or wounded, victims of clashes between provocateurs and demonstrators. It was that night that the correlation of forces suddenly shifted against the workers. They were not prepared to use force against the CEC, but the CEC was prepared to use force against them. That night, troops loyal to the CEC and the government arrived. They had been influenced in part by forged documents, conveniently leaked to the press by the Kadet minister of justice, purporting to show that Lenin was a German agent working for a separate peace with Germany. The troops proceeded to ransack the premises of the Bolshevik Central and Petersburg Committees, demolishing their print shop. In the ensuing days, Bolshevik activists and leaders, including Trotsky – Lenin went underground – were arrested. The whole top leadership of the party was put out of action. Angry crowds beat up, sometimes even killed, workers they found on the streets. The Menshevik-Internationalist paper, itself about to be shut down by the provisional government, remarked on July 11: "The counter-revolution is making great strides. . . . Searches, arrests – and what arrests! – even the tsarist police did not allow itself the kind of insolence that the bourgeois youth and Cossack officers have lately been displaying in Petrograd in their efforts to 'restore order'."

The Kadet ministers had resigned from the government on July 2, ending the first coalition. On July 7, a new, second coalition was formed. This time it had a socialist majority, including a socialist prime minister, Kerensky. But rather than signifying a shift to the left, this was a move to the right: as a condition for their participation in the government, the Kadets demanded and obtained a veto on "all basic reforms" pending the constituent assembly. The new coalition now openly declared its intention to pursue the war to the end. It assumed powers to suppress publications, prohibit demonstrations, close meetings, and arrest and detain without trial. It tried (but failed) to disband and arrest the very radical Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet for having refused to send ships to Petrograd against the demonstrators on July 3–4. It dissolved the Finnish parliament, whose social democratic majority had voted for Finland's autonomy. It reintroduced the death penalty, abolished by the February Revolution, for soldiers at the front. It forbade the workers' elected factory committees from meeting during work hours in an attempt

to paralyze their activity and denied them any say in decisions on hiring and firing. It revived the plan to “unload” Petrograd of its industry. And it tried, but largely failed for lack of willing troops, to repress peasant land seizures.

But less important than the physical effects of the repression was its psychological impact. On the one hand, the confrontation between moderate leadership of the CEC of Soviets and the most active and politically conscious segment of the popular classes, the Petrograd workers, encouraged the propertied classes in their desire to recoup the losses they had suffered in the first months of the revolution. But even more, for the Petrograd workers, the violence of the July Days and the repression that followed changed everything. The CEC's participation in repression against workers seemed to render meaningless the demand for soviet power. But on the other hand, to abandon the soviets as the future organs of popular power in favor of some other organization, such as the factory committees, and to prepare for insurrection against the provisional government as well as the CEC, as Lenin now proposed, threatened the workers with political isolation from the mass of peasants who still followed the CEC. This raised the specter of civil war within the ranks of the popular classes.

The July Days had given the workers a foretaste of civil war, and they were not eager for it. They had previously been thinking in terms of a peaceful assumption of power by the soviets that enjoyed the support of the soldiers. Unable to find a way forward, the workers retreated to defensive positions to mull things over. Some observers noted a certain withdrawal from politics. Within the Bolshevik Party itself, Lenin's position – to abandon the soviets and prepare for insurrection – was rejected in favor of a compromise that recognized that a peaceful transition of power was no longer possible, but retained, albeit in slightly modified form, its old slogan, calling for the transfer of “all power to the *revolutionary* soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies.”

Despite the slander campaign and the repression, there was no mass desertion from the Bolsheviks. On the contrary, Bolshevik support, after a slight pause, continued to grow. By the end of July, party membership had reached 200,000, with 36,000 in Petrograd alone. As before, the Bolsheviks were strongest in the main industrial centers – Petrograd, the Urals,

Moscow, the central industrial region, the Donets basin of the Ukraine, the Baku oilfields. It would not be long before a majority of the soviets rallied to the Bolsheviks, resolving the problem of seeking alternative organs of popular power.

As for the provisional government's military offensive, despite some initial local successes, it was a disaster that dealt the final blow to the Russian army as a fighting organization. The provisional government and bourgeoisie had lost their wager. Not only did the offensive fail to stabilize the domestic situation, stopping and reversing the popular radicalization, it ensured that the army could not be used against the people, as the events were soon to show.

Failed Counterrevolution: General Kornilov's Attempted Coup

After the July Days, orators at the “private” meetings of the State Duma abandoned all restraint. They described the CEC of Soviets as “a band of crazy fanatic impostors and traitors” and openly called for suppression of the soviets, for a coup d'état, a bourgeois dictatorship, and insisted that no constituent assembly could possibly be convened in wartime. A sign of the times was the reemergence from his self-imposed seclusion of the monarchist anti-Semite V. Purishkevich, who now added his voice to the reactionary chorus calling for suppression of the soviets.

On August 3, at the All-Russian Congress of Commerce and Industry, Ryabushinskii, the liberal banker, explained that the soviets and other popular organizations were holding the government prisoner and driving the country to an abyss. At the same time, he flatly rejected any state intervention into the economy. The revolution was “bourgeois,” he declared, and those at the helm of the state should act in a “bourgeois manner.” “Unfortunately,” he continued, “the long bony hand of hunger and national impoverishment will have to seize those false friends of the people by the throat, the members of the various soviets and committees, before they come to their senses.” When he finished, the hall erupted in a “thunder of applause.” The assembled businessmen sprang to their feet and hailed the orator. But in working-class circles, the speech at once became infamous. It was read as an open admission by the employers that they were conducting a masked lockout.

Ryabushinskii became the personification of the *kapitalist-lokoutchik*. "Thanks for the truth," commented the Bolshevik paper *Proletarii*. "The conscious workers and peasants can only thank Ryabushinskii. The only question remains: whose hand will grasp whom by the throat?"

Meanwhile, the government still took no action to avert the approaching economic catastrophe. There was a general sense that the dam was about to burst. Bolshevik economist V. Milyutin told a conference of factory committees in August that "Russia has already entered a period of real catastrophe, because the economic breakdown and the food crisis have reached extreme limits. We already feel an acute shortage of grain, and the specter of real hunger looms before us in all its immensity." Until August, only 43 plants, mostly small and medium, had closed down in the capital. This affected relatively few workers. But in August, the Petrograd Metalworkers' Union reported that 25 more factories had announced their imminent closure, and 137 were cutting back production, including some of the largest factories. "The storm has now broken over everyone's head," a representative of the Central Soviet of Factory Committees told the conference. For the first time since the war, industrial employment in the capital declined in July, a trend that would accelerate in later months and not stop until the end of the civil war three years later.

If, nevertheless, most of Petrograd's working class remained employed in the factories until the October Revolution, this was in large part thanks to the efforts of factory committees and their Central Soviet. But the employers, even while they blocked any move toward state regulation, blamed the meddling of the factory committees for the crisis. With the government's backing – the minister of labor was a Menshevik – they stiffened their resistance to the factory committees. They also hardened their stand on wages, which had been seriously eroded by inflation. According to one estimate, the cost of living rose by 75 percent in July and August 1917 alone.

The counterrevolution now for the first time took on the more concrete form of a military dictatorship. Speaking to the State Duma, Milyukov did not mince words: "We feel it absolutely necessary that the prime minister [Kerensky] either cede his place or, in any case, take as aides authoritative military men, and that

these authoritative military men act with the necessary independence and initiative." On July 22, Cossack General L. Kornilov, touted by the non-socialist press as the "strong man" who would save Russia – his biography was being distributed in great numbers – was appointed supreme commander by Kerensky. In accepting the appointment, the general announced that he considered himself responsible only to his "own conscience and to the entire people." Kornilov was already known to the capital's workers. As commander of the garrison during the "April Days," he had ordered artillery fire against the demonstrating workers and soldiers. A massacre was averted only because the gunners refused to obey his order without the soviet's countersignature.

As the counterrevolutionary mood among the propertied classes solidified, so too did Bolshevik support among the workers. It was during this period that Moscow's working class, less concentrated in large plants than Petrograd's, less skilled (textiles predominated over machine building), and more closely linked to its peasant origins, shifted its support en masse to the Bolsheviks. Moscow had the reputation of being less militant than Petrograd. Yet even as late as the start of July, the factory committees in Moscow were still dominated by moderate socialists.

Moscow's reputation for moderation is why the provisional government chose it in August as the site for its state conference, an ersatz constituent assembly with skewed representation and no power that was convened to obtain an expression of broad public support for the coalition government. But Moscow's workers, defying the leaders of their own soviet, still led by moderate socialists, organized a nearly unanimous general strike to protest the conference's opening.

The vast majority of workers in Russia by now supported the Bolsheviks. A minority, mostly on the basis of their continued links to the land, preferred the left SRs. Like the Menshevik-Internationalists, the left SRs opposed the coalition government but did not support the Bolsheviks' call for soviet power, considering the soviets would provide too narrow a political base for a revolutionary government. To the average worker, this position made no sense, and even workers who belonged to the left SR tended, in fact, to support the Bolshevik position. As for the Mensheviks, they were quickly losing support even among the printers, who had long been their stronghold.

This was the context in which General Kornilov made his move. Using the fall of Riga and the threat it posed to Petrograd as a pretext (it was widely believed he engineered Riga's fall), he transferred Cossack units to the capital. On August 26, martial law was declared, and troops were positioned in the working-class districts. The next day, the Kadet ministers resigned from the provisional government. On August 30, when the coup's failure had already become evident, the Kadets' newspaper appeared with a blank front page where the editorial should have been. The missing editorial was later published in the socialist press. It stated that "Kornilov's aims are identical to those we feel are necessary for the country's salvation. We adhere to his formulation. . . . Yes, it is a conspiracy, but it is not counter-revolutionary."

News of Kornilov's march on Petrograd electrified the capital's workers. But there was no panic. On the contrary, the mood was one of enthusiasm, self-sacrifice, even liberation. For Kornilov had provided them with a way out of the impasse created by the July Days: they could now strike a decisive blow against the counter-revolution in unison with the popular forces that still supported the moderate leadership of the CEC. Kornilov threatened everyone, and his coup seemed to have restored unity among the popular classes, thus removing the danger of a civil war within their ranks.

Everywhere workers formed red guards. They inundated the CEC with demands for arms. As it turned out, they did not have to join battle with Kornilov's troops. For the latter's troops melted away en route to the capital. Much of the credit belonged to the Petrograd workers who infiltrated Kornilov's echelons, explaining to the soldiers their commander's real aims. Railway workers also did their part by dispersing the troop trains and sabotaging the lines.

Since the moderate socialist majority of the CEC seemed to have shifted to the left and was now taking an active stand against the counter-revolution, Lenin offered it a compromise: take power, form a soviet government, and the Bolsheviks would act as a loyal opposition. For a brief period after the Kornilov Affair, the Bolshevik Party dropped its post-July position on the need for an insurrection to save the revolution. However, the CEC's leftward shift proved short-lived.

Toward the October Insurrection

The immediate effect of the Kornilov rising was conclusively to swing the mass of soldiers away from the moderate socialists and to the Bolsheviks and left SRs. As a result, by the end of September the soviets in the vast majority of towns with any significant industry or a garrison were demanding the transfer of state power to the soviets. (The shift in many urban soviets had been delayed by the overrepresentation in them of the garrisons.) In some predominantly industrial towns, like Ivanovo-Voznesensk, the Bolsheviks already won majorities in general municipal elections, and local soviets were in practice exercising power there.

Given the Kadets' complicity in the Kornilov uprising, the moderate socialists at the head of the CEC of Soviets finally rejected their further participation in the provisional government. Yet they could not bring themselves to support the idea of a government responsible to the soviets, even those representing the great mass of the population. They felt that the revolution would be doomed if it was supported only by the workers, soldiers, and peasants. The liberals, as representatives of the bourgeoisie, had to participate in the government. The problem – and no small one – was that the liberals were by now openly counterrevolutionary and completely discredited.

Had the moderate socialists been the democrats they later claimed to be when they opposed the Soviet government and the Bolsheviks, the CEC of Soviets, elected back in May, would have convened a new soviet congress to decide the matter of state power. Indeed, according to the statutes, a new congress was due in mid-September, since three months had elapsed since the last one. But the Mensheviks and SRs at the head of the CEC knew they would be in a minority at a new congress, which would very likely decide to take power from the provisional government. And so they decided instead to convene a "Democratic Conference," to which they gave the task of deciding the question of a new government. And to ensure it decided the way they wanted, they skewed the representation to favor organizations they dominated. Thus, while the soviets were allotted only 300 delegates, the cooperatives, dominated by wealthy peasants and really representing no one but themselves, were given 500, more than a third of the total seats.

But even this manipulation backfired. The assembly voted by a slim majority of 766 to 688 (38 abstentions) for a new coalition government with liberals. But it also adopted by a vote of 595 to 493 (72 abstentions) an amendment that stated that there should be no Kadets in the coalition. The Kadets, however, were the only party that could claim to represent the liberal bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. Since the amended resolution was obviously meaningful, it was rejected by a vote of 813 to 183 (80 abstentions). Undaunted, the CEC leaders then proposed to expand the conference presidium, but the body voted 60 to 50 against allowing representatives of the propertied classes into a coalition government.

In the end, Kerensky merely ignored the conference and the CEC and formed a new coalition government that included SRs, Mensheviks, prominent Kadets, and some businessmen, including the industrialist V. Smirnov, who had just locked out 3,000 striking workers at his textile mill in the village of Likino near Moscow. And despite all this, the CEC gave the new coalition government its support. In return, Kerensky agreed to convene a “pre-parliament,” another ersatz constituent assembly with no power. It would be made up of 15 percent of the delegates to the Democratic Conference and another 156 representatives of the propertied classes.

The Democratic Conference, which the workers had met with total indifference, only confirmed their worst fears: nothing remained of the CEC’s leftward shift during the Kornilov Affair. But under pressure from the Bolsheviks, the CEC was finally forced to set a date for a Congress of Soviets – October 25, which went down in history as the date of the October Revolution.

From the moment the date was set for a new soviet congress, it became the focal point of the workers’ hopes for saving the revolution. As the Menshevik-Internationalist paper wrote: “To the broad masses, it seems self-evident . . . The Democratic Conference disappointed because it was rigged. The soviets are the true representatives. Let the Congress meet and take power.”

The Bolshevik leaders, themselves under strong pressure from their own rank and file and from Lenin, still in hiding to avoid arrest, demonstratively walked out of the “pre-parliament.” This move was greeted by the capital’s workers, who watched with growing desperation as the threats of economic collapse and counterrevolution

loomed ever larger. The Petrograd soviet also approved the boycott of the “pre-parliament” by a huge majority. At the same session, on the suggestion of the Mensheviks, it voted to establish a “revolutionary defense committee” to defend the capital from the Germans (who had just captured an archipelago in the mouth of the Gulf of Finland – Petrograd was located at the east end of the gulf), to arm the workers, and to defend the capital against new counterrevolutionary attempts. In just a little over two weeks, that committee, renamed the Military Revolutionary Committee, would overthrow the provisional government.

Meanwhile, the poorly supplied, undernourished army was disintegrating. There were two million estimated deserters. A report from the northern front at the end of September found “a complete lack of confidence in the officers. . . . The influence of Bolshevik ideas is spreading very rapidly. To this must be added a general weariness, irritability, and a desire for peace at any price.” On the western front “intense defeatist agitation has developed, accompanied by refusal to carry out orders, threats to the commanding personnel, and attempts to fraternize with the Germans.” On the southwestern front “the Bolshevik wave is growing steadily. . . . The dominant theme . . . is peace at any price, under any conditions. Every order, no matter what its source, is met with hostility.” In Helsinki sailors murdered officers whom they suspected of having participated in the Kornilov Affair. They were incensed that Kornilov and his co-conspirators had been treated so leniently, having merely been placed under arrest (the conspirators fled south after the October Revolution to organize one of the first centers of the civil war), while the provisional government had reintroduced the death penalty for ordinary soldiers.

A certain lull had descended over the villages between the end of July and the beginning of September. There was the harvest and the autumn sowing to do, and also the fact that the peasants had already achieved the first phase of their demands: seizure of the meadows and pastureland, withdrawal of prisoner-of-war labor from the landed estates, reduction of rents. There had been some land seizures, but overall there was still hope the land might be acquired legally. But patience finally grew thin. From September, the land seizures multiplied, and so did the destruction of manor houses and other

property. This destruction was aimed at driving off the landowners, according to the adage "Destroy the nest, and the bird won't return." As before, the movement was strongest in the central agricultural and Volga provinces, and also the western provinces.

In the factories, the committees were increasingly under pressure from the workers to take action to stop the decline in production. The factory committees had been established to monitor management, not take it over. But what if management was not interested in maintaining production? "We are told that we must control," complained a worker at a factory committee conference in August. "But what will we control if we have nothing left but walls, bare walls?" V. Levin, a left SR member of the Central Soviet of Factory Committees, warned the same conference that "it is very likely that we stand before a general strike of capitalists and industrialists. We have to be prepared to take the enterprises into our hands to render harmless the hunger that the bourgeoisie is so heavily counting upon as a counterrevolutionary force."

The factory committee activists were reluctant to assume direct responsibility for running the plants, understanding only too well the complexities of the task in conditions of economic breakdown and without the support of a friendly state. They also felt that the owners were egging them on in order to discredit them or to have an excuse to abandon their factories. N. Skrypnik, a Bolshevik member of the Central Soviet of Factory Committees, reported to his party that "it is felt that the leaders [of the committees] do not entirely express the mood of the masses. The former are more conservative." Faced with these pressures, committees whose factories were under direct threat were moving beyond control, in the sense of monitoring management's activity, and directly assuming managerial functions, even against their own better judgment.

But all agreed: the only solution was a soviet government. At a conference of factory committees on the eve of the October Revolution, a Putilov worker explained: "This conference can give us valuable direction. But let's not fool ourselves into thinking that it can get us out of the dead-end. Both private and state administrations are sabotaging production, and [when we try to intervene] they refer us to the [rules adopted by] the Society of Factory Owners. They are still strong. The conference must first of all point out

the obstacles that prevent people of action from saving the country. They are put before us by the bourgeois government. Only the reorganization of state power will allow us to develop our activity."

Debates Within the Bolshevik Party

It was on September 13, during the Democratic Conference which conclusively demonstrated the refusal of the CEC to break with the liberals and take power on its own, that Lenin first insisted that an insurrection at the first opportune moment was the Bolshevik Party's immediate task. In passionate letters to the Central Committee from his hiding place, he pointed out that the Bolsheviks held majorities in the soviets of both Petrograd and Moscow. The soldiers would wait no longer. The peasant insurrection was a fact. And despite its biased representation, the majority of peasant delegates to the Democratic Conference had voted against a coalition with the Kadets. That meant that despite their attachment to the SRs, the peasants would follow the workers if they took power in the capitals. "The crisis is ripe. The whole future of the international workers' revolution for socialism is at stake. The crisis is ripe."

But Lenin, along with Trotsky who supported him, held a minority position in the party's Central Committee. The majority wanted to participate in the "pre-parliament" and even went so far as to burn one of Lenin's letters. They wanted to wait for the constituent assembly. However, the party's lower ranks and the mass of workers were in agreement with Lenin and Trotsky. Lenin even threatened to resign from the party leadership in order to be free to explain his position to the rank and file and mobilize them in its support. He sent copies of his letters to the Petersburg, Moscow, Vyborg district, and other local party organizations, appealing to the membership to exert pressure on the leaders, where "unfortunately, one can observe wavering, as if there is 'fear' of the struggle for power, a tendency to replace it with resolutions and protests." Local party conferences held in October, notably in Moscow and Petrograd, rebuked the leadership: "A defensive policy is incorrect. An offensive is needed immediately to root out the seeds of the counterrevolutionary government," declared the conference of Bolsheviks of the Northern Region that included Moscow and Petrograd. It was only on October 10 that the

Central Committee finally adopted the decision on insurrection.

In view of the widespread, but erroneous, view of the authoritarian, highly disciplined, and hierarchical “Leninist party,” it is worth emphasizing here that had the Bolshevik Party indeed been such in 1917, there would have been no October Revolution, since the majority of the leadership was opposed to it. (What the party became afterwards is another matter.) It was only because the party was democratic and linked organically to the mass of workers that Lenin was able to prevail – he prevailed in October because his position was shared by the party rank and its intermediary leadership, and beyond them by the broad masses of workers, soldiers, and peasants. Had the Bolshevik Party not taken the leadership in October to overthrow the provisional government, the workers’ and peasants’ revolutionary energy would, in all likelihood, have been squandered in a series of uncoordinated, spontaneous explosions that would have opened the way for a right-wing military, or even fascist-type, dictatorship of the type that ruled most of Europe during the inter-war period. (In Italy fascism followed rapidly on the heels of the Socialist Party’s refusal to act as the Bolsheviks did in a very similar situation. In Germany and Austria the rise of fascism was delayed by a decade.)

Lenin was not inclined to link the insurrection to formal democratic considerations. He felt that once the laboring classes had shown their support for a new revolution, the organization and timing of the insurrection ceased to be a political question and became a technical one. Indeed, he felt it would be criminal to risk success of the insurrection on formalistic considerations. The experience of December 1905 had taught him that if the high point of the revolutionary wave was allowed to pass without an insurrection, there would be no second chances. He also feared that the delegates to the Soviet Congress might hesitate before so enormous a decision as assuming responsibility for state power, a huge leap into the unknown that instilled fear, even if the present situation demanded it. Moreover, if the Bolsheviks waited for the Soviet Congress formally to take the decision, it would be a sitting duck for the provisional government to arrest it in one swoop. For these reasons, Lenin argued for an insurrection *before* the Congress: he wanted to outmaneuver the forces of counterrevolution

and at the same time present the Congress with a *fait accompli* that the delegates would and could not reject. Trotsky, on the other hand, who was at liberty and in closer contact with the workers and soldiers, felt it was important that the insurrection bear the stamp of legitimacy of the Soviet Congress. Otherwise, it might seem a party affair. This was especially important for the soldiers, who supported the Bolshevik Party’s policies, but did not have the workers’ organic links with the party. A compromise was reached: the Petrograd soviet would carry out the insurrection, which would be made to appear a defensive operation. And it would be in time for the opening of the Congress.

The October Revolution

October 22 was the “Day of the Petrograd Soviet.” It was called by the soviet as a peaceful show of forces. Eyewitness accounts concur that the response was overwhelming. Sukhanov, who opposed the transfer of power to the soviets, recalled the meeting that took place in the People’s House, which was filled to overflowing with 30,000 people: “Around me was a mood close to ecstasy. I felt as though the crowd would rise up on its own and sing some religious hymn. Trotsky formulated some brief resolution, something to the effect that ‘we will stand for the cause of the workers and peasants to the last drop of blood.’ All, as one person, raised their hands. I saw these raised hands and the burning eyes of the men, women and youths, workers and soldiers. . . . With an unusually heavy heart I watched this truly majestic scene. . . . And it was the same all over Petrograd. Everywhere final reviews and final oaths. Strictly speaking, this was already the insurrection. It had already begun.”

It began on the morning of October 23, technically in response to government moves against the Bolsheviks and the Petrograd soviet’s Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC), which had put the city’s garrison under its direct command. That night the government shut down the Bolshevik papers, ordered the arrest of Bolsheviks who were agitating against the government (in fact, all Bolsheviks), and opened criminal proceedings against the MRC. Kerensky called in troops to the capital, posted officer cadets at strategic points, raised the bridges, cut the telephone line to the Smolnyi Institute, seat of the Petrograd soviet, and also to the Bolshevik Party headquarters.

The MRC immediately went into action and by the afternoon of October 25 it held the entire city, except for the Winter Palace, where the provisional government was located. A Menshevik-Internationalist delegate to the Soviet Congress who had just arrived from the Crimea recalled the meeting of the Petrograd soviet on that day: "When Trotsky informed the Soviet that 'power had passed to the people,' there followed a storm of applause. Then Lenin and Zinoviev spoke. Such a triumph. Trotsky's speech especially carved itself into my mind. . . . Each word burned the soul . . . and I saw that many of the people were clenching their fists, that an unshakeable determination was forming in them to struggle to the end."

Lenin spoke in public to the soviet for the first time since the July Days: "The workers' and peasants' revolution, the necessity for which the Bolsheviks have been speaking all this time, has been accomplished. . . . We will have a soviet government, our own organ of power with no participation whatsoever of the bourgeoisie. . . . The Third Russian Revolution must, in the end, bring about the victory of socialism. . . . To end this war . . . we must defeat capital itself. In this we will have the aid of the world labor movement, already starting to pick up speed in Italy, Germany, France [in the form of strikes and mutinies]. . . . We must immediately publish the secret treaties. . . . We will win the trust of the peasants by a single decree destroying landlord property. . . . We will establish genuine workers' control of production. . . . Long live the worldwide socialist revolution!" That meeting of the Petrograd soviet voted its "full support for the workers' and peasants' revolution."

After a siege of the Winter Palace lasting into the night, the ministers of the provisional government were arrested, except for Kerensky who escaped to rally loyal troops. That evening, while the siege of the Winter Palace was playing itself out, the Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies opened. Shortly after it opened, the moderate socialist delegates – about a sixth of the total – walked out in protest against the insurrection that had been carried out "behind the back of the Congress." They formed a Committee of Salvation of the Revolution with the outgoing CEC, with members of the municipal Duma (government), the CEC of Peasant Soviets, and some others.

Many histories of the October Revolution refer to it as a "military coup" or "Bolshevik coup," thus denying it any sort of historical legitimacy. The insurrection did take place before the Congress decided to take power. But the moderate socialists were hardly credible when they explained their walkout as a protest against the violation of democratic norms, as they had shown scant concern for it themselves when they controlled the CEC. They had done their best to postpone the Congress, convening instead the Democratic Conference, which they packed with their supporters. They then ignored that conference's decision not to allow Kadets into a new coalition government. Moreover, the moderate socialists had already walked out of the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region after it voted quite democratically for soviet power, and there had been no issue of democracy, since the insurrection was yet to occur. They walked out, in fact, not to defend democracy but because they were opposed to the democratic will of the soviets, which overwhelmingly wanted a soviet government.

Of the 650 delegates at the Congress of Soviets, 390 were Bolsheviks, 90 were left SRs, and there were an unknown number of Menshevik-Internationalists, some of whom also walked out later. That night, within the space of a few brief minutes, the Congress passed two decrees that the provisional government during its eight months in power had refused to adopt, despite the will of the vast majority of the people of Russia. The "Decree on Peace" proposed an immediate, democratic peace to all governments, while at the same time summoning the world's workers to action against their imperialist governments. The Entente's secret treaties were abrogated and published soon after. The "Decree on Land" abolished landed private property and gave it to the exclusive use of those who worked it. Later that night, Lenin wrote up a Draft Law on Workers' Control that gave the factory committees access to all documents and factory supplies and made their decisions binding on management, subject to repeal only by the trade unions or by city-wide conferences of factory committees.

The Congress also elected a new government, the Council of People's Commissars, responsible to it alone. The government consisted exclusively of Bolsheviks, with Lenin as chairman. The left SRs and Menshevik-Internationalists refused to participate in the government without the

moderate socialists, while the latter would have nothing to do with a government in which Bolsheviks participated. This should make clear that October was not a “Bolshevik coup” but, in fact, a soviet, that is, a workers’ and peasants’ revolution (the soldiers being the most politicized and active part of the peasantry). To call it a “Bolshevik coup” is to read backward into history developments that took place later under different circumstances. Whatever Lenin himself may have wanted – and that can be debated – a single party regime was not the goal of the majority of the Bolshevik Party leadership or of the party rank and file.

Many writers, hostile to the October Revolution, cite the fact that the insurrection lacked the outer trappings of a popular revolution: no crowds milling in the streets, no scenes of mass jubilation, no barricades or street fighting, no general strike. October was indeed different from the February Revolution, which had all the above things. It was a military-like operation. But not often mentioned is the fact that the insurrection’s leaders themselves urged the workers to stay at work and off the streets. Trotsky, for one, knew that Petrograd’s workers had not recovered from the bloodshed of the July Days and he wanted to avoid a repeat that might have repulsed them. The Russian workers (though not the soldiers) were still far from the ferocity and cruelty that emerged during the civil war. The arrested ministers of the provisional government were well treated. Cossack General Krasnov, who attempted to lead his troops against the capital in October and was thwarted by red guards, was released by the latter on his word of honor, despite his own soldiers’ wish to lynch him on the spot. (Krasnov then went south to organize a counterrevolutionary army.)

Sukhanov, who mercilessly lambasted the new soviet government in his editorials in the Menshevik-Internationalist paper *Novaya-zhizn*, noted that the moderate socialists for months afterwards comforted themselves with the thought that October had been a military conspiracy, not a popular insurrection. But he pointed out that the masses “had nothing to do on the streets. . . . This was an especially happy circumstance of our October Revolution, for which it is slandered as a military rising or palace coup. Why not ask: Did the Petrograd Proletariat sympathize or not with the organizers of the insurrection? . . . Were they on the side of the

accomplished insurrection, neutral or opposed? There can be no two answers: yes the Bolsheviks acted on the mandate of the Petrograd workers and soldiers. And they carried out the insurrection throwing into it as many (very little!) forces as were necessary. No, excuse me. Through carelessness and clumsiness, they threw in much more than was necessary.”

Elsewhere in northern and central Russia, the transfer of power went quite smoothly. Only in Moscow did the soviet encounter serious, sustained, and bloody resistance. That was in large part due to the local Bolsheviks’ hesitation – against which Lenin had specifically warned – since not one regular regiment of the garrison came out in support of the provisional government. The Moscow soviet began preparations for the insurrection late, and at one point in the fighting its forces inside the Kremlin agreed to a truce. This resulted in the cold-blooded massacre of some 300 red guards as they were leaving the fortress. It took another week of fierce combat to defeat the anti-soviet forces, mostly officers and officer cadets. When they learned of the fighting in Moscow, armed workers from the industrial towns of the central industrial region rushed to its aid in trains and helped to turn the tide.

The revolution in the central industrial region itself was bloodless and easy. The same is generally true of the towns of the Urals and Siberia to the east. In the non-industrial towns of Saratov and Kazan on the Volga, there were brief skirmishes, but the soviets prevailed. In some other non-industrial centers, soviet power was not clearly established until December. This was, in general, a period of considerable confusion, when the Central Soviet government’s influence was extremely weak in the provinces. But the stream of soldiers returning from the front was usually enough to crush any serious armed resistance. The SRs tried to use the army’s General Staff as a base against the soviets, but the new government was able to take it over without serious difficulty. All attempts to send troops against Petrograd from the various fronts proved fruitless. The old army soon just melted away.

In Central Asia, the main city of Tashkent became a red oasis, surrounded by hostile Cossacks and Asiatic tribesmen. In the Caucasus, the Baku soviet took power quite easily. However, the Mensheviks predominated in Georgia (the only region where they had a

peasant base), awaiting the constituent assembly. In Kiev, although the soviet decided to take power, it was defeated by nationalist forces linked to the SRs, who declared Ukraine's independence and immediately entered into contact with the German army. But the influence of their government was, in fact, restricted to the nationalist region in the west. In the more industrial and Russian-speaking east, a soviet regime took shape. Apart from the Ukraine, the Cossack regions of the Don and Kuban became anti-soviet centers in which counterrevolutionary officers, politicians, and members of the propertied classes gathered, establishing the so-called Volunteer Army that became known as the "Whites."

Nevertheless, by February 1918, the Soviet regime had extended itself into almost all these main centers of early opposition in the Ukraine and the Cossack regions. For a brief moment, Lenin thought the civil war was over and peaceful construction could begin. In fact, the civil war had barely begun.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marxism; Paris Commune, 1871; Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolutions: Sources and Contexts; Russian Civil War, 1918–1924; Russian Revolutionary Labor Upsurge, 1912–1914; Soviet Union, Fall of; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); War Communism and the Rise of the Soviet Union

References and Suggested Readings

- Carr, E. H. (2004) *The Russian Revolution: From Lenin to Stalin (1917–1929)*. New York: Palgrave.
- Carrère d'Encausse, H. (1981) *Lenin*. New York: Longman.
- Chamberlin, W. H. (1935/1965) *The Russian Revolution*, 2 vols. New York: Grosset & Dunlap.
- Deutscher, I. (1965) *The Prophet Armed, Trotsky: 1879–1921*. New York: Vintage.
- Deutscher, I. (1967) *The Unfinished Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ferro, M. (1980) *October 1917: A Social History of the Russian Revolution*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Frankel, E. R. et al. (1992) *Revolution in Russia: Reassessments of 1917*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gill, G. (1979) *Peasants and Government in the Russian Revolution*. London: Macmillan.
- Kaiser, D. (1987) *The Workers' Revolution in Russia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kochan, L. (1978) *Russia in Revolution, 1890–1918*. London: Grenada.
- Liebman, M. (1980) *Leninism under Lenin*. London: Merlin Press.
- Lih, L. (1990) *Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914–21*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mandel, D. (1984) *The Petrograd Workers and the Soviet Seizure of Power*. London: Macmillan.
- Reed, J. (1960) *Ten Days that Shook the World*. New York: Vintage.
- Serge, V. (1967) *Birth of Our Power*. New York: Doubleday.
- Shukman, H. (Ed.) (1994) *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of the Russian Revolution*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Sukhanov, N. N. (1984) *The Russian Revolution 1917: A Personal Record*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Trotsky, L. (1967) *History of the Russian Revolution*, 3 vols. London: Sphere Books.

Russia, Revolutions: sources and contexts

David Mandel

In the early part of the twentieth century Russia lived through three revolutions in the course of 12 years. The workers and peasants who made these revolutions initially conceived of their goals as a liberal (capitalist) democracy to replace the absolute monarchy and agrarian reform to distribute the vast estates of the nobility among the land-hungry peasants.

As such, the tasks of the revolution in Russia resembled those carried out by the great French Revolution of 1789–94. But the problem was that both Russia and the world were very different places in 1917 from France and its world in 1789. In the intervening 125 years capitalism had developed rapidly, creating large-scale industry and a large propertyless working class that depended on the sale of its labor to live. And although Russia lagged behind the West in these developments, it had nevertheless also undergone significant change.

Because of this, the revolution in Russia was able ultimately to win only by assuming a more radical character than that in France. It would overthrow not only the monarchy but capitalism too. The roots of this radical transformation lay deep in the country's history and social and political structures. An understanding of Russia's revolutions must begin with an analysis of the

nature of the tsarist state, its relation to the social classes that made up Russian society, and the various interests that flowed from the respective social and economic situations of these classes.

The State at the Turn of the Twentieth Century

The Russian state was an autocracy, in which all power was ultimately concentrated in the hands of the monarch, the tsar. Article I of the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire read: "The emperor of all the Russians is an autocratic and unlimited monarch. God himself commands that this supreme power be obeyed out of conscience and fear." While popular unrest in the years preceding the February Revolution of 1917 that overthrew the monarchy forced some grudging and limited concessions from Nicholas II, he remained determined until the very end to accept no significant limits to his absolute power, to answer to no one. In the very midst of the popular insurrection of February 1917 he made the following response to the British ambassador's urging that he make some concessions to the people in order to bolster his support: "Do you mean that *I* am to regain the confidence of my people or that they are to regain *my* confidence?"

Nicholas was a stubborn man of mediocre intelligence, open to the mystical and superstitious influences of his wife. He kept aloof from the profound changes that industrialization was bringing to Russian society. Cruel, with a proclivity for violent repression, he was nicknamed by the people "Nicholas the Bloody." Historian L. Kochan in *Russia in Revolution* (1978) also notes the profound racism (the Russian term is "Great-Russian chauvinism") of this ruler of a multinational empire. He nurtured a particular hatred for Jews, whom he made scapegoats for the revolutionary ferment that challenged his power, and was a patron of the proto-fascist organization the Union of Russian People (known also as the "Black Hundreds"), which the state subsidized. (It says much about present-day Russia that the Russian Church made Nicholas II a saint after the communist regime fell.)

Rural Society and Peasant Ferment

The tsarist state's main support was the landed aristocracy, whose members traditionally staffed

the higher echelons of the public administration and military. Until the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, the aristocracy, together with the state, owned all the land as well as the peasants who worked it. The emancipation was undertaken by Alexander II in part to forestall an apprehended peasant revolt. (Russia had seen four great peasant risings in previous centuries.) But another reason was Russia's recent defeat by the British and French in the Crimean War (1855–6), a defeat that was due in large part to Russia's economic backwardness: Russia still lacked railroads to bring its troops to the theater of action in the south. Serfdom came to be seen by the tsar and his officials as a brake on Russia's economic development, threatening Russia's great power status.

But since the landed aristocracy was the state's principal social base, the emancipation turned out to be a compromise that left much of the land, often the best parts, in the hands of the aristocracy (some peasants actually ended up with less land than they had farmed before the emancipation). Moreover, the peasants were saddled with debt, payment for the land the aristocracy gave up. Nor were the peasants completely free, as they were tied to their village communes and collectively responsible for taxes and the redemption payments. Rural government continued to be dominated by the local nobility, which continued to exercise vast arbitrary power over the peasants' lives.

The peasants never accepted the partial nature of the emancipation. They firmly held onto the conviction that the land belonged to those who worked it. Under feudalism (which in Russia's case resembled slavery, since serfs could be bought and sold, together with or separately from the rest of their families), the peasants had a saying: "We are yours (the nobility's), but the land is God's." The peasant communes' practice of periodic redistribution of the land according to the number of "mouths" in the households was itself, in its own manner, a rejection of private property of the land.

All the same, the emancipation reform did bring real improvement to the peasants' lives and so inaugurated several decades of relative calm in the countryside. When in the 1870s young, educated, urban revolutionaries "went to the people" to arouse it against the regime, they met little response. The passivity of the peasantry, the overwhelming majority of Russia's population (in

1897, 87.6 percent of the population was rural; in 1913, 82 percent), was one of the reasons the peasant-oriented, populist movement concentrated its efforts in this early period on terrorism, directed against hated state officials. (Alexander II himself fell to a terrorist bomb in 1881.)

However, by the 1890s, rapid population growth and the limited employment opportunities in the cities led to severe rural overpopulation, intensifying the peasants' land hunger. Together with the communal restraints on peasant freedom, the low technical level of peasant agriculture, annual redemption fees, heavy taxation of basic consumer goods, high rent for additional land, and a system of protective tariffs that kept the price of manufactured goods artificially high (all these were policies aimed at fostering rapid industrialization) created a situation in which much of the peasantry was permanently only a step away from famine, since most were too poor to lay aside reserves. The poor harvests of 1891 and 1898 caused widespread famine, during which the government, which proved incapable of organizing relief itself, reluctantly allowed the educated and well-to-do elements of urban society to organize themselves for this purpose. Other factors that contributed to the peasant awakening were rising educational levels (by 1897 half of male peasants less than 20 years of age could read) and the gradual breakdown of rural isolation due to intensive railway construction and the migration of peasant youth to the towns in search of work. This youth had never lived under serfdom and so was relatively free of the servile mentality it fostered and more open to new ideas.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the mood in the villages had clearly changed. Peasant disorders grew in number and severity, especially in the areas that suffered most from land shortage. These took the form of refusals to pay rent to the large landowners, seizures of their grain and cattle, cutting their timber, and, in extreme cases, organized armed attacks on estates, during which the manor houses were burned down and the land divided among the villagers.

It should, therefore, be obvious why the aristocracy – except for a relatively small liberal fringe that dwindled in size after its experience with the Revolution of 1905 – was the main support of the autocracy and strongly opposed to democratic change. Democracy would have given power to the peasant majority of the

population to carry out land reform, expropriating the aristocracy and terminating its social existence as the dominant class.

Russia's last great peasant uprising, the Pugachev rebellion of 1773–5, occurred just 15 years before the French Revolution. Both Russia and France at that time were overwhelmingly peasant societies and both revolts were directed against an absolute monarchy and the aristocracy upon which it rested. But the Russian uprising failed, while the French Revolution succeeded because the French peasants found allies in the cities – the bourgeoisie and the *sans-culottes* (the “small people” – artisans, small merchants, members of the liberal professions, wage-laborers). These urban classes provided the revolution with a striking force at the very heart of political power, the capital city and the other major urban centers, with a program for remaking the state and society, and with a degree of centralized organization that the peasants, scattered about the countryside, could not have achieved on their own.

In contrast, the Russian peasants that rose up in 1773–5 found no allies in the cities, because the rare cities that existed were mainly administrative centers and garrisons rather than vital centers of industry, commerce, and culture, as in Western Europe. Russia's artisanal industries were located in the villages. As late as the mid-nineteenth century, western observers were struck by the rural appearance of the towns. Without allies in the cities and a clear program for remaking the state, the Pugachev rebellion proved no match for the centralized power of the autocracy.

Urban Society and Working-Class Ferment

The political weakness of Russian urban society, due to economic backwardness, helps to explain why the absolute monarchy was able to hold on for so long in Russia. But the impetus for change came, ironically, from the state itself when it began to promote industrialization in the second half of the nineteenth century, mainly for military reasons. In doing so, it brought into existence the social force that would ultimately be its undoing. That force would not be the bourgeoisie, as in France of 1789, but a class that in 1789 had not yet existed – the working class, and in particular its industrial cohort.

Two new urban classes came into being in Russia almost simultaneously in the second half, and especially last quarter, of the nineteenth century: the bourgeoisie, owners of the large factories, mines, banks, construction, transport, and commercial enterprises; and the working class, people who owned none of those things and so to survive had to sell their labor-power to the owners of those enterprises in return for wages.

The Russian bourgeoisie was both economically and politically dependent on the autocracy and so not eager for democratic change. Because the domestic market for manufactured goods was weak, due to the poverty of the mass of the population, the industrialists' fortunes depended heavily on state policies that promoted industrialization: the state was the main source of factory orders for heavy industrial goods (especially for railway construction and armaments); it maintained high tariff barriers to protect Russian industry from foreign competition; it guaranteed foreign loans and itself subsidized Russian enterprises; its highly regressive tax policy placed the major burden of public finances on the laboring classes (the workers and peasants). And last but certainly not least, it kept wages low and the workers in line through severe repression of any attempts to organize unions or syndicalist organizations and to take collective action.

Although the bourgeoisie did not itself wield political power and did not strongly aspire to it, its members nevertheless enjoyed considerable influence with the state. Tsarist officials dominated gatherings of the industrial magnates (until the 1905 Revolution the state allowed no truly independent sociopolitical organizations), but, on the other hand, the industrialists knew they could count on a sympathetic hearing from state officials. Except for a very small liberal fringe among the textile mill owners – textiles were one of the few sectors that developed without state support in response to popular consumer demand – the bourgeoisie did not manifest any serious opposition to the autocracy, except for a very brief period during the 1905 Revolution, and even then its aim was not to overthrow the monarchy but to avoid popular revolution.

A related cause of the lack of enthusiasm for democratic change among the bourgeoisie was the militancy of Russia's workers: the employers did not relish the prospect of facing this restive class without the backing of the tsar's repressive apparatus, its police force and army. In 1913

wage-laborers employed in the various economic sectors, both urban and rural, numbered almost 18 million (not including family members) in a total population of about 159 million. The militant core of the working class, those engaged in manual trades in large-scale industry and mining, numbered 3.35 million, to which one could add the 800,000 employees of the railroads.

But these numbers do not reflect the workers' real social and political strength. From the late 1890s onward, the industrial workers showed themselves to be the most formidable opponents of the autocracy. And soon they took the lead in the struggle for democracy. Several factors account for this. In the first place, they were highly exploited – only skilled workers earned enough to be able to rent a room or an apartment and to raise a family. The rest lived together, sharing “corners” of rooms in overcrowded tenements in the cities' outskirts. At work, they put in long hours (up to 11 and even 12 hours a day, six days a week, though this was partially mitigated by the large number of public religious holidays), often in unsanitary and dangerous conditions. And they were subject to the arbitrary, degrading despotism of foremen and higher administrative personnel, including the widespread practice of fines (docking of wages for violation of rules or defective output) and even physical abuse.

At the same time, workers had no legal avenue of collective defense against their employers. Nor could they count on the state to intercede on their behalf, since the authorities, except in the most flagrant cases of abuse, took the side of the employers. Besides, in return for the state's inadequate protection (a weak labor law was introduced in 1886 in response to a particularly ferocious strike), workers were told to abandon all claim to freedom of association, including the right to form trade unions, let alone political parties.

However, misery does not of itself provoke revolt. It can just as often foster acquiescence, depending on the context. Revolt requires a sense of human dignity and the confidence that collective action can bring positive change. Writing in the 1840s about England, Friedrich Engels noted that only through struggle could English workers avoid being reduced to the state of dumb beasts. That would explain why the vanguard of the Russian labor movement, those who drew the great mass of workers behind them, were the more skilled workers, mostly

concentrated in the metalworking industry. Although often born in the countryside, these were the most urbanized contingent of the working class, having shed traditional peasant meekness along with their ties to the countryside. These workers were literate; they manifested pride in their profession; and they could aspire to half-decent living conditions. Yet they had no rights, either at work or outside of it, where they were treated as pariahs by “polite society.” For all these reasons, St. Petersburg, Russia’s capital, which had the highest concentration of large metalworking factories, became the radical center of the labor movement and the locomotive of the revolution.

The very large size of Russian factories was one of the factors that favored militant class consciousness and organization. These plants gathered together thousands, in a number of cases more than ten thousand, workers in a single site. The high level of concentration of the workforce was a result of Russia’s late industrialization, which allowed its industry to adopt the latest production methods from the West, skipping the stage of small-scale, artisan production. Another consequence of Russia’s late industrialization was that the ideological outlook of the labor movement, virtually from the start, was influenced by Marxism, a theory and worldview that crystallized the experience of a century of labor struggles in the West.

The spread of Marxist influence, thanks to the efforts of the radical intelligentsia, was facilitated by the weak hold of liberal ideology on Russian society, even on the bourgeoisie. This meant that as the official semi-feudal ideology – “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality” – lost its grip on workers’ minds, as they increasingly came up against violent state repression, Marxism encountered no competing ideology. Karl Kautsky, leading theoretician of the German Social Democratic Party and later an opponent of the October Revolution, observed that nowhere else had Marxism sunk such deep roots into the workers’ consciousness.

The concentration of industrial workers in the capital and other major urban centers, their capacity to paralyze the economy by collectively withdrawing their labor, the absence of any legal recourse for grievances, the ideological openness to the Marxist analysis of the antagonistic interests that opposed labor to capital and to the state – all this contributed to making the Russian

working class into the most formidable opponent of both the autocracy and the bourgeoisie.

One of the first displays of the workers’ political potential was the general strike of 1896–7 in the textile mills of St. Petersburg. It began in May 1896 over non-payment for the days off during the coronation of Nicholas II. But the workers’ main demand soon changed to the reduction of the workday from 13 to ten and a half hours. This strike displayed several new features: it was a concerted, disciplined action involving 20,000 workers in many mills; in each mill the workers elected strike committees and also representatives to maintain contact among the striking plants; and workers in other sectors gave financial support to the strikers. In addition, a small group of Marxist workers and intellectuals, including Lenin, were active, writing and distributing leaflets. After three weeks the strike ended in failure, but it erupted anew in January 1897, finally forcing the tsar to concede a maximum 11-and-a-half-hour working day. This was the first time that the organized pressure of any popular elements in society had forced the tsar to make concessions from his autocratic principles and directly to outside pressure from society.

The Intelligentsia

There is some dispute about the origins of the term “intelligentsia,” but the view is widespread that the expression originated in nineteenth-century Russia. Objectively, “intelligentsia” represents those drawn from various classes, occupying positions requiring advanced education or learning, members of the liberal professions, engineers, journalists, scientists and technical experts, academics, teachers, and students. But in Russia the term “intelligentsia” also included the moral concern with “accursed questions”: the fate of Russia, and a dedication to its people’s freedom and welfare.

That a large part of the intelligentsia, whose numbers increased rapidly with industrialization, opposed the autocracy is not surprising, given the latter’s reactionary, obscurantist character and its unyielding opposition to any public initiative or autonomous organization on the intelligentsia’s part. Most of its members were attracted to liberalism, which, except for a brief period in 1905, eschewed revolutionary methods of social and political change. A minority, however, adhered to various socialist currents that

looked to the revolutionary overthrow of absolutism and, in return, suffered severe persecution.

While the liberal movement remained an affair of the intelligentsia, toward the beginning of the twentieth century the socialist minority of the intelligentsia eventually established contact with the workers and peasants. The clandestine socialist parties that were formed served as schools for the eventual emergence of a worker and, to some degree, also a peasant "intelligentsia." It was during and especially after the Revolution of 1905–7 that the different socialist parties were able to establish strong, unwavering influence among the laboring classes.

The Nationalities

Russia was a multinational empire, in which ethnic Russians constituted only 44 percent of the population, according to the 1897 census. The Ukrainians, a related Slav people, made up 18 percent; the various Turkic-speaking peoples (mostly nomadic and Muslim), 11 percent; Poles, 7 percent; Byelorussians, 5 percent; Jews, 4 percent; and Finns, 2.7 percent. There were also numerous smaller ethnic groups or nationalities, as they were called in Russia. Most of these lived relatively compactly in regions on the periphery of the empire. The central part of the empire was predominantly Russian, as were most cities.

Socialists referred to the Russian empire as the "prison of peoples" because of tsarism's refusal of any measure of autonomy to the minorities and because of its policies of ethnic and religious discrimination and persecution, including enforced Russification and conversion to the Greek Orthodox religion. Since most of the national minorities, even more than the Russians, were predominantly peasants and lived a quite isolated life, the main political aspiration of their popular classes was land reform, not national autonomy or independence. The bearers of the nationalist movements were the urban intelligentsia and the petty bourgeoisie. But where class and national antagonism overlapped, for example in Latvia, where the landlords were aristocrats of German origin and the peasants Latvian, the result tended to be especially explosive. For similar reasons, the labor movement in the Polish part of the Russian empire also displayed particular militancy.

The national movements were not, in and of themselves, a major moving force in Russia's

revolutions. But the disproportionate number of members of the non-Russian minorities that belonged to the various revolutionary parties clearly shows that national oppression made a significant contribution to the revolutions. A survey conducted among students in 1910 found that 80 percent of those of Jewish origin and of the various Caucasian people (mainly Georgians and Armenians) belonged to left-wing parties.

The Political Parties

Russia's parties can roughly be divided into two groups: those that looked to revolution for democratic change, essentially the socialist parties, which drew their support from the popular classes and from the leftist minority of the intelligentsia, and the non-socialist parties, which rejected revolution (most also rejected democracy) and drew their support from the propertied classes and the majority of the intelligentsia. The clear class divide that separated the socialist and the non-socialist parties was a striking feature of Russian society. Only the intelligentsia straddled this divide, but its majority nevertheless supported the non-socialist parties and identified with the propertied classes.

Since political parties were illegal in Russia until the Revolution of 1905, the non-revolutionary parties were not formed until that year, although an informal predecessor of the main liberal party, the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), had been established clandestinely in 1902. The Kadet Party was suspended in a sociopolitical void between the basically reactionary propertied classes, on one hand, and the revolutionary laboring classes, on the other. For example, on the all-important question of land reform, it called for fair compensation of aristocratic landowners who were to be expropriated, a position that could satisfy neither the landowners, for whom the loss of their land was tantamount to social death as the dominant class, nor the peasants, who believed that all the land should be in the hands of those who worked it themselves. Only for a brief period during the 1905 Revolution did the Kadets contemplate revolutionary action as a means of obtaining democratic change.

Farther to the right were the Octobrists, named after the tsar's Manifesto of October 1905, which granted civil liberties and created a legislature with limited powers and system of representation highly skewed in favor of the propertied classes.

That was as far toward democracy as the Octobrist Party, which was close to the industrial bourgeoisie, was prepared to go, though on the eve of the world war it did temporarily refuse to support the government. On the extreme right was the Union of Russian People (Black Hundreds), a reactionary monarchist party which, as noted, enjoyed the tsar's patronage.

There were two main socialist currents, both of which looked to revolution for achieving democracy. The populists drew their main support from the peasantry, although they were also active among urban workers; the Marxists, on the other hand, had their social base almost exclusively among urban workers.

The main populist party, the Social Revolutionaries (SRs), lacked a coherent organization and ideology, but its members looked to the peasants as the leading force in a revolution to establish a democratic republic, socialize the land, making it available to the peasants according to need, and introduce the eight-hour workday. The development of collective forms of control over the rural and urban economy would eventually pave the way for socialism. However, the left (maximalist) wing of the SR Party believed that socialism should be the immediate goal of the revolution.

Besides their basically peasant orientation, the SRs were distinguished by their espousal of terrorism, mainly the assassination of odious government officials. The role of terrorism, assigned to an independent combat group within the party, was to disorganize the enemy, educate the people by undermining the regime's prestige, and defend the party against its enemies. At the height of the Revolution of 1905, between November 1905 and October 1906, a total of 3,611 government officials of various ranks were killed or wounded, many, if not most, at the hands of SRs. Several attempts were made on the life of the hated prime minister, Peter Stolypin, responsible for the vicious suppression of that revolution, until he was finally killed in 1911.

Russia's social democrats, who sought their base in the urban working class, envisioned the coming revolution as liberal democratic, not socialist. As Marxists, they believed socialism was impossible in a poor country, since egalitarianism in the context of generalized poverty would inevitably reproduce the inequality in new forms. Moreover, workers, the class that was objectively interested in collective management of the economy (because they had no property of

their own to defend), constituted only a minority of the society. As for the peasants, despite collectivistic village traditions, they aspired to individual working of the land, if not outright private ownership.

Despite their shared orientation, the social democrats split early on into two factions and eventually parties, the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. The initial division occurred at the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party in 1903, ostensibly over organizational differences. But as often occurs in political life, the true nature of the split, which was over revolutionary strategy, became clear only later, after the defeat of the Revolution of 1905. Despite a widely held misconception among historians, the organizational differences that separated Mensheviks and Bolsheviks were not serious. The widespread image of the Bolsheviks as a highly disciplined organization of mostly intellectual, professional (full-time) revolutionaries does not correspond to historical reality. It is true that in conditions of harsh repression, when a party activist could expect to remain free for only a few months before being arrested, the party emphasized conspiracy and discipline, and membership was limited to dedicated revolutionaries – though most of these were workers. But in the periods of relative freedom opened by the revolutionary struggle (1905–7, 1912–14, and 1917), the party functioned in an open, democratic manner with much room for debate and local initiative, certainly no less so than did the Mensheviks. Rather than an elitist group of professional revolutionaries, the Bolshevik Party before the October Revolution should be viewed as an integral part of the working class. That was its real source of strength.

Although Russia gave the world two leading anarchist figures (both aristocrats), Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin, anarchism, which is characterized by deep mistrust of the state in any form and by the rejection of party organization and electoral activity in favor of direct action, especially the general strike and insurrection, found only limited support among industrial workers. It was rather more successful among sailors and peasants, especially during the Civil War of 1918–21.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Russia; Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1814–1876); Bolsheviks; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; French Revolution,

1789–1794; Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Kropotkin, Peter (1842–1921); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marxism; Pugachev's Rebellion, 1773–1775; Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russian Civil War, 1918–1924; Russian Revolutionary Labor Upsurge, 1912–1914; Soviet Union, Fall of; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); War Communism and the Rise of the Soviet Union

References and Suggested Readings

- Haimson, L. (1955) *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kochan, L. (1978) *Russia in Revolution, 1890–1918*. London: Grenada.
- Manning, R. (1982) *The Crisis of the Old Order in Russia: Gentry and Government*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Shukman, H. (Ed.) (1994) *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of the Russian Revolution*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wood, A. (2003) *The Origins of the Russian Revolution 1861–1917*. New York: Routledge.

Russia, temperance movement, 1858–1860

Yury V. Bosin

Before 1712, the Russian alcohol market operated under state monopoly for the benefit of large agricultural interests. Peter the Great annulled the state monopoly and alcohol concessions became an exclusive mechanism of alcohol supply and retail for more than 150 years to 1863.

Every four years, the government arranged alcohol auctions. Concessionaires bid for the rights to retail alcohol, charging the price that not only covered their investment but also made them a quick fortune. Economically, concessions were very effective, contributing to almost 40 percent of the Russian budget. For consumers, the concession system was a burden and meant economic hardship. Vodka, consumed more than any other alcohol product, was considered out of the price range of average peasants, and in many cases it was adulterated. Despite the rise in prices and concern as to its authenticity, liquor retailing was ubiquitous and taverns mushroomed, reaching 77,386 by 1860. Alcoholism plagued Russia, causing massive poverty and degradation.

The Crimean War from 1853 to 1856 depleted Russian finances and in order to raise

revenues, the government increased the auction price of alcohol by 40 million rubles. In a chain reaction, concessionaires raised retail prices by nearly three times – from 3.5 rubles to 8 to 10 rubles for a bucket of vodka. In turn, mass anger led to the formation of the temperance movement. The movement emerged in Russia's western provinces as entire villages ruled to abstain from drinking while picketing liquor establishments. By 1859, temperance committees spread across 32 Russian provinces.

As alcohol sales plummeted, retail prices dropped to 0.5 rubles a bucket, and in some localities retailers offered vodka free. But protests nonetheless gained momentum as 220 drinking shops were destroyed during the summer of 1859. The government arrested 780 people in an attempt to prevent the movement from expanding. However, because of widespread opposition, it was forced to replace its alcohol concessions with an excise tax on January 1, 1863.

SEE ALSO: Bulavin's Rebellion, 1707–1708; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Pugachev's Rebellion, 1773–1775

References and Suggested Readings

- Avrich, P. (1976) *Russian Rebels, 1600–1800: Four Great Rebellions Which Shook the Russian State in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Bazilevich, K. V. (1936) *Urban Uprisings in Moscow State in the 17th Century*. Moscow and Leningrad (in Russian).
- Bogoiavlensky, S. K. (1941) *Khovansky's Rebellion in Historical Notes*, Vol. 10. Moscow (in Russian).
- Buganov, V. I. (1964) *Moscow Riot of 1662*. Moscow (in Russian).
- Buganov, V. I. (1986) *Moscow Chronicles: Popular Uprisings in the 11th–18th Centuries*. Moscow (in Russian).
- Field, C. (1947) *The Great Cossack: The Rebellion of Sten'ka Razin against Alexis Michaelovitch, Tsar of all the Russias*. London: H. Jenkins.
- Fyodorov, V. A. (1962) *The Peasants' Temperance Movement of 1858–61 in the Revolutionary Situation in Russia in 1959–1961*. Moscow (in Russian).
- Gessen, S. Y. (1932) *Cholera Riots (1830–2)*. Moscow (in Russian).
- Gessen, S. Y. (1961–70) *The Peasants' War in Russia in 1773–1775: Pugachev's Rebellion*, Vols. 1–3. Leningrad (in Russian).
- Lebedev, V. I. (1955) *S. T. Razin's Rebellion (1667–1671)*. Moscow (in Russian).
- Peasants' Wars in Russia in the 17th–18th Centuries* (1966) Moscow and Leningrad (in Russian).

- Pod'yapolskaya, E. P. (1962) *Bulavin's Rebellion of 1707–1706*. Moscow (in Russian).
- McGrew, R. E. (1965) *Russia and the Cholera: 1823–1832*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Smirnov, I. I. (1951) *Bolotnikov's Rebellion of 1606–1607*. Moscow (in Russian).
- Tikhomirov, M. N. (1955) *Peasant and Urban Riots in Russia in the 11th–13th Centuries*. Moscow (in Russian).

Russian Civil War, 1918–1924

David Mandel

A Bolshevik Government or an All-Socialist Coalition?

Historians often attribute the formation of a one-party regime after the October Revolution to the Bolsheviks' thirst for power. But an examination of the actual developments shows that this is another case of reading history backwards. The Soviet state did eventually come to be ruled by a one-party regime. But does that prove that the Bolsheviks began with that intention?

The workers welcomed the October Revolution overwhelmingly positively with a mixture of relief and hope. However, among the left-leaning intelligentsia – technical and administrative employees (in the private and public sectors), journalists, engineers, a large part of the teachers and students – who mostly supported the moderate socialists, there was considerable opposition to the soviets' seizure of power. A Menshevik-Internationalist (left Menshevik – the Mensheviks were the moderate wing of Russian Marxism) observer noted that “until recently, the predominant type of *intelligent* was the *intelligent*-populist, sighing sympathetically over the lot of our ‘smaller brethren.’ Now, alas, this is an anachronism. In his place appears the malevolent *intelligent*, hostile to the muzhik [peasant], the workers, the entire benighted toiling mass. . . . And it is neither the excesses of the October Days nor the madness of Bolshevism that have caused this. The leave-taking of the intelligentsia began long ago, almost on the morrow of the [February] Revolution.”


Among workers themselves, the most serious opposition came from the executive committee of the Railroad Union, where Menshevik-

Internationalists held the majority. The railway union leadership demanded the formation of a “homogeneous socialist government,” that is, a coalition of all the socialist parties. It backed up the demand on October 28 with a strike threat. The left Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs – a peasant-oriented, populist party) also supported this demand and threatened to follow the Menshevik-Internationalists in boycotting the new Central Executive Committee (CEC) of Soviets, elected at the Second Congress of Soviets on October 25, 1917. (The Julian calendar, used in Russia until January 21, 1918, was 13 days behind the Gregorian calendar, in use in most other countries.)

The mass of workers, their organizations (the Central Soviet of Factory Committees, the Petrograd soviet, the Trade Union Council – all led by Bolsheviks) and also a majority of the Bolshevik Party leadership itself also favored the formation of a coalition government of the socialist parties. Everyone recognized the danger of isolation of the workers from the soldiers and peasantry, who mostly supported Bolshevik positions but not necessarily the Bolshevik Party itself. But the danger of isolation of the masses from the left intelligentsia also loomed large. Workers understood that they sorely needed the help of educated elements of society to run the state and the economy effectively. Fear of isolation was a dominant theme of speakers at the conferences of workers' organizations both before and after October. Finally, socialist unity was seen as a guarantee against civil war among the popular classes themselves.

On the question of a socialist coalition government, Lenin and Trotsky found themselves in a minority within their own party's Central Committee. They argued that the presence of the moderate socialists, who continued to insist on the inclusion of liberals in the government, would only paralyze the government at a time when decisive action was most needed. But almost everyone else wanted a socialist coalition government.

The problem was, however, that the basis for such a coalition was lacking. The Bolsheviks and the vast majority of workers were adamant that the government be responsible solely to the Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies that had voted to take power in October. The Menshevik-Internationalists, for their part, rejected this, arguing that a government responsible only to the soviets was too narrow a political



During the Russian Civil War (1918–24), the Red Army successfully defended the newly formed Bolshevik government against interventionist anti-Bolshevik forces. Images and texts from that era often cast the revolutionary struggle in terms of good and evil. This portrait from 1919 entitled “The Struggle of the Red Knight against the Dark Force” explicitly refers to the “dark forces” that commonly denote devils and other evil spirits in Russian folklore. (David King Collection)

base for the revolutionary government. (It was not too clear whom else they wanted to include, as the Congress represented the workers, soldiers, and eventually peasants.)

As for the moderate socialists, they wanted nothing less than to annul the October insurrection that had transferred power from the provisional government, a coalition of liberals and moderate socialists, to the soviets. They demanded a government responsible to a revamped version of the “pre-parliament,” that is, an unrepresentative assembly that had been convened in September 1917 by the provisional government to avoid calling the constituent assembly and that included liberals, representatives of the propertied classes. Meanwhile, representatives of the newly elected CEC of Soviets, in which the Bolsheviks held a majority, would be only a

minority in their proposed coalition government. They also demanded the liberation of the ministers of the provisional government and the cadet officers who had fought against the soviet forces in the October insurrection, the reopening of the bourgeois press that had been closed for subversion after October (following the earlier example of the provisional government, which had closed the left socialist press), and that the capital’s armed forces be placed under command of Petrograd’s municipal government.

When these unbridgeable differences finally became clear in the course of the negotiations sponsored by the Railroad Union, support for a “homogeneous socialist government” within the Bolshevik Party and among the workers evaporated. This was further aided by the fact that the threat to Petrograd from General Krasnov’s troops and the fighting between soviet and bourgeois forces in Moscow had ended in victory for the soviets, alleviating fears of civil war. Nevertheless, a minority of the Bolshevik Central Committee, including some members of the new government, resigned in protest over the termination of the negotiations.

The left SRs, on the other hand, realized, as one of their leaders stated, that “even if we had achieved a ‘homogeneous government,’ it would really have been a coalition with the most radical part of the bourgeoisie [he meant the moderate socialists]. . . . Once both sides realized their error – and the defensists [moderate socialists] realized it first, adopting from the start an irreconcilable position – any agreement fell away of its own.”

The Menshevik-Internationalists also dropped their boycott of the CEC, though they still refused to participate in a government responsible solely to the soviets. But in early December the left SRs decided to enter a coalition soviet government with the Bolsheviks, occupying the posts of Commissars for Agriculture, Justice, and Post and Telegraph. This was preceded by an Extraordinary Congress of Peasant Deputies (“extraordinary” because not all peasant soviets had sent delegates) on November 10–25. Against the wishes of the outgoing Peasant Executive Committee, the delegates to the congress had been elected from the district level and so reflected more faithfully the mood in the villages, as opposed to delegates who would have been elected by provincial assemblies. As a result this congress had many more ordinary, poorer peasant delegates than the

previous one in May 1917, which had been dominated by better-off peasants and SR intellectuals. One hundred and ten of the 255 delegates were left SRs; the moderate SRs had 50 delegates, the Bolsheviks 55, and 40 delegates had no party affiliation. The moderate SRs just walked out of the congress almost as soon as it opened.

On November 15, 1917, the Peasant Congress endorsed the platform of the Second Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (of October 25–6) and decided to merge its newly elected Executive Committee with the CEC of the Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Accompanied by an honor guard and an orchestra, the peasant deputies marched en masse to the Smolnyi Institute for a joint session with the workers' and soldiers' CEC. "The atmosphere was exalted, joyous," wrote the left SR paper. The workers, who feared political isolation and the danger of civil war, greeted this union with enthusiasm and relief. The Second Peasant Congress in December, with full representation of the villages, later confirmed the decisions of this extraordinary congress.

This was unity from below of the workers and peasants. Missing were the vast majority of the left-leaning intelligentsia. "At the moment when the old bourgeois chains of the state are being smashed by the people," wrote a left SR member of the Central Soviet of Factory Committees, "we see that the intelligentsia is deserting it. People who have had the good fortune to receive a scientific education are abandoning the toiling people who carried them on their exhausted, lacerated shoulders. As if that were not enough, in departing, they are mocking the people's helplessness, its illiteracy, its inability to carry out painlessly the great transformations." Some of the intelligentsia, left-leaning and otherwise, that opposed the October Revolution would eventually return to serve the Soviet regime – there would be little alternative, save emigration. But when they did, it was cap in hand, as they had abandoned the people in their time of greatest need.

The Constituent Assembly

Russian society after October thus irretrievably split, with the popular classes, who supported soviet power, a government of the toiling classes, on one side, and the propertied classes (bourgeoisie, aristocracy, and the intelligentsia sym-

pathetic to them), who wanted to impose their own dictatorship on the toiling classes, on the other. The February Revolution had briefly papered over these class divisions, which had very deep roots in Russia's social structure and history. It had taken a mere eight months for the social contradictions to manifest themselves again with all their force, paving the way for the October Revolution. In the popular mind the October Revolution was seen as an act of defense of the goals of the February Revolution, which were essentially liberal democratic and not socialist. This act of defense was now directed, however, against the propertied classes and the liberals (political representatives of the propertied classes) who had amply demonstrated their hostility to those goals in the intervening months. A constituent assembly, elected by equal and universal suffrage and assigned the task of proclaiming a democratic republic, had always been a central element of the popular conception of the revolution. Its repeated postponement by the provisional government was seen by the people as yet another indication of its counterrevolutionary nature. The soviet government organized the elections as scheduled on November 12–14, 1917. The Bolsheviks won 24 percent of the vote, mostly from the workers as well as from soldiers in the urban garrisons and at the fronts nearest to the capital, where they had been in contact with workers. Forty-one percent of the vote went to the SRs. In fact, if one includes the various related national parties, the SRs obtained an absolute majority. The Mensheviks, a strictly urban party, were reduced to only 3 percent of the vote, much of it from Georgia, the only region where they had peasant support. The Kadets (Constitutional Democrats – liberals, the main party of the propertied classes) and parties further to the right obtained only slightly over 8 percent, mostly from Moscow and Petrograd, where they were greatly outdistanced by the Bolsheviks.

The election results showed that most of the peasants remained loyal to their traditional party, the SRs, despite the fact that the party's leaders, who had participated in the provisional government, had refused to carry out land reform, the central element of the party's program, nor had they sought peace or held the promised elections to the constituent assembly. Because of their isolated way of life and their contradictory aspirations (at once egalitarian but also favoring

individual farming and the free market), peasants have generally had great difficulty orienting themselves in national politics.

At the same time, it should be noted that most peasants in November 1917 supported the positions espoused by the left SRs, as shown by the Extraordinary Peasant Congress. Already in August 1917, 40 percent of the delegates to the SR Party Congress were supporters of the left wing. But since the left SRs had decided only in the fall to split from the moderates, it was too late for them to run a separate slate in the constituent assembly elections. And the leaders of the SR Party, in putting together the still united list, did not respect the relative weight of the two wings. The peasants were therefore unable to clearly express their preference for the SRs who supported soviet power as opposed to those who wanted to restore a coalition government with liberals. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that at least half and probably considerably more of the votes cast for the SR list of candidates were, in fact, intended for its left wing.

The Bolsheviks and the left SRs, the two parties supporting soviet power, together won a majority of votes to the constituent assembly. Ignoring this fact, historians consistently exaggerate the strength of the moderates in the constituent assembly, whose dispersal by the soviet government is widely considered the regime's original sin. The decision to disperse the assembly was taken because the majority of deputies were moderate socialists opposed to a government responsible to the soviets and who wanted to restore a coalition government with liberal participation.

In practice, this meant annulment of the October Revolution, something neither the Bolsheviks nor the workers were prepared to contemplate. The workers had taken part in the elections to the constituent assembly, a longstanding demand of the Russian labor movement, with a view to obtaining its confirmation of soviet power, a sort of all-class approval of a government exclusively of the toiling classes. (The constituent assembly was elected by universal suffrage, while the propertied classes had no representation in the soviets.) The following resolution of a meeting of the workers of the Treugol'nik Rubber Factory, adopted before the constituent assembly convened, reflected the thinking of the vast majority of workers: "The constituent assembly must be one that expresses

the genuine will of the toiling masses, and the only guarantee of that and of the defense of all the gains of the revolution is the preservation and further consolidation of the workers', soldiers' and peasants' power. And, therefore: Long live the power of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies!" As for the peasants, they had already put into practice the Soviet Congress's Decree on Land. One can, therefore, assume that they shared the workers' position, as later events would confirm.

When it became clear that the constituent assembly would not endorse soviet power, most popular support for it evaporated. The Bolshevik and left SR press openly stated that the assembly would be shut down if it opposed soviet power. The SRs and some dissident Mensheviks tried to organize demonstrations in its support, but the response was quite weak, both in the cities and in the countryside. The Menshevik-Internationalist newspaper remarked that there were few workers in the January 5 demonstration for the constituent assembly in Petrograd, although many students and white-collar employees took part.

The popular reaction to the dissolution of the constituent assembly was likewise weak. But even though the Kadets and SRs had repeatedly postponed elections to the constituent assembly when they were in power after the February Revolution, that did not prevent them from subsequently making it their rallying cry for armed struggle against soviet power. The Menshevik Party, in which the left (internationalist) wing dominated after the October Revolution, decided to end its boycott of the CEC of Soviets. But it still refused to participate in the soviet government and, like the SRs, demanded that the constituent assembly be reconvened and that it replace the soviets as the basis of the government.

Was the constituent assembly a viable alternative to soviet power? Many historians argue that the constituent assembly was Russia's last chance for democracy and to avoid civil war. But to defend that position is to entrust the constituent assembly with some sort of magical powers to heal profound class divisions in Russian society, divisions that did not begin with the October Revolution or with the dispersal of the constituent assembly, but which were, in fact, the underlying cause of those events and also of the failure to form an all-socialist coalition government.

And the class antagonisms would only deepen. Workers were deeply embittered by strikes that state, municipal, bank employees, even doctors and teachers organized against soviet power on the morrow of the October Revolution. They had never struck under the tsarist regime. Then on January 1, 1918, a car in which Lenin was riding was fired upon. This led to calls for red terror against the opponents of the soviet regime. The Kadet Party was banned, and its leaders made subject to arrest. The January 5 demonstration in support of the constituent assembly resulted in 21 dead, mostly among the demonstrators, who were fired upon by red guards. In the thickening atmosphere of mutual class hatred, there was little room for a government of the “center” that could reunite society around some kind of compromise policy. During the civil war that raged from the spring of 1918 to the spring of 1921, the moderate SRs were nowhere able to establish liberal democratic regimes in those areas where they took power. Instead, their governments unleashed terror against the pro-soviet elements of the population.

Those who argue that the constituent assembly represented a real alternative to soviet power and civil war note that during its one day of deliberations, the assembly adopted a decree on land reform similar to that of the Soviet Congress and that it approved the ceasefire negotiated by the soviet government. These were policies that the mass of the population supported. But this begs the question as to why the moderate socialists had refused to do this when they held power in the provisional government. The reason they did it now was clearly the October Revolution: the soviet government was now breathing down their necks. Without that threat, their insistence on accommodation with the liberals would have continued to paralyze their capacity to respond to the popular will.

The real, not imagined, alternative to a soviet government was not the constituent assembly but right-wing dictatorship based on the propertied classes. Such a regime would have wreaked a terrible vengeance on the slaves and drudges who had dared to rise up against their masters, as history has regularly demonstrated. Russian workers and peasants did not have far to look to see what the alternative to soviet power would be. In neighboring Finland, whose independence from Russia the soviet government recognized on December 5, 1918, a workers’ and peasants’

soviet revolution was crushed with the aid of German troops in April 1918. This was followed by massive, brutal repression of the popular classes. When the city of Tampere fell, the majority of the captured 11,000 red guards were executed on the spot; 80,000 workers and peasants, including women and children, were interned in concentrations camps. Of these, 12,000 died of starvation and typhus, not counting those executed. The rest were eventually freed conditionally. (To put these figures in perspective, it should be noted that Finland at the time had a population of less than three million.)

“The alternative to Bolshevism, had it failed to survive the ordeal of civil war,” wrote the American historian W. Chamberlin in his classic work *The Russian Revolution* (1935), “would not have been Chernov [leader of the SRs] opening a Constituent Assembly, elected according to the most modern rules of equal suffrage and proportional representation, but a military dictator, a Kolchak or Denikin, riding into Moscow on a white horse to the accompaniment of the clanging of the bells of the old capital’s hundreds of churches.”

The “Obscene Peace” of Brest-Litovsk

Following the dissolution of the constituent assembly, the central issue was peace. Despite repeated soviet offers for peace talks, the only reaction from the Entente was US President Wilson’s “Fourteen Points.” Coming only on the heels of the October Revolution, they were clearly intended to counteract its anti-imperialist appeal. (Wilson’s points were largely ignored after the war when the victorious allies imposed a punitive victors’ peace and made good their secret imperialist treaties.) On the other hand, the Central Powers agreed readily to a ceasefire and accepted soviet conditions not to transfer troops from the east to the western front and to allow fraternization among their respective troops. These soviet conditions reflected the Bolsheviks’ concern to show that they were not seeking a separate peace, which would have objectively been siding with German imperialism against the Entente.

The soviet government’s goal was to win time to allow the revolutionary situation to ripen in the West. The Bolsheviks remained convinced that the fate of their revolution depended on

that international support. The soviet government devoted significant resources to revolutionary propaganda, opening a special department to train propagandists from among the prisoners of war and publishing papers in all the languages of the Central Powers. Immediately upon signing the ceasefire, Trotsky, commissar of foreign affairs, issued an appeal “to the toiling, oppressed, and exhausted peoples of Europe,” in which he explained the soviet government’s goals and summoned them to rise up against their governments: “The workers and soldiers must wrest the business of peace from the criminal hands of the bourgeoisie. . . . We have the right to demand this of you, because this is what we have done in our own country.”

Meanwhile, Germany pressed for the peace talks to begin. These took place in the border town of Brest-Litovsk. The soviets dragged them out, using them as a platform for international revolutionary propaganda. That propaganda fell on fertile ground, especially in Germany and Austria, where the mood of the workers was turning increasingly radical. The Central Powers themselves gave a boost to the soviet efforts when they demanded, as the price for peace, their annexation or quasi-annexation of Russia’s Baltic territories from Finland to Lithuania, as well as the Russian part of Poland, the Ukraine and the Caucasus, and three billion rubles in war reparations.

News of these imperialist demands set off a wave of mass political strikes in the industrial regions of Austria in January 1918, spreading as far as Budapest and provoking mutinies in the fleet. At mass meetings imbued with genuine revolutionary fervor and solidarity with the Russian Revolution, the workers elected their first councils on the soviet model. They sent a delegation to their government, which was in the process of bringing troops from the Russian front to put down the strikes, and obtained a false pledge not to make territorial demands and to recognize the right of peoples to self-determination. Despite heated resistance from the rank-and-file workers, the Austrian social democratic leaders decided to call off the strike rather than to test its revolutionary potential.

Encouraged by the Austrians, German workers began a wave of strikes at the end of January that soon engulfed the entire country, involving over a million people. In Berlin, 400,000 took part in a general strike led by revolutionary

shop stewards in the name of “workers’ councils.” They demanded peace without annexations and democracy for Germany. The government responded by declaring martial law, closing down the trade unions, and making mass arrests. The strike lasted a whole week, but as in Austria, the troops were not yet ready to come over to the side of workers, and the leaders of the Social Democratic Party were anything but revolutionary. Indeed, they were staunch supporters of the war. As in Austria, the German revolution would break out only ten months later, and the social democratic leadership would do everything in its power, including sending proto-fascist troops to repress the workers and their councils, to keep the revolution within bounds acceptable to the propertied classes.

France had already witnessed mutinies and political strikes in 1917. In December, the left wing became a majority in the Socialist Party and withdrew its ministers from the war cabinet. In January 1918, responding to the soviet appeal to French, British, and Italian workers, a general strike erupted in Lyons, spread to the factories of Saint-Etienne and the Loire, and finally reached Paris. A conference of workers’ councils demanded immediate peace “without victors or vanquished.” But the revolutionary potential of the French workers’ movement would only manifest itself once the war ended. The same was true of Italy, where the impact of the October Revolution was strongest of all the countries at war. The response to the October Revolution was generally weaker in the Anglo-Saxon countries, but nevertheless very tangible.

The protest movement in the countries of the Central Powers greatly encouraged the soviets. But when the Germans presented an ultimatum, threatening to launch a military offensive, the soviet government finally had to take a decision. Except for sailors and some strongly pro-Bolshevik Latvian troops, the old army was useless and fast melting away. The workers, as opposed to the soldiers, were more prepared to fight, but their untrained and poorly armed red guards did not count for much against the seasoned German army.

Lenin favored acceptance of the German terms. He argued that the soviets had done everything they possibly could to accelerate the outbreak of revolution in the West. That revolution would surely come, but no one could predict when. The peace that Germany was offering was indeed “obscene,” but the soviet government was not

signing it willingly – the Germans were holding a knife to the throat of the revolution. The soviets had proved their internationalist commitment and they would continue to fulfill it after the peace treaty was signed. It would contribute nothing to sacrifice the Russian foothold of the world revolution on the altar of an abstract principle. The working classes in the West would understand.

But Lenin again found himself in a minority in his party's Central Committee. The majority continued to see a separate peace as a betrayal of internationalist principles as well as of the revolutions in the Baltic region, Finland, and the Ukraine, which the Germans would certainly crush. They called for a revolutionary war against the German imperialists. The Petrograd Bolshevik organization also supported this position. In the end, a compromise, proposed by Trotsky, was adopted. Trotsky agreed with Lenin that Russia simply did not have the forces to wage war with Germany. Instead he proposed that the soviets unilaterally declare the war ended, allowing the Germans to launch their offensive. The hope was that this criminal act would finally provoke revolutions in the Central countries.

But the revolutions did not begin. Meanwhile, the Germans had hardened their demands, and their offensive, launched on February 17, 1918, met with little resistance and soon threatened Petrograd itself. (The capital was hastily transferred to Moscow.) This immediate threat brought the majority of the Central Committee around to accepting a separate peace. (Trotsky himself abstained.) This position was ratified at the Fourth Congress of Soviets on March 15 by a vote of 784 to 261 (115 abstentions). Lenin told the Congress that the treaty was only a “breathing space,” a temporary respite that would allow the revolution to consolidate itself in Russia while the revolution in the West matured.

The Mensheviks and the left SRs opposed the peace treaty. The left SRs resigned from the government, leaving the Bolsheviks again as the sole governing party. The left SRs remained active, however, in the CEC of Soviets and in various governmental bodies, including the Red Army and the Cheka, the All-Russian Commission for Struggle Against Counterrevolution and Sabotage (the political police). The left SR position was not, however, supported by the mass of peasants and it cost them much support in the villages. M. Natanson, one of the left SR leaders, told a party congress in April 1918 that

the opposition to the peace and the resignation from the government had been nothing more than a “beautiful pose” and were “deeply wrong” policies. “The people wanted to save at least something, so that they could begin to realize the gains of the revolution in that part of Russia.”

Nationalization of Industry and the “Food Dictatorship”

The Bolsheviks, like the workers, had shifted between February and October 1917 from their initial conception of the revolution as liberal democratic to the idea of soviet power, a government from which the propertied classes were excluded. But the economic program of October Revolution was not clear. While it was hoped that the October Revolution would spark socialist revolutions in the developed West, it was also recognized that Russia, still a quite backward, mostly peasant society, lacked the conditions for a collectivist, democratically managed, socialist economy.

For the interim, Lenin proposed what he termed “state capitalism.” By this he meant the establishment of state regulation of the economy, which would remain capitalist. This kind of state regulation of the economy was being practiced by all the warring countries. The difference in Russia would be that a workers’ and peasants’ government would be doing the regulating in the interests of the people, not the bourgeoisie.

A key concern was to prevent the bourgeoisie from sabotaging the economy or simply fleeing with its capital. The Decree on Workers’ Control went to meet this concern by extending the rights of the workers’ committees to intervene in management, but not calling to remove the private administrations or nationalize the factories. The banks, a key lever for economic control, were, however, nationalized at the end of 1917. The government also repudiated the foreign debt contracted by the previous governments. Private ownership of large houses was abolished, as was payment of dividends, transactions involving stocks, and private ownership of gold.

But pressure for more radical measures was coming from the workers themselves, desperate to save their jobs and livelihoods. As supply problems grew worse – by the start of 1918, only half of Russia’s locomotives were still functioning – and the owners increasingly lost interest in running their factories, the workers

pressured their factory committees to take over management completely. The committees, realizing the enormity of the problems they faced, in turn pressured the government to nationalize the enterprises. Already in January 1918, the soviet of the town of Shuya in the central industrial region, which had been desperately struggling to keep its textile mills open, demanded nationalization of the textile industry. The Petrograd Conference of Factory Committees also demanded nationalization of industry.

By the time the Decree on Nationalization was issued in June 1918, many factories had already passed into state hands as a result of their abandonment by the owners. But the greater part of Russian industry was already no longer functioning. The number of employed industrial workers in Petrograd in September 1918 had been reduced to less than a third of that at the start of 1917. At the same time, because of the desperate shortage of fuel and raw materials and the priority of supplying the Red Army with the little that was still being produced, management of industry became increasingly centralized in the hands of central state economic organs, pushing aside the factory committees with their local perspectives.

Meanwhile, the food shortage became critical in the spring and summer of 1918, directly threatening the survival of the soviet regime, which was entering its worst crisis of the civil war. Hunger fostered opposition even among the workers. Just how desperate the situation had become can be judged by Lenin's telegram of May 11, addressed to all soviets and food committees, pleading and demanding they send food at once to save the "red capital . . . on the verge of perishing." And matters only grew worse in the course of the summer. But the poor peasants – 10.5 million households out of 15 million – were also hit hard, since they were net consumers of grain. They had received land, though not always enough. Moreover, they lacked the resources – seed, horses, inventory – to work it, and the state, though it tried, was unable to supply what was needed. But an even more urgent problem was that of feeding the Red Army, then in the process of formation.

The grain problem had several sources: the breakdown of transport; the equalization of land holdings (the soviet government did not enforce the Bolsheviks' idea of creating large state farms on part of the confiscated estates), which reduced

the amount of grain produced for the market; and the preference of the better-off peasants for selling their grain at speculative, free market prices rather than delivering it to the state at lower fixed prices.

Formally, a state grain monopoly had already been established in March 1917 by the liberal provisional government with the support of the moderate socialists and of the rural cooperatives that they dominated. This meant, in principle, the prohibition of free trade in grain, which had to be sold to the state at fixed prices. But the government, under pressure from the merchants and wealthier farmers, had been unable or unwilling to put the monopoly into effect. Now, the Mensheviks, SRs, and the cooperatives were attacking the soviet government for its efforts to impose this same monopoly. They called for a return to free trade. This demand was supported by the wealthy and middle peasants, who were often able to abolish or circumvent the grain monopoly in their villages and regions. But the government felt it had no choice but to enforce the monopoly centrally and to apply as much force as it could to make it respected. To this end, it organized armed detachments of workers and committees of the peasant poor to seize the surplus from the wealthier peasants. This, in effect, unleashed class war in the villages, with all the accompanying cruelty and excesses on both sides, provoking localized peasant risings.

Like the nationalization of industry, historians often attribute the Bolsheviks' grain policy to ideological fanaticism. There was undoubtedly much that was not well thought out in the soviet grain policy. But these historians pass much too lightly over the utterly desperate circumstances of a very large part of Russia's population and of the government itself, which faced an extreme military emergency and the collapse of industry and transport. They also forget that the last provisional government, which had been anything but Marxist, had itself attempted to use the army to enforce the grain monopoly and that the democratically elected Soviet and Food Committee Congress in early 1918 also demanded enforcement of the grain monopoly. Moreover, it is not clear what the alternative might have been. In villages and districts where the local soviets allowed free trade, the supply of grain did not increase. But wealthy peasants who had surpluses were in a position to dictate their will to the soviets and even to disperse those they did not like.

The left SRs did not oppose the grain monopoly as such, but criticized the centralization and the use of force to extract the grain. They argued that it should be left to the local rural soviets to fight the kulaks, though the local soviets could ask for help from the center. The problem was that in conditions of famine, the kulaks, with a surplus of grain, were often able to control the local soviets, pushing aside the poor peasants and abolishing the food monopoly. In this they were usually supported by the middle peasants, who in the net grain-consuming regions produced little surplus themselves but still had enough means to engage in lucrative private trade in grain. Eventually, the Bolsheviks themselves, in an effort to attract the middle peasants, relaxed their policy, disbanding the “committees of the poor,” raising the state purchasing price, and increasing the amount of grain that producers were allowed to keep. But the centralized, coercive grain monopoly remained in effect until the end of the civil war.

The centralized management of nationalized industry and the abolition of the free market in grain, and eventually in all basic consumer goods, along with the spread of rationing and the fall into disuse of money, were all part of what was given the name of “war communism” after the civil war. These measures, at least in the extreme form they took, had not figured in the Bolshevik program in October. They were first and foremost practical responses to the collapse of industry, famine, and the military threat. It is doubtful that they would have been undertaken had full-scale civil war not erupted in the spring of 1918 and raged on for almost three more desperate years. This is supported by the fact that the government returned to something resembling its initial idea of “state capitalism” – a mixed economy with the state retaining the controlling levers – as soon as the civil war ended.

Nevertheless, many historians have insisted that “war communism” was driven by the Bolsheviks’ ideology. There is no evidence – and much to the contrary – to indicate that the Bolshevik leaders saw these measures, based on mass coercion and absolute scarcity, as “building socialism.” At most one can say that they made a virtue out of necessity, presenting the measures as necessary elements of a revolutionary struggle and that they expressed no regret about them. The Bolsheviks’ actions were also influenced by the hope, which had a basis in reality in 1918–20, that revolutions

in the West would come quickly, allowing the Russian Revolution to resolve its contradictions. That this international factor influenced the thinking of socialists is supported by the impact that the revolutions in Germany and Austro-Hungary in the fall of 1918 had on Menshevik policy, when the party changed its attitude to soviet power, recognizing it “as a fact of reality” and dropping the call for a constituent assembly.

Foreign Intervention

Until the spring of 1918, the soviets’ armed forces, weak though they were, had been capable of dealing with the hostile domestic forces arrayed against them. As for the German troops, they seemed satisfied with the vast territories already under their control and showed no inclination to move against the soviet government.

All this changed with the intervention of the Entente at the end of May. This took the form of 30,000 Czechoslovak troops, formerly Russian prisoners of war (the territory of the future Czechoslovakia was part of the Austro-Hungarian empire), who were making their way by rail across Russia toward the Pacific Ocean, from there to join the Entente armies fighting in France. The SRs, who had been planning an armed uprising against the soviets, were looking to just such an outside force to crystallize domestic opposition. They had been in contact with the Czechoslovak officers for this purpose. The soviet government’s attempt to disarm the Czechoslovak troops sparked the uprising, which soon overthrew the soviets in the towns all along the rail lines from the middle Volga to the Pacific.

This uprising had the blessing of the Entente powers. It was followed in August 1918 by the arrival of Japanese, British, American, and French troops at the Pacific port of Vladivostok. The same month, a British naval force landed in Arkhangelsk on the White Sea to coincide with an anti-soviet uprising there, depriving the soviet government of its last port. A small British force also temporarily occupied the oil center of Baku. French and British forces later intervened in the Black Sea area in the south.

The dire military situation, together with the food crisis, made this the lowest point of the civil war for the soviet regime, whose existence was hanging on a thread. The Soviet Republic was reduced to roughly the same territory as the

fifteenth-century principality of Muscovy, from which the Russian empire had begun.

At various times during the civil war, Polish, Canadian, Romanian, and Greek forces also participated in the intervention. But direct foreign military intervention was relatively limited (for reasons to be examined later), though it did give important moral encouragement to the Whites.

On the other hand, material support from the capitalist powers played a much greater role. Together with the economic and diplomatic blockade of Soviet Russia, it undoubtedly helped to prolong the civil war far beyond the period it would have lasted had the Whites fought with their own resources alone. Foreign intervention also played an important role in keeping the revolution confined to Russia, preventing or defeating soviet revolutions in neighboring Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Hungary, where popular ferment was very strong.

The Party Dictatorship

The crisis of the spring and summer of 1918 was the context of the soviet state's transformation into a one-party regime, though Mensheviks and to some extent SRs continued to participate at different levels in the soviets until the end of the civil war, subject to varying degrees of repression. As with "war communism," most historians view the transformation of the soviet state as integral to the unfolding logic of "bolshivism," though they are hard pressed to find anything in the pre-1918 writings of Lenin or any prominent Bolshevik supporting a one-party dictatorship. On the other hand, historians tend to play down the influence of objective circumstances on the development of the dictatorship and they studiously avoid discussion of the realism and probable consequences of the alternatives.

This said, the Bolsheviks did centralize state power as best they could – not very well, in fact, given the prevailing conditions of semi-anarchy – and they were ruthless not only toward counterrevolutionary forces linked to the domestic and foreign propertied classes, but also toward opposition that did not collaborate with the Whites, including Mensheviks and peasant insurgents. Sometimes even neutral citizens who refused to collaborate with the war effort fell victim to government repression. Thus, during the great transport crisis of February 1919, the soviet authorities threatened to shoot peasant

hostages unless the rail lines were cleared of snow by the villagers. The Bolsheviks expressed no regret about these measures, which they regarded as a normal part of the revolutionary process.

The political regime quickly evolved in two parallel directions. The first was the shift of power within the soviets from the general assemblies of delegates to the executive committees and full-time staff. This was accompanied by measures of centralization that restricted the autonomy of the local soviets in favor of the provincial soviets and the national government.

The second direction was the establishment of the Bolshevik monopoly in the soviets. Both Mensheviks and SRs (as opposed to the left SRs) continued to reject the soviet power in favor of the constituent assembly. Until their formal split in August 1918, there were two factions in the Menshevik Party. The left majority continued to argue that the soviets were too narrow a base for a viable government and believed an all-socialist coalition was possible. The additional forces that this would bring into the government would not be the propertied classes, whom they rejected, but the intelligentsia and the wealthier peasants. At the same time, they rejected the use of violent methods against the soviet government and called on party members to participate in the soviets, though not in the government, with the aim of helping the workers to shed their illusions. The right Mensheviks, on the other hand, opposed participation in the soviets, and favored an alliance with the bourgeoisie and the use of force to overthrow the government and to establish a "bourgeois democracy." Despite these serious divergences, the party remained unified until August 1918, when the right Mensheviks were expelled for joining with SRs and Kadets in an organization aimed at the armed overthrow of the soviet government.

The SRs were close in their positions to the right Mensheviks, but, given their terrorist heritage, they were much more ready to resort to arms. A week before the Czechoslovak rising, the SR Party Council adopted a policy of armed overthrow of the soviet government and resurrection of the constituent assembly. It gave its approval to the negotiations that the party's Central Committee was conducting with Entente representatives in preparing the uprising. Party leader V. Chernov later claimed the party had played an instrumental role in linking up the Czechoslovak command with local counterrevolutionary forces

in the Urals and Volga region. The SRs were also very active in anti-soviet movements in the Ukraine.

Meanwhile, on the background of the industrial collapse and famine, the Mensheviks and SRs were making headway among the workers, at least those still employed in the factories. Of all the major cities, the situation was worst in Petrograd. In the first six months of 1918 it received only one-third of the grain of the corresponding period of 1917. The workers' ration did not cover even basic physical needs, and the illegal, free market price of bread was beyond their reach. However, the growth of discontent among these workers was based more on their suffering and disillusionment than on any faith that the constituent assembly offered a solution. Workers, on the whole, were not prepared actively to oppose the soviet government. This was shown by the weak response to the Mensheviks' call for a political strike on July 2, 1918.

The failure of that strike was in part due to arrests made among the organizers in the days leading up to it. But the Mensheviks' paper itself had to admit that "the organizers . . . undoubtedly overestimated the dissatisfaction of the ordinary people, they showed insufficient understanding of the psychology of the working class, did not take into account all the threads, that despite everything, still tie the masses to the regime." Most workers remained wedded, as in October, to soviet power. And the Bolsheviks, along with the left SRs, were the only parties defending it, however much government practice diverged from initial soviet democracy. The Bolsheviks pointed out to the workers that the Kadets and tsarist generals were organizing their counterrevolution under the banner of the constituent assembly, too. They could also point to the fate of the Ukraine, where the overthrow of the soviets by a nationalist SR uprising resulted not in liberal democracy but in the right-wing dictatorship of General Skoropadskii, who was being propped up by German troops. Despite the suffering, the dashed hopes for immediate improvement of their situation, and the repressive measures against the opposition, the Bolshevik argument that the choice was "soviet power or Skoropadskii" carried weight. In the end, the Bolsheviks' call to "summon every last ounce of strength or surrender" prevailed. As noted earlier, even the majority of Mensheviks abandoned their support for the constituent assembly

and recognized soviet power at the end of December 1918, adding, however, that they saw it as a "fact of reality" and were not in agreement on the principle.

In this context of combined economic, internal political, and military crises, the CEC of Soviets decided on June 14, 1918 to expel the SRs and Mensheviks and instructed local soviets to do the same. Formally, these parties were not outlawed. But most of their papers were shut down and they were subject to varying levels of persecution.

This left the Bolsheviks and left SRs. Besides their opposition to the peasant "committees of the poor," the left SRs also wanted to tear up the peace treaty with Germany. To this end, they organized the assassination of the German ambassador in Moscow on July 6, 1918 and prepared a rather confused plan for armed defense against the Bolsheviks' inevitable response. This defense looked a lot like an insurrection, during which the left SRs occupied strategic points in the capital. After this revolt was crushed, the left SRs suffered the same fate as the Mensheviks and the SRs. Many left SR members took their distance from the party leadership and continued to work with the soviet government, fighting and dying alongside the communists. (The Bolsheviks had thus renamed themselves to emphasize their break with the discredited social democratic parties that supported the war.)

The situation became even worse for the SRs and Mensheviks when on August 30, 1918, at the most desperate point of the civil war, an SR terrorist shot and seriously wounded Lenin in Moscow. The same day, a White officer assassinated M. Uritskii, head of the Petrograd Cheka. In response, all the socialist parties, except the Bolsheviks, were formally outlawed. Even worse, this was followed by a ferocious outburst of "red terror," that is, mass and, to a significant degree, arbitrary repression. In Petrograd, more than 500 people were shot, including four former tsarist ministers; in Moscow more than 100 were summarily executed, and so it went. Among the victims were also members of the socialist parties.

There are no reliable figures for the deaths from "red terror" during the civil war. One estimate puts them as 50,000, not including people killed without government sanction by mobs and soldiers. "White terror" was certainly no less widely practiced. The "red terror" reached its height in August–September 1918 and relaxed soon

after, when the anti-Bolshevik front on the Volga collapsed and the revolution in Germany ended the occupation of Ukraine. In November 1918, Menshevik and SR papers were again allowed to publish, a political amnesty was declared, and hostages released. The Cheka was deprived of its power to sentence offenders, except in areas under martial law. However, the Menshevik and SR press was closed down once again when the White armies of Kolchak in Siberia and Denikin in southern Russia posed an immediate, mortal threat in the spring and summer of 1919. Their defeat led to a new relaxation of repression, but that too ended when the Poles invaded and conquered most of the Ukraine in the spring of 1920, before being repulsed by the Red Army.

These oscillations in the level of repression support the view that repression was a response to perceived emergency, not an ideological project of the Bolsheviks. But here again, the Bolsheviks expressed no regrets about what they saw as an integral part of the revolutionary process. This ruthlessness was a far cry from the initial tolerant attitude of the period of the October Revolution, when Trotsky was careful to avoid bloodshed and when Petrograd workers released General Krasnov on his word of honor. Civil wars are the most brutal of wars. And the Russian civil war came on the heels of three and a half years of an unspeakable imperialist slaughter in a country that had been ruled for centuries by the most barbarous regime of Europe.

Who is to Blame?

Among most historians both in the West and in contemporary Russia, the Bolsheviks are blamed for the civil war and its terrible consequences. But was the October Revolution the cause of the civil war? And was it itself, as is so often implied, an arbitrary act of the Bolsheviks, or even of Lenin himself?

Without entering into a full-blown discussion of these questions, one can at least point to a few relatively undisputed facts. The first is that there would have been no October Revolution had the liberals and moderate socialists in the provisional government not refused to do what the peasants, workers, and soldiers, the great majority of the population, insistently demanded: to summon the constituent assembly immediately after the February Revolution; to carry out the land reform; to denounce the imperialist war aims

in favor of an active, democratic peace policy; to legislate the eight-hour day; and to regulate economic activity in order to halt the economic dislocation and prevent collapse. These demands were not exorbitant. They corresponded to any basic conception of justice and democracy. Yet, the provisional government rejected them because they threatened the interests of the propertied classes, a small minority of the population. In attributing responsibility for the civil war, surely this must be considered.

Secondly, one must ask if the October Revolution was really the result of an arbitrary decision by Bolshevik leaders. To argue that is to imply that there were more acceptable alternatives that would have allowed Russia to avoid civil war. But for the workers the alternative to the soviet (not “Bolshevik,” as most histories write) seizure of power in October was a victorious counterrevolution, a right-wing military dictatorship, and a terrible bloodletting that would surely have followed. There is much to support the workers’ view. We have argued that the October Revolution for the laboring classes was first and foremost an act of defense of the democratic revolution of February, not a mindless, headlong rush to utopia.

The Petrograd workers, in particular, the most politicized cohort of the revolution, were highly conscious of the fact that the odds were against them if they could not obtain the support of revolutions in the West. They acted because they felt they had no choice, though of course they might have acquiesced to the counterrevolution. Understandably, they were not prepared to do that. A delegate to the factory committee conference in August 1917 responded to a Menshevik, who warned the workers that they would not be able to hold onto power: “The bourgeoisie understands its interests better than the petty-bourgeois [moderate socialist] parties. . . . They have expressed themselves very clearly in [banker] Ryabushinskii’s words that they will wait until hunger grabs us by the throat and destroys everything we have won. But while they reach for our throats, we will fight and we will not back away from the struggle.” The same essentially defensive outlook lay behind the struggle for workers’ control in the factories that eventually led to their nationalization. As one activist put it after the October Revolution, “Conditions were such that the factory committees became full masters of the enterprises. . . . The proletariat did

not so much move toward this, as circumstances led it. It simply had to do what in the given situation it was impossible not to do. . . . Will this be another Paris Commune [drowned in blood by the bourgeoisie after three months] or will it lead to world socialism? In any case, we have absolutely no choice.”

Was the constituent assembly or an all-socialist coalition government based on a realistic alternative to soviet power, as the Mensheviks and SRs claimed? We have tried to show that this was not the case. If these slogans failed to attract the popular masses, it was not because of Bolshevik intransigence and repression. The propertied classes, as much as the Bolsheviks, did not want the constituent assembly to take power, although the liberals hypocritically used it as a rallying cry to organize the counterrevolution. As we noted, nowhere where the SRs held power during the civil war did they establish a liberal democratic regime.

A third issue is that of foreign intervention. Chamberlin, quoted earlier, concludes: “Had there been no intervention . . . the Russian civil war would almost certainly have ended much more quickly in a decisive victory of the Soviets. Then a triumphant revolution Russia would have faced a Europe that was fairly quivering with social unrest and upheaval.” The aim of the intervention was not to save democracy from Bolshevik dictatorship (which did not yet exist when intervention began). It was undertaken in support of Russia’s propertied classes and generals, who were intent on restoring the old order, or at least a right-wing dictatorship. The soviet regime made very accommodating proposals in an effort to prevent this intervention but they were rejected.

Two basic types of interests were behind the intervention: an imperialistic interest that is the acquisition or defense of spheres of interests in Russia and access to its natural resources, and related counterrevolutionary interests – defense of capitalism and the crushing of a bad example that was proving contagious. Surely, this foreign intervention must be considered when attributing responsibility for the civil war.

As for the Bolsheviks, they were indeed ruthless in defense of the revolution. But the historian must ask whether a less brutal means and a more conciliatory attitude to the enemies of the revolution would have shortened or prolonged the civil war. To lay all or most of the blame for the civil war and the national catas-

trophe on the October Revolution and Bolsheviks is implicitly biased toward the propertied classes and an unquestioning acceptance of the legitimacy of their goals, a choice that can be taken, but made transparent.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; German Revolution, 1918–1923; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marxism; Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russia, Revolutions: Sources and Contexts; Russian Revolutionary Labor Upsurge, 1912–1914; Soviet Union, Fall of; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); War Communism and the Rise of the Soviet Union

References and Suggested Readings

- Carr, E. H. (2004) *The Russian Revolution: From Lenin to Stalin (1917–1929)*. New York: Palgrave.
- Carrère d’Encausse, H. (1981) *Lenin*. New York: Longman.
- Chamberlin, W. H. (1935/1965) *The Russian Revolution*, 2 vols. New York: Grosset & Dunlap.
- Koenker, D. et al. (1989) *Party, State and Society in the Russian Civil War*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Liebman, M. (1980) *Leninism under Lenin*. London: Merlin Press.
- Lih, L. (1990) *Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914–21*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mawdsley, E. (1998) *The Russian Civil War*. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
- Serge, V. (1984) *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*. London: Writers & Reader.
- Serge, V. (1985) *The Conquered City*. New York: Doubleday.
- Shukman, H. (Ed.) (1994) *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of the Russian Revolution*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Russian revolutionary labor upsurge, 1912–1914

David Mandel

Worker militancy after the defeat of Russia’s 1905–7 revolutionary upsurge, as measured in strike activity, reached a low point in 1910, with a mere 222 strikes involving 46,000 workers. However, an economic recovery began in 1911 that soon turned into an industrial boom, increasing the industrial workforce from 1.8 million in 1910 to 2.5 million on the eve of the world

war. The relative scarcity of labor reduced the workers' fear of losing their jobs and helped rekindle their fighting spirit. In 1911, the number of strikes and strikers more than doubled as compared to 1910.

In the spring of 1912, the workers' movement exploded with a force unseen since 1905. Once again it was a government massacre that provided the spark. On April 4, troops opened fire on strikers in the Lena goldfields of Siberia, killing 172 and wounding another 372. Over 500,000 workers across Russia struck in response, more than during the preceding four years combined. That year, the total number of strikers was seven times greater than in 1911, and the political character of the strikes became increasingly pronounced, a trend that would continue to the very outbreak of war in July 1914. As before, St. Petersburg was the center of militancy, with three-quarters of all strikers between April 1912 and July 1914, a total of three million in the capital (the figure counts repeated participation in strikes), of which 88 percent were political in nature.

Despite the intervening years of reaction, St. Petersburg's workers seemed to have picked up directly just where they left off in 1905–7. Government officials were struck by the high level of organization and solidarity. All sectors and categories manifested a strong drive to organize into unions, which had been severely restricted after the defeat of the revolution. Even workers scattered in numerous small establishments, like bakers, tailors, jewelry makers, and porters, succeeded in organizing concerted strikes for economic demands. Strict boycotts of jobs in plants that were struck were observed by other workers, preventing the hiring of strikebreakers or the transfer of orders to other plants, as these would be struck in their turn if the orders were undertaken. Repression, including widespread use of police spies, arrest of leaders, activists, and even ordinary strikers, mass lockouts and fines, were powerless to halt this mighty upsurge. Nor did the government's limited concessions, like the creation of a sickness and accident insurance fund, have any appreciable impact.

Workers reacted with great sensitivity to political dates and events. May 1, 1912, for example, brought out 200,000 workers in the capital, 80 percent of the entire factory proletariat, despite the owners' policy of fining workers for participation in political strikes. Indeed, the

imposition of fines by some of the employers for that strike provoked new and very stubborn strikes in a number of factories. On May 1, 1913, 420,000 workers struck across Russia (more than half of these in the capital), and on May 1, 1914, 500,000. Other key political dates, like the anniversaries of Bloody Sunday and the Lena massacre, also brought out hundreds of thousands. At the end of October 1912, 250,000 workers (two-fifths of them in St. Petersburg) downed tools to protest the sentencing of 142 Black Sea sailors for mutiny; 100,000 (two-thirds in the capital) struck a few months later over the threatened death penalty for 52 Baltic sailors. On November 6 and 7, 1913, 110,000 struck to protest the sentencing of workers of a St. Petersburg factory for an illegal strike; and even greater numbers struck in May 1914, when these workers were tried a second time. The mass poisoning in March 1914 of workers at a rubber goods factory brought out 156,000 in protest in the capital. Other political strikes protested the state's persecution of the labor press and government interference in the Duma elections. On the very eve of the war, 150,000 struck in St. Petersburg, and more in Lodz and Moscow, to protest the police firing on workers of one of the capital's factories.

There were, of course, also economic strikes with demands addressed to the employers. But even in these actions, the workers often added political demands to their list. This was one of the most striking traits of the movement: the interweaving of the economic and political struggles. One of the issues that straddled the divide between economic and political was that of dignity. In one of the most impressive strikes of the period, the workers of a St. Petersburg metalworking factory walked out for 102 days to protest the death of a fellow worker driven to suicide by a despotic foreman. This generation of young workers, more urbanized than their elders, showed no trace of the proverbial peasant meekness. Nothing expressed this more forcefully than their demand for "polite address," which figured frequently on lists of strikers' demands. This was a demand for management to stop speaking to workers in the second person singular (*ty*), a familiar form reserved for children, animals, and close friends. The workers demanded the polite, second person plural (*vy*), which implied respect and distance. It is telling that the officials of the ministry of the interior

considered this to be a political demand. And they were right. Workers who respected themselves could not tolerate the despotism of the autocratic state or the Russian factory management.

Bourgeoisie and Liberals: Renewed Opposition Coupled with Hostility to the Workers

This interweaving, even fusion, of political and economic demands in the workers' movement had its counterpart on the employers' side in the close cooperation of factory owners and police in preventing and repressing both political and economic strikes of workers. There was no longer any trace of the sympathy that many employers had shown for the workers during their political strikes of 1905, when they opened their factories for meeting places. The owners were by now much better organized. The St. Petersburg industrialists adopted a new, binding convention in June 1912 that called for fining workers in the event of a political strike. The convention also rejected any permanent representation of workers in the factories, refusing workers the right collectively to negotiate wages and conditions. It also provided for the blacklisting of strikers. And lockouts became a favorite weapon of the employers. They were accompanied by mass dismissals, followed by the weeding out and blacklisting of "troublemakers" when hiring resumed. In 1914 alone, St. Petersburg's employers, in close collaboration with management of the state factories, conducted three mass lockouts, during which a total of 300,000 workers were dismissed.

Yet even while this happened, certain elements of the business class were distancing themselves from the government. Their shift to the opposition was provoked, as in 1905, by the regime's increasingly manifest inability to maintain social order, by the quasi-vacuum of power at the top of the pyramid of power, the endemic corruption of the public administration, and by the increasingly embarrassing decadence of the regime.

The latter was manifest most strikingly in the growing influence of Rasputin on the royal family and by the Beilis trial. Grigori Rasputin was a Dostoyevskian figure, an adventurer of dubious morals who enjoyed a reputation as a healer and "man of God." He won the confidence of the tsar's wife in 1909 and came to exert increasing influence on state policy through the royal family. Mendel Beilis, on the other hand,

was a Russian Jew put on show trial in 1911 for the alleged ritual murder of a Christian child, an accusation that harkened back to the darkest Middle Ages. Although Beilis was eventually acquitted, the trial, part of the regime's policy of diverting internal discontent toward the Jews, attracted worldwide condemnation. All this proved too much even for the Octobrists, the party closest to the industrial bourgeoisie. A broad-based realignment took place within the third Duma (which the tsar was planning to dissolve), with some of the Octobrists joining the Kadets and other liberals in opposing the government. The left wing of this opposition, which included some prominent businessmen, even opened a dialogue with the social democrats and toyed with the idea of appealing to the masses. However, the vast majority of the business class and the intelligentsia were as frightened as ever of revolution and unsympathetic to the workers' movement.

This opposition was also opposed to the peasants' aspirations. The peasantry, however, remained relatively quiescent during this period, still smarting from the cruel repression that had followed the Revolution of 1905. Unlike the workers, the peasants were not prepared to act until they had some assurance that the state's repressive apparatus had been undermined. As noted earlier, while the liberals allowed for the forced alienation of noble estates, they wanted to make the peasants pay for it. One of the reasons for this position was that much of the land the nobility owned had been mortgaged to banks. Other estates had been bought by members of the bourgeoisie. Expropriation without compensation would, therefore, have hurt the banks and bourgeois landowners. The Kadets, as staunch supporters of capitalist property, could not accept that. Besides, although the noble estates were feudal in origin, any violation of property rights set a bad example.

The Working Class and the Bolsheviks: Class Independence

Given the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the workers, it is not surprising that the Bolsheviks were able to greatly strengthen their support among the workers during this period. In the elections to the fourth Duma in the fall of 1912, six of the nine deputies elected by the workers were Bolsheviks. All the major

industrial areas of Russia sent Bolsheviks to the Duma, whereas the Menshevik deputies came from the less industrialized periphery – the Caucasus, Ukraine, and the western provinces. The Bolsheviks also became the dominant force in most of the trade unions of St. Petersburg and Moscow. In August 1913, they won from the Mensheviks the leadership of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union, the strongest union in the capital. And on the eve of the war they were elected to the leadership of the Printers' Union, whose members had traditionally leaned toward moderation (in part because their jobs linked them to the intelligentsia). The Bolsheviks also held dominant positions in the workers' sections of the sickness insurance boards.

Worker support for the Bolsheviks was based on their common rejection of the liberals, representatives of the bourgeoisie (or at least its progressive elements), as political allies in the struggle for democracy. The Bolsheviks, as noted, called for an alliance of the laboring classes, the workers and peasants, in overthrowing the autocracy. They argued that the bourgeoisie would oppose the revolution. On the other hand, the Menshevik strategy of cooperation with the liberals caused them to adopt a much more guarded attitude to the workers' proneness to engage in political strikes, which they sometimes criticized as "reckless," since that militancy could frighten the liberals away and into the arms of the autocracy, as happened in 1905. However, even workers who were not very politicized could see that the Bolsheviks' position corresponded best to their daily lived experience, one in which the employers were bitterly hostile to their aspirations. The Mensheviks' insistence on separating the economic from the political struggle was simply out of touch with reality.

The aspiration toward class independence – both organizational and political – from liberal society was one of the most striking characteristics of the labor movement of this period, though it had manifested itself already to some extent in 1906 and 1907. When they could vote, workers never cast ballots for liberals, only for one of the socialist parties. And they resisted any attempts by the employers to influence their organizations. A police report from St. Petersburg in 1915 observed that workers everywhere rebuffed offers of aid from the Society of Factory Owners to help them set up consumer cooperatives. In one factory, "the majority pointed out that the Society

is totally dependent on the factory owners, and since cooperatives are one form of the workers' movement, it is necessary to think along lines of our own worker societies, independent of the owners." The report noted a similar attitude in relation to the sickness insurance boards, which were co-financed by employers and workers: "One observes of late in the worker population the tendency toward isolation of their activities from any sort of pressure from the authorities or entrepreneurs. Here, too, one feels the shift toward pure autonomy. . . . This tendency can be observed at all workers' meetings without exception."

The aspiration to class independence was reinforced by the relative absence during this period of intellectuals in the labor movement, people who, by their status in society, were often a kind of bridge between the laboring and propertied classes. The socialist intelligentsia that was active, a small minority of the intelligentsia overall, was attracted mostly to the Mensheviks and the SRs, the more moderate political currents. The rank-and-file and most of the leadership elements of the Bolshevik Party were now composed overwhelmingly of workers. Bolshevik cells existed in almost all large and medium factories, and as one group of activists was arrested, other workers came forward to take their place. But the shortage of educated people was severely felt and was a constant source of complaint. About this Lenin remarked in 1913: "The entire 'intelligentsia' is with the liquidators [pejorative term for the Mensheviks who favored legal forms of struggle]. The worker masses are with us (40,000 readers of *Pravda* contra 12,000 of *Luch* [the Menshevik paper]). But it is extremely difficult for the workers to develop *their own* intelligentsia. . . . It is hard and slow."

The Bolsheviks in this period were "flesh of the flesh" of the working class, both ideologically and physically. In the capital and in Moscow their main strength was among the metalworkers, especially those in the machine construction sector, who were on the whole a more skilled, better educated, better paid, and more urbanized part of the industrial proletariat.

On the Eve of World War I

The strike movement spread progressively from the capital to the rest of Russia, including

the south, the Urals, and the textile mills of the central industrial region. On May 28, 1914, the oil workers of Baku on the Caspian Sea, long under Bolshevik influence, struck over the threat of plague that had erupted in nearby oilfields. They made use of the occasion also to demand the eight-hour day, the construction of decent settlements and housing, higher wages, and recognition of May 1 as a holiday. On June 2, the owners declared a lockout and demanded that the workers be evicted from company housing. Troops occupied the oilfields.

Meanwhile, the situation was also tense in St. Petersburg. In early June, the death sentence pronounced against a worker who had murdered his supervisor and the prison sentence of lawyers who had protested against the Beilis case provoked a wave of political strikes that drew 27,000 workers. That same month, the most inert, scattered sections of the working class, such as porters, bakers, and chimney sweeps, organized impressive, concerted economic strikes. All this time, the capital's workers were closely following events in Baku, collecting money for the strikers, despite the mayor's threat of a 500-rouble fine or three months in jail for doing that. At the start of July, the workers of the large plants observed a one-hour protest strike against the repression in Baku.

On July 3, yet another government massacre sparked events that had no parallel in the history of the capital. Mounted and foot police burst in on a mass meeting about the Baku strike that was being held in the yard of the Putilov factory. They began immediately horsewhipping the workers and ordered them to disperse. But the gates were locked. They then fired two salvos, killing two workers and wounding 50 others. All this time, the beatings continued. Sixty-five workers were arrested. When the Bolshevik Duma deputy A. Badaev reached the police station, he was horrified to see the police beating the arrested workers into unconsciousness. News of what happened provoked mass strikes in Lodz, Moscow, Kharkov, and elsewhere. In St. Petersburg demonstrations took place in all the working-class neighborhoods. The demonstrators moved toward the Putilov factory, which was cordoned off on all sides by police, who shot and wounded four demonstrators.

On July 4, 90,000 workers struck in the capital. In an effort to give the protest a more

organized form, the Bolshevik Petersburg Committee called for a three-day general strike and for a peaceful demonstration on July 7, explaining that the time for armed uprising had not yet arrived. July 5 and 6 were relatively calm, the workers holding meetings. Then on July 7, 130,000 struck. Huge demonstrations took place in the working-class districts. The first barricades appeared. On July 8, the strike became general. Transport and commerce shut down, the latter on the demand of the workers. Everywhere workers clashed with the police and threw up barricades made of felled telegraph poles, overturned streetcars, and any other material at hand. To many observers this recalled the atmosphere of 1905.

Meanwhile, additional police and Cossacks poured into the city. Severe measures were announced. The Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* was ransacked and all those present in its offices were arrested. The paper would not reappear until after the February Revolution. On July 9, the Bolshevik Committee called off the strike and urged the workers to avoid confrontations so as not to provide the police with a pretext for more killing. It explained that the time was not yet ripe for insurrection: the capital's workers still had to impart their revolutionary determination to workers of the distant provinces, to the peasantry, and to the troops.

But the Bolsheviks were not in control of the situation. The strike continued on July 10, even after the employers of the large metalworking plants announced a lockout and began firing workers en masse. The military was brought in. Even so, the police reported 133,000 workers on strike on July 11. Some Bolshevik workers defied their leaders and tried to convert the street fighting into an insurrection. It was not until July 17, two days before the start of the war, that the movement completely died down. That day, in view of the impending war, the owners reopened their factories.

St. Petersburg was the vanguard but not the only place where the movement displayed a revolutionary temper. Besides Baku in the south, there was Kostroma in central Russia, where 30,000 textile workers were striking. The governor wrote the following assessment: "The present strike is extremely serious, not only because of its dimensions. . . . Being on the surface economic, the movement is, in fact, in my opinion,

entirely of a revolutionary nature. . . . When a strike in the course of a few days embraces an entire district, when identical demands are presented, when these demands are obviously unrealizable, then it is clear the movement is guided by some unseen hand. . . . This hand, having taken possession of the labor movement . . . will apparently lead the workers to social revolution.” The hand was “unseen” because the movement’s leaders were workers themselves, practically all Bolsheviks.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marxism; Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russia, Revolutions: Sources and Contexts; Russian Civil War, 1918–1924; Soviet Union, Fall of; Trotsky,

Leon (1879–1940); War Communism and the Rise of the Soviet Union

References and Suggested Readings

- Elwood, R. C. (1972) Lenin and *Pravda*, 1912–1914. *Slavic Review*, June.
- Haimson, L. (1964, 1965) The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905–1917. *Slavic Review*, December, March.
- Haimson, L. (2005) *Russia’s Revolutionary Experience, 1905–1917: Two Essays* (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Kochan, L. (1978) *Russia in Revolution, 1890–1918*, London: Grenada.
- Le Blanc, P. (1993) *Lenin and the Revolutionary Party*. Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books.
- Shukman, H. Ed. (1994). *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of the Russian Revolution*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Shlyapnikov, A. (1982) *On the Eve of 1917*. London: Allison & Busby.

S

Sacco and Vanzetti case

Tom Collins

Nicola Sacco (1891–1927) and Bartolomeo Vanzetti (1888–1927) were Italian immigrant laborers and anarchists whose conviction in a murder case in the United States in 1921 aroused international controversy. The pair were accused of the armed robbery and murder of a company paymaster and his security guard outside a shoe factory in South Braintree, Massachusetts in 1920. Although their trial featured muddled eyewitness testimony and inconclusive ballistics evidence, the men were found unanimously guilty by a jury and sentenced to death by Massachusetts Superior Court Judge Webster Thayer. The verdict galvanized leftists, who denounced the trial as a miscarriage of justice tinged by anti-immigrant and anti-radical prejudice. Organizations such as the grassroots Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee and the Communist Party-backed International Labor Defense undertook mass publicity campaigns arguing for a new trial.

pages 2947-3190 are missing!

Sudan, Aba Island Rebellion, 1970

Andrew J. Waskey

Sudan received its independence from the British in 1956. The movement for independence had pitted a number of political groups against the British. One of these was an Islamic party called the Umma (Nation) Party. Begun in the 1930s by Sadiq al-Mahdi, the Umma Party sought complete independence. Sadiq was a grandson of Mohammad Ahmed al-Mahdi who had successfully driven the British and the Turco-Egyptian forces out of Sudan in the 1880s.

In Southern Sudan, which was either animist or Christian, the opposition to domination by the Arabic-speaking Islamic population broke into violent conflict even before Sudanese independence on January 1, 1956. Southern opposition contributed to the destabilization of Sudanese security to the extent that General El-Ferik Ibrahim Abboud, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, claimed justification to launch a coup d'état in 1958 against the civilian government of Abd Allah Khalil. General Abboud imposed authoritarian rule, replaced English in the schools with Arabic, expelled most of the English-speaking teachers, and sought to turn Sudan into an Arabic-Islamic state. He was expelled from power by the October Revolution of 1964, brought down by street disturbances led by the Ansar, who were members of the Umma Party. Authority was given to a civilian transitional government led by Sir Al-Khatim Khalifah. The 1965 election for president was won by Sadiq al-Mahdi, a great-grandson of the Mahdi. The general vote was split between the centrist Islamist Umma Party and the Democratic Union Party (DUP). However, the government was too weak to govern effectively because the Umma Party was factionalized among its several Al-Mahdi family leaders.

The weakness of the Umma Party government tempted the military to seize power. On May 25, 1969 Colonel Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri, leader of the Free Officers movement, led a successful coup against the parliamentary government of President Isma'il Azhari. Establishing a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) he declared Sudan a socialist state and renamed it the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. He pre-

sented himself publicly as a Free Officer in the Nasserite mold. A committed secularist, he used the help of the communists to gain and keep power until 1971, when they attempted a coup against him.

Early opposition to Nimeiri's coup came from the religious right. Nimeiri viewed the conservative Ansar as a threat to the Ruling Command Council. The Ansar were demanding a return to democracy and the expulsion of the communists from the government. Street demonstrations by the Ansar turned into Mahdist riots in Khartoum. Then many Ansar were killed at Wad Nubawi in Omdurman in March of 1970. Nimeiri tried to visit with the Imam Sayyid Al-Hadi al-Madhi, a grandson of Mohammad Ahmed al-Mahdi; however, hostile crowds kept him away and prevented the talks.

Fighting erupted between Nimeiri's government forces with as many as 30,000 Ansar. Nimeiri responded by seeking to destroy the power of the Mahdi family. His attention was focused on Al-Hadi because he was the leader of a faction of the Umma Party. Al-Hadi had retreated to Aba Island. Located in the middle of the White Nile, south of Khartoum, the island was the traditional Mahdi stronghold. The land on both sides of Aba Island is a featureless desert plain. Neither the island nor the riparian plains offered geographical features that could shelter the Ansar. Without effective weapons they were slaughtered. When the Nimeiri's ultimatum to surrender was ignored by the Ansar, the island was strafed and bombed. A major amphibious assault was launched against the island. At least 3,000 Ansar were killed. Al-Hadi fled on March 27, 1971, leaving Nimeiri to confiscate the vast Mahdi family estates and other assets. Al-Hadi fled toward Ethiopia, but was gunned down on March 31 before he could escape across the border to safety. His death did not end the opposition of the Umma Party to military regimes in the history of modern Sudan.

Unable to gain the cooperation of Sadiq Al-Mahdi, a nephew of al-Hadi had him arrested in June 1971. Sadiq was exiled to Egypt to be held under house arrest by Gamal Abdul Nasser. Opposition to Nimeiri continued from the Umma Party until he was driven from power. Today, the son of al-Hadi, Dr. al Sadiq al Hadi al Mahdi, is a leader of the General Leadership faction of the Umma and vice governor of the state of Khartoum.

SEE ALSO: Mahdist Revolt; Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970); Sudanese Protest under Anglo-Egyptian Rule; Sudanese Protest in Turko-Egyptian Era; Sudanese Women’s League

References and Suggested Readings

- Daly, M. W. (2007) *Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Warburg, G. R. (1992) *Historical Discord in the Nile Valley*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Sudanese protest under Anglo-Egyptian rule

Fadwa Taha

The Anglo-Egyptian invasion of Sudan in 1896–8 toppled the Mahdist revolution, which had occurred in 1885. The British and the Egyptians consolidated their power through the Condominium Agreement of 1899, which created a theoretical dualism. It named the territory south of the 22nd parallel the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, technically restoring Egypt’s control over the region. Even so, it left the British actually in control of the region until after 1924, at which point they took sole charge. Of course, the Sudanese resisted this dual imperialism.

The Sudanese nationalist movement was a peaceful struggle for freedom and independence, but it was characterized by factional conflict, which in the 1940s crystallized into a “dualism” that was to dominate Sudanese politics even in the post-independence era. Two opposing nationalist ideas developed. One advocated an independent Sudanese identity and demanded independence for the Sudan from both Egypt and Britain. Its motto was “The Sudan for the Sudanese.” The other nationalist idea advocated unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown, and a united struggle of both parts of the Nile Valley against the common colonial power, Britain. The Sudanese case, then, contradicted the general rule of the existence of one nationalist idea and the inclusiveness of the nationalist movement’s platform of self-government and independence. In the Sudanese case, there was an alternative to the demand for self-government and independence – unity of the Nile Valley.

Historians of the modern history of the Sudan tend to divide the Sudanese nationalist movement

during the Condominium rule into chronological phases. The first phase (1900–19) was marked by religious and tribal risings refusing the new rule. Most of these movements were characterized by spontaneity, organizational weakness, and poor potential, which made it easy for the British administration in the Sudan to crush them.

The execution of Khalifa Sharif, the fourth Khalifa of the Mahdi and the Mahdi’s sons, and subsequently the defeat of the Khalifa Abdullahi meant that Mahdism was deprived of influential leaders in those early days. This situation continued until the emergence of Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, son of the great Mahdi. Abd al-Rahman established himself as the recognized political leader of Sudanese neo-Mahdism which dismissed armed struggle against the government.

However, violent Mahdist reaction reflected itself in the various Mahdist uprisings that were organized after 1900. Its source of inspiration and strength was the Muslim doctrine of Nabi Isa. Religious movements of this kind followed in 1900, 1902, 1904, 1906, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1912, and 1915. Despite the failure of these movements, they kept struggle alive. Their failure signaled the end of the role of religious movements on the political scene and raised the need for other alternatives that would lead and guide political struggle.

In 1908, however, an uprising occurred in the Blue Nile. Abd al Qadir Wad Habuba, who organized and led the revolt, and who was neither a *faki* nor an ordinary desperate Mahdist, declared himself Nabi Isa. His family enjoyed a position of political leadership in the Halawin tribe. He became one of the disciples of al-Mahdi. The Mahdist regime had confiscated the lands of those members of the Habuba family who had not accepted Mahdist rule, but the Condominium government restored the land. Abd al Qadir, who returned to his land after fighting with the Khalifa’s armies in the north, tried to reacquire his lost possessions. He began to dream of the day when he could revive and reestablish Mahdist rule in the Sudan. He mobilized the Mahdist elements in the Gezira and tried to associate them with Mahdist sentiments in other parts of the country. Abd al Qadir’s revolt was suppressed after reinforcements were dispatched from Khartoum.

Tribal movements concentrated during this period in the Nuba Mountains in southern

Kordofan and the southern Sudan. Protest in these areas stemmed from tribal loyalty that refused the hegemony of the central state and its taxes. British policy at the beginning was to send patrols to solve conflicts and to collect taxes. The Nuba refused to pay taxes and clashes occurred between them and the government. By 1914, most Nuba, notably the weaker communities, were successfully subjugated and administrative control extended over them. The period after 1914 is marked by the gradual consolidation of British administration in the Nuba Mountains.

British administration in the south faced strong tribal resistance, especially during the first two decades and up to the early 1930s. Southern resistance to British rule concentrated around three tribes: Nuer, Zandi, and Dinka. Southerners in general disliked any foreign rule, whether Turkish or *jallaba* (itinerant traders). They treated British rule in the same way. Taxes and forced work were imposed on them without return from the government, who depended on firearms to impose its authority. Most early southern resistance to Condominium rule took the form of isolated incidents in the sense that there was no coordinated policy on any level beyond the particular sub-section of the tribe. Foreign intrusion was unacceptable in any form, and so was central authority.

However, this prolonged resistance by southern tribes had a permanent adverse effect on the participation of the southern Sudanese in the Sudanese nationalist movement: it limited the southern Sudanese role in the nationalist struggle for independence and retarded the region both economically and politically. This situation was augmented by the southern policy introduced after the 1924 revolution in northern Sudan, creating solid barriers between the north and the south. This policy sought to isolate the south administratively and culturally from the north in order to minimize the southward spread of Islam and of anti-colonial ideas like those that prevailed during the 1924 uprisings. The government's ability to suppress tribal resistance indicated the failure of the institution of the tribe to confront British rule. New social forces with a national attitude developed to lead the nationalist movement.

The beginning of the second phase (1918–24) was associated with general international conditions after World War I. It resulted in the

growth of political and nationalist consciousness, in both Egypt and the Sudan, and in the emergence of nationalist ideas amongst the Sudanese intelligentsia. This period was marked by the formation of the School Graduates Club in 1918 as a forum for practicing cultural and social activities among school graduates.

The league of Sudanese Union, the first secret Sudanese party, was formed in 1920 by young graduates. It had secret cells and a pyramid organization. The first secret circular, which was distributed in November 1920, urged the Sudanese to unite with the Egyptians to achieve complete independence. This League was formed to counter the pro-Britain faction, led by traditional leaders and some of the older graduates.

The League's secret activities were no longer adequate to express the developing national consciousness, however, and conflict arose as some members, led by Obaid Haj al-Amin, sought the substitution of secret means by more effective ones. They called for direct confrontation with the colonizers. The White Flag League was formed on May 20, 1924 by these members and was led by Ali Abdullatif. Early in 1922, Ali Abdullatif wrote an unpublished article entitled "The Claims of the Sudanese Nation." He was arrested, put on trial, and imprisoned, and was released in early 1924.

The 1924 Sudanese uprisings consisted of urban demonstrations, the distribution of seditious circulars, and army mutinies. These events took place in the northern Sudan urban centers of Khartoum, Omdurman, Port Sudan, Shendi, and Atbara, as well as the military battalions as far south as Malakal and Wau. Although many participants voiced admiration for and solidarity with Egyptians, their grievances had roots in the economic hardships experienced by urban artisans and the working class and job dissatisfaction for Sudanese military and civilian personnel.

Sudanese writers usually call the uprisings of 1924 a revolution and regard them as an early manifestation of nationalism. However, the uprisings brought neither the change nor the mass appeal and ideological coherence of a nationalist program. The 1924 revolution had many weaknesses, one of which was that its events happened at different times with a lack of coordination between them.

The 1924 revolution was a turning point in British policy in the Sudan and in the future of the graduates' nationalist movement. First,

the years following the revolt gave the graduates time to reevaluate the movement and make use of better tactics and techniques. Second, official policy toward them caused a sense of bitterness against the British. The harsher the treatment by the government, the closer they drew to Egypt.

With the defeat of the 1924 revolution, the Sudanese nationalist movement entered its third stage, which extended until the formation of the Graduates General Congress in 1938. The Sudan government, however, implemented an anti-graduates policy in the first decade after the revolt. For most of this period, British administration in the Sudan fought the intelligentsia and turned toward indirect rule by promoting native administration.

This period was marked by the development of literary societies, political struggle in the Graduates Club, and the development of magazines and newspapers. A large number of study groups and literary societies emerged inside and outside the capital. The most outstanding in that period were in Omdurman: the Abu Roaf and al-Fajr groups.

The Gordon College students' strike of 1931 was an important incident during this phase. It was instigated by a reduction in Gordon College graduates' starting salaries. The British administration in the Sudan employed the policy of "divide and rule" among the committee organizing the strike and a compromise was finally reached with the intervention of the two prominent religious leaders – Sayyid Ali, leader of the Khatmiyya sect, and Sayyid Abd al-Rahman, leader of the Ansar sect. However, the strike was a promoter for the Sudanese nationalist movement. It came seven years after the defeat of the 1924 revolution. It was a landmark in the change of the graduates' activities from literary to political. Differences started to develop among the graduates as they started to seek ways and means to get rid of the colonizers.

The fourth phase began with the formation of the Graduates' General Congress in 1938 and ended with the dominance of the pro-unity parties of Congress in 1945. The Graduates' General Congress was the first organized nationalist movement. The Sudan government tolerated the Graduates' General Congress to counterbalance the expected Egyptian influence after the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, since the Congress emphasized a separate Sudanese identity.

For the period 1938–41, the Congress activities were confined to organizational, social, cultural, and educational matters. Congress committees were formed in big towns and the group's popularity increased through its educational programs. The year 1942 was marked by important international developments. In the same year, the Atlantic Charter was signed between the British and the American governments, promising the colonies self-determination immediately after the war. Reacting to this development, the Congress sent a memorandum in April 1942 to the Sudan government calling for Sudanese self-determination after the war. The memorandum created tension between the Sudan government and the graduates. Pursuing its policy of "divide and rule," it began personal communications with moderate elements in Congress and convinced them of the gradual process of self-government and self-determination.

The first institution formed by the Sudan government toward this gradualism was the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan in 1943. This led to further dissensions in the Congress; the elections for the six sessions were fiercely contested and won by pro-unity elements led by the Ashiqqa (in Arabic, brothers of the same father and mother) Party formed in 1943 under the leadership of Ismail al-Azhari (first Sudanese prime minister in 1954).

It became evident by 1945 that one political party was dominating the Congress. The factions that lost domination of the Congress formed the Umma ("nation" in Arabic) Party in the same year, advocating the motto of "The Sudan for the Sudanese" and believing in a gradual process of self-government and self-determination with the aid of the Sudan government.

The period was also marked by the infiltration of sectarianism in the Graduates General Congress. The two major rival sects were the Khatmiyya and the Ansar. During the Condominium rule, these sects succeeded in infiltrating the graduates' ranks and directing the nationalist movement. Some Sudanese claim that just as the rivalry between the sects was exploited by the co-rulers, so also was the rivalry between the co-rulers exploited by the sects. This sped up the process of self-government and, ultimately, independence.

The last phase (1945–53) started with the clear emergence of Sudanese political parties patronized by the two major sects. The Umma

Party came under the patronage of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi as a political party favoring the complete independence of the Sudan. The Ashiqqa Party, favoring union with Egypt, came under the patronage of Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani and adopted the motto of unity of the Nile Valley. Tense relations developed during this phase between the Sudan government and the Sudanese political parties and groups, particularly the Ashiqqa Party, which had boycotted the constitutional institutions on the ground that they were furthering Britain's imperialist interests. The government wanted in particular to persuade the Ashiqqa Party to cooperate in the Assembly. This party declined to change its acknowledged hostile stand toward the government and its institutions. Instead, it actively participated in the demonstrations, which synchronized with the inauguration of the Assembly in December 1948, and criticized the government's policy in all respects. The Ashiqqa had, furthermore, worked through their majority in the Graduates Congress to build for themselves strong support among the public.

The period 1945–53 also witnessed the emergence of other groups and parties who had adamantly opposed the policies of the Sudan government. Since the inauguration of the Legislative Assembly in 1948, students and workers had organized violent demonstrations against it. They advocated revolutionary struggle against imperialism. Youth in particular had apparently seen in the slogan of unity of the Nile Valley a means for the struggle against colonization rather than an end in itself. The labor movement also developed during this period. The Sudan Workers' Trade Union Federation (SWTUF) was formed in November 1950. The Federation's constitution was amended to include political objectives such as immediate liquidation of all forms of colonization in the Sudan (economic, political, administrative, and military). The Federation advocated the cessation of all forms of cooperation with the colonial regime and the formation of a united revolutionary front. The United Front for Sudan Liberation was thus eventually formed. In a published statement, the Front proclaimed the weakness of imperialism and urged the people to intensify their revolutionary struggle against the government and its institutions.

During 1952, the Front was particularly active in organizing political rallies and demonstrations

against the Self-Government Statute, which it dismissed as an imperialist plot and urged the public to boycott it. The recommendations of the Constitutional Amendment Commission were used to prepare the Self-Government Statute, which was submitted to the co-rulers in May 1952, and later on became the base of the 1952–3 Anglo-Egyptian negotiations.

The political atmosphere in the Sudan was very strained when a military coup took place in Egypt on July 23, 1952. It was presumably evident that nothing would calm this intensive political agitation in the Sudan other than a clear recognition of the right of the Sudanese people to self-government and self-determination. The new Egyptian government was realistic enough to acknowledge the strength of the Sudanese factor. It reversed the policy of previous Egyptian governments by recognizing these rights and facilitating the way for the conclusion of the February 12, 1953 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. A transitional period followed and the complete independence of the Sudan was declared from within the Sudanese parliament on December 19, 1955. The Sudanese celebrated their independence on January 1, 1956.

SEE ALSO: Mahdist Revolt; Sudanese Protest in the Turko-Egyptian Era; Sudanese Women's League

References and Suggested Readings

- Abu Hasabu, A. A. (1985) *Factional Conflict in the Sudanese Nationalist Movement 1918–1948*. Khartoum: Graduate College Publications, University of Khartoum.
- Al-Gaddal, M. (2002) *Tarikh Al-Sudan al-Hadith: The Modern History of the Sudan 1820–1955*, 2nd ed. Omdurman: Abd al-Karim Mirghani's Cultural Center.
- Cudsi, A. S. (1969) *Sudanese Resistance to British Rule 1900–1920*. MSc thesis, University of Khartoum.
- Daly, M. (1991) *Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1934–1956*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mawut, L. (1983) *Dinka Resistance to Condominium Rule 1903–1932*. Khartoum: Graduate College Publications, University of Khartoum.
- Sharkey, H. (2003) *Living with Colonialism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Taha, F. (2006) *The Anglo-Egyptian Dispute over the Sudan 1937–1947*. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press.
- Woodward, P. (1979) *Condominium Rule and Sudanese Nationalism*. London: Rex Collings.

Sudanese protest in the Turko-Egyptian era

Fadwa Taha

In the nineteenth century the Sudan was subjected to a Turko-Egyptian invasion. At the time of the invasion, the Funj and the Fur Kingdoms were the two strongest political organizations in Eastern and Central Bilad Al-Sudan. The Funj Kingdom, with its capital in Sinnar, had since the mid-nineteenth century witnessed political struggles that had weakened its influence, and it became evident that the kingdom's fall was imminent.

Mohammed Ali, ruler of Egypt since 1805, used force in invading the Sudan. He established an elaborate administrative system, with an emphasis on taxation and the export of agricultural and natural products. The Sudanese saw the Turkish administration and development efforts as instruments of oppression and injustice, and alien to most of their traditional religious, moral, and cultural concepts. The most important characteristic of Sudanese resistance was its persistence, in spite of its failure under the repressive policy of the regime.

Two sophisticated expeditions were prepared for the invasion. The Sudanese were forced to confront them with very limited means. Resistance to the first expedition, which was heading for the capital Sinnar and was led by Ismail, son of Mohammed Ali, occurred in the Shayqiyya area. The Shayqiyya is one of a number of large groups in Bilad Al-Sudan, and its leaders decided to resist, since they were denied the right to retain arms and horses. They entered into a confrontation in which modern arms were the decisive factor for the victory of the invading army. Thus, the army continued its advance without noticeable resistance.

The situation was worse for the Funj Kingdom, which had no organized army. There, preparations for resistance collapsed at the last minute due to internal conflicts. Conspirators supporting his cousin had killed the regent, Mohammed Wad Adlan, who had sent a defiant message to Ismail. With his death, resistance ended and Ismail entered Sinnar in June 1821. Although this resistance was eliminated, it had long-term effects because the courageous stand provided a psychological and moral boost to the Sudanese nationalist movement.

Another expedition, equipped with firearms and artillery, was prepared for the invasion of Kordofan and Darfur. Maqdom Mussallam, who was ruling Kordofan on behalf of the sultan of Darfur, refused to submit to Daftardar, leader of the expedition. The result of the confrontation was his utter defeat.

During the first stage of the invasion, the victories of the invading army were facilitated by its military superiority in arms, ammunition, and military planning. Sudanese resistance to the invading army was weak, and many areas submitted without a fight. Political disintegration then reached a stage where the Turks could easily deal with one group at a time. Resistance and protest in this early stage was confined to a few places. Some tribal chiefs were aware of the situation in Egypt and the development of a strong government there, and hoped that this rule would extend to the Sudan to give them some kind of stability. In many ways, then, the time was not ripe for the development of nationalism in the modern sense.

Despite the ease in conquering the country, the Turko-Egyptian rulers were confronted from 1822 to 1825 by Sudanese protest that manifested itself in uprisings. The restiveness of the Sudanese under the new Egyptian rule can be explained only by reference to the kind of rule that they had experienced before the Egyptians arrived. During the Funj rule there had been a light tax on crops, both irrigated and rain-grown. All taxes were payable in cash, in length of cloth, or in livestock. The Turko-Egyptian administrative and taxation policies affected and disturbed the lives of the ordinary people. Reaction was quick and spontaneous. It first exploded among tribes of the Gezira – the area between the Blue and the White Nile. Isolated Turkish garrisons were attacked, and soldiers were killed. Other tribal groups fled to the Ethiopian borders. Ismail hurried from Fazugoli, where he was searching for gold, to confront the explosive situation in the Gezira. He adopted a conciliatory policy, as he was not in a position to confront a large-scale protest.

In late October 1822, Ismail was murdered at Shendi. His death was a result of his failure to keep his temper. He had demanded an outrageous contribution – 30,000 dollars and 6,000 slaves within two days. Nimr, *mak* of the Ja'liyin tribe, protested that his people simply could not produce what was demanded in the specified time.

Ismail insulted him, and Nimr went away. That night his men piled forage around Ismail's quarters and at a given signal set it alight. Ismail and his staff were killed. The killing incited people in other places to protest. From al-Damar to Sinnar, the people rose and dislodged the Egyptian garrisons from al-Matamma, Karari, Halfayat al-Muluk, and al-Ailafun. Only Wad Madani was safe.

The news that Ismail was dead and the Nile Valley was in revolt reached the Daftardar in Kordofan. Ismail's death had made the Daftardar immediately responsible for the Egyptian forces in the Sudan. Without waiting for orders from Egypt, he led a strike force from Kordofan to the Nile. The revolt had cut the lifeline between Sinnar and the north.

In December, the Daftardar reached the Nile between Khartoum and al-Matamma, and then turned northward, burning and killing as he went. An Egyptian force defeated Nimr at Nasub near the wells of Abu Dilaiq, whence he fled with his surviving followers to the Abyssinian marshes and founded a buffer state with his seat at Sofi on the Atbara River. The Daftardar turned south, ravaging the villages as he passed. The people of al-Ailafun resisted him; some he killed, others he humiliated by branding them as slaves. Finally, the avenging army reached Wad Madani and relieved the garrison. For the time being, the Sudanese lay inert under his bloody hand. The revolt was a rising of despair, without leadership or aim. No chief among the Funj rose to unite the broken fragments of the old loyalties to the Funj Kingdom, which had gone for good. The Sudan had to wait 60 years for a leader to rouse the people in a single movement against the occupying power.

The uprising continued for three years, during which the country witnessed devastations not familiar to the people. The rebellious tribes confronted for the first time the brutality of the centralized state with its modern equipment. In the past, they had faced tribes whose strength was similar to their own. The supremacy of modern firearms became evident for the people and could not be resisted by traditional arms and tribal military formations.

The uprising demonstrated the fierce nature of the government and a bad image was created and consolidated in people's minds. Suppression became a phenomenon that accompanied the rule until it was ousted. The decentralization

of the uprising weakened its power and made it easy for the Turks to suppress it. The tribal feeling prevented a unified center from being created to confront the regime. Despite the loss, however, the uprising became a legacy for the Sudanese, guiding them later in their moment of national awakening. The murder of Ismail in Shendi became a bequest in which people saw a national challenge for foreign invasion.

Other forms of protest and resistance developed between 1825 and 1881. Resistance was launched from different areas and developed between numerous social groups. Passive resistance was one type that demonstrated itself in people fleeing to forests and jungles inside the Sudan or border areas. It expressed rejection of injustice and the inability to resist foreign rule by direct confrontation. The protest of Sufi sheikhs took a passive form. They alienated themselves from the regime and sought exclusion in their Quranic schools among their students and followers. They stopped practicing their role as mediators between the ruled and ruler. The government then lost an important tool that could have helped it in linking the two.

Tribal resistance was a positive form of resistance. Some tribes expressed their rejection of the government's method by confronting it head on. Their motives were tribal and their resistance was a rejection of some of the regime's practices. None of these tribes was qualified to bring down the regime. However, this resistance deprived the regime of the satisfaction of enjoying absolute authority.

Resistance and protest extended to the army among the black troops (the Jihadiyya), with rebellions in 1844 and 1864, which the government was able to extinguish. The Jihadiyya were the slaves and sons of the slaves taken as captives by the Turks from the tribes of the Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. A more serious mutiny of the Jihadiyya broke out in the 4th regiment at Kassala in 1865, where the governor, whose finances were in desperate straits aggravated by a crop failure, was forced to suspend salaries. The Kassala revolt, the most dangerous the Sudan government had suffered over 30 years, was crushed; however, it constituted a different type of rebellion, coming from the soldiers loyal to the government.

Some *jallaba* (itinerant traders) may well have welcomed the new order, since they anticipated better trading conditions with Egypt, but even the

jallaba suffered from heavy taxes and the government's policy of monopolizing trade. They also suffered from uneven competition with Egyptian and foreign traders and from their secondary role in Egyptian markets. The spread of the *jallaba* across the different urban areas of the Sudan and their superior economic position led them to form elements of importance in the society. Through their position, they diffused their resentments to other groups.

Among all forms of resistance, protest, and revolts, the Mahdist revolution was the one that succeeded in overthrowing Turko-Egyptian rule. According to Holt (1958), the Mahdist revolution "was a movement of religious origin which was assisted in its development by political, social, and economic stresses in Sudanese society, and which accomplished a political revolution – the overthrow of the Egyptian rule and the establishment of an indigenous Islamic State." Holt believed that a revolutionary movement was most likely to be successful when there was general discontent that was not confined to one class or territorial group, and which arose from specific grievances, not merely from a vague malaise or resentment. Secondly, this had to coincide with a weakness in the existing government that prevented it from crushing the revolution. Thirdly, there had to be a revolutionary army. Fourthly, there had to be a revolutionary high command to disseminate propaganda and propose a renewed social and political order, and to organize the revolutionary activities evoked by this propaganda.

Shuqayr (2007) listed four principal causes of the Mahdiyya. Firstly, the violence that accompanied the original conquest and the Daftardar's devastation in the Shendi region created a desire for revenge, which he described as revenge of sons for their fathers. Secondly, the unaccustomed and inequitable taxation was levied by force. Thirdly, the attempts of the government to suppress the slave trade struck at an important source of wealth and the basis of the country's domestic and agrarian economy. Fourthly, the partiality shown by the government to some tribes and religious sects engendered jealousy.

The nature of the Mahdist revolution differed from early types of protest. The Mahdi was primarily a religious leader, who had arisen to purge the Muslim world of its faults and to break the power of the infidels. Successive victories of the Mahdi created military problems,

both for the local administration and the government in Cairo. The last Egyptian attempt to hold the Sudan had ended in a defeat at Shaykan in Kordofan in November 1883. It forced both the Egyptian and British governments to confront the problem of the future of the Sudan. The British government, which had occupied Egypt since 1882, insisted that the Egyptians should evacuate their troops and officials. General Gordon, who was sent to accomplish this mission, was murdered at the hands of the followers of the Mahdi, and Khartoum, the capital, fell on January 26, 1885.

SEE ALSO: Mahdist Revolt; Sudanese Protest Under Anglo-Egyptian Rule

References and Suggested Readings

- Abu Saleem, M. (1970) *al-Haraka al-Fikriyya fil Mahdiyya* (The Ideology of the Mahdiyya). Khartoum: Khartoum University Press.
- Bjorkelo, A. (1989) *Prelude to the Mahdiyya Peasants and Traders in the Shendi Region, 1821–1885*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hill, R. (1959) *Egypt in the Sudan 1820–1881*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Holt, P. M. (1958) *The Mahdist State in the Sudan*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Holt, P. M. & Daly, M. W. (1988) *A History of the Sudan from the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*. London and New York: Longman.
- Shuqayr, N. (2007) *Goghrafyat ma Tarikh Al-Sudan* (The History and Geography of the Sudan), 3rd ed. Khartoum: Dar Azza lil Nashr.

Sudanese Women's League

Christine Cynn

The Sudanese Women's League (Rabitat al-Nisa' al-Sudaniyyat) was founded in 1946 by women members of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) in Omdurman, a city on the western bank of the Nile River, across from Khartoum. Founded primarily by middle-class urban women under Dr. Khalda Zahir as president and Fatima Talib as secretary, the League sought to improve the economic and social status of women through focusing on education. The League organized literacy classes, taught sewing and home economics, and gave lectures on women's social problems and health. It also

opened a nursery, which eventually became a primary school for girls.

The League restricted membership to the educated – a tiny minority of the population – and its activities were limited mostly to the urban north. The organization's development reflected ongoing political and class struggles on the national level, in particular around anti-colonial nationalism. In 1947, some of the League's members left to join the *Jamiyat Taruiyat al-Mar'a* (Society for the Promotion of Women), which sought to advance the interests of the land-owning elites from the Mahdi family. In 1952, three members of the League and members of the Sudanese Communist Party founded *Itihad el-Nisai* (the Sudanese Women's Union, or Women's Union) as part of a broad-based unionization movement among workers, teachers, and peasants. Although the Women's Union succeeded the League, it still restricted membership to the educated elite until its leadership recognized that such requirements were hindering its organization efforts.

Centered in Khartoum and since 1956 led by Fatima Ahmed Ibrahim, the Women's Union focused primarily on reform – women's political, social, economic, and civic rights, and equality between men and women in public and private spheres. The Women's Union Constitution of 1957 enumerated its goals as: female education, consciousness raising, and the defense of women's rights, especially through wage parity and social equality.

In 1955, the Women's Union began publishing *Sawat el-Mara* (The Woman's Voice Magazine) to debate issues such as Islam's stance on the status of women, the elimination of cliterodectomy, and facial scarification. The journal enjoyed wide circulation of about 17,000, and the Women's Union itself became the dominant women's organization in Africa with a membership estimated at about 15,000.

The Women's Union remained closely linked to the SCP. It was structured like the hierarchical SCP with a central committee overseeing local and regional cells, and the SCP determined the Women's Union leadership. After an unsuccessful leftist coup in 1971, the Women's Union was forced underground for 16 years, and Fatima Ahmed Ibrahim went into exile. The Women's Union was practically neutralized, with many of its secondary leaders joining the women's wing of the government organ, the Sudan Socialist

Union, which co-opted the Women's Union's name. Throughout the late 1980s, controversy around the Women's Union agenda, strategies, and Ibrahim's leadership resulted in some feminist and women activists on the left distancing themselves from the Women's Union.

SEE ALSO: Women and National Liberation in Africa

References and Suggested Readings

- El-Bakri, Z. B. & Kameir, E. M. (1983) Aspects of Women's Political Participation in Sudan. *International Social Science Journal* 35 (4): 605–23.
- El-Bakri, Z. B., Zahir, F., Badri, B., Khalid, T. A., & al Sanusi, M. (1989) The History of the Sudanese Women's Movement. In S. Wieringa (Ed.), *Women's Movements and Organizations in Historical Perspective*. The Hague: Women and Development Programme, Institute of Social Studies.
- Fluehr-Lobban (1974) Women and Social Liberation: The Sudan Experience. Three Studies on National Integration in the Arab World. Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Information Papers 12 (March): 28–34.
- Hale, S. (1996) *Gender Politics in Sudan: Islamism, Socialism, and the State*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Ibrahim, F. A. (1996) Sudanese Women's Union: Strategies for Emancipation and the Counter Movement. *ufahamu: Journal of the African Activist Association* 24: 2–20.
- Kashif-Badri, H. (1980) *el-Haraka el-nisaiyya fi-el-Sudan* (The Women's Movement in Sudan). Khartoum: University Publishing House, University of Khartoum.

Sukarno (1901–1970)

Andrew J. Waskey

Sukarno (Soekarno) is the only name of the first president of Indonesia. He was an active member of the struggle for independence from Dutch colonial rule.

Sukarno was born in the city of Surabaya in East Java, the Dutch East Indies. His father was a schoolteacher and his mother was from the Buleleng regency. In 1916 he went to Surabaya to attend secondary school, and studied engineering and architecture five years later at the Technische Hogeschool in Bandung.

In 1927 Sukarno and others formed the *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian Nationalist Party, PNI). The party operated on a pro-independence platform. It was also anti-capitalist as well as

anti-imperialist. His involvement in politics led to his arrest in 1929 by the Dutch colonial government, and he was sentenced to two years in prison. When released he found that he had become a folk hero to the Indonesians, although the PNI fell apart during his incarceration.

During the 1930s Sukarno was arrested several times by the Dutch. When the Japanese invaded Indonesia in 1942, they freed him from jail and used him to organize resistance against the Dutch. From Sukarno's point of view, however, he was using the Japanese to free Indonesia from the Dutch. He was able to encourage non-cooperation with the Dutch and limited cooperation with the Japanese. When the Japanese needed aviation fuel, labor conscripts, and other supplies, Sukarno was able to obtain them; he did radio propaganda for them as well.

In November of 1943, Sukarno went to Japan where he was decorated by the emperor and became the head of a ruling committee organized by the Japanese. The committee was the nucleus of the future independence organization. By September of 1944 the Dutch were promising independence at a future date, the announcement of which vindicated Sukarno's policy of cooperating with the Japanese in order to defeat the Dutch.

With Sukarno's help, the Japanese recruited two million Indonesians as a native contingent to fight the Allies; these units were ready to fight against any Allied forces sent to retake Java. The Japanese surrender in August of 1945 was followed by the Indonesian declaration of independence on August 17, 1945. The next day a provisional convention elected him president. Sukarno announced five principles for the new government. These were nationalism, equality among nations, representative democracy, social justice (Marxist in vision), and theism. However, his constitutional vision was to flounder from the beginning because of the numerous factions in Indonesia.

Between 1945 and 1950 Sukarno and other Indonesian nationalists attempted (unsuccessfully) to prevent the Dutch from returning. In October 1945 the Indonesian army was formed but was too disorganized to defeat the Dutch, and in December 1948 Sukarno was captured and taken to Jakarta. After independence, recognized by the Netherlands on December 27, 1949 (later, in August 2005, it declared that it recognized *de facto* Indonesian independence on August

17, 1945), Sukarno continued as president until March 1967, when he was expelled from the presidency by the generals of the army. He died on June 21, 1970.

SEE ALSO: Indonesian Pro-Democracy Protests; Indonesian Protests against Suharto Dictatorship; Indonesian Revolution and Counterrevolution; Japan, Pacifist Movement, 1945–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Legge, J. D. (1985) *Sukarno*. New York: Routledge.
Penders, C. L. M. (1979) *The Life and Times of Sukarno*. New York: Pan Macmillian.

Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925)

Amit Bhattacharyya

Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the “frustrated patriot” and “Father of Modern China,” was a political and revolutionary leader in the early twentieth century who is still highly regarded in China and Taiwan as a unifying figure, in spite of his long history of political failures. Although he did not live to see Manchu despotism overthrown or a political consolidation in post-revolutionary China, he initiated and nurtured a movement that would succeed many years later.

Sun Yat-Sen was born into a peasant family in the village of Choyhung in Kwangtung province. He was educated in missionary schools, mostly outside China: in Hawaii and the British colony of Hong Kong. This missionary background and western exposure may have led to his aversion for traditional Chinese religion and embrace of Christianity in 1884. Sun Yat-Sen returned to China to attend Queens College and then medical school in Hong Kong, where he qualified as a physician in 1892. From the 1890s, reformist ideologies had been gaining ground among the western-educated professional and commercial class in China. Sun Yat-Sen initially aligned himself with such bourgeois-liberal reformists in an attempt to push through proposals for reform in agriculture, railways, administration, education, and business. All of his attempts ended in failure, however, and he was impelled to think in terms of a revolutionary overthrow of the Manchu rulers and the creation of a republic.

Anti-Manchu Protest

In 1894 Sun Yat-Sen formed the Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Society) in Honolulu as the first Chinese bourgeois revolutionary organization. Hsing Chung Hui attempted to weave together the multiplicity of anti-Manchu popular outbreaks that erupted when China was forced to sign the humiliating Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 – a result of the Manchu defeat at the hands of Japan. Sun Yat-Sen became a fugitive in China when his first plan for a revolutionary uprising in Canton was exposed. He secretly left China for Europe, and while in London became acquainted with the writings of western philosophers and political economists such as Karl Marx, J. S. Mill, and Adam Smith. By early 1901 Sun Yat-Sen was in Japan mobilizing almost 10,000 Chinese expatriates for an uprising in Huichow, China; however, this attempt was also suppressed.

After signing the Protocol of 1901, the Qing government facilitated imperial penetration, and all of China cried out for the overthrow of the Manchu regime. Sun Yat-Sen thus set about forming a revolutionary party to unify the diverse radical and anti-Manchu forces to lead the bourgeois-democratic revolution on a nationwide scale. His strategy was to bring together sporadic revolts, while at the same time gaining foreign respect for the revolution. The culmination of his efforts was the formation of the revolutionary organization Tung Meng Hui (Revolutionary Brotherhood) in 1905.

Three Principles of the People

The essence of Sun Yat-Sen's ideology was manifested in the slogan "Drive out the Manchus, restore Chinese rule, establish a republic, and equalize land rights." From this slogan the Three Principles of the People were developed: People's Nationalism, People's Democracy, and People's Livelihood, which Sun Yat-Sen proclaimed in 1905. People's Nationalism was aimed at the overthrow of Manchu rule and the establishment of a republic in China. It targeted the Qing ruling aristocracy, but made no mention of the role played by foreign imperialism. The goal of People's Democracy was to establish a democratic constitutional government patterned after the western capitalist countries. The Principle of People's Livelihood reflected the social aspect of the program and referred to

equal rights to land, and implied nationalization of land. People's Livelihood sought to free the peasantry from the feudal yoke; however, it did not take into account the role of the working class.

Tung Meng Hui's formation coincided with numerous anti-tax riots and revolutionary outbreaks that took place in different parts of China from 1905 to 1911. Though these were not successful, they nourished the protest movements that would intensify and compel the Qing to promulgate a Nine-Year Program of Constitutional Reform in 1908. Later that year, both Empress Tzu Hsi and the imprisoned Emperor Kuang-hsu died, and Pu Yi, an infant surrounded by non-entities, was on the throne. The crisis of the Manchu became more serious than ever, while at the same time Sun Yat-Sen was secretly preparing for the final showdown with the imperial army. In September 1911 a rising in Sichuan stimulated the revolutionary mood of the people. Within a month, 13 provinces had been lost from the empire. After the revolution of 1911 the defeated Manchu rulers tried to save their position by appointing a Manchu army general and former minister, Yuan Shikai, as the premier. Sun Yat-Sen became the president of the republic on January 1, 1912. China was essentially divided between the republicans in the South, with Nanking as their capital, and Yuan Shikai and his forces in the North, with Peking as the capital. The revolution remained incomplete; it abolished the feudal dynastic rule of the Manchus, but not feudalism, foreign imperialism, or Yuan Shikai's dictatorship. Anxious to bring about the unity of the North and the South, Sun Yat-Sen yielded the presidency to Yuan Shikai in 1912. Yuan Shikai went on to establish a military dictatorship in China.

Kuomintang and the Three Major Policies

In August 1912 Sun Yat-Sen formed the Kuomintang (KMT) political party, which replaced Tung Meng Hui. In 1913, when the full depth of Yuan's betrayal became clear, Sun Yat-Sen mobilized the army of south China and launched the Second Revolution, directed against the dictator. This uprising was suppressed after months of fighting, however, because agrarian demands were again ignored and the peasants therefore remained aloof. After gaining victory, Yuan Shikai banned the KMT.

With the outbreak of World War I, China stood face to face with a new set of problems. Japan joined the Allies in the war and presented the president, Yuan Shikai, with the infamous Twenty-one Demands, the acceptance of which would mean the colonization of vast parts of China by Japan. The Chinese government succumbed to this pressure and accepted all of the demands. This, in addition to Article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles, which handed over German concessions in China to Japan, led to the May 4th movement of 1919.

With the influence of the October Revolution in Russia, Sun Yat-Sen's ideology began to evolve. With the formation of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1921, he drastically revised his own views and program. He then propounded the Three Major Policies for the KMT: Alliance with Soviet Russia; Alliance with the CPC; and Support for the Workers' and Peasants' Movement. This provided the ideological basis of the First United Front (1923–7) between the KMT and the CPC. A new revolutionary government was set up in Canton. It established the Whampoa Military Academy, with the KMT officer Chiang Kai-Shek as the dean, and the CPC leader Zhou Enlai as political director, to train officers to fight against the Northern warlords. Canton thus became the center of the revived hopes and activity of everything that was progressive in China. Sun Yat-Sen, however, did not live long after that. In the end, nothing grew from Sun Yat-Sen's elaborate plans for China's economic transformation, and no imperialist government recognized any regime he headed, impelling historian C. Martin Wilbur (1976) to describe Sun Yat-Sen's life as "a somber story of shattered dreams."

SEE ALSO: Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; China, May 4th Movement; Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911; Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864; Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bergere, M. C. (1989) *The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie 1911–1937*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Epstein, I. (1956) *From Opium War to Liberation*. Beijing: New World Press.
- Schiffirin, H. Z. (1968) *Sun Yat-Sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Sharman L. (1934) *Sun Yat-Sen: His life and its Meaning: A Critical Biography*. New York: John Day.
- Sheng, H. & Liu, D. et al. (1983) *The 1911 Revolution: A Retrospective After 70 Years*. Beijing: New World Press.
- Wilbur, C. M. (1976) *Sun Yat-Sen: The Frustrated Patriot*. New York: Columbia University Press.

SWAPO (South West African People's Organization)

Tilman Dederling

The South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) was formed in the 1950s in contemporary Namibia among a group of about 200 Ovambo workers who had maneuvered their way through the bureaucratic maze of the migrant labor system to reach Cape Town where they faced the constant danger of falling foul of the repressive South African pass laws. Under the leadership of Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, this group established connections with white and black members of left and liberal South African opposition groups, such as the African National Congress, the Communist Party, the Liberal Party, the Congress of Democrats, and the South African Coloured People's Organization. In 1957 the South African government removed Toivo to Ovamboland, where he continued campaigning for political independence and petitioning the United Nations. The Ovambo People's Organization (OPO) emerged from this set of connections between Namibian and South African activists and against the background of the increasing internationalization of anti-colonial resistance in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1960 it was transformed into SWAPO. Unlike other emerging leaders of the independence movement, such as Sam Nujoma, Toivo did not go into exile. In 1966 the apartheid government sentenced Toivo to 20 years in prison. He was released in 1984 and joined SWAPO in exile, which in the meantime had been recognized as the sole representative of the Namibian people under the organization's energetic president, Nujoma.

From the 1950s, a number of Namibian political organizations, such as the South West Africa Progressive Association (SWAPA) and the Herero-dominated Chiefs' Council, emerged to test the limits of independent African political

action under the South African occupation. The South West Africa National Union (SWANU) was originally conceptualized as an umbrella organization for the different independence movements. From its inception, however, it was disrupted by debates on representation and by organizational difficulties. These conflicts among the different sections of the independence movement showed that there were not only incompatible views on strategy. The older representatives of traditional leadership often seemed to be tainted by their integration into the structures of the colonial state as salaried headmen or as organizers of migrant labor. Some scholars suggest that the new conflicts reflected the aspirations of a new generation of leaders, who had been exposed to external ideological and political influences and perceived themselves to be more modern and less "tribal" than the old leadership. Representatives of this new generation of activists wanted to mobilize followers more vigorously across ethnic barriers and, stimulated by the rising wave of decolonization on the continent, they envisaged more resolute action beyond petitioning the authorities.

The violent response of the colonial state to African protest against the forced removal of Windhoek's black population to nearby Katutura township in 1959, which left 11 people dead and 44 injured, has been described as a major turning point in the history of Namibian nationalism. Subsequently, the South African authorities intensified the repression of black political movements, which mirrored the harsh methods employed against the ANC and other organizations in South Africa from the early 1960s. In the wake of the Katutura killings the disputes between the Herero in the Chiefs' Council and the SWANU leadership escalated and led to an open split between the two organizations, which eventually damaged the chances of both associations to consolidate their respective positions.

Although SWAPO was never banned in Namibia, many of the important leaders were driven into exile where they could establish connections with international organizations and with newly independent countries in the Third World. Before he left the country to organize the armed struggle against South African rule, Nujoma played a major role in Namibia in building organizational ties among various important sections of the African population. His diplomatic activities in exile contributed to

alerting the world public to the situation in Namibia. In 1960 Nujoma appeared together with other Namibians and with Oliver Tambo of the ANC before the UN General Assembly to speak up against South Africa's repressive policies.

In 1961 SWAPO opened an office in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, and the organization began to send cadres for military training to Algeria, Egypt, North Korea, and the Soviet Union. SWAPO continued to cooperate with the Chiefs' Council for several years after the Katutura killings. Although he represented a new type of vigorous national leadership, Nujoma had kept his distance to the better-educated SWANU leadership and initially relied more on the solid ethnic base of the Herero leaders in the Chiefs' Council. The fallout between the latter and SWANU made the cooperation with SWANU less significant. Moreover, the Cold War and its ramifications, such as the Sino-Soviet split, impacted on the disputes between SWANU and SWAPO in the 1960s. SWAPO pursued a strategy which aimed at keeping the doors to the UN and to western countries open, despite increasing support from the Soviets. In contrast, SWANU propagated a closer alignment with China, which stance contributed to its gradual slide into irrelevance.

Although the independence movement in Namibia was unable to create a unified centralized structure for the struggle against South Africa, SWAPO succeeded in establishing the political credibility which proved to be crucial to its ascent to international recognition. A major reason was that SWAPO started a guerrilla war in Namibia in 1966. The military activities of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) did not produce significant results on the ground, but their importance consisted in affirming SWAPO's status as one of the legitimate liberation movements in Africa. By the late 1970s SWAPO was recognized both by the OAU and the UN as the sole representative of the Namibian people.

During the "heroic period of the internal struggle" from 1971 to 1975, SWAPO also made its presence felt inside Namibia, holding public meetings and successfully boycotting elections for an Ovambo "homeland." The general strike of 1971-2 erupted among contract workers in the South African enclave Walvis Bay and spread to the mining industry and other sectors, immobilizing an estimated 43,000 contract workers. Because

of the participation of contract workers from Angola and from Ovamboland, the repercussions of the strike extended to the rural population on both sides of the northern border, where Africans began to rebel violently against the Portuguese and South African regimes. The strike became a key moment in the history of the independence movement because it generated genuine mass support for SWAPO in Ovamboland. Traditional leaders were increasingly discredited because they collaborated with the South African administration and exposed their men to the brutal realities of labor migration. By the mid-1970s SWAPO also found strong support among the Nama in the south of the country. In subsequent years, facing increasing bouts of state repression, SWAPO tried to adjust its tactics to the situation on the ground by inspiring and supporting a number of organizations, ranging from students' and women's associations to trade unions. These activities were often observed with some suspicion by the leadership in exile. Since Ovamboland was increasingly turned into a war zone from where the South African military launched cross-border raids into Angola, SWAPO activism could only be pursued more openly in the south of Namibia. The southerners were considered better educated and politically more sophisticated than the traditional leadership based in Ovamboland. This heightened tensions within the independence movement, which was under constant attack from the apartheid regime. In the long run, the external leadership established its hegemony of the internal resistance, arguing somewhat convincingly that, ultimately, any prospect of liberation depended on SWAPO's military activities and international connections.

These tensions between the internal and external branches of SWAPO were also reflected in the resurrection of trade union activities in the 1980s following a period of heavy state repression which practically immobilized the workers' movement. In the 1980s the SWAPO-affiliated National Union of Namibian Workers began to organize workers in the mining sector and in the meat-processing and chemical industries. Labor actions, such as a strike in the Tsumeb copper mine in 1987, were influenced by the contemporaneous upsurge of union activities in South Africa and by the release of a number of SWAPO labor activists from South African prisons. These activities generated concern among

the external leadership; Sam Nujoma is reported to have summoned trade union leaders to Europe and reprimanded them for creating independent centers of political militancy in Namibia.

Until the collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola in the early 1970s the South Africans were able to suppress SWAPO's military activities in Ovamboland. This forced PLAN fighters to focus on the Caprivi Strip in the northeast of the country, which was accessible from Zambia. These strikes on representatives of the state included attacks on collaborators among the indigenous elite, such as the killing of Chief Philomenon Elifas who participated in the South Africa-inspired *Turnhalle* (sports hall) assembly which attempted to achieve an alternative solution to a SWAPO-led government.

SWAPO successfully negotiated and survived the shifting strategic and political circumstances which added to the complexities of the situation in southern Africa during the period of the proxy war which devastated Angola in the 1970s and 1980s. The South African military involvement in Angola from September 1975 to March 1976 provided a major impetus to the SWAPO war effort, because in the wake of the South African withdrawal SWAPO could move its bases closer to the northern Namibian border. Groups of 60–100 PLAN fighters conducted cross-border raids into northern Namibia and planted landmines. The armed struggle received a setback, however, when South African troops returned to Angola from 1978 to become involved in heavy fighting with government troops and their Cuban auxiliaries.

On May 4, 1978 South African troops attacked the Cassinga camp, 250 kilometers north of the southern Angola border, which left about 600 people dead, many of them non-combatants. The South African military celebrated the raid as a great success in fighting terrorism, but it backfired politically because the mass killing infuriated the world public and gave SWAPO a clear victory in the propaganda war. The early 1980s saw the intensified presence of the South African military in southern Angola. In a series of military operations the South Africans put enormous pressure not only on the Angolans and their Cuban allies but also on SWAPO's positions.

By 1988 the situation had escalated to the point that the main patrons of the belligerents – the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the United States – pushed the warring parties into negotiations.

American diplomacy had succeeded in creating “linkage” between the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and the occupation of Namibia by the South Africans. South Africa’s involvement in the war in Namibia and Angola had put great pressure on the finances of the white minority regime. The apartheid government faced increasingly bitter resistance in South Africa, which convinced many whites that the war in Namibia and Angola had become a costly obstacle to seeking a peaceful solution at home. In 1988 Angola, Cuba, and South Africa agreed to an end of the war. South Africa accepted UN Resolution 435, which paved the way for free elections in Namibia under the supervision of UN peace-keeping troops and for the final withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia. On March 21, 1990 Sam Nujoma was sworn in by UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar as the first president of the independent Republic of Namibia. Subsequently, SWAPO became the dominant party in the independent battle-scarred country.

SEE ALSO: Nujoma, Sam (b. 1929); Toivo ya Toivo, Andimba (b. 1924); Witbooi, Hendrik (ca. 1825–1905)

References and Suggested Readings

- Brown, S. (1995) *Diplomacy by Other Means: SWAPO’s Liberation War*. In C. Leys & J. S. Saul (Eds.), *Namibia’s Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword*. Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Dierks, K. (2002) *Chronology of Namibian History: From Pre-Historical Times to Independent Namibia*. Windhoek: Namibia Scientific Society.
- Emmet, T. (1999) *Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915–1966*. Namibia Studies Series 4. Basel: P. Schlettwein.
- Katjavivi, P. H. (1988) *A History of Resistance in Namibia*. Paris: Unesco.
- Leys, C. & Saul, J. S. (Eds.) (1995) *Namibia’s Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword*. Athens: Ohio University Press.

Swaziland, nationalist and economic protests

Nhlanhla Dlamini

Early Period

Protest and resistance have been manifested in Swaziland since at least the sixteenth century, when the Dlamini rulers started to assert their

hegemony over the resilient peoples of the area. In this context, contestations centered on the alliances and rivalries that were set up either in support of, or in competition with, Dlamini domination. During the time of Mswati II’s reign in the nineteenth century, major forms of protest emanated from competing rivalries contending the throne. This was the case, for example, when rebellions were staged by the king’s brothers, Malambule, Fokoti, and Somcuba. Ultimately, Dlamini hegemony had been firmly established by the time of Mswati II’s demise in 1865.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century there was pressure from the Boer republics and the British empire: this was met by diplomatic but vigorous protest from Swaziland’s indigenous rulers, although they ultimately agreed to the territory becoming a British protectorate in 1902. The traditional rulers continued advancing Swazi grievances after the establishment of colonial rule, and well before the emergence of modern political parties.

While British sovereignty was accepted, its terms were contested throughout the period of colonial rule. Traditional leaders sought to defend their prerogatives at the same time as they were being incorporated into the system of “indirect rule.” Between 1895 and 1921, the Queen Regent Labotsibeni Gwamile Mdluli fiercely resisted the imposition of colonial authority, and openly and boldly challenged the claims of the colonial power. As early as 1904 the Swazi protested heavy taxation by the colonial state as they were dissatisfied with the manner in which taxation was introduced. Rumors caught the attention of the colonial administration that the Swazi felt that they were oppressed and harshly treated and were contemplating revolution.

The Sir George Grey Commission which completed the demarcation of land in 1909 inspired protest among the Swazi who felt that they had been cheated when land was divided among themselves, the British crown, and private European landowners. In meetings with colonial officials the Queen Regent Labotsibeni and Prince Malunge vigorously expressed these sentiments. A series of articles in the newspaper *Abantu Batho* (The People), which was identified with the South African Native National Congress (SANNC, later the African National Congress, ANC) in 1913 saw anonymous writers, supposedly Swazi, articulate grievances about

the manner in which the Swazi had lost land, and argued that it was identical to the South African case where the ownership of land had been largely removed from Africans (Swaziland National Archives, RCS 124/1913).

Soon after his installation as Paramount Chief in 1921 Sobhuza II protested, among other issues, the manner in which British rule interfered with the powers of the traditional rulers, and the transfer of land ownership to whites and the state. This was pursued through a series of delegations to London, including a legal case in 1926 through which Sobhuza sought to regain lost land. Though Sobhuza lost the case, a combination of change in wartime colonial policy and a petition presented to the British in 1941 resulted in some considerable amount of crown land being allocated for use by the Swazi between 1930 and 1950.

Nationalists and Modernizers

Swazi protests from the 1920s were also inspired by the emergence of modern associations, and by the example of the ANC in South Africa. The nascent group of educated Swazi, under the auspices of the Swaziland Progressive Association (SPA) formed in 1929, had begun to protest racial discrimination in Swaziland. Though the SPA made its representations directly to the colonial government, it frequently experienced opposition from the Swazi traditional leadership, the “royalists,” who considered themselves as the authentic voice of the Swazi people.

For much of its existence, the SPA confined itself to the submission of petitions to the colonial government. Occasionally the SPA’s struggle had contradictory overtones, and oscillated between themes that addressed discrimination and those that celebrated positive relations between blacks and whites. It also appears that the SPA lacked coordination strategies, as it tended to speak for groups that were not apparently aware of its activities. This may be attributed to its elitist approach, with the SPA perceiving itself as the educated “mouthpiece” of the masses. It lacked a strategy to translate its concerns into a national campaign, and ultimately failed in protesting racial discrimination in Swaziland.

The start of the 1960s saw parties like the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) emerge and compete; there was growing protest and increas-

ingly vocal calls for a return of Swazi self-determination. These developments coincided with the labor protests of 1962–3 when rising worker consciousness was manifested in a series of strikes in industrial and urban centers. This long overdue labor unrest was an outlet for deep-seated grievances concerning poor working and living conditions, which were inextricably linked to the prevalent discriminatory workplace policies. From the point of view of the workers and political activists who rose to articulate these grievances, and to mobilize labor, these conditions were the result of colonial domination; hence the underlying anti-colonial gestures and sentiments during the strikes.

The period also saw constitutional negotiations with the colonial power, which served as bargaining forums for a new political order. While the newly formed political parties favored change along the principles of liberal democracy, the royalists advocated a political dispensation in which power was transferred to the Swazi monarchy. One key area of contention was land, which the royalists regarded as the property of the monarchy, administered on behalf of the people by the chiefs. When it became apparent that the British would not hand over power to the monarchy without the evidence of support from the Swazi people, the monarchy formed the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM) to contest the elections.

Ultimately, conditions swung in favor of the Swazi monarchy, as witnessed in its major victories in the Legislative Council elections in 1964 and the pre-independence elections in 1967. The monarchy and its supporters also secured the support of most conservative whites in Swaziland. It was able to present the radical nationalism of groups like Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) – a 1964 split off the SPP, headed by Zwane – as a foreign ideology, contrary to Swazi traditions. The INM formed the first government of independent Swaziland in 1968, with Samuel Thornton Msindazwe Sukati as Speaker.

Soon after the first post-independence elections in 1972, Sobhuza II abrogated the constitution and decreed the banning of political parties in the country, subsequently instituting a system of limited “non-partisan” elections based on *Tinkhundla*, or local constituencies. The parties had begun showing signs of being a credible threat to

the royalist bloc. The NNLC, backed by figures like Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, for instance, had won four seats, mainly in the working-class constituencies of the Mpumalanga sugar plantations. From the banning of political parties, opposition parties operated from underground, key figures like Zwane were repeatedly arrested or driven into exile, and trade unions provided a major vehicle for public protest. A new constitution was promulgated in 1978, but not formally presented.

Under the *Tinkhundla* Regime

Supported by students, teachers staged a general strike in 1977 to protest low wages. The action resulted in serious disturbances in many parts of the country. The period following Sobhuza II's demise in 1982, just prior to the coronation of Mswati III in 1986, was characterized by a political vacuum and serious infighting in the ruling elite, a section of which seems to have favored a republican state. University students took to the streets in 1983 to protest the dethronement of Dzeliwe Shongwe as Queen Regent.

The underground People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO), now the main opposition grouping, was formed at the University of Swaziland the same year. In 1990 university students at the main university campus, Kwaluseni, engaged in class boycotts to protest, among other issues, the shortage of lecturers and to demand the release from jail of a student detained in connection with political activity. The protest was forcefully terminated through army and police intervention. Throughout the 1990s students' grievances at the university received the sympathy of the labor movement and political activists. The Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO) was formed in 1991.

Squatter evictions from farms in the different parts of the country since the 1980s inspired protests well into the early 2000s. In an unrelated case, dissident chiefs Mliba Fakudze and Mtfuso Dlamini were evicted from the Kamkhweli and Macetjeni chiefdoms in 2000 in favor of Prince Maguga. This was condemned by some union leaders, as well as by women from these chiefdoms, who showed their naked buttocks in public as a "gift" to the now deceased prince.

Parallel to student protests were various strikes, which at times brought the economy of

the country to a halt. A small underground Swaziland Communist Party was formed in 1994. In the mid-1990s, Swazi unions were amongst the most rapidly growing in the world. They forged close ties with formations like the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which, along with the South African Communist Party (SACP), provides support to Swazi political exiles and had organized several blockades of Swazi border posts. In 1994, the Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) held a two-day general strike for political and economic reforms. The strength of the labor movement was again dramatically demonstrated when the SFTU staged a countrywide strike in March 1996 that brought the country to a standstill for 28 days, despite the arrest of union leaders. Through this strike the SFTU was applying pressure for the improvement of working conditions as well as demanding certain political reforms and a new constitutional dispensation. Several more general strikes took place in 1997.

Such struggles forced some concessions: most of the political reforms since the start of the 1990s can be traced to protests by pro-democracy groups and labor. An ongoing review of the constitution saw Mswati III announce in 2001 that the existing system would be retained, and even extended. By July 2006, protests had led to a new constitution being put in place (not long after the arrest of a number of PUDEMO and SWAYOCO activists for high treason after a spate of firebomb attacks). The new constitution has, however, generally been heavily criticized by civil society for its disappointing provisions and its strong continuities with the political status quo.

Discontent with the constitution, the repression of political parties, and worker-unfriendly policies led to unions and prominent political formations jointly organizing successful protest marches on July 24 and 25, 2007 in Manzini and Mbabane respectively. At the same time, there have been major protests at the University of Swaziland against curriculum restructuring: political groups saw this as a favorable climate for their activities ahead of the 2008 elections. The protests have involved, *inter alia*, the burning down of university buildings, leading to the closure of the university in 2007. In 2008, the university administration resolved to postpone examinations indefinitely. Students appealed to the courts, and a final verdict interdicting the

university from implementing its new curriculum was issued April 10, 2008. With ongoing student militancy and labor organizing, it seems certain Swaziland will remain a turbulent area for years to come.

SEE ALSO: COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions); Lesotho, Popular Protest and Resistance; Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972); Nyerere, Julius (1922–1999); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; Zwane, Ambrose Pheseyha (1922–1998)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bonner, P. (1983) *Kings, Commoners, Concessionaires: The Evolution and Dissolution of the Nineteenth-Century Swazi State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Booth, A. R. (1983) *Swaziland: Tradition and Change in a Southern African Kingdom*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Crush, J. S. (1985) Colonial Coercion and the Swazi Tax Revolt of 1903–1907. *Political Geography Quarterly* 11: 179–90.
- Dlamini, N. (2007) *The Legal Abolition of Racial Discrimination and its Aftermath: The Case of Swaziland, 1945–1973*. PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand.
- Fransman, M. (1978) *The State and Development in Swaziland, 1960–1977*. PhD thesis, University of Sussex.
- Genge, M. (2001) *Power and Gender in Southern African History: Power Relations in the Era of Queen Labotsibeni Gwamile Mdluli of Swaziland, ca. 1875–1921*. PhD thesis, Michigan State University.
- Jones, H. W. (1993) *A Biographical Register of Swaziland up to 1902*. Pietermaritzburg: Natal University Press.
- Kanduzza, A. (2001) Evolving Significance of Sobhuza's 1941 Petition. *TransAfrican Journal of History* 25: 110–22.
- Levin, R. (1997) *When the Sleeping Grass Amakens: Land and Power in Swaziland*. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press.
- Macmillan, H. (1985) Swaziland: Decolonization and the Triumph of "Tradition." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 23: 643–66.
- Matsebula, J. S. M. (1988) *A History of Swaziland*, 3rd ed. Cape Town: Longman.
- Nyeko, B. H. L. (1977) *The Swazi Leadership's Response to Colonial Rule, 1902–1930*. DPhil, Makerere University.
- Potholm, C. (1972) *Swaziland: The Dynamics of Political Modernization*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Simelane, H. S. (2000) *Colonialism and Economic Change in Swaziland, 1940–1960*. Manzini: JaNyeko.

Swedish Revolution of 1809

Marcelline Block

King Gustavus III of Sweden (r. 1771–92) was a so-called enlightened despot who not only ushered in an age of culture and prosperity in Sweden, but also imposed absolutism during a coup d'état in 1772. Previously, Sweden had been ruled by a parliamentary system under the Riksdag of the Swedish Estates. In 1792 Gustavus III was assassinated at a masquerade ball by a conspiracy of nobles angered by his absolutist stance.

Gustavus III's son, Gustav IV Adolf (1778–1837; also known as Gustavus IV) ascended to the throne at age 14 in 1792 under the regency of his uncle Charles, duke of Södermanland. At age 18 he became the sole ruler of Sweden. Gustavus IV was a devout Christian; in 1796 he refused to marry the granddaughter of the Russian Empress Catherine the Great, Alexandra Pavlovna, because she intended to continue worshipping in the Russian Orthodox Church. Gustavus IV was initially well liked, perceived as a down-to-earth, pious man, unlike his father. Yet he too became an intransigent, absolute monarch who claimed he would never again call a meeting of the Riksdag of the Swedish Estates after they opposed him in March and April 1800. Gustavus IV's ferocious hatred of France – because of the Jacobins and Napoleon, whom he considered to be the antichrist – coupled with his refusal to cooperate with the Riksdag and his failure to resolve Sweden's fiscal and agricultural crises led to his downfall. Gustavus IV's rule was marked by internal strife as well as major diplomatic gaffes, military mistakes, and substantial losses of Swedish territories during the Russo-Swedish Wars and the Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century.

In 1805 Gustavus IV joined the Third Coalition of Great Britain, Russia, and Austria against Napoleonic France. After France's strategic and devastating victory over Prussia in the Battle of Jena (1806), Napoleon made numerous diplomatic proposals to Sweden, which Gustavus IV rejected, even though he had previously lost several battles in his attempts to aid the British and Russian armies against France. As a result, Sweden lost its territorial holdings in Pomerania and the Swedish army was nearly massacred.

When Tsar Alexander I of Russia (Sweden's former ally) and Napoleon signed the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, Gustavus IV rejected all of Alexander's proposals and also did not properly protect Finland, at that time a Swedish territory, and it was soon attacked by Russia. A small Swedish contingent attempted to stave off the Russian assault while the under-equipped Finnish army was essentially left to fend for itself. Swedish troops were preoccupied with Denmark, whose declaration of war against Sweden in 1808 was at the behest of Napoleon and, oddly enough, was to be led by Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte – ironically, the future king of Sweden. This Danish assault never materialized, yet the defeat of Sweden by Russia during the Finnish War of February 1808–September 1809 caused the loss of Sweden's eastern territory, which then became the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland under the rule of imperial Russia. In the Treaty of Fredrikshamn/Hamina (September 17, 1809), Sweden formally surrendered all of its holdings in Finland, as well as parts of Lapland, to Russia. Sweden's loss of Finland led to the deposition of Gustavus IV by several military conspirators on March 13, 1809. This is one of the main events of the Swedish Revolution of 1809, which established a new constitution and a new royal dynasty.

Gustavus IV was deposed when seven army officers, all part of a larger conspiracy, broke into his royal palace, seizing him and his family, and imprisoning them in Gripsholm Castle. Gustavus IV's elderly uncle and former regent, Charles, was instated as King Charles XIII. On March 29 Gustavus IV abdicated the throne because he thought that by doing so he could preserve the crown for his son. But this was not to be. On May 19 the Riksdag of the Swedish Estates proclaimed that not only Gustavus IV but also his entire family had lost their right to the crown. In December 1809 Gustavus IV and his family were exiled to Germany; he ultimately died in poverty in Switzerland, where he was known as Colonel Gustavsson, among other aliases that included Count Gottorp and the Duke of Holstein-Eutin.

Since King Charles XIII had no heir, the Swedish Estates named Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte (1733–1844) – he who had previously served as one of Napoleon's marshals – crown prince in 1810 and elected him heir to the Swedish throne. In 1818 Bernadotte became King Charles

XIV John. Although the Bernadotte family remains the royal family in Sweden, the current king of Sweden, King Carl XVI Gustaf (b. 1946; ruled since September 15, 1973), is coincidentally a descendant of both Gustavus IV and Bernadotte, since the Bernadotte King Gustav V of Sweden married Gustavus IV's great-granddaughter Victoria of Baden. Gustav V is the father of King Gustav VI Adolf (r. 1950–73) and the grandfather of King Carl XVI Gustaf. Through this marriage, the line of Gustavus IV who had been deposed and had abdicated the throne in 1809 has been reinstated. Both lines – Gustavus and Bernadotte – have produced the current royal family of Sweden.

Along with the new Bernadotte dynasty, another major result of the Swedish Revolution of 1809 was the ratification by the Riksdag of the Swedish Estates of an important constitutional reform, the *Regeringsformen* (Instrument of Government) on June 6, 1809. The *Regeringsformen* lasted until 1974. In 1975 a new constitution established Sweden as a parliamentary monarchy.

SEE ALSO: Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821); Denmark, Insurrection and Revolt; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Gustav Rebellions; Nordic Revolts and Popular Protests, 1500–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Bain, R. N. (1905) *Scandinavia: A Political History of Denmark, Norway and Sweden from 1513 to 1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barton, H. A. (1986) *Scandinavia in the Revolutionary Era, 1760–1815*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Carlsson, S. C. O. (1946) *Gustav IV Adolf: En biografi*. Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand.
- Elkan, S. S. (1913) *An Exiled King: Gustaf Adolf IV of Sweden*. London: Hutchinson.
- Elstob, E. C. (1979) *Sweden: A Political and Cultural History*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Griffiths, T. (2004) *Scandinavia: At War with Trolls: A History from the Napoleonic Era to the Third Millennium*. Kent Town, S. Australia: Wakefield Press.
- Heckscher, G. (1959) *The Swedish Constitution, 1809–1959: Tradition and Practice in Constitutional Development*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute.
- Jorgensen, C. (2004) *The Anglo-Swedish Alliance Against Napoleonic France*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Koblik, S. (Ed.) (1975) *Sweden's Development from Poverty to Affluence, 1750–1970*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Miller, D. (1975) *The Political History of Finland, 1809–1966*. London: Heinemann.

- Nordstrom, B. J. (2002) *The History of Sweden*. Greenwood Histories of the Modern Nations. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Sather, L. (2004) *Border War and Border Peace: The Norwegian-Swedish War of 1808 and the Swedish Revolution of 1809*. In *Scandinavians in Old and New Lands: Essays in Honor of H. Arnold Barton*. Chicago: Swedish-American Historical Society.
- Scott, F. D. (1977) *Sweden: The Nation's History*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Swift, Jonathan (1667–1745)

Karen Sonnelitter

In the history of protest literature, few authors have been as successful as Jonathan Swift in making their dissident voices heard. Although he sometimes wielded his satirical pen on behalf of narrow partisan political interests, the universal themes of his best writing assure its immortality. His best-known work, *Gulliver's Travels*, takes pomposity and the absurdity of the human condition as its subjects, and his *Battle of the Books* lampoons the self-importance of scholarly discourse, but some of his most powerful satires take aim at wrongs done to his native Ireland. In *A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Poor People in Ireland Being a Burden to Their Parents or Country, and for Making Them Beneficial to the Public*, Swift argued with deadpan seriousness that impoverished Irish families should breed children to be sold as culinary delicacies for the rich.

Swift was born in Dublin on November 30, 1667. Little is known about his early life, but it seems that when he was a child his widowed mother returned to England, her birthplace, and left him in Ireland to be raised by an uncle. He entered Trinity College in 1682 and completed his BA degree in 1686. In 1688 political troubles in Ireland stemming from England's "Glorious Revolution" prompted Swift to emigrate to England, where he became secretary to Sir William Temple. While living at Temple's home, Swift met Esther Johnson, then 8 years old, whom he preferred to call "Stella." The two would maintain a close relationship for the rest of her life, and she would figure prominently in his writing.

Swift completed his MA in 1692 at Hertford College, Oxford, and in 1694 he temporarily left Temple's service to be ordained in the Church of Ireland. Unhappy with the remote parish to which

he was appointed, he returned to work for Temple until the latter's death in 1699. In 1702 Swift received his Doctor of Divinity from Trinity College, Dublin. Shortly after, he began to gain a reputation as a writer through the publication of *A Tale of a Tub* and *The Battle of the Books*.

Swift also became increasingly politically active, traveling to London to argue for the claims of the Irish clergy to "Queen Anne's Bounty" – substantial financial benefits enjoyed by the English clergy. Finding little support from the Whig government, Swift allied himself with powerful Tories and published several political pamphlets on their behalf. He was recruited to become editor of the *Examiner*, the weekly Tory newspaper, in 1710. During the years the Tories were in office (1710–15), Swift was an active member of inner government circles. He hoped his friends would be able to find him a church appointment in England, but Queen Anne personally disliked him and the best they could do for him was the deanery of St. Patrick's Cathedral in Dublin, which he accepted in 1713. Swift's thoughts and experiences during this time were recorded in a long series of letters he wrote to Esther Johnson and later compiled into *The Journal of Stella*.

Though dejected at having to return to Ireland, Swift soon began to channel his skills as a political pamphleteer into support for Irish causes. His status as an Irish patriot was earned through the publication of *Proposal for the Universal Use of Irish Manufacture* (1720), *The Drapier's Letters* (1724), and the above-mentioned *Modest Proposal* (1729). He also began to write his masterpiece *Gulliver's Travels*, which was published pseudonymously in 1726.

In 1728 he was devastated by the death of his beloved Stella. In 1731 he would write his own obituary, *Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift*, though he would live on until 1745. He left his fortune to the establishment of a hospital for the mentally ill and was buried alongside Stella, as he had desired.

SEE ALSO: Glorious Revolution, Britain, 1688

References and Suggested Readings

- Forster, J. (1876) *The Life of Jonathan Swift*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Nokes, D. (1985) *Jonathan Swift, a Hypocrite Reversed: A Critical Biography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Quintana, R. (1955) *Swift: An Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Swing Riots

Carl J. Griffin

Starting with the concurrent destruction of threshing machines in the Elham Valley area of east Kent and a wave of incendiary fires in the vicinity of Sevenoaks in the late summer of 1830, the so-called "Swing Riots" went on to engulf most of rural southern, central, and eastern England. Whilst the destruction of labor-sapping threshing machines became, retrospectively, the hallmark of the movement, Swing took many forms including incendiarism, "mobbings," political demonstrations, attacks on migrant laborers, food riots (in Cornwall), and enclosure riots (at Otmoor, Oxfordshire). Notwithstanding the deployment of such seemingly disparate weapons of rural resistance, Swing protests universally sought to improve the living standards of the rural worker, whether through eliminating unemployment (attacking threshing machines) or increasing wages and poor relief payments.

The first recorded attack on a threshing machine occurred at Wingmore, near Canterbury, on August 24. However, it was not until September 27 that any arrests were made, by which time at least 15 machines had been destroyed. Immediately thereafter the intensity of protest declined.

The trial, though, acted to reinvigorate protest. That six of the seven men were sentenced to four days' imprisonment against a maximum sentence of seven years' transportation provoked a sensation. Following what Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel called the "unparalleled lenity shown to the Destroyers of Thrashing Machines," overt collective protests spread beyond Elham overnight.

Initially, the new loci were Ash-next-Sandwich in east Kent, where machine breaking dominated, and the area between Sittingbourne and Maidstone in mid-Kent, where wage demonstrations dominated. From the latter center, protests literally spread into west Kent, and by November 3, Swing had diffused into the Kentish Weald and the Sussex border by the activities of highly mobile temporary "gangs." Concurrently with this latter diffusion, an independent wave of open protests had started in the east Sussex protest centers of Battle and Brede on November 1 and 5 respectively. In the Weald

and the rest of east Sussex, wages and poor relief "riots" dominated, a reflection of both the lower uptake of threshing machines in the largely pastoral and hop economy and chronic levels of unemployment and pauperization.

Between November 8 and 14, virtually every Wealden and southwest Kent parish rose. From here, though, there is little evidence to suggest that Swing physically diffused into the combined arable-pastoral of central Sussex. Instead, on November 13, laborers' assemblages occurred independently in the northwest Sussex parishes of Kirdford and Wisborough Green. What then appears to have unfolded over the following three days is that other geographically non-contiguous incidents – though potentially connected by the diffusion of news and the actions of radical agents provocateurs – occurred throughout west Sussex, even spreading eastwards to the areas around Ringmer and Uckfield.

At this point, the movement lost its geographical coherence. Instead of diffusing in an essentially linear way, Swing now had several concurrent foci. A wave of threshing-machine breaking in the vicinity of Chichester physically diffused into neighboring Hampshire on November 18, the day after a series of wages assemblages had started in the vicinity of Whitchurch in north Hampshire. In Berkshire, Swing was first manifest in its overt form at Thatcham on November 15 in an incident inspired by Kentish and Sussex precedents, but otherwise unconnected. The first manifestations of Swing in its overt form in Wiltshire occurred through a combination of physical spread and indigenous inspiration on Saturday, November 19. In all three south-central counties, Swing spread quickly and, with the arguable exception of the Dever Valley in central Hampshire, burned brightly – and quickly.

As Hobsbawm and Rudé in their seminal *Captain Swing*, the only comprehensive national account of the movement, suggest, it was in these counties that the movement reached its peak (1969: 170). This intensity, though, stiffened governmental resolve and ultimately changed the pattern and depth of subsequent protests, if not checking protest altogether. Indeed, elsewhere in the south, Swing was only manifest in an intensive form in isolated pockets, most notably upon Cranborn Chase and in the Blackmore Vale in Dorset and in the vicinity of

High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, where highly mechanized paper mills were targeted.

Intensive protests in East Anglia in December in many ways represented a separate movement informed as much by the cultural memory of the 1816 Bread of Blood riots and the 1822 wave of protests as they were by southern Swing. Threshing machines – long a focus of popular opprobrium in East Anglia – were a particular target. Rural workers also made common cause with the farmers in attempting to force tithes reductions from the clergy, a feature of protests in the Weald but ubiquitous wherever Swing was manifest in East Anglia.

Notwithstanding East Anglia, few further overt protests occurred beyond December 1, though there was a clear resort to incendiarism in response to the military-led repression in south-central England. Whilst it is currently unknown how many individuals were arrested, in the six counties where the government sponsored Special Commissions of Assize, 992 criminal cases were heard. Here, the sentence of death was passed on 227 individuals, of whom five were actually hanged, 359 were transported to New South Wales or Van Diemen's Land, 254 were jailed, and two were fined. According to Hobsbawm and Rudé, the “draconian punishments distributed . . . [and] the deportation of hapless men and boys to antipodean semi-slavery” helped to thoroughly demoralize rural workers (1969: 281). In those counties where the government did not sponsor trials, including Kent and Sussex, Hobsbawm and Rudé suggest that Swing “died a natural death” (1969: 233). In some areas though, not least in the vicinity of Dover and Sittingbourne in Kent and in the Dever Valley in Hampshire, Swing lived on into 1831, whilst Swing-inspired protests occurred well into the summer of 1833.

SEE ALSO: East Anglian Wheat County Riots, 1816; Enclosure Movement, Protests against; Luddism and Machine Breaking; Luddite Riots in Nottingham; Peterloo Massacre, 1819; Poor Law, Britain, 1834

References and Suggested Readings

- Charlesworth, A. (1979) *Social Protest in a Rural Society*. Norwich: Geobooks.
- Griffin, C. (2004) Policy on the Hoof: Sir Robert Peel, Sir Edward Knatchbull and the Trial of the Elham Machine Breakers, 1830. *Rural History* 15 (2): 1–22.

Hobsbawm, E. & Rudé, G. (1969) *Captain Swing*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Wells, R. (1990) Social Protest, Class, Conflict and Consciousness in the English Countryside. In M. Reed and R. Wells (Eds.), *Class, Conflict and Protest in the English Countryside, 1700–1880*. London: Frank Cass.

Swiss Peasants' War of 1653

Lynette M. Deem

During the Thirty Years' War, Swiss peasants had, generally, profited from the wartime economy, exporting goods at higher prices than ever before. After peace was secured in 1648 the quick recovery of the southern German economy led to a sharp decline in Swiss exports. Swiss peasants, therefore, began to face sudden financial problems.

The decrease in exports, coupled with the devaluation of Swiss currency, led to the Swiss Peasants' War of 1653. This revolt continued a series of tax revolts that had occurred throughout the confederacy. In addition to the poor fiscal situation, there was discontent regarding the concentration of political power in the hands of a few urban families, who subjugated the rural population with decrees which restricted their rights and social and cultural freedoms.

The revolt began in the Entlebuch Valley, near Lucerne, and spread to the Emmental Valley, near Bern, eventually encompassing the cantons of Solothurn, Basel, and Aargau. The peasant armies were led by Niklaus Leuenberger, Hans Emmenegger, and Christian Schybi. Emmenegger and Schybi organized a delegation to address the concerns of the peasants; however, the city council of Lucerne refused to listen to its demands. The peasants, therefore, organized a general assembly. Freedom of assembly, however, was not granted by the laws of the times, so these actions were deemed illegal by the local authorities.

Regardless of its legality, this assembly met on February 10, 1653 and decided to suspend all tax payments until the authorities reduced or abolished taxes, including the taxes on the salt, cattle, and horse trades. During the ensuing negotiations a resolution was proposed that satisfied most of the peasants' fiscal desires,

but the talks stalled, and as authorities considered how best to subdue the revolts, the peasants worked to gather support in the rural areas.

In April 1653 the peasants concluded an alliance at Huttwil to aid each other in achieving their goals and elected Niklaus Leuenberger as their leader. This alliance, which became known as the Huttwil League, accomplished two major feats. First, it united Catholics throughout Switzerland with their Protestant counterparts, thus demonstrating the primacy of class difficulties over religious differences. Second, it successfully established the League as a separate political entity from the cities, both equal to and independent of city authorities.

With the signing of a written contract, the tax revolt of 1653 surpassed previous revolts and became an independence movement. The peasants had, furthermore, managed to gain political and military control over the territory they occupied and refused to succumb to city authorities. Due to its overwhelming popularity in rural areas, the Huttwil League further declared its intent to continue expanding until it encompassed the entire Swiss Confederacy.

One of the most significant problems for civil authorities manifested itself as both sides prepared for military conflict: the city militias were supposed to be composed of the rural population. It was this population, however, that had turned against the government. The city establishment, therefore, conscripted troops from the two cantons not involved in the uprising, Vaud and the Bernese Oberland. In its request for assistance, the authorities in Zürich used the term "revolution" for the first time. Incidentally, this note appears to be the first use of the word in the sense of a political revolution without any connotation of a circular movement.

On May 22 one of the armies of the Huttwil League arrived in Berne and another marched to Lucerne. The government of Berne immediately began negotiations. A peace treaty was signed on May 28 by Leuenberger and Niklaus Dachselhofer, the mayor of Berne. This peace agreement required the disbanding of the Huttwil League, in return for which the peasants' fiscal demands would be met; therefore, the troops retreated and lifted the siege on Berne. The peasants, however, refused to break up the League.

The army assembled in Zürich, unaware of the aforementioned treaty, marched toward the

peasant army and demanded its unconditional surrender. The peasant army of 24,000 far outnumbered the 8,000 men of the authorities; nevertheless, the government's army decisively defeated the peasants at the Battle of Wohlenschwil, resulting in the peace of Mellingen, which annulled the Huttwil League and declared amnesty for the peasants, excluding their leaders. Despite this defeat, peasants in the Entlebuch Valley continued to resist. The peasant troops were led by Schybi, whereas the army of the city of Lucerne was led by Sebastian Peregrin Zwyer. Zwyer's army gained control over the Lucerne on June 20, 1653. Schybi was captured and incarcerated at Sursee.

Although the peace treaties that followed the revolt granted the peasants amnesty, city authorities ignored this portion of the agreement and opted to punish severely those involved in the rebellion. In addition to the disarmament of the rural population, many cantons forced the peasants to pay all military expenses involved in suppressing the insurgency.

The Swiss peasant revolt of 1653 demonstrated that the cities depended heavily on their rural subjects. The authorities became increasingly aware of this reliance and sought to prevent future insurrections, especially considering the difficulties they faced in quelling this rebellion. The government politically incapacitated its rural subjects; however, authorities also began to grant the peasants' original fiscal demands.

SEE ALSO: German Peasant Rebellion, 1525

References and Suggested Readings

- Holenstein, A. (2004) *Der Bauernkrieg von 1653: Ursachen, Verlauf und Folgen einer geschichterten Revolution*. In J. Römer (Ed.), *Bauern, Unterfanen und "Rebellen."* Zürich: Orell Füssli.
- Stüssi-Lauterburg, J. (2003) *Verachtet Herrenpossen! Verschüchert fremde Gäst!* Lenzburg: Merker im Effingerhott.
- Suter, A. (1997) *Der Schweizerische Bauernkrieg von 1653: Politischen Sozialgeschichte Sozialgeschichte eines politischen Ereignisses*. Tübingen: Bibliotheca Academica.
- Suter, A. (2002) *Bauernkrieg (1653). Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz*. Available at www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/index.php.
- Suter, A. (2004) Kollektive Erinnerungen an historische Ereignis – Chancen und Gefahren. *Der Bauernkrieg als Beispiel*. In J. Römer (Ed.), *Bauern, Unterfanen und "Rebellen."* Zürich: Orell Füssli.

Sylvis, William H. (1829–1869) and the National Labor Union

Gregory R. Smulewicz-Zucker

William H. Sylvis was one of the earliest and most radical American labor leaders. He first served as president of the Iron Molders' International Union and was later elected president of the short-lived National Labor Union. While his memory and significance are largely overshadowed by the eventual decline of the National Labor Union and by the better-known and more successful labor leaders that followed him, during his short life Sylvis led ambitious campaigns for working people's rights, attempted prescient reforms of the labor movement, and exerted significant political influence. He was a pioneer in the effort to forge national cooperation among American working people, regardless of race or gender. Had he lived longer, he intended to strengthen the United States' ties to the international labor movement.

The son of Nicholas Sylvis, a poor wagon shop owner who struggled to support a large family, William chose to leave his father's profession and found work as an apprentice iron molder. Following his apprenticeship, Sylvis attempted to establish his own foundry, but the business endeavor failed. He spent the early 1850s moving with his wife and son looking for work across Pennsylvania. In 1853, the family settled in Philadelphia. There, Sylvis found work at the Cresson foundry. An accident that Sylvis suffered at the foundry, in 1854, led to a lowering of his wages and made it more difficult for his family to get by. This event, according to the biography by Sylvis's brother, led Sylvis to begin thinking more radically about the plight of working people. In 1857, he joined the Philadelphia Stove and Hollowware Molders' Union and was soon made the union's secretary. Around this time, molders were beginning to mobilize toward the creation of a national union. Sylvis was among those most active in promoting the idea of a national union of iron molders. At a Philadelphia meeting in 1858, he introduced a resolution calling for a national convention. The first national convention on July 5, 1859 led to the establishment of the National Union of Iron Molders.

In the years that followed, Sylvis remained active in the building of a national union for iron molders. However, by 1861, the national organization that Sylvis had worked to establish had been weakened by the outbreak of the Civil War and was virtually nonexistent. Sylvis took it upon himself to reinvigorate the movement. He called for a convention in Pittsburgh in January 1863. There, amidst little enthusiasm, the Iron Molders' International Union (international because it hoped to include Canadian workers) was founded and William Sylvis was elected its president. Throughout 1863, Sylvis tirelessly toured the northern states, organizing, visiting locals, and recruiting members. His tours of 1863–4 greatly increased the size of the Iron Molders' International Union and earned Sylvis a reputation as one of the most successful union organizers. The union continued to grow and was strengthened by a number of strike victories. By 1866, the Iron Molders' International Union was regarded as one of the strongest in the country.

Throughout his life, Sylvis's radicalism was motivated by his belief in the common interests and cooperation of working people. However, his vision was not limited to creating solidarity among iron molders. With the success of the Iron Molders' International Union, Sylvis turned his efforts toward the creation of a national organization of labor. In collaboration with several other powerful labor leaders, Sylvis began working toward the creation of a federation of American labor. After months of preparation, a call for a congress was sent out and on August 20, 1866, the National Labor Union (NLU) was launched at the National Labor Congress in Baltimore. The first resolution passed called upon every worker to join a union and for every union to seek national and international cooperation. Delegates also agreed to make the fight for an eight-hour workday and the improvement of living conditions and education its primary goals.

Over the next two years, the NLU suffered for lack of organization and ambition in its leadership. At the 1867 National Labor Convention, a constitution was adopted to remedy the organization's weaknesses. The reforms primarily empowered the NLU's president and changed the ways that funds would be collected. Despite these attempts at strengthening the organization, it still lacked the necessary inspiration and ambition to galvanize the labor movement.

The NLU was only truly transformed at the 1868 Convention when William Sylvis was elected its president. One of his first acts as president was to appoint a veteran labor organizer, Kate Mullany, his vice-president, making her the first woman to hold such an office.

After Sylvis's election, the NLU grew rapidly. Sylvis tirelessly toured across the country, as he had as president of the Iron Molders' International Union, organizing offices of the NLU. Membership soared. He also attempted to transform the NLU into a political force by appointing a committee of five lobbyists to bring the NLU's cause to Washington. Sylvis saw the NLU's primary objectives as: the eight-hour workday; the organization of women workers; the organization of African American workers; forging international bonds with union leaders abroad; the formation of workers' cooperatives to compete with the capitalist companies for the employment of workers; currency reform; and lobbying the government. Such a program was by far one of the most radical in the world – particularly with respect to Sylvis's vision for organizing women and African American workers. Word of Sylvis's work spread to Europe. He counted among his many great admirers Karl Marx. There was even talk of admitting the NLU to the International Workingmen's Association.

It is impossible to predict how much success William Sylvis might have had in fulfilling his program, but all hopes were dashed when his life came to an abrupt end. His nearly endless travel and campaigning had taken its toll on his health, and on July 26, 1869, William Sylvis died. During his short tenure as president of the NLU, few of his visionary objectives made real progress. Although Congress passed an eight-hour workday, it was rarely enforced. In 1869, at the height of the NLU's power, Sylvis was able to pressure President Grant to issue an executive order upholding the eight-hour workday. However, once Sylvis was gone, employers continued to violate the order. Internal opposition within the union hindered any serious effort to recruit women and African Americans. Before his death, Sylvis was never able to overcome the racism and sexism of the union's members. Similarly, without Sylvis's guidance, the NLU never joined the International Workingmen's Association or built solidarity with workers abroad.

Although Sylvis's plan for forming cooperatives was somewhat of a success when ironworkers

in Troy, New York, created their own foundry, it failed miserably in subsequent attempts. The cooperatives failed due to lack of organization, demands for high-interest rates from investors, and companies' underselling of their goods to ruin the cooperatives. The program for monetary reform was in a sense inspired by the failure of the cooperatives. Its ultimate aim was to secure government loans, which could be used to revive the cooperatives. Yet, in the end, the movement only exhausted the energy of the NLU and distracted its leaders from campaigning for labor reforms.

After Sylvis's death, the NLU took a reactionary turn, and by 1872 it was dissolved. Due to its short existence, it has largely faded from memory and Sylvis along with it. However, the history of the NLU under Sylvis's leadership offers insight into the early history of the fight for American workers' rights and ambitions of American unions. Despite the apparent failings of the movement he attempted to build, Sylvis might yet reemerge as a model for the current labor movement, in crisis and in search of purpose. The unity that Sylvis sought to forge still eludes America's labor movement. Reflecting on the obstacles he faced might inform modern labor leaders with similar hopes.

SEE ALSO: Marx, Karl (1818–1888); US Labor Rebellions and the Rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)

References and Suggested Readings

- Foner, P. S. (1982) *History of the Labor Movement in the United States*, Vol. 1: *From Colonial Times to the Founding of the American Federation of Labor*. New York: International Publishers.
- Grossman, J. P. (1945) *William Sylvis: Pioneer of American Labor*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Marx, K. (1869) Address to the National Labor Union of the United States. Available at www.Marxists.org/history/international/iwma/documents/1869/us-labor.htm.
- Sylvis, J. C. (1968) *The Life, Speeches, Labors and Essays of William H. Sylvis*. New York: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers.

Syndicalism, France

Stephen Leberstein

The two decades before World War I were the “heroic” period for French syndicalism, one that saw it emerge as a major workers' movement

pledged to revolution. Syndicalists were highly conscious of their class identity. Seeing in class consciousness an essential element of a revolutionary movement, they rejected parliamentary politics as a means to the new socialist society that would be organized by a working class they regarded as sufficient in its own right for this task.

Their emphasis on working-class autonomy and self-sufficiency made syndicalists particularly interested in culture in the totality of workers' experience. Culture and education in particular assumed a political burden. While syndicalists generally claimed they were anti-political, they tended to politicize every aspect of their lives in the effort to define a specifically working-class agenda. The educational activities of French syndicates were, in this sense, always elements of political struggle. For the left wing of the French labor movement in the two decades leading up to World War I, then, every kind of labor organization would become a "school of revolt," a way to educate workers. In the political ferment of the period, anarchists, syndicalists, and revolutionary socialists all agreed on the need to educate workers, on the importance of training them in "la science de son malheur," as the secretary of the Bourses du Travail, Fernand Pelloutier, put it. Projects to promote that consciousness of their poverty were seen as vitally important by many militants and often served as a means for organizing workers. The educational work of labor organizations often went beyond the expected short courses and study circles to take on a greater purpose than teaching new skills needed on the job or for union work. Writing in *La Vie Ouvrière* just before the war, Albert Thierry, the syndicalist educator, looked to the syndicates to cultivate "the treasure" of the working class, that is "this profound understanding workers get by means of their labor . . . [that of a] society capable of justice." As Thierry's generation of militants sought to create a cadre of dedicated militants who would lead the working class to overthrow capitalist society, they saw the educational task of labor organizations as an important organizing device, both in the present and for the long run. From the youth groups, the model schools, the work of the Bourses du Travail, and the struggles of the organized public school teachers, syndicalists were doing far more than demonstrating ideas on adult education or school reform.

The syndicalist educational project was shaped by the changing circumstances of working-class life in the period before the war. The two decades leading up to World War I mark a period of great economic change in France as small, self-sufficient enterprises gave way to much larger ones and as the working class became increasingly proletarianized. Workers responded to these changes with growing militancy expressed in labor organization, revolutionary rhetoric, and strike movements. Of the approximately 15 million wage workers in the first decade of the twentieth century, about half worked in industry.

In the same period (1902–10), the number of syndicates doubled from 1,403 to 3,012, and the number of workers who belonged to syndicates in the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) grew from 100,000 in 1902 to about 400,000 in 1908. Strikes attest to growing worker militancy. As compared with the last decade of the nineteenth century, the period 1900 to 1910 saw the number of strikes and strikers more than double (from 4,210 to 9,042 and from 924,000 to 2,021,200, respectively). Similarly, the number of strike days also shot up from 15,021,840 in the last decade of the nineteenth century to 37,702,650 in the first decade of the twentieth. While syndicates did not include a majority of French workers, the CGT still exerted a great influence, especially at times of strikes, according to Lefranc and others; syndicalists were the "minorités agissantes" able to galvanize masses of workers despite their small numbers and the lack of a trade union apparatus. The "heroic age" of revolutionary syndicalism in France was more than rhetorical; it was one of growing militancy. It was against this background of mounting class conflict and industrial strife that the syndicalist movement in France took on its revolutionary character.

If any labor organization of the time embodied the syndicalist educational project it was the Bourses du Travail, or labor exchanges. The first Bourse was authorized by the Paris Municipal Council in 1886 and was established there in 1888 and in other cities thereafter. Bourses were sponsored by unions, or associations, of local syndicates as a means of providing job placement services and mutual aid. For the local governments, the Bourses were intended to help promote social peace by aiding struggling syndicates and by giving workers a chance to improve themselves.

By the end of the 1890s, 57 Bourses were functioning throughout France, representing the association of 1,065 syndicates, nearly half the total number in the country. In this regard, the Bourses had joined local unions together in common efforts across trade or jurisdictional lines. Another aspect of the Bourses was that they were by definition local; by providing a common center of activities and a physical facility, they represented the working-class community in the cities and towns where they existed. These were qualities that made them responsive to the needs and concerns of workers that may have been beyond the ken of union action over wages and the like. These included temporary lodging and assistance for those in search of work, cultural activities for workers, and guided activities and even schooling for children and youth. They also offered services such as free job placement and raised funds to distribute to the unemployed and to aid itinerant workers. The Bourses du Travail also offered an instructional service, which usually included a library, an information office, vocational training, and general education courses for adults. In the main the Bourses devoted their energies to offering trade courses to workers.

Attention to the needs of working-class children and youth also remained an important concern of the syndicalist movement in general. The syndicalist press was full of articles and letters on educational issues. While much of this interest can be attributed to the nearly universal worries of working parents, part of it stemmed from the continuing conflict between church and state in France and elsewhere. One response to the perceived failure of state schools for working-class children was the creation of model schools, often anarchist-inspired. The anarchist weekly *Les Temps Nouveaux* set out a project for a model school in 1897 as a needed alternative to public schools, described with poorly concealed hyperbole as “the perfect training for servitude.” Critics were especially incensed that coeducation was actually prohibited by school law. Impatient to show what could be done, some of the critics organized a summer camp for August 1898 near Paris, with 19 children. The unfortunate experiment foundered when one of the organizers lost his patience and slapped a camper.

By 1901 Francisco Ferrer organized La Escuela Moderna in Barcelona, a model school that attracted widespread attention and support and

which inspired similar projects all over Europe, and even in New York. The most important French model school was La Ruche which Sébastien Faure directed at Rambouillet near Paris from 1904 until 1917. Over a ten-year period from 1904 to 1914 about 4,000 children applied to La Ruche, mostly the children of single parents, abused women, and those determined to keep their children out of charitable religious institutions when they were hard up.

In 1913 the idea emerged of federating all the children's groups that had become a part of the labor movement. Léon Clément and Maurice Bouchor argued in *La Vie Ouvrière* that workers' cooperatives, syndicates, and socialists together should coordinate and support the Pupils' Groups. Such an arrangement had apparently already been worked out in Bouchor's own neighborhood, the 14th arrondissement of Paris, and the proposal garnered a warm response from readers of *La Vie Ouvrière*. Within a year a Coordinating Committee for the Pupils of Cooperatives of the Parisian Region had been created, affiliating the activities of 26 separate groups under the control of labor organizations. The groups were not meant only to extend the school day, explained a member of the Coordinating Committee, but rather “to give our children a social education which is given them nowhere else.”

The most interesting aspect of the syndicalist project, though, was the Jeunesses Syndicalistes that emerged alongside the children's groups. Embracing adolescent apprentices and workers, the first such youth groups appeared for a very brief time around 1904–5, just as the student-worker study circles began to fade away. But it seemed that they too faded away, mainly due to the indifference or active hostility of older militants. By 1911 *La Vie Ouvrière* regarded the ascendant syndicalist youth groups as crucial to the future of syndicalism. To understand better how the syndicates could attract and hold onto youth, the journal developed a questionnaire to survey all the youth groups it could identify. The results of the poll were encouraging. Within a few months, the journal's inquiry found the Jeunesses Syndicalistes to be generally flourishing. In the first summary of reports to the *Vie Ouvrière* questionnaire, 22 different groups sent in answers to the survey. Most of those that responded were well established or growing, although it is hard to estimate the exact numbers of young workers involved due to their loose

organization. Although the Jeunesses Syndicalistes probably included fewer than 1,000 steady members throughout the country at the end of 1911, these groups, like the syndicalist movement itself, certainly exerted an influence on their comrades out of all proportion to their numbers, especially during anti-militarist campaigns and in times of crisis.

Some trends are apparent from the responses. In Paris the youth groups formed within certain trades, whereas in the suburbs and provincial towns the small number of workers in any given trade meant that groups formed instead within the local labor exchange or cooperative, drawing their members from among all the syndicalist workers in the area. A majority of the groups admitted and encouraged non-organized workers to join their activities as a way to recruit new members to the labor movement. For this organizing tactic to work, the groups had to do more than study together; they had to embrace the kind of things youth in general would be interested in, like physical education and sports. Many of the Jeunesses Syndicalistes groups thought of themselves as representing "advanced" ideas, an attitude that often brought them into conflict with their elders.

The first youth group to form that was identified in the survey, in July 1909, was the Jeunesse de la Voiture in the automobile industry. These youths tried to strike a balance by sponsoring cultural activities in addition to family outings and what they called "rational" or non-competitive sports. They also participated as a group in street demonstrations, and although they wanted to include "revolutionary" in the group name, they held back in order to attract more recruits. Even though their number remained small, the auto-workers practiced solidarity by going out of their way to help organize other youth groups. So the Jeunesse Syndicaliste des Ferblantiers, the tin-workers, reported that they got the idea to organize from their comrades among the auto-workers. So too did the Jeunesse Syndicaliste d'Asnières help their comrades at Saint Ouen in setting up a group, and together they organized the Coordinating Committee of Revolutionary Syndicalist Youth Groups of the Suburbs. The youth saw the need to combine their efforts the better to oppose the government's militarism, as they saw it, since young workers would be "the principal victims of such ignoble carryings-on."

Sometimes youthful enthusiasm put the youth in conflict with their elders, as when the activities of the youth of the Le Mans group threatened the local Bourse du Travail with the loss of its municipal funding. In such cases the youth might have found themselves on the street instead of inside the labor exchange. Still, the Fédération des Bourses du Travail had endorsed the creation of youth groups at its 1910 congress in Toulouse and so was consistent in calling on all local syndicates to join the effort.

The organization of youth groups was not limited to the Parisian region. A congress of allied youth groups in the West met in February 1912 and agreed to coordinate its activities to make its members more effective in their anti-militarist campaigns. Now agreed on their tasks, reported a spokesman, the youth groups of the West "will be able to give this region, undergoing rapid industrialization, and to all its bodies a generation of militants."

Among the most militant syndicalist workers were public school teachers, who began to organize trade associations, or Amicales, around 1900. With wages hovering near the subsistence level and jobs scarce, the teachers' main concern was survival. Allied with the CGT, the teachers' syndicates saw themselves as a vanguard. By joining in the labor movement, the syndicalist teachers also believed that they would "gain an understanding of the intellectual and moral needs of the people." These teachers identified their interests with those of the communities they served. Such attitudes brought the syndicalist school teachers into conflict with the government. Under Clemenceau, the government in 1907 banned the teachers' syndicates from joining in the Bourses du Travail on the grounds that such membership would conflict with their official public role. In response, the national federation of teachers' syndicates formed a defense committee, which issued an "Open Letter to M. Clemenceau," accusing the government of being the "Defender of Capital and of privileges," and of blocking the teachers' membership in the Bourses du Travail to prevent them from discussing the conditions of social organization with other workers. With that the syndicalist teachers vowed to fight "the insatiable Moloch." In response, the government fired some of the signers.

Not all syndicalists welcomed the school teachers, some, like C. A. Laisant, believing that they would dilute the militant fervor of the labor

movement. Anatole France, on the other hand, saw their actions as an example of labor solidarity in which “functionaries and state employees, along with those who hold the pen and those who wield the pick,” worked together as fellow proletarians. Eventually, Victor Griffuelhes wrote in *L’Humanité* welcoming the teachers as comrades in the battle against “the forces of oppression and exploitation.” In the years that followed, syndicalist teachers came to talk more and more about the need for “Adaptation of teaching to the needs of the working class.” And over the years, they worked actively to define how they might adapt public schools to those needs.

In an example of labor solidarity in August 1912, the congress of the Fédération nationale des syndicats d’instituteurs at Chambéry voted to support a CGT anti-militarist project, the “Sou du Soldat,” designed to strengthen the bond between young conscripts and their syndicate. That resolution gave the government the excuse it needed to dissolve the teachers’ syndicates.

At the beginning of the 1913–14 school year, the editors of *Ecole Émancipée*, the journal of the teachers’ syndicate, expressed the opinion that crises in the labor movement, the attempted dissolution of their syndicates, and the countless reprisals against militant teachers, had only served to strengthen teachers’ syndicalism.

All in all, while the continual agitation and organizing of syndicalist workers may have been a necessary condition for transforming an unjust society, it was an insufficient one. The syndicalist education project could not succeed in holding the forces of war at bay in 1914, and so it failed almost at the peak of its power to create the new world it had promised. But it demonstrated strategies that could, and did, work to build class-conscious, community-oriented, rank-and-file organizations that could effectively mobilize workers to fight both for their own interests and for a larger agenda.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Anarchism and Culture, 1840–1939; Anarchism and Education; Anarchism, France; Anarchosyndicalism; Bourses du Travail; Confédération Générale du Travail and Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire; Pelloutier, Fernand (1867–1901) and the Bourses du Travail

References and Suggested Readings

Ansell, C. K. (2001) *Schism and Solidarity in Social Movements: The Politics of Labor in the French Third Republic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Bérenger, H. et al. (1897) *Les Prolétaires intellectuels en France*. Paris: Editions de la revue.
- Bou’t, L. et al. (1924) *Le Syndicalisme dans l’enseignement: Histoire de la Fédération de l’enseignement et du syndicalisme universitaire*. Avignon: Editions de l’Ecole Émancipée.
- Friedman, G. C. (1997) Revolutionary Unions and French Labor: The Rebels Behind the Cause; or, Why Did Revolutionary Syndicalism Fail? *French Historical Studies* (Spring) 20, 2: 155–81.
- Gambone, L. (1995) *Revolution and Reformism: The Split between “Moderates” and “Revolutionaries” in French Anarcho-Syndicalism*. Montréal: Red Lion Press.
- Jennings, J. (1990) *Syndicalism in France: A Study of Ideas*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Jouenne, A. (1914) L’Education dans les Cooperatives; nos Groupes de Pupilles. *L’Ecole Émancipée* 4, 30 (April 18).
- Julliard, J. (1971) *Fernand Pelloutier et les origines du syndicalisme d’action directe*. Paris: Seuil.
- Lefranc, G. (1967) *Le Mouvement syndical sous la troisième république*. Paris: Payot.
- Maitron, J. (1951) *Histoire du mouvement anarchiste en France*. Paris: SUDEL.
- Maitron, J. (1964) Le Groupe des Etudiants Socialistes Révolutionnaires Internationalistes. *Le Mouvement Social* 46.
- Mitchell, B. (1987) *The Practical Revolutionaries: A New Interpretation of the French Anarchosyndicalists*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Pelloutier, F. (2005) [1895] Anarchism and the Workers’ Union. In D. Guérin (Ed.), *No Gods No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism*. Edinburgh: AK Press.
- Pouget, E. (2003) [1920] *Direct Action*. London: Kate Sharpley Library.
- Stearns, P. N. (1971) *Revolutionary Syndicalism and French Labor: A Cause without Rebels*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Tucker, K. H. (1996) *French Revolutionary Syndicalism and the Public Sphere*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Syndicalism, Greece

Georgos Koukoules

The Greek labor movement reflects the particularities of socioeconomic development in the Greek state from the 1870s to the early twentieth century. The early development of labor syndicalism emerged during the depression in Western Europe after 1873 which forced capital to seek new national markets in Greece. The Greek economy also expanded in the late

nineteenth century as expatriate capital began flowing into the country. The conditions for elementary industrial development were also facilitated from 1875 to 1895 by measures introduced by the government of Prime Minister Charilaos Trikoupis to insulate domestic production from foreign imports. Greek industrial activity also expanded through the construction of a national transportation network in 1884 and the development of government infrastructure. Despite modest industrialization in the early twentieth century, 50.5 percent of Greece's population remained active in the dominant agrarian economy.

The first trade unions as understood today were established in the country around the end of the nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century a type of horizontal, cross-sector union appeared, the Local Labor Centers (*Ergatika Kentra*; *Εργατικά Κέντρα*), equivalent to the British Trades Councils. Federalized unions organized on a vertical basis appeared following the establishment of the General Confederation of Workers of Greece (GSEE; ΓΣΕΕ) in 1918. The mainly Jewish Workers' Solidarity Federation under its leader Avraam Benaroya was instrumental in the establishment of the GSEE. In the same year (1918), the Socialist Labor Party of Greece (SEKE; ΣΕΚΕ) was established, subsequently renamed the Communist Party of Greece.

The evolution of the Greek syndicalist movement was influenced by the country's turbulent political reality as well as by broader international developments and conditions. The following briefly presents these developments using as its main theme the activities of the GSEE, which organized workers in the private sector. Employees working under public law contracts such as civil servants joined primary-level trade unions belonging to the Supreme Administration of Civil Servants' Trade Unions (*ADEDY*; *ΑΔΕΔΥ*).

The first period (also known as the fractions period) lasted from 1918 to 1936 and includes the period of the military dictatorship of General Pangalos (1925–6). Two splits took place within the GSEE and the organizations that subsequently formed it: the first in 1919, and the second in 1928, leading to the formation of the so-called Unitary GSEE (*Ενωτική ΓΣΕΕ*), which was under communist control.

The second period lasted from 1936 to 1944. During this time the dictatorship of General

Metaxas (1936–41) converted syndicalist organizations into part of the state's mechanism. During the country's Triple Occupation (1941–4), the Greek syndicalist movement operated through the ranks of the National Workers' Liberation Front (EEAM), while the vast majority of the dictatorial syndicalists of the GSEE collaborated with the occupying forces.

The third period (1944–74) comprises one of the darkest periods of contemporary Greek history: a civil war (1946–9), un concealed interventions by the US in the country's internal affairs, and the military dictatorship (1967–74). During these years the syndicalist movement was – for obvious reasons – under the conservatives' control. However, a number of initiatives took place that opposed official syndicalist representation, promoted unitary demands, and resulted in some reduction in the otherwise unrelenting exploitation of workers.

The period following the fall of the dictatorship (1974–2008) saw some attempts to democratize the syndicalist movement and the corresponding labor legislation, but with limited results. After 1981 under the government of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK; ΠΑΣΟΚ, attempts at democratization were more solidly promoted. In 1985 the PASOK government's economic policy caused a split among members of the government-affiliated majority side of the GSEE leadership.

The capacity of Greek labor unions to unify has been hindered by unaffiliated grassroots unions, a plethora of Local Labor Centers and Federations, disputed financial independence, the existence and activity of party-affiliated groups at all levels of the syndicalist organization (groups acting as their party fractions, not tendencies), and a low union density rate in the population of 25 percent of the total workforce in the private sector. Yet for all its disadvantages, the movement has engaged in exemplary syndicalist struggles throughout the period of its existence and operation. For example, during the Triple Occupation, the EEAM refused to collaborate with the conquerors and acted at various levels, establishing communal soup kitchens and consumption cooperatives during the great famine (1941–2), which cost thousands of lives, and even organizing strikes – some of the first in occupied Europe. Moreover, it organized other activities that reached their apogee with the cancellation of civil conscription in

February–March 1943. Another example is the appearance of an industrial workers' movement after the end of the 1967–74 dictatorship, which grew in size and in some cases managed to impose principles of workers' control. However, this movement experienced a number of setbacks and began to fall apart from 1976 onwards. Finally, recent mobilizations against the privatization and reform of the country's social insurance and pensions system are also notable. The movement's success in April 2001 in causing the withdrawal of the reform bill was partially overshadowed by its subsequent failure in March 2007.

Today, in the face of neoliberal policies, job losses, business restructuring, and privatization, the syndicalist movement struggles to protect basic workers' rights at the national as well as international level.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Greece; Anarchosyndicalism; Britain, Trade Union Movement; Greece, Anti-Dictatorship Protests; Greece, Partisan Resistance; Greece, Socialism, Communism, and the Left, 1974–2008; Syndicalism, France

References and Suggested Readings

- Ioannou, C. (1995) *The National Labour Relations System in Post-War Greece (1995–1967)*. In *Greek Society During the First Postwar Period (1945–1967)*, Vol. 11. Athens: Sakis Karagiorgas Foundation, pp. 73–105 (in Greek).
- Katsanevas, T. (1984) *Trade Unionism in Greece*. Athens: National Center for Social Research.
- Kordatos, Y. Y. (1972) *The History of the Greek Labour Movement*. Athens: Boukoumanis (in Greek).
- Koukoules, G. (1995) *The Greek Trade Union Movement and Foreign Interventions, 1944–1948*. Athens: Odysseas (in Greek).
- Koukoules, G. (2000) *The Workers' Movement and the Myth of Sisyphus, 1964–1966*. Athens: Odysseas (in Greek).
- Kouzis, Y. (2007) *The Main Features of the Greek Trade Union Movement*. Athens: Gutenberg (in Greek).

Syria and Iraq, Baathists

Steven Isaac

Three main currents of socialist thought flowed through the Arab world during and after World War II: the Baath Party's version, shared by Nasser, and the options promulgated by the

region's various communist parties. None could be considered independent from the others. The history of Arab communists is often a story of rivalry and occasional cohabitation with other movements. The Baathists were active beyond just Syria and Iraq, which saw their most signal successes, and concomitant disappointments.

Michel Aflaq, a Sorbonne-educated Syrian Christian, is one of the two primary founders of the Baath movement. Exposed to Marx during his studies in France, Aflaq associated for some time with communists in Syria after returning in 1932. While he declared his fascination with communism ended by 1936, others cite him as a confirmed party member until 1943. His co-founder, Salah al-Din al-Bitar, likewise went to France for university education and returned to Syria as a teacher. Frustrated by France's interwar policies, the nationalism of both men significantly influenced their attitudes toward the West, such that even western socialism was viewed as another form of imperialism. From 1940 onward, Aflaq and Bitar considered forming a political party based on their nationalism, but the failure of the Rashid Ali revolt in Iraq in 1941 and the Lebanon crisis of 1943 finally galvanized them into action. By 1945 they had formally created the Baathist Party, which held its first convention in 1947. Bitar was more successful at occasionally winning election to office, while Aflaq was recognized as ideologue of the party and, through the office of secretary general, *de facto* controller.

The Baath holds a number of positions contradicting traditional western socialism. From the start it was intended to herald a "Renaissance" or "Resurrection" (both translations of *Baath*) of the entire Arab world, not just the Syrian region. Thus, it was a fiercely nationalistic movement. These positions followed from the insistence of the Baathists, like many other Arab socialists, that an ideology appropriate to Arab needs was required. In Aflaq's words, socialism was "a means to resurrect our nationalism and our people and is the door through which our Arab nation enters history anew." He saw socialism as the means to achieving a "structural transformation . . . in the spirit and thinking of the Arab people which would revolutionize their society."

Aflaq's writings clarify that besides internal social justice, Baath socialism sought empowerment of the state precisely so the Arab state could enjoy just treatment on the world stage.

Baath ideology rejects the economic determinism of western models, viewing socialism as a solution arising from the conviction of a majority of society, not a single class. These stances explain Baathist opposition to communism as exclusively secular and, during the Cold War, overly dependent upon the Soviet Union. Aflaq's vision for the Baath Party has been described, perhaps not inappropriately, as romantic nationalism. Like previous nationalisms, its "spiritual" message appealed to its target audience, explaining some of the early Baath success. Concurrently, emotional and intellectual approaches often left the Baath without the "political realism" that might have secured its victories and implement policies.

The 1947 constitution of the party included numerous policy statements outlining the Baath vision of socialism fitted for an Arab nation. The program did not seek an end of private property, but limited ownership by measuring it against its exploitative factor. Workers were supposed to share wages with management; usury was outlawed, and foreign companies banned. The state would control utilities and all the largest undertakings while guaranteeing employment to citizens. In politics, non-alignment was preferred out of recognition that neither the US nor the Soviet Union had Arab interests at heart. On social issues, the Baath was dedicated to universal and free public health care and education. From its earliest days, the Baath called for gender equality, and by 1947, the right to vote for women was supported by its National Convention. The Baath also espoused parliamentary democracy in its calls for action, which was ultimately an early victim of political maneuvering once the party gained power.

The practicalities of achieving and holding power in Syria and Iraq have seen the Baath go through numerous incarnations. Initial membership was primarily among intellectuals and students. Observers often noted how the Baath exercised influence well beyond its actual numbers. The party gained enormous prestige as a result of the Palestinian debacle. Party leaders and members volunteered to fight in Palestine while the party collected money and weapons for the war. In political opposition, the Baath distanced itself from the defeats. Over time, the Baathists appealed to sectarian minorities of Syria, especially the Alawites and Druze. In conjunction with this appeal, the Baath began programmatically to seek inroads in the Syrian military, proving

fertile ground since both Baath ideology and the military profession held promises of social mobility for segments of Syrian society.

The role of the military became evident within a few years of Syrian independence. The first of several coup d'états occurred in March 1949 when Husni al-Zaim, apparently supported by Baathists, overthrew the government dominated by landed elites and rich merchants. The Baath soon moved to opposition, however, after al-Zaim began pushing a constitution forbidding civil servants from joining political parties; a Baath pamphlet denounced the regime's measures. Subsequently, al-Zaim responded by banning all political parties and jailing the Baath leaders. After the coup d'état led by Colonel al-Hinnawi, several Baathists joined the new coalition government. In December 1949, Adib al-Shishakli launched a third coup and assumed power, tolerating the Baath until January 1952, when he closed the offices of *al-Baath*, the party's newspaper. On December 29, 1952, Shishakli had Aflaq and Bitar arrested, as well as Arab Socialist Party leader Akram Hourani. Five days later, the men escaped to Lebanon and moved to Europe. When Shishakli announced new elections for October 1953, Aflaq, Bitar, and Hourani returned to Damascus. Disaffection with the government's management of the elections led to a Baath boycott of the election along with the People's Party and the National Party. Charges of corruption against Shishakli's Arab Liberation movement resulted in widespread demonstrations by all other parties after the election. A leaflet campaign led to new arrests in January 1954 of the three men.

One month later, the fortunes of the Baath changed dramatically. Proselytization amid the army paid off as disaffected troops mutinied in Aleppo in February. The revolt spread to Damascus, and Shishakli fled. A few days later the jailed leaders were released, and on March 5, 1954 announced the merger of the Baath and Arab Socialist Party, henceforth known as the Arab Baath Socialist Party. The constitution of the new party was adopted virtually unchanged from Aflaq's and Bitar's party. While the party remained comparatively small, the merger expanded Baath membership beyond the pockets of intellectuals scattered around the country into the influential Syrian military officer corps. In the elections of late 1954 the party won 22 seats in the Syrian parliament, up from three seats in

1949. Working with other leftist parties, including the communists, the Baathists could garner 25 percent of parliamentary votes. With a weak and fractious Syrian parliament, the Baath benefited from a clearly organized and delineated agenda. As the Cold War came to the Middle East in the 1950s, Baath resistance to western schemes further expanded its influence in Syria and in several other Arab states. By the mid-1950s party branches were active in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. As each party gained viability, these were termed as “regions” of the party organization, overseen by the National Command, a credible adjective given the party’s pan-Arabism.

The Baathists’ success led to an effort by opponents to counter their gains. In Syria, most prominently, on the political right, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) emerged prominently in opposition, and Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood campaigned against Baathist secularism. The Baath was ideologically opposed to the Communist Party’s economic determinism and ties to the Soviet Union, but a rapprochement was negotiated for practical gains. The party leadership often defended the alliance by saying, “We may meet in the same trenches, but we can’t join up with them.” When a member of the SSNP assassinated Adnan al-Maliki, the Syrian army’s deputy chief of staff and a Baathist, in April 1955, sympathy for the Baath ran high, and the party capitalized on this popularity to abolish the conservative SSNP. Many SSNP leaders fled to Lebanon while 130 members were arrested and put through show trials for treason, intimidating opposition to leftist parties.

The fallout from the Maliki assassination led to further Baath–communist cooperation and growing popularity, particularly as Syria turned to the Soviet bloc for economic and military assistance. An anti-imperialist party advocating socialism as the path to a better society naturally led further to the left. The 1956 Suez Crisis confirmed the imperialist threat of the West among many Syrians, and the pace of the country’s drift to the political left accelerated. By 1957, Baath members controlled vital foreign affairs and economic posts in government, Hourani became speaker of the Syrian parliament, and the chief of army intelligence was an ally. The overall conclusion among scholars is that Baath fear of dramatically growing communist popularity impelled its next initiative: the union of Syria with Egypt under Gamal Nasser’s control.

Beyond a fear of growing communist support, the Baath advocacy of union with Egypt appealed to the movement’s ideology of Arab nationalism. In addition, Nasser’s popularity across the Arab world after the Suez Crisis of 1956 was unmatched by any regional leader. He may have thus appeared to Aflaq as the person who could achieve the conditions of *inqilab*, restructuring crucial to Aflaq’s vision of Arab recovery. The question of Baath motives, however, remains a sharp one since the Syrian Baathists, in moving toward union, also knowingly moved toward their own dissolution. Nasser made conditions for union perfectly clear – total union, not a federal one; a single executive under his control instead of a plurality; the end of all political parties in Syria and their replacement by a single-party system mirroring the National Union in Egypt.

Given the speed with which the union was achieved, the Baath scarcely appeared to blink at the prospect of its demise, and in fact, worked to achieve it. When the original set of talks stalled, Baath leadership encouraged the Syrian army to negotiate independently with the Egyptian military. Those talks resulted in an agreement to merge the two nations’ armed forces, a *fait accompli* forcing Damascus’s hand. Al-Bitar was sent to confer with the Syrian officers, but met instead directly with Nasser to cement the agreement. The Syrian premier, Quwatli, had little choice left but to bend before the political winds. On February 1, 1958, Quwatli and Nasser jointly announced the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR), confirmed by referenda in both nations three weeks later, and Nasser was elected as president in a 99 percent landslide.

Perhaps Aflaq and al-Bitar thought that the incipient formal end of the party was a technical detail. There was some expectation that both would shape the ideology of the National Union in Syria, and perhaps, they thought, impart a Baathist tilt to the one party. “Since it was we who began preaching Socialist ideas at least fifteen years before Nasser assumed power,” Aflaq reasoned like many other Syrians, surely Nasser would want to listen to them.

At the outset, Nasser understood the significant role of the Baath in crafting the union, and rewarded them with several cabinet posts in the new UAR government. They were lesser posts, however, since Nasser had set in motion the

dynamics that would also bring this hasty marriage to an end; from the start Egypt's tradition of centralized control ran against Syria's more often fractured, localized structures. Nasser sent Egyptian officers and agents north to bring Syria's armed forces and bureaucracy in line with Egyptian patterns. Although formally disbanded as a party, the Baathists still had a presence as individuals and through their National Command, which relocated to Lebanon. The Baathists professed their allegiance to the union and to Nasser, but grew into serious disarray. In September of 1958, Nasser began implementing an Egyptian-style land reform which alienated the many landowners of Syria. Simultaneously, he began sifting the Syrian armed forces for potential opponents and relocating them to safer positions, often in Egypt. The mood in Syria soon soured and former Baathists caught the brunt of disaffection in the July 1959 elections to the National Union. Of the 9,445 seats allotted to Syria in this body, known Baathists won only 250. Still, the party's leaders claimed a victory, saying that the popular vote in the union had nonetheless elected a 90 percent socialist majority.

All of these dynamics had to account for another factor after July 1958, following the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, bringing Abdul Qasim to the fore as another leading personality in the Middle East. The fact that his regime included members of Iraq's branch of the Baath Party added new impetus to the direction that Arab socialism might take. Talk of union between Iraq and the UAR began immediately, but it was clear that Qasim intended to follow his own trajectory. Fuad al-Rikabi, the Baath secretary general in Iraq, was so convinced that Nasser was the key to fulfilling Baathist goals that he left his cabinet post in the new government and participated in a 1959 plot to assassinate Qasim. The government reaction was predictably harsh and the Baath were driven underground. Having been persecuted under the monarchy as well, the Iraqi Baathists were accustomed to operating as a cell-type organization, and actually managed to grow by influencing several key trade unions and the Iraqi Students' Organization. Four clandestine newspapers managed regular issues during the period 1958–63.

By 1959, the cracks in the Baath Party were unmistakably clear. At the Fourth National Congress, held in Beirut in August, Aflaq could barely retain control over the party. A movement

to condemn formally the previous year's dissolution of the Syrian "Region" was narrowly thwarted. Ideologically committed to the UAR, Syrian Baathists began to form a passive resistance to Nasser. A third group, led by the Iraqi al-Rikabi, which saw so little difference between Nasserism and Baath ideology, and supported an end to the party, was expelled. His wholehearted Nasserist pan-Arabism had already earned him several rebukes from the National Command of the party, but he remained intransigent. The final straw apparently was open advocacy of violence and assassination: methods, according to the party ideologues, betraying a lack of trust in the people's ability to understand and achieve socialism's benefits.

In 1959, a new fissure emerged, unbeknownst to the civilian Baathists. Numerous military officers with Baathist sympathies, stationed deliberately by Nasser in Egypt to be supervised more closely, mostly drawn from the minority Alawi and Druze communities of Syria, formed a "Military Committee." Its history remains difficult to penetrate, but the members' later actions testify to a desire to reconstitute the Baath Party and an opposition to civilian leadership. The Baathists had long decried the intrusion of the military into politics, although they were not above using the military themselves. This military turn would eventually see an inversion of the original Baath stance. Although the Baath in Syria would reconstitute the party, the older generation of leaders found their younger counterparts pressing the party in new directions.

Nasser's brand of socialism continued to alienate the Syrians. Despite protestations of support from the party's leaders, individual Baathists in Nasser's administration continued resigning across 1959, including Hourani himself. In December, all the remaining Baathists resigned *en masse*. In 1961, Nasser's measures to nationalize banks and insurance companies left the significant bourgeois elements of Syria worried about the future of private enterprise. For their own reasons, the Baathists were also upset by the maneuver, construing it not as a step toward socialism but as thinly disguised state capitalism. The political left in Syria, however, had been weakened by Nasser's policies, and so it was a conservative backlash that brought on the September 28, 1961 coup. Landowners and bourgeois elements supported conservative military units

who moved into Damascus that day and declared the end of the union with Egypt.

The Baathists faced a dilemma. Committed to the principle of Arab unification, they knew that a continuation of Nasser's policies would end Baathist socialism. Hourani and al-Bitar were originally signatories to the declaration of separation, but al-Bitar soon "removed" his name. Hourani, though, had had his fill of Nasserism and split from the main Baath body that could not publicly condemn Nasser or forego the possibility of recreating the union. The next two years were turbulent. At the time of the coup, the National Command directed the Syrian "Region" to reorganize itself and to work for union again, but this time on a "democratic, socialist, and popular" basis. Splits continued in the Syrian and Lebanese branches of the party on the acceptability of union with Nasser. Aflaq, still the ideological weathervane of the party, continued to push for union despite mistrust of Nasser. At the 1962 Congress, Aflaq packed the meeting with his supporters and pursued a federal union, an idea anathema to Nasser. Simultaneously, the Baath came in for criticism all around the Arab world from Nasser's supporters, who charged the Syrian socialists with spearheading the 1961 secession.

Once again, though, events in Iraq exerted a heavy influence on Syria, Egypt, and whether Arab socialism might have a Nasserite or Baathist face. Iraq's Baathists could not claim many members in 1962, but concentrated on developing grassroots sympathy to bring people out in demonstrations, intended both to counter the apparent popularity of Iraq's communists among the people and to win outright control of key areas if necessary. Concomitantly, the Baath made overtures in the military to nationalist officers. In 1962, it formed the Military Bureau of the Baath, composed of the party's leader Ali Saleh al-Sa'di and prominent generals like 'Abd al-Salam Arif and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. Then a December 1962 incident at Baghdad's al-Sharqiyyah (Eastern) High School led to a student strike. The Baath in Iraq, ensconced in the Iraqi Students' Union, succeeded in extending the strike across all schools in the country. At the same time, the political arm of the Kurdish resistance approached Iraq's Baath searching for an ally against Qasim's regime. The pressure paid off in February 1963, when Qasim arrested several Baathist officers, spurring

others into quick action. The Iraqi Communist Party moved its partisans into the streets of Baghdad, hoping to forestall the coup, and begged Qasim for weaponry to defend his regime. He was reluctant to give weapons out to the public and the Baath street forces kept an upper hand. Within a day the coup's military allies forced their way into the ministry of defense and captured Qasim. He was tried immediately and executed, with pictures of his bullet-riddled body broadcast to prove the charismatic leader was indeed dead.

Even as Qasim was besieged, the Baath and their allies formed the National Council of the Revolutionary Command to oversee the new administration, beginning with 12 Baath civilian and military members and four Arab nationalist officers. For the government itself, 'Arif assumed the presidency, a result of his popularity with the armed forces, while the Baathists al-Bakr and al-Sa'di became vice-president/prime minister and deputy prime minister/minister of the interior respectively. A Baathist National Guard was established, growing quickly to 30,000 members as savage reprisals against the communists were carried out. By all appearances, the Baath had achieved control of Iraq, but the coalition with the nationalists proved tenuous. The regime could not continue its cooperation with the Kurds and an expensive struggle ensued. Within the Baath Party ideological differences became apparent, with al-Sa'di leading the most left-leaning elements, and the ruling coalition split apart, each fraction seeking to secure an independent agenda. Events in Syria soon widened these fissures into real conflict.

On March 8, 1963, one month after the Baath gained control of Iraq, the Military Committee formed in Egypt became quite visible by toppling the government in Damascus, giving the Baath control of Syria as part of a "National Front" government. Scholars of the movement began to introduce a new term, the neo-Baath, denoting the new party orientation. Aflaq remained as a Founding Father and guide, but the new emphasis by the military leaders began to emphasize Syria's interests over a pan-Arab vision. The party also shifted its efforts to mobilizing the rural population.

In the meantime, the unexpected confluence of Baath regimes in both Damascus and Baghdad immediately spurred talk of Syrian-Iraqi union. The Baathists approached Egypt again, pushing

more strongly for a collective executive and a federal arrangement giving greater regional autonomy. Nasser was unenthusiastic by this prospect, but the movement for union seemed to have all the initiative. By April 17, a Tripartite Union was agreed upon, to be implemented over the next two years. The pace of the talks and schedule of integrating the three nations virtually ensured self-destruction of the process: a result most observers view as Nasser's actual objective. Recrimination and propaganda campaigns ensued as each side shifted blame for the failed unification. The Baath was accused of being "anti-religious," a charge denied vigorously, in no small part because of Aflaq's Christianity and the growing Alawi presence in the party. In Syria, the military Baathists continued to purge Nasserist officers from all authority positions.

In October 1963, the Baath held its Sixth National Convention, calling for federal union between Syria and Iraq, with economies operated according to socialist principles. Particular attention was given to collective farming, workers' "control of the means of production," and austerity programs, in part to avoid foreign economic assistance. All called on the Baath governments to support the ongoing revolutions in Yemen and Algeria. The party appeared to move to the left. One conclusion attributes this movement to the new concentration of rural members in the party, especially in light of the push for land redistribution.

Among the more Marxist-inclined members of the Baath, al-Sa'di might have looked upon the October meeting as a confirmation of his views, but it was seen differently in Iraq, where "rightist" members of the Baath reacted against the leftward tilt and managed to take over the November Regional Congress. Al-Sa'di and his clique were exiled from the country, leading to a violent reaction by the National Guard on his behalf and an air force mutiny. In this disarray, Aflaq and other members of the National Command went to Baghdad, but their "help" was mostly resented. Finally, President 'Arif acted, dispatching trustworthy military units against the National Guard. Fighting broke out in Baghdad, but full civil war was avoided when the National Guard surrendered to the army. Baath National Command members were arrested and later expelled from Iraq.

The story of the Baath in Syria after this point is a complex political narrative of coup and

counter-coup within the framework of the party itself. Another military coup struck in February 1966 and adopted the more radical propositions of the 1963 National Congress. The infighting eventually saw both Aflaq and al-Bitar expelled from the party they founded. The nationalist faction of the Military Committee slowly continued to build its base, most particularly under the direction of Hafez al-Assad, who profited from his quiet resistance to the more socialistic programs of the Baath. In 1970 al-Assad ousted the "progressive" wing of the party in a final coup, establishing control over the party and state. The fact that some analysts refer to the Baath as al-Assad's fief is testimony to how far the party had moved from its founding principles.

In Iraq, although out of power, the Baathist Party continued on, but no longer as an affiliate of the Syrian "mother" party. While it plotted (including a September 1964 coup among the military which the regime forestalled in advance), 'Arif implemented Nasser-style socialist reforms, in July 1964 decreeing the nationalization of banks, insurance industry, and the largest manufacturers. The Iraqi Petroleum Company remained almost wholly under control of foreign investors, limiting government revenues. By 1965, the country was losing capital, joblessness was rising, and the prospect of land redistribution stymied investment. When 'Arif died in a 1966 plane crash, his brother 'Abd al-Rahman 'Arif assumed the presidency, but his association with the military and the tribal shayks was not as strong as his brother's. In addition, the Communist Party was reviving in Iraq's south, prompting concern among religious conservatives that Islam might be in danger.

When street demonstrations began in 1967 to "save the country from unbelief," the Baath aligned with the anti-secular movement. Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, former vice-president in 1963, reorganized the Baathist Party, turning to relatives to fill positions, including Saddam Hussein as secretary of the Regional Command. Both men went to jail after the 1964 aborted coup, but new cells of the party developed, including in the military.

When Hussein was released from jail in 1966, he expanded recruitment among the military and disaffected, gaining the ability to reconstitute a Baath militia. Having activists available in crisis moments was pivotal to creating the impression of Baathists' control of the streets.

The pressure grew as 'Arif's weaknesses became apparent to the Baathist Military Bureau; at that point the Regional Command established links with a trio of key officers in the army and Republican Guard. These Baathist officers struck on July 17, 1968, seizing key ministries and expelling 'Arif from the country. Al-Bakr became the president, and Hussein was given control of domestic security and the police forces. Using this portfolio, plus his position with the Baath regional command, Hussein began consolidating his hold on the party and regime. He would not take the reins from al-Bakr until 1979, a changeover only ratifying a situation long in the making.

The 1970s saw the Baath of Iraq lose ideological moorings, as was happening in Syria, but the process was more easily camouflaged by progress in several socialist initiatives. In 1972, the long-sought nationalization of the oil industry was finally achieved. The regime also concentrated on creating the goods and services it needed for the dominant industry within Iraq. It also sought diversification, tapping into the country's rich sulfur and phosphate reserves. Policies were implemented whereby the state took the lead over communal groups in providing health care, handling labor problems, addressing family needs, and making education accessible.

The oil riches meant that Iraq was one of the few developing nations of the world with surplus capital, allowing it to increase spending on the medical infrastructure by 40 percent from 1968 to 1974. Meanwhile, Hussein was extending control through a growing network of secret police and informers, many recruited from the same pool of desperation that Hussein had come from earlier. In the face of torture, illegal imprisonments, wholesale killings, and suppression of all political activity beyond Hussein's countenance, the party's longtime slogan of "Unity, Freedom, and Socialism" doubtless rang hollow alongside the socialist advances.

With the initiation of the Iran–Iraq War, Hussein lost his oil-driven economic advantage, and within two years Iraq became a debtor nation. Socialist programs had to be abandoned due to costs and to conditions "suggested" by lender nations. The regime continued, even increased, its repression, although it was little remarked on the world stage since many of Iraq's erstwhile supporters at this time were more

focused on containing the Islamic revolution of Iran. As with Syria, measures to maintain authority undercut Baathists' implementation of socialist ideals.

SEE ALSO: Arab Left and Socialist Movements, 1861–1930; Egypt and Arab Socialism; Iraq, Revolution of 1958; Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970)

References and Suggested Readings

- Abu Jaber, K. S. (1966) *The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Avraham, B. (1968) The Neo-Ba'th Party of Syria. *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, 3 (July): 161–81.
- Hanna, S. (1967) Al-Afghani: A Pioneer of Islamic Socialism. *Muslim World* 57: 24–32.
- Hanna, S. & Gardner, G. (1969) *Arab Socialism: A Documentary Survey*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Ismael, T. (2001) *Middle East Politics Today: Government and Civil Society*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Kerr, M. (1968) Notes on the Background of Arab Socialist Thought. *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, 3 (July): 145–59.
- Olson, R. (1982) *The Ba'th and Syria, 1947 to 1982: The Evolution of Ideology, Party, and State*. Princeton: Kingston Press.
- Reid, D. M. (1974) The Syrian Christians and Early Socialism in the Arab World. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5, 2 (April): 177–93.
- Tibi, B. (1986) Islam and Modern European Ideologies. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 18, 1 (February): 15–29.
- Tripp, C. (2000) *A History of Iraq*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wahba, M. M. (1990) The Meaning of *Ishirakiyah*: Arab Perceptions of Socialism in the Nineteenth Century. *Alif: Journal of Contemporary Poetics* 10: 42–55.

Szabó, Ervin (1877–1918)

János M. Bak

Ervin Szabó, a Hungarian sociologist and anarchosyndicalist, was born in Slanica (now a lost village in Slovakia). After studies in Budapest and Vienna he became a librarian, and from 1911 director of the Budapest Municipal Library (now bearing his name), which he made into a modern public library. A member of the Social Democratic Party from 1900, he was co-founder,

with Oscar Jászi, of the journal *Huszadik Század* (*Twentieth Century*), the organ of modern social science in Hungary, and a regular contributor to *Neue Zeit* (*New Times*) as well as, later on, to *Mouvement Socialiste* (*Socialist Movement*). After failing to organize a successful opposition to the doctrinaire-reformist Social Democratic Party in 1905, he came to be ever closer to anarchists at home and abroad.

While editing the first Hungarian translation of the selected works of Marx and Engels (1905–9) and keeping close contact with orthodox Marxists such as Karl Kautsky, Karl Mehring, and Georgi Plekhanov, Szabó became critical of their determinist views and the “Prussian discipline” of social democracy. He was convinced that “all social progress is the work of critically thinking intellectuals,” and turned against those “enemies of workers’ socialism who use a falsified Marx as a weapon in the fight for state socialism.” Szabó’s contacts with radical Russian émigrés in Vienna (in whose underground activities he participated) and then with George Sorel and Hubert Lagardelle, as well as with Count Ervin Batthyány, brought him close to anarchosyndicalism. When attempts at a syndicalist organization around 1909–10 failed, Szabó saw himself as “the flag bearer of

the morrow and the day after tomorrow,” and retreated into librarianship.

During World War I Szabó was a mentor to young anti-militarist activists, many of whom became communists; however, later on, the Bolshevized Communist Party rejected Szabó’s libertarian views. Only in the 1980s, and then after the fall of Soviet communism, was his position in the progressive traditions of his country restored.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Hungary; Anarchosyndicalism; Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bak, J. M., Bozóki, A., & Sükösd, M. (Eds.) (1991) *Liberty and Socialism: Writings of Libertarian Socialists in Hungary, 1884–1919*. Savage: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Bozóki, A. & Sükösd, M. (2006) *Anarchism in Hungary: Theory, History, Legacies*. Boulder: Social Science Monographs.
- Goldberger, S. (1985) *Ervin Szabo, Anarcho-Syndicalism and the Democratic Revolution in Turn-of-the-Century Hungary*. PhD dissertation, Columbia University.
- Szabó, E. (1982) *Socialism and Social Science: Selected Writings of Ervin Szabó, 1877–1918*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

T

Tagore, Saumyendranath (1901–1974)

Shatarupa Sen Gupta

Saumyendranath Tagore began his political career as a Gandhian but joined the Workers' and Peasants' Party (WPP) in April 1926. Thereafter, he began mobilizing the jute mill-workers of Bengal to form the Bengal Jute Workers' Association. Both his success as a trade union activist and his attempts to win over revolutionary terrorists to the WPP made him a marked man. In order to avoid arrest, Tagore left for Europe in May 1927 with a mandate from the WPP. By June 1927 he was in Moscow where he presented a report on the political condition of India. He attended the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928 as an Indian delegate, and expressed some limited unease with the Colonial Thesis, though he did hold that since the Indian bourgeoisie had much to gain from the British, any upsurge in the national revolution would make them oppose it.

In early 1929 Tagore was preparing to return to India when he was implicated in the Meerut Conspiracy Case. He thus decided to remain in Europe to carry on with his politico-literary activities, which included the translation of the *Communist Manifesto* into Bengali. During this time he was arrested and later released by the Gestapo on charges of planning the assassination of Hitler. He returned to India in 1934, by which time the WPP was defunct and the communist movement was in disarray. By this time he had also become critical of Stalin and the Comintern. Consequently, he started a communist organization known as the Communist League of India, which advocated the formation of *soviets* of workers and peasants for the success

of the Indian revolution. This party became the Revolutionary Communist Party of India in 1938, which took a revolutionary internationalist stance during World War II.

In 1940 Saumyendranath published a pamphlet in which he equated British and French imperialism with fascism, and urged for the utilization of the British crisis of World War II to press for Indian freedom. As a result he was imprisoned for a year. He was jailed again in 1942 for opposing the Cripps mission to India. He condemned the assassination of Trotsky, and characterized the USSR as a bureaucratic-collectivist regime, carrying on anti-Stalinist as well as anti-imperialist propaganda from jail.

After his release in 1945, Tagore participated in the mass movement against the trial of the Indian National Army officers and provided leadership to the hugely successful general strike in Calcutta on July 29, 1946. He also initiated the formation of trade unions in mercantile concerns.

In 1948 the RCPI split into two, whereby Tagore's group was reduced to a minority. He spent the remainder of his political career as a civil rights activist. He also defended the records of early Indian communists such as Abani Mukherjee, who was murdered in Stalinist Russia, and those vilified as agents of imperialism by Stalinists, such as Muzaffar Ahmed. Some of his important works are *Biplabi Russia* (Revolutionary Russia), *Russiar Kabita* (Poems of Russia), *Troyee* (The Three), *Communism and Fascism*, *Hitlerism and the Aryan Rule in Germany*, and *Sadharan Swattabadia Ishtahar* (Communist Manifesto). He died on September 22, 1974.

SEE ALSO: Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

Chandra, A. (1993) Communist League: Trisher Dasaker ekti Samantaral Communist Sangathan. In A. W. Mahmud (Ed.), *Itihas Anusandhan*. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi.

Chattopadhyay, G. (1970) *Communism and Bengal's Freedom Movement*. New Delhi: Peoples' Publishing House.

Chattopadhyay, S. (Ed.) (1975, 1984) *Against the Stream: An Anthology of Writings of Saumyendranath Tagore*, Vols. 1–2. Calcutta: Saumyendranath Memorial Committee.

Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864

Amit Bhattacharyya

One of the greatest Chinese peasant rebellions, the Taiping (Great Peace) Rebellion was directed primarily against the feudal rule of the Manchu dynasty and secondarily against foreign capitalism, which had been making steady inroads into the economy, society, and politics of China ever since the country's defeat in the first Opium War and the signing of the Treaty of Nanking.

Crises of the Manchu Rule (1644–1911)

Manchu rule was the rule of a conquering dynasty named the Ch'ing or Qing that had overthrown the indigenous Ming dynasty. They were a Tungusic people, considered foreigners by the mainland Chinese. Manchu rule was torn by crises, mismanagement, and corruption in the late eighteenth century, at both the central and provincial levels. Government encouragement of the sale of official positions created a vicious cycle of corruption. Taxes were arbitrarily enhanced by local officials and landlords, who also acted as tax collectors. Political decline led to economic failure. The great majority of the peasants had no protection against exploitation by officials and various feudal elements. As in all feudal societies, land was concentrated in the hands of a handful of gentry officials and the peasants were subjected to all forms of oppression and exploitation. Factors such as these caused peasant rebellions in the earlier periods of the history of China. However, in the mid-nineteenth century, social crisis assumed a new dimension by the unexpected population explosion. In fact, China's population increased from 180 million in 1751 to 430 million in 1851 without any corresponding expansion of the area of arable land. In the absence of any industry to absorb the surplus

population and territory to which they could migrate, land was further fragmented. This not only disrupted the balance of the rural economic sector but also crippled the peasantry by lowering their standard of living.

Advent of Western Imperialism

The scenario was aggravated by the entry of western capitalism. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the import of goods from abroad, especially opium, had risen steeply compared to exports. Thus the balance of trade went against China. The import hike was met by the export of large quantities of silver from China to other countries. Before the beginning of the nineteenth century, *tael* (1 ounce of silver) was equal to 1,000 copper coins; in 1835, the rate of exchange was 1 ounce to 2,000 coins. The great majority of the population usually used copper coins to pay for goods including agricultural products. But the problem was that peasants had to pay their taxes not in copper but in silver. Therefore, for the peasants, taxes were doubled simply by the alteration in the rate of exchange. Moreover, a series of natural disasters from 1826 to 1850 drove the peasants below subsistence level and they were no longer in a position to pay taxes.

The political and social crises were accelerated by the First Opium War (1840–2) and the Treaty of Nanking (1842), the first in a series unequal treaties that, along with subsequent developments, transformed China from a feudal country into a semi-feudal and semi-colonial one. The Manchu state became totally discredited, politically weak and subservient to foreign powers. Before the Opium War, foreign trade was limited to the port city of Canton. A great number of porters were regularly employed in transporting goods between Canton and the Yangzi provinces. After the war, the British intruders demanded that other ports such as Amoy, Shanghai, Ningpo, and Foochow also be opened to trade. Decline in the importance of the Cantonese monopoly threw hundreds of thousands of boatmen and porters in central and southern China out of work. These unemployed masses swelled the ranks of the Taiping and furnished many of their leaders. The influx of cheap foreign textiles ruined millions of weavers and other handicraftsmen through direct competition in the market. This was known as

deindustrialization, a phenomenon noticeable also in contemporary colonial India. Indigenous merchants and moneylenders, who used to finance artisans, now invested in foreign goods.

Proto-nationalist feelings gave these long-standing and diverse socioeconomic grievances a common vocabulary of protest. Followers of the Ming dynasty, overthrown by the Manchus, had prepared a literary battle against the foreign rulers at the end of the seventeenth century that profoundly inspired the leaders of the Taiping Rebellion and other risings. Supporters of the Ming dynasty formed a secret society called the Heaven and Earth Society, whose slogan was "Overthrow the Ch'ing and restore the Ming."

Hong Xiuquan

The beginning of the Taiping Rebellion almost coincided with the revolutionary outbreaks that shook Europe in 1848. Starting off in Tzu-chin shan in the province of Kwangsi, near the Vietnam border, it cut across China like a sword, approaching Peking in the north, Shanghai in the east, and the Tibetan mountains in the west. The rebels made Nanking their capital and set up the revolutionary state of the oppressed people known as the Taiping Tien-kuo or the Heavenly Kingdom of the Great Peace.

Hong Xiuquan, the supreme leader of the rebellion, was a poverty-stricken schoolteacher who had been ill treated by the corrupt Confucian scholar gentry that served the Manchus. He was born in the province of Kwangtung (capital Canton), which gave birth to many a Chinese revolutionary including Sun Yat-sen. Witnessing the persecution of his own people by the landlords, Hong was deeply influenced by the heroic battles of the Cantonese peasant detachments against the British invaders during the Opium War. At the same time, he came into contact with the Christianity preached, but rarely practiced, by the missionaries.

This rebellion brought within its fold a number of people from different walks of life. In fact, Hong's earliest colleagues such as Yang (charcoal-burner), Feng (village schoolteacher), Hsiao (poor peasant and woodcutter), Wei (trader), and Shih (rich peasant) reflected the class basis of the movement. There were also representatives of small sections of relatively well-to-do scholar gentry who were opposed to the Manchus for national, not social, reasons. Their followers consisted of

the Hakka, Yao, and Miao tribes, several hundred charcoal-burners, a large number of miners, and former pirates who had been driven from the seashores by foreign warships. Moreover, there were a few traders and well-to-do peasants as well as deserters from the government troops and porters from Canton. The peasantry constituted the main fighting force of the movement.

Dynamics and Defeat

As the revolutionary situation was conducive to their growth, the Taiping rebels quickly grew in strength. In the summer of 1852, they left their original base in Kwangsi and marched northwards toward Hunan, where they were joined by a huge body of rebels from other movements. From Hunan they proceeded through Hupei and then occupied Nanking, the southern capital of the Ming dynasty in the spring of 1853. Nanking became the seat of rebel power and Hong Xiuquan set up his court there. An army was dispatched northwards with the aim of capturing Peking. However, because of inadequate military preparations and the inability of the southern soldiers to adjust to the northern food habits and cold winter climate, the thrust to the north came to nothing.

The rebels could not keep their revolutionary fervor intact for long for a number of reasons. In 1856, the rebels fell out among themselves in the city of Nanking itself, and the treachery of a commander named Wei Chang-hui resulted in a confrontation in which some of the most important leaders lost their lives. This brought the revolutionary offensive to an end and its continuance in the following years turned out to be purely defensive. Along with this, other internal contradictions developed within the rebel order. The Taipings began by conducting mobile warfare, all the way from the mountains of Kwangsi to the rebel capital of Nanking. Undoubtedly this was a spontaneous people's war against the feudal order. However, as Chesneau (1973) points out, after establishing a government and a state in Nanking, the leaders soon became a privileged class. In order to make the governmental machinery work, they had to make increasing demands on the peasantry. This marked the transition point for the peasantry, who were transformed from active agents participating in the decision to create a new political formation to passive subjects of a government. They had to

pay taxes, suffer requisitions, and supply unpaid labor: the system they had sought to change. This was why the peasantry became increasingly disaffected in the last years of the Heavenly Kingdom. The rebel state was thus in the process of being weakened by these internal contradictions.

The defeat of the Taipings can be attributed not only to internal factors, but also to external ones. The foreign powers played a major role in this. At the beginning, the rebellion received much praise in the western press and even in government circles. The fact that the rebels were Christian and stood against Manchu corruption and backwardness was much acclaimed. That is why the western powers maintained neutrality in the initial years of the revolt. They wanted to utilize the revolt to further their own gains by exploiting the internal contradictions within China. Some foreign leaders sought to transform the rebel leaders into their stooges, who would help them capture political power and gain control over China. Others wanted to see China exhausted by internal turmoil and cease to exist. However, the Taipings were never prepared to allow foreigners to use them as they wished. Through their revolutionary activities and their program of action, they made it clear that the civil war in China was the internal affair of the Chinese people and that any offer from foreigners to mediate between the rebels and the Manchu state was unacceptable to them. At the same time, by imposing a ban on the opium trade in areas controlled by the Taiping rebels, they made their anti-western position perfectly clear.

Foreign Intervention

The Opium War and the treaties signed thereafter paved the way for the control of China's internal affairs by the foreign powers. Britain's declaration of war on China was followed by that of France, culminating in the Second Opium War in 1857–8 which also ended in China's defeat and the signing of another unequal and humiliating treaty, known as the Treaty of Tientsin (1858). By this treaty, the Manchus had to concede a tremendous war indemnity, the legalization of both opium and missionary activities, and the perpetuation of foreign control of customs and tariffs. The toiling people of China were transferred to different colonies to serve in Malay, US, and New Caledonian plantations and mines as

nothing better than slaves. This marked the beginning of the infamous "coolie trade" whereby Chinese workers were forced to work in abysmal, unhygienic conditions. Britain and France were to provide military help to the Manchu government to fight the Taiping rebels. Opium was legalized by the treaty and the Taipings, who had banned opium, were regarded as "international law-breakers" in their own motherland.

The attitude of the foreign governments and the press toward the rebels soon changed. They were no longer regarded as religious brethren but as "anarchists" and "blasphemers." The Manchu government, regarded previously as reactionary, was now hailed as the guardian of trade and legality and a force for stability. In fact, by 1861–2, British and French troops started participating in the armed conflicts on the side of the Manchus in Shanghai.

Many progressive people in the western world raised their voices against unwarranted western interference in the internal affairs of China. Marx and Engels denounced such aggression in a series of articles. A number of foreigners fought directly for the Taipings. Augustus Lindlay, a British citizen, not only took up arms on the side of the Taipings but also wrote a moving eyewitness account of the rising. Moreover, several former officials of the French army and at least one Italian named Major Moreno played an active part in it.

The last phase of the battle was the bloodiest of all. The combined attacks of the Manchu and foreign troops finally put an end to this greatest peasant revolt in the history of modern China. In the summer of 1864, the capital Nanking fell to the Manchus.

Revolutionary Measures

The military successes of the Taiping were based on the overwhelming support of the people. It was truly a people's war that unleashed the initiative and creativity of the masses. The social and political program they adopted reflected the aspirations of the masses. In fact, many of the principles of the Taiping Rebellion served as an inspiration and model for Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang (National People's Party) he founded, as well as for the May 4th movement of 1919 and the communists. Franke writes that the Taiping took the idea of equality from Christianity. This idea combined with many

ancient ideas and did much to strengthen their revolutionary social program.

- *Common property*: Under the Taipings, unlike in previous regimes, there were no private possessions. They established a common treasury and granary from which provision was made for individual weddings, births, funerals, and so on.
- *Land reform program*: The makers of the new order proclaimed an egalitarian Agrarian Law according to which all the land under Heaven was to be collectively cultivated by all the people under Heaven. All land was divided into nine categories according to its quality and was allocated for the use of the population. The peasants retained for themselves only that part of the produce that was needed for their subsistence. Taxes were reduced to a level that was lower than that demanded by the Manchu state. In a manifesto of November 2, 1860, Hong Xiuquan announced a reduction of taxes in the southern counties of Kiangsu. It read: “Now, seeing the suffering of the people, and fulfilling the will of the Most High, I and my youthful heir to the throne intend to govern humanely and to lower taxes in order to lighten the life of the people and bring them relief. . . . As I have learned from the report of Brother Li Hsiucheng, in the past the population of Kiangsu paid onerous taxes and extortionate duties to the Manchu devils, who sucked your blood and rebelled against Heaven” (Anon 1959). The Soviet historian Tikhvinsky (1983) has drawn attention to the limitations of the measures of the Taiping. It is true that the revolutionaries were thoroughly anti-feudal and anti-Manchu and regarded all property, including landed property, as the “property of the Satan.” At the same time, as peasant rebels they tended to reproduce structures similar to what had existed before, relying on gentry and bureaucrats for administration. As a result, in many cases landlord-bureaucrats failed to carry out demands for the reduction of sharecroppers’ rent and were able to impose practically the whole burden of taxation on the shoulders of the peasantry.
- *Position of women*: In traditional Chinese society, the position of women was subordinate in every respect to that of men. Women did not have any right over property; they were

subjected to political, religious, clan-based, and patriarchal exploitation. The Taipings marked a qualitative departure from the past as they sought to create a new society based on gender equality. Their unhesitant declaration to this effect was itself a revolutionary political statement. In a feudal society where women had no rights whatsoever, they forbade prostitution and the purchase and sale of women in marriage. In the rebel order, women could sit for state examinations and occupy the same civil or military positions as men. One unique fact is the presence of women soldiers in special women’s contingents in the Taiping army. Monogamy was made obligatory. Rape was punishable by death.

- *Temperance*: Like tobacco and alcohol, opium was also strictly prohibited and this was enforced in practice.
- *Attack on images*: The Taipings were monotheistic and their activities showed signs of their intolerance toward other religious sects. They were influenced by Christianity and destroyed the images, statues, and temples of Buddhism, Taoism, and particularly Confucianism, which served as the ideological basis of the feudal system in China. By directing their attacks against images, the Taipings gave their critics and opponents a powerful weapon to use against them.
- *Treatment of foreigners*: The Taiping Rebellion took place in the context of western capitalist penetration when foreign trade and the opium business had already extended their tentacles. The Taipings recognized none of the privileges the foreign powers extracted from the Manchus through unequal treaties. On the other hand, they were prepared to establish commercial relations with them on the basis of equality. As a result of the Christian influence, they regarded all nations as having equal rights; they did not deride foreigners as “barbarians,” nor did they regard the Chinese as people chosen by the Lord on High. They were hostile to Catholics, but fairly friendly to Protestants.
- *Calendar reform*: The traditional lunar Chinese calendar was replaced by a completely new lunisolar calendar with a seven-day week.
- *Literary reform*: The Taipings also introduced important changes in the written language of the people. The Chinese language does not have an alphabet: it is ideographic. Moreover,

there was a wide variety in the dialects used by people living in each province. Despite such differences, the written language was the same everywhere and it was this unity that could hold the Chinese nation together, regardless of disunity in other fields. The problem was that the overwhelming majority of the Chinese did not know the written language and so were not in a position to write. The Taipings relaxed the heavily conventional written style, which was quite different from the spoken language, by approximating it more closely to colloquial speech. In this they were the forerunners of the great literary revolution that took place later on.

- *Other reforms:* Besides these reforms, the Taipings envisaged other modern infrastructural reforms, such as the construction of a network of railways, a postal service, hospitals, and banks. They accepted the Ten Commandments and the divinity of Christ. In their opinion, Hong Xiuquan was the second brother of Christ. They believed in baptism, and the Old and New Testaments were integral parts of their religious canons. It can therefore be argued that the Taipings created a complete politico-religious system which combined spiritual salvation and obedience to the will of God with the political and military defense of the rebel state.

Nature and Significance

Although the Taipings did attempt to establish an egalitarian utopian society, their reforms were actually such as to pave the way to capitalism. But peasant rebellions without the creation of new productive forces through the participation of an urban bourgeoisie could not achieve capitalist development. In effect, the peasantry was used by the landlords and the nobility as a lever to bring about dynastic changes.

The Taiping Rebellion took place at a time when Chinese society had been undergoing a process of transition from a feudal society to a semi-feudal and semi-colonial one. The process of transition started roughly from the time of the Opium Wars when Britain and other foreign powers had already begun making active encroachments on Chinese soil. Epstein (1956) holds that this rebellion was simultaneously the last of China's old-style peasant wars and the first great democratic fight of its people in the modern

period. Chesneau (1973) says that elements of proto-nationalism in the Taiping movement linked it with the peasant revolts of earlier days. The rebels accused the Manchu dynasty of wanting to drain the country of its wealth. It is important to refer in this connection to an interesting feature: they allowed their hair to grow on the front part of the head – a longstanding practice that was prohibited by the Manchu rulers. It was this nationalistic element that explains the participation of a large number of educated and rich people whose anti-Manchu patriotism gave them some sympathy for the rebel cause.

A number of scholars, both Chinese and western, have written on the nature and significance of the Taiping Rebellion. Mao Zedong (1939) pointed out that peasant risings and wars constituted a unique feature of Chinese history. According to him, class struggles between peasants and feudal forces constituted the dynamic element in the progress of China amidst the changing fortunes of ruling dynasties. He argued that in the absence of “correct leadership” by the proletariat and the Communist Party, peasant wars of the past were unable to liberate the peasantry from the feudal yoke. While speaking of the Taiping Rebellion, Mao said that it was one of the eight major events that occurred in the formative period of China's bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Mao's observations inspired the historians of modern China to engage in 11 years of debate from 1950 to 1961. In 1952, the Chinese Historical Society published eight volumes of source materials on Taiping from Shanghai. During that period, Chinese journals published 400 research articles. However, as Tan Chung (1985) argues, this important intellectual achievement has hardly been noticed outside China. J. P. Harrison, who followed this debate with interest, was critical of the communist historians' attempts to put the peasant movements of the past on a new pedestal.

Tan Chung argued that in earlier times the gentry had suppressed information about the importance of peasant rebellions in Chinese history, an importance that was recovered only after the aforementioned debates. These debates helped Chinese scholars view their past as a continuous process of social evolution with peasant movements acting as locomotives, having an anti-feudal dynamic. A different view was that the peasants attacked the regime, not feudalism as a

class system. Hou Wailu described the Taiping revolt as the highest form of peasant war and a very good beginning for modern revolution. Another writer, Wu Shimo, asserted that Taiping stood for political equality, economic equality, sexual equality, and equality among nations.

Karl Marx and *The Times* (August 30, 1853) hailed the event in identical language. Marx called it a formidable revolution and *The Times* described it as the greatest revolution the world had ever seen. On the other hand, Barrington Moore (1993) and Kung-chuan Hsiao (1979) maintain that it was a rebellion, not a revolution, as it did not alter the basic structure of society. Vincent Shih holds that the Taipings had genuine revolutionary possibilities in borrowing Christian and western ideas. But these possibilities were nullified because the Taipings were only able to perceive Christian ideas through the glass of traditional concepts. It is ridiculous to argue that all revolutionary possibilities should be identified solely with western ideas. While opposing Vincent Shih, Tan Chung argues that the Taiping ideology drew heavily on native cultural aspirations such as folklore, but the trace of continuity does not necessarily dilute its revolutionary character. D. S. Zagoria has made an ecological analysis and argues for the inevitability of the movement. He maintains that a peasant rebellion of the Taiping type was the inevitable outcome of "Monsoon Asia." China, one of the wettest countries in the world, is well known as a "rice economy," highlighted by intensive utilization of farmland, a dense population, hunger for land, elimination of smallholdings, and proletarianization of the peasants, thereby creating the conditions for rural unrest, revolts, and anti-feudal wars. Although old democratic revolutions consisting of the Taiping, Boxer, and the 1911 nationalist revolution failed to free China from the tentacles of feudal and imperialist forces, its successor, the new democratic revolution, from the May 4 movement onwards – when the working class entered the political stage – could bring about the liberation of the country within a short span of 30 years. The Taiping Rebellion was an agrarian revolution, which formed part of the democratic revolution.

SEE ALSO: China, Peasant Revolts in the Empire; Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925); Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Anonymous (1959) *Records of the Taiping Era*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press.
- Chesneaux, J. (1972) *Secret Societies in China in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Chesneaux, J. (1973) *Peasant Revolts in China 1840–1949*. London: Thames & Hudson.
- Epstein, I. (1956) *From Opium War to Liberation*. Beijing: New World Press.
- Franke, W. (1970) *A Century of the Chinese Revolution 1851–1949*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kung-chuan Hsiao (1979) *A History of Chinese Political Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mao Zedong (1939) The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party. Available at www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_23.htm (downloaded May 5, 2008).
- Moore, B., Jr. (1993) *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Shih, V. Y. C. (1972) *The Taiping Ideology: Its Sources, Interpretations, and Influences*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Spence, J. D. (1996) *God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Tan Chung (1985) *Triton and Dragon: Studies on Nineteenth-Century China and Imperialism*. Delhi: Gian.
- Tikhvinsky, S. L. (Ed.) (1983) *Modern History of China*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Zagoria, D. S. (1974) Asian Tenancy Systems and Communist Mobilization of the Peasantry. In J. Lewis (Ed.), *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Taiwan, anti-imperialism and nationalism

J. Megan Greene

Nationalism in Taiwan has in many ways been generated and refined through a series of protests of foreign imperialism. Taiwan has had a long history of imperialist conquest, which began with the Dutch in the seventeenth century and ended, according to many Taiwan nationalists, with the Guomindang (GMD) takeover of the island in 1945. Over this 300-year period, Taiwan

was governed by Dutch, Chinese, and Japanese rulers, and although protests were infrequent, from the late nineteenth century on they took on an increasingly nationalistic character. In recent years, Taiwanese nationalists have drawn upon the island's colonial history to encourage its modern residents to resist efforts by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to take it over and turn it into a Chinese province.

The residents of Taiwan at the time of the Dutch conquest in 1624 were composed of numerous Austronesian aboriginal tribes that can be broadly divided into two groups. Mountain aborigines had had little or no contact with Chinese traders and other groups that had periodically landed on Taiwan's shores, and were regarded by Taiwan's Dutch rulers, and later by Chinese and Japanese rulers alike, as impossible to assimilate and best left on their own, although the territory that they controlled diminished substantially over time and under Japanese rule many of their traditional practices were outlawed. Plains aborigines, who inhabited the western plain of Taiwan, assimilated rapidly, and during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries many intermarried with Chinese settlers. Between the seventeenth and late nineteenth centuries Taiwan's plains aborigines periodically protested against the unfair taxation practices of the Dutch and Qing Chinese rulers and mountain aborigines occasionally conducted violent wars against the Dutch and Chinese.

The earliest notable protest that can clearly be understood as anti-imperialist came in 1895 in response to the news that Taiwan was about to be given to the Japanese as part of the war reparations the Qing dynasty was forced to pay following its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–5). A group of local leaders decided to secede from the Qing and establish a Taiwan Republic, thereby preempting the planned colonization of Taiwan by Japan. This maneuver was not intended so much as a rejection of the Qing, since its authors were themselves pro-Qing, as an attempt to evade the fate of becoming Japanese.

Although the move failed, the leaders of the Republic backed up their political efforts with an army, and fought the Japanese invasion for five months before finally acknowledging defeat. These actions were followed by further efforts at resistance, but within the first ten years of Japanese rule the resistance had been pacified and

the Japanese had only to contend with occasional rebellions from mountain aboriginal groups, whereas the plains aborigines and Chinese residents of the western plain yielded to Japanese authority. By the 1930s and 1940s, a group of Taiwanese elites had begun to call for self-government and autonomy, but their approach was to work within the system rather than to attempt to overthrow it.

As Taiwan was handed from Japan to GMD-controlled China at the end of World War II, with no regard for the wishes of the Taiwanese people, these same elites continued to call for self-government, but they now did so from within a new provincial assembly that the GMD permitted to exist. Their efforts to work within the system, however, ended in early March 1947 after riots had erupted in protest of the GMD's taxation policies and its perceived authoritarianism. The February 28 Incident, as these events have come to be known, started with a smallish riot in protest against brutal treatment by police of a woman selling contraband cigarettes. Over the next several days, increasing numbers of people took to the streets to protest the new GMD government.

In this environment, Taiwan's elites met to formulate a series of demands, including the dissolution of the Taiwan Garrison Command, all of which aimed at the ultimate goal of self-rule. These demands met with violent opposition on the part of the GMD, however, when Governor Chen Yi called in troop reinforcements who killed or imprisoned many of the elites who had been involved as well as other protesters. Following the February 28 Incident, martial law was declared in Taiwan and was not lifted until 1987.

Although martial law severely restricted the political activities of the people of Taiwan, there were nonetheless some notable protest movements during the martial law era, most of which were associated with publications. In 1960, for example, Lei Zhen (Lei Chen), a writer and intellectual, called upon the Republic of China (ROC) to democratize. He published his essays in a journal by the name of *Ziyou zhongguo* (Free China), which had been established by a number of well-known advocates of liberal democracy, including Hu Shi, who had served the GMD government in various capacities since the 1930s. Although Lei Zhen and the other *Ziyou zhongguo* writers were supporters of the ROC and, to

a certain extent, of the GMD itself, the GMD state could still not tolerate such open criticism; it shut down the journal and arrested Lei as well as a number of other figures who had associations with the journal.

In 1979, the publishers of *Meilidao* (Formosa) magazine undertook to organize a major protest in Kaohsiung that was violently suppressed by the authorities. *Meilidao* magazine was perhaps the most radical of a number of new journals that had sprung up in the year or so prior to the Kaohsiung Incident. Its aim was to promote democratization and its editors included some important political figures, one of whom, Xu Xinliang (Hsu Hsin-liang) had earlier been expelled from the GMD for keeping his name on a ballot even after having lost a primary. The magazine increasingly functioned more or less as a political party, opening branch offices in various cities in Taiwan and promoting activism, anti-GMD protest, and a pro-Taiwan independence agenda. These activities ultimately proved more than the GMD was willing to tolerate, and as a result it responded harshly to the planned protest in Kaohsiung in 1979.

In spite of the fact that *Meilidao* was shut down and its editors were jailed, some for very long sentences, the incident helped to catalyze a democracy movement in Taiwan that ultimately contributed to the ending of martial law in 1987. Although political parties other than the GMD were illegal under martial law, Xu and others could run in local elections as so-called "outside the party" (*dangwai*) candidates. Beginning in the late 1970s these candidates began to coalesce, and *dangwai* took on an identity that was akin to an opposition party. It was out of this group that Taiwan's first opposition party, the illegal Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), emerged in 1986, and it was in part owing to President Jiang Jinguo's (Chiang Ching-kuo) decision not to suppress that party that he subsequently also decided to end martial law.

The protests of the 1940s, 1970s, and 1980s all sought to democratize Taiwan, but like those of the 1890s and 1930s they were also anti-imperialist in nature. The question of Taiwan's autonomy was at the center of each of these movements, and the activists not only called for an end to GMD authoritarianism, they also hoped for an end to GMD rule altogether. The GMD had, like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the PRC, insisted since 1949 on maintaining the

fiction that there was a single China and that both Taiwan and the mainland were a part of it. Many Taiwanese, however, never accepted this view, and for them calls for democratization were closely linked to their desire to establish an independent Taiwan. Perhaps the most important plank in the platform of the DPP other than its opposition to the GMD was its support for Taiwan independence. In other words, the early DPP regarded the GMD as a Chinese colonial force, and sought to oust both the party and the government. It never chose to attempt using methods any more violent than mass protest, however, and always tried to work within the very system that it sought to end. With the DPP candidate Chen Shuibian's election to the presidency in 2000, however, the party had to take a more pragmatic stance with respect to antagonizing the PRC, and backed away, at least partially, from the Taiwan independence platform.

Following its ascension to power in 2000, however, the DPP used every cultural institution it controlled to help teach Taiwanese to think of the GMD as a colonial power, just like the Japanese, the Qing, and the Dutch. New museums were constructed that commemorated bygone colonial experiences, and spaces in existing museums were dedicated to exhibits on the Dutch seventeenth century, English treaty-port culture of the nineteenth century, and the Japanese colonial era. Likewise, high school curricula were revised to include more material on Taiwan's colonial experiences than they had included under GMD rule. Taiwan's students and general public were encouraged to start thinking about the GMD as just another conqueror from outside. Although the public ultimately voted to return the GMD to power in 2008, the results of this mass education campaign are still unclear.

SEE ALSO: China, Maoism and Popular Power, 1949–1969; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Meilidao Protests, 1978; Taiwan, Land Reform; Taiwan, 2-28 Protests, 1947

References and Suggested Readings

- Phillips, S. (2003) *Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945–1950*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Shepherd, J. R. (1993) *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Taiwan, land reform

J. Megan Greene

Sometimes small revolutions occur as the consequence of state policy. An example of this phenomenon was the land reform of 1949 to 1953 in Taiwan. During this period, the Guomindang (GMD) government, which had taken control of Taiwan at the end of World War II, undertook a thorough land reform in an effort to disempower local elites, solve problems of economic inequity in the countryside, and carry through an economic strategy that had been espoused by the GMD founder, Sun Yatsen. Land reform resulted in a radical redistribution of wealth in the Taiwanese countryside which had a lasting effect on economics and politics through the twentieth century. It thus amounted to an essentially non-violent, rural, economic "revolution from above" that was guided by a coercive state.

When the GMD relocated to Taiwan following its defeat by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, it undertook to carry out, in a much more systematic and meaningful way than it had during its period of rule in China, the economic policies of Sun Yatsen. China's early twentieth-century revolutionary leader, motivated by a desire to see China take control of its own economy, and inspired by western socialist and liberal thinkers, mapped out a strategy for a Chinese economic revolution that would involve nationalization of industry, development of state-owned enterprises, and land reform. Sun himself never had the opportunity to implement any of these policies, and his successor Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) did not acquire sufficiently stable or penetrating control of China to carry them out with any sustained success prior to 1949. Following the GMD's retreat to Taiwan, however, the party was able to undertake all three of these major policies, the first of which, nationalization of industry, they initiated in Taiwan as soon as they took control of the island from the Japanese in 1945.

Land reform was a critical element of this economic reform process, and was of particular importance to the GMD because of the fear of party leaders that communism would take hold in Taiwan as it had in China. As in China, the majority of Taiwan's population were peasants, and the GMD leadership was concerned that communist activists would succeed in fomenting peasant discontent in Taiwan as they had in

China by utilizing the land question. A high priority for the GMD in the early 1950s, therefore, was the elimination of this threat by addressing the land question itself, and it was encouraged in this undertaking by its US advisors, who offered aid and advice through the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR). Unlike land reform in the People's Republic of China, which involved violent class struggle and created a permanent division between China's old landlords and the new ruling party, however, the GMD carried out the land reform in Taiwan in a way that bound the interests of the party and the old landed elite together. Land reform enabled the GMD to win support from both the rural poor and segments of the agrarian elite, neither of whom had owed any allegiance to the GMD prior to the implementation of the policy.

The GMD's land reform was undertaken in three stages. First, in 1949, farm rents were reduced. Second, between 1948 and 1953, public farm land that the GMD had confiscated from the Japanese or private owners was sold or leased to tenant farmers. Third, in 1953, a "Land to the Tiller Act" was implemented which set an upper limit on the amount of land that an individual could own and determined a formula for compensation to landowners for the land that they would lose. Compensation was given in two forms: 70 percent of it was given in land bonds in kind, so that landowners received rice for paddy land and sweet potatoes for dry land, and 30 percent was given in stock in four major state-owned enterprises.

Land reform affected about one-quarter of Taiwan's arable land and resulted in a large rise in the quantity of owner-cultivated land, from 50.5 percent in 1949 to 75.4 percent in 1953. The number of tenant farmers fell from 36 percent to 15 percent, and the amount of land farmed by tenant farmers was reduced from 41.8 percent to 16.3 percent over the same period. As a consequence of land reform large landowners were replaced by small landowning families as the main force in rural Taiwan, and this pattern continues to the present day. The GMD followed up on the land reform by establishing, with the assistance of the JCRR, peasant associations that offered economic and technical assistance and helped farmers to diversify the agricultural economy and make Taiwan more agriculturally self-sufficient.

Although the benefits of land reform were immediately apparent to Taiwan's peasant population, who were able to acquire land at

substantially reduced prices, they were not at first obvious to landlords, many of whom were particularly skeptical of the trade of land for stock. The GMD, which in the spring of 1947 had effectively established its willingness to use force to draw Taiwan's population to order, however, was able to rely on the coercive authority that it already had, along with the absence of organized opposition among landlords, to force landowners to comply with the policy. Those landlords who held onto their stock in Taiwan Industry and Mining, Taiwan Paper and Pulp, Taiwan Agriculture and Forestry, and Taiwan Cement, however, found over the course of the following decade and more that their economic interests had become closely aligned with those of the state. These bedrock enterprises blossomed in the 1950s and 1960s and the value of the early stock issues skyrocketed. It behooved the stockholders, therefore, to throw their political and economic support behind the GMD state.

Scholars have varied in their assessment of the causes of Taiwan's so-called miraculous economic development of the late twentieth century. Most agree, however, that the 1950s land reform laid the foundation for a pattern of equitable growth that enabled the emergence of a large middle class and helped to tie the interests of Taiwan's population to the GMD state. This state-guided economic revolution overturned old economic patterns and established new ones that endured at least into the 1990s if not to the present day.

SEE ALSO: Taiwan, Anti-Imperialism and Nationalism; Taiwan, 2-28 Protests, 1947

References and Suggested Readings

- Gold, T. B. (1986) *State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Yager, J. A. (1988) *Transforming Agriculture in Taiwan: The Experience of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Taiwan, 2-28 protests, 1947

J. Megan Greene

In 1895 Taiwan was ceded by China's Qing court to the Japanese, who had defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5). With this act, Taiwan became Japan's first imperial colony, and it remained so for the next 50 years. After

such a long colonial experience not all Taiwanese were pleased when, in 1945, Taiwan was returned to China in accordance with the terms of the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943 that was agreed upon by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), Winston Churchill, and Franklin Roosevelt. This displeasure increased as representatives of Jiang's Guomindang (GMD) government took over Taiwan and began to implement a new set of political, economic, and social policies that in many ways discriminated against the Japanese Taiwanese and sought to extract as many resources as possible from Taiwan to assist the GMD in their quest to solidify their control over mainland China. Rising tension between Taiwanese people and representatives of the GMD government culminated in a protest riot that began on February 28, 1947 and that led to a lengthy repression of the Taiwanese people.

By early 1947 the new provincial government of Taiwan had started to nationalize Japanese-owned industries and enterprises, established a considerable police presence, and implemented a number of new taxes. The GMD thus presented itself to the people of Taiwan as a coercive and taxing authority that had little interest in the will of the Taiwanese themselves. Many elite Taiwanese resented the GMD's failure to listen to their calls for Taiwan's autonomy in the wake of World War II, and they looked down upon the Chinese migrants, many of whom were not themselves elites, and who seemed to these Japanese-educated Taiwanese to be backward and ill-educated. They also felt that the mainlanders were keeping them out of government jobs and pushing them out of the former Japanese-owned industries that the GMD was in the process of nationalizing.

Chinese who went to Taiwan with the GMD, on the other hand, generally regarded Taiwanese with considerable suspicion. China had just won a protracted war against Japan, and these Japanese-speaking Taiwanese, many of whom wore Japanese-style clothing, lived in Japanese-style homes, and had adopted Japanese cultural habits, all seemed to be extensions of China's former enemy. In this environment of mutual suspicion, and in which the GMD was eagerly seeking to both control and extract resources from Taiwan, it is hardly surprising that tensions would erupt into violence.

On February 27, 1947 two agents from the GMD-controlled Monopoly Bureau beat a woman who had been selling cigarettes at a small stand



The Taipei Branch of the Guomindang (GMD) Bureau of Monopoly, located in Taipingding (now Yanping North Road), was occupied by a crowd during the protests known as the 2-28 Incident. After GMD forces opened fire on a demonstration, killing two civilians, a major Taiwanese uprising ensued, leading to the deaths of 1,000 Chinese nationalists from the mainland. Following the institution of martial law in 1949, an estimated 20,000–30,000 Taiwanese were killed by the GMD government.

on a Taipei street. They also seized her wares and cash on the grounds that only the GMD government was permitted to sell goods such as cigarettes and liquor. A crowd of onlookers interested in defending the woman grew, and in the scuffle that ensued, a bystander was shot. The following day a group of about 2,000 protestors demonstrated in front of the Monopoly Bureau headquarters and the office of the governor-general. Guards at the governor-general's office fired upon the crowd and two protestors were killed. At roughly the same time, a mob in a different part of Taipei beat two other agents of the Monopoly Bureau to death, and many other demonstrators were taking to the streets to protest the actions of the Monopoly Bureau. As word spread about the protests, more and more demonstrations occurred throughout the cities of Taiwan, and in some cases young Taiwanese who had served in the Japanese imperial army even began to wear their old Japanese military uniforms and sing Japanese military songs in the streets. Over the next days around 1,000 mainlanders were killed by the mob.

The military force at the disposal of the GMD governor of Taiwan, Chen Yi, was too small to control the riots, and as a consequence he had no choice but to negotiate with local elites who demanded punishment of guilty authorities. On March 7 Taiwanese elites were emboldened to make a series of demands for the implementation of self-rule that included the dismantling

of the Taiwan Garrison Command, which was one of the core institutions of the GMD government in Taiwan. Chen Yi viewed these demands as tantamount to rebellion, however, and called upon Jiang Jieshi to send more troops, following which he implemented martial law, which remained in effect until 1987.

Over the course of the next several days, thousands of troops landed in Taiwan and were immediately put to work reestablishing GMD authority and quelling the insurrection. Over the course of March many of the leaders of the protest were hunted down and either killed or imprisoned. Between this repression and a later purge of Taiwanese political elites that took place in 1949–50, it has been estimated that as many as 20,000 to 30,000 Taiwanese were killed. Under martial law, which lasted for 40 years, Taiwanese were forbidden to establish political parties, there was heavy censorship of all media and other published material, military police were widely visible, and the political sphere was carefully controlled by the governing GMD.

This series of events that took place in the spring of 1947 has come to be known as the 2-28 Incident, and although during the martial law era it was rarely mentioned in public, Taiwanese nationalists and anti-GMD activists drew upon the event for inspiration and sought retribution for it. When the GMD finally lifted martial law in 1987, one of the first major topics of public discussion was the 2-28 Incident. Critics of the GMD sought acknowledgment of and an apology for the events, and they sought access to documents that would bring to light all that had actually happened. In the early 1990s Taiwan was awash with public meetings and discussion of 2-28 and the subsequent white terror, and by the latter part of that decade new monuments and parks were being erected to commemorate the event and those who died as a consequence of it.

SEE ALSO: Taiwan, Anti-Imperialism and Nationalism

References and Suggested Readings

- Phillips, S. (2003) *Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945–1950*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Roy, D. (2003) *Taiwan: A Political History*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Tse-han, L., Meyers, R., & Wu, W. (1991) *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Tajikistan, protests and revolts

Nandini Bhattacharya

Constructing Tajik Identity

Tajikistan is a modern Central Asian state first created by the Bolshevik Soviet regime as part of its revolutionary experiment during the 1920s. However, the Tajiks first emerged as a distinct Persian-speaking ethno-linguistic group in the eighth century during the Arab conquest and Islamization of Central Asia. Between 1860 and 1900 Tajikistan underwent a divided existence, with the north under tsarist Russian rule and the south under the Emirate of Bukhara.

In the early twentieth century a number of reformist trends developed in this traditional society, especially in Bukhara. Ahmed Donish (1826–97) was the first Tajik who sought to reform and regenerate the stagnating Bukhara through education. Arguing largely from the Quran and Hadith, Donish's writings also reflected western influences after three visits to Russia from 1857 and 1874 as the Bukhara Emir's delegate. He upheld secularization of *madrasa* (seminary) education offering history, natural sciences, and traditional Islamic law, theology, or logic. Supporting reform from above, Donish saw the Emir as the entitled servant of the people as long as he responded to popular aspirations. But the Bukhara Emir simply rejected his concept of reforms.

By 1900 a novel educational approach began to be transformed into a sociocultural movement known as *Jadid* (a "new method" of teaching in schools) in different parts of Central Asia. Receiving support from Tajiks, Tatars, and Uzbeks, the Jadidists were modernizers and nationalists, viewing Central Asia in holistic terms. Although not necessarily anti-Russian, tsarist officials in Turkestan found Jadid education even more threatening than traditional teaching in *maktabs* (Islamic primary education centers) that did not impart basic literacy training. The Jadid emphasis on teaching alphabets phonetically ensured functional literacy, a new method intended for a new generation coinciding with the coming of the printing press to Central Asia, providing the tools to challenge the monopoly of the handful of traditional educated

religious elites. Aware of the general backwardness of Central Asia, the Jadids identified themselves as *taraqqi-parvarlar* (progressives), a terminology combining Persian and Turkic coined to imply linguistic agility and broad cultural knowledge.

Though Jadidism failed to develop any institutional framework to articulate its political objectives and faced substantial opposition from conservatives, by World War I several cities in present-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan had developed underground Jadidist organizations. This movement had a strange history of collaboration and conflict with the rising tide of Bolshevism, arriving in the same broad ethno-cultural space. Though both were critical of traditional sociocultural and political systems, Jadidism was an indigenous movement for change and Bolshevism an outside effort to restructure Central Asian society fundamentally toward revolutionary socialism. Bolsheviks published the secret treaties showing tsarist plans to dismember the Turkish state, and the party's support for peace in Central Asia was a source for recruitment in 1916. As many lives were lost in the war, a section of Jadidists turned to the Bolsheviks.

The Muslim Commissariat in Moscow oversaw Russia's policy towards Islam; Muslims with few communist credentials were granted leading positions in the organization. Mahmudkhoja Behbudi, Abdurrauf Fitrat, and Sadriddin Aini were a few of the eminent leaders of Jadid movements. Among them, Sadriddin Aini, inspired by the Russian Revolution, joined hands with the Bolshevik revolutionaries to overthrow the Emirate of Bukhara in the 1920s and propagated revolutionary ideas in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Aini was a leading Tajik scholar among predominantly Uzbek (Turkic-speaking) colleagues and instrumental in creating a modern Tajik literature during the early Soviet era.

It was the Jadid movement that created the Tajik-language press. *Bukhara-i-Sharif* (1912–13) or the *Noble Bukhara* was an important Tajik newspaper published by the Jadids which supported the Russian Revolution. Welcoming the new regime, Aini took a careful stand regarding the national question and openly supported an autonomous existence within the Soviet regime. However, the close collaboration between the Jadidists, who sought Enlightenment ideals for modernizing Islamic societies, and the Bolsheviks

began to decline with the rise of Stalin and the transformation of the Russian Revolution. Most of the leaders of the Jadid movement were liquidated either for their Islamic overtones or nationalist aspirations during the Stalin era. Aini, by adhering to Tajik cultural production, produced an acceptable line of creating the nation, creating a Tajik national consciousness that survived through the Soviet experience and after.

Russian Revolution and Attempts at Reform

Tajikistan underwent the great revolution at the very moment of the state's creation. Even prior to that, Bolshevik, Menshevik, and Socialist Revolutionary (SR) propaganda mobilized local people in Russian Turkestan and Bukharan Emirate for eradicating oppression and poverty. But a majority of clandestine parties were overwhelmingly Russian cadres. In fact, discontent and sporadic protests were growing in certain places against the discriminatory taxation and extortion by the tsarist government. In July 1916 the first violent and spontaneous reaction against conscription in Khojent, an important region of the subsequent Tajik Republic, was suppressed, preparing the groundwork for resistance to tsarism and acceptance of the Bolshevik regime. The slogan of land, bread, and shelter found many takers.

The Bolshevik Revolution in Turkestan formed even before October 1917, but did not consolidate power until two months later. Meanwhile, the interim government headed by Nalivkin, created to rule over Russian Turkestan, attempted futilely to break the revolutionary upsurges in Turkestan. After the seizure of power in October 1917, Turkistan Soviets convened and passed a motion to rally along the Bolshevik victory, and Soviet power was proclaimed at Tashkent. But the new Soviets did not include a single local Muslim in the coalition committee, despite the promise of national self-determination. Aware of this anomaly, Lenin argued for the need to include large numbers of Muslims, and the Bolsheviks sought compromises with Islamic traditions (introduction of *Shariat* courts following Quranic laws, while declaring illegal certain *sharia* punishments such as cutting off hands or stoning to death).

The Jadids and "Young Bukhara" formed by them, emboldened by Bolshevik assurances,

organized a demonstration in the streets of Bukhara demanding immediate reforms and independence in the Emirate of Bukhara. The demonstration was brutally suppressed. After repeated appeals from Young Bukhara the president of the Turkestan Soviet government, Kolesov, agreed to intervene in the Bukharan Emirate through an insurrection. Though Kolesov favored abolishing the Emirate, he agreed to the Young Bukhara preference for a constitutional monarchy as the precondition for a revolutionary committee to take power. But this attempt to seize power in early 1918 failed, as the Emir launched a strong counterattack supported by *mullah* (Islamic theologian) forces. Railway communication with Turkestan was cut to prevent the small Bolshevik detachment from contacting headquarters.

The peace of Kizil Tepe on March 25, 1918 was signed, whereby Soviet power was forced to recognize the independence of the Emirate. The victory of counterrevolution showed that Kolesov underestimated the strength of the Emir and his support base and the Jadids visibly overestimated their popularity and acceptance among the masses of Bukhara. There was also a push-factor by a religious undercurrent acting as the rallying force against foreign domination.

In fact, this event drew the attention of Lenin, who admitted the practical limitation of the Bolsheviks to mobilize the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Kirgiz to adhere to the goal of revolutionary transformation. The Fifth Congress of Soviets of Central Asia (April 1918) proclaimed the federation of the Autonomous Republic of Turkestan and elected a central executive committee for Turkestan with ten Muslim representatives, mainly chosen from the Jadids, providing space for the indigenous population to participate in the running of the new order. The Jadidists had a clearly modernist outlook. Even before the Russian Revolution, they had attempted to widen women's rights, including educational rights. During 1917 Jaddists contested the *ulama* (experts in Islamic jurisprudence) on women's equal rights and the right to vote, finding the Bolsheviks as allies, and continued as they struggled against the landlord-dominated Emirate.

Barely two years after the failure of the Kolesov operation, in 1920 Bukhara had collapsed in the face of the combined forces of the Bolsheviks and the Jadids. Not before the end of the civil war in 1919 could Bolsheviks again concentrate on

Central Asian territories. In the 1920s the Red Army and Central Asian allies gradually occupied all of Central Asia, defeating the conservative forces. After establishing communist rule in Central Asia by 1924, the Soviet government redrew internal political borders based on the Marxist concept of nation and taking into account local aspirations.

Tajikistan was initially created as an autonomous zone within Uzbekistan, one of the new states created during this time. Instead of having Bukhara as capital, Dushanbe, an obscure village, was made capital by the Soviet authorities. In 1929 Tajikistan was given independence from Uzbek SSR, designated Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic under the USSR. Despite integration of Gorno-Badakhshan (in the Pamirs on the eastern part of Tajikistan) as an autonomous region, Tajikistan was the smallest of Central Asian states with the highest population density and lowest economic output throughout the Soviet era.

The Basmachi Movement

The consolidation of Soviet power in Central Asia was vigorously opposed by an indigenous Islamic group in Tajikistan, the Basmachis (“violators”). Identified as rural bandits, the Basmachi instigated indigenous uprisings after the establishment of Soviet power. The Basmachis claimed to be the “free men” denouncing the establishment of the Soviet authorities. This movement, though sporadic and decentralized, received a severe jolt with the passing of its leader, Envar Pasha (1922), who organized a unified resistance against Soviet rule. However, resistance continued for about a decade (1920–31) under the warlord Ibrahim Bek, providing a geopolitical dimension to his movement by involving Afghanistan as his strategic powerbase. Appealing for the defense of Islam in the face of Russian oppression of Tajikistan, this leader of the Lokai tribe mobilized 200 Kurbashi (the local leaders who recruited the Basmachi fighters) and 5,000 ordinary soldiers in his troop. In 1923 the Basmachi defeat in Lokai demoralized the local people. Subsequent relocation of his base across the Afghan border enabled Ibrahim to restructure his army and mobilize funds and centralize power. But his harsh taxation system made him unpopular and turned many of his followers into renegades, who assisted the Red Army in 1925, during the second Soviet

onslaught (March–September). The movement weakened thoroughly and failed to resist Soviet forces in central and southern Tajikistan.

To prevent any further large-scale Basmachi operations within Tajikistan, Soviet authorities banned the popular pilgrimage to the grave of Envar Pasha and arrested the *mullahs* who agitated against them. The Soviet government concentrated attacks against Basmachi strongholds, abandoning large-scale military operations. The Soviets formed a special 60-man cavalry unit comprising Lokai tribesmen to hunt down and kill Ibrahim Bek, who again took refuge in Afghanistan, awaiting another chance to strike back. By October 1925 the Soviets officially announced the termination of Basmachestvo (Basmachi revolt) in Tajikistan.

Despite the Soviet-Afghan agreement of neutrality and non-aggression in 1921, the Afghans provided tacit support and indulgence to the Basmachi movements. The Red Army’s capture of the Basmachi military base in the Urta-Tugai Island in the north Afghanistan, and the disarming of a garrison forced Afghanistan to restrain cross-border operations of Basmachis, formalized by a treaty in 1926. But the rise to power in Afghanistan of Bacha-i Sakkao in 1928 led to a resurgence of the Basmachis. The Emir of Bukhara received official recognition of Basmachi organization through Bacha-i Sakkao, who permitted them to use northern Afghanistan as a base and to recruit Afghan Tajiks and Uzbeks into their ranks. Acting upon the decree of the ousted Emir of Bukhara, Ibrahim Bek created a large band of Basmachis to overthrow Soviet rule from Tajikistan. The guerilla warfare through the mountains of Tajikistan was ruthlessly suppressed. But Ibrahim Bek could not be caught. In June 1929 he re-crossed the Soviet-Afghan frontier and began another phase of preparation along with the exiled Basmachis.

The Afghan government of Nadir Khan that came to power was more interested in reviving peace with the USSR and actively liquidating Basmachi strongholds within Afghanistan. But the new government failed to pin down Ibrahim Bek, who in 1931 initiated a mass terror by killing all pro-Soviet elements, destroyed *Kolkhozy* (collectivized farms) and demolished railway lines as part of his jihad (holy war) against Tajikistan and Bolshevism. The countryside of eastern and southern Tajikistan was swept by revolts. Despite promises of a new regime,

replacing the alien Soviet rule, Ibrahim returned to the old feudal and tribal practices of the Emirate regime, causing disillusionment among the peasantry.

The loss of mass confidence ultimately destroyed the backbone of Basmachi revolt. While escaping into Afghanistan, Ibrahim was caught, tried, and executed by Soviet authorities. Ibrahim Bek's movement was seen as an assertion of national and Islamic identity, though it was unsympathetic to workers and peasants.

Soviet Power: Repression and Protest

The Soviet turn towards collectivization of agriculture in Tajikistan between 1927 and 1934 involved violence against peasants and forcible resettlement of mountain Tajiks and Uzbeks in the cotton cultivation area. While the expansion of irrigation networks and implementation of modern technology turned Tajikistan into the third largest cotton-producing state in the USSR, the overall economic development of the state suffered. Apart from peasant opposition to forced collectivization and Stalin's path to socialism, many Tajik communists were purged and executed en masse by the Communist Party of Tajikistan between 1933 and 1935.

The 1930s also marked an era of repression of religious expression. The adjustment with Islam was replaced by heavy-handed atheistic propaganda in educational and other collective institutions of society. In the late 1930s Muslim intellectuals were purged or forced into exile, and most mosques and madrasas were closed. During the same phase the Jadids, too, were purged and many were executed by Stalin's forces. Prominent leaders close to the Soviet establishment, such as A. Fitrat, A. Muhiddinov, and F. Khojayev, were killed in the ruthless process of creating a uniform "Socialist" identity and stamping out "bourgeois nationalist deviation."

During World War II the Soviets compromised their strong stand against religious practice due to the strategic importance of Central Asia. In the early 1940s they partially reversed their religious policy and in 1947, after 15 years of closure, the famous Sheykh Moslehedin Friday Mosque in Khojand was reopened and official permission granted for the practice of Islam. A Spiritual Board of Central Asian Muslims was created in Tashkent and the Tajik representative of this

organ was called Qazi. This liberal attitude towards Islam was projected by the Soviet authorities to Muslims beyond the USSR to create a benevolent image and gain sympathy and moral support during the Cold War rivalry with the US from the 1950s to the 1980s.

The postwar phase also saw a substantial amount of de-Stalinization in various politico-economic issues, but the processes of rapid economic productivity and substantial urbanization were not evenly distributed in Tajikistan. However, during the Brezhnev regime, an era of stability and progress broadened the scope of participation of a limited number of political elites in the function of the state and party, which continued until Gorbachev's experiment with Perestroika and Glasnost.

Rise of Political Islam: Prelude to the Civil War

From 1970 to 1990 different strands of political Islam emerged. In northern Tajikistan economic standards advanced in Khojent-Quliab, an urban and industrial region, and living standards increased, especially for supporters of Soviet rule in Central Asia. Communist influence brought secularism to the politics of the North. But the relative prosperity among secular populations of the North created alienation among less-prosperous Tajik counterparts. Once the Soviet system was broken, this alienation surfaced in a bitter civil war. For a generation, the Tajik communist leadership emerged from the Khojent-Quliab-Hissar-Leninabad territories of the northern zone.

The most stubborn opponents of the northerners were the tribal people of the Gorno-Badakhshan region, which was significantly less economically advanced, despite the Soviet system, and where Islam was more popular. In the late-Soviet era five Islamic movements arose against the government. Beginning in the 1970s, clandestine Islamic organizations operated in several areas of Southern Tajikistan and operated openly following the end of Soviet rule. Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the consequent influence of the Mujahidins (anti-USSR Afghan Islamic militants), and partial relaxation towards religious practices pushed the neglected and underdeveloped region towards diverse shades of extremist Islamic ideology. One such revivalist trend was influenced by Hojji Muhammadjan

Hindustani (1895–1989), who had survived the Stalinist era and returned in the 1950s. Hindustani received a full religious education, including training in the Deobandi Madrasa in India. Many Islamic political leaders in Tajikistan were Hindustani's disciples, including Said Abdullo Nouri, leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), among other traditional leaders. Similar revivalism appeared among Sufi brotherhoods (such as the Naqshbandi branch) in the southern part of Tajikistan.

Mass Protest Since 1991

With the introduction of Perestroika and Glasnost in 1986 the entire Soviet system entered the final phase of socialist experiment. As part of Perestroika, the nationalities question intensified within all Soviet states and Tajikistan sought to assert a national independence in governance. Russian was replaced as the official language by Tajik in 1989, and Tajikistan's second largest city, Leninabad was renamed Khojent. Initially, no Central Asian political party emerging in the new atmosphere of Glasnost sought secession from the Soviet Union until the collapse of the system. Rather, impending independence brought tremendous power struggles and interethnic riots in the Central Asian states. Tajikistan experienced intense internal strife among the completing Garm (Islamic nationalist force) and the Quliab (communist) factions.

The Dushanbe Riots (known as Hot February) broke out in February 1990 when the Garmis and the Pamiris demonstrated against what they saw as the corrupt and self-righteous communist regime through the use of religious and regional loyalties. In the March 1991 referendum on the continuation of a socialist USSR, nearly 90 percent of Central Asians supported maintaining the system along with a renewed federation of strong republics. This political consensus was ruptured by the arbitrary decision of the three Slav republics of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to join a new union called the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The December 8, 1991 decision led to the demise of the USSR and independence for all 15 republics.

Each Central Asian republic suffered from this unforeseen freedom, which brought enormous economic calamity, as subsidies from the center were suddenly cut. Tajikistan went through the most complicated and prolonged crisis in the

region. While the northern Khojent-Quliabi faction, protégées of the ex-communist regime, preferred continuance under the same power structure, the long-deprived South, swayed by Islamic currents (represented by the IRP), attempted to replace the northern hegemony. Pro-market liberals like the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT) or Lal-i Badakhshan (representing primarily the northern Pamiris, who advocated greater autonomy for the mountainous Badakhshan region) vacillated between the two extremes.

In 1991 tensions mounted after the failed August coup d'état against Gorbachev. The ban on the Communist Party in Russia by President Boris Yeltsin intensified polarities in Central Asia, followed by a similar ban by the southern faction led by Aslanov, a Garmi leader, rendering futile efforts at reconciliation of the northern leader Khakhar Makhkamov (president of the Tajik Supreme Soviet), who brought Aslanov to chair the Supreme Soviet. Rakhmon Nabiyev, a hardliner, replaced the more conciliatory Makhkamov. The 1992 presidential election reinstated former Communist Party officials in their previous positions, who unleashed a vengeful policy against opposition leaders. Thus, the trials of Rastokhez (Rebirth – another nationalist organization) leader Mirbobo Mirrakhimov and DPT leader Shodmon Yusupov were fixed in spring 1992 and Qazi-kalon Turajonzoda, official head of the Tajik Muslims, was dismissed as untrustworthy. The opposition took up the challenge to fight back with stronger determination, backed by popular support from Garm and Badakhshan.

A protracted civil war lasted from May 1992 to June 1997, with government forces opposed by various sociopolitical and ideological groups (drawing support from a particular region) forming a coalition. The IRP was the largest faction, with a stronghold in the southwest Qurghonteppa zone, and aligned itself with the DPT, the Rastokhez (composed mainly of Dushanbe-bound intellectual nationalists), and Lal-i-Badakhshan to form a United Tajik Opposition (UTO) to further the cause of a national front to oust the former communists. President Nabiyev and speaker of the Supreme Soviet Safarali Kenjayev organized armed government militias, while the opposition turned to Afghan rebels for military aid, adding the dimension of cross-border Islamic terrorism to the civil war.

Nabiyev mobilized Moscow's aid and deployed "peacekeeping troops" of the CIS to guard the Tajik-Afghan border. Nabiyev was captured by the opposition in September 1992 and resigned at gunpoint. Chaos reigned until Nabiyev's government was replaced by another Quliabi government in Dushanbe in December 1992, under Rahmonov.

Despite IRP military interventions in 1992–3 the Quliabis held power with external support. Human Rights Watch accused the government of ruthless ethnic cleansing against Pamiris and Garmis. Tens of thousands of popular opponents were killed or fled to Afghanistan, where the resistance reorganized and rearmed with the aid of the Ahmed Shah Masoud's Jamati-Islami. The umbrella opposition group UTO continued with its mission. An opinion poll in 1991–2 suggested that though most people in the republic wanted greater space for Islam in society, only 5–7 percent sought the establishment of an Islamic state.

Despite the origins of the government from the remnants of the CPSU, portrayals of the civil war as between atheistic communists and dogmatic Islamists neglect the underlying regional and factional conflicts that are rooted in the instability of Tajik national identity. Iran, the center of Shiite Islam, did not support the Islamic party since Tajiks, though Persian-speakers, are overwhelmingly Sunni Islam. Unlike the Balkans or Caucuses, secessionist sentiment was not a factor in the war. Some 20,000 to 60,000 people were killed in 1992 and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that some 600,000 were internally displaced, with 80,000 refugees forced into Afghanistan.

Fear felt by both sides toward the possibility of Taliban aggression into Tajikistan, and the pragmatic awareness that continued warfare could threaten the future independence of the country they aspired to control, was conducive for the peace process. A power-sharing compromise to govern a unified state was preferred by both parties. In June 1997 the UN ultimately was able to bring the divergent interests together to a General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord, a political and military settlement centered on a power-sharing formula. Even after this peace accord there were periodic skirmishes and assassination attempts by government forces and militant opponents, but the danger of civil war was in all probability over.

SEE ALSO: Afghanistan, 1978 Revolution and Islamic Civil War; Afghanistan, Resistance to 19th-Century British Invasion; Bacha-i Sakkao's Movement; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Soviet Union, Fall of; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and "Revolution from Above"; Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan; Turkmenistan, Protest and Revolt; Uzbekistan, National Movement and Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Akiner, S. & Barnes, C. (n.d.) *The Tajik Civil War: Causes and Dynamics*. Available at www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/tajikistan/causes-dynamics.php. Accessed December 24, 2006.
- d' Encausse, H. C. (1988) *Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolutions in Central Asia*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Dixit, A. (1993) Tajikistan: Engulfed by Flames of Afghan Civil War. *Strategic Analysis* 15, 9: 873–81.
- Hetmanek, A. (1993) Islamic Revolution and Jihad Came to the Former Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Tajikistan. *Central Asian Survey* 12, 3: 367–74.
- Khalid, A. (1998) *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Patnaik, A. (2003) *Nations, Minorities and States in Central Asia*. Kolkata: Anamika.
- Ritter, W. S. (1985) The Final Phase in the Liquidation of Anti-Soviet Resistance in Tadzhikistan: Ibrahim Bek and the Basmachi, 1924–31. *Soviet Studies* 37 (October): 484–93.
- Rubin, B. R. (1993–4) The Fragmentation of Tajikistan. *Survival* 35 (Winter): 71–91.
- Tishkov, V. (1997) *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame*. London: Sage.

Taliban, 1996–2007

Yury V. Bosin

The Taliban emerged in Pakistan in the spring of 1994 as a movement built on radical Islam and Pashtun nationalism. Essentially, the Taliban accumulated the protests and dissatisfaction raging against the anarchy and violence that plagued Afghanistan under the rule of competing Mujahedeen (holy warrior) factions who had come to power with US assistance against the Soviet Union. With implicit Pakistani sponsorship, the Taliban forces grew rapidly and by fall 1994 had reached 1,500 followers, recruited mostly from among Afghan religious students. Headed by Mullah Muhammad Omar, a Mujahedeen veteran, the Taliban army captured

Qandahar, and by fall 1995 reached Herat. In September 1996 the Taliban seized Kabul and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. During the next two years, Taliban rule expanded over 90 percent of the Afghan territory, with small pockets of regional resistance.

Many Afghans welcomed the Taliban as the movement responded to their longstanding hopes for peace and political stability in a country divided on the basis of region, ethnicity, and clan. Others, however, were opposed to the Taliban's strict policy of imposing fundamental Islamic values and its goal to transform Afghanistan into a theocratic state. The most important factor for the Afghani people was not religious fundamentalism, as was demonstrated following the Taliban's fall, but establishing order and honest representative government. The destruction of the country's pre-Islamic cultural heritage contributed to the Taliban's image as fanatics and barbarians, even though for many observers the Taliban's religious fundamentalism was a means to power rather than an essential component of its rule. As a force of resistance, countering the US-imposed government installed in 2002, the Taliban moderated its religious fundamentalism, promising the core goal of establishing order and stability. Nonetheless, while the Taliban were in power, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was ostracized by the international community, with only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognizing the Taliban government. Diplomatic pressure on the Taliban to improve human rights, combat the opium trade, and end support for the Mujahedeen terrorist groups had little effect. International economic assistance to Afghanistan evaporated, leaving it one of the poorest countries in the world.

As the Taliban was welcomed by civilians throughout the country as a force of order, resistance to the new government was concentrated primarily in the north of Afghanistan among the Northern Alliance encompassing Uzbek and Tajik units from the former Mujahedeen forces. Stationed in the mountains, they engaged in intermittent clashes with the Taliban army but were not strong enough to defeat it. In the meantime, Afghanistan became a hub of international jihadist organizations which received a welcome reception from the Taliban government. The most notorious was al-Qaeda, headed by Osama Bin Laden, the likely architect of

the 1998 US embassies bombings and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, DC. Afghanistan became a prime target of the US-led war on terror and in October 2001 an international coalition of forces started military operations against the Taliban. The Taliban regime had fallen by December 2001, although resistance continues unabated as the government of Hamid Karzai, installed by the US, has failed to deliver order, stability, or any measure of prosperity to Afghanistan.

Afghan Resistance to US Invasion (2001–2007)

The displacement of the Taliban posed a problem regarding the composition of a new Afghan government. The US did not want it to be monopolized by the Northern Alliance, which was responsible for the four-year chaos before the coming of the Taliban. Besides, a Pushtun leader would better fit the country's political tradition. As a result, Hamid Karzai, a moderate figure with strong anti-Taliban views, was appointed president of the Afghan Transitional Administration and in 2004 was elected president of Afghanistan. International peacekeeping forces were deployed in Kabul and in some provincial centers. Foreign governments and donor organizations pledged billion of dollars for the Afghan reconstruction.

The peace in Afghanistan has been fragile, and at times appears nonexistent. The resistance to Hamid Karzai's regime has several sources. The first source is Taliban extremists who are dispersed throughout the country and pursue anti-government activity. The second source is international terrorist groups still remaining on Afghan territory. The third threat to Hamid Karzai comes from regional warlords who have lost their influence and revenues. Finally, the most serious resistance force is generated at the grassroots level. It is driven by popular worries that the foreign presence has not led to any improvement in economic conditions, jeopardizes Islamic traditions by bringing in thousands of foreign nationals, and represents a new foreign occupation that thwarts independence.

The prospects for Hamid Karzai's government are difficult to predict: much depends on his ability to achieve a viable compromise with opposition groups rather than quell them by

force, although rampant patronage and corruption appear to hamper these prospects. American backing adds another pitfall as Hamid Karzai cannot afford to ignore deep-seated xenophobic sentiments in the Afghan society. If, however, Hamid Karzai fails to tame the resistance by peaceful means, a new round of insurgency and violence is likely to engulf the country. In this case the rise of radical or reformist elements, whether Taliban or another faction, is a highly plausible scenario for the future.

SEE ALSO: Afghanistan, 1978 Revolution and Islamic Civil War; Afghanistan, Resistance to 19th-Century British Invasion; Bacha-i Sakkao's Movement; Bin Laden, Osama (b. 1957) and al-Qaeda; Durrani Empire, Popular Protests, 1747–1823; Islamic Political Currents

References and Suggested Readings

- Ali, T. (2008) Afghanistan: Mirage of the Good War. *New Left Review* 50 (March–April): 5–22.
- Briant, P. (2002) *From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire*. Trans. P. T. Daniels. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Dupree, L. (1979) *Red Flag over Hindu Kush*: Hanover, NH: American Universities Field Staff.
- Gregorian, V. (1969) *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Marsden, P. (2002) *The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan*. New York: Palgrave.
- Masson, V. & Romodon, V. (1964) *A History of Afghanistan*, Vols. 1–2. Moscow: Nauka (in Russian).
- Montgomery, J. D. & Rondinelli, D. A. (Eds.) (2004) *Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Lessons from Development Experience*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Poullada, L. (1973) *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919–1929: King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Rubin, B. (2002) *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Sykes, P. (1940) *A History of Afghanistan*. London: Macmillan.

Tambo, Oliver (1917–1993)

Luli Callinicos

Oliver Reginald Kaizana Tambo, political and professional partner of Nelson Mandela, was the leader of the African National Congress (ANC)

during its 30-year period in exile, from 1960 to 1990. Tambo became renowned for maintaining the unity of a broad liberation movement, consisting of many tendencies, during a long Cold War period of vicissitudes, changing circumstances, and shifting strategies. He nurtured its far-flung members and military cadres as the movement steered its way between international diplomacy and armed struggle while also maintaining its mystique inside South Africa. When the ANC was reestablished in South Africa, Tambo delivered an organization “bigger, stronger, intact” – more skilled and sophisticated, acknowledged and acclaimed throughout the world and at home.

Tambo was born in 1917 in the remote village of Mpondoland, on the east coast of South Africa. Half a century later, Tambo recalled the seminal influence of his rural childhood. The traditional homestead, his three mothers, and his polygamous father's ability to create harmonious relationships in the large, extended family fostered an ability to commit himself to collective values; the little boy had to share his mother with many others. Embedded in this way of life were values imparted by the homestead economy. Even young children were economically active: Tambo was scarcely 3 years old when he began to learn from older children how to herd and how to span oxen “in such a way as the whole team pulls together.” Social relations, courtesy, and consensus were highly valued parts of an *ubuntu* (humanist) outlook that taught that “a person was a person through other people.” The priority of the collective good over individual needs guided Tambo in the years to come.

From the age of 11 Tambo was educated in Anglican missionary schools. The youngster, whose own mother was a Christian, became deeply influenced by the spiritual and moral message of the missionaries. The intellectual challenges that they offered excited him, and he excelled academically. He graduated to St. Peter's College, situated in the melting pot of Johannesburg. For the first time he encountered blatant racism and acquisitiveness in a city that treated blacks instrumentally, that is, they were tolerated only for their low-paid labor. Tambo became aware of the contradictions and the bigotry embedded in the colonial interpretation of Christianity, and while he never forsook the church, he came to perceive the social construction of culture and religion.

After obtaining top marks in the Transvaal matriculation examination, Tambo was awarded a scholarship to the black Fort Hare University. Unlike most black students, Tambo enrolled for a science degree. In 1942, he took up a post as mathematics master at his old school of St. Peter's. In Johannesburg, Tambo met Walter Sisulu and Mandela. These three men became key ANC leaders. In 1944 they helped to found the ANC-aligned Youth League (YL), an Africanist body that criticized "exotic" ideologies like Marxism, and stressed African culture, history, and identity.

In 1948 the white electorate voted into power the National Party on a platform of apartheid. It immediately introduced a barrage of white supremacy laws. The Youth League presented their Programme of Action to the ANC in 1949 to mobilize mass resistance, and Tambo was elected into the executive council of the ANC. The Youth League and its activists played a key role in reviving a fairly moribund ANC, and figures like Tambo were centrally involved in the turbulent anti-apartheid campaigns of the 1950s. Tambo was always a close associate of Mandela, and the two men – who managed despite enormous obstacles to become attorneys – also set up a law firm in Johannesburg to defend their people.

From the late 1940s onwards, the ANC had worked alongside opposition groups of different races, including members of the multiracial South African Communist Party (SACP). Tambo was closely involved in the mass campaigns against apartheid in the 1950s. He was also on the working committee that crafted the ANC's Freedom Charter and its non-racial message: "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white." The ANC adopted the Charter in 1955, together with the Congress Alliance, which linked unions and organizations representing different racial groups. Tambo's concept of nation widened to include not only Africans regardless of ethnicity, but all South Africans.

In 1956, Tambo was arrested for high treason along with 155 others, including Mandela and Joe Slovo. In 1959, following the banning of ANC President Chief Luthuli, Tambo was elected to the position of deputy president. In March 1960, following the police massacre of 69 men and women at a protest meeting in Sharpeville Township, the ANC instructed Tambo to leave the country to garner international support for the ANC.

Articulate and a careful listener, Tambo was a successful diplomat in exile, obtaining the trust of many influential friends. However, in 1962, the ANC announced that it had turned to armed struggle, believing peaceful attempts to resist apartheid had been met with contempt and violence. Tambo did not succeed in garnering support from most western countries, and the ANC found provision for military support for the armed wing *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (the "Spear of the Nation," or MK) from the Soviet bloc with the aid of the SACP. Tambo was, however, able to raise funding for the ANC's administrative and educational activities from the Scandinavian countries and anti-apartheid groups in the West. Where state support was lacking, Tambo developed a "people-to-people diplomacy" that fostered links with grassroots groups.

Tambo received much of the flak for the unsuccessful military efforts of the 1960s. He responded by calling a consultative conference at Morogoro in Tanzania, where the ANC executive resigned *en bloc*, though Tambo was reelected. The conference foregrounded political rather than military imperatives. It also strengthened ties with the SACP and opened ANC membership to non-Africans. The ANC was fairly weak within South Africa in the 1970s, but it became the major beneficiary of the wave of young refugees fleeing the country after the violent suppression of the 1976 uprising. Frustrations in MK ranks, émigré tensions, and infiltration by South African agents helped create a tense and paranoid climate in the ANC's camps, resulting in a series of mutinies, as well as repression and abuses. Tambo, along with Chris Hani, sought to resolve these conflicts without alienating senior military officers. He finally took the problem to the ANC conference in Kabwe, Zambia in 1985, which condemned the abuses, redeployed commanders, and forbade executions.

Kabwe helped reposition the ANC at a time of rising mass struggles in South Africa and rapidly rising ANC support. As resistance inside South Africa escalated, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was launched in 1983 – comprising unions, neighborhood groups, women's and youth movements, and extraparliamentary opposition groups – and generally looked to the ANC for inspiration.

While Tambo had a "diamond-edged" intellect and shrewd strategic sense (Mandela 1994: 55), he also possessed a remarkable emotional

intelligence. As an educator he was a nurturing mentor, finding time to visit the camps and explain the challenges facing the liberation movement. During the camp abuses, he remained personally popular with the youth. ANC strategy now centered on “four pillars of struggle”: armed struggle, the South African underground, mass mobilization, and international support. These were not seen as mutually exclusive.

From exile each year, Tambo’s January speech on Radio Freedom gauged the struggle and announced a focus for the coming year. In 1985, he called on South Africans to conduct a “people’s war,” aimed at arming the masses. The police and army had moved into the townships and unequal battles occurred in the streets. Hundreds were killed while the labor movement and civics embarked on a series of “rolling mass action,” blocking the city streets. While MK did not seriously threaten the armed forces of apartheid, its attacks on “hard targets” served as powerful “armed propaganda” and inspiration.

At the same time Tambo, secretly in touch with Mandela, was quietly exploring the option of negotiations with the apartheid government. Remarkably, Tambo was able to bring the ANC’s diverse constituencies along this difficult route through his inclusive, participatory, and consensus approach. Furthermore, through patient consultation with African heads of state, Tambo and his team oversaw the Harare Declaration (1989), which set down the key demands of the ANC and launched the process of talks that was ultimately to lead to South Africa’s “negotiated revolution” and democracy. Tambo’s prestige in South Africa was by this time second to that of Mandela. However, he suffered a debilitating stroke the day the draft of the Declaration was finalized and did not contribute his experience to the negotiations.

Quiet and thoughtful, in meetings Tambo was always the last to speak; it was easy for the unperceptive to underestimate the strength of his character and integrity. But he left the ANC a legacy that aspired above all to unity; an ability to view the terrain holistically without losing sight of the detail; a scientist’s rigor in revisiting strategies and tactics as situations changed; and the intelligence to manage contradictions. To the generation that followed, the challenge was to acknowledge and conserve those values most relevant to a democracy needing to respond to the twenty-first century’s global age of insecurity.

Oliver Tambo died in April 1993, a year before South Africa’s first democratic elections. At his funeral, attended by many international figures in high office who considered Tambo to be their friend and by many of the ordinary people who made the end of apartheid possible, an elegy likened Tambo to Moses: he led his people out of exile during the long, difficult journey to the Promised Land, but did not live to reach it himself.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Apartheid Movement, South Africa; Hani, Chris (1942–1993); Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918); Slovo, Joe (1926–1995); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC

References and Suggested Readings

- African National Congress, www.ANC.org.za.
 Baai, S. (2006) *O. R. Tambo: Teacher, Lawyer, Freedom Fighter*. Isando: PSD Promotions.
 Callinicos, L. (2004) *Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains*. Cape Town: David Philip.
 Jordan, P. & Mabuza, L. (Eds.) (2007) *Oliver Tambo Remembered*. New York: Macmillan.
 Mandela, N. (1994) *Long Walk to Freedom*. London: Abacus.

Tamil nationalist struggle for Eelam

Charan Rainford

The struggle for Eelam (homeland) revolves around the notion of the Tamil nation and its traditional homeland, historically and geographically equivalent to the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka, and the inalienable right to self-determination. Following independence in 1948, the post-colonial Sri Lankan polity passed legislation on citizenship, language, and education favoring the majority Sinhalese at the expense of the minorities, particularly the Tamils comprising approximately 15 percent of the population. This led invariably to an escalation of Tamil demands, from federalism to armed struggle for a separate homeland. In the former avatar the Tamil political leadership coalesced around S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and the Federal Party (FP), which equated the rights of the Tamils to that of a separate nation. It demanded a federal state with language rights through non-violent struggle. In 1976, after the failure of successive

Sri Lankan governments to adhere to promises made concerning decentralization, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) was formed on a united political platform for Eelam.

Outbreak of Armed Insurrection 1976–1987

The shift to a call for independent statehood left the TULF vulnerable to an impatient generation of youths frustrated at the failure to gain any settlement from the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL). The origins of armed struggle can be traced to the founding in 1970 of the Tamil Students Federation, later renamed the Tamil New Tigers and then in 1976 the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The symbolic beginning of armed struggle was the assassination of the government organizer in Jaffna and former Mayor Alfred Duraipappah in 1975 by a group of Tamil youth led by Velupillai Prabhakaran, the future leader of the LTTE.

The LTTE has subsequently been at the forefront of the Tamil armed struggle, usurping the democratic path taken by the TULF and swamping its armed rivals. In addition to the LTTE there were 37 armed groups with diverse ideology and caste-composition (Gunaratna 1994), of which the most important were the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), and the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS). Despite emphasizing socialism in its literature, the LTTE's approach was effectively pragmatic and lacked revolutionary ideology. The Marxist EPRLF was firmly committed to revolutionary struggle, PLOTE and EROS were ostensibly Marxist organizations, and TELO was of high-caste composition.

Two momentous events in the early 1980s transformed the struggle from one of isolated incidents of assassination and robbery to a fully-fledged guerrilla war. In the wake of decentralization proposals there was extensive violence in the Northern Jaffna Peninsula, the symbolic center of Eelam, culminating in the destruction of the culturally vital Jaffna Library. The second event, known as Black July 1983, was a country-wide pogrom primarily centered in Colombo. This state-sponsored violence (backed up by myriad Sinhala Buddhist extremist groups)

resulted in the deaths of thousands of Tamils and caused more than 100,000 to flee the country. This forced migration of Tamils helped to create a significant diaspora, large sections of which have supported the nationalist struggle.

During this time, almost all the aforementioned armed groups were given training and allegedly arms by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of India. Under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and after her assassination, Rajiv Gandhi, India was increasingly drawn in as a mediator, particularly in 1985, when the TULF and the five dominant Tamil military organizations were involved in direct negotiations with the GOSL in the Bhutanese capital, Thimpu. On July 13, 1985 the Tamil parties united to put forward the Thimpu principles as the benchmark of Tamil nationalism: a recognition of the Tamil people as a distinct nationality with the right to self-determination; a guarantee of the territorial integrity of an independent Tamil homeland; the safeguarding of the fundamental rights of the Tamil people outside the independent Tamil homeland.

GOSL's Operation Liberation in May 1987 (headed by President J. R. Jayewardene) aimed at defeating the LTTE in a key sector of the Jaffna Peninsula, and was followed by an uninvited and angrily derided Indian humanitarian intervention. By mid-July the government, forced to take a diplomatic route, agreed upon a set of proposals leading to the creation of provincial councils. Critically, the issue of the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces was to be temporary, its permanence dependent on a referendum in the Eastern Province. Agreement was secured with the Tamil parties on the crux of the issues, but the LTTE broke ranks, opposing the referendum and the stipulation that it must relinquish its weapons.

LTTE-India Confrontation, and War for Eelam, 1987–2002

As part of the agreement the Indian government dispatched the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). From the outset there was a lack of communication between the Indians and the LTTE. Matters reached a nadir when eight LTTE commanders bit their cyanide capsules and committed suicide rather than be transported to Colombo. The Indian officers were unable to prevent this incident. This, along with the

public fast-unto-death by senior commander Thileepan, and the issue of disarmament, ultimately exploded into a bitterly contested war. The IPKF could not garner the support of the local population, hamstrung by the symbolism of a foreign occupying force and by their own aggressive approach, since an overambitious India was seeking to establish its hegemony in Sri Lanka. Vociferous protests grew in the Indian province of Tamil Nadu, supporting Sri Lankan Tamils. Therefore, despite successfully eradicating several population centers, including Jaffna, of the LTTE, the IPKF were not able to defeat it. The EPRLF was the victor in the provincial elections held under Indian auspices, and associated openly with the IPKF, a situation that neither gained it the support of the local population nor a fallback mechanism if, and when, the IPKF withdrew. Simultaneously, RAW was assisting and supporting TELO and PLOTE, a situation that ultimately led to the LTTE decimating both organizations.

In the South, in 1987, the second armed insurgency of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front) (JVP) broke out, as they bitterly opposed Indian intervention. Ranasinghe Premadasa succeeded Jayewardene on a twin pledge to defeat the JVP and remove the IPKF. In a bizarre twist of fate, Premadasa covertly acceded to a request by the LTTE for arms to fight the IPKF. In effect, the LTTE fought the IPKF with arms provided by India and subsequently fought the Sri Lankan army with arms provided by the GOSL.

With no support from the GOSL, Rajiv Gandhi's defeat at the polls, and under increasing pressure from its own citizens, the IPKF withdrew in March 1990. The provincial EPRLF leadership collapsed and fled to India in an attempt to escape LTTE retaliation. Even before the withdrawal, in May 1989, the Premadasa administration had begun peace talks with the LTTE, which used the opportunity to re-arm and recuperate as well as install a network of sleeper agents. It also decimated its remaining militant rivals and removed perceived pro-India elements. The assassination of the charismatic TULF leader A. Amirthalingam by the LTTE during negotiations effectively marked the end of the TULF's limited influence on the destiny of the struggle. The LTTE became the self-styled sole representative of the Tamils, a status adhered to by large numbers of Tamils, to whom

Prabhakaran had become the supreme leader. The remaining moderates among the Tamil community acquiesced, fled, or were assassinated.

The 1990s witnessed escalating conflict between the LTTE and the GOSL, separated by a period of negotiations conducted with President Chandrika Kumaratunga's administration in 1994–5. The LTTE celebrates July 5, the day of the first suicide attack, as Black Tiger day, in memory of the Black Tigers (suicide bombers dying in the cause). Its use of suicide bombings markedly increased and several high profile officials, including President Premadasa (assassinated at a rally on May Day in 1993), in Colombo and elsewhere were targeted with significant loss of life. The resort to suicide attacks and child recruitment, among other things, has led to the LTTE being banned in several countries. Most significantly, the LTTE's assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by suicide bombers brought it global notoriety, including in previously sympathetic Tamil Nadu. The repercussions of the Gandhi assassination are still felt today, including international warrants for the extradition of Prabhakaran and his intelligence chief Pottu Amman.

Furthermore, the LTTE's transformation from a guerrilla organization to a conventional army with a quasi-state apparatus took place in this period. An international network of agents facilitated fundraising and procured armaments, but the separate state apparatus played a role in gaining legitimacy in the quest for *Eelam*. The GOSL conducted a "War for Peace" strategy, aimed at militarily defeating the LTTE while pursuing a constitutional reform package to satisfy Tamil aspirations. Kumaratunga's constitutional package – even after an attempt on her life in 1999 – was rejected in parliament. Militarily, large-scale battles were prevalent with significant loss of life. The zenith of the government push was the capture of Jaffna in November 1995, but the LTTE hit back strongly from 1998 to 2000, culminating in the overrunning of the critical Elephant Pass military base. Their push towards Jaffna was, however, halted by overstretch and a Sri Lankan military resuscitated by emergency support from foreign allies. It was in this climate of strategic parity, along with the devastating economic impact of a successful strike on the only international airport in June 2001, that renewed negotiations provided an ephemeral hope for tangible peace.

Failed Negotiations

The parliamentary elections of December 2001 installed a government elected on a platform of peace, leading to the signing of a ceasefire agreement with the LTTE in February 2002, its deproscription in September, and six rounds of negotiations between September 2002 and April 2003, the highlight of which was an agreement to explore a federal solution in acceptance of the Tamil right to internal self-determination. In a climate imbued with hope, the GOSL and the LTTE jointly participated in sub-committees related to humanitarian needs, demobilization, and gender. However, the LTTE withdrew from negotiations dissatisfied with the government's actions on fundraising and economic development, and a government hamstrung by its lack of a clear majority was dismissed by a hostile President Kumaratunga in November 2003, on the grounds that national security was being impaired.

New elections brought in a government more critical to the peace process, though Kumaratunga attempted to make progress on an interim administration and on a structure for post-tsunami cooperation. The impact of the tsunami on the LTTE was significant and the slide towards conflict was further strengthened by a major split in the LTTE led by its eastern commander Colonel Karuna. The next president, Mahinda Rajapakse, had strong inclinations towards a military strategy. The government initially concentrated its energies on the Eastern Province, where Colonel Karuna's faction lent it support, and succeeded in clearing it of large-scale LTTE resistance for the first time in decades.

The present theater of conflict has shifted to the North, with a mushrooming of human rights violations including abductions, disappearances, and killings. The LTTE has stepped up its attacks on civilian and military targets with the added innovation of a limited but psychologically effective air force. Nonetheless, in the face of a revitalized and modernized Sri Lankan military, the LTTE's armed struggle faces severe obstacles, evidenced by the death of the leader of its political wing S. P. Thamichelvan in an air strike. Therefore, the armed struggle for Eelam continues apace amid diminishing prospects for a diplomatic breakthrough.

SEE ALSO: Marxism; Non-Violent Movements; Struggles for Rights, Justice, and Identities; People's

Liberation Front of Sri Lanka (JVP); Prabhakaran, Velupillai (b. 1954)

References and Suggested Readings

- Gunaratna, R. (1994) *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India's Intelligence Agencies*. Colombo: South Asian Network on Conflict Research.
- Loganathan, K. (1996) *Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities, Past Attempts at Resolving Ethnic Conflict*. Colombo: University of Colombo Press.
- Narayan Swamy, M. R. (1994) *Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas*. New Delhi: Konark.
- Rupesinghe, K. (Ed.) (2006) *Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures and Lessons*, Vol. 2. Colombo: Foundation for Coexistence.
- Wilson, A. J. (1994) *S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism 1947-1977*. London: Hurst.
- Wilson, A. J. (2000) *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. London: Hurst.

Tanzania, protest and independence

Ayokunle Olumuyiwa Omobowale

The Maji-Maji Revolt and its Aftermath

The Maji-Maji revolt stands out as one of the major phenomenal occurrences in the political development of colonial and postcolonial Tanzania. It started on July 31, 1905 and lasted until 1907, when the last remnants of the revolt were crushed. It was indeed a classic example of a peasants' revolt against their colonial masters' unfavorable economic policies, constructed and carried out, however, within the boundaries of the prevalent belief system. Its suppression nevertheless brought dire consequences for both the natives and the German colonial regime. One lasting consequence of the revolt was the decimation of a hitherto thickly populated environment, which has since served as a game reserve.

As with other European colonists, German colonial rule in Tanzania was directed along economic lines in order to provide much-needed raw materials for German industries and also extract adequate tax for colonial administration. The situation reached its peak when the new governor, Gotzen, decided to increase cotton growing by creating communal cotton plantations

(*shambas*), where each native was expected to work over a specified period of time per month under the supervision of African headmen and colonial officials. As the plantations expanded and production increased, the demand for more labor meant peasants were taken away from subsistence production to work for the European colonists' interests.

The resultant impoverished socioeconomic conditions of the natives engendered resentments, which were soothed by the anti-European apocalyptic predictions of a religious native chief, Kinjikitile. He demanded an end to the payment of taxes and predicted that all white men would be swept away by flood, swallowed up by the earth, and/or killed by seven lions, while their guns would become ineffective, shooting out merely water. In addition, the prophet gave out Maji water as a protection against the white man's bullet. His message, leadership, and messianic claims for Maji water acted as a unifying force for the ethnically diverse and oppressed people of German East Africa. In each community, the message was spread by religious assistants (*hongo*), who also issued Maji water to the faithful. Thus, the hitherto ethnically divided natives were symbolically united in the fight against white domination, believing the Maji water medicine to act as an antidote against the white man's firearm. Starting with the first insurrection at Rufiji in July 1905, the rebellion quickly spread to other parts of the territory as natives attacked European settlers, missionaries, and their associates, killing about 12 Europeans in the process. As the revolt became widespread in German East Africa, the colonial authority decided to take drastic action to suppress it.

Reprisals by the colonial regime were brutal and aimed at wiping out every bit of resistance. German forces subjected insurgents and their accomplices to corporal and capital punishment, in the process destroying the local subsistence system of agricultural production and causing widespread famine. By the time the revolt was suppressed, an estimated 75,000 Africans had died through starvation and disease. As a consequence of the elimination of the food system, the densely populated region of southeastern Tanzania was depopulated and eventually returned to the wild, later to become the Selous Game Reserve, 50,000 square kilometers of savannah grasslands designated a protected site

by UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization).

Nevertheless, while repression effectively ended the revolt, it also provided a rationale for condemnation of German colonial administration in East Africa. The campaign against German rule was conducted largely by British officials, who denounced the German colonial administration as brutal and having little consideration for its African subjects. Britain gained a strategic advantage in the region when Germany was divested of its African colonial territory after World War I. The former German territory was placed under British colonial rule in 1919.

The Maji-Maji also served as an inspirational model for Julius Nyerere, the anti-colonial leader in the Tanganyika African National Union's nationalist struggles in the 1950s who later became the first president of the independent nation. While the 1905 revolt was violent, Nyerere emphasized the non-violent nature of his own nationalist struggle and stressed the historical precedent of the Maji-Maji as a source of unification of Tanganyikans (Tanzanians), irrespective of region, ethnicity, or clan. Furthermore, Nyerere used the Maji-Maji struggle in the implementation of the postcolonial *Ujamaa* initiative, designed as a self-reliance development policy that he viewed as a means to restore African socialism.

Julius Nyerere: Nationalism, Anti-Colonialism, and the Making of the One-Party State

Julius Nyerere emerged as the president of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) at its inauguration in 1954. Under his leadership, TANU vastly increased its membership around the country while Nyerere took the campaign for Tanganyika's independence to the international scene. Despite the suppression of TANU's activities by the British colonial government, which sponsored a rival political party, the United Tanganyika Party (UTP), TANU earned a landslide victory in the 1959 legislative election and eventually formed the government when independence was granted in December 1961.

Nyerere thought the multi-party political system would contribute to internecine dissent and erode the country's capacity to advance economically and independently. This potential for

internal hostility could be remedied by evolving a single national party, which would accommodate all politicians in the country. In 1962, therefore, Nyerere relinquished his position as prime minister in order to reorganize TANU. For the next 11 months he worked assiduously as TANU's president to reposition it as a national party. By 1965, TANU was able to reform the constitution inherited from Britain and subsequently became the country's single political party. The aim was supposedly to prevent strife and ethnic rivalry, which Nyerere believed were endemic to multi-party politics. A one-party structure would, he believed, bring about political hygiene. The one-party constitution was designed to allow citizens to choose candidates to represent them under the same party banner. After the first election under the new constitution, party officials who held powerful positions, including ministers, lost to seemingly less popular candidates. It turned out to be a free and fair election under a one-party arrangement.

The next stage in Nyerere's reform was to merge the party with the state and bureaucracy. Thenceforth, civil servants were posted to the party to work as officials. They were to be well informed and absorb the ideology and programs of the party, which they would carefully implement as government policies. Ultimately, all this was intended to bring about an equal society, which Nyerere believed was based on a socialism reminiscent of precolonial African societies.

SEE ALSO: Charismatic Leadership and Revolution; International Socialism: Mass Politics; Mau Mau Rebellion, 1952–1959; Nyerere, Julius (1922–1999); Uganda, Protests against British Colonialism and Occupation; *Ujamaa* Villages; Zanzibar Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Hallet, R. (1974) *Africa Since 1875*. London: Heinemann.
- Iliffe, J. (1967) The Organization of the Maji Maji Rebellion. *Journal of African History* 8 (3): 495–512.
- Sunseri, T. (1997) Famine and Wild Pigs: Gender Struggles and the Outbreak of Maji Maji War in Uzaramo (Tanzania). *Journal of African History* 38 (2): 235–59.
- Sunseri, T. (1999) Majimaji and the Millennium: Abrahamic Sources and the Creation of a Tanzanian Resistance Tradition. *History in Africa* 26: 365–78.
- Sunseri, T. (2000) Statist Narratives and Maji Maji Ellipses. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 33 (3): 567–84.

Tecún Umán (d. 1524)

Dima Zito

Tecún Umán led the resistance of the Mayan Quiché people against the Spanish invasion in the highlands now called Guatemala and was killed in a battle by the conquistador Pedro de Alvarado.

In 1524 Spanish conquerors under the command of Pedro de Alvarado attacked the region populated by the Maya. The Quiché and other Maya groups fought the arriving Spanish troops with intelligent guerilla tactics, but the invaders benefited from the fact that the different peoples were divided among themselves. Tecún Umán, a member of the Quiché royal family, formed an alliance with some of the neighboring peoples and gathered thousands of warriors to resist the Spanish invasion. The army of about 450 Spaniards was strengthened by numerous allied indigenous fighters and equipped with superior weapons – guns and steel arms as well as horses, which were still not known by the Maya. In an open battle near Quetzaltenango, Alvarado and Tecún Umán met face to face. A legend claims that Tecún Umán killed Alvarado's horse, thinking that man and animal were one, and was then killed by the conqueror. A Quiché legend says that Tecún Umán was accompanied by a quetzal, Guatemala's national bird, which was his *nahual* (spiritual guide). When Tecún Umán was killed, the quetzal landed on him and was stained with his blood. Since then quetzal birds are said to have red feathers on their breast and no longer sing.

At this decisive battle, in which more than 10,000 warriors were killed, the Quiché were defeated. Tecún Umán is still celebrated as a symbol of indigenous resistance to this day. In 1960 he was declared Guatemala's official national hero and is commemorated on the anniversary of his death, February 20.

SEE ALSO: Cuauhtémoc (1502–1525); Guatemala, Popular Rebellion and Civil War; Mapuche Indian Resistance

References and Suggested Readings

- Galeano, E. (1971/1997) *Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Informationsstelle Guatemala (Ed.) (1982) *Guatemala: Der lange Weg zur Freiheit*. Wuppertal: Peter Hammer Verlag.

Recinos, A. (1957) *Titulos de la casa Ixquin Nehaib*. Available at www.literaturaguatemala.org/ixquinnehaib.htm.

Westphal, W. (1977) *Die Maya: Volk im Schatten seiner Väter*. Munich: Bertelsmann.

Tennis Court Oath, France, 1789

Eric F. Johnson

The Tennis Court Oath was a pledge taken on June 20, 1789 by members of the Third Estate of France, along with several sympathetic members of the clergy and nobility, not to disband until they had produced a constitution for France. It represents an important turning point in the French Revolution when the monarchy effectively lost influence over the direction of events, and when political power came to be perceived as residing in the people and their representatives rather than the king. Louis XVI's hostile response to the oath further weakened the monarchy and alienated him from much of French society.

In 1788 a mounting financial crisis forced Louis XVI reluctantly to summon the Estates General, an advisory body consisting of deputies from the three traditional orders of French society (the clergy, the nobility, and the commoners). When the Estates convened in Versailles in May 1789, one of the first issues of contention was whether it should vote by order (which would have preserved the traditional influence of the clergy and nobility) or by head (which would have given the more numerous Third Estate the advantage). While Louis allowed the Third Estate more seats, he refused to allow a vote by head.

The failure to reach a compromise led to a stalemate that lasted into mid-June. On June 17, 1789 the Third Estate created a National Assembly, which most of the clergy's delegates and a number of sympathetic nobles agreed to join. On June 20 the king locked the new Assembly out of their meeting hall, which led them to convene at a nearby tennis court where they took their famous oath. Their action represented a dramatic challenge to the traditional order of French society by asserting that the people and their representatives are the source

of political legitimacy, and that the king's authority was not absolute but was limited by a "social contract" with his subjects.

Originally, the king appeared to accept the National Assembly and the idea of a constitution, although relations between the deputies and the monarchy remained tense. The public remained distrustful of the king and was further agitated by speeches and pamphlets made by radical journalists and activists. These anxieties seemed to be confirmed in early July when Louis ordered several thousand troops to march to Paris. Fearing that the king was planning to restore royal authority by force, a crowd of Parisians stormed the Bastille, a fortified royal prison, on July 14, 1789. The fall of the Bastille became symbolic of ordinary citizens becoming politically assertive and spelled the beginning of the end for the old regime in France.

SEE ALSO: Estates General, France; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Mirabeau, Comte de (1749–1791); Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778); Sieyès, Abbé (1748–1836)

References and Suggested Readings

Fitzsimmons, M. (1994) *The Remaking of France: The National Assembly and the Constitution of 1791*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hunt, L. (1984) *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rudé, G. (1972) *The Crowd in the French Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sewell, W. H., Jr. (1994) *The Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution: The Abbé Sieyès and "What Is the Third Estate?"* Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Thai Communist Party

Pierre Rousset

The communist movement was first established in Siam (renamed Thailand in 1939) mostly in the Chinese ethnic migrant communities, then proliferated in the seemingly disparate surrounding regions in the North, Northeast, and South of the country. Following a long, difficult period of transition, the Thai Communist Party (CPT), once an urban party, retreated to the jungle and engaged in armed struggle. Its national expansion, during the 1970s, occurred while the kingdom was transformed into a US base for

military intervention in the Vietnam War. The party eventually saw its decline during the Sino-Indochinese conflict of 1978–9 and disappeared from sight in the mid-1980s.

In Siam the formation of the CPT was dependent upon its strategic geopolitical position, a social formation characterized by a three-way segmentation of the population (town-province, center-outskirts, migrant-Thai), and also by the gap between a Chinese political orientation and the realities of life in Thailand. Thailand also benefited from its geographical position and avoided the colonization suffered by its neighbors. By creating ties with Germany, who helped form its army, and navigating a balance between the French and British imperial influences in the region, Thailand became a buffer zone between the possessions of the French in the East and Great Britain in the South and West.

The communist movement in Thailand, therefore, could not arise from a powerful popular tradition of anti-colonial resistance. Instead, the movement had to confront the dominant class and authorities whose power had never been checked by colonialism or loss of independence. These realities had significant consequences on the trajectory of sociopolitical struggles in Thailand, and made the CPT unique within the greater political sphere in Southeast Asia.

The Thai peasantry was particularly difficult to organize for a number of reasons. For one thing, ethnic divisions made the expansion and unification of sharp class conflicts in rural Siam difficult. At the same time, in urban areas, workers' strikes were initially acts of Chinese immigrant workers who sometimes fought to defend their jobs against the hiring by employers of Thais. The Chinese labor movement was often linked to the Guomindang or to family clans. Thus, the communist movement was confronted with the difficult task of organizing such a divided population.

Revolution of 1932

In 1932 the political struggle took a new turn with the overthrow of the absolute monarchy and transition to a constitutional monarchy. The People's Party was a direct player in the coup. Though its membership was small, the party was supported by regiments in Bangkok as well as a large faction of urban dwellers, if not provincial populations or rural peoples. The civilian left wing

was led by Pridi Banomyong (1900–83), an intellectual influenced by European non-Marxist liberal and socialist ideas. A field officer and a commoner, Phraya Phahon Phonphayuhasena (1887–1947), led the military group.

Through his support for individual freedom, social progress, and a state-implemented economic plan, Pridi gained support from businessmen, the Chinese trade unions, and the politicians of the provinces. Soon, however, the politically progressive civilian wing of the People's Party was usurped by the military wing. In 1935 the new army chief and defense minister, Plaek Phibun Songkram (1897–1964), known as Field Marshal Phibun, became Prime Minister and established a dictatorship. From 1933 to 1937 the number of military men doubled and the military budget increased dramatically. The army became a vector of industrialization. In the name of nationalism it invested in agriculture and transport and took control of Chinese enterprises. A new law on nationality in 1939 forced minorities to "become" Thais by learning the language, changing their family names, and sending their children to Thai schools. The regime of Phibun imposed a martial law more severe than Siam had ever known in order to assimilate non-ethnic Thais into this nationalistic vision. A new alliance was established between sectors of the traditional bourgeoisie (including Sino-Thais), the administration, and the military. But, under Phibun, some campaigned for the "superiority" of the "Thai race" and racist campaigns were directed against minorities.

First Communist Parties

The Chinese community established in Thailand had been precociously politicized by the impact of the 1911 and 1927 revolutions in China. Thus, the communist movement first established itself among Chinese traders and workers, with the primary exception to this trend in the poor and densely populated region of the Northeast, where Vietnamese communists played a significant role from the late 1920s.

The onset of communism in Thailand was not widespread. A first small staff of half a dozen people was sent to the kingdom by the Chinese Communist Party in 1923. In 1926 the Committee of the Southern Seas, or Nanyang Party, was established in Southeast Asia. In 1927 hundreds of young Chinese founded the

Communist Youth of Siam (CYS), linked to the Communist Party of Siam (CPS), a precursor of the CPT. A second organization, the Thai branch of the Chinese Communist Party or the Chinese Communist Party of Thailand (CCPT), may have existed, though the relationship between the CPS, CPT, and the CCPT is not clear. At the same time, there was a constant movement of militants from China and Vietnam who, alongside Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia, promoted the establishment of the Thai communist movement. Ho Chi Minh (alias Nguyen Ai Quoc) went several times to the field as an envoy of the Komintern to help with the establishment of the CPS.

Organizing the movement in Thailand was risky. Chinese militants were arrested from 1921 to 1931 in Bangkok and in the North, and anti-communist laws became more stringent. In 1933 the propagation of communist doctrine became a crime against the state. Repression was widespread and the CPS declined until it fragmented altogether around 1936. In the Northeast, Vietnamese militants were either detained or deported, and remaining Vietnamese militants returned to their country to reinforce their own anti-colonial battles. The influence of the Indochinese Communist Party on Thai communists declined significantly.

Communist Party of Thailand and the Beginnings of Social Battle, 1940–1972

At the onset of World War II Thailand, under the authority of General Phibun, allied itself with Japan, embracing much of Japan's fascistic ideology. In 1941 Japanese troops invaded the country under the pretense of fighting British and French armies on the Thai borders. The Thai government declared war on the Allied powers while joining the Axis, but Japanese forces quickly took on the role of conquerors, alienating the Thai population. Two resistance movements organized against the Japanese occupation: the Volunteer Organization for Armed Opposition to Japan created by the newly reestablished CPT, and the underground Seri Thai (Free Thai) network, represented in exile by Pridi Banomyong and Seni Pramroj (1905–97), a former ambassador to the US. Both movements were limited in their capacity to act against the occupation, and there was effectively no cooperation between

them. Still, Thailand's occupation by Japan was an impetus for communists in Thailand legitimately to declare its first battle for national liberation.

The CPT's movement-building during the war was more influential than its military activities, which were limited essentially to gathering intelligence and some operations of armed propaganda. Though initially the political situation was not amenable to popular resistance, the atmosphere eventually changed and the communist struggle flourished with the creation of welfare associations, an underground labor union, and the Anti-Japanese Federation.

The party was not able to contend with the Seri Thai movement in the aftermath of the war, but the immediate postwar period nonetheless constituted a very important political opportunity for the communists' struggle. Members of the Seri Thai network returned from exile to negotiate peace with the Allied movement. Seni Pramroj, Oxford-educated and a member of the royal family, became prime minister in 1945. The following year a constitution proposed by Pridi was adopted and the parliamentary regime was restored. In order to avoid a Russian veto on the entry of Thailand into the United Nations, the Thai government abrogated the anti-communist law and authorized the CPT to act legally.

As armed struggle was no longer on the agenda, the CPT dissolved its military forces. Then, instead of organizing peasants in the countryside, the CPT called back its members to Bangkok, which shows how much it remained an urban party. Leaders and militants of the party returned from China, including Udom Srisuwan, who became a well-known editorialist of the CPT and its primary theorist. During the years following the war the influence of revolutionary ideas began to find its place among students such as Jit Phumisak (1930–66), whose essays and poems impressed many generations of militants, and who was eventually killed by police. The underground, episodic CPT newspaper, *Mahachon* (the Masses), became a weekly publication. The party reestablished itself in the capital and started the Bangkok Labor Federation as well as unions, associations for women and youth, and associations of school and university students. The CPT became politically involved at the parliamentary level when parliament member Prasert Sapsunthon publicly declared his affiliation.

In order to offer a common framework to the union organizations in which it was active, the CPT created the Association of United Workers of Thailand. Moreover, the prestige of the party increased with the defeat of the Kuomintang in China and the party's influence developed within the Central Labor Union (CLU), which joined the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in 1949. Even so, during these years, the Thai left was diverse. Pridi Banomyong created the Southeast Asia League to affirm solidarity with the national liberation movements in the region. The writings of European socialists were translated into Thai. A progressive Buddhist current was developed and represented by the thinker Buddhadasa; the possible relationship between Marxism and Buddhism was discussed.

The development of a legal, pluralist left was ultimately hindered by the chronic instability of the postwar parliamentary regime. In 1947 Phibun instigated a coup d'état and took power. He took a series of measures against the communist movement, unions, and Sino Thai schools, ending the CPT's period of legality after less than two years. Phibun established the Thai Labor Union (renamed the Thai National Trade Union Confederation (TNTUC) in 1951), reserved only for Thai nationals and serving as a mass base for the regime. In 1952, in the name of the Anti-Communist Act, the Central Labor Union was dissolved and its leaders were arrested.

From 1950 Bangkok aligned itself with the United States and became the first country in Asia to offer troops and material to the United Nations in Korea. In return, Washington offered massive military assistance to the Thai regime. Thus, the geopolitical situation of Thailand changed dramatically. In the past, Siam, as a buffer between French and British colonies, remained at the margins of regional conflicts and avoided colonial conquest. This time, the kingdom was on the front lines, in the direct service of imperialist military strategy. The anti-communist and anti-Chinese repression worsened and arrests increased. The democratic movements and the left were muzzled. Pridi Banomyong returned to exile, this time permanently.

The influence of the Chinese Communist Party and the role of the Sino-Thai cadres in the CPT did not insure the "spontaneous" adoption of a Maoist orientation for the CPT. During the 1920s when Chinese influence on Thai commun-

ists was taking hold, the Chinese party itself was not yet Maoist. The relationship between the two parties was tenuous after the counterrevolution of 1927 and "pro-Chinese" during this period did not necessarily mean "pro-Mao." The CPT's Maoist orientation shaped only after the victory of the revolution of 1949, and was not formalized until the Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1960s.

The movement toward rural armed struggle was difficult for the Thai party to make, as it necessitated a radical reorganization of party forces that were culturally and sociologically removed from the peasantry. The prestige and influence of Chinese Maoism helped move the CPT toward rural struggle, but the evolution of Thailand's political scenery itself played a significant role. From the mid-1940s to the end of the 1970s, the country had only three democratic interludes of three years each punctuating three decades of military rule. There were 18 coups d'état under one reign of King Bhumibol, Rama IX, who ascended the throne in 1946.

The CPT held its second congress in early 1952 and was officially named the Communist Party of Thailand. It was only during this period, the early 1950s, that the Chinese Communist Party of Thailand (CCPT) was formally dissolved. According to some estimates, this organization had about 4,000 members and the CPT only 200. Some militants went back to China and others joined the Thai party. This integration reinforced the "Chinese" influence on the direction of the organization. The congress also endorsed the "rural turn" of the CPT, without giving up the development of its urban activities. In particular, it mobilized forces to participate in the worldwide peace movement, an issue important to Thailand.

Meanwhile, Thailand experienced a new relatively democratic interlude. Numerous jailed Chinese leaders were freed. Thailand's trade relationship with China improved. Prominent figures on the left went to Peking, such as Thep Jotinuchit, leader of the socialist opposition, and Klaew Norapati, general secretary of the Economist Party. The Chinese government linked itself with Thai opposition parties. Peking targeted the role of the United States in Thailand, and the party focused on anti-imperialism and nationalism more than revolution.

In 1954 Thailand and the Philippines joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), whose purpose was to fend off communism in the region through alliances with the West and

pro-western nations. In 1957 a new coup d'état brought General Sarit Thanarat to power, and the following year his regime consolidated authoritarian rule. A wave of arrests hit militants and prominent figures on the left. In 1959 imports from China were prohibited and in 1960 Thai troops were sent to fight secretly in Laos on the side of US forces.

The third congress of the CPT in 1961 effectively marked the inception of armed struggle, though much preparation was necessary to ready the forces before battle began. Cadres had to be sent in the countryside to establish bases. Militants had to be trained (outside Thailand) in military as well as political fields. The CPT had to get the support of the Chinese, Indochinese, and other small neighboring parties. Political repression contributed much to the turn toward armed struggle. Soon after the third congress, one of the leaders of the CPT, Ruam Wongphan, was captured by security forces and later executed. Other members of the central committee, based underground in Bangkok, found refuge along the border or in China. For the first time, the national leadership of the party, by and large, left the capital and never returned.

Throughout the 1960s Thailand was a western stronghold of the counterrevolutionary security belt in Eastern Asia. The United States turned Thailand into an important operational base for Indochina. For four years, the CPT avoided confrontations with the government, knowing that the conditions were not yet ideal for engaging in military operations. However, counterrevolutionary actions on the part of the Thai state accelerated the CPT's decision to engage in an armed struggle even if conditions were not yet ideal. The mass base was fragile, comprised of no more than a few thousand sympathizers and only a small number of villages, primarily in the Northeast, where battles broke out in 1965. Under pressure from the government army, the party was forced to begin fighting while it was still badly prepared in most regions of the country.

The CPT targeted remote provinces of strategic importance. In the mountainous North it recruited members of Hmong tribes who had been bombarded with napalm by the Thai army in 1968, and who were still alienated from the rest of Thailand. Alliances with the hill tribes were made by offering services such as health, education, and assistance to the poor, and by attack-

ing outside enemies such as the Thai army, the forestry companies, and various gangs. In the Northeast Isan region the battle for socialism was led by the Samakee-kun (Solidarity) movement, which was influenced by Khrong Chandawong, a member of the Socialist Front and the Peace Committee of Thailand. Khrong was arrested during the waves of state-led repression in 1958 and sentenced to death in 1961. The repression contributed to the radicalization of northeastern resistance, though it also caused a great deal of problems for the party.

The mountains of the South were dense with forests and served as an important refuge for the CPT and its active guerilla forces. Armed struggle took place in 1966, alongside the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), which depended on bases in the Thailand side at the border after defeat by the British. In this region the communist movement did not benefit from proximity with China or Indochina, and developed more autonomously than in the other provinces. Muslim resistance in the South was reorganized underground along the border and by the 1960s the regional resistance was at once Islamic and socialist in character.

From Success to Crisis: 1973–1982

The CPT developed itself along the fault lines of Thai society. The militants were devoted to serving the people; the CPT participated in social protection more than fomenting revolution. It protected the tribal communities or villages from outside threats such as armed forces, a corrupt administration, and usurers. It also offered services that the state did not, such as healthcare and education, and consequently benefited from a moral debt of recognition. The party acted in favor of social justice but without necessarily radicalizing the social sphere itself.

The CPT's strategy is summarized in the maxim: "The countryside encircles the town, the jungles lead the village." The first part of this saying is common to all Maoist parties, although its application differs in different regions (in China and Vietnam, armed forces were established following revolutionary struggle and mass uprising, which was not the case for Thailand). The second term of the maxim reflected a characteristic particular to the CPT: in order to escape repression, the political and military cadres did not stay in the village, but the surrounding forest.

Cadres and party members left their homes, entered the jungle, and secretly returned to work in the villages. They worked in the jungle during the day and in the village at night. This system of organization would have significant consequences for the future of the CPT.

The whole CPT organization, then, was reoriented in order to support the rural armed struggle up to the point that in the beginning of the 1970s there was no leadership structure in Bangkok responsible for activities in the capital as a whole. There were networks, each of which linked to a different region, charged with helping the development of the guerilla forces by assuring communication, information, or collection of funds, clothing, and medicines. Comparatively, renouncing centralized leadership of the urban network was an uncommon move for a Maoist party.

Operating along the Indochinese borders and near China, the CPT benefited from important logistical, financial, military, and food support from its neighbors. It had diplomatic representation in Peking and the backcountry of Yunnan. It opened bases in Laos where there were hospitals, schools, and training camps. With the exception of Thailand's southern region, militants based in the jungle were armed, fed, and cared for thanks to this foreign assistance. The cadres of the party were often sent to train in China; thus, ideological dependence on Peking was coupled with a dangerous physical dependence.

A Crucial Decade

The political climate in the 1970s shifted in such a way that the CPT was able to coordinate its struggle at the national level. A national crisis – simultaneously political, social, and moral – broke out in Thailand with the overthrow of the military dictatorship in 1973 and the proliferation of radicalized student and peasant movements. For the first time, revolutionary victory seemed possible. Communist guerillas were active in Thailand, Burma, and Malaysia, hoping for support from Peking and Hanoi. American officials expected to see the loss of continental Southeast Asia.

During this period large numbers of people and a plurality of organizations were engaged in a struggle against dictatorship and for democracy. Students participated actively in the organization of labor unions. They also launched a campaign

promoting and publicizing the rights of peasants and contributed to the development of peasant associations, especially in the North where the new Federation of Peasants of Thailand became prominent. Workers' strikes and peasant delegations increased in the capital.

The arrest of democratic militants who demanded the promulgation of the constitution stoked the fire in October 1973. The student movements and then the common urban people of the capital took to the streets. Faced with repression, the huge demonstrations turned violent. The king had no choice but to demand the exile of the dictators. For the first time in the history of Thailand, a military dictatorship was defeated under pressure from the street. Individually, militants of both the CPT and the Socialist Party participated in the October 1973 struggle. They built underground networks and had an increasing influence on above-ground organizations. The CPT enjoyed a substantial amount of prestige among the students, who admired its tenacity and its devotion to the people, but who knew very little about the party itself. In fact, as such, the CPT was not at the initiative of the 1973 upsurge and had little to offer in terms of orientation to the continuing mass struggles. Some student groups, such as the Federation of Independent Students (FIST), which were animating the movements, looked to the CPT but usually were not members.

The false unanimity present after the October 1973 uprising died down as a result of the dual impact of social struggle within the kingdom and the victory of communist forces in Indochina. The royal family worried about the radicalization of struggles and was concerned with the abolition of the monarchy in Laos, a neighboring country. Political repression increased in severity and popular struggle became more risky. After several assassinations and attempted assassinations, many student and labor leaders from Bangkok fled to the jungle to join the underground partisans of the CPT. Notable among these was Seksan Prasertkul, a prominent union and student leader.

On October 6, 1976 police, military, and anti-left wing paramilitary forces assembled at the gates of Thammasat University and opened fire on protesters in what would come to be known as a massacre. There were hundreds of deaths and thousands of arrests; the televised images of the massacre shook the entire country. Just three years

after the removal of the dictator in 1973, the military took power again in October 1976, shortly after the massacre. For many, it destroyed hope for Thailand's democratic evolution.

Still, this was not the end of the left. By the thousands, in order to avoid arrest or death, to pursue their struggle, and obsessed by the desire to avenge friends massacred at Thammasat, students joined the guerilla forces, along with workers and peasants. The People's Liberation Army of Thailand (PLAT) increased its forces dramatically. In the beginning of 1979, at its peak, it had 12,000 to 14,000 soldiers according to government estimates; according to other estimations, there were 20,000. Guerilla zones existed in more than forty provinces and the CPT had influence in thousands of villages with a total population of more than 3 million.

It was not only numbers that gave the CPT and PLAT strength. The credibility of party leadership was reinforced by the coup. Though the party had not necessarily drawn large numbers of members from protest movements in the past, guerilla zones became the only refuge for the urban and student activists who were now hunted by government forces. Members of the mainstream left were also forced to go underground and join the movement, including the United Socialist Front (USF) and particularly the Socialist Party of Thailand (SPT).

The mass arrival of young urban folks in the guerilla camps caused many logistical problems. The integration of students educated into the urban democratic fight within more traditional village communities was difficult. A few months after the coup d'état of October 6, 1976, the first conflict broke out within the camps in the southern province of Surat Thani; however, such conflicts remained localized. Still, the rallying to the CPT, to the PLAT, and to the new United Front of prominent worker, peasant, and student activists, and the growing propensity of the student movement for revolution, allowed for a considerable enlargement of the social base of the Thai communist movement.

Sino-Indochinese War

Between 1979 and 1980 the CPT lost a great deal of support from the outside. Militants left the guerillas and returned to towns in large numbers, discreetly at first, then publicly, in response to a government offer of general amnesty. In 1981

through 1982 the crisis of the Thai left became increasingly profound. The contradictions that undermined the heart of the CPT became apparent with its Fourth Congress. At that time, approximately half the guerillas had already left the jungle. Extensive political debates within the Thai left called its legitimacy into question.

One cause of this decline, and perhaps the most obvious, was the Sino-Indochinese crisis. Political and then military disputes between the Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Chinese regimes had serious repercussions for Thailand. A flow of refugees from the three Indochinese countries caused confrontations within the movement and raised several ideological and political issues. Tensions were particularly obvious between the CPT and the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). The VCP had proposed, since 1975, a considerable increase of military assistance to the CPT, in order to take advantage of the American collapse in Indochina and to give a push to the revolutionary struggle in Thailand. Such offers were reiterated until 1978, but the CPT refused, believing that the Vietnamese party wanted to exert its own influence on the revolutionary movement in Thailand. For Hanoi, the CPT's refusal reflected the will of Peking to avoid an extension of revolutionary struggle in the region and demonstrated the political dependence of the CPT on China.

In this period, the CPT was obliged to choose between its past allies. It maintained its alliance with Peking and the Khmer Rouge and denounced Vietnam as an agent of social imperialism in Southeast Asia. Pham Van Dong, Vietnamese prime minister, declared in 1978 that all assistance to the CPT was suspended. In 1979 the CPT and CCPDF camps in Laos were closed and the Thai militants expelled.

Crises of Allegiance

The Third Indochinese War, in which China briefly invaded Vietnam in response to Vietnam's aggressions against Cambodia, accelerated the crisis of the party, which politically and logistically depended on the support of its neighbors. The war also instigated a series of debates within the CPT, as the militants began to question the capacity of the party's leadership. The brutal decline of the CPT and its guerilla forces after a period of such rapid growth was a result of the way in which the leadership of the party reacted

to the regional conflicts between the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cambodian regimes.

The party came into crisis even before the government and the army inflicted heavy blows on the resistance. It was not defeated by superior forces, but was weakened both by the loss of its Indochinese allies and by the evolution of Chinese diplomacy as it opened up to the West. The CPT was also undermined by the advent of deep internal divergences.

Because the party was unable to avoid a rupture with Vietnamese and Lao forces, some questioned whether the CPT's leadership was more responsive to the Thai people or to Chinese policymakers. These questions arose when Chinese leadership supported ASEAN and efforts were made for the constitution of an anti-Vietnamese front. Suspicions were also raised by increasing diplomacy between China and the US and the improvement of relations between the Thai and Chinese governments. The Voice of the Thai People, the radio station of the CPT that had been established in China, permanently ceased broadcasting a few days after the declaration announcing China's rupture with Hanoi and denouncing Vietnam as a threat to Thailand. The disappearance of the radio station was a blow to the Thai movement, as it had been the principal means of political communication between militants in Thailand. The discontinuation of the station was perceived by the government as a pledge of good will from Peking toward Bangkok. Moreover, leadership began to solicit the militants to prepare for resistance against what seemed an inevitable Vietnamese invasion of Thailand.

The Vietnamese invasion never occurred. Slowly, the militant Thai left started to get the measure of the tragedy faced by the Cambodian people under the Khmer Rouge. In the Northeast, many PLAT units experienced the bloody "radicalism" of their Cambodian comrades. Moreover, some CPT members implemented a "Polpotian" policy by forcefully shifting many Thai villages to the Cambodian side of the border. After the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, the Thai government army allied with the Khmer Rouge and turned Chinese arms against PLAT.

Many newer members of the party and of PLAT finally decided to leave the jungle, often citing reasons concerning lack of democratic decision-making practices. The politburo of the CPT was often non-communicative and few

political documents circulated within the party. Rare "directives," often obscurely signed "center," were written in terms so general that they were nearly impossible to discuss. The recruitment of new members to the party was rigidly controlled. The vertical orientation, partially a result of being underground, prohibited horizontal contacts and exchanges. Critical documents and communications only reached the leaders, who often did not reply.

Isolated in the jungle, with little contact with the population, the students, who by thousands joined the armed struggle in 1976, were powerless. They left, discouraged, one by one, group by group. Some left very early, others left much later, such as Seksan Prasertkul, who reached Bangkok only in 1981. The absence of democracy within the CPT, PLAT, and the Thai revolutionary movement in general was an essential factor in the crisis of the left. The militants were faced with the alternative of keeping quiet or voting with their feet by returning to the towns or villages.

A first disagreement, concerning strategy within Thailand, broke out regarding the attention paid to urban work versus rural work. The coup d'état of October 1976 and resultant move to the jungle temporarily staved off this debate. Later, the evolution of government policy opened a new space for democratic intervention in the towns. The union movement began new activities. Bangkok became again a political center of concern.

A second disagreement emerged over the party's Maoist orientation. Many felt that the Thai revolutionary movement did not have a clear line of action. These debates confirmed the end of the Chinese model. China had become the single point of reference for the Thai militants. The ideological formation of the militants was based on chosen Maoist works. Faith in the Chinese "big brother" was shaken by the violent struggles between factions which tore apart the PCC in the following years. The Chinese leadership eventually attacked the heritage of Mao himself. The experience was traumatizing for the Thai militants.

Fourth Congress of CPT

The crisis of the Communist Party of Thailand was already obvious when the Fourth Congress convened more than twenty years after the

third. Due to the precariousness of the military situation, the leadership of the party decided to convene three regional assemblies. At this particular moment, the CPT was losing the majority of its active forces and its prestige was declining. A small majority opted for a reform of the orientation and the functioning of the party: the Northeast, the new zones of the North, and the organization in Bangkok voted together against the North, the South, and the Central leadership.

On ideological issues the term "semi-feudal" gave way to "semi-capitalist." The traditional orientation was replaced by formulas balancing the strategic importance of the town and the countryside, of the armed struggle and the political struggle. Such formulas were closer to those of the Vietnamese than the Chinese. The word "revisionist" was withdrawn from the party vocabulary. Analysis of the USSR became vague, and the congress declared that it was ready to seek alliances with all "neutral" groups who were not too allied to Moscow or Peking. The party's Maoist orientation was further questioned.

The reformers gained ground at the last congress. However, the votes did not express homogeneous lines but blocs of factions. The aftermath of the congress was bitter for the reformers. The new leadership remained *de facto* under the control of former dominant factions, and key zones of the reformers did not have representation in the central committee. The official communiqués of the CPT played down the debates and changes. The documents of the Fourth Congress were only officially published in 1986.

The 1982 congress did not resolve the crisis. A new series of eye-catching defections occurred, including among the party leadership. Groups of guerilla forces negotiated *en masse* their surrender, especially in the Northeast. In certain regions of the South the military forces of the CPT resisted the crisis, but on the national level the guerillas disintegrated. In 1986 the CPT leadership announced that it had reorganized and reinforced its relationship with international solidarity; however, the party did not reappear on the political scene.

Difficult Departure from the Jungle

The 1980s marked the end of an era of party oriented revolutionary struggle. Another era

commenced which, on the contrary, was characterized by the disappearance of political parties with leftist roots. Unlike in places such as the Philippines, the crisis of the CPT did not give way to a pluralist left, but to the disappearance of the political left. This contrast could be understood in part by the new policy of counterinsurrection implemented in Thailand under the government of General Prem Tinsulanonda. The government offered individual amnesty to CPT members and negotiated the grouped return of guerilla units into newly established villages. This policy was a success because it came at the time when the CPT leadership could not offer any credible solution to its crisis. Still, it does not completely explain the reasons for the collapse or the disintegration of the political left as a whole.

The militant struggle in the jungle collapsed for a number of reasons. First, ideological confusion, disciplinary constraints, and isolation of camps from one another made collective departure difficult. More importantly, members of the party and the revolutionary army living in the jungle had depended on the central leadership for everything (money, rice, ammunition, and arms), and splitting meant being without material means for survival. Each member had to search for work or for his or her family for financial resources. Priority was placed on professional and social reintegration. Many resumed the education interrupted by the 1976 coup. Under such conditions, it proved very difficult for the "returnees from the jungle" to maintain their newly formed organizations.

There were also generational and linguistic issues. The generation gap was particularly profound. The leadership was largely composed of cadres advanced in age, of Chinese origin, and for whom Thai was a second language. The assimilation of Sino-Thai children accelerated with the suspension of immigration in 1949. They went to Thai schools and fewer spoke the dialects of their parents or grandparents. Living in China or in surrounding camps, the historical cadres of the CPT remained unaware of these developments. Language created a political barrier for other reasons as well. English was not used frequently, even by the students, as Thailand had not been colonized, and there were very few Marxist works translated into Thai. Very few people could read Marx or understand how Marxism was plural, encompassing various trends.

Continuing the Struggle

Some students who returned from the underground movement took up activities in the parties of the traditional “political establishment” linked to industrial and banking sectors, and defended sociopolitical reform. Others turned to the Socialist Democratic Party, established legally after the SPT went underground. The National Labor Party recruited some student and labor cadres returning from the jungle and hoped to be a permanent voice for the workers for the first time in the Thai political arena, which was historically reserved for the elite classes. However, the majority of leftist militants felt that this new party would primarily serve to intervene in the union movement on behalf of various military factions.

Others returning from the jungle concentrated their energy on the publication of above-ground political magazines, with both information on current events and in-depth discussions related to the militant experience. Study groups were formed with students who were often anxious to reflect on these experiences. The crisis of the CPT paved the way to a vast ideological debate within the Thai left and provoked an effort at political reflection never witnessed before in Thailand.

Social work and the defense of democracy took on greater importance for militants desirous to engage in work for social change. New associations of volunteer work were established and oriented towards slums, children’s welfare, and the rural population. Various cooperatives appeared in the villages. These associations began to coordinate their actions more systematically. Still, in spite of a very precarious political situation in the kingdom, the era of revolutionary struggle ended, at least temporarily.

SEE ALSO: Cambodia, Communist Protests and Revolution; Mao Zedong (1893–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- Baker, C. & Pasuk P. (2005) *A History of Thailand*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bello, W., Cunningham, S., & Li, K. P. (1998) *A Siamese Tragedy: Development and Disintegration in Modern Thailand*. Oakland, CA: Food First; Bangkok: White Lotus; New York: Zed Books.
- Elliott, D. (1978) *Thailand: Origins of Military Rule*. London: Zed Books.
- Gawin, C. (1990) *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Thailand (1973–1987)*. Detroit: Cellar Book Shop.

- MacCargo, D. (Ed.) (2002) *Reforming Thai Politics*. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies.
- Marks, T. (1994) *Making Revolution: The Insurgency of the Communist Party of Thailand in Structural Perspective*. Bangkok: White Lotus.
- Ross, P. & Sinsawasadi, N. (1974) *Thailand: Student Activism and Political Change*. Bangkok: DK Book House.
- Ungpakorn, G. (Ed.) (2003) *Radicalizing Thailand: New Political Perspectives*. Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University.
- Wedel, Y. & Wedel, P. (1987) *Radical Thought, Thai Mind: The Development of Revolutionary Ideas in Thailand*. Bangkok: Assumption Business Administration College.

Thailand, Patani Malay nationalism

Herbert Docena

Muslim Malay or Patani Malay nationalism refers to the ideology or sentiment of those movements among Muslim Malays in southern Thailand which seek greater autonomy or independence from Thailand. Patani or Muslim Malays currently comprise about 2 percent of the total population of predominantly Buddhist Thailand, but they constitute approximately 80 percent of the population in the three southern provinces bordering Malaysia. These provinces were once part of the former kingdom of Patani, a then-independent state that for centuries maintained fluctuating degrees of autonomy in a tributary relationship with Siam. Patani was gradually and forcibly incorporated into Siam (renamed Thailand in 1939) beginning in the early nineteenth century against the will of its leaders and without the consent of its people. Since then, frequent and recurring attempts on the part of Malays to challenge Thai rule have posed a persistent threat to Thailand’s claim to its current territory.

Annexation

In the sixteenth century the kingdom of Siam expanded southward into Patani, deploying its navy and army to control the peninsula’s resources. Though at this time the kingdom of Patani was one of the largest and most important in the peninsula, it was relatively weaker than its expanding neighbor and ultimately, along with

other Malay states, Patani entered into a tributary relationship in which it became a vassal and Siam the suzerain.

Unlike in a direct colonial relationship, the tributary system was essentially an unequal power-sharing arrangement between states in which the vassal's ruling class submitted to the suzerain in exchange for direct rule over their subjects. Siam selected or confirmed its vassals' rulers, exacted tributes or a portion of the vassals' revenues, and demanded conscripts to fight on its side in times of war, but otherwise allowed the vassals' rulers free rein in domestic affairs. Depending on the relative balance of power between it and Siam, Patani accommodated and allied with but at other times defied and resisted Siam.

Beginning in the eighteenth century, Siam gradually replaced its suzerainty over Patani with more direct rule. In the late eighteenth century Siam's military forces conquered Patani, and Patani's autonomy began to erode. In the early years of the nineteenth century, with French and British forces consolidating their rule and expanding their colonies in that region, Siam deepened its rule over Patani and Patani began to be considered a province of Siam. By 1902 Siam had removed the remaining powers of the Patani royalty and replaced them with Thai bureaucrats who directly governed the province. In 1909 Siam and Britain agreed, without Malay consent, to partition the Malay states between themselves. The former Patani kingdom was annexed by Siam while other Malay states were incorporated into British Malaya. The move was contentious. Even Thai King Chulalongkorn acknowledged that the Malay provinces were treated as though they belonged to Thailand, though that was not true (Thanet 2007). Still, a powerful alliance ensured that Patani would remain a Thai province. Seeking to maintain a buffer between British Malay and French colonies, Great Britain consistently rejected the Patani Malays' repeated appeals for intervention. The United States also played a decisive role by pressuring Britain not to support Patani independence or incorporation into Malaya.

Assimilation

After annexing Patani, Thai rulers sought to integrate and assimilate the Muslim Malays into their conception of a Thai nation. The inten-

sity and severity by which Thai governments attempted to achieve this varied only according to their capacity to exact submission, the ideological inclination of their leaders, and the degree of resistance posed by the Malays.

The Thai monarchy has historically engaged in nation-building by coopting and manipulating the Buddhist religious hierarchy to buttress its legitimacy. Though the power of the king was curbed in 1932 with the transition from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy, the Thai nationalism founded on the king – with its myths and Buddhist rituals and symbols – did not dissolve. Instead, it morphed into a more popular version mobilized by successive regimes and eventually became more strongly identified with Thai Buddhism. Thus, with Buddhism unofficially serving as Thailand's national religion, successive Thai governments attempted to homogenize Muslim Malays, along with Chinese immigrants, hill tribes, and the Lao people in the northeast, into "proper" Thai citizens through a raft of "Thai-fication" policies that sought to change the ethnic minorities' identities and behaviors by controlling and subordinating their cultural practices and institutions.

For Malays and Thai Muslims in general, Islamic laws were replaced with Thai laws and administered by Thai judges. Malay children were forced to attend Thai primary schools, often with Buddhist Thai monks as teachers, to learn the Thai language, Buddhist morals, and Buddhist-oriented texts on history and civics. During some ultra-nationalist regimes the wearing of Malay traditional dress was forbidden. Men were required to wear trousers and tops. Women were forced to wear hats and western dress. Even the Malay practice of carrying loads on the head was proscribed; only the supposedly Thai way of carrying loads on the shoulder was allowed. Malay Muslim children were required to bow down before statues of Buddha placed in public schools. Malays could not take on Malayo-Arabic names, only Thai ones. Creating a sense of Thai-ness among the Patani has long been an enduring goal of the Thai government.

While many of these policies were eventually relaxed, the determination to assimilate the Malays into the "Thai race" persisted. When widespread Malay opposition to these policies threatened to escalate into more serious threats to the Thai state, certain policies were abandoned, only to be renewed when the opposition

defused. In 1948 snowballing protests by Malays prompted the Thai government to abandon temporarily some ultranationalist policies. By the 1960s and 1970s, however, the Thai government again required that Muslim schools use Thai as the medium of instruction, and follow the Thai-imposed curriculum which consciously stressed the supposed homogeneity of Thai culture and identity. The emphasis on Thai education was so great that at the height of the separatist rebellion from 1972 to 1976, government spending on primary education in the three southern provinces increased annually by an average of 40 percent. After having successfully pacified the rebellion by the 1980s and 1990s, Thailand's assimilation efforts continued. While Malay students could study English, French, German, and Arabic as a second language after Thai, the study of Malay remained forbidden. Malays were again encouraged to take Thai names and Malay street names were changed to Thai.

Subordination

While various Thai governments have proven willing to ease assimilationist policies and grant concessions to Malays in the cultural sphere (such as recognizing the Muslim weekend or building more mosques), they have consistently refused to concede political or administrative autonomy to Malays. When, at the height of the Malay Muslim uprising in the late 1940s, Muslim leaders issued seven demands – that 80 percent of all the government posts within the provinces be filled by local-born Malays, that all tax revenues raised in the provinces be spent in the provinces, and that Malay be considered an official language in the provinces, among others – the most that the Thai government could grant was the assurance of religious freedom for Muslims; none of the demands were met.

The Thai government consistently appointed Buddhist Thai-speaking officials, many of whom see Buddhism as a defining and essential marker of Thai-ness, to govern the Malays. The civil servants sent by the various ministries in Bangkok were almost all Thais, and many were seen as corrupt and incompetent bureaucrats dumped in the south as a sort of punishment. Locals intensely feared or resented their presence. For a long time, Malays could assume only lower-ranking posts in local government, and only 5–15 percent of these posts were held by

Muslim Malays as late as 1978. With few exceptions, virtually all of the provincial governors and their immediate subordinates, as well as other high-ranking bureaucrats, were Thais. Malays that did manage to get into the bureaucracy often lost their posts or were denied promotion. Inside government offices where ceremonies and rituals were entirely Buddhist, Malays became the subject of deliberate efforts for them to acquire “Thai hearts and manners.”

Dispossession

By annexing Patani, Thailand gained access to its resources. The area's lands, fishing grounds, forests, mineral deposits, and other resources became subject to the control of the Thai state. Most of the rubber plantations, tin-mining operations, large fishing operations, and other commercial interests are now overwhelmingly run by Buddhist Thais, ethnic Chinese Thais, or foreigners. Most of the Muslim Malays are small-scale fishers, shopkeepers, rice farmers, or rubber tappers working on small landholdings. Thus, wealth in the Malay-majority provinces is concentrated in the hands of non-Malays and the ethnic divisions coincide with the class cleavages.

Economic opportunities for Malays continue to dwindle. Since the 1960s more and more large commercial trawlers from outside the region have been fishing in the south, leaving Malay fishermen with far less catch. In 1961 the average catch was 298 kilograms of fish per hour, but by 1999 it was just 3 kilograms. Malays who have survived on communal lands and forests have been threatened by the worsening deforestation in the region as well as by state development projects that effectively fence off those lands. Gas pipelines, sewage plants, power lines, and other government projects expelled or threatened to expel families cultivating crops in what were once communal lands.

The Thai government exacerbated some of these problems by instituting resettlement programs. In the 1950s Thai Buddhists living in Kelantan, Malaysia were encouraged to settle in the southern provinces and were granted Thai citizenship as an enticement. In the 1960s it encouraged landless northeasterners to migrate to the southern provinces, often with financial assistance. On one hand, this migration of over 100,000 people was intended to quell the perceived communist threat in the impoverished and



In an attack upon a symbol of Thai repression, separatists set fire to a school in Patani province on September 10, 2007. Between 2004 and 2007, daily violence in the ongoing conflict between Patani Malay nationalists and Thai state control cost more than 2,500 lives in the Muslim-dominated south. (AFP/Getty Images)

densely populated northeastern region; on the other, the government encouraged the relocation to the south in order to “increase loyal Thai blood” in that region. Though in both cases the government intended to reduce the proportion of Muslims, the ethnic balance remained more or less constant. The resettlement programs, however, were perceived by Malays as a form of territorial invasion.

While Thailand as a whole has enjoyed sustained economic growth through the last few decades, economic well-being in the three southernmost provinces has worsened. As Thai policies have prioritized Bangkok as the focus of economic development, Thailand’s economic growth has been accompanied by an increased income gap between the rich and the poor, between the cities and the countryside. This growing inequality disparately affects Muslim Malays. If, in the past, the southernmost provinces fared better than most of rural Thailand, they are now considerably worse off by some measures. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, as Thailand’s economy surged and total poverty incidence dropped, income in the south, along with the northeast and central regions, actually declined. In 1990 the poverty line in the three provinces was more or less the same as in the northeast, conventionally considered Thailand’s poorest region; by 2000 the southern provinces had overtaken the northeast. In 1962 the south’s gross domestic product was one-fourth larger than the national average; by 1999

it was a third smaller. In 1962 household income in the southern region was one-fifth higher than the national average; in 2000 it was about one-tenth lower. In addition, compared to Buddhist Thais, Malay Muslims have lower educational attainment and higher unemployment rates.

Repression

Thailand’s efforts to integrate the Muslim Malays and to access Patani’s resources were enforced at gunpoint. Throughout their volatile tributary relationship, Siam occasionally deployed its troops to Patani to quell its defiance. During this long period, recollections of carnage, looting, and rape perpetrated by Siamese armies were imprinted in Malay folk memory. In 1902, when Siam unilaterally abrogated Patani’s vassal status and dislodged its royalty, Siam arrested and exiled those who resisted. In the late 1940s Thailand faced the real and growing possibility of losing Patani, when siding with Japan during World War II resulted in a growing large-scale Patani popular uprising. Thailand responded with massive force, including aerial bombardment. Hundreds were killed, thousands fled, and many were arrested. The region was placed under a state of emergency. Thai forces were accused of abuses and cruelty. Haji Sulong, the movement’s leading figure, was imprisoned and subsequently disappeared; many believed he was executed by the police.

From the 1950s through the 1970s armed, openly separatist and communist movements emerged. With the help of over \$3 billion in military and non-military assistance from the United States, Thailand responded with large-scale police and military operations. Even after Thailand wrote off the threat posed by separatists in the 1980s, it retained its military presence in southern provinces with a vast network of informers that enabled security forces to keep a lid on the violence.

When violence surged again in the early 2000s, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra placed the region under martial law. Emboldened by the worldwide wave of repression and curtailment of civil liberties legitimized by the US-led “war on terror,” the Thai government strengthened the hand of its security forces, allowed warrantless arrests and indefinite detentions, and tolerated torture and summary executions. Impunity reigned. In one incident in a mosque in April

2004, around 30 lightly armed and otherwise defenseless Malays, most of them young, were killed by the military. In another incident in Tak Bai in October 2004, up to 76 Malays died after Thai security forces rounded up hundreds of protesters and piled them six layers deep on top of each other in trucks. Since 2001, scores have been abducted, tortured, and disappeared. Though the Thai government has held few officials responsible and the emergency law was not revoked, new Thai Prime Minister Surayud has acknowledged the responsibility of Thai security forces in at least the Tak Bai incident, saying, "What happened in the past was mostly the fault of the state."

Response

Since Patani's incorporation into Thailand, Muslim Malays have challenged their relationship with the Thai state. At first, the Malay aristocracy and religious elites spearheaded opposition to Thai rule from 1902 through the late 1940s in what amounted to an inter-elite conflict between the Siamese and the Malay royalties for power over the Malay people. Despite their subordinate status under the Thai suzerains, the Malay ruling families had grown wealthy off the labor of Malay peasants, with only a small portion of wealth transferred to the Siamese. This ended when Siam displaced the Malay rulers and replaced them with Thai bureaucrats. After 1902, 87.5 percent of revenues went to Bangkok while the Malay rulers received 12.5 percent. Stripped of their power, the Malay rulers rebelled.

The resistance collapsed quickly. Some rulers quickly made deals with Siam in order to preserve their remaining power and those who refused to surrender were arrested and exiled. In this period, opposition to Thai rule was not founded on Malay nationalism or Islamic mobilization but on the displaced elites' desire to regain power. The Malay rulers could not appeal to an imagined Malay solidarity: in the past, the different Malay states were frequently at war with each other; at times, it was Siam's support that allowed Patani to fight her Malay neighbors. Neither did the Malay rulers appeal to anti-colonialism. In fact, the deposed rulers wished to become a British colony.

Outside the nobility, Muslim Malays resisted Thailand's successive moves to sideline Islamic

law, subordinate the Malays' religious institutions, and compel the Malays to attend Thailand's Buddhist-oriented school system, which threatened the power and interests of the Malays' religious establishment. Increasingly, religious leaders took an active role in opposition to Thai rule. In the 1940s Haji Sulong, a charismatic religious leader, organized a mass movement and soon became the symbol of Malay struggle. Sulong successfully appealed to Islam to mobilize popular support. The traditional Malay elites joined hands with the religious leaders in the hope of ruling again.

Though they succeeded in mobilizing the Muslim masses, the religious and traditional elites' demands conflicted with the interests of the mostly peasant Malays.

Armed Struggle

In time, the resistance evolved. In the 1950s and 1960s active opposition to Thai rule broadened beyond the traditional and religious elites. Tactics expanded from passive resistance and non-violent political actions to organized armed revolt. Its aims moved beyond autonomy to outright separation from Thailand.

During this period, various organizations and ideologies emerged. *Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya* (GAMPAR) was formed by exiled religious leaders and aristocrats, but was allied with the leftist Malay Nationalist Party in Malaya and called for Patani's incorporation into Malaya. The *Barisan Revolusi Nasional* (BRN) or the *National Revolutionary Front* (NRF) advocated pan-Malay nationalism, becoming the first organization that did not call for the restoration of the Patani royalty, but sought to distance itself from the traditional elites and establish a state that would bring together Malays from existing Southeast Asian states. Invoking anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism, it called for a socialist revolution to bring about "Islamic socialism," a vaguely defined concept which one spokesman claimed to be similar to Egypt under Nasser. Unlike other organizations, the BRN forged intimate relations with the Communist Party of Malaya and fought alongside guerrillas of the Communist Party of Thailand, which promised autonomy to Malays in the event that it seized state power.

Repelled by BRN's leftist positions, descendants of the former royalty and religious leaders

formed the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP) or the National Liberation Front of Patani (NLFP). The most conservative of all the groups, the BNPP shifted from espousing Malay nationalism to a more orthodox Islamic orientation. Though it called for full independence, some BRN leaders still supported the restoration of Patani royalty. Seeking to distinguish itself from the BNPP's conservatism and the BRN's socialism and expand its base, the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) instead advocated secular nationalism even as it claimed to be fighting for an Islamic republic. Deriving support from Libya and Syria and maintaining a base in Saudi Arabia, it was allegedly the most aggressive and best organized of the organizations. Many smaller groups were formed as well – by 1970, there were an estimated 20 different groups, with about 1,000 fighters.

Turn to Islam

To different degrees and in various ways many Malay groups articulated their struggle through a narrative of religious persecution. Marginalized politically, and having relatively weak ties to an explicit and unifying Malay identity, many sought refuge in religion, in the schools and mosques. Simultaneously, the Thai state, although increasingly tolerant of religious difference, maintained its efforts to dilute the Malay ethnicity and undermine it as a source of nationalism. Hence, Malays can be Thai Muslims but they cannot be Malays. In seeking to blunt their ethnicity, Thailand sharpened their religious identity.

Although some Malay organizations have spoken about establishing an Islamic republic, their struggle remained rooted in ethnicity and nationalism. The goals include a more autonomous political entity or an independent state for Malays in which they will have power over their affairs, religion being one of them. Religious leader Haji Sulong called for Malays, not any Muslims, to rule over Malays. Their fight against the Thai state has not been one between Muslims and Buddhists; other non-Malay Muslims in Thailand have not rallied to their cause. Their aspirations do not concern non-Malay Muslims and these Malay groups are not known to have links with organizations promoting regional or global pan-Islamic agendas.

Role of Peasants

The armed rebellion by Patani Malay organizations reached its height during the late 1960s and 1970s. With fragmented leadership, poor organization, and lack of mass support, the rebellion posed little threat to Thai rule and was effectively suppressed by the 1980s. Since then, the organizations have split along tactical and ideological lines. Some have disbanded. Others shifted from armed struggle to political organizing, or went underground or operated from exile. Armed separatism went into a long period of decline. Beginning in 2004, after the Thai government dissolved bureaucratic structures that had pacified the region, supported the US wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, and mounted a war on drugs in which many Muslims in the south were executed, a new wave of violence ensued. The government response to the violence included the abduction, torture, and killing of many Muslims. Consequently, the violence escalated.

Who perpetrated the violence remains in question. At one point, a Thai deputy prime minister claimed that as many as half of the violent incidents were instigated by state authorities, with only a quarter attributed to separatists. The targeting of state symbols, institutions, and structures, of Buddhist monks, teachers, and civilians, as well as of Muslims supposedly collaborating with the Thai government, seemed to point to the separatists' involvement. No group, however, has come forward officially and consistently to claim responsibility for the violence or to advance a set of political demands. The perpetrators were either unwilling or unable to articulate their goals. It is possible that various groups, possibly from a new generation with loose or no ties to the organizations of the past, are involved.

While in the past primarily nobility and the religious elites mobilized against Thai rule, the sustained insurrection since the 1960s could not have happened without the increasing participation of ordinary Malays, an overwhelming majority of whom are peasants. While peasants were involved in earlier actions, they often followed the initiatives of Malay elites. In this new period the traditional and religious elites have largely abandoned the initiative. The separatists' goals threatened their interests, many lost their following, and some found a niche within Thailand's political system. Previously, Malay peasants responded to government injustice and discrimination by avoiding

or minimizing contacts and relations with the Thai state. After World War II and more so since Thailand's economic boom of the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, state projects and capitalist enterprises have severely impacted peasants' livelihood. Malay traditions and social relations have suffered. To cope, many leave the countryside to seek employment, but in the towns and cities they experience difficulties finding work due to lack of education or the structural discrimination in the Thai Buddhist-dominated civil service. Others have fled to find work in Malaysia, leaving their families behind, but this has become more difficult as border restrictions become more stringent.

Increasingly, many Malays have found themselves in direct confrontation with the Thai state. In the 1970s some fisher folk were driven to arm themselves and shoot at trawlers illegally fishing close to the shore, only to find that the Thai police were on board the trawlers themselves, protecting their owners. They organized themselves into a coalition, demonstrated in large numbers in front of government offices, and submitted petitions, but were ignored. Many of those sitting on the government board administering fishery policy owned the very trawlers that the fisher folk wanted out of their fishing grounds. Villagers driven to live in the forests have also clashed with Thai bureaucrats and timber companies. Demonstrations against state projects have either been brutally broken up or ignored.

It is still not clear to what extent and in what ways peasants have been directly involved in violence aimed at achieving separatists' goal of breaking free from Thailand. Measuring the degree of active mass support for avowedly separatist organizations has been difficult. Though they swim in a sea of antagonism to Thai rule, it is believed that the organizations' core membership remains small. At least one survey confirmed that a sizable number of people sympathize with the separatist movements (Srisompob 2007). But whether or not they have actually joined the armed movements, it is evident that ordinary Malays have indirectly cooperated with them, or else passively refused to assist the Thai state against them. In some instances they may even have acted on their own without being directed by the organized separatists. The fisher folk, who are among those most affected by the enclosure, for example, are known to have previously received weapons

from separatists in their fight against commercial fishers, share their resentment or hostility towards the state, or else find little motivation to object to their actions.

Of those Malay peasants actually involved in the violence, it is not clear to what extent their actions are motivated by disparate resource use or nationalism, or to what degree they actually share the separatists' specific aims. Of the new wave that began in the 2000s, it has been suggested that, rather than a separatist movement, the actions of the Malays – with their appeal to folk Islam, their putative lack of organization, and their seeming aimlessness – may be more accurately characterized as a millenarian movement. While the Muslim Malays may be seeking an end to the intrusion of the Thai state and capitalists into their lives, their alternative political project remains to be articulated and heard. Like others who consider the prospects of separatism elsewhere, they face a familiar dilemma: nationalism promises deliverance from subordination but does not necessarily guarantee emancipation.

SEE ALSO: Thai Communist Party; Thailand, Popular Movements, 1980s–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Baker, C. & Phongpaichit, P. (2005) *A History of Thailand*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, D. (1994) *The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia*. London: Routledge.
- Che Man, W. K. (1990) *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian (1988) *Thai Malay Relations: Traditional Intra-Regional Relations from the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries*. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Lim Joo-Jock & Vani, S. (Eds.) (1984) *Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Melvin, N. J. (2007) Conflict in Southern Thailand: Islamism, Violence, and the State in the Patani Insurgency. *SIPRI Policy Paper* (September) 20.
- National Reconciliation Commission, Thailand (2006) *Overcoming Violence through the Power of Reconciliation*. Bangkok: National Reconciliation Commission.
- Srisompob, J. with Sobhonvasu, P. (2007) Unpacking Thailand's Southern Conflict: The Poverty of Structural Explanations. In D. McCargo (Ed.), *Rethinking Thailand's Southern Violence*. Singapore: NUS Press.
- Thanet, A. (2007) *Rebellion in Southern Thailand: Contending Histories*. Washington, DC: East-West Center.

Thailand, popular movements, 1980s–present

Pierre Rousset

During the 1980s various social movements appeared in Thailand for democracy and against capitalist globalization, including village organizations to preserve forests, peasant struggles against construction of dams, and workers' mobilizations for higher wages. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s these popular movements lacked national coordination, due to the demise of a left political party (revolutionary or reformist) with a significant national influence. The decline of the Thai communist insurrection paved the way to new conflicts within the dominant class, opening a new political cycle of resistance, which crystallized over the question of the constitution.

New Political Cycle

In the late 1970s, after five decades in power, the army maintained considerable influence. With a thousand generals, the army's presence was felt throughout society. A growing segment of the "civilian" bourgeoisie sought to diminish this influence and was also worried about the increasing economic strength of the royal family. This wing of the civilian bourgeoisie wanted its political clout to correspond to its economic power, and sought to eliminate the burdens imposed by administrative bureaucracy, red tape, commissions, and subcommissions. Seeking to open the country to foreign investments, it criticized the inefficiency of some 70 state enterprises. In unison with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, it demanded a "rationalization" of the public sector, including a number of privatizations, and an increase in the prices of public services.

The conflict within the civilian and military elite revolved around the budget and government institutions. Business pushed for the establishment of a properly parliamentary regime: the role of the Senate should be limited, military officers should no longer have the right to be elected and to take government functions. The army itself was the scene of some dissidence. The political game remained largely modeled by the military factions.

In April 1981 the "Young Turks" attempted a coup d'état. These middle-rank officers claimed to defend traditional values, being at the same time anti-communist and anti-capitalist. They dissolved their group after a final coup attempt in 1985. With the "Democratic Soldiers," for the first time in Thailand a "reformist military" current emerged. They had been, like Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, involved in the political side of counterinsurrection and concluded that communism was just a reaction to the wrongdoings of capitalism.

General Athit Kamlang-ek – strong man of the military command, right-wing populist demagogue, and close to the queen – wanted a democracy maintained under the tutelage of the military. For him, the army was the only guarantee of the general interest, while the political parties only represented particular interests. Another officer, General Chatichai Choonhavan, who became prime minister in 1988, broke off with the traditional military concept of "guided democracy" and opted for a parliamentary (but elitist) regime, closer to the will of the civil business class. He gave priority to profits above security policy. After a long political-military career (he led a coup d'état as early as 1947), he became a powerful businessman in the textile and banking industries.

Crisis of 1991–1992

"Democracy" through constitutional reforms against the military or "democracy" through military-led reforms against the political parties – the use of the word "democracy" showed the lasting impact of the 1973–6 people's mobilizations: it had become a useful catch-word to gain popular legitimacy. The 1991–2 crisis confirmed that the country was not ready to accept another dictatorship.

The army took power in February 1991 and chose a civilian as prime minister, Anand Panyarachun. The military denounced the "money politics" of the influential provincial businessmen, but compromised itself into private enrichment by negotiating juicy contracts in armaments and communications. The 1991 coup d'état revived democratic mobilizations, spearheaded by the Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD). But the king intervened to calm down the situation, ending street demonstrations. In March 1992 the pro-military party Samakkhitham won the

elections and a military junta took power. Democratic mobilizations started again and built in intensity. On May 17, 200,000 demonstrators – members of the middle class, rural migrants, workers and students, among others – marched in Bangkok, as well as in the provinces. The military junta sent in troops who opened fire: 40–60 people died during three nights of violence. On May 20 the king intervened again, this time for General Suchinda Kraprayoon, the chief of the junta, to resign and for new elections to be called in September 1992.

The 1991 coup and the bloody repression that followed dealt a severe blow to the status of the army. The general staff had to accept the principle of the “depoliticalization” of its role. The decline of the military, very sensitive during the 1990s, paved the way to neoliberal economic reforms and to the integration of the country into capitalist globalization.

Acceleration of Socioeconomic Transformations

The country changed at an accelerated rhythm. The demographic growth rate declined. The economic center of gravity swung to the towns. Bangkok became a tentacle town with more than 10 million inhabitants. The best-paid urban wage-earners and professionals began to play a stronger public role; their tastes westernized with the development of a consumer society. Women from relatively prosperous families entered massively into higher education and occupied quite a significant number of qualified jobs and responsibilities in banks, finance, and administration – but did not join the ranks of senior executives in industry and the bureaucracy. Political power remained patriarchal: in 1995 only 2 percent of village heads were women.

Asian capital came to Thailand, from Japan, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, in the form of assembling industries (automobiles, home appliances) and manufacturing of toys, textiles and garments, and information technology. Production turned more and more towards the world market. The tourist sector was in full boom. Labor became one of the main products of exportation, in particular to Middle East building sites. In 1985–95 the industrial labor force nearly doubled, reaching 5 million. This industrial boom attracted new migrants from neighboring countries. Most came from Burma and others from Vietnam, Laos,

Cambodia, and China. In 1997 the population of migrant laborers in Thailand ranged from an estimated 1–3 million. Migrants were employed in the fishing industry, fruit plantations, and sweat shops, and as domestic workers, without civic rights or social protection. By the mid-1990s women comprised half of Thai wage earners.

In the early 1980s agriculture still represented nearly half of exports, but a decade later dropped to only 10 percent. The economic importance of the peasantry quickly declined, though they remained an important demographic segment of society, composing the majority of the population until the beginning of the 2000s. The rural world lost its significance in the kingdom’s cultural imagination, while in the 1970s the countryside inspired many writers, poets, and popular singers. Urban migration became massive, especially in the Northeast where a million people a year moved to towns. With the sex tourism boom, Thailand became a center of AIDS epidemics, provoking the first deaths at the end of 1980. HIV cases were probably 600,000 in 2000.

1997 Financial Crisis

Thailand had the sad privilege of being the starting point of the 1997–8 international financial crisis. The social shock was very brutal: a ruined urban middle class, 2 million wage earners laid off right away, bankruptcies, etc. A part of the urban labor force returned to the villages. Others tried to survive in the informal sector. What was a disaster for many was a good chance for a few. Foreign investors bought bankrupted enterprises at extremely low prices. During the three years that followed the crisis, more capital entered Thailand than during the previous eleven years of booming economy. It came with the benediction of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

This was the first structural crisis of neoliberal capitalist globalization, the new mode of class domination and organization of the world market. Its political consequences included the fall of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, loss of legitimacy of neoliberal ideology, and loss of authority of its international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank in Thailand. Beyond financial speculation, this crisis revealed the significant influence of capitalist globalization to spreading social insecurity, economic precariousness, and the tyranny of the market in all

spheres of life. It also contributed to the development of new international links between social movements within the Global Justice Movement and the World Social Forum. One of the most active organizations in this process, Focus on the Global South, is based in Bangkok. People's Thailand has been an integral part of the renewal of internationalism. However, linguistic barriers – few people speak foreign languages – have meant that the integration of local popular movements into international activities is slower than in other countries.

Diversity and Convergence of Struggle

The expansion of the capitalist market and implementation of neoliberal policies in every sector of society fostered the development of a diverse array of social resistance in Thailand. While the centralization of struggles could not operate as in the 1970s (because of the defeat of the Communist Party of Thailand), new ways of converging had to be found.

The situation remained particularly difficult in unionism. At the end of the 1970s, legal unions remained essentially subservient to patronage and all “political” activities were prohibited. The noose loosened the following decade and at the end of the 1980s a few (temporary) victories were gained on issues such as social security, the minimum wage, and the privatization of public enterprises. But after the coup d'état of 1991 these favorable laws were put into question, unions were banned in public enterprises, and repression considerably hardened.

The development of free trade zones (where employers are not under the usual legal constraints) and of work at home (evaluated, at the end of the 1980s, at about 800,000 people in textile production) made the organization of workers especially difficult. The arson attack in May 1983 at the Kader Toy Factory gave a lift to protests, so big was the emotion resulting from the death of 188 employees and 500 others injured because there were no protection measures whatsoever. Struggles developed to reinforce legislation protecting the health and security of workers.

In the 1980s demographic pressure in the countryside was lessened because of migration to the cities. Nevertheless, inequalities increased between regions that had access to the urban

market and could commercialize their products (rice fields giving way to fruit and shrimp) and others hit by poverty, debt, and falling prices. This fall was particularly brutal with the devaluation of the baht following the financial crisis of 1997. Peasants then developed new forms of struggle, blocking roads to pressure the government to sustain prices and cancel debts. Faced with an unstable market, some peasants turned again to forms of cooperation and mutual aid, aiming at self-sufficiency or attempting to combine production for home-consumption, local exchanges, and the market.

The rural world also faced many other kinds of aggression in addition to the dictatorship of the market. The extension of urban and industrial zones reversed a historical trend. In the past, cultivated areas did not stop growing; now they declined. Ecologically destructive plantations like eucalyptus spread (particularly in the Northeast). Customary rights on forest use by villages were denied by big, often illegal, logging exploitation (especially at the Burmese border). Huge infrastructure projects, like dams, did not benefit local populations; on the contrary, they often deprived them of traditional resources. The “American” era of development led to an over-exploitation of natural resources. Thailand, so richly endowed with natural resources, became a country where conflicts over their use multiplied, placing into conflict the state, enterprises, and peasants over access to forest, rivers, lakes, the sea, and beyond. The villagers responded to commercial logging and overfishing through petitions to local authorities, and quasi-military operations to destroy company equipment.

New Movements

The establishment of the first non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Thailand dated back to the end of the 1960s, but at that time they were not militant. They began to radicalize and to widen their activities (on rural conditions, human rights, etc.) after the October 14, 1973 upheaval, but the repression that followed the 1976 coup d'état put a brake on their activities and forced some of their founders into exile – together with well-known personalities like Dr. Puey Ungpakorn, former governor of the Bank of Thailand and former rector of Thammasat University. The following decade, elements defending a “this-worldly” Buddhism or actions

based on local communities (the “community culture movement”) systematized criticisms of the authoritarian policies of modernization “from top to bottom” dear to the international financial institutions. This contributed to the building of a new activist culture and influenced the subsequent evolution of NGOs.

The activities of NGOs expanded again during the 1980s: they started to intervene on questions of the environment and were more involved in social rights and working conditions in industrial zones. They were considerably reinforced in 1985–7 when they occupied the space left vacant by the CPT crisis, and played a significant role in the democratic mobilization of 1992.

The NGO movement had a strong identity, but it was not politically homogeneous. There were significant differences of orientation between associations, especially on the question of relationships with the state. In the words of researcher Dulcey Simpkins, some NGOs were more “collaborationist” (without giving to this term the very pejorative meaning it can have) and others were more “autonomist” – they could look for the “patronage” necessary to their legal registration or on the contrary renounce it. Some NGOs actively supported social struggles, others were para-governmental bodies, and others limited themselves to charitable activities.

In the 1990s the left debated NGOs’ role. Could they claim to represent the population and become a force in themselves, or should they support more socially representative and rooted social movements? Should they try to build a new consensus on development with the administration and private companies, or should they facilitate the expression of social radicalism? Did they gain an unjustified power over people’s organizations because of their international and media links, and because of their control of important financial flows?

Various types of people’s organizations and social movements also formed in the 1990s. Independently from submissive unions, some informal “labor clubs” appeared in the popular suburban areas of Bangkok. Centers of initiatives like the Thai Labor Campaign, with links to international solidarity networks, helped to revive campaigns against privatization and for the reinforcement of social legislation and to popularize struggles engaged in factories (e.g., Thai Durable Factory, Almond Workers).

Several peasant movements were reconstituted in the beginning of the 1990s, like the Small Scale Farmers of the Northeast or the Northern Farmers Network.

In this framework, feminist movements seemed strangely discreet. To be sure, there were programs of feminist studies in the universities and quite a number of feminist associations. Many struggles, especially in factories, were initiated by female workers. Women activists often played a key role in information, local radio, and coordination of militant unions, social movements, NGOs, and community organizations. Feminist movements prepared for the Fourth World Conference on Women organized in Beijing by the United Nations in September 1995, but the mobilization ended with the conference. After the 1997–8 financial crisis a new network was created to favor multi-level and multi-sector coordination of organizations: the People Alliance for the Advancement of Women. This alliance aimed at the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, and at the utilization of the clause of the 1997 Thai constitution allowing the petitioning of parliament by collecting 50,000 signatures.

However, the visibility of the feminist struggle did not correspond to the actual participation of women in mobilizations. Due to the absence of a feminist movement, as such, there was great difficulty in linking women’s specific demands on violence, equal wages, and legislation on the family to global issues and economic policies. Those who spoke in the media were mostly individual personalities from relatively well-to-do backgrounds whose vision of feminism was quite different from the popular classes of women. After the September 2006 coup d’état, a new network came to light but with an English name (“We Move”), a choice with a strong middle-class connotation.

The legacy of the 1970s was not totally lost. Militants who had lived through the struggle of this radical decade – or even who had been members of the CPT – often played an active role in the emergence of new movements. They had an experience of political work both in villages and popular suburbs. In the 1980s it helped the organization of local resistance and, most importantly, to connect urban and rural networks. Opposition to the building of dams, in particular,

has been an occasion to bring together into a common struggle a great variety of solidarity networks. This process began as early as 1982, against the construction of the Nam Choan Dam. This resistance movement included residents of the villages directly affected, progressive militants and sympathizers from the neighboring towns, Thai NGOs and international ecological groups, monks and singers, journalists and academics. Thus, a growing number of links were made between social sectors.

In the 1990s the struggle against the Pak Mun Dam took on national dimensions with a march to Bangkok and a protest camp in front of government house. This hydroelectric dam was built in 1994. It blocked the migration of fish, provoking a drastic reduction of stock for the local community living upstream (more than 20,000 people). They had opposed the construction of the dam since 1990 and later sought to shut it down, pursuing the struggle for years. On March 23, 1999, 5,000 villagers began a permanent occupation of the site. In June 2001 the government decided temporarily to reopen the sluice gates. It was an important victory, but in spite of an impact study which proved the critics of the dam right, the sluices were closed again in November 2002.

The establishment of the Assembly of the Poor on December 10, 1995 (International Human Day) gave a permanent framework to these dynamics of convergence. It built a loose network linking locally rooted activist groups without central leaders and coordinated by a minimal secretariat. The social movement was initiated by this Assembly much more than by NGOs. The Assembly of the Poor primarily included rural movements from the North and the Northeast, but also welcomed fishing communities from the South and a few labor organizations. It did not represent all peasant organizations, far from that, for its establishment was an outcome of the division within these movements. Those who represented a peasantry with relatively stable living conditions aimed at defending their income by developing, in particular, political lobbying. On the other hand, those who participated in the Assembly represented sectors living in precariousness: they fought for the securitization of access to land and forests, against the construction of dams, etc. The flexible way in which the Assembly's network functioned represented a break from both the "centralist" tradition of the

CPT and the "lobbyist" traditions of organizations operating through clientelist linkages.

The Pak Mun Declaration was issued on December 14, 1995, four days after the creation of the Assembly, in the village of Dan Kao (province of Ubon Rachathani in the Northeast). The poor spoke to the leaders of the country and to public opinion: "The people must set up the country's development direction. The people must be the real beneficiaries of development. And the poor must participate in decision-making involving development projects that will affect them." The Assembly published a 125-point action program. It helped to link local demands to global stakes. It also reflected new relationships (socioeconomic and cultural) between the countryside and cities, provoked by the commercialization of agriculture and village-town migrations. Often, the rural cadres of the movement had temporarily worked in workers' suburbs or as migrants in the Middle East, or had been teachers.

The Assembly also gave new life to forms of struggle successfully tested in the early 1990s – marches, "invasions," and occupations that received important media coverage for the struggles. In 1996 the Assembly organized a spectacular demonstration in Bangkok. The following year it did it again, gathering more than 20,000 people and occupying the surroundings of the seat of government for 99 days. The encirclement ended after the Chavalit government acceded to some demands.

The victory was only temporary. The state reneged on its pledge after a change of government and the accession of Chuan Leekpai to the premiership. The repression was severe and the movement responded by recentering its action on local struggles more than central mobilizations. The Assembly of the Poor's model of organizing has been questioned by activists, and it was not a panacea. But the Assembly considerably renewed the militant experience of the social movements.

Crisis of Democracy

At the turn of the century it looked as if the army no longer wished to play an open political role in the kingdom. The coup d'état of September 19, 2006 proved that this was not so. It revealed how deeply Thai democracy was in crisis after the Thaksin years.

Thaksin Shinawatra was linked both with provincial businessmen and heavyweights from Bangkok's bourgeoisie. His election as prime minister in 2001 heralded a new step toward a wheeler-dealer style of parliamentary regime. It seemed that the civilian bourgeoisie wished to free itself from the traditional compromises with the Palace and the army and exercise directly political power, but the coup d'état of 2006 was a severe reminder that neither the royal clan nor the military was ready to lose its privileges.

Thaksin knew well the importance of the army. He placed trusted people in key positions. He leant on it to pursue a policy of repression against irredentist Muslim movements in the South. Before becoming a politician, he was a businessman who had built a fortune and an empire in telecommunication with licenses and concessions obtained from the military and the government. After the 1997 financial crisis, he judged that it was time to reform the system. He was not hit by this crisis because the service sector in which he had invested was protected from international competition by state licenses. He created his own party, the Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love the Thais), and strengthened links between business and politics.

Thaksin did not content himself with offering political levers to businessmen. He developed a nationalist and populist profile, relying on the unpopularity of the IMF-imposed economic reforms. With the help of his clientelist networks in the North and the Northeast, he consolidated a rural mass base, implementing efficient social programs in the countryside. In the name of the fight against drugs, he allowed the police to summarily shoot down alleged traffickers: 1,200 people were assassinated in such a way in 2003 alone.

Thaksin's populist policy insured him a lasting electoral success. In 2005 his party won an unprecedented 377 of the 500 seats in parliament. But he implemented a neoliberal program of integration into capitalist globalization. He initiated a bilateral free trade agreement with China and attempted to do the same with the United States. The inner contradictions of his policy became obvious. His authority crumbled around three issues. First, resistance to neoliberal policies strengthened when Thaksin accelerated talks with the United States on the free trade agreement: on April 9, 2006, in Chiangmai, around 10,000

demonstrators tried to penetrate into the building where negotiations were being held between Thai and American representatives.

Second, from the end of the 1990s various armed Islamic resistance movements reconstituted in the provinces near Malaysia. They sometimes had the same name as in the 1970s – like the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) – but the cadres and the ideology had changed: there were no more socialist references, which were often replaced by fundamentalist influences.

Third, the repressive policy of the Thaksin government in the three provinces of the far South, where the majority of the population is Muslim, led to a bloody dead end. Murders and massacres became frequent. The behavior of the governmental armed forces raised a public outcry, as when, in the region of Tak Bai, the army transported 1,300 persons under such terrible conditions (piled on top of one another) that at least 79 of them died of suffocation. Rebellion intensified and Thaksin recommended summary executions, declared a state of emergency, and gave full powers to the military. His policy became more and more unpopular and the Palace imposed the nomination of General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, a Muslim, at the head of the army. The general staff distanced itself from the prime minister.

Thaksin took advantage of two terms in office to enrich himself and his friends in a shameless way. In 2006 he decided to sell his industrial empire Shin Corp. to the telecommunications holding company Temasek, controlled by the Singaporean state. Through a secret company in a tax haven and by means of a transfer of ownership to his children, he evaded Thai regulations and did not pay a single baht in tax on the sale. This became another enormous scandal.

From January 2006 mobilizations multiplied in Bangkok to demand the resignation of the prime minister. By tens of thousands, intellectuals, the urban middle class, and members of the Democrat Party demonstrated in Bangkok. Nevertheless, Thaksin won again in the April elections: his party received 16 million votes against 10 million abstentions. However, as opposition seats were not issued (due to a boycott), parliament could not be convened. The king intervened on television to declare with an unusual straightforwardness that the elections were not democratic. The Constitutional Court invalidated

the ballot. New elections were planned, which Thaksin would have probably won again. He could also hope to reinforce his control of the military hierarchy on the occasion of the October 1 promotions. Just before this date, a putsch put an end to his ambitions.

The coup d'état of September 2006 took place without a single shot being fired. It enjoyed the support of Thailand's urban public opinion and provoked only very mild criticisms internationally. The coup was nonetheless a grave event: it meant the political comeback of the army and it sanctioned a structural crisis of democracy. By dint of wheeler-dealing and nepotism, politicians had discredited the parliamentary regime, and Thailand became one of a growing number of countries to reconstitute themselves under regimes of more or less military power, endangering the fundamental democratic freedoms gained during the 1990s.

Thai progressives split over the question of the coup d'état. Many militants regarded the military as the lesser of two evils. Others immediately denounced the return to power of the military. Thai popular movements have not been able to define their own political answer to the crisis, independently from the moves of the Palace and the general command. Beyond tactical issues, what was at stake was the capacity of progressive forces to act politically. This issue was largely eluded after the trauma of the 1970s. In reaction to the authoritarianism of the CPT, many of the best NGOs and associations became autonomist and localist, having in that sense an anarchist vision. The dominant radical currents were "movementists," whether consciously or not. Very few militants raised the issue of rebuilding one (or several) radical parties, or reflected on what could be the relationships between such parties and the social movements, to avoid the authoritarian model of the CPT. The 1980–90 generation did not have a historical "founding experience" of the scope experienced in the 1970s, and thus lacked a common framework of collective politicization.

The coup d'état of 2006 could have plunged Thai progressive movements into crisis. It did not happen. In spite of everything, the first Thailand Social Forum was held as planned in November 2006. And it was a success.

SEE ALSO: Charusathira, Prapas (1912–1997); Thai Communist Party; Thailand, Patani Malay Nationalism

References and Suggested Readings

- Baker, C. (2000) Thailand's Assembly of the Poor: Background, Drama, Reaction. *South East Asia Research* 8, 1. London: SOAS, University of London.
- Baker, C. & Phongpaichit, P. (2004) *Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.
- Baker, C. & Phongpaichit, P. (2005) *A History of Thailand*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bello, W., Cunningham, S., & Li, K. P. (1998) *A Siamese Tragedy: Development and Disintegration in Modern Thailand*. Oakland, CA: Food First; Bangkok: White Lotus; London: Zed Books.
- Boonyarattanasoontorn, J. & Chutima, G. (Eds.) (1995) *Thai NGOs: The Continuing Struggle for Democracy*. Bangkok: Thai NGO Support Project.
- Brown, A. (2004) *Labour Politics and the State in Industrializing Thailand*. London: Routledge Curzon.
- Connors, M. (2003) *Democracy and National Identity in Thailand*. London: Routledge Curzon.
- Handley, P. (2006) *The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol Adulyadej*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- MacCargo, D. (Ed.) (2002) *Reforming Thai Politics*. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies.
- Mills, M. B. (1999) *Thai Women in the Global Labor Force*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Missingham, B. (2003) *The Assembly of the Poor: From Local Struggles to National Protest Movement*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.
- Phongpaichit, P. (1999) *Civilizing the State: State, Civil Society and Politics in Thailand*. Amsterdam: Wertheim Memorial Lecture.
- Ungpakorn, G. (Ed.) (2003) *Radicalizing Thailand: New Political Perspectives*. Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University.
- World Commission on Dams (2000) *Pak Mun Dam, Mekong River Basin, Thailand*. Cape Town: WCD.

Than Tun, Thakin (1911–1968)

Justin Corfield

The leader of the Communist Party of Burma from 1945 until his death in 1968, Thakin Than Tun was a longstanding Burmese leftist politician and activist. He studied at the Teachers' Training School in Rangoon and then worked as a school teacher. Influenced by Marxism from an early age, in 1936 he joined the Dobama Asiayone (We Burmans Association), which was allied to Ba Maw's Sinyetha (Poor Man's Party).

As a Burmese nationalist, Than Tun gained the honorific title *Thakin* (Master), a reflection on the term by which the British liked to be called.

A colleague of U Nu, he circulated Burmese-language translations of some Marxist books and associated with the retired left-wing British intellectual J. S. Furnivall. Than Tun sought to diminish the influence of Indian businessmen in the country, and in his early teachings urged the Burmese to regain control over economic life in Burma, not just from the British but also from other foreign interests.

In 1940 Than Tun joined Aung San, the leading Burmese nationalist, on a visit to India where they established contacts with important Indian politicians. On their return, Than Tun was held in jail by the British along with U Nu, U Soe, Ba Maw, and others – some of whom had been arrested when Than Tun was still in India.

While in Insein prison, in July 1941 Than Tun and Thakin Soe wrote what became known as the “Insein Manifesto.” They felt that world fascism was the biggest threat to the world, arguing for an alliance with the Soviet Union. However, in spite of this, Than Tun served as minister of land and agriculture in the pro-Japanese government of Ba Maw. In this position he made a fortune, and this brought him into contact with a wealthy timber merchant. Soon afterwards he married the merchant’s daughter, Khin Gyi. Her sister, Khin Kyi, soon afterwards married the Burmese nationalist leader Aung San.

The influential Than Tun used his position in the government to supply information to U Soe and cooperated with the British who returned to Burma through the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League. In 1945 the Communist Party of Burma was established, and, although not present at the first meeting, Than Tun became the leader of the party, which cooperated with Aung San, although a breakaway group under U Soe formed the Red Flag Communist Party.

After independence on January 4, 1948, U Nu became the first prime minister of the Union of Burma – Aung San and some senior cabinet ministers having been assassinated in July of the previous year. Than Tun organized a civil disobedience campaign and orders were given for his arrest on March 28. He fled the capital, Rangoon (Yangon), and launched a guerilla war with the communists from the jungle for many years. They tried to negotiate with U Nu but failed; and after the establishment of the military government in 1962, they also tried to reach an accommodation with Ne Win, but also failed. On September 24, 1968, Than Tun was assassinated by a subordinate who had hoped to win Ne

Win’s favor. His widow then moved to Rangoon and lived with her sister until her death in 2001. During that time she lived in a house in the compound where Aung San Suu Kyi was regularly held under house arrest from the 1990s.

SEE ALSO: Aung San (1915–1947); Burma, Democracy Movement; Burma, National Movement against British Colonial Rule; Nu, U (1907–1995); Soe, Thakin (1906–1989)

References and Suggested Readings

- Butwell, R. (1963) *U Nu of Burma*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Lintner, B. (1990) *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma*. New York: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program.
- Wintle, J. (2007) *Perfect Hostage: A Life of Aung San Suu Kyi*. London: Hutchinson.

Thelwall, John (1764–1834)

Steve Poole

John Thelwall rose to prominence in England during the politically volatile 1790s as a highly influential orator for the proto-democratic London Corresponding Society (LCS). He had already produced literary work critical of empire and the slave trade, as well as an excursion into history, travel, and philosophy in *The Peripatetic* (1793). By 1794, Thelwall was drafting universal suffragist policy resolutions and public addresses for the LCS, and in April appeared as principal speaker at an outdoor meeting of 2,000 plebeian reformers at Chalk Farm.

Within a month, together with 11 other prominent LCS organizers, he was arrested, imprisoned in the Tower, and charged with high treason by a ministry that had convinced itself that LCS plans to call a national convention of delegates might spark a revolutionary confrontation, overturn the constitution, and depose the monarchy. Neither Thelwall nor any of his co-defendants was convicted, earning themselves the disdainful soubriquet “acquitted felons” from Secretary of State for War William Wyndham.

Thelwall was the only defendant to throw himself forcefully back into the reform struggle after his release, his republicanism undented. He resumed political lectures to packed houses in London and published them in his own weekly journal, *The Tribune*. He published the

lengthy and uncompromising trial defense his counsel had forbidden him to deliver in court as *The Natural and Constitutional Rights of Britons* (1795). He took a leading oratorical role in a series of outdoor public meetings called by the LCS in the autumn of 1795 and which, following a crowd attack on George III's coach, prompted the immediate passage of two "Gagging Acts" (1796), aimed specifically at silencing Thelwall.

Despite repeated interference from government spies, agents provocateurs, and loyalist mobs, Thelwall traveled the country in 1796–7, lecturing for provincial reform societies and protecting himself from prosecution by disguising political rhetoric with historical allegory. Like Thomas Paine, Thelwall rejected constitutional foundation myths and was careful not to locate abstract natural rights in accidents of precedent. Thelwall's most significant theoretical work was *The Rights of Nature Against the Usurpations of Establishments* (1796), a treatise which advanced a sustained critique of commercial monopoly and the damaging effects upon liberty of the social inequalities produced by political economy. Between 1818 and 1821, he edited a pro-reform weekly, *The Champion*, and remained a professional lecturer on political and historical subjects for the Lyceum movement until his death in 1834.

SEE ALSO: London Corresponding Society; Paine, Thomas (1737–1809)

References and Suggested Readings

- Claeys, G. (Ed.) (1995) *The Politics of English Jacobinism: Writings of John Thelwall*. Pennsylvania: Penn State Press.
- Poole, S. (Ed.) (2009) *John Thelwall: Radical Romantic and Acquitted Felon*. London: Pickering & Chatto.
- Scrivener, M. (2001) *Seditious Allegories: John Thelwall and Jacobin Writing*. University Park: Penn State Press.
- Thompson, E. P. (1994) Hunting the Jacobin Fox. *Past and Present* 142: 94–140.

Thistlewood, Arthur (1774–1820) and the Cato Street Conspiracy

Christopher Frank

Arthur Thistlewood was a British radical best known for leading the Cato Street Conspiracy, a botched plot to assassinate members of the

Cabinet in 1820. Thistlewood was born in 1774 near Topholme, in Lincolnshire, England. His father was a prosperous farmer who paid to have Thistlewood educated as a land surveyor. This work was not to his liking, so he joined the army and served in the West Indies. He later traveled to the United States and France, where he was greatly influenced by revolutionary ideas and became committed to the overthrow of the British government and the creation of a more just and equitable society. In 1808 Thistlewood married Susan Wilkinson, a woman who shared his revolutionary ideas. Three years later they moved to London, and it was not long after that Thistlewood joined the Society of Spencean Philanthropists, a group of radical men who met regularly to discuss politics and revolution.

This organization was inspired by Thomas Spence, a bookseller and teacher, who between 1792 and his death in 1814 produced radical books, pamphlets, and the journal *Pigs Meat*. He was imprisoned in 1794 and 1801 under the suspension of habeas corpus, and was regularly harassed by police. Spence advocated remaking society based on equality by ending private property and redistributing land. After his death, his followers formed the Society of Spencean Philanthropists. Almost from the beginning, government spies heavily infiltrated the group. These informants gave regular reports to the Home Office about Thistlewood and fellow Spencean James Watson.

Police spy John Castle reported to the government that on December 2, 1816, at the second of three mass meetings planned at Spa Fields, the Spenceans were planning to overthrow the government by encouraging rioting, looting gunsmiths' shops, and attacking the Tower of London and the Bank of England. Magistrates dispersed the meeting with 80 police officers and rounded up four Spencean leaders, including Thistlewood, who was arrested while attempting to board a ship for America with his family. Thistlewood, James Watson, Thomas Preston, and John Hopper were charged with high treason. At the trial, however, Watson's defense counsel was able to discredit the evidence against Castle with the jury, which acquitted Watson, forcing the government to drop the charges against the others.

This close brush with the hangman's noose did not temper Thistlewood's commitment to revolutionary change. He wrote angry letters

to the government, demanding that he be reimbursed for the tickets to America he and his family had been prevented from using by his arrest. When he received no reply, Thistlewood challenged Home Secretary Lord Sidmouth to a duel, which led to him being arrested for breach of the peace and landed him in prison. This experience, as well as the Peterloo Massacre and the passage of the Six Acts, which deemed any meeting calling for radical reform an act of treason and conspiracy, heightened his anger against the government.

In February 1820 government *agent provocateur* George Edwards alerted Thistlewood to an article in the *New Times* stating that the entire Cabinet would be dining at the home of the Earl of Harrowby, Lord President of the Council on February 23, 1820. Thistlewood, with the support of some London shoemakers and silk weavers, planned to assassinate the entire Cabinet as they sat down to dine, and then parade through the streets with ministerial heads upon pikes in order to incite the city. They planned to proclaim a provisional republic with Thistlewood as president. Edwards reported the plot in its entirety to the government, which had placed the advertisement in the *New Times*.

On February 23, when the conspirators met in a hayloft on Cato Street to prepare for the assassination, a dozen police officers descended upon them. Thistlewood killed an officer with his sword and escaped along with three others out a back window, but was soon arrested. Eleven men, including Thistlewood, were charged with high treason, but two had their charges dropped in return for testifying against the others. On April 28, 1820 Arthur Thistlewood was found guilty of high treason and sentenced to death. On May 1, 1820 he was executed at Newgate Prison, declaring, "I desire all here to remember that I die in the cause of liberty."

Thistlewood and the Cato Street conspirators have been described by different historians as "mad-cap" or "pathetic," but it is noteworthy that the British government did not view them that way. Not long after the arrest of the conspirators there was an attempted rising in Glasgow, and another two in Yorkshire. Thistlewood's revolutionary activities occurred against the backdrop of the March of the Blanketeers, the Luddite disturbances, the revelations of "Oliver the Spy," the Peterloo Massacre, and the passage of the Six Acts and repeated suspension of habeas corpus.

Between 1816 and 1820 the British government paid significant numbers of spies and informants and resorted to increasingly drastic measures to deal with radicals.

SEE ALSO: Hunt, Henry "Orator" (1773–1835); Luddite Riots in Nottingham; Peterloo Massacre, 1819; Spence, Thomas (1750–1814)

References and Suggested Readings

- Johnson, D. (1974) *Regency Revolution: The Case of Arthur Thistlewood*. London: Compton Russell.
- Milsome, J. (1970) Arthur Thistlewood and the Cato Street Conspiracy. *Contemporary Review* 217: 151–4.
- Stanhope, J. (1962) *The Cato Street Conspiracy*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Thompson, E. P. (1963) *The Making of the English Working Class*. London: Penguin.
- Turner, M. (1999) *British Politics in an Age of Reform*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Wilkinson, G. T. (1972) *An Authentic History of the Cato Street Conspiracy: With the trials at Large of the Conspirators for High Treason and Murder*. New York: Arno Press.

Thompson, Edward Palmer (E. P.) (1924–1993)

Bryan D. Palmer

Edward Palmer (E. P.) Thompson was a historian, dissident communist, and peace activist. One of the English-speaking world's finest social historians and a lifelong campaigner for human rights and critic of powerful elites, he fits easily in few preconceived understandings of radicalism. Reared in a household steeped in the proselytizing zeal of Methodist missionaries, Thompson himself was a dissident atheist. With an American mother and an English father, his origins were unmistakably internationalist, yet he would often mistakenly be associated with a narrow parochialism.

Overshadowed in youth by his brother Frank, who had precocious talents as a poet and an early mastery of languages, Edward grew up feeling very much the intellectual inferior. The two brothers nevertheless grew especially close in the mid- to late 1930s, both gravitating to the radicalism of the period, drawn to the causes of the Spanish Civil War and anti-fascism. They

joined the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in 1939 and 1942, and both fought in World War II – Edward as a tank troop commander in Italy and Frank in a variety of roles. Frank was parachuted behind enemy lines, and it is possible that elements of the British military with few sympathies for the radical and revolutionary impulse of popular resistance to fascism abandoned him. The Nazis captured and executed Frank. His last act was a clenched-fist salute in the name of the Partisan Fatherland Front. Some of E. P. Thompson's earliest writings, as well as his last published book, would commemorate his martyred brother.

With World War II over, Thompson lived for a time in Yugoslavia, where he was part of a youth brigade building a railway line. One of his co-workers was a Young Communist League member, Dorothy Towers. The two met at Cambridge, and by the end of 1945 they were living together, marrying in 1948. For almost 50 years, Edward and Dorothy Thompson were partners in an amazing array of movements and political causes. They combined to influence decisively the field of social history through their personalities, temperaments, and complementing styles.

Settling in Halifax, Yorkshire, the couple worked as communists, raised a family of three children (Ben, Kate, and Mark), and lived on Edward's meager annual salary of £425 as an adult education tutor in extra-mural studies at the University of Leeds, as well as Dorothy's part-time employment as a sociological researcher. It was in this period that Thompson began to research the life of William Morris. Published in 1955, the first edition of Thompson's 800-page *William Morris: Romantic to Revolutionary* betrayed no hint of his growing disillusionment with orthodox Communist Party political practice – what he went on to call Stalinism.

At the death of Stalin in 1953, as Khrushchev's revelations of the "Great Leader's" crimes and growing opposition movements in Soviet Eastern and Central European countries unfolded, the CPGB was tense with a questioning dissidence. At its head were Thompson and a historian colleague, John Saville. In defiance of the party, they published a mimeographed journal, the *Reasoner*, in 1956. This act ultimately led to their expulsion from the CPGB. Ten volumes of a co-edited journal, the *New Reasoner*, followed. Thompson elaborated his

discontents with Stalinism in writings on socialist humanism that resonated with the late 1950s and early 1960s birth of a transatlantic new left. Thompson edited one of the first collections of writings from this political mobilization, *Out of Apathy* (1960), a book heralded by the American sociologist C. Wright Mills.

For Thompson, whose clarity of thought always sharpened in polemical rejoinder, the new left would promise much but fracture early. Thompson invested much in mass mobilizations, such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), and in researching the origins of the English labor movement. Yet a younger generation of new leftists, of which Perry Anderson was arguably the most prominent, was increasingly turning away from the resources of a national culture to champion an abstract and less politically engaged Marxism. It leaned less on organization and more on theory; it looked far more in the direction of Parisian Left Bank discourses than to the values, moral resiliency, and historical example of homegrown class struggles. In part, the two perspectives were a cause of the British new left's split that saw Anderson found the *New Left Review*, essentially an amalgam of two publications: the *New Reasoner* and the *Universities and Left Review*. The new direction Thompson, Saville, and others chose not so much to oppose as to counter and supplement, with the founding of the *Socialist Register* in 1964.

Ironically, the result of this rupture would be, in Eric Hobsbawm's words, a volcano of a book. In 1963, Thompson published *The Making of the English Working Class*, gaining decades of international acclaim and galvanizing new approaches to class struggle in North America in the 1960s and 1970s. Remaining central to debates over historical method into the age of postmodernism in the late 1980s and 1990s, *Making* took on increasing salience in historical writing in Asia and Latin America well into the twentieth century. Thompson showed with argumentative passion and detailed empirical recovery that workers drew on their own resources and human agency to make themselves, as they were also forged in the determining crucible of change associated with industrial capitalism.

One of the most important books of historical reconceptualization published in the last half of the twentieth century, Thompson's *Making* did nothing to lessen the divide in the

new left. Collaboration with Raymond Williams and others in the *May Day Manifesto, 1968* offered a statement of continued engagement, but Thompson was undeniably on the margins of a second new left mobilization that accented youth and new fashions of Marxist thought.

For a time Thompson moved more decisively into historical research. He helped to found, and taught successfully at, Warwick University's Centre for the Study of Social History in the late 1960s. Stimulating graduate students no doubt offered him much, but Thompson yearned to write more and teach less. In the aftermath of a student campus revolt, Thompson resigned to take up full-time writing in the 1970s.

That decade saw his immersion in historical projects initiated in his Warwick years and associated with research on eighteenth-century plebeian culture, in which time and work discipline, the moral economy of the crowd, and crime and punishment figured prominently. Fighting his way back into politics with his pen, Thompson also wrote relentlessly on the inadequacies of certain tendencies in Marxist theory and published wide-ranging political commentary in British journals such as *New Society* and *New Statesman*. Convinced that the horizon of dissident political possibility was shrinking, Thompson opposed the power of a menacing statism that undermined democratic rights and practices.

Two books were nearing completion as the 1970s ended: a pioneering Thompson reinterpretation of eighteenth-century plebeian culture; and a radical revision of the meaning of William Blake, Morris's predecessor as the romantic critic of early capitalism. Both studies were shelved as Thompson became convinced in the late 1970s and early 1980s that a renewed and technologically out-of-control global arms race threatened nuclear annihilation in an age overshadowed by the menace of "Star Wars."

Thompson was soon Britain's, and some argue the world's, leading campaigner for nuclear disarmament. A 1980 pamphlet, *Protest & Survive*, sold 50,000 copies in a single year. As one of the growing nonaligned peace movement's leaders, Thompson transformed himself into a fastidious disarmament researcher, a prolific arms race writer, and the European Nuclear Disarmament (or END) campaign's most ardent platform speaker. From Berkeley to Budapest, Thompson mounted podiums and met in small enclaves,

encouraging peace advocates in Britain and America, while also working with independent peace protesters in Hungary's Peace Group for Dialogue, Czechoslovakia's Charter 77, and Poland's Solidarity.

All of this registered. By 1986, the threat of nuclear war lessened. Nevertheless, the physical toll on Thompson had been great. His immune system weakened, he succumbed to a plethora of physical afflictions. The writing he wanted to finish was more and more difficult to see through to its proper conclusion. Hospitalized for much of 1987, he managed to get back to his studies of Blake and the eighteenth century with difficulty, while, with the help of Dorothy, he was determined to organize his manuscripts. *Customs in Common* (1991) and *Witness Against the Beast: William Blake and the Moral Law* (1993) were completed before Thompson died in his garden at his Wick Episcopi, Worcester, home on August 28, 1993. *Beyond the Frontier: The Politics of a Failed Mission, Bulgaria, 1944* (1997), Thompson's study of his brother's death, was published posthumously, with Dorothy playing a decisive role in transforming an incomplete draft and research notes into a published text. A collection of Thompson's poetry also appeared after his death, in 1999.

E. P. Thompson was the perennial objector, opposing capitalism and its rapaciousness; Stalinism and its deforming intellects and initiatives; the mendacious state; the nuclear threat to humanity. Thompson spent his life opposing the entire corpus of thought that blinds us from seeing men and women as whole human beings, capable of making the collective lot of all so much better than the select few seem to want to allow. Thompson wrote with passion, with polemical zest, and with a politics of unrivaled feeling for what men and women could become. In the history of world revolution and protest, E. P. Thompson's voice was one that mattered and was never silenced.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Campaign, Britain; Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Blake, William (1757–1827); Charter 77; Morris, William (1834–1896); Solidarność (Solidarity); Williams, Raymond Henry (1921–1988)

References and Suggested Readings

Anderson, P. (1980) *Arguments within English Marxism*. London: Verso.

- Hobsbawm, E. (1996) Edward Palmer Thompson, 1924–1993. *Proceedings of the British Academy* 90: 521–39.
- Kaye, H. J. & McClelland, K. (Eds.) (1990) *E. P. Thompson: Critical Perspectives*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Palmer, B. D. (1994) *E. P. Thompson: Objections and Oppositions*. London: Verso.
- Thompson, E. P. (1963) *The Making of the English Working Class*. London: Penguin.

Tiananmen Square protests, 1989

Michael J. Thompson

The Tiananmen Square protests and the violent government crackdown on June 4, 1989 – known in China as the “June 4” movement – represent one of the most important political episodes in modern Chinese history. Indeed, although the epicenter of the protests and the crackdown itself occurred at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, major protests occurred in many large cities in China. The protests should therefore genuinely be seen as a movement and not as a series of isolated protests. Although there was universal condemnation of the crackdown in the West, the origins and aims of the protests themselves have remained ambiguous to many western observers.

The movement was a real attempt at changing the political and cultural dimensions of Chinese society. In this sense, it was a legitimate extension of the protest movements that began to spring up in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The most important among these movements was the “May 4th” movement of 1919. This was a movement of students, writers, and intellectuals who sought to modernize China by adopting the powers of modern science, but also through an adoption of democracy and a republican form of government. Chinese culture had always given primacy to intellectuals as critics of state power. Confucian ethics taught that an essential part of the vocation of the intellectual in society consisted of the duty to point out the moral wrongs of political leaders, to point the way toward a more humane, enlightened form of ruling for the happiness of the people. This tradition continued through the twentieth century, from the May 4th movement through Tiananmen

Square, which was also motivated first by the actions and ideas of intellectuals and then taken to a higher stage of political activity by student groups and other organizations. How this happened is a complex story, but it can be best understood as a reaction of ideas against the entrenched institutions of the Chinese Communist Party and its attempts to suppress the democratic interests and tendencies of an emerging civil society, itself a product of the economic reforms of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Social Reform and the Intellectual Elite

The roots of the 1989 protests reach back to the ideological struggles and debates that emerged in the years accompanying the rise to power of Deng Xiaoping in 1978. China had just emerged from perhaps the most disruptive and chaotic period in its history. The Cultural Revolution (1966–76) had left Chinese society and its institutions in virtual shambles, and after Mao’s death in 1976, it became clear that China had to follow new paths if the aim of developing and modernizing the country was to be realized. Since 1949, China’s political system has been a Leninist system, characterized by the centrality of party power over all aspects of political and social life. For its part, China’s Communist Party has always had as its primary focus the modernization of the country: economic development, the development of modern technology, its emergence as a world player economically and militarily, and so on. But under Mao’s control, this power was severely abused, and China’s development goals had been taken far off course. Upon Deng’s assumption of power, it became a paramount concern among many intellectuals and party members to try to put some limits on party power and control. But a discontinuity between party officials and the democratic ideas of the new intellectual elite oriented toward democratic reforms quickly began to form.

Two groups began to emerge and cross-pollinate beginning in the late 1970s and through the 1980s: first, a group of reform-minded government officials and technocrats who were eager to push forward with economic development, but, more importantly, a second group of intellectuals who were associated with the general secretary of the Communist Party and a protégé of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang. This



“Tank Man” is the anonymous figure who became internationally famous after being photographed standing in front of a Chinese tank on June 5, 1989. This iconic image has come to represent the Tiananmen Square protests that began in April of that year and were met by fierce government repression: the Chinese Red Cross estimates that 2,000–3,000 protesters died. “Tank Man” has not been seen since, and is rumored to have been executed by the Chinese government or to be still in hiding. (Stuart Franklin/ Magnum Photos)

latter group was eager to introduce reforms which would both curb the all-encompassing political power of the party and attempt to humanize the kind of Marxist ideology China possessed in order to provide a new intellectual groundwork for a post-Cultural Revolution era. This democratic intellectual elite was not a well-defined group; at best it was made up of a loose association of intellectuals, think tanks, editors, and journalists. They differed with respect to their ideologies, but they were essentially unified around the goal of undermining the control of the party by forming institutions which would protect the rights of individuals: an independent judiciary, a free press, freedom of association, and so on. They were encouraged by Hu to continue their ideas, and Hu protected them and their discourse from conservative factions from within the party. These intellectuals were democratic in their outlook, and their basic position was that only through initiating democratic reforms could there be any sense of true modernization in China.

But another social reality was beginning to emerge and shape the context for the protests. One of the key elements of Deng’s reform program was economic growth through liberalization of the economy. Farmers in the countryside were allowed to decollectivize farms and sell their produce on the open market for the first time; new economic zones were launched in major coastal cities to encourage economic growth; and a new

openness to the outside world for investment and technology began to take place, among other major reforms. The intent of these reforms was to mobilize economic growth, but their unintended consequence was a gradual loosening of the party’s control over society. The reforms began creating new pressures on the outmoded political system, and in 1987, Peng Zhen – a participant in the Long March and a conservative member of the Central Advisory Commission – began phasing in direct elections in the villages. Although these elections were confined to rural areas, urban areas began to be deeply affected as well.

These forces began to awaken new sensibilities among everyday people. First, the problem of official corruption – an issue of central importance for the entirety of modern Chinese history – became a central grievance. The intensity of this sentiment was tied to economic growth: those with connections to party officials or those officials themselves benefited disproportionately from the rest of the populace, and students as well as everyday people began to feel resentment. The economic reforms created a swift transformation of society: a “market fever” (*shichang re*), as it was called, was giving rise to a “cultural fever” (*wenhua re*) where people began to question the nature of Chinese society. The New Chinese Cinema was beginning to make films critical of China’s past and present; new forms of literature were emerging, the “obscure poetry” (*menglong shi*) of poets such as Bei Dao was challenging the older literary forms of socialist realism; the novels of writers such as Gu Hua were revealing new aspects of Chinese society and its collective self-consciousness; and philosophers such as Li Zehou were fashioning a new philosophical language for the times. A new cultural consciousness was emerging, signaling major shifts in society as a whole.

But as social and economic reforms progressed, it became clear to students and intellectuals that their interests were not being met. Intellectuals remained underpaid, but even more: the belief was that reforms had not penetrated deep enough into the entirety of society. Political reforms bent toward democracy were needed. This became evident as early as 1979 during what was known as the “Democracy Wall” movement. The most prominent of this group was Wei Jingsheng, a former Red Guard and worker at the Beijing Zoo, who argued that democracy was in fact an

essential reform that had to take place if other reforms were to have any meaning. Calls for democracy were therefore building slowly but certainly throughout the 1980s, and intellectuals and students over that period were becoming increasingly involved in that discourse.

Outside of the intellectual class, the reforms also began to unleash terrible effects on working people. Whereas prior to the reforms workers had some guaranteed benefits and wages – known as the “iron rice bowl” – reforms toward a market economy were rapidly dismantling these benefits. In addition, conditions for workers were worsening, and there were no viable avenues for workers to communicate their grievances. Inflation was rising; in some places the rate was as high as between 20 and 40 percent. Corruption, always present, was now becoming more visible with government officials and factory owners – themselves linked to the party – accruing benefits while workers saw their own fortunes declining. The reforms therefore created a powerful potential alliance between many sectors of society, most importantly workers, students, and intellectuals, which would form the basic alliance of forces of the protests and account for their extraordinary resiliency.

Origins of the Tiananmen Protest Movement

The social and political context had therefore been set for the beginnings of the movement by bringing to a head both economic pressures and a new set of political ideas oriented toward democratic reform. The event that sparked the protests was the death of Hu Yaobang early in the spring of 1989. Hu had been forced to resign as party secretary general in 1987 by conservative elders in the party who had opposed his reforms and his tolerance of democratic ideas and intellectuals from the beginning. Although Hu then receded from public view, he remained a major symbol of reform in the minds of many intellectuals and students. In addition, Hu’s image was associated with pro-democracy sentiments among students and intellectuals. He was seen as someone who not only stood for political reforms, but was also untouched by the problems of corruption and the moral lassitude associated with the party.

Hu was about to launch a return to power in April 1989 when he was struck down by a heart

attack, dying a week later on April 15. Students at Beijing University already had plans for a demonstration to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the 1919 May 4th movement, but Hu’s death offered a political opportunity. In a traditional festival in remembrance of the dead, students marched from the campus of Beijing University to Tiananmen Square with a black wreath and portrait of Hu in tribute. In addition to this act of remembrance – which in and of itself was apolitical – were the accompanying demands that Hu’s purge be reinterpreted politically and that his status be rehabilitated within the party. Students and intellectuals knew that Hu had been purged by conservative forces in the party, and this was an opportunity for them to show opposition to their continuing efforts to halt political reforms.

Things intensified on April 22, the day of Hu’s funeral. Although it was only seven days since Hu’s death and the wreath-bearing march at Beijing University, an estimated 70,000 students and approximately 30,000 workers turned out in Tiananmen Square near the Great Hall of the People where Hu’s state funeral was being held. The protesters were also prepared for a direct encounter with the party elite. They carried with them a large petition demanding democratic reforms such as a free press, an increase in aid for education, a raise in salaries for intellectuals, and a fair account of the protest demonstration in the media, among other demands. In a provocative, media-savvy move, three organizers of the demonstration held the petition over their heads on the steps in front of the Great Hall demanding that Premier Li Peng come out and take the petition himself. The students waited on their knees for 40 minutes, but no one from inside came to accept it.

The demonstrations continued and intensified. Students from other universities in Beijing began to join the demonstrations. The media’s response was also crucial in swelling support and participation in the protests. Hu’s successor and one-time protégé, Zhao Ziyang, was engaged in his own struggles with the party elders. He allowed and encouraged openness in the media in its coverage of the events. Many of the editors of China’s newspapers, such as the *China Morning Post*, *New Observer*, *Beijing Youth*, *Science and Technology Daily*, and others, were part of the democratic intellectual elite allied around Hu when he was in power. They began reporting

objectively and openly on the events in addition to publishing editorials in support of the demonstrations. As a result, the message was being sent to the public that a crackdown was not imminent and that the students had broader support. Even more people began to support and participate in the demonstrations as a result.

But on April 26, the *People's Daily*, the major national daily paper of China, published a front page editorial by Deng Xiaoping that would enrage the students and other members of the protests. The editorial branded the protests as sowing "dissension among the people" and having the aim of plunging "the whole country into chaos." By labeling the protests and the students as disrupters of society, Deng related the student protests to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. In reality, the hardliners saw the demonstrations as the possible beginnings of what was at the time bringing down communism in Eastern Europe. But the editorial had the opposite effect: instead of making people fear the demonstrations as a slide into social chaos, they were angered by what they rightly saw as an attempt to further quash social reforms. The students now made a reversal of the April 26 editorial a part of their demands.

As a result, the demonstrations, marches, and protests continued to grow. Other cities such as Guangzhou and Xian also began to stage demonstrations and marches, and in Shanghai the demonstrations were accompanied by a general strike. The situation was becoming national in scope, but the real epicenter remained in Beijing, and the core of the organizers and demonstrators remained inside the Square. The government had refrained from using force to put down the protests only because Zhao urged dialogue with the students. By doing this, Zhao was forced into a difficult position: by using the popularity of the protests to protect himself as a reformer against the elder conservatives in the party, he had to promise that a policy of dialogue would produce effective results. The hardliners in the party had advocated a crackdown from the beginning, but it was Zhao who was able to stave them off. Dialogue sessions began to sprout between members of the student groups and middle-range officials, but they were either incompetently handled by the officials or, at other times, disrupted by students themselves.

Some of the student groups began to introduce democratic procedures within their associations. They held elections and discussions at campuses,

and they also saw that this was something that needed to be introduced into the movement as a whole. Two prominent student leaders, Wang Dan and Wu'er Kaixi, founded an autonomous student union, and almost 100 intellectuals organized to form the Beijing Intellectuals' Autonomous Federation. But the movement quickly moved into other sectors of society. Reforms in China up to this point had allowed a significant development of civil society in urban areas and, as a result, other groups began to organize as well. Hang Dongfang, a 27-year-old railway worker, organized approximately 20,000 workers to form the Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation, and shopowners and small-scale business people also began to aid the protesters by donating food, communications and office equipment, and other needed supplies to facilitate organization. All these groups were, in their own way, disaffected by the government's unwillingness to extend, deepen, and genuinely pursue modernizing reforms such as property rights, wages, worker protection, and guarantees for free speech and assembly.

On May 4, about 100,000 students and workers marched in Beijing and began occupying Tiananmen Square, refusing to leave. Students from other parts of the country were now swarming into Beijing and the number of people participating in the demonstrations reached into the hundreds of thousands. But frustration at the lack of real dialogue and response from the government was growing. The students had demanded that dialogue take place between elected student leaders and members of the government, but the government would only recognize the leaders of state-sanctioned student organizations, ignoring the demands of students. In addition, splits within the movement as a whole began to emerge. Many of the students therefore decided to go on a hunger strike on May 13, continuing for several weeks – but there was no response from the government. They garnered sympathetic support from Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan as well and mustered even more sympathy from society at large within China, especially the residents of Beijing, who were witnessing the unfolding of events first hand. The hunger strike finally provoked an emergency meeting between conservative premier Li Peng and student leaders. But both sides essentially talked past one another, leading to further deadlock.

As the protest movement increased in size and strength, factional splits within the party elite were deepening. But the use of force was made even more problematic. Two major international events were also occurring during this period: first was a meeting of the Asian Development Bank in Beijing early in May, and the second was a historic visit by Mikhail Gorbachev from May 15 to 18. At the meeting of the Asian Development Bank, Zhao gave a joint press conference with other Asian leaders and representatives where he referred to the student demonstrations as “patriotic.” Students were emboldened and saw this as a signal to push forward with the protests. But then, at a meeting with Gorbachev on May 16, Zhao implied that Deng bore responsibility for handling the student movement. As a result, he lost Deng’s support and the hardliners were able to organize internally against him. On May 19, the government decided to impose martial law and to use force in order to end the demonstrations; even though Zhao objected, he was left with no allies to support him and he resigned his post that day. Later that evening, Zhao gave a tearful speech amid students at the Square apologizing for not having done enough. “We have come too late, we are sorry,” saying finally, “we deserve your criticism.” He then receded from public view, effectively kept under house arrest until his death in 2005. The students and other protesters were now left with no one to restrain the hardliners in the government. The message had already been sent. Miles outside the city of Beijing, the People’s Liberation Army was being mobilized for a full-scale military invasion of the city.

The Crackdown and its Aftermath

Finding troops actually to carry out the order, however, proved harder than expected. The local army units stationed in and around Beijing were sympathetic to the students and the protests and refused to use force. As a result, the decision was made to send in troops from the 27th and 28th armies from the outer provinces. There was fear that a split within the military could become a problem, but the hardliners saw few options: their unwillingness to dialogue and their interests in eradicating dissent compelled them to bring the movement to a close at all costs. Troops entered Beijing on June 3. Residents of the city had set up barricades, mainly burning buses, to try to stop the troop advance. Soldiers

shot indiscriminately at residents, students, and sometimes at each other. The wounded were taken to local hospitals by rickshaws and bicycles, and they soon became swamped with the wounded and dying. Late that night, the troops reached the Square where students were beaten and some killed. By 6 a.m. June 4, the Square had been completely cleared of demonstrators. The military remained in the city where smaller clashes and skirmishes continued between soldiers and citizens through June 6.

The actual number killed and wounded is difficult to estimate. The numbers fluctuate wildly from 300 to 6,000, but there are no hard statistics. The weeks and months that followed were filled with arrests, jail sentences, executions, and the persecution of students and workers who were involved with the protests. The government reasserted itself with vigor in the following months and years. First among their concerns was the vilification of the demonstrations and those involved with or who had sympathy for them. Liberalization of political and cultural organs of society was curtailed, and Marxism-Leninism once again became required ideological study at universities. The subject of the protests and the crackdown became taboo and there was no room for toleration for those who engaged in dissenting acts or discussions, however minor, against the government. Today, the Tiananmen Square protests and the bloody crackdown are forgotten or even totally unknown among the younger generation. They are not taught in schools and there is strict censoring of the event in the Chinese media. Although they were the largest and most robust demonstrations in the history of the People’s Republic, it can generally be said that the crackdown was successful in suppressing the major currents of democratic dissent in contemporary China.

SEE ALSO: China, May 4th Movement; China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Democracy Wall Movement, 1979; Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997); Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Wei Jingsheng (b. 1950)

References and Suggested Readings

- Gilley, B. (2004) *China’s Democratic Future*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Goldman, M. (1994) *Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schwarcz, V. (1986) *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth*

- Movement of 1919*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Spence, J. (1999) *The Search for Modern China*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Thompson, M. J. (2006) The Price of Heavenly Peace: Tiananmen Square 15 Years Later. In S. E. Bronner & M. J. Thompson (Eds.), *The Logos Reader: Rational Radicalism and the Future of Politics*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, pp. 141–8.
- Wang Chaohua, Wang Dan, and Li Minqi (1999) A Dialogue on the Future of China. *New Left Review* 235 (May/June).
- Wei Jingsheng (1997) *The Courage to Stand Alone: Letters from Prison and Other Writings*. New York: Viking.
- Zhang Liang (Comp.), Nathan, A., & Link, P. (Eds.) (2002) *The Tiananmen Papers*. New York: Public Affairs Press.
- Zhang Xudong (1997) *Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Tianjin Massacre, 1870

J. Megan Greene

In 1870 tensions between Chinese residents of the northeastern port city of Tianjin (Tientsin) and western missionaries came to a head in a spontaneous eruption of anti-western protest dubbed the Tianjin Massacre. Sixteen French men and women and three Russians, including the consul and ten nuns, were killed in a single day as a crowd of Chinese responded violently to the western presence. The event represented the largest single anti-western protest in China prior to the Boxer Uprising of 1900, although smaller-scale anti-Christian protests were not infrequent.

As a consequence of the unequal treaties that China was compelled to sign between 1842 and 1858, the western presence in coastal China, particularly in the environs of the so-called treaty ports such as Tianjin, grew rapidly. The treaties gave westerners unprecedented rights to travel freely in China, engage in commerce with comparatively little restraint, and be governed not by Chinese laws but by the laws of their home countries. Numerous Catholic and Protestant missionaries took advantage of the new access to China that they were granted by the treaties, building churches, recruiting converts, and setting up schools, hospitals, and orphanages both in the treaty ports and farther inland. In Tianjin the western presence was perhaps even more

visible and more hated than elsewhere because the city had been the site of humiliating treaty negotiations in 1858 and had housed British and French troops at the time of the Anglo-French sacking of Beijing in the early 1860s.

The missionary presence in China met with considerable resistance as it both threatened the Confucian social order that elites were trying so hard to hold on to and created anxieties among non-elites, who did not always fully comprehend the aims of the missionaries. Elites found that missionary efforts to introduce new schools, in particular, were threatening to a social order that was built upon Confucian texts and precepts. At the same time, missionaries sought to play philanthropic roles in areas that had traditionally been the realm of local elites, and thus threatened their position as local agents of social welfare. It was not uncommon, therefore, for elites to fan the fires of anti-foreign sentiments that developed among non-elites by producing anti-foreign publications and posters depicting the worship of Christianity as the worship of a pig (the Chinese character for pig and one of the characters in the word for Christianity are homonyms).

Because some of the activities of missionaries were rather mysterious to casual observers, non-elites also often perceived missionaries in a negative light as well. The activities of orphanages, in particular, led to numerous misunderstandings and rumors. Missionaries frequently took in very ill children and infants in order to baptize them before they died, one consequence of which was that orphanages were observed to have very high death rates. Missionaries sometimes also offered to pay for children. As a result, rumors abounded that missionaries were killing Chinese children and using their body parts to make medicine or conduct other sorts of medical experiments.

The Tianjin Massacre, as the event was later called by westerners, was by no means the only anti-foreign protest in late nineteenth-century China, but it was one of the most brutal and well publicized. It resulted from precisely these sorts of misunderstandings and from a mob desire to protect China from the undesirable foreign presence. To begin with, the French illegally erected a new cathedral on the site of an old imperial temple, an act that enraged many Chinese observers. Anti-western sentiments were further fueled by exceptionally high death rates among

children in the Catholic orphanage during the summer of 1870. In addition, throughout the early summer Tianjin had been in the grips of a kidnapping epidemic, and evidence suggested that at least some of the children that had been kidnapped had later been purchased by Chinese working for the Catholic Church.

In combination, these issues led to the wide circulation of numerous anti-foreign rumors, a rising level of anti-Catholic sentiment, and investigations into the activities of Catholic Chinese by local officials. Acting on these suspicions, various Tianjin authorities on June 19 and 20 approached the French consul, Henri Fontanier, to solicit his assistance in the investigations into the kidnappings. On June 21, however, Fontanier stormed into the office of one public official and shot at him. After departing, he shot at yet another official, killing his servant, following which a mob of witnesses fell upon him and killed both Fontanier and his assistant. The mob subsequently burned down the newly erected Catholic church of Tianjin and broke into the convent of the Catholic Sisters of Mercy, brutally killing ten nuns and several other westerners, as well as some Chinese Catholics.

The impact of this protest was primarily to exacerbate ill will between Europe, particularly France and the Vatican, and China. The European powers responded to the event by demanding that the perpetrators of the violence be punished, and by sending warships to Tianjin to back up their demands. The Qing court bowed to pressure by executing a number of Chinese, paying reparations to the French, and sending an official envoy to France to apologize. The event also hampered efforts that the Qing had earlier been making to renegotiate the unequal treaties. Popular protest against foreign presence in China thus served to highlight the Qing court's weakness vis-à-vis the foreign powers, and foreign presence became ever more visible in China in subsequent decades.

SEE ALSO: China, Protest and Revolution, 1800–1911; Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911

References and Suggested Readings

Cohen, P. A. (1963) *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860–1870*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Tibet Uprising and resistance

James Steinberg

In 1959 a major rebellion erupted in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, as thousands of Tibetans gathered to protect their threatened religious leader, the fourteenth Dalai Lama. The uprising culminated after ten years of intrusive Chinese military and political coercion that turned more violent by early 1952. The new Chinese communist regime began in 1949, led by Mao Zedong (1893–1976), who began a subtle and intentional strategy to spread the communist revolution to Tibet and lay claim to the region as an integral part of China. As the Chinese began to move into the region in the 1950s, tensions increased between the Chinese communists and the Tibetans (who are by and large devout Yellow Hat Buddhists, a local sect founded in the fifteenth century).

In 1950, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) defeated the Tibetan army at Chamdo (in outer Tibet); however, they ceased their offensive and sent an ultimatum to the Dalai Lama. The Chinese strategy was to force the Tibetans into negotiating a settlement and allow the Chinese to move into the region, building roads and electrical stations. Using agreements and committees, they sought to reassure the Tibetans that changes would not be immediate, and Lhasa (in central Tibet) would be left alone for six years. The communists' aim was the "peaceful liberation" of Tibet, and their strategy was to show a united front to reduce resistance by the Tibetan people and convince Tibet to accept the changes.

In 1952, Chinese officials began imposing a socialist transformation on Tibetans living in outlying areas of the capital. The Chinese engaged in dismantling religion as monks were imprisoned and chased from monasteries. The hostilities by the Chinese led to rebellions in these areas as Tibetan Khampa and Ambowas were outraged by the abuse and murder of their own people. As tribal Tibetans continued to rebel and the casualties mounted, the Chinese, however, did not engage in hostilities in Lhasa, the residence of their god-king, the Dalai Lama. The Chinese created intolerable conditions of coerced "social change" that would gradually cause the

disparate Tibetan tribal groups to unify and fight against their communist oppressors.

Mao's Strategy

Mao's approach to handling Tibet was to attempt to persuade the government of Tibet to accept a political agreement; he wanted to obtain the consent of the Dalai Lama to recognize China's sovereignty, which would reduce the risks of rebellion. For Mao, military intervention carried a moderate risk, although he did not anticipate any international intervention even if he had to resort to massive military force. On October 7, 1950, however, Mao ordered his troops to engage the poorly organized Tibetan army in Chamdo. The Tibetan army of 10,000 was soundly defeated in only two weeks and Tibet was essentially defenseless. This attack killed 4,000 Tibetan troops and intimidated the Dalai Lama into participating in negotiations with China. Meanwhile, Lhasa issued an appeal to the United Nations to settle the dispute (that Tibet is a state), but it was not considered. Tibetan officials traveled to Beijing and, following some inducements, signed the Seventeen-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet on May 23, 1951. The agreement nearly closed the "Tibet question": is Tibet an independent state or part of China? The answer for the Chinese was that Tibet had accepted political control by China. Essentially this agreement was consistent with Mao's gradualist policy to postpone major reforms in central Tibet until the populace became more willing to accept Chinese socialist changes.

The Prelude to the Rebellion

In the 1950s the People's Republic of China's new government initiated the first five-year plan and started the socialist transformation. Parts of eastern Tibet (Kham and Amdo) were subject to communist changes by 1952 and 1953. The Chinese considered Kham and Amdo as parts of provinces (Tsinghai, Szechwan, and Yunnan) established earlier and were not considered to be the central Tibetan region. The Chinese did not consider outlying areas as a part of the Seventeen-Point Agreement, even though Tibetans had inhabited the region for over five centuries. Moreover, religiously speaking, both the Khampas and Amdowas (who later were key

actors in the revolt) maintained devout patronage to the Dalai Lama as the sacred incarnation of Avalokitesvara (a compassionate Buddha).

In early 1953 certain areas in Kham were subjected to Chinese oppression. Thousands of monasteries were obliterated, lamas were sentenced to death, and monks sent to prison. These early Chinese initiatives reflect the socialist changes in the forced collectivization of agriculture, curtailing nomadic herding, atheist indoctrination, and the disarmament of the Tibetans. The reforms spread and soon afterward about 80,000 fiercely independent Khampas rose up in a rebellion against the Chinese. Again, in August 1954, 40,000 Tibetans rebelled in Kham, but the most serious rebellion was the Kanting rebellion of 1955–6, when Khampas engaged in violence against communist government bureaucrats and the Han Chinese. This was followed by yet another regional outbreak, the Szechwan-Chando rebellion in 1956. Both groups were dispersed by mobilized Chinese armies and air force attacks that killed thousands of Khampas and Amdowas. By late 1956 the PLA dispersed Khampas, and Amdowas began trekking to Lhasa to seek refuge from PLA crackdowns and persecutions, as well as to protect their godking, the Dalai Lama. In total, 15,000 rebels from eastern Tibet had settled in Lhasa. News of the Chinese aggression had become well known and posed a threat of impending violence in the capital.

The Rebellion in Lhasa, 1959

The Chinese presence in Lhasa and news of the brutal violence against rebels generated deep resentments. By 1954 a grassroots resistance group had begun operations in Lhasa. Called the Mimang Tsongdu (People's Meetings), the group engaged in demonstrations and publicly hung posters criticizing the Chinese for their treatment of the Dalai Lama and their restrictions on Tibetan social observances and religious ceremonies. In 1957 the Chinese cracked down on the movement and imprisoned a number of its leaders. By then outer Tibet had been forcefully reorganized into 47 communes.

In 1958 fighting broke out in Lhoka, about 50 miles from Lhasa, as Khampas were pursued by the PLA, engaging the rebels on over a dozen occasions. As more rebels filtered into Lhasa, the Chinese infuriated the tribal leaders by

attempting to expel them from the city. News of PLA interrogations of nomads across Tibet revealed thousands of civilians were abusively treated by the PLA. With the Chinese continuing the pressure, a Kham-born merchant, Gompo Tashi Andrugstang, began organizing 23 tribal groups to unite and fight against the Chinese. Five thousand Khampas volunteered to join the newly formed military organization they called the Chushi Gandruk (Four Rivers and Six Ranges). The resistance movement formed its base of operations at Trighthang, 50 miles south of Lhasa. From August 1958 to April 1959 it reported 14 violent engagements against numerous PLA forces in the region, ranging in distances from 5 to 100 miles from Lhasa. This protracted and dispersed rebellion left no doubt that China had no intention of permitting the Tibetans political and religious freedom.

Although the Dalai Lama pleaded with the Khampas to cease their operations and settle their differences peacefully, the Chushi Gandruk continued fighting. The resistance fighters reported that the Chinese military used coordinated troop movements to set up ambush points. On April 14, 1959, the Khampa base was discovered and overrun, dispersing the Khampas, some of whom returned to Lhasa. The crowds in the city had increased; combined with the NDVA (National Volunteer Defense Army), they composed about 30,000 Khampas, Amdowas, and other tribal Tibetans. Lhasa was crowded and tense.

In February of 1959 a rumor began circulating that the Dalai Lama had been invited to a theater presentation by the PLA military leaders. The Tibetans, however, felt it was a Chinese ruse to kidnap the Dalai Lama. By March 10, the rumor had become magnified and created a veritable panic among the Tibetan faithful. It has been reported that over 20,000 Tibetans assembled around the palace and Chinese army headquarters. The crowd assembly whipped up further hatred for the Chinese, and a mob killed a Tibetan politician and injured a member of the Dalai Lama's cabinet. This incident further ignited the crowds for action. From mid-March to June, the Dalai Lama's palace was besieged with thousands of Tibetans who by now believed that their god-king was in mortal danger. By mid-June the situation in Lhasa was very tense and the PLA reinforced its defenses, waiting on the outskirts of the city. Artillery was brought in and set up

around the perimeter. For the Dalai Lama, the rebellion was on his doorstep and his advisors began planning for his escape from possible arrest or worse by the Chinese authorities.

On June 14, recognizing that he could no longer influence the crowds, the Dalai Lama was disguised in military garb and escaped to India where he was immediately given political asylum. In his article "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union" (2006), Jian shows that Mao was still coolly playing his game of strategy: he really did not care if the Dalai Lama escaped since it just changed the strategy. As the unfriendly crowds harassed PLA troops there, some groups became more violent; still their orders were to hold out but not engage the "rebels." However, by March 20 the PLA began attacking the Tibetans in Lhasa, opening fire with small arms, mortars, and artillery at rebel positions. The PLA also organized maneuvers around Lhasa and repeatedly engaged a fierce resistance until March 23. The PLA eventually crushed the rebellion, killing a total of 80,000 Tibetans between 1958 and 1959.

Following the rebellion, the CIA (US Central Intelligence Agency) funded air drops to Tibetan guerillas to ascertain the possibility of maintaining the resistance. During the escape of the Dalai Lama in 1959, CIA operatives assisted in making advanced requests for his political asylum. While a number of incursions have been reported, there was no appreciable effect of their clandestine activity.

The Dalai Lama set up his government-in-exile in Dharamsala, India, condemning the Seventeen-Point Agreement and pleading for Tibetan independence. Soon after the Dalai Lama arrived, thousands of faithful pilgrims also crossed the border to join him.

Causes of the Rebellion

While the communist plan was an initial success, failure was ultimately linked to the Chinese assumption that outer Tibet was part of China. This region was subject to more immediate communist transformation that involved disregard for the symbols of religion signified by Tibetan monks and monasteries. In his 1979 article "The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion: An Interpretation," Dawa Norbu argues that the Tibetans had become painfully aware of what the socialist transforma-

tion meant, and when surrounding tribal groups filled Lhasa, the atmosphere was volatile.

A related factor in the rebellion was the outrage felt by Tibetans in Lhasa at the early abuse of Khampas and Amdowas in which brutality was displayed (during the democratic reforms in eastern Tibet). The casualties inflicted between 1953 and 1958 were in the thousands: the Chinese air force devastated rebels, nomad civilians, homes, livestock, and monasteries, but there was a lag in the realization of the devastation given the expanse and isolation of the region. It also offended the Buddhists, for instance, when the Chinese treated nuns, monks, and lamas with disdain and meted out draconian punishments – an affront to their religious faith. As the PLA smashed the Khampa rebels, the cause also became one of protecting their way of life and their religious leader.

In addition, there are causal wildcards that appear plausible: rumors in Lhasa may also have played a role in generating mass anxiety and anger in the crowds, as did the artillery explosions near the Norbulinka (Jian considered them accidental) that energized their gathering and precipitated murder in rebellious defiance for a week before the PLA crackdown on June 20. In the end, Goldstein and Norbu agree that Mao failed in his gradualist approach by oppressing eastern Tibetans, whom he did not comprehend. Moreover, after he reached India, the Dalai Lama once again raised the issue of declaring Tibet's independence from China.

SEE ALSO: China, Peasant Revolts in the Empire; China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Nepal, People's War and Maoists

References and Suggested Readings

- Goldstein, M. (1997) *The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jian, C. (2006) The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union. *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8, 3 (Summer).
- McGranahan, C. (2006) The CIA and the Chushi Gandrug Resistance, 1956–1974. *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8, 3 (Summer).
- Norbu, D. (1979) The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion: An Interpretation. *China Quarterly* (March).
- Patterson, G. (1960) China and Tibet: Background to the Revolt. *China Quarterly* (January–March).

Tiso, Josef (1887–1947)

Stanislav J. Kirschbaum

Josef Tiso, a Roman Catholic priest and politician, assumed leadership of the Slovak People's Party after the death of Andrej Hlinka (1864–1938) and served as prime minister and president of the First Slovakia Republic. His leadership of Slovakia during its first appearance as a nation-state (1939–45) places Tiso among the most controversial figures in modern Slovak history. To some he was an outstanding statesman who preserved Slovakia from usurpation by Hungary, forestalled German occupation, and sought to contain the extremist tendencies within the Hlinka Slovak People's Party. Others hold him responsible for the break-up of Czechoslovakia and Slovakia's collaboration with Nazi Germany in the deportation and death of Slovak Jews.

Tiso's administration of the first modern Slovak state affirmed the nation's capacity for self-government, laying to rest the perception that Slovaks were incapable of running their own affairs. His pragmatic negotiation of international pressure preserved Slovakia from dominance by Germany during World War II and allowed him to retain influence over the governance of Slovakia to undermine the extension of German policies. While an alliance with Germany was unavoidable given the military threat posed by the Nazi regime, recent research indicates that German advisors sent to Slovakia found anything but willing puppets (Tönsmeier 2003). Tiso often opposed Adolf Hitler while appearing to cooperate with him. He often received German officials, praised them in public, and promised to follow their advice while in fact doing the exact opposite.

The political system of the Slovak Republic is characterized as a one-party state because the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSPP) was the sole contender in the December 1938 elections to the Slovak Assembly (which later became the parliament of the Slovak Republic). The HSPP was not ideologically homogeneous; rather, it was a convenient alliance of most of the political parties in Slovakia (excluding the communists) in pursuit of independence from Czechoslovakia. As the leader of the moderate faction within the party, Tiso worked to minimize German interference and contain attempts by the radicals, led by Vojtech Tuka, to introduce National

Socialism to Slovakia. In July 1940, Tiso was summoned to Salzburg by Hitler and told to dismiss Slovak politicians – among them Foreign Minister Ferdinand Ďurčanský and HSPP Secretary General Jozef Kirschbaum – whom Berlin considered anti-German. He acquiesced to the German demands but also used his presidential powers to restrain the policies of Tuka, who was prime minister. As head of state, he refused to sign the Jewish Codex, laws the Slovak parliament passed to define the restrictions imposed on Slovakia's Jews, but he could not stop the Tuka government from deporting Slovak Jews to Germany from March to October 1942. However, he used his legislative authority to extend exemptions to individual Jews and their families, thus saving some 30,000 before the outbreak of the 1944 uprising.

The 1944 uprising, which provoked the German invasion of Slovakia, all but eliminated Tiso's authority. Despite his political ineffectiveness he tried to mitigate the effects of the German occupation by personally intervening to save lives, but he was unable to prevent further deportations of Slovak Jews. When Soviet troops entered Slovakia in 1945, Tiso and other government officials moved to Austria where they surrendered to the United States Army. He was handed over to Czechoslovak authorities and charged in a Slovak court with treason against the Czechoslovak Republic and collaboration in the 1944 uprising. He was found guilty, sentenced to death, and executed on April 18, 1947, after Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš refused to grant clemency.

SEE ALSO: Hlinka, Andrej (1864–1938) and the Slovak People's Party; Slovakia, 1944 Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Durica, M. S. (1989) *The Slovak Involvement in the Tragedy of the European Jews*. Abano Terme: Piovani Editore.
- Durica, M. S. (2003) *Dejiny Slovenska a Slovákov v časovej naslednosti faktorov dvoch tisícročí* (The History of Slovakia and the Slovaks in the Chronological Order of Facts over Two Centuries). Bratislava: Luč.
- Kirschbaum, J. M. (1960) *Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe*. New York: Robert S. Speller & Sons.
- Kirschbaum, S. J. (2005) *A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival*, 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave.
- Spiesz, A. (1992) *Dejiny Slovenska: Na ceste k sebauvedomeniu* (History of Slovakia: On the Road

to Self-Determination). Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo Respekt.

- Sutherland, A. X. (1978) *Dr. Jozef Tiso and Modern Slovakia*. Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union.
- Tönsmeier, T. (2003) *Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei, 1939–1945*. Politischer Alltag zwischen Kooperation, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.

Tisquesuza (d. 1537)

Olga Burkert

Tisquesuza was the fourth king of the indigenous tribe of the Muisca, the so-called Zipa of Bucatá. He was killed by the Spaniards while fighting their conquest of the territory of modern-day Colombia. The Muisca were part of the linguistic family of the Chibchas and Zipa was their title of nobility given to their rulers in the southern part of their territory, what is today known as the Sabana de Bogotá of Colombia. In the northern region, the so-called Zaque ruled, and the two kingdoms together were *el reino de los Chibchas*.

The Zipa's throne was inherited, but not directly from a patriarchal line, instead, power was given to the son of the ruler's elder sister. Tisquesuza was known as a great warrior, and apart from being the nephew of the third Zipa Nemequene, he was his commander-in-chief. After his succession to the throne, Tisquesuza continued fighting Nemequene's war against the traditional tribal rival, the Zaque Quemuenchatocha. In a war against another tribe, Tisquesuza was surprised by the arrival of the Spaniards under Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada. In April 1536 Quesada established military headquarters in Santa Marta with 800 men and 100 horses to conquer the inland. His forces traveled down the Magdalena River to Muisca territory. Zipa ordered a close watch on the invaders to determine their intentions. On hearing of Tisquesuza's spectacular gold treasures, Quesada sought to capture and defeat his people.

Tisquesuza engaged in a broad resistance against Quesada's forces, but in face of the overwhelming technical superiority of European arms he fled to the mountains. In 1537 Zipa was assassinated by one of Quesada's soldiers, but the Spaniards had to retreat, unaware that they had killed Zipa and having failed to discover the location of the treasure. The Spanish conquistadores never were able to find Tisquesuza's gold. Two years after defeating Tisquesuza, Quesada

founded Colombia's modern capital of Santa Fé de Bogotá.

Tisquesuza remains a leading popular figure in the national historical struggle of Colombia's indigenous peoples. Politicians frequently name Tisquesuza and his fierce resistance against the conquerors as an example of the bravery of the indigenous ancestors of many Colombian people.

SEE ALSO: Lempira (d. 1537); Panama, Cemaco's Anti-Colonial Resistance, 1510–1512; Túpac Amaru (ca. 1540–1572); Urracá, Cacique of Veraguas (d. 1516)

References and Suggested Readings

- Castillo, G. (2003) *Caminando en el tiempo: El encuentro de tres conquistadores en la Sabana de Bogotá*. Bogotá: Intermedio Editores.
- Francis, J. M. (2007) *Invading Colombia: Spanish Accounts of the Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada Expedition of Conquest*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Friede, J. (1966) *Invasión del País de los Chibchas*. Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo.
- Kintto, L. (1992) *Rebeliones indígenas y negras en América Latina*. Quito: Editorial Abya Yal.

Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980)

Boris Kanzleiter

Josip Broz Tito was leader of the communist anti-fascist movement in Yugoslavia during World War II that, like Albanian and Greek partisans, liberated the Balkans from Nazi occupation without assistance from foreign powers. Subsequently, Tito developed a form of socialism independent of Moscow through the establishment of "Workers' Self-management." As founder of the Non-Alignment Movement, Tito achieved widespread international respect as a statesman in the global South in the 1950s and 1960s.

Tito was born to a Slovenian mother and Croatian father on May 7, 1892 in Kumrovec, a village in Croatia, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The seventh of 15 children, Tito grew up poor and began work as a waiter at 16. He then was a locksmith apprentice in the Croatian city of Sisak, where he was educated by a fellow worker in socialist ideals. In 1910 Tito became a machinist in Zagreb, joining the Metal Workers Union and Social Democratic Party. In 1911 and 1912 Tito migrated to Slovenia,

Czechoslovakia, and Germany for employment, joining a successful strike in Bohemia and strengthening his socialist and labor sympathies.

Drafted into the Austro-Hungarian army in 1913, World War I was decisive to Tito's political future. He was sent to Vojvodina to fight Serb forces and then transferred to the Eastern Front against the Russians. In March 1915 Tito was wounded, captured by the Russian army, and sent to a work camp in the Ural Mountains. In 1917 Tito participated in the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, including July 1917 demonstrations in Petrograd. He enlisted with the international Red Guards, consisting mainly of former war prisoners and in 1920 returned to Croatia after the Austro-Hungarian Empire was dissolved. Croatia formed part of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, renamed in 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

In the early 1920s Tito was a communist revolutionary and joined the newly formed Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), which attracted considerable mass support before being banned in late 1920. By the late 1920s Tito was a labor union leader and strike organizer and in June 1927 became secretary of the Metal Workers Union. In January 1928 he joined the leadership of the banned Communist Party in Zagreb. After his arrest in November 1928 Tito spent five years in several prisons, associating with fellow communists and helping organize political discussions and Marxist education.

With his release from prison in March 1934, Josip Broz was gradually recognized as an influential leader of the CPY. His party pseudonym, "Tito," was a common nickname in his region of origin. In 1935 he worked for the Balkan Comintern (Communist International) in Moscow, witnessing the Stalinist purges. At the end of 1936 he was appointed "organizational secretary" of the CPY and dispatched to Yugoslavia to reorganize the divided and weakened party.

In the autumn of 1938 Tito returned to Moscow, where he was interrogated but survived purges while other CPY leaders were arrested and shot. He was appointed the CPY's new general secretary and in early 1939 returned to Yugoslavia when the Yugoslav royal regime was in disarray due to national conflicts and economic crisis. Tito and the CPY leadership built a disciplined party organization and expanded membership and political influence. Although Tito's opinions differed with the Comintern,

fundamentally he remained loyal to Moscow, defending the purges and the Hitler–Stalin pact.

On April 6, 1941, after German, Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian forces attacked Yugoslavia, Tito's prominence expanded dramatically. The CPY initiated armed resistance after Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Over four years of struggle Tito formed an army of more than 500,000, liberating Yugoslavia from the foreign occupiers and defeating local anti-communist collaborators, like the fascist Croatian nationalist Ustasha and monarchist Serbian Chetnics. Tito gained worldwide recognition as the leader of the Yugoslav war against fascism and was named marshal by the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia, and then president of a provisional government. He was identified by the majority of partisans as undisputed leader of the Yugoslav anti-fascist "People's Liberation War."

After Tito's break with Stalin in 1948, socialist Yugoslavia gained significant political and economic support from the West. Tito was invited to Washington in 1963, 1971, and 1978. With the formation of the Non-Alignment Movement in the late 1950s he was a celebrated figure also in many countries of the Third World. After his death on May 4, 1980, three days before his 88th birthday, his funeral was attended by statesmen from 128 nations.

Tito's legacy is contentious. The struggle of the communist partisans during World War II under Tito against the German Wehrmacht was an inspiring example for anti-fascists around the world and the source of Yugoslavia's international prestige in the postwar era. Under Tito's rule, standards of living improved rapidly for most as the country rebuilt infrastructure and housing after the war. In the 1960s and 1970s Yugoslavia was by many standards the most prosperous country in Eastern Europe, and citizens enjoyed the broadest political and cultural liberties of all citizens in the socialist world, and arguably greater democracy than many countries in the West.

Tito's reputation dissolved after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, and he was often demonized by new nationalist movements and intellectuals dominating the political landscape. Tito's concept of "brotherhood and unity" of the South Slav (Yugoslav) people is ridiculed and some historians even condemn partisan war crimes during World War II. The Tito cult, his luxurious lifestyle, and many affairs with women

are condemned, while conspiracy theories abound that the "real" Tito was a Jew, Freemason, Russian agent, or American spy. In the early 2000s a more balanced evaluation of Tito's legacy emerged that emphasizes his leadership in the partisan anti-Nazi resistance, commitment to democratic workplace governance, and independence from imperial powers.

SEE ALSO: Yugoslavia, Anti-Fascist "People's Liberation War" and Revolution, 1941–1945; Yugoslavia, Formation of the Non-Aligned Movement; Yugoslavia, Marxist Humanism, *Praxis* Group, and Korčula Summer School, 1964–1974; Yugoslavia, Resistance to Cominform, 1948

References and Suggested Readings

- Dedijer, V. (1980) *Novi prilozii za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita*, Vols. 1–2. Zagreb: Mladost.
- Djilas, M. (1980) *Tito: The Story From Inside*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Pavlowitch, S. K. (1992) *Tito – Yugoslavia's Great Dictator: A Reassessment*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Tlatelolco 1968 and the Mexican student movement

Vittorio Sergi

The movement of 1968 in Mexico was part of a worldwide social movement that year. It was characterized by the definition of a common enemy concentrated in the authoritarian state party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the government, and the president of the republic, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–70). It was led by university students, who occupied the universities and organized militant mass demonstrations. The escalation of radical protests and open repression led to high levels of institutional violence. On October 2, 1968, ten days before the beginning of the Olympic Games in Mexico City, army and security forces opened fire on the student crowd on Tlatelolco Square.

From 1966 there had been an increasing tendency to autonomy by the official student organizations, supported by both the Mexican Communist Party and the more radical groups inspired by the Cuban Revolution. The spark for the movement was the heavy-handed intervention

of riot police in a vocational school of the National Polytechnic Institute (IPN) in Mexico City, with the pretext of stopping a fight between different groups of students on July 23. The protest against repression soon escalated into a national claim against authoritarian government and culture. It represented a rupture in the legitimacy of the Mexican state system.

Due to the strength of the students' militant organizations against the police and the rapid growth of the protests, Prime Minister Luis Echeverría asked the army to restore public order. The army, led by General Marcelino García Barragán, was directed to use open force to strike what it considered as a communist conspiracy against the state. On July 30 the army attacked various schools and university facilities within the center of Mexico City. On August 5 in Mexico City the first student demonstration received the support of many dissident intellectuals, as well as the rector of the IPN, Wilfrido Massieu Helguera.

With an agreement between the main student groups of IPN, the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), the Autonomous University of Chapingo, and the National Teachers' Schools, the National Strike Council (CNH) was created. The CNH spread to 210 committees all over the country and 250,000 students went out on strike. It had a strong militant organization and diffusion in the metropolitan area of the Federal District and in some provinces. The CNH issued a document of public demands to the government calling for an end to the repression and respect for the student organizations, and, on August 8, declared a national strike of universities and secondary schools. Five days later the group held a large peaceful demonstration in the center of Mexico City, gaining wide popular support. It proposed a public dialogue with the government and asked for a public discussion to be broadcast on television to avoid the risk of corruption and co-optation of the students' leadership.

On August 27, a large demonstration of 400,000 ended in the Zócalo (central plaza) of Mexico City and remained there to maintain permanent pressure on the government. In the early hours of the morning, the Mexican army and police used tanks and violence to evict the crowd. In a speech on September 1, President Díaz Ordaz announced that protests would no longer be tolerated, particularly since Mexico

was to host the Olympic Games beginning on October 12. On September 18, 10,000 soldiers under General José Hernández Toledo occupied UNAM, arresting 1,500 people.

On September 23, the army tried to evict the main campus of IPN, the Casco de Santo Tomás, but encountered armed resistance from the students who confronted several hundreds of riot police and soldiers. After heavy combat the security forces took over. Four students were killed and hundreds were wounded and arrested. On October 2 the CNH called for a demonstration and a speech in Tlatelolco Square, in front of the foreign ministry.

The government, led by Prime Minister Echeverría, began a planned repression with the use of covert agents and the army. The Battalion Olimpia, a covert military unit, was in charge of opening fire to provoke the reaction of several army units encircling the square. After the army opened fire on the crowd, the Battalion Olimpia started to chase down the CNH leaders, arresting many and killing others in the chaotic fights that followed the intense gunfire. A number of people were arrested, others were sentenced to detention, and others disappeared. After the massacre, the army removed the corpses to disguise the number of casualties. On October 5, the CNH claimed that 150 civilians and 40 soldiers had been killed, but it was not able to document this statement. John Rodda, a sports reporter for the *Guardian* newspaper in 1968, reported the number of dead as 325. The government recognized only 34 dead. In 2005 an independent investigation by an American non-governmental organization, National Security Archive, officially documented 44 dead, ten of whom were unidentified. The number of dead and disappeared has never been definitely recognized and remains an open question. The movement lasted until December with the occupation of several faculties and schools, and was then disbanded. The massacre of Tlatelolco gave impetus to the resurgence of a new wave of guerillas arising from the urban students' and workers' movement.

SEE ALSO: Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; May 1968 French Uprisings; Student Movements

References and Suggested Readings

García Pineda, C. (2002) *Testimonio de la Verdad (Tlatelolco 68)*. Mexico City: Editorial Claz.

- Jardón, R. (2003) *El Espionaje Contra el Movimiento Estudiantil*. Mexico City: Editorial Itaca.
- National Security Archive (2007) *The Dead of Tlatelolco*. Available at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB201/index.htm (downloaded May 15, 2008).
- Poniatowska, E. (1980) *Fuerte es el Silencio*. Mexico City: Editorial Era.
- Zermeño, S. (1978) *México: Una Democracia Utópica. El Movimiento Estudiantil del 68*. Mexico City: Siglo XXI.

Togliatti, Palmiro (1893–1964)

Mauro Stampacchia

Palmiro Togliatti was both a prominent leader of the Communist International and the secretary of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) between 1927 and his death in 1964. After the fall of Fascism he returned to Italy and contributed to shape the PCI as a new mass party, with a large electoral support and roots in the Italian working classes and society.

Togliatti was born in Genoa on March 26, 1893 and as a law student in Turin was active in the Socialist Party before World War I. During the war he was an interventionist, but he later joined the Ordine Nuovo group, and in 1921 the Communist Party. The year after, at the Congress in Rome, he was elected to the Central Committee. He then worked with Antonio Gramsci at the Congress in Lyon in 1926 to draft the Lyon Thesis, which became the political statement of the new Gramsci leadership. Togliatti attended the 5th Congress of the International in Moscow in 1924 and was elected to its Executive Committee.

The final takeover of Fascism and the disrupting of the Communist Party in 1926 found Togliatti in the USSR, where he was to become one of the foremost leaders of the International, one of the few not from the Russian Communist Party. However, his full support for Joseph Stalin and Nikolai Bukharin against Leon Trotsky brought him into conflict with Gramsci. Togliatti then succeeded Ruggiero Grieco as secretary of the PCI in 1927, a position he was to hold for the rest of his life.

Togliatti, with the battle name of Ercoli, played fundamental roles in all the internal conflicts of the Communist International. He kept close

to Stalin, not only in supporting the building of socialism in one country, but also in backing up after 1928 the new sectarian course known as the “socialfascism” period, though he does not seem to have shared this position completely.

When the 7th Congress in 1935 initiated the new “popular front” course, Togliatti was one of the foremost supporters of the new anti-Fascist alliance. In 1935 he published *Lezioni sul fascismo*, a series of lectures on Fascism in which he formulated the idea that Fascism was a “mass reactionary regime” that could draw consent from the middle classes and in Italian society as a whole. After July 1937 he was in Spain as a Comintern agent to enforce Stalin’s directives, which included the persecution of left-wing anarchists and Trotskyists. In 1938 he approved the execution of the whole Polish communist leadership, as well as the Grand Terror trials in the USSR. After the fall of republican Spain he was sent to France, where he was arrested in September 1939. Once released, he returned to the USSR, where he encountered a period of disgrace. He was accused by Gramsci’s widow of being an obstacle to the attempts to liberate Gramsci from prison, and he disagreed on the divulgation of Gramsci’s prison writings.

The anti-Fascist policies that the USSR embraced after being attacked by Germany in June 1941, and the fall of Fascism in Italy, gave him a new chance to affirm his political leadership. In March 1944 he returned to liberated Italy and used his influence and political stature, somewhat legendary among the communists, to negotiate a common stance in the Resistance between moderate monarchists and the more radical parties, communists included. The king would yield to his son Umberto as Lieutenant as soon as Rome was liberated, and it was agreed that the political and constitutional questions of monarchy vs. republic would be handled only after the end of the war, through a Constituent Assembly. In the meantime, anti-Fascist parties of the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale would be part of the executive, in the context of a politics of national unity.

During the Resistance and the postwar Constituent Assembly period, Italian communists were led by Togliatti (who held the post of minister of justice and subsequently of vice premier) into playing a national role. Only the Cold War disrupted this policy, and in May 1947 socialists and communists were left out of the executive

and were defeated in the general elections of April 18, 1948. Then, in a July 14, 1948 assassination attempt, Togliatti was severely wounded, and a general protest strike extended spontaneously to most of Italy, but the party leadership he had molded stood firm in not letting it get out of hand. Togliatti had devoted much of his political influence to avoid the Greek model of a communist insurrection.

During the Cold War Togliatti strongly backed the socialist camp theory of the USSR, but at the same time tried to limit its influence. He also sought to keep in check the radicalism and militancy inside the CPI, much under the influence of Pietro Secchia. He chose to transform the CPI into a mass party, with roots in factories and among peasants. “A party seat in every village” had been the organizational formula. The electoral turnout of the PCI under Togliatti’s leadership kept growing steadily.

In 1951 Togliatti refused Stalin’s proposal to go back to Moscow to lead the Cominform. The strong link with Soviet communism was a constant in Togliatti’s policy, but he also worked to gain full access and respectability in Italian politics. He pursued this goal at the cost of being considered by some a “double faced” political personality, shaped in ambiguity. Despite this characterization, Togliatti was a fine, if not shrewd, politician and a man of great culture. One of his contributions to the cultural policy of postwar Italy was the publication of a first (abridged) edition of Gramsci’s *Quaderni*.

In 1956 Togliatti had to face two main problems. In March Nikita Khrushchev, at the PCUS 20th Congress, denounced Stalin’s crimes, and Togliatti advanced the idea of policentrism in the international communist movement. But when the Hungarian revolt took place in November, he denounced it as a counterrevolution and gave his support to the Soviet invasion, encountering dissent from inside his party, as well as from union leaders and intellectuals who had expressed their sympathy to the PCI. For Togliatti, the national road to socialism did not imply major conflicts with Soviet leadership or a strong criticism of ideas that had been so far shared with Soviet leaders. The Sino-Soviet dispute saw Togliatti active on an international basis. Although an ally of Soviet Russia and a supporter of “peaceful coexistence,” he refuted the Soviet condemnation of communist China, as it defied his “polycentrism.”

Togliatti died in August 21, 1964 in Yalta, before a meeting in which he and other Soviet leaders were scheduled to tackle such hot matters. He had prepared a text, known as *Memoriale di Yalta*, to serve the purpose of political confrontation on international and Italian issues. This document, which suggested a different approach, could be considered his political testament. He called for actions based not on ideology but on current political issues, especially in response to Chinese (and Albanian) dissent, and he disagreed with an international conference to condemn dissent and advocated one that would gather communist parties in capitalist countries and liberation movements in former colonies. He stood for international actions of unions, and for communists to become “champions of freedom in intellectual life, of free artistic creation and scientific progress,” even advocating dialogue with Italian Catholics (Togliatti 1988).

After his death, the city of Stavropol in Samara province was renamed Togliattigrad in his memory. His funeral in Rome drew an extraordinary crowd, revealing his popularity, even if he is now controversial in both historiography and political studies.

SEE ALSO: Bordiga, Amadeo (1889–1970) and the Italian Communist Party; Dimitrov, Georgi (1882–1949); Gramsci, Antonio (1891–1937); Italian Communist Party; Italian Socialist Party; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- Agosti, A. (2008) *Palmiro Togliatti: A Biography*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Agosti, G. (1999) *Togliatti*. Turin: Utet.
- Aga Rossi, E. & Zaslavski, V. (1997) *Togliatti e Stalin. Il PCI e la politica estera staliniana negli archivi di Mosca*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Di Loreto, P. (1991) *Togliatti e la “doppiezza”: il Pci tra democrazia e insurrezione (1944–49)*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Ragionieri, E. (1976) *Palmiro Togliatti. Per una biografia politica ed intellettuale*. Rome: Editori Riuniti.
- Togliatti, P. (1967–73) *Opere*. Rome: Editori Riuniti.
- Togliatti, P. (1970) *Lezioni sul fascismo*. Rome: Editori Riuniti.
- Togliatti, P. (1988) *Il memoriale di Yalta*. Palermo: Sellerio.
- Urban, J. B. (1986) *Moscow and the Italian Communist Party: From Togliatti to Berlinguer*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Toivo Ya Toivo, Andimba (b. 1924)

Tilman Dederling

Hermann Andimba Toivo Ya Toivo was born on August 22, 1924 at Omangundu in Oshana Region of Namibia, near the Angolan border. After obtaining primary and secondary education in northern Namibia, Ya Toivo fought for the British in World War II from 1942 to 1943. After the war he initially worked as a teacher in Namibia and then moved to Cape Town employed as a railway police officer from 1952 to 1953. While in Cape Town, Ya Toivo joined with a network of other black Namibian expatriates and with black and anti-apartheid activists from all races and political persuasions. In 1957 he joined the South African National Congress (ANC) and Ya Toivo helped found the Ovamboland People's Congress (OPC), the precursor of the Ovamboland People's Organization (OPO), and forerunner to the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

In cooperation with Mburumba Kerina and Michael Scott, Ya Toivo petitioned the United Nations in 1958 protesting South Africa's occupation of Namibia. The apartheid government reacted by deporting Ya Toivo from Cape Town to Namibia, where he was placed under house arrest in Ovamboland. While under surveillance, Ya Toivo remained active in the community of political dissidents in Namibia, in 1965 meeting with the first combatants from SWAPO's armed wing that filtered into Namibia to agitate among the indigenous population. In 1966, when SWAPO formally launched an armed struggle against the occupying forces, Ya Toivo was arrested and taken to South Africa with other compatriots. In solitary confinement for more than a year, Ya Toivo and his co-accused were sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment by the Pretoria Supreme Court in 1968. His speech in the dock, condemning South Africa's occupation of Namibia, made international headlines.

Ya Toivo survived the hardships of imprisonment on notorious Robben Island and was eventually released on March 1, 1984, serving 16 of his 20-year sentence. After a brief stay in Namibia he went into exile in Zambia. In Lusaka, Zambia, Ya Toivo met Sam Nujoma, the president of SWAPO, for the first time and

became a member of the SWAPO Central Committee and Politburo and appointed secretary-general. During Namibia's transformation to independence Ya Toivo was a member of the Constituent Assembly. After independence, Ya Toivo was appointed to ministerial portfolios in the Namibian government, including Mines and Energy, Labor, and finally Prisons and Correctional Services. After retiring in 2005 Ya Toivo became a senior advisor at an international oil and gas company. In 2007 Ya Toivo lost reelection to SWAPO's Central Committee and Politburo, according to critical observers, due to his siding with a small splinter group that seceded from the organization.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Apartheid Movement, South Africa

References and Suggested Readings

- Dierks, K. (2002) *Chronology of Namibian History: From Pre-Historical Times to Independent Namibia*, 2nd ed. Windhoek: Namibia Scientific Society.
- Emmet, T. (1999) *Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915–1966*. Namibia Studies Series, 4. Basel: P Schlettwein Publishing.
- Hopwood, G. (2006) *Guide to Namibian Politics*, 2nd ed. Windhoek: Namibia Institute for Democracy.
- Nujoma, S. (2001) *Where Others Wavered. My Life in SWAPO and My Participation in the Liberation Struggle of Namibia. The Autobiography of Sam Nujoma*. London: Panaf.

Tolpuddle Martyrs, Britain, 1834

Paul A. Pickering

Successive wage reductions in Dorset, England in the early 1830s prompted a small group of agricultural laborers in the village of Tolpuddle to establish a trade union. Known as the Friendly Society of Agricultural Labourers, the aim and resolution of the members was simple: not to work for less than 10 shillings a week. Although restrictions on "combinations," the blanket term covering associations of workers, had been eased, trade unions were still regarded with fear and suspicion by the British elite. The Tolpuddle laborers had followed a longstanding ritual and sworn an oath to underscore their determination, leading local landowners to complain until the laborers were arrested for contravening the 1797 Mutiny Act that had made it illegal

for individuals to swear oaths of loyalty to each other.

The laborers were united by ties of flesh and blood as well as trade and neighborhood. Led by George Loveless, a Methodist preacher, the society met in the house of his brother in law, Thomas Standfield. Both these men were arrested, along with James Brine, James Hammett, George's brother, James Loveless, and Thomas's son, John Standfield. Despite no evidence of any seditious purpose on the part of the hapless laborers, at their trial they were treated very harshly and given the maximum sentence of transportation for 7 years to Australia. The laborers remained defiant in the face of persecution, and this contributed to their celebrity.

Petitions calling for their release were collected all over the country, culminating in a massive procession through the streets of London in 1834. In Parliament their cause was taken up by popular radicals, including Feargus O'Connor, a rising star in the radical movement who would go on to lead the Chartists. Like others, O'Connor focused on the hypocrisy of the incumbent Whig government that had come to power on a wave of popular support in the early 1830s. The Dorchester Unionists had "erred without a knowledge of the law," but members of the Cabinet were the ones who "had been the prime movers and actors in all the transactions which had for their object the promotion of political change by means of unions of the working classes."

The public outcry wore down the resolve of the government. All, except James Hammett, were released in 1836. Four of the six returned to England to a rousing welcome before moving to Ontario, Canada, where they are commemorated for their contribution to the labor movement. Hammett was released in 1837 and returned to Tolpuddle where he remained. He died in the Dorchester workhouse in 1891.

SEE ALSO: Chartists; O'Connor, Feargus (1796–1855)

References and Suggested Readings

- Loveless, G. (1837/1946) *The Victims of Whiggery: A Statement of the Persecutions Experienced by the Dorchester labourers with a Report of their Trial*. Hobart: privately published.
- Marlow, J. (1971) *The Tolpuddle Martyrs*. London: History Book.

Tolstoy, Leo N. (1828–1910)

*Alexandre J. M. E.
Christoyannopoulos*

Leo N. Tolstoy is one of the world's most esteemed authors of literature for his *War and Peace* (1869) and *Anna Karenina* (1887), but he is also the most famous proponent of Christian anarchist ideas. Although this more controversial part of his legacy was a target for suppression and misinformation during the Soviet era, his writings did influence figures like Mohandas Gandhi and Ammon Hennacy, as well as ordinary people in the wider pacifist movement.

After a long and increasingly acute existential crisis which he later narrated in *A Confession* (1879), Tolstoy converted to a deeply rationalistic, deistic version of Christianity toward the end of the 1870s. For him, the essence of Christianity was to be found in the Sermon on the Mount, where Jesus teaches not to resist evil with evil but to turn the other cheek instead. Tolstoy pondered this teaching and eventually concluded it to be the most rational idea ever pronounced, the only remedy for humanity to overcome the cycle of violence that has plagued human relations from time immemorial.

He accused the church of burying this revolutionary teaching in exchange for political power, and he blamed the state for perpetuating violence and slavery to the advantage of the well-to-do classes. For the last 30 years of his life, in numerous letters, essays, and books such as *What I Believe* (1884), *The Kingdom of God is Within You* (1893), and *The Slavery of Our Times* (1900), he used his talent to write intensive criticisms of both church and state, but also of any revolutionary group opting for the use of violence against these institutions. He wanted humanity to wake up from what he saw as its hypnotic submission to the lies, myths, and rituals maintained by the ruling classes, but he insisted that this also required a strict rejection of violence as a revolutionary method.

Despite being censored in tsarist Russia, Tolstoy's writings were widely circulated both in Russia and abroad. He also wrote letters directly to the clergy and to public officials pleading with them to repent, the only substantial result

of which was his excommunication in 1901. His followers were arrested and persecuted, and while Tolstoy longed to share this burden with them, the authorities did not want to make him a martyr. In the meantime, he forewent most of the luxurious habits he had grown into (he was born an aristocrat), became a vegetarian, worked the land, and generally strove to emulate as much as he could the simple life of Russian peasants which he admired. He also welcomed many distinguished visitors to Yasnaya Polyana (his home), and diligently answered the many letters from around the world that inquired about his ideas.

His political writings no longer circulate as widely as they once did, but they have inspired many conscientious objectors, Christians, and pacifists for over a century.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Russia; Day, Dorothy (1897–1980); Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869–1948); Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907

References and Suggested Readings

- Christoyannopoulos, A. J. M. E. (2008) Leo Tolstoy on the State: A Detailed Picture of Tolstoy's Denunciation of State Violence and Deception. *Anarchist Studies* 16 (1): forthcoming.
- Hopton, T. (2000) Tolstoy, God and Anarchism. *Anarchist Studies* 8: 27–52.
- Marshall, P. (1993) Leo Tolstoy: The Count of Peace. In *Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism*. London: Fontana.
- Maude, A. (1930) *The Life of Tolstoy*, 2 vols. London: Oxford University Press.
- Tolstoy, L. (1990) *Government is Violence: Essays on Anarchism and Pacifism*. Ed. D. Stephens. London: Phoenix.

Tone, Theobald Wolfe (1763–1798)

Karen Sonnelitter

Theobald Wolfe Tone was an Irish nationalist and political writer. He was born in Dublin on June 20, 1763 into a wealthy middle-class family, but its fortunes declined with a downturn in his father's coach-building business in the late 1770s. Theobald entered Trinity College in 1781, was suspended briefly for dueling, and graduated in 1786 before going on to train as a barrister. In 1785 he married Matilda Witherington, cloping

with her to the disapproval of her family. His career as a barrister commenced in 1789, and in 1790 he began writing pro-Whig political pamphlets.

At about that same time, Tone became friends with Thomas Russell, who asked him to compile resolutions for a political club that radical Dissenters (Presbyterians) planned to establish in Belfast on July 14, 1791, the second anniversary of the fall of the Bastille. Tone's resolutions were initially rejected because they included the demand for Catholic emancipation. In response he wrote *An Argument on Behalf of the Catholics of Ireland*, a persuasive tract that led the Dissenters to drop their objections and invite Tone to Belfast for the founding of the Society of United Irishmen. Tone thereafter gained a reputation as a political writer for both the United Irishmen and the Catholic Committee.

In 1794 Tone's radicalization deepened through political collaboration with William Jackson, an agent of revolutionary France. Jackson was betrayed to the authorities and arrested, prompting Tone to flee to the United States in 1795. The following year he went to Paris with the aim of negotiating French military assistance for the Irish independence struggle. He was commissioned as an officer in the French military with the expectation of commanding an invasion of Ireland to challenge British rule. When the Rebellion broke out in Ireland in 1798, Tone was authorized to lead a small French force in a raid on the coast. His ship was captured by an English squadron, however, and he was taken prisoner. He was tried and convicted by a military court and sentenced to be publicly hanged. Tone considered hanging an unbearable humiliation, so he cut his own throat the night before his scheduled execution and died a week later, on November 18, 1798. Tone's wife and children remained in France, and his journals were published posthumously by his son in 1826.

Wolfe Tone's martyrdom, and the courageous and eloquent defense of Irish independence he expressed at his trial, won him the admiration of later generations of Irish revolutionaries who have immortalized him as "the father of Irish republicanism."

SEE ALSO: Fitzgerald, Lord Edward (1763–1798); Ireland, Age of Revolutions, 1775–1803; Ireland, Great

Rebellion, 1798; Napper Tandy, James (1737?–1803); O'Connor, Arthur (1763–1852); United Irishmen

References and Suggested Readings

- Curtin, N. J. (1998) *The United Irishmen: Popular Politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791–1798*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Elliott, M. (1989) *Wolfe Tone: Prophet of Irish Independence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Knox, O. (1997) *Rebels and Informers: Stirrings of Irish Independence*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Tone, T. W. (1826/1998) *Life of Theobald Wolfe Tone*. Ed. T. Bartlett. Dublin: Lilliput.

Torres Restrepo, Camilo (1929–1966)

Edward T. Brett

Camilo Torres Restrepo was born into an upper-class family from Bogotá, Colombia on February 3, 1929. After studying law at the Universidad Nacional in Bogotá, he entered the seminary to study for the Catholic priesthood. Following his ordination in 1954, he was sent to the Pontifical Roman Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium to do graduate work in political science and sociology. After earning a licentiate, he returned to Colombia where he co-founded the sociology faculty with Orlando Fals Borda at the Universidad Nacional in Bogotá and served as national chaplain of the university student movement. During this time he also worked with various popular organizations devoted to social justice, especially agrarian reform.

Influenced by Fidel Castro's Marxist revolution and some of the more radical theological intellectual movements in the Catholic Church, he began to cooperate with Marxist activists in his pursuit of social justice. In January 1965 he formed the Frente Unido (United Front), a leftist coalition dedicated to radical social reform, but through non-violent, lawful means. This brought the wrath of the Colombian Catholic hierarchy upon him and when the conservative prelate of Bogotá, Cardinal Luis Concha, forbade him to lecture, speak, or write on social problems and ordered him to resign from his professorship, he asked the cardinal to release him from active priesthood. On June 18, 1965 Concha granted him his request, but

noted that he was being laicized because he rejected the doctrines and ordinances of the Catholic church.

The Frente Unido quickly grew in numbers, prompting authorities to accuse Torres of being a Marxist-Leninist. In his "Message to the Communists" he denied this, stating that as a Christian and a priest he could never become a communist. Nonetheless, he added that he was willing to collaborate with everyone, regardless of their affiliation, who attempts to improve the world. When security forces arrested several members of the Frente Unido, Torres concluded that the elite-based Colombian power structure would never allow peaceful change and that violent revolution was therefore necessary. In early 1965 he began to meet secretly with representatives of the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (Army of National Liberation) (ELN), a Marxist guerrilla group organized after the Cuban model. On October 18, 1965 he publicly announced that he had joined the ELN as a low-ranking combatant. Claiming that Marxism and Christianity were compatible, he attempted to provide spiritual direction to his fellow combatants. Since the ELN guerrillas were poorly armed, they planned an ambush of an army patrol in the department of Santander. Torres, who had not yet experienced combat, convinced his superiors to let him take part. On February 15, 1966 he died in his first battle.

Seeing the propaganda value of Torres' death, the ELN declared him a revolutionary martyr. Consequently, throughout the 1960 and 1970s, he served as an inspiration for some leftist Christians, such as Néstor Paz in Bolivia, Maryknoll Father Thomas Melville in Guatemala, and Sacred Heart Father Gaspar García Laviana in Nicaragua, motivating them to join guerrilla movements as "Christian revolutionaries."

SEE ALSO: *Bogotazo* and *La Violencia*; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Ejército de Liberación Nacional, Colombia; Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer (1898–1948), UNIR, and Revolutionary Populism in Colombia; Lame, Manuel Quintín (1880–1967), Indian/Peasant Organization, and the Struggle for Land in Colombia, 1920s–1930s

References and Suggested Readings

- Guzman, G. (1969) *Camilo Torres*. Trans. J. D. Ring. New York: Sheed & Ward.
- Torres, C. (1972) *Father Camilo Torres: Revolutionary Writings*. New York: Harper & Row.

Torrijos, General Omar (1929–1981)

Inga Töller

General Omar Torrijos Herrera was a military dictator of the Panamanian Republic between 1968 and 1981. He took power by a coup d'état in 1968. His politics were formed by progressive and nationalist policies with a focus on the rural areas, social security, health, and education. He also wanted to regain the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone from the United States and thus recover national sovereignty.

Torrijos was born to rural teachers on February 13, 1929 in Santiago, in the province of Veraguas, Panama. He earned a scholarship to the Military Academy in El Salvador and there he achieved the rank of 2nd lieutenant of infantry. In 1952 he started working with the Panamanian National Guard (the national army), where he became lieutenant colonel in 1966.

After his third reelection on October 1, 1968, the former oligarchic and fascist president, Dr. Arnulfo Arias, who was deposed three times by military coups backed by the National Guard, decided to restructure the National Guard and the overseas delegation and demote several of the high commanders. This was what spurred Torrijos, who was then secretary of the Commander's Office of the National Guard, and Major Boris Martínez, to carry out the coup d'état on October 10, 1968. After the takeover, Martínez first held the highest position in the Panamanian state, but he was sent overseas by Torrijos in 1969, after an unapproved speech Martínez gave on public television. Torrijos then began to act as head of state.

Torrijos' national politics were marked by several reforms in favor of the poor, which helped him gain great support from the Panamanian poor, working class, and parts of the middle classes in urban as well as rural areas. His reforms included the division of the ministry on work and welfare, social provision and public health, opening of communitarian health centers, implementation of public vaccinations, a rise in the numbers of employees in the public health sector, and enforcement of communitarian allotments for food production, so that by 1972 the health and social system had improved considerably. Housing was also increased. The

educational sector experienced major changes in institutions; for example, the foundation of the Institute for the Formation and Utilization of the Human Resources and the National Institute of Culture. Moreover, the numbers of matriculations in primary and secondary schools increased 90 percent, and in universities 180 percent. More schools were built and more personnel were employed. Minor changes occurred in the agrarian sector where the government bought land and built settlements for the poor. Agrarian Councils were formed. A major change was the new constitution and the new legislation in 1972, which implied a new governmental structure and gave Torrijos the provisional title of chief of the government (1972–8) and nearly absolute power.

The student and popular social movement held a divided position concerning Torrijos. The group that allied with Torrijos saw him as a progressive, anti-imperialistic and anti-oligarchic force, and saw in his military government a new armed force supporting major social change. His opponents argued for an anti-militarist government with no links to the political oligarchy. Other leftist groups such as Marxist MLN-29 and Marxist-Leninist MUR, which saw themselves in the tradition of the Cuban Revolution, were opposed to Torrijos' military leadership and suffered the repressive violence of Torrijos' military forces.

Torrijos' major aim was to recover the sovereignty of Panama and to end the colonial enclave within the Panamanian Republic by regaining the Panama Canal and its Canal Zone. In order to browbeat the United States to end the unequal treaty of 1903, Torrijos sought international support. Supporters of this cause were Tito in Yugoslavia, Velasco Alvarado in Peru, Bánzer in Bolivia, Perón in Argentina, and Portillo in Mexico. Finally, the Torrijos-Carter Treaty was signed on September 7, 1977 in Washington, which promised to return the Panama Canal and its Zone to Panama on December 31, 1999.

Torrijos also formed relationships with the Latin American socialist countries. He supported the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua against the Somoza dictatorship and the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) for national freedom in El Salvador. He assisted the Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries in Cuba in 1979. His international politics were marked by dialogue,

not by confrontation. This is why he met with different parties of conflicting groups and invited them to Panama for discussions, a strategy which was criticized by the occidental powers.

On July 31, 1981 Torrijos died in an airplane crash. There is debate about whether this was an accident or whether it was an assassination. Public opinion on Omar Torrijos was and is today strongly polarized in Panama. On the one hand, he is praised for his social governance and for his international politics and his work as a mediator and negotiator between conflicts. On the other hand, he is accused of using repressive methods against his political opponents, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 1978 accused him of violating human rights, citing “disappearances” of his enemies. His oldest son Martín Torrijos won the elections for the presidency in 2004, but in public dissociates himself from his father’s politics.

SEE ALSO: Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN); Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN); Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980)

References and Suggested Readings

- De León Jiménez, E. M. (1996) *Torrijos: Un camino por correr*. Panama: Fundación Omar Torrijos.
- Escobar Bethancourt, R. (1981) *Torrijos: ¡Colonia Americana, No!* Bogotá: Carlos Valencia Editores.
- Greene, G. (1984) *Getting to Know the General: The Story of an Involvement*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Vargas, D. (2004) *Omar Torrijos Herrera y la Patria Internacional*. Panama: Fundación Omar Torrijos.

Tory rebellion, Ireland

G. K. Peatling

“Tory rebellion” is most commonly used in Irish history to refer to elite and popular Protestant resistance to concessions to Catholic nationalist interests. “Tory,” however, arose in mid-seventeenth-century Ireland as a term applied to outlaws, often assumed to have been dispossessed Catholics, although they may have had little political motivation. Later in the century it was imported into British politics as a term of derision applied to supporters of conservative Anglo-Catholicism and Jacobitism. Applications of the term shifted as the Jacobite threat receded, and late eighteenth-century “Tories” resumed

a close relationship to the British monarchy and the Protestant establishment.

By the nineteenth century, therefore, by association, supporters of the British establishment in Ireland – a predominantly Anglican group – were being labeled “Tories.” While the British political “Tory” party became more commonly referred to as the “Conservative” party in the nineteenth century, “Tory” continued to be used thereafter as a term of affirmation and derision. Most definitively, opposition to home rule by Protestant “Tories” backed by English “Tories,” especially in Ulster in the period 1911–14, is conceived of as Tory rebellion. This “rebellion” frustrated demands for home rule, and ultimately helped to avert the establishment of an all-Ireland jurisdiction. An echo of “Tory rebellion” thus appeared in protests intended to preserve a position of strength for Protestants in late twentieth-century Northern Ireland.

“Tory rebellion” has thus been a persistent if changing phenomenon in modern Irish history. A cognate historiographical debate pertains to how far it was a manifestation of rooted differences between Britain and even unionist Ireland (Jackson 1989; Loughlin 1995: 33–7). For Stewart (1977), “Tory rebellion” was a historically embedded democratic movement, dependent on the united support of Protestant communities often acting in the teeth of British government policy. Fanning (2004), however, suggests that in the crucial context of 1911–14, Tory rebellion was dependent on collusion within elements of the British ruling class and establishment itself, suggesting it was an example of counterrevolution. But “Tory rebellion” has not always been effective in Irish history, as the ultimate failure of resistance to Catholic emancipation and disestablishment in the nineteenth century shows.

SEE ALSO: Ireland, the Troubles; Irish Nationalism, Irish Revolts, 1400–1790; Jacobite Risings, Britain, 1715 and 1745

References and Suggested Readings

- Boyce, D. G. & O’Day, A. (Eds.) (2006) *The Ulster Crisis*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Fanning, R. (2004) *The Home Rule Crisis of 1912–14 and the Failure of British Democracy in Ireland*. In M. J. Bric & J. Coakley (Eds.), *From Political Violence to Negotiated Settlement: The Winding Path to Peace in Twentieth-Century Ireland*. Dublin: University College Dublin Press.

- Jackson, A. (1989) *The Ulster Party: Irish Unionists in the House of Commons, 1884–1911*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Loughlin, J. L. (1995) *Ulster Unionism and British National Identity since 1885*. London: Pinner.
- Prest, W. R. (1998) *Albion Ascendant: English History, 1660–1815*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stewart, A. T. Q. (1977) *The Narrow Ground: Aspects of Ulster, 1609–1969*. London: Faber & Faber.

Toussaint Louverture and the Haitian Revolution, 1796–1799

Alexander King

Political developments in revolutionary France naturally ran up against a solid front of rejection from neighboring European monarchies. This rejection became all the more uncompromising with the increasing radicalization of the revolutionary process leading up to the proclaiming of the Republic. During the trial of the deposed King Louis XVI before the National Convention, which led to his execution in January 1793, the hostilities in Europe intensified until the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars beginning in 1792. On February 1, 1793 France declared war on Britain, which had taken the leadership position among the monarchist opponents of the Revolution. Then on March 7, 1793 France declared war on Spain. France was now engaged in war on several fronts: internally against the counterrevolution, at its borders against the hostile European powers, and in the Caribbean for its colonies. In 1793 both Spain and Britain took advantage of the turmoil that had befallen the colony of Saint-Domingue and attempted to take this potentially lucrative colony away from France.

The economic prosperity of the French half of the island had all along aroused the envy and greed of the Spanish colonial masters of Santo Domingo. For this reason, since the beginning of the slave revolt in Saint-Domingue in 1791, sporadically there had been small, rather informal acts of assistance by Spanish soldiers to the insurgents. Principally, though, Spain at first remained neutral. However, under the impact of the increasing antagonism between France and Spain in the wake of the revolutionary process in France – and prior to the French-Spanish War – neutrality was abandoned in the Caribbean



Toussaint Louverture (1743–1803) was the influential leader of the Haitian Revolution who abolished slavery and led the French colony of Saint-Domingue to independence. After his conquests in Haiti, Louverture invaded Santo Domingo where he also freed the enslaved. He is credited with defeating imperial armies from France, Spain, and Great Britain. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

as well. In February 1793 the governor of Santo Domingo, Joaquín García y Moreno, began a systematic recruitment of black insurgents from Saint-Domingue for his armed forces. He offered the insurgents freedom in exchange for putting themselves under the Spanish flag. But it was the aim of the Spaniards to take advantage of the moment to bring the entire island under their rule in order to preserve the old colonial order – including slavery.

Jean-François and Biassou, who had headed the insurgency since the outbreak of the revolts in the summer of 1791, put themselves under Spanish command in May 1793; Toussaint Louverture did the same in June. What at first glance appears to be a joining together of insurmountably opposed interests – the slaves' drive for emancipation versus the aim of the Spanish crown to preserve the old colonial order – had its basis not only in an agreement regarding military strategy, but also in an agreement in the realm of ideas. In accordance with their beliefs and the traditions of the

societies from which they came, the black insurgents of the northern plains were not in the least republican; on the contrary, they were fervently royalist. The rebel leader, Macaya, who in 1793 would drive out the royalist Galbaud from Cap Français on behalf of the Jacobin Sonthonax, had as late as the early 1790s compared the three kings of France, Spain, and the Congo to the three kings of the nativity account in the Bible. The insurgents also believed that the French king, Louis XVI, was on their side. In the summer of 1791 a rumor had spread throughout the colony that the king had, in line with the demands of the insurgents, ordered the abolishment of the whip and an increase in the slaves' leisure time; but, according to the rumor, the king's order was being boycotted by the white planters of Saint-Domingue, and the king himself was being held hostage by scoundrels in France. The insurgents therefore adorned themselves with the insignia of the monarchy to express their solidarity with the king, whom they saw as their benefactor, and they repeatedly declared that they were fighting for the king.

In the summer the Plaine du Nord and the adjacent parts of the mountain range directly to the south, Massif du Nord, were fully outside the control of the French government. The insurgents had established a kind of liberated zone on the ascent to the Massif du Nord, which is the natural border between the Plaine du Nord in the North, the central Haitian plateau in the South (under Spanish sovereignty at that time), and the Vallée de l'Arbimonite in the Southwest. This liberated zone extended from Ouanaminthe in the East and Vallière in the Southeast to the Grande-Rivière-du-Nord and Dondon in the West. Within this area slavery was at least at times abolished. Above all, this territory included the French colony's former northern border with the neighboring Spanish colony. The insurgents therefore had an "open line of communication with Spanish Santo Domingo," as Bell (2007: 38) puts it. Biassou and Jean-François had established themselves along the Spanish border in the mountains of the Massif du Nord; the scarcely populated Spanish central plateau to the South served as a convenient retreat and source of supplies. Toussaint Louverture had already spent the autumn of 1791 there in safety together with his wife and children.

After the execution of Louis XVI the black insurgents fought against the Republic with all

the more determination and finally went over to the side of the Spanish monarchy; there their leaders quickly took leading positions in the battle against the French troops. Both Biassou and Jean-François rose to high military rank and were honored with awards. Their defection to the Spanish flag turned the liberated zone into Spanish-occupied territory, which Biassou and Jean-François divided between themselves: the latter took command over the eastern part, from Ouanaminthe to the Grande-Rivière-du-Nord; Biassou took command over the mountainous region south and west of Grande-Rivière-du-Nord and the adjacent region to the west between Dondon and Limbé. Toussaint Louverture, who had joined with Biassou in November 1791, followed him and Jean-François to the Spanish side and, like them, made a career for himself in the Spanish army. Within half a year he had reached the rank of lieutenant general in the royal army.

There were 14,000 black recruits in the ranks of the Spanish governor's troops. With their help the Spaniards were able to conquer large parts of the northern part of Saint-Domingue (Massif du Nord, Artibonite). The conflicts of interest between the black insurgents and their Spanish allies soon became clear, however, especially after the French commissioners Sonthonax and Polverel abolished slavery in Saint-Domingue. The contradictions on the Spanish side became all the more clearly accentuated in 1794, when hundreds of former French plantation owners poured into the Spanish-occupied parts of Saint-Domingue in the hope that the new rulers would give them their plantations and slaves again. Jean-François answered these hopes with a massacre: in July 1794 he had several hundred French planters killed in Fort-Dauphin under the eyes of the Spanish troops. But he, like Biassou, stayed with the Spanish when Toussaint Louverture switched sides and joined the French army in May 1794. Following the Spanish defeat and the 1795 Peace Treaty of Basel, Biassou and Jean-François left the island. Biassou settled in Florida, while Jean-François settled in Spain.

When Toussaint Louverture and his 4,000 troops joined forces with the French army, the fortunes of the war changed. In October 1794 Toussaint Louverture conquered the border towns of the Saint Raphaël and Saint Michel for the French. The Spaniards were beaten. Also, in

Europe, the war ended with France victorious and thus able to gain recognition as a European power on an equal footing with other nations. Per the Treaty of Basel, Spain was forced to cede its colony of Santo Domingo to France in July 1795.

British Intervention and Alliance with White Planters

Fearing loss of ownership of their plantations and slaves – and in the hope of preserving the old colonial order from which they had profited – French planters had, after the outbreak of the revolutions in France and in Saint-Domingue, repeatedly made secret attempts to form an alliance with France’s arch-enemy, Great Britain; they even offered to place themselves under the sovereignty of the British crown.

As in the case of the confrontation between Spain and France, the British military intervention in Saint-Domingue came in the wake of the war in Europe. In September 1793, 600 British soldiers came from Jamaica and landed in Môle Saint Nicolas on the northwestern coast of Saint-Domingue. Like Spain, Britain had the dual goal of seizing a potentially rich colony and simultaneously containing the spread of revolutionary ideas in the Caribbean. The resident white planters welcomed the British invaders with joyous acclaim. The subsequent landings of British troops on other parts of the western coast of Saint-Domingue (Léogane, Arcahaie, Saint-Marc) were also met with rejoicing by the white population, which supported the British invasion in the hope that it would provide security for the preservation of the slave economy.

During the first years of the war the British were able to push forward to Mirebalais and Lascahobas in the East and to Grande-Rivière-du-Nord in the North and to bring a third of Saint-Domingue under their control – supported by the militias of the white planters. Despite some effort, they were not able to establish an alliance with the Spaniards, even though the Spaniards were their allies in the war in Europe. The desire to take possession of the rich colony of Saint-Domingue was simply too strong. Therefore, the powers fought in different regions of the colony: Britain in the West and in the South and Spain in the North and in the East, and without getting in each other’s way.

Disease and the tropical heat took their toll on the British troops, just as on the Spanish

troops, and brought their advance to a halt. The hope of conquering the colony for Britain gave way to a defensive war with the sole aim of holding established positions and not losing them to the adversary. All in all, 20,000 British soldiers were deployed in Saint-Domingue, assisted by several thousand colonists and German merchants. The governor of Jamaica was their military commander and was at the same time governor of the British zone of Saint-Domingue. He sought close cooperation with the white planters. Outside the cities, British authority was frequently enforced by the French planters’ militias, in which black mercenaries also fought.

The economic results of the British invasion were mixed. In some communities, where the supremacy of the French planters and their British protector had been secured (for example, in Jérémie), agricultural production continued with the utilization of slaves just as before the Revolution. However, in many communities it was not possible to resume operation of the plantation economy that had been shattered by the civil war. The occupation proved to be very costly. This, and the persistent and increasing military threat of the republican troops under the leadership of Toussaint Louverture in the West and the North and of André Rigaud, who headed up the mulattos, in the South – along with the consequent rising costs of the occupation – induced the British government finally to withdraw troops from Saint-Domingue in September 1798.

Rise of Toussaint Louverture in the Spanish-French War

The rise of Toussaint Louverture as the leading military and political figure in Saint-Domingue is closely linked with the Spanish-British-French war on the island. Toussaint, who in the course of his military and political ascent adopted the surname Louverture (“the opening”), was born as François Dominique Toussaint Bréda on May 20, 1743, on the possession of Bréda in Haut-du-Cap, a few kilometers away from Cap Français. He was the son of black slaves of the Aradas tribe. His grandfather Gaou Guinou had been the king of this tribe on the southern coast of West Africa (near present-day Ghana). Gaou Guinou’s son of the same name, Toussaint’s father, had been captured during a war with an enemy tribe, sold to European

slave traders, and then transported to Saint-Domingue. For some historians, Toussaint Louverture's royal ancestry is an explanation of his early attachment first to the French king and then to the Spanish king.

Toussaint was a *Créole*, a black born in Saint-Domingue, in contrast to the majority of those *Bossales* who had been born in Africa and transported to Saint-Domingue. And something else set Toussaint apart from those whose advocate he would later become. Although he was himself a black and always relied in his military and political struggle on the *nouveaux libres*, the black majority that had been liberated by the decree of February 4, 1794, he himself belonged to the group in the *anciens libres* or *Affranchis* dominated by mulattos, who had already been free prior to the Revolution. In 1776 his owner had freed him from slavery. At the onset of the Revolution of 1789 he was himself a property owner (some say he was a tenant) of a successful coffee plantation with 13 slaves in Grande-Rivière-du-Nord.

Toussaint was not one of the leaders at the beginning of the insurrection; in November 1791 he joined the group allied to Biassou. In December 1791 he belonged to the delegation that, under the leadership of Biassou and Jean-François, carried out negotiations with the First Civil Commission regarding a possible end of the slave uprising. Following the failure of these negotiations and a period of stagnation and dispersion, the struggle of the blacks and the rise of Toussaint Louverture as a central figure in this struggle gained new impetus when the leaders decided, in the spring and summer of 1793, to join the army of the Spanish king.

In August 1793 Toussaint Louverture drew attention to himself with a statement that he made from Camp Turel, an insurgent post in the border mountains between Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo, addressed to the insurgent slaves. For the first time he formulated his own claim to leadership: "Brothers and Friends, I am Toussaint Louverture, perhaps my name has made itself known to you. I have undertaken vengeance. I want Liberty and Equality to reign in Saint Domingue. I am working to make that happen. Unite yourselves to us, brothers, and fight with us for the same cause" (cited in Bell 2007: 18).

Toussaint had already joined the Spanish army and was operating along the Cordon de l'Ouest, the border between the Spanish cen-

tral plateau and the northern part of Saint-Domingue. He had by this time already come a long way: as a plantation and slave owner, he had been among those who had profited from the colonial order. He had a close friendship with the caretaker of the plantation on which he had worked as a slave when he was younger, a friendship that lasted even during the exile of his friend, who fled with Galbaud and other white royalists from Cap Français to the United States in June 1793. At the beginning of the insurgency Toussaint had not aspired, any more than the other leaders did, to the complete overthrow of the old regime. Years of insurgency in Saint-Domingue both radicalized Toussaint and made him into a committed defender of the freedom of all former slaves. This conviction did not end with his alliance with Spain. In this Toussaint differed from Biassou and Jean-François, who after joining the Spanish side engaged in the slave trade, were primarily concerned with obtaining financial security for themselves, and showed little enthusiasm for further military ventures. Although Toussaint had at first only been a field marshal subordinate to the generals Biassou and Jean-François, he quickly took a dominant role during the battle for military position along the Cordon de l'Ouest. His military successes, and his consequent control of the Cordon, isolated the Plaine du Nord and Cap Français from the rest of the French colony. At the same time he single-mindedly made use of his integration into the Spanish military apparatus to enlarge his own military power. He built up an army of 4,000 that was subordinate to him alone, and he was thus able to emancipate himself from Biassou. By the spring of 1794 Toussaint Louverture had attained such military power that it became of critical importance in Saint-Domingue which way he would lean. The British invasion was no longer progressing and British troops were loath to fight in the inaccessible mountain regions. The Spanish advance also stagnated. Spanish conquests were more conquests by Toussaint himself and became regions that he ruled. French territory was intersected and divided up by military front lines. In this stalemate, all parties sought to get Toussaint Louverture on their side. He decided to put himself at the service of France.

He may have had many different reasons for this decision. First, by this time the rivalry with Biassou and Jean-François, both of whom had

observed his ascent in the Spanish army with growing distrust, had taken on dangerous proportions. Both had already threatened him militarily; they had had his brother Pierre killed and the families of his followers kidnapped and sold as slaves. A second reason might have been the proclamation of the universal prohibition of slavery by the French National Convention on February 4, 1794. Opinions differ as to whether Toussaint had already been informed of the decision of the Convention by the time he went over to the side of the Republic. The official proclamation of the decision was publicly noticed in Saint-Domingue at a later time, but it is quite possible that the report had previously reached Toussaint, who was generally well informed and up to date regarding European affairs. When Toussaint joined the French armed forces they gained the upper hand against Spain and were also able to recapture territory from the British. From Trou-du-Nord to Marmelade, Plaisance, and Ennery and then to Gonaïves, the French troops took back control of the Cordon de l'Ouest.

In July 1794 Toussaint became the commander of the Cordon de l'Ouest; in October 1795 he became brigadier general; and in August 1796 he became division general. In September 1797 he was made general of the army, the supreme commander of the French troops in Saint-Domingue. Along with his military ascent began also his rise to political power. In all regions that he conquered for the Republic he immediately took over military and administrative control.

Third Civil Commission

Meanwhile, during the years 1794 and 1795, the political situation in France had again changed. With the execution of Robespierre on July 28, 1794, the reign of the Jacobins and the radicalization phase had come to an end; these had commenced in the spring of 1793 with the establishment of the Welfare Committee and the Revolutionary Tribunal, followed by the forced removal of the Girondists from the National Convention in June 1793, and had finally led to a reign of terror.

Among the revolutionists, the forces of the grand bourgeoisie prevailed. The new Constitution of August 22, 1795 secured their privileges. As the government an Executive Directory, made up of five conservative republicans, was

established. At the same time, France succeeded in delivering a decisive blow against external threats. After France negotiated a peace agreement with Prussia in early April 1795, it was able, after a successful military advance into northern Spain, to end the war with Spain. Thereby two important enemies from within the monarchist coalition were eliminated, and France once again became a recognized major power in Europe.

In the Peace Treaty of Basel of July 22, 1795 France received from Spain the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo. For the first time, the entire island of Saint-Domingue was formally under French rule, even though France initially had neither the military nor the administrative capacity to establish De Facto sovereignty over the eastern part of the island. The new Constitution of 1795 defined the French colonies as integral parts of the Republic. Furthermore, the Constitution envisioned the possibility of sending agents to the colonies that would have the same authority as the Executive Directory in the metropolis and to whose instructions they would be bound. There seemed to be a strong need for assignment of such an agent to the colony of Saint-Domingue.

The British occupation of parts of the colony (in the West and in the South) continued and was further consolidated. In the territories that were not occupied, the French administration increasingly lost control to competing local warlords: the mulatto generals Villatte in Cap Français (until his failed coup of March 1796) and André Rigaud in the South – both enjoyed the support of the local mulattos, the *anciens libres* – and Toussaint Louverture as the leader of the blacks, the *nouveaux libres*, along the Cordon de l'Ouest. Against this background the agents sent by the Executive Directory as the Third Civil Commission to go to Saint-Domingue had a threefold assignment: they were to drive the British occupiers from the island, reconcile the various factions in Saint-Domingue, and reestablish the colonial order.

The Third Civil Commission was led by Léger-Félicité Sonthonax, who had been deported from Saint-Domingue to France as a prisoner upon the termination of the Second Civil Commission but who had been able to rehabilitate himself in France after the fall of Robespierre and had since then become celebrated as a hero. Among the five agents of the Third Civil Commission was Philippe-Rose Roume,

previously a member of the First Civil Commission and thus another agent with many years of experience in Saint-Domingue. Sonthonax and Roume were accompanied by the mulatto Julien Raymond, who since the 1780s had lobbied in Paris on behalf of the rights of the free blacks and mulattos. There were also two other agents and 900 soldiers.

Roume came to the island in April 1796; he was the only one of the five agents to move into quarters in Santo Domingo, which now belonged to France. The other agents, including Sonthonax, arrived a month later in Saint-Domingue. Following the failed coup of the mulatto General Villatte, the agents saw a danger to the unity of the colony in the regional dominance of the mulattos, especially in the South. Sonthonax especially mistrusted the mulattos. The commission therefore sent a delegation to the Southern Province to reorganize relations there as they saw fit. The delegation met with considerable local resistance and rioting and was finally forced to flee. The subpoena of the commission upon the leaders of the mulattos in the South, including André Rigaud and his brother Augustin, which required them to appear in France before the parliament, was defied; the subpoena was tied to the tail of a donkey that was then driven through the streets of Cayes.

The stay of the Third Civil Commission in Saint-Domingue was only of short duration and characterized by internal squabbles. Its end was initiated in an unforeseen way by the surprising election of its president, Sonthonax, and of the current governor, Etienne Laveaux, as two of the first six new representatives from Saint-Domingue to the French parliament. It is difficult to understand the choice of these two, considering their responsibility for key tasks and the important positions they held in Saint-Domingue; some historians describe this choice as the result of manipulation by Toussaint Louverture, who in this way wanted to get rid of two competitors.

Sonthonax and Toussaint, who had for years been in agreement with each other, had in the end parted company over the issue of how to handle the large landowners who had emigrated. Sonthonax, the radical Jacobin, took a harsh attitude towards emigrants, but Toussaint counted on them for the reconstruction of the devastated economy of Saint-Domingue. In August 1797 Toussaint Louverture finally resorted to military

threats to force Sonthonax, who for a year had steadfastly refused to depart, to take up his mandate in France and therefore to leave the colony.

End of British Occupation and French Control

Sonthonax's successor, General Joseph d'Hédouville, who arrived in Santo Domingo in March 1798, had received orders from the Executive Directory to limit the increasing power of Toussaint Louverture in the colony. Hédouville tried to bring the colonial administration under his control by replacing followers of Toussaint Louverture with administrative personnel he had brought with him to Saint-Domingue. Hédouville pursued the goals of bringing the administration under civilian control, rolling back the influence of black military personnel in the administration, and reducing the size of the army. Toussaint Louverture was actively opposed to these ideas. Despite the resistance of the agents, he furthermore persisted in his cooperative efforts to rebuild the colonial economy with the assistance of the large landowners who had emigrated, a policy that had already brought him into antagonism with Hédouville's predecessor, Sonthonax.

To weaken Toussaint's position, Hédouville drove a wedge between him and the mulatto leader André Rigaud, who ruled the rebellious Southern Province, by granting Rigaud the rank of army general for the Southern Province and thus putting him on the same level as Toussaint. But with the departure of the British from Saint-Domingue, Toussaint Louverture was able to buttress his own claim to power: after Toussaint's troops had taken from the British the strategically important Mirebalais in the south of the Artibonite valley, they succeeded in March 1798 in breaking through the circle of defense surrounding the coastal city of Archahaie; they were thus able to threaten the most important positions held by the British, Saint Marc and Port-au-Prince. In this strong position, Toussaint negotiated with the British occupiers regarding their complete withdrawal from the Western Province, and he did not include Hédouville, the representative of the French central power, in these negotiations. A key part of the agreement that Toussaint negotiated with the British was the granting of impunity to the French planters who had collaborated with the British. Many planters

nevertheless left western Saint-Domingue in May 1798 together with the British; Toussaint promised to respect the property rights of those who remained. That it was Toussaint who negotiated with the British regarding their withdrawal signified a defeat for Rigaud. Furthermore, this was a political setback for Hédouville, who was not included in the negotiations and who would not have approved the agreements concerning the treatment of the white planters. His authority was shaken.

In the fall of 1798, when rioting in the military camp of Fort Liberté spilled over into the Plaine-du-Nord and grew into a general uprising against Hédouville, Toussaint not only refused to give the agents his help, but he put himself at the head of the rebellion and tried to have Hédouville arrested. Hédouville took refuge on a ship in Cap Français and left the island on October 22, 1798. As his successor, Hédouville named André Rigaud.

After the withdrawal of the British, who in September 1798 held only two positions – Jérémie in the extreme southwestern part of the island and Môle Saint Nicolas in the extreme northwestern part – and after the nearly simultaneous escape of Hédouville, Toussaint could turn his attention to the internal tensions in Saint-Domingue in order finally to consolidate his power.

SEE ALSO: Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (1758–1806); French Revolution, 1789–1794; Haiti, Revolutionary Revolts, 1790s; Haiti, Revolutionary Struggles; Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath; Haiti, Saint-Domingue and Revolutionary France; Haitian Revolution and Independence, 1801–1804; Ogé's Revolt, 1790

References and Suggested Readings

- Bell, M. S. (2007) *Toussaint Louverture: A Biography*. New York: Pantheon.
 Moise, C. (2003) *Dictionnaire historique de la révolution Haïtienne (1789–1804)*. Montréal: Images et al.

Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)

Benjamin Shepard

Organized by HIV-positive South African activist Zachie Achmont in 1998, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) helped the international move-

ment for access to medication and therapy for people living with HIV/AIDS in South Africa and around the world. Building on the lessons of the US activist group AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP), TAC took the stigma of HIV/AIDS head on, shifting debate about the disease from deviance to one of human rights and access to treatment.

In public demonstrations in the early 2000s, both HIV-positive and HIV-negative members of the organization wore t-shirts with the words "HIV POSITIVE" to increase visibility for people with HIV/AIDS and reduce social isolation among those with the disease in South Africa. Anti-apartheid icon and international human rights hero Nelson Mandela, leader of the South African anti-apartheid movement and former president, wore an "HIV POSITIVE" t-shirt as a symbol of the need to expand public access to HIV treatment. Mandela's advocacy for the group also helped solidify the links between the anti-apartheid struggle and the campaign for treatment access as human rights movements. Since access to treatment for people with HIV/AIDS was only narrowly available to South Africans, Achmont drew international headlines for refusing the medication until available to everyone. In doing so, Achmont put his own health at risk to make a larger point about what he called medical apartheid in South Africa. "Making health care more accessible to South Africa's poor is now a constitutional duty facing the government," a TAC press release stated in 2001. He claimed that the South African constitution stipulated that: "Everyone has the right to have access to health care services. The state has a constitutional duty to progressively improve health care access for everyone." Yet the government was not TAC's only target.

When the South African government finally responded to activist pressure and focused on treatment for the masses, the policy shift was at odds with multinational pharmaceutical companies. When the South African government sought to import generic AIDS drugs from abroad, the administration attracted the ire of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association (PMA) of the US and pharmaceutical companies worldwide, who threatened to sue for patent infringement. TAC activists publicly dissented and joined with the global justice movement, engaging in solidarity protests throughout the world. In different demonstrations, protesters chanted such

slogans as: “AIDS Crimes Against Humanity, from Botswana to the Bronx,” “DEMAND affordable AIDS Drugs for Africa,” and “Drug Company Greed Kills.” The PMA dropped the suit in April 2001, after world protest the previous month. By 2003, TAC successfully pushed the South African government to back a plan to distribute and expand access to anti-retroviral medications for people with HIV/AIDS. By 2005, TAC was already considered among the most innovative and effective social movement groups in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

SEE ALSO: ACT UP; Anti-Apartheid Movement, South Africa; Lesbian, Gay, Transsexual, Bisexual Movements; Mandela, Nelson (b. 1918)

References and Suggested Readings

- D’Adesky, A.-C. (2006) *Moving Mountains: The Race to Treat Global AIDS*. New York: Verso.
- Friedman, S. & Mottiar, S. (2004) *A Moral of the Tale: The Treatment Action Campaign and the Politics of HIV/AIDS. A Case Study for the UKZN Project entitled Globalization, Marginalization, and New Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Available at www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/ (accessed April 8, 2008).
- Smith, R. A. & Siplon, T. (2006) *Drugs into Bodies: Global Treatment Activism*. New York: Praeger.
- Treatment Action Campaign (2001) *The Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997 – A Step Toward Ending Apartheid in Health Care*. Press Release, February 1.

Triangle Shirtwaist fire protests

Anne F. Mattina

On Saturday, March 25, 1911, fire broke out on the eighth floor of the Asch building, home to the Triangle Shirtwaist Company in New York’s Washington Square neighborhood. Workers, the majority young immigrant women, found themselves trapped in what was claimed to be a “fireproof” structure. Some managed to make their way down smoke-filled staircases; others rushed to the fire escape doors only to find them locked, a common practice of the era. The first alarm brought firefighters to a horrific scene of panic and hysteria, as many trapped workers sought their escape by jumping from the windows

of the eighth and ninth floors of the building. In total, 146 workers died as result of the fire, an event that gave rise to waves of protest over the next several weeks.

Though the fire itself, the trial of the factory owners, and the political response have been the subject of scholarly analysis, little attention has been focused on the public outcry in the days that followed. Protests occurred in several phases. The first phase was organized labor’s meetings demanding justice for the dead and a governmental response to issues of workplace safety; the second was an enormous funeral cortege preceding the burial of eight unidentified workers; and the third occurred surrounding the trial of the factory’s owners, along with spontaneous protests after their not guilty verdict.

Triangle workers played a significant role in the 1909–10 industry-wide strike of garment workers, known popularly as “The Uprising of the 20,000.” Within a day after the fire, the Women’s Trade Union League held an organizational session at its New York headquarters to discuss plans for a mass protest meeting. Over 20 philanthropic organizations and settlement workers joined in the efforts, designed to memorialize the dead and bring focus to the issue of workplace safety. It was decided to form a committee to collect information from workers regarding the status of fire safety in their place of employment.

The following day, March 28, a funeral service held for many of the victims evolved into a protest. Members of the Ladies’ Waist and Dressmakers’ and other unions refused to work that day, instead attending the funeral to both demonstrate support and object to working conditions. On March 30, the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU) held a memorial meeting which drew some 2,000 workers to pray for the dead. The event served as a political rally as well, as workers were urged to attend an upcoming debate on insuring socialism a place in New York government.

The next day, more mass meetings were held, including an event at Cooper Union addressed by Dr. Anna Howard Shaw and Samuel Gompers. On April 2, the Women’s Trade Union League (WTUL)-sponsored meeting took place at the Metropolitan Opera House, where thousands of New Yorkers from all social strata gathered. It was here that WTUL organizer Rose Schneiderman voiced her scathing condemnation of events:



On March 25, 1911, the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory in New York City caught fire in one of the most notorious industrial disasters in US history. Over 140 garment workers, many of them young immigrant women, died in the blaze. Following the tragedy, the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union pushed for legislation to improve working conditions and safety standards. After the fire, friends and family come to the scene to identify the victims as they lay in coffins along the sidewalk. (Getty Images)

"I would be a traitor to these burned bodies," she began, "if I were to come here to talk of good fellowship. We have tried you good people of the public and found you wanting." Throughout this time, the WTUL and others were demanding the release of the unidentified bodies still being held in the city morgue, as another funeral parade was being planned. City officials, fearing an outpouring of mass hysteria, refused. Finally reaching a compromise, the city agreed to release the bodies for burial on the day of the march, separate from the actual parade.

Organizers called for participants to assemble Wednesday, April 5 at 1.30 p.m. at two locations – one uptown, one downtown – with plans to meet at Washington Square Park. By 9 a.m. participants began gathering, eventually reaching a multitude estimated at 400,000. The downtown contingent, led by survivors and 400 family members of the deceased, stepped off at the scheduled hour, following a horse-drawn carriage carrying an empty coffin. The uptown wing, comprised mostly of working women and suffragists, marched to meet them. Several hundred thousand more watched the procession from sidewalks and tenement windows along the route, some waving handkerchiefs in tribute.

Protesters marched silently through steady rain all afternoon. As the massive crowd filled Washington Square, the morgue released the bodies of the unidentified workers, and a much smaller cortege formed as two automobiles of

city officials followed the eight hearses to the cemetery. There was a small graveside ceremony as thousands marched silently through the streets of the city. As the marchers converged on Washington Square, city officials forbade them from filing past the Asch building, fearing hysteria. Instead, the crowd groaned in unified sorrow and carried on, dissolving at Madison Square Park around 6 p.m.

On December 4, jury selection began in the trial of Isaac Harris and Max Blanck, indicted for manslaughter in the deaths of their employees. As they arrived at the courtroom, the co-defendants were surrounded by a mob of women, angrily shouting "murderer, murderer" at the men. When a "not guilty" verdict was pronounced several weeks later, the mob had grown considerably. Blanck and Harris fled the courtroom through a back door to avoid the crowd's anguish. Though there were calls for a new trial, a judge, citing double jeopardy, refused. Blanck and Harris later settled with some of the victims' families for an average of \$75.00 per worker's life.

SEE ALSO: Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 20th Century; Socialism

References and Suggested Readings

- Duchez, L. (1911) The Murder of the Shirt Waist Workers in New York City. *International Socialist Review* (May): 667–73.
- Kenneally, J. (1981) *Women and American Trade Unions*. Montreal: Eden Press.
- Linder, D. (2002) The Triangle Shirtwaist Fire Trial. Available at www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/triangle/trianglefire.html.
- Triangle Factory Fire. Available at www.ilr.cornell.edu/trianglefire/default.html.

Trinidad, anti-colonial movement

Michael F. Toussaint

Trinidad and Tobago's anti-colonial struggle began with the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century agitation of the rising black and colored middle classes, their reform movements of the 1880s and 1890s, and the emergence of labor-based organizations from that period onwards. From the twentieth century to the present, such influences worked in tandem

with international currents of anti-imperialism and race consciousness to impact attitudes and approaches to the nationalist question.

Trinidad's colonial history began in 1498 when Columbus arrived on the island and claimed it in the name of Spain. Thereafter, for some 285 years the island remained an underpopulated, colonial outpost of the Spanish Empire. In the closing decades of the eighteenth century, French white and colored planters, together with their enslaved Africans, settled in the colony at the invitation of the Spanish crown. The island also attracted royalist and republican sympathizers fleeing revolutionary upheavals elsewhere in the Caribbean. Britain captured the island in 1797 and encountered a society which, though governed by Spanish law, was markedly French in culture and imbued with related revolutionary ideologies regarding the rights of men. Some of the inhabitants had an immediate aversion to British rule, preferring to exit the colony under the peaceful terms offered by the British government. Those who remained were faced with the challenge of living in a society increasingly dominated by British colonialism, despite the retention of some Spanish laws.

An early anti-colonial response among the white French classes emerged and was decisively anti-British; however, from the days of military rule under Governor Picton, it was the colored class who waged the more aggressive and sustained campaign. In 1810 Britain introduced a system of crown colony government aimed at consolidating its control over the island's affairs. The system was based on the almost absolute subservience of the island's legislature to the governor, and, in turn, his subservience to the crown. Its introduction angered white French and Spanish inhabitants, who began to mount an essentially muted challenge to British rule. They were not concerned with changing the system of governance, however, so much as balancing the power shared by the various classes of white inhabitants, and continuing to enjoy land ownership and trade concessions granted earlier under Spanish rule.

Favorable concessions were also granted to coloreds, and by the 1820s some had emerged as well-to-do planters and professionals. The latter class included teachers, medical practitioners, lawyers and solicitors, minor civil servants, clerks, pharmacists, and journalists. Those who spoke on their behalf questioned the racial discrim-

ination and prejudice meted out to them at the hands of whites and the colonial administration. In 1823 Jean-Baptiste Philippe, a medical doctor, made two trips to London where he addressed the Colonial Office on the diminished rights of the colored community *vis-à-vis* the civil and political privileges enjoyed by whites.

During the 1840s the more radical protagonists among the colored community began to attack the system of crown colony government, particularly following the introduction of immigration programs which reduced the bargaining power of the ex-enslaved and led to heavier taxes on the laboring population. When, in 1849, a riot occurred over the unfair treatment of black prisoners at the Royal Gaol, Alexander Fitzjames, defense counsel for rioters, argued that laws of the colony were obnoxious and tyrannical, and that the people felt the laws were enacted by individuals unsanctified by them, disapproved of by them, and not responsible to them.

In 1853, in protest against the crown colony system, hundreds of black and colored inhabitants abandoned the island to establish an independent state on the South American mainland. The initiative failed and they returned home to continue to challenge the system. As the century progressed, agitation mounted; the imperial government and colonial authorities seemed bent on reducing financial commitments to the colony and increasing the burden of taxation on the masses. During the 1880s a number of prominent inhabitants established a committee aimed at pressuring the colonial administration to introduce constitutional reform. Its members included notable black lawyers such as Mzumbo Lazare, Prudhomme David, and Sir Henry Alcazar. In 1887 a petition was presented to the Royal Franchise Commission requesting that the inhabitants be extended the right to elect representatives of their choice to manage the island's affairs. The commission's response was that the people of Trinidad were not fit to choose their own representatives. Undoubtedly, in 1889 a similar view of the inhabitants of Tobago had informed Britain's decision to link Tobago into a federal relationship which made that island subservient to the crown colony administration in Trinidad.

In the 1890s several public meetings were held to sensitize the population to the undemocratic nature of crown colony government. Two decades earlier the prejudice of leading British

thinkers and imperial officials was confronted through J. J. Thomas's *Fraudacity*, which addressed in particular the disparaging treatment of West Indian blacks in James Anthony Froude's *The Bow of Ulysses*. The Canboulay and Hosea riots of the 1880s indicated the determination of the masses to make cultural statements of their own. The authorities remained unmoved by such expressions of political and social consciousness.

Developments during the opening decades of the next century continued to reflect the ways in which citizens were provoked by the insensitivity of the imperial and colonial administrations. The Water Riots of 1903 saw agitation against the proposed introduction of a meter system in Port of Spain. A number of protestors were killed or injured, and the Red House, the seat of political administration, was destroyed by fire. The roots of the riot lay in the dissolution of the Port of Spain City Council (the old Spanish Cabildo), through which the people of Port of Spain formerly managed their affairs.

During World War I young black males in the colony eagerly enlisted to serve the British crown, joining Allied forces in France, where they distinguished themselves despite limited training and experience, and discrimination at the hands of white officers. On returning home after the war they were again neglected by the British and colonial administration. Adequate preparation for their return had not been made, and many were forced to join the ranks of the destitute and unemployed. Many participated in the bloody 1919 waterfront strike. Following this strike, Captain Arthur Andrew Cipriani emerged as the leader of the working-class movement, converting its key organization, the Trinidad Workingmen's Association, into a political party. His constant agitation for adult franchise and representative government encouraged the appointment of a Royal Commission in 1921 to investigate the possibility of constitutional change in the West Indies. In 1925, based on the commission's recommendations, the constitution was amended to allow seven representatives, elected on a constituency basis, to serve in the Legislative Council. Representatives of the East Indian community had objected to the change, as they were convinced that the smaller size of their population relative to that of the African-descended community would place them at a great disadvantage. But as East Indians began

to get elected to the Legislative Council there emerged an overall sense that representative government could work in everyone's interests.

During the interwar period (1919–38) Cipriani, who had been consistently elected to the Legislative Council, continued to push for constitutional reform. Across Trinidad and Tobago political consciousness deepened as locals were influenced by international developments such as Garveyism, Pan-Africanism, and socialism. One year before the end of the term of the Legislative Council the island erupted with a spate of labor disturbances. This time, however, the hero of the labor movement was Tubal Uriah Butler, a Grenadian who served in the West Indian Regiment during World War I and had come to Trinidad in search of work during the 1920s. Earlier in his career he worshipped Cipriani, under whom he had served during the war, as a hero. The two later parted ways because Butler began to perceive Cipriani as too conservative, while Cipriani viewed Butler as too hard hitting and uncompromising.

Butler's popularity soared to such an extent that the labor disturbances began to be spoken of as the Butler Riots. In 1937 he formed his own political party, the British Empire Citizens' and Workers' Home Rule Party. Butler was no radical; he was in fact extremely loyal to the British Empire, but his immense popularity, fiery rhetoric, and continuous defiance of the authorities brought a new and threatening dynamism to national politics. Meanwhile, labor disturbances across the Caribbean were also unsettling for the British government. The Moyne Commission, sent out by the British government to investigate the cause of these disturbances, recognized the widespread poverty and discontent of the West Indian population. Consequently, it recommended, among other things, the introduction of adult franchise and a gradual transition to internal self-government.

The implementation of these measures following the war ushered in a new phase of nationalism. There was a mushrooming of political parties, the majority of them one-man organizations, but most had a position on the nationalism question. Among the leading political figures were Albert Maria Gomes, publisher of *The Beacon* and founder of the Political Progress Groups; and Butler, who had been imprisoned and detained during World War II as part of efforts by the authorities to suppress all political

activities. After his release from prison Butler founded the Butler Home Rule Party (later, the Butler Party) which captured the largest block of seats in the Legislative Council. However, in defiance of the popular vote, the governor installed Gomes as the chief minister. Historically anti-colonial and anti-crown colony, once installed in office Gomes abandoned the nationalist cause.

The system under which Gomes operated was one in which the responsibility for the conduct of the internal affairs of Trinidad and Tobago was passed to elected ministers who functioned under the supervision of the governor. The 1956 elections, however, provided for full internal self-government, placing the exercise of executive powers fully in the hands of elected members. Critical to the emerging nationalism from here onwards was the rise of Dr. Eric Williams and the People's National Movement (PNM). In the elections of 1956, nine months after the PNM was formed under his leadership, the party unseated the Gomes administration. Dr Williams became Trinidad and Tobago's first premier and stepped up the battle for political autonomy and national sovereignty. One example was the struggle to reclaim Chaguaramas, located in the northwestern peninsula of Trinidad. During the war years this area had been leased by Britain to the United States for use as a military base. The Lease-Base Agreement provided for the US occupation of the area for 99 years, and was one of several such agreements made by the Churchill administration in return for a number of US destroyers (warships to combat German U-Boats during the war effort). After the cessation of hostilities the United States continued to occupy the base at Chaguaramas. Williams and the PNM viewed this as an affront to national sovereignty. In 1961 Williams and thousands of PNM supporters staged a march to protest the continued occupation of the base. The march began at Woodford Square, where Williams set fire to a copy of the agreement. From there the marchers proceeded to the office of the United States consul-general, to whom a memorial demanding the return of the base at Chaguaramas was read. The march, undertaken in the pouring rain, attracted widespread national support and international attention. The United States, willing to retain good relations with Trinidad and Tobago, was eager to return the base.

Between 1958 and 1961 Trinidad and Tobago were part of the effort to establish a West Indian Federation; however, there were many people that thought the pursuit of independence should take precedence over the federal initiative. Jamaica's withdrawal from the federation in 1961 provided Trinidad and Tobago with the opportunity to do likewise. In December 1961 full internal self-government was attained, and an even more determined and focused anti-colonial PNM emerged after capturing 20 of the 30 seats in the House of Representatives. In January 1962 the PNM's General Council approved a resolution that the government should forgo the federal initiative and pursue national independence as quickly as possible. In February the government published a first draft of an independence constitution. After much public consultation an amended version was debated in the parliament and approved by a majority of 16 to 9 in the House of Representatives on May 11, 1962. Both government and opposition participated in the Marlborough Conference, which focused on the nationalism question and accepted the outcome of the debates in Trinidad and Tobago's parliament.

On August 31, 1962 Trinidad and Tobago became independent and joined the Commonwealth, but the country was still governed by the British Queen, and remained one of several constitutional monarchies in the Caribbean. There remained, among other things, the necessity to restructure the economy in the public's interest and to give nationals far greater say in decision-making processes. There was also the need to remove the many racial barriers and prejudices which limited the opportunities of the vast majority of the citizens and worked against their sense of belonging.

In February 1970 thousands of youths and workers led by black militants began marching throughout Trinidad and Tobago, demanding that political, social, and economic power be passed to the people. On April 20, one day after their leading spokesmen were arrested and detained on Nelson Island, a State of Emergency was declared. The following day some of the soldiers of the regiment stationed at Teteron Bay mutinied, surrendering after a 12-day standoff. In the main, these activities were perceived as efforts to bring about much needed social and economic changes. The Williams administration responded by implementing measures to lower

unemployment, develop a people's sector, and reduce the dominance of foreign multinational corporations. A number of banks, insurance companies, and key financial institutions were nationalized.

In 1976 Trinidad and Tobago adopted a republican constitution. The queen was replaced by an elected president, who became the constitutional head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Greater emphasis has been placed on the development of national identity and the promotion of cultural nationalism. Given the cosmopolitan nature of the country's population, much attention is placed on promoting unity of the races and embracing the diversity of cultures. Further, against the background of greater effort at Caribbean integration the attempt is being made to develop local and Caribbean institutions to replace those which were representative of colonialism.

SEE ALSO: French Caribbean in the Age of Revolution; Trinidad, Labor Protests; Trinidad, Parliamentary Crisis; Williams, Eric (1911–1981)

References and Suggested Readings

- Collymore, G. (1995) *Birth Pangs of a Nation*. London: Minerva Press.
- Hackshaw, J. M. (1997) *Party Politics and Public Policy: A New Political Culture Needed for Trinidad and Tobago*. Diego Martin: Hackshaw.
- Meighoo, K. P. (2003) *Politics in a Half-Made Society: Trinidad and Tobago 1925–2001*. Princeton: Marcus Wiener.
- Ryan, S. (1972) *Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago: A Study of Decolonization in a Multiracial Society*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Trinidad, labor protests

Jerome Teelucksingh

In Trinidad's era of indentured servitude (1845–1920) subtle protests emerged in the form of absenteeism and faked illness among Indian laborers on the sugar estates. This was due to strict labor regulations, police harassment, and judicial partiality. There was also a series of disturbances among the Indian working class which culminated in a phenomenal 12 strikes in 1884.

In 1903 the Water Riots in Port-of-Spain resulted in violence and repression brought

upon the working class at the hands of the government. The initial protestors belonged to the middle and upper class; however, the working class was misled by anti-government propaganda which created fear concerning water distribution to the public. The working class was convinced to join the protest, and when the government discriminated against them in the issuing of tickets to the Legislative Council for the debate on the Water Works Ordinance, the crowd responded in a hostile manner. In the ensuing confrontation with police 16 persons were killed and 43 wounded.

The high cost of living due to World War I (1914–18), deplorable working conditions, and low wages contributed to labor protests in 1919. In February 1919 civil servants petitioned Governor J. R. Chancellor seeking increased salaries, and in March the atmosphere of discontent spread to stevedores and mechanics employed on the docks, along with porters and laborers at the Trinidad Government Railway. Other occupations were affected as protests spread to the Trinidad Rice Mills, and the borough council's waterworks and sewage department in Port-of-Spain. At Trinidad's Central Oilfields, workmen and fitters went on strike demanding a 25 percent salary increase; likewise, striking scavengers employed by the city council demanded a 50 percent salary increase. Strike action spread to the plantation sector and at the Woodford Lodge Estate one of the workers was killed. Faced with island-wide unrest, the British government dispatched the Royal Sussex regiment to restore order and its forces arrived in December 1919. The persistence of the Trinidad Workingmen's Association (TWA) culminated in a settlement on December 3, 1919, with a concession to the workers: shipping agents consented to a wage increase of 25 percent. Also in December 1919, tension engulfed the Lake Asphalt Company; reluctantly, the company met with the TWA, and in May 1919 workers were given a 33 percent wage increase.

This victory boosted the island-wide status of the TWA: 800 sugar workers protesting in 1934, at Brechin Castle and Esperanza Estates, were later joined by their comrades in the North. The complaints of the sugar workers included unemployment, withholding of wage packets, exploitative estate officials, and the like. The public marches by sugar workers in 1934 formed what Bridget Brereton (1981) describes

as “a watershed in Indian participation in Labor movements in Trinidad.” O. N. Bolland (2001) suggested that the proposed hunger march of sugar workers on July 20, 1934 from Caroni to Port-of-Spain was planned to unite East Indian sugar workers and African hunger marchers in a massive city demonstration. The protests of the Indians set in motion a series of civil demonstrations as workers resorted to direct action.

There were further disruptions a few months later in March 1935, when workers at Apex Oilfields decided to undertake a strike action to protest unsuitable working conditions, wage reductions, and low wages in general. Eventually, the strike ended and the workers accepted a 2 percent wage increase. One of the leaders of the strike, Tubal Uriah Butler (1897–1977; a member of the TWA), would later play an important role in the labor riots of 1937.

Both long-term and short-term factors led to the eruption of June 1937. The agony of the Great Depression in the early 1930s lingered on and the 17 percent increase in the cost of living in 1937 added to the misery of the masses. It has been suggested that the Italian conquest of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in June 1935 provoked anti-British feeling in the West Indies and increased tensions between whites and Africans in Trinidad. Brereton (1981) contends that rampant poverty among laborers contributed to malnutrition, poor sanitation, illiteracy, and unemployment. The combination of these factors, as well as the denial of wage increases for oil workers, finally exploded with a massive strike on June 19, 1937.

Despite being jailed twice, Butler continued to be a threat to colonial authorities and employers during the 1940s. He was the mastermind behind the three-week strike in central and south Trinidad in May 1947; more than 7,000 sugar workers from 11 estates of Caroni Limited were involved in this fiery protest. Similarly, Butler was responsible for the protest of 1948 involving 3,000 workers from 18 estates of the Ste. Madeleine Company. In both instances workers benefited from increased wages and improved working conditions.

The formation of the political party the United Labor Front (ULF) on February 18, 1975 was another attempt by trade unions to unite the Afro- and Indo-Trinidadians and capture political power from the ruling People's National Movement (PNM). On March 18, 1975 the short-lived ULF attempted a religious march

from San Fernando to Port-of-Spain: 37 people were arrested, including union leaders.

SEE ALSO: Caribbean Islands, Protests Against IMF; James, C. L. R. (1901–1989); Trinidad, Anti-Colonial Movement; Trinidad, Parliamentary Crisis; Williams, Eric (1911–1981)

References and Suggested Readings

- Basdeo, S. (1982) 1934 Labor Disturbances. In B. Brereton & W. Dookeran (Eds.), *East Indians in the Caribbean: Colonialism and the Struggle for Identity*. New York: Kraus International.
- Bolland, O. N. (2001) *The Politics of Labor in the British Caribbean: The Social Origins of Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Labor Movement*. Kingston: Ian Randle.
- Brereton, B. (1981) *A History of Modern Trinidad, 1783–1962*. Port-of-Spain: Heinemann.
- Samaroo, B. (1972) The Trinidad Workingmen's Association and the Origins of Popular Protest in a Crown Colony. *Social and Economic Studies* 21: 205–22.
- Tikasingsh, G. (1982) Toward a Formulation of the Indian View of History: The Representation of Indian Opinion in Trinidad, 1900–1921. In B. Brereton & W. Dookeran (Eds.), *East Indians in the Caribbean: Colonialism and the Struggle for Identity*. New York: Kraus International.

Trinidad, parliamentary crisis

Michael F. Toussaint

Following independence in 1962, Trinidad and Tobago adopted a system of government based on parliamentary democracy according to the Westminster model. Executive power was vested in the prime minister and his Cabinet, which together exercised general direction and control over the governance of the country. A bicameral parliament was charged with the responsibility of making laws for the peace, order, and good governance of the country. It consisted of a lower house of 36 elected members, each representing an electoral district, and a 31-member Senate made of persons appointed by the president on the advice of the prime minister and leader of the opposition. In 1976 Trinidad and Tobago enacted a written republican constitution, which remains the supreme law of the land and cannot be amended, abridged, or infringed without the requisite parliamentary majority.

The bicameral legislature was retained and the parliament, unless dissolved, was required to sit for five years, after which a general election is held. Since independence, various challenges precipitated by different circumstances have emerged to frustrate the normal operations of the parliament.

In 1971, following a successful “No Vote” campaign by the opposition in protest against the introduction of the voting machine, the incumbent People’s National Movement (PNM) won the 36 seats contested in the general elections; however, absolute parliamentary non-cooperation had been achieved by the opposition forces. The development left the upper and lower houses of parliament without any opposition. Additionally, it frustrated the operations of the Public Accounts Committee, which could only function through the joint effort of members on both sides. Parliament was only able to resume normal operations when, in June 1972, two members of the PNM crossed the floor and formed an opposition.

Under its founder and leader, Dr. Eric Eustace Williams, the PNM dominated the parliament with sizable majorities since 1962, sometimes by as much as twice the number of seats controlled by the opposition. Notwithstanding the perception of a vacuum in the leadership of the PNM following Williams’ passing in 1981, under his successor George Michael Chambers the party was able to secure a two-thirds majority in the parliament in the elections held that year. Following this, the Chambers regime suffered a devastating 33–3 defeat in the elections of 1986 at the hands of the National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR), led by Arthur Napoleon Robinson.

In July 1990, in an attempted coup and what amounted to the most violent development in Trinidad and Tobago’s political history, armed members of a radical Islamic group, the Jamaat al Muslimeen, stormed the parliament while it was in session and held at gunpoint all parliamentarians and members of the public in attendance. Their demands included the resignation of Prime Minister Robinson, the installation of a caretaker government, and the holding of general elections within 90 days. Six days later, however, the hostages were released from the Red House, following an agreement with the insurgents. During the impasse over 30 persons were killed and some 700 wounded. For months afterwards

the parliament was unable to function. *Inter alia*, the Red House, the seat of the legislature, was severely damaged.

The PNM rebounded in the elections of 1991, winning 21 of the 36 seats contested. Subsequent developments conspired to mark the achievement as the end of the era of sizable or “comfortable” parliamentary majorities. In the second half of its term in office the PNM’s majority in the lower house began to dwindle. The party lost one seat in a special bye-election. Additionally, there was the expulsion of a PNM representative from the parliament. The PNM saw this development as part of a plot between the opposition United National Congress (UNC) and the Speaker, Occah Seepaul, to reduce the number of elected PNM members in the lower house. Consequently, the government declared a limited State of Emergency and the Speaker of the House of Representatives was removed and placed under house arrest. This led to the loss of yet another PNM member of parliament, when Ralph Maraj, the brother of Occah Seepaul, defected to the UNC. Cognizant of the declining PNM parliamentary majority, Prime Minister Patrick Manning called a snap election in 1995. The PNM and UNC won 17 seats each. The NAR having won two seats, it took a UNC–NAR coalition to form the next government.

The results of the elections of December 2000 returned the UNC to office with 19 seats, compared to 16 by the PNM and a single seat by the NAR. After six months in office, however, the UNC found itself challenged from within; three of its members of parliament declared their unwillingness to support the government, on the grounds that it seemed averse to investigate allegations of official corruption.

The elections of 2001 resulted in a hung parliament in which the PNM and UNC received 18 seats each. Guided by an agreement forged between the leaders of the two political parties in response to the crisis, President Robinson appointed Patrick Manning as prime minister. However, the operations of parliament were forestalled for the next 12 months as the prime minister remained unable to form a majority and parliament was unable to sit. The crisis was resolved when, upon a return to the polls, the PNM won 20 of the 36 seats contested. In the aftermath of the crisis precipitated by the election results of 2001, parliament approved in

2005 a proposal by the independent Elections and Boundaries Commission to increase the number of seats in the House of Representatives from 36 to 41.

SEE ALSO: French Caribbean in the Age of Revolution; Trinidad, Anti-Colonial Movement; Trinidad, Labor Protests; Williams, Eric (1911–1981)

References and Suggested Readings

- Deosaran, R. (1993) *A Society Under Siege: A Study of Political Confusion and Legal Mysticism*. St. Augustine: Mc Al Centre for Psychological Research, St Augustine University of the West Indies.
- Hackshaw, J. M. (1997) *Party Politics and Public Policy: A New Political Culture Needed for Trinidad and Tobago*. Trinidad: Hackshaw.
- Meighoo, K. P. (2003) *Politics in a Half-Made Society: Trinidad and Tobago 1925–2001*. Princeton: Marcus Wiener.

Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

Paul Le Blanc

Leon Trotsky was one of the most impressive revolutionaries of the twentieth century, and his example and ideas have profoundly affected successive generations of labor and socialist activists. Born in the Ukraine, then part of the Russian empire, the scope of his thought and activism became quintessentially global. Born Lev Davidovich Bronstein, he adopted the underground name “Trotsky” (the pen) and became known not only for his eloquence as a writer, but also as an orator. These talents were inseparable, however, from his role as a political activist.

At the age of 18 Trotsky first become active in the revolutionary socialist movement in the Russian empire, and he was soon drawn to the revolutionary Marxist current around the newspaper *Iskra*, initiated by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Georgi Plekhanov, and Julius Martov. Initially close to Lenin, he broke with him when the newly reformed Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) split into Bolshevik and Menshevik factions in 1903, lining up with the anti-Leninist Mensheviks. In the course of the revolutionary upsurge of 1905, in which he played a central role, Trotsky developed the theory of permanent revolution (discussed below) which caused him

to become independent of the Mensheviks in the complex factional line-up in the RSDLP. Although in some ways drawing closer to Lenin’s Bolsheviks, he was a firm partisan of RSDLP unity and sharply opposed the creation of a separate Bolshevik party in 1912. At the outbreak of World War I in 1914 he played a major role in organizing an anti-war opposition, with a diverse grouping of socialists from various countries which gathered in Zimmerwald, Switzerland.

When the Russian tsar was overthrown in February and March 1917 by a spontaneous workers’ uprising, Trotsky was living in exile in the United States. Hurrying back to Russia, he found that his thinking converged with that of Lenin – favoring a second workers’ and peasants’ revolution to replace the coalition of pro-capitalist liberals and moderate socialists with a revolutionary socialist regime based on democratic councils (soviets). This caused him and his followers to join Lenin’s party, in which he quickly became a central figure. He was also one of the central leaders of the Russian Revolution of October and November 1917, the organizer and leader of the Red Army that defended the early Soviet Republic in the face of civil war and foreign invasions, and a founder and leader of the Communist International.

In the 1920s, after Lenin’s death (1924), Trotsky became one of the foremost defenders of the original ideas and ideals of the 1917 Revolution and of the early communist movement against the bureaucratic tyranny, crystallizing around Joseph Stalin, that increasingly overwhelmed them. The left opposition that Trotsky helped lead was decisively defeated in 1927, and Trotsky found himself again in exile – first in Turkey, then in Norway and France, and finally in Mexico. In his later years, he helped organize the Fourth International (formally founded in 1938, made up of handfuls of revolutionary socialists who formed themselves into organizations in various countries, and who came to be known as Trotskyists). An unyielding opponent of the brutal regime and policies of Stalin in the Soviet Union and the world communist movement, Trotsky was assassinated by a Stalinist agent in Mexico in 1940.

The Nature of Revolution and Revolutionaries

Although he was a critical and original thinker, Trotsky’s theories and analyses involve a creative



Russian communist Leon Trotsky (1879–1940) speaking to Red Army troops in 1925. Trotsky was a leader of the Bolsheviks during the Russian October Revolution, second in command to V. I. Lenin. He was an outspoken critic of Joseph Stalin and after exile from the Soviet Union was a leader in the International Left Opposition and Fourth International. After his assassination by USSR operatives in 1940, Trotskyism, in many forms, gained currency as an international socialist ideology. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

elaboration and application (or in some cases a parallel development) of ideas that one can find in Marx, Luxemburg, and Lenin. In particular, Trotsky shared their commitment to a radical form of democracy represented in the notion of *workers' power*. This is reflected in this passage from the introduction to his classic *History of the Russian Revolution*:

The most indubitable feature of a revolution is the direct interference of the masses in historic events. In ordinary times the state, be it monarchical or democratic, elevates itself above the population, and history is made by specialists in that line of business – kings, ministers, bureaucrats, parliamentarians, journalists. But at those crucial moments when the old order becomes no longer endurable to the masses, they break over the barriers excluding them from the political arena, sweep aside their traditional representatives, and create by their own interference the

initial groundwork for a new regime. . . . The history of a revolution is for us first of all a history of the forcible entrance of the masses into the realm of rulership over their own destiny. (p. xvii)

For Trotsky there is a fundamental harmony between this view of revolution and the quality of socialism that he felt must be the goal of a working-class revolution. “Socialism signifies a pure and clear social system which is accommodated to the self-government of the toilers. . . . Socialism implies an uninterrupted growth of universal equality. . . . Socialism has as its goal the all-sided flowering of the individual personality. . . . Socialism would have no value apart from the unselfish, honest, and humane relations between human beings” (Trotsky 1973–9 [1936–37]: 328–9).

From the very beginning, Trotsky shared with Lenin and other revolutionary Marxists the belief that the working class under capitalism has the creativity, the latent power, and the potential consciousness that would be required to bring about this transformation. The more *advanced layers* of the working class, joined by radicalized students and intellectuals, must – as Trotsky saw it – organize themselves in order to help the laboring masses realize this revolutionary potential.

There is a striking harmony between his vision of socialism and the qualities that he believed must animate revolutionary activists. This quotation from a female veteran of Russia’s revolutionary movement of the early 1900s, offered with the author’s obvious agreement, appears near the beginning of Trotsky’s biography of Stalin, his final book: “Turning over in my mind the mass of comrades with whom I had occasion to meet, I cannot recall a single reprehensible, contemptible act, a single deception or lie. There was friction. There were factional differences of opinion. But no more than that. Somehow everyone looked after himself [and herself] morally, became better and more gentle in that friendly family.” Trotsky added: “The measure of ambition was to last as long as possible on the job [of engaging in labor and socialist activity] prior to arrest; to hold oneself steadfast when facing the gendarmes; to ease, as far as possible, the plight of one’s comrades; to read, while in prison, as many books as possible; to escape as soon as possible [into] exile abroad; to

acquire wisdom there; and then return to revolutionary activity in Russia” (Trotsky 1967: 54).

Trotsky frequently insisted that “revolutionary discipline has nothing to do with blind obedience,” that any revolutionary worthy of the name “does not take anything on [just someone else’s] word. He judges everything by reason and experience” (1973–9 [1932]: 326; [1932–33]: 199). The organic connection between revolutionary commitment and integrity comes through in Trotsky’s comments – in the early 1920s – about the qualities of a genuine Bolshevik:

A Bolshevik is not merely a disciplined person; he is a person who in each case and on each question forges a firm opinion of his own and defends it courageously and independently, not only against his enemies, but inside his own party. Today, perhaps, he will be in the minority in his organization. He will submit, because it is his party. But this does not always signify that he is in the wrong. Perhaps he saw or understood before the others did a new task or the necessity of a turn. He will persistently raise the question a second, a third, a tenth time, if need be. Thereby he will render his party a service, helping it to meet the new task fully armed or to carry out the necessary turn without organic upheavals, without factional convulsions. (1975–81 [1923–25]: 127)

Such a description is consistent with Trotsky’s own character as a revolutionary. This first became clear with the development of his theory of permanent revolution – for many years a minority position among Russian socialists, until it was, in practice, embraced by Lenin and the Bolshevik party in 1917.

The Theory of Permanent Revolution

The majority of Russian Marxists insisted that the absolute monarchy and semi-feudal nobility in Russia must be overthrown by a democratic revolution that would also allow for an industrial capitalist development that could provide the material basis for socialism, which would be achieved by a later working-class revolution. The Menshevik faction among Russian socialists called for a worker–capitalist alliance to lead the democratic revolution. The Bolshevik faction insisted that the capitalists could not be trusted,

that only a working-class alliance with Russia’s impoverished peasant majority would result in a victory of the democratic revolution. In this, Trotsky agreed with the Bolsheviks but then went much further.

Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution linked the struggle for democracy – freedom of expression, equal rights for all, and rule by the people – with the struggle for socialism, a society in which the great majority of people would own and control the economic resources of society to allow for the free development of all. It also linked the struggle for revolution in Russia with the cause of socialist revolution *throughout the world*.

Trotsky’s theory contained three basic points. One held that the revolutionary struggle for democracy in Russia could only be won under the leadership of the working class with the support of the peasant majority. The second point held that this democratic revolution would begin in Russia a transitional period in which all political, social, cultural, and economic relations would continue to be in flux, leading in the direction of socialism. The third point held that this transition would be part of, would help to advance, and would also be furthered by an international revolutionary process.

The first aspect of Trotsky’s theory was related to his understanding that the relatively weak capitalist class of Russian businessmen was dependent on the tsarist system, and that the capitalists would be too frightened of the revolutionary masses to lead in the overthrow of tsarist tyranny. The struggle for democracy and human rights could only be advanced consistently and finally won under the leadership of the working class, which was capable of organizing labor unions and political organizations in Russia’s cities and towns. Allied with the workers would be the vast peasantry hungry for land, as well as other oppressed social layers – women, oppressed ethnic and national groups, religious minorities, and dissident intellectuals. A victorious worker-led revolution would bring the working class to political power. In other words, democratic revolutions in so-called “backward” countries such as tsarist Russia must spill over into working-class revolutions.

The second aspect of Trotsky’s theory was related to the understanding that the masses of victorious revolutionary workers would not be willing to turn political power over to their capitalist bosses. Instead, they would – with the support

of the peasants – consolidate their own rule through democratic councils (known in Russia as “soviets”) and their own people’s army. Under working-class rule there would be dramatic efforts

- to spread education;
- to create universal literacy;
- to make the benefits of culture available to all;
- to provide universal health care to all as a matter of right;
- to ensure that decent housing would be available for all;
- to secure full and equal rights for women and all others oppressed (for example, on the basis of nationality, race, religion) in the old society;
- to include all people in building and developing an economy that would sustain the free development of all.

Increasingly and fairly rapidly, the development of society in this transitional period would go beyond the framework of capitalism and in the direction of socialism.

The third aspect of Trotsky’s theory was related to his understanding that capitalism is a global system that can only be replaced by socialism on a global scale. It was his conviction that it would not be possible to create a socialist democracy in an economically underdeveloped country such as Russia surrounded by a hostile capitalist world. In fact, a working-class revolution in one country would inevitably generate counterrevolutionary responses in surrounding countries – with efforts to repress the revolution. At the same time, it would inspire the workers and oppressed of countries throughout the world. The Russian Revolution would be one of a series of revolutions in country after country throughout the world. This would come about not only because of the example of revolutionary Russia, but especially because of the desire of more and more workers and oppressed people in all countries to end the exploitation and hardship that, Trotsky believed, are the inevitable result of capitalism. The process of socialist revolution can begin within a single country, but socialism can only be created on a global scale.

Opposing Bureaucratic Tyranny

Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution was connected to his approach to revolutionary

strategy in general, and also to his analysis of Stalinism. He explained that the Russian Revolution’s isolation – resulting from the failure and defeat of revolutions elsewhere – led to the bureaucratic and murderous distortions of the Stalinist dictatorship in the Soviet Union. “On the foundation of the dictatorship of the proletariat – in a backward country,” Trotsky wrote, “surrounded by capitalism – for the first time a powerful bureaucratic apparatus has been created from among the upper layers of the workers, that is raised above the masses, that lays down the law to them, that has at its disposal colossal resources, that is bound together by an inner mutual responsibility, and that intrudes into the policies of a workers’ government its own interests, methods, and regulations.”

Given the economic underdevelopment and general poverty of Soviet Russia, many in the Communist Party and government apparatus were inclined to translate their political power into personal economic privileges, and they were motivated by the desire to defend such power and privilege. Even this bureaucracy’s policies for developing the country’s economy were carried out in a bureaucratic manner. “Industrialization and collectivization are being put through by the one-sided and uncontrolled laying down of the law to the laboring masses by the bureaucracy,” Trotsky pointed out. “The bureaucracy cannot exercise its pressure upon workers and peasants except by depriving them of all possibility of participating in decisions upon questions that touch their own labor and their entire future” (1971: 213, 219, 220).

Increasingly the most undemocratic, unjust, and inhumane policies became associated with the “general line” of the bureaucratized Soviet Communist Party, headed by Joseph Stalin. Trotsky was scathing in his comments on the bureaucratic functionary “who manipulates the general line like a fireman his hose.” In this description, written in 1932, we see similarities between labor bureaucrats inside and outside of Stalinist Russia:

He eats and guzzles and procreates and grows himself a respectable potbelly. He lays down the law with a sonorous voice, handpicks from below people who are faithful to him, remains faithful to his superiors, prohibits others from criticizing himself, and sees in all of this the gist of the general line. . . .

The ruling and uncontrolled position of the Soviet bureaucracy is conducive to a psychology which in many ways is directly contradictory to the psychology of a proletarian revolutionist. Its own aims and combinations in domestic as well as international politics are placed by the bureaucracy above the tasks of the revolutionary education of the masses and have no connection with the tasks of the international revolution. In the course of a number of years the Stalinist faction demonstrated that the interests and the psychology of the prosperous peasant, engineer, administrator, Chinese bourgeois intellectual, and British trade union functionary were much closer and more comprehensible to it than the psychology and needs of the unskilled laborer, the peasant poor, the Chinese national masses in revolt, the British strikers, etc. (1971: 213–15)

The Revolutionary Socialist Defense of Democracy Against Fascism

Just as there is a link between Trotsky's view of labor bureaucracies inside and outside of the Soviet Union, there is a connection between the theory of permanent revolution and Trotsky's approach to revolutionary strategy in general. Every genuine and consistent struggle for democratic rights, he believed, must, if it was to be fought through to victory, be based on and led by the working class – by critical-minded working-class activists organically connected to and followed by masses of working people throughout society. Such democratic struggles and victories always have a revolutionary dynamic and pose the question of workers' power. In Trotsky's time there were a number of major right-wing attacks on democratic rights, including:

- in Russia of 1917, the attempted military coup by General Kornilov between the March and November revolutions;
- in Mussolini's fascist onslaught to take over Italy in the 1920s;
- in the rise and final 1933 triumph of Hitler's Nazis in Germany;
- in the Spanish Civil War initiated by the 1936 military–fascist–conservative uprising against the new democratic republic.

In each case, Trotsky rejected proposals for broad and far-reaching political alliances of working-class

organizations with liberal capitalist forces for the purpose of defending capitalist democracy against the right-wing threat. He always insisted on remaining true to the Marxist perspective of working-class political independence. He therefore favored a united front of all working-class forces to uncompromisingly defend genuine democracy and the interests of the workers. The victory of such a working-class defense of democracy would, as had happened in Russia of 1917, create the immediate possibility of the workers taking political power and initiating a socialist transition.

Trotsky (in conjunction with Lenin) held that a *united front* could also be made with other class forces – including pro-capitalist liberals – around limited struggles (for democratic rights, for specific reforms, or against war), but never in a manner that compromised the political independence of the working class. Such united front efforts, for example, existed during the struggle against tsarism – but Lenin and Trotsky rejected the Menshevik orientation of turning this into the far-reaching strategy of a worker–capitalist alliance. In later years, Trotsky and his followers were prepared to form united fronts with bourgeois liberals to aid the Spanish Republic against fascist attack (while rejecting the far-reaching worker–capitalist alliance of the Popular Front), to expose the falseness and criminality of Stalin's Moscow trials (the Dewey Commission), and to oppose war (support for the Ludlow amendment in the US). A central thrust of the united front tactic, however, was always to make more effective the struggles of the working class in the defense of its interests – and to the extent that this is successful, a revolutionary dynamic is set in motion.

Trotsky's analysis of fascism is also linked to his revolutionary strategic orientation. Fascism involves the rise of right-wing mass movements whose goal is the creation of a permanent dictatorship dedicated to the systematic destruction of both democratic rights and independent workers' movements, combining a radical–populist rhetoric (often laced with racism) with super-patriotic and aggressive nationalism, and with the glorification of militarism and war. It developed in Italy and in Germany (taking an especially racist form) in the 1920s and 1930s. Trotsky believed fascism resulted from a social and economic crisis generating on the one hand a radical upsurge of the workers' movement and, on the other hand,

deep fear from the upper classes and among the so-called “middle classes.” If the workers failed to take political power (and failed to begin a transition to a socialist solution to the crisis), then right-wing demagogues with fascistic “solutions” would gain an ever-greater hearing among the frightened “middle classes” and disappointed masses, and powerful upper-class elements would offer such movements substantial economic and political support. The rise of fascism indicates revolutionary socialist possibilities that have remained unrealized – and the only effective way to defeat fascism is to develop an uncompromising working-class defense of democracy that pushes in a revolutionary socialist direction.

Workers’ Democracy Against Reformism and Capitalism

One of the greatest obstacles to the forward movement of the working class, in Trotsky’s opinion, was the development of bureaucracies (in some cases Stalinist, in others moderate socialist, in many other cases anti-socialist, or “business unionist”) that had developed and become encrusted in the leaderships of working-class organizations – creating a great divide between the functioning of organizations claiming to represent the workers and the actual workers themselves. The ideology of the labor bureaucrats in capitalist countries was often labeled *reformism*, which held that the accumulation of reforms – won through pressuring and negotiating with the capitalists – makes socialist revolution unnecessary. “Both Marxism and reformism have a solid social support underlying them,” according to Trotsky. “Marxism expresses the historical interests of the proletariat [that is, the working class]. Reformism speaks for the privileged position of the proletarian bureaucracy and [higher-paid labor] aristocracy within . . . capitalist [society]” (1971: 211). Obviously, such elements in the labor movement would be inclined to establish far-reaching alliances with liberal capitalist politicians not only to oppose fascism but also to continue accumulating modest reforms. Near the end of his life, Trotsky observed that this was leading to something new as powerful capitalist corporations became increasingly entwined with the state apparatus:

The trade unions in the present epoch cannot simply be the organs of democracy as they were

in the epoch of free capitalism and they cannot any longer remain politically neutral, that is, limit themselves to serving the daily needs of the working class. . . . The trade unions of our time can either serve as secondary instruments of imperialist capitalism for the subordination and disciplining of workers and for obstructing the revolution, or, on the contrary, the trade unions can become the instrument of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. (1969: 71)

From Trotsky’s standpoint, there would be a need for unions, and other organizations of the working class, to be democratically controlled by their members for the purpose of defending their own interests and the interests of the working class as a whole. Active participation, serious and far-reaching political education, and the self-organization and self-mobilization of workers at the rank-and-file level would be required to secure improved working and living conditions, to defend the democratic and human rights of all, and to overcome the multifaceted social crises of our time. This could only be realized through socialism. “Life is beautiful,” Trotsky wrote in 1940. “Let the future generations cleanse it of all evil, oppression, and violence, and enjoy it to the full” (1973–9 [1939–40]: 159).

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Imperialism, Modernization to Globalization; Internationals; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Martov, Julius (1873–1923); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918); Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”

References and Suggested Readings

- Broué, P. (1988) *Trotsky*. Paris: Fayard.
- Cliff, T. (1989–93). *Trotsky*, 4 vols. London: Bookmarks.
- Deutscher, I. (1954) *The Prophet Armed, Trotsky: 1879–1921*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Deutscher, I. (1959) *The Prophet Unarmed, Trotsky: 1921–1929*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Deutscher, I. (1963) *The Prophet Unarmed, Trotsky: 1929–1940*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Le Blanc, P. (1996) *From Marx to Gramsci: A Reader in Revolutionary Marxist Politics*. Amherst: Humanity Books.
- Löwy, M. (1981) *The Politics of Uneven and Combined Development*. London: Verso.
- Mandel, E. (1995) *Trotsky as Alternative*. London: Verso.

- Trotsky, L. (1936) *History of the Russian Revolution*, 3 vols. in 1. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Trotsky, L. (1967) *Stalin, An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence*. New York: Stein & Day.
- Trotsky, L. (1969) *On the Trade Unions*. New York: Merit Publishers.
- Trotsky, L. (1970a) *My Life*. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Trotsky, L. (1970b) *The Revolution Betrayed*. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Trotsky, L. (1971) *The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany*. Ed. G. Breitman, M. Maisel, & D. Roberts. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Trotsky, L. (1972) *Permanent Revolution and Results and Prospects*. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Trotsky, L. (1973–9) *Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1929–1940*, 14 vols. Ed. G. Breitman et al. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Trotsky, L. (1975–81) *The Challenge of the Left Opposition, 1923–29*, 3 vols. Ed. N. Allen & G. Saunders. New York: Pathfinder Press.

Truth, Sojourner (ca. 1797–1883)

Albert Rolls

Born around 1797 in Hurly, New York, and given the name Isabella, Sojourner Truth, who later in life earned fame as an evangelist, abolitionist, and women's rights advocate, remained a slave until 1827 when, on July 4, African Americans born before July 4, 1799 were freed in accordance with New York's 1817 emancipation statute. Her owners during her first 30 years included Johannes Hardenbergh and his son Charles Hardenbergh, who sold her to John Neely in 1806. Martinus Schryver bought her in 1808, and two years later she was sold to John Dumont.

Dumont remained Truth's master until the fall of 1826, when she emancipated herself after he reneged on a promise to set her free early. He insisted that she return, and while he and she argued the matter, Isaac Van Wagenen, an opponent of slavery, stepped in, paying Dumont \$20 for the services he believed were owed to him. Thus for the last months of her legal status as a slave, she stayed with Isaac and Maria Van Wagenen, whose surname she took when she received her free papers.

For the next two years, Truth lived in Kingston, working as a domestic servant. She also successfully sued to free her 5-year-old son Peter, who had been illicitly sold to an Alabama

slave-owner. During the same period she became a member of Kingston's Methodist Church. In 1829 she moved, with Peter, to New York City and joined the John Street Church, where she preached and, according to contemporary reports, managed to convert others with her zeal. Soon, however, she joined the all-black Zion Church.

In 1831 Truth went into the employ of Elijah Pierson, who introduced her to Robert Matthews, or the Prophet Matthias. She then joined Matthias's Utopian community, the Kingdom, in which she lived until 1834, when Matthias was accused of murdering Pierson. Truth was then accused of attempting to poison Ann and Benjamin Folger, a wealthy family also involved with Matthias. She successfully sued to clear her name.

On June 1, 1843 she quit her domestic position, took the name Sojourner Truth, and became a traveling evangelist, living in Northampton, Massachusetts, from 1844 to 1857 and in Battle Creek, Michigan, from 1857 until her death in 1883. During her first years as Truth, she extended her reputation as a powerful preacher. In 1850 she spoke at a women's rights convention in Massachusetts, and Oliver Gilbert's *Narrative of Sojourner Truth* (1850) first appeared. After that, she began traveling throughout the Northern states, speaking as an abolitionist and women's rights advocate.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Women's Movement, United States, 19th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Gilbert, O. (1850/1991) *Narrative of Sojourner Truth*. Intro. J. C. Stewart. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mabee, C. (1995) *Sojourner Truth: Slave, Prophet, Legend*. New York: NYU Press.
- Painter, N. (1996) *Sojourner Truth: A Life, a Symbol*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Tubman, Harriet (ca. 1819–1913)

Albert Rolls

Primarily remembered for her work as a conductor on the Underground Railroad (UR), Harriet Tubman came to be known as "the Moses of her people" during her lifetime, yet her helping

slaves escape to freedom represents only a portion of her accomplishments.

Given the name Araminta Ross at her birth in Dorchester, Maryland, in about 1819, Tubman spent the first 29 years of her life as the property of Edward Brodas. Brodas often rented her to other families, including that of James Cook when she was around 5, but most often to that of Anthony Thompson, whose father, Brodas's stepfather, served as the master of Harriet's parents before Brodas came of age.

At the age of 13, Tubman, who according to some accounts had already changed her name to Harriet, suffered a head injury at the hands of her overseer, who, while throwing an iron weight at another slave, hit her, leaving a permanent indent in her skull and inflicting her with a condition that caused her to fall asleep in the middle of daily activities. She nonetheless continued working for the families to which she was rented or on Brodas's plantation. In 1844 she married John Tubman. Five years later she escaped Thompson's plantation without her husband, who refused to run, and was taken to freedom on the UR.

After gaining her freedom, Tubman met William Still, one of the organizers of the UR, at the Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Society and began planning the emancipation of her sister, brother-in-law, and their two children, a plan that was put into action in 1850. Over the next decade Tubman continued working on the UR, emancipating over 300 slaves, including her brother in 1851 and her parents in 1857, without, it was said, ever allowing one to be captured. The year she rescued her parents, William Stewart, New York's governor, presented Tubman with a house in Auburn, New York, a gift Tubman insisted on paying for in small regular payments.

In 1860, after going to Maryland for the last time, Tubman went to Canada, as a \$40,000 reward had been offered for her capture, but she returned the following year after the Civil War broke out, and for the next four years served in various capacities in the Union Army, including as a cook, nurse, spy, and scout. When the war ended, Tubman returned to her house in Auburn, where her parents were still living. There, she carried out what she called her "last work," providing a home for those who were unable to care for themselves. For the rest of her life, which ended on March 10, 1913, she supported that cause with help from supporters

and earnings that she received from the two biographies, *Scenes in the Life of Harriet Tubman* (1869) and *Harriet, The Moses of Her People* (1886), written about her by Sarah Bradford.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Slave Rescues and the Underground Railroad, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Clinton, C. (2004) *Harriet Tubman: The Road to Freedom*. New York: Little, Brown.
- Edmonds Crewe, S. (2005) Housing: Harriet Tubman's Last Work. *Journal of Housing and Community Development* 62 (3): 6, 8, 10–12.
- McMahon Humez, J. (2003) *Harriet Tubman: The Life and the Life Stories*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan

Donnacha Ó Beacháin

Askar Akaev said he wanted Kyrgyzstan to be “the Switzerland of Central Asia,” but when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 the small country of five million people found itself ill-prepared for independence. The economy went into free fall and poverty was widespread. Despite an early reputation for being a progressive liberal, President Akaev adopted an increasingly authoritarian and corrupt style of rule, alienating many sections of the Kyrgyz electorate and influential members of the political elite. On March 24, 2005 his rule came abruptly to an end when the presidential palace was seized and the Akaev family fled the country. While it is well known who was unhappy with Akaev's presidency and who benefited from his overthrow, to this day it is not clear who was responsible for ousting the Kyrgyz president.

The Rise of Askar Akaev

By the middle of the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan, a newly independent former Soviet republic, was considered an island of democracy in a desert of Central Asian authoritarianism. It was ruled by a president who was a politician by accident, Askar Akaev. Born in 1944, the youngest of five sons, Akaev studied and taught physics in Leningrad from 1967 to 1977 before returning



Kyrgyz protesters raise their arms to vote for the resignation of President Askar Akaev during the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan on March 15, 2005. The Tulip Revolution sought to end the rule of Akaev, who was considered corrupt and authoritarian. On April 4, 2005, Akaev fled the country and signed his resignation in Moscow. (AFP/Getty Images)

to Kyrgyzstan where he was respected as an academic, becoming president of the country's Academy of Sciences in 1989. On October 27, 1990, the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet selected Akaev as a compromise choice for the new position of president of the republic. His surprise victory came shortly after the two major candidates – the president of Kyrgyzstan's Council of Ministers, Apas Jumagulov, and the first secretary of the country's Communist Party, Absamat Masaliyev – were eliminated from the contest after each failed to secure a majority of votes in the Supreme Soviet. Kyrgyzstan's relative liberalism (compared to other Central Asian republics) was attributed to Akaev's lack of a political background. As the 1990s progressed, however, Akaev's presidential rule became increasingly authoritarian, and there was a corresponding rise in dissatisfaction with the regime.

The political demise of Georgian President Edward Shevardnadze in the Rose Revolution of November 2003 and of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's nominee, Victor Yanukovich, in the Orange Revolution of November–December 2004 led many to look anxiously (or expectantly) to other post-Soviet countries for similar regime changes. Akaev had ruled Kyrgyzstan for 14 years and had said he would not contest the presidential elections to be held in October 2005. Thus, the parliamentary elections of February 27 and March 13 would have a direct bearing on his retirement. The bicameral parliament of 60 members in the Legislative Assembly (lower house) and 45 deputies in the People's Assembly (upper house) were to be

replaced by a new unicameral parliament of 75 seats. Many suspected that Akaev would try to fill parliament with his own supporters and move the country away from a presidential form of government lest his successor prove unreliable in guaranteeing the interests, particularly the economic wealth, of the Akaev family. The fact that opposition candidates found it difficult to contest the election while several members of Akaev's family, including his son and daughter, were registered without difficulty reinforced this perception. Media freedom was increasingly stifled and the few remaining bastions of independent journalism – *MSN* and *Respublika* – found themselves threatened with closure. The most prominent opposition figure, Felix Kulov, was in prison, having been dispatched there on politically motivated charges of embezzlement once he had started to show signs of opposing Akaev. Kulov was a former vice-president of Kyrgyzstan (1992–3) before the position was abolished and governor of the Chui region (1994–7). He was also a popular mayor of the capital, Bishkek, but on resigning from that position in 1999 he established an opposition political party, *Ar-Namys*, and made it clear that he would contest the 2000 election against Akaev. Disqualified from running for the presidency by the government-appointed Central Election Commission, Kulov soon found himself in military custody and was not due to be released until November 2005, one month after a presidential election which many observers felt he would win if permitted to run.

Akaev had always sought good relations with both Washington and Moscow. His even-handed approach was reflected in his decision to permit both American and Russian military bases to operate on Kyrgyz territory. In the run-up to the election, however, there was a noticeable shift in Akaev's position as he sought refuge by strengthening his alliance with Russian President Vladimir Putin against the West. When Akaev introduced Putin to his son, Aidar, at a meeting in Moscow in January 2005, some suspected that he was grooming his heir for high political office. Allied with this increased reliance on Russia was Akaev's marked characterization of opposition within Kyrgyzstan as western-financed exporters of revolution. Akaev, along with other regional presidents, repeatedly claimed that the conditions for a velvet revolution did not exist in Central Asia. Such a revolution

would be manufactured from abroad rather than be a response to indigenous problems. There were no economic or political premises for revolution, Akaev said, as in contrast to Georgia, for example, the Kyrgyz were well off or at least people had electricity and heat in their homes. Akaev was also aware that in an election whose outcome would be crucial to his retirement plans, he was likely to get a ringing endorsement from the delegations of election monitors from the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) while evoking embarrassing criticisms from western-based organizations like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Indeed, the CIS monitors had already judged the Uzbekistan parliamentary elections in December and January, in which no opposition party had been allowed to register, to be free and fair, so they were unlikely to find fault with those to be conducted in Kyrgyzstan.

Elections and Protests

Opposition to the Akaev regime came from a number of prominent political figures, most of them former members of his administrations, but it was clear that there was no single leader around whom the opposition could unite. In Georgia and Ukraine, Mikheil Saakashvili and Viktor Yushchenko, respectively, had successfully personified opposition to the status quo, but in Kyrgyzstan, despite the plethora of political parties, the system was, and remains, dominated by individual rather than ideological competition. In this sense, the opposition suffered more from a dearth of leadership than leaders. Worthy of mention is Kel Kel (Kyrgyz: "It's Time"), a small group of anti-government dissidents, largely student intellectuals, who self-consciously modeled their actions on successful revolutionary youth organizations in Georgia (Kmara), Ukraine (Pora), and Serbia (Otpor). From the beginning of the year, Kel Kel began organizing small-scale demonstrations, mainly in Bishkek, and again following the examples of other movements, tried to adopt appropriate symbols and colors to identify and characterize the movement for change. Initially, there was indecision as to whether to adopt pink or yellow as a color and the lemon or the tulip as a symbol. The tulip won out (imitating the rose that symbolized the Georgian Revolution), and the violent ousting of

Akaev was to be known as the Tulip Revolution among its supporters.

The two rounds of elections conducted on February 27 and March 13 passed without major incident. A novel feature of the contests was the use of voter marking in an effort to counteract organized fraud. The left thumb/index finger of the voter was marked with indelible ink to prevent repeat voting. The program was financed by the US government (costing \$185,000) and distributed by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). The first round of elections was inconclusive and only 32 candidates succeeded in securing election (Kyrgyzstani election law demands that a candidate secure more than 50 percent of the vote, otherwise a second ballot is required between the two strongest contenders). Most of the candidates successful in the first round of voting were wealthy local businessmen thought to be loyal to Akaev. Very few opposition figures were elected in this opening round, though several made it through to the runoff stage on March 13. The results of the second round, as predicted, saw most key oppositionists marginalized; only seven of the 75 deputies elected were clearly identifiable members of the opposition. There was no instant reaction to the results and Akaev even claimed on March 16 that, after studying carefully the Orange and Rose revolutions, he had developed an anti-virus to counter the color revolution disease that was plaguing the post-Soviet space. His boasts proved premature, however, and rumblings of discontent soon began in different parts of the country.

Initially, protests were of a local character and were carried out by supporters of defeated parliamentary candidates in Naryn, Talas, and Kochtor in the north of the country, and Osh and Jalalabad in the south. In the Osh region, demonstrators in Uzgen seized administration buildings, forcing the electoral commission to declare defeated candidate Adahan Madumarov the winner, while supporters of another defeated candidate in Alay blocked the main road to Osh, Kyrgyzstan's second largest city. In Talas, several thousand supporters of Ravshan Jeenbekov, a former Akaev insider turned opposition candidate, also blocked roads and seized government buildings but went one step further by holding the regional governor hostage for 24 hours. On March 15, a large rally of about 15,000 people took place in Jalalabad, where opposition protesters occupied administration buildings, and

was addressed by a variety of prominent anti-government figures including Kurmanbek Bakiev, Rosa Otunbaeva, and Azimbek Beknazarov. The meeting called for Akaev's resignation and new parliamentary elections. It also elected a Coordinating Council for National Unity and chose Jusupbek Jeenbekov as its chairman and "people's governor" for the Jalalabad region. On March 18, protesters seized government buildings in Osh and three days later a large rally appointed Anvar Artykov as a "people's governor," thus creating a parallel system of government for the region. The choice of Artykov – an ethnic Uzbek – was partially to quell fears among the large Uzbek population in Osh, who had traditionally viewed Akaev as a bulwark against assertive Kyrgyz nationalism.

The government forces were caught unawares by the sudden rise in activism and were slow to respond. State security forces recaptured the government buildings in Osh and Jalalabad on March 19, but up to 10,000 protesters regained control of the building in Jalalabad the following morning and destroyed police headquarters and other state buildings. Similar events occurred in Osh and other towns. The police – obviously under orders not to precipitate a bloodbath – used minimum force and rapidly ceded control of much of the southern urban centers to the protesters. Jalalabad and Osh airports were seized to prevent the government flying in reinforcements.

Overthrow of Akaev

While the south was in turmoil, the capital Bishkek, situated in the far north of the country, remained calm. On March 22, the Kyrgyz president convened the new parliament and told the newly elected deputies that there would be no revolution. From his citadel in the White House (as the presidential palace is called), Akaev rejected all overtures from the opposition to negotiate a way out of the impasse. Rather, a harder line was in evidence when, on March 23, he fired the interior minister and the prosecutor-general. The following day, opposition leaders held a major rally in Bishkek with many protesters bussed in from other (particularly southern) regions. In the main square on Chui Street close to the White House, opposition leaders made speeches while Kel Kel activists brought tents, emulating the protesters in Kiev of a few months earlier, and prepared for a protracted

battle of wills. When buses carrying several hundred people from Osh arrived they were met with a rapturous welcome; however, rather than join the rally, the Osh protesters continued onwards to the White House where they were joined by some young people from the rally. This group clashed with police protecting the White House and twice was forced back. The position of the security forces – under instructions not to open fire – was untenable and they eventually fled. With no one to hinder them, the protesters stormed the building and within a short time were waving from the windows and throwing furniture and pictures out onto the plaza. Akaev had already left the building some hours earlier, but those unfortunate enough not to escape – the heads of the presidential administration, public relations, and the National Guard – were badly beaten.

The old regime never regained control, nor was there a serious attempt of the ruling political elite to reassert its right to govern. Mass looting followed throughout Bishkek. Businesses thought to be connected with the Akaev family were targeted, as were foreign enterprises, particularly Turkish shops. There is considerable anecdotal evidence too that shops belonging to ethnic minorities within Kyrgyzstan suffered disproportionately and there was some intimidation of ethnic Slavs. In an attempt to avoid financial ruin, some shopkeepers put signs in their front window expressing support for the protests. The release of Felix Kulov from prison on March 24 by jubilant supporters and his rapid return to prominence greatly assisted in bringing the security situation under control. Kulov was immediately given the position of national security chief and entrusted with bringing the country back from the brink – quite a feat for a man who earlier that morning had woken up in a prison cell at a high-security correctional labor camp. Kulov managed to impose a curfew, persuade police to return to work, and ordered them to fire on looters in an attempt to restore stability. Despite widespread disorder, there were only three reported fatalities during the disturbances.

What was clear during the first few days is that the opposition had overstepped themselves. Having surpassed their most optimistic expectations so quickly, there was little time to put together a strategy and the lack of sustained coordination began to show. With the disappearance of the government and the breakdown of law and order, a political vacuum had been

created that some force had to fill. Opposition leaders professed themselves eager to act within the constitution and to effect a peaceful transition, but to do that they had to get Akaev to formally resign; until then, Akaev would retain legal authority in the country. The problem was that for some time nobody knew the whereabouts of the president, though the most popular rumors suggested he was in Russia, Kazakhstan, or the Russian military base at Kant, 30 kilometers from Bishkek.

Into the breach stepped Kurmanbek Bakiev who, amid the chaos on March 24, assumed the positions of acting prime minister and, in Akaev's absence, acting president, appointments later confirmed by the newly elected parliament. Though not a particularly charismatic or even strong leader, Bakiev proved acceptable to many in the opposition. As a southerner, he could rely on the support of many in the south who felt alienated from the Akaev elite in Bishkek that had filled key positions in the administration with relatives and friends from the north of the country. For those in the more liberal and Russified north who feared dominance by the relatively traditional and nationalistic south, Bakiev was able to present himself as a moderate, and the fact that he was married to an ethnic Russian assuaged the fears of many national minorities. For political conservatives – both inside Kyrgyzstan and in other post-Soviet republics – who feared a radical departure from previous political and economic policies, Bakiev's experience in politics and his cautious tenure as prime minister from 2001 to 2002 allayed many suspicions. His conservative streak was immediately evident when it became clear that there would be no new elections and that the new parliament would be considered the legitimate legislature of the country. This, at a stroke, undermined the very basis on which Akaev had been overthrown: that he had engineered a compliant parliament before and during an election that was marred by irregularities. From Moscow, Akaev defiantly condemned the new administration as a group of political adventurers riding on the backs of anarchy and pogroms disguised by revolutionary slogans. For a while it seemed like Akaev might refuse to relinquish office, but following a meeting in Moscow with a delegation led by Kyrgyz parliamentary speaker Omurbek Tekebaev, on April 3, the Kyrgyz president agreed to step down. On April

4, Akaev traveled to the Kyrgyzstan embassy in Moscow to tender his resignation. This was accepted by the new parliament a week later, and July 10 was set as the date for presidential elections. Both Bakiev and Kulov declared their candidacy and there was speculation that the contest might increase tension between the north and south of the country (represented by Kulov and Bakiev respectively). These fears were eventually dispelled on May 13 when Kulov announced that he was withdrawing from the race and would support Bakiev. A pact was agreed whereby Kulov would allow Bakiev a clear run for the highest office (there would be other candidates but none had a realistic chance of success), and in return Kulov would be appointed prime minister by Bakiev. The pre-election pact took the heat out of the campaign, but some more democratically inclined observers criticized the deal, arguing that it deprived voters of a real choice. Certainly, Bakiev's landslide victory on July 10 – he took almost 90 percent of the votes in a six-man race – was more a coronation than an election. While a strong mandate was perhaps desirable to legitimize Bakiev's rapid and unorthodox rise to power, the scale of victory seemed to mirror the rigged elections of other post-Soviet autocracies.

Revolution?

The question remains whether what happened in Kyrgyzstan during March 2005 can be called a revolution. Certainly, groups like Kel Kel, who had prepared for peaceful regime change and self-consciously copied the style and tactics of successful protest movements in Georgia and Ukraine, believed that a revolution had occurred. Like a proud mother or father, they claimed parentage of the new order. However, these groups played a very small role in determining the composition of the new government. Indeed, so carried away were they with the euphoria that resulted from an unexpected victory that they did not seem to mind that the composition of the new cabinet included many old faces from the Akaev administrations. But while the intellectual opposition may have prepared for regime change and conferred legitimacy on the new order, it played no role in the decisive taking of the White House and overthrow of the regime. It remains a mystery why the police and army put up so little resistance to the crowds who

besieged the presidential palace. Rather than being a revolution brought about by a strong opposition, it is arguable that what happened was simply the collapse of rotten state institutions, which could not survive even a minor frontal assault. Another mystery is who exactly were the few hundred individuals that stormed the White House and, more importantly, what were their motives? What is certain is that they had little to do with the peaceful protesters who had prepared for a long campaign. There is no evidence to link the sudden demise of the old regime on March 23 with the activities of the main opposition figures and groups, and the forces that did topple the Akaev regime – the few hundred men who stormed the White House – may have been adept at destroying the old order, but they played no role in creating a new one. That task was left to disparate opposition leaders like Bakiev, Kulov, Otunbaeva, and Beknazarov who had united against the established order, but their unity of purpose would be difficult to sustain now that Akaev was gone.

The Kyrgyzstan political elite today is not noticeably more democratic than that which governed during the last years of Akaev. However, parliament has asserted itself and there is evidence that civil society and political activism remain significant forces in Kyrgyzstan. The occupation of cities and mass protests in the south of Kyrgyzstan had a more popular revolutionary aspect than those that ousted Akaev in Bishkek. And it is important to note that during these mass demonstrations, there was no evidence of western-funded non-governmental organizations playing a prominent role, as was later suggested by other authoritarian leaders in the post-Soviet space, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Akaev himself.

Less than two years after the overthrow of the Akaev regime, Bakiev and Kulov had parted ways and the president was fending off strong opposition from a number of civil society groups. On February 20, 2007, Bakiev declared that “any manifestation of radicalism is unacceptable and cannot be supported by the healthy forces and the people of Kyrgyzstan” – hardly the words of a revolutionary.

Even Akaev couldn't figure out who had been the author of his downfall. The “West,” in particular the Soros Foundation, received some of the blame from Akaev, while on March 31,

2005, he told the BBC that the US ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, Steven Young, had played a role in orchestrating the regime change. Six weeks later, in an article written for the Russian-language daily newspaper *Izvestiya*, he claimed the new administration that had replaced him was composed of old communist-era officials. “It is laughable to see the organizers of this coup d'état [described] as a ‘new political elite’ – these are mainly those who sprang from the [Communist] party and Soviet *nomenklatura*” (May 12, 2005). In the end, neither old Soviet *nomenklatura* nor new American acolytes had manufactured widespread disaffection against the Kyrgyz president. Akaev had done a good job of that all by himself.

SEE ALSO: Charter 77; Color Revolutions; Soviet Union, Fall of; Ukraine Orange Revolution, 2004–2005

References and Suggested Readings

- Abazov, R. (2007) Parliamentary Elections in Kyrgyzstan, February/March 2005. *Electoral Studies* 26, 2 (June): 529–33.
- Anderson, J. (1999) *Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Island of Democracy*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Cummings, S. N. & Nørgaard, O. (2004) Conceptualising State Capacity: Comparing Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. *Political Studies* 52, 4 (December): 685–708.
- Fuhrmann, M. (2006) A Tale of Two Social Capitals: Explaining Revolutionary Collective Action in Kyrgyzstan. *Problems of Post-Communism* 53 (November–December): 16–29.
- International Crisis Group (2005) *Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution*. Bishkek and Brussels: ICG.
- McMann, K. M. (2006) *Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Marat, E. (2006) *The Tulip Revolution: Kyrgyzstan One Year After*. Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation.
- OSCE/ODIHR International Observer Mission (2005) *Final Report of Parliamentary Elections in the Kyrgyz Republic, 27 February and 13 March 2005*. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR.
- Yarkova, T. (2004) Applying the Concepts of Legitimacy and Trust in Kyrgyzstan. In C. Harrington, A. Salem, & T. Zurabishvili (Eds.), *After Communism: Critical Perspectives on Society and Sociology*. Oxford and New York: Peter Lang.
- Several useful articles covering events in Kyrgyzstan during 2005 are available at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (www.rferl.org), Eurasianet (www.eurasianet.org), and Transitions Online (www.tol.cz).

Tunisia, protests under Ottoman (Bey) rule to 1881

Arnaud Lucien

The government of the Bey dynasty in Tunisia, in power from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, originated in protest against Turkish hegemony as the regional janissary corps of the Ottoman empire sought autonomy and local administration over the province.

Tunisia emerged as a territory of independent principalities and harbor cities, setting the stage for wars between the Hafsid dynasty, the Ottoman empire, and the French and Spanish. In 1534, Khizirkhayn al din, also known as Barbarossa, distinguished himself by capturing Bizerte, la Goulette, and Tunis from the Hafsid dynasty, which had ruled them for three centuries. In 1535, Tunis was taken for Spain by Charles V, to be relinquished only in 1560 when the Ottoman navy under the command of Piyale Pasha and Turgut Reis defeated the fleet of Spain's Philip II in the Battle of Djerba. Shortly afterward, Spain returned Hafsid Sultan Hamid to the throne of Tunis.

In 1569, Uluj Ali, the Pasha of Algiers, seized Tunis and held it until 1573, when Don Juan of Austria recaptured it for Spain. In 1574, returning with a large fleet, Uluj Ali defeated Spain and returned Tunis to the Ottoman empire. Domination of the Ottoman province remained fragile, especially in central Tunisia. In 1590, 4,000 janissaries in Tunis launched an insurrection and placed a Dey in power, with a Bey under his command. The Beys were responsible for military control of the territory and for collecting taxes. In 1705, Hussein Ben Ali was elected Bey of Tunis and founded the Hussein dynasty, which installed a monarchy officially under the sovereignty of the Ottomans. However, throughout the Hussein period, Tunis gradually became more autonomous from the Turkish empire and its allegiance to the sultan became symbolic. Europe began negotiating directly with the Dey.

In 1735, Hussein Bey I was overthrown by his nephew, Ali I Bey, and later murdered by his grandnephew in 1740. Ali I Bey would later be overthrown by the sons of his predecessor, who took control of Tunis with the help of the Bey of Constantine, Rachid Bey (1756–9), and

his successor, Ali II Bey (1759–82). In 1781, Hammouda Bey came to power and initiated a prosperous period for Tunis. Hammouda was also successful in halting an Algerian invasion in 1807 and a janissary revolt in 1811.

Following the end of a number of European conflicts in the early nineteenth century, economic activity in Tunisia entered a severe decline. By 1820, Tunisia had experienced plague and cholera epidemics, and in 1827 its fleet was destroyed. In the following years, Ahmad Pacha Bey (1837–55) initiated reforms and set about modernizing the army, administration, education, and health care. He also put an end to the country's slave trade. His successor, Muhammad Pacha Bey, continued his reforms by establishing a pact in 1857 that created a constitutional monarchy. He was succeeded by Sadiq Pacha Bey in 1859, who continued his predecessor's legacy by enacting policies that transformed the pact into a constitution.

Tunisia's independence under the hereditary rule of the Hussein family was recognized by the Turkish sultan, but the province suffered severe financial problems. By 1871 Tunisia was forced to obtain foreign credit, and when its debt grew to unmanageable levels, domestic commerce gave way to foreign investment. In April 1879, French troops entered Tunisia with no resistance from Sadok Bey. On May 12, 1881, the Treaty of Bardo was signed, turning Tunisia into a French protectorate, which it remained until 1956. While the Hussein Beys continued to perform administrative tasks, their power was restricted under French rule. In 1957, after Tunisia had gained independence from France, a republic was declared and the Beylic office was abolished, bringing an end to the Hussein dynasty.

SEE ALSO: Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962; Tunisian Independence Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Brown, C. (1974) *The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey 1837–1855*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ganiage, J. (1959) *Les Origines du protectorat français en Tunisie (1861–1881)*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Moalla, A. (2003) *The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777–1814: Army and Government of a North-African Eyalet at the End of the Eighteenth Century*. New York: Routledge.
- Sebag, P. (1989) *Tunis au XVII^e siècle. Une cité barbaresque au temps de la course*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Tunisian independence movement

Seema Shekhawat

The present-day Republic of Tunisia, al-Jumhuriyyah at-Tunisiyyah, achieved independence from France on March 20, 1956. Its history, however, is one of occupation, with the final colonization phase being under France.

Tunisia was under the control of the Berber dynasties until the sixteenth century. With their decline, this North African coastal region (known as the Barbary Coast because of the Berbers) became a bone of contention between Spain in the west and Turkey in the east (Perkins 1986). Though Turkey emerged as the winner in this contest, Tunisia did not come under its direct control as a unified territory. A line of chieftains, called Beys, who were ultimately responsible to Turkey, ruled Tunisia until 1881.

The modernization drive by the Beys financed by borrowing money from European countries finally bankrupted Tunisia. This consequently brought the regions of the Barbary Coast under the economic control of three major European powers – Italy, Britain, and France. In a later chain of events, the region eventually entered its last colonial phase when France turned it into a protectorate in 1881. This forced the Bey, Muhammad III al-Sadiq, to sign the Treaty of Bardo (also known as the Treaty of Al-Qasr as-Sa'id) with France on May 12, 1881.

As elsewhere, colonial status brought some modernization for the region, including education and infrastructure. But in due course it also awakened the desire to become free from occupation. Resistance movements can be traced back to the late 1880s even before the colonial masters had completed one decade of occupation. The launch of the weekly magazine *al-Hadira* in 1888, and later *al-Zahra* in 1890, initiated the process of mass unrest against colonial rule. In 1896 there followed a discussion group, the Khaldunniyya School, led by Bashir Sfar; the formation of the Young Tunisian Party in 1907; and the launch in 1909 of a journal, *Le Tunisien*, in French and Arabic editions by Ali Bash Hamba to promote indigenous rights.

In 1911 and 1912, a series of events set the stage for independence, including unrest within institutions of higher education, the launch of

a new political party, al-Ittihad al-Islami (The Evolutionist), and mass demonstrations concerning religion. The colonial masters dealt with the situation with an iron fist, imposing martial law, and many Tunisians were killed during this period. Later in 1912, many nationalist newspapers were forced to shut down and several leaders of the independence movement, which was still in its infancy, were sent into exile in order to curb the growth of nationalist sentiments (Laroui 1977). Nationalist currents only resurfaced following the end of World War I.

The Destour (Constitution) Party was established in 1920 and put forward demands for full independence. Young nationalists who adopted a more aggressive stance on independence defected from the party in 1934 to form the Neo Destour (New Constitution) Party. This event was a turning point since it set the stage for the rise of the most important leader of the independence movement in Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba (1903–2000). French authorities banned the party and Bourguiba was imprisoned. However, his leadership skills ensured the continuation of the movement for independence.

During World War II, Tunisia's bid for independence came to a halt. The Axis powers unsuccessfully courted Bourguiba's influence in Tunisia to help them defeat the Allied powers. Following his release from prison in 1943, Bourguiba proposed a concept of gradual independence (gradualism is also known as Bourguibism, a consistent characteristic of Bourguiba's political approach). Paying no attention to his proposal for non-violence, the Neo Destour recommenced its violent campaign of planting bombs and carrying out attacks on colonial facilities to pressurize the French authorities, leading to a two-year prison term for Bourguiba in 1952. Nevertheless, the violent independence struggle continued.

In June 1954, the new, liberal-minded French prime minister, Pierre Mendès-France, introduced a policy of partial withdrawal from Tunisia as well as from Morocco, partly in order to avoid full-scale armed uprisings on either side of Algeria (Mazrui & Tidy 1984). The consequence of this was an agreement in April 1955 that led to a return to the situation of 1881, with Tunisia receiving internal autonomy while external affairs remained under French control. A Neo Destour government was formed, but Bourguiba refused to take charge until full independence.

Talks continued between Bourguiba and France in accordance with the former's policy of gradualism. The Algerian War of Independence and the independence of Morocco in November 1955 finally paved the way for full independence for Tunisia on March 20, 1956. Bourguiba became prime minister of the newly independent state of Tunisia, with Muhammad VIII al-Amin Bey as king. Following the abolition of the monarchy in 1957, Bourguiba became the first president of the Republic of Tunisia. Tunisia managed to emerge in the postcolonial era with its precolonial boundaries scarcely affected by the redrawing of the political map of Africa by European colonialism.

SEE ALSO: Algerian National Revolution, 1954–1962; Francophone Africa, Protest and Independence; Morocco, Protests, 1600s–1990s; Tunisia, Protests under Ottoman (Bey) Rule to 1881

References and Suggested Readings

Braudel, F. (1992) *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. Trans. S. Reynolds. New York: HarperCollins.

Kinross, P. B. (1977) *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire*. New York: Morrow Quill.

Laroui, A. (1977) *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mazrui, A. A. & Tidy, M. (1984) *Nationalism and New States in Africa: From about 1935 to the Present*. Nairobi: Heinemann.

Perkins, K. J. (1986) *Tunisia: Crossroads of the Islamic and European Worlds*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Túpac Amaru (ca. 1540–1572)

Viviana Uriona

Túpac Amaru was the last indigenous leader of the Inca state in Peru. He was born in Cuzco in about 1540 and died there in 1572. He was the second son of Manco Inca Yupanqui, who had been recognized by Spanish explorer Francisco Pizarro as emperor. After his father's death, the eldest son, Sayri Túpac, submitted to Spanish rule. He was baptized and rewarded by a tract of land and by the command over the Indians at Urubamba. However, Túpac Amaru renounced his family claims and retired to the mountains



Túpac Amaru (ca. 1540–72) was the last indigenous leader of the Sapa Inca royal dynasty in Peru and led the final stronghold of Inca resistance against the Spanish conquest. This drawing by the chronicler Guaman Poma de Ayala in the seventeenth century depicts his execution by Spaniards in 1572. (South American Pictures)

of Vilcabamba. Between 1534 and 1572, an anti-colonial resistance group emerged, consisting of the so-called Incas of Vilcabamba. Their four rulers, who did not actually have real political power, were Manco Inca Yupanqui (Manco Cápac II), Sayri Túpac Inca, Titu Cusi Yupanqui, and Túpac Amaru I.

In 1558 the Inca Sayri Túpac was defeated by the Spaniards and moved to Lima, but his brother Titu Cusi stayed in Vilcabamba, spearheading a group of resistant Indians. Túpac Amaru took over the imperial title after Cusi, his half-brother, died in 1571, poisoned, as the Incas believed, by the Spaniards. Unaware of the Inca chief's death, the Spaniards sent two delegates for further talks with the tribe, but these agents were killed by the Incas. The new viceroy, Francisco de Toledo, took advantage of this situation to justify an attack on Vilcabamba,

fearing that their resistance could spread to the rest of the Andean population.

In 1572, on the pretext of sending auxiliaries to Chile, Francisco de Toledo ordered 250 men to march against the district of Vilcabamba, where they launched hostilities against Túpac Amaru and the indigenous people of the region. The latter resisted in self-defense, but were defeated several times. With all means of subsistence cut off, Túpac Amaru fled to safety with his family and some followers to the mountains. Receiving notice of his retreat, Captain Martin de Loyola led 20 men across the mountain stream that defended the Incas' retreat and captured the camp in a surprise night-time attack, taking the prince and his family prisoner. Túpac Amaru was transported to Cuzco, where he was baptized before being publicly and brutally executed. The last stronghold of Inca resistance and the royal dynasty of the Incas was thus destroyed, since Túpac Amaru left no male descendants. He did, however, leave two daughters; one of them, Juana Pilco-Huaco, married a chieftain of Surimaná. One of their descendants took the name of Túpac Amaru II and rebelled against the Spaniards in the eighteenth century.

SEE ALSO: Túpac Amaru Rebellion II and the Last Inca Revolt, 1780–1783; Túpac Katari (ca. 1750–1781); Tupamaros

References and Suggested Readings

- Antkowiak, A. (1977) *Túpac Amaru oder die letzte Rebellion des Inka*. Halle: Mitteldeutsche Verlag.
- Guillén Guillén, E. (1974) *Versión inca de la conquista*. Lima: Milla Batres.
- Hemming, J. (1970) *The Conquest of the Incas*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- MacQuarrie, K. (2007) *The Last Days of the Incas*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Túpac Amaru Rebellion II and the Last Inca Revolt, 1780–1783

María N. Marsilli

The great-great grandson of Túpac Amaru I, the last Incan leader and a provincial Indian nobleman, José Gabriel Condorcanqui Noguera, alias Túpac Amaru II (1742–81), led the most

significant Indian rebellion that took place in the Americas between the Spanish conquest and independence. Aware of the conditions endured by common Indians, in 1780 he organized a revolt that appealed to the Incans' sense of justice and thus attracted large numbers of native fighters. After much effort, the Spaniards suppressed the movement and executed Condorcanqui. They subsequently implemented major changes in their imperial administration of the Peruvian viceroyalty.

Condorcanqui was born in Tinta (province of Cuzco) into an upper-class Indian family. Through his maternal side, he was a descendant of Túpac Amaru I, the last Incan rebel executed by the Spaniards in 1570. He received a Jesuit education, spoke fluent Spanish and Quechua, and read Latin readily. He amassed a sizable fortune thanks to muleteering, a profitable activity in colonial Peru. Condorcanqui was nicknamed the “muleteer-cacique” when he inherited the caciqueship (leadership position in Andean communities) of Tungasuca and Pampamarca from his older brother. He married Micaela Bastidas Puyucahua, a pure-blooded Indian woman, and fathered three children, Hipólito, Mariano, and Fernando. His duties as a chief acquainted him with the harshness of life experienced by common Indians. He found that several time-honored practices were particularly detrimental to the well-being of everyday Indians: inhumane working conditions in textile workshops and mines; the mandatory purchase of superfluous products (*reparto*); burdensome labor obligations (*mita*); and unfair taxation.

Condorcanqui initially assisted the Indians in trying to correct these abuses by using legal means. But in November of 1780, when all legal channels proved hopeless, the chief arrested Don Antonio de Arriaga, the Spanish governor of Tinta province, for his abuses against the natives, claiming he was following orders from the Spanish king. Arriaga was hanged in front of the crowd, and within a week the region was in open revolt. Soon a vast number of Indians throughout the Peruvian viceroyalty joined the rebel forces, unleashing the greatest open challenge to Spanish rule in the Americas since the time of the conquest. The rebellion spread throughout most of the viceroyalty, largely because it sparked and converged with a parallel insurgency initiated in Upper Peru (now Bolivia) by the Cataris, a noble Indian family from Potosí.

Many Indians, both commoners and noblemen, supported Condorcanqui's rebellion. The chief led the Indian peasantry in a mass uprising against both exploitation by the Spanish and the profound injustices of colonial society. But the Great Rebellion, as scholars have named it, also appealed to Indians because it represented the reassertion of traditional ideals of time, space, and social relations inherent to Andean culture. The uprising embodied an eighteenth-century revival of Incan identity, a motivation that was already common among Indian ruling groups throughout the Andes. Shortly after the beginning of the rebellion, Condorcanqui changed his name to Túpac Amaru II, in honor of his Incan ancestor. He also adopted a more native style of dress and spoke to his troops in Quechua, their native language. Most importantly, Condorcanqui and his wife proclaimed themselves Inca emperor and empress, thus encouraging Andean peasants to believe that the Inca empire had returned. While Túpac Amaru II repeatedly claimed to be following orders from the Spanish king to correct the numerous injustices of the colonial system, in truth his troops launched an ethnic war against the Spaniards, killing anyone suspected of European ancestry. For instance, at the battle of Sagarará, where he beat numerous Spanish forces, Condorcanqui ordered 600 soldiers to be burned to death inside the church where they had taken refuge.

Túpac Amaru II and his wife Micaela Bastidas fought together, sharing the command of the insurgent forces. They besieged the city of Cuzco, once the center of the Inca empire, but were not able to capture it. The violence of the war intensified, as many Indians and Creoles wanted to take revenge against Spanish bureaucrats and their collaborators. Although the Spaniards deeply feared the rebel army, they fiercely defended the city of Cuzco. As the siege took excessive time and effort, the rebellion started to lose momentum. This allowed the Spaniards to organize a powerful army to fight the insurgents. After a series of defeats, his closest collaborators betrayed Túpac Amaru II and the Spaniards captured him and his family.

Colonial judges wanted to set a precedent against further Indian revolts by giving the rebels an exemplary punishment. After a short trial, Condorcanqui, his family, and most of his loyal associates were sentenced to public execution. The lawyer defending Micaela Bastidas

tried to save her life, alleging that she was a married woman and, therefore, had to obey her husband. The judges denied the petition, arguing that Bastidas had exhibited exceptional initiative and command during the revolt, and that she ought to die as a man. Túpac Amaru witnessed the execution of his wife, his eldest son Hipólito, his uncle, his brother-in-law, and some of his captains. He was sentenced to die by dismemberment, a form of execution in which four horses simultaneously pulled body and limbs apart. But the rebel leader was a strong man, and the horses could not complete the procedure. Condorcanqui was then drawn and quartered in the main square of Cuzco, where his great-great grandfather had been executed 200 years earlier.

The Spaniards wanted to eliminate all vestiges of Incan blood to prevent future rebellions. The only survivor of Condorcanqui's family was his youngest son, Fernando. Because of his young age (he was 12), he was sentenced to live in Spain for the rest of his life. It is not known if any other member of the Incan family survived this extermination.

The Spaniards also introduced administrative changes to hinder future Indian revolts. To this end they changed colonial taxation, created new administrative jurisdictions, inaugurated special courts with exclusive powers over Indian matters, and eliminated the compulsory selling of products. But the major change experienced by Indian communities was a dramatic reduction in the power of their leaders. The Spanish crown abolished caciqueships as hereditary positions and authorized Creoles and mixed-race individuals to become community leaders, thus irreversibly eroding the significance of Indian representation in the Andes.

SEE ALSO: Túpac Amaru (ca. 1540–1572)

References and Suggested Readings

- Campbell, L. (1981) Social Structure of the Túpac Amaru Army in Cuzco, 1780–81. *Hispanic American Historical Review* 61 (4): 675–93.
- Campbell, L. (1985) Women and the Great Rebellion in Peru, 1780–1783. *The Americas* 42 (2): 163–96.
- Fisher, L. E. (1966) *The Last Inca Revolt, 1780–1783*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Flores Galindo, A. (Ed.) (1976) *Túpac Amaru II – 1780*. Lima: Retablo de Papel.
- Golte, J. (1980) *Repartos y Rebeliones: Túpac Amaru y las Contradicciones de la Economía Colonial*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

- O'Phelan Godoy, S. (1988) *Un Siglo de Rebeliones Anticoloniales: Perú y Bolivia, 1700–83*. Cuzco: Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas.
- Serulnikov, S. (2003) *Subverting Colonial Authority: Challenges to Spanish Rule in Eighteenth-Century South Andes*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Stavig, W. (1999) *The World of Túpac Amaru: Conflict, Community, and Identity in Colonial Peru*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Stern, S. (Ed.) (1987) *Resistance, Rebellion, and Conscientiousness in the Andean Peasant World, Eighteenth to Twentieth Centuries*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Walker, C. F. (1999) *Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780–1840*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Túpac Katari (ca. 1750–1781)

Robin Stock

Túpac Katari was an Aymara leader in the so-called Great Rebellion in Upper Peru (now Bolivia) of the indigenous population against the Spanish in the 1780s. Although born with the Christian name Julián Apaza in 1750 in Sicasica (La Paz), he adopted the name Túpac Katari in honor of the indigenous leader Túpac Amaru II (leader of the insurgency in Cuzco) and Thomás Katari (leader of the insurgency in Chayanta – Potosí) who fought against the Spanish colonial power in the same years. Túpac Katari grew up as an orphan and without any formal education and later lived the life of a common salesman of coca leaves in the Andes.

Katari shared the suffering of his indigenous people and publicly stated his resistance against the Spanish, although it is not known exactly how his leadership evolved. In comparison to Túpac Amaru II and Thomás Katari he did not enjoy much social prestige and was not allied to the powerful community leaders (the *cacique* or *kurakas*). He became the leader of the rebellion against the Spanish colonial troops and on March 13, 1781 he and his wife Bartolina Sisa laid siege to the city of La Paz with an army of about 40,000 indigenous people. The rebellion was extended all through the Bolivian highlands, mainly influencing the regions of Cochabamba and Oruro. Attempts to conquer the city of La Paz, though, were unsuccessful because of a lack of weapons and the desperate defense by

the Spanish. The siege was finally broken by Spanish forces advancing from Lima and Buenos Aires in June. Another attempt to besiege the city began in August of the same year, supported by Andrés Túpac Amaru and Miguel Bastidas Túpac Amaru (nephews of Túpac Amaru II), but was quelled again by colonial forces. In the end the indigenous uprising left about 10,000 people dead, many of them from starvation because of the siege. After being captured by Spanish colonial forces, Túpac Katari was imprisoned, tortured, and finally executed on November 15, 1781.

The Túpac Katari rebellion is seen as the largest – geographically as well as by number of participants – and therefore most important insurgency against the Spanish in the Aymara region. Just some 25 years before the independence wars in the nineteenth century, the rebellion, inspired by attempts to overthrow Spanish colonialism and to reinstall indigenous rule, society, and customs, seriously endangered the colonial rule of the Spanish. Túpac Katari is today remembered as a hero in Bolivia, and social movements and guerrilla groups (e.g., the Túpac Katari Guerrilla Army) have adopted his name.

SEE ALSO: Katarismo and Indigenous Popular Mobilization, Bolivia, 1970s–Present; MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru); Túpac Amaru (ca. 1540–1572); Túpac Amaru Rebellion II and the Last Inca Revolt, 1780–1783

References and Suggested Readings

- Stavig, W. & Schmidt, E. (Eds.) (2008) *The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions*. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Vale de Siles, M. E. del (1977) Tupac Katari y la rebelión de 1781. Radiografía de un caudillo aymara. In *Anuario de estudios Americanos*, Sevilla.

Tupamaros

Stefan Thimmel

The urban guerrilla movement called Tupamaros (officially described as the National Liberation Movement, Movimiento de Liberación Nacional – Tupamaros) (MLN-T) was founded in 1963 in Uruguay and was composed mainly of trade unionists, socialists, and former members of the traditional Uruguayan Blanco Party. Its name was derived from the Peruvian rebel leader Túpac

Amaru II (1738–81), who in 1780 led a rebellion of natives in the vice-kingdom of Peru and was executed by the Spanish conquerors in 1781. One of the founders of Tupamaros was the attorney and trade unionist Raúl Sendic (1925–89).

The political aim of the Tupamaros in the 1960s was a socialist society in general but especially in terms of land reform. From the mid-1960s they went underground, and in the beginning of their activities they fought with non-violent means against the Uruguayan state by exposing corrupt politicians and state employees and by attacking banks and distributing the money to the poor of the Uruguayan capital. These so-called expropriations were a typical form of action of the Tupamaros. Between 1968 and March 1971 the police attributed 74 bank assaults to the revolutionary organization.

Unlike the Cuban Revolution, which nevertheless influenced the Tupamaros, the members organized themselves not in rural areas but in urban regions, since already in the 1960s Uruguay had an urbanization rate of more than 80 percent. The example of the Tupamaros also had a large influence on Western Europe, where revolutionaries saw them as proof that a guerrilla movement could also be set up in an urban context. In 1968 in West-Berlin the Tupamaros West-Berlin (TW) followed their lead by becoming the first militant group in that region to go underground. In their heyday in the late 1960s and early 1970s the Tupamaros in Uruguay had around 3,000 militants, and with their Robin Hood-like actions they gained broad support among the Uruguayans.

In the late 1960s, however, authorities reacted by creating special military forces whose only purpose was the annihilation of the Tupamaros. As a result, the Tupamaros began to radicalize in the early 1970s, calling attention to their cause with kidnappings and killings. The best-known case is the one of FBI agent and expert in torture methods Dan Mitrione, who on July 31, 1970 was kidnapped by a Tupamaro command in Montevideo, and who was executed several weeks later, after being interrogated in a so-called "People's Prison." This resulted from the Uruguayan government's refusal to liberate all political prisoners as the Tupamaros had demanded. This led to a turning point for public opinion in Uruguay. The Tupamaros failed in communicating that Mitrione really was a US expert whose only purpose was the training

of Uruguayan Special Forces in torture and counterinsurgency, so the execution of Mitrione remained a flaw and the myth of Robin Hood was gone.

Starting in 1970 the new Special Forces succeeded in arresting leading members of the Tupamaros. On August 7, 1970 Raúl Sendic, using the code name Bebe, was arrested for the first time. However, on September 6, 1971 he and 109 other prisoners, mostly Tupamaros, succeeded in a spectacular escape from the Punta Carretas Prison in Montevideo by means of a tunnel they had dug. Tupamaros came under even stronger attack after the reactionary Juan María Bordaberry was elected president in 1971 and became dictator in June 1973. In 1972 hundreds of Tupamaros were detained, among them nearly all leading members (the majority men, but traditionally there was also a strong branch of militant women involved in Tupamaros activities). The Uruguayan authorities distributed the detainees to prisons all over the country and from then on nine leading personalities of the Tupamaros were considered "hostages of state," among them the legendary founder of the movement, Sendic. Incarcerated in absolute isolation and sometimes buried in burrows, most of the hostages remained imprisoned for 12 years and were physically and psychically mistreated and tortured. The military regime guaranteed the lives of the prisoners, but only under the condition that there were no assaults or activity by Tupamaros. This tactic of using the leaders as hostages meant the end of any resistance against military dictatorship in the country. A deathlike silence remained until the mid-1980s.

In 1984 the altered geopolitical situation allowed the Uruguayan people to enforce elections, and Julio María Sanguinetti from the right-wing Colorado Party was elected president. He decreed an amnesty and on March 14, 1985 the surviving prisoners were released. Most Tupamaros leaders decided to found a new legal political party. They created the Movement for People's Participation (Movimiento de Participación Popular) (MPP) in 1986, and it joined the Frente Amplio (Broad Front), which had been founded in 1971. In 2004 the center-left coalition won the elections, and for the first time in the history of independent Uruguay a left-wing president came to power in March 2005. The MPP succeeded in becoming by far the largest force of the coalition and participated with two

ministers in the government of socialist president Tabaré Vázquez (among them minister of agriculture José Mujica, one of the founders of the Tupamaros). Like Sendic, who died in 1989, “Pepe” Mujica had been a hostage of the state for 12 years. Today, he is the undisputed leader of the Tupamaros Party.

The MPP, though it has its limits, promotes a strong welfare state and support for small farmers (important in Uruguay, where even now meat production is one of the most vital industries). In economics, however, they support market-liberalism and oppose radical land reform, which remains as necessary as it was when it was one of the Tupamaros’ main purposes. Mujica, who in March 2008 was displaced as secretary, and since then returned as senator to parliament, is considered the presidential candidate for elections in October 2009.

SEE ALSO: Sendic, Raúl (1926–1989); Túpac Amaru (ca. 1540–1572); Túpac Amaru Rebellion II and the Last Inca Revolt, 1780–1783

References and Suggested Readings

Fernández Huidobro, E. (1989–90) *Historia de los tupamaros*. 3 Vols. Montevideo: Banda Oriental.

Turati, Filippo (1857–1932)

Donatella Cherubini

Filippo Turati is the most influential figure in Italian anti-revolutionary socialism from the 1890s to the rise of fascism, having a prominent role throughout Europe. Like many early Italian socialist leaders, he received a degree in law, and later became actively involved in the literary and intellectual milieu of Milan. Influenced by positivist culture, in the 1880s Turati was immersed in politics. His ties with the Russian revolutionary Anna Kuliscioff and close contact with the Milanese labor environment led him from democratic ideals toward socialism.

From 1891 Turati edited *Critica Sociale*, the most important journal of Italian anti-revolutionary socialism. Founding the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI) in 1892, he was deputy member of the Socialist International and sustained a gradual (reformist) program. Between the 1890s and the rise of fascism, Turati was *de*

facto leader of the reformist socialists, opposing a revolutionary stance. He was committed first and foremost to guaranteeing the growth and development of the socialist union and political network, which was spreading especially in the central and northern part of the country. As a result, his politics were forcefully attacked by those who favored the south, in particular the historian Gaetano Salvemini.

In the late nineteenth century Turati opposed protectionism, which he believed led to the popular rebellion against the high price of grain and bread in Milan and throughout Italy. Arrested during the political repression, Turati had a leading role in the parliamentary opposition against attempts to transform the Italian constitutional regime into a reactionary dictatorship. When the crisis was overcome and Giovanni Giolitti emerged as liberal democratic leader at the beginning of the twentieth century, Turati supported liberal democratic governments against a revolutionary position, favoring the introduction of social and welfare legislation. A pacifist before World War I, after Italy entered the conflict Turati upheld a position neither of support nor of sabotage regarding the war effort.

Nevertheless, Turati did not wish the PSI to stand in distinct opposition to the homeland, especially after the enemy invasion. In the postwar crisis, Turati maintained a prominent position in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, while anti-parliamentarism was becoming widespread on both the left and right. Turati proposed alliances with the liberal bourgeoisie in contrast to the socialist left, which was strongly influenced by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Meanwhile, fascism had emerged as a political phenomenon, pitting itself violently against Italian reformist political and economic structures. Turati’s opposition to fascism was firm, deeply rooted in his confidence in liberal institutions.

However, the climate of violence and the support of fascism by wealthy industrialists and landowners made the survival of the socialist network continually more difficult, while differences and disputes among socialists became insurmountable. Drawing on his past political experience, Turati proposed in parliament “to remake Italy [*rifare l’Italia*]” in the name of democratic and legalistic political traditions, even as Benito Mussolini was taking over the government. After the birth of the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista d’Italia, PCI) in 1921,

Turati was expelled from the PSI and became a member of the United Socialist Party, which inherited its reformist stance and was headed by Giacomo Matteotti. Turati participated in anti-fascist protests after the murder of Matteotti in 1924 by fascist assassins, at a time when the government was eliminating political opposition.

Sentenced to confinement in 1926, Turati immigrated to France after a daring escape organized by Carlo Rosselli and other liberal socialists. In exile, Turati supported the reunification of the two socialist parties, which was finally achieved in 1930, and actively opposed fascism as president of the Concentrazione di Azioni Antifascista, a federation of non-communist political groups of Italian emigrants in Paris. He was criticized within the movement for his inability to arrest the rise of fascism, especially by Carlo Rosselli and the liberal socialists who rejected the traditional pacifism of Italian socialism.

Turati remained influential in international socialism and participated actively in the debates of the new Socialist International. In the last years of his life, Turati took a stand in favor of a United States of Europe. In Italian socialism, the adjective *Turatian* remained a synonym for gradualist, reformist, and anti-revolutionary politics, even after the fall of fascism and the end of World War II.

SEE ALSO: Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Italian Socialist Party; Kuliscioff, Anna (1853/1857–1925); Rosselli, Carlo (1899–1937); Salvemini, Gaetano (1873–1957)

References and Suggested Readings

- Arfè, G. (1965) *Storia del socialismo italiano, 1892–1926*. Turin: Einaudi.
- Di Scala, S. (1980) *Dilemmas of Italian Socialism: The Politics of Filippo Turati*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Miller, J. E. (1990) *From Elite to Mass Politics: Italian Socialism in the Giolittian Era, 1900–1914*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.

Turkey, anti-secular protest, 1980–present

Özlem Tür

In May 1980 worshippers in Istanbul's Fatih Mosque jeered and booed at the mention of Atatürk in a broadcast service, an open challenge

to the secular order of Turkey. On September 6, at a mass rally in Konya, supporters of Necmettin Erbakan's Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP) refused to sing the national anthem and called for a return to Shari'a law. During the same period, clashes between leftist and rightist groups deepened social polarization. The growing instability at the time was seen as challenging the modernization project. Islamist forces and leftist groups were seen as a threat to the regime. Within the framework of the Cold War, the army was already conscious of the threat of a Soviet takeover and the leftist forces were seen as elements that could contribute to such a possible scenario. On September 12, 1980 the military carried out a coup and intervened in politics for a third time.

After the coup d'état, in order to maintain stability and contain future protests, the military cadres tried to initiate a new framework that would secure the continuation of the Kemalist project. This new framework was designed in line with what some have termed the Turkish-Islamic synthesis (*Türk-Islam Sentezi* – TIS). The TIS was implemented as a policy to decrease the power of the leftist groups and glue society together. Nationalism and secularism were kept as the official ideological components of the regime, but bringing Islam into the official discourse added an element of cultural authenticity. Seeing the left as the main threat for society, the Turkish Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (*Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*) (DİSK) was closed down and its property confiscated. A new constitution was put into effect in 1982 that dramatically curbed individual and associational rights and freedoms. Socially and politically, the state moved back as the main source of power at the expense of individual and organizational rights. After the 1980 coup, apart from the reaction to the DİSK's closure, *Türk-İş* leaders hoped that the coup would not do much harm to their organizational base. However, there was disappointment with the new constitution. The period after the coup was one of the most repressive periods in the republic's history, especially regarding workers' rights and collective action based on class.

Following the return of civilian politics, the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*) (ANAP) of Turgut Özal (1927–93) won the 1983 elections and became the leading party until 1991.

Workers' unions believed that the ANAP would allow them to increase their bargaining power under civilian rule by pushing for changes in the constitution. However, this did not materialize. Turgut Özal was himself the architect of the economic liberalization policy known as the 24 January Decisions. The capitalist class became the main ally of the government, to the detriment of the workers, especially before 1989.

Economic liberalization and export-oriented growth strategies brought the Turkish economy into a new phase from 1980 onwards. By the end of the decade Turkey had gone a long way towards integrating with the world economy through trade and foreign investment. These developments led to the rise of a newly enriched stratum, composed of businessmen from of Istanbul, İzmir, Adana, and major cities, as well as other small towns of Anatolia. In addition to this new bourgeoisie, sometimes referred to as the Anatolian Tigers, new professionals in the service sector emerged. The illicit wealth of certain groups and charges of corruption became widely discussed issues in the media during this period. Conspicuous consumption of luxurious imported goods and a show-off culture seemed to take root among the *nouveaux riches* of the period. This led to increasing resentment, especially among the wage and salary earning masses.

Losing their organizational base and bargaining power, workers' movements and class politics continued to decline dramatically during the 1980s. However, populist policies returned in 1989. This had two main causes. Firstly, opposition to the government was increasing rapidly. This became evident when the large demonstrations known as Spring Demonstrations in 1989 were continued in following years by workers' syndicates after long years of silence. Secondly, in 1989, restrictions on former party leaders and parties that were put into effect after the coup were lifted and competition from these parties led Özal to resort to populist policies for support. In 1989 public sector workers received high wage increases, amounting to 150 percent in some instances. Subsidies for the agricultural sector also came back. The parties reentering politics used a discourse that mainly capitalized on the position of the workers, state officials, and agricultural sector that were hard hit by the economic policies of the 1980s.

During his period in office as prime minister, Özal advocated political liberalism in addition to

economic liberalism. Civil society occupied an important place in state discourse and was seen as a dynamic force for maintaining sustainable growth and enhancing the democratic structure of the country. The increasing number of private TV channels, radio stations, publications, and different organizations that capitalized on these newly developing identities provided an environment conducive to free discussion and the creation of public opinion. Within this context, feminist, gay, and lesbian and environmentalist groups began to emerge, but they remained limited in scope and, according to some observers, confined to elitist groups.

An important exception to this was the resistance organized by the villagers of a town called Bergama in the Aegean. Bergama villagers, relatively rich with fertile soil and intense mechanization and irrigation networks, organized in resistance to gold mining by Eurogold. In 1989 Eurogold was given permission by the ministry of energy to search for gold in the region. Initially, the project received a positive response as it would create new jobs. However, when the environmental impact of the project became evident, there was huge opposition. The resistance campaigns brought rural women into protests, demonstrating against state authorities, closing main roads, and distributing leaflets. This was a novelty, as the rural population, men and women alike, had not demonstrated in this manner in Turkey before.

An important challenge to the Kemalist modernization project during the mid-1980s came from the illegal Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), which was founded at the end of the 1970s. The PKK became active after 1984. It adopted terrorist tactics, aiming at the formation of a separate Kurdish state in the southeast of Turkey. Describing itself as Marxist-Leninist from the beginning, it adopted anti-imperialist rhetoric. Kurdish groups challenged the state from the mid-1980s onwards and especially during the 1990s, when they entered the Turkish parliament through coalitions with leftist parties, but their expressions of a separate Kurdish identity and support for the terrorist PKK led to their expulsion. In the fight with the PKK, over 30,000 people died in Turkey. Schools and medical centers were closed down in 3,000 villages; around 3 million people migrated from the southeast of the country. The conflict ended in 1998 when the head of the PKK, Abdullah

Öcalan, was captured in Nairobi, Kenya. In 1999 the PKK was declared to be militarily defeated. However, it recommenced its activities in 2005.

Radical Islamist groups also posed an important challenge to the state, especially to its secular ideology. In July 1993 in Sivas, 37 people who came to a festival in the city, among them many Alevi poets, intellectuals, and musicians, were burnt to death by radical Islamist groups, chanting and demonstrating with slogans for Shari'a rule.

Increasing economic hardship during the 1990s contributed to the radicalization of politics. Increases in wages and salaries from 1989 had eroded under spiraling inflation and the austerity measures implemented after the 1994 economic crisis. The privatization of state-owned enterprises also led workers to protest. Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, workers' activities were concentrated in the state sector, especially from the 1990s onwards, parallel to privatization. *Türk-İş* organized several demonstrations about the deteriorating standard of living, but its power was radically diminished during this period compared with previous decades. By the mid-1990s global capital and transnational corporations and multinational companies were increasingly perceived as the main threat to workers' interests. The discourse in demonstrations shifted from demands for workers' rights to defense of national property, sovereignty, and resistance to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The patriotic slogans in demonstrations were especially important within an emerging identity politics and later with deepening relations with the European Union.

By the mid-1990s the political scene was once again increasingly polarized. Political parties proved unable to incorporate emerging identities. Discussions on the nature of the public sphere and what kind of identity symbols could be used within it became significant. The Islamic headscarf became an important issue. As an officially secular but overtly Muslim country, strict rules on the use of Islamic symbols led to a polarization between Islamists and secularists, especially after Necmettin Erbakan of the Islamist Welfare Party – a continuation of the former MSP – became prime minister in 1995. Erbakan promised in his election campaign to build a “just order.” Suffering economically under austerity measures and rising unemployment, as well as increasing corruption and nepotism, building such an order appealed to many different groups,

making the Welfare Party a party of the masses demanding change. Erbakan became prime minister in a coalition government with Tansu Çiller's True Path Party. Çiller became the head of the True Path Party when its leader Süleyman Demirel became president in 1993, after Turgut Özal's sudden death. Çiller was Turkey's first female prime minister and often portrayed herself as the guarantor of the secular republic. Her coalition with Erbakan was met with surprise.

A traffic accident near the Western Anatolian town of Susurluk in November 1996 became an important incident leading to popular protests in Turkey. Involved in the accident were a former head of the Istanbul police, a murder suspect, and an MP from the True Path Party, all traveling in the same car. What brought the murder suspect, Abdullah Çatlı, together with police and the MP Sedat Edip Bucak, leader of one of the largest tribes in the southeast that supported the government in its struggle with the PKK, led to many questions. Widespread corruption and rumors about the state using criminals in its fight with the PKK led to debate about a “deep state” (*derin devlet*), a web of clandestine relations working outside the rule of law. Following this event, campaigns were organized around the country calling for an end to corruption, and support for transparency and rule of law. The main campaign was called One Minute of Darkness for the Sake of Continuing Light, in which citizens turned off their lights every evening at 21:00 for a minute. Soon, this darkness was accompanied with loud whistles. The campaign lasted for months.

The mid-1990s also witnessed protests by a group of mothers whose children had disappeared, mostly in state custody. The Saturday Mothers gathered and sat-in for years with pictures of their children every Saturday in Beyoğlu district in Istanbul. Most of their missing children were thought to have been killed under torture. Their demonstrations increased calls for transparency and the rule of law.

The coalition government of the Welfare and True Path parties came to an end in 1997 by means of indirect army intervention. The calls of Erbakan and his party for Shari'a rule and their excessive use of Islamic symbols led the military to intervene, this time indirectly through decisions taken in the National Security Council on February 28, 1997. The military demanded the implementation of new policies to ensure the

continuity and stability of the secular regime. These policies included the closing down of private Quran courses, the implementation of the dress code (prohibiting the wearing of headscarves for women and long beards and religious caps for men) with no exceptions, and extending compulsory education from five to eight years, which would lead to the closure of the secondary parts of the *Imam-Hatip* high schools that give religious education. Erdogan was ousted from power and another coalition government was formed. These policies generated reaction, especially from Islamists. There were mass meetings calling for Shari'a rule, as well as calls for a liberal approach to wearing headscarves. There are restrictions in Turkey on wearing headscarves in public, including at universities. The headscarf is not seen merely in religious terms or in terms of individual liberties by the regime. It is perceived as a political symbol against the secular modernization project.

In the European Union's Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey was given candidate-member status. A series of reforms were carried out in 2002 and 2003 in harmonization with the EU. Freedom of organization and association that was limited by the 1982 constitution was extended, impediments to the use of languages other than Turkish were lifted. The death penalty was also abolished. However, another economic crisis hit Turkey in 2001. Austerity measures once again worked against wage/salary earners and increased unemployment. Turkish governments have remained unable to deal with growing poverty, the remedy for which was seen as economic growth, so that no real poverty alleviation programs were implemented. The gap between rich and poor widened as the share of wage/salary earners in income distribution was radically decreased. During the 2000s *Türk-İş* and workers' movements tried to increase the living standards of workers, but without much success. The workers' movement began to use a patriotic and anti-imperialist discourse.

Negotiations with the EU led to positive gains in democratic rights and also opened up debate about the limits of national sovereignty and possible concessions from Turkey's core interests, including that of Cyprus. The debate about a revival of the Treaty of Sévres through the EU negotiation process acted as an important factor in increasing nationalism and patriotism in the country at large. This perception was shared

by most of the working class, as reflected in slogans during demonstrations: "It is enough, this country is ours"; "Stand up for your work, bread and country"; "Down with IMF, Sovereign Turkey"; "Down with European, American Imperialism."

Protest movements in Turkey became diversified from 1980 to 2005, bringing class, identity, ideology, and center/periphery dynamics into the political sphere. Workers' movements and class politics declined from the 1980s. Identity issues took the upper hand in collective actions. These emerging identities were often seen as threats to the survival of the regime by the military-bureaucratic elite. This not only limited the representation of such identities and the scope of collective action, but also led to the radicalization, resulting in a series of crises.

The coming to power in 2002 of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) (AKP), an offshoot of the Welfare Party of Erdogan, can also be understood within this context, although it still remains to be seen to what extent the party will be able to respond to identity politics. Apart from domestic developments, collective action in the 2000s has also been affected by global and regional factors. The increasing impact of globalization, relations with the EU, and developments in the Middle East affect collective action. Both the negotiation process for full membership of the EU and the US policy in the Middle East as reflected in the Iraqi War feed into Turkish nationalist and patriotic movements, adding another dimension to identity issues and politics.

SEE ALSO: Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938); Kurdistan Nationalist Movement and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party); Turkey, Protest and Revolution, 1800s–1923; Turkey, Working-Class Protest, 1960–1980; Turkish Republic Protests, 1923–1946

References and Suggested Readings

- Ahmad, F. (1993) *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London: Routledge.
- Altunışık, M. B. & Tür, Ö. (2005) *Turkey – Challenges of Continuity and Change*. London: Routledge.
- Berkes, N. (1965) *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press.
- Bianchi, R. (1984) *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Evin, A. (Ed.) (1984) *Modern Turkey – Continuity and Change*. Oplagen: Leske.

- Göle, N. (1996) Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey. In A. R. Norton (Ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Vol. 2. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Hale, W. (1994) *Turkish Politics and Turkish Military*. London: Frank Cass.
- Heper, M. (1985) *State Tradition in Turkey*. Beverley: Eothen Press.
- Heper, M. & Evin, A. (1988) *State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Jung, D. & Piccoli, W. (2001) *Turkey at Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle East*. London: Zed Books.
- Karpat, K. (2001) *The Politization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kasaba, R. & Bozdoğan, S. (Eds.) (1997) *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Kedourie, S. (Ed.) (1988) *Turkey Before and After Atatürk – Internal and External Affairs*. London: Frank Cass.
- Kirişçi, K. & Winrow, G. (1997) *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict*. London: Frank Cass.
- Özbudun, E. (2000) *Contemporary Turkish Politics – Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Parla, T. (1991) Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları (Official Sources of Political Culture in Turkey). Istanbul: İletisim.
- Zürcher, E. (1993) *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Turkey, protest and revolution, 1800s–1923

Özlem Tür

Protest and social movements in the Turkish republic carry important continuities from the late Ottoman period. The reforms of the nineteenth century led to the development of a new group, the military bureaucracy, which became the central power in the administration of the Empire and later the Turkish republic. The reforms led also to the development of a duality between the center, represented by the reform-minded military bureaucracy, and the periphery, which continued to stick to traditional values and norms albeit making use of the social mobility the reforms provided. This duality continued to evolve during the Turkish republic. Protest

movements continued the legacy of this duality to a great extent in challenging state ideology.

Most analysts of Turkish politics underline the centrality of party politics. Almost all social movements are in time turned into political parties, or existing political parties take over the cause of the movements and voice protest through their channels in politics.

The Turkish republic went through a consolidation process from 1923 to 1946, under single-party rule. In this process, protests were often against the secular, western, Turkish nature of the republic. During the multi-party period challenges to state ideology continued along these lines, but class politics and class identity also developed, as well as ideological conflicts based on left-right divisions. From the mid-1980s onwards, identity issues returned to the political stage, with protests and movements shaped by identity and the rights of expression of distinct identities in the public sphere.

Nineteenth-Century Reforms in the Ottoman Empire

The roots of the social movements and protest in the Turkish republic go back to the nineteenth century. Modernization efforts in the Ottoman Empire started in the late eighteenth century with Selim III (1789–1807) and continued during the reign of Mahmut II (1808–39). Reforms in the military field with the abolition of the Janissary system were carried out, a medical school and a military academy were established in Istanbul, and centralization efforts that strengthened the role of the bureaucracy were put into effect. Seeing the economic and military supremacy of the West and having faced a series of defeats at the hands of the western powers, the belief that the only way to save the Ottoman Empire was to introduce European-style reforms started to take root in the ruling circles of the Empire. Further reforms in the military, judicial, and administrative fields were announced and implemented from 1839 to 1871 – what came to be known as the Tanzimat (New Order) period.

These reforms were parallel to those that improved the position of the Christian minorities in the Empire. With a decree in 1839, all members of the Ottoman state were given equal rights, independent of their religion. This was reiterated in the 1856 *Islahat Fermam*. It was generally under pressure from the European powers

that the sultan granted equality before the law to all his subjects, enhancing the status of the Christians to that of the Muslim majority. The increasing trade of the Ottoman Empire, especially as a result of the agreements signed with Britain and France that gave these two countries trading rights in 1838, was important during this process. One of the consequences of the regime's capitulations was the withdrawal of local merchants from trade and their replacement with Greek, Armenian, and other non-Muslim minority tradesmen who carried the passports of foreign countries and therefore were outside the Ottoman tax and legal systems. They started to act as intermediaries with the foreign firms conducting business in the Empire. There was a class of small and medium-scale Turkish-Muslim traders mainly concentrated in domestic trade within the Empire, but compared to the wealthy and powerful minority merchants they were weak, unorganized, scattered, and generally dependent on the latter's activities.

As a part of the Tanzimat, secularization of laws was carried out as well as significant reforms in the central bureaucracy in line with the principles of rationalization and specialization. A complete set of ministries and boards, as in the European system, was established in the capital Istanbul. Consultative assemblies and commissions were formed that aimed to help prepare for the new measures and legislation in areas like building and trade. Secular educational institutes were formed to train future bureaucrats and army members. These reforms created new elites from the ranks of the military and the bureaucracy, who constituted the major actors in the late Ottoman and new Turkish republic's political life. While this new elite, educated in the secular institutions of Istanbul, was promoting constitutionalism, adhering to western ideas, and seeking the westernization of Ottoman political and social life, the rest of the population continued to stick to traditionalist values.

During the 1860s antagonism towards the reforms intensified on the part of the Ottoman Muslim community, who saw them as subservience to European powers and non-Muslim communities whose power and wealth were increasing. The group later called the Young Ottomans criticized Tanzimat policies as superficial imitations of Europe and serving European interests. They saw the solution to the ills of the Tanzimat system in a constitutional,

representative, and parliamentary system that would build up a true feeling of patriotism and loyalty to the state among all Ottoman subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. They tried to create and influence a politically conscious public with their writings. The call of the Young Ottomans resulted in a constitutional system in 1876. The Young Ottomans can be regarded as the first ideological movement and the first opposition movement in the Ottoman Empire.

The first Ottoman constitution (*Kanun-i Esasi*) was enacted in 1876 and the first parliamentary elections were held in December 1876 and January 1877. However, the parliamentary regime was rather short-lived, as Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) closed down the parliament in 1878, using the defeat against Russia as a pretext. This also started a period of repression within the Empire. Abdülhamid had gone so far as to form a group of spies and agents to alert him to any developments among his subjects. Against such repressive rule, secret organizations were founded around the Empire. In time some of the members of these groups were arrested and most fled abroad, mainly to Paris, where they carried on their activities. The groups called the Young Turks (*Jön Türkler*) founded a small committee, the Committee of Union and Progress (*Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) (CUP), an umbrella organization against Abdülhamid's repressive policies, under which most of the secret organizations united. The Young Turks started to challenge the sultan's rule. Different from the Young Ottomans, they not only wanted to save the Empire but also radically reform the regime, mainly to westernize it. Increasing pressure from the Young Turks led the sultan to reintroduce the 1876 constitution and call for elections in July 1908. The decision to reinstate the constitution after 30 years was met with great enthusiasm in the Empire, as the new era was seen as promising equality, justice, and liberty to all groups regardless of their differences. The press was now free to publish without fear of censorship and people could gather together without fear of palace spies. The Committee of Union and Progress won the elections by an overwhelming majority.

The Young Turks continued with the reform process. Although the reforms were not radical, they paved the way for the future reforms of the republican period. In family issues, judicial rights were transferred from Shari'a law to

civilian courts. Polygamy was restricted with severe measures that made it almost impossible in practice. Girls were accepted at university, medical schools, and humanities departments. There were books and journals published during this time on women's rights. The influence of the *ulema* (Muslim clerics) on secular schools was further restrained. The Quran and some prayers were translated into Turkish.

However, CUP rule was not without opposition, firstly against its centralizing efforts from liberal decentralization supporters, and secondly against its westernizing reforms from religious and traditional circles. Various magazines advocated "Islam as the powerful ideology" as an alternative to CUP ideology, to save the Ottomans from decline relative to the West and to help return the Empire to the glory days of the past. On April 13, 1909 some of these groups gathered in Istanbul against the Young Turks and the CUP and revolts started with a call for Shari'a rule. The CUP reaction was harsh. It repressed the revolt, dethroned Abdülhamid, and brought Mehmet V (1909–18) to the throne. Under Mehmet V the CUP managed to further consolidate its power.

During the rule of the CUP three main ideological lines of thought continued to develop in the Empire: Ottomanism, (Pan) Islamism, and (Pan) Turkism. Ottomanists adhered to the Young Ottoman ideal of the unity of the different communities around the Ottoman throne; (Pan) Islamism sought to regenerate the Empire on the basis of Islamic practices and solidarity within the Muslim *umma* (Muslim society); Turkism sought the unity of the Turkic peoples under the Ottoman flag. Within these ideological circles discussions as to how much to westernize and what should form the basis of loyalty in the future Ottoman state constituted the main differences between groups. Ottomanism became the main ideology of the CUP after 1908 and remained as such until the 1913 Balkan wars. Turkish nationalism was a relative latecomer on the scene, but was strengthened as different territories, one by one, declared their independence from the Empire. Leading the main opposition to the CUP, the (Pan) Islamists were deeply suspected by the regime after the 1909 demonstrations. Especially after the rise of nationalist movements in the Empire, Turkish nationalism began to dominate over the ideas of Ottomanism and Islamism.

The Armenian groups that had joined the enthusiasm of 1908 and the end of repression became one of the groups that were suspicious and resentful of rising Turkish nationalism. They started to advocate their own independence, which they thought could be secured through the weakening of the Ottoman state and the help of the western powers. Thus, as World War I started, CUP leaders became wary of Armenian activities, and the Armenians were increasingly seen as an internal enemy by the CUP leadership.

One of the priorities of the CUP regime was to strengthen the economy and develop indigenous industry. The propertied classes were mainly the non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisie who were interested in trade rather than investing in manufacturing. The Muslim bourgeoisie was weak and involved in small-scale manufacturing based on handmade goods. Thus it was the state that took on the role of industrializing the country. The aim of creating a "national bourgeoisie" with the backing of the state became a priority in the development of the country.

The 1914 Law for the Encouragement of Industry (*Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu*) was passed with the aim of developing national production. In 1915 Muslim businessmen founded the Tradesmen's Association (*Esnaf Cemiyeti*) with the aim of taking the domestic market under their control. In 1916 parliament approved a new customs law that would apply 30–100 percent customs duty on imported goods to encourage and protect local production. While the policies of encouraging industrialization and the creation of a native bourgeoisie continued, World War I and the War of Independence changed and affected the whole of the peninsula, resulting in the abolition of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the Turkish republic.

World War I and the War of Independence

The Ottoman Empire entered the war in November 1914 on the side of the Axis powers. Ottoman armies were defeated on many fronts. In 1915 the Ottoman regime began forcibly to relocate the Armenians living in the eastern provinces of the Empire with the aim of reducing the possibility of Armenian insurrections behind the Eastern front. During the relocation many Armenians were killed. Some estimate

around 500,000 deaths, while others estimate it to be as high as 1.5 million.

The war resulted in the Ottoman Empire's defeat and the occupation of its Arab provinces by Britain and France. The Armistice of Mudros was signed on October 30, 1918. The military administration of the Allied powers was established in Istanbul in December 1918. In addition, Italian forces landed in Antalya in April 1919 and Greek forces entered Izmir and began to occupy the area in May 1919. The signing of the Armistice and the occupation of the Empire led to the emergence of a resistance movement, which was further bolstered by the Greek occupation.

From 1919 onwards, Associations for the Defense of Rights (*Müdaafa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri*) were formed throughout Anatolia and Thrace which later constituted the roots of the national resistance movement. The organizational base of the CUP was of great importance for the national resistance. After the Congresses of Erzurum and Sivas that called for a fight against occupation and partition, as well as the restoration of the Sultanate and the Caliphate, the War of Independence began. Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938) (later named Atatürk – the father of Turks) became the leader of the national struggle. Kemal cooperated with many local notables and prominent families, as well as regional militias. On March 16 the Allied powers invaded Istanbul. On April 23, 1920 the Turkish Grand National Assembly was opened in Ankara as the representative and legislative body of the national resistance. This led to a duality of administration – one in Istanbul led by the sultan who was collaborating with the Allied powers to ensure the survival of the Sultanate and the other one in Ankara representing the resistance to foreign occupation, again with the aim of ensuring the survival of the Sultanate and Caliphate but independent of foreign powers. The Ankara government that was composed of representatives from all regions declared all agreements signed by the Istanbul government after March 16 invalid.

The Allied powers were in disagreement over how to divide the territories of the Empire. In June 1920 Greek armies started to progress into Anatolia from the west with the aim of crushing the national resistance as well as compelling the Istanbul government to sign a peace agreement with the Allies. In August 1920 the Allied powers proposed the signing of the Treaty of

Sèvres. The treaty left a small piece of land for the Ottoman state in the Northern Asia Minor with Istanbul as its capital. Eastern Thrace and the area around Izmir were given to Greece. An independent Armenian state was proposed in the eastern provinces. While the Kurdish-populated areas north of the Mosul province remained under Ottoman rule with autonomy, they were given the right to appeal to the League of Nations for independence within a year. Arab lands were divided between British and French rule. Straits were to be administered by an international Straits Commission and the territories around it were demilitarized. The Istanbul government signed the treaty. The national resistance in Ankara, after declaring that sovereignty belonged to the nation and that it represented the national will through the nationalist assembly in Ankara, rejected it.

The Greek advances from the west were stopped by the national resistance. The victories of the resistance on the Eastern front led to agreements with and swift withdrawals of French and Italian forces. One of the problems that the Ankara government faced during this process came from the local militias that wanted autonomy and rejected becoming a part of regular forces. Çerkes Ethem (1885–1948), influential in organizing the national resistance in the west, refused to become a part of the regular forces. Later, through the general offensive that was led against the Greek forces, which surrendered on September 2–3, 1922, the forces of Çerkes Ethem could be defeated as well. After Greek withdrawal, British forces agreed to withdraw in October 1922. Negotiations for a new peace treaty began. When the Allied powers invited both the Ankara and the Istanbul governments to Lausanne where the peace negotiations would take place, this led to uproar in the Ankara government. The Ankara government abolished the Sultanate in reaction. On November 17, 1922 the last sultan, Vahdettin, left the country on a British battleship. The Treaty of Lausanne was signed after long negotiations and was ratified by the Assembly on August 21, 1923.

The economic and social conditions of the country were very poor after long years of continuous warfare. What was left of the Ottoman Empire, the future Turkish republic, was highly depopulated, impoverished, and in ruins. The emigration, relocation, and expatriation of non-Muslim communities during and after the war

led Anatolia to lose 10 percent of an already much-reduced population. This had two other major consequences: the migrations led to a highly homogenized Muslim community in the territories and resulted in the loss of capital owned and run by non-Muslim communities. With them, technological know-how and international links were also lost to a great extent.

After the victory of the War of Independence, energies were diverted towards the future of the country and the direction of political and social development. Mustafa Kemal had already begun to consolidate his political position before the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. The People's Party was founded under the leadership of Kemal in September 1923. By taking over the main organization of the wartime resistance to foreign occupation, the People's Party gained an already established network all over Anatolia. The first parliament that carried out the War of Independence was dissolved and new elections were held that carried the People's Party to parliament. The consolidation of power in the National Assembly and the party, which were both under the control of Kemal, continued as the main feature of the coming decades, generally referred to as the consolidation period of the new republican regime.

SEE ALSO: Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938); Kurdistan Nationalist Movement and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party); Turkey, Anti-Secular Protest, 1980–Present; Turkey, Working-Class Protest, 1960–1980; Turkish Republic Protests, 1923–1946

References and Suggested Readings

- Ahmad, F. (1993) *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London: Routledge.
- Berkes, N. (1965) *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press.
- Hale, W. (1994) *Turkish Politics and Turkish Military*. London: Frank Cass.
- Heper, M. (1985) *State Tradition in Turkey*. Beverley: Eothen Press.
- Jung, D. & Piccoli, W. (2001) *Turkey at Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle East*. London: Zed Books.
- Kansu, A. (1997) *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Kedourie, S. (Ed.) (1988) *Turkey Before and After Atatürk – Internal and External Affairs*. London: Frank Cass.
- Kinross, L. (1965) *Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey*. New York: Morrow.
- Lewis, B. (1961) *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mardin, Ş. (1962) *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Parla, T. (1991) *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları (Official Sources of Political Culture in Turkey)*. Istanbul: İletişim.
- Pope, N. & Pope, H. (1997) *Turkey Unveiled – Atatürk and After*. London: John Murray.
- Zürcher, E. (1993) *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Turkey, working-class protest, 1960–1980

Özlem Tür

The Turkish military launched a coup d'état on May 27, 1960. The leaders of the Democratic Party (DP), Adnan Menderes, Hasan Polatkan, and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, were executed after trial. Although this coup had many causes, including repression of the regime, allegations of corruption against the rulers, dependency on foreign powers, and attacks on Kemalist principles in general and secularism in particular were important factors. May 1960 was the first time the military intervened in Turkish civilian politics. Since Ottoman times the army has played a major role in the political life of the country. The DP's policy of de-bureaucratizing meant official elites lost not only their representation in parliament and their close links with political elites, but also much of their economic power, prestige, and influence. There is agreement among many researchers that the 1960 coup demonstrated the quest of the military-bureaucratic elite to return to the center, to revive its diminishing role in the nation's politics.

The environment after the 1960 coup was relatively more liberal than the past. The new constitution enacted by the military rulers in 1961 guaranteed basic rights and freedoms and adopted a more liberal approach to secularism, religion, and freedom. A full bill of civil liberties was attached to the constitution. It supported associational rights, providing different groups with the opportunity to develop their own organizations. Remembering the DP experience, the military wanted to prevent a monopoly of any political party, so counterbalancing institutions

to the national assembly were founded through the new constitution.

A second chamber called the Senate (*Senato*) was introduced and all legislation was required to pass through both chambers. An independent constitutional court was introduced. Universities and media were guaranteed full autonomy under the new system. Through the constitution, the military carved itself a special place within the politics of the country via the establishment of a National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) (NSC), whose constitutional duty was to advise the government on different policy issues. The NSC comprised the leaders of the military forces and the head of the general staff, as well as related ministers – varying according to the subject under consideration. The role of the NSC increased in time, extending its influence over government policies.

During this period ideology began to shape collective action and protest in Turkey and political parties also increasingly defined themselves on ideological grounds. After the military returned power to civilians and general elections were held on October 15, 1961, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) (JP) that had assumed the legacy of the Democratic Party won power. The JP represented center-right politics. Süleyman Demirel became its leader in 1964. There was also a change of leadership in the Republican People's Party (RPP), with Bülent Ecevit. In order to secure its position and increase its popularity, the RPP leadership adopted a new slogan determining its place in the political spectrum: "Left of center."

As well as ideological differences, class politics began to take shape from the 1960s onwards. The project of developing the capitalist class had been successful to some extent and started to bear fruit by the 1960s. The working class had been developing and increasing its power and collective action based on class had been emerging in society. The Türk İşçi Partisi (TWP) was formed in February 1961 by leftist organizations, workers, and trade unionists. According to the party program, except for the ownership of major means of production, private property would be supported, and some economic activities should be left to private initiative in a mixed economy. Despite taking a moderate stand on the economy in the short term, the party questioned the private and state-capitalist dominated development and considered a non-capitalist path as

a long-term objective. The TWP contributed to the class-based nature of politics in the 1960s, forcing other parties to take a stance in clearer ideological terms.

After 1962 the economy was regulated by five-year plans. The main industrialization strategy implemented after 1960 centered on import-substitution industrialization (ISI), based on the notion that industrial goods previously imported should be produced by domestic industries under state supervision. Until the 1970s, domestic markets produced basic consumption goods, but the new program initiated the production of intermediary and light manufacturing. A division of labor was created between the state and private sector, with state industries directed to invest in large-scale intermediate goods industries, while private firms participated in the profitable consumer goods sector, protected from foreign trade.

The 1960s witnessed significant growth of big businesses. The strengthening capitalist class began to demand that the government clearly designate those sectors that were open or closed to government intervention. In the 1960s the perception of arbitrary state intervention became a common theme in the economy and the demand from the capitalist class for a more planned economy increased the belief that predictable planned actions and policies of the state would increase profitability. The upper classes demanded that the areas of operation of the state and the private sectors should be clarified for businesses to determine areas of secure investment. Government and business leaders engaged in negotiations on establishing holding firms and a new legal framework for family businesses, securing and institutionalizing the business community.

In addition to arbitrary interventions in the market, small businesses criticized the system of favoring big Istanbul capitalists and ignoring the interests of family firms. Special incentives for businesses were granted for the private sector, but small business owners claimed the process was arbitrary and had no transparency. Small businesses did not have equivalent opportunities to the large firms who enjoyed close relations with political power. They struggled to survive under competition and were forced to invest in tertiary areas of the economy.

In the 1960s the development of a strong upper class and growth of private capital accumulation hastened the creation of a working class and class-consciousness. Worker rights were seen

as important but nonetheless secondary to the interests of capitalists on the government's agenda. However, the 1961 constitution provided workers with the right to strike and engage in syndicalist activity. As such, worker organizations began to expand in economic and political importance, albeit slowly. The subordinate position of workers started to change as their negotiating power with employers increased and strikes over wages and conditions broke out across industries. Boycotts and strikes for better working conditions surged during the 1960s. In May 1962, 5,000 building workers organized under the Construction Workers' Syndicate marched on parliament, known as the March of the Hungry for better working conditions. In 1965 workers employed in Ereği Coal Mines engaged in a major demonstration, and in 1966 a significant strike was waged by workers at Paşabahçe glass producing factory that led to the formation of the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Syndicates (DİSK) in 1967. The DİSK advocated workers' rights in socialist and even communist terms.

Realizing the increasing power of the working classes during the 1960s, the JP regime sought to introduce corporatist structures of cooperation between capitalists and laborers in an effort to control and institutionalize both groups into political life. It advocated a corporatist structure for the workers' union by asserting that an independent and politically active labor union would promote class warfare, presenting new challenges to the authority of the state. By the end of the 1960s, the *Türk-İş* leaders had brokered an agreement with JP leaders in which they were given the right to represent workers and guaranteed access to policy-making, in return for continued moderation in exercising rights to strike and engage in collective bargaining. However, this corporatist effort of the JP failed as factionalism inside *Türk-İş* and increasing influence and power of leftist ideology opposed cooperation with the JP. The support of the workers was mainly directed towards the RPP's new "left of center" discourse during this period. By the late 1960s, support for the JP within the union was marginalized.

From 1968 on, inspired by university students' activities, and by the DİSK, there were large sit-ins and factory invasions by workers aiming at halting the restrictions on association and syndicate rights in the workplace and solving problems with employers. In 1969 workers

employed at the Alpagut Coal Mine, unpaid for months, organized and seized the factory's production and management by force, paying their own wages from sales. The activities of workers in the state sector remained limited compared with the private sector during this period, and protest among government workers was scarce. Those rare instances of protest were typically in reaction to late payment of wages or arbitrary firing of workers.

The intensification of conflict and class-based activities in the late 1960s alarmed the government. As a response it proposed a new law to ban the DİSK and member syndicates from operation in Turkey. In reaction, on June 15–16, 1970, over 100,000 workers in syndicates across employment categories and throughout Turkey held protests and demonstrations in what was the largest workers' demonstration in the country's history. In response, thousands of workers who led the demonstrations were fired, leading to further radicalization of the leftist movement and forcing legal, organized syndicate activity to go underground. The repression of labor organization led to the emergence of small, urban guerilla groups from the mid-1970s on. During the 1970s, while organized labor was on the defensive, the conditions and wages of workers improved marginally, and syndicate activities were essential in these gains.

The corporatist effort of the JP with the capitalist class was more successful. The National Union of Chambers of Commerce, Chambers of Industry and Commodities Exchanges (*Türkiye Odalar Birliği*) (TOB) represented simultaneously the interests of all merchants, industrialists, and commodities brokers. The close cooperation of its members with the JP, most of whom had top positions in JP provincial organizations, increased the importance of this board in the 1960s. However, commercial interest groups were dominant within TOB and it was mainly with this group that the JP had close ties. Industrialists were not well represented in the organization. Although they were cooperating closely with the JP in projects for investment, in the late 1960s they began to press the government for a change in economic policy-making in their favor over commercial groups. In an attempt to differentiate themselves, in 1967 industrialists founded the Union of Chambers of Industry, under the TOB. Later, in 1971, industrialists founded the Turkish Industrialists' and

Businessmen's Association (Türkiye Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSIAD), aimed at promoting capital accumulation of manufacturing over commercial and agricultural interests.

While Turkey entered a period of turmoil during the 1960s, by the decade's end the struggles between extremist movements on both the right and the left culminated in near civil war. The radicalization of the population, especially university students, during the 1960s stimulated the development of a radical mass movement. By the end of the decade the actions of leftist urban guerillas were a fixture of everyday life in Turkey. The leftist groups and their radicalization in turn led to a harsh response from the Turkish right and formation of the Society for the Struggle against Communism. In addition to this organization, which gathered the center-right under its banner, the formation of radical nationalist groups under the Nationalist Action Party (which developed a racial ideology during the 1960s and became known as the Grey Wolves) added another dimension to social formation. In 1970 Necmettin Erbakan founded the National Order Party as representative of the conservative circles in the country, bringing political Islam onto the stage.

The demonstration of 1970 against the plan to ban the DİSK was an important sign of workers' dissatisfaction with the system. Nine months later the government announced an austerity program leading to further national protests and urban guerillas launched a series of bank robberies and kidnappings to finance their activities. On March 12, 1971 Turkish generals sent a memorandum demanding a strong and credible government capable of restoring order. The government was warned that if order was not restored by elected officials, the army would exercise its constitutional duty and intervene directly. The military was once more on the political scene, this time not terminating civilian politics but intervening with a memorandum.

Ideological differences and collective action in terms of class politics continued to intensify during the 1970s. The disagreement between the reforming military-bureaucracy and the traditionalists regarding the modernization of the country developed side by side with class action and ideological divisions. After the military memorandum, Necmettin Erbakan formed the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) (MSP) to replace the disbanded National Order

Party to represent political Islam in Turkey. MSP emerged as the primary representative of professionals and small business owners. Small businesses in Anatolia that were struggling to compete with Istanbul businesses formed the backbone of MSP, which appealed to conservative Islamist circles and small businesses.

In the late-1970s Turkey's population expanded and urbanization increased dramatically. The decline in agriculture as a share of GNP triggered migration to the cities, providing a workforce for the rapidly expanding industries. Unlike previous waves of urbanization, most new migrants to cities were landless peasants who could not survive in rural villages. The newest wave of propertyless migrants formed the base of the proletariat in Turkey's major cities.

Despite a huge increase in GNP, the end of the 1970s were years of economic hardship for Turkey. ISI had reached a second stage in which production demanded more capital and high technology. With the growth in industrial production, demand for imports was also producing a foreign exchange crisis and a production crisis. The shrinking domestic market, decreasing productivity, world oil shocks, and the increasing costs of production led to the crisis of the ISI economic regime.

Until 1977 when signs of the crisis became apparent, economic growth propelled the real incomes of Turkey's population. Union/syndicate activity succeeded in improving wages for the working classes even as the state began to erode the power of workers, for example the 1971 removal of bargaining rights for state officials. Nonetheless, until 1977 populist policies maintained salaries relatively high. In 1978 the incomes of government workers were devastated by spiraling inflation; agricultural workers, who benefited from state subsidies, also saw their standard of living fall dramatically. By the end of the 1970s, with spiraling inflation and stagnation, crisis began to be felt more strongly throughout the economy. Workers' syndicates were struggling to retain their bargaining power and maintain workers' wages. However, in 1979, in a policy shift, rather than responding to workers' demands, capitalists began calling openly for a change in the system of wage growth and suppression of workers' unions and syndicates. Business also demanded that the government create secure conditions for capital and investment.

As economic hardship increased in the late-1970s, crisis in the political sphere reached a new high. From 1976 to 1980 the ideological polarization between left and right erupted into violence, claiming the lives of more than 4,000 people. Street violence became common. Rivalries on the basis of ethnic and religious identity were emerging as well, still overshadowed by ideological divisions. Most notably, the era saw the growth of the Kurdish opposition, though still within the larger ideological picture of leftist politics. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (in Kurdish: *Partiya Kerkoran Kurdistan*) (PKK) formed in the late 1970s, but remained a minor force until 1984. By the end of the 1970s the heterodox Alevi community also espoused demands for political rights distinct from the dominant Sunni Islam. Tension between the Alevi groups and the Sunnis erupted in the late 1970s. In 1978, 111 Alevis were killed in Kahramanmaraş; in 1980, 50 were killed in Çorum.

On January 24, 1980 the government announced a series of economic reform policies to remedy the economic deterioration of the country – known as the 24 January Decisions. Seeing the bankruptcy of ISI policies and the deteriorating economy, a new set of policy measures aimed at introducing a neoliberal market economy. These economic policies sought to control inflation and stabilize the economy by encouraging exports, and decreasing state initiatives and state enterprises in heavy industry and primary goods.

In place of ISI policy, the government adopted a new strategy of export-oriented growth or export promotion. The new economic program included devaluation of the currency, the primacy of market forces, and the ending of subsidies on goods produced by the state sector, leading to huge price increases. The reform package incorporated reforming state economic enterprises, limiting employment in the state sector, tax reform, incentives for foreign investment, and privatization of state industries. Close cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank was instrumental in implementing the new pro-capitalist policies.

The neoliberal reforms served to benefit multinational corporations and capitalists in Turkey at the expense of workers and farmers, whose wages were curbed and agricultural subsidies cut. To decrease internal demand, the government chose to limit wages. Workers,

whose wages and salaries were already declining under high inflation, saw their standard of living decline further. For many, the reform package was a means to reduce the political and economic power of the working class and a broad-scale effort to create greater instability that would undermine labor organizations and political militancy. As political opposition expanded in the months after the introduction of the neoliberal reforms, the military staged a coup d'état on September 12, 1980 to ensure the continuation of the measures.

SEE ALSO: Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938); Kurdistan Nationalist Movement and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party); Turkey, Anti-Secular Protest, 1980–Present; Turkey, Protest and Revolution, 1800s–1923; Turkish Republic Protests, 1923–1946

References and Suggested Readings

- Ahmad, F. (1993) *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London: Routledge.
- Altunışık, M. B. & Tür, Ö. (2005) *Turkey – Challenges of Continuity and Change*. London: Routledge.
- Berkes, N. (1965) *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press.
- Cizre-Sakalhoğlu, Ü. (1997) The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Autonomy. *Comparative Politics* 29, 4: 141–66.
- Hale, W. (1994) *Turkish Politics and Turkish Military*. London: Frank Cass.
- Jung, D. & Piccoli, W. (2001) *Turkey at Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle East*. London: Zed Books.
- Keyder, Ç. (1988) Class and State in the Transformation of Modern Turkey. In F. Halliday & H. Alawi (Eds.), *State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Landau, J. (1974) *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Mango, A. (1994) *The Challenge of a New Role*. New York: Praeger.
- Poulton, H. (1997) *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and the Crescent*. London: Hurst.
- Zürcher, E. (1993) *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Turkish rebellions, 1918–1925

Hülya Küçük

At the end of World War I, on October 30, 1918, the defeated Ottoman Empire signed the Truce of Mudros, which included 25 articles with

provisions for the Allied military occupation of the Straits, control of the railways and telephone lines, demobilization and disarmament of Ottoman troops, and the freeing all Allied prisoners of war. The most perilous clauses of the truce for the Ottoman Empire were Article 7, granting Allied Powers the right to occupy Ottoman Empire lands deemed a threat to security, and Article 24, conferring Allied Powers the right to intervene militarily in the Armenian provinces in the event of breakdown of law and order. Turkish nationalists were troubled by the extensive reach the two articles granted Allied Powers. Public opinion shifted to the Turkish nationalist resistance following the decision to permit Greek troops to land in İzmir on May 15, 1919, and Allied occupation of Istanbul, seat of Ottoman power, in March 1920.

The Liberation War is the name given for the Turkish struggle against Allied Powers from May 19, 1919 to July 25, 1923, a resistance extending from formal combat, underground activities of the Young Turk Unionists, and regional uprisings, stirrings, and rebellions by traditional forces against the emergent state.

The Turks were weary of the wars that began in 1911, and while economically and militarily weak, continued struggling for national independence after World War I. Even the Sèvres Treaty, in which the Allies abolished the Ottoman Empire on August 10, 1920, could not prevent the growth of the modern Turkish nationalist movement. The Allied Powers, under strong British pressure, accepted the Greek offer to enforce the Sèvres Treaty by military means, resulting in a full-scale war between Turks and Greeks, until 1922 when Turkish nationalists declared victory.

On October 11, 1922 the Truce of Mudanya was signed, and the Allied Powers invited Turkey to a peace conference in Lausanne, Switzerland, commencing on November 21, 1922. The Allied Powers viewed themselves as victors of World War I and considered the conference an opportunity to adjust the terms of the Sèvres Treaty. In contrast, following national liberation, the Turks viewed themselves as triumphant, considering World War I and the Allied occupation historical artifacts. The Ankara nationalist delegation, led by Mustafa İsmet İnönü, sought to overturn the stringent terms of the Sèvres settlement. After many months, on July 24, 1923, a treaty was signed, whereby the Straits were neutralized, Christian minorities and foreigner legal

status was guaranteed, and disputes between Greeks and Turks were to be resolved. A demilitarized zone was established, and exchange of populations arranged between Greece and Turkey. On October 1, 1923 the British and Allied occupying forces departed Istanbul.

No reliable data are available on the population of Ottoman Anatolia in 1918, though following the national liberation in 1922, an estimated 3.5 million Anatolian Muslims, Greeks, Armenians, Nestorians, Chaldeans, and others lost their lives – more than 20 percent of the population – while another 1.8 million migrated abroad.

Liberation War as Rebellion

The Turkish Liberation War was a two-faceted rebellion: an uprising of the Turkish nation and a revolt against the Ottoman sultan. During the Liberation War the Istanbul government issued a *fatwā* (a verdict of the highest religious order) on April 11, 1920, declaring Turkish nationalists “rebellious against the sultan” and described their acts as “*Khurūj ‘ala’s-Sultan*” (uprisings against the sultan). In response, the sultanate formed the *Kuwā-yı Ahmadiyya* (Ahmadian Forces), *Kuwā-yı Muhammadiyya* (Muhammadian Forces), both named after the Prophet Muhammad, and *Khilāfet Ordusu* (Army of the Caliphate). Some sultanate supporters were given responsibility for arresting Mustafa Kemal as he launched the Liberation War. The *Ali Ghālip Incident* (August 20–September 15, 1919) is a distinctive instance of a rebellion against a rebellion. The Istanbul government ordered Ali Ghālip, governor of Mamuretulaziz (present-day Elazığ in Eastern Anatolia), to recruit 100–150 Kurdish horsemen to arrest Mustafa Kemal and disperse the Congress, in an effort that was aborted. Ali Ghālip saw it as too risky to dispatch Kurds, who were pursuing their own independent state, on the raid. Although Ali Ghālip was loyal to the Istanbul Ottoman government and willing to act against Mustafa Kemal, he shared a fear of Kurdish nationalism.

The Istanbul government considered *Kuwā-yı Milliye* (National Forces) rebels and guerilla forces independent of the sultan’s central command. As such, a *Fatwa* was declared against the nationalists as “rebellious against the sultan.” Officially, the sultan and the nationalists conflicted over liberating the country from the Allied forces.

But the sultan altered his political sympathies according to the benefit that might bring. In April 1920 with the rift between Istanbul sultanate and Ankara nationalists rapidly widening, the *Sheikh al-Islām* (Grand Mufti), at the request of the Istanbul government, issued a *fatwā* declaring the nationalists rebels. But after the Treaty of Sèvres, all legal action was suspended against the nationalists, as the Istanbul government signed a document declaring: “There was no doubt that the ‘national forces’ had sought to defend the country and that they should therefore be praised rather than arraigned in court.”

Later, ‘Abd al-Madjd, the sultan’s heir apparent, sought to assist the nationalist movement, sending his son ‘Umar Fārūk to Anatolia in April 1921 to advance the effort. However, Mustafa Kemal rejected the assistance, contending that in the national interest the country was not ready to use the services of the “exalted” dynasty. Nonetheless, the nationalists proclaimed liberation of the sultan-caliph from the enemy as their goal. In so doing, Mustafa Kemal concealed his plan for an ideological and administrative separation of Anatolia from Istanbul through proclamation of a republic.

The *Ulemā* (religious scholars) and *meshāyikh* (Sufis) perceived the sultan-caliph as guardian of religion, while supporting the nationalist movement and ostensible goal of liberating the SULTAN-CALIPH from the enemy. Members of parliament (MPs) of the First Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) with the rank of ‘ulemā’ and *meshāyikh* gathered under the presidency of ‘Abd al-Halīm Çelebi to discuss the opening of the TGNA. The *meshāyikh* or Sufis supporting the national cause sought reconciliation between the nationalists and the sultan. ‘Abd al-Karīm (Abdulkerim) Pasha served as mediator between the Palace and Mustafa Kemal at the beginning of the Liberation War.

Rebellions Against the Nationalists

During the Liberation War, separatist, religious, and economic revolts broke out throughout Turkey against the nationalists as popular opinion was not fully unified behind the creation of a new state. The *eshrāf* (notables) were divided on a Turkish future, but nonetheless provided money and food to the nationalists, and helped suppress local and regional uprisings during and after the Liberation War.

Khādjas (religious leaders) and *aghās* were popular spokesmen in many cases. Religious men were the most influential layer of society and indispensable as mediators between the state and different societal actors, and emerged as leaders of the Anatolian peasants and farmers during the Liberation War. Even though the struggle was officially organized by the bureaucratic and military leadership, and intelligentsia, most peasants would pay heed to the *khādja* traditional religious authorities.

Although the Liberation War sought popular legitimacy, most uprisings were viewed as anti-nationalist and pro-sultanate. Before using force, Ankara and Istanbul sought to quell dissent in their realms through dispatching *Hey’et-i Nasīhas* advisory delegations to reassure opponents. Advisory delegations were established in 1919 to prevent enmity, though they failed to reassert Ottoman ideology.

The most harmful rebellions in the West of Turkey were led by Ahmed Anzavur. The first Anzavar rebellion began on September 22, 1919, and the second on February 16, 1920 in the northern district of Balıkesir Province. Anzavur’s forces were defeated and eventually dispersed by the nationalists. The Istanbul government continued encouraging Anzavur to engage in a new upheaval, promising him the rank of a Pasha (governor). In May 1920 nationalists succeeded in suppressing Anzavur’s planned uprising in Adapazarı and Geyve.

The Bozkır Uprisings from September 27–October 4, 1919 and October 20–30, 1919 broke out in response to rebel claims that nationalists were invading villages and indiscriminately killing Muslims and Christians. The uprisings ended through the mediation of *Hey’et-i Nasīha*, as nationalists agreed to cease entering Bozkır. ‘Abd al-Halīm Çelebi, the Mawlawī sheikh and a Konya MP, mediated many uprisings in the province through writing letters to the sultan and sending delegations to meet with rebels, or directly participating in peace negotiations.

The leaders of the Eastern rebellions were usually organized by sheikhs. A small religious order was established in 1908 in a small village near Gümüşhane by Sheikh Eshref, who claimed to be the messiah, and spread Islamic Shi’ism throughout the eastern towns of Bayburt, Sürmene, and Erzurum, gaining a small cult following in the region. To suppress an emerging insurrection a delegation was sent led by *müfitt*

(the highest religious leader), several *Ulemā* (religious scholars) and *eshrāf* (notables). Conciliation efforts failed and Sheikh Eshref continued to resist the government. A detachment was ultimately sent under Lieutenant Colonel Khālīd Bey's command on December 25, 1919. Sheikh Eshref and some of his adherents were killed and the insurrection defeated on January 1, 1920. Similar opposition emerged from Sheikh Redjeb's partisans of the sultan and his adherents, who disparaged Mustafa Kemal in letters and in an effort to publish an anti-nationalist newspaper *Der Sa'adet* (Istanbul), which was banned by Allied censors.

The Düzce-Hendek and Adapazarı Rebellion was a multiregional rebellion of some 5,000 insurgents who seized the prison in Düzce, released detainees, confiscated military arms, and captured officers and government officials. A division from Geyve was dispatched, but the rebellion had already spread to nearby Hendek and Adapazarı regions. On April 25, 1920 a division ordered to intervene and occupy Düzce was trapped, taken as prisoners of war, and their commander executed. Thereupon, military forces under the command of General Ali Fuat (Cebeşoy) were sent to Adapazarı, and military forces under the command of Colonel Refet (Bele) sent to Bolu. After three months, in July 1920, the rebellion was defeated and Ankara regained control over the region.

The uprising of Yozgat (Çapanoghlu), from May 15 to June 27, 1920, was organized by Çapanoghlu Edīb, leader of the provincial Freedom and Understanding Party (HIF). In the pre-World War I era, the feudal clan had clashed with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) modernizers, and traditional authorities also viewed Mustafa Kemal's nationalists as opponents. Situated within the province of Ankara, the Yozgat Rebellion threatened nationalist headquarters and was viewed as a major political and military threat to the Liberation War.

Most Alevī (Alawī) villages in Alaca joined the insurrection, which could not be controlled by local army units. Failing to control the uprising, Mustafa Kemal summoned Kılıç Ali and his forces (*Kuvā-yı Milliye*), who were fighting the French in the southeastern Cilicia region. The Çapanoghlu insurrection was defeated by Çerkes (Circassian) Ethem, who was summoned from the west with 2,000 men.

Yozgat was captured on June 23 and the Çapanoğulları insurgents fled. The effort to contain the revolt was bloody. The town of Yozgat was looted by Circassian Ethem's forces, who demanded that Ankara's governor Yahya Ghālib (Kargı) be held responsible for the spread of the rebellion, and called to answer court martial charges of negligence. But Mustafa Kemal sought to prevent the dismissal of Yahya Ghālib. He thus arranged for the interior ministry to advise Circassian Ethem that Yahya Ghālib was too ill to travel. Circassian Ethem was persuaded to leave Yahya Ghālib in peace, and received a hero's welcome by the TGNA on his arrival in Ankara.

In September 1920 irregular armies at the western front, including the Circassian Brothers guerilla forces, were put under the command of Ali Fuat (Cebeşoy). During an attack on Gediz, some 200 members of Circassian Ethem's militia were killed and 500 wounded. Mustafa Kemal replaced Ali Fuat with the chief of the general staff, Colonel İsmet İnönü of the northern district, and dispatched interior minister Colonel Refet (Bele) to prevent further hostility with Circassian Ethem and his brother Tawfīk, acting commander of the Kütahya forces. But the Circassians refused orders from the front commander.

The Ankara government, unable to calm down the hostilities, sent 15,000 troops against the Circassians. Ethem resisted the regular army occupation of Kütahya, his stronghold in the district. On January 2, 1921 Ankara offered to pardon the Circassian brothers if they relinquished their commands, but on January 17 they instead aligned with the Greeks. Ethem was proclaimed a traitor and condemned to death along with his accomplices by the Independence Tribunal. After the war, Ankara expelled Circassian Ethem and his followers. Circassian Ethem was brought to Athens by the Greeks.

The Delibash Insurrection, named after its leader, broke out on October 2, 1920. Zayn al-'Ābidīn Khōdja, leader of the *Hurriyet wa 'Itilāf Fırkası* HIF, was primary organizer of the rebellion. Delibash Mehmed, supported by a rebel army of 500, was joined by a militia of more than 3,500 from Konya region. On November 15, 1920 the rebellion was suppressed with the help of Colonel Refet (Bele), minister of the interior, who was entrusted with the task of protecting Konya by the Ankara government.

The official report given by Mustafa (Sırrı) Bey, MP for Karā Hisār-ı Sharkī, present-day

Şebinkarahisar in the Black Sea region of Turkey, and his friends held ‘Abd al-Halīm Çelebi and Kāzım Hüsni (MP for Konya) responsible for the incidents. ‘Abd al-Halīm Çelebi denied participation in the Delibash uprising, arguing he only served as a mediator. He was not punished by the TGNA, but on October 17, 1920 dismissed from the *meshīkhat* (Sheikhdom) of Mawlānā *dargāh* and exiled to Erzurum. Nevertheless, as no satisfactory evidence was found against him, he was reinstated in June 1921 and pardoned by the TGNA.

Milli Uprising

In southern Turkey a local ethnic group called *Milli* initially cooperated with the *Kumā-yı Milliye* (National Forces) during the independence struggle of Urfa against the French. The *Milli* were later persuaded by the French to join the invasion of Urfa and Siverek. On August 24, 1920 some 3,000 horsemen and 1,000 foot soldiers from the *Milli* arrived in the vicinity of Viranşehir in northeast Turkey under pretense of submitting to the nationalists, but occupied the district instead, until reinforcements arrived and the *Milli* militia fled further south to the desert region.

Alevī Kurdish Uprisings

Unlike the Bektāshī leaders, some Alevī leaders (*dedes*) were deeply involved in anti-nationalist uprisings in Dersim (present-day Tunceli) from 1916 to the 1930s, and more importantly, Koçgiri. Based on the TGNA debate on December 18, 1920, the unrest in Dersim was unrelated to regional Alevī religious syncretism, but rooted in Kurdistan demands for independence. Protracted dissent continued in the region without Ottoman or Ankara improving the poor economic conditions. According to Ferīd Bey, Istanbul finance minister, the unrest was organized by nomadic inhabitants, Dersim (*yörük*), who sought to settle in the region. Led by Kurdish chiefs demanding autonomy, the insurrection was suppressed by the nationalists.

Kurdish nationalism was dated from the period of Sultan Mahmūd II (1808–39). Kurds had been divided along tribal lines. Under Sultan Mahmūd II the Kurdish emirates were repressed and society became increasingly fragmented. After the constitutional revolution in 1908, members of the Kurdish elite founded the *Kürt Te’āwün*

me Terakkī Djem’iyyeti (Society for Support and Progress of the Kurds). Later, in 1918, the *Kurdistan Te’ālī Djem’iyyeti* (Society for the Elevation of Kurdistan) was established in İstanbul, with branches in Kurdistan. The leaders wanted a Kurdish state founded in southeastern Turkey. To this end, they provoked the Alevī Uprisings in the East against the National Government. The Kurds supported the resistance movement, in spite of the efforts of British agents to influence them and despite the fact that they gained autonomy under the Sèvres Treaty. There were Kurdish representatives at the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, and even on the nationalist Representative Committee.

The Koçgiri Uprising, also known as the Alevī Uprisings, lasted from March 6 to June 17, 1921. The rebellion erupted under the leadership of Haydar Bey, head of the Koçgiri tribe and founder of a branch of the *Kürt Te’ālī me Te’āwün Djem’iyyeti* (Association of Kurdish Elevation and Mutual Assistance), as rumors were spreading that the Ankara government would deport Kurds similarly to Armenians. A report from the British High Commissioner Sir Horace Rumbold to Minister for Foreign Affairs Lord Curzon described this rebellion as a regional “anti-Kemalist.”

Despite fierce resistance, the uprising, a precursor of the Sheikh Sa’īd revolt of February 1925, was suppressed by the army under Nūr al-Dīn (Nurettin) Pasha’s command. The Sheikh Sa’īd revolt broke out after the caliphate was banned. With the abolition of the caliphate, the most important symbol of Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood disappeared and the Ankara government was increasingly condemned as irreligious.

The rebellion, primarily an expression of Kurdish and religious sentiment, is viewed as significant in the evolution of Middle Eastern history after 1925 in Turkey and Iraq, and in the foreign policies of several European countries. The rebellion was motivated primarily by efforts to create an independent Kurdish state with respect for Islamic principles, which went against the *Mūhāk-ı Millī*, goal of the Liberation War. The Kurdish case went unmentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne and nationalist promises of autonomy during the Liberation War were abrogated to the great disappointment of Kurdish nationalists.

The discontent led to a great rebellion planned by the *Āzādī* (Freedom) Society, founded in 1923

by former militia officers, and the Nakshbandi sheikh, influential among the Zaza and Kormandji, who led the insurrection in Diyarbakır, which spread widely. Ultimately, the Kurdish rebels were repelled into the mountains, Sheikh Sa'îd was seized on April 15, 1925, and he and his accomplices were sentenced to death by the Independence Tribunal in Diyarbakır on June 29, 1925.

The Sheikh Sa'îd rebellion created the atmosphere and the mechanism necessary to silence the opposition through the *Takrîr-i Sükûn Kânûnu* – Maintenance of Order Law – which was passed on March 4, 1925, empowering the government to ban by administrative measures for two years any organization or publication it considered to cause disturbances detrimental and prejudicial to law and order. Two Independence Tribunals were reinstated to help this desired order and carry out the purges of 1926 of Mustafa Kemal's opponents.

The rise in regional insurrections during and after the War of Liberation from 1918 to the 1930s evinces the cultural, regional, religious, and economic impediments to the consolidation of the state and establishment of a Turkish national identity.

SEE ALSO: Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938); Kurdistan Nationalist Movement and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party); Turkey, Protest and Revolution, 1800s–1923; Turkish Republic Protests, 1923–1946

References and Suggested Readings

- Aydemir, Ş. S. (1992–3) *Tek Adam. Mustafa Kemal 1881–1919*, 3 vols. İstanbul: Remzi.
- Bardakçı, C. (1940) *Anadolu İsyamları*. İstanbul: Koşkun.
- Erdeha, K. (1975) *Milli Mücadele'de Vîlâyetler ve Valiler*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.
- Güneş, İ., et al. (1997) *Türk Parlamento Tarihi. I. ve II. Meşrutiyet*, 2 vols. Ankara: TGNA.
- Küçük, H. (2001) *The Role of the Bektâşîs in Turkey's National Struggle*. Boston: Brill.
- McCarthy, J. (1983) *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*. New York: New York University Press.
- Olson, R. W. (1989) *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Olson, R. W. (1990) The International Sequels of the Shaikh Said Rebellion. In S. Selek (Ed.), *Milli Mücadele*, 2 vols. İstanbul: Örgün.
- Zürcher, E. J. (1993) *Turkey, A Modern History*. New York: I. B. Tauris.

Turkish Republic protests, 1923–1946

Özlem Tür

Once the Turkish state secured power in 1923, Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues designed a reform plan as a “modernization project” to constitute the foundations of the country's future. This modernization project was formed with the goal of developing the Turkish state and “catching up with the developed countries of the West.” The main aim of the new ruling circle of the country was to make Turkey a developed, modern, and respectable nation in the international sphere.

The first pillar of the Kemalist modernization project consisted of capitalist industrialization, seen as critical to replicating the success of Western European economies. Economically, Turkey was seen as weak and backward, and Turkey's new leaders focused their efforts on industrializing and incorporating the economy into capitalist international markets. The state was given the main role in this process of modernization. The second and third pillars were nationalism and secularism. The new state was formed around the notion of Turkish nationality and *Turkishness*. Religion was assigned a minimum role in public life and reserved for the private sphere, as a belief system only relevant to relations between the individual and God. Nationalism filled the unifying role previously assigned to Islam. Westernization emerged as an important component of the project. Reforms were initiated to realize this modernization project and they were implemented under the single party rule of the People's Party, which was later re-named the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, RPP) after the announcement of the republic on October 29, 1923.

One of the main changes of the republican elite, the Kemalist military-bureaucracy, was abolition of the caliphate in March 1924, which drew widespread political opposition. In November 1924, some members of the RPP split with the party cadres to form the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, PRP) as a reaction to the early changes. The new party announced its basic aim as protection of individual rights against the growing power of the rulers. Republicanism, liberalism, and democracy were other unifying principles of the party. As

liberals, the party aimed primarily to protect religion against the secularist principles of the government in the name of freedom of belief.

Turkey's economic policy was shaped around state-led capitalist industrial development. Under the Committee of Union and Progress, measures to encourage the manufacturing sector and the development of the national bourgeoisie were already underway. Nationalism became one of the main pillars of the Kemalist modernization project, through politics, ideology, and the economy. The nationalist stand of the Kemalist regime was revealed in the Izmir economic congress of February 1923, where the leadership was unified in establishing a state-directed economy to gain complete sovereignty. The economic congress promulgated new measures such as a protectionist tariff policy, nationalization of foreign trade, and establishment of a national bank, and revived opposition to foreign concessions.

However, the economic implications of the Lausanne Treaty following World War I prevented implementation of these policies. Lausanne was not only a peace treaty but a framework that drew up the international economic relations of the new Turkish Republic. As the Lausanne Treaty was signed, three main economic guidelines for Turkey's relations with European powers were also drawn up. The first was abolition of the capitulations that provided concessions to foreign powers during the Ottoman period. Second, Ottoman external debt was renegotiated and apportioned between the successor states. Turkey was due to pay 67 percent of the total in gold sterling, beginning in 1929. Third, the free-trade treaties renewed periodically during the nineteenth century were discontinued, and a new agreement was drawn up for existing low tariff rates and restrictions against quotas to continue until 1929, when the new republic would be free to pursue its own commercial policies.

Within this context, during 1923–1929, capitalist development took its place on the agenda of the government as the main pillar of the modernization process. The primary aim of creating a national bourgeoisie continued, as did state support for the private sector. State monopolies that were operational in many sectors of the economy were transferred under favorable terms to private firms. Individuals and companies with political connections to the ruling Republican People's Party received most of the largesse. During this period, foreign capital was also invited into the country and cooperation with local capital was

encouraged. The objective was that while the foreigners would provide capital, local partners with connections to state power would operate businesses. During this period estates and property left behind by the minorities leaving the country were expropriated by the state. This property was mainly used to further expand the formation of capital and development of a national bourgeoisie.

The encouragement of the industrial sector was the main task of the ruling elite. However, agriculture remained the leading economic sector. Although the government maintained close relations with the large landowners, peasants became an important symbol of the Kemalist revolution. The peasant was described as the "master of the nation" and policies that were aimed at improving peasant status became important. The abolition of the tithe (*öşür vergisi*) – by which peasants were forced to give the central authority one-eighth of their total production as a tax – in 1925 was an important factor in improving standards of living in rural areas. With the tithe terminated, peasants were left with an excess of production, helping to integrate them into the market without intermediaries. The commercialization of agriculture by the peasants themselves helped increase the income of the peasants and the villagers as a whole.

Despite the positive developments in the economy – both capitalist industrialization and improvements in the agricultural sector – and relative calm in the country, the Kemalist modernization process was not without opposition. By the beginning of February 1925, the Kurdish population, under Sheikh Sait of East Anatolia, started a rebellion against the republic with the aim of founding an independent Kurdish state and reinstating the caliphate. The abolition of the caliphate, an important religious symbol, led to resentment against the RPP rule. In addition, the nationalist ideology of the regime to construct a national consciousness around *Turkishness*, loosely defined as including anyone who called themselves a Turk, led to growing opposition. As the rebellion broke out, the Ankara government declared martial law and the Law for the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sukun*) was passed by the parliament, giving the government absolute power to crush the rebellion.

In addition to these measures, Independence Tribunals had been formed in 1920 to deal with cases of treason and offenses against the regime, which reinstated the right to carry out the death sentence without sanction of the Assembly. After

the rebellion had been suppressed, government attention turned to political opposition from the newspapers and the Progressive Republican Party. Leading Istanbul newspapers – conservative, liberal, and Marxist – were closed down and some journalists were arrested and tried in the courts. The opposition party was banned in June 1925, after the short-lived multi-party experience, strengthening the single-party government which extended its power to every region of the country and curbed political opposition against its project. After 1925, new reforms were implemented.

In 1925, all religious shrines and religious orders (*tarikats*) were closed down. In 1926, Islamic Shari'a laws regarding the family and individual were abolished. In addition, the regime ended the religious education system and introduced harsh penalties for secret religious education. The state passed reforms including disestablishment of the state religion (1928), adoption of the Latin alphabet (1928), and the use of the Turkish language in the Islamic call to prayer (1932).

The year 1929 was an important milestone in Turkish economic development since it marked the end of the economic implications of the Lausanne Treaty and was a year of world economic crisis. The ending of the provisions of Lausanne freed the Turkish Republic to determine tariffs and quotas on foreign trade. The main consequence of the 1929 economic crisis was the decline in agricultural commodity prices. Between 1925 and the early 1930s, prices of agricultural goods fell by one-third. Since Turkish exports were primarily agricultural, the country's balance of trade was devastated. The severity of the crisis forced the government to take some serious protectionist measures through asserting greater control over foreign trade and foreign exchange. In June 1929, average tariff rates on imports almost tripled.

While some people supported a more active state role in the economy and increasing protectionism as a response to the crisis, others argued instead for a liberal economic policy with limited state intervention. As this debate intensified, in August 1930, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk announced that Fethi Okyar (1880–1943), one of his closest colleagues, planned to form an opposition party – the Free Party (Serbest Firka, FP). Okyar, a liberal on economic policies, was opposed to the statist stand of the RPP after the 1929 economic crisis.

The FP sought to abolish monopolies, cut taxes, and promote the importation of foreign capital. Rather than attracting the industrial and

commercial bourgeoisie, the FP became a center of right-wing forces opposed to the Kemalist “modernization project,” thus becoming a core of counterrevolutionary reaction. In the local elections of October 1930, the FP's strong showing surprised and alarmed the RPP. The FP members accused the RPP of fraud in the elections, which led to open and fierce attacks between the two parties. Mustafa Kemal, amid this environment of tension, announced that it was impossible for him remain impartial as president, and sided with the RPP. Fethi Okyar was forced to close down the FP on November 16, 1930.

On December 23, 1930, several weeks after the closure of the FP, a small group of Islamic radicals began calling for Shari'a law in a town called Menemen. This event is regarded as the second most important protest against the “modernization project” after the Sheikh Said rebellion. The radicals killed and beheaded Kubilay, a young teacher. The uprising was suppressed swiftly by the army, and the attackers were caught and executed. Kubilay became a symbol of the Kemalist revolution.

After 1930, the regime grew more authoritarian and suppressed opposition. Aware of the strength of the opposition, the ruling circle adopted a more forceful strategy in advancing reforms. New powers were given to the RPP to close down any organization or newspaper that contradicted the general policy of the regime. Having consolidated its power and secured its position through eliminating opposition from the FP which advocated liberal policies, the RPP more freely asserted the state role in the economy. The RPP implemented policies encouraging industrialization, and in 1931 adopted an import substitution strategy calling for high tariff rates and a quota system in foreign trade.

In 1931, the basic principles of the modernization project, the Kemalist principles, were laid down officially in the RPP program: republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and revolutionism. These six principles, represented by arrows, constituted the new RPP emblem. As the reforms were put into place, populism was incorporated into the principles to promote solidarity and cooperation in a society seen as growing more conservative and fragmented.

Despite the concessions to the upper classes, the RPP elite were disenchanted with the growing class divisions. Kemalism as an ideology considered the interests of the nation as superior to those of any group or class. The state denied

the existence of any classes in the European sense in Turkey and prohibited political activity based on class interests. Populism and the emphasis on national solidarity became one of the main principles of the Kemalist project. Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) is seen as the major ideologue of Turkish nationalism, with his ideas about a state-centric corporatism constituting the basis of the Kemalist populist principle. Gökalp's ideas about "solidarism" and corporatist state-centered organizational structure became the basic characteristic of collective action in the early republican ideology.

The new nationalist economic philosophy was accompanied by a shift towards étatist economic policy and provided much of the ideological justification for Kemalist experiments with state corporatism during the 1930s. During 1932–1934, corporatism was further developed by a group of intellectuals gathering around the journal *Kadro*. The *Kadro* group portrayed the Kemalist modernization project as a struggle against capitalism and imperialism, arguing that Turkey represented economic development without the social contradictions it brought in other countries, and that Turkey would accumulate capital while avoiding class struggle.

From 1932 to 1940, the state's role in investment, management, and production became the main feature of the economy, and industrialization was initiated. The first five-year economic plan was concluded in 1933, aiming to establish the main industries. The basic goal of this plan was "self-sufficiency" – to produce the goods necessary for local consumption in peace and war, and to establish industries that utilized local raw materials. The first five-year plan was implemented largely successfully and most basic industries were established by 1938.

Agriculture also developed quite well during this period. The foreign trade deficit recovered and, except for in 1938, the Turkish trade balance was positive during the period. From 1930 to 1939, the trading bourgeoisie, which had been strengthened in the previous era, lost its privileged position, especially those members engaged in importing goods who were now subject to protectionist policies. On the other hand, members of the bourgeoisie who had supplemented the state's investment, rather than acting as rivals, managed to benefit greatly. The advent of the state sector did not lead to dramatic declines in the profits of private capital. Through investing in large, expensive projects in inter-

mediate goods and providing them as inputs, the state sustained the growth of private enterprises in the manufacturing of the final goods for the consumer. The private sector continued to be supported and subsidized all through the 1930s. Although the benefits to the bourgeoisie were significant, capitalists feared the speed of state sector development and the limitations to operating a private market in the future.

The RPP began using the term populism, describing itself as "the synthesis of the people and as the sole authoritative interpreter of the national interest." Representation of interests through alternative, non-party or non-bureaucratic channels was regarded as unnecessary and as encouraging the acquisition of illegitimate privilege. The period between 1925 and 1946 is considered as an era of inactivity in Turkish associational life, with only modest attempts to sponsor corporatist professional organizations. For workers, organizational membership was prohibited. The labor law of 1936, bringing some safeguards to industrial workers (which materialized only after 1946), prohibited the formation of trade unions and even appeals for strikes.

1940–1945: War Economy

With the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on November 10, 1938, İsmet İnönü (1884–1973) became the president of the republic and single-party rule continued. During 1939–1945, the Turkish economy was affected by World War II. Although Turkey did not enter the war and managed to remain out of it, it was affected by the shortages in the world market. Besides, keeping and equipping its army, which was increased tenfold during the war, brought great economic strains for the country. The government had to increase taxes and print money to finance these expenses.

In 1940, a new wave of state intervention came with the implementation of the National Defence Law (*Milli Koruma Kanunu*), giving the government full authority to fix prices and impose forced labor. An important development was the initiation of the "wealth tax" by the RPP to increase state income. Although the tax was imposed on all wealthy people, ethnic minorities were most deleteriously affected. According to the Lausanne Treaty, minorities in Turkey are non-Muslim groups. The main implication of the "wealth tax" was the suppression and impoverishment of minorities without access to state authorities. Most minorities had to sell their

property to pay the tax, generally to the *nouveaux riches* of Anatolian roots.

The war years also enriched the landowners and the merchants who depended on trading agricultural products. High ranking bureaucrats with special ties to the ruling elite and Anatolian merchants were enriched by the wartime policies of the RPP. However, the rich bourgeoisie of Istanbul with international links and composed of minorities was estranged by the wealth tax, as were large landowners by the agricultural production tax (*toprak mahsulleri vergisi*) and the Law for Village Institutes and Land for Peasants (Köy Enstitüleri ve Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu).

Introduction of Multi-Party Politics

At the end of World War II, the domestic forces in Turkey combined to demand political and economic changes from the government. By 1946, a growing number of social groups were dissatisfied with single-party rule. Wartime policies, especially the economic policies of the RPP, alienated much of the population. The dissatisfaction and differences of opinion within the RPP also intensified and turned into intra-party opposition during the discussions on land reform in 1945. The reform was aimed at improving the rapidly deteriorating conditions of peasants, and led to growing opposition from large landowners.

Despite increasing agricultural production, the living standards of peasants declined dramatically during World War II due to new regulations implemented as the war started, including the obligation to sell agricultural products to the state, which set the prices lower than the market price in order to keep the cost of bread and other food low in the cities. The production demands placed on peasants were determined by the state in advance, except subsistence family needs.

Amid growing peasant dissatisfaction with the agricultural policies, the government passed a land reform law in June 1945 to gain their support. The Land Reform Law allowed for the redistribution of land and supply of necessary equipment for landless and smallholding peasants. The first lands slated for redistribution belonged to the state, municipalities, and charitable organizations, followed by large plots of privately owned land. Support for the RPP from local notables with large land holdings in the countryside was weakened as a result of the discussion of the land reform in parliament. In the end the reform did not in fact materialize as opposition became more forceful.

After the debate over land reform was initiated in parliament, in June 1945, some prominent members of the RPP submitted a petition calling for the democratization of political life in Turkey. The petition called for more active parliamentary control over the government, increased individual liberties, and especially more room for opposition. Despite the support of President İnönü for the proposal, the RPP party leaders in parliament rejected the petition.

Despite the reluctance of the RPP group in parliament, President İnönü declared in a speech on November 1, 1945 that the main shortcoming of Turkish democracy was the lack of an opposition party, and he announced general elections for a multi-party system in 1947. Shortly thereafter, new parties were formed and most of them tried to reach the rural population. Twenty-four different parties were founded, most with programs emphasizing traditionalist values and Islamic principles. Most parties mainly challenged the secularization and westernization pillars of the Kemalist modernization project. Since open attacks on secularism and Kemalist principles were banned by the constitution, the new parties attacked the RPP as the vanguard of secularism, while calling for increased emphasis of Islamic principles in political life. One of the newly founded parties, the Nation Party (NP; *Millet Partisi*), openly advocated an increased role for Islam in public affairs.

Among many parties, the formation of the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) on January 7, 1946, under the leadership of Celal Bayar (1883–1986), and by MPs opposing the Land Reform Law in parliament, was an important development in Turkish politics. Shortly thereafter, popular support for DP leaders expanded significantly in opposition to the “elitist one-party rule” of the RPP.

All opposition to RPP rule coalesced around the DP as this new party took on the mission of “mobilization for freedom,” or what the DP members termed “movement against despotism,” manifested in their election slogan of “That’s Enough!” (*Artık Yeter!*). The DP candidates were met with great enthusiasm during their visits to different cities, and became highly popular, not necessarily as a result of their program, but mainly on the credentials of opposition to RPP rule. Their criticisms against the RPP revolved around the high cost of living, lack of freedom and liberties, and anti-democratic laws. Alarmed with the increasing popularity of the

opposition, the RPP government held elections a year early, on July 21, 1946, when the DP party structure was not yet fully organized. The DP won 62 seats in the 465-seat parliament.

Despite winning the elections with a large majority, the RPP was aware of the support that the DP had gathered. By 1947, the Republican People's Party had begun implementing some policies advocated by the opposition, such as greater reliance on private capital and a new definition of *étatisme*. The emphasis on state control and *étatisme* in the five-year economic plan was amended in 1947 to suit the wishes of Istanbul businesses, to include free enterprise and the development of agriculture and related industries, to appeal to the rural segments of society.

After the policy shift, the economic policy positions of the RPP and the DP were nearly identical – with the DP seeking to privatize state enterprises, and the RPP seeking an equal division between public and private sectors.

In the social sphere, in 1946 the RPP government lifted the ban on organizations with a class base, giving rise to the formation of trade unions. In 1947, with a new Law on Trade Unions, workers were given the right to organize in trade unions, but at the same time all political activity and strikes were forbidden. Despite the prohibition of politics in the trade unions, both the RPP and the DP sought their support in the coming elections. The DP promised workers the right to strike in return for their support, a promise soon forgotten.

In the second multi-party elections in 1950, the RPP lost power to the Democrat Party. During the election campaign, the DP promised to bring services to the peasants, to de-bureaucratize Turkey, and to liberalize religious practices. The DP regime is regarded by many observers as the periphery's accession to power. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (1899–1961) took a critical stance against the republican reforms and called for a more liberal approach towards secularism.

Changes to secular practices included a law permitting prayer in Arabic (it had been conducted in Turkish under the Republican People's Party), and the reading of the Qur'an in public and over the radio; and optional religion courses in high schools were made mandatory. The government made large amounts of funds available for religious education, which provided intensive religious instruction to children in many rural localities.

Since its foundation as a political party, the DP had advocated a liberal and anti-statist economic policy. Upon coming to power, the DP directed all its efforts towards loosening state controls on the economy and encouraging the private sector. Capitalist groups were strongly encouraged and creating a national bourgeoisie became the economic priority. As such, the 1950s were important years for capital accumulation and the founding of new private businesses. Private establishments more than doubled in the 1950s, as did the number of employees in the private sector. Besides a developing capitalist class, a working class also emerged in growing numbers, and class consciousness and class politics began to take root in the country.

In 1952 the Türk-İş Workers Union was founded as an organization to represent the interests of the labor class. Despite the founding of Türk-İş, the DP did not keep its election promise for the “right to strike” upon coming to power, and workers' wages and working conditions remained poor.

Although the process of industrialization was leading to the formation of class identities among capitalists and workers, limitations were placed on the formation of class politics in Turkey. The profitability for the private sector of investing in speculative areas had obstructed full-scale industrialization. The DP's policies as reflected in its slogan of “a millionaire for each neighborhood” (*her mahalleye bir milyoner*) encouraged capital accumulation, but not necessarily investment. Besides, the dependence of private capital on the state and state credits and projects limited the formation of an independent bourgeois class and the deepening of class identities. In addition, the duality of society between the military-bureaucratic elite and the traditional liberal circles limited collective action on the basis of socioeconomic class.

The economic policy of the DP prioritized private capitalists in rural areas, where it drew most of its support. The expansion of cultivated areas by 55 percent led to a doubling of output, in part due to the mechanization of agriculture. The government implemented the Land Distribution Law of 1945, not for land reform, as originally envisaged, but for the distribution of state-owned lands. Under this law, communal pastures were transferred to peasants and village cooperatives, serving to strengthen small land ownership across Anatolia.

The Democrat Party used US Marshall Plan aid to finance the import of agricultural machinery and especially tractors. Wealthy landowners purchased tractors with favorable credits from state banks, helping to increase the cultivated area and productivity in the agricultural sector. Despite these policies, the weaknesses of the agricultural sector were nonetheless evident, especially after 1953, when stagnation in agricultural production became visible as the country continued to rely on dry farming – irrigation was not a priority of the government, and expansion of cultivated land ended.

The lack of productivity in agriculture spurred urban migration as industrialization necessitated a new workforce. However, most migrants retained some property in their villages, and workers in the 1950s were generally not destitute and stripped of all property, due to continuing ties to the village and agricultural land, limiting the formation of class identities based on ownership and relation to production.

The liberal environment accompanying the DP in the early 1950s began reverting to “authoritarian party” rule from 1954 onwards as the economy began stagnating and inflation was spiraling. After 1954, Turkish trade balance deficits became chronic and IMF advice regarding stability policies became central to the national political economy.

However, against the IMF proposals calling for devaluation, deflationist policies, and liberalization of foreign trade, the DP regime chose to implement the National Protection Law (*Milli Koruma Kanunu*) to control prices and markets, introduce import substitution policies, and pursue inflationist policies accompanied by populist, distributive policies. As the agricultural sector constituted two-thirds of its electoral power, the Democrat Party could not risk economic stagnation in rural areas. As such, the DP introduced subsidies and protective measures for the agricultural sector, later to cover most of the economy.

Authoritarian policies of the DP were seen in the measures against opposition. The DP introduced amendments that tightened the press law and changed the electoral law, and the power of the bureaucracy was curtailed as the executive powers were given the right to retire civil servants, including university professors. There was growing opposition to the DP regime, and by the end of the decade there were mass demonstrations,

especially in the universities, against the increasing repression of the regime. As a result of demonstrations in April 1960 in Istanbul and Ankara universities, a state of emergency was declared in these two cities and mass student arrests followed. Protests continued in May 1960, when Prime Minister Menderes was booed by the crowd on many occasions; and a demonstration by military academy students in protest against the government followed.

SEE ALSO: Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938); Turkey, Anti-Secular Protest, 1980–Present; Turkey, Protest and Revolution, 1800s–1923; Turkey, Working-Class Protest, 1960–1980

References and Suggested Readings

- Ahmad, F. (1993) *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London: Routledge.
- Berkes, N. (1965) *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press.
- Bianchi, R. (1984) *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Evin, A. (Ed.) (1984) *Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change*. Oplagen: Leske Verlag.
- Kedourie, S. (Ed.) (1998) *Turkey Before and After Atatürk: Internal and External Affairs*. London: Frank Cass.
- Kinross, L. (1965) *Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey*. New York: Morrow.
- Pope, N. & Pope, H. (1997) *Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and After*. London: John Murray.
- Poulton, H. (1997) *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and the Crescent*. London: Hurst.
- Zürcher, E. (1993) *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris.

Turkmenistan, protest and revolt

Summer D. Leibensperger

Turkmenistan, a constituent republic of the USSR until 1991, was one of the last to secede. Tribalism was prominent in the area that is now Turkmenistan until Russian forces began to control the region in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Soviet Russia encouraged nationalism within the region to support modernity, although Turkmen wanted greater control over the process than the Soviets would grant. Turkmen anti-Soviet movements, such as the Jadidism and Basmachi movements, were generally suppressed through a combination of Soviet force and reversal of policy.

Russian Control of the Region

Russia had gained control of the area that is now Turkmenistan by the late 1800s (through events like the massacre of thousands at the Battle of Gök-Tepe in 1881) and built a fortress near Ashgabat to establish a seat of occupation. The fortress provided protection to the city, thereby attracting wealthy merchants, and, after the building of a major railroad, Ashgabat became a major industrial center. In 1907, Russian control over Turkmenistan solidified with the Anglo-Russian Convention, an agreement that defined Russian and British spheres of influence.

Prior to 1917, concepts of nationalism in Turkmenistan were vague – tribalism was prominent, and people were bound together by ancestry and not by clearly defined national borders, a defined political system, or language. Members of a tribe might consider another tribe just as much of an enemy as another state.

Nationalism, Turkmen Protest, and the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic

The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic (or Turkmen SSR) was created when the Bolshevik government divided Central Asia into multiple republics; the area was initially part of Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, but became the Turkmen SSR in 1925. During 1917, Turkmen likely hoped that the provisional government and then the Bolsheviks would acknowledge the right of the Turkmen to self-determination. Such hope was misplaced: Soviet policy was generally aimed at reducing the influence of tribes and the authority of Islamic clergy as the latter was a strong anti-Bolshevik force.

Soviets were interested, however, in fostering nationalism. Historians suggest different motivations for why, but many contend that Soviets saw fostering nationalism as the quickest way to encourage progress (the Turkmen people were viewed as backward by the Soviets and in desperate need of modernization) and to gain the confidence of the Turkmen people. Soviets who were worried that peoples of Central Asia might have some kind of natural unity also saw fostering nationalism as a way to divide that unity.

The Soviet Union fostered nationalism initially by creating republics that were based on ethnicity and then promoting ethnic cultures

and a standardized language. Further, to help with modernization, the Soviet Union established political (and later, educational) institutions. Turkmen were generally excluded from government positions, although that should not imply that the Turkmen themselves were not involved in the formation of their nation, hence the protests and disagreements with the Soviets.

Nationalism discussions (and the ensuing constitutional conflicts) in the 1920s and 1930s were shaped by tribal concepts of genealogy and identity alongside Bolshevik concepts of nationhood and class. As early as 1917, Turkmen were protesting their disfranchisement through congresses where Muslims demanded autonomy, at one point even suggesting that Turkmen leaders should provide governmental leadership to rural villages while Soviets should rule cities, which were primarily dominated by Russians. These protests were suppressed.

Perhaps the most dramatic of these suppressions relates to the Jadids, a group of Muslim reformers. As early as the 1880s, the Jadids were concerned about (and had begun to question) traditional cultural and religious identity, especially in light of the struggles with European colonialism. The reformers were particularly interested in educational reform: schools would teach a common Central Asian Turkic language and secular subjects like history and science. Jadids wanted to promote secular notions of nationalism as well; they created a provisional government that proclaimed autonomy in December 1917 in Kokand. In early 1918, the town of Kokand was destroyed, and thousands of residents, including many Jadidist leaders, were killed. A political party known as the Young Bukharans rose from the Jadids in 1918.

The Basmachi movement was another Muslim uprising against the Soviets. The movement began in or before 1917 and rose, in part, out of dissatisfaction with Russian policy that changed Muslim exemptions from military service. By 1920, in response to unpopular and harsh Soviet policies, the Basmachi had gained wide support throughout Turkestan, and Soviets began to worry they would lose the territory. Fighting among members of the group combined with Soviet reversal and revisal of policy lessened support for the Basmachis in the 1920s.

By early 1922, Basmachi had grown again under the direction of Ismail Enver, a Turk war minister, with the goals of pan-Turkism and

pan-Islamism. Enver developed a professional army to fight the Soviets, but again the Soviets were able to defeat the Basmachis through policy changes (political and economic) and through greater numbers in combat: the Basmachis were defeated in the Battle of Kafrun. Some Basmachis who survived began a guerilla war that lasted until 1931. Their tactics of terror combined with Soviet concessions caused the Basmachis to lose support from peasants.

Less formal and less violent protests were happening in day-to-day government office environments. While Turkmen were promised roles in government institutions and an environment where their native language would be spoken, they encountered prejudice and discrimination from the Russians who held posts. Despite numerous commands from the Soviets for employees of government agencies to speak the native language of the Turkmen SSR and for agencies to hire native Turkmen, few Russians learned the language and few native Turkmen were hired. Turkmen who were hired were often the victims of discrimination when meetings were held in Russian and no translators were available; Turkmen were often simply ill prepared and ill trained to take on positions.

A national language was a critical part of protest. Many Turkmen were frustrated by the failure of government institutions to use their language. They also worried about the loss of Turkmen identity when the interest in learning the Turkmen language declined in the 1930s and 1940s since Russian was clearly the language that citizens needed to use to get ahead. Indeed, one of the first moves after the dissolution of the USSR was cultural reform related to language: Turkmen readopted a Latin alphabet it had been forced to abandon by the Soviets.

Many traditionalist Turkmen also protested Soviet initiatives to change the role of women in Turkmen society. Women were expected to conform to very traditional gender roles, but Soviet officials wanted to encourage gender equality political activism among women. Officials met with little success: few women participated, and Soviets were unhappy that the women who participated were generally older women. Young women simply were not accustomed to speaking in front of strangers or even older relatives and were burdened by cultural expectations for housework and childrearing; older women had moved past some of these cultural expectations. Generally, the

numbers of women participants involved in political activism slowly grew throughout the 1920s and 1930s; women also made gains in literacy through Soviet literacy programs and schools, although in some cases husbands had to be threatened by Soviet officials to send their wives to school. Women's roles perhaps changed most notably in their economic contributions to their households: they began contributing to the household's income through the sale of carpets.

Soviets also created laws related to women and family life which angered many traditional Turkmen. Laws related to divorce that enabled women to divorce men without a reason were especially troubling to Turkmen, who fought fiercely for harsher restrictions on women (under Qur'an law, men could divorce women by saying "I divorce you" three times). Turkmen also opposed laws banning polygamy, child marriage, and bridewealth practices.

After Nikita Khrushchey's de-Stalinization speech in 1956, Turkmen started to make greater headway in terms of political presence, and by the 1970s they had greater political and budgetary power.

Dissolution of the USSR and Turkmenistan's Independence

The 1991 dissolution of the USSR changed little in Turkmenistan. The Turkmenistan Communist Party (TCP) was dismantled, but in name only; most leaders of the TCP became leaders of the Turkmenistan Democratic Party. Saparmurat Niyazov, the former secretary of the Communist Party who had been in power since 1985, was "elected" president: he was the only candidate in the election. In 1999, Niyazov became president for life. Niyazov is known for his cult of personality, cruel acts of repression, and his odd decrees and actions: he has banned car radios and long hair on men and closed libraries and hospitals.

Turkmenistan's constitution suggests the country is a democracy with a separation of powers and guarantees some human rights, including gender and social equality, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and freedom of movement and religion. The wording is careful, though. While the constitution indicates that citizens can create associations, including political parties, for example, it also indicates that the government can prohibit those organizations if they "encroach on the health and morals of the people."

In practice, the country has a one-party system; many government officials are appointed rather than elected, and opposition is viewed as treason. In practice, many of these freedoms do not exist: police brutality and confessions gained by torture are suspected to be common; religious groups are closely watched, and Niyazov's book of spiritual writings, *Ruhnama*, is imposed on religious communities; the media is heavily censored. In practice, few organizations do not encroach on the government's definition of what is good for the "health and morals of the people."

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, various opposition groups were formed which carried out protests (often in the form of strikes and pickets) against Niyazov's rapidly entrenching government. In 1989, members of the intelligentsia formed the first opposition movement, named *Agzybirlik*. The group called for democratic reforms and cultural revival. In 1991, members of the Academy of Sciences created *Paikhas*. The group wanted to promote public discussion of politics. Also in 1991, a group named *Genesh* was founded that functioned as a coalition among *Agzybirlik* and other democratic reform organizations: its goal was to coordinate the movements of opposition groups.

Niyazov moved to suppress his critics by arresting leaders, and by 1993 the KNB (the successor to the Soviet-era KGB) had suppressed much of the public unrest. Some dissidents chose to leave the country; those who did not were often kept under surveillance by the KNB. Instead of charging his critics with political crimes, Niyazov was more likely to charge them with criminal actions (sometimes related to the drug trade).

By the mid-1990s, much of the opposition to Turkmenistan's policies was situated in Moscow and led by Avdi Kuliev. Kuliev was Turkmenistan's first foreign minister and left Turkmenistan when he grew uncomfortable with Niyazov's policies. In Moscow, he founded the Turkmenistan Foundation, which later evolved into the United Democratic Opposition of Turkmenistan or UDOT. Kuliev advocated for the creation of a multiparty system to foster political change; he also wanted an immediate internationally monitored national election to occur. The KNB has tried to destroy the organization, in part through the arrest of two leaders (Khoshali Garayev and Mukhamedkul Aitmuratov) in October 1994, one of whom later died while being held in prison.

In 2001, the former minister of foreign affairs, Boris Shikhmuradov, faced criminal charges and fled Turkmenistan. Shikhmuradov did not approve of Niyazov's isolationism practices and favored closer ties with the West. Unlike Kuliev, Shikhmuradov wanted to put an 18-month hold on elections for a transitional period after Niyazov fell. Other members have since joined Shikhmuradov, and together they are sometimes referred to as the nomenklatura opposition.

During Niyazov's rule, women also lost ground that had been gained under Soviet leadership. In many ways, traditional notions of gender roles have reemerged, in part because Niyazov's *Ruhnama* teaches a traditional role for women, and the book is required reading in schools and political arenas. There are no advocacy groups for women, and women often do not attend school.

Ultimately, Soviets introduced the concepts of nationalism to Turkmen, but in many ways the Soviets limited the Turkmen's abilities to achieve a unified country. The fight against Soviet Russia strengthened the desire for genuine democratic processes, although the first leader of post-Soviet Turkmenistan, Niyazov, continued with Soviet suppression and created a legacy of human rights abuses. Niyazov died in 2006. His replacement, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, reversed some of Niyazov's less popular decrees and more harmful policies, although many worry that he is working toward developing his own cult of personality.

SEE ALSO: Afghanistan, 1978 Revolution and Islamic Civil War; Bolsheviks; Central Asian Protest Movements; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Leninist Philosophy; Marxism; Soviet Union, Fall of; Tajikistan, Protests and Revolts; Uzbekistan, National Movement and Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Allworth, E. (Ed.) (1994) *Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview*, 3rd ed. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Bremmer, I. & Taras, R. (Eds.) (1997) *New States, New Policies: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Edgar, A. L. (2004) *Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Khalid, A. (1998) *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wheeler, G. (1964) *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

U

Uganda, protests against British colonialism and occupation

Raphaela von Weichs

From the beginning, British colonial rule in East Africa encountered severe protests and manifold resistance. When the Uganda protectorate was established in 1894, almost everywhere local populations struggled against foreign domination, albeit with differing degrees of success. Resistance was most pronounced in the Kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitara in the western Nile region. This centralized state dominated the Great Lakes area until the early eighteenth century when its eastern neighbor, the Kingdom of Buganda, began to expand. In the late nineteenth century, the rival kingdom collaborated effectively with British imperialism and became the center of power in the protectorate. Local resistance was therefore directed not only against European hegemony, but also against African sub-imperialism. Though uprisings and rebellions spilled over almost everywhere in the protectorate, Bunyoro-Kitara excelled in military resistance under King (Omukama) Kabalega from 1893 to 1895.

In the 1880s, when Kabalega had regained power in the Great Lakes area, slave raiders from Equatorial Egypt encroached in the north of Bunyoro-Kitara. They pillaged villages and enslaved Kabalega's subjects, the local Banyoro. Ironically, the acting governor of the Equatorial province, Sir Samuel Baker, utilized the slave raiders as irregular troops in his effort to annex Bunyoro-Kitara to Egypt. He failed dismally and was defeated in the battle of Masindi in 1872. Thereafter Kabalega's army chased him out of Bunyoro-Kitara. As a consequence of this humiliation, Baker ostracized Omukama Kabalega

in his publications as an anti-imperialist. This reputation stimulated imperial incentives in Britain to crush Kabalega's power and to use his expansion into neighboring kingdoms as a pretext for war. In this way, the Westminster government tried to secure the British sphere of influence against the interests of France, Belgium, and Germany. Because of the Mahdist revolt in the Sudan, which began in 1881 and continued until 1898, Bunyoro-Kitara was cut off from the northern route of long-distance trade. As a result Kabalega ran short of guns, which were supplied by Arabs from Equatorial Egypt in exchange for slaves and ivory. Trade routes to the Indian Ocean, the Swahili coast, and Zanzibar on the other side were controlled by the rival kingdoms of Buganda, Karagwe, and Nkore. Nevertheless, Kabalega succeeded in drawing more and more trading caravans to his kingdom. He consolidated his power on the basis of a newly created standing army (Barusura), which he equipped with firearms.

In 1891, the Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC) under the leadership of Captain Lugard provoked Kabalega by re-installing a king in Toro. This province had seceded from Bunyoro-Kitara in 1830 as an independent kingdom. In 1876 Kabalega reconquered Toro, but lost the province again through Captain Lugard's intervention. Kabalega consequently lost control over Katwe, a center of commerce and salt production in the Great Lakes area. Bunyoro-Kitara's resources in cattle, trade, and land shrank quickly and Lugard's dominion in Toro augured what was to follow over the coming years. By 1892, Lugard's expeditions had ruined the IBEAC to such an extent that the British crown accepted the protection of the colony. This decision was taken among other reasons to safeguard the Nile as a trading route for Great Britain's imperial economy.

The Colonial Office sent Colonel Colvile to remove all obstacles, especially resistance in

Bunyoro-Kitara. Colville declared war on the western kingdom in 1893 and marched there in company with a handful of British officers and a huge army of 14,000 Baganda. The army of King Kabalega repelled the attacks successfully, but by 1895 another army of 20,000 Baganda, some Sudanese companies, and a few British officers conquered the main areas of the Kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitara. Meanwhile, the king had fled to the north of the Nile. Kabalega had realized early on that an open battle would be detrimental to his position in the face of an overwhelming enemy, equipped with the Maxim gun. Drawing on guerilla tactics, he thus successfully kept on fighting against the occupation of his territory for two more years. Likewise he ordered sabotage against the supplying caravans for the British forts. These stretched in a line from Lake Albert in Bunyoro-Kitara to Lake Victoria in Buganda. Though most of the Banyoro chiefs had officially surrendered to the British and accepted occupation, Kabalega still influenced their politics from his exile north of the Nile. Out of loyalty to the king, Barusura army leaders continued the warfare and attacked British forces until 1896. From then on, Kabalega was pursued by British expeditions with the objective of expelling the king from Bunyoro-Kitara and ending military as well as cultural resistance. In 1899, Omukama Kabalega was captured, together with Kabaka Mwanga, the deposed king of Buganda. Both were taken to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean. Mwanga himself had resorted to resistance in 1897 against the British protectorate government. He realized that he was stripped of his powers and patronized by his leading chiefs, who collaborated with the European government.

From 1888 to 1892, Buganda was divided by a power struggle between Muslims, Catholics, and Protestants, in which French Catholic and British Protestant missionaries as well as the IBEAC had interests. To appease the Catholics and Protestants, they were given various counties of the conquered Bunyoro-Kitara kingdom. Two of the counties, Bugangaizi and Buyaga, lay in the former heartland of Bunyoro-Kitara and contained the kingdom's royal tombs. They came under the rule of Catholic chiefs, who opened up the land for Baganda settlers. Buganda had thus expanded at Bunyoro-Kitara's expense and exercised a harsh rule over the conquered Banyoro population in the so-called "lost coun-

ties." Baganda tended to see the Bunyoro "lost counties" as a reward for their alliance with the British in the war of conquest. Ironically, the British government considered the transfer as a political strategy to consolidate colonial power over both kingdoms. The whole of Bunyoro-Kitara was to be ruled by the Baganda system of administration. This meant that Baganda took over leading chiefships, acquired freehold land, imposed and collected taxes, and demanded labor from Banyoro. Women were exploited for sexual or reproductive labor. Another major grievance of Banyoro was the use of Luganda as the *lingua franca* in the new system. The language debate increased fears among Banyoro that Bunyoro-Kitara was to be absorbed as a province of Buganda. By 1907 Banyoro sub-chiefs who were under the tutelage of Baganda chiefs turned to strikes against the Baganda administrative regime. They refused to cooperate and chased Baganda chiefs out of the villages back to the administrative center in Hoima. The protectorate government reacted to the rebellion by punishing and arresting the ringleaders and deporting most of them out of Bunyoro-Kitara. Though violent in character, the boycott remained passive, recognizing British military superiority. The rebellion was therefore called "Nyangire," meaning "I have refused." In fact, it was a continuation and transformation of active resistance against conquest and occupation.

From 1908 onwards, the protectorate government in collaboration with its Baganda agents introduced cotton to the occupied territory. Bunyoro-Kitara was still without a peace treaty and under ceasefire. Cotton did not provide an alternative to agricultural subsistence production. Rather, this cash crop commercialized economic activities in Bunyoro-Kitara and introduced it to the global market. Although imperialism and capitalist development in the protectorate accelerated, these processes did not contribute to progress in Bunyoro-Kitara. Many Banyoro suffered from the aftermath of the war, especially from new diseases, epidemics, drought, and famine. Large parts of the kingdom were depopulated and infested with the tsetse fly. The remaining cattle that were not taken or slaughtered during the conquest died from rinderpest epidemics spread by the tsetse fly. Until the end of World War II, Bunyoro-Kitara did not improve in population, economy, or infrastructure. It lacked roads, markets, hosp-



October 1, 1955: Mutesa II, king of the Buganda people, is permitted to return to Uganda as a constitutional monarch after several years of protest against British colonialism. Mutesa II, the first president of Uganda from 1963 to 1966, was deposed and forced into exile by his eventual successor, President Milton Obote. (*Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images*)

itals, and schools, especially for higher education. Compared to other parts of the protectorate, notably Buganda, the western kingdom lagged behind capitalist development. In local discourse, the protectorate government was accused of privileging Buganda and discriminating against Bunyoro, as the reduced kingdom was now referred to by colonial officials.

Already in the 1920s, a group of Banyoro in the “lost counties” had formed a committee for the liberation of the land that was given to Buganda. The Mubende Banyoro Committee (MBC) pronounced grievances concerning Baganda chiefs. It sent petitions to the governor of the protectorate to return the “lost counties” to the kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitara. The committee also complained about discrimination against the local language, Runyoro, and against the use of Runyoro personal names, the Baganda chiefs’ unwillingness to sell land to Banyoro, and the lack of Banyoro chiefs who would apply

justice. Though the king of Bunyoro, Omukama Tito Winyi, supported the Committee’s demands with petitions to the colonial secretary and to the queen of England, no changes came about until after World War II. By then, a veteran of that war, Joseph Kazairwe, returned from serving the British empire in the King African Rifles army. He became secretary of the MBC and used his influence to both militarize and radicalize the movement. The leaders of the MBC now called for a peasant revolt. Most of the peasants had become *bona fide* tenants of the “Mailo land” (miles of land) given to Baganda by the protectorate government. Few possessed letters of occupancy, which would secure their rights in the land under cultivation. On top of one month’s labor, tenants paid rent and 10 percent of their local produce to their landlord. Baganda chief-landlords levied hut tax, and later poll tax and gun tax, for the protectorate’s revenues. They also forced labor for projects in the public infrastructure. The system of coercion and administration did not differ much from other parts of the protectorate. Yet it affected Banyoro in the “lost counties” even more deeply because of the combined effects of administrative and cultural domination by Baganda. More settlers from the rival kingdom had come to live permanently on what was seen by Banyoro as their ancestral soil.

The revolt gained force under the mobilization of the MBC. The leaders began to channel frustration and strategically used peasant riots for political protests against foreign occupation. Petitions became more ambitious and were sent to the major political parties in Britain, as well as to the United Nations in 1956, all for the purpose of liberating the “lost counties” from Buganda. Around the same time, in 1952, the Mau Mau movement in Kenya had culminated in a war between Gikuyu freedom fighters and British armed forces. Like the MBC, the Mau Mau leadership declared land and freedom as the major objectives of Gikuyu resistance to the British government. Both movements rejected foreign occupation of indigenous land for political and social reasons. Yet Mau Mau resistance was openly directed against European settlement, while the MBC fought against African sub-imperialism. Under this cover, Banyoro struggled against British colonial land policy and the colonial system of administration. By 1956, the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya was over and its political leaders were in detention. Land was no

free asset but restricted to loyalists of British government policy. Thousands of Gikuyu freedom fighters had been killed during the war, while British forces had far fewer casualties. These incidents might have influenced the struggle of the MBC for freedom and land. Though violence was directed against Baganda settlers, it never culminated in an open war against the protectorate government. Instead, Banyoro political strategies increasingly focused on legal solutions.

On the eve of independence, Banyoro prepared for the Constitutional Conference in London where they wanted the "lost county" issue to be put on the agenda. They feared that the British would withdraw from colonial rule without rectifying the land problem they had created. However, the British government did not comply with the Banyoro conflict resolutions. Instead, the government privileged any move that kept Buganda in the constitutional process. The Kabaka of Buganda had threatened to boycott the conference if the integrity of his kingdom was tampered with. Consequently, the political party of the monarchists, Kabaka Yekka, was only willing to share power with the Uganda People Congress, a Protestant party, when Buganda obtained its sovereignty and political leadership in the new nation-state. Both parties agitated against the Catholics in the Democratic Party. Thus they perpetuated the religious competition of nineteenth-century politics which had led to the alleged "reward" for Baganda of the "lost counties." Banyoro efforts to find a legal solution to the transfer of their territories before independence were frustrated. They were followed by riots and violence in the "lost counties." The protectorate government declared the counties "disturbed areas" and sent out police patrols, which further militarized the conflict. Peasants had no choice but to support the protest movement or to stay neutral. Collaborators with Baganda chiefs were deemed traitors and were threatened by MBC supporters. In fact, this divide led to tragic disruption of Banyoro communities where members of both ethnic groups had intermarried. Other Banyoro had gained privileges, work, or other rewards in Buganda's administrative system.

Finally, a compromise was found in 1961, after a privy council committee had investigated the disturbed areas and recommended that a referendum should be held two years after independence. In six counties, the population had

to vote on whether it belonged politically to either Buganda or Bunyoro. Since the Baganda population was in the minority in Buyaga and Bugangaizi, the Kabaka's government quickly initiated a settlement program for war veterans on the shores of Lake Albert. Large sums of money were invested in the Ndaiga Settlement Scheme and the Kabaka himself stayed in this remote area to attract settlers by his mere presence. Despite all efforts to increase the Baganda population in the two "lost counties" with a Banyoro majority, the strategy was a self-deception on the part of the Baganda royalists and failed. The referendum took place in 1964 and a majority of Banyoro in Buyaga and Bugangaizi voted for a return to Bunyoro-Kitara. The other four counties remained in Buganda. Undeniably, the MBC had utilized its power base in the two returned counties by demanding ethnic loyalty and promoting ethnic nationalism in the Kingdom of Bunyoro-Kitara. Banyoro regained control of their land and the MBC was in control of political governance, though now under the hegemony of the government of the Bunyoro-Kitara kingdom. The leaders of the MBC ascended to the highest chiefships in the former "lost counties." Yet the victory was ambiguous, since the Baganda landlords were still in possession of their land certificates and were thus foreign capitalists *in absentia*. Since the 1960s, the land question has perpetuated legal and violent conflicts which have not been resolved to the present time.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Sabotage; Anti-Slavery Movement, Britain; Imperialism and Capitalist Development; Mahdist Revolt; Mau Mau Rebellion, 1952–1959

References and Suggested Readings

- Doyle, S. (2006) From Kitara to the Lost Counties: Genealogy, Land and Legitimacy in the Kingdom of Bunyoro, Western Uganda. *Social Identities* 12, 4 (July): 457–70.
- Green, M. (1990) Mau Mau Oathing Rituals and Political Ideology in Kenya: A Re-Analysis. *Africa* 60 (1): 69–87.
- Jorgensen, J. J. (1981) *Uganda: A Modern History*. London: Croom Helm.
- Kiwanuka, S. (1974) The Diplomacy of the Lost Counties and its Impact on Foreign Relations of Buganda, Bunyoro and the Rest of Uganda, 1900–1964. *Mawazo* 4 (2): 111–41.
- Roberts, A. D. (1962) The Sub-Imperialism of the Baganda. *Journal of African History* 3 (3): 435–50.

- Steinhart, E. I. (1977/1999) *Conflict and Collaboration in the Kingdoms of Western Uganda, 1890–1907*. Kampala: Fountain.
- Strayer, R. W., Steinhart, E. I., & Maxon, R. M. (1973) *Protest Movements in Colonial East Africa: Aspects of Early African Response to European Rule*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Uzoigwe, G. N. (1970) *Revolution and Revolt in Bunyoro-Kitara. Part Two. The Kyanyangire, 1907: Passive Revolt against British Overrule. Makerere History Paper 5*. Kampala: Longman.

Uhuru movement

Ernest A. Amador

Stemming from the perception that the non-violent approach of the early 1960s civil rights movement was ineffective, the Uhuru movement, a multi-organization crusade founded in 1973 in Saint Petersburg, Florida, set forth to liberate oppressed blacks victimized by a white-dominated capitalist society. The African People's Socialist Party (APSP), the leading organization of the movement, campaigned for a socialist society and endorsed the use of armed self-defense. Although many of its initiatives failed, the APSP's labors to improve the quality of life for blacks worldwide have been considered a revival of the Black Power movement of the 1960s and a source of inspiration for other revolutionary organizations.

Omalı Yeshitela (born Joe Waller), founder and decades-long leader of the APSP, was a victim of police harassment even as a young teenager. While serving overseas in the US Army, he witnessed racial discrimination – both within and outside of the military. Disgruntled at the oppression of blacks at the hands of capitalist societies, he formed the movement's ideology by fusing Marcus Garvey's "race-first," Marxist philosophy with Malcolm X's call for armed resistance.

Although the Uhuru movement (Uhuru is Swahili for "freedom") was spearheaded by the APSP, its mission was carried out by several "sister" organizations, each created to perform a particular function. Noting that the majority of the imprisoned population were blacks, Yeshitela created the African National Prison Organization in 1979, which has been labeled the earliest effort to organize prisoners for a revolution. After the Uhuru movement relocated

its headquarters to Oakland, California in 1981, it created the African National Reparation Organization (ANRO). The first of its 11 annual War Reparation tribunals (held in Brooklyn) demanded that the United States pay over \$4 trillion to blacks for their centuries-long oppression.

Within a few years of its inception, the Uhuru movement's leadership realized that the movement would not survive long without substantial financial backing and wanted to secure every available resource – even from whites (which some argue contradicted Garvey's doctrine of self-reliance). In 1976, the APSP created the African People's Solidarity Committee, allowing whites to support the movement financially.

Like Marcus Garvey decades previously, the APSP took its black liberation mission to the international arena. In 1999, the APSP helped form the African Socialist International, an organization aimed at ending worldwide black oppression by ending capitalism. (This organization was still active as of 2008.)

It was not until after the Uhuru movement moved its headquarters back to Saint Petersburg in the early 1990s that the APSP's armed self-defense philosophy gained national attention. After two Saint Petersburg police officers were acquitted of murder charges for the 1996 killing of 18-year-old Tyron Lewis, members and supporters of the APSP forced police out of local black neighborhoods, which sparked what have been said to be the largest, most violent rebellions in the city's history. Although the police patrolled the black neighborhoods again, many claimed that the disturbances unified the black community.

Like other radical Black Power organizations (such as the Black Panther Party and the Revolutionary Action Movement), the APSP became a routine target of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the police. Many members were harassed, and the APSP headquarters was even raided by police. Yeshitela himself was jailed numerous times. The movement, however, withstood the persecution of federal and local authorities, although divisions among the APSP leadership grew (as in many other black revolutionary organizations) in the late 1990s, stifling the movement's momentum. While it is clear that many, if not most, of the Uhuru movement's objectives were never reached, the APSP and its goals have been credited with the successful decades-long effect of raising social consciousness.

SEE ALSO: Black Nationalism, 19th and 20th Centuries; Black Panthers; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism; King, Martin Luther, Jr. (1929–1968) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); League of Revolutionary Black Workers; Malcolm X (1925–1965); Revolutionary Action Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Ahmad, M. & Stanford, M. (2007) *We Will Return in the Whirlwind: Black Radical Organizations, 1965–1975*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.
- English, J. (2008) *Black Power Still Lives: The Uhuru Movement in Saint Petersburg, Florida (1972–2001)*. Master's thesis, Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University. Available at www.uflib.ufl.edu/ufdc/?c=fhpc&m=hd1&i=52105 (downloaded July 10, 2008).

Ujamaa villages

Ayokunle Olumuyiwa Omobowale

At the outset, *Ujamaa* socialism was viewed as a new development model divergent from established capitalist economies in Africa and throughout the world. Largely dissociated from the dominant Soviet and Chinese brands of socialism, emphasizing Marxist ideology, Tanzania held out *Ujamaa* (community/socialist) villages as a solution to poverty and advanced the new development model for poor countries in Africa and the global South.

The foundation of *Ujamaa* socialism is based on the opinions, ideas, and writing of Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's first president, who led the country from independence in 1961 to his retirement from public life in 1985. Whereas the thoughts that produced *Ujamaa* socialism are contained in a 1962 publication entitled *Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism*, the program was implemented in 1967 through the *Arusha Declaration*.

The *Ujamaa*: African Socialism

Tanzania's President Nyerere ascended the leadership of his country in 1961, with a personal commitment to the development and improvement of the lives of his people. Starting with political reforms, culminating in remaking Tanzania into a one-party state in 1965, Nyerere went ahead in applying development/socioeconomic reforms

to reposition Tanzania as a distinctly African socialist country, a brand of socialism termed *Ujamaa*. The kernel of *Ujamaa* socialism did not derive from the orthodox Marxian-socialist perspective. It was based on sociocultural values in synchrony with African ways of life. The emphasis of *Ujamaa* was equality, freedom, cooperation, and self-reliance. In rural areas, *Ujamaa*, the peasant village model Nyerere championed, was rooted in a collective and communal production and cooperation for the benefit of all those in society rather than individual needs. Through *Ujamaa* socialism, the entire community marshals collective resources and skills to the benefit of the entire society. Nyerere considered *Ujamaa* as an alternative to development based on external capital investment, foreign aid, and modern technology, which failed to develop society or improve the lives of most Tanzanians. Rather, foreign development produced an unequal society led by a few political elites that impoverished the vast majority.

In order to ensure equality within the framework of the *Ujamaa*, the government of Tanzania nationalized foreign companies and limited the number of properties government officials could own. Nyerere was convinced that *Ujamaa* could only succeed through equitable distribution of productive resources, and the forces of production must be in public hands. The educational system was redesigned for retraining the mind toward the ideal of *Ujamaa*.

Ujamaa was directed to the development of rural areas that were profoundly impoverished through reorganizing scattered communities into *Ujamaa* villages, whose residents were expected to cooperate and jointly engage in the production and distribution processes. Also, the villages were to be organized without compulsion, with villagers given free latitude to decide the forms of cooperation, governance, production, and distribution they preferred for development purposes. The *Ujamaa* village model was not to be imposed on communities.

From 1968 when villagization for actualization of *Ujamaa* socialism commenced to 1975, as many as 7,000 villages were reorganized on the basis of the *Ujamaa* system, though in many cases not with the full support of the community. Rather, officials who had the responsibility of ensuring the implementation of the *Ujamaa* provision frequently resorted to coercion in the fulfillment of their duties.

Challenges to Ujamaa Socialism

Inasmuch as the *Ujamaa* came out as a novel and seemingly celebrated phenomenon, the program faced significant challenges from the outset. Indeed, the program was designed as a policy that would be carried out without compulsion and emphasized freedom. However, the bureaucrats given the responsibility to ensure the implementation of *Ujamaa* resorted to the use of coercive measures, including imprisonment and payment of fines to ensure forceful villagization and *Ujamaa* living and production among peasants. The result of the often compulsory system pushed unenthusiastic peasants into villages. Peasants frequently viewed the *Ujamaa* system as imposed by government officials who dictated to villagers how they should live, produce, and cooperate. A significant impediment to the functioning of the system was the 1970s drought that produced food shortages and a financial crisis that signaled an end to self-reliance, forcing dependence on international assistance.

As a consequence of the drought and financial crisis, Tanzania's dependence on international funds and foreign financial inflow from western countries expanded dramatically by 1978 to US \$800 million. In addition, by the mid-1970s, about 5,000 expatriates were deployed from foreign nations under diverse aid programs, diluting the principles of self-reliance. Foreign aid to Tanzania was often conditioned on the withdrawal of the state from economic activities and decontrol of fiscal policies. The rise in private business commercial activity in the 1970s displaced the public sector and dramatically increased inequality as well as ending the notion of social responsibility rooted in the community. In impoverished rural areas, *Ujamaa* villages were viewed as a means of developing society, but the program failed due to lack of resources, mismanagement, bureaucracy, drought, and the urgent necessity for success.

SEE ALSO: Charismatic Leadership and Revolution; International Socialism: Mass Politics; Nyerere, Julius (1922–1999); Tanzania, Protest and Independence

References and Suggested Readings

- Blommaert, J. (1997) Intellectuals and Ideological Leadership in *Ujamaa* Tanzania. *African Languages and Cultures* 10 (2): 129–44.
- Linton, N. (1968) Nyerere's Road to Socialism. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 2 (1): 1–6.

- Mohiddin, A. (1968) *Ujamaa: A Commentary on President Nyerere's Vision of Tanzanian Society*. *African Affairs* 67 (267): 130–43.
- Pratt, C. (1999) Julius Nyerere: Reflections on the Legacy of His Socialism. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 33 (1): 137–52.
- Samoff, J. (1981) Crises and Socialism in Tanzania. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 19 (2): 279–306.
- Schneider, L. (2004) Freedom and Unfreedom in Rural Development: Julius Nyerere, *Ujamaa Vijijini* and Villagization. *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 38 (2): 344–92.

Ukraine Orange Revolution, 2004–2005

Abel Polese

Ukrainians responded to corruption and electoral fraud in the second round of the 2004 presidential elections with massive protests. Thousands of hardcore activists occupied the center of Kiev, where they set up residence in tents and organized sit-ins, strikes, and various forms of non-violent protest to demand a revote in the run-off between opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko and the ordained successor of outgoing President Kuchma, Viktor Yanukovych. International reports of fraud and widespread public perception of intimidation and abuse by the authorities in favor of the government's candidate resulted in an enormous outpouring of support for Yushchenko and democratic change. Hundreds of thousands of citizens filled the capital, with the number of demonstrators reaching as many as 1 million on November 27, 2004. Mass strikes and rallies took place around the country. As a result of the protests the election results were voided and a revote was ordered by the Ukraine Supreme Court at the end of December. Yushchenko won 52 percent of the vote in the new election to become the third president of the Ukraine.

These events were designated the Orange Revolution because orange, the color Yushchenko had chosen for his campaign, came to symbolize discontent with the Kuchma regime. Opposition supporters wore orange scarves and ribbons, while supporters of the president-backed candidate, Yanukovych, wore blue. Civic organization were a major force behind the Orange Revolution; the NGO PORA ("It's time"), in particular, is regarded as the primary coordinator of the



One hundred thousand Ukrainians braved freezing temperatures and snow to mark the first anniversary of Ukraine's Orange Revolution. Former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (center) is carried by supporters during a huge rally in Independence Square. Tymoshenko is considered a hero for her role in the revolution, which succeeded in establishing a democratic reelection for the presidency after the initial election was marred by massive fraud, corruption, and intimidation. (© Aleksandr Prokopenko/epa/CORBIS)

protests. PORA successfully managed the tent city (*palatochnyi gorodok/nametove mistechko*) where thousands of protestors lived in the center of Kiev. It further coordinated the flow of resources and information between the capital and the rest of the country, and maintained a non-violent ethos, employing strategies of resistance suggested by Gene Sharp. The Orange Revolution is one of several organized protests in former communist countries at the beginning of the twenty-first century that have come to be known as “colored revolutions”. These revolutions share a non-violent strategy, color imagery, and the pursuit of democratic change in entrenched authoritarian regimes.

In 1991 Ukraine became a sovereign and independent republic with a multi-party system and a legal opposition. Despite a ban on the Communist Party in 1991 – waived in 1993 – no lustration was carried out and the communist elites continued to have a major role in the country. Consolidation of a political opposition, however, does not mean that authoritarian rule is wiped out, and most of the power remained in the hands of the president – Leonid Kravchuk (1991–4) and successor Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004) – who often manipulated the media and consolidated the role of oligarchic clans in politics.

In 2000 journalist Hrihory Gongadze was murdered while investigating corruption in

President Kuchma's entourage. On the basis of audio tapes that implicated Kuchma in the crime, socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz accused the president of Gongadze's murder and a political crisis ensued. The opposition gained momentum and civil society was prompted into action: after a decade of silence thousands of protesters gathered in Kiev in 2000, and again in 2001 and 2002 to protest the president, whose popularity was in steep decline.

The 2002 parliamentary elections resulted in the first victory for a non-communist party. The electoral bloc *Nasha Ukraina* headed by Viktor Yushchenko – former head of the national bank and prime minister 1999–2001 – became the lead party in parliament. Yushchenko rapidly emerged as the most popular politician in the country and the favorite for the 2004 presidential elections, given Kuchma's extremely low popularity. Kuchma appointed the governor of Donetsk, Viktor Yanukovich, prime minister in 2002 with the intention of positioning him to become the next president. In the first round of the 2004 presidential elections Yushchenko won 39.9 percent of the vote and Yanukovich 39.26 percent, despite allegations that government corruption biased the results in Yanukovich's favor. On November 21, 2004 Yanukovich won the run-off elections by a margin of less than 3 percent. Motivated by accusations of electoral fraud, the next day protestors in unprecedented numbers came from all over Ukraine to occupy the center of Kiev, refusing to acknowledge the official results of the elections.

Prior to August 2004 there were two organizations named PORA. They operated in the same milieu and held similar goals until they formally joined forces at a conference in August 2004. The organization distinguished as Yellow PORA because of the color chosen for its campaign was conceived in December 2003, and headed by Vlad Kaskiv. It was established to monitor the results of the 2004 elections, and its official campaign began in March 2004, when the website www.pora.org.ua was launched. The organization later developed into a political party that ran candidates in the 2006 elections. The other group, known as Black PORA for printing its literature in black and white, was involved in the 2000 movement “Ukraine without Kuchma” in response to Gongadze's murder, and had participated in various protest movements since that time. Black PORA began its 2004 campaign

in February by hanging posters asking “What is Kuchmism?” in the main cities of Ukraine. The posters directed viewers to a website where “Kuchmism” was described as authoritarian rule, corruption, lack of liberty, and lack of economic prosperity – all of which were attributable to President Kuchma and his corrupt collaborators. This group developed into a new NGO, Opora, after Yushchenko’s election.

Just as the Orange Revolution is related to the color revolutions movement, it is possible to consider PORA as one of the “color organizations” that were behind the massive mobilization of people in recent years. The protest movements in the former communist bloc since 2000 have in common the adoption of Gene Sharp’s ideology and formation of a strategy based on his non-violent action methods. Additionally, they all employ a short easy-to-remember name, use humor and satire to discredit the regime, and massive distribution of gadgets, posters, strips, badges, and flags, all of a bright color to better attract public awareness. PORA had well-established ties with the organizations that facilitated these similar movements. It was connected to the OK in Slovakia that was instrumental in marginalizing Prime Minister Mečiar in the 1998 elections; to the Serbian organization Otpor, which played a major role in demanding the dismissal of President Slobodan Milošević; and the organization Kmara which aided the opposition in demanding the resignation of Georgian president Edvard Shevarnadze in December 2003.

Activists from these various organizations were networked within the NGO milieu and the political opposition of several Eastern European countries. They shared their experience, technology, and forces to train the Ukrainian opposition in anticipation of an occasion for mass uprising. The 2004 elections provided the perfect conditions for a society-wide challenge to the status quo: a weakened president, a compact opposition agreeing to put aside ideological differences and support a single candidate, a popular opposition candidate, well-trained social activists, and a receptive and active population that exceeded the most optimistic expectations.

The strategy followed in the Orange Revolution resembled that of the other colored revolutions. Two civic campaigns, one positive the other negative, raised citizen awareness of the issues. The positive campaign aimed to maximize

voter turnout, while the negative campaign sought to discredit the regime by exposing its corrupt practices. These goals were achieved by holding meetings, setting up an information hotline, and opening new channels for communication. This twofold approach raised civic and political activism in Ukraine to unprecedented levels, galvanizing hundreds of thousands of people.

To give legitimacy to the protests and foster people’s anger against the regime, a parallel vote counting was arranged for the second round election. The results of the independent vote provided legal evidence to support the protesters’ declaration that the election was invalid. Once people occupied the capital, protests were organized peacefully but tenaciously, with the explicit message “we will not go away until we get what we want.” A huge stage was set up in Maidan nezaleshnosti (Independence Square) for artistic performances and political announcements that maintained high spirits among the gathered crowd – many of whom spent day and night in the street with sub-zero temperatures. Mass strikes around the country combined with city rallies of overwhelming numbers prevented repression by the authorities. As in the “Ukraine without Kuchma” movements, evidence of popular support for President Yushchenko drew international attention to the protests and prompted the EU, led by Poland and Latvia, to take part in the negotiation process.

A striking feature of the protests was the massive use of the Internet to circulate information. The Internet was an effective vehicle for activists in the face of state monopolization of traditional media in Ukraine. Only one TV channel, 5 kanal, was a source of unbiased information and it was unable to broadcast over the whole Ukrainian territory. Independent news sources moved from print to the web to avoid government pressure. The Internet was a primary means of communication and its importance grew throughout the protests. Portals like www.maidan.org.ua, where live updates from Kiev were available, inspired hundreds of new websites.

One of the main innovations of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine relative to previous protest movements was the introduction of humor to circulate the message. Members of the regime were ridiculed through computer games, cartoons, songs, and re-synchronized films. In one example, when presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich was knocked out by an egg thrown by a student

in Ivano Frankivsk (Western Ukraine) a satirical website “veseli yaytsya” (merry eggs) was created and the “egg” became a leitmotif of the movement on the web. Thousands of employees spending their workdays in front of a PC had the opportunity to liquidate Viktor Yanukovich and his bodyguards by throwing eggs at them, or watch parts of soviet classic films transformed into parodies of political meetings between Yanukovich and his Cabinet of Ministers. Webpostings of old Soviet songs reinterpreted to comment on the current political situation in Ukrainian also entertained people and raised their awareness of the authoritarian character of Kuchma’s regime.

Finally, unity was a decisive element of the protests. Feeling themselves to be part of an immense engine gave the protestors the motivation to withstand the freezing cold and continue striking. Wearing orange or possessing orange gadgets became an expression of this solidarity.

The Orange Revolution brought about significant political, institutional, and social change. The second round of the presidential elections was repeated, and Viktor Yushchenko was elected president of Ukraine on December 26, 2004 with 51.99 percent of votes against 44.2 percent for Yanukovich. Although they committed some major political mistakes, Yushchenko and his team began a number of democratizing reforms: presidential dominance in politics was curtailed, and measures to address corruption and establish a free media were put in place. Political activism increased throughout the country; Black PORA developed into a civic NGO, while Yellow PORA founded a political party that would prompt a new generation of Ukrainians to enter politics. However, it did not win any seats at the 2006 elections.

At an institutional level the main consequence of November 2004 was the transformation of Ukraine from a presidential system into a parliamentary republic. Additionally, changes in electoral law to support the institutionalization of political parties and increase representation by requiring candidates to be nominated by a political party were introduced in 2006.

Perhaps the most striking change in Ukraine, however, is evident at the social level. Ukrainians showed an unprecedented interest in politics during the presidential campaign and participated collectively in the political events of their country, whether their support had been for the existing

regime or for the opposition. Despite the enormous pressure on media and individual activists, Ukrainians lost their fear of the authorities and learned to express their opinions, overcoming the self-censorship that plagues many post-Soviet societies. Furthermore, the collective nature of the protests increased the civic consciousness of Ukrainians and as a result self-conscious civic engagement and civic initiatives significantly increased after November 2004. Finally, Ukrainian unity as a civic nation was boosted despite the persistence of regional polarization in the country. The citizens of Ukraine in 2004 were for or against the protests, but the quasi-totality of them were for Ukraine – a significant achievement in a country where according to the 2001 census Russians account for 17.3 percent of the population.

SEE ALSO: Color Revolutions; Non-Violent Revolutions; Serbian Revolution of October 2000; Sharp, Gene (b. 1928); Soviet Union, Fall of; Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan

References and Suggested Readings

- Aslund, A. & McFaul, M. (Eds.) (2006) *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Kuzio, T. (2009) *Democratic Revolution in Ukraine: From Kuchmagate to Orange Revolution*. New York: Routledge.
- Wilson, A. (2005) *Ukraine’s Orange Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

UNAM Strike, 2000, and Mexican student movement

Leticia Pacheco Espejel

The student movement of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) from 1999 and 2000 was sparked when university rector Francisco Barnés de Castro announced various reforms that included increasing tuition fees from US\$25 to about US\$150 and the elimination of the *pase automatico*, which had allowed aspirants to enter the university automatically after completing preparatory exams for the College of Science and Humanities (Colegios de Ciencias y Humanidades) (CCH) without additional entrance examinations.

In March 1999 students organized a general university consultation at the University Students Assembly (AEU) about students' opinions concerning the imposed reforms: 90 percent of the students rejected the reforms. The students took two decisions. One was the transformation of the AEU into a General Strike Council (Consejo General de Huelga) (CGH) and the second was to establish an indefinite cessation of the university's laboratories. The strike began on April 20 with the following demands: abolition of the general regulation of payment; an end to repression (intimidation by the federal police and by the so-called *porros* – a group of thugs); the restoration of lost class hours; an open discussion about the future of the UNAM.

The CGH was ignored as interlocutor by Rector Barnés de Castro and he declared the students' strike illegal. The months between April and November witnessed numerous protest activities and the students organized various marches. Other universities, independent syndicates, parents, and intellectuals throughout the country protested in solidarity with them. At the same time, opponents of the strike organized a continuation of university lectures off-campus (*clases extramuros*) which made dialogue impossible. Strikers continued to be intimidated. The authorities tried to break the strike with violence and the escalation of this conflict caused students and professors to call for the resignation of Barnés de Castro. On November 13, 1999 Barnés de Castro resigned, which was a huge triumph for the students' movement. Students demanded that the new rector, Juan Ramón de la Fuente, accept the CGH as an intermediary and liberate detained students. The new rector stated publicly that dialogue could only take place if all installations of the university were handed back to the authorities without any preconditions.

In January 2000 the CGH was split when the strikers of CCH-Naucalpan handed over installations without consulting the CGH. At the same time, Juan Ramón de la Fuente called for the Federal Preventive Police (PFP) on the pretext that they should observe the handover of installations to UNAM. University authorities declared the termination of the strike whereas the CGH kept on insisting on the continuation of dialogue. In February 2000 the PFP violently entered the installations of UNAM and arrested 1,000 students. About 400 were convicted and imprisoned. The declarations of the detained

students demonstrated innumerable violations of their human rights. The decision to bring the PFP to the campus was made by the Executive with President Ernesto Zedillo.

SEE ALSO: Oaxaca Uprising, 2006; Student Movements; Student Movements, Global South; Student Movements, Korea; Tlatelolco 1968 and the Mexican Student Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Aranda, S. J. M. (2001) *Un movimiento estudiantil contra el neoliberalismo: UNAM 1999–2000*. México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
- Preston, J. & Dillon, S. (2005) *Opening Mexico: The Making of a Democracy*. New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux.

Unemployed protests

Alex Zukas

It is impossible to comprehend fully the course and long-range impact of the Great Depression in the major capitalist countries of the world (Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States) without first understanding the mass protests of unemployed workers in the 1930s. Their protests form an indispensable element of the histories of class struggle, the working class, and modern notions of citizenship and the welfare state. They also form an indispensable background to the German elites' invitation to the Nazis to join them in the halls of power, with all of its terrible consequences.

While most histories of the Great Depression assume that the majority of the unemployed passively accepted their fate, and there is evidence to support this view, the repeated mass protests of many of the jobless were central to the short-term and immediate alleviation of their suffering as well as the medium-term development of the labor movement and the long-term expansion of the welfare state. Movements of the unemployed in the 1930s asserted the rights of the unemployed as citizens to certain levels of support when they were out of paid employment, and in so doing renegotiated boundaries of social acceptability. The cry heard at almost every unemployed demonstration in the major capitalist countries was a version of "work or full maintenance." That slogan unsettled old associations between relief payments and malingering,

feckless, undeserving paupers who shirked work. The goal was to remove the stigma attached to applying for relief (“a handout”) during an era of mass unemployment, when the idea that poverty was an individual and moral failing rather than a result of systemic economic failure was hard to uphold. As part of a larger cultural shift, workers began viewing unemployment relief as a right and a matter of public discussion, not a discretionary fund of government bodies, and in the process developed an expansive conception of citizens’ rights. This discussion focuses on Britain, France, Germany, and the US because they were the world’s leading capitalist industrial nations and they led the world in recorded unemployment: some 10.5 million of the world’s estimated 30 million unemployed in 1932 lived in continental Europe (with Germany alone having six million registered unemployed) while about 15 million unemployed lived in the US.

Background

When Wall Street crashed in October 1929 and initiated the Great Depression, few nations had unemployment insurance for workers. Most industrialized countries experienced a boom in the 1920s and industrial unemployment before World War I was slight. Under these circumstances, it was commonly believed in prewar Europe and the United States that anyone who really wanted a job could find one. In Germany, for instance, average unemployment in the decade before 1914 was 2.6 percent. The situation in the US, France, and Britain was similar. After World War I, these industrial countries took separate paths. In Britain unemployment was chronic and never went below one million persons at any time between 1920 and 1929, averaging above 8 percent for that period. In Germany unemployment averaged 4.2 percent from 1919 to 1923 and 13.7 percent from 1924 to 1929.

The US and France experienced some unemployment during postwar demobilization but, unlike Britain and Germany, the US and France had no problem of continuous mass unemployment in the 1920s. In fact, the 1920s was a period of labor shortage in France despite three acute recessions. Partly because of very strong labor movements and partly because of rising labor unrest which fed elite fears of working-class insurrection as postwar revolutions swept

Europe, the German and British governments established emergency relief as a step toward general unemployment insurance. On November 13, 1918, at the start of the German Revolution, the German state instituted a nationwide emergency relief system to be administered by municipalities, while the British state not only distributed emergency relief to demobilizing soldiers, some of it administered by the local Poor Law Guardians, but in 1920 it greatly expanded the very limited national compulsory unemployment insurance plan of 1911.

Under trade union pressure in the face of chronic unemployment, a similar compulsory unemployment insurance system, financed by contributions of employees and employers, finally came to Germany in 1927. France followed the Ghent system, a form of non-contributory, voluntary, departmental or communal (i.e., local government) unemployment funds subsidized by the central government. Coverage was slight and did little to help the jobless. At the start of the Depression only 10 percent of the French working class were in a union and only 4 percent had collective bargaining agreements. The balance of class power did not support improvements to the unemployment relief system in France.

Similarly, due to the relative weakness of the labor movement in the US, and the hostility of American business to the British model of unemployment insurance as an unnecessary intrusion and a socialist menace, there was no national unemployment insurance or relief system and the jobless had to turn to municipal relief (administered punitively much like the Poor Law in Britain, to discourage vagrancy) or private charities for support. In addition, conservative labor leaders like Samuel Gompers (1850–1924) of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) contemptuously believed that unemployment insurance was a “dole.” As a consequence, provision for unemployed workers in the US before 1933 remained local, inadequate, and punitive.

Germany’s highly developed unemployment insurance system with relatively good levels of support was introduced just two years before the Depression started but it was never meant to provide long-term benefits: it provided 35 percent of weekly average earnings for 26 weeks. After that, the unemployed had to apply for crisis relief or means-tested municipal relief. Since German unemployment insurance was the

most generous of its day, one can easily grasp how the loss of a job during the Depression, even when new employment could be found, usually meant a future of economic hardship, deskilling, and insecurity, while long periods of unemployment led to complete impoverishment. The often humiliating experience of qualifying for relief was coupled with the discouraging and increasingly useless search for work in key sectors of the economy.

In all of the industrialized countries, unemployment was concentrated in staple industries (coal, iron, steel, and shipbuilding), large cities, rural mining communities, textile centers, and port cities. In the US the heartland of unemployment stretched in a large crescent from Boston in the northeast to Milwaukee and Minneapolis in the west through Pittsburgh, West Virginia, and Chicago. Almost all major ports also experienced high levels of unemployment.

In Germany unemployment was concentrated in industrial and port towns like Rostock, Hamburg, Bremen, Cologne, and Düsseldorf, but also in major industrial districts like the Ruhr and the Rhineland in the west, Saxony Thuringia in central Germany, Greater Berlin, and most large German cities. Likewise, the major industrial regions of France had the greatest unemployment (17 out of 61 departments contained nine-tenths of all unemployed workers in France). They were the Paris basin, Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Lorraine, Lyons-St. Etienne (Rhône), Loire-Inférieure (Saint-Nazaire, Nantes), and Seine-Inférieure (Rouen, Le Havre). French industry was fairly dispersed compared to other industrialized nations but it formed a crescent through the northern and eastern parts of the country. In Britain, deep recession in coal, iron, steel, shipbuilding, and textiles concentrated unemployment in Scotland, South Wales, northeast England, Coventry, and Lancashire.

A major hurdle in comparing the impact of the Great Depression across national boundaries involved the way governments of different nations gathered official unemployment data. In France the government used data collected by trade unions and unemployment exchanges, while in Germany and Britain the numbers came from people applying for compulsory unemployment insurance benefits. As a result, the reliability and scope of the numbers varied, preventing sound comparisons and, in addition, the statistics did not address the problem of "hidden unemploy-

ment," those workers who wanted work but were discouraged from registering at labor exchanges or who were no longer eligible for benefits and so stopped reporting at unemployment offices. In Germany (as in Britain), domestic help and farm laborers were excluded from unemployment insurance; estimates of hidden unemployment in Germany ran between 20 and 40 percent of statistically visible unemployment, or roughly two million additional people, in 1932.

Nevertheless, keeping these caveats in mind, some general trends stand out in the historical scholarship on the Great Depression. The economic crisis of the Great Depression was more acute in the US than in Britain and Germany and it was more chronic in Britain than elsewhere. Between 1929 and 1932 industrial production fell in Britain by 9.3 percent, in Germany by 11.6 percent, and in the US by a massive 44.8 percent. Statistics give some picture of the scale of the economic crisis in the US: from 1929 to 1932 employment fell from 14.3 million to 8.8 million in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and building. Most estimates of the level of unemployment in the US are less reliable than employment or production statistics until 1935 when the Social Security Act allowed better data gathering on unemployment. Estimates of unemployment in the US ranged from 13 to 18 million by late 1932 or early 1933, with perhaps one-third of the labor force out of work by 1933. Germany had six million officially unemployed workers at the height of the Depression, February–March 1932, or over 30 percent of its workforce. In the peak year of 1932 British unemployment reached 3.4 million (17 percent of its workforce). The Depression arrived later in France, in 1931, and unemployment appeared to peak in 1936.

National averages hid important regional variations. In November 1934, unemployment in Britain stood at 17 percent but it was 35 percent in the so-called "Distressed Areas" (i.e., Scotland, South Wales, northeast England, and Lancashire). Long-term unemployment was a major problem in all of these areas. In France, Paris's industrial suburbs suffered tremendous unemployment as did Nord and Pas-de-Calais, the Seine estuary (Rouen), Lorraine, the Rhône and Loire regions, and seaports like Nantes and Saint-Nazaire. In Germany, the Ruhr had around a 40 percent unemployment rate, and it was over 50 percent in mining; Saxony and Thuringia

neared 40 percent while Greater Berlin was not far behind. In the US, the northeast (New England, New York, Pennsylvania) and the midwest (Ohio through Minnesota) were hardest hit, as were mining areas in West Virginia and textile towns in North Carolina. Not surprisingly, it was these areas that would spawn the most powerful and sustained unemployed protests during the Great Depression.

Any change to government support was one of the main spurs to unemployed action since those changes would worsen an already dire standard of living. Faced with rising deficits, governments usually reduced expenditure on unemployment by administrative measures that disqualified individuals or cut their benefits. The two main administrative measures that disqualified individuals were the means test and the "genuinely-seeking-work" test. The means test became a much-hated symbol of the coarse treatment of the unemployed by authorities in the 1930s because it assessed household income and resources such as savings, furniture, and parental or youth employment. It involved an assessor coming to one's home, poking into every corner, and tallying up a family's meager resources, usually on a monthly basis, to make sure the household qualified for welfare. The genuinely-seeking-work test involved the jobless reporting to a labor exchange for work even when the likelihood of a job being posted was slim or non-existent. In addition, governments faced with rising deficits simply cut overall benefits.

In July 1930 the new chancellor of a minority government, Heinrich Brüning (1885–1970), had the president of Germany sign emergency decrees that reduced insurance benefits and raised contributions to 6.5 percent of wages. Subsequent decrees in June 1931 and June 1932 cut benefits for unemployment insurance and relief even further. While still substantial, given the paltry sums dispensed by unemployment support of all kinds, the British unemployed suffered less severe cuts to their living standards. Both Germany and Britain introduced means tests in the early 1930s but Brüning's decrees reduced benefit by 40 percent whereas British cuts under the National Government after October 1931 reduced benefit by 10 percent.

While mortality (death) rates did not increase much during the Great Depression in the US, France, Britain, or Germany, morbidity (disease) rates did. The most common diseases were

tuberculosis, rickets, and catarrh in adolescents and adults, rickets in children, skull-softening in infants, and a decline in general immunity due to increased malnutrition, especially among children. Part of the explanation for the rise in morbidity concerned the worsening provision for the jobless. To take Germany, which had the best levels of support in 1929, 52 percent of jobless workers were drawing insurance benefits, 17 percent municipal relief, 17 percent national emergency relief, and 14 percent no relief in January 1931.

By the end of 1931, only 11 percent received insurance payments and the remainder subsisted on very meager means-tested emergency or municipal relief or drew no relief at all. By all contemporary reports from the US, Britain, Germany, and France, as the Depression deepened after 1929 the unemployed experienced their enforced idleness as an affront to their personal dignity, a threat to their family's cohesion, a risk to their and their loved ones' health, and an inducement to crime, migration, and/or suicide. When the unemployed had had enough, when conditions were right, they took to the streets to make their voices and concerns heard.

Protests

There was no simple formula that turned increasing unemployment into radical protest. The American and European unemployed moved between despair and anger, apathy and action, quiescence and insurrection, and there are many clues that help clarify the dialectic of unemployed protest. The ideological foundation of unemployed protests was that the unemployed suffered from a predicament that was not of their own making. They did not control the business cycle and they were *involuntarily* idle. In many respects, unemployed protest and the demand for adequate government support were a call for recognition and respect. In addition, protest offered collective endeavors to unemployed workers for whom suicide was both a temptation and a far too common option given that long-term unemployment could result in feelings of insecurity, worthlessness, inferiority, and anxiety, leading to social isolation and withdrawal.

The year 1932, that of greatest unemployment, was also the peak year for suicides across Europe and the US. While many unemployed protests were spontaneous affairs in late 1929 and early

1930 in the US and Europe, they soon became a chief activity of unemployed organizations, called “unemployed councils” in Britain, France, and the US and “unemployed committees” in Germany. Communists figured prominently in the majority of these organizations although socialists in Britain, France, and the US and anarchists in France also created unemployed organizations, usually in response to already existing communist councils.

One reason why communists were so prominent in unemployed organizations had to do with the fact that with the onset of the Depression the Communist International (Comintern) exhorted communists throughout the world to build unemployed movements as part of its Third Period strategy of “class against class.” In 1928 the Comintern had concluded that the capitalist world was entering a Third Period of crisis characterized by ascending revolutionary class struggles that would overthrow capitalism. These predictions coincided with the beginnings of worldwide depression and the elemental anger of those thrown out of work, but the prospects for building an unemployed protest movement varied greatly: for instance, not only did the Depression come earlier and harder to Germany than it did to Britain or France, but the German Communist Party (KPD) with 350,000 members at the end of 1932 was the only mass Communist Party in the industrial capitalist world. Other parties were tiny in comparison: the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) could claim around 6,000 members, the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) around 26,000, and the Communist Party of France (PCF) around 30,000.

Unemployed organizations were generally not spontaneous creations in any of these countries but were formed through tireless and often frustrating activism in the Third Period (1928–1934). The unemployed were notoriously difficult to organize and to keep organized due to the poverty, despair, and transitory nature of unemployment. Finding even a temporary or part-time job would cause workers to leave the movement and interrupt organizing.

A few factors helped organizers: mass unemployment was concentrated in certain regions; in many of these regions socialist or communist parties and unions had a strong presence; as a result, many unemployed had a background of party or trade union radicalism and activism,

especially in mining, metallurgy, engineering, and longshoring, and could help the movement; finally, party and union resources could provide material support to unemployed organizations whose members paid minimal dues or none at all. If concentration of unemployed workers was a necessary precondition to protest, systems of relief, changes in qualifications or relief payments, community cohesion, and strong leadership could help activists transcend difficulties in organizing the unemployed. Close relationship with another working-class organization, a party or union, was essential to the success of unemployed movements. Political militants also seem essential to the development of unemployed movements. In the US, for instance, activists from the Socialist Party, the Industrial Workers of the World, the Trotskyist Socialist Workers’ Party, and the Marxist Musteites organized unemployed either in opposition to communist activists or where communists were not present in large numbers. Unlike in the US, in France, Britain, and Germany, rival organizations of non-communist activists were very short-lived. In all cases, where activists were not present, unemployed movements never got off the ground.

The strength of unemployed protests, organized and led mainly by communists, varied from country to country, partly because the scale, severity, and persistence of joblessness varied considerably, as did the psychological dimension of unemployment, the social welfare net, the strength of trade unions and working-class parties, the changing tactics of activists, and the response of authorities. It should be said that non-communist reformist working-class parties and unions in Britain, France, Germany, and the US were at best indifferent and usually hostile to the prospect of unemployed protest (Welsh unions were the major exception), while the mainstream capitalist press in all these countries was unremittingly hostile. Unemployed councils and committees in these countries organized demonstrations, hunger marches, relief work strikes, school student strikes, occupations of city halls, and other forms of collective action and public protest.

The National Unemployed Workers’ Movement (NUWM) in Britain was the most cohesive, successful, and long-lasting unemployed workers’ organization of the period, thanks to communist activists Walter Hannington (1896–1966) and Harry McShane (1891–1988), who showed a

great deal of independence from CPGB directives. Headquartered in London, the NUWM took an activist approach to unemployed problems and always stressed that if the unemployed organized themselves and acted they could improve their lot and not be passive victims of fate. Founded in 1921 and finally disbanded in 1946, it organized successful national hunger marches in 1922, 1929, 1930, 1932, 1934, and 1936 (almost all of which began in Scotland and ended in London), but its activities, like those of all unemployed movements, were wider than that: it led numerous local protests against relief cuts, physically prevented evictions, won rent reductions, played a role in preventing strike-breaking, and advised and represented the unemployed in appeals tribunals. It participated in over 2,000 individual appeals to rescind cuts and was successful in about a third of the cases.

While unemployed organizations in France, Germany, and the US advised the unemployed of their rights, they were never granted the legal right of representation that the NUWM won in Britain as a "union of the unemployed." Major unemployed protests and hunger marches occurred in Britain between 1931 and 1936, especially in the Distressed Areas, usually in response to government cuts in benefits, application of means tests, and changes in eligibility. Local authorities who administered relief were very susceptible to mass pressure at city hall. For instance, locally run Public Assistance Committees (PACs) faced fierce local opposition to the means test and benefit cuts in late 1932. While large demonstrations rocked Rochdale, Glasgow, and Bristol in the spring of 1932, unemployed uprisings occurred in Dundee, Newcastle, Liverpool, Birkenhead, and Belfast in the fall of 1932 and gained significant concessions from the city councils to raise relief scales, give more money for public works, and soften the means test.

Thanks to its well integrated nationwide network, the NUWM also had success pressuring national governments to alter policy, something few other unemployed movements achieved. The high point of unemployed protests in Britain occurred in response to the Unemployment Assistance Board's (UAB) attempt in January 1935 to implement new scales which lowered unemployed payments. The size and fury of unemployed protests (for example, 300,000 people demonstrated across South Wales on

February 3) led to the Standstill Act of February 1935 which allowed payment at UAB or PAC scales, whichever was greater. Unemployed militancy may have contributed to the Labour Party's and the CPGB's partial recovery at the polls in the 1935 election but it did not prevent huge defeats in 1931. The campaign against the UAB was the high point of unemployed activity in Britain and extracted a major policy reversal by militant means. The fall of 1936 saw the last significant phase of unemployed protest in Britain and once again the NUWM mobilized the unemployed against the national UAB scales. With the national hunger march of October–November 1936 the NUWM achieved broad working-class unity involving left-wing national Labour Party members as well as the Welsh miners' union, the Welsh Labour Party, and the Welsh Trades Union Congress. The march ended with the customary mass demonstrations in London (250,000 people) and the government postponed introducing the new scales. They were only fully implemented nationwide in May 1938 when the NUWM was in decline. In fact, the decline in NUWM membership and activism began soon after the 1936 hunger march.

While many historians attribute this decline to difficulties in sustaining a movement based on unemployed workers because of the "natural" apathy and resignation of the unemployed, such an explanation is not persuasive. Historians have estimated that about one million people passed through the ranks of the NUWM from 1921 to 1939. As would be expected, annual membership fluctuated: the NUWM had 40,000 dues-paying members in 1932 and claimed 100,000 members in early 1933. Beyond these numbers, the NUWM was able to mobilize hundreds of thousands of protestors when the British working-class movement as a whole was at its nadir in the early years of the Depression, and succeeded in getting cuts restored and benefits increased. A more satisfactory explanation would regard the timing of the NUWM's decline as the outcome of a gradual return of economic growth to Britain due to rearmament which boosted employment, and, ironically, the result of the very success of the NUWM in gaining concessions which took some of the ragged edge off being unemployed. Back in work, NUWM activists turned their energies to rebuilding the union movement in Britain at the end of the 1930s.

Unlike Britain, one cannot speak of a coherent national unemployed movement in France. There were no national hunger marches and there was no NUWM. National direction came from the Parisian unemployed movement or the communist trade union federation, the CGTU. Because the Depression and mass unemployment struck France late, the upsurge in unemployed activity occurred in the mid-1930s, but Paris, like London, was fairly active throughout the Depression. Upsurges in unemployed protests and activism occurred from 1931 to 1932 and from 1934 to 1935. The PCF tried to launch a national unemployed movement from its Parisian stronghold in the early 1930s, and combined neighborhood protests with regional days of action and demonstrations at the Chamber of Deputies on November 12, 1931 and January 12, 1932, but the movement did not live up to the leaders' expectations.

Organizing the Parisian unemployed coincided with the first upswing in unemployment in France, much of which was concentrated in the Paris basin, and despite the sectarian hostility to the rest of the left, unemployed committees attracted numerous unemployed into their ranks and mobilized substantial numbers of protestors. The Parisian movement declined after 1932 but regional unemployed movements arose in Saint-Etienne, Rouen, Nord, Valence, Limoges, and Lyons. The most famous episode of French unemployed protest was the Lille to Paris hunger march in late 1933. The marchers had a successful entry into Paris on December 2, 1933 and inspired activists to see new possibilities and prospects of struggle. A new phase of militancy followed the Lille to Paris hunger march, with two months of turmoil in Calais starting on January 5, 1934.

The events in Calais inspired and anticipated militancy elsewhere, with widespread demonstrations, hunger marches, relief workers' strikes, and occupations of mayors' offices. In 1935, early in the Comintern's Popular Front period (1934–9), there was heightened unemployed activity with hunger marches in the Ardennes, Brittany, the Somme, and Rouen which fused with anti-fascist protests. In contrast to Britain, unemployed organization and protests greatly aided the electoral fortunes of the PCF. The period of the greatest unemployed activity (1934–1935) preceded significant electoral gains for the PCF in municipal (1935) and national (1936) elections, and party and union membership was growing

as well. PCF wins in municipal elections created advantages for local unemployed movements and improved the social provision for the unemployed who resided in "red" cities. As in Britain, however, success and mild economic recovery also meant the decline of unemployed organization and protest as former unemployed activists joined the workplace struggles that swept France in great waves from 1936 to 1938. Finally, momentum died when the PCF abandoned its demand for radical action by the unemployed in support of the Popular Front government (1936–7).

The German unemployed movement fitted somewhere between the British and the French. While there were no successful national hunger marches and there was no NUWM in Germany, there was a National Committee for Unemployed Committees which oversaw regional efforts and coordinated activities through the Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition (RGO). In Germany, the unemployed movement was treated as part of a trade union movement and the RGO was quite successful in preventing unemployed workers from becoming strike-breakers.

Unlike Britain and France, the vast majority of Communist Party members (over 90 percent) were unemployed, so the movement had a highly motivated and fairly well trained cadre despite incessant turnover. The KPD also took much more seriously the "class against class" line of the Comintern and took the class struggle to the streets every chance it could. Unemployed struggle and protest had greater intensity in Germany from 1930 to 1932 largely because unemployment was a much more catastrophic experience there and the KPD was much larger than the CPGB or the PCF and constantly exhorted the unemployed to fight for their right to adequate support in the face of a capitalist economic crisis. Regional demonstrations and hunger marches where militant unemployed clashed with police were common in almost all urban areas of Germany from January 1930 to November 1932. The largest regional hunger marches and demonstrations occurred routinely in Bremen, Hamburg, Berlin, the Ruhr, the lower Rhineland, Saxony, Silesia, and most large industrial cities.

German unemployed protests tended to anticipate or follow emergency decrees that cut benefits and restricted eligibility, so May through July 1930, May through October 1931, and May

through November 1932 were periods of intense mobilization and protest. Unlike in Britain or France, the harsh winters were a period of relative quiet. The RGO estimated that there were 1,500 unemployed committees with 80,000 members in the summer of 1931 and 15 newspapers with a circulation of 485,000. Given the increase in activism, the figures would likely be higher for 1932 and the unemployed committees' influence reached far beyond their members. Besides organizing jobless protests against benefit cuts and strikes by municipal relief workers, the committees engaged in anti-eviction fights and campaigns for emergency provision of coal and food. The unemployed achieved notable victories in these struggles by resisting and reversing cuts in benefits and obtaining back pay for dismissed relief workers in the Ruhr, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Offenbach, Chemnitz, Hamburg, Bremen, and Berlin. As more unemployed were pushed onto local poor relief and off national insurance as the Depression continued, the communists had far more success pressuring local authorities to accede to unemployed demands than they ever did at the national level. Unemployed activism brought the party a measure of success by late 1932: it trebled its membership and won six million votes for the national parliament (17 percent of the total vote).

Due in large part to unemployed activism, Germany faced urban civil war by the end of 1932 and the fear of the elites that anarchy and communism would soon follow induced them to offer the position of prime minister to Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) whose Storm Troopers (SA) had some support among the unemployed. The SA almost never organized protests of the unemployed against rate cuts or better support levels but instead ran a private political charity for the unemployed with soup kitchens, housing, indoctrination, and uniforms, which served to integrate some unemployed into the Nazi movement. Hitler swiftly instigated class war from above and violently suppressed all workers' organizations, including the KPD and the communist unemployed workers' movement. It was not how the KPD thought that "class against class" would end but, interestingly, the Nazis' public relief works projects were no better liked by the unemployed than those of Weimar: police reports from the mid-1930s ascertained that autobahn construction sites were hotbeds of communist sedition.

As in Europe, successful unemployed protests in the US occurred in regions with high levels of industrialization, heavy clusters of unemployment, and high concentrations of political activists with good organizing skills. In the US non-communist groups were more significant to unemployed protest than in Britain, France, or Germany but the CPUSA was nevertheless the first to organize the unemployed in 1930, mainly because other left parties had not made it a political priority. The CPUSA organized marches and formed local unemployed councils in early 1930 and organized demonstrations with thousands of participants outside city halls in the northeast and midwest, along the Pacific coast, and in larger cities in the south, for the next two years. Many were peaceful demonstrations but others ended in sharp conflict with police.

In July 1930 a national conference of Unemployed Councils held in Chicago with 1,300 delegates made demands that were national in scope, demanding emergency relief, and organizing a petition campaign for a "Workers' Unemployment Insurance Bill" (an idea the AFL only endorsed years later), and hunger marches. The petition soon gained 1.5 million signatures. The councils staged national hunger marches in December 1931 and December 1932 when unemployed workers converged on Washington, DC from across the country to make their demands to Congress and the president, but in general local relief agencies were the targets of agitation. The purely local and often arbitrary criteria for judging need generated a sense of injustice that resulted in unemployed sit-ins, pickets, and demonstrations which often brought concessions (for example, the restoration of cuts by relief agencies in Atlanta and Chicago in 1932). The actions of the unemployed certainly shaped the national mood for Franklin Roosevelt's (1882–1945) landslide electoral victory in 1932 and subsequent administration of federal emergency relief.

After 1932, communist efforts languished while the Socialist Party and the Musteites, identified with socialist Abraham Muste (1885–1967), organized the unemployed with some success. The most important non-communist organizations of the jobless were the Unemployed Leagues created by local chapters of the Socialist Party in 1931 and later. At first they emphasized self-help but as unemployment grew they adopted more militant tactics, fought evictions, and protested

at relief agencies against cuts. The leagues were especially active in industrial towns in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Indiana as well as in Chicago and New York City. Musteite councils were active in Seattle, Pittsburgh, Ohio, western Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and the textile towns of North Carolina, with their strongest base in Ohio and Pennsylvania.

In 1936 all three strands joined to form the Workers' Alliance of America (WAA), but, once again, success meant the slow erosion of unemployed protest and organizing. The New Deal, in the form of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Social Security, and New Deal public works, was a response to the unemployed protests of the early 1930s for a coherent and fair system of relief. Responding to unemployed militancy, New Deal relief institutions adopted approaches reminiscent of British practices with complaint procedures and rights to representation and appeal; consequently, conflict became institutionalized, channeled and sparked less public outrage. The Works Progress Administration recognized the WAA as the legitimate representative of relief workers and negotiated with it, giving it a status much like that of the NUMW in Britain, but only with regard to relief workers. Their bitterest complaints seem to have been heard and, as a result, some unemployed activists became enthusiastic supporters of the New Deal. Perhaps mirroring the turn from the Third Period to the Popular Front, the unemployed movement in the US became less insurrectionary and mirrored trade union practices, while at the same time many unemployed activists went back to work and organized in the Congress of Industrial Organizations after 1935 and took many of the unemployed movement's tactics with them into the mines and factories.

SEE ALSO: Agitprop; Bolsheviks; Britain, Strikes, 1905–1926; Britain, Trade Union Movement; Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA); Confédération Générale du Travail and Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire; Food Riots; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 20th Century; Marxism; Socialism; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); US Labor Rebellions and the Rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)

References and Suggested Readings

Bagguley, P. (1991) *From Protest to Acquiescence? Political Movements of the Unemployed*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Bahne, S. (1981) Die Erwerbslosenpolitik der KPD in der Weimarer Republik (KPD Policy toward the Unemployed in the Weimar Republic). In H. Mommsen & W. Schulze (Eds.), *Vom Elend der Handarbeit: Probleme historischer Unterschichtenforschung (On the Misery of Manual Labor: Problems of Historical Research regarding the Lower Classes)*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Crew, D. F. (1998) *Germans on Welfare: From Weimar to Hitler*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Croucher, R. (1987) *We Refuse to Starve in Silence: A History of the National Unemployed Workers' Movement*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Croucher, R. (1990) Communist Unemployed Organisations between the World Wars: International Patterns and Problems. *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, pp. 584–98.
- Folsom, F. (1991) *Impatient Armies of the Poor: The Story of Collective Action of the Unemployed, 1808–1942*. Boulder: University of Colorado Press.
- Garraty, J. A. (1978) *Unemployment in History: Economic Thought and Public Policy*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Huber-Koller, R.-M. (1977) Die kommunistische Erwerbslosenbewegung in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik (The Communist Unemployed Movement during the Late Weimar Republic). In *Gesellschaft: Beiträge zur Marxschen Theorie 10 (Society: Contributions to Marxist Theory 10)*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Kingsford, P. (1982) *The Hunger Marchers in Britain, 1920–1939*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Leab, D. (1967) United We Eat: The Creation and Organization of the Unemployed Councils in 1930. *Labor History* 8: 300–15.
- Lorence, J. J. (1996) *Organizing the Unemployed: Community and Union Activists in the Industrial Heartland*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- MacDougall, I. (Ed.) (1991) *Voices from the Hunger Marches*. London: Polygon.
- McElligott, A. (1987) Mobilising the Unemployed: The KPD and the Unemployed Workers' Movement in Hamburg-Altona during the Weimar Republic. In R. J. Evans & D. Geary (Eds.), *The German Unemployed: Experiences and Consequences of Mass Unemployment from the Weimar Republic to the Third Reich*. London: Croom Helm.
- Perry, M. (2000) *Bread and Work: Social Policy and the Experience of Unemployment, 1918–39*. London: Pluto Press.
- Piven, F. F. & Cloward, R. (1978) *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New York: Vintage.
- Rosenhaft, E. (1983) *Beating the Fascists? The German Communists and Political Violence, 1929–1933*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rosenzweig, R. (1983) Organizing the Unemployed: The Early Years of the Great Depression. In

- J. R. Green (Ed.), *Workers' Struggles, Past and Present: A "Radical America" Reader*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Schöck, E.-C. (1977) *Arbeitslosigkeit und Rationalisierung: Die Lage der Arbeiter und die kommunistische Gewerkschaftspolitik 1920–28 (Unemployment and Rationalization: The Situation of the Workers and Communist Trade Union Politics 1920–28)*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
- Stevenson, J. & Cook, C. (1994) *Britain in Depression: Society and Politics, 1929–1939*. New York: Longman.
- Tartakowsky, D. (2000) Syndicats et mobilisations de chômeurs dans les années trente (Unions and Mobilizations of the Unemployed in the Thirties). *Cahiers de Ressa* 3–4: 16–21.
- Zukas, A. M. (2001) Lazy, Apathetic and Dangerous: The Social Construction of Unemployed Workers in Germany during the Late Weimar Republic. *Contemporary European History* 10 (1): 25–49.

União dos Lavradores e Trabalhadores Agrícolas do Brasil (ULTAB-Brazil)

Fabiana de Cássia Rodrigues

The União dos Lavradores e Trabalhadores Agrícolas do Brasil (ULTAB-Brazil) was founded at the Peasants' Conference in September 1954, in the city of São Paulo. This organization resulted from the efforts of the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro, PCB) to unite protests around the country. ULTAB was created in order to encourage wage-earners to fight for their rights, but it also supported other categories of workers, including leaseholders.

The 1950s in Brazil were characterized by the emergence of many agrarian struggles: the state of Paraná saw resistance by the Porecatu guerillas and struggles between leaseholders and colonists' companies; in the state of Goiás there were fights with the Trombas and Formoso; conflicts of peasant leagues erupted in northwest Brazil; and strikes broke out in São Paulo. The emergence of these conflicts resulted from the capitalist expansion to the countryside and rural areas. These circumstances arose during intense intellectual debates on how to solve the agrarian question in Brazil.

The PCB had a particular role in these discussions and in political struggles. The efforts of the PCB included gathering complaints and

articulating a set of general objectives, including agrarian reform. It also ran a journal, *Terra Livre* (Free Land), whose purpose was to publicize the injustice occurring in rural areas. The actions of the PCB throughout Brazil were highly significant for the success of ULTAB. According to Lyndolpho Silva, the first secretary of ULTAB, in the beginning the struggle was more efficient where the party had previously organized workers (Cunha 2004). ULTAB was present in many states in Brazil, including Minas Gerais, Paraná, Maranhã, Ceará, and especially in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, where there was a larger number of wage-earners. ULTAB supported rural workers organically and politically. To accomplish these objectives, it worked alongside lawyers to avoid threats against the exploited rural population.

ULTAB left a legacy of worker organization, education, and awareness. It helped produce political pressure that culminated in 1963 with the foundation of the National Confederation of Agriculture Workers, Contag (Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Agricultura). This organization survives today as an important rural trade union at the national level.

SEE ALSO: Brazil, Labor Struggles; Brazil, Workers and the Left: Partido dos Trabalhadores and Central Única dos Trabalhadores

References and Suggested Readings

- Cunha, P. R. (2004) *O camponês e a História*. São Paulo: Instituto Astrojildo Pereira.
- Martins, J. de S. (1986) *Os camponeses e a política no Brasil*. Petrópolis: Vozes.
- Medeiros, L. S. (1989) *História dos Movimentos Sociais no Campo*. Rio de Janeiro: FASE.
- Rodrigues, F. de C. (2005) *O papel da questão agrária no desenvolvimento do capitalismo nacional, entre 1950 e 1964. Em Caio Prado Jr., Ignácio Rangel, Celso Furtado e autores pecevistas*. Available at www.libdigi.unicamp.br/document/?code=vtls000377296 (downloaded April 20, 2008).

Unión Patriótica

Andrés Otálvaro H. and Hermann Ruiz

The Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union, UP) was a Colombian political movement that emerged in the middle of the 1980s as a civil alternative to the political forces when peace negotiations under the government of Belisario Betancur

took place. Since then PU leaders and militants have been targeted and over 5,000 have been murdered by army men, paramilitaries, and drug smugglers who were deeply involved with the right-wing political elite of the country.

After unsuccessful peace agreements with the guerrillas in 1957, these groups attained a significant presence in large zones of Colombia. In 1977 and 1982, two huge national protests occurred. This led to a determination on the part of the government to open new spaces for dialogue. In 1984 the Betancur administration agreed on an armistice with the FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo) in order to implement the necessary measures for an urgent political debate.

This explains why in 1985 the UP was founded, including militants from FARC, ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional), and Autodefensa Obrera (Workers' Self-Defense). Meanwhile the government compromised by guaranteeing free speech for the leaders of these illegal movements and the option to participate as candidates in general elections. At the beginning the UP was the political expression of a widespread mass movement and its development was accompanied by a surge of civil protest rallies by native Indians and peasants. One of the most important goals was the recovery of farmland as a way to overcome the century-old accumulation of huge amounts of property in the hands of a few owners, a legacy of Spanish colonial rule.

In light of a rigid two-party system, the initiatives promoted by the UP (popular participation in the state administration, right of opposition against official policies, popular elections for local administrations, equal access to the media and information, land reform, and peasant production subsidies) gained legitimacy among other traditionally marginalized social actors such as the Communist Party, some peasant unions, indigenous and women organizations, popular housing associations, organized students, artists, and intellectuals. More than 3,300 leaders from all over the country converged on the UP First National Congress which materialized thanks to the creation of 2,200 Juntas Patrióticas (local organizations of the UP). In 1985 the UP succeeded in organizing 500 large concentrations, with one million people participating.

In the 1986 elections, UP candidates won a significant number of seats in different state organs (14 *congresistas* (congressmen), 19 *diputados* (representatives), and 335 *consejales* (city coun-

cilors). Indeed Jaime Pardo Leal (magistrate and union leader), the presidential candidate for the UP, achieved 4.5 percent of the ballot and came third: the most significant result for a non-traditional party in Colombian history. In 1988, UP candidates won 15 seats by themselves and 150 seats within a coalition after the national approval of the general community election. From the first moment, prosecutions, kidnappings, assassinations, and violent assaults against UP advocates became daily occurrences.

In 1986, after the elections, Jaime Pardo Leal was assassinated. A series of demonstrations expressed people's anger against this crime and other attempts to silence the movement. Because of the lack of security for FARC-related members of the party, they resumed the armed struggle in 1987. In 1990 the new presidential UP candidate, Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, was killed. Two other political candidates were killed during the same year: Luis Carlos Galán and Carlos Pizarro (a former M-19 guerilla leader). The massive intimidation spread a deep feeling of terror among all social institutions, and continues to do so. Due to generalized fear, and the impunity of those who committed the crimes, the movement progressively lost its popular pressure.

SEE ALSO: Colombia, Armed Insurgency, Peasant Self-Defense, and Radical Popular Movements, 1960s–1970s; FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army)

References and Suggested Readings

- Cepeda, I. & Girón, C (2005) El genocidio contra la Unión Patriótica. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May: 614.
- Dueñas, O. (1990) *Unión Patriótica: venciendo dificultades*. Bogotá: Universidad Incca de Colombia.
- Giraldo, F. (2001) *Democracia y discurso político en la Unión Patriótica*. Bogotá: Centro Editorial Javeriana.
- Herrera, J. (1985) *Unión patriótica por la tregua y la paz*. Medellín: Lealón.
- Ortiz, I. (2004) *Veinte años del genocidio contra la Unión Patriótica*. Revista Taller, No. 9, Bogotá.

Union for Women's Equality

Giuseppina Larocca

After the Russian Revolution in 1905, many liberal women – especially those who had attended universities – began asking for civil and political rights. From this moment began the second

period of the development of Russian feminism. (The first had started with the philanthropic “triumvirate” of Maria Trubnikova, Anna Filosofova, and Nadezhda Stasova). The women’s movement became more diverse, but the main aim of each association and society was women’s civil and political equality.

In February 1905, a group of 30 liberal women in Moscow declared the formation of a national women’s political organization, the All-Russian Union for Women’s Equality (*Vserossiiskii Soyuz Ravnopraviya Zhenshchim*), whose general aim was “freedom and equality before the law without regard to sex.” Its first act was to petition the city Duma and the local *zemstvo* (the elective district council in pre-revolutionary Russia) for voting rights in those bodies (Stites 1978: 199). The leaders were journalists like Mariya Chechkova and Lyubov Gurevich from St. Petersburg, and Zinaida Mirovich-Ivanova and Anna Kalmanovich from Moscow. Soon two other important figures joined the association and strengthened it: the journalist Ariadna Tyrkova (1869–1962) and Anna Milyukova (1859/1861?–1935), wife of the future leader of the “liberal” Kadet Party (Party of Constitutional Democrats), Paul Milyukov (1859–1943).

Together they organized the first political meeting for women in Moscow on May 7–10, 1905. More than 1,000 participated, and Milyukova presided over the 300 recognized delegates. The charter adopted by the congress provided for an elected central bureau, autonomous local chapters, and special committees for politics, education, labor, and organization. The main points of the program were immediate convocation of a constituent assembly elected by the so-called seven-tailed suffrage (equal, direct, secret, and universal, without any distinctions), national autonomy, equality of the sexes before the law, equal rights for women, and laws for welfare, insurance, and protection of women workers.

Different approaches inside the movement (especially socialist and liberal ones) divided the Women’s Union and at the end of 1907 it collapsed, due to lack of unity and leadership together with official persecution by the social democrats. The congress of women on December 10–16, 1908 signaled the gap between the two main ideologies: liberal (represented by the Kadet Party of Tyrkova and Milyukova) and socialist (represented by Alexandra Kollontai and Varvara Volkova). Kollontai could not read

her essay against a “bourgeois” feminism and was obliged to escape to Germany, where the Russian émigré community was fairly strong.

SEE ALSO: Kollontai, Alexandra (1872–1952); Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Society for Cheap Lodgings; Women in the Russian Revolution; Women’s Movement, Soviet Union

References and Suggested Readings

- Ajvazova, S. G. (1998) *Russian Women in the Equality Maze: Essays on Political Theory and History*. Moscow: Rusanov.
- Bisha, R. M., Gheith, J., Holden, C., & Wagner, W. G. (2002) *Russian Women, 1698–1917: Experience and Expression. An Anthology of Sources*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Kollontai, A. M. (1908/2003) Woman-Worker in the Contemporary Society. In V. I. Uspenskaia (Ed.), *Marxist Feminism. Text Collection. A. M. Kollontai*. Tver’: Feminist Press, Russia.
- Shelochaev, V. V. (1999) Ariadna Vladimirovna Tyrkova. *Questions of History* 11–12: 67–81. Moscow.
- Stites, R. (1978) *The Women’s Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860–1930*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Venturi, F. (1952) *The Russian Populism*, 2 vols. Turin: Riuniti.

United Englishmen/ United Britons

Michael T. Davis

The United Englishmen was an underground revolutionary society that existed in England between about 1796 and 1802 and which sought to overturn the government by means of a coordinated insurrection in England, Ireland, and Scotland. The foundations for the United Englishmen were laid after attempts to seek political reform through constitutional avenues were unsuccessful in the first half of the 1790s. Following the passage of the repressive Two Acts in 1795, sections of the English democratic movement shifted their tactics to a more physical force approach to promoting reform. In this climate, a reinvigorated United Irish society was able to find willing recruits in England. Political tours by United Irishmen in the winter of 1796–7 helped disseminate the prospect of insurrection and foster an interest in establishing societies modeled on the Irish example. Many English radicals, particularly in the northern

manufacturing districts, were lured by the opportunity offered through the United movement and the first cells of the United Englishmen were established in late 1796.

The United Englishmen directly modeled its organization and agenda on the United Irishmen. It conducted its proceedings in secret and members guarded their identity through oaths and esoteric handshakes. The structure of the United Englishmen was borrowed from the United Irishmen, involving an intricate network of branches that helped facilitate their clandestine operations and geographical reach. Each branch was made up of 15 members, and it would split into two branches when membership reached about 30. The organization was administered from above by a network of baronial, county, provincial, and national committees, which operated in complete secrecy and made the society difficult for government agents to infiltrate.

The United Englishmen and United Irishmen maintained close contact. Irish radicals frequently toured England teaching new signs and reinforcing the merits of insurrection to their English counterparts. Irish immigrants were engaged in distributing political literature and teaching new oaths to local revolutionaries, whose minds were inflamed by the promise that insurrection was imminent and necessary. In particular, it was radicals in the northern districts of England, where trade contacts with Ireland had been well established, who were most attracted by the revolutionary call. Disillusioned members of the reform societies in places like Manchester, Leicester, Wolverhampton, Birmingham, and Nottingham soon joined the United Englishmen. Although precise membership numbers cannot be determined, by all accounts the organization grew rapidly during 1797 with hundreds of recruits reportedly signed on to the revolutionary cause.

The United Englishmen also began taking root in London, where the society was variously referred to as the United Britons and the True Britons. The London cells of the organization drew most of their prominent members from the London Corresponding Society (LCS). Their meeting places were either the smoky parlors of local public houses, like Furnival's Inn on the Strand, or the private residences of leading United activists. Indeed, these were the same spaces and often the same personnel that underpinned the LCS, and as such the distinction between LCS politics and the agenda of the

United Englishmen is easily blurred during 1797 and 1798.

While the agenda of the United Englishmen did, in part, reflect the reformist aims of the LCS, the fundamental mantra of the United men was revolution. Cells of the United Englishmen conducted armed drills and the grand vision was for a coordinated uprising in England, Ireland, and Scotland, with the backing of a French invasion. United Irishmen toured England in 1797 and 1798 galvanizing support for the cause and delegates from the United Scotsmen were at times active in English radical circles. In the turbulent period of the late 1790s, the members of the United Englishmen were intoxicated by the potential for revolution and the French were seen as critical allies.

The Irish republican and Catholic priest James O'Coigly was a key player in linking the United societies with the French. In late 1797, he returned from France promoting the word of French plans for invasion, but in February 1798 he was arrested, along with some leading members of the United Englishmen, with damning evidence in his possession of a letter inviting Napoleon Bonaparte to invade Britain. Further arrests were made from among the ranks of United Englishmen in April 1798, and when O'Coigly was executed in June 1798 for high treason, the spirits of United men were deflated.

The following year, the government arrested more revolutionaries, and on July 12, 1799 the United Englishmen, along with other popular political organizations, was banned by legislation. However, depleted sections of the United Englishmen remained active, albeit subdued, and in 1800–1, when economic conditions fueled popular discontent and made revolutionary action seem possible, the United Englishmen regrouped. The arrest and subsequent execution of Edward Marcus Despard in 1802–3, who acted in concert with United Englishmen to plot an attack on the government, saw the final collapse of resolve among United men. The organization ceased to exist after this time, but the revolutionary sentiments of those former members who survived the 1790s were taken with them into the ultra-radical movement led by Thomas Spence.

SEE ALSO: Despard, Colonel Edward Marcus (1751–1803) and the Despard Conspiracy; London Corresponding Society; Spence, Thomas (1750–1814); United Irishmen; United Scotsmen

References and Suggested Readings

- Elliott, M. (1982) *Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Goodwin, A. (1979) *The Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic Movement in the Age of the French Revolution*. London: Hutchinson.
- Graham, J. (2000) *The Nation, the Law and the King: Reform Politics in England, 1789–1799*, 2 vols. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- McCalman, I. (1988) *Radical Underworld: Prophets, Revolutionaries and Pornographers in London, 1795–1840*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wells, R. (1983) *Insurrection: The British Experience, 1795–1803*. Gloucester: Alan Sutton.

United Irishmen

Karen Sonnelitter

The United Irish Society, or United Irishmen, was initially a liberal political organization in eighteenth-century Ireland that sought parliamentary reform by legal means. It evolved into a radical republican organization with a massive underground army that launched the Great Rebellion of 1798 and aimed at forcefully ending British rule of Ireland and creating an independent republic.

Origin

The 1770s and 1780s were a period of patriotic agitation in Ireland. The American Revolution had inspired the development of an extra-governmental organization, the Volunteers, which exerted pressure on the Irish government to make political concessions. In the 1780s, liberal members of the Protestant Ascendancy sought a measure of legislative independence from Great Britain, which they obtained in 1782. Influenced ideologically by Britain's radical Whig tradition, they also promoted the idea of increasing the rights of Catholics and Protestant Dissenters.

Classical republicanism and John Locke's theories of government provided the intellectual foundations of the United Irish movement and created a shared set of political assumptions that the United Irishmen would draw upon. The outbreak of the French Revolution was also an inspiration to radicals everywhere, and Ireland was no exception. The decline of the Volunteer movement in the 1780s meant that there was no longer a national organization as the focus of

reformers' activities. There was a Whig Club operating in Ireland but it was limited to the political elite, so more radical circles felt the need for a broader organization.

A group of nine Belfast Presbyterians interested in reforming the Irish parliament invited a young lawyer named Theobald Wolfe Tone to compile resolutions on their behalf. While they initially balked at his support for Catholic emancipation, they reconciled themselves following the publication of his *Argument on Behalf of the Catholics of Ireland*. The organization that their collaboration produced, the United Irish Society, was a nonsectarian movement that sought to transcend the lines of religious affiliation which had traditionally divided Irish society. Though the Society was dominated by Protestants, it worked to appeal to Catholics as well, drawing on their resentment of the Protestant Ascendancy. Radical dissenting Protestants, who were the primary founders of the Society, appealed to the common enemy they shared with Catholics, the established Anglican Church and the members of the Anglo-Irish ruling class.

Founding and Early Years

On October 18, 1791, the Belfast group invited Wolfe Tone and Thomas Russell to the first meeting of the United Irish Society, where three resolutions written by Tone were passed:

First, that the weight of English influence in the government of this country is so great as to require a cordial union among *all the people of Ireland* to maintain that balance which is essential to the preservation of our liberties and the extension of our commerce.

Second, that the sole constitutional mode by which this influence can be opposed is by the complete and radical reform of the representation of the people in parliament.

Third, that no reform is practicable, efficacious, or just which shall not include Irishmen of every religious persuasion.

Thirty men attended that first meeting. In addition to Russell and Tone, others included William Sinclair, Henry Joy McCracken, Samuel Nielson, Henry Haslett, Gilbert McIlveen, William Simms, Robert Simms, Thomas McCabe, and Thomas Pearce. A few weeks later a Dublin branch of the Society was established, with

James Napper Tandy serving as secretary. The United Irishmen worked closely with the Catholic Committee to promote Catholic emancipation and repeal the discriminatory penal laws. It was hoped that Catholic emancipation would lead to reform along republican lines.

The new organization was primarily centered in Belfast and Dublin, but it spread throughout the country. Though the rhetoric of the society made clear its desire to appeal to men of all social backgrounds, its membership was largely middle class and its strongest chapters were in commercial and industrial centers. The United Irishmen's desire to secure a mass following seemed headed for success. The movement's growth was stimulated by the wide circulation of pamphlets, leaflets, and newspapers such as the *Northern Star*. However, the rapid spread of the movement alarmed the government and in 1793, following Britain's declaration of war on France, the United Irish Society was banned.

Underground Years

From the mid-1790s onward the movement was forced to go underground, and its character changed dramatically. The suppression of their organization convinced the majority of members that the peaceful pursuit of parliamentary reform was impossible and that "physical force" – armed revolution – was their only option. They drew upon Ireland's rich tradition with regard to the formation and maintenance of secret societies. Renowned dissident political leaders such as Lord Edward Fitzgerald and Arthur O'Connor joined their ranks, bringing with them a wealth of military knowledge and experience. Before long, paramilitary units throughout Ireland were arming themselves and secretly engaging in nocturnal military training.

Meanwhile, the militancy of the mostly Protestant United Irishmen attracted the attention of the multitudes of oppressed Catholics, who had begun to come together in a plebeian organization known as the Defenders. Government repression drove the Defenders and United Irishmen into each other's arms. Defender militants began joining United Irish military units in large numbers, swelling the ranks of the underground army to massive proportions. By the time of the outbreak of the Great Rebellion in 1798, the United Irish had the capacity to put hundreds of thousands of men in arms in the field.

Decline and Fall

The middle-class and landowning Protestant leadership of the United Irish was hesitant to unleash the energy of the land-hungry Catholic peasants, so instead of mobilizing them for a revolutionary explosion, a more "controlled" form of revolution was sought through an alliance with France. United Irish emissaries, including Fitzgerald, O'Connor, and Wolfe Tone, negotiated with the French government to request ships, troops, arms, and ammunition to overthrow British rule in Ireland, while leaving the existing social order in Ireland essentially intact. French aid was eventually provided to the Irish rebels, but far too little and far too late.

The inadequacy of French military support, however, was not the most important factor in the failure of the United Irishmen's 1798 attempt at insurrection. Ireland's long experience with rebellious secret societies had also equipped the authorities with methods of combating them. The government's most effective weapon was the police spy. The United Irish organization was riddled with informers from its highest levels down. On the eve of the Rebellion of 1798, police raids netted almost all of the organization's central leaders who were not already dead or in exile. Lord Edward Fitzgerald briefly escaped, but was soon thereafter captured and died of wounds sustained during his arrest. The movement had been decapitated, and with only low-ranking leaders on the scene, the Rebellion unfolded in a piecemeal manner. A series of isolated risings was easily suppressed by the British military forces and their Irish partners.

Following the failure of the 1798 Rebellion, the United Irishmen continued to function clandestinely. The replacement of the Irish parliament with direct rule by the British parliament, and the puppet Irish government's increased efforts to play Catholics and Protestants against each other, led to an increase in sectarianism, which undermined the movement. In 1803 an aftershock of the Great Rebellion occurred in the form of an event known to history as Emmet's Rebellion. Despite the admirable courage of Robert Emmet and his followers, their rising was a debacle, after which the United Irish Society effectively ceased to exist. In its wake Ireland's population experienced a deepening sectarian gulf. Except for the failed Young Ireland movement of the 1840s, the United Irishmen's attempt

to bring Catholics and Protestants together in common cause has not been repeated.

SEE ALSO: Emmet, Robert (1778–1803) and Emmet's Rebellion; Fitzgerald, Lord Edward (1763–1798); Ireland, Age of Revolutions, 1775–1803; Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798; Napper Tandy, James (1737?–1803); O'Connor, Arthur (1763–1852); Tone, Theobald Wolfe (1763–1798); Young Ireland

References and Suggested Readings

- Curtin, N. J. (1998) *The United Irishmen: Popular Politics in Ulster and Dublin, 1791–1798*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Elliott, M. (1982) *Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Elliott, M. (1989) *Wolfe Tone: Prophet of Irish Independence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Knox, O. (1997) *Rebels and Informers: Stirrings of Irish Independence*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Packenham, T. (1972) *The Year of Liberty: The Great Irish Rebellion of 1798*. London: Granada.

United Scotsmen

Michael T. Davis

The United Scotsmen was an underground revolutionary society that sought radical political reform in Scotland through a campaign of physical force activism and conspiratorial politics in association with the United Englishmen, United Irish, and French. Although the United Scotsmen was not directly descendant from the earlier Glasgow Society of United Scotsmen founded in 1793, it did share in common an emphasis on universal suffrage and parliamentary reform and probably some overlap of membership. However, a more direct influence on the origins and agenda of the United Scotsmen was the reinvigoration of the United Irishmen in 1795. The passing of the repressive Two Acts in that year made a clandestine existence an increasingly important and unavoidable feature of the United Irishmen, and it was United Irish deputies and Irish refugees who exported ideas of revolution to Scotland in the latter part of the 1790s. In July 1796, the first recorded contact between United Irish missionaries and Scottish radicals took place when two delegates from the Belfast United Irishmen were sent to Scotland. Armed with a copy of the constitution of the United Irishmen, the missionaries found the

Scottish to be generally enthusiastic about forming a sister organization based on the Irish model.

Within six months of this contact between Irish and Scottish democrats, the United Scotsmen society was formed. Government authorities first became aware of the United Scotsmen in early 1797 and it was believed the organization was nothing more than a local branch of the United Irishmen. Indeed, the constitution of the United Irishmen was drawn heavily upon by the United Scotsmen and the two groups fostered a close relationship with regular visits from United Irishmen to stir republican sentiments in Scotland and to facilitate the spread of the United movement.

The United Scotsmen also sought to further its cause by collaborating with the French. Some contemporaries believed that the United Scotsmen was guided by French principles, and while this may be overstating the connection, it is true that there were important linkages. At times, French radicals toured Scotland with promises of revolutionary support, and from 1797 to his death in 1799 Thomas Muir lived in Paris where he acted as a conduit between the United Scotsmen and the French directory. The United Scotsmen were also able to develop productive relations with English radicals, particularly in the northern districts of England where the United Englishmen was active.

The United Scotsmen was most active in 1797 and the rapid growth of the society concerned authorities. Against a backdrop of active recruitment, popular discontent with the Scottish Militia Act of 1797, and the increased immigration of Irish radicals to Scotland following the imposition of martial law in Ulster, the United Scotsmen expanded to a peak of about 10,000 men in September 1797, although some estimates range as high as 200,000 recruits. While the precise level of membership cannot be determined, 26 United organizations in Scotland are recorded in the government records.

While the authorities were acutely aware of the United Scotsmen, the society remained elusive. It was an oath-bound society, with secret handshakes and a commitment to communicating in secrecy with fellow radicals. There is also some evidence to suggest that the United Scotsmen infiltrated the freemasons' lodges in Scotland, facilitating its clandestine operations and providing a network through which to attract new members.

Despite the underground nature of the society's operations, the government was able to make inroads into the United Scotsmen. Irishmen suspected of carrying with them radical sympathies were apprehended and sometimes deported at Scottish ports in an effort to break the exchange between the United societies in Ireland and Scotland. The Illegal Oaths Act of 1797 resulted in some sections of the United Scotsmen ceasing to meet and discouraging potential members from taking the oath. The government also made an important impact on the confidence of the United Scotsmen when George Mealmaker, one of the society's leading activists, was arrested in 1797 and transported to Botany Bay the following year. The United Scotsmen was eventually outlawed by name, along with other radical societies, in legislation passed on July 12, 1799. Remnants of the United Scotsmen continued to meet after 1799, but their activities were infrequent and lacked coordination, and ultimately the society disappeared in 1802.

SEE ALSO: Muir, Thomas (1765–1799); United Englishmen/United Britons; United Irishmen

References and Suggested Readings

- Dickson, D., Whelan, K., & Keogh, D. (Eds.) (1993) *The United Irishmen: Republicanism, Radicalism and Rebellion*. Dublin: Lilliput.
- Fry, M. (1992) *The Dundas Despotism*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Goodwin, A. (1979) *The Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic Movement in the Age of the French Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Graham, J. (2000) *The Nation, the Law and the King: Reform Politics in England 1789–1799*, 2 vols. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- McFarland, E. W. (1994) *Ireland and Scotland in the Age of Revolution*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Wells, R. (1983) *Insurrection: The British Experience*. Gloucester: Alan Sutton.

Urabi movement

Andrew J. Waskey

The Urabi Arabi movement, also known as the Arabi Revolt, was led by Colonel Ahmed Arabi (1841–1911) (Urabi or Orabi) in Egypt in 1881. A protest movement against foreign intervention

in Egypt, its slogan was “Egypt for the Egyptians.” It ended with the death or exile of many of its leaders in 1882.

The origin of the Arabi movement lay years earlier in the imperial ambitions of the Khedive Ismail (r. 1863–79). Western-educated and fluent in French, he was a promising ruler who failed financially. Like his grandfather Mohammed Ali Pasha, he had continued to spend money seeking to profit from trade in the Sudan. He financed numerous public works as well as the military with the tax returns from the 1863 cotton boom Egypt enjoyed when the war in the American South had immensely contracted the world's cotton supply. Nominally, Egypt was a possession of the Ottoman empire. In reality it was quite autonomous. However, by 1877 Khedive Ismail was bankrupt due to bad investments, expeditions to the Sudan, and lavish spending on a number of projects. He met the financial crisis by allowing France and Great Britain to set up a dual financial control over Egypt's state revenues. On June 25, 1879, the Ottomans replaced Khedive Ismail with his much more compliant son Khedive Tawfiq. The latter was faced with a growing sense of nationalism, especially among the increasing numbers of educated Egyptians.

A leading opponent of foreign control was Ahmed Arabi. Educated at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, which was a center of emerging nationalism, he joined the Egyptian army and rose through the officer ranks to become lieutenant colonel by the age of 20. A powerful public speaker, Arabi's peasant origins gave him great rhetorical power among the peasants, who hailed him as the voice of the Egyptian people. In January 1881, Arabi headed a delegation of Egyptian officers who tried to visit the prime minister. Khedive Tawfiq was dealing with the financial crisis by retiring soldiers and blocking promotion for Egyptians while allowing it for non-Egyptians. It meant the exclusion of Egyptian peasants from the army.

The war minister, Uthman Rifqi, tried to have the Arabi delegation arrested as it attempted to see the prime minister. However, it had brought enough troops that it was able to violently prevent the arrests. In the face of this crisis, Tawfiq fired Rifqi and replaced him with Colonel Mahmud Sami al-Barudi (1839–1904). A power struggle then ensued between the Tawfiq and the Egyptian officers. Mass public demonstrations

drew people from all segments of Egyptian society. The movement recruited a group of politicians and legal scholars to write a constitution, which was adopted. The protest soon developed wider aims. Joining with the peasants, Arabi and others sought to free Egypt from foreign controls. They also fought to end the absolutism of the Khedive.

In June 1882 riots erupted in Alexandria. Thousands of Egyptians were injured or killed and 50 Europeans were killed or wounded. Large numbers of frightened Europeans sought refuge on the ships of the British and French fleets anchored at Alexandria. The commander of the British fleet bombarded Alexandria's forts when the Egyptians refused to dismantle them. The French fleet just sailed away.

Tawfiq, fearing the Egyptian officers, sided with the Europeans while the government in Cairo declared war on the British. Seeking to leave Egypt, the British found that they were also faced with the Mahdist movement in the Sudan. Troops were sent to Egypt that had to first suppress the nationalists. The British force of 17,500 and 60 cannons, led by Garnet Woolsey, met the Egyptian army with 25,000 men at Tel-el-Kebir on September 13, 1882. The battle lasted two hours, ending with complete victory for the British. Arabi was captured and sentenced to death after a trial. However, the British commissioner, Lord Fredrick Dufferin, granted a plea of clemency to Arabi and others. Instead they were sent to the British colony of Ceylon, remaining in exile from December 28, 1882 to October 1, 1901.

The anti-colonialism of the Urabi movement failed to gain independence. However, its members became folk heroes, encouraging later generations to resist colonialism. Egyptian nationalism can be traced to the movement.

SEE ALSO: Egypt, Peasant Rebellion of 1824; Mahdist Revolt; Sudanese Protest in the Turko-Egyptian Era

References and Suggested Readings

- Cole, J. R. (1993) *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's Urabi Movement*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Farwell, B. (1972) *Queen Victoria's Little Wars*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Goldschmidt, A., Jr. (2008) *A Brief History of Egypt*. New York: Checkmark.

Urban rebellions, United States

Sven Dubie

American cities have been centers of social and political ferment since they first emerged in the seventeenth century. With greater regularity than is commonly known, they have been the site of a wide range of disturbances that have been variously referred to as riots, civil disorders, mob actions, insurrections, and uprisings. Indeed, depending on how one defines any given disturbance of the peace – be it a genuine uprising against the established authority, a mob action directed at a particular individual or group of people, or a rowdy group of sports fans venting their joy or frustration – the list could be practically limitless. However, in the twentieth century, and especially during the half-century following the end of World War II, a particular manifestation of unrest known as an urban rebellion became one of the most common – and certainly the best known – examples of civil disorder in the history of the United States.

Customarily, these disturbances are referred to as simply riots or race riots. Yet neither of these terms is quite accurately descriptive. Riot is overly broad, and race riot is misleading, especially since the term has often been used to describe racially motivated mob attacks by one group (often whites) on another group (often blacks). In the latter instance, this term would best describe the unrest in Chicago in 1919, or in Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1921 when, in each case, a large group of whites invaded the black section of town with the intent of attacking blacks and their property in order to maintain white supremacy. By contrast, the urban rebellions of later in the twentieth century were not aimed at reinforcing the racial status quo but, rather, challenging it. Likewise, the unrest was not the result of interaction between the races that was undesired by one group. Instead it stemmed from one group's perception that, because of its race, it was isolated and alienated from the mainstream of society.

Another important distinction between urban rebellions and the more generic riot is that while both contain an element of spontaneity and chaos, in most cases urban rebellions reflect a greater degree of deliberate and sustained

resistance to the governmental or societal status quo – sometimes lasting for numerous days. In fact, rebellions can even have brief periods of quietude, during an overnight period, for instance, or when authorities temporarily regain control over the situation, before being restarted by some new provocation.

The urban rebellions of the twentieth century, and especially those of the 1960s, are also deeply rooted in the context of the time in which they occurred. Since the early part of the twentieth century, African Americans had migrated out of the rural South and into the urban North in search of economic opportunity and to escape the repressive system of officially sanctioned segregation that was widespread in the South. However, the harsh reality of life in the Northern urban ghetto, including the limited economic opportunities, the substandard living conditions, the pervasive racism and discrimination, and the persistent neglect and occasional abuse of the rapidly growing black population by local government, fueled deep resentment toward city officials in nearly every urban center. Such frustration was heightened during the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, and not simply because the movement instilled a stronger sense of racial pride and a greater willingness to lay claim to one's basic rights among the black population of the urban North. Many of the movement's justifiably heralded accomplishments did little to address the problems of urban centers. Indeed, the triumphs of the civil rights movement in the South in some ways seemed to stand in cruel mockery to the persistence of the status quo in the black ghettos. When that lack of progress was underscored by some perceived act of police brutality or other official injustice, the stage was set for a rebellion.

Significantly, the Harlem riots of 1935 and 1943 were harbingers of the kind of unrest that was to plague many of the urban centers in America in the 1960s. The Harlem riots reflected a new type of unrest that was not the result of labor unrest or the invasion of the black community by whites determined to perpetrate violence as an expression of white supremacy. Instead, these disorders reflected widespread and growing discontent in the black community over living and working conditions, allegations of police brutality, lack of adequate public services, and other manifestations of racial oppression. In this instance, a riot broke out on March 19, 1935, after

a young black boy attempted to steal a pocket knife from a Harlem department store. Although the boy gave up the knife when apprehended by store employees and was subsequently allowed to go on his way, suspicion and hostility toward the white community helped give rise to a rumor that the boy had been beaten and killed by the white employees in the basement of the store. In response, African Americans lashed out against white-owned businesses, smashing store windows and looting some 600 properties. Before police were able to restore order, three people were killed and scores were injured, most of whom were black.

The August 1943 Harlem riots are less notorious than the race riots that occurred two months earlier in Detroit – in large part because city officials had taken steps to address some of the grievances of black Harlem after the 1935 riots and were on guard because of the disturbances in Detroit. Nevertheless, like the unrest in Harlem eight years earlier, this incident stemmed from misunderstanding about a minor altercation between whites and blacks and then, fueled by rumors and racial tensions, a similar outburst of rage threatened to consume the community. Events that led to the unrest began when several African Americans and a white police officer got into an argument at a Harlem hotel. Eventually one of the African Americans, a soldier on leave who was visiting with his mother, was shot after scuffling with the officer. The wound was minor but both the black man and the officer were taken to a nearby hospital.

Almost immediately, however, word swept through Harlem that a black soldier had been gunned down by a white officer while trying to protect his mother. Such rumors, when seen against the backdrop of the recent Detroit race riot and the general mistrust of white officials that existed in the black community, were all that was needed to provoke unrest. Individuals and then groups began to break windows and then looting ensued. When stores had been emptied of their wares to the satisfaction of looters, some of the properties were set alight. The mêlée continued through the night until order was restored the next morning, but not before six people – all black – were killed and nearly 200 were injured. Hundreds of arrests were made and nearly 1,500 stores suffered damage and/or theft totaling several million dollars. Subsequent studies of the disorders credited the swift but measured

response of New York City officials, who were determined not to allow matters to get out of hand as they had in Detroit, for keeping the situation from becoming far worse.

The pent-up frustration felt by those living in black ghettos like Harlem at the persistent economic inequality and racial oppression that fueled the disturbances of 1935 and 1943 was similarly the root cause for many in the long series of rebellions in the 1960s. While many of these took place in the urban centers of the North, among the first manifestations of this new variety of disturbances occurred in Birmingham, Alabama, in the late spring at the conclusion of a long series of civil rights demonstrations, led by Martin Luther King, Jr. and others that aimed at ending official segregation in the city.

The Birmingham Campaign, as the demonstrations came to be known, is legendary for the use of police dogs and fire hoses by city authorities against demonstrators, some of whom were young children. The situation, which had hovered on the brink of catastrophe for several tense days in early May, eased when a truce between city officials and demonstrators was announced on May 10. However, when three bombs exploded the following night, in all probability detonated by the Ku Klux Klan as they targeted the leaders of the demonstrations, several thousand African Americans flooded the streets of the city and for the next several hours unleashed a torrent of anger and frustration that provided an ugly, if understandable, coda to the Birmingham Campaign, which, by design, had been conducted upon principles of non-violence.

Leaders of the desegregation campaign called for an immediate cessation of the disturbances, but the calls for peace were ignored as angry youths poured out their fury across a 28-block area. Police cars, fire engines, and private vehicles, along with their occupants, were attacked, resulting in scores of injuries. White-owned stores and properties in the neighborhood were the initial targets, but several black properties were eventually looted and destroyed as well. When authorities tried to quell the violence, they were pelted with rocks, bricks, and bottles, and the anger of the mob was further fueled when the police surged into the black community and assaulted its members indiscriminately. Not before the early morning hours of May 12 was order finally restored, ending the first urban

rebellion of the tumultuous mid-1960s. Ominously, following the unrest in Birmingham, there were widespread protest demonstrations across the country, reflecting a new spirit of militancy in black communities. Over the course of the summer of 1963, there were over 750 demonstrations in 186 cities, with some of the most serious disturbances lasting several days in Cambridge, Maryland, and Danville, Virginia.

In response to the injustices and discontent brought to light by the demonstrations and subsequent riot in Birmingham, President John F. Kennedy introduced sweeping civil rights legislation that was designed to eliminate formal racial discrimination and to begin to address some of the other grievances in the African American community. This bill was eventually enacted in early July 1964, as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Ironically, within weeks of the landmark legislation's passage, there were major disturbances in Harlem, Rochester, New York, and Philadelphia, as well as lesser ones in cities in northeastern New Jersey and suburban Chicago, establishing a pattern of waves of urban unrest sweeping through the nation's cities that would be replicated with discouraging predictability during the next several years.

The first incident took place in Harlem July 18–20, after an off-duty white police officer shot and killed a black teenager who had allegedly threatened him with a knife. Although a grand jury would eventually exonerate the officer of any wrongdoing, local residents charged the killing was reflective of the routine police brutality to which the African American community was subjected. In response to the killing, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), a leading civil rights organization at the time, organized a series of peaceful protests demanding, among other things, the immediate dismissal of the officer and the resignation of the police commissioner. When demonstrators marched on police precinct headquarters in Harlem, the police not only resisted the demonstrators but also conducted a series of heavy-handed sweeps through Harlem in which innocent bystanders were beaten by the police. The perceived overreaction of the police provoked a violent response in the African American community, leading to two days of rioting. One person died, more than 100 were injured, and hundreds more were arrested.

The next major disturbance, which took place July 24–6, came to be known as the Rochester

Riot. While unrest might have been predicted in an expansive and notoriously impoverished ghetto such as Harlem, Rochester, situated in western upstate New York, seemed like an unlikely candidate for civil disorders, given the relative affluence of the community and modest, albeit rapidly growing, size of the black population. Nevertheless, for the several thousand African Americans who were confined to the city's poorest wards, the lack of economic opportunity and frustration with authorities continually stoked resentment.

The civil unrest in Rochester was sparked when a confrontation erupted during the course of a routine arrest at a large outdoor street dance in one of the city's black wards on a hot Friday night. It did not help matters that when police arrived on the scene, they included a K-9 patrol, reviving memories of Birmingham. In short order, rumors of police brutality began to circulate, provoking a fierce reaction in the black community that set off two nights and three days of rioting. There was extensive looting in the downtown area, scores were injured and arrested, and four persons were killed – three of them when a helicopter surveying the riot damage crashed into a house. Eventually New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller was forced to call for National Guard assistance, marking the first time during the civil rights era that these forces had to be called out in the North. Significantly, most of those arrested in the disturbances were gainfully employed and had no previous record of arrest, indicating there was more to the rebellion than just poverty.

A month later, a riot erupted in predominantly black North Philadelphia, once more against a backdrop of allegations of police brutality. Relations between the city's black population and the predominantly white police force had long been tense, but they had grown worse since the city's black newspaper, the *Philadelphia Tribune*, routinely spotlighted incidents of alleged brutality that occurred with impunity. Thus, when a black woman whose car had stalled at an intersection got into an argument with two police officers – one white and one black – which then escalated into a scuffle, word began to spread that a white policeman had beaten a pregnant black woman to death. A crowd soon gathered in the area and emotions spilled over. For the next several days, from August 28 to 30, blacks looted white-owned shops in North Philadelphia's central

commercial district. While there were no deaths, there were hundreds of injuries and arrests and over 200 stores were damaged or destroyed.

The following summer brought the most notorious of all the 1960s riots in the largely black sector of Los Angeles known as Watts. The disorder lasted for six days, making it one of the longest and, as a result, most destructive riots of the era. In what was a familiar pattern, the unrest began in response to a confrontation between several local blacks and the police. On August 11, in the midst of a late summer heat-wave, a white California Highway Patrol official pulled over a car he suspected was being operated under the influence. Inside the car were two black men, brothers Marquette and Ronald Frye. By all accounts the officer handled the situation in a fully professional manner but, in due course, and perhaps related to the arrival of the Fryes' mother on the scene, Marquette, who was driving the vehicle, became unruly. By this time a crowd had gathered, and more police had also arrived. One of them determined the situation was getting out of hand and rushed the Frye brothers, striking them with his baton. When their mother attempted to intervene, she, along with her two sons, was shoved into a police car. The rough handling of the Fryes, combined with an eager willingness to believe the worst about law enforcement officials, sent rumors racing through the ghetto about the excessive use of force and police beating a pregnant woman. Within minutes, rocks and bottles began to fly, storefront windows were smashed as a prelude to looting, and a tempest of violence commenced that would continue for five days and involve some 35,000 people. In addition to state and local officers, 16,000 National Guard troops were brought in, and a declaration of martial law was required to end the rebellion.

The extent of destruction in Watts was staggering compared to the 1964 disturbances and marked a serious escalation of urban unrest. By the time peace was restored, 34 people had been killed, the majority of whom were black; at least 1,000 had been injured and four times that number arrested. Although rioters often failed to distinguish between white- and black-owned properties, to a considerable extent, white-owned businesses and homes were initially targeted by the angry mob, as these were seen by blacks to be the most visible and readily accessible symbols of their oppression. However, as the riots spread,

hundreds of white and black properties were damaged or destroyed and an estimated \$200 million in property damage occurred.

What further made the Watts riot unique was the imperviousness of the community to calls from prominent African Americans to stop the orgy of destruction. When comedian and activist Dick Gregory went into the neighborhood to appeal for calm, he was shot in the leg. One looter, when asked by the renowned black writer Louis Lomax how he could justify such wanton theft, ordered Lomax to get out of his way, as he was interfering with his ability to get a chair that matched the one he had already taken. After the riot ended, black youths famously bragged to Martin Luther King that they had won a victory despite the fact that they had effectively destroyed their own community because they finally had forced whites to turn their attention to the ghetto. Surprisingly, given the pattern of multiple riots that erupted in other years, the Watts rebellion marked the only major incident of unrest in 1965.

During the summer of 1966, and for several years thereafter, however, the pattern of multiple riots would reassert itself. The first of the 1966 disturbances occurred along Division Street, near Humboldt Park, in Chicago and are thus referred to as either the Division Street or Humboldt Park Riots. It was remarkable in that it marked the first rebellion during the contemporary era based in a Hispanic community. However, the sources for the unrest – chronic poverty, inadequate public services, alienation from mainstream society, and anger over perceived mistreatment at the hands of authorities – were nearly identical to those that had sparked rebellions in black neighborhoods. And, as with many of the African American rebellions, the Division Street Riot began with an incident between police and local youth.

Following celebrations to mark the first Puerto Rican Day celebration in Chicago on June 12, 1966, officers shot a young Puerto Rican man, Aracelis Cruz, whom police were trying to arrest after breaking up a fight. Officers also said Cruz was carrying a gun. The community reaction to the shooting was nearly spontaneous, as hundreds of Puerto Ricans filled the streets to protest what they said was a wholly unprovoked but all too common attack by police. As more officers rushed to the scene, bringing with them police dogs, tensions quickly escalated. Police tried to

disperse the crowd with tear gas and night sticks, which simply provoked more anger in the Puerto Rican community. For the next three days, unrest wracked the neighborhood, as locals battled with police and the National Guard for control of the streets. There was widespread looting and numerous police vehicles were set afire or damaged. While no deaths occurred during the unrest, more than a dozen people were injured and dozens were arrested.

A month later, on July 11, a rebellion broke out in the poor and predominantly black Near West Side of Chicago. While not as extensive as the Humboldt Park disorders, the unrest served as a reminder that resentments also ran deep among Chicago's African Americans. Ironically, the unrest corresponded with the arrival of Martin Luther King in Chicago, as he began a campaign to spotlight the poverty and injustice that afflicted African Americans in the urban North. When authorities shut off fire hydrants that had been opened by youngsters seeking relief from the July heat, adults protested, particularly since three blocks away, but in a heavily Italian community, police had not taken similar action. When police arrested one of the adults who tried to reopen the hydrant, tempers boiled over. The crowd that had gathered to observe the scene hurled insults and rocks at the police. The situation was exacerbated by the involvement of area gang members and false rumors that the youngsters who had tried to cool themselves by opening the hydrants had been beaten by the police; the *mêlée* quickly became a riot, as the windows of buildings and cars in the area were shattered. Over the next several days, the violence spread into nearby black neighborhoods and housing projects. Despite King's calls for peace and efforts to mediate an end to the disorder, looting and vandalism were widespread, and there was even scattered sniper fire, reflecting the limits of King's influence in the disaffected urban centers of the North. Eventually, the National Guard was called out for the second time in a month to restore order, but not before two bystanders had been killed. Eighty others were seriously wounded, and six of these were police hit by snipers' bullets. All in all, hundreds of arrests and several million dollars of property damage were incurred.

Only days after the rebellion on Chicago's Near West Side, unrest erupted in the poor and predominantly black Hough neighborhood of

Cleveland. The Hough Riot, as the incident is known, proved to be the country's most serious disturbance that summer. The unrest began on the night of July 18, when a black man entered the white-owned Seventy-Niner's Café at the corner of Hough and 79th Streets. After purchasing a bottle of wine, he asked for some ice water but his request was denied. The customer stormed out of the bar and soon afterward a crowd comprised mainly of African Americans gathered outside the bar. Tempers quickly escalated in the summer heat, and the arrival of a significant force of Cleveland police seemed to touch off an explosion of pent-up anger and frustration. When the police tried to disperse the crowd, a shower of rocks and bricks rained down upon them. Simultaneously, the windows of nearby stores, many of which were owned by whites, were shattered, leading to looting and arson. As additional police reinforcements and firefighters were called in an effort to gain control over the situation, snipers began firing at them, prompting some of them to withdraw, which allowed the crisis to deepen. The next day Cleveland's mayor called for National Guard support, but the arrival of more than 2,000 Guardsmen only served to drive the violence outside the Hough neighborhood and into some of the adjacent black communities. Order in Cleveland was not restored for a week, and during the unrest, four people died, 30 were injured, and hundreds were arrested. Scores of businesses were severely damaged or destroyed, resulting in millions of dollars in property losses that would leave the neighborhood deeply scarred for decades to come.

Two months later, the last of the major riots began in the Hunters Point section of San Francisco, the site of a large naval shipyard on San Francisco Bay and home to a large African American population. On September 27, a young black man was shot and killed by police as he fled from a car that had been stolen. In response to the shooting, a large crowd gathered demanding that the police be held accountable for what many in the black community deemed excessive use of force. San Francisco officials suspended the officer pending an investigation into the incident, but this did not placate the crowd, which began jeering and even pelted with rocks a black community leader brought on to the scene to prevent the situation from getting out of hand. Subsequently, there were scattered outbreaks of looting, arson, and rock throwing

throughout Hunters Point. Over the course of the next several days the unrest also spread to other sections of the city with sizable black populations. As in Chicago and Cleveland, the National Guard was called out to restore order in San Francisco. Compared to the other major riots, the casualty rates at Hunters Point were relatively low: other than the young black man killed fleeing from the stolen car, no one died and only ten civilians were injured, though several hundred thousand dollars of property damage was inflicted, generally to white-owned or official buildings and vehicles.

In addition to these major rebellions, there were numerous other disturbances, albeit on a smaller scale, over the course of the summer of 1966. These took place in Omaha, Nebraska, Benton Harbor, Michigan, Waukegan, Illinois, and the Summerhill section of Atlanta. All told, there were some 40 separate disturbances in 1966. Seven lives were lost, 400 people suffered significant injuries, 3,000 people were arrested, and property losses were estimated at \$5 million.

In retrospect the disturbances of 1966 seemed simply to be a warm-up for 1967, which was by far the worst of the years for unrest. Not only did the summer provide some of the deadliest and most destructive riots – in Detroit and Newark alone 70 people were killed and an estimated \$60 million in property damage was incurred – but the sheer number of disturbances was unlike anything in the modern history of the United States. All told there were more than 150 disturbances scattered across 125 cities and no section of the country emerged unscathed by the unrest. Before the five-day riot in Detroit was ended, army tanks rumbled through the city's streets and a combined force of 17,000 policemen, National Guardsmen, and army troops – some with machine guns mounted atop their jeeps – were called out. As widespread as the disturbances were, however, their root causes were all too familiar: chronic frustration with poor living conditions, the lack of economic opportunity, and perceived police brutality.

The outbreak of violence during the summer of 1967 was of sufficient severity that it prompted President Lyndon Johnson, on July 28, to establish a blue-ribbon National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, popularly known as the Kerner Commission after its chair, Otto Kerner, the governor of Illinois. The mandate of the commission was simply to report back to the president on the causes for the unrest in recent

years and to recommend measures that might prevent unrest in the future. The committee delivered its report in February 1968, concluding famously that “our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white – separate and unequal.” It noted that “segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment totally unknown to most white Americans,” and, more controversially, laid much of the blame squarely with white America: “What white Americans have never fully understood – but what the Negro can never forget – is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain, and white society condones it.” This, of course, was what participants in the urban unrest had been saying all along and, not surprisingly, it did not settle well with either the president, who all but ignored the findings of the report, or with mainstream white America, which felt the report failed to sufficiently acknowledge recent improvements in race relations or the efforts whites had made to reach across the racial divide.

Just over a month after the release of the Kerner Commission Report, and as if to underscore the commission’s findings, another epidemic of rioting swept across the nation in the wake of the assassination of Martin Luther King on April 4, 1968. There were disturbances of a varying degree of severity in over 100 cities, the worst of which occurred in Northern urban centers with large, disaffected black populations such as New York, Chicago, Baltimore, and Washington, DC. Thirty-nine people were killed and several thousand were injured. In Washington, where some of the worst rioting occurred, peaceful demonstrations to mourn King’s passing quickly turned violent as anger and frustration were vented through vandalism, looting, and arson. At their peak, an estimated 20,000 rioters roamed the streets of Washington, coming at one point within sight of the White House. The District of Columbia’s police force was overwhelmed, prompting President Lyndon Johnson to pour over 13,000 federal troops and National Guardsmen into the nation’s capital. Soldiers patrolled the grounds of the White House and machine guns were mounted on the steps of the United States Capitol. In addition to the dozen deaths and over 1,000 injuries, property damage in excess of \$30 million devastated the core of Washington’s black community.

Although there were numerous small rebellions in the years after the nationwide conflagrations that erupted in response to the assassination of Martin Luther King, the next substantial rebellion did not occur until the Miami Rebellion in the spring of 1980. The unrest centered on the largely poor and black districts in Liberty City, Coconut Grove, Overtown, and Brownsville. The roots of the disturbance went back to December 1979, when a black insurance executive by the name of Arthur McDuffie was beaten to death by four white police officers. McDuffie, riding his motorcycle, was alleged by police to have run a red light and then led the officers on a high-speed chase. After crashing his motorcycle, McDuffie tried to flee, but pursuing officers caught up to him. A scuffle ensued and during the ensuing *mêlée*, McDuffie received several blows to the head that proved to be fatal. In the aftermath of the incident, officers tried to make it appear that McDuffie’s death was a result of the motorcycle crash.

Unlike in many earlier rebellions, there was no immediate outburst of violence in black Miami when word of the incident spread. Indeed, following an investigation, the officers were indicted for manslaughter and put on trial in the spring of 1980. In light of the potential volatility of the situation in Miami, however, the case was tried across the state in Tampa. Eventually, on May 17, 1980, an all-white jury acquitted the officers of all charges. Fearing a backlash in black neighborhoods, community leaders quickly called for a massive but silent march of protest in Miami, but events rapidly spun out of control, as thousands of disaffected African Americans poured into the streets to vent their anger at the perceived injustice. For the next three days, blacks across Miami went on a violent rampage, looting and burning mainly white-owned property. Rioters shot at police trying to quell the violence; passengers were burned alive in their cars, and countless shops, stores, and other businesses were destroyed. More than 3,500 National Guard troops were needed to bring the rebellion to an end, but only after 18 people had died and \$100 million in property damage had been incurred. Veteran civil rights activist Jesse Jackson expressed the shock of many leaders – black and white – when he described the rebellion as one of “the most bitter and mean I’ve ever seen.”

After the passage of another decade without significant unrest, the largely black community

in South Central Los Angeles erupted in the spring of 1992 in one of the most serious instances of civil unrest in the history of the United States. The uprising was rooted in the classic sources for urban unrest: poverty, lack of opportunity, alienation from the mainstream of society, as well as long simmering anger over incidents of police brutality. In this case, however, there was video evidence to substantiate charges against police. In March 1991, a bystander videotaped four white Los Angeles policemen subjecting Rodney King, an African American, to a savage beating after King had led the police on a high-speed car chase and, allegedly, was violently resisting arrest. The video was widely broadcast on national television and the images provoked widespread condemnation. Subsequently, charges of using excessive force were brought against the police by the Los Angeles district attorney. Given the publicity surrounding the videotaped beating, the venue for the trial was moved to neighboring Simi Valley, which was largely white and Hispanic. On April 29, 1992, a 12-person jury – ten of whom were white and none were black – acquitted the officers of the charges.

The verdict pointedly reinforced perceptions in the black community of South Central Los Angeles that the judicial system, like the law enforcement system, was stacked against them. Only hours after the verdict was handed down, a crowd that had gathered in South Central to protest the decision began attacking non-African American passengers in vehicles passing through the community. Shortly thereafter, there were outbreaks of vandalism, looting, and violence, directed in particular at the Asian community which had a significant presence in South Central. The violence continued to escalate and lasted for nearly a week. In addition to the Los Angeles police, the National Guard was mobilized and President Bush eventually called out federal troops to help quell the violence. Tens of thousands of people were involved in the rebellion and over 12,000 arrests were made. Before it was over, 53 people had died, including 25 African Americans, 16 Hispanics, and 8 whites, and more than 4,000 people were injured. The community suffered catastrophic property damage, as hundreds of buildings were damaged or destroyed. Property losses were valued at upwards of \$1 billion and affected white, Asian, and black owners.

Finally, in an incident much smaller in scale than the South Central Riot of 1992, or many of the rebellions in the 1960s, Cincinnati police, in April 2001, shot and killed an unarmed black teenager whom they had been pursuing on foot. The killing occurred in the predominantly black and poor Over-the-Rhine neighborhood, and the victim was the fifteenth African American to be killed in a series of confrontations with city police over the previous six years, fueling charges of police brutality and official callousness toward the black community. Two days later, nearly 200 black Cincinnatians interrupted a city council meeting to demand action in response to the killing. When they were rebuffed after several tense hours, the crowd reluctantly left the building but reassembled, now nearly 1,000 strong, in front of the headquarters of the police precinct where the shooting had occurred. Individuals in the crowd threw rocks and bottles at the phalanx of officers who stood guard in front of the building, and police began firing tear gas and bean-bag projectiles which dispersed the crowd. The next day, however, the demonstrations resumed and, as they moved into the heart of downtown Cincinnati, they turned violent. Protesters began to smash store windows and overturn garbage cans and street vendor stands. Over the next several days, the magnitude of the violence increased as shops were looted and burned, gunfire was exchanged with police, and the mayhem spread over a larger portion of the city. At times, non-blacks were threatened, and on several occasions assaulted, by the mob. Eventually the unrest subsided, leaving behind dozens of injuries and arrests and damage estimated at nearly \$4 million. To be sure, the situation could have been much worse. Yet the Cincinnati riots were an ominous reminder that many of the root causes for civil unrest in America's urban centers during the past 60 or so years clearly persisted in the new century.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978; Civil Rights, United States: Overview; CORE (Congress of Racial Equality); Red Summer, United States, 1919

References and Suggested Readings

- Capeci, D. (1977) *The Harlem Riot of 1943*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Conot, R. (1968) *Rivers of Blood, Years of Darkness*. New York: William Morrow.

- Gilje, P. A. (1996). *Rioting in America*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (1968) Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Sugrue, T. J. (1996) *The Origins of the Urban Crisis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Thompson, H. A. (2001) Urban Uprisings: Riots or Rebellions? In D. Farber & B. Bailey (Eds.), *The Columbia Guide to America in the 1960s*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 109–17.

Urracá, Cacique of Veraguas (d. 1516)

Viviana Uriona

The name Urracá comes from the extended Taíno term for “Hurricane” that was introduced by the Spaniards. The name of Urracá – in the language of his group, the Bugle – was “Molenan” (Puma). He led efforts to resist Spanish forays into his territory in search of gold.

In his quest for gold, the Spaniard Gaspar de Espinosa founded the base of Natá in Urracá’s territory, but Urracá sustained the fight against the invaders for almost ten years. He used guerrilla tactics, developing an apparently weak offensive and ceding the battleground to his enemy before really starting to fight. The Spaniards, encouraged by what they thought to be the fear and weakness of the enemy, forged ahead, but in the ravines and gorges they were besieged by legions of indigenous fighters. In 1527 a powerful confederation of people against the Spaniards was organized, led by Urracá and other chieftains, Pocoa and Trota, who defied the invaders.

Francis Compañón (one of Natá’s men) was appointed by the governor Pedrarias Davila to open friendly talks with Urracá in 1531. Urracá attended a meeting, confident of good intentions, but was arrested, chained, and sent to Panama, to the city of Nombre de Dios from where he was supposed to be brought to Spain. Two days before the ship set sail, Urracá escaped. Both the official and the traditional history agree that Urracá died in 1531 or disappeared in the midst of his people.

SEE ALSO: Agüeybaná I (d. 1510) and Agüeybaná II (d. 1511); Aracaré (d. 1542); Caonabo (d. 1496); Cuahtémoc (1502–1525); Hatuey (ca. 1400s–1512);

Jumandi (d. 1578); Lautaro (d. 1557); Lemba, Sebastian (d. 1547); Lempira (d. 1537); Panama, Cemaco’s Anti-Colonial Resistance, 1510–1512; Sepé Tiarajú (1722/3–1756); Tisquesuza (d. 1537); Túpac Amaru (ca. 1540–1572); Túpac Katari (ca. 1750–1781)

References and Suggested Readings

- Alba, C. M. M. (1979) El Cacique Urracá. *Revista Lotería* 277. Panama-Stadt.
- Cooke, R. G. (1993) Alianzas y relaciones comerciales entre indígena y españoles durante el período de contacto: el caso de Urraca, Esquegua y los vecinos de Natá. *Revista Nacional de Cultura* 25, 111–22. Panama-Stadt.
- Durán, Pastor E. (2006) Natá de los “Caballeros.” Available at: www.argenpress.info/notaold.asp?num=027248 (accessed May 25, 2008).

Uruguay, labor and populist movements, 1965–present

Raul Zibechi

In the mid-1950s, economic and political crisis was apparent in Uruguay. After a long period of domestic growth and the formation of a welfare state, Uruguay’s fledgling domestic industry was battered by economic stagnation resulting from economic recovery in the core countries after the Korean War (1952) and dry weather, which reduced agricultural production.

In factories, trade unions were divided among different political ideologies, reducing the effectiveness of organizing. But in 1956, workers went on a long strike in the refrigeration industry – Uruguay’s largest (by number of workers employed) and, because of the national export of meat products, most significant industry. The powerful militant pressure emerging from among workers at the grassroots factory level forced national union leaders to rebuild bridges to the rank and file.

In 1964 the National Convention of Workers (CNT) was founded as a trade union coordinating body, planning the complete formation of a new labor federation in 1966. Concomitantly, the government, falling further into debt, signed the first Letter of Intent with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and initiated systematic alignment with the United States through adopt-

ing a program to suppress worker and labor union opposition (a policy remaining in force until March 2005) and the election of the leftist Frente Amplio (Broad Front, FA) government. From 1965 to 2005 the CNT was the most prominent association of workers' resistance in opposition to the new economic model driven by the elites.

One of the first decisions of the CNT was to build a great social alliance aimed at national Uruguayan liberation and independence from foreign economic interference. The proposal resulted in the convening of the People's Congress including, in addition to workers, students, artisans, scholars, pensioners, and small and medium producers to formulate an agenda to resolve the crisis and organize an effective popular alternative. The congress met August 12–15, 1965, with 1,376 delegates from 707 organizations representing 800,000 people, a third of the country's population. The approved program centered on three basic principles seeking to return to endogenous development – fundamental agrarian reform; nationalization of the banking system, foreign trade, and industry; and a moratorium on foreign debt. Simultaneously, the CNT promoted deepening democratic measures that would defend wages, education, health, and access to housing for the working class, peasants, and all popular sectors.

In the intervening years from 1965 to the coup d'état of 1973, the trade union movement, closely allied with students and university teachers and the cooperative movement, intensely resisted the government's effort to profoundly restructure Uruguay's economy and weaken the social movements to resolve the economic crisis in favor of the upper classes and state bureaucrats. One of the most dramatic protests surfaced in the winter of 1969 when Jorge Pacheco Areco's government called a state of emergency and martial law, severely restricting freedom of expression and social mobilization.

The urban guerilla MLN-Tupamaros (National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros), simply called Tupamaros or Tupas, challenged the state with armed propaganda actions, hijacking personalities on the right and attacking the police. Within a relative balance of forces, the government began restructuring the refrigeration industry, which entailed massive closures of large plants. At the same time, adjustment measures to the economy entailed a sharp deterioration in workers' income.

At that juncture, the main branches of production recorded long and combative strikes that led union leaders to propose a general strike to curb the country's rightward lean. After a bitter controversy within the CNT between communists and other groups (socialist, nationalist left, democrats, anarchists, and radical), it was decided not to hold the strike, since the Communist Party felt that the extreme conditions necessary to implement it were lacking. Those opposed to the communist position argued that broad sectors of workers were already on strike and that it was just a question of making the strike official to give it greater force. In fact, the communists were working to build a broad alliance that could be transferred to the electoral terrain.

From November to February 1971, the FA ran a selection of candidates in the national elections. Although the party failed to gain 20 percent of the vote, this new political force managed to break the traditional electoral bipartisanship between the National Party and the Colorado Party. In 1972, a strong police and military offensive was launched against the guerillas. The military gained prominence and began to impose conditions on the political system. In February 1973, amid a deepening military crisis, there were sharp divisions within the CNT. The communist front formed an alliance with progressive sectors of the armed forces, whom they considered *peruanistas* for their ostensible resemblance to the progressive government of Peruvian military leader Juan Velasco Alvarado. However, a significant portion of the social movement remained deeply mistrustful of the military.

Finally, on December 27, 1973, President Juan Maria Bordaberry dissolved parliament and installed a dictatorial government, consolidating power throughout Uruguay with the backing of the armed forces. The trade union movement organized resistance to the military coup d'état by launching a general strike that included sit-downs and occupation of workplaces. The strike lasted 15 days before a major military onslaught crushed the labor action and all forms of protest. The military fiercely suppressed working-class resistance, banning the CNT, the student movement, and left-wing parties and declaring unlawful any form of political activity and social protest. CNT leaders and activists were arrested and those who escaped went into hiding or exile.

The military regime engaged in state repression, imprisoning tens of thousands of people over a period of 12 years.

Under the dictatorship, union locals were occupied by the armed forces and any attempt at union organization was suppressed. By breaking social resistance, the regime was able to impose an export-focused economic model and completely abandon endogenous development, putting an end to social rights. This left thousands of people unemployed and resulted in a sharp drop in real wages.

Beginning in 1982, however, the workers' movement revived. Trade unionists created new groups to oppose the legislation imposed by the dictatorship, which also continued to crush students. On May 1, 1983, labor activists and supporters founded the Workers' Interunion Plenary (PIT), a horizontally based assembly representing the first broad-based public opposition to the dictatorship. The massive popular mobilization encouraged the formation of new social organizations that shaped the formation of a popular working-class campaign for democracy, known as the Intersocial, an association encompassing labor, students, cooperatives, and the human rights movement.

The consolidation of opposition at the grassroots level ushered in a new cycle of popular social movements that placed the military regime on the defensive. Former trade union leaders and banned political parties began to return from exile. Under pressure, the regime called elections for November 1984 but did not allow Liber Seregni, leader of the FA, or Wilson Ferreira Aldunate to participate, thus facilitating the triumph of rightist Julio María Sanguinetti, leader of the Colorado Party, and ensuring the continuation of a state of repression against workers and peasants.

The trade union movement went through painful transformations in that year. The return en masse of exiled party and trade union leaders hindered the construction of a new culture and social association. Thereafter, a similar logic that had prevailed in the CNT was reestablished in a movement dominated by the Communist Party (which had been most active in the clandestine resistance to the dictatorship), renamed the PIT-CNT. A major crisis soon developed within the movement, leading to a split during the Third Congress held in 1985. An Extraordinary Congress held in 1986 reconciled the different ideological

currents, but the internal crisis had weakened the movement.

In the ensuing years the battle of the human rights movement against military oppression was at the center of social protest. In late 1986, parliament adopted a controversial law that provided amnesty for military officials who had violated human rights during the dictatorship, thereby preventing the delivery of justice. The popular reaction was impressive: in less than a month, more than 300 neighborhood commissions, acting without party or social organization backing, were created in Montevideo to demand a referendum to repeal the law on amnesty. In this powerful social movement that was decentralized and dispersed throughout the country, young people and women, who had had little involvement in the institutionalized movement, played a prominent role.

This movement transformed Uruguayan society. For a year, thousands of activists traveled throughout the country to large urban areas and small towns in remote rural areas, collecting signatures as they sought at least 25 percent of the electorate to call for a plebiscite to challenge the law that gave the military immunity for crimes against humanity. While the referendum of April 1989 was won by those who sought to prevent trials of crimes against humanity, the human rights movement expanded its influence throughout Uruguayan society to people who had previously never been in contact with the popular forces and burgeoning social movements. The political campaign successfully broke patronage barriers and questioned the control of solidly ensconced regional political institutions and leaders. Through the growth of grassroots protest by youth and workers, a new democratic political culture emerged that parted significantly from traditional forms of institutional representation, leading the way for the extension and solidification of social protest in the 1990s.

In 1989, the year in which the referendum was defeated, leftists won the mayor's office in Montevideo, home to half of Uruguay's population, for the first time. The human rights movement had played a major role in that victory, but, following a national tradition, had never openly expressed its electoral preferences and policies.

The 1990s was a decade of neoliberal market reforms, including plans to promote labor flexibility and dismantle the domestic industry,

particularly textiles and metallurgy. In the early 1990s the government, at the instigation of foreign multilateral organizations and capital, sought to end agreements governing the tripartite negotiation of wages and working conditions between employers, unions, and the state. The model inspired by the Washington Consensus weakened the union movement, especially in private companies. The PIT–CNT experienced some of the most acute problems in its history, with a substantial drop in membership and a decline in its national influence. Traditional forms of struggle – strikes and pressure on the authorities – failed to have a positive effect on building the movement.

However, the movement did succeed in halting the privatization of public enterprises, appealing for a referendum on the basis of the experience gained by the human rights movement. In 1992, a broad coalition in which unions in state enterprises played a decisive role managed to halt the imminent privatization wave triggered by the neoliberal administration of Luis Alberto Lacalle. The recent Argentinian experience, where massive privatization driven by President Carlos Menem engendered a huge social cost, provided an example that made the Uruguayan movement's arguments more convincing. In the years that followed, the movement used referendums, which were generally successful, to prevent further privatization and to help the state regain full control of basic resources such as water.

Thanks largely to the active role played by social movements since the end of the dictatorship in 1985, the first government of the left assumed control in 2005. This new situation represented an unprecedented challenge for the social movements. The unions held a congress before the electoral triumph of the FA in which they reaffirmed their independence from political parties but proclaimed that they would not remain indifferent to any debatable aspects of government policies. The new government established smooth relations with the trade unions, reinstated collective bargaining, and awarded wage increases and improvements in working conditions, thereby promoting a remarkable growth in union membership. For the first time in decades, unions regained prominence.

Broadly speaking, the trade union movement recognized the positive aspects of the government of the left (in areas such as wages, health, human

rights, and the fight against poverty), but criticized economic policy and the government's alignment with the administration of George W. Bush. In March 2007, social movements and trade unions staged a large demonstration on the day President Bush arrived in Uruguay to express their opposition to the possible signing of a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States.

The triumph of the left fostered a change in the social and cultural climate that enabled the expansion of new movements. Great strides were made toward sexual diversity rights, and women gained freedom through the decriminalization of abortion. The construction of two large pulp mills brought the country's small environmentalist movement to the forefront. The question of appropriate economic models was taken up by the PIT–CNT, which before the elections had argued for the return to a manufacturing economy against the service economy promoted by financial neoliberals.

In 2008, the social movements convened their Second Congress of the People to define and debate future directions. Leaders argued that just as the congress of 1965 had provided a decisive influence in the program that moved the country to the left after 1971, so the new congress could influence the government in the changed economic climate of 2008, pushing for a new model of endogenous development that involved parting ways with neoliberalism.

SEE ALSO: Artigas, Gervasio José (1764–1850); Tupamaros; Uruguay, Left-Wing Politics from the Tupamaros to the Frente Amplio; Velasco Alvarado, Juan Francisco (1910–1977)

References and Suggested Readings

- Botaro, J. (1985) *25 años de movimiento sindical uruguayo*. Montevideo: ASU.
- Chagas, J. & Tonarelli, M. (1989) *El sindicalismo uruguayo bajo la dictadura*. Montevideo: Nuevo Mundo.
- Elissalde, R. (2003) Under the Umbrella. *New Internationalist* 26, 2 (May 1).
- Remedi, G. (2004) *Carnival Theatre: Uruguay's Popular Performers and National Culture*. Trans. A. Ferlazzo. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Winn, P. (1995) Frente Amplio in Montevideo. *NACLA Report on the Americas* 29 (1).
- Zibechi, R. (1997) *La revuelta juvenil de los 90. Las redes sociales en la gestación de una cultura alternativa*. Montevideo: Nordan.

Uruguay, left-wing politics from the Tupamaros to the Frente Amplio

Raul Zibechi

Until the early 1960s the left in Uruguay occupied a marginal position in the political arena and had a significant presence only in the trade union movement. In barely three decades, the left emerged as the hegemonic force in the country, rising to an absolute majority in the 2004 elections. Established in 1971, the Frente Amplio (Broad Front) has demonstrated a remarkable and sustained progression. Previously divided, the left obtained less than 5 percent of the vote until it unified and leaped to 18 percent in the 1971 election, bringing to an end the dominant bipartisanship maintained by the Colorado and National parties. Since 1971, the left vote has never ceased to grow, reaching a record 51 percent in the election that brought Tabare Vazquez to the presidency (2005–10).

The factors behind the surge in support for the left reflect the cultural, political, and social history of Uruguay, and especially the failure of the neoliberal model that destroyed the country's homogeneous social fabric and weakened the most robust state welfare in Latin America. The Uruguayan left is the legacy of a tradition forged during the 1903–7 and the 1911–15 administrations of President José Batlle y Ordóñez, which laid the foundations for a modern state separated from the economic elites that, in turn, created vast social democratic forms of social legislation. Historians agree that unlike most of Latin America, Uruguay never had an oligarchy forcing its dominant economic groups to “delegate” the state administration to professional politicians.

Under these circumstances, the left found it difficult to establish a base in a socially and ethnically integrated society that was heavily buffered by the cultural hegemony of the middle layers, composed of professionals, skilled workers, and a large mass of public employees. The political map was monopolized by the Colorado Party, rooted in Montevideo and the most prosperous cities, and the National Party (also known as the White Party), of rural origins, which had remained at the helm of the country

since the founding of the republic. It was not until the recovery of the core countries and the crisis in the industrial model revealed the limits of the country's dependence, with the implementation of the prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the late 1950s, that the left lost its marginal position in Uruguay's political landscape.

During this decade, the trade union movement led some major conflicts, especially in the meat-packing industry and then in the textile industry, in response to the growing unemployment generated by the economic crisis and the closure of large factories. At the same time, a young law student with a socialist political background settled in the north of the county and began organizing workers in the rural sector, which had until then been marginalized from the national trade unions. Led by Raúl Sendic, the cane and beet sugar industry workers created their first organizations in the early 1960s.

In search of solidarity to combat the harsh repression against their movement, cane-cutters sought the support of urban organized sectors and conducted long marches to the capital city of Montevideo. These actions marked the origins of one sector of the Uruguayan left, a sector that was non-traditional and sharply differentiated from socialists and communists since it relied on direct action and later lent its support to armed struggle. The sugar cane workers' organization Artigas Sugar Workers' Union (UTAA) was the first solid social base of what in the mid-1960s would become the National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros (MNL-T).

In a few years the Tupamaros obtained what the traditional left had not achieved in decades: it placed the social problems and desperate situation of the poorest at the center of the political stage. With ingenious armed propaganda actions, it caught the attention of the middle sectors (students and professionals in particular) and succeeded in uniting the broad discontent bred by the increasing economic crisis devastating the country.

The final years of the 1960s were plagued by strikes, demonstrations, and mass actions led by trade unions and student organizations. In this climate, both the Tupamaros and the traditional left experienced a significant quantitative growth. Two major trends developed within the social movements: the communists became interested in channeling social conflicts into the electoral terrain; and an informal alliance developed

between the Tupamaros, socialists, anarchists, and “radical” groups who favored direct action. The 1967 ban on several radical organizations and newspapers by the conservative administration of President Jorge Pacheco Areco indirectly benefited the presence and visibility of the communists in the social movement.

As the state of emergency (curfews, suspension of individual rights) became routine and relations between the social movements and the opposition became increasingly tense, urban guerilla actions were met sympathetically among broad sectors of the population. In these circumstances the communists initiated the formation of a broad electoral front. Named the Broad Front (Frente Amplio, FA), this new electoral grouping was founded on February 5, 1971. Overcoming old enmities, communists and socialists joined together for the first time. Although the Tupamaros did not formally support the FA, organizations identified with the armed struggle joined the alliance. Christian Democrats joined the FA as well as dissident sectors from the Colorado Party – among them former cabinet member Zelmar Michelini – the White Party, and nationalists. Only anarchists rejected participation in the Broad Front.

The forging of unity among such heterogeneous forces was not an easy task. It was the communists who showed greater flexibility to attract allies, giving in on the most confrontational issues. In a moment of great political polarization with the guerillas and unions, the left managed to appoint Liber Seregni – a former general with a long and distinguished career – as head of the FA. As a leader he showed brilliant strategic skills, prioritizing negotiation and dialogue over confrontation and the widening spectrum of alliances – attitudes which at the time could be attacked as overly pragmatic, but almost always paid rich dividends.

The unity and legitimacy of the newly founded FA were reinforced by the 1973–85 dictatorship. Since the reinstatement of democracy, the left had regained not only its legality but also a very prominent place in the political arena. The public recognition of their leaders transcended political boundaries and ideologies, not only in the case of Seregni but also that of the Tupamaro leader Sendic, who bravely endured 13 years of torture and imprisonment in harsh conditions, spending months in prison cells ankle-deep in water. The dictatorship consolidated the left’s

identity, both at the grassroots level and at the leadership level, through a sort of “blood pact” that sealed loyalties.

It was during the period of authoritarian rule that the left became dominant in major cultural events and collective daily life. Despite harsh repression and mass migration, left-wing culture managed to preserve itself within the family, and later reproduced itself through the existence of strong bonds of solidarity. The left attained cultural hegemony long before obtaining the electoral majority. The public university and theater have constituted, for more than half a century, the bulwark of a non-partisan middle-sector left. By the 1960s, left-wing culture was already hegemonic among professionals and academics. Over the years, leftist sympathies became relevant in popular music, carnival, and major mass demonstrations, and were also prevalent among some leading football stars, who made no secret of their preference for the FA. From 1990, the left’s successful management of the municipality of Montevideo, where half the country’s population lives, was crucial in strengthening and deepening its social and cultural hegemony. This hegemony is grounded in the acknowledgment that the central ideas embodying the FA – the welfare state, honest government, national sovereignty, social justice, among others – have become “common sense” for Uruguayans in the early twenty-first century.

From its inception, the FA’s original contribution to the political culture of the country became one of the keys to its acceptance by the population: the grassroots committees where militants and activists of all the different currents come together. With a dense network of committees from its foundation, the FA sought to penetrate society on a committee basis, with militants and activists from all currents. The dense network of committees became spaces for socialization, through which a *frenteamplista* identity was forged that subsumed the previous identities of the different organizations in the FA. This is one of the peculiarities of the Uruguayan left: the unit is much more than the sum of its parts.

The FA’s organizational network is impressive. In 2000, the FA had 207,000 affiliates – in a country of three million people, this figure represents slightly more than one in every ten adults. In the 1999 election the FA obtained approximately 800,000 votes, which meant that at least one in ten registered voters was organized within

the committee networks of the FA. Currently there exist around 300 committees, but during the democratic transition 500 committees were formed in Montevideo alone (in a city of 1.2 million inhabitants) – one committee for every 2,500 inhabitants. This kind of network not only sustains the growth of the Uruguayan left but also ensures its permanence, despite socialist failures and their consecutive electoral defeats.

Supporters pay a monthly fee, choose the leaders of their own committee, and elect the leadership of the FA. Committees are grouped into zones, of which there are 18 in Montevideo and a similar number nationally. The grassroots elect delegates to the National Plenary and the National Political Bureau – the FA's permanent governing bodies between congresses. Being *frenteamplista* meant much more than voting every five years, an attitude that reflected the best political traditions of the social democratic sector of the Colorado Party, known as *batllismo*. José Batlle y Ordóñez, the popular president from 1903 to 1907 and from 1911 to 1915, fought for unemployment compensation, eight-hour workdays, and universal suffrage.

A significant milestone for the growth of the left was the 1986 adoption of the law declaring the expiration of crimes against human rights perpetrated during the military dictatorship (1973–85). Adopted with the support of both the Colorado and White parties, the legislation granted virtual immunity from prosecution to members of the military involved in illegal repression against leftists and popular leaders. For a population accustomed to living in a country with political and legal equality, the “impunity law” was a severe blow to their social consciousness. In response, an impressive social movement to repeal the law was formed through the creation of 300 neighborhood committees throughout the country, including not only *frenteamplistas* but also progressive members of the Colorado and White parties.

The campaign lasted two years and created a genuine social dialogue among ordinary citizens. In order to collect the 25 percent of the total number of registered voters required to call a referendum to repeal the law, local activists carried out home visits among neighbors to explain the importance of their demand. In all, 30,000 activists took part in the campaign, visiting approximately 80 percent of all households in the country and talking to more than one million

people, sometimes returning to a household two, three, and up to seven times to obtain a signature.

This was the biggest social movement ever in Uruguay, and it changed the face of the country, despite the fact that in April 1989, 42 percent voted to repeal the law of impunity, while over 56 percent voted to retain it. The campaign, however, helped the left to break its historical boundaries by bringing thousands of activists into rural areas. Shortly afterward, the left won the municipal elections for the first time in the capital city of Montevideo.

Through massive mobilization, the left was able not only to halt privatization and neoliberalism but also to recover the powerful statist tradition that began with *batllismo*. The referendum of 1992 against privatization had the backing of 70 percent, although the left still did not reach 30 percent of the vote. At the height of privatization worldwide, Uruguayans’ “common sense” pointed in the opposite direction. The crisis of neoliberalism finally hastened the end of right-wing governments in Uruguay, and the victory of the left was only a matter of time. Trends in society as well as generational impulses were eroding irreversibly the hegemony of the traditional parties.

The 2002 economic recession ushered in by the Argentine crisis dealt a death blow to the right. Between January and July 2002, the country risk index for Uruguay rose from 220 to 3,000 points; 45 percent of bank deposits were repatriated out of the country; the price of the dollar doubled; and gross domestic product was equivalent to half that for 1998. Unemployment climbed to 20 percent and the percentage of the population below the poverty line reached 40 percent. The crisis facilitated the electoral triumph of the left. The collapse of the Colorado Party gives an idea of the enormity of the change: it passed within a few years from commanding more than 40 percent of popular support to a mere 10 percent of the vote in 2002.

The FA maintained its meteoric electoral progression. In 1994 it obtained 30 percent of the vote and was only two points short of winning. For the next election, the right amended the constitution and increased the voting age, seeking to hinder an eventual left-wing victory. In 1999, the FA rose again, reaching 44 percent in the second round. Finally, in November 2004, it received 51 percent of the vote to form the first left-wing government in Uruguay on March 1, 2005.

SEE ALSO: MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru); Sendic, Raúl (1926–1989); Tupamaros; Uruguay, Labor and Populist Movements, 1965–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Blixen, S. (2004) *Sendic*. Montevideo: Trilce.
- Caetano, G. et al. (1995) *La izquierda uruguaya. Tradición, innovación y política*. Montevideo: Trilce.
- Demasi, C. (Ed.) (1998) *Cronología del Uruguay de la crisis y de la dictadura, 1967–1984*. Montevideo: Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias.
- Turiansky, W. (1997) *El Uruguay desde la izquierda*. Montevideo: Cal y Canto.

US labor rebellions and the rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)

Harris Freeman

The year 1934 was a turning point in the US class struggle. That year, militant strikes by truckers in Minneapolis, auto parts workers in Toledo, and longshoremens in San Francisco spurred broad labor solidarity in these cities, transforming the strikes into massive working-class social upheavals. These three strikes, all led by revolutionary-minded workers, proved to be strategic victories for industrial unionism and paved the way for the organization of basic industry in the United States by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).

By 1934, the Great Depression that began in 1929 had thrown almost one-third of the workforce, more than 15 million workers, onto the streets. Union membership had fallen from a high of over four million in 1920 to a low of around two million in 1933. As one historian put it, these figures are history's sad commentary on the American Federation of Labor's policy of favoring craft unionism in a country dominated by a mass production economy.

From the start of the 1929 economic collapse, US President Herbert Hoover, backed by the bulk of the employing class, resisted every measure to provide federal assistance for the hungry and homeless. Nevertheless, fearing the political consequences of what was widely seen as a brutal, repressive government labor policy,

Congress enacted important labor reforms. In 1932, the Norris-LaGuardia Act outlawed the yellow-dog contract (in which employees agree, as a condition of employment, not to be a member of a labor union), proclaimed the right to organize unions as federal policy, and restricted the ability of the federal courts to issue labor injunctions to suppress the right to strike. This did not stop local police and federal troops from unleashing brutal attacks on unemployed workers' demonstrations in the summer of 1932. Indeed, neither Democrats nor Republicans protested the use of tanks and tear gas against hunger marchers that year.

Labor rights and working-class relief were not on the mainstream political agenda during the 1932 presidential election campaign. The platform of the Democratic presidential nominee, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, other than a vague call for a new deal, differed little from that of the Republicans. As his future labor secretary, Frances Perkins, would later explain, "the New Deal was not a plan with form or content." His victory over President Hoover was unsurprising. Roosevelt did not need to present a program for working-class relief to win the election; it was widely stated at the time that even Mickey Mouse could have defeated Hoover in 1932.

Roosevelt's first 100 days were dominated by relieving the distress facing American business. In the meantime, the industrial working class had grown impatient. A. J. Muste, leader of the Toledo Auto-Lite strike, recounts that "all hell began to pop" in early 1933. "Strike followed strike with bewildering rapidity." That year the number of work stoppages doubled to 1,856 actions and the number of strikes increased fourfold, involving more than 1,100,000 workers. The strike activity, focused primarily on union recognition and wage increases, began even before the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) was signed by Roosevelt in mid-June. Initially, the NIRA did not even address collective bargaining rights. It was only after protests by American Federation of Labor (AFL) President William Green and pressure from United Mine Workers' (UMW) leader John L. Lewis that Roosevelt added Section 7(a) to the NIRA.

However, Section 7(a)'s support for the right to organize was so vague that it was interpreted to recognize the then-flourishing company-dominated unions side by side with genuine labor organizations. It offered nothing by way of

rights or remedies that were not already offered by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. But its enactment did spur the US labor leadership to authorize more organizing. The immediate results were huge. In two months the UMW signed up 300,000 workers and the International Ladies' Garment Workers signed up 150,000. But the NIRA's enactment could not protect workers from the employer's bitter resistance to the new wave of union organizing.

This was seen most clearly in the failed textile strike led by the AFL's United Textile Workers of America (UTW). The UTW's membership mushroomed from around 50,000 to over 400,000 by mid-1934. In August, the UTW delegates called a national strike for recognition and the 30-hour workweek at the pay scale for the 48-hour workweek established by NIRA. Over 400,000 workers headed the union call. The *New York Times* expressed alarm at the flying picket squads, women workers' active role in picketing, and the military efficiency of the strikers. The employers responded with a brutal reign of terror. In the South, this included armed racist mobs whipped into frenzy by red baiting promoted by the mainstream press. Throughout New England, National Guard troops occupied mill towns. The AFL failed to provide the kind of leadership needed to win this battle. Fortunately, labor battles fought in the spring and summer of 1934 in Minneapolis, Toledo, and San Francisco led by groups and individuals not tied to the old ways of the AFL shifted the momentum of the class struggle.

Toledo, Ohio, a little Detroit built on the glass and auto parts industries, was decimated by the Depression. The city's major employer of 28,000 crumbled in bankruptcy and one out of three workers was on relief. A unique political feature of the Toledo workers' movement was the formation in 1933 of the Lucas County Unemployed League, led by A. J. Muste, a Dutch-born preacher and veteran leader of the 1919 textile strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts. Muste became dean of the Brookwood Labor College in 1921 where he trained many who rose to prominence in the 1930s workers' movement. He also formed a small revolutionary organization, the American Workers' Party (AWP). Under the AWP's leadership the Unemployed League led mass actions of the Toledo unemployed, winning cash relief for them. Importantly, the League operated on broad labor solidarity prin-

ciples, mobilizing the unemployed not to scab and to aid strikes.

In this context, the fight for industrial rights began in 1933 with the AFL chartering of Federal Local 18384 to organize workers at the Toledo Auto-Lite factory. A February strike was called demanding recognition, a 10 percent wage hike, and seniority. It was quickly ended by AFL leaders who sought a negotiated agreement mediated through NIRA's National Labor Board. When the company refused to negotiate, the Local called a second strike in April. But fewer than half the workers followed the Local and the boss hired strikebreakers to keep the plant operating. Picketing at the factory gates threatened to shut the plant and the employer sought and was granted a court injunction limiting the pickets to 25 at each factory entrance. The union officials obeyed the terms of the injunction, and in three weeks the company had secured 1,800 scabs to work at the Auto-Lite factory.

The strike seemed doomed until a group of union members approached the Unemployed League. Soon, unemployed workers joined the picket line to support the strike and AWP leader Louis Budenz suggested the tactic of disobeying the court injunction with mass picketing. Two Unemployed League officers, Sam Pollack and Ted Selander, along with several auto Local members, wrote Judge Roy. R. Stuart advising him that they would violate the injunction and encourage mass picketing. When League members blocked the entrance to the factory gates, they were arrested on contempt of court charges and released on suspended sentences. They immediately returned to the picket lines. The company responded with hired armed guards, special deputies to protect the scabs, and the storing of munitions in the plant.

Budenz soon addressed a series of rallies during the week of May 21 outside the Auto-Lite factory. Over the course of the week, the crowds grew so that by Wednesday, May 23, a crowd of 10,000 strikers and unemployed were massed outside the Auto-Lite plant. The Battle of Toledo began here with street fighting that continued from mid-afternoon until midnight, effectively imprisoning 1,500 scabs inside the factory. National Guard troops were called out and a pitched battle involving tear gas, bricks, and bullets occurred on the streets of Toledo for six days. Strikers and their supporters not only fought the Guard, they engaged them in dialogue

to try to win them over to the cause. Some Guardsmen quit and others voiced support for the strike. Nevertheless, the Guard killed two strikers and wounded 25. It was not until Friday, May 31 that the troops were withdrawn when the company agreed to close the plant to scabs. By that time, however, 98 out of 99 of the AFL local unions voted for a general strike. That day 40,000 workers gathered at the courthouse square protesting the arrest of over 200 strikers.

By June 4, an agreement was reached. Local 18384 was deemed the exclusive bargaining agent at Auto-Lite; it was the first agreement that did not include proportional representation for a company-sponsored union. The six-month contract also required the company to rehire all strikers and granted a 5 percent wage increase. By year's end 19 auto parts plants were organized in Toledo. Within a year, the first successful strike at a General Motors auto plant occurred, beginning the union's conquest of the largest manufacturing firm in the US.

Even before the Toledo Auto-Lite strike erupted, the ground was being laid in Minneapolis for a campaign that transformed the International Brotherhood of Teamsters from a stodgy craft union, with 80,000 members nationwide, into a powerful labor union organized along industrial lines. The city's role as a distribution hub for the upper Midwest region provided the objective conditions for this campaign. In the course of the Depression, thousands of displaced and unemployed railwaymen, lumberjacks, miners, farmers, and their families from throughout the upper Midwest ended up in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Their movement into Minneapolis reinforced an already established multi-ethnic working class with a rich tradition of class struggle born of historic ties to the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and the Socialist Party traditions of Eugene Debs. The overall political climate in the state was also favorable. Farmer-Labor Party governor of Minnesota at that time, Floyd Olsen, was among the most left wing of elected officials in the nation, proclaiming, "I am not a liberal . . . I am a radical" who wanted "a definite change in the system." However, unionism in the city was thwarted by a powerful business organization. The Citizens' Alliance had for more than 20 years used espionage, stool pigeons, and thugs to do whatever was necessary to thwart unionism in Minneapolis.

In this stew, a small cadre of revolutionary communist workers cooked up a plan in 1930 to transform Teamster General Local 574 into an industrial union encompassing drivers, helpers, and warehouse workers. The radical leadership included Ray and Vince Dunne, brothers and communists with a long history of union organizing experience and participation in the IWW, and Carl Skoglund, a Swedish immigrant, veteran railroad worker, and founder of the American Communist Party (CP). By 1934, all were collaborators of James Cannon, a founding leader of the American CP who was expelled for allying with Leon Trotsky, the Russian revolutionary who led the fight against Stalinism. Cannon's group organized into the Communist League (CL). The CL's Minneapolis cadre provided leadership and a strategy that in the winter of 1934 quickly and decisively organized the city's coal yard truckers into Local 574. In the course of this first stage of the Minneapolis struggle, the Dunne brothers and Skoglund recruited coal yard worker Farrell Dobbs to the CL. Dobbs went on to become a central figure in the anti-Stalinist left and the key leader of the Teamster rebellion in the city and then architect of the drive that successfully organized over-the-road truckers throughout the Midwest.

The victory in the coal yards led Local 574 to push for unionizing all drivers and helpers in a city where trucking was at the center of its economic life. By spring of 1934, thousands had joined Local 574. At the end of April the union placed its demands before the trucking bosses: closed shop and recognition of Local 574, a hefty wage demand, and premium pay for overtime. Backed by the Citizens' Alliance, whose pedigree included smashing the 1916 drivers' strike, the trucking owners categorically rejected the demands. On May 12, Local 574 voted to strike.

The union rented a garage that served as strike headquarters where thousands gathered each night. A 75-person rank-and-file strike committee took the lead. A kitchen was set up that fed up to 10,000 workers each day, staffed round the clock by a women's auxiliary. Picket captains stationed on major roads throughout the city phoned in messages on scab truck movements. Flying picket squads of strikers were dispatched to stop any truck without union clearance. Nothing moved except unionized coal, ice, and milk trucks. Thirty-five thousand building workers

walked off work in solidarity as did the city's taxi drivers. The union published *The Organizer*, a daily strike newspaper, a first for the US labor movement, with runs of 10,000 each day.

Within days newspaper editorials red baited the strike. The Citizens' Alliance organized its members, deputized by the local police. Pitched battles created casualties on both sides. In the largest confrontation on May 22, 1,500 police and armed strikebreakers, sworn in as deputies, attacked a gathering of 20,000 strikers. Known as the "Battle of Deputies Run," the strikers defeated the cops and strikebreakers in vicious hand-to-hand combat. Union members soon were directing traffic in the street of the market where the battle occurred. A tentative agreement was then reached on May 25 with the aid of Governor Olsen and the regional office of the National Labor Board that banned discrimination in hiring and promotion and recognized seniority; wages remained under discussion. Among the more problematic features of the accord was lack of clarity as to who was an employee of the trucking firms, i.e., the employers sought to exclude "inside" warehouse workers from Local 574's jurisdiction. Both sides prepared for a resumption of class struggle.

The May 25 agreement quickly broke down as the trucking bosses refused to rehire strike leaders and did not engage in any serious negotiations on wages or other terms. Red baiting attacks on Local 574 resumed in the major media. The international president of the Teamsters, Dan Tobin, an opponent of industrial unionism, joined in the red baiting attack on Local 574's leadership. In early July, Local 574 struck again. After more than two weeks during which no trucks moved without union approval, the trucking bosses staged an ambush on strikers who arrived at a major city market in their vehicles to stop the movement of a scab truck. The 50 heavily armed police who guarded the truck opened fire on picketers. Two picketers died and 65 others were wounded. Later that night a journalist at the hospital reported that almost all the strikers had bullet wounds on the backs of their head, arms, and shoulders. The cops shot the workers as they ran away from the bullet fire. One striker, Henry Ness, a World War I veteran, had 37 bullets in his body. One hundred strike leaders including Local 574 president Bill Browne and the Dunne brothers were arrested. The next day, a mass funeral march of more than

20,000 accompanied Ness's body as it moved to the strike headquarters. The governor now proclaimed martial law and ordered more than 4,000 National Guard troops to Minneapolis.

In the face of military strikebreaking, a protracted struggle by the union continued for five weeks. The union ultimately won its demand for broad representation of truckers, helpers, as well as the inside workers. Within two years, the union had collective bargaining agreements with 500 Minneapolis employers. Local 574 and its revolutionary leadership soon moved on to be the organizing hub for an expansive campaign that organized over-the-road truckers in the upper Mississippi Valley.

In the 1920s labor conditions on the San Francisco docks were among the worst of any industrialized city. Longshoremen referred to the shape-up system of hiring on the docks as the "slave market." Thousands of men would descend upon the docks each morning with no certainty of employment. Employers would pick who they wanted, leaving others without any work. Kickbacks, favoritism, nepotism, and all forms of corruption were endemic to this casual labor market. Given these conditions, it is not surprising that 95 percent of longshoremen on San Francisco's Embarcadero joined the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) in the summer of 1933.

When the ILA leaders failed to take any steps to challenge the hated shape-up, a militant rank-and-file movement took shape. In the winter of 1934, this movement called a West Coast convention, excluded the union's paid officers as delegates, and called for a strike if the shape-up was not replaced with a union-sponsored hiring hall. The most prominent leader of this bottom-up movement was Harry Bridges, an Australian seaman with a Wobbly (IWW) past, revolutionary politics, and close ties to the Communist Party members who worked in this industry. Bridges was elected as chairman of the San Francisco strike committee. On May 9, longshoremen struck in major ports from Seattle and Tacoma to Oakland and San Francisco and as far south as San Diego. The strike was not officially sanctioned by the ILA but still involved between 10,000 and 15,000 members. It soon spread to other seamen and involved over 25,000 workers. Attempts to thwart the strikers were made by their own union's president, Joseph Ryan, who first repudiated the main

strike demand – the union hiring hall. After the strikers repudiated this effort, he tried to negotiate separate agreements at each port. This too failed. The strikers, like the truckers in Minneapolis, were red baited by the employer groups and William Green, AFL president.

As had happened in Minneapolis, on July 5 shipping bosses orchestrated a violent assault on strikers in San Francisco, the West Coast's strike center. The "Battle of Rincon Hill" resulted in the deaths of two strikers and wounded more than 100 others. The response to this assault on the longshoremen was the fabled San Francisco general strike. For two days, the working class brought the city to a standstill. The workers directed traffic and assumed many municipal tasks. Workers in other industries and trades began formulating and pressing their own demands. Over 130,000 workers joined the strike. The San Francisco Central Labor Council eventually backed the strike after previously branding the strike leadership as "communist." The Council's conservative leadership then attempted to orchestrate a quick ending to a labor uprising that was spreading to other cities on the West Coast.

More than 4,000 National Guardsmen entered the city. The *Los Angeles Times* wrote that the events in San Francisco were being improperly labeled as a general strike. Rather, "[w]hat is actually in progress is an insurrection; a Communist inspired and led revolt against organized government." The editors wrote that the revolt must be put down "with any force necessary." Over 30 gangs of vigilantes raided the offices of socialist, communist, and IWW offices. Over 300 were jailed. The strike ended with a poor settlement – arbitration. However, the workers returned to work as an organized body and guerilla job actions and quickie strikes gave ongoing expression to the demands of the longshoremen. Within a year, job actions won union hiring halls on the docks up and down the West Coast.

The examples of the union battles in Toledo, Minneapolis, and San Francisco – all led by revolutionary, class-conscious Marxists – showed the way for the even larger class battles that followed in 1936–7. But it was these struggles that demonstrated to future CIO leader John L. Lewis that the American working class had the potential to construct a social movement to transform the industrial landscape. Saul Alinsky,

radical organizer and biographer of Lewis, noted that Lewis observed these battles and became convinced that American workers "were seething and aching to be organized so they could strike back . . . America was becoming more class conscious than at any time in its history."

SEE ALSO: Alinsky, Saul (1909–1972) and the Industrial Areas Foundation; Cannon, James P. (1890–1974) and American Trotskyism; Debs, Eugene (1855–1926); Industrial Workers of the World (IWW); Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 20th Century; Socialist Party, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Bernstein, I. (1970) *A History of the American Worker, 1933–1941: Turbulent Years*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Boyer, R. & Morais, H. (1955) *Labor's Untold Story*. New York: United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America.
- Brecher, J. (1997) *STRIKE!* Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
- Dobbs, F. (1972) *Teamster Rebellion*. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Preis, A. (1964) *Labor's Giant Step: Twenty Years of the CIO*. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Smith, S. (2006) *Subterranean Fire: A History of Working-Class Radicalism in the US*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Yellen, S. (1936) *American Labor Struggles, 1877–1934*. New York: Monad Press.

Utopian communities, United States

Richard Goff

In 1516 Thomas More, an English lawyer, statesman, and humanist scholar, published *Utopia*, a fantastic traveler's tale taking place in the "New World." Inspired by the voyages of Amerigo Vespucci, More imagined an idyllic island nation governed by a communitarian and egalitarian ethos that sharply contrasted with the corruption and materialism of England. While More's book, part satire, part social critique, was never intended as blueprint for a society, the term "utopian" (which literally means "no place") has since come to describe intentional attempts to create "perfect" societies, separated from the rest of the world.

Although More's description of life in the New World was hardly accurate, his choice to place

Utopia in the newly discovered lands across the Atlantic was prophetic. America has been the repository of the hopes and dreams of a multitude of reformers, radicals, and revolutionaries. In 1630 John Winthrop's "city on the hill" sermon argued that in the New World it would be possible to correct the evils of mankind. Many Puritans left behind the turmoil of revolutionary England to settle in the "wilderness" of Massachusetts Bay and carve out their utopia, an orderly Christian society that would stand as a model for all others. Although the Puritans never achieved their city on the hill, they contributed to the notion that America is, quoting James Madison, "useful in proving things before held impossible." More's *Utopia* also predicted the role of the Atlantic as being the conduit through which Europeans, frustrated with the decaying feudal order or dismayed with the emerging capitalist one, would find fertile ground for social experimentation. European communalists, both religious and secular, have flocked to the New World, particularly to the American West, looking for an opportunity to make the world anew.

Since the American Revolution, the United States has hosted a multitude of utopian communities motivated by faith, ideology, and lifestyle choice. Although these communities are often dismissed as hopeless creations of ideologues or simply as failures, they represent significant, and quite often practical, attempts to reconcile the ideas of social justice, equality, and shared economic activity. Moreover, collectively, they offer salient critiques of the existing social order. While many utopian communities were authoritarian in some respects, they challenged established religious practices, gender norms, or conventional economic arrangements. Utopian communities also served as proving grounds for future activism and reform.

The diversity of American utopian experiments is immense; however, some generalizations are possible. Most communities were either explicitly religious (typically Christian and Protestant, but there are exceptions) or secular socialist. Religious communities varied in practice but generally shared a commitment to apostolic communalism and were motivated by millennial prophecy. Secular communities have generally been cooperative in nature and hoped to provide an alternative socioeconomic model to industrial capitalism. Both religious and secular utopians believed that separation from the corruption

of society was necessary to the success of their groups; however, most utopians also believed that limited interaction with the outside world was necessary for the survival of the community.

Utopian communities developed in fits and starts over the nineteenth century with some new experiments emerging in the late twentieth century. The initial utopian push took place during the 1810s and 1820s in the wake of the American and French revolutions, and during the Second Great Awakening and the early Industrial Revolution. A second utopian moment, more of an echo of the first, followed in the 1840s and 1850s, as the United States expanded rapidly to the west and the country moved towards Civil War. During the period of Civil War and Reconstruction, interest in utopian experiments waned, as reformers, both secular and religious, focused their attention on the issue of slavery and rebuilding the nation. As the second Industrial Revolution developed, interest in utopian experimentation reemerged, shaped by the notion of the "cooperative commonwealth," an American version of socialism that reconciled collectivism with individualism. The cooperative moment was quickly eclipsed by the development of Debsian socialism, with its emphasis on working-class self-activity and electoral politics. In the mid-twentieth century utopian imaginings, drowned by totalitarianism and war, gave way to the pragmatic social experimentation of the New Deal. More recently, frustration with liberal capitalism has prompted a new interest in communitarian experiments and in the study of utopianism.

SEE ALSO: Amana Inspirationist Utopians; Cooperative Commonwealth; Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony; Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians; Icaria Utopian Community; New Harmony; Oneida Perfectionist Utopians; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Shakers Utopian Community; Utopian Intentional Communities; Wright, Frances "Fanny" (1795–1852)

References and Suggested Readings

- Andelson, J. G. (1974) *Communalism and Change in the Amana Society, 1855–1932*. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms.
- Bestor, A., Jr. (1950) *Backwoods Utopias: The Sectarian Origins and the Owenite Phase of Communitarian Socialism in America, 1663–1829*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Claeys, G. & Tower Sargent, L. (Eds.) (1999) *The Utopia Reader*. New York: New York University Press.

- Foster, L. (1981) *Religion and Sexuality: Three American Communal Experiments of the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hayden, D. (1976) *Seven American Utopias: The Architecture of Communitarian Socialism, 1790–1975*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Holloway, M. (1951) *Heavens on Earth: Utopian Communities in America 1680–1880*. London: Turnstile Press.
- Jacoby, R. (1999) *The End of Utopia*. New York: Basic Books.
- Miller, T. (1998) *The Quest for Utopia in the Twentieth Century*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- More, T. (2003) *Utopia*. New York: Penguin.
- Morris, C. (1992) *Fanny Wright: Rebel in America*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Oved, Y. (1988) *Two Hundred Years of American Communes*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Pitzer, D. E. (1997) *America's Communal Utopias*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Pitzer, D. E. & Elliot, J. (1979) New Harmony's First Utopians, 1814–1824. *Indiana Magazine of History* 75 (September): 225–300.
- Sutton, R. P. (1994) *Les Icarions: The Utopian Dream in Europe and America*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Sutton, R. P. (2004) *Communal Utopias and the American Experience*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Sutton, R. P. (2005) *Modern American Communes*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Utopian intentional communities

Timothy Miller

Intentional communities have dotted the American historical landscape for over three centuries and their presence continues, if not always prominent. They have always embodied a radical critique of prevailing society; their members have consistently had a vision of a better world, and have had the courage to live that vision.

The first communal movement to exhibit great longevity and gain widespread public recognition was that of the Shakers, who arrived from England in 1774 and ultimately established about twenty communal villages. They continue, although by 2007 they had dwindled to one village with three members.

The nineteenth century saw the creation of many intentional communities of immigrants, especially Germans seeking religious freedom. The Harmony Society, founded in Pennsylvania in 1805 (and later located in Indiana and then

again in Pennsylvania); the Amana Society, whose members began to arrive in New York state in 1843 (and moved on to Iowa in 1854); and the Society of Separatists at Zoar, Ohio, who arrived in 1817, were just three prominent examples of a remarkable burst of communal energy in the first half of the century. Other religious communes would follow, including the Oneida Community, whose members engaged in a long-lived group marriage and prospered from the manufacture of animal traps and then silverware, and the Hutterites, German-speaking Anabaptists who arrived from Russia in 1874 and grew into a still-thriving movement of over 40,000 members living communally in over 400 colonies in North America.

Not all communes were based in religion, however. In the 1820s the Scottish industrialist Robert Owen brought his considerable communitarian energies to the United States, where he purchased the recently abandoned New Harmony, Indiana, and invited others to join him in building a “new moral world.” Although the Owenite New Harmony was short-lived, it inspired several additional communities and other experiments in collectivism, such as cooperative stores, as well.

As Owenism was winding down, another movement, that of the Icarions, arose from a utopian novel (*Voyage en Icarie*) whose readers wanted to create the fetching society depicted in the book. From 1848 to 1898 the French-speaking Icarions lived in colonies in several states, part of the time under the personal leadership of the *Voyage's* author, Étienne Cabet.

The later years of the nineteenth century saw the creation of a series of explicitly socialist and anarchist communal settlements. An early one was Kaweah Colony, founded by a group of socialists in the Sierra Nevada mountains in 1884. The Kaweah colonists were prodigious workers, but they were denied the fruits of their labors when the federal government decided to create a Sequoia National Park in the area and evicted the colonists without compensation. The world's largest tree, which the colonists had named the Karl Marx Tree, became the General Sherman.

The largest cluster of socialist and anarchist colonies erupted in Washington state in the years bracketing the turn of the twentieth century. Most of that great burst of communal energy stemmed from the work of the Brotherhood of the Cooperative Commonwealth, a socialist organization that arose from frustration over the failure of

socialism to achieve lasting success within the American political system and saw demonstration colonies as a way to illustrate the virtues of socialist life. The BCC thus sought to open colonies, one by one, that would lead to the socialization of the state of Washington and eventually the nation. The first BCC colony was Equality, named for Edward Bellamy's latest novel and founded near what is now Bellingham in 1897. In its first few years Equality operated several businesses, and published *Industrial Freedom*, a leading radical periodical of the day. Its population soon declined, though, and then factional conflicts took a toll. A disastrous fire was the last straw, and Equality closed in 1907.

An anarchist colony known as Home, in the southern reaches of Puget Sound, was Equality's contemporary. Home's members owned small plots on which they helped each other build homes, and enjoyed such common amenities as a community building and a school. Despite hostility from its neighbors (a nearby newspaper crusaded against the colony as a nest of far-left radicals and free lovers) Home continued until its formal dissolution in 1919, and several of its members lived on the site for decades afterwards.

Several other communal enclaves dotted western Washington at roughly the same time: the Puget Sound Cooperative Colony, Burley, and Freeland. As a center of left-wing political communalism, the area has had no peer in American history. But that is not to say that reformers were not organizing intentional communities elsewhere in the United States as well. For example, the single-taxers, like the BCC colonists, turned to colony building in the face of their failure to prevail in the political arena. Henry George had published his manifesto *Progress and Poverty* in 1879, and a substantial movement arose to implement George's central principle, the imposition of a single tax (i.e., to the exclusion of all other taxes) on the value of unimproved land. Failing to convince any jurisdiction to enact the single tax, some of the activists decided to test the theory in communally owned enclaves in which residents rented lots, reallocating the tax bill of the community according to Georgist theory. Some ten such enclaves were created from the 1890s through the 1930s, most prominently Fairhope, Alabama; Arden, Delaware; and Free Acres, New Jersey. Several of them continue as pleasant, congenial neighborhoods today, and Fairhope, in particular, has continued to follow its single-tax principles.

Yet another communal enterprise was Ruskin, which operated in Tennessee and then briefly in Georgia. J. A. Wayland, in his day the most prominent socialist editor in the country, founded *The Coming Nation* in 1893 and saw it quickly become the nation's most-read radical periodical. Soon he began to envision an intentional community that would provide good jobs and rich culture to working people, and proposed to fund it with profits from the newspaper. In 1894 Wayland located a suitable 1,000-acre tract of land west of Nashville, Tennessee, and called for his charter members to join him at the site. A printing press for *The Coming Nation* was soon installed, and the colony grew apace. The prickly Wayland, however, was soon involved in disputes with many of the other colonists, and he left in 1895. He went on to found the *Appeal to Reason*, America's all-time highest-circulating socialist periodical. Ruskin continued until 1899; a splinter colony in Georgia lasted two years longer.

The most prominent socialist colony of the early twentieth century was Llano del Rio, founded in California in 1914. Its founder, Job Harriman, was yet another radical who had become disillusioned with socialism's political progress and turned to the idea of creating a model socialist colony. Soon he acquired land near Palmdale, California, and invited others to join him. Over the next few years the population of Llano colony shot up to 1,100. The colony might have survived its serious internal conflicts and implacable opposition from the *Los Angeles Times*, but its failure to secure water rights vital to its plans for farming in the desert was insurmountable. However, many members were unwilling to give up, and in 1917 some hundreds of them moved to a large tract of land in Louisiana with a small existing town they renamed Newllano. There, despite endemic poverty and internal strife, they had a robust social life and continued to live their socialist principles. Newllano endured until 1938.

In the early twentieth century New York City was home to a group of anarchists centered on the radical magazine *Mother Earth*. In 1915 several of them founded a colony on 143 acres of land near Stelton, New Jersey. Although getting out of the city was an important goal of the founders, the real center of Ferrer Colony was the Ferrer Modern School, an alternative educational institution known for its unstructured approach to education. At its peak the colony had over 80 homes and over 200 residents who enjoyed a lively intellectual and social life. In the

early years the colony's neighbors were aghast at having a colony of radicals in their midst, but over time tensions subsided. Ferrer came to an end during World War II, when Camp Kilmer was suddenly built next to the colony. Many residents sold their homes to soldiers, and the colony faded away.

In the meantime another anarchist colony, the Sunrise Co-Operative Farm Community, had been founded near Alicia, Michigan. Its principal founder, Joseph J. Cohen, had been one of the founders of Ferrer Colony; he intended for Sunrise to be more fully collective than Ferrer had been, with common labor and ownership of land. By the spring of 1933 he had come up with a down payment on a 9,000-acre farm, and a membership dominated by anarchists and other radicals – most of them Jewish, although Sunrise was not officially a Jewish colony – reached 300 the first year. Many things went well for Sunrise, but problems emerged as well, ranging from a housing shortage to a conflict over a proposal that Yiddish be the only language permitted at the colony. In 1936 the property was sold to the federal Resettlement Administration.

Alongside the single-tax enclaves and anarchist colonies were other communities dedicated to specific reformist causes. Among them were feminist colonies, whose presence paralleled the rise of modern feminism in the second half of the nineteenth century. One that was widely noticed was the Woman's Commonwealth, organized in 1879 in Belton, Texas, by Martha McWhirter, who embraced celibacy following her Wesleyan experience of entire sanctification and soon attracted other women (and, briefly, a few men) to her cause. The community soon reached 50 members, many of them leaving their husbands. The community enjoyed great economic success from its operation of a hotel and other businesses, and in 1898 the sisters used their capital to buy a large house in Washington, DC and a farm outside the city in Maryland. A few years after McWhirter's death in 1904 they consolidated the community at the farm, where they continued to run successful businesses. The last sister died there in 1983.

Yet another set of radical/reformist communities with specific constituencies and missions was that of the communal colleges. The most thoroughly radical of them was Commonwealth College, founded at Newllano Colony in 1923 with the goal of producing labor leaders from

the working class. Commonwealth soon moved to its own campus in the Ozarks near Mena, Arkansas, where students and faculty labored side by side, and it became widely known as a center of leftist thought and activism. Its presence in the conservative South led to continual outside pressure, however, and by the mid-1930s the state legislature was trying to figure out how to get rid of the school. In 1940 the college was convicted of failing to fly an American flag, among other "crimes." Its assets were sold to pay the fines levied by the court.

Although the 1940s and 1950s were lean years for commune building, a few did manage to emerge here and there. One was the Glen Gardner Cooperative Community, founded by the peace activist David Dellinger, his wife Betty Dellinger, and others in New Jersey in 1947. In 1950 the community changed its name to St. Francis Acres and deeded the land to God. For several years the community operated a radical printing and publishing business; it survived until 1968, when, during the Vietnam War era, it suffered a series of attacks. The Dellingers felt forced to leave, and St. Francis Acres closed.

The great wave of communes that emerged after 1965 naturally included many radical political enclaves. Communal solidarity helped some young men resist the military draft, and communes near the border helped shepherd more of them to the draft-free nation of Canada. Communes became natural organizing bases for anti-war protests. Depicting the full panoply of those communes is far beyond the scope of a short article; suffice it to mention just one of the many. Black Bear Ranch was planned as a radical enclave where revolutionaries would be able to practice using weapons and hide from the authorities. The 80-acre property was a ghost town left over from gold-mining days in a remote area of mountainous northern California. The commune's radical goals, however, were never fully realized, mainly because less-militant settlers arrived in considerable numbers, diverting full attention from revolutionary praxis, and in any event simple survival in the rugged wilderness was taxing. Black Bear did survive, though, and continues as a rural outpost for the self-sufficient.

Most of the communities mentioned so far were essentially secular in orientation, but some of the most radical communities of all were religious. In 1896, for example, at the height of the Social Gospel movement, a group of committed Protestants founded the Christian

Commonwealth Colony near Columbus, Georgia. They gave up all they owned, pooling all assets, and opened their doors to all in an attempt to emulate the early Christians described in the second and fourth chapters of the biblical Book of Acts. Although the colony closed amid poverty and disease in 1900, its impact on Christian idealists endured.

A more enduring example of Christian community has been the Catholic Worker movement. Founded in 1933 by bohemian radical Dorothy Day and grassroots philosopher Peter Maurin in New York, the movement is devoted to communal sharing, voluntary poverty, and service to society's neediest. The movement's Houses of Hospitality have been founded by the hundreds in most major American cities, and dozens of communal farms have provided food for the urban houses as well as quiet places for personal renewal. In their communal dedication the Workers feed the hungry, house the homeless, and, importantly, challenge a society and its government that let the ills of poverty and violence fester.

Thousands of intentional communities have been founded over the course of American history, and although the majority tended to be short-lived, some have lasted for decades, even centuries. Communal people are true radicals, willing to put everything – their money, their individual preferences, their very lives – on the line for their beliefs.

SEE ALSO: Amana Inspirationist Utopians; Catholic Worker Movement; Cooperative Commonwealth; Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony; Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians; Icaria Utopian Community; New Harmony; Oneida Perfectionist Utopians; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Shakers Utopian Community; Utopian Communities, United States; Wright, Frances “Fanny” (1795–1852)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bestor, A. (1970) *Backwoods Utopias: The Sectarian Origins and the Owenite Phase of Communitarian Socialism in America: 1663–1829*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Chmielewski, W., Kern, L., & Klee-Hartzell, M. (Eds.) (1993) *Women in Spiritual and Communitarian Societies in the United States*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Fogarty, R. (1990) *All Things New: American Communes and Utopian Movements, 1860–1914*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hine, R. (1983) *California's Utopian Colonies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- LeWarne, C. (1975) *Utopias on Puget Sound, 1885–1915*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Miller, T. (1998) *The Quest for Utopia in Twentieth-Century America*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Miller, T. (1999) *The 60s Communes: Hippies and Beyond*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Pitzer, D. (Ed.) (1997) *America's Communal Utopias*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Uzbekistan, national movement and protests

Immanuel Ness

Central Asia includes the former socialist republics of the Soviet Union (also known as transitional states), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The region also encompasses Afghanistan and the Xinjiang province of western China. Prior to 1500, the region was conquered and occupied by Turkic, Persian, and Russian forces. Central Asia's modern history has been dominated by imperial forces countered by fierce resistance from the local nomadic inhabitants, who frequently repelled invasion through their knowledge of the rugged and mountainous terrain.

In the early eighteenth century, the region now known as Uzbekistan had come under Russian imperial control. Russians entered the region in 1716, during the reign of Peter the Great, in a supposed move to assist the Khanate of Khiva (much of it having been in today's Uzbek territory) against the incursions of neighboring Kazakh and Turkmen tribes and to establish trade connections with the region. The Russians were initially repelled by regional forces in 1716. Under the leadership of Tsar Nicholas, Russia attempted another major incursion into the region in 1839, yet their forces were again repelled. Finally, in 1875, Russian forces gained control over much of what is considered as Central Asia and became the protectorate of Turkistan.

The Soviet Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had dramatic aftershocks in Uzbekistan, especially in Tashkent, its multi-ethnic capital. In the late nineteenth century, Uzbekistan was still under tsarist Russian rule and suffered severely from the autocratic government that banned all dissent. In the aftermath of the Russian Revolutions, political movements in Uzbekistan emerged and

expanded dramatically. While virtually all residents supported ending tsarist rule, communists and Muslims emerged as the primary political forces following the 1905 Russian Revolution and the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.

Communists and Jadid Muslim modernizers unified to establish a new state free of repression and economic inequality. The primary goal of the Jadid movement was expanding and improving enlightened education through providing modern facilities and increasing access to schools. As the tsarist Russian state crushed the growing socialist movement, so it suppressed the Jadidists seeking to build a modern society and establish a system of equality. While many believed the 1905 Russian Revolution would lead to important reforms, tsarist rule continued and pushed activists in the socialist and Jadid movements into secretive societies underground. In summer 1916, Tsar Nicholas issued a decree that Central Asians be conscripted into service in the Russian army in World War I; violent demonstrations erupted, leading the government to reverse the order.

In 1916 and 1917, the events leading up to the Bolshevik Revolution sent political tremors throughout Central Asia as communist and Jadid Islamic reformist militants sought to gain state power against local traditional clans allied previously with tsarist Russia. Less than a year later, protests expanded throughout Uzbekistan during the Bolshevik Revolution from February to October 1917, led by socialist and Jadidist activists. Following the Russian Revolution in Petrograd, the tsarist government in Tashkent was overthrown and a state of rebellion prevailed over the entire region. The Jadidists and communists gradually unified to defeat the tsarist guard in the violent battles of Bukhoro and Khiva. Amid a civil war, the Bolshevik–Jadid forces formed the Bukharin People's Party, with the ultimate objective of taking power in Tashkent.

In 1917, insurgents controlled the territory, known as the Bukharan People's Republic. However, a fissure emerged between Jadidists and an alliance of communists and former Jadidists and traditional Islamic opponents. The Jadid or communists could not consolidate power, and a violent civil war broke out in 1918 against insurgents loyal to the Emir of Bukhara, seeking to retain traditional control and defeat modernizing forces allied with the Soviet Union. The Basmachi rebellion lasted from February 1918 through

1924, setting local traditional clansmen against Soviet and Jadid forces.

Enver Pasha, the Islamic modernizer and leader of the Jadid, was defeated and Faizullah Ubaidullaevich Khojaev, a former Jadid, joined forces with the communists, who prevailed in the violent civil war, in which some 15,000 lost their lives. The Basmachi rebellion against the local Bolshevik leaders ultimately sought to create a Central Asia-wide Islamist entity. Instead, the USSR divided Soviet Central Asia into six states that were mere administrative boundaries among otherwise friendly entities within the USSR. Ethnicity in Central Asia was not considered to be significant prior to the Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent formation of the ethnic states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. People throughout Central Asia were unified in their opposition to the authoritarian leadership of tsarist Russia.

There were no major uprisings or popular protests in Uzbekistan's history as a Soviet republic from 1925 to the 1980s, other than raids by Islamic traditional forces into the territory. In a break with the tsarist era, the USSR sought to develop Uzbekistan's infrastructure and improve the standard of living. While insurgencies continued in some areas, the lack of popular protest was largely due to Soviet economic and social progress having highly benefited the majority and thus bought the allegiance of most of its citizens. During the 1980s, in the waning years of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (economic restructuring) engendered new political divisions in Uzbekistan. One local movement sought to replace Russian as the official language with Uzbek. Some western observers – though not the majority or the most heavily funded intelligence agencies – had rightly stated that Gorbachev's Soviet reforms were to lead to further decay of the USSR. And indeed, due to the new openness brought about by Gorbachev's policies and the economic problems encountered by the Soviet system that was mired in military spending, ethnic and class tensions broke out in Uzbekistan and the Central Asian republics.

After the August 1991 failure of the Soviet coup, all five former Soviet republics of Central Asia declared independence, Uzbekistan on August 31. While some freedom was granted in the aftermath of the dismantling of the Soviet

Union, soon after a new post-communist dictatorship consolidated power, forcing nearly all opposition groups underground. Boris Yeltsin's formation of a nationalist Russian state and the dissolution of the USSR intensified social, political, and economic problems, engendering violent protest in Uzbekistan.

In December 1991, Islom Karimov, former first secretary of the Communist Party, won the election. Subsequently, an Islamic organization known as Adolat (Justice), likely inspired by its Muslim cohorts in Afghanistan and Iran, sought autonomy for Uzbekistan's province of Namangan in the northeast. Insurgents seized the Communist Party headquarters in Namangan and sought to convert it to the local Islamic center, demanding an amendment to Uzbekistan's constitution to adopt Islam as the official state religion and Islamic Shari'a law. The Uzbek government, led by President Karimov, allowed limited autonomy to Namangan, but thereafter rescinded the decision and arrested over 70 Adolat activists, crushed the movement, and forced the activists into exile.

Conflict in Namangan continued unabated. By 1997, a series of ostensible political assassinations in Namangan led to accusations by the Uzbek government of Wahhabi (Islamic extremist) participation in the killings. Government authorities arrested thousands of suspected Islamists, many devout Muslims with little or no political motives. In turn, suspected Islamists were accused of kidnapping and beheading Uzbek government officials. Violence continued in 1999, as car bombs exploded in Tashkent in February 1999 in a failed attempt to assassinate Karimov by Islamists.

On May 12, 2005, an armed militia of 50 stormed the prison in the provincial town of Andijon in northeast Uzbekistan. The insurgents were allegedly followers of the Islamic Akramiya, which sought to unify Muslims into a religious caliphate. Several hundred prisoners were released and many government personnel and insurgents were killed. The militia kidnapped government officials in Andijon, leading to public protests in Andijon square against Uzbek local and national officials. The next day, Uzbek armed forces surrounded the protesters in Andijon and began shooting directly on the mostly unarmed crowd, killing and wounding many, leading to a death toll ranging from 300 to 1,000 persons.

The primary cause of the uprising, however, was the unmet expectations of the authoritarian government and the failure of the government

to provide jobs, education, housing, and other opportunities in the post-Soviet era. Poverty is concentrated in the Ferghana Valley, the agriculturally rich region that straddles the Central Asian nations of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The Ferghana Valley is the most densely populated region in Central Asia. Nearly 75 percent of the ten million inhabitants of Ferghana Valley live in Uzbekistan.

In the early twenty-first century, Uzbekistan ranked fourth in global production and export of cotton and the nation is one of the world's largest producers of gold and natural gas products. Nonetheless, poverty among the country's working class and poor intensified as resources were concentrated among a small upper-class population. The vast majority of Uzbekistan's population does not benefit from the country's natural wealth and is falling into deeper poverty as the current government fails to provide subsidies as in the Soviet era. Both poverty and income inequality have been growing dramatically since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Given that the income distribution is skewed in favor of a small upper class that is supported by what many perceive to be a corrupt government, many residents view the post-Soviet rulers with skepticism. To quell any form of dissent, the government has banned most forms of public opposition. In addition, the standard of living sinks further for the majority of the population, because the government is unwilling to democratize the society and provide basic political freedoms, such as the right of expression and legal political dissent.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Central Asian Protest Movements; Gorbachev, Mikhail (b. 1931); Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Soviet Union, Fall of; Tajikistan, Protests and Revolts; Turkmenistan, Protest and Revolt

References and Suggested Readings

- Akbarzadeh, S. (2005) *Uzbekistan and the United States: Authoritarianism, Islamism and Washington's New Security Agenda*. London: Zed Books.
- Khalid, A. (1999) *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Melvin, N. J. (2000) *Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road*. London: Harwood Academic.
- Nazparv, J. (2002) *Post-Soviet Chaos*. London: Pluto Press.
- Whitlock, M. (2003) *Land Beyond the River: Untold Story of Central Asia*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

V

Vaneigem, Raoul (b. 1934)

Roger Farr

Raoul Vaneigem is a writer and social philosopher born, and currently residing, in Belgium. He is the author of dozens of books and tracts on politics, literature, and the history of ideas, many of which have been written pseudonymously. Vaneigem's influence and reputation are largely due to his role as a leading theoretician for the Situationist International (SI), from the time he joined the organization in 1961 until his forced resignation in 1970. Along with Guy Debord, to whom he was introduced by the sociologist Henri Lefebvre, Vaneigem's work was instrumental in shaping the intellectual and political culture of France in the 1960s. His much-cited book *Traité du savoir-vivre à l'usage des jeunes générations* (1967; published in English as *The Revolution of Everyday Life*), written in Paris between 1963 and 1965 and published in 1967, is often read, along with Debord's *Society of the Spectacle*, as having prompted the 1968 student and worker unrest in France.

Prior to his contact with the SI, Vaneigem studied romance philology and French literature at the Free University of Brussels, graduating in 1956 with a dissertation on Lautréamont, a figure whom Vaneigem views as exemplary of a certain tradition within French culture which has as "its basic principle the abolition of culture as a separate sphere through the realization of art and philosophy in everyday life" (1976/1999: 7). Indeed, it could be argued that this "basic principle" also underlies and organizes Vaneigem's entire oeuvre: in the "Introduction" to *Traité du savoir-vivre*, he writes that "[e]ver since men grew up and learned to read Lautréamont, everything has been said yet few have taken advantage of it" (1967/1983: 7). However, given that his earliest

writing was often co-authored, and was written explicitly to propagandize ideas developed collectively by the SI, it makes sense to divide his work into two phases: Situationist (1961–70) and post-Situationist (from 1971).

In the first, Situationist phase, Vaneigem's writing appears mainly in the group's journal, *Internationale Situationiste*, which published 12 issues between 1958 and 1969. In 1962, Vaneigem joined the Central Council responsible for editing the journal, and seven articles published between August 1961 and September 1969 bear his name (although he is believed also to have written many of the unsigned articles). His major work of this period, however, is *Traité du savoir-vivre*, a work which elaborates in poetically charged prose his major critical concerns: "everyday life" ("People who talk about revolution and class struggle without referring explicitly to everyday life . . . have a corpse in their mouth"), the qualitative nature of revolution and transcendence ("Only the qualitative permits a higher stage to be reached"), and "radical subjectivity" ("the consciousness that all people have the same will to authentic self-realization, and that their subjectivity is strengthened by the perception of this subjective will in others") (1967/1983: 15, 151–2). *Traité du savoir-vivre*, often regarded as both a stylistic and theoretical counterbalance to the austerity and rigor of Debord's writing, was read widely by French students.

Since leaving the SI, Vaneigem has been prolific. English translations of his post-Situationist work include *Movement of the Free Spirit*, a radical reinterpretation of heretical religious movements as antecedents in the ongoing struggle of "life" against totalitarian ideologies and "a repressive power that has been in place for thousands of years" (1986/1994: 7); *A Cavalier History of Surrealism* (1976/1999); and *A Declaration of the Rights of Human Beings* (2001/2003), a new declaration of human rights and an attack on the presumed sovereign powers of global capitalism

and democracy on behalf of the “sovereignty of life.” At the time of writing, his most recent book (2008) is *Rien n’est sacré, tout peut se dire: Réflexions sur la liberté d’expression* (Nothing is Sacred, Everything Can Be Said: Reflections on Freedom of Expression). A critical biography, *Raoul Vaneigem*, was published in 2007.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; Debord, Guy (1931–1994) and the Spectacle; May 1968 French Uprisings; Situationists

References and Suggested Readings

- Knabb, K. (Ed.) (2006) *Situationist International Anthology*. Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets.
- Lambrette, G. (2007) *Raoul Vaneigem*. Chaucer: Éditions Libertaires.
- Vaneigem, R. (1967/1983) *Revolution of Everyday Life*. London/Seattle: Rebel Press/Left Bank.
- Vaneigem, R. (1976/1999) *A Cavalier History of Surrealism*. San Francisco: AK Press.
- Vaneigem, R. (1986/1994) *Movement of the Free Spirit*. New York: Zone Books.
- Vaneigem, R. (2001/2003) *A Declaration of the Rights of Human Beings*. London: Pluto Press.

Vanguard party

Soma Marik

The idea of a vanguard party has caused controversy in Marxist circles centered around the debate over whether workers need to be led to socialism by outside forces. Academic Marxology has held that Lenin’s concept of a vanguard party signaled a change from Marx’s focus on proletarian socialism to a revolution led by a tightly organized minority of intellectuals who would take socialism into the working class from outside. Marx’s thrust on the self-emancipation of the working class certainly meant rejection of any imposition of socialism from above by a wise leadership. But this did not solve the problem of revolutionary strategy.

Marx and Engels believed that the propaganda on the necessity of, and the road to, communism by the conscious minority of workers alone would not suffice to make the revolution. Their political practice and writings show particularly during the stage of the Communist League (1847–51) that a revolutionary party was a crucial instrument in the proletariat’s struggle for self-emancipation. It was this organization that could give them the self-confidence essential for becoming a “class for itself” active

in their emancipatory struggles from a “class in itself.” The specificity of the communist party, according to the *Communist Manifesto*, lay in its internationalism and in its emphasis on the interests of the proletarian movement as a whole as opposed to partial or fragmentary interests. In this sense, the intention of the creators of the League was to set it up as a vanguard party. Marx did write that the communists were, on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties and, on the other hand, theoretically, the far-sighted section. Clearly, a revolutionary centralization of the advanced workers was being advocated to ensure class independence and unity.

Marx and Engels’ subsequent move away from this perspective was more due to a temporary lull in the revolutionary ferment than any moderation on their part. Their activities and writings indicate attempts to build a broad-based working-class party where no class independence existed at all, and attempts to develop a socialist vanguard when independent working-class politics already existed.

Lenin, hoping to build a disciplined Russian Social Democratic Party, considered the problem of having a spontaneous working-class movement forging ahead while revolutionaries were unorganized and lagging behind. In his book *What Is To Be Done?* he emphasized the centralization of revolutionary experience of advanced workers who could lead the class movement toward a political direction. Repeating an argument of Karl Kautsky, the most authoritative German socialist theoretician, he observed that like all science, socialist theory is created by bourgeois intellectuals, and has to be brought into the working class from outside.

Marxist activist writers like Molyneux (1978) and LeBlanc (1990) have challenged the idea that this was a dogma that Lenin clung to all his life. According to them, the emphasis on taking ideology into the working class from outside was a polemical response to the position of another group of Russian social democrats, the Economists, who derided theory and argued that the spontaneous economic struggles were adequate to generate revolutionary consciousness and a revolutionary struggle. Lih (2006) argues that Lenin was simply trying to create an orthodox revolutionary party, in Russia, on the German model.

Lenin, like Marx, emphasized the self-emancipation of the working class. But being

politically active in a more revolutionary era, he did not suffer from Marx's dichotomy. The concept of professional revolutionary meant a serious attempt to create working-class leadership within the party, formed of working-class militants so as to centralize and coordinate their efforts against the system. The idea was to give these activist-workers a respite from daily wage-work, enabling the vanguard to be active on a more permanent basis. The flexibility of tactics displayed in different periods shows that Lenin attempted to draw in masses of radicalizing workers during periods of mass upsurge and fought to retain revolutionary principles in periods of downturn. He rejected both minority revolutionism and any idea of parliamentary socialism to be accomplished on behalf of the working class. The revolutionary organization has to help the working class understand collectively the need for a socialist transformation of society, for the socialist revolution. That is the dialectical relationship between the vanguard party and the mass self-organization of the working class.

The concept of vanguard party was turned into a caricature by Stalinists and self-proclaimed Leninists. For them, the possession of correct doctrine makes the party a vanguard proletarian party, regardless of whether the real class vanguard is with the party or not, and regardless of whether party policy is made democratically by them. Trotsky, the Russian revolutionary and an early critic of Lenin, acknowledged that Lenin had been right in focusing on building a revolutionary party. The Trotskyist alternative model of vanguard party has stressed building a democratic party from working-class cadres, and being resolutely internationalist.

SEE ALSO: Class Struggle; Kautsky, Karl (1854–1938); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940)

References and Suggested Readings

- LeBlanc, P. (1990) *Lenin and the Revolutionary Party*. London: Humanities Press.
- Lih, L. T. (2006) *Lenin Rediscovered: What is to be Done? In Context*. Boston: Brill.
- Marik, S. (2008) *Reinterrogating the Classical Marxist Discourses of Revolutionary Democracy*. New Delhi: Aakar.
- Molyneux, J. (1978) *Marxism and the Party*. London: Pluto Press.
- Shapiro, L. (1970) *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. New York: Random House.

Vanuatu, land reform protests

Justin Corfield

Vanuatu, formerly the New Hebrides, was jointly ruled by the French and the British until its independence on July 30, 1980. It was visited by French and English sailors in the eighteenth century, and both Louis Antoine de Bougainville and James Cook landed there. Chinese merchants also visited in search of sandalwood. The Irish trader Peter Dillon started to harvest sandalwood in large amounts in 1825; before long, the sandalwood was largely depleted and most trees had been felled by 1868.

This destruction was followed by “blackbirding,” in which people from the New Hebrides were used as indentured laborers in sugar cane plantations in Fiji and in Queensland, Australia. Many people were seized and chained or enticed aboard ships to serve for up to 12 years in what was effectively a form of slavery. Presbyterian missionaries used the White Australia Policy to put an end to blackbirding, but much damage had been done to the society in the New Hebrides, with the population falling from 650,000 in 1870 to about 100,000 by 1890. By 1935, the indigenous Hebrideans were estimated at only 41,000, and the islands of Aneityum, the location of the early sandalwood trees, and Erromano lost up to 95 percent of their original population.

The American Civil War led to high prices for cotton. Thus, cotton plantations were established on the New Hebrides, followed later by coconut and cocoa plantations. After acquiring New Caledonia in 1853, the French took over nine-tenths of the mainland and were obviously planning to annex the New Hebrides. The Presbyterian Church there urged Australia to become involved, which ultimately led to joint Anglo-French rule. Many of the settlers, mostly from Australia, were nearing bankruptcy by the early 1880s, and there was hope that French investment money might revive the economy. To this end, an Irish-born French property developer named John Higgonson founded the Compagnie Calédonienne des Nouvelles-Hébrides (CCNH) and bought up a fifth of all the agricultural land there, some of it from Australians, but most of it from local chiefs, or people thought to be local chiefs, who put their thumbprints on French legal documents

they could not understand. The CCNH became the Société Française des Nouvelles-Hébrides (SFNH) in 1894, by which time it owned more than half of all agricultural land in the islands.

In response to antagonisms between British and French business interests, in 1887 the Anglo-French Joint Naval Commission was established, followed in 1906 by the Anglo-French Condominium. The New Hebrides at that time had 65,000 islanders, 2,000 French settlers, and 1,000 British settlers. An Anglo-French Protocol was signed in 1914 but, because of World War I, was not ratified until 1922. As a result, two parallel police forces were created, as well as parallel education systems, health services, currencies, postal systems, and even prison services.

In the 1950s plans were developed to give the New Hebrides self-government and later independence, but problems immediately arose, mostly concerning land ownership. With the European settlers owning nearly a third of the land, half of which had been turned into coconut plantations and the other half left undeveloped or used for cattle ranching, protests emerged among the indigenous people who claimed that much of the undeveloped land was not being used and was therefore the property of the nearby village. Many others challenged the titles of some of the settlers, since the land had originally been bought from people who may not have had the right to sell the land. These problems were common to all the islands, but on the island of Espiritu Santo, a local bulldozer driver and nationalist named Jimmy Stevens formed the Nagriamel movement in order to put pressure on the authorities to allow indigenous people to take over undeveloped land.

With financial backing from the US Phoenix Foundation, which was interested in developing real estate, the Nagriamel movement became heavily associated with French interests. At the same time, the New Hebrides National Party, later renamed the Vanua'aku Party (My Land Party), founded by Anglican priest Walter Lini, drew most of its support from the English-speaking Protestants. Initially it was Stevens who, in 1971, petitioned the United Nations for independence for the New Hebrides. However, three years later when the Vanua'aku Party petitioned the UN, Stevens and his supporters opposed it, wanting greater autonomy for Espiritu Santo and other islands. To try to resolve this impasse, the colonial authorities held elections in November 1979, with

the pro-French parties forming the Union of Moderate Parties (UMP). Lini's Vanua'aku Party won decisively and Lini himself was appointed chief minister, having control of the largest block of seats in the new representative assembly.

This situation caused disquiet among the mainly French-speaking supporters of Stevens on Espiritu Santo, and they started to talk of secession. They seem to have been encouraged by some French officials, but it is debatable whether they acted independently or with the support, albeit tacit, of the French government. On the island of Tanna in May the following year, rebels tried to take control. In June the northern islands, Malekula, Ambae, Maewo, and Ambrym, all proclaimed their secession and formed the Provisional Government of the Northern Islands. Stevens himself had led his supporters into Luganville, the main town on Espiritu Santo, on May 27, 1980, and, with his Nagriamel movement armed with bows and arrows, declared the independent country of Vemarana. The British and French sent in their soldiers, who stood by while Luganville was looted. The subsequent arrival of soldiers from Papua New Guinea stopped the looting; they arrested the settlers who supported Stevens and quickly put an end to the secession. The New Hebrides became Vanuatu on July 30, and Stevens was finally arrested on September 1. A long series of trials was held for the secessionists and Jimmy Stevens was sentenced to 14 years 6 months in prison. A general amnesty was granted in 1991 and Stevens was released. He died three years later.

Meanwhile, the independent republic of Vanuatu still faced many problems associated with land ownership. A number of breakaway movements from the Vanua'aku Party challenged Lini and others for the leadership. In the November 1983 elections, the Vanua'aku Party again won, with Lini remaining as prime minister. Even though his party lost votes in the November 1987 elections, it was still returned to power. Lini was dismissed as prime minister in December 1988 by the country's first president, Ati George Sokomanu, who caused a constitutional crisis by dissolving parliament and appointing his nephew, Barak Tame Sope, as head of an interim administration. Sokomanu and Sope were subsequently arrested by security forces loyal to Lini, who was restored to office. During these years Lini was in poor health, suffering a cerebral haemorrhage in early 1987 and

a heart attack in May 1991. This immediately led to feuds in the ruling Vanua'aku Party, and Lini was forced to stand down on September 6. He was replaced by Donald Kalpokas, who served as prime minister for just over two months, until a factional dispute caused defections from the Vanua'aku Party and Kalpokas was forced to resign. Maxime Carlot, the leader of the UMP, then came to power. He had been involved in the separatist government of Sope in December 1988 – serving as the titular deputy prime minister – and although jailed for sedition, had been quickly released. Carlot had 19 seats in the 46-seat parliament but managed to attract enough of Lini's supporters to remain in power.

In July 1992 relations between Australia and Vanuatu soured and the Australian acting high commissioner was ordered to leave the country. Australia introduced bans on official visits to Vanuatu, and Vanuatu officials were prevented from coming to Australia. Although these bans were lifted in the following year, relations remained tense. Further dissension arose over the large-scale commercial operations of the Malaysian logging company Parklane. After the elections of November 1995, Serge Vohor came to power as the second pro-French prime minister. Subsequent elections were held on March 6, 1998.

As Vanuatu became enmeshed in political and financial crises, local protests arose against corruption and the marginalization of the audit department's role. However, elections continued to be held regularly and in February 2004 US President George W. Bush named Vanuatu as one of the 63 countries that were eligible for part of the US\$1 billion in aid for its commitment to democracy and free market reform. Vanuatu has remained a popular tourist destination, and in spite of the fractious political scene since independence, it has never experienced the civil unrest of many nearby Pacific nations.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Nuclear Protest Movements; Anti-Nuclear Protests, Marshall Islands; Cape Verde, Independence Struggle; Fiji, Parliamentary Insurrection; French Polynesia, Protest Movements

References and Suggested Readings

- Ray, C. (1992) On the Way Up: A UDI for New Caledonia in September '82? *Pacific Islands Monthly* (January): 13–18.
- Van Trease, H. (Ed.) (1995) *Melanesian Politics: Stael Blong Vanuatu*. Christchurch, NZ: Macmillan Brown Center for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury.

Vázquez, Genaro (1931–1972)

Vittorio Sergi

Genaro Vázquez Rojas was born in San Luis Acatlán, Guerrero, Mexico on June 10, 1931. He was a teacher, political organizer, and trade unionist belonging to dissident organizations in Guerrero. After intense repression against the popular movement, he went underground and formed an armed guerilla group. He died in a car accident during an undercover operation in Morelia, Michoacán, on February 2, 1972.

Vázquez, as well as the other guerilla leader from Guerrero, Lucio Cabañas, had been a popular teacher who had studied in the rural college of Ayotzinapa in the town of Tixtla. In the summer of 1960, he led the opposition to the government of General Caballero Aburto through the Civic Association of Guerrero (ACG) and the Independent Farmers' Coordination (CCI), both political and unionist organizations that claimed independence from the ruling party's political line. Vázquez became vice-president and an important leader of the movement. The main contrast was established with the oligarchy of landlords, military, and political bosses who ruled the region with repression.

On December 2, 1962, the ACG presented its candidates for the state and municipal elections. The result was an open fraud against them and the ruling Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) candidate won. The ACG reacted with the occupation of several municipalities and a blockade (*paro cívico*) of the capital Iguala, demanding the deposition of the governor. After severe repression leading to several deaths, Caballero Aburto was removed from power, but the repression continued. From 1963 to 1966, Vázquez led the ACG to more radical Marxist and revolutionary political positions.

On November 9, 1966, while linking the ACG to the dissident Movement of National Liberation, Vázquez was arrested in Mexico City and transferred to jail in Iguala. He was freed by an armed commando of ACG comrades on April 22, 1968 and went underground, founding the Civic National Revolutionary Association (ACNR), which began acting as a guerilla group in Guerrero and Mexico City. It attacked banks and local bosses to obtain resources, then shifted

its attacks against the Mexican army and local police. The group kidnapped Jaime Castejon Diez, headmaster of the University of Guerrero, on November 21, 1971, exchanging him for the release of nine guerilla group prisoners and a ransom. The group constantly struggled between popular support and heavy repression by the state and the army, never managing to establish consistent cooperation with other guerilla groups in Mexico nor with Lucio Cabañas's Party of the Poor (PDLP), which was active in the same period in Guerrero.

From the beginning of 1971 the ACNR and its popular bases suffered repression, and when Vázquez died, the group was disbanded. Vázquez's legacy influenced the historical background and political legitimization of guerilla armed movements such as the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) and Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People (ERPI), which emerged in 1996 and 1998 in the same regions of Guerrero.

SEE ALSO: Mexico, Armed Political Movements, 1960s–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Baloy, M. (1980) *La guerrilla de Genario y Lucio*. Mexico City: Diogenes.
- Bartra, A. (1996) *Guerrero bronco. Campesinos, ciudadanos y guerrilleros en la Costa Grande*. Mexico City: Sinifiltro.
- Bellingeri, M. (2003) *Del agrarismo armado a la guerra de los pobres*. Mexico City: Casa Juan Pablos, Secretaria de Cultura de la Ciudad de México.
- Castellanos, L. (2007) *México armado, 1943–1981*. Mexico City: Era.

Vegetarian protests and movements

Amy Buzby

Vegetarianism has a long and varied history as a protest movement. Before the nineteenth century, the avoidance of meat and other animal products was generally justified with moral, religious, and metaphysical arguments: in ancient times writers like Plutarch and Ovid decried the killing of animals for food, while philosophers like Pythagoras and Porphyry argued that the consumption of animal flesh was an act of violence upon the human soul (Whorton: 1994). This early vegetarian thought engendered a holistic view that connected and enmeshed physical and spiritual

health and utilized the vegetarian diet as a means of transcending the status quo.

During the early 1800s, an intensified drive for improved health, combined with the Enlightenment ascendancy of science, led to a new breed of vegetarians who also lobbied for vegetarianism as a healthful dietary alternative and means of protest against unsanitary conditions in the meat industry. By using the objective and convincing language of science as a forum for moral reaction and outcry, importantly, vegetarianism entered the social mainstream and began to attract a growing following, who flew first to the Bible Christian Church founded by Manchester minister John Cowherd. The first major publication of the nascent movement was John Oswald's *The Cry of Nature, or, An Appeal to Mercy and to Justice, on Behalf of the Persecuted Animals* (Whorton 1994).

This wave of new converts to vegetarianism led directly to the formation of the first vegetarian organization, the Vegetarian Society, and the coining of the term "vegetarian," in 1847 in Ramsgate, Kent. This scientific drive is showcased by the first resolution passed by the American Vegetarian Society, founded in 1850, which demanded that "comparative anatomy, human physiology, and . . . chemical analysis . . . unitedly proclaim the position, that not only the human race may, but *should* subsist upon the products of the vegetable kingdom" (Whorton 1994). The International Vegetarian Union, an international organization of national vegetarian societies, was founded in 1908.

Vegetarians range in the scope of the restriction of animal products in their diets. Those who abstain from the consumption of any animal products of any derivation are known as vegans and generally constitute the most radical populations of vegetarians as protesters. Some vegans, known as "Freegans," combine the moral protest against the use and consumption of animal products with a socioeconomic protest against capitalism and acquire all foodstuffs through means other than monetary exchange. Fruitarianism carries the moral protest inherent in vegetarianism further and eat only plant products that can be gathered without harming the plant.

Vegetarianism has generated or been adopted by many protest movements. Romanticism and vegetarianism were famously linked by moral outcries and also by the public conversion of figures like Mary Shelley to a vegetarian lifestyle. The popular health reform movement, started

by Presbyterian minister Sylvester Graham, espoused vegetarianism as a cardinal principle. When the alternative health movement gradually supplanted Graham's movement, vegetarianism became intimately connected with it as well (Whorton 1994). By the 1860s, vegetarianism had generated a large literature and was a relatively organized movement. This literature had a profound effect on John Harvey Kellogg, who famously brought vegetarianism more scientific credibility and moral urgency through the publication of his work *Shall We Slay to Eat?*, which uncovered the frightful conditions present in slaughterhouses a year before the publication of Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle*.

Many vegetarians engage in further protest by demanding the protection and liberation of animals from the factory farm industry, animal testing operations, and other potentially abusive situations. This moral call for the cessation of cruelty to animals and the adoption of compassion in relation to all living things takes many forms. The animal rights movement, broadly speaking, is ideologically linked to the antivivisection movement led by members of the English upper class during the Victorian era and the contemporary American feminist and environmentalist movements. The movement is predominantly composed of middle-class females (Einwohner 1999). A 1991 survey by *The Animals' Agenda*, one of the largest animal rights publications, further found that 82 percent of respondents had at least some college education, and that 39 percent had incomes exceeding \$50,000 per annum (Einwohner 1999).

The cause of animal rights was famously adopted by scholar Peter Singer with the publication of his book *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals* in 1975. Singer's argument is a fervent attack on the prevalent social position of "speciesism," or the belief that all members of the human species have a special moral status that other species fail to attain (Singer 1978). Singer's arguments are based on the suffering of animals in modern society, not on the question of killing animals, but he does endorse the adoption of a vegetarian diet as the most practical solution to the ethical quagmire of speciesism (Singer 1975).

Vegetarianism has also been famously endorsed by philosopher Tom Regan as part of a case for animal liberation. Like Singer, Regan argues that vegetarianism is a moral obligation, but Regan

goes beyond Singer in maintaining that animals are the bearers of rights that must be recognized and respected (Regan 1980). The publication of Francis Moore Lappe's *Diet for a Small Planet* also bolstered the case for vegetarianism by articulating the advantages of vegetarianism as a major facet of a lifestyle that utilizes the earth's resources in a limited and responsible fashion.

This rich tradition of protest and recent intellectual support has led to a thriving vegetarian community in contemporary society, including many vegetarian organizations with a wide range of advocacies and actions. Contemporary vegetarian protest organizations and social movements include Food Not Bombs (independent cooperatives that provide vegetarian food to the needy), Compassion Over Killing (an animal protection advocacy group), People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, the Christian Vegetarian Association (a non-denominational group that advocates responsible stewardship of natural resources and animal life), Food for Life (a vegetarian food relief organization), the Animal Liberation Front (a militant organization that advocates direct action on behalf of animals against abusive industries), the Revolutionary Cells – Animal Liberation Brigade (a resistance movement that advocates open violence against industries that mistreat animals), and the Animal Rights Militia (a British militant group that advocates direct action on behalf of abused animals).

SEE ALSO: Ecological Protest Movements; Environmental Protest, United States, 19th Century; Food Not Bombs, United States

References and Suggested Readings

- Einwohner, R. L. (1999) Gender, Class, and Social Movement Outcomes: Identity and Effectiveness in Two Animal Rights Campaigns. *Gender and Society* 13, 1 (February): 56–76.
- Lappe, F. M. (1971) *Diet for a Small Planet*. New York: Ballantine.
- Regan, T. (1980) Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 9, 4 (Summer): 305–24.
- Singer, P. (1975) *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals*. New York: Random House.
- Singer, P. (1978) The Fable of the Fox and the Unliberated Animals. *Ethics* 88, 2 (January): 119–25.
- Singer, P. (1982) Ethics and Sociobiology. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 11, 1 (Winter): 40–64.
- Whorton, J. C. (1994) Historical Development of Vegetarianism. *American Journal of Clinical Nutrition* 59, 5 (May): 1103S–1109S.

Velasco Alvarado, Juan Francisco (1910–1977)

Gabriel Cabrera M.

Juan Francisco Velasco Alvarado was a Peruvian military leader and politician who led the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces in Peru during its first phase (1968–75). He instituted economic, social, political, and cultural reforms of an anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialistic nature with the aim of democratizing Peruvian society and encouraging modernization. Although this process was interrupted, many of the transformations initiated by Velasco became irreversible and changed the face of the country.

Velasco Alvarado was born to a poor working-class family on the Peruvian north coast. In 1929 he moved to Lima, the capital of the republic, and after serving in the army as a foot soldier he acceded to a higher military career, graduating in 1934 at the top of his class. His talent allowed him to become an instructor and professor in several military institutions. Promoted to brigadier general in 1959, he became military attaché for the Peruvian embassy in France in 1962. In 1965 he reached the rank of major general, the highest grade in the Peruvian army. This occurred during the presidency of Fernando Belaunde Terry, who also named Velasco General Commander of the Army and Chief of the Armed Forces Joint Command in January 1968. This made him the second-highest national authority in military affairs after the president.

During his military career, Velasco was involved with the Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM). Under the influence of leftist and progressive teachers, a strong ideological tendency inside the CAEM considered the military best suited to carrying out the democratization of society and guiding national development. The goal was to end the traditional and anachronistic privileges of the oligarchy, composed of landowners, the agro-export bourgeoisie, and the elite in general linked to imperialist, especially US, interests. Such changes were thought necessary to avoid a Marxist or communist revolution. Thus, when Velasco participated in courses given to the military by the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, he maintained a highly critical outlook.

On October 3, 1968, Velasco and eight other members of the military high command carried out a coup to overthrow President Belaunde, who had attempted moderate agrarian reform but whose government had veered progressively to the right, especially after entering into an agreement with the US International Petroleum Company (IPC). A few days after the coup, Velasco's military government occupied and expropriated IPC installations. The day was declared the "Day of National Dignity."

By means of the "Inca Plan," Velasco implemented the very first organic project of national development, based on what was termed "democracy of a social nature" (defined as neither capitalist nor communist). To execute this plan, Velasco nationalized oil production, which was mainly US-controlled, and the vast mining, telecommunications, rail transportation, fishing, and other strategic industrial and economic sectors, pursuing a policy of national modernization and the creation of a solid domestic market. He sought to promote workers' participation in the industrial community through co-management, and also extended national insurance, health, and basic services. Strict controls on imports were implemented to encourage domestic production. In response to a trade blockade enforced by the US government, Velasco established trade and political relationships with the Soviet bloc countries, China, Cuba, and Salvador Allende's Chile.

One of Velasco's most impressive reforms was his agrarian agenda, which began in 1969 and is considered one of the most radical in Latin American history. In an attempt to diversify landownership, the state not only expropriated huge tracts of land but kept the production complex, creating cooperatives and social property enterprises on the expropriated land. In addition to these units, producers' associations were created and national plans implemented for soil use, territorial planning, and technical counseling to peasants and farmers. Velasco liquidated the landowners' class, which was based on an enclave economy on the coast and feudalism in the Andean region.

Educational reform was another fundamental part of the government's plans, inspired by the hope of strengthening national identity and popular and indigenous culture. One of its goals was to diffuse and establish Quechua as an official language, while another was to spread new values

based on social equality and the eradication of discrimination. Velasco believed he could realize his reforms through a militarily controlled political monopoly of state, without political parties and class struggle. For this purpose he created the National System for Social Mobilization (SINAMOS), a state organ whose aim was to bring under its control all organized social sectors.

It is unclear why the Velasco regime fell into crisis in its final years. From the beginning it faced opposition from the political right, but the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), which had initially defended most of Velasco's reforms, also turned against the regime. Even though some leftist parties supported the government, many others joined the opposition. During this era the left was especially popular among the working classes, but in 1973 the cost of living rose dramatically due to rising inflation. In 1974 there were protests, including a police strike. In the face of economic crisis, oligarchic sectors and their political allies promoted social instability. The situation forced the government to adopt repressive measures. Privately owned television and newspapers were expropriated as part of a plan to democratize media contents. Velasco also suffered intoxication in 1973; he may have been poisoned by one of his political enemies, probably in complicity with the CIA. As a result, one leg was amputated and his health was severely undermined.

In August 1975, Prime Minister Francisco Morales Bermúdez seized the presidency through a military coup, using Velasco's ill health as justification. Velasco convened his cabinet near Lima, but his illness forced him to accept the new situation. Morales vowed to continue Velasco's reform program and named his government "the second phase of the Peruvian revolution." Instead, he began dismantling the reforms and initiated a long process of economic liberalization.

Velasco's health deteriorated and he died in 1977 at the age of 69. Controversy still exists as to the characterization of the Velasco regime. It has been considered as bourgeois reformist, fascist, nationalist, socialist, popular or patriotic, and also as a mixture of some of these, although in fact many tendencies were encompassed within his government.

SEE ALSO: Peronist Resistance; Peru, Labor and Peasant Mobilizations, 1900–1950; Peru, "People's War," Counterinsurgency, and the Popular Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Béjar, H. (1978) Velasco: ¿reformismo burgués? *Socialismo y participación* 5 (December).
- Castillo, M. (1982) La burguesía industrial y el reformismo militar: 1968–1978. In *Debates en sociología* 7. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
- Franco, C. (Ed.) (1983) *El Perú de Velasco*, 3 vols. Lima: Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participación.
- Juventud Nacionalista – Partido Nacionalista Peruano (n.d.) Juan Velasco Alvarado. Available at www.partidonacionalistaperuano.com/juventudes/velasco.htm.
- Marutían, J. I. (2003) El Gobierno del General Juan Velasco. Estudio de un caso de Cesarismo. Work Document No. 17. Buenos Aires: IDICSO. Available at www.salvador.edu.ar/csoc/idicso.
- Zimmermann, A. (1974) *El Plan Inca. Objetivo: la Revolución peruana*. Lima.

Velázquez, Francisco José (1884–1954)

Vittorio Sergi

Francisco José Múgica Velázquez was born in Tinguindín, Michoacán, on September 3, 1884. He was a military leader in the Mexican Revolution on the Constitutional side against Porfirio Díaz and Victoriano Huerta. As a politician, he was oriented to socialism and to the defense of national sovereignty.

From 1898 Velázquez lived in Zamora, Michoacán, where he studied medicine and wrote in liberal newspapers in opposition to the Díaz regime. He led the opposition to the reactionary governor of Michoacán, Don Aristeo Mercado, from the newspaper *Ideal*. In 1910 he traveled to San Antonio, Texas, in the United States to build the military organization of the Juntas Revolucionarias, and in 1911 he fought with Pascual Orozco in Ciudad Juárez. In 1915 he rose to the rank of general in the Constitutional army with Venustiano Carranza. The same year he became chief of military operations and then governor of the southern state of Tabasco. At the end of 1916 he was elected deputy to the federal congress and took part as representative of Michoacán in the Constitutional Convention of 1917.

He had a strong influence on the drafting of articles 3, 27, and 123 of the Political

Constitution of the United States of México, which ruled on the collective and national property of land and natural resources, the public character of basic education, the right to strike, and the eight-hour workday. In 1917 he was one of the founders of the Socialist Party of Michoacán (PSM) and ran for state elections. He was elected as governor of Michoacán in 1920, where he promoted land reform in Patzcuaro and other Indian territories. He presented a stark contrast with the president, General Alvaro Obregón. Velázquez was eventually sentenced to death, but because of his close relationship with Lázaro Cárdenas he was not prosecuted, and in 1932 he ascended to the rank of general of brigade.

Velázquez was a firm ally of President Cárdenas within the left wing of the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), opposing Catholic clergy and the more conservative elements in the parliament and advocating for political asylum for Leon Trotsky in Mexico. In the government of Lázaro Cárdenas, Velázquez was minister of economy (December 1934–June 1935) and of public works (June 1935–July 1939), and in 1938 he was highly influential in pushing the government's oil expropriation bill. He sought the presidency in 1939 but Cárdenas supported the secretary of national defense, Manuel Ávila Camacho, against Joaquín Amaro y Juan Andrew Almazán of the conservative National Action Party (PAN). On December 17, 1940, Velázquez was designated governor of Baja California Sur. He continued to serve as a public administrator until his death in Mexico City on April 12, 1954.

SEE ALSO: Cárdenas, Lázaro (1895–1970); Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Mexico, Worker Struggles and Labor Unions, 1950s–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Ceballos Garibay, H. (2004) *Francisco J. Múgica: crónica política de un rebelde*. Mexico City: Eds. Coyoacán.
- De María y Campo, A. (2004) *Dos aproximaciones a la figura de Francisco J. Múgica*. Mexico City: INEHRM.
- Gilly, A. (1977) *La revolución interrumpida*. Mexico City: El caballito.
- Mondragón Aguirre, M. (1967) *Cuando la Revolución se cortó las alas*. Mexico City: Costa-Amic.
- Múgica Velázquez, F. J. (1985) *Hechos, no palabras: prensa, parlamento*. Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana.

Velvet Revolution, 1989

Stanislav J. Kirschbaum

There are two names given to the events of November–December 1989 that brought about the collapse of the communist regime of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. “Velvet Revolution” is the name that the Czechs give these events and that is used in the West. There are many theories about the origin of the term; what is known is that it was used by a journalist after the first demonstrations and that it gained international currency thereafter. In Slovakia, on the other hand, from the very beginning these events have always been referred to as the “Gentle Revolution.”

The public demonstrations, strikes, political meetings, and formation of political groups that provoked the collapse of state socialism in the former Czechoslovakia were preceded by a series of major political changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the previous year and a half. In June 1988 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev all but abandoned the Brezhnev doctrine, which stipulated that the USSR and other socialist countries had a duty to come to the aid of any state where forces hostile to socialism were trying to turn its development towards capitalism. CPSU general secretary Leonid Brezhnev had developed this doctrine to justify the military invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and, retroactively, that of Hungary in 1956. The doctrine gave communist authorities in Eastern Europe the justification and capacity to prohibit and punish severely any dissident political activity. Gorbachev officially rejected it in March 1989. Its abandonment meant that the threat of a Soviet/Warsaw Pact military invasion was removed and that each Soviet bloc country could henceforth embark on its own political development. In Eastern Europe, Poland led the way with political change in September 1988 when round table discussions between the Communist Party and Solidarity were held. The round table led to the elections of June 1989, which resulted in the appointment of the first non-communist government in Eastern Europe since 1947. Regime change was also slowly taking place in Hungary during 1988 and 1989; major reforms occurred following the replacement of János Kádár as general secretary of the



Supporters of Václav Havel gather in Wenceslas Square in Prague to celebrate his election and the fall of communism. In 1989 the “Velvet Revolution” led to the peaceful overthrow of the communist government in Czechoslovakia and the election of Havel to the presidency. On January 1, 1993, after Czech and Slovak political leaders failed to reach an agreement on coexistence in one state, Czechoslovakia broke apart into two separate entities. (Getty Images)

Communist Party of Hungary in May 1988. The Hungarian parliament adopted a series of measures, which included freedom of association, assembly, and the press; trade-union pluralism; a new electoral law; and a radical revision of the constitution. In October 1989 the party changed its name to the Hungarian Socialist Party. During the summer and fall of 1989 in the German Democratic Republic thousands of East Germans departed for Hungary, which had opened its border with Austria in May, and Czechoslovakia, and there were regular demonstrations for change, especially in Leipzig and East Berlin.

Czechoslovakia was at that time in the grip of “normalization,” the name given to the repressive measures that were imposed after the Warsaw Pact invasion that put an end to the

Prague Spring in 1968. Public reaction to the new order expressed itself through “inner emigration,” where the people turned their interests and energy to their country cottages. Nevertheless, in 1977 a group of intellectuals led by the playwright Václav Havel made public *Charter 77*, a document that challenged the regime to comply with the commitments found in Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. After Gorbachev became secretary general of the CPSU in March 1985, Czechoslovakia began to experience challenges to the regime, namely the growth of public criticism, economic difficulties, and protest inspired by the changes that were taking place elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In December 1987 the author of normalization, Gustáv Husák, was removed from his position as general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS). The change of personnel did not indicate a political opening, however, as he was replaced by another hard-liner, Miloš Jakeš and, furthermore, Husák remained president of Czechoslovakia. Jakeš maintained the repressive measures of his predecessor in responding to the increasingly mobilized society. During 1988 there were public demonstrations throughout Czechoslovakia, including a candlelight vigil for religious freedom in Bratislava on March 25 that was brutally repressed, demonstrations marking the August 21 anniversary of the 1968 invasion in Prague and other cities, and demonstrations in Prague to mark the October 28 anniversary of the creation of Czecho-Slovakia, and, on December 10, the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Czechoslovak government’s response was to ban demonstrations in 1989, especially those planned in January to commemorate the 1969 death of Jan Palach and the alternative May Day demonstration. However, the November 3, 1989 decision by the Czechoslovak authorities to allow thousands of East Germans hiding in the West German embassy to travel directly to West Germany became a catalyst for dramatic change. In the days to come, thousands more East Germans traveled through Prague on to West Germany until the Berlin Wall was opened on November 9. This new freedom to travel abroad extended to East Germans did not go unnoticed by the citizens of Czechoslovakia.

The revolution began on November 16, 1989 with a peaceful student demonstration in Bratislava, Slovakia to celebrate International

Students Day. The next day a similar demonstration in Prague for the same purpose was brutally repressed by the police, provoking a chain of events that brought down the regime. On November 18 students from the Academy of Performing Arts in Prague launched a strike that over the course of several days mobilized university students throughout Czechoslovakia, as well as theater employees and actors in Prague and other cities. These strikes set the stage for the next step: political change.

On Sunday, November 19 Czech political dissidents, including members of Charter 77, formed Civic Forum in Prague, thereby initiating the political process that brought down the regime by the end of the year. Civic Forum was not a political party in the strict sense of the word; rather, it brought together various political dissidents and activists. Civic Forum representatives met with federal Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec the next day, November 20, demanding abolition of the political and social control the constitution accorded to the CPCS. Communist leaders resisted the demands but proved unable to reassert their authority as successive public demonstrations in the towns and cities of Czechoslovakia increased the pressure for change. Civic Forum representatives met again with Adamec on Tuesday, November 21 while a mass demonstration was taking place in Prague. That evening, CPCS general secretary Jakeš appeared on television vowing to preserve order. The government intended to deploy the People's Militia to crush the protest, but these plans were called off at the last moment and public demonstrations continued to take place throughout Czechoslovakia. On Wednesday, November 22 Civic Forum announced a 2-hour general strike for Monday, November 27. On Thursday, November 23 the authorities again considered asking the military to intervene and changed course. That evening the minister of defense appeared on television with assurances that the army would not act against the people and a plea for an end to the demonstrations. On Friday, November 24 general secretary Jakeš resigned and was replaced by an unknown apparatchik, Karel Urbánek. Czechoslovak radio and television announced that they would join the general strike planned for November 27, and supported the popular demand for political change by broadcasting an address by Havel on the general strike. On Sunday, November 26 Adamec finally

met with Havel, the leader of Civic Forum, but still refused to accede to any of the organization's demands. Finally, on Monday, November 27 the 2-hour strike at noon took place throughout the country as planned, with the support of a reported 75 percent of the population.

For a regime that had used mass demonstrations to mobilize the people, the general strike sent an unambiguous message about the desire for political change. But the CPCS leaders were not yet ready to give up power. In the days that followed, it took a series of political events to bring down the regime. On November 29 the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly eliminated Article 4 of the 1960 constitution, which gave the CPCS control over the state and society; the communist speaker of the assembly resigned. On November 30 the teaching of Marxism-Leninism was eliminated from institutions of higher learning and the government decided to remove the barbed wire along the Austrian border and let its citizens travel abroad without exit permits. On December 3 President Husák named a new government headed by Adamec with 15 communist and 5 non-communist ministers, but Civic Forum rejected it. On December 8 President Husák declared amnesty on political crimes and on December 10 he resigned after naming a federal Cabinet agreed upon by Civic Forum and the CPCS. The new Cabinet was headed by a Slovak communist, Marián Čalfa, but was made up of a majority of non-communists. The People's Militia was abolished on December 21. The next day Civic Forum, PAV, CPCS, and student representatives agreed that Alexander Dubček, leader of the Prague Spring, would become speaker of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly and Havel President of the Republic. On December 28 the assembly, still consisting of a majority of communist deputies elected in 1986 from a single CPCS list, allowed for the cooptation of new deputies, thus changing its composition and giving it much-needed legitimacy. Dubček was elected speaker. Finally, on December 29, the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly elected Havel as president. Čalfa, the last prime minister of communist Czechoslovakia, remained in his post, while another Slovak, Ján Čarnogurský, a leading Catholic dissident, was appointed deputy prime minister. The election of Havel to the presidency formally marked the end of the communist regime. The first free post-communist elections were held in June 1990.

In Slovakia, where the Gentle Revolution had been launched on November 16, events unfolded much along the same lines as in the Czech Socialist Republic during the first week. The first political movement to arise was founded on November 20 and was called Public Against Violence (PAV). It initiated and organized mass demonstrations throughout Slovakia. Among its founders were Ján Budaj, Fedor Gál, and a well-known stage and television actor, Milan Kňažko. Public meetings took place in Slovak towns and cities, most importantly in Bratislava, under the leadership of Kňažko and Budaj in an atmosphere that was specifically Slovak, that is to say very relaxed and informal, at times even theatrical. On November 21 PAV was the first post-communist group to demand the abolition of the leading role of the CPCS that was enshrined in the constitution of 1960. That same day there was a student demonstration encouraging the population to participate in the November 27 strike and another one asking for the release of Černogurský, jailed at that time for dissident activity, at which Dubček spoke, marking his first appearance during the Velvet/Gentle Revolution. On November 30 communists resigned from the Slovak National Council and were replaced by PAV members and other dissidents. When the federal government announced the freedom to travel to Austria on December 4, the following weekend some 250,000 Slovaks crossed the border where they were met by Austrians with bread and salt, the customary form when welcoming a guest. On December 8 a new Slovak government was formed under the prime ministership of Milan Čič.

Despite the similarities of most events during the Velvet and Gentle Revolutions, the political development that followed showed that the return to democracy had a different meaning in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia. The first signs of this difference appeared in March 1990 when the Federal Assembly debated the change in the name of the country as it abandoned the communist term Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Slovak deputies suggested that the name be simple and revert to the one used in the Peace Treaties of 1919–20, namely Czecho-Slovakia, rather than Czechoslovakia, which had been introduced in the 1920 constitution. The refusal on the part of the majority of Czech deputies and some Slovak ones provoked a mass demonstration in the streets of Bratislava on April 1, where

once again the chant of an independent Slovakia was heard. After some acrimonious discussions, two compromises were reached. It was agreed that in the short version the hyphen could be used in Slovakia, although in the Czech Lands and abroad the unhyphenated spelling would apply. Then, on April 20, the Federal Assembly voted the official name Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (ČSFR, and in Slovakia Č-SFR). This incident was the first to show how very different were the Czech and Slovak conceptions of their common state and brought into the open the need to re-examine the state of Czech-Slovak relations. Nevertheless, initially the political process unfolded along similar lines in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and the elections of June 1990 produced a clear rejection of the communists as both Civic Forum and PAV won the elections.

Over the next three years, differences between the Czech and Slovak communities became politically salient as the country made the transition from communist rule to democracy. Both the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks in their common state and the particular economic and social policies that would replace state socialism were matters of contention. In the Czech Republic political parties and most citizens favored the introduction of a market economy and a centralized federal system. In Slovakia, on the other hand, the approach was more social democratic, favoring a slower pace of economic change with continued social security measures and state intervention in the economy, and a decentralized political system. Despite many attempts to find a constitutional solution satisfactory to both communities, these differences could not be bridged. When the elections of June 1992 provided clear evidence of the polarization between the two parts of the country, the prime ministers of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Václav Klaus and Vladimír Mečiar, respectively, agreed to the break-up of Czechoslovakia on December 31, 1992.

SEE ALSO: Charter 77; Dubček, Alexander (1921–1992); Gorbachev, Mikhail (b. 1931); Prague Spring; Slovakia, Dissidence in the 1970s

References and Suggested Readings

Bradley, J. F. N. (1992) *Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution: A Political Analysis*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs.

- Čarnogurský, J. (1997) *Videné od Dunaja (Seen from the Danube)*. Bratislava: Kalligram.
- Havel, V. (2007) *To the Castle and Back*. Trans. P. Wilson. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Kenney, P. (2002) *A Carnival of Revolution – Central Europe 1989*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kirschbaum, S. J. (2005) *A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival*, 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave.
- Leff, C. S. (1997) *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation versus State*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Shepherd, R. H. E. (2000) *Czechoslovakia: The Velvet Revolution and Beyond*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Wheaton, B. & Kavan, Z. (1992) *The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia, 1988–1991*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Venezuela, exclusionary democracy and resistance, 1958–1998

Gregory Wilpert and Dario Azzellini

Venezuela's democratic era can be divided into three distinct periods. The first represents its economic glory days, from the end of its last dictatorship in 1958 to the height of its oil boom years in 1978. The second period, which lasted from 1979 to 1998, was marked by decline and by popular reactions in the form of constant protests, an uprising, and two military rebellions, as well as state repression of these popular reactions. The third period is the era of the Hugo Chávez presidency, which began with his assuming office in 1999.

Between 1958 and 1978 there was a self-reinforcing dynamic between Venezuela's oil-based economy and a political culture that favored rentierism. On the one hand, oil income tended to drown out all other economic activity, and on the other, the dominance of the oil economy produced rentierism, whereby all the main political and economic actors were focused on obtaining a piece of the country's oil revenues.

Until 1989 Venezuela was generally considered an exemplary democracy in Latin America. The criteria generally considered by liberal analysts as indicators for stable democracies – regular elections, possible alternation of the parties in power, respect of certain civil rights – were all seen as present. In reality, however, it was more

a repressive democracy in which two parties – the formally social democratic Democratic Action (Acción Democrática, AD) and the conservative Political Electoral Independent Organization Committee (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente, COPEI) – shared power. From the fall of the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 1958 up to the seizure of power by Hugo Chávez in 1999, they filled the entire institutional space of interaction with the state and the whole social life.

The Pérez Jiménez dictatorship was overthrown on January 23, 1958 by an alliance of the Democratic Republican Union (Union Republicana Democrática, URD), COPEI, AD, and the Communist Party (PCV), which together had formed the Patriotic Junta to coordinate the struggle against the dictatorship, as well as employers, trade unions, and significant sectors of the military. The alliance also enjoyed the support of a mass movement. At that time the political, social, and economic model for Venezuela had already been decided. With a number of pacts among the most powerful social sectors (bourgeois parties, employers, military, trade union, and church), a hermetically sealed bourgeois representative democracy was installed and tightened from 1958 on.

Already before the elections of 1958 the chairmen of the three bourgeois parties, Rómulo Betancourt (AD), Rafael Caldera (COPEI), and Jóvito Villalba (URD), signed the so-called Pact of Punto Fijo (PPF), named after the Venezuelan city where it was signed. The pact was an agreement on how to establish governability in a framework of representative democracy. The PCV, which had played a leading role in the Patriotic Junta, was excluded from the agreement.

The PPF signatories committed themselves to respect and defend the results of the forthcoming elections in December 1958. They agreed, regardless of the electoral result, that no party should govern alone, but that the three should build together a government of national unity. A minimum program for joint government was also decided in the PPF but not included. The pact was signed separately on December 6, 1958. All parties agreed that nobody could present a program contrary to the minimum program in which, among other things, they agreed on a mixed economy, a development plan based on import substitution, the elaboration of a new constitution and social legislation, and a strong

alliance with the United States. The minimum program also specified the future role of the armed forces, which were to be apolitical and obedient, while guaranteeing public peace.

The PPF model was particularly strengthened by the integration of the trade union federation, the Confederation of Workers of Venezuela (CTV), which signed the Worker–Employer Pact with the representatives of the entrepreneurs. The pact established that the CTV, as the only federation, would defend the existing democracy and satisfy social and wage demands by means of negotiations and consent, avoiding strikes or any work interruptions. The CTV was established as the intermediary between government and entrepreneurs on the one hand and workers on the other. The AD government controlled the CTV after expelling the leftists.

The social climate in Venezuela at the beginning of the 1960s was strongly influenced by the success of the Cuban Revolution. A protest movement that started on October 19, 1960 spread through the country and turned into an open rebellion, which was suppressed on October 23. On November 21, students and police clashed heavily in Caracas. Strikes followed, and the movement was finally smashed on November 29 with the storming of the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) and over 4,000 arrests.

After the URD left the PPF in 1960 and was marginalized, AD and COPEI controlled the state. AD's shift to the right provoked two leftist splits in 1960–1, when it lost almost all its youth members to the new Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). The PCV and MIR began to prepare the armed struggle but were outlawed by Betancourt after their participation in a leftist military uprising against the government in May 1962. From 1960 to 1962, several leftist military revolts took place. The former head of the Patriotic Junta, URD member of parliament Fabricio Ojeda, left parliament on June 30, 1962 in order to oversee the construction of a guerrilla front in the Andes.

Over the following years the Punto Fijo system (*puntofijismo*) was further elaborated with a greater number of pacts. AD and COPEI agreed on a voting system that benefited parties having a nationwide apparatus and strong finances. Voters could elect parties by paper ballot, but decisions about candidates were made by the party leadership. Direct elections of mayors and governors of the federal states, established in the

1961 Constitution, did not occur. Instead, the president appointed the governors, who then appointed the mayors. This system impeded electoral success for small parties or independent candidates.

On March 6, 1964, the Vatican and the Venezuelan government signed an agreement in which the government assumed responsibility for the maintenance of bishops, vicars, and church institutions, in exchange for which the Catholic Church gave the government a veto against the appointment of any archbishop, bishop, or prelate. Thus the two-party system extended its control to the social influence of the church. In 1970 an Institutional Pact established that at the beginning of each presidential term, the posts of chairman of the national congress, general prosecutor, high court judges, and other organs of the judiciary and the electoral council had to be shared among AD and COPEI.

The URD obtained success in the presidential elections of 1968 when its candidate, Miguel Angel Burrelli Rivas, won 22.2 percent of the vote. After that its political importance declined, and it supported COPEI and AD candidates in subsequent presidential elections before almost completely disappearing from political life.

However, the elections of 1968 are interesting for another reason. With an election turnout of 96.7 percent – the highest in Venezuelan history – AD and COPEI together obtained only 57.37 percent of the vote. Luis Beltrán Prieto Figueroa, a high school teacher and union leader, won 19.34 percent as candidate of a leftist coalition under the leadership of the Electoral Movement of the People (MEP). The MEP had split off from AD in 1967. Its candidate was supported by the PCV which, although still illegal, had created the Union to Advance (UPA) in order to participate in the elections. Because of the split of leftist votes, the COPEI candidate, Rafael Caldera, won the presidency with just 29.13 percent against the AD's Gonzalo Barrios with 28.24 percent.

Since neither of the two alternative candidates had succeeded in breaking the AD–COPEI alliance, and the parties supporting them lost significant support in the following elections, the two-party system can be regarded as being consolidated from the next general elections on in 1973. AD candidate Carlo Andrés Pérez won the presidency with 48.7 percent, while the left presented three different candidates, obtaining 12.4 percent altogether.

AD and COPEI became nationwide mass organizations. From 1973 to 1988, together they won 80 percent of the votes in general elections and 90 percent in presidential elections. All substantial government decisions – above all those concerning defense, foreign affairs, and oil policies – were made with the consent of both parties. The decisions were taken by a small inner circle of the parties' leaderships (called *cogollos*). MPs had to vote as a bloc in favor of their leaderships' decisions if they did not wish to jeopardize their careers.

Members of AD and COPEI were subjected to an iron party discipline and were expelled when they refused to accept decisions from above. In addition, both parties penetrated numerous social organizations and institutions – including state enterprises, trade unions, neighborhood, peasant, and student organizations, professional bodies and foundations – and put them to work for party political purposes. Beyond that, they maintained close relations with the military and the private capitalist sector, who were both endowed with enormous advantages (funds, training, subsidies, tax exemptions, protection, privileges, and state contracts) in exchange for their non-interference in political affairs.

Thus, *puntofijismo* represented a corporate pact unifying the forces that could guarantee a formally democratic system servicing the interests of the United States, transnational companies (mainly oil), and the Venezuelan bourgeoisie. All subordinated forces had access to resources and power; all others were excluded. The articulation of demands and decision-making had to occur through the established mechanisms of the party system. Protests were not accepted as instruments of democratic struggle and were equated with communism or guerilla action. Until 1994, even peaceful protests were met with brutal repression and numerous deaths.

As the world's largest exporter of oil between 1925 and 1986, Venezuela experienced a "golden decade" from 1974 to 1983. On August 29, 1975, President Carlos Andrés Pérez (1973–8) nationalized the oil industry, but the traditional oligarchy and the new upper class created through the party system continued to take advantage of the nationalized enterprises and use them as their private treasure. They also used the state apparatus to guarantee maximum profits with the lowest risk in the private sector.

In the expectation that oil prices would remain high, the Venezuelan state became heavily indebted to international banks and institutions. By raising hopes of social ascent and improvement, it pacified the situation in the country.

Popular Reactions against Neoliberalism and the Rise of Chávez, 1989–1998

A fundamental shift began in Venezuelan society, however, once the oil bonanza began to wane. The country entered a 20-year decline and suffered one of its worst economic shocks in 1984. There were occasional oil booms in this period, such as during the Iranian Revolution (1980) and the Gulf War (1991), but these short-lived booms could not make up for heavy indebtedness, increasing oil production costs, declining oil prices, and massive population growth. The decline in per capita oil income and thus also in per capita GDP was steady and unprecedented in the world during this period. Real per capita income declined by 27 percent between 1979 and 1999. No other economy in South America experienced such a dramatic decline. Along with this, poverty increased from 17 percent in 1980 to 65 percent in 1996. When oil income began to decline, it was not as easy to reduce government spending as it had been to increase it. The result was that the government gradually went deeper and deeper into debt. In addition, interest rates for the foreign debt increased dramatically, so that between 1970 and 1994 foreign debt rose from 9 percent to 53 percent of GDP.

Compounding the declining revenues and the rising debt burden was a massive capital flight, largely in response to the deteriorating economic situation and the impression that the government was unable to do anything to stop the decline. In 1982 alone, \$8 billion left the economy, which had a GDP of \$56 billion at that time. To stem this capital flight, President Luis Herrera Campins dramatically devalued the currency, which decreased the value of Venezuelans' wealth and income relative to the outside world. Middle-class Venezuelans, who had become used to going on shopping sprees to Miami, could suddenly no longer afford to do so. Other consequences of this economic decline were increasing unemployment (reaching 13.4 percent in 1984), a growing informal sector (reaching 54 percent in 1998), and a dismantled welfare state.

By 1988, while a secret revolutionary movement was being organized within the military, Venezuela seemed to be on the brink of an abyss. That year, former President Carlos Andrés Pérez (known as CAP) campaigned on a promise to reinstitute Venezuela's glory days of the mid-1970s, on anti-neoliberalism, and on not bringing in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help with the country's fiscal deficit. CAP easily won a second (non-consecutive) term in December 1988. However, three weeks after his inauguration in February 1989, he effected a complete reversal of his campaign promises and introduced a full package of IMF-required neoliberal measures, such as gasoline price increases, privatization, social spending cutbacks, and deregulation of prices.

The economic shock treatment hit the population with unprecedented force. However, since the most immediate measures of the package affected all Venezuelans evenly in absolute terms, they affected the poor more than anyone else in relative terms. The 30 percent increase in bus fares, for example, affected the poor much more than the middle classes.

Protests against the IMF-mandated bus fare increases began immediately and soon turned into full-blown riots, in which stores were looted, first in Caracas and, as word spread, to almost all other cities throughout Venezuela. The protests and riots appeared to be spontaneous and neither the country's political leadership, from the government or the opposition, nor the unions made any declarations about them one way or the other. At first the police stood by, but as the riots and lootings continued all night and into the following morning, the government finally reacted with a televised call for calm. The statement had no effect and President Pérez declared martial law, suspending constitutional guarantees. The government then proceeded to suppress the protests and riots with violence, bringing in the military who, together with the police, fired indiscriminately at protesters and rioters.

The repression continued for several days after the riots had ended, with military forces going into poor neighborhoods (*barrios*), attacking people and homes at random. Finally, when the shooting ended on March 4, the official death toll stood at nearly 400. Most other unofficial estimates, however, place the number of dead between 1,000 and 3,000, some even higher. Weeks later, human rights groups found mass

burial sites in the *barrios*, with bodies too decomposed to be identified.

The *Caracazo* acted as a wake-up call for the secret Bolivarian movement within the military, the Bolivarian Revolutionary Army (Ejército Bolivariano Revolucionario, EBR-200). It was completely unprepared for such a civilian uprising, even though this was more or less the kind of event it believed it needed in order to be successful in toppling the government. Numerous soldiers and officers began approaching the group.

In the aftermath of the IMF-imposed structural adjustment plan that had initiated the *Caracazo*, unemployment rose from 7 to 10 percent, the economy shrank by 10 percent, real salaries dropped by 11 percent, and inflation rose to 94 percent for 1989. On May 18, the country's main labor union federation, the CTV, which was normally controlled by the ruling AD, called for a one-day general strike against the government it had originally supported.

By 1990 a recovery had set in. That year the economy grew by 4.4 percent, then by 9.2 percent in 1991. The economic expansion was attributable to the privatization of state enterprises and the momentary oil price boom due to the Gulf War, both of which provided the state with fresh cash. However, despite the economic turnaround, numerous protests continued throughout these years, largely because the structural adjustment program still affected the poor disproportionately.

Social movements began emerging throughout the *barrios*, such as the Barrio Assemblies, in which communities gathered together to discuss their needs and organizers tried to channel them through protests. The number of protests between 1989 and 1993 increased steadily, from 675 in 1989–90 to 1,047 in 1992–3. Pérez's popularity plunged in light of the constant protests, so that by 1992 he had lost control over his own party and was facing strong pressure to resign, even among former supporters. Numerous scandals involving Pérez's associates surfaced during this period, making matters even worse for the president.

Meanwhile, the EBR-200 was renamed the MBR-200 (Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement) and was preparing a military uprising for 1992. Two failed Bolivarian attempts to overthrow the government followed in February and November 1992. The insurrection attempt of February 4 failed militarily, since the insurgents did not

succeed in arresting the president or conquering important military positions in Caracas.

In other federal states the military insurrections had greater success. In Zulia, for example, the military succeeded in gaining control of the regional government, oil fields, and central airport, but when it became clear that the rebellion was doomed to failure, Hugo Chávez surrendered with his troops in Caracas and asked to give a short speech on television to his fellow combatants. He spoke for barely one minute, thanked the soldiers involved, assumed responsibility for the coup d'état and its failure, and declared the objectives out of reach "for now" (*por ahora*). He added that there would be new possibilities for the country to change its path, but for the time being people should lay down their arms and avoid senseless bloodshed. His speech raised huge sympathies and transformed him into a symbol of hope for change. The second military uprising on November 27, 1992 also failed after heavy fighting and the death of more than 300 soldiers.

In the aftermath of the two coups, corruption scandals, further economic decline, and governmental deadlock, it came as no surprise that in the December 6, 1992 regional elections, the main winner should be a political newcomer, the leftist union-based party La Causa R (R[adical] Cause, LCR). By then even Carlos Andrés Pérez's own party rejected him, and he had to face a corruption trial for embezzling \$17 million. On May 20, 1993, the Supreme Court removed his immunity and by June he was removed from office. Ramón Velásquez, a prominent historian, was named to complete the remainder of Pérez's term in office.

The December 1993 presidential vote proved to be the official beginning of the end of the *puntofijo* system that had been in place since 1958. Voters could choose between four major candidates: Claudio Fermín from Acción Democrática, Osvaldo Alvarez from COPEI, Andrés Velásquez from La Causa R, and Rafael Caldera, the former president and founder of COPEI, who had formed a new party for his candidacy, Convergencia (Convergence). The vote was almost evenly split between the four candidates, but Caldera won with a relatively small 30 percent of the vote, since no run-off elections or absolute majority is needed to win the Venezuelan presidency. However, there was evidence that many votes had been stolen from Velásquez when ballots cast for him were found in a garbage dump

in Caracas. Also, LCR said it had evidence of forged vote counts that were sufficiently high to have given its candidate enough votes to win the presidency. Velásquez, though, told his party to accept the results and work toward an even stronger showing next time around.

Caldera's Convergencia was a coalition of parties that included the support of the Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS) and 15 other parties and organizations. The success of Convergencia and of La Causa R, which combined received over 50 percent of the presidential vote, signaled the end of the dominance of the two parties that had traditionally governed Venezuela for the previous 35 years. However, abstention had also reached record levels, increasing from 22 percent in 1988 to 44 percent in 1993, thus indicating the huge loss of confidence in Venezuela's political system during this period.

Making Venezuela's economic and political situation worse, in late 1993, shortly before Caldera was due to be sworn into office, a banking crisis erupted. The government decided to nationalize the bank's losses by bailing them out with newly printed money, amounting to 10 percent of the country's GDP, or \$8.5 billion, while numerous bank managers and owners fled the country, along with some of the bail-out funds. The result was massive inflation, which was to reverberate through the entire Caldera presidency. The annual average inflation rate was thus 61 percent – the highest average in the country's democratic history. The Caldera government vainly tried to gain control over the country's economic chaos, but oil prices kept dropping, reaching an all-time low of \$10 per barrel in 1998.

Caldera presented several very different economic plans during his presidency. The first tried to keep his campaign promise not to follow neoliberal precepts. However, with inflation skyrocketing and oil prices plummeting, none of these worked. So, in the second half of his presidency, Caldera, just like Pérez before him, switched gear and began implementing measures more aligned with neoliberalism, under a plan called Agenda Venezuela, which he presented in April 1996. With this plan, designed by planning minister Teodoro Petkoff from the MAS, he initiated the privatization of the state telephone company and began to explore the privatization of the state oil company. Also, gasoline prices were increased by 600 percent. Caldera's popularity

plummeted, from 66 percent to 33 percent in a two-year period, and Venezuela's political class faced yet another crisis of confidence.

While President Pérez had been struggling with the continuing decline of Venezuela's economy and its political institutions and his own impeachment, Chávez was meeting numerous political leaders in prison. When Caldera assumed the presidency, however, Chávez was released from prison in an amnesty for all of the participants in the coups of 1992. Caldera had made the release of the coup plotters one of his campaign promises, and kept this promise shortly after assuming office. Chávez and his fellow former conspirators had clearly acquired much popular support and had raised expectations among large parts of Venezuela's population. Also, within the military, Chávez's organization had been destroyed, making any renewed military coup attempt virtually impossible.

An important factor during this time was that Venezuela's two-party system had fallen apart. Already in 1989, Velásquez (of La Causa R) won the governorship of Bolívar state – practically the first time anyone from a party outside the two-party system had obtained public office. Then, in 1993, Caldera won the presidency mainly because he had left his party and had made a political comeback on the basis of sympathizing with Chávez's coup attempt. Next, in December of 1995, one of Chávez's former closest allies, Francisco Arias Cardenas, ran for governor of the state of Zulia and won on the Causa R ticket.

In 1997 the MBR-200 decided to opt for electoral participation. Since Venezuelan electoral law prohibits any party from using the name of Simón Bolívar in its party name, Chávez's party was named the Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento Quinta República, MVR). The party counted four republics since Venezuela's independence and wanted to found a fifth with the passage of a new constitution if Chávez were elected.

Hugo Chávez went on to win the December 6, 1998 presidential election with 56.2 percent of the vote. The reasons for his success were directly related to the country's 20-year economic decline and the consequent disintegration of its two-party system and popular revolts. Chávez presented himself as someone who would bring about radical change for Venezuela, even though he was somewhat vague as to what this change would consist of, beyond the passage

of a new constitution and an end to neoliberal politics, especially the imminent privatization of the oil sector. However, his complete outsider status and the fact that he had tried to overthrow the old regime more than six years earlier gave him a solid base of support among the voting public.

SEE ALSO: Bolivarianism, Venezuela; *Caracazo*, 1989; Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954); Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–Present; Venezuela, Guerilla Movements, 1960s–1980s; Venezuela, MAS and Causa Radical; Venezuela, MBR-200 and the Military Uprisings of 1992

References and Suggested Readings

- Buxton, J. (2001) *The Failure of Political Reform in Venezuela*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Coronil, F. (1997) *The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ellner, S. (2008) *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Gott, R. (2005) *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*. London: Verso.
- Karl, T. L. (1997) *The Paradox of Plenty*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Lopez Maya, M. (1999) *La protesta popular en Venezuela entre 1989 y 1993*. Caracas: Nueva Sociedad.
- Lopez Maya, M. (2003) Movilización, institucionalidad y legitimidad en Venezuela. *Revista Venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales* 1: 211–26.
- Lopez Maya, M. (2005) *Del viernes negro al referendo revocatorio*. Caracas: Alfadil.
- Ochoa Henríquez, H. & Rodríguez Colmenares, I. (2003) Las fuerzas armadas en la política social de Venezuela. *Política y Cultura* 20: 117–35.

Venezuela, guerilla movements, 1960s–1980s

Dario Azzellini

Venezuela was the second country in Latin America (after Cuba) to have a significant guerilla movement during the second half of the twentieth century. After the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) and other leftists had played a central role in overthrowing the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jimenez in 1958, the bourgeois parties excluded them from decision-making.



Mexican magazine editor Mario Menendez (center) poses late 1962 with guerilla forces commander in chief Douglas Bravo (right) and his assistant Luben Petkoff (left). After being expelled from the Communist Party of Venezuela in 1965, Bravo went on to lead the military wing of the Partido de la Revolución Venezolana (PRV). In 1980 he recruited a young military officer within the Venezuelan army, Hugo Chávez, to help foment revolution from within. (AFP/Getty Images)

The formerly center-left *Acción Democrática* (AD) aligned the country with the US and followed a politics of repression toward the left. The result was a guerilla war from 1962 to 1973, inspired by the Cuban revolution. But even if the level of armed confrontation dropped after that, the existence of armed leftist organizations persisted.

Following the Cuban model, tactical combat units (*Unidades Tácticas de Combate*, UTC) were formed as urban guerillas in Venezuela, starting in 1960. They were formed as military apparatus of the PCV, the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR), and smaller leftist organizations. They gained visibility from 1961 on with attacks on US enterprises and strategic institutions. Especially during 1961 and 1962, the units of the MIR were the most active Venezuelan guerillas.

The MIR was founded on April 8, 1960, by young AD militants who had been involved in the struggle against the dictatorship. It was founded as a Marxist party with the goal of introducing a socialist system through revolution. The founders had been expelled from the AD between 1958 and 1960 because, influenced by socialism and the Cuban revolution, they were demanding agrarian reform and criticizing the interior, economic, financial, and foreign policies of the party.

In 1961, guerilla units of the PCV, MIR, and URD (*Unión Republicana Democrática*)

dissidents joined together to form the Forces of National Liberation (FNL). Rural guerilla fronts were organized in the federal state of Merida (starting from 1960), in the mountains of Lara (starting from 1961), in the mountains of Falcón and Yaracuy, in the east of the country (starting from 1962), and last in the levels of Apure (starting from 1965).

On January 18, 1962, a transportation strike grew into a country-wide rebellion, which was put down after two weeks, while a planned civilian-military rebellion in the coastal area close to Caracas was aborted before it began. This was the first attempt of leftist forces and army sectors to start an uprising. After that a military uprising in Carúpano, in eastern Venezuela, took place but was defeated. More than 400 people, including PCV member of parliament Eloy Torres and other PCV and MIR members who had taken part in the rebellion, were arrested.

President Rómulo Betancourt banned the PCV and MIR on May 9, 1962. Thousands of arrests followed. However, until the end of 1963 a democratic image was maintained and the elected members of parliament of the PCV and MIR kept their seats. On June 2, 1962, a marine battalion in Puerto Cabello, in the federal state of Carabobo, started an uprising in coordination with the PCV and its youth organization Communist Youth of Venezuela (JCV). The uprising was put down two days later with massive military attacks from air and sea, causing 300 to 400 deaths. After the two military rebellions, the FLN initiated its transformation into FLN Armed Forces of National Liberation (FLN-FALN), a structure to coordinate all groups and build a People's Army. All organizations, not just the PCV, were strongly influenced by Cuba and China, and both the guerilla activities and the repression grew.

On June 30, 1962, journalist, congressman, and former leader of the Patriotic Junta that had coordinated the uprising against the dictatorship, Fabricio Ojeda, announced that he would join the armed struggle. He went to the Andes in order to command a front of the FLN-FALN. Ojeda was arrested in 1966, tortured, and killed by the Intelligence Service of the Army Forces (SIFA) on June 21, 1966. Official sources said he committed suicide.

The FALN carried out armed attacks, as well as spectacular propaganda operations. On January 18, 1963 an urban guerilla unit stole

five paintings by Van Gogh, Picasso, Cézanne, Braque, and Gauguin from a special exhibition in Caracas. On February 18, 1963 the FALN hijacked the Venezuelan cargo ship *Anzoátegui* and while heading toward Brazil sent out to the world messages about the situation of political prisoners in Venezuela. On August 24, MIR units kidnapped the Argentine football star Alfredo Di Stefano, who was playing for Real Madrid, and released him after 54 hours.

After the FALN killed several National Guard members on September 29, 1963 during an attack on a tourist train line, President Betancourt ordered the arrest of the PCV and MIR members of parliament. As a consequence, in January 1964, the MIR and PCV defined the armed struggle as the central task of the left in Venezuela. At this time more than 1,000 Guérilleros were active. In October 1964 Douglas Bravo and Elías Manuitt of the general command of the José Leonardo Chirinos guerilla front issued a report that was approved by the PCV-FALN calling for the cooperation of revolutionary sectors of the army, and the guerilla was declared for the first time an important strategy.

In late 1965, part of the PCV central committee (among them Teodoro Petkoff, Guillermo García Ponce, and Pompeyo Marquez), from prison, criticized the armed struggle as an error which had isolated the left. Parts of the MIR supported the criticism. Douglas Bravo and others were excluded from the PCV, so the PCV split and on April 23, 1966 the Party of the Venezuelan Revolution (PRV) was founded. The guerilla fronts in Falcón and Lara, defining themselves as revolutionary Bolivarian Marxists, named Simón Bolívar, Simón Rodríguez, Ezequiel Zamora, and the heritage of black and indigenous resistance as the base of Venezuelan socialism and the civilian-military uprising as the way to the Venezuelan revolution. They decided to continue the armed struggle as PRV-FALN under the leadership of Douglas Bravo, taking up the intentional infiltration of the military. The PRV-FALN succeeded in organizing important members of the army, and their work remained largely undiscovered until they left the armed forces. The PCV-FALN stopped military operations in 1966 and dissolved officially in February 1969. The final break of the PCV with the armed struggle and Cuba, which supported it, took place in 1967, and in 1968 the PCV participated in elections under a different name.

The MIR split into a hard (MIR duro) and a soft (MIR blando) faction. The MIR blando gave up armed struggle and dissolved in the middle of the 1970s into the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS). The MIR duro, which continued the armed struggle, split in 1968 into the Frente Guerrillero Antonio José de Sucre (FGAJS), which remained a guerilla organization, and the MIR, which became the legal party. In 1979–1980 the party disintegrated into five different organizations and lost importance.

With the seizure of power of Rafael Calderas of the conservative Copei in 1969, the high tide of the guerilla war was over. Caldera put an emphasis on the pacification of the conflict. About 300 members of armed organizations, above all the PCV and MIR, accepted offers of a remission of penalty or exile and gave up armed struggle. The PCV and MIR were admitted again as legal parties.

In 1970 the guerilla FGAJS split into two main currents. One formed the guerilla Red Flag (Bandera Roja – BR) with a Stalinist-Maoist orientation and a military front. The other current advocated a combination of armed struggle and legal political activities by founding the urban guerilla Organization of Revolutionaries (OR) and then, in 1973, the Socialist League (LS) as a legal political organization. At the beginning the LS defined itself as Marxist-Leninist-Maoist but as time passed it moved more and more to an undogmatic Marxism. During the 1970s it had a certain influence in the student sector with the Student Movement of Popular Unity (MEUP) and later with the Movimiento 80.

After the 1976 kidnapping of the US entrepreneur William Frank Niehaus, accused of working for the CIA, by the Groups of Revolutionary Commandos (GCR), a split-off of the OR advocating for an offensive of the armed struggle, the repression forces led a brutal campaign against the LS and the OR. The LS founder and chairman, Jorge Rodríguez (father of Jorge Rodríguez Gómez, vice-president of Venezuela since 2007), was murdered. The repression led to the weakening of the LS, which had experienced a reinforcement before the kidnapping, and led to the dissolution of the OR in the following years. The LS participated in elections in 1983 and 1988 with small success and supported the 1998 candidacy of Chávez. In 2007 it dissolved into the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

The guerilla front of BR and its leadership split off during 1976–1977 and created BR-Marxista-Leninista (BR-ML), which was disbanded by repression a short time after. BR rebuilt the military structures as Frente Americo Silva (FAS) and in August 1977 organized the escape of imprisoned militants. A phase of intensive and successful military activities followed, which lasted until 1982. At the beginning of October 1982 the army bombarded a BR-FAS camp during a large meeting and surrounded the region with huge military forces, killing 23 guerrillas, some of whom were literally executed. BR declared a ceasefire and accomplished no further military operations, officially abdicating in 1994. At that point, BR concentrated on political work in schools and universities. Most of the BR finally dissolved in Bolivarian organizations. The remaining BR rejects Chávez and the Bolivarian movement, calling them false socialists. BR became part of the right-wing opposition alliance and became a legal party in 2000. With fewer than 100 members, however, it lost its party status in 2008.

The PRV-FALN remained active until the end of the 1970s and carried out numerous armed operations, especially during the first half of the decade. The PRV-FALN also had an urban command. The Mobile Unit (Unidad Móvil) was founded at the end of the 1960s and operated up to the early 1980s, concentrating on financing operations such as bank robberies.

The idea of a continental liberation like that envisioned by Simón Bolívar was already common among the Venezuelan left in the 1970s. The Brigada Internacionalista Simón Bolívar supported the liberation struggle in Nicaragua militarily. The PRV organized international armed solidarity with movements in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Colombia.

The political and military defeat of the armed struggle in Venezuela led huge parts of the Venezuelan left between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s to question dogmatism, a missing connection with the everyday life struggles of the population, imported political models, the focus concept, and the authoritarianism of the Communist Party. Most armed organizations put their emphasis on grassroots work. Most cadres were not militarily active, but political organizations alongside social movements (the PRV with Ruptura, the OR with the LS, BR with the Committees of Popular Struggles – CLP).

The magazine and publishing house Ruptura, created by the PRV in 1974, grew into a broad movement. Ruptura became a strong reference point in the cultural sector and developed broad grassroots work with fronts for peasants, workers, students, and neighborhoods. Meanwhile the guerilla activities of the PRV continued. On January 18, 1975 the PRV-FALN, together with the BR, organized a mass escape of 23 political prisoners from the San Carlos prison in Caracas.

As a revolutionary strategy PRV-Ruptura continued to support the civilian-military rebellion and continued to try to infiltrate the army in order to organize the rebellion. The success of Ruptura's political work with mass movements led to an intensive internal debate in 1978–1979. The activists from the movements questioned the military structure. A current led by Ali Rodríguez split off from the PRV and founded the Revolutionary Tendency (TR) as a legal organization, which later merged with the PCV faction that had split off, Causa R. Ruptura broke up during a PRV crisis in 1979, but many networks of militants and grassroots organizations persisted.

The PRV dissolved in 1983. In 1985 the current around Douglas Bravo founded PRV Third Way (Tercer Camino) as a legal political organization. It developed activities in neighborhoods, factories, and universities. In addition, it had clandestine structures which participated in the civilian-military rebellions of 1992. Douglas Bravo was condemned for his participation in the rebellions and later pardoned.

During the early 1980s the GCR, led by Carlos Lanz, merged with the Guevaristic currents of the poor Caracas 23 de Enero neighborhood and formed the Revolutionary Workers' Movement (MRT). This guerilla organization was small and short-lived, but their political orientation had a great influence on the Venezuelan left during the following decades.

Like the PRV, the MRT followed the strategy of the civilian-military alliance and the continental revolution. Although the majority of the MRT militants came from very avant-gardist organizations, the MRT understood itself not as avant-garde, but as a further resistance experience. It referred to the experiences of the indigenous and Afro-Venezuelan resistance as well as to practices of counter-culture. It advocated for an alliance of different resistance forms and movements, hoping to unite workers, students,

sexual minorities, human rights activists, and the oppressed of various races and ethnicities.

Breaking with Leninism, the MRT studied Rosa Luxembour, Leon Trotsky, and the experiences of self-management, in order to develop a libertarian socialism. The MRT questioned the Leninist democratic centralism and insisted upon the necessity of horizontal forms of organization. Instead of cooperating with trade unions and official student associations the MRT supported and cooperated with workers' and students' councils. The MRT postulated neither full legality nor absolute clandestinity. Based on an analysis of Venezuelan capitalism and different concepts of armed struggle, it assumed that organized people's power would lead to social revolution. Therefore the struggle was not limited to armed operations but was part of everyday life. The organization's structure consisted of mobile urban militias, which had legal and unarmed tasks as well as military clandestine ones.

Social circumstances and increasing repression during the 1980s led to a resurgence of armed groups. Especially in Caracas's poor neighborhoods many local armed militias were founded for self-defense against police repression and to fight the drug economy, which was frequently allied with the police. The armed structures of the MRT were the origin of the Revolutionary Tupamaro Movement, also known as Tupamaros. From Caracas's well-known 23 de Enero neighborhood, the organization spread over the country. The Tupamaros supported the candidacy of Chávez in 1998 and has participated in elections since 2004. In 2002 in Caracas the Revolutionary Movement Carapaica and the Tactical Combat Unit Nestor Zepa Cartolini (UTCNZC) split off as exclusively clandestine urban militia structures. Beyond these, other armed militias exist, particularly in the poor neighborhoods of Caracas.

There were rural groups in addition to the urban groups. The Bolivarian Liberation Forces-Liberation Army (FBL-EL) was founded in 1986 and became public in 1992. This group had contact with neither the guerillas of the 1960s and 1970s nor the rebellious army members. The FBL-EL still exists as an armed guerilla organization, but officially it does not undertake any armed operations. It supports Chávez as well as the Bolivarian process, but it postulates the necessity of armed self-organization of the population beyond the army.

SEE ALSO: Bolivarianism, Venezuela; Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954); Tupamaros; Venezuela, MAS and Causa Radical; Venezuela, Military Uprisings, 1960–1962

References and Suggested Readings

- Bonilla-Molina, L. & El Troudi, H. (2004) *Historia de la Revolución Bolivariana*. Caracas: Ministerio de Comunicación e Información.
- Gabaldón Márquez, E. (2007) *Por el camino de Chimiro*. Caracas: El perro y la rana.
- Garrido, A. (2000) *La Historia Secreta de la Revolución Bolivariana*. Merida: Editorial Venezolana.
- Garrido, A. (2002) *Documentos de la Revolución Bolivariana*. Caracas: Ediciones del autor.

Venezuela, MAS and Causa Radical

Dario Azzellini

As a consequence of the debates provoked by the defeat of the armed struggle and the invasion of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) by the Soviet Union, the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) split in 1970. The PCV had recently been legalized, but tensions within the international communist movement led to local debates. As a result, the Movement to Socialism (MAS) and the Radical Cause (Causa R) formed by splitting off from the PCV in 1971.

In January 1971 MAS was formed under the leadership of Teodoro Petkoff, Pompeyo Marquez, Eloy Torres, and others, some of them former PCV central committee members. Instead of maintaining Marxism as its main ideology, MAS followed a reformist orientation. Because of these more conservative currents, former guerilla commander Alfred Maneiro, in turn, broke with MAS and led a small group of approximately ten activists to create a new political organization. This group acted first as Venezuela 83 but changed its name to Causa Radical (Causa R) in 1973. From 1973 to the beginning of the 1990s, MAS represented the main left-wing voting option, putting forward José Vicente Rangel, well known for his strong advocacy of human rights, as a presidential candidate in 1973.

MAS

While Causa R focused on building independent trade unions, the split-off from MAS had

also provoked a split in the PCV union federation CUTV. The MAS sector of the CUTV negotiated power quotas with the official union federation CTV and joined the federation the communists had left years before, winning three seats on the CTV leadership board at the group's seventh congress in 1975. In the 1978 general elections MAS won 6.08 percent of the votes. In 1980 it had approximately 40,000 members, enjoying special support from the middle class and universities.

In the course of the 1980s, MAS moved increasingly to social-democratic positions, joined the socialist international, and consolidated its institutional presence. The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a party built out of the MIR faction which gave up armed struggle in 1969, merged with MAS in 1983. In the general elections the same year, MAS won 5.74 percent of the votes, gaining ten seats in Congress and two in the Senate. In 1988, MAS nearly doubled their vote to 10.2 percent (18 congressional seats and three senators). But after this peak the votes began to drop, and with the participation of Rafael Caldera in the government (1994–1998) MAS experienced a huge loss of confidence among the voters. Above all, Teodoro Petkoff caused huge disappointment with his neoliberal politics. A former communist and ex-guerrilla, he had joined the Caldera government as minister for planning and was responsible for the structural adjustment program known as Agenda Venezuela, negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Pompeyo Marquez worked in the same government as a minister for borders. Just before the end of Caldera's term MAS withdrew its support.

The growing distance of the party representatives from the rank-and-file, however, did not only concern MAS, but also Causa R. The reason was not just the individual incapacity of party representatives or the party itself, but the immanent systemic limits of representative democracy. The parliamentary logic set clear limits to an organic relationship between the organized movements and the institutional representation of left parties. The endless debates and negotiations in parliament led even the left parties into the logic of negotiation and to ensure their own parliamentary presence. This led the masses to question not only the representation legitimacy of the right parties but also that of the new leftist parties. In turn, they increas-

ingly questioned the entire parliamentary system of representative democracy.

MAS faced further splits. When they decided in 1998 to support Hugo Chávez as a presidential candidate, Petkoff protested and left the party. Pompeyo Marquez also split off and formed the small social-democratic anti-Chávez party Democratic Left (ID). In 2002 MAS split again. While the majority of MAS leaders and representatives in parliament decided to follow Petkoff and Marquez in joining the opposition, most of the rank-and-file members joined Podemos, under the leadership of Didalco Bolívar and Ismael García, and continued in their support for Chávez. For the presidential elections of 2007 MAS supported the opposition alliance candidate, Manuel Rosales, and won only 0.61 percent of the votes, the worst result of its history. Podemos finally broke with the Chávez government in 2007, with a great majority of their representatives and rank-and-file members joining the newly formed United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

Causa R

The group which later adopted the name Causa R decided to concentrate its 1971 political activities on three axes – the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) in Caracas; the workers of the Siderúrgica del Orinoco (Sidor) steel plant in Ciudad Guayana, where a large strike had been crushed with the dismissal of 514 workers and the magazine *Matancero* was available to support their work; and Catia, a poor neighborhood of Caracas.

In contrast to MAS or the PCV, from whom the group always kept a clear distance, Causa R was to a large extent organized in a very informal way. No foundation congress was held, and Causa R had no statute or platform. It did not even have regulated decision structures. Instead, the group tried to be a mixture of movement and party, whereby decisions were made by a reduced leading circle. Although its analysis instrument was Marxism, Causa R resisted being classified as Marxist, socialist, or communist.

The political axes of Causa R developed unequally. The university sectors were excluded or left Causa R in the middle of the 1970s, criticizing Causa R as too pragmatic and demanding more programmatic clarity, theory, work, and political formation. After Maneiro's death in

1982 Causa R was fractionated by debates around political axes and electoral politics.

Causa R had organizational and political success in Sidor, where in 1979 a Causa R group based around the labor leader Andrés Velásquez won the majority in the internal elections of the industrial union SUTISS. In 1981 the AD-controlled union intervened in SUTISS, some trade union activists were fired, and all representatives were exchanged for unionists supporting AD (Acción Democrática). In 1988, however, with the first free internal elections after the intervention, Causa R supporters again won a majority. That same year Causa R obtained its first electoral success on a national level and won three seats in parliament. This was due to their extraordinary strength in the federal state of Bolívar, while country-wide they only garnered 0.54 percent of the votes.

Because of its position and its work close to the movements, Causa R was seen by the people as an alternative to the established parties between 1989 and 1993. In 1989 Andrés Velásquez won the first governor elections for Causa R. Causa R collaborated with the military uprising in November 1992, although it had withdrawn from the February 1992 rebellion at the very last moment. In the presidential elections of 1993, Velásquez ran as the Causa R candidate and came fourth with 21.95 percent of the votes. The leadership of Causa R thought there had been some fraud but did not protest. In these elections Causa R for the first time won even more votes than MAS (MAS had 10.81 percent, 24 Congress members, and 5 senators, while Causa R had 20.68 percent, 40 Congress members, and 9 senators).

One year earlier Causa R had already achieved some important local and regional electoral victories. In Bolívar, Velásquez was voted in for a second term as governor with 63.36 percent of the votes; and Causa R won mayoral elections for a second time in places such as the municipality of Caroní (Ciudad Guayana and the surrounding industrial region), where Clemente Scotto won 68.36 percent of the votes, and Libertador, the most populated of Caracas's five districts, where Aristóbulo Istúriz won with 34.45 percent of the votes. As after the elections in 1989, mass mobilizations forced the state to recognize electoral results, and Causa R became the third most popular party in the polls.

In the next governor elections, in 1995, Causa R suffered severe setbacks, even though it remained the third strongest party, since MAS likewise registered losses. In Bolívar, Causa R lost the governorship. The rank-and-file, especially the middle-range cadres, argued that there had been electoral fraud. They saw this confirmed by the strong discrepancies during the vote count and transmission of the results. They began to mobilize in order to defend their victory. But a majority of the party leadership and the gubernatorial candidate Victor Moreno stopped the mobilization and negotiated with AD. In exchange for stopping the mobilizations, AD recognized the victory of Causa R in the mayoral elections of Caroní but not in the others. In Caroní, mayor Clemente Scotto introduced a model of participatory municipal budget and participatory town planning.

With more and more people coming to see Causa R as just another typical party, Istúriz lost the next elections in Libertador due to low voter turnout in the poor neighborhoods. According to López Maya (1996) the reason for this loss of enthusiasm was that Causa R from 1992 on did not take advantage of its institutional role, nor did it maintain a connection with the social movements. Central questions such as the democratization of the unions or labor conditions were not part of the parliamentary work of Causa R. The party limited itself to demanding a Constitutional Assembly and trying to obstruct important government projects.

Causa R did not succeed in adapting its organization and decision structures to the new circumstances. Thus it had neither a clear organizational structure nor transparent methods of decision-making. Due to the increased size of the party, decisions could no longer be taken by consensus, so decisions were generally made by a small circle of party leaders, especially in matters pertaining to strategic orientation and decisions about the staff or candidates.

In 1997 Causa R split. About 80 percent of the members and cadres formed Motherland for All (Patria Para Todos – PPT), reinforcing a leftist orientation. In 1998 PPT supported the candidacy of Chávez. The party managed to consolidate politically and organizationally and still existed in 2008 as an independent party, part of a government alliance supporting Chávez. Another group of members left Causa R to join the newly founded United Socialist Party of

Venezuela (PSUV). Thus, beyond the name and individuals using it, Causa R is no longer a party with any visibility, public profile, or militancy.

SEE ALSO: Venezuela, Exclusionary Democracy and Resistance, 1958–1998; Venezuela, Guerilla Movements, 1960s–1980s

References and Suggested Readings

- Bonilla-Molina, L. & El Troudi, H. (2004) *Historia de la Revolución Bolivariana: Pequeña crónica, 1948–2004*. Caracas: Gobierno Bolivariano, Ministerio de Comunicación e Información.
- Ellner, S. (1988) *Venezuela's Movimiento al socialismo: From Guerrilla Defeat to Innovative Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Ellner, S. (1995) *El sindicalismo en Venezuela en el contexto democrático (1958–1994)*. Caracas: Fondo Editorial Tropykos. Universidad de Oriente.
- López Maya, M. (1995) El Ascenso en Venezuela de La Causa R. *Revista Venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales* 2–3: 205–39.
- López Maya, M. (1996) Nuevas representaciones populares en Venezuela. *Nueva Sociedad* 144 (July–August): 138–51.

Venezuela, MBR-200 and the military uprisings of 1992

Dario Azzellini and Gregory Wilpert

Founded in December 1982, the Revolutionary Bolivarian Army 200 (EBR-200), later renamed Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 200 (MBR-200), was a clandestine civil-military organization with the goal of overthrowing the government and building a more just system. Founding members Hugo Chávez Frías, Yoel Acosta Chirinos, and Jesús Urdaneta Hernández symbolically swore a Bolivarian oath under the same tree (*Samán de Güere*), where Simón Bolívar is said to have rested. The organization worked intensively against social injustice and corruption within the political system of Venezuela. They were inspired by Simón Bolívar, Ezequiel Zamora, and Simón Rodríguez. They were also influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, especially his radical democratic ideas. MBR-200 was finally dissolved before the elections in 1998 and integrated into the Movimiento V República (MVR).

The movement spread quickly throughout the army, especially among the young officers,

who found its Bolivarian orientation and anti-corruption stance appealing. It was a politically broad discourse which concentrated on bridging the growing gap between the constitution and reality. Inside the army and the National Guard, discontent grew after the brutal repression of the anti-neoliberal rebellion in Caracazo in 1989, and MBR-200 expanded rapidly.

The experience of Caracazo and pressure by civil groups persuaded MBR-200 to bring forward to 1992 the armed rebellion actually planned for 2000. Intensive networking with political and social movements and organizations, as well as individuals, began. Apart from former guerillas, MBR-200 also discussed the idea of rebellion with representatives of the political party Causa R (Radical Cause). Though Causa R at first agreed to take part, the group had important sectors that did not want to support the coup, so ultimately they decided not to participate officially. Instead, only some of their militants participated. MBR-200 also conspired with the Electoral Movement of the People (Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo, MEP).

At 2.00 am on February 4, 1992, President Perez appeared on national television and announced that a military rebellion was taking place and that it was in the process of being subdued. Rebellious military forces, under the leadership of Chávez, had attempted to take control of several key installations in Venezuela: the Caracas military airport, La Carlota; the presidential palace, Miraflores; the Caracas historical museum; the state television channel; the president's residence, La Casona; the defense ministry and Caracas's main barracks, Fuerte Tiuna; the military installations of Maracaibo, Venezuela's second largest city; the air force base of Maracay; and several other military installations throughout the country.

President Perez was returning from an overseas trip early that morning, and the coup leaders had planned to detain him on his way from the airport. However, word of the rebellion had leaked out and Perez was prepared. He managed to prevent the interception on his way from the airport by reinforcing his security, making it to the Miraflores presidential palace, from which he was able to make his televised address to the nation. Also, Chávez managed to occupy the Caracas historical museum, which was supposed to serve as his communications headquarters, but he was surrounded and without the com-

munications equipment that was supposed to be there. He was thus unable to communicate with his commanders in other areas of Caracas and Venezuela. In Fuerte Tiuna, La Casona, Maracay, and several other locations, the rebel forces had to surrender after relatively brief confrontations. Some deaths occurred in these confrontations, but almost always after the rebel forces had surrendered. In the end, 14 soldiers were killed in the coup and over 1,000 were detained.

Several of the rebellious commanders were successful in their objectives, though. Francisco Arias Cardenas was able to take over the city of Maracaibo. Chávez's men also seized the air base of La Carlota, in the middle of Caracas, and bases in Aragua and in Valencia, where soldiers even distributed weapons to the civil population. Realizing that the failures outweighed the limited successes, and to avoid more loss of life, at 9.00 am Chávez decided to surrender. As a condition of his surrender, he asked to address the tank regiment in Valencia and the parachute regiment in Aragua, via national television, in order to tell them to lay down their weapons. Around noon that day, Chávez was thus given one minute on television, which turned him into an instant hero.

There were two main reasons why the television appearance turned Chávez into the undisputed leader and gained him broad support throughout the population. First, he assumed all responsibility for the coup d'état and its failure. Many found this refreshing and honest since leaders rarely publicly assume responsibility for failure. Second, people also admired him because he did not retreat or renounce the political project behind the civilian-military uprising. He clearly maintained his goals, but agreed to surrender for the time being. This encouraged hope that the struggle had just started and sooner or later the objective of getting rid of the corrupt and dysfunctional regime would be possible.

The coup failed for a number of reasons. It had been organized as a civilian-military rebellion in connection with social movements and political organizations, but the unity did not last. Some civilians who were involved say that few civilians participated because Chávez was unwilling to give them a larger role in the uprising. Chávez, however, says that the civilians proved to be unreliable.

Even so, the uprising found immense sympathy in the social movements and among the

impoverished population. The uprising was led by young officers who rose against a delegitimized leadership. Also, Chávez and the other leaders came from the lower social classes. Finally, the discourse of the rebellious militaries did not concern order, but originated around freedom (Denis 2001).

Another coup attempt took place about ten months after the first, on November 27, 1992. This attempt was led by higher-level officers than the first one – by navy Admiral Hernan Grüber Odreman and air force General Francisco Visconti. Again, Perez discovered the coup shortly beforehand and again addressed the nation in the early hours of the morning to say that it was in the process of being subdued, which it was by midday. This time, however, the fighting that broke out was much more serious and led to the deaths of about 300 soldiers, mostly in battles for the control of key military installations in Caracas and Maracay.

The participants of the uprisings were released in 1994 due to an amnesty declared by the newly elected president Rafael Caldera, and they started to build MBR-200 as a country-wide mass organization with horizontal structures, despite the military background of the founding members. On a local level Bolivarian circles formed. Their members swore an oath to be honest, laborious, and modest, and to maintain solidarity. The circles held frequent meetings to discuss concrete social alternatives. The results were gathered on a local level by the Bolivarian Coordination of Municipalities. Further organizational levels were the regional coordinations, the national coordination, and the National Direction. The results of the discussions in the circles formed the basic orientation of the National Project Simón Bolívar, the social project of MBR-200. The National Direction consisted of five people, two of whom were former soldiers.

MBR-200 opposed strengthening and consolidating the organization through participation in elections and institutional collaboration. But the refusal was not shared by everybody, and this led to divisions and split-offs in MBR-200. Francisco Arias Cárdenas, former army officer, participant of the uprisings, and charismatic number two after Chávez in MBR-200, left the organization after his release from prison in 1994. Further ex-militaries did the same. During the following years various former members stood in elections as candidates for

Causa R. In 1995 Arias Cardenas, supported by Causa R, was elected governor of the federal state of Zulia, and he ran as a rival candidate to Chávez in the 2000 presidential elections. Some years later he moved again closer to the government and was appointed UN ambassador of Venezuela in 2006. Chávez, unlike others, rejected all offices offered by President Caldera and dedicated himself to the transformation of MBR-200 into a mass organization. In this process of transition, the leading role of Chávez, the most radical of all military officials, was consolidated and became unquestioned.

The political strategy of MBR-200 during the era of their first public appearance, from 1994 to 1996, was marked chiefly by building grassroots structures and also by the demand for a constitutional assembly. In 1994, MBR-200 presented seven papers concerning a constitutional assembly and a draft for a new constitution. MBR-200 stressed the necessity for a total transformation of all social structures, and they proposed the creation of five powers: executive, legislative, judicial, electoral, and moral. They advocated in favor of a people's democracy – a direct democracy in which the people are the protagonists of the decisions.

By 1996 MBR-200 had built local and regional organizational structures across the entire country. Decisions were taken by consensus, including the decision not to participate in the regional elections of 1995. This was a tactical decision. In April 1997 MBR-200, at a national congress, decided to participate in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 1998. The reasons for the participation in the elections lay in an analysis of the situation, which assumed that the next elections would be of massive importance and non-participation would have weakened the organization. For the elections the alliance with the Movimiento V República (MVR) was created, since it is forbidden in Venezuela to participate in elections with the name of Bolívar, and MBR-200 was dissolved.

SEE ALSO: Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954); Venezuela, Exclusionary Democracy and Resistance, 1958–1998; Venezuela, Guerilla Movements, 1960s–1980s

References and Suggested Readings

Azzellini, D. (2007) *Venezuela Bolivariana*. Cologne: ISP.

Bonilla-Molina, L. & El Troudi, H. (2004) *Historia de la Revolución Bolivariana: Pequeña crónica, 1948–2004*. Caracas: Gobierno Bolivariano, Ministerio de Comunicación e Información.

Denis, R. (2001) *Los Fabricantes de la rebelión*. Caracas. Garrido, A. (2000) *La Historia Secreta de la Revolución Bolivariana*. Merida: Editorial Venezolana.

Garrido, A. (2002) *Documentos de la Revolución Bolivariana*. Caracas: Ediciones del autor.

López Maya, M. (1996) Nuevas representaciones populares en Venezuela. *Nueva Sociedad* 144 (July–August): 138–51.

López Maya, M. (2003) Hugo Chávez Frías, su movimiento y presidencia. In S. Ellner & D. Hellinger (Eds.) (2003), *La Política venezolana en la época de Chávez*. Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, pp. 98–120.

Zago, A. (1998) *La Rebelión de los ángeles*. Caracas: Warp Ediciones.

Venezuela, military uprisings, 1960–1962

Dario Azzellini

The beginning of the 1960s in Venezuela was marked by general discontent with the results of the overthrow of dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez. The bourgeois parties, entrepreneurs, Catholic Church, and high-ranking military officials had agreed to share power and had excluded the Communist Party and the leftist and progressive forces which had played a crucial role in the struggle against Pérez Jiménez. Since 1957, the revolutionary left had begun to infiltrate the army and form the Frente Militar de Carrera, a clandestine organization.

On June 26, 1961, the *Barcelonazo*, a military rebellion in the eastern coastal city of Barcelona, took place. While some authors describe the event as a right-wing conspiracy against the government of Rómulo Betancourt and Acción Democrática, other authors and contemporary witnesses, mainly former members of the guerilla Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), who were involved in the rebellion, tell a different story. The *Barcelonazo* was led by nationalistic and anti-imperialistically oriented soldiers with connections to the entrepreneurs association Fedecamaras and to the old elites, and cooperating also with leftist sectors of the Republican Democratic Union (URD) and the MIR.

The rebels brought the city and one military barracks under their control. But the rebellion

failed, because no further army units followed. Moreover the rebellion had been infiltrated since the time of its planning, and the entrepreneur Eugenio Mendoza is supposed to have financed the uprising on behalf of Betancourt, who wanted to verify who was willing to conspire against him.

In 1962 two left army rebellions and one attempt failed. On February 28, following a demonstration in support of a public transport strike in the coastal town of La Guaira near Caracas, hundreds of people gathered at the barracks of Marine Battalion no. 1, expecting to be armed. The commander of the battalion informed the police, but later investigations revealed that in fact the commander had been part of a rebellion plan in coordination with the left.

Then, on May 4, 1962, the Carupanazo took place. Marine Battalion no. 3 and unit no. 77 of the National Guard, based in the city of Carúpano in the federal state of Sucre in the east of Venezuela, rose against the government. They occupied the city and the airport and announced the manifesto of the Movement of Democratic Recuperation (MRD). The rebellion was put down by the military on May 6, and more than 400 people were arrested. The congressman Eloy Torres of the Communist Party (PCV), other PCV members, and several MIR members were among those arrested. Both organizations had taken part in the rebellion.

President Betancourt used the events as an opportunity to ban the PCV and the MIR on May 9, 1962. Severe repression with thousands of arrests followed. However, the government still preserved its democratic image until the end of 1963, by not arresting the parliament members of the PCV and MIR.

On June 2, 1962, a further military rebellion, known as El Porteñazo, took place in the coastal city of Puerto Cabello in the federal state of Carabobo. Marine Battalion Rafael Urdaneta no. 2 rose in coordination with the PCV and its youth organization, Communist Youth of Venezuela (JCV). The rebels arrested soldiers loyal to the government and took control of the airport and most of the city. They also freed 50 imprisoned Guerilleros, who then joined the uprising. One day later, the navy destroyer *Zulia* joined the rebellion. On June 4, however, the uprising was bloodily put down by military forces loyal to the government. The city was bombarded from air and sea, with the number of deaths estimated at approximately 300–400, and over 700 people

injured. With the Porteñazo, the infiltration of the army by revolutionaries apparently came to an end. Most leftist soliders joined the guerillas during the following years.

The last attempt at a military uprising was aborted on October 30, 1966 before it even started. Nearly 100 National Guard members at the National Guard training school, Ramo Verde, in Los Teques, a satellite city of Caracas, were arrested.

SEE ALSO: Venezuela, Exclusionary Democracy and Resistance, 1958–1998; Venezuela, Guerilla Movements, 1960s–1980s; Venezuela, MBR-200 and the Military Uprisings of 1992

References and Suggested Readings

- Blanco Muñoz, A. (1981) *La Conspiración cívico-militar: habla el Guairazo, Barcelonazo, Carupanazo y Porteñazo*. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela.
- Blanco Muñoz, A. (1994) *Venezuela 1962: Carupanazo: la chispa que encendió la pradera*. Caracas: Centro de Estudios de Historia Actual – Cátedra Pío Tamayo – Universidad Central de Venezuela (CPT-CEHA-UCV).
- Blanco Muñoz, A. (1996) *Venezuela 1962–1963: El Porteñazo: trágica expresión de una aventura*. Caracas: CPT-CEHA-UCV.
- Bonilla-Molina, L. & El Troudi, H. (2004) *Historia de la Revolución Bolivariana: Pequeña crónica, 1948–2004*. Caracas: Gobierno Bolivariano, Ministerio de Comunicación e Información.
- Duarte Parejo, A. J. (2005) *El Carupanazo*. Caracas: Gobierno Bolivariano, Ministerio de Comunicación e Información.

Venezuela, Negro Miguel Rebellion, 1552

Dario Azzellini

In 1553, the first recorded revolt by Africans enslaved by the Spanish colonial authority disrupted a gold rush in Venezuela's Burla mining region. The uprising was led by Negro Miguel, an African slave who established a maroon colony and who is now recognized as a leader in the historical struggle for racial justice in Venezuela.

Following the discovery of gold reserves by Spanish explorer Damián del Barrio on the edges of the Buría River, now in Venezuela's Yaracuy State, near the city of Nirgua, a gold rush ensued, leading to the founding in 1551 of Real de Minas de San Felipe de Buría, the first miners'

settlement in Venezuela. In its wake, gold miners established the town of El Tocuyo in 1545 as a prospecting center. In 1550, the Spanish crown decided to permit the involuntary transport of the first African slaves to the region to work the mines. By 1552, 80 Africans, including Miguel, his wife, and his children, were forced into slavery in the Real de Minas region. In 1553, Negro Miguel fled the mining operation with his family and other slaves to the surrounding mountains, from where they planned a nocturnal ambush of colonial guards and miners in Real de Minas. The attack was successful, making possible the collective escape of enslaved African miners.

After the successful rebel attack on Spanish colonial authorities, the reputation of Negro Miguel and his rebel force was widely celebrated among Africans of the region, some of whom escaped to the mountains where he had established a fortified community. Miguel was proclaimed king of the maroon community, and his wife Guiomar was made queen. Both were crowned in a West African-style ceremony.

In his colony, Negro Miguel founded a church that blended animistic African cults and Catholic belief systems and appointed a government with a functioning administration. While Spanish monks described the town as an "imperial" system, little is recorded or known of its social organization. The community was defended by more than 180 male and female African and indigenous warriors, who attacked Spanish colonial settlements and destabilized mining and agriculture in the region. As the economic, political, and religious power of Negro Miguel and his community expanded, a growing number of Spanish settlers abandoned Real de Minas. To counter the growing influence of Negro Miguel, the Spanish reinforced their military forces to reestablish control over the region.

Miguel was thwarted and killed by Spanish troops under the command of Diego de Losada. Those rebels who did not die on the battlefield were executed, and others were tortured by the Spanish colonial forces as a warning to Africans against further unrest. Following Miguel's defeat and death, some rebels who survived managed to escape and continued to harass colonial settlers through the end of the sixteenth century. While they did not have the military power to challenge Spanish troops directly and refrained from attacking major urban centers, maroons of

African descent continued to perpetrate road assaults and sabotage goldmining operations.

Real de Minas remained a stronghold of culture, freedom, and liberation for descendants of African slaves who founded several towns. Nirgua retained special status as a settlement of free people of African descent, and Zambos, a community populated by descendants of Africans and Indians, gained self-determination, a status forbidden in the rest of the colony.

In popular imagination Negro Miguel became a heroic figure among people of African descent and his name is evoked for spiritual protection among members of the María Lionza cult (a Venezuelan Yoruba variation). Negro Miguel remains a national hero and icon in the struggle for African liberation in Venezuela and South America.

SEE ALSO: Guaicaipuro (ca. 1530–1568); Queen Nanny and Maroon Resistance

References and Suggested Readings

- Acosta Saignes, M. T. (1978) *Vida de los esclavos negros en Venezuela*. Havana: Casa de las Américas.
- Brito Figueroa, F. (1982) *El problema tierra y esclavos en la historia de Venezuela*. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, UCV.
- Ramos Guédez, J. M. (2001) *Contribución a la historia de las culturas negras en Venezuela Colonial*. Caracas: Alcaldía de Caracas, Instituto Municipal de Publicaciones.

Venezuela, solidarity economy, social property, co-management, and workers' control

Dario Azzellini

When Hugo Chávez assumed the presidency in 1999, Venezuela was in a serious longstanding crisis. Capital flight and deindustrialization had led to the closure of thousands of production sites since the early 1980s. The goal became to diversify the production of the largely oil-dependent economy, begin the further processing of natural resources, and transform as much property and means of production as possible into collective forms of ownership and management.

Beyond the oil revenue, the prospects looked bleak as the new government set out to build what it defined as a "humanistic and solidarity economy," putting Venezuela on the path to a "socialism of the twenty-first century." Democracy was central to this agenda.

Cooperatives

In 1998 only 700 cooperatives existed, so to fulfill the goal of building a social and solidarity economy, the government in 2001 simplified the creation of cooperatives. They were made exempt of institutional charges and, if they fulfilled the statutory framework, income tax. Credits at favorable terms were handed out through specially established state banks and funding institutions. Small cooperatives could even get interest-free loans. Cooperatives also received preferential loans to buy abandoned companies. These conditions led to a boom in the foundation of cooperatives. At the end of 2006, 37,552 working cooperatives were officially registered.

However, the creation of cooperatives is not free of problems. Having many owners instead of one does not automatically change anything fundamentally in the capitalist mode of operation, even if it means an improvement in working conditions. There is also a risk in some areas of deregulating labor relations through cooperatives. Criticisms were directed at employee-controlled means of production, especially in companies with mixed ownership (state/employees cooperatives).

In 2007 a new model was launched – the communal cooperative. These are established in organized communities and owned by the community. While the workers are part of the community, they are not owners of the cooperative, neither individually nor collectively.

Social Production Enterprises

The social production enterprise (EPS) was a new model created in 2005 that was meant to ease the transition to a socialist production model. What is important is not the form of ownership, but the acting of enterprises: cooperatives, state enterprises, joint ventures, or even private companies can become social production enterprises, a status with several benefits, such as priority in having state contracts assigned. The EPS weighs social profit higher than private profit and orientates its production toward social needs

instead of aligning it primarily along market logics and capital accumulation. In an EPS the internal work organization should follow a democratic model, the activities should rotate, and alienation in the production process should be gradually abolished. The EPS has to invest a part of the profits (at least 10 to 15 percent) in local social needs and infrastructure and integrate with the surrounding community through the community council. EPS must also organize suppliers and customers of the processed products in cooperatives, and maintain transparent and public accountability.

Because an official, universally valid definition of EPS has never existed, different government agencies have developed different models. As a result, for example, the EPS formed by the state-owned oil company PdVSA, pays a part of their profits to a fund which is used to pay for community projects. This is more like an additional tax than a form of integration with the community.

Recovered Companies

The Spanish term *empresas recuperadas* (recovered companies) refers to companies that have been removed in different ways from the control of the private capitalist sector and are under the control of employees, the state, and collective or combined forms of administration. In Venezuela this includes closed enterprises acquired by the state, companies expropriated because of the national interest, and, up to a certain point, the nationalization in 2007 of the formerly privatized electricity sector and national telephone company CANTV.

Although the constitution of 2000 allows expropriations, up to the end of 2006 only a few cases existed. In January 2005, the paper factory Venepal (now Invepal) was expropriated, and in April the Constructora Nacional de Válvulas (CNV, now Inveval), producing valves for the oil industry, followed. From July 2005 the government began to pay special attention to closed production sites. In September the process of expropriation of an occupied sugar cane processing plant and a pipe manufacturer for the oil industry started. In the following months an industrial slaughterhouse, a tomato processing plant belonging to the US Heinz Corporation, a corn-flour processing plant, and some others followed. The abandoned or occupied plants

were handed over to cooperatives of former workers. The owners got an indemnization equivalent to the market value.

At the end of July 2005, on the television show *Aló Presidente* Chávez presented a list of companies that were in the process of expropriation, another of companies whose expropriation was due to be examined, and yet another of companies that had reduced their production facilities partly or wholly – all in all 1,149 sites. Labor minister María Cristina Iglesias urged unions and former workers of the companies to recover them. However, only a few were occupied, and the total number of occupations, expropriations, and purchases by the state remained well below the 1,149. A systematic expropriation policy in the productive sector does not exist. Most expropriations are the result of pressure on state institutions exerted by occupations and mobilizations.

Co-Management and Worker Control

Co-management was implemented in 2005, mainly in state enterprises and those of mixed ownership (mostly those owned by both the state and workers' cooperatives). As yet no legal basis exists, and there are different models discussed and implemented. The trade union UNT (Union Nacional de Trabajadores) proposed a law to the National Assembly that stipulated that the workers should have access to the operational, legal, and financial documents of the company, and that at least 50 percent of the board of directors should be workers, but the law was withdrawn under criticism of the workers. Companies with co-management have easier access to credit and cheaper government services. A new law and national commission are being planned to monitor co-management in public and private companies, but at the end of 2007 the law had not yet been presented.

The process of democratization of enterprise structures is not harmonious, and in numerous state enterprises there is no co-management. This is especially the case in the oil company PdVSA. Conflicts also occur in the expropriated, formerly occupied factories. Alcasa, part of a state-owned industrial conglomerate and the second largest aluminum smelter in Venezuela, represents a prime example of far-reaching co-management leading to workers' control. In mid-February 2005, Carlos Lanz was named director of Alcasa. The assembly was established as the highest

authority of the plant, followed by round tables of spokespeople elected in the departments. All representatives were elected in assemblies and decisions could be revoked. The six-hour work-day was introduced. Alcasa became an EPS and set up cooperatives for further aluminum processing. In July 2006 Lanz was elected director with 1,800 out of 1,920 workers' votes. In 2007 Alcasa started organizing in workers' councils.

Fábrica Adentro

Private firms not fulfilling their production targets have had access to preferential loans through the program *Fábrica Adentro* (Inside the Factory) since the end of 2005. They have to agree with their employees on a co-management model. They have to transfer a part of the profits (5–15 percent) to a fund for industrial transformation. No workers can be dismissed, and new job opportunities must be created. By the end of 2007 nearly 900 companies had joined the program.

In one way, co-management leads to a dilemma. While many private entrepreneurs see it as a social partnership to avoid conflicts and increase production, the UNT, many employees, and parts of the state apparatus see it as an interim step toward workers' control in a socialist society. Moreover, many private companies, although they handed over part ownership to the employees through individual shares or as a cooperative with minority participation, failed to give the workers real participation in the decision-making structures. So workers simply share the risk with the capitalist owner as well as a stake in increasing added value.

Endogenous Development and Job Training

Venezuela follows a strategy of endogenous development, aiming to integrate the excluded population and develop new forms of self-managed social and productive organization. It puts people at the center and is based on education, training, and popular knowledge, with an emphasis on cultural practices and ecological aspects. It promotes the development of productive chains covering the different phases of production for elaborating natural resources. Venezuela also aims to encourage endogenous distribution and consumption.

Training is important to this transition. Since 2004 the Misión Vuelvan Caras has trained

workers in these ideas, preparing them for jobs in such fields as construction, tourism, agriculture, catering, services, and industry. The trainees, about 65 percent of whom are women, are paid a small grant to participate in the program for between six months and two years. The participants establish cooperatives and receive credits and technical assistance. The workers who take over their enterprises often also assist the *Vuelvan Caras*. The training usually takes place in the *Núcleos de Desarrollo Endógeno* (endogenous development cores), where networks of cooperatives exist, offering the communities the opportunity to use the potential of the region. Between 2004 and 2005, 264,720 people completed this job training, and 284,040 attended the courses in 2006.

In mid-2007 the program was relaunched as *Misión Che Guevara*. The name change is connected to a reorientation that aims to establish a new economic system by building its own networks and no longer strengthening the capitalist market. The first 40,000 participants completed the new job training program in September 2007. The participants of *Misión Che Guevara* are mainly trained to work in the new socialist factories.

Socialist Enterprises

After difficulties experienced with the different models, especially with mixed ownership, the ministries asked the state factories in April 2007 to propose criteria defining what a socialist enterprise could be. Various factories and ministries presented projects and a debate began. In the constitutional reform of December 2007, which was ultimately rejected, two types of social ownership were defined: direct, where businesses are managed by the people (community councils, workers), and indirect, where they are managed by the state. The goods produced are not sold on the market but transferred to those who are most in need of them. Workers are proposed by the local communal councils. While specialized workers are provided by the state, the plan is to hand the socialist factories gradually over to the control of workers and communities.

Conclusions

Venezuela has implemented a variety of measures to promote structural changes in the economy and the democratization of relations of ownership

and labor. Some measures aim to overcome exploitative conditions, the separation between manual and intellectual labor, and, in the long term, capitalist relations. Other initiatives aim merely at democratization of capitalist labor relations. In many institutions, a degree of restraint regarding structural changes can be noted. Moreover, while some policy is set from above, in various institutions, programs, and regions there is no uniform policy – indeed, in many cases, there aren't even any generalized criteria. But all in all, there are many successful initiatives, and a significant growth in initiatives from below can be observed.

SEE ALSO: Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954); Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–Present; Venezuela, Exclusionary Democracy and Resistance, 1958–1998

References and Suggested Readings

- Azzellini, D. (2007) *Venezuela Bolivariana*. Cologne: ISP.
- Bilbao, L. (2002) *Chávez y la Revolución Bolivariana*. Buenos Aires.
- Blanco Muñoz, A. (1998) *Habla el Comandante*. Caracas: Fundación Pio Tamayo.
- Bonilla-Molina, L. & El Troudi, H. (2004) *Historia de la Revolución Bolivariana: Pequeña crónica, 1948–2004*. Caracas: Gobierno Bolivariano, Ministerio de Comunicación e Información.
- Denis, R. (2001) *Los Fabricantes de la rebelión*. Caracas: n.p.
- Harnecker, M. (2002) Hugo Chávez Frías. Un hombre, un pueblo. Available at www.nodo50.org/cubasigloXXI/politica/harnecker24_310802.pdf.
- López Maya, M. (1996) Nuevas representaciones populares en Venezuela. *Nueva Sociedad* 144 (July–August): 138–51.
- López Maya, M. (2003) Hugo Chávez Frías, su movimiento y presidencia. In S. Ellner & D. Hellinger (Eds.), *La Política venezolana en la época de Chávez*. Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, pp. 98–120.

Venezuelan War of Independence

Jan Ulrich

Venezuela's War of Independence (1811–21) was one of many Latin American revolutionary uprisings between 1810 and 1825 that brought three centuries of colonial domination by the Spanish monarchy to an end. An aspiring Creole social and economic elite, tired of the political

domination of the royalist aristocracy and inspired by the conflictive transformations in Europe at that time, realized the vulnerability of the Spanish monarchy and rose to play a fundamental role in developing a republican movement in Venezuela. Certainly the War of Independence profoundly changed Venezuelan society when the Congress of Cucutá founded the independent Great Columbian Republic in 1821. Whether or not the Venezuelan process of independence was also a social revolution remains the object of historical disputes and ideological conflicts today.

The social and economic structures in colonial Spanish America changed fundamentally during the second half of the eighteenth century. The increased production of export goods outside the mining sector, in Venezuela the production of cacao, was now changing the integration of the colonies in the European metropolis. The renovation of the Spanish colonial pact in the second half of the eighteenth century had opened new opportunities within the colonial economy, but the reluctant administrative reform had not resolved the antagonism of the colonial racial and hierarchical society. The Mantuanos, a Creole cacao-producing oligarchy, became the economically and socially dominant class in Venezuela, while political domination remained in the hands of Spanish officials. Spain's maintenance of the trade monopoly over their American colonies and the rise of a new class of Cadiz merchants, who by the end of the eighteenth century were controlling the colonies' trade markets, aggravated the opposition of local Creole elites who called for direct trade relations and access to the industrializing markets in Europe.

Hostilities against Spanish officials and Cadiz merchants were growing by the end of the eighteenth century but did not lead to fundamental opposition against the Spanish crown. Europe was reconstituting its monarchies under the ideas of the Enlightenment, and for the local elites, reforms of the colonial order seemed to be the better option to assure their domination over the indigenous and mestizo population than ideas of an independent republic. Until Spain's affiliation with Napoleon's France in 1795, republican ideas in Venezuela, inspired by the French Revolution and the independence of the United States, remained confined to a small group of the politically adventurous. One of these was Francisco de Miranda (1750–1816), who began a first expedition for independence in 1806 when he landed

near Venezuela's city of Coro. Napoleon had brought Spain into the war that was separating Britain from its American colonies, while British domination of the sea implied the end of the Spanish trade monopoly. The result of the European war was the successive decline of the colonial trade order and, consequently, of the political-administrative domination in the Spanish American colonies during 1795 and 1810.

The dismissal of the popular Bourbon successor Fernando VII by Napoleon in 1808 led to the Spanish War of Independence against French occupation and brought the Spanish monarchy into a new alliance with Britain. In Spain and in its colonies regional juntas were founded in order to assert Fernando VII's return to the throne. The Creole elites in the Americas began to distinguish themselves as the legitimate inheritors of the ancient order, while Spain had lost almost its entire European territory in 1810. The colonial institutional organization was then dismantled by the erupting political conflicts between the Spanish and the new American elites in order to reconfigure the relations with the decadent mother land. The institution of the *Cabildo*, the urban municipal council, in which the urban Creole oligarchy was represented without effectively being able to influence colonial administration, became the basis of the revolutionary changes. On April 19, 1810 the *Cabildo* of Caracas forced the resignation of the Spanish governor, General Captain Vincente Emperan, to establish a governing junta. On March 2, 1811, the first Venezuelan Congress was established by the seven regions that supported independence from Spain. The first Venezuelan constitution was based on the declaration of civil rights, the formal equality of races, the protection of private property, and the division of powers. Francisco de Miranda, who had gone to London after his failed attempt in 1806, came back to Venezuela and became the designated leader to organize an effective republican army to defeat the royalist resistance in the western provinces of Coro and Maracaibo. At his side was the young colonel Simón Bolívar, associate of the literary society *Sociedad Patriótica* that had become the republican Creole think tank.

Spanish captain Domingo Monteverde had mobilized a popular royalist army of the mestizo and mulatto castes against the plenary dominance of the Mantuanos republicans. A disastrous earthquake in Caracas in 1812 had killed over

20,000 people and the absence of broader support by the population was debilitating the First Republic when Monteverde defeated the republican army of Colonel Bolívar in Puerto Cabello. Miranda capitulated under the initiative of the congress in July 1812. To ensure their own escape, Bolívar and other republican commanders had delivered Miranda to the royalists. He was arrested and died in a Spanish prison in 1816. Bolívar retreated first to Curaçao and then to New Granada's Cartagena de la India, where he joined the struggle of the republican United Provinces of New Granada against the remaining royalist regions.

In January 1813 Bolívar took New Granada's city of Ocaña, in the north of today's Columbia, and went with the permission of the republican government of Cartagena into Cucutá. From there he started his "Admirable Campaign" in February 1813. With his Andean army of herdsmen, Bolívar, who had received the title of The Liberator on his way to Merida, and Colonels Atanasio Girardot and José Félix Rivas defeated Monteverde's troops near the Venezuelan city of Valencia and went into Caracas in August 1813. The Second Venezuelan Republic was established.

The increasing brutality of the war became institutionalized in the Decree of War to Death. Bolívar proclaimed the extinction of all Spaniards and Canarians who did not actively work in favor of the independence of the Americas. The Decree was also an attempt to convert the civil war between Venezuelans into a colonial war of Venezuelans against Spaniards. But Bolívar's nationalist dream failed at that time. José Tomas Boves had recruited a royalist rebel army in Los Llanos, the lower lands in the southwest of Venezuela, by mobilizing the *llanero* mestizo cattlemen against the white-Creole landowner oligarchy. Bolívar's troops had to draw back from Caracas and were defeated in Maturín in December 1814. Santiago Mariño (1788–1854) in Cúmana and Juan Bautista Arismendi (1775–1841), who had recruited an army of mulatto fishermen on the island of Margarita, resisted the royalists' reaction in the eastern regions of Venezuela. Bolívar went to Cúmana, where he found himself in the forlorn situation of a divided republican movement of several *caudillos* that were now faced by reinforced royalist troops under Spanish general Pablo Morillo (1775–1837). The War to Death had unleashed its cruelty, and the count of victims had become

enormous, yet the majority of the population refused to support the republican struggle.

In 1815 Napoleon was defeated by English and Spanish troops and Ferdinand VII returned to the Spanish throne. He sent 10,000 soldiers to Venezuela and brought an end to the first period of revolutionary uprisings. But even the violent reassertion against those who had supported the republicans was not able to reconstitute the ancient colonial order.

The first period of the War of Independence was originally a conflict of elites, but unintentionally the militarist mobilization of the marginalized population had profoundly changed the social order. The mixed-race population of mestizos, which amounted to 60 percent of the Venezuelan society at that time, could now socially advance in the prevailing militarized order. Rebellious against their oppression by the Creole landowner oligarchy, they had predominantly joined the royalist lines, while peasants from the Andes and the lower urban classes had advanced their social status in the republican army. Slaves had fought on both sides also for emancipation and personal freedom. The claims of the republican leaders Arismendi and Piar to abolish slavery became a serious threat to the coffee oligarchy and their slavery-based plantation economy. The first period of the war had also significantly reduced the extensive wealth of the urban oligarchy, while the new free trade with Europe had brought cheap industrial products to the markets and debilitated the manufacturing sector.

The debilitation of the dominant social groups, also by political violence, had created divergences between the revolutionary movement and the urban Creole oligarchy. Venezuela's War of Independence was no longer a competition of aspiring Creole elites fighting against the representatives of the *ancien régime*. It had also obtained an ethnic and social dimension.

In May 1815 Bolívar went to Jamaica, where he wrote his famous *Letter from Jamaica*. Defending the struggle against Spanish tyranny, he called for the abolition of racial hierarchies and slavery, considering prudently that the oppressed castes of mulattos and mestizos had predominantly supported the royalists. Independent Haiti under General Alexandre Pétion (1770–1818) sent the expedition from Los Cayos by Admiral Luis Brión and Bolívar in March 1816 to Ocumare de la Costa, offering liberty to the slaves if they joined

the struggle for the republic. Angostura, today's Ciudad Bolívar, and parts of the eastern regions on the Orinoco River were liberated in 1817 by the republican troops of mestizo Manuel Piar (1774–1817) and José Francisco Bermúdez (1782–1831).

Two main factors were then hoped to accomplish Venezuela's independence. First, the republican leaders could subsume the ethnic and social dimension of the conflict under the construction of a national identity directed against the renewed relentless Spanish domination. Second, the ongoing debility of the Spanish monarchy and the liberal Revolution of 1820 was increasingly affecting the situation of the royalist troops under the command of Pablo Morillo, due to the absence of reinforcements and supplies.

Since 1816 José Antonio Páez (1790–1873), later a Venezuelan president, had successively won the *llanero* militia over to the republican idea of independence. The same caste of mestizo herdsmen who had fought before under the royalist Boves was now facing the Spanish troops. Francisco de Paula Santander (1792–1840) had led several successful rebellions in Los Llanos de Casanare of New Granada against Morillo in 1818. In Guiana, Santiago Mariño (1788–1854) and Piar had claimed leadership of the republican forces, deferring their victorious campaigns. Bolívar's nationalist project became threatened by their incited racial competition and conflicts that had evoked internal divisions among the republicans. While the republican leaders Bermúdez and Páez had recognized Bolívar's national leadership, Piar was finally condemned to death. Bolívar had achieved the unity of the republican forces under his command.

In 1818 the constitutional congress in Angostura was established. In his Angostura Address on February 15, 1819, Bolívar announced his principal idea of the Great Columbian Republic, a union of New Granada, Venezuela, and Quito in which slavery would be abolished, a free and popular education system established, and civil rights, the right to work, to think, to speak, and to write, would be respected. A centralized executive power would be accountable to the parliament, while Bolívar promulgated his skepticism on the concept of federalism.

The international political constellation had changed by the abandonment of British neutrality in the Spanish Americas, and the Legión Británica (British Legion), an army of predominantly Irish

volunteers, was now supporting Bolívar's daring liberation campaign in 1819. From Angostura, Bolívar crossed the Andes through the Páramo de Pisba with an army of 2,500 soldiers. On July 25, 1819, the Spanish troops fled in the Battle of Pantano de Vargas, and Bolívar's patriot army reached the city of Tunja in August. There he united forces with Santander. Bolívar and Santander then headed to Bogotá and confronted the royalist army on August 7, 1819 in the decisive Battle of Boyocá. The republicans under Bolívar's command then controlled the north and center of New Granada. On December 17, 1819 the Great Columbian Republic was proclaimed by the improvisatory government of Angostura.

In the Battle of Carabobo in June 1821, Bolívar had decisively defeated the royalists in Venezuela. At the same time, Sucre took Quito, today's Ecuador, after the battles of Riobamba and Pichincha. In May 1821, the Constitutional Congress of Cucutá was established. Venezuela, New Granada, and Quito were united under the new centralist government in Bogotá. Santander became the vice-president, while The Liberator Simón Bolívar became the first president of the new republic. In 1823, Great Columbia, after a series of smaller royalist uprisings, was completely liberated from the Spanish troops. José de San Martín (1778–1850) had liberated the colonies of the south, while Antonio José de Sucre (1795–1830) and Bolívar achieved victories in the battles of Ayacucho and Junín in Peru in 1824. The colonial domination in the American mainland had come to its definitive end. In the Caribbean, Cuba and Puerto Rico remained under Spanish rule until 1898.

The stabilization of the Great Columbian Republic was threatened from the beginning by a multitude of factors. Not only did the church oppose a new order, but the Mantuanos resisted the abolition of slavery. Merchants and manufacturers were also organizing their opposition against a new free trade order. Santander's government was trying to compromise with a moderate administrative reformism, without seriously confronting the conservative forces. The ongoing war in Peru and in the new-found Republic of Bolivia, after 1821, limited the financial resources of the central Great Columbian government, and the growing particular interests of the provinces prevented the stabilization of a new order. Venezuela under the administration of General Páez evaded the domination of the

centralist government, and Bogotá was divided by different republican fractions. Bolívar's authority could momentarily unite the different interests, but almost 15 years of war had produced a hybrid militarized order. Large landowners, often higher ranks of the republican army that had appropriated land during the war, were now extending their political influence in Venezuela. In contrast, the urban Creole elites who should have filled the positions of the republican institutions to enforce a new civil order were debilitated. The war had exhausted their properties, while the ascent of the landowner oligarchy was now threatening their anticipated political domination.

The country was devastated in many ways. First, 140,000 people (more than 20 percent of the population) had died in Venezuela. Agricultural production had declined almost 90 percent during the war, and the mestizo population was no longer disposed to work under the ancient conditions of labor. Coffee production based on the slave workforce had declined, and emancipation had led to changes in the work discipline of the former slaves. The export-orientated agrarian economy that had developed in Venezuela at the end of the eighteenth century, though beneficial for integration in world markets, did not lead to economic prosperity because of the lengthy duration of the war. Great Britain had become the most important trading partner. The Venezuelan markets were flooded with industrial import goods and local crafts declined. A growing external debt to Britain and the economic influence of the United States after 1825 enforced external economic dependence, while duty income had become the main resource of the republican government. The liberal ideal of economic egalitarianism, with equal economic opportunities for all individuals, had not reduced prevailing differences of wealth distribution in the postwar era and foreclosed the modernization of the old economic structures.

Growing opposition between federalists and centralists, who had been in competition since the Angostura improvisational government, was now threatening the republic's unity. Antonio Nariño (1765–1823), who represented the conservative urban elites of Bogotá, opposed the liberal faction of Santander. In this situation of growing division, the call for Simón Bolívar to assume power to ensure the unity of the new republic opened the way to authoritarianism. Bolívar's political realism attempted to pacify

the revolutionary forces and the dominant social groups of the old order. But the attempt to consolidate the republic by replacing militarized structures with an aristocratic organization failed. The reconciliation with Páez, who had led a secessionist rebellion, brought Bolívar into conflict with Santander. The constitutional convention of Ocaña in 1828 had only intensified the political divisions. Bolívar was declared dictator on August 27, 1828, but Great Columbia had already entered into decline. Peru and Bolivia had deprived Bolívar of control and were now at war with Bogotá. In 1830 Venezuela and Quito fell apart, and Bolívar died the same year. The War of Independence and the conflictive formation of a new postcolonial order determined Venezuelan history for the coming decades.

SEE ALSO: Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); Bolivarianism, Venezuela; Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–Present; Venezuela, Guerilla Movements, 1960s–1980s; Venezuela, MBR-200 and the Military Uprisings of 1992

References and Suggested Readings

- Ayala Mora, E. (2006) *Simón Bolívar: pensamiento fundamental*. Quito: Campaña Nacional Eugenio Espejo por el Libro y la Lectura.
- Bakewell, P. J. (2004) *A History of Latin America: c.1450 to the Present*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Halperín Donghi, T. (1993) *The Contemporary History of Latin America*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Liévano Aguirre, I. (1988) *Bolívar*. Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia.
- Pino Iturrieta, E. A. (Ed.) (2004) *La independencia de Venezuela: historia mínima*. Caracas: Funtrapet.
- Rivas, J. (1994) *Independencia y guerra a muerte*. Caracas: Fondo Ed. Venezolano.

Vesey's Rebellion

Douglas R. Egerton

Denmark Vesey, a free black carpenter, organized perhaps the largest slave conspiracy in North American history, in Charleston, South Carolina in 1822. Although brought into the city in 1783 as a slave of Captain Joseph Vesey, Telemaque, as he was then known, purchased his freedom in December 1799 with lottery winnings. For the next 22 years Vesey earned his living as a craftsman, respected by both the white and black communities. His last (and probably third) wife,

Susan Vesey, was born a slave but became free prior to his death.

Around 1818 Vesey joined the city's new African Methodist Episcopal congregation. The African Church, as both whites and blacks called it, quickly became the center of Charleston's enslaved community. His wife Sandy also joined, as did four of his closest friends: Peter Poyas, a literate ship carpenter; Monday Gell, an African-born Ibo who labored as a harness maker; Rolla Bennett, the manservant of Governor Thomas Bennett; and "Gullah" Jack Pritchard, an East African priest purchased in Zinguebar in 1806. The temporary closure of the church by city authorities in June 1818 and the arrest of 140 congregants reinforced the determination of black Carolinians to maintain a place of independent worship and established the motivation for his conspiracy.

At the age of 51 Vesey resolved to orchestrate a rebellion followed by a mass exodus from Charleston to Haiti, where President Jean-Pierre Boyer had recently encouraged black Americans to bring their skills and capital. Perhaps learning from past revolts, Vesey did not intend to tarry in Charleston long enough for white military power to present an effective counterassault. For all of his acculturation into Euro-American society, Vesey, as a native of St. Thomas, remained a man of the black Atlantic.

Vesey planned the escape for four years. His chief lieutenants included Poyas, Gell, Pritchard, and Bennett. Although there are no reliable figures for the number of recruits, Charleston alone was home to 12,652 slaves. Pritchard, probably with some exaggeration, boasted that he had 6,600 recruits on the plantations across the Cooper and Ashley rivers. The plan called for Vesey's followers to rise at midnight on July 14 – Bastille Day – slay their masters, and sail for Haiti and freedom.

Those recruited into the plot during the winter of 1822 were directed to arm themselves from their masters' closets. Vesey was also aware that the Charleston Neck militia company stored their 300 muskets and bayonets in the back room of Benjamin Hammet's store, and that Hammet's slave Bacchus had a key. But as few slaves had any experience with guns, Vesey encouraged his followers to arm themselves with swords or long daggers, which in any case would make for quieter work as the city bells tolled midnight. Vesey also employed several enslaved

blacksmiths to forge "pike heads and bayonets with sockets, to be fixed at the end of long poles."

Considerably easier than stockpiling weapons was the recruitment of willing young men. With Vesey and Pritchard employed about the city as carpenters, it is not surprising that so many other craftsmen became involved in the plot. Most of all, Vesey and his lieutenants recruited out of the African Church. As a class leader, Vesey was not only respected by the church membership, but he knew each of them well; he knew whom to trust and whom to avoid.

Even so, the plot unraveled in June 1822 when two slaves, including Rolla's friend George Wilson, a fellow class leader in the African Church, revealed the plan to their owners. Mayor James Hamilton called up the city militia and convened a special court to try the captured insurgents. Vesey was captured and hanged on the morning of Tuesday, July 2, together with Rolla, Poyas, and three others. According to Hamilton, the rebels collectively "met their fate with the heroic fortitude of martyrs." In all, 35 blacks were executed. Forty-two others, including Sandy, were sold outside the United States; some, if not all, became slaves in Spanish Cuba. Robert Vesey lived to rebuild the African Church in the fall of 1865. Susan Vesey and her free daughter, Diana, sailed for Liberia in 1833.

In the aftermath of the conspiracy, Charleston authorities demolished the African Church and banished Morris Brown to Philadelphia. The state Assembly subsequently passed laws prohibiting the reentry of free blacks into the state, and city officials enforced ordinances against teaching African Americans to read. The City Council also voted to create a permanent force of 150 guardsmen to patrol the streets around the clock at an annual cost of \$24,000. To deal with the problem of black mariners bringing information about events around the Atlantic into the state's ports, in December 1822 the legislature passed the Negro Seamen Act, which placed quarantine on any vessel from another "state or foreign port, having on board any free Negroes or persons of color." Although United States Circuit Court Judge William Johnson struck the law down as unconstitutional, a defiant Assembly renewed the act in late 1823. It would be no coincidence that many of those who nullified federal law in 1832 – including Governor James Hamilton, who resigned his office in 1833 to command troops in defense of his state's right to resist

national tariffs – were veterans of the tribunals that tried Vesey and his men a decade before.

SEE ALSO: Nat Turner Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Egerton, D. R. (1999) *He Shall Go Out Free: The Lives of Denmark Vesey*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Lofton, J. (1964) *Insurrection in South Carolina: The Turbulent World of Denmark Vesey*. Yellow Springs, OH: Antioch Press.
- Paquette, R. L. (2002) Jacobins of the Lowcountry: The Vesey Plot on Trial. *William and Mary Quarterly* 49.

Vía Campesina and peasant struggles

Marc Edelman

Vía Campesina (“Peasant Road”) is a transnational social movement, founded in 1993, that links over 100 organizations of “peasants, small- and medium-sized agricultural producers, landless, rural women, indigenous people, rural youth and agricultural workers” (www.viacampesina.org), in almost 60 countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The membership is diverse and includes landless peasants in Brazil, small dairy farmers in Europe, well-off farmers in South India, wheat producers in Canada, and land-poor peasants in Mexico. The main issues of concern to Vía Campesina (always referred to by its Spanish name) include global trade rules, intellectual property and genetically modified organisms, the survival of family farms, sustainable alternatives to corporate-controlled industrial agriculture, agrarian reform, the human rights of peasant activists, and “food sovereignty,” which it defines as the right to protect national production and to shield domestic markets from the dumping of low-priced agricultural imports. Vía Campesina and its component subnational, national, and regional organizations have participated in numerous militant and theatrical protest actions against the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), G8 summit meetings, and large agribusiness corporations such as Monsanto, Cargill, and Syngenta. The movement has also been a prominent participant in global civil society gatherings, such as the World Social Forums.

The rise of transnational agrarian movements during the 1980s and 1990s is a direct result of a global farm crisis. The origins of the crisis in the 1970s included skyrocketing prices for petroleum and fossil-fuel-based fertilizers and other inputs; sharply higher interest rates, resulting from oil-price shocks and monetary policies intended to slow inflation; and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of capital controls and fixed exchange rates, which set the stage for the rapid expansion and liberalization of global agricultural trade. At the same time, growing concentration among input and machinery suppliers, and in the processing, storage, brokering, and exporting stages of key commodity chains, allowed a handful of giant corporations to garner a rising share of the total value added between field and dinner plate. In the late 1970s, as commodity and land prices plummeted and interest rates soared, many US and Canadian producers defaulted on loans and lost their land, spurring militant farmers’ movements and reviving anti-foreclosure tactics such as “farm gate defenses” not seen since the 1930s depression. In Europe, farmers’ organizations had been struggling since the mid-1980s to reform the European Economic Community’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), demanding a per-farm ceiling on price supports, so that large enterprises would not be the main beneficiaries of CAP subsidies and arguing for improved supply management to prevent the production of huge surpluses, which had to be stored at public expense and which were frequently “dumped” in less developed countries, undermining peasant livelihoods.

In poorer countries, notably in Latin America, the debt crisis of the early 1980s, also caused in part by rising interest rates and oil import bills, brought neoliberal reforms that devastated small agricultural producers accustomed to guaranteed prices, low-interest loans, and state-sponsored extension services. Peasant movements in several countries were at the forefront of protests against neoliberal structural adjustment programs imposed by the World Bank and IMF. In India, peasant organizations spearheaded direct action campaigns against corporate efforts to patent traditional rice varieties and other cultigens and, in the 1990s, began to stage protests against economic liberalization.

Prior to the formation of Vía Campesina, peasant and farmer movements had already started to found transnational organizations in

several world regions. The European Farmers' Coordination, established in 1985, eventually linked organizations in over a dozen countries. In Central America, where peasant groups from the different countries of the isthmus had long participated in cross-border peasant-led agricultural extension efforts, a regional alliance formed in 1991 with the goal of combating trade liberalization and structural adjustment programs. As part of the 1992 continental indigenous protests against the Columbian quincentenary, native and Afro-descendant movements from throughout the hemisphere initiated a process that culminated in the founding two years later of the Latin American Coordinating Group of Rural Organizations (Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Organizaciones del Campo, CLOC).

The initial nucleus of *Via Campesina* included a small number of Central American, Canadian, and European activists who met at the 1992 congress of the Nicaraguan National Union of Agriculturalists and Livestock Producers (Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos, UNAG), an organization that ultimately opted not to join the emerging transnational movement. *Via Campesina's* founding convention in Mons, Belgium, in 1993, coincided with an upsurge in farmer protests in Europe against the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the precursor to the WTO), many of which were attended by delegations of farmers from the Americas and Asia.

For its first three years, *Via Campesina's* structure was based on an International Coordinating Committee (ICC), with representatives of organizations from different regions, each of which was responsible for overseeing activities in their respective areas of the world. Many communications activities were initially centered in the offices of the Canadian National Farmers' Union in Saskatoon and the European Farmers' Coordination in Brussels. In 1996, an International Operational Secretariat was established to oversee the entire network and complement the work of the ICC. Because of the Central Americans' extensive experience in cross-border organizing, responsibility for the secretariat was entrusted to the Honduran member coalition and its coordinator Rafael Alegría. In 2004 the headquarters moved to the office of the Federation of Indonesian Peasants, and Henry Saragih became the *Via Campesina* coordinator.

Much of *Via Campesina's* organizing is carried out by its constituent groups, often with funds

from European and Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The *Via Campesina* itself has a tiny staff and a small budget. Despite its reliance for funding on developed country NGOs, *Via Campesina* has frequently criticized the claim of some NGOs to represent or to advocate on behalf of the rural poor, and has argued that this type of advocacy is best carried out by the peasant organizations themselves. *Via Campesina* has, however, formed strategic alliances with organizations such as the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty, the German-based Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN), and the Land Research Action Network (LRAN), an international team of activist researchers sponsored by research centers based in Brazil, Mexico, the United States, and Thailand. These alliances have permitted *Via Campesina* access to state-of-the-art information and analysis on issues such as global trade negotiations, the World Bank's market-oriented land reform program, and the implications of genetically modified crops.

In addition to being a movement or action-oriented network, *Via Campesina* is also an arena in which peasant and farmer activists from different world regions meet, exchange experiences, share protest repertoires, and develop strategic plans about how best to meet their goals. The member organizations have found, however, that not all experiences are easily transferred across borders. The efforts of the Brazilian Landless Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST), for example, to aid the South African Landless Peoples' Movement were recognized by both sides as having yielded at best mixed results. *Via Campesina* and its allies maintain active websites and also use Yahoo and Google list serves to distribute news and position papers in English and Spanish and at times in French, Portuguese, or other languages. Periodic congresses, as well as other international meetings that members attend, provide opportunities for refining the movement's short- and long-term agendas.

Although *Via Campesina* claims to be a "global" or "world" movement, its geographical coverage is uneven. Probably the largest single member movement is the Brazilian MST. *Via Campesina* supporters typically sport green kerchiefs and baseball caps at public events, a practice adopted from the MST, whose members often wear matching caps and red tee-shirts.

Many other member movements, however, are quite small and in several countries, including France and the United States, the largest peasant and farmer organizations are affiliated with the more conservative International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP) and not with Via Campesina. In China, where rural protests against corrupt officials and land privatization schemes have become common, the government has managed to prevent the emergence of durable independent peasant organizations. Via Campesina has no presence in China or in a number of other countries, such as Burma and most of the former Soviet republics, where repressive regimes have blocked peasants from organizing. It has a large number of member organizations in Latin America and Europe and only a handful in Africa. In Francophone Africa many peasant organizations are affiliated with ROPPA (Réseau des Organisations Paysannes et de Producteurs de l'Afrique de l'Ouest [Network of Peasants' and Producers' Organizations of West Africa]), an alliance with similar aims to Via Campesina but which has remained outside it.

Most of the Asian Via Campesina members have only joined since 2004. The Korean Peasant League has demonstrated a capacity for mobilizing thousands of supporters for international protests, as occurred at the 2005 WTO ministerial meeting in Hong Kong, when hundreds of Korean protesters donned orange life vests and plunged into the harbor in an effort to bypass a police cordon and swim to the meeting. Many Korean rural activists also participated in the 2003 anti-WTO demonstrations in Cancun, Mexico, and one, Lee Kyang Hae, who was holding a sign that said "WTO kills farmers," stabbed himself to death as a protest during a large march. Even though Lee belonged to a non-Via Campesina organization (the Korean Advanced Farmers' Federation), Via Campesina commemorates September 10, the anniversary of Lee's death, as an "international day of struggle against the WTO." Member organizations of Via Campesina also frequently stage protests on April 17, "the international day of peasant struggle," which commemorates the 1996 massacre by hired gunmen of 19 peasants involved in a land occupation in Eldorado dos Carajás, Brazil. The killing occurred while a Via Campesina international conference was taking place in Tlaxcala, Mexico, which contributed to giving the event immediate international resonance. Subsequent Via

Campesina conferences have been held in 2000 in Bangalore, India, in 2004 in São Paulo, Brazil, and in 2008 in Mozambique.

Via Campesina has come to have a high profile in global civil society. The actions it has taken, along with its allies, have arguably contributed to slowing global trade negotiations. It has helped to return agrarian reform to the international development agenda. It has forged significant ties between peasant and farmer movements in diverse world regions as well as with a range of sympathetic action research, advocacy, and funding organizations. Some of its constituent organizations participate in the civil society consultative bodies of United Nations (UN) agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Increasingly, Via Campesina has sought to call attention to violations of peasants' rights in different world regions, issuing annual reports that tally abuses in the parts of the world where its members are active. In its 2002 "Draft International Convention on the Rights of the Peasant," which it hopes to have ratified by the UN, Via Campesina includes the rights "to a proper living standard," to agrarian resources, to seeds, to information and technology, to biological diversity and environmental preservation, and to freedom of association.

SEE ALSO: Korea, Peasant and Farmers' Movement; Movimento Sem Terra (MST); World Social Forums; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Cancun, 2003; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Hong Kong, 2005; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999

References and Suggested Readings

- Borras, Jr., S., Edelman, M., & Kay, C. (Eds.) (2008) *Transnational Agrarian Movements Confronting Globalization*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Desmarais, A. A. (2007) *La Via Campesina: Globalization and the Power of Peasants*. London: Pluto Press.
- Holt-Giménez, E. (2006) *Campesino a Campesino: Voices from Latin America's Farmer to Farmer Movement for Sustainable Agriculture*. Oakland: Food First.
- Mazoyer, M. & Roudart, L. (Eds.) (2002) *Via Campesina: Une alternative paysanne à la mondialisation néolibérale*. Geneva: Centre Europe-Tier Monde.
- O'Brien, K. & Li, L. (2006) *Rightful Resistance in Rural China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Via Campesina (2002) *Peasant Rights—Droits Paysans—Derechos Campesinos*. Jakarta: La Via Campesina. Available at www.viacampesina.org/main_en/images/stories/pdf/peasant-rights-en.pdf (downloaded June 7, 2007).

Vieques

Victor R. Quiñones Guerra

Vieques or *La Isla Nena* is located in the Caribbean 10 miles (16 km) east of Puerto Rico. At 18.5 miles (30 km) in length by 6.2 miles (10 km) in width, this small island has only two main towns, Isabel Segunda and Esperanza, with a population of approximately 9,400. The island is one of 78 municipalities of the commonwealth of Puerto Rico. In the 1940s during World War II, the United States purchased and occupied two-thirds of the island for military use by the Navy. The occupied regions were divided into three main areas: the naval ammunition facility, Camp García (also known as the eastern maneuver area), and Atlantic fleet weapons training facility. Vieques was viewed as a unique and valued training site by officials of the US armed forces, allowing for training in air, land, and sea.

Controversy was perpetuated among residents of Vieques due to the use of live shellfire and bombs. The presence of depleted uranium-coated shells raised concern among residents, who argued that live fire practices were causing the destruction of the environment and contaminating the air, water, and soil. Some regions were found to have high levels of radiation. Health problems also emerged as a result of decades of Navy occupation. Indicators showed an increment of infant mortality, death, and cancer rates that outranked rates in mainland Puerto Rico.

However, scientists commissioned by the US government conducted numerous studies and found no evidence correlating the Navy's practices to deteriorating natural resources at Vieques and poor health of residents on the island. Others argued that residents could not be affected physically by the military training facility since they resided 9 miles (14.4 km) away. Skeptics were critical of health research findings, which did not account for alcoholism, drug abuse, HIV infection, or lack of sound medical services.

Protests on the island did not gain momentum until the death of Angel Sanes, a civilian security guard, who was killed accidentally in April 1999 when a US Navy deployed two live bombs. After Sanes's death live fire training was suspended, allowing only inert bombs to be used for training purposes. However, the Navy's

emphasis on the importance of live fire training called for its reinstatement, and it was at this juncture that the protest battle took off.

Protests against the Navy have occurred at Vieques since the 1970s. Resistance to the Navy was expressed by politicians, community groups and organizations, religious groups, local government bodies, and residents from both Vieques and Puerto Rico. The majority of the protests took place in the form of vigils, marches, civilian penetration of restricted military zones, and the establishment of protest camps. Right after Sanes's death, a week-long series of protests led to the arrest of 65 protesters who trespassed into the Navy's restricted zone. However, it was not until May 2000 that organized civil disobedience camps were forcibly evacuated by military personnel.

The struggle for the removal of the Navy from Vieques gained national attention across the United States. The protests made it beyond Vieques and Puerto Rico when on September 22, 2000, approximately 2,500 activists traveled from the US and Puerto Rico and marched in front of the White House: 78 participants were arrested that day. The State of New York also hosted a series of protests, where established Puerto Rican leaders brought Vieques to the attention of their elected officials to garner support on the mainland and in Congress. Protests asking for the liberation of Vieques took place at Yankee Stadium, on Fifth Avenue, and at the Statue of Liberty. The movement gained solidarity from celebrities and prominent public figures.

However, not all acts of protest were peaceful. Although minimal, acts of violence took place in June 2000 when protesters in boats struck and injured Navy officials patrolling the shores with iron bars. Other instances of violence on land have included protesters throwing rocks at Navy engineers trying to repair fences that protesters had broken as a means of penetrating restricted areas. Protesters also injured five Navy officials with rocks and bottles and damaged several vehicles. Since Sanes's death, over 1,500 have been arrested in the US and Puerto Rico for civil disobedience.

Given Puerto Ricans' resistance and the Navy's desire to resume live fire practice, intervention from the Department of Defense's special panel on Vieques was called upon. It offered the solution of a five-year phase-out of the Navy from

the island. However, Governor Pedro Rosselló was opposed to the Navy's intention to resume live fire practice and called for the Navy's immediate removal. President Bill Clinton's mediation efforts included offers of economic incentives so that the Navy could remain, and a referendum so that the people of Puerto Rico could decide whether the Navy should leave or remain on the island. The results of the referendum showed that the majority of Puerto Rican citizens wanted an immediate departure of the Navy from Vieques. After changes in administration, Governor Sila Calderon conducted difficult negotiations with President George W. Bush following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York. The US government claimed it needed Vieques to train and prepare for war. As a result, the November referendum was disregarded and a firm exit date was established for May 3, 2003, when the Navy finally left Vieques.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Puerto Rico; Puerto Rican Independence Movement, 1898–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Barreto, A. A. (2001) *Vieques, the Navy and Puerto Rican Politics*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- McCaffrey, K. T. (2002) *Military Power and Popular Protest: The US Navy in Vieques Puerto Rico*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Meléndez, A. (1982) *La Batalla de Vieques*. Rio Piedras, PR: Editorial Edil.
- Sued, G. (2001) *Vieques: Crónicas desde la Desobediencia*. San Juan, PR: La Grieta.

Vietnam, anti-colonial, nationalist, and communist movements, 1900–1939

Daniel Hémerly

Of all the national and revolutionary movements that emerged between World Wars I and II in the European colonial empires of Asia and Africa, those of Indochina were, aside from those of India, the most precocious, most diversified, most radical, and most dynamic.

Vietnam lay at the heart of nationalism in the Indochinese peninsula. In Vietnamese society the nationalist project was elaborated slowly in

the image offered by colonial France, itself the product of a powerful nationalism. Two figures came to embody Vietnamese nationalism: Phan Boi Chau (1867–1940) and Phan Chu Trinh (1872–1926). Phan Boi Chau, an intellectual from Nghe An, gathered around him patriotic intellectuals in order to define a new nationalist path. From 1902 he crisscrossed the country from North to South to articulate this new way. In 1905 he went into exile in Japan and led young partisans in activities against the colonial French power. His group established active exchanges with the Japanese Pan-Asiatics, the Chinese Guomindang of Sun Yat-sen, Chinese and Japanese anarchists, and the Chinese constitutionalist movement of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. In exile first in Japan, and after his expulsion in 1908, in China, he sought to create a revolutionary organization composed of young men with political and military education in Japan. The organization gained the attention of the educated Vietnamese elite through clandestine propaganda and sought to prepare a national uprising to liberate the country from colonialism. With a member of the imperial family, Prince Cuong De, Phan Boi Chau created in the summer of 1906 the Viet Nam Zuy Tan Hoi (Society for the New Vietnam) and put his ideas to work.

As early as 1900, however, a reformist approach opposed this project of state nationalism. In several texts of 1906 and 1907, Phan Chu Trinh articulated this reformist approach. Trinh resigned as a government mandarin in Hué, met Phan Boi Chau in 1906 in Tokyo, and returned disappointed and reticent with regard to the new Japanese militarism and expansionism. No less suspicious of Confucianism, Trinh believed nation-building demanded a radical break with contemporary Vietnam and its institutions of the monarchy and mandarinat. He was resolutely against any use of violence.

Phan Boi Chau advocated borrowing from colonial adversaries to advance nationalism through the use of science, democracy, education, and modern exchange and production. He considered education essential for disseminating the new culture. The challenge was to pressure the colonial power, and form external alliances with the liberal currents of colonization and the democratic forces of the metropole: freemasons, the League of Human Rights, radicals, socialists, unions, and the intellectual left. Vietnamese

society would be incapable of emancipating itself as long as it remained a prisoner of its own stifling conformism and subjected to the crushing pressure of foreign domination.

Reformists and partisans of violence had a dialectical relationship. Modernist and democratic nationalism seemed for a long time to be the most credible of the two. In 1906–8 reformists undertook a campaign throughout the country. Associated with the members of the Zuy Tân League, they created new schools and a network of stores and modern businesses, and in March 1907 in Hanoi opened Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc (Hanoi School of the Just Cause), which was hugely successful.

On March 12, 1908, in the central provinces of Annam, vast peasant protests began after the number of days of labor were increased, and against extortion by the mandarin and village notables. Reformists sought to combine this revolt with their own project. Thousands of peasants cut their hair as a sign of acceptance of new ideas and attempted to present their grievances to the mandarins and to French provincial residents. In several places, riots occurred. Partisans of armed action were no less active, and attempted to poison the Hanoi garrison in June 1908. The colonial authorities struck back by closing the Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc in January 1909, used the military to quell the peasant demonstrations, and condemned hundreds of reformers to prison. In some cases, mandarin courts used torture against reformers. Phan Chu Trinh was condemned to life imprisonment by the Hué government and deported to Poulo Condore penitentiary (he was pardoned in 1911 and sent to France) with approximately sixty of his friends.

Partisans of armed struggle suffered a similar fate. Lacking Chinese aid and popular support, they could not break the grip of the colonial regime, even during World War I. Their actions included attacks in December 1912 and April 1913 in Tonkin, attacks on military stations on the Chinese border in 1915, the conspiracy of Tran Cao Van in Hué on May 3, 1916 in which the young emperor Zuy Tân participated, and the uprising of the garrison and prisoners of the penitentiary of Thai Nguyen on August 30, 1917, supported by provincial miners.

Conservatism prevailed within the French colonial regime, but in the metropole the above examples of Vietnamese nationalism stirred activists such as the League of Human Rights, the

Socialist Party, the anarchist press, intellectual leftists, some unions of the CGT, and Christian groups. They campaigned against official Indochinese policies and against its scandals, lawsuits, and colonial crimes.

Albert Sarraut, a young Radical deputy, undertook in his two successive terms as general governor of Indochina (1911–14 and 1917–19) his “Sarrautist” reforms for developing “Franco-Annamite collaboration,” an unequal partnership that the colonial regime was forced to build with traditional and modern elites to combat intransigent nationalism. The principal innovations were the creation of indigenous and Franco-indigenous assemblies elected through suffrage based on a tax threshold in the five territories of Indochina. However, colonization did not evolve further toward democratization. From 1930, any effort to modify the political status of Indochina disappeared from the agenda of the metropole. The colonial regime was isolated through protracted political inaction accompanied by relentless repression.

Nevertheless, Sarrautist colonial reformism had provoked real expectations within the Vietnamese nationalist movement. Following reformist and middle-class modernist initiatives, from the 1910s onwards many young people undertook a “voyage towards the West” with the goal of appropriating the tools of modernity and power. Many were attracted to study in France. The principal consequence of colonial reformism was to prevent reformist nationalism from resonating with the popular masses, to remove or neutralize their political initiative. Reformist nationalism in the 1920s thus underwent a crisis that also saw the formation of Vietnamese communism.

In Vietnam the majority of intellectuals were students, secretaries of administrations or enterprises, schoolteachers, professors, and journalists, often from families of the ancient educated elite. In the 1920s they were confronted with the emergence of an embryonic proletariat and modern social struggles, such as the first workers’ strikes in Saigon. Vietnamese intellectuals were forbidden to exercise the functions of the modern scholar. Instead, they were maintained in a subordinate social status compared to French colonialists and civil servants. Some among the younger generation demonstrated their alienation by becoming social dissidents and by adopting revolutionary beliefs. They constituted themselves as revolutionary elites, as an intelligentsia

in the most fundamental sense of the term. Their revolt was first expressed through the iconoclastic rejection of Confucian tradition, the family, and gerontocracy, and the affirmation of individual liberation. Young intellectuals and the transient new press led a permanent campaign for radical modernization of society and culture, constituting themselves as irreconcilable adversaries of the colonial administration.

These intellectuals were fascinated by western literature and philosophy and leftist European ideologies. A vigorous feminism was affirmed in the educated elite and inspired *Phu Nu Tan Van* (Women's News), the most influential opposition newspaper in Saigon in the early 1930s. The intelligentsia was attracted to a range of traditions, from Marxism to the ideas of Gandhi, Tagore, Sun Yat-sen, and Lenin. This cross-generational transformation among intellectuals, elevating youth as a political force, was completely unexpected in a Confucian society.

In 1925–6 Vietnamese youth plunged into political radicalism. Multiple confrontations with the French authorities increased following the arrest of Phan Boi Chau in Shanghai and his sentencing to death in November 1925 (later commuted), and the funeral of Phan Chu Trinh in April 1926 provoked mass demonstrations and a wave of strikes and boycotts in schools that spread throughout Indochina. The Vietnamese intelligentsia then turned to illegal action – printing tracts and manifestos, and publishing the first clandestine newspapers, especially among the growing number of Vietnamese students who traveled to study in China and France. A first generation of clandestine revolutionary groups was born, principally the Revolutionary Party of the New Vietnam in Annam and the Viet Nam Quoc Zan Dang (VNQZD), founded in November 1927 in Hanoi by Nguyen Thai Hoc on the ideological model of the Chinese Guomindang and a program of armed action, which rapidly recruited hundreds of militants in Tonkin.

Nguyen Tat Thanh – the future Hô Chi Minh, then known under the pseudonym Nguyen Ai Quoc – had settled in Paris and was a member of the Socialist Party. He traveled to Moscow in June 1923 and received his initial communist education. Sent to Canton in December 1924, he was from then on one of the clandestine leaders of the Comintern in Eastern Asia. With a young group of revolutionary youth, Hô Chi Minh formed in Canton the first cadre of Vietnamese

communists. Centralized and disciplined, it ensured the political formation in Canton of some three hundred Vietnamese youths from Indochina, who returned home to create workers' cells. The young revolutionary intelligentsia thus arrived at an endogenous communism that offered coherent answers to the problems Vietnam confronted. This communism allowed the intelligentsia to end its social isolation and lead new social movements. The first major protests were workers' strikes that grew in number from 1925 onwards in cities, rubber plantations, and agrarian regions. Communism placed intellectual youth in direct contact with the immense indigenous population. The era of revolutionary politics and ideological coherence had begun.

Upon Comintern instructions, Hô Chi Minh organized a meeting of representatives of the three main communist groups in Kowloon (Hong Kong) in February 1930, where they were unified into the Dang Cong San Viet Nam (Communist Party of Vietnam) on the basis of a program of national liberation and proletarian direction. Tran Phu, a young militant returning from Moscow, was named general secretary. Although the Communist Party was barely born in Indochina, the insurrection was already underway.

The period from 1929 to 1932 was marked by social polarization and dissatisfaction with heavy colonial taxes and the corruption of mandarins and notables, who seized collective lands from villages and thus broke traditional solidarity that had guaranteed a precarious equilibrium to peasant life. The assassination in Hanoi by the VNQZD of the director of an office of recruitment of coolies on February 9, 1929 unleashed a spiral of repression and revolutionary violence. The repressive operations of General Security led to massive roundups and big trials that decimated revolutionary groups but suddenly aggravated tensions. VNQZD militants were arrested by the hundreds in Tonkin and forced to confess. From May to July 1929 the French held huge trials of 227 VNQZD militants in Hanoi. On January 26, 1930, those leaders remaining free decided to risk everything. A general uprising was set for February 9.

On the night of February 9, 1930, 40 garrison riflemen of the great Yen Bay fortress that commanded the valley of the Red River secretly allied with the nationalist cause. Reinforced by approximately 60 outside insurgents, they mutinied, killed French officers, and occupied their

installations. The remaining 550 soldiers refused to join and hours later the revolt was crushed. A few attacks occurred elsewhere, unsuccessfully. Other insurrections of the VNQZD were repressed within 15 days, its chiefs and militants arrested *en masse*, and terror was unleashed over the North. The Criminal Commission of Tonkin judged 536 of the accused, condemning 80 to death and the others to hard labor. Nguyễn Thái Hoc stepped on the scaffold at Yen Bay on June 17, 1930 with 12 of his comrades to the cry of “Viet Nam Van Tuê! Viet Nam Van Tuê!” (Let Vietnam live! Let Vietnam live!).

Even before these events, workers and peasants unexpectedly laid the foundation for the second phase of the revolutionary crisis of 1930. They joined together to construct a communist framework sufficient to counter the power of rural notables in the villages. During Tết on February 4, 1930 in Cochinchina, young Communist Party militants coordinated a strike in the immense rubber plantation of Phu Rieng: 3,000 coolies controlled the plantation for three days. In March and April strikes erupted in small industrial centers in North Annam, Nam Dinh in Tonkin, and Cochinchina. In worker demonstrations on May 1 – the first in Vietnamese history – protesters were shot dead by the Indigenous Guard. In Tonkin, striking workers planned meetings and nighttime processions, placing red banners under trees, and peasants marched on administrative offices in Tonkin. From May to October, in Cochinchina and Annam, the workers’ movement expanded incessantly. In Annam, the northern provinces, and Quang Ngai, notables were tried, beaten, and shot; bloody battles broke out between protesters and the army and Foreign Legion throughout the spring of 1931.

After a poor harvest in October 1929, rising food scarcity had increased tensions; famines led peasants and workers to march on administrative centers. The marches continued throughout May 1932 at the initiative of some 1,300 communist militants. Peasants attacked official offices, tax registers were burned and prisoners liberated, and stores monopolizing alcohol destroyed. In the summer of 1930 the militia of self-defense (“*tu ve*”) had appeared, the local administration disintegrated, and notables fled to cities, leading to a political vacuum in the countryside. On September 1, 1930 leaders of the regional Committee of Annam established rural soviets modeled after Chinese soviets in Jiangxi. The

soviets abolished debts and taxes and established communal rice fields on land previously confiscated by the rich for redistribution among the poor. In an atmosphere of exaltation, meetings of villagers, peasant unions, and armed militias were improvised. Between September and December 1930 perhaps 17 soviets were established in Nghe An and, a few months later, 14 others in Ha Tinh.

The breadth of the movement surprised and influenced the Communist Party. During 1930, 100 strikes and more than 400 peasant demonstrations were staged. Reunited in Hong Kong in October 1930, the Central Committee was radicalized, rejecting the latent nationalist theses of Hồ Chí Minh, prioritizing the struggle for independence, and recommending formation of a “worker and peasant government” on the Stalinist plan adopted by the Comintern within the framework of a “middle-class democratic” revolution simultaneously “anti-imperialist” and “anti-feudal,” with proletarian direction, which would remain the central concept of the party until 1975. The new name of the party was Dong Duong Cong San Dang (Indochinese Communist Party) (ICP). The Comintern admitted the ICP in April 1931.

In early 1931 revolutionary sentiment continued to rise and colonial repression expanded. The ICP did not have significant control over the popular uprising and was unable to organize a retreat. After two successive lost harvests, from late 1930 to spring 1931, a famine had expanded throughout northern Annam, violence increased, and the peasant movement slipped into riots, isolated itself, and died. French planes bombed demonstrations and the districts where uprisings occurred were militarily occupied – “Red” villages were burned, and suspects and prisoners were gunned down. In July 1931 in North Annam the insurrection was defeated, thousands of suspects filled the prisons, perhaps 3,000 peasants were killed, and an equal number of judgments pronounced with lengthy punishments. By the end of 1931, throughout Vietnam, there were probably 9,000–10,000 political prisoners. The clandestine apparatus of the ICP was entirely dismantled by General Security, which in April 1931 captured the central committee of Saigon, shortly before Hồ Chí Minh was arrested by British police in Hong Kong on June 15. After his arrest Hồ Chí Minh owed his life to his lawyer’s skills. In 1933 he set out again for the USSR.

Those revolutionary nationalists who survived took refuge in southern China and were unable to reorganize inside Indochina before 1945. The nationalist political culture remained, immersed in the communist movement, subsequently the principal adversary of colonization.

The Great Depression had worsened living conditions for workers, leading to the collapse of the prosperous Indochinese colonial economy. Public finances and budgets were drastically cut, reducing the capacity for colonial economic and social intervention, leading to the disintegration of the partnership between colonial and indigenous elites. The crisis created a political vacuum between the colonial regime and society.

Colonial policies were organized around absolute rejection of any idea of decolonizing or substantial change in the political status of the colonies. Instead of responding to demands for self-determination, Paris opted for the modernization of existing colonial capitalism, denying “self-government.” The French chose to restore the authority of the councils of notables in the villages, modernizing the mandarinat, fighting peasant poverty, and developing the countryside through irrigation schemes and intensification of agriculture. This conservative choice was accomplished by repression of both the revolutionary and democratic opposition.

The colonizers’ strategy gave the Vietnamese communist movement a new chance to advance. The Comintern sent back to Indochina and to the Chinese border the young Vietnamese Moscow-educated executives, who reorganized fragile regional structures. The French Communist Party actively intervened in support of the communists, establishing as early as 1930 a permanent campaign against repression in Indochina, intensified in 1933 by the formation of the Committee of Amnesty for the Indochinese. Vietnamese prisons, notably the important Bagne of the Poulo Condore Islands, were quickly transformed into true “red universities” – centers of political formation and new militants for the CPI.

Driven back to Indochina by the French police in May 1930, Trotskyists teaching at private schools in Saigon organized in 1931 several clandestine organizations that were dismantled by General Security in August 1932. On the initiative of Nguyen An Ninh, their ideological leader, a unique front for legal worker resistance was built among brilliant francophone intellectuals.

The Comintern supported the labor project and undoubtedly provided funds. On April 24, 1933 in Saigon the *Worker* weekly paper was legally constituted, as was *The Fight* and the political group of the same name. *The Fight* quickly gained ascendancy from May 1933 to May 1935. “The Fighters” carried out an uninterrupted campaign against repression, engaged in investigative journalism to reveal the miserable conditions workers and peasants lived under, exposed the crimes of rural notables, the administration, and the collusion of the indigenous bourgeoisie, and called for political and labor union democracy. Gradually, they succeeded in turning public opinion. Thanks to the group’s action, in 1935 the workers of Saigon-Cholon started again to strike, the convicts of Poulo Condore engaged in hunger strikes, prisons were agitated, and the southern peasants dared to protest. Communist cells were reorganized in the South and in North Annam. The ICP held its first regular congress in Macao in March 1935, which adopted a leftist position (quickly abandoned because it countered the Comintern position that had just adopted a strategy of popular fronts), and appointed a new secretary general, Hong Phong, a young militant “returned from the USSR.”

In 1936–7 France’s Popular Front – the electoral and governmental alliance of the three socialist parties, communists, and radicals – provoked immense hope among the Vietnamese. There began a wave of hundreds of strikes, big and small, perhaps a thousand in total and undoubtedly the largest in Vietnamese history. Strikes mobilized from August 1936 onward on the model of the French general strike of June that year. In their tens of thousands, workers in cities and the southern countryside engaged in militant agitation. Strikes were peaceful: workers and coolies wrote down their claims, elected delegates charged with negotiation with bosses, and restarted work after obtaining satisfactory concessions. The Vietnamese proletariat and semi-proletariat were in the process of assimilating the model of the European strike. Taken aback, the colonial administration – under pressure from the Popular Front government in France – grew anxious about a social and political crisis in Indochina and the risk of a return to 1930.

Colonization had lost the historical initiative against communism. The legal form of

communism acquired considerable authority, evinced by its success at various official elections in 1938–9. But the still-clandestine ICP was the principal beneficiary of the militancy. It reconstituted itself in a great number of provinces and prepared for the future. According to the French police, the ICP comprised perhaps 2,000 militants carefully recruited in 1939 and divided into 150 cells. It was the only party operating in all of colonized Vietnam, incontestably dominating national opinion in Tonkin and in Annam. In the South, political forces were more diverse. Throughout Indochina, several hundred clandestine unions were operating.

For the French colonialists, as World War II approached, the question was how to modernize and restore colonial authority. For the leaders of French socialism, any reform, however limited, was dangerous, since it was likely to benefit the ICP. In 1936–7 French communists fell silent about anti-colonialism. The Popular Front government tolerated legal political activity, but in mid-1937 engaged in a showdown with “The Fight,” the motor of the great movements of 1936–7, and condemned its three leaders, Ta Thu Thau, Nguyen An Ninh, and Nguyen Van Tan. It broke the general strike of the railway employees of the Transindochinese in August 1937, arresting hundreds. As a result, the revolutionary alliance – primarily between Trotskyists and communists – was broken in the summer of 1937. Their common newspaper, *The Fight*, remained with the Trotskyists, and from then on ideological war raged.

On the eve of World War II, Trotskyist criticism of the ICP, which, as a member of the Comintern, was forced to support the Popular Front, gained some traction, particularly in Cochinchina. Communists were stimulated by Trotskyist exploration of a strategy comparable to Maoist communism in China, but by 1939 Vietnamese communists had returned to an anti-imperialist position, like most of the Comintern. This Indochinese Democratic Front adopted by the ICP in March 1938 was deeply impregnated with Indochinese communism. However, divisions between nationalism and communism created political confusion. Notably, the National Alliance Dai Viet (Grand Vietnam) was founded in December 1938.

Although the colonial regime held firm in Indochina, it was on the defensive. The regime was unable to take back the initiative, which passed

to adversaries it could only oppose through repression. The decree of September 26, 1939 dissolving every revolutionary organization led to hundreds of arrests and the disappearance of Trotskyist groups and remnants of nationalist parties, forcing the ICP to retreat into absolute clandestinity as prisons again filled up. However, it was evident that the showdown had only been deferred.

SEE ALSO: Cambodia, Anti-Colonial Protests, 1863–1945; Cambodia, Communist Protests and Revolution; Cambodia, Rebellion Against France; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Hồ Chí Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh) (1890–1969); Laos, Protest and Revolution, 19th and 20th Centuries; Leninist Philosophy; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Marxism; Trotsky, Leon (1879–1940); Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954; Vietnam, Protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974; Vietnam, Protests, 1975–1993; Vo Nguyen Giap (b. 1911)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bizot, F. (2000) *Le Portail*. Paris: Editions de la Table Ronde.
- Boudarel, G. (1965) *Phan Bội Châu et la société vietnamienne de son temps*. Paris: France-Asie, 199.
- Boudarel, G. (1991) *Cent Fleurs écloses dans la nuit du Vietnam*. Paris: Jean Bertoin.
- Bourdeaux, P. (2003) Emergence et constitution de la communauté du Bouddhisme Hoa Hao. Contribution à l'histoire sociale du delta du Mékong (1935–1955). Thesis, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, IV.
- Brocheux, P. (Ed.) (1981) *L'Asie du sud-est. Révoltes, réformes, révolutions* Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille.
- Brocheux, P. (1995) *The Mekong Delta: Ecology, Economy and Revolution, 1860–1960*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Brocheux, P. (2003) *Hồ Chí Minh*. Paris: Payot.
- Brocheux, P. & Hémery, D. (2001) *Indochine, la colonisation ambiguë (1858–1954)*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Bui Tin (1995) *Following Hồ Chí Minh: Memoirs of a Vietnamese Colonel*. London: Hart.
- Duiker, W. J. (1976) *The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900–1941*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Duiker, W. J. (2000) *Hồ Chí Minh*. New York: Hyperion Press.
- Fourniau, C. (2001) *Vietnam, domination coloniale et résistance nationale, 1858–1914*. Paris: les Indes Savantes.
- Gosha, C. (1999) *Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks of the Vietnamese Revolution (1885–1954)*. Richmond: Curzon Press.
- Hémery, D. (1975) *Révolutionnaires vietnamiens et pouvoir colonial en Indochine. Communistes, trotskystes,*

- nationalistes à Saigon de 1932 à 1937*. Paris: François Maspero.
- Hémery, D. (1990) *Hô Chi Minh. De l'Indochine au Vietnam*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Hô Chi Minh (1994) *Toan Tap*. Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Su That.
- Hue Tam Ho Tai (1983) *Millenarianism and Peasant Politics in Vietnam*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Huynh Kim Khanh (1982) *Vietnamese Communism, 1925–1945*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Huynh Ly (1992) *Phan Châu trình. Than Thê va Su Nghiep*. Da Nang.
- Hy Van Luong (1992) *Revolution in the Village: Tradition and Transformation in North Vietnam, 1925–1988*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Lockhart, G. (1989) *Nations in Arms: The Origins of the People's Army of Vietnam*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Marr, D. (1971) *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885–1925*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Marr, D. (1981) *Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920–1945*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Phan Bôi Châu (1968) *Mémoires*. Paris: France-Asie.
- Ponchaud, F. (1998) *Cambodge, année zero*. Paris: Kailash.
- Quinn-Judge, S. (2003) *Hô Chi Minh, The Missing Years*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Trinh Van Thao (1990) *Vietnam. Du Confucianisme au Communisme*. Paris, L'Harmattan.
- Werner, J. S. (1981) *Peasant Politics and Religious Sectarianism: Peasant and Priest in the Cao Dai in Vietnam*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Translated by Marcelline Block

Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954

Daniel Hémery

In the summer of 1945, the world emerged exhausted from World War II. Nevertheless, violence continued almost without interruption in Southeast Asia and Indochina for the next three decades, with only two brief intermissions, between 1954–61 and 1975–8.

In September 1945, the Vietnamese communists prepared a military showdown with colonial France, leaving no possibility for a negotiated compromise. From the outset the likelihood of confrontation was clear, since the French were determined to apply the Indochinese Federation project developed by Admiral d'Argenlieu, the

high commissioner, with the support of successive French governments in 1945–6. Begun in September 1945 in Cochinchina, the spread of the conflict was deferred for over a year owing to the relative weakness of each adversary and the necessity for the Vietnamese as well as the French to remove Chiang Kai-shek and his armies, which had been occupying the north of Indochina since September 1945, by means of negotiation.

After more than 15 months of negotiation to December 1946 between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), the French, and the Chinese, the Chinese finally ceded in February–March 1946 when General Leclerc's troops landed at Haiphong. The French troops settled in Hanoi in an uneasy coexistence with the government of the DRV, its self-defense militias (*Tu ve*), and the emergent People's Liberation Army (PLA), organized by Vo Nguyen Giap.

The Agreements of March 6, 1946 concluded in *extremis* on the eve of the French arrival in Tonkin between Hô Chi Minh and the French negotiator Jean Sainteny apparently opened the road to a compromise with France, recognizing a free State of Viet-Nam that would be part of the Indochinese Federation and the greater French Union, whose unification was due to be decided by referendum in Cochinchina. This initial compromise bought time for the two adversaries and allowed the communists to defeat their nationalist opponents. Over the next few months the nationalists were dispersed or defeated, and they were no longer represented in the subsequent government formed on October 6, 1946.

Franco-Vietnamese negotiations proved difficult and seemed destined to fail after the lack of progress at the first Conference of Dalat in May 1946. Hô Chi Minh was well received as virtual head of state in Paris in July, but the Conference of Fontainebleau in July–August ended in complete disarray. After the conference, conflict was already developing in the Mekong Delta between French troops and Viet Minh guerillas in the jungle, reorganized by their new chief, Nguyen Binh. Armed confrontation was deliberately prepared in April 1946 by the French high command and by d'Argenlieu who, protected by Paris, blocked the Cochinchinese preparations for a referendum and promoted the establishment of a transitional Autonomous Republic of Cochinchina, headed by Nguyen Van Tinh, a former leader of Saigon constitutionalism who had obtained the recall

of General Leclerc. The bombing of Haiphong by the French fleet on November 20–3, 1946 increased tensions. Further attempts at dialogue were futile. On the evening of December 19, the Viet Minh engaged the Battle of Hanoi against the French troops, which they lost after a month of ferocious fighting.

For France, the Indochinese War – for the Vietnamese, the “First Resistance” – was first lost politically and then militarily. The initial balance of military forces was unfavorable to the Viet Minh. The CEFEO (French Expeditionary Task Force in the Far East) numbered approximately 100,000 men in 1947, with modern equipment and an air force. It faced 80,000 regular Vietnamese combatants, who also had village militias and regional units carrying out large-scale guerilla warfare according to concepts tested in 1927 in the regional Chinese communist bases then at Yan’an. Nevertheless, in October 1947, the Viet Minh and PLA emerged unscathed from CEFEO’s offensive in Upper Tonkin, where the government and the central apparatus of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) had withdrawn. The initial French hypothesis of a short war proved illusory. It turned out in fact to be a long war imposed by the Viet Minh, theorized initially by the secretary general of the ICP, Truong Chinh, in his “On the Prolonged War,” and later by General Vo Nguyen Giap in his “People’s War, People’s Army,” adapting the military concepts of Mao Zedong to the Vietnamese situation. Success was achieved, at enormous cost to the peasantry, through the development of rural guerilla warfare, forcing the CEFEO to disperse manpower and become mired in an exhausting combat that produced no lasting results. As early as 1945, the CEFEO faced a vast network of resistance, from Thailand to South China, patiently constructed through extensive international political alliances throughout Asia, the communist world, and the French left.

The war was fought for high ideological stakes. Vietnamese communists and the Viet Minh led a daily combat to preserve national legitimacy. This had largely been achieved by 1945–6 and was maintained through popular mobilization on the dual themes of the struggle for independence and the unity of Vietnam. The pledge to end economic and social underdevelopment was important in this combat for national legitimacy. The DRV government that emerged in 1945–6 implemented effective social measures to reduce

tenant farming, eliminate illiteracy, introduce education for the masses, and create a basic health care system.

In order to analyze the Vietnamese communist phenomenon, a distinction needs to be drawn between communism rooted in the Confucian and national tradition, which constituted the intellectual apparatus of Hô Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap, and orthodox communism promoted by leaders such as Bui Cong Trung, Tran Van Giau, and Truong Chinh, secretary general of the ICP until 1956. This binary tension manifested itself through partisans seeking national maximum unity and those who sought to prioritize class struggle and the communist project.

Hô Chi Minh gained legitimacy through the Revolution of August 1945 and the proclamation of independence on September 2 to the masses. At the same time, communist ideology was embraced by successive generations of revolutionary intelligentsia as well as by the proletariat in the towns, factories, mines, plantations, and villages. During the long Indochina war, the party was constantly attentive to the military struggle and the peasantry, which in North Vietnam and in part of the South had provided recruits for the popular army. Unlike the small urban nationalist parties, Vietnamese communism presented itself as the historical alternative to the crisis of rural society, which had suffered underdevelopment in several regions since the 1930s. In December 1953, it experimented with agrarian reform in the liberated region of Thai Nguyen, confiscating and redistributing land, possibly under pressure from the USSR and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which was involved in its own agrarian revolution to eliminate the landowning class.

From this complex historical meeting between communism, nation, and society emerged the August Revolution and the transformation of the intelligentsia and communist leaders into a powerful civil and military bureaucracy. The communist leaders of the war effort represented the foundational structures of the Vietnamese party-state. In the ethnic minority zones in the northeast of Laos, the Pathet Lao political front was founded on the Viet Minh model by Prince Souphanouvong after the dissolution of the Lao Issara movement in 1949.

In Vietnam, the five “inter-zones” (*lien khu*) and a large proportion of the regions occupied

by the CEFEO and the administration of the State of Vietnam were surrounded by an immense network of party cells. Society was reorganized for the production of war supplies for the army, mobilized in numerous rural campaigns by the party through large mass organizations. The effort demanded of peasants was enormous and willingly granted, with little resistance other than locally to the intensification of agricultural production and the improvisation of workshops for the manufacture of tools and small arms.

Ultimately, political society was totally substituted by the party, which was developed in the cities and its principles of organization borrowed from Stalinist and Maoist communism. The bureaucracy was defined by its monopoly of power, structured in the party and popular units of the army, which were themselves under the strict control of the hierarchy of cells.

With the official reappearance of the party in 1951, the repressive practices of “correction” and personal “rectification” (*chinh huan*) became for several decades essential components of the training of militants, then of a growing number of the population. The aim was to establish conformity with the official ideology. There was no room in this system for plurality of opinion and even less for opposition, as demonstrated through the assassination of political adversaries throughout 1945–6.

The initial effect of the First Resistance was to force France to abandon the bulk of its Indochinese Federation project by early 1947 and substitute a new geopolitical option: the installation of three “Associated States” unified through treaties with the French Union. The concern of the High French Commission was how to impose nationalist, anti-communist regimes in opposition to Vietnamese communism and its Khmer and Laotian allies. It began to prepare what Nixon would later call the “Vietnamization of the war,” establishing Associated State accords with the Cambodian and Laotian constitutional monarchies.

Long and difficult negotiations began with ex-emperor Bao Dai in December 1947, then with the small Vietnamese nationalist parties and the Cao daist and Hoa Hao sects of the South, whose armed militias had doubled in size. The Auriol-Bao Dai Agreements of March 8, 1949 recognized the independence of the State of Vietnam, with Bao Dai as leader. However, his unstable and fragile administration, with an army trained

with considerable support from the French, was unable to impose power.

Almost at the same time, the proclamation in Beijing of the People’s Republic in October 1949, with armies reaching to the border of Tonkin, was the decisive turning point of the Indochina War, even more so than Dien Bien Phu. The final outcome of the war had always depended on the attitude of the Chinese. As a consequence, France could no longer win over the Vietnamese popular army, which had quickly transformed itself into a regular army equipped and supported, materially and intellectually, by China. Beginning in early 1950, a permanent Chinese military and political mission began working in the DRV. By 1954, nearly 10,000 Chinese advisors and technicians were active in the administrative management of the DRV. Nevertheless, Indochinese communism did not slip into the Chinese sphere of influence, which was itself split between Maoism and the pro-Soviet factions. In February 1951, at the second congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the ICP was officially transformed into a communist party.

In October 1950, the French disaster at Cao Bang and on Colonial Road 4 (RC 4), added to the catastrophic evacuation of the French strategic base of Lang Son, confirmed a military turning point: the CEFEO had lost vital control of the Chinese border, providing a strategic initiative to the Viet Minh.

With this new balance of military forces, the Viet Minh were able to maneuver large regular divisional units, with a sizable armed infantry and modern artillery, together with the local guerilla and regional units. The new strategy of General de Lattre de Tassigny, appointed high commissioner and French commander in chief in December 1950, was to accelerate the establishment of a Vietnamese imperial-dominated army of nearly 300,000 men, which gave the French a fragile military advantage during 1951. In France, opposition to the war, carefully cultivated by DRV leaders, was already strong among the working class and the Christian and intellectual left. After 1950 it spread to the middle classes, the Socialist Party, and parties of the center, and in 1953 it found a distinguished spokesman in the French National Assembly in the person of Pierre Mendès-France.

Meanwhile, the war had spread throughout the peninsula, reaching Cambodia and Laos. The

Viet Minh installed bases among its allies, who were certainly weak but by no means insignificant. They included the small Revolutionary Party of the Khmer People, which in 1951 numbered nearly 1,000 members, and the Lao Popular Party, created in February 1951. The widening of its strategic space was the response of Vietnamese communism to the military superiority of its adversaries: initially the French, and later the Americans. In both Laos and Cambodia, the Vietnamese neutralized all those associated with the French, particularly among social elites. In Laos in March–April 1953, the PLA helped install a government allied to the Pathet Lao in the city of Sam Neua, in Houaphon Province. In October, through bilateral negotiations, the Laotians gained full independence. In Cambodia, King Norodom Sihanouk left Phnom Penh and launched the Crusade for Independence in the first half of 1953, achieving huge popular success and forcing the French to yield in 1954.

With the entrance of the People's Republic of China, the Indochinese War had become an international event. With the setting up of the State of Vietnam and army, it became a civil war. From 1949, the stakes continued to be raised beyond the confines of the peninsula, turning the conflict into a struggle over decolonization. This transformation was certainly apprehended by global strategists in the United States.

Diplomatic recognition of the DRV by China occurred on January 18, 1950, and by the USSR on January 30, a few days after the first meeting of Hô Chi Minh and Stalin in Moscow. For their part, the United States and Britain recognized the Associated States on February 7, applying the notorious “domino theory” to Indochina, reportedly the brainchild of President Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, but in fact earlier conceived by French geopolitical strategists. From 1951, the US assumed a growing proportion of French military expenditure: 40 percent in 1953, 70 percent the following year. Indochina was emerging as the hot front of the Cold War.

In 1953 Vietnamese communists were able to turn victoriously against the French. A plan devised in 1953 by the staff of General Navarre, the last French commander in chief, was inspired by the “hedgehog” strategy tested by the Germans against Soviet offensives after Stalingrad and adapted successfully to Vietnamese terrain in

1952 at the Battle of Nasan. He set up a defensive complex at Dien Bien Phu, which would block the route of the Viet Minh forces trying to return to camps in neighboring Laos. Navarre assumed that in an attempt to reestablish the route to Laos, General Giap would be forced to organize a mass attack on the French forces at Dien Bien Phu. However, the Navarre plan gravely underestimated the capacity of the Popular Army to transport the heavy material and artillery necessary across difficult mountain terrain to encircle and besiege what would be an Asian Verdun. The challenge was met by 50,000 to 70,000 citizen workers (*zan cong*) for 40,000 combatants, men and women recruited through intensive political mobilization from the peasant communities of North Vietnam, who built a road through 500 kilometers of jungle. Road 41 was completed on January 25, 1954, along which Chinese artillery and material were transported by truck to Dien Bien Phu.

The battle, which began on March 13, ended in complete disaster for the French. After two months of relentless combat, on May 7, 1954 Dien Bien Phu was taken by storm by the PLA. The French command had practically no mobile reserves. In Geneva, Mendès-France urgently negotiated the Agreements of July 20–1 with the support of the Soviets and the Chinese, who pressured leaders of the DRV. An armistice divided Vietnam into two “provisional” zones in the North and the South, separated by the 17th parallel. A final declaration obtained the departure of the CEFEO in April 1956 and provided for general elections in Vietnam before July 1956 to unify the country. However, on July 16, 1955, the South refused to hold elections. Presided over by the former Catholic mandarin Ngo Dinh Diem and supported by the US, the South challenged the armistice as well as the final declaration of Geneva. Moreover, neither the USSR nor the PRC wanted the unification of Vietnam, and in 1957 Moscow proposed the admission of two Vietnams to the United Nations.

After nine years of war, the French colonial project of 1945 was in ruins. The Vietnamese communists and the DRV succeeded in decolonizing Vietnam, but had not achieved unification. Less than a year after Geneva, war again became an implacable necessity.

SEE ALSO: Cambodia, Anti-Colonial Protests, 1863–1945; Cambodia, Communist Protests and Revolution;

Cambodia, Rebellion against France; Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh) (1890–1969); Sihanouk, Norodom (b. 1922); Souphanouvong, Prince (1909–1995); Vietnam, Anti-Colonial, Nationalist, and Communist Movements, 1900–1939; Vietnam, Protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974; Vietnam, Protests, 1975–1993; Vo Nguyen Giap (b. 1911)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bizot, F. (2000) *Le Portail*. Paris: Editions de la Table Ronde.
- Boudarel, G. (1991) *Cent Fleurs écloses dans la nuit du Vietnam*. Paris: Jean Bertoin.
- Brocheux, P. (Ed.) (1981) *L'Asie du sud-est. Révoltes, réformes, révolutions*. Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille.
- Brocheux, P. (1995) *The Mekong Delta: Ecology, Economy and Revolution, 1860–1960*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Brocheux, P. (2003) *Ho Chi Minh*. Paris: Payot.
- Brocheux, P. & Hémerly, D. (2001) *Indochine, la colonisation ambiguë (1858–1954)*, 2nd ed. Paris: La Découverte.
- Bui Tin (1995) *Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a Vietnamese Colonel*. London: Hart.
- Cesari, L. (1995) *L'Indochine en guerres, 1945–1993*. Paris: Belin.
- Devillers, P. (1952) *Histoire du Viêt-Nam de 1940 à 1952*. Paris: Le Seuil.
- Duiker, W. J. (2000) *Ho Chi Minh*. New York: Hyperion Press.
- Fall, B. (1960) *Le Viet-Minh, La République Démocratique du Viêt-Nam, 1945–1960*. Paris: Colin.
- Hémerly, D. (1990) *Hô Chi Minh. De l'Indochine au Vietnam*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Lockhart, G. (1989) *Nations in Arms: The Origins of the People's Army of Vietnam*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Mus, P. (1952) *Vietnam. Sociologie d'une guerre*. Paris: Le Seuil.
- Nguyen Van Ky (1995) *La Société vietnamienne face à la modernité. Le Tonkin de la fin du XIXe siècle à la Seconde Guerre mondiale*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Translated by Marcelline Block

Vietnam, protest against colonialism, 1858–1896

Daniel Hémerly

At the time of the Second Opium War (1858) initiated by Britain, France, and Spain against China, Napoleon III began to colonize Vietnam. After a failed attempt to take the Imperial Court

in Hue, Saigon was conquered on February 17, 1859. However, the city and its Chinese annex of Cholon were effectively besieged by more than 12,000 soldiers and Vietnamese militiamen gathered by the imperial authorities in the south. It was only in February 1861 that resistance fell to a French task force, inaugurating the French conquest of the interior provinces.

Hue's government was divided between partisans seeking a conciliatory strategy to modernize the country and those favoring resistance to French colonial rule. Partisans were militarily weakened by an uprising of the Catholic Le Duy Phung in the old Le dynasty in Vietnam's northern provinces and were forced to cede three eastern provinces of the south (My Tho, Gia Dinh, and Ba Ria) to France, along with Saigon and the archipelago of Poulo Condore. These areas constituted the territorial core of French Cochinchina. In the Treaty of Saigon of June 5, 1862, Hue's government agreed to open three commercial ports in the center and north of Vietnam.

First Anti-Colonial Insurrections, 1868–1873

In 1863 in the occupied provinces, a small group of influential intellectuals organized in the villages with the clandestine support of the Hue Imperial Court. They formed an active guerilla resistance movement in the swamps of the west. Opposition emerged in the mangroves at the edge of the immense Plain of Reeds, led by a young military chief, Truong Cong Dinh. His death in August 1864 weakened the resistance movement, which nevertheless reemerged in 1866 in the provinces west of the delta (Vinh Long, Chau Doc, and Ha Tien) that had remained Vietnamese.

Negotiations initiated by the Vietnamese embassy in Paris in 1863 clashed with a campaign led in France by a nascent colonial party, composed of a coalition of the navy, commercial traders, and the Cochinchinese colonial administration and supported to some extent by the opposition republican party. On August 11, 1863, Admiral de la Grandière of the Cochinchinese administration negotiated a treaty with King Norodom Promborirak of Kampuchea making Cambodia a French protectorate. Norodom's reign was weakened by a revolt by his half-brother Si Votha, which was encouraged by

Siam (Thailand). In order to protect his crown and ward off the double threat from the Thais and the Vietnamese, Norodom accepted the protectorate treaty with France.

For the French, Kampuchea – a “sanctuary” for the Vietnamese guerrillas of the south as well as a strategic key to the Mekong basin – was needed to control Cochinchina and the important Mekong River. Between 1866 and 1868, a scientific mission by Doudart de Lagrée and Francis Garnier had explored the course of the Mekong River north into China. Control of Kampuchea was essential to dominate the south of Vietnam, which could also become a geographical base for expansion into Siam.

The fate of the final southern Vietnamese provinces was sealed when they were annexed to French Cochinchina. From June 1866 to June 1867, with the support of Bangkok, the three Khmer provinces of Battambang, Sisophon, and Siem Reap were transferred to the French protectorate of the Khmer Kingdom. Annexation of these last southern Vietnamese provinces was strongly resisted on the ground. In Kampuchea, several peasant risings led by charismatic local leaders disrupted the countryside, including Achar Sua (1864–6) and the revolt of the former monk Pou Kombo in the border region between Cochinchina and Kampuchea between June 1866 and December 1867.

In western Cochinchina, where an administrative vacuum was created by the withdrawal of the mandarins, the imperial police chief (*kinh luoc*) Phan Thanh Gian yielded to the military superiority of the French. After his suicide, peasant guerilla uprisings led by his sons began in early 1867, but were defeated in December of that year. In the following decade, anti-colonial agitation sporadically revived in Cochinchina on the initiative of secret societies or millenarian sects, in particular the revolt of February 1873, which destabilized the regions of Soc Trang, Tra Vinh, and Ben Tre in the central delta, but did not seriously threaten French domination in the south.

The nucleus of anti-colonial protest and resistance shifted toward central and northern Vietnam, renamed Annam and Tonkin by the French. French business interests and adventurers from China actively lobbied for the commercial opening of Tonkin. The turning point came with an attempt by Admiral Dupré, governor of Cochinchina, to annex Tonkin in October 1873. Dupré sent a small expedition commanded by Lieutenant F. Garnier to Hanoi, which seized the

city in November and sought to occupy strategic points of the Red River delta, installing pro-French authorities in the four provinces with the assistance of Catholic missionaries and Vietnamese Christians.

There was vigorous popular resistance supported by the Black Flag, bands of former Chinese insurrectionists from the Taiping Rebellion recruited by the provincial Vietnamese administration as additional troops. In 1864, after the defeat of the Taiping Rebellion, members of the Black Flag took refuge in the Red River region in the northern Vietnam borderlands. Lieutenant Garnier was killed on December 21 during a Black Flag attack on Hanoi. In 1873, the Van Than movement, a powerful nationalist and anti-Christian association, mobilized intellectuals in the northern and central regions to attack French colonial residences. These protests won the support of some of the high traditional mandarins and the court of Hue, where there was resistance to French demands. Calls for the massacre of Christians were made, and several Christian villages were attacked and burned. As in China, the anti-Christian movement persisted until the early twentieth century.

Tonkin progressively slid into chaos and rural misery, with the collapse of agricultural production, local famines and epidemics, and banditry. After the treaty of March 1874, France evacuated Tonkin in exchange for economic and consular advantages and the acceptance by Hue of French protection.

Resistance to the French Protectorate (1883–1896)

Patriotic resistance was reinforced by the brief but violent 1873 crisis, while successive French governments pursued a program of conquest and colonization of the Indochinese peninsula. On April 25, 1882, an expedition led by Commander Rivière seized the citadel of Hanoi. In March 1883, China sent 30,000 men to Tonkin to resist the French conquest of the principal cities of the delta. The French task force, arriving in August, occupied Tonkin and drove the Chinese army back toward the border. A French navy squadron prevented rice deliveries from the southern provinces of China to the north, and launched swift attacks along the coast of Formosa.

The imperial government was weakened by the death of Emperor Tu Duc in July 1883. He was succeeded by three regents who were seriously

divided on a plan of resistance. The Hue government finally agreed to negotiate with France and signed a protectorate treaty on June 6, 1884. The treaty was recognized by China, which signed its own agreement with France on June 9, 1885. With the collapse of the weak imperial army in Tonkin, imperial Vietnam essentially lost its struggle against colonial subjugation. Nevertheless, resistance continued for another ten years.

The long war of French “pacification” began in July 1885 when General de Courcy, Resident General of France, began the process of eliminating resistance in Hue, led by the regent Ton That Thuyet. In 1883–4, Thuyet organized Tan So, a secret military base across acres of mountainous terrain in the middle of the Muong country west of Quang Tri and the mountain road towards Upper Tonkin. He attacked French legations and quarters on the night of July 4–5. The attack failed and the French seized Hue as well as the Purple Forbidden City. Overnight, the regents fled toward Tan So with members of the court and the 14-year-old emperor, Ham Nghi. A few days later, Ham Nghi and Tan So launched an appeal for general resistance – “Support the King!” (*Chieu Can Vuong!*) – with a call to massacre Christians.

In September De Courcy crowned a new emperor, the nephew of Tu Duc, Dong Khanh (1885–9). Ham Nghi’s call for resistance had launched a formidable national uprising, which spread as far as Cochinchina, where several conspiracies in the Saigon area were thwarted in 1885. The situation was exacerbated for the French by a general insurrection in Cambodia in January 1885. King Norodom refused to cooperate with the protectorate authorities, who could not fight on two fronts. Can Vuong forced the French to divide their military operations and, in August 1886, abandon the idea of annexing the Khmer kingdom.

Resistance intensified in the center and north of Vietnam. Although Can Vuong did not have unanimous support, it had nevertheless been a general insurrection. In spite of official French denials of the uprising’s broad scope, shrewd politicians and high-level civil servants such as general governor De Lanessan (1891–6), as well as brilliant young officers such as Colonels Pennequin and Servière, recognized a new indigenous politics of patriotic resistance.

An unprecedented national crisis, caused by the installation of the protectorate and the partition of Tonkin, had significantly destabilized Vietnamese society. With the capitulation of the imperial

court, the divine mandate that was supposed to uphold the dynasty weakened. As in 1945, the Vietnamese in 1885 were confronted with the problem of “national security” (*cuu quoc*) and national survival. For many in this dilemma, the only recourse was to answer the appeal of the legitimate sovereign, who symbolized the fatherland in the people’s fight against foreign invasion.

Until 1890–1, although broad, the movement was regionally fragmented in poorly coordinated local uprisings. In Annam – the center of present-day Vietnam – the entire society led by intellectual elites rose up to defend the throne, particularly in northern Annam, where the dynasty had originated. Christians, considered internal enemies, were massacred *en masse*. In early 1888, however, the insurrectionists appeared to be defeated, as Ham Nghi was handed over to the French by his Muong warriors. Resistance resumed locally at Thanh Hoa from 1889 to 1892, then in Nghe An and Ha Tinh in 1890 under the prestigious imperial scholar Phan Dinh Phung, who led the resistance until his death in 1895. As of July 1895, Can Vuong gained popular support in the southern provinces of Annam, but collapsed the following year.

All central authority had broken down in the Tonkin delta provinces, devastated for 25 years by revolts, Chinese banditry, poor harvests, and floods, and then by the colonial war of 1884–5. Resistance was mobilized among the farming peasant community, who reacted as much against French efforts to recruit local porters as in response to the imperial call to arms against the foreign occupation.

Throughout most of the delta, particularly in the broad marshy Bai Say Plain between Hanoi and Hung Yen, a situation of dual power arose. Indigenous peoples apparently submissive to the colonial power during the day developed a clandestine resistance network by night. Dozens of armed bands, each containing no fewer than 250 men, went on the move and were impossible to detect in the immense plain that remained under water during the rainy season. The mountains and thick forests of the middle region surrounding the delta were bastions of the most resilient guerillas. They were well equipped with modern arms, often Winchester automatic rifles, whereas the French only had Gras rifles, bayonets, and revolvers. The guerilla troops were led by Vietnamese chiefs, among them Hoang Hoa Tham in the Yen The Mountains, or by Chinese from the remnants of Taiping groups.

The resistance troops built fortified systems composed of hideouts, forts, and several lines of traps. But the northern region on the Chinese border fell into the hands of Chinese bands, who had no connection to Can Vuong and who controlled travel in the frontier zone. The region was dominated by former Chinese soldiers or Taiping insurgents, itinerant Hunan gangsters, or the Hakka people of Hainan, such as the band of Luu Ky, who had thousands of rapid-fire rifles and operated in Dong Trieu in 1892.

At Ba Dinh the Can Vuong unsuccessfully sought to develop a coordinated resistance. Constructed amid rice plantations that were under several meters of water and connected to land by four narrow dams, the village fortress measured 1,200 by 400 meters and was protected by bamboo spikes. Ba Dinh was commanded by Dinh Cong Trang and 3,000 men. The French colonial authorities needed 3,500 men to conquer Ba Dinh, along with 5,000 peasant soldiers, 20 artillery pieces, and a two-month siege between December 1886 and January 1887. Nevertheless, although some chiefs conceived daring raids, the armed resistance groups could not advance beyond two or three provinces.

The resistance failed for several reasons. First, the Can Vuong insurrectionists were unable to put across the significance of the popular struggle against the French task force from Tonkin and Annam and did not have Chinese aid – so often decisive in the Indochinese wars of the contemporary era. Second, French authorities shrewdly exploited divisions within Vietnamese society as well as internal weaknesses within Can Vuong. Although the movement gained sympathy, in Tonkin it faced old suspicions toward the dynasty coupled with a wait-and-see attitude. Third, Christian dissidents provided invaluable support to the colonial troops. More generally, the Can Vuong failed to articulate a project of social transformation and global modernization. It proclaimed no social reforms, as it belonged to a Confucian and imperial order that addressed appeals only to the elites. In fact, the issue of “progress” was addressed only by the colonizers, who used it as a major justification for their actions.

The defeat of Ton That Thuyet and Ham Nghi, and the final rallying of the dynasty and the high mandarin to the protectorate, had the direct consequence of seriously weakening and even breaking all dynastic and monarchic

identifications with the nation. The court, the dynasty and, to a lesser degree the mandarinates were all discredited and henceforth disqualified as legitimate rulers in the eyes of the defenders of independence.

SEE ALSO: Cambodia, Anti-Colonial Protests, 1863–1945; Cambodia, Communist Protests and Revolution; Cambodia, Rebellion against France; Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864; Vietnam, Anti-Colonial, Nationalist, and Communist Movements, 1900–1939; Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954; Vietnam, Protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974; Vietnam, Protests, 1975–1993

References and Suggested Readings

- Boudarel, G. (1991) *Cent Fleurs écloses dans la nuit du Vietnam*. Paris: Jean Bertoin.
- Brocheux, P. (Ed.) (1981) *L'Asie du sud-est. Révoltes, réformes, révolutions*. Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille.
- Brocheux, P. (1995) *The Mekong Delta: Ecology, Economy and Revolution, 1860–1960*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Chandler, D. P. (1991) *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution since 1945*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Chandler, D. P. (1992) *A History of Cambodia*. Oxford: Allen & Unwin.
- Devillers, P. (1998) *Français et Annamites. Partenaires ou ennemis? 1856–1902*. Paris: Denoël.
- Duiker, W. J. (1995) *Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Forest, A. (1980) *Le Cambodge et la colonisation française. Histoire d'une colonisation sans heurts*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Fourniau, C. (1989) *Annam-Tonkin (1885–1896). Lettrés et paysans vietnamiens face à la conquête coloniale*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Fourniau, C. (2001) *Vietnam, domination coloniale et résistance nationale, 1858–1914*. Paris: Les Indes Savantes.
- Gosha, C. (1999) *Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks of the Vietnamese Revolution (1885–1954)*. Richmond: Curzon Press.
- Hémery, D. (1990) *Hô Chi Minh. De l'Indochine au Vietnam*. Paris: Gallimard.
- McLeod, M. W. (1991) *The Vietnamese Response to French Intervention, 1862–1874*. New York: Praeger.
- Marr, D. (1971) *Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885–1925*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Werner, J. S. (1981) *Peasant Politics and Religious Sectarianism: Peasant and Priest in the Cao Dai in Vietnam*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Vietnam, protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974

Daniel Hémerly

The first regional effect of the compromise of Geneva was the push to neutrality and non-alignment encouraged by China, which feared the installation of US military bases in Indochina. This impetus quickly weakened, except in Cambodia, where the government remained neutral for a decade under Prince Sihanouk, who seized power in 1960. Sihanouk fought American influence with Chinese support, tolerating the establishment of Vietnamese communist bases at the border of South Vietnam until the pro-American coup d'état of 1970. The US-backed coup ended Cambodia's capacity to restrain the action of the Khmer communists.

In Vietnam, antagonism between the party-state installed north of the 17th parallel and the army-state that the Eisenhower administration sought to consolidate in the south under the Republic of Vietnam was evident from the start. The Republic of Vietnam was officially founded following the departure of ex-emperor Bao Dai in May 1955 and elected through a referendum of October 23, 1955, won by Ngo Dinh Ziem with 98 percent of the vote.

For the powerful bureaucracy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), the reunification of Vietnam with the Lao Dong (Communist Party of South Vietnam) according to the model of the North was seen as a necessity. The North did not exclude the possibility of elections as envisaged in Geneva, which would probably have been favorable to the political transformation of the Viet Minh. However, the North's strategic view did not include the spread of pluralist political democracy. After Geneva and the partial victory of 1954, conditions appeared optimal in a war-ravaged society for establishing a planned economy and total control of the state party. North Vietnam would thus be a test bench for a radical transformation.

The establishment of a state-planned economy began in 1956 with the broad implementation of agrarian reform, conceived according to the Chinese model of 1953. In the fight to eliminate landowners and the rich, the liberation army established special popular courts, where public

accusations were made and summary executions carried out. Around 20,000 arrests and 15,000 executions of rich peasants took place. Villages were terrorized and peasant revolts erupted in several provinces that were bastions of the Viet Minh, in particular in Nghe An. The party was forced to retreat and engage in self-criticism, relieving its general secretary Truong Chinh in 1956 and replacing him temporarily with Hô Chi Minh.

While the scale and intensity of the persecutions declined, the essential measures were maintained: the old elite of notable villagers was replaced by a local bureaucracy of political and administrative leaders, and 810,000 hectares of land were equally redistributed to 2,100,000 families of poor or landless peasants. The villages were deeply divided, and the former solidarity was broken. In 1958, in order to expand farm production, land was collectivized on the Soviet and Chinese model into cooperatives (*hợp tác teststemxà*), generally the size of a village. Cooperatives were obliged to deliver agricultural products to the state at fixed prices.

In 1960, 86 percent of families belonged to cooperatives and family farming virtually disappeared. A program for accelerating industrialization was launched with foreign aid – more than \$3 billion between 1968 and 1970 – from the USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the Chinese. More than 650,000 rural youth were transferred to jobs in new factories and power stations, the metallurgical industry, modernized mines, mechanical engineering, and cotton factories. The rapid economic transformation made the DRV the most industrialized nation in Southeast Asia at that time.

In the larger cities, the political isolation of the most brilliant intellectuals of the DRV began, including romantic poet Phan Khoi, lexicographer Dao Zuy Anh, attorney Nguyen Manh Tuong, and philosopher Tran Duc Thao. The crackdown was organized at the same time as the Hundred Flowers (May–July 1956) in China, with the banning of independent reviews such as *Nhan Van* and *Giai Pham* and the denunciation of their editors as part of a violent mass campaign. The editors were banned from publishing and condemned to hard labor.

After the vote of the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee in December 1963 condemning “modern revisionism,” and the purge of 1967 – the imprisonment and execution of generals, former ministers, and executives who

were considered pro-Soviet and pro-Khrushchev – the political monopoly of the party was absolute. Real power was exercised by a core of virtually unchangeable leaders, in particular Truong Chinh, Le Duan, secretary general of the party after 1960, Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Chi Thanh, and Pham Van Dong. Considered pro-Soviet and thus “revisionist,” Vo Nguyen Giap was pushed aside. After 1960, Hồ Chí Minh possessed symbolic rather than effective power, embodying the figure of father of the country.

The communist movement faced a new adversary: the French-appointed imperial government of the Republic of Vietnam in the South. From the outset the regime was organized along authoritarian lines, with a military and police bureaucracy supported by US power. Two small nationalist parties survived from the earlier conflict: Dai Viet and the VNQZD. In 1955, power in Saigon was in the hands of the Ngo Dinh Ziem family, generals of the corps of army officers (ARV), French-educated administrative and police elites, and increasingly the American-educated elites of the Can Lao Party.

This official party of the South, created in September 1954 by the brother and mentor of Ziem, Ngo Dinh Nhu, attempted to militarize and rebuild society on the basis of anti-communism. Supporters included 600,000 Tonkinese Catholic refugees and, to a lesser extent, the landed bourgeoisie and business elites. The political system was maintained only with the support of the US, which provided US\$1.4 billion – or 60 percent of its budget – from 1955 to 1960. The regime was also sustained through the presence of thousands of US counselors and military instructors (9,000 in January 1962) and civilians assisting the South Vietnamese army and state apparatus. For Eisenhower and his successor, John F. Kennedy, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the goal was to provide South Vietnam with practical experience in “nation building” on the South Korean model, while crafting the army as the backbone of the anti-communist state. The militarist state-building model served as a framework for Southeast Asia and for the global US strategy of anti-communist “containment.”

The South Vietnamese strategy quickly failed. The coalition regime of Ngo Dinh Ziem engaged in harsh repression and was politically isolated. In 1960, the government acknowledged the existence of 50,000 political prisoners in detention

camp. It entered into open military conflict in the spring of 1955 with the Caoaists and Hoa Hao, which controlled militarily important territorial enclaves. The religious armed militias were crushed and their remaining forces went into hiding in the maquis (forests). In the delta countryside, where land was controlled by large neutral landowners, the government maintained the agrarian status quo. The small peasantry was forced to renounce ownership of land redistributed by the Viet Minh during the war (approximately 600,000 hectares). In 1955, government measures gave farmers a 25 percent ceiling of the harvest and provided for fixed-term leases. The army helped large owners recover unpaid rents. In 1956 and thereafter, agrarian reforms placed a ceiling of 100 hectares on property but were largely unenforced. By 1965, 10 percent of the richest proprietors owned 55 percent of the land. As a result, endless campaigns to denounce communists launched by Ziem failed against the militants and the guerillas of the Viet Minh remaining in the South (between 5,000 and 15,000), whose actions against the regime were increasingly supported. An ordinance of January 11, 1956 authorized the internment without trial of communists and another on August 21, 1956 made communism a crime punishable by death.

For the Lao Dong, armed resistance became the only means to oppose government repression. A threshold was crossed in May 1959: the 15th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong pronounced in favor of relaunching the armed struggle to reunify the country and authorizing guerilla operations. The DRV began to send men and material to the South and in May started operating the Hồ Chí Minh Trail in Laotian territory. At the third Congress of the Lao Dong of January 1960, the party proposed a new direction. Le Zuan, the first secretary, Le Duc Tho, the organization’s secretary, and General Nguyen Chi Thanh, head of the political department of the army, actively prepared for war. In the South, guerillas successfully provoked an uprising in the province of Ben Tre in the Mekong Delta. On December 20 in Tan Lap, in the province of Tay Ninh in the northwest of Saigon, it created the National Liberation Front (NLF), headed by Nguyen Huu Tho, an upper-class lawyer from Saigon and a former member of the Viet Minh. The NLF was controlled by militant communists of the South, not directed from Hanoi by Lao Dong’s political office. In

January 1961, Lao Dong decided to prepare an armed insurrection, combining political action and military struggle.

The NLF updated the Viet Minh program: priority was given to constituting a democratic coalition government in the South that would negotiate a peaceful reunification with the DRV. In 1961 the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was constituted, comprising 15,000 combatants spread over regular forces, regional guerilla units, and village militias by the end of the year. With the DRV, the NLF quickly developed an international presence, particularly on the diplomatic scene and in public opinion, where it aroused an unprecedented movement of international solidarity. Lao Dong also used the Sino-Soviet conflict that was declared at that time. By advocating the intensification of anti-imperialist struggles, the Vietnamese Party maintained an equal balance between the two antagonists who lent political and material support. For the PRC it was important to draw America away from the South, to make itself the dominant force of the Indochinese peninsula and transform the DRV into a satellite. For the USSR, Vietnam was a valuable example of a successful communist state that could open up an anti-American front in the context of a second Cold War and with which it could renew an alliance against its Chinese adversary.

Hence China and the USSR provided aid to the North Vietnamese and the NLF. From 1967 to 1970, according to American estimates, China provided US\$995 million and the USSR US\$2.335 billion in assistance. On a similar scale to the previous revolutionary war in the peninsula, the "Second Resistance" of Vietnamese communism was proving itself capable of meeting the formidable challenge of a war against the US, the world's greatest power.

Never, perhaps, has the expression "total war" been so apt than in Indochina in the 20 years that followed Geneva. It was at one and the same time a civil war between the Vietnamese, an indirect international war between Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and the three great world powers, and a war for the example that the US wanted to prevent the advent of revolutionary regimes or simply neutral regimes in the Third World. Even more than before, the war would be a world war: "The border of the US extends to the 17th parallel," in the words of Ngo Dinh Ziem on May 13, 1957.

From 1962 to 1963, the Southern government installed "strategic hamlets," often by force, displacing 10 million peasants in the South as an essential part of the "counterinsurrection" strategy of General Maxwell Taylor and the MACV (Military Assistance Command in Vietnam). The government sought to control entire regions of the Mekong Delta, infiltrating the cities and carrying the war to the high Southern plateaus. After an unexpected success in Ap Bac in the delta in early 1963, the PLA began to seize the military initiative. The result was that the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem, the heavily armed South Vietnamese army, and their American advisors lost control of large parts of the territory.

Ziem's hostile measures and bloody repression of a Buddhist demonstration in Hue on May 8, 1963 aroused the opposition of the influential Vietnamese Buddhist community. On June 11 the first Buddhist monk committed suicide by setting himself alight, leading to further Buddhist protests. The Buddhists had readily accepted the idea of negotiation between the South and North, which was encouraged by the NLF and Hanoi. In summer Nhu and Ziem, fearing rapprochement between Washington and Moscow, secretly negotiated with Hanoi to form a coalition government with the NLF. Relations became tense in the summer of 1963 between the government of Ngo Dinh Ziem, Nhu, and the US embassy. Worried by the overtures made to Hanoi, generals prepared a coup d'état, and on November 1, 1963, Ziem was assassinated along with his brother.

In the second stage of the war, Vietnamese communists were brutally opposed by the American superpower. The Vietnam Republic fell in a succession of military coups d'état. From then on, a violent military dictatorship was installed through repeated appeals of the US. The American administration was convinced that in post-colonial societies of the Third World, only the army could rule – as in South Korea or in Indonesia – as a bulwark against revolutionary opposition. In Vietnam, however, the remedy was not working.

In the spring of 1964, the US estimated that the NLF controlled approximately half the population of the Southern territory. The administrative disorganization that followed the change of personnel after Ziem's assassination facilitated the installation of a parallel territorial

administration, which won over the peasantry by destroying the latifundism that dominated in the South and achieving the agrarian reforms begun by the Viet Minh. In these “liberated regions,” private property was limited to 5 hectares as opposed to 100 in the government zones. Each family received approximately 1.2 hectares. Small peasant landowners were from then on in the majority. In the cities, in spite of the police, the NLF formed workers’ militias and a vast clandestine network. The PLA became a genuine army, organized in battalions, and was in the process of staging a regular war. In December 1963, at the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee, the Lao Dong secretly decided to reinforce the military fight in the South and prepare for a general uprising.

The Saigon government was incapable of achieving national stability and at risk of seeing the total collapse of the army in the South, which was demoralized and provided little threat despite a crushing material superiority. At the beginning of 1964, the option of using aerial bombardment north of the 17th parallel as well as American land forces in the South seemed the only possible solution to General Westmoreland.

In the spring of 1964, President Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk launched a graduated escalation of conflict in Vietnam by air and on land. In Laos civil war started again in May between Phoumi Nosavan’s right-wing forces and the Pathet Lao. In Cambodia Norodom Sihanouk remained neutral. Naval provocations by the Americans and South Vietnamese and the ensuing incidents in the Tonkin Gulf on August 2 and 4 allowed the Johnson administration to obtain the agreement of Congress to directly enter the war, without a war declaration. After Johnson’s reelection in November, a continuous bombing campaign was launched on North Vietnam following the NLF attack against the American air base at Pleiku on February 7, 1965.

On March 8, the first battalions of Marines arrived at Da Nang. The US not only assumed leadership of the war, but also took over the administration of South Vietnam. The government army was defeated at Bin Gia in late May and, after a final coup d’état on July 11, 1965, the regime of General Nguyen Van Thieu and Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky was installed. The new regime was quickly discredited. It was a brutal and repressive police state, corrupt and inefficient.

Its army of 968,000 men in 1970 was ineffective, and the regime never became more than a semi-military dictatorship under the façade of the 1967 constitution.

Without no popular support for the government and a cruel police state in place, PLA guerilla operations expanded throughout the South. In the presidential elections of September 3, 1967, even with massive fraud, Thieu and Ky managed reelection with only 35 percent of the vote. The opposition candidate Truong Dinh Dzu, an attorney and almost unknown Buddhist partisan, received 17 percent of the vote, and was imprisoned the following year.

Never had there been such a great disparity of material forces in any revolution. However great the military advantage of the Americans, the disparity had potentially dangerous consequences. The military advantage only prolonged the war for the US, according to a war hypothesis that the Twelfth Plenum of the Central Committee of December 1965 secretly examined and adopted. The war hypothesis was close to the victorious experience of the “people’s war” against France.

Four factors bear out the hypothesis of the prolonged war. First, the US was immediately overwhelmed by the relentless escalation of the war, being forced to engage more troops for a hypothetical quick victory that never arrived. Certainly Westmoreland’s tactic of attrition – a combination of bombings and massive land offensives by the American army which grew to 536,000 men in 1968 – succeeded in stabilizing the military situation in the South in the second half of 1965. But the US plan did not lead to reconquest or a regaining of the military initiative, in particular because of the temporary return of the South Vietnamese PLA to a guerilla strategy.

In June–July 1965, the first protests appeared in large American universities. Global opposition to the American war, encouraged by the subtle attitude of openness of Hô Chi Minh, the DRV, and the leaders of the NLF, grew incessantly, seriously hampering the initiatives of the Johnson and Nixon administrations. The cost of the US war reached 13.5 percent of the federal budget. After 1966, demonstrations against the war multiplied and fatigue settled in among the majority of Americans, particularly among professors and young people, who became hostile to the continued intervention in Vietnam. As opposition

grew in the US, demoralization began to increase among troops engaged in the war.

Second, the theory of the “war as example” for the Third World lost much of its point with the anti-communist coup d’état of October 2, 1965 in Indonesia. The break of the Peking (Beijing)-Jakarta axis, the return of Indonesia into the western camp, and the Cultural Revolution (1965–9) considerably weakened China’s capacity for foreign engagement, and in fact demonstrated the success of the anti-communist “containment” strategy in Southeast Asia. Military disengagement was therefore possible, increasing internal opposition to the war.

Third, both the Soviet Union and China remained supporters of the DRV and NLF, although they remained rivals as the Vietnamese refused to choose between them, a position Hô Chi Minh defended until his death in 1969. Vietnam finally leaned toward the Soviet Union only after Henry Kissinger’s trip to China in 1969. However, the Chinese provided the DRV with rice, medicines, light and heavy arms, and ground-to-air missiles. The assistance was used with maximum discipline by the DRV and NLF, unlike American aid to South Vietnam, which was frequently squandered. From 1965 to 1969, China provided logistical support and air defense as far as the 21st parallel, with some 80,000 Chinese soldiers and two anti-air divisions protecting the North from economic blockade.

Finally, popular resistance in the DRV, stimulated by the party and its mass organizations, galvanized support for the idea of democratization and unification of the country. These political ideas were so firmly entrenched that no opposing ideas could reverse them. US bombardment did not break the morale of the North. From 1965 to 1968, 212,000 US Air Force operations dropped 425,000 tons of bombs on the DRV, and over a million tons of bombs were dropped from 1965 to 1973. The bombings disrupted DRV transportation and basic public services, and slowed the deployment of troops and equipment to the Southern fronts through the Hô Chi Minh Trail. But despite the bombing, North Vietnam held. As bombs continued to fall, hundred of thousands of women and men repaired destroyed infrastructure, buildings, ports, railroads, bridges, roads, trails, and ferry-boats. The infiltration of material and troops from the North to the South via the Hô Chi Minh



Between January 30 and September 23, 1968, Viet Cong forces and the North Vietnamese Army launched a massive military campaign against the forces of the Republic of Vietnam. This campaign, later known as the Tet Offensive, marked a turning point in the Vietnam War. A female Viet Cong soldier is seen here in action with an anti-tank gun during fighting in southern Cuu Long delta. (AFP/Getty Images)

Trail continued, mitigating potential difficulties in local recruitment to the PLA. After 1966, the NLF was forced to institute conscription and provisions for obligatory work service: in March 1967, 53,000 regular northerners supported some 63,000 soldiers of the PLA, added to which were between 220,000 and 280,000 regional guerillas and local militiamen. In 1968, the American and South Vietnamese command were still unable to prevail.

The turning point of the war was the striking offensive of the PLA and the PAV (People’s Army of North Vietnam) at Tet in 1968. Its political aim was to subvert American and world opinion. Giap wanted to start a battle by the PAV on the 17th parallel in order to attract American forces there rather than organizing a general uprising in the city of Le Zuan. The battle was that of Khe Sanh on October 10, 1967, in which Westmoreland threw a good part of his forces. This was followed by an attack on the cities by the PLA and the NLF, with the PAV kept in reserve. This attack was to be followed by a general uprising in the South. The attack on tens of cities started on January 31, 1968. Except for Saigon, where the PLA reached the US embassy, and in Hue, where fighting extended for weeks and where 2,500 functionaries of the regime were liquidated, the Tet Offensive was a serious military failure – almost half the leaders of the NLF were killed or captured, considerably weakening the PLA – but a real political success.

American carpet bombing of the cities caused colossal civilian losses. The passivity of the army of the South – saved only by American troops – and the futility of the escalation were now demonstrated in the US, opening up the perspective to American public opinion of a war without end. The political effect of the offensive was thus largely attained: on March 31, in a televised speech, Johnson proposed negotiations with the DRV, which were quickly accepted. The Conference of Paris began on May 13 involving all the parties – the DRV, United States, South Vietnam, and the NLF, with the aim of finding a formula for the military withdrawal of the US.

The “Vietnamization” of the conflict invented by Nixon, who had been elected president in November 1968, and his secretary of state Henry Kissinger involved restoring functionality to the Southern army and the ARV and stabilizing the Saigon regime: a Sisyphean task. There was never any question that the Vietnamese communists would yield to the intransigency of Nguyen Van Thieu’s regime or to the determination of Nixon and Kissinger to strengthen it by forcing them to renounce reunification.

The DRV and the NLF demanded a ceasefire, an American withdrawal, Thieu’s resignation, and a coalition government in the South to prepare for reunification in the long term. NLF militants established two organizations to rally democratic and neutral opinion in the South: the Alliance of National Democratic Forces and Peace, headed by a former minister of Bao Dai in 1945, Me Trinh Dinh Thao, and the Revolutionary Provisional Government (RPG), formed in July 1969 with representatives of the Alliance and the NLF. The proposed formula of political rule was supported by world opinion.

While world opinion was essential for the leaders of Vietnamese communism, it did not influence their position. After the failure of the 1968 uprising and the weakening of the NLF, the CIA, with the assistance of the Southern police, had between 1968 and 1972 assassinated 20,000 local executives of NLF through the Phoenix Plan. The only strategy open to the NLF from that point was that of a classic war, carefully prepared by the reinforcement of the PAV in heavy Soviet tanks and artillery, to be used after the withdrawal of the American troops. Troops began to withdraw in June 1969 and by late 1971 only 157,000 American soldiers remained,

falling to 24,200 by the end of 1972, when the American command ceased effective operations in Vietnam.

“Vietnamization” was predicated on four risky wagers: (1) the reduction of foreign aid to the DRV and the exploitation of the Sino-Soviet conflict; (2) the application of real agrarian reform in the South in 1970; (3) the transfer of considerable firepower to the Southern army; and (4) the deliberate extension of the aerial and land war to Cambodia and Laos to destroy the PLA’s logistical system in the north and any bases remaining on the Vietnamese–Cambodian border. This was a departure from the policy of the Johnson administration, which had respected the Cambodian neutrality of Sihanouk.

Of these wagers, only the first was successful: the rapprochement between the US and China following Nixon’s trip to Peking in February 1972 and China’s admission to the UN in October translated into an effective reduction of Chinese support and, consequently, Soviet aid to Hanoi, as well as greater pressure on the Vietnamese to accept a diplomatic solution. The Chinese feared the success of Soviet hegemony in Southeast Asia more than they supported the weakening of American regional power.

The other wagers, however, failed. In the US, the peace movement increased public pressure to end the war, reinforced by the Watergate scandal of June 1971. On December 22 Congress prohibited the use of land troops and American counselors in Cambodia and Laos. But the relative improvement in the fighting capability of the South Vietnamese army and its influence on the ground achieved nothing other than to reinforce the DRV’s determination to win. Furthermore, the last of the American military’s major initiatives in the peninsula ended badly. Finally, the disastrous failure of the invasion of Southern Laos by two South Vietnamese divisions on August 2–3, 1971 allowed the Pathet Lao to reinforce its military operations in the east of the country.

In Cambodia, the fragility of the Khmer Republic proclaimed on September 10 after the coup d’état by Lon Nol and his army, with the assistance of the US, had serious implications for America. The destruction of Vietnamese bases in Cambodian territory proved to be impossible: the American–South Vietnamese offensives of May 1970 and February 1971 managed only to displace PAV and NLF bases to the west. But the extension of the war to Cambodia

exacerbated the agrarian crisis and created social destabilization, which coincided with the emergence of a new national Indochinese communism among a small segment of Khmer society that was radical in its terrorist leanings.

The “Easter offensive” of March 30 to June 8, 1972 toward Hue, the last to be organized by Vo Nguyen Giap before he was supplanted by General Van Tien Zung, was a repeat of the strategy implemented at Tet in 1968, demonstrating once more the frailty of the South Vietnam army (with 20,000 desertions per month), which was only rescued by repeated bombings north of the 17th parallel. But the PAV was forced to retreat, leaving 100,000 dead on the battlefield, and in the South the regime remained intact. In September, the DRV renounced its call for the resignation of Nguyen Van Thieu, forming the basis of a temporary compromise negotiated by Kissinger and Le Duc Tho.

After the “Christmas bombing” of December 18, 1972 throughout North Vietnam to forestall North Vietnamese violation of the accord, the Paris Accords of January 27, 1973 provided for the total retreat of American forces, the maintenance of PAV and NLF troops in enclaves they occupied in the South, and the administration of the latter by the RPG. The Council of Reconciliation and Concord was created to organize free elections in South Vietnam, and the government was to negotiate a long-term peaceful reunification with the DRV. Finally, there was to be a financial contribution by the US to the reconstruction of the DRV and the whole of Indochina. In Laos, a similar treaty was concluded between Prince Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao on February 20, and a government of national union was constituted on April 5, 1974.

In Cambodia, where the PAV refused to evacuate its bases, fighting between the Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Republic of Lon Nol continued after February 9, with heavy American aerial bombardment of densely populated regions (in six months, the US Air Force dropped more bombs on Cambodia than on Japan during the whole of World War II). Approximately 1.5 million refugees – out of 6.5 million inhabitants – migrated to the cities. Nevertheless, in the spring of 1973, the Khmer Rouge battalions defeated Lon Nol’s army.

On July 1, 1973, Congress prohibited American participation in operations on the whole penin-

sula from August 15: this marked the US’s definitive withdrawal from the long Indochinese War. The way was virtually clear for the victory of Indochinese communists. It was not long in coming. It occurred first in Cambodia where Lon Nol’s regime proved itself incapable of defeating the Khmer Rouge guerillas – themselves directly supported by both China and the North Vietnamese.

In Vietnam, discussions between Hanoi, the NLF, and the Saigon government came to a dead end. In the South, the reduction of American credit and the departure of the US Army brought social disintegration. In the cities half of the active population was unemployed. After the Paris Accords nearly a million more refugees left for urban areas, three-figure inflation ravaged cities and the countryside, tens of thousands of soldiers deserted, and corruption was denounced by the Catholic clergy. As communist troops were strengthened in an effort to wear down the opposition in the territory, the regime reached the final stages of self-destruction.

In Hanoi in December 1974, the Party’s Political Bureau decided to launch a test attack for January some 70 kilometers northwest of Saigon. The province of Phuoc Long fell in 15 days. In the second offensive on March 9, Ban Me Thuot in Central Vietnam was taken in three days. Hanoi then launched the “Hô Chi Minh Campaign.” Under the assault of columns of armed tanks, the Southern army collapsed.

The decisive military event was the taking of Da Nang on March 29. America did not intervene: “For the US, the Vietnam War is over,” pronounced President Ford on April 23, to applause from a student audience. Hanoi rejected a late French proposal to form a transitional government headed by General Duong Van Minh. Nguyen Van Thieu resigned in time for the North to transmit a radio order to capitulate on April 30, while the reinforced tanks of North Vietnamese General Tran Van Tra surrounded the presidential palace.

SEE ALSO: Cambodia, Anti-Colonial Protests, 1863–1945; Cambodia, Communist Protests and Revolution; Cambodia, Rebellion against France; Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh) (1890–1969); Le Duan (1908–1986); Sihanouk, Norodom (b. 1922); Souphanouvong, Prince (1909–1995); Vietnam, Anti-Colonial, Nationalist, and Communist Movements, 1900–1939;

Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954; Vietnam, Protests, 1975–1993; Vo Nguyen Giap (b. 1911)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bizot, F. (2000) *Le Portail*. Paris: Editions de la Table Ronde.
- Boudarel, G. (1991) *Cent Fleurs écloses dans la nuit du Vietnam*. Paris: Jean Bertoin.
- Brocheux, P. (Ed.) (1981) *L'Asie du sud-est. Révoltes, réformes, révolutions*. Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille.
- Brocheux, P. (1995) *The Mekong Delta: Ecology, Economy and Revolution, 1860–1960*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Brocheux, P. (2003) *Ho Chi Minh*. Paris: Payot.
- Brocheux, P. & Hémery, D. (2001) *Indochine, la colonisation ambiguë (1858–1954)*, 2nd ed. Paris: La Découverte.
- Bui Tin (1995) *Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a Vietnamese Colonel*. London: Hart.
- Cesari, L. (1995) *L'Indochine en guerres, 1945–1993*. Paris: Belin.
- Devillers, P. (1952) *Histoire du Viêt-Nam de 1940 à 1952*. Paris: Le Seuil.
- Duiker, W. J. (1995) *Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Duiker, W. J. (2000) *Ho Chi Minh*. New York: Hyperion Press.
- Fall, B. (1960) *Le Viet-Minh, La République Démocratique du Viêt-Nam, 1945–1960*. Paris: Colin.
- Hémery, D. (1990) *Hô Chi Minh. De l'Indochine au Vietnam*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Hy Van Luong (1992) *Revolution in the Village: Tradition and Transformation in North Vietnam, 1925–1988*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Lockhart, G. (1989) *Nations in Arms: The Origins of the People's Army of Vietnam*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Mus, P. (1952) *Vietnam. Sociologie d'une guerre*. Paris: Le Seuil.
- Nguyen Van Ky (1995) *La Société vietnamienne face à la modernité. Le Tonkin de la fin du XIXe siècle à la Seconde Guerre mondiale*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Qiang Zhai (2000) *China and Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Quinn-Judge, S. (2003) *Hô Chi Minh: The Missing Years*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Smith, R. (1983, 1965, 1986) *An International History of the War of Vietnam*, 3 vols. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Turley, W. (1980) *Vietnamese Communism in Comparative Perspective*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Woodside, A. B. (1976) *Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Translated by Marcelline Block

Vietnam protests, 1975–1993

Daniel Hémery

On May 1, 1975, the day after the North Vietnamese entered Saigon, Khmer Rouge troops launched their first incursions into the Vietnamese islands of the Gulf of Siam. This third Indochinese War, the first between the communist states, posed a new political and military problem throughout Southeast Asia: who would succeed the US and France as the new regional hegemonic power? The reunification of Vietnam under a communist regime had immediately raised the question of the reorganization of the Indochinese peninsula.

For the People's Republic of China (PRC), which had always considered Indochina its "natural" sphere of influence, the issue was to prevent Vietnam, which supported the USSR after the Sino-American rapprochement, from succeeding the US as the dominant power in Southeast Asia. For the USSR, on the other hand, maintaining Vietnamese hegemony in the peninsula was a strategic necessity for several reasons, primarily to contain China's growing influence.

The four adversaries in the third Indochinese War formed two main alliances between 1975 and 1978: Cambodia and the People's Republic (linked by a secret military accord of February 6, 1976, followed on February 24, 1977 by the non-renewal of Chinese aid to Vietnam) against Vietnam and the USSR (through a treaty of friendship of November 3, 1978), together with the Soviet allies and the countries of the socialist camp. For US President Carter and his ally Thailand, the conflict between PRC-supported Cambodia and Soviet-supported Vietnam was an obvious gift for their triangular relationship with the two rival communist powers, and had the additional advantage of getting rid of the communist guerillas of Southeast Asia. Diplomatic relations established between the US and China on December 15, 1978 indirectly benefited Thailand and the defeated Khmer Rouge forces.

In April 1978 the first Khmer military units in Vietnam were set up among the refugees, often former Khmer Rouge threatened by the Pol Pot regime, and in December formed a political front allied to the Vietnamese, the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (KUFNS).

The war, which had so far remained at the border, reached a brief but decisive conclusion with the offensive of the PAV (People's Army of North Vietnam) on December 25, 1978, ending the genocidal Khmer Rouge revolution. Phnom Penh fell on January 7, 1979, and in three weeks the Khmer Rouge regime collapsed.

The historical project of the Vietnamese communists to build a unified nation-state and forge a path toward socialism had been put on hold by a third of a century of war. Subjected to an American embargo that lasted until February 1994 and blocked from international investment, the population was living in destitution: between 1960 and 1975, two million had been killed, five million wounded, and ten million displaced. In the South, the import economy financed by American credit collapsed. The reconstruction of the devastated country seemed to offer a unique opportunity for implanting socialism based on the post-Stalinist Soviet model.

From 1975 to 1977, after the military conquest of South Vietnam, the structure of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was imposed with some minor adaptations. The immediate reunification of Vietnam was proclaimed on July 2, 1976 with the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). The fourth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) of December 1976 planned to increase agricultural production and accelerate industrialization through the nationalization of the economy, with massive financial and technical assistance from the USSR and other Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries. In the North, cooperatives were reorganized, concentrated in large units and managed on a district scale.

The collectivization of agriculture promulgated by the Saigon regime in 1970 initiated huge transformations. Over the medium term the state planned for the internal migration of part of the urban population and peasantry in the overpopulated deltas of the North and the Center toward the New Economic Zones of the Mekong Delta, the high plateaus of the Center, and the mountainous areas of the North, displacing approximately 3.6 million people from 1975 to 1989. This revolutionary transformation of society was accomplished by grafting the much more diversified social formation of South Vietnam onto the North and extending communist administrative bureaucracy throughout

the country. Several hundred thousand leaders (*can bo*) from the North took hold of the South and the country's largest city, Saigon, which was renamed Hô Chi Minh City. In 1975 a relentless police campaign began in the South that sent between 500,000 and 1 million people to "reeducation" camps for prolonged internment. The operation lasted for a decade and aimed to prevent the development of political opposition.

In 1975, the majority of the population was disposed to reconciliation, and protest was primarily passive. Opponents who had the financial means fled the country. Between 1975 and 1985, from 1 to 2 million "boat people" of all social origins, predominantly middle class and educated elites, left the country illegally, with approximately 100,000 a year heading for refugee camps on the Thai border, Hong Kong, the US, Europe, Australia, or non-communist countries in Asia. By its sheer visibility, the exodus had world repercussions, destroying the immense sympathy the Vietnamese communists had accumulated as well as hopes for a new form of communism after the experience of Soviet Stalinism and the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

The Vietnamese peasantry, integral to the communist victory, forced the regime to change its project. In 1978–9, in the South and increasingly in the North, resistance to collectivization, the killing of cattle, peasants' withdrawal to individual plots of land, and underproductivity in the collective units led to a food catastrophe, aggravated by the effects of a demographic explosion. Food shortages increased as the parallel private market was extended. Production then seemed to improve, but crisis returned with the missed monetary reform of 1985 followed by inflation of more than 400 percent a year at the beginning of 1989. Partial famines occurred in 11 provinces in the North and peasant demonstrations erupted (notably in November 1988 in the South), encouraged by groups of former resisters. The CPV could no longer guarantee to feed the people. Another decisive factor in the failure of the Vietnamese communist project was the inability of the PAV to end Khmer Rouge guerilla actions in Cambodia. Added to this were the costs of political and military tension with China, then, in 1991, the suspension of Soviet financial assistance – at least \$21 billion from 1978 to 1986. Ten years after victory, the legitimacy of the communist regime in Vietnam was under threat.

Divided between pragmatic and conservative reformers, the CPV leadership in 1979 opted for partial reform, including establishing family contracts in the cooperatives, restoring small family production, and free markets. Internal pressure, the end of Soviet communism, and the successful adoption of market socialism in China from 1976 triggered a debate within the CPV over its future strategy. At its sixth party congress in December 1986, the party opted for a completely new course: *doi moi* (renovation).

The historical transformation accomplished in one decade redefined the tacit pact between the party-state and society. Through the progressive acceptance of market reforms, specific and carefully controlled measures were taken to govern the rules of operation of the open market. The country was opened up to large enterprises and foreign investors and the Vietnamese economy became part of the globalized world.

From 1986 to 1995 new policies were established, including the decollectivization of land and a return to small-scale family farming, freedom of trade, and the deregulation of prices governing agricultural and artisanal products. The system of administered industrial prices was abandoned and direct state management of the country's 5,800 enterprises was ended. The state developed an increasingly wide sector of collective local enterprises and private firms that were opened up to foreign investment, especially to multinational Asian companies. The state created tax-free zones, drastically reduced customs tariffs, and adopted a monetary system, including a floating rate of exchange (1991), reduction of interest rates, and radical budget stabilization.

Vietnam's neoliberal policies opened the way to linkages with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), unblocking international investment. Vietnam emerged as a low-cost industrial producer, as did Cambodia and Laos. These developments led to the peaceful evacuation in 1989 of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia through the Paris Peace Treaty of October 23, 1991. The admission to ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) of all three countries marked the end of their international isolation. On January 11, 2007, Vietnam became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

These transformations indicated a historical rupture in the Indochinese peninsula, which had been a major center of revolutionary action

and communist thought for more than 50 years. In contemporary Vietnam, *doi moi* and market socialism have replaced the planned economy without leading to major crisis, due to the fact that peasant agriculture is now entirely private (in 1997, food availability increased to 398 kilos per capita). Through its "green revolution," Vietnam is a leading exporter of rice, coffee, and rubber, facilitated by massive foreign investment.

The decline of the peasant class has opened up a cycle of industrialization in Vietnam that is equivalent to the current industrial development of China, and it is a major producer of textiles, shoes, crude oil, and more recently electronics due to the low cost of labor. After China, Vietnam has the highest growth rate of Eastern Asia (an annual average of 7.5 percent since 1996, 8.1 percent in 2006) and is the central pole of development in the vast zone known as the Greater Mekong. Its economy is one of the most dynamic in the world. Foreign investment grew to 45 percent in 2005, with exports totaling \$5.5 billion. The United States has become Vietnam's largest market.

From 1945 to 2006, Vietnam's population increased nearly fourfold from 23 million to 84 million, and is expected to exceed 100 million by 2020. Meanwhile, the country is becoming increasingly urbanized. In 2006, Hô Chi Minh City grew to 10 million inhabitants, and socio-economic polarization is expanding. A large proportion of the population lives in poverty, and the country's public sector is collapsing. Even with the recent growth of Vietnam's GDP per capita, the country is among the poorest in the world. A new class of private and public contractors has emerged, benefiting from the growth in corruption in the regional and national bureaucracy. These developments have also come at the cost of ecological disaster. Forests declined from 13.5 million hectares in 1943 to 9.2 million in 1995, and there are huge imbalances in regional development. The urban region of Hô Chi Minh City furnished 58 percent of industrial production in 2006.

SEE ALSO: Cambodia, Anti-Colonial Protests, 1863–1945; Cambodia, Communist Protests and Revolution; Cambodia, Rebellion against France; Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh) (1890–1969); Vietnam, Anti-Colonial, Nationalist, and Communist Movements, 1900–1939; Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954; Vietnam, Protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974; Vo Nguyen Giap (b. 1911)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bizot, F. (2000) *Le Portail*. Paris: Editions de la Table Ronde.
- Brocheux, P. (Ed.) (1981) *L'Asie du sud-est. Révoltes, réformes, révolutions*. Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille.
- Chandler, D. P. (1991) *The Tragedy of Cambodia History: Politics, War and Revolution since 1945*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Chandler, D. P. (1992) *A History of Cambodia*. Oxford: Allen & Unwin.
- Chandler, D. P. (1993) *Pol Pot: Frère Numéro Un*. Paris: Plon.
- Chandler, D. P., Kiernan, B., & Boua, C. (1988) *Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976–1977*. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Monograph 33.
- Duiker, W. J. (1995) *Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Heder, S. & Ledgerwood, J. (1966) *Propaganda, Politics and Violence in Cambodia*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Hy Van Luong (1992) *Revolution in the Village: Tradition and Transformation in North Vietnam, 1925–1988*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Kiernan, B. (1985) *How Pol Pot Came to Power*. London: Verso.
- Kiernan, B. (1998) *Le Génocide au Cambodge, 1975–1979: Race, idéologie et pouvoir*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Locard, H. (1996) *Le Petit Livre rouge de Pol Pot ou les paroles de l'Angkar*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Ponchaud, F. (1998) *Cambodge, année zero*. Paris: Kailash.
- Scott, J. C. (1976) *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Smith, R. (1983, 1965, 1986) *An International History of the War of Vietnam*, 3 vols. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Stuart-Fox, M. (1986) *Laos: Politics, Economics and Society*. London: Pinter.
- Stuart-Fox, M. (1997) *A History of Laos*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Translated by Marcelline Block

Villa, Pancho (ca. 1878–1923) and the division of the North

Janet E. McClellan


The early life and times of Francisco “Pancho” Villa are shrouded in mystery and little is known

of his past except that he was born Doreoteo Arango in San Juan del Rio in the state of Durango around 1878. His father was Agustín Arango, and his family was extremely poor. It was said that at the age of 17 he killed his sister’s rapist, the landowner’s son on the ranch where he and his family worked. He went into hiding, became a bandit, and assumed the name the world would come to know him by. In 1912, during the Mexican Revolution, Villa joined the federal troops under General Victoriano Huerta and enjoyed the rank of honorary brigadier-general. But Huerta feared him and his successes in battle and had him falsely charged with an infraction and sentenced to death. President Madero commuted his sentence to imprisonment, which he served until his escape in 1913. Villa lived in Texas until the assassination of revolutionary President Madero.

In assessing the Mexican Revolution, most urban intellectuals of Mexico City regarded both Villa and his associate Emiliano Zapata as primitives but favored Villa over Zapata. Villa was considered faithful to Madero, while Zapata renounced Madero and continued his war against the haciendas. Villa’s public image included tales of his cruelties, womanizing, volatile temperament, and audacity in battle. When Madero became president, Villa enjoyed the support of the public as the military strategist and defender of the revolutionary regime.

After Madero’s assassination, Villa joined the Constitutionalist Army and became the head of the División del Norte (North Division). His popularity increased amongst the populace as the indomitable campaigner in the war. Many citizens believed that he was a friend of the poor and a true revolutionary, but his popularity hinged on the tales of his exploits, military victories, and explosive temperament. He was a larger-than-life figure of popular imagination and fascination.

Villa, as ranking member of the military and popular campaigner, recognized General Carranza as the leader of the Constitutionalist-supported revolution. However, he was aware of his popular support and its ability to translate into political power and therefore stipulated that delegates from the many revolutionary armies arrange a democratic presidential election and set up a new government to ensure the well-being of workers, their economic emancipation, and equitable distribution of land. Although he conceded the stipulations, Carranza was not in favor



During the Mexican Revolution Emiliano Zapata (1879–1919) (right) and Pancho Villa (ca. 1878–1923) (left) were military leaders in the Mexican Revolution. Villa fought for agrarian reform and the establishment of communal land rights for Mexico’s indigenous population. Here, Villa and Zapata gather with a group of soldiers on January 2, 1915. (Getty Images)

of reforms protecting the indigenous people. Thus, in mid-1914 Zapata and Villa entered Mexico City and secured the capital.

Villa was forced out of Mexico City in 1915, following a number of violent incidents involving citizens, himself, and his troops. Additionally, the return of Carranza and the Constitutionals to Mexico City from Veracruz followed and Villa rebelled against Carranza. Villa’s military prowess seemed to have faded as he lost various skirmishes and a major battle against the Constitutionals. With supplies running low, Villa sought out American arms dealers. On March 16, 1916 Villa ordered his troops to make a cross-border attack against the community of Columbus, New Mexico as a response to being cheated by arms dealers within the community. The attack on American soil resulted in United States President Woodrow Wilson sending 6,000 troops under the command of General John J. Pershing into Mexico to pursue Villa and his raiders. Villa was then pursued by the US army and the Mexican Constitutionals army under the direction of President Carranza. Over the next four years Villa eluded capture but was reduced from the engagements of military tactics to those of a guerilla force commander. In 1920, Villa negotiated peace with Mexican President Adolfo de la Huerta and went into retirement. He was assassinated on the morning of July 20, 1923 in the town of Parra, Chihuahua. The assassins were never captured.

SEE ALSO: Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919) and the Comuna Morelense

References and Suggested Readings


- Brunk, S. (1995) *Emiliano Zapata: Revolution and Betrayal in Mexico*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Hodges, D. C. & Ross, G. (2002) *Mexico, the end of the Revolution*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Krauze, E. (1997) *Mexico: Biography of Power: A History of Modern Mexico, 1810–1996*. New York: HarperCollins.
- O’Malley, V. (1986) *The Myth of the Revolution: Hero Cults and the Institutionalization of the Mexican State, 1920–1940*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Vinegar Hill/Castle Hill Rebellion, 1804

Andrew Moore

Unlike the Eureka rebellion at Ballarat, Victoria in 1854, Australian historians have been slow to recognize the 1804 convict revolt near present-day Castle Hill in western Sydney as a legitimate expression of political resistance. Established in 1788, the fledgling British colony of New South Wales was then a place of penal servitude, small and isolated, but with a significant component of political rebels among its convict population. In the wake of the 1798 rebellion in Ireland at least 300 and probably more than 600 United Irishmen were transported to the infant thief colony. As a result New South Wales had a strong undercurrent of republicanism and a persistent anti-authoritarianism to British rule. On March 5, 1804 about 200 convicts, principally Irishmen, confronted the NSW Corps at Vinegar Hill, thus named after a battle in the 1798 rebellion. According to Patrick O’Farrell, the Irish were led to rebel by semi-mystical impulses, “frustrations, sickness of heart, and impulses of affront: in a word pride.” Lynette Ramsay Silver also implies that the rebels were merely homesick romantics.

More recently historians Ann-Maree Whitaker and Ruan O’Donnell have recognized the political imperatives that shaped the rebellion. In large part the Irish rebels were fired by news arriving in the colony of Robert Emmett’s uprising in Dublin in 1803. United by the rallying call “Death or Liberty (and) a Boat Home,” their aspiration was to return to Dublin to assist their country in overthrowing its colonialist oppressor.



Convict uprising at Castle Hill, 1804 (watercolor, National Library of Australia). Major Johnston, with Quartermaster Laycock and 25 privates of the New South Wales Corps, defeat 266 armed rebels, March 5, 1804. The uprising of Irish prisoners against the British colonial administration, led by convicts Philip Cunningham and William Johnston, ended with more than 100 rebels killed. (National Library of Australia, Rex Nan Kivell Collection NK10162)

In as much as the rebels had a leader, that person was Phil Cunningham. A Clonmel United Irishman, Cunningham was a hardened revolutionary. A stonemason and republican in Clonmel, he was regarded as “an articulate man who moved in high social circles.” During the 1798 rebellion it is probable he helped coordinate the United Irish insurgency in the Clonmel district, perhaps holding the rank of captain. In 1799 Cunningham was involved in rescuing prisoners and conducting arms raids. Captured and charged with sedition at Clonmel on October 9–11, 1799, a legal technicality caused the death sentence to be commuted to transportation to Botany Bay for life. In 1800 he was placed aboard the *Anne*, the third transport to carry rebel prisoners to New South Wales, on which he became one of the leaders of a shipboard mutiny. Cunningham was dispatched to Norfolk Island, a place of secondary detention even more forbidding than “Botany Bay.” However, because his skills as a stonemason were needed in New South Wales, he did not stay there long. Assigned to duties in the government farming settlement at Castle Hill, Cunningham ultimately became the overseer of government stonemasons. Cunningham’s rebellious spirit was not expunged. With the fellow *Anne* convict Conor Sheehan, in October 1802 Cunningham tried to abscond, seeking to join a departing French vessel. They did

not get far. Both were apprehended in nearby Parramatta and received 100 lashes.

In 1804 Cunningham was reputedly building his own stone home but, like many of his comrades, was greatly excited when the news of Emmett’s uprising arrived on a whaling ship, the *Ferrett*, on January 22, 1804. Six weeks later, on March 4, he became the principal leader of the Irish rebels and uttered the republican battle cry, “Death or Liberty.” After addressing his followers at Toongabbie’s Constitution Hill, Cunningham dispatched several columns of men to obtain guns and reinforcements prior to the planned attacks on Parramatta and Port Jackson. The tactics used by the United Irishmen in 1798 – massing centrally controlled forces on high ground sites – were again deployed.

After limited skirmishes and several successful raids in the Seven Hills/Pennant Hills areas, on March 5 George Johnston of the NSW Corps staged a tactical coup by quickly taking the battle to the rebels. Cunningham and his colleagues, William Johnston and Samuel Hume, two Protestant United Irishmen from the north of Ireland, had expected more of a lull in which to rally their troops. They sought a ceasefire. Johnston initially agreed, but then reneged, ordering his troops to open fire. The rebels were largely without ammunition and soon scattered. Estimates of the numbers of casualties vary. O’Donnell suggests that 30 rebels were killed. In 2004 the “official” Vinegar Hill Bicentenary view was that 15 rebels died. Martial law was declared for the first time in Australian history. Nine of the rebel leaders were hanged. A similar number were flogged. Dozens more were sent to Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania) or Coal River, working the coal mines beneath Fort Scratchley, thus founding the city of Newcastle. The event O’Donnell styles “the most serious insurrectionary challenge directed against the Australian state” was over.

Typically, there is debate about what happened to Cunningham. One tradition has it that during the ceasefire negotiations with Johnston, a certain Lieutenant Laycock struck Cunningham with his rifle or shot him in the back, either the blow or the bullet killing him. Another tradition has it that Cunningham initially escaped, perhaps wounded, but was captured on a patrol later that night or early on the morning of March 6, whereupon he was taken to the Hawkesbury and hanged in a storehouse. It might be that the two

theories can be married. Given early nineteenth-century notions of exemplary justice, it is possible that Laycock did kill Cunningham, and the gibbeting of his body followed in order to show all the other cropy boys that the state would brook no further dissent. As part of the Bicentennial commemorations of Vinegar Hill in 2004, a historic marker was unveiled on the site of the 1803 Government Store in Windsor, the site of Cunningham's hanging.

The effect of the state repression was salutary. Vinegar Hill extinguished the dying embers of rebelliousness among the Irish convicts, at least in terms of their willingness to take up arms. The fighting of 1798 was at last over, though the United Irish rebel traditions lived on in New South Wales through the transmission of revolutionary methodology and the creation of a radical Irish subculture. Subsequently enjoying the patronage of Governor Lachlan Macquarie, the Irish rebels excelled in other areas, in commerce, surveying, construction, and exploration, and later formed the backbone of the Catholic Church in the colony.

SEE ALSO: Emmet, Robert (1778–1803) and Emmet's Rebellion; Eureka Stockade; Kelly, Edward "Ned" (1855–1880) and the Kelly Gang; Ireland, Great Rebellion, 1798; Lalor, Peter (1827–1889); United Irishmen

References and Suggested Readings

- O'Donnell, R. (1996) "Marked for Botany Bay": The Wicklow United Irishmen and the Development of Political Transportation from Ireland 1791–1806. PhD thesis, Australian National University.
- O'Donnell, R. (1998) Philip Cunningham: Clonmel's Insurgent leader of 1798. *Tipperary Historical Journal* 17: 150–7.
- O'Donnell, R. (2003) "Liberty or Death": The United Irishmen in New South Wales 1800–4. In T. Bartlett, D. Dickson, D. Keogh, & K. Whelan (Eds.), *1798: A Bicentenary Perspective*. Dublin: Four Courts Press, pp. 607–19.
- O'Farrell, P. (1987) *The Irish in Australia*. Sydney: New South Wales University Press.
- Moore, A. (1998) An "Indelible Hibernian Mark"? Irish Rebels and Australian Labour Radicalism: An Historiographical Overview. *Labour History* 75: 1–8.
- Moore, A. (2004) Phil Cunningham: A Forgotten Irish-Australian Rebel. *The Hummer*. Available at www.asslh.com/sydney/hummer/vol4no2/cunning.htm.
- Silver, L. R. (1983) *The Battle of Vinegar Hill*. Sydney: Watermark Press.
- Whitaker, A. (1994) *Unfinished Revolution*. Sydney: Crossing Press.

Vo Nguyen Giap (b. 1911)

Justin Corfield

Vo Nguyen Giap is considered among the greatest generals of the twentieth century for his involvement in the Vietnamese communist planning of the war against the French, the defeat of the United States, and the invasion of Cambodia that overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime of Pol Pot.

Vo Nguyen Giap was born into a peasant family on August 25, 1911 in the central Vietnamese village of An Xa in Quang Binh province. He had sufficient scholarly connections to attend the Quoc Hoc (National Academy) in Hue, the imperial capital in central Vietnam, where he came into contact with leading opponents of the reimposition of French colonial rule. As a teenager he joined the Tan Viet (New Vietnamese Revolutionary Party) and took part in demonstrations against the French after the death in 1926 of Phan Chu Trinh, a Vietnamese patriot jailed and then exiled to France before being allowed to return to Saigon in 1925. Giap was expelled from the school for participating in the protests.

In 1930 Giap joined the newly created Indochina Communist Party. He was arrested later that year and held in captivity for two years. On his release Giap went to study law at the University of Hanoi. He taught history at the Thang Long School, where he met and married Nguyen Thi Minh Giang, the daughter of Dang Thai Mai, a progressive intellectual, and the sister of Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, the wife of Hồ Chi Minh. By this time Giap had read, and was heavily influenced by, books by Napoleon Bonaparte and the Chinese military theoretician Sun Tzu.

When the Popular Front government came to power in France and conditions changed in Vietnam, Giap was allowed to become a journalist in Hue, founding the paper *Le Travail*, a French-language journal, and co-authoring a pamphlet, *The Peasant Question*, with Truong Chinh, a leading communist intellectual. Active in the Viet Minh armed resistance, Giap served under Hồ Chi Minh during World War II and became a commander of the Armed Propaganda Brigade, the precursor of the Vietnamese Liberation Army.

His influence gradually led to his rise to become a member of the Communist Party Politburo and the highest-ranking general in the People's Army of Vietnam.

As an advocate of the Maoist policy of "People's War," Giap led the Vietnamese communists in the First Indochina War. He was a leader in the campaign against the French, culminating in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. At that battle Giap was aided by Chinese advisors and followed their plan for a massive artillery barrage to start the attack on the French base, thought to be impregnable. The Vietnamese communists then launched "human wave" attacks resulting in horrendous casualties. While the Chinese advised continued attacks to wear down the French quickly – before the US became involved – Giap decided to conserve his strength, which involved digging trenches around the French lines and gradually tightening the noose. These actions led to the French defeat before the start of the Geneva Conference on Vietnam, and as a result Giap was hailed a military genius. Later interviewed about the battle, he said: "in war there is only one goal, and that is to win."

With the establishment of North Vietnam, Giap was appointed minister of defense, a position he held until 1975, becoming the prime architect of the "armed conflict" by which the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese communists combined to defeat the United States and South Vietnamese forces, forcing their withdrawal from South Vietnam. As at Dien Bien Phu, Giap believed he had time on his side. As such, he tried to wear down the United States, gradually increasing the number of attacks on the South Vietnamese and the United States forces until the rising number of US casualties spurred an anti-war movement back home. To achieve maximum publicity, with the North Vietnamese army devastated by the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley in January 1968, Giap masterminded the Tet Offensive as the US presidential election began. Although the Tet Offensive was considered a disaster as a military campaign, the insurrection turned public sentiment in the US firmly against the war, leading Richard Nixon, after his election in 1968, to extricate US forces from Vietnam. At the time of the Easter Offensive in 1972, Giap appeared on the front of *Time* magazine.

Giap remained leader of the communist war effort, which ended in the final defeat of South

Vietnam in 1975. Although Giap was officially sidelined soon afterwards, he continued to consult on military matters, particularly the invasion of Pol Pot's Cambodia from late December 1978, culminating a fortnight later in the capture of Phnom Penh on January 6, 1979 and the occupation of 90 percent of the country days after. The ousting of Pol Pot was one of the fastest campaigns in the region in modern times. However, Giap's influence waned, and in 1982 he was dropped from the Politburo and placed in charge of the promotion of science and technology. He lives in retirement in Hanoi, granting occasional interviews to the press, including meeting with the former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1995. Giap wrote a number of books about his military ideas. He is hailed as one of the great military geniuses, while remaining despised and feared by opposing forces who were soundly defeated in armed engagements.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Vietnam War Movement, United States; Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh) (1890–1969); Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Vietnam, Anti-Colonial, Nationalist, and Communist Movements, 1900–1939; Vietnam, First Indochina War, 1945–1954; Vietnam, Protest and Second Indochina War, 1960–1974

References and Suggested Readings

- Macdonald, P. G. (1993) *Giap: The Victor in Vietnam*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- O'Neill, R. J. (1969) *General Giap: Politician and Strategist*. Melbourne: Cassell Australia.
- Simpson, H. R. (1994) *Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot*. Washington, DC: Brassey's.
- Vo Nguyen Giap & Van Tien Dung (1976) *How We Won the War*. Philadelphia: RECON.

Voltaire (1694–1778)

R. O'Brian Carter

Voltaire was the penname of François Marie Arouet. As a writer and philosopher, he was one of the prime movers of the Enlightenment, the revolutionary intellectual movement that exalted reason (as the alternative to religious faith) and progress, and shaped the modern world by promoting the values of human rights, religious toleration, and democracy. Voltaire's primary weapon was his wickedly satirical pen, which he used to advocate social reform, defend civil

liberties, and criticize French institutions and the Catholic Church. His voluminous work includes poems, plays, fiction, history, philosophical dialogues, scientific treatises, encyclopedia entries, tracts, pamphlets, and volumes of letters.

Born in Paris to a well-off middle-class family on November 21, 1694, Voltaire harbored resentment toward the French nobility, which refused to accept him as an equal despite his supreme intellectual and artistic achievements. The young man's sensitivity to arbitrary injustice was sharpened when some satirical verses he wrote in 1716 landed him in the Bastille for almost a year. In 1726 when a nobleman, the Chevalier de Rohan, mocked Voltaire's origins, he published an acerbic and witty reply that earned him a beating at the hands of men in the Chevalier's employ. Voltaire's appeals to aristocratic circles for justice backfired. Nonetheless, his antipathy toward the nobility did not mean that he would not have liked to have joined their ranks. He added the aristocratic particle "de" to his chosen pseudonym, signing himself "Arouet de Voltaire" in the early stages of his career, and he spent his final years living in an aristocratic manner at his Ferney estate, where he promoted local industry in the manner of the ideal enlightened nobleman.

French conservatives have long tried to pin the "blame" for the French Revolution on Voltaire, asserting that it was he who started the ideological ball rolling in the revolutionary direction. Voltaire, however, was not a proponent of democracy, nor was he one to foment or even endorse revolt driven by social inequality. When on rare occasions he mentioned "the people" in his writings, his concerns were with the upper tiers of the bourgeoisie, and the educated elite in particular. Protests against social inequality were left to his literary rival, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whom Voltaire derided for having once served, it seems, as a valet. Voltaire, himself a successful entrepreneur, for the most part supported the social status quo and never strayed from his endorsement of "enlightened monarchy" as the best form of government.

Nonetheless, his long ideological struggle against aristocratic privilege was neither hypocritical nor insincere. His fervent advocacy of reason and religious toleration and his powerful condemnations of bigotry and arbitrary injustice were profoundly revolutionary for the period in which he lived, an age when the strictures of royal censorship were acute. For that reason, a

large portion of his work was published anonymously and clandestinely, and he was compelled to spend significant periods in voluntary exile, in England (1726–9), Prussia (1750–2), and Geneva (1754–8). The Ferney estate where he lived for the last two decades of his life was situated on the French border with Switzerland, in case a quick escape should prove necessary.

Although frequently condemned by religious-minded contemporaries as an agnostic or even an atheist, Voltaire was in fact a Deist in his religious outlook. In accordance with the precepts of what he saw as "natural religion," he acknowledged a higher and ultimately unknowable intelligence as God, but refused to go beyond saying that this intelligence created and ordered the universe as a divine "clockmaker." This view ruled out divine revelations and providence, making prayer superfluous, and dismissed the pomp, ceremony, and rituals of the Catholic Church as mere "superstition." Voltaire's critique of organized religion put him at odds with the Catholic hierarchy, which he regarded as socially parasitic.

Voltaire's early period of self-imposed exile in London, from 1726 to 1729, was an important formative phase of his financial and intellectual life. Successful investments increased his personal fortune, and he made the acquaintance of Jonathan Swift and Alexander Pope. He gathered materials for his first important work in prose, the *Philosophical Letters*, also known as *Letters Concerning the English Nation*, which was published in 1734. This work displayed Voltaire's admiration of English commercial prowess and constitutional monarchy, and helped to further French knowledge of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and above all, Isaac Newton.

Too audacious despite their apparent moderation, Voltaire's *Letters* warranted another exile from Paris. In 1734 he took up residence in a château at Cirey, owned by Emilie, the Marquise du Châtelet, in the Lorraine countryside, and they formed a close relationship. The marquise was herself a scientist and mathematician. She translated Newton's *Principia* into French, encouraged Voltaire's own attempts at scientific experimentation, and influenced him to write *Elements of the Philosophy of Newton*, which popularized the Englishman's scientific universe on the continent. While at Cirey, Voltaire also took up correspondence with the Prussian crown prince, the future Frederick II, in whom he found a potentially "enlightened monarch."

The death of the Marquise de Châtelet in 1749 sent Voltaire reeling emotionally. At the behest of Frederick II, he accepted a post at his court in 1750. Petty grievances with fellow French émigrés at the Prussian court, and disagreements with the king himself, prompted Voltaire's departure two years later.

In addition to his polemical writing, Voltaire also functioned as a campaigning activist to further his views. His most notable success in this regard was his intervention in the notorious Calas Affair of 1762. The court of Toulouse had condemned a Huguenot, Jean Calas, to be tortured to death for the murder of his son, ostensibly because the father could not tolerate his son's Catholicism. The sentence was carried out despite evidence that the son had committed suicide, and friends of the family convinced Voltaire that it was a horrible miscarriage of justice caused by Catholic bigotry against Huguenots. Voltaire used his fame to make it into a *cause célèbre* that had an overwhelming impact on public opinion throughout Europe. Eventually the judgment against Calas was reversed, his name was cleared posthumously, and the government was ordered to pay the family an indemnity. The case secured Voltaire's reputation as a crusader against injustice in the legal system and religious intolerance.

Voltaire resided at Ferney until March 1778, when he was invited to Paris for one last triumphal tour. His great celebrity made him the object of adulation, which he no doubt enjoyed, but it was physically fatiguing and the ordeal hastened his death on May 30, 1778, at the age of 84.

Voltaire's prodigious output included works of history (*The Century of Louis XIV*, *The History of Charles XII*, and *New Thoughts on History*), philosophy of science (*Elements of Newton's Philosophy*, *Philosophical Dialogues*, and the *Philosophical Dictionary*), and critiques of religion (*Poem on Natural Religion*, *Treatise on Tolerance*, and *The Cry of Innocent Blood*). His plays have not withstood the passage of time as well as his other writings, but those of his works that are most similar in character to modern fiction are perhaps his most accessible, and they encompass, in varying degrees, the themes central to his thought: *Zadig, or Destiny*, and *Candide, or Optimism*. He also contributed a dozen or so articles to the central literary project of the Enlightenment, the *Encyclopédie* overseen by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d'Alembert. Also of note are Voltaire's posthumous *Memoirs* and his voluminous epistolary, regarded as a literary genre in its own right in the eighteenth century.

SEE ALSO: Diderot, Denis (1713–1784); Enlightenment, France, 18th Century; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1712–1778)

References and Suggested Readings

- Carlson, M. (1998) *Voltaire and the Theater of the Eighteenth Century*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Davidson, I. (2005) *Voltaire in Exile*. New York: Grove.
- Parker, D. (2005) *Voltaire: The Universal Man*. New York: Sutton.
- Pearson, R. (2005) *Voltaire Almighty: A Life in Pursuit of Freedom*. New York: Bloomsbury.
- Schui, F. (2006) *Early Debates about Industry: Voltaire and His Contemporaries*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Voltaire (1977) *The Portable Voltaire*. Ed. B. R. Redman. New York: Penguin.
- Voltaire (1994) *Political Writings*. Ed. D. Williams. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Voltaire (2000) *Treatise on Tolerance*. Ed. S. Harvey. Trans. B. Masters. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Voltaire (2001) *Candide, Zadig, and Selected Stories*. New York: Signet Classics.

W

Walentynowicz, Anna (b. 1929)

Edyta V. Materka

Anna Walentynowicz is widely understood to be the catalyst for the Gdańsk shipyard strikes and was the face of the anti-communist propaganda posters of the *Solidarność* (Solidarity) movement in the 1980s. A member of the free trade unions of Gdańsk, Walentynowicz was fired in August 1980 from her job as a crane operator at the Lenin shipyards in Gdańsk (preceding Lech Walesa, who worked in the same shipyard) for distributing the journal *Robotnik Wybrzeża* (Coastal Worker). She was editor of the illegal newspaper, which advocated workers' rights to unionize and a 1,000-złoty pay raise. Walentynowicz and Walesa organized labor union strikes demanding their reinstatement and a 2,000-złoty pay raise in the Lenin shipyards. Once the government allowed Walentynowicz to return to work, she became one of only two female members of the Interfactory Strike Committee Presidium and one of the signatories of the Gdańsk Agreements of August 1981 that legalized the Solidarity trade union.

As the Solidarity movement gained momentum, Walentynowicz's prominence waned when her local chapter elected a male delegate to the National Solidarity Congress in Gdańsk in the fall of 1981. The new local, regional, and national boards systemically excluded women who were involved in the Solidarity movement. Nevertheless, Walentynowicz's activism, in conjunction with the many shipyard strikes that led to the formation of the Solidarity movement, helped overthrow the Polish Communist Party (PZPR) in Poland in 1989.

In post-1989 Poland, while Lech Walesa (by then a Nobel Peace Prize winner) became the president of Poland, Anna Walentynowicz felt

excluded because of her status as a woman. She criticized Walesa's policies and withdrew from political life.

SEE ALSO: *Solidarność* (Solidarity); Walesa, Lech (b. 1943); Women in the Solidarity Movement, Polish Underground

References and Suggested Readings

- Jancar, B. (1985) Women in the Opposition in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the 1970s. In S. Wolnik & A. Meyer (Eds.), *Women, State and Party in Eastern Europe*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Long, K. (1996) *We All Fought for Freedom: Women in Poland's Solidarity Movement*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Penn, S. (2005) *Solidarity's Secret: The Women Who Defeated Communism in Poland*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Wales, nationalist protest, 19th century

Mark J. Crowley

Popular protest had become a distinctive feature of Welsh politics and society by the nineteenth century. Although trade unionism had not at that time developed substantially, the tradition dates from the eighteenth century, when unions were commonly known as "associations" and were predominantly rural. A rudimentary form of unionism was clearly manifested in the late eighteenth century in a rebellion of Swansea dockyard workers against their tyrannical employers. The unionization of Flintshire coal miners in 1830 placed radicalism solidly on the Welsh agenda, and it would gather strength from that point forward.

The inception of the Welsh trade union movement dates from agitation in western Wales in 1811. Its development in that period was affected by two important factors. First, communications

between groups of workers were limited by the complexities of Welsh geography, with its mountainous terrain and large distances between towns and villages, coupled with a poor transportation infrastructure. This increased the likelihood that issues would differ from place to place. In the tinplate industry, for example, the workers' pay was the predominant issue, whereas in the coal industry the main concerns were reducing working hours (frequently as much as 16 hours per day) and improving the safety of workers underground.

The second factor was that many of the workers in the mechanical and manufacturing industries during this period were categorized as "unskilled," and thereby denied the right to vote. The workers' lack of political rights caused them not to be taken seriously by the elites with whom they had to negotiate, and their trade unions were hampered by their relative lack of power to influence government policy with regard to workers' rights.

Skilled workers did have some influence when their trade unions took action in defense of their rights, but because they were considerably fewer in number than those in the unskilled category, their protests' effectiveness was limited in the early era. They faced stiff opposition from factory owners, as well as from religious leaders who preached that trade unionism and strikes were inherently anti-religious. The religiosity of Welsh workers in this period prevented many from joining unions, but a shadowy group called Scotch Cattle rebelled against the preachers' attempts to dissuade them.

Scotch Cattle

Solid evidence is lacking as to exactly what and who the Scotch Cattle really were. The group formed in response to industrial disputes in the tinplate and coalmining industries in the period from 1810 to 1815. It operated as a secret society and behaved in a disciplined manner; historians have often portrayed it as a terroristic group. It first appeared in the north and western areas of Sir Howi, Rhymney, and Monmouthshire valleys, and spread westward to the semi-isolated valleys of the Ebbw Fach and Ebbw Fawr, where the iron extraction industry predominated.

The Scotch Cattle were predominantly Welsh speaking, and evidence relating to their activities can only be gleaned from contemporary court proceedings. They were mostly young men who

worked as ironworkers or colliers. After about 1815 they were joined by less respectable colleagues, including local criminals and murderers, who apparently played an ever-growing role in the movement until its unexplained demise around 1850.

The movement was greatly involved in propagandistic activities, including what later generations might describe as "propaganda of the deed." It is unclear how many people actually adhered to this group, yet evidence suggests that the number was at least in the hundreds and perhaps in the thousands. The origin of the movement's name is also unknown, although historians have offered various hypotheses. It probably derives from the fact that participants blackened their faces and wore animal skins to avoid being recognized while carrying out their actions, not unlike the way the Rebecca rioters disguised themselves later in the nineteenth century.

Scotch Cattle arose in response to the oppressive nature of employment policies that affected all workers, but especially the coal and iron miners. Their jobs were highly insecure, and continual fear of losing their livelihood provoked widespread unrest. Rising food costs due to the Corn Laws, constant threats of wage cuts, frequent delays in wage payments, and a trend toward absentee bosses all contributed to the volatility of the social situation. The workers also resented being drawn into debt by the price-gouging "truck shops" (company stores) owned and operated by their bosses. A portion of the workers' wages was paid in food tokens, redeemable only in those truck shops.

Scotch Cattle targeted many people in their protests, including factory owners, strikebreakers, independent contractors who performed jobs for less than the going rate, "unspoken masters" (i.e., those who refused to support the workers' cause), "master miners" (who worked underground but held managerial positions), bailiffs, turnpike keepers (who collected tolls from farmers along the rural roads of Wales), and exploitative shopkeepers. The movement's tactics were designed to intimidate these people, and ultimately to ensure that injustices would be punished.

What Was the Purpose of Scotch Cattle?

Scotch Cattle tried to restrict the number of people in mines by imposing what would later

be called a “closed shop” on the mine owners. They also attempted to keep demand for their labor high by restricting mine output. They enforced unwritten rules prohibiting any worker from filling his coal cart higher or more quickly than others at the same workplace. The aim was to prevent large inequalities in pay that would tend to exacerbate disunity among the workers. The ultimate objective was to create a unified movement that could stand up for the workers’ interests. Workers’ solidarity, especially in the coal mines, was enhanced by the fact that the workforce was predominantly Welsh speaking and the owners were predominantly monoglot English speakers.

Pressure was exerted through collective action and the threat of the “midnight visit.” Those who declared their opposition to the movement or who opposed granting more rights to workers faced violent retribution, such as having their houses smashed up. The circumstances of the time were such that the bosses were often forced to negotiate with the Scotch Cattle leaders.

Scotch Cattle meetings were announced by notices placed at workplaces, railway sidings, and other prominent locations. The posters’ blood-curdling warnings against non-attendance were usually sufficient to ensure a large turnout. Modern observers would find the meetings to be highly dramatic affairs. They took place on hillsides in the dead of night, sometimes attended by thousands, to the accompaniment of banging drums and guns firing. Participants wore face paint and wild-animal costumes to frighten any who might happen upon them, and carried the *Croes Penmaen* (Penmaen Cross), which became the symbol of the movement.

The movement managed to unite workers from many of the Welsh valleys. In 1834, hundreds of Scotch Cattle followers marched through a village, smashing it to pieces. They were sufficiently well disciplined to leave no clues behind as to who had inflicted the damage, so that Scotch Cattle could not officially be charged with a crime. The movement’s members swore an oath of silence to their leaders, and refused to cooperate with authorities.

In 1835, however, the leader of Scotch Cattle, Edward Morgan, was hanged for the murder of a man named John Thomas who had received a Scotch Cattle nocturnal visit, and this signaled the beginning of the movement’s demise. The authorities regained control and from that point

onward, Scotch Cattle was a minority movement and its effectiveness declined. To the movement’s loyal partisans, however, Edward Morgan remained a heroic martyr.

The Merthyr Riots, 1831

The Merthyr riots were a further manifestation of widespread unrest in Wales during the early decades of the nineteenth century. They were not, however, attributable to an organization, but were a response to an incident that occurred in Merthyr in 1831. The roots of the disturbance date from the seventeenth century, when agitators from London conducted spirited campaigns for political change. Social class awareness then became a prominent part of Welsh politics and society, and by the latter half of the nineteenth century a distinct Welsh nationalism had developed. The Merthyr rising grew out of a disturbance in the town that led to a general strike. A militia from Brecon established itself there, putting the town effectively under military occupation.

Many changes had been occurring within Welsh industry and society. First, following a significant economic boom, the iron industry faced a slump resulting from reduced foreign demand. Second, the oppressive ways in which regulations were applied meant that if people fell into debt due to harsh economic conditions, the authorities could seize parts of their property. Third, industrial disputes in Merthyr during this period had profoundly influenced the psyche of the workers, who were becoming more politically aware and politically discontented. Furthermore, the reform of the parliamentary franchise had at last given ordinary working people a means of wielding political influence so they could campaign for improved legal and political rights.

Some historians have maintained that the trial and execution of one of the primary Merthyr leaders, Dic Penderyn, who had been arrested for killing a police officer, sparked the rise of a distinct working-class consciousness that spread across Wales. At the same time, the development of the radical press, with newspapers such as *The Worker*, gave the working classes a medium through which they could express their political views. The effectiveness of the working-class press, however, was limited by the 1832 Reform Act, which restricted the output of radical

publications. Although Merthyr's first working-class parliamentary campaign was unsuccessful, the Merthyr rioters' demands for "bread" and "reform" were not inconsequential; the way had been paved for the development of the Chartist movement in Wales.

The Rebecca Riots, 1834

The Rebecca riots were a response to an agricultural economic depression that severely affected the Welsh farming community. A memorable feature of these disturbances was the presence of men concealing their identities by dressing in women's clothing as they waged terror throughout Wales. The protesters' main target was the tollgates placed by English landowners along the rural roads that farmers had to use to take their produce to the local market. In addition to the rents they were paying, the farmers were also forced to pay tolls to the landowners for the transportation of their goods, an imposition that was deeply resented.

Angry protesters, who took inspiration from the biblical story of Rebecca's fight against injustice, did not abstain from violence. The typical pattern involved a primary instigator calling himself "Rebecca's mother" leading a riotous assault, removing gates from their hinges, and destroying the tollbooths. The violence of these protests struck at the heart of the communities where they occurred, and its impact was profound, because it seemed at odds with the religious pacifism that was predominant in Wales during the period. Religion, however, was itself a primary source of conflict between Welsh tenant farmers and English landowners. The Englishmen belonged to the Anglican Church and the Welsh farmers, who did not, were nonetheless required by law to pay 10 percent of their income to support that church. Not surprisingly, the compulsory tithes were often resisted.

In one controversial incident, an elderly tollgate keeper named Sarah Davies was killed during an attack on the tollgate in Efailwen. The 73-year-old woman had been perceived by the Rebeccas as an instrument of their oppression, but many in the community, especially Welsh religious leaders, felt the protesters had unjustly murdered an innocent employee of the landowners. Nevertheless, widespread sympathy for the Rebeccas was sufficient to shield them from the expected legal consequences of their

actions, which might have included death sentences. A court inquiry on Davies's death ruled that she had died of lead poisoning!

The Rebecca riots alerted the British government to the problems of the Welsh agricultural community. In response, some measures were taken to address the grievances and quell the revolutionary impulses of the Welsh people, but they were only partially successful. Protests continued, and very little time separated the end of the Rebecca movement and the rise of the Chartists.

The Chartists

The Chartist movement was not a Welsh phenomenon *per se*; it was a working-class political movement that spread throughout England, Scotland, and Wales. It was organized around six particular demands for reform that were to be presented as a petition – the Charter – to the British parliament. The reforms aimed at providing genuine political representation for working people in the expectation that as the majority they would achieve political power, thus enabling them to materially improve their lives.

Chartism developed enormous support in Wales. Hugh Williams, a supporter of the movement with connections in London, established the first Chartist branch in Wales. Chartist associations in Merthyr, Monmouthshire, Aberdare, and Glamorganshire soon emerged. The organization proved able to rally support on a number of fronts, including against the Poor Law and the system of parish relief. The New Poor Law Act of 1834 instituted workhouses, a harsh system abhorred by many. Chartism also once again took up the fight against the tollgates that had been the focus of the earlier Rebecca movement.

Chartism was particularly strong in mid-Wales, where, when parliament rejected the Chartist petitions, major protests occurred in places such as Newtown and Llanidloes. The most significant action was the Newport rising of 1839, the nature of which has been debated by historians, but which apparently was an insurrectionary attempt to overthrow the local government. The uprising was militarily suppressed by the authorities, but it made a powerful impression. Chartism in Wales, as in the rest of England, has been recognized as a highly significant chapter in the history of the development of working-class political movements.

Nonconformity and the Influence of Religion

“Nonconformity” was the generic name for religious groups, including Methodists, Baptists, and Independents, that stood outside the Anglican Church. Even though the nonconformist movement had different strands, all with antipathy toward one another, its characteristic feature was the impressive ability of the movement as a whole to present a powerful united front when under attack.

The nonconformist chapels were perceived as social institutions as well as places of worship. The chapels were important in how they shaped their members’ lives – socially, politically, culturally, and even linguistically. Influential nonconformist religious leaders organized local meetings and political associations, and worked to develop their congregants’ social consciousness. Despite the 1851 Census’s report that more than 50 percent of the population did not attend any form of worship, it is nonetheless undeniable that nonconformist religion played a significant part in the formation of the Welsh identity.

The 1851 Census must be interpreted with caution due to its flawed methodology, but its evidence that nonconformists held a 20 percent majority over Anglicans cannot be ignored. Because the Anglican Church, or Church of England, was the established church with official preference giving it immense advantages over the others, the political focus of Welsh nonconformists was to “disestablish” the established church, thus separating themselves from the Church of England.

Linguistic disputes increased as a rise in the number of immigrants to Wales sparked debate within the chapels over whether to offer services in English to accommodate the newcomers. The difference between being English and being Welsh came to the fore, and the nonconformists’ grievances and the attack on the established church became the central issue of the day. This was primarily manifested in attacks on the tithes laws, which nonconformists blamed for preventing them from developing a Welsh economic identity.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Corn Law Agitation, Britain, 19th Century; Chartists; Newport Rising, Wales, 1839; Poor Law, Britain, 1834; Reform Acts, Britain and Ireland, 1832

References and Suggested Readings

- Davies, D. W. (2004) *Hugh Williams: The Man Who Was Rebecca?* Machynlleth: Machynlleth and District Civic Society.
- Davies, J. (1993) *A History of Wales*. London: Penguin.
- Evans, D. G. (1989) *A History of Wales, 1815–1906*. Cardiff: University of Wales.
- Jenkins, P. (1992) *A History of Modern Wales, 1536–1990*. London: Longman.
- Jones, I. G. (1981) *Explorations and Explanations: Essays in the Social History of Victorian Wales*. Llandysil: Gwasg Gomer.
- Jones, R. T. (2000a) The Church and the Welsh Language in the Nineteenth Century. In G. H. Jenkins (Ed.), *The Welsh Language and its Social Domains*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
- Jones, R. T. (2000b) Nonconformity and the Welsh Language in Nineteenth-Century Wales. In G. H. Jenkins (Ed.), *The Welsh Language and its Social Domains*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
- Smith, D. (1990) Focal Heroes: A Welsh Fighting Class. In R. Holt (Ed.), *Sport and the Working Class in Modern Britain*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Williams, D. (1986) *The Rebecca Riots: A Study in Agrarian Dissent*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
- Williams, S. R. (1991) The True Cymraes: Images of Women in Women’s Nineteenth-Century Welsh Periodicals. In A. V. John (Ed.), *Our Mothers’ Land: Chapters in Welsh Women’s History*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Walesa, Lech (b. 1943)

Amy Linch

Lech Walesa (Wałęsa) was co-founder and leader of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” (Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy “Solidarność”) through its decade of struggle against the communist regime in Poland. As the face and voice of Solidarity, Walesa is arguably the most significant figure in the revolution that precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1989 he chaired the opposition delegation to the Round Table negotiations with the communist government that ended the communist monopoly over political and social life in Poland. In December 1990 he became the first freely elected president of Poland’s Third Republic.

Born in the small village of Popowo, Poland to peasant farmers during the Nazi occupation, Walesa’s early life was marked by the reconstruction of Poland under the dominance of the

Soviet Union. His father, a carpenter, died in 1946 from exposure and abuse he suffered under the Nazis and Walesa was raised by his mother and paternal uncle. He attended a parish primary school and trained to be an electrician at the state vocational school in Lipno. After graduating he worked as a car mechanic until 1965 and subsequently served two years in the army, rising to the rank of corporal. In 1967 he was employed as an electrician in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk.

Walesa was a member of the strike committee in his shipyard during the 1970 workers' protests against the dramatic increase in food costs. He was a member of the delegation that met with the authorities in Warsaw, and was later elected an officer in the union. During the strikes he addressed a crowd of demonstrators from the police headquarters in Gdańsk while they took over the building and tried to set it on fire (Zuzowski 1992: 48). He was detained briefly for his participation in the strikes. Over the next several years he was the target of police surveillance and occasional questioning for his continued agitation for better working conditions. Walesa was fired from his job in 1976 for organizing shipyard workers in strikes against a new round of price increases. With the support of the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR) and the Catholic Church, Walesa and other activists begin to organize and participate in protest activity on the Baltic coast. As he became increasingly involved in dissident activities initiated by KOR between 1976 and 1980, he suffered state surveillance and periodic detention. He was invited to join the Coastal Free Trade Union by Bogdan Borusewicz in April 1978 (Zuzowski 1992: 101) and in 1979 he was a signatory of the Workers' Rights Charter – the first comprehensive document of workers' rights to be published by an independent group in any of the purported “workers' republics” (Kubik 1994: 162).

In July 1980 price increases again sparked a wave of worker protests that paralyzed the Baltic coast and quickly spread throughout Poland. Within a month workers had occupied the Lenin shipyard in Gdańsk. Walesa scaled the walls to join his former co-workers and was declared the leader of the strike. The workers demanded reinstatement of Walesa and Anna Walentynowicz, who had been fired ten days earlier for participating in the illegal trade union. Recognizing the need to overwhelm the capacity

of the government to maintain control through force, Walesa chaired the Interfactory Strike Committee, which linked the workers from the Lenin shipyard to strikes in 20 other facilities on the Baltic coast and in the coalmining center of Silesia. On the behalf of over 500,000 workers the committee issued 20 political and economic demands, including the right to strike and legalization of the independent trade union, Solidarity.

Within two weeks the government capitulated to the workers' demands. On August 31 Walesa and Poland's first deputy premier Mieczyslaw Jagielski signed the Gdansk Agreement, which recognized workers' right to organize. In September the Interfactory Strike Committee officially became a national federation of unions, renamed *Solidarność* (Solidarity). Elected chair of the new organization, Walesa represented a constituency of nearly ten million – a quarter of the Polish population.

Over the next 15 months Walesa traveled to Japan, Italy, Sweden, France, and Switzerland as a guest of the International Labor Organization (ILO). He was received at the Vatican by Pope John Paul II, who assured Walesa and the Polish people that after his visit two years earlier, “during your difficulties I have been with you in a special way, above all through prayer.” Walesa traveled around Poland persuading workers to support his moderate approach to reform, recommending cooperation with the government and cautioning against action that would provoke the Soviet Union. He was advised by a team of dissident activists and intellectuals, who availed him of expert political and economic analysis of the problems endemic to state socialism. The power of Walesa's leadership lay with his ability to translate this advice into simple direct terms. He was a savvy politician with an excellent crowd sense and a charismatic speaking style. He wove an image of himself as the embodiment of an expansive Polish identity through the use of coarse Polish, while wielding elements of Polish patriotism and religious culture to challenge the authority of the Communist Party.

Walesa's approach to reform came under criticism on several occasions during the fall of 1981. He was opposed in the union elections by three candidates who criticized him for being highhanded in his decision-making, and overly conciliatory with respect to the government. His participation in tripartite talks with the church and the Communist Party and efforts to tame

the wildcat strikes occurring around the country were challenged by some factions within the movement, who favored a more confrontational strategy. Meanwhile, in a shocking demonstration of the deteriorating power of the Communist Party, the Sejm refused to pass a bill restricting the right to strike. The recently declared head of the party, General Jaruzelski, prepared to impose martial law to regain control of the country. He used force to break up demonstrations and began an attack campaign against Walesa. In early December, against Walesa's counsel, more radical members of the union proposed a referendum on the continued existence of communism and Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union, giving Jaruzelski the pretext he needed to cease tolerating Solidarity.

Jaruzelski declared martial law, curtailed civil liberties, outlawed Solidarity, and arrested thousands of activists. Walesa was taken from his apartment by the police in the middle of the night and detained for nearly a year. He was released in November 1982 and reinstated at the Gdańsk shipyard but kept under close government surveillance. As Solidarity's unity was strained under conflicting opinions about how to best resist government repression, Walesa remained the central figure in the movement. His receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983 emboldened the movement as it struggled to survive underground.

In 1988 over three months of coordinated action by workers in transport, coal, steel, and the shipyards compelled the government to negotiate with Solidarity. Walesa called an end to the strikes and organized a committee, including many prominent artists, intellectuals, and dissident leaders, to prepare for official talks with the government. Walesa chaired the Solidarity delegation and traveled around the country giving speeches and meeting with government representatives to generate support for the negotiations. The Polish Round Table, as the 59 days of talks begun in February 1989 came to be known, dramatically changed the course of Polish politics and ultimately precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union. Solidarity was relegalized, the Senate was reintroduced to parliament with limited veto powers over the Sejm, the presidency was instituted, and Solidarity was allowed to run candidates in free elections.

Solidarity won all of the lower house seats it was allowed to contest in June 1989, and 99 of the 100 seats in the newly created Senate. Walesa

refused to allow Solidarity to be a minority partner in a governing coalition, and Solidarity took control of the government. The following year Walesa became president of Poland with 77.5 percent of the vote in the second round of the first direct presidential election in the country's history. Motivated by the conviction that democracy required competition, he declared a "war at the top" of Solidarity against his own former advisors. While many of his critics have argued that introducing real political competition too early frustrated the growth of democratic institutions in Poland, Walesa feared that the cooperative approach to running the country during the transition from communism could easily devolve into autocracy. He thought Solidarity needed to foster competition from within as the former communist leaders retreated to ensure the development of a robust democracy. He served as president until 1995 when he was narrowly defeated in a bid for reelection by former communist Aleksander Kwasniewski.

In 1995 Walesa formed the Lech Walesa Institute to consolidate democracy and a free market economy in Poland and promote European integration. He continued to actively participate in Polish politics after leaving office, running for president again in 2000. Throughout his political career Walesa has been haunted by accusations that he collaborated with the secret police in the early 1970s. He was exonerated by a 2000 court decision but such allegations continued to plague him nearly a decade later. In 2008 two historians associated with the Institute of National Memory published a book claiming that Walesa did collaborate with the secret police during the early 1970s. He vigorously denied the charge and the ensuing national debate strongly polarized both experts and the public. An August 2008 survey showed that the renewed allegations had no effect on Walesa's popularity; most people seemed to accept that even if he engaged in some talks with communist agents for a brief period in the 1970s, his position as a national hero was secure.

SEE ALSO: Kuroń, Jacek (1934–2004); Michnik, Adam (b. 1946); Poland, Committee for Workers (KOR); Poland, Trade Unions and Protest, 1988–1993; Poland, Student Movement, 1968; *Solidarność* (Solidarity); Soviet Union, Fall of; Walentyńowicz, Anna (b. 1929); Women in the Solidarity Movement, Polish Underground

References and Suggested Readings

- Craig, M. (1987) *Lech Walesa and His Poland*. New York: Continuum.
- Garton Ash, T. (2002) *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Krzysztof, J. (1997) Poland: Wałęsa's Legacy to the Presidency. In R. Taras (Ed.), *Post-Communist Presidents*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 13–167.
- Kubik, J. (1994) *The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Kurski, J. (1993) *Lech Walesa: Democrat or Dictator*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Walesa, L. (1987) *A Way of Hope*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Walesa, L. (1992) *The Struggle and the Triumph*. New York: Arcade.
- Zuzowski, R. (1992) *Political Dissent and Opposition in Poland*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Walker, David (1785–1830)

Beverly Tomek

David Walker is often cited as one of the first militants in the African American anti-slavery and civil rights struggle. Born in Wilmington, NC, to a free mother and an enslaved father, and thus free himself, he gained literacy and read extensively on the topics of resistance and revolution. After growing up witnessing the horrors of slavery first hand, including an incident in which a slave was forced to whip his mother until she died, he left the South and eventually settled in Boston, where he opened a used clothing store in the 1820s. While in Boston he made friends with a number of other black activists and became an agent and contributor for the country's first African American newspaper, the New York-based *Freedom's Journal*.

In 1829, Walker put four of his abolitionist articles together and published them as the pamphlet known as *Walker's Appeal*. This pamphlet caused an immediate stir because it appeared to call for slaves to revolt against their masters. Taken South by the sailors who bought clothes in Walker's store, it immediately frightened and enraged whites, who responded by passing laws forbidding black literacy and the distribution of abolitionist literature. Some states expelled free black settlers, and others offered monetary rewards for Walker's capture or death.

What was unique about Walker's pamphlet was that it was one of the first to grapple with the issue of violence in the struggle for freedom. On the surface, it called for slaves to rise up against their masters and fight for their freedom. Indeed, many historians have shown that this call influenced Nat Turner's decision to revolt. Importantly, however, *Walker's Appeal* was primarily an attempt to resist the American Colonization Society's efforts to repatriate blacks in Africa. He wanted to show that blacks had worked just as hard as whites, if not harder, to build the United States and thus should not be driven from their homes and country.

Though known for its militant rhetoric, Walker's pamphlet was equally a call for acceptance. Aware of the pro-slavery horror stories of blacks slaughtering babies, raping women, and murdering men during the Haitian Revolution, he called upon his black readers not to rise up and kill whites but to fight to earn white respect. He prevailed upon educated black men to lead the rest of the race out of degradation through the dissemination of education and religion and "prove to the Americans and the rest of the world, that we are MEN, and not brutes."

Near the end of his address, Walker introduced the argument that, regardless of how black men felt about violence toward whites, whites feared them. He argued that if black men would shed their "servile spirit" and "death-like apathy" they could stand up for themselves by asserting their manhood. He argued that vengeance belonged "to the Lord" and even offered hope that God would forgive the oppressors if they would repent and aid in black enlightenment. "Treat us like men," he concluded, "and there is no danger but we will all live in peace and happiness together."

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Haiti, Saint-Domingue Revolution, 1789–1804, Aftermath; Nat Turner Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Aptheker, H. (Ed.) (1965) *One Continual Cry: David Walker's Appeal, Its Setting and Its Meaning*. New York: Humanities Press.
- Bennett, L. (1968) *Pioneers in Protest*. Chicago: Johnson.
- Walker, D. (1829/1972) *Walker's Appeal, in Four Articles; Together with a Preamble, to the Coloured Citizens of the World, But in Particular, and Very Expressly, to Those of The United States of America, Written in Boston, State of Massachusetts, September 28, 1829*. In S. Stuckey (Ed.), *The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism*. Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 39–117.

Wang Ming (1904–1974)

Alexander V. Pantsov

Wang Ming, whose real name was Chen Shaoyu, was among the important early leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He was born on May 23, 1904 in the town of Jinzhai, Liuan (now Jinzhai) County, Anhui Province. In 1924 Wang graduated from Liuan Agricultural College and entered the preparatory department of Wuchang University of Commerce. In 1924 he joined the Chinese Socialist Youth League, and the following year both the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang (Nationalist Party). He worked in the Propaganda Department of the Hubei Provincial Guomindang Committee.

In the fall of 1925 Wang went to Moscow and on November 23 enrolled in Sun Yat-Sen University of Toilers of China (UTK). From February through April 1927 he accompanied UTK vice rector Pavel Mif to China as a member of the Soviet Communist Party propagandists' delegation. Beginning in May 1927 he worked in the Party's Central Committee (CCP CC) Propaganda Department, and served as an editor of the CCP CC magazine *Xiangdao* (Guide). He returned to Moscow in August 1927 and studied and worked at UTK as an instructor and translator through April 1929. On assignment from the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI), from January through July 1928 he participated in the preparations for convening the Sixth Congress of the CCP that was held at the Pervomaiskii collective farm near Moscow. He headed the translators' section of the congress secretariat. Between July and September 1928 he engaged in similar preparatory work in connection with the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern.

In February 1929 Wang returned to China and worked in the Shanghai Eastern Region CCP Committee. Starting in October 1929 he served as an editor of the CCP CC magazine *Hongqi* (Red Flag). In January 1931 at the Fourth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, under Comintern representative Pavel Mif's pressure on the party leadership, Wang was coopted onto the CC Politburo. He, Lu Futan, and Zhou Enlai formed a triumvirate to lead the party.

On September 25, 1931, along with Meng Qingshu, Lu Jingru, and Wu Kejian, Wang left Shanghai for the Soviet Union again, this time to head the CCP delegation to the ECCI. He

arrived in Moscow via Vladivostok on October 18, and from 1932 until the Comintern was dissolved in 1943 he served as a member of the ECCI and the ECCI Presidium. From November 1931 until August 1935 he was also a member of the ECCI Political Secretariat. In August–September 1932 he attended the Twelfth Plenum of the ECCI, delivered a report, and made a speech on the Chinese Revolution. At the Thirteenth Session of the Plenum he was elected its executive chairman. This marked the first time that a CCP representative chaired an ECCI meeting.

On December 29, 1933 Wang was elected a full member of the highest organ of the World Communist Movement, the Political Commission of the Political Secretariat of the ECCI. He served as a member of the commission until its devolvement at the Seventh Comintern Congress in July 1935. In early 1934 he was elected a delegate to the Seventeenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party with a consultative vote.

After that Wang participated in preparations for the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern, which adopted the tactics of the united anti-fascist front. In July–August 1935 he attended the Seventh World Congress as chairman of the CCP delegation with full voting rights and was elected to the 42-member Presidium of the Congress. On August 1 he presented the CCP's declaration of principles regarding the united front against Japan and against Chiang Kai-shek. On August 7 he made a report analyzing the revolutionary movement in colonial and semi-colonial countries and discussing the tactics of the communist parties. The congress elected him to membership on the ECCI. Following the congress he was reelected to membership on the ECCI Presidium and became an alternate member of its Political Secretariat. In addition to the Chinese question, he was put in charge of Latin American affairs. In September 1935 he attended the Sixth Congress of the Young Communist International and was elected to the Presidium of the Congress. In November–December 1936 he also attended the Eighth Extraordinary Soviet Congress, which accepted the so-called Stalin Constitution of the Soviet Union.

During his sojourn in the Soviet Union he cooperated closely with the NKVD, Stalin's secret police, in fabricating false charges against many Chinese communists, and was responsible for the arrest and execution of numerous members of the CCP and Communist Youth League

of China (CCYL). In November 1937, along with Kang Sheng, he returned to China. En route he stopped in Xinjiang and concocted a set of false charges against the leaders of the CCP CC Xinjiang organization. He accused them of being Trotskyists and persuaded the local militarist Shen Shicai to arrest them and hand them over to the Soviet authorities, who consequently executed them.

In 1937–8 Wang served as secretary of the CCP CC Changjiang (Yangzi) bureau. In 1938–9 he headed the CCP CC United Front Department. He was criticized during the intra-party “rectification” campaign of 1941–5 that served to strengthen Mao Zedong’s position within the CCP leadership. However, at the Seventh CCP Congress in April–June 1945 Wang was reelected, on Mao Zedong’s initiative, to membership in the Central Committee (a position he held until the Tenth Party Congress in April 1969). In 1945 Wang became head of the CCP CC Judicial Commission. After the Communist victory in 1949, he headed the Commission on Legislative Proposals of the Central People’s Government.

In January 1956 Wang went to the Soviet Union for medical treatment. He remained there for the rest of his life – a fortunate circumstance for him, because it allowed him to avoid persecution during the Cultural Revolution – and died in Moscow on March 27, 1974.

SEE ALSO: China, May 4th Movement; China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- Deng Liqun (Ed.) (1996) *Zhonggong dangshi renwu zhuan* (Biographies of the Chinese Communist Party History Activists), Vol. 58. Xian: Shanxi renmin chubanshe.
- Dangshi yanjiu ziliao* (1982) (Study Materials on Party History), Vol. 3. Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe.
- Meng Qingshu (n.d.) *Vospominaniya o Wang Ming* (Memories of Wang Ming). Manuscript in Russian. Moscow.
- Xiang Qing (1985) *Gongchan goji yu Zhongguo geming guanxi lunwenji* (Collection of Articles on the Relationship between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe.
- Zhou Guoquan et al. (1991) *Wang Ming nianpu* (A Chronicle Biography of Wang Ming). Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe.

War communism and the rise of the Soviet Union

David Mandel

Contrary to the analyses and predictions of all currents in Russian Marxism, the revolution in Russia survived without the support of victorious revolutions in the West. But it survived in a much distorted form compared to the original project and at a terrible cost that was borne first of all by the revolution’s main social support, the urban working class. How can one account for the victory of a revolutionary state that began its existence without any serious armed forces, with no experience in public administration, and which almost at once was confronted with the armed hostility of the propertied classes, who were supported by most of the intelligentsia, the old officer corps, as well as the most powerful capitalist states in the world?

Among the domestic factors that favored the Soviet regime, the most important was undoubtedly its working-class base. Workers provided the committed backbone of the mainly peasant Red Army and of the new Soviet state administration (which also retained much of the old state personnel). These workers brought with them qualities they had developed in the struggle against tsarism – political acuity and commitment, solidarity, self-sacrifice, initiative, discipline, and organizational talent. Even the disillusionment and wavering of the less committed strata of the working class were based more on hunger than on the attraction of the alternatives, and these workers were often brought around by good Soviet orators and an increased supply of food. In the end, they continued to identify with the Soviet regime.

Largely because of its working-class base, the Soviet state, even at the lowest point of its fortunes in the civil war, never lost control of Russia’s core territories, the provinces around Moscow, including St. Petersburg. This was where the bulk of the industry and the hub of railway communications were located. The government was thus able to equip the Red Army in spite of the economic blockade. Its central geographical base gave the army great mobility, allowing for the rapid transfer of limited shock troops from one front to the next. The White

armies, on the other hand, were scattered on four fronts in southern Russia, western Siberia, northern Russia, and the Baltic region and were never able to link up or seriously coordinate their operations. The central region continuously occupied by the Soviet regime was also Russia's most populous and so provided a much larger manpower pool than the Whites possessed, allowing the Soviet forces great numerical superiority. At the same, this territory was sufficiently large to allow the Soviet forces to retreat tactically without creating a serious threat to the state.

Another critical domestic factor was what might best be termed the "benevolent neutrality" of the mass of the peasantry. The peasants were not eager to fight on either side. They willingly fought really only when the front passed near their own region or when they were defending their local autonomy. However, they definitely did not desire the victory of the White armies, whose only program was the "restoration of order," meaning a return of the landlords and their terrible vengeance against the peasants. No more than the workers were the peasants attracted to the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary (SR) slogan of the constituent assembly, which in any case was not espoused by the White generals, who did not trust the people and made little effort to mobilize them on a political, rather than coerced, basis.

A serious peasant revolt that erupted in the spring of 1919 in the central Volga region proclaimed the slogan "Long live soviet power on the platform of the October Revolution." This was hardly a position the White generals or even the SRs could approve. Later that summer, as the White Army of General Denikin, who was counting on the peasant uprising for support, drew nearer to Moscow, the peasant insurrection simply died down of its own, and almost a million peasant deserters voluntarily returned to the Red Army. The peasants did not like the Bolshevik policies of requisitioning their produce and giving little or nothing in return (as there was nothing to give), or the policy of mobilizing their men, horses, and cattle for the Red Army. But they also knew that the Bolsheviks were the only political force capable of organizing the defeat of the Whites.

The most menacing and widespread peasant rebellion erupted only in the spring of 1920, when the White armies had already been defeated in

almost all of Russia proper. The only serious remaining threats came from the Polish invasion of Ukraine, which was soon beaten back, and from General Wrangel's army in the Crimea, which was vastly outnumbered. Meanwhile in May 1920, the SRs, encouraged by this peasant uprising, returned to their policy of armed struggle against the Soviet government, which they had abandoned the previous year. Everywhere, the slogans of the peasant revolt were "soviets without communists" and free trade in grain. The Soviet government met these risings, some led by former allies, with the same ruthlessness it had displayed in the case of earlier military threats. But these uprisings, together with the revolt of the sailors of the Kronstadt fortress in February 1921 under similar slogans, and simultaneous strikes in Petrograd's factories, convinced Lenin and the rest of the Bolshevik Party to revise the economic policy. Another factor that favored the change was the improvement of Russia's international situation in 1921.

A third domestic factor was the attitude of the movements of the national minorities of the former tsarist empire. In many ways it was akin to the peasants' "benevolent neutrality." The leaders of these national movements and of the newly independent states of Poland and the Baltic region were pro-capitalist and strongly anti-Soviet but they too did not want a victory of the White armies, whose slogan was "Russia, one and indivisible" and whose generals, in any case, ruled out cooperation with separatists. As for the popular classes of these national minorities, like the Russians, they were attracted to the Bolsheviks' socialist message. The White forces were notorious for their anti-Jewish pogroms, while the Bolsheviks firmly opposed any expression of Russian chauvinism and were sincerely prepared to grant a measure of self-government to national groups and to encourage their national-cultural awakening (at least until Stalin put a stop to that at the end of the 1920s), as long as the ruling Communist Party and the army remained centralized institutions.

The national factor played a direct military role at two critical junctures. In September 1919, when General Yudenich marched on Petrograd, the Finnish and Estonian bourgeois governments decided not to participate in the offensive, which otherwise would almost certainly have proved successful. This is hardly surprising, since the supreme White authority refused to recognize

the independence of those states. For much the same reasons, capitalist Poland sat out the major White offensive of March 1919, when its action on Russia's western border would have made possible the capture of Moscow. Instead, Poland waited for the White armies to be defeated before launching its own invasion aimed at annexing the Ukraine.

The other set of factors that explains the Soviet victory is of an international nature. The internationalism of the Bolsheviks and the Russian workers as a whole was not abstract idealism. They genuinely believed their fate depended on the revolution in the West, not just because of the threat posed by international intervention but also because the internal contradictions of the Russian Revolution, such as those that arose between the workers and peasants in connection with the food question, could not be easily resolved at Russia's level of socioeconomic development. The Bolsheviks and workers showed in practice that they were prepared to sacrifice much to aid the international revolution, including by military means. The Soviet counteroffensive against the Poles in 1920 that reached the outskirts of Warsaw before being beaten back (with the help of French officers) was motivated largely by the desire to bring material and military aid to the German Revolution. The Soviet counteroffensive into Poland aroused tremendous enthusiasm among Russian workers, since victory would have provided the Russian Revolution with direct access to Germany's revolutionary workers.

If the victorious socialist revolutions on which the Bolsheviks were counting did not materialize, the years 1918–20 nevertheless witnessed an unprecedentedly powerful radicalization and upsurge of the workers' movements in all industrialized countries and regions. In Germany, Austria, Finland, and Hungary these produced revolutions; in Italy and (some argue) in parts of France they created revolutionary situations which, however, failed to develop into revolutions. But all the countries, including Great Britain, Canada, and the US, witnessed a tremendous growth in trade union membership and in offensive strike action. There was a similar growth in membership in socialist parties, especially the revolutionary ones.

Since this labor upsurge was beaten back by the capitalist states and the bourgeoisie, historians usually argue that the Bolsheviks

were deluding themselves about receiving aid from revolutions abroad. Some deny there was any revolutionary potential outside of Russia. But as is so often the case, one's judgment as to whether the revolutionary glass was half empty or half full depends, in the end, on one's ideological leanings. But there is no doubt that the European bourgeoisie itself was deeply frightened at this time. In a memorandum to the Paris Peace Conference dated March 25, 1919, Lloyd George, prime minister of Britain, wrote that "the whole of Europe is in a revolutionary mood. The workers have a deep feeling of dissatisfaction with conditions of life as they existed before the war; they are full of anger and indignation. The whole of the existing social, political and economic order is being called into question by the mass of people from one end of Europe to the other." Nor was North America immune to this unrest.

But in the end, this labor upsurge did not produce victorious socialist revolutions. It was, however, powerful enough to prevent the capitalist powers from intervening with sufficient force to crush the revolution in Russia. American historian W. Chamberlin writes: "The statesmen [at the peace talks] in Paris were sitting on a thin crust of solid ground, beneath which volcanic forces of social upheaval were seething. . . . So there was one absolutely convincing reason why the Allied powers could not fulfill the hopes of the White Russians and intervene with large numbers of troops: no reliable troops were available. It was the general opinion of leading statesmen and soldiers alike that the attempt to send large numbers of soldiers to Russia would most probably end in mutiny." And mutinies did occur, notably among the troops sent by the French government, the most anti-Bolshevik of all the interventionists.

In the midst of a massive British strike wave and with the red flag flying atop the city hall of Glasgow, Lloyd George told the Paris conference that "if Britain were to start military action against the Bolsheviks, Britain herself would go Bolshevik and we would have a soviet in London." Britain never really got very near to a revolutionary situation, but the British labor movement did play a direct role in saving the Russian Revolution. When Poland invaded the Ukraine in the spring of 1920, the British dockworkers prevented their government from sending arms to the Poles. And when the Red Army approached the gates of Warsaw, and Britain

threatened to declare war on Soviet Russia unless she withdrew her troops, the British Labour Party organized huge demonstrations across Britain and, together with the trade unions, set up hundreds of local action committees in towns throughout the country in preparation for a general strike. The leader of the Labour Party warned Lloyd George that if he moved to help Poland, "there will be a match set to explosive material, the result of which none of us can foresee today." This unselfish act of the British working class was decisive in dissuading the government from a new effort at direct military intervention. Of course, the British workers also understood well that defeat of the revolution in Russia would greatly encourage their own employers and government to move against their gains.

Another international factor was the conflicting imperialist interests that kept the intervening powers from coordinating their activities and giving the degree of support to the Whites that they otherwise might have given. For example, the US was competing with Japan for control of the Pacific area and was not at all enthusiastic about Japanese intervention in Siberia, which was aimed at annexation of this resource-rich region. Nor were France and England very happy about the Whites' dream of restoring the grandeur of the Russian empire. All the imperialist powers wanted a capitalist Russia, but they preferred one that was weak and accommodating to their economic and geopolitical interests. The tsarist state had been a traditional rival of Britain in Asia. And France was now banking on newly independent Poland as its chief ally in Europe on the eastern border of Germany, France's traditional enemy. But tsarist Russia had been Poland's traditional oppressor.

Socioeconomic Consequences of the Civil War

The civil war, together with the destruction inflicted earlier by the world war, left the Russian economy in a shambles. In 1921, Russian industry was producing at only a seventh of its prewar level. It would take almost five more years to restore the economy to the level of 1914. A quarter of the cultivated land had been abandoned, and agricultural output was down by 40 percent from the prewar level. Famine stalked the countryside and the largely depopulated cities.

Approximately four and a half million people, about 3 percent of the population, had died as a consequence of the civil war (on top of the almost two million killed in the world war). There were 4.5 million homeless children (up from two million before the war). Most of the civil war deaths were not direct participants or victims of the armed struggle, but the result of hunger and epidemics. Some two million people emigrated, including many of the highly educated. A famine in the months following the civil war took additional hundreds of thousands of lives, some claim several millions. As with almost any significant aspect of the Russian Revolution, figures on deaths are widely disputed.

From a political point of view, however, the biggest loss was the dispersal of the working class. The Vyborg district of Petrograd, the radical heart of the labor movement in 1912–14 and in 1917, virtually ceased to exist in the spring of 1918, reduced from 69,000 industrial workers in January 1917 to only 5,000. In March 1918 only a single large metalworking plant was still operating there. That spring Lenin wrote to Petrograd's workers, urging them to abandon the hope of resuscitating their factories in the near future and to leave for the countryside where they could feed their families and organize the peasants. The most committed workers and the Bolsheviks first of all fought in the Red Army. Others went to occupy positions in the new state and economic administrations. The minority that remained in the factories were demoralized by the cold, hunger, and the necessity of supplementing their meager rations, when they could, with petty trade or theft.

The working class that had been the leading force of Russia's revolutionary movement exhausted itself in its heroic struggle. The Communist Party, with 612,000 members in 1920, claimed to represent the working class and act in its name. But the working class itself ceased to exist as an independent political force capable of imposing its interests, and of posing limits, on the state that it had brought into being.

At the end of the civil war, with the working class dispersed and much of the propertied classes and intelligentsia gone, Russia was much more than before the revolution an overwhelmingly peasant society. Russian – but not only Russian – history shows that a peasantry, and all the more so an impoverished peasantry, is incapable on its own of wielding state power in its own interests.

Peasants may aspire to democracy in some form, but left to their own resources they constitute a social basis upon which dictatorships arise. A secret Soviet report on the Tambov region, one of the main centers of armed peasant opposition to the Bolsheviks at the end of the civil war, offered the following assessment of the peasants' political capacity: "Even the kulaks [well-off farmers], the most cultured, the most politically developed stratum . . . do not, in general, show any capacity for raising their sights to thinking in terms of the state as a whole; their economic [outlook] has not carried them very far beyond the outskirts of their villages or rural districts. . . . Without the guidance of parties of the . . . bourgeoisie, this movement can lead only to anarchistic rioting and bandit destruction."

Russia under Lenin after the Civil War

In 1921, as the fighting came to an end and the immediate prospect of revolution in the West receded, the Bolsheviks had to decide what to do with the state power that they held. As Marxists, they found themselves in an unexpected and highly anomalous position at the head of a socialist state that was governing a society in which the social forces and the material conditions of socialism were very weak, practically nonexistent. They recognized that, on their own, without the help of socialist states in more developed countries, they could not make a socialist society out of the existing material. But having fought so hard to retain power, they were not going to hand it over to a pro-capitalist force, which was how they saw the consequence of holding free soviet elections at that time: the Bolsheviks would certainly have won only a minority of the vote.

Instead, the party adopted a rather paradoxical program of partially restoring capitalism while tightening the party dictatorship. The New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced in the spring of 1921 restored free trade, abandoning the food monopoly. Grain requisitions were replaced with a fixed tax in kind, and the peasants were free to sell what was left on the open market. Small-scale private commercial and industrial enterprises were legalized. Inflation was eventually brought down, the ruble stabilized.

This did not mean, however, that the Bolsheviks abandoned their socialist project. If

Russia independently lacked the conditions for socialism, the Soviet government could nevertheless strengthen the conditions for socialism while it awaited, and to the degree possible encouraged, a new revolutionary upsurge in the West, as well as anti-colonial struggles in the East. To do this, the state had to retain the "commanding heights" of the economy – the large industrial enterprises, banks and railroads, a monopoly on foreign trade. The goal was to restore and then expand Russia's industry, thus reinforcing the numerical and political weight of the working class in society. The state would also encourage the peasants, especially the poorer peasants, to produce on a cooperative basis, thus creating a pro-socialist base in the countryside too.

But this economic plan went in parallel with reinforcement of the party dictatorship. From a Marxist perspective, the Soviet state was in a completely unnatural situation. It was socialist in terms of its ultimate goals, but it was governing a society that spontaneously aspired to capitalism. The peasants in particular, as small independent producers, despite their largely egalitarian values constantly reproduced capitalist relations in their daily practice. The NEP itself was in large part a response to the pressure of the peasantry. The working class, the only force interested in socialism, was extremely weak. It would take considerable time before it could again become a dominant political force. At the same time, Lenin in particular believed that the peasants, at least the poor and middle majority of peasants, could be won over to collective production if the state led them in that direction through education, economic incentives, and the provision of material and technical support.

But for any of this to happen, the state had to protect its socialist character from the corrupting capitalist influences emanating from the society it governed. If the state had to be responsive to the society – coercion as a means of transforming society and administering the economy was abandoned at the end of the civil war – it could not simply reflect the peasant society, which spontaneously favored capitalist relations. Hence the revolutionary leaders sought to reinforce the party dictatorship and the unity of the Communist Party itself. This explains why it was only at the end of the civil war that the Menshevik and SR parties were definitively banned.

Meanwhile, the Communist Party itself was riven by passionate debates over policy. Self-

discipline had kept these differences in check during the civil war emergency. But they now erupted with great force, creating the danger that the party, in the absence of other competing parties, would come to reflect all the divergent interests in society and in the end split. If that happened, it would lose its capacity to guide society's development in the desired socialist direction. This is why the tenth party congress in the spring of 1921 adopted a ban on organized tendencies within the party. The intention was not to suppress free debate but to safeguard the party's unity by prohibiting permanent groupings around separate platforms. This measure, which was supposed to be temporary, would play an important role in stifling democracy in the party under Stalin's leadership and, with that, destroy the party as a living political movement, as opposed to a mass organization to be mobilized and manipulated at the will of a self-appointed leadership.

But in other ways this was a period of broad social and cultural freedom. For example, the government adopted a very liberal Labor Code in 1922. Strikes were legal and treated sympathetically by the press. Trade unions enjoyed a limited, but nevertheless real, degree of independence. Cultural experimentation of all kinds flourished. National groups enjoyed recognition and a genuine degree of autonomy that gave a boost to the development of national cultures.

But from a Marxist point of view, a materialist theory, the project smacked of idealism, that is, it lacked the necessary sociopolitical underpinnings. In Marxist theory, the state is seen as dependent upon, or "reflecting," the nature of the underlying society. The state can in turn influence the society, but it can hardly change its fundamental nature unless the economic and political conditions for that are ripe. And the socioeconomic conditions for a socialist state in Russia after the civil war were certainly not ripe. Lenin, who had a firm understanding of Marxist analysis, undoubtedly realized that. But he could find no acceptable alternative. The Bolsheviks saw the Soviet state as a foothold of the world revolution. They had fought and died to save it and they were not prepared to give up. Moreover, they felt that the stabilization of western capitalism in the early 1920s was temporary, as it indeed turned out to be.

It did not take long, however, for Marxist theory to prove its strength. The Soviet state was not able for very long to "float" above the

peasant society and retain its socialist character. In the years before his death at the beginning of 1924, Lenin himself became increasingly alarmed that the Soviet state was displaying despotic and Russian chauvinist traits reminiscent of the old tsarist regime. His proposals suggest that he understood that the only real solution was democratic control of the state. But he could not find a way out of the dilemma of a socialist state in a society dominated by spontaneously pro-capitalist forces. All he could propose were half-measures, which Stalin, who was accumulating power at the head of the party-state administration, carried out in a formalistic way that subverted Lenin's intention. Lenin also saw Stalin himself as personifying many of the problems he had identified and he called for Stalin's removal from his positions of power. However, by that time Lenin was too sick and politically marginal to win over the party leadership.

In the end, a new autocratic regime arose, one that displayed many of the traits of the old tsarist autocracy. Hiding behind the ideological façade of socialism, it was opposed to socialism (defined minimally as a society without exploitation), either in Russia or abroad. At the same time, the ruling group, led by Stalin, did not restore capitalism, as the left opposition in the 1920s had feared. The capitalist forces in Russia, mainly within the peasantry, proved too weak to impose their will on the state. Instead, at the end of the 1920s, the state took direct control of the entire economy, both urban and rural, and in the process deprived both workers and peasants of their rights as citizens. This totalitarian system was then presented to the Soviet people and the world as socialism.

The main social support of this new autocracy was the state administration itself, the army of full-time government and party functionaries who had backed Stalin's rise to power. But the social terrain out of which this regime arose was, in the final analysis, the impoverished, overwhelmingly peasant society that had only recently emerged from semi-feudal, tsarist barbarism and seven years of brutal warfare and destruction. The system that resulted, neither capitalist nor socialist, was historically unviable and would eventually be destroyed by its own internal contradictions.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; German Revolution, 1918–1923; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marxism; Russia,

Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russia, Revolutions: Sources and Contexts; Russian Civil War, 1918–1924; Russian Revolutionary Labor Upsurge, 1912–1914; Soviet Union, Fall of; Stalin, Joseph (1879–1953) and “Revolution from Above”

References and Suggested Readings

- Carr, E. H. (2004) *The Russian Revolution: From Lenin to Stalin (1917–1929)*. New York: Palgrave.
- Carrère d’Encausse, H. (1981) *Lenin*. New York: Longman.
- Chamberlin, W. H. (1935/1965) *The Russian Revolution*, 2 vols. New York: Grosset & Dunlap.
- Lewin, M. (1975) *Lenin’s Last Struggle*. London: Pluto Press.
- Liebman, M. (1980) *Leninism under Lenin*. London: Merlin Press.
- Rosmer, A. (1972) *Moscow Under Lenin*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Serge, V. (1984) *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*. London: Writers & Reader.

Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, 1943

Blake W. Remington

The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising marked the first instance of open, armed resistance against the Nazis by an underground organization and was the largest Jewish revolt during the Holocaust. Although the fighting ended with the complete destruction of the ghetto and the deaths of nearly all the Jewish resistance fighters involved, news of the uprising spread quickly and influenced resistance movements in Jewish ghettos throughout Europe.

On Yom Kippur, October 12, 1940, loudspeakers located throughout Warsaw announced the establishment of the Jewish Residential Quarter of Warsaw; the *Judenrat* (Jewish council) was responsible for carrying out the mass relocation of over 150,000 Jews. Cordoned off from the rest of Warsaw, the ghetto was designed to bring about the death of its residents. Jews were allotted a daily ration of 184 calories, compared to 669 for Poles and 2,613 for Germans. By the summer of 1941 the ghetto population surpassed 400,000. Corpses lined the streets; typhus, starvation, and a brutal winter added to the casualties. More than 60,000 perished in the first 15 months.

On the morning of July 22, 1942, SS officers announced to *Judenrat* President Adam Cziernoków that deportations would begin within the next few hours. Members of the *Judenrat* were taken hostage; if the evacuations failed, the hostages would be shot. Each day, thousands were gathered at the *Umschlagplatz* (transfer point) and taken by freight train to Treblinka, the extermination camp. On September 21 the deportations ceased. A total of 265,040 Jews had been deported to their deaths.

The Jewish Fighting Organization (*Zydowska Organizacja Bojowa*) (ZOB) had been active since the first week of deportations. Formed out of an assembly of Jewish youth organizations, the ZOB served as the chief resistance group within the ghetto. Plagued by setbacks and internal arguments, the ZOB was initially only effective in its retaliation against known Jewish collaborators. Following the deportations, the ZOB strengthened due to the return of some of its leaders who had left the ghetto in an attempt to secure arms and external support. A separate resistance group, the Jewish Military Union (*Zydowski Związek Wojskowy*) (ZZW), emerged in October 1942. Comprised of right-wing Zionists, the ZZW operated independently of the ZOB.

In the aftermath of the deportations the composition of the ghetto drastically changed. Whole blocks of residential buildings were now vacant; there was no movement in the streets. Most of the 35,000 Jews remaining were healthy individuals working in shops and factories, but 25,000 more remained in hiding. Four areas were designated as residual residential enclaves and all communication between them was banned. The fate of the summer’s deportees became more apparent as rumors made their way into the ghetto, bringing reports of Jews being murdered by gas and burned alive in ovens. But as the ZOB gained control of the ghetto, despair transformed into stern determination. Many of the resistance fighters had already accepted the certainty of their fate: Yitzhak Zuckerman acknowledged that “we will be killed . . . but our honor will be victorious.”

On January 9, 1943 Reichsführer-SS Himmler visited the ghetto and subsequently ordered the deportation of 8,000 Jews. Nine days later, German police arrived to carry out the new *Aktion*. Resistance erupted in an organized, yet independent fashion. Because the January *Aktion* was mostly unexpected, the disparate members



Two Jewish resistance fighters are arrested by German troops after the uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto during World War II. The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising is considered the largest revolt by the Jews during the Holocaust. (Getty Images)

of the fighting organizations were unable to coordinate a combined retaliation. The commander of the ZOB, Mordechai Anielewicz, devised a simple plan: five armed fighters would join the ranks leading to the *Umschlagplatz*, wait for the signal, break from the lines, and attack the nearest Germans. The German police were taken completely by surprise. Upon hearing the pistol shots, the assembled Jews dispersed. The Germans ceased their attempted deportation after having rounded up only 6,500 Jews over a period of four days.

The success of the revolt in January boosted the fighters' confidence; the numbers of the resistance increased. By spring 1943 roughly 750 fighters comprised the Jewish resistance in the Warsaw ghetto. Yet while the ZOB possessed an intimate knowledge of the ghetto's labyrinthine network of interconnected buildings and bunkers, they profoundly lacked weapons. Between January and April the leaders of the resistance increased their acquisition of arms and prepared for a protracted struggle with the Germans and their collaborators. Most importantly, the various factions of ghetto fighters had resolved to fight not for victory, but for the preservation of Jewish honor.

When the Germans approached the ghetto on the night of April 18, the inhabitants were prepared. News had traveled from the Aryan side that another *Aktion* was imminent; ZOB members spent the night observing the German mobilization from the rooftops. At 6 a.m. the next day, 16 Waffen-SS officers and 850 soldiers entered the ghetto. As in the January *Aktion*, the insur-

gents initiated the fighting – this time with hand grenades and a barrage of Molotov cocktails. The ghetto fighters surprised the Germans enough to force a retreat. Following this initial defeat, SS General Jürgen Stroop took over operations and recalculated its strategy. Stroop's forces reentered the ghetto and began searching for and attacking hidden bunkers, flooding underground tunnels, and pursuing the Jews through their network of passageways, but their efforts were repeatedly met with forceful resistance.

Over the next few days Stroop called upon the Waffen-SS, the German police and Wehrmacht, nationalist auxiliaries, and the Jewish police for reinforcements. Open fighting persisted and fierce battles ensued in the streets. Resistance continued even as the fighters were forced to retreat to the bunkers. Stroop's forces responded by setting entire blocks on fire. On April 23 Anielewicz wrote: "Jewish retaliation and resistance has become a fact. I have been witness to the magnificent heroic battle of the Jewish fighters." On May 8 the SS discovered what had become the ZOB's command center, at 18 Mila Street. Among the victims of the Nazi assault on the bunker was the commander of the ZOB, Mordechai Anielewicz.

Within the first two weeks of the uprising nearly every Jewish resistance fighter was killed, along with most of the non-combatant Jews remaining in the ghetto. As the ghetto burned to the ground, General Stroop decided "officially" to end the *Aktion* through destroying Warsaw's Great Synagogue. On May 16, 1943 Stroop pushed a button on an electronic detonator and watched the synagogue explode. Stroop titled his 75-page report of the uprising, "The Jewish Residential District in Warsaw No Longer Exists."

SEE ALSO: Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Germany, Resistance to Nazism; Jewish Resistance to Nazism; Poland, 1956 Uprising; Poland, Revolutions, 1846–1863

References and Suggested Readings

- Bartoszewski, W. (1991) The Martyrdom and Struggle of the Jews in Warsaw under German Occupation 1939–1943. In W. T. Bartoszewski & A. Polonsky (Eds.), *The Jews in Warsaw: A History*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bartoszewski, W. & Polonsky, A. (1991) Introduction. In W. T. Bartoszewski & A. Polonsky (Eds.), *The Jews in Warsaw: A History*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- Friedländer, S. (2008) *The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939–1945*. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Gutman, I. (1982) *The Jews of Warsaw, 1939–1943: Ghetto, Underground, Revolt*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Gutman, I. (1994) *Resistance: The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Kaplan, C. (1999) *Scroll of Agony: The Warsaw Diary of Chaim A. Kaplan*. Ed. A. I. Katsh. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Kurzman, D. (1976) *The Bravest Battle: The Twenty-Eight Days of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising*. New York: Putnam.
- Stroop, J. (1979) *The Stroop Report: The Jewish Quarter of Warsaw Is No More!* Ed. S. Milton. New York: Pantheon.
- Zuckerman, Y. (1993) *A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Washington, George (1732–1799)

Beverly Tomek

George Washington was more than the first president of the United States, he was the very model delegates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 had in mind when they agreed to create the executive office. Known for his military achievements and leadership ability, it is his character that captivated his contemporaries and historians alike. The embodiment of the concept of “virtue,” he was the only major leader of the Revolutionary Era to free his slaves.

The future president was born to Augustine and Mary Ball Washington, a family of moderate means, in Westmoreland County, Virginia. His formal studies were minimal – the equivalent of a modern elementary-level education. By age 15 he was an able field surveyor, gaining skills of wilderness survival as well as an appreciation for land that would feed his later interest in westward expansion and a brief career in land speculation. From an early age he was known as a practical person concerned with proper manners and outward appearances.

Washington first gained notice during the French and Indian, or Seven Years’, War. His ability to rally his fellow troops and his bravery under fire led Virginia governor Robert Dinwiddie to place him in charge of the state’s troops at the rank of colonel. Though most of the real fighting was directed from Britain and

conducted by British regulars, Washington took his duties seriously, working diligently to prepare his militia recruits and maintain discipline and order. He used the skills he gained in commanding strong-willed men in his later efforts as leader of the American forces in the War for Independence. He also used the resentment he developed toward the British due to their mismanagement and ill treatment of colonial forces during this war to help fuel his efforts during the Revolution.

As the colonies began to consider armed action against the British, the Continental Congress invested Washington with “full power and authority to act as you shall think for the good and welfare of the service.” This was a dangerous move that, under the appropriate circumstances, could have opened the door to a military dictatorship. Washington agreed, however, that Congress would retain the ultimate power.

Washington proved an able leader during the Revolution. In addition to making wise tactical decisions, often managing to immobilize British forces, he made effective use of foreign advisors such as Prussian general Friedrich von Steuben, an aide-de-camp to Frederick the Great. He also used important victories, such as that at Saratoga, to convince the French to enter the war on the side of the colonists. Just as importantly, he employed his skills of leadership to keep his troops going despite their lack of pay and inadequate supplies, especially during the winter of 1777–8 at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania.

Though American mythology celebrates the role of the citizen-soldier, as embodied in the volunteer Minutemen, the reality is that Washington realized early on that he needed more help than they alone could offer. As a result, he set out to build a Continental Army of regular soldiers. This act was, in itself, revolutionary. The prevailing belief at the time was that only volunteer soldiers with property, and thus a true stake in society, could be relied upon and that soldiers recruited from among the poorer ranks would be naturally untrustworthy. Washington, however, realized that common people were essential, not only in filling the ranks of the army, but also in producing the supplies. He fought to ensure that his soldiers were well paid and adequately supplied, even when the Continental Congress made these efforts difficult. He was known among the rank and file for sharing the dangers and hardships they faced. At the same time, he worked to minimize suspicion of his troops by ensuring tight discip-

line and order. One of his main goals was to serve as a moderating force between the left wing's complete support for popular rule and the right wing's fear of too much democracy. When some of the army's officers grew disenchanted with Congress's failure to pay them as promised, he used his personal sway over them to convince them to settle peacefully. As a result, Congress granted the officers five years' pay and the tensions ended. After the fighting ended, Washington retired his commission to the Continental Congress in a highly symbolic display of the virtue he was, and is, well known for.

Virtue in the eighteenth-century context was a very important characteristic, essential in all good leaders. It meant, first and foremost, a willingness to sacrifice one's own interests for the greater good. It also meant restraint from selfish or passionate behavior. This characteristic is what led members of the Second Continental Congress to offer him complete power as commander in chief and the delegates at the Constitutional Convention to create the executive office with him specifically in mind. In an age where many people held to the "commonwealth ideology," or the fear that power always corrupts, and when a war had just been fought to break away from a system that had been thus corrupted, it took a great deal of faith to award one man the kind of power that was invested in George Washington.

Washington the president knew just as well as Washington the general how to lead and when to relinquish power. He was inaugurated in New York City on April 30, 1789 and labored from the beginning under the realization that his actions would set important precedents for the future. He often sought the advice of those he considered more knowledgeable, the most famous example being his reliance upon Alexander Hamilton for advice in creating a financial plan to get the new nation on its feet. He also continued his efforts to moderate disagreements among those around him and discouraged party affiliation.

Of all of the founding generation, Washington was perhaps the least educated, but he was also perhaps the most open and willing to learn from experience. Unlike some Enlightenment figures, notably Thomas Jefferson, who disdained organized Christianity, Washington saw spiritual and social value in religion. While some of his cohorts spoke publicly about the evils of slavery yet failed to do anything concrete to fight the system, Washington never spoke out

against the institution yet was the only one to free his slaves in his will. He ultimately rejected slavery, not out of some abstract philosophical consideration, but simply because he realized it violated the revolutionary principles he fought for. His role as leader of what became a racially integrated army also gave him first-hand experience that led him to respect blacks and rethink their bondage. Not only did he provide for his slaves' freedom, he also provided for their support and education to help them establish themselves.

The will that freed his slaves went into effect after he died on December 14, 1799. He died after suffering from cold symptoms for two days.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776; Paine, Thomas (1737–1809); Shays' Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Elkins, S. & McKittrick, E. (1993) *The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Martin, J. K. & Lender, M. E. (1982) *A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763–1789*. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson.
- Wienczek, H. (2003) *An Imperfect God: George Washington, His Slaves and the Creation of America*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
- Wood, G. S. (2006) *Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founder Different*. New York: Penguin.

Wathbah of 1948

Johan Franzén

In late 1947 and early 1948, Iraqi and British politicians sat down in London to "renegotiate" Iraqi–British relations. Saleh Jabr, the prime minister, led the Iraqi delegation. His appointment in March 1947 had been intended to ease the pressure from the Shi'i part of the population. Being a Shi'i himself, it was thought that his appointment, as the first Shi'i to occupy that post, would appease growing anti-British sentiment that had been brewing among the politically conscious since 1920.

When these "negotiations" produced nothing more than a revision of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, protests began. These protests have come to be known in the annals of Iraqi popular history as *al-Wathbah* – "the Awakening." The first phase of the *Wathbah* started on January 3, 1948 when the Iraqi foreign minister, Fadil al-Jamali, who was a member of the Iraqi delegation in London, made the claim that much of

the criticism against the old treaty was without justification and was a result of oppositional party politics. The nationalists were incensed. On January 5, students from a Baghdad secondary school responded by demonstrating on the streets and were met by mounted police. When the students failed to disperse, they were fired upon. On January 6, the right-wing nationalist Istiqlal (Independence) Party came out to support angry students now striking throughout the capital.

On January 16, when the terms of the new treaty were finalized, new strikes and protests were now being coordinated by the illegal Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), steering them toward a more radical stance. A Student Cooperation Committee, controlled by the ICP, was the driving and uniting force of the protests. Initially, the Committee managed to unite with the Istiqlal Party, Progressive Democrats, Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and the National Democratic Party (NDP). But on January 19, the Istiqlal Party ordered its student supporters to disassociate, leaving the ICP as the driving force behind the *Wathbah*.

On January 20, the protests reached another level as the *Shurugis*, impoverished rural migrants from the 'Amarah province living in the shantytowns of Baghdad, and radical railway workers joined the protests. Faced with this united front, the police began firing indiscriminately into the crowds, resulting in several casualties. The following day, while escorting their fallen comrades, students were again attacked by police inside the Royal Hospital, leaving two dead and another 17 wounded. These acts incensed the public even further as crowds rushed onto the streets armed with whatever they could lay their hands on. Suddenly, the streets of central Baghdad were transformed into a battle ground.

While the Istiqlal Party had decided to stop its protests, it did little to appease the other parties. Unwisely, Saleh Jabr further incensed the crowds by announcing on January 22 that the protests were only the work of a few seditionists. On the following day, huge crowds poured onto the streets of Baghdad, with no immediate confrontation by the police. On January 26, Jabr, after returning from London, announced in a public statement that the terms of the treaty would soon be explained in detail, insinuating that the protests somehow had been caused by a misunderstanding. Angry protesters took to the streets again, only to be met by the machine guns

of the police. The following day, crowds from all over Baghdad made their way toward the center of the city to join forces and deal a decisive blow to the regime. The first skirmishes took place in the al-Rasafah neighborhood, where police again fired upon the crowds. Four people were left dead, but the angry crowds nevertheless managed to push the police back and headed for Rashid Street, Baghdad's main avenue, but were eventually met by police reinforcements.

The fighting would continue all day and end in a massacre. However, the death-defying crowds showed no signs of relenting, and eventually the police, realizing the futility of the situation, withdrew. The total death toll of the carnage is not known. Many of the bodies were quickly buried by the authorities without being registered, but the figure is believed to be somewhere between three and four hundred. The *Wathbah* would have important implications for Iraqi politics, beginning with the regent's ability to repudiate the treaty and discredit the regime. This not only weakened the monarchy but also eroded the legitimacy of the political process.

SEE ALSO: Iraq, Anti-British Nationalists; Iraq, Revolt of 1920; Iraq, Revolution of 1958

References and Suggested Readings

- Ismael, T. (2008) *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party in Iraq*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kingston, P. (2002) *Britain and the Politics of Modernization in the Middle East, 1945–1958*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Polk, W. R. (2005) *Understanding Iraq: The Whole Sweep of Iraqi History, from Genghis Khan's Mongols to the Ottoman Turks to the British Mandate to the American Occupation*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Salucci, I. (2005) *A People's History of Iraq: The Iraqi Communist Party, Workers' Movements and the Left, 1924–2004*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Webb, Sidney (1859–1947) and Beatrice (1858–1943)

Andrea Geddes Poole

Sidney and Beatrice Webb were social reformers, influential early members of the Fabian Society, and principal founders of both the London



English author, Labour Party member, and social reformer Sidney James Webb (1859–1947) with his wife, socialist thinker and writer Beatrice Webb (1858–1943). Both were influential members of the Fabian Society, an organization that sought to inform on the evils of capitalism. The Webbs were prominent theorists of labor unions and social reform. (Getty Images)

School of Economics and the *New Statesman*. Their writings on trade unionism, the cooperative movement, labor history, and local government had a considerable effect on contemporary political theory and practice. Theirs was, on the face of it, an unlikely partnership. Beatrice Potter Webb was the daughter of a wealthy businessman. Sidney Webb, in contrast, was the son of a London shopkeeper. Their intellectual partnership, however, was productive. They married in 1892 and for the next 50 years jointly worked toward creating a science of society.

Following Beatrice Webb's appointment in 1905 to the Royal Commission on the Poor Law, both Webbs applied themselves to researching and identifying deficiencies in the existing poor law structure. Their dissenting minority report advocated the abolition of the existing structure of poor law guardians, replacing it with specialized agencies to meet the needs of the sick, the aged, and the very young. But the Webbs worked within the political system as well. Sidney Webb served as chairman of the Technical/Education Board of the London County Council. During his tenure he restructured London's educational system, creating a scholarship ladder that could take talented London schoolchildren from elementary school on to university.

Throughout the Webbs' work ran a consistent respect for expertise and the abilities of the

trained and experienced professional, as opposed to the talents of the gifted amateur. In 1894, the Webbs persuaded their colleagues in the Fabian Society to use a recent bequest to establish a modern, research-based school, radically different from the gentlemanly, classical education of Oxford and Cambridge. The London School of Economics (LSE) was to be an institution that would produce professional economists, political and social theorists, and public administrators. As a member of the Labour Party's executive from 1915, Sidney Webb drafted most of the party's postwar policy statements, including the 1918 manifesto, *Labour and the New Social Order*, and key elements of the party's constitution. He went into parliament in 1922, representing the Durham mining district of Seaham. He served as president of the Board of Trade in 1924 and as colonial secretary from 1929 to 1931.

Both the Webbs had been highly critical of Bolshevism in its early stages and in the Labour manifesto of 1918, Sidney Webb had attempted to enunciate the Labour Party's position on nationalization of key industries and common public ownership of land as an "anti-Bolshevist" but essentially anti-capitalist and parliamentary alternative. However, by the late 1920s, faced with the collapse of Great Britain's economy, the Webbs toured the Soviet Union and returned to Britain impressed not only with the apparent ability of central planning to avoid the boom and bust cycle of free-market capitalism, but equally with the collective assumption of self-denial and the subsuming of individual needs to the common good. Their book, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* (1935), appeared to many to show the Webbs' abandoning of their belief in gradual social and political evolution. Although for many the Webbs' reputation as political theorists was tarnished by their faith in the Soviet system, their legacy is found in the emergence of the postwar welfare state, the predominance of planning and expertise, and the rejection of unbridled, free-market capitalism.

SEE ALSO: Britain, Trade Union Movement; Socialism, Britain

References and Suggested Readings

Dahrendorf, R. (1995) *LSE: A History of the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1895–1995*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McBriar, A. M. (1962) *Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 1884–1918*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Muggeridge, K. & Adam, R. (1968) *Beatrice Webb: A Life, 1858–1943*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Royden, J. H. (2000) *The Life and Times of Sidney and Beatrice Webb 1858–1905: The Formative Years*. London: St. Martin's Press.

Wei Jingsheng (b. 1950)

J. Megan Greene

Wei Jingsheng became a symbol of the disaffection of Chinese intellectuals with the communist government following his bold call for democracy in 1979. In 1978, China's premier, Deng Xiaoping, called upon the nation to follow a new path to greatness by implementing the Four Modernizations of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense. At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made it clear that it now welcomed intellectual participation in shaping this new path for China's development. In this heady atmosphere of change and considerably increased political openness that followed years of repression of intellectuals in accordance with Mao Zedong's dictum that it was better to be red than expert, many intellectuals began to express their views on politics as well as economic development in an array of new journals and study groups and in other public venues such as Beijing's "democracy wall." It was in this environment that in 1978, Wei Jingsheng, a 29-year-old electrician employed at the Beijing zoo, posted a big character poster on democracy wall that called upon Deng to implement a fifth modernization, democracy.

Like many urban Chinese of his generation, Wei was a member of a Red Guard unit during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). During that time, he traveled around northern China, was eventually sent down to the countryside with other Red Guards, and toward the end of the Cultural Revolution he served for a time in the People's Liberation Army. Wei's poster and later essays reflected many of the observations that he had been making regarding Chinese politics ever since his experience as a Red Guard. In them, he called for power to be given to the masses, who, he argued, should have the right to replace their representatives when they misgoverned or deceived them. Wei also published essays in

the journal *Explorations*, which he co-edited with a physicist by the name of Yang Guang, which were directly critical of Deng for opposing democratic reforms, and which called upon the government to have greater respect for human rights, and in particular the right to express political ideas contrary to those of the CCP.

Not the only protester against the tyranny of the state, Wei was perhaps the best known, and many other intellectuals and students found his call for a fifth modernization an exciting point around which to rally in the spring of 1979. They were also emboldened by his willingness to sign his own name to his work. Along with other intellectuals, Wei was arrested in May 1979 and charged with inciting counterrevolutionary activity and giving information to a foreign journalist. In October 1979 he was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Released in September 1993, having served 14 years of his sentence, Wei returned to publishing essays critical of the Chinese government, many of which he had originally written on toilet paper while in prison. He was arrested again after less than six months and sentenced to another 14-year term, but in 1997, after serving four years of his term, he was removed from prison and put on a plane to the United States, where he remains active as an advocate for political and human rights reforms in China.

SEE ALSO: China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949

References and Suggested Readings

Wei Jingsheng (1997) *Courage to Stand Alone – Letters from Prison and Other Writings*. New York: Viking.
www.weijingsheng.org.

Wells, Ida B. (1862–1931) and the anti-lynching campaign

Summer D. Leibensperger

Best known as the pioneer of the international anti-lynching campaign, Ida B. Wells-Barnett was a civil rights activist who fought for women's suffrage and against racial discrimination and segregation. A skilled protest writer and speaker, Wells used graphic descriptions of rape and lynching to show that the underlying cause of



Ida B. Wells Barnett (1862–1931) was a journalist and Progressive reformer who fought for civil rights and women's suffrage. She is best known for her efforts to call attention to the atrocities of lynching. She also fought against racial segregation and helped to found the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). (Getty Images)

this form of racial brutality was reinforcement of white hegemony.

Wells was born on July 16, 1862, in Holly Springs, Mississippi to James and Elizabeth Wells. Although born into slavery, Wells and her siblings grew up in a home her father owned, and she attended Rust College. In 1878, Wells's parents and her youngest brother died from yellow fever. Wells kept her family together and supported them all by teaching at a rural school. She later moved to Memphis, Tennessee to teach, but, in 1891, was dismissed from her teaching position after she wrote about the inequality of segregated education.

Wells began writing for church bulletins and weeklies in 1887, and this grew into an editorship at *Free Speech* (where she became part owner). After 1891, she focused entirely on writing for *Free Speech*. In 1892, Wells's articles about the March 9 lynching of three black businessmen who operated a grocery that had taken business away from white grocers provoked a reaction that changed Wells's life. She was in Philadelphia when a mob destroyed the presses

of *Free Speech* and vowed to lynch her. After receiving warnings not to return to Memphis, she stayed in the north and began writing for the *New York Age* about the evils of lynching.

In 1892 Wells published *Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases*. This work, along with *A Red Record: Tabulated Statistics and Alleged Causes of Lynchings in the United States 1892–1893–1894*, published in 1895, contained graphic descriptions of lynching violence and provided statistics that proved that sexual offences (rape) against white women were not the principal reason for lynching black men.

Between 1893 and 1895, Wells conducted international (primarily in England) and national speaking tours as part of the effort to raise awareness about lynching. She also helped set up anti-lynching organizations in both the US and abroad. The American publicity related to this tour was often critical of Wells, but it enabled her to get her message over to whites.

Wells also attended or led various protests, lobbied for an anti-lynching bill to be passed, personally investigated lynchings, spoke at trials, and was involved in the establishment of a number of organizations and clubs, including the National Association of Colored Women (1896) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) (1909).

Traditionally, whites had justified lynchings by arguing that the black men they lynched had raped white women. Wells's efforts, however, exposed this lie. She argued that many so-called rape cases were actually cases of consensual sexual contact between white women and black men. She also drew attention to the often-overlooked experiences of black women who were raped by white men. Ultimately, Wells demonstrated that lynching functioned as a mechanism to reinforce the social, economic, and political oppression of blacks by showing that it was used as justification for torturing black men, most of whom had really done nothing more than succeed economically or socially.

Wells is also known for suing a railroad (1884), protesting against the exclusion of black Americans in the 1893 Chicago Columbian Exposition, forming a settlement house for blacks modeled on Jane Addams's efforts, and fighting for universal suffrage. She also ran for Illinois state senate in 1930 but lost. In 1895, Wells married Ferdinand Barnett, a lawyer and founder of the first black newspaper in Chicago, and they had

four children. She died of kidney disease on March 25, 1931.

In some sense Wells's life ended in frustration; she was either pushed out of organizations she helped to form, or resigned when she believed the organization was not active enough. The anti-lynching movement never resulted in the passing of federal anti-lynching legislation: even though over 200 anti-lynching bills were introduced, none was passed by the US senate (for which the senate apologized in 2005). Wells laid the groundwork, though, by forcing a reconsideration of the nature and role of black Americans and by leading the way for a number of efforts ranging from anti-lynching to universal suffrage.

The anti-lynching effort was pursued by the NAACP (which adopted some of her tactics) and, in the 1930s, by the Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching. The number of lynchings per year generally declined after the early 1890s, and several states had passed anti-lynching laws by 1940.

SEE ALSO: African American Resistance, Jim Crow Era; African American Resistance, Reconstruction Era; Radical Reconstruction, United States, Promise and Failure of

References and Suggested Readings

- Bederman, G. (1992) "Civilization," the Decline of Middle-Class Manliness, and Ida B. Wells's Antilynching Campaign (1892–94). *Radical History Review* 52: 4–30.
- Sterling, D. (1988) *Black Foremothers: Three Lives*, 2nd ed. New York: Feminist Press.
- Wells, I. B. (1970) *Crusade for Justice: The Autobiography of Ida B. Wells*. Ed. A. M. Duster. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Zangrando, R. L. (1980) *The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 1909–1950*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Wesley, John (1703–1791), Methodism, and social reform

Srividhya Swaminathan

John Wesley

John Wesley was at the forefront of the religious revival in Britain during the eighteenth century and his influence spanned church and secular

interests. He was born into the large family of the rector of Epworth and steeped in religious doctrine at a very young age. After completing his BA at Christ Church, Oxford in 1724, he decided to seek holy orders on the advice of his father. After completing his MA in 1727, he was ordained in the Anglican Church in 1728. Wesley's copious writings document the spiritual journey of a man committed to social change.

His sense of Christianity from his early studies focused on rigorous self-examination and practicing various forms of religious discipline that would later shape Methodist doctrine. While serving as a tutor at Oxford he formed the Holy Club to promote piety and morality, which came under heavy criticism for its religious excesses. In 1735 he traveled to Georgia under the auspices of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. Initially sent to convert the Native Americans, Wesley soon found himself ministering to the colonists. He preached a strict adherence to church doctrine in order to curb the excesses of the colonists, which did not win him any great support. Upon returning to England in something of a disgrace, he had an intense conversion experience in 1738 and entered fully into the evangelical revival that was sweeping England. Wesley left the notion that good works alone could lead to salvation and became more interested in preaching Christian discipline to organize life and work in the pursuit of perfection. Salvation occurred solely through faith, not works; however, this idea did not keep Wesley from pursuing social reform.

Methodism

John Wesley broke with conservative Anglican orthodoxy and embraced the charismatic preaching style that evoked religious renewal across Great Britain. He allied with George Whitefield, a dynamic and powerful orator, and began a long career as itinerant preacher. Wesley and Whitefield traveled throughout Great Britain and her colonies, bringing the doctrine of absolute faith to disenfranchised members of the population. Though Wesley quarreled and eventually parted from Whitefield over a doctrinal issue, the two are often seen as the most charismatic religious figures to emerge in the eighteenth century. Wesley eschewed staid High Church practices and preached to large audiences in open fields. He organized his followers into

smaller prayer groups devoted to reading and understanding scripture. He also encouraged those followers to use their personal experience with faith to deliver their own sermons, creating an entire cadre of lay preachers.

These practices disturbed Anglican orthodoxy and Wesley's followers soon became known as Methodists. Though the term was more widely applied to Calvinists, followers of Whitefield, and evangelical ministers, Wesley's organized congregations came to be the primary group associated with the term by the mid-century. Wesleyan Methodists did not see themselves as independent of the Anglican Church, and only in the nineteenth century, long after Wesley's death, did followers break away and establish a separate church. In fact, most Methodists, including Wesley, allied themselves with the conservative Tory party, so the push for reform did not come from radical ideology. Rather, Methodists practiced the doctrine of charity and ministered to the poor and disenfranchised in society. For example, Wesley accepted and promoted sermonizing by women in his lay ministry, an act not supported by the Anglican Church. In *Advice to the People call'd Methodists*, Wesley defined his followers as the "steady Imitation of Him they worship . . . particularly, in Justice, Mercy, and Truth, or universal Love filling the Heart, and governing the Life" (Wesley 1745: 3).

Social Reform

Wesley's most active contribution to social reform came after years of travel and observation. He was an avid reader and keenly interested in understanding his world. He corresponded with the Quaker Anthony Benezet and read with interest *Some Historical Account of Guinea* (1771). The friendship with Benezet may have also acquainted him with Granville Sharp, and he avidly followed the historic Somerset case, in which an impassioned Sharp exhaustively researched English civil law to prove that slavery was not legal in England. Since he had spent time in Georgia as a youth, he would probably have witnessed firsthand the practice of slavery in the colonies.

Two years after the decision in the Somerset case, Wesley published *Thoughts upon Slavery* (1774). Though the text was primarily lifted from Benezet's work, Wesley admonished slavers and masters alike for participating in the "execrable"

trade. He advocated abolition, not only of the trade but of slavery itself, arguing "Liberty is the right of every human creature, as soon as he breathes the vital air" (Wesley 1774: 27). His essay was so popular that it went through four editions. When the movement to abolish the slave trade gained momentum in the 1790s, abolitionist societies throughout Great Britain distributed free tracts to educate the public about the atrocities of the trade. Wesley's essay was reprinted and widely distributed. He traveled to Bristol in 1788 and preached an anti-slavery sermon that was violently disrupted, most probably by slavery advocates. In the last months of his life he wrote a letter to William Wilberforce encouraging him to continue his campaign against the slave trade.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Benezet, Anthony (1713–1784); Sharp, Granville (1735–1813); Wilberforce, William (1759–1833)

References and Suggested Readings

- Carey, B. (2005) *British Abolitionism and the Rhetoric of Sensibility: Writing, Sentiment and Slavery, 1760–1807*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hindmarsh, D. B. (1996) *John Newton and the English Evangelical Tradition: Between the Conversions of Wesley and Wilberforce*. New York: Clarendon Press.
- Kent, J. (2002) *Wesley and the Wesleyans*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rack, H. D. (2004) John Wesley. In *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wesley, J. (1745) *Advice to the People call'd Methodists*, 3rd ed. Bristol.
- Wesley, J. (1774) *Thoughts upon Slavery*, 2nd ed. London.

West German "new left"

Belinda Davis

The West German "new left" (or extraparliamentary movement) refers generally to a broad movement, coming to prominence in the 1960s, constituted primarily of younger activists who sought to realize freedom and democracy. The movement was very much part of the larger protest of the period, but also bore distinct characteristics. West German activists perceived freedom and democracy as promised, but not delivered, by a postwar government and society

defined in contrast both to the Nazi past and to the contemporary Cold War enemy. In pursuit of these principles, activists sought changes from the most global (e.g., concerning the Vietnam War and brutality in Iran) to the most local and personal (e.g., challenging conventional living and social arrangements). The "new left" and postwar protest movement are conventionally defined in West Germany as constituted primarily by the Social Democratic Student Organization (*Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund*) (SDS) and other university students. This was an important, although not the only, component of the West German movement in the longer history of this movement, which stretched from the late 1950s to the early 1980s, and reflected the actions of hundreds of thousands of protesters in the two "capitals" of protest (West Berlin and Frankfurt) and well beyond.

Forms and Content of Protest

Early campaigns, beginning in the early 1960s, included demands for educational reform – at all levels of schooling – in response to perceived residual authoritarian practices, and a corresponding sense of being silenced and ignored. Activists quickly applied these concerns more broadly to combat similar practices they found in government and in society. These activists were among the first to push successfully for serious encounters with the Nazi past – and with its residues in the present. The very forms of protest were communicative in themselves, redefining popular political participation for the era. Protesters defied efforts to manage their self-expression through narrow and what seemed often fruitless channels, for example, through formal "student councils" and other top-down methods of organizing. They engaged in an infinite range of creative forms, inspired by direct circumstances – and by the idea that serious politics could be fun – often provoking others to win attention to their concerns. Examples range from the more conventional demonstrations that filled city and village centers to protest imposition of "emergency laws" that would limit public expression, to a tiny group of Hamburg women who bared their breasts in public to garner public attention for an imprisoned co-activist and comment simultaneously on women's position in society. West Berlin's "Commune I" was one important source of inspiration for these

more provocative and "situationist" modes of protest. An example of members' provocative style is a 1967 flyer calling for the burning of department stores, so that complacent West German consumers could "feel the crispiness" of burning North Vietnamese villagers. This last example has provided ammunition for some to suggest that the larger protest movement was fundamentally violent, in character or impact, and begot in turn the physically violent acts carried out by a tiny number (primarily in the Red Army Faction) that dominated media coverage throughout the 1970s. However, this argument ignores the non-violent practices of the overwhelming number of protesters – despite the brutality they often faced from police and others. The argument also draws attention from the lasting successes of the movement, from democratization of the political culture to the breakdown of repressive norms governing social roles and relations.

Early History and Transnationalism

From the beginning, the West German movement reflected the larger movement's transnationalism, across Cold War boundaries and well beyond European borders. Unprecedented postwar mobility, coupled with likewise new heterogeneity in the country (from American GIs to Turkish "guest workers"), meant that prospective activists challenged their norms and expectations, often still as schoolchildren, through personal contact, as well as via a globalizing media. Activists borrowed the term "new left" from Britons, thereby distancing themselves from a Stalinist left after 1956 – and from the West German parliamentary left, who were perceived as uninterested in change. They were inspired by the non-violent direct action of American civil rights activists, as well as by American rock 'n' roll. They drew on notions of freedom, democracy, and authoritarianism conceived by Frankfurt School sociologists, circulating from Germany to America and back. Activists drew on examples set by Iranian, Greek, and African students on West German campuses from the late 1950s, who protested their governments back home. Thus, in 1964, German- and African-born demonstrators together decried the official visit of Congolese dictator Moïse Tschombé to West Berlin. Activists also looked to indigenous examples and traditions

of protest. In a move some see as the official start of the movement, charismatic activist Rudi Dutschke, an East German student at West Berlin's Free University, borrowed a concept from postwar peace activists, declaring in 1966 the need for an "extraparliamentary organization" (APO). The APO, explicitly imagined as bringing together a broad population well beyond students, was to provide some means of political resistance in the face of a new grand coalition government that left no parliamentary opposition – and that was led by a former Nazi party member, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger.

Intensification of Activity: 1967–1968

A watershed moment came on June 2, 1967, a moment that both disoriented those already closely involved and galvanized the participation of tens of thousands more. On this day, demonstrators peacefully assembled around the country to protest the state visit of Iranian Shah Reza Pahlevi. In West Berlin, police violently dispersed the demonstration, beating protesters and bystanders alike with billy clubs. Police killed Benno Ohnesorg, a theology student, new father, and first-time protester, shooting him in the back of the head as he knelt on the ground. This seemed to confirm activists' worst fears about the West German state, and contributed to a year of especially intense and populous activity. This included massive demonstrations against the proposed reinstatement of emergency laws (associated with Hitler's rise to power) and the international Vietnam Conference, convening in West Berlin in February 1968. The "miracle year" 1968 itself became as much a time of anguish as of hope, drawing from international and local sources, from the crushing of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, to the attempt on Dutschke's life (from which he died in 1979), to the ultimate enactment of the emergency laws. Crushed in the criminal justice system and disillusioned within, activists splintered off, a tiny few proclaiming the need for violence against "the Auschwitz generation," some joining new parties looking to East Germany or to China, and others opting for more mainstream political means, joining the Social Democrat Party (SPD), finding hope in reforms promised by new SPD chancellor Willi Brandt.

The Protest Continues

The 1970s saw a burgeoning of popular extraparliamentary activism, now manifested primarily

in underground and subcultural form. Thousands of groupings emerged across West Germany and West Berlin, from the enduring new social movements (anti-nuclear, environmental, and, above all, feminist), to the more fleeting "citizens' initiatives" forming around every imaginable cause, to experiments in lifestyle, community, education, media, production, and commerce, designed to challenge existing norms, and, for many, to build a new self from the inside out. This proliferation of a subculture was not epiphenomenal to the "60s movement" but was arguably the most popular and influential component. Indeed, despite harsh measures by Helmut Schmidt's SPD government to contain protest and an overall hysteria whipped up by the yellow press over terrorism and all protest, by the end of the decade there was an overall if grudging legitimacy of the civic right to express oneself politically beyond the ballot box and party membership (officials also lowered the voting age from 21 to 18, as in several countries during the era). Activists had gained substantial public and official attention to and action on many of the issues they had identified. Many activists coalesced in 1980 in a new formal political party, the Greens, which has worked with some success to open up the political process, and which influenced the formation of like parties in many other countries. Popular former foreign minister and Green Party leader Joschka Fischer emerged from extraparliamentary activity in the 1970s. The broader movement played a major role in inspiring and enabling the peace demonstrations of the 1980s, which brought millions of West Germans to the streets. This was the most populous and most diverse movement in German history to that time, and part of the largest international movement ever. This longer history helps challenge characterizations of 1968 as a revolution versus the product of longer-term changes in culture and politics, suggesting rather a far more interactive process. These changes in political culture, including a broader sense of politics, of what constitutes democratic participation in politics, and of the relation between the personal and the political, have in significant measure been lasting transformations.

SEE ALSO: Dutschke, Rudi (1940–1979); Germany, Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Group); Kelly, Petra (1947–1992); Situationists; Student Movements

References and Suggested Readings

- Baumann, M. "Bommi" (1979) *Terror or Love: Bommi Baumann's Own Story of His Life as a West German Urban Guerrilla*. New York: Grove Press.
- Davis, B. et al. (Eds.) (2008) *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in the 1960s/70s West Germany and US*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Dutschke, R. (1980) *Mein langer Marsch: Reden, Schriften und Tagebücher aus zwanzig Jahren*. Ed. G. Dutschke-Klotz et al. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.
- Enzensberger, U. (2004) *Die Jahre der Kommune 1. Berlin 1967–1969*. Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch.
- Fichter, T. & Lönnendonker, S. (2007) *Kleine Geschichte des SDS*. Essen: Klartext.
- Fraser, R. (Ed.) (1988) *1968: A Student Generation in Revolt*. London: Chatto & Windus.
- Kätzel, U. (2002) *Die 68erinnen*. Berlin: Rowohlt.
- Koopmans, R. (Ed.) (1995) *Democracy from Below: New Social Movements and the Political System in West Germany*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Kraushaar, W. (1998) *Frankfurter Schule und Studentenbewegung. Von der Flaschenpost zum Molotowcocktail 1946 bis 1995*, 3 vols. Hamburg: Rogner & Bernhard.
- Kraushaar, W. (2000) *1968 als Mythos, Chiffre und Zäsur*. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition.
- Thomas, N. (2003) *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A Social History of Dissent and Democracy*. New York: Berg.
- Von Dirke, S. (1997) *All Power to the Imagination! The West German Counterculture from the Student Movement to the Greens*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Whiskey Rebellion

Nathan King

In 1791 the sapling federal government, in dire need of money to pay off revolutionary war debt, imposed an excise tax on whiskey. Prior to imposition of the tax, westerners sought protection from Native American attacks and a treaty with Spain for the use of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers from the federal government. Neither of these occurred. The tax thus embittered already angry westerners, particularly Western Pennsylvanians and Virginians, against the federal government. In addition the tax had to be paid in money and not whiskey, which was frequently used as currency. Also, under the new law, tax evaders would be tried in federal court in Philadelphia. Almost immediately upon

learning of the tax, Western Pennsylvanians and Virginians voiced their dissent through petitions, protests, and the formation of democracy clubs. President Washington believed these clubs were subversive of the power of the constitution and undermined the federal government.

Through 1791 and into 1792 the protest of the tax escalated into violence against the tax collector. In an attempt to placate the rising insurrection, Congress, at the behest of Alexander Hamilton, lowered the tax rates and agreed to allow monthly payments. The rebellion continued, and by September Washington proclaimed that any organization or assemblage that obstructed federal law would be dissolved.

By 1793 collection of the excise tax had halted and the federal government had slowed because of a yellow fever epidemic that swept through Philadelphia. Rebels took the opportunity to demand the repeal of the excise tax. Their demands were not met. Radical rebellion leaders changed strategy in 1794 and harassed anyone who followed the tax law. Distillers who registered under the excise tax law were targeted. Congress took heed of the new tactics and on June 5, 1794, amended the excise tax law to allow for local trials for accused tax evaders and special licenses for small distilleries. However, that same day, Congress passed taxes on snuff and sugar and the rebels' fears of expansion of taxes came true.

By midsummer of 1794, federal agents began arresting supposed tax evaders and violence ensued. On July 16, 40 rebels surrounded the mansion of John Neville and demanded his resignation as inspector of revenue for Western Pennsylvania. Prior to his appointment Neville was against the excise tax, which spurred the rebels to believe he was bribed. The rebels advanced upon Neville's yard but were driven back by his slaves. In all, four were wounded and one killed in the skirmish. They retreated and returned later with a small army led by Captain James McFarlane. Ten federal soldiers were set to defend Neville's mansion against the rebels. After negotiations failed, rebels set fire to several estate buildings and exchanged gunfire with the troops. Hearing what he thought was a call for a parley, McFarlane came out from hiding and was shot. The troops guarding the mansion surrendered as it filled with smoke. Subsequently, rebels looted the mansion. Neville and his family escaped before the rebels entered his property. Upon hearing of McFarlane's death, rebel David

Bradford rallied militia forces at Braddock's Field and marched into Pittsburgh, intending to burn the city to the ground to send a message to the federal government. Pittsburgh residents greeted the rebels with a party-like atmosphere by offering them food, whiskey, and agreeing to banish all federalist sympathizers. Pittsburgh was spared. After the Pittsburgh incident, President Washington and Secretary Hamilton decided that the federal government must take action or else face full-scale revolution.

Although the excise tax was disobeyed throughout Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia, the most violent opposition occurred in Western Pennsylvania, and suppression of the rebellion there would send a message to other insurrectionists. Although it was decided that military coercion was the best option, Washington wanted to appear conciliatory by sending a series of peace commissioners to Western Pennsylvania to meet with insurgents. As an army was being assembled to march into Western Pennsylvania, particularly Allegheny, Westmoreland, Fayette, and Washington counties, moderate dissidents like Albert Gallatin persuaded some insurgents to stop their violence. By October 1794, a 12,000-plus army was assembled to stop the insurrection. Through October and into November the army marched into Western Pennsylvania, and the Whiskey Rebellion appeared to dissipate before its arrival. Some rebels were apprehended, but none were die-hard rebels like David Bradford because they had escaped further west. By late November, 20 rebels were sent to Philadelphia for trial and two were found guilty of treason. Washington pardoned both of them. In celebration of the end of the Whiskey Rebellion, he declared February 19 a holiday to give thanks.

Although the rebels were not successful in the immediate repeal of the excise tax, the Whiskey Rebellion, and more specifically the response from the federal government, did solve some of the region's problems. The army's westward march pumped money into the starving economy and jumpstarted it. Within a year of the rebellion westerners were given protection from Native American attacks through the Jay Treaty and the Treaty of Greenville. Furthermore, the Pinckney Treaty with Spain allowed westerners to use the Mississippi River for trading purposes. In the end the federal government asserted its power and solved the problems that had spurred

the Whiskey Rebellion. The Whiskey Rebellion also set the stage for the development of the two-party system of politics by showing the differences in thought between easterners and westerners, agriculture and commerce, and order versus liberty. In 1802 the Republican Congress repealed the hated excise tax on whiskey.

SEE ALSO: American Revolution of 1776; Fries's Rebellion; Shays' Rebellion

References and Suggested Readings

- Barksdale, K. T. (2003) Our Rebellious Neighbors. *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 111 (1): 5.
- Boyd, S. R. (Ed.) (1985) *The Whiskey Rebellion: Past and Present Perspectives*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Hogeland, W. (2006) *The Whiskey Rebellion: George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and the Frontier Rebels who Challenged America's Newfound Sovereignty*. New York: Scribner.
- Kohn, R. H. (1972) The Washington Administration's Decision to Crush the Whiskey Rebellion. *Journal of American History* 59, 3 (December): 567-584.
- Slaughter, T. P. (1988) *The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press.

White Rose (Weiße Rose)

Peter Rosenbaum

The White Rose (Weiße Rose) was an anti-Nazi resistance group founded in June 1942 by Hans Scholl and Alexander Schmorell, who were subsequently joined by Scholl's sister Sophie, Christoph Probst, and Willi Graf, all of whom were students at the University of Munich. The core group also included and was advised by philosophy professor Kurt Huber and later expanded into a network of supporters in Berlin, Freiburg, Hamburg, and Vienna. Compared to other youth opposition groups such as the Edelweiß Pirates (Edelweisspiraten) and the Swing Kids, (Swingjugend), White Rose resistance was both distinctly political and guided by religious and humanistic principles.

Motivated by their Christian sense of responsibility and their idealistic and philosophical cultural heritage, the group produced and distributed a total of six leaflets that called for resistance. These pamphlets drew on the ideas of a wide range of philosophers, theologians,

and classical writers including Aristotle, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Friedrich Schiller, and Laozi. In the first phase of activities in June and July 1942, four leaflets aimed at mobilizing the educated elite by condemning the elimination policies against the Jews and Poles, appealing to the responsibility and guilt of all Germans for the crimes perpetrated in their names, and urging passive resistance to Hitler by sabotaging arms production and war propaganda.

After Hans Scholl, Schmorell, and Probst had returned from a three-month army service at the Russian front, the core group issued its fifth leaflet in late January 1943. Instead of restricting its intended audience to the academic intelligentsia, as during its first phase, the group now focused on reaching a larger audience. The fifth leaflet, entitled “Leaflets of the Resistance Movement in Germany,” was addressed to all Germans and vehemently rejected Prussian militarism and National Socialism, calling for a federalist political structure in Germany and Europe with guaranteed civil liberties.

In the wake of the German army’s defeat in Stalingrad and the surrender of the last German forces on February 2, 1942, the White Rose entered its third and final phase of resistance activities. In their sixth leaflet, the members of the group called on their fellow students to fight against the Nazi terror. While distributing their last leaflet in the entrance hall of the University of Munich on February 18, 1943, Hans and Sophie Scholl were denounced by the building janitor and arrested by the Gestapo. On February 22, they were brought in front of the People’s Court in Berlin and, together with Probst, convicted of treason by the court’s presiding judge, Roland Freisler, one of Nazi Germany’s most infamous judges. They were executed only hours after the verdict. Later that same year, Schmorell, Graf, and Huber were sentenced and executed. Many of the other members of the group received prison sentences.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Fascist People’s Front; France, Resistance to Nazism; Germany, Resistance to Nazism; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Hitler, Assassination Plot of July 20, 1944; Jewish Resistance to Nazism

References and Suggested Readings

Axelrod, T. (2001) *Hans and Sophie Scholl: German Resisters of the White Rose*. New York: Rosen.

Chaussy, U. & Miller, F. J. (Eds.) (1991) *The White Rose: The Resistance by Students against Hitler 1942/43*. Munich: White Rose Foundation.

Moll, C. (1994) *Acts of Resistance: The White Rose in the Light of New Archival Evidence*. In M. Geyer & J. W. Boyer (Eds.), *Resistance Against the Third Reich, 1933–1990*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Scholl, I. (1983) *The White Rose: Munich, 1942–1943*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.

Wijeweera, Rohana (1943–1989)

Balasingham Skanthakumar

Patabandi Don Nandarisi Don Rohana Wijeweera was a revolutionary leader and socialist born in Kottegoda in the deep south of Sri Lanka. Later, he adopted the name Rohana derived from *Ruhuna*, the ancient name for that region. His father Don Andris Wijeweera was a stalwart of the Communist Party (CP) of Ceylon. Physical assault by right-wing United National Party (UNP) thugs on his father during the election campaign (1947) and the resulting paralysis left a lasting impression on him. While studying medicine at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow Wijeweera got embroiled in the Khrushchev-Mao ideological disputes and became a partisan of Maoism. Consequently, in 1964 he was refused re-entry to the Soviet Union and was forced to abandon his studies.

Wijeweera joined the pro-Peking group of the Ceylon CP led by N. Shanmugathasan in 1964. His political education and international experience propelled him to leadership of the youth wing of the party. From the outset he was critical of his party’s position that the majority Sinhala community would never accept leadership by Shanmugathasan, an ethnic minority Tamil. He was also frustrated by its emphasis on trade union work among the urban and Tamil plantation proletariat. As his factionalizing became more obvious, Wijeweera was expelled in 1965.

Between 1965 and 1970 Wijeweera and his co-thinkers, many of whom were contemporaries at Dharmasoka College in Ambalangoda, began conducting clandestine educational classes known as the Five Lessons and training in

armed insurrection. In 1970 this charismatic personality founded the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP, People's Liberation Front) to carry out the revolutionary seizure of state power and socialist transformation of society. But Wijeweera was arrested by the UNP government in May 1970 and was released after two months following election of the United Front coalition grouping the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), and CP (Moscow).

From early 1971 the JVP began arming itself. A state of emergency was proclaimed and Wijeweera and other leaders were arrested again on March 13, 1971. He was transferred to Jaffna in the Tamil-dominated far north to isolate him from the party. His comrades persisted with his plan for a "one day revolution" to seize state power and on April 5 there were simultaneous attacks on police stations in several districts and an abortive jail break to rescue Wijeweera.

Wijeweera's speech before the Criminal Justice Commission created to prosecute the leaders of the insurgency was his first public statement of JVP ideology and his own political evolution reflecting an eclectic blend of Sinhala nationalism and Marxism-Leninism. His life sentence was later commuted to 12 years rigorous imprisonment.

In 1977 Wijeweera was released by the UNP government following its resounding electoral victory. Between 1977 and 1983 he led the JVP's open, legal, and mass work as it became popular among the losers from economic liberalization. Once critical of participation in bourgeois democratic politics, Wijeweera contested the 1982 presidential election. He was placed third after the UNP and SLFP candidates, receiving 4.19 percent of the vote.

In July 1983 an anti-Tamil pogrom was unleashed by the UNP government but blamed on the JVP among others. Banned and driven underground, Wijeweera reverted to the earlier strategy of armed revolution. Clandestine recruitment and military training commenced. JVP ideology also shifted under Wijeweera's influence towards Sinhala chauvinism, with a greater influence on wider society than socialism and with quicker results for recruitment.

The Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987 and arrival of Indian troops in the north and east provided the fillip the JVP needed to marshal Sinhala resentment against the UNP government's political and socioeconomic policies and anxiety

over Tamil separatism into an armed youth insurgency. Two terror-filled years followed in which 40–60,000 were killed mainly by state-sponsored paramilitaries.

During the insurgency Wijeweera and his family adopted new identities and were comfortably housed and cared for by the JVP. On November 12, 1989 their hide-out was betrayed and Wijeweera was captured and executed the following day. The authorities concocted the story of an armed confrontation to explain his extra-judicial killing. Thereafter the rudderless insurgency was easily crushed. Well after his death he remains the idol of the JVP, and his images adorn JVP rallies. But former comrades sometime equate him with Pol Pot.

SEE ALSO: Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and Sri Lankan Radicalism; People's Liberation Front of Sri Lanka (JVP)


References and Suggested Readings

- Gunaratna, R. (1990) *Sri Lanka – A Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP*. Kandy: Institute of Fundamental Studies.
- Wijeweera, R. (1974) Speech before the Ceylon Criminal Justice Commission. *New Left Review* 1, 84 (March–April): 85–104.

Wilberforce, William (1759–1833)

Srividhya Swaminathan

William Wilberforce provided the anti-slavery movement with a dynamic and charismatic political force that effected change in both houses of parliament. He was born in Hull of a prosperous merchant family but decided early that he did not wish to go into trade. An indifferent student, Wilberforce discovered an interest in politics very early and became a member of parliament for Hull in the House of Commons at the age of 21. Only four years later he was elected as representative for Yorkshire, England's largest county. Even in his early political career he exhibited a zeal for reform, and he learned much about dealing with parliamentary politics. He made important political contacts, including William Pitt the younger, who became prime minister in 1783. Pitt later encouraged Wilberforce to champion the cause of abolishing the slave trade. In 1785,



William Wilberforce (1759–1833) was a British politician who led the movement to abolish the slave trade that culminated in the passage of the Slave Trade Act of 1807. Wilberforce also campaigned for the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833. Wilberforce was a member of parliament for nearly 50 years, during which time he was considered to be a moral reformer. (© Wilberforce House, Hull City Museums and Art Galleries, UK/The Bridgeman Art Library)

Wilberforce underwent a profound conversion experience and embraced evangelical Christianity. Pitt and evangelical minister John Newton, however, counseled him against giving up his political career for church life, and his religious zeal translated into a strong desire to make a positive contribution to society, which he perceived as sliding toward moral bankruptcy.

Biographical evidence conflicts on how Wilberforce first became involved with the anti-slavery cause. Wilberforce began collecting information on the slave trade sometime in 1786, alerted to the atrocities by Sir Charles and Lady Middleton and the Reverend James Ramsay. Thomas Clarkson's compelling essays prompted Wilberforce to become quite passionate about the cause, and in 1788 he became the political arm of the anti-slave trade campaign by initiating a parliamentary review of the African slave trade. Though illness temporarily kept Wilberforce from pursuing his cause, his return to parliament marked a renewed vigor as he carefully directed the inquiry into the

practices of the trade. After two years of careful research, Wilberforce made a motion to bring the bill for abolition to a vote – and was defeated. Abolition would not come for another 17 years.

Abolishing the African Slave Trade

The inquiry into the slave trade initiated by Wilberforce, and formally proposed to parliament by Prime Minister William Pitt, revealed for the first time the extent of slaveship atrocities. Speeches against the trade cited the famous cases of the slave ship *Zong*, whose captain had callously thrown overboard 132 slaves in order to collect the insurance money. Because of Wilberforce's eloquence, another captain, Kimber, was tried (but acquitted) for the murder of a slave girl on board his ship. Sentiment against the slave trade seemed to be rising; however, the revolution in France, and then the revolution in Haiti (most colonial slaveholders' worst nightmare), shifted sentiment in favor of maintaining the status quo.

Though the House of Commons defeated his bill in 1790, Wilberforce reintroduced it in 1792 only to have it pass in a moderated fashion. Henry Dundas proposed adding the word "gradual" before abolition, setting a deadline of 1796 for complete abolition. Even so, it languished in the House of Lords, giving slavery advocates time to regroup and intensify their support of the trade.

Undaunted, Wilberforce refocused his energies to directing the Sierra Leone Company under the auspices of Granville Sharp. He worked with Thomas Babington and John Clarkson (brother of Thomas Clarkson) to relocate former slaves, who fought for the British during the revolution, from Nova Scotia to West Africa.

From 1793 to 1797, Wilberforce continued to chip away at the slave trade by reintroducing bills for immediate abolition to the Commons and attempting to pass a Foreign Trade Bill limiting Britons from supplying slaves to other European colonies. However, the growing unrest in France as it systematically dismantled its monarchy created tensions in the British government that effectively blocked the passage of these subsequent abolition bills.

Toward the close of the eighteenth century, Wilberforce turned his attention to other kinds of reform. Still deeply religious, he renewed his commitment to bringing a Christian morality to

the kingdom and allowed the cause against the slave trade to lapse temporarily. The new century brought many fresh faces to the Commons that revived hope for abolition; however, the growing threat from Napoleon once again shifted attention from the cause. The bill passed the Commons in 1805 but proved too late in the term to be introduced to the Lords. Pitt’s death in 1806 brought Lord Grenville and Charles Fox, two ardent abolitionists, to power and sounded the end of the trade. Wilberforce published *A Letter on the Abolition of the Slave Trade*, marshaling all the arguments against the practice, and on March 25, 1807, parliament and the king formally agreed to end Great Britain’s participation in the trade immediately.

Moving Against Slavery

Once abolition (hypothetically, at least) took care of new slaves coming into British dominions, Wilberforce turned his attention to those currently enslaved. His concern for both the physical and spiritual welfare of slaves made him an integral contributor to the newly formed African Institution, an organization looking into slavery in the West Indies. He continued to work with the Sierra Leone Company. Wilberforce soon came to believe that only emancipation would improve the condition of slaves, so in 1823, he helped form the Anti-Slavery Society. His health failing, he still participated in the debates for emancipation in 1824. Unfortunately, health issues forced him to give up his seat in parliament and retire. Just before his death in 1833, the bill to abolish slavery seemed to have enough support to pass both houses of parliament. Though he did not live to see full emancipation achieved (1838), William Wilberforce was content that his lifelong campaign against slavery would come to a most satisfying end.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, Britain; Anti-Slavery Movement, British, and the Founding of Sierra Leone; Benezet, Anthony (1713–1784); Clarkson, Thomas (1760–1846); Equiano, Olaudah (1745–1797); Sharp, Granville (1735–1813)

References and Suggested Readings

- Blackburn, R. (1988) *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776–1848*. London: Verso.
- Brown, C. L. (2006) *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

- Carey, B. (2005) *British Abolitionism and the Rhetoric of Sensibility: Writing, Sentiment and Slavery, 1760–1807*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Davis, D. B. (2006) *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Metaxas, E. (2007) *Amazing Grace: William Wilberforce and the Heroic Campaign to End Slavery*. New York: HarperSanFrancisco.
- Tomkins, S. (2007) *William Wilberforce: A Biography*. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans.
- Wilberforce, W. (1823/1969) *Appeal to the Religion, Justice, and Humanity of the Inhabitants of the British Empire*. New York: Negro Universities Press.

Wilkes, John (1725–1797) and the “Wilkes and Liberty” movement

Jason M. Kelly

John Wilkes, the son of a Clerkenwell distiller, played a central role in the development of English radicalism during the reign of George III. Wilkes was responsible for prompting several controversies that brought an end to the “general warrant” in England as well as a reassessment of the concepts of *habeas corpus*, due process, and freedom of the press. Wilkes’s mother was a wealthy heiress of a tanner, and it is largely due to her inheritance that Wilkes received a boarding school education in Hertford. In 1744, his family sent him to the University of Leiden, but he left in 1746 without taking a degree, a common practice among the eighteenth-century elite.

Upon his return to England, Wilkes married Mary Mead, a childhood friend who was ten years his senior. Mismatched, Wilkes was an affable rake while Mary was a devout Presbyterian and recluse. With his father’s marriage present of land, in addition to his wife’s substantial trust, Wilkes set himself up as a country squire in Aylesbury. The couple was perpetually unhappy, and by 1756 they permanently separated. Their marriage resulted in the birth of a daughter in 1750. Mary, or Polly as Wilkes called her, was his closest companion throughout his life.

Wilkes was incredibly successful at cultivating the social network that he would need in the principal pursuit of his life, politics. He joined the Royal Society in 1748/9, the Sublime Society of Beefsteaks in 1754, and he became a governor



John Wilkes (1727–97) was an English radical who fought for voters' rights to determine their own representatives. As a member of parliament he advocated anti-government legislation and was often removed from office by his political enemies. Wilkes was instrumental in promoting the right of the press to publish parliamentary debates, which in turn made the workings of government a public affair. (Dover Publications)

of the Foundling Hospital in 1759. During these years, he and his close friend, Thomas Potter, engaged in the activities of the Monks of Medmenham Abbey, a club for libertines that included such notables as Sir Francis Dashwood and John Montagu, 4th Earl of Sandwich. Wilkes's introduction to parliamentary politics came through Potter in 1754. Having supported Potter's bid for an Aylesbury seat in parliament, Potter's patrons, William Pitt and Richard Grenville, 1st Earl Temple, orchestrated Wilkes's appointment to High Sheriff of Buckinghamshire. This association with the Pitt–Temple alliance led to his election as MP for Aylesbury in 1757.

Wilkes's election to parliament took place during Britain's first bleak years in the Seven Years' War. Improved British fortunes by 1759

coincided with the subsequent rise of a new monarch and his Scottish favorite, John Stuart, 3rd Earl of Bute. Wilkes and other followers of Pitt and Temple found themselves in the opposition, for which Wilkes became the leading journalist. Wilkes published the *North Briton* between 1762 and 1763, turning his acid pen against the Bute ministry, including his friends Dashwood and Sandwich, now political rivals. When Wilkes's attacks became too much for the ministry with the publication of *North Briton*, number 45, it attempted to suppress Wilkes's voice, issuing a general warrant in May 1763 and arresting 48 printers in addition to Wilkes. His arrest, despite his parliamentary privilege, and the heavy-handed approach by the ministry sparked popular resentment, especially among the middling orders. Broadside and newspapers came to Wilkes's defense, and crowds shouting "Wilkes and Liberty" were a common scene outside Wilkes's cell. By the time Wilkes was released under parliamentary privilege, he was a popular hero in London. And, even as the government attempted to build a case against him, he built a case against the arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of the printers as well as the illegal seizure of his papers.

During the spring of 1763, Wilkes helped organize 25 printers to bring suits against the government for illegal arrest and seizure of property. The printers, and later Wilkes, won their cases against the execution of the general warrant and received compensation. The precedent effectively ended the issuing of general warrants. Meanwhile, Wilkes embarked on printing a new edition of the *North Briton* as well as a scandalous poem, the *Essay on Woman*, which he and Potter had written for their fellow Monks of Medmenham Abbey. Unfortunately for Wilkes, the government was orchestrating a counteroffensive. In November, parliament, which had obtained a stolen copy of the *Essay on Woman*, declared Wilkes guilty of seditious libels in both the *Essay* and the *North Briton*. It condemned the "Forty-Five" to be burned by the hangman. Once again, however, Wilkite "mobs" came to his defense, preventing the December 3 burning of the "Forty-Five." Nevertheless, Wilkes's fate was sealed and he escaped to France, where he remained an outlaw for four years.

Wilkes's return to Britain in 1768 reveals that his popularity had not waned. Despite being imprisoned for libel and expelled from parliament,

he was undefeated in three parliamentary elections. Wilkite supporters would not have their electoral wishes denied, and they voted him a London city alderman while they petitioned for the revocation of his parliamentary expulsion. One of the best-organized Wilkite groups was the Gentlemen Supporters of the Bill of Rights, or the Bill of Rights Society. The Bill of Rights Society's initial mission was to pay Wilkes's extensive debt so that he would not find himself in debtors' prison upon his 1770 release. However, the Bill of Rights Society's interests became more general, especially under the influence of John Horne, who argued for annual parliaments and the reform of the corrupt electoral system. Unfortunately, Horne and Wilkes's relationship was acrimonious, and, in 1771, Horne split to form the Constitutional Society. The ministry would use the split to undermine radical causes in the years leading to the American War of Independence.

While Wilkes had challenged arbitrary government in the 1760s, setting important precedents, his position in London City government allowed him to permanently transform the status of the press in Britain. Long denied the right to report on parliamentary debates, the press's ability to accurately cover the government was limited. In fact, the Commons actively prosecuted several printers in 1771. Led by Wilkes, the City of London defended the printers, claiming that it alone had the right of arrest within city boundaries. With massive support, and the potential for violence should the government pursue the matter, parliament backed down, beginning the period of modern parliamentary reporting.

Despite the fact that Wilkes continued to push for reform in city and national politics – even introducing the first parliamentary reform bill in 1776 – the final decades of Wilkes's life found him increasingly criticized by the public. His role in suppressing the 1780 Gordon Riots and his ever closer association with governmental ministries suggested to many that Wilkes was no longer the radical that he was in the 1760s. A more likely assessment may be that Wilkes's political positions did not change as rapidly as the face of radicalism. Thus, Wilkes could not find common ground with the more radical supporters of the French Revolution.

SEE ALSO: Gordon "No Popery" Riots, Britain, 1780; Horne Tooke, John (1736–1812)

References and Suggested Readings

- Cash, A. H. (2006) *John Wilkes: The Scandalous Father of Civil Liberty*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Rudé, G. F. E. (1962) *Wilkes and Liberty: A Social Study of 1763 to 1774*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Sainsbury, J. (2006) *John Wilkes: The Lives of a Libertine*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Thomas, P. D. G. (1996) *John Wilkes, A Friend of Liberty*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Wilkes, J. & Potter, T. (2000) *An Essay on Woman*. Ed. A. H. Cash. New York: AMS.

Williams, Eric (1911–1981)

Rhayn Garrick Jooste

Eric Eustace Williams was prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago from 1956 to 1981, and an anti-imperialist historian who outlined a divergent theory of social development based on economics and the dynamics of slavery, based particularly on racial exploitation and the accumulated concentration of capital giving rise to modern capitalism.

Born in Trinidad, Williams' father worked for the post office. His mother's lineage was rooted in the Creole elite. He attended Queens Royal College in Port of Spain from 1931 onward, where he captained the football team and excelled academically. In 1932 he was awarded the Lone Island Scholarship which allowed him to attend Oxford, where he studied modern history and obtained his Doctor of Philosophy in 1938. Williams extended his doctoral thesis from Oxford and published it as *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944). In this book he elucidated the relationship between Britain and the West Indies from an economic perspective, based on slavery. His framework of analysis has transcended its purely historical narrative to become indispensable to the development of a Caribbean identity. Williams expounds upon the basic premise that western capitalism (based on the British experience) was founded on the slave trade; hence, the British motivation for ending slavery was economically opportune and allowed the western industrialists to limit what would have been a West Indian monopoly on sugar.

Williams immigrated to the US in 1939 to teach social and political science at Howard University as an assistant professor. He obtained full professorship in 1947 and published *Documents*

Illustrating the Development of Civilization (1947) based on his experience teaching in America. During his stay in the United States he began to work as a consultant for the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, which was established after World War II for the study of the Caribbean. In 1948 he resigned from Howard University to head the research branch within the commission. His book *The Negro in the Caribbean* (1942) was a study of the economic and social conditions of the Caribbean and reflected Williams' burgeoning interest in politics.

Williams' pan-Caribbean ideals stemmed from the period he spent traveling for the commission (1948–55); this gave him the practical experience in politics at an international level that formed the basis for his innovative reforms he would eventually implement as prime minister. His frustration at being held back in the commission pushed him into the political arena. He left the commission in 1955 due to a disagreement over policy. His first political speech, *My Relations with the Caribbean Commission* (1955), held in Trinidad, reflected his years working for the commission and his view of policy change in the Caribbean. He was a charismatic lecturer on the topic of colonialism, which he framed as the enemy of progress in Trinidad and Tobago. Utilizing middle-class tenets enabled Williams to achieve his political goals, as he addressed this social stratum, which was to become a primary disagreement with C. L. R. James (1901–89), who believed that the masses (peasants and workers) were more important from the perspective of social transformation; however, both men shared the same vision: an independent Trinidad.

Once he left the commission, Williams' political career took off; from the now-famous lectures in Woodford Square – the main square in Port-of-Spain – Williams' following grew into the People's National Movement (PNM). In 1956 the PNM won the national elections and Williams became chief minister for Trinidad and Tobago. In 1959 he became the premier, and in 1961 the prime minister. Williams continued to dominate political life in the Islands for 25 years. He was reelected several times, and directed Trinidad and Tobago into the Federation of the West Indies in 1958; however, this venture collapsed in 1962 due to internal disagreements. Later that same year, he led Trinidad to independence from the Commonwealth. Williams was able to construct a strong self-determined stance on the world's political stage due to Trinidad's growing economic

security. This was forged through his skillful policy-making and the fact that Trinidad had the highest per capita income in the Caribbean due to its local oil industry. During his tenure, however, he had to contend with trade unionist problems, a militant black power movement (which included a coup d'état in 1970), and the Tobago Independence movement.

Williams was unique in the Caribbean, as his position of power combined with his education allowed him to explore the ideals he had acquired through his intellectual studies. He was dedicated to the self-determination of the Caribbean. Williams' political agenda was broadly informed by his life experiences: industrialization for economic expansion (from his research on the Caribbean), social development (from his childhood and his experiences teaching at Howard University), liberal democracy and political development (based on the Westminster system of government in London), and finally, self-determination. Self-determination was a powerful ideal that he shared with many other Caribbean intellectuals of the 1950s and 1960s. A crowning moment was when Williams signed the treaty for the Caribbean Community and Common Market in 1973.

Williams' later books, *British Historians and the West Indies* (1964), and *From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean 1492–1969* (1970), were criticized for not being as incisive as his first, as they were more factually based. Once he left the academic environment he was unable to recapture the earlier radicalism of *Capitalism and Slavery*, as his early attraction to Marxism and socialism waned. Writing became a meditative exercise that reflected his change in occupation rather than a tool for social transformation.

Williams was an informed and methodical scholar and historian. There is an ongoing debate in the literature suggesting that his early radicalism did not persist as the basis of his political philosophy as he developed as a statesman. However, his ruling years allowed Trinidad to advance and attain self-determination in a meticulous manner, a legacy that he left to the Caribbean as a whole. He died on March 29, 1981 while still in office as prime minister. In Trinidad he is known as the Father of a Nation.

SEE ALSO: French Caribbean in the Age of Revolution; James, C. L. R. (1901–1989); Rodney, Walter (1942–1980); Trinidad, Labor Protests; Trinidad, Parliamentary Crisis

References and Suggested Readings

- Palmer, C. A. (2006) *Eric Williams and the Making of the Modern Caribbean*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Solow, B. L. & Engerman, S. L. (Eds.) (1987) *British Capitalism and Caribbean Slavery: The Legacy of Eric Williams*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, E. (1994) *Capitalism and Slavery*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Williams, E. (2006) *Inward Hunger: The Education of a Prime Minister*. New York: Marcus Weiner.

Williams, Raymond Henry (1921–1988)

Amy Hatmaker

British critic and scholar Raymond Williams is considered to be the founder of cultural studies. A man who maneuvered between two realms, he revolutionized traditional cultural interpretations.

Born August 31, 1921 in Llanfihangel Crucorney, Monmouthshire, Wales, Williams was the only child of Henry Joseph and Gwendolene (Bird) Williams. His father worked as a railroad signalman and supported the labor movement. An exceptional student, Williams received a full scholarship to study literature at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1939; however, the outbreak of World War II temporarily halted his education. Williams began his service in 1941 and would achieve the rank of tank commander, returning to England following the war.

Having already joined the Communist Party during his first enrollment at Trinity, Williams eagerly joined with other socialists in supporting the Labour Party. He graduated from Cambridge in 1946 and worked in adult education for several years at Oxford, during which time he wrote two of his most influential works, *Culture and Society 1780–1950* (1958) and *The Long Revolution* (1961). Williams returned to Cambridge as a lecturer, taught for a brief period at Stanford University, and accepted the position of Professor of Drama at Cambridge in 1974.

A prolific writer and playwright, Williams's theoretical developments reflected both his working-class upbringing and the influence of the elitism in academia. Though influenced by some conservative scholarship, Williams's work also showed his Marxist ideologies. His theoretical arguments challenged both the vehicles and purveyors of cultural interpretation. Williams argued against the traditional belief that art and

literature were the only true definers of culture, subject only to intellectual interpretation. Instead, he argued that true culture was “ordinary,” maintaining an inclusive view of both high and popular culture that provides meaning to daily life. This interpretation, known as “cultural materialism,” with its emphasis on societal experiences based on human agency, would radically alter the study of humanities.

Williams also dramatically changed the way popular culture, television especially, was viewed. His critical work *Television: Technology and Cultural Form*, published in 1974, sets out his theory that the popular medium of television is influenced by social and historical relationships. Williams saw television as a means of leveling societal divisions and a legitimate cultural form.

Williams produced hundreds of publications throughout the course of his career as well as a number of plays. He died in London, England, on January 26, 1988.

SEE ALSO: Critical Theory; Labour Party, Britain; Marxism; Socialism; Socialism, Britain

References and Suggested Readings

- Colini, S. (2004) The Literary Critic and the Village Labourer: “Culture” in Twentieth-Century Britain. *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 14: 93–116.
- Dworkin, D. & Roman, L. G. (Eds.) (1993) *Views Beyond the Border Country: Raymond Williams and Cultural Politics*. London: Routledge.
- Neal, R. S. (1984) Cultural Materialism: A Critique. *Social History* 9 (2): 199–215.
- Pendergast, C. (Ed.) (1995) *Cultural Materialism: On Raymond Williams*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Williams, R. (1989a) *The Politics of Modernism: Against the New Conformists*. Ed. T. Pinkney. London: Verso.
- Williams, R. (1989b) *Resources of Hope: Culture, Democracy, Socialism*. Ed. R. Gable. London: Verso.
- Woodhams, S. (Ed.) (2001) *History in the Making: Raymond Williams, Edward Thompson and Radical Intellectuals 1936–1956*. London: Merlin.

Williams, Robert F. (1925–1996)

Thomas Edge

Robert F. Williams was an African American civil rights activist whose tactics challenged some widely held notions of the origins of Black Power and the nature of the Southern civil

rights movement. He was born on February 26, 1925 in Monroe, North Carolina. His first taste of activism came during World War II, when he worked in Detroit with Local 600 of the United Automobile Workers of America, CIO. Between 1944 and 1955, Williams served stints in the Army and the Marines, attended three different colleges, and sought work outside the South to relocate his family. By 1955, Williams returned to Monroe and became president of the local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).

As president, Williams began to recruit among lower-class blacks, including tenant farmers and domestic workers, with a particular emphasis on young people. Williams helped organize protests against segregated facilities in town at a time when the local Ku Klux Klan (KKK) experienced a dramatic resurgence. On October 5, 1957, Williams responded to Klan violence, organizing armed resistance to a KKK motorcade when it attacked the home of an NAACP officer. The Klan members quickly dispersed, and the Monroe city council immediately banned the group's motorcades.

Several high-profile court cases brought further attention to Williams. In the 1958 "kissing case," two black boys, aged 8 and 10, were arrested and convicted for allegedly kissing a 7-year-old white girl, igniting international protests. Williams worked in 1959 on behalf of two black women assaulted by white men. When both cases were dismissed on the same day, Williams told reporters that blacks "must be willing to kill" in the absence of real justice. The NAACP immediately suspended Williams, who responded by starting a journal, *The Crusader*, that echoed his belief in armed resistance, black-owned institutions, and anti-colonialism.

In 1961, during a tense racial standoff in Monroe, a white couple drove into the black section of town. Williams took the couple into his home for their safety and was charged with kidnapping by local police. Friends helped Williams and his wife, Mabel, escape to Cuba, where Williams established a radio program, *Radio Free Dixie*. Here, Williams wrote his classic work, *Negroes with Guns*, which in turn had a tremendous impact on the development of Black Power in the late 1960s. By 1965, tensions with the Cuban government forced the couple to move to China. Williams returned to the United States in 1969 and, after a brief stint with the

University of Michigan's Center for Chinese Studies, he moved to Baldwin, Michigan, where he remained until his death on October 15, 1996.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights Movement, United States, 1960–1965; Civil Rights, United States, Black Power and Backlash, 1965–1978

References and Suggested Readings

- Joseph, P. E. (2006) *Waiting 'til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Tyson, T. T. (1999) *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Winnipeg general strike of 1919

James Naylor

In the wave of working-class rebellion that swept much of the world in the aftermath of World War I, the Winnipeg general strike stands as one of the key confrontations on the North American continent. Winnipeg, the capital of Manitoba and the largest city on the Canadian prairies at the time, was a transportation, industrial, and service hub whose boosters liked to consider the "Chicago of the North." For six weeks, from May 15 until late June, about 35,000 Winnipeg workers effectively shut down the city. The immediate cause of the strike was the refusal of the city's employers to bargain with the newly established building trades' and metal trades' federations. Consequently, the Winnipeg Trades and Labor Council organized a poll of its affiliated members, who voted 11,000 to 500 in favor of organizing a general strike.

Both the scale of the strike and the employers' response to it suggest that much more was at stake than the collective bargaining rights of two groups of workers. The majority of those who struck were not union members and had little to gain directly from their struggles. In fact, large numbers were Central and Eastern European immigrants who had largely been excluded from the craft union movement. Even the demand that employers recognize their union federations represented a move from craft unionism to a desire to build broader and more unitary working-class organizations. These developments were

rooted in local history, including a near-general strike the previous year in support of municipal workers, but largely reflected a broader frustration with the challenges of war and reconstruction. Anger at the way in which workers had sacrificed on the battlefield and suffered the effects of inflation and restricted rights while capital was enriching itself largely explains the wave of approximately 20 general strikes in towns and cities across Canada, of which Winnipeg's was the largest.

Local business and professional leaders organized the Citizen's Committee of One Thousand to fight the strike. Their newspaper, the *Citizen*, relentlessly assailed the strikers as "enemy aliens" and "Bolsheviks." When the city council dismissed the entire police force for refusing to sign a loyalty oath, the Citizen's Committee helped recruit 1,800 anti-strike "specials" to police the city. Not surprisingly, the federal government was active as well. Besides preparing a potential military response, a new immigration act was rushed through parliament in mere hours allowing for the unprecedented possibility of deporting British subjects, and a sweeping new definition of sedition was added to the criminal code. Nonetheless, the opponents of the strike had to tread carefully. They were particularly concerned that railway running trades would join the strike and cause it to spread beyond Winnipeg. Once a deal was forged with the railway unions, action was undertaken to smash the strike. Strike leaders were arrested in late-night raids in mid-June, along with a number of immigrants to give credence to the Citizen Committee's claim that it was an "enemy alien" conspiracy. On June 21, soon dubbed "Bloody Saturday," a silent parade of pro-strike returned soldiers was ferociously attacked by mounted police and "specials," killing two men and injuring dozens. Authorities shut down the strikers' paper, the *Western Labor News*. The strike ended on June 25.

Much of the debate about the strike in its aftermath and in the historiography has focused on the degree to which it represented a political challenge to capital as opposed to a simple industrial relations dispute writ large. To some extent, this was framed by the accusations by the Citizen's Committee that the strike represented a revolutionary challenge to authority, and by the explicitly political trials that followed. Facing the potential threat of martial law during the strike, the Central Strike Committee was intent on

maintaining order while the *Western Labor News* focused on rebutting the rhetorical attacks of the Citizen's Committee. In their own history of the event, written under the auspices of the Defense Committee in the context of the trials, the strike leadership explicitly denied broader political goals and focused on the assaults by the Citizen's Committee and by the state on collective bargaining as well as attacking their exaggerated and often racist rhetoric. However, the trials themselves addressed the political radicalism of several of the strike leaders.

In attempting to make the charge of seditious conspiracy against eight of the leaders, the prosecutors pointed to the participation of some of them in the Western Labor Conference in Calgary in March 1919 that had approved the general strike as a weapon to achieve the six-hour day and to oppose Canadian military intervention against the Bolshevik revolution. It was this convention that had initiated the secession of Western Canadian unions from the craft union-dominated Trades and Labor Congress of Canada into the One Big Union, a movement influenced by revolutionary syndicalist ideas. Similarly, they pointed to their active role in meetings in Winnipeg sponsored by the Socialist Party of Canada, a party that had consistently opposed the war and that saw itself as a revolutionary Marxist organization. Unsurprisingly, given an unsympathetic judge and packed jury, convictions were obtained. Still, while serving their sentences, three of them were elected to the Manitoba provincial legislature and two others who had been charged but not convicted of seditious libel were elected to the legislature and the federal parliament. Only by gerrymandering the city's ward boundaries was labor excluded from dominating Winnipeg's city council in the aftermath of the strike. The ongoing presence, for decades to come, of a strong working-class representation in civic politics, including both laborites and communists, is generally attributed to the strike.

Liberal and social democratic historians have, for the most part, accepted the argument that the strike was limited to the demand for collective bargaining rights and that the local business community simply overreacted. More recently, though, historians have come to see the strike as part of a broader social crisis, the outcome of which was very much up in the air. The strike could have easily spread along the railway lines of

western Canada and the volatile participation of large numbers of returned soldiers added a considerable measure of uncertainty. Notably, however, the sizable socialist and social democratic parties in Winnipeg, both of which were increasingly active in the previous months, had very little political presence during the strike. The failure of socialists to provide more leadership in the strike was part of the process that led to the split in socialist ranks and the emergence of the Communist Party. In the end, the strike was clearly defeated, although all working-class political currents in the city, and beyond, including the Independent Labor Party, the One Big Union, and the Communist Party, claim it as part of their heritage.

SEE ALSO: Canada, Rebellion of 1837–1838; Regina Riot; Saskatchewan Socialist Movement; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Quebec City, 2001

References and Suggested Readings

- Bercuson, D. J. (1990) *Confrontation at Winnipeg: Labour, Industrial Relations, and the General Strike*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Heron, C. (Ed.) (1998) *The Workers' Revolt in Canada, 1917–1925*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Penner, N. (Ed.) (1972) *Winnipeg 1919: The Strikers' Own History of the Winnipeg General Strike*. Toronto: James Lorimer.

Winstanley, Gerrard (1609–1676)

Soma Marik

Gerrard Winstanley was born in Wigan, Lancashire to a clothier and became a freeman of the Merchant Tailors' Company. He married Susan King, the daughter of London surgeon William King, in 1639. The Civil War and the disruption of commercial networks between London and Lancashire bankrupted this modest trader around 1643 and exposed him to the horrors, humiliations, and powerlessness of the poor in the face of eviction by landlords or speculative land purchasers. This situation awakened his radical consciousness and led him to adopt communal values.

Winstanley's early pamphlets, particularly *The Mysterie of God Concerning the Whole Creation* and *The Saints Paradise*, written around 1648, displayed a typically religious mysticism. In these

writings he was dealing with the relationship between God, the world, and humans, to understand the origins of evil and to trace the path of salvation. His view of God evolved rapidly, leading him to pantheism and then practically to materialism through rationalism. Along the way, he adopted ideas that supported a communist outlook.

In *The New Law of Righteousness* (1649) Winstanley laid the foundations of his communism. He argued that in the beginning all men and women were governed by the spirit of justice, harmony, and peace. The growth of a love of private property, however, led to the fall. Selfishness and covetousness had led to the rule of man over man. To create private property through enclosures was to live according to the law of Satan. If all were to live as brothers, the earth must be taken as the common treasury of the children of God. He advocated using lands belonging to the king, the church, and the Royalists to provide for the poor. Others before him had suggested expropriating the rich and establishing a communist society, but Winstanley systematically worked out a theory of communism that could be put into practice immediately by the activism of the landless class.

St. George's Hill

In the spring of 1649, in the aftermath of poor harvests and rising prices, Winstanley and the Leveller William Everard led activists in taking up a piece of land in St. George's Hill in the county of Surrey, to cultivate it in common. Located close to London, this place had a sustained history of radicalism. At the same time, it was not an isolated action. Buckinghamshire Levellers had issued two pamphlets calling for equality of property, and the Diggers, or True Levellers as they called themselves, began to appear in a number of places such as Northamptonshire, Hertfordshire, Middlesex, Bedfordshire, and Leicestershire.

The term "Digger" had a long pedigree, signifying resistance to enclosures. But the colony at St. George's Hill, as the first self-consciously communist colony of modern times, caused panic among the nearby prosperous farmers and landowners. Receiving a report about the activities of the Diggers, the Council of State sent a cavalry unit on April 16, 1649. In response, Digger leaders William Everard and Winstanley

appeared before General Lord Fairfax in London to explain their aims. At the meeting, Everard explained that they were peaceful and did not intend to take away any private property but only to cultivate common land. Fairfax promised that henceforth troops would not interfere in the conflict.

In the face of continuous attacks by the landlords, however, Fairfax visited the colony on May 29 and tried to persuade the men to disperse. But Winstanley responded that the poor had the right to cultivate common land, which was not privately owned. Winstanley's *A Declaration from the Poor Oppressed People of England* shows that the Diggers believed themselves outside the sphere of action of laws protecting private property and market. In a remonstrance to Fairfax, he argued that the Norman Conquest had deprived the English of their inherent right to the land, turning them into the servants of the Norman Lords. He argued that the victory in the Civil War should also profit the poor. Winstanley defined freedom widely enough to cover not only the landless, but also the interests of the small owners, who were demanding the complete abolition of feudalism. But by the spring of 1650 repeated attacks led to the collapse of the community.

The Law of Freedom

After the collapse of the Digger community, Winstanley wrote his most significant work, *The Law of Freedom in a Platform or True Magistracy Restored* (1651). In the beginning, he said, there was no private property, no class inequality. The power of enclosing land and owning property was brought about by the sword. True freedom lies in the free enjoyment of the earth. So, all laws not grounded upon equity and reason, not giving a universal freedom to all, differentiated according to persons, ought to be abolished. In the earlier writings a millenarist vision had prevailed and the state and all laws were expected to fall away rapidly. But now he decided that a period of transition would be necessary, so he drafted laws for his future society.

While Winstanley was opposed to the use of physical coercion, a new kind of force would be brought to bear through the setting up of a collectivist community. Labor available to the landlords would soon be withdrawn. Family farming by peasants could survive, but at a

lower level of efficiency than cooperative farming. Higher productivity would lead to the peaceful triumph of the collectivist communities. While land was central to his conception, he had a well thought out plan for industry as well. Though Winstanley called for the abolition of buying and selling, and the abolition of toll collection, he argued in favor of the establishment of a state monopoly of foreign trade. Collective production meant the abolition of wage labor. Crafts were to be taught by the apprentice system, one of the genuine backward elements left in his model society.

What is striking in his analysis and prescription is not just the communism, but the class analysis. He wrote that it was the labor of the common people that lifted up the landlords to rule as tyrants over them. The dedication of this book to Oliver Cromwell reflected both a note of despair and the argument that a republic (commonwealth) is incompatible with private ownership of land. The book was divided into three parts – a critique of exploitative society, arguments on the nature of the state and law, and a description of the new society. Since knowledge of God is the knowledge of his manifestation in his creation, to know the secrets of nature is to know God. The law of nature and the laws of God are the same for him. He developed the idea that every individual born in England had an equal right to maintain their lives by the fruits of their own labor, produced on land freed from private ownership.

Winstanley represented the most theoretically articulate ideologue of the far left in the English Revolution and even sought to go beyond its bourgeois democratic boundaries. For him, the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth becomes possible only by casting out the selfish, imaginary, covetous, murdering power, hence by establishment of a communist order. Winstanley accepted the need for specialized work, only arguing that the produce should be brought to shops for exchange without sale, with everyone having the right to get what he or she needed. He also accepted the right to personal property, like one's house, furniture, and items of personal use.

Winstanley clearly affirmed that women would not be property, a point of great importance owing to recurrent charges that communists wanted to hold women in common. He advocated punishment of polygamy, as well as of men who

forced sexual relations on unwilling women. But this was not just a variant of the Puritan idea of sexuality. In *The Law of Freedom* he put it very clearly that every man and woman should have the liberty to marry whom they loved, provided they had the willing consent of the other person. So it was simple marriage of trust and love, devoid of money considerations and church rituals. But he opposed divorce, fearing that it would mostly be against the interests of women, who would be abandoned along with their children. He therefore objected to the property relation in which the wife lost autonomy and became the servant of the husband. A stable family within a society where all worked and all could eat was, for Winstanley, a superior alternative to the hypocritical Puritan action where nobody recognized that the break up of the family had been caused in the first place due to poverty and male migration. Despite his progressive ideas, however, Winstanley cast women in the same patriarchal mold where they were willing and respected sources of nurturance, victims and objects of male desire, not agents in their own right.

Unlike much early communist work, Winstanley's was realist. His ideal had been developed out of concrete struggles of the propertyless poor in a revolutionary era. The Digger experiment showed a desire to convince through practical action. At the same time, his acceptance of Cromwell's Protectorate, while a step back, was a realistic move. He could not wish away what really existed. And he could not hope that a royalist restoration would look with greater kindness to his project than the republic. Defense of the republic, even though degenerated, seemed a necessary action. Politically, he wanted adult suffrage, annually elected officials, and accountability of officials before the people. By and large, punishment in his ideal community was light, though the death penalty still remained, possibly because counterrevolution could not be wished away.

SEE ALSO: Cromwell, Oliver (1599–1658); English Revolution, 17th Century; English Revolution, Radical Sects

References and Suggested Readings

Barg, M. A. (1990) *The English Revolution of the 17th Century Through Portraits of its Leading Figures*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

- Boulton, D. (2000) *Gerrard Winstanley and the Republic of Heaven*. Hobsons Farm, Dent, Cumbria: Dales Historical Monographs.
- Hill, C. (1985) *The World Turned Upside Down*. London: Penguin Books.
- Sabine, G. H. (Ed.) (1941) *The Works of Gerrard Winstanley*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Shulman, G. M. (1989) *Radicalism and Reverence: The Political Thought of Gerrard Winstanley*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Sutherland, D. R. (1991) The Religion of Gerrard Winstanley and Digger Communism. In *Essays in History*. Corcoran Department of History at the University of Virginia. Available at www.etext.lib.virginia.edu/journals/EH/EH33/suther33.html (accessed November 12, 2007).

Wirat Angkathawon (1921–1997)

Pierre Rousset

The Kingdom of Thailand entered into a period of turmoil in 1973 when the military dictatorship was overthrown. Wirat Angkathawon, at the age of 42, became a principal leader of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and a distinctive representative of the militant post-World War II generation.

Wirat was born in 1921 in Bangkok to a family of Chinese origin from the town of Swatow, a port in the South of China. Although relatively affluent, his family encountered financial difficulties due to his father's health problems. After studying in a Chinese school, Wirat joined the communists and began working in a match factory in 1940. Subsequently, Wirat was sent to the South of Thailand, meeting his future wife, Somphon, from a Sino-Thai trading family from the southern province of Patthalung. Somphon spent a short period in China for studies and became a member of the Communist Party in 1943. Wirat returned to Bangkok in 1944 and was elected to the Central Committee of the CPT and the political department at the second congress in 1952. He was re-elected to the Central Committee and elected to the five-member secretariat of the CPT at the third congress in 1961.

From 1950 to 1951 Wirat resided mostly outside of Thailand, in China and Laos or in mountain bases on the border of Thailand. He first studied at the Marxist-Leninist Institute in Peking and returned to Thailand in 1957–8 and

regularly went to China for Communist Party meetings. From 1965 to 1976 Wirat lived alternatively in China and a remote base of Nan in northern Thailand. Wirat settled in Laos where he led the “re education” of the dissident cadres of “the region of three provinces” (Phetchabun-Phitsanulok-Loei) before traveling to China in the late 1970s. In 1982 he joined a base of CPT to participate in the fourth congress.

Wirat used the pseudonyms of Comrade Than, Jang Yuan, and Tho Phianwithhaya. It was under this last name that he signed, in 1978, the principal document analyzing the history of the CPT from the point of view of his leadership. He was the writer of important official declarations of the party.

Wirat Angkhathawon advanced the prestige of the CPT among the generation of Thai radicals in the 1970s. The CPT was the only Thai party successfully to organize resistance against the military dictatorship, and was widely recognized for its political and economic integrity. But after 1978 the CPT entered a period of crisis when the People’s Republic of China moved decisively toward a market, pro-capitalist economy. The CPT’s staunch “pro-Chinese” stance impaired the party’s reputation among leftists and youths in Thailand.

In late 1982 Wirat suffered a stroke. After hospitalization in Bangkok, he returned to China in 1983 for treatment before his death on June 16, 1997.

SEE ALSO: Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Thai Communist Party; Thailand, Popular Movements 1980s–Present

References and Suggested Readings

- Jeamteerasakul, S. (2003) *Prawat pho kho tho chabab pho kho tho* (History of CPT by the CPT). *Fa dieo khan* January–April (part 1) and May–June (part 2). Phianwithhaya, T. (2003) The History of Our Party and Some of its Lessons. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, October 1.

Witbooi, Hendrik (ca. 1825–1905)

Tilman Dederling

Hendrik Witbooi was born into a prominent family of the Witbooi Nama, a subgroup of the southern African Khoekhoe, who roamed the

northern frontier region of the Cape Colony as pastoralists, hunters, and cattle-raiders. Hendrik was educated by European missionaries and was profoundly influenced by their religious teachings. He was highly literate and communicated in writing to other Namibian chiefs and German officials. Witbooi became famous as an exceptional leader seeking to maintain the independence of his people from colonial intruders. In contemporary Namibia, Hendrik Witbooi is officially commemorated as among the most important figures in the anti-colonial struggle.

In 1863 the Witboois moved away from the advancing colonial frontier in South Africa to settle at Gibeon in southern Namibia. The Witboois consolidated their position as an important force in the predatory relations among Nama groups in the south and the Herero cattle breeders in central Namibia. Hendrik groomed his leadership qualities performing important functions in the Christian community. He also sharpened his martial skills as leader of the Witbooi commandos, which maintained paramilitary structures that were a hallmark of the political organization of the Khoekhoe in Namibia. In 1880 Hendrik nearly died in a clash with the Herero, crediting his narrow survival through spiritual revelation. Hendrik subsequently viewed himself as a Christian prophet chosen by God as a leader in Namibia.

In response to armed Herero resistance he could not realize his ambitious dream of unifying southern and central Namibia under his supreme command. Instead, he consolidated his dominance among southern Namibians through diplomatic and military campaigns from the late 1880s. In 1889 Hendrik established a new residence at Hornkrans in central Namibia, from where he conducted raids on the Herero. The Germans, who had annexed the territory in 1884, regarded Hendrik as the major obstacle to consolidating German rule. In contrast to most Namibian chiefs, Witbooi vehemently refused to sign any “protection treaty” with the colonial rulers. In 1893 German troops attacked Hornkrans, but Witbooi escaped to launch attacks on the invaders until his resources were depleted. In 1894 Hendrik was forced into accepting cooptation into the German system of indirect rule. He was required to return to his old settlement at Gibeon as a salaried headman, and actively support several German military expeditions against other African groups. He could not

prevent the loss of ownership of large tracts of land to white settlers, compounding the economic hardships of the Witboois and intensifying their disempowerment. When the Herero rose against colonial rule in 1904, Hendrik initially remained committed to his treaty with the Germans. However, as the German military campaign against the Herero turned into genocide, Hendrik severed relations with the colonialists even as settlers were calling for his elimination.

Hendrik's millenarian tendencies, dormant for many years, were reignited by an itinerant colored prophet from South Africa envisioning white colonial rule coming to an end soon. Many German officials clung to an idealized image of Hendrik Witbooi as a noble savage who learned to settle into an inferior but honorable position in the colonial system. Thus, Germans were shocked when the Witboois and their allies launched a bitter guerrilla war in October 1904. On October 29, 1905 Hendrik Witbooi was wounded in a skirmish with German soldiers and died of his injuries about two weeks later.

SEE ALSO: Namibia, Struggle for Independence; South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC

References and Suggested Readings

- Dedering, T. (1993) Hendrik Witbooi, the Prophet. *Kleio* 12: 54–78.
- Drechsler, H. (1980) *Let Us Die Fighting: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against German Imperialism (1884–1915)*. London: Zed Books.
- Lau, B. (1989) *The Hendrik Witbooi Papers*. Trans. A. Heywood & E. Maasdorp. Windhoek: National Archives of Namibia.
- Steinmetz, G. (2007) *The Devil's Handwriting. Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wollstonecraft, Mary (1759–1797)

Rachel Finley-Bowman


Mary Wollstonecraft was an author, educator, and journalist whose influential work *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792) became the foundation of modern rights-based feminism. She championed equal education for women and equality in marriage. In all cases, she strove to disprove any notions of female inferiority.

Wollstonecraft was born in London to a middle-class family in April 1759. The second born and eldest girl of seven children, Wollstonecraft's early years were marked by her father's repeated business failures and by an intense rivalry with her older brother, the family heir. Edward John Wollstonecraft, an apparent alcoholic and purveyor of physical and emotional abuse, squandered away the family's wealth through a series of failed ventures, creating a foreboding atmosphere of domestic enmity and financial uncertainty. In response to her husband's tyranny, Elizabeth, Mary's mother, became cold and withdrawn, leaving Wollstonecraft and her siblings with little support.

These years of familial discord and the constant upheaval associated with her father's schemes took their toll on an adolescent Wollstonecraft. Her perspective on men and marriage became skewed, as she blamed her mother's descent into cowardly acquiescence upon her father. She repeatedly vowed never to marry, and grew increasingly disillusioned by the limitations imposed by her gender. Wollstonecraft possessed an innate desire to learn, but because of family and social circumstances it was left largely unfulfilled. Opportunities and privilege were only given to her eldest brother Edward. Yet, by her own determination, she resolved to emancipate herself from this experience, using education as her liberator. Against her parents' wishes, she left home in 1778, seeking employment, and more importantly, solace, as a companion to the Widow Dawson of Bath. She hoped this new position would provide both stability and the opportunity to pursue greater academic study.

Nonetheless, this time in Bath would be brief, as a series of family tragedies forced Wollstonecraft to return to London in 1780. She nursed her dying mother and tended her sister Eliza, who suffered from post-partum depression. Four years later she opened a school for girls in Islington with the help of her childhood friend and confidant, Fanny Blood. The school was initially successful, affording Wollstonecraft cherished opportunities for scholarship, intellectual growth, and interaction with the local liberal intelligentsia of the Enlightenment period. Yet Blood's marriage in 1785 would uproot this period of relative calm.

Fanny Blood moved to Portugal with her new husband, eventually falling ill, and Wollstonecraft abandoned her work to tend to her



Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–97) was a leading eighteenth-century British feminist and writer. In 1792 she published *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* in which she argued that women were not naturally inferior to men. Wollstonecraft is considered a founder of feminist philosophy and served as an inspiration for a global feminist movement into the twenty-first century. (Private Collection/The Bridgeman Art Library)

ding friend. When she returned to England the following year, her school was in financial ruin. Wollstonecraft closed the institution, channeling her frustrations about the experience, and women's lack of opportunities in general, in her first work, *Thoughts on the Education of Daughters* (1787). Now seemingly destitute, she reluctantly accepted the position of governess to the daughters of Viscount Kingsborough. She moved to Ireland that same year to fulfill her duties and, despite publishing her first novel, she remained confined and unhappy. She lasted only 12 months in the position, with the apparent confirmation that the actions of idle, aristocratic females such as Lady Kingsborough contributed little to the advancement of women or society. Such ideas shaped her later writings and critiques on feminine behavior.

Upon her return to London, Wollstonecraft joined the editorial staff of the *Analytical Review*, the radical philosophical magazine of her publisher, Joseph Johnson, in 1788. Through her connections to the magazine, Wollstonecraft interacted with many of Johnson's influential

friends, including the political theorist William Godwin. Her ideas and concerns began to grow during this period beyond the specific injustices experienced in her own life because of men, inadequate education, and the burdens of marriage and motherhood to the broader plight of oppressed women everywhere. With the French Revolution dawning, Wollstonecraft seized upon the opportunity to make a significant comment about the role of women, or at least their perceived role, writing *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* in 1792. This work openly celebrated women as moral, rational, and strong beings worthy of education, autonomy, and equal rights, decrying their historical subjugation and exploitation.

Her main argument in *Vindication* was built upon the "simple principle" that if woman "be not prepared by education to become the companion of man, she will stop the progress of knowledge and virtue." She contended that education represented the path of emancipation for all women, just as it had been for her personally, and that in every role, whether wife, mother, or other, their positions would be improved. Wollstonecraft called for women to share equal rights with men and be perceived as independent, rational beings that were held to, and judged by, the same virtues, standards, and concepts of morality. Reflecting her radical political views, she condemned despotism of all kinds, whether carried out by a king, father, or husband, and urged the overthrow of arbitrary power for the rewards of social equality. These arguments demanded profound change at most levels of society, beginning with the reconstruction of traditional gender roles. Popular but controversial, *Vindication* challenged the opinions and theories of many Enlightenment thinkers, most notably Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

On the excitement generated by this publication Wollstonecraft left for France to join the cause of the Revolution and continue writing. Her work was ironically interrupted, however, by a passionate love affair with American businessman Gilbert Imlay. Although married, the relationship with Imlay consumed Wollstonecraft, taking her across Europe and leading to the birth of their daughter, Fanny, in May 1794. The affair eventually cooled, prompting Wollstonecraft to attempt suicide. She later relayed the torture of this relationship in *Letters Written During a Short Residence in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark* in 1796.

Later that same year Wollstonecraft was reintroduced to William Godwin. The two, who had met years earlier, now became close friends and lovers. Despite earlier protestations to the contrary, she married Godwin in a private ceremony in March 1797, and in August gave birth to a daughter. The delivery was difficult and Wollstonecraft died of a subsequent infection ten days later. Godwin published Wollstonecraft's final novel, *Maria, or The Wrongs of Woman* (1798), posthumously and wrote a memoir of her life as homage to her extraordinary contributions.

Unfortunately, the publication of Godwin's *Memoirs of Mary Wollstonecraft* had the opposite effect. It damaged Wollstonecraft's reputation by exposing the full details of her extramarital affair with Imlay and Fanny's illegitimacy. Branded as wanton and immoral, she was viciously attacked from all sides for her unconventional life choices. The scandalous revelations of this work eventually eclipsed the larger social relevance of *Vindication* and her other writings. Nineteenth-century feminists even rejected her theories on education and women's rights, fearing the taint of her conduct would jeopardize their own causes. Such perceptions only shifted with the passage of time.

Feminists of the early twentieth century, particularly suffragettes whose own personal experiences had paralleled those of Wollstonecraft, embraced her contributions to the women's movement, placing her in the venerated position she enjoys today. Wollstonecraft became seen as a pioneer for the cause of gender equality and independence who attempted to model change by example, regardless of the consequences. Her philosophy on education became particularly relevant, with its emphasis upon rational self-improvement and the acquisition of knowledge. To her, education represented the basic foundation of reform and civic progress, and its perpetual absence had relegated women to historical inferiority, unable to realize their true potential. Eradicating these stifling social constructs would afford women, including her daughters, the opportunity fully to explore the possibilities of their own identities, becoming better wives, mothers, and citizens of the world. (Her younger daughter, in fact, later grew up to become the famed author of *Frankenstein*, Mary Shelley.) Two hundred years after her death, Wollstonecraft's broad message of reform continues to transcend experi-

ence and situation, inspire political action, and facilitate theoretical debate.

SEE ALSO: French Revolution, 1789–1794; Godwin, William (1756–1836); Women's Movement, Britain

References and Suggested Readings

- Gordon, L. (2005) *Vindication: A Life of Mary Wollstonecraft*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Jacobs, D. (2001) *Her Own Woman: The Life of Mary Wollstonecraft*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Todd, J. (2000) *Mary Wollstonecraft: A Revolutionary Life*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Tomalin, C. (1992) *The Life and Death of Mary Wollstonecraft*. New York: Penguin.
- Wardle, R. M. (1951) *Mary Wollstonecraft: A Critical Biography*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.

Woman's Christian Temperance Union

Carolyn DeSwarte Gifford

The Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) was the largest women's organization in the United States at the turn of the nineteenth century. Its leaders mobilized several hundred thousand women in a fight against what the WCTU perceived as the danger to American society of excessive alcohol use, especially to its most vulnerable members – women and children.

Temperance reform in America began at the beginning of the nineteenth century, resulting in significant lowering of liquor consumption before the Civil War. However, drunkenness rose in the postwar era due to several factors, especially the development of a nationally powerful liquor industry with the encouragement of the federal government that relied heavily on revenue from taxes on liquor dealers. By the late 1860s temperance reformers geared up again to fight the liquor business and its government allies.

The WCTU emerged out of the Ohio Women's Temperance Crusade of 1873–4, a spontaneous uprising of Protestant church women marching to protest the sale of alcohol in the saloons that lined the main streets of their communities. The Crusade rapidly spread throughout the Midwest, the Northeast and the far West. In the wake of this protest women called for a national organization to carry on the work of the Crusade. The National WCTU was

founded in November 1874 and its leadership labored to recruit members into the temperance ranks and create a strong, active network of local and state WCTUs.

The WCTU was the first national temperance group comprised solely of women, neither dominated nor directed by men. Its founding marked the rise of female leadership in the campaign for prohibition of the sale of alcohol. The WCTU trained women to be change agents, skilled at influencing institutions at all levels of society – governmental, economic, social, and religious. After its most famous leader Frances Willard became president of the organization in 1879, she widened its agenda to address the issue of women's equality in all aspects of life. She also extended its reach throughout the nation and globally with the founding of the World's WCTU in the mid-1880s.

By the early 1880s the WCTU endorsed women's suffrage, demanding "The Ballot for Home Protection" as a tool for enacting prohibition legislation and also from a belief in women's right to full citizenship. Working closely with other temperance organizations, the WCTU campaigned for statewide prohibition in many areas of the country and began to call for a national prohibition amendment in the mid-1880s. Doubting that either of the two main political parties – Democratic or Republican – would endorse prohibition and women's suffrage, the organization entered the arena of third-party politics. By 1884 it had swung its considerable weight and influence behind the Prohibition-Home Protection Party, which espoused the WCTU's two primary aims.

During the last two decades of the nineteenth century the organization became a powerful pressure group, influencing the American political process at all levels, even though its membership still could not vote. The formidable lobbying skills the WCTU developed in working with state legislatures and Congress were quickly copied by other reform groups. In what were perhaps its two most significant legislative victories during the period, the WCTU succeeded in convincing most states to institute temperance education in the public schools and raise the age of consent for female sexual activity to 16 years or older. These victories reflected the organization's concern to develop a new generation of temperance reformers and to protect girls from rape.

By the late 1880s Willard began to address the glaring issue of poverty, decrying the great gap between the few rich and the many poor. She led her organization to champion the aims of the rising labor movement, focusing particularly on the plight of women and child workers. By the 1890s Willard herself espoused Christian socialism, believing it to be the best way to tackle the economic inequities of the Gilded Age and bring justice to the poor. Although some of the WCTU's members agreed with Willard in this analysis, the organization as a whole did not. Some members began to call for narrowing its scope to the single issue of prohibition.

After Willard's death in 1898, WCTU leaders joined with the Anti-Saloon League in the final push for national prohibition. With the passage of the Eighteenth (Prohibition) Amendment in 1918 and the Nineteenth (women's suffrage) Amendment in 1919, the two most enduring aims of the organization were achieved. Following the prohibition victory, WCTU enjoyed great popularity and attained a membership of 500,000. However, with the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1933, the organization began to lose both power and prestige. The WCTU still exists in the twenty-first century but its membership has shrunk to below 5,000 and has become politically and socially conservative. Yet its aim of educating against substance abuse remains important.

SEE ALSO: Women's Movement, United States, 16th–18th Centuries; Women's Movement, United States, 19th Century; Women's Movement, United States, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Blocker, J. S., Jr. (1989) *American Temperance Movements: Cycles of Reform*. Boston: Twayne.
- Bordin, R. (1981) *Woman and Temperance: The Quest for Power and Liberty*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Gifford, C. D. & Slagell, A. R. (Eds.) (2007) *Let Something Good Be Said: Speeches and Writings of Frances E. Willard*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Gordon, E. P. (1924) *Woman Torch-Bearers: The Story of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union*. Evanston, IL: National Woman's Christian Temperance Union.
- Series III – Woman's Christian Temperance Union (1977) *The Temperance and Prohibition Papers* (microfilm edition). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Women in the 1848 Revolution, Poland

Edyta V. Materka

The *Entuzjastki* (Enthusiasts) were a small, organized faction of Polish female writers, educators, and conspirators whose activism, centered in Russian-occupied Warsaw, generated the first, second, and third waves of what became known as the women's movement in partitioned Poland from the 1840s to the 1880s. Their name was coined by Enthusiast leader Narcyza Żmichowska (pseudonym Gabryella) in the 1870s. Since many scholarly works written about the Enthusiasts did not survive World War II, there are very limited resources available, and the scope of interpretation concerning the Enthusiasts' political and social influence has been disputed among scholars.

What is known and agreed upon about the Enthusiasts is that the group of women emerged in one of the most tempestuous periods of Polish history. Their activities were vested in the midst of the country's uprisings, insurrections, conspiratorial activities, and peasant rebellions against the Russian occupation. Although the Enthusiasts introduced the idea of women's emancipation in Poland, the movement never broke through the survivalism barrier of promulgating the nationalistic identity and women's integral role as mothers in raising the next Polish generation to fight against the occupying forces during Poland's politically tumultuous times.

The Enthusiasts organized prior to the failure of Poland's November Insurrection in the 1830–1 Uprising (Cadet Revolution) against the Russian government, which resulted in the emigration of over 9,000 defeated, male, leftist leaders, noblemen, and conspirators. The emigration unshackled traditional fetters that bound upper-class women's lives to the private, familial sphere of proper conduct. As a result, the Enthusiasts were able to produce a unique literary and social movement of public female dialogue which complicated the traditional values and virtues that defined the power structure of the *szlachta* (noble classes of Polish society) taught by famous pedagogues of the day such as Stanisław Jachowicz and Klementyna Hoffmanowa. The Enthusiasts founded schools, taught, became

involved in charitable activities, undertook editorial work, wrote, carried out lively correspondence, organized social life, and distributed illegal literature.

Some notable Enthusiasts, including Narcyza Żmichowska, Tekla Dobryznka, Bibiana Moraczewska, Wincenta Zablocka, Faustyna Morzycka, Emilia Gosselin, and Paulina Zbyszewska, were unmarried noblewomen from land-owning families and were economically forced to engage themselves in educational and civic activities in order to financially support themselves. They were neither anti-male nor isolationist, as they had non-marital relationships with men and extended their conspiratorial networks with male insurgents. According to Narcyza Żmichowska's letters, however, the Enthusiasts did not have a shared dogma or creed but were rather united by "sincere friendship" even if they had opposite principles.

Ideologically, however, the Enthusiasts, influenced by George Sand, Fourier, Saint-Simon, and other French feminist resistance writers, propagated post-Enlightenment ideas of liberation in monthly literary journals such as *Przegląd Pedagogic* (Pedagogical Review) and *Przegląd Naukowy* (Scientific Review) where they announced their objectives in seeking "truth and goodness, independent action, economic self-sufficiency, access to higher education, and social and legal freedom." They were supported by Eleonora Ziemiańska, editor of a philosophical and literary monthly, *Pielgrzym* (Pilgrim), and of *Mysli o wychowaniu kobiet* (Thoughts about the Conditioning of Women), and opposed by a group of public female activists named the "Lionesses" and female-represented popular magazines such as *Pierwiosnek* (Primrose) and *Biblioteka Warszawska* (Warsaw Library).

In 1848, the Enthusiasts participated in nationalistic conspiratorial organizations such as Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie (Polish Democratic Society), Stowarzyszenie Ludu Pulsing (Polish People's Association), and Związek Plebejuszy (Plebeian Association), which incited the Greater Poland Uprising of 1848 against the occupying Prussian forces. The crucial link between the Enthusiasts and the artisans' conspiracy was Żmichowska's role as the emissary who met with famous insurgents Karol Libelt (father of the word "intelligentsia") and Ludwik Mierosławski, but also others who plotted toward the assassination of the Russian

tsar. Although the nature of Żmichowska's role in actively carrying out conspiratorial activity is unknown, when she was arrested by the tsarist secret police, she denied the accusations and was kept in a Lublin prison for three years. The Russian government's incessant arrests of male and female conspirators until the early 1850s led to the eventual end of the Enthusiasts' political work.

SEE ALSO: Hungary, Women Radicals, 1848–1849; Polish Revolution of 1830; Women and National Liberation in Africa; Women in the Russian Revolution; Women in the Solidarity Movement, Polish Underground

References and Suggested Readings

- Borkowska, G. (2001) *Alienated Women: A Study on Polish Women's Fiction 1845–1918*. New York: Central European University Press, pp. 23–54.
- Lorence-Kot, B. & Winiarz, A. (2004) The Polish Women's Movement to 1914. In S. Paletschek & B. Pietrow-Ennker (Eds.), *Women's Emancipation Movements in the Nineteenth Century: A European Perspective*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 206–20.
- Women in Poland during the 1848 Revolution. In *Encyclopedia of 1848 Revolutions*. Available at www.ohiou.edu/~Chastain/rz/womenpol.htm.

Women and national liberation in Africa

Alicia C. Decker

African liberation from colonial rule was the product of years of intense negotiation, compromise, and armed struggle. In 1957, Ghana became the first Sub-Saharan African country to receive independence. As president and “father of the nation,” Kwame Nkrumah symbolized liberation and potential to Africans across the continent. The following year, in 1958, Guinea's independence brought to power another important nationalist figure – Sékou Touré. Like Nkrumah, Touré personified the hopes and possibilities of the new nation. Shortly thereafter, others who also represented African independence and autonomy joined them: Patrice Lumumba (Zaire), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), and Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia). But “big men” were not the only ones responsible for their countries' liberation; many women also struggled

alongside men for independence. In most cases, however, they agreed to put gender demands aside until the struggle was over. Few women assumed that their significant contributions would be forgotten; yet this is exactly what happened in country after country. For this reason, it is fair to say that African liberation was partial at best.

Colonialism and Women's Struggles for Liberation

African women have a long history of instigating and participating in resistance actions against the colonial state. Throughout the colonial era, they struggled against discriminatory policies and practices. Many of their efforts were non-violent, relying instead on “traditional” methods of peaceful confrontation. At other times, however, women actively engaged in protracted guerilla struggles, both in combat and in supportive capacities.

Harry Thuku Riot (Kenya)

In the 1920s, Harry Thuku and his political party – the East African Association – championed the grievances of Africans living under British colonial rule in Kenya. They struggled against taxation, forced labor, and pass laws. Thuku and his party also resisted the lack of land ownership for Africans and the forced removal of young girls for employment in settler plantations. The colonial power structure saw Thuku's activism as a threat and arrested him on March 14, 1922. Soon after, a large crowd gathered outside the police station demanding justice. Kenyan women were outraged when African male leaders failed to secure Thuku's release. One woman responded by exposing her genitals to the offending party, a traditional Kikuyu insult known as *Guturama*. Tabitha Kanogo (1987) argues that *Guturama* was the ultimate recourse for those who were consumed by anger, frustration, humiliation, and revenge (see also Wipper 1989). The woman then challenged the group of men to hand over their trousers as symbols of their manhood to signify that they were incapable of handling the situation effectively. The gathered women ululated in support and prevented the crowd from dispersing. Police opened fire, killing 21 people, including four women. Although the women were ultimately unable to release Thuku, their use of *Guturama* was a powerful challenge to the male monopoly of political power and colonial rule.

Igbo Women's War (Nigeria)

Nigerian women also relied on traditional forms of non-violent protest to resist British colonial rule. In November 1929, thousands of Igbo women collectively organized against "warrant chiefs," a group of Nigerian men who served as the functionaries of indirect rule. The band of women "sat" on the chiefs, singing, dancing, and following them everywhere. The women ordered the chiefs to turn over their red felt caps, which were important symbols of their allegiance to British colonial rule. If the chiefs gave up their caps without a fight, the women levied a fine and verbally abused everyone within the compound. If the chiefs refused to submit to their demands, the women damaged property and threatened physical violence. In the end, however, they were the only ones injured; British colonial soldiers killed more than 50 women. The Igbo Women's War is a classic example demonstrating how women used traditional forms of protest and how oblivious colonial officials were to the meanings and significance of their actions (Bastian 2002; Van Allen 1976).

Kabaka's Protest (Uganda)

In 1953, the British colonial government deported the Kabaka of Buganda because of his opposition to the proposed East African Federation. The king refused federation and insisted on independence for his kingdom. The British governor, however, felt that the Kabaka was impeding the transition to independence with his obstinacy. He believed that by removing the king from power, a more progressive nationalism would emerge. The governor was sorely mistaken. After the Kabaka was deported, several members of the Mothers' Union formed a subsidiary group called the Mothers of the Nation, traveling throughout the country and rallying support for the king. Eventually, they organized three busloads of women to protest before the governor. The women assembled at the governor's mansion in mourning dress, refusing to sit on chairs, drink tea, or speak in English. They gave the governor a memorandum, chastising him for not consulting the "Mothers of the Nation" before taking action. The Baganda, they argued, were the only ones with the right to dethrone their king. Surprisingly, the governor was receptive to the women's demands and agreed to meet with the Buganda parliament about the matter. He later conceded that Uganda should become an inde-

pendent state and within two years, the king was permitted to return from exile. In 1962, the country gained independence and the Kabaka was elected the nation's first president.

Forms of Resistance

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, many African nations achieved independence after years of intense political negotiation and compromise. A handful of others, however, were unable to celebrate the turning tide because they remained under the grip of colonial rule. They were left with no alternative but to launch revolutionary wars of liberation. The armed struggle against the Portuguese was particularly brutal, though after the Caetano regime was overthrown in 1974, Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau soon won their independence. In 1980, Zimbabwean freedom fighters forced out the white settler regime and ten years later, Namibians were released from the shackles of South African occupation. In 1993, Eritrea gained autonomy from the imperialist grasp of Ethiopia, and in 1994 South Africa held its first multiracial democratic elections. African women were active participants in all of these struggles. The problem, however, was that many of the promises of liberation made to women during the struggle were broken once the wars were won. This has been a major source of contention for African women and continues to stoke their activism today.

How did women contribute to the liberation struggles? Despite the popular image of the female revolutionary with a baby strapped on her back and an AK-47 across her chest, relatively few women participated in direct combat. During Algeria's liberation struggle from France, for instance, only 0.5 percent of women in the army were combatants. Even in contexts where the percentage of women fighters was significantly higher, such as in Zimbabwe or Eritrea, most women played supportive roles. Many used their femininity subversively by carrying weapons underneath their skirts or in their babies' nappies. Because existing gender norms viewed women primarily as wives and mothers, they were not suspected of subversive activity. At the same time, many women provided vital logistical support such as cooking, cleaning, and doing laundry for the comrades. Though less glamorous, these activities were crucial to the success of the struggle. Despite the importance of their involvement,

both on the frontlines and in non-combative roles, there is agreement among scholars that women's emancipation has been limited at best.

Women's Movements in Postcolonial Africa

Women's movements in Africa are broadly categorized as either welfare-oriented or feminist, depending on their ideological orientation. Because emphasis may shift over time, it is difficult to classify any given movement. Nevertheless, it can be generally argued that the first type of women's movement seeks to improve women's welfare, but does not necessarily challenge existing gender inequalities. Instead, it strives to make women's lives easier by increasing their efficiency and productivity. Feminist women's movements, on the other hand, seek to fundamentally alter the existing patriarchal gender order. They question the inequitable distribution of power and resources and seek radical transformation of the status quo.

Autonomy from government intervention or co-optation has been a major challenge for women's movements in Africa. Without the ability to set their own agenda, women's groups have been deradicalized. In Mozambique, for example, women played an active role in the anti-colonial struggle against the Portuguese. As early as 1964, women joined the liberation movement as part of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Although they were initially barred from guerilla training, women fought for the right to participate in combat operations. In 1966, FRELIMO established a Women's Detachment, giving women the opportunity to become actively involved in the armed struggle. By 1968, women were considered candidates for minor leadership roles within the army, though they were still excluded from top leadership positions within the movement.

"The woman question" became increasingly important as the struggle intensified. FRELIMO theorized that the root of women's oppression was the capitalist system of labor exploitation, which promoted cultural practices that were harmful to women, such as bridewealth and polygamy. In 1973, they created the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) "to guarantee the implementation of women's emancipation as defined by the Frelimo Party" (Sheldon 1994: 33).

Because of their Marxist orientation, they believed that women would be emancipated through the national liberation struggle. The major problem was that the party, not the women themselves, articulated women's liberation. As a result, women were seen primarily as wives, mothers, and workers. After winning independence in 1975, the OMM became the official "women's wing" of the FRELIMO government. Although women were technically incorporated into the political arena, they lacked the autonomy to set their own agenda. As a result, most OMM projects reinforced "traditional" social expectations about women's roles as wives and mothers. In 1991, after Mozambique became a multiparty state, the OMM broke away from FRELIMO and registered as a non-governmental organization. For the first time since its inception, OMM could advocate solely for women's rights. Unfortunately, its ability to function as an independent organization was seriously compromised by funding obstacles. In 1996, the group decided to realign with the government. The extent to which the OMM can now advance its own agenda is debatable.

The Nigerian women's movement also has inextricable links to the state, resulting from a pattern known as "wifeism" (Abdullah 1995) or "the cult of the first lady" (Amadiume 2000). In response to the demands of the UN Decade for Women (1975–85), the government of Ibrahim Babangida established the National Committee on Women and Development in 1982 to serve as a liaison between state and non-governmental organizations. The committee initiated a variety of projects that were designed to improve rural women's lives, including home economics, arts and crafts, health and hygiene, literacy, and income-generating schemes. However, because most of the committee members were from the urban upper class, they did not represent the interests of the rural majority.

Interest in women's issues also coincided directly with macroeconomic restructuring, such as structural adjustment programs. The state needed women's labor in order to increase cash crop production, so it launched the Better Life for Rural Women Program (BLP) in 1987. According to Hussaina Abdullah, this represented the "direct intervention by the state in the formation and funding of women's organizations and the systematic appointment of wives of high-ranking government officials as leaders of

these organizations,” a process she calls “state pseudo-feminism” (1995: 214). By maintaining indirect control over the movement and bureaucratizing women’s concerns, the state prevented challenges to the regime and advanced class interests. The founder and coordinator of the BLP was the president’s wife, Maryam Babangida. While the BLP’s programs did benefit some women, they did not fundamentally transform larger social relations. Women were still viewed primarily as wives, mothers, and secondary income earners. When the Babangida government was overthrown in 1993, the same pattern was repeated. The new president’s wife, Maryam Abacha, dismantled the BLP and repackaged it as the Family Support Program. By institutionalizing patronage for the wives of military dictators, autonomous feminist organizing became exceedingly difficult.

Feminist Movements in Postcolonial Africa

Given the realities of government co-optation and funding scarcities, independent feminist organizing in Africa has been a major challenge. Nonetheless, African women have persevered, paving the way for social change. As a political project, African feminism challenges structures of power and domination. In Nigeria, for instance, there is also a feminist movement that is coterminous with the state-centric women’s movement described above.

In 1982, Women in Nigeria (WIN) emerged as a national women’s organization with a radically different ideological bent than the first lady’s Better Life Program (BLP). It maintains that women’s subordination is rooted in class and gender oppression and works toward their eradication. Although they claim to represent the interests of the poor, most of WIN’s members are educated women from the urban middle class. They have been criticized for their elitism and their identification with western feminists. Unlike the BLP, which focused primarily on income-generating projects for women, WIN seeks to fundamentally enhance women’s economic status and independence. It also focuses on broader issues such as reproductive rights, sexual harassment, and violence against women. For this reason, WIN’s relationship to the Nigerian state has been tenuous; the government has attempted to co-opt the group on numerous occasions. Since WIN has consistently refused

to give up its autonomy, it is an excellent example of a feminist political project, even if, as Molaria Ogundipe-Leslie (1994) has pointed out, the term feminism carries a negative stigma in Africa because it is associated with western feminists.

Ogundipe-Leslie argues that African feminists waste precious time responding to charges that they are imitating the West or antagonizing men. If there were alternative terminologies, energy could be channeled toward the real struggle – improving the conditions of women in Africa. She proposes the term *stivanism*, an acronym standing for Social Transformation Involving Women in Africa. Similar to the earlier “add women and stir” approaches to development, “STIWA” seeks to include African women in the “contemporary social and political transformation of Africa” (1994: 230). Obioma Nnaemeka, on the other hand, embraces the term feminism, but adds “nego” as an important qualifier. She argues that *nego-feminism* (the feminism of negotiation or no-ego feminism) is a way of naming African feminisms (2004). It is an inclusive feminism that is based on shared values common within African cultures. As Nnaemeka suggests, *nego-feminism* “knows when, where, and how to negotiate with or negotiate around patriarchy in different contexts” (2004: 378). In this way, then, feminism in Africa is a dynamic process versus a static framework. It is constantly evolving based on emerging needs and politics.

Renaming feminism is one strategy that has been used to make women’s liberation more palatable to the masses. Another strategy is to reclaim the term feminism and imbue it with meaning. African feminists have articulated a feminism that stems from continental realities such as slavery, colonialism, and neocolonialism. Because it is relevant to Africans and defined on their terms, it should be considered a proactive social movement (Steady 2006). African feminists do not see oppression as hierarchical. Instead, they focus on the salience of particular issues in local contexts in order to determine what is oppressive and what is empowering. For example, while some western feminists may view motherhood as disempowering to women, most African feminists would disagree. As an individual decision and as a collective ideology, motherhood is embraced and not rejected. Their concern is not whether to have children but how to combine mothering with other social roles.

Just as children are central to African women’s identities, so are men. According to Nnaemeka,

there is a deep “inter-gender partnership” among men and women in African cultures. Gender complementarity and cooperation are therefore important values. At the same time, she warns scholars not to ignore the reality of gender inequality and oppression. While African feminists do not want equality with men, they need equity and empowerment. Unlike radical feminists, they do not want to overthrow or disrupt the system. Instead, they seek alliances and engage in coalition building. They value power sharing, communalism, negotiation, and compromise.

African feminists also value tradition and modernity. They try to understand the importance of customs practiced in specific cultural and historic contexts and rework those that may be harmful to women. The point is that African women are setting the agenda and determining which traditions are oppressive or empowering. This does not mean that western feminists cannot work in coalition with Africans to eradicate practices which may be harmful. It does mean, however, that they must assume an ancillary position in the struggle and allow African women to take the lead. Similarly, elite African women must be willing to listen to women at the “grassroots.” Most importantly, their theories must be related to practice. Academic feminists have to work with local activists so that their feminisms are situated in local realities. A number of important feminist networks have emerged on the continent, thus ensuring that research is practice-oriented and socially grounded. These include the Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD) and CODESRIA.

Even though it is possible to articulate some basic tenets of African feminism, the discourse remains fraught with disagreement. One arena concerns the origins of feminist activism; some claim that feminism is indigenous to Africa environments, while others see it as a social movement still in its infancy. Another tension revolves around who should lead the movement. Those believing that feminism is indigenous to Africa would argue that strong women leaders should come from the rural communities and the “grassroots” level. In contrast, those seeing feminism as a nascent movement assert that leadership needs to be in the hands of academic and elite women. In addition, there are disagreements about the origins of patriarchal oppression. Some say that the roots of oppression lie within traditional cultural practices, while others assert that patriarchy is a product of colonialism and not

inherent to African cultures. Finally, there is contestation regarding what actually constitutes feminist action. Academic feminists would claim that the Harry Thuku Riot, the Igbo Women’s War, and the Kabaka’s Protest were not feminist because they were not specifically aimed at ending gender inequalities. Indigenous feminists, however, would view feminist engagement in much broader terms and therefore classify the actions as feminist.

In addition to theoretical challenges, African feminists also struggle with a number of pragmatic issues, many resulting from the continent’s tremendous size and diversity. For example, language barriers make coalition building more difficult. Differences in social class and education levels may also present challenges to feminist mobilization, and identity politics further complicate the situation. Many women may feel a greater sense of loyalty to their ethnic or religious groups and do not want to risk alienating themselves from the larger collective. By fighting for women’s rights, they face a very real threat of being labeled as traitors to their community. And finally, the lack of autonomy experienced by many feminist organizations on the continent make it extremely difficult to organize around issues that challenge patriarchy, particularly if they are linked to the state. Thus, while it is not impossible to build pan-African feminist alliances, it requires a high level of creativity and diligence.

Although women have made tremendous contributions to anti-colonial and nationalist movements, their emancipation has been far from complete. Most women continue to live in patriarchal households, communities, and nations that view them as second-class citizens. Nonetheless, African women are not victims. They have crafted a political and ideological resistance movement seeking liberation for all Africans from racist, imperialist, and patriarchal oppression.

SEE ALSO: FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique); Women’s Movement, Southern Africa; Women’s War of 1929

References and Suggested Readings

- Abdullah, H. (1995) *Wifeism and Activism: The Nigerian Women’s Movement*. In A. Basu (Ed.), *The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Feminisms in Global Perspective*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Aina, O. (1998) *African Women at the Grassroots: The Silent Partners of the Women’s Movement*. In O. Nnaemeka (Ed.), *Sisterhood, Feminisms, and*

- Power: From Africa to the Diaspora*. Trenton: Africa World Press.
- Amadiume, I. (2000) *Daughters of the Goddess, Daughters of Imperialism: African Women Struggle for Culture, Power and Democracy*. London: Zed Books.
- Bastian, M. L. (2002) Vultures of the Marketplace: Southeastern Nigerian Women and Discourses of the Ogu Umanwaaniy (Women's War) of 1929. In J. Allman, S. Geiger, & N. Musisi (Eds.), *Women in African Colonial Histories*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Kanogo, T. (1987) Kikuyu Women and the Politics of Protest: Mau Mau. In S. MacDonald, P. Holden, & S. Ardener (Eds.), *Images of Women in Peace and War*. London: Macmillan.
- Nnaemeka, O. (2004) Nego-Feminism: Theorizing, Practicing, and Pruning Africa's Way. *Signs* 29, 2 (Winter): 357–85.
- Ogundipe-Leslie, M. (1994) *Re-Creating Ourselves: African Women and Critical Transformations*. Trenton: Africa World Press.
- Oyèwumi, O. (Ed.) (2005) *African Gender Studies: A Reader*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ranchod-Nilsson, S. (1994) "This, Too, Is a Way of Fighting": Women's Participation in Zimbabwe's Liberation War. In M. A. Tetreault (Ed.), *Women and Revolution in Africa, Asia and the New World*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Sheldon, K. (1994) Women and Revolution in Mozambique: *A Luta Continua*. In M. A. Tetreault (Ed.), *Women and Revolution in Africa, Asia and the New World*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Steady, F. C. (2006) *Women and Collective Action in Africa: Development, Democratization and Empowerment, with Special Focus on Sierra Leone*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Van Allen, J. (1976) Aba Riots or Igbo Women's War? Ideology, Stratification and Invisibility of Women. In N. J. Halfkin & E. G. Bay (Eds.), *Women in Africa: Studies in Social and Economic Change*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Wipper, A. (1989) Kikuyu Women and the Harry Thuku Disturbances: Some Uniformities of Female Militancy. *Africa* 59 (3): 300–37.

Women in the Russian Revolution

Soma Marik

Revolutionary Origins

A long-drawn-out event, the roots of the Russian Revolution go back to the reforms of Tsar

Alexander II, notably the emancipation of the serfs. Unhappy with the limited reforms (for example, emancipation came with a price tag as serfs had to pay huge compensation), many young radicals, influenced by a number of Russian and western political thinkers and activists, became revolutionaries. Belonging to the Russian upper and middle classes and notably the intelligentsia (men and women), they came to accept socialism as the goal, but hoped to avoid the West European path, through banking on peasant collectivism and moving directly to socialism, bypassing capitalism. Because of their call to go to the people they were called Populists or Narodniks (people). Early efforts at raising people's consciousness to overturn the exploitative state and social order failed, as did the efforts to form revolutionary terrorist organizations. One such organization named Narodnaya Volya (Peoples' Will or Freedom) succeeded in killing Tsar Alexander II, but perished in the subsequent state repression. Among those hanged was Sophia Perovskaya. Vera Figner spent many years in prison for her role in the revolutionary movement. Vera Zasulich began her career as a militant by shooting a notorious general, but became the supporter of a minority current, led by G. V. Plekhanov, which formed the first Marxist group in Russia, the Emancipation of Labor Group.

Although issues of women's equality were among the subjects of discussion in the political movements, a fully fledged women's movement did not develop till 1905, the year of Russia's first revolution. Then, given the sharp class conflict in Russian society as well as the clear position of Russian and international social democracy as regards feminism, two distinct women's movements arose.

Suffrage Struggle

In times of general political unrest, twentieth-century feminism took on a decidedly more political color. Younger feminists were not satisfied with philanthropy. In Finland, ruled by the Tsar but with a different political system, feminism had progressed from philosophical reflections to education, and thence to social work and eventually a battle for women's suffrage.

Around 1905 a number of liberal organizations such as the Union of Liberation invited Russian women to their political banquets. In February 1905 several hundred women members of

Moscow society published in the liberal paper *Russian News* a lament for Bloody Sunday (January 9, 1905, when a huge number of peaceful workers were gunned down by the tsarist armed forces). By late February an all-Russian Union for Women's Equality (Women's Union) was formed, calling for freedom and equality before the law irrespective of sex. It began by petitioning the City *Duma* (municipality) and the local *zemstvo* (self-governing body) for voting rights in those bodies. Soon St. Petersburg became its headquarters. Leaders of the Union included Zinaida Mirovich-Ivanova, Anna Kalmanovich, Lyubov Gurevich, and Mariya Chekhova. A meeting on April 10, 1905, attended by around a thousand women, laid the foundations for the Union's Congress. Held on May 7–10 in Moscow, the Congress demanded a constituent assembly elected by equal, direct, secret, and universal vote, without distinction of nationality, religion, or sex. Its progressive demands included equality of the sexes before the law, equal rights for peasant women in any land reforms, laws for the welfare and insurance of women workers, equal opportunity for women, coeducation, reform of laws relating to prostitution, and abolition of the death penalty. In July 1905 the Union of Unions, an all-inclusive liberal formation, accepted the Women's Union as a member, though the future Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) leader Paul Miliukov was opposed to it. When the Women's Union threatened to turn to revolutionary working-class parties for support, male liberals of the *zemstvos* gave in.

In December 1905 Dr. Maria Ivanovna Pokrovskaya and some supporters formed the Women's Progressive Party. They demanded a democratic constitutional monarchy and opposed united action with men in the struggle for women's rights. More moderate than the Women's Union, it was opposed to strikes, but called for factory reforms for women workers.

The demand for women's suffrage met a diverse response among the political parties. The Social Democratic Party had incorporated women's equality, including the right to vote, in its party program in 1903. Within the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR), the latest Narodnik organization, Viktor Chernov, the main leader of the party, was entirely in favor of women's complete equality, including women's suffrage. However, some peasants in the party were com-

pletely opposed to equality, suggesting women should get the vote but not the right to be elected. Peasant women fought against such prejudices and in the end the Peasant Union joined the SR in endorsing political equality for women. The liberals were more strongly divided. At the Kadet Congress of January 1906 there was a sharp division, with Miliukov opposing Ana Miliukova and Tyrkova. But Professor Petrazhitsky's support tilted the balance and the feminists won by a narrow margin. Parties to the right of the Kadets, like the Octobrists, refused to give feminists any hearing. Till January 1906 the suffragists had partially sided, with great hesitation, with the extreme left. The vote at the Kadet Congress came as a relief for them, and many turned to the liberals. A small left wing oriented to the Trudoviks, a group of moderate Narodnik deputies to the *Duma*, Russia's semi-constitutional representative body.

During the elections of March 1906, women organized meetings, raised money, and helped in counting votes. This approach of loyalty in return for rights, originally taken by the Women's Union, would lead many feminists to support the Russian state during World War I. After the elections the feminists tried to mobilize opinion in favor of a women's suffrage bill without much headway.

After June 1907, when new Premier Stolypin used martial law to smash the revolutionary struggles, there was a general decline in radical activities. Kadets like Miliukova and Tyrkova devoted their main efforts to their party. Zinaida Mirovich was aligned with Carrie Chapman Catt of the USA and Millicent Garrett Fawcett of England on the right wing of the women's suffrage movement and opposed to universal suffrage movements. On the left wing of the feminist movement were people like Gurevich and Olga Volkenstein. They criticized the bourgeois character of the Women's Union. Gurevich had some Marxist links (as her familiarity with the works of August Bebel, Karl Kautsky, and Klara Zetkin shows), but she was not a member of any Marxist party. Her attempts to organize women workers occurred within a feminist context of organizing women separately. This led to women social democrats like Alexandra Kollontai turning very sharply against her. The final confrontation between the organized Marxists and the feminists came in 1908 at the First All Russian Women's Congress.

Russian Socialist Movement

Though the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) was intended to be an orthodox party on the German model, in fact Lenin's party building strategy focused much more on organizing militant proletarians. In addition, his concept of building up the party with an initial scaffolding of "professional revolutionaries" had both a positive impact on making it a revolutionary workers' party, and a more complex impact on women workers. Lenin wanted a party of vanguard workers. In order to centralize the political experience of a fragmented class, it was necessary to bring together vanguard workers and unify the sectional experiences of the class by giving them respite from routine waged work. Though the concept of full-time professional revolutionary was aimed at ensuring the proletarian democratic content of the vanguard, very little was done to integrate the experiential or existential realities of the women workers, who had no respite from housework and who were routinely treated as backward.

In Russia in the early twentieth century the average woman worker married and had children by the time she was 20–22. Without party education to enhance the value of work done by women or to organize them separately, the formal equality of comrades in the party could not erase the real inequality of the private sphere, where women had to look after children, do housework, and earn money for their professional revolutionary husbands. Cecelia Bobrovskaya, a veteran revolutionary and a midwife, wrote later that during a long underground career she had met a number of committed women who were so tied down by domestic work that they could not become professional revolutionaries. A large number of male Bolshevik workers became leaders, while the percentage of women leaders was low and only two of them, Alexandra Artiukhina and Klavdiia Nikolaeva, came from the working class. On the eve of the February Revolution, out of 24,000 members there were about 2,500 women in the Bolshevik Party.

In 1901 Nadezhda Krupskaya's pamphlet *Zhenshchina Rabotnitsa* (The Woman Worker) urged the party to turn to women workers as a group and to look at their demands for the first time. Until Kollontai's book appeared in 1909, this was the only Russian Marxist work that warned Russian working men that taking women out of

the labor force would not end exploitation. The writings of the founders of Russian Marxism had said virtually nothing about women. So while reviewing in 1899 the first Russian Marxist program of 1885, Lenin stressed the need to add a demand for complete equal rights for men *and women*, possibly as a result of Krupskaya's influence. Certainly, like the men, the women who joined the RSDLP felt that the Marxist program offered a way out of the exploitative society and the autocratic tsarist order. The liberal feminist analysis and the limited reforms seemed inadequate compared to the Marxist analysis, which linked the real emancipation of millions of working-class and peasant women with the social revolution.

Relatively larger numbers of women joined the SR Party than the Social Democratic Party. There were a number of reasons for this. First, the Populist movement had deeper indigenous roots. Second, Populism attracted large numbers of women from the intelligentsia. While Marxist socialism also attracted some of the latter, its focus on the proletariat made it very different from the Populists. According to one assessment (Stites 1991), over 9 percent of mandated delegates to SR congresses or conferences in 1905–8 were women. The Union of School Teachers was dominated by the party and these teachers were crucial in spreading SR politics in the countryside. The party believed in revolutionary terrorism and its terrorist wing also had a number of women. General Min, who led the military repression of the Moscow uprising of 1905, was killed by the SR Zina Konoplyanikova. She was hanged at Schlüsselburg Fortress. The most important of such SR women was Maria Spiridonova. Following the instructions of the local committee, she shot General Luzhenovsky, who had subjected her province to punitive raids in 1905. She was arrested by soldiers and tortured brutally. International protests resulted in her being exiled to Siberia instead of being hanged.

The revolution of 1905 resulted in relatively larger numbers of women coming to the Social Democratic Party. Also, with an increase in women's recruitment into industry, the party had to pay more attention to work among women. Secretaries of the city committees were professional revolutionaries. The usual structure was to have three secretaries – one for the basic political decisions, one for publication of pamphlets and leaflets, and one for the technical work of the committee. Evans Clements' (1997) survey

showed that women secretaries were mostly technical secretaries. This reflected internalization within the party structure of a typical gender division of labor.

The picture among émigrés was even clearer. No woman other than Alexandra Kollontai ever obtained recognition as a theoretician in the Bolshevik Party. It was always thought better to engage women in other kinds of work – working in the underground, as couriers, as assistants, working to earn money so that theoretician husbands need not work, and so on. As the life of Inessa Armand shows, the party leadership (in this case, Lenin) exerted considerable pressure on women, asking them to do more “useful” work. From the Second Party Congress of 1903 to the February Revolution, women theoreticians, Central Committee members, and members of any other émigré committee, whether Bolshevik or Menshevik, numbered no more than a dozen.

The 1905 revolution brought many women workers into the political and trade union movements. Moreover, feminists were trying to create women-only unions. As a result, some Marxist women turned to organizing women workers. When a few working women were elected to the Shidlovsky Commission appointed to inquire into the tragedy of Bloody Sunday, the government refused to seat them. This led to protests by women workers. In Ivanovo-Voznesensk some 11,000 female textile workers took part in a huge strike. Kollontai played an important role in this period. Coming into contact with Marxists while living in West Europe, by 1903 she was a committed party activist, engaged in illegal socialist work in St. Petersburg. Bloody Sunday found her in the streets. She worked hard for the party, writing, distributing literature, and raising money. Participating in the inaugural meeting of the Women’s Union, Kollontai was appalled at the support given to a bourgeois liberal feminist meeting by many socialist women. She spoke sharply against “classless” feminism and was attacked by the feminists in response. Her attendance at a meeting of German socialist women in Mannheim convinced her that a special effort among women workers was needed. But now she was faced with the accusation of a “harmful tendency towards feminism.” When the Party Committee grudgingly gave her permission to hold a women-only meeting, she found the premises locked and a sign that read that the meeting had been cancelled.

Organizing women was difficult both in the party and trade unions. Unequal educational opportunity was supplemented by lesser pay for women, who were also saddled with the double burden of being workers and housewives. Despite all this, Kollontai was able to work among the Union of Textile Workers, made up largely of women. She organized a number of meetings where, under the guise of discussing women’s health, she explained the nature of social exploitation and liberation and fought against Kadet feminism. In 1908, hearing of feminist plans for the All-Russian Women’s Congress, Kollontai wanted to intervene. Unlike the official line of simple rejection of the Congress, or participating purely rhetorically in order to “expose” the liberal feminists, Kollontai tried to turn women workers’ participation in this Congress into a political education for them. Her theoretical intervention came through *The Social Bases of the Woman Question* (1908). It involved a simultaneous criticism of the class limitations of bourgeois feminism and a critique of the ungendered nature of social democratic politics. By rejecting a resolution on universal suffrage and other measures, liberal feminists showed clearly enough their opposition to the demands of working-class women at the Congress.

Between Two Revolutions

One result of the struggles by women workers was the recognition by a number of Bolshevik women that some kind of women-specific effort should be made to mobilize women. One major step in creating an autonomous space for women came in 1912 when, looking at women readers’ responses to a women’s page in *Pravda*, a number of Bolshevik women activists decided to launch a paper for women. Inessa Armand and Krupskaya among the exiles, and Anna Elizarova and Konkordia Samoilova within Russia, were the main figures behind the launching of *Rabotnitsa*. There were two perspectives among them, with Krupskaya writing that women were backward and had to be brought into the movement, while Armand stressed that without more encouragement to the struggles of women workers the socialist movement could not move forward. In article after article women workers highlighted the dual oppression faced by women workers, thereby compelling *Pravda* to pay more attention to women workers.

In 1913 Bolshevik and Menshevik women in Moscow were also able to organize a meeting in honor of International Proletarian Women's Day, despite the problem of police intervention, and deep suspicion in many socialist quarters about such a program. A day for spontaneous self-expression also signified the global struggle for proletarian women's rights.

As a result of the initial lack of socialist attention to the struggles of women workers, women's strikes and agitation sometimes remained unorganized. In 1917 women textile workers forced concessions out of their director in ways trade union organizers would oppose as "spontaneous violence." But the "general demands" chalked out by these organizers seldom talked about equal wages for men and women. In 1905 the demand was for 90 kopecks daily for men and 75 for women. In 1917, when factory committees won a minimum wage clause from the owners in Petrograd, the rates were 5 rubles for men and 4 for women. When women themselves took a leading role, the demands could change. In 1912–13 several strikes in which women were significantly present were organized in protest against sexual harassment when workers were searched as they left factory premises. Women workers were aware of problems posed by male bias in the unions. Tsvetkova, a woman worker in the leather industry, pointed out that male workers did not regard women workers as full and equal members of the working class, and tried to pass the burden of unemployment and lay-offs onto women (Marik 2004).

War and Revolution: 1914–1917

The coming of World War I intensified class conflicts in Russia and within a few years led directly to the revolutions of February and October 1917. Nobles and many women from the intelligentsia, including pacifist feminists, supported the war in the hope that their patriotism would be rewarded by suffrage and other rights by the government. A number of women also fought in the army, the best-known being Maria Bochkareva, who tried to organize women's battalions in 1917. Though none of this led to women's enfranchisement before 1917, upper-class women gained in educational and employment opportunities. The demand for more engineers, for example, led to granting graduates of the Women's Technical Institutes the right to be-

come full-fledged engineers. In 1917 the feminist organizations therefore had legal existence and ample funds. After the February Revolution, the pro-war League for Women's Equality reemerged as the Republican Union of Democratic Women's Organizations. It won over the aged Vera Figner to its cause and organized a demonstration to the Provisional Government. The radicals ridiculed this, with the Bolshevik women pointing out that women's right to vote for the constituent assembly should not depend on the blessings of the Provisional Government. By May, Bochkareva had taken the initiative in forming a Women's Battalion of Death, hailed by feminists like Anna Shabanova. In August a Women's Military Congress was held. One unit of these battalions fought to defend the Kerensky regime in its last days. In the face of rising Bolshevik power, differences between bourgeois liberal feminists and women of the moderate socialist parties tended to vanish.

By 1917 women formed 43 percent of the workforce. Before the Bolsheviks entered the field, women workers themselves had taken initiatives. The February Revolution began on International Working Women's Day (February 23) when women textile workers determinedly launched a general strike, ignoring the advice of the Bolshevik local leadership not to do so. The first weeks after February saw an unprecedented increase in the number of women organizing themselves to make political and economic demands. Bolsheviks were active among them. In Petrograd Bolshevik women were active in organizing the *Soldatki* (soldiers' wives) helping to increase Bolshevik influence in the army. The social peace established by the Mensheviks and the SRs after February was broken for the first time by several thousand women laundry workers in Petrograd. Bolshevik women like Goncharskaya, Novikondratieva, and Sakharova led these struggles for an 8-hour working day and minimum wages. Under the influence of Kollontai, *Pravda* regularly reported about the strike. After a month's strike, there was a partial victory.

However, liberal feminists and right-wing socialists or ex-socialists were active in mass movements and had to be combated. Among them was E. D. Kuskova, an early social democrat famous in Russian Marxist history as a major target of Lenin for her support for revisionism, and Menshevik women like Lyubov Akselrod,

who said in 1917 that Marxism was closer to liberalism than to anarchism, especially in times of revolution. The League for Women's Equality, working among women, was able to put up socialists as well as democrats in its list of candidates for the constituent assembly. A meeting of the executive committee of the Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks suggested the necessity of setting up a bureau of working women under the city committee, as some kind of autonomy was essential to enable women to think out things for themselves, to talk freely, and to express their political concerns while at the same time being part of the party and the class movement. Despite resistance to Slutskaya and Kollontai's attempts to create autonomous space in the party for women, the latter's return to Russia from exile, and her enthusiastic support to Lenin's *April Theses*, put power behind the work of agitating among women. *Rabotnitsa* was revived and became the center of agitational and organizational work among women workers. As one activist named Prokhorova wrote in the women's journal, whatever was done without women's participation was likely to be dangerous for them. But within their work it is possible to find the stirrings of a Bolshevik-"feminist" discourse that went beyond Bolshevik orthodoxy. They organized working-class women and strove to incorporate gender equality within class-struggle politics in a big way. This resulted in significant gains after the October Revolution, including autonomous organization for women.

SEE ALSO: Kollontai, Alexandra (1872–1952); Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917

References and Suggested Readings

- Donald, M. (1982) Bolshevik Activity Amongst the Working Women of Petrograd in 1917. *International Review of Social History* 27: 129–60.
- Elwood, R. C. (1992) *Inessa Armand: Revolutionary and Feminist*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Evans Clements, B. (1997) *Bolshevik Women*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Farnsworth, B. (1980) *Aleksandra Kollontai: Socialism, Feminism and the Bolshevik Revolution*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Knight, A. (1979) Female Terrorists in the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party. *Russian Review* 38, 2 (April): 139–59.
- McDermid, J. (1999) *Midwives of the Revolution: Female Bolsheviks and Women Workers in 1917*. London: University College Press.

- Marik, S. (2004) Gendering the Revolutionary Party: The Bolshevik Practice and Challenges before the Marxists in the 21st Century. In B. Chatterjee & K. Chattopadhyay (Eds.), *Perspectives on Socialism*. Calcutta: Progressive.
- Smith, S. A. (1994) Gender and Class: Women's Strikes in St. Petersburg, 1895–1917, and Shanghai 1895–1927. *Social History* 19, 2: 141–68.
- Stites, R. (1991) *The Women's Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism and Bolshevism 1860–1930*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Women in the Solidarity movement, Polish underground

Shana Penn

In communist Poland women made up 50 percent of the labor force and 50 percent of the 10-million-strong membership in the Solidarity free trade union movement, but less than 8 percent of Solidarity's decision-makers. Underrepresented in the trade union's male-dominated governance and political platform, women expressed their activism through other civic and communal means such as education, grassroots union organizing, parish projects, and most importantly, the opposition press. One group of women in particular played a historic role in building a free press and rescuing the Solidarity movement during the 1980s martial law era.

Solidarity, Martial Law, and the Patient Revolution

Solidarity was born of strikes by shipyard, factory, and transportation workers that spread across Poland in July and August 1980 until an estimated 1 million workers laid down their tools and added their weight to the non-violent protests. The largest strike in world history achieved a landmark victory – the founding of Solidarity, the first and only free trade union movement in the Eastern bloc and a dream come true among workers in a so-called workers' state. Solidarity set in motion a social revolution which in nine years' time would bring about the collapse of the Polish communist system and, by extension, of the entire Soviet bloc.

By the time it celebrated its one-year anniversary in August 1981, Solidarity had become so

powerful that the Polish Communist Party – and the Kremlin – were determined to quash the grassroots movement. On December 13, 1981 the Polish government declared martial law and arrested an estimated 10,000 activists in the first week – 9,000 men and 1,000 women, including most of Solidarity’s male leadership. The few leaders who eluded arrest went into hiding. Tanks swept across the country, police and militia raided homes and offices, and General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Communist Party leader, cracked down on the nation with communication and transportation bans, nighttime curfews, and myriad other restrictions on daily life. Solidarity was in a shambles, with a vacuum in leadership and the population traumatized.

In Warsaw, the nation’s capital, a group of women activists immediately rose up to counter the political crisis. Through word of mouth and the help of trusted contacts they found one another and met clandestinely in the first days of martial law to plot the rescue of their crippled movement. Their first actions were to locate and protect the leaders in hiding and to disseminate information about the military coup to the general population. By January 1982 this uniquely all-female team of journalists had organized hideouts and volunteers, moved typewriters and printing presses into attics and basements, and produced and distributed a news bulletin which informed people of arrests and imprisonments, strikes and protests, and how to otherwise weather the curfews and communication blackout that paralyzed the country.

These seven women were Helena Luczywo, Joanna Szczesna, Ewa Kulik, Anna Bikont, Anna Dodziuk, Zofia Bydlinska, and Malgorzata Pawlicka. In their 20s and 30s at the time of martial law, one was a wife and mother; three were single mothers; and three were single, with or without “significant others.” Prior to martial law they had been editors of various opposition presses; in the mid-1970s Luczywo had edited *Robotnik* and Szczesna had edited *Bulletyn Informacyja*. Some were old friends who had met in high school or university and whose activism spanned a decade. In September 1980 Luczywo, Szczesna, Dodziuk, and others had set up the Solidarity newswire service AS, and while Solidarity remained legal they built a network of contacts around the country. These experiences served them well when they went underground 16 months later and established a powerful

media network. As these women discovered, there was power in the press and power in their numbers. When police swept through their community and arrested most of Solidarity’s leadership, these women took control.

Their overriding mission was to preserve the voice and authority of Solidarity developed during its legal phase and to keep the membership informed, actively engaged, and hopeful that their movement would survive. In order to manage the safety of the male leaders-in-hiding, the women set about rebuilding Solidarity into an underground network. They created an elaborate matrix of apartments, which would provide shelter and continuity to a movement that was in danger of extinction. Equally important, the women published a newspaper to provide a platform from which the leaders could be heard and to break the government’s monopoly over communication. Their newspaper *Tygodnik Mazowsze* (Regional Weekly), became the voice of Solidarity during the underground years of the 1980s. Its weekly print run of up to 80,000 copies was all done secretly, illegally, and without real editorial offices, real printing houses, real distribution centers, and sometimes even without real ink.

The female cabal organized other women to serve as couriers, typists, smugglers, distributors, and all-purpose conspirators. They organized housing networks to hide the men, the print production, and themselves. Drawing inspiration from the anti-Nazi resistance model of Flying Universities (secret study groups formed after the Nazis had shut down Polish universities), they created Flying Offices for newspaper production. Like a defiant game of musical chairs, the editing, printing, and distribution of the newspaper moved through a chain of apartments every few weeks, to protect the production teams and their cherished equipment, supplies, and weekly editions. They had, in effect, moved Solidarity into the home, where according to Polish tradition, women rule. This women’s network made it possible for its female masterminds to persist for close to eight years, evading arrest, and hiding in ever-changing apartments, often leaving their children in the care of their own parents, and working round the clock to keep the spirit of Solidarity alive.

Their formula for saving Solidarity rested on the realization that martial law would not be a time for large-scale public actions, such as mass

protests and nationwide strikes. Nor would it be a time for negotiations with the Communist Party, which had delegatized the trade union movement. With martial law, Solidarity had entered the long, slow period when a revolution gestates. Solidarity underground was not-quite public space and not-quite private space. It was a third space, which made use of the domestic sphere to incubate a nascent civic life. It was feminine space where, in the absence of men who were in jail or in hiding; women of various ages and backgrounds could overstep traditional gender role restraints and become politically active. For some, like the *Tygodnik Mazowsze* editors, this meant assuming leadership roles. The underground also fostered an uncanny gender role reversal because the male leaders in hiding were housebound and reliant on the female editors who were able to move about in public. According to Szczesna, the Solidarity underground was a safe haven and power center for women because “women will only assume responsibilities where there is no competition with men.” The underground was not a valued sphere, she said in an interview, because its clandestine operations precluded public recognition, which men valued and demanded more than women.

Gender Roles and Icons

The seven women called themselves the Damska Grupa Operacyjna (Ladies Operational Unit) or simply DGO. It was the clearest symbol of their gender awareness. They had left their children in the care of their parents, separated from their male partners, and lived together, enduring crowded conditions, sharing political dreams and confidences. They quickly stopped using the DGO as a means of formal identification in the signing of communiqués, etc., however, because they rightfully feared it could unmask their highly guarded anonymity. These women knew that the government was mainly searching for the men behind the newspaper’s bylines and not aggressively hunting for women. The DGO exploited this oversight by using the female stereotype of the Good Polish Mother – the *Matka Polka* – to camouflage their activism. They smuggled petitions and brochures between cities by stuffing the papers under their dresses and feigning pregnancy when in transit. They concealed their newspapers inside washing machines, under refrigerators, and wherever

else the police never thought to search. Sexism became the wild card to their success.

Matka Polka, who selflessly protected her nation and her men, has a long history in Poland. Historical continuity and religious symbolism were powerful unifiers in Solidarity. Matka Polka was actually the personification of the Black Madonna, which has been Poland’s icon of protection since 1655, when a battle was won in her name at Jasna Gora in eastern Poland. Centuries later, Solidarity hero Lech Walesa wore a Black Madonna brooch pinned to his shirt. After receiving the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize, Walesa placed the award in the Jasna Gora monastery. Some of the most interesting Solidarity graffiti include cartoon images of the baby Jesus sitting on the Madonna’s lap – he is holding his tiny fingers in a V for Victory sign, and she is waving her fist.

The Madonna’s “example” suffused the lives of Polish women. Under tsarist occupation in the nineteenth century, when Polish men were sent to Siberian labor camps and prisons, their women smuggled food and clothing into the prisons and operated clandestine networks across Poland. In the anti-Nazi resistance, girls ran messages through Warsaw’s sewers and took up arms against the German occupiers. Martial law perpetuated an old tradition: when men were arrested, or went into hiding or exile, women battled political oppression as they had always done in the absence of their men.

Telerevolution

The DGO’s most important achievement was as editors of the most popular and influential opposition press. An independent press is crucial to the health of a democratic society. The women of *Tygodnik Mazowsze* succeeded in breaking the government’s monopoly over information. According to the British historian Timothy Garton Ash, Solidarity was a “telerevolution” because it was able to circulate reliable news and information quickly, which mobilized, educated, and uplifted millions of people. Women were at the center of this telerevolution – although Garton Ash failed to report this fact.

After the communist government stepped down in 1989, the DGO helped found *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the first independent national news daily in Poland, and the first independent press in all of the then-crumbling Eastern bloc. The

DGO's pioneering of a free press had nurtured the growth of civil society, showing that Solidarity was much more than a typical trade union. Hundreds of thousands of people nationwide were involved in the newspaper's production and dissemination. *Tygodnik Mazowsze* mobilized a grassroots civic movement that, even in the underground, educated the population in democratic values and practices, and promoted non-violent, evolutionary, and deep-rooted transformation of the communist state. The female editors were a critical force in incubating the spirit and organization of Solidarity during martial law, and in promoting these key aspects of democratic political culture.

But in 1989, when Solidarity's leaders stepped forth to celebrate their historic victory over communism, only men took the stage. Women's contributions were not acknowledged; nor did the women themselves demand their due recognition. The strategy of invisibility that made them so effective in resisting communism backfired in the face of their success. Their role in keeping Solidarity alive throughout the 1980s was eclipsed as the male leaders returned to dominate the Round Table negotiations with the communist regime and formation of Poland's democratic government. It was over a decade before women's leadership role was finally recognized and recorded.

SEE ALSO: Poland, Committee for Workers (KOR); Poland, Revolutions, 1846–1863; Poland, Student Movement, 1968; Polish Revolution of 1830; Socialism; Solidarność (Solidarity); Walesa, Lech (b. 1943); Women in the 1848 Revolution, Poland

References and Suggested Readings

- Brown, B. (2003) *The Private Revolution*. London: Hera Trust.
- Garton Ash, T. (1983) *The Polish Revolution*. London: Trinity Press.
- Kenney, P. (1999) The Gender of Resistance in Communist Poland. *American Historical Review* 104 (April).
- Long, K. (1996) *We All Fought for Freedom*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Penn, S. (2005) *Solidarity's Secret: The Women Who Defeated Communism in Poland*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Reading, A. (1999) *Polish Women, Solidarity and Feminism*. London: Macmillan.

Women's movement, Anglophone Caribbean

Reena N. Goldthree

Since the late nineteenth century, women in the Anglophone Caribbean have demanded greater social, economic, and political rights by petitioning government officials, marching collectively for food and relief work, taking part in mass strikes and public demonstrations, organizing labor unions and political organizations, launching far-reaching public education campaigns, and participating in Marxist-oriented revolutionary struggles. Although historiography on protest politics in the region focuses overwhelmingly on the contributions of charismatic male trade union leaders and political figures, feminist historians and sociologists since the 1970s have convincingly challenged notions of female docility by highlighting the critical contributions of female activists. While the degree to which women have been involved in protest movements varies significantly by country and historical period, Anglophone Caribbean women have actively participated in all of the major social and political struggles of the past century, while also organizing autonomously to promote women's rights and gender equality.

The earliest women's organizations were middle-class reform and self-help societies such as the Lady Musgrave Self-Help Society and Women's Social Service Club (WSSC) in Jamaica and the Trinidad Home Industries and Self-Help Association and the Coterie of Social Workers in Trinidad. While the Lady Musgrave Self-Help Society and the Trinidad Home Industries and Self-Help Association primarily helped women to earn additional income through craft and cooking projects, the WSSC and the Coterie of Social Workers combined traditional self-help efforts with progressive calls for women's suffrage, female jurors for trials involving women defendants, and a greater voice for women on government committees and boards.

Whereas middle-class women reformers of the 1910s and 1920s advocated for social welfare programs and greater political participation for women through self-help organizations and socio-religious clubs, many working and lower middle-class women flocked to black nationalist organizations such as the Universal Negro

Improvement Association (UNIA). Co-founded by Amy Ashwood and Marcus Mosiah Garvey in Jamaica in 1914, the UNIA was a mass movement that promoted black economic self-sufficiency, political empowerment, and repatriation to Africa through grassroots chapters in North America, the Caribbean, Africa, and Central America. The association's "race-first" platform and gendered dual leadership structure attracted widespread support from women, who served in local leadership positions and filled the ranks of the association's two all-female auxiliaries, the Black Cross Nurses and the paramilitary Universal African Motor Corps. By 1926 there were 67 UNIA chapters in the Anglophone Caribbean and Garveyite women challenged colonial policies through public speeches, mass demonstrations, petition-writing campaigns, and racial uplift projects. Despite the association's masculinist rhetoric and praxis, the UNIA was an important political training ground for a generation of formidable women activists, including Daisy Crick of Trinidad, Una Marson, Amy Bailey, Amy Jacques Garvey of Jamaica, and Elfreda Reyes of Belize.

Starting in Belize and Trinidad in 1934, an unprecedented wave of strikes, riots, and protests swept the Anglophone Caribbean, erupting in St. Kitts, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and British Guiana (Guyana) in 1935; in St. Lucia, Barbados, and Trinidad in 1937; and Jamaica in 1938. Although most labor unions during this period were male-led, rural and urban women workers figured heavily in these labor disturbances and contemporary observers frequently claimed that women protesters were more aggressive and determined than the men. In July 1934 hundreds of Indo-Trinidadian women sugar workers launched a month-long series of hunger marches and protests to demand steady employment and food. Female laborers from the Brechin Castle and Esperanza sugar estates in central Trinidad also struck repeatedly in order to reduce their daily task assignment, at times violently attacking the managers and overseers.

When labor unrest erupted once again in Trinidad in 1937, Elma Francois' militant Negro Cultural and Welfare Association (NWCSA) provided vital support for striking workers in southern Trinidad and mobilized workers and the unemployed in Port of Spain. During the massive series of strikes and riots which rocked Jamaica in 1938, female agricultural workers joined

their male colleagues in violent work stoppages while groups of dressmakers, barmaids, and domestic servants in Kingston established unions and called on local lawmakers to help them secure better wages and working conditions.

In the aftermath of the 1930s labor rebellions, women helped to establish the region's first mass-based political parties as a part of the nascent nationalist movement. In Belize thousands of militant working-class women took to the streets in a series of anti-colonial marches and demonstrations in Belize City in early 1950 and campaigned vigorously on behalf of the newly formed People's United Party (PUP). In Guyana Janet Jagan co-founded the leftist People's Progressive Party (PPP) in 1950 along with her husband Cheddi Jagan and trade union leaders Ashton Chase and Jocelyn Hubbard. Four decades later, Janet Jagan became the first woman head of state in the Anglophone Caribbean when she served as president of Guyana from 1997 to 1999.

The emergence of the "second-wave" feminist movement internationally during the 1960s and 1970s spurred a major shift in women's political mobilization in the Anglophone Caribbean. Throughout this period, feminist activists pressed political party leaders and government officials to systematically address the social and economic needs of women and to combat gender discrimination. In 1970 Viola Burham of the People's National Congress (PNC) in Guyana founded the Caribbean Women's Association (CARIWA), a regional network of women's political and social organizations. In response to calls by feminist activists within the People's National Party (PNP), Jamaica established the first Women's Bureau in the Anglophone Caribbean in 1973. Over the following two decades official Women's Bureaus or Women's Desks were created in every Anglophone Caribbean nation and CARICOM opened a Women's Desk in Guyana in 1980. Several political parties also established women's subgroups, such as the Women's Revolutionary Socialist Movement (WRSM) of the PNC in Guyana, the National Women's Organization of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada, the United Women's Groups of the PUP in Belize, and the PNP Women's Movement in Jamaica.

Additionally, the United Nations Decade for Women (1975–85) provided a critical opening for women in the Anglophone Caribbean to formulate alternative development programs

to enhance the quality of life of women and to establish autonomous women's advocacy groups. In June 1977 the members of CARIWA and the Caribbean Conference of Churches met with representatives from 12 Caribbean governments, international development agencies, and the University of the West Indies (UWI) in Jamaica to draft a regional strategy to implement the "women and development" goals of the UN Decade for Women. This meeting produced a Regional Plan of Action which called for the creation of national and regional bureaus to foster development programs for women and a host of related research and public education projects based at the UWI.

The introduction of International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment policies in Jamaica in 1977 and other Anglophone Caribbean territories in the 1980s severely undermined efforts to implement development programs formulated during the UN Decade for Women. As Caribbean governments privatized state-owned enterprises and curtailed social spending and economic redistribution programs, real wages declined and women's unemployment increased. In response to these profound economic challenges, a coalition of women's groups in Jamaica – including the Committee of Women for Progress (CWP) and the PNP Women's Movement (PNPWM) – joined forces to address rising food costs and demand a national maternity leave law (which was passed in 1979).

In April 1985 the Women and Development Unit (WAND) of the UWI crafted a collective Statement of Caribbean Women which argued that "conventional growth-oriented models of development" caused "increasing unemployment and inequalities" and forced women to "take on more of their governments' responsibility for the health, education, and social well-being of the society" (quoted in Reddock 1998: 70). Women in Trinidad, after witnessing the impact of structural adjustment policies in Jamaica, formed the Women against Free Trade Zones: Work with Dignity working group in 1988 to lobby against the introduction of free trade zones and to highlight the ways in which free trade zones negatively impact women workers.

In addition to protesting the introduction of structural adjustment policies, women across the Anglophone Caribbean since the mid-1980s have successfully mobilized to protest domestic violence and sexual abuse. As Reddock (1998: 62)

has observed, "the issue of sexual violence in its many forms has been a key factor in mobilizing women throughout the region, uniting women of all classes, races and ethnic groups." Between 1985 and 1986 women in St. Vincent and the Grenadines led a grassroots Campaign Against Violence to Women, while women in Trinidad and Tobago vigorously lobbied for the passage of the Sexual Offenses Bill. Likewise, the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA), a regional network of feminist activists founded in 1985, spearheaded several groundbreaking education and training programs to combat domestic violence and sexual assault in the 1980s and 1990s. More recently, the Dominica Women's Bureau and the Dominica National Council of Women sponsored a year-long campaign from 1997 to 1998 denouncing violence against women and calling for a national domestic violence law.

SEE ALSO: Belize, National Independence Movement; Garvey, Marcus (1887–1940) and Garveyism; Jagan, Cheddi (1918–1997); Jamaica, 1938 Labor Riots; New Jewel Movement; Postcolonial Feminism and Protest in the Global South; Trinidad, Labor Protests

References and Suggested Readings

- Bolles, L. (1983) *Kitchens Hit by Priorities: Employed Working-Class Women Confront the IMF*. In J. Nash & M. P. Fernandez-Kelly (Eds.), *Women, Men, and the International Division of Labor*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Bolles, L. (1996) *We Paid Our Dues: Women Trade Union Leaders of the Caribbean*. Washington, DC: Howard University Press.
- Macpherson, A. (2007) *From Colony to Nation: Women Activists and the Gendering of Politics in Belize, 1912–1982*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Martin, T. (1988) Women in the Garvey Movement. In R. Lewis & P. Bryan (Eds.), *Garvey: His Life and Work*. Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies.
- Phillip, N. (2007) Women in the Grenada Revolution, 1979–1983. *small axe* 22 (February): 39–66.
- Reddock, R. (1994) *Women, Labour and Politics in Trinidad & Tobago: A History*. London: Zed Books.
- Reddock, R. (1998) Women's Organizations and Movements in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The Response to Global Economic Crisis in the 1980s. *Feminist Review* 59 (Summer): 57–73.
- Vassell, L. (1993) The Movement for the Vote for Women. *Jamaican Historical Review* 18, 11: 40–54.

Women's movement, Australia

Marilyn Lake

Power of the Ballot

In 1902, just one year after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australian women were the first in the world to win full political rights – the right not just to vote, but to stand for election to the national parliament. Their victory was secured after a decade's long struggle across all the Australian colonies, which involved grassroots campaigns as well as political deputations, prodigious journalism, and the gathering of vast petitions. In 1891, for example, Victorian women sent a "monster petition" with 30,000 signatures into the parliament to demonstrate that, contrary to the claims of their opponents, women did really want the vote. The Woman Movement, as it was called, desired radical reforms in the relations of men and women and the vote promised power to effect these changes through the ballot box.

Most men had been enfranchised in the Australian colonies with the introduction of manhood suffrage fifty years earlier in the 1850s. Some women also claimed an equal voice in the fledgling democracy, but the emergent doctrine of separate spheres ensured that self-government – and economic independence – remained the preserve of men. When women began to mobilize politically in the 1880s they usually addressed the particularities of women's condition – as wives, as mothers, as household drudges, as prostitutes – rather than making arguments about abstract or equal rights. It was the oppressed condition of women, especially married women, which commanded the movement's attention and inspired their passion.

The economic dependence of wives subjected them to men's personal power and sexual coercion, which rendered many a bedroom a "Chamber of Horrors," according to Louisa Lawson, a leader of the Woman Movement in New South Wales. "A nerve of iron," she wrote, "must be possessed by frail women, who are expected to endure this horrid ordeal, and put a cheerful face upon it in the morning, well knowing that this is her fate so long as her power of endurance holds out" (Lake 1999:

19–20) To promote the cause of women's freedom and economic independence, Lawson established the magazine *Dawn* in 1888 and a city club of the same name. Like many suffrage leaders, Lawson demanded the vote in the name of motherhood: "If we are responsible for our children give us the power and sacredness of the ballot, and we will lift ourselves and our brothers to a higher civilization" (Lake 1999: 20).

A Welfare State

Leaders of the Woman Movement assumed that women would bring different experiences and values to public life and that they would thus contribute to the building of a "welfare state," rather than one dedicated to making money or war. Suffragists also argued that the enfranchisement of women would purify political life of its selfishness and corruption. "I can imagine no more effectual way," explained another New South Wales leader, Rose Scott, to her Sydney audience, "of raising the tone of Public Opinion, of purifying its moral sentiments, than by imparting into Public Life the woman's influence and something of that tenderness, refinement and Purity for which women are especially noted" (Lake 1999: 28).

Scott ran a salon to which she invited leading politicians and journalists to discuss the issues and legislation of the day. The reforms to which she and other women attached highest priority were: raising the age of consent, securing married women's property and custody rights, employing women in public offices in government, hospitals, and factories, and winning their right of access to higher and professional education. Labor women also placed importance on the reform of working hours and conditions in factories and played a key role in forming women's trade unions. For example, Mary Lee became secretary of the Working Women's Trades Union in 1890 in South Australia; Emma Miller became the first woman member and life member of the Brisbane Workers' Political Organization and president of the Women Workers' Political Organization in Queensland in 1903; while in New South Wales Kate Dwyer was a founder of the Women's Progressive Association and founding president of the Women's Organizing Committee of the Political Labor League in 1904.

Women initially won the vote in Australia on a colony by colony basis, with two colonial

governments, in South Australia (1894) and Western Australia (1899), granting womanhood suffrage before it was won on a federal basis in 1902. New South Wales women were also granted the state suffrage in 1902, Tasmanian women in 1903, Queensland women in 1904, and finally, Victorian women in 1908. For six years, then, Victorian women were able to vote in federal elections, but not in state elections. It was thought that the very longevity and persistence of the campaign in that state provoked organized opposition and thus played a role in the tardiness of their victory.

Although Australian women were at the forefront in international terms in winning full political rights, they lagged significantly when it came to securing representation in parliament. Not until 1921 did the first woman enter a state parliament, when Edith Cowan was elected in Western Australia; and not until 1943 did the first women win seats in the federal parliament, when Labor woman Dorothy Tangney was elected as a Western Australian Senator and conservative (United Australia Party) Edith Lyons won a Tasmanian seat in the House of Representatives. At the same time, however, the broader women's movement flourished, with new organizations such as the Australian Federation of Women Voters and older ones such as the National Council of Women playing a key role as citizens in civil society. They were successful in having women appointed to a range of public positions, as police officers, factory inspectors, doctors, magistrates, wardens, and lawyers. Some feminists argued for the appointment of women as protectors of Aboriginal women and children and some activists in Western Australia, notably Mary Bennett, were outspoken in their condemnation of the separation of Aboriginal children from their families.

Most feminist organizations at this time conceived of their role in non-party terms, while Labor Party women were exhorted by the men in their party to eschew the "sex antagonism" associated with feminism. These different groups of women sometimes worked together, however, in campaigns for reforms such as the Maternity Allowance, a one-off payment to mothers on the birth of a baby, introduced in 1912, which extended payments to unmarried mothers, but denied them to all non-white mothers (a policy criticized by radical Vida Goldstein, editor of the *Woman Voter*, as "the White Australia policy

gone mad") (Lake 1999: 76). Other goals such as motherhood endowment (the payment of a regular income to mothers) and equal pay championed by trade union organizer Muriel Heagney, author of the book *Are Women Taking Men's Jobs?* and leading non-party feminist Jessie Street, proved rather more elusive.

Equal Pay and Equal Rights

Following Commonwealth Arbitration Court judgments that awarded men a living wage in recognition of their obligations to support wives and children, and defining women as economic dependents, Australian women lobbied for the principle of "the rate for the job" regardless of the sex of the worker. A large Women's Industrial Convention was held in Melbourne in 1913 addressed by activists such as Sarah Lewis from the Hotel and Caterers' Union, who insisted on the justice of a decent living wage being paid to women. A campaign for motherhood and childhood endowment also argued for women's right to economic independence, while they worked at home as wives and mothers. New South Wales passed legislation granting childhood endowment to mothers in that state in 1927, but a federal Royal Commission enquiring into the feasibility of a more radical scheme of motherhood endowment decided against the reform because in offering women economic independence it would cause, they said, "a revolution in the family." Labor women and non-party feminists reluctantly concluded that the only way for women to win economic independence was to enter the labor market and demand equal pay on the same terms as men. The Council for Action for Equal Pay was established in 1938, just as World War II was about to begin.

Women's experience on the home front during the war was formative in reinvigorating campaigns for equality and economic independence. A new wartime tribunal, the Women's Employment Board, ensured that many thousands of female employees conscripted into men's work for the duration were paid equal or near-equal wages so as not to undercut men's employment on their return from the war. To enable mothers to join the labor market in this time of national need, the government introduced childcare centers, thereby setting another precedent for the postwar world. Following concerted lobbying by women's groups, a Commonwealth Arbitration

Court decision lifted the standard women's wage from 54 percent of the male rate, which had been prescribed by H. B. Higgins in the famous Harvester judgment of 1907, to 75 percent in 1949.

In 1950, Communist Party and other left-wing women formed a new organization, the Union of Australian Women, to campaign for equal pay, Aboriginal rights, housing reforms, and child welfare. They joined feminist groups such as the United Associations and trade unionists such as Kath Williams in campaigning for equal pay, which was achieved in a piecemeal fashion, state by state, with New South Wales granting teachers and other public servants equal pay in 1958. But still women were usually required to resign from paid work on marriage until 1966, when the federal government lifted the marriage bar, even while continuing to deny women employees access to the executive levels of the public service.

It was the demand for equal access to the professions and to public life that prompted two young academic women in Brisbane in 1965 to chain themselves to the rail of a local public bar, which was also a men's only space. Among other sources of inspiration, Merle Thornton and Ro Bognor quoted from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to demand an end to discrimination. In earlier decades, feminists had espoused the cause of temperance, seeing alcohol consumption as responsible for much of men's ill-treatment of women and children; now in the 1960s women activists demanded the right to drink in the same ways and in the same places as men, and to enjoy the same sexual and social freedoms. In earlier phases of the women's movement feminist leaders had seen sexual relations as the source of men's oppression of women; now in the 1960s a new generation of activists saw sexual liberation as integral to women's liberation, as the new women's movement came to be called. When women's leaders had earlier demanded an end to the double standard, they had demanded that men be as chaste as women; from the 1960s – armed with the Pill – women's liberationists demanded the same sexual freedoms, the same rights to sexual fulfillment as their brothers and lovers. But they also demanded the right to be free from sexual relations with men if they so chose; and the right to take women as sexual partners. By the 1970s lesbianism was often promoted as a political position as well as an individual sexual choice.

Femocrats

The Australian women's movement of the 1970s and 1980s shared many goals with movements around the world, but as well as drawing on a shared critique of sex roles, sexism, conditioning, and patriarchy – new concepts popularized by key texts such as Germaine Greer's *Female Eunuch* and Kate Millet's *Sexual Politics* – the movement also joined a national political tradition of looking to the state to effect radical reform. The Australian women's movement expected state and federal governments to outlaw discrimination, to subsidize childcare and women's refuges, and to introduce affirmative action and equal pay and opportunity. The movement also secured the appointment of dedicated feminists to work with the public service, at both state and federal levels, in achieving these reforms: hence was born the distinctively Australian figure of the "femocrat."

A key organization in achieving legislative change and in securing the election of women to parliament was the Women's Electoral Lobby (WEL), formed in 1972, just in time for it to play a role in the change of government at the end of that year. The election of the Whitlam government brought an end to 23 years of conservative political rule in Australia and brought the Labor Party and the women's movement into a productive, if often fraught, working relationship. The appointment of Whitlam's first advisor on women's affairs, Liz Reid, a former university tutor in philosophy, gave women a voice at the highest level.

The following decade, with the election of the Hawke Labor government, a new minister for women's affairs and former WEL member Susan Ryan presided over the passage of the Anti-Discrimination Act of 1984 and the Affirmative Action (Equal Employment of Women) Act in 1986. That same year a new kind of feminist organization was initiated with the formation in Melbourne of the Victorian Women's Trust, which combined advocacy with feminist philanthropy to achieve change as a local and state level.

At the beginning of the new century the women's movement as a collective, powerful, vocal presence was no longer as visible as it had been 20 or 100 years before, but its beneficiaries – including several high-profile women politicians such as Deputy Prime Minister Julia Gillard and

former premiers Carmen Lawrence and Joan Kirner – testify to its long-term impact. The continuing challenges posed by the excessive workloads carried by women trying to combine paid work and domestic responsibilities and widespread evidence of ongoing sexual violence against women remind us of the work that lies ahead.

SEE ALSO: Australia, New Social Movements; Australian Labor Movement; Women's Movement, Britain; Women's Movement, France; Women's Movement, Germany; Women's Movement, India; Women's Movement, Latin America; Women's Movement, Southern Africa; Women's Movement, United States, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Caine, B. (Ed.) (1998) *Australian Feminism: A Companion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dux, M. & Simic, Z. (2008) *The Great Feminist Denial*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Lake, M. (1999) *Getting Equal: The History of Australian Feminism*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Lake, M. & Holmes, K. (Eds.) (1995) *Freedom Bound 2: Documents on Women in Modern Australia*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Paisley, F. (2000) *Loving Protection? Australian Feminism and the Aboriginal Women's Rights 1919–1939*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Radi, H. (1989) *200 Australian Women: A Redress Anthology*. Sydney: Women's Redress Press.
- Ryan, E. & Conlon, A. (1975) *Gentle Invaders: Australian Women at Work 1788–1974*. Sydney: Nelson.
- Sawer, M. (1990) *Sisters in Suits: Women and Public Policy in Australia*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Sawer, M. (2008) *Making Women Count: A History of the Women's Electoral Lobby in Australia*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Women's movement, Britain

Susan Kingsley Kent

Though the term was not introduced until 1890 or so, the movement that came to be called “feminism” became large and outspoken during the second half of the nineteenth century, arising in response to the exclusion of women from participating in political and public life. Women's exclusion was argued for and justified by references to their sexual differences from men, differences, it was asserted over and over again,

that derived from nature. As a consequence, feminists had to answer their opponents in the language used to categorize women as inferior. They had to refuse the ideology of sexual difference that established their inferiority as fact, to transgress the boundaries and practices that normalized “women.” But they had also to focus on women as a collectivity on whose behalf they advocated. Paradoxically, they had both to embrace and refuse their identities as “women.” Feminists cast their arguments in the context of a larger discussion about the value and function of the family and its individual members' roles in industrial capitalist society, reserving their most furious objections for representations that equated the female with the sexual.

Patriarchy, Sexual Difference, and the Rise of Feminism

The discussion of gender roles took place within a framework of centuries of political and economic change. The patriarchal household had rested on the presumption that the male head of the household owned his wife, his children, his tenants, his animals and tools, and his land. Throughout the nineteenth century, however, England experienced the dismantling of aristocratic, patriarchal institutions and concentrated on building a society based on liberal, individualistic, egalitarian philosophies. Middle- and working-class groups of men agitated and asserted their rights to participation in the new industrial order, basing their claims on the ideology of liberalism. With traditional forms of power and authority facing challenge from insubordinate groups, women joined the fray, seeking out changes in law and custom that would more clearly reflect their changing role in the family.

Under the law of coverture, married women had no rights or existence apart from their husbands. The popular aphorism “my wife and I are one, and I am he” described a situation in which a married woman had no legal rights to her property, her earnings, her freedom of movement, her conscience, her body, or her children; all resided in her husband. Throughout the nineteenth century, women and their male allies challenged these holdovers of aristocratic patriarchal society, seeking property rights, education and employment opportunities, and the right to divorce, insisting that rather than protecting women in the domestic sphere of home and

family, these legal disabilities exposed them to the brutalities of the world at large.

The most radical challenge of the women's movement to patriarchal control consisted of demands for enfranchisement on the same lines as men. The Reform Acts of 1832, 1867, and 1884 had afforded to increasing numbers of men the opportunity for political participation, until virtual universal manhood suffrage prevailed. When women began to agitate for inclusion in the public arena in the 1860s, their claim was continually denied on the basis of their sex.

The contradiction between, on the one hand, a liberal ideology that had legitimated the dismantling of aristocratic power and authority and the enfranchisement of middle-class, and later working-class, men and, on the other, the denial of the claims of women to full citizenship was resolved by appeals to biological and characterological differences between the sexes. Adherents to this "separate spheres" ideology asserted that men possessed the capacity for reason, action, aggression, independence, and self-interest, while women inhabited a separate, private sphere, one suitable for the so-called inherent qualities of femininity: emotion, passivity, submission, dependence, and selflessness, all derived, it was claimed insistently, from women's sexual and reproductive organization. Upon the female as a biological entity, a sexed body, nineteenth-century theorists imposed a socially and culturally constructed "femininity," a gender identity derived from ideas about what roles were appropriate for women. This collapsing of sex and gender – of the physiological organism with the normative social creation – made it possible for women to be construed as at once pure and purely sexual; although paradoxical, these definitions excluded women from participation in the public sphere and rendered them subordinate to men in the private sphere as well.

These arguments at once idealized women and expressed profound fear of them. On the one hand, women were aligned with morality and religion, whereas men represented corruption and materialism. Women were construed as occupying the ethical center of industrial society, invested with the guardianship of social values, whereas men functioned in a world of shady dealings, greed, and vice, values generally subversive of a civilized order. On the other hand, women were also identified with nature – wild, unruly, yet to be explored and mastered; whereas

men belonged to culture – controlled, systematic, symbolic of achievement and order. Correspondingly, women were assigned an exclusively reproductive function, in contrast to men, who allegedly held a monopoly on productivity. In each case, notions of femininity, or female nature, ultimately rested upon the perceived sexual organization of women, who were construed to be either sexually comatose or helplessly nymphomaniacal. Whether belonging to one category or the other, women were so exclusively identified by their sexual functions that nineteenth-century society came to regard them as "the Sex." This in turn set up yet another dichotomy, which offered two possible images for women: that of revered wife and mother, or that of despised prostitute. Both roles effectively disqualified women from economic and political activity. At the same time, as middle-class feminists and working women argued, the characterization of women as "the Sex" created the potential for the sexual abuse of women.

The contradiction between the ideal wife and mother on the one hand and the degraded prostitute on the other was simply too extreme to reflect the real experiences of women. Nineteenth-century women were, indeed, participants in and agents of culture; they did operate in the material and productive world of industrial society; and their contribution to the economic sphere was not limited to the reproduction of babies or the servicing of male sexual needs. Working-class women battled valiantly against enormous economic odds to bring in precious shillings to the household exchequer while at the same time maintaining a household in such a way as to affirm their families' respectability. Many middle-class women coopted the vision of "the angel in the house" in order to justify stepping out of it and engaging in public campaigns to end slavery, increase education, or reform the lives of poor Britons at home or colonized subjects abroad. Other middle-class women protested the image of femininity assigned to them, and, borrowing the very terms liberals used to justify enfranchising men, embarked on a movement to gain recognition for their full and complete humanity, thereby eliminating the reductively sexualized definition of femininity that threatened their integrity and dignity.

Some of the most prominent nineteenth-century writers on domesticity, like Sarah Stickney Ellis, incorporated the notion of

women's greater spirituality and morality in calling upon women to utilize their influence to effect reform outside the home. Ellis identified the domestic sphere as the proper one for women, and eschewed the idea of women engaging directly in the political or economic sphere. But Ellis and others like Harriet Martineau and Hannah More also believed that women's influence could be felt far beyond the arena of home and family, and urged women to exercise their power in order to change things in the political, social, and economic realms. Women had a "mission," a duty to bring their special qualities to the immoral world outside, a concept that authorized women's activities outside the home that appeared to contradict the mandate that they remain within it. Martineau, Ellis, and More insisted that women required education if they were to use their talents for beneficial ends rather than simply fritter away their time in idle pursuits. Convinced of their greater virtue and of their duty to bring their moral strengths to bear on the harsher aspects of society, women flocked to a number of campaigns that were in fact political in nature. They formed moral reform associations to fight prostitution – directing their attacks on the men who solicited prostitutes, not on the prostitutes themselves – and temperance societies to reduce the incidence of alcohol abuse. Above all, British women joined the anti-slavery campaign in huge numbers.

Quest for Equal Treatment

The contradictions of separate sphere ideology opened up space within which women could contest their positions of powerlessness. For women such as Bessie Raynor Parkes and Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon, women's inability to find respectable work by which they might support themselves, and, indeed, to actually end up owning for themselves any wages they might earn, rendered them unable to leave abusive or potentially abusive situations. Bodichon's *A Brief Summary in Plain Language of the Most Important Laws Concerning Women*, published in 1854, laid out in a systematic fashion the legal situation that condemned women to a position of chattel of men. The solution to these problems lay in increasing educational and employment possibilities for women and obtaining the passage of bills that gave married women the right to own property and retain their

earnings, just as single women, or *femes sole*, might currently do.

To this end these "ladies of Langham Place," as they came to be called after the location of their office in London, founded the *English Woman's Journal* in 1858. In its pages contributors publicized "the cause" of women throughout Britain, raising issues of concern for women such as property rights and divorce laws. Langham Place also provided space for the Society for Promoting the Employment of Women, founded by Jessie Boucherett in 1859, to provide a kind of clearing house of employment opportunities for mostly middle-class women without means of support outside the overcrowded, low-paying, and humiliating profession of governing, which was currently the only work they might obtain without compromising their class position. The society argued that middle-class parents must recognize that their daughters might not be able to marry, given the "redundancy" of women relative to men, and must be educated for work beyond governing or teaching. They recognized that for women to become economically independent of men they must break down the barriers that kept them from being educated in sound educational institutions for work that was remunerative.

Queen's College had been founded in 1848 and began to grant degrees to women. In the 1850s Mary Frances Buss and Dorothea Beale had opened the North of London Collegiate School for Ladies and Cheltenham Ladies' College, respectively, so that single middle-class women might qualify for employment that would provide an income to support them. But the Ladies of Langham Place had their sights set on bigger targets – the British universities and medical schools. Their activities on behalf of women's higher education ensured that Girton College at Cambridge in 1871, the University of London in 1878, and Newnham College at Oxford in 1879 admitted women to examination. Anna Jellicoe, an Irish advocate for women's education, helped found Alexandra College in Dublin. The University of Edinburgh admitted five women to its medical school in 1869, and in 1874 the London School of Medicine for Women opened its doors and matriculated 14 women.

The ladies of Langham Place also helped to set in motion the campaign for women's property rights. With the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts of 1870 and 1882, married women

secured the right to retain and own any property or earnings they might bring to their marriage. Husbands no longer enjoyed full and free access to their wives' assets.

The feminist critique of marriage necessarily involved a critique of masculinity. Male sexuality, exemplified in microcosm by the institution of marriage, was, British feminists like Josephine Butler, Elizabeth Wolstenholme Elmy, and Frances Swiney believed, destructive both to women and ultimately to the whole of humanity. The experiences of women in marriage where, in the words of Wolstenholme Elmy, they were subject to "the excess of sexual proclivity and indulgence general on the part of man," led feminists to demand the right to control their bodies and their fertility.

Yet artificial means of birth control were anathema to most mainstream nineteenth-century feminists, who believed that they would simply allow men easier and more frequent access to their wives by eliminating the fear of pregnancy. With only a few exceptions, they opposed contraception because they feared it would "give men greater sexual license." Feminists certainly favored "voluntary motherhood" – the right to abstain from sexual intercourse. For some, in fact, the right to refuse intercourse stood at the core of their movement. But abstinence from sexual intercourse was possible only if men agreed to it, something feminists doubted the willingness of most husbands to do. Feminists charged that the rights of husbands to force sexual intercourse and compulsory childbearing on their wives established a condition of "sex-slavery," as *Common Cause*, the official newspaper of Britain's National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies, described it in 1910. For many, this issue stood at the center of the feminist movement. Couched in rather vague terms, the issue that so inflamed the passions of feminists was marital rape. A husband's right to sexual intercourse with his wife was absolute, superceding even the right of a woman to protect herself and/or her unborn children from disease.

Feminists' critique of masculinity instilled in them the conviction that only a massive transformation in the laws, customs, mores, and traditions of Britain could produce a society in which women could exercise the same freedom and liberty accorded to men. That transformation, they insisted, required that women arm themselves with the vote. The campaign for

the vote was designed to eliminate the notions of separate spheres and "natural" differences between the sexes insisted upon by domestic ideology. The British women's suffrage campaign as an organized movement began in April 1866, when Barbara Bodichon, Jessie Boucherette, Emily Davies, and Elizabeth Garrett, all members of prominent Liberal families, set out on a petition drive to demand votes for women. By June they had collected 1,499 signatures. John Stuart Mill, who had stood for election to parliament on a platform that had included the enfranchisement of women, presented the petition to the House of Commons.

Although feminists identified the contradictions contained in domestic ideology and liberalism as they pertained to power relations between women and men, they were blind to the implications they had for inequalities based on class and race. Few feminists questioned their white, bourgeois status, or considered how working-class or colonized women fared under their strictures. Instead, they tended to embrace the divisions and prejudices based on class and race that informed liberalism and their societies as a whole. British feminists participated uncritically in an imperial discourse that cast subject Indian and African peoples as savage and immoral. Closer to home, feminists rarely intended their dreams of a new world for men and women to extend to the working classes of their nation. Socialist feminists, always in a minority, did make far more radical claims on behalf of women workers. The icy receptions they met from their bourgeois sisters very often reinforced their beliefs that capitalist relations of production, rather than the relations between men and women in patriarchy, stood at the center of women's inequalities and oppressions and would have to be removed if equality between men and women were to be attained.

By the beginning of the twentieth century the suffrage campaign had attained the status of a mass movement. With the advent of militancy arising out of the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU) in 1905, the whole of the feminist movement centered on suffrage as the means by which women could free themselves from servile bondage to men. As a symbol of civic and political personality, the vote would be an effective agent in eliminating the notion of women as "the Sex." As an instrument of power, feminists believed – as did their adversaries – it would transform the elevating "influence" of

women into a tool with which to create a greater and truer morality among men by eliminating the distinctions between public and private spheres. They meant to use it to build a sexual culture in Britain that would reflect the needs, desires, and interests of bourgeois women.

Birth of "New Feminism"

The outbreak of world war in August 1914 brought to a halt the activities of suffragists in their efforts to gain votes for women. When war ended, feminists continued to agitate for votes on the same terms as they had been granted to men; but organized feminism, despite the fact that a considerable portion of the potential female electorate remained disenfranchised, never regained its prewar status as a mass movement. By the end of the 1920s feminism as a distinct political and social movement had become subsumed in other causes. The experiences of the Great War – articulated and represented in specific languages of gender and sexuality – forged dramatically different ideas about gender and sexual identity for many men and women than those prevailing in the late Victorian and Edwardian eras. These languages and the identities they spawned provide the context within which interwar feminism operated and by which it was constrained. Feminists' understandings of masculinity and femininity – of gender and sexual identity – became transformed during the war and in the postwar period. Their insistence upon equality with men gradually gave way to an ideology that emphasized women's special sphere – a separate sphere, in fact – and carried with it an urgent belief in the relationship between the sexes as one of complementarity.

Prewar feminists had vigorously attacked the notion of separate spheres and the medical and scientific discourses about gender and sexuality upon which those spheres rested. Many feminists after World War I, by contrast, pursued a program that championed rather than challenged the prevailing ideas about masculinity and femininity that appeared in the literature of psychoanalysis and sexology. In embracing radically new – and seemingly liberating – views of women as human beings with sexual identities, many feminists accepted theories of sexual difference that helped to advance notions of separate spheres for men and women. This shift did not take place

suddenly and was resisted throughout the 1920s by many other feminists, but the acceptance of the dominant discourse on sexuality represented a fundamental abandonment of prewar feminist ideology. By the end of the 1920s feminists found themselves in a conceptual bind that trapped women in "traditional" domestic and maternal roles, and limited their ability to advocate equality and justice for women.

A faction within the largest feminist organization, the National Union of Societies for Equal Citizenship (NUSEC), declared that they would now refer to themselves as "new feminists" in order to distinguish their thinking from that of the prewar period still held onto by many of their colleagues. "New feminism," explained Eleanor Rathbone, president of NUSEC in 1925, embodied the belief that the equality of women with men had been achieved. "Women are virtually free," she announced, and feminists could now turn to the needs of women as women, not as imitators of men. "At last we can . . . demand what we want for women, not because it is what men have got, but because it is what women need to fulfill the potentialities of their own natures and to adjust themselves to the circumstances of their own lives." Justification for "new feminist" demands like the endowment of motherhood, birth control, and protective legislation for women centered on the role of women in the home and "the occupation of motherhood – in which most women are at some time or another engaged, and which no man . . . is capable of performing."

The "new feminist" agenda was not inherently anti-feminist by any means; such demands can be quite radical. Indeed, as Rathbone argued, women's needs are often very different from those of men, and a strictly egalitarian line failed sometimes to address those needs. The right to access to contraceptive knowledge, for instance, became an explicit aspect of the feminist agenda, as activists like Marie Stopes and Dora Russell began explicitly to demand the right of women to the use of contraception. The difficulty arose from the arguments "new feminists" advanced to legitimate their demands. Not the *rights* of women but the *needs* of women *as mothers* backed feminist appeals now. Not equality but sexual difference characterized the relationship between men and women as "new feminists" understood it.

When "new feminists" made demands based on women's traditional special needs and special

functions, when they ceased to challenge the dominant discourse on sexuality, their ideology became difficult to distinguish from that of anti-feminists. To "old" feminists like Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence, Cicely Hamilton, Rebecca West, Winifred Holtby, and Vera Brittain, espousing a strictly egalitarian line, "new feminist" arguments reminded them of nothing so much as the anti-feminist arguments marshaled in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to deny women equality with men. In 1927 NUSEC split over the change in emphasis and lost much of its momentum and status as an organization. More importantly, "new feminism," by accepting the terms of the larger culture, by putting forward a politics of sexual difference, compromised its ability to advocate equality and justice for women.

Second Wave of Feminism, 1960s to the Present

What is called the second wave of feminism, known at the time as women's liberation, arose in the West in the 1960s. Inspired in part by the civil rights movements in the United States and the new left movements in Europe, women in Britain began to demand freedom from the roles, portrayals, and expectations that limited, diminished, and oppressed them. The sexual revolution of the 1960s had placed a premium on men's pleasures and the fulfillment of their sexual desires, at the expense of women, whose highly sexualized images appeared in magazines like *Playboy* and *Penthouse*, on billboards and posters. Women's liberation activists protested loudly and vividly against such depictions of women as sexual objects. One of their first actions took place in 1970 at the Miss World beauty contest in London, when a group of women interrupted the pageant by leaping on stage and blowing whistles, hooting, mooing like cattle, and brandishing signs that read "Miss-conception," "Miss-treated," "Miss-placed," and "Miss-judged." They lobbed stink bombs, flour bombs, and smoke bombs at the contestants, the judges, and at Bob Hope, the master of ceremonies. Their actions resembled those of the militant suffragists of the first decade of the twentieth century, and earned them the same result – arrest. They created a spectacle that succeeded in garnering for the movement enormous publicity.

Some 70 women's liberation groups existed in London alone by 1969. Publications like *Shrew*, *Red Rag*, and *Spare Rib* appeared, analyzing women's oppression, recounting earlier feminist efforts, spreading the feminist message, and making claims for women's personal, sexual, and familial freedom. "Second wave" feminists looked for more than equality with men before the law; they sought changes in the law, the social and economic system, and the culture that would "liberate" them from current conceptions of femininity that, they argued, locked them into stifling, unfulfilling, slavish positions, and often made them vulnerable to sexual predations from men. Unlike contemporary liberal feminists and those of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, feminists seeking liberation believed that the very system in which they lived required abolition or complete overhaul.

Feminists differed in their designation of just what system it was that oppressed them. Socialist feminists identified capitalism as the source of conditions that rendered them inferior to men. The family, in particular, required complete transformation. For socialist feminists, adherence to Marxist doctrine and to socialist groups remained a significant aspect of their politics, the goal of which was to eliminate the unjust class system produced by capitalism and reproduced by the family. The achievement of feminist aims would follow upon its extinction. At the same time, their insistence that women's work, experiences, and functions in a capitalist society could not simply be subsumed into those of men forced traditional socialists to enlarge their understandings and expand their analyses of capitalism.

Radical feminists, by contrast, saw domination by men in patriarchy, not in the economic system, as the root of their oppression. They insisted that if women were to be liberated, they would have to arrive at a "consciousness" of their oppression. In "consciousness-raising" sessions where they explored their personal lives in depth, many feminists gained an understanding of how patriarchy operated in the most insidious ways to make women complicit in their own subservience to men. In consequence, some radical feminists – many of them lesbians who had been ostracized by straight feminists who feared that their movement would be tainted by association with lesbianism – became convinced

that they would ultimately have to remove themselves from sexual and social relationships with men. Separatism, as they saw it, provided the only avenue to liberation.

Despite their differences, which would become increasingly evident and acrimonious in the mid- and late-1970s, feminists of virtually every stripe agreed that women's sexual freedom, their capacity to choose the kind of intimate or social grouping in which they would live, and the right to determine for themselves the kind of work they would do, were vital to their liberation. They could readily come together to support reforms that contributed to that end: access to free and legal contraception and abortion; equal pay; health, educational, and social services; increased penalties for rape and domestic violence; nursery and daycare for children; and provisions that enabled women to be legally and financially independent like divorce law reform and wages for housework. They made clear from the start that they intended their varieties of feminism to create entirely different roles, expectations, identities, and material realities for women than those currently operative. Their focus on personal and family issues, and on social and cultural practices – like the clubs, bookstores, magazines, and literature of the “sexual revolution” that gratuitously portrayed women as the proper objects of male sexual desire and violence – gave their movement a broad comprehensiveness that touched the lives of generations of women – and men – to come.

Race in the Women's Movement

Women of color in Britain found themselves in a kind of political no-man's-land in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Disconcerted by their treatment at the hands of the male-dominated black power movement, yet finding women's liberation and feminism entirely irrelevant and blind to their needs and desires, women of color began to form their own organizations to gain liberation for themselves. When they looked toward white feminist groups, black women saw a political program that addressed few of their concerns. In order to deal with a dual oppression arising from racism and sexism, a number of women formed other local black women's groups throughout London and in cities like Leicester, Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, and Nottingham.

Coalitions of women of color such as the Organization of Women of Asian and African Descent (OWAAD) enabled a broader national movement to emerge within which issues of racism and sexism that concerned women of color could be addressed and a national dialogue established. The structures of racism meant that black women experienced different kinds of subjection than white women. What white women regarded as an oppressive institution – the family – black women often found to be a place from which to resist political and cultural forms of racism. White radical feminists might espouse separatism from men; black women relied on “progressive” men in their struggles for equality and justice. Finally, white feminists had not recognized their role in continuing imperialist and colonialist regimes around the world, or indeed, in acting as oppressors of black people at home, and it was left to black feminists to raise these issues.

Feminism has proven to produce tough and resilient ideologies and movements, reflecting both the strength of opposition to women's demands for freedom and equality, and the power of those ideals to move millions to take action to realize them. Feminists' successes have resulted from their ability to analyze the power relations obtaining between men and women in any given time and place, and from their challenges to the assumptions, policies, and practices that structure social, economic, political, cultural, and familial life.

SEE ALSO: Britain, Women's Suffrage Campaign; Pankhurst, Emmeline (1858–1928), Christabel (1880–1958), and Sylvia (1882–1960)

References and Suggested Readings

- Carby, H. V. (1999) *Cultures in Babylon: Black Britain and African America*. New York: Verso.
- Halbersleben, K. I. (1993) *Women's Participation in the British Antislavery Movement, 1824–1865*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Ingram, A. & Patai, D. (1993) *Rediscovering Forgotten Radicals: British Women Writers, 1889–1939*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kent, S. K. (1990) *Sex and Suffrage in Britain, 1860–1914*. London: Routledge.
- Purvis, J. (2004) *Emmeline Pankhurst: A Biography*. London: Routledge.
- Smith, H. L. (1990) *British Feminism in the Twentieth Century*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Women's movement, Cuba

Jean Weisman

The women's movement in Cuba in many ways illustrates the broader Latin American women's movement. Looking more closely at the events in Cuba and the feminist leaders who have made an impact in that country can further bring to life the picture of the Latin American women's movement.

Women's Congresses in Cuba, 1923 and 1925

Hundreds of women from various provinces in Cuba joined together in women's congresses in 1923 and 1925 to work for reforms that included equality for women, the right to vote, and an end to child abuse consistent with principles of reverence for motherhood, the home, and the family, and respect for Cuban nationhood. These were the first congresses of women in Latin America. While most of the women were white middle-class and upper-class women, many were concerned about issues that involved poor and working-class women.

In the 1923 Congress, women spoke out in favor of solidarity and knowing and defending their rights. They emphasized the historical role of women in the struggle for Cuban independence and called for the right to vote and greater participation of women in government. Some called for the need for special courts for women and children and respect for the rights of illegitimate children. They spoke out against the abuse of drugs and alcohol and addressed the special needs of women professionals in journalism and the arts. They called for decent wages for working women and an end to discriminatory laws, such as the one that allowed husbands to murder wives who committed adultery but did not allow for any punishment of unfaithful husbands. As part of the congress, they visited women's institutions such as daycare centers, orphanages, and maternity homes. They also invited politicians to receptions to discuss women's rights, hoping to work with men to win reforms.

At the 1925 Congress speakers called for women's suffrage, the necessity of giving women jobs in all categories of the government and

administration, equal pay for equal work, a six-hour day for working women, the necessity of time off from work before and after delivery of a baby, the need to help poor and abandoned women, the need for women to join trade unions, the right of women to be part of tribunals, the creation of dining halls for working women, the creation of low-price clinics, and the struggle against prostitution. They called for more women to work in the upper levels of education and participate in boards of education, and they urged the creation of more schools with an emphasis on home economics. President General Machado, seen at the time as a liberal reformer and not the dictator he later became, spoke at the congress. He promised to give women the vote, but the vote was not granted until 1934, after his term was completed. Ofelia Dominguez Navarro, an attorney from Santa Clara, reintroduced a resolution from the previous congress in support of the rights of illegitimate children, and when the resolution failed, ten women walked out. Several years later these proposals, put forth by the radicals, became law.

MAGIN and other Cuban Women's Organizations

In the last decade of the twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first century, organizations in Cuba flourished that were dedicated to the study of women and the creation of programs to bring about improvements in their social, political, and economic conditions. Some of these organizations included the women's studies departments at several universities; MAGIN, an organization of communicators dedicated to improving the image of women in the media and an increase in women in upper-level decision-making positions; CENESEX, dedicated to sexual education; and Casa de las Americas, which encourages research on women in literature, the publication of women's writings, and a conference on violence and women's culture in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The first women's studies program at a Cuban university was created in Villa Clara in 1989, and later programs were developed in eight other provinces. Research on women developed in the departments of sociology, demographics, psychology, anthropology, economics, literature, economics, and law, and each program studied the relation of gender to their particular fields and

made recommendations about the improvement of the role of women in Cuban society. Beginning in 1995, the Women's Studies Faculty in Havana began organizing international conferences every two years on the role of gender in Cuba and other societies. Some of the workshops were Gender Theory; Methodology and Feminist Thought; Gender, Identity, and Subjectivity; Studies of Masculinity; Gender and Violence (Including Wars and Armed Conflicts); Gender and the Environment; Gender and Power; Gender and Work; Gender, Race, Class, and Ethnicity; and Gender and Religion. A master's program in women's studies has been created at the University of Havana.

In 1993, professional women who participated in an international conference on women and communication in Havana saw the need to have a broad discussion of gender in the area of media and government. They decided to form MAGIN, which means inspiration, image, and imagination. This organization, with a collective non-hierarchical structure, sponsors study groups, workshops, and conferences around the theme of gender. It defines gender not primarily in terms of the biological differences between men and women but in terms of the social, cultural, and political construction of relationships between men and women in society, pointing out that although the Cuban Family Code requires men to participate equally in housework and child care, women still have a triple day, involving care of their family, their jobs, and their political work.

Conference participants decided to focus on two critical issues: the image of women in the Cuban media and the need for more women in the upper levels of government decision-making. MAGIN organized workshops to develop women's self-esteem and empowerment and succeeded in creating television and radio programs and articles that challenged prevailing views of women. It reached out to younger women and women throughout the island and developed committees that involved a total of 400 women. It developed a proposal on women and the media which was submitted to the 1995 Beijing Women's Conference and was later adopted by the Cuban government.

In 1996 MAGIN began to have trouble finding places to meet, and representatives from the Cuban Women's Federation (Federation de Mujeres Cubanas, FMC) began to withdraw from the organization. It was called to a meeting

of the Politburo of the Central Committee and ordered to disband, being told that it duplicated the work of the FMC and that independent organizations were being influenced by foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were trying to overthrow the Cuban government. While the US government, through the Helms-Burton Act, was trying to manipulate Cuban organizations with funds provided by the Agency for International Development, MAGIN's members were strong women who could not be influenced by subversives. The women in MAGIN had a long history of support for the Cuban Revolution, and while they did receive some funds from UN and women's organizations in Canada and Europe, they never received funds from US governmental organizations.

The MAGIN women reluctantly decided to disband because they did not want to be considered dissidents and threaten their personal professional development. They were encouraged to continue to do their work through the FMC and organizations at their workplaces. They became strong advocates for women's rights in various governmental and non-governmental organizations.

In 1979, the FMC formed a committee on sex education. In 1989, this committee became CENESEX, the National Working Group on Sex Education. It developed extensive sex education programs, worked to develop a greater understanding of the needs of transsexuals, and encouraged sex-reassignment surgery. It is working on reforming the Cuban Family Code to include articles on sexual orientation and gender identity. At this time it is pushing for recognition of same-sex legal unions but not for same-sex marriages in order to avoid "complications and rejections."

Numerous other organizations in Cuba have formed study groups, committees, and conferences around the issues of gender. In February 2008, the national cultural organization Casa de las Americas held a conference on "Violence and Counterviolence in the Culture of Latin American and Caribbean Women."

Some Leading Cuban Women Activists

Vilma Espin (1930–2007)

Vilma Espin was a revolutionary leader in Cuba in the 1950s. President of the FMC from 1962 until her death in 2007, she was also a member

of the Central Committee and the Politburo of the Cuban Communist Party and was married to Raúl Castro, Fidel Castro's brother.

Espin was born to an upper-middle-class family in Santiago de Cuba. She spent two years in parochial schools and received all her undergraduate education at the University of Oriente in Santiago. She graduated as a chemical engineer and went to Cambridge, Massachusetts to do graduate work in engineering at MIT. She was deeply affected by the poverty in her country, and the March 1952 coup by Batista spurred her to action. The students formed a political school for workers at the University of Oriente, hoping to free Cuba from tyranny. They organized demonstrations and fought with the police. Espin met Fidel Castro after the attack on Moncada in 1953 and his famous "History Will Absolve Me" speech. That year she joined Frank Pais's revolutionary cadre in Oriente, working with him to organize support for the revolution.

Espin offered to bring messages from Fidel Castro to the revolutionaries in Cuba and organized First Aid Brigades. She was also part of a failed plan to stage an uprising to support the landing of the *Granma* boat with Cuban revolutionaries from Mexico. The young women in the First Aid Brigades also transported medicines and weapons. Some women also carried and planted bombs and engaged in supportive activities.

After the triumph of the revolution in 1959, Espin went to the International Federation of Democratic Women's Conference in Chile with 75 other Cuban women. This group became the nucleus of the Cuban Women's Federation, which united all Cuban women's organizations in 1960. The main goal of the federation was to incorporate women into educational programs and the workforce, and hundreds of thousands of women got involved in education and cultural programs. They established dressmaking classes, first aid centers, and daycare centers. Women attended schools for peasants, domestic workers, prostitutes, and daycare workers. Women enrolled in the militia through the FMC. The women's militia became a branch of the FMC and were very active in the defense of the country during the Bay of Pigs invasion. They were also active in social work, dealing with juvenile delinquency, health preventative care programs, hygiene, and baby care.

Although Espin did not originally see herself as a feminist, through the course of her work with

the FMC over many years she began to accept a certain kind of feminism. She said: "I believe in those feminists who tie the solution to the oppression of women, the liberation of women, the liberation of all the exploited, the oppressed and discriminated against, which also means taking into consideration social, political, and ideological as well as economic problems, from the perspective of a class, sex, and race analysis." Crucial to her hopes was the raising of Cuban women's political, cultural, and ideological consciousness so that they would understand what socialism had to offer. Her emphasis was in creating programs for Cuban women, rather than bringing about changes in the structure of the male-dominated government.

Celia Sanchez (1920–1980)

Celia Sanchez was a major leader who played a critical role in the development and success of the Cuban revolution. Creating a network of peasants in the Sierra Maestra Mountains when Fidel Castro was in prison and in Mexico, she became an expert in the trails, the rivers, and the swamps of the area. A leading strategist in the Cuban Revolution, she was appointed secretary to President Castro after the revolution and continued to be a leading decision-maker.

Sanchez was born in Media Luna, a small town in eastern Cuba, to a landowning father who was also the leader of the Cuban Medical Association. She studied biology at the university and nursing at home, and she developed a way to process swamp water so that it could be used to irrigate farms. She also assisted her father in providing medical services to peasants in Oriente. When Castro was in prison and in Mexico, she was busy building a base amongst the peasants in the Sierra Maestra.

In 1953 she began visiting towns and farms in the Sierra Maestra, recruiting peasants to fight in the revolutionary war, developing safe houses, and collecting weapons. She recruited 200 men and women to join her army and found 50 more people to transport supplies and weapons. The first troops that Batista sent to the Sierra Maestra ended up in swamps as a result of Celia's maneuvers and the revolutionaries captured the weapons. Fidel Castro wrote her: "What you have done and are doing has thrilled me and inspired me beyond anything I have ever imagined" (Haney 2005: 29). Pedro Alvarez Tabio, director of the Cuban Council of State's Office of

Historical Affairs, interviewed 300 Sierra rebels, and they overwhelmingly said that Sanchez was the organizer and leader of the Cuban Revolution.

While secretary to the president, Sanchez responded to the specific requests received from the Cuban people. She was highly organized and provided homes for peasants in the former mansions of the Batista people who left Cuba, gave cars to peasants, and set up medical, cultural, educational, and sports programs. Although never publicly acknowledged, she was widely believed to be the companera of Fidel Castro, in work and in love. She never married or had any children, but she was seen as the mother of the people of Cuba. Always wearing ribbons in her hair and maintaining her femininity, she worked tirelessly to provide for others, seeking no personal gain.

Haydée Santamaría (1922–1980)

Haydée Santamaría fought in the Battle of Moncada in 1953, was a revolutionary leader throughout the 1950s, and after the revolution was the director of Casa de las Americas.

She was born to a family of small landowners in central Cuba and moved to Havana with her brother in the early 1950s. Concerned about the oppressed people in Havana, she became involved in the student movement, helping to publish an underground newspaper and allowing her apartment to become a base for the revolutionaries who planned the attack on the Moncada garrison in Santiago. She and Melba Hernandez were the only two women who participated directly in the attack. Her brother and fiancé, along with 65 other men, were tortured and killed in the attack, but she continued fighting in order to allow for more time for Fidel Castro to escape.

Santamaría and Hernandez were arrested and sentenced to seven months in prison. After being released, Santamaría worked with others to print and distribute over 10,000 copies of Fidel Castro's "History Will Absolve Me" speech and began work to organize the 26th of July Movement. In 1956 she was one of the leaders of an uprising in Santiago that was planned to coincide with the arrival of the *Granma* ship from Mexico. Although they lost the battle, they received considerable support from the people of Santiago, preventing many rebels from dying. When the *Granma* ship landed in 1956, Santamaría did underground work, fought in the Sierra Mountains, and traveled to the US to collect funds and weapons.

After the revolution Santamaría became the director of Casa de Las Americas, a cultural organization designed to promote literature, the arts, drama, poetry, theater, and music throughout Latin America. After Casa de las Americas was formed in 1959, she worked with Silvio Rodríguez and Pablo Milanes to develop the New Song movement. She was deeply committed to internationalism and in 1967 directed the Latin American Organization for Solidarity Conference in Havana.

Santamaría believed that the revolution provided economic support to women. Poor women no longer had to marry to get support for their children. After the revolution thousands of women participated in various activities, and they were more committed than men. She called for more daycare centers, understanding from men, scholarships, and workers' dining rooms to complete the revolution. She committed suicide in 1980 for unknown reasons.

SEE ALSO: Castro, Fidel (b. 1926); Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Music and Protest, Latin America; Rodríguez, Silvio (b. 1946); Women's Movement, Latin America; Women's Movement, Venezuela

References and Suggested Readings

- Bedregal, X. (2002) *Los encuentros Feministas: Lilita y el todo poder UNO*. Available at www.creatividad-feminista.org (downloaded December 12, 2007).
- CIMAC (2003) *Hacedoras de la historia. Impulso Consuelo Zavala el primer Congreso Feminista*. Available at www.cimacnoticias.com/noticias/03sep/s03090204.html (downloaded June 20, 2008).
- Chomsky, A. et al. (2003) *The Cuba Reader: History, Culture, Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Fernandes, S. (2005) Transnationalism and Feminist Activism in Cuba: The Case of MAGIN. *Politics and Gender* 1, 3 (September).
- Haney, R. (2005) *Celia Sanchez: The Legend of Cuba's Revolutionary Heart*. New York: Algora.
- MacLean, B. (2003) *Haydée Santamaría*. Melbourne: Ocean Press.
- Randall, M. (1974) *Cuban Women Now*. Toronto: Women's Press.
- Rodríguez Calderon, M. (1995) Recovering the History of Women. In *Cuba Update* (June). New York: Center for Cuban Studies.
- Stoner, K. L. (1991) *From the House to the Streets: The Cuban Women's Movement for Legal Reform 1898–1940*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Weisman, J. (2004) The Continuing Revolution. In M. Azicri & E. Deal (Eds.), *Cuban Socialism in a New Century: Adversity, Survival and Renewal*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

Women's movement, France

Marcelline Block

One of the prominent legacies of the May 1968 French uprisings is the modern French women's movement. Founded by feminists Antoinette Fouque, Monique Wittig, and Josiane Chanel, the movement was dubbed MLF by the press in reference to the American women's liberation movement, which was at its most visible expression of public activism during the 1960s and 1970s. MLF was mainly used during the initial period of the movement in the early 1970s, after which independent groups were created.

Provocative actions during the formative years of the MLF include public demonstrations, such as in August 1970 when a group of women placed a wreath on the tomb of the unknown soldier at the Arc de Triomphe in order to commemorate his wife, whom they declared was "more unknown" than he was. This action sparked the first public discussion of the MLF in the media. Another major media event drawing attention to the MLF was the April 1971 Manifeste des 343. Three hundred and forty-three women, many of whom were famous artists and writers, signed the manifesto, admitting to having had an illegal abortion. It was published in important print media such as *Le Nouvel Observateur* and *Le Monde*, garnering attention for the MLF. In May 1972, 5,000 women congregated at the Maison de la Mutualité conference center in Paris, testifying to the injustices they suffered, such as rape, domestic violence, sexual harassment, and discrimination. Only two weeks later women marched down the Champs Élysées to protest Mother's Day, claiming that it celebrated mothers for one day and overlooked the fact that they were exploited all year long.

While the term MLF is a catchphrase that refers to the entirety of post-1968 French feminism, in actuality the MLF encompasses numerous groups, all of which are devoted to the general goals of ending the oppression of women in society in order to achieve women's equality and liberation. However, the various groups and movements within the MLF are often in conflict with each other in terms of their ideologies, methods, politics, claims, and objectives. To foster these varying aims, as many as 18 different

feminist publications, including *Questions féministes*, *Revue d'en face*, *Des Femmes en mouvements*, *Des Femmes en mouvements hebdo*, *Parole*, *Modes et Travaux*, *Nous Deux*, and *F Magazine*, among others, have existed at different times. La Ligue du Droit des femmes (The League of Women's Rights), whose president was Simone de Beauvoir, published the *Nouvelles féministes* (Feminist News) newsletter and the journal *Questions féministes* (Feminist Questions). By 1977, each particular feminist group had its own journal.

In the early 1970s the MLF split along class lines. Women wanting to include working-class women formed *groupes de quartier* (neighborhood groups), which led to the formation of the Mouvement pour la liberté de l'Avortement (Movement for the Freedom of Abortion, MLAC). *Les Pétroleuses* (1974–6) was the original journal of this branch of the MLF. At the end of the 1970s, this movement became the Mouvement autonome des femmes (Autonomous Women's Movement, MAF), a Marxist, feminist, working-class group.

Another important branch of the MLF was Les Féministes révolutionnaires (Revolutionary Feminists), an umbrella term covering many feminist groups throughout France (some of which broke up and then reappeared later), which took Simone de Beauvoir's *Le Deuxième Sexe* (*The Second Sex*) as their foundational text. One of the groups associated with Féministes révolutionnaires was Choisir (Choose), a movement founded in 1971 by lawyer Gisèle Halimi, devoted to women's reproductive rights. This movement contributed to passing the contraception and abortion law proposed by Simone Veil, the first female French government minister of health, in 1975. Other groups associated with this branch were SOS Femme-Alternative (SOS Domestic Abuse) and SOS Femmes violées (SOS Rape). The women who belong to these organizations define themselves against their Marxist feminist counterparts, who attribute the oppression of women to capitalism. Rather, the revolutionary feminists, who consider themselves influenced by radical feminists in the US, struggle against the oppression of women within patriarchy and a phallographic society.

Another group, Psychanalyse et politique (Psychoanalysis and Politics), more commonly known as Psych et po, PsychePo or psykép, is a non-feminist, non-Marxist group founded by psychoanalyst Antoinette Fouque. It was based

upon and centered around the writings and teachings of Jacques Derrida on deconstruction and Jacques Lacan on psychoanalysis. Psych et po emphasized semiotics, language, sexual difference, and the feminine, seeking to recuperate through women's writing the feminine from patriarchal oppression. Psych et po created the publishing house Editions des femmes (founded by Fouque, Marie-Claude Grumbach, and Sylvina Boissonnas), and organized the Librairie des femmes, a women-only bookstore in Paris. Editions des femmes published the short-term journal *Le Torchon Brûlé* (Burning Rag). Some of the major figures of French feminism, such as Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva, and Luce Irigaray, were part of Psych et po at one time or another. Because of its intellectual orientation, and particularly its preoccupation with language and high levels of abstract theorizing, this movement was not accessible to most feminist activists; furthermore, it aligned itself against "feminism" since the group's aims were not to make men and women equal, but rather to affirm the "essential" difference of women. For these and other reasons, Psych et po has a limited following.

Further dramatic fissures within the MLF were to follow and would overshadow the progress and development of feminism in France in the post-1968 era, demonstrating the complexity and fragmentary and often contentious nature of the feminism of this period. This lack of cohesion among feminists and feminist groups remains a significant aspect of second-wave French feminism. However, this is not surprising given the overall French political climate, which is usually fragmented among a multitude of parties, voices, groups, and sub-groups, rather than being monolithic. Over the years, not only have some MLF groups waged political battles against one another – often in the form of articles appearing in competing feminist/women's journals printed by rival feminist/women's publishing houses – but some of the groups and individual members have become embroiled in legal battles over accusations of libel and slander, among others.

One of the best-known controversies within the MLF, known as the "Barbara Affair," occurred in 1976 when women aligned with *Féministes révolutionnaires* took over the Librairie des femmes, which was maintained by the Editions des femmes publishing house of the Psych et po movement. This action was in retaliation for the dismissal of Mireille "Barbara" Dekoninck,

manager of the Librairie des femmes. In January 1977, Dekoninck and her colleagues responded by screening a film denouncing the Editions des femmes at a *fête des femmes* (women's festival) in Paris. In May 1979, Editions des femmes successfully sued the makers of the film for defamation.

In 1979, Psych et po unleashed another controversy when Antoinette Fouque, its leader, registered the name MLF, causing Simone de Beauvoir, the leftist newspaper *Libération*, and other members of the feminist press in France to decry Psych et po's attempt to claim the MLF. The anthology of essays entitled *Chroniques d'une imposture* (Chronicles of a Forgery), prefaced by Beauvoir, denounced both Psych et po's claiming of the term MLF and the works published by Editions des femmes. In 1980, 11 feminist publishers signed a petition against Psych et po and Editions des femmes. Editions des femmes sued, going against its rival feminist publisher, Editions Tierce, for slander and unfair market practices. Editions des femmes won its case in June 1981. While Psych et po has ceased to exist, its founder, Antoinette Fouque, has been elected as a member of the European Parliament and has organized another feminist group, *L'Alliance des femmes pour la démocratie* (Women's Alliance for Democracy), which is shunned by most other feminist organizations and societies who do not wish to be associated with Fouque or her group.

The French feminist movement found itself in disarray by the late 1970s, although by the end of the decade France was second only to Sweden for the highest number of female government ministers: President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1974–81) had nine women in his cabinet, including Simone Veil, the first female minister, and Françoise Giroud, minister for women. Yet there were still very few women in the National Assembly and in 1977, to protest the absence of women in the senatorial elections, 67-year-old Senator Janine Alexandre-Derbay started a hunger strike. In 1981 many feminists, including the usually apolitical Psych et po group, supported the presidential candidacy of François Mitterrand.

When Mitterrand won in May 1981, the French women's movement made many inroads, such as the approval of a 1983 law against sexism sponsored by Yvette Roudy. In May 1981, Mitterrand appointed the first French female prime minister, Edith Cresson, who was not a

feminist. Cresson was subsequently mocked for making undiplomatic comments such as, among others, declaring that British men were less “sexy” than French men, and that homosexuality was mainly a “problem across the Channel” (in Britain), not a Latin one. Her sexist comments matched by racist ones against the Japanese exemplify her lack of political savvy. Cresson became very unpopular and resigned her position after less than a year in office. Cresson spent the shortest time in office of all the French prime ministers of the Fifth Republic. The Secretariat à la condition féminine (Women’s Secretariat) and the Ministère des droits de la femme (Ministry of Women’s Rights) were created during Mitterrand’s presidency.

The election of Jacques Chirac in 1995 heralded a return to the right and conservative politics, leading to a major feminist protest on November 25, 1995 in Paris. Over 100 women’s organizations throughout France called for women to march to defend women’s rights and warned that past gains of the women’s movement, such as free and legalized abortions, were under threat. More than 40,000 women demonstrated. In 1996, female ministers from the left and the right signed the Manifeste des 10, demanding equal representation of women in politics. In March 1997, the National Assises for the Rights of Women, another pro-women’s rights demonstration, took place, although on a smaller scale than in 1995 (approximately 2,000 women and numerous men, at the behest of over 150 women’s groups, participated).

Many feminist organizations flourished in France at the end of the twentieth century, especially since the 1990s were viewed by feminists as a time of backlash against the gains made by the post-1968 French women’s movement. (This conservative trend continued with the election of Nicolas Sarkozy of the UMP Party to the presidency in 2007.) In 1995, for example, over 1,700 women’s rights organizations existed in France. Several significant women’s rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were created in the late twentieth century: the Chiennes de garde (Female Guard-dogs) founded in 1999 by Florence Montreynaud; Ni Putes, Ni Soumises (Neither Whores, Nor Doormats), founded in 2002 by young French Muslim women in response to violence against them – in particular, gang rape and the much publicized vicious murder of a Muslim teenager named Sohanne Benziane,

who was burned alive by her ex-boyfriend – in suburbs and housing projects outside of Paris and other major French cities; and the Collectif des féministes indigènes (Collective of Indigenous Feminists), formed in 2007, which combats racism and sexism as well as what its members consider the domination of non-western women by western feminists.

In 2007, the first national French female presidential candidate, Ségolène Royal (Socialist Party), was defeated by Nicolas Sarkozy of the Conservative UMP. However, in the 1974 elections, Arlette Laguiller had become the first woman to attempt a presidential campaign as part of the Workers’ Struggle Party, and continued to run for president in 1981, 1988, 1995, 2002, and 2007. Laguiller never made it to the national election level as did Ségolène Royal. Sarkozy appointed Fadela Amara (b. 1964) as his secretary of state for urban policies. Amara is a life-long feminist who began her political activism as a teenager against French Islamist movements and Islamic fundamentalism by founding the Association des femmes pour l’échange inter-communautaire (Women’s Association for Inter-communal Exchange) when she was 18 years old. Amara went on to organize the Women’s Commission in 1989 as well as Ni Putes, Ni Soumises. Sarkozy’s appointment of Amara to his cabinet – although not without controversy – demonstrated that across the political spectrum from left to right, in the early twenty-first century the women’s movement in France continues to progress steadily.

SEE ALSO: Beauvoir, Simone de (1908–1986); Immigrant and Social Conflict, France; May 1968 French Uprisings; Women’s Movement, United States, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Adkins, L. & Leonard, D. (Eds.) (1995) *Sex in Question: French Feminism*. London: Taylor & Francis.
- Allen, J. & Young, I. M. (Eds.) (1989) *The Thinking Muse: Feminism and Modern French Philosophy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Amara, F. & Zappi, S. (2003) *Ni putes ni soumises*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Aubin, C. & Gisserot, H. (1994) *Les Femmes en France: 1985–1995, rapport établi par la France en vue de la quatrième Conférence mondiale sur les femmes (Breaking the Silence: French Women’s Voices from the Ghetto, trans. H. Chenut)*. Paris: La Documentation Française.

- Bellil, S. (2003) *Dans l'enfer des tournantes*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Duchen, C. (1986) *Feminism in France: From May '68 to Mitterrand*. New York: Routledge.
- Evans, M. N. (1987) *Masks of Tradition: Women and the Politics of Writing in Twentieth-Century France*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Fraser, N. & Bartky, S. L. (Ed.) (1992) *Revaluing French Feminism: Critical Essays on Difference, Agency, and Culture*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Gorrara, C. (1998) *Women's Representations of the Occupation in Post-'68 France*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Jardine, A. & Menke A. (Eds.) (1993) *Shifting Scenes: Interviews on Women, Writing, and Politics in Post-'68 France*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Scott, J. W. (1996) *Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Stewart, D. (1980) The Women's Movement in France. *Signs* 6, 2 (Winter): 350–4.

Women's movement, French Windward Islands

Jennifer Westmoreland Bouchard

In Francophone Caribbean societies, women have traditionally served as the head of household. Outside the home, however, women have had extreme difficulty establishing any sort of equality, much less authority. Women are marginalized in the workforce, and they are rarely represented in politics. Though more women have entered the workforce during the past 20 years (mostly in the fields of administration, education, health, and tourism), they tend to work longer hours and are compensated less than their male counterparts. In addition, women hold drastically fewer managerial positions than men. On the whole, Francophone Caribbean feminist movements have typically responded to these types of gender-based injustices, as well as issues surrounding race.

In Francophone Caribbean islands, colonial discourses regarding race played an important role in shaping economic, social, and gender relations. During the colonial period, Europeans commonly preached their “cultural and racial superiority” to the native inhabitants of the islands. Even after decolonization these cultural mores and practices of ingrained racism remained in most

of these island societies. Therefore, the issue of race is one of the largest and most controversial concerns of current Francophone Caribbean feminist movements.

Francophone Caribbean feminisms have historically sought to examine and critique rigid social structures and reform the roles of Caribbean women throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The emergence of Francophone Caribbean feminism was closely tied to movements such as Pan-Africanism, Pan-Caribbeanism, and Négritude. Pan-Africanism, a movement that originated in Anglophone communities, is a cultural and political philosophy based on the assumption that African people dispersed throughout the world share similar struggles and goals. Négritude was essentially Francophone intellectuals' response to Pan-Africanism. Male scholars and poets Léopold Sédar Senghor (Senegal), Aimé Césaire (Martinique), and Léon Damas (French Guiana) are typically credited as the founders of Négritude. However, literary research has shown that Jane and Paulette Nardal, feminist writers from Martinique, were influential in establishing the intellectual and theoretical bases for this movement. Their writings were published in *La Revue du monde noir* (Paris) in the 1930s and 1940s.

The second wave of Caribbean feminism was inspired by the international women's movement of the 1970s. Following a Pan-Caribbean period of radical politics concerning race, class, and identity, a series of strong Caribbean feminist activists emerged during the 1970s and 1980s. The leaders of these second-wave feminist groups were also active in socialist and left-wing politics. These movements were postcolonial in nature, focusing on female issues of identity, race, and difference. Other important concerns included sexual exploitation, globalization, and women's roles in economic development at home and abroad. Using these movements as a springboard, in-depth feminist scholarship on the inherently “gendered” nature of race and ethnicity began in the 1990s.

There are several key organizations that support feminist activism and scholarship in the Caribbean. The most influential include the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Activism (CAFRA), the Center for Gender and Development Studies at the University of the West Indies, and Women Working for

Social Progress (also known as Workingwomen). In 1985, CAFRA was established by Peggy Antrobus (Grenada and Barbados), Rawwida Baksh-Soodeen (Trinidad and Tobago), Sonia Cuales (Netherlands Antilles), Joan French (Jamaica), Honor Ford-Smith (Jamaica), and Rhoda Reddock (Trinidad and Tobago). Their outreach and educational programs have included the following areas: women in agriculture; women and the law; women's history and creative (artistic/literary) expression; women, development, and sustainable livelihood; women's health and reproductive rights; sexuality; and gender and youth. The Center for Gender and Development Studies at the University of the West Indies was established in September 1993. Its institutional goals include establishing Caribbean feminism as a reputable field of scholarship, disseminating information on gender in the Caribbean on an international scale, and supporting research and policies that will aid in making Caribbean societies more just for people of all genders and races. Workingwomen was founded in 1985 in Tunapuna, Trinidad, with anti-racism as its focus. Throughout the 1990s, Workingwomen sought to eliminate racism and level the playing field between Afro-Trinidadian and Indo-Trinidadian women.

Thanks to the members of these and other organizations, Caribbean feminism has evolved into an academic field of study with a strong body of theory and literature. Principal theorists in this field include: Peggy Antrobus (Grenada and Barbados), activist and professor of economics, sociology, and social work at the University of the West Indies; Eudine Barriteau (Barbados), professor of gender and public policy in the Center for Gender and Development Studies at the University of the West Indies; Rhoda Reddock (Trinidad and Tobago), head of the Center for Gender and Development Studies at the University of the West Indies, activist in the Caribbean Women's movement, and founding member of CAFRA; Brinda Mehta (India), author and professor of French and Francophone Studies at Mills College; Patricia Mohammed (Trinidad and Tobago), who founded the Rape Crisis Center in Trinidad and is senior lecturer at the Center for Gender and Development Studies at the University of the West Indies; and Rawwida Baksh-Soodeen (Trinidad and Tobago), deputy director/head of the gender section in the Social Transformation Programs

Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat. The influential theories of these writers typically discuss themes such as the intersection of race and gender, women and work, feminist epistemology, gender-based violence, legislation, sexual tourism, sexual and reproductive health, and migration, among others. Similar themes are discussed in the works of Francophone Caribbean fiction writers Suzanne Dracius-Pinalie (Martinique), Maryse Condé (Guadeloupe), Edwidge Danticat (Haiti), and Myriam Warner-Vieyra (Guadeloupe).

SEE ALSO: Césaire, Aimé (1913–2008); Négritude Movement; Senghor, Léopold (1906–2001); Women's Movement, Anglophone Caribbean

References and Suggested Readings

- Baksh-Soodeen, R. (1998) Issues of Difference in Contemporary Caribbean Feminism. *Feminist Review* 59 (1).
- Mohammed, P. with Perkins, A. (1998) *Caribbean Women at the Crossroads: The Dilemma of Decision-Making among Women of Barbados, St. Lucia and Dominica*. New York: UWI Press and IPPF.
- Momsen, J. (1993) *Women and Change in the Caribbean: A Pan-Caribbean Perspective*. Kingston, Jamaica: I. Randle.
- Reddock, R. (2007) Diversity, Difference and Caribbean Feminism: The Challenge of Anti-Racism. *Caribbean Review of Gender Studies* 1.
- Sharpley-Whiting, T. D. (2002) *Négritude Women*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Shelton, M.-D. (1990) Women Writers of the French-Speaking Caribbean: An Overview. In S. Cudjoe (Ed.), *Caribbean Women Writers: Essays from the First International Conference*. Wellesley, MA: Cataloux Publishing, pp. 346–56.

Women's movement, Germany

Jennifer A. Miller

In 1847–8, as revolutions broke out across Europe, international movements for women's suffrage, economic independence, and property rights emerged as feminists began to reach out to one another for inspiration and help. German feminists Louise Dittmar (1807–84) and Louise Aston (1814–71) took radical positions on property and other rights, while middle-class feminist Louise Otto (1819–95) emphasized the distinctive

contributions of “German womanliness” in her politically radical work and in her long-running publication *Frauenzeitung* (Women’s Newspaper). Following unification in 1871 and the establishment of national male suffrage, Hedwig Dohm (1831–1919), inspired by the British suffrage campaigns, made a case for German female suffrage in 1873.

Marxist-socialist feminists contributed landmark texts to the German women’s movement, such as August Bebel’s *Women in the Past, Present and Future* (1878) and Clara Zetkin’s 1889 address to the founding congress of the Second International Working Men’s Association, “Women Workers and the Woman Question.” In 1894 when the Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine (National German Women’s Association) (BDF) was founded, women’s political participation was forbidden in Wilhelminian Germany; the BDF cautiously included only charitable, educational, and philanthropic groups and chose to campaign for women’s educational and economic issues over suffrage.

In the twentieth century the women’s rights movement emerged with renewed intensity from the seeds of previous attempts. In 1904 in Berlin, the International Women’s Suffrage Alliance (IWSA) began a worldwide suffrage campaign and lobbied for labor rights, world peace (after World War I), and better access to education, divorce, and property rights for women. The Weimar Republic (1919–33) included in its constitution full and equal suffrage for women; every political party had a women’s committee; and, culturally, Germany saw the birth of the “new woman,” who believed in equal rights and self-reliance. Then National Socialism vehemently opposed women’s rights and tried to limit women’s roles in the workforce and their access to education. In 1933 the BDF disbanded in the face of Nazi threats to take it over, though some feminists debated the connection of the BDF to the Nazi state.

After the end of World War II the splitting of Germany into two states along ideological lines divided the German women’s movement. The new West German (FRG) and East German (GDR) constitutions of 1949 contained virtually identical, basic equal rights provisions, proclaiming that men and women were equal under the law. In West Germany the SPD renewed its call for equal pay for women, while middle-class women lobbied for a new civil code to regulate

marriage and family relations. In the early 1950s West German feminist activists such as Marie-Elisabeth Lüder (1878–1966) were influential leaders in postwar political battles, including the pledge to gender equality, for example with the 1957 revision of the Family Law. In East Germany women activists mobilized formally from 1947 in the Democratic Women’s League of Germany (DFD) and in grassroots organizing for homosexual rights or the right to form “voluntary households.” They also participated in dissident groups such as Women for Peace and New Forum.

West German feminist critiques of patriarchy, including those in leftist organizations, developed in the context of 1960s radical social movements. Sigrid Rieger, for example, famously threw a tomato at the leading theorist of the Socialist German Student Organization (SDS) for not taking feminists’ demands seriously. In West Germany self-help campaigns and consciousness-raising groups mobilized into strong forces for social change, including demands for equal access to education and public life, equal pay, full-time nursery facilities, free contraception and access to abortion, lesbian rights, and an end to domestic and sexual violence. Grassroots movements were able to achieve success in abortion and family law, in the transformation of urban housing policy, and in galvanizing popular support for projects such as women’s bookstores and cafes, rape-crisis and domestic-violence shelters, and feminist journals and publishing houses. The 1970s and 1980s also saw heightened politicization of sexuality under the impact of gay, lesbian, and feminist activism.

In 1990 East German feminists such as Ina Merkel (with her “Manifesto for the Independent Women’s Movement”) and West German feminists hoped that German unification would bring progressive women’s policies into legislation. In the post-unification era, national women’s organizations such as non-governmental organizations have replaced community based feminism, resulting in the professionalization of German feminism and leaving policy decisions in a few individuals’ control – a worldwide phenomenon.

SEE ALSO: European Revolutions of 1848; German Democratic Republic Protests, 1945–1989; German Revolution, 1918–1923; Germany, Resistance to Nazism; Germany, Socialism and Nationalism; International Congress of Women at The Hague

References and Suggested Readings

- Davis, B. (2008) Civil Society in a New Key? Feminist and Alternative Groups in 1970s West Germany. In K. Hagemann et al. (Eds.), *Civil Society, Public Space and Gender Justice: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*. New York: Berghahn.
- Herzog, D. (2005) *Sex After Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Karapın, R. (2007) *Protest Politics in Germany: Movements on the Left and Right Since the 1960s*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Moeller, R. (1993) *Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Offen, K. (2000) *European Feminism, 1700–1950: A Political History*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Women's movement, Greece, formation of

Maria Anastasopoulou

After a six-year war of independence from Ottoman Occupation, Greek independence was secured in 1827. A small section of the southern peninsula of the Balkans was allotted to the neo-Hellenic nation and the 18-year-old Bavarian King Otto was installed. The newly established nation was set on a course of reconstruction and identity-building, and women played an important role in this effort.

Functioning under the pressure of Bavarian historian G. Fallmerayer's nineteenth-century theories that present-day Greeks had no connection whatsoever with the ancient inhabitants of the country, as well as Bulgaria's forceful annexation of Eastern Romulia in September 1885, which threatened the ethnic identity of Greek populations in the area, the country launched a process of redefining modern Hellenism by a two-directional course: to westernize its culture and, at the same time, to find its fundamental Greekness in local customs and mores. As a result, there was manifested a "tilt toward Europe," even as Greeks began re-examining and emphasizing their own local everyday customs, which proved to be similar to those of the ancient Greeks. Purging the country of all vestiges of its oriental/Ottoman influences and emulating a West nurtured on ancient Greek values would move the country away from its recent past and thus closer to its classical roots.

Consequently, in less than 50 years, the western style of life had prevailed in urban centers like Athens, not only among the upper middle classes but also among the working classes.

The woman question, which raised the feminist awareness in Greek society toward the end of the nineteenth century, was intertwined with the country's ongoing struggle to define its ethnicity and secure its national viability. Cultural leaders realized the important role women could play as mothers and schoolteachers in the process of identity-building, both in the newly established country and the occupied territories. Public discussions began promoting a new messianic role for Greek women in forging a younger generation of Greeks with a strong ethnic and national identity, ready to sacrifice themselves for the liberation of their still enslaved brothers beyond the borders of the country.

Thus, toward the end of the 1880s, women began to be praised as the repository of Greek traditional values and of the Greek language and were considered the cornerstones of the country's regeneration. Their role as active agents in the formation of ethnic identity was emphasized and promoted as nineteenth-century Greek nationalism adopted the image of woman as a fundamental agent in achieving its irredentist dream of liberating and unifying all Greek populations within the boundaries of a free Greek state. At the same time, reminiscent of the contradictory attitude towards women in the West, the public and the private spheres were sharply separated, schools were segregated, women's education narrowed down to religious and domestic issues, and the function of women as wives and mothers was idealized and valorized. Responding to the social demands of the newly established country, women in the larger cities began claiming the public place by organizing Ladies' Associations which addressed the practical problems of Greek society, and those qualified as schoolteachers volunteered to teach grade school in the occupied territories under harsh conditions and often at risk of their own lives.

It is not accidental that Callirrhoe Parren (1859–1940), born in the small village of Platania in the Rethymnon Prefecture of Crete, chose that time to start the publication of the *Efimeris ton Kyriou* or *The Ladies' Newspaper*, which became the forum for promoting social change and feminist positions for 30 years (1887–1917). Persecuted by the Turks in his native island of

Crete because he supported the Cretan revolt of 1866, Parren's father, Stylianos Siganos, took his family to Piraeus and then to Athens where Callirrhoe, the eldest of six children, attended the French Nuns Grade School, then the Sourmeli High School for Girls, one of the best private schools in Athens, as public education for girls ended with the four grades of elementary school. She qualified as a teacher in 1878 and taught for four years at the Rodokanakeion Greek Community High School for Girls in Odessa, Russia, and then a couple of more years in Andrianoupoli, Turkey. In one of her visits to Constantinople/Istanbul, she must have met Jean Parren, who was of French and English descent. The couple must have married in Constantinople in the early summer of 1886 and soon settled in Athens where Jean, having taken Greek nationality two years earlier, was employed at the Athens News Agency.

Callirrhoe did not go back to teaching. She was in for the leisurely life of a bourgeois wife. But she was restless. Observing the life of women around her, she had come to the conclusion that their position was regrettable and decided to lift women out of their ornamental role and boredom and teach them how to lead a meaningful life as independent agents, potentially wielding enormous influence in society. She wanted to help those lucky enough to finish high school to continue growing intellectually, and she wanted to help raise poor girls' self-esteem and give them the opportunity to learn a profession that would free them from poverty and dependence. She wanted to write a book, but decided that women read very little, so she came up with the idea of a women's newspaper, through which she would slowly change their thinking, an undertaking her husband supported her with. Her newspaper was an immediate success and soon became second in circulation among Athenian journals.

Through her editorials Parren launched the "woman question" and incited discussions that pushed Greek society towards a feminist awareness at the turn of the century. Her weekly became a forum of literary expression for women as well as an authority for information on literature, art, home economy, health, beauty, childrearing, and world news, especially that pertaining to the international feminist movement and women's achievement in developed countries. She also included biographies of Greek women

of achievement and promoted women's social issues. She pressured successive governments for women's equal rights to education and employment opportunities, for passing appropriate bills protective of working children and women, and for hiring women as state employees. To decongest the teaching profession, she insisted on state supported Technical Education and Home Economy Schools for girls and applauded the admittance of the first female students to the University of Athens in 1891, publicizing every female success or achievement.

Through her paper Parren mobilized women to philanthropy. She encouraged the establishment of Sunday Schools for illiterate young women, mainly factory workers and maids who swarmed to the capital city in search of jobs. She supported the Woman's Hospital for Incurable Diseases and St. Catherine's Asylum, which offered needy working girls and unwed mothers accommodation and moral support. She organized fundraisers, often recruiting the support of the queen and the princesses of Greece, in redressing social needs like the construction of hospitals – Evangelismos, with its all-female board of directors and Saint Sophia Children's Hospital.

In 1896 Parren established the National Women's Association, which was mobilized to participate in the Greco-Turkish War of April 1897. In spite of fierce opposition to the Women's Association, which often took the form of sneering or satirical comments, Parren's women went to the front with five surgical units managed by Maria Kalapothaki, the first Greek female surgeon.

After the war Parren remained active in philanthropy. She started a school of home economics and professional arts on her own funds and founded a nursing school and a Froebelian early childhood development school with an accompanying daycare center, the first of its kind in Athens. She also founded the Epheveion, a full grade school furnished with a hospital, the penitentiary section of the Averof Prison in Athens, the PIKPA summer camp for children by the sea south of Athens, and in 1911 the Lyceum of Greek Women for the purpose of preserving national dances and songs. For her contributions to the development of Greek society, Parren was later awarded three of the highest honors: the Silver Cross of the Phoenix (1921), the Silver Medal of the Academy of Athens (1936), and the Gold Cross of the Phoenix (1936).

Parren had embraced her mission for the emancipation of women with the dedication of an apostle. She admitted that she belonged to that group of people who “sign sacred contracts with society” and therefore they are not “free to tend to their own personal needs, to have friends . . . for they are slaves to their duty to society” (letter to Agathoniki Antoniadou, December 1889). Later, in 1896, when a fellow writer attacked the “scribbling women,” calling her an “apostle of women’s emancipation,” she accepted the title with pride.

Parren soon began receiving invitations to represent Greek women in international conferences. In 1889 she went to Paris for the Congrès Français International des Droits des Femmes, where she networked with the representatives of the international feminist movement. In 1893 Parren participated in the Congress of Representative Women in Chicago, where she found social models worth promoting in her own country. She was especially encouraged by Susan B. Anthony (1820–1906), the leader of the American feminist movement, to go on with the struggle for women’s rights that she had launched in her country.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, already recognized as the leader of the feminist movement in Greece, Parren decided to fictionalize her vision of the new woman as she had witnessed it in the United States. To this end, between 1900 and 1903 she wrote three novels which comprise a trilogy on the woman question and convey not only the messianic role Greek society expected women to play, but also Parren’s vision of a brave new world in which equality of the sexes would bring happiness to the human species. Through her novels, Parren introduced the attributes of the new woman: educated and modest, independent and self-reliant, working and a wife who would raise her husband to new moral levels, and above all a good mother who would create a younger generation of Greeks with strong ethnic identity and willingness to sacrifice their lives for their country’s freedom. The three novels – *The Emancipated* (1900), *The Sorceress* (1901), and *The New Contract* (1903) – are not only technically impeccable, but more importantly, they are deeply enmeshed in the ongoing cultural debate on the woman question and the changing conception of women’s role in the developing Greek society. The novels were turned into a play entitled *The New Woman*,

performed in September 1907 in Athens and later in Cairo, Alexandria, and Constantinople for the local Greek communities.

Although some prominent men, and undoubtedly the majority of the public, bemoaned “the death of that fragile and weak creature that the Middle Ages had idealized and poets had written poems about, that creature men had always protected and adored,” as writer N. Episkopopoulos put it in an article in the journal *Panathenaea* in 1901, other, more liberal and progressive men clearly saw the significant contribution educated and socially active women could play in the regeneration of the nation and showed their support in different ways. Preeminent among them was Greek poet Costis Palamas (1895–1943), who wrote poems which clearly reflect the notion of the messianic role of women which prevailed in Greek society toward the end of the nineteenth century.

SEE ALSO: Greek Nationalism; Women’s Movement, United States, 16th–18th Centuries

References and Suggested Readings

- Anastasopoulou, M. (1997) Feminist Awareness and Literary Discourse at the Turn of the Century Greece. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 15, 1.
- Fallmerayer, J. P. (1945) *Fragmente aus dem Orient II*. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta.
- Jusdanis, G. (1991) *Belated Modernity and Aesthetic Culture: Inventing National Literature*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Varika, E. (1987) *I Exegerisis ton Kyrion: The Genesis of a Feminist Awareness in Greece 1833–1907*. Athens: Foundation for Research and Education of the Commercial Bank of Greece.
- Xerathake, K. (1972–3) *From the Records of the Council of School Supervisors: Girls’ Schools and Female Teachers of the Enslaved Hellenism*. Athens.

Women’s movement, Haiti

Grace L. B. Sanders

Haitian women have used protests and activism to negotiate their compromised positions in the national citizenry. Their protests reflect the nuanced and multiple social locations of women in Haiti and have varied from infanticide and *marronage* in the eighteenth century, to guerrilla warfare, public demonstrations, and political organization in the nineteenth century, to a “literature of

revolution,” and the development of individual, national, and transnational feminist discourses by the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

The oppressive conditions of slavery during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries pushed Haitian women to early forms of protest. Through individual and collective acts of work stoppage, infanticide, suicide, *marronage*, manumission, and armed revolt, enslaved women resisted both the system of slavery and their role within that system as free labor and sexual objects. In 1791 the centuries of slave resistance came to a climax as women participated in the slave revolts that led to their emancipation and Haitian independence. The particular ways in which women contributed to the Haitian Revolution are scarcely documented. However, a number of women have been noted as influential to these protests. These women include an unnamed Vodou priestess who is believed to have assisted in officiating at the ceremony at Bois Caïman; Catherine Flon, who is credited with sewing the Haitian flag in 1803; and Defilée (Dedee Bazile), who is best known for gathering Jean-Jacques Dessalines' remains after his death. Although the accuracy of these women's historical narratives and their involvement in these specific events are unverified, Haitian women's historical resistance to slavery suggests women played a significant role in these foundational moments in Haitian history.

Regardless of the accuracy of these women's resistance narratives, their place in the Haitian historical memory held “real” consequences for how women organized and protested oppression throughout the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. One such outcome was the 1844 Piquet Revolt in which Louise Nicolas, a peasant woman from southern Haiti, was the lead organizer and sought to both redistribute wealth in Haiti away from the elite and elect a black president. Although the revolt was unsuccessful, the revolutionary precedent set by women in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries extended into the twentieth century as women continued to resist multiple oppressions.

The most extensive research on women and protest has been conducted on the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Within this body of scholarship, the history of Haitian women and protest has been divided into three stages: the Haitian women's movement in the early twentieth century (1934–56); the Haitian

transnational women's movement in the mid-twentieth century (1956–86); and a combination of both national and transnational “new feminism” in Haiti at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century (1986–2008).

Women's involvement in early twentieth-century protests began with their participation in anti-US occupation movements. During the 19-year US occupation in Haiti (1915–34) the most aggressive armed resistance came from the Caco rebellions. In these armed struggles between Caco rebels and US soldiers, peasant women played strategic roles in the guerrilla tactics. Peasant women's mobility as market women and domestic servants allowed them to transport ammunition and sensitive US intelligence information inconspicuously to Caco rebel leaders. In addition to peasant women's involvement in anti-occupation protests, elite and middle-class women were also involved in anti-occupation coalitions and organizations such as the Union Patriotique. During their involvement in these campaigns, women continued to be treated as second-class citizens. Feeling marginalized, women demanded equal rights for Haitian women and men at the end of the US occupation.

After the US occupation ended (1934), women's demands for gender equity continued to be ignored. Thus, women began to organize themselves to fight for the improvement of women's rights, which included suffrage and increased educational and career opportunities. The Ligue Feminine d'Action Sociale was the primary organization through which these claims were made. A self-identified feminist organization, led by attorney Madeleine Sylvain-Bourchereau, the Ligue fought for women's political, social, and economic equality. Motivated by the prospect of improving Haitian women's citizenship and social status, the *Ligue* conducted research projects on the social conditions of Haitian women, founded a women's journal (*La Voix des Femmes*), lobbied for the modification of marriage laws, hosted educational and social events, and demanded universal suffrage. In 1950 the Ligue hosted the first Women's Congress in Haiti. With delegates from 57 women's organizations throughout the Caribbean and the United States, the full-scale feminist crusade led to women's suffrage by the end of that year, and Haitian women voted for the first time in 1957.

The Duvalier military state that developed in the 1960s presented women with various other forms of repression. Under François Duvalier (1956–71) women were seen as the “political subjects” of the state, whose abuse and harassment were used to threaten women and men alike. The state-sanctioned violence against women was a primary legacy of the Duvalier regime and a catalyst for Haitian women’s migration in the 1960s.

In the early 1960s thousands of Haitians moved to North America, France, and other locations in the Caribbean to flee Duvalier’s repressive regime. The first migrants were elite Haitians and anti-Duvalierists; however, by the late 1980s, thousands of Haitians from all socioeconomic classes and political affiliations migrated. Thus, in the mid-1980s there were approximately 500,000 Haitians living in North America alone. In these diasporic locations women organized public protests and organizations to denounce women’s oppressive conditions in and outside of Haiti, including domestic violence, illiteracy, and sexual violence. In many of these organizations, including the Union of Patriotic Haitian Women and Rally for Haitian Women, women developed feminist, anti-racist, and anti-imperialist agendas that included transnational organization between women in the Haitian diaspora and women in Haiti.

Transnational women’s activist networks were strengthened in 1986 when Jean-Claude Duvalier was forced into exile. Almost immediately a wave of new activist spaces emerged in Haiti to address the human rights violations that occurred against Haitian women during the Duvalier regime. On April 3, 1986 women of all socioeconomic classes voiced their concerns in a public demonstration where over 30,000 women marched the streets of Port-au-Prince demanding recognition of women’s marginalized social position in the nation. Following this demonstration, various organizations such as ENFO-FANM, SOFA (Worker Solidarity with Haitian Women), and Fanm D’Ayiti (Women of Haiti) were established to address Haitian women’s needs, particularly those concerning protection from domestic violence, healthcare, and access to higher education. These organizations not only represented an emerging new feminist consciousness among women in Haiti, but also reflected the influence of transnational networks among Haitian women. Many of the members of

these organizations had lived abroad and were closely affiliated with other women’s organizations in the Haitian diaspora.

In 1991 the establishment of the ministry of women’s affairs reflected the decades of activist work and protest organized by various Haitian women’s coalitions. Likewise, in 1995, Haitian women activists participated in the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China, where Haitian activists not only expressed their national struggles as women, but also defined their particular experiences and acts of protest as reflections of their social location as Third World women and activists. Haitian women also used feminist scholarship, literature, and prose to resist gender and imperial oppression. Works by Edwidge Danticat, Marie-Cécile Agnant, Carole Charles, and Myriam Chancy, among others, contributed to a body of scholarship and “literature of revolution” that articulated Haitian women’s multidimensional social location. In the twenty-first century, Haitian women continue to use protests and activism as tools for negotiating their multiple identities as Haitians, women, transmigrants, and Third World women, while at the same time constructing their acts of resistance to effect both their local and global location.

SEE ALSO: Haiti, Protest and Rebellion, 20th Century; Haiti, Resistance to US Occupation; Migration Struggles and the Global Justice Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Bell, B. (2001) *Walking on Fire: Haitian Women's Stories of Survival and Resistance*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Bellegarde-Smith, P. (1990) *Haiti: The Breached Citadel*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Castor, S. (Ed.) (1990) *Centre de Recherche et de Formation Economique et Sociale pour le Developpement*. Haiti.
- Chancy, M. J. A. (1997) *Framing Silence: Revolutionary Novels by Haitian Women*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Charles, C. (1995) Gender and Politics in Contemporary Haiti: The Duvalierist State, Transnationalism, and the Emergence of a New Feminism, 1890–1990. *Feminist Studies* 21, 1 (Spring): 135–64.
- Moitt, B. (1996) Slave Women and Resistance in the French Caribbean. In D. B. Gaspar & D. C. Hine (Eds.), *More Than Chattel: Black Women and Slavery in the Americas*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Neptune-Anglade, M. (1986) *L'Autre moitié du développement*. Port-au-Prince & Montréal: Eds. des Alizes & ERCE.

- N'Zengou-Tayo, M. (1998) "Fanm Se Poto Mitan": Haitian Women, the Pillar of Society. *Feminist Review* 59 (Summer): 118–42.
- Peabody, S. (2005) *Négresse, Mulâtresse, Citoyenne: Gender and Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1650–1848*. In P. Scully & D. Paton (Eds.), *Gender and Slave Emancipation in the Atlantic World*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Sylvain-Bourchereau, M. (1957) *Haiti et ses femmes: une étude d'évolution culturelle*. Port-au-Prince: Les Presses Libres.

Women's movement, India

Soma Marik

Once India achieved independence, the Constituent Assembly of India passed a number of laws supporting basic rights for women. On paper, modernity was achieved, but the immediate concerns were not constitutional proposals but hard realities. Partition and communal violence reached ferocious levels, resulting in the world's largest migration. Women and children often bore the brunt of hardship, including abduction of 80,000 to 150,000 women. By 1957 the two states, as stand-in patriarchs, had "recovered" over 30,000 women. For many, it was indeed a case of getting out of a traumatic experience. But others had adjusted to the situation, and the recovery in turn created a trauma.

Middle-class and upper-class women and the mainstream liberal organizations like the All India Women's Conference (AIWC) were drawn into a share of the administrative work by the government. Since the 1930s the women's movements had sought to pass a Hindu Code Bill, aimed at abolition of polygamy, equality in the right to divorce of men and women, raising the age of consent and marriage, and giving women the right to maintain an inheritance of family property. This was sharply challenged by Hindu communal and right-wing nationalist forces, including President Rajendra Prasad and Home Minister Ballabh Patel. The comprehensive package for which the women had fought was dropped, and Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, the law minister, resigned in disgust. Eventually, bits and pieces were enacted as separate laws in the mid-1950s. Full equality, however, was not achieved for Hindu women. The stress on the Hindu Code rather than a Uniform Civil Code (UCC)

also meant that non-Hindu women, including Muslims, the largest minority, were excluded.

The Communist Parties

After the initial euphoria that followed the transfer of power from the British, workers, peasants, tribals, oppressed castes, and women of all these social categories began to feel betrayed as their conditions did not improve. Moreover, this was a time when the flames of revolution spread across many countries, most notably China. Inspired by these, and prodded by the Cominform under Cold War conditions, the Communist Party of India resorted to varieties of ultra-leftism, including a Chinese-style line of guerrilla warfare. Agrarian struggles going on from before independence in Bengal and Andhra were also continued regardless of the changes in situation. The government responded by outlawing the CPI.

Bengal sharecroppers' struggles (1948–9) for a greater share of the crop and land ownership, which were widespread before independence, had become more militant yet also more localized, especially in Kakkdwip and Lalganj. A large number of women participated in the struggles, and quite a significant number were martyred, but equality between women and men was not fully realized within the peasant movement. The Telengana movement in Andhra, a peasant struggle for land that attempted to transform into an agrarian revolution, was unusual for the attention paid to women's issues, though only as a tactical device to ensure women's mobilization. But most women were expected to provide auxiliary tasks for the revolutionary men. Ultimately, too, the party's attitude remained one of benevolent paternalism.

The ultra-left line of the CPI also meant forced militancy in urban areas. In May 1948 the Mahila Atma Raksha Samiti (Women's Self-Defense Association) (MARS), the women's organization launched by CPI women activists in collaboration with many non-CPI women, launched a campaign for prisoners' release. There was severe state violence, including arrests, as well as banning the organization and its organ, *Ghare-Baire* (At Home and Outside). On April 27, 1949, after a meeting called by the Mayeder Samiti (Association of Mothers of Prisoners) and the MARS, police opened fire at a demonstration, killing four women, including

Latika Sen, the first-ever woman member of the CPI in Bengal.

The CPI eventually gave up the line of armed struggle after fresh pressure from Moscow. Though Maoist-inclined cadres in Andhra felt betrayed, the party and many front organizations gained legal status in 1951. In May 1953 an All India Coordination Committee was set up with Anusuya Bai Gyanchand and Hazara Begum as the Joint Conveners. In June 1954 this Coordination Committee organized a national women's congress, out of which was born the National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW), which essentially functioned as the women's wing of the CPI. In 1964 the CPI split, and the Stalinists and Maoists formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)). The pro-CPI(M) women eventually set up new organizations, culminating in the formation of the All India Democratic Women's Association (AIDWA) in March 1981. While numerically the NFIW and later the AIDWA registered significant growth, politically they represented an increasingly deradicalized current.

Until the rise of the autonomous women's movements, the party-controlled women's organizations tended to see women's oppression as subsumed entirely by class oppression, while their engagement in struggles was linked to the tactical lines of the parties to which they were affiliated. The communist-led organizations had mixed relations with the autonomous women's movements. They collaborated on law reforms and issues ranging from the anti-dowry movement of the 1980s to the anti-globalization struggles going on presently. At the same time, the left women's groups often dismissed the autonomous women's groups as petit-bourgeois. Their attitude to anti-globalization struggles, for example, changes when friendly parties are in power in a particular province, most notably in West Bengal, where the AIDWA and its leaders have actively opposed anti-globalization struggles.

Rise of Feminist Currents

The formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) ("Naxalites" – CPI-ML) in 1969 gave an impetus to the radicalization of many women, both poor peasants and urban youth. Within a short while the tendency to support the revolutionary terrorist line of "annihilation" of the class enemy dominated the party. Women

fought in various capacities. Naxalite politics hit existing social values in a number of ways. The call for rebellion included rebellion against family control and conservatism. The politics of revolution, regardless of its ultra-leftism and confusions, made the man-woman relationship less hierarchical.

A generally worsening economic situation around 1972 gave rise to anti-price rise movements. In Maharashtra a series of events crystallized feminist ideas and activities. Famine and hoarding led to skyrocketing prices of basic consumer goods, infuriating lower-middle-class and poor women. A particularly inspiring agitation occurred in Shahada, Dhulia district, where agitations by *Bhil* tribals saw a militant and leading role played by women. Activists of the far left combined with local workers, including Gandhians, to form a grassroots organization – the Shramik Sangathana (Workers' Organization). Women in this movement also raised the issue of wife-beating, which subsequently led to militant anti-alcohol and anti-price rise campaigns led by women.

The anti-price rise movement in 1973–4 saw huge numbers of women from the working and middle classes take to the streets. This movement soon spread to Gujarat and became known as the *Nav Nirman* (New Construction) movement. Originally a student-led movement against rising prices, corruption, and black-marketeering, it was joined by thousands of middle-class women. Later, former socialist Jayaprakash Narayan joined in and behind him anti-Congress parties tried to turn it into one more electoral battle. Neither the anti-price rise movement nor the *Nav Nirman* movement were consciously anti-patriarchal, and they sometimes used gender-defined symbols of contempt, like offering bangles to men to denote their unmanly nature or lack of ability to hold public office. Yet the fact that women acted collectively in the public domain made these movements forerunners of the contemporary feminist movement.

In 1974 the first of the autonomous women's groups was formed – the Progressive Organization of Women (POW) in Hyderabad. Identifying the existence of gender oppression as a distinct category of oppression, the POW's manifesto contrasted women's constitutional equality with their actual inequality in sharp terms. From the start this new wave feminism in India had a strongly socialist thrust. The POW manifesto

ended: "We proclaim solidarity with all women! We proclaim solidarity with all oppressed classes" (Patel 1985: 113).

A landmark year for feminism in India, 1975 saw International Women's Day observed on March 8 by autonomous organizations for the first time. (Till then, women's wings of the left parties had observed the day.) In Maharashtra, feminism and anti-caste struggles were linked together. *Janvedana*, a Marathi *dalit* ("untouchable" castes) newspaper, published a special number on women entitled "In the Third World Women hold up Half the Sky." A *dalit* women's group formed, calling itself the Mahila Samta Sainik Dal (League of Soldiers for Women's Equality). Unlike the POW, it saw religion as a major force in the oppression of women as well as *dalits*.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s there were a large number of autonomous women's organizations all over India. Many called themselves feminist even though they came from Marxist backgrounds and Indian Marxists had traditionally seen feminism as a divisive ideology. Their definition of an autonomous organization was that women organized and led the movements; the fight against oppression, injustice, and discrimination against women was the first priority of the organization and women's rights were not to be subordinated to any supposedly higher cause which must be served first; and the organization was not to be subordinated to the decisions and necessities of any political group. Later, autonomy was also maintained from the state, religious, or any funding agency. Between 1977 and 1979 organizations that came up were Stree Mukti Sanghatana (Women's Liberation Organization), Purogami Stree Sanghatana, Socialist Women's Group, Samta (Equality), Stree Sangharsh (Women's Struggle), and Mahila Dakshata Samiti (Women's Capability Society).

In West Bengal the situation was rather different. In 1978 the Pragatisheel Mahila Samiti (Progressive Women's Association) was formed in West Bengal as a "third stream" (neither liberal nor mainstream-CP dominated) organization, but in 1977 the Left Front, led by the CPI(M), had come to power, and the CPI(M)'s frontal organizations all insisted that progressivism consisted of giving a blank check to the activities of the Left Front government. In the eyes of the Pashchimbanga Ganatantrik Mahila Samiti, the West Bengal chapter of the AIDWA, all

women's organizations not geared to the Left Front were bourgeois organizations. Eventually, a number of organizations came up, like Sachetana, Mahila Pathagar, Mahila Pathachakra, Mahila Gabeshanakendra, Lahari, and Protibidhan. These groups came together in 1983 to form a broad platform, the Nari Nirjatan Prairodh Mancha (Forum Against Oppression of Women) (NNPM), which later became a separate, unitary organization.

The relationship between these organizations and the CPI(M)'s women was far more antagonistic than elsewhere in India, and it would be a long time before even the feminists outside West Bengal would realize the degree of violence the CPI(M) was prepared to use against women in West Bengal as part of the fight to retain its domination in the province, as well as the fact of its transformation into a party of order supporting the police, the upper classes, and entrenched interests. The autonomous women's groups, notably the NNPM, waged sustained struggles against state violence on women. When Archana Guha, a political prisoner tortured by the police under the previous regime, brought a case, she had to wage a two-decade struggle, with only the Association for the Protection of Democratic Rights and the NNPM as her consistent supporters, while the AIDWA simply ignored the issue and the CPI(M) helped the accused police officers.

State violence, and violence by party-controlled thugs, on protesting women has become a common feature in West Bengal. During anti-globalization struggles in 2006–7 women have been beaten up, sexually abused, evicted from their land, and shot at. While the women's networks, including Maitree, have fought in their defense, the AIDWA, including its all-India leader Brinda Karat, have defended the actions of the West Bengal government and CPI(M).

Anti-Dowry and Anti-Rape Movements

The issues that brought many feminist groups together were anti-rape and anti-dowry campaigns. Violence within the family includes torture and often murder because of dowry demands, cutting across class, caste, and religious and regional boundaries. The POW manifesto demanded enforcement of anti-dowry legislation. Some of their demonstrations mobilized 2,000 people. A few years later a movement

developed in Delhi. The Mahila Dakshata Samiti and Stree Sangharsh took up the campaigns. Deaths by fire, passed over as suicides, were challenged, and mass demonstrations were organized in mid-1979. But the organizations found that it was not so easy to encourage a battered woman to leave her husband's family. Feminists thus found themselves compelled, much to their dislike, to advising couples to live in a nuclear family instead of acting directly against those who used violence. Dowry death was particularly difficult to tackle because police routinely ignored dying declarations.

However, after years of campaigns, in 1983 Section 498A to the Indian penal code was introduced whereby cruelty to a wife was made a cognizable offense, punishable by up to three years' imprisonment. Shifting the onus of proof to the accused in the Indian Evidence Act enabled courts to convict husbands and in-laws. Finally, post-mortem examination of any woman who died within seven years of marriage was made compulsory, by amending Section 174 of the Criminal Procedures Act (Cr.P.C.).

The anti-rape movement began with a number of police rapes. They included rape of a beggar woman named Laxmi in Punjab, Rameeza Bee and Shakeela Bee, both in Hyderabad, and most famously, the Mathura Rape Case in Chandrapur, near Nagpur, Maharashtra. The shocking judgment of the Supreme Court in the last case, when policemen-rapists were found not guilty on the grounds that Mathura had a boyfriend and was therefore a woman of loose morals, sparked off countrywide demonstrations on March 8, 1980, in Bombay, Delhi, Nagpur, Pune, Ahmedabad, Bangalore, and Hyderabad, demanding a retrial. In Bombay the Forum Against Oppression of Women decided to campaign for reopening the case. This case brought together feminists from all over India on a national campaign issue.

Subsequent rape cases showed how mainstream politicians were seeking to utilize the issue and transform it by stressing the "honor" of women and the need to "protect" them, shifting back to a patriarchal discourse. Based considerably on suggestions from feminist groups, a 1983 bill was introduced to define custodial rape. Controversy raged over shifting the burden of proof to the accused, as opponents alleged that this paved the way for women to frame innocent men. Feminists also pushed for the implementa-

tion of law, rather than just the enactment of new laws. The significant gains of the anti-rape campaigns were the creation of wider networks, the bringing of rape into the open as a major threat to women's equality, and also the very definition of rape (whether only penile penetration should be treated as rape, or whether the term "sexual assault" should replace rape.)

National Campaigns and Networks

The autonomous women's movement in India has carried out many campaigns and built various networks. The definition of autonomy never meant a narrow focus on women's issues, though. The origins of the movement and the socialist-feminist inclination of many activists meant the various organizations were often involved with other kinds of rights organizations and movements. The major countrywide network was the National Conferences of the Autonomous Women's Movement. From the 1980s to the present, seven have been held. The sheer scale of the movement and the variety of organizations and concerns mean a multiplicity of panels and parallel workshops, with sub-networks in particular themes commanding more internal cohesion.

Two major debates that have rocked the feminist movement are those over the UCC and the reservation of seats for women in parliament and legislative assemblies. Feminist activists took up the demand for a UCC in the 1980s, arguing that substantive equality for women was possible only through a uniform set of non-religious personal laws (relating to marriage, property inheritance, maintenance, and related areas). However, the growing threat of communalism made this a contested domain. On one hand, the Hindu communalist campaign for a UCC argued in essence that the existence of a Muslim personal law meant that Muslims were somehow not proper Indians. Such views occasionally influenced court judgments as well. Muslim fundamentalists also insisted that Muslim law was derived from the *Shariat* (Islamic law derived from the Koran) and could not be tampered with, ignoring the reality that the current laws were the product of colonial legislation in the 1930s for maintaining centralized rule.

Muslim women in particular faced the problem of being forced to choose between women's rights and the rights of the Muslims as a threatened minority. The issue first became

controversial in 1985, after the Supreme Court judgment of April 23 in the Shah Bano case, granting her maintenance from her husband under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. Responding to Shah Bano's husband's claims that he was governed by Muslim personal law, the judges suggested that a UCC would remove disparate loyalties, thereby insinuating that Muslims have loyalties in some sense outside the nation. So UCC became a weapon to Hinduize the nation. Muslim communal leaders took this up in a big way and the central government, in order to keep this Muslim vote-bank intact, brought in a bill seeking to exclude Muslim women from the purview of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. At the same time, the Hindu Right now demanded UCC, presenting the case that only Muslim women were oppressed by Muslim personal law, completely ignoring the still-existing unequal Hindu personal laws. In the Bombay national conference (1996) over the reform of personal laws there were attempts to shift the focus to gender justice, not merely uniformity. Some groups like Majlis felt it necessary to retreat from the demand for UCC altogether, while others like NNPM refused to do so.

Finally, there was the debate over reservation of seats for women. This issue was not raised by feminists. Given the socialist origins of many of them, they had if anything looked down upon parliamentary politics and representation in it generally. It was the Congress that proposed that one third of all parliamentary and state assembly seats should be reserved for women, to increase their representation in these institutions. The patriarchal attacks on this proposal angered many feminists. Feminists and Trotskyists have sometimes demanded reservation of a proportion of jobs for women. But the issue became crucial in the context of the debates on representation. Many feminists felt that self-representation of women could be the only way to defend women's rights, as it has been for *dalits*. Others have questioned how far, in the communally charged political scenario, with extremist Hindutva fundamentalists or fascists mobilizing greater numbers of women, such a demand would in reality serve a progressive cause.

Women from the Margins

The autonomous women's movement has stressed that there are a diversity of goals and has sought to build bridges. Some of these movements,

however, have been treated by urban and upper-class India as marginal. Best known is the *Chipko* movement in Garhwal from 1974, where women were central to the environmental protection movement. In central India the Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha, a radical movement among a people who wanted a separate province, generated a women's movement, the Mahila Mukti Morcha (Women's Liberation Front). Originating after 1977 in a struggle against exclusion of tribals due to the Bhilai steel plant's policy of mechanization, the Morcha became a militant mass organization. In North East India, where the Armed Forces Special Powers Act has been in force since the late 1950s, violence by the Indian state has been endemic. Women in the province of Manipur have repeatedly protested in diverse forms to rapes and murders by the army, and civil rights violations in general, by forming the Meira Paibi since the 1970s. Finally, the Bhopal gas disaster, the world's biggest industrial environmental disaster, which remains unsettled, with Union Carbide having paid a pittance in compensation, has seen women mobilize massively in protest. The Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Udyog Sangathan (Bhopal Gas Affected Women's Initiative Organization) played the leading role in the struggles to secure justice for the affected people.

SEE ALSO: Hindu Nationalism, Hindutva, and Women

References and Suggested Readings

- Chattopadhyay, M. (2001) *Shottor Dashaker Nari Andolan Paschim Banglae*. In M. Chattopadhyay (Ed.), *Eso Mukto Karo* (Come, Liberate). Calcutta: People's Book Society.
- Gandhi, N. & Shah, N. (1993) *The Issues at Stake*. Delhi: Kali for Women.
- Karat, B. (2005) *Survival and Emancipation*. Gurgaon, Haryana: Three Essays Collective.
- Kumar, R. (2002) *The History of Doing: An Illustrated Account of Movements for Women's Rights and Feminism in India 1800-1990*. Delhi: Kali for Women.
- Mukhopadhyay, K. (1993) *Narimukti Andolan O Amra* (Ourselves and the Women's Liberation Movement). Kolkata: National Book Agency.
- Omvedt, G. (1980) *We Will Smash This Prison!* New Delhi: Zed Press.
- Patel, V. (1985) *Reaching for Half the Sky: A Reader in Women's Movement*. Baroda: Antar Rashtriya Prakashan.
- Roy, K. & Marik, S. (2007) *Women Under the Left Front Rule: Expectations Betrayed*. Vadodara: Documentation and Study Center for Action.

Women's movement, Italy

Vinzia Fiorino

In Italy, the Jacobin years (1796–9) and the revolutionary processes of 1848, linked to the struggle for national unity, are the two most important occasions of female commitment in the modern public sphere.

From the end of the eighteenth century the political sphere, a place for state authority, social conflict, and political representation, grew steadily away from the private sphere, a place for family, for affections, for “natural” relations. The attribution of the first to men and of the second to women was a historical process of major importance, capable of radically influencing the structure of future societies. From the French Revolution on, the abstract and general concept of “man” and “citizen” embodied only one particular subject: the adult male, making the exclusion of women one of the basic elements of modern politics. It should be no surprise, then, that women's struggles to gain political rights – often objects of radical criticism, ferocious satire, and archaic ostracism – were the most difficult and the most strenuously fought.

A Long Nineteenth Century

A number of women posed the question of the female role in the new constitutional order brought on by the French Revolution. They did not advocate political rights but, rather, a precise role in the public sphere, consistent with the general project of moral and political renewal of the entire society. Forms of women's political writings – from minor writings, newspaper articles, and leaflets to petitions and public questioning – were numerous. Women complained of the partiality of the application of universal revolutionary principles. They cited the lack of acknowledgement of many rights as an element of robust continuity with the *ancien régime*.

In the 1799 Neapolitan Republic the noblewomen Eleonora Fonseca Pimentel, Luisa Sanfelice, and Giulia Carafa played important roles, and the assault on Forte Sant' Elmo in January 1799 was also due to Neapolitan women. Their experiences put forward themes and problems that remained the focus of women's

claims in the long nineteenth century. The first of these was education. An adequate education shaped on the rational model had been central in revolutionary and Enlightenment culture, but women were often left out. This was an offense to the dignity of the person, and they resented the frivolous education they were offered. They also sought opportunities for honorable work and fought their exclusion from inheritance. They hoped to overturn the unchallengeable authority of *paterfamilias*, and they sought free choice in terms of marriage and everyday life. This also led them to confront the complex problem of sexual morality, another of the central issues in the revolutionary period and throughout the nineteenth century.

The new political and revolutionary lexicon led to an emphasis on the concept of virtue. For men, it summarized all the qualities of a (male) citizen: to work for the benefit of the common good, to put public happiness before individual self-interest, and to spread a strong ethic capable of renewing the political and social structure from the very foundations. For women, on the other hand, it referred to the capability of educating future citizens in patriotic values and new structures. Modernity seemed to recognize a new and fundamental role for women: excluded from political rights, they could be citizens as wives of male citizens and particularly as mothers of citizens brought up in the new patriotic values. What resulted was a public role for women as the “mother-citizen.” Female heroism consisted of offering sons to the homeland and accepting the possibility of losing them.

As single persons, in groups, or organized in movements, Italian women kept as a central theme the issue of motherhood, both as a value specific to women and with the aim of elaborating in political terms the symbolic values linked to maternity. Motherhood came to symbolize a sphere of female virtues and skills that, if confined to the home, could turn into subjection and exclusion, but if turned into the public sphere could be the stepping stone to redefine the spaces and contents of politics.

On the eve of the 1848 insurgencies there was a strong contraposition between the exclusion of women from the public sphere and the reevaluation of women as supporters of military action. However, women did not want only to support male actions. The spontaneous participation of women in insurgencies occurred throughout the

whole country. The collective oath and the option to bear arms were the two most important channels of political involvement. The oath underlined a commitment to bring alive communities and placed emphasis on popular sovereignty in contrast to a monarchist and supernatural conception of its origin. Female oaths voiced an equality claim to men, but also broke the homoerotic pact that men-only oaths implied. The option of bearing arms had in any case a strongly subversive character.

Female virtues thus expanded from maternal tenderness and mercy to strength, energy, and firmness in sacrifice. In this context, in Venice and other cities, women active in the revolutionary process asked not only to bear arms but also to constitute a women's battalion. Many women dressed as men for the purpose of gaining the battleground. Colomba Antonietti fought alongside her husband in Venice and then in Rome, where she died; Luigia Sassi Bartoletti fought in the Milan *Cinque giornate* at the head of 100 men. These are the best known among the many women who fought in the armed struggle. Others epitomized women's political commitment. Caterina Franceschi Ferrucci fought to promote female education. Cristina Trivulzio di Belgioioso, a protagonist in Milan's insurgencies and an international figure, was an essayist and a salon promoter. Laura Solera Mantegazza was a Mazzini follower who matched conspiratory activity with social efforts for women workers and their education.

The second half of the nineteenth century brought major changes, the first and most important being the passage from single individuals or group action to an emancipationist movement, fully structured and independent from all other political organizations. The political path of the most representative figure of the Italian emancipationist movement, Anna Maria Mozzoni, is a significant one. She brought together Fourier's ideas first with Mazzini's postulates, then with the socialist workers' movement, to create an independent women's association. A restless militant, she was the founder in 1881, together with Paolina Schiff, of the *Lega promotrice degli interessi femminili* (League for the Promotion of Female Interests), which gave priority to struggles for women's education, access to liberal professions, equality of women in the legal field, and the right to vote. The subjection of women within the family through the Pisanelli civil

code (much like the Napoleonic code), which embodied the concept of marital consent and thus became symbolic of women's subjection, became her most significant issue. But she was also critical of the relationship between the nation-state and women that perpetuated women's subjection.

From the 1880s the foundation of *Leghe per la tutela degli interessi femminili* (Leagues for the Defense of Women's Interests) brought the political women's movement to the national fore with a strong pacifist and anti-colonial stance. Italian women's associations, with Catholic, socialist, or liberal orientations, moved on issues such as the fight against prostitution and against marital consent, and in favor of paternity search, of suffrage, and of access to professions.

After the political crisis of the end of the century and the consequent repression of all active associations, the new century saw the reconstitution of the better-known groups, such as the *Associazione per la donna* in Rome, and in 1905 the *Unione Femminile Nazionale* in Milan, chaired up to World War I by Ersilia Majno Bronzini. With more conservative positions, but with a large membership, the *Consiglio Nazionale delle Donne Italiane* (National Council of Italian Women) (CNDI), founded in 1903 as the Italian section of the International Council of Women, was established in Washington in 1888.

The *Unione Femminile* left deep marks on the history of Italian feminism for two reasons. First, Ersilia Majno refused Mozzoni's gender equality for its being a limited issue in view of specific female aptitudes and of the difference maternity brings with it. *Unione Femminile* practiced what was to be called "practical" or "social" feminism. It represented a large movement of political and social action to redefine the very concept of citizenship and to build a social welfare state that included women and minors. On the basis of values thought to be specifically feminine (devotion, altruism, sensitiveness) the *Unione* gave birth to many structures in favor of mother-workers, single mothers, prostitutes, poor workers, and elders, carrying out many functions later to be occupied by Welfare. The creation in 1910 of a *Cassa per la maternità* (maternity funds) was, for all its limitations, the most important gain of that period.

The other great battle, the one in favor of the right to vote, galvanized the women's movement

and reached its apex in 1906–8. Committees in favor of women's suffrage were established from 1906, and the issue was raised and debated with high political figures of the time, earning much press coverage. In March 1906 a petition, whose first signature was Mazzoni's, was presented to parliament. The petition sparked parliamentary debate but met with no real results.

Twentieth Century

At the outbreak of World War I, interventionist propaganda influenced the women's movement, implying that participation in the war could lead to national redemption and a chance to gain full access to the national political sphere. Women's activity during the war, from work in factories to assisting soldiers, seemed to legitimate claims of equality and suffrage.

The rise of Fascism, however, changed the general context. Mussolini closed many associations and called feminism an antiquated model. Instead, he proposed a substantially different model of the "new Italian woman." Women played a role in wartime resistance. Because of the end of the separation between private and public spheres, Italian women were able to play important roles in such endeavors as food rationing and protests on essential goods. They also participated informally in municipalities and constituted an important network of direct democracy. The right to vote was granted on January 31, 1945.

In *La Zanzara*, a student paper of the Parini Lyceum in Milan in 1966, some girls wrote about their sexual activity, creating a national scandal that revealed changes that were already at work and were about to break out in Italian society. In doing so, they introduced a new feminism that was strictly connected to student and youth protests at the end of the 1960s. This new movement kept its distance both from the emancipation and feminist movements of the past and from the two organizations affiliated with the two major mass parties, the *Unione Donne Italiane* (UDI) to the Communist Party and the *Centro Italiano Femminile* (CIF) to the Christian Democratic Party. This more modern feminism aimed at a final overcoming of the patriarchal heritage in Italian society and legislation. Themes connected to physical subjection, gender oppression, and free expression were put in the front line, encouraged by international events such as

the American civil rights movement, pacifism, anti-authoritarianism, and social and cultural nonconformity.

The most relevant novelties in the new movement were separatism and the centrality of women's liberation. Separatism implies great political and innovative value given to private and political relations between women only. In this context, lesbian groups, traditionally less visible, found free expression and a larger public space. Self-consciousness, the principle of "starting from oneself," innovations in political language and practices, a particular attention to internal democracy, and a refusal of separations between leaders and militants were the tenets of new feminism. The most famous slogan – "the personal is political" – summarized the radical nature of the movement and implied the overcoming of the distinction between private and public spheres and the political relevance of issues linked to women's subjectivity, such as maternity, sexuality, contraception, and abortion. The struggle to gain an abortion law galvanized the whole movement, creating a truly mass movement in 1975 and 1976. Passed in 1978, the law was confirmed by a referendum in 1981. The feminist movement also fought for, and obtained, women's health advisory bureaus, kindergartens, and a new family law that almost completely abrogated previous patriarchal heritages.

SEE ALSO: Civil Rights, United States: Overview; Italian Communist Party; Women's Movement, United States, 19th Century; Women's Movement, United States, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Banti, A. M. (2005) *L'onore della Nazione. Identità sessuali e violenza nel nazionalismo europeo dal XVIII secolo alla grande guerra*. Turin: Einaudi.
- Bertolotti, T. & Scattigno, A. (2005) *Il femminismo degli anni Settanta*. Rome: Viella.
- Bravo, A. & Buzzone, A. M. (1995) *In guerra senza armi: storie di donne, 1940–1945*. Rome-Bari: Laterza.
- Buttafuoco, A. (1988) *Cronache femminili. Temi e momenti della Stampa emancipazionista in Italia dall'Unità al fascismo*. Siena: Facoltà di Magistero.
- De Grazia, V. (1992) *How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922–1945*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Offen, K. M. (2000) *European Feminisms, 1700–1950*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Pieron Bortolotti, F. (1975) *Alle origini del movimento femminile in Italia (1848–1892)*. Turin: Einaudi.

Women's movement, Japan

Jill M. Nussel

To western observers, putting radical and Japanese feminism in the same sentence may seem incongruous. After all, this is a nation where women did not receive the franchise until the postwar constitution of 1947. Women were granted rights to abortion the following year, but did not have legal access to the pill until 1999. Today, women are guaranteed constitutional equality, but it is perfectly acceptable for businesses to deny women promotion on the basis that they *might* someday marry and have children. Japanese women still practice a distinctly gendered style of writing and speech, while household labor is esteemed as virtuous. As recently as February 2008, efforts to reform domestic violence laws faced a backlash from critics claiming the legislation infringed men's rights and promoted the destruction of families by encouraging radical feminism. Perhaps in this context any feminist consciousness would be considered radical, and indeed, the concept needs to be understood within its own framework and not simply accorded western values.

Throughout the nation's modern history, the Japanese have consistently endeavored to define what it means to be Japanese (*kokutai*), embracing modernity in concert with tradition. Japanese historiography has viewed radicalism as a reactionary impulse against the western order, expressing an emotional preoccupation with traditional and conservative moral and spiritual values threatened by the West. Whether as imperial subjects before 1945 or as citizens in the postwar decades, radical feminists resisted many of the gender-specific policies intended to bend Japanese women and men to the will of the modern Japanese state.

Since the late eighteenth century, the role of women has been profoundly influenced by the neo-Confucian text *Onna daigaku* (*Precepts for Children and Greater Learning for Women*), in which Kaibara Ekken (or possibly his wife Kaibara Token) wrote that women were expected to master domestic skills and moral character to raise strong, intelligent sons. In the creation of a modern industrialized nation-state in the late nineteenth century, this concept also included

women as passive supporters of *fukoku kyōhei* (wealthy country and strong army). The family became a crucial link of loyalty from subject to emperor and nothing was more important to the development of the state than motherhood. As a result, women did not exist independently and were subordinate to their fathers, then their husbands, and to their husbands' families.

By 1875, women's roles were being described as *ryōsai kenbo* (good wives and wise mothers). The result was the development of a fledgling feminist consciousness with origins reflected in western influence, state policy, and growing working-class consciousness. Japanese feminists were certainly influenced by western thought as writers including John Stuart Mill and Charlotte Perkins Gilman were translated into Japanese. Their Marxist ideas of communal work were enticing to many Japanese people whose belief in support of the collective, rather than the individual, was more in keeping with neo-Confucian thought. At the same time, state policy codified men as the absolute authorities. The Meiji Civil Code of 1898, which remained largely intact until after the Pacific War, gave husbands and fathers sole discretion over marriages, property, and children. One provision even lumped wives with "cripples and disabled persons." Ultimately, the patriarchal family became a part of state policy, and neo-Confucian principles were extended to all women, regardless of class. It was in this context that Japan's military-industrial complex was built on sons who became soldiers and daughters who marched into factories. While men took up arms, women worked in squalid conditions and sent their pay home to their parents.

It was this labor dichotomy that prompted women to begin asking questions out loud and often led to their radical expression. Many thoughts, practices, and activities intersected with the elements of Japanese modernity. Japanese radicalism split into several divergent groups whose participants and leaders occasionally overlapped, and whose ideologies often crossed as well. Radicalism was most manifest in movements for basic rights, suffrage, and birth control where they were often coupled with socialism, communism, and anarchism as they sought recognition and legislation to improve the conditions of women. It is important to note that most radical participants did not see their activities as subversive to the modernization efforts, but as better patriotic ways of improving all of Japan.

There were several incidents of radical action in the years of the twentieth century. Heimminsha (Commoners' Society) was formed in 1900 and included several women who supported campaigns opposing the repeal of the Peace Laws that made it illegal for women to join, speak at, or convene political meetings. This organization, associated with the socialist movement, was the first organized attempt on the part of women to attain political rights. The following year, Aikoku Fujin Kai (Patriotic Women's Association) published its first journal, and by 1912 it had over 800,000 members, making it the largest women's organization of the Meiji period. This organization was meant to embrace *ryōsai kenbo* in an effort to gain women's continued support for the war effort with Russia, but in 1904, Yosano Akiko's poem translated as "do not give up your life for the Emperor" exposed the conflict between women and patriotic obligations. This was seen as so threatening that many newspapers branded Yosano a traitor.

"In the beginning, woman was the sun," was the rebellious statement of writer, journalist, and political activist Hiratsuka Raicho. In an effort to give women a literary voice, she founded a Seitō-sha (Bluestockings Society) in 1911 and began publishing the journal *Seito* later the same year with many feminists among the contributors. Members of Seitō-sha were subjected to harsh criticism and *Seito* was regularly censored by authorities, further inflaming members. After four years of publication, an exhausted Hiratsuka turned the reins over to Itō Noe, who was living with the anarchist Ōsugi Sakae. Itō, who had been inspired by Emma Goldman, saw to it that *Seito* became more radical as it increasingly dealt with social injustices in Japanese society. However, due to financial difficulties, *Seito* ceased publication in 1921. Itō was murdered in 1923 along with Ōsugi in the chaos following the great Kanto earthquake. The killing of such high-profile anarchists, along with a young child, sparked surprise and anger throughout Japan.

In addition to traversing the spatial boundaries of respectability, *Seito* brought formerly taboo topics into public discourse and spurred the appearance of several other intellectual journals that generated liberal, socialist, suffragist, and anarchist ideology. Men who were confounded by the sudden voice women seem to have found labeled Seitō-sha members as "new women," a term whose negative connotations Japanese

feminists originally rejected. However, by 1920, they were embracing the term and formed the Shin Fujinkyōkai (New Women's Association). Taisho Japan's new women were characterized by urban living, consumerism, and more western dress. Cutting the hair was illegal for women, but Taisho new women did just that. Hiratsuka, along with Ichikawa Fusae, used the New Women's Association to call for a revision of the laws that made women's political organization illegal as well as calling for measures that would prevent men afflicted with venereal disease from marrying. However, the most radical concept was their call for universal suffrage. Although unsuccessful at gaining the franchise before the war, women made noticeable gains in accessing public space. Even though women had been working in factories since the 1870s, more women were now better educated and moving into teaching, nursing, and clerical work.

Operating in the same general sphere, Ishimoto [Kato] Shidzue pushed for birth control availability as part of a broad spectrum of progressive reforms. Married to eccentric and liberal Baron Ishimoto Keikichi at age 17, Ishimoto spent her honeymoon on Kyushu where her husband managed Mitsui's Miike Coal Mine. Here, she observed the squalid conditions of women burdened with many children and no way to care for them. Her meeting the following year with Margaret Sanger in New York proved to be the turning point in Ishimoto's life. This exposure showed her that enabling women to plan their families responsibly rather than suffer the miseries of unwanted children would elevate the conditions not only of Japanese women, but of the Japanese people as a whole. While Ishimoto did not face the religious opposition that stymied efforts of many western reformers, she did face serious opposition from the growing militaristic regime of Taisho Japan of the 1920s and 1930s who were fiercely hostile to her efforts. In fact, the government made it illegal to even discuss the subject so that public meetings during Sanger's 1922 visit had to be translated with coded terms. Ishimoto's marriage failed and it took 14 years and approval from the Imperial Household Agency to secure a divorce. After considerable scandal she was married in 1944 to radical labor organizer Kato Kanju, with whom she had had a longtime affair.

Radical feminism was thrown into disarray as Japan's militarist propensities of the 1930s and

1940s led to the invasion of China and eventually to the Pacific War. Hiratsuka Raicho and Takamura Itsue criticized the relative silence of women's groups. An even more radical response came from anarchist Yagi Akiko, who described the annexation of Manchuria as having created a slave state exchanging one invader for another. Ultimately, even feminists by and large supported the war effort.

Ironically, it was the 1947 postwar constitution, largely compiled by American occupation forces, which gave Japanese women many of the reforms they had been seeking since the Meiji Restoration. The new constitution granted (at least on paper) universal suffrage for the first time and granted women equality with their husbands. This included property ownership, rights to divorce, rights to appeal divorce, the right to marry without parental consent, and the right to inherit property. Abortion was legalized that same year. Buoyed by their successes, 39 women were elected to the 466-seat Diet in the first election in which women participated, including Kato Shidzue and her husband. Not everyone, however, was convinced that women belonged in political office.

In the postwar years, Japanese feminism has been caught up in many of the same issues that have affected women in other industrialized countries. Yet many feminists believe that oppression has become invisible and internalized as they cannot express the experiences of oppression with a common voice. During the Women's Lib movement of the 1970s, women's groups fought for reforms, built Women's Studies departments at universities throughout Japan, obtained greater education, and entered into the professional workforce in far greater numbers than before the war.

Kanai Yoshiko characterizes the postwar experience for women as those who made up a "feminist generation." These are the women who struggled for sexual equality and for self-reliance, forced to choose between careers and family. By the mid-1980s, the issue of self-reliance manifested itself in "ecofeminism," which argues a fundamental connection between women and nature that comes from a shared history of oppression by a patriarchal society. Radical feminists launched into debate on how to recognize the background of sexual oppression, but debate continued to be centered around "housewife feminism," where women made the biggest

gains in government programs that favored wives and mothers. To radicals, it seemed women were satisfied as long as they could involve their husbands more in house-work and childcare.

Western feminists need to understand that the image of patriarchy is different in Japan than in the West. Radical feminists developed the concepts of domestic and reproductive labor and contributed to an analysis of capitalism as a system to provide non-wage labor, believing the lack of radical feminism can be explained by the lack of discourse on power relations. In Japan, "housewife feminism" has influenced all of the major issues of second-wave feminism: equality in employment and sexual division of labor; domestic labor and reproduction; and an overall demand for sexual independence and self-determination.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism, Japan; Goldman, Emma (1869–1940); Itō Noe (1895–1923); Ōsugi Sakae (1885–1923); Sanger, Margaret (1879–1966) and the American Birth Control Movement; Women's Movement, Britain; Women's Movement, United States, 16th–18th Centuries; Women's Movement, United States, 19th Century; Women's Movement, United States, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Buckley, S. (1997) *Broken Silence: Voices of Japanese Feminism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hopper, H. (2002) *Kato Shidzue: A Japanese Feminist*. New York: Pearson.
- Mackie, V. (2003) *Feminism in Modern Japan*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Yoshiko, K. (1996) Issues for Japanese Feminism. In *AMPO-Japan Asia Quarterly Review*. New York: M. E. Sharpe.

Women's movement, Latin America

Berenice Hernández

The story of women's political participation in Latin America is a long one. Latin American women not only have been involved as pioneers and activists in various social movements, but also have been constructing, via national and international alliances, their own movement as women: Latin American feminism. It is a movement so wide-ranging and diverse that it converges in many others. Along with the indigenous and black movements, it is a fundamental bastion of

the struggles and political practices taking place in Latin America at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Women's Organizing up to the 1950s

Although it has historically been blocked or rendered invisible by the patriarchal narrative, women's political participation has occurred for more than a century almost everywhere in the region. Between 1870 and 1900, women's movements surfaced in Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru. These movements then reappeared with greater force in most Latin American countries during the first decades of the twentieth century. In this period, known as the first wave of Latin American feminism, women's movements mostly articulated their struggle around obtaining civil and social rights. Women's legal, economic, and social inequality was brought to light by the different movements, which made concrete and urgent demands for suffrage, for access to education and to land, and for wage equality, while also claiming rights in the private sphere.

A series of women's meetings took place in various Latin American countries to discuss these topics. Though many participants were middle or upper class, workers, schoolteachers, and peasants played crucial roles in broadening the discussion of the feminist platform.

A first meeting, the International Women's Congress, took place in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1910. There, Chilean, Uruguayan, and Paraguayan women discussed international laws, matrimonial issues, and wage inequality. They also drew up a resolution of support for the Uruguayan government, expressing approval of the first law permitting divorce in Latin America in 1907. Anarchist and socialist women founded the female workers' society *Unión Gremial Femenina*, made up of proletarian women, the Women's Socialist Center, and the National Council of Women. The National Feminist Union was formed in 1918, promulgating the civil and political emancipation of women, access to education, and wage equality. In 1919 Elvira Rawson de Dellepiane and Alfonsina Storni created the Association for Women's Rights, which was led in 1922 by Julieta Lanteri Renshaw.

In Mexico, feminism emerged hand in hand with social struggles. The Mexican Revolution

(1910–1921) gave way to the first Feminist Congress in the state of Yucatan in 1916, where the school teacher Consuelo Zavala was president of the Organizing Commission. There 700 women, especially elementary school teachers, debated the social means necessary to emancipate women from the yoke of tradition. These women discussed access to education, declaring themselves in favor of secular education, as well as free access, so that women would “cease to be led and can be leaders.” The participants agreed upon the need to have women recognize their own capacities and to encourage free thinking while “promoting the spectacle of a socialist tendency.” In addition to being granted more legal rights and freedoms, they argued, women must also be given the option to earn money for themselves and be able to relate to their partners as equals.

That first meeting in 1916 marked the beginning of feminism in Mexico, aiding in the emergence of other women's groups, which strove for access to land, wage equality, and the expansion of popular education. More radical feminist movements also emerged, such as the Radical Women's Center (1918) within the *Casa del Obrero Mundial* (COM). The COM already had a history marked by anarchosocialist women like Juana Belén Gutiérrez de Mendoza, who in 1901 conspired with the Flores Magón brothers against the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, and in 1907 founded the Daughters of Anahuac, an organization that brought together almost 300 anarchist women. Thanks to these movements, by the middle of the 1930s the United Front for Women's Rights (FUPDM) had reached 50,000 members.

Uruguay was one of the first Latin American countries to grant legal rights to women. In 1911, Maria Abella created the first feminist group, the Feminist Section of the Pan-American Women's Federation. By 1901 anarchist women had formed resistance societies of laundresses, ironing women, match makers, and cigarette makers, and in 1910 the Women's Association of Various Trades was created within the Anarchist Federation of Uruguay (FAU). In 1919 Paulina Luisi founded the Uruguayan Alliance for the Women's Vote (AUSF) and in 1923, along with worker women, the Uruguayan Women's Alliance was announced.

Similar processes occurred in other countries in the region. In Cuba at the beginning of the 1920s, the Women's Club for Equal Rights

(CFDIM) was founded, and in 1928 the Labor Union of Women was created to resist the Machado dictatorship. In Ecuador the proletarian women's group Rosa Luxemburg gathered to participate actively in the first general strike of Guayaquil in 1922. In Venezuela, the Women's Cultural Group combated the Gómez dictatorship (1934). This organization, along with the Venezuelan Association of Women, called the first Women's Congress, laying out reforms to the civil code. In Peru, María Jesús Alvarado created the group Women's Evolution in 1915, and in Bolivia the Worker Woman's Federation of Peace was founded.

In Chile, with the inspiration of Belén Sárraga, anarchist and worker women formed the League of Freethinking Women and the Women's Anti-Clerical Center, as well as the Belén Sárraga Women's Centers in the saltpeter (nitrate) towns of the Chilean Pampa. In 1936 the Movement for the Emancipation of Chilean Women was also created, with its own publication, *La Mujer Nueva* (The New Woman). In its newspaper it criticized discrimination against women in the workplace, the home, and education. Representatives, belonging to the middle classes, used the newspapers to call domestic workers to join the ranks and contribute to the trade union organization.

Out of these women's social organizations arose the first feminist parties, including the Female Republican Party (PRF), Brazil (1910); the National Feminist Party (PNF), Argentina (1919); the Civic Female Party (PCF) in Chile (1922); and the Democratic Female Party (PDF), Uruguay (1937).

As a result of the development of these organized struggles, diverse Latin American countries begin to grant suffrage to women, beginning with Uruguay in 1917, Ecuador in 1929, Cuba in 1934, the Dominican Republic in 1942, Guatemala in 1945, Argentina in 1947, Venezuela in 1947, Chile in 1949 (and since 1935 only in municipal elections), Bolivia in 1952, Mexico in 1953 (although since 1853 in the province of Vélez Santander, a right which was lost temporarily in 1857), and Brazil in 1961.

The Second Wave of Latin American Feminism

After achieving one of the principal demands of the movement, women's suffrage, a period of

"readjustment" took place in the 1950s and 1960s. Feminism resurged in Latin America during the 1970s in the context of a sharp radicalization of social struggles, the leading expressions of which were the Chilean *cordones industriales* (industrial belts), the Cordobazo civil uprising in Argentina, and the student mobilization in Tlatelolco, Mexico. These set off diverse liberation, urban guerilla, and peasant movements that questioned the imperialist policies of the US and the dictatorships in Latin America, and it was in this atmosphere of emancipation that the hippie movement, sexual liberation, environmentalism, pacifism, and anti-racism were born. Alongside feminism, these are the most important political expressions of the period, giving way to what were later called "new social movements."

In the heat of these emancipation movements, Latin American feminism demanded the abolition of patriarchy as a system of social oppression and the patriarchal structures of power that extend into social relationships. The authoritarianism of the state, parties, education, and even of fellows in the struggle was questioned. Claims were made for free sexuality, the right to abortion, and the choice of sexual orientation. Different forms of violence, as well as the division of labor by gender, were denounced as reinforcing the patriarchal capitalist logic.

However, by the end of the 1970s, the bloody counterrevolutionary offensive in Latin America led to a reconsideration of the practices and discourses of social movements – including the feminist movement – that was reflected above all in the next decade. On the one hand, the establishment of dictatorial regimes in parts of the continent weakened the social movements. This was due not only to the imposition of a conservative and reactionary ideology based on the defense of tradition and the family, but also to state terrorism against civil society – murders, persecution, torture, forced exile, imprisonment, and disappearances. But, on the other hand, the repression of the movements had as a consequence the delineating of new strategies for struggle and resistance, based on the elaboration of a new discourse: the struggle for the defense of human rights. These new movements were to a large extent led by women. Examples include the emblematic Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina (1977) or the Arpilleristas in Chile (1974).

The year 1975 represented a year of relevant events for the feminist agenda: the World Conference on Women called by the United Nations, and the proclamation of that year as International Women's Year. The inclusion of indisputably feminist demands in the international agenda had important repercussions for the movement's development over the next decades.

During the 1980s the movement again took a new direction thanks to the fall of the dictatorships, the ensuing democratizing attempts, and the movement's proximity to the struggles for human rights. Here they outlined a political repositioning of Latin American feminism in relation to the state, political parties, and social movements. These spaces were then used by the feminist discourse to make public their particular demands, emphasizing the social significance of "being women" through experiences of oppression and inequalities in the social-political arena, and revealing the public character of the subordination of women in private environments. This discourse generated new categories of analysis, and it even proposed a new political language that at the end of the 1980s took a place at the center of democratization debates: domestic violence, sexual harassment, the feminization of poverty, sex work, the "double day," and health and reproductive rights, among others. Thereby a need was acknowledged for creating proper places for meeting and articulating the discourse and lines of action, giving way, from 1981 on, to the Latin American and Caribbean Feminist Meetings.

However, it was also in this context of the expansion of the movement in which a split occurred over the debate between autonomy and the danger of institutionalization and co-optation. These two sides marked the development of feminism in the 1990s. Also, as to be expected of any movement that grows and diversifies, splits, affiliations, and differences between feminists began to become more and more evident, translating into sometimes contradictory conceptions about the relationship between theory, ideology, and the practice of feminism as a political movement.

Essential in this debate was the critique made by black, indigenous, and lesbian women, who questioned the idea of homogeneity, demanding the inclusion in the Latin American feminist discourse of other relationships of subordination, such as those of class, ethnicity, "race," sexual

orientation, and what results from their intersection. They also criticized the relations of power existing within the movement, interrogating the classist, racist, and homophobic behavior of some white/mestizo, upper-middle-class heterosexual feminists.

The 1980s closed at the meeting in Taxco (1987) with a profound reflection on the state and direction of the movement. A document of important repercussions laid out the political line of Latin American feminism and listed a number of impediments faced by feminists. For one thing, feminists were not interested in power, and they had a different approach to politics. Despite differences among feminists, the document argued that all feminists were equal and encouraged the recognition of a natural unity among women. Other problems included the fact that feminism only existed as a policy of women for women and that their numbers were small. It also pointed out that the personal is automatically political and that consensus is democracy.

Latin American Feminism between Neoliberalism, Autonomy, and Diversity

In the 1990s, processes of globalization, its neoliberal policies, its negative repercussions, and its promises – economically, politically, and socio-culturally – produced new quandaries for social movements. Particularly for Latin American feminism, globalization's effects were contradictory. On the one hand, the United Nations summits and international conferences dealing with issues relevant to the discussion of democracy opened up global spaces of debate in which women's issues took on importance. At the same time, international organisms like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and multinational corporations began to set aside funds for the "development of the Third World," where they established and prioritized their own ideas of work, as well as involved social actors in their logic of problem solving in the face of worsening poverty and social inequalities in the region – the consequence of the application of their own neoliberal recipes. The non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were the executors of their specialized projects.

On the other hand, new social movements arose as a consequence of still unhealed democratic transitions, "development" projects that stripped

disadvantaged social groups of civil, social, and cultural rights. Here women saw themselves especially affected, due to the intersection of their multiple affiliations (class, ethnicity, and race). In these resistance movements against the “democratizing,” neoliberal logic, black, indigenous, and worker women took on central roles, bringing their experience to the feminist platform and vice versa.

For example, in January 1994, in the face of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada, and Mexico, the EZLN Zapatista indigenous group emerged, disrupting the narrative of democracy and development and showing up neoliberal policy’s character of exclusion with the symbolic “*ya basta!*” (enough!). In the EZLN, indigenous women were not only protagonists, represented by Comandante Ramona, the “arm and heart” of Zapatism, but they also promulgated their own laws: the Zapatista Women’s Revolutionary Law. The EZLN reincorporated elements central to feminist discourse, emphasizing the critique of vertical power resulting from subordination, the valuing of differences that do not necessarily imply inequality, and the practice of solidarity so discredited in patriarchal political language and activity. The mutual influence between neo-Zapatism and the Latin American feminist movement is indisputable.

However, it is in this situation that the split between “official” and “autonomous” feminists, present since the 1980s, became evident. Tired of marginalization, parts of feminism that enjoy recognition, knowledge, and a political history in the struggle for women’s rights claimed themselves as experts. They opted to use institutional spaces with funds administered through NGOs, to insert claims in the name, category, perspective, or focal point of gender from the Anglo-Saxon discourse. Another part of feminism criticizes this posture, arguing that there is a loss of autonomy and of the political character of feminism through its “institutionalization” and “NGO-ization.” This splitting into sides did not manage to break up the Latin American feminist movement, but instead generated debate that led both currents to recognize one another and reposition themselves. Bases were laid down for facing new challenges at the beginning of the new century, where the movement’s influence on new important struggles and political practices in the region is undeniable.

Latin American and Caribbean Feminist Meetings (1981–Present)

The Latin American and Caribbean Feminist Meetings are stages for meeting, reflection, dialogue, debate, criticism, controversy, and the formation of coalitions between the distinct lines of thought in the region. Through them, Latin American feminism goes on to weave networks of collective action, define dates of common struggles, and affirm transnational ties to address issues that transversally affect women. In them November 25 was proclaimed as the Latin American Day against Violence toward Women, and September 28 as the Day of the Fight for the Legalization of Abortion. These meetings are a privileged space for carrying out key discussions on feminism in the region, covering such issues as the relationship of feminism with social movements; globalization, social exclusion, and gender justice; the inclusion in the feminist discourse of critique made by young women, indigenous women, lesbians, and women of African descent; the relationship of feminism with the state, political parties, and international organisms; autonomy and institutionalization, financing and representation; and democracy. One major victory of the movement was achieved in Mexico in 2007, when the legalization of abortion was achieved after decades of struggle, mobilization, information campaigns, marches, disputes, and the discrediting of feminism and feminists by the conservative right (PAN) and the Catholic Church. Abortion is currently between the first and third cause of death of women in Latin America, so its legalization in Mexico City was a triumph for the Latin American feminist movement.

Latin American Feminism: Recent, Western, White, and Bourgeois?

Today, the Latin American feminist movement brings together many tendencies, orientations, and discourses that join together, take a stance, and ally with one another in their diversity. And it is precisely this feminist diversity – constructed by different trajectories, political projects, contradictions, by the participation of women from the multiplicity of their alliances, whether they be of class, ethnicity, race, or sexual orientation, and their capacity to struggle to insert themselves in different arenas, whether they be social organizations, parties, unions, institutions, and/or

academic discourses, among others – that makes Latin American feminism a women's political movement that is wide-ranging, diverse, and anti-establishment, and that has a reciprocal reflection in movements and social events emerging at the beginning of the twenty-first century in the region.

SEE ALSO: Casa del Obrero Mundial; Cordobazo and Rosarizao Uprising, 1969; Cuban Revolution, 1953–1959; Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo; Madres de la Plaza de Mayo; Magón, Ricardo Flores (1874–1922) and the Magonistas; Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Tlatelolco 1968 and the Mexican Student Movement; Women's Movement, Cuba; Women's Movement, Venezuela; Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Bedregal, X. (2002) *Los encuentros Feministas: Lilith y el todo poder UNO*. Available at www.creatividad-feminista.org (downloaded December 12, 2007).
- CIMAC (2003) *Hacedoras de la historia. Impulso Consuelo Zavala el primer Congreso Feminista*. Available at www.cimacnoticias.com/noticias/03sep/s03090204.html (downloaded June 20, 2008).
- Carneiro, S. (2005) Ennegrecer al feminismo. In *Feminismos Disidentes en América Latina y El Caribe. Nouvelles Questions Feministas* 24 (2).
- Chomsky, A. et al. (2003) *The Cuba Reader: History, Culture, Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Curiel, O. (2007) Los aportes de las afrodescendientes a la teoría y la práctica feminista. Desuniversalizando el sujeto "Mujeres." In *Perfiles del Feminismo Iberoamericano*, Vol. 3. Buenos Aires.
- D'Atri, A. (2004) Entre la insolencia de las luchas populares y la medida de su institucionalización. *Luchas de clases* 2 (April). Buenos Aires.
- Fernandes, S. (2005) Transnationalism and Feminist Activism in Cuba: The Case of Magin. *Politics and Gender* 1, 3 (September).
- Gargallo, F. (2006) *Ideas feministas latinoamericanas*. Caracas, Venezuela: El Perro y La Rana.
- Haney, R. (2005) *Celia Sanchez: The Legend of Cuba's Revolutionary Heart*. New York: Algora.
- Hernández, B. (1996) Feminismos, las jóvenes y horizontes. *LUNATIKA* 1: 14–15.
- MacLean, B. (2003) *Haydee Santamaria*. Melbourne: Ocean Press.
- Pisano, M. (1997) *Ponencia en el VII Encuentro Feminista Latinoamericano y del Caribe*. Cartagena, Chile: Edición de la Comisión Organizadora.
- Randall, M. (1974) *Cuban Women Now*. Toronto: Women's Press.
- Rodriguez Calderon, M. (1995) Recovering the History of Women. In *Cuba Update* (June). New York: Center for Cuban Studies.
- Stoner, K. L. (1991) *From the House to the Streets: The Cuban Women's Movement for Legal Reform 1898–1940*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Vitale, L. (1987) *La mitad invisible de la historia latinoamericana*. Buenos Aires: Planeta.
- Vitale, L. (n.d.) *El movimiento Feminista Latinoamericano del siglo XX*. Available at www.clasecontraclase.cl/generoHistoria2.php?id=20 (downloaded May 27, 2008).
- Weisman, J. (2004) The Continuing Revolution. In M. Azicri & E. Deal (Eds.), *Cuban Socialism in a New Century: Adversity, Survival and Renewal*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

Women's movement, Southern Africa

Lorna Lueker Zukas

Women have always been involved in – and often led – struggles for self-determination and freedom in Southern Africa. Oral histories from indigenous sovereign states of pre-colonial Southern Africa, archival records from the colonial period, and ongoing activism in the current nation-states of Southern Africa (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) provide ample evidence of the existence of women's movements and women's resistance to colonialism, racism, and gender oppression.

Early Women Leaders

Women in pre-colonial Southern Africa were activists and leaders and not, as they have often been characterized, peripheral members of their societies. While one cannot generalize about the nature of women's positions for all of Southern Africa, one can say that women were fierce fighters, leaders in resistance movements, and rulers among their people. Women struggled for justice in myriad ways. Some struggles have become legendary, while others have become only distant memories, but all were significant moments of revolution and protest. Women leaders were found among Khoi, Sotho, and Venda speakers and the Lovedu, who ritually passed leadership from mothers to daughters. Zulu royal women were influential in state affairs as advisors and decision-makers.

Recorded histories of women leaders in Southern Africa date from the sixteenth century.



This portrait by late seventeenth-century artist Giovanni Antonio Cavazzi shows Queen Nzinga of the Ndongo and Matamba Kingdoms in southwestern Africa meeting with the Portuguese governor in 1624. Nzinga, known as a warrior queen, was determined to oppose Portuguese dominance of her country (present-day Angola). After observing that the only seat in the room belonged to the governor, she summoned a woman, who fell on her hands and knees in what became Nzinga's "seat." (Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library at Brown University)

Queen Nzinga M' Bandi (ca. 1581–1663) of Angola flourished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. She led a powerful guerilla army which repulsed Portuguese colonization during her lifetime. She joined and broke alliances with the Dutch and Portuguese to protect her rule and her people as it suited her. She offered freedom and protection to individuals running away from slave traders. She conquered the Matamba and fought African leaders involved in slavery. She actively appointed women as war leaders, council advisors, and members of her fighting forces. In the seventeenth century Chieftainess Hoho (d. ca. 1750) of the Khoikhoi and Chieftainess Kaipkire (b.-d. unknown) of the Herero both led their people in struggles for freedom. Mmanthatisi of the Sotho (ca. 1781–1835), ruling for her young son, led her people out of defeat and became a respected warrior. As the chieftainess of the Tlokwa tribe during a time of vast social and political change in Southern Africa (a period in the early nineteenth century of severe drought and warfare often referred to as the Difaqane, Mfecane, or Lifaqane), she led a fighting force of 25,000 warriors. In 1896–7 the Shona and Ndebele peoples of Zimbabwe collaborated in the first Chimurenga, a war against

white invaders. The Shona were led by a spirit medium named Nehanda Nyakasikana (1862–98). She helped organize the combined resistance effort and instructed that her people should touch nothing that belonged to the white man. Nehanda was captured and sentenced to death in 1898. She remained important not only for her part in the rebellion, but for her prophecy *mapfupa angu achamuka*: my bones will rise to win back freedom. Her legend inspired women sixty years later to participate in the 1966–80 liberation war in Zimbabwe.

Colonial Struggles and Women's Movements, 1900–1970

Clearly, the legacy of women leaders in Southern Africa laid the groundwork for women's participation in twentieth-century movements against colonialism, imperialism, and apartheid. During the colonial period traditional spaces of power for women were erased by western and Christian ideas which reshaped African cultural landscapes. European hegemony and notions of patriarchy worked to redefine African women as docile creatures, with desire only to provide a home, children, and labor power to men. While forced by circumstance into domestic and reproductive roles, women did not settle in the space created for them by European and African men.

Women's movements in the twentieth century centered on struggles for and commitments to family, self, ethnic group, and nation. Women's struggles for emancipation took place more often in local arenas than on national stages. Women's struggles for power and voice incorporated upper-class women and rural women who had little to struggle with but their hearts and minds. Women protested when there was not enough food, when their children suffered, or their livelihood or families were threatened. Rural women who were *de facto* heads of households when husbands migrated to work in the mines or on agricultural plantations formed peasant societies, joined churches and welfare societies, and created self-help associations to enable them to meet their family, religious, cultural, and political obligations and fulfill their productive and reproductive roles. Organizations such as the ANC Women's League, the Association of Women's Clubs in Zimbabwe, and the YWCA were used to defend women's interests throughout the twentieth century.

Women's movements engaged issues directly relevant and pressing to women's daily lives. They organized campaigns to bring domestic oppression to light and stop it. For example, in 1904 Namibian women organized a sexual intercourse strike and refused to bear children following the German genocide of the Herero people. Women understood this as an active measure to help end German occupation of their lands. In subsequent years, under South African occupation, Namibian women organized against working for whites; they only worked for whites if they could not earn a living any other way. In 1936, 60 Herero women protested to the superintendent of the Waterberg East Native Reserve that colonialism was ruining their families. They demanded support to end alcoholism, encourage marriage, and prevent sexual promiscuity and the birth of illegitimate children – all problems they believed resulted from colonialism. In 1955 women participated in the BaHerero anti-Lutheran Church revolt and helped found the Oruano Independent Church. In 1959 Namibian women under the leadership a fierce militant woman named Kakurukaze Mungunda (d. 1959) of the South West African National Union participated in a mass demonstration to protest South Africa's forceful land confiscation policy in Windhoek. South African forces opened fire, killing 12 people, including Mungunda, and injuring 54 more. In honor of Kakurukaze Mungunda, December 10 is celebrated as Women's Day in Namibia. In 1908 the Indian Women's Association formed in South Africa to protest Act 17 of 1895 which required that all non-indentured Indians pay £3 per year to purchase residence licenses or return to India. Women added their voice to the ongoing protests and published several petitions in the *African Chronicle*. The Indian Women's Association helped organize the fourth Passive Resistance Campaign which culminated in the multiracial march on Pretoria in 1956. The group continues to exist today as the Durban Indian Women's Association.

Women's activism in South Africa is best known for mass organized anti-pass protests. The first occurred in Bloemfontein in 1894 when women signed petitions against pass laws. In 1898 the Association of Women of the Household and the Location Women wrote letters protesting passbooks. In the Orange Free State the passage of Law 8.2 in 1893 extended influx control legislation to women by requiring

that they carry passes and take up domestic work in order to remain in urban areas. In 1912 native and colored women of the Province of the Orange Free State organized a women's association to protest against women carrying passes. More than 5,000 women, of all classes and colors, signed the petition. Women's resistance grew in 1913 when the enforcement of pass laws increased; 80 women were arrested when they publically burned their passes. The following day 600 women turned out in support of those arrested and shouted demands to end pass laws. In 1914 the government relaxed the laws towards women and the resistance ended. In 1918, with the reintroduction of pass laws, the Bantu Women's League was founded under the leadership of Charlotte Maxeke (1874–1939). An active women's movement again curtailed pass laws in 1919. The Bantu Women's League became the African National Congress Women's League in 1948 and again aggressively protested pass laws in the 1950s. In 1955, 2,000 women participated in a demonstration. Then on August 9, 1956 Lilian Ngoyi (1911–80), a longtime trade unionist, led a march of 20,000 women in Pretoria to deliver a petition against passes to the prime minister. This was the largest of the anti-pass protests and it was made possible by the collective action of multiple organizations. As a result, August 9 is now known as Women's Day. Ngoyi eventually became president of the African National Congress's Women's League (ANCWL) and she was the first woman to join the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress (ANC). To provide women with greater power and voice she helped to found (with Hilda Watts Bernstein, Ray Alexander, Frances Baard, Ida Mtwana, Josie Palmer, Helen Joseph, Dorothy Nyembe, and Amina Cachalia) the Federation of South African Women, a non-racial group determined to end apartheid and create racial and sexual equality in society. Ngoyi also advocated within the international women's movement to create solidarity for all women engaged in liberation struggles around the world.

Women's activism in colonial Southern Africa included published letters to newspapers and petitions presented to colonial administrators seeking justice for themselves and their families; when this failed they marched and demonstrated against government policies. They were active in trade union organizing, became active

in underground organizing for revolutionary nationalist movements and, finally, when peaceful means of protest failed, women were trained as guerilla warfare and became freedom fighters in national liberation struggles.

Women in Pre- and Post-Independence Movements

The era of European conquest and colonization in Africa altered women's forms of leadership and protest styles, but women never ceased organizing resistance to tyranny. In the second half of the twentieth century women joined revolutionary struggles to overthrow colonial and settler regimes and to protest patriarchy and gender oppression imposed upon them under the guise of "tradition." Women stepped easily into the roles of their pre-colonial ancestors. Women resisted the oppression of racially based, gendered societies where most benefits went to whites and men. Despite banning, imprisonment, and banishment women struggled for national and personal liberation. Women struggled because their men were jailed and their children were ill, hungry, or hurt, and they were surrounded by poverty. Mamphela Ramphele (b. 1947) exemplifies the women's movement in Southern Africa in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Early in her life she refused to let racism, sexism, or classism define her opportunities or goals. She did not accept conventional ideals of women's roles, especially those for black women in apartheid South Africa. Ramphele joined the South African Student Organization at the University of Natal and actively participated in the Black Consciousness movement. She organized other black students, helped operate a clinic for low-income black families and, after leaving the university, continued her social justice and women's activist work. She started a daycare center, a literacy project, and a communal vegetable garden. Breaking new ground, she joined the anthropology department at the University of Cape Town, where she earned a PhD. She insisted on writing on patriarchy and introducing gender analysis into her work. In 1996 Ramphele became a vice chancellor at the University of Cape Town and developed programs not only for racial equality, but also for gender and class equality.

Elsewhere in Southern Africa women were active revolutionaries. In Zimbabwe's liberation

struggle thousands of women joined the fighting forces. The Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) included 1,500–2,000 female combatants, while 7,000–10,000 women supported the struggle from refugee camps. The Women's Brigade of the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) constituted about 10 percent of ZIPRA's soldiers. The women's movement was strong in this liberation struggle; women in urban areas gave money to buy provisions for the struggle and they organized and led mass demonstrations to voice African concerns about inequality. Moreover, rural women cooked food and washed clothes, and transported these items and military supplies to the guerilla armies. These women were in large measure responsible for the success of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle.

Women also worked actively outside of the country, bringing international attention to the plight of the African population in Rhodesia under the white settler regime. Zimbabwean women were commanders of refugee and training camps in Zambia and Mozambique. Many women traveled to the United States, England, the former Soviet Union, and other Eastern bloc countries to receive political and educational training in order to develop skills necessary to run the country at independence. Margaret Dongo (b. 1960), one such ex-combatant and former member of parliament, continued her struggle for equity in Zimbabwe. After independence, when the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party failed to uphold the promises of the liberation struggle, Dongo spoke out. In the 1995 general election she lost her seat in parliament. She accused ZANU-PF of vote-rigging and the registrar general's office of incompetence. She took the matter to court and won. She regained her seat in parliament as an Independent. A dynamic, intelligent ex-combatant, she refused to bow to the ZANU-PF hierarchy or be silenced on issues that matter. Dongo started the Zimbabwe War Veterans Association and she began rural cooperatives to provide education and income-generating projects for women.

Namibian women also actively participated in their country's struggle for independence. In 1960 the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) was officially constituted and it developed both legal and extra-legal resistance movements. Urban women under the leadership

of Lucia Hamutenya, Getrude Kandanga, Nora Chase, Martha Ford, Pendukeni Ithana, Libertine Amathila, Ida Jimmy, Rauna Nambinga, Maria Kapere, and Ida Hoffman held mass demonstrations and political rallies, participated in bus and beer hall boycotts, and supported the liberation struggle in myriad ways. In 1969 the SWAPO Women's Council was formed in exile and members worked to support the struggle from outside the country. Since independence, the Namibia women's movement has worked to engage women as a political force for social transformation.

In Angola women joined the liberation struggle in 1962 with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola's (MPLA) formation of the Organization of Angolan Women (OMA). Women received military training and took part in the guerilla struggle; the women's movement quickly demanded literacy training, job skills, and political positions for women on village committees. Deolinda Rodrigues and Helena de Almeida, along with Ruth Neto and Ruth Lara, laid the groundwork for women's active involvement in political work after independence. Women's Day in Angola (March 2) marks the day five female combatants were slaughtered by the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA).

Not all peoples in Southern Africa were forced to wage armed struggle to obtain independence. Botswana gained independence in 1966 peacefully. Botswana created a Women's Affairs Department as part of the government and the main opposition party also has an active women's wing, the Botswana National Front (BNF) Women's League. But outside the political parties, Botswana women formed a coalition of groups (trade unions, non-governmental associations, women's civic and professional associations) to constitute the women's movement. The Emang Basadi Women's Association (EB) is perhaps the best recognized. Since the 1980s women have moved into waged employment, gained university educations, and taken up professional and political positions. The equal rights of women workers are firmly entrenched in the political landscape.

Women's wings in the nationalist movements and seemingly innocuous women's groups and associations, social service and civil groups, mothers' clubs, and income-generating and market women's associations often worked to support

nationalist struggles. Women's participation in armed struggles and other forms of resistance formed a critical part of the women's movement in Southern Africa in the late twentieth century and in the construction of gender identities and relationships within the state and civil society of post-colonial Africa. In the opening decade of the twenty-first century the women's movement in Southern Africa actively promoted economic, social, and political equality for women; women's organizations such as the Women and Law in Southern Africa Research Trust engaged in cross-border activism to combat gender oppression. Women once again have political and customary leadership roles. Legislation granting women majority status, equal pay, and family leave benefits has been passed in many nations, while in rural areas women gained access to agricultural extension services and women's groups openly discussed domestic violence, rape, and the need for education and healthcare reforms. Notions of freedom and self-determination bind women from ruling families in pre-colonial Southern Africa to women in early colonial and labor struggles, to women in anti-colonial struggles and guerilla movements, and to the women who served in politburos and new parliaments, and accepted posts as cabinet ministers and in civil service. The threads of solidarity can be traced in women's multiple and varied experiences and in their evolving political and activist consciousness.

SEE ALSO: South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; Women and National Liberation in Africa

References and Suggested Readings

- Brickhill, J. (1995) *Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU, 1976–79*. In N. Bhebe & T. Ranger (Eds.), *Soliders in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
- Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. (1997) *African Women: A Modern History*. Trans. B. G. Raps. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Daymond, J. M., Driver, D., Meintjes, S., Molema, L., Musengezi, C., Orford, M., & Rasebotsa N. (Eds.) (2003) *Women Writing Africa: The Southern Region*. New York: Feminist Press.
- Geisler, G. G. (2004) *Women and the Remaking of Politics in Southern Africa: Negotiating Autonomy, Incorporation and Representation*. Uppsala: Nordic African Institute.
- Lapchick, R. E. & Urdang, S. (Eds.) (1992) *Oppression and Resistance: The Struggle of Women in Southern Africa*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

- Lueker, L. L. (1998) *Women, War and Social Change: The Challenge of Independence in Zimbabwe*. PhD dissertation, University of California, San Diego.
- Quanta, C. N. (1987) *Outstanding African Women, 1500 BC–1900 AD*. In C. Quanta (Ed.), *Women in Southern Africa*. London: Allison & Busby.
- Scott, C. V. (1994) *Men in our Country Behave Like Chiefs*. In M. Tétreault (Ed.), *Women and Revolution in Africa, Asia, and the New World*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Van Allen, J. (2001) *Women's Rights Movements as a Measure of African Democracy*. In S. N. Ndegwa (Ed.), *A Decade of Democracy*. Leiden: Brill.
- Weir, J. (2007) *Chiefly Women and Women's Leadership in Pre-Colonial Southern Africa*. In N. Gasa (Ed.), *Women in South African History*. Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council Press.
- Weiss, R. (1986) *The Women of Zimbabwe*. London: Kesho.

Women's movement, Soviet Union

Soma Marik

Women played a number of significant roles in the Soviet Union. They participated politically, fought in the revolution itself, and pushed for their own rights in areas such as reproduction and sexual liberation. They also took part in resisting the counterrevolution.

Political Efforts

Shortly after the October Revolution, the Conference of Working Women of the Petrograd Region was organized to mobilize women's support for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Planned by Aleksandra Kollontai and Konkordiya Samoilova, two Bolshevik women, the conference brought together 500 delegates representing 80,000 Petrograd women workers, as well as a few people from Moscow, Ivanovo-Vozhenesnsk, Tula, and Kaluga. This meeting also heard a non-Bolshevik, Dr. Doroshevskaya, of the separatist feminist League for Women's Equality. The conference passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a fund administered by soviets with substantial democratic participation by proletarian women, so that women would play a guiding role in the institutions that emancipated them. Yakov Sverdlov, head of the Party Secretariat, chairperson of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets,

and husband of a politically active communist, K. T. Novgorodtseva-Sverdlova, was sensitive to women's subordinate status. So he became a strong ally of the communist women involved in organizing women. Lenin, too, felt that the revolution needed women's support in order to succeed. Despite accusations of separatism, this support and the party's need to mobilize masses enabled the *Bolshevichki* (Old Bolshevik Women) to press forward. They organized the First All-Russian Congress of Worker and Peasant Women (November 1918), though some leaders, like Zinoviev and Rykov, were unwilling to endorse such a nonparty women's congress. Creation of a provisional bureau and the tireless work by the women resulted in an unexpectedly large turnout of over 1,000 elected delegates. The important programmatic issues raised in the congress included opposition to domestic slavery, double standards of morality, protection of women's labor and maternity, abolition of prostitution, and drawing women into party and state activities.

Following the congress the provisional women's bureau became the Central Commission for Agitation and Propaganda among Working Women, an official institution attached to the Central Committee (CC) of the Bolshevik Party. Later in 1919, the commission was upgraded by being reorganized into the *Zhenskii Otdel* (Women's Section – *Zhenotdel*) of the CC with Inessa Armand as its first director. Armand had been involved in organizing the 1918 Congress as Kollontai and had delivered two of the major reports there. The effective organizational technique used by the *Zhenotdel* had emanated from Armand, who had proposed that the congress delegates should report back in women's meetings in order to disseminate the significance of the congress decisions to other women. In the *Zhenotdel* Armand and Samoilova took this up and suggested that women entering soviet or trade union work should periodically report back to local meetings on their experiences, thereby increasing awareness among women and attracting others to public activity. The *Zhenotdel*, along with the *Evseksiia* (Jewish Section), breached the sexual, ethnic, and organizational unity of the party in an effort to reach and mobilize an otherwise inaccessible constituency, thereby giving women autonomy.

The *Zhenotdel* work was based on three levels into which any party work was usually classified:

propaganda, agitation, and mobilization. *Rabotnitsa* remained the central organ, and *Kommunistika* became the theoretical journal. In 1921 *Kommunistika* had a print run of 30,000, suggesting a considerable growth of women activists. A number of other journals came into existence at different stages, aimed at different groups of women. But printed propaganda was not enough. Agitational techniques included face-to-face discussions and delegate meetings. Organizing delegate elections was difficult work, especially in the countryside.

The death of Inessa Armand in 1920 led to Kollontai's being given charge of *Zhenotdel*. Particularly important was her work in organizing among the women of Caucasia, the Volga, and Central Asia, often involving campaigns against the control exercised by religion over women (both Islam and Christianity) and the veil. This was viewed as a serious obstacle to mobilizing women and fighting for women's equality. On one occasion there was the dramatic gesture of Muslim women mounting the podium and taking off the veil. Hundreds, and later on thousands, of women worked their way into the *Zhenotdels* in these regions, ignoring ferocious male hostility. But Kollontai's role as a leader of the Workers' Opposition, a faction that demanded the immediate restoration of working-class democracy and opposed the introduction of the market-linked New Economic Policy, resulted in her removal from her position in 1922. Sofia Smidovich followed Kollontai, to be followed by two proletarian women, Klavdia Nikolaeva (a Zinovievist for a brief while in 1925–6) and Aleksandra Artiukhina (1927–30). *Zhenotdel* organized masses of women. It raised issues that went beyond suffrage, such as the social and economic rights of women. The shutting down of *Zhenotdel* in 1930, as a part of the Stalinist counterrevolution, meant that henceforth, decisions concerning women, whether good or bad, would overwhelmingly be taken by male policy-makers, and by an increasingly bureaucratic state, rather than by women themselves.

Revolution and Liberation

Complete civil, legal, and electoral equality was decreed for women in January 1918, and subsequently incorporated into the Constitution adopted a few months later. Six weeks after the revolution, civil marriage replaced the rule of the church, and before a year was out the marriage

code was produced. This proclaimed full equality of husband and wife and abolished the concept of illegitimacy. The Family Code, by exclusively recognizing civil marriage, broke the historic monopoly powers of the church to sanctify marriages. It invalidated the old code with its language of domination by allowing freedom in choosing which surname to use, and by forbidding spousal control in business, friends, correspondence, and residence. Given the extremely limited forms of contraception available in Russia at that time, abortion was made legal in 1920, ensuring maximum safety for women since the Bolsheviks thought that some limitation on family size was necessary for women's emancipation to be meaningful.

Women played a significant role in political struggles, including the Civil War. Though relatively few women actually fought in the army, in 1920 there were at least 73,858 women combatants, of whom 1,854 became casualties. Women were also active partisan fighters and paid for it when caught, as in the case of the women in Yakutsk who were frozen alive by their captors. A number of women also worked in the *Cheka* (Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution), though stories of atrocities committed by them come only from extreme anti-Bolshevik and anti-Semitic sources.

Sexual Liberation

Kollontai also played a significant role in the movement for sexual liberation by insisting that love-life and sex should not be central to a woman's life. She faced frankly the likelihood that, freed from economic concerns and family responsibility, marriages might be less stable and could take the form of comradely but short-lived relationships. She believed that women should learn to view love and the emotions within family relationships in the same way as men – as only one part of their total existence instead of the most important part of life.

Kollontai had no clear political explanation as to why comradely love or emotional attachment between equals would be of short duration. Perhaps she expected that the new women, in the interests of personal liberation, could not permit themselves to be entangled irrevocably in love for one man. In her essay "Make Way for Winged Eros," and in the stories collected as *The Love of Worker Bees* (1923), she suggested that the

proletariat would evolve its own morality as an enriching experience of emotional and physical eroticism that would take the place of a universal sexual code. She did, however, believe in the natural function of motherhood. She also believed that society had an obligation to help mothers raise their children.

In some ways Kollontai's views were out of touch with reality. In urban Russia in the 1920s there was a sharp lowering of the age of sexual activity, which also involved callousness towards women and unwanted pregnancies. Equality also brought new problems. Some couples had to live apart, either for lack of space or because of circumstances such as jobs and educational plans. Women activists also enraged many husbands. But the laws, and the existence of the *Zhenotdel*, also meant the ability of women to resist marital coercion.

The major problem, however, was soon perceived to be the way equality had been imagined. Marriage could be dissolved on the spot by mutual consent, or by a brief court hearing if sought by a single claimant. By abolishing the concept of guilt and the humiliations associated with divorce, full freedom of divorce had been established. In 1925–6, when a revised Family Code was being drafted, it was decided to simplify divorce even further. *De facto* marriages, which were given equal status, could also have a registered divorce. But simplified divorce seemed to have facilitated irresponsibility among men; women were either being deserted or betrayed. The poverty of the country meant that alimony or support for children was very limited.

The Family Code was publicly debated and redrafted several times. Peasants opposed the new code on the basis that it would undermine the household's economic stability, and women's groups generally opposed the code on moral grounds. Protectionists believed that marriage and the family were important while the means of production were not yet socialized, and progressive jurists argued that the new laws were there to protect women and not the traditional family. But the pressure of social groups, notably the peasantry, as well as concerns about deserted women, combined to compel a step back. In addition, a very conservative strain surfaced within the party and upper layers of administration, exemplified by Aron Zalkind of the Society of Marxist Psycho-neurologists, who argued that the

sole legitimate function of sex was the reproduction of children.

In this connection it is necessary to stress that within Bolshevism there were different positions on women. For Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870–1924), any talk about sexuality was irrelevant or a move away from really serious work. For many on the left wing, like Leon Trotsky (1879–1940) and Evgenii Aleksevich Preobrazhenskii (1886–1937), the struggle against bureaucracy and social progress included greater rights for women. But the majority of party members were men, and they held the average woman, if not in contempt, at least in lesser esteem, shown by the lack of women at the top-most levels of state and party leadership.

Counterrevolution

The revolution was followed by a bloody civil war and imperialist intervention, resulting in the collapse of soviet democracy as well as a breakdown of economic structures. It also meant the death and annihilation of much of the politically alert section of the working class and the transformation of the rest often into administrators. Through the middle 1920s, battle had raged in the Soviet Union. A bureaucratic layer had developed, and it found in Joseph Stalin (1878–1953) a leader who could enable it to seize power while hiding behind the mask of the revolution. With the consolidation of Stalin's victory in 1929 came a partial counterrevolution, a political regression of immense dimensions, even though capitalism was not restored.

One dimension of this bureaucratic counterrevolution was a massive retreat from gender equality. It established a conservative regime in certain ways, while preserving some of the gains of the revolution. Industrialization and forced collectivization transformed the Soviet Union between 1928 and 1940, as the number of female workers and employees rose from 24 percent to 39 percent of the total workforce. Though this was portrayed as the foundation of women's liberation, in fact it created a double burden. The pattern of industrialization, with a focus on heavy industry and a total neglect of housing, consumer goods, and services, was of no help to the women workers and peasants. Nevertheless, the reversal in Soviet family policy by the mid-1930s was *not* primarily the result of Russia's backward economy, or the lack of state facilities

(many more childcare centers and communal dining halls were set up in the early 1930s). The turnabout was primarily due to the ideological shift which went hand in hand with Stalin's reactionary policies in other areas.

The new rulers found the family a useful institution. It provided domestic work and childcare with no financial burden for the state. Motherhood became a regular propaganda theme. In 1934 homosexuality was made a criminal offense. In 1936 legal abortion was abolished except where life or health was endangered. Divorce was made increasingly difficult and cumbersome by imposing stiff fees and restoring much power to the courts. The effect was to make people avoid going to court and simply separating and even starting new *de facto* families. To combat this, sexual freedom was virulently attacked. *De facto* marriages were made adulterous and their progeny were declared illegitimate. Children born after July 8, 1944 could not claim the patronymic, the surname, or the inheritance of their biological father. In 1943 co-education was abolished. The construction of a new image of women was shown clearly in the manner in which the unemployed wives of the privileged members of society were positively evaluated.

Despite Stalinism, there remained some gains. By the end of the Second Five Year Plan (1937) the number of employed women had tripled since 1927. By the end of the 1960s women made up over half the workforce. Over 80 percent of able-bodied women were employed. A wide range and variety of occupations were open to Soviet women. Women often received technical education of a high order. Equal wages for equal work was enforced for the most part but modified by the informal but pervasive system of occupational segregation, so that women were pushed into relatively low-paying and low-status occupations with a gender gap in incomes. Equal educational opportunity was not very successful, though compared to many countries it looked bright. But much of the gain was achieved at the high price of double burdens. The state never took up public responsibilities of the kind envisaged by Lenin or Kollontai.

An economy of full employment and public healthcare and education meant a great deal of advantage, particularly for the most underprivileged. The overthrow of the bureaucratized

workers' state and the restoration of capitalism resulted in the loss of remaining gains. To give one example, in 2001 women's life expectancy had fallen to 71.8, and in 2006 it has been estimated to be 64.

SEE ALSO: Kollontai, Alexandra (1872–1952); Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Russian Civil War, 1918–1924

References and Suggested Readings

- Clements, B. E. (1997) *Bolshevik Women*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cliff, T. (1987) *Class Struggle and Women's Liberation: 1640 to the Present Day*. London: Bookmarks.
- Elwood, R. C. (1992) *Inessa Armand: Revolutionary and Feminist*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Farnsworth, B. (1980) *Aleksandra Kollontai, Socialism, Feminism and the Bolshevik Revolution*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Goldman, W. Z. (1993) *Women, the State and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917–1936*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kollontai, A. (1971) *Communism and the Family*. Sydney: D. B. Young.
- Lapidus, G. W. (1978) *Women in Soviet Society: Equality, Development and Social Change*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Stites, R. (1978) *The Women's Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism 1860–1930*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Women's movement, Spain

Pedro García Guirao

Despite the existence of distinctive female personalities and individual interventions on behalf of women, feminism – understood as a mass movement – remained a rarity in Spain until April 14, 1931; that is, until the proclamation of the Second Republic. For feminism to triumph, two things were necessary: first, the popularization of the ideas represented by the French Revolution, and second, the Industrial Revolution. Neither of these two prerequisites existed in Spain until the Second Republic and the country remained in the grip of conservative Catholicism, without anything resembling the Industrial Revolution that was happening in the rest of Europe.

María de Zayas Sotomayor (1590–1661?) is often considered as the first Spanish “feminist” and female novelist. The heroines of her works

are women who, in the social sphere, are capable of gaining access to education. In the private sphere, they are framed in the picaresque, with a certain degree of sexual freedom typical of the aristocracy, which enabled the author to attack concepts deeply rooted in the Spanish mentality, such as "honor" and "virtue." Even though María de Zayas Sotomayor was translated into a number of European languages, the Inquisition in the eighteenth century prohibited and persecuted the publication of her works, accusing them of undermining "the habits and customs of Christian morality." The era was particularly marked by the proliferation of prejudices against women and there are virtually no movements that illustrate even minimal freedom for women.

During the nineteenth century, two historical events might have altered the position of women in Spain; both of them, however, ended up having little impact. First, during the Revolution in 1868 and the subsequent First Republic (1873–4), activities resembling feminism emerged in connection with the philosophy of Krausism. Second, in the course of the 1875 Restoration, the *Institución Libre de Enseñanza* (Free Institute of Education) was founded. Its guiding principles were laicism, apoliticism, and the defense of the freedom of knowledge. Nevertheless, these two historical phenomena hardly contributed to the emergence of Spanish feminism since, when they considered women's roles in the society, they addressed merely their roles in the family. In other words, women – even though educated – remained enclosed in the private sphere.

Despite the general conservatism of Spanish society, the nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of at least three important female figures. Flora Tristán (1803–44) was the first person in Spain to connect the demands of feminism and socialism. In her view, without an anti-capitalist revolution, it was impossible to liberate anybody: neither men nor women. According to some theorists, such as Lidia Falcon, Tristán was repeatedly marginalized by the Marxists as a feminist intellectual, even though Marx possibly plagiarized his most important ideas about the working class from her work. In any case, Tristán never defended a separate feminist movement. The second influential female from the nineteenth century, Concepción Arenal (1820–93), was the first world-renowned criminologist who worked as an inspector of prisons and correctional institutions for women. She

claimed that women had always lived on the margins due to their being denied worthwhile education, instead being taught basic lessons about gallantry, the picaresque, and the inevitability of marriage. In 1859, Arenal founded the *Conferencias de San Vicente de Paúl* women's group, and exactly ten years later, together with Fernando Castro, a literary and artistic association for women, the *Ateneo Artístico y Literario de Señoras*. Despite the subsequent social repercussions, the latter association served as a model for similar organizations in the future. The last significant woman of the era was the countess Emilia Pardo Bazán (1851–1921), who criticized the disastrous position of women through her novels. She pointed out that it was precisely in the area of education that differences between men and women originated. The only "education" that Spanish women of the time received was in preparation for marriage and motherhood. Pardo Bazán also attacked the contradiction in the law that enabled women (if they had a well-off husband or father) to study but not to use their education in a profession. On one of her trips to Oxford, she became fascinated with the life and works of John Stuart Mill, especially *The Subjection of Women*, which she translated into Spanish and provided with a prologue.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, in 1918, María Espinosa de los Monteros founded the *Asociación Nacional de Mujeres Españolas* (National Association of Spanish Women, ANME). It devoted itself to women's suffrage and soon cleared space for the creation of other similar associations such as *Juventud Universitaria Femenina*, *Mujer del Porvenir*, *Progresiva Femenina*, *Liga Española para el Progreso de la Mujer*, and *Sociedad Concepción Arenal*. In 1936, ANME attempted to define itself as a political party and join the Popular Front under the name *Acción Política Feminista Independiente*. This effort, however, proved fruitless and ANME was dissolved at the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. Another organization that appeared in the 1920s was *Cruzada de Mujeres Españolas*. One of its members was the writer and journalist Carmen de Burgos (better known as *Colombine*), who organized the first demonstration of suffragists in the streets of Madrid in 1921. Although these associations included activists from various social backgrounds and did not belong to any political party, they all leaned toward the left. The more traditional right,

alerted by the proliferation of "feminist associations of indecorous radicalism, unsuitable for Spanish women," created in reaction *Acción Católica de la Mujer* in 1919, dedicated to the defense of the ideal traditional woman.

With the advent of the Second Republic, women for the first time obtained seats in the parliament: Clara Campoamor (1888–1972), Margarita Nelken (1896–1968), and Victoria Kent (1892–1987). All three belonged to ANME, even though they held different opinions regarding the question of women's suffrage. Campoamor, who was a firm defender of universal suffrage, also belonged to *Asociación Femenina Universitaria* and *Unión Republicana Feminista* and defended the slogan "one woman, one vote," since the new government enabled women to be elected but not to vote. Nelken, on the other hand, was a member of *Comité de Auxilio Femenino* and *Comité Nacional de Mujeres Antifascistas*, but she did not promote female suffrage. She argued that Spanish women were not ready to vote since the majority of them were so influenced and manipulated by the church that they would elect reactionary parties. Similarly, Kent opposed women's suffrage, although as a vice-president of *Lyceum Club Femenino* (founded in 1926 by María de Maeztu) she always addressed problems relating to women's position in the society.

In broad terms, the Spanish Revolution and Civil War gave rise to two types of women who were heard in different ways. On the one hand, there were radical women from the republican side, split into two major organizations: *Mujeres Contra la Guerra y el Fascismo* (its members were communists, socialists, and republicans) and *Mujeres Libres* (which included anarchists). The former group, created in 1933, was led by Catalina Salmerón and Dolores Ibárruri (1895–1989). Its priority was to win the war, and in order to achieve that, it thought it best for women to temporarily return to their traditional gender roles as mothers, wives, and daughters. The slogan of the organization was: "Men on the front, women in the rear guard." The anarcho-feminist organization *Mujeres Libres* emerged in 1936 out of correspondence between *Grupo Cultural Femenino*, founded two years earlier in Barcelona, and the Madrid-based newspaper *Mujeres Libres*. The main initiators were Lucía Sánchez Saornil (1895–1970), Mercedes Comaposada Guillén (1901–94), and Amparo Poch y Gascón (1902–

1968). The group did not form alliances with the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* (National Confederation of Work, CNT), the *Federación Anarquista Ibérica* (Iberian Anarchist Federation, FAI), or the *Federación Ibérica de Juventudes Libertarias* (Iberian Federation of Anarchist Youth, FIJL), preferring to remain independent within the anarchist movement in order to address more specifically the issues related to women. On the other hand, the Francoist side promoted the reactionary model of the traditional, submissive, and obedient woman.

In April 1939, the dream of an emancipated woman with equal rights to men vanished along with the victory of the Francoists. Women returned to being the slaves of the home, the church, and men. Laws concerning divorce, civil marriage, and abortion were immediately eliminated from Spanish society. For more than 30 years, *Sección Femenina* of the Falange, directed by Pilar Primo de Rivera (1907–91), imposed its one and only female role model.

After the death of Franco, all legal barriers preventing women from achieving their liberty were removed from the constitution in 1978. In spite of this, a crisis and polarization within the feminist movement emerged. On the one side stood the radical feminists, such as the groups *Lamar*, *Colectivo Feminista*, and *Organización Feminista Revolucionaria*, which were independent of political parties and unions. On the other side was institutionalized feminism, supported by political parties, unions, and universities. Representative examples include *Partido Feminista*, founded in 1979 under the direction of Lidia Falcón and legalized in 1981; *Instituto de la Mujer*, created in 1983 by the ministry of culture; and finally, the incorporation of Spain in 1986 into the European Union (EU), which led to the adoption of its requirements and programs concerning women's equality. The new feminism that was born out of this historical and institutional conjunction gave rise to other organizations dedicated to specific problems, such as *Comisión Pro-derecho al Aborto*, *Ateneo Feminista*, *Centro de Estudios e Investigación Feminista*, *Forum para una Política Feminista* and *Ágora Feminista*.

In conclusion, contemporary Spanish citizens have absorbed various values for which feminism has been struggling for many years, "although it is necessary to emphasize that there still exist problems that the society as a whole and public

institutions should eradicate: violence against women [and] the violation of certain fundamental rights of women within the framework of political, civic, social, and cultural rights” (Folguera 2007: 196). These social maladies have been addressed by such organizations as Red Feminista de Organizaciones Contra la Violencia de Género, Federación de Asociaciones de Mujeres Separadas y Divorciadas (in 1973 known as Asociación de Mujeres Separadas Legalmente), and Asociación Democrática de la Mujer.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Gender; Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT); Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI); International Women's Day; Mujeres Libres; Sánchez Saornil, Lucía (1895–1970); Spanish Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Cook, A. T. (1977) Emilia Pardo Bazán y la Educación como Elemento Primordial en la Liberación de la Mujer. *Hispania* 60, 2 (May): 259–65.
- Folguera, P. (Ed.) (2007) *El Feminismo en España. Dos Siglos de Historia*. Madrid: Editorial Pablo Iglesias.
- Garrido, E. (Ed.) (1997) *Historia de las Mujeres en España*. Madrid: Síntesis.
- Kaplan, T. E. (1971) Spanish Anarchism and Women's Liberation. *Journal of Contemporary History* 6 (2): 101–10.
- Nash, M. (1986) *Mujeres, familia y trabajo en España, 1875–1936*. Barcelona: Antrophos.
- Scanlon, G. M. (1986) *La polémica feminista en la España contemporánea, 1868–1974*. Madrid: Akal.

Women's movement, United States, 16th–18th centuries

Lucille A. Adkins

Traditional history locates the birth of the women's rights movement in the nineteenth century, coinciding with the development of a women's political rights movement. Viewing any woman's written expression or individual action that strayed from the traditional patriarchal definition of female roles and behavior, however, feminist historians have broadened this scope in the last thirty years. They have shown that, though women's resistance to patriarchal dominance has not always been a movement, a level of consciousness, a firm stance, and an attitude of

confidence, has done just as much as the organized, collective effort in challenging oppression. The oppositional efforts of women in the United States began with isolated radical insights and sparks of feminist consciousness expressed through the actions of individual women long before the nineteenth-century birth of the women's rights movement.

Colonial America

The legitimization of male dominance and female subordination in colonial American society was linked to church teachings, specifically Genesis and the story of the Fall (Genesis 3:1–24). Eve's guilt in bringing about the fall of *man* and the loss of paradise was accepted as evidence of the natural weakness of women and God's punishment of subordination to her husband. New Testament texts most often cited derive from St. Paul, who seems to dictate women's submissiveness and public silence: 1 Timothy 2:8–15; 1 Corinthians 14:33–35; Ephesians 5:22–23. The Church of England's assumptions about the natural weakness, inferiority, and preordained subordination of women accompanied the people who founded Plymouth (1620), Massachusetts Bay (1630), Connecticut (1635), and New Hampshire (1638) and were formidable barriers to women who attempted to redefine themselves as the equals of men. Known as Puritans, these separatist dissenters from the Anglican Church of England established settlements in the New World and dedicated themselves to creating a righteous and disciplined life based on a covenant with God. Church and state were one, giving religious and moral values the force of law. Puritans drew clear boundaries to delineate women's proper place and to contain women who presumed to challenge male authority. Nevertheless, challenge it they did.

Few Puritan women wrote diaries or books. Only 4 of the 911 books produced in seventeenth-century New England were written by women. The most famous of these was Anne Bradstreet's *Several Poems Compiled with Great Variety of Wit and Learning* (1678). Bradstreet (1612–72) arrived with her family in Massachusetts in 1630. While she lived her life within the dicta of traditional Puritan domesticity, she interjected the inner life of a poet. In fact, Anne Bradstreet was the first American poet. When her brother, the pastor Thomas Parker, wrote that

“Your printing of a Book, beyond the custom of your sex, doth rankly smell,” Bradstreet took his apparent insult of woman’s intellectual literary pursuits seriously by noting in one of her poems:

I am obnoxious to each carping tongue
Who says my hand a needle better fits,
A Poets Pen all scorn I should thus wrong
for such despight they cast on female wits;
If what I doe prove well, it won’t advance,
They’l say it’s stolne, or else, it was by chance.

Anne Bradstreet subtly subverted the gender constraints Puritan society imposed on women’s intellectual expression by challenging the “carping tongues” cautioning female limitations and duty, and continuing to publish as a poet.

Other challenges were raised in far less subtle ways by Puritan women. Once they testified to their salvation to the satisfaction of the clergy and other male community leaders, Puritan women shared with men the right to be members of the church, and this led some to challenge the power of the male clergy and offer their own doctrinal interpretations. One example was Anne Hutchinson, who in the 1630s contested both religious orthodoxy and assumptions of female roles within Puritan society.

Hutchinson arrived in Massachusetts in 1634 and almost immediately began proselytizing to all-female groups in conjunction with her role as midwife. She moved on to holding informal religious meetings in her home where her preaching to mixed groups, an act considered “promiscuous,” challenged not only religious doctrine but also the male clergy who interpreted it and the magistrates who enforced Massachusetts colony laws. Hutchinson’s heresy was her belief that people were “saved” by the direct and sudden infusion of God’s spirit, not by the mere adherence to Puritan moral code. As Hutchinson’s popularity among the colonists grew, so did the threat of her radical religious views to the male clergy and leadership of the colony. Armed with both civil and religious power, they attempted to convince Hutchinson of her theological errors and to cease her rebellious and disruptive activities. Hutchinson refused.

In 1637 Hutchinson was brought to trial for heresy. Trial transcripts describe her as “a woman of haughty and fierce carriage, of a nimble wit and active spirit, and a very voluble

tongue, more bold than a man, though in understanding and judgment, inferior to many women.” The formal complaint brought against her charged: “You have stepped out of your place, you have rather been a Husband than a Wife and a preacher than a Hearer; and a Magistrate than a Subject.” In his admonition of Hutchinson’s actions, Boston minister John Cotton preached to his female congregants that Hutchinson “is but a Woman and many unsound and dayngerous principles are held by her.” Hutchinson defended both her religious ideas and the right of a woman to preach, but was excommunicated and banished from the colony. She moved to Rhode Island, which was established in 1636 as a refuge for a growing number of refugees from Massachusetts orthodoxy.

Anne Hutchinson was what Puritan leaders called an “unquiet” woman. Mary Dyer (1611–60) was another. A follower of Anne Hutchinson in the 1630s, Dyer shared Hutchinson’s discontent with the models of feminine virtue offered by her Puritan clergy. She traveled to England in 1652 and became a member of the Society of Friends. Reborn in “the Light,” Quaker women enjoyed an active spiritual role in their church. Dyer returned to New England in 1657 to preach Quaker doctrine. She was received as Hutchinson had been received and was banished, first from Massachusetts and then from New Haven. She returned to Boston but was again expelled. Defying the court, Dyer returned several times during 1659, recognizing that to do so was to invite the death penalty. She was arrested and sentenced to be hanged for heresy. At the last minute, Dyer’s death sentence was overturned and she was once again banished from the colony. In 1660 she undertook her last act of defiance and returned once more to Boston, where she was arrested and executed.

Revolutionary Era

As the values of the Enlightenment reached the colonies, the philosophies of such thinkers as John Locke weakened somewhat the view that women were subordinate to the natural rule of their husbands. Yet a married woman (a *feme covert*, literally, “covered woman”) lost control of her property upon her marriage. A married woman was deemed to be under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage was

called her *coverture*. Even a single woman, or *feme sole*, was without legal rights to make contracts or sue in court. The democratic ideals born of the American Revolution, however, held the promise at least for expanding opportunities for women in the new republic.

Women actively participated, although usually in distinctively gendered ways, in the American Revolution and the founding of the new nation. Historians debate the extent to which participation in the Revolution changed women's lives in the long term. Some say women's rights declined after the war as white men's rights expanded. Others, however, argue that participation in the war, even if through traditional avenues such as sewing bees and boycotts, led women to develop a new consciousness which encouraged them to push for greater educational opportunities and increased presence in the public sphere. As Norton (1980) has shown, women were able to use the revolutionary climate to argue that, because of their duties as mothers, they should be better educated so they could train the next generation of citizens.

The Great Awakening also helped empower women during this time. As early as the 1730s and 1740s, waves of religious revivalism began to sweep the colonies. Inspired by English minister George Whitefield, this Great Awakening challenged the Puritan emphasis on salvation by good works and right behavior, focusing instead on the conversion – an immediate and ecstatic religious experience. The egalitarianism and challenge to traditional orthodoxy that marked this period of revival offered women a greater voice in religious worship and church affairs than had been available previously. In particular, two radical religious groups centered around charismatic women emerged as the Great Awakening reached its greatest intensity shortly before the 1770s.

Jemima Wilkinson (1752–1819), a former Quaker, had visions that led her to believe she was the female incarnation of Christ. She attracted devoted followers in Rhode Island and Connecticut. Wilkinson threw off her female identity, opting to dress in clothing similar to men's and refusing to answer to her female name. She insisted that she be called the Publick Universal Friend. For more than forty years Wilkinson preached and prophesied for her 200 settlers at New Jerusalem, her utopian community near Seneca Lake, New York.

British-born Ann Lee (1736–84), founder of the “Shaking Quakers” or, more simply, Shakers, was also directed following ecstatic experiences to deny her femaleness and form a utopian community. Lee's religious doctrine revitalized the woman-centered concept of an androgynous God. Shakers believed in the equality of the sexes, and Mother Ann required celibacy for herself and her followers, teaching that marriage was based on the subjugation of women and thus violated Divine law. Leadership, teaching, and preaching within their communities were shared between men and women. Mother Ann had been the victim of marital rape and domestic abuse. The celibate way of life and the alternative she offered to the private, patriarchal family strongly appealed to her and to her followers.

Both Wilkinson and Lee dramatically broke with tradition. Each sought female spiritual and mental emancipation for themselves and freedom from restrictive sex-gender roles for their followers. By denying their sexuality and femaleness, they removed the issue of gender and its potential for undermining their religious leadership.

Barriers to consistent radicalism by women persisted despite the revolutionary fervor and the appeal by many for a loosening of the restrictions on women's access to education and the public arena. Abigail Adams' (1744–1818) plea to her husband, John Adams, as he worked to write the “Declaration of Independency” is often cited as an example of an emerging feminist consciousness among women of Abigail's social class. Her early letters reveal a youthful radicalism for women's rights. She advocated a separate legal system for women, one that would denounce the legal subjection of wives to husbands, believed a woman should be free to marry a mate of her choice and to limit the number of children she bore. She also staunchly refused to accept the intellectual inferiority of women, adding her influence to the growing demand for the education of girls. Abigail's reminder to John to “remember the ladies” in creating the new republic evidenced her awareness of the liabilities of being born female in a paternalistic society.

As radical as her request might have appeared, Abigail accepted the doctrine of separate spheres, in which women were restricted to domestic space and subordinate to men, as evidenced by the last line of that letter. She said, “Regard us then as Being placed by providence under your

protection and in imitation of the Supreme Being make use of that power only for our happiness." That acceptance fixed the boundaries of her feminism. Within those limits she maintained that the private political role of women in the new republic was fully as important as the public role of men. The role that Abigail Adams exemplified and advocated for other women in her class can be summarized as Republican Womanhood – a political function for women by which their private virtue was expanded to include the obligation to nurture husbands and sons dedicated to self-sacrificial public service and incorruptible patriotism. Republican Womanhood provided for the first time a political function for women. Despite her tacit support of separate spheres, Abigail Adams' petition for the expanding involvement of women in the political sphere would be invoked countless times in the next 200 years by both First Wave and Second Wave advocates for women's rights.

There have always been women who have asserted their right to expression and creativity despite the social constraints that sought to deny their talents. Confidence in their own creativity empowered colonial and revolutionary women as thinkers and writers, but their intellectual autonomy had to be won before their creativity could be released. Two stand out as breaking through the social barriers to female literary expression.

Mercy Otis Warren (1728–1814) was born in Massachusetts. She married James Warren in 1754 and had five sons. Of the many ways in which women supported the patriot cause before and during the American Revolution, Mercy Otis Warren chose writing. She was especially acclaimed for her two political plays, *The Adulateur* (1773) and *The Group* (1775). Published but apparently not performed, these satires characterized the royal governor of Massachusetts, Thomas Hutchinson, and his administration as greedy and unprincipled. Warren was also most likely responsible for anti-federalist newspaper contributions under the pseudonym "A Columbian Patriot." Her major work, however, was a three-volume history of the American Revolution. *The History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution, Interspersed with Biographical, Political and Moral Observations* (1805) runs to more than 1,200 pages. It includes brutal and eroticized representations of attacks on American women

by the English and their mercenary allies. It was the only history of the American Revolution written by a woman of that era.

There is debate as to the extent to which Warren challenged the sexual politics of her time and advocated, like her friend Abigail Adams, the extension of republican concepts of liberty to women. Yet she is generally thought by many feminist scholars to have been one of the most emancipated women of her day and one of the most literate women of the eighteenth century. She held absurd the idea that women had no stake in politics and government. Her letters commenting on the status of women do endorse a strong version of the separate spheres doctrine. Through her history, however, Warren expressed the right of women, even from within the female domestic realm, to formulate and express political views as well as to compose history.

Judith Sargent Murray (1751–1820) was at the center of the post-Revolutionary discussion concerning the proper role for women in the new republic. Unlike Abigail Adams who espoused a separate but equal status for women, Murray's views of gender relations represented the cutting edge of what could be labeled feminism in eighteenth-century America. Murray expressed a feminist consciousness through her prolific writing, which challenged the limits that constrained even the most educated women of her time. Writing with more authority than any American woman dared to do at that time, she pushed for equality and full opportunities for women, offending many of her contemporaries.

In 1790 Murray wrote the essay *On the Equality of the Sexes*. In it, she argued for educational equality, believing that the minds of men and women were capable of equal intellectual attainment. She took issue with prevailing sex-gender roles, arguing that the supposed superiority of men was not a function of innate sex differences but the result of the fact that from their early years, the minds of girls were "depressed" while those of boys were "exalted." To excel, she argued, girls needed more than an education focused on domestic skills.

Warren and Murray stand out as pioneers who challenged gender definitions and used their minds' potential, yet even with such logic, a changed environment for women who sought an education beyond the domestic sphere and for talented women who chose the life of a writer

would not develop in the United States until the nineteenth century.

SEE ALSO: Hutchinson, Anne (1591–1643); Women's Movement, United States, 19th Century; Women's Movement, United States, 20th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Berkin, C. (1996) *First Generations: Women in Colonial America*. New York: Hill & Wang.
- Dubois, E. C. & Dumenil, L. (2005) *Through Women's Eyes: An American History with Documents*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's Press.
- Koehler, L. (1980) *A Search for Power: The "Weaker Sex" in Seventeenth-Century New England*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Lerner, G. (1993) *The Creation of Feminist Consciousness: From the Middle Ages to Eighteen-Seventy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Norton, M. B. (1980) *Liberty's Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750–1800*. New York: Little, Brown.
- Norton, M. B. (1996) *Founding Mothers and Fathers: Gendered Power and the Forming of American Society*. New York: Knopf.

Women's movement, United States, 19th century

Lucille A. Adkins

What is often termed the First Wave of feminism, involving the conscious struggle for equal rights for women, began in the early nineteenth century. It culminated in a vigorous reaction against the refusal to grant women equal citizenship rights, including the right to vote, in the wake of the Civil War, when the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (having to do with the expansion of civil rights and voting rights, respectively) were added to the US Constitution. The seeds of this feminist upsurge were sown, however, during the previous two centuries, germinating in the democratic aspirations, struggles, and disappointments associated with the American Revolution.

The New Republic

Abigail Adams (1744–1818) could not hide her disappointment that the final draft of the Declaration of Independence contained no

references to slavery, as had a previous draft sent to her by her husband. The final draft also contained no reference to the women's issues Abigail had raised with him. While there had been heated debate over the existence of slavery in the new republic, there was no debate over the definition of a voter as male. Women were not to become members of the polity. Abigail suggested to her friend Mercy Otis Warren (1728–1814) that she join in signing a petition to Congress, but later dropped the subject in her letter to John:

I can not say that I think you very generous to the Ladies, for whilst you are proclaiming peace and good will to Men, Emancipating all nations, you insist upon retaining an absolute power over Wives. But you must remember arbitrary power is like most other things which are very hard, very liable to be broken – and notwithstanding all your wise Laws and Maxims we have it in our power not only to free ourselves but to subdue our Masters, and without violence throw both your natural and legal authority at our feet.

Abigail had enjoyed a liberal relationship with her husband, expressing her love and affection instead of obedience and subservience. In the first three decades of the nineteenth century, however, most women were still subordinated, legally and socially, to their husbands. Disenfranchised, only the roles of wife and mother were open to them.

The 1830s and 1840s were decades of reform in the nation. The belief in the natural moral fiber of woman, and her role as cultivator of morality in her husband and children, further expanded the principles of Republican Motherhood. What emerged was a cult of domesticity, which imposed four standards of behavior on women: piety, purity, domesticity, and submissiveness. While an ideal, with little application to the lives of most women, particularly the poor and working women, the cult of domesticity constrained the lives of middle- and upper-class women and was a formidable barrier to their emergence as leaders of the women's rights movement in the nineteenth century.

Social Reform

A powerful wave of religious revival beginning in the late 1820s (the Second Great Awakening),

followed by the physical and economic transformation of the United States by the 1830s, generated an intense wave of moral and social activism from the 1840s to the Civil War. Women played prominent roles in moral reform, with as many as 10 percent of adult women in the Northeast active in benevolent and reform societies in that period.

With its idealization of woman's premier position within the private sphere of the home, the middle-class cult of domesticity was often a locale for domestic violence, sexual abuse, and female disempowerment. Family and sexual life were appropriately important concerns of female reformers. Among the women calling for radical change in women's sexual and reproductive lives were female health activists who violated the taboo against direct, public speech about women's bodies and their sexuality.

Mary Grove Nichols was one of the most infamous and influential women in America. A radical social reformer and pioneering feminist, Nichols became a national figure in the 1840s and 1850s. A victim of emotional and sexual abuse at the hands of her first husband, she wrote and lectured forcefully and explicitly about the physical suffering and sexual frustrations of married women, equality in marriage, free love, spiritualism, the health risks of corsets and masturbation, the benefits of the cold-water cure, and the importance of happiness. Considered too radical even by other reformers, Nichols and her second husband, medical writer and social reformer Thomas Low Nichols, were often excluded from the very social causes they had helped to establish. Excluded also from the history of that time, Nichols' campaign for the awakening of women's desires and needs reveals the diversity of opinion within nineteenth-century America's social reform movements and the budding radical feminist network of the time.

Paulina Wright (1813–76) was also a health lecturer. She shamelessly used a female manikin to teach women about their sexual and reproductive anatomy. Her exposure to the abuses women suffered within marriage propelled Wright (later Wright Davis) to become a leader in the women's rights movement.

Frances (Fanny) Wright (1795–1852) was born to a wealthy family in Dundee, Scotland. By the age of 18 she had written her first book. In 1818 she immigrated to the United States. Wright was co-founder of *Free Inquirer* newspaper and

authored several books, including *Views of Society and Manners in America* (1821). She was the first woman to lecture publicly before a mixed audience when she delivered an Independence Day speech at the utopian community, New Harmony, in 1828. Dubbed by her critics as the Great Red Harlot for her personal life, which included several illicit romances, as well as her progressive views on sexual relations, Fanny Wright was a political figure in the early labor movement and is credited with bringing the political struggle for women's rights to America.

Allying with Robert Owen, founder of the utopian community New Harmony, Wright launched a campaign for education reform and against organized religion. She advocated a system of free state boarding schools in which children would be educated without religious doctrine but receive training in traditional subjects as well as industrial skills. Wright saw this system as relieving families of the burden of raising children. From her desire to see these educational proposals enacted, Wright moved into the political sphere and became a central figure in the workingmen's movement. She differed in some technical aspects from the broader workingmen's movement, which consisted of activism by small farmers, artisans, and workers in early factories, but her name became synonymous with their protests. Those opposing the workingmen's movement referred to the movement as the Fanny Wright Party.

In 1825 Wright founded the Nashoba Commune near Memphis, Tennessee. Her goal was to build a self-sustaining multi-racial educational community comprised of slaves, free blacks, and whites. Nashoba did not fare well despite her persistent efforts. Her outspoken political rhetoric and attacks on racially segregated schools, organized religion, racial taboos in sex relations, marriage, and cultural standards on Christian womanhood, left her on the fringes of mainstream society, and Nashoba suffered a financial collapse. Wright emancipated the slaves and paid for their transportation to Haiti as she had promised.

Wright also took issue with the widening gulf between the classes within capitalist America. She saw women as particularly affected by the increasing emphasis on the market as industry shifted away from the home into the city. Her multiple ideologies converged in the popular health movement of the 1830s. Because she saw

the workingmen's movement as a reaction to an increasingly aristocratic culture in which the "professionals" controlled the system as well as the information, doctors were included in her target. Similarly, by advocating the woman's voice, Wright gave credence to women becoming involved in health and medicine. She had strong views on social reform, as well. She condemned capital punishment and demanded improvements in the status of women, including equal education, legal rights for married women, liberal divorce laws, and birth control.

After the midterm political campaign of 1838, Wright suffered from a variety of health problems and died in 1852. She never achieved much individual success; after a lifetime of struggling for high ideals, she spent the last years of her life embroiled in financial problems and a complicated divorce. However, her life struggles proved to be the greatest model for the women's movement. Her defiance of women's proper place led her to tackle highly controversial issues well before their time. From birth control to affirming sexuality as "the noblest of passions," Wright chipped away at a rigid sex-gender structure and paved the way for other women to make changes regarding women's rights, health, and woman's place within society.

A number of utopias emerged in the nineteenth century and expressed ideas important to women's rights. Perhaps the most famous secular utopia was Brook Farm, founded in Roxbury, Massachusetts, in 1841. The most prominent woman associated with Brook Farm was Margaret Fuller (1810–50). In 1844 Fuller wrote an article on the conflict between women's possibilities and their assigned roles. One year later she wrote *Woman in the Nineteenth Century* (1845), the first full-length feminist treatise in American history. Less overtly political than other women's rights advocates of that time, she was widely admired for her vision of the creative power of women.

In 1844 Fuller moved to New York City to become the first literary editor of Horace Greeley's progressive Whig newspaper, the *New York Daily Tribune*. As one of the first female members of the working press and the first woman to serve on the editorial staff of a leading American newspaper, Fuller published 250 articles in her 20 months on the job. Her journalistic investigations focused not just on the conditions and concerns of women. In a city ripe

with nativist resentment of immigrants, she called for her readers to "learn from all nations" and to build understanding across race, class, and gender lines. Fuller's life was cut short when in 1850 the vessel carrying her and her family from Europe to the United States was shipwrecked off the coast of New York.

Of all the expressions of antebellum social activism, abolitionism had the most profound impact on the growth of an organized political movement for women's rights. By the mid-1830s a growing number of women abolitionists went beyond the limits of female propriety. Their defiance resulted in a split in the abolitionist movement over the role of women. That division redirected the more radical women within abolitionist ranks to the broader struggle for women's rights.

In 1831 Maria Stewart (1803–79), a black domestic servant from Connecticut, defied racial and gender conventions and became the first black woman to publicly criticize slavery before a mixed audience of women and men. She boldly insisted, "The whites have so long and so loudly proclaimed the theme of equal rights and privileges, that our souls have caught the flame also, ragged as we are." In her lectures, Stewart encouraged black women to work to strengthen the African American community, and by 1833 her activities had aroused such opposition among Boston's black leaders that she left the city. It was not so much her message that disturbed them. It was that the message was being delivered by a black woman who dared to speak out.

Isabella Baumfree (1797–1883) was born a slave in New York and, upon emancipation, spent several years in a religious community in New York City. In 1846 she emerged from the community as Sojourner Truth and became an itinerant preacher and prophet. She was unlike most female abolitionists of the time. She was black. She was not a member of the respectable middle class. She was, instead, unlettered, opinionated, emotionally intense, and direct. Her passion for equality and unconventional style had a tremendous impact on white audiences, and she ranks among the most influential radical female abolitionists.

Lucy Stone (1818–93) graduated from Oberlin College the first woman to earn a bachelor's degree in the United States, and the first to earn a doctorate of divinity from an American college. Against her family's wishes, she chose

the “unladylike” vocation of professional public speaker and adopted abolition as her cause. Like other abolitionist women, Stone was harassed wherever she spoke. Opponents tore down posters advertising her talks, threw pepper into the auditoriums where she lectured, and doused her with cold water one winter day. Yet she continued to speak out in support of abolition and women's rights. When told by the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society that she had been hired to speak on abolition, not women's rights, Stone replied: “I was a woman before I was an abolitionist. I must speak for the women.”

Sarah (1792–1873) and Angelina Grimké (1805–79) also weathered attempts to silence their outcries against slavery and the denial of rights for women. Born into a wealthy slaveholding family in South Carolina, the sisters ran away to Philadelphia in 1829, became Quakers and joined the abolitionist movement. They followed Maria Stewart's lead and preached against slavery in front of “promiscuous” (mixed) audiences. What set the Grimké sisters apart were their shocking descriptions of the sexual corruptions of slavery. So scandalous were their actions that they earned a reprimand from the Massachusetts General Association of Congregationalist clergy, demonstrating that little had changed since the days of Anne Hutchinson's challenge to male clergy. The Grimkés neither apologized nor retreated. Instead, in 1838, Sarah published a series of letters and abolitionist and feminist essays titled “Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and the Condition of Women.”

The Grimkés defense of their claim to the equal rights of women as moral beings and social activists led to a split in the abolitionist movement over the role of women. In 1840 William Lloyd Garrison, editor of the leading abolitionist newspaper *The Liberator*, formed the American Anti-Slavery Society. Under Garrison's leadership the society included women as full and equal partners in the struggle against slavery. Frederick Douglass, who insisted that the issue of women's equality should be kept separate from that of abolition, drove the second wing of the once-unified abolitionist movement.

The conflict that raged over women's full and equal participation mirrored a separate but connected issue – the denial of the franchise to women. Their inability to function as full citizens of the nation wearied and angered abolitionist women who lacked political rights but were

the primary support and workforce of a movement that was moving beyond moral arguments against slavery to political methods, including the formation of political parties against slavery.

Focus on Women's Rights

By the 1840s all of these issues – moral reform, temperance, petitions against slavery, and the Grimké sisters' defense of woman's equal participation – drew many women reformers to the broader question of women's rights. One of the first lines of attack was aimed at the extensive body of state laws that deprived married women of all independent property rights. The legal principle of *coverture* treated wives as non-persons before the law on the grounds that they were dependent on and subordinate to their husband's authority. In effect, marriage buried a wife's selfhood in that of her husband. Attempts to undo coverture laws started as early as 1836 with Ernestine Rose (1810–92), a Jewish immigrant who had fled an arranged marriage in Poland and settled in a “free-thinking” (atheistic) community in New York City. Rose assisted New York State legislator Elisha Hertell in gaining support for his bill intended to grant married women the same right to earnings and property as single women and all men. Despite Rose's best efforts, however, only a handful of women would sign a petition on behalf of Hertell's bill.

In the 1840s two other women joined Rose in her continuing efforts to undo coverture laws. The first was Pauline Wright (later Davis), a feminist activist who had started her career as a women's health educator. The second woman to champion the cause was Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who would become the greatest women's rights activist of the nineteenth century. Rose, Wright, and Stanton continued their campaign until April 1848 when the New York legislature passed a bill that gave wives control over inherited, but not earned, wealth. Change in the law giving wives the right to own and sell their own property, to control their own wages, and to claim rights over their children upon separation and divorce would not be won until 1860.

For nearly thirty years Ernestine Rose was a passionate campaigner on the lecture circuit, attending every National Women's Rights Convention between 1850 and 1869 and many state and local conventions as well. Known as the Queen of the Platform, she was considered the

best female orator of mid-nineteenth century America. Rose traveled to over 23 states by railroad car and stagecoach, speaking in churches, barns, and state legislatures, and addressing new immigrants in German and French. She stirred women to work tirelessly for their own emancipation. Rose's social status may have contributed to the relative lack of recognition she received from historians. She was an immigrant in a period of rising nativist sentiment, a Jew in largely Protestant reform movements, an outspoken freethinker and atheist in movements that often turned to the Bible for authority. She challenged American society to its very core – its Puritan past. Susan B. Anthony recognized Ernestine Rose as one of the foremothers of the nineteenth-century women's rights movement in the United States and kept a photograph of her on the wall of her study.

It had taken decades of defiant acts by individual women to bring the issue of women's rights to the forefront of American life. National and international events occurring in 1848 helped accelerate the process and transform the efforts of individual women into a national political movement. Shortly after the February Revolution, a group of French feminists published a daily newspaper devoted to women's interests. In the March 23, 1848 issue of *La Voix des Femmes* (The Voice of Women), they spoke up in defense of women who had been denied important roles in the anti-slavery movement when male abolitionists expelled them from the 1840 London World Anti-Slavery Convention. Among the women expelled were Quaker abolitionist Lucretia Mott (1793–1880) and Elizabeth Cady Stanton (1815–1902).

Anne Knight (1786–1862) spoke up the loudest for the abolitionist women as she promoted an international feminist discourse by sending appeals to “spread the cause” of women's rights to feminist sympathizers in Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. She pasted to her envelopes brightly colored labels with feminist messages, calling on “revolutionary feminists” in all four countries to band together to enact “the complete, radical abolition of all the privileges of sex, of race, of birth, of rank, and of fortune.” The publication in 1850 in *Godey's Lady Book* of an article titled “The Sphere of Woman: Translated from the German of Goethe,” in which the author appealed to German women to embrace rather than rebel

against their proper place in the home, indicates an awareness within the United States of feminist rumblings in Europe. This international discourse, along with visits, shared proclamations, and conventions, provided support for and confirmation of the efforts of the women who would gather at Seneca Falls, New York, in July of 1848.

Seneca Falls

The year 1848 was momentous for American women, as it was for women around the world. It was the year of revolution. Germany, Italy, France, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire experienced revolts against tyrannical governments. War, poverty, disease, and the dream of limitless opportunities brought millions of European immigrants to the United States. Between 1847 and 1857 more than 3 million immigrants arrived.

Amid all of these events, few Americans noticed a gathering of men and women meeting in Seneca Falls, New York in July 1848. The gathering had been planned four years earlier when Stanton and Mott had been refused the podium at the London International Anti-Slavery Convention. Since that first meeting, Mott had instructed Stanton in the principles of women's rights. The mother of four boys living in the small industrial town of Seneca Falls, New York, Stanton was eager for changes in her own life. “The general discontent I felt with woman's portion as wife, mother, housekeeper, physician, and spiritual guide,” she wrote, “the wearied, anxious look of the majority of women impressed me with a strong feeling that some active measures should be taken to right the wrongs of society in general, and of women in particular.” That day in July, Stanton, Mott, Mott's sister Martha Coffin Wright (1806–75), and two other local abolitionist women convened a public meeting in a local church to discuss “the social, civil and religious condition of Woman.”

A group of women gathering to discuss women's rights was not a revolutionary act. The result of that gathering was. Of the 300 women and men who attended, two-thirds endorsed a manifesto that rewrote America's most powerful symbol of liberty, the Declaration of Independence, to declare that “all men *and women* are equal.” If the Declaration of Independence had worked to free the nation from tyranny, Stanton figured, it would work to free a nation of women

from the tyranny of men. Stanton's version read, "The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world." The manifesto listed 18 specific instances of tyranny, among them that women were denied access to professions, trades, and education; their rights in marriage and motherhood were denied to them; and their self-confidence and moral equality before God were kept from them. Implicit in the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions was the final demand: women's suffrage. The Declaration of Sentiments ended with a call to activism and a promise to "employ agents, circulate tracts, petition the State and national Legislatures, and endeavor to enlist the pulpit and the press in our behalf."

News of the Seneca Falls Convention was carried by newspapers across the nation. Much of the coverage was highly critical. One editorial called it "The most shocking and unnatural incident ever recorded in the history of womanity." The women who had signed the Declaration of Sentiments were accused of "unwomanly behavior" and of neglecting "their more appropriate duties." Editorials raised the fear that equal rights for women would "demoralize and degrade" women and "prove a monstrous injury to all mankind." True ladies, a Philadelphia newspaper wrote after the convention, would be foolish to sacrifice their status as "Wives, Belles, Virgins and Mothers" for equal rights. A few of the female signers of the Declaration of Sentiments withdrew their support in light of the bad press. The support of other women who signed may have remained, but they were powerless to resist their husbands' opposition. For the women who remained actively committed, the negative press served only to galvanize their efforts to fight for women's rights.

It would take 72 years before women were granted the right to vote, but the revolutionary act of writing and signing the Declaration of Sentiments gave birth to an organized women's rights movement. Susan B. Anthony (1820–1906), a Quaker and renowned lecturer on temperance, joined the movement in 1851, adding the message of the drunkard husband who batters his wife to the list of abuses suffered by women. Anthony and Stanton formed a decades-long

friendship and collaboration for the cause of women's rights. Stone also joined, bringing with her a following of women who shared her passion for what was now being called "the emancipation of women." True to the optimism of the women gathered at Seneca Falls, women's rights conventions were held regularly from 1850 until the beginning of the Civil War.

Divergent Currents

In the years following the Seneca Falls Convention, women's rights advocates debated the next steps to achieving equality for women. Paulina Wright Davis (1813–76), who had started her career as a women's health advocate, was the chief organizer for the first National Women's Rights Convention in Worcester, Massachusetts in 1850. Wright decided that the women's rights movement needed its own journal and in 1853 published *Una*, the first feminist periodical owned, written, and edited entirely by women. Sharply critical of the reverence expressed by moral reformers for "femininity," she recognized that such a sentimental and conservative view actually denied women their basic liberties. Unable to find a co-publisher for the journal, Davis stopped publishing *Una* in 1855.

While the journal was short-lived, historians consider it an influential publication of the time for its illuminating view of the radicalism of the early women's rights movement. Davis' writings reveal the utopian nature of her beliefs. She focused on three issues that she saw as critical to the emancipation of women: labor freedoms, the right to vote, and reforms in the laws and practice of marriage. She equated the condition of Northern white married women with chattel slaves and advocated breaking through the barriers imposed by the discourse of true womanhood (the cult of domesticity) to show that white women shared a common humanity with enslaved black women. She challenged not only the legal framework of marriage but also what she saw as its sterile emotional nature for women. The "enforced inferiority" of women denied them more than just their freedom; it disallowed their self-expression.

The 72 years between the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments and the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment saw growing conservatism within the women's rights movement, as well as increasing opposition to it. Even so,

radical acts of defiance staged by individual women continued as more and more women attempted to enter the professions, African American women rose in protest of continuing mistreatment, and the number of women entering the workforce grew. The defiance of Victoria Woodhull was unequaled in the ranks of feminist radicalism of the time.

Victoria Woodhull (1838–1927) was a colorful and notorious advocate of women's rights, free love, and labor reforms. Her open rebellion against what she saw as the sexual hypocrisy of her time led to accusations by her opponents as advocating sexual immorality, prostitution, and libertinism, but she offered no apologies for her beliefs. She boldly addressed a meeting of the National Woman Suffrage Association in 1871, declaring: "We mean treason; we mean secession. . . . We are plotting revolution; we will . . . [overthrow] this bogus Republic and plant a government of righteousness in its stead." In 1872 Woodhull became the first woman to become a presidential candidate, running on the newly formed People's Party. Frederick Douglass was named as the candidate for vice president but never acknowledged the nomination. Viewed by most as little more than Woodhull's attempt at self-promotion, the ticket stirred up a great deal of controversy. Not only was Woodhull a woman but she was a white woman with a black man as her running mate.

While Woodhull impressed Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton with her pro-suffrage stance, she was responsible for a sex scandal that tarnished the entire suffrage movement. In 1872 she devoted an entire issue of her paper, *Woodhull & Claflin's Weekly*, to a rumored affair between Elizabeth Tilton and Reverend Henry Ward Beecher, a prominent Protestant figure and, unfortunately, a supporter of female suffrage. Woodhull claimed she wrote the article in order to highlight what she saw as a sexual double standard between men and women. The next day, Woodhull was arrested by federal marshals for violating the anti-obscenity Comstock Law by sending obscene material through the mail. The article that had precipitated her arrest resulted in Beecher's wife suing him for alienation of affection. The trial was sensationalized across the nation, with Woodhull cited as the source of the collapse of the Beechers' marriage. Elizabeth Cady Stanton was one of the few suffragists who defended Woodhull, who was found not guilty

six months later, but her arrest prevented her from being present during the 1872 election. She dropped out of public life and moved to England, where she remade her reputation. For years following the event, however, opponents of women's suffrage equated women's rights with free love and destruction of the family.

The greater part of the women's rights movement had become political, however, moving away from feminist outrage. This trend can be seen in the split within the women's suffrage camp. As Congress debated the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment, women's rights activists called for woman suffrage to join with black suffrage in one constitutional act of enfranchisement. Stanton, Anthony, Antoinette Brown Blackwell (1825–1921), and Stone established the American Equal Rights Association (AERA) in pursuit of this goal. Mott was elected president. The creation of this organization was a milestone in the struggle for female equality. It was the first organization formed by American women and men to fight for the right to vote.

Divisions soon emerged in the AERA. Republicans in Congress felt that pursuing women's suffrage at the same time as black suffrage would lead to the defeat of the amendment. Thus, they drafted the Fifteenth Amendment to say: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Gender was not included.

Stanton denounced the action, and the AERA collapsed over accusations that those who opposed the amendment were racists. Thinking it a politically sound move to continue to ally the struggle for woman's suffrage with the Republican agenda, Stone and her husband Henry Brown Blackwell (1825–1909) organized the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) in 1869 and took the battle for suffrage to the state level. Stanton and Anthony took a different, more radical route, breaking with their former Republican allies and forming the rival National Women's Suffrage Association (NWSA). The NWSA's newspaper, defiantly named *The Revolution*, never found consistent funding and would last only two years. By denying the interrelationship between race and gender, the NWSA lost an important part of the women's rights legacy and would be viewed as an organization for white women only.

The NWSA's response to the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments was a bold and inventive step. Called the New Departure, Stanton and Anthony argued that women were "persons" whose rights as American citizens were established in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the right to vote was central to and inherent in national citizenship. Therefore, woman's right to vote was established by both amendments and did not require additional changes to the Constitution. It was the New Departure that Victoria Woodhull argued before the Judiciary Committee of the US House of Representatives in 1871.

During the elections of 1871 and 1872 groups of women used the theory of the New Departure at polling places across the country and attempted to vote. African American journalist Mary Ann Shadd Cary (1823–93) was able to register in Washington, DC but not to vote. Anthony was more successful. She managed to cast a ballot, but was subsequently arrested and brought to trial. Her testimony, given under penalty of contempt of court, illustrates her defiant outrage and her refusal to be intimidated by male authority. Suffragist Virginia Minor (1824–94) also attempted to vote, but was turned away. She subsequently sued the official who had not allowed her to vote.

In *Minor v. Happersett*, one of the most important rulings in the history of women's rights, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that, while Minor was a citizen, voting was not a right but a privilege bestowed by the federal government on those who could be trusted to use it wisely. The *Happersett* ruling not only crushed the New Departure theory but by allowing more and more devices aimed at depriving black men of their constitutional right to vote, stripped freed people of the South from government protection for their constitutional rights. Undeterred, the NWSA mounted a campaign for a new amendment to the Constitution. As Stanton had done in the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments, NWSA activists invoked the promises of the Declaration of Independence.

The NWSA and the AWSA pursued their separate goals for 20 years. In 1887 Alice Stone Blackwell, daughter of Stone and Blackwell, launched a campaign to merge the two organizations. In 1890 the two organizations became the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). Stanton served as the first

president of the NAWSA until she retired from active involvement in 1892.

SEE ALSO: Anthony, Susan B. (1820–1906); Grimké, Angelina (1805–1879) and Sarah (1792–1873); Seneca Falls Convention; Stanton, Elizabeth Cady (1815–1902); Women's Movement, United States, 16th–18th Centuries; Women's Movement, United States, 20th Century; Woodhull, Victoria (1838–1927); World Anti-Slavery Convention, London

References and Suggested Readings

- Dubois, E. C. (2003) *Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an Independent Women's Movement in America, 1848–1869*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Flexner, E. (1974) *Century of Struggle: The Women's Rights Movement in the United States*. New York: Atheneum Books.
- Fuller, M. (1845/1971) *Woman in the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Norton.
- Goldsmith, B. (1998) *Other Powers: The Age of Suffrage, Spiritualism, and the Scandalous Victoria Woodhull*. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Griffith, E. (1984) *In Her Own Right: The Life of Elizabeth Cady Stanton*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gurko, M. (1976) *The Ladies of Seneca Falls: The Birth of the Woman's Rights Movement*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Kerber, L. (1980) *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kornfeld, E. (1997) *Margaret Fuller: A Brief Biography with Documents*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's Press.
- Sherr, L. (1995) *Failure is Impossible: Susan B. Anthony in Her Own Words*. New York: Random House.
- Silver-Isenstadt, J. (2002) *The Visionary Life of Mary Grove Nichols*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Sklar, K. K. (2000) *Women's Rights Emerges within the Antislavery Movement 1830–1870: A Brief History with Documents*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's Press.
- Stanton, E. C. (1979) *History of Women Suffrage*. Manchester, NH: Ayer Press.

Women's movement, United States, 20th century

Lucille A. Adkins

The First Wave of feminism in the nineteenth century gathered sufficient momentum in the early twentieth century as more radical expressions

of feminism emerged and culminated, in 1920, in the triumph of woman suffrage through the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. A long-term waning of women's rights efforts from the Great Depression through the end of the 1950s was reversed in the late 1960s and early 1970s by a dramatic resurgence in the struggle for women's rights in what some have termed the Second Wave of feminism. Its impact continued to be felt well into the early years of the twenty-first century.

Bridges from First to Second Wave

By 1890 a new, more modern culture was emerging in the United States. With it came a cultural shift marked by greater emphasis on individuality, the inner life, and the free development of personality. As women pushed the boundaries of the private sphere to participate more fully in wage earning, education, the professions, or community service, the concept of "true womanhood" was pushed aside in favor of the "New Woman." Author Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860–1935) was the first great spokeswoman for the New Woman.

Gilman wrote *Women and Economics* (1898), the utopian novel *Herland* (1915), and numerous short stories. Her most famous short story is "The Yellow Wallpaper" (1892), in which the protagonist, a sheltered, self-denying wife and mother, slowly goes mad. Gilman's work was a critique of the single-family household and the exclusive dedication of women to motherhood. She advocated, instead, the importance of female individuation, of each woman realizing and expressing her talents, capacities, and personality. Gilman's philosophy was deemed forward-thinking and courageous by some, but her advocacy of a communal family structure in which childrearing and household responsibilities would be shared by its male and female members drew sharp criticism.

It was Elizabeth Cady Stanton (1815–1902), however, who would write a feminist manifesto for the twentieth century. "The Solitude of Self" (1892) was Stanton's greatest expression of a life dedicated to women's freedom. In this one piece, she envisioned not just the New Woman, but also a radically different approach to the pursuit of women's emancipation, insisting on equal rights for women "because of her birthright of self-sovereignty; because, as an individual, she must rely on herself."

Stanton's final act of rebellion was an attack on patriarchal religious control. In 1895, at age 80, she published *The Woman's Bible* (1895), a feminist interpretation that provides examples of the ways in which scripture and religious teachings deny equality and degrade women. Most of her suffragist colleagues were shocked by her actions, and many found her interpretations blasphemous. However, Matilda Joselyn Gage (1826–98) shared her sentiments and served as her collaborator on this work. Gage was throughout her career one of the more radical leaders of the women's rights movement, and like Stanton focused on the role of social institutions, particularly religion, in the oppression of women. Gage also co-authored Stanton and Anthony's first three volumes of *A History of Woman Suffrage* (1881). In 1893 Gage published her most widely known work, *Woman Church and State*. She maintained that the downfall of woman-kind in the West corresponded to the rise in Christianity. Steeped in the triple doctrines of obedience to authority, woman's subordination to man, and woman's responsibility for original sin, the church, Gage said, was the primary enemy of women, "the stronghold of woman's oppression." The church was part of "the four-fold bondage of women": the state, the church, the capitalist and the home.

When Anthony effectively merged the two existing suffrage organizations, thereby bringing in the conservative Women's Christian Temperance Union forces, and formed the National American Suffrage Association in 1890, Gage left the suffrage movement and formed the anti-church group she had been considering. Composed of anarchists, prison reformers, labor leaders, and feminists, the Woman's National Liberal Union (WNLU) was viewed as one of the most radical organizations in the country, prompting the government to intercept Gage's mail. She was editor of the WNLU journal *The Liberal Thinker* until her death in 1898.

By the mid-1890s Americans were beginning to recognize that the nation's cities were centers of poverty, overcrowding, exploitative employment practices, poor sanitation, and a host of other social injustices. The period up until the end of World War I witnessed a mass mobilization of social reform efforts, known as the Progressive Era, in which women played a leading role. The steady increase of women in the labor force, the growth of college education for women,

and the spread of women's organizations in the decades following the Civil War laid the foundations for women's active involvement in the public arena during the Progressive Era.

Feminism in the Twentieth Century

The first two decades of the twentieth century saw the development of a new philosophy of modern womanhood. Advocates of this new, *avant-garde* approach to the emancipation of women distinguished themselves from the more conventional suffragists and referred to themselves as "feminists" (from the French, *féminisme*). The feminist agenda of the time was a broad one. They moved beyond political and economic rights to embrace female individuality, sexual freedom and birth control. Labor organizer Elizabeth Gurley Flynn (1890–1964) described her feminist club, *Heterodoxy*, as providing "a glimpse of women of the future, big spirited, intellectually alert, devoid of old 'femininity.'" Called *Heterodoxy* because it "demanded of a member that she should not be orthodox in her opinions," this group called the first mass meeting on feminism in February 1914. Most of the adherents of feminism were middle-class college graduates, labor organizers, professionals, artists, and immigrants clustered in urban neighborhoods, particularly New York City's Greenwich Village. While they possessed no precise definition of feminism, they were united on the power of feminism to disrupt the existing gender order. After attending her first meeting of *Heterodoxy*, Rheta Childe Door wrote: "Feminism is something with dynamite in it. It is the state of mind of women who realize that their whole position in the social order is antiquated . . . made of old materials, worn out laws, customs, conventions, fetishes, traditions and taboos."

Unlike the suffragists, feminists saw the greatest need for change in women's private lives, not their public roles. Gilman's work on collectivizing housework inspired New York City feminist Henrietta Rodman (1878–?) to organize a communal apartment house for women to realize Gilman's vision. Rodman was a flamboyant activist for women's rights, defining feminism as "the attempt of women to grow up, to accept the responsibilities of life, to outgrow those characteristics of childhood – selfishness and unworldliness – that we require our boys to

outgrow, but that we permit and by our social system encourage our girls to retain." Rodman organized the radical Feminist Alliance in 1914. Other early feminists advocated freeing women from dependence on and subordination to men, calling, instead, for women and men to live and love openly in mutual passion. A small group of feminists lived openly as lesbians in partnerships with other women.

Emma Goldman (1869–1940) was an anarchist and labor organizer who advocated an integrated philosophy of women's liberation, anti-authoritarianism, and anti-capitalism. Best known as a labor organizer, Goldman's goals were to promote equality in economic dealings, freedom of artistic expression, and equality and freedom in sexual relations. In 1905 Goldman published *Mother Earth*, her magazine promoting a revolutionary agenda. The first issue contained an article entitled "Tragedy of Women's Emancipation," which described suffrage as a distraction from the real need to change society at its roots. Their "tragedy," in her view, was their limited understanding of emancipation. The right to vote, civil rights, and access to job opportunities were "good demands," but none would lead to "true emancipation." Goldman believed that each woman had to "emancipate herself from emancipation, if she really desires to be free."

Reminiscent of Gage's conviction of personal liberty, Goldman defined emancipation as possible only when women confront the "puritanical vision" that clouds their emotional lives and allow themselves to love and be loved. This meant eliminating the "ridiculous notion that to be loved, to be sweetheart and mother, is synonymous with being a slave or subordinate." She labeled marriage "legalized prostitution" and a parasitic relationship based upon the treatment of women as property. To be truly emancipated, each woman should listen to the "voice of her nature, whether it calls for life's greatest treasure, love of a man, or her most glorious privilege, the right to give birth to a child." Vilified in the press as an exponent of free love who would destroy the American family, Goldman's militancy did add strength to women advocating radical change in gender relations.

Goldman was one of the first to speak widely on women's right to contraception, not only so they could avoid unwanted pregnancy but also so that they could enjoy sexual relationships. In 1912 Margaret Sanger (1879–1966), a nurse and

socialist, began to write and speak on women's right to birth control. Sanger knew that immigrant women suffered the most from the ban on discussions of contraception. She began by teaching reproductive and sexual information to young girls by a series of articles entitled "What Every Girl Should Know." The articles were published first in the socialist *Call* and, beginning in 1914, in her own magazine, *The Woman Rebel*.

By sending her publications through the US mail, Sanger violated the anti-obscenity Comstock Laws, enacted in the 1870s. She fled to Europe to avoid arrest, but returned in 1916 and opened the first American birth control clinic in an immigrant neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York. As she had expected, Sanger was arrested a few days after her clinic opened. In 1917 she was convicted and served 30 days in jail. She continued to promote the cause of birth control for the next 40 years, but advocated the use of physician-prescribed diaphragms. In 1921 Sanger founded the American Birth Control League, the forerunner of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. She remained active in the promotion of birth control and pioneered new methods of contraception until her death in 1966.

National Suffrage Movement

In 1913 two new provisions to the Constitution – one establishing a federal income tax and the other requiring the direct election of US senators – were moving through Congress. Suffragists saw this as an opportunity to reintroduce the franchise for women. The National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), under the new leadership of Anna Howard Shaw (1847–1919), who had replaced the equally conservative Carrie Chapman Catt (1859–1947) as president in 1906, was unwilling to pull suffrage efforts from the traditional route of mounting state campaigns. In 1913, however, two young college graduates, Alice Paul (1885–1977) and Lucy Burns (1879–1966), sought and won NAWSA permission to work on a federal amendment. More radical than NAWSA leadership, Paul and Burns had met in England after becoming members of the Women's Social and Political Union, a women's rights organization. Both were jailed for their radical protests. The feminist struggle for equality in England inspired both women and, on their return to the United States, they joined NAWSA, serving as congressional lobbyists.

In 1916 they organized a suffrage march in Washington, DC the day before Woodrow Wilson's inauguration. The parade drew thousands of spectators, including those who were to greet Wilson's arrival that day. A few weeks later, the suffrage amendment was reintroduced in the House of Representatives and was actively debated for the first time in 17 years.

Paul and Burns formed a new national women's suffrage organization, the Congressional Union, the sole purpose of which was to pressure Congress to pass the amendment. Recognizing that there was strength in the votes of women in the West who had already been enfranchised, in 1916 they changed the name of the organization to the National Woman's Party (NWP) and began publication of the newsletter *Suffragist*. Their initial strategy of mobilizing enfranchised women in the West to vote against Wilson until he backed the amendment failed. Their actions became more radical and included increased demonstrations, parades, mass meetings, picketing, and hunger strikes.

In January 1917 the NWP staged the first political protest ever to picket the White House. The picketers, known as Silent Sentinels, held banners demanding the right to vote. By the summer, they were becoming a nuisance to the government and were arrested on charges of obstructing traffic. Many, including Paul, were convicted and jailed at the Occoquan Workhouse in Virginia (later the Lorton Correctional Complex) and the District of Columbia Jail. Burns joined Paul and many other women in hunger strikes to demonstrate their commitment to their cause, claiming that they were political prisoners. Both women were force-fed and claimed to have been tortured.

Newspaper coverage of the abusive treatment suffered by the jailed women drew other women to even larger, more militant demonstrations, keeping the pressure on the Wilson administration. In January 1918 the president announced that women's suffrage was urgently needed as a war measure. Two years later, Congress ratified the Nineteenth Amendment, granting women the right to vote. After the 1920 victory, Burns retired from public life, but Paul became involved in the struggle to introduce and pass an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).

Women activists were optimistic following the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, but the lines that divided women before the passage

of the amendment – race, class, age, ideology – became more significant, and fragmentation hampered any attempt at developing a strong feminist movement. The greater part of radical women's involvement in the 1920s and 1930s was confined to labor disputes. Women actively participated in strikes, but the Great Depression forced them to focus more on issues of survival than the expansion of women's rights.

Working-Class Women and Labor Unions

Women's activism in the workforce was one of the most dramatic characteristics of the post-World War II era. Unionized women challenged layoffs, poor pay, restricted job opportunities, and other discriminatory practices. A dramatic example of female activism at this time was the actions of the women of the United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA). A Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) union, the UPWA had espoused workplace equity in the 1930s and 1940s. Post-World War II reconversion reduced opportunities and wages for women members, however, and women were laid off in large numbers regardless of their seniority rights. Union men provided no support.

Women turned to national leadership and, working through the union's anti-discrimination department, organized women's conferences, established a women's column in the union newspaper, and became a clearing house for women's grievances. African American women were among the most militant female activists in the UPWA as well as other labor unions. They faced the double challenge of being female and black and were active in fighting discriminatory practices in the workplace. Overall, UPWA women fought for better wages and conditions for women. Their ultimate goal, however, was to improve and protect jobs designated as women's work. Class, more than gender, drove their understanding of the inequalities of the workplace. Consequently, most would not challenge the gendered structure of the workplace as part of the broader women's rights movement of the 1960s.

Women working in the electrical industry were the most militant female workers in the postwar period. During World War II they pressured their CIO union, the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (UE), to address wage differentials and other forms of discrimination

against women. Once again, after the war employers replaced many women electrical workers with returning soldiers and reverted to prewar discriminatory practices against women workers. They continued to pressure the UE and by 1947 achieved non-discrimination clauses for race, sex, color, creed, and national origin in 700 local contracts.

In the midst of the communist red scare the CIO expelled the UE, known to have a strong communist presence, and established a new union, the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE). In need of members, the UE increased its efforts to address discrimination against women workers. The most significant document to emerge from the UE's deepened rhetoric of social justice was a 40-page pamphlet released in 1952, "UE Fights for Women Workers." Recent research reveals that Betty Friedan (1921–2006) authored the pamphlet. Through her summary of the plight of women working in the electrical industry, Friedan exposed the situation for working women in all areas of the workforce. With Friedan's (and the UE's) call for women to mobilize for workers' rights, lies the connection between unionized women's activism in the 1940s and 1950s and the roots of the Second Wave of the movement for women's rights in the 1960s.

Second Wave

The experience of defense work and union activism gave millions of women a new sense of confidence and willingness to challenge sexism and traditional gender roles. Yet the 1950s were a time of conformity in America, and women's rights were subsumed beneath a renewed call for domesticity. In 1963 Betty Friedan released *The Feminine Mystique*, which identified the "problem that has no name." The problem was lack of fulfillment, and Friedan supported her claim through a detailed examination of the frustrating lives of countless American women who were expected to find fulfillment primarily through the achievements of husbands and children.

She contrasted the false vision of the happy modern housewife as described in magazines and on television, what she termed the "mystique of feminine fulfillment," with a compelling vision of women suffering from the loss of "that voice within [them] that says, 'I want something more than my husband and children and my



Left to right, front row: Billie Jean King, Susan B. Anthony, Bella Abzug, Sylvia Ortiz, Peggy Kokernot, Michelle Cearcy, and Betty Friedan carry the bronze torch on the final leg of a 2,612-mile feminist relay from Seneca Falls, New York, to the 1977 Conference for Women in Houston, Texas. (© Diana Mara Henry/dianamarahenry.com)

home.” Friedan called for “self-realization,” an awakening of a woman’s personal aspirations, and urged women to leave their homes, reject the smothering constraints of domesticity, and pursue careers.

The scope of Friedan’s exploration of women’s sense of anonymity was limited. Married women were a significant presence in the workforce by the early 1960s. Moreover, her detractors accused her of neglecting issues of race, class, and ethnicity. Nonetheless, *The Feminine Mystique* was a contributing factor to renewed mobilization of women’s rights activism in the late 1960s.

The women’s rights movement that arose in the late 1960s was composed of two diverse groups of women. In 1966 educated, white, middle-class women who had reached maturity during the postwar period formed the National Organization for Women (NOW). As the first president of NOW, Friedan focused the group’s membership on three goals: the massive reconstruction of traditional gender roles, the need for women to have equal employment opportunities with men, and the right of married women to enjoy an equal partnership with their husbands in home and family care. While some NOW members adopted more radical techniques in their expressions of discontent with the restrictions of domesticity, the overall approach of the group was conservative, opting to act as a legal watchdog for women by working within the political system to bring about change.

In 1972 the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was finally passed in Congress and sent to the

states for ratification. The ERA was one line: “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.” The campaign for state ratification of the ERA can be seen as revolutionary because of the hundreds of thousands of women who became involved at the grassroots level across the nation. Marches, walk-a-thons, door-to-door canvassing, letter writing campaigns, fundraising, and events of every kind imaginable were held by women who had never before done anything political. In the end, the time required for ratification by every state expired and the ERA was defeated. Fifty years earlier, Alice Paul had referred to the women’s rights movement as a “mosaic” in which each woman “put in one little stone, and then you get a great mosaic at the end.” To Paul’s and surviving First Wave feminists’ disappointment, there was no unified movement, no “great mosaic at the end.”

Indeed, a new generation was assuming leadership in the movement. Younger women on college campuses had been active in New Left anti-war and free speech organizations and protests and were far more militant in their demand for the liberation of women. Many of these women found their efforts at leadership within the broader student movement blocked by men who claimed leadership as the province of men. Their roles were limited to preparing food and performing clerical functions. It was those women who began forming their own “women’s liberation” groups to address women’s role and status within 1960s protest movements and American society. Referred to as “liberationists” or by the pejorative term “women’s libbers,” these more radical feminists encouraged women to understand aspects of their personal lives as politicized – “the personal is political” – and reflective of a sexist society that legitimized male privilege.

Thus, while NOW and the more loosely organized radical feminist groups believed that they spoke in a universal voice for all American women, by the mid-1970s their assumptions were proven wrong. African American, Chicana, Native American, and Asian women raised concern over broader issues than their female identity. Race and class, they asserted, intersected with gender and could only be addressed in the context of what it meant to be a member of a minority group. Working-class and lesbian

women also denounced NOW and radical feminist groups for indifference to their specific issues of oppression. Groups such as New York Radical Women and Redstockings espoused feminist activism. Important feminist writing, such as Anne Koedt's "The Myth of Vaginal Orgasm" (1970) and Kate Millet's *Sexual Politics* (1970) emerged at this time. In 1968 radical feminists protested the Miss America pageant by throwing high heels and other "feminine" clothing into a "freedom garbage bag." Sit-ins publicized the radical feminist agenda. In 1970 a group staged a sit-in at the *Ladies Home Journal* offices, protesting what they saw as the glorification of domesticity propagated in the magazine. Radical feminist activism was the strongest revolutionary movement within the Second Wave of the women's rights movement from 1967 to 1975. Many of the most influential feminists of that period were part of the radical feminist movement.

Shulamith Firestone (1945–) was a central figure in the early development of radical feminism. She was a founding member of the New York Radical Women, Redstockings (named in reference to the bluestockings, women intellectuals of previous centuries, but "red" for the group's espousal of a cultural revolution), and New York Radical Feminists. In the early 1970s Redstockings were noted for their "speak outs" and "zap actions" (a combination of disruptive protest and guerrilla theater) on the issue of abortion rights. Firestone authored *The Dialectic of Sex: A Case for Feminist Revolution* in 1970. She saw the roots of women's inequality in their biology. Pregnancy, childbirth, and childrearing resulted in physical, social, and psychological disadvantages for women. She advocated the dissolution of the family and, instead, encouraged women to seize control of the means of reproduction and escape their biology. She supported human reproduction in laboratories, free access to contraception, abortion, and state support for childbearing/rearing. Reminiscent of Gilman's utopian vision, Firestone advocated communal care of children.

Andrea Dworkin (1946–2005) was best known for her work on violence against women. An anti-war activist and anarchist in the late 1960s, Dworkin published ten books on radical feminist theory and practice. During the late 1970s and the 1980s she was best known as a spokeswoman for the anti-pornography movement, and for her writing on pornography

and sexuality, particularly in *Pornography: Men Possessing Women* (1979), which categorizes pornography as an industry of woman-hating dehumanization. Dworkin spoke at the first Take Back the Night (protest against rape) March in November 1978, and joined 3,000 women in a march through the red-light district of San Francisco.

Susan Brownmiller (1935–) is best known for her pioneering work on the politics of rape in *Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape* (1975), in which she argues that rape has been defined by men rather than women. As a consequence, men use and all men benefit from the use of rape as a means of perpetuating male dominance by keeping all women in a state of fear. Brownmiller was co-founder of Women against Pornography in 1979. She continues to write and speak on feminist issues, including a memoir and history of Second Wave radical feminism, *In Our Time: Memoir of a Revolution* (1999).

As radical women had done in the nineteenth century, Mary Daly (1928–), a theologian and radical lesbian, has challenged patriarchal religion and the institution of the family for over thirty years. Her first work, *The Church and the Second Sex* (1985), drew sharp condemnation from the Roman Catholic Church. Daly's critics consider her a misandrist who practices reverse discrimination and perpetuates sexism. Her work has influenced decades of feminist work and theology and continues to make a dramatic impact. She has advocated research into parthenogenesis (the growth and development of an embryo or seed without fertilization by a male) as a means of creating a male-free paradise. Her treatise on parthenogenesis appeared in *Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy* (1992), in which she advocates "nothing less than the process of a woman creating her Self." Daly's life and writings are highly controversial. In 1998 she was dismissed from her teaching position at Boston College for refusing to admit male students to her introduction to feminist ethics class. Daly recently protested the commencement speech delivered by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at Boston College and continues to speak on campuses around the United States as well as internationally.

In 1970 Robin Morgan (1941–) edited one of the first anthologies of radical feminist writings, *Sisterhood is Powerful* (1970). A refugee from the New Left, Morgan was a founding member of New York Radical Women, helping to organize

their protest of the Miss America pageant in 1968. Later in the same year, Morgan helped to create WITCH, a radical feminist group that used public street theater (called hexes or zaps) to call attention to sexism. The alternative, she asserted, was man-hating: "I feel that 'man-hating' is an honorable and viable political act, that the oppressed have a right to class-hatred against the class that is oppressing them." In 1968 WITCH staged a hex against both House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and the Chicago Eight, arguing that men in HUAC and the Chicago Eight played off of each other to portray the anti-war movement as the pet project of a few male "stars."

By the 1990s, women's activism was primarily political. Pockets of revolutionary thought still existed and continued to influence the remnants of the Second Wave. Third Wave has emerged, but its members, for the most part, reject as no longer relevant the ideologies passed on to them by their mothers and grandmothers. Nonetheless, Second Wave activism brought about significant change for women: reproductive rights as guaranteed through *Roe v. Wade*; enrollment in military academies and service in active combat; expanded leadership roles in many religious denominations; anti-pornography legislation; sexual-harassment awareness and legislation; advances in employment laws; marital rape laws; election to public office at all levels of government; and opening of doors of male-dominated professions and trades.

SEE ALSO: Friedan, Betty (1921–2006); Goldman, Emma (1869–1940); National Organization for Women (NOW); Paul, Alice (1885–1977); Sanger, Margaret (1879–1966) and the American Birth Control Movement; Steinem, Gloria (b. 1934); Women's Movement, United States, 16th–18th Centuries; Women's Movement, United States, 19th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Baxandall, R. & Gordon, L. (Eds.) (2000) *Dear Sisters: Dispatches from the Women's Liberation Movement*. New York: Basic Books.
- Chalberg, J. (1991) *Emma Goldman: American Individualist*. New York: Longman.
- Crow, B. A. (2000) *Radical Feminism*. New York: New York University Press.
- Daly, M. (1968) *The Church and the Second Sex*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Echols, A. & Willis, E. (1990) *Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967–1975*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Evans, S. M. (1989) *Born for Liberty: A History of Women in America*. New York: Free Press.
- Freedman, E. B. (2003) *No Turning Back: The History of Feminism and the Future of Women*. London: Ballantine Books.
- Gilman, C. P. (1898) *Women and Economics: A Study of the Economic Relation Between Men and Women as a Factor in Social Evolution*. Boston: Small, Maynard.
- Gilman, C. P. & Knight, D. D. (1999) *Herland, The Yellow Wall-Paper, and Selected Writings*. New York: Penguin.
- Hill, M. A. (1980) *Charlotte Perkins Gilman: The Making of a Radical Feminist*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Kessler-Harris, A. (1992) *Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Red Stockings (1979) *Feminist Revolution*. New York: Random House.
- Sochen, J. (1972) *The New Woman: Feminism in Greenwich Village, 1910–1920*. New York: Quadrangle Books.
- Willis, E. (1992) *Radical Feminism and Feminist Radicalism. In No More Nice Girls: Countercultural Essays*. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.

Women's movement, Venezuela

Cory Fischer-Hoffman

Women have been active, not only in support roles, but as organizers and combatants in all social struggles throughout Venezuela's history. Women were leaders and participants in early indigenous resistance, slave rebellions, and independence movements. The first large slave rebellion in Venezuela's history took place in 1553, under the spiritual leadership of Princess Guimar. Guimar led enslaved men and women into battle, at the Rebellion of the Mines of Buría, which is often noted as being instigated by her husband, Negro Miguel. Around 1769 in the coastal region of Barlovento, Juana Francisca, an Afro-descendant woman enslaved by Bernardo Llanos, fled with her lover Guillermo to the Cumbé de Ocoyta. Francisca was noted as one of the most rebellious of the cimaronas. María de la Concepción was a leader in numerous slave rebellions in 1794 and 1795.

The Venezuelan indigenous resistance movements were also characterized by a large participation of women in combat. Ana Soto (1618–68) was

a leader in anti-colonial indigenous resistance movements. Soto, a Camago woman, continued resisting Spanish colonialism, even after the great Cacique Guaicaipuro had been defeated. Josefa Joaquina Sánchez died in prison after being held for eight months as a punishment for collaborating with conspirators. Leonor Guerra and Eulalia Ramos de Chamberlain (1796–1817) shouted “Long Live the Patria and Death to the Tyrants!” They were both mutilated and killed, their bodies tied to the backs of horses and sent into town as a warning to those who were conspiring against the Spanish crown. Josefa Camejo, a combatant and commander of rebel forces in Coro, authored a statement advocating for women’s inclusion and participation in the independence struggles. On May 25, 1813 Juana Ramírez, who fought in an all-female battalion called the Bateria de Mujeres during the Batalla de los Altos Godos, earned the nickname “La Advancadora” for being the first to move towards the enemy.

Even after independence, fighting for women’s rights was seen as unacceptably feminist. Even so, some women participated in labor struggles. In 1818 female launderers at the hospitals in Valencia went on strike – the first in Venezuela’s history – to demand payment for their work and wage increases. One tactic women developed was to fight for their rights as women and workers under the label of family rights, such as on May 1, International Workers Day, 1944, when the Asociación de amas de casas was formed to fight for lower food costs and lower rents.

A feminist agenda was also incorporated into the clandestine struggles against the dictatorships of 1936–45 and 1948–58. In 1935 the Agrupación Cultural Feminina was formed at the Universidad Central de Venezuela. From 1937 to 1948 the organization printed a one-page insert entitled “The Culture of Women” into the weekly newspaper *Ahora!* The Organización de la Unión Nacional de Mujeres was formed in 1946, during the *trienio* (1945–8). In 1947 women won the right to the vote. After 1948, when a military junta overthrew the democratically elected Romulo Gallegos, many women joined the clandestine struggle against the dictator Pérez Jimenez. While women participated in armed struggle against the dictatorship and pursued feminist organizing, most political parties subjugated women’s liberation to bureaux of their parties such as the Feminine Committee of the

Patriotic Junta (CFJP), as well as the feminine secretariat of Acción Democrática. Women joined and collaborated with the guerrillas of the 1960s; however, the leadership of the armed struggle remained male-dominated.

After the democratic opening of the suffrage, elite women in leadership advanced narrow goals that were often alienating to working-class women. In 1968 the First Seminar for the Evaluation of Venezuelan Women was held; however, feminist organizing was fractured across class and party lines during this period. In 1974 the first state agency for women was formed: the Comisión Feminina Asesora de la Presidencia (COFEAPRE); it was replaced by the Ministry for the Participation for Women in Development in 1978.

Large class divides plagued the movement throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The Coordinator of Women’s Non-Governmental Organizations (CONG) was formed in 1985, successfully uniting 26 women’s groups and creating a feminist agenda that was not solely limited to working within the structure of political parties. CONG played an active role in drafting the 1990 Reform of the Labor Law, which did not include provisions for domestic workers, and therefore excluded the interests of working-class women. The National Council for Women (CONAMU) formed in 1992 and strongly backed the 1993 Law of Equal Opportunity for women.

Then, in 1995, a broad alliance of social democratic, leftist, and grassroots women organized regional meetings throughout the world in preparation for an International Women’s Conference to be held in Beijing. The delegation of women from Venezuela insisted that the women representing the government and political parties must seriously incorporate the demands of the grassroots and leftist women. Other victories included the 1997 Suffrage Law, requiring that 30 percent of party candidates be women, and a 1998 law discouraging violence against women and the family.

In 1998 Hugo Chávez Frias was elected president of Venezuela and brought women’s rights into the national spotlight. The 1999 constitution is described as the non-sexist Magna Carta. It is the first in the world to place value on housework and entitle housewives to social security. Women are also the majority participants in many social “Missions.” María del Mar of the National Defender of Women’s Rights

proclaimed that under Chávez “feminism is reaching the popular sectors” (Wagner 2005).

SEE ALSO: *Caracazo*, 1989; Venezuela, Exclusionary Democracy and Resistance, 1958–1998; Venezuela, Guerilla Movements, 1960s–1980s; Venezuela, Negro Miguel Rebellion, 1552; Venezuelan War of Independence

References and Suggested Readings

- Friedman, E. (2000) *Unfinished Transitions: Women and the Gendered Development of Democracy in Venezuela, 1936–1996*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Petzoldt, F. & Bevilacqua, J. (1979) *Nosotros tambien nos jugamos la vida: testimonios de la mujer venezolana en la lucha clandestina 1948–1958*. Caracas: Editorial Ateneo de Caracas.
- Troconis de Veracochea, E. (1998) *Gobernadoras, Cimarronas, Conspiradoras y Barraganas*. Caracas: Alfadil Ediciones.
- Vargas Arenas, I. (2006) *Historia, Mujer, Mujeres: Origen y desarrollo histórico de la exclusión social en Venezuela. El caso de los colectivos femeninos*. Caracas: Ministerio para la Economía Popular.
- Wagner, S. (2005) Women and Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution. *Venezuelanalysis* (January 15). Available at www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/877 (accessed May 1, 2008).

Women's movements, Eastern Europe

Pavla Vesela

Despite differences in individual countries, the history of women's movements in Eastern Europe can be divided into three periods: the time when these movements originated and gained their first achievements in the mid-nineteenth until the early twentieth centuries; the era after World War II, when women were officially liberated by the socialist state; and finally the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, when women's movements again emerged in their original diversity.

Beginnings

The first women's organizations in Eastern Europe date from the mid-nineteenth century. Most of the countries in the region were striving for national independence (Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks from the Habsburg Monarchy; the

Poles from the Russian Empire; the Bulgarians from the Ottoman Empire) and women's movements were formed alongside the nationalist movements. In Bulgaria, for example, the first women's organizations were formed during the National Revival in the 1860s and 1870s. In Poland, around the year 1840, a group named the Enthusiasts was created by women left alone after the emigration of men defeated during the 1830–1 uprising against Russian rule. In the Czech lands, women actively participated in the National Awakening (mainly in the cultural and educational spheres, but also on the barricades during the June 1848 uprising). The major figures from this era include Bohuslava Rajská, Božena Němcová, Karolína Světlá, and later, Eliška Krásnohorská and Teréza Nováková. The first organizations in the Czechlands – the Association of Slavic Women and the Slavic Morning Star – date from the late 1840s.

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century these initial steps were followed by a number of women's associations with greater diversity of goals. In Hungary, for example, numerous groups were created, including the Hungarian Feminist Association, the National Association of Women Office Workers, the National Catholic Association for the Protection of Women, and the Association of the Home of Cultivated Women. Among the first prominent Hungarian female activists were Teréz Karacs, Johanna Bischitz, Countess Apponyi, Róza Schwimmer, and Vilma Glücklich – the first woman in Hungary to earn a degree in philosophy at the Budapest State University.

Just as in Western Europe, women's organizations in Eastern Europe were almost exclusively an urban phenomenon, consisting primarily of educated middle-class and noble women, and reflecting the values of this group. Given the great proportion of agricultural population in such countries as Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania (in Bulgaria, for example, at the end of World War II, the agricultural population was over 85 percent), the first women's movements were concerned with issues relevant to the minority of women living in those countries. Nevertheless, the achievements were relevant for the future as the region became more modernized. They included the first female organizations devoted to the rights of women, women's periodicals, the opening of higher education to women, female members of parliaments,

fewer limitations concerning women's labor, greater freedom to participate in political and cultural activities, and, above all, the right to vote. Although many goals were not met, after gaining suffrage, women's movements were generally on the decline.

State Feminism

After World War II, as the countries of Eastern Europe were gradually brought under the influence of the Soviet Union, the existing women's organizations were absorbed by the state or controlled by it. One primary women's committee was established that oversaw the official emancipation of women. Undeniably, during the era of "state feminism," much was achieved. Women began to work at paid employment in numbers unheard of in the West (in Czechoslovakia in 1989, for example, women made up 46 percent of the labor force); childcare facilities were available; maternity leaves and protective legislation enabled women to keep their jobs while being mothers. Other aspects of state women's liberation included high numbers of educated women, both at secondary and university levels, general availability of birth control and abortion, and minimal presence of prostitution and pornography. Fixed quotas for the participation of women in politics brought them in greater numbers into this traditionally male sphere – on average, there were around 30 percent of women in the parliaments (Einhorn 1993). Finally, efforts were made to emphasize women's role in culture and history, symbolized by such acts as printing the image of Clara Zetkin – an early German socialist and women's rights activist – on the 10 mark bill of the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

However, beyond the achievements of the state controlled women's emancipation, problems persisted. Women's role as mothers and homemakers was never questioned, which resulted in the double burden of public work and family. Women's access to the public sphere coincided with its devaluation as a site of hypocrisy and oppression, rather than a sphere of personal realization, so women often voluntarily remained focused on their families. Moreover, the public professions that women held – mostly in education, banking, light industry, and nursing – were also devalued and lower paid. Finally, such issues as the underground presence of

prostitution and pornography, homophobia, and violence against women were not addressed at all.

During the era of socialism women were active in various dissident movements, but they largely remained associated with the struggle for democracy, environmentalism, and peace activism rather than with women's rights. The Czech Charter 77, for example, had 18 percent female signatories and several of the most prominent – like Jiřina Šiklová – were women. Solidarity in Poland was for many years dependent on the clandestine networks run by women like Barbara Labuda, Danuta Winiarska, Helena Luczywo, and Ewa Kulik. In addition to contributing to such major dissident organizations there existed a few underground all-female organizations. One such example is the former GDR group Women for Peace, formed in opposition to the change in the Law of Conscription that called for the participation of women in the army in case of emergency. In the former Yugoslavia, where the environment remained relatively tolerant compared with other socialist countries, remnants of women's movements survived. Especially from the 1970s, female activists were increasingly vocal, which led among other things to the first all-Yugoslav feminist meeting that took place in Ljubljana in 1987.

Post-Socialism

A multitude of women's organizations emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall, although not all of them placed women's issues on their agenda. Some groups derived from the official socialist women's committees; others were successors to the dissident movements; others were indigenous grassroots organizations; and still others emerged under the influence of western activists and funding from such agencies as USAID, UNIFEM, or the Soros Foundation. These organizations differed in their character and included feminist ones (for example, the Independent Women's Association in the GDR), but also Christian women's associations with pro-life programs and groups of women mobilized in the name of their right to motherhood, such as the Prague Mothers. Most of the post-1989 organizations existed on a non-governmental level.

Currently, conditions for women in Eastern Europe do not significantly differ from two

decades ago. Women continue to participate in the public sphere, but in less-paid and “feminized” professions. At the same time, they keep their roles as homemakers and are largely responsible for childrearing. Issues such as violence against women, sexual harassment, the boom of the pornography industry, homophobia, and prostitution are still addressed insufficiently. In several countries, governments repeatedly attempt to put restrictions on abortion.

Women's organizations continue to respond to these issues, still primarily on a non-governmental level. The Network of East West Women, founded in 1990 by feminists from the United States and the former Yugoslavia, continues to connect and support women's initiatives throughout the region. Numerous local groups and organizations have survived since the boom after 1989, for example the Polish Women's Parliamentary Group, the Feminist Association, and Pro Femina; the Czech Gender Studies Center and Profem; the Slovak group *Aspekt*; the Croatian B.a.B.e. (Be Active Be Emancipated); and the Hungarian MONA. These, however, are hardly representative examples of the plethora of women's groups and organizations that continue to exist all over the region and include rape crisis counseling centers, shelters for abused women, feminist publishing houses and periodicals, women's libraries, university gender studies centers, associations of midwives, environmentalist groups, lesbian groups, groups of women with breast cancer, legal centers that monitor the law, and many others.

SEE ALSO: Hungary, Women Radicals, 1848–1849; Women in the Solidarity Movement, Polish Underground

References and Suggested Readings

- Einhorn, B. (1993) *Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender and Women's Movements in East Central Europe*. New York: Verso.
- Funk, N. & Mueller, M. (Eds.) (1993) *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*. New York: Routledge.
- Jovanovic M. & Naumovic, S. (Eds.) (2004) *Gender Relations in South Eastern Europe: Historical Perspectives on Womanhood and Manhood in 19th and 20th Century*. Belgrade: Lit.
- Penn, S. (2005) *Solidarity's Secret: The Women Who Defeated Communism in Poland*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Women's War of 1929

Lorna Lueker Zukas

The Aba Women's Riot of 1929, as it was named in British colonial records, is more aptly considered a strategically executed anti-colonial revolt organized by women to redress social, political, and economic grievances. The protest encompassed women from six ethnic groups (Ibibio, Andoni, Ogoni, Bonny, Opobo, and Igbo) of southeastern Nigeria and was named by locals *Ogu Umunwanyi* (in Igbo) or *Ekong Iban* (in Ibibio), the “women's war.” The confluence of global events in southeastern Nigeria in the late 1920s gave rise to women's dissatisfaction and ultimate action. A worldwide economic depression caused a reduction in the price of palm oil (a chief export of the Nigerian economy), rising unemployment, and increased school fees and prices for goods. The unceasing British demand for forced labor, increased taxation on the local population, corruption by local administrators, trade restrictions, and newly assessed levies and other fees on women, without corresponding benefits, gave rise to frustration and hostility among women's groups. Having no place within the colonial structure to air their grievances, they took to the roads, utilizing precolonial practices and political structures to demand a hearing before a colonial administration that ignored them.

As early as 1925 women were increasingly active in protests and in the anti-colonial struggles that erupted from various quarters. The 1925 market women's riot in Calabar province protested imposed market tolls on commonly owned land, staging anti-government propaganda dances and protest songs to contest taxes and forced labor, while spiritual movements gave women a voice to express dissatisfaction with colonial reality.

In 1928, amidst colonial promises to improve roads, schools, and court buildings and to end forced labor practices, taxes were collected for the first time among the Ibibio, Ibo, and Delta peoples of southeastern Nigeria. People paid the taxes, albeit somewhat reluctantly, assuming this was a one-time fee for the promised improvements. In 1929 when it was realized that tax collection was to be continuous and that women and their personal property were to be counted and taxed, violent protest erupted.

The first outbreaks of violence occurred at Ukam, Opobo Division, when, failing to collect expected tax revenues, the local administrator, R. K. Floyer, demanded property be reassessed. He ordered farms measured, yam heaps and domestic animals counted, and the number of doors and fireplaces in a man's house calculated. He also directed that women's cooking pots and utensils be counted along with women's belongings, including their clothing. Women considered this counting and recording of their personal belongings an egregious intrusion into their private lives.

On November 23, 1929, after months of preparations and discussion women mobilized against dehumanizing and humiliating behavior enacted upon them by colonial representatives. Women protested by blockading the road from Ikot Abasi Township to Aba. They knocked down telegraph polls and severed wires. Women leaders met with local administrators but when these talks failed, women attacked the Essene Native Court, releasing prisoners detained there. Calling upon the traditional practice of women's protest, all women in the local area participated. Before long, rumors of British taxation of women and protests against it had spread to surrounding towns and countryside.

Colonial administrators, failing to understand women's traditional practices and trade and communication networks, dismissed the first actions as crazy acts by hysterical women. In multiple provinces women set fire to Native Court buildings, some destroyed property, chanted threatening songs, and organized customary "sitting on" to embarrass African warrant chiefs who aided colonial administrations or who were corrupt. They did no physical harm to any persons. Despite police reinforcements and additional troops being called in, the Women's War could not be stopped. On December 13, 1929, a British medical officer, frightened by protesting women, ran over two women in his car and fled. This senseless act of violence angered the women, who damaged his car and chased him into the factory where he had run to hide. Women proceeded to damage local banks, post offices, and merchant stores associated with white foreigners. Within days, groups of women from 400 to 4,000 strong, wearing palm leaves, were attacking government buildings and Native Courts in Ikot Ekpene, Utu Etim Ekpo, Abak, and Opobo. More than 15,000 women in southeastern Nigeria were at war.

British reaction was merciless: soldiers shot protesting women, women were massacred through southeastern Nigeria, and entire villages were burned as collective punishment.

SEE ALSO: Nigeria, 20th-Century Protest and Revolution; Women and National Liberation in Africa

References and Suggested Readings

- Abaraonye, F. I. (1998) *The Women's War of 1929 in South-Eastern Nigeria*. In M. J. Diamond (Ed.), *Women and Revolution: Global Expressions*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press.
- Afigbo, A. E. (1972) *The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southern Nigeria 1891-1929*. London: Longman.
- Akpan, E. O. & Ekpo, V. I. (1988) *The Women's War of 1929: A Popular Uprising in South-Eastern Nigeria (Preliminary Study)*. Calabar, Nigeria: Government Printer.
- Bastian, M. L. (2002) *Vultures of the Marketplace: Southeastern Nigerian Women and Discourses of the Ogu Umanwaanyi (Women's War) of 1929*. In J. Allman, S. Geiger, & N. Musisi (Eds.), *Women in African Colonial Histories*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Hanna, J. L. (1990) *Dance, Protest, and Women's Wars: Cases from Nigeria and the United States*. In R. L. Blumberg (Ed.), *Women and Social Protest*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ifeka-Moller, C. (1975) *Female Militancy and Colonial Revolt: The Women's War of 1929, Eastern Nigeria*. In S. Ardener (Ed.), *Perceiving Women*. London: Malaby.
- Mba, N. E. (1982) *Nigerian Women Mobilized: Women's Political Activity in Southern Nigeria 1900-1965*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Nzegwu, N. (1995) *Recovering Igbo Traditions: A Case for Indigenous Women's Organizations in Development*. In M. C. Nussbaum & J. Glover (Eds.), *Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Osuji, C. (1995) *The Aba Women's Revolt of 1929: A Study in the Mass Mobilization Process in Nigeria*. In C. Dike (Ed.), *The Women's Revolt of 1929*. Proceedings of a National Symposium to mark the 60th anniversary of the women's uprising in Southeastern Nigeria. Lagos: Nelag.
- Umoren, U. E. (1995) *The Symbolism of the Nigerian Women's War of 1929: An Anthropological Study of an Anti-Colonial Struggle*. *African Study Monographs* (Kyoto), 16 (2): 16-72.
- Van Allen, J. (1976) *Aba Riots or Igbo Women's War? Ideology, Stratification and Invisibility of Women*. In N. J. Halfkin & E. G. Bay (Eds.), *Women in Africa: Studies in Social and Economic Change*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Woodhull, Victoria (1838–1927)

Amy Linch

Victoria Woodhull was a champion of women's suffrage and workers' rights in the mid-nineteenth century United States. She thought women's rights could be achieved through nothing less than a full-scale social revolution that eliminated oppressive marriage laws, legalized prostitution, and uplifted the poor and oppressed women of society. Her newspaper, *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly*, was a beacon for the incipient labor movement, with reports on workers' strikes and capitalist corruption. Editorials discussed abortion and endorsed health education for women, criticized the Franco-Prussian War for the suffering it brought upon peasants, and challenged readers to see the injustice in a system that allowed the wealthy to amass ever greater fortunes while sending poor children to jail for stealing bread. Marx and Engels' *Communist Manifesto* appeared for the first time in the United States in its pages.

Woodhull developed her remarkable oratory skills as a childhood preacher traveling around Ohio admonishing audiences to repent their sins. The daughter of a conman and itinerant peddler, she supported her family by mesmerizing crowds, first in the hellfire and brimstone spirit of religious revival and later as an accomplished spiritualist. At 15 she married an abusive alcoholic. She lived with him for five years and had two children, one of whom was mentally retarded. Her struggle to care for her children in the face of his absence and drunken tirades set the convictions she would later develop as a leader of the suffrage movement.

Victoria's remarkable life of historic firsts began when she moved to New York City at the age of 29. Her fame as a spiritual healer drew the attention of railroad tycoon Commodore Vanderbilt. With his advice and financial backing she profited enormously from financial investments. In 1870, two years after her arrival in New York City, she and her sister opened a brokerage firm, and Victoria became the first woman to hold a seat on the New York stock exchange, a full century before her successor. She used the profits gained from exploiting capitalist markets to finance *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly*,

in which she attacked capitalism and its supporting institutions, religion and politics.

In 1869 she allied with Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Lucretia Mott, the radical wing of the women's suffrage movement. Her program was far more progressive than that of the suffrage movement, embracing workers' rights and social reform that would free women from the slavery of domestic relations. Under the current marriage laws, she argued, women were slaves whether they could vote or not. She railed against the moralism and hypocrisy that relegated prostitutes to social outcasts and constructed class divisions among women despite their shared oppression by a society in which they were denied the most basic of human rights. She argued before the House Judiciary Committee that women, as US citizens, already had the right of suffrage under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution.

She was a keynote speaker in the National Women's Suffrage Association meeting the next day, as well as at subsequent conventions over the next year and a half. She gave numerous public lectures to labor and women's rights activists on the fundamental right to free love, constitutional equality, and the evils of capitalism. In a speech at Lincoln Hall in Washington, DC in February 1871 she declared that barring government recognition of women's right to vote, secession was women's only option. A year later in a speech billed as "Impending Revolution," she charged financial monopolies and minority representation with the enslavement of the working class.

In 1872, impatient with the narrow scope of the suffragists' political agenda, Woodhull split with Stanton and Anthony to form her own People's Party. She endorsed a much broader platform that included social, educational, and employment reform than that of the suffragist leaders who were single-mindedly focused on securing the right to vote. The new party, renamed the Equal Rights Party, nominated Victoria for president of the United States with Fredrick Douglass as her running mate on May 10, 1872. Douglass later declined the nomination to support Horace Greeley. She was supported by socialists, trade unionists, and many of the rank and file of the women's suffragists movement. On the night of the election, however, she and her sister were in prison in New York City charged under the Comstock Act with distributing obscene materials through the mail.

Woodhull's sensational views on free love were tolerated, but her outspoken critique of capitalism drew the ire of the New York establishment. As public reports attacked her character, she lashed back by publishing an exposé of the sexual infidelity of Henry Ward Beecher, a prominent preacher, and Luther Challis, a stockbroker, in *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly*. She was ultimately exonerated of the charges but her legal bills left her bankrupt. She moved to England in 1878 where she married a wealthy banker. She remained active in the suffrage movement and continued to work for women's advancement until her death in 1927.

SEE ALSO: Labor Revolutionary Currents, United States, 1775–1900; Stanton, Elizabeth Cady (1815–1902); Women's Movement, United States, 19th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Frisken, A. (2004) *Victoria Woodhull's Sexual Revolution: Political Theater and the Popular Press in Nineteenth-Century America*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Gabriel, M. (1998) *Notorious Victoria: The Life of Victoria Woodhull Uncensored*. Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books.
- Goldsmith, B. (1998) *Other Powers, The Age of Suffrage, Spiritualism, and the Scandalous Victoria Woodhull*. New York: Alfred Knopf.
- Harvard University Library Open Collections Program. Links to speeches available at "Women Working 1800–1930," www.ocp.hul.harvard.edu/ww/people_woodhull.html.
- Underhill, L. B. (1995) *The Woman Who Ran for President: The Many Lives of Victoria Woodhull*. Bridgehampton, NY: Bridgeworks.
- Woodhull and Claflin Weekly* Archive available at www.victoriawoodhull.com/wcarchive.htm.

Workers' self-management, Yugoslavia

Boris Kanzleiter

The proclamation of workers' self-management in June 1950 shaped Yugoslavia's "own way," independent of the Soviet Union, to socialism. In a basic law, the Yugoslav communists transferred the management of a series of state economic enterprises in key sectors like mining, transport,

agriculture, and trade into the hands of working collectives. Through a system of workers' councils, workers would manage the factories. According to the program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) from 1958, workers' self-management would create "new social relationships" without "class contradictions" and "exploitation of man by man." The new system should elevate not only the "degree of material wealth" but also the "degree of true freedom of the individual." Interpersonal and social relationships should develop a "new humanistic quality" in a "socialist democracy."

The program of building workers' self-management was a reaction to the split with the USSR and Stalinism in 1948 that had shattered the Yugoslav communists, who had liberated the country in World War II mainly through the mobilization of their own resources and rejected submission to Moscow. With workers' self-management the Yugoslav Communist Party intended finding a new ideological groundwork, considering the experiment of socialism in the USSR as "deformed." In contrast, the LCY claimed their model of workers' self-management took up the authentic roots of the socialist movement. They emphasized the tradition of "council communism" represented through the Paris Commune of 1871 and the early soviets in the October Revolution in Russia in 1917. The LCY defined the main problem in the Stalinist USSR as statism and the all-powerful role of a bureaucracy. Building socialism through workers' self-management, in contrast, should lead to a process of "withering away of the state," which Lenin and Engels had called for. Instead of bureaucratic rule, the Yugoslav communists wanted the "working people" to manage society by themselves.

Workers' self-management was the key pillar of the political and economic system in socialist Yugoslavia. The growth rates as well as the social and cultural developments that were achieved under its banner were impressive: Although the country was largely destroyed by the fierce battles of World War II, infrastructure, communication, and houses were rapidly rebuilt in the decade immediately following the end of the war. In the 1950s and 1960s, Yugoslavia was one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Between 1947 and 1964, industrial production multiplied five times. The industrial takeoff and fast urbanization process changed the then

largely rural society rapidly. During the 1960s and 1970s, the living standards of large parts of the population grew and soon reached levels comparable to those of Italy and Greece. An effective healthcare and school system was established, and illiteracy was reduced dramatically. The number of employed women grew from 322,000 in 1947 to 2.4 million in 1982. Above all, Yugoslav citizens enjoyed a degree of individual, cultural, and political freedom superior to any other socialist country in the world. Travel was not restricted; literature, music, and films from East and West were part of everyday life.

The so-called "Yugoslav miracle" popularized workers' self-management as a model promoted not only by the LCY but also by western and eastern intellectuals who sympathized with the Yugoslav independent path to socialism. The Czech communist economist Ota Šik, who was one of the chief architects of Alexander Dubček's reform program of the Prague Spring in 1968, was influenced by the Yugoslav concept of workers' self-management. But also trade unions and socialist parties in western countries discussed the Yugoslav model.

In spite of the indisputable achievements of the Yugoslav economic model, problems were manifold and the system went through periods of sharp crisis. After its proclamation, workers' self-management was constantly reformed and reshaped. Dissident voices in Yugoslavia itself, like the former partisan commander Milovan Djilas or the "Marxist humanist" intellectuals of the magazine *Praxis*, criticized the mainly declarative character of the system. In fact, the LCY never considered giving up final control over the decisions of the workers' councils and defended its monopoly of power. A real grassroots industrial democracy was proclaimed but never developed. Instead, party functionaries and managers remained in key positions of power. Bureaucracy was spreading also in Yugoslavia. In spite of the discussions about the problem of alienation, the working process remained largely unchanged.

At the level of the national economy, workers' self-management generated the problem that the relatively autonomous enterprises favored their particular interests over the general interests of integral social development. Growing wages and income were often given priority over increases in effectiveness and productivity. To overcome stagnation, an "economic reform" was

launched in 1965, calling for decentralization of decision-making and a "socialist market economy," in which the enterprises under workers' self-management should compete. Integration into the world market was favored. But the reform deepened the problem. Unemployment and social imbalances grew. The gap between rich republics in the north (e.g., Slovenia) and underdeveloped regions in the south (e.g., Kosovo) widened. Localism and nationalism grew as a consequence. Furthermore, there was some dispute as to whether industrial growth was achieved because of the system of workers' self-management or because of the large foreign credits that Yugoslavia obtained from western banks and monetary institutions. The US, it is argued, was interested in stabilizing Yugoslavia politically, though not necessarily advancing socialist goals, as a counterweight to Soviet influence in Southeast Europe during the Cold War.

For many historical analysts, the Yugoslav experiment of workers' self-management still requires critical investigation. After the nationalist war in the 1990s foreshadowing the break-up and dissolution of Yugoslavia, scholarly interest concentrated on ethnic conflict, nationalism, and European and US imperialism rather than on the socialist experiment. Although the left in Yugoslavia virtually disappeared from the political scene, public recollection of the period of workers' self-management is largely positive, even among leading western political observers such as Charles E. Lindblom, who expounds his theory of Yugoslavian worker democracy in his seminal work, *Politics and Markets*. Identification of the workforce with "their" company is often relatively high, boosting struggles against privatization. A critical evaluation of the benefits and errors of the system in Yugoslavia could be of interest for the workers' movements in other countries such as Argentina and Venezuela where experiments with workers' self-management are still on the political agenda.

SEE ALSO: Djilas, Milovan (1911–1995); Dubček, Alexander (1921–1992); Paris Commune, 1871; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Yugoslavia, Anti-Fascist "People's Liberation War" and Revolution, 1941–1945; Yugoslavia, Formation of the Non-Aligned Movement; Yugoslavia, Marxist Humanism, *Praxis* Group, and Korčula Summer School, 1964–1974; Yugoslavia, Student Protests, 1966–1974

References and Suggested Readings

- Arzenšek, V. (1985) *Struktura i pokret*. Belgrade: Centar za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju.
- Lemân, G. (1976) *Das jugoslawische Modell: Wege zur Demokratisierung*. Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlags Anstalt.
- Lindblom, C. E. (1977) *Politics and Markets: The World's Political Systems*. New York: Basic Books.
- Rusinow, D. I. (1977) *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Savez Komunista Jugoslavije (1958) *Program SKJ*. Belgrade: Komunist.
- Sekelj, L. (1993) *Yugoslavia: The Process of Desintegration*. New York: Atlantic Research and Publications.

World Anti-Slavery Convention, London

Lisa Guinn

The World Anti-Slavery Convention met in June 1840 in London. It brought together European and American abolitionist societies to discuss the issue of slavery. As its name suggests, this convention had the potential of influencing an international movement on the issue of abolition. However, what the convention is most remembered for is its influence on the rise of American women's rights. The convention is connected to women's rights because of two major events that occurred: Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, two of the most important women in the early American women's rights movement, met for the first time and came together in friendship and protest; and the "woman question" that had plagued the American abolitionist movement since the late 1830s was openly discussed on an international stage, prompting American women to equate their own secondary status with that of slaves and begin their own revolution for women's rights.

A week before the convention, seven women delegates, part of the larger American delegation from Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, arrived in London expecting to take their place as active participants in the world conference. The women were informed that while they could attend the conference, they would not be allowed to participate, and in fact were to sit behind a bar in the balcony of the convention hall as "visitors." The women were outraged at this banishment and took every opportunity to protest the situation.

According to historian Lori Ginzberg, women got more attention from the banishment than if they had participated in the convention itself (2000: 87). Since American women had been active participants in the American abolitionist movement, including speaking about the subject to mixed (male and female) audiences on a regular basis, the women delegates were shocked to be treated with such disrespect. The delegates took it upon themselves to protest the action in every possible way.

The first method of protest was a written declaration, authored by Sarah Pugh. Pugh wrote that the women delegates were disappointed to be excluded "as co-equals in the advocacy of Universal Liberty" (Tolles 1952: 28). This resulted after Lucretia Mott exerted independent protest when she refused to respond to British questions on the free produce movement, a movement largely initiated by her. At an informal meeting, members of the British delegation asked to be enlightened on the subject. When the largely male American delegation looked to Mott, she refused to address the free produce movement and instead, according to Mott, "gave some rubs on our proposed exclusion" to the cries of "hear! hear!" (Tolles 1952: 27). The most significant means of protest, however, would not materialize for eight years. At the convention, sitting in banishment, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott resolved to hold a women's rights convention when they returned to the United States to address women's subjugation and unequal treatment.

Elizabeth Cady Stanton was a newlywed when she and her husband, Henry, a member of the American delegation, arrived in London to attend the World Anti-Slavery Convention. Although not a formal member of the seven women delegates, Stanton was still appalled at the women's exclusion. In her memoirs, Stanton remembered that despite these women being "members of the National Anti-Slavery Society, accustomed to speak and vote in all its conventions, and to take an equally active part with men in the whole anti-slavery struggle," they were "rejected because they were women" (Stanton 1971: 79). Stanton further protested that the convention "would have been horrified at the idea of burning the flesh of the distinguished women present with red-hot irons, but the crucifixion of their pride and self-respect, the humiliation of the spirit, seemed to them a most trifling matter" (Stanton 1971: 82).

Lucretia Mott led the American women's delegation that arrived in London. A longtime Quaker abolitionist, Mott believed in the equality of the sexes. It seemed especially absurd to Mott that the convention omitted women from participation since women in the American abolitionist movement had played such a prominent role. She herself had presided over the National Conventions of Anti-Slavery Women in the United States from 1837 to 1839. Although Mott attended the convention, she did so in protest, a protest that continued long after the convention closed. When leaving London, Mott thanked the members of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society for their continued work on abolition but noted that they fell short of supporting "Human Freedom on the broad scale" (Tolles 1952: 58).

The banishment resulted from the long-divisive issue in the American abolitionist movement known as the "woman question" – the debate concerning whether or not to allow women leadership roles within American anti-slavery societies. In May 1839, the movement split into those who followed William Lloyd Garrison and supported strong leadership roles for women (American Anti-Slavery Society) and the "new organization" or the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, which excluded women from membership in male societies and restricted them to auxiliary status only. When the two factions headed to London for the World Convention, they took these divisions with them. The British Foreign Anti-Slavery Society sided with the "new organization," which ultimately led to the banishment of the American women delegates. Unlike the American anti-slavery movement that had integrated anti-slavery societies (Lucretia Mott, for example, belonged to both the Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society and the Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Society), British anti-slavery societies had always restricted women to auxiliary status. For the British delegates who authorized the banishment, they were doing nothing more than reinforcing English traditions. When Lucretia Mott attempted to rally her British abolitionist sisters to join her in the protest of the banishment, the British women refused. In her diary, Mott expressed her disappointment to "find so little independent action on the part of women" (Tolles 1952: 38).

It was this banishment in 1840 that led directly to the first women's rights convention in the

world, held at Seneca Falls, New York in 1848. The convention, led by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, introduced the Declaration of Sentiments that outlined the injustices against women.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Slavery Movement, Britain; Anti-Slavery Movement, United States, 1700–1870; Garrison, William Lloyd (1805–1879); Seneca Falls Convention; Stanton, Elizabeth Cady (1815–1902)

References and Suggested Readings

- Ginzberg, L. D. (2000) *Women in Antebellum Reform*. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson.
- Maynard, D. H. (1960) The World's Anti-Slavery Convention of 1840. *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 47, 3 (December): 452–71.
- Sklar, K. K. (1990) Women Who Speak for an Entire Nation: American and British Women Compared at the World Anti-Slavery Convention, London, 1840. *Pacific Historical Review* 59, 4 (November): 453–99.
- Stanton, E. C. (1898/1971) *Eighty Years and More: Reminiscences, 1815–1897*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Tolles, F. B. (Ed.) (1952) *Slavery and "The Woman Question": Lucretia Mott's Diary of Her Visit to Great Britain to Attend the World's Anti-Slavery Convention of 1840*. Haverford, PN: Friends' Historical Association.

World Social Forums

Pierre Rousset

The World Social Forum, founded in January 2001 in Porto Alegre, Brazil, was created as an open forum for groups and movements dedicated to resisting globalization. According to its charter of principles, the Social Forum is "an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and interlinking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neoliberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism, and are committed to building a society centered on the human person."

A Rare Dynamism

The World Social Forum was fueled by movements coming from all continents, especially Latin America and Southern Europe, and expanded rapidly. The year following its Brazilian launching,

the first European Social Forum was held in November 2002, in Florence, Italy. The first Asian Regional Forum met in Hyderabad, India, in January 2003. One year later, after three sessions in Porto Alegre, the World Forum was founded. By the fourth meeting, the number of participants had grown to 130,000, and a year later 155,000 people came from 135 countries to attend. This growth occurred at a time when people were predicting its decline, due partly to the move from Mumbai back to Porto Alegre.

The particular success of the fifth World Social Forum (WSF) can partly be explained by the Latin American context: the scale of neoliberal attacks coupled with the aggressive policy of “preventive” intervention and so-called wars that result are creating profound instability and new phases of politicization. Demonstrating this politicization, the debates over questions of orientation and strategy were particularly well attended at the WSF. It was apparently the first occasion for many Brazilian activists, in particular young activists, to engage in broad and disparate discussions to challenge government policies.

In 2006 the WSF was less centralized, meeting on three continents and each gathering with a unique focus. The choice of Caracas, Venezuela, represented another small revolution in Latin America: after the Brazil of Lula, the Venezuela of Chávez. In Bamako, Mali, the process of the social forum truly began to take shape in Africa, since previous African meetings had been much smaller. In Karachi, Pakistan, a world forum met for the first time in a Muslim country under military rule.

Each year local, regional, and national forums are held in many places, to varying though often noteworthy degrees of success. The process of social forums has spread and even resisted the ideological countershock of the attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as repression.

Elements of Continuity

Logically enough, the numerical scope of the social forum depends on the host country (in Europe, for example, the forum was smaller in London than in Florence or Paris). Since 2001, although by no means uniform, forums have been much more consistent and vary less in social scope. They have succeeded in situations both favorable and unfavorable for social movements; in defensive as well as offensive economic situations;

in very different cultural areas; and in countries with varied political regimes.

The WSF in Karachi in March 2006 illustrates this point well. The forum was held in a country subjected to military rule and the pressures of religious fundamentalist movements and fragmented social movements. It had to be deferred three months, and militant energies and financial resources were entirely absorbed by efforts to help the victims of the terrible earthquake that had struck Kashmir and the north of Pakistan. Despite this, and the stakes involved (meeting in one of the largest Muslim countries in the world), it made the most of what little international support it had.

The design of social forums emerged out of the characteristics of the period. Defensively, they provided a means for regrouping in the face of the universal nature of neoliberal, anti-democratic, and militarist attacks, while offensively they gave expression to an alternative embodied by new generations of activists. They provided a model for building links of solidarity and ensuring convergent approaches between various sectors of society, as well as offering much more varied fields of mobilization than in the past.

Indeed, conditions of solidarity had changed since the 1970s. In some countries the trade union movement may still play a key unifying role (for example, the KCTU in South Korea), but overall many movements lack such organizational poles of attraction or centralization. This is not to say that the “new” forms of organization eliminate or replace the “old” ones. Many so-called traditional movements like trade unions are vital components of the social forum process. However, solidarities now combine in a novel way.

This new framework, among other factors, explains the present function of the Porto Alegre standard of social forums. These forums offer an “open space” where all kinds of organization meet and exchange views in a much less hierarchical way than in the past. They offer a focus for resistance to liberal economic policies and a space where alternatives and aspirations for change can be collectively expressed. They offer a militant space too, where unity can be forged, where international campaigns can be discussed, and where a common calendar of initiatives can be elaborated. This combination of an “open space” and the capacity to prepare joint actions has proven to be extremely dynamic. The forums also provide a way of becoming involved in

politics at a time when the authority of the political left is being challenged.

Social forums embody much more complex and rich international processes than traditional conferences (of trade unions or non-governmental organizations, for example) as well as new forms of unity building. This makes them, sometimes at least, better able to deal with the issues at hand. For example, at the European Social Forum (ESF) held in Florence in November 2002, the call for the massive anti-war demonstration on February 15, 2003, was diffused even before being relayed in January at the international level during the third World Social Forum in Porto Alegre. This “amplifier” function of the social forums thus contributed to the unparalleled success of that day. Just as importantly, the ESF is helping to define common action programs at a specifically European level, something which unions have been unable to do for the last 40 years.

Evolution

The Porto Alegre forum of 2005 benefited from Mumbai’s experiment on many levels. Physically, it benefited by leaving the campus of the Catholic University, pitching its tents by the side of the lagoon, and getting closer to the local center of the city and population. It also benefited from placing the Youth Camp at the very heart of the site instead of at the far fringes, accommodating 35,000 people, especially Brazilians and Argentinians. In terms of practice, it took environmental questions fully into account in the way the site was conceived, using small producers for food supplies, using free software, and relying on the Babels network of voluntary interpreters. Organizationally, priority was given to coal-organized initiatives.

New “methodology” (to use the vocabulary of the forum) was applied. Programs were worked out after wide consultation of base organizations. Eleven “axes,” “fields,” or “areas” were defined so as to ensure the visibility of the major topics dealt with. All the movements were invited to check whether their initiatives could be regrouped in order to reinforce dialogue and collaboration (in a process known as “agglutination”). Every topic had to try to link reflection to proposals for action and campaigns to create a closer link between debates and mobilizations.

Since then, this new, complex methodology has been implemented in a number of other forums,

though it is still difficult to judge the results. Nevertheless, it seems to effectively unite networks of militants in discussing different approaches and in defining, over and above political differences, common grounds for campaigning. It has also created a new balance between the topics of debate within the forum and the Assembly of Social Movements, which in Porto Alegre remained the place where a common calendar for international action was elaborated.

Another significant change occurred at the meeting of the international council of the WSF in Parma in October 2006, when it decided to call for one day of action in 2008 instead of organizing a new World Forum following the one in Nairobi, Kenya, in January 2007. This decision brought to a close a politically very important debate on the regularity of forums. The question arose shortly after the first ESF in Florence in 2002: while forums contribute to the development of struggle, their multiplication can exhaust financial and activist resources and in fact become an obstacle to mobilization. La Via Campesina, in particular, requested that world forums no longer meet once a year.

The debate was a difficult one, especially given the disparity of resources of the organizations involved. Most institutions that have significant resources and permanent budgets can easily ensure their presence at the forums, while militant movements such as La Via Campesina face limited means and multiple responsibilities, both inside and outside the forums. Their needs must be particularly taken into account, as it is they who ensure the social and numerical success in forums and mobilizations.

Democracy and Power Centers

By their scope and diversity, social forums pose new problems of organization and democracy. There is no single model in this field. The Brazilian process is directed by a restricted committee of eight organizations representing a balance of sectors and currents. In Europe or India, on the other hand, the process is controlled by open assemblies. In France, for example, it would be impossible to choose a particular federation to represent the whole of the labor union movement, or only one committee for the unemployed, or only one network for migrants. The meetings are thus open to any organization concerned that wishes and is able to participate.

The principle of the open assembly corresponds better to the nature of the process as a whole than a closed management committee, and indeed opens up the political basis of opposition in accordance with the WSF's charter of principles, which call for "an open meeting place" for democratic debate. It is this principle that has allowed convergence between such disparate organizations and even the creation of new international movements like Babels, which brings together thousands of interpreters and professional translators who are actively committed to contributing to the events (which require an enormous effort of translation and interpreting) and also to overcoming at least partially the inequality between languages (usually regarded as "international," "national," or "local").

The question then becomes one of how to exercise democracy in this vast movement of movements. "Traditional" forms of militant democracy, tested in social struggles, presuppose a homogeneity of actors that does not exist here. Strike committees are elected in each company by the striking workers, and councils are elected by the inhabitants in each locality: these bodies can then be centralized by means of delegations elected at the regional or national level. In contrast, the process of the forums is characterized by its heterogeneity. The challenge is how to balance votes between a strong trade union federation of hundreds of thousands of members, a network of feminist organizations, an association of local ecologists, and a small international solidarity committee. It becomes a challenge to elect a delegation without giving rise to a crisis if it means choosing between competing trade unions or movements. Under such conditions, recourse to the vote is infrequent and operation by means of consensus is often the rule.

Achieving consensus requires taking the time to integrate divergent points of view as closely as possible. It does not necessarily mean unanimity: once the debate is exhausted, the minority should not seek to prevent implementation of collective decisions. Consensus seeking makes it possible to ensure that divergences do not prevent joint initiatives.

Consensus plays such an important part in the WSF process since it corresponds well to the idea of an "open meeting place for reflective thinking" which the forums encourage. Concrete measures have been taken to encourage participation in international meetings by the most financially

disadvantaged: contributions by social movements in the North reduce travel costs for those in the South, while the "migration" to other countries of the European assembly preparing the ESF facilitates the presence of organizations from the east and southeast of the continent. Of course, financial and social inequalities are far from being overcome, but a more consistent effort is being made to surmount them.

The forums face a number of challenges. In Europe, for example, the question of political parties is the focus of many debates. In accordance with the charter of principles, political parties cannot jointly organize forums with social movements, but neither can they be excluded from these open spaces. The debates especially relate to the "marked" presence of certain organizations on the political left, such as the International Socialists, the European Socialist Party, and the Socialist group in the European parliament. In South Asia, however, it is often the role of non-governmental organizations and the financing they receive that creates difficulties for many movements. The role of churches and church organizations are members of the WSF international council, the degree to which religious institutions may organize in what the charter itself describes as a "non-confessional" space is unclear. For example, can Caritas, a network of charitable organizations under the direct authority of the Vatican, have the same status as another social movement? And how can different religions be represented equally?

The composition of the WSF international council reflects its Latin and western origins, but since the Mumbai forum of 2004 in particular, Indian representation has played a much more central role. This geographic widening of the international council, however, faces much resistance and proceeds at a slow pace. In the same way, the weight of militant social movements is small compared to that of more institutional organizations, which have the means and permanent budgets to participate as often as they wish.

The international council has significant although restricted capacities: it decides the place, date, and a portion of the contents of the world event. For the remainder, it creates a framework in which all the forces concerned can act. In this sense it offers direction to the overall process of the forums. However, at the meeting in Parma, Italy, in October 2006, the

international council noted that it is actually the whole of the world forums – regional, national, and local – that nourishes the WSF. Thus, the WSF is directed by multiple centers of capacities, by the movements which, on every level, in every place, take the initiative, some using their financial power, others their capacity of mobilization. There is no “general command,” and as long as the dynamism of social resistance is expressed in and by the forums, they will be able to remain a democratic framework of expression.

Expansion and Articulation

The forum encourages a North to South solidarity that challenges regional inequalities. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami serves as a case in point. In the aftermath of the tsunami, the role of local grassroots organizations and people’s movements proved to be essential to the economic, social, and psychological rebuilding of the region, and important links were created and strengthened between social movements in the North and their counterparts in the disaster-stricken countries. Also, more traditional international campaigns have been revived, like that for the cancellation of Third World debt. At the same time, new “horizontal” solidarities are forming. Never in the past have the same neoliberal anti-democratic policies been applied by the same institutions in such a universal way: from East to West and from South to North, all peoples are faced with the same deregulations, privatizations, and opening-up of markets, with the same attacks on civil liberties. “Preventive” war and “anti-terrorist” ideology appear to be the counterparts of capitalist globalization, and this situation is encouraging a unity of resistance.

The social forums offer a framework where both standard solidarities, “traditional” and “horizontal,” can be addressed. Specific campaigns are again occupying a more important place after the big “general” mobilizations of past years against neoliberal policies: for the cancellation of Third World debt, against discrimination, and against the war in Iraq, for example. The role of the regional forums appears to be strengthening, and the World Social Forum is being decentralized, inevitably taking on a more regional content than previously. The decentralization of the movement must not lead to its disarticulation or a weakening of the capacity of collective resistance to liberal and military globalization, so new and

concrete answers will also have to be found to meet this challenge.

SEE ALSO: Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Grassroots Resistance to Corporate Globalization

References and Suggested Readings

- De Sousa Santos, B. (2006) *The Small Channel of the Total Left: The World Social Forum and Beyond*. London: Zed Books.
- Fisher, W. F. & Ponniah, T. (Eds.) (2003) *Another World is Possible: Popular Alternatives to Globalization at the World Social Forum*. London: Zed Books.
- Interdependent Europe Without Borders (ESSF) (in English and in French): www.europe-solidaire.org/.
- Leite, J. C. (2005) *The World Social Forum: Strategies of Resistance*. Chicago: Haymarket.
- Nairobi World Social Forum: www.wsf2007.org.
- Sen, J., Anand, A., Escobar, A., & Waterman, P. (Eds.) (2003) *The World Social Forum: Challenging Worsens*. New Delhi: Viveka Foundation.
- World Social Forum (multilingual): www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/.
- World Social Forum India: www.wsfindia.org/.
- United States Social Forum: www.ussf2007.org/.

World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Cancun, 2003

Mary Lou Malig and Aileen Kwa

The fifth ministerial of the World Trade Organization (WTO) took place in Cancun, Mexico, from September 10 to 14, 2003. There were both internal “protests” by government negotiators and external protests by social movements, peoples’ organizations, and activists, the combination of which contributed to the dramatic collapse of the ministerial.

This was not the first time a WTO ministerial collapsed, the first being the third ministerial in Seattle, US, in 1999, where developing country negotiators refused the demands of developed countries to move forward with a new set of negotiations while ignoring long-standing demands for an assessment of the impacts of the Uruguay Round. The collapse took place as tens of thousands of protesters blockaded the streets. The WTO, however, quickly recovered from that setback at its fourth ministerial in Doha, Qatar, in 2001, held shortly after the dramatic events in

New York on September 11. At that ministerial, the WTO produced a declaration called the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), which launched a new round of trade negotiations. There were four sets of issues that were highly controversial in the DDA: the so-called “new issues” or “Singapore issues” (see below), agriculture, cotton, and industrial products liberalization. These were to be tackled at the fifth ministerial.

As the highest decision-making body of the WTO, the ministerial has the power to seal agreements and frameworks for negotiations for years to come. It is empowered to take decisions on all issues, agreements, and proposals under the realm of the WTO. The Cancun ministerial was important because, if successful, it would include an entire set of “new issues” in the ambit of the WTO. These “new issues” or “Singapore issues” are so called because they were initially proposed at the First WTO ministerial in Singapore. They are investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation. If included, the mandate of the WTO would be expanded exponentially. The majority of developing countries were vehemently opposed to the inclusion of these issues. Simply put, it would have meant that domestic governments would not be able to regulate foreign investors. The latter would be given as favorable treatment as local companies.

Also at stake at Cancun was the issue of agriculture. The agriculture negotiations were at a stalemate because the United States and European Union (EU) had come together a month before the ministerial, suggesting a tariff-cutting formula that would imply much larger tariff cuts for developing countries than for themselves. This was owing to pressure from the EU which sought to protect its sensitive agricultural products. In addition, the US and EU were united in ensuring that only cosmetic reductions would come out of the domestic subsidies negotiations. Even before the start of the ministerial, the joint US and EU proposal on agriculture had raised the ante in the negotiations. The third major sticking issue was cotton. The West African countries Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Benin were asking for the US to eliminate its subsidies in cotton.

The Road to Cancun

As soon as Mexico’s offer to host the 2003 ministerial was accepted, preparations began in the

spheres of the global justice movement. Around the world, national coalitions, social movements, civil society organizations, and trade activists began preparations for the coming ministerial. Efforts began to coordinate with each other and pool resources for those who were planning to mobilize delegations to Cancun.

On November 15–16, 2002 in Mexico City, a broad spectrum of Mexican and international civil society organizations met to discuss their strategies and plans for the upcoming ministerial. The National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organizations (UNORCA), a network of Mexican small farmer and indigenous farming organizations, played a key role in organizing the meeting. Other key groups were La Via Campesina (an international peasants’ movement), the Hemispheric Social Alliance (a continent-wide alliance of social movements and organizations), and Our World is Not for Sale (OWINFS) (a worldwide network of social movements, organizations, and trade activists). The main outcome of that meeting was a joint call, inviting Mexican and international organizations to coordinate actions and information exchanges with the common goal of organizing protests around the WTO ministerial.

Several months later, on May 11–12, 2003, the Hemispheric Social Alliance, together with Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC), its national chapter in Mexico, organized a Hemispheric and Global Assembly against the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the WTO in Mexico City. Also attended by organizations and movements from all over the world, this meeting produced a stronger call. Entitled “Derail the Fifth Ministerial of the WTO,” the participants declared their intention and commitment to disrupting the fifth ministerial of the WTO and called on the world to join them. They also made a strong statement against the war on Iraq, linking the push for free trade to the US military aggression as part of its unilateralist foreign policy. Most importantly, the meeting called for the world “to launch massive united and coordinated demonstrations” during the week of the ministerial. The statement was widely circulated and was used as a tool for mobilizing.

In the meantime, Mexican organizations were busy preparing the ground in their country. At the May meeting, an agreement was reached to organize a common calendar of activities

under the banner of the People's Forum for Alternatives to the WTO, Cancun – 2003. Two main groups were organizing parallel forums and mobilizations on the ground. One was being organized by Bienvenido a Cancun or the Welcome to Cancun Committee, and the other by the peasants' movements led by La Via Campesina, called the International Farmers and Indigenous Peoples' Forum. Other groups were simultaneously planning their own autonomous activities.

The Derailment Strategy

"Derail the Fifth Ministerial of the WTO" became the collective battle cry of many movements and organizations around the world. Walden Bello, a prominent and long-term critic and campaigner against the WTO and corporatized globalization, best explained the derailment strategy, arguing that since the WTO makes decisions based on consensus, and in this particular case the Doha mandate calls for "explicit consensus" to be reached to approve the inclusion of the contentious "new issues," the goal should be to prevent the emergence of consensus at all costs (Bello 2003).

Doing so required a multipronged strategy. Organizers had learned from Seattle that the refusal of developing countries to agree to the demands of the developed countries combined nicely with the massive demonstrations in the streets to ensure the collapse of the ministerial. One of the components of the strategy, then, was massive national mobilizations and campaigning to pressurize governments ahead of the ministerial. The second was to work with sympathetic developing country delegations and provide technical support and analysis for them to better argue against demands from developed countries. The third component was to hold massive protests in the streets, not only in Cancun but all over the world to show a global resistance to the WTO. Thus, there was work to be done both *inside* and *outside* the Conference Center.

The Collapse of Cancun

A few days before the ministerial, Mexican police were hard at work building fences around the perimeter of the hotel zone. Cancun, with its five-star hotels lining the beach front, was beginning to look like a fortified base. Navy

ships sat in the waters only a few meters from the beach. The edge of the hotel zone, which was marked as Kilometer Zero, was where the security perimeter began. The main venue of the ministerial was the Cancun Convention Center, 9 kilometers from the security perimeter at Kilometer Zero, and the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Center was at a nearby hotel a kilometer from the Convention Center. Both were inside the hotel zone.

Besides a small number of press events and forums by accredited NGOs, most of the civil society activities were well away from the ministerial. Activists had to be innovative and creative to get their message out. Early on in the week, several activists did a media stunt on the beach, spelling out "NO WTO" with their naked bodies. Some groups held a tour for journalists called the Real Cancun Tour, introducing the media to the displaced locals on the other side of the exclusive tourist destination. Although not in the numbers of Seattle, there were several thousand protesters who traveled to Mexico from all over the world to join the mobilizations against the WTO. There were many obstacles to getting big numbers to Cancun, including the prohibitive costs of travel to, and accommodation in, the city, as well as visa restrictions.

On September 10, the day of the Farmers' March, a few thousand people, including farmers, indigenous peoples, workers, students, activists, some accredited NGOs, and anarchists, all marched from the city center to Kilometer Zero. The farmers and women were at the front of the march, but by the time they reached the fence some members of the demonstration (suspected by some of being agents provocateurs) started throwing rocks at the police who were lined up behind the fence. The police threw rocks back, injuring some of the protesters. Some people started rattling the fence and some started climbing. One Korean farmer, a member of the Korean Advanced Farmers' Federation, Lee Kyung Hae, wearing a placard around his neck that said "WTO Kills Farmers," was able to climb to the top of the fence where he stabbed himself with a Swiss army knife.

Everyone was in shock at Lee's death, including the Korean delegation of almost 200, under the umbrella name Korean People's Delegation against WTO. A number of groups, both on the scene and throughout the world, held vigils. The ministers also observed a minute of silence

for Lee. Ultimately, the magnitude of his action reminded people that for many, this was a matter of life or death.

Lee, who had distributed copies of his statement before he took his own life, had gone to Geneva on February 23, 2003, setting up a tent in front of the WTO headquarters and displaying placards which read “WTO Kills Farmers” and “Exclude Agriculture from the WTO.” In his statement, he detailed the suffering of fellow farmers witnessed at first hand, including one farmer poisoning himself because of debt. Lee linked the source of their plight to the WTO and posed the question, “For whom do you negotiate now? For the people, or for yourselves?”

Internal Revolt

Inside the ministerial, the most contentious issues in the negotiations were agriculture, the “new issues,” and cotton. On the issue of agriculture, a new grouping of developing countries was born. The G20 group of 20 developing countries, led by Brazil and India, and which also included China, Argentina, Indonesia, and the Philippines, came together to issue a common position that the US/EU proposal on agriculture was unacceptable. The US and the EU relentlessly attacked the G20 but the coalition remained firm, arguing that it represented over half the world’s population and that it would stand united in its demands. The cotton negotiations were also very heated. The director general, Supachai Panitchpakdi, who had taken on the role of chairing the negotiating group, attempted to push the US to take on board, at least partially, the proposal of the West African countries.

The battle culminated when the draft Cancun declaration was issued on the penultimate day of the ministerial. The text did not represent the views of the majority – neither on the Singapore issues, where it endorsed the launch of these new issues, nor on agriculture, where the text reflected the US and EU position. That evening, the heads of delegations meeting held to discuss the text saw delegation after delegation tearing the draft to shreds.

Pivotal to the collapse of the Cancun ministerial was the refusal by the G90 – the group of countries that included the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, the African Group, and the least developed countries (LDCs) – to accept the launch of any of the Singapore issues (Jawara & Kwa 2004).

Fences and Flowers

Outside, after several strategy meetings, the Korean delegation, La Via Campesina, other international movements and organizations, students, and local movements and groups, in a show of unity and determination, marched together to the fence at Kilometer Zero. This was on September 13, the day of the March against Corporate Globalization and Militarization. The police were again standing in line at the ready behind the fences.

The Korean delegation led the march and, with the women, began systematically taking down the fences. As each piece of fence fell, people would erupt into cheers. After the third and last fence fell, there was nothing between the police and the protesters, but instead of rushing into the police and pushing their way inside, the protesters all sat down and held up flowers, dispelling the media’s stereotype of the anti-globalization movement as violent hooligans. The police responded with restraint.

An Abrupt End

The next day, September 14, given the unbridgeable differences in the negotiations, the chair of the ministerial, Mexico’s foreign minister, Luis Ernesto Derbez, pulled the plug on the ministerial at 2.30 p.m., surprising even most of the negotiators and causing a range of reactions. The activists campaigning for the derailment of the ministerial displayed a mixture of relief and joy. Others were in more somber mood. Some of the developmental NGOs saw this as a missed opportunity for developing countries, believing that the DDA could bring development. Others still feared a rush to bilateral free trade agreements, as reinforced by the statement of US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick at his final press conference: “As the WTO members ponder the future, the US will not wait: we will move towards free trade with can-do countries.”

The ministerial in Cancun marked an important historical conjuncture, both in the history of neoliberalism and in the movement against corporate globalization. Several commentators argued that the failure to reach consensus on the basis for a new round of trade talks caused an important rupture in the neoliberal project (Wallerstein 2003). This rupture was further enhanced by the failure of the WTO’s sixth ministerial in Hong Kong in 2005 to repair the

growing divisions between developed and developing nations' delegations. On the side of the global justice movement, despite the failure to mobilize the enormous numbers that had been hoped for, important progress was made in terms of building networks amongst both Mexican and international movements, organizations, and civil society. At the same time, the conscious cooperation between grassroots social movements and trade delegations from developing countries, which led to the successful derailing of the ministerial, set in motion an ongoing discussion as to the means by which the movement against neoliberalism could most successfully act and intervene in the future.

SEE ALSO: ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens); Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Grassroots Resistance to Corporate Globalization; World Social Forums; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Doha, 2001; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Hong Kong, 2005; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Quebec City, 2001; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999

References and Suggested Readings

- Barlow, M. & Clarke, T. (2003) *Making the Links: A Peoples' Guide to the World Trade Organization and the Free Trade Area of the Americas*. Canada: Council of Canadians and Polaris Institute.
- Bello, W. (2003) *The Road to Cancun: Towards a Movement Strategy for the WTO Ministerial in Cancun. Focus on the Global South*. Available at www.focusweb.org/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=22 (posted February 26, 2003).
- Bello, W. (2005) *Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Call for Mobilization Toward the WTO Meeting in Cancun 2003*, November 15–16, 2002 Available at www.focusweb.org/call-for-mobilization-toward-the-wto-meeting-in-cancun-2003.html?Itemid=92.
- "Derail the Fifth Ministerial of the WTO" *Call of the Hemispheric and Global Assembly against the FTA and the WTO, Mexico City, May 11–12, 2003*. Available at www.asc-hsa.org/article.php3?id_article=20.
- Jawara, F. & Kwa, A. (2004) *Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of Trade Negotiations*. London: Zed Books.
- Rosset, P. (2006) *Food is Different: Why We Must Get the WTO Out of Agriculture*. Canada: Fernwood Publishing.
- Wallerstein, I. (2003) *Cancun: The Collapse of the Neo-Liberal Offensive*. Available at www.fbc.binghamton.edu/122en.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Doha, 2001

Peter Hardstaff

The 2001 World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar tends to be remembered purely for the fact that it resulted in the launch of a new round – the “Doha Round” – of trade talks. Yet Doha marked an important point in the evolution of the global justice movement and also in the ongoing tension between northern and southern governments in the WTO.

The Doha Protests and Global Civil Society

Campaigners in advance of the ministerial suspected that Doha had been specifically chosen as a location in response to major civil society protests at previous summits. Holding the conference in a country where public activism and protest were as good as forbidden was assumed to be a reaction demonstrating that those in power were on the run and showing their true anti-democratic colors.

The decision to hold the conference in Doha was widely condemned by civil society groups, but official reaction was dismissive, stating that governments are the chosen representatives of the people and that civil society groups are not a necessary part of the process. Clare Short, UK secretary of state for international development at the time, argued in a BBC interview that “governments represent the people in an open way that listens to civil society at home and having loads of NGOs [non-governmental organizations] squawking all over the place does not represent the poor of the world. The governments of developing countries do” (Wheeler 2001).

Interestingly, many NGOs were actively supporting the agendas put forth by those governments, hoping to “review, repair, and reform” the WTO, rather than launch a new round of trade talks (WDM 1999). There was also strong NGO support for developing country demands for a more transparent negotiating process.

The response to Doha from a wide coalition of civil society groups was twofold. The first involved organizing protests and events across

the world before the ministerial to demonstrate the strength of feeling on the issues. It has been estimated that hundreds of thousands of people were involved in protests or events in over 100 cities worldwide in the run-up to Doha (Indymedia 2001). The largest of these took place in Rome with an estimated turnout of 150,000, New Delhi with 75,000, and Seoul with 20,000 (Indymedia 2001). An “alternative summit” was also organized in Beirut titled the “World Forum on the WTO,” with participants from across the globe.

The second response involved modifying activism tactics to suit the restrictive political atmosphere in Qatar. Unlike several other WTO ministerials, opportunities for people to link with indigenous activist groups and organize major demonstrations away from the convention center were effectively nonexistent. The suppression of activism within Qatar itself, coupled with the difficulty of gaining entry to the country for those not officially accredited for the conference and wanting to engage in protest, limited the numbers of people able to demonstrate.

The task therefore fell to those who gained official NGO accreditation. Alongside media stunts to draw attention to the injustices of the current trade system, civil society representatives also engaged in smaller, more targeted protests within the boundaries of the convention center. For example, some 65 NGO representatives blockaded the door of a press conference being given by Robert Zoellick (US trade representative at the time), chanting slogans to highlight the secretive negotiating process (Indymedia 2001).

The fact that such stunts and protests took place within the boundaries of the convention center insulated activists to some degree from potentially extreme reactions by the Qatari authorities because it was a “neutral territory,” with the WTO secretariat having significant say over how it was policed. And the WTO certainly did not want potentially bad publicity resulting from NGO activists being thrown out or arrested.

The Doha Round and the WTO

Even so, civil society activism was in some ways little match for the high politics taking place, and a major political change occurred after the horrific events of September 11, 2001. With the Doha ministerial just two months later, the pressure increased on trade negotiators to make a deal to demonstrate that international cooperation

and the multilateral system worked. Unlike at the previous Seattle ministerial, developing country delegates were more reticent about being perceived as blocking a deal because such opposition was being simplistically linked with support for those who wanted to “attack” the international system.

Combined with this topline political pressure was a secretive negotiating process. For example, developing country proposals were omitted from negotiating texts submitted to the Doha conference; in Doha, developing countries were excluded from meetings; and the conference was extended without agreement from the full membership, meaning some delegates, who were unable to reschedule flights, missed the final stages of the meeting (Jawara & Kwa 2003). Late on November 14, running 24 hours overtime, after 48 hours of continuous negotiations and with several delegations having already caught their flights home, the remaining members of the WTO agreed to launch a comprehensive round of talks (Jawara & Kwa 2003). This outcome was immediately christened the Doha Round or the Doha Agenda. The WTO secretariat, which is supposed to be neutral, unilaterally adopted this strapline to accompany its Doha Round logo. In contrast, many civil society groups criticized the final Doha ministerial text as an anti-development outcome and a long way from the “review, repair, reform” agenda being advocated by many in the developing world.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to claim a direct link between the restriction on civil society activism in Doha and the outcome of the conference, deemed a success by the WTO and major players like the European Union and United States and a failure by many in civil society and some developing country governments. There were several complicated forces at work that influenced the Doha outcome, including the negotiating process and the political pressure created in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. However, it is fair to say that Doha provided lessons for all sides that shaped the interaction between civil society and governments at a range of summits that followed.

SEE ALSO: Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Grassroots Resistance to Corporate Globalization; Indymedia Global Justice Campaign, 2000s; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Cancun, 2003; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Hong

Kong 2005; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Quebec City, 2001; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999

References and Suggested Readings

- Indymedia (2001) *The WTO in Doha: Global Actions, Criticisms, Outcomes*. *IMC News Blast*, November 21. Available at www.archives.lists.indymedia.org/imc-news/2001-November/000235.html.
- Jawara, F. & Kwa, A. (2003) *Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International Trade Negotiations*. London: Zed Books.
- WDM (1999) *Wake Up to Seattle: Report on WTO Negotiations*. Press briefing, Saturday, December 4. London: World Development Movement.
- WDM (2006) *Missing Presumed Dead: Whatever Happened to the Development Round?* July. London: World Development Movement.
- Wheeler, J. (2001) Trying to Protest in Doha. *BBC News Online*. Sunday, 11 November. Available at www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1648930.stm.

World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Hong Kong, 2005

Mary Lou Malig

Ever since thousands of protesters successfully blockaded the opening ceremony of the third World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial in Seattle in 1999, the WTO has been both a point of focus for the movement against neoliberal globalization and an arena of contestation between trade delegates representing countries from the global South and those from the global North. The sixth WTO ministerial, which took place in Hong Kong, China, from December 13 to 18, 2005, was no exception.

The trade negotiations in Seattle had collapsed, failing to reach a basis for a new round of talks to follow the “Uruguay Round” which had called the organization into existence. Boosted in their confidence by the protests taking place outside the Convention Center, a number of delegates from the global South had refused to back down to the intransigence of several countries from the global North to their demands for reform.

The meeting which followed, in Qatar in November 2001, however, saw a number of real advances, due largely to the combination of the

post-September 11, 2001 political climate in which many states felt the need to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the United States, along with the relatively repressive atmosphere of Qatar, which considerably restricted protest. Here, the basis for the Doha Round of negotiations was secured.

However, the WTO’s fifth ministerial, in Cancun, Mexico, in 2003, met a similar fate to that of Seattle, being plagued by both fierce protests outside the conference hall (and indeed, elsewhere in the world whilst the conference was taking place) and division within. A surprising coalition of globalization activists, Mexican and international civil society organizations, and countries from the global South succeeded in “derailing” the Cancun talks. As such, many regarded the Hong Kong ministerial as the last chance for the WTO to move forward with the Doha Round. It is precisely for this reason that the ministerial became the focus of protest activity.

Background and the “July Framework”

Following the collapse of the Cancun negotiations, the United States and others followed through on their pledge to pursue bilateral trade agreements with “can-do” countries, having become frustrated with the multilateral process within the WTO. Simultaneously, pressure was applied to members of the G20, led by Brazil and India, who had played a central role in the derailment of Cancun. The presumed objective was to persuade a number of weaker actors within the group to leave, thereby reducing their overall bargaining power. However, whilst the strategy had some limited success, with countries such as Costa Rica pulling out of the G20 shortly after Cancun, the alliance remained relatively stable. A similar constellation of actors managed to considerably water down the agreements being proposed within the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations in November 2003, where again mass street protests surrounded the talks in Miami. As a result, the United States and European Union (EU) shifted their strategy toward one which sought to court the leaders of the G20.

In April 2004, a new grouping named the Five Interested Parties (FIPS) (the US, the EU, Australia, Brazil, and India) was formed in an

apparent attempt to allow the voices of leading developing countries to be heard. The primary goal was to form the basis for an agreement on the issue of agriculture which had been a major stumbling block in Cancun. There was temporary cause for optimism among many developing countries that their demands would finally be listened to. Brazil and India agreed to liaise between the other members of FIPS and the G20, as well as the G33 group of developing nations, formed out of concern with the issue of agriculture (and, in particular, the Special Products and Special Safeguard Mechanism which would allow for limited protectionism in certain cases). Simultaneously, the US and EU made efforts to court the good will of the G90, the group of least developed countries, the African Union, and the Africa Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries, urging them that the Doha Round offered the promise of development.

In large part as a result of this process, a draft framework for negotiations on issues including agriculture, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), and services was in place by July 2004. In effect, this was the framework which had failed to be agreed in Cancun. Keen to build on these developments, and in an unusual move, the trade ministers of around 40 countries (out of slightly over 140 members) were invited by the US and EU to take part in the July 27–8, 2004 meeting of the General Council (GC), the WTO's highest decision-making body. Here the GC produced the "July Framework."

The Framework focuses largely on agriculture, as well as the issue of NAMA. It was seen as partially reviving the WTO and the Doha Round, serving as a road map for further negotiations and bringing the conclusion of the Round within sight. The Hong Kong ministerial would be a critical step toward this goal. The passing of the Framework was controversial to the extent that a large number of WTO members had been excluded from the *de facto* decision-making forum, and that the voices of civil society and popular social movements had also not been given a chance to articulate their criticism in the drawing up of the Framework. Many regarded the content as biased in favor of developed countries. Rather than moving toward the elimination of agricultural subsidies, for example, the US managed to secure an agreement that would allow it to continue with its subsidies. The same NAMA text that developing countri-

es had rejected in Cancun as unfair was also adopted.

The Road to Hong Kong

Preparations for the WTO's sixth ministerial in Hong Kong began in early 2005. John Tsang, Hong Kong's secretary for commerce, industry and technology, was elected as chair of the sixth ministerial, and former EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy was appointed WTO director general, replacing Supachai Panitchpakdi. In his acceptance speech, Lamy stated that his first, second, and third priority was to complete the Doha Development Agenda Round.

On the ground in Hong Kong, members of civil society were also busy preparing for the coming ministerial, dubbed "MC6." On September 22, 2004, the Hong Kong People's Alliance on WTO (HKPA), a broad alliance of movements, trade unions, and other organizations, was formed. On February 26–7, 2005, the HKPA hosted an International Coordination Network Meeting in Hong Kong, bringing together more than 200 delegates from around 80 countries covering a wide array of social movements, networks, and organizations. The meeting formed working groups and drew up plans and an initial schedule for activities and actions during the week of the ministerial. Some of the major agreements at the meeting were that a People's Action Week would be organized, the HKPA would provide space for organizations and movements to meet, and it would coordinate protests on December 11, 13, and 18.

Despite fear of scenes of violence conjured up by the Hong Kong media, groups from across the region and beyond continued to prepare delegations to Hong Kong. Being relatively accessible from most of Asia, a large number of delegations from the region were expected, including fisherfolk, a peasants' delegation, trade unions, and others. La Via Campesina, the international peasants' movement, mobilized over a thousand farmers from all over the world. The Korean People's Delegation Against HK WTO Ministerial consisted of 1,500 delegates from a variety of organizations, including the peasants' movement and trade unions.

With around 31 million labor migrants in Asia, migrants' groups were to play a crucial role in the mobilization. Groups like the Asian Migrant Center, which was also part of the



On December 13, 2005, South Korean farmers protest the sixth World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial conference (MC6), to be held at the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Center in Wan Chai. Some 10,000 protesters formed the Hong Kong People's Alliance on WTO, which gathered in the Chinese territory to march against the WTO under heavily armed police patrol. (Getty Images)

HKPA, linked groups from Indonesia and the Philippines with the Indonesian and Filipino migrants in Hong Kong, providing a strong link between the groups on the ground and delegations coming from abroad.

Changing the Rules

In the run-up to the Hong Kong ministerial, Director General Lamy took an active role in negotiations that was unprecedented, chairing a “mini-ministerial” at the WTO headquarters. The secretariat, which had always played the role of a non-biased facilitator, became an active participant in negotiations. The process for decision-making also underwent a transformation. Whereas consensus had previously been required to *add* to a draft text, this was now only necessary to *remove* elements of the text. This raised concerns from some developing country delegates and civil society.

Yet despite the more interventionist role played by both the director general and the secretariat, negotiations nevertheless began to falter as Hong Kong drew closer. The informal meetings of the FIPS and “the new Quad” (FIPS without Australia) were argued by some to have reached an impasse. The deadline of November 15, 2005 for a draft ministerial statement was delayed until December, shortly ahead of the final GC meeting before the ministerial. The text contained many controversial elements that did not reflect the consensus of the membership.

“Kong Yee Sai Mau,” or Protest the WTO

“Kong Yee Sai Mau,” or Protest the WTO, was the common slogan of those participating in the mobilizations and activities during the People’s Week of Action in Hong Kong. As thousands began to arrive, the majority of protest participants joined the activities in Victoria Park where the People’s Week of Action and other activities were being held. The park is a common site of public protest in Hong Kong, playing host to the annual vigils commemorating the July 4, 1989 crackdown on the Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing.

On the morning of the first day of the ministerial, fisherfolk from around Southeast Asia, together with their supporters and allies from other movements and organizations, held a fluvial parade in Victoria Harbor. Two boats carrying colorful banners that called on the WTO to remove fisheries from the NAMA negotiations sailed in Victoria Harbor. In the middle of their journey, some fisherfolk jumped into the cold water to unfurl a banner stating their demands.

Later the same afternoon, 100 Korean farmers leapt into the cold harbor waters, swimming toward the Convention Center during a demonstration. Whilst fellow protesters cheered the Koreans, they were quickly gathered up by police boats.

Protests and other actions took place every day. Groups such as Our World Is Not For Sale carried out media stunts and other actions to capture delegates’ attention and transport a message within the Convention Center, while forums, teach-ins, film showings, and street art events were held on the outside. Concerts took place almost every night, including a major event named Rock Against the Round. Numerous demonstrations and marches were also held. One organized by the Korean delegation lasted several hours. It was called “Sam-bo-it-bae,” literally meaning three steps, one bow. The practice is a form of Buddhist meditation involving the seeking of truth through physical hardship and symbolizing the difficulties faced by those struggling against poverty. Local Hong Kong residents, originally intimidated by negative press coverage, began taking part in the activities in Victoria Park. Others demonstrated solidarity by distributing food and drinks to protesters.

By December 17, the penultimate day of the ministerial, tensions were running high as rumors of a deal despite the protests of developing countries began to circulate. “Green room,” or secret, meetings were said to be being held through the night in order to hammer out a deal. The December 17 march, once again, began in Victoria Park. Yet despite the route having been previously agreed, riot police blocked the demonstration on its way to the Convention Center. Led by Korean peasants and workers, the protesters broke through the police lines before scattering in different directions, creating confusion amongst the police. Protesters were able to reach the street in front of the center, where they were greeted by others holding a candlelight vigil. Korean peasants and workers, together with others, continued attempting to push their way right up to the Convention Center. Riot police, in response, used their shields and pepper spray to hold the demonstrators back. The march was only dispersed after much tear gas was deployed.

After dispersing the crowd, police prevented them from regrouping and began arresting hundreds of protesters. In total, between 900 and 1,000 arrests took place. The majority arrested were Korean. Many of those not arrested joined a vigil in front of the jail, demanding the prisoners’ release. By the end of the ministerial, all had been freed apart from 14 who remained in custody (11 from Korea, 1 from Japan, and 2 from China).

A Deal is Made

On December 18, the final day of the ministerial, a deal was agreed upon. A declaration was released by the WTO, along with detailed annexes on the issues of agriculture, NAMA, and services. The developing country formations that held their ground in Cancun had given in.

The G90 was promised the “Round for Free” and Aid for Trade. The Round for Free referred to the promise that the G90 countries would have duty-free, quota-free market access to developed countries. They were also promised aid or loans to help make their economies WTO-consistent. Upon closer inspection of the agreement, however, it was revealed that the US had only promised to remove 97 percent of their tariffs, with the remaining 3 percent covering the products that are of interest to the G90 countries

remaining in force. Meanwhile, the G20 welcomed a pledge by the EU to end agricultural export subsidies by 2013. Other subsidies, however, remained in place, as had been the case with the July Framework.

In the area of NAMA, the “Swiss formula” with coefficients for reducing industrial tariffs was agreed upon. This was a tariff reduction formula that would bring all tariffs closer together, with the highest being reduced to a lower level. In practice, this meant that developing countries, whose industrial tariffs tended to be higher, now had to cut these to the level of developed countries. Analysts were quick to point this out as a raw deal for developing countries.

Despite reaching a deal in Hong Kong, dissatisfaction with the process remained amongst many developing country delegates. They objected that the format of the final plenary made it difficult for opposition to be heard. The WTO nevertheless declared the ministerial a victory and step toward the conclusion of the Round.

Beyond the Ministerial

After the ministerial, many activists either remained in Hong Kong or returned at a later date in order to join the campaign for the release of the remaining 14 protesters. Others held rallies in front of Chinese embassies around the world in support of the detained demonstrators. By March 2006, all had been acquitted. The demonstration of solidarity, continuing long after the protests themselves were over, was interpreted by many as an important strength within the global justice movement.

The mass protests around the WTO ministerial in Hong Kong, despite failing to “derail” the negotiations as had been achieved in Cancun, nevertheless won a number of important victories. First of all, they went some considerable way to maintaining pressure on those negotiating in the Convention Center to offer the poor a better deal. Secondly, they built and strengthened the connections between actors within the global movement against neoliberalism on an international level. And finally, they created new networks on the ground in Hong Kong and throughout the region.

Despite the optimism generated by the deal struck in Hong Kong, the “consensus” formed in the Convention Center proved not to be

strong enough to fully reinvigorate the WTO after the collapse in Cancun. Meetings which immediately followed the ministerial soon reached an impasse and came once again to a halt in July 2006 at the GC meeting in Geneva. Talks were suspended for the rest of that year.

SEE ALSO: Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Grassroots Resistance to Corporate Globalization; World Social Forums; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Cancun, 2003; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Doha, 2001; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Quebec City, 2001; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999

References and Suggested Readings

- Bello, W. (2005) *Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Focus on the Global South (2005) *The Derailers' Guide to the WTO*. Available at www.focusweb.org.
- Gill, S. (2000) Towards a Postmodern Prince? The Battle in Seattle as a Moment in the New Politics of Globalization. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29 (1): 131–40.
- Wallach, L. & Woodall, P. (2004) *Whose Trade Organization? A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO*. New York: New Press.
- Wallerstein, I. (2003) *Cancun: The Collapse of the Neo-Liberal Offensive*. Available at: www.fbc.binghamton.edu/122en.htm.

World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Quebec City, 2001

William K. Carroll

Introduction

“Amid an explosion of tear gas and the zing of rubber bullets they signed a ‘democracy clause’ in Quebec City. The irony of doing so behind a four-kilometre-long perimeter fence – known as the ‘wall of shame’ – probably went over the heads of the Heads of State. . . . Again and again the more militant protesters tried to storm the fence. They breached it and tore it down on several occasions. In a week of heavy symbolism, this was a symbolic defeat for the forces of order” (Swift 2001: 20).

“We, the delegates of the Second People’s Summit of the Americas, declare our opposition to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project concocted secretly by the 34 Heads of State and government hand in hand with the American Business Forum. Who are we? We are the Hemispheric Social Alliance, the voices of the unions, popular and environmental organizations, women’s groups, human rights organizations, international solidarity groups, indigenous, peasant and student associations and church groups. We have come from every corner of the Americas to make our voices heard. We reject this project of liberalized trade and investment, deregulation and privatization. This neo-liberal project is racist and sexist and destructive of the environment. We propose to build new ways of continental integration based on democracy, human rights, equality, solidarity, pluralism and respect for the environment” (*No to the FTAA! Another America is Possible! Declaration of the Second People’s Summit of the Americas, Quebec City, April 19, 2001*).

The above excerpts portray two faces of movement politics, both of which were central to the massive protests that accompanied the third Summit of the Americas at Quebec City in April 2001. In the first account, as militants attempt to breach a three-meter tall fence that has been erected between the heads of state of the western hemisphere and the rest of humanity, they meet with a police response resembling warfare but geared down to minimize risk of fatalities. This face presents a dialectic of force and counterforce, of militant, direct-action protest and state coercion – from enclosing property to police brutality. The activist objective is to disrupt, and even undo, the project of hemispheric integration “from above” and expose the hypocrisy of elite commitments to “democracy.” The second reveals a more discursive politics that strives to supplant the dominant social vision with a resonant alternative attuned to the needs and interests of subordinate groups. These facets are instances of what Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci termed respectively “war of maneuver” and “war of position” – forms of struggle that are indispensable to radical, transformative politics. The events at the Quebec Summit provide an instructive case in the dual politics of anti-corporate globalization, demonstrating the struggle “from above” and “from below.”

Situating the Quebec Summit of the Americas

The Quebec events reveal one moment in a series of elite summits that, beginning in Seattle, November 1999, elicited dramatic and visible responses “from below.” Ever since the so-called G7 held its first summit in 1975, meetings of heads of states and their entourages have formed an important component in global governance. The G7, comprised of the leading developed capitalist countries (and now including Russia as the G8), has dealt with the major political and economic issues facing its member states and the international community as a whole, such as international trade and North–South relations (Soederberg 2006: 16). Elite summits are one aspect of the globalization of the state, as political management of a globalized capitalist economy requires increased international coordination.

The rise of global governance since the 1970s has occurred in tandem with consolidation of a neoliberal policy framework that emphasizes the virtues of deregulated markets as the preferred means of economic coordination in all fields of life. However, since contemporary capitalism concentrates economic assets and power within a relatively small group of international investors and employers, what Sklair (2001) refers to as a transnational capitalist class, the enhanced “freedom” of the market actually enables those who dominate markets to accumulate wealth to their own advantage, and often to the disadvantage of workers and communities. Viewed in this light, international agreements and policies that promote “free trade” and investors’ rights are key elements in a class project of neoliberal globalization that entails (1) the protection of the interests of capital and expansion of accumulation; (2) the tendency toward homogenization and harmonization of state policies and even state forms in the direction of protecting capital and expanding accumulation; (3) the elaboration of a layer of transnationalized institutional authority, with the aim of penetrating states and rearticulating them to global capital accumulation; and (4) the exclusion of dissident social forces from the arena of policy formation, thereby insulating the neoliberal state forms against the societies over which they preside (Amoore & Dodgson 1997). Not surprisingly, advocates of corporate business have been the most ardent advocates of

neoliberalism (Carroll & Carson 2003), while grassroots movements and organized labor have been its leading critics.

In 1994, the first Summit of the Americas brought leaders from the 34 member countries of the US-dominated Organization of American States to Miami (Cuba being the only excluded western hemisphere nation). The Miami Summit’s main achievement was the decision to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) within ten years. The model for FTAA would be the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which had taken effect earlier in the same year. A paradigmatic neoliberal arrangement, NAFTA would construct a unified economic zone including the US, Mexico, and Canada, within which corporate investors would have new rights to pursue profit without state interference.

The first Summit of the Americas provoked no visible protest, but by 1998 when formal negotiations on FTAA began at the second Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile, the anti-corporate globalization movement had started to mobilize. Indeed, although the extensive protests that Peoples’ Global Action organized at the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) ministerial conference in Geneva in May 1998 have been cited as the first contemporary anti-summit protests (Drainville 2004: 55–6), a month earlier, at Santiago, a People’s Summit convened for the first time, as a political alternative to the elite Summit of the Americas. This first People’s Summit released a critique of plans for FTAA, and resolved to form a Hemispheric Social Alliance in opposition to the neoliberal forces pressing for FTAA (Smith 2004: 222–4).

Intervening between the second Summit of the Americas and the third was the “Battle in Seattle,” a massive protest that contributed to the collapse of the WTO ministerial in December 1999, and a series of protests against neoliberal summits and institutions that followed in its wake. Major actions occurred at the IMF/World Bank meeting in Washington, DC (April 2000), the Asian Development Bank meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand (May 2000), the World Economic Forum in Melbourne (September 2000), and the IMF/World Bank meeting in Prague (September 2000) (Ayres 2004).

These successive actions began the two-pronged strategy mentioned at the beginning of this article – the one prong directed toward mass

resistance, the other toward discursive critique and the promotion of an alternative social vision. Resistance took the form of both conventional mass demonstrations, aimed at attracting media coverage, and militant direct action, aimed at disrupting the summits themselves. Envisioning was centered upon the popular summits that typically convened a day or so before the elite summit, with an agenda focused on both the critique of neoliberal globalization and the assertion of viable alternatives. Hence, by the time of the Quebec Summit, a distinctive strategic approach had been devised and used effectively in the struggle against corporate globalization.

Also by this time, anti-corporate protest had evolved into a global network, enabling supportive actions to occur contemporaneously with the protests at Quebec. Indeed, resistance to the Quebec Summit began on April 7 with a demonstration of 10,000 in Buenos Aires, following a two-week strike against the IMF. During the summit, US and Canadian demonstrators blocked border crossings at Detroit and Vancouver, Mexican and US activists demonstrated their opposition to FTAA along the 14-mile fence separating San Diego and Tijuana, and related actions occurred in Brazil and other Latin American countries (Long & Tichi 2006: 34).

Summit and Protest

The Summit of the Americas was a characteristically extravagant event, including about 9,000 delegates, staff, and corporate executives and advisors from the 34 participating countries, and about 2,500 journalists. Protesters and participants in the People's Summit numbered approximately 60,000, roughly ten times the number of police and security officials on hand. Under the theme "Resisting, Proposing, Together," the People's Summit convened on April 17, three days before the elite summit, with several thousand in attendance. Organized by the union-backed Common Frontiers and Réseau Québécois d'intégration continentale – respectively Canada's and Quebec's links to the Hemispheric Social Alliance – the People's Summit was funded largely by the governments of Canada and Quebec, and was situated in the Lower City, well away from the heads of states' summit (which was also funded by the same governments). In the popular summit, feminists, indigenous peoples, trade

unionists, ecologists, human rights activists, and others from across the Americas attended dozens of workshops, panels, and speakers' forums on the social, environmental, human rights, and cultural issues associated with the FTAA. The People's Summit blended countercultural festivities with purposeful work on issues ranging from the clear-cutting of forests, privatization of water, and Tobin tax to health care, union history, and art and activism. Forums, education sessions, and panels featuring high-profile activists and intellectuals helped drive a process of consciousness raising, while evening plenaries searched for ways to aggregate demands and reach a consensus that could be incorporated into the next draft of *Alternatives for the Americas*, the People's Hemispheric Agreement (Drainville 2004: 54, 68).

On the second day of the People's Summit, a leaked copy of the investment chapter of the proposed FTAA agreement was posted on the website of the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy. FTAA had been, to that point, negotiated in absolute secrecy. The public posting of the investment chapter broke that secrecy and created a problem for the elite summit reminiscent of the leakage of the draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, which had contributed to the collapse of those negotiations three years earlier (Egan 2001).

Comparison immediately revealed that the FTAA's draft investment chapter closely resembled the infamous Chapter 11 of NAFTA, granting extensive rights to corporations to sue interventionist governments for diminished profit opportunities resulting from new policies. This enabled People's Summit activists to expose the bad faith of the Canadian government (which had earlier pledged not to sign an FTAA that contained Chapter 11 of NAFTA) and to challenge the refusal of the elite summit to release any details on the FTAA. Thursday evening, the Common Front on the WTO held a well-attended public forum on the General Agreement on Trade in Services – a WTO initiative that would enhance investor rights in key fields such as finance, education, and health. Friday brought over a thousand people to a Teach-In on the FTAA.

By the close of the People's Summit, the assembled groups had agreed on the direction of revisions to *Alternatives for the Americas* and had called for a referendum on the FTAA in

all 34 countries of the Americas. As one leading activist put matters, the People's Summit "provided a wealth of information on every aspect of hemispheric integration and put forward powerful alternative visions to the corporate-dominated model" (Barlow 2007). By Friday, however, the direct action face of the protest was beginning to eclipse the more discursive, visionary face of the campaign as the Carnival Against Capitalism, organized by the anarchist group CLAC (Convergence de Luttes Anti-Capitaliste) got underway at the perimeter fence.

The People's Summit formally ended on Saturday, April 21, with a march of 60,000. As had happened in 1999 at Seattle, trade union moderates shepherded the vast majority of demonstrators away from the elite summit site to an officially approved site, a parking lot where they heard speeches from representatives. But perhaps a thousand broke away and went back uptown to support direct action at the fence. It was at this point that the battle escalated, as militants breached the fence and drew an extensive police response in the form of tear gas, water cannon, and rubber bullets. Under the rubric of toleration for a "diversity of tactics," CLAC had designated three color-coded zones of protest – green for non-confrontational protest, a yellow zone of peaceful direct action, and a red zone of direct action at the fence – against the police barricade. This geo-coding was quickly overtaken by "The Democracy of Tear Gas" (Friedmann 2007: 101); however, the ventilation system in the elite summit building had to be turned off to protect heads of state from being gassed.

As Mark Engler noted, much of the chaotic nature of the direct action was by design, a product of the organizing that shaped the protest. The adoption of an anything-goes "diversity of tactics," and CLAC's refusal to join with other groups who would use non-violence guidelines as means of facilitating more disciplined collective action, invited the violent police response. "Lost was the idea – so vividly instilled when activists locked themselves peacefully around the Seattle convention center – that there could be an option other than simple marching or uncontrolled mêlée, and that this, indeed, might be a most potent option" (Engler 2001: 2).

Still, if the struggle at the fence, which protesters renamed the Wall of Shame, failed

to derail the elite summit, the spectacular media coverage did draw public attention, to both the lack of democracy in the FTAA process and the presence of pitched opposition to that process. And, according to Naomi Klein (2001), the extreme police response did not demoralize or intimidate the protesters as much as it galvanized them enough to cheer for the Black Blockers who dared to throw tear gas canisters back at the riot squads. When the gas fumes had finally dissipated, police had fired 1,700 tear gas canisters and had made 392 arrests. More than 300 protesters, police, and bystanders had been injured (Dougherty 2001).

The elite summit also concluded with a show of unity around a tepid "democracy clause" that could be invoked to "conduct consultations in the event of a disruption of the democratic system of a country that participates in the summit process" (Walkom 2001). On the whole, little tangible progress appeared to have been made within the security perimeter. The heads of state renewed their resolve to achieve an FTAA by January 1, 2005, but they rejected an American proposal to fast-track negotiations into a shorter time frame. In fact, they could not even reach a consensus on the 2005 deadline, as Hugo Chávez, president of Venezuela, dissented, insisting instead that the citizenry of Venezuela assent to FTAA by referendum before Venezuela would commit in principle to joining the pact (Dougherty 2001). This defection from an elusive consensus proved to be a harbinger of problems to come with the FTAA project.

The Aftermath: Implications and Ramifications

In Ricardo Munck's view, the actions at Quebec City in April 2001 were "the most significant protests since Seattle" (2007: 67). FTAA was, after all, to be the world's biggest free trade area, and the linchpin of the regionalization of global neoliberalism – a means of neutralizing nationalist or regionalist tendencies in Latin America. Although the protests may have had little immediate impact on the formal summit outcome, they demonstrated a strong popular resolve to resist the hemispheric neoliberal agenda, and they embarrassed a political-economic elite intent on marketing "free trade" as democracy. For several South American leaders facing the dilemma between hemispheric and continental

integration, the summit and the protests accompanying it may have helped to crystallize issues and stiffen their resistance to the neoliberal Washington Consensus. Certainly, the summit was the moment when Hugo Chávez, an ardent critic of neoliberal globalization, stepped onto center stage in international politics, but even before the summit Chávez had met with the president of Brazil and worked out a tentative agreement for Venezuela to join the South American trade bloc Mercosur (Lee 2001: 114–15), strengthening a South American alternative to FTAA.

In this light, the Quebec Summit protests may be seen as part of a political process that led to a major turning point at the eighth ministerial of FTAA negotiations in Miami in 2003. By that time, it was widely recognized that NAFTA had exacerbated economic conditions in Mexico, and this increased skepticism about the value of a NAFTA-type agreement for other Latin American countries. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (elected president of Brazil in 2002) and Nestor Kirchner (elected president of Argentina in 2003) had joined Chávez as critics of neoliberal policy. Moreover, the impasse created by US refusal to reduce export subsidies and import tariffs for agriculture had only hardened. At Miami, Brazil led the South American states in forcing the US to accept a provision for varying levels of commitment to FTAA, effectively removing its neoliberal teeth (Wainwright & Ortiz 2006: 356–8). Two years later, the fourth elite Summit of the Americas, at Mar del Plata, Argentina, failed to reach the much-vaunted goal of an FTAA by 2005; in fact, the gap between Washington and Latin America was so wide that no consensus document issued from the meeting.

The defeat of FTAA was juxtaposed to the success of the third People's Summit of the Americas, held at the same time and place. With more than 12,000 Americans from across the hemisphere participating in over 150 workshops and events, covered by 600 mainstream and independent journalists, the People's Summit was a huge success. A closing assembly of over 5,000 people condemned the presence of President Bush in Latin America, the occupation of Iraq, the immoral debt foisted upon poor countries, the WTO and the FTAA, and called for a people's integration based on human needs rather than private profit. The following day, the "No Bush No FTAA" rally, attended by

a crowd of 40,000, was electrified by the presence of Argentine soccer star Diego Maradona, Cuban singer Silvio Rodríguez, Indigenous Ecuadorian leader Blanca Chancosa, Bolivian presidential candidate Evo Morales (elected to office shortly thereafter), and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez (James 2005).

However, if the Quebec Summit protests were part of a political process that led to the defeat of FTAA, they were also part of an elite learning process that led to changes in strategy. Indeed, Quebec, followed a few months later by the events of September 11, 2001, was a turning point for state management of elite summits. After Quebec, and in a climate of increased surveillance of citizenries and the criminalization of dissent, states responded to anti-summit protests with increased repression. At the EU summit in Gothenburg, Sweden (June 2001), protesters were met with live ammunition; a month later, Carlos Giuliani was murdered by police while protesting the G8 summit in Genoa. In the changing situation, the efficacy of the "summit-hopping" activist strategy came into question (Hurl 2005; cf. Grundy & Howell 2001), with implications particularly for the "war of maneuver" face of activism. In their analysis of the failure of direct action protest at the Miami FTAA ministerial of 2003 to even get within reach of the summit conference center, let alone close it down, which was the declared objective, Wainwright and Ortiz note that

in heavily policed urban spaces, a movement that defines its goals in terms of closing buildings is practically doomed to fail. The "arms race" of protest (as well as the US state's response to 9/11) has facilitated investments in police technologies, and the US state today enjoys a profound capacity for controlling urban space. Opportunities to recreate the conditions that led to the closure of the Seattle Conference Center in 1999 seem remote. (2006: 363)

After Quebec, intensified direct repression of protesters was combined with a strategy of sequestration, as elite summits met in remote locations such as Doha, Qatar (WTO ministerial, November 2001), where tight visa restrictions and fear of repression led activists, with the exception of Greenpeace, to abandon on-site protests in favor of less effective remote ones (Brooks 2004: 572).

By mid-2005, a further shift away from the high-profile, easily accessed elite summits that celebrated globalization from above in the 1990s could be discerned. With FTAA having been entombed, the three North American states opted for a low-profile, behind-the-scenes approach in working toward a Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP, known vernacularly as NAFTA II) – removing any visible trace of a target to which protest could be directed. Initiated by the three national leaders, on the basis of a planning document prepared by North American business elites, SPP aims to harmonize economic standards and border policies and to “eliminate disincentives to business, such as state-run public services, restrictions on foreign investment, industrial policies, labor standards, employment insurance, and minimum wages” (Halliwell 2007).

What is striking is the level of secrecy in this program for deep integration. In September 2006, for instance, a “North American Forum” of political and economic elites, relating to SPP, was held in Banff, Alberta. No announcement of the meeting was issued, nor was any public statement made at its conclusion; indeed, Canada’s minister of public safety, Stockwell Day, refused to comment on the meeting or even to confirm his participation, although he apparently was a keynote speaker (Barrett 2006). One senior Canadian official, when asked why the SPP had not been brought before the legislatures of the three countries, replied that the governments did not want a repeat of the “bruising NAFTA battle” (Barlow 2007). The implication is that it is both prudent and appropriate to devise and implement neoliberal policy by stealth, preempting public discussion, let alone resistant collective action.

On August 20–1, 2007 – six years and a few months after the Quebec Summit of the Americas, a summit of the three North American leaders was held behind a security fence at a remote lodge at Montebello, Quebec, in order to firm up the SPP. The summit featured a long session with the 30-member North American Competitiveness Council (composed of CEOs of leading American, Mexican, and Canadian corporations), the only group permitted to give recommendations to the national leaders. Despite SPP’s low profile, some 1,600 protesters attempted to disrupt the meeting but were relegated to state-designated “protest pens,” some distance away from the summit. The

hundreds of protesters who refused to be contained at the designated sites were met with tear gas, pepper spray, and rubber bullets when they approached the heavily fortified lodge.

Conclusion

If elite summits such as the Quebec Summit of the Americas have comprised an important component of neoliberal “globalization from above,” anti-summit protest, showing its two characteristic faces, has formed a no less important component of “globalization from below.” Since at least Seattle 1999, they have shaped each other in a strategic interaction that ultimately foregrounds two radically different conceptions of democracy. Globalization from above, via elite summits and free trade agreements, reduces democracy to a “competitive elitist” model, a procedure for competitively selecting leaders, with citizen participation confined mainly to voting every few years – as consumers in a political marketplace. A presumption in the competitive-elitist model is that policymaking elites require autonomy from the mass public so that they can exercise their professional expertise most effectively (Hackett & Carroll 2006: 70). If in this model of democracy active citizen engagement in politics is minimized, the institutions of neoliberal globalization – transnational corporations, global financial markets, the WTO, free trade agreements and the like – go further by reducing the power that governments have to influence economic and social affairs in ways that conflict with the interests of transnational corporations (Lee 2001: 112).

Not surprisingly, the anti-corporate globalization movement – the movement for globalization from below – has framed its main grievance against neoliberal globalization precisely in terms of the weakening of democracy (Ayres 2004). The secrecy of summitry, the elitism, the enclosure of political decision-making within a private space (behind a security perimeter), the use of coercion in repressing protest, the criminalization of dissent add up to a regime of global politics that articulates closely with the needs of a transnational capitalist class but is largely disconnected from majoritarian social interests (Robinson 2004). The two faces of protest, evident at Quebec in 2001 and more generally in the anti-corporate globalization movement, can be read as refusals of this technocratic authoritarianism.

One face, emblemized by direct action struggles at the fences that demarcate the elite from the people, contests the legitimacy of summits in their concrete immediacy, and attempts to block elite actions that lack popular support. The other face, that of popular summitry, promotes public, inclusive discussion, critique, and envisioning as a participatory democratic alternative to the exclusionary practices of elite summitry. Both faces contest the legitimacy of neoliberal democracy, and insist that the core of democracy resides not in the rituals of electoral representation but in the direct participation of the people in practices of self-governance.

The criminalization of dissent and strategies of sequestering summits far away from any possibility of public access virtually preclude a repeat performance of the Battle in Seattle or the Struggle at Quebec, obliging activists to devise new strategies of militant engagement on issues of globalization. Despite its success in institutionalizing popular summits, the World Social Forum, established in 2001 a few months before the Quebec Summit, continued to wrestle with the most effective ways of ensuring that forum discussions become a material force for social change by informing collective actions (Santos 2006). The future of globalization from below rests on the capacities of activists to find ways of advancing an agenda of social justice through both the direct actions of the war of maneuver and the longer, political-cultural transformation that composes a war of position.

SEE ALSO: ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens); European Union Summit Protests, Gothenburg, 2001; G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; G8 Protests, Gleneagles, 2005; G8 Protests, Heiligendamm, June 2007; Global Day of Action Against Capitalism, June 18 (J18), 1999; Global Day of Action Against the IMF and World Bank, Prague, September 26 (S26), 2000; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Grassroots Resistance to Corporate Globalization; Peoples' Global Action Network; World Social Forums; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Cancun, 2003; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Doha, 2001; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Hong Kong, 2005; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Seattle, 1999

References and Suggested Readings

Amoore, L. & Dodgson, R. (1997) Overturning "Globalization": Resisting the Teleological, Reclaiming the "Political." *New Political Economy* 2: 179–95.

- Ayres, J. (2004) Framing Collective Action Against Neoliberalism: The Case of the "Anti-Globalization" Movement. *Journal of World-Systems Research* 10 (1): 11–34.
- Barlow, M. (2007) On the Road with Maude Barlow. *Canadian Perspectives* (Summer): 4.
- Barrett, T. (2006) Secret Summit on Shared "Security." *The Tyee*, October 12. Available at www.thetyee.ca/News/2006/10/12/Forum/ (accessed August 10, 2007).
- Brooks, D. C. (2004) Fraction in Movement: The Impact of Inclusivity on the Anti-Globalization Movement. *Social Science Quarterly* 85 (3): 559–77.
- Carroll, W. K. & Carson, C. (2003) The Network of Global Corporations and Policy Groups: A Structure for Transnational Capitalist Class Formation? *Global Networks* 3 (1): 29–57.
- Dougherty, K. (2001) Accord at Summit. *Montreal Gazette*, April 23: A1.
- Drainville, A. C. (2004) *Contesting Globalization: Space and Place in the World Economy*. New York: Routledge.
- Egan, D. (2001) The Limits of Internationalization: A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. *Critical Sociology* 27 (3): 74–97.
- Engler, M. (2001) Fortress Quebec: A Return to Tear Gas and Violence. Available at www.alternet.org/story/10759 (accessed August 8, 2007).
- Friedmann, H. (2007) The World Social Forum at Porto Alegre and the People's Summit at Quebec City: A View from the Ground. *Studies in Political Economy* 66: 85–105.
- Grundy, J. & Howell, A. (2001) Negotiating the Culture of Resistance: A Critical Assessment of Protest Politics. *Studies in Political Economy* 66: 121–32.
- Hackett, R. A. & Carroll, W. K. (2006) *Remaking Media: The Struggle to Democratize Public Communication*. London: Routledge.
- Halliwell, E. (2007) Deconstructing the Security and Prosperity Partnership. Available at www.gnn.tv/articles/3160/NAFTA_on_Steroids_Deepening_the_trade_bloc (accessed August 20, 2007).
- Hurl, C. (2005) Diversity of Tactics: Coalescing as New Combinations. Master's thesis, University of Victoria, Victoria, Canada.
- James, D. (2005) Summit of the Americas, Argentina: Tomb of the FTAA. Available at www.commondreams.org/views05/1123-22.htm (accessed August 10, 2007).
- Klein, N. (2001) The Bonding Properties of Tear Gas. *Toronto Globe and Mail*, April 25: A15.
- Lee, M. (2001) The FTAA after Quebec: What Happened? What's Next? *Studies in Political Economy* 66: 107–19.
- Long, A. S. & Tichi, C. (2006) A Short World History of "Seattle." In A. S. Long & C. Tichi (Eds.),

- What Democracy Looks Like: A New Critical Realism for a Post-Seattle World.* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, pp. 25–40.
- Munck, R. (2007) *Globalization and Contestation: The New Great Counter-Movement.* New York: Routledge.
- Robinson, W. (2004) *A Theory of Global Capitalism.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Santos, B. de Sousa (2006) *The Rise of the Global Left.* London: Zed Books.
- Sklair, L. (2001) *The Transnational Capitalist Class.* Oxford: Blackwell.
- Smith, E. T. (2004) From Miami to Quebec and Beyond: Opposition to the Free Trade Area of the Americas. *Peace and Change* 29 (2): 221–49.
- Soederberg, S. (2006) *Global Governance in Question.* Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring.
- Swift, R. (2001) The Enclosed Summit. *New Internationalist* 338 (September): 20.
- Wainwright, J. & Ortiz, R. (2006) The Battles in Miami: The Fall of the FTAA/ALCA and the Promise of Transnational Movements. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 24: 349–66.
- Walkom, T. (2001) Just What's in this Trade Deal? *Toronto Star*, April 24: A21.

World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Seattle, 1999

Jennifer Whitney

The protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle, Washington, from November 29 to December 4, 1999, are often referred to as the global justice movement's "coming out party." Over 75,000 people took to the streets, 10,000 of them taking direct action which shut down the summit's opening ceremonies. Protesters converged from over 700 different organizations to participate in marches, teach-ins, and direct actions that occupied both the city's streets and the worldwide web for over a week, forever changing the national and international debate on the WTO, which, until that time, operated largely unnoticed by people in the global North.

Internationally, November 30 (N30) was called as a global day of action by the Peoples' Global Action (PGA) Network – an international coalition, predominantly from the global South, committed to direct action against economic globalization. Discussions about this began

during PGA's Intercontinental Caravan in July of 1999, in which 500 people from all continents traveled across Europe to protest globalization's impacts on peasant farmers in the global South. A month later, it issued a formal call to action. Actions in solidarity with those in Seattle took place in over a hundred cities worldwide.

Context

The WTO ministerial in Seattle was tasked with launching a new "Millennium Round" of trade negotiations, which would vastly expand intellectual property rights such as the patenting of plant and seed varieties, software, genetic material, and drugs; furthering the Agreements on Agriculture, which guarantee market access, domestic subsidies, and export competition for large commercial farming; and inserting new accords similar to those attempted through the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), which had been thwarted by global campaigning the previous year. The MAI would have removed health, environmental, and social regulations as "barriers to trade," as well as opening up public services like health care and education to the free market.

The summit's location in Seattle was rather fortuitous for the emergent counterglobalization movement. One of the most unionized cities in the United States, it had a fairly liberal city and county government, both of which voted unanimously to declare the city an "MAI-Free Zone." However, the high pressure that the WTO reach a new agreement, combined with the generally low awareness and understanding of trade and other economic issues in the United States, meant that activist groups had to present hundreds of educational events to help people enjoying a booming economy understand the threats inherent to an expansion of economic globalization in concrete terms that would capture their imagination.

Protest Methodology and Organization of the Seattle Protests

The success of the Seattle protests was largely due to the efforts of the Direct Action Network Against Corporate Globalization (DAN), a loose coalition of grassroots groups, which convened, trained, and helped coordinate individuals and affinity groups – usually around a dozen people



Thousands of anti-World Trade Organization (WTO) protesters march in downtown Seattle, Washington, the site of the WTO ministerial conference in 1999. During the conference, from November 30 to December 3, nearly 50,000 protesters congregated in one of the largest anti-globalization movements in the US. (AFP/Getty Images)

who take actions together – committed to literally shutting down the WTO's opening ceremonies through large-scale creative direct action. The participants in DAN covered a broad spectrum of politics, ranging from street theater and arts groups to radical ecology organizations, independent trade unions, student groups, and a few non-governmental organizations which supported with training, outreach, and material resources.

The goal was to generate mass disruption through an organizing methodology that operated in stark contrast to the way the WTO functions: widespread, directly democratic participation; recognition of the creative and the cultural as essential components of society; and autonomous planning with a loose coordinating body. It was widely believed that no amount of policy reform or legislation was going to stop, or even slow down, the machinations of the WTO, so the intent was to stop it physically, with human bodies.

One tactic DAN used to bring together a broad coalition and facilitate mass participation was to set guidelines for the action. These were not intended to judge tactics or impose an overall philosophy on how change happens, but to widen a space of possibility, to create a basis for trust, and to emphasize the asymmetrical nature of the struggle. The guidelines were: use no violence – physical or verbal – toward any person; carry no weapons; neither bring nor use any alcohol or illegal drugs; and destroy no property.

There were also relationships built with the municipal Labor Council and with the local

AFL/CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) leadership. Strong links were also forged between DAN organizers and rank-and-file members of the International Longshore Workers' Union (ILWU) and the United Steelworkers of America, the latter of which was in the midst of a year-long lock-out. The investment that DAN made over several months in supporting their struggle had powerful results, leading a large contingent of union members to participate in the DAN marches and direct actions. There were also several other groups working in parallel, including liberal consumer advocacy groups, student organizations, cross-border labor groups, and a radical grassroots Filipino-led organization.

Concomitant to the action organizing was the birth of the Independent Media Center (IMC) network – a grassroots media project that facilitates primarily Internet-based reporting by independent journalists. The first Indymedia website was launched on November 24 and received over a million and a half hits in its first week. Over 450 independent media makers registered at the IMC headquarters, located in the city center, and in addition to filing regular updates to the website produced a daily newsletter, numerous audio reports, and a nightly television program during the week of the protests.

Both the Indymedia network and the N30 organizing took inspiration from international protests, social movements, and analysis, drawing deeply from the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, Mexico in particular, as well as adhering to the PGA principles (of direct action, non-violent confrontation, rejection of the WTO, and prioritization of local alternatives) from early on. Another major influence was the anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s, which used affinity group-based actions and a formal decision-making process that aimed to achieve large-group consensus. Throughout DAN's organizing ran strong threads of anarchist methodology: decentralization, direct action, consensus decision-making, and affinity groups can all be traced to organizing structures used by the anarchists fighting for the Republic during the Spanish Civil War.

Networking and Popular Education

While organizers in Seattle held weekly public meetings to plan the actions and the convergence,

using regional meetings and conference calls with spokespersons from around the country to give updates and offer and request resources, others took the cause on the road. A PGA caravan spent a month traveling to Seattle with people from 12 countries telling stories of how globalization was ravaging their homelands, and a three-week road show by Art and Revolution and other DAN participants toured the western US and Canada, carrying out educational street theater and teach-ins about the WTO. Additionally, in mid-September the California-based Ruckus Society hosted an action training camp, in which 160 people participated in workshops ranging from political theater to blockade tactics to non-violent direct action theory, history, and practice.

Huge waves of people arrived in the final week before the shutdown, taking advantage of a four-day holiday weekend. They got to work transforming the city with posters and stickers announcing the action, as well as disseminating information about free trade's impact on issues ranging from the prison industrial complex to food safety to labor conditions.

The Protests

About a week before the ministerial began, 15,000 spoof newspapers were wrapped around the regular local morning daily, featuring "news" based on the WTO's vision of the future. Other preliminary actions included the occupation of an abandoned building drawing attention to the increase in poverty caused by WTO policies, a giant banner hung from a 52-meter-tall construction crane, and a protest of 30,000 people demanding debt forgiveness for the global South.

On November 30, participants in the DAN actions marched from two locations toward the venue for the ministerial's opening ceremonies at 7.00. Along the way, affinity groups blockaded the intersections with a wide range of materials, including an inflatable whale, a wooden stage for performances, a group of 50 people chained together, and a giant canvas where people painted all day. Adding to the complete shutdown was the suspension of the city bus service and a taxi strike organized by the Cab Drivers' Alliance of King County. By 9.00, the entire city center was at a standstill, with thousands of WTO delegates – including Secretary of

State Madeleine Albright and US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky – trapped in their hotel rooms.

Despite the action planning having been open and the maps publicly displayed at the convergence center, the police were caught off guard and began, with no warning or order to disperse, to fire tear gas into the crowd at around 10.00. Volunteer medics reported treating hundreds of injuries. They were also targeted by police – both directly attacked and having first aid supplies confiscated.

By the time the 50,000-strong permitted labor march began at 12.30, clouds of tear gas and volleys of rubber bullets were ubiquitous, yet the blockaders, though exhausted, held tight to their positions – locked to each other and doorways, linking arms, and building barricades out of newspaper boxes and dumpsters. The announcement at 12.45 that the opening ceremonies had been officially cancelled was cause for celebration, though not nearly as much as the news that hundreds of union members had defied their security marshalls and broken away from their march. They showed up at blockades around the city to reinforce the tired and heavily gassed frontlines.

About two hours after the police attack began, some people formed a "black bloc" – a group of masked people dressed uniformly in black whose actions during mass protests can include property damage, freeing detained protesters, building barricades, and other confrontational tactics. This "black bloc" began breaking windows and painting graffiti on deliberately targeted corporations such as Niketown, McDonald's, Starbucks, Gap, and Old Navy, as well as police cars and government buildings.

At 17.00 Mayor Paul Schell declared a state of emergency, which included a 19.00–daylight curfew, the arrival of hundreds of state police and the National Guard to patrol streets alongside the local police, a ban on the possession or use of gas masks, and the creation of a "no protest zone" – a 54-block area that covered the entire city center. Anyone found within this area expressing political opinions was to be immediately arrested.

Meanwhile, at the convergence center, activist medics were treating people suffering from exposure to chemicals, burns from explosive concussion grenades, and blunt trauma injuries from plastic bullets and truncheons.

The other half of the center was given over to a spokescouncil meeting, where thousands planned the next day's events.

On December 1, a large group of demonstrators marched into the "no protest zone" and flooded into a park, which was sealed off by the police and National Guard, who made hundreds of arrests. That afternoon, the Steelworkers gathered at a dock and staged a recreation of the Boston Tea Party, dumping steel into the Puget Sound in protest against the flooding of the US market with foreign steel. More arrests occurred shortly after, with police surrounding an intersection and firing tear gas into the trapped crowd.

From the moment of arrest, protesters engaged in constant acts of non-compliance – some refused to walk to the buses used to transport, others refused to sit down on the buses, and most of the 600 arrestees refused to give their names and were not in possession of identification. Prisoners were threatened with rape and torture, and some were strapped into four-point restraint chairs when they (unsuccessfully) demanded access to lawyers, who negotiated the release of the majority of protesters within the week.

The next day a press conference took place, denouncing both the WTO and the mayor and police's constitutional violations and violence, and then ended with a march to the King County jail, located in the city center and within the "no protest zone." A constant vigil was maintained there until those arrested were released. The following day, the last day of the summit, more protesters gathered around the jail, while others blockaded the hotels to which the delegates would return, in some cases locking themselves to the entrances. At the end of the day the ministerial was forced to announce that the summit had been a failure, as the delegates were unable even to agree on an agenda, to set a next meeting, or to convince trade representatives from over 70 nations of the global South to sign an agreement written at the closed meetings from which they were excluded.

The Global Day of Action

Solidarity actions took place in over 100 cities worldwide. In the US, the ILWU completely shut down all ports along the West Coast for the day. In France, 75,000 people protested in

80 different cities. Turkish peasants ended a 2,000-mile walk to the capital, while in New Delhi hundreds of indigenous people blockaded the World Bank building, covering it with posters, graffiti, cow dung, and mud.

In Geneva, activists snuck into WTO headquarters, short-circuiting electricity mains and crashing computers for several hours. As 8,000 marched in Manila to the US embassy and Presidential Palace, 200,000 people flooded the WTO website in a virtual sit-in. Over 8,000 in Muzafer Ghar, Pakistan, hit the streets warning about WTO threats to agriculture; and 2,000 people rallied in London against the privatization of public transport. In Mexico City, hundreds of striking university students demonstrated outside the US embassy, demanding freedom for those arrested and an end to neoliberal policies.

Legacy

One of the deepest legacies has been the sharp turn of public opinion against the WTO, both on the streets of Seattle and across the world. For years after there were efforts to mimic aspects of the DAN organizing, ranging from specific tactical decisions to overall structural development. The degree of success of such emulation was varied. The most successful attempts worked largely because they adhered to the notion of successful struggle being locally rooted and relevant to the needs at hand.

Another key product of the success of Seattle was the networking and radicalization of a new generation of activists and journalists, who have gone on to be deeply involved in covering and organizing across as broad a swathe of social justice movements as were represented in Seattle. Even after the attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City in 2001 and the subsequent state repression, veterans of the Seattle protests have been involved in nearly every major summit protest since; in solidarity with the Zapatista rebels in Chiapas; in human rights delegations to Palestine; in the anti-war movements in many nations; in organizing for the European and US Social Forums; in movements to abolish prisons; in water rights and national sovereignty struggles in Bolivia.

Additionally, the increased awareness of global trade issues and the momentum generated in Seattle lent itself to struggles against the

International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Free Trade Area of the Americas, which collapsed just before the Hong Kong WTO ministerial in 2005. As a result, industrialized nations have largely had to negotiate bilateral trade agreements to move their agenda forward.

Seattle led to changes in tactics on both sides as well. In addition to the “no protest zone” and the concomitant attack on civil liberties, a 2004 National Lawyers’ Guild report highlighted Seattle as the turning point for a new wave of law enforcement tactics including: preemptive and unjust arrests before, during, and after protests; content-based permit procedures and onerous liability insurance requirements; abusive and unjustified use of “less-lethal” weapons; the establishment of so-called “free speech zones” which seek to confine protest to pens; arbitrary checkpoints and searches without cause or warrant; unprecedented high bail; restriction of access to counsel; and a lack of prompt processing. Indeed, Seattle is thought to have laid the basis for the introduction of the draconian Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act of 2007 in the United States. At the same time, intense debate sprang up about protest tactics, and a split began between those in support of property damage as an acceptable form of protest and those who felt that it constitutes violence and is damaging to the cause. As a result, a trend developed in later mobilizations toward supporting a “diversity of tactics,” through which efforts are made to incorporate different tactics into a larger strategic plan.

The protest legacy that began in Seattle has really affected the WTO. Unable to agree on a meeting agenda or any new accords in Seattle, the WTO held its next meeting in Qatar, where protest is largely prohibited by law. Here, a few agreements were signed under intense pressure from US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, who suggested in an earlier speech to the Institute for International Economics that there are “intellectual connections” between those who destroyed the WTC and “others who have turned to violence to attack international finance, globalization, and the United States,” drawing a direct parallel between the Seattle protesters and those who launched the attacks of September 11, 2001. Even so, the WTO failed again to achieve its goals at the fifth ministerial in Cancun, 2003, where delegates from 22 nations

from the global South agreed to block any agreements on agriculture whilst popular protests erupted on the streets outside. In 2005, limited agreements were signed in Hong Kong, again amidst considerable protest. These were undercut the following year when the Doha Development Agenda was suspended indefinitely.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism; ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens); European Union Summit Protests, Gothenburg, 2001; G8 Protests, Genoa, 2001; G8 Protests, Gleneagles, 2005; G8 Protests, Heiligendamm, June 2007; Global Day of Action Against Capitalism, June 18 (J18), 1999; Global Day of Action Against the IMF and World Bank, Prague, September 26 (S26), 2000; Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Grassroots Resistance to Corporate Globalization; Peoples’ Global Action Network; Indymedia Global Justice Campaign, 2000s; Reclaim the Streets; World Social Forums; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Cancun, 2003; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Doha, 2001; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Hong Kong, 2005; World Trade Organization (WTO) Protests, Quebec City, 2001; Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Boghossian, H. (2004) *The Assault on Free Speech, Public Assembly, and Dissent: A National Lawyers’ Guild Report on Government Violations of First Amendment Rights in the United States*. Great Barrington, MA: North River Press.
- Cockburn, A. & St. Clair, J. (2000) *Five Days That Shook the World: Seattle and Beyond*. London: Verso.
- Gill, S. (2000) Towards a Postmodern Prince? The Battle in Seattle as a Moment in the New Politics of Globalization. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29 (1): 131–40.
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2003) Convergence in Seattle. In *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. Penguin: New York and London, pp. 285–8.
- Notes from Nowhere Collective (2003) *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism*. London: Verso.
- Prokosch, M. & Raymond, L. (2002) *The Global Activist’s Manual: Local Ways to Change the World*. New York: Nation Books.
- Solnit, D. (2004) *Globalize Liberation: How to Uproot the System and Build a Better World*. San Francisco: City Lights Books.
- Yuen, E. et al. (2002) *The Battle of Seattle: The New Challenge to Capitalist Globalization*. New York: Soft Skull Press.

Wright, Frances "Fanny" (1795–1852)

Richard Goff

Frances Wright was a Scotch-American political radical and social reformer, feminist, humanist, and political radical of the early nineteenth century. Ahead of her time in many respects, she defied gender norms by openly opposing slavery, racism, and sexism before such ideas were publicly acceptable. Wright's radical egalitarianism and willingness to speak on divisive issues made her one of the more controversial figures of antebellum America.

Frances "Fanny" Wright was born in Dundee, Scotland on September 6, 1795. A daughter of privilege (her father was a linen merchant and admirer of Thomas Paine), she was orphaned at the age of three and inherited a substantial estate. After self-educating herself at libraries in Glasgow, where her uncle was a professor, she traveled to the United States. During her journey she wrote her first major work, *Views of Society and Manners in America* (1821), a traveler's tale which praised the progressive and democratic ethos of the United States in comparison to Europe. Being the first major work by a European woman on the United States, it caught the attention of European liberals ranging from Jeremy Bentham to the Marquis de Lafayette.

While her travels to the United States initially prompted praise, in her subsequent visits she became appalled at the institution of slavery and its obvious inconsistency with the democratic and republican values of the nation. In 1825, on tour with the Marquis de Lafayette, she met with Thomas Jefferson and James Madison and made public her plan for gradual emancipation. According to her work, *A Plan for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery in the United States without Danger of Loss to the Citizens of the South* (1825), Congress would set aside tracts of unsettled land for slaves. This land could be used by the slaves to learn the skills necessary for freedom. In theory, the slaves, after a period of 5–10 years, would be shipped to Africa or to Haiti.

In order to demonstrate the workability of the plan, she used a large portion of her inheritance to purchase a 640-acre plot in western Tennessee to set up an interracial commune comprised of slaves and whites. The community, known as

Nashoba, was based on Robert Owen's model of shared labor and radical egalitarianism. Wright had visited utopian communities during her travels through the United States and had been impressed with their functioning and believed that utopian socialist communities could become training grounds for freedom.

The experimental community of Nashoba opened in November of 1825, 14 miles from Memphis. Initially, the community was comprised of about a dozen slaves, either purchased or donated, and several of Wright's friends. The community featured integrated educational facilities and repudiated individual competition. In 1827 Wright abandoned the notion of African repatriation in favor of the idea that whites and blacks could learn to live together in harmony and that Nashoba could provide a model for racial integration and equality. Unfortunately, poor harvests and public controversy quickly eclipsed early successes. By 1828 charges of "free love" and miscegenation made Wright the target of public vitriol and warded off new recruits and investors. While Wright defended the community as one which embraced the idea of liberty in speech and action, Wright's contraction of malaria forced her to leave Nashoba. Upon her return, the community was clearly in disarray and Wright chose to emancipate the slaves, purchasing their passage to Haiti in 1830.

Following the failed experiment, Wright worked with Robert Owen's son, Robert Dale Owen, editing the *New Harmony Gazette* and the *Free Enquirer*. Additionally, she became a popular public lecturer on many controversial subjects. Deeply suspicious of organized religion, she routinely attacked religion's influence in politics and faith-based justifications for the subordination of women. She also became a vociferous advocate for liberalized divorced laws, birth control, free public education, and for the political organization of the working class. Her power as an orator earned praise from John Stuart Mill, who called her "one of the most important women of her day," but her radical views and often controversial personal life also invited scorn, and the label "The Red Harlot of Infidelity."

Wright and Owen became increasingly involved in the labor movement in the late 1820s and early 1830s. Wright was an active supporter of the Workingmen's Party of New York. Wright hoped to give women a larger role in the nascent, male-dominated, labor movement and pushed the

organization to adopt educational reform as a primary aim. Routinely speaking before large crowds of workers, "Fanny Wrightism" became synonymous with working-class radicalism. After internecine struggles produced the demise of the Workingmen's Party, she became closer to the Jacksonian Democratic Party, going so far as to campaign for Martin Van Buren in support of Jackson's banking policies.

Her political alliance with the Democrats and her fierce opposition to organized religion isolated her from the growing, evangelical, abolitionist movement and contributed to her marginalization. After briefly living in Paris with her husband, Guillaume D'Arusmont, a physician she met at New Harmony, she settled in Cincinnati in 1835. In her later life she divided time between Europe and the United States while writing her final work, *England the Civilizer* (1848), a treatise on revolutions. She died in 1852 of complications from a broken leg.

Wright is widely credited with being the first American woman to openly advocate complete sexual equality, the abolition of slavery, and racial equality. Her life and thought connected the

rational idealism of the Enlightenment with the political radicalism of the nineteenth century. Although she never saw many of the reforms that she advocated, she served as an inspiration for later political activists. Additionally, many of her views on birth control, marriage, and sex predicted cultural changes that would take place in the 1960s and 1970s.

SEE ALSO: Amana Inspirationist Utopians; Cooperative Commonwealth; Father Rapp (1757–1847) and Harmony; Fourier, Charles François Marie (1772–1837) and the Phalanx Utopians; Icaria Utopian Community; New Harmony; Oneida Perfectionist Utopians; Owen, Robert (1771–1858); Utopian Communities, United States; Utopian Intentional Communities; Women's Movement, United States, 19th Century

References and Suggested Readings

- Morris, C. (1992) *Fanny Wright: Rebel in America*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.
- Pitzer, D. (Ed.) (1997) *America's Communal Utopias*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Wright, F. & Adams, S. (2004) *Reason, Religion, and Morals*. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books.

Y

Yaa Asantewaa (ca. 1840–1921)

Joshua Kwesi Aikins

Nana Yaa Asantewaa is remembered throughout Africa and the African diaspora as a leading figure in African anti-colonial resistance. She was the military leader and commander-in-chief of the Asante army during the Asante–British War of 1900–1, which is remembered as Yaa Asantewaa War.

At the time of the war she was *Edwesohemaa*, the queen mother of Edweso, a small but important state within the Asante confederation, the largest and most powerful indigenous state in today's Ghana. Queen mothers (*ahemaa*, sing.: *ohemaa*) had important positions in the political systems of the matrilineal Akan cultures, where inheritance is traced through female lines. Most offices in the two main spheres of politics, the extended lineage and the state, are held by men, but women confer political status as well. The *ahemaa* had the status of female co-rulers who, together with their male counterpart (*ohene*), exercised a joint authority and responsibility in all state affairs. In the absence of the *ohene*, the *ohemaa* ruled as prime authority and head of the polity. This dual line of authority was accentuated by the fact that *ahemaa* were older than their male co-rulers, which brought into play the importance of seniority and a corresponding duty to seek the queen mother's advice in all matters of importance to the state or the lineage. Thus, an *ohemaa* held a vital political office that included participation in the state's governing council, judging cases in her own court, and playing a decisive role in key political controversies, including questions of peace and war. Thus, Nana Yaa Asantewaa's key role in the Asante–British War of 1900–1 was firmly placed in the *ahemaa* leadership tradition.

Yaa Asantewaa was a member of the Asona royal clan of Edweso–Besease. She was enstooled as *Edwesohemaa* in around 1888. One of her grandsons, Akwasi Afranie Kuma, became *Edwesohehene*. Following increasing conflicts with the British, he was forcibly exiled to the Seychelles in 1896, together with other key leaders, most notably the highest political authority of the Asante confederation, Asantehene Agyeman Prempeh I. As a result, Nana Yaa Asantewaa became the paramount chief of Edweso. Although in that same year she signed a Treaty of Protection with the British, she resisted British attempts to seize gold mining lands from her territory.

The event that propelled her into assuming a lead role in Asante anti-colonial resistance, however, was the demand made by Governor Frederick Hodgson in Kumasi on March 28, 1900 for the Golden Stool, the symbol of the Asante state. In an unprecedented act of provocation, he also declared that the Asantehene was not going to come back and reminded Asante leaders of the need to pay for the 1874 and 1896 British war efforts in Asante. In addition, the British resident in Kumasi was to assume the role of Asantehene and was to have the right to use Asantes for compulsory labor. At a secret meeting later that night, Yaa Asantewaa challenged the male Asante authorities to take up their responsibility and fight for Asantes' freedom. She then seized a gun and fired into the air. That night, all the chiefs present took an oath to fight to rid Asante of British rule. Under her leadership, a war council was formed to plan for the war that was to begin immediately. Nana Yaa Asantewaa assumed the role of a military leader and commander-in-chief of Asante forces.

Perceiving their African enemy through the lens of their European gender conventions, British forces were at first unable to identify the over 60-year-old woman as commander of the campaign. The Asante did not only capitalize on the limited perceptions of their enemies during

the war, but also used it to turn a military defeat into a symbolic victory: a fake Golden Stool was created and vigorously defended. Thus, while British forces took away a fake in triumph, the real stool, a key symbol of Asante statehood, remained in Asante. This deceit in the face of defeat served as an important basis for continued Asante nationalism and the maintenance of political structures while the Asantehene was exiled.

Despite Nana Yaa Asantewaa's appeal to Asante independence, her campaign was weakened by the fact that some states of the confederation did not support the war effort. As a result, Asante could not withstand the superior fire power of the British forces and their African auxiliaries. The use of newly deployed 75-millimeter guns by the British proved a decisive advantage over the Asante army. Yaa Asantewaa finally surrendered to the British on March 3, 1901. She was exiled to the Seychelles, where she died in October 1921. Though the war ended in the defeat of Asante, Nana Yaa Asantewaa remains a symbol of female leadership in the African struggle against colonialism.

SEE ALSO: Dahomey Women's Army; Queen Nanny and Maroon Resistance; Women and National Liberation in Africa

References and Suggested Readings

- Agyeman-Duah, I. (2000) *The Asante Monarchy in Exile; The Exile of King Prempeh I and Yaa Asantewaa in the Seychelles*. Ghana: Kumasi.
- Boahen, A. A. (2003) *Yaa Asantewaa and the Asante-British War of 1900-1*. Accra: Sub-Sahara Publishers; Oxford: James Currey.
- McCaskie, T. C. (2007) The Life and Afterlife of Yaa Asantewaa. *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute* 77, 2: 151-78.
- Osei K. (2000) *An Outline of Asante History*. Kumasi: Cita Press.

Yemen Socialist Revolution of 1962

Stacy Warner Maddern

As with most of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen has a long history of ethnic/clan/religious sect organization under the theocratic despotism of the imam as ruler. This rule has been periodically tested and challenged by discontented societal

groups, particularly those of the Sunni Muslim persuasion. In 1839 the territorial concerns of the imam were altered by British influence, which increased in the southern and eastern portion of Yemen after the British captured the port of Aden in 1839. It was ruled as part of British India until 1937, when Aden was made a crown colony with the remaining land designated as East Aden and West Aden protectorates.

In 1918, after World War I, the Al-Mutawakkilite Yemeni Kingdom was established in northern Yemen with Imam Yahya Mohammed Al-Mansour Hamid Al-Din as its ruler. In 1923, after gaining independence from the Ottoman empire, Northern Yemen was recognized by the League of Nations. In South Yemen, under the British protectorate, Aden became a haven for anti-imam politics. As such the British utilized deportation policies as a means of quelling political uprisings between the North and South. Having jurisdiction only in the South, the British would simply send agitators to the North where they would be confined to the imam's dungeons.

The reign of Imam Yahya, and later his son Ahmed, was characterized as a dark time for Yemen. A number of attempts were made to overcome their rules. In 1948, Imam Yahya died during a failed coup and was succeeded by Ahmed, who in turn ruled with even harsher authority, creating a great deal of animosity toward the British for their presence in the South.

In 1952, the Egyptian Revolution under Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Arab nationalist movement seriously impacted political developments in Yemen. The Egyptian Revolution had been built since the 1950s as a series of trends unfolding against the imperialist forces of Britain. After Nasser created the United Arab Republic, attempts were made to incorporate Yemen, threatening the British protectorate. Britain answered by uniting those states in South Yemen under its protection into the Federation of Arab Emirates of the South in 1959.

In 1962, Ahmed bin Yahya died of natural causes and was succeeded by his son, the Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr, who served as imam for approximately eight days. On September 26, 1962, revolutionaries overtook imamate rule in favor of a republican form of government and founded the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), which was supported by troops from Egypt to

combat those forces still in favor of imamate rule. Saudi Arabia and Jordan came to the aid of Badr, beginning what was to become the North Yemen Civil War or revolutionary struggle between monarchists and republicans. Then, in 1963, the entire colony of Aden was incorporated into the Federation of South Arabia under British rule. Later that same year, as fighting in YAR spread into Southern Yemen, the Marxist-influenced Nation Liberation Front (NLF) formed in order to force the British colonialists out of Yemen entirely.

By 1964, the British–Saudi coalition was fighting Egyptian-imamate loyal–NLF forces. This lasted until 1966, when the British government announced its intention to withdraw. At the same time the socialist Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) began a power struggle with the NLF in a bid for power, culminating in mass riots throughout Aden in 1967. After the British government completely withdrew, the Federation of South Arabia was disbanded and Southern Yemen became known as the People’s Republic of South Yemen. Two years later, a radical wing of the Marxist NLF gained power over Southern Yemen and changed its name to the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1970. In the PDRY, sanctions were made for the existence of one political party – the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP). This allowed for further diplomatic movements between the PDRY and the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and radical Palestinian factions. North and South Yemen would remain separate states until reunification in 1990.

SEE ALSO: Egypt, Revolution of 1952; Nasir, Hassan (1928–1960); Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970); Saud, Abd al-Aziz ibn (1879–1953) and the Founding of Modern Saudi Arabia

References and Suggested Readings

- Crouch, M. (2001) *An Element of Luck: To South Arabia and Return*. London: Rawlhouse.
- Halliday, F. (1979) Yemen’s Unfinished Revolution: Socialism in the South. *MERIP Reports* 81.
- Lord, C. & Birtles, D. (2000) *The Armed Forces of Aden, 1839–1967*. Solihull: Helion.
- Miles, O. (1997) The British Withdrawal from Aden. *British-Yemen Society Journal* (December).
- Stork, J. (1973) Socialist Revolution in Arabia: A Report from the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. *MERIP Reports* 15.

Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Rebellion

James Steinberg

During the 1890s, China suffered a series of humiliations through unfair treaties with western powers. The pent-up frustrations eventually ignited thousands of Chinese to join secret societies and engage in murder and mayhem for revenge. For many decades the Chinese had endured the privations of increasing taxation, along with severe droughts and floods, which resulted in extreme suffering. A series of treaties in which western powers not only established trading concessions in various regions but were also permitted the unimpaired movement of Christian missionaries on what was considered Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist soil only exacerbated the situation. Gradually, grassroots Chinese groups started fomenting vehement opposition to the “foreigners” and even to the imposing Qing (Manchu) court.

Following China’s defeat in the Opium Wars (1840–2, 1856–60) and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5, western powers engaged in a “race” to establish their own additional land concessions. This was the era of “gunboat diplomacy,” which led to numerous unequal treaties with western powers requiring China to pay expensive indemnities and nearly bankrupting the country. The provisions of many treaties also allowed extraterritoriality in their concessions and access by Protestant and Catholic missionaries. Their power eventually infuriated Chinese groups who came to resent the arrogance of the westerners. Gradually, as the western powers pressed to increase their influence, conflicts arose among the Chinese peasants derived from sectarian and militia groups that were trained in traditional boxing. The Qing court enlisted militias to police particularly bandits and rebels, lending some legitimacy to these secret societies.

Western Powers and the Qing (Manchu) Court

In the early 1800s western trade with China was restricted to specific ports, especially Guangzhou (Canton) in the south. Since the 1780s the British had defied a Chinese ban on smuggling opium and



During the Boxer Rebellion in China (1900–1), interventionist troops advance under Admiral Edward Seymour against members of the Chinese Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists. The Boxer Rebellion is considered a peasant-based movement against foreign influence in Northern China. (akg-images)

attempted to persuade the Daoguang emperor to open a brisk opium trade. However, the debilitating effects of the drug had created problems for the Chinese and generated anti-opium efforts culminating in the Chinese destruction of British opium in 1839. The British were incensed and initiated extensive military action in June of 1840; exchanges of hostilities – using British gunboats – continued and deepened the hatred of the British by the Cantonese. Exposing the weaknesses of the Chinese government’s military, the Opium War resulted in the Treaty of Nanjing, and subsidiary treaties were also signed with the United States and France, essentially opening up China for trade and access by Christian missionaries. The British destruction of Canton fueled anti-foreign sentiments, which caused deep resentment of the intrusive, militarily superior, western powers.

Disputes over opium went unsettled, exploding into the Arrow War (Second Opium War) between the Cantonese and the British in 1856. Complicating matters was the northern diffusion of anti-foreign feelings in Peking when the coastal Dagu Fort repulsed the signatories from making a peace settlement. This Chinese act of military aggression further provoked the British. In 1859 they invaded Peking and coerced the court into another set of treaties that further expanded foreign access to Chinese markets and villages. Missionaries maintained a sense of moral superiority, arguing that Confucianism was a heathen religion and thus seeking to eliminate traditional Confucian rituals and observances. This compounded the distrust and hatred of missionaries.

After the Arrow War, the improvement of foreign relations between the Qing and the western powers was a priority for the court. In 1861, it initiated the Self-Strengthening Movement to stabilize China. An office of foreign affairs was formed, the Tsungli Yamen, to coordinate with western legations. Foreign exchanges, however, turned sour when in 1870 an anti-Christian riot erupted in Tianjin. The massacre of ten French nuns, priests, and officials revealed that tensions between villagers and western religion had turned lethal.

Making matters even more troubling for the Qing court was the rise of rebellions, the suppression of which required extensive military efforts. The Taiping Rebellion of 1851–64 was one of the most devastating civil wars in world history and was caused in part by poverty, religious conflict, and the disorganization of the Qing court. To effectively confront the Taiping rebels, the government organized local militias made up of peasants, since the imperial forces (the Green Standards) were poorly trained. While religious and ethnic cleavages caused the Taiping Rebellion, a second major protest was the Nian Rebellion (1856–9), caused instead by a series of devastating floods of the Huang He (Yellow River) that created widespread poverty. A third rebellion (1855–73) among Muslims and Han Chinese in Western China, in which religious independence was a major goal, was inspired by the successes of the Taipings. The problem for the court was that the damage created by the rebellions weakened its economy and the effectiveness of military interventions. It further illustrated that starving peasants in poverty, and those with extreme religious disputes, were attracted to rebel causes and demands for immediate social change.

Following China’s defeat during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5, the Treaty of Shimonoseki led to a scramble in which Russia, Britain, and France all prepared to slice up the Chinese “melon.” The expansion of concession areas and another expensive treaty led to a sense of doom among intellectuals and intermediaries in the court. One key result was the initiation by the Qing court of the Hundred Days of Reform of 1898, in which (for a brief interlude) a number of reformist announcements were made. The reforms, however, were shallow and given a superficial reception by the conservative Empress Dowager. It signaled that the tradition-

encrusted court recognized that many Chinese institutions were poorly developed to provide resources for villagers and that lack of economic and military modernization had caused China's military defeats and decline as a world power. The last half of the nineteenth century found missionaries increasing peasant conversions and building Christian village bases while foreign legations expanded trade beyond the British thirst for China's extraordinary tea.

Following China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, local secret societies of young men began to spread the ideology of protest against foreign aggressors. The message of hope generated a grassroots movement and the initiation and growth of boxing training. Between June 4 and 21, 1896, members of a Big Sword Society (the *Da-dao hui*) attacked Christian residences and burned over 100 homes, schools, and churches. Later, on November 1, 1897, the Juye Incident was even more violent with the murder of two German missionaries, ostensibly by a band of Big Sword Society members. Their resentments against the missionaries were released against haughty foreigners. Although further attacks were suppressed by local authorities, it portended further destruction and murder of Christians living in nearby Shandong Province.

The expansion of foreign development in China created major unemployment problems for peasants in the handicraft industries and the businesses relying on the Grand Canal traffic that shifted to the western-funded railways. This absence of income was not new; the Taipings, a pseudo-Christian movement, created destitution among many peasants. Initially, the Taipings were blamed for peasants' calamities, but gradually the blame shifted, facilitated by the Chinese traditions of prejudice toward foreigners. To compound matters, the Yellow River flood of 1898 and the drought of 1900 were devastating, and foreigners became the scapegoats and were blamed for upsetting the balance of nature. Rumors spread across northern provinces that malevolent Christians poisoned wells and sprinkled blood, causing insanity. These rumors added to the sense of panic and urgency to eliminate Christians. As the blame became focused on Christians, they became nervous about the prospects of more hostilities by villagers in secret societies.

The anti-Christian movement can be traced to a combination of factors. First were the conflicts with Confucian beliefs, manifested in the prohibi-

tion of Confucian rituals by Chinese converts. Christian repudiation and condescension of the gentry and court then led the gentry to consider it a heterodox sect, which created problems for the peasants. Then there was the use of local peasant militias for military expeditions, which provided for the creation of the social structure of secret societies using the martial arts. Intervillage disputes then led to resentments that were eventually settled by boxers claiming to be village militias, a self-serving assertion to rationalize violence of the "offending" Christian village. Finally, institutional support and financing of the boxers led to the rapid spread or contagion of volatile confrontations in Shandong Province.

The Rise of the Boxers (Yi Ho Tuan)

Numerous secret societies have existed in China since the early 1800s and can be connected to the gradual emergence of the boxers. The Big Sword Society, the Armor of the Golden Bell, the Eight Trigrams, and the White Lotus sects all used traditional combative boxing (martial arts). Since the 1700s, China had developed a tradition of training in hand-to-hand combat that was used by soldiers and bodyguards along the silk road. A number of different schools refined boxing to a precise, effective, and complex form of fist and kicking combat moves that could be lethal against robbers and ruffians.

The predecessor to the Yi Ho Tuan was the I-ho ch'uan, who were anti-dynastic and anti-foreign, and protested the high taxes and poverty imposed on the peasants. The I-ho ch'uan operated in Shandong, Kiangsu, and Anhwei provinces from the early 1800s. By the 1890s the I-ho ch'uan's activities became more extremist and it developed into a vehemently anti-foreign group that condoned harassment and killing (in its words, extermination) of Christians whom it disparaged as hairy men. Moreover, any foreign-related symbol was demonized, such as churches, schools, railroads, homes, and business establishments. The group's prejudices were inflamed by the conservative governor of Shandong, Li Ping-heng, who supported and compensated the Boxers' organization.

Although the I-ho ch'uan was initially anti-dynastic, the court's support eventually led the Boxers to rally around the slogan "support for the

Qing and extermination of foreigners," so their enmity could be concentrated on all things foreign. In fact the movement started to frame its problems in a patriotic and defensive posture. Following complaints by area missionaries, the court was forced to replace the Boxer-sympathizing governor of Shandong Province with Yu-hsien, who unexpectedly continued Boxer support and encouraged the fervor. He renamed them the Yi Ho Tuan – Righteous and Harmonious Fists – lending legitimacy to their cause. Supporting both the Big Sword Society and the Boxers, the governor organized boxing centers to train new recruits, expanding to nearly 800 centers that served as a major mechanism to communicate their enmity and opposition toward foreigners.

The Boxers also used magio-religious practices to increase their members' confidence. With talismans (charms), geomancy (incantations and rituals), ritual taboos, and boxing practice, they imbued themselves with otherworldly power. Preparing for their battles, and supported by the court, the Boxers' weapons were swords, sticks, and lances while the court's military used guns. Because the Boxers believed that contamination by women would doom their cause, women rebels formed their own secret societies as the Red Lanterns. Through the proper adherence to ritual and practice, the Boxers believed they would be protected from harm and would even be immune to their enemies' bullets.

By 1899, the Boxers' numbers had grown, and believing their cause was patriotic, their actions to expel the barbarians took on characteristics of a millenarian movement. Their cause was at its base a form of religious expression. To righteously expel the barbarians and restore China's Confucian past became a spiritual cause, and it was further reinforced by beliefs of invulnerability. Across the northern plains thousands of Boxers were poised for the ensuing harassment of the enemy. Foreigners and missionaries had become the source of their problem and their elimination the source of their salvation.

Boxer Mayhem

Boxer violence started in mid-1899 when Boxers, most of them young impressionable males aged 13–20, harassed Catholics in Shandong Province. Initially their mischief involved vandalism, theft, extortion, kidnapping, and arson. Between May

1899 and January 1900, arson and theft were the most common offenses; however, five deaths were reported, including that of S. M. Brooks, the first foreign missionary to be killed (December 31, 1899). In spite of attempts by local officials to maintain strict order, the Boxers, facing execution, gradually became more violent.

By the spring of 1900, Boxer incidents involved clashes with government troops, which slowed their movements; however, they became emboldened by mid-1900. On their march north they destroyed railways and bridges. In an about-face, the Empress Dowager and the reactionary court began to openly support the Boxers, and in early June they arrived in Peking, burning homes and churches and killing Christian converts. Attacking a number of foreign legations, they killed German minister Clemens von Ketteler, infuriating Germany. Others surrounded the reinforced foreign legations in Peking and staged assaults against them for several months, but the legations managed to hold out and call for military rescue.

An initial military column led by Sir Edward Seymour was organized in June 1900 to march troops to Peking to free the trapped legations. However, it met with fierce resistance 80 miles south of Peking and the international force of about 1,000 had to retreat to Tsiku. Meanwhile, a second and larger international force was assembled to conduct a relief effort to the legations under siege as well as rescue Seymour's forces. On August 3, 1900, news that the garrison was intact led to an assembly of 19,000 soldiers (Great Britain, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Bengal Lancers, First Indian Brigade, Americans, Japanese, Russian, French, and German), who marched to Peking, fighting minor battles along the way. Initially the international force concentrated on capturing Tientsin, assuming that the Peking legations were annihilated. On August 14, the professionally trained soldiers reached Peking and within hours easily dispersed the disorganized Boxers and Chinese troops. In the aftermath of the rebellion, international troops apprehended and severely punished the leaders of Boxer bands. Samurai sword-wielding Japanese soldiers followed suit and engaged in beheading their foreign enemies. The destruction of buildings and villages was widespread across the North China plain, and order was restored in the absence of Qing rulers. The international force was later condemned for its looting and

ransacking of Peking. In the final toll, the rebellion reported at least 231 foreigners and hundreds of Chinese Christians killed. Various other estimates of casualties place the number of Christians killed much higher.

Meanwhile, the imperial court escaped to Xi'an while an international military occupation force was established to sustain order in Peking. The western powers once again anticipated suing for peace, with the discredited Qing government narrowly escaping into exile.

Suing for Peace: The Boxer Protocol

With the Qing court in exile, it pleaded with Canton governor Li Hung-chang to serve as plenipotentiary and negotiate a treaty with the western powers to preserve the Chinese government. For several months Li balked at attending the peace conference until he received some indication from the powers that their negotiations would be reasonable. Several signs reassured Li when the powers ignored the war declaration by Empress Dowager and restricted their sanctions to the Boxer rebels. The attention of the powers was steered to the punishment of the Boxer supporters, with Germany particularly vehement in its revenge for the death of von Kettler, insisting that a monument be erected in his memory with inscriptions expressing "regrets" for his murder.

Li agreed to a number of conditions in the treaty. First, China agreed to pay an indemnity of \$67.5 million over 39 years, increasing tariffs and instituting a tax on merchandise to fund this costly indemnity. Each western power assisting in the rescue was designated a percentage of the indemnity. Second, in the matter of punishment of the guilty, a number of officials were ordered to be executed, some were ordered to commit suicide, and Prince Tuan was sentenced to imprisonment for life. The provincial officials also received severe reprisals, with a total of at least 110 penalties ranging from execution to official humiliation.

The Open Door policy circulating in 1900, offered by US Secretary of State John Hays, created a background for the western powers' approach in debating the conditions of the Boxer Protocol. The policy stated that all trading nations should have equal privileges, and in 1900, following the Boxer Rebellion, Hays emphasized the

mutual advantage of keeping China's territory and government intact. Preserving the economic system of China allowed the western powers a future destination for their exports. Hays was successful in creating a policy that prevented any country having designs on China that would slice the country into colonies and reduce its economic potential. Most foreign powers agreed with this position in principle and it ostensibly provided restraint in the peace settlements.

Over a year later, on September 7, 1901, the 11 allied powers finally signed the agreement with Li and Prince Ch'ing representing China. The timid court did not return until January to reestablish itself. It was henceforth severely weakened, and its ineptitude revealed a power vacuum. Growing anti-Manchu sentiment centered around the lack of modernization and the urgent need for reform. On October 10, 1911, imperial troops sent to subdue a protest mutinied, moving against the capital of Wuchang and staging a coup that would finally end the imperial system and usher in the republican period led by Yuan Shikai.

SEE ALSO: China, Protest and Revolution, 1800–1911; China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Chinese Nationalist Revolution, 1911; Taiping Rebellion, 1851–1864

References and Suggested Readings

- Bickers, R. & Tiedemann, R. G. (Eds.) (2007) *The Boxers, China, and the World*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Cohen, P. A. (1997) *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience and Myth*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Elliott, J. (2002) *Some Did it for Civilization; Some Did it for their Country: A Revised View of the Boxer War*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
- Esherick, J. W. (1987) *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Stiger, G. N. (1966) *China and the Occident: The Origin and Development of the Boxer Movement*. New York: Russell & Russell.
- Tan, C. (1967) *The Boxer Catastrophe*. New York: Octagon Books.

Yorkshire Rising, 1820

Fred Donnelly

One of the largest insurrections of the pre-Chartist era of the Industrial Revolution in England took place in the West Riding of

Yorkshire in the first two weeks of April 1820. It constituted outbursts in three towns in that county and was loosely connected to a simultaneous revolt in the west of Scotland around Glasgow. It also coincided with the trials of political radicals arrested at “Peterloo” some months earlier.

The rebellion began with a coordinated attack from four directions on the town of Huddersfield by some 2,000 armed men on April 1, 1820. For some reason the assault was called off and most of the insurgents disappeared. The authorities made only four arrests; Nathaniel Buckley (journeyman clothier), Thomas Blackburn (cardmaker), John Peacock (laborer), and John Lindley (nailmaker). The first two served two years in the prison hulks, and the latter two were transported to the penal colony in Tasmania.

A second attempt was made to capture Huddersfield on the night of April 11–12, 1820, this time by an armed band of about 400, mostly linen weavers, from the Barnsley area. Their radical club, the Barnsley Union Society, which had a Secret Acting Committee, directed their efforts. Led by Waterloo veterans Richard Addy and William Comstive, they marched to the beat of a drum to Grange Moor outside Huddersfield. They expected to be a small part of a much larger force, so panic set in when they realized other contingents had not appeared. There was no military engagement, and the authorities simply arrested 17 men and picked up abandoned weapons.

After a trial in September 1820 the government transported 11 Barnsley men to Tasmania; William Comstive, Richard Addy, Charles Stansfield, Benjamin Hanson, Joseph Chapiel, Michael Downing, Joseph Firth, Benjamin Rogers, William Rice, John Burkinshaw, and Thomas Morgan. They along with John Peacock and John Lindley of the Huddersfield area were transported on the convict ship *Lady Ridley* in 1821. Various other Barnsley rebels were pardoned after serving lesser sentences in the prison hulks. These included James Flowers, John Vallance, William Holland, John and Thomas Farrimond, Abraham Ingham, and George Brien. Other important local leaders who had planned the affair as members of the Secret Acting Committee were never found, including James Lowe, Arthur Collins, Craven Cookson, and Stephen Kitchenman.

Simultaneous with the march to Grange Moor on April 11, 1820 the town of Sheffield

experienced a popular disturbance led by a well-known local agitator, John Blackwell. He assembled 200 armed men and marched them about shouting radical slogans such as “The Revolution, the Revolution” and “All in a mind for the Barracks.” For some reason the crowd then dispersed without any attack on the local barracks. The next day only Blackwell was arrested at his house and he was later sentenced at York to 30 months in prison.

SEE ALSO: Luddism and Machine Breaking; Peterloo Massacre, 1819

References and Suggested Readings

- Donnelly, F. (2007) *The Yorkshire Rebellion of 1820. Albion Magazine Online* (July), www.zyworld.com/albionmagazineonline.
- Thompson, E. P. (1963) *The Making of the English Working Class*, London: Victor Gollancz.

Yoruba Wars, 19th century

Adebusuyi I. Adeniran

The Yoruba nation of nearly three hundred ethnic groups is one of the three largest in Nigeria, with a population of well over 40 million indigenes. The populace is spread over 10 of the 36 states in Nigeria: Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ondo, Ekiti (Southwest); Delta, Edo (South); Kwara and Kogi (Middle-belt). Yorubas can also be found in Benin Republic, Brazil, Cuba, and Trinidad and Tobago. The ethnic group is renowned for its bravery and entrepreneurship, and in contemporary Nigeria for its educational achievements and advancement.

Oduduwa, who is believed to have migrated southward from ancient Egypt about a thousand years ago, is often referred to as the Yoruba’s progenitor. The impetus for various intra-tribal conflagrations which swept through the entire Yorubaland between 1817 and 1893 was fundamentally the control of trade routes within the region. The massive Yoruba empire of Oyo was renowned as an extraordinary exporter of slaves in the eighteenth century, and also as the seat of government for millions of citizens. The empire was to collapse shortly before the invasion of the Fulani Jihadists during a period of civil strife in the years following 1817. By the mid-1830s

the ensuing uprisings had engulfed the entire Yorubaland. Meanwhile, the Owu War, which started around 1820, had earlier facilitated the creation of a new Oyo at Ago-Oja in 1837, and indeed, immediate abandonment of Oyo-Ile, the empire's headquarters. Basically, difficulties in controlling a huge build-up of slaves in and around metropolitan Yoruba settlements, and the intensification of the slave trade along the Lagos-Badagry trade axis during the late eighteenth century, led to the final disintegration of the Oyo empire, and of course, the first waves of intra-tribal wars among the Yorubas.

The scramble for control of Yorubaland post-Oyo empire by emerging power blocs in the region – the Abeokuta, Ibadan, Owo, and Warri – commenced another era of intense insurgencies among the Yorubas, from 1837 to 1878. By this time the British were already retreating from the slave trade, and indeed blockading the coast previously used as transit points for slaves. Such blockades led to changes in slave transactions along the Eko (Lagos) lagoons. War and slavery were undoubtedly complimentary among the Yoruba warriors during this period. Incomes generated from the slave trade were needed to acquire firearms for the prosecution of the war.

The rapid growth of Ibadan, among the largest urban areas in black Africa, and other centers of power in Yorubaland is directly traced to the roles they played during the post-Oyo empire imbroglio. The Ibadans also took advantage of the obvious isolation of the Benins during the insurgencies to take over control of the trade routes linking the blooming slave center at Eko. However, the increasing socioeconomic influence of the Ibadans led to fear of eventual domination among their rivals within Yorubaland. This suspicion was to give rise to the third wave of intra-ethnic uprisings among the Yorubas, which was the deadliest in terms of casualties over a large region. In 1877 the Egbas, in alliance with the Ijebus (from the southern flank of Yorubaland), launched an unexpected attack on some Ibadan businessmen on their way back from Porto Novo, where they had gone to purchase firearms. This attack was to serve as the platform for the Ijeshas and the Ekitis (from northeastern Yorubaland) to launch a revolt against the Ibadans. In 1878 the insurgency against Ibadan occupation began with the killing of all Ibadan outpost personnel in Ijeshaland, Igominaland, and Ekitiland.

Eventually, the Ibadans were entangled in a web of uprisings on nearly five fronts. From the Northeast, they were encountering Ekitiparapo forces under the formidable command of Ogedengbe Agbogungboro – the Seriki of Ijeshaland. On the southern flank, the Egbas and the Ijebus were waging an intense insurrection. From the north, the Ilorin Fulanis were attacking, while the Ifes joined the Ekitiparapo's alliance in 1882. However, historic frictions between the Ifes and the Modakekes were intensified by the war. The Modakekes moved to dislodge the Ifes from their ancestral homeland. Thereafter, the Ifes waged a war of reclamation against the Modakekes.

The major battle of the third wave of Yoruba wars took place at Kiriji in northeastern Yorubaland. Kiriji is about 25 miles north of Ilesha, the capital of Ijeshaland, and a few miles south of Ila-Orangun, the capital of Igboinaland. The Ibadan and Ekitiparapo forces exchanged massive fire at Kiriji, which resulted in weakening Ibadan domination of northeastern Yorubaland, though initial setbacks were suffered by Ekitiparapo forces. The control of the trade routes was the primary bone of contention. Only three such routes linked the interior of Yorubaland, that is, through Ondo, Ijebu, and Egba. The Ondo axis had been opened up by the British colonialists as a result of the inaccessibility of other routes during the war. The Ekitiparapo alliance was to gain an edge in the ensuing altercation courtesy of the support it received from Ijeshas and Ekiti businessmen living in Eko. Breech-loading rifles, more accurate than the arms used by the Ibadans, were constantly supplied to their warring kinsmen.

Between 1879 and 1880 various attempts to resolve the dispute were made but without any real impact. The involvement of the Alaafin of Oyo and the Ooni of Ife, who could not be trusted by either side to the conflict, was the major factor that worked against a timely truce. What is more, the Ifes joined in the fighting, essentially on the side of the Ekitiparapo alliance. The colony of Lagos was under strict orders from London and Accra to stay out of the altercation, though its economy was already battered by the impact of the war. The Lagos government, under a special arrangement, planned to broker a truce, but was rejected. Despite a ceasefire put in place in 1886, which provided for the independence of the Ekitiparapo's settlements, the conflicts continued unabated.

In 1891 the British advanced numerous proactive measures for the penetration of the interior of Yorubaland in view of French colonial competition and interference. By 1892 both trade routes through Egba and Ijebu were taken over by the British. Treaties were thereafter agreed with the Oyos and Egbas. The war between Ekitiparapo and Ibadan forces eventually ended in 1893.

Although intra-ethnic wars among the Yorubas ceased over the years, conspicuous hangovers of the conflicts are still visible in contemporary Yoruba society, such as incessant communal clashes between the Ifes and the Modakekes in northeastern Yorubaland.

SEE ALSO: Agbekoya Peasant Uprising and Rebellion, 1968–1969; Barbados and the Windward Islands, Protest and Revolt; Ethnic and Nationalist Revolts in the Hapsburg Empire, 1500–1848; Ife-Modakeke Conflict; Jamaica, Rebellion and Resistance, 1760–1834; Oke-Ogun Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Ade-Ajayi, J. F. (1964) *Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Jones, D. H. (1965) *The Yoruba and Their Wars*. *Journal of African History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 Smith, R. S. (1988) *Kingdoms of the Yoruba*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Young Communist International

Joel A. Lewis

In November 1919, the Young Communist International (YCI) established itself as the youth coordinating body of the Communist International (Comintern). The YCI was neither a creation of Lenin's Bolshevik Party, nor did it originate in the young Soviet republic. The YCI grew out of the anti-war struggles of socialist youth in Western Europe, representing itself as the organizational heir of the Socialist Youth International (SYI).

During World War I, the SYI led the first attempts to reestablish international socialist anti-war activities. Willi Münzenberg of the Swiss Youth League coordinated an international call to action, bringing together youth from ten nations for an International Youth Conference

in Berne, Switzerland during April 1915. The Berne Conference inspired anti-war socialists to reconvene in Zimmerwald, Switzerland in September 1915. Here, Münzenberg and the youths consistently supported Lenin's revolutionary positions against the war. Zimmerwald ultimately forged a close association between youth and communism.

The SYI had its first postwar meeting in Berlin during November 1919. Representatives of the newly formed Comintern sent lengthy appeals to the SYI to court their organization away from the SI. This meeting resulted in the socialist youth reforming the SYI as the Young Communist International. When the YCI affiliated to the Comintern in 1919, it considered its organization to be politically independent – a proposition that was quickly squelched by the Comintern executive. The YCI was moved from Berlin to Moscow in the summer of 1921, becoming officially subordinated to the Comintern and dominated by the Soviet YCL (Komsomol).

The primary role of the YCI was to provide ideological education for youth by constructing a “Leninist Generation” of revolutionaries for recruitment into communist parties. By 1924, the YCI had established over 60 Young Communist Leagues (YCL) throughout the world. During the 1920s, however, YCLs outside of Germany and the Soviet Union remained small propagandist sects exerting little impact on labor and youth politics.

With the rise of Hitler in 1933, the role and character of the YCI shifted dramatically, emphasizing anti-fascism over revolutionary communism. In 1935, Georgi Dimitrov, general secretary of the Comintern, instructed the YCI to redirect its appeals to mobilizing a broad “Popular Front” of youth against fascism and war. During the 1930s, YCLs in Britain, France, Spain, and the United States became prominent in the YCI. Western young communists shifted their organizational emphasis from the YCI to the World Youth Congress (WYC). The WYC was a broad coalition of anti-fascist youth dedicated to defending the principles of democracy, youth unity, and peace. Communist youth also played an integral role in the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War.

The YCI went through a lengthy period of crisis after the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, decimating many of their established youth coalitions. Along with the Comintern, the

YCI was dissolved in May 1943 to forge closer anti-fascist bonds between the Soviet Union and its western allies during World War II. In November 1945, the World Federation of Democratic Youth was established, eventually becoming the organizational heir of the YCI.

SEE ALSO: Anti-Fascist People's Front; Communist Party, Germany; Dimitrov, Georgi (1882–1949); Internationals

References and Suggested Readings

- Cornell, R. (1982) *Revolutionary Vanguard: The Early Years of the Communist Youth International, 1914–1924*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Davenport, T. (n.d.) Young Communist International (1919–1943): Organizational History. *Early American Marxism: A Repository of Source Material, 1864–1964: Online Archive*. Available at www.marxisthistory.org/subject/usa/eam/yqi.html.
- Dimitrov, G. (1975) *The United Front: The Struggle Against Fascism And War*. San Francisco: Proletarian Publishers.
- Privalov, V. (1971) *The Young Communist International and its Origins*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Waite, M. (1992) Young People and Communist Politics in Britain 1920–1991: Aspects of the History of the Young Communist League. MPhil thesis, University of Lancaster.

Young Hegelians

Lynnette M. Deem

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) was a popular name in the academic circles of the 1830s and 1840s, especially in Germany. Many groups were organized to (re)interpret Hegel's complex and unyielding view of history. The Young Hegelians represented Hegel's left-wing advocates. Leaders of this idealist trend, including David Strauss, the Bauer brothers, Max Stirner, Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels, sought bourgeois reform based on Hegel's dialectical worldview. The Young Hegelians accepted Hegel's dialectical approach, while disagreeing with many of his other conclusions.

The Young Hegelians' reassessment of Hegel's philosophies brought them into conflict with the Right Hegelians (the intellectual leaders of the time). The latter believed in Hegel's proclamation that Prussian society was superior. The former group alleged that Prussian society was

rather flawed and that historical progress was an ongoing phenomenon. These idealistic views were often suppressed by the intellectuals and the Prussian government. The primary claim of the Young Hegelians was that a dependency on Lutheranism hindered Prussia's progress; thus ideas of God and Christianity must be destroyed. Most agreed with the idea that God was invented by man, but each expressed this sentiment in his own unique, radical way. David Strauss, for example, argued that Christianity, as an organized religion, went against its nature as a revolutionary movement against oppression. Feuerbach professed that man preferred to blame his insecurities and imperfections on an outside force ("God"), rather than overcoming them on his own. The most extreme claim of the Young Hegelians was Bruno Bauer's claim that Jesus was a fabrication of the church and that Christianity was a lie.

Marx also acted as an opponent of state-sponsored religion. Marx, however, asserted that religion furthered the purposes of the propertied classes by engendering the complacency of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie, therefore, could maintain their socioeconomic domination throughout the world. According to Marx, the only desire of humanity should be the discovery and creation of the good society on earth. Marx's view caused him to break away from this group and write derisive critiques of it, most notably in *The Holy Family* and *The German Ideology*.

The increasing disillusionment and continued infighting led to the Young Hegelians' demise in the 1840s. The idealistic trend, however, was semi-revived in the Frankfurt School.

SEE ALSO: Engels, Friedrich (1820–1895); Frankfurt School (Jewish Emigrés); Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831); Marx, Karl (1818–1883)

References and Suggested Readings

- Breckman, W. (1999) *Marx, the Young Hegelians and the Origins of Radical Social Theory: Dethroning the Self*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Löwith, K. (1991) *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Mah, H. (1987) *The End of Philosophy, the Origin of "Ideology": Karl Marx and the Crisis of the Young Hegelians*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Massey, J. (1978) The Hegelians, the Pietists, and the Nature of Religion. *Journal of Religion* 58, 2 (April): 108–29.

Young Ireland

William H. Mulligan, Jr.

Young Ireland was an Irish nationalist movement highly influenced by Thomas Carlyle and the Romantic movement. The name was chosen by a group of nineteenth-century Irish nationalists who wanted to differentiate their approach to Irish nationhood from that of Daniel O'Connell.

They first set forth their ideas in 1842 when the first issue of their journal, the *Nation*, appeared. The three main founders of the *Nation* were a diverse group. Thomas Osborne Davis was a Protestant and the son of an English army surgeon. He graduated from Trinity College and was called to the bar in 1838. John Blake Dillon, the son of a Catholic shopkeeper, was also a Trinity graduate and member of the bar. The third founder, Charles Gavan Duffy, a journalist, was from a middle-class Catholic family.

Young Ireland called for equality for all religious traditions, separating the definition of Irishness from Catholicism. In this, they drew on the tradition of the United Irishmen of 1798. Perceiving the Irish nation as a spiritual entity as well as a geographic and political one, Young Ireland demanded cultural as well as political sovereignty, and argued that the Irish language was an important bulwark against English cultural domination.

They distanced themselves, at first gradually and then more dramatically, from O'Connell and his approach to Ireland's future. Young Ireland's cultural nationalism differed sharply from O'Connell's increasing concern with the "bread and butter" political issues of economic development and civil liberties. Furthermore, O'Connell's apparent comfort with the British constitutional system contrasted sharply with their view of England and English culture as oppressive. By 1846 the break between Young Ireland and those who looked to O'Connell for leadership was complete.

Young Ireland did not share O'Connell's aversion to violence. A number of incidents and experiences pushed Young Ireland toward recognizing "physical force" as a legitimate means of gaining Irish freedom. In 1844 O'Connell was arrested even after bowing to government pressure and canceling the Clontarf "monster meeting" he had called. That same year, Charles Gavan Duffy, the editor of the *Nation*, was imprisoned for sedition. Achieving their goals by

legal means seemed ever more hopeless.

O'Connell died in 1847, leaving his movement without a strong, charismatic leader. The following year, 1848, was a year of dramatic events throughout Europe. The February Revolution in Paris gave the Young Ireland leaders a model for action. Then in May, Gavan Duffy's successor as editor, John Mitchel, was convicted of the newly defined crime of felony-treason and transported to Bermuda. With non-violent change apparently no longer an option, Young Ireland began to formulate a plan for an armed rebellion after the harvest. A war council was formed, composed of Dillon, Thomas Francis Meagher, Richard O'Gorman, Thomas D'Arcy McGee, and Thomas Devin Reilly. An effort was made to win O'Connell's son John to the conspiracy, but it was unsuccessful.

The war council recruited William Smith O'Brien to lead the planned rebellion. Smith O'Brien claimed direct descent from Brian Boru, who had reigned in the eleventh century as the last high king of Ireland. The expectation was that his patriotic pedigree (however spurious) would help to rally popular support. Smith O'Brien, however, was a Protestant landowner who had been educated at Harrow and Cambridge, with views on change in Ireland that were rather complex and at times even contradictory. He had served in parliament from 1828, where he supported Catholic emancipation, backed efforts to reform education and the Poor Law, and assisted emigration from Ireland. He joined O'Connell's Repeal Association in 1843 (although his mother disowned him for doing so) and served as the organization's leader while O'Connell was in prison. When Young Ireland broke with O'Connell and left the Repeal Association, Smith O'Brien left with them.

Problems plagued the 1848 rebellion. There was little chance of surprise; government informers and spies had penetrated the organization. Young Ireland's leaders failed to notice the movement of large numbers of troops to Dublin early in the summer, and the suspension of *habeas corpus* on July 21, as the planned date for the uprising approached. Furthermore, the country remained in the grip of the Great Famine, so the population was weakened by starvation and disease.

Smith O'Brien's commitment to the revolutionary cause was compromised by his membership in the landlord class. He refused to promise that victory would result in confiscation of the

land and its redistribution to the peasantry. Furthermore, he even ordered that trees on landlord property not be cut down, and that landlord property generally be respected. Not unexpectedly, the peasantry failed to respond to the call to rise. In addition, the parish priests remained committed to the non-violent approach of O'Connell; with few exceptions they did not support the rebellion, and discouraged their parishioners from participating.

The rebellion was therefore brief and disastrously unsuccessful. A bloodless encounter between rebels and British troops at Killenaule in County Tipperary on July 28 was followed by the somewhat farcical "battle of the Widow McCormack's cabbage patch" the following day. Leaders fled, and some, including Dillon, O'Gorman, and Reilly, made it to the United States. Others, including Smith O'Brien and Meagher, were captured and tried for high treason. British support for relief efforts in famine-plagued Ireland, which had never been strong, plummeted.

The leaders of 1848 were convicted and sentenced to death, but their sentences were commuted and they were transported to Australia instead. A number escaped to the United States, where the Irish American community greeted them as heroes. Smith O'Brien refused to escape, however, because he had given his word as a gentleman not to do so. He accepted a pardon in 1854 and returned to Ireland in 1856, where he lived quietly as a country gentleman until his death in 1864. Dillon and Gavan Duffy later sat in parliament, and D'Arcy McGee was a founder of the Confederation of Canada. Gavan Duffy, after emigrating to Australia, was knighted for his service in government.

Young Ireland never managed to build a base outside the Catholic middle classes, and their rebellion was a calamitous failure. Their cultural nationalism and emphasis on the importance of the Irish language, however, represented a positive legacy that would reemerge years later in the work of Douglas Hyde and the Gaelic League.

SEE ALSO: Fenian Movement; France, June Days, 1848; Irish Nationalism; O'Connell, Daniel (1775–1847); United Irishmen

References and Suggested Readings

Clarke, R. (1942) The Relations between O'Connell and the Young Irelanders. *Irish Historical Studies* 3: 18–30.

Davis, R. (1987) *The Young Ireland Movement*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.

Donnelly, J. S., Jr. (1989) A Famine in Irish Politics. In W. E. Vaughan (Ed.), *Ireland under the Union I: A New History of Ireland*, Vol. 5. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gwynn, D. (1949) *Young Ireland and 1848*. Cork: Cork University Press.

Mulvey, H. F. (2003) *Thomas Davis and Ireland*. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.

Nowlan, K. B. (1965) *The Politics of Repeal: A Study in the Relations between Great Britain and Ireland, 1841–1850*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Young Turks

Andrew J. Waskey

The Young Turks was one of the secret societies that arose in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire (1299–1923) to oppose the absolutist rule of Sultan Abdulhamit II (1842–1918). While ultimately able to depose Sultan Abdulhamit, their program to return the Ottoman Empire to its glory days failed.

In 1876 the Ottoman Empire adopted a constitution that provided for a representative legislature and increased personal freedoms. Although the newly installed Sultan Abdulhamit signed this new constitution, he eventually set it aside and instituted autocratic policies that grew



The Young Turks were a revolutionary coalition committed to modernizing and reforming government in the Ottoman empire. The Young Turk Revolution was predominantly composed of student activists and military cadets willing to die to establish a constitutional monarchy. The Young Turks were instrumental in the creation of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1906 that help to shape a tradition of dissent in the late Ottoman empire. (Collection of Wolf Dieter Lemke)

repressive through the use of state-sponsored violence. The response to Abdulhamit's rule by fear was the formation of secret societies. Some of these were nationalist, others were secular, and still others were religious. The nationalist groups promoted Turkish nationalism in order to transform society from a multi-ethnic empire to a society of Turkish nationalists. The secret societies were composed of students, military cadets, military officers, and others. The most influential of these was a coalition group called the Young Turks, their name taken from their journal, *La Jeune Turquie*.

In 1906 the Young Turks formed the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The membership of CUP was ethnically very diverse and included Turkish nationalists, western-oriented secularists, and a variety of reformers. As the movement flourished it created a tradition of dissent that became a major influence on sociopolitical life and thought throughout the last years of the Ottoman Empire; however, the movement changed as a variety of small uprisings shook the empire.

In 1907 a second Congress of Opposition was held in Paris (where the first congress had been held in 1902). The goal was to unite all of the opposition groups in the empire into a single united movement. In 1908 the Young Turks revolted against Sultan Abdulhamit, forcing him to restore the 1876 constitution. The Sultan then manipulated a counter-coup that failed. The Young Turks forced his abdication and had his brother Mohammed installed as the new Ottoman Sultan.

The Young Turks were able to rule the Ottoman Empire through Sultan Mohammed. However, their imperial ambitions were frustrated as parts of the empire either broke away or were taken by foreign powers. By the outbreak of World War I the only European territory left in the empire was Thrace.

The coup of 1913 put Ismail Enver Pasha (1881–1922, from Salonika) into power, replacing minister of war Nazim Kiamil Pasha (1833–1913). In the autumn of 1914 the Young Turks led the empire into World War I on the side of Germany, its one strong European ally; however, the empire continued to crumble throughout the war. During World War I the empire was led by three Pashas who were leaders of the CUP: Mehmed Talat Pasha, Ismail Enver, and Ahmed Djemal.

SEE ALSO: Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (1881–1938); Tunisia, Protests Under Ottoman (Bey) Rule to 1881; Turkish Rebellions, 1918–1925

References and Suggested Readings

- Hanioglu, M. S. (1995) *The Young Turks in Opposition*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Turfan, M. N. (2000) *Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military, and Ottoman Collapse*. New York: I. B. Tauris.

Yugoslavia, anti-fascist "People's Liberation War" and revolution, 1941–1945

Boris Kanzleiter

World War II in the territory of former Yugoslavia started with the unannounced bombarding of Belgrade by the German Luftwaffe on April 6, 1941. In the days that followed, the German Wehrmacht and its Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian allies invaded the country, which had refused to align with the German Reich. On the orders of Adolf Hitler the state territory was split up. The unfolding war turned Yugoslavia into one of the most destructive battle grounds of World War II. According to estimates around 1 million people were killed. The communist partisans defeated not only the Wehrmacht and its local collaborationists, but also turned the war into a process of social revolution.

The course of war was complex and had strong regional characteristics. The largest parts of Serbia were put under the direct military rule of the German army. After the unconditional surrender of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on April 17, 1941, a part of the collapsed Yugoslav Royal Army and volunteers regrouped in the Ravna Gora district in central Serbia. Under the leadership of Colonel Draža Mihailović the royalist Serbian nationalist Četnik movement was formed. In the first months of the war they fought against the Germans. However, from the autumn of 1941 they were also fighting against the communist partisans, conducted campaigns of ethnic cleansing against Muslims in Bosnia, and started partially to collaborate with the Germans although they never formally allied with them. The partisans, on the other hand, formed their

first liberated territory in the mountainous Užiča region in western Serbia in September 1941. Until a German attack in November 1941 the "Republic of Užiča," which temporarily included large parts of Serbia, was the first liberated territory in German-occupied Eastern Europe. In the liberated zones the partisans formed so called People Councils as the organizations of a new government.

In Croatia the Germans transferred power to the fascist ultranationalist Ustaša movement under the leadership of Ante Pavelić. On April 10, 1941 an Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was declared, which also included Bosnia-Herzegovina and parts of Serbia. The Ustaša were inspired by a racist ideology of Croat supremacy. They committed genocide and ethnic cleansing against Serbs, Gypsies, and Jews. The Pavelić regime set up a system of concentration camps, in which some estimate that over 300,000 Serbs in the NDH were killed. The most notorious was the Jasenovac complex on the Sava River. Here alone as many as 100,000 people, mainly Serbs but also large numbers of Jews, Roma, and Croatian anti-fascists, were killed.

The other regions of former Yugoslavia were also turned into battlegrounds. In Slovenia, which was divided between Austria, Italy, and Hungary, already in April 1941 the Liberation Front (first called the Anti-Imperialist Front) was formed. Its particular characteristic was that it initially consisted of a broad coalition, which included communists, Christian-socialists, and other non-communist forces. Montenegro was put under Italian rule. Like Bosnia it was a center of the partisan movement. Macedonia was occupied by Italians, Bulgarians, and Germans. In the territory of Western Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania a fascist Greater Albania was formed.

According to its official claims, at the beginning of the war the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) had only about 8,000 members. Its youth organization had another 40,000 members. Nevertheless, in the period between the start of the partisan uprising after the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 and the liberation of the country in May 1945 it was able to mobilize an army numbering more than half a million soldiers. It achieved this success in extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Until the Teheran Conference in November 1943 the Allies, including the Soviet Union, had supported the Četnik movement and the royal gov-

ernment in exile in London as their partners in Yugoslavia. Only after the partisans had proved that they were the only force in Yugoslavia efficiently fighting the Germans did the Allies change their policies and started to support them.

The partisans achieved their victory largely through the mobilization of their own resources, counting on an organization with an experienced and committed cadre. After its establishment in 1919 the CPY achieved considerable support and won a series of important local elections in 1920. By end of 1920, however, the CPY was banned and remained illegal until the German attack. After several splits the clandestine party was reorganized in 1937 when Josip Broz Tito took control. Around 1,500 Yugoslav communists participated in the international brigades to defend the Spanish Republic between 1936 and 1939. About half of them were killed. Most of the survivors returned to Yugoslavia, where their military experience played an important role in the formation of the partisan units.

However, the main reasons for the success of the Yugoslav partisans were of a political nature. In the first stage of the war in 1941 it was particularly the brutality of the Ustaša regime in Croatia which led mainly Serbs, but also other inhabitants of the NDH, to turn to the partisans to defend themselves. The population was also radicalized by the brutal massacres the German Wehrmacht committed against civilians in retaliation for attacks by the partisans. On September 16, 1941 the German Generalfeldmarschall Keitel issued a command that for every killed German soldier 50 to 100 Serb civilians should be executed. In fact the first to be killed were often Jews and Roma. For example, in the central Serbian city of Kragujevac on October 21, 1941, 2,300 civilians, including students at a local high school, were massacred by the German Wehrmacht.

During the war it became increasingly clear that only the partisans with their slogan of "brotherhood and unity" of the different Yugoslav people and nations could offer a program for the defeat of the German and Italian occupiers and their local collaborators. The communist partisans were the only political and military forces operating in the whole territory of Yugoslavia and could attract people of all nationalities. They presented themselves not only as the most consequential anti-fascist force of national liberation, but also as a force for fundamental social and

political change. In November 1942 the partisans formed the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) as a political umbrella organization for all so-called People's Liberation Committees, which were established as a form of local governmental organization in the territories under partisan control.

The second AVNOJ conference took place in the Bosnian town of Jajce in November 1943. It took two main decisions. Firstly, it officially formed a temporary government and proclaimed Tito as its president. The royal government in exile in London was declared illegal. King Peter II Karadjordjevic was banned from returning to Yugoslavia until "the people" decided about the monarchy after the war. Although the monarchy was not formally abolished, the decision opened the door for a process of deep social change, which would lead to the expropriation of considerable parts of the elite and "enemies of the people." Secondly, AVNOJ declared Yugoslavia a federal state of six republics based on the right of self-determination for its different nations, breaking with the centralist concept of the Serb-dominated monarchy.

The year 1943 was also decisive on the military front. The partisans won a series of important battles. In January the Germans and their Italian and Croatian allies started an offensive against the partisans' main units in South Croatia and Western Bosnia (Operation Weiß). But Tito's guerilla army managed to escape into Central Bosnia. At the Neretva River the partisans afterwards would defeat the Četniks in a decisive battle. In May the Germans and Italians started the next offensive against the partisans in Montenegro (Operation Schwarz). Although suffering heavy losses, once again the partisans managed to escape in the battle of Sutjeska. Battles continued throughout 1944 until May 1945.

The anti-fascist People's Liberation War, as it was called by the communists, laid the groundwork for the establishment of the new Yugoslav state after World War II. On March 8, 1945 a coalition government was formed in Belgrade with Tito as premier. On November 29, 1945 King Peter II was deposed and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was established as a socialist state. The dominant position of the communists due to their victorious struggle in the war meant that the elimination of bourgeois political forces was faster than in other "people's democracies" in Eastern Europe. A harsh cam-

paign of repression of former collaborators with the Germans, "enemies of the people" and real or imagined anti-communist forces, was conducted. In May 1945 partisans executed around 50,000 Ustaša, Četniks, and members of other anti-partisan formations which had retreated with the German army into Austria, but were turned back on the border to Slovenia by the British. At the same time large parts of the ethnic German and Italian prewar populations, including supporters of the fascist occupation in 1941, were forced to leave the country.

During the time of socialist Yugoslavia between 1945 and 1991 the successful People's Liberation War and its principle of "brotherhood and unity" was the key source of legitimacy for the rule of the Communist Party, which was renamed the League of Communist of Yugoslavia (LCY) in 1952. Between 1945 and 1965 over 30,000 books and essays about the partisan struggle were published. Monuments which commemorated the struggle were built all over the country. The politics of remembrance successfully created, in large parts of the population throughout the country, a feeling of belonging to the new state and identification with the new Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, the institutionalized glorification of the partisan struggle created a dichotomist picture of "good" and "bad," "friend" and "enemy." On one side were the occupiers, collaborators, and traitors, on the other the heroes of the liberation struggle. Passive victims, the survivors of the concentration camps, or the traumatized and invalid veterans did not fit into this simplistic picture and were therefore marginalized in the politics of memory. Controversial issues like inter-ethnic violence and the repression of non-communists were made taboo. In the long run this manichean picture lost credibility and created a countereffect of delegitimization of the political system.

Today, the People's Liberation War is highly disputed in the former countries of Yugoslavia. Attempts at a necessary, differentiated, scientific reevaluation are largely marginalized. Instead, after the breakup of socialist Yugoslavia in 1991, a wave of nationalist and anti-communist revisionism is trying to delegitimize and criminalize the partisan movement. In Croatia alone, about 3,000 monuments paying homage to anti-fascist partisans were destroyed. In the school books of the different post-Yugoslav states the struggle

of the partisans is widely neglected while the anti-communist nationalist collaborationist movements are often glorified. In official discourses the numbers of victims of the German army, Ustaša, Četniks, and other anti-communists are minimized while the numbers killed by the partisans are inflated.

SEE ALSO: Djilas, Milovan (1911–1995); Fascism, Protest and Revolution; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Yugoslavia, Resistance to Cominform, 1948

References and Suggested Readings

- Manoschek, W. (1995) *“Serbien ist judenfrei”: Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941/42*. Munich: R. Oldenbourg.
- Petranović, B. (1988) *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988*, 3 vols. Belgrade: Nolit.
- Ramet, S. (2006) *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Sundhussen, H. (2007) *Geschichte Serbiens. 19.–21. Jahrhundert*. Vienna: Böhlau.
- Tomsevic, J. (2001) *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Yugoslavia, anti-privatization struggles

Andrej Grubacic

To understand neoliberalism in Serbia, one has to go back to the time of Slobodan Milosevic. Of central importance to the rule of Milosevic was the direct political supervision of the country's economic elite. In Milosevic's Serbia the primary means of capital accumulation did not take place in the market. To the contrary, the major financial profits to be had were achieved via state intervention – in other words through state monopoly, systematic privileges, monetary speculation and shady financial transactions, generalized larceny and appropriation of property, illegal imports, and backroom deals and bribes. It was a given that, in such a system, the power elite could not only easily convert their own “political capital” into real financial gains, but could also control and influence the flow and direction of the entire economy.

That is how Milosevic succeeded in constructing a tight clientalistic net around the entire

national economy. It was a net that encompassed any place where capital was being produced, starting with himself and his family, all the way down to factory workers and vendors on the street. Entry into this protected net meant guaranteed financial gain. The most powerful members of that net, the economic elite, could count on rapid accumulation of riches thanks to the market monopoly, from rigged participation in state “barter arrangements” (the import of oil and gas), to the illegal trade in cigarettes, weapons, and other goods.

Thus, in the 1990s, a unique structure of power was installed in Serbia. This structure, or system, could be called a kleptocracy. The neoliberal model would provide this system with a much more sophisticated justification. The key moment for the introduction of the neoliberal doctrine in Serbia was the *petooktobarska revolucija* of 2001 (October 5th revolution) and the overthrow of Milosevic, which many leftists hoped would result in real, socially progressive change. However, instead of any meaningful steps towards an economic and participatory democracy, a neoliberal system with a distinctly local accent was installed, an economic shock treatment imposed, and a new authoritarian doctrine established: that of Zoran Djindjic.

By mid-2002 Djindjic had essentially taken over Milosevic's entire system of political control of society. Moreover, armed with the neoliberal rhetoric of “economic transition” and “privatization,” Djindjic, exactly as Milosevic had before him, succeeded in gaining control of the legislative, executive, judicial-political, economic elite. Milosevic's system was thereby transposed into a new, neoliberal Serbia.

Zoran Djindjic, and his successors, the so-called neoliberal or “IMF” political class, installed a very specific ideological monopoly on reforms and reformism. The notion that Djindjic was a “pragmatic reformer” who was trying to “lead a dark and backward Serbia into Europe” and similar ideological platitudes were quickly absorbed not only by western governments and all sorts of analysts, but also by the Yugoslav media, and by members of the local “opposition” – the “friendly civil society” comprised of several influential non-governmental organizations. Protagonists of this peculiar “neoliberal consensus” were sympathetic to the long line of laws and policies proposed by Djindjic's government (on privatization, work, taxes) in order to bring Serbia into the world of “strict but just market capitalism.”

In other words there was no essential difference between Milosevic's and Djindjic's systems. A similar, voracious logic of power saturated both systems, and the outcry against it that began during Milosevic's rule continued to resound in the period of neoliberal transition. The neoliberal system both aggravated the myriad social problems that exist in today's Serbia and initiated new ones. Current social conditions are truly catastrophic. Poverty is deepening vastly and spreading widely. The number of unemployed is approaching 1 million. Every day over 15,000 workers demonstrate; 70 percent of the population declares itself to be below the poverty line.

Serbia is a country with the largest number of strikes in Europe, a country where more than 1 million unemployed workers march, and a country in which transition boils down to the property of 8 million people pouring into the pockets of eight people. This is being described as the inevitable side-effect of "technocratic reformism."

What is the nature of working conditions in transitional Serbia governed by the neoliberal elite? According to research conducted by the activists from the Freedom Fight collective, within 50 of the "largest private or foreign-owned companies in the country it was impossible to find a single labor organization." Workers who attempted to organize were discouraged and stopped through various informal means such as managers giving strong "advice" or by simply firing "meddlesome workers" in order to discourage others from organizing. One of the most surprising discoveries of this research was that two of the companies explicitly stated in their code of conduct for workers that labor organizing is not welcome. This is, of course, in stark violation of Article 206 of the Labor Code which explicitly states that "workers have a guaranteed freedom to organize and to act without approval." Recognizing the limitations of the research, as interviews and surveys only cover full-time or temporary hired workers and thus neglect black market workers – among the most precarious and vulnerable segments of the new working class – Freedom Fight considers the research results, quite rightly, "scandalous."

The crucial moment for the articulation of anti-privatization struggles was the case of the pharmaceutical factory Jugoremedija in the town of Zrenjanin. The factory was privatized in 2000, in such a way that 58 percent of the shares were

given to the workers, and the state took 42 percent. In 2002 the state sold its shares to a transitional capitalist who made his fortune smuggling cigarettes and was wanted by Interpol. As with all the other buyers involved in Serbian privatization, this wasn't seen as a problem, as the only other alternative would, in the words of one Serbian daily, "bring us back to the dark days of self-management." The PR statements put forth by the company held that the new owners had been facing obstructions from the beginning by shareholders and workers, and that workers had obstructed the previous management as well. "These are remnants of the communist self-management system in which workers were allowed to meddle in everything," one report read. Breaking all the rules, the state allowed the new co-owner of Jugoremedija to become the dominant owner of the factory. Through various illegal maneuvers the ownership structure was changed: the new owner was given 68 percent of the shares and the workers' portion was reduced to 32 percent.

In December 2003 the workers began a strike and a factory occupation, as well as a lawsuit against the recapitalization. This was the first workplace occupation in post-socialist Serbia. In May 2004 the state, pressed by the workers, investigated the privatization of Jugoremedija and found that the new owners were in violation of the privatization contract. Still, the state did nothing to intervene. In response, the workers, mainly women, came to the capital, Belgrade, and occupied the state's Privatization Agency for one whole day. One of the memorable anecdotes from this occupation was when workers answered, with one voice, the question of who was their leader: "We are all leaders." Probably less because of the horizontalist ethics of the workers, and more because the Privatization Agents were locked in a room with no air conditioning, only after this spectacular occupation did the state begin to take the violation seriously. Meanwhile, the factory occupation continued. PR agents called it "a rebellion, a state of anarchy, and a taking of the factory by force," one which warranted intervention and the hiring of private security forces to protect it from future rebellions.

This so-called "private security" inflicted severe injuries on a number of strikers. They even used trained dogs. One woman was badly injured, two women had dislocated arms, and one worker received a blow to the head. In an incredible scene,

women workers laid down in front of security vans, with signs declaring “This is OUR factory” and defended their workplace. Throughout the summer of 2004 a private army sent by the new boss tried several times to take over the factory, but the workers, with breathtaking courage, forced them to leave, sometimes using their bodies to block military vehicles. In September 2004 the private army was joined by Serbian police, who had the order to evict the workers. Police and the private army forced their way into the factory, resulting in the hospitalization of many workers and the arrest of four of the strike leaders. The workers were then charged with disturbing the peace. As soon as the factory had been physically emptied in this way the 200 workers were illegally fired.

The most definitive development in the anti-privatization struggle centering on Jugoremedija was the convergence and solidarity between activists of the Serbian alter-globalist movement Another World is Possible (DSM!) and the workers. There were many moving details in this struggle: moments of mutual aid and solidarity that cut across class and regional differences. At the Peoples Global Action conference in Belgrade convened by DSM! in August 2004, workers from Jugoremedija joined with workers from other factories to form the Union of Workers and Shareholders of Serbia. At first the union’s mission was limited to the struggle against corruption in privatization, but after experiencing different aspects of Serbian privatization the union came out with another demand – the call for a constituent assembly. They believed that the people should make the decisions that effect their lives and workplaces, and that a new constitution could help make this happen. Graffiti appeared on the walls of Belgrade asking, “Who owns our factories?”

Although without jobs for two years, the workers of Jugoremedija refused to quit. Their militancy and creative direct action made them a symbol of resistance to neoliberal capitalism in Serbia. At long last, as a response to a series of direct and legal actions, workers won the struggle. Jugoremedija was the first victory of the anti-privatization struggles in Serbia.

Privatization of Zrenjanin’s Sinvoz, a railcar manufacturing and repair plant, began in 1990, as required by the Law on Social Capital. By 1993, when privatization efforts were suspended due to hyperinflation, the Sinvoz workers had acquired

14 percent of shares in the company. In 2004 privatization was reinitiated under the new Law on Privatization. Sinvoz workers and retirees held 30 percent of company shares, while the state sold the remaining 56 percent to a new owner, who personally attended the share auction. At the time of the share auction, Sinvoz employed approximately 870 people.

In the summer of 2006, for the first time ever, Sinvoz workers went out on strike over the issue of unpaid wages. With the intervention of the Ministry of Finance, the strike was suspended after two weeks, but it soon became apparent that the majority owner had no intention of fulfilling the strikers’ demands. In November 2007 Sinvoz went into bankruptcy. The leading bankruptcy trustee appointed was a company also owned by the same boss. Approximately 470 workers were employed at Sinvoz when it became bankrupt; all of them lost their jobs on the same day the trustees were appointed.

On December 28, 2007, after the suicide of one of their fellow workers, about 400 Sinvoz worker-shareholders blockaded the factory and demanded the cancellation of the privatization agreement with the boss and relief from bankruptcy. The worker-shareholders of Sinvoz, together with the worker-shareholders from the Zrenjanin factory BEK (which was also privatized and then forced into bankruptcy), demanded the privatization of Sinvoz be cancelled as well as bankruptcy relief for both companies.

Both factories are now under worker occupation. The workers of occupied factories, together with the workers of Jugoremedija, have established a relationship of solidarity with the workers of Frapè Behr, the occupied factory in Spain. The alter-globalist network of DSM!, now reorganized under the name Freedom Fight, has continued to provide assistance in the struggle. In one of the most remarkable displays of internationalism and solidarity in the Balkans, workers of Jugoremedija began to finance the Serbian edition of the American *Z* magazine, published by the Freedom Fight activists, by and large anarchist-leaning students from Belgrade. A recent issue of the magazine, proposed by the workers, was devoted to the model of participatory economics, participatory planning, and a participatory workplace, a model that is widely recognized as a viable path for workers’ self-management. The participatory model of self-management suggests economic reorganization

that calls for the abolition of the market and the corporate division of labor, recognizing in them the chief structural problems inscribed in the historical experience of Yugoslav self-management.

SEE ALSO: Neoliberalism and Protest; Workers' Self-Management, Yugoslavia

References and Suggested Readings

- Grubacic, A. (2003) *Globalizacija Neprijateljstvo*. Svetovi: Novi Sad.
- Momcilovic, I. (2003) *It's Great We Are Everywhere, We Thought We Were Quite Alone. In Notes from Nowhere (Eds.), We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anti-Capitalism*. New York: Verso.

Yugoslavia, formation of the non-aligned movement

Boris Kanzleiter

The formal establishment of the non-aligned movement (NAM) was the culmination of increasing convergence of its main member states who sought a path independent of the USSR and the US in the wake of the outbreak of the Cold War in 1948. The term "non-alignment" itself was first coined by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954. A significant step toward the development of the NAM was the Bandung Conference in 1955 in Indonesia, in which leaders of Asian and African states who had gained independence from colonial rule after World War II participated. Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito took the initiative to form the NAM while Jawaharlal Nehru and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt were visiting Yugoslavia in July 1956. Following the split with Moscow in 1948, the Yugoslav communists were looking increasingly for cooperation with the postcolonial states in Asia and Africa to counterbalance political pressure from the USSR and the US.

The founding of NAM at its first official conference in September 1961 in Belgrade was an important step in the promotion of political cooperation between a number of postcolonial states that included India, Egypt, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia, with the latter being NAM's main European member. The nation-states attending the summit in Belgrade sent a letter calling

for US President John F. Kennedy and Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev to "remove the danger of war in the world and enable mankind to embark upon the road to peace." In a declaration signed by 25 governments at the summit, the NAM called for "an end to the Cold War" and an international policy of "peace-loving coexistence." The heads of state demanded that the "right of self-determination," "independence," and "freedom to determine the form and way of economic, societal and cultural development" of every nation should be the foundations of international relations.

The political bases of non-alignment may be understood in terms of the five Ds. The NAM demanded:

1. the completion of the process of decolonization, which was initiated broadly in the aftermath of World War II and continued into the 1950s, 1960s, and beyond;
2. disarmament and an end to the Cold War arms race;
3. a policy of development of the postcolonial world and a "new international economic order" to consolidate political independence of the postcolonial states by economic emancipation;
4. a policy of détente (relaxation/easing of tensions) between East and West and peaceful development of international relations; and
5. dissemination, the "decolonization of information," and a "new international order in information" to overcome the monopolization of information by major news agencies based in the US and Europe.

During the 1960s and 1970s NAM gained considerable political influence throughout the newly independent states in the global South. Among the most active members during this period were Yugoslavia, India, Algeria, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Cuba, and Mexico. NAM was an important ally for movements of national liberation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism. It spoke out against the Vietnam War and supported Latin American emancipation movements like the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in the 1970s and 1980s. On the other hand, NAM was never able to adopt a coherent political program. Its members followed differing strategies of development. Although

NAM demanded democratization of international relationships, many of its member states did not guarantee basic democratic rights to their own citizens. Also, the basic principle of non-alignment was not followed by some of the member states. A typical example of crisis was the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979. While NAM members close to Moscow, like Cuba, supported the military action, other members, particularly Muslim countries, protested against it.

NAM lost its importance particularly after the end of the Cold War. Yugoslavia, one of its key founding members, ceased to exist in 1991. Today, 118 states are members of NAM, representing 55 percent of the world's population and almost two-thirds of the votes in the UN General Assembly. After the conferences in Belgrade (1961), Cairo (1964), and Lusaka (1970), summits take place every three years, the last summit taking place in Havana in 2006.

SEE ALSO: Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970); Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889–1964); Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980)

References and Suggested Readings

- Bogetic, D. (1990) *Koreni jugoslovenskog opredeljenja za nesvrstanost*. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju.
- Köchler, H. (Ed.) (1982) *The Principles of Non-Alignment*. Vienna: Third World Centre.
- Mates, L. (1970) *Nesvrstanost – Teorija i savremena praksa*. Belgrade: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu.
- Matthies, V. (1985) *Die Blockfreien: Ursprünge, Entwicklung, Konzeptionen*. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.
- Rubinstein, A. Z. (1970) *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Yugoslavia, Marxist humanism, *Praxis* group, and Korčula Summer School, 1964–1974

Boris Kanzleiter

The publication of the first issue of the magazine *Praxis* in September 1964 initiated a philosophical and political project searching for “humanist socialism.” The official sponsor of the magazine was the Croatian Philosophical Society. The

editorial board was formed by university professors in Zagreb and Belgrade. Prominent leftist intellectuals from all over the world formed an advisory council in 1966. Within a short time the international edition of *Praxis*, published in German, French, and English, became one of the most influential Marxist publications until it was closed down in 1974. In socialist Yugoslavia it was the intellectual center of Marxist trends, openly confronting the regime of the ruling League of Communist of Yugoslavia (LCY).

In the preface to the first issue the editors stated the “desire” to create a journal “in which philosophy is the thought of revolution.” An allusion to a famous statement by Marx, it proclaimed the “merciless critique of all existing conditions” as its methodological groundwork. Professor Gajo Petrovic, one of the founders, explained in an article: “Socialism is the sole human outlet offered to mankind to the difficulties with which it is struggling, and Marx’s thought is the theoretical basis of, and the most adequate inspiration for, revolutionary action.” At the same time he made clear that *Praxis* was breaking with the determinist conceptions of dogmatic Soviet Marxism and called for the “revitalization and development” of the “philosophical thought” mainly in Marx’ early writings.

In the following years *Praxis* opened pluralistic debates on a variety of philosophical and political topics. Each issue featured a special theme to which a series of essays was devoted. The topics ranged from general problems of philosophy (e.g., “What is History?”) to culture (e.g., “Art in the Modern World”) and critical analysis of the political development of Yugoslavia (e.g., “The Moment of Yugoslav Socialism”). Certain issues contained in-depth considerations of individual thinkers like Karl Marx himself, Antonio Gramsci, or Leon Trotsky. Most essays were contributed by members of the editorial board, such as Milan Kangrga (Zagreb), Gajo Petrović (Zagreb), Mihailo Marković (Belgrade), Ljubomir Tadić (Belgrade), and Zagorka Golubović (Belgrade). Others were written by members of the international advisory board, such as Ernst Bloch, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Lucien Goldmann, and many other leading critical intellectuals from East and West.

Praxis was never a homogenous group of thinkers which defined a narrow position or program. It was rather a platform offering debate and communication. An important function for the

project was the annual “summer school” organized by *Praxis* members on the Adriatic island of Korčula between 1963 and 1974. Here, the editors, students from Yugoslav universities, members of the advisory board, and other international guests discussed in an open atmosphere. Every year (except 1966 when the school had to be cancelled because of intense pressure by the LCY) the summer school was dedicated to one main subject. The discussions were later published in the magazine and included the topics Progress and Culture (1963), Meaning and Perspectives of Socialism (1964), What is History? (1965), Creativity and Creation (1967), Marx and Revolution (1968), Power and Humanity (1969), Hegel and Our Time (1970), Utopia and Reality (1971), Freedom and Equality (1972), The Essence and Limits of Civil Society (1973), and Art in a Technologized World (1974).

The editors of *Praxis* generally supported the experiment of Worker’s Self-Management identified with socialist Yugoslavia and were members of the LCY. Some of them, like Mihailo Marković, had been combatants in the anti-fascist partisan movement which liberated Yugoslavia from German occupation during World War II. *Praxis* was however increasingly critical of the specific politics and power structures the LCY represented. The magazine called for “democratization” and a fight against “bureaucracy.” The consequences were open conflicts with the LCY.

In the summer of 1968 Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito accused *Praxis* professors in Belgrade and Zagreb University of being behind the student protests which had erupted in Yugoslavia. *Praxis* on the other hand sharpened their criticism of the reality of Self-Management Socialism. In February 1975 a group of eight leading *Praxis* professors (Mihailo Marković, Ljubomir Tadić, Zagorka Golubović, Svetozar Stojanović, Miladin Životić, Dragoljub Mićunović, Nebojša Popov, and Trivo Indjić) were expelled from Belgrade University. The magazine had already ceased publication due to increasing pressure from the regime in 1974. From 1981 until 1994 a journal named *Praxis International* was published abroad, in an attempt to continue the project.

The controversial debate about *Praxis* in the first place contains philosophical questions the editors had raised. On the other hand, discussions

center around the concrete political role *Praxis* and its former members played in socialist Yugoslavia and still play today. Some Yugoslav anti-socialist critics say *Praxis* never challenged the LCY’s leading role and was not calling for party pluralism. Some of the Belgrade-based *Praxis* professors were accused of having turned to a Serbian nationalist position in the late 1980s. Most notably, Mihailo Marković took the position of a vice president in Slobodan Milošević’s Socialist Party of Serbia at the beginning of the 1990s. On the other hand, many *Praxis* members like Nebojša Popov played a leading role in the anti-nationalist, anti-war movements in the 1990s.

SEE ALSO: Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Yugoslavia, Student Protests, 1966–1974

References and Suggested Readings

- Gruenwald, O. (1983) *The Yugoslav Search for Man: Marxist Humanism in Contemporary Yugoslavia*. South Hadley, MA: J. F. Bergin.
- Popov, N. (1989) *Contra Fatum. Slučaj Grupe Profesora Filozofskog Fakulteta u Beogradu 1968–1988*. Belgrade: Mladost.
- Popov, N. (Ed.) (2003) *Sloboda i nasilje: Razgovor o časopisu Praxis i Korčulanskoj letnjoj školi*. Belgrade: Res publica.
- Rütten, U. (1993) *Am Ende der Philosophie? Das gescheiterte “Modell Jugoslawien” – Fragen an Intellektuelle im Umkreis der PRAXIS-Gruppe*. Klagenfurt: Drava.
- Secor, L. (1999) Testaments Betrayed: Yugoslav Intellectuals and the Road to War. *Lingua Franca* 9/6. Available at www.linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9909/testbet.html (downloaded February 13, 2008).
- Sher, G. S. (1977) *Praxis – Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Yugoslavia, resistance to Cominform, 1948

Boris Kanzleiter

Yugoslavia’s break with the USSR represents the first major split in the communist world movement after World War II. On June 28, 1948, the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties (Cominform), after months of conflict, issued a resolution expelling the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), then under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito. The Stalin-led alliance of the major communist parties in

Europe accused the Yugoslavs of “deviation from Marxism Leninism,” “unfriendly politics” against the Soviet Union, and the “abolishment of the position of the working class.” According to the resolution the errors of the CPY had led to the growth of “capitalist elements” especially amongst the farmers, the negation of the “leading role” of the Communist Party as well as “nationalism” in the CPY’s foreign policies.

The CPY Central Committee rejected Moscow’s attack. Although Tito tried to show loyalty to Stalin in the weeks after the resolution, the gap could not be bridged again. Already in the resolution Cominform had called upon “healthy” parts of the membership to overthrow Tito’s leadership group. The Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe proclaimed an economic blockade against heretic Yugoslavia. In 1949 and 1950 the situation escalated further: the Hungarian army was reinforced largely with Soviet support. The possibility of an invasion was evident. Yet in the meantime Tito had turned to the West for support. The US threatened with a military response in the case of a Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia. The fragile status quo was maintained.

Although the Cominform resolution argued concretely against a number of political decisions of the CPY, ideological difference is not considered the primary factor for the Soviet condemnation of Yugoslav communists. Rather, behind the split lay Stalin’s wish to control Tito and the Yugoslav communists who were seeking a relation of partnership rather than subordination to Moscow. The material base for the CPY’s self-consciousness and confidence was its military victory in the anti-fascist “People’s Liberation War” against the Wehrmacht and its collaborationists (1941–5), a victory achieved without major support from the allies. The strength and international prestige gained in the war enabled the CPY to conduct a relatively independent domestic and foreign policy.

Already during the war the CPY’s decision to form a partisan-led government to replace the monarchy in the second session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in November 1943 had met with resistance from Stalin. After the war, the CPY’s continuing support of the communist partisans in the last stage of the Civil War in Greece (1946–9) and of the territorial claims of Yugoslavia in Carinthia (Austria) and in Venezia

Giulia and Gorizia (Italy) were rejected by the Soviet Union, which was not interested in confrontation with the western powers. A conflict between Moscow and Belgrade had also developed around the question of the formation of a Balkan federation. Notably, Tito did not hesitate to exchange support for Greek partisans for US political support for Yugoslavia to maintain control over Macedonia.

The first schism between two ruling communist parties had severe consequences. In Yugoslavia several senior partisan generals and leading communist politicians had sided with Stalin. They were repressed by a purge conducted by Tito against real or alleged supporters of Cominform. An estimated 11,000–15,000 persons were arrested and sent to a prison on Goli Otok (“naked island”) in the Adriatic Sea. On the other hand, in several socialist states in Eastern Europe purges against real or alleged “Titoists” were initiated, coming to an end in the early 1950s. In Czechoslovakia in 1952, the former general secretary of the Communist Party, Rudolf Slansky, was sentenced to death and executed.

After Stalin’s death in March 1953, the new chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, and Tito normalized relations between the two countries. In the “Belgrade Declaration” of June 1955 they agreed on the “respect on sovereignty, independence, integrity, and equality” as well as “non-interference” and “peaceful coexistence” in relationships between the states. In the long run, Belgrade’s split with Moscow enabled Yugoslavia to conduct even more independent internal and foreign policies. Yugoslavia was forced to find its “own way to socialism,” which led to its proclamation of “workers’ self-management” and “nonalignment” between the power blocks between East and West during the period of block confrontation.

SEE ALSO: Internationals; Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Workers’ Self-Management, Yugoslavia; Yugoslavia, Anti-Fascist “People’s Liberation War” and Revolution, 1941–1945; Yugoslavia, Formation of the Non-Aligned Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Banać, I. (1988) *With Stalin, against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Clissold, S. (Ed.) (1975) *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939–1973*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Dedijer, V. (Ed.) (1979) *Dokumenti 1948*, 3 vols. Belgrade: Rad.
- Kačavenda, P. & Tripković, D. (Eds.) (1999) *Jugoslovensko-sovjetski sukob 1948. godine*. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju.
- Vucinich, W. S. (Ed.) (1982) *At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito–Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective*. New York: Brooklyn College Press.

Yugoslavia, student protests, 1966–1974

Boris Kanzleiter

The Yugoslav student protests in June 1968 embraced the struggle for freedom, justice, and self-determination, defined as the underlying moral and political principles of the global youth movements of the era. Yugoslav protests were also marked by a protest between eastern and western influences integrating anti-capitalist and anti-bureaucratic elements. The protest also affirmed the fundamental values and ideologies of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRFY). In essence, the Yugoslav students protested in the name of communist principles against a hypocritical and frustrating reality.

The climax of the student movement was the week-long strike at Belgrade University from June 3–9, 1968, spreading to other university centers in Zagreb, Ljubljana, and Sarajevo. The occupied university in Belgrade was renamed Red University Karl Marx. Students and many professors who supported the action established democratically elected action committees (*akcioni odbori*) and held conventions (*zborovi*). In declarations the protesters demanded “abolition of all privileges for the elites, democratization of all information media and freedom of assembly and demonstration.” A popular slogan was “Down with the red bourgeoisie!” The protesters affirmed however the ideological groundwork of the ruling system, calling for an extension of the system of workers’ self-management. A statement said: “We do not have our own program. Our program is the program of the most progressive forces of our society – the program of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia (LCY) and the constitution. We demand that it should be put consequently into practice.”

June 1968 was the first open revolt since consolidation of power of the Communist Party

following World War II. In heated debates, students, professors, and citizens discussed the country’s problems. With police blocking the facilities, curious crowds gathered and actors, writers, artists, and delegations of workers showed solidarity. The leadership of the ruling LCY was deeply shocked. On June 4, 1968, at a meeting of the inner circle of the party, Stevan Doronjski declared that Belgrade was in a state of “extremely electrified psychosis.” If workers were to take to the streets, which he considered a possibility, then the army should be deployed. LCY leader Josip Broz Tito reacted with an astonishing move. In a televised speech on June 9 he said students were “right” with most criticisms and promised to resign if the situation did not improve. His call for students to end the strike was subsequently honored.

The protests of June 1968 were part of a longer protest cycle at Yugoslav universities lasting from 1966 to 1974, consisting of three phases. In the first period (1966–8) the official student league articulated a series of social demands to improve students’ conditions in a confrontational manner. The demands were in the context of reform politics, introduced by the LCY in 1964, bringing many looming social and political contradictions to the surface of open public debate. Politicized students began articulating demands independently from official structures. Theoretical magazines like *Praxis*, edited by a series of university professors, formulated criticism on the basis of humanist Marxism. Students discussed the escalating student unrest in western countries, and protests in Poland and Czechoslovakia, while new global trends in the arts were creatively received.

During the second phase from June 1968 to the end of 1971 the LCY leadership sought to control the movement through selective repression and integration. Instead of mollifying unrest, government actions instead radicalized student activists, who expanded criticism of authoritarian power structures and official corruption that they perceived as hypocritical and morally bankrupt. They warned that social and regional economic imbalances in Yugoslavia, as well as the empowerment of regional elite structures in the federal republics through a policy of “decentralization” without democratization, could increase nationalist sentiment. In October 1970, in Belgrade, and in June 1971, in Ljubljana, several thousand students took strike action against the repression

of a series of key activists who were imprisoned, including 1968 strike leader Vladimir Mijanović.

The third phase of the student movement began in late 1971 through the beginning of 1975. After a nationalist movement in Croatia that included a student strike at Zagreb University was suppressed at the end of 1971 (later called the Croatian Spring), a government crackdown ensued throughout Yugoslavia. A last moment of student activism was sparked by the February 1975 eviction of *Praxis* group professors from Belgrade University.

The student movement of 1968 marked a significant rupture in the political development of the SFRY through demystifying the political power elite of the LCY. Until the breakup of the country in 1991 the student protests were taboo for public discussions and scientific research. The student demonstrations, essentially supportive of

Yugoslav integration and socialism, are absent from most dominant “nationalist” histories, which reject the multinational Yugoslavia as an “artificial” state created and maintained by pure force.

SEE ALSO: Tito, Josip Broz (1892–1980); Workers’ Self-Management, Yugoslavia; Yugoslavia, Marxist Humanism, *Praxis* Group, and Korčula Summer School, 1964–1974

References and Suggested Readings

- Arsić M. & Marković, D. R. (1985) '68. *Studentski bunt i društvo*, 2nd ed. Belgrade: Istraživačko centar SSO Srbije.
- Popov, N. (1990) *Sukobi. Društveni sukobi – izazov sociologiji*, 2nd ed. Belgrade: Centar za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju.
- Sher, G. S. (1977) *Praxis – Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Z

Zambian nationalism and protests

Miles Larmer

International understanding of Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia) is usually framed by a regional southern African perspective, dominated by first President Kenneth Kaunda (who ruled from 1964 to 1991, from 1973 as the leader of a one-party state) and his morally informed stand against settler colonialism and apartheid South Africa. However, a more compelling theme in the country's domestic history is the consistent influence of the crowd on national affairs.

In the first half of the twentieth century industrial action, protest marches, rural rebellions, and urban riots provided a considerable impetus to improvements in living standards, the rights of Africans in a colonial setting, and the achievement of national independence in 1964. Continued protests and struggles, while not preventing the country's profound economic and social decline since independence, have consistently reversed the implementation of unpopular policies, provided a significant check on the abuse of political power, and played a major role in the return of democracy in 1991.

Throughout Zambia's history, acts of political protest, resistance, and rebellion have been framed by a largely implicit debate about the meaning of independence. The nationalist struggle of the 1950s against British colonial domination was not, in the minds of those who took part, simply a movement to replace the trappings of British imperialism with the new symbols of a largely invented Zambian state. For most grassroots activists (although not all leaders), implicit in the nationalist project was a revolutionary transformation in both personal and collective prosperity and power, as part of a variously imagined new international post-colonial political and

economic order. This new order would enable Zambia to overcome the poverty and marginality that appeared to result from its peoples' forced integration, at the end of the nineteenth century, into a European-dominated global political economy as a supplier of cheap raw materials (specifically, copper). It would thus take its place on the world stage as a "modern" nation-state. The challenges and arguments surrounding attempts to move towards economic independence have underlain not only the actions of the Zambian state, but also disparate sections of Zambian society seeking to realize their own hopes and aspirations for such a process of change.

Urbanization and Working-Class Protest

Zambian politics were shaped by its early and sustained urbanization. In the 1930s the colonial backwater of Northern Rhodesia was transformed into a major global producer of copper. Multinational mining companies rapidly expanded production in the remote Copperbelt region, bordering the Belgian (now the Democratic Republic of the) Congo. Five large mines were producing 116,634 tonnes of copper by 1936, rising to 268,551 tonnes in 1941. Skilled white labor was attracted from South Africa and elsewhere by relatively high wages. Simultaneously, tens of thousands of unskilled African miners were recruited, drawn into the cash economy through taxation and a growing desire for consumer goods. From 7,459 African mine-workers in 1933, the black workforce doubled to 14,023 in 1936, reaching 26,023 by 1940.

White miners, taking advantage of their scarce skills and utilizing the model of racially based labor systems established elsewhere in southern Africa, were able to secure a *de facto* color bar separating "white" and "African" jobs. Africans were objectified as rural and tribal,

working only for “target” wages, and banned from settling permanently in the new mining towns. This migrant labor system passed the costs of labor reproduction onto rural African societies and served to justify low “single male” wages, making Northern Rhodesian copper production among the most profitable in the world. The weak colonial state was, however, never able fully to enforce migration controls. The mines’ requirement for increasingly skilled labor also promoted effective African stabilization, without any official acceptance of African urbanization. Cross-border migration also played a key role in spreading movements like the radical Industrial and Commercial Workers Union, of which a section was formed in Livingstone in 1931. Colonial neglect of the African labor question was decisively exposed by the mine strikes of 1935 and 1940. An increase in poll tax sparked the 1935 strike; this was ultimately put down by force, with six miners killed. Following the strike, colonial officials attempted to stem the stabilization of the African labor force. Africans evaded relatively inefficient colonial pass laws, migrating between mines to ensure continued urban employment.

Official anxiety focused on white mineworkers, who brought the South African practice of militant, if racially based, labor organization. Charlie Harris of the South African Mine Workers Union (SAMWU) went to Northern Rhodesia, and the SAMWU section that was established evolved into the independent whites-only Northern Rhodesian Mineworkers’ Union (NRMWU) in 1936, and secured a job color bar in 1938. In 1941 a segregationist Labor Party was established on the lines of the South African Labor Party, winning several seats in mining constituencies.

In 1940 NRMWU members struck and won a substantial wage increase. This provided an instructive example to African workers, who struck immediately afterwards: African miners demanded 10 shillings a day, access to jobs reserved for whites, and equal wages with them. “Tribal” representatives appointed by the mine companies as an alternative to African trade unions were unable to control the dispute, the real leaders of which remained anonymous. The strike was well organized, but a confrontation between 3,000 strikers and 150 working men was put down by troops; 17 were killed and 60 injured. This episode placed African miners at the center of official concern.

While reluctant to accept African unions, the companies and colonial authorities feared, above all, the creation of a unified trade union representing both African and European labor. If the racism of most white mineworkers made this unlikely, “junior” African branches of the NRMWU were actually established in 1946. The railway strike of 1945, spanning both Northern and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), provided an additional warning of African labor militancy.

These events shaped a newly “enlightened” company attitude that conceded the need for African unions. The postwar British Labour government sought to address African demands, sending British union officials to help establish “non-political” African unions that would negotiate without recourse to industrial action. The African Mineworkers’ Union (AMWU) was established in 1949 and a Trade Union Congress (TUC) in 1951. The government’s role in establishing trade unions led some to see them as an imposition from above, with limited capacity to represent African workers (Henderson 1972). However, mineworkers embraced the new unions enthusiastically. AMWU membership rose rapidly from 50 percent of the 37,000-strong labor force in 1949 to 80 percent in 1953. The new unions, however, did not improve industrial relations. Between 1949 and 1953, 30 disputes and 12 strikes occurred, as African mineworkers took the opportunity to express grievances. Activists took bodies designed to be mechanisms of control and remade them in their own interests. AMWU culture emphasized branch and shop steward organization and democratic accountability. Epstein (1958/1973) described monthly branch meetings attended by 8,000 miners where “rank and file members are free to participate in the discussions.” Parpart (1983) demonstrated the importance of community organization and the role of women in particular to ensure effective industrial action, for example in preventing scabbing.

Independent Christianity

As elsewhere in central and southern Africa, Christian missionary activity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries gave rise to a new generation of mission-educated Africans. These newly literate Africans read stories of struggle and injustice in the Bible, drew comparisons to their subordinate position in colonial society,

and often established new theological approaches and independent churches, rooted in a millennial Christianity. Independent churches accused whites of withholding Bible truths, particularly the promised second coming of Christ. From the 1920s, in the mining communities, on white-owned farms, and along the new rail line to South Africa, religious movements provided radical explanations for the upheavals of colonialism and the money economy. Preachers drew on local and global theologies and iconographies to explain African sufferings, and promised salvation in the next world, the arrival of which was widely thought to be imminent.

From the 1910s the Watch Tower church entered the fierce competition among Northern Rhodesian mission churches for the souls of Africans. Originating from (but different to) Jehovah's Witnesses, Watch Tower provided a theological justification for non-participation in the initiatives of the colonial state, including labor recruitment. Preachers reinterpreted scripture for local consumption, depicting the British as Roman oppressors of true Christians, and implicitly identifying Africans as struggling for their promised land. They did not generally advocate open rebellion: they provided an explanation for the dislocation colonialism wrought on generational, gender, and race relations, rather than a program for their political reversal. Nevertheless, the message of non-cooperation was regarded by secular authorities as a threat to colonial order. Local chiefs, whose powers over their peoples were strengthened (in some cases created) by the colonial state, also found their authority challenged by Watch Tower. Legislative steps were taken to suppress these churches, including the deportation of preachers to Nyasaland (now Malawi) and elsewhere.

At times of extreme societal disruption such as World War I, when British and German forces clashed on the Northern Rhodesian-Tanganyikan borders, new waves of millennial preachers emerged. During the Great Depression, when many newly employed mineworkers were thrown out of work, there was a resurgence of millennial religion, and in particular witch-finding movements, which provided desperate people with compelling mythological explanations of hardship. The 1933–4 *muçapi* movement, introduced from Nyasaland, gave its acolytes medicine which supposedly gave immunity to the innocent and death to those who practiced witchcraft. It was

suspected of influencing the 1935 Copperbelt mineworkers' protest. The government responded by outlawing accusations of witchcraft and the use of poison tests to identify witches.

While many independent churches were temporary phenomena, some were able to sustain themselves. On the Copperbelt, Ernest Muwamba's relatively orthodox but independent Union Church grew in the absence of urban missions. Muwamba was a clerk of Nyasa origin, whose position in the Ndola Welfare Association was just one example of an emerging overlap between such churches and more "modern" forms of African representation.

Welfare Associations and the Rise of African Nationalism

Self-conscious African political organization began among mission-educated Africans who had migrated to line-of-rail towns and rural centers in the early 1930s. Welfare Associations (WAs) were organized by teachers, clerks, and traders, and they sought modest practical improvements in the conditions of elite Africans, and also for the wider population. The Livingstone Native Welfare Association, founded in 1930, protested the removal of Africans to reserves, opposed the arrest of Africans for using foot-paths, and highlighted the worst forms of racial discrimination. Some WAs gave evidence to colonial commissions, seeking a legitimate place for Africans within colonialism. However, the frustration of such aspirations pushed educated men to develop wider alliances with the mass of Africans and to seek more radical solutions.

WAs were closely watched by the colonial authorities. Most were permitted to register as legal organizations, but warned not to get involved in political activity. In practice, the associations increasingly tended towards activities regarded as subversive. A leading member of the Luanshya WA, Henry Chibangwa, called for equal rights and "Justice to we Native people of this colony" as early as 1931. In 1933 the nationwide United African Welfare Associations (UAWA) was established, with Godwin Lewanika among its leading members. The UAWA stressed its moderation, praising the "protection" offered by the colonial authorities from abuse by settler employers. It was, however, seen as political by colonial authorities and denied recognition. Colonial officials, while

apparently seeking “responsible” Africans with whom to discuss limited advancement, tended to regard as subversive those who put themselves forward in this role. This attitude changed somewhat after the Copperbelt riots of 1935; Lord Hailey’s influential 1938 speech called on colonial authorities to relate constructively to moderate African opinion. In practice, Northern Rhodesia’s colonial authorities lacked the resources to meet WA requests for improved African social welfare and development. Nevertheless, new structures for consultation were established. In the late 1930s Urban Advisory Councils (UACs) were appointed: although they lacked formal powers, they were the first recognition that urban Africans needed to be heard.

During World War II expectations of political representation and social and economic advancement increased across the continent. Northern Rhodesians fought in Burma, in a war depicted as a fight for freedom and justice; demobilized soldiers returned with aspirations to end racial domination at home. In 1943 African Provincial Councils (APCs) were appointed for the first time and in 1946 a nationwide African Representative Council (ARC) was established. These bodies provided a training ground for educated Africans such as Harry Nkumbula and Kenneth Kaunda, who would later play a leading role in African nationalist organizations.

Parallel to this, Africans continued to develop their own organizations, drawing on the experiences of neighboring territories. In 1942 Dauti Yamba returned from South Africa with plans to launch an African Congress on the South African model. In 1946 a new Federation of African (Welfare) Societies was formed by Yamba and Lewanika. The organization’s request for official recognition and five ARC seats was rejected on the basis that it was unrepresentative – a rebuff that inevitably highlighted the inability of Africans to elect representatives.

The post-World War II period saw a reassessment of colonial rule in Africa. In southern Africa pressure from whites led to the proposal for a Central African Federation comprising Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, and Southern Rhodesia – designed to entrench settler authority over regional mineral wealth and labor – and was the major stimulus to the development of an overtly nationalist movement in Northern Rhodesia. Individuals and organizations were now forced to confront larger questions of state power,

leading the Federation of African Societies to transform into the Northern Rhodesian Congress in 1948, with Godwin Lewanika its first president. It declared its opposition to Federation, and its demands for African advancement, regardless of class, sex, and tribe. Congress sought to lobby colonial authorities regarding Federation, but its application for representation at the 1949 conference to discuss the issue was rejected.

Congress derived its immediate support from urban Africans, many of whom took its message into rural areas. Opposition to Federation was shared by most Chiefs, the educated elite, and the urban and rural masses, and provided a cohesive focus for Congress. Its growing influence was shown in the selection by the ARC of two Congress supporters as the African representatives on the territories’ Legislative Council in 1951. That year, the ARC voted unanimously against the proposals for Federation.

Road to Independence

The launch of the Central African Federation, scheduled for 1953, stimulated a more radical approach by the renamed African National Congress (ANC), now led by Harry Nkumbula. In 1951 Nkumbula launched a public campaign against Federation and traveled throughout Northern Rhodesia to build support. There were parallel struggles against Federation in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia. Congress was committed to full self-government, as Nkumbula declared: “There is now a rising tide of nationalism among our people. Our national spirit, now ripe, is an upthrust from our long suffering. There is no going back. We are a nation and like any other nation on earth we love to rule ourselves” (quoted in Mulford 1967).

In 1952 Congress initiated a direct action campaign against Federation. To challenge colonial accusations that it was unrepresentative of rural Africans, it sought (and received) the support of Chiefs. Chiefs who supported its campaigns were suspended or, like the Mambwe Paramount, deposed by the colonial authorities. However, 120 chiefs signed a petition against Federation in 1953. Congress saw the trade union movement as its vanguard. The AMWU had 20,000 members by this time, had won significant wage increases in 1952, and had the ability to halt copper production through industrial action.

At the Congress assembly in March 1953 Nkumbula burnt the British parliamentary bill bringing Federation into existence and declared that two days of “national prayer” would take place in April, during which “measures would be taken to paralyze the industries of this country” (Hall 1965/1976). However, there was no organized call by the AMWU to pull out its members. The government mines and large companies threatened employees with dismissal. Although the “stay away” was supported by 50 percent of workers in Lusaka and 80 percent of mine-workers in Mufulira, it was a failure. Federation was introduced and amid demoralization and recriminations many Congress leaders were replaced by younger militants; Kenneth Kaunda was elected secretary general. In 1955 Nkumbula and Kaunda were sentenced to two months’ hard labor; further arrests significantly weakened the ANC.

When Kaunda and Nkumbula were released, the former achieved notable success in rebuilding Congress on the Copperbelt and the Northern Province. In the latter, the loyalty of Chiefs became the focus of opposing nationalist and colonial pressures; Chiefs were rewarded for banning Congress activity in their areas, and deposed for offering support. In rural areas Congress engaged in local conflicts over discriminatory regulations. In the Gwembe Valley during the removal of 30–40,000 people before the flooding of what became Lake Kariba, eight people were killed and 34 wounded when the police opened fire on those refusing to move. Congress campaigned against African exclusion from public places; blacklisted shops in towns were picketed.

Congress launched, but did not control, such campaigns; some businesses were attacked and white-owned houses and cars were stoned. As the economy stagnated in 1957 with the fall of the copper price, unemployed youths expressed the frustration of their aspirations through acts of arson and the derailment of trains. Younger Congress leaders were frustrated by Nkumbula’s moderation in the face of a settler campaign for a Central African “Dominion” that would entrench racial inequality on South African lines. In 1958, following Nkumbula’s support for African participation in elections which militants argued would legitimize Federal structures, Kaunda, Simon Kapwepwe, and others broke away to form the Zambia African National

Congress (ZANC). The ZANC’s election boycott was successful; only 25 percent of eligible Africans registered to vote, ensuring that it could not be portrayed as an endorsement of the political status quo. The ZANC was banned, 2,000 supporters were detained, and its leaders were restricted to rural areas. It was effectively replaced by the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in 1959. UNIP won widespread support and established new branch structures in northern Zambia, and boycotted the Monckton Commission, which was appointed to survey opinion for a review of Federation. UNIP supporters pressured Chiefs to support the boycott. Kaunda, elected UNIP president, pledged the party to non-violence, but insisted Zambia would achieve self-government that year. When Monckton commissioners visited Northern Rhodesia in 1960, UNIP organized demonstrations; Monckton reported an “almost pathological dislike” of Federation.

The authorities sought to impose a new electoral system in 1961, guaranteeing a narrow European majority in a new assembly. Kaunda labeled this a betrayal and declared “practical, non-violent” war against the proposals. By July there was an insurrection in the Copperbelt and northern areas, in what became known as the Cha Cha Cha campaign. Government outposts were cut off and villagers held local marches through the bush chanting UNIP slogans; 27 people were killed, whole villages were burnt by the security forces, and 3,000 were arrested. In September the British offered to negotiate if the disturbances stopped. Kaunda managed to end the uprising, and restrictions on UNIP activities were lifted. From this point forward some form of self-rule seemed inevitable. UNIP participated in the 1962 elections, with UNIP and ANC leaders serving as ministers in a coalition government. UNIP authority was entrenched in a further election in 1964, paving the way for independence later that year.

Alternative Visions of the Post-Colonial Order

However, there was no consensus regarding the meaning of independence among Zambia’s disparate and disconnected peoples. It was initially uncertain whether Zambia would follow the exact contours of Northern Rhodesia. As elsewhere in Africa, the ruling party strenuously

resisted any attempt to redraw colonial borders, fearing the disintegration of territories over which they had gained control into smaller territories based on narrowly drawn interpretations of ethnic allegiance.

For UNIP leaders, demands for autonomy or secession smacked of a revival of the Central African Federation that threatened to remove copper revenue from the future government. The Katanga secession in the Congo was a warning: like the Copperbelt, Katanga was a region of vast mineral wealth, and its secession was supported by multinational mining interests, the Belgian military, South Africa, and Roy Welensky, erstwhile Federation premier (and former NRMWU and Labor Party figure). UNIP thus interpreted any questioning of Zambia's artificial boundaries as the machinations of its enemies in the white-ruled territories across the borders.

In the western region of Barotseland the officially endorsed special status of the Lozi king, the Litunga, presented a particular challenge. With the dissolution of Federation, the Litunga sought the secession of Barotseland, but UNIP argued the region was an integral part of Zambia. UNIP's legitimacy was confirmed by its electoral victory in Barotseland in January 1964. In April an agreement was reached allowing the Litunga to retain limited responsibilities after independence. In return he was forced to accept the incorporation of Barotseland into Zambia and to have a UNIP official as Ngambela, the Lozi first minister. The Barotse aristocracy lost much of its remaining autonomy, but the "Lozi factor" remained important in post-Independence Zambia.

Nor was this the only problem UNIP faced in seeking to establish its supremacy in the period before independence. Radical religious challenges to the secular authorities were another. In Chinsali District the Lumpa Church was launched when in 1953 its spiritual leader Alice Lenshina supposedly died and returned to Earth. Lumpa, like many independent African churches, opposed practices like polygamy and witchcraft. It combined rituals like baptism with the singing of newly composed hymns in CiBemba. Thousands of converts flocked to the Lumpa "cathedral" in Sione, the largest church in the district, which was completed in 1958. Lumpas were regarded as a displaced protest against colonial rule; there was initially no conflict with nationalism. In 1958, however, the Lumpas (like the Watch Tower before them)

refused to recognize any temporal authority. In the run-up to independence, as UNIP began to secure the earthly power it had campaigned for, it faced the withdrawal of the church's members from wider society to live in secluded Lumpa communities. They refused to send their children to state schools and to carry party membership cards, putting them at loggerheads with UNIP's imposition of its authority in an area that was a key battleground during Cha Cha Cha.

UNIP supporters clashed physically with church members in 1963 when they demanded that locals buy and carry UNIP membership cards; Lumpa supporters saw parallels with the hated colonial pass document or "fitupa." UNIP militants burnt Lumpa churches, while the church's supporters retaliated by burning the houses of party officials. Although talks took place between Lenshina and UNIP leaders, no reconciliation was secured on the ground. In June 1964 a new clash between UNIP and the church took place, resulting in the police killing five of the latter's members. Kaunda, now in control of a state on the brink of national independence, ordered the destruction of all Lumpa villages. Church members, fearing the destruction of their only guarantee for salvation, defended themselves against removal. Two thousand soldiers were mobilized, and between August and October the armed forces ruthlessly destroyed the church. Seven hundred people were killed, the vast majority of them church members. Many of the remaining Lumpa supporters fled into the Congo.

The suppression was presented by outgoing colonial authorities and incoming UNIP politicians alike as a triumph of law and order over savagery and superstition. It represented the assertion of a UNIP-dominated unitary nationalism that would, in its subsequent rule of independent Zambia, brook no challenge to its authority. In the decade after independence, local UNIP militants continued to clash with adherents of Watch Tower and other independent churches that refused to recognize state authority by singing the national anthem or saluting the Zambian flag.

Labor Struggles after Independence

The centrality of mining to development plans (copper earned 60–70 percent of the country's gross national product and provided 90–95 percent of government revenue in the 1960s) ensured

that political control of the Copperbelt and its organized workers was a central developmental issue. UNIP, in its efforts to ensure the continued flow of mine revenue, sought to direct mineworkers' labor, curtail their right to strike, and control their union. Weeks after independence, a *Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)* was created under government auspices, designed to discipline member unions. The "election" of ZCTU officials was carefully controlled by the ministry of labor. However, despite UNIP's best efforts, it was unable to do the same with the mineworkers. Zambia's mineworkers could not be subsumed into an officially sanctioned labor movement with no right to strike, as occurred in other post-colonial African states. While most unions were weak, unorganized, and prone to political interference in the first decade after independence, the mineworkers' union, with its strong central organization and powerful branch structure, was able to resist such interference and, in the long term, provide a basis for the growth of an effective national labor movement.

The high expectations workers had at independence for rapid political and economic progress brought them into conflict with UNIP's policy of cooperation with the foreign owners of Zambia's copper mines. While the companies and the state cooperated in restricting wage demands, *Zambian mineworkers* defined their struggles as progressive actions against multinational capital in the context of a highly profitable global industry. Significant strikes broke out 18 months after independence, with mineworkers taking unofficial and illegal strike action in protest at the pay agreement signed by their union leadership. Despite the arrest and "rustication" (deportation to rural areas) of militant branch officials and shop stewards, the strikes succeeded in winning a substantial pay increase. These strikes increased government efforts to ensure effective control over mineworkers. In 1967, under government auspices, a new *Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ)* was established. The new union's leadership was fulsome in its declarations of loyalty to UNIP. It was, however, unable to end the widespread wildcat strike action that continued throughout the industry. Groups of workers pursued a range of grievances, notably efforts to end the job color bar. Zambia's principled stand for non-racialism – equality and political cooperation between white and black – in southern Africa was compromised domestically by its

dependence on a mining industry which continued to pay skilled white mineworkers significantly higher wages and conditions.

Ultimately, Kaunda increased political control over the country's most valuable asset. In 1969 the government announced a 51 percent nationalization of the copper mining companies. Although the state secured greater control over mine revenue, mine management was left in the hands of the multinational companies. One of the key motivations for nationalization was to increase control over the copper revenues; another was to secure control over the strategic industry's workforce, as Kaunda indicated when announcing the move: "The state . . . holds industrial investments, not for its own good, not merely for the good of those directly employed in the state enterprises, but for the benefit of *Zambians everywhere*. Thus, for a union to push a claim against the state is to push a claim against the people" (Government of Zambia 1969). Kaunda then made his position clear by imposing an immediate wage freeze and a temporary ban on strikes.

The MUZ leadership's attempts to play the role assigned to it in UNIP's corporatist vision put it in conflict with its membership. In the early 1970s it faced repeated challenges from branch leaders and shop stewards who more accurately reflected mineworkers' own vision of a post-independence economic settlement, in which the wealth generated by their labor flowed not to an increasingly unaccountable state and its allies in the multinational companies, but to themselves, their families, and their communities. In 1971 this grassroots mineworkers' movement came close to ousting the MUZ leadership, creating fear among government and company officials that the edifice of corporate industrial relations would be toppled. UNIP loyalists were mobilized to physically intimidate mineworkers from taking protest action, and in May 1971, 15 dissident union leaders were detained and rusticated to their villages of origin. The immediate threat to UNIP's control of the mining industry was addressed. However, rank-and-file rebellions succeeded in removing pro-government MUZ leaders in 1982, and again in 1990. While the incidence of industrial action fell drastically in the 1970s, economic decline and the failure of state ownership to address mineworkers' grievances led to renewed unofficial industrial action in the 1980s.

More importantly, mineworkers' militancy and organization provided the inspiration for

the growth of the wider labor movement. During the 1960s the relative autonomy secured by the MUZ encouraged the development of other unions which, by the early 1970s, were effective representative of their membership. Previously controlled by state appointees, the ZCTU was able to elect its own leaders directly for the first time in 1974. Under the new leadership of Frederick Chiluba and Newstead Zimba, the ZCTU emerged as one of the most important critical voices in the one-party state era.

Regional Division and Rural Rebellion

Although UNIP's rhetoric centered on a humanistic and moderate "African socialism," its centralized approach to decision-making expressed itself in the weakening of local government and in 1969 the effective replacement of autonomous local officials with new district governors, appointed by and accountable to President Kaunda. The independent civil service was similarly undermined as the ruling party shaped the post-colonial administration in its image. In this sense, the creation of a one-party state was a process that, although legally confirmed only in 1972, began to be implemented shortly after independence.

Party and state centralization masked considerable unevenness and conflict between Zambia's regions. In the 1960s, high copper earnings enabled the government to distribute significant largesse to the provinces, via, and sometimes into, the hands of loyal supporters. Kaunda's policy of "tribal balancing," the appointment of quotas of various ethno-regional groups to government and state positions, only deepened the sense that competition for central power and funding was defined in "tribal" terms. In a context in which the ruling party's slogan, "It Pays to Belong to UNIP," was interpreted literally by many senior officials, areas of ANC support (particularly Southern Province) perceived themselves as deprived of development funds for political reasons. The ANC nevertheless retained support in the Southern Province and in the 1968 election – the first after Independence – also gained support from Barotse (subsequently Western) Province.

Lozi discontent increased in 1966 when the province's migrant workers were banned from working in South Africa: what was, for UNIP

leaders, a principled isolation of the apartheid regime was, for Lozis, the cause of substantial economic hardship in a poverty-stricken region. Following the 1968 election, in a perceived punishment for the defeat of UNIP candidates, the UNIP government removed the Litunga, and Barotse Province's special status. This remains an issue of contention to this day.

In the Mwinilunga district of North-Western Province, similar unhappiness regarding UNIP's authoritarianism was expressed by local political leaders and by the senior Lunda chief Kanongesha. He and his supporters utilized a nostalgic discourse, evoking the once-powerful Lunda empire in rejecting their subordination to a Lusakabased bureaucracy which appeared no more accountable, nor responsive, to local demands than its colonial predecessor. The Kanongesha, like some other Chiefs, demanded regional autonomy and the removal of centrally appointed officials who undermined his chiefly authority. In 1965, faced with his deposition by the state, Kanongesha led hundreds, possibly thousands, of youthful supporters across the still-fragile border into neighboring Lunda areas of Angola, then ruled by Portugal. The Lunda youths, organized by the Portuguese into a guerrilla force, mounted periodic cross-border raids, fighting the Zambian army as well as Angolan national liberation forces based in Zambia. With the advent of the one-party state they were joined by substantial new recruits. Adamson Mushala resigned from his position as a North-Western Province UNIP organizer in 1966 and became an articulate critic of the ruling party's "dictatorship." In the early 1970s Mushala transferred 100 supporters to the Caprivi Strip in South West Africa (now Namibia), to be trained by South African special forces. However, South Africa's détente policy towards Zambia led to their forcible return into the hands of Zambian forces. Following Angola's achievement of independence, Mushala continued his uneasy alliance with South Africa, encapsulating the dilemma facing rebellious forces in southern Africa during this period: in an era of Cold War politics and the struggle against apartheid, opposing one undemocratic and oppressive state often meant making common cause with another.

In 1975 Mushala and a small band of guerrillas escaped what amounted to South African detention and trekked to their home area in

North-Western Province, launching a small-scale guerrilla war that lasted until Mushala's death at the hands of Zambian security forces in 1982. Mushala gained significant support from local residents who shared his discontent with the lack of development in the area and the oppressive one-party system. Like many supporters and opponents of UNIP, Mushala equated state control of the economy with socialism: he rallied his followers with a heady mixture of regional autonomism, anti-communist rhetoric, and the use of "medicine" which was believed to protect his forces against army bullets. Although he achieved no demonstrable military gains, Mushala made significant parts of North-Western Province no-go areas for party and government officials in the late 1970s, making a significant dent in UNIP hegemony.

UNIP Divided

In most parts of Zambia there was early and sustained dissatisfaction at the failure of national independence to achieve substantial economic and social development. Within UNIP, competition revolved around the attainment of leading government and party positions that enabled senior politicians to channel resources to their areas of origin. Rising competition within the party ultimately led to the breakaway of former Vice President Simon Kapwepwe's United Progressive Party (UPP) in 1971, when Kapwepwe declared "Independence is good, but is meaningless and useless if it does not bring fruits to the masses" (quoted in Larmer 2006). The UPP criticized UNIP's corruption and the lack of democracy. State repression effectively restricted UPP activities to its Bemba-speaking Northern heartlands and the strategic Copperbelt, where it appealed particularly to discontented workers. Hundreds of UPP supporters were detained, with some being tortured; many were dismissed from government employment and had their businesses attacked by UNIP-organized mobs. Nevertheless, the prospect of a UPP-ANC alliance created the possibility of a UNIP defeat at elections due in 1973.

In 1972, therefore, Kaunda introduced a one-party state. While some opposition leaders bowed to the inevitable and joined the new "one-party participatory democracy," others kept the flame of opposition burning, organizing UPP secret committees on the Copperbelt. This

helped ensure a state of paranoia among UNIP leaders, whose formal dominance of the country's political scene was undermined by the virtual collapse of party structures and membership in Bemba-speaking areas.

During this period, Zambia's remaining western-oriented technocratic leaders were marginalized by a group of populist veterans of the liberation struggle, led by the pro-Soviet UNIP Secretary General Grey Zulu. The more the government failed to meet people's aspirations, the more politics was dominated by nostalgia for the certainties of the nationalist struggle. Zambia actively supported the liberation struggles of its southern African neighbors, but many Zambians felt this to be at the expense of their own situation. Economic decline resulted primarily from the dramatic fall in international copper prices, but there was a widespread perception that it was worsened by internal mismanagement, corruption, and the state's increasing domination of economic activity.

In 1977 Kapwepwe and many former UPP supporters rejoined UNIP. The following year both he and Harry Nkumbula sought to challenge Kaunda for the UNIP (and Zambian) presidency. Hasty changes were made to the party's constitution to prevent them standing. At the same time, some of Kapwepwe's lieutenants were accused of bombing a nightclub: although no evidence was ever produced, they were detained for years. Kapwepwe himself died in 1980 in circumstances which led many of his supporters to believe he had been assassinated. With his death, formal political opposition to Kaunda came to an end for a decade.

The inability of Kaunda's opponents to mount an open challenge to his rule within the confines of the one-party state led them to resort to other measures, for example in the coup plot of 1980. Elements of Zambia's educated elite combined with middle-ranking army officers and Katangese opponents of Zairian President Mobutu sese Seko in an attempt to overthrow Kaunda. The plot was uncovered and the plotters tried and convicted. A second coup plot was foiled in 1988.

Anti-IMF Food Riots

In the mid-1970s Zambia's dependence on copper was decisively exposed by the sudden and sustained rise in international oil prices and

the simultaneous collapse in global commodity prices, including copper. With the collapse of the copper price went the vast majority of government revenue, the assumptions on which post-independence development and industrial planning had been built, and the patronage system that oiled state and party structures. Zambia borrowed extensively and unsustainably on international markets, soon making it one of the world's most indebted countries. Lenders, coordinated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), instituted policy conditionalities on future support, regularized in the early 1980s as structural adjustment policies. They pressed Zambia to reduce the size of the state sector, to remove food subsidies, and to reduce social spending; these policies worsened the lives of urban dwellers and led to increasing localized protests.

In December 1986 the IMF secured a major reduction in subsidies on basic foodstuffs, which led to an overnight doubling of the price of the staple, maize meal. Major riots broke out in the Copperbelt towns, with anger directed at both the IMF and the ruling party, whose offices were attacked. Fifteen people were killed in the repression of these riots. The ZCTU called for an end to cooperation with the IMF. The government was forced to reverse the decision, leading international donors to suspend loan payments to Zambia. The following May, Kaunda announced a break from the IMF and the adoption of an indigenous economic policy, which received widespread support. As the IMF ruefully conceded: "The early demise . . . of the adjustment package imposed by the IMF resulted from an unrealistic . . . assumption that the majority of middle and lower income urban Zambians would tolerate pauperization" (World Bank 1989). However, Zambia's inability to manage without donor support led to renewed cooperation in the late 1980s and the resumption of economic liberalization.

Pro-Democracy Movements

Under UNIP's one-party state, open opposition was regarded as treason. Former political opponents, and potential future ones, were kept under close surveillance by the intelligence services. Mild criticism of specific government policies or ministers was therefore carefully combined with general declarations of loyalty to

"the party and its government." Nevertheless, as the economic situation worsened, increasingly vocal attacks on UNIP's failure to arrest ongoing economic decline were made by trade union leaders, senior church figures, and leading business representatives.

The resumption of food subsidies following the 1986 riots was a sign of weakness. Dissidents, encouraged by this development, held secret meetings to discuss how to remove UNIP. Once again, the Copperbelt was a focus of this opposition. ZCTU National Chairman Chiluba, detained in 1982 during a significant strike wave, emerged as Kaunda's most public and forcible critic. In the 1980s he consistently highlighted the gap between UNIP's socialist rhetoric and the reality of its economic policies. By the late 1980s he was addressing underground meetings among union officials and intellectuals on the Copperbelt. The Catholic Church also provided a base for the expression of discontent, with local priests utilizing Latin American-style liberation theology to criticize economic injustice and the lack of political democracy.

A spark to this smoldering discontent was provided by the collapse of the Eastern European regimes in 1989–90. Inspired by the overthrow of apparently unassailable communist one-party states, Chiluba led calls for a return to multi-party democracy. Kaunda was forced by internal unrest and donor pressure to concede a referendum on multi-partyism. In 1990 the government was again forced by donors to remove food subsidies: major riots in Lusaka were followed by a failed coup attempt, which had been widely celebrated on the streets of the capital. Both events revealed the extent of popular discontent. Kaunda now cancelled the referendum, agreeing to a multi-party election in 1991.

Mass urban mobilization was vital to the success of the new Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), which held large rallies in support of an end to the one-party state. The ZCTU provided a powerful organizational basis to the MMD, funding the new party and providing vehicles for its campaign. A substantial rise in industrial action provided an important impetus to rapid and largely peaceful change; strikes combined economic and political demands. As a result, Chiluba was elected MMD president and in October 1991 the second president of Zambia.

Political and Economic Liberalization

The MMD's sweeping electoral victory did nothing to resolve Zambia's economic problems. Copper prices remained low, and despite his record as a longstanding critic of economic liberalization, Chiluba now embarked on one of Africa's most sweeping structural adjustment programs. The government's popular credibility gave it the breathing space to implement the wholesale privatization of state assets and other free market economic policies. The result for most Zambians was a disaster. Incomes fell, educational and health standards collapsed, and life expectancy declined. The capacity of the labor movement to protest was weakened both by the halving of formal sector employment and a post-Cold War ideological vacuum in which, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, there appeared to be no alternative to neoliberalism. The ZCTU, despite its prominent role in establishing and supporting the MMD, had no institutional role in the party. It was marginalized from official policy-making and, weakened and divided, it split in 1996 over its relationship with the MMD (most affiliates subsequently rejoined).

An unfree election in 1996 gave Chiluba a second term in office, during which the corrupt privatization of the loss-making copper mining industry was overseen by an alliance of the international financial institutions, multinational mining corporations, and the MMD government. Popular anger at the increase in poverty and corruption found expression in 2001, when Chiluba attempted to stand for an unconstitutional third term as president. New civil society organizations, which had gradually emerged in the space provided by the return to democracy, now organized themselves as the Oasis Forum, with church bodies taking a lead in the campaign against a third term; the weak and divided labor movement played only a limited role. This was supplemented by large (and illegal) demonstrations and other creative manifestations of discontent: for example, cars and minibuses throughout Lusaka simultaneously sounded their horns at a scheduled time each week in a show of collective anger. Such actions played an important part in persuading Chiluba not to seek reelection.

The success of this campaign increased the confidence of Zambian activists to seek further economic and political reforms. Demands for a

deepening of democracy in a country which, despite multi-partyism, remains authoritarian and centralized, led to a Constitutional Review Commission which in 2005 published a draft constitution guaranteeing freedoms of speech and assembly and limiting presidential powers. When the MMD government of President Levy Mwanawasa threatened to scupper these reforms, a wave of demonstrations took place demanding the implementation of all the commission's recommendations. For the first time in Zambian history, simultaneous marches took place not only in Lusaka and the Copperbelt, but also in small provincial and district capitals; these were enabled by the widespread ownership of cell phones.

Since 2004, rising international mineral prices have made Zambia's copper mining industry profitable for the first time in thirty years. This has thrown into sharp relief the iniquitous and corrupt mine privatizations of the late 1990s, in which foreign corporations were granted significant tax holidays as part of secret agreements with the government. As a result, the 2006 election was framed by populist rhetoric against the poor labor and environmental practices of foreign-owned mining companies, particularly those owned by Chinese investors. In February 2007 Chinese President Hu Jintao's planned visit to the mining town of Chambishi had to be cancelled because of protests by mineworkers. Zambians are once again demanding that a larger proportion of the value extracted from their land and labor remain within their national borders.

The opening years of the twenty-first century have suggested that some Zambians have begun to reclaim their radical tradition and, in doing so, begun to roll back the worst aspects of economic liberalization. In a context in which high mineral prices have again highlighted the old question of the fair distribution of the vast income produced by the natural wealth of one of the world's poorest and most unequal countries, Zambian activists face the challenge of going beyond their proud record of protest, to find a mobilizing discourse that can enable them to achieve the type of society most Zambians would wish to see.

SEE ALSO: Anarchism and Syndicalism, Southern Africa; Angolan National Liberation, 1961–1974; Chiluba, Frederick (b. 1943); Harris, Charles (1896–1939); Kaunda, Kenneth (b. 1924); Malawi National Liberation; South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC; South Africa, Labor Movement; Southern

Africa, Popular Resistance to Neoliberalism, 1982–2007; Zimbabwe, Labor Movement, 1890–1980; Zimbabwe Labor Movement and Politics, 1980–2007; Zimbabwe, National Liberation Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Bratton, M. (1980) *The Local Politics of Rural Development: Peasant and Party-State in Zambia*. Hanover: University Press of New England.
- Epstein, A. L. (1958/1973) *Politics in an Urban African Community*. Manchester: Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia/Manchester University Press.
- Fields, K. E. (1985) *Revival and Rebellion in Colonial Central Africa*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gertzel, C., Baylies, C., & Szeftel, M. (Eds.) (1984) *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Gewald, J.-B., Hinfelaar, M., & Macola, G. (Eds.) (2007) *One Zambia, Many Histories: Towards a History of Post-Colonial Zambia*. Leiden: Brill.
- Government of Zambia (1969) *Towards Complete Independence*. Lusaka: Government Printers.
- Hall, R. (1965/1976) *Zambia, 1890–1964: The Colonial Period*. London: Longman.
- Henderson, I. (1972) *Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia 1900–1953: A Study in the Limits of Colonial Power*. PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh.
- Larmer, M. (2006) “A Little Bit Like a Volcano”: The United Progressive Party and Resistance to One-Party Rule in Zambia, 1964–1980. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 39, 1: 49–83.
- Larmer, M. (2007) *Mineworkers in Zambia: Labour and Political Change in Post-Colonial Africa, 1964–1991*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Larmer, M. & Macola, G. (2007) The Origins, Context and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion against the Zambian One-Party State. *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 40, 3: 471–96.
- Meebelo, H. S. (1971) *Reaction to Colonialism*. Manchester: Institute of African Studies, University of Zambia/Manchester University Press.
- Mulford, D. C. (1967) *Zambia: The Politics of Independence 1957–1964*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Parpart, J. L. (1983) *Labour and Capital on the African Copperbelt*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Rakner, L. (2003) *Political and Economic Liberalization in Zambia, 1991–2001*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikaninstitutet.
- Roberts, A. (1976) *A History of Zambia*. London: Heinemann.
- World Bank Country Economics Department/Colclough, C. (1989) *The Labor Market and Economic Stabilization in Zambia*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Zamora, Ezequiel (1817–1860)

Dario Azzellini

Following the declaration of Venezuelan independence and the founding of Gran Colombia in 1819, the expectations of land redistribution to peasants were not realized and large tracts of arable land remained in the control of a small oligarchic aristocracy. Ezequiel Zamora was a fearless military leader of rebel armies that sought land redistribution, fueling peasant uprisings during 1846 and acting as commander in the Federal War from 1859 to 1863. The son of a small landowner, Zamora moved to Caracas as a youth to finish his primary education. Inspired by his brother-in-law to study revolutionary movements in Europe and by José Manuel García, a lawyer, he examined principles of equality for transforming Venezuela into a democratic society.

In 1846, Zamora ran for electoral office as a candidate for the Liberal Party in the Cantón of Villa de Cura, northwestern Venezuela, but his election was blocked illegally by conservative opponents. In his speeches, Zamora condemned the oligarchs who retained control of most of the arable land after Venezuelan independence from Spain. In the years following the death of the Liberator Simón Bolívar in 1830, General José Antonio Páez closed ranks with large landowners and cattle ranchers seeking to maintain control over farms and natural resources. However, the failure to redistribute land intensified poverty and economic disarray, escalating social and political tensions. As inequality and the scarcity of land expanded, class divisions were brought into stark relief in the 1840s, social and political tensions swelled, and peasant uprisings in central Venezuela expanded.

Zamora demanded the expropriation of property from large landowners and redistribution to the landless poor. After he was barred from office, Zamora led an armed uprising on September 7, 1846 in Guambra, a town several miles due south of Caracas. The uprising and the demand to free slaves laid the foundation for the unification of liberal and peasant leaders in the Valles del Tuy, Barlovento, and other regions in northern Venezuela. Zamora led his army under the slogans “free land and free men,”

“respect for peasants,” and “clear out the *godos*” (a derogatory term directed at the oligarchy), gaining popular support in the rural regions. After defeating government forces in the battles of Los Bagres and Los Leones, Zamora was defeated and captured on March 26, 1847 and sentenced to death. Zamora’s death sentence was later commuted to ten years’ imprisonment by President General José Tadeo Monagas. In January 1848, Monagas pardoned Zamora and other political prisoners and offered Zamora a position in the army, which he accepted, rising to the rank of brigadier by 1854.

On February 20, 1859, 40 of Ezequiel Zamora’s supporters, under the command of Tirso Salavarría, attacked and captured the Coro garrison in north central Venezuela, seizing 900 rifles, two cannons, and stores of gunpowder. Three days later, Zamora arrived from Curaçao and assumed the general command of troops as a civil war, known as the Federal War, broke out between liberals seeking land distribution and conservatives seeking to maintain oligarchic control.

Zamora was a leading military figure in the guerilla insurgency. Impoverished peasants in rural areas and the urban poor sought redistribution of cultivated land and the overthrow of the conservative oligarchy in power. Zamora led the masses under the slogans “popular elections,” “horror to the oligarchy,” and “free land and free men.” Between 1859 and 1863 the guerilla war was transformed into a popular and peasant revolution aiming to fulfill the unmet popular demands of the War of Independence. Zamora’s popular army was known for setting fire to the houses of landowners and immediately redistributing the land to poor peasants.

Zamora won the battle of El Palito on March 23, 1859 and began advancing on the lowlands of the country, taking San Felipe on March 28 and reorganizing the Federal Province of Yaracuy in the northwest. In a decisive battle on December 10, 1859, Zamora and 3,400 troops were defeated in Santa Inés by conservative troops. After the defeat at Santa Inés, Zamora repositioned his rebel army in central Venezuela and was victorious in Barinas, Portuguesa, Carabobo, Barquisimeto, and Cojedes. On January 10, 1860, Zamora was assassinated during an assault on the city of San Carlos (Cojedes), near Caracas.

Zamora’s sudden death was a blow to the revolutionary goals of the civil war and to militant

liberals, who lost their drive and momentum. On May 22, 1863, the Treaty of Coche was signed, putting an end to the Federal War in which one-third of Venezuela’s population, or just over one million people, had lost their lives. A reconstituted liberal oligarchy subsequently imposed control without redistributing land, leaving the social order intact.

Ezequiel Zamora, along with Simón Bolívar and Simón Rodríguez, is a central figure in the historical ideals of Bolivarianism, independence from foreign control, unity, and egalitarianism. Zamora’s legacy is historically rooted among those in Venezuela seeking independence from foreign control and radical land redistribution. Zamora is invoked by Venezuelan peasant organizations and in the names of government projects.

SEE ALSO: Bolívar, Simón (1783–1830); Bolivarianism, Venezuela; Chávez, Hugo (b. 1954); Chávez, Hugo and the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998–Present; Rodríguez, Simón (1769–1854); Venezuelan War of Independence

References and Suggested Readings

- Brito Figueroa, F. (1981) *Tiempo de Ezequiel Zamora*. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela.
 Tapia, J. L. (1993) *Ezequiel Zamora a la espera del amanecer*. Caracas: Ediciones Centauro.

Zanzibar Revolution

Ayokunle Olumuyiwa Omobowale

Zanzibar is an island group (including principally Zanzibar, Pemba, and Tumbatu) in the Indian Ocean, off the coast of Tanganyika (Tanzania). Its coast and ports served as major trade routes among African, Arab, Indian, and European traders in the nineteenth century. Even though Zanzibar was first populated by Africans, Asians came as later migrants and it served as the seat of the sultan of Oman from 1828 when the African elite class and peasants alike were subordinated under its rule.

Zanzibar came under British administration as a protectorate in 1890. It remained a British protectorate until 1963, when it gained independence. Nevertheless, the nature of the British departure provided a breeding ground for resentment among native Africans. The British officials manipulated ethnic, racial, and linguistic divisions and discrimination against the African majority



On January 12, 1964, the independent government of Zanzibar and the constitutional monarch, Sultan Jamsid bin Abdullah, were overthrown by a communist rebellion that became known as the Zanzibar Revolution. The revolution resulted in the proclamation of Zanzibar as a People's Republic. Three months later Zanzibar united with Tanganyika to form Tanzania. On November 23, 1964, Nation of Islam leader Malcolm X (1925–65) (left) met with General Abdul Rahman Mohamed Babu (1924–96), a leader of the Zanzibar Revolution. (Getty Images)

to secure electoral victory for an Arab- and Indian-dominated alliance between the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) in the tiny island nation's 1963 pre-independence election. Great Britain consequently granted independence and handed power over to the Arab sultan, while the ZNP/ZPPP coalition formed the government. The pro-Asian government lasted barely a month, when it was overthrown by a pro-African revolution. The nation subsequently drifted into draconian one-party rule.

Anti-Arab Revolution and the Institutionalization of African Rule

On January 12, 1964, a revolution initiated by the radical leader of the Umma Party, Abdul Rahman Mohamed Babu, in collaboration with radical elements of the main opposition party, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), toppled and ended the rule of the Arab sultan and the government of the ZNP/ZPPP coalition. The revolutionaries formed a socialist, majority-African government called the Revolutionary Council, with leftist ASP leaders Abeid Karume and Kassim Hanga as president and vice-president respectively. Babu was named the external affairs and trade minister.

The revolutionaries sought to create a socialist society on the principles of majority rule. Their goals would effectively end the system of discrimination against the African majority, nationalizing land and resources, creating a one-party state, and ending the exploitative system of clientelist patronage and exclusion practiced by the Arab and Indian elite. In order to achieve these goals, the government, which had difficulty gaining recognition from western powers, opted for a union with the neighboring country of Tanganyika. It also sought and received assistance from the socialist countries of the Soviet Union, East Germany, and China. With the consummation of Zanzibar's union with Tanganyika, the two nations were renamed Tanzania. The president of Zanzibar became the first vice-president of Tanzania, but Zanzibar remained semi-autonomous within the union and openly retained socialist ideas and its association with socialist states rather than following the preference of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, who opted for a form of African socialism and non-alignment. Again, irrespective of Nyerere's aversion for ethnic or racial divisions, the leaders of Zanzibar pursued a policy of African domination and the suppression of Arabs and Indians.

Hence, in accordance with its revolutionary goals, the pro-African leadership ensured a merger of the Umma Party and ASP while banning all other political parties. Furthermore, it ensured a redistribution of land from the hitherto dominant elite Asian classes to Africans. Likewise, state offices were predominantly filled by African appointees except where Asian expertise was necessary. While few Africans had previously had access to formal education, following the revolution Zanzibar expanded western education to Africans. Nonetheless, as the leaders of Zanzibar accentuated pro-African policies, the regime drifted into draconian rule, with dire consequences for the nation's population and the revolutionary leaders who were considered oppositional.

The Drift to Draconian Rule

Following the merger of the Umma Party with the ASP, President Karume named prominent members of the defunct Umma Party to leadership positions on the Tanzanian mainland. With little opposition, Karume limited personal freedoms through reducing the powers of the

judiciary and abolishing the right to appeal. By 1970, the government replaced the erstwhile judiciary with a People's Court, drawn largely from among party officials. In addition, the ASP government proscribed labor unions, banned strikes, imposed unpaid compulsory labor, and restricted travel outside the island, even for university education. The government required a permit for foreign travel, including to mainland Tanzania, and in 1969 instituted a fee of 56,000 shillings for all those outside Zanzibar wishing to marry a woman from the islands and relocate elsewhere. The charge, according to the proclamation, was to cover the government's costs of educating and providing social services for the young women. Furthermore, unlike mainland Tanzania, where free and fair elections under one-party rule were in effect, officials representing Zanzibar on the Island and the Tanzanian National Assembly were appointed and not elected.

Thus, the 1964 revolution and subsequent merger of the Umma Party and ASP paved the way for consolidation of power under President Karume and his close confidants in the Revolutionary Council. The government sought to repress all opposition through arrest, imprisonment, and death. In 1967, Vice-President Hanga and prominent politicians accused of planning to overthrow Karume were tried under questionable circumstances and subsequently executed.

On April 7, 1972, Karume was assassinated and a new government took over that also sought to consolidate power by suppressing opposition. Those thought to have masterminded the assassination included Babu, who was on the mainland. Nyerere arrested Babu, but refused to turn him over to the Zanzibar authorities since he could not secure an assurance that his trial and judgment would be fair, fearing that Babu would receive the same treatment as Vice-President Hanga after he was turned over to Zanzibar in 1967. Zanzibar officials nonetheless tried Babu *in absentia* and sentenced him to death. On the mainland, Babu was incarcerated for six years until his release in 1978. After his release, Babu migrated to the US, where he taught in universities and was recognized as an international radical activist until his death on August 5, 1996.

SEE ALSO: Charismatic Leadership and Revolution; International Socialism: Mass Politics; Mau Mau Rebellion, 1952–1959; Nyerere, Julius (1922–1999);

Tanzania, Protest and Independence; Uganda, Protests against British Colonialism and Occupation; *Ujamaa Villages*

References and Suggested Readings

- Bienen, H. (1965) National Security in Tanganyika after the Mutiny. *Transition* 21: 39–46.
- Burgess, J., Cliffe, L., Doornbos, M., Selassie, B., Shivji, I., Puritt, P., Abdul-Raheem, T., & Mandani, M. (1996) A Tribute to A. M. Babu. *Review of African Political Economy* 23 (69): 321–48.
- Chase, H. (1976) The Zanzibar Treason Trial. *Review of African Political Economy* 6: 14–33.
- Shivji, I. (2003) The Life and Times of Babu: The Age of Liberation and Revolution. *Review of African Political Economy* 30 (95): 109–18.
- Triplett, G. (1971) Zanzibar: The Politics of Revolutionary Inequality. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 9 (4): 612–17.

Zapata, Emiliano (1879–1919) and the Comuna Morelense

Janet E. McClellan

Conditions and treatment of indigenous persons in northern and southern Mexico during the conquest of New Spain and the colonial period (1519–1821) varied because of historical and cultural differences between the peoples in those regions. The south comprised a more obvious economic, cultural, social, and political heritage and managed to maintain a great deal of autonomy, with recourse to traditional land rights and access to the established Indian courts for the possibility of redress of grievances. The north did not enjoy such opportunities. Being less populated and more widely disbursed, the people there were subjected to the Spanish *encomienda* (forced labor) system. In the south the acknowledgment of the historical rights of pueblos, villages, and land ownership assured greater acceptance of the colonial governance, while unfortunately supporting the development of the hacienda system (patronage land grants for Spanish and foreign entities). During the childhood and youth of Emiliano Zapata the centuries-long struggle for land rights, economic survival, and political recognition became increasingly intense.

From 1876 to 1880 and 1884 to 1911, the president of the newly independent Mexico was General Porfirio Diaz, who initiated land

privatization reforms, all of which benefited foreign investors and the wealthy and further undermined the rights of indigenous persons, causing them to suffer massive relocations, poverty, starvation, and corporate enslavement. One of those villages and pueblos of indigenous persons was the village home of Emiliano Zapata, whose surrounding farmlands were seized by the encroaching sugar-cane plantation of the Hacienda Hospital.

Emiliano Zapata was born on August 8, 1879, and was raised by his family in the southern Mexican village of Anenecuilco, Morelos. One of ten children, he attended elementary school, spoke the language of his Aztec ancestors, and lived with his family until he was orphaned at the age of 16. He then went into business himself using a mule team to transport supplies from ranches to towns in and around the state of Morelos. Zapata was a successful farmer and *charro* (horseman) and was known to compete in the village rodeo. His intellectual development was influenced by Pablo Torres Burgos and Professor Otilio Montano. In 1906 Zapata left Anenecuilco to live with Inés Aguilar, although her family did not approve, as he was a reputed womanizer. In 1910 the family's complaints forced Zapata to join the army and serve in the Seventh Army Battalion. He returned to Anenecuilco, where the male citizens named him president of the community defense committee and presented him with the land grants, deeds, and ownership claims of the villagers.

Zapata was raised in the village of his ancestors and schooled in the history, culture, and tabulations of the subjugation of his people. He also knew firsthand the invasive presence of the haciendas. By the age of 30, he had become the embodiment of the embitterment and resentment of the dispossessed, not the anarchist peasant frequently depicted.

In 1910, as the president of the defense committee Zapata won several important legal battles against the encroaching sugar-cane plantation of the Hacienda Hospital and reclaimed wide swaths of the previously disputed lands from the hacienda managers through the local prefect. With his reputation increasing, Zapata's volunteer army grew. In the north the Madero revolt was gaining support and the federal government was unable to suppress or otherwise thwart its spread. The time for open armed revolution approached.

A wealthy and educated hacienda owner, Francisco I. Madero of northern Mexico called the nation to arms in November 1910 with the objective of removing President Porfirio Díaz from power. In March of 1911 Zapata organized a guerilla force and joined the fighting. Díaz resigned the presidency in late May 1911, and Madero and Zapata met in June, though they would not remain on friendly terms. Zapata distrusted Madero's judgment and returned to the mountains with his followers and planned his attacks against Madero. Madero and the other new leaders were more dedicated to developing an emergency democracy than to the land reforms and recovery that Zapata and his followers had expected. Under his guidance and mismanagement, the hacienda owners immediately began maneuvers intended to preserve their power and wealth in the state, further distancing the presidency of Madero from the needs of the followers of Zapata.

Ultimately Madero was deposed and executed by the Porfirista military and his own aides, whom he had unwisely neglected to replace with revolutionary supporters. The attacks and skirmishes by Zapata against Madero and his officials began in late 1911 and continued throughout 1913, shifting only to the reemergent Porfirista military after their execution of Madero. Madero's execution at the hands of the Porfirista military in 1913 was followed by the most violent period of the revolution which continued until 1917 when revolutionary president Venustiano Carranza managed to secure a relative degree of national stability.

In mid-1914 Zapata and Poncho Villa entered Mexico City and secured the capital. By November 1914 the fighting had started again. Zapata captured Puebla in December, but a series of assassinations in the capital strained relations between Zapata and Villa, while the intellectuals they had placed in charge of the government began bickering amongst themselves. Attempting to secure the hard-won gains, Zapata returned to Morelos, where land reform was under way and provided him with the opportunity to fulfill his promises to villagers. For a while, the land reform process spread beyond Morelos and into other areas of neighboring states under Zapatista rule.

Unfortunately the land reform would prove to be temporary, and the country's stability was threatened by the unstable alliance between Villa

and Zapata's war effort against Carranza. In mid-1915 Villa lost a major battle of the revolution to the Constitutionalist general Alvaro Obregón, and by early August Zapata's army was driven from Mexico City, followed by the invasion of Morelos by Carranza's troops.

Not one to give up, Zapata sought alliances with anyone who might help him fight Carranza, but the war effort went sour, resources became scarce, and defections from the cause increased at an alarming rate. Desperate to preserve the gains of the rebellion, Zapata contacted Jesús Guajardo, a purportedly disaffected Carrancista colonel. After some correspondence, in the spring of 1919 Zapata rode through the gates of the hacienda expecting to meet with other disaffected Carrancistas. Soldiers were indeed assembled as if to do him military honors, but instead they shot him dead.

Zapata's death did not mean the end of his importance in contemporary Mexican life. The remaining Zapatistas formed alliances with the Alvaro Obregón forces who won the revolution in 1920. Obregón and his successors recognized the power of Zapata's programs of land reform and freedom for the Mexican peoples. In modern Mexico, Zapata is celebrated as the founding father of liberty and the land reform movement.

SEE ALSO: Mexican Revolution of 1910–1921; Obregón, Alvaro (1880–1928) and the Sonoran Generation; Zapatismo; Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Brunk, S. (1995) *Emiliano Zapata: Revolution and Betrayal in Mexico*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Hodges, D. C. & Ross, G. (2002) *Mexico, the End of the Revolution*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Krauze, E. (1997) *Mexico: Biography of Power: A History of Modern Mexico, 1810–1996*. New York: HarperCollins.
- Meyer, M. C. & Breezley, W. H. (Eds.) (2000) *The Oxford History of Mexico*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Womac, J. (1969) *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Zapatismo

John Holloway

Zapatismo represents an important break with the tradition of revolutionary thought. When the

Zapatistas rose up in Chiapas in the southeast of Mexico on January 1, 1994, they took the world by surprise. This was not just because they revolted when the age of rebellion seemed to have passed, but because they spoke a new language and expressed new ideas that broke sharply with the received language and ideas of the revolutionary tradition.

The nature of the break became abundantly clear in a letter sent by the Zapatista leadership on January 30, 1994, in which they explained their rebellion: "Then that suffering that united us made us speak, and we recognized that in our words there was truth, we knew that not only pain and suffering lived in our tongue, we recognized that there is hope still in our hearts. We spoke with ourselves, we looked inside ourselves and we looked at our history: we saw our most ancient fathers suffering and struggling, we saw our grandfathers struggling, we saw our fathers with fury in their hands, we saw that not everything had been taken away from us, that we had the most valuable, that which made us live, that which made our step rise above plants and animals, that which made the stone be beneath our feet, and we saw, brothers, that all that we had was DIGNITY, and we saw that great was the shame of having forgotten it, and we saw that DIGNITY was good for men to be men again, and dignity returned to live in our hearts, and we were new again, and the dead, our dead, saw that we were new again and they called us again, to dignity, to struggle" (EZLN, *La Palabra*, 1: 122).

The Politics of Dignity

The fundamental break with the Leninist tradition lies in the centrality given to the idea of dignity. Dignity speaks in the first words of the Zapatista uprising: *¡Ya basta!* Enough! We rebel because we can no longer abide the humiliation of living the way we do. We rebel because, although our dignity has been trampled upon for 500 years, we still have sufficient dignity to revolt against this negation. The revolt is the revolt of dignity against its own negation: it is a struggle of and for dignity, the struggle of dignity for its full realization. It is a movement that comes from below and pushes toward a society based on the recognition of dignity. This includes the struggle for indigenous rights, but this must be understood as just one step, part of

a broader and deeper struggle for the creation of a world based on the mutual recognition of dignities. In other words, the struggle of and for dignity is necessarily a struggle against capitalism (as the Zapatistas declare explicitly in the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle in 2005).

To start from dignity means to understand people as subjects, not as victims. However victimized, humiliated, or objectified they may be, they are still subjects with dignity. These are not the inherently limited subjects of Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?* who can have no more than "trade union consciousness" and require the leadership of a party, but rather subjects who do not need to be told what to do by any external authority.

There is no question, then, of having to bring consciousness to the masses: the central issue is not consciousness but dignity. This changes the whole conception of politics, the whole tonality and style of political action. Traditional revolutionary politics is monological: since the central problem is seen as the lack of consciousness, the task of the party is to explain to people what is wrong with the world and what must be done. Leaders speak at length, often at very great length. But if the starting point is the dignity of all, then this leads to a dialogical politics, a politics not of talking but of listening, or, perhaps better, of listening-and-talking. "*Preguntando caminamos*," "asking as we walk," is one of the central principles of Zapatista organization. We advance not by telling people what to do but by asking them what they are doing and what should be done. Thus, when Subcomandante Marcos left Chiapas to travel around the country as part of the *Otra Campaña*, the "other campaign" announced in the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle in July 2005, it was not to give big speeches but to sit and listen to people talking of their struggles and take notes on what he heard. There is no program, no royal road to follow: the only way forward is the path we make by walking, and we walk by asking.

Dignity is not just the dignity of revolutionaries, it is the dignity of ordinary people. This is perhaps the most profound challenge, theoretically and practically, that the Zapatistas issue: "We are quite ordinary women and men, children and old people, that is to say, rebels, non-conformists, uncomfortable, dreamers" (*La Jornada*, August 4, 1999). There is nothing special about being an anti-capitalist rebel. We who rebel are not an elite. It is as if the Zapatistas are

saying to us, "look at the people around you and listen to their rebellion, listen and look, hear and see." The traditional image of the revolutionary hero has no place here.

This concept of politics is inherently anti-hierarchical. An organization that listens must be a horizontal organization, one that seeks to articulate people's views rather than to dictate a line. The basic unit of Zapatista organization is the village council or assembly, in which all take part, express their views, and work to reach a consensus. The EZLN (*Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*, Zapatista Army of National Liberation) itself, however, is organized as an army, with vertical structures of command. This, they argue, is an unfortunate necessity in the situation of conflict in which they live. The way in which they combine the need for effectiveness with radical democracy is through the principle of *mandar obedeciendo* (to rule by obeying), which states simply that anyone in a position of authority must obey those who have placed her or him in that position. This involves a system of instant recallability of anyone entrusted with a particular responsibility. It is not quite the same as the radical principle of horizontality that was so important in the uprising in Argentina (the uprising that exploded on December 19–20, 2001 and brought down a whole row of presidents), but is perhaps more realistic in its recognition of the tensions inherent in trying to create a different type of society within a capitalist framework.

The emphasis on dignity leads inevitably to a rejection of trying to change society through the state. A focus on the state draws those involved into certain forms of organization. The state is not a thing but a form of organization characterized above all by its separation from society. A state-oriented politics involves processes of exclusion: separation of leaders from led, the adoption of a language that is not accessible to all, the learning of bureaucratic regulations and procedures, the calculation of advantages and disadvantages according to the logic of power, and so on.

Ruling by Obeying

From the beginning the Zapatistas have been consistent in their refusal to enter into this kind of politics, but there has been a process of learning and change in their dealings with the state. In the early period, they entered into a dialogue with the Mexican state in order to achieve the recognition

of indigenous rights. This led to the signing of the Agreement of San Andrés in 1996 in which the government agreed to the implementation of many of the demands of the indigenous movement aimed at improving the position of the indigenous peoples and giving recognition to a certain degree of self-government. The agreement, although signed, was never implemented. After a change of government (involving the replacement of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional [PRI] after 70 years in power), the EZLN organized a march (the "March of the Color of the Earth") to Mexico City, where they addressed the Congress. In spite of this, and of the promises of the new government, the Congress proceeded to introduce legislation which, far from implementing the agreement of San Andrés, actually reduced indigenous rights in some respects.

Since then, the EZLN has abandoned any attempt to negotiate with the state and insisted on implementing the demands through their own organization. The key element in this strategy of autonomy is the structure of administration centered on the *Juntas de Buen Gobierno* (Councils of Good Government), the authorities established by the Zapatistas to regulate the territory that they control in Chiapas. The composition of these councils is based on a combination of the election of instantly recallable delegates (on the basis of *mandar obedeciendo*) and a rapid rotation at the regional level between the councils of the different villages within the region. The *Juntas de Buen Gobierno* should not be seen as an alternative state but as a radically different form of organization. They are based not on a separation from society but on the integration of communal organization into the society. Thus, the constant rotation of the composition of the *Juntas* is designed to ensure that as many people as possible gain experience of community organization, even at the cost of a loss of efficiency.

The rejection of the state as a form of organization means also the rejection of the temporality of the state. A dialogical politics based on discussion, on listening and the taking of decisions by consensus means a different time framework from that of the state and of state-centered politics. This was expressed very neatly in the context of the dialogue that led to the agreement of San Andrés. When the government representatives insisted on rapid replies to their proposals, the Zapatistas replied that they did not understand the indigenous time.

As recounted by Comandante David afterwards, the Zapatistas explained that "we, as Indians, have rhythms, forms of understanding, of deciding, of reaching agreements. And when we told them that, they replied by making fun of us; well then, they said, we don't understand why you say that because we see that you have Japanese watches, so how do you say that you use the indigenous clock, that's from Japan" (*La Jornada*, May 17, 1995). And Comandante Tacho commented: "They haven't learned. They understand us backwards. We use time, not the clock" (*La Jornada*, May 18, 1995).

This sense of time is undoubtedly rooted in the practice and traditions of the indigenous communities, but it is also inherent in the construction of a society with different social relations. In the case of the Zapatistas it is expressed in a dual temporality. On the one hand there is the urgency of their cry of *¡Ya basta!* Enough! Revolution now! We cannot accept one moment longer this terrible system that is humiliating and destroying us! But also there is a different temporality, the temporality of the patient construction of a different world, beautifully expressed in their saying that "we walk, we do not run, because we are going very far" (*caminamos, no corremos, porque vamos muy lejos*).

The Challenge of Zapatismo

More than anything else, Zapatismo is a challenge. The Zapatista movement is an indigenous movement and much more. The Zapatista language and practice draw on the traditions and history of the indigenous communities, but this is not just an expression of indigenous wisdom; rather, it is something that resonates profoundly with the questions and reflections of the anti-capitalist movement throughout the world in the last 40 years or so. The Zapatista movement is not a movement out there in faraway Chiapas but a political direction, a new sensibility that was already sprouting in many parts of the world, a particularly powerful articulation of that which was already pushing to be born. That is why it has had so much influence in the "anti-globalization" movement and in the general rethinking of the possibility of transforming the world. The global appeal of Zapatismo was expressed by Major Ana María in her speech to the "Intergalactic" meeting (the Intercontinental Meeting for Humanity and against Neoliberalism organized by the Zapatistas in July 1996):

“Behind us are the we that are you (*Detrás de nosotros estamos ustedes*). Behind our balaclavas is the face of all the excluded women. Of all the forgotten indigenous people. Of all the persecuted homosexuals. Of all the despised youth. Of all the beaten migrants. Of all those imprisoned for their word and thought. Of all the humiliated workers. Of all those who have died from being forgotten. Of all the simple and ordinary men and women who do not count, who are not seen, who are not named, who have no tomorrow” (*Chiapas* no. 3, p. 103).

SEE ALSO: Global Justice Movement and Resistance; Marcos, Subcomandante (b. ?); Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas Uprising

References and Suggested Readings

- Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (n.d.) *La Palabra del los Armados de Verdad y Fuego*, 3 vols. Mexico.
- Holloway, J. (2005) *Change the World without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today*, 2nd ed. London: Pluto Press.
- Holloway, J. & Peláez, E. (1998) *Zapatista! Reinventing Revolution in Mexico*. London: Pluto Press.
- Marcos, Subcomandante (2004) *Ya Basta! Ten Years of the Zapatista Uprising – Writings of Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos*. Edinburgh and San Francisco: AK Press.
- Marcos, Subcomandante (2006) *The Other Campaign: The Zapatista Call for Change from Below*. San Francisco: City Lights Books.
- Midnight Notes (2001) *Auroras of the Zapatistas: Local and Global Struggles of the Fourth World War*. New York: Autonomedia.
- Mentinis, M. (2006) *Zapatistas: The Chiapas Revolt and What it Means for Radical Politics*. London: Pluto Press.
- Zapatistas (2002) *Zapatista Encuentro: Documents from the 1996 Encounter for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism*, 2nd ed. New York: Seven Stories Press.
- www.ezln.org/documentos/index.html.

Zapatistas, EZLN, and the Chiapas uprising

Vittorio Sergi

The Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) is a Mexican political-military organization founded on November 17, 1983 in Chiapas, southeast Mexico. In 1994 the EZLN started

an armed rebellion against the Mexican government that soon had wide resonance and support in Mexico and among a wide network of anti-capitalist movements worldwide. The EZLN is the military wing of a civil movement that is organized around 40 autonomous councils in the State of Chiapas. The EZLN's discourses and practices have resonance in a wide national and international network of anti-capitalist political organizations.

Historical Context and Origins

The origins of the EZLN can be traced to the cycle of guerilla insurgency that started after the repression of the students' movement of 1968 and lasted until the second half of the 1980s. Its original organization was the National Liberation Forces (FLN), an armed group founded in the industrial city of Monterrey on August 6, 1969, by the brothers Cesar German and Fernando Yañez Muñoz and Alfredo Zarate Mota, among others.

The FLN was a political-military organization that aimed at national insurrection and the implantation of a socialist government in Mexico. It worked from a strictly clandestine structure that had a national organization. Its local sections performed clandestine activity and gathered resources mostly from legal work and voluntary contributions. Its political references were rooted in Mexican revolutionary history and in Latin American anti-imperialism. On February 14, 1974, in a police raid on a secure house in Nepantla, State of Mexico, five FLN members were shot dead and two more were arrested. Using information disclosed in the raid, the army discovered and attacked the movement's base in Chiapas in a rancho called El Diamante near Ocosingo and killed more people. The survivors struggled with the army on various occasions among the mountains of Chiapas, but were tracked down and killed or disappeared. Various other militants were killed or disappeared in the counterinsurgency against the guerillas of the 1970s and 1980s, but the organization was not completely broken.

The surviving militants worked underground in Mexico and in Chiapas until 1983, when a popular army organization was officially founded with strong involvement from Mayan workers and peasants from the Altos Highlands and the new settlement region of the Lacandon Jungle.



Women members of the Mexican Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) arrive at a meeting of social organizations on September 10, 2005 in Ocosingo, Mexico. The EZLN is an armed revolutionary group based in Chiapas, one of the poorest regions of Mexico, where indigenous peoples declared war on the Mexican state. While considered to be part of a larger anti-globalization, anti-neoliberalism movement, the EZLN struggled to gain control of vital resources in their own land. (AFP/Getty Images)

The EZLN served as a self-defense group while Mayan peasants and landless wage workers organized themselves in unions and associations that faced the repression of both federal and state governments of Chiapas.

A strong movement for Indian rights and land rights had been growing since the mid-1970s in Chiapas with the support of Catholic clergy inspired by liberation theology. With the help of local peasant leaders the armed group succeeded in gaining the support of the population. In 1993 the organization had a wide popular base among Mayan peasants. According to the spokesperson and military leader Subcomandante Marcos, the base of the movement decided to move war to the government because of the increasing pressure that the neoliberalist politics of the government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari was imposing on the already extremely poor peasants of Chiapas. The abolition of article 27 of the constitution that guaranteed the right to collective land tenure in 1992 removed the possibility of land reform and opened up the process of privatization and enclosure.

The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Mexico, USA, and Canada was considered as an attack on the living conditions of the peasants and indigenous people of the country. In order to conduct a revolutionary

war, the EZLN issued and published in the clandestine magazine *El Despertador Mexicano* its Revolutionary Laws concerning forms of combat, the civil-military relationship, administration and socialization of private wealth and lands, and women's rights. The EZLN chose as the date for the insurrection the day of the issue of NAFTA, resulting in a symbolic and psychological blow to the government and a menace to US investments in Mexico.

On January 1, 1994 the EZLN declared war on the federal government and army and called the people of Mexico to a national uprising against the authoritarian government and the neoliberal capitalist system with a manifesto called "The first declaration of the Lacandon Jungle." The declaration presented 11 demands concerning basic needs and claimed the importance of republican values such as democracy, freedom, and justice. The EZLN called upon the people of Mexico to support their struggle for "work, land, housing, food, healthcare, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice, and peace." They added that they would "not stop fighting until the basic demands of our people have been met by forming a government of our country that is free and democratic."

EZLN troops were formed mostly of Mayan indians, both men and women, and attacked by surprise, moving in big military units transported by trucks and vans. They took by surprise the city centers and main infrastructures of six towns and cities, four of which were municipal centers (Margaritas, Ocosingo, San Cristobal de Las Casas, and Altamirano). They fought with the Mexican federal army and police forces, seized radio stations and municipal buildings, burned down archives, and freed prisoners from jails. According to US army reports, the Zapatistas comprised 5,000 soldiers and five to ten times as many civilian supporters. Other sources estimate 2,000–3,500 armed fighters. In the first seven days 17,000 Mexican troops were deployed in the conflict area. Forces from the US and Guatemala provided intelligence and tactical support to the Mexicans but did not intervene directly.

When the rebel troops came under air attack by the Mexican army, they began to retreat into the jungle and mountains and split into smaller units. Heavy fighting occurred around San Cristobal when the insurgent army attacked for several days the military base of the 31st Military Zone in Rancho Nuevo, and in the

town of Ocosingo where several Zapatista units were surrounded by the federal army. While retreating, the Zapatistas engaged in combat and set ambushes against the army. The Mexican army successfully cut off the Zapatistas' lines of communication, and from January 12, 1994 was ready to attack guerilla bases in the Lacandon Jungle. In Comitàn the Zapatistas imprisoned General Absalon Castellanos, landlord and former governor of Chiapas, and sentenced him with a political trial to lifelong detention. On February 16 Castellanos was freed in exchange for Zapatista fighters imprisoned by the Mexican army.

International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) accused the federal army of human rights violations such as executions, rape, and the bombing of civilians. On their side, the Zapatistas attacked both military and police forces, and in some case civilian landlords and bosses. The EZLN asked for acknowledgment as a belligerent force in an internal conflict according to the Geneva Convention, but its status was never officially accepted by the Mexican state, which accused the leaders of the movement of terrorism and other criminal offenses.

From the first hours of the rebellion, news coverage, with an important contribution from independent national and international media, spread news and images of the rebellion at the international level. On January 10, 1994 demonstrations of support for the insurgents and requests for a ceasefire were organized in Mexico City and all over the country. After 12 days of open combat, and pressed by national and international public opinion, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari called for a unilateral ceasefire. In the rural areas combat continued until January 17.

The conflict between the Zapatista army and the federal army, after a series of advances and retreats, was stabilized around a virtual border that was drawn in March of 1994. The armed ceasefire that followed defined a conflict zone that included the Altos region, the North Zone between the city of Palenque and the state of Tabasco, and the wide triangle crossed by the valleys called *cañadas*, where the tributaries of the Usumacinta River flow from the city of Ocosingo and Altamirano south to Comitàn, passing from the southeast border with Guatemala in the region called Marqués de Comillas. In March 1994 a first contact between the gov-

ernment and the EZLN was established thanks to the Catholic bishop of San Cristobal de las Casas, Samuel Ruiz. The EZLN also addressed Mexican and international civil society in an open and public dialogue on the future of the insurgency. In August 1994 a large conference was held in the Zapatista village of Guadalupe Tepeyac, renamed Aguascalientes as the historical place where the Zapatista movement gathered during the Mexican Revolution (1910–20). More than 5,000 delegates from Mexico and around the world attended, bringing together the majority of the leftist and autonomist groups and the Mexican opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). This dialogue was the first of a large series of public encounters and meetings organized by the insurgent group.

In August 1996 the First Intergalactic Meeting in the Zapatista conflict zone was organized. In this meeting the EZLN emerged as a political and symbolic point of reference for a wide number of political subjects from the left at the global level. The Second Declaration of La Realidad was issued, marking an important point of reference for the anti-capitalist movement started at the end of the 1990s. The network of subjects and organizations built during this process was defined by scholars as the neo-Zapatista movement.

Development of the Conflict and Main Political Issues

The conflict in Chiapas has been classified as a low-intensity conflict, with less than 1,000 battle-related deaths between 1994 and the present. In reality, casualties of the social unrest and repression are higher, with an average of 100 killings a year. The uprising in Chiapas had resonance in the whole of Mexico, and at an international level due to the economic and geopolitical importance of the area and thanks to the wide dissemination of news and discourses allowed by the new electronic communication technologies. The December 1994 crackdown on the Mexican peso and the subsequent financial crisis that struck the world economy has been related to the Zapatista uprising and widespread opposition to NAFTA.

The relationship of the EZLN with its various and diverse supporters has been described by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1998) as a "netwar." In this type of conflict the key combatants organize in

such a way that small units can effectively conduct military operations. A major organizational innovation in the EZLN was decentralization, and another important move was the group's campaign to win over NGOs and other members of global civil society to its cause. In seeking the support of these groups, the EZLN changed tactics, calling for reform rather than the overthrow of the government. The EZLN uprising combined the use of arms with different political strategies based on communication, civil mobilization, and regional organizing. Nevertheless, it represented the reopening of the armed struggle option within the Mexican left and at the borders with the United States, causing great concern in military and security circles, who decided to apply the counterinsurgency plan named DN-2. Since 1994 the conflict has been deeply militarized by the Mexican state, which deployed in Chiapas up to 70,000 troops and experimented with various low-intensity conflict strategies, supported by financial, military, and information cooperation by the US government, and the governments of Guatemala, Spain, and Israel.

The Zapatista strategy has been marked by a civil and peaceful political initiative. It has restricted low-profile armed self-defense to some extreme cases, as for example the police attacks on the autonomous municipality in 1998, when the rebels fought back by shooting down a military helicopter and killing several soldiers and policemen. The EZLN relies on armed self-defense as a dissuasive means within a political strategy. From 1996 to 2001 the rebels aimed to mobilize civil society in support of indigenous rights claims, and after 2003 assumed an open discourse of class struggle and horizontal national and international class organization for the overthrowing of the state and the capitalist economic system. To confront this strategy the Mexican state has improved since a February 1995 attempted direct military strike on the Zapatista leadership failed. A paramilitary strategy and a complex counterinsurgency plan, named Plan Chiapas, also failed, as did the founding and supporting of several indigenous paramilitary groups in Chiapas to form an ethnic and economic confrontation and to block the Zapatista civil government. The main attack of these groups was the massacre of 43 civilians in the village of Acteal, in the Altos region, on December 23, 1997. Due to such paramilitary violence, there are 15,000 internally displaced persons in Chiapas

and various groups are active in the eviction of Zapatista bases and supporters from recovered land and villages. Organizations such as Paz y Justicia, Mascara Roja, and the Peasants and Indigenous Rights Defense Organization (OPDDIC) contribute weapons, training, and funds and are attacking the civil Zapatista supporters in order to displace them.

The Zapatista army is organized as a military-political organization. The armed wing is structured on three main levels. At the bottom there are the support bases (*bases de apoyo*) formed by people enlisted in the organization who provide logistic and economic support to the structure from their own hometowns and villages. Then there are the militiamen (*milicianos*) who have periodic military training and can be enlisted according to the need of the army. At the top level there are the insurgents (*insurgentes*) who are in active permanent service, are organized by military ranks, and are armed. The highest ranks are organized in the General Command (*Comandancia General*) led by Subcomandante Marcos.

The political structure is linked with the military at the highest level, but relies on a bottom-up organization of delegates, starting from meetings of local assemblies and ending with the Clandestine Indian Revolutionary Committee (CCRI). The CCRI is formed by commanders of both genders, who are entitled to every zone of influence of the EZLN in the territory of Chiapas. They represent the highest political authority within the movement, as the CCRI is the expression of the civil bases and can have authority also over the General Command.

After the unsuccessful call for general insurrection, the Zapatistas formed a dual power structure that responded to the needs of indigenous peasant supporters by providing access to land and basic services, respected indigenous culture, and stressed political autonomy from the state apparatus. From January 1, 1994 Zapatista bases started to occupy lands owned by big landlords and state-owned territories. Soon, other peasant organizations began taking back the land. In 2007 these occupied lands amounted to some 251,000 hectares.

From December 18, 1994 the EZLN broke out from its military encirclement and declared the foundation of Autonomous Councils (*Municipios Autonomos*). These are civil institutions that rule both the Zapatista supporters and other

inhabitants of a territory, autonomous of the Mexican state. In many cases, both the official and the rebel municipality exist in the same town or village, for example as both the Zapatista and official school and health clinic.

In 2007 there were 40 autonomous municipalities, ruling half of the territory of Chiapas. They are coordinated by five regional centers called Caracoles. These centers, situated in the center of five regions of the Zapatista zone of influence, coordinate civil government, administer international cooperation funds and projects, and organize productive and sustainable plans to provide for the basic needs and rights of the population. The Caracoles have instituted parallel services that are open also to non-zapatistas and provide basic services in education, health, food, commerce, justice, and local security. The EZLN exercises a counter-power in territories that are not homogeneous. In fact, they often share social space with official government institutions and often with other political groups. The autonomous councils are in strong conflict with official power for the control of natural resources and the administration of justice and education. As a result, Zapatista supporters, according to their declared stance of resistance, boycott completely the official government, do not vote, do not pay taxes or obey Mexican laws, and do not receive any aid or assistance from governmental agencies, financial or material. The autonomous government receives significant support from international solidarity and cooperation through NGO and direct channels.

The indigenous character of the insurgency was visible from the composition of the Zapatista army, but only became the main point of the political agenda and discourse after the first round of talks with the government in March 1994. The indigenous claims for autonomy and respect for cultural and political ways of organizing were directly linked to the more basic claims of the Mexican peasantry, which is mostly Indian or of Indian origins and culture. The majority of EZLN troops and supporters are from the Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Tojolabal, Chol, and Mam Mayan population. The vast political mobilization was also accompanied by a strong women's movement within the EZLN and within Mexican society that questioned deep gender discrimination and violence.

After two years of standoffs and low-intensity conflict, the EZLN and the federal government

of President Ernesto Zedillo came to a dialogue which involved a large number of academics, professionals, and politicians as advisors of both parties. The first talks were about the more urgent needs of the Mayan population and of the whole native population of Mexico. After several months an agreement on Indigenous Rights and Culture, called the San Andrés Agreements, was reached on February 16, 1996. It established collective rights for indigenous people, the right to local and regional self-government, and the right to collective ownership of land. These agreements were boycotted by the government and never became law.

From late 1996 to 2001 the situation remained in a stalemate, and on the ground the ELZN suffered the intensification of the counterinsurgency war by paramilitary groups and by the military. In 1997, 1,111 masked Zapatista delegates traveled the country to promote a political dialogue with other indigenous organizations and with civil society, promoting the acknowledgment of the San Andrés Agreements. In 1999 the EZLN organized the *Consulta Civil*, an important civil poll in which 2.8 million people expressed their support for the EZLN and the peace process. The EZLN also participated in the national political debate supporting the students' strike in the Autonomous National University of Mexico (UNAM) against neoliberalism in education, which lasted nine months until it was repressed by the federal police. In February 2001, with the new president Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN), the EZLN launched another civil and public campaign with a convoy of unarmed commanders and supporters that traveled around 14 states to get the Federal Congress to open a new dialogue. Despite the wide popular support of the initiative, the dialogue never started.

Recent Developments

In June 2005 the EZLN published the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, calling for the construction of a wide and horizontal network of anti-capitalist organizations and subjects in order to build a national civil insurrection. This national and international initiative was called the Other Campaign in opposition to the presidential campaign that was ongoing in Mexico. The campaign suffered escalating governmental hostility and repression. In May 2006 the mem-

bers of the Front for the Defense of the Land (FPDT) in Atenco, State of Mexico, an important urban organization in the Other Campaign, were attacked by the police. Two of the young protesters were killed and ten were imprisoned. Police forces exercised sexual violence against prisoners and acted with extreme brutality in the repression. A nationwide campaign for the freedom of the Atenco prisoners resulted.

The Other Campaign continued with a series of national and international meetings, held in Chiapas in July–December 2007 that aimed to make contact between the civil Zapatista movement and the transnational solidarity and anti-capitalist Zapatista network. From 2006 the autonomous councils and the civilian bases of the EZLN suffered a new paramilitary offensive supported by an indigenous peasants' paramilitary organization (OPPDIC) that aims to regain control of occupied land and to disrupt the autonomous social and economic infrastructure. The EZLN has not responded with arms and continued with its national and international civil movement through the support and cooperation networks established over 14 years. Meanwhile, a political dialogue has reopened with other Mexican insurgent groups such as the Revolutionary Popular Army (EPR) and the Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People (ERPI).

Much has been written about the EZLN and the Zapatista movement. Its peculiar strategy and its insertion in the worldwide electronic communication network have driven some researches to define it as a postmodern insurgency, or to analyze how insurgents used such communication as a fundamental tool of war. Many studies and widespread media coverage have underlined the charismatic and original figure of its leader, Subcomandante Marcos, who soon became an icon of the anti-capitalist movement that emerged by the end of the 1990s in the countries of the global North. Many researchers – sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists – have studied on the ground in Chiapas the transformations of communal life, culture, and politics between the Maya Indians and the mestizo population in the context of the conflict. Others have analyzed the implications of the insurgency for contemporary post-colonial and radical politics. Zapatism as political discourse resonates strongly in a cross-over of political cultures and practices that are characterized by their radical anti-capitalism and anti-

authoritarianism, and the defense of multiple identities and forms of life against gender, race, and cultural discrimination.

SEE ALSO: Mexico, Armed Political Movements, 1960s–Present; Mexico, Indigenous and Peasant Struggles, 1980s–Present; Zapatismo

References and Suggested Readings

- Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D. (1998) *Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico*. Santa Monica: Rand.
- Cleaver, H. (1999) *Computer-Linked Social Movements and the Global Threat to Capitalism*. Available at www.eco.texas.edu/faculty/cleaver/polnet.html (accessed May 5, 2008).
- EZLN (1996) *Cronicas intergalacticas*, México: Planeta tierra, montañas del sureste mexicano.
- Gilly, A. (1997) *Chiapas la razón ardiente. Ensayo sobre la rebelión del mundo encantado*. Mexico: Era.
- Higgins, P. N. (2004) *Understanding the Chiapas Rebellion, Modernist Visions and the Invisible Indian*. Austin: Texas University Press.
- Holloway, J. & Peláez, E. (Eds.) (1998) *Zapatista! Reinventing Revolution in México*, London: Pluto Press.
- Mentinis, M. (2006) *Zapatistas: The Chiapas Revolt and What It Means for Radical Politics*. London: Pluto Press.
- Montemayor, C. (1998) *Chiapas, la rebelión indígena de México*. Mexico: Aceves.
- Muñoz Ramírez, G. (2008) *The Fire and the Word: A History of the Zapatista Movement*. San Francisco: City Lights.
- Olesen, T. (2005) *International Zapatismo*. London: Zed Books.
- Rovira, G. (1995) *Mujeres de maíz*. Barcelona: Virus.
- Shannon Speed, R., Hernández Castillo, A., & Stephen, L. M. (Eds.) (2006) *Dissident Women: Gender and Cultural Politics in Chiapas*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Vanden Berghe, K. (2005) *Narrativa de la rebelión zapatista. Los relatos del Subcomandante Marcos*. Madrid: Iberoamericana.
- Vázquez Montalbán, M. (1999) *Marcos el señor de los espejos*. Barcelona: Paidós.

Zasulich, Vera (1849–1919)

Pavla Vesela

Vera Ivanovna Zasulich is remembered primarily for her 1878 attempt to assassinate the governor of St. Petersburg, General Fyodor F. Trepov, and for her subsequent trial. Zasulich went on to

become an important figure in the Russian exile community, where she joined efforts to foment revolution from abroad. Although Zasulich's writings never attained the profound influence of her contemporaries Vladimir Lenin, Georgi Plekhanov, or Julius Martov, she was an exceptionally skilled propagandist and organizer and a crucial figure in the formation of Russian Marxism.

Zasulich was born into a family of impoverished nobles on July 27, 1849 in the Gzhatsk district of Smolensk Province. Her father died when Vera Ivanovna was three years old, and her mother, unable to support the family, sent Vera and her two sisters to live with affluent relatives in nearby Biakolovo. After finishing high school in the late 1860s, Zasulich moved to St. Petersburg, where she worked as a clerk and became actively involved in the Russian populist movement, beginning a life in hiding, prison, and exile. She taught evening literacy classes for workers, distributed propaganda, and met with Sergey Nechayev, which resulted in her first imprisonment in 1869. Later, in Kiev, she worked for the anarchist supporters of Mikhail Bakunin.

In 1878, in revenge for the beating of a political prisoner, Zasulich shot and wounded Trepov. She was charged with attempted murder and subject to a widely publicized trial. Her surprising acquittal, as Samuel Kucherov demonstrates, was a symbolic condemnation of the regime, expressing the dissatisfaction of the Russian people toward the government. Zasulich left Russia for Switzerland, and in exile experienced a vital intellectual turn from populism to Marxism. She began to work with Plekhanov, and helped found the first Russian Marxist organization, the Emancipation of Labor Group, in 1883. Later, she assumed a prominent role in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). She corresponded with Marx and translated a number of his works from German into Russian, became a member of the editorial board of the Marxist newspaper *Iskra*, and published work of her own, including the article "Revolutionaries from the Bourgeois Milieu," a study of Voltaire. Her history of the First International was influential in underground communist and leftist circles of the 1890s. Zasulich's works from this era illustrate her conviction in the proletariat's morality, solidarity, cooperation, altruism, unity, and fundamental social power and prominence.

Following the Second Party Congress in 1903, after which RSDLP emerged divided, Zasulich supported the Mensheviks. Returning to Russia after the 1905 Revolution, Zasulich participated actively in politics, though the articles she wrote continued to defend her vision of a mass workers' movement. In 1917 Zasulich opposed the Bolshevik Revolution, considering it premature. She died in 1919.

Jay Bergman, her biographer, portrays Zasulich as a homeless and solitary being subject to bouts of depression and anxiety, who looked for consolation in mass movements and ideologies – first populism and then Marxism. However, delayed research and publication of a number of Zasulich's writings indicate that, despite her idiosyncrasies, her altruism led her to become an important contributor to Marxism in Russia.

SEE ALSO: Bolsheviks; Decembrists to the Rise of Russian Marxism; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Martov, Julius (1873–1923); Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Plekhanov, Georgi (1856–1918); Russia, Revolution of 1905–1907; Russia, Revolution of February/March 1917; Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917; Women in the Russian Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Bergman, J. (1983) *Vera Zasulich: A Biography*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Engel, B. A. (1983) *Mothers and Daughters: Women of the Intelligentsia in Nineteenth-Century Russia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kucherov, S. (1952) The Case of Vera Zasulich. *Russian Review* 11, 2 (April): 86–96.

Zenroren Labor Federation

Keisuke Fuse

Zenroren, the National Trade Union Confederation of Japan, is the second-largest labor federation in Japan, and the most militant class-based federation in the country. Formed in November 1989, Zenroren's roots emerged from leftist unions in the prewar era. In 1950 all communist-influenced labor unions were effectively banned in the red purge. Japan unions affiliated with Sohyo, a major federation formed in 1950, disbanded in 1989. Zambetsu Federation (Japan Council of Industrial Labor Unions), affiliated

with the Japanese Communist Party, broke away and joined Sohyo, which embraced an anti-communist ideology, similar to the US union federations. The breakup of Sohyo created three federations: Rengo (center-left), Zenroren (left), and Zenroyko (independent left).

As the largest leftist labor federation in Japan, since 1989 Zenroren has actively advanced global labor solidarity, peace movements, and opposition to neoliberal free-market policies. As Japan's labor unions primarily represent members on a factory level, as opposed to an industrial basis, political action has become a significant activity of labor unions. Headquartered in Tokyo, as of 2007 Zenroren represented some 1.23 million workers, consisting of 22 industrial unions, and 47 prefectural federations. The federation primarily represents public service workers in central and local government, teachers, and medical workers.

Rengo, a moderate federation of some 8 million members, is not as militant as Zenroren, but the union is opposed to the imposition of labor laws favorable to business, and global neoliberal policies that infringe on workers' wages, and supports advancing labor solidarity with labor federations abroad. Moreover, individual unions within the Rengo federation maintain a range of political perspectives. Zenrokyo, a smaller federation, represents some 500,000 workers, including workers in community based unions.

Zenroren maintains the three principles of its Action Program: (1) independent from capital, (2) independent from political party, and (3) pursuing united action based on workers' common demands. The Japanese government has excluded Zenroren from tripartite structures such as the Central Labor Commission and all Policy Boards of central governments. Zenroren demands fair and decent treatment for itself and other independent trade unions.

At its 22nd Statutory Convention held in July 2006, Zenroren launched a campaign called "Another Japan" with the following three objectives: (1) to prevent Japan from waging war and taking part in any war; (2) to establish rules of work, redress the growing social gap, and reduce poverty; (3) to work to create safe and secure local communities. In addition, Zenroren announced that it would take up the challenge of building large-scale trade union joint action and strengthen its ranks to achieve a "2 million member-strong Zenroren."

Zenroren is active in international grassroots and issue-based solidarity with many progressive unions in the world, even though it is independent from any international trade union organization.

SEE ALSO: Japan, Community Labor Union Movement; Japan, Labor Protest, 1945–Present; Japan, Post-World War II Protest Movements; Sohyo

References and Suggested Readings

- Apter, D. E. & Sawa, N. (1984) *Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Aspinall, R. W. (2001) *Teachers' Unions and the Politics of Education in Japan*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Kume, I. (1998) *Disparaged Success: Labor Politics in Postwar Japan*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Zetkin, Clara (1857–1933)

Alex Zukas

Clara Zetkin, née Eißner, was the most prominent German socialist of her generation to take the concerns and issues of women's oppression seriously in her theoretical *and* practical work. Born in Wiederau, a small weavers' village in the industrialized kingdom of Saxony where her father Gottfried taught school, she saw first hand the oppressive working conditions of industrial capitalism for men and women. In 1872 the Eißner family moved to Leipzig, a seedbed of the German feminist and socialist movements. Through her mother Josephine, Clara met leaders of the German feminist movement. Graduating with honors in 1878, she had already become attracted to Marxist revolutionary socialism, in part due to the influence of the Russian revolutionary Ossip Zetkin (1848–89), who lived in Leipzig and with whom she fell in love. Ossip Zetkin was expelled from Germany under the Anti-Socialist Laws in 1880 and Clara Eißner joined him in Paris in 1882 where they worked tirelessly in the international socialist movement. They had two sons and she assumed his surname while choosing to remain unmarried to retain her German citizenship.

In 1889, the year Ossip died, Clara Zetkin helped organize the inaugural meeting in Paris of the Second International from which she

emerged as the foremost female leader of the German and European socialist movement after giving a speech arguing that women's emancipation required a revolutionary transformation of society, and this change could only be fully realized by socialism. After the lapse of the Anti-Socialist Laws in 1890, Zetkin returned to Germany where she organized the socialist women's movement and became chief editor of the socialist periodical for women, *Die Gleichheit* (Equality), in 1892. Like all German women, Zetkin was forbidden by law from direct membership in a political party until 1908. She was active in women's auxiliary movements of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and in socialist trade unions in the decades before World War I and spoke at party conferences. She served as a member of the party's arbitration tribunal from 1895 to 1914 and was instrumental in establishing the annually celebrated International Women's Day beginning March 8, 1911.

A Marxist internationalist, Zetkin belonged to the revolutionary wing of the SPD and was highly critical of the party's reformist male leadership. When the parliamentary SPD authorized German war loans on August 4, 1914, Zetkin and fellow radicals Rosa Luxemburg (1870–1919), Franz Mehring (1846–1919), and Karl Liebknecht (1871–1919) protested publicly that authorization as well as the *Burgfrieden* (political truce) to which all German parties committed themselves. In March 1915 she convened an International Conference of Socialist Women in Bern, Switzerland that denounced World War I as a capitalist, imperialist conflict. A co-founder of the Spartacist League in 1916, she was removed as editor of *Die Gleichheit* in 1917 due to her continued criticism of the SPD leadership. She left the SPD that year to join the anti-war Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD). Zetkin supported the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and joined the German Communist Party (KPD) in early 1919.

She was elected to the German parliament (*Reichstag*) as a KPD representative in 1920 and remained in parliament until 1933. Zetkin organized a communist women's movement and continued to emphasize the importance of women to revolutionary struggles. A member of the KPD Central Committee from 1919 to 1924 and the Executive Committee of the Communist International from 1921 to 1933, Zetkin moved to Moscow in 1924 due to deteriorating health

and only returned to Germany to attend *Reichstag* sessions. An opponent of Stalin, she became politically isolated after Lenin's death in 1924 even as she continued to be publicly honored by the communist establishment in the Soviet Union. Zetkin died in Moscow in June 1933 and her body was placed in the Kremlin wall. As a socialist theoretician and activist who believed in full human emancipation for both working men and women, Clara Zetkin held that only revolutionary social change and internationalism could achieve that emancipation.

SEE ALSO: German Revolution, 1918–1923; International Women's Day; Internationals; Leninist Philosophy; Liebknecht, Karl (1871–1919); Luxemburg, Rosa (1870–1919); Marxism; Social Democratic Party, Germany; Socialism; Women in the Russian Revolution

References and Suggested Readings

- Badia, G. (1994) *Clara Zetkin: Eine neue Biographie*. Berlin: Dietz.
- Boxer, M. J. & Quataert, J. H. (Eds.) (1978) *Socialist Women: European Socialist Feminism in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*. New York: Elsevier.
- Dornemann, L. (1989) *Clara Zetkin: Leben und Wirken*, 9th ed. Berlin: Dietz.
- Evans, R. J. (1982) Theory and Practice in German Social Democracy, 1880–1914: Clara Zetkin and the Socialist Theory of Women's Emancipation. *History of Political Thought* (Summer): 285–304.
- Honeycut, K. (1976) Clara Zetkin: A Socialist Approach to the Problem of Women's Oppression. *Feminist Studies* 3, 3/4 (Spring/Summer): 131–44.
- Pore, R. (1981) *A Conflict of Interest: Women in German Social Democracy, 1919–1933*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Quataert, J. H. (1979) *Reluctant Feminists in German Social Democracy, 1885–1917*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Zetkin, C. (1984) *Selected Writings*. Ed. P. S. Foner. New York: International Publishers.

Zhang Guotao (1897–1979)

Alexander V. Pantsov

Zhang Guotao was an important early leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He was born in Pingxiang County, Jiangxi Province, in 1897. He studied at Beijing University and took part in the May 4th movement in 1919, a

sustained anti-imperialist mass mobilization that aimed at combating Japan's occupation of Chinese territories and the West's collusion with that occupation. It also opposed the reactionary Beijing warlord regime that had failed to resist Japan's encroachments. In 1920 Zhang joined the Beijing communist nucleus. In July–August 1921 he served as chair of the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, and was elected to membership of the CCP Central Bureau in charge of organizational activity.

In August 1921 Zhang became head of the Secretariat of the Chinese Labor Unions. From January through February 1922 he headed the CCP delegation to the Congress of Far Eastern Peoples in Moscow and Petrograd. While in Moscow he was received, together with Deng Pei, Guomindang (Nationalist Party) member Zhang Qiubai, and a Korean delegate to the Congress, by Lenin himself. After the congress, Zhang returned to China at the end of February 1922. In July, at the Second Congress of the CCP, he was elected a member of the party's Central Executive Committee (CEC). He was one of the leaders of the famous Beijing–Hankou railroad workers' strike on February 7, 1923. In late February 1923 he again traveled to Moscow to brief the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) and the Profintern (the "Red International of Labor Unions") on the February 7th strike. On March 12–23, 1923 he attended the Third Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI and made a speech on the China question. He returned to China at the end of April.

In June 1923, at the Third Congress of the CCP, Zhang was not reelected to the CCP Central Committee because he opposed Stalin's policy requiring the CCP to form an alliance with the Guomindang (Nationalist Party). The same year, however, he joined the Guomindang. Then in January 1924 he was again elected to membership on the CCP CEC. He was also elected a member of the CCP Central Bureau and became head of the Workers' and Peasants' Department of the CEC, as well as secretary of the CEC Labor Movement Commission. In October 1926 he was appointed a CCP CEC representative in Hubei province and in December became secretary of the Hubei Provincial CCP Committee. In May 1927 he was elected to membership in the CCP CC Politburo.

After the Communist defeat at the hands of Chiang Kai-Shek's Guomindang forces in 1927,

Zhang briefly headed the Standing Committee of the CCP CC Provisional Politburo that was organized on July 12, 1927. At the August 7 Conference of party leadership he was elected an alternate member of the CCP Provisional CC Politburo. In June 1928 he went to Moscow again to attend the Sixth Congress of the CCP, and was once again elected to membership in the Politburo. Following the congress, he stayed on in Moscow as a member of the newly organized CCP delegation to the ECCI, and along with Qu Qiubai represented the CCP in the ECCI. In July–September 1928 he attended the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern with full voting rights, and served as a member of the Program Commission. The congress elected him an alternate member of the ECCI, and the ECCI Plenum promoted him to alternate member of the ECCI Presidium. In 1929–30 he studied at the International Lenin School (MLSh).

During his stay in the Soviet Union Zhang actively participated in exposing and severely repressing the clandestine Chinese Trotskyist organization in the Soviet international schools, cooperating closely in this activity with Stalin's secret police and the International Control Commission of the Comintern. At the same time he was involved in the factional struggle among Chinese students at Sun Yat-Sen University, in which one group of students opposed the dictatorial leadership over the student community of Wang Ming, who was supported by the university rector, Pavel Mif. Unlike most members of the CCP delegation who backed the anti-Wang Ming student group, Zhang equivocated. Nevertheless, during the ECCI purge of foreign communists in the Soviet Union that took place in late 1929 and early 1930, some students at the Communist University of the Toilers of China (KUTK) accused Zhang of being a supporter of the Trotskyists. He was endorsed by the ECCI, however. The spring 1930 ECCI secret resolution concerning the "mistakes" of the CCP delegation mentioned Zhang as one of the "minority" of the CCP delegation that had opposed the majority's incorrect views, although not from the very beginning of the contest. After the departure of Qu Qiubai and Zhou Enlai for China in July 1930, Zhang remained an official representative of the CCP Central Committee to the ECCI. He attended the meeting of the ECCI Presidium regarding the extreme-leftist "Li Lisan line" in

December of 1930 as a member of the CCP delegation.

In April 1931 Zhang returned to China and in May became secretary of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet Region CCP Bureau, and the chairman of the regional military committee. In November 1931 he was elected deputy chairman of the Chinese Soviet Government. In 1935, during the Long March, he was appointed general political commissar of the Red Army, but he split with the majority of the CCP CC leadership and led his troops to Xinjiang, where they were defeated by warlords. In August 1935 at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern he was elected to membership on the ECCI. He arrived in the CCP CC headquarters in Northern Shaanxi in July 1936 and was appointed secretary of the CCP CC Northwest Bureau. The following April he was elected deputy chairman (from August, executive chairman) of the government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region.

Due to personal differences with Mao Zedong, in April 1938 Zhang left for the Guomindang headquarters in Wuhan and broke relations with the Chinese communist movement. He was expelled from the party on April 18, 1938. In late 1948 he fled the mainland to Taiwan and at the end of 1949 moved to Hong Kong. He moved to Canada in 1968, where he spent the last decade of his life, and died in Toronto on December 3, 1979.

SEE ALSO: China, Maoism and Popular Power, 1949–1969; China, May 4th Movement; China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- Chang Kuo-t'ao, F. (1971) *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party: 1921–1927*, 2 vols. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
- Dangshi yanjiu ziliao* (1982) (Study Materials on Party History), Vol. 3 Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe.
- Liao Gailong et al. (Eds.) (2001) *Zhongguo gongchandang lishi dacidian. Zonglun. Renwu* (Big Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party. General Part. Personalities). Enlarged and revised ed. Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe.
- Xiang Qing (1985) *Gongchan goji yu Zhongguo geming guanxi lunwenji* (Collection of Articles on the Relationship between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe.

Zhang Wentian (1900–1976)

Alexander V. Pantsov

Zhang Wentian, whose real name was Zhang Ying, was an important early leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He was born in Nanhui County, now a part of Shanghai, Jiangsu Province, on August 30, 1900. He studied at the Nanjing Engineering Institute. In 1919 he took part in the May 4th movement, a sustained anti-imperialist mass mobilization that aimed at combating Japan's occupation of Chinese territories and the West's collusion with that occupation. It also opposed the reactionary Beijing warlord regime that had failed to resist Japan's encroachments. The movement began in Beijing but soon involved hundreds of thousands of young patriots throughout the country. Around this time Zhang joined Shaonian Zhongguo (Young China), a patriotic society. He went abroad to study in the United States and then returned to China.

Zhang joined the CCP in 1925, and that fall went to Moscow where he enrolled as a student at Sun Yat-Sen University of the Toilers of China (UTK). He graduated two years later, but stayed on at UTK as an instructor and translator. In September 1928 he entered the Institute of Red Professors (IKP). Between 1928 and 1930 he also taught at the Communist University of the Toilers of China (KUTK) and worked in the Eastern Department of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI). He returned to China in 1930 and was appointed head of the Propaganda Department of the party's Central Committee (CCP CC). In January 1931 he was elected to membership in the Politburo. Early in 1933 he went to the Central Soviet Region and became head of the Propaganda Department of the CCP CC bureau. He was reelected to the Politburo in January 1934 and became secretary of the CC Secretariat.

In February 1935, during the Long March, Zhang was elected to the executive post of general secretary of the CCP CC. In the fall of 1938 he yielded the leading position in the CCP CC Secretariat to Mao Zedong, and took the position of secretary and head of the Propaganda Department of the CCP CC. From 1937 to 1941 he was also editor-in-chief of the CCP CC

magazine *Jiefang zhoukan* (Liberation Weekly). From May 1938 to 1941 he was also head of the CCP CC Institute of Marxism-Leninism. At the Seventh Party Congress in June 1945 he was once again reelected to the Politburo. During the Civil War of 1946–9 Zhang headed the Organization Department of the CCP CC Northeast Bureau and served as secretary of the Liaoning Provincial CCP Committee.

In 1951 Zhang was sent to Moscow as the People's Republic of China (PRC) ambassador. He returned to China in 1955 and was appointed first deputy foreign minister. At the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956 he was elected an alternate member of the Politburo. In 1959 he joined Peng Dehuai, minister of defense, in criticizing Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward policy, and was consequently dismissed from all his party and government positions. After that he worked as a research fellow at the Institute of Economy of the PRC Academy of Sciences. Persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, Zhang died in disgrace in Wuxi on July 1, 1976, but two years later was posthumously rehabilitated.

SEE ALSO: China, Maoism and Popular Power, 1949–1969; China, May 4th Movement; China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Peng Dehuai (1898–1974)

References and Suggested Readings

- Deng Liqun (Ed.) (1994) *Zhonggong dangshi renwu zhuan* (Biographies of the Chinese Communist Party History Activists), Vol. 52. Xian: Shanxi renmin chubanshe.
- Liao Gailong et al. (Eds.) (2001) *Zhongguo gongchandang lishi dacidian. Zonglun. Renwu* (Big Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party. General Part. Personalities). Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe.

Zhou Enlai (1898–1976)

Alexander V. Pantsov

Zhou Enlai, born in Huaian County, Jiangsu, on March 5, 1898, was a leading figure in the Chinese Communist Party and Revolution of 1949. He enrolled in Nankai University in Tianjin in 1913. He went to study in Japan in 1917, and returned in 1919 in time to take part in the May 4th movement, an anti-imperialist

sustained mass mobilization that aimed at combating Japan's occupation of Chinese territories and the West's collusion with that occupation. It also opposed the conservative Beijing warlord regime that had failed to resist Japan's encroachments. Originating in Beijing, hundreds of thousands of Chinese youth throughout the nation joined the May 4th movement.

In 1919 Zhou founded *Juemu she* (Awakening), a patriotic society, in Tianjin. In 1920 he traveled to France to participate in a work study program. He was one of 18 young Chinese in France who, in June 1922, organized the Communist Party of Chinese Youth in Europe (CPCYE), and he was elected head of the Propaganda Department of its Executive Committee. When the CPCYE was renamed the European branch of the Chinese Socialist Youth League in October 1922, Zhou became its secretary. In February 1923 its name was changed again, to the European branch of the Chinese Communist Party, and Zhou remained a member of its leadership. Between 1923 and 1927 he was also a member of the Guomindang (Nationalist Party).

In August 1924 Zhou returned to China and became head of the Guangdong and Guangxi United CCP Committee and head of the Political Department at the Whampoa Military Academy, a Guomindang school for training officer cadre for their National Revolutionary Army (NRA). Shao Lizi replaced him in that latter position in July 1925, and Zhou was appointed head of the Political Department in the 1st Corps of the NRA. After the March 20 incident of 1926 (Chiang Kai-shek's bloodless coup d'état in Canton), he was dismissed from this position, but in May was made head of the Advanced Political Courses at Canton. In the winter of 1926 he moved to Shanghai where he served as secretary of the Military Department of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee (CCP CC), and as secretary of the Military Commission of the Jiangsu-Zhejiang Regional CCP Committee. He became a member of the CCP CC in May 1927, and on July 12 a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP CC Provisional Politburo. After the communist defeat by Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang forces in the spring and early summer of 1927, he was one of the leaders of the anti-Guomindang August 1 uprising in the National Revolutionary Army in Nanchang.

In the first half of 1928 Zhou traveled to Moscow to attend the Sixth Congress of the CCP. He was a member of the CCP CC Politburo from July 1928. In July–September 1928 he attended the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern with full voting rights, and was elected an alternate member of the Comintern’s Executive Committee (ECCI). He returned to China after the congress and was appointed head of the CCP CC Organization Department and secretary of its Military Commission. In April 1930 he traveled to the Soviet Union again as head of the CCP delegation to the ECCI and in June he attended the Sixteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The following month he took part in the Comintern’s discussion on the Chinese question concerning the extreme leftist “Li Lisan line.” He returned to China in the summer of 1930, and together with Qu Qiubai followed ECCI instructions to convene the Third Plenum of the CC that exposed Li Lisan’s “mistakes.” As of January 1931, he, Lu Fudan, and Wang Ming constituted a three-man party leadership.

In December 1931 Zhou moved to the Central Soviet Region, and became secretary of the region’s CCP CC Bureau, as well as general political commissar of the Red Army and political commissar of the Red Army 1st Corps. In 1934–5 he took part in the Long March. At the CCP leadership conference in January 1935, he was blamed for the communists’ defeat in Eastern China and dismissed from office. Following the conference he served as deputy chairman of the CCP CC Military Revolutionary Council. He was elected in absentia to membership on ECCI at the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in August 1935. In 1936–7 he took part in negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomintang concerning the organization of an anti-Japanese united front. In December 1937 he was appointed head of the CCP CC Changjiang (Yangzi) Bureau Propaganda Department at Wuhan. After the liquidation of the Changjiang Bureau, in November 1938 he became secretary of the CCP CC Southern Bureau at Chongqing.

At the end of August 1939, along with his wife, Deng Yingchao, he went to the Soviet Union again for medical treatment. On December 29 he delivered a report at a secret meeting of the ECCI Presidium concerning the situation in China. In it, he raised the question of whether the CCP CC should abandon the tactics of the united front since the Guomintang was follow-

ing a policy of persecuting the communists. He returned to China in March 1940 bearing the ECCI Presidium’s decision to continue the current united front policy and carrying \$300,000 in financial subsidies. On his return he resumed the post of deputy chairman of the CCP CC Revolutionary Military Committee and secretary of the CCP CC Southern Bureau. In August 1943 he transferred to CCP CC headquarters in Yan’an, Shaanxi province. At the Seventh Party Congress in June 1945 he was elected secretary of the CCP CC secretariat. He participated in the peace negotiations with the Guomintang and US envoy General George C. Marshall in 1946. During the civil war of 1946–9 he was head of the general staff of the People’s Liberation Army.

After the communist victory in 1949, Zhou served from that year until his death as premier of the State Council. At the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956 he was elected deputy chairman of the CCP CC, and was a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. He died in Beijing on January 8, 1976.

SEE ALSO: China, May 4th Movement; China, Student Protests, 20th Century; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Mao Zedong (1893–1976)

References and Suggested Readings

- Ci hai: Lishi fence: Zhongguo xiandai shi* (Ci Hai Dictionary: History Section: Chinese Contemporary History) (1984) Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, pp. 229–31.
- Dangshi yanjiu ziliao* (Study Materials on Party History), Vol. 2, 2nd ed. (1982) Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, p. 797.
- Liu Wusheng (Ed.) (1998) *Zhou Enlai da cidian* (The Dictionary on Zhou Enlai). Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe.
- Xiang Qing (1985) *Gongchan goji yu Zhongguo geming guanxi lunwenji* (Collection of Articles on the Relationship between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution). Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, pp. 353–93.

Zhu De (1886–1976)

Alexander V. Pantsov

Zhu De, whose real name was Zhu Daizhen, was one of the principal military leaders of the Chinese Revolution of 1949. He is commonly credited with having founded the Red Army (precursor of the People’s Liberation Army) in the prerevolutionary period.

Zhu was born in Yilong County, Sichuan Province, on December 1, 1886 and was a graduate of the Yunnan Infantry School. As a young man in 1909 he joined Sun Yat-Sen's Revolutionary Alliance. He participated in both the anti-monarchy Xinhai Revolution of 1911–12 and the movement to oppose Yuan Shikai's imperial aspirations in 1915. After the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia, Zhu went to study in Germany. In 1922 he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In July 1925 he was expelled from Germany and went to Moscow to study at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV). Subsequently, he transferred to a secret military training school. He returned to China in the summer of 1926 and participated in the Northern Expedition of the Guomindang National Revolutionary Army (NRA). Following the Communist defeat by Chiang Kai-Shek's Guomindang forces in the late spring and early summer of 1927, he participated in the anti-Guomindang August 1 uprising in the NRA in Nanchang. After the uprising was suppressed, in early 1928 he led his troops to the mountainous region of Jingganshan where he joined up with Mao Zedong's peasant forces. He was co-founder of the first Soviet region in China, and became commander of the Red Army 4th Corps.

In June 1930 he was appointed commander of the Red Army 1st Army Group (renamed the Red Army First Front in August). In September 1930 he became an alternate member of the Party's Central Committee (CCP CC). He became chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Council and People's Commissar of Military Affairs in November 1931. In January 1934 he was made an alternate member of the Politburo and the following month he was elected a member of the Presidium of the Chinese Soviet government. In 1934–5 he was one of the leaders of the Long March. He was promoted to full membership in the Politburo in January 1935, and in June he became commander-in-chief of the Red Army. During the Sino-Japanese war of 1937–45, Zhu De was commander of the Communist 8th Route Army and deputy chairman of the CCP CC Military Revolutionary Council. At the Seventh Party Congress in May 1945 he was reelected to the Politburo and made a secretary of the CC Secretariat. During the Civil War of 1946–9 he served as commander-in-chief of the People's Liberation Army.

Following the Communist victory in 1949 he became deputy chairman of the Central People's Government. In 1954 he was elected deputy chairman of the People's Republic of China and deputy chairman of the Defense Council. From November 1949 through May 1955 he was secretary of the CCP CC Discipline Commission. In September 1958 he was elected deputy chairman of the CCP CC. In 1959 he became chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC). At the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973 he became a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. He died in Beijing on July 6, 1976 at the age of 90.

SEE ALSO: China, Maoism and Popular Power, 1949–1969; Chinese Communist Revolution, 1925–1949; Mao Zedong (1893–1976); Russia, Revolution of October/November 1917

References and Suggested Readings

- Ci hai: Lishi fence: Zhongguo xiandai shi* (Dictionary Ci Hai. History Part. Chinese Contemporary History) (1984) Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe.
- Dangshi yanjiu ziliao* (Study Materials on Party History) (1982) Vol. 2, 2nd Ed. Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe.
- Wang Yongjun et al. (1986) *Zhongguo xiandai shi renwu zhuan* (Biographies of Chinese Contemporary History Activists). Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe.

Zimbabwe, labor movement, 1890–1980

Timothy Scarnecchia

The very foundation of Southern Rhodesia, first as the province of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) and then after 1923 as a white settler-controlled British crown colony, established a privileged position for white workers in relation to African workers. The failure of the BSAC to find large and profitable mining prospects in Southern Rhodesia – as compared to Northern Rhodesia's copper belt and the gold and diamonds of South Africa – meant that the landlocked colony would look to agriculture as its primary asset, along with capital-intensive gold mining, and a large deposit of coal at Wankie. In order to satisfy the interests of white farmers, industrialists, and mining companies, the Southern Rhodesian government instituted a

regime of laws and regulations used to recruit labor – often forced labor – and to maintain strict controls on terms of employment and wages.

Charles van Onselen has written about this system – known in the local ChiShona language as *chibaro*, or slave labor – and the high toll it took on the first generations of Africans employed in Rhodesian farms, mines, and towns. Van Onselen has also criticized the academic writings of those who tried to fit the African labor experience into a narrative of development. Rather than conceptualizing the history of African labor in Southern Rhodesia as a search for unity and formal labor organization, van Onselen believes the violent nature of the labor system in Southern Rhodesia, and the state's extensive investment in maintaining cheap labor, overrides conventional narratives of working-class history (van Onselen 1975). Much of the wealth of the colony would come from supplying goods and services to Northern Rhodesia and South Africa, a pattern which would later result in strong industrialization after World War II. The first trade unions therefore developed around rail transport and mining, as the railways linked the economies of Southern and Central Africa to the world, and the gold and coal mining industries required relatively large numbers of skilled and unskilled laborers early on (Phimister 1994; Lunn 1997).

The first attempts at organization by white railway workers in Southern Rhodesia in 1911–1912 were crushed by the railway authorities. It was only after World War I that the Rhodesian Railway Workers' Union (RRWU) was formed, in October 1917. The RRWU's leader, Jack Keller, the RRWU's president, dominated the railway union from 1920 until the early 1940s (Lunn 1997: 93). In 1919, the white mine workers formed the Rhodesian Mine and General Workers' Association (RMGWA). The RRWU and the RMGWA held a series of successful strikes in 1919 and early 1920, which led to sizable wage increases and an eight-hour day for white workers.

The Southern Rhodesian government and industrialists worked together to defend against the unified effort of trade unions in different key sectors after 1920, first by designing the Industrial Disputes Act of 1920, which gave the state a mediating role between labor and employers, while allowing “individual industries to set up their own structures of arbitration” (Lunn 1997: 94). The mining and railway author-

ities also worked to divide the white trade unions by supporting their own Amalgamated Engineers' Union (AEU). The AEU was instrumental in making sure that the RRWU and the RMGWA were incapable of creating a “closed shop” union structure, therefore giving employers the ability to challenge strike actions and break the unity of white labor.

Following a failed RRWU strike in 1929 and the economic depression of the early 1930s, railway management removed the more radical trade unionists. Facing a weakened position, the RRWU became more cooperative with management, and increasingly involved in preserving skilled and semi-skilled jobs for whites. The 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) was an important step in protecting the “color bar” in wages and job classifications. The ICA required the establishment of industrial councils, and, most importantly, required the designation of one registered trade union to represent workers in each industry, therefore restricting Africans from forming official unions in those industries where a white trade union was already recognized by the ICA. The act was also explicit in its definition of workers covered by the ICA, as it did not originally include African workers as “workers” with rights to collective bargaining.

African Workers and the Labor Movement

The chronology of African organized labor is similar to that of white labor. The aftermath of World War I and the 1918 influenza epidemic, as van Onselen and Phimister argue, created conditions that allowed African workers to carry out strike actions in the mines and on the railways (Raftopolous & Phimister 1997). Tsuneo Yoshikuni (1989) has shown how both African railway workers and municipal workers in Bulawayo and Salisbury were able to gain pay increases in strike actions during 1919 and 1920.

In the late 1920s, as Terence Ranger has shown, although there were no official African trade unions in the mines, there were organizations such as the Beni dance societies and the Watch Tower movement that allowed African miners to organize themselves into concerted action against their extreme forms of exploitation. In 1927, for example, African workers went on strike at the Shamva mines. It was generally believed that members of the Watch Tower

movement were behind the strike. The strike was put down relatively easily, by deportations of the more radical foreign workers, but the ability of African workers to organize themselves to withhold their labor power surprised many employers (Ranger 1970: 142, 147). It was in this radicalized environment at the end of the 1920s that the message of Clement Kadalie's Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) began to make inroads with African workers in mines and in urban townships.

The ICU made its way into Southern Rhodesia during 1927, led by Clement Kadalie's talented representative Robert Sambo. Sambo managed to get the ICU up and running in Bulawayo but the authorities soon expelled him from the colony. As Ranger explains, there were three Rhodesian Africans who planted the roots of the ICU in Southern Rhodesia: "S. Mosoja Ndlovu, General Secretary of the ICU in 1929, Charles Mzingeli, [who] was organizing secretary in Salisbury, and . . . Job Dumbutshena, who was responsible for attempting to spread the movement to the mining towns and compounds" (Ranger 1970: 152). Although the ICU advocated trade unionism, the real strength of its message was a pan-African notion of race-pride that linked the mistreatment and segregation of African workers and residents throughout Southern Africa. Mzingeli and Ndlovu had some early successes in the towns, while Dumbutshena faced fierce resistance from mine managers and the police. An interesting influence on Mzingeli's early career with the ICU was a female community leader, Martha Ngano, who Mzingeli suggests helped to form the ICU and create the basis for African protest politics in Southern Rhodesia (West 2002: 128–9).

Mzingeli was not very successful in forming a strong trade union in Salisbury, but after World War II he established the Reformed ICU as a viable protest organization for township residents and workers. The main impetus for recognition of African trade unions came from the railway workers, who organized a successful strike in 1945. The African railway strike succeeded in opening the door to recognition of African workers "as workers." It would still take until the late 1950s, but the state and employers began to deal directly with African trade unions and their leaders in hopes of averting the numerous work slow-downs and strikes after World War II.

African workers managed to orchestrate a general strike in 1948, this time broadening the scope and breadth of working-class unity across a wide range of industries and cities. Both of these major strike actions were achieved with little in the way of national unity or strong trade union leadership, and subsequent attempts to sustain unity proved difficult. Given the severity of employer and state repression against African trade unions, the need for secrecy and covert planning may in fact help explain the lack of any specific political or trade union organization leadership during strike actions, especially in the 1948 general strike.

Opposition from employers and the state was not the only factor slowing down the creation of a national-level African trade union body. Leaders such as Charles Mzingeli in Salisbury and Benjamin Burombo in Bulawayo resisted any move to form a national organization, jealously guarding their own political organizations. Jasper Savanhu, for example, tried to create a national African trade union after the 1945 railway workers strike but soon met with intransigence from Mzingeli in particular. After the 1948 general strike, the Rhodesian state was nevertheless worried that more radical white trade unionists, socialists, and communists would work with African workers to establish more effective trade unions.

In the Cold War climate of 1950, the state introduced the Seditious Organization Act (1950), which, among other repressive measures, made it illegal for whites and Africans to work together in political and trade union organizations. It also, importantly, created the Special Branches division of the police who were granted powers to investigate suspected subversives and deport those who were not Rhodesian citizens. It also gave the police the power to use live ammunition against African workers during strikes and protests. Critics of the Seditious Organization Act were quick to point out that the laws were directed at African workers and trade unions, and not white workers and trade unions.

One of the key shifts in the late 1950s was the Southern Rhodesian government's actions to change the Industrial Conciliation Act in such a way that Africans could technically be recognized and given rights to collective bargaining. But the shift to a "non-racial" ICA in 1959 was accompanied by efforts to co-opt African workers under the existing recognized white trade union bargaining units. The impact of this in the key

mining sector, where South African and British firms dominated the industry, was to strengthen the power of the white trade unions who used their power to maintain rigid job classifications that became *de facto* lines of discrimination.

Against such formidable laws and employer powers, African workers continued to organize themselves into more effective trade union organizations. One exception to this was the Waiters and Caterers' Union, established in 1938 by Shato Nyakauru in Salisbury. Another key exception was the railway workers who, given the regional coverage of the railways, were able to gain trade union recognition in the early 1950s because African railway workers in Northern Rhodesia had done so. The Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland (1953–63) would soon open up the possibility for legal recognition of more African trade unions.

Trade Unions and Nationalism in the 1960s

The Federation period and the high profits it brought to Salisbury for building and industrial firms created an atmosphere where large firms sought a more conciliatory approach to African labor in the 1960s. Unfortunately, just as industrialists began to be interested and in a position to recognize African trade union demands in order to create a more stable and skilled industrial workforce, African nationalists began to fight over control of the Southern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress (SRTUC) led by Reuben Jamela.

The nationalist movement absorbed many of the trade union leaders, including Joshua Nkomo who started his career as a trade unionist with the railway workers and had led the SRTUC before taking the leadership position in the succession of nationalist organizations created after the previous organization was banned by the Southern Rhodesian state: the Southern African National Congress, the National Democratic Party (NDP), and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), respectively. In 1960, after many nationalists had been arrested and the NDP was under threat from the state, more radical elements in the NDP/ZAPU campaigned against Jamela's leadership in hopes of taking over the leadership of the SRTUC and also gaining access to the sizable foreign funding the SRTUC received from the United Kingdom and the United States. Jamela decided to fight back rather than relinquish control, leading to

factional fighting in Harare and Bulawayo between the SRTUC and ZAPU in 1961. The trade union movement was officially divided between Jamela's SRTUC and Josiah Maluleke's SRATUC (Southern Rhodesian African Trade Union Congress) in 1962.

The difficulties of maintaining a coherent trade union congress soon became apparent, and the SRATUC had a failed strike in May of 1962. Jamela's earlier headway in gaining recognition for African workers under the ICA was weakened by this factionalism, however, and the decision by the nationalists to use general strikes as a political weapon left the African trade union membership vulnerable should such strikes fail. The early 1960s also started to see a rise in unemployment in Southern Rhodesia, after years of state-sponsored labor recruitment from neighboring states and the use of the overcrowded African reserves in Southern Rhodesia as sources of cheap labor.

Trade Unions after UDI

During the UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) period, from 1965 until the late 1970s, the Rhodesian state continued to crack down on African trade unions. Actions were taken to weaken African trade unions by amending the ICA in 1967 to make it more difficult for trade unions to receive external support. In 1971, the ICA was again amended and this "gave the state the power to remove the right to strike if it was considered to be against the 'public interest'" (Raftopoulos & Phimister 1997: 92). A large number of key African trade union leaders were detained during these years. The gap between European and African wages continued to widen during UDI, as the white skilled-labor leadership of the key railway and mining trade unions bargained on behalf of all workers, while continuing to recognize the vast differences in pay structures for the various grades of workers.

The year 1975 marked a turning point in the liberation war which involved guerilla warfare on the part of the African nationalist forces that fought against Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front. The independence of the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique opened up an important front for the African military forces. As a result of increased access to Southern Rhodesia from Mozambique by the liberation forces, diplomatic efforts pushed Ian Smith to accept a more conciliatory attitude toward an eventual sharing

of power with African nationalists. It was during this period that white trade unionists began to see the writing on the wall and thus began to negotiate more equitable multiracial trade union structures in order to protect themselves in a future Zimbabwe, where they would be in the minority and no longer be able to maintain their privileged protection, higher wage scales, and separate bargaining power (Raftopoulos & Phimister 1997: 102).

SEE ALSO: Mzingeli, Charles (1905–1980); Southern Africa, Popular Resistance to Neoliberalism, 1982–2007; Zimbabwe, Labor Movement and Politics, 1980–2007

References and Suggested Readings

- Lunn, J. (1997) *Capital and Labour on the Rhodesian Railway System, 1888–1947*. Oxford: Macmillan.
- Phimister, I. (1994) *Wangi Kolia: Coal, Capital, and Labour in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1894–1954*. Harare: Baobab Books.
- Raftopoulos, B. & Phimister, I. (Eds.) (1997) *Keep on Knocking: A History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe, 1990–97*. Harare: Baobab Books.
- Ranger, T. O. (1970) *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898–1930*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Scarnecchia, T. (2008) *The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940–1964*. Rochester: Rochester University Press.
- van Onselen, C. (1975) Black Workers in Central African Industry: A Critical Essay on the Historiography and Sociology of Rhodesia. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 1 (2): 228–46.
- van Onselen, C. (1976) *Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900–1933*. London: Pluto Press.
- West, M. O. (2002) *The Rise of an African Middle Class: Colonial Zimbabwe, 1898–1965*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Yoshikuni, T. (1989) Strike Action and Self-Help Associations: Zimbabwean Worker Protest and Culture after World War I. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15 (3): 440–68.

Zimbabwe, labor movement and politics, 1980–2007

Timothy Scarnecchia

As political scientist Eldred Masunungure concludes, Zimbabwe's ruling ZANU-PF party

emerged in the 1980s in the confident expectation that the state-sponsored Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) would continue its “dependence on the state for political patronage” (Masunungure 2004: 169), thus ensuring the trade union movement's loyalty to the state and ruling party. The nationalist party's dominance over trade unions was institutionalized after independence through the formation of the ZCTU on February 28, 1981, when 52 unions agreed to unify under the leadership of Alfred Mugabe, a relative of Zimbabwe's president, Robert Mugabe. Workers' rights improved during the formative period of independence, especially with the passage of the Labor Relations Act of 1985 repealing repressive elements of labor law, including the right to form or join labor unions. The 1985 Act, however, maintained the state's vertical union structure, permitting only one union in each industry (Madhuku, in Raftopoulos & Sachikonye 2001: 109).

The entwined relationship between ZCTU and the state lasted until 1988 when a new, more radical leadership within ZCTU “severed all ties with the ruling ZANU-PF” during an extraordinary congress. The new ZCTU secretary general, Morgan Tsvangarai, “accused the ruling party of being in an ideological crisis and of being insecure” (Masunungure 2004: 169). Tsvangarai was arrested in October 1989 for supporting students at the University of Zimbabwe. Tsvangarai's anti-ZANU-PF pronouncements led to his being charged with “attempting to bring about the downfall of Government through unconstitutional means . . . and that he was acting under external influences” (Masunungure 2004: 170). Such charges would become the hallmark of state tactics against the trade union movement and were reminiscent of tactics used in Southern Rhodesia.

Reforms of labor laws in 1992 officially removed the restriction on one union for each industry, but still gave power to the government to deregister unions if necessary. In addition, the government increased its role in collective bargaining and raised the barriers to strike action. As Madhuku comments, the post-1992 “law on strikes in Zimbabwe is ridiculous: it is almost impossible to have a legal strike owing to a number of restrictions,” as the definition of “essential services” was expanded to include “virtually every service,” and “there is no clear constitutional protection for a right to strike” (Madhuku, in Raftopoulos & Sachikonye 2001: 127).

By the mid-1990s, ZCTU began staging successful protests, strikes, and stayaways from work to protest government policies such as levies to pay war veterans' pensions and other regressive taxes. In addition, public sector workers successfully went on strike in the early to mid-1990s, including railway workers in 1992, postal and communications workers in 1992 and 1994, bank workers in 1993 and 1994, and a large civil service workers' strike in 1996. But as Sachikonye writes, these strikes "represented a last-ditch attempt by workers to obtain wage awards to mitigate the downward slide in their living standards" (Sachikonye 1997: 122). However, a successful national strike in December 1997 resulted in the withdrawal of the war veterans' pension levy.

Raftopoulos describes ZCTU's successes by 1998 as mostly from having "turned the concerns of the strikers into broad common-sense issues, gaining important hegemonic ground in the struggle against the state. However, the labor actions also showed the need for the ZCTU to extend its reach into the rural areas, small towns and mining centers" (Raftopoulos & Sachikonye 2001: 14). The successful ZCTU strike actions led to the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Labor Relations) Regulations of 1998, which "outlawed any concerted action by workers or employers whose purpose was (i) resisting any law or lawful measures of the Government, or (ii) inducing or compelling the Government to alter any law or lawful measures" (Madhuku, in Raftopoulos & Sachikonye 2001: 128).

Urban food riots and uprisings in Harare and Bulawayo in 1999 and 2000 added to growing public opposition to the ZANU-PF government's intransigence on a host of economic issues. In this atmosphere, ZCTU's leadership and members of the National Constitutional Assembly launched an opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), on September 11, 1999. Morgan Tsvangarai of ZCTU was named MDC's president. In view of the successful shift from a trade union congress to political party in Zambia, MDC sought to channel labor's discontents into those of the urban poor and unemployed to build a unified opposition to Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF government.

The defeat of a ZANU-PF referendum in February 2000 that was to give Mugabe increased executive powers was the first electoral loss ZANU-PF experienced since independence in 1980. Shifting strategies, Mugabe and his associates immediately began to support land inva-

sions of white-owned farms and launched a violent campaign against the MDC before the June 2000 parliamentary elections. Such political violence led to "more than 30 people reportedly killed, mostly MDC members, and approximately 18,000 others were victims of a myriad of human rights violations" (Masunungure 2004: 178). In the June 2000 parliamentary elections, 12 trade unionists were elected as MDC candidates, representing 21 percent of all MDC parliamentarians.

The election of trade unionists to parliament initiated a debate over the future autonomy of ZCTU from MDC (Raftopoulos & Sachikonye 2001: 23). Nevertheless, the violence surrounding the 2000 parliamentary elections, continuing against ZCTU members, particularly during the farm occupations of 2000, led Morgan Tsvangarai to threaten President Mugabe in September 2000: "Mugabe should go peacefully. If he does not want to, we will remove him violently. This country cannot afford Mugabe to rule a day longer than is necessary" (quoted in Raftopoulos & Sachikonye 2001: 23).

As Kanyenze describes, the meltdown of the Zimbabwe economy, coupled with repressive measures against political and trade union organizing, intensified the difficulty of ZCTU and Zimbabwe's other trade unions. There were attempts in April 2003 to organizing a three-day stayaway protesting fuel price hikes and "the continued unilateral decisions of government," which met with some successes as the business community also aligned with ZCTU. The ZANU-PF's refusal to respond to trade union and business interests, along with the economically disastrous fast-track land reform program, created a financial and economic meltdown that dramatically increased unemployment from 2002 to 2008. In 2008, Zimbabwe recorded an annual inflation rate of 2.2 million percent. Hyperinflation, unemployment, and repression of trade unions made daily survival the priority for workers in Zimbabwe, as many were forced to leave for work in South Africa, Botswana, or Zambia, or to the United Kingdom, Australia, and North America. In the early 2000s, remittances from the diaspora were a lifeline for many Zimbabweans.

The situation for ZCTU leaders and their affiliated union leaders also deteriorated greatly from the early 2000s. Attempts to organize strikes and protests were met with arrests and beatings, as Mugabe's ruling party unleashed

paramilitary forces against any group perceived to oppose it. Youth trained in violence as part of “national service” and war veterans on the government payroll terrorized union leaders and rank-and-file members, particularly in the run-up to presidential or parliamentary elections in 2002, 2005, and 2008. In 2007, ZCTU leaders were severely beaten while in police custody, following their arrest and the breakup of a demonstration calling for higher wages, more anti-retroviral medications for HIV-positive Zimbabweans, reductions of taxation, and an end to the harassment of street vendors and other informal sector workers.

The crackdown and violence against the leadership of ZCTU was followed by similar beatings of the MDC leadership in police custody in 2007. During the 2008 elections, in which the MDC won a majority in parliament and the majority of presidential votes, violence against the MDC and ZCTU intensified during the two-month “run-off” campaign for the presidency. ZCTU President Lovemore Matombo and Secretary General Wellington Chibebe were arrested and held in jail during the run-off campaign and faced charges of “communicating falsehoods” and “inciting the public to rise against the government” for having stated what everyone, including the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission, clearly recognized: that the MDC and Tsvangarai had gained the most votes during the March 29 elections (ZCTU Newsflash, 2008). The general secretary of the Progressive Teachers’ Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ), Raymond Majongwe, who has been arrested and beaten on numerous occasions since 2002, was forced into hiding from ZANU-PF paramilitary forces. A ZCTU councillor, Rebecca Butau of Chegutu, was “seriously beaten and had to seek medical attention” during the run-off campaign (ZCTU Newsflash, 2008). Meanwhile, members of the General Agriculture Plantation Workers’ Union of Zimbabwe (GAP-WUZ) were forced to seek shelter in safe houses in Harare “after being harassed and beaten up by youth militia” (ZCTU Newsflash, 2008).

In the wake of the 2008 elections, there were signs of regional trade union solidarity to support ZCTU and the MDC as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) labor federation and others agreed to boycott handling goods destined for Zimbabwe. During the 2008 elections, the COSATU dock workers’ union in Durban, South Africa, represented by the South African Transport and Allied Workers’ Union

(SATAWU), stopped unloading a Chinese ship, the *An Yue Jiang*, containing ammunition and weapons destined for the Zimbabwean government. This show of solidarity undoubtedly saved many lives, although even without these weapons the ZANU-PF assault on the opposition and trade unions over three months in 2008 reportedly killed over 130 people, injured hundreds more, and displaced thousands of others.

In such difficult times, Zimbabwe’s trade union rank and file and leaders demonstrated the bravery and tradition of resistance shown over the previous 90 years. As in the past, Zimbabwe’s labor movement will undoubtedly remain a crucial force in the fight against oppression, exploitation, and tyranny.

SEE ALSO: COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions); Mugabe, Robert (b. 1924); Mzingeli, Charles (1905–1980); Southern Africa, Popular Resistance to Neoliberalism, 1982–2007; Zimbabwe, Labor Movement, 1890–1980

References and Suggested Readings

- Kanyenze, G. (2004) The Zimbabwe Economy 1980–2003: A ZCTU Perspective. In D. Harold-Barry (Ed.), *Zimbabwe: The Past is the Future*. Harare: Weaver Press, pp. 107–46.
- Masunungure, E. (2004) Travails of Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe since Independence. In D. Harold-Barry (Ed.), *Zimbabwe: The Past is the Future*. Harare: Weaver Press, pp. 147–92.
- Raftopoulos, B. & Phimister, I. (Eds.) (1997) *Keep on Knocking: A History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe, 1990–97*. Harare: Baobab Books.
- Raftopoulos, B. & Sachikonye, L. (Eds.) (2001) *Striking Back: The Labour Movement and the Post-Colonial State in Zimbabwe, 1890–2000*. Harare: Weaver Press.
- Sachikonye, L. (1997) Trade Unions: Economic and Political Development in Zimbabwe since Independence in 1980. In B. Raftopoulos & I. Phimister (Eds.), *Keep on Knocking: A History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe, 1990–97*. Harare: Baobab Books, pp. 107–28.
- ZCTU Newsflash (2008) www.zctu.co.zw/.

Zimbabwe, national liberation movement

Lisa B. Sharlach

Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia, became independent in 1980 after a decades-long war of liberation that killed over 30,000 (and possibly twice that figure). Marxist guerilla groups fought

against the European settlers of Southern Rhodesia to end white oligarchy and establish multiracial democracy. Tragically, the guerillas also fought against each other, and this bloodshed continued after independence. Instead of embracing democracy, the leaders of ZANU-PF, victorious in Zimbabwe's first elections, terrorized those supposedly affiliated with the defeated political party, ZAPU. It was largely comprised of the Ndebele ethnic minority, so the partisan conflict had an ethnic dimension. To this day, the ruling party continues to intimidate the opposition to forestall true multiparty democracy in Zimbabwe.

Colonial Context

The Shona are the largest ethnic group in Zimbabwe, with slightly more than 80 percent of the population, and the Ndebele, at slightly less than 15 percent, are the largest minority. The Ndebele (or "Matabele") were descendants of but had broken off from the South African Zulu. The expansion of Zulu and South African Boers' territories forced the Ndebele to move northward in the nineteenth century, subjugating the Shona people already there. In 1890, a "Pioneer Column" of several hundred whites, financed by diamond prospector Cecil Rhodes and his British South Africa Company (BSAC), trekked from South Africa to this territory and named it Rhodesia after their benefactor. Rhodes's motivations were to expand British influence and to find gold, but the supply of the latter was long since extinguished. King Lobengula of the Ndebele appealed to the British government for help against invasion by these pioneers, but none arrived. The whites defeated him in 1893, and in 1896–7 quashed a series of African uprisings that the Shona termed the *Chimurenga*, or "struggle for freedom."

The white settlers, disappointed by prospecting, became farmers. They forced the resident Africans on to small Native Reserves of the poorest-quality land and took the rest for themselves. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 gave 20 million hectares of land to whites and only 8.7 million hectares to Africans. Within a couple of generations the result of this uneven allocation of land was crop failure; too many African peasants on too little and too arid farmland destroyed the soil and depleted the water. The colonial administration blamed environmental

degradation on African farming methods and overpopulation. Authorities commanded Africans to work in gangs on ecological projects (such as building dams), causing much resentment.

In 1923, when the BSAC charter expired, Southern Rhodesia opted against joining South Africa and instead became internally self-governing under British annexation. The British intended for Southern Rhodesia to be a "white man's colony," much like the United States or Australia had become. Frontier life in Southern Rhodesia did not lure many Europeans to relocate there, however, until during and after World War II. By the 1960s, whites in Southern Rhodesia enjoyed one of the highest standards of living in the world, made possible by low taxes, cheap labor, and plenty of land. The average European farmer in Southern Rhodesia at that time owned 100 times more land than did his or her African counterpart. By 1969, so many Europeans had moved to the country that Rhodesian-born whites were less than half of the country's white population.

The colonial administrators passed a series of laws institutionalizing European hegemony over the Africans and their lands. First, this disenfranchised all but a few African citizens. The vote was in theory race-blind, but the income criteria for eligibility was so high that few Africans qualified. Second, it put the force of law behind the orders of white supervisors. In 1891, the Masters and Servants Act criminalized any disobedience to an employer's command by an employee. This Act applied to farm as well as domestic workers. Third, it limited the opportunity for upward mobility of Africans by the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act, which barred Africans from apprenticeships, skilled labor, and unions. Fourth, it chilled African resistance with the 1936 Sedition Act, criminalizing political and religious discontent. Fifth, it transferred an African man's control of his labor to the white settlers by means of the 1942 Compulsory Native Labour Act, which required some 15,000 Africans to work for European farmers. Finally, the 1955 Public Order Act permitted police to arrest and detain anybody for any reason without charge or trial.

The Second Chimurenga

The middle of the twentieth century witnessed non-violent African demands for more rights by

civil society – churches, clubs, students, teachers, and women. In 1948, a general strike in Bulawayo concerning land rights lasted three days. In 1957, the ANC (African National Congress, and not related to the South African political party of the same name) was formed by Joshua Nkomo, a railway union official and lay preacher. The ANC was the first organized group in Southern Rhodesia demanding independence and majority rule. It mobilized many people, but the government banned it in 1959 and arrested its leaders. The next year, Nkomo reemerged as the leader of the NDP (National Democratic Party). It demanded majority rule, and the government banned it in December 1961. ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) formed that same month, and Nkomo again was the leader. Robert Mugabe was the secretary for information and policy. The authorities banned ZAPU in September of 1962. Several smaller political parties also opposed white rule, but they were not nationally based and eventually disappeared.

In 1962, the Rhodesian Front (RF) formed as an alliance of conservative whites. Most colonies in Africa were transitioning to or had already won independence. The massacres of Europeans in what had been the Belgian Congo and also accelerated white flight from their own colony frightened the RF members. They believed that Africans were too immature for self-government – probably for several generations to come – and should have only limited self-autonomy (or “separate development”) under benevolent European guidance. The RF wanted independence for Southern Rhodesia, as did Great Britain. The UK wanted a constitutional clause guaranteeing majority rule and an end to racial segregation in Southern Rhodesia; however, this was entirely unacceptable to the RF.

In 1965, under Prime Minister Ian Smith, the RF government waged the UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) from Great Britain. Patterned after the US Declaration of Independence, the document had been ratified by most Southern Rhodesian voters. Great Britain imposed sanctions, and no nation, not even apartheid South Africa, ever recognized the UDI as legitimate. The United Nations imposed selective sanctions on Southern Rhodesia in 1966, and mandatory ones in 1968. Nevertheless, the standard of living for whites did not diminish appreciably. Mozambique (still under Portuguese rule) and South Africa shipped supplies to

Southern Rhodesia despite the boycott. Moreover, import-substitution industrialization flourished in Southern Rhodesia, and the country also profited by being able to default on its loans to the UK.

In 1969, three-quarters of the Southern Rhodesian electorate approved a new constitution. Like its predecessor, this constitution reserved 16 parliamentary seats for Africans (out of 66). “Chiefs” – appointed and paid by the government – selected the representatives for eight of the African seats, and the electorate voted for the remaining eight. The new constitution stated that Africans would get more than their 16 reserved seats only when the day came that they paid at least 25 percent of the national taxes. Africans paid about 0.05 percent of the national taxes at that time, with only negligible growth rates, so it would likely be many centuries before they could win more than 16 seats. Moreover, the new constitution permanently allocated half of the country's land to blacks and half to whites – even though there were about 20 times more blacks than whites. This entailed some transfer of what had been white land, but did not cause a major economic shift in power because the land reallocated to Africans was the least desirable. Furthermore, the RF government resegregated city facilities, private schools, and sports that had been racially desegregated under the previous regime.

While Southern Rhodesian whites became more repressive of the majority, the independence movement became more militant in the mid-1960s. Shona speakers split from Nkomo's ZAPU because of conflicts amongst the leadership and the perception that it was dominated by the Ndebele. Ethnic violence between the Shona and Ndebele in parts of Southern Rhodesia accompanied this split. ZANU formed as a breakaway group from ZAPU in 1963, with Ndabaningi Sithole as its leader (and Robert Mugabe as a member). Its military wing, ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army), waged a few attacks in the 1960s but at first suffered many losses to the Southern Rhodesian military. It gained some, although limited, support from China.

By early 1965, ZAPU also created an armed wing, ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army), which became based in Zambia and enjoyed Soviet financing and training. In the late 1960s, it cooperated with South Africa's ANC (African National Congress), providing safe

passage through the country. About one-tenth of ZIPRA soldiers were women, most of them in the Women's Brigade, which had female commanders and conventional military training. In 1974, quarrels erupted within ZAPU between moderates (generally pro-capitalist) and Soviet-influenced communists. The latter were primarily the leaders of ZAPU in exile. The former wanted to negotiate with Smith, and became increasingly irrelevant.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), instead of favoring one faction over the other, decided to support both. It strongly urged reconciliation between them. Thus ZAPU and ZANU reluctantly united into FROLIZI (Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe) in October of 1971. Its leadership was overwhelmingly of the minority Zezuru ethnicity, and the collaboration soon withered.

The Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) was the next try at cooperation between ZAPU and ZANU. The OAU refused to provide weapons to either until they agreed to coalesce. This union was also unsuccessful, in part because of discrepancies in capabilities between the two militias. ZAPU's army was well trained and well supplied by the Soviets. According to a ZAPU fighter at the time, however, many of the ZANU recruits had so little training that they could barely fire a gun. Another problem was that ZIPA was perceived as being dominated by ZAPU, even though half of the commanders of ZIPA came from each army. Bloodshed between ZANU and ZAPU troops in ZIPA (stationed in Mozambique) ensued with a few weeks. Those ZAPU soldiers who survived fled for Zambia.

Thus ZAPU and ZANU fought separately against the RF. Government counterinsurgency forces displaced residents of areas suspected of supporting guerillas and destroyed crops to prevent them from nourishing insurgents. Soldiers forced peasants on to fenced and guarded "protected villages" that were sealed between 6 at night and 6 in the morning. Forced relocation took place rapidly and without compensation, in some cases moving tens of thousands of people at a time. Some were simply dropped off in new areas, without sanitation, shelter, adequate nutrition, blankets in the wintertime, or water. Simultaneously, soldiers blocked off the country's northern border to prevent the guerillas' escape. Southern Rhodesia's government also covertly formed a counterinsurgency group in Mozambique known

as RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance), which attacked the guerillas who had fled Southern Rhodesia.

Attacks on the government and on Southern Rhodesian white civilians intensified during the 1970s and included the downing of a commercial passenger plane and the destruction of the oil reserves in Salisbury (now Harare). Combating the "terrorists," as white Rhodesians called ZANU and ZAPU, necessitated militarization. The armed forces drafted both white and black men (although the latter served only at the lower ranks). Both the fear of ongoing guerilla attacks and the threat of perpetual military conscription sapped the enthusiasm of some white Southern Rhodesians for a continuation of white minority rule. Black Southern Rhodesians, meanwhile, were often the targets of terrorist attacks by both government and guerillas, in addition to being forced to risk their lives in battle to defend a government that oppressed them.

British and African leaders, too, grew increasingly irritated by the prolonged conflict in Southern Rhodesia and especially by the liberation movement's internal power struggles. The Patriotic Front (PF), formed in October of 1976, was the last alliance between Mugabe's ZANU and Nkomo's ZAPU. There was much distrust between the two groups in the PF. Nkomo secretly negotiated with Ian Smith in 1978 to try to come to power himself. Smith had crafted a power-sharing agreement that put three African leaders and himself at the helm of a new, still white-dominated government called Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. The OAU and the PF refused to recognize it. Relations between Nkomo and Mugabe were extremely strained at the three-month-long Lancaster House peace negotiations amongst rebels and the RF in 1979, hosted by Margaret Thatcher.

Nkomo, who was older and in worse health than Mugabe, badly wanted negotiations to succeed and welcomed reconciliation with whites. Mugabe, however, wanted an end not just to settler rule but also to capitalism. Britain offered to give some compensation to the white farmers so that land reform might commence, and in return asked for a clause in the peace treaty permitting the white farmers to keep their lands for ten years after independence. A team of pre-eminent African leaders warned a recalcitrant Mugabe that if he did not consent, he could no longer keep his army in Mozambique and



As the newly appointed prime minister of Zimbabwe, Dr. Robert Gabriel Mugabe holds a press conference in his garden in Mount Pleasant, Salisbury (Harare). Mugabe later emerged as the first president of Zimbabwe in 1987. Mugabe rose to power through the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), of which he was leader, and was instrumental in negotiations resulting in the Lancaster House Agreement granting Zimbabwe independence from Britain. (Getty Images)

his soldiers would face arrest. Mugabe signed the agreement, and thus Southern Rhodesia, one of the very last European colonies in Africa, became the sovereign state of Zimbabwe. Britain's other African colonies had won independence some 20 years earlier; disunity within the liberation movement was surely a factor in the delay in Southern Rhodesia.

***Gukurahundi* and the Third Chimurenga?**

In March of 1980, the two elements of the PF, ZANU and ZAPU, split again and ran against each other at the polls. Nkomo felt hurt by Mugabe's decision to have ZANU run alone and was devastated by his party's electoral defeat to Mugabe's ZANU. On April 11, 1980, at independence, Robert Mugabe became prime minister. He offered Nkomo the ceremonial position of president, which he refused. Nkomo did eventually take the "home affairs" position, putting him in control of the police.

Peace did not last long. The British supervised a reintegration of ZANU and ZAPU into the national army, but this unification was fraught with suspicion. There were regional and linguistic differences between the two groups, and irregulars from both armies had become bandits. Soon skirmishes broke out between the soldiers of ZANLA (ZANU's army) and ZIPRA (ZAPU's

army). Fighting also erupted in the newly integrated units, killing over 300 and causing many ZIPRA members to flee. Moreover, Mugabe survived several assassination attempts.

Mugabe secretly brought 106 North Koreans to Zimbabwe to train a new elite force that reported directly to him. He called it the Fifth Brigade and the Shona term *Gukurahundi*, "the rain that washes the chaff off of the wheat." Mugabe's forces staged raids on ZAPU property of arms caches, with which Mugabe claimed that Nkomo was plotting to overthrow him. After Mugabe fired Nkomo from the government, several hundred ZIPRA "dissidents" deserted the new army. Many became criminals in what is known as Matabeleland, where the Ndebele minority are concentrated. South Africa's apartheid government had already recruited many elements of the old RF army, including the famous Selous Scouts. South Africa then recruited the ZIPRA defectors, trained them, and sent them back into Zimbabwe to cause unrest.

In December of 1982, Mugabe unleashed his new elite force on the ZAPU and ZIPRA affiliates. The Fifth Brigade tortured, humiliated, and murdered (sometimes several dozen at a time and often simply because of being Ndebele). The Ndebele refer to this time of massacre and famine as the *Gukurahundi*. The army ordered all stores to close and stopped shipment of food supplies into an area that had been suffering from drought for four years. Tens of thousands were beaten and over 2,000 killed within a month and a half. Hundreds vanished. *Gukurahundi* continued for months, during which time, despite the ZANU-sponsored slaughter, all citizens had to attend ZANU pep rallies. ZANU Youth Brigades, modeled on China's Red Guards, flooded Matabeleland on the eve of elections, and ZAPU officials "disappeared." Nkomo, who had since fled to London, condemned the violence. In December of 1987, to avoid more deaths amongst his supporters, he signed a Unity Accord that merged ZAPU and ZANU into a single party, called ZANU-PF. Mugabe then offered an amnesty to the remaining ZIPRA "dissidents," but there were only 122 of them left. Between 10,000 and 20,000 Ndebele had died in the aftermath of Zimbabwe's independence, and the country had become a *de facto* one-party state.

Power became even more centralized after 1987, when Mugabe changed the constitution

so that he could be executive president. The distinction between the army and the civilian government became increasingly blurred. Corruption, structural adjustment programs, the AIDS epidemic, and military operations in Zaire all soured Zimbabwe's economy in the 1990s. Britain had begun to issue to Zimbabwe compensation for whites' land, as agreed to at Lancaster House, but stopped abruptly in the late 1980s. The British complained that Mugabe was embezzling the funds and awarding land to his friends in government instead of needy farmers. Mugabe, in turn, lambasted Great Britain for renegeing on the agreement and began, in his words, "the Third *Chimurenga*" against neo-imperialism in Zimbabwe.

Approximately half of Zimbabwe's farmland still belonged to an ever-shrinking white minority. In 2000, the day after the government circulated a list of properties, squatters violently "repossessed" several hundred large white-owned farms (and 21 black-owned ones). Western press coverage tended to emphasize the racial nature of the violence and to sidestep the history of the whites' violent seizure of the land 100 years prior. Mugabe's legacy as a war hero has been further overshadowed by his improbable victories at the polls; the killing and torture of members of the current opposition; the episodic persecution of ethnic minorities; and his reliance on simply printing more money when there are bills to pay, causing Zimbabwe to have the world's highest inflation rate. The European Union (EU) and the US have imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe, and President Bush has denounced Mugabe's regime as "illegitimate."

With respect to world leaders who denounce his regime as authoritarian, however, Mugabe responds that the origins of African democracy are to be found in the liberation struggle rather than in the intervention of western donors. The West, he asserts, has tampered with Zimbabwe's elections under the guise of "monitoring." Mugabe has claimed repeatedly that the UK is trying to recolonize Zimbabwe, and that the churches and the opposition party, the MDC (Movement for Democratic Change), support this goal as well. Constitutional and institutional restructuring of Zimbabwe (specifically, strengthening its leadership) is necessary in light of the peril of imminent recolonization. According to Mugabe, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, the EU, and the US are con-

trolling the international media to demonize his government as retaliation for the 2000 invasions of white-owned farmland. The advanced industrialized world, he explains, criticizes him because he stands up to them. They fear the "Zimbabwean Contagion" effect across the region and the continent.

SEE ALSO: Mugabe, Robert (b. 1924); Mzingeli, Charles (1905–1980); Southern Africa, Popular Resistance to Neoliberalism, 1982–2007; Zimbabwe, Labor Movement, 1890–1980; Zimbabwe Labor Movement and Politics, 1980–2007; Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA)

References and Suggested Readings

- Brickhill, J. (1995) Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU 1976 to 1979. In N. Bhebe & T. Ranger (Eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London: James Currey, pp. 48–72.
- Dabengwa, D. (1995) ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation. In N. Bhebe & T. Ranger (Eds.), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*. London: James Currey, pp. 24–35.
- Meredith, M. (1980) *The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia: UDI to Zimbabwe*. London: Pan.
- Meredith, M. (2002) *Mugabe: Power and Plunder in Zimbabwe*. Oxford: PublicAffairs.
- Mugabe, R. (1983) *Our War of Liberation: Speeches, Articles, Interviews 1976–1979*. Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press.
- Mugabe, R. (2001) *Inside the Third Chimurenga*. Harare: Department of Information and Publicity, Office of the President and Cabinet.
- Nhongo-Simbanegavi, J. (2000) *For Better or Worse? Women and ZANLA in Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Harare: Weaver Press.
- Nkomo, J., Mugabe, R., & Zvobgo, E. (1978) *Zimbabwe: The Final Advance: Documents on the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement*. Oakland, CA: Liberation Support Movement Information Center.
- Ranger, T. (1985) *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Sithole, M. (1999) *Zimbabwe: Struggles Within the Struggle (1957–1980)*. Harare: Rujeko Publishers.

Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA)

Stephen O'Brien

In late 1975 a movement of young Marxist-inspired guerrillas formed the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). ZIPA's combination of a per-

suasive approach to politics, a transformational vision, and aggressive military tactics altered the course of the liberation struggle against Ian Smith's Rhodesia. However, its success also paved the way for its downfall and the rise to power of Robert Mugabe.

ZIPA grew out of the flood of young people who fled Rhodesia in the 1970s to join the respective military wings of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). In 1975 the key nationalist leaders became entangled in factional strife and long-running and unproductive peace talks with Smith. By 1975 the young recruits who would go on to form ZIPA sought to take charge as the war stalled and the old leaders became increasingly sidelined. In October 1975 a group of ZANU officers from the training camps in Tanzania approached President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and the leader of newly independent Mozambique, President Samora Machel, for support to restart the war against Smith. Both Machel and Nyerere had supported peace negotiations and a ceasefire with Rhodesia, but as little real progress had been made, they were sympathetic to the young officers' proposal.

The ZANU officers also sought unity with ZAPU. They won its backing and in November 1975 ZIPA was formed with a joint high command with equal numbers from ZAPU and ZANU. While the alliance with ZAPU disintegrated after a few months, it was an important attempt at unity which went against the prevailing trend of disunity. ZIPA's nominal head was Solomon Mujuru, who later became head of the Zimbabwe army, but the real leadership came to reside in his young deputy, Wilfred Mhanda.

The new army relocated to Mozambique from Tanzania. In January 1976, 1,000 guerrillas crossed into Rhodesia. The entire eastern border of Rhodesia became a war zone as mines, farms, and communication routes, such as the new rail line to South Africa, came under attack. ZIPA educated its cadre against the sexual abuse of women and sought to win the support of the peasantry through persuasion rather than coercion. It established Wampoa College to help institute its vision and ran Marxist-inspired courses in military instruction and mass mobilization for the combined ranks of ZIPA.

ZIPA aimed for political and economic transformation which sought to overturn the social and economic relations of Rhodesia. The previous

conception of the old guard nationalists had seen armed struggle mostly as a means to pressure external intervention, as Rhodesia technically remained a British colony. Many of the ZIPA leaders, such as Mhanda, had been influenced by the youth radicalization of the 1960s. They became known as the Vashandi, a word which means worker in the Shona language, but which took on a broader meaning as the revolutionary front of workers, students, and peasants.

Theory influenced tactics. ZIPA fighters were not regarded as cannon fodder, lines of retreat and supply lines were secured, counteroffensives were anticipated, and strategic reserves were readied. Senior commanders were seen at the front. Smith's regime reeled under the offensive. Despite intensified repression it was forced to borrow 26 helicopters from South Africa and deploy 60 percent more troops. In order to counter the influence of the young Marxists in Zimbabwe, Henry Kissinger, the United States secretary of state, kick-started talks in Geneva in October 1976.

ZIPA remained opposed to negotiations and wary of the old leadership. When pressed to nominate an intermediary, in a decision which was to have fateful consequences, they nominated Robert Mugabe, one of the ZANU leaders. Disunity had long plagued the nationalist movement, and on at least two occasions – the March 11 movement within ZAPU (1971) and the Nhari Rebellion (1974–5) within ZANU – guerrilla revolts against what were perceived to be incompetent leaders were brutally suppressed. The fallout from the Nhari Rebellion saw Herbert Chitepo, the ZANU chairman, assassinated. In response, Kenneth Kaunda, the Zambian president, who had hosted the liberation forces in Zambia, banned Zimbabwean nationalist organizations and detained hundreds of their leaders and supporters. However, these leaders were subsequently released so that they could attend the Geneva talks, along with Mugabe, who had been under detention in Mozambique. In Geneva, ZIPA unsuccessfully tried to unite the various nationalist delegations. Disunity contributed to the collapse of the talks.

While the ZIPA leaders were distracted with solidarity duties in Europe following the breakdown of the talks, Mugabe and Josiah Tongogara, the official military leader of ZANU, rushed back to Mozambique. In January 1977, with Machel's support, they started to impose control.

The radio and print media were taken over, Wampoa closed, and ZIPA officers arrested. A massive purge was conducted throughout ZANU. According to Astrow (1983: 107), at least 300 ZIPA junior cadre were executed.

In August 1977 Mugabe, possibly feeling sufficiently in control of ZANU, called a special congress and was appointed party president. While the congress adopted many aspects of ZIPA's left discourse, this mainly served to provide a cover for its apparent repressive tendencies. Most of the key ZIPA leaders were not released from detention in Mozambique until after independence in 1980 and the movement dispersed. In 2000 Mhanda and other ex-combatants formed the Zimbabwe Liberators' Platform to reclaim the rights of Zimbabwe's genuine war veterans.

SEE ALSO: Chimurenga Armed Struggles; Machel, Samora (1933–1986); Kaunda, Kenneth (b. 1924); Mugabe, Robert (b. 1924); Nyerere, Julius (1922–1999); Zimbabwe, Labor Movement, 1890–1980; Zimbabwe, National Liberation Movement

References and Suggested Readings

- Astrow, A. (1983) *Zimbabwe, A Revolution That Lost Its Way?* London: Zed Books.
- Chung, F. (2006) *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Stockholm: Nordic Africa Institute in cooperation with Weaver Press.
- Martin, D. & Johnson, P. (1981) *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing.
- Mhanda, W. (2007) Interview with Wilfred Mhanda by Stephen O'Brien, August 2007. Harare.
- Moore, D. (1990) *The Contradictory Construction of Hegemony in Zimbabwe: Politics, Ideology and Class in the Formation of a New African State*. PhD dissertation, York University, Toronto.
- Nhongo-Simbanegavi, J. (2000) *For Better or Worse: Women and ZANLA in Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Harare: Weaver Press.

Zionism

Shellie K. McCullough

Zionism is an international movement comprising political, cultural, and social ideologies which calls for the return of Jewish people to a homeland. The term "Zion" is derived from ancient biblical sources and embodies a yearning for a return to a lost place of origin: "Weeping, we sat by the rivers of Babylon, thinking of Zion"

(Psalms 137:1). With that said, the actual term "Zionism" was not coined until 1890, when Nathan Birnbaum began to formulate ideas concerning "political" Zionism which he felt were the direct result of anti-Semitism.

Political Zionism was emancipated western Jewry's response to the mass diffusion of anti-Semitism, but was also a reaction to the failure of the Enlightenment, which did not always improve the status of the Jew on a par with others. Initially, the objective for political Zionists concerned the establishment of a Jewish homeland. However, the property did not necessarily have to hail from the Holy Land, nor did it have to be in Palestine. From the outset, the political Zionists were searching for any available territory to fit their requirements. Many political Zionists viewed the so-called "Jewish problem" through an Enlightenment rationalistic approach, hoping that European countries would support the establishment of a Jewish state outside Europe to help solve the "Jewish problem" and secure for Jews equal rights and protections as others in society.

Up until the end of the eighteenth century, Jews received limited status as citizens across Europe. During the half-century or so following the French Revolution and the emancipation contract, the status of Jews in Western and Central Europe changed for the better, as they seemed to be assimilating to the national cultures of their respective states. Jews were entitled to become citizens of particular countries post-emancipation, but they were often still differentiated by the religion they practiced on an individual basis. In Eastern Europe, however, where the great majority of Jews were concentrated, the situation was more complex and problematic. It seems the western Enlightenment and emancipation had only marginal impact there, although Eastern European Jewry did retain collective traditions such as the common language of Yiddish and a unique style of dress that set them apart. In these societies social modernization progressed at a slower rate than in Central or Western Europe, and the Jewish community remained somewhat autonomous. Jews were still sharply repressed, but a narrow and influential stratum of Jews did manage to respond to the liberal movements unfolding across Europe.

These hopes aroused by Jews among the liberalizing tendencies were tested, if not completely dashed, by the rise of anti-Semitism

and the (re)emergence of the Jewish question in post-revolutionary Europe. In France, Edouard Drumont's anti-Semitic text *La France Juive* sold more than a million copies, making it one of the top-selling books in the last half of the nineteenth century. Also during the *fin-de-siècle* period, the Dreyfus Affair burst onto the French political scene as a patriotic, assimilated French Jewish military captain was falsely accused of treason. It was not until the writer Emile Zola came to his defense with *J'accuse!* that Dreyfus was finally able to clear his name, but only after years of public humiliation and turmoil in the French court system. Aside from France, there was a significant amount of anti-Semitism growing all across Europe. In Germany there was a major financial crisis that caused an outpouring of anti-Semitism; in Austria there was Karl Lueger's anti-Semitic Christian Social Party (which would later inspire Adolf Hitler's regime); and in the tsarist empire of Russia, bloody pogroms and cases of blood libel were emerging at an alarming rate.

Standing at the crossroads of these two influential Jewish worlds were countries such as West Prussia, Serbia, Ukraine, Romania, Poland, and Russia, and many important Zionist writings were generated from the cultural intersection where a variety of Zionist ideas were converging. Interestingly enough, the first Jew to articulate a Zionist platform was a Russian doctor living in Odessa. In 1881, in response to the devastating Russian pogroms, Leo Pinsker wrote in his pamphlet *Auto-Emancipation* that anti-Semitism was a phenomenon stronger than any Enlightenment philosophy or belief system could conquer. From Pinsker's perspective, the Jews must therefore seek out their own national homeland because self-emancipation could only occur outside the boundaries of Europe. Pinsker eventually became the head of the organization Hibbat Tziyyon (Lovers of Zion), a group devoted to Hebrew education and national regeneration. Moses Hess, a former acquaintance of Karl Marx, also established a reputation in intellectual circles when he published *Rome and Jerusalem* in 1862, a text that expounds on the author's beliefs in the rediscovery and redefinition of Judaism as a nationality and not a religion, and directly correlates his preoccupation with the Jewish question to the rise of anti-Semitism.

The Zionist idea crystallized during these difficult times in tandem with the exacerbation

of the Jewish question in nineteenth-century Europe. In the individual biographies of many seminal Zionist thinkers, such as Theodore Herzl, one finds that anti-Semitism was the crucial driving force behind the Zionism movement. As Herzl relates in his diary, "We were led to [Zionism] by the new enemy just when we were in the process of complete dissolution: by anti-Semitism. I am still aware what an impression it made upon me when I . . . read Duhring's book on the Jewish Question, a book that is as full of hate as it is brilliant. I think that prior to that I really no longer knew that I was a Jew."

The driving force behind a Zionist organization with outlined, specific goals, Herzl put forth his solution to the Jewish question in his 1896 publication *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State). In this particular work he called for the establishment of a Jewish state, in any available territory, which would then allow the majority of European Jewry to immigrate there in order to solve the Jewish question in Europe. This new state would be modeled after a European state that had already been emancipated, so in this way it granted no special privilege to the Hebrew language, Judaism or devoutness of religion, or even the ancient Jewish homeland in Palestine. Herzl firmly believed in the Enlightenment principles that were rooted in a faith that all men were rational and would work toward goals that they perceived to be in their best interests. Along those same lines of thinking, Herzl also believed that European countries would "rationally" follow suit and aid the Zionists in their cause, and because of this, he actively sought the aid of various countries in creating a Jewish state. In 1897 Herzl assembled the first Zionist congress in Basel, Switzerland. The World Zionist Organization (WZO) formally established a congress and outlined its goals for establishing a homeland for the Jewish people. The WZO developed and cultivated membership in societies worldwide, eventually encouraging settlement in Palestine, registering a bank in London, and going on to establish the Jewish National Fund, which would aid in purchasing the land in Palestine. This first convening of the Zionist congress, which Herzl brought about, established a set of collective goals for Zionists, but it also came to symbolize a new Jewish identity, one that had been lost since the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE.

Social Zionism

In 1897, just one year after Herzl published *Der Judenstaat*, a Jewish philosopher from Belorussia named Nahman Syrkin published his own work on Zionism, entitled “The Jewish Question and the Socialist Jewish State,” in an Austrian socialist monthly. He went on to become a leader of the social Zionist movement, and outlined the goals of this faction at the third convening of the Zionist congress in 1899. Although Syrkin sometimes disagreed with those in his own faction of social Zionism, he became infamous for attacking the body of religious Zionism started by Ahad Ha’am (also known as Asher Ginsberg, 1856–1927). Syrkin felt that Ha’am’s spiritual aims disregarded the hard, factual evidence of anti-Semitism and could not cope with all the problems that would arise with Jewish immigration en masse. Syrkin believed that an answer to the Jewish question in Europe could only be found through the elimination of capitalism and through immigration to Palestine.

The fundamental belief system of social Zionism (reminiscent of socialism) is deeply rooted in the idea of a settlement or *kibbutz* (Hebrew for “a gathering”) in which Jews would supervise and work their own land autonomously, without any kind of outside aid. Jews from Eastern and Western Europe (and theoretically all over the world) would immigrate to Palestine and recharacterize themselves specifically as a Jewish proletariat of workers and farmers rather than as merchants. Liberation, from this perspective, is derived from labor and a Jewish identity tied directly to the land. Owing to a variety of disagreements in regard to the core belief system of social Zionism (with that of, say, Marxism), many branches split off and formed a diverse assortment of organizations that led to the formation of youth movements such as Hashomer Hatz’air and Hehalutz. Prominent leaders who headed these parties, like David Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Ben Zvi, went on to lead the national Labor Party in Israel, which is one of the two main political parties in Israel today.

Cultural or Spiritual Zionism

Ahad Ha’am, whose Hebrew name means “*one of the people*,” was born Asher Ginsberg in Skvira, Ukraine. Ha’am, the founding father of the cultural or spiritual branch of Zionism, believed that the revival of a Jewish and specifically

Hebraic culture, as a new center of Jewish society, would save Judaism, and not just the Jewish people. So while Herzl wanted to prevent harm from befalling the Jews due to anti-Semitism in Europe, Ha’am sought out a homeland to save Judaism itself. Feeling that there was nothing inherently Jewish about Herzl’s Jewish state, Ha’am decided to found a cultural center in Palestine that was specifically dedicated to the revival of Jewish culture during the Diaspora.

For Ha’am, the possibility of successful assimilation meant that Judaism itself would lose its identity as well, whereas for Herzl the mere thought of a failed, assimilated Jewish homeland would have been his greatest personal and professional defeat. The points counterweighed between tradition and a response to the Jewish problem also influenced the Israeli nationalist movement, or the Jewish national movement. In addition to being a statesman and a writer, Ha’am was above all else a close critic of Herzl. In an 1889 analytic piece regarding what he saw as the failure of the Hibbat Tziyyon movement, entitled “This is Not the Way,” Ha’am focused on building strong cultural and spiritual foundations because he believed any efforts without such spiritual undergirding would ultimately fail. In addition to spiritual criticism in regard to Zionism, Ahad Ha’am was also one of the first to warn of impending tensions with the Arab population.

Beginning as early as 1891, groups of influential Arabs from Jerusalem with authoritative political and economic sway protested against the influx of Jews into the region as well as the Jewish purchase of land by means of an official letter to Istanbul. Despite the fact that Jewish immigration was occurring at a relatively slow rate, clashes between Jewish émigrés and the indigenous Arab population occurred with increased frequency. While the sultan was ruling tensions could be suppressed, but with the Young Turks revolution in 1908 a new political dawn emerged in this region. As Ottoman rule came to an end, Arab nationalism and Zionism became adversarial, and each began its own struggle for independence. In November 1917 the British issued the Balfour Declaration, a letter stating Great Britain’s support for the creation of a Jewish national homeland. The declaration was the result of lobbying by a small British Zionist movement, headed by Dr. Chaim Weizmann. Throughout the 1920s many Arab riots broke out across the region in Jaffa, Haifa,

Hebron, and Jerusalem in violent response to the Balfour Declaration.

After uncontrollable, widespread rioting throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the British responded with a 1939 White Paper which decreed that only 15,000 Jews would be allowed to enter Palestine each year for five years, and thereafter immigration would be subject to Arab approval. During World War II (1939–45) and the Holocaust, the threat of extermination was increased for Jews following the closure of Palestine's gates by the 1939 White Paper. After the war, the British lifted the restrictions, leaving many Arabs frustrated with the situation once again. The fight over who holds claim to this land continued after Israel became an independent state for Jews as secular and religious Palestinian organizations sought to reclaim the land that they view as theirs, in hopes of forcing the Jews back out of the region.

SEE ALSO: Arafat, Yasser (1929–2004), Fatah, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Ben-Gurion, David (1866–1973) and the Haganah; Dreyfus Affair; Enlightenment, France, 18th Century; French Revolution, 1789–1794; Hamas: Origins and Development; Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) and German Nazism; Israeli Peace Movement; Israeli Settlers Movement; Jewish Bund; Jewish Resistance to Nazism; Jews and Revolution in Europe, 1789–1919; Marx, Karl (1818–1883); Marxism; Socialism; Young Turks; Zola, Emile (1840–1902)

References and Suggested Readings

- Brenner, M. (2006) *Zionism: A Brief History*. Trans. S. Frisch. Princeton: Markus Wiener.
- Herzl, T. (1966) Zionism. In Z. Zohar (Ed.), *Israel Among the Nations*. Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization.
- Laqueur, W. (2003) *A History of Zionism*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Poliakov, L. (2003) *The History of Anti-Semitism*, Vol. 3: *From Voltaire to Wagner*. Trans. M. Kochan. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Salmon, Y. (1996) Tradition and Nationalism. In J. Reinharz & A. Shapira (Eds.), *Essential Papers on Zionism*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 94–116.
- Vital, D. (1980) *The Origins of Zionism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Žižek, Slavoj (b. 1949)

Gal Kirn

Born in Ljubljana, Slovenia, Slavoj Žižek was awarded a Bachelor of Arts in philosophy and

sociology in 1971, a Master of Arts in philosophy in 1975, and a Doctor of Arts in philosophy in 1981 at the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Ljubljana. In 1985, at the University of Paris-VIII, he received his second PhD, this time in psychoanalysis.

After his MA studies he wished to remain at the University of Ljubljana, but was rejected on account of his potential political and theoretical aberrations. However, in 1977 he obtained a post at the Central Committee of the League of Slovene Communists, where he wrote speeches for politicians and continued studying philosophy. In 1979 he became a researcher at the University of Ljubljana's Institute for Sociology. This was also the period of the foundation of the Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis with the takeover of the editorial board of the journal *Problemi*. The so-called "Slovenian theoretical school" cannot be understood without its struggle for the Marxist legacy; it was through critique of classical Marxism that the fusion of post-Marxism (thinkers like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe were important in this regard) and psychoanalysis took place. Žižek's main academic fields remain Marxism, German classical philosophy, and psychoanalysis, whereas the basis for his thought is located in Jacques Lacan's theory. Žižek became famous in the 1990s and 2000s with numerous visits, conferences, and professorships abroad as well as the numerous books he published. In the 2000s, Žižek has become a trendy figure on college campuses in Europe and North America, and his work has popularized intellectual discourse on Marxism, Leninism, and socialist philosophy and a resurgence of interest in the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, among others. He became a member of many editorial boards: *Analecta* (in Slovene), *Wo es war* (in German), and *Wo es war* (with Verso) and *SIC* (with Duke University Press) in English.

One of his most important contributions was his innovative use of psychoanalysis: with his understanding of a range of cultural phenomena, from pop culture (film) to opera and political theory, Žižek not only enabled a new perspective on these phenomena but also supplied readers with a different access to psychoanalysis itself. The use of popular examples and jokes is a vital part of his philosophical arguments.

On the other hand, Žižek's works are explicitly political, contesting the widespread consensus that we live in a post-ideological or post-political world, where there is no alternative and history

has already reached its end and goal. In contradiction to such ideological presuppositions, he is one of a very few authors who seriously advocates a return to Lenin. If nowadays Marx has become an important academic reference (although not in the post-socialist countries), Lenin still haunts Marxism and political thought in general. Žižek's notion of the political act that breaks up radically with the existing order, namely, with capitalism and liberal democracy, is consistent throughout his texts. Moreover, on the background of the debate of revolution, he remains loyal to the Leninist idea of taking over power. What kind of new political form it will take is of course another question, but Žižek locates the new "proletariat" in the excluded masses (e.g., the *sans-papiers*, slum dwellers).

If it is true that Slavoj Žižek remains consistent and faithful to revolutionary ideas on the level of theory, the question of political practice reveals quite a different perspective, one that contradicts the theory. In the 1980s Žižek was a frequent contributor to *Mladina*, a weekly magazine which, together with *Radio Student*, became the most important platforms for democratic oppositional social movements in Slovenia. He was one of the founders of the famous Committee for the Defense of Human Rights. After the 1980s his political path became less alternative, when in 1990 he ran for the four-man presidency of the Republic of Slovenia in the first multiparty elections, which he narrowly lost. He became an ambassador of science for the Republic of Slovenia in 1991 and later was the main ideologue of the Liberal Democratic Party that remained in power from 1992 to 2004.

Even if this contradictory relationship between political theory and political practice is apparent, Žižek remains one of the most important reference and orientation points in contemporary debates.

SEE ALSO: Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924); Marxism

References and Suggested Readings

- Butler, R. (2004) *Slavoj Žižek: Live Theory*. London: Continuum.
- Daly, G. (2009) *Žižek: Ideology, the Real and the Subject*. London: Sage.
- Kay, S. (2003) *Žižek: A Critical Introduction*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Myers, T. (2003) *Slavoj Žižek (Routledge Critical Thinkers)*. London: Routledge.

Parker, I. (2004) *Slavoj Žižek: A Critical Introduction*. London: Pluto Press.

Sharpe, M. (2004) *Slavoj Žižek: A Little Piece of the Real*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Žižek, S. (2001) *Repeating Lenin*. Zagreb: Arkzin.

Žižek, S. (2002a) *Revolution at the Gates: Žižek on Lenin, the 1917 Writings*. London: Verso.

Žižek, S. (2002b) *Welcome to the Desert of the Real*. London: Verso.

Žižek, S. (2005) *Interrogating the Real*. London: Continuum.

Žižek, S. (2006) *The Parallax View*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Žižek! (2007) Film directed by Astra Taylor. www.zizekstudies.org/

Zola, Emile (1840–1902)

Annette Richardson

Emile Zola was a French novelist and social critic whose novels criticized all aspects of Second Empire France (1852–70). In 1898 he protested the imprisonment of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French army who had been falsely convicted of being a traitor. This volatile article *J'accuse* ("I Accuse") polarized the country and resulted in his conviction for criminal libel.

Emile Edouard Charles Antoine Zola was born on April 12, 1840 in Paris to François Zola and Emilie Aubert. François died seven years later, leaving his family destitute. Zola was educated at Aix College and granted a scholarship to attend Lycée Saint Louis, but he never obtained a degree. He was unsuccessful in several vocations until he began to write freelance columns for newspapers as a political journalist. Zola's work illustrated a strong dislike for Emperor Napoleon III, who ruled France from 1852 to 1870.

Zola's writing went beyond journalism. Early in his career he wrote a number of essays, short stories, plays, and novels. He obtained a position with M. M. Hachette, a prominent publishing house, but lost it in 1865 when his lurid novel, *La Confession de Claude* (*Claude's Confession*), appeared in print. In 1867 Zola published *Thérèse Raquin*, the novel which brought him fame. From 1871 to 1893 he worked on a successful series (*Les Rougon-Macquart*) about the travails of several generations of a family's life during the French Second Empire period. The series eventually grew to 20 volumes. Zola's well-researched stories about working-class families, with realistic plots and interesting character

portrayals, made his work extremely popular. In 1880 he examined and wrote about the sex trade, which made him both enemies and admirers simultaneously. His masterpiece, *Germinal*, which focused on the coal industry, was published in 1885. Although Zola presented factory owners sympathetically, the political right in France perceived the novel as a call for revolution.

Even more controversial was his letter concerning the Dreyfus Affair. In the 1890s Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish army captain, was accused of espionage and found guilty on false evidence in two separate trials. He ultimately served a 5-year sentence on Devil's Island in French Guiana. The anti-Semitic generals of the French army were aware of Dreyfus's innocence but refused to admit fault. Realizing the injustice against Dreyfus, Zola exploded against the "establishment." At huge cost to his personal safety but with great clarity of conscience, Zola published a 4,000-word open letter, *J'accuse*, to President Félix Faure in the newspaper *L'Aurore* on January 12, 1898. By making such a public attack, Zola knew he could be charged with libel, but the letter challenged the army, the general staff, and the military justice system, clearly accusing the government of anti-Semitism. One of the most famous publications in French history, *J'accuse* was instrumental in transforming public opinion and convinced many people of Dreyfus's innocence. As Zola expected, he was convicted of criminal libel on February 23, 1899. His title of Knight of the Legion of Honor was repealed, and, at the approach of his second trial, he fled to England to escape a prison sentence. He successfully appealed his conviction to the Court de Cassation and returned to France after being given amnesty on December 24, 1900.

Zola died of carbon monoxide fumes from a blocked chimney in September 29, 1902. He was buried initially at Montmartre Cemetery in Paris. On June 4, 1908, he was moved to the Panthéon, an honor reserved for the greatest of French citizens.

SEE ALSO: Dreyfus Affair

References and Suggested Readings

- Bloom, H. (Ed.) (2004) *Émile Zola*. Philadelphia: Chelsea House.
 Brown, F. (1995) *Zola: A Life*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux.

Hemmings, F. W. J. (1977) *The Life and Times of Emile Zola*. London: Paul Elek.

Zola, É. (1998) *The Dreyfus Affair: "J'accuse" and Other Writings*. Ed. A. Pagès. Trans. E. Leveux. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Zumbi (ca. 1655–1695)

Gregory R. Smulewicz-Zucker

Zumbi was the final and most famous leader of Palmares, a *quilombo* known in English as a maroon society (a community or society of escaped slaves) that existed nearly throughout the seventeenth century in the Brazilian state of Pernambuco. Under Zumbi's leadership, the citizens of Palmares (Palmarinos) defended the *quilombo* against the final Portuguese offensive, which ultimately led to Palmares' destruction. Like much of the history of Palmares, few verifiable facts are known about Zumbi and much about his life has become mythic. Zumbi's name is also often spelled "Zambi." It is unclear whether "Zumbi" is a proper name, a title, or a term expressing reverence. Much that is known about Zumbi's life comes from Portuguese reports and is the subject of debate among scholars.

Zumbi was probably born free in Palmares around 1655. At the time of his birth, Palmares had already been in existence for about 50 years and was home to thousands of escaped slaves as well as free-born people of African descent. The year 1655 also saw the Portuguese lead their first major assault on Palmares, under the command of Brás da Rocha Cardoso, after first expelling the Dutch who had controlled Pernambuco from 1637 to 1654. The assault was largely as ineffective as previous offenses led by the Dutch and those led by the Portuguese prior to the Dutch capture of Pernambuco in 1637. Early reports suggest that Zumbi was captured as a baby by the Portuguese during the assault of 1655. As an infant, Zumbi was placed under the charge of Father Antônio Melo, a priest in the town of Porto Calvo. He was baptized by Father Melo and given the name Francisco. Under Father Melo's tutelage, Zumbi received a remarkable education for a person of African descent living among the Portuguese. He learned both Portuguese and Latin and probably also received instruction in other subjects that comprised the education of a Catholic priest. In 1670, at the age of 15, Zumbi ran away from Porto Calvo and Father Melo and

returned to Palmares. However, he apparently remained grateful to Father Melo for his kindness and would often sneak back to visit the priest.

Upon his return to Palmares, Zumbi gave up the Christian name Francisco and came to be known as Zumbi. By the mid-1670s, he had acquired distinction as a great warrior. Portuguese reports of this time refer to him as a general in the armies of Palmares. The fact that Zumbi attained such a rank suggests that he came from royal blood, since such ranks were most commonly bestowed by the king to his relatives. Zumbi became a popular leader among the citizens of Palmares for his bravery in fending off the Portuguese attacks of the 1670s. According to Portuguese reports on the attacks of 1675–6, Zumbi received a wound that left him with a limp.

While the Portuguese attacks of the 1670s failed to overtake Palmares, they did have a devastating impact on the *quilombo*. In 1678, the king of Palmares, Ganga Zumba, sued for peace. Some reports suggest that Zumbi was Ganga Zumba's nephew. It remains unclear whether Zumbi was in fact Ganga Zumba's nephew: given the nature of traditional African family structures, Zumbi may have been related to Ganga Zumba by blood, by adoption, or by some other form of kinship. Regardless of the exact nature of their relationship, the two men were close and Zumbi was considered an important advisor to Ganga Zumba; however, a rift formed between the two men over Ganga Zumba's decision to sue for peace. The terms of the peace set by the Portuguese stipulated that the Portuguese authorities would recognize Palmares' right to exist on condition that, among other demands, the Palmarinos resettle in the Cucaú Valley. Zumbi was incredulous of the Portuguese promises to allow the citizens of Palmares to relocate and live freely. The Cucaú Valley lacked the mountainous terrain that made Palmares so easy to defend. Further, the Portuguese military had not demobilized its units, adding to Zumbi's suspicions. Ganga Zumba's decision to accept the peace and travel to the Valley led to the creation of a rival faction under Zumbi's command. Ganga Zumba was ousted from power and Zumbi was put in his place. Just how violent the coup was and how much popular support it had remains unknown. Ganga Zumba may have abdicated or the regicide may have been sanctioned by the Council in

Palmares' capital, Macaco, which served as a balance to the king's power. Some reports suggest that Zumbi murdered Ganga Zumba, while others suggest that Ganga Zumba took his own life after realizing that accepting the Portuguese peace was an error.

From the time Ganga Zumba led his faction to Cucaú, Zumbi continued his resistance against the Portuguese. By 1680, Zumbi was recognized as the supreme chief of Palmares. Under Zumbi, the peace negotiations were abandoned and the war with the Portuguese resumed. The Portuguese launched almost continuous attacks on Palmares, but met with little success. For years, the Portuguese battled the large network of villages ruled from Palmares' capital, Macaco, but made little headway. In 1693, due to the stalemate, the Portuguese governor of Pernambuco hired a group of *bandeirantes* (frontiersmen) led by Domingos Jorge Velho. Velho's forces were more accustomed to fighting the kind of guerilla warfare necessary to defeat the Palmarinos. Velho's forces succeeded in defeating the villages outside of Macaco. In February 1694, Velho's forces and 3,000 Portuguese soldiers finally captured Macaco and Palmares was defeated.

Reportedly, Zumbi escaped before Palmares' destruction. He continued to lead a small band of fighters and managed to elude the Portuguese for nearly two years. Ultimately, one of Zumbi's men was captured and, in exchange for his life, led a group of Paulistas to Zumbi's hideout. Zumbi was taken alive. He was decapitated on November 20, 1695, and his head was put on public display. Portuguese reports suggest that the head was put on display to show the slaves that Zumbi was not immortal; however, Zumbi has acquired a different kind of immortality. His memory is celebrated by people of African descent as a symbol of resistance to racism. He has become something of a national hero among Afro-Brazilians who continue to live in a country with deep racial divides. In 1995, the tercentenary of Zumbi's death was marked by celebrations throughout the country, among them a speech by then president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The date of Zumbi's execution continues to be celebrated in Brazil as National Black Consciousness Day.

SEE ALSO: Brazil, Peasant Movements and Liberation Theology; Canudos, Religion and Rebellion in 19th-Century Brazil; Palmares Slave Revolts, 1602–1603

References and Suggested Readings

- Anderson, R. N. (1996) The *Quilombo* of Palmares: A New Overview of a Maroon State in Seventeenth-Century Brazil. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 28, 3 (October): 545–66.
- Diggs, I. (1953) Zumbi and the Republic of Os Palmares. *Phylon* 14, 1 (1st Qtr.): 62–70.
- Kent, R. K. (1965) Palmares: An African State in Brazil. *Journal of African History* 6 (2): 161–75.

Zwane, Ambrose Phesheya (1922–1998)

Ackson M. Kanduzo

Ambrose Phesheya Zwane was born into a relatively privileged family background and had bright prospects in Swaziland's traditional political system. However, he chose to strive instead for fundamental social reform, taking a path that placed him at loggerheads first with the British colonial power, then with the Swazi traditional authorities, and finally with the postcolonial regime.

Zwane's father, Amos Zwane, was a personal physician and advisor to King Sobhuza II – the Swazi crown prince from 1900 to 1921, and then the country's longest-reigning monarch, ruling from 1921 to 1982. The elder Zwane was in London in 1922 (accompanying Sobhuza II, who was appealing a land case at the Privy Council) when his son Ambrose Phesheya was born: Phesheya means “across the seas” (Kuper 1978).

Ambrose Phesheya Zwane studied in neighboring South Africa and became, in 1951, the first Swazi medical doctor to graduate from medical school at the University of the Witwatersrand. Three things engendered his embarking on what many in Swaziland saw as quite a revolutionary path. First, his studies in South Africa at the Universities of Fort Hare and Witwatersrand introduced him to African nationalism, which gave rise to a rejection of both colonialism and traditional power. He became active in campus politics. Second, when he returned to Swaziland he suffered racial discrimination: he saw this as so widespread at all levels of Swazi society that he resigned from government employment in 1960 (Kuper 1978: 218). Third, he believed strongly in blending the ideals of Pan-Africanism, which dominated African decolonization politics, with those of liberal democracy.

Zwane therefore assisted both the main African nationalist groups of South Africa – the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) – in Swaziland, during their long years of exile and armed struggle against apartheid. These influences shaped Zwane's social and political life until his death in 1998 (Dlamini 2006: 269).

African nationalism was a late development in Swaziland, a British protectorate. Decolonization was also fairly peaceful; however, the movement for decolonization was deeply divided between the more modernizing African nationalists, among whom Zwane counted himself, and forces linked to Swaziland's powerful traditional authorities, linked to Sobhuza II. In July 1960, the nationalist Swaziland Progressive Association converted itself into a political party, the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP), and Zwane was invited to become secretary general. Two months later, Sobhuza II called for the abolition of political parties, arguing that they were incompatible with Swazi and African traditions.

The early 1960s saw constitutional talks with the colonial power taking place: Zwane participated as a member of the SPP and was part of the Swazi delegation to the negotiations until a deadlock in February 1963 caused the British government to suspend the talks. The radical wing of the SPP broke away and formed the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC), with Zwane as its president. When elections were held in April 1964 and April 1967, the royalists were the dominant force. The NNLC performed poorly in elections. Its Pan-Africanism was portrayed by opponents as a “foreign ideology,” and it had a limited appeal to Swazi voters, who rallied strongly behind the king's party, the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM) (Macmillan 1985).

The INM formed the first government of independent Swaziland following its overwhelming victory in April 1967. Zwane did not accept what he viewed as a “government of the royal family and its in-laws” (Legum 1975: 634). He established strong ties with Pan-Africanists like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania after 1964, and sent young Swazis to Ghana for political training.

These developments eventually paid off for Zwane. In the first elections in independent Swaziland, held in April 1972, he was elected to parliament and his party had three representatives. These were elected in the Mpumalanga

constituency in the sugar cane plantations, where the emerging Swazi working class gave the NNLC and Zwane overwhelming support for the first time. This was seen as an indication of Zwane's increasing popularity, as well as signifying the emergence of a liberal democracy with competing parties. The INM and the king moved decisively to stop this trend.

On April 12, 1973, Sobhuza II abrogated Swaziland's constitution and banned all political parties. In 1975, Zwane was detained under a 60-day detention law. Modeled on legislation used against political opponents of the government in apartheid South Africa, it authorized the government to detain anyone for 60 days without explanation or legal redress in a court of law. It is indicative of the political sympathy that Zwane enjoyed even amongst government and security officials that he was able to escape into exile in Mozambique. Zwane had welcomed the independence of Mozambique in June 1975 with a public statement anticipating increased support for Pan-Africanism and socialism; he also hoped it would protect him against repression in Swaziland.

Later Zwane moved to Tanzania. President Nyerere negotiated with Sobhuza II in 1978 to arrange Zwane's return with immunity from political detentions. Even so, Zwane was detained several times in the late 1980s and early 1990s. He died on September 13, 1998, still widely recognized as leader of the NNLC in Swaziland. He left behind a strong tradition of support for liberal democracy: disputing the claim that absolute monarchy was the "Swazi way," he envisaged a Swaziland based on economic and social equality, progress, and human rights.

SEE ALSO: Nkrumah, Kwame (1909–1972); Nyerere, Julius (1922–1999); South Africa, African Nationalism and the ANC

References and Suggested Readings

- Booth, A. R. (2000) *Historical Dictionary of Swaziland*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.
- Dlamini, N. C. (2006) *The Legal Abolition of Racial Discrimination and its Aftermath: The Case of Swaziland, 1945–1973*. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
- Kuper, H. (1978) *Sobhuza II. Ngwenyama and King of Swaziland: The Story of an Hereditary Ruler and his Country*. London: Duckworth.
- Legum, C. (1975) *African Contemporary Record*. London: Africana Publishing House.

- Macmillan, H. (1985) Swaziland: Decolonization and Triumph of "Tradition." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 23: 643–66.
- Matsebula, B. N. (2006) *A History of the Swaziland Progressive Association, 1929–1960*. BA thesis, University of Swaziland.

Zwingli, Huldrych (1484–1531)

Jordan J. Ballor

Born in the Swiss town of Wildhaus, Huldrych Zwingli was a first-generation leader along with Martin Luther in what would later be known as the Protestant Reformation. His first public writings expressing clear sympathies for the Reformation date to 1522, although in the years prior he had taken steps sympathetic with the position of Luther. Zwingli dates his decisive shift to the year 1516, when he decided to preach the gospel directly from the scriptures. For the next decade Zwingli would be a major figure in the spread of the Reformation among the Swiss cantons, particularly in Zurich, where he had been called to minister in 1519. He spoke out against medieval church practices such as tithes, indulgences, and invocation of saints.

Zwingli was particularly influential in his desire to evangelize the Swiss confederation to form a political bulwark for Protestantism against Roman Catholic states. On the one hand, Zwingli faced doctrinal opposition from Luther, especially on the question of the Lord's Supper. On the other, Zwingli was challenged by Anabaptists and radical reformers who denied the validity of infant baptism, which Zwingli defended on appeals to the biblical doctrine of covenant.

Futile attempts to resolve the disputes between Zwingli and Luther culminated in the Marburg Colloquy in 1529. Luther insisted that Zwingli's account of the presence of Christ in the supper was inadequate and that Zwingli could therefore not be counted as a brother in the Protestant faith. This continuing disagreement was enough to prevent a greater political alliance between the Swiss Reformed and German Lutheran powers, despite the attempts at mediation by figures like Martin Bucer, Philip Melancthon, and Johannes Oecolampadius.

In 1531, five Catholic cantons joined forces to invade and attack Zurich. As minister in the city's

“great church” (*Grossmünster*), it was custom for Zwingli to ride with the defending guard. Zwingli was mortally wounded in the battle, which was lost by the Zurich forces. Zwingli’s influence was sustained primarily through the work of his successor, Heinrich Bullinger, who continued his reforms. It was particularly Zwingli’s views on the relation of the civil magistrate and the authority of the church that led to a model of church–state relations later identified with figures like Bullinger, Wolfgang Musculus, and Thomas Erastus. Zwingli’s positive view of the magistrate’s role in society also separated him from the more radical reformers. Zwingli represents part of the variegated and pluriform reformed tradition, in distinction from

both Roman Catholicism and the “Radical” Reformation.

SEE ALSO: Anabaptist Movement; Calvin, John (1509–1564); German Reformation; Luther, Martin (1483–1546); Reformation

References and Suggested Readings

- Gordon, B. (2002) *The Swiss Reformation*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Locher, G. W. (1981) *Zwingli’s Thought: New Perspectives*. Leiden: Brill.
- Stephens, W. P. (1992) *Zwingli: An Introduction to His Thought*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Zwingli, H. (1987) *Early Writings*. Ed. S. M. Jackson. Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press.

Index

Note: page numbers in bold denote main entries.

- Aarafa, Muhammed Ben 2336
Aba Island Rebellion 3191–2
Aba Women's Riot, Nigeria 2482, 3634
Ababda tribe 1075
Abacha, Maryam 3548
Abacha, Sanni 2116, 2481, 2483
Abad de Santillán, Diego 261, 1187
Abadia Méndez, Miguel 343
Abalone Alliance 1–2, 1052
Abantu Batho (The People) 3205
Abatangelo, Pasquale 2402
Abbas, Chaudhuri Ghulam 1929
Abbas, Ferhat 45, 1246–7
Abbas, Mahmoud 1550
Abbey, Edward 1054
Abboud, El-Ferik Ibrahim 3191
'Abd al-Halīm Çelebi 3356, 3358
'Abd al-Madǧīd 3356
Abd al Qadir Wad Habuba 3192
Abd al-Rahman, Sayyid 3194
Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi 3192, 3195
Abdali, Ahmad Shah 1928
Abdelkrim uprising 44
'Abduh, Muhammad 1809
Abdul Aziz, Sultan 2235
Abdul-Hamid II 283, 285, 293, 3347, 3681
Abdul-Jelil, Animasawun Gbemisola 547–8
Abdul Salam II 352
Abdul Wali Khan 2582
Abdullah, Farooq 1933–4, 1935
Abdullah, Hussaina 3547
Abdullah ibn Muhammad, Khalifa 2164
Abdullah, Muhammad 1928, 1929–30, 1931
Abdullah, of Jordan 399
Abdullahi, Khalifa 3192
Abdullatif, Ali 3193
Abdurahman, Abdullah 2–3, 2395
Abdurrahman Khan 15, 16
Abejas, Las (The Bees) 2289
Abella, Maria 3597
abeng (cow's horn instrument) 612
Abeng Newspaper movement 1863
Abeokuta 954, 3677
Aberdeen Trades Council 2821
Abern, Martin 596
Abernathy, Ralph 1852, 1972, 1973
Aberri 1128
'Ābidīn Khōdja, Zayn al- 3357
Abiola, Moshood Kashimawo Olawale 2481, 2483
Abiyot Seded (Revolutionary Flame) 1137
abolitionism
 antebellum 214–16
 Britain 200–5, 1223
 Civil War 56
 Declaration of Independence 1113
 Enlightenment 203, 1112–13
 militant resistance to slavery 88
 non-violence 2491
 Spain 917
 see also American Anti-Slavery Society; anti-slavery movement; Anti-Slavery Society; Anthony, Susan B.; Douglass, Frederick; Garrison, William Lloyd; Wilberforce, William
Aboriginal Affairs 310
Aboriginal Land Rights Act 311
aboriginal protests, Australia 3–6, 307–12
Aboriginal Rights Coalition 6
Aboriginal Tent Embassy 3–4, 309–10
Aborigine Integral Law 258
Aborigines Advancement League 308
Aborigines Progressive Association (APA) 307
Abouré people 883
Abraham, Collin Rajasingham 2176–9
Abraham Lincoln Brigade 6–7, 2847
Abrahamsen, R. 1948
Abramowski, Edward 140
Abreu e Lima, José Inácio de 493
Abrilada rebellion 187
absolutism
 of monarchy 783, 1303–4, 2125, 2922
 of papacy 2829
absurdist theater 582, 1563
abu Bakr 234
Abu Dharr 234
Abu-Jamal, Mumia 7–8
Abu Roaf group 3194

- Abu Sayyaf 2329, 2330
 Abu Turab, Shaykh 1766
 abu-Zyad, Ziad 1814
 Abubakar, Abdusalami 2482
 Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo: *see* Grandmothers of
 the Plaza de Mayo
 Abuja Declaration, OAU 3113
 Abukir Bay, Battle of 441
 Abunimah, Ali 1760
 Abyssinia 450
 Academia dos Renascidos 485
 Academy of Sciences, France 2990, 2991, 2992
 Ação Libertadora Nacional (ALN) 472
Acción Católica 2057
 Acción Católica de la Mujer 3611
 Acción Democrática (AD) 604, 3436, 3437,
 3442, 3447, 3450
 Acción Revolucionaria Salvadoreña (ARS) 1163
 Aceh War 1720
 Aceiceira, Battle of 188
 Achar Sua 3476
 Achcar, G. 1771, 1773
 Acheson, George 1894
 Achmont, Zachie 3312
 Ackerson, Wayne 209–11
 Acqui Division 2834
ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power)
 8–10, 1482, 2100, 2108, 2503
 Action Command of Indonesian (KAMI) 1724,
 3180
 Action Directe (AD) 1369, 2817
 Action Française 824
 Action Socialiste 2784
Actos (Valdez) 28
 Acuña, Antonio de 844, 845
 Adam, Barry D. 2092–6
 Adamec, Ladislav 3434
 Adams, Abigail 84, 3614–15, 3616
 Adams, Gerry 1802, 3044
 Adams, John 83, 996, 1546, 2570, 3614
 Fries's Rebellion 1300, 1301–2
 Adams, Samuel 77, 452
 Adapazarı Rebellion 3357
 Adas, M. 552
Addams, Jane 10–12, 1742, 3519
 Adebayo, Adeyinka 24
 Adedeji, Adebayo 3111
 Adekunle, Julius O. 23–6
 Aden, captured 3670
 Adeniran, Adebusuyi I. 563–5, 852–3, 858–9,
 2478–80, 2484–5, 3006–7, 3007–8, 3676–8
 Adeoye, Tafa 25
 Adhikari, Mohamed 2–3
 Adhisuryo, Tirto 1728
 Adirondack Forest Preserve 1119
adivasi (tribal villages) 2802
 Adkins, Lucille A. 3612–16, 3616–23, 3623–30
 Adlan, Mohammed Wad 3196
 Adler, M. 321, 322, 354, 1581
 Adman, Ursula 1109
 Administration of Justice Act 78
 Adolat (Justice) 3422
 Adolf Frederick, of Sweden 1496
 Adongo, Ambrose 1950
Adorno, Theodor W.
 Authoritarian Personality, The 906, 1302
 and Brecht 504
 Dialectic of Enlightenment 12, 906, 907, 1255
 Frankfurt School 12–13, 325, 904, 1253
 and Horkheimer 905, 907–8
 Marxism 2249
 Minima Moralia 906
 Negative Dialectics 13
 works 1255
 Adrian of Utrecht 844
 adult education 2543
 Adultery Act 1104, 2805
Adunata dei Refrattari, L' 131
 Advance organization 964
 Advani, L. K. 1585, 1693, 1694, 1935
 aesthetic socialism 3061
 Afary, J. 3017
 affirmative action 754
 Affirmative Action (Equal Employment of
 Women) Act 3563
Affranchis, Les 1534, 1543–4
 Afghan War I 1688
 Afghani, Jamal al-Din al- 234, 236, 1809
Afghanistan
 Amanulla Khan 329, 330, 1934
 April Revolution 13
 Bin Laden 3247
 British invasion 15–16
 Islamic Civil War 14–15
 Khazara peoples 329
 Pashtuns 13
 PDPA 13, 14
 Revolution (1978) 13–15
 Soviet Union 388, 1465
 and Tajikistan 3243
 US invasion 1401, 1664, 3247–8
 warlords 14
 see also Bacha-i Sakkao's movement; Durrani
 empire; Khuda-i Khidmatgar (Red Shirts);
 Roshaniya movement; Taliban
 AFL-CIO 416–17, 2036–7, 2803, 3662
 see also American Federation of Labor;
 Congress of Industrial Organizations
 Aflaq, Michel 1069, 3221, 3222, 3223, 3224, 3226
 Afranie Kuma, Akwasi 3669

- Africa
 average income 1671
 cash crops 1662
 European colonialism 1657–8, 1663, 3545, 3670
 feminism 3548–9
 gold 1657
 independence struggles 3545–9
 Islam 1657
 Make Poverty History 1312, 1402–3
 Marxism 2249
 patriarchy 3547
 postcolonial 3547–9
 slave trade 1657
see also individual countries
 Africa Caribbean Pacific countries (ACP) 1995, 3644, 3651
 Africa Growth and Opportunity Act 3114
Africa Times and Orient Review 1336
 Africa Trade Network 3114
 African Advisory Council (AAC) 454
 African Aid Society 208, 209
African Americans
 American Civil War 20
 American Revolution 84
 Black Codes 20
 black male identity 2846
 churches 2799
 CPUSA 394
 Declaration of Independence, American 213
 Great Migration 2822
 Jim Crow era 16–19
 Lincoln and 394, 2121–3
 martyrs 3460
 Reconstruction Era 19–21, 2798–9
 right to own weapons 20–1
 women's rights 212, 217
 World War I 2822
 World War II 17
see also black community; civil rights movement
African Blood Brotherhood 21–3, 394, 837
African Chronicle 3603
 African Church 3460
 African Civil Service Association 456
African Communist 3040, 3104
African Daily News 2221
 African Elected Members' Organization (AEMO) 2269
 African Food and Canning Workers' Union 26
 African Institution 204, 210, 941–2, 3022, 3529
 African Labor Research Network (ALRN) 3111
 African Lakes Company 2172
 African Methodist Episcopal Church 214, 391
 African Mineworkers' Union (AMWU) 834, 3093, 3696
 African National Congress (ANC)
 African nationalism 3084–90
 Aggett 26
 banned 172
 Blaxall 2357
 COSATU 2192, 3084, 3101, 3112
 CPSA 171, 832
 Defiance Campaign 2191
 foreign support 173
 and FOSATU 874–5
 Freedom Charter 2192, 3249
 ideological splits 3086
 Mandela 171, 1940, 2111, 2189
 and MK 3105–6
 Mozambique 2153
 neoliberalism 3098
 Nkumbula 3698
 and NP 170–1
 and NRC 1940
 and PAC 171, 2192, 2358, 3104
 post-Fordism 1399
 Rand Revolt 832
 and SACP 2192, 3052, 3084, 3103, 3249
 Tambo 3248
 unbanned 175, 3107
 water supplies 3099, 3101–2
 women's participation 3603
 African National Congress, Rhodesia 3735
 African National Congress's Women's League (ANCWL) 3603
 African National Prison Organization 3373
 African National Reparation Organization (ANRO) 3373
 African Newspapers 2221
 African Orthodox Church 1336
 African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) 2360
 African People's Socialist Party (APSP) 395, 3373
 African People's Solidarity Committee 3373
 African Political Organization (APO) 2
 African Provincial Councils (APCs) 1940, 3698
 African Regeneration 208
 African Representative Council (ARC) 1940, 3698
 African Union 3651
 African Women Living in Europe Conference 326
Africano, O 153, 2354
 Afrikaner League of Mineworkers 1557
 Afrikaner Student League (ASL) 3180
 Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) 2181
Afro-Colombian movements 794–6
 Afro-Costa Ricans 640
 Afro-Cubans 911–14

- Afro-Germans** 91–2
see also Ayim, May
- Afro-Jamaicans 1858, 1860, 1861
- Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) 3708–9
- Afro-Venezuelans 737
- Aga Khan 1921
- Agadir Incident 2335
- Agartala Conspiracy Case 346, 2579
- Agbekoya Parapo (Farmers Resist Suffering Society) 2483
- Agbekoya Peasant Uprising and Rebellion** 23–6, 2481
- age of consent 3543
- Age of Consent Act 1582, 1696
- Agee, Chris John 2258–60
- Aggett, Neil** 26–7
- Agha, Ismael 1762
- Agitators 1101
- Agitprop** 27–8, 2962, 3133
- Agnew, Spiro 532
- Agnos, Art 1207
- Agoda prisons, storming of 25
- Agranat State Investigating Committee 1813
- agrarian capitalism 1090
- Agrarian Leagues 2606–7
- Agrarian Party of Greece (AKE) 1436, 1444
- Agrarian Reform Law, Bolivia 1936
- agribusinesses 3461
- Agricultural Labor Relations Act 1610
- Agriculture et Artisanat* 242
- Agrupación Cultural Feminina 3631
- Agrupación de Mujeres Antifascistas (Anti-Fascist Women) 3139
- Agrupación Mujeres Libres (Group of Free Women) 123
- Agua Prieta Plan 2540, 2541
- Aguas Blancas Manifesto* 1122
- Aguas Blancas massacre 1121, 2285, 2288
- Aguas del Tunari, Bechtel Corporation 790, 791–2
- Aguascalientes Convention 2278–9, 2540
- Agudelo, William and Teresita 606
- Agüeybaná I** 28–9
- Agüeybaná II** 28–9
- Aguilar, Carlos 2129
- Aguilares killings 2868
- Aguinaldo, Emilio 445, 2668–9
- Aguirre Cerda, Pedro 50
- Aguirre Gainsborg, José 428
- Ahern, G. P. 902
- Ahidjo, Ahmadou 580, 1252
- ahimsa* (non-injury) 1701, 1969
- Ahlman, Nicolai 990
- Ahmad, Chaudhury Manzoor 2584
- Ahmad, Muhammad 2163, 2164
- Ahmad, Sheikh 352
- Ahmad Pacha Bey 3334
- Ahmad Shah 1763
- Ahmadullah, Maulavi 1690
- Ahmed, Muzaffar 961, 2582, 3229
- Ahmed, Tajuddin 347
- Ahmed, Ziauddin 2577
- Ahmed the Prophet 1074, 1075
- Ahmed the Vizier 1074
- Ahmedabad textile mills 1325, 1694, 1700, 2429
- Ahora!* 3631
- Aid for Trade 3653
- AIDS**
 LGBT 2095, 2098, 2099
 Thailand 3273
 Zimbabwe 3738
see also ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power); HIV/AIDS
- AIDS ACTION NOW!** 2100
- AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power: *see* ACT UP
- Aiken, Frank 1050
- Aikins, Joshua Kwesi 91–2, 325–6, 2788–90, 3669–70
- Aikoku Fujin Kai (Patriotic Women's Association) 3595
- Ailhaud, Jean-Antoine 1532
- Aini, Sadriddin 3241
- AK (Polish underground army) 2695
- Akaev, Askar 813, 2511, 3328–30, 3331–2
- Akali Party 1930
- Akanle, Olayinka 1640–1, 2480–2
- Akanran village 25
- Akbar, Mughal emperor 1928
- Akbar Khan 1931
- Akbayan (Citizens' Action Party) 2686, 2687
- Akselrod, Lyubov 3554
- Akselrod, Pavel 2228
- Akwesasne Mohawk Reserve 2417–18
- Al Ahad Society 1775
- Alaafin of Oyo 2558, 2559
- Alagoa Grande trade union 52
- Alais, peace of 1069
- Alakananda flood 736
- Alam II, Shah 368
- Alamance Creek 77
- Alasia, Walter 2815, 2817
- Alavi, S. 1686
- Alawi community 3222, 3224, 3226, 3357
- Alba, Duke of 517, 1035
- ALBA (Alternativa para las Américas) 2352
- Albania**
 alphabet 34, 35
 and China 32
 Christians 34, 36
 Greek Christians 36

- Greek Muslims 36
 Italian occupation 386
 Kosovo 35, 37
 languages 34
 millet system 34
 nationalism 34–8
 Ottoman empire 34
 pyramid banking 33
 refugees 38
 religious divide 34
 socialism 29–33
 Soviets in Czechoslovakia 32
 tribal affiliations 34
see also Kosovo
- Albanian Church 1452
 Albanian Communist Group 29
 Albanian Communist Party (ACP) 30
 Albanian League of Prizren 34–5
 Albany Free School 118
 Albert, Michael 2620
 Albert I, of Belgium 362
Albizu Campos, Pedro 38–9, 2769, 2773, 2774
 Albright, Madeleine 1397, 2594, 3663
 Alcasa oil company 3454
Alcatraz Uprising
 American Indian Movement 39–40
 Red Power 2413–14
 Alcazar, Henry 3315
 alcohol supply 2927
 Alcott, Louisa May 3165
 Alcuin 2829
 Alday Sotelo, Rafael 2296
 Aldermaston marches 513
 Alebu, Ezekiel 3081
 Alegria, Rafael 3462
 Alejandro, Lean 2684
 Aleksic, Srdjan 224
 Alembert, Jean le Rond d' 846, 1001, 2316,
 2991, 3495
 Alessandri, Arturo 692
 Alessandri, Jorge 50, 680
 Alessandrini, Emilio 2750
 Alevi community 3354
 Alevi Kurdish Uprisings 3358–9
 Alexander, Jacqui 2734
 Alexander, Kristian Patrick 399–400, 635–6,
 2068–70, 2070–2, 2072–4
 Alexander Action Committee (AAC) 2264
 Alexander I, Tsar 442, 977, 1201, 2716, 3209
 Alexander II, Tsar 157, 2703, 2921, 2922, 3550
 and Kropotkin 2006
 Alexander III, Tsar 1201, 2081, 2689
Alexander Nevski (Eisenstein) 1081
 Alexandre-Derbay, Janine 3576
 Alexey, Tsar 2806
 Alexis, Jacques Stephen 1517, 1519
 Alexis, Nord 1513, 1514–15
 Alfa-Romeo 1840
 Alfaïates 485
 al-Fajr groups 3194
 Alfaro, Eloy 1063
 Alfaro Lives, Dammit! (AVC) 1058
 Alfieri, Vittorio 1825
 Alfonsín, Raúl 2159
 Alfonso I 186
 Alfonso VII 186
 Alfonso XII, of Spain 1187
 Alfonso XIII, of Spain 145
 Alfred, Taiaïake 111
 Algeciras, Conference of 2335
Algeria
 Arab people 42, 43, 44
 Barricades Week 42
 Ben Bella 366–7
 Berber people 42–3, 44
 civil war 1645–6
 colons/indigènes 1246–7
 de Gaulle 43, 1247
 Fanon 1162
 FLN 226, 366, 1072
 forced labor 43
 French citizenship 42, 43, 1246, 1643
 French Communist Party 44
 French rule 226, 1246–7
 independence 43–5, 3546
 Islamic Salvation Front 40–1
 Jewish people 42–3
 Liberation War 41–2
 riots 1235
 Sétif massacres 226
 torture 41, 1022
 Toussaint rouge 45
 women's rights 356
 women's role 46, 47, 3546
 see also Algerian National Revolution; Algerian
 War of Independence; Front de Libération
 Nationale; Kabyl resistance to government
 Algerian Communist Party (PCA) 44, 45
 Algerian National Liberation Army (ALN) 42, 45
 Algerian National Liberation Front 564
Algerian National Revolution 41–7
 Algerian People's Party (PPA) 44
 Algerian War of Independence
 anti-war activists 226
 Camus 581
 Corsica 873
 Côte d'Ivoire 884
 FLN 1644
 Kabyl 1927
 and Tunisia 3336

- Algiers, Battle of 42, 46
 Al-Jazeera television network 389
 Ali, Ayann Hirsi 2448
 Ali, Mirza Husayn 1766
 Ali, Mohammed 1326, 1702
 'Ali, Muhammad: *see* Muhammad 'Ali
 Ali, Muhammad (formerly Cassius Clay) 221
 Ali, Rashid 1705, 3221
 Ali, Shaukat 1326, 1702
 Ali, Tariq 218, 2260–4
 Ali, Zulfikar 2388
 'Ali Dinar, Sultan 51
 Ali Ghālip Incident 3355
 Ali I Bey 3334
 Ali II Bey 3334
 Alia, Ramiz 32
 Aliança Nacional Libertadora 470–1, 2749
 Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (AAA) 246, 249, 273
 Alianza Democrática M-19 802, 1082, 2149–50
 Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO) 800, 801
 Alianza PAIS 871
 Alianza Patriótica por el Cambio (APC) 2135
 Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) 47–9, 1567, 2648, 2649, 2651, 3431
 Alien Acts 1300, 1301, 1412
 alienation
 dialectics 2837, 2839
 Lukács on 2136
 Marxist 784, 1843
 Alimi, Eitan Y. 1812–16
 Alinsky, Saul 661, 2499
 Community Service Organization 1609
 have-nots theory 2539
 Industrial Areas Foundation 49
 Reveille for Radicals 49
 Rules for Radicals 49
 Alipore Conspiracy Case 1675
 Aljubarrota, Battle of 186
 Alkatiri, Mari 1045
 Alkebulan, P. 398
 All-African Convention 2220
 All-African People's Revolutionary Party 395
 All-Bengal Muslim Students' League (MSL) 1705
 All-Bengal Students' Association 3179
 All Blacks rugby team, NZ 3155–6
 All Burma Congress 554
 All Burma Students Union 301, 3180
 All Burma Youth League 553
 All-Ceylon Harbor and Dock Workers' Union 1494, 2052
 All-Ceylon United Motor Workers' Union 2052
 All-Ceylon Youth Congress 969
 All-China Federation of Labor (ACFL) 2124
 All-China Labor Congress 723
 All-Ethiopia Peasant Associations (AEPA) 1137
 All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON) 1135–7
 All-Ethiopian Trade Union (AETU) 1136
 All-Ijaw Youths' Conference 2485
 All-in African Conference 2192
 All India Communist Party 961–2
 All-India Congress Committee (AICC) 1329, 1702, 1704, 2423, 2793
 All India Coordination Committee 3587
 All India Coordination Committee of Revolutionaries (AICCR) 2265, 2423
 All India Democratic Women's Association (AIDWA) 3587
 All-India General Strike 1922
 All India Khilafat Committee 1680
 All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS) 1710, 2793
 All-India Nepali National Congress 2441
 All India Peasant Conference 2576
 All-India States People's Conference 1929–30
 All-India Textile Workers' Strike 1922
 All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) 1325, 1680, 1700, 1710, 2430, 2585, 2793
 All India Women's Conference (AIWC) 646, 2388, 3586
 All Japan Seamen's Union 1894
 All Nations/Four Directions March 2417
 All Pakistan Federation of Labor (APFOL) 2585
 All Pakistan People's Party 2580
 All Pakistan Students Organization 2404
 All People's Congress (APC) 3031
 All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) 439
 All-Russian Congress of Representatives of Trade and Industry 2906
 All-Russian Constituent Assembly 676
 All-Russian Metalworkers' Union 3029
 All-Russian Soviet of Peasant Deputies 2908, 2909
 All-Russian Union for Women's Equality 3390, 3551
 All-Russian Women's Congress 3553
 All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) 439
 All-African Convention (AAC) 833
 All-African People's Conference 857
 Allah Tigers 1935
Allam Nékül (Without State) 128
 Allard, J. 2621
 Alleanza della Democrazia Socialista 1161
 Alleanza Nazionale 1307
 Alleg, Henri 226
 Allen, Barbara C. 3028–30
 Allen, Ethan 78, 79, 80
 Allen, Louis 1258
 Allen, Richard 391
 Allen, William 210, 899, 2460
 Allende, Ignacio 1578, 1579

- Allende Gossens, Salvador** 49–50, 112, 678, 679–80, 683, 685
 Christians for Socialism 2061
 coup 2436, 2507
 killed 1911
 Santiago demonstration 690
 Socialist Party 693
 Unidad Popular 2377, 2379
- Allgemeine Deutsche Burschenschaften (ADB) 3177
- Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein 1351
- Alliance des Ba-Kongo (ABAKO) 856, 2137
- Alliance des femmes pour la démocratie (Women's Alliance for Democracy) 3576
- Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) 853, 858
- Alliance of Korean Youths 136
- Alliance Nationale pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (ANDP) 1505
- Alliance Party, Fiji 1197
- Alliance of the Peoples of the Forest 2273, 2274
see also Mendes, Chico
- Alliance of Progressive Labor (APL) 2686
- Alluri Sitaram Raju 1703
- Almada, Martín 2597, 2598
- Almeida, Helena de 3605
- Almonte, Ramón 1016
- Aló Presidente* 667, 3454
- Alonso, José 864
- ALP–ACTU (Australian Council of Trade Unions) accord 316
- Alpha Boys School, Kingston 611
- al-Qaeda** 388–90, 1646, 1783, 1810, 3247
- al-Qa'idah* 2953
- al-Qassam regiments 1548
- Alquati, Romano 1842
- Alsace-Lorraine 1919
- al-Sanusi, Muhammad ibn Ali** 50–1
- Altagracia Cáceres, Manuel 1017
- Altamirano, Luis 692
- alter-globalization movement 1307, 2305, 2306, 3687
- Alternativa para la Américas (ALBA) 667
- Alternative Canberra 107
- Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA) 809
- Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC) 3114
- Alternative Libertaire 121, 122
- Alternatives for the Americas* 3656–7
- Alternatives to Neoliberalism in Southern Africa (ANSA) 3111, 3112
- Altgeld, John Peter 1570
- Althusser, Louis 1669, 2249, 2307, 2316, 2735
- Altman, Dennis 305
- Altman, J. 5
- Altos Godos, Batalla de los 3631
- altruism 842
- Alvarado, María Jesús 3598
- Alvarado, Pedro de 2080, 3255
- Alvaréz, Juan 1925
- Alvarez, Lenín 639
- Álvarez, María Teresa 845
- Alvarez, Mariano 445
- Alvarez, Osvaldo 3440
- Alvarez Martínez, María Ximena 1012–20, 1268, 1270–1, 2593–5
- Alvarez Tabio, Pedro 3573–4
- Alves, Margarida Maria** 51–2
- Alves, Nito 2360–1
- Amador, Ernest A. 1335–6, 2840–1, 3373–4
- Amador, Zulma 2350–3
- Amakasu Masahiko 1848
- Amal (Hope) 1575, 1576, 2405
- Amalgamated Clothing Workers 1737
- Amalgamated Engineers' Union (AEU) 3728
- Amana Inspirationist Utopians** 52–3, 3417
- Amandala* 1634
- Amangkurat II 1718
- Amanullah Khan 329, 330, 1934
- Amara, Fadela 3577
- Amaral, Francisco Xavier do 1043
- Amarasinghe, Somawansa 2634
- Amasya Protocol 293
- Amato, Giuliano 1311
- Amauta* journal 2218, 2649
- Amazonian rainforest protest and resistance** 2273–4
- Ambedkar, B. R.** 53–5, 955, 957–8
Buddha and His Dhamma, The 54, 958
 Buddhism 54
 class 1710
 as Dalit leader 1328, 2435
 and Gandhi 54, 958
 literary works 54
 non-payment of taxes 1683
 political parties 54
 resignation 3586
 social struggles 54
 untouchables 53, 957–8, 2434
- Amchitka Island nuclear test 1460
- Amdowa people 3290, 3291, 3293
- Amendola, Giovanni 1383
- America First Committee (AFC) 2489
- American Anti-Slavery Society
 disbanded 217
 Douglass 168
 Garrison 168, 214–15, 216, 1334, 3640
 Grimké 1467
 membership 2491
 women in 215, 1467, 3640

- American Birth Control League 2969, 3626
 American Brazilian Railway Company 467
 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 12, 1203
 Scottsboro Resistance 3002–3
 Sinclair 3041
American Civil War 55–69
 black troops 16, 56, 63, 71
 Cuba 917–18
 draft riots 69–70
 financing of 62
 noncombatants 65
 politics of 59–61
 radicalization 61–2
 Reconstruction 68, 2798–801
 Republicanism 62–3
 as revolution 61–3, 2020
 secession 58, 59
 sectionalism 55–6
 slavery 59, 70–2, 755–7
 socialist influences 2024–9
 uniforms/flags 59
 Union forces 58, 59
 women's role 62, 3617
 see also Brown, John; Harpers Ferry
 American Colonization Society 207, 213–14, 394, 942
 American Communist Party (CP) 3413
 see also Communist Party of America (CPUSA)
 American Equal Rights Association (AERA) 169, 3622
 American Federation of Labor (AFL)
 craft unionism 3411
 Debs 2031–2, 3064
 Gompers 2031, 2033, 3380
 Green 3411
 and IWW 1735
 and Knights of Labor 1978, 2026, 2258–9
 Morones 2340
 origins of 2028
 SPA 3064
 and TUEL 1220
 see also AFL–CIO
 American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society 215–16, 3640
 American Friends Service Committee 1170
American Historical Review 794
 American Indian Environmental Activism 2417–19
American Indian Movement (AIM) 385,
 399, 2414–15
 Alcatraz Uprising 39–40
 Peltier 2628–9
 split 2415
 American Indian Movement of Colorado 2416
 American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) 2128
American left 72–4
 American Legion 1532, 3150
 American Livestock Commission Company 2726
 American Medical Association 2969
 American Peace Mobilization (APM) 2489
 American Peace Society Congress 12
 American Philosophical Society 75
 American Railway Union (ARU) 595, 974, 2030–1
 American Revenue Act 77
American Revolution 74–88
 African Americans 84
 aftermath 3022
 American Independence 2022–4
 Atlantic port seaman resistance 294–7
 early settlers 74–7
 Enlightenment 112
 France 1218
 and French Revolution 1274
 influence on Ireland 1785, 3392
 Lafayette 2041
 New England phase 78–9
 organization of working 2020
 Paine 2569–71
 Saint-Simon 2952
 sexuality 3016
 Southern states 85–6
 utopian communities 3416
 War of Independence 74
 women's movement 3613–16
 women's rights 3612–13
American slave rebellions 88–90
 American Teheran embassy 1964
American Trotskyism 595–7
 American Vegetarian Society 3428
 American Veterans Committee (AVC) 72
 American War of Independence 74, 202, 1126, 1807, 2041
 see also American Revolution
 American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) 169, 3622
 American Workers' Party (AWP) 596, 2035, 3412
 Americas Watch 2060
 Americo-Liberians 2114
 Ameringer, Oscar 1459
 Amerio, Ettore 2815
 Amharic language 1132
Ami du peuple, L' 2805
 Amiama Tió, Luis 1017
 Amicale, L' 853
 Amicales 3218
Amico del popolo, L' 1419
 Amiens, Peace of 442, 1224

- Amin, Jamil Abdullah al- 531–2
see also Brown, H. Rap
- Amin, Obaid Haj al- 3193
- Amin, Samir 1313, 1392, 1669
- Amirthalingam, A. 3252
- Amis de la Loi 1294
- Amish 1633
- Amman, Pottu 3252
- ammiyah* uprisings 2073
- Amnesty International
 Abu-Jamal 8
 Chiapas 2288
 Colombia 810
 Dalits 959
 Davitt 967
 Genoa G8 1309, 1401
 Madres de la Plaza de Mayo 2159
 Morocco 2339
 Ochoa 2289
 Paraguay 2603
 Saro-Wiwa 2973
Tutela Legal 2060
- Amo, Anton Wilhelm** 91–2
- Amritsar, Treaty of 1928
- Amroz* 2581
- Ana María, Major 3713
- Anabaptist movement** 92–3, 1356–7, 1633–4,
 2491, 2831, 3417
 and Scientific Revolution 2987–8
- Anacaona 601, 602
- Anakpawis 2686
- Analytical Review* 3540
- Anand Panyarachun 3272
- anarcha-feminism 103, 124
see also anarcho-feminism
- Anarchie, L'* 120, 3013
- anarchism** 93–101
 abstention from voting 100, 104
 anti-clericalism 99
 Argentina 101–5
 Australia 105–8
 Brazil 474
 Britain 108–10
 Canada 110–11
 CGT 120
 Chile 111–13, 691
 China 96, 113–15
 cinema 116
 culture 115–17
 education 117–18
 Finland 118–19
 France 119–22
 gender 122–6
 global justice movement 100
 Greece 126–7
 Hungary 127–9
 Italy 129–33
 IWW 98
 Japan 96, 133–5
 Jews 96–7, 99
 Korea 135–7
 marriage 123
 and Marxists 1745, 1755
 May Day 158
 Mexico 97, 137–9
 Mozambique 153
 New Zealand 139–40
 patriarchy 124
 Poland 140–1
 Puerto Rico 141
 and punk 2064
 Russia 141–3, 3013
 sabotage 143–4
 South Africa 148–9
 Southern Africa 147–55
 Spain 97, 100, 144–7
 Spanish Civil War 100
 spread of 96–7
 students 127
 syndicalism 147–55
 USA 154–60
 violence 142
 virile 125
 Zapatismo 100
see also Black Bloc; *individual anarchists*
- Anarchist, The* 108
- Anarchist Black Cross 131
- Anarchist Exclusion Act 1412
- Anarchist Federation of Britain (AFB) 109,
 3072
- Anarchist Federation of Uruguay (FAU)
 3597
- anarchist feminism 122
 publications 124
- Anarchist League of Japan 1807
- Anarchist Library 142
- Anarchist People of Color 160
- anarchist-socialist movement 95–6
- Anarchist Workers Group (AWG) 3072
- Anarchists Against the Wall 1815
- Anarchistyczna Inicjatywa Robotnicza (AIR)
 140
- anarcho-banditry 104
- anarcho-capitalism 97
- anarcho-feminism 2962
- anarcho-indigenism 111
- anarcho-punk 159
- Anarcho-Surrealist Insurrectionary Feminists
 107
- anarcho-Zionism 99

- anarchocommunism** 97, 160–1, 2048
 France 119
 Japan 133
 Kropotkin 120, 123
 Malatesta 98
 Reclus 2813
 anarchopacifism 99, 2048
anarchosyndicalism 98, 161–2, 2048
 Catalonia 145, 351, 2739, 3130, 3141
 Finland 119
 France 119, 120
 Hungary 3228
 IWW 96
 Landauer 2048
 SolFed 3071
 Spanish Civil War 847–50, 3136–7
see also Proudhon, Pierre Joseph
Anarchy 109
Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed 159
Anarkiets Bibel (The Anarchist's Bible) 2524
 Anastasopoulou, Maria 3581–3
 Anatolia 283, 3350, 3355, 3360
 Anatolian Tigers 3343
 Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) 3342–3
 Anaya, Elbio Carlos 277
 Anaya González, Benjamín 562–3, 1911–12,
 2157–8, 2853
 ANC: *see* African National Congress
 ANC Youth League 349, 3085, 3086, 3249
 Anckarström, Jacob Johan 1496
 Andean communities
 music 2377
 peasant mobilization 2647
 Peru 2218, 2643, 2647, 2648–9
 religious practices 2660
 and Spaniards 3337–8
 Andean Community of Nations 871
 Anderson, Benedict 96, 2767
 Anderson, Elijah 3047
 Anderson, Guillermo 640, 641
 Anderson, J. L. 929
 Anderson, K. B. 3017
 Anderson, Michael 308, 309
 Anderson, Perry 3282
 Anderson, Sherwood 2253
 Anderson, Terry 1576–7
 Andhra Mahasabha 1707
Andhra Pradesh, Rampa rebellions 2802–3
 Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist
 Committee (APRCC) 2423
 Andhra Provincial Congress Committee 2793
 Andijon protests 3422
 Andō Shōeki 133
 Andover Union 2720
 Andrade, David 105, 106
 Andrade, Juan 2738
 Andrade, Mario d' 2359
 Andrade, William 105
 Andreassi, Ansoino 1310, 1311
 Andrés Pastrana government 797
 Andrés Pérez, Carlos 604, 605, 665, 3437, 3439,
 3440
Andresote, Zambo 162–4
 Andress, David 893
 Andrews, Jack 106
 Andrews, Stephen Pearl 123, 156
 Andrews, W. H. 149, 150, 151, 154, 832, 834,
 2222, 3091, 3092
 Andropov, Yurii 1626, 3118
Ang Bayan 2682, 2687
 Angelim, Eduardo 490, 562
 Angell, Alan 678–83
 Angeloni, Elena 1433
 Angiolillo, Michele 130, 145, 383
 Anglican Church 516
 Anglo-Boer War 148
 Anglo-Burmese War III 552
 Anglo-Dutch Treaty 1720, 2176
 Anglo-Dutch War IV 86
 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement 3195
 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 3194
 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) 1763,
 1764, 2343
 Anglo-Irish Agreement 2573
 Anglo-Irish Treaty 1802, 3044
 Anglo-Irish War 793, 1801, 3044
 Anglo-Malayan Defense Treaty 2178
 Anglo-Portuguese alliance 187
 Anglo-Russian Convention 3366
 Anglo-Russian entente 1768
 Anglo-Scottish Union of Parliaments 1789, 1854
 Anglo-Yoruba treaties 1641
Angola
assimilado elite 164, 2448
 and Cuba 166
 government in exile (GRAE) 2359
 independence 3546
 Lara 1216
 National Heroes Day 2449
 national liberation 164–7
 Neto 2448–9
 Portuguese rule 878, 1042, 2448, 3204
 rebellion 1216
 trade unions 3112
 USA 164–5
see also Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola
 (FNLA); Mondlane, Eduardo; Movimento
 Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA)
 Angolan Communist Party 164
 Angoulvant, Gabriel 884

- Angry Brigade 512
 Anguas Barragán, Francisco 2776
Angustura Address 412
 Anicinabe Park 585
 Anido, Martínez 145, 352
 Anielewicz, Mordechai 3513
 Aniello, Tommaso (Masaniello) 1847
 Anilewicz, Mordecai 1917
 Animal Liberation Front 160, 1052, 1054, 1055, 3429
 animal liberation movement 1052
 Animal Rights Militia 3429
 animal rights movement 3429
Animals' Agenda, The 3429
 Anjuman-I-Islah-ul-Afghana (Society for Afghan Reform) 1966
 Ankara Democratic Higher Education Association (ADYÖD) 2010
 Annam provinces 2054, 3468, 3469, 3476
 Annan, Kofi 738
 Annapolis Convention 87
 Anne of Austria 1303–4
 Anne of Cleves 516
 Annenkov, Yuri 327
 Annese, Gennaro 1847
 Annexation Club 1564
 Annual, Battle 2336
 Anorí Operation 801, 1082
 Another World is Possible (DSM!) 3687
 Ansar people 3191, 3194
 Ansari, Bayazid 2869
Anschluß 320, 321, 1179
 Anson, George 1924
 ANSWER 227, 229, 2504
 Antal, S. P. 2857
 Antananarivo 2156
Anthony, Susan B. 167–70
 abolitionism 167
 AERA 3622
 coeducation 168, 170
 and Douglass 169
 History of Woman Suffrage, A 3624
 National American Suffrage Association 3624
 NWSA 167, 169–70
 and Parren 3583
 resistance to 168
 Seneca Falls 167, 3621
 and Stanton 3164
 women's rights 3620
 women's suffrage 167, 2492
 and Woodhull 3621, 3636
Anthorcha, La 104
 anthracite industry 2344
 Anti-Airport League 1906–7
anti-apartheid movement
 Britain 173
 South Africa 170–6, 2503
 anti-art 953
 Anti-Authoritarian International 1756
 anti-authoritarianism
 Godwin 1410
 punk 2777
 Anti-Boycott Act 553
 anti-Brahmin campaigns 1682
Anti-Bread-Tax Circular 177
 Anti-Capitalist Alliance 831
 anti-capitalist movement 324, 1387, 1388
 Reclaim the Streets 2809–10
 anti-Catholicism 1405–7, 1418–19
 Anti-Circular Society 1698, 1699
 anti-clericalism
 anarchism 99
 Ecuador 1062–3
 England 2988
 Enlightenment 1109–11
 free schools 118
 Ireland 1785
 Mussolini 2384
 secularism 1109
 Anti-Communist Act, Thailand 3259
 Anti-Compromise Conference 451
Anti-Corn Law agitation 176–8, 658
 Anti-Corn Law League 176, 2693
 anti-corporatism 3659
 anti-delinquency projects 49
 Anti-Discrimination Act 3563
 anti-dowry campaigns 3588–9
 anti-fascism
 GDR 1338
 Italy 1832–5
 Partito d'Azione 1383–4
 People's Front 178–80, 1003
 Resistenza 1832–5, 2834–6
 Yugoslavia, World War II 3682–5
 Anti-Fascist Council on National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) 3296, 3684, 3691
 Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO) 302, 556
 Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) 302, 556, 2527, 2977–8, 3279
anti-fascist People's Front 178–80
 Anti-Fascist Student Association of Greece (AASPE) 1435
 Anti-Flag 885, 2778
anti-Franco worker struggles 180–4
 anti-globalization 110, 1147–8, 1431, 2503–4, 3588
 anti-GM protests 1040
 Anti-Imperialist League 2225
 Anti-Imperialist United Front (FRA) 420

- anti-Japanese boycotts** 185–6
 Anti-Japanese Federation 3258
 Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association 1926
 anti-Jewish action 1914
 see also anti-Semitism
 anti-Kaihatsu Foundation 1904–5
 anti-Lutheran Church revolt 3603
anti-monarchy protests, Portugal 186–8
anti-Napoleonic Wars of Liberation 188–90
anti-nuclear campaigns 190–9
 Australia 305
 Britain 190–1
 Food Not Bombs 159
 Japan 191–3, 1887, 1888
 Marshall Islands 199
 New Zealand 2528–9
 non-violent 2501
 see also environmental protest
 Anti-Occupation Treaty – Year 21st 1814
 anti-organizationalists 98, 162
 Anti-Partition League 1416
 Anti-Poor Law movement 2720
 anti-power 323
 Anti-Privatization Forum (APF) 3100
Anti-Racist Action (ARA) 199–200, 3071
 anti-rape movement 3588–9
 Anti-Rightist Campaign 2203
 anti-roads movements 1039, 1052, 1054
 see also Reclaim the Streets
 Anti-Saloon League 3543
 anti-Semitism
 Austria 3741
 black nationalism 396–7
 Europe 1181
 France 405, 1021–2
 Hitler 1589
 Proudhon 2766
 Russia 1914, 1915
anti-slavery movement
 Britain 200–5, 206–9, 209–11
 USA 211–18
 Wilberforce 3527–9
 women's organizations 3620
 see also abolitionism
 Anti-Slavery Society 204, 212, 3529, 3618
 Anti-Socialist Laws 3066, 3721
 anti-statism 156
 anti-Tamil riots 2741
 anti-tax riots 734, 3201
 anti-terrorism 3644
anti-Vietnam War movement 1946–7, 2785,
 3170, 3178
 Britain 218–19
 United States 219–23
- anti-war movement**
 Australia 303–4
 France 225–7
 Iraq 227–30
 punks 2778
 World War I 2489
 Yugoslavia 223–4
 see also anti-Vietnam war movement
 anti-war songs 2380
 Anti-Zionism 349
 Antietam, Battle of 61, 64, 217
 Antigua 2075, 2077
 Antigua Trades and Labor Union 2077
 Antillean Islands 942, 1032
 antinomianism 155, 401, 2988
 Antirreleccionista National Party 2158
 Antliff, Allan 110–11
 Antonescu, Ion 2857
 Antonietti, Colomba 3592
 Antonio, José 182
 Antônio Conselheiro 597–9, 600, 601
 Antonioli, Maurizio 997–8, 1821–4
 Antonov-Ovseenko, Vladimir 3141
 Antrobus, Peggy 3579
 Antun, Farah 235
 Anvil Operation 2256
 Anzavur, Ahmed 3356
 ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty) 2529
 Aoun, Michel 2405
 apartheid
 COSATU 874–5, 3096–8
 United Nations 2398
 see also anti-apartheid movement
 apartheid-capitalism 173
 Apodeti 1042–3
 Aponte uprising 89, 911
Apóstil, El 2868
 Apostol, Gheorghe 2866
Apostolato Popolare 2267
Appeal to Reason 3418
APRA: see Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana
April Fifth Forum 985
 April Rebellion, Nicaragua 605
 April Revolution, Korea 3181, 3182
April Revolution, Nepal 230–2
 Aprista Party: *see* Partido Aprista Peruano
 Apte, Narayan 1331
 Aptheker, Bettina 233
Aptheker, Herbert 232–3, 964
 Aqqaqir, Battle of 51
 al-Aqsa Intifada 1760, 1815
 al-Aqsa Mosque 1760
 Aquash, Anna Mae 2629

- Aquino, Benigno 2506, 2682
 Aquino, Corazon (Cory) 2506, 2682
 Ar-Namys 3329
 Arab-Israeli War (1948) 399
 Arab Liberation Movement 3222
Arab socialism 233–7, 1072
 Arab Socialist Union 2406
 Arabi, Ahmed 3395
 Arabi Revolt 3395
 Arabic language 2577
Aracaré 237
Arafat, Yasser
 death of 1760
 and Fatah 238–9, 1758
 in Kuwait 237–8
 Oslo Accords 1759, 1815
 and PLO 237–40, 399
 Araguaia Guerilla movement 472–3
 Aramburu, Pedro Eugenio 244, 245, 2638
 Arana Osorio, Carlos 1476
 Araujo, Arturo 2020, 2224, 2225, 2956
Arbeiter Fraint, Der 108
Arbeiter-Stimme 2027
Arbeiterverbrüderung 1350
Arbenz, Jacobo Guzmán 240–1, 1217, 1473,
 1485, 1604
 Arce, Bayardo 2469
Arch, Joseph 241–2
 Arcos, Federico 110
 Arcos, Santiago 111
 Arden enclave 3418
 Arditti, Rita 1427–8
 Aref, Abd al-Rahman 1781
 Aref, Abdul 1781
 ARENA (Aliança Renovadora Nacional) 497,
 2959
 Arena Theater 406
 Arenal, Concepción 3610
 Arenas, Gloria 2285
 Arenas, Reinaldo 923, 3018
Arendt, Hannah 242–3, 504, 904
 banality of evil 243
 Human Condition, The 242
 Hungarian 1956 Revolution 1625
 Origins of Totalitarianism, The 242, 3157
 On Revolution 243
 Arenstein, Rowley 3104
 Arévalo Bermeja, Juan José de 240, 1014, 1472
 Argaña, Luis María 2603, 2608
 Argelian independence 1271
 Argenlieu, Admiral Georges Thierry d' 3471
Argentina
 armed struggle/guerrillas 243–7
 bakers' strike 101–5
 bishops 2059
 car industry 864, 867
 CGT 863–8, 2638–9, 2640
 class struggle 248–9
 Communards 102
 Cordobazo and Rosarioz uprisings 863–9
 currency pegged 262, 267, 2347
 de-Peronization 863, 2638
 Dirty War 1155
 disappeared 105, 251, 255, 1427–8, 1579–81,
 2159, 2500
 escraches 1579–80
 general strikes 247–9, 260–1, 2641–2
 grassroots workers' movement 250–3
 Grita de Alcorta 253–4
 Guillén 1491–2
 harvest failures 254
 human rights movement 254–7
 ILO 258
 IMF 1085, 2640–1
 indigenous popular protests 257–9
 interclass cooperation 268–9
 kidnappings 255, 1427–8
 labor strikes 259–61
 labor unions 261–3
 literary figures 103
 March Against Hunger, Unemployment, and
 Repression 263
 May Day 103
 metal workers' strike 2640
 military government 254
 Montoneros 245–6, 1155–7, 2149
 Movement of Recuperated Factories 2346–50
 neighborhood assemblies 1085–7
 NGOs 2346
 Nueva Canción 2377
 piquetero movement 262, 263, 263–5
 poverty 268, 2347
 priests resigning 868
 punk rock 105
 resistencia commandos 2639–41
 road blockades 262
 Semana Roja 265–7
 Semana Trágica 103, 247–8
 social and political protest 267–70
 socialism 270–3
 socialist and communist workers' movement
 270–3
 state terror 1427–8
 student movement 3181
 sugar cane cultivation 866, 2642
 torture 1427–8
 trade unions 2638–9, 2642
 trash collectors' strike 2640
 Triple A 1155
 two demons theory 2159

Argentina (*cont'd*)

- unemployed protests 261–3, 2347
- University Reform 864, 273–4
- worker actions 274–6
- worker strikes in Patagonia 276–8
- workers' self-management 2347–9
- see also* Madres de La Plaza de Mayo
- Argentinazo, El* 264, 1084–7, 1580
- Argentine Anarcho-Communist Federation 104
- Argentine Corporation of Producers 2641
- Argentine League for the Rights of Man 254
- Argentine Libertarian Federation 104
- Argentine University Federation (FUC) 274
- Argentine Vanguard Socialist Party 271
- Argüelles, José Albino 277
- Arias, Arnulfo 1480, 3304
- Arias, Desiderio 1012
- Arias, Juan Angel 2018
- Arias Altamirano, Luis 163
- Arias Cárdenas, Francisco 3441, 3449
- Arias Peace Plan 2958
- 'Arif, 'Abd al-Rahman 3225, 3226
- 'Arif, 'Abd al-Salam 3225, 3226
- Aringo, Peter Aloo 1948
- Aristide, Jean-Bertrand** 278–80, 1503, 1506–7, 1508, 1509
 - Lavalas* 1520–1
 - overthrown 1510
- Aristotle 777, 2836, 2987
- Ariza, Daniel 1014
- Arizmendiarieta, José María 2314, 2315
- Arjona, Ricardo 639–40
- Arkansas National Guard 763
- Arkzin* 224
- Armand, E. 97
- Armand, Inessa 3553, 3606, 3607
- Armed Forces Movement (MFA) 1042, 2729, 2731–2
- Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) 413, 800, 2771, 2772, 3442–3
- Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 1615
- Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 41
- Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) 41
- Armée de Libération Nationale Kameronaise (ANKL) 580
- Armenia**
 - Diaspora 281, 282, 284
 - genocide 280, 281–3, 285, 286
 - Ottoman empire 285–6
 - popular mobilization 280–5
 - resistance 285–7
 - suicide attack 284
 - terrorism 280, 281
 - Turkey 3348
 - see also* Young Turks

- Armenian, Garo 283
- Armenian language 283, 286
- Armenian Question 281, 282
- Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA) 280
- Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) 283, 286
- Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) 280, 284
- arms, right to bear 331
- Arms Act 1674, 1681, 1695
- Armstrong, Louis 2380
- Army of National Liberation 1614
- Arnauld, Marie-Angelique 1304
- Arnold, Benedict 79–80, 82, 84, 2041
- Arnold, Victoria 545–7, 1552–4, 2692–3, 3150–2
- Arnold-Forster, H. O. 518
- Arns, Paulo Evaristo 2060
- Aron, Raymond 2316
- Aronowitz, Stanley 771, 1398–9
- Arora, Jagjit Singh 348
- Arouas people 1269
- Arouch Movement 1927
- Arouet, François Marie: *see* Voltaire
- Arp, Jean 953
- Arpilleristas 3598
- Arquilla, J. 3716
- Arriaga, Don Antonio de 3337
- Arrow Cross 1175, 1176
- Arrow War 3672
 - see also* Opium Wars
- Arroyo, Gonzolo 2061
- Arrufat, Anton 923
- Arshinov, Peter 98, 143, 2166, 2167
- Arslan, Shaqib 236
- art and anarchy 115, 116
- Art is a Weapon* 27
- Artaud, Antonin 1482
- Artavia Araya, Fernando 1017–20, 2843–4
- Artêşa Rizgariya Gelê Kurdistan 2011
- Artésano, El* 270
- Articles of Confederation 86, 87
- Artigas, Gervasio José** 287–9
- Artigas Sugar Workers' Union 3408
- artisans/savants 2991–2
- Artiukhina, Alexandra 3552, 3607
- Artois, Comte d' 891, 892, 896, 897
 - see also* Charles X
- Arts and Crafts movement 2340
- Artykov, Anvar 3331
- Aruba 1032, 1033
- Aruna Yukanthor, Prince 567
- Arundel, Henry, third Lord 289
- Arundel, Lady Blanche** 289–90
- Arusha Declaration* 2532
- Arya Samaj 1583, 1697

- Aryanization 1179, 1587
 Asad, Asaduzzaman 2578
 Asad, Hafiz al- 2779, 3226
 Asamblea de Barrios (Assembly of Shantytowns) 605
 Asamblea Popular, Bolivia 419
 Asante, Molefi Kete 393
 Asante-British War 3669
 Asante culture 3669-70
 Asbestos (Quebec), civil rights 2783
 Ascaso, Francisco 1187
 Ascaso Column 131
 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 2656, 3263, 3488
 Asedillo, Teodoro 2673
 Ash, Timothy Garton 1342, 3557
 Ash Can School 1125
 ash-Sharif, Shaykh Muhammad 2163
 Ashaninka people 1923
 Ashgabat fortress 3366
 Ashida, Hitoshi 1909
 Ashihama plant, Chubu Electric 191
 Ashio riots 1898
 Ashiqqa Party 3194, 3195
 Ashley, Lord 2125
 Ashman, Sam 1672
 Ashwood, Amy 3559
 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit 111
 Asian Bureau of the Comintern 2874
 Asian Development Bank 3288, 3655
 Asian Labor Education Center 2676
 Asian Migrant Center 3651-2
 Asian Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) 1397, 1399-400
 Asian Regional Forum 3641
 Asian Relations Conference 2389
 Asian Social Forum 959
 Asinara Special Prison 2402, 2816
 Aske, Robert 509
 Aslanov, Kadreddin 3245
 Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños (ANAP) 921, 936
 Asquith, Herbert 527, 528, 1047
 Ass'ad, Ahmad el- 2069
 Assad, Cemil al- 2011
 Assad, Hafiz al- 2011
 Assad, Rifat al- 2011
 Asamblea de Catalunya 632
Assemblés coloniales 1526
Assemblés provincials 1526
 Assembly Bomb Case 1677
 Assembly of Factory Workers of St. Petersburg 2879
 Assembly of First Nations 584
 Assembly of Notables 1298, 2041
Assembly of the Poor 290-1, 3276
 Assembly of Social Movements 3642
 Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (ASP) 788
assimilado elite
 Angola 164, 2448
 South Africa 153
 Assmann, Hugo 478
 Assoa revolt 566, 567
 Associação Social Democrática Timorense (ASDT) 1042
Association, L' 2811
 Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD) 3549
 Association of Agriculturalists of Alto Paraná (ASAGRAPA) 2602
 Association of All Classes and All Nations 2461
 Association amicable des originaires de l'AEF: *see* Amicale
 Association of Anarchist Movements (ADA) 143
 Association of Cretan Students 1434
 Association of Displaced Afro-Colombians (AFRODES) 796
 Association of the Friends of the People 2366
 Association for Human Rights 2104
 Association of International Cooperation and Disarmament (AICD) 304
 Association of Rural Workers (ATC) 2474
 Association of Slavic Women 3632
 Association for Social Knowledge (ASK) 2099
 Association of Southeast Asian Nation: *see* ASEAN
Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens: *see* ATTAC
 Association of United Workers of Thailand 3259
 Association for Women's Rights 3597
 Association for Women's Suffrage 2524
 Association of Young Democrats 1618
 Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI) 224
 associationists 2620
 Associations for the Defense of Rights 3349
 Astiz, Alfredo 255
 Aston, Louise 3579
 Astrow, A. 3740
Asturias
 guerilla warfare 3138
 October uprising 291-3
 Provincial Revolutionary Committee 292
 repression 292
 Spanish Revolution 3129, 3130-1, 3133
 Aswan High Dam 1072, 2406
 Aswan revolt 1074
 Atabayev, Gaigysyz 643

- Atabekian, Alexander 142
 Atahualpa, Inca emperor 1923–4, 2876
 Atahualpa (Juan Santos): *see* Juan Santos
 Atahualpa Rebellion
 Atanasov, Velcho 539
 Ataque Frontal 2063
Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 293–4
 anti-secularists 3342
 Armenia 281
 and Bolsheviks 282
 death of 3362
 Liberation War 3355
 modernization 3359
 and PKK 293–4, 1116, 2010
 Turkish nationalism 1453
 War of Independence 3349, 3350
 Atbara, Battle of 2165
 Ateneo Artístico y Literario de Señoras 3610
 Athens, Battle of 1454, 1455
 Athens, famine 1436
 Athens Law School 1434
 Athit Kamlang-ek 3272
 Atiyah, Bahjat al- 2954
 Atlacatl Brigade 2958, 2959
 Atlantic Charter 3194
Atlantic Monthly 10, 615
Atlantic port seaman resistance 294–7
Atlantic slave trade, shipboard insurrections
 3024–7
 Atomic Energy Basic Law 192
 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 194
ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of
Financial Transactions for the Aid of
Citizens) 297–301, 1152, 1308, 1313,
 1316, 1402, 1403, 3100
Attaque, L' 2071
 Attlee, Clement 302, 557, 1330, 2039, 2792
 Attwood, Thomas 633
 Atwoli, Francis 1950
 Audin, Maurice 226
 Audu, Reine 1294
 Audubon Society 617
Aufbau 242
 Aulfray, Hughes 2382
 August Revolution, Vietnam 1716–17
 Augustenburg, Duke of 2985
 Augustine of Hippo 2828–9
 Aulard, Alphonse 1283
 Auld, William 1566
Aung San 301–3
 AFPFL 3279
 assassinated 2977, 3068
 Blueprint for Burma 555
 and Bose 301–3, 451, 1679
 federal union plans 549
 and Nu 2527
 as student 549, 554
 and Than Tun 3279
 Aung San Suu Kyi 301, 303, 550, 551, 2522,
 2528
 house arrest 3279
 Aurangzeb 368, 2869
 Auriol-Bao Dai Agreements 3473
Aurora, L' 3745
 Auschwitz-Birkenau camps 13
 Australasian Secular Association (ASA) 105
Australia
 aboriginal protests 307–12
 anarchism 105–8
 anti-war movement 303–4
 Commonwealth Parliament 314
 dispossessed 307
 femocrats 3563–4
 gay rights movement 305, 2097
 green bans movement 1456–8, 2373
 IWW 315, 1738–9
 labor movement 312–16
 Labor's Volunteer Army 2038–9
 land rights movement 3
 left-wing politics 313–14, 316–17
 LGTB 2096–8
 new social movements 305–6
 squatting 1944
 suffrage 3561–2
 unemployment 315
 unionization 313–14
 wages 314, 3562–3
 welfare state 3561–2
 women's movement 3561–4
 youth movements 107
 see also Eureka Stockade; Munday, Jack; New
 Australia movement; Vinegar Hill Rebellion
 Australia, New Zealand, United States Security
 Treaty (ANZUS) 2529
 Australian Aboriginal Fellowship 3
 Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association
 (AAPA) 307
 Australian Aborigines League (AAL) 307
 Australian Anarchist Centenary Celebrations 108
 Australian Freedom League 303
 Australian Labor Party (ALP)
 Aboriginal Affairs 310, 313–15, 316–17
 Australian Political Economy Movement 823
 Australian Student Labor Federation 304
Austria
 Anschluss 320, 321
 anti-Semitism 3741
 Catholic Church 320
 Christian Socialists 319
 ethnic mix 318, 319, 320

- European Union 321
 fascism 320
 and Italy 1826
 Napoleon I 189
 National Socialist Sturmabteilung 319
 Nazism 320
 NSDAP 320, 1172
 parliamentary democracy 319–20
 protests, twentieth century 317–21
 Schutzstaffeln (SS) 320
 Social Democratic Party 319
 World War I 318–19
 Austria-Hungary 318, 319
 Austrian Succession, War of 1126, 2851
 Austro-Fascist coup 354
 Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy 1624
 Austro-Hungarian War 2689
Austro-Marxism 321–2, 354, 1581
 Auténticos 926
 Authentic Labor Front (FAT) 2294, 2298
 Authentic Radical Liberal Party 2606
 authoritarianism 648, 815
 Autodefensa Obrera (Workers' Self-Defense) 3389
 Automatists 110
autonome 1741
Autonomía magazine 2162
 Autonomia Operaia (Workers' Autonomy) 1838, 1840, 1842, 1843, 2426
autonomism 322–5
 autonomist Marxism (operaism) 1841
 Autonomous Action (AD) 143
 autonomous free time politics 1420
 autonomous Marxism 2306–7
 Autonomous Social Centers: *see* Centri Sociali
 Autonomous University of Chapingo 3297
 autonomy
 heteronomy 622, 2307
 of migration 2305, 2306, 2307
 organization forms 2371–2
 Autumn Harvest Uprising 725, 2201
 Avalos, Eduardo 275–6
 Avanguardia Operaia (AO) 1840, 2622
Avanti! 1440, 2169, 2383, 3013, 3015
 Ave Lallemand, Germán 270
 Aveling, Edward 2229, 2341, 3061
 Avendaño 277, 278
 Aviano, Italy 1008
 Ávila-Espinosa, Felipe Arturo 606–7, 2158
 Avineri, S. 1000
 Avineri, Shlomo 1649
 Avlihos, Mikelis 126
 Avneri, Uri 1816
 Avrich, Paul 159, 2167
 Avril, Prosper 1506
 Awakening 89 1345
 Awami Jamhoori Party (People's Democratic Party) 2583
 Awami Jamhoori Tehreek (People's Democratic Movement) 2585
 Awami League 344, 346, 2578, 2581, 2582–3
 Awami National Party (ANP) 1857, 2404, 2584
 Awolowo, Obafemi 23, 25
Axe, The 2784, 2785
 Axel Springer publishing 1037
 Axelrod, Pavel 979
 Ayacucho, Battle of 3458
 Ayacucho people 2644
 Ayala, C. J. 2769, 2774
 Ayala, Eligio 2609
 Ayala, Eusebio 2599, 2609
 Ayala Plan 2277, 2279, 2540
Ayim, May 325–6
 Aylwin, Patricio 687, 2507
 Aymara Altiplano 1936
 Aymara protesters 434, 1936–7, 1939, 2371, 2658, 2660
 'Ayn, Qurrat al- 1766
 Ayub Khan 16, 346, 2262, 2578, 2579
 Jalib on 1857
 martial law 2580, 2581
 Ayyanger, N. Gopalaswamy 1932
 Azad, Chandrasekhar 1678, 1710, 3041
 Azad, Maulana 2432
 Azad Hind Fauz 451, 1679, 1704–5, 1710–11
 Azad Muslim Conference 1929
 Azad Pakistan Party (APP) 2580
 Āzādi (Freedom) Society 3358–9
 Azaña, Manuel 3144
 Azania People's Organization (AZAPO) 3084, 3086, 3088
 Azania Youth Unity (AZANYU) 3089
 Azanian Confederation of Labor 3096
 Azerbaijan 811
 Azhari, Ismail al- 3191, 3194
 Azione Cattolica (Catholic Action) 2835
 Azione Rivoluzionaria 131
 Aznar, José Maria 229
 Azores 186
 Aztlan Underground 2064
 Azzellini, Dario 162–4, 412–16, 737, 1006–10, 1081–4, 1307–12, 1471–2, 1832–5, 1835–9, 2814–18, 3436–41, 3441–5, 3448–50, 3450–1, 3451–2, 3452–5, 3706–7
 Ba Jin 115, 158
 Ba Maw, Dr. 302, 554, 556, 2527, 2977, 3279
 Ba Pe, U. 552, 554, 3068
 Ba Sein, Thakin 2978
 Baader, Andreas 1368

- Baader-Meinhof Group:** *see* Red Army Faction
- Baathists**
 counterrevolution 2955
 Iraq 353, 1777, 1781, 1782–3, 3221–7
 socialism 1069
 Syria 3221–7
- Baba Chinese 2176
- Babacar, Seye 3007
- Babangida, Ibrahim 2114, 2481, 2483, 3547
- Babangida, Maryam 3548
- Babbar Akali Movement 1677
- Babel, Isaac** 327–8
- Babels network 3642, 3643
- Babeuf, François-Noël (Gracchus)** 328–9,
 403, 545, 894, 1004, 1743, 2543
- Babi Conference 1766–7
- Babi Yar 1183
- Babington, Thomas 3528
- Babu, Abdul Rahman Mohamed 3708, 3709
- Baby Doc: *see* Duvalier, Jean-Claude
- Bach, Alexander 1620
- Bacha-i Sakkao's movement** 329–30, 3243
- Bachmann, Josef 1037
- back-to-Africa movement 208
- Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council 49
- Bacon, David 1641–3
- Bacon, Francis 2987, 2988–9
- Bacon, Nathaniel 330–1
- Bacon, Wendy 107
- Bacon's Rebellion** 75, 330–1
- Badasht Conference 1766
- Baden, Max von 2117
- Badiou, Alain 2263
- Badl-ke-Serai, Battle of 1690
- Badlands National Monument 2413
- Badoglio, Pietro 1384, 1833, 2834
- Badr Bahini al- 347
- Baeck, Rabbi Leo 1916
- Baer, James 1332–3
- Báez, Buenaventura 1015, 1016
- Báez, Cecilio 2608
- Báez, Ramón 1017
- Bagha Jatin 1675, 1676, 2874
- Baghdad Pact 1769, 1776, 1780
- Baghiu, Aurel 2866
- Bagley, Sarah 2130–1
- Bahadur Shah II 1687, 1688, 1689, 1690, 1709
- Bahamas 89, 2734
- Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 959
- Bai, Rani Lakshmi 1690
- Bailey, Amy 3559
- Bailey, Melanie A. 225–7, 1601–2, 2805–6
- Bain, J. T.** 149, 331–2, 3091
- Bainimarama, Frank 1199, 1200
- Baird, Ernest 2572
- Baird, John 1385
- Baise Uprising 986
- Bajpai, Girja Shankar 1932
- Bak, János M. 3227–8
- Baker, Ella Josephine** 73, 332–3, 740, 1259
 and King 1973
 SCLC 1974, 3186
- Baker, Josephine 1555, 1556
- Baker, Newton D. 2824
- Baker, Samuel 3369
- Baker, Thomas 1196
- Baker, Valentine 2164
- Bakht Khan 1689
- Bakhtiar, Shapour 1770
- Bakhtiari, Haj Aligoli Khan 1768
- Bakhtin, Mikhail 1148
- Bakiev, Kurmanbek 3331, 3332, 3333
- Bakke, Allan 754
- Bakongo 164
- Bakr, Ahmad Hassan al- 1781, 3225, 3226–7
- Baksh-Soodeen, Rawwida 3579
- Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed 1932–3
- Baku Opposition 3030
- Baku soviet 2919
- Bakunin, Mikhail Alexandrovich** 333–7
 anarchism 95, 122, 124, 335–6, 1575, 2926
 collectivism 335, 2008, 2813
 and communism 161
 domestic revolution 976
 and Fanelli 1161
Federalism, Socialism, and Anti-Theologism 334
 First International 977, 1755, 2237
 as influence 102, 129, 141, 154, 336, 973,
 2008, 2009, 2030
 International Alliance of Social Democracy
 2811
Knouto-Germanic Empire, The 335
 and Marx 96, 333–4, 335, 1744
 and Mazzini 335
 and Nechaev 334, 2425
 and Nicholas II 334
 and Pisacane 2692
 and Proudhon 333
 and Reclus 2811
 state collapse 976
Statism and Anarchy 335, 2237
 and Zasulich 3720
- Bala, Sruti 1965–70
- Balabanoff, Angelica 2382
- Balabanov, Slavi 540
- Balafrej, Ahmad 1248
- Balaguer, Joaquín 1017, 1019
- Balaiada revolt 491
- Balasingham, Anton 2741
- Balch, Emily G. 1742

- Baldwin, James 73, 391, 964
 Baldwin, Stanley 520, 521, 525
 Bale revolt 1134
 Balfour, Sebastian 180
 Balfour Declaration 374, 3742, 3743
 Bali, Conquest of 1720
 Balibo Accord 1043
 Balkan Alliance 338
 Balkan Communist Federation 338
 Balkan Federation 31
 Balkan Federative Republic 337
Balkan socialist confederation 337–9, 1440
 Balkan Wars 35–6, 338, 1440
 Balkans 338, 1450, 1452, 1453, 2341
see also Albania
 Ball, Hugo 116, 953
 Balladur, Edouard 2459
 Ballarat goldfields 1144, 1944, 2043
 Ballarat Reform League 1144
 Ballén, Durant 1066
 Ballestrino de Careaga, Esther 2159
 Balli Kombëtar (National Liberation Front) 30
 Ballinamuck, Battle of 1788
 Ballinger, William 833
 Ballivián, Hugo 431
 Ballor, Jordan J. 3748–9
 Ballynahinch, Battle of 1788
 Balmaceda, José Manuel 690–1, 693
 Baloo, Palwankar 1328
 Baltic Chain 811
 Baltic Fleet 2004, 2911
Baltic protests 339–43
 German control 2890
 rebellions against landlords 2884
 Russian Revolutions 340
 Singing Revolution 810–11
 World War II 340–1
 Baltimore MTW 1753
 Baluches Rebellion 1029
 Baluchistan 13, 1680
 Balweg, Conrado 2686
 Balzac, Honoré de 1283
 Bama-htwet-yat Ghine (Freedom Bloc) 302
 Bamford, Samuel 1632
 Bamileke peoples 579, 580, 1252
 Ban the Bomb 190, 2877
 Ban Me Thuot 3485
 banana growing
 Colombia 795
 Costa Rica 447
 Ecuador 1064
 massacres 805
 Nicaraguan emigrants 447
banana plantation worker rebellion,
 Colombia 343–4
 Banbury Mutiny 1102
 Banco Popular 144
 Banda, Aleke 2176
 Banda, Hastings 2174, 2175, 3112
 Banda Tepanhuani 639
 Bandaranaike, S. W. R. D. 2050, 2052, 2053,
 2632
 Bandopadhyay, Surendranath 2574
 Bands Against Bush 2845
 Bandung Conference 1731, 2434, 3035, 3688
 Banerjea, Surendranath 1689, 1698
 Banerjee, Rameswar 1704
 Banff North American Forum 3659
 Banfi, Antonio 2870
Bangabasi 1697
bangabhanga movement 2574
 Bangali people 2577, 2579
 Bangiyo Pradeshik Krishak Sabha 2575
 Bangkok Labor Federation 3258
 Bangla language 345, 2577
Bangladesh
 British East India Company 368
 creation of 368
 divided 347
 independence 2425, 2579
 languages 368
 Liberation War 344–8
 peasant movement 2574
 scorched earth policy 347
 Bangladesh Freedom Party 344
 Bangura, John 3031
 Bangwaketse Tribal Council 460
 Bangwato people 1955
 Bani-Sadr, Abolhasan 1774
 Banks, Dennis 2414
 BankWatch 1391
banlieues, Paris 2307
Banna, Hasan al- 1557–60, 1962–3
 Bannerjee, Albion 1928
 Bano, Shah 1585, 3590
 Bantman, Constance 2171–2
 Bantu Authorities Act 2192, 3087
 Bantu Education Bill 2192
Bantu Mirror 2221
 Bantu Women's League 3603
 Bantustans 2398
 Banyamulenge ethnic group 852, 858
 Banzer Suárez, Hugo 418, 419, 420, 790, 791,
 1936, 2060
 Bao Dai 1598, 1599, 1716, 3473, 3479, 3484
 Bao Jingyan 113
 Baoulé people 883, 884
 Baptist Church 332, 1100, 1869, 2804
 Baptista, Mariano 425
 Baptiste, Jean Pierre 1508

- Baragua, Protest of 919
 Barak, Ehud 239, 1759
Baraka, Imanu Amiri 348–9, 393
 Baran, Paul 1648, 1649, 1668, 2249
 Barang, Marcel 2747
 Barata, Cipriano 485, 488, 489
Barayi, Elijah 174, 349, 3094, 3096
 Barbachano, Miguel 621
Barbados
 Busso 204, 559
 IMF loan 609
 independence 351
 protest and revolt 350–1
 slave insurrection 90, 204, 559
 Barbados Labour Party 609
 Barbara Affair 3576
 Barbarossa 3334
 Barbarossa Operation 451
 Barbé-Marbois, François 1526
 Barber, James 3085
 Barbès, Armand 403, 1234
 Barbie, Klaus 421, 1242
 Barbuse, Henri 2217
 Barcelona 145, 180, 227, 351–2, 3142
Barcelona General Strike 351–2
 Barchiesi, Franco 873–4
 Barco, Virgilio 798, 2791
 Bardez, Félix-Louis 568
 Bardo, Treaty of 3335
 Bardot, Brigitte 2216
 Bare, Marie Rose 1293
 Barebones Parliament 910, 1103, 1194
 Barei, Geoffrey 2220–2
 Barev, Tsenko 538
 Barfurushi, Mulla Muhammad Ali 1766
barga 2574
 see also sharecropping
 Bari, Judy 125
 Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP)
 3270
 Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) 3269
 Barkat, Abul 2578
 Barker, Tom 1738
 Barnave, Antoine 1284
 Barnes, Mary 1091
 Barnes de Carlotto, Estela 256, 1428
 Barnés de Castro, Francisco 3378–9
 Barnett, Ross 743, 2275
 Barnett, Samuel and Henrietta 10
 Barnitz, Jacqueline 2313
 Baron, Samuel 2694
 Barotseland 3700, 3702
 Barras, Paul 1079
 Barren Hill 83
 Barrera, Ernesto 2061
 Barres, Maurice 888
 Barrett, James R. 1220
 Barrett, Rafael 2609
 Barrias, Louis-Ernest 3147
Barricada 448
 Barrientos, René 416
 Barrio, Damián del 3451–2
 Barrio Assemblies 3439
 Barrionuevo, Francisco 1117
 Barrios, Gonzalo 3437
 Barrios, Justo Rufino 1475
 Barrios de Chamorro, Violeta 2470, 2476, 2564
 Barriteau, Eudine 3579
 Barroso, América 2963
 Barry, John 79
 Barry, Marion S., Jr. 3186
 Barry, Redmond 1944
 Barshevsky, Charlene 1397, 3663
 Barthélemy, G. 1537
 Bartoletti, Luigia Sassi 3592
 Barudi, Mahmud Sami al- 3395
 Baryatinskiy, Duke 2806
Barzani, Mulla Mustafa 352–3, 1777, 1778
 Barzola, Maria 429
 Barzón, El 2293, 2294
 Basarwa relocation 3113
 Baschetti, R. 2640
 base communities (CEBs)
 Brazilian Church 478, 2059, 2351
 El Salvador 2059
 Guatemala 1479, 2059
 and Gutiérrez 1497
 Nicaragua 2059, 2061, 2468
 non-violence 2500
 Vatican on 2062
 Basel, Council of 2830
 Basel, Treaty of 3307, 3310
 Bashir, Amir 2073
 Bashir Sfar 3335
 Bashkimi (Unity) 29
 Bashorun Ogunmola 1641
 Basiana 3081
 Baskin, Jeremy 875
 Basmachi movement 643, 3243–4, 3365, 3366,
 3421
 Basotho people 2110, 2111
Basque Country
 clandestine organizations 1128
 industrialization 1128
 Mondragón 2314–15
 nationalism 1127–32
 Spanish Revolution 3129, 3133
 see also Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
 Bassa peoples 579, 580
 Bassanesi, Giovanni 1383

- Bastian, Gert 1946
 Bastidas Puyucagua, Micaela 3337
Bastille 353–4, 1274, 1275, 1526, 1743, 2851, 3256
 Bastille Day 354, 1273, 1274, 1744–5, 2339
 Bästlein, Bernhard 1377
 Bastwick, John 2118
 Basu, Jyoti 1637, 2422
 Basutoland 2109, 2111
 see also Lesotho
 Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) 2111
 Basutoland National Council (BNC) 2110
 Basutoland National Party (BNP) 2111
 Basutoland Progressive Association (BPA) 2110
 Bataan, Battle of 2674
Bataille Syndicaliste, La 870
Batalla, La 103, 2257, 2740
 Batallones Rojos (Red Battalions) 2279, 2280
 Batasuna 1131
 Batatu, Hanna 1780, 1781
 Batavia (Jakarta) 1727
 Batavian Republic 2445
 Bateria de Mujeres 3631
 Bates, Daisy 17
 Bates, Ruby 3002
 Batista, Fulgencio
 amnesty 928
 attempted coup 1013–14
 Camp Columbia base rebellion 2152
 Castro against 623, 914–17, 926, 927, 1216, 2762
 in exile 2996
 against guerillas 932
 and Machado 2150–1
 rural warfare 2467
 unpopularity of 933
 Batlle y Ordóñez, José 3408, 3410
 Batra, R. L. 1931
 Batraverse, Benoît 1516
Battaglia, La 131
 Batthyány, Ervin 128, 3228
 Batthyány, Lajos 1620, 1623
Battleship Potemkin (Eisenstein) 1080
 Baudouin I, of Belgium 363, 854, 2137
 Bauer, Bruno 333, 2230, 3679
Bauer, Otto 354–5, 1756, 2243
 Baum, Herbert 1378
 Baumfree, Isabella 3618
 see also Truth, Sojourner
 Bauthumley, Jacob 1104, 1105, 2805
 Bautista Arismendi, Juan 3457
 Bautzen, Battle of 443
 bauxite 608, 2197
 Bavdra, Timoci 1197, 1198, 2797
 Baxter Springs 65
 Bay of Pigs invasion 626–7, 923, 2376, 3573
 Bayan, Philippines 2681, 2682, 2686
 Bayar, Celal 3363
 Baylor Massacre 85
 Bayo, Alberto 929
 Bayonet Constitution, Hawaii 1564
 Bayrou, François 1645
 Bazin, Marc 1505, 1507
Beacon, The 3316
 Beale, Dorothea 3566
Bean na hEireann (The Irish Woman) 1416
 Beaton, David 3001
 Beauharnais, Josephine de 1546
 Beaulieu, Christian 1517, 2872
 Beaulieu, Yannick 2776–7, 3044–6
 Beaumont, Florence 220
 beauty contests 3569, 3629
Beauvoir, Simone de 355–7, 2974, 3575, 3576
 autobiographies 356
 Mandarins, The 356
 Nouvelles féministes 3575
 Pour une morale de l'ambiguïté 356
 Pyrrhus et Cinéas 356
 Second Sex, The 355–6, 2262, 3167, 3575
 Temps Modernes, Les 1420
 Bebel, August 124, 1351, 1942, 2237, 2243, 3055, 3066, 3551
 Women in the Past, Present and Future 3580
 Beccaria, Cesare 1112, 2101
 Beccaris, Bava 3014
Bechaland News 700
 Bechtel Corporation 790, 791
 Bechuanaland
 beef exports 455
 as British High Commission 2111
 cultural organizations 455
 Khama 1955–7
 Maripe 2220–2
 Mpho 2357–8
 Reformist phase 455
 see also Botswana
 Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) 456, 460
 Bechuanaland Federation of Labour (BFL) 456
 Bechuanaland Protectorate African Teachers' Association 456
 Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party (BFP) 456, 458–9
 Bechuanaland Protectorate Workers' Union 456
 Bechuanaland Trade Union Congress (BTUC) 456, 2358
 Beck 2378
 Beck, Ludwig 1595
 Becker, Elizabeth 574
 Becker, Marc 1056–7, 1057–8, 1058–60
 Beckerman, Paul 1066–7

- Beckford, George 1862
 Bédié, Henri Konan 881
 Bedouins 234, 1074
 Beecher, Henry Ward 216, 3622, 3637
 Beer Hall Putsch 1365, 1374–5, 1589, 2271
Beethoven, Ludwig van 357, 896
 Beg, Yaqub 716
Begin, Menachem 358–60, 374, 376, 1813–14
 Likud Party 1817, 1851
 Beggs-Sunter, Anne 1144–6, 2043–4
 Begum, Hazara 3587
 Behbudi, Mahmudkhoja 3241
 Beheiren (Peace for Vietnam Committee) 1888
Behem, Hans: *see* Böhm, Hans
 Behrens, E. 1370
 Behrens, Fritz 1340
 Bei Dao 3285
 Beijing 2309, 3289
 see also World Conference on Women
 Beijing Intellectuals' Autonomous Federation 3287
Beijing Spring 985
 Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation 3287
 Beilharz, Peter 822–3
 Beilis, Mendel 2942, 2944
 BEK factory 3687
 Bekken, Jon 1752–5, 2252–3
 Beknazarov, Azimbek 3331, 3333
 Belarus 811, 812
 Belaúnde Terry, Fernando 1568, 2643, 2657, 3430
 Belén Sárraga Women's Centers 3598
 Belfast bombings 1802
 Belgian Federation for Women's Suffrage 2722
Belgian League for Women's Rights 2721–2
 Belgian Socialist Party 361
 Belgian Workers' Party 1745
 Belgioioso, Cristina Trivulzio di 3592
Belgium 360–4
 Christian Socialist Party 362–3
 coal strike 360–1
 Congo 1661
 independence 362
 language disputes 363–4
 political conflict, twentieth century 362–4
 Strike of the Century 361–2
 Belgium, National Congress of 362
 Belgrade Declaration 3691
 Belgrade University, renamed 3692
Belize (formerly British Honduras) 364–6
 Despard 364, 993
 general strikes 364
 Hyde 1634–5
 national independence movement 365–6
 Belize Estate and Produce Company 365
- Bell, Daniel 3064, 3188
 Bell, John 57
Bell, journal 1574
 Bell, M. S. 3307
 Bell, William 3081
 Bell Rebellion 1496, 2514
 Bell Trade Act 2675
 Bellamy, Edward 861, 2341, 3041, 3418
 Bellecourt, Clyde 2414
 Bello, Adolfo Ramón 866
 Bello, Walden 1392, 1429–32, 1672, 2687, 3646
 Belloc, Hilaire 634, 2171
 Bellows, George 1125
 Belo, Bishop 1044
 Belo Monte massacre 597, 599–600
 Beltane 2258
 Beltrão, Oscar 2351
 Belzu, president of Bolivia 424
 Bem, Józef 1621
 Bemis Heights 82
 Ben Barka 2337, 2338
Ben Bella, Ahmad 366–7, 1247
Ben-Gurion, David 358, 359, 372–5, 3742
 Benalcázar, Sebastian Moyano de 1061, 2876
 Benaroya, Avraam 1440, 1442, 3220
 Benary, Arne 1340
 Benavides, Oscar 2650
 Bendigo gold miners 1144
 Benedict XVI, Pope 1497
 Benello, G. 2314
 Beneš, Edvard 2252, 3294
 Benett, Hans 7–8
 Benett, Juan Pablo 692
Benezet, Anthony 202, 203, 213, 367–8, 3022, 3521
- Bengal**
 age of consent 1697
 anti-partition movement 1697–8, 2573–4
 British rule 368, 1708
 Bulaki Shah's Revolt 370
 Chakma Revolt 370
 Chittagong revolt 1710
 colonial era 368–72
 Fakir-Sannyasi Revolt 368–9
 famine 1208
 Hatikheda Revolt 371
 Indigo rebellion 1711–13
 Manasa Devi goddess 955
 nationalism 344, 2573–9
 Pagolponthi Revolt 371–2
 partition 1697–700, 1709
 Permanent Settlement 370, 1695
 revolution, nineteenth century 370–1
 Sandwip Revolt 369–70
 Sen 1678

- Shamsher Gazi's Revolt 369
 sharecropping 1706, 2574, 3586
 Siraganj revolt 372
swadeshi 1698–9
 tax revolts 1682
tebhaga movement 1706, 1711, 1922, 2265,
 2574–5
 women's movement 3588
zamindars 370, 371, 372, 1703, 1712, 2574
 Bengal army 1685–7
 Bengal Chemical Works 1698
 Bengal Jute Workers' Association 3229
 Bengal Provincial Students' Federation 1704
 Bengal Technical Institute 1698
 Bengal Tenancy Act 372
 Bengal Volunteers 1678
 Bengali Language Movement martyrs 2578
 Beni dance societies 3728
 Benjamin, Mary 3189–90
Benjamin, Walter 375–7
 Arcades project 376
 On the Concept of History 376
 Critique of Violence 375–6
 Frankfurt School 376, 904, 1256
 Illuminations 904
 Life of the Students, The 375
 Marxism 2249
 One Way Street 376
 Selected Writings 905
 on "Sixty-Eight" 3170
 "Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
 Reproduction" 376
 Bennett, Mary 3652
 Bennett, R. B. 2831
 Bennett, Rolla 3460
 Bennett, Terri 290–1, 303–4, 500–1
 Bennett, W. B. 2563
 Bensaid, Daniel 2260
 Benson, Allan 1458
 Benson, Helen 1334
 Bent, David L. 586–90, 2752–3, 2831
 Benteen, Frederick W. 901
 Bentham, Jeremy 2460, 3666
 Benziane, Sohanne 3577
 Béranger, Pierre-Jean de 1229
 Berber Decree 1248
 Berber language 1927
 Berber people
 Algeria 42–3, 1927
 Morocco 2332–3
 Tunisia 3335
 and Wattasids 2332
 Berbice 1031
 Berdimuhammedow, Gurbanguly 3368
 Berdyayev, Nicholas 634
 Beresford, John 1786
 Berg, Alban 1255
 Berg, Peter 1482
 Berg Damara people 2390, 2394
 Bergama resistance 3343
 Berger, John 2308
 Berger, Joseph 3161
 Berger, Meta 837
 Berger, Victor 837, 3064, 3065
 Bergere, M. C. 735
 Bergés, Jorge 246
 Bergman, Jay 3720
 Bergsten, Fred 1430
 Berisha, Sali 32, 33
Berkeley Free Speech Movement (FSM)
 377–8
 Berkely, William 330
Berkman, Alexander 94, 158, 161, 378–9
 deportation 1412, 2589
 and Goldman 1125
 Berlichingen, Götz von 1354
 Berlin
 Garment Workers' Strike 2047
 gay scene in Weimar period 2104
 Koepi 1741
 revolutionary sailors 1362
 Berlin, Congress of 34
 Berlin, Isaiah 336
 Berlin Conference 883, 2353
 Berlin Peace 2985
 Berlin Treaty 2856
 Berlin Wall 811, 1339, 1344, 1948, 3632
Berlinguer, Enrico 379–81, 683, 1146, 1820
 Berlusconi, Silvio 1307
 Berman, A. Z. 152
 Bermudez, José Francisco 3458
 Bermúdez Cerutti, Francisco Morales 2643
 Bernabe, R. 2769, 2774
 Bernadotte, Jean-Baptiste 3209
 Bernal, J. D. 195, 2999
 Bernard, John 841
 Bernardes, Artur 468, 469, 2748
 Berneri, Camillo 131
 Bernhard, M. 2697
Bernstein, Eduard 381–2, 973, 1648, 1749,
 1756, 2838
 Erfurt Program 1942
 and Jaurès 1913
 and Luxemburg 382, 2143
 Preconditions of Socialism, The 382
 revolutionary socialism 2243
 Sozialdemokrat, Der 1941
 SPD 3055, 3058
 Bernstein, Leonard 1551, 3104
 Berr, Isaac Cerf 1919

- Berrigan, Daniel 73
 Berrigan, Philip 73
 Berríos, Juan Carlos 639
 Berry, Duc de 896
 Berseba people 2394
 Bertinotti, Fausto 1010
 Bertolucci, Bernardo 1237, 3014–15
 Bertolucci, Franco 1419–20
 Bertrand, Francisco 2018
 Bertrand Russell Foundation 2677
 Berwick, Treaty of 3000
 Berzenci, Sheikh Mahmud 352
 Besant, Annie 1699, 2388
 Beseler, Wilhelm 2895, 2984
 Besier, Gerhard 1342
 Besnard, Pierre 851
 Bessarabia 2856, 2857
 Besson, Jean 1870
 Besteiro, Julian 3145
Betances, Ramón Emeterio 382–3, 2767
 Grito de Lares 382, 383, 2767
 Betancourt, Rómulo 1015, 3436, 3442, 3451
 Betancur, Belisario 801, 1120, 1168, 3389
 Betar youth movement 1851
Bethune, Henry Norman 383–4
 Beto, Frei 414, 478
 Better Life for Rural Women Program (BLP)
 3547, 3548
 Beuys, Joseph 1945
 Bevin, Ernest 520, 523
 Bey, Hakim 159, 979, 1741
 Bey dynasty 3334, 3335
 Beyond ESF 1147
 Beyond Pesticides 617
Bezerra, Gregório 384
 Bhagalpur 2970
 Bhakna, Baba Sohan Singh 1676
 Bhakra-Nangal Dam 2434
 Bhandari, Madan 2437, 2438
 Bharati, Uma 1584
 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 1584, 1585, 1692,
 1694, 2435
 Bhasani, Moulana 2579, 2581
 Bhattacharya, Nandini 1762–3, 1763–6, 1766–8,
 1768–75, 2342–4, 3241–6
 Bhattacharyya, Abinash 1674
 Bhattacharyya, Amit 732–6, 3200–2, 3230–5
 Bhattacharyya, Narendranath 1676
 see also Roy, M. N.
 Bhattarai, Baburam 230, 2438, 2439, 2440
 Bhattarai, Krishna Prasad 2437
 Bhave, Vinoba 2403
Bhil tribals 3587
 Bhongir Conference 1707
Bhoodan movement 2403
 Bhopal gas disaster 3590
 Bhumibol, of Thailand 2747, 3259
 Bhumibol Adulyadej, King 660
 Bhutto, Benazir 2584, 2585
 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali 346, 348, 1160, 1857, 2582,
 2583
 Biafra 2482, 2484
 Biagi, Marco 2818
 Bianchini, Guido 1842
 Biassou 1529, 1530, 1533, 3306–7, 3309
 Bibikov, Alexander 2776
 Biblioteca Popular José Ingenieros 104
 Biblioteca Social Reconstruir 138
Biblioteka Warszawska 3544
 Bicesse Accords 2361
 bicycle demonstrations: *see* Critical Mass
 Biddle, Brenda 1210–12
 Bielefeld Agreement 1365
 Bielsky brothers 1918
Biennio Rosso 384–7, 446, 1822, 2168, 3013
Biermann, Wolf 387, 1344
 Bierut, Boleslaw 2699
 Biet, Bishop 1269
 Big Bear 583, 584
 Bigelow, Albert 1461
 Biggar, Joseph 2616
 Biggin Hill 510
 Bikini Atoll 199, 1461, 1885, 1887, 2303
 Bikini Kill 2845
 Biko, Steve Bantu 1163, 3088
 Bikont, Anna 3556
 Bilbao, Francisco 111
 Bill of Rights 87, 3531
 Bill of Rights Society 3531
 Billingham, Guillermo 2648
 Billionaires for Bush 1482–3
 Billiton mining 2419
 Bin Gia 3482
Bin Laden, Osama 388–90
 Afghanistan 388, 389
 “bayan” against USA 389
 Salafism 1810
 Sudan 388–9
 World Trade Center 389, 3247
 Binational Indigenous Oaxacan Front (FIOB)
 2536
 Bio, Julius Maada 3031
 biofuels 1211
 biopolitics 1006, 2305
 biotechnological revolution 2998
 Bir Singh 2970
 Biratnagar strike 2441–2
 Birchfield, Vicki 297–301
 Bird, Robert Montgomery 3147
 Bird, V. C. 2078

- bird flu 1605
 Birendra, of Nepal 230, 2437, 2443
 Birla, Ghanshyam Das 1327, 1684, 2431, 2434
 Birmingham, Alabama
 King 743–4
 Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing
 745, 1974
 Birmingham, UK 1797
 see also G8 protests, Birmingham
 Birmingham Campaign (Alabama) 3398
 Birnbaum, Nathan 3740
birth control
 by abstention 3567
 feminism and 3567, 3568
 Flynn 1204
 Goldman 1412
 Sanger 2968–9
 Birth Control Clinical Research Bureau 2968
 Birth Control Federation of America 2969
Birth Control Review 2968
 bisexuality 1300
 Bisharin tribe 1075
Bishop, Maurice 390–1, 1462, 1464, 1465–6,
 2461–2
 Bishops' War 1097, 3000
 Bisig organization 2682, 2686
 Bismarck, Otto von
 Franco-Prussian war 2610
 homosexuality laws 2101
 and Lassalle 2236
 nationalism 887, 1744
 Prussian expansion 1348
 Social Democrats 3055
 united Reich 1351
 Bissolati, Leonida 3015
 Bitar, Salah al-Din al- 3221, 3222, 3223, 3224,
 3226
Biuletyn Informacyjny 2696, 2698
 Bix, H. P. 1899
 Bizoton Affaire 1513
 Bjerneboe, Jens 2526
 BJP: *see* Bharatiya Janata Party
 Black, Bob 160
 Black, Conrad 2263
 Black Allied Workers' Union 3095
 Black Arts movement 393
 Black Arts Repertory Theater School 348
 Black Bear Ranch 3419
 Black Bloc 132, 1308, 1309, 1317, 3663
 Black Blockers 3657
 black capitalism 1853
 black community 611, 1023
 see also African Americans; black nationalism
 Black Consciousness 1517, 1860, 3088–9,
 3604
 Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) 174,
 3084, 3086, 3095
Black Dwarf 218, 2260, 2262
 Black Flag 109, 2778, 3476
 black flag 2300
 Black Flag Federation 136
 Black Friend Society 136
 Black Guards 2840
 Black Hawk War 57
 Black Hills, South Dakota 900
 Black Hundreds 2921, 2926
 Black Lamp 819
 Black Liberation Army 395
 Black Madonna 3557
 Black Mask 159
 Black Monday 406
 Black Movement Society 136
 Black National Baptist Convention 695
black nationalism 391–7, 1863
 anti-Semitism 396–7
 Baraka 348
 critiqued 395–7
 cultural 393
 economic 392–3
 educational 393
 global impact 2396
 goals/strategies 394–5
 political 393
 religious 393–4
Black Newspaper 136
Black Panthers 18, 159, 393, 397–9, 613, 2757
 FBI 19, 395
 Hampton 1551
 Hoover 751
 Maoist influence 2199
 Murray 3169
 Black People's Convention 3084
 Black Power 391
 APSP 3373
 Australian Aborigines 308
 Carmichael 393
 emergence 750
 FBI 19
 and FLQ 2785
 Jim Crow era 16, 18–19
 Malcolm X 398
 Meredith 2275
 salute 750, 3169
 SNCC 3186, 3187
 Trinidad and Tobago 1463
 Black Repartition 2693
 Black Revolt 348
Black September 239, 399–400
 Black Spring protests 1927, 1928
 Black Star Line 1336, 2396

- Black Stone Rangers 1551
 Black Student Union (BSU) 3169
 Black Studies 3170
 Black and Tans 793, 1048, 1801
 Black Terrorist Unit 1926
 Black Tiger day 3252
 Black Wave Society 136
 Black Youth Alliance, Beijing 135
 blackbirding 1196, 3425
 Blackburn, Thomas 3676
 Blackett, Richard J. M. 3046–8
 Blackman, Robert H. 328–9, 545
 Blackwell, Alice 3623
 Blackwell, Antoinette Brown 3622
 Blackwell, Henry 169, 3622
 Blackwell, John 3676
 Blades, *Tiempos* 640
 Blagoev, Dimitar 540
 Blair, Ezell, Jr. 739, 3186
 Blair, Tony
 Clause Four and 2040, 3062
 coming to power 2040
 Commission for Africa 1314
 Iraq invasion 2040
 July 2005 bombings 1315
 neoliberalism 512, 1398
 New Labour 3062
 Third Way 1913, 2040, 3056
 Blake, Eubie 1555
Blake, William 400–1
 Blakeney, Allan 2975, 2976
Blanc, Louis 401–2, 1149, 1910
 Histoire de dix ans 401
 Histoire de la révolution française 402
 Luxembourg Commission 401, 1244, 2765
 Organisation du travail, L' 401
 Revue du progrès 401
 right to work 2843
 statist communism 2763
 Blanc, Olivier 1421
 Blanchelande, Philibert 1528, 1530, 1531, 1532
 Blanck, Max 3314
 Blanco, Luis 866
 Blanco Party, Uruguay 3340
 Blancpain, F. 1546
 Blanketeers 520
Blanqui, Louis Auguste 402–4, 1234
 anti-Louis XVI 403
 Central Republican Society 403
 as influence 2382, 2805
 Parisian workers 1244
 storming National Assembly 404
 Blasphemy Act 1104, 2805
Blast 379
 Blaurock, George 92, 1356
 Blaxall, Arthur 2357
 Blazer, Lillian 604
 Bleakney, David 2618–19
 Bloch, Ernst 2249, 3689
Bloch, Marc 405
 Block, Marcelline 842–3, 1234–9, 1824–6,
 2228–9, 2952–3, 3164–5, 3208–10, 3575–8
 Block G8 coalition 1403
 Bloem, Filip 387
 Bloncourt, Gérald 1517
 Blood, Fanny 3540–1
 Bloody Assizes 1405
 Bloody Friday, Belfast 1802
Bloody Sunday Demonstration 405–6, 2341
 Bloody Sunday (Ireland) 1797–8, 1801
 Bloody Sunday (Liverpool) 518
 Bloody Sunday (Russia) 1746–7, 1915, 1979,
 2718, 2789–91, 2883, 3551, 3553
 anniversary strike 2891, 2894, 2941
 Bloody Sunday (US, 1965) 748, 1975
 Bloody Week, Paris Commune 1323, 2410
 Bloomer, Amelia 168
 Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos (BOC) 879,
 2257, 2486, 2737
 Blount, James A. 1565
 Blücher, Gerhard Leberecht von 189
 Blue Shirts, Guomindang 727
 Bluemel, Helen 317–21, 821–2, 1346–52,
 2373–4
 Bluestein, Abe 3082
 Blum, Léon 179, 824, 825, 1003
 Blumenfeld, Kurt 242
Boal, Augusto 406–7
 Boal, Iain A. 903–4
 Boas, Franz 1555
 Boas, M. 2114, 2116
 Boatmen of Thessaloniki 126
 Bobo, Rosalvo 1516
 Bobo uprising 2181
 Bobrovskaya, Cecelia 3552
 Boccia, Alfredo 2597
 Bochev, Dimitar 538
 Bochkareva, Maria 3554
 Bode, Johan Joachim Christophe 3146
 Bodichon, Barbara Leigh Smith 3566, 3567
 Bodnāraš, Emil 2866
 Boff, Claudius 2500
 Boff, Clodovis 478
 Boff, Leonardo 478, 2059, 2062, 2500
 Boffa, Paul 2187
 Bogan, Alexander 1918
 Bogdan, Jolan 2856–62, 2862–5
 Bogdanov, Alexander A. 438, 2083
 Boggs, James 772
 Bogle, Paul 1869, 1870, 2321–2, 2323

- Bognor, Ro 3563
 Bognot, Cirilo 2672
Bogotazo 407–10, 623, 805, 1321
 Bohemia 318, 1143, 2829
 Bohemian United Brethren 2323
 Bohley, Bärbel 1345
Böhm, Hans 410–11
 Bois Caïman 1529, 3584
 Bojadžijev, Manuela 2305–8
 Bokina, John 534–6, 2213–15, 3145–50
 Boland, Harry 793, 1048
 Boleyn, Anne 515, 516, 1093
 Bolingbroke, Viscount 1853
 Bolívar, Didalco 3446
 Bolívar, Rocio 1191
Bolívar, Simón 411–12, 576, 2555, 3706
 Admirable Campaign 3457
 Afro-Colombians 785
 Angostura Address 412, 3458
 Haitian support 1538
 as influence 3448
 Letter from Jamaica 412
 as El Libertador 424
 M-19 802
 and Miranda 412, 3456
 Oath of Monte Sacro 412
 and Rodríguez 2854
 and Sucre 1061
 theft of sword 800, 801, 2149
 in Venezuela 412
 see also Bolivarianism
 Bolivarian Circles 666
 Bolivarian Liberation Forces-Liberation Army
 (FBL-EL) 3445
 Bolivarian Movement, Venezuela 605
 Bolivarian Revolution 413, 664, 668–74
Bolivarianism 412–16, 2949
Bolivia 425–35
 Agrarian Reform Law 1936
 bishops 2060
 Catholic Church 2061
 Chaco War 1936, 2599
 and Chile 433
 Civil War 430
 clientelism 789–90
 coca leaf cultivation 423, 433, 434, 435, 707–8
 Cochabamba Water Wars 790–2
 Creoles 424
 decolonization 787
 dictatorships 420–1
 elites 790
 factory workers 419–20
 Federalist Revolution 425
 Great Rebellion 3339
 IMF 421, 433, 434
 independence struggle 424–5
 indigenous population 424, 3337–8
 Katarismo indigenous popular mobilization
 1936–9
 Labor Movement 426–7
 military socialism 427–8
 mine closures 422–3
 miners' strike 422, 426
 MNR 788, 789
 as multinational state 1939
 National Revolution 425–32, 787
 neoliberalism 432–5
 peasant mobilization 420, 1936–9
 PGA 2637
 pongueaje (bondage system) 426
 protest and repression 416–23
 reproletarianization 2371
 road blockades 1936
 social mobilization 432–5
 State Socialist Party 428
 student protests 419–20
 tin mining 425–6, 432
 universal suffrage 432
 War of the Pacific 425–32
 women's rights 3598
 World Bank 791
 World War II 429
 see also cocaleros peasant uprising; Morales
 Ayma, Juan Evo; Movimiento Al Socialismo
 (MAS)
 Bolivian Workers' Confederation (COB) 46,
 416, 418, 421, 431, 1937
 Bolland, O. N. 3318
 Bologna 1008, 1838
 Bologna, Sergio 323, 1836
 Bologna University 1838
 Bolotnikov, Ivan 436
Bolotnikov's Rebellion 435–6
 Bolsa Familia 3038
Bolshevichki (Old Bolshevik Women) 3606
Bolshevik 153, 437
 Bolshevik Leninist Party of India (BLPI) 969,
 1494, 1705, 2051, 2793, 2794
 Bolshevik Petersburg Committee 2897
 Bolshevik Revolution
 Comintern 1373
 as counterrevolution 436, 888
 impact on USA 3065
 Tajikistan 3242
 Tito 3295
 universalist outlook 1920
 and Uzbekistan 3420
 Zasulich on 3720
 see also Russian Revolution of October/
 November (1917)

- Bolsheviks 436–40**
 agrarian program 2908
 and anarchism 100
 anti-World War I 438–9
 Democratic Conference 2916–17
 dictatorship of the proletariat 1171, 2887
 dual power 2902
 Estonia 340
 Goldman on 1413
 industrial centers 2911, 2914
 Kemal 282
 Kollontai 1980
 Latvia 340
 Lenin 2082, 2085–6
 Liberty Loan 2904
 and Mensheviks 2228, 2887, 2926
 rise of 2082
 Second Party Congress 437
Soldatki 3554
 Trotsky 437
 workers' control 2907–8
 working class 2942–3
 world capitalism 439
see also Bolshevik Revolution
- Bolshevization 1172
 Bolshoi Ballet 3149
 Boltanski, E. 2436
 Bolten, Virginia 103, 124
Bolton Free Press 2550
 Bolzaneto Detention Center 1311
 Bombay
 strikes 1705
swadeshi 1699
 textile industry 961, 1684, 1695
 Trotskyists 1705
 World Social Forum 959, 2306
 Bombay army 1685–6, 1687
 Bombay Mill-Owners' Association 1681
 Bombay Plan 2433
 Bombay Students' Brotherhood 3179
Bon Sens, Le 401
 Bonaerense Typographical Society 270
 Bonafini, Hebe de 255, 2159, 2160
 Bonald, Louis 1228
 Bonanno, Alfredo Maria 132, 979
 Bonapart, Rosa Muki 1042, 1043
 Bonaparte, Louis 1079–80, 1718
Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon 440, 1150, 1245, 2216
see also Napoleon III
- Bonaparte, Napoleon (Napoleon I) 441–4**
 Austria 189
 banishment and escape 189
 crowned 1227
 death 1228
 Egypt campaign 1796
 Eighteenth Brumaire 1079–80, 3033
 Italy, invasion of 441
 Lafayette 2042
 Malta 2184–5
 O'Connor 2547
 Portugal 187
 Rochambeau 2852
 Russia 443
 and Sieyès 3033
 Spain 442–3
 Toussaint Louverture 1265–6, 1523, 1545
 Waterloo 189, 443, 1282, 2445
- Bonapartism 1228–9
 Bonavena, Pablo 243–7
 Bond, Patrick 3109–14
 Bonda 703
 bonded labor 2173
 Bondelswart Rebellion 2395, 2396, 2397
 Bondelswarts 2394
 Bondfield, Margaret 521–2
 Bonfire of the Vanities 410
Bongobondhu 347, 348
 Boniece, Sally A. 676–7, 3152–4
 Boniface VIII, Pope 2829
Bonifacio, Andres 445–6, 2668, 2846
 Bonilla, Policarpo 2018
 Bonilla, Yarimar 1468–71
 Bonilla-Milina, Luis 413
 Bonjol, Tuanku Imam 1719
 Bonnelly, Rafael F. 1017
 Bonner, Raymond 2958
 Bonnot Gang 120
 Bonnymuir, Battle of 1384
 Bono 1312, 1314, 1317, 1402
Bonus Army Unemployed Movement (1932) 445–6, 2489
 Book of Common Prayer 509, 516, 517, 1094
 Bookchin, Murray
 influencing Greens 99, 159
 Institute of Social Ecology 159
 lifestyle anarchism 160
 social ecology 99, 161, 1052, 2620, 2808
- Boomerang* 1145
 Boone, Daniel 84
 Boorstein, Daniel 973
 Booth, John Wilkes 2123
 Booth, Joseph 694
Africa for the Africans 695
 Bootstrap Operation 2770
 Bopage, Lionel 2633
 Borah, William 445
 Bor'ba 142
 Bordaberry, Juan María 3340, 3405
 Bordas Valdez, José 1017

- Bordeaux 1919
 Bordeaux, Duc de
 see also Chambord, Comte de
Bordiga, Amadeo 446–7, 1422, 1818–19
 Borduas, Paul-Émile 110
 Borg, Filippo 2184
Borge, Tomás 447–8, 1205, 1206, 2467, 2469,
 2964
 Borge Martínez, Tomás 2467
 Borghi, Armando 131
 Borge, Pozzo di 873
 Boricua Popular Army-Macheteros (EPM-B)
 2844
 Boris, Tsar 542, 543, 544
 Borja, Rodrigo 1066
 Borlaug, Norman 3028
 Bormann, Martin 1593
 Borno, Louis 1516–17
 Borodin, Michael 1597, 2874
 Borodino, Battle of 443
 Borro, Sebastián 2641
 Bortolotti, Attilo 1110
 Borton, H. 1899
 Borusewicz, Bogdan 3502
 Bosch, Juan 1017, 1018, 1029
 Bose, Bhupendranath 1698
 Bose, Rashbehari 451, 1676, 1679
 Bose, Sarat Chandra 1704, 1705
Bose, Subhas Chandra 448–52
 arrested 1710
 Azad Hind Fauz 1704–5, 1710–11
 death of 1704
 election 1329
 and fascism 450
 Indian Legion 1678–9
 Indian Struggle, The 450
 and Irwin 1327, 1681
 and left 1710
 and Prabhakaran 2741
 reforms 2430
 removed from power 2792
 and Roy 2875
 and Tojo 451
 World War II 1330, 2432
 Bosin, Yury V. 13–15, 15–16, 329–30, 435–6,
 536, 1029, 2342, 2689, 2775–6, 2806–7,
 2877–8, 2927–8, 3246–8
 Bosnia 226–7, 318
 Bosnia-Herzegovina 223
 Bosnian War 1831
 Bossi-Fini law 1830
 Boston 1305, 1753
 Boston Anarchist Club 105
 Boston Massacre 77, 296
 Boston Port Act 78
Boston Tea Party 78, 156, 452–3, 2491
 Bosworth, Richard 1180
Bota e Re (New World) 29
 Botha, Fanie 2626
 Botha, P. W. 2194
Botswana 453–63
 ethnic groups 453
 exports 455, 3110
 Frontline States 461
 independence transition 462
 JAC 458
 Khama 457–8, 460
 labor force 3112
 Legco 457–8, 460
 nationalism 454–5, 457–61, 1955–7
 protest and nationalism 453–63
 Women's Affairs Department 3605
 Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) 461
 Botswana Congress Party (BCP) 461
 Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) 1956,
 2358
 Botswana Federation of Trade Unions
 (BFTU) 461
 Botswana Freedom Party 2358
 Botswana Independence Party (BIP) 460,
 2358
 Botswana Mineworkers' Union (BMWU) 461
 Botswana National Front (BNF) 461, 1957,
 3605
 Botswana People's Party (BPP) 455, 459, 1956,
 2222, 2358
 Botto, Pietro and Maria 2623
Boucaniers 1540
 Bouchard, Jennifer Westmoreland 350–1,
 2427–9, 3578–9
 Boucherette, Jessie 3566, 3567
 Bouchor, Maurice 3217
 Bougainville, Louis Antoine de 3425
 Bouglé, Celestin 2766
 Boukalas, Christos 621–3, 2735–7, 3062–3, 3168
 Boukman 1529, 1530, 1536
 Boum Om 2055
 Boumedienne, Houari 367
 Boun Oum, Prince 2054, 2055
 Bound Brook 82
 Bourassa, Robert 2557
 Bourbons
 counterrevolution 896–7, 1228
 Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 1332, 1333,
 1825, 1826
 Louis XVIII 443
 and Napoleon I 895
 Reforms 424
 Restoration 896–7
 Spain 424, 1848

- Bourgeault, Ron 2841–2
 Bourgeois, Robyn 2556–8
 bourgeoisie
 Engels 766
 Germany 821–2
 Marx 777, 821, 1284, 1647
 Reiss 766–7
 Trotsky 1667–8
 Bourget, Paul 888
 Bourguiba, Habib 1248, 2337, 3335–6
 Bourke, Brian 311
Bourses du Travail 463–4, 1821
 Pelloutier and 463, 464, 850, 2628, 3216
 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz 41
 Bouterse, Desi 1032
 Boven Digul camp 1729
 Boves, José Tomas 3457
 Bovio, Giovanni 1419
 Bowdoin, James 3022, 3023
 Boxer, Marilyn J. 1750–2
 Boxer Rebellion 717–18, 733, 1214, 1896, 2392,
 2780, 3289
 see also Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Rebellion
 boyars, Romania 2862, 2864
 Boyce, Ed 1570
 Boycott, Charles 2617
 boycotts 209, 2491, 2492, 2617
 Boyd, Lennox 946
 Boyer, Jean-Pierre 1015, 1511
 Boyle, Robert 2989
 Boyne, Battle of 1786
Boynton v. Virginia 1257
 Boyocá, Battle of 3458
 Bozkiir Uprisings 3356
 Bozoki, Andras 127–9
 BR-Partito Comunista Combattente 2817–18
 BR-Partito della Guerriglia 2817
 BR-Unione Comunisti Combattenti 2818
 BR-Walter Alasia 2817
 Bracegirdle, Mark 969
 Bradford, David 3524, 3525
 Bradford, Marion Peter 2061
Brado Africano, O 2355
 Bradshaw, John 1106
 Bradshaw, Robert 2078
 Bradstreet, Anne 3612
 Braechlein, Ingo 1343
 Braes, Battle of the 2819
 Bragado prisoners 254
 Braganza, House of 187
 Bramble, William 2078
Brand, Adolf 464–5, 1586, 2103
 Brand, Ulrich 1315–18
 Brando, Marlon 2412
Brandreth, Jeremiah 465–6
 Brandt, Willi 1945, 2583, 3056, 3523
 Brandywine Creek 82
 Branicki, Franciszek Ksawery 2712
 Brant, Shawn 586, 2557
 Brasilia 2636
 Brassens, Georges 2381
 Bratmobile 2845
 Braun, Otto 2749
 Braverman, Harry 768, 773, 2249
 Bravo, Douglas 665, 3442, 3443, 3444
 Bravo, Ignacio A. 621
 Bravo, José Molina 683–5
 Braxfield, Lord 2366
Brazil 466–500
 abolition of slavery 598
 agrarian reform 52, 2350–3
 anarchists 474
 Araguaia Guerilla movement 472–3
 Bolsa Familia 500, 3038
 Cabanagem of Grão-Pará 490, 561–2
 Canudos 468, 597–601
 Catholic Church 482–3, 494, 599, 2060
 Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) 112,
 477, 494–500, 681, 808–9
 Church of the Poor 478
 Constitutionalist Revolution 470
 Contestado War 467–8
 Farmers' Leagues 1925
 gold mining 483, 484–5
 guerilla movements 466–73
 independence movements 483–7
 Intentona Comunista 470–1
 labor struggles 473–8
 land reform 2117–18
 liberation theology 478–83
 Ligas Camponesas 472, 2117–18, 2350–1
 Maroon communities 2586
 military dictatorships 471–2, 496–7, 598,
 2273
 millenarianism 598, 599
 Movimento Sem Terra 481–3, 2350–3,
 2635
 Música Popular 2377
 participatory budgeting 2621
 Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) 494–500
 peasant movements 478–83
 Portuguese rule 2350, 2586–8, 3745–6
 protest song 2377–8
 rebellions 483–94
 as republic 493–4
 sugar cane plantations 2350, 2586
 syndicalism 474
 Tenentismo movement 468–70
 urban guerilla movement 2219–20
 Vargas era 470

- World Social Forums 1009, 1401, 1431–2
see also Rio de Janeiro; São Paulo; Silva, Luis
 Inácio Lula da
- Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) 2319, 2350, 3388
see also Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB)
- Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) 2351
- Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) 2351
- Brazilian Worker Federation (COB) 474
- Brazzaville protest** 853–4
- Bread and Puppet Theater** 500–1, 1482
- Bread and Roses Strike** 502–4, 2032
- Bread or Blood riots 1040–1, 3212
- bread riots** 501–2, 777, 1277, 3014
- Breadbasket Operation 1852
- Brecht, Bertolt** 387, 504–5
 Epic Theater 28, 1482
- Breckenridge, John C. 56
- Breitman, George 772
- Brel, Jacques 2381
- Brenner, Robert 1430, 1669–70
- Brereton, Bridget 3318
- Bresci, Gaetano 130, 1419
- Brest Trials 2690
- Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of 143, 1359, 1979, 2085–6, 2932–4, 3153
- Breton, André 2428
- Breton Club 1288, 1294
- Brett, Edward T. 364, 365–6, 605–6, 614–15, 1189–90, 1578–9, 1603–4, 1634–5, 2019–20, 2055–63, 2128–9, 2226–7, 2867–9, 2956–9, 3303–4
- Bretton Woods 1209, 3110
 breakdown of 3461
- Brewster, Lee 2108
- Brezhnev, Leonid
 Czechoslovakia 950, 1025, 2262
nomenklatura 3117, 3118
- Brian Boru, King 2544
- Briand, Aristide 225
- Briand-Kellog Pact 1173
- Bridges, Harry 2035, 3414
- Briel, Holger 2046–7
- Brigada Internacionalista Simón Bolívar 3444
- Brigadas Rojas (Red Brigades), Argentina 245
- Brigate Rosse: *see* Red Brigades
- Briggs, Cyril 17, 21, 22, 394, 837
- Bright, John 2827
- Brine, James 3301
- Brinton, Maurice
 Solidarity 325
- Brión, Luis 3457
- Brisbane, Arthur 1222–3
Social Destiny of Man, The 1222
- Brisbane Commonwealth Games 308, 311
- Brissot, Jacques Pierre** 505–6, 893, 1281, 1525, 2848
 on *sans-culottes* 2969
- Brissotins 506, 1289
- Bristol Riots** 506–7
- Britain** 507–30
 abolition of slavery 200–5, 367–8
 American colonies 201
 American War of Independence 507–9
 anarchism 108–10
 Anti-Corn Law 176–8, 658
 anti-nuclear campaigns 190–1
 anti-roads protests 1039, 1054
 anti-slavery movement 200–5, 206–9, 209–11
 anti-Vietnam War movement 218–19, 512
 bread riots 501–2
 coalition government 2792
 colonialism 206–9, 1655
 color bar 2526
 fascism 1172–3, 2526
 feudalism 1665–6
 general strike 518–19, 520, 2821
 Glorious Revolution 75, 1224, 1404–8
 homosexuality 2263
 immigration 511–12
 India 1656, 1708, 2970–1
 Industrial Revolution 2340, 2566
 Labour Party 198, 520, 521, 522–3, 528, 2039–41
 Marxism 2249
 May Day 2258
 mutinies 510–11
 peasant uprisings 509
 Poor Law 656, 658, 2720–1, 3380
 post-World War II 511–14
 race riots 511–12
 Reform Acts (1832) 205, 633, 655, 786, 1632, 2692, 2825–7, 3499, 3565
 Reform Bills (1867, 1884) 526, 2827–8, 3061, 3565
 Renaissance era 514–17
 sexual liberation 512–13
 socialism 3060–2
 strikes 109, 518–19, 529–30
 syndicalism 518
 Syria 2073
 Tolpuddle Martyrs 656, 3300–1
 trade union movement 519–26
 unemployment 521, 525, 3380, 3384
 women's movement 3564–70
 women's suffrage campaign 526–9, 3567
- British Association for the Promotion of Cooperative Knowledge 2129
- British Central Africa Company 2174
- British Central Africa Protectorate 2172

- British Columbia
 Doukhobors 592
 indigenous activism 584, 2557
 land claims 2556
 relief camps 2831
 Vancouver Island 785
- British Council for Peace in Vietnam (BCPV)
 218
- British East Africa Protectorate 2253
see also Kenya
- British East India Company 1655, 1691
 Bangladesh 368
 Bengal army 1685
 China 1657, 1658
 and direct rule 1695
 Iraq 1775
- British Empire Citizens' and Workers' Home
 Rule Party 3316
- British Foreign Anti-Slavery Society 3640
- British Guiana: *see* Guyana
- British Guiana Labor Union (BGLU) 1500
- British Guiana Workers' League (BGWL) 1500
- British Honduras: *see* Belize
- British National Party (BNP) 512, 2526
- British Nationality Act 511
- British Socialist Party (BSP) 511, 3061
- British Solomon Islands Protectorate 3080
- British South Africa Company (BSAC) 453,
 699, 700, 701–2, 3727–8, 3734
- British Statesman* 2543
- British Union of Fascists 1587
- British Vietnam Committee (BVC) 218
- Brittain, Vera 3569
- Brittany 892, 893–4, 1288, 2215
- Brix, Harald 990
- Brixton Riots** 511, 530–1
- Brizola, Leonel 495, 499, 2749
- Broad, Robin 1430
- Broad Contemporary Art Museum 1483
- Broad Front for the Creation of a National
 Liberation Movement (FAC-MLN) 2289
- Broad Left Front (FADI) 1058
- Broad Opposition Front (FAO) 2469
- Broderick, Bertie 1087, 1557
- Broken Hill 2038
- Bronner, Stephen Eric 755, 885–90, 904–8
- Bronterre's National Reformer* 2543
- Brook Brothers 69
- Brook Farm community 1222
- Brookfield, Percy 2039
- Brooklyn 81
- Brooks, S. M. 3674
- Brosses, Charles de 3146
- Brotherhood of the Cooperative Commonwealth
 3417–18
- Brotherhood for the Defense of the People's
 Rights 676
- Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen 974
- Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP)
 393, 757, 2037, 2803
- Brotherhood of Timber Workers 1736
- Brouard, Carl 1516
- Broué, Pierre 2250
- Brousse, Pierre 1304, 1756
- Browder, Earl 839, 1220
- Browder v. Gayle* case 2615
- Brown, Bradford C. 1227–33
- Brown, Desmond 591
- Brown, Gordon 2040
- Brown, H. Rap** 531–2, 751
 and Randolph 2804
- Brown, J. 1326
- Brown, J. Forrester 149
- Brown, John** 532–4
 Addams on 10
 anti-slavery 90, 156–7, 216
 Harpers Ferry 57, 90, 533, 534, 2491
 and Spartacus 3146
- Brown, Morris 3460
- Brown, Roy 2380
- Brown, Susan Love 332–3, 1257–8, 1258–9,
 1971–7, 3186–7
- Brown, Thomas 3047
- Brown, Will 2823–4
- Brown v. Board of Education* 651, 739, 741,
 760–4, 2498
- Browne, Bill 3414
- Brownell, Herbert 760
- Brownmiller, Susan 3629
- Brownstein, Carrie 2845
- Broz, Josip: *see* Tito
- Bruat, Armand-Joseph 1272
- Brubaker, Rogers 392
- Brugha, Cathal 1048, 1049
- Bruhn, K. 1122
- Brunete, Battle of 3143
- Brüning, Heinrich 3066, 3382
- Brunkenberg, Battle of 1495
- Brunswick Manifesto 1289
- Brunswick-Oels, Duke of 189
- Bryan, William Jennings 3064
- Bryant, Anita 2099
- Bryant and May strike 2229
- Buarque, Chico 2378
- Buback, Siegfried 1368
- Buber, Martin 1916, 2047–8
- Bucak, Mehmet Celal 2010
- Bucareli Accords 2541
- Bucer, Martin 1094, 1357, 3748
- USS *Buchanan* 2529

- Buchar* 3172
 Bucharest 2860–1
 Buckley, Nathaniel 3676
 Buckridge, Steeve O. 1871–4
 Budaj, Ján 3435
 Budapest Anarchist Group 128
 Buddhism
 Burma 552–3, 2496, 2978–9, 2980
 in China 113
 and Marxism 3259
 Middle Path 303
 Sam-bo-it-bae (three steps, one bow protest) 3652
 Sri Lanka 2053
 Thailand 3259, 3266–8
 Tibet 2496, 3293
 Vietnam 219
 Buddhist monks 2496, 3481
 Budenz, Louis 3412
 Budyonny, Semyon 327
 Buechler, S. 779, 782
 Buenos Aires
 Central Fruit Market 261
 Ezeiza massacre 1155–7
 First International 102
 strikes 247–8
 Buenos Aires University 3169
Buysameike (The Bolshevik) 2781
 Buganda, Kingdom of 3369–70, 3546
 Buhle, Paul 1734–8, 3071
 Bui Cong Trung 3472
 Buk-ro-gun-jung-sea (Northern Military Administration Office Army) 1970
 Bukhara 1029, 3241
Bukhara-i-Sharif (Noble Bukhara) 3241
 Bukharan Emirate 642
Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich 534–6, 1649, 1757, 2243
 ABC of Communism 535
 communist theory 2247
 executed 3162
 Historical Materialism 535
 Imperialism and World Economy 1672
 Leninism 2089, 3159
 NEP 2087
 Stalin 2248
 and Togliatti 3298
 Bukharin People's Party 3421
 Bukharinists 2875
 Bukhoro, Battle of 3421
 Bukovina 2856, 2857
 Bulaki Shah's Revolt 370
 Bulavin, Kondratiy 536
Bulavin's Rebellion 536
 Bulawayo 700, 3732, 3735
- Bulgaria** 536–45, 3068–9
 anti-Soviet movements 536–8
 communism 542–5
 dissidents 3068
 economic protests 539–40
 independence movement 538–9
 Jewish people 543
 language war 1452
 leftist and workers' movements 540–2
 nationalism 1452
 opposition parties 537
 Sofia demonstrations 3068–9
 Turkish minority 3069
 women's movement 3632
 World War II resistance 542–5
 Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) 540
 Bulgarian Church 1452
 Bulgarian Liberating Movement 538
 Bulgarian National Committee 537
 Bulgarian National Front 537
 Bulgarian Social Democratic Party 540
 Bulgarian Social Democratic Union 540
 Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) 539
 Bulgarian Workers' (Communist) Party 541, 542, 1003
 Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party (BWSDP) 540
 Bull Ring Riots 657
 Bull Run creek 58
Bulletin 1145
Bulletin, Sidney 2450, 2454
Bulletyn Informacjya 3556
 Bullinger, Heinrich 1356, 3749
 Bulzani, Francisco 253
 BUMIDOM 1469
 Bunce, Valerie 1417
 Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1366
 Bunker Hill 79
 Bunster, Alvaro 683
 Bunting, S. P. 149, 152, 154, 349, 832–3, 3092, 3093
 Bunyoro-Kitara, Kingdom of 3369–70
Buonarroti, Philippe 328, 403, 545, 2266, 2543
 Buozzi, Bruno 998, 1823
 Burbridge, Jake 1039
 Burchett, Wilfred 2457
 Burden, Jane 2341
Burdett, Sir Francis 519, 545–7, 1553, 2692
 Bureau Central de Renseignement et d'Action (BCRA) 1240
 Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 1642
 Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 40, 2413, 2414, 2628
Burevestnik (Storm Petrel) 142

- Burford Mutiny 1102
 Burger King boycott 1054
 Burgmann, Meredith 1458–60
 Burgmann, Verity 306, 1458–60, 1738–9, 2373
 Burgos, Carmen de 3610
 Burgos, José 2667
 Burgos trial 183, 1129
 Burgoyne, John 82
 Burham, Viola 3559
 Burke, Edmund 507, 886, 1223, 2715, 3024
 on common people 3151
 Reflections on the Revolution in France 1115,
 1224, 1284, 2570
 Burke, T. H. 2617
 Burkert, Olga 2018–19, 2045–6, 3294–5
Burkina Faso 547–8
 Burla mining region 3451
 Burley Colony 3418
Burma 548–58
 British rule 302, 551–2, 556–7
 Buddhism 552–3, 2496, 2978–9, 2980
 Buddhist monks 2979
 democracy movement 548–51
 ethnic minorities 549–50, 551
 Four-Cut Policy 550
 Freedom Bloc 555
 Home Rule Association 2978
 hybrid color revolution 811, 817
 Japanese Occupation 556
 Land Acquisition Act 2979
 military coups 550
 national movement 551–8
 no tax rebellion 2979
 Nu 2527–8, 3068
 religion and protest 2496
 Saw 2977–8
 Saya San movement 553, 2978–81
 SLORC 551
 Soe 3068
 student movement 553, 554
 Village Act 2980
 youth movements 553–4
 see also Aung San
 Burma Independence Army 302, 555
 Burma Oil Company 554
 Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) 550
 Burne-Jones, Edward 2340
 Burnham, Forbes 1497, 1500–1, 1502
 burning of sugar cane 1866, 2076, 2554
 Burns, Anthony 216
 Burns, Lucy 2624, 3626
 Burombo, Benjamin 3729
 Burroughs, Major 2971
Burschenschaften 558, 3177
 Burton, Beatrice 2121–3
 Burton, Henry 2118
 Burton, Orville Vernon 70–2, 2121–3, 2798–801
 Burton, Richard 2452
 Buscayno, Bernabe 2677, 2680, 2681
 Busch, Alberto Natusch 421
 Busch, Germán 428
 Bush, George H. W.
 Iran-Contra scandal 2475
 Los Angeles riots 3403
 Bush, George W.
 Chávez on 667
 electoral support 1459
 free trade 1430
 globalization 1430
 Iraq invasion 227, 1831
 on Mugabe 3738
 Panama 2594
 People's Summit of the Americas on 3658
 Road Map to Peace 1760
 and Saddam Hussein 2504
 Swedish visit 1152
 Uruguay 3407
 Vanuatu 3427
 Vieques 3465
 war on terror 1401
 Bush, Melanie E. L. 1602–3
 Bush, Roderick 21–3, 1551–2, 1874–5, 2852–3
 Buss, Mary Frances 3566
Bussa's Rebellion 204, 559
 Bustamante, Alexander 1859, 1867
 Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU)
 1861, 1867
 Bustamante y Rivero, José Luis 1567–8
 Bustamante y Rivero, Manuel 2650
 Bustani, Boutros al- 234
 Butadroka, Sakesai 1197
 Butau, Rebecca 3733
 Buthelezi, Mangosuthu Gatsha 3086, 3088
 Butler, Benjamin 61, 65, 70
 Butler, John 1804
 Butler, Josephine 3567
 Butler, Judith 1191–2
 Butler, Smedley 2489
 Butler, Tubal Uriah 3316, 3319
 Butler Home Rule Party 3317
 Butler Party 356
 Butt, Isaac 967, 2616
 Butt, Maqbool 1934
 Butterwick, Richard 2710–15
 Buttigieg, Emanuel 2182–7
 Buttonshaw, Harvey 107
 Buxton, Charles 208
 Buxton, Thomas 205
 Buzby, Amy 327–8, 3428–9
 Bydgoszcz crisis 3074, 3076

- Bydlinska, Zofia 3556
 Byrne, David 2378
 Byrne, Joe 1943
 Byrnes, Jack 510–11
- Ca-canny strategy 2169, 2820
 Caamaño Deñó, Francisco Alberto 1018
 Cab Drivers' Alliance 3663
 Caballero, Florencio 615
 Caballero Aburto, General 3427
Cabanagem of Grão-Pará 490, 561–2
 Cabañas Barrientos, David 2285, 2286
Cabañas Barrientos, Lucio 562–3, 1122, 2283, 2285, 3427, 3428
cabanos 561
 Cabello, Tristan 2106–9
 Cabet, Étienne 2763, 2843, 3417
Voyage en Icarie 1639, 2763, 3417
 Cabeza de Vaca, Alvar Núñez 237
 Cabindan oil 2360
Cabral, Amilcar 563–5, 602, 1042, 1492, 2249
 Cabral, José Maria 1016
 Cabral, Juan José 866
 Cabral, Luis de Almeida 564, 603
 Cabral, Luiz 1493
 Cabral, Pedro Alvares 187
 Cabrera, David 2642
 Cabrera, Teodoro 2289
 Cabrera Infante, Guillermo 923
 Cabrera M., Gabriel 47–9, 1923–4, 3430–1
 Cacchione, Pete 841
 Cacciari, Massimo 1836
cacelorazo (popular mobilization) 268, 687, 1085, 1580
 Cáceres, Alonso de 2080
 Cachalia, Maulvi 2191
 Cachin, Marcel 824
 Caco rebellions 3584
cacos 1521, 1522
 Cacuangó, Dolores 1056
 Cadet Revolution, Poland 2715–17, 3544
 Cadiz Constitution 2667
 Cadogan, Jack 2453
 Cadogan, Roger 2455–6
 Caetano, Marcello 2729, 2731, 2732, 3546
 Caffentzis, George 1401
 Cafiero, Carlo 129, 1161, 2169, 2692
 Cagol, Maria 2815
 Cagoule group 2871
 Cairns, Daniel 113–15
 Cairo Anti-War Conference 367
 Cairo Conference 1775
 Cairo Declaration 3239
 Caja Laboral Popular (CLP) 2315
 Cakchiquel rebellion 1476
 Cakobau, Ratu George 1196, 1197
 Calais Agreement 1468
 Calas Affair 3494
 Calatafimi, Battle of 1826
 Calcutta Pottery Works 1699
 Calcutta riots 1705, 1711
 Caldera, Rafael 666, 3436, 3437, 3440, 3441, 3443, 3446, 3449
 Calderón, Felipe 2286, 2294–5, 2539
 Calderon, Sila 3465
 Calderón Guardia, Rafael 878, 2058
 Caldicott, Helen 305
 Caldoches 2458
 Caldwell, Malcolm 574
 Caledonian Multi-Racial Union (UMNC) 2458
 Calédonie dans la République (RPCR) 2458
 Calenzana, Battle of 872
 Čalfa, Marián 3434
 Calgary Winter Olympics 585
Call, The 2968, 3626
 Call of Mercedes 288
 Callaghan, James 2040
 Callahan, Kevin J. 1742–50
 Callao Port uprising 48
 Calleja, Félix 1579
 Calles, Plutarco Elias 606, 2278, 2280
 exiled 2542
 law reforms 902
 Morones 2340
 National Revolutionary Party 2542
 Sacasa 2541
 Sonorans 2539
 Callinicos, Alex 1392
 Callinicos, Luli 2189–96, 3248–50
 Calloway, Cab 1555
Calvin, John 565, 1094, 1357–8, 3001
 Calvinism
 Church of Scotland 1111, 2300, 3001
 Gaelic society 3002
 Geneva 1111
 Netherlands 1033, 1034–5
 Cama, Bhikaji Rustam 1674
 Camacho, Isaac 416
 Camacho, Manuel Avila 2542
 Camacho, Marcelino 180, 181
Cambodia 566–78
 agrarianism 1960
 anti-colonial protests 566–9
 Chinese businessmen 576
 communist movement 568
 communist protests and revolution 569–75
 eviction to countryside 574
 as French Protectorate 566, 568, 575, 3035
 invaded 2055
 Japanese defeat 569

Cambodia (*cont'd*)

Khmer Republic 3484
 massacres 572
 National Assembly elections 570, 573
 Phnom Penh protests 1713
 political parties 576–8
 rebellion against France 568–9, 575–8
 Umbrella Revolt 568, 1713, 1958
 and Vietnam 3474
see also Kampuchea; Sihanouk, Norodom
 Cambodian Genocide War Crimes Tribunal
 1961
 Camden, Lord 508
 Camejo, Josefa 3631
Camejo, Pedro (Negro Primero) 578–9
 Cameron, Andrew 2727
 Cameron, Mary 2453
Cameroon 579–81, 1251–2
 Camilist Union–National Liberation Army
 (UC-ELN) 801
 Camilista Union-ELN (UCELN) 1083
 Camp New Havana 685
 Campa, Valentín 2297
 Campaign Against Moral Persecution (CAMP)
 2096–7
 Campaign for Democracy, Nigeria 2481
 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)
 190, 195–6, 513, 2528, 2877, 3178, 3282
 Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD),
 Thailand 3272
 Campaore, Blaise 548
 Campbell, Colin 1690
 Campbell, Jack 307
 Campbell, John, Duke of Argyll 1854
 Campbell, Louis 837
 Campbell, Robert 208
 Campbell, Robert, of Glenlyon 1385–6
 Campbell, Susan 22
 Campbell Soup Company 1170
 Campero, Leonel Sagahón 2374–6
 Campesino Environmentalist Organization
 (OCESP) 2289
 Campesino Justice Brigade 2283
 Campesino Organization of the Sierra del Sur
 (OCSS) 2288
 Campo, Diego de 2079
 Campo Formio, Treaty of 441
 Campoamor, Clara 3611
 Cámpora, Héctor J. 1155, 1156
 Campos, Batista 561
 Campos Alúm, Antonio 2597
 Campusano Corenjo, Rosita 2949
Camus, Albert 356, 581–2
 Can Lao Nhan Vi (Personalist Labor Party) 2465
 Can Vuong 3477, 3478

Canada 582–93

anarchism 110–11
 anarchist journals 110
 Charter of Rights and Freedoms 592
 Chinese immigrants 110
 class consciousness 2975
 Constitution Act 585
 draft resisters 220
 freed slaves 214, 216
 Great Depression 591, 2562, 2832
 immigrants 587
 indigenous peoples 2098
 indigenous resistance 582–6
 IWW 110, 587
 labor protests 586–90
 law and public protest 590–3
 LGTB 2098–100
 MTW 1753
 neoliberalism 2562
 Nine-Two Resolutions 593
 OCAP 2560–2
 One Big Union 588, 3535, 3536
 postal workers' strikes 590
 Riel 2841–2
 Saskatchewan socialist movement 2975–6
 unemployment 588, 2561, 2563
 Union, Act of 594
 Vietnam volunteers 220
 welfare payments 2562
 Winnipeg general strike 3534–6
 World War II 589
 Zionism 845
Canada, Rebellion of 1837–8 593–5, 2841
 Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labor
 (CCCL) 589
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 592
 Canadian Labor Congress (CLC) 589, 590,
 2619, 2975
 Canadian National Farmers' Union 3462
 Canadian Socialist Party 110
 Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW)
 2618
 Cananea miners' strike 137, 2276
 Canary Islands 1657
 Canboulay riot 3316
 Cancel Miranda, Rafael 2770
 Cancun: *see* World Trade Organization (WTO)
 protests, Cancun
Candide 404
 cane cutters' newspaper 107
 Caneca, Frei 489
 Cangiano, M. C. 252
 Cannibal Army prison break-in 1508
Cannon, James P. 595–7, 837, 2250, 3413
 Cano, Alonso 1168

- Cano, Gabriela 3017
 Cano, Maria 805
 Canovas, Antonio 130, 383
 Canterbury Working Men's Mutual Protection Society 829
Canudos 468, 597–601
 Cao Bang, Battle of 3473
 Cao Rulin 713, 719
Caonabo 601–2
 Caos 2063
 Capanna, Mario 2622
 Capanoghlu insurrection 3357
 Caparaó guerilla 472
 Cape Colony 2109
 Cape Federation of Labor 152, 3092
 Cape Town 148
Cape Verde 602–3
 Cabral 563
 French/British fighting 86
 independence struggle 602–3
 PAIGC 1492
 Capet, Louis: *see* Louis XVI, of France
 Capetillo, Luisa 123, 141
 Capistran Garza, René 903
 capital accumulation 2245, 3160, 3685
 capitalism
 agro-industrial 795
 class 766–7, 1667–8
 colonialism 1381, 1648
 Engels 766, 777, 2240
 Europe 1655
 global shake-up 1398
 Herzen on 1574
 imperialism 1649–53
 Japan 1663
 laissez-faire 1171, 1174
 Marx 766, 777, 2232–4, 2240
 Mexico 2280
 Nkrumah 2488
 plutocratic 1174
 production modes 1666–7
 prostitution 3017
 surplus value 784
 transnational 1430
 working class 768, 783–4, 2920
 Yates 778
 Yuppies 1281
 Capitulation Law 1770
 Caporosso, Stefano 129
 Capuchin Society 891
 car industry, Argentina 864, 867
 Carabinieri 1836
 Carabobo, Battle of 578
 Caracas accord 1166
 Caracas Pact 933
Caracazo 603–5, 665, 3439, 3448
 Carafa, Giulia 3591
 Carbonari 403, 1825
 Carboniera 2266
 Carcaterra, Giovanni 1833
Cardenal, Ernesto 605–6, 2061, 2062, 2473
 Cardenal, Fernando 2061, 2471, 2473
 Cardenal, Katia and Salvador 638
 Cárdenas, Cuauhtémoc 2285, 2287, 2292, 2538
Cárdenas del Río, Lázaro 428, 606–7, 2287
 corporatism 2542
 land reforms 2281, 2282
 MLN 2283
 Morones 2340
 and Velázquez 3432
 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique 477, 499, 1669, 3746
 Carias Andino, Tiburcio 1603, 2018
 Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Activism (CAFRA) 3560, 3578–9
 Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) 1465, 1509
 Caribbean Conference of Churches 3560
Caribbean islands 607–12
 emancipation 350–1
 ethnic divisions 350–1
 feminist meetings 3600
 IMF 607–10, 3560
 indentured labor 1031, 1512
 Leninism 1863–4
 protest music 610–12
 slave communication networks 297
 slave revolts 201, 350–1
 strikes 3559
 sugar cane cultivation 1657
 women fiction writers 3579
 women-headed households 3578
 women's movement 3558–60
 see also Dutch Caribbean; French Caribbean
 Caribbean Women's Association (CARIWA) 3559, 3560
 CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market) 3559
 Caridad González, José 737
 Caritas 3643
 Carl XVI Gustaf, of Sweden 3209
 Carlier, Julie 2721–2
 Carlisle, R. 392
 Carlism 1127
 Carlo Alberto, of Sardinia 2267
 Carlos, Sixto 2680
 Carlos I, of Portugal 2730
 Carlot, Maxime 3427
 Carlsbad Decrees 558, 3178
 Carlsson, Chris 903–4

- Carlyle, Thomas 2548
 Carlyle Circular 1698
Carmichael, Stokely (Kwame Turé) 18, 393,
 531, 612–14, 653
 LCFO 750–1
 and Randolph 2804
 SNCC 2499, 3169, 3187
 Carmona Estanga, Pedro 666
Carnation Revolution 165, 1042, 1262,
 2728–9, 2731, 2972
 Carney, Amy Beth 1587–94
 Carney, James 2061
Carney, James Francis “Guadalupe” 614–15
 Carnival Against Capital 111, 1388, 1397, 3657
 Carnival of Freedom 3073–4
 Carnival for Full Enjoyment 1313
 Carnival Knowledge 1191
 carnivalesque 1148, 1390, 1393, 1873
 Čarnogurský, Ján 3434, 3435
 Carnot, Lazare 328–9, 1795–6
 Caro, José María 806, 2058
 Carol I, of Romania 2856
 Carol II, of Romania 2857
Caroline, steamer 594
 Carolingian Renaissance 2829
 Carpa de la Reina, La (The Queen’s Tent) 2379
 Carpenter, Edward 1807–8
 Carpio, León 1478
 Carr, E. H. 1574
 Carr, Shirley 590
 Carranza, Venustiano 619, 2278–9, 3710
 Constitutionalists 2539, 3431
 death of 2541
 Guadalupe Plan 2279–80
 Morones 2340
 and Obregón 2539, 2540–1
 Obregonistas 2541
 ousted 2541
 and Roy 2874
 and Villa 3489–90
 Carrera, José Miguel 2555
 Carrera, Rafael 1475
 Carrero Blanco, Luis 183, 1129
 Carriacou island 1462
 Carrilho, Fernão 2588
 Carrión, Luis 2469
 Carroll, Peter N. 6–7
 Carroll, William K. 3654–61
 Carson, C. 652
 Carson, Edward 1045
Carson, Rachel 615–18
 Silent Spring 615–16
 Carter, J. O. 1566
 Carter, Jimmy
 and Begin 360
 cruise missiles in Sicily 1830–1
 El Salvador 2957
 Haiti 1519
 human rights 2469
 Iran 1963
 Nicaragua 1164, 2469, 2957
 nuclear weapons 197
 Panama 2594
 Paraguay 2606
 Puerto Rico 2771
 and Romero 2868
 Suharto 1725
 Thailand 3486
 US traditional values 889
 Carter, R. O’Brian 402–4, 823–6, 3493–5
 Carter Center 672
 Carteret, Philip 3080
 Carvajal, Francisco Henríquez 1012
 Carvalho, Jorge Isaac 638
 Carvalho, Manuel de 489
 Carvalho, Setembrino de 468
 Cary, Mary Ann Shadd 217, 1102, 1106–7,
 1194, 1195, 3623
 Casa de las Americas 3571, 3574
 Casa del Mundo Obrero 138
Casa del Obrero Mundial (COM) 618–19,
 2279, 2280, 2340, 2540, 3597
 Casablanca 2332
 Casablanca Conference 2336
 Casado, Segismundo 3144
 Casaroli, Agostino 2058
 Casarini, Luca 1006
Casement, Roger 619–20, 1046
 Caserio, Sante 130
 Casey, Gilbert 2453
 Cassen, Bernard 298
 Cássia Rodrigues, Fabiana de 51–2, 3388
 Cassinga camp attack 3204
 Castañeda, Jorge 2283
 caste system
 Bengal army 1685–6
 and class struggle 785
 Hindu society 1582–3
 Korea 1997
 Sri Lanka 2632
**caste war of Yucatan (Guerra de castas en
 Yucatán)** 620–1
 Castejon Diez, Jaime 3428
 Castellanos, Absalon 2284, 3716
 Castelli, Roberto 1310
 Castells, Manuel 1400
 Castilla, Enrique 2657–8
 Castillo, Heberto 2291
 Castillo, José María 2468
 Castillo Armas, Carlos 240, 241

- Castle, John 3280
 Castle Hill Rebellion: *see* Vinegar Hill Rebellion
 Castlereagh, Robert Stewart 210, 896, 1789
Castoriadis, Cornelius 325, 621–3
 Socialisme ou Barbarie 2839, 3062, 3062–3
 castration, Santal rebellion 2971
 Castro, Fernando 3610
Castro, Fidel 623–9
 attempted invasion of Dominican Republic 926
 and Eisenhower 922, 934
 Granma era 624, 928–31, 3573, 3574
 guerilla attacks 2762
 and Guevara 624, 625, 626–7, 928–9, 1486–90
 on homosexuality 3016
 as influence 447
 and Malcolm X 2180
 and Manley 2197
 Marxism-Leninism 2249
 Moncada barracks 916, 927, 928, 2150
 Revolutionary Agrarian Reform Law 933
 and Soviet Union 2996–7
 Unity Manifesto 932
 Castro, Raúl 624, 625, 626, 629, 932, 1485, 3573
 Castro, Rómulo 640, 641
 Catalan Federation 2737
Catalonia 629–32
 anarchism 3130
 anarchosyndicalists 145, 351, 2739, 3130, 3141
 Assembly of 183
 against centralism 629–32
 CNT 630, 3129
 Communist Party 179
 FAI 3129
 fall of 2963
 Nin 2486–7
 Nova Cançó 632
 POUM 2737–40
 propaganda 3129
 separatists 351, 629
 Solidaridad Obrera 145, 847
 Souchy 3082–3
 Spanish Revolution 3129, 3133
 Workers' Commissions 181–3
 Catastrophists 2308
 Catavi Massacre 422, 428
 Catayée, Justin 1270
 Catesby, Robert 1186
 Catherine II, of Russia, “the Great” 1002, 1112,
 1114, 2710, 2711, 2775
 Catherine of Aragon 514, 1092
 Catherine of Braganza 2333
 Catholic Action 1477, 1479
 Catholic Association 633, 2544
 Catholic Church
 anti-nuclear protests 195
 Austria 320
 birth control 2968
 Bonaparte 442
 Brazil 482–3, 494, 599, 2060
 Ecuador 1056, 1057
 England 517, 1405–7
 Haiti 279, 1504, 1506–7
 Hungary 1618
 imperialism 1654
 Index of Forbidden Books 1111, 2316
 Ireland 971, 1099, 1806–7
 Italy 1177
 Latin America 1924, 2055–63
 liberation theology 2059–60
 Mexico 2281
 Pilgrimage of Grace 509
 Poland 2700, 2712, 3076, 3077, 3078
 Portugal 877
 Quebec 2783–4
 Scotland 3001
 Stroessner 2605–6
 Venezuela 3437
Catholic emancipation 632–4, 655, 2544, 2546
 Catholic German Center Party 3066
 Catholic Intelligentsia Club (KIK) 2696
 Catholic Labor Youth (JOC) 2600
 Catholic land pastoral 2273
 Catholic Relief Act 633, 1418, 2544
Catholic Worker 634, 968
Catholic Worker movement 228, 634–5,
 2489–90, 3420
Cato Street Conspiracy 3151, 3280–1
 Catt, Carrie Chapman 170, 1751, 3551, 3626
 Cattaro mutiny 318
 Cattle Acts 1785
 cattle plantations 795
 Catumay Camones 639
caudillos (regional chiefs) 807, 2651
Causa Radical 3440, 3441, 3445–8
 Cavaço Silva, Anibal 2732
 Cavagnari, Louis 15
 Cavaignac, Eugène 1233, 1244, 1245
 Cavaliers 289, 909, 1097
 Cavallo, Domingo 262, 1580
 Cavendish, Lord 2617
 Cavite mutiny 2667
 Cavour, Camillo Benso di 1824, 1826
 Cawal ng Capayapaan 1614
 Cayenne Company uprising 1270
 Cayetano Carpio, Salvador 1164
 Cayo Confite Invasion 1014
 Cazerta agreement 1437
 Ceant, Eamonn 1046
 Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 2114,
 3032

- Ceaușescu, Nicolae 2855, 2858, 2859–60
 Cecil, Sir William 516
Cedar Revolution, Lebanon 635–6
 Cédras, Raoul 279, 1507, 1520
 celibacy 1110, 1185, 3019
 Celt, E. 2698
 CENESEX 3571–2
 Center for the Biology of Natural Systems 820
 Center for Gender and Development Studies
 3578, 3579
 Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM)
 3430
 Center Union, Greece 1432
 Centipede-Flying Eagle Operation 419
 Central African Federation 2174, 2175, 3698
 Central African Republic 1250–1
Central America 637–41
 peasant groups 3462
 protest music 637–41
see also individual countries
 Central American All-Stars 641
 Central American University (UCA) 1165
 Central American Workers' Revolutionary Party
 (PRTC) 614
 Central and Eastern European BankWatch 1391,
 1392
Central Asia 641–4, 3420
 independence from Soviet Union 642–3
 Jadidism 643, 3366
 protest movements 641–4
 Russian control 641, 3420
 settlement by Russian peasants 642
 Turkic language 3366
see also individual countries
 Central Commission for Agitation and
 Propaganda among Working Women 3606
 Central Committee of the Opposition of the Seine
 1243
 Central Council of Factory Committees 2907
 Central Executive Committee (CEC) 2909–12,
 2915, 2928, 2929
 Central General dos Trabalhadores (CGT) 477
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
 Archive of Terror 2597–8
 Bishop 390
 Bolivia 417
 Castro 922
 Chile 2472
 Fiji 1198
 Grenada 2462
 Guatemala 240, 2472
 Iran 1765
 Manley 2198
 Nasi, support for 1833
 Nicaragua 2472
 Paraguay 2597–8, 2606
 Philippines 1615–16
 Tibet 3292
 torture and 2597–8
 Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) 462
 Central Labor Union (CLU) 3259
 Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU)
 1949, 1951
 Central Republican Society 403
 Central Soviet of Factory Committees 2913
Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT)
 112, 477, 494–500, 681, 808–9
 establishing 2601
 Mendes 2274
 Central University of Venezuela (UCV) 3437
 Centri di Permanenza Temporanea (CPTs) 1830
Centri Sociali, Italy 1831–2, 1841, 1845
 Centro Artistico 2375
 Centro de Acción Legal en Derechos Humanos
 (CHARLA) 1478
 Centro de Investigaciones Regionales de
 Mesoamerica (CIRMA) 1478
Centro Italiano Femminile (CIF) 3593
 Cepeda, Iván 798
 Cepeda Vargas, Manuel 798
 Ceresole, Norberto 666
 Cerezo, Vinicio 1477
 Ceric, Irina 590–3, 785–6
 Černík, Oldřich 2745
 Cerpa Catolini, Nestor 2363
 Cerro Corá, Battle of 2608
Césaire, Aimé 644–5, 1162, 1469, 1554, 2427
 Négritude 2428, 3007, 3578
 Césaire, Suzanne 2428
 Cespedes, Carlos Manuel 918
 Céspedes, Carlos Maria de 2152
 Cetiwe, Reuben (Alfred) 152, 154
 Četnik people 3682, 3684, 3685
 Ceylon Federation of Labor 2051
 Ceylon Mercantile Industrial and General
 Workers' Union (CMU) 2632
 CGT-Argentinos 866
 CGT-Azopardo 866
 Cha Cha Cha campaign 3699, 3700
 Chabry, Louise 1293
 Chacabuco, Battle of 2555
 Chacha Goicochea, Vicente Evangelista 1012–13
 Chaco War 419, 427, 432, 1936, 2455, 2599, 2603
 Chadwick, Edwin 656
 chaebols 1985
 Chagla, Muhammad Karim 1931
 Chaguaramas base 3317
 Chaikovsky Circle 2006
Chainsaw 2844
 ChainWorkers 1147

- Chaki, Prafulla 1675
 Chakma Revolt 370
Chakravartty, Renu 645–6
 Chalid, Aini 1724
 Challenger, Edgar 2077
 Challis, Luther 3637
 Chamberlain, Neville 525, 1592
 Chamberlain, Peter 1102
 Chamberlin, W. 2932, 2940, 3508
 Chambers, Ed 49
 Chambers, George Michael 3320
 Chambers of Industry and Commodities
 Exchange (TOB), Turkey 3352
 Chamblain, Jodel 1508
 Chamdo, Battle of 3290
 Chamorro, Pedro Joaquín 2468, 2469
 Chamoun, Camille 2068, 2069, 2070
 Champaran village 1325, 2430, 2493
 Champion, H. H. 2229
Champion, The 3280
 Champlain, Lake 82
 Champs de Mars 892, 1231, 1276, 1288, 1294
 Champseix, Léodile Bréa 2612
 Chan, Florentino 621
 Chancellor, J. R. 3318
 Chancellorsville 64
 Chancosa, Blanca 3658
 Chand, Lokendra Bahadur 2443
 Chanel, Josiane 3575
 Chaney, James 747, 1258, 1975
 Chang Kilsan 1997
 Chang Tai-yen 733
 Changsa massacre 725
 Chanlatte, Antoine 1534–5
 Chantries Act 1094
 Chao Anou 2054
 Chapekar, Damodar and Balkrishna 1674
 Chaplin, Charlie 3044
 Chaplin, Ralph 463
charisma 646–54
 Ahmed the Prophet 1074, 1075
 authoritarianism 648
 King 651–3
 leadership and revolution 646–54
 origins of 650
 Weber 647–9
 Charlemagne 2829
 Charles Albert, King 1149, 1150
 Charles I, of England
 Cavaliers 289
 civil unrest 1097–8, 1601
 and Cromwell 908, 909
 execution 909, 1106
 Scottish Prayer Book 3000
 Scottish unrest 1096
 Charles I, of Portugal 188
 Charles I, of Spain 843
 Charles II, of England
 Arundel 289
 Bacon's Rebellion 330
 Boyle 2989
 Catherine of Braganza 2333
 enthroned 1100
 Fell's petition 1099, 1190
 Restoration 1194
 Charles IV, of Spain 288
 Charles IX, of Sweden 2514
 Charles the Bold 1034
 Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor 515, 845,
 1034, 1035, 1093, 1355, 1805
 Malta 2183
 Charles VI, of France 353
 Charles X, of France 403, 897
 abdication 1231, 1607
 enthroned 1227–8, 1229–30
 see also Artois, Comte d'
 Charles XIII, of Sweden 3209
 Charles XIV, of France 2950
 Charles XIV John, of Sweden 3209
 Charlotte, Grand Duchess of Luxembourg 2142
 Charta 77 1618
 Chartand, Michel 2786
Charter 77 654–5, 951, 1563, 2698, 3177, 3433,
 3434, 3633
 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation 41
 Charter of Rights and Freedoms 2100
 Charter of Workers' Rights 2698
 Chartist Cooperative Land Society 2551
Chartists 520, 655–9, 2463
 Ballarat 1144–5
 decline of 657–9
 historical background 655–6
 as mass movement 1744
 Newport rising 2463–4
 O'Connor 2548–52
 origins of 633, 656–7
 patriarchy 658
 People's Charter 656, 657, 658, 2549, 2693
 physical/moral force 657
 Prince Edward Island 2753
 Reform Acts 2827
 Reform Bills 2828
 socialism 3061
 Wales 3500–1
 women 657
 Chartrand, Michel 2787
Charusathira, Prapas 659–60
 Chase, Ashton 1856, 3559
 Chase, Samuel 1302
 Chateaubriand, René de 1228

- Chatichai Choonhavan 3272
 Chatra Shibir 347
 Chatterjee, Debi 53–5, 954–61, 2372, 2403–4
 Chatterjee, Jogesh 1678
 Chatterjee, Kanai 2423
 Chatterjee, Shibashis 1775–7, 1779–82
 Chattopadhyay, Bankim Chandra 369, 1582–5, 1674
 Chattopadhyay, Gautam 449
 Chattopadhyay, Kamaladevi 1329, 2389
 Chattopadhyay, Kunal 448–52, 783–5, 996–7, 1324–32, 1673–9, 1680–4, 1685–92, 1692–4, 1694–700, 1700–4, 1704–8, 1711–13, 1920–2, 1928–30, 1930–6, 2317–18, 2429–35, 2791–5, 2802–3, 2874–6, 2970–1, 3041–2
 Chattopadhyay, Virendranath 1675, 2388
 Chau Sen Cocsal 575, 576
 Chaudhurani, Sarala Debi 1689, 1698
 Chaudhuri, J. N. 1707
 Chaudhuri, S. B. 1687
 Chaudry, Mahendra 1199, 2797
 Chauri Chaura attack 1326, 2430
 Chautaria, Fateh Jang 2441
 Chavalit government 3276
 Chavalit Yongchaiyudh 3272
 Chavannes, Jean-Baptiste 1263, 2555
 Chaves, Federico 2600, 2601, 2604
Chávez, César 660–4, 1609
 criticisms of 663–4
 non-violence 663, 2499
 see also United Farm Workers
 Chávez, Joaquín M. 1163–7
 Chávez Frias, Adán 665
Chávez, Hugo 664–74
 Bolivarian Revolution 413, 664, 668–74
 Bolivarianism 413, 664, 672–4
 and Correa 1059
 failed coup 665, 667, 670–1, 3440, 3449–50
 and FARC 1169
 Guacaipuro 1472
 and MBR-200 3448
 participatory democracy 2620
 and Pérez Jiménez 3436
 and Primera 2751
 return to power 414, 3441
 support for 3445, 3446, 3448
 women's rights 3631–2
 WTO, Quebec 3657, 3658
 Chávez y González, Luis 2868
 Che-Lumumba Club 964
 Cheap Art Press 501
Checas (private prisons) 3143
 Chechnyan War 3127
 Cheikh Mokrani Rebellion 1927
 Cheka (political police) 1000, 2228, 2934, 2938, 3607
 Chekhova, Mariya 3390, 3551
 Chelcický, Peter 2323, 2830
 Chelvanayakam, S. J. V. 3250
 Chemical Workers' Industrial Union (CWIU) 2801
Chen Duxiu 114, 674–6, 713
 discredited 725–6
 Guomindang 725
 May 4th movement 723
 New Youth 2200
 sinization of Marxism 730, 2249
 totalitarianism 676
 Trotsky 675, 2782
 Chen Shuibian 3237
 Chen Tien-hua 3236, 3240
 Chen Yi 3236, 3240
Chenbao (Morning) 2781
 Cheney, G. 2315
 Cheng, Hongming 2975–6
 Cheng Ch'eng-kung (Koxinga) 2311
 Cheng Heng 572
 Chénière, Ernest 1645
 Chepman, Walter 3001
 Chernenko, Konstantin 3118
 Chernobyl disaster 192, 193, 2529
Chernov, Victor 676–7, 979, 2904, 2909, 2911, 2937–8, 3153
Chernyshevsky, Nikolai G. 677–8, 1575, 2081
 What Is To Be Done? 678, 977
 Chertoff, Michael 1642, 1643
 Cherubini, Donatella 2009, 2870–1, 2959–60, 3341–2
 Chesapeake Bay 86
 Chesneaux, J. 3231, 3234
 Chesterton, G. K. 634
 Chevaliers de La Foi 896, 1228
 Chevron-Texaco terminal occupied 2734
 Cheyenne people 2418
 Chhattisgarh Mukti Morcha 3590
 Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act 2372
 Chi, Cecilio 621
 Chiang Kai-Shek
 alienating national opinion 729
 arrest of Hô 1598
 civil war 726–7
 death of 2271
 Guomindang 705, 724, 2113, 2201, 3238, 3723
 Japanese agreements 726
 Long March 2201
 Nationalists 2630
 Sino-Japanese War 727
 US support 1217
 Whampoa Military Academy 3202
 white terror 2201, 2202

- Chiang Mai, Thailand 2636
- Chiapas uprising** 1122, 1395, 2293, 3714–19
 Amnesty International 2288
 liberation theology 481
 Marcos 2212–13
 massacres 2289
see also Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN)
- Chiapello, L. 2436
- Chibangwa, Henry 3697
- Chibás, Eduardo 623, 916, 927
- Chibebe, Wellington 3733
- Chicago
 discriminatory housing policies 1976
 fire 2344
 Hough Riot 3400
 King 751–2
 poverty 11
 Puerto Rican Day celebration 3400
 Puerto Rican street gangs 2770
 race riots 2823, 2824, 3400
 Red Summer 2822–3
 segregated beaches 2823
 Southside 837
 unemployment 2822
 Woodlawn 49
see also Haymarket tragedy
- Chicago Boys 690, 2436
- Chicago Circle 1752
- Chicago Columbian Exposition 3519
- Chicago Eight 3630
Chicago Tribune 11, 2489
- Chicago Urban League 12
- Chichibu Rising 1898, 1899–900
- Chickamauga battle 64
- Chickasaw Bayou, Battle of 62
- Chidley, Katherine 1107
- Chien Heng Company 732
- Chiennes de garde 3577
- Chifley, Ben 315
- Chihuahua 2540
- Chikerema, James 2385
- child labor 960, 2460, 2567
- Child Marriage Restraint Act 2389
- childcare 3629, 3633
- Childers, Erskine 1050
- Childers, Shari 1298–300
- Children of the Disappeared**
 HIJOS Movement 256, 1579–81
- Children's Campaign 744
- Children's Crusade 1974
- "Children's Exodus" 503
- Children's Fund 2195
- Chile** 678–94
 anarchism 111–13, 691
 and Bolivia 433
 Catholic Church 2060, 2061
 CIA 3472
 copper industry 50, 689
cordones industriales 112
 coup 688–90, 2444
 Democratic Alliance 687
 FPMR 1226–7
 Freire in 1261
 IMF 2436–7
 independence movement 2555–6
 IWW 112, 1753
 JAP bureaucracy 685
 Labor Law 686
 land grants 2209
 Mapuche 2209–10
 MTW 1753
 mutual aid 111, 691
 neoliberalism 688, 690, 1398, 2436
 Neruda 2444
 Nueva Canción 2377, 2378–9
 people's power 683–5
 Pinochet 685–8, 2507
 Popular Front 3060
 protests 688–90
 punk movement 2063
 silver 691
 social and political struggles 690–4
 socialism 678–83, 684
 squatting 680, 682
 strikes 691–2
 student movement 3181
 terror 688
 torture 688
 unemployment 686
 Vicariate of Solidarity 2060
 women's rights 3598
 working class 690
see also Allende Gossens, Salvador; Left Revolutionary Movement; Pinochet, Augusto
- Chilean Congress 691
- Chilembwe, John** 694–6, 2173, 2174
- Chilembwe Rebellion 2173
- Chiluba, Frederick** 696–8, 1941, 3111, 3702, 3704, 3705
- Chimurenga armed struggles** 698–705, 3734, 3737
- China** 705–21
 agrarian reforms 705–6, 723, 729
 anarchism 96, 113–15
 anti-Japanese resistance 727–8
 anti-tax riots 734
 army 708
 boycotting Japanese goods 185

China (*cont'd*)

bureaucracy 708
 cadres 708
 Christianity 718, 3233, 3289, 3671, 3673
 civil war 725–7, 2121
 class struggle 706, 707
 collectivization 709–10
 Confucianism 113, 674, 707, 723, 2994, 3284
 Cultural Revolution 710, 720, 2121, 2125,
 2204–5, 2422, 3016
 decollectivization 3285
 deindustrialization 3230
 earthquake 2205
 ethnic uprisings 715
 European colonialism 1657–8, 1663
 famine 2204
 flooding 3673
 Great Leap Forward 709–10, 986–7,
 2203–4
 human rights 3518
 Hundred Flowers Campaign 708–9, 985,
 2203, 3479
 imperialism 1654
 industrialization 723
 land redistribution 3233
 Maoism 705–12
 Marxism 723, 730, 2249
 May 4th movement 712–14, 723
 mutual aid 707
 newspaper editors 3286
 peasant revolts 707, 714–15, 3230
 as People's Republic 2202–3, 2995, 3236
 People's Republic proclaimed 2202–3
 popular power 705–12
 population growth 3230
 protest and revolution 715–18
 Red Guards 720, 2996
 science and technology 2994–6
 sexuality 3016, 3017
 silver exports 3230
 social revolution 705, 1663
 student movement 3181
 student protests 708–9, 710, 713, 718–21,
 3180
 Taiwan 3236
 Tianjin Massacre 3289–90
 Tibet 2433
 treaty ports 718
 unemployment 3230–1
 urban centers 706–7
 women 707–8, 730, 3233
see also anti-Japanese boycotts; Communist
 Party of China; Deng Xiaoping; Mao
 Zedong; Tiananmen Square protests
 Chinchilla, Manuel 111

Chinese Communist Revolution 713,
 721–32, 1213–14
 First Chinese Revolution 723
 science and technology 2994–6
 Second Chinese Revolution 722, 723–5
 Third Chinese Revolution 728–9
 Chinese Exclusion Act 1978
 Chinese Historical Society 3234
Chinese Nationalist Revolution 674, 732–6
 Chinese Socialist Youth League 3725
 Ching Dynasty 1996
 Chinyama, Ralph 2175
 Chipembere, Henry Blasius Masauko 2175
 Chipenda, Daniel 2360
Chipko movement 736, 3028, 3590
 Chiquito, Manuel 1016
 Chirac, Jacques 645, 1237, 1238, 1273, 2458,
 2459, 3577
 Chirife, Adolfo 2609
Chirinos, José Leonardo (Zambo) 737, 3443
 Chirinos, Yoel Acosta 3448
 Chirwa, Orton 2176
 Chirwa, Wellington Manoah 2175
Chissano, Joaquim 738, 1262
 Chit Hlaing, U 552, 553
 Chitepo, Herbert 3739
 Chittagong revolt 1710
 Chittagong struggle 1328, 1678
 Chiume, Murray William Kanyama 2175
 Chkheidze, N. 2899
 Choi Gabryong 136
 cholera 3100
Chomsky, Noam 738–9, 1783
 anti-Vietnam War 222
 and Bakunin 336
 on humanitarian intervention 159, 224
Manufacturing Consent 739
 mass media 739
 non-voting anarchists 100
 Chorotega group 1005
 Chosun Dynasty 1996
 Chowdhurani, Debi 369
 Chowdhury, Abu Torap 369
 Christian Academic Youth (JUC) 478
 Christian Agrarian Leagues 2597, 2605
 Christian Commonwealth Colony 3419–20
 Christian Confederation of Workers (CCT) 2605
 Christian Democratic General Confederation of
 Guatemalan Workers (CGTG) 1473, 1481
 Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Chile 50,
 679–80, 681–2, 684
 Christian Democratic Party (PDC), El Salvador
 1164, 2957
 Christian Democrats (CDU), Germany 1366,
 3056

- Christian Federation of Peasants of El Salvador (FECCAS) 2957
- Christian I, of Denmark 2983
- Christian II, of Denmark 988, 2513, 2523
- Christian III, of Denmark 2513, 2523
- Christian VIII, of Denmark 2984–5
- Christian X, of Denmark 991
- Christian Marxism 606, 614, 2061
- Christian revolutionary movement 3303
- Christian socialism 111, 870, 3061
- Christian Socialist Party 362–3
- Christianity
- in China 718, 3232–3
 - Clapham Sect 206
 - Enlightenment 1111
 - Nyasaland 2174
 - Slavs 1142
 - socialism 1343
 - Syrian 235
 - Tolstoy 3301
 - in Vietnam 3477
 - Zambia 3696–7, 3704
 - see also* Catholic Church; Protestantism; Reformation
- Christians for National Liberation (CNL) 2680
- Christians for Socialism 2061
- Christiansen, Samantha M. R. 3177–9
- Christie, Stuart 109
- Christmas, William 965
- Christobal de Olid 911
- Christophe, Henri 1266, 1511, 1522, 1538, 1546
- Christoyannopoulos, Alexandre J. M. E. 3301–2
- Chroniques d'une imposture* 3576
- Chrysler strike 250, 2067
- Chu Ch'ang-fang 2309
- Chu I-hai 2310
- Chu Yu-chien 2309
- Chu Yu-sung 2309
- Chuan Leekpai 3276
- Chubu Electric 191
- Chukaku League 1907–8
- Chulalongkorn, of Thailand 3256
- Chulavitas, Los 408, 1321
- Chumash Indian burial ground 1
- Chun, Michael H. C. 1604–6
- Chun Du-hwan 1981, 1982, 2014, 3183
- Chun Kuo Min Chiao Yu Hui (Educational Society of China) 733
- Chun Tae-il 1981
- Chung Kuo Jih Pao* (China Daily) 733
- Chungara, Domitila 420
- Church Ladies for Choice 1482
- Church of England 1092, 3612
- Church of Ireland 1806
- Church of the Poor 478
- Church of the Province of Kenya (CPK) 1951
- Church of Scotland 1111, 1940, 2300, 3001
- Churchill, Winston
- Athens visit 1438
 - and Haldane 1778
 - India 2432, 2792
 - Kenya 2253
 - and Saw 2977
 - statue transformed 2810
 - Taiwan 3239
 - V-for Victory 1240
- Chushi Gandruk 3292
- Chustenahlah attack 59
- Chusto-Talasa attack 59
- Čič, Milan 3435
- Cicero 1207
- Cienfuegos, Camilo 625, 933, 1488
- Cienfuegos, Joaquin 862–3
- Cientificos 2276
- Ciferri, Elvio 446–7, 2266–8
- Cigarrón label 2751
- Çiller, Tansu 3344
- cimarrones* 795
- Cincinnati riots 3403
- Cinéma du Peuple 116
- Cinque Giornate insurrection 2267
- CIO**: *see* Congress of Industrial Organizations
- Cipriani, Amilcare 126, 1419
- Cipriani, Arthur Andrew 3316
- Circassian Brothers 3357
- Circolo Socialista Avanti trade union 474
- Cirillo, Ciro 2817
- CITE (Interunion Confederation of State Workers) 2653
- Cité Libre* 2783
- Citizen* 3535
- citizen activism 820
- citizen patrols 862
- citizen protest 2603
- Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE) 1865
- Citizens' Alliance 3413, 3414
- Citizens' Committee, Poland 3076, 3079
- Citizen's Committee of One Thousand 3535
- Citizen's Constitutional Forum (CCF) 1198
- Citizens' Daily* 733
- Citizens' Party 820
- Citizens' Union of Serbia (GSS) 224
- Ciudad Juárez, Treaty of 2277
- Civic Association of Guerrero (ACG) 3427
- Civic Associations of the Southern Transvaal (CAST) 2265
- Civic Campaign 98 811–12
- Civic Female Party 3598
- Civic Forum, Prague 951, 3177, 3434, 3435

- Civic Legal Watch 1392
 Civil Constitution, France 892, 893
 civil disobedience
 Barayi 349
 Committee of 100 190
 environmentalism 785
 Gandhi 1327–9
 India 1684
 La Boétie 2017
 Quakers 1225
 Tute Bianche 1007
 Vancouver Island 785
 see also satyagraha
 Civil Guards, Spain 3131
 Civil Rights Act 2800, 2803
 Friedan 1299
 Johnson 745, 1974
 passing of 740–1, 746, 753, 3166
 Paul 2625
 Civil Rights Commission 740
 Civil Rights Guards 17
civil rights movement 739–64
 anti-Vietnam protests 220
 black grassroots 1154
 Black Power 749–55
 charisma 652–3
 Columbia University 811
 Cuffe 941
 Jackson 1852–3
 Johnson 745
 King 220, 889, 3397
 Meredith 2275
 nascent 758–61
 non-violence 742–3
 overview 755–64
 Parks 2615
 Scottsboro Resistance 3002–3
 SNCC 651
 USA (1960–5) 739–49
 World War II 2497
Civil Society 1638
 Cixous, Hélène 3576
 Clamshell Alliance 1, 125, 159, 1051
 Clandestine Indian Revolutionary Committee
 (CCRI) 3717
 Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army
 (CIRCA) 1313, 1482
 Clandestine Revolutionary Workers' Party-Union
 of the People (PROCUP) 1122, 2285, 2286
 Clann na Gael 2616–17
 Clapham Sect 203, 206, 208, 210
 Clapton, Rick 219–23
 Claramunt, Teresa 116, 123
Claridad 2649, 2770
Clarion 331
 Clarion Fellowship 830
 Clark, George Rogers 84
 Clark, Peter H. 2027
 Clarke, John 2560–2
 Clarke, Maura 2060
 Clarke, Thomas 620, 860, 1046, 2627, 3022
 Clarkson, John 210, 3528
 Clarkson, Lawrence 1104
Clarkson, Thomas 203, 204, 205, 210, 764–5
 abolitionist writings 368, 764–5, 3528
 colonization 206
Clarté 2217
 Clash, The 2777
class 776–83
 capitalism 766–7, 1667–8
 consciousness 769–71
 gender 3565–6
 identity 771–3
 interclass cooperation 268–9
 Japan 1880, 1895–6
 Marx 765–7
 Mills 768, 772
 poverty/revolution 776–83
 solidarity 102
 Winstanley 3537
 women's rights 1293
 working class 767–8
 class-based anarchism 109
class identity 765–76
class struggle 782, 783–5, 821
 Argentina 248–9
 autonomism 323
 China 706, 707
 Communist Manifesto 765–7
 Foucault 772, 1221
 French Revolution 1287
 identity 771–3
 Italy 1842–3
 IWW 1844
 Japan 1880, 1895–6
 Marx 783, 1912, 2231–4
 sans-culottes 778
 Thompson 769–70, 773
 unemployment 3385
 workplace 3072
Class Struggle 2584
 Class War Federation 1387, 3072
 class warfare 779, 2024, 2662
Classe Operaia (Working Class) 1842, 1843
 CLAT (Latin American Central of Workers)
 808
 Claussen, H. R. 2984
 Clay, Cassius 221
 Clay, Henry 214
 Clay, Philippe 2381

- Clayoquot Sound** 785–6
Cleage, Albert B. 394
Clean Air Act 617
Clean Government Party (CGP) 1910
Cleaver, Harry 1397–8
Cleburne Demands 2725, 2727
Clemenceau, Georges 851
Clemenceau, M. 3218
Clément, Léon 3217
Clement, Skipper 988, 2513, 2516
Clement VII, Pope 515, 1093
Clément XIII, Pope 1001
Clements, Evans 3552
Clements, Samuel (slave) 3047
Clermont-Tonnere, Count 1918
Cleveland, Grover 1565
Cleyre, Voltairine de 115, 157
clientelism 789–90, 1861, 3685
Cliff, Tony 2250
Clifford, Henry 1632
Climate Camp (2007) 1040
Climate Change Operation 2479, 2485
Clinton, Bill
 and Barak 239, 1759
 and Carney 615
 Guatemala 1473
 Haiti 1520
 Huerta 1610
 neoliberalism 1398
 Panama 2594
 Puerto Rico 2772
 transnational capitalism 1430
 Vieques 3465
Clinton, Henry 81, 83, 85
Clive, Robert 368, 1708
Clontarf meeting 2544
Clothing Workers' Industrial Union 152, 1414, 3092
Clouds, Battle of 82
Cloward, R. A. 781–2, 2756, 2757–8, 2759
Club des Impartiaux 891
Club Liberal Ponciano Arriaga 998
Club Massiac 1525, 1527, 2553, 2554
Club War 2514
Clubmen Associations 1097
Cluchette, John 965
CND: *see* Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CNT: *see* Confederación Nacional del Trabajo
CNT-FAI 131, 848, 849, 1030, 1188, 1413
Coal Wars 2418
Coalición de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya (COPMAGUA) 1478
Coalition to Abolish the Fur Trade 513
Coalition Against Water Privatization (CAWP) 3102
Coalition of Democratic Ethiopian Forces (CODEF) 1139
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) 3036
Coard, Bernard 390, 1464, 1465, 1466, 2462
cobas 1307, 1308, 1311, 1839–41
Cobb, Richard 1285
Cobban, Alfred 1284
Cobbett, William 786, 1632, 2543, 3024
 Political Register 546, 547
Cobden, Richard 177
Coca-Cola workers 809, 1479, 1480
coca growers' movement 423, 434, 1938–9, 2653
coca leaf cultivation
 Bolivia 433, 434, 435, 787–8
 FARC 1169
 Morales 2320
cocaleros peasant uprising 786–90
Cochabamba Water Wars 423, 432, 433, 434, 790–2
Coche, Treaty of 3707
Cochinchina region 1714, 1715, 3468, 3470, 3471, 3475
Cochran, Bert 840
Cochrane, Kelso 2527
Cochrane, Lord 488, 489
Cock Crowing in the Dark Society 113
Cockcroft, James 2541
Coco, Francesco 2815
cocoa cultivation 23, 24, 25, 1382, 1541
Code Napoléon 2721
Code Noir laws 1543
CODESRIA 3549
Codreanu, Cornelius Zelea 2857
Coe, Paul 309, 310
Coercion Bill 2617
Coercive Acts 78, 453
COFAVIC 604–5
coffee industry
 Brazil 469
 El Salvador 2956
 Haiti 1530, 1535, 1542
 prices 469
Cohen, G. A. 770
Cohen, Giuseppe 2184
Cohen, Joseph J. 3419
Cohen, Joshua 2620
Cohen, Ran 1812
Cohen, Sheila 771
Cohen-Cruz, Jan 407
Cohn, Jesse 93–101, 115–17, 122–6, 158–60, 160–1, 161–2, 1609, 2047–9, 3082–3
Cohn-Bendit, Daniel 224, 792, 1235, 2260, 2705
 Socialisme ou Barbarie 3062

- Cohn-Bendit, Gabriel 792
 Coiffe, Dorothea 641–4
 COINTELPRO 19, 395, 398, 2769, 2840
 Colbert, Jean Baptiste 1541, 2842, 2991
 Colborne, John 594
 Cold War
 anti-nuclear protests 194
 autonomism 324
 CPA 822
 dependency theory 1671
 end of 223, 1147
 espionage 840
 France 825
 GDR 1337
 Kashmir 1931
 nuclear arms race 2501
 Red Scare 194
 revisionism 73
 Saddam Hussein 1782
 start of 2248–9
 US–Japan 1885
 Coldbath Fields Prison 546
 Cole, G. D. H. 2547, 2620
 Colectivo Feminista 3611
 Colectivo Situaciones 1580
 Coligny, Admiral 2950
 Collado, Pablo 1471
 Collazo, Oscar 2770
 Collectif des féministes indigènes 3577
 collective action 983
 LGTB 2503
 non-violent 2492–4
 poverty 780–2
 reasons for 781–2
 Sweden 2519
 Tilly 2490
 unemployed 781
 Collective Bargaining Act 181
 collectivism 97, 98, 3417
 anarchocommunism 161
 Bakunin 161
 France 119
 Winstanley 3537
 collectivization 1343, 3117, 3134, 3625
 College of Science and Humanities (CCH),
 Mexico 3378
 Collenberg, Carrie 1036–7
 Collett, Camilla 2524
 Collingwood, Luke 203
 Collins, John 2129
 Collins, Michael 793–4, 972, 1048
 Collins, Tom 2589, 2947–8
 Collor, Fernando 477
 Collor de Melo, Fernando 499
 Collot d'Herbois, Jean-Marie 1298
 Cologne: *see* G8 Protests, Cologne
Colombia 794–810
 Afro-Colombian movements 794–6
 Agrarian Reform Law 700
 Amnesty International 810
 anti-neoliberalism 808–10
 anti-racist protests 794–6
 anti-war movements 796–8
 armed insurgency 798–800, 801–3
 banana plantation rebellion 343–4
 bishops 2059
 Constitution 796
 displaced communities 796, 1084
 drug cartels 808
 ELN 244, 410, 420, 800, 801, 1081–4, 2791
 FARC 244, 410, 796, 799, 801, 1081, 1082,
 1084, 1167–70
 Gaitán 408
 homicides 810
 ILO 809
 IMF 808
 independence struggles 795
 Indian/peasant organization 2045–6
 indigenous mobilization 797–8, 803–5, 3294–5
 insurrection 805–6
 kidnappings 1169
 labor 805–6
 M-19 802, 1082, 2149–50
 paramilitary groups 802, 808
 peasant self-defense 798–800, 801–3
 punk movement 2063
 radical popular movements 798–800, 801–3
 Socialist Revolutionary Party 805–6
 strikes 808–10
 Thousand Days' War 806–7, 2045
 Tisquesuza 3294–5
 trade unions 808–10
 UNIR 1320–1
 UP 3388–9
 US financing 1169
 women's movement 798
 Colombia Plan 797, 803, 809, 1084, 1169
 Colombian Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA)
 799
 Colombian Federation of Workers (CTC) 808
 Colombian Union of Workers (UTC) 808
 Colombini, Chiara 1383–4
 Colonia Cosme: *see* Cosme Colonists
 Colonia Nueva Australia: *see* New Australia
 movement
 Colonial Declaration of Rights and Grievances 78
 colonialism
 Africa 3545
 Americas 74–7
 black response 206–9

- Britain 206–9, 1695–700
 and capitalism 1381, 1648
 India 1695–700
 Luxemburg on 1649–51
 Portugal 186, 2731
 self-reliance 76
- color revolutions** 810–18, 2510–11
 future of 817
 social forces 816–17
 technology of 814–16
see also specific revolutions
- Colorado coalfields 2344
 Colorado Labor Wars 1570
 Colorado Party
 and Liberal Party 2608
 Paraguay 2135, 2450, 2596, 2599–600
 purges 2604
 and Stroessner 2601
 Uruguay 3340, 3405, 3408, 3410
- Colorum* religious organizations 2672
- Colpoys, John 3154
 Colson, Charles 1947
 Colucci, Francesco 1310
 Columbia, Tennessee 17
- Columbia University, civil rights protests**
 818, 904
- Columbus, Bartolomé 601
 Columbus, Christopher 2055, 2074, 2416, 3315
 Columbus Day 2416, 2420
Coluna Prestes 469, 475, 2748
 Colville, Colonel 3369–70
- Comando Descamisados (Shirtless Commandos)
 245
- Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT) 476
 Comando Nacional Unitario (Unitary National
 Command) 809
- Comaposada Guillén, Mercedes 2367, 3611
- Combat* 581
 Combat Organization 2718, 2719
 Combative Class Current (CCC) 264
 Combattants de la Libération (CDL) 45
- Combination Laws** 519, 655, 818–20, 2133
 repeal of 2692
- Comblin, José 2059
 Comeau, Robert 2786
 Comenius, John Amos 2323
- Cominform, in Yugoslavia** 3690–2
- Coming Nation, The* 3418
 Cominiello, Sebastián 1579–81
 Comino island 2183
- Comintern: *see* Communist International
- Comisión Feminina Asesora de la Presidencia
 (COFEAPRE) 3631
- Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (CLN) 131,
 1833, 2835, 3298
- Comité Central des Sociétés Fraternelles 1294
 Comité de Enlace Intersindical (Inerunion Liaison
 Committee) 274–5
 Comité de Organización Política Electoral
 Independiente (COPEI) 3436
 Comités Sindicalistas Revolucionarios 2257
 Commandos Populares de Liberación (CPL) 245
 Commands of Revolutionary Areas, Venezuela
 415
 Commercial Workers' Union 2220–1, 3729
 Commission for Industrial Relations Reform,
 Korea 1988
 Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC)
 3002–3
 Commission of Peace and Justice 2060
 Commission on Race Relations 2824
 Commission of Rehabilitation of Refugees (EAP)
 1442
 Committee of 100 190, 196
 Committee for Campesino Unity (CUC) 1477,
 1480, 2272
 Committee for the Defense of Human Rights
 3744
 Committee for the Defense of the Revolution
 (CDR) 626, 921, 936
 Committee for the Defense of Workers (CDR)
 626
 Committee on Labor Organization (CLO)
 1612–13
 Committee of National Liberation: *see* Comitato
 di Liberazione Nazionale (CLN)
 Committee for Nuclear Information 820
 Committee of Public Safety 962, 1277, 1291,
 1298, 2611, 2849
 Committee for a Unified NewArk 348
 Committee of Union and Progress (CUP),
 Turkey 293, 1452, 3347–8, 3357
 Committee for the Unjustly Persecuted (VONS)
 654
 Committee of Women for Progress 3560
- Committee for Workers (KOR), Poland:** *see*
 Workers' Defense Committee (KOR)
- commodification of knowledge 2992
 commodity fetishism, Marx 973, 1648
 Common Action 361
Common Cause 3567
 Common Frontiers 3656
 common land rights 1354, 3150
 common property 3061
- Commoner, Barry** 820–1
 Commoners' Society 133
Commonweal, The 2229, 2341
Commonwealth, The 861
 Commonwealth Arbitration Court 3562–3
 Commonwealth College 3419

- Commonwealth Immigration Act 2527
 Commonwealth of Independent States 1418,
 3125, 3245, 3330
 Commonwealth of Northern Marianas 2304
 Commonwealth Parliament 1099
 Communards/Communardes 270, 402, 1608
see also Paris Commune
 Commune, La 1204–5
 communes, draft resisters 3419
 communism
 Buonarroti 2266
 collapse of 2263
 and counterrevolution 888
 revolution 778
 voluntary 1410
see also individual countries' communist parties
 Communist Correspondence Committee 1091,
 2234
 Communist International: *see* Internationals,
 Third
 Communist Labor Party 595, 836, 2825, 3065
 Communist League (CL) 2234, 2235, 3061,
 3413, 3424
 Communist League of America (Opposition)
 (CLA) 596
 Communist League of India 3229
 Communist League of South Africa (CLSA) 833
 Communist Left of Spain (ICE) 2737
Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels)
 821–2, 2234–5, 2451, 2754
 capitalism 1647, 2241–2
 class struggle 765–7, 777–8
 Communist League 3056
 counterrevolution 887
 development 2240
 history and struggle 1398
 influence on Lenin 2082
 as programmatic text 1148
 proletariat 2241
 revolution 777–8, 1215, 2760, 3424
 Singh 3042
 socialism 3056
 translations 3229
 in *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly* 3636
 workers of the world 839, 1742, 2244
 working class 767–8, 770, 1351, 2147, 2241–2
 Communist Party of America (CPA) 22, 595,
 835–6, 3065
see also Communist Party of the United States
 of America
 Communist Party of Aotearoa 831
 Communist Party of Argentina (PCA) 244, 271–2
Communist Party of Australia (CPA) 3,
 304, 316, 822–3, 830, 1738–9
 Munday 2373
 Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ) 2046
 Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB) 417, 428
 Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) 471–2, 474,
 495
 Bezerra 384
 Frei Chico 3038
 illegal 2749
 Moraes 2319
 Silva 3039
 Communist Party of Bulgaria (BCP) 536, 540,
 541, 3069
 Communist Party of Burma (CPB) 550, 3068,
 3278
 Communist Party of Canada (CPC) 383, 588,
 2783, 2831
 Communist Party of Ceylon 2631, 3526
 Communist Party of Chile (CChP) 683, 687,
 692, 693, 1226
Communist Party of China (CCP)
 agrarian reforms 706
 Central Committee 2124–5
 civil war 725–7
 Deng 3284–6
 founding of 114, 674
 and Guomindang 1597
 Liu Shaoqi 2124–5
 Lu Xun 2132
 Mao 2199, 2203–4, 3284
 as model for Philippines 2680–1
 Qin Banxian 2780
 Qu Qjubai 2781–2
 reconstruction 711
 Russian control 2200
 Second Chinese Revolution 722
 and students 720–1, 2203
 Sun Yat-Sen 3202
 Zhang Guotao 3722–3
 Communist Party of Chinese Youth in Europe
 (CPCYE) 3725
 Communist Party of Colombia (PCC) 798, 1121
 Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista
 Cubano, PCC) 916–17, 922, 929, 936, 940,
 2151, 2853
 Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Socialista
 Popular, PSP) 623, 625, 930
 Communist Party of Cyprus (AKEL) 945, 948
 Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
 (CPCS/KSČ) 951, 2742, 3048, 3433–4
 Communist Party of East Pakistan (CPEP) 2581
 Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE) 1057
 Communist Party of El Salvador (CPS) 1163,
 2224, 2225, 2957
Communist Party of France (PCF) 121,
 823–6
 Algeria 44

- Amicale, L' 853
 anti-fascist 179
 Cameroon 579
 Hô Chi Minh 1597
 Indochina 225–6
 membership 3383
- Communist Party of Germany (KPD)**
 826–9, 3067
 formation of 1374
 and Frankfurt School 1253
 Luxemburg 2117
 Marxists 1338
 membership 1374, 3383
 against Nazis 1376–7
Rote Fahne, Die 1376
 Spartakusbund 2117
 Zetkin 3722
- Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) 524,
 2050, 2821, 3062, 3282, 3383
- Communist Party of Greece (KKE) 1432–3,
 1436, 1446, 1447–8, 1453, 1454, 3220
- Communist Party of Greece (Interior) (KKE-
 Εσωτερικόν) 1433, 1446, 1447–8
- Communist Party of Guiana 1270
- Communist Party of Haiti (PCH) 1517, 2872
- Communist Party of Hungary 2866
- Communist Party of India (CPI)
 Bose 449
 de-Stalinization 2421
 formation of 961, 1677
 independence 2421
 Kashmir 1934
 Mazumdar 2265
 Muslim League 2793
 peasant movements 2573, 2575
 Quit India 2051
 World War II 1329–30
- Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M)
 961, 1934, 2265, 2422, 3587
 ideological struggle 2422
- Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
 (CPI-ML) 2423
 women's roles 2424, 3587
- Communist Party of Indochina (ICP) 2065,
 3468, 3472
- Communist Party of Indochina (PKI) 1598,
 1713, 1722–3, 1724, 1728, 3257
 armed insurgency 1728–9
 Sukarno 3180
- Communist Party of Indonesia 2677
- Communist Party of Iran: *see* Tudeh Party
- Communist Party of Iraq (ICP)** 1159, 1776,
 1779, 2953–6, 3225, 3516
- Communist Party of Italy (PCI)** 1818–21
 and AO 2622
- Berlinguer 379–80
- Bordiga 446–7
 formation of 386, 1828
 Gramsci 1422
 outlawed 1818
 Red Brigades 2814–15
 Rossanda 2870
 Serrati 3013–14
 Soviet invasion of Hungary 1834
 and Soviet Union 2196
 Togliatti 1146, 3298
 Turin 1835
see also Red Brigades
- Communist Party of Japan** 134, 1883,
 1910–11
- Communist Party of Kampuchea 569
- Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL) 2111
- Communist Party of Luxembourg 2142
- Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) 2178, 3260,
 3269
- Communist Party of Malaysia (MDU) 2178
- Communist Party of Mexico (PCM) 2291, 2296,
 2298, 2755, 2874
- Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M)
 230, 231–2
 Maoist influence 2199, 2437, 2438
- Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist
 Leninist) (CPN-UML) 230, 232, 2437,
 2438
- Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN)
 2446
- Communist Party of New Zealand** 829–31
- Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) 1857, 2580,
 2581
- Communist Party of Palestine 3161
- Communist Party of Paraguay 2600, 2609
- Communist Party of Peru 2219, 2664
- Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
 2677, 2679–80, 2682–8
- Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP)
 2673–4, 2677, 2679
- Communist Party of Poland (PZPR) 996, 3497
- Communist Party of Puerto Rico 2769
- Communist Party of Romania 2855, 2856, 2857,
 2861
- Communist Party of Russia
 Bolsheviks 2993
 Makhno 2166–7
 membership 3509
 Stalinism 2247–9
 Women's Section 1979–80
- Communist Party of Scotland 2820–1
- Communist Party of Siam (CPS) 3257
- Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) 3048
- Communist Party of Slovenia 3052

- Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA)**
 831–5, 1414
 and ANC 171, 832
 Botswana mine laborers 455
 Dunbar 1028
 formation of 2222, 3092
 and LLB 2111
 Marks 2222–3
 Motsaedi 2345
 Rand Revolt 832
 revival 833
 and SALP 153, 832
 Simons 3039
 World War II 834
 Young Communist League 2948
see also South African Communist Party (SACP)
- Communist Party of South Vietnam** 3479
- Communist Party of Spain (PCE)** 182
 Eurocommunism 1146
 Maurin 2257
 post-war 181
 and socialists-anarchists 179
 Spanish Revolution 3130–1, 3139–40
- Communist Party of Sudan (SCP)** 3198
- Communist Party of Thailand (CPT)**
 2746–7, 3256–65
 BRN 3269
 crises 3261–5
 Fourth Congress 3263–4
 Laos bases 3261
 origins 3258–9
 Revolution (1932) 3257, 3261
 Sino-Indochinese Wars 3262–3
 Wirat 3538–9
- Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)**
 799, 3103, 3432
 and Bolsheviks 3158
 Brezhnev 3432
 Stalinist view of Leninism 2089
see also Gorbachev, Mikhail
- Communist Party of Turkmenistan (TCP)**
 3367
- Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA)** 835–42
 African Americans 394
 Aptheker 233
 Cannon 595
 European revolutionary feeling 22
 Foster 1220
 McCarthy era 1220
 membership 3383
 Spanish Civil War 7
 support from public figures 841
 unemployment 3386
- Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV)** 413, 668, 3441–2, 3445, 3451
- Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV):** *see* Dang Cong San Viet Nam
- Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY)** 1011, 3052, 3295, 3683, 3690–1
- Communist Party Opposition** 1371
- Communist Party Vanguardia Popular** 878
- Communist Refoundation Party** 1820
- Communist University of the Toilers of China (KUTK)** 2782, 3723, 3724
- Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV)** 1159, 2124, 3727
- Communist Workers Peasants Party (CMKP)** 2584
- Communist Youth of Siam (CYS)** 3257
- Communist Youth of Venezuela (JCV)** 3442, 3451
- communitarians** 2450
see also utopian communities
- Community for Peace and Construction** 1380
- Community of Peace People** 2522
- Community Radio** 107–8
- Community Relations Serice** 746
- Community Service Organization (CSO)** 661
- community union** 1876, 1877
- Community Union National Network (CUNN)** 1877
- Comonfort, Ignacio** 1925
- Comorera, Joan** 3141
- Compact of Free Association** 2304
- Compagnie Calédonienne des Nouvelles-Hébrides (CCNH)** 3425–6
- Compagnie des Indes Occidentales** 1540
- Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS)** 1235
- Compañón, Francis** 3404
- company-owned stores system** 253
- Companys, Lluís** 3136
- Compiègne, Treaty of** 872
- Complete Suffrage Union** 2464
- Comprehensive Peace Accord** 2439–40
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty** 197
- Compulsory Native Labor Act** 3734
- Comstock Law** 1412, 2968–9, 3622, 3626
- Comte, Auguste** 842–3, 2764
 positivism 600, 842–3, 2276
 and Saint-Simon 842
- Comuna Morelense** 3709–11
- Comunero movement** 843–5, 2569
- concentration camps** 685, 1338, 1917
- Concentrazione di Azioni Antifascista** 1383, 2871, 3342
- Concepción, María de la** 3630
- Concha, Luis** 2059, 3303

- Concklin, Seth 3047
- Concordia University, student protests**
845–6
- Condera, Juan Gerardi 2060
- Condillac, Etienne 2873
- Condominium Agreement 3192
- Condor Operation 2598, 2607
- Condorcanqui Noguera, José Gabriel: *see* Túpac Amaru II
- Condorcet, Madame de 1293
- Condorcet, Marquis de** 846–7, 1115, 1421, 1525, 2547
death of 2990
Equisse d'un tableau historique 846
- Cone, James H. 394
- Confederação do Equador 489
- Confederação Operária Brasileira (COB) 474
- Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA) 146, 291, 3130, 3131
- Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT) 138, 244
- Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT), Argentina 249, 251, 271, 274, 863–8, 2638
- Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT)** 847–50
anarchism 98, 99
anarchosyndicalism 161, 1413
Asturias 291
Barcelona General Strike 351
Catalonia 630, 3129
and CGT 850
and CGT-SR 851
emergence of 145
FAI 1030, 1187–9
Maurín 2257
and Mujeres Libres 2368–9
Nin 2486–7
post-war 181
Sánchez Saornil 2962
SolFed 3072
Souchy 3082
Spanish Civil War 3135–7
- Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM) 619, 2280, 2296, 2340
- Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC) 915, 921, 936
- Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM) 619, 2291, 2297, 2340, 2542
- Confederate States of America 57
- Confederation of Anarchosyndicalists (KAS) 143
- Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) 856
- Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU) 1135, 1136
- Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT)** 850–1
anarchism 120
anarchosyndicalism 161
and Bourses du Travail 161, 463
dock workers 1235
membership 3216
Pelloutier 2628
Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire 850–1
- Confédération Générale du Travail Unitaire (CGTU) 851, 3385
- Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) 3077
- Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE/CONACNIE) 480, 803, 1056–7, 1064, 1065, 1066
- Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE) 1056, 1064
- Confederation of Labor Unity of Guatemala (CUSG) 1481
- Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) 607
- Confederation of National Trade Unions 589
- Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CNTCB) 1937
- Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (DİSK), Turkey 3342, 3352
- Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV) 670, 3437
- Confederation of Workers of Chile (CTCH) 692
- Confederation of the Workers of Peru (CTP) 2650
- Confederazione Generale del Lavoro (CGdL) 997, 1822, 1823, 3015
- Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) 130, 380, 998, 1834, 1835
- Confederazione Italiana dell'Industria 1822
- Confederazione Italiana Sindacati dei Lavoratori (CISL) 998, 1823
- Confederazione Unitaria di Base (CUB) 1147, 1837, 1840
- Conference of Working Women, Petrograd 3606
- Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 816
- Conferência Nacional da Classe Trabalhadora (CONCLAT) 498
- Conferencias de San Vicente de Paúl 3610
- Conferença Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura (CONTAG) 3039
- Confiscation Acts 70, 217
- Conflict and Consensus movement 1007
- Confucianism 113, 674, 707, 723, 2994, 3284
and communism 3472

- Congo, Democratic Republic of** 852–9
 anti-colonialism 857, 2137, 2138
 armed insurgency 852–3
 Belgium 856–7, 1661, 2138
 Brazzaville protest 853–4
 Copperbelt 3695
 crisis 854–6
 Kinshasa protest 856–8
 protest and uprisings 858–9
 self-determination 856
 Soviet Union 855
 UN 855
see also Mobutu; Zaire
- Congo-Brazzaville 1251
 Congo Free State 619, 856
 Congo War II 2364
 Congolese National Liberation Front (FNLC) 852
 Congrégation 1228
 Congreso Obrero de Filipinas (KAP) 2672
 Congress Against Imperialism 2430
 Congress Alliance 171–2, 2346, 2357, 3103, 3105, 3249
 Congress of the Christian Peasants' Federation (FCC) 2605
- Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)**
 838, 3411–15
 Alinsky 49
 black members 2066
 membership 3411
 moderation 2036–7
 rise of 1737, 2035–6
 sit-down strikes 2494
 unemployment 3387
 UPWA 3627
see also AFL-CIO
- Congress of Labor (CT) 2294, 2299
 Congress–League alliance, India 1921
 Congreso Obrero de Filipina (COF) 2672
 Congress Poland: *see* Poland, Congress Kingdom of
- Congress of Polish Culture 3075
- Congress of Racial Equality (CORE)**
 869–70, 2840
 Carmichael 613
 Freedom Rides 741, 1973, 3186
 Freedom Summer 750
 Harlem riots 3398
 Jim Crow era 18
 non-violence 762, 2498
- Congress of Representatives of Trade and Industry 2892
- Congress Socialist Party (CSP) 450, 1683, 2793, 2794
- Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)** 349, 874–7
 and ANC 2192, 3084, 3101, 3112
 anti-apartheid 174
 growth of 3106
 Mandela 2195
 Mayekiso 2264, 3096
 and MDC 3733
 post-apartheid democratization 3097–8
 Soviet support 175
 and Swaziland 3207
- Congress of Soviets of Central Asia, Fifth 3242
 Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies 2918, 2928
 Congress Working Committee (CWC) 448, 1326, 2793
 Congressional Union (CU) 2624
 Conintes Plan 2641, 2642
 Conjuração Baiana 485–6
 Conjuração Carioca 484
 Conn, Matthew B. 558
 Connaught, Republic of 1795–6
 Connaught Rangers mutiny 511
 Conner, Clifford D. 992–4, 1273–83, 1654–64, 1790–6, 2545–8, 2548–52, 2986–99
- Connolly, James** 859–61
 Easter Rising 620, 1046
 Irish Citizen Army 1046
 labor politics 1800
Labour in Irish History 2545
 land reform 2819
 and Larkin 1026
- Connor, Eugene “Bull” 742, 743, 1974
Conquest, The 135
 Conquest of the Desert 257
- Conquistadors
 Alvarado 3255
 Aracaré 237
 Ecuador 237, 1061, 1925–6
 and Incas 2876
 Taíno 1561
- conscientious objectors 1343
 consciousness raising 116, 3569
 Conscription Act 12
 Conseil Electoral Provisoire (CEP) 1505
 Conseil National de la Résistance (CNR) 1240
 Consejo de Comunidades Étnicas “Runujal Junam” (CERJ) 1478
 Consejo de Organizaciones Mayas de Guatemala (COMG) 1478
 Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere (CNRM) 1044
 Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense (CNRT) 1044
 conservation ethic 1117
 Conservative Party, Britain 528, 529
see also Thatcher, Margaret

- Conservative Party, South Africa (KP) 2626
 Considérant, Victor 2843
 Consiglio Nazionale delle Donne Italiane (CNDI) 3592
 Consolidated Slave Law 204
 Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) 1166
 Conspiração dos Suassunas 484
 Conspiracy of Equals 328–9, 545, 1004, 1743, 2543
 Constantine, Emperor 2828
 Constantine, King: *see* Konstantinos, of Greece
 Constantinescu, Emil 2861
 Constitution Act, Canada 585
 Constitutional Convention 3023
 Constitutional Society 3531
 Constitutional Union Party 1776, 1779
 Constitutionals 1019, 1020, 2541
Constitutionnel, Le 1229
 Construction Workers' Syndicate, Turkey 3352
 Constructivism 116
 Constructora Nacional de Válvulas (CNV) 3453
 consubstantiation, doctrine of 1356
 Consultative Committee of Black Trade Unions (CCOBTU) 3095
 Consultative Labor Commission (CCT) 2356
 consumption, mass 1665
 Contadora Group 2475
Contemporary, The 677
Contemporary Society, The 136
 Contestado War 466–8, 467–8
 Continental Army
 Bound Brook 82
 Lafayette 2851
 Rochambeau 2851
 Washington 79, 2851
 Continental Congress 78, 80, 2041
 Continental System 442
 Continuity IRA 1802, 1803
 see also Irish Republican Army (IRA)
 Continuous Discharge Book 1754
 Contra Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ARDE) 2473, 2475
 contraception: *see* birth control
 Contract Labor Law 1978
 Contrat Première Embauche 1148, 1238
 Conventicle Act 517, 1190
 Convention Act 1787
 Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) 1552, 3107
 Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 3275
 Convergence Démocratique (CD) 1509
 Convergence de Lutte Anti-Capitaliste (CLAC) 3657
 Convergencia 3440
 Conversion Our Goal (COG) 2108
 Convocation 515
 Conzé, Jean-Baptiste 1523
 Konzett, Conrad 2027
 Cooch's Bridge 82
 Cook, James 2205, 2456, 3425
 Cook, William 7–8
 Cooke, John William 2639
 Coolie Riots 554
coolies 1511, 3232, 3468
 Cooper, David 2335
 Cooper, William (Australian) 307
 Cooper, William (Prince Edward Island) 2752–3
Cooperative Commonwealth 861
 Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) 592, 2783, 2975
 cooperatives 990
 Argentina 2349
 Soviet Union 3122
 USA 2725–6, 3041, 3215
 and utopianism 3416
 Venezuela 3453
 Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida 790, 791–2
 Coordinadora Nacional de Frentes Regionales 2655
 Coordinadora Nacional de Pueblos Indígenas y Campesinos (CONIC) 1478
 Coordinating Committee of Oaxacan Women (COMO) 2536
 Coordinating Committee of Revolutionary Syndicalist Youth Groups of the Suburbs 3218
 Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Coast of Ecuador (COICE) 1064
 Coordinator of Women's Non-Governmental Organizations (CONG) 3631
 Coorey, Tony 309–10
Cop Watch Los Angeles 862–3
 Copacabana Fort revolt 2748
 COPEL 665
 Copenhagen 1741, 2733, 2982
 Coppe, Abiezer 1104, 1105, 2805
 copper industry
 Chile 50, 689
 Mexico 137
 Namibia 3204
 prices 689, 1941
 Zambia 1941, 3695, 3697–8, 3700–1, 3704, 3705
 Copperbelt region 3695, 3697, 3698, 3699
 Coppi, Hans 1377
 Coppi, Hilde 1371
 copra industry 2304
 Coptic Church 1132

- Corach, Carlos 1580
 Corbo, Jean 2785
 Corda Frates 274
 Corday, Charlotte 894, 1296, 2212
 Cordeliers Club 962, 1288–9, 1292, 1294, 2211
 Cordero, Luis 1063
 Córdoba, José María 578
 Córdoba, Piedad 796
 Córdoba University 3179
Cordobazo Uprising 248–9, 250–1, 272, 863–9, 3598
cordones industriales 112, 681–2, 3598
CORE: *see* Congress of Racial Equality
 core–periphery theory 1218
 Corfield, Justin 199, 569–75, 575–8, 602–3, 659–60, 738, 1196–200, 1261–2, 1271–3, 1492–5, 1662–3, 1958–61, 2054–5, 2065–6, 2153–4, 2303–5, 2309–11, 2313–14, 2332–9, 2448–9, 2456–60, 2464–5, 2527–8, 2663–4, 2797–8, 2971–2, 2977–8, 3034–6, 3080–2, 3083–4, 3278–9, 3425–7, 3492–3
 Corfu Channel incident 31
 Corn and Provision Laws 176, 655
 Corn Laws, repealed 177, 3498
 Cornbush Field 1098
Cornelissen, Christianus Gerardus 870–1
 Cornish Rebellion 509
 Cornwallis, Charles
 Ireland 2547
 and Lafayette 81, 85, 370, 508, 1788, 1789, 1795, 2041
 surrender 2851
 Coromante slaves 1871
 Corona, Bert 1641
 Corpo Volontari della Libertà (Freedom Volunteer Corps) 2835
 corporate corruption 2263
corporate globalization 1429–32
 Corporation Act 655, 2826
 Corpuz, Victor 2680
 Corral, Victor 480
 Correa, Omayra 2594
Correa Delgado, Rafael Vicente 871–2, 1058–60
 Corretjer, Juan Antonio 2770, 2771
 Corridoni, Filippo 1822
Corsica 872–4
 Algerian War for Independence 873
 Britain 872–3
 Corsican Revolution 872–3
 French Revolution 872–3
 Genoa 872
 independence movement 872–4
 Maquis 873, 1240
 vendetta 872
 Corso, Sampiero 872
 Corsu language 873–4
 Corte Anarchosindicalista group 618
 Cortés, Carmelo 2283
 Cortés, Hernán 910, 911, 2080
 Cortés Castro, León 879
 Cortes system 844
 Cortez Vargas, Carlos 344
 Cortiella, Felipe 116
 Cortiñas, Nora de 255
COSATU: *see* Congress of South African Trade Unions
 Coser, Lewis 769
 Cosgrave, William 971, 972, 1050
 Cosme Colonists 2450, 2453–4
 Cossacks 536, 2806, 2914, 2920
 Cossutta, Armando 2622, 2623
Costa, Afonso Augusto da 877–8
 Costa, Andrea 129, 2009
 Costa Gomes, Francisco da 2729, 2731
Costa Rica 878–80
 civil war and uprising 878–80
 music 640
 Nicaraguan migrants 447
Côte d'Ivoire 880–5
 France 883
 IMF 880
 post-independence protest 880–3
 pre-independence protest 883–5
 SAPs 880
 women in politics 884
 Côte d'Ivoire Democratic Party (PDCI) 880
 Cotton, John 1632, 3613
 cotton gin 213
 cotton industry 1196, 3253–4
 bulking 2723
 Egypt 2365
 Haiti 1535
 Paraguay 2607
 Peru 2647
 Tajikistan 3244
 Tanzania 3253–4
 USA 213, 2725
 Vanuatu 3425
 WTO 3645
 Coty, René 1235
 council communism 162, 325, 3637
 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR) 312
 Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) 747, 1258
 Council of National Trade Unions (CNTU) 2786
 Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) 834, 2222, 2346, 3093
 Council of People's Commissars 2918–19
 Council for Reconciliation Bill 4

- Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) 3096
counterrecruitment 885
counterrevolution 885–97
 aristocratic 891
 Baathists 2955
 Bourbons 896–7
 Charles X 1228
 France 891–7
 Hitler 1365
 Kosovo 3010
 moderates 891–3
 Peng Dehuai 2631
 Poland 2702–3
 sexuality 889
 Soviet Union 3608–9
 Spain 3142–4
 Trotsky 3116
 Countryside Can Stand No More 2294
 Counts' Feud 2523
 Courage to Refuse 1816
Courbet, Gustave 897–8, 2766
 Courcy, General de 3477
 Cousins, Margaret 2388
 Coussarys 1269
 Couthon, Georges 894
 Covas, Mário 499
 Covenanters 1806, 3000, 3002
 Coverdale, Miles 1094
 Cowan, Edith 3562
 Cowherd, John 3428
 Cox, John M. 1373–81, 2271–2, 3055–6
 Cox, Oliver 772
Coxey's Army 898–9, 2344
 Cozma, Miron 2855
CPSA: *see* Communist Party of South Africa
CPUSA: *see* Communist Party of the United States of America
CQL: *see* Quintin Lame
 craft unions 784, 3411
 Craig, James 1045
 Craigie, Billy 308, 309
 Crane, Richard Francis 405
 Cranmer, Thomas 515, 516, 517, 1093, 1094, 1095
 Crassus, Marcus Licinius 3145
 Crawford, Archie 148, 149, 331, 1556, 3091
 Craxi, Bettino 380, 1829
Crazy Horse 899–902
 Creagh, Ronald 155–8
 Creeks 59, 212
 Crémieux Decree 1644
 Creoles 424, 917, 1543, 1544
 Cresson, Edith 3576–7
 Crete, Battle of 1436
 CRIC (Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca) 803, 2791
 Crick, Daisy 3559
 Crimean War 1452, 1688, 2921, 2927, 3507
 Crimes Act 2617
 CrimethInc. Ex-Workers' Collective 160
 Criminal Code of Canada 591
 Criminal Justice Act 2807
 Criminal Justice Commission 2632
 Criminal Law Amendment Act 519, 2819
 Criminal Procedures Act 3589
criollo (American-born Spaniards) 1061, 1578
 Cripple Creek Mine Owners' Association 1570
 Cripps, Stafford 1929, 2792, 3229
 Cripps Mission 1329–30
Crisis 508, 1023, 1024, 1025, 1554, 1555, 2569
 Crisp, Charles 899
 Crispus Attacks 296
Cristero uprising 902–3, 1116, 2281, 2542
 Cristiani, Alfredo F. 1166, 2958
Critica Sociale 2009, 3341
Critical Mass 903–4
critical theory 904–8
 Croatia 3683, 3689, 3693
 Croce, Benedetto 1423, 2960
Croes Penmaen 3499
 Crofters' Act (1886) 2819
 Crofters' Holding Act 2820
 Crofters' War 2819
 Croix-des-Bouquets, Concordat of 1528
 Croix de Feu 824
Cromwell, Oliver 908–10, 1098
 and Lilburne 2118
 as Lord Protector 1100, 1103
 military dictatorship 1102
 on monarchy 1101
 New Model Army 2989
 and Trapnel 1194
 Winstanley 3537
see also Rump Parliament
 Cromwell, Thomas 516, 1093, 1804
Cronaca Sovversiva 1321, 2947
 Cronkite, Walter 1461, 2465
 Crook, George 900–1
 Crooked Circle Club 2013, 2301, 2695
 crop lien system 2723
 Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young 222
 Cross, James 592
 Cross, James Richard 2787
 cross-dressing 1871–2, 2949
 Croton water project 1118
 crowd psychology 1587
 Crowder, G. 1409
 Crowley, Mark J. 519–26, 3497–501
 Crudos, Los 2064
 cruise missiles 1830, 1945, 2501
 protests against 1830

- Crusader, The* 21, 3534
 Cruse, Harold 772
 Crusenstolpe, M. J. 2518
 Cruz, Aracelis 3400
 Cruz, Arturo 2475
 Cruz, Benjo 418
 Cruz, Francisco 146
 Cruz, Juan de la 621
 Cruz, Rigoberto 2468
 Cruz, Viriato da 2359
 Cruz Sánchez, Gabriel Alberto 1121, 2286
 Cruzada de Mujeres Españolas 3610
 Cuales, Sonia 3579
Cuauhtémoc 910–11
Cuba 911–40
 American Civil War 917–18
 Amnesty Law 928
 anti-racist movement 911–14
 Batista regime 914–17
 bishops 931–2
 Christians for Socialism 2060
 Constitution 912, 2150
 Creole elite 917
 elections 936–7
 Family Code 3572
 general strikes 914–17, 932, 2151
 Granma Years 1486
 and Grenada 2462
 guerilla war 1486
 healthcare 2997
 homosexuality 923, 924, 925
 independence from Spain 917–21
 literacy campaign 934, 2997
 massacre 913–14
 musicology 2565
 National Assembly 936–8, 939–40
 nationalization 934
 NGOs 936, 3572
 Nueva Canción 2379–80
 Nueva Trova 2377, 2379, 2853
 oil industry 626
 Partido Independiente de Color 911–14, 2150
 post-revolutionary protests 922–6
 protest songs 2379–80
 revolutionary government 935–40
 sexuality 3016, 3017
 slavery 90, 917–18
 social revolution 1663
 and Soviet Union 934
 student movement 3180
 sugar industry 627, 628, 916, 917, 926, 928, 2151
 Ten Years' War 911, 917–21, 2226, 2565
 tourist industry 925
 trade unions 921
 transition to socialism and government 921–2
 US occupation 920
 women's movement 3571–4
 women's rights 912, 3597–8
 see also Castro, Fidel; Cuban Revolution;
 Guevara, Ernesto "Che"
 Cuba Libre movement 2226
 Cubah, slave 1872
 Cuban American Sugar Foundation 2150
 Cuban Labor Federation (CTC) 934
 Cuban Missile Crisis 190, 197, 627, 922–3, 1490
Cuban Revolution 926–35
 and Argentina 272
 and Brazil 472
 government 935–40
 Guevara 1488–91
 Marxism 2996
 as model 1056, 1205, 2770, 3442
 and Nicaragua 2466, 2564
 post-revolutionary protest 922–6
 science 2996–8
 Soviet Union support 1216, 1490, 2996
 students 3180
 and US 1217
 and Venezuela 3437
 see also Castro, Fidel
 Cuban–Soviet Sugar Agreement 1490
 Cuban Women's Organizations 3571–2
 Cubas Grau, Raúl 2603
 Cubism 116, 1555
 Cucutá, Congress of 3456
Cuffe, Paul 207, 214, 392, 394, 941–2
 Cugoano, Quobna Ottobah 202, 206–7
 Cuito Cuanavale battle 166
 Cullen, Countee 1024, 1554, 1555
 Culloden, Battle of 1854
 cultural materialism 3533
 cultural studies 3533
culture/anarchism 115–17
 Cultuur-en-Ontspannings Centrum (COC) 2093
 Cunningham, Phil 3491
 Cuong De 2663, 3465
Curaçao 942–3
 Chinese laborers 1032–3
 oil industry 1032
 uprising (1969) 942–3, 1031
 Curaçao Federation of Workers (CFW) 942
 Curcio, Renato 2815, 2816, 2817
 Curragh Mutiny 1046
 Curran, Philpot 1089
 Currency Act 77
 Current of Socialist Renewal (CRS) 1083
 Currlin, Albert 2027
 Curtin, John 315
 Curtin, Nancy 1787
 Curtis, Richard 1314

- Curtis-Bennett, Frederick Henry 2978
 Curzon, Lord 1674, 1698, 3358
 Cusa, Alexandru 2856
 Cusi, Titu 3336
 Custer, George Armstrong 899, 901
 Customs Commissioners, Board of 77
 CUT: *see* Central Única dos Trabalhadores
 Cut Nyak Dien 1720
 Cuyamel Fruit Company 2018
 Cuzco, siege of 3338
 Cyganowski, Carol Klimick 2624–5
 Cynics 94
 Cynn, Christine 3198–9
Cyprus 943–8
 as Crown Colony 944
 Enosis 1455
 Greeks/Turkis 943, 944, 945
 millet system 943
 protest and revolt 943–8, 1446
 Turkish invasion 1435, 1447
 Cyril, Saint 3050
 Czaplinski, Daniel 1957
 Czartoryski, Adam 2700, 2716, 2717
 Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR)
 3435
 Czech Children 3176
 Czech Republic 1392, 1563, 3632
 Czech Socialist Republic 3435
 Czech Technical University 3172
 Czecho-Slav Society 3051
 Czecho-Slovakia, creation of 3433, 3435
 Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) 2509,
 3432, 3435
 Czechoslovak Youth Union (CYU) 3172
Czechoslovakia 948–52
 break-up of 3435
 Brezhnev 950
 Civil Forum 2509
 civil resistance 2745
 currency reform 949
 de-Stalinization 949, 2742
 Dubček 628, 654, 950–1, 2742–5
 Hapsburg empire 318
 PCI support 1820
 resistance to Soviet political and economic rule
 948–52
 Soviet invasion 2743, 3117
 student movements 1820, 2743
 wage cuts 949
 worker–student solidarity 2743
 see also Charter 77; Prague Spring; Velvet
 Revolution
 Czechoslovakian republic 319
 Cziernokóv, Adam 3512
 Czolgosz, Leon 1412
 D-Day Normandy invasion 1241
 da Cunha, Euclides 597, 601
 Da Gama, António Pinto Chichorro 493
 Da Nang 3482, 3485
 da Silva, Antonio 878
 da Silva Xavier, Joaquim José 485
 Dachseltner, Niklaus 3213
 Dacke, Nils 1496
 Dacke's Rebellion 1496, 2514
 Daco-Roman historical theory 2863
Dada 116, 953–4, 2777
 Dadaoglou, Emanouil 126
 Dadoo, Yusuf 3104
 Daendels, H. W. 1718
 Daer, Lord 2126
 Daewoo Apparel Company union 1983
 Daewoo Motors 1983, 1989
 Daftardar people 3197
 Dagohoy, Francisco 2666
 D'Agostino, Anthony 2167–8
 Dahal, Pushpa Kamal 2437
 Dahlmann, Friedrich Christoph 2983, 2985
Dahomey Women's Army 954
 Dai Viet 3480
 Dáil Eireann 793, 971, 1048, 1801, 3044
Daily Herald 521
Daily Nation 1950
Daily People 1736
Daily Worker 840, 841, 1603, 2804
Dakshin Desh group 2423
 Daladier, Edouard 1592
 Dalai Lama 3290, 3291, 3292
 Dalakoglou, Dimitrios K. 29–33, 34–8, 126–7,
 972–4
 Dale, David 2567
 Dalecarlian Dance 2516
 d'Alesio, Giuseppe 1847
 Daley, Richard J. 751, 1976, 2824
 Dalhousie, Lord 1687
 Dalit Panthers 958–9
 Dalit Solidarity Networks (DSN) 959
Dalits 954–61
 Ambedkar 53
 child labor 960
 CPI 1707
 equality 1585
 feminism 960
 Gandhi 1327
 Gujarat 1693
 Hindu nationalism 1684
 liberation struggles 954–61
 Nepal 231–2
 Quit India 2794
 separate electorate demand 1683
 Daljankare, Gustav rebellions 1496

- Dalrymple, John 1385, 1386
 Dalton, Roque 1164, 2223
 Daly, Mary 3629
 Daly, V. T. 983
 Damas, Léon 2427, 3578
 Damska Grupa Operacyjna (DGO) 3557–8
 Dan, Alexander 327
 Dan Kao village 3276
 dancehall music 611
 Dang Cong San Viet Nam (Communist Party of Vietnam) 3262, 3467
Dange, S. A. 961–2, 1700
 Gandhi Versus Lenin 961
 Dangwai candidates 2270
 Daniel, Evan Matthew 119–22
Dannevirke 2984
 D'Annunzio, Gabriele 2169
 Danquah, J. B. 2488
 Dansard, Claude 1294
 Dantas, A. J. 3038
Danton, Georges Jacques 962–3, 1277, 1281, 1283
 Cordeliers 1288
 Indulgents 1291–2
 Robespierre 2849
 on *sans-culottes* 2969
 D'Antona, Massimo 2818
 Dantonists 1288
 Danubian Confederacy 2865
 Dao Zuy Anh 3479
 Dap Chhuon 575–6, 578
Daquilema, Fernando 963, 1063
 Darboy, Monsignor 2611
 Darío, Rubén 2312
 Darnand, Joseph 1240
 Darrien Insurrection 16
 Darrow, Clarence 1571, 3041
 Dartiguenave, Sudre 1516
Dartmouth 453
 Dar'ul-Islam 532
 D'Arusmont, Guillaume 3667
 Darwin, Charles 2007, 2238
 Das, C. R. 448, 449, 1326, 1702, 2430
 Das, Hemchandra 1675
 Das, Jatin 1677
 Das, Tarak Nath 1675
 DAS Rural 1121
 Dasgupta, Nupur 301–3, 551–8, 2978–81
 Dastidar, Tarakeswar 1678
 Dato, Eduardo 2486
 Datta, Mahesh Lal 2971
 D'Aubuisson, Roberto 2868
 Daud, Karim Ahmad al- 2954
 Daudeij, J. M. F. 2589–92
 Daughters of Anahuac 3597
 Daughters of Bilitis 2093, 2106, 2107
 Daumier, Honoré 1283
 Dauve, Gilles (Barrot) 325
 David, Commandante 3713
 David, Jacques Louis 2212
 David, Prudhomme 3315
 David, Randolph 2682
 Davide Lazzaretti movement 1846
 Davidson, C. 2621
 Davidson, Lawrence 237–40, 358–60, 372–5, 389–90, 1547–51, 1557–60, 1575–7, 1758–61, 1816–17, 1851–2, 1961–5, 2976–7
 Davies, Emily 3567
 Davies, Miles 2380
 Davila, Carlos 693, 1468
 Dávila, Gil González 1005
 Davila, Pedrarias 3404
Davis, Angela 963–5
 Davis, Belinda 3521–4
 Davis, Benjamin, Jr. 841
 Davis, J. C. 2804
 Davis, Jefferson 57
 Davis, Laurence 1–2
 Davis, Michael T. 501–2, 2126–7, 2366–7, 3390–2, 3394–5
 Davis, Paulina Wright 3621
 Davis, R. G. 1482
 Davis, Thomas Osborne 3680
Davitt, Michael 967–8, 1045, 2617, 2820
 Davos: *see* World Economic Forum, Davos
 Dawes, William 78
 Dawisha, K. 2746
Dawn 1857, 1921, 3561
 Dawson, Jane 3001
 Daxi Dynasty 714
Day, Dorothy 634, 635, 661, 968–9, 2489, 3420
 Day, Luke 3023
 Day, Richard 111
 Day, Stockwell 3659
 Day of Loyalty 276
 Day of Mourning 307
 Dayan, Moshe 1812
 Dayr al-Qamar village 2073
 Days of May 2826
 Daza, Victor Hugo 791
 DDT 616
 De Ambris, Alceste 1822
 De Falla, Manuel 2381
 de Gaulle, Charles
 African colonies 884
 Algeria 43, 2381
 Cambodian visit 570
 coming to power 1235
 in exile 1239
 Free France 1239, 1713, 2336

- French Polynesia 1272
 Madagascar 1249
 Marianne 2216
 May 1968 events 2260, 2261, 3178
 PCF 825
 protest song about 2381
 Resistance movement 1240
 on Sartre 2261
 De Gennaro, Gianni 1311
 De Jesus Bonifacio, Gregoria (Lakambini) 444
 De Klerk, F. W. 3107
 De La Beckwith, Byron 744, 1155
 De la Cuadra, Alicia Zubasnarbar de 255, 256
 de la Huerta, Adolfo 2278, 2280, 2541, 3490
 de la Madrid, Miguel 2287, 2293
 de la Rúa, Fernando 262, 263, 264, 268, 1580
 De la Sagra, Ramón 144
 de la Torre, Ed 2680, 2682, 2684
 de la Torre, García 163
 de la Torre, Miguel 578
 De Lanessan, General Governor 3477
 De Launy, Bernard René 354
 De Leon, Daniel 149, 151, 2028, 2820, 3013
 De Santiago Ramos, Simone Cezanne 1352–5
De Silva, Colvin Reginald 969–70, 2050, 2052, 2053
 De Soto, Hernando 2652, 2653
 de Sousa, Luís Pereira 469
 de Souza, Doric 2051, 2052
 de Souza, José Francisco 2118
 de Souza Castro, Aires 2588
de Valera, Eamon 970–2
 and Albizu Campos 38
 Collins 38, 793
 Easter 1916 Rising 970, 971
 electoral success 1047, 3044
 resigning 1049
 de Waard, Marco 1408–10
 De Waele, Michel 1069, 2950
 Deacons for Defense and Justice in the South (DDJ) 18, 862
 Dead Kennedys 2778
 Deans, Eric 611
 Death March, Philippines 2674
 d'Eaubonne, Françoise 125
 Dębe Wielkie, Battle of 2716
Debord, Guy 972–4
 anarchism 3045
 Situationists 2808, 3044
 Socialisme ou Barbarie 3062
 Society of the Spectacle 972–4, 1237, 3044–5, 3423
 Debray, Régis 417, 628, 2754
Debs, Eugene 974–5
 AFL 2031–2
 American Railway Union 595, 974–5, 1458, 1571, 1735, 2030–1
 IWW 974, 2032, 3413
 Pullman Strike 2031
 Socialist Party of America 2489, 3041, 3064–5, 3416
 Debswana Diamond Company 2221
 debt cancellation 3644
 debt peonage 233, 2647, 2723
 DeCaux, Len 2036
Decembrists 975–9
 Deçiq battle 35
 Decker, Alicia C. 3545–50
 Declaración of Iximché 1481
 Declaration of Independence, American
 abolitionism 1113
 African Americans 156, 213
 democratic values 2022–3
 and Enlightenment 1114
 equal rights 2023, 3620–1
 as model 1145
 sailors 296
 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 1113, 1127, 1275, 1281, 1525, 1912
 Jewish people 1919
 Lafayette 2041
 Mirabeau 2312
 Robespierre 2848
 Sieyès 3033
 Declaration of Sentiments 3005, 3621, 3640
 see also Seneca Falls convention
 Declaratory Act 77, 1785, 1786, 2402
 Declercq, Pierre 2458
 deconstructive theory 908
 Dedering, Tilman 2389–401, 2529–31, 3202–5, 3300, 3539–40
 Deem, Lynette M. 3212–13, 3679
 deep ecology 1039, 1053
Defender 2824
 Defenders, Catholic 1787, 1791, 1792
 Defense of National Sovereignty of Nicaragua (EDSN) 2966
 Defense of Public Order and Liberty of Persons 2604
 Defense Sites, Treaty of, Panama 2593, 2594
Défenseur de la Constitution, Le 2848
 Defiance Campaign 2346, 3087
 Défilée 3584
 Defoe, Daniel 765
 deforestation 2603
 Degalvès, Manuel 1124
 Déjacque, Joseph 97, 122, 123
 Humanisphère, L' 156
 Dekoninck, Mireille Barbara 3576
 del Mar, Maria 3631

- Delacroix, Eugene 1231–2, 2216
 Delane, John 2720
 Delany, Martin R. 208, 209, 217, 391, 392, 394
North Star 1021
delegados 2059
 DeLeon, Abraham P. 117–18
 DeLeon, Daniel 1735–6
 DeLeonites 830
 Delesalle, Paul 120, 2628
 Deletant, Dennis John 2865–7
Deleuze, Gilles 979–83
Anti-Oedipus 980
 autonomism 324
Capitalism and Schizophrenia 980
Difference and Repetition 980
 global justice movement 979–83
Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature 980
Logic of Sense 980
 and Negri 2427
 nomadism 980, 2750
 and Prima Linea 2750
Thousand Plateaus, A 980, 981
What is Philosophy? 980
 Delgrès, Louis 1266
 Delhi 1331, 1690, 1699
 Delhi Bomb Case 1677
 Delibash Insurrection 3357
 Dell, Floyd 2253
 Dell, S. 179
 Delli Veneri, Domenico 2402
 Dellinger, Betty 3419
 Dellinger, David 73, 3419
 Delrio, Walter 257–9
 Demarchi, Juan 50
 DeMarco, Patricia 615–18
 Dembowski, Edward 2701
Demerara, slave rebellion 204, 983–4
 Demetriou, Andreas 946
 Demirel, Süleyman 3344, 3351
 democracy 777
see also participatory democracy
 Democracy Now 1345
Democracy Wall 984–6, 2203, 3285, 3518
 Democrat Party, Turkey 3363, 3364, 3365
 Democratic Alliance, Bulgaria 541
 Democratic Alliance, Chile 687
 Democratic Alliance, Philippines 1613
 Democratic Army of Greece (DSE) 1438, 1445
 Democratic Club of Patras 126
 Democratic Conference, October Revolution 2915
 Democratic Convergence (CD) 1166
 Democratic Defense 1432, 1433, 1446, 1448
 Democratic Federation of Unions of Public Servants (FEDESSP) 2294
 Democratic Female Party 3598
 Democratic Front 1165
 Democratic Front, Peru (FREDEMO) 2652, 2654
 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1812
 Democratic Kampuchea: *see* Kampuchea
 Democratic-KMP 2686
 Democratic Labor Party (DLP), Korea 1981, 1990–2
 Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) 2002
 Democratic League of the People, Greece 126
 Democratic National Convention 747, 758, 1975
 Democratic Nationalist Union (UDN) 1164
 Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) 812, 2509, 3011, 3012
 Democratic Party of Albania (PD) 32
 Democratic Party of Chile 692
 Democratic Party of Costa Rica 879
 Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) 2003
 Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) 1820
 Democratic Party of Turkey 3350
 Democratic People's Republic, Huambo 166
 Democratic Popular Left (IDP) 2286
 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan 3237
 Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV): *see* Vietnam, Democratic Republic of
 Democratic Republican Party 1301
 Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), El Salvador 1163, 1165, 1167, 2957
 Democratic Revolutionary Government (GDR) 1165
 Democratic Revolutionary Tendency-Army of the People (TDR-EP) 2286
 Democratic Rural Union 2273
 Democratic and Social Power Party (PODEMOS) 435
 Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) 1909
 Democratic Socialist Party, Argentina 271
Democratic Spring, Guatemala 240, 1472–4
 Democratic Tendency (TD) 2291, 2299
 Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) 322
 Democratic Union of Liberation (UDEL) 2468
 Democratic Union Party, Sudan 3191
 Democratic Unionism, Korea 1985–6
 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 1797–8, 2572
 Democratic Women's League of Germany (DFD) 3580
 Democratici di Sinistra 1307
Démocratie de l'Ouest, La 2628
 Democrats, American Civil War 55
 Democrazia del Lavoro 2835
Democrazia Proletaria (DP) 2621–3

- demokratizatsiya* (democratization) 3121–2
- Demszy, Gabor 1618
- Deng Pei 3723
- Deng Xiaoping** 709, 711, 720, 726, 830, 986–7
 death of Mao 2205
 Four Modernizations 985, 986–7, 3518
People's Daily editorial 3287
 recentralization 2204
 science 2996
 social reform 3284–6
- Deng Yingchao 3726
- Denikin, Anton 3507
- Denis, Lorimer 1517
- Denmark** 987–92
 absolute monarchy 2519, 2983
 agricultural reform 989, 2983
 as Composite State 988, 2983
 cooperative associations 990
 democratization 2520
 farmers' protests 2520
 German invasion 2495
 Great Depression 2520
 insurrection and revolt 987–92
 Napoleonic Wars 2983
 Reformation 988
 strikes 2495
see also Nordic countries; Schleswig-Holstein
 uprisings
- Departamento Intersindical de Estatística e
 Estudos Socioeconômicos (DIEESE) 496
- Departamento de Investigaciones de la Policía de
 la Capital (DIPC) 2597
- Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) 311
- Department of Indian Affairs 583
- departmentalization, Guadeloupe 1469
- dependency theory 1668–70, 1671
- Depestre, René 1517
- Depressed Classes 53
- Deputies Run, Battle of 3414
- Derbez, Luis Ernesto 3647
- Derby, Lord 2828
- Derby-Lewis, Clive 1552
- DerGhougassian, Khatchik 267–70, 280–5
- Derogy, Jacques 283
- Derrida, Jacques 772, 3576
- Derry City 1797
- Dervishes 2164
- Desai, Bhulabhai 2792
- Descamisado, El* 270
- Descartes, René 1601, 2988–99, 3151
Discourse on Method 2989
- Deschamps, Frederic 1244
- Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparaya 2633
- Deslondes, Charles 89
- Desmond, Earl of 1804, 1805
- Desmoulins, Camille 962, 1277, 1288, 2969
- Desobediencia Civil 2063
- Despard, Charlotte 1416
- Despard, Edward Marcus** 819, 992–4, 3391
- Despard Conspiracy** 992–4
- Despertador Mexicano, El* 3715
- Despertar, El* 2609
- Dessalines, Jean-Jacques** 994–6
 elected leader 1547
 as Emperor Jacques I 1511, 1538
 independence for Saint-Domingue 994–6,
 1522, 1537–8
 remains of 3584
 and Toussaint Louverture 1265, 1266, 1534
- Destour Party 1248, 3335
- Destructive, The* 2543
- Determination of Right and Unity for
 Menominee Shareholders (DRUMS)
 2413–14
- Detroit
 race riots 3165, 3397, 3401
 racial tensions 758
 racially stratified employment 2067
- Deuba, Sher Bahadur 2438
- Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labor Front)
 1371
- Deutscher, Isaac** 996–7, 2250
- Deutscher Bund* 1347–8
- Deutscher Herbst (German Autumn) 1368
- Dev, Narendra 2432
- development, uneven/combined 773–4, 1666–8
- Devi, Bimalprotiva 1705
- Devine, Michael 2967
- Devoy, John 2627
- Dewey, John 713
- Dewey Commission 3325
- Deyanova, Liliana 1002–4
- Dhaka University Central Students' Union
 2578, 3180
- Dhar, D. P. 1932–3
- Dhar, Sushovan 230–2, 2437–8, 2438–41,
 2441–4
- d'Héricourt, Jenny 122
- Dhingra, Madanlal 1675
- Dhlakama, Afonso 738, 1262
- Dhonde, Kamal 1706
- Di Gennaro, Giuseppe 2402
- Di Stefano, Alfredo 3443
- Di Vittorio, Giuseppe** 997–8, 1823
- Diabate, Naminata 880–3
- Diablo Canyon 1
- Dial* 1305
- dialectical materialism 1080, 2240, 2838, 2992
- dialectics 1423, 2240, 2836, 2837, 2839
- diamond industry 147, 2394, 2492, 3091

- Diario, El* 2660
Diario de Costa Rica 879
Diary of Gloumov (Eisenstein) 1080
Dias Lopes, Isidoro 469
Díaz, Adolfo 2541
Díaz, Epifanio 930
Díaz, Felix 2277
Díaz, Italo Ricardo 2286
Díaz, Porfirio
 anarchosocialists against 3597
 Madero 2275
 and Magón 137, 2162
 Mexican Revolution 2276, 2375, 3431
 opposition to 13, 998, 2158
 ousted 2539
 privatization 3709–10
 revolts 1925
Díaz Ordaz, Gustavo 3296
Díaz-Plaja, Guillermo 2313
Díaz Soto y Gama, Antonio 277, 278, 998–9, 2541
Dickens, A. G. 1092, 1094
Dickerson, Isaiah 1608
Dickinson, H. T. 507–9, 786
Dickman, Enrique 271
dictatorship of the proletariat 999–1001
 Bolsheviks 1171
 Lenin 2087
 Mandel 2188
 Marx and Engels 2247, 3057
dictatorships 2266, 3021
Diderot, Denis 1001–2
 Encyclopédie 1001, 1109, 2316, 2873, 3495
 and Holbach 1001–2, 1602
 Lettre sur le commerce de la librairie 1002
 Lettres sur les aveugles 1001–2
 Pensées philosophiques 1001
 Religieuse, La 1002
Diebitsch, Hans Karl von 189
Diegues, Carlos 2588
Dien Bien Phu, Battle of 44, 1599, 2054, 3083, 3473, 3474, 3493
Digger 107
Diggers 93, 161, 1103–4, 3536–7
Digna, Osman 2164
dignity, politics of 3711–12
Digos incident 2684
Diliman Commune 2678
Dillard, Angela D. 2275
Dillon, John 1047
Dillon, John Blake 3680, 3681
Dillon, Peter 3425
Dillwyn, William 203
Dimitratos, Panagis 1440, 1441
Dimitrieff, Elizabeth 2612
Dimitrov, Georgi 1002–4
 Agrarian Party 537
 Anti-Fascist People's Front 178
 Balkans 338, 339
 coup attempt 543, 544
 Old Guard communists 542
 Popular Front 2248, 2431, 3678
 Reichstag Fire 2833
 and Tito 31, 339
Dimitrova, Blaga 3068
Dimokratiki Amyna: *see* Democratic Defense
Din Nuri, Baha' al- 2954
Dinescu, Mircea 2861
Ding Ling 1752
Dinh Cong Trang 3478
Diokno, José 2678, 2683
Diouf, Abdou 3006, 3008
Dipendra, Crown Prince of Nepal 230
Diponegoro, Prince 1719–20
Direct Action 110
direct action
 environmentalism 1051
 journalism 1461
 road protests 2807
Direct Action 140, 304, 1738
Direct Action Movement (DAM) 109, 3072
Direct Action Network (DAN) 1397, 3661, 3663–4
Direct Tax on Lands, Dwelling Houses, and Slaves 1300, 1301
Directorio Revolucionario 624, 926, 927, 930, 933
Directory 1004–5, 1792
 conspiracy against 328
 Eighteenth Brumaire 1079
 Saint-Simon 2952
 Sieyès 441–2, 3033–4
 Tone 2545
Diriangén 1005–6
Dirty War, Mexico 2022
disappeared
 Argentina 105, 251, 255, 273, 1579–81, 2159, 2500
 Italy 1833
 Mexico 2288
disease 74–5, 1196, 1655, 3382
Disinherited, Movement of the 2405
Disobbedienti 1006–10, 1307
Disolucion Social 2063
Dispatch Industry Workers' Union (DIWU) 3072
displaced communities 307, 796, 1711
Disraeli, Benjamin 519, 2828
disruption, social 2757–8
Dissent! network 1313, 1314, 1316, 2636
Dissenters 3302, 3392

- dissidents 2757
Dittmar, Louise 3579
DIVA TV project 2503
Diverse Women for Diversity 2734
Divide Bengal Plan 2574
Division Street riots, Chicago 3400
divorce
 Iran 1774
 Muslims 1585, 1693, 3367
 racial policy 1179
 Soviet Union 3609
 Winstanley 3538
Dix, Dorothea 1010–11
Dixiecrat revolt 747, 759
Djerba, Battle of 3334
Djilas, Milovan 1011–12, 3638
Djindjic, Zoran 3011, 3012, 3685–6
Dlamini, Mtfuso 3207
Dlamini, Nhlanhla 3205–8
Dlamini rulers 3205
Dmowski, Roman 2717, 2718, 2719
Dmytryk, Edward 1603
do-it-yourself
 media 1739
 punk 2778
 Riot Grrl 2844–5
Dobama Asiyone (We-Burmans Association)
 302, 553–4, 2527, 3278
Dobbs, Farrell 3413
Dobrev, Nikolai 539
Dobroliubov, Nikolai 977
Docena, Herbert 2324–32, 3265–71
Dochev, Ivan 537
dock workers' strikes 2229, 3061
Doctor, Manilal Maganlal 1196
Dodd, Thomas J. 196
Dodge Plan 1898
Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM)
 2067
Dodziuk, Anna 3556
Doe, Samuel 2115
Dogra Rajputs 1928
Doha, WTO: *see* World Trade Organization
 (WTO) protests, Doha
Doherty, Kieran 2967
Dohm, Hedwig 3580
Doi, Takako 1910
Doitsh, Tzvika 1812
Dokie, Samuel 2116
Dokubo-Asari, Mujahid 2480, 2485
Dolan, J. 1191
Dole, Sanford 1565
Dolgoft, Sam 158–9
Dolgorukiy, Duke 536
Dollfuss, Engelbert 291, 320, 3130
Dolphin Coast concession 3101
Dome of the Rock mosque 1817
Domei Federation (Japan Federation of Labor)
 1878, 1880, 1882, 3069
Dominguez, Rufino 1642
Dominguez Navarro, Ofelia 3571
Dominica
 IMF loans 351, 609
 independence 351
Dominica National Council of Women 3560
Dominica Public Service Union 609
Dominica Women's Bureau 3560
Dominican Liberation Movement (MLD) 1014
Dominican Nationalist Union (UND) 1013
Dominican Republic 1012–20
 civil war 1217
 Cuban invasion attempt 926
 IMF 609–10, 1018
 independence 1512
 IRI 1509
 protests 1015–17
 resistance to military 1017–20
 slavery ended 1015
 Triumvirate 1018
 US imperialism 1012–15
Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) 1018
Dominican Voice 1015
Dominique, Jean 1520
Don Juan, of Austria 3334
Dona Naca revolt 2351
Donaldson, Stephan 2107
Dong Duong Cong San Dang (ICP) 3468
Dong Khanh 3477
Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc (Hanoi School of the
 Just Cause) 3466
Donghak Peasant War 1998
Dongo, Margaret 3604
Donish, Ahmed 3241
Dönitz, Karl 1593
Donnelly, Fred 3675–6
Donoughmore Constitution 2050
Donovan, Jean 2060
Door, Rheta Childe 3625
Dora, Gantam 2803
Dora, Mallu 2803
Dorbe, Marie 1295
Dorchester Unionists 3301
Dorman-Smith, Reginald 302, 556, 2978
Doro union 1882
Doronjski, Stevan 3692
dos Anjos Ferreira, Manuel Francisco 491
Dos Passos, John 837, 3003
dos Prazeres, José 2351
Dos Prazeres, Zezé 2118
Dos Rios, Battle of 2227

- Dos Santos, José Eduardo 166, 2354, 2359, 2360, 2361
- Dos Santos Albasini, João 153, 2355
- Dos Santos Albasini, José 2355
- Dost Muhammad Khan, Shah 14
- Dostoevsky, Fyodor 634
- double standards, sexuality 1111
- Double V Campaign 757–8
- Douc Rasy 573
- Doud, Muhammad 13
- Douglas, Angela 2108
- Douglas, Kirk 3149
- Douglas, R. Stuart, Jr. 2489
- Douglas, Stephen A. 56, 57, 2025, 2123
- Douglas, Tommy 589, 2975
- Douglass, Aaron 1554
- Douglass, Frederick 1020–1**
- abolitionism 90, 3619
 - American Anti-Slavery Society 168, 215
 - and Anthony 169
 - on Lincoln 2121–2, 2123
 - North Star* 3006
 - organized labor movement 2023
 - People's Party 3622, 3636
 - in *Pittsburgh Gazette* 71
 - Radical Abolition Party 216
 - and Stanton 3165
- Doukhobors 592
- Dowling, Andrew 629–32, 1127–32
- Dowling, Emma 1312–15
- Downing Street Declaration 1798
- dowry death 3589
- Doyle, W. 892
- Dozier, James Lee 2817
- draft resisters 220, 3419
- draft riots, American Civil War 69–70**
- Drake, Francis 517, 602
- Drakoulis, Plato 1440
- Dramis, Attanasio 2692
- Drapeau, Jean 2787
- Draper, H. 767, 1000, 2238, 2250
- Draper, Theodore 22
- Draper, Timothy Dean 2824–5
- Dravya Shah 2441
- Dred Scott v. Sandford* 56, 70
- Drenica massacres 2002
- Drennan, William 1786
- Dreschel, Thomas 92
- Dresden, Battle of 443
- Drew, Allison 831–5, 1552, 3103–9
- Drexler, Anton 1588
- Dreyfus, Alfred 887, 1021–2, 1912–13, 3744
- Dreyfus Affair 405, 887, 1021–3, 3741, 3744**
- Dri, Ruben 478
- Drinot, Paulo 2647–50
- Drogheda, Battle of 909
- Drovetti, Bernadino 1074, 1075
- Drucker, Wilhelmina 2721
- drugs, medicinal generic 2998
- DRUM (Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement) 393
- Drumgo, Fleeta 965
- Drummer of Niklashausen 410
- drumming 611–12
- Drummond, Don 611
- Drumont, Edouard 3741
- Druze community 2069, 2073, 2502, 3222, 3224
- Du Bois, W. E. B. 1023–5**
- African Blood Brotherhood 22
 - and Aptheker 233
 - Black Reconstruction in America* 1024–5
 - Darkwater* 21
 - double consciousness 391
 - Dusk of Dawn* 1025
 - on Garvey 1336
 - Harlem Renaissance 1554
 - and Ignatin 3070
 - and James 1023–5, 1874
 - Jim Crow era 16, 1608
 - NAACP 395, 756, 1023, 1554
 - and Nkrumah 1025
 - Paris Peace Conference 2396
 - Philadelphia Negro, The* 1023
 - and Randolph 2803
 - Souls of Black Folk, The* 1023
 - and Washington 756
- Du Camp, Maxime 1826
- dual consciousness
- working class 3070
- Dual Monarchy, Sweden/Norway 2513
- Duarte, José Napoleón 1165, 2957, 2958
- Duarte, Juan Pablo 1015
- Duarte Frutos, Nicanor 2135
- Dubasov, Admiral 2885
- Dubček, Alexander 1025–6**
- Czech–Slovak relations 3051
 - Czechoslovak Federal Assembly 3434
 - KSČ 2742, 3174
 - Prague Spring 3051, 3638
 - and Russian tanks 628, 654, 950–1, 1025–6, 2262
- Dubček shifts 2743
- Dubie, Sven 739–49, 3396
- Dublin**
- Castle Party 1785
 - General Post Office 1046, 2627
 - General Strike 860, 1026–7
 - Transit Strike 1046
- Dublin Brigade 860
- Dublin Castle 1089

- Dublin Volunteers 1785–6
Dubois, Laurent 1262–8
Dubois, Pierre 143
Duc, Aimée 2104
Duc, Thic Quang 220
Duchamp, Marcel 953
Duclos, Jacques 824
Duclos, Pierre Roger 442
Ducos, Roger 3033
Dudley, John: *see* Northumberland, Duke of
Dudman, Richard 574
Dudu Mia 371
Due Obedience law 1579, 2160
Dufferin, Frederick 3396
Duffy, Charles Gavan 3680
Duffy, E. 1094
Dufour, François 298
Duhalde, Eduardo 268
Dukakis, Michael 1853
Duke, David 2275
Dukhtaran-e-Millat (Daughters of the Nation) 1935
Dulce, Domingo 918
Dulles, Allen 240
Dulles, John Foster 196, 240, 3474
Dumbutshena, Job 3729
Dumont, René 934
Dumouriez, Charles 1290
Dunayevskaya, Raya 1027–8, 1303
 Hegelianism 2250, 2839
 Marxism and Freedom 2838
Dunbar, Andrew 149, 1028–9, 3092
Dunbar, Battle of 1099
Dunbar-Ortiz, Roxanne 1459
Dunca, Ion 2857
Dundas, Henry 3528
Dungan Revolt 716
Dunkerley, James 420
Dunlap, Andrew 2724, 2725, 2727
Dunmore, Lord 79, 202, 213
Dunne, Bill 596, 836
Dunne, Ray and Vince 3413, 3414
Dunne, Vincent Raymond 2035
Dunstan, Graeme 107
Duo Guardabarranco 638
Duong Chakr 567
Duong Van Minh 3485
Dupetit-Thouars, Abel 1272
Duplessis, Maurice 589, 2783
Dupré, Admiral 3476
Duraiappah, Alfred 2741, 3251
Durban Conference on Racism 959
Durban Indian Workers' Industrial Union 3092
Durban strike 174
Durgan, Andrew 291–3, 2257–8, 2486–7, 2737–40, 3128–45
Durham, Lord 594
Durkheim, Emile 2316
Durnovo, P. 2890
Durr, Clifford 2614, 2615
Durrani empire 1029
Durruti, Buenaventura 1029–30, 1187, 3142
Dushanbe Riots 3245
Dussel, Enrique 478, 2059
Dutch Caribbean 1030–3
 abolition of slave trade 1031
 languages 1033
 Maroon communities 1031, 1032
 migration to Netherlands 1031
 postcolonial resistance 1031–2
 rebellion against colonialism 1030–1
Dutch colonial system, Indonesia 1718–19, 1727
Dutch East India Company 1656, 1718
Dutch East Indies 1721
Dutch Gold Coast Colony 1720
Dutch Guianas 1031
Dutch Provos 161
Dutch Republic 2589–92
Dutch Revolt 1033–6
Dutra, Olivio 476, 496, 2219
Dutronic, Jacques 2381
Dutschke, Rudi 1036–7, 1368, 1945, 3523
 Frankfurt School 12, 1256
Dutt, Aswini Kumar 1697
Dutt, Batukeswar 3041, 3042
Dutt, Kalpana 1922
Dutt, R. C. 1695
Dutta, Bhupendranath 1674, 1698
Dutta, Dhirendranath 2577
Dutta, Kalpana 1678
Dutta, Narendranath: *see* Vivekananda
Dutta, Saroj 2424
Duvalier, François (Papa Doc) 278, 996, 1503, 1508–9, 1517, 1518, 1523, 3585
Duvalier, Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) 278, 1519, 3585
 overthrown 1503–4, 1508–9
Düzce-Hendek Rebellion 3357
Dwernicki, Jozef 2716
Dworkin, Andrea 3629
Dwyer, Kate 3561
Dwyer, Michael 1788
Dybic, Field Marshal 2715
Dyer, Mary 3613
Dylan, Bob 632
Dzeliwe Shongwe 3207
Dzherzhinsky, Felix 2086
Dzurinda, Mikuláš 812

- E-Verify federal database 1642
 Ealham, Chris 1188
 EAM/ELAS 1438, 1453, 1454
 Earth Day 820
Earth First!
 deep ecology 125, 159, **1039–40**, 1052, 1054
 Summer Gathering 1387
 Earth Liberation Front 160, 1040, 1052, 1054, 1055
 Earthlife Africa 3100
 East African Association 3545
 East African Indian National Congress (EAINC) 3043
East Anglian Wheat County Riots 1040–2
 East India Company 452
 East Pakistan Student League 2578
 East Pakistan Student Union 2578
East Timor
 anti-colonial struggle **1042–5**
 civil war 1043
 independence 1043
 Indonesian occupation 1043–4
 Portuguese traders 1718
 UN 1044–5
Easter Rising (1916)
 Connolly 859, 860
 de Valera 793, 970
 as example 2769
 Irish Civil War **1045–50**
 nationalist spirit 1193, 1800
 Pearse 2627
 Sinn Féin 1800–1, 3043
Eastern Europe
 anti-state protest 810–18
 color revolutions 2510–11
 Jewish people 3740–1
 NGOs 811–12
 post-socialism 3633–4
 religion 3740
 revolution 2508–11
 student movement 3170
 women's movement **3632–4**
 women's organizations 3634
 Eastern Orthodox Russians 2865
 Eastern Question Association 2341
Eastman, Max 1050–1, 2253, 2825
 Eastman Kodak 49
 Eade, Michael 180–4
 Ebenezer community 52
 Ebert, Friedrich 1359, 1361–2, 1363, 1373, 3055
 Ebert, Teresa 124
 Ebola virus outbreak 852
 Eboue, Felix 853
 Ebrié people 883
 Ebro, Battle of 3143, 3144
 Echandi, Mario 880
 Echandiá, Dario 409
 Echeverría, José Antonio 624, 926, 930, 1017
 Echeverría, Luis 2290, 2299, 3297
 Echeverría, Rodolfo 2604
 Echigo Rising 1898, 1899
 Eckstein, G. 321
 Eclectic Institute 2543
eco-anarchism 99, 1051–2
 eco-feminism 125, 1052
 eco-sabotage 159
 eco-terrorism 1055
 eco-village protest 1313
Ecole Emancipée 3219
ecological protest movements 1052–5
 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 882, 2115, 2116, 2182
 economic democracy 2620
 Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) 1615
 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 1431
 Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP) 3188
 Economic Sabotage Law 2360
Economist, The 2012
 Economy, Pennsylvania 1185
 ECOPETROL 809
 ecotage 1054
 ECOWAS: *see* Economic Community of West African States
Ecuador 1056–68
 anti-clericalism 1062–3
 banana exports 1064, 1065
 Bolivarianism 1061–2
 Campesinismo 1063–4
 Catholic Church 1056, 1057, 1062
 Conquistadors 1925–6
 Correa **1058–60**
 coup 1058
 dollarization 1067
 economic decline 1065–8
 ethnic divisions 1059
 Glorious May Revolution 1057
 IMF 1067
 independence from Spain 1061
 Indians/mestizos 1064–5
 indigenous uprising **1056–7, 1058–60**, 1925–6
 left and popular movements **1057–8**
 mass mobilization 480
 oil exports 1064, 1065
 and Peru 2655
 political parties 1063, 1067
 protest and revolution 1059, **1060–8**
 Uprising (1871) **963**
 women's rights 3598
 World Bank 1067

- Ecuador Indians Awaken (ECUARUNARI) 1064
 Ecuadorian Communist Party (PCE) 1057
 Ecuadorian Confederation of Catholic Workers (CEDOC) 1057
 Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Trade Union Organizations (CEOSL) 1058
 Ecuadorian Confederation of Workers (CTE) 1058
 Ecuadorian Federation of Evangelical Indians (FEINE) 1056–7
 Ecuadorian Federation of Indians (FEI) 1056, 1064
 Ecuadorian Marxist Leninist Communist Party (PCMLE) 1058
 Ecuadorian Revolutionary Socialist Vanguard (VSRE) 1057
 Ecuadorian Socialist Party (PSE) 1057
 Ecuaurunari (Ecuador Indians Awaken) 1056
 Eda, Saburō 1909–10
Edad de Oro (Golden Age) 2227
 Edelman, Marc 1917, 3461–3
 Edelstadt, David 115
 Edge, Thomas 1154–5, 2179–81, 3533–4
 Edgehill, Battle of 1098
 Edict of Nantes: *see* Nantes, Edict of
 Edinburgh, Treaty of 3000, 3001
 Editions Tierce 3576
 Edmund Pettus Bridge incident 748
 Edogawa Union 1876
 Edogawa Ward Labor Union Federation (EWLUF) 1876
 education
 anarchism 117–18
 equality of access 3170
 gender 3566
 Greece 3582
 Indochina 1714
 neoliberalism 3185
 Place on 2692
 Rousseau 1203
 scholarships 3517
 segregation 11, 743, 745
 Soviet Union 3609
 syndicalism 3217
 Venezuela 671
 see also Montessori, Maria
 Education Acts 526
 Edward IV, of England 514
 Edward V, of England 514
 Edward VI, of England 509, 516, 1094
 Edward VIII, of Britain 525
 Edwards, George 3281
 Edwards, Thomas 1107
 Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) 3251, 3252
 Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS) 3251
Efimeris ton Kyrion 3581
 Egan, Jim 2099
 Egan, Michael 820–1
 Egbe Omo Oduduwa 23
 Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA) 2484, 2485
 Egerton, Douglas R. 1318–19, 3459–61
 Eggleston, Lennie 1551
 egoism 133
Egoist, The 116
Eguaglianza 129
Egypt 1069–79
 Arab socialism 1069–73
 British high commissioner 1557
 exports 2365
 loans to peasants 1072
 Ottoman empire 2365
 peasant rebellion 1073–6
 re-Islamization 1559–60
 Revolution 1076–9, 2406
 Shari'a law 1557
 UAR 1072
 unemployment 1560
 Urabi movement 3395–6
 see also Nasser, Gamal Abdel
 Egyptian Federation of Workers 235
 Eichmann, Adolf 242
 Eiderdanes 989, 2985
 Eidlin, F. 2746
 Eigene 2093
Eigene, Der 2103
 Eight Trigrams 716–17
Eighteenth Brumaire 1079–80
 Eighth Route Army 2202
 see also Red Army, China
 Eighty Years' War 1036
 Einaudi, Luigi 2871, 2960
 Einstein, Albert 195, 2947, 2993
 Eisenhower, Dwight D.
 and Castro 922, 934
 civil rights 762, 763
 Dominican Republic 1014
 French Resistance 1241–2
 Japan 1887
 nuclear test ban hopes 195
 Panama 2593
 on unemployed 446
 Vietnam War 2499, 3480
 Eisenhower Doctrine 2068
Eisenstein, Sergei 28, 1080–1
 Eisenstein, Zillah 772
 Eisner, Kurt 1361, 1363, 2048
 Ejercito Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (EBR-200) 414, 3439

- Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo (EGP) 244
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) 420,
 1081–4, 2791
 birth of 801
 Collectives of Unions' Work 1082
 Concha 2059
 and EPL 1120
 and FARC 1081, 1082, 1084, 1167, 1168, 3389
 formation of 244, 800, 1081
 pipeline blown up 1083
 Torres 3303
Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) 801,
 1082, 1120–1, 2791
Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR)
 1121–3, 2285, 2289, 3428, 3719
 Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) 245,
 254, 2293
 Ejército del Sur (Army of the South) 2276, 2277
 Ekici, Deniz 352–3
 Ekitiparapo alliance 3677
 Ekoglasnost 3068
 El Chaparral invasion 1205
 El Orabi, Hosni 235
 El Palito, Battle of 3707
 El Salvador
 Catholic Church 1163, 1165, 2060
 coffee 2956
 death squads 2868
 demilitarization 1166
 FENASTRAS 1166, 1189–90, 2959
 Fourteen Families 2956
 Fuerzas Populares de Liberación 2061
 and Honduras 2956
 income per capita 2956
 indigo 2956
 kidnapping 2957
La Matanza 638–9, 1163, 2019–20, 2956
 left-wing parties 1164
 liberation theology 481
 Marmón 2223–4
 Martí 2224–6
 massacre of 1932 638–9
 Mayan culture 639
 music 639
 Reagan 1163, 1165
 Romero 2060, 2867–9
 Soccer War 2956–7
 Truth Commission 2959
 UN accords 1166
see also FMLN; Martí, Farabundo; Salvadoran
 Civil War
 El Troudi, Haiman 413
 Elazar, David 1813
 Elbaum, M. 3071
 Eldorado dos Carajás massacre 3463
 elephant trapping 371
 Eleven Years' Tyranny 1097
 Elias, Serrano 1478
 Elifas, Philomenon 3204
 Eliot, Charles 2253
 Elisabeth of Austria 130
 elites 781–2, 790
 Elizabeth I, of England
 birth 516
 enthroned 516
 Irish insurrections 1805
 Protestantism 1095–6, 3001
 and States General of the Netherlands 1035
 Elizabeth II, of Britain 1199, 2487, 3317
 Elizarova, Anna 3553
 Elizondo, Francisco 1579
 Ellacuría, Ignacio 478, 2958, 2959
 Ellington, Duke 1555
 Elliot, Gilbert 873
 Elliott, Marianne 993
Ellis, Daniel Edward “Daan” 1087–8, 1557,
 2626, 3093, 3094
 Ellis, Havelock 2968
 Ellis, Sarah Stickney 3565–6
 Ellis, Sylvia 218–19
 ELN: *see* Ejército de Liberación Nacional
 Elphinstone, John 1097
 Elser, Georg 1370
 Elton, G. R. 1092
Emancipador, O 153
 Emancipation Movement 204–5
 Emancipation of Labor Group 3720
 Emancipation Proclamation 2491
 Emang Basadi Women's Association 3605
 Emergency Acts, Germany 1366
 Emerson, Ralph Waldo 1222, 1305, 2491
 emigration 394, 537, 1798
 Emiliano Zapata Campesino Organization
 (OCEZ) 2288
 Emiliano Zapata National Independent
 Campesino Alliance (ANCIEZ) 2288
 Emmenegger, Hans 3212
Emmet, Robert 819, 1088–9, 1789, 3490
 United Irishmen 2545
 Emmet, Thomas Addis 1088–9, 1787
Emmet's Rebellion 993, 1088–9
 Emperan, Vincente 3456
 empire as concept 1672
see also imperialism
 Enabling Act, Finland 1202
 Enabling Act, Nazi Germany 1178, 1590, 2832
enclosure movement 1089–90, 1103, 1785,
 3211
encomienda (forced labor) 3709
 Encouragement of Industry Law 3348

- Encruzilhada Natalito 2352
- Encyclopédie*
- d'Alembert 1109
 - Diderot 1101, 1109
 - Holbach's contributions 1602
 - Montesquieu 2316
 - Voltaire's contributions 3495
- Endara, Guillermo 2594
- Enes, António 2354
- Enfantin, Prosper 1232, 2953
- ENFO-FANM 3585
- Engel, George 1569, 1570
- Engelbrektsson, Olav 2523
- Engels, Friedrich 1091–2**
- on Bakunin 336
 - Bernstein on 381
 - Condition of the Working Class in England* 1091, 2923
 - Dialectics of Nature* 2992
 - exploitation 773
 - Ludwig Feuerbach* 2837
 - and Marx 2230, 2238–9
 - on *Northern Star* 2549
 - Origin of the Family* 1091, 3042
 - Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy* 1091
 - on Paris Commune 1000, 2236–7, 2612–13
 - on patriarchy 124
 - Polish liberation 2701
 - Revolution and Counter-Revolution* 887
 - on sabotage 143–4
 - scientific socialism 2992
 - Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* 2244, 2952
 - see also *Communist Manifesto*
- engineering workers' commission 181–2
- England
- common law 201, 590
 - Glorious Revolution 75, 1224, 1404–8
 - Jacobins 1116, 3150
 - Reformation 514–16, 1092–6
 - Restoration 1100
- Engler, Mark 3657
- English Civil War 93, 289, 908, 1098–9, 1100, 1194, 2118, 2125
- Locke 2125
 - Paracelsus 2988
- English Reformation 1092–6**
- English Revolution 1096–109**
- Charles I 1097–8
 - Civil Wars 1098–9
 - Commonwealth 1099–100
 - radical sects 1100–6, 2988
 - women 1106–9
- English Woman's Journal* 3566
- Eniwetok nuclear testing site 199, 1461, 2303
- Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdista (ERNK) 2011
- Enlightenment 1109–16**
- abolitionism 203, 1112–13
 - Adorno 13
 - American Revolution 80, 1112
 - anti-clericalism 1109–11
 - on Christianity 1111
 - democracy 1113–14
 - Diderot 1001
 - effect on China 713
 - France 1109–16
 - Germany 1349
 - Judaism 1111
 - Locke's influence 2125
 - and modernity 886
 - monarchy 115
 - reason 1112
 - Renaissance legacy 886
 - sexuality 1110, 2101
 - slavery 91
 - Voltaire 1110, 1111
- Enlightenment* 985
- Enmore Riots 1856
- Enniscorthy, Battle of 1788
- Enosis* (union with Greece) 943, 945, 947, 1455
- Enquirer* 1409
- Enragés* 962, 1277, 1288, 1290–1, 1296, 1531, 2849–50
- Enrique of Hispaniola 2079
- Enriquez, Fadrique 844
- Enriquillo and Taíno revolt 1116–17**
- Enron 2263
- Ensler, Eve: *The Vagina Monologues* 1191
- Ensslin, Gudrun 1368
- Enthusiasts 3544–5, 3632
- Enver Pasha 51, 3243, 3366–7, 3421, 3682
- Environmental Defense Fund 617
- environmental justice activism 1053
- Environmental Protection Agency 617, 2418
- environmental protest 1117–21**
- Australia 305
 - Carson 616–17
 - civil disobedience 785
 - direct action 1051
 - First Nations 785
 - NGO 3113
 - as social movement 1052
- Ephevion school 3582
- Epic Theater 28, 504, 1482
- Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) 2506, 2683
- Epinay, Congress of 825
- Episcopal Church, Scotland 1854, 1855
- Episcopal Conference of Latin America (CELAM) 479, 480, 2057, 2500
- Episkopopoulos, N. 3583

- EPL Maoist guerrilla movement** 1120–1
EPR: *see* Ejército Popular Revolucionario
 Epstein, A. L. 3696
 Epstein, I. 3234
 Equal Opportunity Employment Commission 746
 Equal Opportunity Law, Venezuela 3631
 Equal Pay Act 3166
 equal rights
 employment 3566–8
 same-sex relations 2100
 Wollstonecraft 3541
 Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) 2411, 2624, 2625, 3626, 3628
 Equal Rights for Everyone 1009
 Equal Rights Party 3636
 Equality colony 3418
 Equator, Confederacy of 489
Equiano, Olaudah 202, 206, 207, 296, 1123–4, 3022
 Erasmus, Desiderius 1355
 Erbakan, Necmettin 3342, 3344, 3353
 Erdman, D. V. 401
 Eretz Israel 359, 1816
 Erfurt Program 1942
 Erickson, Reed 2108
 Erignac, Claude 873
 Eritrea 3546
 Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) 1138
 Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) 1132, 1138
 Eroshenko, Vasilij 135
Erőszaknélküliség (Non-Violence) 128
 Erskine, John, Earl of Mar 1854
 Erundina, Luiza 1260
 Ervin, Charles Wesley 969–70, 1493–5, 2049–54
 Ervin, Lorenzo Komboa 159
 Esack, Farid 1811
 Escalante, Anibal 627, 934
 Escarpit, Robert 2261
 Escheat movement 2752–3
 Escóbar, Filemón 418
 Escobar, Pablo 797
 Escoto, Miguel d' 2061, 2473
escrache 1579–80
 Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA) 254
Escuela Moderna movement (The Modern School) 145, 1124–5, 3217
 Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS) 809–10
 Escuela Racionalista 618
 Eshref, Sheikh 3356–7
 ESKOM 3099–100
 Espanyolists 630
 Espejel, Leticia Pacheco 618–19, 910–11, 1015–17, 1269–70, 1924–5, 2339–40, 2538–9, 3378–9
 Esperanza, Paz y Libertad party 1121
 Espin, Vilma 3572–3
 Espino Negro Pact 2965
 Espinosa, Gaspar de 3404
 Espinosa de los Monteros, María 3610
 Espionage Act 12, 975, 1051, 1412, 1571, 2489
 Espirito Santo, Diana 917–21
 Espiritu Santo 3426
Esprit 226
 Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) 630, 2737, 3136
 Esquipulas Accords 2475
 Esquipulas II accord 1165–6
Esquire 3166
 Essien-Udom, Essien U. 396
 Estaing, Charles Hector d' 2553
Estates General 1125–7, 1525
 Lafayette 2041
 Marat 2211
 Saint-Simon 2952
 women's participation 1125–7, 1274–5, 1292–3
 Estenoz, Evaristo 912, 913, 914
 Estenssoro, Victor Paz 416
 MNR 419, 428
 National Revolution 431
 neoliberalism 422–3, 432
 ousted 1260
 shock therapy 787
 tin mining 432
 Esterhazy, C. F. 1022
 Estevam, José 153
 Estigarríbia, José Félix 2599
 Estimé, Dumarsais 1518
 Estonia 340, 341, 3507
 Estrada, Joseph 2687
 Estrada Palma, Tomás 912, 918, 919
 Estrup, J. B. S. 990
Estudios Centroamericanos 2958
ETA: *see* Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
 Eternal League 2374
 Ethem, Çerkes 3349, 3357
Ethiopia 1132–42
 Christianity 1132
 Coptic Church 1132
 Eritrea 1138–9
 Italian occupation 1133, 1180, 2383
 National Period Charter 1139–40
 Revolution 1132–42
 state–society relations 1133, 1140
 students 1134, 1135–6
 Zemene Mesafint 1132
 Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) 1136

- Ethiopian People's Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) 1132, 1139–41
- Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) 1135
- ethnic cleansing 223, 1180, 1855, 3683
- Etudiant noir, L'* 2427
- Etxebarrieta, Txabi 1129
- eugenics 1587, 1591–2
- Eulenberg Affair 1586
- Eureka Stockade** 1144–6, 1944, 2043
- Eureka Youth League 304
- Eurocentrism 2733
- Eurocommunism** 379, 823, 1146–7
- Eurogold 3343
- EuroMayDay** 1147–8, 1390, 1403
- Europe** 1148–51
- anti-Semitism 1181
 - capitalism 1655
 - Marxism 2249
 - revolutions (1848) 1148–51
 - see also* Eastern Europe
- European Coal and Steel Community 360
- European Convention on Human Rights 2011
- European Democratic Central Committee 2267
- European Farmers' Coordination 3462
- European Nuclear Disarmament (END) 198, 3283
- European Social Forum (ESF) 227, 1009, 2306, 3641
- Florence 1009, 1311, 3642
 - London 1147
 - see also* World Social Forums
- European Socialist Party 3643
- European Trade Union Confederation 228
- European Union** 1151–4
- anti-neoliberalism 1400–1
 - Common Agricultural Policy 3461
 - Gothenburg summit protests 1151–4, 1307, 1401
 - Haiti 1504
 - Malta 2187
 - promoting democracy 816
 - sanctions on Zimbabwe 3738
 - Thessaloniki Leader Summit 127
 - Turkey 3345
- Eusebius of Caesarea 2828
- Euskadi 182, 183
- Eutaw Springs 86
- euthanasia program 1179
- Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)** 1127–32
- assassinations 182, 2776
 - execution of members 183
- Evading Standards* 1388, 2809
- Evangelical Protestantism 214, 3520
- homosexuality 2094
- Evangelista, Cristo 2672
- Evangelista de Monte Marciano, João 600
- Evans, Arthur "Slim" 2563, 2832
- Evening Standard* 1388
- Everard, William 1104, 3536–7
- Evers, Medgar** 73, 744, 1154–5, 1258, 1975
- Evian Agreement 1247
- Evrard, Simone 2211
- Evseksiia* 3606
- Ewald, Kerstin 447–8, 1005–6, 2223–4
- Ex-Slave Mutual Relief, Bounty, and Pension Association 1608
- Examiner* 3210
- Exceso de Equipaje 639
- existentialism 581
- Expeditionary French Task Force (CEFEO) 3472, 3473, 3474
- exploitation 1662–3
- Explorations* 985, 3518
- Export, Valie 1191
- Exposition Coloniale Internationale 851
- Expressionism 116
- Exxon Corporation 2418
- Eylau, Battle of 442
- Eyre, Edward John 1870, 2321–3
- Eyschen, Paul 2141
- Eyskens' Bill 361
- Ezeiza Protest and Massacre** 1155–7
- Ezhavas 955–6
- EZLN:** *see* Zapatista Army of National Liberation
- Faas-Hardegger, Margarethe 2049
- Fabbri, Luigi 1322, 1419, 2168, 3015
- Fabian Society 316, 381, 830, 2341, 3061, 3516
- Fabre d'Eglantine, Philippe 1297
- Fábrica Adentro* program 3454
- Facilities for Titles Law 2197
- Facio Brenes, Rodrigo 879
- factories
- councils 249, 1818
 - grassroots leadership 250
 - occupation of 1236
 - Russia 2923–4
 - see also* Movement of Recuperated Factories, Argentina
- Factory Acts 658
- factory guerillas 250
- Fadayan-e-Islam 1764, 1770
- Fadlallah, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn
- Islam and the Logic of Force* 1575–6
- Fagor Electrodómicos 2314
- Fahd, Yusuf Salman Yusuf** 1159–60, 1779, 2953–4
- Fahri Pasha 287
- FAI:** *see* Federación Anarquista Ibérica

- Faina, Gianfranco 131
 Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC)
 757, 2803
 Fair Housing Act 753
 Fairbanks, Calvin 3047
 Fairfax, Anne 1106
 Fairfax, Thomas 1101, 1104, 3537
 Fairhope enclave 3418
 Faisal, Prince 1775
Faiz Ahmed Faiz 1160–1, 1761, 2581
 Faizpur Congress 2431
Fakir-Sannyasi Revolt 368–9
 Fakudze, Mliba 3207
 Falange, Bolivia 419, 431
Falange Española 180, 1587
 Sección Femenina 3611
 Falck, Niels Nicolaus 2983, 2984
 Falcon, Lidia 3610, 3611
 Falcón, Ramón 243, 266
 Falintil 1043
 Falk, Jim 305
 Fallas del Sistema 2063
 Fallmerayer, Jacob Philipp 1451
 Fals Borda, Orlando 3303
 false consciousness 771
 False Dmitry 436
 Families against State Terrorism (FAST) 1865
 Family Code, Soviet Union 3607
 Family Protection Law 1774
 Family Support Program, Nigeria 3548
 famine
 China 709, 2204
 France 1304
 India 3587
 Ireland 1798, 2545
 Russia 2922
 Spanish Civil War 180
Fanelli, Giuseppe 97, 144, 1161–2, 2692
 Fang Kuo-an 2310
 Fanm D'Ayiti (Women of Haiti) 3585
 Fanmi Lavalas Party 280
 Fanning, R. 3305
 Fanny Wright Party 2024, 3617, 3667
Fanon, Frantz 18, 613, 1162–3, 2784
 Damnés de la Terre, Les 1162, 1163, 2839, 2974
 dialectics 2839
 Peau noire, masques blancs 1162, 2839
 Farabundo Martí, Agustín 2020, 2224, 2249
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
 (FMLN) 1163–7
 Catholic Church 2060
 formation of 1163
 and Mármol 2224
 military units 1165
 Primera 2751
 Salvadoran Civil War 2956–9
 and Torrijos 3304
 Farber, S. 933
FARC: *see* Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
 Colombia
 FARC-EP 797, 1120, 1167, 3389
 Fard, Wallace D. 394
 Farel, Guillaume 565
 Farga Pellicer, Rafael 145
 Farina, Louis 3065
 Farjallah, Muhammad Husayn 2953
 Farkas, E. 1631
Farm Labor Organizing Committee 1170
 Farmer, James 613, 653, 762, 869–70, 1975
 CORE 2498
 Freedom Rides 1257, 2498
 Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union 2721
 Farmers' Association of the Middle Atrato
 (ACIA) 795–6
 Farmers' League, Japan 1901–2
 Farmers' March 3646
 Farouk, King 1069, 1070, 1076, 1077, 2366
 Farr, Roger 3423–4
 Farrakhan, Louis 397
 Farrapos, Guerra dos 491–2
 Farthing, L. 433
Fasci Siciliani movement 2168
fascism 1170–85
 Austria 320
 collapse of 1183–4
 economics of 1174
 Germany 1171, 1176–80, 1587–8
 Italy 1171, 1172, 1176–80, 1184, 1828–9,
 3341–2, 3593
 motherhood 1174
 nationalism 1173
 Portugal 2730
 protest and revolution 1170–5
 Spain 291–2
 student groups 3178
 as third way 1171
 violence 1173
 and war 1180–3
 Fascist Repubblica Sociale 1823
 Fascist Trade Unions 1177
 Fasehun, Frederick 2484
 Fasi, Allal al- 1248, 1249
 Fassnacht, Robert 222
 Fast, Howard 3149
 fast-food corporations 671, 1054
 fasting as protest 1605
Fat Korean 136
 Fatah 238–9, 1758
 Fatemi, Hossein 1765
 Fatherland Front coalition 536, 537, 544

- fatwa* 3356
 Faubourg Saint Germain 1228
 Faubus, Orval 763
 Faulkner, Daniel 7, 8
 Faure, Félix 3745
 Faure, Sébastien 98, 120, 1124, 3217
 Fauset, Jessie 1024, 1554, 1555
 Favras, Marquis de 892
 Fawcett, Millicent 527, 3551
Fawkes, Guy 1186–7
 FBI: *see* Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Feake, Christopher 1103
 Febrerista Revolution 2599, 2600
 February 28 Incident (2–28): *see* Taiwan,
 February 28 protests (1947)
 Febvre, Lucien 405
 fedayeen 285
 Fedecamaras 670, 3450
 Federación Agraria Argentina 253
Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI)
 1187–9, 1433
 Catalonia 3129
 Durruti 1030
 emergence of 145
 as proto-political party 848
 Federación de Estudiantes de Chile (FECh) 112
 Federación de Estudiantes de Estudios Medios
 (FEEM) 936
 Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios (FEU)
 936
 Federación de Trabajadores de Chile (FTCh)
 111, 112
 Federación de Trabajadores de la Región
 Española (FTRE) 145
 Federación Ibérica de Juventudes Libertarias
 (FIJL) 849, 1189
 Federacion Obrera Argentina (FOA) 102, 260,
 261, 1419
 Federacion Obrera de la Región Argentina
 (FORA) 102, 161, 247–8, 254, 265, 277
 Federación Obrera Regional Paraguaya (FORP)
 2609, 2648
 Federación Obrera de Unidad Sindical (FOUS)
 2739
 Federación Sindicalista Libertaria 848
 Federación Universitaria Argentina 864
 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
 Addams 12
 Black Power 19
 BPP 398
 COINTELPRO 395, 398
Daily Worker 1603
 IWW 1737
 on Steinem 3167
 Uhuru movement 3373
 Federal Coordination for Internationalism
 (BUKO) 1316
 Federal Council of Aboriginal Affairs (FCAA)
 307–8
 Federal Council for Aborigines and Torres Strait
 Islanders (FCAATSI) 3, 308, 309
 Federal Drug Administration 617
 Federal Electrical Commission (CFE) 2299
 Federal Homestead Act 63
 Federal Labor Party 316
 Federal Party, Sri Lanka 3250–1
 Federal Preventive Police (PFP) 3379
 Federal Theater Project 28
 Federation of African (Welfare) Societies 3698
 Federation of Anarchist-Communist Groups in
 Exile 142
 Fédération Anarchiste 121
 Fédération des Bourses du Travail (FBT) 850
 Fédération Communiste Libertaire (FCL) 121,
 122
 Fédération Communiste Révolutionnaire
 Anarchiste 120
 Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) 921, 936,
 3572
 Federation of Free African Trade Unions of
 South Africa (FOFATUSA) 3094, 3095
 Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) 1617, 2676
 Federation of Free Workers (FFW) 2676
 Federation of Independent Students of Thailand
 (FIST) 2747, 3261
 Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and
 Industry (FICCI) 1681, 1684
 Federation of Indigenous Organizations of Napo
 (FOIN) 1056
 Federation of Indonesian Peasants 3462
 Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU)
 1981, 1982, 1986–7, 1988, 1989–90
 Federation of Mining, Metallurgical, and Steel
 Workers (FNTMMSP) 2652
 Fédération Nationale des Syndicats (FNS) 850
 Federation of Non-European Trade Unions
 (FNETU) 832, 2111, 3093
 Federation of Organized Trades and Labor
 Unions of the United States and Canada
 (FOTLU) 2028, 2029
 Federation of Peasants of Thailand 3261
 Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland 3730
Federation of Salvadoran Workers
(FENASTRAS) 1166, 1189–90, 2959
 Federation of Shuar Centers 1064
 Federation of South African Labor (FEDSAL)
 3097
 Federation of South African Trade Unions
 (FOSATU) 174, 874, 2264, 2801, 3089,
 3096, 3106

- Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW)
171, 3040, 3603
- Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA)
3097
- Federation of Unions of Workers at the Service
of the State (FSTSE) 2294
- Federation of University Students of Paraguay
(FEUP) 2601
- Federazione Anarchica Informale (FAI) 132
- Federazione Anarchici Italiani (FAI) 131
- Federazione dei Comunisti Anarchici Italiani
(FCAI) 131
- Federazione Giovanile Socialista 997
- Federazione dei Lavoratori Metalmeccanici
(FLM) 1823
- Federazione Operaia Napoletana 1161
- Federazione Sindacale Mondiale 998
- Federazione unitaria 1823
- Fédérés* 2611
- Fedraheimen* (Home of the Forefathers) 2524
- Feijó, Diogo 562
- Feillet, Paul 2357
- Felco, Juan 1614, 1616, 2672
- Felker, Clay 3166
- Fell, Margaret** 1106, 1107, 1190
- Fell, Thomas 1190
- Fellagha group 1248
- fellahin* (peasant-origin officers) 1076, 1077
- Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) 194, 869,
2498
- Felquistes* 2785, 2786
- Feltrinelli, Giangiacomo 1836, 1837, 1847
- Female Republican Party (PRF) 3598
- Female Society of Birmingham 204
- Feminine Committee of the Patriotic Junta
(CFJP) 3631
- femininity 3565
- feminism
- Africa 3548–9
 - Belgium 2721–2
 - first wave 3616–23
 - France 3620
 - Goldman 1411–12
 - Hoy 1609
 - Huerta 1609
 - Iraq 1784
 - Japan 3595–6
 - lesbianism 2093–4, 3569
 - Marxism 2249
 - Montessori 2317
 - postcolonial 2733–5
 - race 3570
 - second wave 124, 355, 3569–70, 3627–30
 - third wave 3630
 - transnational 2734–5
 - World War I 3568
see also women's movement
- Feminist Alliance 3625
- feminist performance** 1191–2
- Féministes révolutionnaires 3575, 3576
- femocrats 305
- FENASTRAS**: *see* Federation of Salvadoran
Workers
- Feng Ziyou 674
- Fenian Brotherhood 793, 1192
- Fenian movement** 967, 1192–3, 1799
- Fennell, Vera Leigh 2199–205
- Fenner Brockway, A. 218
- Feral Faun 979
- Ferdinand I, Emperor 186, 3178
- Ferdinand II, of Aragon 844, 2055
- Ferdinand IV, of Naples and Sicily 2185
- Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria 1925
- Ferdinand V, of Spain 1623, 2055
- Ferdinand VII, of Spain 3457
- Ferghana Valley 3422
- Ferguson, Bill 307
- Ferīd Bey 3358
- Fermin, Claudio 3440
- Fernandez, R. 2771, 2774
- Fernández, Rafael Tomás 1018
- Fernández de Cevallos, Diego 2293
- Fernando, H. N. 2633
- Fernando VII, of Spain 3456
- Ferrari Bravo, Luciano 1844
- Ferrat, Jean 2381
- Ferré, Léo 2381–2
- Ferré, Théophile 2300
- Ferreira, Benigno 2608
- Ferreira, Câmara 2219
- Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson 3406
- Ferreira da Silva, Newton 561–2, 3008–9
- Ferrer, Francisco 117, 153, 2048, 3217
- Ferrer Colony 3418
- Ferrer Modern School 379, 3418
- Ferrer y Guardia, Francisco 99, 145, 618, 1124
- Ferrera, Gregorio 2018
- Ferrero, Pietro 130
- Ferrucci, Caterina Franceschi 3592
- Fersen, Axel von 2518
- Fès, Treaty of 2335
- Festival of Light 513
- Festival of Resistance 2807
- Fetjó, François 1625
- Fetterman Fight 900
- Feuchtwanger, Lion** 1193–4
- feudalism
- Britain 1665–6
 - Deleuze/Guattari 980
 - Free Officers 1071

- French Revolution 1275, 1279, 1286
 Germany 1352–3
 Japan 1897
 Korea 1998
 Kurdistan 2010
 Luxemburg on 1650, 2144
 peasants 1352–3
 Romania 2863
 Russia 2921
 Feuerbach, Ludwig 677, 2230, 3679
 and Bakunin 333
 and Proudhon 2764
 Feuillants 1288–9, 1292, 1531, 2042
 Fez Treaty 1249
 Fiallo, Viriato 1018
 Fianna Fáil 971, 1050
 Fiat
 Argentina 864
 Italy 1836, 1837, 1839, 1844
 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 333
 Fidelismo 627
 Fidelity Exploration and Production Co. 2418
 Fielden, John and Joseph 2720
 Fielden, Samuel 1569, 1570
 Fier rebellion 29
 Fifteen Years' War 134
Fifth Estate 159, 1052
Fifth Monarchists 1099, 1100, 1102–3, **1194–5**
 women 1109, **1194–5**, 1225
Figaro, Le 1229
Fight, The 3469
 Fighting Solidarity 2708
 Figner, Vera 3550, 3554
 Fignolé, Daniel 1518, 1520
 Figueres Ferrer, José 878, 879
 Figueroa Alcocer, Rubén 2285, 2288
 Figueroa Cordero, Andres 2770, 2771
 Figueroa Figueroa, Rubén 563, 2283
Fiji 1196–200
 as British Crown Colony 1196
 Chinese immigrants scheme 1198
 CIA 1198
 indentured labor 1196, 1197, 3425
 Indian population 1196, 1197
 Methodists 1196, 1198
 missionaries 1196
 parliamentary insurrection **1196–200**
 Rabuka 2797–8
 sugar cane cultivation 1196
 World Wars 1197
 Fiji Military Force 1197
 Fijian Nationalist Party 1197
 Fijian Political Party 2797
 filibustero interventions 56
 Filizzola, Carlos 2601, 2603, 2607
 Fillon, François 1238
 Filmer, Robert 2370
 Filosofova, Anna 3067, 3390
 Fim-Cisl (Catholic trade union) 1840
Finally Got the News 2068
 Fine Gael 1050
 Fini, Gianfranco 1310
Finland 1200–2
 anarchism 118–19
 anarchosyndicalism 119
 break with Russia 1202, 2932
 civil war 1200–2, 2517–18, 2519
 General Strike 2517
 independence 2517
 parliament dissolved 2911
 Plekhanov 2694
 Red Guard/White Guard 2517
 revolution 1200–2
 in Russian Empire 2512, 2883
 Social Democratic Party 2519
 Soviet Union 2520, 3507
 and Sweden 1200–1
 women's suffrage 3550
 see also Nordic countries
 Finley-Bowman, Rachel 3540–2
 Finney, Charles Grandison 214
 Finnish Question 1979
 Finnish War 3209
 FIOM (metal workers' union) 1307, 1311, 1821, 1823
 Fionn mac Cumhail 1192
 Fiorino, Vinzia 3591–3
 FIOT (textile workers' union) 1821
fiqh, Iran 1774
 Firemen's Union of the Pacific Coast 1754
 Firestone, Shulamith 772, 3167, 3629
 Firmin, Anténor 1515
 First, Ruth 2357, 2358, 3053
 First All Burma Conference, Youth League 553
 First All-Russian Congress of Worker and Peasant Women 3606
 First All Russian Women's Congress 3551
 First Balkan Social Democratic Conference 337
First Book of Discipline 3001
 First Coalition, War of 3154
 First Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia 3049
 First Intergalactic Encuentro for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism 1386, 1396
 First Nations 582, 785, 2098
 First Nations Policing Policy 2557
 First Quarter Storm 2678
 First Seminar for the Evaluation of Venezuelan Women 3631
 First Workers' Congress 2648
 Fischer, Adolph 1569, 1570

- Fischer, Bram 3104
 Fischer, E. 770
 Fischer, Joschka 224, 1367, 3523
 Fischer-Hoffman, Cory 2949–50, 3630–2
 Fischhof, Adolf 1920
 fish-ins 2412
 Fisher, John 515
 Fisher, Mochi 2856
 Fisher, Percy 151, 154, 832, 3091
 Fitrart, Abdurrauf 3241, 3244
Fitzgerald, Edward 1203, 1788, 1790–1, 1795
 United Irishmen 2545, 2546, 3393
 Fitzgerald, James Fitzmaurice 1805
 Fitzgerald, Mary 148–9
 Fitzgerald, William 837
 Fitzgibbon, John 1786, 1787
 Fitzjames, Alexander 3315
 Fitzpatrick, Claire 1026–7, 1798–800
 Fitzpatrick, John 2034
 Fitzpatrick, Sheila: *Everyday Stalinism* 3160–1
 Five Interested Parties (FIPs) 3650, 3652
 Five-Percent Nation 394
 Five Republics of Central America 2949
 Flamank, Thomas 509
 Flaubert, Gustave 2974
 Fleming, John “Chummy” 106–7
 Fleming, Klaus 2514
 Flemish 361, 362–4
 Flesselles, Jacques de 1607
 Fletcher, Ben 2033
 Fleurus, Battle of 1292, 2850, 2951
Flibustiers 1540
 Flick 1367
 FLN-FALN 3442
FLOC: *see* Farm Labor Organizing Committee
 Flon, Catherine 3584
 Flood, Henry 1786
 Flor, Christian 989, 2983
 Florence 227
 European Social Forum 1009, 1311
 Flores, Andres 2770
 Flores, J. 2774
 Flores, Juan José 1062
 Florescu, Madalina 2358–62
 Florestan Fernandes National School 2352
 Florida 88
 Flosse, Gaston 1273
 Floud Commission 2574
 Flower, Richard 2460
Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley 125, 143, 836, 1125, 1203–4
 Alderson Story, The 1204
 Heterodoxy 3625
 IWW 2032, 2623
FMLN: *see* Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
 FMLN-FDR 1165, 2958
Fo, Dario 131, 1204–5
 Foa, Vittorio 2622
 Folk Brothers 612
 Follen, Karl 558
 Fonda, Jane 221
Fonseca, Carlos 1205–6, 2467, 2469, 2471, 2964, 2966
 Fonseca, Hermes da 469
 Fonseca, Jorge Carlos 447, 603
 Font, José 278
 Fontanier, Henri 3289
 Fontenelle, Maria Luisa 499
 Fontenis, Georges 121
 Fontes, Paulo 473–8
 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 1211, 2319, 3111, 3463
 Food and Canning Workers' Union (FCWU) 2398, 3039, 3093, 3094
 Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN) 1211, 3462
Food Not Bombs 159, 161, 1206–7
 food prices
 French Revolution 1277–8
 Germany 1360
 setting 1208
 Wales 3498
food riots 501, 1207–10
 anti-IMF 1209–10
 England 3211
 French Revolution 1208
 harvest failure 1209
 Italy 130, 1846
 women 1209
 World War I 1209
 Zimbabwe 3732
 food shortages, Russia 1417, 2934–6
food sovereignty 1210–12, 3461
 Foot, Hugh 946
 Foot, Michael 2040
foquismo (guerilla cells) 1489
 Forbes Commission 1516
 Força Sindical 477
 Force Ouvrière (FO) 1236
 forced labor 1279
 Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (FFI) 1241
 Ford, Gerald 1043
 Ford, Henry 1424
 Ford, Ita 2060
 Ford protests 512, 837
 Ford-Smith, Honor 3579
 Fordism 1007, 1398, 1399, 1423, 2370, 3171

- foreign intervention** 1212–19
 China 1213–14
 France 1214
 ideology 1215–16
 imperialism 1216–17
 Japanese and Prussian exceptions 1214–15
 revolutionaries 1218–19
 Russia 1214
 Skocpol 1213
 world systems theory 1217–18
- Forest Acts 2802
 Forest Brothers 341
 forest defense campaigns 1052
 Forest movement, Iran 1768
 forestry 1119
 formalism/social realism 1081
 Forman, James 1259
 Forman, Michael 1755–8
 Forrest, Edwin 3147
 Forrest, Nathan Bedford 65, 2801
 Forsberg, Randall 198
 Fort, Jeff 1551
 Fort Donelson 59
 Fort Henry 59
 Fort Laramie, Treaty of 900, 2413
 Fort Pillow massacre 65, 2801
 Fort Sumter 58, 65
 Fort Ticonderoga 79, 82
 Fort Wagner 65
 Fort Wilson Riot 84
 Forten, James 207
Fortnightly Review 2172
 Fortune, Thomas 16, 756
 Fortuyn, Pim 2448
 Forum Against Oppression of Women 3589
 Forum Demokrasi (FODEM) 1723
 Forum of Indigenous Peoples of Oaxaca 2537
 Forum for Union Coordination (FCS) 2356
Forverts (Forward) 1916
Forward 2821
 Forward Bloc (FB) 450, 1704, 2792
 Forza Italia 1307
 Forza Nuova Nazi group 1310
 Fos-Lavera blockade 1235
 Foster, Abby Kelly 167
 Foster, Frank 2029
 Foster, John (Irish politician) 1786, 1787, 1789
 Foster, John (US Secretary of State) 1565
 Foster, John Bellamy 2249
Foster, William Z. 596, 836, 840, 1220, 1737, 2034, 2037
 Foti, Alex 1147–8
 Fottorino, Éric 1238
Foucault, Michel 1220–2
Archaeology of Knowledge 1221
 biopolitics 1006, 2305
 class struggle 772, 1221
History of Sexuality 1221
 power theory 1221, 2736
 sexuality 1221, 3018
- Fouché, Joseph 895
 Foulards Rouges 2458
 Fouque, Antoinette 3575, 3576
 Four Mothers 1816
 Fourah Bay College demonstration 3031
Fourier, Charles François Marie 973, 1222–3, 1910, 3147
 communities 2842–3
 as example 1638
 Phalansteries 2763
Theory of Four Movements and of General Destinies 1222
 utopian socialism 677, 1574, 2231
- Fournier, Michelangelo 1310
 Fourshey, Catherine Cymone 2960–2
 Fourteen Families, El Salvador 2956
 14th of June movement 1014, 1018
 Fourth Congress of Soviets 2934
 Fourth International Organization of South Africa (FIOSA) 834
 Fourth (Unification) Conference 438
Fox, Charles James 507, 1203, 1223–4, 2546, 3024, 3529
Fox, George 201, 1105, 1107, 1190, 1224–5
 Fox, Vicente 2286, 2289, 2291, 2294, 2536, 3718
 Foxe, John 1095
Foxe's Book of Martyrs 1095
- FPMR:** *see* Frente Patrioco Manuel Rodriguez (FPMR)
- FPRLZ:** *see* Lorenzo Zelaya Popular Revolutionary Forces
- Frackman, Kyle E. 1200–2
 fragging, Vietnam War 221
 Friginals, Moreno 919
 Frame Breakers' Bill 2134
 Franc-Tireur Resistance group 405
- France**
 Algeria 225, 226
 American Revolution 1218
 anarchism 119–22
 anarchocommunism 119
 anarchosyndicalism 119, 120
 anti-Semitism 405, 887–8
 anti-war movement 225–7
 Charter of 1814 1227–8, 1229
 clandestine societies 1228
Code Noir 201
 Cold War 825
 collectivism 119
 counterrevolution 891–7

France (*cont'd*)

- 1830 Revolution 1227–33
- 1848 Revolution 1242–5
- Enlightenment 1109–16
- Fanon 1162–3
- fascism 1172–3
- feminism 3620
- food riots 1208
- Haiti 1527–8, 1541–2
- Huguenots 1068–9, 2950, 3494
- immigrants/social conflict 1643–7
- Indochina 44, 225, 3473
- Jewish people 1918–19
- June Days 1233–4, 1244, 2044, 2409
- labor protests, post-World War II 1234–9 and Latin America 486
- May 1968 events 323, 2260–4
- music, songs, and protest 2380–2
- Muslim headscarf debate 1644–5
- mutualism 119
- Nazism resisted 1239–42
- nuclear weapons 196
- pacifism 225
- Popular Front 3469
- Protestantism 1110
- Restoration 1229
- strikes 2933, 3216
- student protests 3172, 3178
- unemployment 1644, 1646, 3380, 3381, 3385
- universal suffrage 1243–4
- women's movement 3575–8
- working class 1280
- see also* French Revolution
- France, Anatole 2947
- Franceschini, Alberto 2815
- Francia, José Gaspar Rodríguez de 2608
- Francis, Will 2408
- Francis Joseph, Emperor 1623
- Francisca, Juana 3630
- Francisco Ferrer School, New York 1125
- Francistown African Employees' Union (FAEU) 456
- Franck, James 194
- Franco, Eduardo 409
- Franco, Francisco
 - CNT 849–50
 - coming to power 180
 - and CPUSA 840
 - protest song about 2381
 - in Spanish Foreign Legion 2336
 - student movement 3170
 - terror 292
 - victory of 146
- Franco, Itamar 499
- Franco, João 188
- Franco, Rafael 2599, 2600
- Franco-Prussian War 440, 1323, 1611, 1827, 3636
 - aftermath 2236
 - Paris besieged 2410, 2610
- Franco-Thai war 1713
- Francois, Elma 3559
- François I, of France 2017
- Francophone Africa** 1246–53
 - Algeria 1246–7
 - Cameroon 1251–2
 - Central African Republic 1250–1
 - Congo-Brazzaville 1251
 - Madagascar 1249–50
 - Morocco 1248–9
 - RDA 1252
 - Tunisia 1247–8
- Frank, André Gunder 1668–9
- Frank, Christopher 2463–4, 3280–1
- Frank, Louis 2721
- Frank, Thomas 1459
- Franke, W. 3232
- Frankenhausen, Battle of 2831
- Frankfurt Parliament 1920
- Frankfurt School** 1253–7
 - Adorno 12
 - Authoritarian Personality, The* 1254
 - Benjamin 376, 904, 1256
 - critical theory 324, 904–8
 - Lukács 2136
 - primitivism 99
 - student movements 3170
 - Studies on Authority and Family* 1254, 1255
 - Western Marxism 1423
 - Young Hegelians 3679
- Frankfurter, Felix 2947
- Frankfurter Rundschau* 1317
- Franklin, Benjamin 1113, 1114, 1785
 - Poor Richard's Almanac* 76
- Franklin, Washington 204
- Franks, Benjamin 108–10, 143–4, 3071–2
- Franqui, Carlos 923
- Franz Ferdinand 318
- Franz-Joseph, Emperor 1621
- Franz Joseph of Austria 1150
- Franzén, Johan 1159–60, 1777–9, 2953–6, 3515–16
- Frape Behr factory 3687
- Fraser, Malcolm 311
- Frashëri, Abdyl 35
- Frashëri, Sami 35
- Frassanito network 2306
- Frauenzeitung* 3580
- Frayhayt* (Freedom) 1916
- Frazer, E. Franklin 1556

- Freda, Ricardo 3149
 Frederica, Battle of 2985
 Frederick, of Sweden 1496
 Frederick Henry of Orange 1036
 Frederick II, Holy Roman Emperor 1034
 Frederick II of Prussia, "The Great" 1114
 gay rights 2101
 Steuben 3514
 Voltaire 3494
 Frederick the Wise of Saxony 2987
 Frederick VII, of Denmark 2985
 Frederick William II, of Germany 2711, 2715
 Frederick William III, of Germany 2981
 Frederick William IV, of Germany 1150–1,
 1348, 2702
 Fredericksburg, Battle of 62, 64
 Frederik I, of Denmark 988
 Free Acres enclave 3418
 Free and Independent Trade Unions (SLIM)
 2356
 Free and Open Source Software (FOSS)
 1739
 Free Angela Davis campaign 965
 Free Association 1153
 Free Basic Water 3101–2
 Free Cambodia Party 575
 Free City project 161
 Free Corps for the National Security (VSN)
 1503, 1518
 see also tontons macoutes
Free Enquirer 3617, 3666
 Free Farmers' Union (MASAKA) 1617
 Free Forum 1152
 Free France 1162, 2336, 2457
 Free German Foundation for Science 2102
 Free German Youth 1343, 1344
 Free Homeland Montoneros (MPL) 1058
 free love 2566, 3626, 3636, 3637, 3666
 Free Officers movement 1069–70, 1076, 2406
 Free Party (FP), Turkey 3361
 Free Patriotic Movement 2405
 free produce concept 208–9
 free-rider problem 649, 651, 652, 2758
 Free Romanian Television 2861
 free schools 118
 Free Software Movement 161
 Free Soil Party 55, 56, 216
 Free Southern Theater 1482
Free Speech 3519
 Free Speech League 1412
Free Speech Movement (FSM), Berkeley
 377–8
 Free Store movement 107
 Free Theater Associates 221
 free trade 176, 1658
 Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA)
 111, 434, 592, 667, 809, 1431, 3645, 3650,
 3654, 3655
 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 804, 1210,
 1431
 Free Trade Area of the Americas 1400, 2636
 Free Trade Unions (WZZ), Poland 3073, 3078
 Free Universities 156, 305, 3169
 Free Workers' Federation (FLT) 141, 2767–8
 Freedmen's Bureau 217, 2800
Freedom 106, 108, 109, 3087
 Kropotkin 2007
 Freedom and Understanding Party (HIF) 3357
 Freedom Bloc 555
 Freedom Charter
 ANC 2357, 3085, 3106
 Congress Alliance 171–2, 2357
 Freedom Fight collective 3686, 3687
Freedom group 148
 freedom from hunger 1212
Freedom Rides 1257–8, 3186
 Australia 308, 309
 CORE 741–2
 Farmer 1257, 2498
 Freedom Schools 1258
 Freedom Shop 139
 freedom of speech 10
Freedom Summer 18, 378, 747, 1258–9
 SNCC 750, 3186
 freedom of thought 2247
Freedom's Journal 3504
 Freegans 3428
 Freeland Colony 3418
 Freely Associated State (ELA) 2769
 Freeman, Donald 18
 Freeman, Harris 3411–15
 Freeman, Kenneth 8
 Freeman, Luke 2156–7
 Freemantle, A. F. 465
 Frei, Eduardo 2377
 Frei Chico 3038
 Frei Montalva, Eduardo 50, 684, 694
Freie Arbeiter Stimme 158
 Freie Arbeiter Union Deutschland (FAUD) 3082
Freiheit, Die 157, 1581
Freikorps 3055, 3056
Freire, Paulo 1259–61, 2500
 as influence 1042, 2605
 Pedagogy of the City 126
 Pedagogy of the Oppressed 407, 1259–60, 1261,
 2059
 Freisler, Roland 3526
FRELIMO: see Frente de Libertação de
 Moçambique
 French, Joan 3579

- French Caribbean** 1262–8, 3578–9
see also specific islands
- French Council for the Muslim Religion 1645
- French Equatorial Africa 1239
- French feminists 3576
- French Foreign Legion 219, 954, 1273
- French Guiana** 1268–71
 Codigo Negro 1269
 departmentalization 1270–1
 ecological movements 1268
 First War of Resistance 1269
 indigenous rebellions 1269–70
 Kourou Space Center protests 1268, 1269
 as overseas department 1270–1
 slavery 1269–70
- French Polynesia** 1271–3
- French Resistance
 Camus 581
 de Gaulle 1240
 Eisenhower 1241–2
 Spanish supporters 1241
see also Bloch, Marc; Free France
- French Revolution** 1273–83, 1283–7, 1287–92, 1292–7, 1297–8
 achievements of 1278–83
 aristocratic privilege 1275–6
 bread riots 777
 class struggle 1287
 Enlightenment 1115
 Estates General 1274–5
 as example 1203, 1786
 feudalism 1275, 1279, 1286
 food riots 1208
 forced labor 1279
 historians' interpretations 1283–7
 Jacobins/Girondins 1277
 July Days 142, 1230–2
 July Monarchy 403, 897, 1227, 1242, 1244, 2044
Liberty 2215–16
 Maximum, Law of the 1243, 1277–8, 1291
 monarchy overthrown 1276–7
 National Assembly 1275, 1532, 3033
 National Convention 2848–50
 National Workshops 1233, 1243–4
 October Days 1276, 1293
 radical factions and organizations 1287–92
 and Russian, compared 2922
 Sainte-Domingue and 1539, 1540–5
 science and technology 2990–2
 Terror 1243, 1277, 1285
 theater 1297–8
 Thermidor 894–6, 1278, 2992
 Tilly on 1215
 Trotsky on 1666
 women's rights 1293
 women's role 1292–7
see also Bastille; Danton, Georges Jacques; Marat, Jean-Paul; Robespierre, Maximilien de; sans-culottes
- French Sudan 3006
- Frente Americo Silva (FAS) 3443
- Frente Amplio (FA) 3405, 3409–10
- Frente de la Juventud Trabajadora Revolucionaria 2740
- Frente de Liberación Popular (FLP) 182
- Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIIMO)** 1261–2
 Machel 738, 2153
 Mondlane 2313–14
 and SACP 1261–2, 3106
 Soviet support 166
 Tanzanian troops 1261
 victories 2355
 Women's Detachment 3547
- Frente Democrática Nueva Guatemala (FDNG) 1478
- Frente Guerrillero Antonio José de Sucre (FGAJS) 3443
- Frente Justicialista de Liberación (FREJULI) 246, 1156
- Frente Militar de Carrera 3450
- Frente Nacional (FN), Colombia 164, 798, 801
- Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) 164, 2359, 2449, 3605
- Frente Obrero Liberashon (FOL) 942
- Frente Patrioco Manuel Rodriguez (FPMR)** 687, 1226–7
- Frente Popular* (Spanish Popular Front) 179
- Frente Social y Politico 809
- Frente Sur (Southern Front) 799
- Frente Unido (United Front), Colombia 800, 3303
- Fresno Larrain, Juan Francisco 2060
- Fretilin party 1042, 1043
- Freud, Sigmund 973, 1256, 1302
 and Hirschfeld 1586, 2103
 Marcuse on 2214
 and Sanger 2968
 on sexuality 3167
- Freyberg-Inan, Annette 297–301
- Frick, Henry Clay 379, 1411
- Friedan, Betty** 1298–300, 3627
Feminine Mystique, The 1298, 3166, 3627
Second Stage, The 1299–300
- Friedländer, Benedikt** 442, 464, 1300, 1586, 1609
- Friedman, Milton 2436
- Friedman, Samuel 3065
- Friedrich Karl of Hesse 1202

- Friedrich Wilhelm III 189
 Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia 1918
 Friendly Correspondence Club 553
 friendly societies 941, 1821
 Friendly Society of Agricultural Labourers 656,
 3300
 Friends of Durruti 1030, 3142, 3143
 Friends of the Earth 1392–3
 Friends of Freedom of the Press 1229
 Friends of Jacques Roumain society 2872
 Friends of Liberty 894
 Friendship Associations 2104
Fries's Rebellion 1300–2
 Frisone, Nicole 818
 Frogier, Pierre 2459
From Caligari to Hitler 905
Fromm, Erich 904, 907, 1256, 1260, 1302–3
 Escape from Freedom 905, 907, 1302
 Frankfurt School 1253, 1254
 Marxism 2249
 Marx's Concept of Man 2838
 Praxis 3689
Fronde, France 1303–5
 Frondizi, Arturo 863, 864, 2640
 Frondizi, Silvio 272, 2839
 Front Antillo-Guyannais (FAG) 1469
 Front Capitán Parmeño 1082
 Front for the Defense of the Land (FPDT) 3719
 Front Domingo Laín 1082
 Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of
 Cabinda (FLEC) 166
 Front for the Liberation of Occupied South
 Yemen (FLOSY) 3671
 Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) 592, 2784
 Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) 226, 366,
 1072, 1162, 2284
 Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste
 (FLNKS) 2458–9
 Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
 (FROLIZI) 3736
 Front National (FN) 1645
 Front National pour le Changement et la
 Démocratie (FNCD) 1507
 Front National de Concertation (FNC) 1505
 Front Uni de Libération Kanak (FULK) 2458
 Fronte Popolare 1333
 Frontier Crimes Regulation Act 1966
 Frontiers Army 46
 Frontline States 461
 Frost, John 2463, 2464
 Froude, James Anthony 3316
 Frundt, Henry J. 1472–4, 1474–9, 1479–82
 Frutos, Duarte 2603
 Frutos, Juan Manuel 2600
 Frye, Marquette and Ronald 3399
FSLN: see Sandinista National Liberation Front
 Fuad I, King of Egypt 1076
 Fuat, Ali 3357
 fueros 1127
 Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación (FAL) 245
 Fuerzas Armadas Peronista (FAP) 244
 Fuerzas Armadas de la Revolución Nacional
 (FARN) 244, 1165
 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) 244,
 272, 1481, 2283
**Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
 Colombia (FARC)** 244, 410, 796, 799,
 1167–70
 birth of 801
 and ELN 1081, 1082, 1084, 2791, 3389
 Fuerzas Populares de Liberación 2061
 Fugazi 2845
 Fugitive Slave Act 56, 70, 216, 533
 Fujimori, Alberto 48, 2363, 2643, 2645, 2646, 2652
 demonstrations 2655
 reelection bid 2655
 resignation 2656
 self-coup 2654
Fujin Sensen (Women's Front) 133
 Fukuyama, Francis 1154, 1386, 1395
 Fulani Jihadists 3676
 Fulbrook, Mary 1341, 1342
 Full Stop law 1579, 2160
 Fuller, Bampfylde 1674–5
Fuller, Margaret 1222, 1305–6, 3618
 Women in the Nineteenth Century 1305, 1306
 Fumagalli, Andrea 1839–41
 FUNCINPEC 1961
 Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire 2921
 Fundidora de Monterrey steel mill closure 2293
 Funj kingdom 3196, 3197
Funke 2046
 Fur kingdom 3196
 Fur and Leather Workers' Union 836
 fur trade 582
 Furet, François 1278, 1284, 1285
 Furnas, J. C. 3146
 Furnivall, J. S. 3279
 Furtado, Isaac 1872
 Fuse, Keisuke 3720–1
 Fusion Government, South Africa 833
 Füssli, Heinrich 3190
 Futurism 116
 poetry 2962
 Fyodor, Tsar 436

 G7 3655
G8 protests 1307–18
 Birmingham 1387, 1397, 2636
 Cologne 1389, 1397, 2636

G8 protests (*cont'd*)

Genoa 127, 132, 299, 1006, 1154, 1307–12,
1390, 1401, 1431, 1450, 1740
Gleneagles 1312–15, 1402, 2636
Heiligendamm 300–1, 1315–18, 1402
G8 Alternatives coalition 1313
G20 group 3647, 3650
G33 group 3651
G90 3647, 3651, 3653
GABRIELA 2681, 2686
Gabriel's Rebellion 297, 1318–19, 2408
Gabrovski, Nikola 540
Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (GAMPAR)
3269
Gadea, Hilda 1485
Gaelic League 1799, 2627, 3681
Gaelic Society 3001–2
Gaffar Khan, Khan Abdul 1328
Gag Law 1301
Gage, Matilds Joslyn 3624
Gage, Thomas 78, 79
Gagging Acts 3280
Gagnon, Charles 2785, 2787
Gaillard, Micha 1510
Gairy, Eric Matthew 1463–4, 2462
Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer 1320–1
assassinated 623, 1320
Banana Massacre 805
Colombia 408
FARC 1167
Gál, Fedor 3435
Galán, José Antonio 1081
Galán, Luis Carlos 802, 808, 3389
Galbaud, François 1533
Galeano, Eduardo 2223, 2637
Galinsoga, Luis de 631
Gallatin, Albert 3525
Galleani, Luigi 98, 1321–3, 1419, 2169,
2947
Gallegos, Rodolfo 903
Gallegos, Romulo 3631
Gallinari, Prospero 2815
Gallipoli 293
Gallo, Marie 884
Gallo, Max 181
Galón athins 2979
Galón Peasant Rebellion 2977
Galván, Javier A. 186–8, 2729–32
Galván, Rafael 2291, 2299
Galveston & Houston Towing Co 1754
Gálvez, Mariano 1475
Gálvez Durón, Juan 1603, 1604
Gama, Vasco da 187
Gamarra, Eduardo 788, 790
Gambari, Ibrahim 2480

Gamber, Cayo 1741–2, 2410–11
Gamber, Francesca 211–18
Gambetta, Léon 463, 1323–4
Gamboa, C. Andrés 2555–6
Gambone, Larry 111–13
Gambuzzi, Carlo 129
Gámiz García, Arturo 2157, 2284
Gamola fight 1074
Gandamak, Treaty of 15
Gandhi, Feroze 2432
Gandhi, Indira (*née* Nehru) 2432, 2434, 2435,
3251
Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand 1324–32,
1709
ahimsa 1701
All India Khilafat Committee 1680
and Ambedkar 54, 958
arrested 2051
assassinated 1584, 2433
Belgaum Session 1677
civil disobedience 449, 1327–9
fasting 53, 1684
Harijan upliftment program 1324, 1683,
1684, 1710
hartals 1330, 1701, 2492
Hind Swaraj 1324, 1701
Indian National Congress 2493, 2792
indigo farmers 2493
and Jinnah 1330, 1680, 1710, 1711, 1921
Khilafatists 1702
and King 1971
non-violence 1324, 2490–1
peasants' rights 1681, 1703
at Round Table Conference 1678
and Sanger 2969
satyagraha 1324, 1679, 1681–2, 1701, 2492–4
sexuality 1329
South Africa 2492–3
swaraj 1701
women's roles 1329
World War II 1329–30
Gandhi, Rajiv 1692, 2432, 2741, 3251, 3252
Gandhi–Irwin Pact 449, 450, 1328, 1683–4
Ganeshman Singh 2443
Ganev, Robin 400–1
Gang of Four 985, 2204, 2205
Ganga Zumba 2588, 3746
Ganguly, Dwarkanath 1695
Ganguly, Jyotirmoyee 1705
Ganilau, Ratu Penaia 1198
Gapon, Father Georgi 1743, 1746, 2879
García, Alan 2362, 2651
García, Carlo P. 2676
García, Cipriano 181
García, Ismael 3446

- García, Luis 1603
 García, Robert Francis 2685
 García Barragán, Marcelino 3297
 García Godoy, Héctor 1019, 1020
 García Guirao, Pedro 144–7, 2776–7, 3609–12
 García Laviana, Gaspar 2061, 3303
 García Lorca, Federico 2381
 García Márquez, Gabriel 805
 García Meza, Luis 421, 2060
 García Moreno, Gabriel 963, 1062
 García Oliver, Juan 138, 1187, 1188, 3142
 García Pérez, Alan 48
 García Ponce, Guillermo 3443
 García y Moreno, Joaquín 3306
 Garde Mobile 1234
 Gardiner, Stephen 1094
Gardista 1596
 Garfield, James 976, 1900
 Garhwali, Thakur Chandra Singh 1682
Garhmali troops, Hindu 1970
Garibaldi, Giuseppe 492, 1332–3, 2169
 and anarchism 129
 compared with Spartacus 3149
 liberal internationalism 1744
 Red Shirts 1826
 Risorgimento 1332, 1824
 Garland, Christian 322–5, 738–9, 2003–5
 Garment Workers' Union 2948, 3093
 Garnier, Francis 3476
 Garrett, Elizabeth 3567
 Garrigo, Xavier 2776
Garrison, William Lloyd 90, 156, 1333–5
 American Anti-Slavery Society 168, 214–15, 216, 217, 3640
 Declaration of Sentiments 1334
 immediatism 2491
 Liberator, The 215, 1021, 1333, 1335, 3619
 non-violence 2491
 suffrage 2492
 Garvey, Amy Jacques 3559
Garvey, Marcus 1335–6
 Africa for Africans slogan 3085
 black nationalism 391, 394
 Black Star Line 392
 Ex-Slave Mutual Relief 1335–6, 1608
 as influence 154, 307, 3092, 3373
 Jim Crow era 17
 Rastafarians 1860
 UNIA 21, 756, 837, 1024, 1336, 1634, 2179, 2396, 3559
 Garvey, Ronald 364, 365
Garveyism 1335–6, 1870, 3559
Garvey's Watchman 1335
 Gary, Joseph E. 1569
 Gates, Horatio 85
 Gatica, Antonio 1924
 GATT: *see* General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
 Gaughan, Evan M. 1385–6
 Gauthier, Michele 2788
 Gaviara, César 1120–1, 2149
 Gaviria, César 802, 808, 1083
 Gay Activists Alliance 9
 gay liberation 2093, 2098, 2099
 Gay Liberation Against the Right Everywhere 2099
 Gay Liberation Front (GLF) 512, 2106, 2108
 see also lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements (LGTB)
 gay rights movement 305, 2097, 2100–1
 Gaylani, Rashid 'Ali al- 1777
 Gayot, François 1505
 Gaytán, Salomón and Salvador 2157
 Gaza City 1548
 Gaza Strip 1548, 1549, 1758, 1817, 2502
Gazeta Wyzbrocza 2302, 3557–8
 Gbagbo, Laurent 880, 881
 Gbaya revolt 1250–1
 Gdańsk Agreement 3502
 Gdańsk monument 3074
 Gdańsk shipyard strike 2302, 2698, 3073, 3497, 3502
 GDR: *see* German Democratic Republic
 GEAR (Growth, Employment, and Redistribution) strategy 2195, 3099, 3101
 Geffard, Fabre-Nicholas 1513
 Geldof, Bob 1312, 1314, 1317, 1402
 Geldof, Lynn 924
 Gell, Monday 3460
 Gellhorn, Martha 7
 Gemayel, Bashir 2071
 Gemayel, Pierre 2070
 Gemeinschaft der Eigenen 1300, 2103
gender
 anarchism and 122–6
 class and 3565–6
 Hindu nationalism and 1582–5
 gender equality
 anarchists 107
 Bakunin 123
 Fuller 1305
 Goldman 123
 gender revolution 2097
 gender roles
 double day reality 3599, 3608
 identity 3565
 patriarchy 3564–6
 World War I 1171

- General, Levi 584
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1396, 1995, 2293, 3462
- Uruguay Round 1995, 3644, 3650
- General Agriculture Plantation Workers' Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ) 3733
- General Association of Guadeloupean Students (AGEG) 1469
- General Confederation of Democratic Workers (CGTD) 808
- General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) 1441, 1442, 1448, 3220
- General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers (CGTG) 1478
- General Confederation of Labor (CGL) 385
- General Council of Buddhist Associations (GCBA) 552, 2978
- General Factory Workers' Benefit Fund (GFWBF) 3095
- General Federation of Nepalese Trade Unions (GEFONT) 232
- General German Workers' Association (ADAV) 3066
- General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) 1878, 1889, 1890, 1892, 1893–4, 3069
- General Line* (Eisenstein) 1081
- General Motors strike 250, 589, 3413
- General Service Enlistment Act 1686
- General Union of Guadeloupean Workers (UGTG) 1470
- General Workers' Confederation of Peru (CGTP) 2218, 2649–51, 2655–6
- General Workers' Union 364, 365
- General Workers' Union (AMT), Philippines 2673
- Genesh group 3368
- Genesis story 3612
- genetically modified organisms 3461, 3462
- genetics 2994
- Genette, Gérard 3062
- Geneva 2636
- Calvinism 1111
- PGA 1386, 2636
- Protestantism 1113–14
- see also* World Trade Organization (WTO)
- protests, Geneva
- Geneva Accords 1166, 1599
- Geneva Convention 1817, 3716
- Geneva Group of Anarchists 142
- Geneva Peace Talks 2663
- Genoa 872, 1834, 2635
- see also* G8 protests, Genoa
- Genoa Social Forum 1008, 1307, 1308, 1309, 1401
- genocide
- Armenia 280, 281–3
- Croatia 3683
- Holocaust 2497
- Nazi Party 1594
- Pakistan 347
- Genovese, Eugene 350
- Genovesi, Antonio 1825
- Gentle Revolution: *see* Velvet Revolution
- Geoffroy, Pierre-Paul 2786
- Geoghegan-Clements, Charlie 2367–9
- George, Alys 1160
- George, Dudley 585, 593
- George, Henry 967, 2820, 3418
- Progress and Poverty* 2450, 2451, 2819
- George, Stefan 2102–3
- George, Susan 298, 299, 1313, 1403
- George-Circle 2102–3
- George Grey Commission 3205
- George I, of Greece 126
- George II, of Greece 1436, 1438, 1443
- George III, of Britain 80, 508, 992, 994, 1223, 3280, 3529
- George IV, of Britain 655, 2826
- Georgia
- non-governmental organizations 814
- Rose Revolution 811, 812, 2510, 3011, 3021, 3329
- Georkadjis, Polikarpos 947
- Geremek, Bronislaw 3076
- Gerhardt, Christina 12–13, 1253–7, 2135–7
- Gerlach, Allen 1062, 1065, 1067
- Gerlach, Kurt Albert 1253
- German, Kieran 1853–6
- German–Danish War I 2985
- German–Danish War II 2896
- German Democratic Republic (GDR)**
- 1337–46
- autumn 1989 mass uprising 2508–9
- Biermann 387, 1344
- civil disobedience 1344
- Cold War 1381
- collectivization 1343
- emigrants to FDR 1340
- emigrants to Hungary 3433
- gender rights 3580
- grassroots activism 1338–9
- homosexuality 2105
- KPD 828–9
- Protestantism 1342–4
- protests 1337–46
- Stalinization 1339
- Stasi 1340, 1341–2, 1343–4, 1369
- totalitarianism 1337

- workers' revolt 1340
Zetkin on currency 3633
- German Federal Republic (FDR)
autonomism 324
Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO) 1037,
3523
homosexuality 2105–6
“new left” 3521–4
women's rights 3580
see also Green movement, Germany
- German Friendship Association 2093
- German Peasant Rebellion** 1352–5, 1357,
2374
- German Reformation** 1355–8, 2139
Calvin 1357–8
Grebel 1356–7
Luther 1355–6
Peasant Rebellion 1357
Reformed Protestantism 1358
Zwingli 1356
- German Revolution (1918–1923)** 826,
1358–66, 2093
first wave 1359–63
second wave 1363–4
third wave 1364–5
fourth wave 1365
- German Saxons 2862
- German Socialist Party (SPD) 2084
- German Tariff Union 1349
- German Workers' Party (DAP) 1588, 1589
- Germana, César 1566–8, 2217–19
- Germantown Petition 212
- Germany**
and Austria 1347, 1350
bourgeoisie 821–2
counterrevolution 1358
currency devalued 1365
Enlightenment 1349
fascism 1171, 1176–80
Green Party (Die Grünen) 1366–7
Haiti 1514
and Holy Roman Empire 1347
homosexual rights movement 1300
industrialization 1346, 1349, 1352
inflation 827
invading Soviet Union 1181–2, 1377, 2792,
3048
Jewish people 1173, 1175, 1179, 1182–3
League of Nations 1592
lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements
2093, 2100–6
National Socialism 1173
nationalism 1346–52, 1373–81, 2982
“new left” 3521–4
proletariat 1350
- Protestantism 1347
racial stereotyping 326
Red Army Faction 1368–9
Reformation 2831
resistance to Nazism 1369–72
socialism 1373–81
strikes 1359–63, 2932–3
student movement 558, 1347
taxation 1352–3
totalitarianism 1590–1
trade unions 1365
unemployment 3380–1, 3385–6
unification 326, 829, 1345, 1346, 1367, 2106,
3056
welfare state 1351
women's movement 3579–81
workers' educational associations 1350
workers' movements 1346–52
working classes 1178
see also German Democratic Republic; German
Federal Republic; Nazi Party, Nazism;
Weimar Republic
- Gerő, Ernő 1626, 1628
- Gershwin, George 1555
- Gesell, Silvio 2048
- Gestapo 1240, 1592
Barbie 1242
homosexuality 2104
and KPD 1376
- Getleff, Poul 990
- Gettysburg 64
- Geva, Eli 1814
- Geve, Augustine 3082
- Geyer, Florian 1354
- Gezo, King 954
- Ghadar (Revolution) Party 1675
- Ghadr Party 3042
- Ghaffar Khan, Abdul 1682, 1683, 1966, 1967,
1969, 2491, 2494
PPP 2580
- Ghana** 1381–3
Asante culture 3669
cocoa cultivation 1382
economic prominence 2181
gold mining 1382
independence 1381, 1660, 3545
nationalism and socialist transition 1381–3
state ownership 1382
see also Nkrumah, Kwame
- Ghani Khan 1967
- Ghare-Baire* (At Home and Outside) 3586
- Ghassemlon, Abdul Rahman 1763
- Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe 2857, 2858, 2865,
2866–7
- Ghilzai rebellion 1029

- Ghioldi, Rodolfo 2748
 Ghislanzoni, Antonio 3149
 Ghosal, Sarala 1674
 Ghosh, Aurobindo 1674, 1697, 1698
 Ghosh, Barindra Kumar 1674
 Ghosh, Girishchandra 1712
 Ghosh, P. 552
 Ghosh, Sisir Kumar 1712
 Ghoshal, Gokul 369
 Ghost Dance movement 902
 Ghurye, G. S. 954
Giai Pham 3479
Giant Killer or Anti-Landlord 3151
 Gibbet Rath surrender 1788
 Gibbs, D. N. 2138
 Gibbs, Pearl 307
 Gicheru, Evans 1948
 Gichuru, Andrew Kiiru 1948, 2268–70
 Giedroyc, Jerzy 3077
 Gierek, Edward 2695
 Gifford, Carolyn DeSwarte 3542–3
 Gikuyu resistance 3371–2
 Gil, Gilberto 2378, 2588
 Gilbert, Oliver 3327
 Gilbert's Act 2720
 Gilchrist, J. 2522
 Giles-Peters, Andrew 107
 Gillard, Julia 3563
 Gilly, Adolfo 2292
 Gilman, Charlotte Perkins 3594, 3624, 3625
 Gilmore, Mary 2453, 2455
 Ginger Group 2975
 Gini, Eleni 1438
 Ginsberg, Allen 3173
 Ginsberg, Asher (Ha'am) 3742
 Ginzberg, Lori 3639
 Giolitti, Giovanni 386, 1828, 2960, 3014, 3341
 Giorgeri, Licio 2818
 Giovagnoli, Raffaello 3149
 Giovane Italia movement: *see* Young Italy
 Giovani Comunisti (GC) 1008
 Giovanni, Severino di 104, 131, 243
 Giovannitti, Arturo 115, 2032
 Giovanopoulos, Christos 1436–9, 1447–50
 Gioventù Italiana del Littorio (GIL) 1177
 Girardot, Atanasio 3457
 Girga, Battle of 1074
 Giri, V. V. 1637
Girl Germs 2844
 Girmi *Kamgar* (Worker) Union 961, 1327
 Girón, Pedro 844, 2569
 Girondins
 Brissot 506
 Condorcet 846
 and Jacobins 894, 1288, 1289–90
 Marat against 2211
 as moderates 1277
 and Robespierre 403, 1292
 Giroud, Françoise 3576
 Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry 1271, 3576
 Gitlow, Benjamin 3065
 Gitting, Barbara 2107
 Giuliani, Carlo 1009, 1307, 1308, 1310, 1311, 1401, 3658
 Giuliani, Rudolph 501
Giustizia e Libertà
 Partito d'Azione 131, 1383–4, 2835
 Rosselli 2871, 2960
 Glaberman, M. 3071
 Gladstone, Jack 204, 984
 Gladstone, Quamina 984
 Gladstone, William Ewart 519, 2164, 2617, 2827
 Glaoui brothers 2336
Glasgow 1384–5
 general strike 519, 1384–5
 Red Clydeside 3061
 road protests 1040
 Glasier, J. Bruce 2820
glasnost (openness) 628, 1395, 1417, 3119–20, 3245, 3421
 Glass, C. Frank 152, 154
 Glasse, Henry 148, 149, 152
 Glasse, John 2820
 Glassman, R. M. 652
 Glavovic, Alen 224
 Glazman, Jacob 1918
Gleichheit, Die 3721
 Gleijeses, Piero 1216
 Glen Canyon Dam 1054
 Glen Gardner Cooperative Community 3419
Glencoe Massacre 1385–6
Gleneagles: see G8 Protests, Gleneagles
 Gleneagles Agreement 3155
 Glenn, Karen C. 3043–4
 Glinkaya, Anna 2342
 Global Call to Action Against Poverty (G-CAP) 1313
 global capitalism 298–9, 2502
Global Day of Action Against Capitalism (J18) 1386–91, 1397, 2809, 2810
Global Day of Action Against the IMF and World Bank (S26) 1391–5, 3664
 INPEG 1391–2
 global governance 3655
global justice movement 1395–404, 3274
 anarchism 100
 Block G8 coalition 1402, 1403
 Deleuze 979–84
 Fukuyama 1395
 Genoa G8: *see* G8 protests, Genoa

- Gleneagles G8: *see* G8 protests, Gleneagles
 Heiligendamm G8: *see* G8 protests, Heiligendamm
 history/struggle 1398–9
 Italy 1398, 1830
 Keynesianism 1402–3
 Mexico 1395–6
 migration struggles and 2305–8
 and neoliberalism 1400–1
 post-Fordism 1399–400
 Seattle: *see* World Trade Organization (WTO) protests, Seattle
 students 3181
 Thailand 979–84
 Zinn 72
see also Deleuze, Gilles; Guattari, Félix; Peoples' Global Action Network (PGA)
- Global* magazine 1009
 Global Network 1010
Global Refusal 110
 Global Resistance 2504
Global South student movements 3179–81, 3274
 Global Street Party 1387
 globalization
 capital 1670
 crisis of 1430–1
 imperialism 1670–2, 2250
 labor 1670–1
Globe, Le 1229
 Glorietta Pass battle 59
 Glorious Holiday Operation 2014
 Glorious May Revolution, Ecuador 1057
Glorious Revolution 75, 1224, 1404–8, 2125
Glos (Voice) 2698
 Glover, Danny 221
 Glücklich, Vilma 3632
 Glynn, Tom 149, 1028, 1738
 GMD: *see* Guomindang
 Gneisenau, Neithardt von 189
 Gobetti, Piero 1383, 2871
 Godesberg Program 1910
 Godett, Wilson “Papa” 942, 943
Godey's Lady Book 3620
 Godly Reformation of England 1102
 Godo Roso unions 1876
 Godoy, C. M. 1005
 Godse, Nathuram 1331, 1584
 Godunov, Boris 436
Godwin, William 1408–10
 anarchism 122, 1410
 Cursory Strictures 1409
 Enquiry Concerning Political Justice 1409
 fire case 1409
 gradualism 1409
 revolution 1116, 1409
 and Wollstonecraft 1409, 3540, 3542
 Godwyn, Morgan 201
 Goebbels, Joseph 1378, 1593
 Goerdeler, Carl 1595
 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang 3189, 3190
 Goff, Richard 52–3, 861, 1185–6, 1222–3, 1633–4, 1638–9, 2460–1, 2559–60, 3018–20, 3415–17, 3666–7
 Goffman, Erving 2758
 Gohier, Louis Jérôme 1079
 Goitia, Francisco 2375
 Goizueta, Adrián 640
 Gök-Tepe, Battle of 3366
 Gökalp, Ziya 293, 3362
 Gokaroren 1879
 Gokhale, Gopal Krishna 1698, 2388
 Golan, G. 2746
 gold
 Africa 147–8, 794, 3091
 Ballarat 1144
 Bendigo 1144
 Black Hills of Dakota 900
 Brazil 483, 484–5
 California 1119–20
 explorations 1655
 Ghana 1382
 Peru 237
 slave labor 794
 Venezuela 3451–2
 Gold, Ted 818
 Gold Coast: *see* Ghana
 Gold Star Families for Peace 229
 Goldberg, Denis 2194
 Goldberg, Jackie 377
 Golden Hill, Battle of 77
 Golden Law 494
 Goldfield, Michael 835–42, 2066–8
 Goldman, Asher 139–40
Goldman, Emma 1411–14
 anarchism 94, 96, 1411
 anarchosyndicalism 1413
 and Berkman 1125, 1411
 birth control 1412, 2968, 3625–6
 Bolsheviks 1413
 in Canada 94, 110
 deportation 1412–13, 2589
 emancipation 3625
 feminism 1411–12
 Fleming 107
 free love 3626
 gender equality 123
 Hoover 412, 1411, 1412
 on Jack London 2127
 Japanese translations 1848

Goldman, Emma (*cont'd*)

- Jewish anarchism 158
- and Kropotkin 1411
- Living My Life* 1413
- and Malatesta 1411
- Mother Earth* 379, 1412, 3625
- pamphleteering 1413
- on prostitutes 1411–12
- Goldmann, Lucien 3689
- Goldmark, William 1920
- Goldson, Philip 364
- Goldstein, M. 3293
- Goldstein, Vida 303, 3562
- Goldstone, J. A. 2505, 2762
- Goldthree, Reena N. 3558–60
- Goldwater, Barry 748
- Goli Otok prison 3691
- Golian, Ján 3048
- Golin, Stephen 2624
- Golkar party 1722, 1725, 1726, 1732
- Golpayegani, Ayatollah 1771
- Golwalkar, M. S. 1584, 1692
- Gomas, Johnny** 152, 832, 1414–15, 3092, 3093
- Gomes, Albert Maria 3316
- Gomes, Eduardo 469, 470
- Gómez, Dolores Ibárruri (La Pasionaria) 2962
- Gómez, Francisco 1016
- Gómez, José Miguel 912–13
- Gómez, Laureano 408, 410
- Gómez, Luis A. 790–2
- Gomez, Mariano 2667
- Gomez, Maximo 918, 920
- Gomez, Rodrigo 999
- Gómez Hurtado, Álvaro 799
- Gómez Ramírez, Pablo 2157
- Gómez y Báez, Máximo 2227
- Gomperism 3064
- Gompers, Samuel 1735, 2028, 2029, 2038
 - AFL 2031, 2033, 3380
 - May Day 2259
 - WTUL 3313–14
- Gompo Tashi Andrugstang 3292
- Gomulka, Wladyslaw 1626, 2695, 2699–700, 2707
- Gona, George 1947–53, 1953–5, 2253–7
- Gonçalves Bento 492
- Gonçalves Campos, João Batista 490
- Gondra, Manuel 2609
- Gongadze, Hrihory 3376–7
- Gonne, Maud** 1415–16
- Gonzaga, Tomás Antônio 485
- Gonzaga das Virgens, Luis 485
- González, Ignacio Maria 1016
- Gonzalez, Mike 623–9, 914–17, 922–6, 926–35, 1484–91, 2150–3
- González, Myrian 2597
- González, Natalicio 2600
- González, Pablo 2278, 2541
- González, Valentín R. 116
- González Arenas, Mauricio 1467–8, 2064–5
- González Casabianca, Miguel Anger 2601
- González Navero, Emilio 2609
- González Prada Popular Universities (UPGP) 2648
- Gonzalez-Rojas, Eugenio 112
- González Videla, Gabriel 693, 2444
- Gonzalo Sánchez, José 2045
- Good Friday Agreement 1798, 1802, 2573
- Goodman, Andrew 747, 1258, 1975
- Goodman, Paul 95, 158, 159
 - Compulsory Miseducation* 117
- Goodrich, Robert 321–2, 354–5, 1581–2
- Goodwin, Clive 2261
- Goodwin, Jeff 2505
- Goodwin, William 501
- Goodwyn, Lawrence 2722–8
- Goody, Manuel de 187
- Goonesinghe, A. E. 1494, 2050
- Goonewardene, Leslie 2050, 2051, 2052
- Gorbachev, Mikhail** 1416–18
 - Afghanistan 14
 - Baltics 341
 - to Beijing 3288
 - Berlinguer 380
 - on Bukharin 535
 - downfall 3125
 - elections 3123–4
 - and Honecker 1345
 - nomenklatura* 3118–24
 - opportunity for change 2757
 - reforms 1214, 1344, 1395, 1417–18, 3116, 3118–25, 3421
 - and Yeltsin 3124–5
- Gorbachev Foundation 1418
- Gorchakov, Viceroy 2703
- Gordillo, Elba Esther 2294
- Gordon, Arthur 1196
- Gordon, Charles George 2164, 3198
- Gordon, George (Lord) 1418
- Gordon, George William 1869, 1870, 2321
- Gordon, Leonard 449
- Gordon, Max 833, 834, 3093
- Gordon, Uri 1051–2
- Gordon College strike 3194
- Gordon Riots** 506–7, 1418–19, 3531
- Gore, Al 2594
- Gore, Thomas Pryor 1458
- Görgey, Artúr 1620
- Gorgopotamos National Resistance 1446
- Gori, Pietro** 102, 1419–20, 2168
- Göring, Heinrich 2391

- Göring, Hermann 1593
 Gorino, Maurizio 130
 Gorkha Parishad 2442
 Gorky, Maxim 327
 Gorn, Elliott 2344–5
 Gorrie, Richard 3024
 Gorter, Herman 2243
Gorz, André 1420
 Ecology as Politics 1420
 Farewell to the Working Class 771, 1420
 Gotha party convention 3066
 Gothenburg Action 1152
Gothenburg EU summit protests 1151–4,
 1307, 1401
 Gotong Rojong 1731
 Gottlieb, K. 2790
 Goudé, Charles Blé 882
Gouges, Olympe de 1294, 1297, 1421–2
 Gougou, Danielle 1467
 Goulart, João 471, 476, 3039
 National Literacy Program 1260
 ousted 416
 Peasant Leagues 2351
 PTB 495, 496
 Gould, Jay 2724
 Gourgue, Gérard 1505
 Gouros people 884
 Gove Land Rights case 309
 Government of Burma Act 554
 Government of India Act 1329, 1684, 1700,
 1710, 2791–2
 Government of Ireland Act 1801
 Gowon, Yakubu 24, 2482
 Gozo island 2183
 Gracey, D. D. 1598–9
 Grachev, Pavel 1417
 Graduates General Congress, Sudan 3194
 Graeber, David 95
 Graf, Willi 3525, 3526
 Graham, Gerald 2164
 Graham, Helen 2962–3
 Graham, Loren 2992, 2993, 2994
 Graham, Sylvester 3429
Gramsci, Antonio 1422–7
 on *Das Kapital* 1423
 Bolivarianism 414
 and Bordiga 447
 death in jail 2383
 Di Vittorio 997
 dialectics 1423, 2839
 on Giovagnoli 3149
 hegemony 1424, 1426–7, 2247, 3070
 influence in Australia 823
 on leadership 1424–5
 Modern Prince, The 1425
 Open Marxism 1423–4
 Ordine Nuovo, L' 130, 385
 PCI 1818, 3014
 Prison Notebooks 1146, 1423
 Quaderni 3299
 “Real Dialectics” 1425
 on Stalinism 1424
 Togliatti 3298
 wars of maneuver/position 3654
 working class 772
 Gran Círculo de Obreros de México 137, 2279
 Gran Colombia, Republic of 411, 1061, 3706
 Gran Mancomunal de Obreras 112
 Granada 2055, 2332
 Grand National Consolidated Trades Union
 2461, 2567
 Grande, Rutilio 2868
 Grandi, Achille 998, 1823
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo 255–6,
 1427–8, 2160
 Grant, Ted 2250
 Grant, Ulysses S. 59, 63, 65–6, 67, 68, 900
 grape boycotts 2499
Grass, Günter 1428–9
 Grasse, Admiral de 86, 2851
 Grassroots Network 2502
grassroots resistance, Argentina 250–3,
 1429–32
 Gratien, Pierre Guillaume 2982
 Gratiant, Gilbert 2427
 Grattan, Henry 1786
 Grau San Martín, Ramón 623, 915, 916, 926,
 1014, 2152
 Graus, Günter 1342
 Grave, Jean 120, 121, 1124, 2628
 Gray, George 510
 Gray, Obika 1856–65, 1865–8
 Gray, Stan 2786
 Gray, Thomas 2409
 Great Awakening 76, 202, 3614
 Second 214, 2559, 3416, 3616–17
 Great Columbian Republic 411, 3456, 3458
 see also Venezuela
 Great Depression
 anti-Nazi resistance 828
 Belize 365
 Brazil 469
 Canada 591, 2562, 2832
 Chile 693
 Jim Crow era 17
 May Day 2259
 Nordic countries 2519, 2520
 poverty 11
 protest and revolution 2756–7
 radicalization of workers 2035

- Great Depression (*cont'd*)
 unemployment 837, 898–9, 2831, 3379–88
 USA 445
 Vietnam 3469
 women's rights 3627
 Zambia 3380–2, 3697
- Great Leap Forward 709–10, 986–7, 2203–4, 2630
- Great Marylebone Radical Association 2550
- Great Northern War 2516
- Great Rebellion, Ireland (1798)** 909, 1790–6, 1807, 2402–3, 2544, 2545, 3002, 3024, 3392
- Great Society program 782
- Great Southwest Strike 2724
- Grebel, Conrad 92, 1356–7
- Greco-Turkish War 1454, 3582
- Greece 1432–56**
 anarchism 126–7
 anti-dictatorship protests 127, 1432–5
 Balkans 1450, 1452
 civil war 3691
 coup d'état 1432
 ethnic/national identity 3581
 ex-Ottoman Christians 1441
 famine 1182, 1436
 formation of 1439
 German invasion of 1182, 1453
 independence 538
junta 1433, 1446, 1447–8
 liberation 3581
 military dictatorship 127, 1439
 Muslims 1441
 National Issues 1454
 nationalism 1451–6
 Nazi resistance 1449
 partisan resistance 1436–9
 socialism, communism, and the left 1439–51
 squatting 127
 student protests 126, 127, 1434, 1448, 3168, 3170
 torture 1433, 1439
 Triple Occupation 3220
 and Turkey 1441, 3349, 3355
 US intervention 1445
 white terror 1444
 women's movement 3581–3
- Greek Civil War 621, 1433, 1438–9
- Greek European Youth Association (EKIN) 1128, 1434
- Greek Force of Cyprus (ELDIK) 947, 948
- Greek General Confederation of Labor 126
- Greek Orthodox Church 1452
 in Russia 2925
- Greeley, Horace 69, 1223, 3618, 3636
- Green, Christina Suszynski 504–5, 1297–8
- Green, Rob 845
- Green, William 3411, 3415
- Green Action Future 1366
- Green Anarchist* 1052
- Green Anarchy* 1052
- green bans movement, Australia** 1456–8, 2373
- Green March, Morocco 2338
- Green movement, Germany** 125, 192, 198, 1366–7, 3523
 Cohn-Bendit 792
 Dutschke 1036–7
 Kelly 1945
- Green Party, Australia 305
- Green Revolution 3028
- Green Student Network 1039
- Green v. School Board of New Kent County* 753
- Greenback Labor Party 2028
- Greencorn Rebellion, Oklahoma** 1458–60
- Greene, J. Megan 185–6, 718–21, 984–6, 2270–2, 2780–1, 3235–7, 3238–9, 3239–40, 3289–90, 3518
- Greene, William B. 156
- Greenham Common 125, 198, 2501
- Greenpeace 1460–2, 3658**
 founded 513
 New Zealand 1055, 2528
Rainbow Warrior 199, 1272
- Greensboro sit-in 1973, 2067
- Greenshirts 569, 2857
- Greenville, Treaty of 3525
- Greenwood demonstrations 751
- Greer, Germaine 107, 305, 3563
- Grégoire, Abbé 896, 1525, 2215
- Gregorian Reform 2829
- Gregory, Dick 2412, 3400
- Gregory VII 2829
- Gregson v. Gilbert* 203
- Greineman, Boris 1918
- Grenada 1462–6**
 British/French struggle 1264
 Cuba 2462
 education 1465
 imperialism 1664
 independence 351
 PRG 1462, 1464–5, 1864
 Revolution 1462–6
 and US 2462
 US invasion 1864
see also Bishop, Maurice; New Jewel movement
- Grenada National Party (GNP) 1463
- Grenada United Labour Party (GULP) 1463
- Grenat, Stella 2158–60
- Grenelle agreements 1236
- Grenimann, Rabbi Yehiel 1916–18

- Grenville, Richard, of Temple 3530
 Gretz, Michael F. 1033–6, 2116–17, 2444–6, 2446–8
 Grey, Charles, 2nd Earl of 2826
 Grey, Jane 516, 1094
 Grey de Wilton, Arthur 1805
 Grey Wolves 3353
 Gribble, Joe 518
 Grieco, Ruggiero 3298
 Griem, Rowena 1300, 1562–3
 Grier, Barbara 2107
 grievance theory 776–7, 778–80
 Griffin, Carl J. 1040–2, 2720–1, 3211–12
 Griffith, Arthur
 death of 793–4, 972, 1050
 Sinn Féin 971, 1048, 1192, 1799, 3043
 Griffith, D. W.
 Birth of a Nation 2822
 Griffith, Robert 2078
 Griffuelhes, Victor 98, 850, 3219
 Grigg, Nanny 204
 Griggs, Christian A. 1186–7, 2566–7, 2661–2
Grimké, Angelina and Sarah 215, 1467, 3619
 Grinnel, Julius 1569
Griots, Les 1517
Grita de Alcortá Peasant Rebellion 253–4
Grito de Jayuya 38, 2769, 2774
Grito de Lares 382, 383, 2767, 2774, 2844
Grito del Pueblo 111
 Grivas, Georgios 943, 947, 1455
 Groener, Wilhelm 1362
 Grogan, Larry 1803
 Grönemeyer, Herbert 1317
 Gronlund, Laurence: *see* Lofgreen, Peter
 Gronniosaw, Ukawsaw 202
 Gross, Jan 2706
 Grosvenor Square rally 218
 Group Areas Act 171, 172, 3087
 Group Aris 1433
 Group of Sound Experimentation (GESI) 2853
 Groupe d'Organisation Nationale de la Guadeloupe (GONG) 1469
 Groupes Anarchistes d'Action Révolutionnaire (GAAR) 121
 Grupo Cultural Feminino CNT 2367
 Groups of Partisan Action (GAP) 1837
 Groups of Revolutionary Commandos (GCR) 3443
Grove Vallejo, Marmaduke 50, 692, 693, 1467–8
 Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) policy 875–6
 Grubacic, Andrej 3685–8
 Gruhl, Herbert 1366–7, 1945
Grün 2020 1367
 Grünberg, Carl 904, 1253
Grünberg Archiv 1253
 Grundtvig, N. F. S. 2983
 Grünen, Die (German Green Party): *see* Green movement, Germany
 grunge bands 2845
 Grupo, El (the Group) 1164
 Grupo Colina 2646
 Grupo Cultural Femenino 3611
 Grupo Experimental, El 640
 Grupo Luz 138, 618
 Grupo Pueblo 638
 Grupo Tuirá 640
 Grupos Dinamizadores 2355
 Gruppe Funke 2046
 Gruppi Anarchica Federati (GAF) 131
 Gruppi di Azione Patriottica (GAP) 2834
 Gruppo Femminile Luisa Michel 124
 Gruppi di Iniziativa Anarchica (GIA) 131
 Gruppo XXII Ottobre 2815
 Guadalajara, Battle of 1180, 3141
 Guadalajara, Declaration of 2299
 Guadalupe Plan 2279–80, 2541
Guadeloupe 1468–71
 Abolition Day 1471
 armed resistance groups 1470
 British invasion 1264
 departmentalization 1469
 emancipation 1267
 French rule 1262–3, 1264, 1266, 1270, 1468–9
 labor protests 1468–71
 mass suicide 1266, 1267
 reintroduction of slavery 1267, 1546
 trade union membership 1470–1
Guaicaipuro 1471–2, 3631
 Guajardo, Jesús 3711
 Gual y España insurrection 2854
 Gualavisi, Jesús 1056
 Gualberto, João 467
 Gualberto Gómez, Juan 911
 Guam 2303
 Guantánamo Bay 915
 Guaraguao, Los 2751
 Guaraní War 3009
Guardian 1403, 3297
 Guardians of the Oglala Nation (GOONs) 2415, 2629
 Guarocuya: *see* Enriquillo
Guatemala 1472–82
 anti-liberal revolts 1475–6
 base communities 1479
 campesinos 1479–80
 Catholic Church 2060
 Christian revolutionary movement 2061
 CIA 240

Guatemala (*cont'd*)

coffee growing 1476
 Creoles 1475
 Democratic Spring 240, 1472–4
 earthquake 1479
 forced labor 1475
 guerillas 1476–7
 Guevara 241, 1485
 human rights violations 1473
 IMF 1477
 indigenous people's involvement 1473, 1474, 1477
 indigo cultivation 1474–5, 1480
 labor movement 1479–82
 massacres 1480
 Mayans 1472, 1473, 1474–5, 3255
 Menchú 2272–3
 music 639–40
 October Revolution 240
 popular rebellion 1474–9
 Quiché resistance 3255
 self-defense practice 1480
 Spanish colonialism 1474–5
 students 3180
 sugar plantations 1474–5
 UN Security Council 240–1
 United Fruit Company 1472, 1473, 1475
 worker struggles 1479–82
see also Tecún Umán

Guatemalan Food and Agricultural Workers' Federation (FESTRAS) 1481
 Guatemalan Human Rights Commission 1481
 Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) 1477–8, 1481, 2272
 Guatemalan Revolution (1954) 1478, 1479
 Guatemalan Section of the Communist Party (PGT) 1473, 1475, 1480

Guattari, Félix 979–84
Anti-Oedipus 980
Capitalism and Schizophrenia 980
 global justice movement 979–84
Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature 980
Molecular Revolution 980, 982
 and Negri 2427
Party Without Bosses 982
Soft Subversion 980
Thousand Plateaus, A 980, 981
What is Philosophy? 980

Guayaquil 1061, 1062
 Guchkov, Aleksandr 2893
 Guebuza, Armando 1262
 Guéi, Robert 881
 Gueiler, Lidia 421
 Guelaguetza Popular 2537
 Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP) 1480, 1481

Guerilla Coodination Simón Bolívar (CGSB) 1083, 1120, 1168, 2791
guerilla movements, Brazil 466–73
guerilla theater 1482–3
 guerilla warfare 244, 417, 932, 1206, 1487–8, 2266, 2630
 Guérin, Daniel 122, 125, 1284, 1286, 2249, 2766
 Guerra, Armand 116
 Guerra, Leonor 3631
 Guerra Chiquita 919
 Guerra Grande 919
 Guerra Hernández, Héctor 49–50, 685–8, 690–4, 2209–10
 Guerra Montemayor, Román 2297
Guerra Sociale 131
 Guerrero, Amado 2680
 Guerrero, Práxedes 137
Guerrilla Girls 1482, 1483–4
 Guesde, Jules 1756, 1913
Guevara, Ernesto “Che” 1484–91
 African American resistance 18
 agrarian reform 923
 and Bethune 384
 Bolivarianism 414, 1491
Bolivian Diary 1491
 and Castro 624, 625, 626–7, 928–9, 1486–90
 fidelismo 933
 Guatemala 241, 1485
 guerilla warfare 244, 417, 932, 1206, 1487–8, 2467
Guerrilla Warfare 1489
 influences on 1163
 J-26-M 916
 land redistribution 933
 “Man and Socialism in Cuba” 1490–1
 as martyr 1216
 Marxism 2249
Motorcycle Diaries 1484
 Guevara, Juan Romualdo de 163
 Guevarism 271
 Guevarist Revolutionary Army (ERG) 1083
 Guha, Ranajit 1325
 Guha Roy, S. 1931, 1935
 Guiana Industrial Workers' Union (GIWU) 1501
Guiana Space Center, Kourou, ecological movements against 1268
 Guianese Movement of Decolonization (MOGUYDE) 1271
 Guianese National Movement 1271
 Guianese Trade Union (UTG) 1271
 guild socialism 2620
 guilds, Meiji Restoration 1897
 Guillain, Charles 2456, 2457
 Guillaume, James 122–3, 2991
 Guillaume, Peter 3062

- Guillaume-Sam, Vilbrun 1514, 1515, 1522
 Guillemin, Henri 1243
Guillén, Abraham 244, 1491–2, 2771
 Guillén Vicente, Rafael Sebastián: *see* Marcos, Subcomandante
 Guillermoprieto, Alma 2958
 Guinama 639
 Guinea 1252, 3545
Guinea-Bissau 1492–5
 Cabral 564
 coup 602
 independence 564, 3546
 literacy 1493
 nationalist movement 1492–5
 Portuguese rule 1042
 rural liberation 164
 Guinn, Lisa 3005–6, 3639–40
 Guiomar, Princess 3630
Guipuzcoana Revolt 162–4
 Guise family 2950
 Guiteau, Charles 976
 Guiteras, Antonio 915, 926, 2150, 2151, 2152
 Guizot, François 1231, 1242–3
 Gujarat 1585, 1693–4
Gukurahundi 3737
 Gul Mohammed Shah 1933
 Gulab Singh 1928
 Gulags 3159, 3161
 Gulf Council States 1782
 Gulf Oil Company 165, 418
 Gulf War 1054, 1782, 2339, 3438
 gun technology 1686–7
 Gun War, Lesotho 2109
 Gunasekera, Vernon 2050
Gunawardena, Don Philip Rupasinghe 969, 1493–5, 2050, 2052
 Gunawardena, Robert 2050
Gunk 2844
Gunpowder Plot 1186–7
 Guomindang (Nationalist Party)
 Blue Shirts 727
 Chen Duxiu 725
 Chiang Kai-Shek 705, 724, 2113, 3723
 Chinese communists 2124
 Li Dazhao 724
 origins of 722
 science and technology 2995–6
 Soviet support 1757–8
 students 720
 Sun Yat-Sen 114, 675, 724, 2630, 3201–2
 Taiwan 2270–1
 US financial support 2202
 VNQZD 1714
 Gupta, C. 1583
 Gupta, Nalini 449, 961
 Guralski, Abraham 2748
 Gurevich, Lyubov 3390, 3551
 Gurindji people 3
 Gurkhas 569, 1686, 1687
 Gush Emunim (Block of the Faithful) 1813, 1814, 1817
 Gusmão, Xanana 1044
 Gustafsen Lake confrontation 585, 586
 Gustav III, of Sweden 1496
 Gustav IV Adolf, of Sweden 3208
Gustav Rebellions 1495–7
 Gustavo, Soledad 123
 Gustavus III, of Sweden 3208
 Gustavus Vasa 2514
 Gutenberg, Johannes 1355, 2753–5
 Gutenberg Revolution 1355, 2753–4
 Guthrie, Arlo 221
 Gutiérrez, Eulalio 2540
Gutiérrez, Gustavo 478, 1497
 Bolivarianism 414
 liberation theology 2059, 2062, 2500
 Gutiérrez, Lucio 1067–8
 Gutiérrez de Mendoza, Juana Belén 124, 3597
Guturama insult 3545
Guyana 1497–502
 abolition of slave trade 1498
 anti-colonialism 1856–7
 devaluation of currency 608
 ethnicities 1498–500
 IMF loans 608, 1856
 indentured labor 1498
 People's Progressive Party 1501, 3559
 Political Affairs Committee 1500–1
 politics/ethnic divisions 1499
 protests and revolts 1497–502
 Rodney 1497–8
 strikes 1499, 1866
 sugar industry 1498, 1500
 trade unionism 1500
 Guzmán Iza, Antonio 277, 1019
 Guzmán Reymoso, Abimael 2644, 2658–60
 Gwiazda, Andrzej 2708
 Gyanchand, Anusuya Bai 3587
 Gyanendra, Prince of Nepal 232
 Haakon VII 2525
 Ha'am, Ahad 3742
habeas corpus 58, 3281, 3529
habeas data right 2597
 Haber, Al 3188
 Habermas, Jürgen 908, 1256, 1572
 Habibie, B. J. 1044, 1726
 Haddad, Niqula 235
 Hadi al-Mahdi, al Sadiq al- 3191
 Hadi al-Mahdi, Imam Sayyid al- 3191

- Hadira, al-* 3335
 Hadj, Messali 44, 1246
 Haeckel, Ernst 1941
 Hafiz, Sultan Mulay 1248
 Hafsid Sultan Hamid 3334
Haganah 358, 359, 372–5
 Hague Congress 157
 Hahn, Dwight R. 786–90
 Hahn, Roger 2991
 Haig, Alexander 1369
 Haile Selassie 1132, 1133, 1138, 1140–1
 Hailey, Lord 3084, 3698
Haiti
 anti-dictatorship 1504
 Avril 1506
 black independence 1267, 1537–40
 cash-cropping 1522
 Catholic Church 1504, 1506–7
 Chirinos 737
 coffee industry 1530
 democratic uprising 1503–8
 European Union 1504
 exports 1535–6
 farm units 1538
 forced labor 1522
 foreign-led insurgency 1508–10
 freed slaves 214
 French Revolution 1510, 1525, 1539, 1540–5,
 3310
 French troops 996
 German settlers 1515
 Germany 1514
 hurricane 1518
 IMF 610
 Indigénisme 1516
 indigo 1530
 kleptocracy 1504
 land reform 737, 1505
 Lavalas 1507, 1508, 1510, 1520–1
 Louis XVI 3307
 massacres 1505, 1506, 1508
 mulattos 1527–9, 1532–3, 1534, 3308–9
 as nation 1263, 1529
 protest and rebellion 1510–21
 Putsch Government 1506
 resistance to US occupation 1521–3
 slave rebellion 1525, 3584
 sugar cane workers 1530, 1541
 sugar exports 1513
 terror regime 1513
 tontons macoutes 278–9, 1503, 1504, 1505,
 1506, 1507
 trade agreements 1525, 1536, 1541
 US Marines 1516, 1522
 Vatican 1519
 wage levels 1519
 white planters 3307–8
 women writers 3585
 women's movement 3583–6
 yellow fever 1547
 see also Haitian Revolutions; Saint-Domingue
 Haitian American Sugar Company (HASCO)
 1521
Haitian Revolutions 442, 1525–37, 1545–7,
 3528
 Aristide 278
 battles 1546
 Chirinos 737
 Dessalines 994–5
 Gabriel's Revolution 297
 independence 1521, 1545–7
 Ogé and Chavannes 2554
 Toussaint Louverture 89, 1545, 1546, 3306–12
 Hajeka, Jiri 654
 Haji Sulong 3268, 3269, 3270
 Hakka tribe 3231
 Hale, Nathan 81
 Halevy, Daniel 464
 Halili, Rigels 29–33, 34–8
 Halimi, Gisèle 3575
 Halisi, C. R. D. 3087
 Hall, Anthony 582–6
 Hall, Louis 585
 Hall, R. 3699
 Hallet, R. 856
 Halliday, Lt. Governor 1689
 Halloway, Nada 954, 2521–2
 Halt All Racist Tours (HART) 3155
 Ham Nghi 3477, 3478
 Hamann, Johann Georg 886, 3190
Hamas 1547–51
 electoral success 1550
 Intifada 1758, 1760
 origins and development 1547–51, 1811
 Hamba, Ali Bash 3335
Hambacher Fest 1348
 Hamburg Club 2824
 Hamburg Massacre 20, 21
 Hamden, John 1097
 Hameed, Abdul 2582
 Hamer, Fannie Lou 73, 653
 Hamilton, Alexander 1302, 3515, 3524–5
 Hamilton, Alice 1742
 Hamilton, Carrie 3015–18
 Hamilton, Charles V. 613
 Hamilton, Cicely 3569
 Hamilton, Henry 84
 Hamilton, James 3460
 Hamlin, Michael 2066–8
 Hammar skjold, Dag 855, 2138, 2397

- Hammett, James 3301
 Hammouda Bey 3334
Hampton, Fred 1551–2
 Han, Jin H. 581–2, 1027–8, 2973–4
 Han-jok chong-yun-hap-hoi (General League of Koreans) 1970
 Han people 715
 Hanchongryun (Korean Confederation of Student Unions) 3185
 Hancock, John 77, 452, 3023
 Hang Dongfang 3287
 Hanga, Kassim 3708, 3709
 Hangu script 1996
Hani, Chris 175, 1552, 2194, 3053, 3105, 3107, 3249
 Haniya, Ismail 1549
 Hanna, Kathleen 2845
 Hannan, Jason 1808–12
 Hannington, Walter 3383
 Hannover Group 1316
 Hanoi, Battle 3471
 Hansen, Nicole B. 1073–6
Happerset case 3623
Hapsburg empire 1142–4
 Austria 317
 collapse of 319, 1749
 Comunero movement 843–5
 ethnic and nationalist revolts 1142–4
 Hungarian autonomy 1619
 Jewish people 1919, 1920
 Luxembourg 2141
 Masaryk 2252
 Netherlands 1034, 2445
 Transylvania 2862–3
 Harara Declaration 3250
 Haras al-Istiqlal (Guardians of Independence) 1778
 Haraszti, Miklos 1618
 Haraway, Donna 2306
 Harbi, Mohammed 44
 Hardayal, Lala 1675
 Hardegger, Margarethe 1609
 Hardie, Andrew 1385
 Hardie, James Keir 860, 1742, 1745, 2820, 3061
 Harding, John 946, 947
 Harding, Neil 2089
 Harding, Warren G. 975, 1013
 Hardstaff, Peter 3648–50
 Hardt, Michael 982, 2369–72
 autonomism 324
 Empire 979, 1399, 1672, 1842, 1845
 Multitude 979, 1399
 on the multitude 1006
Hardy, Thomas 1552–4, 1607, 3151
 London Corresponding Society 2126–7
 Hare, J. Laurence 987–92, 2522–6, 2982–6
 Hari Singh, Maharaja 1929, 1930–1
 Harich, Wolfgang 1340
Harijans 954, 1683, 1684
 Bhoo dan movement 2403
 see also Dalits
 Harison, Casey 1233–4, 2044–5
Harlem Renaissance 393, 1023, 1523, 1554–6, 2428
 Roumain 2872
 Scottsboro case 3003
 Senghor 3007
 Harlem riots 1556, 3397
 Harmel, Michael 3103
Harmony 1185–6, 3417
 Harnack, Arvid 1377
 Harnecker, Camila Piñero 1561–2
Harp, The 860
 Harpers Ferry 57, 90, 532, 533, 534, 2491
 Harpham, Bruce T. 511–14
 Harriman, Job 3063–4, 3418
 Harrington, Michael 2037, 3188
 Harrington, Tim 1415
 Harriott, Joe 611
Harris, Charles 1556–7, 2626, 3093, 3696
 Harris, Isaac 3314
 Harris, Mary: *see* Mother Jones
 Harris, Mike 2561–2
 Harris, William 155
 Harrison, Benjamin 1564
 Harrison, Hubert 21
 Harrison, J. P. 3234
 Harrison, Kristina Hinds 607–10
 Harrison, Thomas 1101
 Harrison, Wilfred H. 148, 149, 154, 833, 3092
 Harry Thuku Riot 3545–6, 3549
 Hart, Armando 929
 Hart, Steve 1943
hartals (mass work stoppage)
 Bengal partition 1697
 Bose 448
 Gandhi 1330, 1701, 2492–3
 Malaysia 2178
 Pakistan 2578
 Pashtuns 1966
 Sri Lanka 2632
 see also strikes
 Hartley, David 507
 Hartmann, Georg Wilhelm 3066
 harvest failures 254, 501, 1148–9, 1209, 1350, 1899, 2922, 3468
 Harvester case 314, 3563
 Harvey, D. 1398, 1672, 2436
 Harwood, Christopher W. 1563
Hasan al-Banna 1557–60, 1962–3

- Hasegawa, Hiroshi 1893
 Haselrig, Arthur 2120
 Hasenclever, Wilhelm 3066
 Hashemite monarchy 3224
 Haskell, Burnett 861
 Hassan, Moisés 2470
 Hassan II 2337–8
 Hasta Mitra 1725
 Hastings, Warren 368, 1223
 Hatch, Orrin 1752
 Hatch, R. B. 785
Hatikhedá Revolt 371
 Hatmaker, Amy 532–4, 565, 869–70, 1333–5,
 2125–6, 3002–3, 3533
 Hats and Caps, of Sweden 1496
 Hatta, Mohammad 1729, 1732
 Indonesian independence 1730
Hatta Shūzō 133, 136, 1561
 Hatter's War 2524
Hatuey 1561–2
 Haudenosaunee 2620
 Haughey, Charles 2573
Hauptmann, Gerhart 116, 1562–3
Weber, Die 1562, 3036
 Hausa-Fulani 2482, 2484
 Hausa-Ibo Riot 2482
 Hauserne, Marie Carpenter 1293
 Haussmann, Georges Eugène 2764
 Havana Workers' Federation (FOH) 2151
Havel, Václav 1563
 arrested 951
Charter 77 654, 3433
 criticizing communism 949
 Global Day of Action 1392
 and KSS-KOR 2698
 opposition party 2742
 as president 2509, 3434
 and student movement 3176
 Velvet Revolution 1026
 Havelock, Henry 1690
 Havemann, Katia 1345
 Havemann, Robert 387
**Hawaii, resistance to US invasion and
 occupation** 1563–6
 Hawaiian League 1564
 Hawatmeh, Nayef 2011
 Hawke, Bob 305, 311, 3563
 Hawkins, John 517
 Hawley, Joseph 899
 Hawthorne, Nathaniel 1222
 Hay, John 3675
 Hay-Bunau Varilla, Treaty of 2593
Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl 47–8,
 1566–8, 2218, 2648
 Hayden, Tom 2619, 3188
 Hayes, Roland 1555
Haymarket tragedy 1568–70
 commemoration of 259
 and Goldman 1411
 IWPA 2030
 police brutality 2259
 repression of anarchists 157, 1734
 working hours 1643
 worldwide impact 106, 158, 898
 Haynes, John 840
Haywood, Big Bill 836, 1570–2, 1735, 2030,
 2033, 2623
 Haywood, Harry 394
 Hazel Hurricane 1518
 Hazlett, Hugh 3047
 Heagney, Muriel 3562
 Healey, Dan 3016
 health hazards 1881
 Healy, Kevin 787
 Hearts of Oak 1785
 Heath, Nick 119–22, 141–3
 Heathorn, Stephen 2877
 Heathrow Airport 1040
 Heaven and Earth Society 3231
 Heaven Helps Those Who Help Themselves
 1229
 Hébert, Jacques René 1277, 1291, 2849
 on *sans-culottes* 2969
 Hébertistes 962, 1288, 1291–2, 2849
 Hedmark peasantry 2513
 Hédouville, Joseph d' 3311, 3312
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 1572–4,
 3679
 and Bakunin 333
 dialectics 1423, 1572, 2230, 2836
 French Revolution 2836
 as influence 771, 973, 3679
 Marx 907, 2229–30
 master/slave dialectic 356, 2839
Phenomenology of Mind 2836
 revolutions 1572–3
Science of Logic 2837
 Hegelian Marxism 324
 hegemony 1218, 1424, 2247, 3070
 Heiberg, Peter Andreas 989
 Heidegger, Martin 904, 1256, 2213
 Heidelberger Program 1581
 Heiligendamm: *see* G8 protests, Heiligendamm
 Heiman, Larry W. 464–5, 1585–7, 2155
Heimin shimbun 2566
 Heiminsha (Commoners' Society) 3595
 Heimwehr 320
 Heine, Heinrich 2140
 Heinrich, Rolf 1345
 Heinz Corporation 3453

- Heinz USA 1170
 Heke, Hone 2206
 Hélder Câmara, Dom 2058
 Helena, Heloisa 500
 Helg, Aline 911–14
Hellenic Democracy 126
 Helms, Jesse 2275
 Helms-Burton Act 3572
 Helsinki 2915
 Helsinki Accords 654, 1618
 human rights 341
 Helsinki Committees 224
 Helsinki Final Act 3049, 3433
 Helsinki Summit 3345
 Helsinki Watch 817
 Helvétius, Claude-Adrien 1409, 1602
 Hem Chieu 568–9
 Hémerly, Daniel 1713–18, 3465–71, 3471–5,
 3475–8, 3479–86, 3486–9
 Hemingway, Ernest 7
 Hemispheric Conference to End the War in
 Vietnam 2786
 Hemispheric Social Alliance 3645, 3655
 Henderson, Arthur 528, 3061
 Hendrix, Jimi 221
 Heng Samrin 575, 1960
 Henninger, Max 1845–7
 Hennings, Emmy 953
 Henoko beach 1888
 Henri IV, of France 1068, 1228
 Henris, John Robert 593–5, 1117–21
 Henry, Claudius 1860
 Henry, Émile 120
 Henry, Hubert Joseph 1022
 Henry, Milton 394
 Henry, Richard 394
 Henry, William “Jerry” 216
 Henry I, of Haiti 1511
 Henry IV, of England 1803–4
 Henry of Navarre 1068, 2950
 Henry the Navigator 186, 1654
 Henry VI, of England 514
 Henry VII, of England 509, 590, 1804
 Henry VIII, of England
 break with Rome 514, 1092
 Kildare rebellion 1805
 Reformation 1093
 Hérard, Charles 1512
 Herbst, Iosif 541
 Herder, Johann Gottfried 1142, 3189
 Herero people
 cattle breeders 3539
 communities 2390
 German genocide 2392, 2396, 3603
 resistance 3539–40
 Truppspieler 2396
 UN 2530
 Herero Proclamation 2393
 Heres, Tomás de 2949
 heretics 1355
 Hernández, Berenice 3596–601
 Hernández, María Julia 2060
 Hernandez, Melba 3574
 Hernandez, Ortega 2296
 Hernández Juárez, Francisco 2299
 Hernández Martínez, Maximiliano 2020, 2223,
 2224, 2225–6
 Hernandez Toledo, José 3297
 Herrera Campins, Luis 3438
 Herrnhut 2323
 Herrnhut, Rudolf 1339, 1340
 Herscher, Walter R. 357, 897–8, 2215–16
 Herstigte Nasionale Party 2626
 Hertell, Elisha 3619
 Herter, Christian 196
 Hertzog, Albert 1088
 Hertzog, Barry 2397
 Hertzog, Enrique 430
 Hertzog, J. B. M. 2, 2111
 Hervey, Frederick 1786
 Herwegh, Georg 333
 Herz, Alice 220
Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich 334, 976,
 1574–5, 2763
 Herzl, Theodore 372, 3741, 3742
 Hess, Moses 2230, 3741
 Hetch Hetchy Dam 1119
 heteronomy/autonomy 622
 Hetherington, Henry 2543
 Heureaux, Ulises 1016
 Heutsz, J. B. van 1720
 Heyrick, Elizabeth 204
Hezbollah 636, 1575–7, 1811
 counterdemonstration 636
 and Islamic Jihad 2072
 martyrdom 1576
 Nasrallah 2404
 suicide bombings 1577
 Hêzên Rizgariya Kurdistan (HRK) 2011
 Hib (Haemophilus influenza type b) 2998
hibakusha (survivors of atomic bombs) 1887
 Hibbat Tziyyon 3741, 3742
 Hibbert, Lennie 611
 Hicks, William 2164
Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel 1578–9, 2281
 Hideyoshi Toyotomi 1996
 Higgins, H. B. 3563
 Higgins, William 1577
 Higgonson, John 3425
 High Treason Incident 2566

- hijab* (Muslim headscarf) 644, 1644–5, 1766, 1774
 hijackings 400, 1576, 3443
Hijo del Ahuizote, El 137
HIJOS Movement, Children of the Disappeared 256, 1579–81
Hilferding, Rudolf 321, 322, 354, 1581–2, 1649, 2243
 Finance Capital 1581, 1582
 Hill, Christopher 2249, 2988, 2989
 Hill, Joe 1204
 Hill, Robert 22
 Hille, Peter 1609
 Hillquit, Morris 3063, 3065
 Hilsner trials 2252
 Himmler, Heinrich 1593–4, 3512
 Hindenburg, Paul von 1178, 1375, 1590, 2833
Hindoo Patriot 1689, 1712
Hindu, The 2741
 Hindu Code Bill 645, 3586
 Hindu Communalism 1582–4, 1692
 Hindu Mahasabha 1328, 1330, 1331, 1583, 1680
 Hindu–Muslim unity 1326, 1331, 1921, 2388, 2430
Hindu nationalism 1582–5, 1684, 2574
 Hindu society 954, 1583, 1692
 Hindustan Republican Association (HRA) 1677, 3041
 Hindustan Socialist Republican Army 1682, 1710
 Hindustan Socialist Republican Association (HSRA) 449, 1677, 3041
 Hindustani, Hojji Muhammadjan 3244
Hindutva 1331, 1582–5, 1692–4, 2435
 Hinnawi, Colonel Sami al- 3222
 Hiratsuka Raicho 3595, 3596
 Hirohito, Emperor 194, 1848, 1889
 Hiroshima atomic bomb 194, 195, 728, 1729, 1885, 1887, 1890
 Hiroyuki, Shima 1903
Hirschfeld, Magnus 464, 1300, 1585–7, 2103
 Sappho und Sokrates 1586, 2103
 WhK 2093, 2104
 Hirst, Paul 2620
 Hispaniola 601–2, 1510, 1561, 2079–80
 see also Dominican Republic
 Historical Association of Kenya 3043
 historical materialism 375, 376, 821, 2231–4, 2240
Historical Materialism 2249
 history, theory of 2240
 Hitchmough, Samuel 877–8
Hitler, Adolf 1587–94, 1594–5
 anti-Semitism 1589
 assassination plot 1594–5
 and Austria 320
 as chancellor 2832
 coming to power 3130, 3386
 coup attempt 1365
 downfall 1593–4
 foreign policy 1592–3
 Führer (leader) 1591
 German Nazism 1587–94
 invading USSR 451
 Mein Kampf 1375, 1590, 2271–2
 rise of 1373, 3678
 and Stalin 1377
 Yugoslavia 3682
 Hitler–Stalin Pact 73, 1372
HIV/AIDS
 ACT UP 8
 Cuba 924
 drugs for 3113
 South Africa 876, 2195, 3312
 Zimbabwe 2364
 Hizb ut-Tahrir 1811
 Hizbul Mujahedeen (Party of Freedom Fighters) 1935
 Hladik, Radim 1391–5
 Hlaváček, Michal 1619
 Hlayhel, Raed 992
Hlinka, Andrej 1595–6, 3293
 Hlinka Guard 1596, 3048
 Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSPP) 1596, 3048, 3293
 HMI (Islamic Students' Association) 1724
 Hmong tribesmen 2055
 Hnchakists 285
 Hnutí Duha 1391
Hô Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh) 1596–601
 Asian Marxism 730, 2249
 in Canton 3467
 communism 3472
 ICP 1958
 prestige 3480
 return from USSR 1714
 revolution 1216, 1219
 Revolutionary Path 1597
 at Tan Trao 1716
 in Thailand 3258
 Hô Chi Minh City (Saigon) 1600, 3487, 3488
 Hô Chi Minh Trail 222, 1599, 3480, 3483
 Hoa Hao 3480
 Hoang Ha Tam 2664
 Hobart-Houghton, D. 148
Hobbes, Thomas 1601
 Element of Law, The 1601
 Leviathan 1601
 multitude 2370
 social contract 75, 1113, 1601
 state of nature 95
Hobbies, The 2357

- Hobkirk's Hill 86
Hobsbawm, Eric 3211, 3282
Black Dwarf, The 2261
on Mafia 2160
Marxism 2249
poverty/revolution 296, 778
social banditry 1944
Hobson, J. A. 1649
Höchberg, Carl 1941
Hoche, Lazare 894, 895, 1792–3, 1795–6, 2545
hod begari system 2576
Hodensaunee (Iroquois) 2412
Hodges, Donald 2283
Hodgkin, Roger 1103
Hodgkin, Thomas 207–8
Hodgson, Frederick 3669
Hodña, Michal Miloslav 3051
Hoel, Halvor 2518
Hoffman, Melchior 93, 1357, 2831
Hoffmanowa, Klementyna 3544
Hofmann, Melchior 2831
Hogan, Walter 2676
Høgsbjerg, Christian 530–1, 2526–7
Hohenzollern dynasty 1373, 1749, 1920, 2856
Hoho, Chieftainess 3602
Hojč, Samuel 1620
Hokkaido Newspaper 1894
Hokuriku Electric 192–3
Holbach, Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d' 1111, 1601–2
Holbrooke, Richard 2003
Holdsworth, William 590
Holeček, Lubomir 3172, 3173
Holland: *see* Netherlands
Holloway, John 323, 981, 2620, 3711–14
Hollywood Ten 1602–3
Holmstrom, Nancy 772, 2249
Holocaust
Begin on 358
genocide 2497
homosexuals 2093
labor camps 1183
Nazi Party 1594
Werfel 287
Holt, Joseph 1788
Holt, P. M. 3198
Holt, T. 1868
Holtby, Winifred 3569
Holy Alliance 2864
Holy Club 3520
Holy Roman Empire 1347, 2987
Holzmann, Johannes: *see* Hoy, Senna
Hombres de Maiz 639
Home colony 3418
Home Rule Association 2616, 2617
Home Rule Bill 783, 1045, 3043
Home Rule Leagues 1699–700, 1701
Homecoming Operation 199, 2303
homeless 1994, 2000
Homes not Roads 1039
Homestead strike 379
homoeotericism 1300
homophile groups 2093
Homophilenbewegung 2106
homophobia 2572, 3016–17
Homosexual Law Reform Society 2096
homosexual rights 1300, 1609
homosexuality
Brand 464
Britain 2263
decriminalization 2263
Hirschfeld 464
Mackay 2155
Nujoma on 2531
Zimbabwe 2364
Homosexuellen Aktion Westberlin (HAW)
2106
Homosexuellen Arbeiter Aktion Westberlin
(HAAW) 2106
Homosexuelleninitiative Berlin 2105
Honduran Commission for Human Rights 614
Honduras 1603–4, 2080
Despard 993
FENACH 2128–9
General Strike 1603–4
indigenous peoples 2080
Lempira 2080
López Gutiérrez 2018
MISURA 2473
music 640
Soccer War 2956–7
Zelaya 2128–9
Honduras Liberal Party 2018
Honecker, Erich 1341–2, 1344, 2509, 3078
Hong Kil-dong 1997
Hong Kong 1604–6, 1658
see also World Trade Organization (WTO)
protests, Hong Kong
Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Democratic
Movement in China 1605
Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions 1605
Hong Kong People's Alliance 3651
Hong Kyung-rae's Rebellion 1997
Hong Phong 3469
Hong Xiuquan 717
Hongqi (Red Flag) 3505
Honort, Jean-Jacques 1507
Hood, Alexander 3154
Hook, Paulus 83
Hook, Sidney 3187

- Hooke, Robert 2989
 Hooper, John 516
 Hoopes, Darlington 3065
 Hoover, Herbert 445, 3411
 Hoover, J. Edgar
 Black Panthers 751
 on Goldman 1411, 1412
 King 752–3
 McCarthyism 3149
 Scottsboro case 3003
 Hopi tribe 39
 Hopkinson, Henry 945
 Hopper, John 3280
 Horat, Mario 868
horizontalidad (social relationship) 1086, 1740
 Horkheimer, Max 12, 904, 905
 and Adorno 905, 907–8, 1255
 Dialectic of Enlightenment 907, 1255
 Frankfurt School 1253, 1254
 Longing for the Totally Other 906
 Marxism 2249
 Studies in Prejudice 906
 Studies on Authority and Family 1302
 Horne, John 3531
Horne Tooke, John 546, 1606–7, 3024, 3151
 Horner, Arthur 524
 Horney, Karen 1256
 Horowicz, Alejandro 274–6
 Horse Drivers' Union 152, 1414, 3092
 Hortense, Queen 2457
 Horthy, Miklós 129, 1175
 Hørup, Viggo 991
 Hosea riot 3316
 Hosokawa, Morihiro 1910
 hospitality, codes of 1385
 hospitality houses 634, 3420
 hostage-taking
 Iran 1964
 Iraq 1831
 M-19 2149
 Mali 2182
 Silesia 3037
 strikers 277
Hôtel de Ville, Paris 1243, 1244, 1607–8, 2850
 Hotham, Charles 1145
 Hou Wailu 3235
 Hou Youn 569, 571, 1959
 Hough Riot, Chicago 3400
 Hountondji, J. P. 92
 Houphouët-Boigny, Felix 880, 881, 884, 1252
 Hourani, Akram 3222, 3223, 3224
House, Callie 1608–9
 House Un-American Activities Committee
 (HUAC) 220, 221, 1602, 3630
 Houses of Hospitality 634, 3420
 housewife feminism 3596
 Houtman, Cornelis de 1718
 Houtman, G. 303, 555
 Howard, Catherine 516
 Howard, Ebenezer 2048
 Howard, John 5, 312
 Howard, M. C. 1670
 Howe, Earl 3154
 Howe, William 79, 81, 82
 Howell, J. 1459
 Howrah–Sibpur Conspiracy Case 2874
 Hoxha, Enver 30, 32, 339, 830
Hoy 915
Hoy, Senna 1609
 Hsaya San 553, 2977, 2978–81
Hsiang River Review 2200
 Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Society) 732,
 733, 734, 3201
 Hu Feng 708
 Hu Jintao 3705
 Hu Nim 571, 574, 1959, 1960
 Hu Shi 713, 3236
 Hu Yaobang 3284–5, 3286
 death 3286
 Hua Guofeng 2205
 Hua Hsing Hui (Society for Revival of the
 Chinese Nation) 733
 Huampu, Edwin 433
 Huanuni miners 421
 Huasipungo 2064
 Hubbard, Gill 1313
 Hubbard, Jocelyn 1856, 3559
 Hubei Provincial Federation of Labor 2124
 Huber, Kurt 3525, 3526
 Huberman, Leo 2249
 Hubmaier, Balthasar 93
 Hudicourt, Max 1517
 Huei, Pang Yang 1596–601
Huerta, Dolores 1609–10
 Huerta, Victoriano 618–19, 999, 2277, 2278,
 2539–40, 3431, 3489
 Hughes, Andrew 1200
 Hughes, Francis 2967
 Hughes, Holly: *Clit Notes* 1191
 Hughes, Langston 1024, 1554, 1555, 1556,
 2428, 2872
 Hughes-Peynado Plan 1013
 Hugo, Jacob Moller 1557
Hugo, Victor 1610–11
 Communards 402
 on Louis-Napoleon 440
 works 1610–11
 Huguenots 1068–9, 2950, 3494
 Hugues, Victor 1264
Huk Rebellion 1611–17, 2674–5, 2676

- Hukbalahap Communist Party (PKP) 1611–12,
1614–15, 2674–5
- Hull House 10, 11
- Hülßenbeck, Richard 953
- human capital 2348
- human rights
abuses 1473
Argentina 254–7
Casement on 619–20
Guatemala 1473
Helsinki Accords 341
Menchú 2272–3
Paraguay 2597–8, 2606
rights to identity 1428
Uruguay 3406
- Human Rights Watch 959, 3246
- humanism 1355, 1940
- Humanist Way* 2876
- humanitarian intervention 224, 2997
- Humanité* 823, 1913, 3219
- Humbert, Jean-Joseph 1788, 1794–5, 1796
- Humboldt, Alexander von 411
- Humboldt Park riots, Chicago 3400
- Hume, Allan Octavian 1695
- Hume, David 1113, 2873
- Humffray, John Basson 1144, 1145
- humor, revolutionary 814, 815
- Humphrey, Hubert 1975
- Hun Sen 571, 1961
- Hundred Flowers Campaign 708–9, 985, 2203,
3479
- Hundred Years' War 514
- Hung Fu Hui 734
- Hung Hsiu-chuan 3231, 3233
- Hung-kuang 2309
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1619
- Hungarian Revolution 996, 1620
- Hungarian Soviet Republic 128
- Hungary** 1617–31
anarchism 127–9
anarchosyndicalism 3228
anti-communist protests 1617–19
April Laws 1623
Arrow Cross 1175
Catholic Church 1618
Centralists 1622
Congress of Nationalities 1621–2
Hapsburgs 1623
Jewish people 1920
Language War 1619–20, 1621
Magyars 1620–2
protests 1619–22
Reform Era 1624
revolt 1339
Revolution (1848) 1622–4, 1630–1, 2508
Revolution (1956) 1625–30, 2387, 2508,
2857–8, 2865
Soviet invasion 1819, 2387, 3062
Stalinist repression 1625
women radicals 1630–1
women's movement 3632
- Hunger Marches 523–5, 3384, 3559
- hunger strikes
Bolivian miners' wives 420
Sands 1798, 2967–8
- Hungerford, Edward 289
- Hünkâr Iskelesi, Treaty of 538
- Hunkpapas 900
- Hunt, Henry "Orator"** 546, 1631, 2543, 2661
- Hunt, Leamon 2818
- Hunt, Lynn 1285
- Hunt, R. N. 2238
- Hunter, Tera 774
- Hunter Commission 1702
- Hunters' Lodges 594
- Hunters Point riot, San Francisco 3401
- hunting rights 1119–20
- Huntington, Samuel 889
- Huq, Zahurul 2579
- Hurban, Josef 1621, 3051
- Hurlock, slave 1872
- Huron Indians 1203
- Hurson, Martin 2967
- Hurst, Fannie 1555
- Hurston, Zora Neale 1024, 1555
- Hurtado, Osvaldo 1062, 1063
- Hus, Jan (John Huss) 1355, 2323, 2829
- Husák, Gustáv 654, 1563, 2745, 3174, 3433–4
- Hüsni, Kâzım 3358
- Husri, Sati' al- 1776
- Hussain, Imam 1770
- Hussein, Saddam: *see* Saddam Hussein
- Hussein Bey I 3334
- Hussein dynasty 3334
- Hussein of Jordan 239, 399, 400
- Husseini, Faisal 1814
- Husserl, Edmund 1255
- Hussites 1355, 2829
- Huszádik Századi* journal 3228
- Hut, Hans 93
- Hutcheson, Francis 3054
- Hutchinson, Anne** 155, 1632–3, 3613, 3619
- Hutchinson, Leslie 611
- Hutchinson, Thomas 3615
- Hutter, Jacob 93, 1633
- Hutterites** 93, 1633–4, 3417
- Hutton, Drew 107
- Huttwil League 3213
- Hutu militiamen 852
- Huxley, Thomas 2007

- Huy Kanthoul 577, 578
 Huynh Nghi 568
 Huynh Phu So 1716
 Hwang, Dongyoun 135–7
 Hyde, Douglas 1799, 3681
Hyde, Evan Anthony 366, 1634–5
 Hyde Park riot 2808
 Hyderabad 1397
 hydroelectric project, Paraguay 2601, 2607
 hydrogen bomb testing 1272
 Hyndman, Henry Mayers 2341, 3061
 Hyundai chaebol 1984, 1989
- Ialá, Kumba: *see* Yalla, Kumba
 Iatrides, J. 1438
 Ibadan, Bashorun Ogunmola 1641
 Ibadan people 3677
 Ibáñez del Campo, Carlos 112, 692, 1468, 1753
 Ibarra de Piedra, Rosario 2291
 Ibárruri Gómez, Dolores 2962, 3611
 Iberian Federation of Libertarian Youth (FIJL) 146
 Iberian Liberation Movement (MIL) 147
 Ibn Khaldun Center 1638
 Ibrahim, Fatima Ahmed 3199
Ibrahim, Mirza 1637–8
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin 1638
 Ibrahim Bek 3243–4
 Ibrahim Khan, Muhammad 1930
 Ibrahim Pasha 2073
 Ibsen, Henrik 116, 2524
 Ibsen, Sigurd 2525
Icaria Utopian Community 1638–9, 3417
 Iceland
 Danish rule 2516
 famine 2517
 fishing rights 2517
 public sector cuts 2520
 see also Nordic countries
 Ichiko Kamachiko 1848
Ideal 3431
 identity, rights to 1428
 identity movements 783
 identity politics 2427, 2538
 Idris I 2779
 Idstedt, Battle of 2985
 Ieng Sary 574, 1958–9, 1960, 1961
 Ieu Koeus 577
Ife–Modakeke conflict 1640–1
 Ife people 3677, 3678
 Iftikhar-ud-Din, Mian 2580, 2581
 Iganie, Battle of 2716
 Igbo secessionists 2484
 Igbo Women’s War 3546, 3549
 Iggy Pop and the Stooges 2777
- Iglesias, María Cristina 3454
 Ignace, William Jones 586
 Ignatin, Noel 3070
 Ijaw Youth Movement 2485
 Ijaw Youths Council (IYC) 2479–80, 2484
 Ikeda, Takashi 1561
 Iliescu, Ion 2858, 2859, 2861
 Illegal Oaths Act 656, 3395
 Illia, Arturo 244, 863
 Illich, Ivan 2058
 illiteracy 954–5, 1714
 Illuminati 3146
 ILO: *see* International Labor Organization
 Iloilo, Ratu Josefa 1200
ilustrados, Philippines 2667, 2668, 2669
 Image Theater 407
 Imbert Barrera, Antonio 1017, 1019
 Imbokodvo National Movement (INM) 3206, 3747
 IMF: *see* International Monetary Fund
 Imlay, Gilbert 3541
 immediatism 979, 2491
immigrants 1641–3
 Britain 511–12
 housing discrimination 1644
 politicization of 1645
 social conflict, France 1643–7
 US protests 1641–3, 2021, 2259–60
 Immigration Act 2589
 Immigration Reform and Control Act 1641
 Immorality Act 171
 Imperial Academy of Sciences 2993
 Imperial Blue Book 2394
 Imperial British East African Company 3369
 Imperial Cigar Manufacturing and Trading Company 3034
imperialism 1647–53, 1654–64, 1664–73
 capitalism 1647–53
 exploitation 1662–3
 globalization 1670–2, 2250
 historical evolution 1654–64
 Industrial Revolution 1659
 industrialization 1659–60
 Kautsky 1652
 Lenin on 2245
 modernization to globalization 1664–73
 nationalism 1660, 2246
 revolution 1649–52
 USA 1660, 1663, 1664
 import-substitution 3092, 3351
 Imre, Baláys 2866
Imroz 1160
 Imsul Rebellion 1997
 In Tam 573
 Inca Plan 3430

- Inca Revolt, Last** 3337–9
- Incas**
- Atahualpa 1923–4, 2876
 - Conquistadors 2876
 - empire restored 1923
 - Machu Picchu 1484
 - Rumiñahui 2876
 - see also* Andean communities
- Incondicional, O* 153
- Inconfidência Mineira 484–5
- indentured labor
- America 75, 211
 - Caribbean 1031, 1512
 - Fiji 1197, 3425
 - Guyana 1498
 - Indian tea plantations 1695
- Independence Front 1617–18
- Independence train station bombing 1570
- Independent Central of Rural Workers and Campesinos (CIOAC) 2287
- Independent Class Syndicalism (SIC) 1082
- Independent Farmers' Coordination (CCI) 3427
- Independent Labor Party 331
- Independent Labour Party, Scotland 2820, 2821
- Independent Labour Party (ILP), Britain 520, 528, 1748, 2595
- Hardie 860, 2820
- Independent Labour Party (ILP), India
- Ambedkar 54, 958
- Independent Media Center 1309, 3662
- Independent Peace Association 3176
- Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) 826, 1359, 1373–4, 1581, 1942, 3722
- Independent Socialist Party, Argentina 271
- Independent Socialist Party of Hungary (ISP) 128
- Independent Women's Association, GDR 3633
- Independent Worker Unity (UOI) 2298
- Index of Forbidden Books 1111, 2316
- India**
- armed struggle 1673–9
 - British rule 1662, 1694–700
 - caste system 1582–3, 1685–6
 - civil disobedience movement 1680–4
 - civil service 1695
 - civilian revolt 1687–91
 - communist parties 3586–7
 - constitutionalism 1684–5
 - deindustrialization 1662
 - extremism 1696–7
 - fascism 1692–4
 - French vs. British 86–7
 - Great Rebellion 1685–92
 - Hindutva 1331, 1582–5, 1692–4, 2435
 - Home Rule movement 1699–700
 - illiteracy 954–5
 - independence 1331, 1660, 1680–4
 - Independence Day 2431
 - independence movement 1673–9
 - inflation 1700
 - jute mills 1700
 - Karnataka State Farmers' Association 2635
 - and Kashmir 1930–6
 - land reforms 2421
 - Maoism 2421
 - mass peasant revolt 2422
 - Munda Rebellion 2372
 - nationalism 1673–4, 1694–700
 - Naxalite Movement 2265, 2266, 2421–5, 3587
 - non-violent non-cooperation movement 1700–4
 - partition/violence/migration 1330–1, 2577, 3586
 - patriarchy 3589
 - peasant resistance 3461
 - post-World War II upsurge 1704–8
 - Rampa rebellions 2802–3
 - rape 3589
 - Santal Rebellion 2970–1
 - secret societies 1674
 - Sepoy Revolt 1685–7
 - student protests 1698
 - Students Congress 3180
 - tribals 2970
 - women's movement 3586–90
 - working-class strikes 2793
 - see also* Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand; Nehru, Jawaharlal
- India Indigo Company 1712
- Indian Act 583
- Indian Association 1695
- Indian Councils Act 1691, 1696, 1699
- Indian Evidence Act 3589
- Indian Independence Act 1932
- Indian Independence Committee 1676
- Indian Movement of Chimborazo (MICH) 480
- Indian Muslim Students Union 3180
- Indian National Army (INA) 1679, 1704–5, 1710, 2404
- see also* Azad Hind Fauz
- Indian National Congress 1965–70
- creation of 1695
 - Gandhi 2493–4
 - Government of India Act 2791–2
 - and Muslim League 2573
- Indian national liberation** 1708–11
- Indian Ocean tsunami 3643
- Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) 2741, 3251, 3252

- Indian Renaissance Institute 2876
Indian Sociologist 1675
 Indian Territory 58, 59, 68
 Indian Women's Association 3603
 Indian Workers' Choir 151
 Indian Workers' Industrial Union 151, 3034
 Indians of All Tribes 2413
 see also Native Americans
Indicatore Genovese 2266
 Indies Social Democratic Organization (ISDV)
 1728
 Indigénisme 1516
 Indigenous Authorities of Colombia (AICO) 803
 Indigenous Clandestine Revolutionary
 Committee-General Headquarters (CCRI-
 CG) 2212
 Indigenous Environmental Network 2417, 2419
 Indigenous Organization of Antioquia (OIA)
 2791
 indigenous peoples, oral histories 3601
 Indigenous Peoples Council 258
 Indigenous Peoples Participation Program 258
 Indigenous Popular Committee of Oaxaca (CIPO)
 2536
 Indigenous Resistance Council, Mexico 2289
 Indigenous Social Alliance (ASI) 804, 2791
 Indigo Commission 1712
 indigo cultivation 1474–5, 1530, 1541, 2493, 2956
Indigo Rebellion 1711–13
 individualism 76, 120, 1173–4, 1409
 Indo-Lanka Accord 2633, 3527
 Indo-Pakistani War 1160
Indochina 1713–17
 Chinese/Soviet influence 3486
 education 1714
 France 44, 568, 3473
 Free France 1713
 PCF 225–6
 World War II and liberation in 1713–17
Indochina War I 1596, 1599, 3471–5
Indochina War II 1600, 2663, 3479–86
 Indochina War III 3262–3, 3486–9
 Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) 1958
 see also Communist Party of Indochina (PKI)
 Indochinese Democratic Front 3470
Indonesia 1718–34
 anti-Suharto protests 1724–6
 colonial protests 1718–21
 Dutch colonial system 1718–21, 3199–200
 financial crisis 1430
 forced cultivation 1719
 independence 3200
 Petition of Fifty 1723
 Portuguese traders 1718
 pro-democracy protests 1721–4
 revolution and counterrevolution 1727–34
 Suharto, fall of 3273
 terror 1733
 World War II 3200
 Indonesian Center for Labor Struggles (PPBI)
 1726
 Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) 1722, 1725
 Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) 1723
 Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) 1722, 1724,
 1729, 3199
 Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) 1730
 Indonesian Students' Action Front (FAMI) 1723
 Indonesian Students in Solidarity with
 Democracy (SMID) 1723
 Indulgents 1291–2
 Industrial Aid Society (IAS) 3095
 Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU)
 152, 154, 832, 1414, 2222, 2385, 3696
 South African branch 2395, 3092
Industrial Areas Foundation 49
 Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) 3092, 3094,
 3096, 3728, 3729–30, 3734
 Industrial Disputes Act 3728
 Industrial Disputes Investigation Act 588
Industrial Freedom 3418
 Industrial Paraguya 2608
 Industrial Peace Act 2676
 Industrial Policy Resolution 2433
 Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation
 Act 589
 Industrial Revolution
 Britain 2340, 2566
 development 1667
 Germany 1352
 and global economy 1647
 imperialism 1659
 Luddites 2133
 Marx on 2232
 modernization 1665
 Morris 2341
 and utopian communities 3416
 Industrial Socialist League 152
 Industrial Trainee System (ITS) 1994
 Industrial Workers of Africa 151, 152
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)
 1734–9
 anarchism 98
 anarchosyndicalism 109, 161–2
 Australia 315, 1738–9, 2039
 Bread and Roses Strike 502–4
 Canada 110, 587
 Chile 112
 Debs 974, 2032
 draft evasion 2489
 Finland 119

- Flynn 1204
 Haywood 836, 1571
 Indian Workers' Industrial Union 151
 and Knights of Labor 1978, 2021
 Lawrence mills 2623
 London, Jack 1734–8, 2128
 Marine Transport Workers 1752–5
 May Day 1570
 Mexican Revolution 2279
 Mother Jones 2345
 New Zealand 139, 830
 One Big Union 1734, 1738
 Paterson Silk Strike 2623
 and PLM 2162
 revitalized 160
 Sinclair on 3041
 and Socialist Party 2489
 SolFed 3072
 South Africa 3092
 spontaneity 157
 unemployment 3383
 Villa 2540
Indymedia global justice campaign 1388,
 1397, 1739–40, 3662
 infant mortality rates 268
 infanticide 1871, 3583
 info shops 324
 Informations et Liaisons Ouvrières 3063
Infoshops 1740–1
 Ingenieros, José 270
 Inghinidhe na hEireann (Daughters of Erin) 1415
 Iñiguez, General 2642
 Initiative Against Economic Globalization
 (INPEG) 1391
 Initiative of Black People in Germany 326
 Initiative for Peace and Human Rights 1345
 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 3084, 3086, 3089
 Inkiov, Dimitar 538
Inkululeko 455
Inkululeko-Freedom 3105
 INLA: *see* Irish National Liberation Army
Inner City Voice 2067
 Innis, Roy 870
Innya Minya Thanbanda Apwe 553
 İnönü, Mustafa İsmet 3355, 3357, 3363
 Inoue, Masao 1878–84, 3069–70
 Institución Libre de Enseñanza 3610
 Institut de France 2992
Institut für Sexualwissenschaft 1586, 1587, 2093
 Institute for Defense Analysis 818
 Institute for International Economics 3665
 Institute for Legal Defense (IDL) 2652
 Institute for Social Research 904
see also Frankfurt School
 Institute of Anarchist Studies 160
 Institute of National Memory 3503
 institutional racism 651
 Instituto Indigenista 2538
 Instituto Indigenista Nacional 1472
 Instituto de la Mujer 3611
 Instituto Nacional de Asociativismo y Economía
 Social (INAES) 2348
 Insurgent War 1476
 Insurrection Act 156, 1787
 insurrectionary anarchism 979
Integralismo Lusitano 188, 2730
 intellectual property 3171, 3461
 Intentona Comunista 470–1
 Inter-American Development Bank 1067, 2274
 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
 (TIAR) 2593
 Interamerican Commission of Human Rights
 3305
 Argentinian visit 255, 256
 Interamerican Human Rights Court 802
 interclass cooperation 268–9
 Intercollegiate Socialist Society 3041
 Inter-Continental Caravan, PGA 1389, 2637
 INTERFET peacekeeping force 1044
 Interim Coordinating Commission (TKK) 3076
Intermittents 1147
Internacional, La 271
International 150, 152, 153
 International Alliance of Social Democracy 2811
 International Anti-Militarist Commission 3082
 International Assessment of Agricultural
 Knowledge, Science, and Technology for
 Development (IAASTD) 1211–12
 International Brigades, Spanish Civil War 851,
 3138–9, 3678, 3683
see also Abraham Lincoln Brigade
 International Brotherhood of Teamsters 596,
 3413
 International Campaign Against Aggression in
 Iraq (ICAAI) 367
 International Committee for Permanent Peace
 1742
 International Confederation of Autonomous
 Chapters of the American Indian Movement
 2415
 International Confederation of Free Trade
 Unions (ICFTU) 2221, 2269, 2356, 2681
 International Conference of Socialist Women
 3722
 International Congress for Sexual Reform 1586
**International Congress of Women, The
 Hague** 1741–2
 International Convention on the Protection of the
 Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their
 Families 2306

- International Coordinating Committee (ICC)
3462
- International Council of Women 2721
- International Court of Justice 1741, 1764, 2398
Israeli settlements 1817
New Zealand *vs.* France 1273
- International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) 3011
- International Dalit Solidarity Network 959
- International Day for Peace 1831
- International Federation of Agricultural
Producers (IFAP) 3463
- International Federation of Democratic Women's
Conference, Chile 3573
- International Forum on Globalization 3028
- International Foundation for Electoral Systems
(IFES) 3330
- International Fund for Agricultural Development
3463
- International Human Rights Day 2270
- International Institute of Social History 850,
1189
- International Labor Defense (ILD) 595, 3002
- International Labor Organization (ILO)
Argentina 258
Colombia 809
Morais 2319
Poland 3502
Southern Africa 3112
- International Labor Union 2028
- International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union
(ILGWU) 2031, 3313, 3412
- International Left Opposition 2050, 2738
- International Longshore and Warehouse Union
(ILWU) 839, 2259, 3662, 3664
- International Longshoremen's Association (ILA)
1752, 3414
- International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Argentina 1085, 2640–1
Asia 1430
Bolivia 421, 433, 434
Burkina Faso 548
Caribbean 607–10, 3560
Chile 2436–7
Colombia 808
conditions attached to loans 1661–2
Côte d'Ivoire 880
Dominican Republic 1018
Ecuador 1067
food riots 1209–10
food sovereignty 1210, 1211
Guatemala 1477
Guyana 608, 1856
Jamaica 2198
Korea 1996
- Mali 2182
Morocco 2338
Mozambique 2355
Nicaragua 2476
Nigeria 2483
Paraguay 2604
Peru 2651
Philippines 1400
Russia 3126
Senegal 3007
Thailand 3272, 3273–4
Turkey 3344, 3354
Tute Bianche 1008
Uruguay 3404, 3408
Venezuela 604, 3439, 3446
Yugoslavia 3011
Zambia 696–7, 3111, 3703–4
Zimbabwe 2364
- International Petroleum Company (IPC) 3430
- International Planned Parenthood Federation
2969
- International Planning Committee for Food
Sovereignty 1211, 3462
- International Pop Underground Festival 2845
- International Proletarian Women's Day 3554
- International Red Aid 2225
- International Republic Institute (IRI) 1509,
3012
- International Seamen's Union (ISU) 1752
- International Security Zone 1019
- international socialism: mass politics** 218,
1742–50
anti-Nicholas II 1746–9
International Socialist Bureau 1745–6, 1747
Second International 1744–5
up to Second International 1743–4
- International Socialist Circle 259
- International Socialist Combat League (ISK)
1379
- International Socialist League 150, 151, 152,
1028, 1414, 2948, 3034
- International Socialist Party, Argentina 271
International Socialist Review 2253
- International Students' Day 3176
International Symposium of Socialist Humanism
1303
- International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)
809
- International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE)
3627
- International Vegetarian Union 3428
- International Vietnam Congress 1037
- International Women's Conference
Beijing 3275, 3572, 3585, 3631
- International Women's Congress 3597

- International Women's Day (IWD)** 1750–2, 3722
 February Revolution 1743, 2084, 2895–6
 International Women's Day of Action for Nuclear Disarmament 2529
 International Women's Suffrage Alliance (IWSA) 170, 3580
 International Woodworkers of America (IWA) 589
 International Workers' Association 120, 990, 3071, 3082
 International Workers' Congress 259
 International Workers' Day 2258
 International Working Men's Association (IWMA) 129, 157, 404, 829, 1750, 2026, 2612, 2764
see also First International
 International Working People's Association (IWPA) 1569, 2028, 2029
 International Working Union of Socialist Parties 355
 International Working Women's Day 3554
 International Workingmen's Association (IWA) 1000
 Bakunin's influence 2237
 Marine Transport Workers 1753
 Spain 144
 Switzerland 2006
see also First International
 International Youth Conference 3678
Internationale Situationiste 972, 3045, 3423
Internationals 1755–8
 First 1755–6
 Bakunin 333–7, 977, 1755, 2237
 Buenos Aires 102
 ending of 2242
 founding of 2239, 3056
 London 1744
 Malatesta 2168
 world politics 2236
 Second 1749
 Bastille Day 1744–5
 formation of 2242–4
 Lenin 1423, 1756, 2084
 Marx, Eleanor 2229
 Roy 2874
 Russian February Revolution 2889–90
 SPD 3055
 World War I 2239
 Zetkin 3721
 Third
 anti-fascism 178–9
 capitalism in crisis 832
 Colonial Thesis 1682–3
 critiqued 2247
 Egypt 235
 formation of 3065
 Gramsci 1422
 Hô Chi Minh 1597
 International Women's Day 1751
 International Women's Secretariat 1980
 Lenin on 2246
 Lovestone 596
 LSSP 1494
 Lukács 2086, 2136
 Marxist view of society 1174
 Marx's influence 2239
 Serrati 3014
 unemployment 3383
 World War I 1756–8
 Fourth 245, 996, 2049, 2165, 2239, 2250, 2794
 Internet use 815, 1389, 2504, 3377–8
 Interstate Commerce Commission 1973
Intervention 823
 Interventionist Left (IL) 1316
 Intifada 1399, 1547, 1548, 1549, 1777, 1780, 1814, 2502
Intifada I and II 239, 1758–61
 Intolerable Acts 78, 453
 Ioannides, Dimitrios 947
 Ioannides, George 1435
 Ioannidis, Yannis 1435, 1444
Iqbal, Muhammad 1761–2, 1810, 1929
IRA: *see* Irish Republican Army
Iran 1762–8, 2342–4
 AIOC 1763, 1764, 2343
 Cold War 1765
 homosexuality 3016
 hostage-taking 3181
 Kurdish national autonomy 1762–3
 Mossadegh era 1763–6, 2342–4
 nationalism 1764
 oil 1783, 3227
 oil industry 1763, 1769, 2343–4, 2505
 Ottoman rule 1778
 political and cultural protests 1766–8
 protest, rebellion, revolution 1777
 railway workers' strike 1779
 Rashid Ali revolt 3221
 resistance 1782–4
 Revolt (1920) 1777–9
 SAVAK 1769
 Shi'ite Muslims 1811
 Shi'ite/Sunni tensions 1776, 1782–3
 squatting 780
 strike 1769
 student movement 1963, 3181
 US-backed coup 1765, 1768
 US invasion 1401, 1664, 1672, 1783, 2504
 US support 1775

Iran (*cont'd*)

- weapons of mass destruction 1783
- women's movement 1767, 1774
- women's organizations 1783–4
- women's status 1770, 1771, 1774
- World War II 1762
- see also* Iranian Revolution; Khomeini, Ayatollah
- Iran–Contra scandal 2475
- Iran–Iraq War 1777, 1782, 3227
- Iranian Revolution 1768–75**
 - Fadlallah 1576
 - Foucault 1221
 - Gulf War 3438
 - KDP 1763
 - non-violence 2505
 - oil 3438
 - poverty 780
 - and USA 889, 1217
- Iraq 1775–9, 1782–4, 3221–7**
 - anti-British nationalists 1775–7, 1778
 - Baathists 353, 1777, 1781, 1782–3, 3221–7
 - Communists/Nationalists 1779
 - Fahd 1159
 - Gulf War 1782–3
 - hostage-taking 1831
 - invasion of Iran 1782
 - invasion of Kuwait 1782
 - Kurds 353
 - Revolt (1920) 1777–9
 - US invasion 1783
 - women's organizations 1783–4
 - see also* Iraq Revolution (1958); Iraq War
- Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) 1779
- Iraq Revolution (1958) 1779–82**
- Iraq Veterans against the War 229
- Iraq War
 - Australian troops 304
 - Blair 2040
 - global day of action 228
 - protests against 227–30, 1311, 1401–2, 2040
- Iraqi Governing Council (IGA) 1783
- Iraqi Petroleum Company 3226
- Iraqi Student's Organization 3224
- Ireland 1784–96, 1798–800, 1803–7, 2571–3**
 - agrarian warfare 1793
 - anti-clericalism 1785
 - Bloody Sunday 1797–8, 1801
 - Catholic Church 971, 1099, 1806–7
 - Cromwell 909
 - emigration 1798
 - famine 1798, 2344, 2545
 - Great Rebellion (1798) 909, 1790–6, 1807, 2402–3, 2544, 2545, 3002, 3024, 3392
 - nationalism 1798–800
 - Protestantism 1784, 3305

- revolts, early 1803–7
- revolutions 1784–90
- sectarian violence 1788
- torture 1794
- Tory rebellion 1046, 3305–6
- the Troubles 1796–8
- World War II 971–2
- see also* Irish Free State; Northern Ireland; Ulster
- Ireton, Henry 1098, 1101
- Irgun Zva'i Leumi 358–60, 374, 375, 1550, 1851**
- Irigaray, Luce 3576
- Irish Citizen Army 860, 1045, 1046
- Irish Civil War
 - Anti-Treaty Struggle 794, 1802–3
 - Collins 794
 - de Valera 971
 - see also* Easter Rising (1916)
- Irish Free State 1050
 - Anglo-Irish Treaty 3044
 - Collins 793, 794
 - composition of 1796
 - de Valera 971
 - elite 1798
- Irish Land League 2820
- Irish Land War 2616, 2617
- Irish language 2627
- Irish National Land League 2617
- Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) 1801
- Irish News* 2522
- Irish Parliamentary Party 1047, 1799
- Irish People* 1192
- Irish Rebellion (1798):** *see* Great Rebellion, Ireland (1798)
- Irish Republican Army (IRA) 1800–3**
 - Anglo-Irish War 3044
 - Collins 793, 794, 1048
 - London bombings 1387
 - Maguire children 2522
 - membership 1802
 - Pearse 1800–2, 2627
 - Provisionals 1797
 - recruitment rise 2967
 - resistance campaign 1802–3
- Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB)
 - Davitt 967
 - de Valera 970
 - regrouped 1799
 - Sinn Féin 793
 - Stephens 1192
 - World War I 1046
- Irish Republican Social Party (IRSP) 1801
- Irish Socialist Federation 860
- Irish Socialist Republican Party 860

- Irish Transport and General Workers' Union
860, 1026
- Irish Volunteers 620, 793, 1045, 1785–6, 1807,
2627
- Irish War for Independence 793, 1415, 1416
- Irlande Libre* 1415
- Irokawa, D. 1900
- Iron Guard 2856–7
- Iron Molders' International Union 3214
- iron rice bowl concept 3286
- Iron Workers' Union 1897
- Iroquois Confederacy 75, 84, 2620
- irredentism 36, 1825, 1827
- Irvin, B. H. 296
- Irwin, Lord 1327, 1681, 2431, 3042
- Isaac, Steven 233–7, 1069–73
- Isabel II, of Spain 1016, 1161
- Isabella, of Spain 2055
- Isak, Joesoef 1725
- Isak, Mary and Abraham 123
- ISCOR 3110, 3114
- Ishaq Khan, Ghulam 2584
- Ishikawa Sanshirō** 134, 1807–8
- Ishimoto Shidzue 3595
- ishtirak* (socialism) 233–4
- Iskra* 437, 1914, 2082, 3029, 3321, 3720
- Islahat Ferman* 3346
- Islam** 1808–12
- eschatology 2163
 - in France 1644–5
 - fundamentalism 890, 1771–2, 1964–5, 3247
 - hadith* 1809
 - ijtihad* 1809
 - Iran 1810
 - Mappilas 2317
 - modernity 1809
 - non-violence 2505–6
 - political currents 1808–12
 - political organizations 1810
 - socialism 235
 - South Asia 1810
 - taqlid* 1809
 - Turkey 3342
 - in west 1811
 - see also* Muslims; Qu'ran
- Islam, Syed Nazrul 347
- Islamic Civil War, Afghanistan** 13–15
- Islamic Jihad 1811, 2071
- Islamic Party of Afghanistan 14
- Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) 3245
- Islamic Republican Party 1962
- Islamic Revolution, Iran: *see* Iranian Revolution
- Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) 41
- Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), Algeria** 40–1
- Islamic Socialist Party 1070
- Islamic Society of Afghanistan (Jamaat-i-Islami)
14
- Islamist Welfare Party 3344
- Isly, Battle of 2334
- Ismail, Khedive 3395
- Ismail, of Sudan 3196–7
- Israel** 1812–17
- Global Day of Action 1389
 - Golan Heights 2502
 - independence 373
 - Intifada 1758–60
 - Labor Party 1816
 - National Water Carrier project 238
 - peace movement 1812–16
 - settlers movement 1816–17
 - state terrorism 1550
 - water supplies 1817
 - women's organizations 1815
 - see also* Intifada I and II; Palestine
- Israeli Socialist Organization 1812
- Issaku, Tomura 1902
- Isserman, Maurice 839
- Istabu Freedom Movement 3081
- Istanbul 234
- Istiaql nationalistic movement 2336
- Isthmian Canal Commission 2593
- Istiqal (Independence) Party 1249, 1779, 2954,
3516
- Istúriz, Aristóbulo 3447
- Itaipú Dam 2607
- Italian Communist Party:** *see* Communist
Party of Italy (PCI)
- Italian General Confederation of Labor 1311
- Italian Risorgimento** 1824–7
- Italian Social Movement 1820
- Italian Social Republic (RSI) 2384
- Italian Socialist Party (PSI)** 385, 1827–9,
2959–60
- Craxi 1829
 - maximalists 1828
 - Mussolini 2383
 - pacifism 2871
 - Salvemini 2959–60
 - scandals 1829
 - Settimana Rossa 1822, 1827–9, 3015
 - Soviet invasion of Hungary 1834
 - Turati 3341
- Italian Workers' Association 2267
- Italians in Spanish Civil War
CNT-FAI 131
- Italo-Turkish War 51
- Italy**
- agricultural sector 1845
 - anarchism 129–33, 1419
 - anti-fascist resistance/new left 1832–5

Italy (*cont'd*)

anti-racist movement 1829–30
 anti-war movement 1830–1
 Austrian rule 1825
autunno caldo 1398, 1823, 1839, 1843
 Biennio Rosso 384–7
 bread riots 3014
 Catholic Church 1177
 Centri Sociali 1831–2, 1841, 1845
 Christian Democracy (DC) 1819
 class struggle 1842–3
 cobas 1839–41
 Disobbedienti 1006–10, 1307
 Ethiopia 1133, 1180, 2383
 fascism 1171, 1172, 1176–80, 1184, 1828–9,
 3341–2, 3593
 food and work protest 130
 friendly societies 1821
 labor movement 1821–4
 in Libya 130, 1180, 1822, 3014
 massacres 2835
 maternity funds 3592
 motherhood 1177, 3591
 new left/great repression 1835–9
 new syndicalism 1839–41
 operaism/post-operaism 1006, 1841–5, 2426,
 3170
 peasant movements 1845–7
 precarious workers' organization 1839–41
 railway workers' union 3015
 red belt 1819
 Resistenza 1832–5, 2834–6
 revolts in the south, 17th century 1847–8
 secret service 1311
 Settimana Rossa 3014–15
 social movements 2401
 squatting 323, 1147, 1831, 1846
 student associations 1836, 1840, 1843
 unification 1333, 1845
 women's movement 3591–3
 women's roles 1177
 women's suffrage 3593
see also Communist Party of Italy; G8 protests,
 Genoa; Italian Risorgimento; Italian Socialist
 Party; Red Brigades
 Itihad el-Nisai (Sudanese Women's Union) 3199
 Itō Noe 134, 1848–9, 2566, 3595
 Ittihad al-Islami al- (The Evolutionist) 3335
 Ivan IV 2342
Ivan the Terrible (Eisenstein) 1081
 Ivanov, Anton 543
 Ivanovo-Voznesensk 2891, 2898, 2905, 2907,
 2914
 Ivasiuc, Alexandru 2866
 Ivól, Ambre 72–4

Ivon Jones, David 149, 150, 151
 Ivonnet, Pedro 912, 914
 Ivorian Human Rights League (LIDHO) 881
 Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) 880
 Ivy Day 2617
 Iwasa Sakutarō 133, 134, 136
IWD: *see* International Women's Day
IWW: *see* Industrial Workers of the World
 Iyengar, Srinivas 449
 Iyotake, Tatanka: *see* **Sitting Bull**
 Izbrannaya Rada 2342
 Izquierda Comunista de España (ICE) 2486, 2737
 Izquierda Unida (IU) 146, 788, 2320, 2362,
 2650–2, 2656, 2657, 2659–60
Izvestiya 535, 2005, 2257, 3333

J18

Global Day of Action Against Capitalism
 1386–91, 2809
 London 1152, 1388–9, 1397
 UK Indymedia 1739
 J8 (Junior Eight) summit 1314
 Ja'afar al Askari 51
 Jabiluka uranium mine 4
Jabotinsky, Vladimir (Ze'ev) 358, 1851–2
 Jabr, Salih 1776, 1779, 3515, 3516
 Jachowicz, Stanislaw 3544
 Jack Scott Operation 1954
 Jackel, Marcelo 259
 Jackson, Andrew 2023
 Jackson, George 964
Jackson, Jesse 1852–3, 3402
 Jackson, Jimmy Lee 1975
 Jackson, Jonathan 965
 Jackson, Thomas J. "Stonewall" 60, 63
 Jackson, Thomas Witter 2322
 Jackson, William 3302
 Jackson State University 222
 Jacob, Franz 1377
 Jacobin Club 2848
 Jacobins
 Amis des Noirs 1530
 and Girondins 894, 1289–90
 influence abroad 1282
 Montagnards 1277
 purged 896
 and Robespierre 328, 2847–9
sans-culottes 894, 1277–8, 1287–8
 women's role 1421
Jacobite risings, Britain 1385, 1853–6, 3001
 Jacques, Amy 1336
 Jacques, Cathérine 2721–2
 Jadidism
 Central Asia 643, 3420
 Tajikistan 3241, 3242, 3244

- Turkmenistan 3365, 3366
 Uzbekistan 3241, 3421
 Jaeger, Hans 2524
 Jafar Sultan 1762
 Jaffna Library 3251
Jagan, Cheddi 1500–1, 1856–7, 3559
 Jagan, Janet 1856, 3559
 Jagger, Mick 218
 Jagi-Jagi 1128
 Jagielski, Mieczyslaw 3073, 3502
 Jagmohan 1934
 Jahāngir Khān, Mirzā 1767
Jahrbuch für sexuelle Zwischenstufen 1586
 Jaish-e-Mohammad 1811
 Jakarta transport strike 1723
 Jakeš, Miloš 3433, 3434
 Jakobson, Pia K. 1606–7, 1632
 Jaldung, Håkan 1153
 Jalée, Pierre 1669
Jalib, Habib 1857–8
jallaba (itinerant traders) 3197–8
 Jallianwala Bagh massacre 1701, 2403
 Jamaat al Muslimeen 3320
 Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic Society of Afghanistan)
 14, 344, 347, 1810, 2582
Jamahiriya (state of the masses) 2779
Jamaica 1858–74, 2320–3
 anti-colonial movement 2196
 Baptist War 205
 bauxite 2197
 black culturalism 1859–60, 1863–4
 clientelism 1861
 freed people 2320–1
 IMF 608, 2198
 independence movement 1858–65
 intellectuals 1862–3
 labor riots (1938) 1865–8
 Maroons 88, 201
 Morant Bay Rebellion 2320–3
 new social movements 1865
 obeah 2789
 peasant uprisings 1868–70
 protest music 611
 Rastafarians 394, 611, 1336, 1498, 1859–60
 rebellion and resistance 203, 1871–4
 Rude Boys 1861–2
 rural–urban migration 1859, 1866
 self-help groups 3558
 slave uprising 1871–3, 2789
 sugar plantation unrest 1868–9
 wages 1866
 Windward Maroons 2788–90
see also Manley, Michael
 Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) 1859, 1861, 1862–3,
 1867, 2197, 2198
Jamaica Mercury 1872
 Jamaica Royal Commission 1870
 Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ) 1865
 Jamali, Fadil al- 3515
 Jamat-al-Ahali 1776
 Jamati-Islami 3246
 Jamela, Reuben 2730
 James, Bob 105–8
James, C. L. R. 613, 772, 1874–5
Black Jacobins 1874, 1875
 dialectics 2839
 Hegelianism 2250
History of Negro Revolt 1874
 Johnson-Forest Tendency 1027
 Leninism 2089
 Marxism 2249
Minty Alley 1874
 and Rodney 2852
 STO 3070
 and Williams 3532
 James, Clive 107
 James, Henry, Sr. 156
 James, Selma 2249, 2852
 James I and VI, of England and Scotland 517,
 1186, 1806, 2989
 James II and VII, of England and Scotland 289,
 1106, 1385, 1405–8, 1853
 James III and VIII (Old Pretender) 1854
 James V, of Scotland 3000
 James Meredith March 18
 Jamestown 330
 Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI) 2582
 Jamiyat Taruiyat al-Mar'a (Society for the
 Promotion of Women) 3199
 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)
 1934
 Jammu-Kashmir 1928, 1930, 1931, 1932
 Jan Andolan (People's Movement) 2437
 Jan Bux Khan 370
 Jan Sangh (People's Association) 1584
Janata 2441
 Janata Party 1584, 1692, 2403
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) 970,
 1495, 2053, 2631–3, 3252, 3527
 Janco, Marcel 953
Jang 1857
 Jang-Whan, O. H. 1926, 1970–1
 Jango: *see* Goulart, João
 Janissary system 3346
 Janjati 232
 Jansen, Wilhelm 464
 Janssens, Emile 854, 857, 2138
 Janvion, Emile 1124
Janvedana (dalits' newspaper) 3588
 JAP bureaucracy, Chile 685

Japan

- agrarian land reform 1890
- anarchism 96, 133–5, 1561
- anarchocommunism 133
- anti-nuclear campaigns 191–3
- capitalism 1663
- class struggle 1880, 1895–6
- community labor union movement 1875–8
- development terms 1904–5
- earthquake 1877
- economic depression 1883–4, 1890
- employment reforms 1883–4
- European colonialism 1657–8, 1663
- farmers 1890, 1901–2, 1903
- feminism 3595–6
- Fifteen Years' War 134
- free trade 1658
- general strike attempt 1895–6
- harvest failures 1899
- health disasters 1881
- Indonesian recruits 3200
- industrializing 1889–90, 1896, 1897–8
- Labor Law 1876–7
- labor protest 1878–84
- labor unions 1895, 1896, 1897–8
- land reform 1892, 1901
- Meiji Restoration 1214, 1896
- mining industry 1891
- modernization 3594
- Narita airport 1881, 1901–9
- new left 1905–6
- Pacific War 3035
- pacifist movement 1884–9
- patriarchy 3596
- Pearl Harbor 727
- peasant revolts 1898–9
- police 1896–7
- post-World War II protest 1889–96
- protest and revolt 1896–901
- radiation fallout 191
- Red Purge 3069
- Sanrizuka unrest 1901–6
- social movements 1876
- Sohyo Federation 1876, 1878, 1879, 1881, 1882, 1909, 3069–70
- stagflation 1881
- student demonstrations 3169
- taxation 1898, 1899, 1900
- trade unions 1875–8, 3720–1
- Twenty-One Demands 185, 719
- US imperialism 1885–6
- US military bases 1886, 1888–9
- US occupation 1898
- wages 1879
- women's movement 3594–6
- workers' production control 1892–3
- World War II 727, 1711, 1884, 1889, 1998–9, 2202, 3200
- Zenroren Labor Federation 3720–1
see also Tokyo
- Japan–US Security Treaty 1880, 1909
- Japan Community Union Federation (JCUF) 1877
- Japan Council against A&H Bombs 1887
- Japan Council of International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF-JC) 1878, 1881, 3069
- Japan Federation of Labor (Domei Federation) 1898
- Japan Peasant Union 1892
- Japan–Russian War 2200
- Japan Socialist Party (JSP)** 1879, 1909–10, 3069
- Japanese Communist Party (JCP)** 134, 1883, 1910–11
- Japanese National Railways (JNR) 1882, 1894, 1895
- Jara, Albino 2609
- Jara Martínez, Víctor Lidio** 1911–12, 2378, 2379
- Jaramillo, Rubén 2282
- Jaramillo Ossa, Bernardo 802, 808, 1168, 3389
- Jaramogi Oginga Odinga 1954, 2269, 2691
- Jaraus, Konrad 1337, 1341
- Järnefelt, Arvid 119
- Jarrow March 525
- Jaruzelski, Wojciech 380, 810, 1147, 2302, 3075, 3078, 3503, 3556
- Jasna Gora, Battle of 3557
- Jászai, Oscar 3228
- Jatoi, Haider Bux 1857
- Jatto 1935
- Jaurès, Jean** 225, 887, 1756, 1912–13
Armée Nouvelle, L' 1913
Austro-Marxist 2243
Humanité 225, 823, 1913
Socialist History of the French Revolution 1283
- Java 1723
- Java War 1719–20, 1721
- Javier de Elío, Francisco 288
- Jawa'ib, al-* 234
- Jawzi, Bandali 236
- Jay, Martin 1255
- Jay Treaty 1301, 3525
- Jayakar, M. R. 1681
- Jayewardene, J. R. 3251, 3252
- jazz 611, 1555, 2380
- Jean-Bosco Church 1506
- Jean-François, Haiti 995, 1529, 1530, 1533, 3306–7, 3309

- Jean-Paul II, Pope 1519
 Jebhe Melli (National Front) 1764, 2343
 Jeddojuhđ Inqilabi Tehrik (Struggle Revolutionary Movement) 2585
 Jedhe, Keshavrao 1682
 Jeenbekov, Jusupbek 3331
 Jeenbekov, Ravshan 3330
 Jeeves, Alan 148
 Jefferson, Thomas
 on Christianity 3515
 and Gabriel 1319
 Hô Chi Minh 1219
 Kentucky Resolution 1301
 and Lee 80
 Notes on Virginia 1113
 and Paine 2571
 and Saint-Domingue 996, 1546
 and Wright 3666
 Jehovah's Witnesses 592, 3697
 Jeju Island revolt 1998
 Jelačić, Josip 1623
 Jellačić, Joseph 1149, 1620
 Jellicoe, Anna 3566
 Jena, Battle of 442, 1282, 3208
 Jena University 3177
 Jennings, James 393
 Jeon Bong-jun 1998
 Jerilderie Letter 1943, 1944
 Jerry Rescue 216
 Jessen, Ralph 1337
 Jesuits
 Brazil 3008
 expelled from Portugal 877
 France 1228
 French Guiana 1269
 in FSLN 2473
 Mexico 1578
 Micronesia 2303, 2304
 New World 2056
Jet 761
 Jeune Haïti 1519
 Jeunesse de la Voiture 3218
 Jeunesse Syndicaliste d'Asnières 3218
 Jeunesse Syndicaliste des Ferblantiers 3218
 Jeunesses Syndicalistes 3218
 Jewell, Jason 509, 1092–6
 Jewish Agency 374
 Jewish Brigade 358, 374, 1918
Jewish Bund 142, 1914–16, 1917, 2717
Jewish Daily Forward 3064
 Jewish Fighting Organization (ZOB) 3512, 3513
 Jewish Legion 1851
 Jewish Military Union (ZZW) 3512
Jewish people 1916–20, 3740–3
 Alsace-Lorraine 1919
 anarchism 96–7, 99
 Austria 320, 3741
 in Bulgaria 543
 in Canada 110
 children rescued 1917
 counterrevolution 886
 Croatia 3683
 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 1919
 emigrating from Russia to USA 1915
 France 1918–19
 Germany 1173, 1175, 1179, 1182–3
 in Greece 1440–1
 Hapsburg empire 1919, 1920
 Hungary 1920
 Italy 1173, 2835
 Morocco 2336
 non-Jewish wives 2495–6
 as plutocrats 1174
 Poland 1851, 2713
 resistance to Nazism 1916–18
 revolution in Europe 1918–20
 Romania 2856, 2857
 against Romans 2490
 Russian pogroms 1851, 3741
 self-defense 1851
 in Slovakia 3049
 in Ukraine 1958
 Warsaw uprising 1915, 1917, 3512–14
 youth movements 1917
 see also anti-Semitism; Jabotinsky, Vladimir (Ze'ev); Zionism; Zionism, revisionist
 Jewish Question 3740
 Jewish Social Democratic grouping 142
 Jewish Workers' Solidarity Federation 3220
 Jian, C. 3292
 Jiang Jieshi: *see* Chiang Kai-Shek
 Jiang Jinguo 3237
 Jiang Qing 223, 711, 2204
 Jiang Zemin 987
 Jiangxi Soviet 2201
Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily) 2780
Jiefang zhouban (Liberation Weekly) 3725
Jigsaw 2844
 Jihadiyya 3197
 Jim Crow era 16, 1608
 institutional racism 651
 King 1972
 Redeemer governments 68
 segregation 756, 759
 white supremacy 1608
 Jimenes, Enrique A. 2593
 Jimenes Grullón, Juan Isidro 1012, 1014, 1017

- Jinnah, Muhammad Ali 1920–2**
 and Gandhi 1330, 1680, 1710, 1711, 1921
 Gandhi–Irwin Pact 1683
 and Iqbal 1810
 Muslim League 1685, 1921–2, 1930, 2577
 Naidu's biography 2388
 and Nehru 1921, 2430, 2433
 Pakistani independence 1922, 2433
 Urdu 2577
- Jit Phumisak 3258
- Jiu Valley 2854, 2858–9
- Jiuguo shibao* 2114
- Joachim of Fiore 1104
- Joanna the Mad 844
- João, Dom 486, 488
- Jock Scott Operation 2256
- Jogiches, Leo 3147
- Johannesburg 2190–1, 3100, 3101
Johannesburg Witness 331
- Johanningsmeier, Edward 839
- John, Cecilia 303
- John, Sándor S. 416–23, 424–5, 425–32
- John XII, Pope 2829
- John XXIII, Pope 2058–9, 2572
Gaudium et Spes 2058–9
Mater et Magistra 2058
Pacem in Terris 2058
- John I of Aviz 186
- John IV, of Portugal 187
- John Paul II, Pope 2062, 2308, 2472, 2508,
 3073, 3078, 3079, 3502
- John VI, of Portugal 187
- Johnson, Andrew 68, 2800
- Johnson, Eric F. 1004–5, 2969–70, 3256
- Johnson, Hugh 2820
- Johnson, James Weldon 1554, 1556
- Johnson, Janet Rae 2313
- Johnson, Joseph (friend of Blake) 401
- Johnson, Joseph (Peterloo) 2661
- Johnson, Joseph (publisher) 3541
- Johnson, Linton Kwesi 326
- Johnson, Lyndon B.
 Australian visit 304
 Black Panthers 398
 Bolivian aid 417
 Civil Rights Act 745
 Dominican Republic 1019, 1217
 FBI investigations of disappearances 1259
 Freedom Budget 2037
 Great Society program 782
 Kerner Commission 3401–2
 MFDP 1259
 and Pham Van Dong 2663
 segregationism 762
 Vietnam 1600, 3482, 3483
 voting rights legislation 748–9
 War on Poverty 752
- Johnson, Marsha P. 2108
- Johnson, William 3460
- Johnson, Yeduo 2115
- Johnson–Forest Tendency 1027
- Johnson–Sirleaf, Ellen 2116
- Johnston, C. 2098
- Johnston, Edith Mary 1784
- Johnston, George 3491
- Johnstone, Harry 2174
- Joliot–Curie, Frederic 195
- Joncker insurrection 1718
- Jones, Claudia 2527
- Jones, Ernest 2547
- Jones, Evan 2727–8
- Jones, G. S. 3054
- Jones, John Gale 546
- Jones, John Paul 79
- Jones, Mary: *see* Mother Jones
- Jones, P. M. 1285
- Jones, William 2463
- Jones Act 2767, 2768
- Jonkonnu masquerades 1873
- Jooste, Rhayn Garrick 1162–3, 3531–3
- Jopson, Edgar 2682
- Jordan 238, 399
- Jordan, David 2874
- Jordan, John 2807–11
- Jordon, Frank 1207
- Jorn, Asger 3044
- Jornada, La* 408, 2285
- Jornal Sem Terra* 2352
- Jorquera, Carlos 111
- José Antonio Circles 182
- Joseph, P. 398
- Joseph, R. 580
- Joseph an Gof, Michael 509
- Joseph II, of Austria 357, 1114, 1143, 1421, 1918
- Josh, Sohan Singh 3041
- Joshi, M. M. 1694
- Joshi, P. C. 1922–3, 2421, 2792**
 Jospin, Lionel 299, 872, 1645
jotedars 2574–5
- Jouhaux, Léon 851
- Journal des Économistes* 2843
- Joven, Manuel 1613
- Joven Cuba 2152
- Jover, Gregorio 1187
- Joyce, Cornet George 1101
- Juan Carlos, King 183
- Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion 1923–4**
- Juárez García, Benito 1924–5**
 Jubilee 2000 1392, 1397, 3100
 Jubilee South Africa 3100, 3113

- Judea 1816–17
Judenrat 3512
 Judeo-Christian values 2022
 Judt, T. 951
Juewu she (Awakening) 3725
 Jugoremedija factory 3686
Jukta (United) Front 345, 2578
 Julian the Apostate 2828
Julião, Francisco 1925, 2118, 2319, 2351
 Julius II, Pope 514, 515
 July, Miranda 2845
 July Column, Place de la Bastille 354, 1233
 Jumagulov, Apas 3329
Jumandi 1925–6
 Jumblatt, Kamal 2069, 2070
 Jumonville Glen 76
 Jun Doo-hwan 1999
 June 18, 1999: *see* J18
 Jung, Carl 1586
Jung Hwa-Am 1926
Junge Gemeinde (Youth Groups) 1342
Junge Welt 1317
 Jungvolk 1429
 Junín, Battle of 3458
 Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps (JROTC) 885
 Junta de Salvação Nacional 2731
Juntas de Buen Gobierno 3713
 Juntas de Coordinación, Ejecución e Inspección (JUCEI) 921
 Juntas Patrióticas 3389
 Juppé, Alain 1237, 1400
 Jura Bookshop 107
 Jura Federation 120, 157, 2006, 2811, 2813
 Juriga, Ferdinand 1595
 Jusos (Young Socialists) 3056
 Just Cause Operation 2594
 Just Militia 1997
Justice 1748, 2229
 Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) 280, 284
 Justice and Development Party (AKP) 3345
 Justice Party, Turkey 3351
 Justo, Juan B 253, 270–1
 Justo, Liborio 272
 jute industry 1700, 2726, 3229
 Juventud Socialista Unificada (JSU) 2739, 3139
Jyllands-Posten 992

 K-Groups 1366
 Kabaka's Protest 3546, 3549
 Kabalega, King 3369, 3370
 Kabat, Marina 261–3
 Kabataan Makabayan (KM) 2677, 2680
 Kabba, Alie 3031
 Kabbah, Ahmad Tejan 3031–2
 Kabila, Joseph 859
 Kabila, Laurent-Désiré 853, 858, 859, 2364
 Kabul 15, 329–30, 1676, 3247
 Kabwe conference 3106, 3249
Kabyl resistance to government 1927–8
 Kadalie, Clements 152, 695, 832, 2385, 3092, 3093, 3729
 Kádár, János 1625, 1627, 1628, 2387–8, 2866, 3432
 Kader Toy Factory arson attack 3274
 Kadet Congress 3551
 Kadets (Constitutional Democrats) 438, 2881–2, 2886, 2891, 2900, 2904, 2915, 2925, 2938, 2942
Kadro group 3362
 Kafka, Franz 949
 Kafrun, Battle of 3367
 Kagame, Paul 859
 Kaganovich, Lazar 3161
 Kaggia, Bildad 1954, 2256
 Kaguvi, Sekuru 703, 704
 Kahina, Queen 42
 Kahlo, Frida 1483
 Kahnawake blockade 2557
 Kahr, Gustav von 1365
 Kai Colo Uprising 1196
 Kaibara Ekken 3594
 Kaigang indigenous people 2352
kaihatsu development 1905, 1908
 Kaipkire, Chieftainess 3602
 Kaisei Rising 1899
 Kaiser, Georg 116, 2047
 Kak, Ramachandra 1929
 Kakori case 1677, 3041
 Kalakauna, King 1564
 Kalamata strike 126
 Kalauokalani, David 1566
Kalayaan 444–5
 Kalikani, Habibulla: *see* Bacha-i Sakkao's movement
 Kalisch, Treaty of 189
 Kalmanovich, Anna 3390, 3551
 Kalmar Union 988, 2512, 2513, 2523
 Kalpokas, Donald 3427
 Kaltezas, Michalis 127
 Kamaiya (bonded laborers) 232
 Kamenev, Lev
 Bolshevik Revolution 2085–6
 death of Lenin 438, 2005, 3159
 executed 3162
 Leninism 2089
 and Trotsky 3158
 Kamichika Ichiko 2566
 Kampuchea (Cambodia) 574–5, 3475

- Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (KUFNS) 1960, 3486–7
- Kamukunji grounds 1948, 1950–1, 1952
- Kanagawa City Union 1876
- Kanai Yoshiko 3596
- Kanak Attak 2306
- Kanak population 2457
- Kanduzi, Ackson M. 3747–8
- Kaneko Fumiko 134, 136
- Kaneko–Pak treason trial 134
- Kanelopoulou, Stamatina 127
- Kangaroo faction 3064
- Kanno Suga 134, 2566
- Kanogo, Tabitha 3545
- Kanongesha, chief 3702
- Kanpur Bolshevik Conspiracy Case 961
- Kanpur massacre 1690
- Kansai Electric 191
- Kansas–Nebraska Act 56, 533
- Kant, Immanuel 1254, 2658, 2836
- Kanto earthquake 3595
- Kanyenze, G. 3732
- Kanzleiter, Boris 223–4, 1011–12, 3011–12, 3295–6, 3637–9, 3682–5, 3688–9, 3689–90, 3690–2, 3692–3
- Kaohsiung incident 2270
- Kaoru, Higashiyama 1902
- Kaos 2063
- Kapenguria Six 3043
- Kapp, Wolfgang 1364
- Kapp–Lüttwitz Putsch 1364
- Kapwepwe, Simon 3703
- Kar, Vasily 2775
- Kar Sevaks train attack 1694
- Karachi Congress 1328
- Karagiorgas, Sakis 1433
- Karalasingham, V. 2053
- Karamanić, Slobodan 178–80, 337–9, 3009–11
- Karamanlis, Konstantinos 1447, 1449
- Karameh, Battle of 238
- Karami, Omar 635
- Karami, Rashid 2069
- Karan Singh 1932
- Karaolis, Michail 946
- Karat, Brinda 3588
- Karen revolt 549
- Karenga, Ron 18, 393
- Karimov, Islom 813, 3422
- Kariwa Village protests 192
- Karl Marx Platz, Leipzig 2508–9
- Karlsbad decrees 1349
- Karmu: *see* Ngainoumbey, Barka
- Karnataka State Farmers' Association 2635
- Karnow, Stanley 2663
- Karpinski, Jakub 3076
- Karsner, Rose 596, 597
- Kartini 1727
- Kartodikromo, Marco 1729
- Karumba, Kungu 2256
- Karume, Abeid 3708–9
- Karuna, Colonel 3253
- Karzai, Hamid 3247–8
- Kasai province 857
- Kasavubu, Joseph 854, 855, 856, 2137, 2139
- Kashmir 1928–36**
 democracy 1933
 under India 1930–6
 Mughals 1928
 Muslims' unpaid labor 1929
 and Pakistan 1931
 popular struggles 1928–30
see also Jammu–Kashmir
- Kashmiri National Conference 1929, 1931
- Kashmiri nationalism 1928–9
- Kashmiri Pandits 1693
- Kaskaskia 84
- Kaskiv, Vlad 3377
- Kasmir, S. 2315
- Kassala revolt 3197
- Kastner, Jens 2161–3
- Kataeb Social Democratic Party 2070
- Kataib Party 2065, 2070
- Katajala, Kimmo 2512–21
- Katanga 855, 857
- Katanga secession 3700
- Katari, Túpac 1937–8
- Katarismo indigenous popular mobilization 1936–9**
katarista–indianista movement 1937
- Katayama, Tetsu 1909
- Kathmandu 230, 2437
- Katipunan 444–5, 2668
- Kato Kanju 3595
- Kato Shidzue 3596
- Katrina Hurricane 100, 1207
- Katsiaficas, Georgy 324, 2620
- Katubusan ng Bayan* 2674
- Katyń Forest massacre 2705
- Katz, Friedrich 2540
- Katznelson, Ira 773
- Kaufman, Arnold 2619
- Kaulia, James 1566
- Kaunda, Kenneth 1940–1, 3545, 3698**
 anti-apartheid 3695
 copper industry 3701
 tribal balancing 3702
 UNIP 696, 1940, 3700
 and Zimbabwe 3739
- Kautokino Revolt 219

- Kautsky, Karl** 1941–3, 2238, 3228, 3551
 and Bauer 355
 on Bernstein 382
 Bund 1915
Erfurt Program 978, 1942
 imperialism 1652
 influence in Greece 1440
 and Jaurès 1913
 and Lenin 1942, 2084
 Lenin on 1672
 on Marxism 1664–5, 2924
 Orthodox Marxism 2084, 2243
 pacifism 1942
 Second International 1756, 3058
 as social democrat 2084
 socialism 1653, 3424
 Socialization Committee 1942
 Third International 1757
 ultra-imperialism 1316, 1653
Vorwärts 1582
- Kaweah colony 861, 3417
 Kaya, Marie Martine 3003–4
 Kaye, Anthony E. 2407–9
 Kaye, J. W. 1686
 Kazairwe, Joseph 3371
 Kazakhstan 811, 813, 3421
 Kazel, Dorothy 2060
 Kazemi, F. 780
 Keane, Shake 611
 Keating, Paul 4, 305
 Kedung Ombo World Bank project 1723
 Keefer, Chris 383–4
 Keefer, Tom 845–6
 Keen, B. 2056
 Kegame, Paul 852
Kein mensch ist illegal 2306
 Keisei Dentetsu 1892
 Keita, Modibo 2181
 Keitel, Wilhelm 3683
 Keith, George 213
 Keke, Harold 3081
 Kel Kel (It's Time) 814, 817, 3330, 3331, 3332
 Kelkar, Lakshmbai 1583
 Keller, Helen 2489
 Keller, Jack 3728
 Keller, Lisa 405–6
 Kelley, Abby 215
 Kelley, Florence 3041
 Kellogg, Edward 2727
 Kellogg, John Harvey 3429
Kelly, Edward “Ned” 1943–5
 Kelly, Jason M. 200–5, 655–9, 2340–2,
 3529–31
Kelly, Petra 1366, 1457, 1945–6
 Kelly, Wynton 611
- Kelly Gang** 1943–5
 Kelly's Bush 1457
 Kelmendi, Ali 29
 Kelmscott Press 2341–2
 Kemaleza, Allan 3081
 Kemal, Mustafa: *see* Atatürk
 Kemp-Welch, A. 2698–700, 2705–7
 Kempton Park 510
 Kenafick, K. J. 107
 Kendal commune 156
 Kendo, Curtis 3088
 Keneally, Thomas 2982
 Kenefick, William 2818–22
 Kengo Wa Dondo 852
 Kenilorea, Peter 3081
 Kenjayev, Safarali 3245
 Kennedy, Charles 2820
 Kennedy, John F.
 affirmative action 754
 Alliance for Progress 799
 assassinated 745, 746–7, 2180
 Birmingham Campaign 1974
 Bolivian aid 417
 civil rights 741–2, 1258, 3398
 Commission on the Status of Women 3166
 Cuba 922
 Dominican Republic 1017
 Iran 1963
 Ngo Dinh Diem 2465
 non-alignment 3688
Spartacus 3150
 Vietnam 3480
 Kennedy, M. 3078
 Kennedy, Robert 741, 742, 743, 752
 Kennington Common 659
 Kent, Holly M. 1305–6
 Kent, R. K. 2586
 Kent, Susan 3564–70
 Kent, Victoria 3611
Kent State student uprising 1236, 1946–7,
 2500
- Kenya** 1947–53, 2268–70
 Harry Thuku Riot 3545–6
 labor unrest 2269
 Lyttelton Constitution 2269
 Mau Mau Rebellion 220, 1155, 1954, 2253–7,
 2269, 2690, 3371
 Mboya 2268–70
 national protests for independence 1947–53
 pro-democracy 1949
 trade union movement 3042
 women's role in liberation 3545
 World War II 1954
 Kenya Africa Union (KAU) 1954, 2255, 2269,
 3043

- Kenya African National Union (KANU)
1947–8, 1951–2, 1953, 2269
- Kenya African Workers' Congress 2691
- Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions
(KFRTU) 2269
- Kenya Land Freedom Army 3043
- Kenya Local Government Workers' Union
(KLGWU) 2269
- Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT)
1950
- Kenyan Independent Movement (KIM) 2269
- Kenyatta, Jomo** 395, 1949, 1950, 1953–5, 3545
arrested 3043
Facing Mount Kenya 1953
Jock Scott Operation 2256
KANU 2269
and Robeson 2847
- Keo Ann 573
- Keo Meas 574, 1959, 1960
- Keo Sang Kim 573
- Keogh, Daire 1785–90
- Keogh, John 1787
- Kepple-Mamros, Deborah 1601
- Kerala 955–6, 2434
- Keralio, Louise (later Louise Robert) 1294
- Kerensky, Alexander 142, 2085, 2895, 2911,
2913, 2915, 2917, 2918, 3058, 3554
- Kerina, Mburumba 3300
- Kerkvliet, Benedict J. 1617
- Kern, Jerome 2846
- Kerner Commission 750, 3401
- Kerr, Charles H. of Chicago 1737
- Kerry, John 221
- Kershner, Jacob 1411
- Kesari* 1699
- Ketelholdt, Maximillian von 2322
- Ketteler, Clemens von 3674, 3675
- Kettle Creek 85
- Kett's Rebellion 509
- Key, Ellen 2968
- Key, Francis Scott 214
- Keynes, John Maynard 2436
- Keynesianism 1398, 1402–3, 1843
- Kgasa, M. 458
- Kgositsile, Keorapetse 2428
- Khachaturian, Aram 3149
- Khaitan, D. P. 1681
- Khaldunniyya School 3335
- Khalid Bey 3357
- Khalifah, Al-Khatim 3191
- Khalil, Abd Allah 3191
- Khama, Seretse** 1955–7
BDP 460, 2358
Botswana nationalism 457–8, 1955–7
and Maripe 2221
- Khama, Tshekedi 458
- Khaminwa, John 1951
- Khampa people 3290, 3291, 3292, 3293
- Khan, Afzal 1697
- Khan, Khan Bahadur 1691, 1709
- Khan, Khushhal 2869
- Khan, M. S. 1705
- Khan, Meraj Muhammad 2583
- Khan, Zarina Rahman 344–8, 2753–9
- Khan Rebellion** 2869
- Khartoum 2164
- Khatmiyya sect 3194
- Khattak, Afrasiab 2584
- Khattak tribe 2869
- Khazara peoples 329
- Khe Sanh, Battle of 3483
- Khidmat* (service to community) 1968
- Khidmatgar* (colonial use of term) 1968, 1970
- Khieu Samphan 569, 571, 573, 1959, 1960, 1961
- Khilafat* movement 2318, 2340, 2573
- Khiva, Battle of 3421
- Khivan Khanate 642, 3420
- Khizirkhayn al din: *see* Barbarossa
- Khleb I Volia* (Bread and Freedom) 142
- Khleivniuk, Oleg 3161
- Khmelnysky Uprising** 1957–8
- Khmer alphabet, Romanized 569
- Khmer Issarak 575, 577
- Khmer Krom 1959
- Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP)
569, 1959
- Khmer Renewal Party 570
- Khmer Republic 3484
- Khmer Rouge** 574–5, 1958–61
CPT 3262
DRV 1599
Indochinese War III 3486
Lon Nol 3485
Pol Pot 573–4, 1958–61
- Khoekhoe people 3539
- Khojaev, Faizullah Ubaidullaevich 3244, 3421
- Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah**
Mussau'i 780, 889, 1763, 1769–75, 1811,
1961–5
Shi'ite Islamic Revolution 1961–5, 2505–6
students 3181
- Khrong Chandawong 3260
- Khrushchev, Nikita
anti-Stalin speech 839, 1220, 2262, 2387,
2698, 3062, 3282, 3299, 3367
arms control 196
de-Stalinization of Hungary 1625, 1627–8,
3117
non-alignment 3688
revolution 1216

- Romanian student protests 2866
 threatening Poland 2699
 and Tito 3691
 withdrawal of aid for China 2995
- Khuda-i Khidmatgar** (Red Shirts) 1328,
 1682, 1965–70, 2494
 banned 2580
- Khuzestan 1763
- Khyber, Mir Akbar 13
- Kiangsi News* 734
- kibbutz* 3742
- kidnappings 255, 1427–8, 1576, 2362
- Kiel, Treaty of 2523
- Kiergaard, Søren 973
- Kiernan, Victor G. 2249
- Kiesinger, Kurt-George 3523
- Kikuyu 2254–5, 2256, 3545
- Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) 1953
- Kildare, Earl of 1804
- Kiliç Ali 3357
- Kill the Lord Society 1997
- Killdeer Mountain, Battle of 900
- Killian, L. M. 776, 779
- Kilmainham, Treaty of 967, 2547, 2617
- Kim Dae-jung regime 1980, 1982, 1989, 1992,
 2000, 2014, 3184
- Kim Jae-gyu 1999
- Kim Joa-jin** 1970–1
- Kim Jong-jin 1970
- Kim Kyung-sook 1982
- Kim Woo-jung 1983
- Kim Young-sam regime 1988, 2000, 3184
- Kimathi, Dedan 2255, 3043
- Kimberley 147, 148, 3091
- Kin Lalot 639
- Kina Hurricane 1198
- King, A. D. 1974
- King, Alexander 1503–8, 1508–10, 1525–34,
 1534–7, 1537–40, 1540–5, 1545–7, 3306–12
- King, Cheryl L. A. 2196–8
- King, Coretta Scott 1971, 1977
- King, J. B. 1738
- King, J. E. 1670
- King, James M. 242–3, 3036–7
- King, Martin Luther, Jr.** 1971–7
 assassinated 19, 1976, 3402
 attacked 1973
 Birmingham, Alabama 743–4, 3398
 on Black Power 751
 Carmichael on 613
 charisma 651–3
 Chicago 751–2, 3400
 civil rights movement 220, 651, 889, 3398
 Freedom Summer 1259
 and Gandhi 1971, 2498
- Hoover 752–3
- “I Have a Dream” speech 745, 2037, 2803
- “I Have Been to the Mountaintop” speech
 1976
- MIA 761, 2614
- Montgomery Bus Boycott 17, 762, 1971–2,
 2615
- NAACP 1971
 and Nehru 1973
- Nobel Peace Prize 745
- Stride Toward Freedom* 1973
- Time* magazine cover 1973
- on Vietnam 753
- see also* Southern Christian Leadership
 Conference (SCLC)
- King, Nathan 330–1, 452–3, 3022–3, 3060–2,
 3524–35
- King, Robert 1124
- King, Rodney 3403
- King, Stewart R. 994–6, 1510–14, 1521–3,
 2552–5
- King, William Lyon Mackenzie 588, 2832
- King David Hotel 358–9
- Kingdom community 3327
- Kingitanga (king movement) 2206
- Kingston, Steve 837
- Kinjikitile, chief 3254
- Kinmel Park riot 510
- Kinshasa protest, Congo** 856–8
- Kinsman, Gary 2098–100
- Kintanar, Romulo 2685, 2687
- Kipré, Pierre 884
- Kirchenleute 1301
- Kirchheimer, Otto 905
- Kirchner, Néstor 264, 268, 269–70, 2160, 3658
- Kirk, James 3000
- Kirkland, Frank M. 1572–4
- Kirkpatrick, Gwen 2313
- Kirn, Gal 1080–1, 3743–4
- Kirner, Joan 3564
- Kirov, Sergei 3030, 3162
- Kirschbaum, Stanislav J. 1596–7, 3048–9,
 3049–50, 3293–4, 3432–6
- Kirti* 1677, 3041
- Kisan Sabha (Peasant Association) 1706, 2265
- Kishi Nobusuke 1887
- Kishinev pogroms 1746
- Kishkina, Elizaveta Pavlovna 2114
- Kissa Khani Bazaar 2494
- Kissinger, Henry 689, 1146, 2436, 3483, 3484,
 3739
- Kissyov, Hadji Yordan 539
- Kiszcak, General 3076
- Kitchener, Horatio Herbert 2164
- Kitson, Ian 3104

- Kizil Tepe peace 3242
 Klaew Norapati 3259
 Klaus, Václav 3435
 Kleber-Claux family 107
 Klehr, Harvey 839, 840
 Klein, Naomi 1400, 3657
 Klennerman, Fanny 833
 kleptocracy 1504, 3685
 Klerides, Glafkos 948
 Klessmann, Christoph 1342
 Klimmer, Rudolf 2105
 Kline, Michael 2610–13
 Kling, B. 1712
 Klinger, Friedrich Maximilien 3189
 Klub Sigma 140
 Kmara 814, 817, 3377
 KMT (Kuomintang): *see* Guomintang
 Knazko, Milan 3435
 Knight, Anne 205, 3620
 Knight, Joseph 202
 Knight, Louise W. 10–12, 3165–8
Knights of Labor 587, 830, 1734, 1977–9,
 2021, 2029, 2450
 AFL 1978, 2026, 2258–9
 Knights of St. Crispin 587
 Knights of the White Camelia 19
 Knights Templar 2183–4
 knitting frame: *see* machine breaking
 Knöchel, Wilhelm 1377
 Knowles, Christopher 294
 Knowles Riot 294, 296
 Knox, Henry 3023
 Knox, John 1095, 3000
 Knox, Macgregor 1176
 Knuden, Halsten 2524
 Knudsen, Peter 990
 Ko Ba Thaug 553–4
 Ko Hla Baw 554
 Ko Shan Theater gatherings 1605
 Kobe Workers' Union 1877
 Kobu Rebellion 1998
 Koçgiri Uprising 3358
 Kochan, L. 2921
 Koedt, Anne 3167, 3629
 Koenigstein, François Claudius (Ravachol) 120
Koepi 1741
 Koestler, Arthur 3149
 Kohl, B. 433
 Kohl, Helmut 1344, 1345, 1367
 Köhler, Major General 1720
 Koinange, Mbiyu 1953
 Koirala, B. P. 2441, 2442, 2443
 Koirala, Girija Prasad 230, 231, 2437, 2438, 2439
 Kokand Autonomous Provisional Government
 643
 Kokori, Frank 2481
 Kokoshkin, F. 2909
 Kokuro (Japanese National Railways' Union)
 1879, 1882, 3070
 Kokushoku Sensensha (Black Battle Front) 134
 Kokutetsu Rodokumiai Sorengokai 1895
 Kokutetsu Soren 1894, 1895
 Kol revolt 1708
 Kolakowski, Leszek 2301, 2302, 2839
 Kolakowski lectures 2695
 Kolhapur Bomb Case 1675
 Kollataj, Hugo 2711
Kollontai, Alexandra 124, 1979–80, 2087,
 2243, 3016, 3553
 Conference of Working Women 3606
 feminism 3553
 and Gurevich 3551
 on Lenin 3554
 recognition 3553
 sexual liberation 3607–8
 and Shlyapnikov 3029
 Social Bases of the Women Question 3553
 Union for Women's Equality 3390
 Worker's Opposition 3029
 Zhenotdel 3606–7
 Kollwitz, Käthe 1483
 Kom, Anton de 1032
 Koma Ciwakên Kurdistan (KCK) 2012
 Koma Komelên Kurdistan (KKK) 2012
 Komala (KDP) 1762
 Komarayya, Doddi 1707
Kombinat 140
 Komin-Kochin Party 554
 Komité Nasyonal Kongrè Oganisasyon
 Démokratik (KONAKOM) 1505
Komites (vigilante committees) 1964
Kommunist, Der 2046
 Komsomol 534
Komunikat 2696, 2698
 Konare, Alpha Oumar 2182
 Kondo Kenji 1848
 Kondratieff cycle 1217–18
 Kong Le 2055
 Kong Yee Sai Mau (Protest the WTO) 3652–3
 Kongra-Gel (Kurdistan Peoples) 2012
 Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasiya Kurdistan
 (KADEK) 2012
 Koniecpolski, Aleksander 1957
Konmayi Athins 553
 Konoplyanikova, Zina 3552
 Konovalov, Aleksandr 2900, 2906
 Konstantin, Prince 2878
 Konstantinos, of Greece 1441, 1452
 Koonz, Claudia 1183
 Kooper, Simon 2393

- Koornhof Bills 3089
 Koornong school 107
KOR: *see* Workers' Defense Committee (KOR)
Korčula Summer School, Yugoslavia 3690
 Korda, Alexis 1484
 Kordatos, Yannis 1442
Korea
 anarchism 135–7
 April Revolution 3181, 3182
 caste system 1997
 civic movement 1980–1
 Democratic Unionism 1985–6
 feudalism 1998
 General Strike 1988–9
 Great Workers' Struggle 1985–6, 1990
 Hot Summer of 1987 1984–5
 IMF 1996
 Japanese rule 734, 1896, 1998–9
 June Uprising 3181
 Kwangju uprising 1982–3, 2014–15, 3181, 3182–3
 labor law revision 1988
 labor movement 1981–93
 migrant workers' struggle 1993–4
 national liberation 1999, 3183
 neoliberalism 1988–9, 2001–2
 New Management Strategy 2001
 NGOs 1994
 peasants' and farmers' movement 1995–6
 popular movements for democracy 1998–2001
 popular rebellions and uprisings 1996–8
 Renovation Government 3182
 self-immolation of worker 1981
 shipbuilding 1987–8
 student movement 3181–5
 union structure 1981–2
 urban poor 1994–5
 urbanization 1994
 see also South Korea
 Korea Telecom 1993
 Korean Advanced Farmers' Federation 3646
 Korean Anarchist Federation in China 135, 1926
 Korean Anarcho-Communist Federation 136
 Korean Confederation of Student Unions (Hanchongryun) 3185
 Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) 1986–7, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1994
 Korean Congress of Trade Union Representatives (KCTUR) 1986–7
 Korean Council of Industrial Trade Union Federations 1986
 Korean Employers Federation (KEF) 1986
 Korean Federation of Poor People's Movements 1995
 Korean Independent Army 1970
 Korean Peasant League (KPL) 1995, 3463
 Korean People's Delegation Against HK WTO 3651
 Korean Trade Union Congress (KTUC) 1985–6
 Korean War
 Australian resistance 304
 impact on Uruguay 3404
 and Japan 1879, 1885, 1909, 3069
 and national liberation 1999
 Peng 2630
 South Korean society 1999
 Korean Youth Federation in South China 1926
 Korean Youth Wartime Operational Unit 1926
 Korec, Bishop 3050
 Korfanty, Wojciech 3037
 Kornegger, Peggy 159
 Kornilov, Lavr 2085, 2913–14, 2915, 3325
 Korokyo 1879, 1882
 Korom Shah 371
 Koromah, Johnny Paul 3032
 Korsch, Karl 377, 2136, 3082
 Marxism and Philosophy 905, 2838
 Western Marxism 1423
 Korsun, Battle of 1958
 Kościuszko, Tadeusz 2715
 Kosik, Karel 2839
Kosovo
 Albanian nation-state 35
 Albanians 2002–3
 civil and armed resistance 2002–3
 counterrevolution 3010
 general strike 3010
 Milošević 37
 NATO 1831, 2003
 rebellion 223
 Tute Bianche 1008
 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 37, 2002–3
 Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) 2003
 Kossomak, Queen 571
 Kossuth, Lajos (Louis) 1143, 1149, 1619, 1620, 1623, 1624
 Kostov, Vladimir 538
 Kostroma 2891, 2944
 Koštunica, Vojslav 812, 2509, 3011, 3012
 Kotahitanga (Unity) movement 2208
 Kotane, Moses 171, 172, 832, 3104, 3106
 Kotoku Shusui 97, 133, 158, 1807, 2566
 Kotzebue, August von 558, 1347
 Koukoules, Georgos 3219–21
 Koumis, Iakovos 127
 Kovacs, Bela 1618
 Kovel, Joel 2249
 Kovner, Abba 1917
 Kowalewski, David 1217, 1218
 Koxinga (Cheng Ch'eng-kung) 2311

- Koy Pech affair 572
 KPD: *see* Communist Party of Germany
 Kraai, Hamilton 152, 154
 Kracauer, Siegfried 905, 1256
 Krahl, Hans-Jürgen 3170
 Krahom, Ben 568, 1958
 Krakatoa eruption 1900
 Krakow Revolution 2701–2
 Krakow students 2706
 Král', Janko 1621
 Kramártsik, Karl 1620
 Kramer, Larry 8–9
 Kramer, Mark 2746
 KRAS (Russian IWA) 143
 Krasnov, General 2919, 2929
 Krause, Allison 1947
 Krausism 3610
 Krausz, Károly 128
 Kravchuk, Leonid 3376
 Kreisauer Circle 1595
 KREM Television 1634
 Krenz, Egon 1345
 Krieger Vasena, Adalbert 865, 866, 868
 Krim, Abdel 2336
 Kripalani, J. B. 1329
 Kripalani, Sucheta 1329, 2794
 Krishak Sabha (Peasant Association) 2575, 2576
 Kristeva, Julia 3576
 Kristian I, of Sweden 1495
 Kristian II, of Sweden 1495–6
 Kritzingner, F. J. 1088
 Krivine, Alain 2261
 Krivoshein, General 2889
 Kroesen, Frederick 1369
 Krog, Gina 2524
 Krom Pracheachon (People's Group) 577, 1959
Kronstadt Mutiny 100, 143, 379, 1413,
 2003–5, 2087, 2883, 2905, 3013, 3507
 Workers' Opposition pamphlet 3029
Kropotkin, Peter 2005–9
 anarchism 94, 95, 98, 634, 2005, 2926
 anarchocommunist 120, 123, 160, 2008
 and Bakunin 2008
Conquest of Bread 2007
 and Cornelissen 870
 decentralism 2048
Fields, Factories, and Workshops 2007
Freedom 2007
 funeral 143
 and Godwin 1410
 and Goldman 1411
 as influence 119, 133, 142, 1561
 and Makhno 2166
Memoirs of a Revolutionist 2007
Mutual Aid 114, 2007, 2620
 mutual aid theory 2006, 2007
 and Reclus 2008, 2813, 2814
Révolution, La 2006, 2811
Révolution, Le 2006, 2811
 scientific work 2006
 and Seymour 108
 Socialist League 2341
 and tsars 2005–6
 United Brethren 2323
 World War I 2890
 Krüger, Hans Andersen 990
 Krukowiecki, Jan 331, 2716
 Krupp iron mines 165
 Krupskaya, Nadezhda 2082, 2993, 3159, 3553
Zhenshchina Rabotnitsa 3552
 Krymov, General 2895
 Ku Klux Klan (KKK)
 Birmingham Campaign 3398
 black resistance 16, 17, 18, 19
 Fort Pillow massacre 2801
 Freedom Rides 742, 1257–8
 and law officers 1259
 lynching 1024
 NAACP against 2067, 3534
 and Oklahoma tenant farmers 1459
 reestablished 2822–3, 2824
 Kuang Fu Hui 733
 Kuang-hsu, Emperor 3201
 Kubai, Fred 2256
 Kubik, Jan 3072–80
 Kubilay, killed 3361
 Kubitschek, Juscelino 2351
 Kubota, Shigeko 1191
 Kubrick, Stanley 3149
 Kucan, Milan 224
 Kuchma, Leonid 3329, 3376, 3377
 Küçük, Hülya 3354–9
Kudi Arasu 956
 Kühn, Augusto 259
 Kuhn, Gabriel 158–60, 2299–300
 Kuhn, Thomas 2987
kulaks (landowning farmers) 2898, 2935, 3509
Kulaura uprising 2576
 Kuliev, Avdi 3368
 Kulik, Eva 3556
Kuliscioff, Anna 2009, 3341
 Kulov, Felix 3329, 3331, 3333
Kultura 3077
 Kumaramand, Swami 1680
 Kumaranatunga, Vijaya 2633
 Kumaranatunga, Chandrika 3252, 3253
 Kumbikano, Clement 2175
 Kun, Bela 1598, 1920, 2136, 2387
 Kundera, Milan 949, 1235
 Kung-chuan Hsiao 3235

- Kunnuji, Michael O. N. 2114–16
 Kuokkavierasjuhlat 118–19
 Kuomintang: *see* Guomindang
 Kupi, Abaz 29
Kurdish national autonomy movement
 1762–3
 Kurdish rebellions 283, 3358–9
Kurdistan 1762, 2009–13, 2010
 nationalist movement 352, 2009–13, 3355
 Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 1762, 1776,
 3516
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 2009–13,
 3343–4, 3354
 Kurds
 Al Ahad Society 1775
 assimilation attempts 2010
 declaration of independence 1762, 1775
 distribution of 1762
 Iraq 353
 Lausanne, Treaty of 2010
 Kuria, Manasses 1949
 Kuro Solidarity Strike 1983–4, 3182
Kuroń, Jacek 2013–14, 2695, 2696, 2698, 2705
 Kurras, Karl-Heinz 1037
 Kurt, Andrew 2406–7
 Kurtz, Geoffrey 1912–13
 Kurtz, Lester 2511
 Kurzack, Roska 1917
 Kusin, Vladimir 2745
 Kuskova, E. D. 3554
 Kutako, Hosea 2396, 2530
 Kutler, N. 2900, 2906
 Kwa, Aileen 3644–8
 Kwahjalein Atoll 199
 Kwaio Rebellion 3081
 Kwangju residents' riot 1994
Kwangju student uprising 1982–3, 2014–15,
 3181, 3182–3
 KwaZulu-Natal areas 3100
 Kwiatek, Józef 2718
 Kwon Young-gil 1987, 1991, 1992
 Kyoto Protocol 1430
 Kyprianos, Archbishop 943
Kyrgyzstan 3328–34, 3421
 NGOs 814
 poverty 3328
 Tulip Revolution 811, 813, 2511, 3021,
 3328–34
 Kyrkos, Michalis 1445
 L7 2845
 La Barbera, Arnaldo 1310
La Boétie, Etienne de 2017–18
 Discourse of Voluntary Servitude 2017
 La Botz, Dan 2290–5, 2297–9
 La Canadiense power plant 351, 847
 La Cassiere, Jean Levesque de 2183–4
La Ceiba Uprising 2018–19
 La Escalera, Conspiracy of 911
 La Follette, Robert 2488–9, 3065
 La Guma, Jimmy 2395–6
La Matanza Peasant Revolt 638–9, 1163,
 2019–20, 2956
 La Mon House restaurant firebombing 1797,
 1802
 Labadie, Jo 157
 Laban, Abu 992
 Laban ng Masa (Struggle of the Masses) 2687
 Laberge, Yves 1001–2, 2315–16, 2380–2
 “LABIA” (Lesbians and Bisexuals in Action)
 2109
 labor
 forced 1475, 1522, 3163, 3709
 globalization 1670–1
hod begari system 2576
 indentured 75, 211, 1031, 1197, 1498, 1512,
 1695, 3425
 racially segregated 313
 reproductive 3370
 unpaid 371
see also wages
Labor 2218, 2649
 Labor, Livio 2622
 Labor and Unemployed Association (LUA) 365
 Labor Contract Act 2075
 Labor Relation Adjustment Law, Japan 1895,
 1898
 Labor Relations Act 875, 3097, 3731
Labor Standard 2027
 labor theory of value 2233
 Labor Union of Women 3598
labor unions: *see* trade unions
Labor's Volunteer Army 2038–9
 Labotsibeni, Queen Regent 3205
Labour and the New Social Order 3517
 Labour Discipline Law 2360
Labour Party, Britain 520, 521, 522–3, 528,
 2039–41
 Labriola, Antonio 1423, 2243, 2838
 Labyrinth Foundation Counseling service 2108
 Lacalle, Luis Alberto 3407
 Lacan, Jacques 3576, 3743
 Lacandon Jungle Declarations 3712, 3715, 3718
 Lacandon Selva insurgency 2287
 Lacayo, Gonzalo 2564
 Lacey, Tom 307
 Laçi, Vasil 30
 Lacin, Asja 376
 Laclau, Ernesto 772, 773, 983, 3743
 Lacombe, Claire 1290, 1294, 1296–7

- Laczó, Ferenc 1622–4, 1625–30
Ladder, The 2107
Ladies' Home Journal sit-in 3629
 Lady Musgrave Self-Help Society 3558
 Ladyfest 2845
 Lafargue, Laura 2754
 Lafargue, Pablo 144
Lafayette, Marquis de 83, 505, 1231, 1276,
 1525, 1607, **2041–2**
 National Guard 2409
 Ogé 2553
 Washington 505, 2041
 Wright 3666
 Laflamme, Rodolphe 2841
 Lafleur, Jacques 2458, 2459
 Lafontant, Roger 1507
 Lagardelle, Hubert 3228
 Lagman, Felimon 2685
 Lagos colony 3676, 3677, 3678
 Lagrée, Doudart de 3476
 Laguiller, Arlette 3577
 Lagun-Aro 2315
 Lahore Resolution 1921
 Lahoud, Emile 636
Lail-o-Nehar 1160, 2581
 Laín Sáenz, Domingo 1082
 Laíno, Domingo 2601, 2603, 2606
 Laisant, C. A. 3218–19
 Laitinen, Jukka 118–19
 Lake, Gerard 1788, 1793, 1794
 Lake, Marilyn 303, 3561–4
 Lal-i-Badakhshan 3245
 Lala Har Dayal 158
Lalor, Peter 1145, **2043–4**
 Lalumière Report 299
 Lam, Wilfredo 2428
 Lama, Luciano 1838
 Lamar group 3611
 Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste 2994
Lamartine, Alphonse de 1149, **2044–5**
 History of the Girondins 2044
 Méditations poétiques 2044
 Lamb, William 2724, 2725
 Lambert, John 1100
 Lambert, Tobias 2224–6
 Lambeth Loyal Association 2127, 3150–1
 Lambrakis, Grigoris 1446
Lame, Manuel Quintín 805–6, **2045–6**, 2791
 see also Quintín Lame (CQL)
 Lamennais, Felicité de 111
 Lamming, George 2852
 Lamont-de la Huerta Treaty 2541
 Lamy, Pascal 3651, 3652
 Lancaster, Roger 774
 Lancaster House Conference 3736, 3738
 Lanctôt, Jacques 2786–7
 Land Acquisition Act 2575, 2979
 Land Apportionment Act 3734
Land and Freedom (Loach) 2738
 Land and Freedom Army: *see* Mau Mau
 Rebellion
 Land and Freedom movement 2426, 2693
 Land and Housing Federation (FTV) 264
 Land League of Ireland 967, 968, 1415
 see also Irish National Land League
 Land and Liberty movement 334, 978
 Land Nationalization Act, Burma 2527
 Land Research Action Network (LRAN) 3462
 Land Rights Act (NT) 4, 5
 Land Rights Commission 4
 Land to the Tiller Act 3238
Landau, Kurt **2046–7**
Landauer, Gustav 116, 1609, **2047–9**
 anarchopacifism 99, 2048
 Aufruf zum Sozialismus 2048
 Revolution, Die 2048–9
 Sozialistischer Bund 2048, 2049, 3082
 Landes, J. B. 1292
 Landes, Joan 3016
 Landless People's Movement 3100, 3462
 see also Movimento Sem Terra (MST)
 Lane, Fintan 619–20
 Lane, Max 1721–4, 1727–34
 Lane, William 106, 108, 2449–50
 Bushmen of Australia 2451
 death 2454
 Guaraní Indians 2452
 see also New Australia movement
 Lang, J. D. 105
 Lang Son attack 1713
 Langa massacre 2358, 3094
 Lange, David 2529
 Langford, Charles 2615
 Lanka Estate Workers' Union 2053
Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) 969,
 1494, **2049–54**, 2631, 2632, 3527
 Lansdale, Edward G. 1615
 Lanteri Renshaw, Julieta 3597
 Lanusse, Agustin 249, 1156
 Lanz, Carlos 3444, 3454
 Lanzmann, Jacques 2381
 Lao Dong (Workers' Party of Vietnam) 1599,
 1600, 3479, 3480, 3481, 3482
 Lao Hun 568
 Lao Issara (Free Lao movement) 2054, 3083,
 3472
 Lao People's Democratic Republic 2055
 Lao Popular Party 3474
 Laor, Yitzhak 1760
Laos 2054, **2054–5**, 3261, 3474

- Lapita people 3080
 Laplace, Pierre Simon 2990
 Laporte, Pierre 592, 2787
 LaPorte, Roger 220
 Lappe, Francis Moore 3429
 Lapse Doctrine, Dalhousie 1687
 Lapua movement 2519
 Lara, Lúcio 1216
 Lara, Ruth 3605
 Lara Parada, Ricardo 1082
 Lardizával, Martín de 163–4
 Largo Caballero, Francisco 146, 291, 3130, 3136, 3140, 3142
 Popular Army 3137
 Larkin, E. 1027
 Larkin, James 860, 1026, 1027
 Larmer, Miles 696–8, 3695–706
 Larocca, Giuseppina 3067, 3389
 Larsen, Henry 148
 Larsen, Nella 1555
 Las Casas, Bartolomé de 601, 1116, 1562, 2056, 2593
 Las Queseras del Medio, Battle of 578
 Lascaris Castellar, Jean Paul 2184
 Lashkar-e-Taiba 1811
 Lasker-Schüler, Else 1609
 Laski, Harold 2197
 Lassalle, Ferdinand 1350, 1910, 2025, 2026, 2236, 2237, 3055, 3066
 Latief, Abdul 1723
 Latimer, Hugh 516, 1095
Latin America 2055–64, 2376–80, 3596–601
 agricultural production 1662
 anti-neoliberalism 1400
 average income 1671
 bishops' conferences 2057
 Catholic Church 1924, 2055–63
 colonial period 2055–6
 debt crises 3461
 feminist meetings 3600–1
 folk Catholicism 2057
 historical space-time theory 48
 hunger 1662
 Japanese-descent people 1876
 Marxism 2249
 missionaries 2057–8
 music and protest 2376–80
 national identities 2767
 NGOs 3599–600
 poverty 2058, 2059–60
 punk rock/protest 2063–4
 rebellious peasant movements 480–1
 “Sixty-Eight” 3169
 strikes 2494
 student movements 3179, 3180
 women's movements 3596–601
 women's suffrage 3598
 World Social Forum 3641
 see also individual countries
 Latin America Security Operation (LASO) 799
 Latin American Bishops' Council (CELAM) 479
 Latin American Bridge of the Americas 2593
 Latin American Coordinating Group of Rural Organizations (CLOC) 3462
 Latino politics 2499
 Latortue, Gérard 1509, 1510
 Lattre de Tassigny, General de 3473
 Latvia 340, 2925, 2933, 3039–40
 Latvian Independence Day 341
 Laud, William 908, 1097, 2118
 Laurel, José P. 1614, 1615
 Laurel, Salvador 2675, 2682
 Laurens, Henry 295
 Lausanne, Treaty of
 Cyprus 944
 Greece 1454
 Kurds 2010
 Turkey 3349, 3355, 3358, 3360, 3362
 Lause, Mark 55–69, 74–88
Lautaro 2064–5
 Lava, Jesus 1612, 1616
 Lava, José 1612, 1615, 1616, 2677
 Lavabre, Guillaume 2215
 Laval, Pierre 179
 Lavalas 1507, 1508, 1510, 1520–1
 Laveaux, Etienne 3311
 Laver, Brian 107
 Lavoisier, Antoine 2990–1, 2992
 Lavrov, Pëtr 976
 Law and Liberty League 406
 Lawrence, Carmen 3564
 Lawrence, D. H. 2262
 Lawrence, Henry 1690
 Lawrence textile workers' strike 502–4, 836, 1204, 2623
 Lawson, F. 1075
 Lawson, Henry 2449, 2454
 Lawson, Louisa 3561
 Lay, Benjamin 213
 Laycock, Lieutenant 3491–2
 Lazare, Bernard 99
 Lazare, Mzumbo 3315
 Lazzaretti, Davide 1846
 Lazzari, Constantino 1822
 Le Blanc, Paul 677–8, 765–76, 1422–7, 1574–5, 1647–53, 1664–73, 2020–31, 2031–8, 2081–8, 2088–91, 2120–1, 2142–8, 2165–8, 2229–39, 2239–51, 2629–31, 3156–64, 3321–7, 3424
 le Bon, Gustav 886

- Le Carré, John 840
Le Duan 1600, **2065–6**, 3480
 Le Duc Tho 3480, 3484
 Le Duy Phung 3475
 Le May, Curtis 416
 Le Pen, Jean-Marie 1449, 1645, 2458
 Leabua Jonathan, Chief 2112
 Leach, James 657
 Leacock, Eleanor 2249
Leader, The 1799
 League Bazaars 177
 League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY)
 3011, 3637, 3689, 3692
 League of Empire Loyalists 2526
 League of the Free Peoples 288
 League of Freethinking Women 3598
 League of Gileadites 533
 League for the Independence of Vietnam 1598
 League of the Just 2234
 League of Nations 1182, 1749
 Albania 36
 Bulgaria 541
 Charter 1173
 Germany 1592
 Greece 1442, 1453
 Iraq 1775
 Namibia 2394, 2397
 Silesia 3037
 Versailles System 1172
 League of Peace and Freedom 2811
 League of Reform Forces 224
League of Revolutionary Black Workers
 2066–8, 3071
 League for Social Reconstruction 2975
 League for Women's Equality 3554, 3606
 League of the Working Classes of Greece
 1440
 Lease, Mary Elizabeth 2727
 Leather Workers' Union 2345
 Leballo, Potlako 2111
 Lebanese Front 2070
 Lebanese National Movement 2070
Lebanon 635–6, **2068–74**
 ammiyyah 2073
 Cedar Revolution 635–6
 Christians 635
 civil war 1575, 1576, **2070–2**
 Druze–Christian conflicts 635, 2073, 2074
 insurrection **2068–70**
 Maronites 2073
 Muslims and Druzes 635
 National Pact 2068, 2070
 partition of 2073
 PLO 360
 revolts, 19th century **2072–4**
 Shi'ite Muslims 635
 Sunni Muslims 635, 2073
 and Syria 635–6, 2069, 2072
 US intervention 2069
 Lebanon War 1813, 1814, 2405
 LeBas, Philippe 2951
 Lebel, Jean-Jacques 2260
Lebensraum (living space) 1590, 1592, 2272
 Leberstein, Stephen 463–4, 1124–5, 3215–19
 Lebron, Lolita 2770
 Lecesne, Louis 205
 Lech Walesa Institute 3503
 Lechín, Juan 419, 422, 428, 429, 430
 Lecky, W. E. H. 1794
 Leclerc, Charles 995, 1546, 1716
 Leclerc, Jacques 1266, 1599
 Leclerc, Théophile 1290
 Leclerc, Victor-Emmanuel 1266
 Lecompte, Claude Martin 2610
 Lecompte, Thomas 2610
 Ledru-Rollin, Alexandre Auguste 1149, 1243,
 1245
 Lee, Algernon 3065
 Lee, Arthur 508
 Lee, Gordon 151
 Lee, Harry 83
 Lee, Herbert 1258
 Lee, M. 1039
 Lee, Martin Chu-ming 1604, 1605
 Lee, Mary 3561
 Lee, "Mother" Ann 3019, 3614
 Lee, Richard Henry 80
 Lee, Robert E. 60, 63, 66–7, 534
 Lee Jesu 1998
 Lee Kyung Hae 1996, 3463, 3646, 3647
 Lee Mong-hak 1997
 Lee Pilje 1998
 Lee Seok-gyu 1984
 Lee Sung-gye 1996
 Lees–Mody Pact 1684
Leeward Islands
 abolition of slavery 2075
 emigration rates 2076, 2077
 Garveyites 2077
 labor protests **2074–9**
 racism 2076, 2078
 sugar industry 2075–6
 Trade Union Act 2077
 see also individual islands
 Lefebvre, Georges 1274, 1283, 1286, 2249
 Lefebvre, Henri 973, 1284, 2249, 3045, 3423
 Lefela brothers 2110
 Lefort, Claude 621, 3062
 Lefranc, G. 3216
 Left Front, Bengal 3588

- Left Revolutionary Movement (MIR) 50, 679, 683, 684, 687, 1058, 2644, 2660, 3437, 3442, 3446, 3450
- Left Social Revolutionaries 3058
- Leghari, Farooq 2584
- Legien, Carl 1362
- Legión Británica 3458
- Legion of the Archangel Michael 1173, 2857
- Leguía, Augusto 1567, 2217, 2648
- Lehi (Fighters for Israel's Freedom) 374, 375
- Lehman, Herbert 841
- Lehmann, Orla 989, 2984, 2985
- Lehning, Arthur 3082
- Lei Zhen 3236–7
- Leibensperger, Summer D. 351–2, 465–6, 2643, 3365–8, 3518–20
- Leigh, General (Chile) 683
- Leinster colonists 1804
- Leipzig, Battle of 443, 1347, 1349
- Leisler's Rebellion 75
- Lekhanya, J. M. 2112
- Lekhotla la Bafo (LLB) 2110–11
- Lemass, Séan 2572
- Lemba, Sebastian 2079–80**
- Lembede, Anton 2111, 2191, 3086, 3087
- Lemel, Nathalie 2300
- Lemieux, Robert 2787
- Lemisch, Jesse 296
- Lemkin, Raphael 282
- Lemoine Plan 2458
- Lempira 2080**
- Lemus, José María 1163
- Lena goldfields 2940
- Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 2081–8, 3424–5**
- April Theses* 439, 2085, 2902–3, 3554
- on Bernstein 381, 382
- Bolshevism 2082, 2085–6
- Brest-Litovsk 2933–4
- and Bukharin 535
- on colonialism 1649
- Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia 643
- Development of Capitalism in Russia* 2082
- Draft Law on Workers' Control 2918
- in exile 2890, 2894
- Finland 1202
- on Hegel 2838
- Hô Chi Minh 1597
- on imperialism 1649, 1651–2
- Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* 1651–2, 2084
- influence in Caribbean 1863–4
- on Kautsky 1672, 1942, 2084
- Kautsky on 1664
- Left-Wing Communism* 2086, 2447
- and Martov 2228
- Marxism 2089, 2244–7
- Marxist theories 2090, 2243
- Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* 438, 2083, 2838, 2993
- nationalization 2903
- NEP 535, 2087, 3510
- Olson on 649
- One Step Forward* 2082
- on Paris Commune 2613
- and Plekhanov 2694
- proletariat 1215
- Proletkult* 2993–4
- RSDWP 1915
- on Russian Revolution 2878
- Second International 175, 2889, 3058
- self-determination 322
- on Stalin 2087–8, 3059, 3158, 3511
- State and Revolution* 1000, 2085, 2147, 2237, 3058–9
- state capitalism 2934
- and Trotsky 2244–5, 3158, 3321
- Twenty-One Conditions 823, 824
- Two Tactics* 2082
- Vanguard party 3424–5
- war communism 2086–7
- What Is To Be Done?* 437, 770, 2082, 3424
- women's section of government 1751
- World War I 2083–4
- Lenin Club 833
- Leningrad 1182
- Leninist philosophy** 1875, 2003, 2088–92
- Lennon, Danny 2522
- Lenormand, Maurice 2457
- Lenshina, Alice 3700
- Lenz, J. M. R. 3190
- Léo, André 123, 2613
- see also* Champseix, Léodile Bréa
- Leo X, Pope 515, 2830
- Leo XIII, Pope 2057
- Leon, José de 1616
- Léon, Pauline 1290, 1294, 1296
- León de la Barra, Francisco 2277
- Léonard, Roger 45
- Leoncavallo 1006
- Leopold I, of Belgium 362
- Leopold II, of Belgium 620, 856, 2714
- Leopold III, of Belgium 362, 363
- Leopold of Austria 892
- Leopold of Tuscany 1112
- Léques, Jean 2459
- LeRoi Jones: see** Baraka, Imanu Amiri
- Leroux, Didier 2459
- Lerroux, Alejandro 291, 3130
- Les Cèdres 80

- Lesage, Jean 2783
- lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual movements (LGTB) 2092–109**
- Australia 2096–8
- Canada 2098–100
- collective action 2503
- Germany 2093, 2100–6
- USA 2106–9
- lesbianism 3016
- feminism 2093–4, 3569, 3625
- movements 2103–4
- NOW 1299
- Lesbians Against the Right 2099
- Lescot, Élie 1517, 2872
- Lesotho 2109–13, 3112**
- Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) 2112
- Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) 2112, 3113
- Lesotho Liberation Army 2112
- Lespwa (Hope) 1510
- Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 3146
- Letsie III 2112
- Lettrist International 972, 3044
- Leuenberger, Niklaus 3212, 3213
- Leutwein, Theodor 2391, 2392
- Levantamiento Indígena 1065–6
- Levasseur, Thérèse 2873
- Levelers 1100–2
- anarchist 93
- dissolution of monarchy 1098, 1099
- Lilburne 1100, 2118–19
- women 1107–8
- Lévesque, René 2783–8
- Levin, V. 2916
- Levinger, Moshe 1817
- Levingston, Roberto M. 249
- Levins, Richard 2997
- Levy, Carl 2168–71
- Lewanika, Godwin 3697, 3698
- Lewis, David Levering 1023
- Lewis, G. K. 2769
- Lewis, Joel A. 3678–9
- Lewis, John 745, 748, 750, 1257, 3187
- Lewis, John L. 49, 838, 2035–6, 3411, 3415
- Lewis, Mary Dewhurst 1643–7
- Lewis, Rufus 1971
- Lewis, Sarah 3562
- Lewis, Simon L. 2635–8
- Lewis, Tyron 3373
- Lexington 78
- Leyden, Jan van 2831
- LFLRA: see Lowell Female Labor Reform Association**
- Lhasa rebellion 3290, 3291
- Li Dazhao 2200
- death of 725, 730
- Guomindang 114, 724
- May 4th movement 723
- Li Hsiu-cheng 3233
- Li Hung-chang 3675
- Li Lisan 2113–14, 2782, 3723–4, 3726**
- Li Peng 3286, 3287
- Li Ping-shu 735
- Li Shizeng 114
- Li Tzu-cheng 2309, 2310
- Li Wencheng 717
- Li Zehou 3285
- Li Zicheng 714
- Libel Act 1223, 1224
- Libelt, Karol 3544
- Liberal, El* 408
- Liberal Autonomist Party 919
- Liberal Democratic Party, Japan 1882, 1889, 1907, 1909
- Liberal Party, Britain 522, 527–8
- Liberal Party, Canada 2787
- Liberal Party, Honduras 2018
- Liberal Party, Mexico 137
- Liberal Party, Paraguay 2608
- Liberal Revolution of Oporto 187
- Liberal Thinker, The* 3624
- Liberal Wars 187
- liberalism 1172, 1913
- Liberation* 2423
- Libération* 3576
- Liberation, Wars of 188–90, 2982
- Liberation Front, Slovenia 3683
- Libération Operation 2787
- Liberation Operation, Tamil 3251
- liberation theology
- Brazil 478–83
- CELAM 2059, 2500
- Gutiérrez 1497
- Haiti 279
- John Paul II on 2062, 2472
- Lugo 2134–5
- music 640
- Zambia 3704
- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 2634, 2740–1, 3251–3
- liberationist Christianity 479
- Liberator, The* 215, 1021, 1333, 1335, 1467, 2253, 3619
- Liberia**
- freed slaves 2114, 2409
- origins of 207, 214
- protest and revolution 2114–16
- warlords 2115
- Liberian National Transitional Government 2115

- Liberians United for Reconstruction and Democracy (LURD) 2116
- Libertaire, Le* 120, 121
- libertarian communism 106
- Libertarian Education League 1124
- Libertarian Group 153
- Libertarian League 158
- libertarian socialism 96
- Libertarian Torch reading club 2755
- Libertarian Workers group 108
- libertarianism 97
- Liberty* (Tucker) 157
- Liberty, France* 2215–16
- Liberty Boys 77
- Librairie des femmes 3576
- Libya
Italy 1180, 1822, 3014
Nasserism 2406–7
and Philippines 2330
Qaddafi 2779
Sanusyyia 51
socialism 2328
- Lichtheim, George 1653
- Liebkecht, Karl** 2116–17, 3147
anti-tsar demonstrations 1748
death of 1253, 1363, 3056, 3148
German Socialist Republic 1361
German war loans 3722
and Luxemburg 2117, 2147
Militarismus und Antimilitarismus 2117
Second International 1756
Spartacus League 3147–8
on SPD 2084, 2116
Studies in the Dynamic Laws of Social Development 2117
- Liebkecht, Wilhelm 259, 1351, 1756, 2116, 2237, 2243, 3055
- Liebman, Marcel 2089
- Life* 624
- Liffe (London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange) 1389, 1397, 2809
- Liga Filipina 444, 2846
- Liga Patriótica (Patriotic League) 248
- Ligas Agrarias 245
- Ligas Camponesas** 472, 2117–18, 2350–1
- Ligondé, Archbishop 1507
- Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire 2261
- Ligue du Droit des femmes (League of Women's Rights) 3575
- Ligue Féminine d'Action Sociale 3584–5
- Ligue internationale pour l'éducation rationnelle de l'enfance 1125
- Lih, L. T. 975–9, 3424
- Likud bloc 359, 1813, 1816, 1817
- Likud Party 1817, 1851
- Lilburne, Elizabeth (née Dewell) 1108, 2119
- Lilburne, John** 1100, 1101, 1102, 1108, 2118–20
Freemans Freedom Vindicated, The 2119
Levelers 2119–20
Protectorate 2120
- Lilburne, Robert 1101
- Liliuokalani, Queen 1563–4, 1565–6
- Lilliput 1308
- Lim Keok-jung 1997
- Lim Su-kyung 3184
- Lima 2645, 2651, 2655–66
- Lima e Silva, Luis Alves de 491, 492
- Limanowski, Boleslaw 2717
- Limerick, Articles of 1784
- Limerick, fall of 1099
- Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 197, 1460
- Lin Biao** 711, 2120–1, 2204, 2422, 2631
- Lin Qing 717
- Linás-Marcoussis agreement 882
- Linch, Amy 167–70, 1190, 1194–5, 1224–5, 1608–9, 1632–3, 2013–14, 2301–3, 2688–90, 2694–8, 2700–5, 2715–17, 3501–4, 3636–7
- Lincoln, Abraham** 2121–3
African Americans 394, 2121, 2122, 2123
anti-slavery 61, 2024, 2122
and Douglass 2121–2, 2123
election of 1860 57, 216
Emancipation Proclamation 70, 755
Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation 61
reelection bid 66
Second Inaugural 67
- Lincoln, Benjamin 3023
- Lindblom, Charles E. 3638
- Lindenberger, Thomas 1337
- Linder, Walter 2495
- Lindlay, Augustus 3232
- Lindley, John 3676
- Lingg, Louis 1569, 1570
- Lini, Walter 3426–7
- Linke, Die 829
- Linker Flügel der KPD/Marxisten/Leninisten 2046
- Linlithgow, Lord 1330, 1710, 2792, 2794
- L'Instant de Pradine, S. 205
- Linton, Marisa 2951–2
- Lipan, Battle of 2830
- Lipinski, Edward 2694
- Lippard, Lucy 1483
- Lippman, Walter 2825
- Lipset, Seymour Martin 2976
- Lipski, Jan Józef 2696
- Lisandro de la Torre Meatpacking Plant 2641
- Lisbon rebellion 2731
- Lisbonne, Maxime 97
- Lissagaray, H.-P.-O. (el Marx) 2229

- Lista Marrón group 252
 Lista Rosa group 252
 literacy campaigns 671, 934, 1493, 2997
Literaturstreit 387
 Lithuania 340, 1417, 2714
 see also Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
Little Bighorn, Battle of 899–902
 Little Rock, Arkansas 17, 763
 Litton Systems 110
 Litunga 3700
 Liu Renjing 2782
Liu Shaoqi 570, 709, 710, 711, 726, 2123–5
 CCP 2124–5
 Cultural Revolution 2124, 2125
 purged 2125
 recentralization 2204
 working class 731
 Liu Shipai 114
 Live 8 1312, 1314–15, 1402
 Live Aid 1314
 Liverpool 518
 Liverpool, Lord 2826
 Liverpool dockers 1387, 2809
Living Daylights 107
 Living Newspapers 28
 Living Theater 1482
 Livingstone, David 2172
 Livingstone, William Jerves 695
 Livingstone Native Welfare Association 3697
 Livingstonia Mission 2172–3
 Livonian War 436
 Lizzadri, Oreste 998, 1823
 Llamas, Ronald 2682
 Llano del Rio colony 3418
 Lleras Camargo, Alberto 407–8, 799
 Lleras Restrepo, Carlos 409
 Liga Regionalista 630
 Lloyd, John 203
 Lloyd George, David 522, 793, 971, 1047–9,
 3508, 3509
 Lluís Companys 630
 Llunas Pujols, José 95, 145
 Loach, Ken 2738
 Lobato, Nicolau 1042, 1043
 Lobengula, King 700, 3734
 Lobo de Sousa, Bernardo 561
 Local Labor Centers, Greece 3220
 Local Organs of People's Power (OLPP) 922,
 935, 937–9
 Local Workers' Federation of Callao (FOLC)
 2648
 Local Workers' Federation of Lima (FOLL)
 2648, 2649
 Locarno Treaty 1173
 Locke, Alain 1554
Locke, John 2125–6
 on absolute monarchy 2125
 Enlightenment 1126
 Epistola de Tolerantia 2125
 Essay Concerning Human Reasoning, An 2125
 Glorious Revolution 1408
 influence of 2435, 2436, 3392
 sensationalism 1409
 social contract 76, 1113
 Two Treatises on Government 1114, 2125
 women's rights 3613
 Lockerbie bombing 2779
 Lockier, Robert 1108
 lockouts 521–2, 2906, 2915
 Łódź general strike 2718
 Loewenheim, Walter 1379–80
 Lofgreen, Peter 861, 2027, 2451
 Loft, Fred 584
 Loft, Leonore 505–6
 Lofthus Uprising 2515
 Logan, William 2317
 Lollards 514, 1092, 3000
 Lomax, Louis 3400
 Lombok, Conquest of 1720
 Lon Nol 569–71, 572–3, 1959, 3035, 3485
 Lon Non 573
 London
 anti-Iraq war protest 228
 dock workers' strikes 2229, 3061
 Grosvenor Square rally 218
 Hyde Park riot 2808
 J18 1152, 1386–91, 1397
 July 2005 bombings 1315
 matchgirls' strike 3061
 RampART 1741
 squattling 1039
 Stop the War Coalition 227, 228
 street party protests 2808
 work stoppage 295
 London, Conference of 36
 London, First Treaty of 2141
London, Jack 2127–8, 3041
 Call of the Wild, The 2128
 Iron Heel, The 2128
 Revolution 2127
 War of the Classes, The 2127
 White Fang 2128
 London Co-operative Trading Association 2129
London Corresponding Society (LCS)
 2126–7
 bread riots 502
 Godwin 1409
 Hardy 1552–3, 1607
 Place 2126–7, 2692
 Spence 3150–1

- Thelwall 3279
 treason trials 3024
 United Englishmen 3391
London Dispatch 2543
 London Greenpeace 1387
 London International Financial Futures and
 Options Exchange: *see* Liffe
 London Mechanics Institute 2692
 London Missionary Society 204, 983
 London Pact 1827
 London Protocols 2985
London Review of Books 1760
 London School of Economics 512, 3517
 London Trades Council 1755
 London University 2692
 London Working Men's Association (LWMA)
 656
 Londonderry 1797
 Lonefighters 585
 Long, Edward 1871
 Long, Huey 1587
 Long, James 1712
 Long Boret 573
 Long Island 81, 156
 Long March
 CCP 707
 Deng Xiaoping 986
 as forced retreat 2680
 Lin Biao 2120
 Mao regime 726
 Peng 2120, 2630, 3285
 Qu Qiubai 2782
 Red Army 726, 2680
 Zhang 3724–5
 Zhou 3726
 Zhu 3727
 Long Parliament 909, 1097
 Longest Walk 2415
 longshoremen
 Canada 1753
 Los Angeles 3041
 MTW 1752–4
 San Francisco 3414
 West Coast 2035
 Longue-Pointe, Battle of 80
 Longuet, Jean 2084
 LoPatin-Lummiss, Nancy 632–4
 Lopes, Manuel and F. 152
 Lopez, Alfredo 2151
 López, Atilio 868, 2640
 López, Carlos Antonio 2608
 Lopez, Miguel 2664
 Lopez, Nativo 1642, 1643
 López Arango, Emilio 104, 1187
 López Arellano, Oswaldo 2128–9
 López de Santa Anna, Antonio 1924
 López Gutiérrez, Antonio 2018
 López Mateos, Adolfo 2283, 2296, 2298
 López Maya, M. 3447
 López Michelsen, Alfonso 800
 López Obrador, Andrés Manuel 2294
 Lopez Pena, Suzie 862
 López Pérez, Rigoberto 447, 2466
 López Pumarejo, Alfonso 407–8, 1320
 López Rega, José 249, 1155, 1580
 López Rodríguez, Rosana 273–4
 Lopizzo, Anna 503
 Lora, César 416
 POR 419, 420
 Lora, Guillermo 429
 Lorca, Federico García 2381
 Lord's Resistance Army 738
 Lords of Congregation 3001
 Lorenzen, Nis 2984
 Lorenzen, Peter Hiort 2984
 Lorenzen-Schmidt, K. 989
**Lorenzo Zelaya Popular Revolutionary
 Forces (FPRLZ) 2128–9**
 Lornsen, Uwe Jens 989, 2984
 Los Angeles
 South Central Riot 3403
 Watts riots 749, 3399–400
see also Cop Watch Los Angeles
Los Angeles Times 3415, 3418
 Los Bagres, Battle of 3707
 Los Leones, Battle of 3707
 Los de Palacagüina 638
 Los Santos, Emilio de 1018, 1019
 Lotta Continua 1836, 1838, 1840, 2401, 2622,
 2749
Lotus 1160
 Lotvala, R. B. 961
 Lotz, Gerhard 1343
 Lotzer, Sebastian 2830
 Loubet, Emile 1022
 Louis Philippe
 abdicated 1243
 as Citizen King 1231, 1283
 fleeing to England 1149
 Hugo 1611
 July Monarchy 403, 1227, 2216
 as king 897, 3033
 and Lafayette 1607, 2042
 and Lebanon 2073
 Louis XIII, of France 1069
 Louis XIV, of France
 absolutism 1304
 and Anne of Austria 1304
 and James II 1406, 1854
 Nantes Edict 1069

- Louis XVI, of France
 absolutism 1303
 Estates General 1126, 1525, 2311
 and Favras 892
 financial backing 1274
 Haiti 3307
 Rochambeau 2851
 Sieyès 3033
 supporters 1276
 Tennis Court Oath 3033, 3256
 trial and execution of 893, 1227, 1277, 2211,
 2849, 3306
 Turgot 846
- Louis XVII, of France 893
- Louis XVIII, of France
 Carbonari 403
 Charter of 1814 1227–8, 1229
 enthronement 189, 443, 895, 896
- Lourenço Marques 153, 2354
- L'Ouvrier, Albert 402, 1244
- Love Canal 1053
- Love & Rage Federation 160
- Lovejoy, Elijah 215
- Loveless, George 3301
- Loveless, James 3301
- Lovera, Waldino 2601
- Lovestone, Jay 596
- Lovett, William** 656, 657, 2129–30
- Lowell factory girls' strike 2023
- Lowell Female Labor Reform Association
 (LFLRA)** 2130–1
- Lowenthal, Leo 904, 1253, 1255
- Lowndes County Freedom Organization 613, 750
- Löwy, Michael 375–7, 2238, 2273–4
- Loyal Repeal Association 2544, 2545
- Loyola, Martin de 3337
- Lozado, Perico 1016
- Lozi discontent 3702
- LSSP: see** Lanka Sama Samaja Party
- Lu Fudan 3505, 3726
- Lu Jingru 3505
- Lu Xun** 713, 2131–2
- Lu Zongyu 713
- Luango slave rebellion 737
- Lubitz, Leonard H. 714–15, 715–18, 829–31,
 986–7
- Lucas García, Romeo 1480
- Luccheni, Luigi 130
- Luch* 2943
- Lucha Social* 2257
- Lucien, Arnaud 3334
- Lucifero, Il* 3015
- Lucknow Congress 2431
- Lucknow Pact 1699
- Luczywo, Helena 3556
- Luddism, machine breaking** 143–4, 2133–4,
 3281
- Luddite riots, Nottingham** 465, 2134
- Ludendorff, Erich 1364
- Lüder, Marie-Elisabeth 3580
- Ludlam, Isaac 465
- Ludlow Massacre 3041
- Lueger, Karl 887, 3741
- Luena, Memorandum of 2361
- Luganda language 3370
- Lugard, Frederick 23, 2558, 3369
- Lugo Méndez, Fernando Armindo** 2134–5
- Lugones, Leopoldo 270, 2313
- Luisa Amanda Espinoza National Women's
 Association (AMNLAE) 2474
- Luisi, Paulina 3597
- Lukács, Georg** 376, 2135–7, 2838
 alienation 2136
History and Class Consciousness 771, 905, 2136,
 2247, 2838
 as influence 973, 3045
 interrogated 2867
 Western Marxism 1423
 works 2136
- Lukanov, Andrei 539
- Łukasiewiczówna, Małgorzata 2696
- Lüke, Martina G. 188–90
- Lukov, Hristo 543
- Lula: *see* Silva, Luis Inácio Lula da
- Lumad people, Philippines 2679, 2686
- Lumpa Church 3700
lumpenproletariat 766–7, 887, 1863, 2306
- Lumumba, Patrice** 854–5, 856, 2137–9
- Lumumba Institute 2691
- Luna, Alfonso 2226
- Luna, Antonio 2669
- Lundy, Ben 1334, 2491
- Lunes de Revolución* 626
- Lunev, K. 2909
- lunfardo* argot 103
- Lung Hua Hui 733
- Lung-wu, Emperor 2310
- Lunigiana region 3014
- Lupeni strike 2858
- Luperón, General 1016
- Lupovitch, Howard N. 1918–20
- Lupu, Petre 2866
- Lusaka Declaration 3114
- Lusaka riots 3704
- Lusitania 187, 188
- Lussu, Emilio 1383
- Luther, Martin** 1355–6, 2139–41
Admonition to Peace 2140
On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church
 2139

- On the Freedom of a Christian* 2139
 and Müntzer 93
 Ninety-Five Theses 558, 1034, 1347, 1353,
 1355, 2139, 2830
Open Letter, An 2140
 and peasant rebels 2987
 Peasants' War 2830
 Reformation in England 514
 and Zwingli 3748
 Luther, Seth 2023
 Lutheranism 483, 515, 1185, 1301, 2513–14,
 3000, 3679
 Luthuli, Chief 2193, 3249
 Lüttwitz, Walther von 1364
 Lutze, Battle of 443
Luxembourg 2141–2
 Luxembourg Commission 401–2, 1244, 2765
Luxemburg, Rosa 2142–8, 2839
Accumulation of Capital, The 1649–50, 2144–5
 anarchism 98
 anarchosyndicalism 162
 and Bernstein 382, 2143, 3055
 bureaucratism 2244
 class consciousness 325
 on colonialism 1649–51
 council communism 162
Crisis in the German Social Democracy 2147
 death of 1253, 1363, 3056, 3148
 dialectics 2838
 dictatorship of the proletariat 98, 2147
 feudalism 1650, 2144
 freedom 2247
 German war loans 3722
 as influence 973, 3045
 and Jaurès 1913
 Jewish origins 1920
 Kautsky on 1664
 and Liebknecht 2117, 2147
 Marxism 1000, 2143–4, 2243–4
Mass Strike, Trade Union, and Political Party
 771, 2145–6, 2244
Reform or Revolution? 2143, 3055
 reformism 2243
 revolutionary-democratic socialism 2146–7
 on Russian communism 1146
 Second International 1756, 2889
 Spartacus League 3147–8
 Spartakusbund 1757, 2147
 on SPD 2084, 2142, 2144, 2145–6
 “Stagnation and Progress of Marxism” 2143
 Luz Cunha, Joaquim da 2729
 Luz y Fuerza 864, 865, 867
 Luzhenovskii, Gavriila N. 3153, 3552
 Luzon Island 2666, 2669
 Lynch, Kevin 2967
 Lynch, Liam 971, 1049, 1050
 lynching
 of African Americans 757, 1746, 2823, 3519
 Jim Crow era 16
 rape 756, 3519
 Sweden 2518
 Warsaw 2716
 Wells against 3518–20
 Lyndhurst, Lord 2720
 Lyon, Phyllis 2107
 Lyons, Clare A. 3016
 Lyons, Denis 793
 Lyons, Edith 3562
 Lyons suburban unrest 1645
 Lyotard, Jean-François 3062
 Lysenko, Trofim 2994
 Lyttelton Constitution 2269

 M3 road protests 1040, 1054, 2807
M-19 of Colombia 802, 1082, 2149–50, 2791
 M11 link road protest 1040, 2807
 M41 street party 1040, 2808–9
 Mabhida, Moses 3106
 Mabini, Apolinario 2669
 Mabo, Eddie 4–5
 Mac Diarmada, Sean 1046
 McAdam, D. 779, 2758–9
 Macandal, Black Messiah 1529
 Macao 2587, 2731, 2732
 Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria 2688
 MacArthur, Douglas 446, 1885, 1889, 1894,
 2673, 2675
 Macas, Luis 1059
 Macaulay, Thomas Babington 1406
 Macaulay, Zachary 210
 Macaya 1266, 3307
 MacBride, John 1416
 McCain, Franklin 739, 3186
 McCarthy, Eugene 1303, 2260
 McCarthy, J. D. 652, 779–80, 2758, 2759
 McCarthy, Joseph 1051, 3165
 McCarthyism
 blacklisted writers 2262
 communism 836
 and Hollywood Ten 1603
 Robeson 2847
 SWP 596
 Zinn on 73
 McClain, James 965
 McClellan, George 60, 66
 McClellan, Janet E. 1896–901, 1910–11,
 3489–90, 3709–11
 McClure, Nikki 2845
 McCook, Tommy 611
 McCormick, John 2039–41

- McCormick, Richard 1787
 McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. strike 2259
 McCoy, Chris 1482–3
 McCracken, Henry Joy 1794
 McCreesh, Raymond 2967
 MacCulloch, D. 1358
 McCullough, Michael F. 1259–61, 3037
 McCullough, Shellie K. 3740–3
 MacDonagh, Thomas 1046
 MacDonald, Alexander (MacIain) 1385–6
 McDonald, David 3100
 Macdonald, Dwight 158
 MacDonald, J. Ramsay 521, 522, 1328, 1683, 1749, 2039
 McDonald, Kevin 306
 McDonald's 1662, 1877–8
 Macdonalds of Glencoe 1385–6
 McDonnell, Donald 661
 McDonnell, J. P. 2027, 2028
 McDonnell, Joe 2967
 McDuffie, Arthur 3402
 Macedo, Rogério Fernandes 384, 3039
 Macedonia
 divided 1442
 military conflicts 223
 nationalism 1440, 1452
 Ottoman 1453
 Slavs 1442, 1455
 Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 1456
 McElwee, Thomas 2967
 Maceo, Antonio 911, 912, 920, 1562
 McFarland, James 1571
 McFarlane, James 3524
 McGee, Thomas D'Arcy 3680, 3681
 McGhee, Richard 2820
 McGill University 2786
 McGovern, George 3166
 McGowan, R. 200
 MacGregor, Catherine 1191
 MacGregor, Peter 107
 McGuinness, Martin 1798
 McGuinty, Dalton 2562
 McGuire, Peter J. 2026, 2028
 Mach, Ernst 2993
Machado, Gerardo
 popular Cuban anti-government struggle 915, 927, 2150–3
 women's movement 3571, 3598
 Machajski, Jan Waclaw 140
 Machcewicz, Pawel 2700
Machel, Samora 738, 1042, 1261, 1262, 2153–4, 2314, 3739
 Macheteros, Los 2771, 2773, 2843
 Machiavelli, Niccoló 2247
 The Prince 1424
 machine breaking 1040, 3211
 see also Luddism, machine breaking; sabotage
 Machoro, Eloi 2458
 Machsom Watch 1815
 Machu Picchu 1484
 McHugh, Edward 2820
 Macierewicz, Antoni 2696, 2698
 MacInnis, Angus 592
 Macintosh, Ebenezer 77
 McIntyre, James R. 792
Mackandal, François 2154–5
 McKay, Claude 22–3, 1554, 1555, 1556
Mackay, John Henry 2155
 McKee, Michael 2844–5
 McKenna, Bridget 2522
 Mackenzie, William Lyon 593, 594
 MacKenzie-Papineau battalion 7
 McKeown, Ciaran 2522
 McKinley, Dale T. 170–6
 McKinley, William F. 920, 1412, 1566, 2669
 McKinley Act 919
 MacKinnon, Catharine 124
 MacKinnon, Dolly 2999–3002
 MacKinnon, P. 591
 Mackintosh, William 1854
 McKissick, Floyd 869–70
 McLachlan, J. B. 588
 McLaughlin, James 902
 McLaughlin, Paul 333–7
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education 759
 McLellan, David 770, 3147
 McLogan, Paddy 1803
 McLuhan, Marshall 1461
 McMahan, William 3, 309
 Macmillan, Harold 947
 MacMillan Bloedel company 785
 McMurray, Matthew 1142–4
 McNabb, Vincent 634
 McNally, Leonard 1795
 McNamara, Robert 220, 223, 3480, 3482, 3493
 McNeil, Joseph 739, 3186
 Macoutism 1519
 see also tontons macoutes
 Macquarie, Lachlan 3492
 McQuillen, Colleen K. 2308–9
 McQuilton, John 1943–5
 McShane, Harry 3383
 McShine, Kynaston 1483
 McSwiney, Terence 1048
 Macune, Charles 2727, 2728
 McWhirter, Martha 3419
Madagascar 2156–7
 French rule 1249–50

- planters killed 2156
 Senegalese troops 1250
 Madari, Ayatollah Shariat 1770
 Maddern, Stacy Warner 39–40, 69–70, 190–1,
 241–2, 362–4, 445–6, 898–9, 899–902,
 953–4, 974–5, 1206–7, 1428–9, 1563–6,
 1570–2, 1946–7, 1977–9, 2477–8,
 2488–90, 2569–71, 2753–5, 2777–8,
 3040–1, 3670–1
 Madeira 186
Madera Uprising, Chihuahua 2157–8
Madero, Francisco 998, 2158, 2162, 2275
 Chihuahua region 2277
 coming to power 2539
 and Huerta 3489
 Mexican Revolution 2276–7
 and Zapata 3710
 Madhesi population 231, 2438
 Madisha, Willie 3108
 Madison, James 765, 1301, 3416, 3666
 Madox, John 1073
 Madras army 1685–6, 1687
 Madras Forest Act 2802
Madres de la Plaza de Mayo 105, 255,
 1085, 1428, 2158–60, 3598
 non-violence 2500
 police brutality 2500–1
 Madrid 1132, 3133
 Madrid, Conference of 2335
 Madrid Peace Conference 1815
 Madrid Treaty, Brazil 3008
 Madsen, D. 650
 Madumarov, Adahan 3330
 Maffeo, Lois 2845
Mafia 2160–1
 Mafutsanyana, E. T. 3087
 Magaia, Filipe 2153
 Magalhães, Gonçalo Jorge de 562
 Magan, Tony 1803
 Magdalena massacre 1320
 Magdoff, Harry 1649, 2249
 Magee, Ruchell 965
 Magellan, Ferdinand 2303, 2304, 2664
 Maghrebi Union Treaty 2338
MAGIN 3571–2
 Magloire, Paul 1518
 Magón, Enrique Flores 158, 2541
Magón, Ricardo Flores 158, 1736, 2161–3
 against Díaz 137, 2276
 influences on 2161–2
Magonistas 1736, 2161–3, 2279
 Magri, Lucio 2196, 2870
 Magsaysay, Ramon 1615
 Maguga, Prince 3207
 Maguire, Mairead Corrigan 2521–2
 Maguire, Tom 1803
 Magyars
 and Croats 1149
 Hungary 1142
 independence claims 1920
 language 3051
 Transylvania 2862
 uprising against 1620–1
 Mahabad Republic 353
Mahachon (the Masses) 3258
 Mahad *Satyagraha* 54
 Mahajan, Meher Chand 1931, 1932
 Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) 1494, 2052
 Maharaj, Mac 3107
 Maharaj, Sahu 955
 Maharashtra 1697, 1699, 1707
 Maharero, Samuel 2390, 2391, 2392, 2396
 Mahasabha 2433
 Mahdi, Mohammad Ahmed al- 51, 3191
 Mahdi, Sadiq al- 3191
 Mahdi al-Senussi, Sayyid Muhammed al- 51
Mahdist Revolt 2163–5, 3198
 Anglo-Egyptian invasion 3192, 3396
 Sudan 2163, 3369
 Mahendra, of Nepal 2442
 Maher, Ali 1070
 Mahila Atma Raksha Samity (MARS) 645, 3586
 Mahila Dakshata Samiti (Women's Capability
 Society) 3588, 3589
 Mahila Mukti Morcha 3590
 Mahila Samta Sainik Dal (League of Soldiers
 for Women's Equality) 3588
 Mahir, Ali 1078
 Mahmud II 2366, 3358
 Mahmut II, emperor 3346
 Mahuad, Jamil 1067
 Maier, Wendy 1303–5
 Mailer, Norman 73
 USS *Maine* 920
 Maintenance of Order Law 3359, 3360
 Mainwaring, William 546
 Maistre, Joseph de 886, 1228
Maitan, Livio 245, 2165, 2250
 Maitree network 3588
 Majhi, Domon 2970
 Maji-Maji Revolt 3253–4
Majles (legislative assembly) 1963
 Majno, Ersilia 3592
 Majongwe, Raymond 3733
 Major, John 1039
 Makabeni, Gana 833
 Makarios III, Archbishop 945, 946, 947
 Make Poverty History (MPH) 1312, 1402–3
 Makeba, Miriam 613
 Makhkamov, Khakhar 3245

- Makhno, Nestor** 98, 100, 143, 1970, 2003, 2165–8
 anarchism and influences 2166
 leadership 2167
 and Malatesta 2170
- Maki referendum 192–3
- Makinson, Lista 595
- Maklakov, V. 2892
- Makombe-nguruve dynasty 699
- Makonen, Endalkachew 1135
- Makronisos military camp 1439, 1445
- Malabar 2317
- Malabarba, Gigi 1310
- Malabari, Behramji 1696
- Malagasy nationalism 1249, 1250, 2156
- Malaita Eagles 3081
- Malatesta, Errico** 2168–71
 as anarchist-socialist 2169
 anarchocommunist 98, 2169, 2170
 Ancona meeting 102, 130
 and Bakunin 129, 336
 ca'canny 2170
 and Fanelli 1161
 against fascism 2169
 fleeing to England 3015
Fra Contadini 2170
 Galleani on 1322, 2169
 and Goldman 1411
 and Kropotkin 2170
 and Mussolini 2170
 and Pisacane 2692
 propaganda by the deed 2169
 return from exile 385
 Villa Rossa meeting 3015
- Malato, Charles** 121, 1124, 2171–2
- Malaviya, Madan Mohan 1327, 1583, 1681
- Malawi** 2172–6
see also Nyasaland
- Malawi Congress Party (MCP) 2176
- Malawi News* 2176
- Malay language 1727–8
- Malay Nationalist Party 3269
- Malay Peninsula 1718
- Malay States 2176
- Malaya
 anti-colonialism 3269
 Fijian soldiers 1197
 as jewel in crown 2178
 Muslims 3266–8
 Thailand 3265
see also Malaysia; Patani Malay nationalism
- Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino (MPKP) 2677
- Malaysia**
 Chinese immigrants 2177
 ethnicities 2177
 globalization crisis 1430
hartals 2178
 and Philippines 2330
 protest and revolt 2176–9
see also Malaya
- Malcher, Felix 561
- Malcolm X** 73, 220–1, 348, 394, 964, 2179–81
 armed resistance 3373
 assassinated 2181
 Black Power 398, 750
 Carmichael 613
 and Castro 2180
 charisma 653
 on Kennedy's assassination 2180
 Message to Grassroots 395
 NOI 746, 764
 OAAU 395, 2181
 Pan-Africanism 395
 racism 2179–80
 RAM 2840
- Malenkov, Georgy 2866
- Mali** 1252, 2181–2
- Mali Federation 3006
- Malig, Mary Lou 3644–8, 3650–4
- Malik, Abdel 2333
- Malik, Adam 1725
- Malik, Yasin 1934
- Maliki, Adnan al- 3223
- Malinowski, Bronislaw 1953
- Malle, Louis 1237
- Malleson, G. B. 1686
- Malmö Truce 2985
- Malraux, André 2381
- Malta**
 Bonaparte 2184–5
 British rule 2185–7
 Catholic Church 2185–6
 European Union 2187
 French rule 2184–5
 Hospitaller Era 2183–4
 Labor Party 2187
 Language Question 2185–6
 Marriage Question 2186
 Muslim slaves 2184
 protest and revolution 2182–7
Sei Maggio (May 6) 2186
Sette Giugno (June 7) 2186
 World War II 2186–7
- Maltby Main Colliery 3062
- Malthus, Thomas 2008
- Maluleke, Josiah 3730
- Malunge, Prince 3205
- Mamaloni, Solomon 3081
- Mamarchov, G. 539

- Mameluks 2365
Mamoon, Muntassir 344–8, 368–72, 1711–13, 2573–9
Managers' Union Tokyo 1876
Manahan, Jacinto 2672
Manasa Devi goddess 955
Manchester, Thomas 2077
Manchester Anti-Corn Law Association 176
Manchester Yeomanry 2662
Manchu rule, crises of 719, 722, 734–5, 2309, 2781, 3200, 3201
Manchuria Invasion 1896
Manchurian Incident 134, 1926
mancomunales (resistance groups) 112, 691
Mancotal 638
Mandalay 549
Mandel, David 2878–89, 2889–902, 2902–20, 2920–7, 2928–40, 2940–5, 3115–28, 3506–12
Mandel, Ernest 245, 2187–9
class struggle 2188
revolutionary Marxism 2250
translated 2165
works 2187–8
Mandela, Nelson 2189–96
Abdurahman honored 2
African nationalism 3084, 3086
ANC 171, 1940, 2111, 2189
in ANC Youth League 3087
anti-apartheid 2503
arrested and imprisoned 172, 2193, 2358, 3088, 3106
HIV/AIDS protests 3312
on Iraq war 227
neoliberalism 3110
as president 2194, 2195
and SACP 2193
and Slovo 3053
and Tambo 2190, 2194
Mandela, Winnie Madikizela 2193
Mandume, Ovambo chief 2395
Mane, Ansumane 1493
Maneiro, Alfred 665, 3445
Manganga people 2174
Mangano, Attilio 2621–3
Mangonès, Albert 1536
Manhattan Project 193
Manifest Destiny concept 2022
Manifeste de Seize 2172
Manifeste des 343 3575
Manifesto, II 1837, 2196, 2870
Manifesto of the 121 226
Manifesto de Timanaku 1937
Manigat, Leslie 1506, 1509
Manila-Americans 2670
Manila protest 1397
Manin, Daniele 1826
Manipoud, Louis 576
Manitoba province 584
Manley, Michael 1864, 2196–8
Manley, Norman Washington 1859, 1867, 2196–7
Mann, Tom 149, 518
Mannarino, Gaetano 2184
Manner, Kullervo 1202
Mannerheim, Carl Gustaf Emil 1202
Manning, Patrick 3320
Mano Negra (Black Hand) 145
Manso de Velasco, José Antonio 1923
Mansour, Ahmed el- 2333
Mansur, Hassan Ali 1770
Mantashe, Gwede 3108
Mantegazza, Laura Solera 3592
Mantegna, Andrea 1484
Manto, Abid Hassan 2583
Mäntsälä, Mutiny of 2519
Mantuanos oligarchy 3456, 3458
Manuel, George 584
Manuel II, of Portugal 188, 2730
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Movement (MPMR):
see Frente Patrioco Manuel Rodriguez
(FPMR)
Manufahi War 1042
Manuitt, Elias 3443
Manukian, Dashnak Aram 287
manumission 213
Manumission Act 1319
Manz, Felix 92
Manzanas, Melitón 182
Manzaneda, Juan de 163
Mao Zedong 2199–205
Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society 724
Chen Duxiu 674, 676
Cultural Revolution 710, 985, 2204–5, 2995–6, 3725
death of 984, 2205
Great Leap Forward 709–10, 986–7, 2203–4, 3725
Jiangxi Soviet 2201
Li Lisan 2114
Little Red Book 2121, 2204
Long March 2201–2
Lu Xun 2132
Marxism 2249
May 4th movement 2200
peasant uprisings 113
Red Army 2201–2
Red Guards 2204
resignation, forced 2204
and Soviet Union 1215–16

- Mao Zedong** (*cont'd*)
 on Stalin 705
 on Taiping Rebellion 3234
 Tibet 3291
 and Wang 3506
 Yenan Period 2202
- Maoism**
 April Revolution 230
 Australia 317
 Ecuador 1058
 India 2421, 2423–5
 Nepal People's War 2437–41
see also Naxalite movement
- Maoist Communist Center (MCC) 2423
- Maoris**
 assimilation 2206
 indigenous resistance 2205–9
 land purchases from 2206
 land rights 2208, 3155–6
- MAPU Lautaro 687
- Mapuche Indian resistance** 2209–10
see also Lautaro
maquiladora zone 2293
Maquis 146, 180, 872, 1240–1
 MAR guerillas 563
 Mara, Ratu Kamisese 1197, 1198, 1199
 Marable, M. 396, 772, 774
 Maradona, Diego 3658
 Maraj, Ralph 3320
- Marat, Jean-Paul** 1276, 1281, 2210–12
Ami du peuple, L' 2211, 2848
 and Brissot 506
Chains of Slavery 2210
Découvertes de M. Marat sur le feu 2211
 Jacobin Republic 2211
Offrande à la Patrie 2211
 and Robespierre 1289, 2848
 on *sans-culottes* 2969
 science 2990–1
 stabbed 894, 1296, 2212
- Maravall, José Antonio 845
 Marburg Colloquy 1358, 3748
 Marcantonio, Vito 841
- March Against Corporate Globalization and Militarization 3647
- March Against Hunger, Unemployment, and Repression 263
- March Against Poverty 2561
 March Days 1620
 March of the Beurs 1645
 March of the Blanketeers 3281
 March for Democracy 2538
 March of the Hungry 3352
 March of Silence 866, 1320
 March for Social Justice 2809
- March of Torches 1320
 March 1st Organization (OPM) 2606
 Marchais, Georges 825
 Marchand, Captain 883
 Marchand, Len 584
 Marchant, William Sydney 308
 Marches of Resistance 2159, 2160
 Marcos, Ferdinand 1723, 2327, 2330, 2506, 2678–9, 2682–3, 3717
 anti-capitalism 3719
 Marcos, Imelda 2679
- Marcos, Subcomandante** 1122, 1739, 2212–13, 2284, 2293, 3712, 3714
- Marcus of the Woods 2075
- Marcuse, Herbert** 2213–15
Aesthetic Dimension, The 2215
Counterrevolution and Revolt 2215
Eros and Civilization 907, 1256, 2214
Essay on Liberation 2215
 Frankfurt School 904, 1253, 1254, 1256, 2213
 on Freud 2214
Hegel's Ontology 2214
 Marxism 2249
One-Dimensional Man 907, 2214
Praxis 3689
Reason and Revolution 1256, 2214, 2838
 “Repressive Tolerance” 2214
Soviet Marxism 907, 2214
 at University of California 964
 works 1256–7, 2214
- Mardi Gras, Sydney 2097–8
 Marek, Franz 770
- Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) 2111
- Marengo, Battle of 442
 Marengo, Jacob 2393
 Margai, Milton 3031
 Margaritis, George 1439–51
 Margarot, Maurice 2366
 Marginalist School 321, 355
 Margo Commission of Inquiry 2154
 Marguerite, Bernard 2706
 Maria I, of Portugal 187
 Maria II, of Portugal 188
 María Lionza cult 3452
 Maria Theresa, Empress 1143
 Mariani, María Isabel Chorobik de 255
- Marianne revolutionary icon** 2215–16
- Mariátegui, José Carlos** 48, 414, 2217–19, 2249, 2649
- Marie Adélaïde 2141
 Marie Antoinette 1208, 1421
 Marie Louise of Austria 443
Marighella, Carlos 472, 2219–20

- Marik, Soma 92–3, 645–6, 999–1001, 1100–6,
1106–9, 1283–7, 1287–92, 1708–11,
2118–20, 2388–9, 2847–51, 3424–5, 3536–8,
3550–5, 3586–90, 3606–9
- marimba 637
- Marin, Craig 294–7
- Marin, Maria 2755
- Marín, Pedro Antonio 1168
- Marin, Raul 2598
- Marin County Courthouse plot 965
- Marine Transport Workers (MTW)** 1752–5
- Mariño, Santiago 3457, 3458
- Marion, Francis 85
- Maripe, Knight** 456, 2220–2
- Maritime Worker Federation (FOM) 247
- Marivault, Bishop 1269
- Marker, Chris 1237
- Markezinis, Spyros 1435
- Markievicz, Constance 1046, 1049
- Markoff, John 1285
- Markov, Georgi 538
- Markovic, Ante 224
- Marković, Mihailo 3690
- Marks, J. B.** 171, 832, 2222–3, 3093
- Marlborough, Duke of 1405
- Marlborough Conference 3317
- Marley, Bob 1860, 1864
- Mármol, Miguel** 2223–4
- Marof, Tristán 428, 432
- Marongoni, Guido 1747
- Maronites 1577, 2069, 2070
- Maroon resistance 1269
- Dutch Caribbean 1031, 1032
 - founding communities 212
 - Haiti 1536–7
 - Hispaniola 2079–80
 - Jamaica 88, 201, 1868
 - Mackandal 2154–5
 - music 612
 - Palmares 2586–9, 3745
 - Queen Nanny 2788–90
 - Saint-Domingue 1263, 1546
 - USA 88
 - Venezuela 3451–2
 - Windward Maroons 2788
- Marquetalia massacre 1167
- Marquez, Pompeyo 3443, 3445, 3446
- Marrakech 2333, 2336
- Marrast, Armand 1243
- marriage
- age of consent 1696, 1774
 - anarchism 123
 - child-marriage 1324, 1583
 - complex 2560
 - Enlightenment 1110
 - Goldman on 1411
 - Gouges 1421
 - Icaria Community 1639
 - Iran 1774
 - post-French Revolution 1297
 - Quakers 1107
 - radical sects 1107
 - same-sex 2094, 2097, 2100
 - Soviet Union 3608, 3609
 - Winstanley 3537–8
 - women's property rights 3564, 3566–7, 3613,
3619
 - see also* divorce
- marriage counseling 1586
- Married Women's Property Acts 3566–7
- marronage* 1269, 3583
- see also* Maroon resistance
- Marroquín, Manuel 806–7
- Mars, Perry 1856–7
- Marsden, Dora 116
- Marseillaise* 2380
- Marshall, Burke 744
- Marshall, George 1039
- Marshall, George C. 1320, 3726
- Marshall, P. H. 1410
- Marshall Islands** 199, 2303
- Marshall Plan 838
- Albania 31
 - Greece 1438
 - Italy 1834
 - Korea 304
 - Netherlands 2447
 - Turkey 3365
- Marsilli, Maria N. 3337–9
- Marson, Una 3559
- Marston Moor, Battle of 909, 1098, 2118
- Martello, Il* 130
- Marten, Henry 1101
- Martí, Farabundo** 1163, 2224–6, 2956, 2966
- see also* Farabundo Martí National Liberation
Front
- Martí y Pérez, José Julián** 2226–7
- anti-racism 912
 - Bolivarianism 414, 650
 - death of 920, 2227
 - Guantanamo* 2227
 - Hatuey Regiment 1562
 - independence war 926
 - influence on Castro 1486
 - Modernismo 2312
 - Partido Revolucionario Cubano 2226–7
 - in USA 919
- Martin, Del 2107
- Martin, Henri 225–6
- Martin, James 861

- Martin, John B. 1019
 Martin, Nathan James 1495–7
 Martin V, Pope 2829
 Martineau, Harriet 3566
 Martinez, Antonio 474
 Martínez, Boris 3304
 Martínez, Maximiliano Hernández 2956
 Martínez Campos, Arsenio 918
 Martínez de Hoz, Alfredo 251
 Martínez de Rozas, Juan 2555
 Martínez Soriano, Felipe 2285
 Martínez Verdugo, Arnaldo 2285
 Martinique
 British invasion 1264
 Fanon 1162
 French rule 1270
 Négritude writers 1162
 revolt 1263
 Martino, Mario 2108
 Martone, Eric 1847–8, 2851–2
 Martone, Nicole 514–17, 1610–11, 1847–8
 Martov, Julius
 and Trotsky 3321
Martov, Julius 2227–8, 2694
 Mensheviks 979, 2082, 2227
 Second International 2889
 martyrdom
 African Americans 3460
 Cercado 1015
 Cuban 1561
 ETA 1129
 Germany 2982
 Guevara 1216
 Haymarket 2030
 Hezbollah 1576
 Iranian 1770
 Iraqi communists 2955
 Irish 994, 1047, 1089, 1203, 2967, 3043, 3302
 Korean 1984
 Nepal 2441
 Nicaraguan 2467
 Pakistan 2578
 Scottish 2366
 South African 2801
 Tai Ping rebels 717
 Tolpuddle 3300–1
 Wales 3499
 Martyrs' Day 2578
 Martyrs of Arad 1620
 Martyrs of Cercado 1015
 Marulanda, Manuel (Tirofijo) 409, 1168
 Marwa, Mallam Muhammed 2483
Marx, Eleanor 2228–9, 2230, 2243, 3061
Marx, Karl 2229–39
 and Bakunin 96, 333–4, 335, 1744
 capitalism 1664–5
 Civil War in France, The 1000, 1755, 2236, 2612
 class identity 765
 class struggle 783, 1912, 2231–4
 Class Struggle in France 887, 1234, 1242
 commodity fetishism 973
 communism 2837
 and Comte 842
 Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 2231–2
 on Crimean War 1452
 Critique of the Gotha Program 2237
 and Debord 973
 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 2238, 2837, 2838
 Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 440, 770, 887, 1080, 1152, 1232, 2231
 and Engels 2230–1, 2238–9
 Ethnological Notebooks 2238
 German Ideology 2238, 3679
 Grundrisse 1842, 1843, 2238
 and Herzen 1575
 historical materialism 622, 2231–4
 Holy Family, The 3679
 influence in China 2200
 influence in Japan 1910
 influence in USA 2025, 2028
 IWA 2026
 Kapital, Das 355, 504, 766, 1423, 1647, 2026, 2144, 2232–4, 2238, 2451, 2837
 labor theory of value 2233
 on Louis-Napoleon 440
 on *Northern Star* 2549
 on Paris Commune 2236–7, 2612–13
 Polish liberation 2701
 Poverty of Philosophy 2231
 proletariat 778
 and Proudhon 2763–4
 religion 3679
 on revolution 776, 2759, 2760
 Silesia 3036
 Spartacus as hero 3146, 3147
 surplus value 2233
 Taiping Rebellion 3235
 Theories of Surplus-Value 2238
 Value, Price and Profit 2236
 Wage-Labor and Capital 2235
 workers' struggle 1749
 see also Communist Manifesto; Marxism
 Marx–Engels Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe 1253
 Marx-Studien 1581, 1582
Marxism 2239–51
 Asian 730

- autonomous 2306–7
 Britain 108
 bureaucracy 2242–4
 China 723, 730
 class struggle 768
 on French Revolution 1283
 Guzman 2658
 Indian 3588
 Kautsky on 1664–5
 Lenin 2089, 2244–7
 Luxemburg 2143–4
 Martov 2227
 Orthodox 1664–5, 2084, 2244, 2694
 poststructuralism 972
 reformism 2242–4
 revolutionary 2240, 2241–2, 2250, 3059–60
 Russian 975–9, 2924, 3720
 sabotage 144
 science 2992–3
 scope of 2240–1
 variants 2239, 2249–50, 3265
 Yugoslavia 3689–90, 3692
 Marxism-Leninism 2010, 3156
 Marxist humanism 1027
 Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Colombia
 (PCC-ML) 1120, 2791
 Marxist-Leninist Party of the Philippines
 (MLMPP) 2686
 Mary I, Tudor 515, 516, 1094–5
 Mary II of Orange 1405
 Mary of Guise 3001
 Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots 517, 1095, 3000
 Maryknoll Society 2058, 2061
 Marzani, Carl 1427
 MAS: *see* Movimiento Al Socialismo
 Masaliyev, Absamat 3329
 Masang Treaty 1719
Masaryk Garrigue, Tomas 1595, 2251–2
 Mascara Roja 3717
 Mascarenhas Monteiro, António 603
 Masetti, Augusto 3014
 Mashaal, Khaled 1550
 Mashayamombe 703
 Masina Ruu 3081
 Masindi, Battle of 3369
 Masire 460
 Mason, Charlotte Osgood 1555
 Mason, George W. 149
 Masoud, Ahmed Shah 3246
 mass politics 1742–9
 Massachusetts Government Act 78
 Massacre 68 2063
 Massari, Edoardo 132
Masses, The 1051, 2252–3, 2825
Masses and Mainstream 2253
 Massieu Helguera, Wilfrido 3296
 Massin, Jean 2210
 Masters and Servants Act 2075, 2077, 2197, 3734
 Mas'ud, 'Abdullah 1159
 Masunungure, Eldred 3731, 3732
 MASYUMI Party 1730
 Matabele 698, 702, 3734
 Matabeleland 701, 3737
 Matante, Philip 459
Matanza, La: see La Matanza Peasant Revolt
 Matanzima, Kaiser 3088
Match!, The 159
 matchgirls' strike 3061
 Materka, Edyta V. 3497, 3544–5
 Maternity Allowance 3592, 3652
 maternity leave 3633
 Mathenge, Stanley 2255
 Matheu, Pierre 2785
 Mathiez, Albert 1283, 2249
 Mathura Rape Case 3589
 Matiba, Kenneth 1948, 1950, 1951
 Matignon Agreement 824, 825, 2459
 Matin, Abdul 2577
Matka Polka stereotype 3557
 Matles, James 2036
 Matni, Nassib al- 2069
 Matombo, Lovemore 3733
 Matos, Huber 626, 924, 934, 1489
 Matsuoka, K. 1892
 Matswa, André 853, 1251
Mattachine Review 2107
 Mattachine Society 2093, 2106–7
 Mattei, Héctor 102
 Matteotti, Giacomo 1176, 2871, 2960, 3341
 Matthaei, J. 2621
 Matthews, Herbert 624
 Matthews, Tom 3091
 Matthias, Prophet 3327
 Matthijs, Jan 93, 2831
 Mattina, Anne F. 502–4, 2130–1, 2623–4,
 3313–14
 Matzpen (Compos) 1812
Mau Mau Rebellion 220, 1155, 1954, 2253–7,
 2269, 2690, 3371
 Maududi, Sayyid Abul A'la 1810
 Maudit, Chevalier 1526
 Maugard, Adolfo Best 2375
 Maugée, Aristide 2428
 Maung Gyi, U 552, 553, 2980
 Maung Maung, U 303, 553, 555
 Maurer, James 2029
 Mauriac, François 2449
 Maurice, Frederick Denison 3061
 Maurice of Nassau 1035
Maurín, Joaquín 2257–8, 2737

- Maurin, Peter 634, 968, 2489, 3420
 Mauritius 455, 3110
 Mauroy, Pierre 825
 Maurras, Charles 888
 Mauthner, Fritz 2048
Mavo group 116
 Max of Baden, Prince 1361
 Maxeke, Charlotte 3603
 Maximilian I 844, 1034
 Maximum, Law of the 1243, 1277–8, 1291
 Maxwell, Alexander 1619–22
 Maxwell, John 1046
 Maxwell, Reginald 2793
 May, Todd 979
May Day 2258–60
 anarchism 158
 Argentina 103, 266–7
 Brazil 497
 Great Depression 2259
 immigrant protests 1642
 Iran 1773
 Japan 1893
 Loyalty Day, US 2259
 Mexico 2292
 Ohio 836
 working-class solidarity 1570
May Day Manifesto 3283
 May First Movement 2681
May 4th movement 712–14, 723, 1116, 2995, 3235
 anarchism 114
 Beijing University 3179
 Chen 675
 Mao 2200
 student protest 719
 70th anniversary 3286
 and Tiananmen Square protest 3284
 May Movement 942
May 1968
 French students 323, **2260–4**
 revolutionary legacy 1234–5
 worldwide youth protest 1236
 May 7 Schools 711
 May 30 Incident 720, 724–5, 2201
 Mayakovsky, Vladimir 327
 Mayans
 caste war 620–1
 EZLN 481, 3719
 involvement in Guatemala 1472–3, 1478
 music 637
 peasant massacres 2289
 Quezaltenango 3255
 MayDay Parade 1147
 Mayegun Society 24
Mayekiso, Moses 174, 2264–5, 3096, 3106
- Mayer, Arno J. 2167
 Maynard, Fred 307
 Mayorga, Silvio 447, 1205, 2467, 2468, 2964
 Mazarin, Jules 1303–4
 Mazdoor Jeddojuhd (Workers' Struggle) 2584
 Maze prison dirty protests 2967
 Mazower, M. 1183
 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz 3077
 Mazrik Kurdish tribe 286
 Mazrui, Ali 2532
Mazumdar, Charu 2265–6, 2422, 2423
Mazzini, Giuseppe 2266–8
 Duties of Man 10
 Fuller 1306
 as influence 2871, 2960
 liberal internationalism 1744
 Paris Commune 2168
 Pisacane on 2691
 and Pius IX 1149
 Risorgimento 1332, 1824
 Young Italy 1332, 1825
 Mbeki, Govan 3086, 3104
 Mbeki, Thabo 876, 2195, 3108, 3110, 3112
 Mbida, Andre-Marie 1251
Mboya, Tom 2268–70, 2691
MBR-200: see Movimiento Bolivariano
 Revolucionario-200
 MC5 2777, 2778
 Mda, A. P. 2191
 Me Trinh Dinh Thao 3484
 Mead, Mary 3529
 Meagher, Thomas Francis 3680, 3681
 Mealmaker, George 3395
 Means, Russell 2416, 2417
 means testing 523–5, 3382
 Meany, George 2037, 2038
 Meat Inspection Act 3040
 mechanical philosophy 2989
 Mečlar, Vladimír 811, 812, 814, 3021, 3377, 3435
Medan Priyayi 1728
 Medellín conference 2059, 2060, 2061
 Medellín documents 2059
 Medical Silicosis Bureau 1087
 medical students 274
 Medici, Catherine de 2950
 Medina, Manuel 2642
 Medrano, Florencio 2284
 Medrano, José 2956
 Medvedev, Roy 3163
 Medvedev, Sergei 3030
 Meeks, Brian 1462–6
 Meerut Conspiracy Case 449, 961, 1922, 3229
 Meerut garrison 1686–7
 Mega-Bintang alliance 1725–6
 Megawati Sukarnoputri 1726

- Mehenni, Ferhat 1928
 Meherali, Yusuf 1683
 Mehmed, Delibash 3357
 Mehmet Ali: *see* Muhammad 'Ali
 Mehmet V, of Turkey 3348
 Mehring, Franz 2243, 3147
 German war loans 3722
 Mehta, Brinda 3579
 Mehta, Usha 2793
 Meiji Civil Code 3594
 Meiji Restoration 1896, 1897
Meilidao (Formosa) 2270, 2271, 3237
Meilidao protests 2270–1
Mein Kampf 1375, 1590, 2271–2
 Meinhof, Ulrike 1368
 Meir, Golda 1813
 Meira Paibi 3590
 Mejía Godoy, Carlos 638, 640
 Mejía Godoy, Luis Enrique 638
 Mekenye, R. O. 2110
 Mekong Delta 3481
 Mekunnu Parapo (Association of Poor People) 24
 Melbourne 1457, 2636
 Melbourne Anarchist Club (MAC) 105
 Melchiorites 93
 Meléndez, Jorge 2225
 Meli, Francis 3086
 Melkonian, Monte 284
 Mella, Julio Antonio 2151, 2152, 2249
 Melliet, Leo 2820
 Mellingen, peace of 3213
 Melo, Antônio 3745
 Meltzer, Albert 108
 Melville, Thomas 2061, 3303
 Memminger Peasant Parliament 1354, 1357
 Mena, Máximo 867
 Menalamba revolt 1249
Menchú, Rigoberta 1480, 2272–3
 Menchú, Vicente 1480
 Mendana y Neyra, Alvaro de 3080
 Mendel, Gregor 2994
 Menderes, Adnan 3350, 3364, 3365
Mendes, Chico 2273–4
 Mendes Filho, Francisco Alves: *see* Mendes, Chico
 Mendès-France, Pierre 226, 1248, 1249, 3335, 3473, 3474
 Mendes Maciel, Antônio Vicente: *see* Antônio Conselheiro
 Mendez, Luis 618
 Méndez Fleitas, Epifanio 2604, 2605
 Mendieta, Colonel 915
 Mendiola, Battle of 2677
 Mendive, Rafael María 2226
 Mendoza, Eugenio 3451
 Mendoza, Felipe 2672
 Mendoza, José Antonio de 1923
 Menelik, Emeror 1132
 Menem, Carlos Saúl 256, 262, 267, 269, 1580, 2159, 2347, 3407
 Menezes, Fradique de 2972
 Menezes, Gilson 499
 Meng Qingshu 3505
 Mengin, F. 1075
 Mengistu Haile Mariam 1137
 Ménil, René 2428
 Mennonites 93, 201, 1633, 2491
 Menocal, Mario 2150
 Menominee Warrior Society 2413, 2415
 Menon, V. K. Krishna 2435
 Menon, V. P. 1922
 Men's League for Women's Suffrage 1051
 Mensalão Scandal 3038
 Menser, Michael 736, 2619–21, 3027–8
 Menshevik-Internationalists 2892, 2918, 2928
 and CEC 2929
 Constituent Assembly 2931
 workers' control 2906–7
 Mensheviks
 and Bolsheviks 437, 2228, 2887, 2926
 dual power 2902
 and Left Social Revolutionaries 3058
 Martov 979, 2082, 2227
 Party Dictatorship 2937
 and Trudoviks 2892
 and workers 2893
 Zasulich 3720
 mentally handicapped 1179
 Menzel, Jiří 949
 mercantilism 76
 MERCOSUR 871, 3658
Meredith, James 743, 2275
 Meredith March 2275
 Méricourt, Théroigne de 1294
 Merina Island Kingdom 1249
 Merino, Admiral 683
 Merkel, Ina 3580
 Merkouri, Melina 1433
 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 356, 2839
 Meron, Theodor 1817
 Merritt College 398
 Mers-el-Kebir attack 1239–40
 Merthyr Riots 3499–500
 Merton, Thomas 605
 Mesa Gisbert, Carlos 433, 434–5, 787, 789
 Meslier, Jean 1113
mesocratismo (populist movement) 692
 Mesquita, Carlos Frederico de 468
 Mesters, Carlos 478
 Mestre, Ricardo 138

- Meszmann, Tibor T. 2707–10
 Metafas, Petros 1220–2
 Metal Allied Workers' Union (MAWU) 2264, 3095, 3096
 metal workers 251, 1751
 metalworkers' union (KOVO) 2744, 2745
 Metaxas, Ioannis 1443, 1453, 3220
 Métayer, Butteur 1508
Methodism 202, 3520–1
 Methodist Episcopal Church 695
 Methodius, Saint 3050
 Methuen, Treaty of 484
 Métis struggle 2841–2
Metropolitan Magazine 2825
 Metropolitan Museum of Art 1483
 Metropolitan Political Collective (CPM): *see* Red Brigades
 Mett, A. 2004
 Metternich, Klemens von 189, 558, 896, 1143, 1149, 1347, 1619, 1744, 1825
 Metz, Christian 52
 Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC) 3645
 Mexican Americans 1170
 Mexican Anarchist Federation 138
 Mexican General Union of Farmers and Peasants (UGOCM) 2157
 Mexican Indians 1578
 Mexican Labor Party (PLM) 619
 Mexican Railroad Workers' Union (STFRM) 2295–6, 2298
Mexican Revolution 2275–82
 anarchists 138
 Batallones Rojos (Red Battalions) 2279, 2280
 Cárdenas 606
 Carranza 1217
 de la Huerta 2277
 Díaz 2276
 economy of 2280
 Haya de la Torre 1567
 influence on Sandino 2965
 Madero 2158
 Magonists 2161–2
 muralism 2375
 US intervention 1217
 Velázquez 3431
 Villa 1217, 3489
 women soldiers 2277
 see also Villa, Francisco Pancho; Zapata, Emiliano
 Mexican Revolutionary Party 2542
Mexican student movement 3296–8, 3297, 3378–9
 Mexican Teachers' Union (SNTE) 2291, 2294, 2296, 2298
 Mexican Union Front (FSM) 2294
 Mexican Union of Electrical Workers (SME) 2294
 Mexican Workers' and Peasants' Party (PO-CM) 2296, 2298
 Mexican Workers' Party (PMT) 2291
Mexico 2282–99
 agrarian reform program 2282
 anarchism 97, 137–9
 armed political movements 2282–6
 capitalism 2280
 Catholic Church 2281
 copper industry 137
 Cristero uprising 902–3
 currency devaluation 2296
 debt crisis 2292
 Dirty War 2022, 2157, 2282
 disappeared 2288
 earthquake 2292
 Global Day of Action 1389
 indigenous and peasant struggles 2286–90, 2294–5, 3709
 intellectuals 1924
 Jesuits 1578
 labor code 138
 labor movement and protests 2290–5
 land reforms 2281
 massacres 2291, 2298
 May Day 2262, 2292
 muralism 2374–6
 national identity 2374, 2376
 native population declining 1655
 oil industry 606
 poverty 1395, 1396, 2286–7
 privatization 2292–3
 railway workers' struggle 2295–7
 soldaderas 2278, 3016–17
 state-owned sector 2297
 student movements and protests 2262, 2291, 3169, 3296–8, 3297, 3378–9
 teachers 2291, 2294, 2296, 2298
 trade unions and worker struggles 2294, 2297–9
 US war 55
 working hours 619
 World Bank study 2287
 WTO 2294
 Mexico accord 1166
 Mexico City 2286, 2292, 2733
 Meyer, Alfred G. 2089
 Mezzadra, Sandro 1841–5
 Mhanda, Wilfred 3739, 3740
 Mhlaba, Raymond 3104
 Miami Pact 931
 Miami Rebellion 3402
 Miami Showband attack 1797

- Miami Summit 3655
 Miao Revolt 715
 Miao tribe 3231
Michael Collins (film) 794
 Michael of Portugal 188
Michel, Louise 123, 2299–300
 exiled 97, 2457
 Paris Commune 2611, 2612
 Michelet, Jules 1232
 Michelini, Zelmar 3409
 Michels, Robert 1743, 2171, 2244
 Michigan University 222
 Michna, Amram 1814
Michnik, Adam 2013, 2301–3, 2695, 2705–6
 on late 1960s 2705
 works 2301
 Mickiewicz, Adam 1143
 Dziady 2301, 2705
 micromobilization 2758
Micronesia 2303–5
 Mid-Atlantic War 81
 Middlesex Declaration 1147
 Middleton, Sir Charles and Lady 3528
 Midnight Ride 78
 Miedzyniastówka Anarchistyczna (Anarchy International) 140
 Mielke, Erich 1341
 Mieroslawski, Ludwik 2702, 3544–5
 Mif, Pavel 2113, 2782, 3505, 3723
 Miglioli, Guido 386
 Mignoni, Fernando 116
 Migrant Branch of Equality Trade Union (MB-ETU) 1994
migration struggles
 autonomy of migration 2305, 2306, 2307
 global justice movement and 2305–8
 Mihai, of Romania 2857
 Mihailović, Draža 3682
 Miike labor union 1880, 3070
 Mijanović, Vladimir 3693
 Mikhailov, N. 2885–6
 Mikhelson, Ivan Ivanovich 2776
 Mikloško, František 3050
 Mi'kmaq nation 586
 Mikulski, Barbara 1752
 Milagrosa Operation 1616
 Milan
 bombing of bank 1837
 Cinque Giornate insurrection 2267
 labor force 3341
 Piazza Fontana bombing 1820
 social centers 1010
 uprising 1826
 youth festival 1838
 Milan, Declaration of 1006
 Milan Chamber of Labor 1821
 Milanés, Pablo 2380, 3574
 Milea, Vasile 2860
 Miles, Nelson A. 901
 Mileti, Carlo 2692
 Mileti, Raffaele 2692
 Milev, Geo 541
 Milford Haven mutiny 510
 Miliband, Ralph 768, 773, 2249, 2736
 Milice Française 1240
 Milicias Rodruiguistas 1226
Militant 833
 Militant Tendency 2250
 Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV) 3481
 Military Base Agreement 2675
 Military Intelligence Service (SIM) 1014, 3142
 Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) 2917
 Miliukov, Paul 976, 3551
 Miliukova, Ana 3551
 Mill, John Stuart
 Subjection of Women, The 10
 translated into Japanese 526, 842, 1410, 3567, 3594
 translated into Spanish 3610
 on Wright 3666
 mill children's strike 2345
 millenarianism
 Brazil 598, 599
 CPT 482
 and Enlightenment 1116
 and Fifth Monarchists 1102, 1194
 Millennium Development Goals 3114
 Miller, Charles 2832
 Miller, David 1314
 Miller, Emma 3561
 Miller, Jeffrey 1947
 Miller, Jennifer A. 3579–81
 Miller, Lewis 2322
 Miller, Timothy 3417–20
 millet system 34, 943
 Millett, Kate 3167, 3563, 3629
 Millevoeye, Lucien 1415
 Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP): *see* National Salvation Party
 Milli Uprising 3358
Milliken v. Bradley 754
 Million Man March 965
 Mills, C. Wright
 on Castro 626
 class 768, 772
 exploitation 773
 Marxism 769
 on Thompson 3282
 wage-workers 771

- Milošević, Slobodan
 anti-bureaucratic revolution 3009
 capital accumulation 3685
 death of 3011
 Kosovo 37, 2002
 and Markovic 224
 ousted 812, 2509–10, 3011, 3178, 3377
- Milošević–Holbrooke Agreement 2003
- Milosz, Czeslaw 2308–9
- Milyukov, Paul 2892, 2895, 2897, 2904, 2910, 3390
- Milyukova, Anna 3390
- Milyutin, V. 2913
- Mimang Tsongdu 3291
- Min, General 3552
- Minas del Frio 931
- Minbu Conference 2979
- Mindanao 2670, 2679
- Mindanaoan collective 2330
- Miners' Federation of Britain 108, 522
- miners' strikes**
 Bolivia 422, 426
 Britain 109, 529–30, 591
 Cananea 137, 2276
 Romania 2854–6, 2858–9
 Shamva mine 3728
 Zambia 3695–8, 3701
- miners' wives, mop and broom brigades 2345
- Minerva* 1572
- Mines and Works Amendment Act 3092
- Mineworkers' Union (SNTMMRM) 2293
- Mineworkers' Union of Zambia (MUZ)
 3701–2
- Ming Dynasty 714, 3231
- Ming Rebellions** 2309–11
- Minimax chain 244
- Minimum Wage Act 1707, 2676
- Minjusahoe-dang 1926
- Minkanrengo (Japan Private Labor Union Federation) 1883
- Minneapolis strike 3413–14
- Minor, Virginia 3623
- Minorca 86
- minoritarianism 982–3
- Minto, Lalo Watanabe 2318–19
- Mintoff, Dominic 2187
- Mintz, Sidney 1868
- minutemen 78, 3514
- Minya, Aggray 2269
- Miodowicz, Alfred 2708
- Mir-Hosseini, Ziba 1774
- MIR–Patria Libre 801, 1082–3
- Mir Qasim 1708
- Mirabal, María 1014
- Mirabal, Minerva 1014
- Mirabal, Patria 1014
- Mirabeau, Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, Comte de** 892, 1126, 1298, 1525, 2311–12
- Mirage* 2108
- Miranda, Francisco de 412, 2555, 3456
- Mirbeau, Octave 115
- Mirbeck, Frédéric-Ignace de 1530, 1531
- Mirghani, Sayyid Ali al- 3195
- Miron, Gaston 2784
- Mirovich-Ivanova, Zinaida 3390, 3551
- Mirrakhimov, Mirbobo 3245
- Mirrar people 4
- Mirza, Iskandar 2581
- Mirza Kuchak Khan 1768
- Mirza Mughal 1688
- Misa Campesina 640
- Misikito Indians 2473–4
- Misión Barrio Adentro 667
- Misión Che Guevara 3455
- Misión Vuelvan Caras 3454–5
- Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation d'Haiti (MINUSTAH) 1508, 1510
- Mission Guaicapuro 1472
- Mississippi 1259
- Mississippi, University of 2275
- Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP)
 748, 750, 1259, 1975, 3187
- Missouri Compromise line 533
- Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada* 759
- Mistral, Gabriela 2444, 2966
- Misuari, Nur 2328, 2331
- Mitchel, John 3680
- Mitchell, Juliet 2249, 2262
- Mitchell v. US* 1257
- Mitra, Dinabandhu 1712
- Mitra, Ila 2575
- Mitra, Ramendranath 2575
- Mitrione, Dan 3004, 3340
- Mitrovich, Giorgio 2186
- Mitsui Mining Co. 1880, 3070
- Mitter, Armin 1337
- Mitterrand, François
 La Baule address 880
 Burkina Faso 548
 Côte d'Ivoire 880
 election 826
 Euromissile 198
 French Guiana 1271
 May 1968 events 2261
 New Caledonia 2458
 PS 825
Rainbow Warrior 1273
 women's movement 3576–7
- Mitzenheim, Moritz 1343
- Mizzi, Fortunato 2186

- Mizzi, Nerik 2187
Mkwati 699, 702, 703, 704
Mladina 3744
MLN-Tupamaros: *see* Tupamaros
Mmanthasi of the Sotho 3602
MNL-T (National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros): *see* Tupamaros
Moakley, Joseph 2959
mobile army surgical hospitals 384
mobilization
 mass 2762
 tactics 2758
“Mobilization” 2499
Mobilization for Life 1057
Mobutu, Joseph-Désiré (Sese Seko) 3703
 Congo armed insurgency 852–3
 Morocco 2338
Moctezuma 910
Moczulski, Leszek 3077
Modakeke people 1640–1, 3677, 3678
Modarres, Hassan 1763
Moderate, The 1101, 2119
Modern Black Convention 348
Modern Times colony 156
Modernismo 2312–13
modernization 1664–73, 3594
 dependency theory 1668–70
 globalization and empire 1670–2
 non-Marxist theory 1665–6
 Orthodox Marxism 1664–5
 uneven/combined development 1666–8
 world systems theory 1668–70
Modestino, Valentino 2623
Modi, Narendra 1694
Mods and Rockers 512
Mody, Homi 1327, 1683
Modzelewski, Karol 2013, 2301, 2705
Moffat, John Smith 699
Moffat Treaty 700
Moghul empire 2869
Mohacs, Battle of 1142
Mohale Dam 2112
Mohammad Ali Shah 1767
Mohammad V 2336, 2337
Mohammed, Patricia 3579
Mohammed ben Arafa 1249
Mohammed VI 2339
Mohani, Maulana Hasrat 1326, 1680
Mohanlal, Monish 1688
Mohanty, Chandra Talpade 2733, 2734
Mohawk community 585
 blockades 2557
 Ganienke encampment 2415
 Kanestake reserve 2556–7
 Mother’s Milk Project 2418
 and OCAP 2561
 Oka crisis 2557
Mohr, Jean 2308
Mohri, Kenzo 1649
Moi, Daniel arap 1947, 1948, 1951, 1952
Mokhehle, Ntsu 2111
Mokrani, Mohamed El- 1927
Molas López, Felipe 2600
Moldavia 2862, 2863, 2865
Mole Lake 2419
Molema, S. M. 455
Molina, Arturo A. 1164, 2957
Molina Ureña, José 1019
Moll, Albert 1586
Mollet, Guy 226
Molnar, Tamas 1618
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact 179, 340–1, 824, 1376, 1593, 1823, 3678–9
Molucca Islands 1656, 1718
Molyneaux, William 1785
Molyneux, J. 3424
Mombasa dock strike 2269
Momoh, Joseph 3031
Momoyo Kamo 1877
Monagas, José Tadeo 3707
Monarchist Manifesto 467–8
monarchy
 abolished in France 2970
 absolutism 783, 2125, 2519, 2922
 Enlightenment 1115
 see also Portugal, anti-monarchy protests
Monatte, Pierre 120, 2628
Monbiot, George 1403
Moncada, José María 2965–6
Moncada barracks battle 916, 927, 928, 2150, 3574
Moncaleano, Francisco 998
Monck, George 1100
Monckton Commission 3699
Mond–Turner talks 521
Mondale, Walter 1975
Monde, Le 1238, 2261, 2706, 3575
Mondelli Plan 250
Mondlane, Eduardo Chivambo 738, 1261, 2313–14
 assassinated 2153, 2314
Mondolfo, Rodolfo 2839
Mondragón Collective 663, 2314–15
Monestel, Manuel 640
Monge Alfaro, Carlos 879
Mongoose Gang 1463, 2462
Moni Singh 2576
Monipong, Sisowath 3035
Monireth, Sisowath 566, 567, 569, 3035
Monks of Medmenham Abbey 3530

- Monmouth 83, 84, 1405
 Monongahela, Battle of 76
 Monroe, Ben 1860
 Monroe, James 1319, 1512
 Monroe Doctrine 1514, 1521, 1523, 1663
 Monrovia 2115
 Mont Pelerin Society 2436
 Montagna, Nicola 1829–30, 1830–1, 1831–2
 Montagnard faction 962, 1277, 1288, 1290–1, 2849, 2970
 Montagu, Edwin 2388
 Montague–Chelmsford Report 552, 1700
 Montague County Farmers' Alliance 2724
Montaña, La 270
 Montaña Mestizo, Tathiana 796–8, 803–5, 2791
 Montaña Hernández, Andrés 2296
 Montañ, Otilio E. 2277
 Monte Bello Islands 513
 Montebello, Quebec 3659
 Monteiro, Enrico 603
 Montejo, Governor 2080
 Montenegro 35, 3010
 Monterrosa, Domingo 2958
 Montesinos, Vladimiro 2646, 2654
Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat
 1112, 1114, 2315–16, 2713
 De l'esprit des lois 1115, 2316
 Enlightenment 1126, 2316
 environmental determinism 1409
 Lettres persanes 2316
Montessori, Maria 2316–17
 Monteverde, Domingo 3456
 Montevideo, Battle of 288
 Montez, Lola 1150
 Montgomery, Richard 79
 Montgomery Bus Boycott 762
 King 651, 1971–2, 2067
 Parks 1971, 2613–16
 SNCC 3186
 Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA)
 761, 1972, 2614
Monthly Review 1649, 2249
 Montiel, Rodolfo 2289
 Montjuic trial 145
 Montoneros 245–6, 249, 273, 1155–7, 2149
 Montreal 80, 845, 2099, 2783, 2786
 see also Concordia University, student protests
 Montreynaud, Florence 3577
 Montseny, Federica 115, 124, 3142
 Montserrat 2075
 Montserrat Trades and Labor Union 2078
 Monzalvo, Luis 275
 Moodie, Susanna 3146–7
 Moodley, R. K. 151
 Moody, Kim 769
 Mooloya strike 2051
 Mooney, Tom 836
Moonhunter (film) 2747
Moonshadow 2108
 Moore, Amzie 73
 Moore, Andrew 3490–2
 Moore, Barrington 3235
 Moore, Fred 2948
 Moore, Johnny “Dizzy” 611
 Moore, Mike 1429
 Moore, Queen Mother 394
 Moore, Richard 837
 Moore, William 899
 Moore Town Maroons 1873
 Moore's Creek 81
 Moorhouse, Frank 107
 Moorosi 2109
Moplah Revolts 2317–18
 MOPOCO, Paraguay 2601, 2605, 2606
Moraes, Irineu Luís de 2318–19
Morais, Clodomir de 2319
Moral and Political Magazine 2126
 Morales, Gómez 249
 Morales, Horacio (Boy) 2680, 2682, 2684
Morales Ayma, Juan Evo 2319–20
 cocaleros 788, 1938, 1939
 election 433, 786–7, 2371
 MAS 418, 423, 433, 434, 788, 789–90, 2320
 WTO, Quebec 3658
 Morales Bermúdez, Francisco 1568, 3431
 Moran, D. P. 1799
 Morandi, Rodolfo 1829
Morant Bay Rebellion 1868, 1869–70, 2320–3
 Morapedi, Wazha Gilbert 453–63, 1955–7, 2357–8
 Moravia 318, 3050
Moravian Brothers 2323–4
 More, Hannah 203, 3566
 More, Thomas 514–15
 Utopia 1639, 3415–16
 Moreau, Alicia 271
 Moreira César, Antônio 600
 Moreno, Major 3232
 Moreno, Nahuel 272
 Moreno, Victor 3447
 Moretti, Mario 2815, 2816, 2817
 Morgan, Edward 3499
 Morgan, Henry Lewis 1091
 Morgan, John Tyler 1565, 1566
 Morgan, Robin 3167, 3629
 Morgan, Steffan 529–30
 Morgan, Thomas J. 2026
 Morgan-Curtis, Samantha A. 289–90
Morgan v. Virginia 760, 869, 1257
 Morgari, Oddino 3013

- Morillo, Pablo 578, 3457, 3458
 Morin, Thérèse 2785
 Morinigo, Higinio 2599, 2600
 Moritz van Nassau, Johan 2588
 Morley, Ian 2804–5
 Morley-Minto Reforms 1699
Morning Post 1702
 Morning Star Uprising 2515
 Moro, Aldo 380, 1820, 1839, 2816
 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 2329–31, 2688
Moro national liberation 2324–32
 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 2327, 2328–31, 2679
 Moro people, Philippines 2679, 2686
 Moroccan Liberation Army 1249
 Moroccan Workers' Union (UMT) 2337
Morocco
 Abdelkrim uprising 44
 French rule 1248–9
 Green March 2338
 IMF 2338
 independence 1249, 3336
 Jewish people 2336
 NLA 1247
 as protectorate 42
 protests 2332–9
 Riff rebellion 1125, 2336
 Roosevelt 2336
 Morogoro General Conference 3088
 Moroka, Dr. 3087
Morones, Luis Napoleon 2279, 2280, 2339–40
 Moroni, Antonio 3015
 Moroz, Oleksandr 3376
 Morrill, John 1100
 Morris, A. D. 650, 651
 Morris, Abraham 2395
Morris, William 2340–2, 2820
 Morse, Chuck 137–9, 141
 mortality rates 3382
 Mosca, Gaetano 2244
 Moscato, Antonio 2165
Moscow fire and protest, 1547 2342
 Moscow Trust Group 198
 Moses, Marian 3166
 Moses, Robert 747, 1258, 1259
 Moses, Wilson J. 391
 Moseveni: *see* Museveni, Yoweri
 Moshoeshoe I 2109
 Moshoeshoe II 2112
 Mosley, Oswald 524, 1174, 2526
Mossadegh, Mohammad 1763–6, 1768–9, 1770, 2342–4
 Most, Johann 128, 157, 1411, 1562
 Motahhari, Morteza 1811
 Motakallemin, Malek al- 1768
Mother Earth 158, 379, 1412, 3418
Mother Jones 2344–5
 Mother Theresa Association 2002
 motherhood
 Italy 1177, 3591
 Mother Jones 2344
 Poland 3557
 Republican Motherhood 3616
 Soviet Union 3607, 3608
 Mother's Milk Project 2418
 Mothers' Day protest 3575
 Mothers of the Nation 3546
 Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo: *see* Madres de La Plaza de Mayo
 Motley, Constance 2275
 Motsete, Kgalemang 459, 2358
 Motshidisi, Klaas 457
Motsoaledi, Elias 171, 2345–6, 3094
 Mott, Lucretia
 Seneca Falls convention 168, 3005, 3164
 suffrage 2492
 and Woodhull 3621, 3636
 World Anti-Slavery Convention 205, 3620, 3639–40
 Motua movement 956
Moudjahid, El 1162
 Mouffe, Chantal 772, 773, 3743
 Moulian, T. 692, 693
 Moulrier Boutang, Yann 2305
 Moulin, Jean François August 1079
 Mounier, Emmanuel 892, 1260, 2465
 Mountbatten, Louis Francis 556, 1704, 1711, 1802, 1922
 Mournier, Emmanuel 634
 Moussaoui, Zacarias 1646
 Moustaki, Georges 2382
 Mouvement autonome des femmes (MAF) 3575
 Mouvement pour la Démocratie en Algérie (MDA) 367
 Mouvement Démocratique de la Rénovation Malgache (MDRM) 1250
 Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) 3006
 Mouvement de libération du taxi 2786
 Mouvement pour la Liberté de l'Avortement (MLAC) 3575
 Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) 854, 856–7, 2137
 Mouvement Ouvrier et Paysan (MOP) 1518
 Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI) 882
 Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) 882
 Mouvement républicain populaire (MRP) 825

- Mouvement Socialiste* 3228
 Mouvements Unis de la Résistance 405
 MOVE organization 7
 Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) 2484–5
 Movement Against the Monarchy 1389
 Movement of Alternative Society 140
 Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK) 1928
 Movement for the Defense of Human and Citizens' Rights (ROP*Ci*O) 3077
 Movement for Democracy (MPD) 603
 Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) 2116
 Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 2364–5, 3112, 3732, 3738
 Movement for the Emancipation of Chilean Women 3598
 Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 2480, 2483, 2484
 Movement for Independence (MPI) 2770
 Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) 858
 Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) 697, 1940, 3111, 3112, 3704
 Movement for National Unity in the Fight against Neoliberalism 2294
 Movement for People's Participation (MPP) 3340–1
 Movement Peronista Montenoro 1156
 Movement of Plurinational Unity (MUPP) 1066, 1067
Movement of Recuperated Factories, Argentina 2346–50
 Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) 2584, 3451
 Movement of Revolutionary Communities (MPR) 684
 Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR EL) 788, 2362
 Movement of Revolutionary Youth (MRY) 3175
 Movement for Self-Defensive Rural Communities 135
 Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) 2479, 2635, 2972
 Movement Toward Socialism: *see* Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS)
 Movement for the Victory of Democratic Rights (MTLD) 44
 Movement for Workers' Unity 112
 MoveOn.org 2504
 Movimiento Todos por la Patria (All for the Fatherland Movement) 246
 Movement Socialista de Catalunya 2740
 Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB) 497
 Movimento per la Democrazia Repubblicana 1384
 Movimento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria: *see* Left Revolutionary Movement (MIR)
 Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP) 2971
 Movimento del Nuevo Cancionero 2377
 Movimento Politico dei Lavoratori (Workers' Political Movement) 2622
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) 164, 564, 2358–62, 2449, 3106, 3605
 Movimento Revolucionário Oito de Outubro (MR-8) 472
Movimento Sem Terra (MST) 481–3, 2350–3
 formation of 2273, 2351–3, 2635
 Moraes 2319
 and South Africa 3462
 Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) 1834, 1838
 Movimiento 80 3443
 Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaria (MAR) 562–3
Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) 423, 668, 787, 788, 789, 3443
 and Causa Radical 3440, 3445–8
 founding of 2292
 Morales 418, 423, 433, 434, 788, 789–90, 2320
Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200 (MBR-200) 605, 665–6, 668, 3439, 3441, 3448–50
 Movimiento del 2 de Febrero 2596
 Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo (MEP) 668, 3437, 3448
 Movimiento Ibérico de Liberación (MIL) 147
 Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (MLN-T): *see* Tupamaros
 Movimiento Libertario (ML) 849, 1188
 Movimiento Nacional de Empresas Recuperadas (MNER) 2347
 Movimiento Nacional de Fábricas Recuperadas por los Trabajadores (MNFRT) 2347
 Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) 416, 428, 431, 788, 1164, 1936–7
 Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) 666, 668, 3441, 3448, 3450
Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) 2063, 2362–3, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2658
 Movimiento Universitario Julián Apaza 1937
 Moyano, Maria Elena 2654, 2658
 Moyer, Charles 1570
 Moyne Commission 1867, 3316
 Moynihan Report 752
 MOZAL metal workers' strike 2356

- Mozambican African National Union (MANU)
1261
- Mozambique**
anarchism 153
anarchosyndicalism 2354
ANC bases 2153
assimilation 2354
Chissano 738, 1262
civil war 1262
IMF 2355
independence 3546, 3730, 3748
indigenous communities 2354
Machel 2153–4
migrant labor 3091
Mondlane 2313–14
Portuguese rule 1042, 1261, 1656, 2353,
2731
slavery 2353–4
and Southern Rhodesia 3735
trade unions 3112
women's movements 3547
worker protests 2353–7
see also Frente de Libertação de Moçambique;
Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
- Mozen, Chelsea 1391–5
Mozote massacre 2958
Mozzoni, Anna Maria 3592
- Mpho, Motsamai** 454, 459, 2357–8
- MPLA:** *see* Movimento Popular de Libertação de
Angola (MPLA)
- MRTA:** *see* Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac
Amaru
- Ms. Magazine* 1610
MSN 3329
- MST:** *see* Movimento Sem Terra
- Mswati II, of Swaziland 3205
Mswati III, of Swaziland 3207
- MTW:** *see* Marine Transport Workers (MTW)
- Mtyingizana Beata 2353–7
Mubarak, Ali 1073, 1075
Mubende Banyoro Committee (MBC) 3371
mucapi movement 3697
Mudanya, Truce of 3355
Mudros, Truce of 3348, 3354–5
Muela Dam 2112
Mugabe, Alfred 3731
Mugabe, Robert 2363–5, 3110, 3731, 3735
black nationalism 396
in Mozambique 3739–40
and Nkomo 3736
as prime minister 3737
and ZANU-PF 3732
and ZCTU 3732
ZIPA 3738
Mugalla, Joseph 1950, 1951
- Mughals
Kashmir 1928
Mughul empire 1687, 1695, 1708
Muhammad, Abdallahi ibn 2163, 2164
Muhammad, Elijah 18, 394, 746, 2179
Muhammad, Khalid 397
Muhammad, Qazi 1762
Muhammad, Sayyid Ali (the Bab) 1766
Muhammad al-Badr, Prince 3670
Muhammad 'Ali 2365–6
Muhammad III al-Sadiq 3335
Muhammad Pacha Bey 3334
Muhammad VIII al-Amin Bey 3336
Muhammed, Qadi 353
Muhiddinov, A. 3244
Muir, Thomas 983–4
Mühsam, Erich 116, 1193, 1609, 2048
Muir, John 652, 1119
Muir, Thomas 2366–7, 3394
Muisca people 3294
Mujahedeen 14, 1773, 3244, 3246
Mujer Nueva, La 3598
Mujeres Contra la Guerra y el Fascismo 3611
Mujeres Libres (journal) 2368, 3611
Mujeres Libres (Free Women) 146, 2367–9,
2962–3, 3134, 3611
Mujica, José 3341
Mujuru, Solomon 3739
Mukherjee, Abani 449, 2874, 3229
Mukherjee, Harishchandra 1712
Mukherjee, Jatindranath: *see* Jatin, Bagha
Mukti Bahini army 347, 348, 2583
Mukti Sena (Liberation Army) 2442
Muktivyodha 347
Mulai Mohammed 2333
mulattos, Haiti 1527–9, 1531, 1532–3, 1534
Mulay abd al-Rahman 2334
Mulay Hassan 2335
Mulay Hisham 2334
Mulay Ismail al-Samin 2333–4
Mulay Suleiman 2334
Mulay al-Yazid 2334
Mulcahy, Richard 1050
Muldoon, Robert 3155
Mulford, D. C. 3698
Mulji Jetha Market 1699
Mullany, Kate 3215
Müller, Frank I. 2079–80, 2154–5, 2755
Müller, Fredrick 3190
Müller, Hans 1353, 1354
Müller, Jiri 3172, 3173
Müller, Tadzio 1151–4
Mulligan, William H., Jr. 793–4, 859–61, 967–8,
970–2, 2543–5, 2616–18, 2626–8, 3680–1
Mullings, L. 396

- Mulrone, Brian 2557
 Multatuli (Dekker) 1718
 Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)
 298, 301, 1396, 3656, 3661
 multilateralism, crisis of 1429–30
 multinational corporations 3099, 3113
 see also pharmaceutical industry
Multitude 2369–72
 Mumba, Levi 2174
 Mumford, Lewis 973
 Munck, Ronaldo 769, 773, 1671, 3657
Munda, Birsa 1708, 2372
Munday, Jack 1456–7, 2373
Mundia 2218
 Mungunda, Kakurukaze 3603
 Munich Agreement 3144
 Municipal Corporations Act 526, 655
 Munje, B. S. 1682
 Munk, Kai 991
 Muñoz, Cesar German 3714
 Muñoz, Fernando Yañez 3714
 Munoz Marin, Luis 2769, 2770
 Munro, Henry 1794
 Munro, Lyall Jr. 308
 Munson, Rube 1459
 Münster, Anabaptists 93, 1357, 2987
 Muntazar, al-Mahadi al- 2163
Müntzer, Thomas 93, 1353, 1357, 2373–4,
 2830–1
 Münzenberg, Willi 2430, 3678
 Muoroto Episode 1949–50, 1951
 Murad, Adbal Hakim 1811
Muralista movement 2374–6
 Muratori, Ludovico 1825
 Murayama, Tomiichi 1910
 Murch, D. 398
 Murillo, Luis Gilberto 796
 Murmu, Sidhu and Kanhu 2971
 Murphy, Emma G. 3–6
 Murphy, Timothy S. 2426–7
 Murphy, William Martin 1026
 Murray, George (General Lord) 1854
 Murray, George (student) 3169
 Murray, John: *see* Dunmore, Lord
 Murray, Judith Sargent 3615
 Murray, William 202
 Murray Hill Company 2786
 Murrow, Edward R. 194
 Mururoa Atoll 1272
 Musa, Said 1634
 Musa, Salamah 235
 Musa Dagh 287
 Mūsahm, Erich 3082
 Musaliar, Ali 2318
 Musawi, Abbas al- 1575, 1576, 2405
 Museum of Memory, the Dictatorship, and
 Democracy 2598
 Museum of Modern Art 1483
 Museveni, Yoweri 852, 858
 Musgrave, Richard 1788
 Mushala, Adamson 3702–3
 Müsham, Erich 2047, 2049
 Musharraf, Pervez 2584, 2585
 Música Popular Brasileira 2378
 Muslim Association of Britain 227
 Muslim Brotherhood 237, 1069, 1071, 1557–60,
 1810, 2406, 3223
 Muslim Conference (MC) 1929
 Muslim League
 and Congress 2573, 2792
 constitutionalism 1685
 CPI 2793
 elections (1937) 346, 1329
 formation of 1709
 Jinnah 1685, 1921–2, 1929, 1930, 2577
 Lahore Resolution 1921
 Nankar protests 2576
 power in Pakistan 2575
 seats in Congress 1699
 student wing 3180
 Muslim Mosque 747
 Muslim Personal Laws 1585, 1693
 Muslim United Front (MUF) 1933
 Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on
 Divorce) Act 1692
 Muslims
 Albania 36
 in China 715, 716
 exiled from Spain 2056
 and Hindus 1582–3
 population dispersal 1808
 young French women 3577
 see also Shi'ite Muslims; Sunni Muslims
 Mussallam, Maqdoom 3196
Mussolini, Benito 2382–4
 anti-clericalism 2384
 and Bose 450
 and CGdL 3015
 as example 1365
 fascism 1170–1, 1176–80, 1422, 2384
 Heimwehr 320
 Hitler 1592
 influence in Colombia 408
 Iqbal on 1761
 and Malatesta 2170
 March on Rome 1589
 as maximalist 1828
 overthrown 1181
 PCI 3341
 PSI 2383

- Reggio Emilia Congress 1822
 Repubblica Sociale Italiana 2834
 and Spartacus 3149
 Turati 3341
 Mustafa, Sam A. 2981–2
 Muste, A. J. 596, 837, 2035, 3411, 3412
 Musteites 3383, 3386
 al-Mutawakkilite Yemeni Kingdom 3670
 mutinies
 Britain 510, 3154–5
 Congo 854
 India 1686
 Mutiny Act 3300–1
 Muṭiu, Caius 2866
 Mutlak, Natalie 871–2
 Muto, Ichiyo 1884–9, 1901–9
 Mutraw, A. May-Oo 548–51
 mutual aid
 Chile 691
 China 707
 Kropotkin 2070
 Kuron 2014
 Peru 2647–8
 Philippines 2672
 Russia 2879
 Sierra Leone 941
 Mutual Aid Society of Peasants 1846
 mutualism
 Chile 111
 France 119
 Huichol 97
 Landauer 2048
 Proudhon 97, 111, 119–20
 Mutualist Confederation 111
 Muwamba, Ernest 3697
 Muzorewa, Gwinyai P. 698–705
 Mwakenya 1947
 Mwanawasa, Levy 697, 3705
 Mwanga, Kabaka 3370
Mwari cult 699, 702
 Mwiandi, Mary Ciambaka 2253–7
 Mwinilunga district 3702
 Myanmar 347
 Myllar, Andrew 3001
 Myrdal, Gunnar 758
 Myrntinen, Henri 1718–21
 Mzilikazi, chief 700
 Mzingeli, Charles 2384–5, 3092, 3729

 N30 3662
 NAACP: *see* National Association for the
 Advancement of Colored People
 Nabat Confederation of Anarchists 143
 Nabi Isa doctrine 3192
Nabil's Narrative 1766

 Nabyev, Rahman 3245–6
Nacion, La 248
 Nacpil, Lidy 2687
 Nadir Khan 330, 3243
 NAFTA: *see* North American Free Trade
 Agreement (NAFTA)
 Nagani (Red Dragon) Book Club 2527
Nagaravatta (Angkor Wat) 568
 Nagasaki atomic bomb 194, 195, 728, 1729,
 1885, 1887, 1890
 Nagashima protests 191
 Nagriamel movement 3426
 Naguib, Muhammad 1070, 1071, 1078
 Nagy, Ferenc 1618
Nagy, Imre 1618, 1625, 1627–8, 1629, 2136,
 2387–8, 2866
 Nagy, Ladislau 2866
 Nahdatul Ulama 1730
 Naicker, E. V. R. 1327, 1328–9, 1710
 Naicker, G. M. 2191
Naidu, Sarojini 1329, 1682, 1709, 2388–9
 Naipaul, V. S. 1499
 Nairobi African Local Government Servants'
 Association (NALGSA) 2268
 Naisseline, Nidoish 2458
 Najimuddin, Khwaja 2577
 Nakakita, Koji 1909–10
 Nakasone, Yasuhiro 191, 1882
Naled ea Lesotho 2110
 Nalivkin, Vladimir 3242
 Nam Bo 1716
 Nam Choan Dam 3276
 Nama communities 3539
 Bondelswart 2394
 guerillas 2393
 Kooper 2393
 transhumants 2389–90
 Namangan province 3422
 Namasudra renaissance 956
 Nambodiripad, E. M. S. 2422
 Nambu Rising 1898, 1899
Namibia 2389–401, 2529–31, 3202–5
 anarchism 147
 and Angolan independence 3204
 decolonization 2530
 German rule 2389–94
 independence 166, 2389–401, 3112, 3204
 indigenous communities 2391–3, 2394
 Nujoma 2399, 2400, 2529–31, 3202, 3204–5
 Ovambo people 2530
 PLAN 2399, 2531, 3203, 3204
 post-independence 2399–400
 Schutztruppe 2392, 2393
 South African occupation 2394–8
 SWANU 2530

- Namibia** (*cont'd*)
 SWAPO 2398–9, 2400, 2530–1, 3112, 3202–5, 3604–5
 unemployment 2399
 water resources 2394
 women's sexual intercourse strike 3603
 World War II 2398
see also Witbooi, Hendrik
- Namphy, Henri 279, 1504, 1505–6, 1520
 Nana Yaa Asantewaa: *see* Queen Nanny
 Nanayakkara, Vasudeva 2632
 Nanchang Uprising 725
 Nane Nane riots 1952
 Nanjing, Treaty of 1658
Nankar protest movement 2576
 Nanking, Rape of 727
 Nanking, Treaty of 3230
 Nanny, slave 1873
 Nanterre University 2260
Nantes, Edict of 1068–9, 1110, 2950
 Nanyang Party 3257
 Naoroji, Dadabhai 1695, 1699
NAP: *see* Nuclei Armati Proletari
 Naples 1149, 1825, 1827, 1847, 1848
 Napoleon I: *see* Bonaparte, Napoleon
 Napoleon III
 Algeria 43
 Carbonari 1825
 counterrevolution 887, 1234
 coup d'état 2610
 Gambetta 1323
 Hugo 1611
 Mexico 1925
 Romania 2865
 Second Empire 404
 Vietnam 3475
see also Bonaparte, Louis-Napoleon
 Napoleonic Code 1282
 Napoleonic Wars 486, 1348, 1718
see also anti-Napoleonic Wars of Liberation
Napper Tandy, James 1786, 2402–3, 3393
Narayan, Jayaprakash 1329, 2403–4, 2432, 2794, 3587
 Narayana Guru 955–6
 Narcosis 2063
 narcotrafficking 808
 Nardal, Paulette and Jane 2427, 3578
 Nari Nirjatan Parairodh Mancha (Forum Against Oppression of Women) 3588
Narita airport, resistance to construction of 1881, 1901–9
 Narodnaya Volya 283, 3550
 Narodniks 2169, 2227, 2426, 3550, 3551
 Narong Kittikachorn 660
 Narváez, Luis de 1472
 Naseby, Battle of 909, 1098
 Nash, Diane 1258
 Nash, Gary 296
 Nasha Ukraina 3376
 Nashoba community 2460, 2461, 3617, 3666
 Nasi, Virgilio 1833
Nasir, Hassan 2404, 2581
 Nasional Samling Party 2525
Nasrallah, Sayed Hassan 1577, 2404–5
Nasser, Gamal Abdel 2406–7
 Arab socialism 1069, 1072, 3224
 Aswan High Dam 2406
 Czech arms deal 1071
 Free Officers 1076, 1077
 land reform 1779
 and Naguib 1071
 Pan-Arabism 399, 2068
 Philosophy of the Revolution 1070, 2406
 and Qadaffi 2779
 and Sadiq al-Mahdi 3191
 Suez treaty 1078
 UAR 1072, 3223
 Yemen 3670
 Yugoslav visit 3688
 Nasser-al-Din Shah 1767
 Nasserism 2406–7
Nat Turner Rebellion 233, 2407–9
 Natali, Shahan 283
 Natanson, M. 2934
 Natera, Ramón 1013
 Nath, Rani Narendra 2388
Nation 3680
 Nation Labor Union 1977
 Nation Liberation Front, Yemen 3671
 Nation of Islam (NOI) 746, 763, 764, 1336, 2179
 Nation of Ulysses 2845
 Nation Party, Turkey 3363
Nation Review 107
National, Le 401, 1230
 National Aboriginal Alliance 6
 National Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC) 311
 National Aboriginal and Islander Health Organization (NAIHO) 311
 National Accord, Paraguay 2606
 National Action Party (PAN), Mexico 999, 2291, 2294, 2537, 3432, 3718
 National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders 750
 National African Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) 3096, 3097
 National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI) 1261
 National Afro-American League 756
 National Agrarian Confederation (CNA) 2655

- National Agrarian Party (PNA) 999
 National Agricultural Labourers' Union (NALU) 241
 National Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression 965
 National Alliance Dai Viet 3470
 National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) 3320
 National Alliance of Shoemakers 2224
 National Amalgamated Sailors' and Firemens' Union 831
 National American Indian Movement 2415
 National American Suffrage Association 3624
 National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) 3165, 3623, 3626
 National Anti-Slavery Society 3639
National Anti-Slavery Standard 215
 National Army for Democracy 1167
 National Army of Democratic Kampuchea 1960–1
 National Army of Greece 1438
 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
 Abu-Jamal 8
 Addams 8, 12
 Baker 332
 and Black Panthers 399
 Du Bois 395, 756, 1023, 1554
 Evers 1155
 Jim Crow era 17
 King 1971
 legal attack on segregation 759–61
 and Niagara movement 1024
 non-violence 2498
 Scottsboro Resistance 3002–3
 Wells 3519
 Williams 2067, 3533–4
 Zinn 73
 National Association of Colored Women 756, 3519
 National Association of Honduran Peasants (ANACH) 614, 2128, 2129
 National Association of Labor Movement Organizations (NALMO) 1985
 National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) 2483
 National Association for Promoting the Political and Social Improvement of the People 2130
 National Association to Repeal Abortion Laws 1299
 National Association of Spanish Women (ANME) 3510
 National Association for Women's Suffrage 2524
 National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) 2292, 3297, 3718
 National Awakening, Nepal 2443
 National Awami Party (NAP) 2579, 2580, 2581–2
 National Black Consciousness Day 3746
 National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) 959, 960
 National Campesino Confederation (CNC) 2287, 2542
National Catholic Reporter 2061
 National Center for Student Action (NSCT) 2747
 National Charter Association (NCA) 657–9, 2464
 National Civic Union (NCU) 1017
 National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) 2159
 National Committee in Defense of the Popular Economy 2291
 National Committee of Trade Union Unity (CNUS) 1472, 1479
 National Committee for Unemployed 3385
 National Committee on Women and Development 3547
 National Complete Suffrage Union 658
 National Confederation of Agriculture Workers (Contag) 3388
 National Confederation of Cuban Workers (CNOG) 2151
 National Confederation of Peasants of the Philippines (KPMP) 2672, 2673
 National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) 482
 National Conference of Catholic Charities 1170
 National Conferences of the Autonomous Women's Movement 3589
 National Conscription Act 69
 National Conventions of Anti-Slavery Women 3640
 National Coordinating Committee (KKP) 3073
 national coordinating committees, Mexico 2291
 National Coordination of Agricultural Producers (CONAPA) 2602
 National Coordination of Christian Grassroots Farmers (KOGA) 2606
 National Council of Churches 1259
 National Council of Education (NCE) 1698
 National Council of Private Enterprise (CONEP) 2594
 National Council of Student Representatives, Korea 3184
 National Council for Women (CONAMU) 3631
 National Covenant 1097, 3000
 National Day of Mourning 3094
 National Defense Law, Turkey 3362
 National Defender of Women's Rights 3631
 National Democratic Action Party 788
 National Democratic Alliance 1693

- National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) 2481, 2483
- National Democratic Front (FDN), Mexico 2287, 2292
- National Democratic Front (NDF), Botswana 461
- National Democratic Front (NDF), Philippines 2680, 2682
- National Democratic Party (NDP), Iraq 2954, 3516
- National Democratic Party (NDP), Pakistan 2584
- National Democratic Party (NDP), Poland 2717
- National Democratic Party (NDP), Zimbabwe 1779, 2363, 3730, 3735
- National Democratic Revolution (NDR) 1136
- National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO) 1261
- National Direction 3449
- National Economic Development and Labor Council (NEDLAC) 875
- National Educators' Union (UNE) 1058
- National Emergency Committee Against Mob Violence 758
- National Employment Law, Argentina 262
- National Endowment for Democracy (NED) 3012
- National Farm Workers' Association 660
see also United Farm Workers
- National Farm Workers' Service Center 1610
- National Farmers' Alliance 2725
- National Fascist Party (PNF) 1172
- National Federation of Christian Agrarian Leagues (FENELAC) 2605
- National Federation for Democracy and National Unification (NFDNU) 1991
- National Federation of Free and Independent Trade Unions of Mozambique (CONSILMO) 2356
- National Federation of Honduran Peasants (FENACH) 2128–9
- National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW) 646, 3587
- National Federation of Indigenous, Peasant, and Black Organizations (FENOCIN) 1056
- National Federation of Peasant Organizations (FENOC) 1056
- National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) 2681
- National Federation of Unions of the Salvadoran Workers: *see* Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FENASTRAS)
- National Federation Party (NFP), of Fiji 1197
- National Feminist Party 3598
- National Feminist Union 3597
- National Forum (NF) 174, 3089
- National Front, Britain 512
- National Front, Cyprus 947
- National Front in Defense of Wages 2291
- National Front for the Liberation of Angola: *see* Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA)
- National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC) 873
- National Front for the Liberation and the Rights of Women 2291
- National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) 220, 1599
- National Front of Popular Action (FNAP) 2291, 2299
- National Front against Repression 2291
- National German Women's Association (BDF) 3580
- National Government Council (CNG) 1504–5
- National Government of Reconstruction 2470
- National Guard** 2042, 2409–10, 2969–70
- National Guerilla Coordination (CNG) 1082–3, 1168
- National Heroes Day 2449
- National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) 2289
- National Independence Party (NIP) 1634
- National Independent League 2609
- National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) 584
- National Indian Youth Council (NIYC) 2412
- National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC) 803, 804
- National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) 3411, 3412
- National Institute of Agrarian Reform 2471
- National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) 2352
- National Institute of Indigenous Affairs (INAI) 258
- National Intelligence Service (SIN), Peru 2654
- National Labor Party (NLP), Thailand 3265
- National Labor Relations Board 1754
- National Labor Union** 2025, 3214–15
- National Labor University 114
- National Land Planning, Japan 1904
- National Lawyers' Guild 3664
- National League, Ireland 1415
- National League, Poland 2717
- National Liberal League 1414, 2341
- National Liberation Alliance (ALN) 45, 2220
- National Liberation Army, Costa Rica 878
- National Liberation Committee (CLN), Spain 1384
- National Liberation Forces (FLN), Mexico 3714
- National Liberation Front (Balli Kombëtar) 30

- National Liberation Front (EAM) 1436, 1437, 1438, 1444
- National Liberation Front (FNL), Venezuela 40, 3442
- National Liberation Front of Guiana (FNLG) 1271
- National Liberation Front of Patani (NLFP) 3270
- National Liberation Movement (MLN) 2283, 2771, 2772
- National Liberation Revolutionary Army 543
- National Maritime Union (NMU) 838, 1754
- National Movement of Democratic Defense (EKDA) 1432
- National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) 1615
- National Movement of Victims 798
- National Museum of the American Indian 2420
- National Opposition Union (UNO) 1164, 2476
- National Order Party 3353
- National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) 943, 946
- National Organization of Cyprus (EOK) 944
- National Organization for Women (NOW)** 1299, 1752, 2410–11, 3166, 3628
- National Partisan Association (ANPI) 1834
- National Party, Chile 681
- National Party (NP), South Africa 170–1, 3093
- National Party of Nigeria (NPN) 1640
- National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 2115
- National Peasant Confederation 607
- National Peasants' Union (PKM) 1612
- National People's Congress 987
- National Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers' Union (NUPENG) 2481
- National *Piquetero* Bloc (PBN) 264
- National Polytechnic Institute (IPN) 3297
- National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) 1436, 1437, 1438, 1444
- National Products Preservation Association 185
- National Progressive Party, Pakistan 2584
- National Project Simón Bolívar 3449
- National Protection Law, Turkey 3365
- National Radical Union of Cyprus (EREK) 944
- National Reformer* 658, 3006
- National Repeal Association 2544
- National Republican Greek League (EDES) 1436, 1437
- National Resistance (RN) 1433
- National Revolutionary Army (NRA) 3727
- National Revolutionary Civic Association (ACNR) 2283, 3427
- National Revolutionary Front (NRF) Malay 3269
- National Revolutionary Party (PNR), Mexico 999, 3432
- National Salvation Front (FSN) 2855
- National Salvation Party (MSP) 3353
- National Security Council (NSC), Turkey 3351
- National Security Law, Korea 3184
- National Shanghai Labor University 135
- National and Social Liberation (EKKA) 1437
- National Socialism, Germany 1173, 3580
see also Nazi Party, Nazism
- National Socialist German Student Group 3178
- National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) 1172, 1588, 2832
see also Nazi Party, Nazism
- National Socialist Women's Association (NSF) 1591
- National Society of Italy 1826
- National Solidarity, Greece 1438
- National Solidarity of Casual Workers' Unions 1993
- National Strike Council (CNH) 3297
- National System for Social Mobilization (SINAMOS) 3431
- National Teachers' Schools 3297
- National Typographical Union 62
- National Unemployed Workers' Movement (NUWM) 524, 3384
- National Union of Agricultural Workers (NUAW) 242
- National Union of Autonomous Regional Peasant Organizations (UNORCA) 3645
- National Union of Distributive Workers 3093
- National Union of Dock Laborers (NUDL) 2819
- National Union of Food Industry Workers (SINALTRAINAL) 809
- National Union of Gasworkers and General Laborers, Women's Branch 2229
- National Union of Iron Molders 3214
- National Union of Metal Workers (NUMSA) 2264, 3096, 3098
- National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) 349, 529, 874, 3062, 3096, 3098
- National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) 3112, 3204
- National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) 2337
- National Union of Railwaymen 519
- National Union of Social Security Workers (SNTSS) 2294
- National Union of Societies for Equal Citizenship (NUSEC) 3568, 3569
- National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) 3088, 3180
- National Union of Textile Workers 3095
- National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) 2361, 2449, 2531
- National Union of the Working Classes 2129

- National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS) 527–8, 3567
- National Union of Workers (UNT) 2224, 2293–4, 3454
- National Unity Coalition, Israel 1814
- National Unity government 1437
- National University of Cordoba 273–4
- National University of Nicaragua (UNAN) 2964
- National Volunteer Defense Army (NVDA) 3292
- National Woman's Party (NWP) 2624, 2625, 3626
- National Women's Association 3582
- National Women's Political Caucus 1299
- National Women's Rights Convention 3621
- National Women's Suffrage Association (NWSA) 167, 169, 3164, 3622–3, 3636
- National Women's Trade Union League 11
- National Worker Peasant Popular Assembly (ANOCP) 2291
- National Workers' Central (CNT) 1479
- National Workers' Confederation (CNT), Paraguay 2599
- National Workers' Liberation Front (EEAM), Greece 3220
- National Workers' Party 2583
- National Workers' Union (NWU) 1861, 2197, 2718
- National Workshops, France 1233
- National Youth Organization (EON) 1443
- nationalism
- African 3084–90
 - Albania 34–8
 - Basque 1127–32
 - Bengal 344, 2573–9
 - Botswana 453–63, 1955–7
 - Bulgaria 1452
 - and fascism 1173
 - Germany 1346–52, 1373–81, 2982
 - Ghana 1381–3
 - Greece 1451–6
 - Hindu 1582–5, 1684, 2574
 - imperialism 1660, 2246
 - India 1673–4, 1694–700
 - Iran 1764
 - Ireland 1798–800
 - Kashmir 1928–9
 - Macedonia 1440, 1452
 - Madagascar 1249, 1250, 2156
 - Nyasaland 2174–5
 - Moro 2324–32
 - Oromo 1134, 1138–9
 - Panama 2593–5
 - Puerto Rico 2768–9
 - Quebec 2783–8
 - Sinhala Buddhist 3527
 - Sudan 3192
 - Swaziland 3026–7
 - Taiwan 3235–7
 - Tamil 2633, 3250–3, 3527
 - Turkish 1453
- see also* black nationalism; Patani Malay nationalism
- Native American peoples**
- aiding runaway slaves 212
 - American Revolution 2022
 - enslaved 211
 - environmental activism 2417–19
 - protest 2411–20
 - reservations 2412
 - resistance 899–902
 - rights 39, 2412
 - water usage 1119–20
 - white colonists 74–5
- Native Baptist Church 2322
- Native Bills, South Africa 2111
- Native Labor Act 172
- Native Labor Code 2354
- Native Labor (Settlement of Disputes) Act 3094
- Native Land Court 2207
- Native Republic thesis 2222
- Native Title Act 5, 312
- Native Title Amendment Act 5
- Native Trust and Land Bill 833
- Natives' Representative Council (NRC) 833, 1940
- NATO: *see* North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Natoli, Aldo 2870
- Natu brothers 1696
- Natural Justice* 113
- natural rights
- Anthony 169
 - Paine 1409
 - Sylvis 2025
 - Winstanley 1104
- Nature, Capitalism, and Socialism* 2249
- naturiens 99
- Naudet, Jean-Baptiste 1298
- Naujawan Bharat Sabha (Young India Association) 1328, 1677, 1683, 3041
- Nautz, Jürgen 1941–3, 3066–7
- Nauvoo community 1639
- Nav Nirman* (New Construction) movement 3587
- Nava Sama Samaja Party 2053, 2633
- Navajo Reservation 2415
- Navarre, General 3474
- Navarro, Arias 184
- Navarro, Atoy M. 444–5, 2845–6
- Navarro, Gustavo 428
- Navarro Wolff, Antonio 2149
- Navdanya movement 2734, 3028
- Naxalbari, Bengal 2422
- Naxalite movement** 2265, 2266, 2421–5, 3587
- Naya Kashmir* (New Kashmir) 1929

- Naylor, James 1105
- Nazi Party, Nazism
 anti-Semitism 758, 1375
 and Antonescu 1590, 2857
 Austria 320
 exiles 1372
 fascism 291, 1183–4
 Final Solution 1594
 Führerprinzip 1371
 Greek resistance 1436–9
 Holocaust 1594
 homosexuality 465, 2104–5
 Jewish resistance 1916–18
 membership 1375
 Netherlands 2447
 racism 1184
 resistance to 1376–81
 rise of 1374–5
 totalitarianism 1917
 and Weimar Republic 1359
 workers' resistance 1370–1
see also Hitler, Adolf
- Nazi–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact 1593
- Nazim Kiamil Pasha 3682
- Nazir, Aizaz 2584
- Ndebele people 698–9, 700, 702, 3734, 3735
- Ndlovu, S. Mosoja 3729
- Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. 3084–90
- Ndola Welfare Association 3697
- Ne Win 550, 555, 2528, 3068, 3279
- Nea Dimokratia 3168
- Nechaev, Sergei** 159, 334, 977, 1575, 2425–6, 3720
Catechism of a Revolutionary 2425
- Necker, Jacques 891, 1275, 3033
- Neebe, Oscar W. 1569, 1570
- Neely, Daniel T. 610–12
- Neeno, Timothy M. 1239–42, 2822–4
- Neff, Francisco 692
- negative liberty 888
- nego-feminism* 3548
- Negri, Antonio** 2426–7
 arrested 1839
 autonomism 323, 324, 1843
 Bolivarianism 414
Empire 979, 1399, 1672, 1842, 1845, 2427
Insurgencies 2427
Marx Beyond Marx 2427
Multitude 979, 1399, 2427
 on the multitude 982, 1006
 plan state theory 1843, 1844
Political Descartes 2426
Savage Anomaly, The 2427
Stato e diritto nel giovane Hegel 2426
 Turin 1836
- Negrin, Juan 849, 1188, 3142, 3143, 3144
- Negrismo movement 2428
- Négritude 2428
- Négritude movement** 393, 644–5, 1162, 1523, 2427–9
 French Caribbean 3578
 Harlem Renaissance 1554
 Roumain 2872
 Senghor 3007, 3008
- Negro Cultural and Welfare Association (NWCSA) 3559
- Negro Factories Corporation 1336
- Negro Miguel Rebellion** 3451–2, 3630
- Negro School, Philadelphia 367
- Negro Seamen Act 3460
- Negro World* 1336
- Neguib, Muhammad 2406
- Nehanda, Ambuya 704
- Nehru, Indira (later Gandhi) 2429, 2432
- Nehru, Jawaharlal** 2429–35
 agrarian reforms 1683
 All-India States People's Conference 1929–30
 and Bose 449
 China policy 2434–5
Discovery of India 2795
 economic policies 2433–4
 education/social reform 2434
 foreign policy 2434–5
 and Gandhi 2429, 2433
Glimpses of World History 2429
 Home Rule movement 1700
 and Irwin 1327, 1681
 in jail 1683–4
 and Jinnah 1921, 2430
 on Kashmir 1931–2
 Khilafat movement 1326, 1677, 1702
 and King 1973
 and left 1710, 2431–2
 non-alignment 3688
 Popular Front 2431
 as prime minister 2433–5
 resignation 2875
 scientific socialism 450
 World War II 2792–3
- Nehru, Kamala 2429, 2430, 2431
- Nehru, Motilal 448, 449, 1326, 1680–1, 2429, 2430
- Nehru Report 1680–1, 2430
- Neill, A. S. 117–18
- Neilson, Samuel 1786
- Neither God Nor Master* 404
 “Nekomma” (Vengeance) 1918
- Nelken, Margarita 3611
- Nello, Paolo 2382–4
- Nelson, David, G. 441, 1807–8, 1848–9, 2565–6

- Nelson, Horatio 442, 873, 993, 2185
 Nelson, Robert 594
 Nemenzo, Francisco 2679, 2682
 Nemequene, of Colombia 3294
 Nemes, Robert 1630–1
 Nemesis Operation 281, 283
 Nenni, Pietro 1829, 2871, 3015
 Neo Destour Party 1248, 3335
 Neo-Kantianism 321
 Neo-Malthusianism 2968
 neo-Nazism
 Bologna 1008
 Czech Republic 1392
 Neoclassical Austrian School 355
 neocolonialism 1660–2, 2058
 neoconservatism 889–90
 neoimperialism 1660–2
neoliberalism 3685
 Bolivia 432–5
 Canada 2562
 Chile 690, 1398
 education 3185
 global governance 3655
 hegemony of 298, 299
 Korea 1988–9, 2001–2
 Peru 2650–6
 protest 1006, 1390, 2436–7
 Puerto Rico 2772
 Serbia 3685
 South Africa 3095, 3096, 3098
 South Korea 2000
 Sweden 1151
 Venezuela 3438–41
 World Social Forums 3640
 WTO 97
Nepal 230–2, 2437–41, 2441–4
 April Revolution 230–2
 Comprehensive Peace Accord 2439–40
 Dalits 231–2, 2440
 emigration 2440
 Gurkhas 569, 1686, 1687
 hybrid color revolution 811, 817
 Indian border violence 2443
 Madhesi population 231, 2438
 Maoists 2437–41
 nationhood 231
 protest movements 2441–4
 Ranas 2441–2
 Seven Parties Alliance 230, 2439
 water resources 2442
 women 231–2
 Nepal Bank Limited 232
 Nepal Democratic Congress 2442
 Nepali Congress Party (NCP) 230, 2437, 2442, 2443
 Nepali National Congress 2441, 2442
Nepali Sangh (Nepalese Society) 2441
 nepotism 2000, 2415
 Nérette, Joseph 279, 1507
Neruda, Pablo 112, 679, 1484, 1911, 2444
 Alturas de Macchu Picchu 2444
 NESEHNUTÍ 1391
 Ness, Henry 3414
 Ness, Immanuel 40–1, 390–1, 774, 1940–1, 2133–4, 2461–3, 3052–3, 3420–2
 Nestlé workers 809
 Netanyahu, Benjamin 239, 846, 1759
Netherlands 2444–8
 American gold and silver 1655
 Calvinism 1033, 1034–5
 COC 2093
 CPN 2446
 England declaring war on 83
 German invasion 1182, 2495
 Hapsburg 1034, 2445
 Interchurch Peace Council 198
 Marshall Plan 2447
 Muslims 2448
 Nazi Party 2447
 Protestant Reformation 1034–5
 protests (1650–1800) 2444–6
 protests (1800–2000) 2446–8
 SDAP 2446
 starvation 2447
 student protests 2447
 workers' movement 2446
 see also Dutch entries
 Netivot Shalom (Paths of Peace) 1813
Neto, António Agostinho 164, 167, 563, 2359, 2360–1, 2448–9
 Quatro Poemas 2448–9
 Neto, Ruth 3605
 Netri, Francisco 253
 Netri, José 253
 Netri, Pascual 253
 Nettleau, Max 95, 1609, 2691
 Network Gothenburg 1152
 Network of East West Women 3633
 Network of Free Initiatives 1618
 Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA) 1481
 Neubert, Ehrhart 1337, 1342
 Neue Freie Volksbühne 116, 2047
Neue Rheinische Zeitung 2235
Neue Zeit, Die 1942, 3228
Neues Deutschland 1317, 1340
 Neuhoff, Theodore de 872
 Neumann, Caryn E. 1617–19
 Neumann, Franz 905
 Neutrality, Treaty of 2594

- Neutrality Acts 56
 Never Again War 991
 Neves, José Maria 603
 Neville, John 3524
 Nevis 2075
 Nevskii Prospect strike 2896, 2904
 Nevsky Shipbuilding and Machine Plant 3029
New Age 2357
New Australia movement 313, 2449–56
 color line 2452–3
 women 2453
New Caledonia
 anarchist exiles 97
 Communard exiles 2300, 2456–7
 French control 3425
 immigrants 2458
 Kabyl exiles 1927
 nickel 2457, 2458, 2459
 protest and revolt 2456–60
 US base 2457
 volunteers in World War I 2457
 New Catholic Association 2544
 New Chinese Cinema 3285
 New Deal 839, 887, 1568, 2036, 2248, 3387
 Great Society 889
 trade unions 3065
 New Democracy Party (ND), Greece 1447, 1449–50
 New Democratic Party (NDP), Canada 390, 2561, 2975
 New Economic Policy (NEP) 3148, 3607
 Lenin 2087, 3510
 Makhno 2167
 prostitution 3017
 New England 78, 156, 1118–19
 New England Anti-Slavery Society 214, 1334
 New England Restraining Act 78
 New England Workingmen's Association (NEWA) 2130
New Era 113
 New Forum 1345
New German Critique 907
 New Granada 3457
 New Green Alliance 2976
 New Guinea hunter gatherers 3080
New Harmony 156, 1185, 1186, 2460–1, 2567, 3417, 3617
New Harmony Gazette 3666
 New Hebrides (Vanuatu) 2458, 3425
 New Israeli Left (SIH) 1812
 New Jersey mill strike 2825
New Jewel movement 390, 1462–6, 2461–3, 3559
 New Lanark Mills 2460, 2567
 New Left, Japan 1902–4
“new left,” Germany 3521–4
New Left Review 2249, 2262, 3282
New Masses 2253
 New Model Army 909, 1099, 1100, 1103, 2119
New Moral World 1091
 New Negro movement 17, 21, 22, 2822
 New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) 3114
 New People's Army (NPA) 2680
 New Poor Law Act 2720, 3500
New Reasoner 3282
new social movements 101, 782, 2503
 Australia 305–7
 Jamaica 1865
 USA 889
New Society 3283
 New South Wales 307, 310, 1456–8
 New South Wales Builders' Laborers' Federation (NSWBLF) 1456–8, 2373
New Statesman 525, 3283, 3517
New Times 3281
 New Woman 3623
 New World Group 1862
New World Quarterly 1862
New York 3166
 New York accords 1166
New York Age 3519
 New York City
 anti-Iraq war protest 227
 East Side Jewish Women 1209
 Irish immigrants 63, 69
 Leisler's Rebellion 75
 Puerto Rican street gangs 2770
 riots 63
 slave insurrection 88, 212
New York Daily Tribune 69, 3618
 New York Doll 2777
 New York Radical Women 3629
New York Times 222, 743, 2012
 Castro 930
 flying pickets 3412
 Macune 2728
 Mozote massacre 2958
 Pentagon Papers 222
 Samkange 2961–2
 water supplies 3100
New York Tribune 1305
New Yorker 615
New Zealand
 All Blacks rugby team 3155–6
 anarchism 139–40
 indigenous people 2205–9
 IWW 139
 Rainbow Warrior 1273
 see also Maoris; Nuclear-Free New Zealand

- New Zealand Herald* 2454
 New Zealand Labour Party 830, 831
 New Zealand Marxian Association 830
 New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone Disarmament
 and Arms Control Act 831, 2528, 2529
 New Zealand Socialist Party 139, 830
 New Zealand Wars 2207
 Newark, Battle of 1098
 NewArk Student Federation 348
 Newark Uprising 531
 Newcastle, Town Moor 3150
 Newllano Colony 3418, 3419
 newly industrializing countries 1670
 Newman, Paul Douglas 1300–2
 Newman, Saul 979
Newport Rising 657, 2463–4
News & Letters 1027
 Newsinger, J. 1027
Newsweek 965
 Newton, Huey P. 395, 398, 532, 613
 Newton, Isaac 2210, 2989, 2990
 Newton, John 3528
 Ney, Michel 443
 Nezib, Battle of 2366
 Nga Tamatoa (Young Warriors) 2208
 Ngainoumbey, Barka (Karmu) 1250
 Ngala, Ronald 2269
 Ngano, Martha 3729
 Ngei, Paul 2256
 Ngo Dinh Diem 219, 570, 1599, 2464, 2465,
 3474, 3481
 Ngo Dinh Kha 2465
Ngô Đình Nhu 2464–5, 3480
 Ngo Dinh Ziem 3479, 3480, 3481
 Ngoni people 2174
 NGOs: *see* non-governmental organizations
 Ngoyi, Lilian 3603
 Nguni groups 699
 Nguyen An Ninh 3469, 3470
 Nguyen Binh 3471
 Nguyen Cao Ky 3482
 Nguyen Chi Thanh 3480
 Nguyen Huu Tho 3480
 Nguyen Manh Tuong 3479
Nguyen Tat Thanh: *see* Hồ Chí Minh
 Nguyen Thai Hoc 3468
 Nguyen Van Hinh 2465
 Nguyen Van Tan 3470
 Nguyen Van Thieu 3482, 3484, 3485
 Nguyen Van Tinh 3471
 Ngwane, Trevor 1313
 Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC)
 3206–7, 3747
Nhan Van 3479
 Nhari Rebellion 3739
 Nhu, Madame 2465
 Ni Putes, Ni Soumises 3577
 Niagara Movement 756, 1023, 1024, 1555
 Nian Rebellion 3672
 Niassa Company 2354
 Nicaragua
 April Rebellion 605
 Carter 1164
 Catholic Church 2061
 CIA 2472
 civil war 2475
 Constitutionalist War 2965
 dictatorship of Somoza 605
 earthquake 2468
 El Chaparral invasion 1205
 ethnic groupings 2473
 filibustering 637
 health issues 2471–2
 IMF 2476
 indigenous resistance 1005
 John Paul's visit 2062
 MISURA 2473
 MISURASATA 2473
 National Government of Reconstruction 2470
 National Literacy Crusade 2471
 political music 637–8
 Socialist Party 2467
 students 2470
 UNAG 2474
 US intervention 2466, 2469
 US occupation 2965–6
 see also Nicaraguan Revolution; Sandinista
 National Liberation Front (FSLN)
 Nicaragua Exchange 2502
 Nicaraguan National Union of Agriculturalists
 and Livestock Producers (UNAG) 2474,
 3462
Nicaraguan Revolution 447, 774, 2465–76
 see also Sandinista National Liberation Front
 (FSLN)
 Nicholas I, Tsar 2716
 as absolute monarch 2921
 and Bakunin 334
 cholera riot 2878
 Decembrists 977
 and Kropotkin 2005
 overthrown 2889
 Nicholas II, Tsar 438
 abdication 439
 anti-Jewish 2921
 Chernov 676
 demonstrations against 1746–9
 Finland 1201
 Polish language 2718
 as saint 2921

- Nicholls, Doug 307
 Nichols, Mary Grove 3617
 Nichols, Thomas Low 3617
 nickel industry 2457, 2458, 2459
 Nickels, Benjamin P. 2779
 Nico 2777
 Nicola, Jabra 1812
 Nicolas, Louise 3584
 Niehaus, William Frank 3443
 Nien Rebellion 717
 Nietzsche, Elisabeth 2478
Nietzsche, Friedrich 2477–8
 On the Genealogy of Morals 2477
 as influence 2382, 2478
 Japanese readers 133
 on Luther 2140–1
 Thus Spoke Zarathustra 2478
 Übermensch 2478
 works 2477
 Nieuwenhuis, Domela 870, 1419
Niger Delta, protest movements 2478–80
 Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 2479
 Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) 2480, 2483, 2485
 Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF) 2483, 2484
 Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) 2480, 2484, 2485
Nigeria 2480–5
 Aba Women's Riot 2482, 3634
 British control 1659
 feminism 3548
 Global Day of Action 1389, 1397
 Igbo Women's War 3546
 IMF 2483
 independence 2484
 indirect rule 2482
 land tributes 1640
 Land Use Decree 1640
 Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 2635
 NAFTA 1053
 oil production 2485
 political and electoral protest 2480–2
 pre-colonial 2558
 protest and revolution 2482–4
 separatism 2484–5
 State Security Service (SSS) 2481
 women's movement 2734, 3547
 Women's War 3634–5
 Yoruba 1640
 youth organizations 1640
 see also Saro-Wiwa, Ken
 Nigeria Cocoa Marketing Board 24
 Nigerian Civil War 24, 25
 Night of Broken Glass 1179
 Night of the Long Knives 1591, 2104
 nihilism 1858
 Nihon Anarchist Club 1561
Nihon Heimin Shimbun 133
 Nihon Nōmintō (Japan Farmers' Party) 1911
 Nihon Nomin Kumiai (Japan Peasant Union) 1892
 Nihon Rōnōtō (Japan Labor Farmer Party) 1911
 Nihon Rodo Sodomei (Labor Confederation of Japan) 1890, 1892
 Nihon Rodokumiai Sodomei 1892
 Nii Win Intertribal Council 2419
 Nikolaeva, Klavdia 3552, 3607
 Nilsen, Celestine Micheline 2610–13
 Nimeiri, Jaafar Muhammad 3191
 Nimr, of Ja'liyīn tribe 3197
 Nimtz, A. H., Jr. 2238
Nin, Andreu 2257, 2486–7, 2738, 2739, 2740, 3136, 3141, 3142
 Nine-Two Resolutions, Canada 593
 Nine Years' War 1805
 Ninn, Serge 121
 Nippon Railway company 1897
 Nisbet, Murdoch 3000
 Nisga'a Indians 585
 Nishio, Suehiro 1909
 Nita, Amador 942
 Nitschmann, David 2323
 Nitti, Fausto 1383
 Nivedita, Sister 1697, 1698
 Nixon, E. D. 73, 761, 2614
 Nixon, Richard M.
 Bolivia 419
 Chile 689
 in China 711, 3484
 civil rights 741
 Freedom Budget 2037
 Kent State students 1946, 1947
 and Pham Van Dong 2663
 SDS 3189
 and Steinem 3167
 student protests 221
 Vietnam War 221, 223, 1946, 3484
 Niyazov, Saparmurat 3367–8
 NJM: *see* New Jewel movement
 Njonjo, Charles 1955
 Njoya, Timothy 1948
 Nkhwa, Kenneth 456
 Nkomati Accord 1262, 2154, 3106
 Nkomo, Joshua 1955, 2221, 2363, 3735, 3736
Nkrumah, Kwame 2487–8
 Botswana People's Party 459
 Du Bois 395, 1025
 fall of 1382–3
 independence movement 1381, 3545

- Nkrumah, Kwame** (*cont'd*)
 and Kenyatta 1954
 and Lumumba 2137
 Marxism 2249
 and Mpho 2358
 and Mugabe 2363
 and Robeson 2847
 socialism 1382
 and Zwane 3747–8
- Nkumbula, Harry 1940, 3698–9, 3703
- NKVD (Russian secret police) 3030, 3139, 3142, 3505
- Nnaemeka, Obioma 3548–9
- No Borders 2306
- No Child Left Behind Act 885
- No-Conscription League 1412
- No Mas march 797
- no-rent campaign 1328
- Noboa, Gustavo 1067
- Noche de los Bastones Largos, La* 865
- Nogaret, Guy Chaussinand 1285
- Nogueras, Antonio 253
- Nohke, Gustav 259
- Noir et Rouge* 121
- Nokor Thom* 573
- nomadic concept, anarchism 96
- nomadic war machine (NWM) 981, 982, 2750
- nomadism, Deleuze/Guattari 980, 2750
- nomenklatura* (bureaucracy) 3115, 3116–17, 3118–20, 3123, 3128
- Nōmin Jichi Kai (Peasants' Self-Governing League) 133
- Non-Aggression Pact 1377
- Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) 3651, 3653
- Non-Aligned Countries Summit, Cuba 3304
- non-aligned movement (NAM)**
 African National Congress 1940
 five demands 3688
 Yugoslavia 3295, 3296, 3688–9
- non-compliance 3664
- non-cooperation 1326, 2490
- Non-Cooperation movement 448
- Non-European Movement (NEM) 3084
- Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) 171, 834, 3086
- non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
 Argentina 2346
 and ATTAC 300
 Cuba 936
 Eastern Europe 811–12
 Internationals 814, 1755–8
 Japan 1876–7
 Korea 1994
 Latin America 3599–600
- Make Poverty History 1312–13
 post-Fordism 1399–400
 Southern Africa 3114
 Thailand 3274–5
 Ukraine 814
 and WTO 3648
- non-interventionists** 1219, 2488–90
- Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 197
- Non-Resistance Society 78, 156
- Non-Sect Radicals 1881
- non-violence**
 Chávez, César 663
 civil rights movement 17–18
 collective action 2492–4
 First Nations protest 785
 Food Not Bombs 1206
 Gandhi 1324, 2490
 La Boétie 2017
 Pashtuns 1965–70
 as protest 2757
 religion 2496
 strikes 2494
 USA 2498–500
see also non-violent movements; non-violent revolutions; Sharp, Gene
- non-violent movements** 2490–7, 2497–505
- non-violent revolutions** 2505–12
see also color revolutions
- Nonconformists 1406, 3501
- Nonviolent Action Group (NAG) 613
- Norbu, D. 3292–3
- Nordic countries**
 conscription 2516
 Great Depression 2519
 peasant/landlord relations 2516
 revolts and protests 2512–21
 social welfare 2520
see also individual countries
- Nore mutiny** 994, 3154–5
- Noriega, Manuel 2594
- Norindeth, Prince 576, 577
- Norodom, King 566, 567
- Norodom Naradipho 570
- Norodom Phanouvong 567
- Norris-LaGuardia Act 3411, 3412
- North, Lord 86, 508, 1223, 1786
- North, Oliver 2475
- North African Star (ENA) 43–4
- North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1053, 1210, 1386, 1396, 1642, 2212, 2293, 3655, 3715
- EZLN 1053, 1386, 3600
- North American Indian Brotherhood 584
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
 British Labour Party 2040

- Czech Republic 1563
 Germany 1366
 Iceland protests 2520
 Kosovo 37–8, 1831, 2003
 missiles 1366
 nuclear weapons 197, 513
 Turkey 281–2
 weapons storage 227
North Briton 3530
 North Carolina 85, 869
 North Korean Workers' Party (NKWP) 3183
North Star 1021, 3006
 North Western Frontier Provinces (NWFP) 1680
 Northeastern Federation of Anarchist
 Communists (NEFAC) 160, 200
 Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation 2418
 Northern Farmers Network 3275
 Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
 (NICRA) 1797, 1801
Northern Ireland peace movement 2521–2
 Northern Marianas, Commonwealth of 2304
 Northern Rhodesian Congress (NRC) 3698
 Northern Rhodesian Mineworkers' Union
 (NRMWU) 3696, 3700
Northern Star 656, 658, 1786, 2543, 2549, 2550,
 3393
 Northern Territory Land Rights Act 310
 Northern Wisconsin Resource Group 2419
 Northumberland, Duke of 1094
 Northwest Frontier Province, Pakistan 1922,
 1965
 Northwest Indian War 87
 Norton, M. B. 3614
Norway
 anarchism 2526
 Danish rule 2513
 German invasion 2495
 Ice Front 2525–6
 industrialization 2524
 protest and revolution 2522–6
 Reformation 2523
 strikes 2495, 2519
 women's suffrage 2524
 see also Nordic countries
 Norwegian Association for the Rights of Women
 2524
 Norwegian Syndicalist Federation 2526
 Norwegian Women's Public Health Association
 2524
 Noske, Gustav 1361, 1363
Nosotros 1188
 Notting Hill Carnival 2527
Notting Hill Riots 2526–7
 Nottingham Captain: *see* Brandreth, Jeremiah
 Nouméa Accord 2459
 Nouri, Said Abdullo 3245
 Nourry, J. B. Jacques 1298
Nouvel Observateur 3575
 Nouvelle Calédonie Pour Tous (NCPT) 2459
Nouvelles Calédoniennes 2458
Nouvelles féministes (Feminist News) 3575
 Nova Canço 632
 Nova Scotia 210
 Novaes, Henrique Tahan 1925, 2117–18, 2219–20
 Novalis 1143
Novaya-zhizn 2919
 Novgorodtseva-Sverdlova, K. T. 3606
 Novi Sad demonstration 3010
 Novomirskii, Daniil 142
 Novotny, Antonín 949, 1025, 3173
NOW: *see* National Organization for Women
 Nowa Huta steelworks 3076
 Noyes, John Humphrey 156, 2559
 n'Soumer, Fadhma 1927
Nu, U 302, 557, 2527–8, 3068, 3279
 Nuba people 3192–3
Ñucanchic Allpa 1056
 nuclear arms race 190, 2501
 Nuclear Claims Tribunal 199, 2303
 Nuclear Exit Law 1367
 nuclear fallout 191, 820, 1461
Nuclear-Free New Zealand 2528–9
 Nuclear Freeze 198
 Nuclear Safety Commission 192
 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 820
 nuclear testing
 Alaska 1460
 French Polynesia 1272, 1273, 1460
Nuclei Armati Proletari (NAP) 2401–2
 nudist movement 107
 Nueva Australians: *see* New Australia movement
Nueva canción 637–41, 1911, 2376, 2751
 Nueva Trova Cubana 2853
Nujoma, Sam 2399, 2400, 2529–31, 3202,
 3204–5
 Nunes, Rodrigo 1400
 Núñez, Carlos 2469
 Nuñez, Rafael 806
 Núñez, Serafin 562
 Nuñez de Balboa, Vasco 2592–3
 Nuova Sinistra Unità (New Left Unity) 2622
 Nuqrashi, Mahmud 1560
 Nūr al-Dīn Pasha 51, 3558
 Nuremberg Trials 889, 1594
 Nuremberg Party Rallies 1175
 Nuri-al-Said 1776, 1779
 Nuruddin, Yusuf 232–3, 531–2, 963–5, 1852–3
 Nussel, Jill M. 3594–6
 Nuu-chah-nulth First Nation 785
 Nwazurike, Ralph 2484

- Nyakasikana, Nehanda 3602
 Nyakauru, Shato 3730
 Nyandoro, George 2385
 Nyasaland
 cash-cropping 2174
 Chilembwe 694–6
 Christianity 2174
 labor conflict 2173–4
 Land Ordinance 2173
 nationalism 2174–5
 Native Associations 2173
 plantation culture 2173
 resistance, early 2174
 see also Malawi
 Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) 459, 2174
Nyasaland Times 695
 Nyatisime College 2961
 Nyeko, Balam 2109–13
Nyerere, Julius 2532–3
 Maji Maji revolt 3254
 and Manley 2197
 and Mondlane 2314
 nationalism 3545
 and Sobhuze II 3748
 TANU 3254–5
 terms of trade 1661
 Ujamaa socialism 2532–3, 3374–5
 and ZANU 3739
 and Zanzibar 3708
 and Zwane 3747
 Nyobe, Reuben um 1251, 1252
Nyoinin Geijutsu (Women's Arts) 133
 Nzinga M' Bandi, Queen 3602
- Ó Beacháin, Donnacha 810–18, 3328–33
 Ó Brádaigh, Ruairí 1802, 1803
 Oakboys 1807
 Oakes, Richard 39
 Oasis Forum 3705
 Oastler, Richard 657
 Oates, Titus 289
Oaxaca uprising 2162, 2286, 2290, 2295,
 2535–8
 civil disobedience 2535
 COCEI 2287
 women's pots and pans march 2536
 Obando y Bravo, Miguel 2061, 2062, 2742
 Obata, Y. 1876
 obeah 2789
Obrador, Andrés Manuel López 2538–9
Obregón, Alvaro 619, 2539–42, 3431
 assassinated 903
 and Carranza 2539, 2540–1
 Casa del Obrero Mundial 2540
 Conventionists 2279
 Morones 2340
 revolutionary nationalism 2281
 and Zapatista 3711
 Obregón, Manuel 641
Obrero, El 270
O'Brien, Bronterre 658, 2543, 3061
 O'Brien, Stephen 2038–9, 3738–40
 O'Brien, William 967
 O'Byrne, Feagh McHugh 1805
 Öcalan, Abdullah
 captured 3344
 handed over to Turkey 1450, 2010, 2011
 withdrawing to Syria 1450, 2010–11
 OCAP Women of Etobicoke 2562
 Occhetto, Achille 2622
 Occupied Social Centers: *see* Centri Sociali
 Ochoa, Arnaldo 629, 924
 Ochoa, Digna 2289
 Ochoa Antich, Fernando 604
 O'Coigly, James 3391
 O'Connell, Dáithi 1803
O'Connell, Daniel 547, 633, 655, 1789,
 2543–5, 2549, 3680
O'Connor, Arthur 546, 1203, 1788, 1790–1,
 2545–8
 exile to France 2547
 imprisonment 2546–7
 legacy of 2547–8, 2549
 and Sheridan 3024
 United Irishmen 2546, 3393
 O'Connor, E. 1026
O'Connor, Feargus 656, 657, 658–9, 2543,
 2545, 2548–52
 Chartism 2548–9, 2550–1
 Northern Star 2543, 2549, 2550
 and O'Connell 2549
 State of Ireland, The 2549
 Tolpuddle Martyrs 3301
 utopianism 2551
 O'Connor, J. Patrick 8
 O'Connor, James 2249
 O'Connor, Roger 2549
October (Eisenstein) 1081
 October 8 Revolutionary Movement (MR8) 384
 October War, Israel 1813
 Octobrist Party 2882, 2891, 2910, 2925–6
 Odi massacre 2485
 O'Doherty, Cahir 1806
 O'Donnell, Manus 1805
 O'Donnell, Rory 1806
 O'Donnell, Ruan 3490, 3491
 Odreman, Hernan Grüber 3449
 Odria, Manuel A. 1568, 2650
 Oduduwa 3676
 O'Dwyer, Michael 1325, 1701

- O'Farrell, Patrick 3490
 Offaly, Lord Thomas 1804–5
 Offen, Karen 1421–2
 Office of Strategic Services, USA 1598, 1715
 Official Secrets Act 1696
 Ogarev, Nikolai 1574
 Ogbar, J. 399
 Ogé, Vincent 1527, 2552–5
Ogé's Revolt 2552–5
 Oginga Odinga: *see* Jaramogi
 Oglala Sioux Civil Rights Organization 2415
 Ogoni people 1053, 2972, 2973
 see also Movement for the Survival of the
 Ogoni People (MOSOP)
 O'Gorman, Richard 3680, 3681
 Oguda, Lawrence 2269
 Ogundipe-Leslie, Molara 3548
 O'Hara, Patsy 2967
O'Higgins, Bernardo Riquelme 2555–6
 O'Higgins, Kevin 1050
 Ohio Catholic Bishops 1170
 Ohnesorg, Benno 12, 1037, 1256, 1368, 3523
 Ohrwalder, Joseph 2164
 Ohta, Kaoru 1879
 Oikeutta Eläimille 118
 Oil Enforcement Agency 1482
 oil industry
 Cuba 626
 Ecuador 1064, 1065
 Iran 1763, 1769, 2343–4, 2505
 Iraq 1783
 Mexico 606
 Nigeria 2485
 Peru 2647
 prices 670
 Russia 3127
 Trinidadian workers 1866
 Venezuela 670, 942, 3436, 3438
 Ojeda, Alonso de 601
 Ojeda, Fabricio 3437, 3442
 Ojeda Ríos, Filiberto: *see* Ríos, Filiberto
 Ojibwe Indians 2414, 2419
 Ojoawo, Mofeyisra Oluwatoyin 2558–9, 3030–2
 Ojukwu, Odumegwu 24
 OK 98 812, 814, 815
Oka crisis 2556–8
Oke-Ogun Uprising 2558–9
 Okinawa
 anti-base protest 1886–7
 pacifist resistance 1888–9
 US imperialism 1885–6
Oklahoma Greencorn Rebellion 1458–60
 Okullu, Henry 1951
 Okyar, Fethi 3361
 Olalia, Rolando 2684
 Olaya Herrera, Enrique 407, 1320
 Old Finns 1201
 Old Republic 466–7
 Olday, John 107
 Oldenbarnvelt, Johan van 1035
 O'Leary, John 1415
 Oliver, William 465
 Oliver the Spy 3281
 Olivera, Oscar 791
 Olivier, George Borg 2187
 Ollman, Bertell 2839
 Olorunkoya (Society Against Injustice) 24
 Olsen, Floyd 3413, 3414
 Olshausen, Theodor 2984
 Olson, Mancur 649, 652, 2758
 Olubadan of Ibadan 24
 Olumide, Olusanya 2487–8
 Olutayo, Seun Molatokubo 1381–3
 Olympic Games
 Beijing 720
 Mexico City 2262, 3296
 Montreal 2099
 Omagh bombing 1797, 1802
 Omaha race riots 2823–4
 O'Mahoney, John 1192
 O'Malley, Vincent 2205–9
 Omar, Mullah Muhammad 3246–7
 Omdurman, Battle of 2165
 Omido, Fred 1950
 Omobowale, Ayokunle Olumuyiwa 579–81,
 853–4, 854–6, 856–8, 1246–53, 2137–9,
 2482–4, 2532–3, 3253–5, 3374–5, 3707–9
 Omowali, Ashanti Alston 159
 Omsk Opposition 3030
 Omvedt, G. 1707
On-to-Ottawa Trek 588, 2562–4, 2831, 2832
 One Big Union
 Canada 588, 3535, 3536
 and IWW 1734, 1738
 Lawrence Mills 110, 149, 150, 154, 315, 502
 South Africa 3090, 3092
 syndicalism 1026
ONE Magazine 2107
 One Pack movement 1904
 One Tsubo movement 1907
 O'Neal, William 1551
Oneida Perfectionist Utopians 2559–60, 3417
Oneida Whig 3006
 O'Neill, Con 1805
 O'Neill, Eugene 1555, 2846
 O'Neill, Hugh 1805–6
 O'Neill, John 1192
 O'Neill, Phelim 1806
 O'Neill, Shane 1805
 O'Neill, Terence 2572

- O'Neill, Vincent Wilfrid 2784
 Oneko, Achieng' 2256
 Onfroi, Comte d' 2073
 Ongania, Juan Carlos 249, 863, 864, 865, 868
 Ongaro, Raimundo 868
 Onjo of Okeho 2558
Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP)
 2560–2
 Ontario Days of Action 2561
 Onus, Bill 307
 Oodua People's Congress (OPC) 2484
 Oorlam people 2390
 Oostindie, Gert J. 1030–3
 Opdyke, George 69
 OPEC: *see* Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
 Open Door policy 1214
 Open Society Institute 815
 Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB) 1177
 Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro (OND) 1177
Operai e capitale (Workers and Capital) 1842
Operai e stato (Workers and State) 1844
operaism/post-operaism
 Finland 119
 Italy 1006, 1841–5, 2426, 3170
 opium trade 1657–8
 Opium Wars 185, 715, 1214, 1658, 2145, 2994, 3230, 3232, 3475, 3671
 Opletal, Jan 2509
 Oposición Sindical Obrero (Workers' Union Opposition) 181
 Oppenheim, James 2032
 Oppenheimer, J. Robert 194–5
 Opportunists 1323
Opportunity 1554
 Opposition League, Japan 1902, 1907
 Opposition United Workers Party 609
Oprimido, El 111
 OPZZ (trade union federation) 2708–9
 Ora, Antonio 2673
 oral histories, indigenous peoples 3601
 Oral Intangible Patrimony of Humanity 1939
 Oram, Gerard 510–11
 Orange, House of 2445, 2591
 Orange Free State 153, 3603
 Afrikaners 2109
 Orange Order 1787
Orange Revolution, Ukraine 811–12, 814–15, 817, 2510, 3011, 3021, 3329, 3375–8
 Oranges, War of the 187
 ORDEN 2956, 2957
 Order of Perfectibilists 3146
Ordine Nuovo, L' 130, 385, 446, 1422, 3298
 O'Reilly, chieftain 1804
 Org 1379–80
 Organisation de l'armée secrète (OAS) 226
 Organisation Pensée Bataille (OPB) 122
 Organisation Révolutionnaire Anarchiste (ORA) 121
 Organisation Speciale 366
 Organización Comunista Poder Obrero (OCPO) 245
 Organización Feminista Revolucionaria 3611
 Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo (ORP) 246
 Organización Revolucionaria de los Trabajadores (ORT) 1164
 Organización Sindical Estatal (OSE) 180
 Organizaciones Peronistas 864
 Organization of African Unity (OAU) 395, 459, 2359, 2530, 3736
 Organization of Afro-African Unity (OAAU) 395, 747
 Organization for Afro-American Unity 395, 2181
 Organization of American States (OAS) 672, 1015, 1019, 1067, 1320, 2594, 2655
 Ministerial 592
 Organization of Angolan Women (OMA) 3605
 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 298, 2293
 Organization of Indigenous Nations and Peoples in Argentina (ONPIA) 259
 Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza (OPIP) 1056, 1057, 1065
 Organization of Marxists-Leninists of Greece (OMLE-PPSP) 1447
 Organization for Marxist Unity 831
 Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) 3547
 Organization of the Mozambican Workers (OTM) 2355
 Organization of People in Arms (ORPA) 1480, 1481
 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 667, 670, 1065, 1135, 1782
 Organization of Republican Workers (ORO) 2600
 Organization of Revolutionaries (OR) 3443
 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 2003, 3330
 Organization of Women of Asian and African Descent (OWAAD) 3570
Organizer, The 3414
 Organs of People's Power (OPP) 922, 935, 940
 Orgreave Colliery 529–30, 3062
 Oribe, Manuel 1332
 Orlove, B. S. 1207
 Orly Airport bombing 284
 Ormond, Earl of 1804
 Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 1134, 1138–9
 Oromo nationalism 1134, 1138–9

- Orozco, José Clemente 2375
 Orozco, Pascual 2277, 2539, 3431
 Orquesta Papaya 641
 Orr, Scott D. 339–43
 Ortega, Camilo 2564
 Ortega, Humberto 2467, 2470, 2564
 Ortega, Samuel 2296
Ortega, Daniel 448, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2474–5, 2476, **2564**, 2964–5
 Orthodox Church of Cyprus 943
 Ortigoza, Napoleón 2597
Ortiz, Fernando **2565**
 Ortiz, R. 3658
 Ortíz Contreras, Raúl 2209–10
 Ortiz Monasterio, Angel 621
 Ortiz Rubio, Pascual 2542
 Ortodoxo Party 623, 624, 926, 927
 Oruuano Independent Church 3603
 Orwell, George 107, 2128, 2738
 Oshawa Strike 589
 O'Shea, Kitty 967, 2617
 O'Shea, William 2617
 Ōshima Eizaburō 134
 Oslo Accords 239, 1758, 1759, 1815
 Osmani, M. A. G. 347
 Osmena, Sergio 1613
 Ospina Pérez, Mariano 408, 409, 1321
 Ostoyich, Kevin 1355–8
Ōsugi Sakae 136, 1848, **2565–6**, 3595
 O'Sullivan, Michael E. 1337–46
 Osvobodilna Fronte (OF) 3052
 Oswald, John 3428
 Otálvaro H., Andrés 343–4, 806–7, 3388–9
 Otis, James 76
 Otpor movement 812, 814, 3011, 3377
Otra campaña, La, Zapatistas 1403, 3712, 3719
 Ottama, U 552, 2979
 Ottanelli, Fraser 839
 Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference 1684
 Otto, King of Greece 1451
 Otto, Louise 3579
 Otto I 2829
 Ottoman empire
 Armenia 285–6
 Bulgaria 538
 collapse of 337, 2862
 Greece 1451
 Hospitallers 2183
 Islam 1808
 Romania 2864–5
 trade 1657
 Turkey 3346–8
 Young Turks **3681–2**
 Otunbaeva, Rosa 3331, 3333
 Ouattara, Alassane Dramane 881
 Ouelette, Jean 2556–7
 Oufkir, Mohammed 2337–8
 Ouko, Robert 1948, 1949, 1951
 Oulart, Battle of 1788
 Oum Mannorine 572
 Oumar Tall, El Hadj 2181
 Our World Is Not For Sale (OWINFS) 3645, 3652
 Outerelo, Manuel 277, 278
 Outram, James 1690
ouvriérisme 120
 Ovambo people 2395, 2529, 3202
 Ovamboland, as war zone 2398, 3204
 Ovamboland People's Congress (OPC) 3300
 Ovamboland People's Organization (OPO) 2530, 3202
 Ovando, Alfredo 417–18
 Ovando, Nicolás de 28, 601, 1116, 2079
 Overseas Reform Act 884
 Overton, Mary 1108
 Overton, Richard 1100, 1102, 1108, 2119
 Ovid 3428
 Oviedo, Fernández de 2593
 Oviedo, Lino 2602–3
Oway (Peacock's Call) 301
 Owen, Chandler 21, 22, 1554
Owen, Robert 655, 656, **2566–7**
 Addams on 10
 al-Bustani on 234
 collapse of communities 1222, 2461
 as example 1638
 New Harmony 156, 1186, **2460–1**, 3417, 3617
 Report to the County of Lanark 2460
 utopian socialism 678, 2231, 2460, 2551, 3061
 and Wright 2460–1
 Owen, Robert Dale 2024, 2461, 3666
 Owenite socialist movement 655, 2454
 Owens, Joe 1456
 Oxfam 1312
 Oxford Movement 2340
 Oyinlola, Olagunsoye 1641
 Oz Ve'Shalom (Valor and Peace) 1813
 Ózal, Turgut 2011–12, 3342–3

 Pabna uprising 372
 PAC: *see* Pan-Africanist Congress
 Pacey, Battle of 2665
 Pach Chhoeun 570, 575
 Pachakutik Indian Movement (MIP) 433, 1057, 1939
 Pacheco, María 844
 Pacheco Areco, Jorge 3409
 Pacific, War of **425–32**, 433, 1890, 2647, 3035, 3594
 Pacific Rim countries 1663

- Pacification of Ghent 1035
 Pacification Pact, Mussolini 2383
 pacifism 225
 see also non-violent movements
 Pact of Brotherhood of Workers Societies 2267
 Pact of Punto Fijo 665, 3436, 3437
 Pact of the Caribbean 879
Pacte colonial 1525, 1527, 1540–1
 Pacto Social 249
 Paddy Lands Act 1494
 Padilla, Heberto 923
Padilla, Juan de 844, 2569
 Padlewski, Zygmunt 2704
 Padmore, George 395, 613, 1874–5, 1954, 2249
 Padri War 1719, 1721
 Páez, José Antonio 578, 3458, 3706
 Páez Monges, Manuel María 2598
 paganism 2258
Pagolponthi Revolt 371–2
 Pahlevi, Mohammad Reza Shah 1256, 1762, 1763, 1765, 1768, 1769, 1811, 1962, 3523
 exiled 2505
 and Mossadegh 2342–3
 see also Iranian Revolution
 Paikhas group 3368
Paine, Thomas 1116, 1409, 2569–71, 2754
 Age of Reason 2571
 Common Sense 80, 83, 2022, 2570
 Crisis papers 81, 2569, 2570
 and Fitzgerald 1203
 Rights of Man, The 1284, 1607, 2126, 2570–1, 3150
 and Smith 3054
 and Thelwall 3280
 Pais, Frank 624, 916, 929, 930–1, 3573
 Pais, Sidonio 878
Paisley, Ian 1797, 1798, 2571–3
 Pajaros, Los 408, 1321
 Pak Mun Dam project 290, 3276
 Pak Yol 134
 Paktoonkhwa QIP 2584
 Pakhtun Zalemy 1970
Pakistan 1761, 2573–9, 2579–86
 Bengali nationalist struggles 344–8, 2573–9
 Cold War 2580
 creation of 344–5, 1810
 displaced communities 1711
 earthquake 3641
 Faiz 1160
 genocide 347
 Global Day of Action 1389
 Ibrahim 1637
 independence 1660, 2579–80
 Iqbal 1761
 and Kashmir 1931
 language movement 2577–8
 Northwest Frontier Province 1965
 protest and rebellion 2579–86
 rape 1711
 student movement 3181
 student uprisings 2262, 2577
 trade unions 2580
 World Social Forum 3641
 see also Jammu-Kashmir; Jinnah, Muhammad Ali; Pashtuns
 Pakistan Muslim League 2584
 Pakistan National Congress 2577
 Pakistan National Party (PNP) 2580–1
 Pakistan People's Party (PPP) 1637, 1857
 Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Limited (PCTL) 2585
Pakistan Times 1160, 2581
 Pakistan Trade Union Federation (PTUF) 1637, 2585
 Pal, Bipin Chandra 1696, 2574
 Palabra Obrera (PO) 244
 Palach, Jan 951, 2744, 3174, 3176, 3433
 Palacio, Alfredo 253, 271, 870, 1059
 Palacios, Andy 640
 Palamas, Costis 3583
 Palau 2304
 Palau, Rosa 2597
 Palazzo Vidoni Pact 1822
 Palestine
 autonomy 360, 374
 Balfour Declaration 374
 Intifada 1399, 1547, 1549, 1777, 1780, 1814, 2502
 Jewish immigrants 3743
 League of Nations Mandate 237
 Occupied Territories 238, 239, 1758, 1760
 poverty 1550
 self-determination 2502
 water supplies 1817
 Zionists 373, 3743
 see also Black September; Intifada I and II
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 237–40
 creation of 238, 399
 Hamas 1549
 Lebanon 360, 2070
 post-Fordism 1399
 renouncing violence 2502
 see also Black September
 Palestine National Authority 239, 1548–9, 1550, 1759
 Palestine National Council (PNC) 1758
 Palit, C. 1712
 Palit, Tarak Nath 1698
 Palladino, Carmelo 1161

- Pallares, Amalia 1064–5
 Palloy, Pierre François 354
 Palm d'Aelders, Etta 1294
 Palma, Arturo Alessandri 693, 1468
Palmares slave revolts 2586–9, 3745
 Palme, Olaf 223
 and Manley 2197
 Palme-Dutt, R. 450
 Palmer, A. Mitchell 595, 836, 1321, 2589, 2947
 Palmer, Bryan D. 591–2, 595–7, 2783–8, 3281–4
 Palmer, S. 501
 Palmer, Thomas Fyshe 2366
Palmer raids 158, 836, 1412, 2253, 2589
 Palmerston, Lord 2827
 Palo de Mayo 638
 Palonegro, Battle of 807
pamphleteering and political protest, Dutch Republic 1096, 1106, 1413, 2589–92
 Pampillon, Santiago 865, 868
 Pan-African Amicalist Movement 853
 Pan African Conference (1945) 1954
 Pan-Africanism 392, 395, 3578, 3729, 3747
 Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)
 African nationalism 3084, 3086
 and ANC 171, 2192, 2358, 3104
 banned 172
 and BCP 2111
 Du Bois 395
 Pogo 3087–8
 support from China 173
 unbanned 175, 3107
 pan-Arabism 399, 1776, 2068
 pan-Caribbeanism 3532
 Pan-Pacific Trade Union 830
 pan-Slavic liberation 334
 Pan-Slavism 1619
 Panagoulis, Alexandros 1433, 1448
Panama 2592–5, 3304–5
 Agrarian Councils 3304
 Cemaco's anti-colonial resistance 2592–3
 imperialism 1664
 independence 2593
 leftist groups 3304
 music 640
 National Guard 3304
 nationalism and popular mobilization 2593–5
 Torrijos 3304–5
 US intervention 2593
 US invasion 2594
 Panama Canal Zone 48, 416, 1754
 Panama Students' Federation (FEP) 2593
 Panamerican Conference 412
 Panamerican Federation of Labor (PFL) 2340
 Panamian National Assembly 2593
 Panarchy 107
Panathenaea 3583
 Pancasán 638
Panchayat (local self-government) 1688, 2437, 2442, 2443
 Pandey, Gyanendra 1327
 Pandey, Mangal 1686
 Pando, José Manuel 425
 Pangalos dictatorship 1442
 Panhellenic Liberation Movement (PAK) 1433, 1446, 1448
 Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) 1446, 1447, 1448–9, 3220
 Panitchpakdi, Supachai 3647, 3651
 Panizzari, Giorgio 2402
 Pankhurst, Adela 2595, 2596
Pankhurst, Christabel 527, 2595–6
Pankhurst, Emmeline 527, 2595–6
Pankhurst, Sylvia 511, 527, 2595–6
 Pannekoek, Anton 414, 973, 2446
 Pant, Govind Ballabh 450, 1329, 2795, 2876
 Pantev, Atanas 543
 Panthay Rebellion 716
 Pantsov, Alexander V. 674–6, 2113–14, 2123–5, 2780, 2781–2, 3505–6, 3722–4, 3724–5, 3725–6, 3726–7
 Panzieri, Raniero 1836
 Paoli, Giacinto 872
 Paoli, Pasquale 441, 545, 872
 Paoli Massacre 85
 Papa Doc: *see* Duvalier, François
 Papadopoulos, George 1433, 1435
 Papanastassiou, Alexandros 1441, 1443
 Papandreou, Andreas 1448, 1449
 Papandreou, Georgios 1434, 1437, 1446
 Papeete uprisings 1273
 Papen, Franz von 1590, 2833
 Papineau, Louis-Joseph 593
 Papon, Maurice 1644
 Papua New Guinea 3080, 3426
 Paracelsianism 2987–8
Paraguay 2599–610
 Amnesty International 2603
 Archive of Terror 2596–8
 Australian radical migrants 313, 2449–56
 Carter 2606
 Catholic Church 2060
 Chaco War 2599
 CIA 2597–8, 2606
 citizen protest 2603
 Civil War 2609
 Colorado Party 2604
 cotton 2607
 exports 2609
 Guaraní 3009
 human rights 2597–8, 2606

- Paraguay** (*cont'd*)
 IMF 2604
 independence 2608
 indigenous population 2601
 landless peasantry 2601
 liberation theology 2135
 protest in post-Stroessner era 2601–3
 protest and revolt 2603–8
 protests in liberal era 2608–10
 resistance to rise of the military 2599–601
 students 2601
 Triple Alliance 2608–10
see also Aracaré; New Australia movement
- Paraguayan Peasant Movement (MCP) 2602, 2607
- Paraskevov, Vasil 536–8, 539–40, 540–2, 542–5, 3068–9
- Pardo Bazán, Emilia 3610
- Pardo Leal, Jaime 802, 808, 1168, 3389
- Parents Against Silence 1814
- Pareto, Vilfredo 2244
- Paria, La* 1597
- Paris
 besieged by Prussians 898, 2610
 general strike 1241–2
 May 1968 demonstrations 3178
 subway bombing 1646
see also Hôtel de Ville, Paris
- Paris, Conference of 3484
- Paris, Treaties of 189, 920, 2752, 2767
- Paris Commune** 123, 2610–13
 Bloody Week 1323, 2410, 2611
 casualties 2611
 council communism 3637
 Courbet 898
 equal pay 2612
 ideology 2611–12, 2903
 Lenin 2613
 Marat 2211
 Marianne 2216
 Marx and Engels on 2612–13, 3057
 Michel 2299–300
 as model 935, 1744
 and Proudhon 120
 Raspail 2805
 Reclus 2811
 Robespierre 2850
 Trotsky 2613
 women's participation 123, 2612
- Paris Congress 1756
- Paris Peace Accord 223, 1960–1, 3036, 3485
- Paris Peace Conference 31, 944, 1453, 1816, 2396, 3036, 3508
- Paris Peace Treaty for Vietnam 1959, 3488
- Paris Treaty 76, 2669
- Park, Sabina 1871
- Park Chung-hee 1982, 1999, 2000, 2014, 3182
- Park Jong-chul 3183
- Park Yeol 136
- Parker, John 3047
- Parker, Richard 3154
- Parker, Thomas 3612
- Parke, Bessie Raynor 3566
- Parkes, Henry 105
- Parks, Rosa** 72–3, 761, 2492, 2498
 Montgomery Bus Boycott 1971, 2613–16
 voting rights march 2615
- Parlato, Valentino 2196
- Parliamentary Reform Bill 547
- Parma, Duke of 1035
- Parnell, Charles Stewart** 967, 1799, 2616–18
- Parnell, Samuel 830
- Parnell, William 2616
- Parpart, J. L. 3696
- Parr, Catherine 516
- Parra, Violeta 1911, 2378, 2379
- Parrales, Edgar 2061
- Parren, Callirrhoe 3581–3
- Parren, Jean 3582
- Parri, Ferruccio 1384
- Parrot, Jean-Claude** 2618–19
- Parsley Massacre 1013
- Parsons, Albert 1569, 1570, 2026, 2027, 2029
- Parsons, Lucy 123, 157, 2029
- Parsons, N. 1956
- parthenogenesis 3629
- Parti Communiste Français: *see* Communist Party of France (PCF)
- Parti Communiste Internationaliste (PCI) 621
- Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) 3006
- Parti pour l'Entente Nationale (PEP) 1519
- Parti de Libération Kanak (PALIKA) 2458
- Parti Ouvrier 2628
- Parti Pris* 2784
- Parti Québécois: *see* Quebec, nationalism
- Parti Rouge 2841
- Parti Socialiste 825, 3006
- Parti Socialiste Populaire (PSP) 1517
- participatory budgeting 2621
- participatory democracy** 2619–21
 types of 2620–1
- Partido Africano da Independencia do Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC/PAICV) 165, 563, 564, 602, 603, 1492
- Partido Aprista Peruano 48, 1567
- Partido Azul (Blue Party) 1016
- Partido Comunista Marxista Leninista Argentino (PCMLA) 245
- Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL): *see* Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)

- Partido Democrata (PD) 1167
 Partido Democratico, Portugal 877
 Partido Feminista 3611
Partido Independiente de Color 911–14, 2150
 Partido Justicialista 243
 Partido de Liberacion Nacional (PLN), Costa Rica 878
 Partido Liberal de México (PLM) 137, 998, 2161, 2276
 Partido Nacional Revolucionario 2281
 Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) 1128, 1130–1
 Partido ng Bayan 2684
 Partido Obrero 270
Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (POUM) 2737–40
 anarchosyndicalism 2486
 and CNT 849
 and CNT-FAI 1188
 and CPE 3141
 German volunteers 1379
 made illegal 3142–3
 Maurin 2258
 Nin as leader 2486–7
 People's Army 3137–8
 Popular Front 146, 2486
 and PSUC 3131
 Partido Republicano Nacional (PRN) 879
 Partido Republicano Paulista 494
 Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM) 2281
Partido Revolucionario Cubano (PRC) 2226–7
 Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores El Combatiente 245
 Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT) 272, 802, 1082, 2291
 Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) 2157, 2281, 2282, 2287, 2290, 2296, 2297, 2535, 2538, 3713
 corporatism 2542
 and Mexican student movement 3296
 Partido Rojo (Red Party) 1016
 Partido Socialismo e Liberdade 500
 Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) 145, 291, 1131
 Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores 272
 Partido Socialista de Vanguardia (PSAV) 244
Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) 494–500
 creation of 477, 494, 495
 electoral victories 499
 Guattari on 982
 Lula 499–500, 2352
 presidential campaign 499–500
 Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) 476, 495, 496
 partisan liberation movements 338–9
 Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC) 630, 2739, 3131
Partito d'Azione 2835
 Giustizia e Libertà 131, 1383–4
 Partito Comunista Internazionalista 447
 Partito Democratico della Sinistra (Democratic Party of the Left) 2622
 Partito Popolare (Popular Party) 2835
 Partito della Rifondazione Comunista (PRC) 2165, 2622
 Partito Socialista Italiano 2169
 Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria (PSIUP) 2622, 2835
Partito di Unità Proletaria (PdUP) 2196, 2621–3
 Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê (PJAK) 2012
 Partiya Welatparêzên Demokrat ên Kurdistanê (PWD) 2012
 Party of Democratic Convergence-Reflection Group (PCD) 2972
 Party of Democratic Kampuchea 1960
Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) 2287, 2292, 2538–9
 Party of Labor of Albania (PPSh) 30
 Party of National Conciliation (PCN) 1163
 Party of Policy Members for Indigenous Fijians (SVT) 1198
 Party of the Poor (PDLP) 1122, 2283, 3428
 Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR) 975, 979
 Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola (PLUA) 164, 2449
 Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) 1137
 Partzsch, Lena 3099–103
 Parvus, A. 2888
 Pascal-Trouillot, Eartha 1506
 Pascucci, Silvina 263–5
 Pasdaran Revolutionary Guards 1964
 Pasha, Raouf 2163
 Pashtuns 2494, 3246
 Afghanistan 15, 330
 Durrani 1029
 identity 1968, 1969
 Khuda-i Khidmatgar 1965–70
 Nadir Khan 330
 Pasipamire 699
 Pass Laws, South Africa 172, 3087, 3603
 Passalidis, Yannis 1445
 Passive Resistance Campaign 3603
 Pastora, Edén 2469
 Pastoral Indígena 1477
 Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), Brazil 481–2, 2351
 Pastrana Borrero, Misael 800, 801
 Pat, Jacinto 621

- Patagonia** 258, 276–8, 2451
Patani Malay nationalism 3265–71
 Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO)
 3270, 3277
 Pataud, Emile 851
 Patel, A. D. 1197
 Patel, Raj 1207–10
 Patel, Sardar 1331, 1705, 1706, 1930, 2795
 Patel, Vallabhbhai 2431, 2433, 3586
 Patel, Zarina 3042–3
 Pateman, Carole 2620
 Patent of Toleration 1918
 patents 2991
 paternalism 1897
Paterson Silk Strike 116, 157–8, 1204, 2623–4
 Pathet Lao 1599, 2055, 3083, 3472, 3482, 3485
 Patiño, Pedro 183
 Patniak, Prabhat 1670
 Patocka, Jan 654
Patria Libre 2226
 Patria para Todos (PPT) 668, 3447
 Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Freedom) 689
 patriarchy
 Africa 3547, 3549
 anarchism 124
 Beauvoir on 356
 Britain 3564–6
 Chartism 658
 gender roles 3564–6
 India 3589
 Japan 3596
 Proudhon 97
 Steinem on 3165
 Patriot movement (Parti Patriote) 593, 2784
 Patriot Party, Ireland 1807
Patriote français 505–6
 Patriotic Anti-Dictatorship Front (PAM) 1432,
 1433
 Patriotic Coalition for Democracy (PCD) 1856
 Patriotic Front (PF), Zimbabwe 3736
 Patriotic Front Manuel Rodriguez: *see* Frente
 Patrioco Manuel Rodriguez (FPMR)
 Patriotic Industrial Association (Sampo) 1898
 Patriotic Junta, Venezuela 3436
 Patriotic Ladies' Committee 1013
 Patriotic Military Service 2475
 Patriotic Society Party (PSP), Ecuador 1067
 Patriotic Union (UP) 798, 801, 1168
 Patriotic Union of Belgian Women 2722
 Patriotic Union Society, Manchester 2661
 Patriots, Haiti 1526, 1527, 1528, 1529, 1530, 1532
 patron–client relations, Indonesia 1730
 Patten, George 307
 Patten, Jack 307
 Patzi, Felix 1939
 Pauer, J. 2746
Paul, Alice 2624–5, 3626, 3628
 Paul, Gangacharan 372
 Paul, Saint 3612
 Pauli, Benjamin J. 49, 634–5, 885, 968–9,
 2005–9, 2811–14
 Pauling, Linus 195, 196, 652
 Paull, Andy 584
 Paulsen, Christian 989, 2984
Paulus, Petrus Jacobus “Arrie” 2625–6
 Pavelić, Ante 3683
Pavletich case 592
 Pavlovich, Konstantin 2716
 Pavone, Claudio 2834–6
 Pawlicka, Malgorzata 3556
 Paxton, Tom 221
 Paz, Néstor 2061, 3303
 Paz, Octavio 2375
 Paz Barahona, Miguel 2019
 Paz García, Policarpo 614
 Paz y Justicia 3717
 Pažout, Jaroslav 3172–5
PCI: *see* Communist Party of Italy (PCI)
PdUP: *see* Partito di Unità Proletaria
 Peace and Friendship Treaty (India–Nepal)
 2438, 2441
 Peace Bloc 1816
 peace camps 2501
 Peace Constitution 1885
 Peace Movement New Zealand 2528
 Peace Operation 360
 Peace Preservation Law, Japan 1897
 Peace Squadron 2528
 Peace Treaty to End the Yoruba Wars 1641
 Peaceful National Strike, Spain 182
 Peacock, John 3676
 Pearl Harbor 727, 757, 2489
Pearse, Patrick (Pádraig) 620, 793, 794, 860,
 2626–8
 Easter Rising 1045, 1047, 1800
 Irishness concept 1048
 Pearse, Willie 1047, 2627
 Peasant Congress 2909, 2929–30
 Peasant League of Dumont 2319
 Peasant League of Galiléia 2118
 Peasant League of Ipatinga 2351
 Peasant Leagues, Brazil: *see* Ligas Camponesas
 Peasant Movement of Philippines (KMP) 2681
 Peasant Organization of the Southern Sierra 563
 Peasant Rebellion 93, 1357
 Peasant Union 3551
 Peasant War 1352, 1353, 1354, 2141, 2374, 2830
 peasants
 landowning 1279–80, 1353
 Marxist view 784–5

- militias 2600
 rights 1352–3, 1354, 2806
 taxation 1352–3
 Trotsky 784–5, 1667–8
Ujamaa socialism 2532–3, 3374–5
- Peasants and Indigenous Rights Defense
 Organization (OPPDIC) 3717, 3719
- Peasants' International 997
 Peasants' Revolution 2139
 Pease, Elizabeth 205
 Peatling, G. K. 3305–6
 Peçanha, Nilo 468
 Peci, Patrizio 2816
 Peci, Roberto 2817
 Pedro I, Dom 487–9, 561
 Pedro II, Dom 490, 493, 561
 Pedro León Arboleda Movement 1120
 Peel, Robert 633, 3211
 Peffer, William 899
 Pegenaut, Lidia 255
 Peguero, Martín 1013
 Peiró, Joan 145, 848, 1188
 Pélage, Magloire 1266
 Pelligrini, Carlos 2452
- Pelloutier, Fernand** 120, 850, 2170, 2628, 3216
 Bourses du Travail 463–4, 850, 3216
 La Vie ouvrière en France 2628
- Peltier, Leonard** 2628–9
- Pemex bombings 1121, 1122, 2286
 Peña Chepe, Alfonso 804, 2791
 Peña Taveras, Mario 1018
 Penal Laws 633, 1405
 Peñaranda, Enrique 429
 Penderyn, Dic 3499
- Peng Dehuai** 709, 711, 2120, 2629–31
 as counterrevolutionary 2631
 influences on 2630
 and Lin Bao 2631
 and Mao 705, 2121, 2629, 2630
 and Zhang 3725
- Peng Pai 724
 Peng Zhen 710, 3285
- Peninsula Campaigns 189
- Penn, William 212, 1225
- Pennsylvania 80, 83, 155–6, 202, 212
 Pennsylvania Abolition Society 213
 Penny Post 177
Pensiero, Il 1419
Pensiero e Volontà 2170
 Pentagon Papers 222
- Pentland, Gordon N. 1223–4, 1384–5, 2825–7
- Pentrich Rising** 465–6
- People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
 1055
- people of color demographic statistics 774
- People's Action Committee (PAC) 1481, 1634
 People's Armed Struggle (ELA) 1448
 People's Army of Vietnam (PAV) 3485, 3487,
 3493
 People's Charter 656, 657, 658, 2549, 2693
 People's Commission 1202
 People's Convention Party (PCP) 2269
People's Daily 709, 2203, 2422, 3287
 People's Democracy (PD), Korea 3183
 People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
 (PDPA) 13
 People's Democratic Party (PRD), Indonesia
 1723, 1725
 People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
 (PDRE) 1137
 People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)
 3671
 People's Democratic Union (UDP) 421–2, 1937
 People's Fedayeen 1769
 People's Forces for the Liberation of
 Mozambique (FPLM) 2153
 People's Front 1003
 People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China 2204,
 2996, 3288, 3290, 3726
 People's Liberation Army of the Cordillera
 (CPLA) 2686
 People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN)
 2399, 3203, 3204
 People's Liberation Army of Thailand (PLAT)
 2747, 3262, 3263
 People's Liberation Army of Vietnam 3471, 3481
 People's Liberation Committees 3684
People's Liberation Front of Sri Lanka (JVP)
 2631–4
 People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
 (PLOTE) 3251
 People's Liberation War 3296, 3682
 People's Militia 2743, 3434
 People's Mojahedin 1769
 People's National Congress (PNC) 1497,
 1501–2, 3559
 People's National Movement (PNM), Trinidad
 3317, 3319, 3320, 3532
 People's Nationalist Party (PNP) 1861, 1864,
 1867, 2198
 People's Organizations 290
 People's Party, Thailand 3257
 People's Party, Turkey 3350
 People's Party, US 2722, 2727, 3636
 People's Progressive Party 1856, 3559
 People's Progressive Party (PPP), Guyana 2852
 People's Property Area 2471
 People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) 575,
 1960
 People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) 1083

- People's Revolutionary Army (PRA), Grenada 1462
 People's Revolutionary Government (PRG), Grenada 1462
 People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) 556, 2527
 People's Socialist Party, Kashmir 1933
 People's Summit 3655, 3656, 3658
 People's Summit of the Americas 3654, 3656–7
 People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO) 3207
 People's Unity Party (PUP) 364, 365–6, 1634, 3559
 People's Victory 21 1991
People's Voice 985
 People's Volunteer Organization (PVO) 557
People's War 2794
 People's Week of Action, Hong Kong 3652
 People's Will Party 976, 977, 2081, 2693
Peoples' Global Action Network (PGA) 2635–8
 Belgrade 3687
 Geneva WTO 3655
 Inter-Continental Caravan 1389, 2637, 3661
 J18 2809
 Manifiesto 2636–7
 Organizational Principles 2636
 Reclaim the Streets 2809
 Support Group 2637–8
 World Social Forum 1313, 1386, 1396
 Peoples of the Isthmus Regional Assembly 2537
 Peoples Publishing House 2404
 Pepper, John 596
 Péralte, Charlemagne 1516, 1522–3
 Perdicaris, Ion 2335
 Pereira, Aristide Maria 602
 Perera, N. M. 969, 2051, 2052
 Perera, Selina 2051
perestroika (economic restructuring) 628, 1395, 1417, 3119–24, 3127, 3245, 3421
 Pérez, J. 845
 Pérez, Manuel 1082, 1083
 Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier 1166, 3205
 Pérez Esquivel, Adolfo 255, 2159
 Pérez Jiménez, Marcos 3436, 3441, 3448, 3450, 3631
 Pérez Rios, Francisco 2299
 Pérez Rivera, J. Encarnación 2298
Perfect Diurnall, A 1106
 performance artists 1191–2, 1237
 Pèrier, Casimir 1232
 Perkins, Charles 308
 Perkins, Frances 3411
 Perlman, Fredy 99, 159, 1052
 Permanent Agrarian Congress, Mexico (CAP) 2294
 Permanent Assembly for Human Rights 254
 Permanent Revolution Group 831
 Permanent Settlement Act 1695, 2574, 2575, 2970
 Pernambucana 487
 Pernambuco 2117–18, 2351, 2586–8
 see also Palmares slave revolts
 Perón, Eva 2638
 Perón, Isabel Martínez 249, 254
 Perón, Juan Domingo 104, 427, 2638
 coup attempts 2638
 and Lanusse 1155
 overthrown 243, 275, 276
 Partido Justicialista 243
 return to government 251
 Triple A 1580
 Peronism 271, 863
Peronist resistance 2638–43
 Peroomian, Rubina 285–7
 Pérouse, Comte de la 2456
 Perovskaya, Sophia 157, 3550
 Perrone, Sean T. 2569
 Perrot, John 1105
 Perry, Luke 1416–18
 Perryville, Battle of 61
 Pershing, John J. 3490
 Persian Gulf War 1369
 personal is political slogan 3593, 3628
 personalism 634, 2465
Peru
 agrarian reforms 2655, 3430
 anarchism 2648, 2649
 armed insurgency 2643–6
 coca 2653
 cotton 2647
 counterinsurgency 2656–61
 currency devaluation 2651
 debt peonage 2647
 Dirty War 2643–6, 2657
 and Ecuador 2655
 educational reforms 3430–1
 gold mining 237
 IMF 2651
 indigenistas 2648–9
 indigenous population 1923–4, 2647
 labor and peasant mobilizations 2647–50
 Mariátegui 2217–18
 MRTA 2362–3, 2645
 mutual aid societies 2647–8
 neoliberalism 2650–6
 oil fields 2647
 “people's war” 2656–61
 poverty 2653
 punk movement 2063
 rondas campesinas 2362, 2644

- rubber plantations 2647
 Shining Path 2644–5, 2656–7
 social mobilization 2650–6
 state violence 2657, 2658–9
 strikes 2651, 2654
 students 2218
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2363,
 2646, 2657
 Velasco Alvarado 3430–1
 women's rights 2655, 3598
see also Andean communities; Sendero
 Luminoso (Shining Path)
- Peru, Upper: *see* Bolivia
 Peru's Peasant Confederation (CCP) 2654
 Peruvian Socialist Party 2218
 Pestaña, Ángel 145, 848
 pesticides
 protests 2499
 soy cultivation 616–17, 1053, 1170, 2603
 Pétain, Philippe 179, 225, 405, 1239, 1713, 2336
 Peter I, the Great 536, 2927, 3420
 Peter II Karadjordjevic 3684
 Peter III, of Russia 2775
 Peter IV, of Portugal 187–8
Peterloo Massacre 507, 547, 1632, 2661–2,
 3281, 3676
 Peteroa, Battle of 2064
 Petersburg 66, 67
 Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks 2898
 Petersen, Nicolaj 990
 Peterson, David 2560–1
 Peterson, Hector 3089
 Peterson, Nora M. 2139–41
 Pethick-Lawrence, Emmeline 3569
 Pétion, Alexandre 1511, 1534, 1538, 1545, 1546,
 3457
 Pétion, Jérôme 1288
 Petit Martinique 1462
 Petition of Fifty, Indonesia 1723
 Petition of Rights 1108
petits blancs 1526, 1527, 1541, 1543, 1544
 Petkoff, Teodoro 3440, 3443, 3445
 Petkov, Nikola 537, 544
 Petőfi, Sándor 1620, 1625, 1626, 1920
 Petone Marxian Club 830
 Petra Kelly Foundation 1946
 Petrangol 165
 Petras, James 1066
 Petrazhitsky, Professor 3551
 Petri, Olaus 1496
 Petrofina 165
 Petrograd
 Bolsheviks 2934
 Cheka 2938
 food shortages 2891
 lockouts 2901
 soldiers/workers 2897
 soviets 2899, 2908
 strikes 2891
 Wilson's visit 2895
 see also St. Petersburg
 Petrograd Conference of Factory Committees
 2906, 2935
 Petrograd Metalworkers' Union 2913, 3029
 Petrograd Society of Factory Owners 2900, 2901
 Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies 3029
 Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA) 667, 671
 Petroleum Workers' Federation of Curaçao
 942
 Petroleum Workers' Union (STPRM) 2293
Pétroleuses, Les 3575
Petropavlovsk 2004, 2005
 Petrovic, Gajo 2839, 3689
 Pettibone, George 1571
 Pettigrew, Richard Franklin 1566
 petty bourgeoisie 1667–8
 Peyret, Alejo 259
 Peza, Muslim 30
 Pezzino, Paolo 2160–1
 Pfemfert, Franz 1609
PGA: *see* Peoples' Global Action Network
 Phadnavis, Nana 1708
 Phalangist Party 2070
 Phalanstries 2763
Phalanx Utopians 1222–3
Pham Van Dong 1599, 1600, 1714, 2662–3,
 3480
 Phamotse, Simon 2110
Phan Boi Chau 1597, 2663–4, 3465, 3467
 Phan Chu Trinh 3465, 3467, 3492
 Phan Dinh Phung 3477
 Phan Khoi 3479
 Phan Thanh Gian 3476
 pharmaceutical industry
 anti-retroviral drugs 3113
 HIV/AIDS 10
 multinational corporations 2998, 3113,
 3312–13
 Serbia 3686–7
 Phelps, Mark Anthony 1125–7
 Phetsarath, Prince 2054
 Phibun: *see* Plaek Phibun Songkram
 Philadelphia
 Quakers 213, 367
 race riots 3399
 Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society 3005
Philadelphia Tribune 3399
 Philadelphia Vigilance Committee 3047
 Philiki Etairia 1451
 Philip I, of Netherlands 1034

- Philip II, of Spain
 Djerba 3334
 Latin America 2056
 and Mary I 516
 Netherlands 1035, 2950
 O'Neill 1805
 ruling Portugal 187, 2333
- Philip of Hesse 1356
- Philippe, Guy 1508
- Philippe, Jean-Baptiste 3315
- Philippine Revolution 445, 2506–7
- Philippines 2664–88**
 agrarian structure 1613–14, 2681
 agricultural products 2326–7
 anti-nuclear protests 2501–2
 armed resistance 2327–8
 Bonifacio 444–5, 2668
 Chinese workers 2665–6
 Christianity 2324, 2326, 2665–6, 2667, 2671
 civil war 2684
 CLO 1613
 colonial protests 2664–70
 colonialism 2324–5, 2664
 counterinsurgency 1615–16
 creoles 2667
 Death March 2674
 death squads 2688
 Democratic Alliance 1613
 dispossession 2325–6
 exports 2670
 fascists 2671
 February Revolution 2683–4
 feminist networks 2686–7
 global justice movement 2687
 IMF 1400
 independence 2328–31
 indigenous peoples 2686
 Islam 2324–5, 2326, 2328, 2664–5
 Japanese occupation 1612, 2674
 labor unions 2672–3, 2681
 land redistribution 1613, 2325–6
 languages 2666, 2671
 left-wing organizations 2685–8
 marginalization 2326–7
 martial law 2678–9
 militant organizations 2677
 Moro national liberation 2324–32
 mutual aid 2672
 nationalism 2677
 natural resources 2670
 People Power 2506–7
 pluralism 2687–8
 protests 2676–8, 2678–88
 Reaffirmists/Rejectionists 2686
 Rizal Day 2845
 sharecropping 2672
 social stratification 2665–6
 Spanish-era protests 2664–70
 Tenant Congress 2672
 torture 2684–5
 US marines 2669
 US military bases 2675, 2688
 US-era protests 2670–6
 Yan'an 2680–1
see also Huk Rebellion; Rizal, José
- Philips, Ulrich B. 233
- Phillips, James 764
- Phillips, Utah 1737
- Phillips, Wendell 217
- philosophes* 1109, 1110, 1409
- Philp, Robert Kemp 657
- Phimister, I. 3728
- Phnom Penh
 capture of 3493
 demonstration 571, 3035
 evictions to countryside 574
 manifestation of parasols 568, 1713, 1958
- Phoenix Park murders 967, 2617
- Phoui Sananikone 2055
- Phouk Chhay 574
- Phoumi Nosavan 3482
- Phraya Phahon Phonphayuhasena 3257
- Phu Nu Tan Van* (Women's News) 3467
- Phuc Quoc 1713, 1714
- Phule, Jyotirao Govindrao 955
- Phulmoni case 1696
- physiocrats 1112
- Pi y Margall, Francisco 97, 144–5
- Piaf, Edith 2382
- Piar, Manuel 3457, 3458
- Piazza Fontana bombing 1820
- Piazza Statuto uprising 1843
- Pibul Songgram 659
- Picado, Teodoro 878, 879
- Piccinini, Alberto 251
- Pichincha, Battle of 1061
- Pickering, Paul A. 176–8, 2129–30, 2543, 3300–1
- Pico, F. 2767, 2774
- Picquart, Georges 1022
- Picton, Thomas 3315
- Pidjot, Roch 2458
- Pieck, Wilhelm 1338
- pieds noirs* 226, 1644
- Pielgrzym* (Pilgrim) 3544
- Pieper, Christopher 2490–7, 2497–505
- Pierce, Franklin 1011
- Pierwiosnek* 3544
- Pietism 52, 1185
- Piggott, Richard 2617
- Pig's Meat* periodical 3151, 3280

- Pijiguaiti Massacre 1492
 Pilar, Marcelo H. del 2668
 Pilbeam, Pamela 2842–3
 Pilgrimage of Grace 509
 Pillai, Anthony 1706
 Pillnitz declaration 892
 Pilsbury, Parker 3164
Pilsudski, Józef 2688–90, 2717, 2719
 Pimentel, Antonio 1016
 Pimentel, Eleonora Fonseca 3591
 Pinatubo volcano 2688
 Pinchot, Gifford 1119
 Pinckney Treaty 3525
 Pincus, Steven 1404–8
 Pine Ridge Indian Reservation 2415
 Pinelli, Giuseppe 131, 1205, 1837
 Pinheiro, Diogo L. 466–73, 483–94, 494–500,
 2376–80, 2748–9
 Pinheiro, Wilson 2273
 Pink and Silver Bloc 1308, 1393
 Pino del Agua ambush 931
 Pinochet, Augusto
 and Allende 686, 2507
 and Bolivia 417
 church opposition 2060
 coming to power 2436
 Jara 1911
 military rule 683, 686
 popular resistance to 685–8, 690
 putsch 49
 repression 2437
 Pinochet Boys 2063
 Pinot-Gallizio, Giuseppe 3044
 Pinsker, Leo 3741
 Pinter, Harold 224
Pinto, Pio Gama 2690–1
 Pinto Coelho da Cunha, José Feliciano 493
 Pinto da Costa, Manuel 2972
 Pinto de Fonseca, Manoel 2184
 Pintor, Luigi 2196, 2870
 Pio, Louis 990
 Pio and Thulia 107
 Pioneer Youth League 1501
 Piquet Revolt 3584
piquetero movement 262, 263–5, 2349
 Pir-i Roshan: *see* Ansari, Bayazid
 Pires, Pedro 603
Pisacane, Carlo 129, 1161, 2169, 2691–2
 Pisani, Edgard 2458
 Pisarev, Dmitri 977
 Piscator, Erwin 28, 1482
 PIT-CNT 3407
 Pitcher, Molly 84
 Pitt, William 507, 519, 633, 1223, 3024
 death 3529
 Ireland 1787, 1789, 2546
 and Wilberforce 3527, 3528
 and Wilkes 3530
Pittsburgh Commercial-Gazette 2028
Pittsburgh Courier 757
Pittsburgh Gazette 71
 Pittsburgh Manifesto 2029–30
 Pius V, Pope 517
 Pius VI, Pope 441
 Pius VII, Pope 442
 Pius IX, Pope 493, 1149, 1150
 Piven, F. F. 780, 781–2, 2756, 2757–8, 2759
 Piyale Pasha 3334
 Pizarro, Carlos 802, 808, 3389
 Pizarro, Francisco 2592, 2876, 3336
 Pizarro Leongómez, Carlos 2149
PKK: *see* Kurdistan Workers' Party
PLA: *see* People's Liberation Army
 Plaatje, Solomon 152
 Placanica, Mario 1310
Place, Francis 519, 2692–3
 Plaek Phibun Songkram 3257
 Plains Warriors 900
 Plan Bolivar 2000 670
 Planned Parenthood Federation of America
 2968, 2969, 3626
 Plassey, Battle of 1708
 Platania, Pietro 3149
 Plato 95, 2102, 2836
 Platt Amendment 926, 2150
 Plaza de Mayo 255, 274
 Plaza of Congress March 2602
 Pledge of Resistance 2502
 Plehve, V. von 2879
Plekhanov, Georgi 2693–4
 Bolsheviks 437, 2887
 dialectics 2243, 2838
 History of Russian Thought 2694
 and Martov 2228
 Marxist influences 2082
 Mensheviks 2082, 2887
 Orthodox Marxism 1664–5
 Russian Social Democrats 978
 SPD model 979
 Szabó 3228
 and Trotsky 3321
 works 2693–4
 World War I 2890
 and Zaslulich 1914, 3550
Plessy v. Ferguson 756, 2798
PLO: *see* Palestinian Liberation Organization
Plody 3051
 Plowden, Alison 289
 Plug Plots 658
 Plunkett, Joseph Mary 1046, 1047

- Plutarch 3428
 Plzeň demonstrations 2252
PM 923
 Poch y Gascón, Amparo 2367, 2962, 3611
 Podkrepa 539, 3068
 Poglajen-Kolaković, Tomislav 3050
 Pohamba, Hifikepune 2400, 2531
 Point Blank 159
 Pokrovskaya, Maria Ivanovna 3551
Pol Pot 573–4, 1958–61
 Polakoff, Pedro 8
Poland 2694–710
 anarchism 140–1
 Bakunin on 334
 Catholic Church 2700, 2712, 3076, 3077, 3078
 Citizens' Committee 3076, 3079
 Constitution 2713
 counterrevolution 2702–3
 émigrés 2717
 food prices, rising 2695–6
 German takeover 1180, 1181
 ILO 3502
 independence 2703, 2715
 invading Ukraine 3507, 3508
 January Insurrection (1863) 2703–5
 Jewish people 2713
 KOR 2013, 2301, 2302, 2694–8, 3077–8
 Krakow Revolution 2701–2
 Kuroń 2013–14, 2695, 2696, 2698, 2705
 March Revolution (1848) 2701
 martial law 3075, 3078, 3555–6
 motherhood 3557
 Nazi invasion 2248
 1956 uprising 2698–700
 Poznań uprising 2699, 2700, 2702–3
 Reds/Whites 2704
 repression of dissidents 1147
 revolutions 2700–5, 3544–5
 Russian occupation 2710, 3544
 student movements 2705–7, 3170
 trade unions and protest 2707–10
 Ukrainian rebellions 2712
 women in 1848 revolution 3544–5
 women's movement 3632
 see also Polish Revolution (Sejm) (1788–92);
 Polish Revolution (1830); Polish Revolution
 (1905–7); *Solidarność*; Warsaw
 Poland, Congress Kingdom of 2715–17
 Polatkan, Hasan 3350
 Polay Campos, Victor 2362, 2363
 Polese, Abel 810–18, 2017–18, 3020–1, 3375–8
 police
 Canada 2562–3
 Carnival against Capital 1388–9
 shooting of 532
 SUNY-Buffalo campus 222
 see also Cop Watch Los Angeles
 police brutality
 Genoa G8 1307, 1308–9
 Gleneagles G8 1314
 Haymarket tragedy 1569, 2259
 India 1682, 1694
 London 1389
 Madres de la Plaza de Mayo 2500–1
 Prague 1393–4
 SNCC 748
 USA 862
 Police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI) 1798
 Polignac, Jules de 896, 1229, 1231
 Polisario Front 2338
 Polish Democratic Society 2700–1
 Polish League 2703, 2717
 Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 436, 2690,
 2700, 2704, 2710, 2715
 Polish People's Republic 2697, 2701
Polish Revolution (Sejm) (1788–92) 2710–15
Polish Revolution (1830) 2715–17
Polish Revolution (1905–7) 2717–20
 Polish Socialist Party (PPS) 142, 2689, 2695,
 2717
 Polish Union of Socialist Youth (ZMS) 2718
 Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) 2695,
 3073, 3074, 3075
 Política Obrera 272
 Political Affairs Committee (PAC) 1856
 Political Committee of Cypriot Struggle (PEKA)
 946
 Political Committee of National Liberation
 (PEEA) 1437, 1444
 Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the
 Peoples (IPSP) 2320
 Political Metropolitan Collective (CPM) 1837
 Political Theater 28
 Political Union 633
Political Week 2201
Politician 2126
 Poljarevic, Emin 1076–9
 Poll, Christabel 2096
 Pollack, Sam 3412
 Pollock, Friedrich 1253, 1254
 pollution 1053, 1881, 3100
 Polster, Joshua E. 27–8
 Polverel, Etienne 1264, 1532, 1533, 1535, 3307
 polycentrism 2699
 polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) pollution 2418
 Polynesians 3080
 Polytechnic School uprising 1447
 Pomarańczowa Alternatywa (Orange Alternative)
 140
 Pomare IV, of Tahiti 1272

- Pomare V, of Tahiti 1272
 Pompidou, Georges 1236
 Ponce, Francisco 240
 Ponce de Bianco, María 2159
 Ponce de León, Juan 28, 2450
 Ponce Erile, Juan 2683
 Ponce Massacre 2768, 2774
 Poncet de Brétigny, Charles 1269
 Pondoland revolt 3087
ponguaeje (bondage system) 426, 429
 Poniatowski, Michal 2712
 Poniatowski, Stanislaw August 2710, 2714
 Ponte Novo, Battle of 872
 Pontes, Paula Rodrigues 466–73, 2376–80, 2748–9
 Pontiac 77, 582
 Ponto, Jürgen 1368
 Pookotoor battle 2318
 Poole, Andrea Geddes 3516–18
 Poole, Steve 506–7, 3279–80
 Poona Pact 53, 1684, 1710
 Poor Bear, Myrtle 2629
Poor Law, Britain 656, 658, 2720–1, 3380
 Poor Law Acts 523, 656
 Poor Law Amendment Act 2720
 Poor Law Commission 2720
Poor Man's Guardian 2543
 Poor People's Campaign 753, 1976
 Poor People's Party (PDL) 562
 Pop, Gheorghe 2866
 Pope, Mary 1106
Popelin, Marie 2721–2
 Popieluszko, Jerzy 3075
 Popol Vuh 1474
 Poptla, Battle of 910
 Popov, Gavriil 3123, 3124, 3127
 Popov, Nebojsa 3690
 Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) 2360
 Popular Army of Liberation: *see* Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL)
 Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oazaca (APPO) 1121, 2290, 2295, 2535
 Popular Defense Fronts (FDIPs) 2650
 Popular Democratic (PD), Philippines 2684
 Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) 2011
 Popular Democratic Party (MPD), Ecuador 1058
 Popular Democratic Party (PPD), Puerto Rico 2769
 Popular Front (FP), Chile 693
 Popular Front (FP), Comintern 3678
 Popular Front (FP), France 179
 Popular Front (FP), Russia 28, 1922
 Popular Front, Spain 146, 3132, 3133, 3144
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 400, 1368
 Popular and Indigenous Minga 797
 Popular Liberation Movement (MLP) 1164
 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) 1216
 Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) 852
 Popular Revolutionary Army: *see* Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR)
 Popular Revolutionary Democratic Party (PDPR) 1122, 2285
 Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC) 1165
 Popular Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe (UPLG) 1470
 Popular Villista Revolutionary Army (EVRP) 1121
 population growth/social organization 2986
 Population Registration Act 171
populism 2722–8
 agrarian resistance 2723–5
 cooperative movement 2725–6
 National Alliance 2727–8
 People's Party 2723
 Populist Revolt 2722
 sub-treasury system opposition 2726–7
 Populist Socialism 677, 3040
Populli (People) 29
 PORA, Yellow/Black 3376–7, 3378
 PORA (It's Time NGO) 814, 817, 3375–6
 Porcupine, Peter: *see* Cobbett, William
 Porecatu guerilla movement 2351
 pornography 3629
 Porphyry 3428
 Porsile, Giuseppe 3146
 Port and Railway Employees' Association 153, 2354
 Port-au-Prince 1528–9, 1543, 3585
 Port Huron Statement 3188
 Porte, Sublime 1451, 1452
 Porteñazo, El 3451
 Porter, Brian 2705
 Porter, Henry 2408, 2409
 Portes Gil, Emilio 2542
Portugal 2728–32
 anti-monarchy protests 186–8
 Brazil 187, 483–4
 British rule 187
 in Cape Verde 602
 Carnation Revolution 165, 1042, 1262, 2728–9, 2972
 Catholic Church 877
 colonies 186, 2731
 coup d'état 602, 1042, 2360
 Estatuto do Trabalho Nacional 2730

Portugal (*cont'd*)

exploration 186
 fascism 2730
 immigrants 1643
 imperialism 1654
 independence 186
 Makombe-nguruvu dynasty 699
 and Morocco 2332–3
 Palmares 3745–6
 protest and revolution 2728–32
 slave trade 186–7, 3024–5
 Spanish invasion 187
 standard of living 2732
 trading-post empires 1656
 World War II 2730
see also Anglo-Portuguese alliance
 Portuguese Guinea 2731
 Portuguese Reconquista 186
 Portuguese Republican Party (PRP) 877
 Portuguese traders 1718
 Portuondo, Fernando 919
 Portuondo Linares, S. 914
Porvenir, El 144, 1016
 Posada, José Guadalupe 2375
 Posadas, Gervasio Antonio 288
 Posadas, Juan 272
 positivism 600, 842–3, 2276
 Post, K. 1866
 post-anarchy movement 979
 post-Fordism 1007, 1399–400, 3171
 working class 2370
 Post Office Workers' Society 2137
 postal workers' strikes, Canada 2618–19
 postcolonial Caribbean 2839
postcolonial feminism 2733–5
 poststructuralism 771, 772, 908
 Marxism 972
 Potatau Te Wherowhero 2206
 Potemkin, Grigorii 2712
 Potere Operaio (Workers' Power) 1836, 1838,
 1840, 1842, 1843, 2426
 Potocki, Ignacy 2713
 Potomac, Army of 61, 64
 Potosi massacre 430
 Potresov, Alexander 2694
 Potsdam Ultimatum 1889
 Pottawatomie Massacre 533
 Potter, Thomas 3529
 Poubalt 2004
 Pouget, Émile 115, 120, 162, 850, 2170
 Poukombo revolt 566, 567
 Poulaille, Henry 115
Poulantzas, Nicos 2735–7
 Crisis of Dictatorships 2736
 Fascism and Dictatorship 2736

Political Power and Social Classes 2735
Social Classes in Contemporary Capitalism
 2736
State, Power, Socialism 2736
POUM (Workers' Party of Marxist
Unification): *see* Partido Obrero de
 Unificación Marxista
 Pound, Ezra 1587
 Poundmaker 583
 Pouvanaa Committee 1272
poverty
 apathy 780
 Camus on 582
 Chicago 11
 culture of 777
 deindustrialization 782
 Latin America 2058, 2059–60
 Mali 2182
 Mexico 1395, 1396, 2286–7
 Palestine 1550
 Peru 2653
 pollution 1053
 and revolution 776–83
 Tilly 778–9
 urban 968
 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 3114
 Powder Alarm 78
 Powder River Country 900
Powderly, Terence 1977–9
 Powell, Adam Clayton, Jr. 841
 Powell, Vavasour 1103, 1194
 power theory, Foucault 1221, 3018
 Powers, Richard 2028
 Poyas, Peter 3460
 Poynings' Law 1785, 1786, 1804, 1807, 2402
 Poznań uprising 2699, 2700, 2702–3
Prabhakaran, Velupillai 2740–1, 3251, 3252
 Prachanda (Maoists) 2347–441
 Pradhan, Sahana 232
 Prado, Manuel 1568, 2650
 Pragatisheed Mahila Samiti (Progressive Women's
 Association) 3588
 Práger, Ármin 127
 Prague 1390, 1431, 3655
 Global Day of Action 1391–5
 Russian tanks 2262
 squatting 1394
 see also Prague Spring
 Prague, Treaty of 990
Prague Manifesto 2374
 Prague Mothers 3633
Prague Spring 1339, 1340, 1346, 2742–6, 3117
 Dubček 1025
 student movement 3170, 3177, 3178
 Prague Students Council 3176

- Praja Parishad (People's Council) 1932, 1933, 2441
 Praja Sabha 1930
Praktika 2684
 Praloto the Maltesean 1529
 Pramanik, Kewala 2970
 Prange, W. 2983
 Prasad, Patel 1329
 Prasad, Rajendra 1329, 3586
 Prasert Sapsunthon 3258
Prasertkul, Seksan 2746–8, 3261, 3263
Pratap 3041
 Pratap, Anita 2741
 Pratap, Raja Mahendra 1676
 Pratap Singh, Viswanath 1934
 Prats, Carlos 682, 689
Pravda 2083, 2705, 2904, 2943, 2944, 3029, 3553, 3554
Praxis 272, 2839, 3638, **3689–90**, 3692–3
 Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom 332
prazeros (European lease holders) 2353
PRC: *see* Partido Revolucionario Cubano
 Pre, Roland 580
 Pre-Raphaelites 2340
 Preap In 570
precarious workers' organization, Italy
 1839–41
 precariousness 634, 1148, 1403, 3171
 predestination 565
 Prem Tinsulanonda 3264
 Premadasa, Ranasinghe 2634, 3252
Prensa, La 2468, 2469, 2472, 2475, 2476
 Preobrazhensky, Evgenii 535, 3608
 Preoteasa, Grigore 2867
 Presbyterian Church 517, 1854
 Presbyterians
 Ireland 1806
 Kenya 1948
 Ulster 1045
Presse, La 2785, 2788
 Prestes, Júlio 469
Prestes, Luís Carlos 469, 475, **2748–9**
Prestes, Olga Benário 2748–9
 Preston, Battle of 909, 1098, 1854
 Preston, Thomas 3280
 Prestonpans, Battle of 1854
 Pretoria Agreement 859
 Pretoria Socialist Society 148
 Préval, René 280, 1510, 1520
 Preventive Detention Act 2221
 Price, Cecil 1259
 Price, George 364, 366
 Price, Richard 507–8, 1553
 Price, Victoria 3002
 Price-Mars, Jean 1516, 1523, 2872
 Prichard, Alex 2763–6
 Pride, Thoma 909
 Pridi Banomyong 3257, 3258, 3259
 Priestley, J. B. 190
 Priestley, Joseph 1116
 Prieto, Horacio M. 145
 Prieto, Indalecio 291, 3131
 Prigione, Geronimo 481
Prima Linea 2749–50
Primera Rosell, Alí Rafael 2750–2
 primitivism 99, 979
 Primo de Rivera, Miguel 145, 352, 848, 1188, 2257, 3128
 Primo de Rivera, Pilar 3611
Prince Edward Island protests 2752–3
 Princip, Gavriilo 318
 Pringle, Bob 1456
 printed word
 Protestantism 3001
 Scotland 3001
 Solidarność 3077
 state-making 2592
printing press/protest 109, 473, 587, **2753–5**
 Prío Socarrás, Carlos 623, 624, 916, 929
 Prison Activist Resource Center 965
 Pristine University 37
 Pritchard, George 1271
 Pritchard, Jack 3460
 Pritchett, Laurie 742
 Prithvi Narayan Shah 2441
 privatization, water supplies 790–2, 3099–100
 Pro-Indigenous Association 2649
 Pro-Prisoners Committee 254
Proal, Héron 138, **2755**
 Proaño, Leonidas 480, 2058
Problemy Kitaya (Problems of China) 2782
 Probst, Christoph 3525, 3526
 Proceso de Reorganización Nacional 246, 250, 254
 Prodi, Romano 132, 1820
 production modes
 Althusser on 1669
 Asatic 766
 capitalism 1666–7, 2232–4
 class society 783
 flexible networks 1007, 1399
 historical materialism 821
 just-in-time 1399
 Marx on 1648, 2232–4
 performative 2370
 tributary 766
 Profane Existence 159
 Profintern 1003
 Progressive Bloc, Duma 2892
 Progressive Democratic Party, Iraq 3516

- Progressive Labor Party (PLP) 3189
 Progressive Organization of Women (POW) 3587
 Progressive Papers Limited (PPL) 2581
 Progressive Party, Burma 552
 Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL)
 945
 Progressive Republican Party (PRP) 3359
 Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe
 (PTUZ) 3733
 Progressive Writers Movement 1160, 1761
 Progressive Youth Movement 139
 Progressivism 886–7
 Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 171
 Proletarian Tendency 2469
 proletariat
 autonomism 323
 Engels 766, 821, 3057
 Germany 1350
 Marx 778, 821, 3057
 Reiss 766–7
 revolution 821
 Trotsky 1667–8
 see also dictatorship of the proletariat
Proletarii 2912
Proletario, Il 3013
 Proletkult Theater 1080
 Prolonged Popular War tendency 2469
 Promborirak, Norodom 3475
 propaganda 2962, 3129, 3133
 propaganda by the deed
 anarchism 94, 120, 161, 2048
 Galleani 1322
 Goldman 1411
 Malatesta 2169
 Reclus 2813
 Prosser, Gabriel 89, 214
 Prosser, Thomas Henry 1319
 prostitutes 1411–12, 2183–4, 2368, 3636
 prostitution 2100, 3017, 3566
 Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual
 Abuse Report 5
 Protection of People and State Decree 2832
 Protection of the Nation Law 543
protest and revolution, stages in 2756–63
 confluence of events 2762
 cycles of 2759
 Goldstone 2762
 Marx 2760
 mobilization 2758–9
 opportunity 2756–7
 outcomes 2760–2
 stages and struggles 2759–60
 tactics 2757–8
 protest music 610–12, 632, 637–41
 protest pickets 3041
 protest songs 221, 611, 632
Protesta, La 104, 248
Protesta Humana, La 102
 Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland 1784, 1806
 Protestant Volunteers 2572
 Protestantism
 Bohemia 1143
 Calvinism 1034
 as dissent 1343
 Evangelical 2062
 France 1110
 GDR 1342–4
 Germany 1347
 Ireland 1784, 3305
 Latin America 482
 Nonconformists 1406
 print technology 1355
 Reformed 1358
 see also English Reformation; German
 Reformation; Reformation; Scottish
 Reformation
 Proud Quakers 1105
Proud Valley (film) 2846
 Proudhon, Charles 2843
Proudhon, Pierre Joseph 2763–6
 anarchism 94, 95, 96, 122, 2763–4
 anti-feminism 2766
 anti-Semitism 2766
 artistic creation 115
 and Bakunin 333
 and communism 161
 De la Capacité Politique des Classes Ouvrières
 2765
 followers 2628
 and Godwin 1410
 as influence 2691
 on justice 2765
 and Marx 2763–4
 Marx on 2231
 mutualism 97, 111, 119–20, 2008, 2048, 2813
 patriarchal family 97
 revolution 100
 on war 2765
 What is Property? 2763
 working class 161, 2765
 Provence, Comte de: *see* Louis XVIII
 Providence Industrial Mission (PIM) 695
 Provisional Democratic Government of Greece
 1445
 Provisional Government of India 1676
 Provisional IRA 1797, 1801
 Provisional Military Administrative Council
 (PMAC) 1135
 Provisional Office of Mass Organizational Affairs
 (POMOA) 1136

- Provisional Peasant Self-Defense Committee 3077
- Provisors and Praemunire, Statutes of 514
- Prus, Maciej 3073
- Prussia 1214, 1348, 2714
- Prussian Reform Movement 1282
- Prynne, William 2118
- Pryser, T. 2524
- Przegląd Naukowy* (Scientific Review) 3544
- Przegląd Pedagogic* (Pedagogical Review) 3544
- Psychanalyse et politique (Psych et po) 3575–6
- Pu Yi 3201
- Public Against Violence (PAV) 3435
- Public Assistance Committees 3383
- Public Opinion* 2197
- Public Order Act 591, 3734
- Public Order Amendment 2221
- Public Peace Police Law, Japan 1896, 1897, 1898
- public–private partnerships 3099–100
- Public Security Bureau 1431
- Public Service Staff Relations Act 590
- Public Works scheme 522
- public workshops, France 2842
- Publiciste parisien* 2211
- Puc, Venancio 621
- Puente, Galileo 2642
- Puertan Rican prisoners
radiation experiments 39
- Puerto Cortés 1603, 2018
- Puerto Rican Day celebration, Chicago 3400
- Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) 2769
- Puerto Rican Nationalist Party 38, 39
- Puerto Rican Socialist League (LSP) 2771
- Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP) 2770, 2771
- Puerto Rican street gangs, US 2770
- Puerto Rican Telephone Company 2772
- Puerto Rican Young Lords 399, 2770
- Puerto Rico** 2843–4
- anarchism 141
 - cultural identity 2767
 - culture 2768
 - emigrants 2767, 2770
 - Grito de Lares* 382, 383, 2767, 2774, 2844
 - independence movement 2766–74, 2774, 3071
 - languages 2767, 2768–9
 - nationalism 2768–9
 - Nationalist Party 2768, 2770–1
 - neoliberalism 2772
 - Ponce de León 28
 - punk rock 141
 - resistance to colonialism 2767
 - sugar cane cultivation 39
 - US rule 2767
 - Vieques 3464–5
 - Young Lords 399
see also Albizu Campos, Pedro
- Puey Ungpakorn 3274
- Pugachev, Emilian 2775
- Pugachev's Rebellion** 2775–6, 2883, 2922
- Puget Sound 861, 2501, 3664
- Puget Sound Cooperative Colony 3418
- Pugh, Sarah 3639
- Pugwash Conference of Concerned Scientists 190, 2877
- Puig Antich, Salvador** 146–7, 2776–7
- Puiggrós, Rodolfo 273
- Puisaye, Count 895
- Pujol, Jordi 631
- Pulacayo, Theses of 429–30
- Pulaski, Kazimierz 85
- Pullman Company 2803
- Pullman Strike 11, 974, 1570, 1735, 2034
- Punjab 1701–2
- Punjab Wars 1688
- punk movement** 109, 139, 159, 2777–8
- punk rock/protest** 105, 141, 885, 2063–4, 3176
- Punnappa Vyalur 1922
- Punto Fijo pact 665, 3436, 3437–8
- Purcell, Thomas 2319–20
- Purdy, Murray Gow 2794
- Pure Food and Drugs Act 3040
- Purishkevish, V. 2912
- Puritanism 76, 517, 1632–3, 3416, 3612–13, 3614
- Purvis, June 2595–6
- PUSH Operation 1852
- Pushkin, Alexander 2878
- Pushtuns: *see* Pashtuns
- Putilov Works 2880, 2891, 2900, 2916, 2944
- Putin, Vladimir 143, 3329, 3333
- Putin Youth 817
- Putney Debates 1098, 1099
- Putumayo atrocities 620
- Putzgruppe* 1366
- Puyricard, Governor 1526
- Pyidawtha (Welfare) program 2527
- Pyjas, Stanislaw 2697, 3077
- Pyliavtski, Battle of 1958
- Pyramids, Battle of 441
- Pythagoras 3428
- Qaddafi, Muammar al-** 2328, 2779, 3031
- Qadr, Birjis 1689
- Qajar dynasty 1766, 1767–8
- Qandahar, captured 3247
- Qarase, Laisenia 1199, 1200
- Qarmatians 236
- Qasim, Abd al-Karim 353, 1708, 1777, 1780–2, 2955, 3224
- Qaumi Inqilabi Party (QIP) 2583

- Qaumi Mahaz e Azadi 2583
 Qavam, Ahmad 2343
 Q'eqchi massacre 1480
 Qhichwa peasants 1936, 1937
Qin Bangxian 2780
 Qing Dynasty 714, 3230
 absolutism 715
 Hundred Days of Reform 3672–3
 military defenses 712
 overthrow of 721, 2994, 3201
 Self-Strengthening Movement 3672
 Sino-Japanese War 3236
 Tianjin Massacre 3290
 and western powers 113, 3671–2
 see also Manchu rule, crises of
Qiu Jin 719, 2780–1
Qu Qiubai 2113, 2781–2, 3723, 3725
Quaderni Piacentini (Piacenza Notebooks) 1836
Quaderni Rossi (Red Notebooks) 1836, 1842,
 1843, 2426
 Quadrelli, Emilio 2401–2, 2749–50
 Quakers
 abolition of slavery 201
 anti-nuclear protests 194, 1460
 civil disobedience 1225
 Fox 1224–5
 and Moravians 1301
 peaceful resistance 1105–6, 2491
 Pennsylvania 155–6, 202, 212
 Philadelphia 213, 367
 and Ranters 2804
 and Shakers 3019
 tithes 1105
 women's rights 1106, 1108, 3613
 Quartering Act 78, 453
Quarto Stato 2871
 Quddus (Barfurushi) 1766
 Que faire? group 2046
Que Viva México (Eisenstein) 1081
Quebec
 French civil code 591
 nationalism 2783–8
 October Crisis 2786–8
 Oka crisis 2556–7
 Quiet Revolution 2783–4, 2788
 separatism 2784–6
 see also World Trade Organization (WTO)
 protests, Quebec
 Quebec Act 78
 Quebec City, Summit of the Americas 3654,
 3656–7
 Quebec Rouges 2842
 Quechua people 480, 2371, 2658, 3430
Queen Nanny, Maroon resistance 2788–90
 Queen's Park Riot 2562
Queens Magazine 2108
 queer activism 2098, 2100
Queer Eye for the Straight Guy 2109
Queer as Folk 2109
 Queer Nation 2100, 2106, 2108, 2109
 Quesada, Gonzalo Jiménez de 3294–5
Questions féministes (Feminist Questions) 3575
 Quetzalcóatl 910
 Quetzaltenango, Battle of 1474, 1476, 3255
 Quezon, Manuel 2673
 Quiché resistance 1474, 3255
 Quijos revolt 1925–6
 Quilapayún 2379
 Quimpo, Nathan (Villalobos) 2684
 Quinim Pholsena 2055
 Quiñones Guerra, Victor R. 3464–5
 Quintero-Rivera, A. 2774
Quintín Lame (CQL) 1083, 2791
 Quintín Lame Armed Movement (MAQL) 802,
 804, 2791
 Quintín Lame Indigenous Movement (MIQL)
 2791
 Quinwonka 2115
 Quipp, June 586
 Quirino, Elpidio 1614, 1615
 Quiroga Santa Cruz, Marcelo 418
 Quisling, Vidkun 2495, 2525
 Quispe Huanca, Felipe 433, 789, 1938
Quit India movement 645, 1329–30, 1494,
 1704, 1710, 2051, 2389, 2432, 2791–5
 Quit Kashmir movement 1929–30
 Quito uprising 1062
 Quota Acts 3154, 3155
 Qur'an 1558–9, 1964, 3367
 Qureshi, Ashraf 1934
 Qureshi, Hashim 1934, 1935
 Quwatli, Shukri 3223

 Rabbani, Burhanuddin 14
 Rabin, Yitzhak 239, 1759, 1813
 Rabinowitch, Eugene 194
 Raboteau massacre 1508
Rabotmisa 3553, 3554, 3607
Rabuka, Situveni Ligamamada 199, 1197–8,
 2797–8
 Rachel Carson Council 617
 Rachel Carson Homestead Association 618
 Rachid Bey 3334
 Rachman, Hasyim 1725
 racial capitalism 3088
 Racial Discrimination Act (Australia) 6
 racial uplift 941
 racism
 and class struggle 785
 Leeward Islands 2076, 2078

- Malcolm X 2179
 Nazism 1184
 Russia 2921
 Stanton 3165
see also anti-apartheid movement; apartheid
- rack-renting 1793, 2318, 2802
 Radama I, of Madagascar 2156
 Radama II, of Madagascar 2156
 Raddeker, Hélène Bowen 133–5
 Radek, Karl 2167
 Radetsky, Joseph 1150
 Radi, Husayn Ahmad al-: *see* Salam ‘Adel
- radiation experiments
 Puertan Rican prisoners 39
 radiation exposure 191, 192, 195, 199
 Radical Abolition Party 56, 216
 Radical Associations 2550
 Radical Cheerleaders 125
 Radical Civic Union (UCR) 266
 Radical Democratic Party, India 2876
 radical feminism
 Britain 3569
 Japan 3594
 Spain 3611–12
 USA 159, 2844–5, 3629
 Radical Humanist Association 2876
 Radical Hungarian Women 1630–1
 Radical Party of Chile 693
 Radical Party of Denmark 991
Radical Reconstruction, USA 755, 2027,
 2798–801
 Radical Socialists 128, 824
 Radical Women’s Center 3597
 radicalesbians 2097
 Radicals and Opportunists 1323
 radio, power of 611
 Radio Barcelona 2871
 Radio Cacerola 2536
 Radio Campesina 1610
Radio Free Dixie 3534
 Radio Free Europe 3077
 Radio Free Grenada 1462
 Radio Hristo Botev 543, 544
 Radio Illimani 419
 Radio KREM 1634
 Radio Moscow 543
 Radio Naroden Glas 543
 Radio Rebelde 932
Radio Student 3744
 Radio Universidad 2535, 2537
 Radio Venceremos 639
Radio Zid 224
 Raditladi, Leetile 458
Raditsela, Andries 2801–2, 3096
 Radkey, Oliver 2886
 Radoinov, Tsvyatko 543
 Radom strikes 2696
 Radowitzky, Simón 243, 254, 267
 Raffarin, Jean-Pierre 1237
 Raftopoulos, B. 3732
 Ragen’s Colts 2824
 Raggi, Anne-Marie 884
 Rahman, Habibur 452
 Rahman, Motiur 2579
 Rahman, Sheikh Muhibur 344, 345, 346–7,
 2578, 2579
 Rahman, Ziaur 344
 Rahman Khan, Zarina 368–72
 Rahmonov, Emomali 3246
 Rai, Lala Lajpat 1677, 1680, 1696, 3042
 Railway Engineers’ and Firemen’s Union 1897
 Railway Worker Federation (FOF) 247
 Rainbow Coalition 1853
Rainbow Warriors 199, 1272, 2303, 2529
 Rainford, Charan 2740–1, 3250–3
 rainforest, protected 1268
 see also Amazonian rainforest protest and
 resistance
- Rainsborough, Thomas 1098, 1102
 Rajagopalachari, Chakravarthi 1628, 2432, 2792–3
 Rajan, Zahid 2690–1
 Rajapakse, Mahinda 3253
 Rajk, László 1625
 Raju, Alluri Seetha Rama 2802–3
 Rakoczi, Franciscus 1142
 Rákosi, Mátyás 1618, 1626, 2387
 Ralin, Radoi 3068
 Ralli-Arbore, Zemfir C. 142
 Rallis, Ioannis 1437
 Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) 858
 Ram Janmabhoomi 1584, 1585, 1692–3
 Ram Mandir (temple) campaign 1693
 Ramadan, Tariq 1811
 Ramakrishna-Vivekananda movement 1696
 Ramanenjana 2156
 Ramasami, E. V. 956–7
 Rambhupati 2802
 Ramchandra, Baba 1703
 Rame, Franca 1204–5
 Ramey, John 503
 Ramgarh Congress 2792
 Ramien, Th.: *see* Hirschfeld, Magnus
 Ramirez, Juana 3631
 Ramírez, Sergio 2470, 2474, 2965
 Ramón de la Fuente, Juan 3379
 Ramona, Comandante 3600
 Ramonet, Ignacio 298
 Ramos, Benigno 2673
 Ramos, Fidel V. 2683, 2684
 Ramos, Isabel 563

- Ramos de Chamberlain, Eulalia 3631
 Ramos-Horta, José 1042, 1044
 Ramos-Zayas, A. Y. 2774
Rampa rebellions 2802–3
RampART 1741
 Ramphele, Mamphela 3604
 Ramsay, James 206, 3528
 Rana, Sardar Singh Raoji 1675
 Ranade, M. G. 1695, 1697
 Ranadive, B. T. 961, 2421
 Ranariddh, Prince 1961
 Ranavalona I, of Madagascar 2156
 Rance, Hubert 302, 557, 2978
 RAND Corporation 280, 1399
 Rand Formula 589
 Rand Revolt 153, 831–2, 3091
 Randall, Adrian 502, 2134
Randolph, A. Philip 73, 1554, **2803–4**
 African Blood Brotherhood 22
 and Baker 332
 Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters 393,
 757, 2037, 3187
 civil rights 745
 Freedom Budget 752, 2037
 Messenger 21
 Rangel, José Vicente 3445
 Ranger, Terence 3728, 3729
 Rangoon Institute of Technology 550
 Rangoon University 552
 Rangoon University Students' Union (RUSU)
 301, 554
 Ranis, Peter 2346–50
 Ranjit Singh 1928–9
 Rankin, Jeanette 2489
Ranters 94, 1104–5, 1107, **2804–5**
 Rao, C. Rajeswara 961, 2421
 rape
 allegations 3002–3
 as collective dishonoring 1585
 Gujarat 1585, 1694
 India 3589
 marital 3567
 of missionaries 2060
 Muslims/Hindus 1584, 1585
 of nuns 1585
 Pakistan 1711
 by police 3589
 politics of 3629
 punishments 3233
 Santal rebellion 2971
 Rape Crisis Centers 3579
 Raphael, D. D. 3054
 Rapid Response Brigades 925
 Rapoport, David 281
Rapp, Father George 1185–6, 2460
 Rappites 2560
 Rappresentanza di base (Rdb) 1840
 Raseta, Joseph 1250
 Rashid, al- 2333
 Rashid, Hama 1762
 Rashra Sevika Samity (Society of Women Serving
 the Nation) 1583, 1584
 Rashtriya Panchayat 2443
 Rashtriya Praja Party (RPP) 2438
 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 1330,
 1331, 1583, 1692, 2433
 in Kashmir 1930
 Raskin, Jonah 2127–8
Raspail, François-Vincent 403, **2805–6**
 Raspe, Jan-Carl 1368
 Rasputin, Grigori 2890, 2895, 2942
 Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA)
 579, 884, 1249, 1251, 1252
 Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale
 (RIN) 2784
 Rassemblement du peuple français (RPF) 825
 Rastafarianism 394, 611, 1336, 1498, 1859–60,
 1864, 1870, 2852
 Rastokhez 3245
 Rathbone, Eleanor 3568
 Rational Dissenters 507
 rational dress 168
 Rational Society 2567
 Ratshosa, Simon 455, 458
 Ratsiraka, President 2157
 Ratzinger, Joseph 1497
 Ratzinger Report 2062
 Raurich, Héctor 272
 Rauschenbusch, Walter 762
 Ravines, Eudocio 2219
 Ravoahangy, Joseph 1250
 Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case 1160, 1637, 2404,
 2581, 2582
 Rawlings, Jerry 2182
 Rawson de Dellepiane, Elvira 3597
 Ray, James Earl 753
 Ray, Man 1125
 Ray, Rajat 1689
 Ray, Rup Narayan 1706
 Raymond, Battle of 63
 Raymond, Jean de 578
 Raymond, Julien 3311
 Razin, Stepan (Stenka) 2775, 2806, 3148
Razin's Rebellion 2806–7
 Raziq, 'Ali 'Abd al- 1809
 Razmara, Ali 1764
Razón, La 2217
 Réaction Démocratique (RD) 1517
 ready-mades 953
 Reaffirmists/Rejectionists, Philippines 2686

- Reagan, Ronald
 on anti-nuclear movement 2502
 arms race 1831
 Black Student Union 3169
 and Davis 964, 965
 El Salvador 1163, 1165, 2868, 2956, 2957
 elected 889, 1395
 Grenada 2462
 Iran–Contra scandal 2475
 Lebanon 2071
 and Manley 2198
 and Marcos 2683
 neoliberalism 690, 1387, 1395, 1882
 Nicaragua 2472, 2564
 reelected 198
 on same-sex relations 2094
 Screen Actors' Guild 1603
 Strategic Defense Initiative 513
- Real de Minas region 3452
 Real Friend Federation 136
 Real Whigs 507
Reasoner 3282
 Rebecca Riots 520, 3500
 Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) 1476, 1480
Recht voor allen 870
 Reclaim the City 1153
 reclaim the state group 2620
Reclaim the Streets 1040, 1387, 1390, 1392,
 1393, 1397, 1483, 2807–11
 Reclus, Elie 2811
Reclus, Elisée 1419, 2811–14
 anarchism and Christianity 2813
 anarchocommunist 2812, 2813
 as influence 1807
 and Kropotkin 2008, 2813, 2814
 Moravian school 2323
Nouvelle Géographie universelle, La 2812
 propaganda by the deed 2813
 racism condemned 2813
- Reconstruction: *see* Radical Reconstruction,
 USA
 Reconstruction Act (1867) 2800
 Reconstruction Amendments 68
 Reconstruction and Development Policy 2195
 Reconstruction and Development Program
 (RDP) 875, 3101
 Recto, Claro M. 2676
 Red Academy 2120
 Red Army, China
 Long March 726, 2201–2
 Mao 708, 726, 2201–2
 origins of 708, 722, 725, 729, 731
 Red Army, Russia 2086, 3507
Red Army Faction 1366, 1368–9, 3522
 Red Bonnets, Revolt of 2215
Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse) 380, 1820,
 1837, 1844, 2402, 2814–18
 Red Channels pamphlet 1603
 Red Cloud agency 901
 Red Clydeside 2820, 2821, 3061
 Red Fern Black Rose 107
 Red Flag Communist Party 3279
 Red Flag guerilla 3443
 Red Guards 710, 711, 720, 2204, 2995, 3168,
 3180
 Red International of Labor Unions (RILU)
 2257, 2486
Red Light 986
 Red Orchestra 1377, 1378
 Red Panthers 2401
 Red Power Movement 40, 2412–14, 2419
Red Rag 3569
Red Revolutionary Tenants 2755
Red Rover 2844
 Red Ruhr Army 1364
 Red Scare repression 194, 379, 824, 2034, 2107
Red Scotland: *see* Scotland
 Red Shirts, Italy 1332, 1333
 Red Shirts (Khuda-i Khidmatgar): *see* Khuda-i
 Khidmatgar (Red Shirts)
 Red Shock Troop 1379
 Red Socorro 254
Red Summer, USA 22, 2822–4
 Red Sun 1058
 Red Terror 2086
Red Week: *see* Settimana Rossa
 Redding, Kimberly A. 2892
 Reddock, R. 3560
 Reddock, Rhoda 3579
 Reddy, Baddam Yella 1707
 Reddy, C. P. 2422, 2423
 Reddy, Jai Ram 1199
 Reddy, Ravi Narayan 1707
 Reddy, T. Nagi 2422, 2423, 2425
 Redfern black community 309
 Redistribution Act (1885) 241
 Redjeb, Sheikh 3357
 Redmond, John 1045, 1047, 1799
redondilla work-sharing system 1753
Reds (film) 836, 2825
 Reds/Whites
 Poland 2704
 Russia 2167
 Redstockings 3629
 Redstone, John 861
 Reeb, James 1976
Reed, John 2253, 2623, 2824–5, 3065
Insurgent Mexico 2825
Ten Days that Shook the World 836, 2825
 Reef Shop Assistants' Union 2948

- Rees, James 3147
 Reeve, Charlie 1737
 Reeves, Steve 3149
 Refet, Colonel 3357
Reform Acts, Britain and Ireland (1832) 205, 633, 655, 786, 1632, 2692, 2825–7, 3499, 3565
Reform Bills, Britain (1867, 1884) 526, 2827–8, 3061, 3565
Reforma Universitaria 864
Réformateur 2805
Reformation
 Denmark 988
 England 514–16, 1092–6
 Finland 2513
 Germany 1355–8, 2139
 Netherlands 1034–5
 Norway 2523
 Radical 92
 as revolution 1357
 Scientific Revolution 2987–8
 Scotland 2999–3002
 Sweden 2513
 Switzerland 92, 3748
 Reformation Parliament 515, 1093
Reforme, La 1243
 Reformed Kirk 3001, 3002
 Reformers' Organization 1087, 1557
 refugees, Greek–Turkish war 1442
 Refuseniks 1816
 Regala, Williams 1506
 Regan, Tom 3429
 Regency Crisis 1223, 1786
Regeneración 137, 2162
 reggae 611, 1860
Regina Riot 588, 2562–3, 2831–2
 Regional Council of Negro Leadership (RCNL) 1155
 Regional Council of Peasant Leagues (CRLC) 2351
 Regional Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FRTS) 2223
 Regional Indigenous Council of Tolima (CRIT) 2791
 Regional Mexican Workers' Confederation (CROM) 2541
 Regional Organization of Embera Waunan of Chocó 2791
 Regional Workers' Federation (FRTS), El Salvador 2225
 Regional Workers' Federation, Puerto Rico 141
 Rehman, Abdul 2583
 Rehoboth Basters 2392, 2397
 Rehoboth Council 2397
 Rehoboth Rebellion 2397
 Reich, Haviva 1917
 Reich, Jens 1345
Reichseimigung 1351
Reichstag Fire 1003, 1178, 1375, 2832–3
 Reid, Donald 235
 Reid Cabral, Donald 1018
 Reign of Terror 2851–2, 2970
 impact on Britain 819
 Robespierre 894, 2849, 2970
 Rochambeau 2851
sans-culottes 2970
 Sieyès 3033
 Reilly, Thomas Devin 3680, 3681
 Reiman, Michel: *The Birth of Stalinism* 3161
 Reinaga, Fausto 1937
 Reinette, Luc 1470
 Reinherz, Adam 2141–2
 Reis, Turgut 3334
 Reiss, Edward 766–7
 Reitman, Ben 125
 Relief Acts 1785
 Relief Camp Workers' Union 2832
 relief camps for unemployed 2831
 religion
 Marx on 3679
 non-violence 2496
 pacifism 2490
 and revolution 3017
 on violence 2490
 Religion, Wars of 1035, 1068, 2950
Religious Recorder 3006
 Religious Socialists 1380
 religious tolerance 1110, 1408
 Remilik, Haruo 2304
 Remington, Blake W. 3512–14
 Renaissance 886
 RENAMO: *see* Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
 Renard, André 361
Rendao (Human Path) 2781
 Rengo trade unions 1876, 1877, 1883, 3069, 3721
 Rénique, Gerardo 2535–8, 2650–6
 Renner, Karl 319, 321, 322, 354
 Reno, Marcus 901
 rent strikes 2819
 Reparation of Victims of the Dictatorship Law 2598
 Repeal Association 3680
 Repetto, Nicolás 271
 Representation of Natives Bill 833
 Representation of the People Act 520, 528, 1047
 Representation of the People (Equal Suffrage) Act 529
 reproductive rights 3630
Repubblica, La 1310

- Republic Assault Guards 3131, 3141–2
 Republic of New Africa 18, 394
 República Chiquita de Indios 2045
 Republican Mobilization, Nicaragua 2467
 Republican Motherhood 3616
 Republican National Convention (RNC) 229, 500
 Republican Party, India 54, 958
 Republican Party, USA
 black voters 762
 coalition 63
 formation of 56
 northern workers 2024
 Reconstruction 2027
 Republican People's Party (RPP), Turkey 3351, 3359, 3362, 3363–4
 Republican Sinn Féin 1802, 1803
 Republican Union of Democratic Women's Organizations 3554
 Republican Womanhood 3615
Republika 224
 Repudiation movement 2207
 Research and Analysis Wing, India 3251, 3252
 Research Foundation on Science, Technology, and Ecology 3028
 Réseau des Organisations Paysannes (ROPPA) 3463
 Réseau Québécois d'intégration continentale 3656
 Reserve Officer Training Corps bombings 222, 1946
 Residence Law, Argentina 261
 Resistance Society 112
 Resistencia Libertaria (RL) 104–5
 Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 738, 1262, 2153–4, 2355, 3547, 3736
Resistencia Peronista 272
Resistenza 1832, 1833, 2834–6
Respublika 3329
 Restoration, England 1100, 1194
 Quakers 1106
Restrictive Covenant Cases 760
Rethinking Marxism 2249
 Reuther, Walter 837, 2037, 2066
Réveil des masses 110
 Revere, Paul 78, 296
 Reverend Billy and the Church of Stop Shopping 1482
 reverse strikes 2502
 Revisionist Zionist Herut Party 359
 Revisionist Zionists 358
Revista Sem Terra 2352
Revolt 106
 Revolta Activa 2360
 Revolta Praieira 493
 Revoltas Liberais 492–3
Révolution, La 2006, 2811
Révolte, Le 2006, 2811
 Revolução Pernambucana 487
Revolución 923, 930
Revolución Argentina 244
 Revolución Libertadora 863, 864, 1156, 2638
revolution
 from above 3156–64
 from below 684, 2282
 class identity 765
 communism 778
 counterrevolution 885–90
 democratic 886
 dialectics of 2836–40
 freeing from oppression 2986
 imperialism 1649–52
 Khrushchev 1216
 Narayan 2403
 permanent 2083, 2247
 proletariat 821
 see also American Revolution; Chinese Communist Revolution; Chinese Nationalist Revolution; color revolutions; Cuban Revolution; French Revolution; Haitian Revolutions; protest and revolution, stages in; Russian Revolution (1905–7); Russian Revolution of February/March (1917); Russian Revolution of October/November (1917); science and revolution; sexuality, revolution and; Spanish Revolution
Revolution 3164
Revolution, The 169, 3622
Révolution cosmopolite 2171
Revolution Québécoise 2785
Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) 18, 1634, 2841–2
 Revolutionary Action Party 1472
 Revolutionary Alliance 3727
 Revolutionary Anarchist Socialist Party 1419
 Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (FARP) 1121, 2285
Revolutionary Armed Forces and Popular Liberation Army: see Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)
 Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People (ERPI) 1121, 2285, 2286, 3428, 3719
 Revolutionary Artibonite Resistance Front 1508
 Revolutionary Autonomous Communities (RAC) 862
 Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 200 (MBR-200) 414–15
 Revolutionary Brigades 1042
 Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) 1071, 1078, 2406
 Sudan 3191

- Revolutionary Commune of Russian Anarchists 142
 Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece (EKKE/AASPE) 1445
 Revolutionary Communist Party of India 1704–5, 3229
 Revolutionary Coordination of the Masses (CRM) 1165
 Revolutionary Cuban Party 919
 revolutionary defensism 2903, 2904
 Revolutionary Ethiopia Women's Association (REWA) 1137
 Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association (REYA) 1137
 Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces in Peru 3430
 Revolutionary Institutional Party 3427
 Revolutionary League 153
 Revolutionary Left Party (PIR) 416, 428
 Revolutionary Liberal Movement (MRL) 800
 Revolutionary Mexican Junta 1924
 Revolutionary Movement Carapaica 3445
 Revolutionary Movement of November 13 (MR-13) 1476
 Revolutionary National Committee 28
 Revolutionary Offensive, Cuba 628
 Revolutionary Organization of Toilers of Kurdistan 1763
 Revolutionary Party of the Khmer People 3474
 Revolutionary Party of the National Left (PRIN) 416
 Revolutionary Party of the New Vietnam 3467
 Revolutionary Party of Venezuela (PRV-FALN) 413, 3443, 3444
 Revolutionary Peasants' Movement (MCR) 684
 Revolutionary Popular Army (ERP) 3718
 Revolutionary Provisional Government (RPG) 3484
 Revolutionary Single Front 386
 revolutionary socialism 2243
 Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR ML) 2362
 Revolutionary Socialist Party of Ecuador (PSRE) 1058
 Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), India 343, 1678, 1704–5
 Revolutionary Socialist Party of Peru 2644
 Revolutionary Struggle for Ethiopian Masses (ECHAAT) 1137
 Revolutionary Students' Front (FER) 684
 Revolutionary Students of Budapest 2136
 revolutionary syndicalism 120, 162
 Revolutionary Syndicalist Committees (CSRs) 851
 Revolutionary Tendency (TR) 3444
 Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition (RGO) 3385
 Revolutionary Tribunal 962
 Revolutionary Tupamaro Movement: *see* Tupamaros
 Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorian Youth (URJE) 1058
 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 3030–2
 Revolutionary Workers' Front (FTR) 684
 Revolutionary Workers' League 830, 996
 Revolutionary Workers' Movement (MRT) 1058, 3444–5
 Revolutionary Workers' Party (POR) 416, 419, 420, 428
 Revolutionary Workers' Party–Mindanao (RPM-M) 2686
 Revolutionary Youth League 2662–3
Révolutionnaire, La 270
Revue du monde noir 3578
Revue Indigène 1516
Revue Socialiste 2784
Rexue ribao (Hot Blood Daily) 2781
 Reyes, Bernardo 2277
 Reyes, Cipriano 274
 Reyes, Elfreda 3559
 Reyes, José Maria 614
 Reyes, Pablo 1016
 Reyes, Raúl 1169
 Reyes, Ricardo 2685
 Reyes Amaya, Edmundo 1121–2, 2286
 Reyes Monterrey, José 447
 Reyes Villa, Manfred 790
 Reynaud, Paul 362
 Reynolds, Earle 1461
 Reynolds, Thomas 1203, 1795
 Reza, Saiyad Hyder 1698
 Reza Shah, Mohammad: *see* Pahlevi, Mohammad Reza Shah
 Rhee Syng-man 1981, 1999, 3169
 student protests 3181, 3182
Rheinische Zeitung 2230
 Rhenish Mission Society 2390
 rhizome concept 981
 Rho Moo-hyun 2000
 Rho Tae-woo regime 1986, 2000
 Rhodakanaty, Plotino C. 97, 137
 Rhodes, Cecil 453, 694, 700, 704, 3734
 Rhodes, J. 399
 Rhodes, James A. 1946
 Rhodesia
 anarchism 147
 slave labor 3728
 UDI 3730
 white settlers 3734
 see also Zambia; Zimbabwe

- Rhodesia Railway Workers' Union (RRWU) 3728
 Rhodesia Railways African Workers' Union (RAWU) 456, 2220–1
 Rhodesian Front (RF) 3730, 3735
 Rhodesian Mine and General Workers' Association (RMGWA) 3728
 Riazanov, David 2238, 2243
 Ribbentrop, Joachim von 451
 Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact 830, 2705
 Ribe, Treaty of 2983
 Riberio de Spinola, Antonio 1492–3
 Ricanstruction 2064
 Ricardo, David 2231, 2451
 Rice, Condoleezza 3629
 Richard, Pablo 478
 Richard II, of England 514
 Richard III, of England 514
 Richards, E. 2819
 Richard's Constitution 23
 Richards, Glen 2074–9
 Richardson, Annette 441–4, 908–10, 1079–80, 2041–2, 2387–8, 2872–4, 3744–5
 Richardson, John 1566
 Richardson, Leigh 364
 Richer, Léon 2721
 Richmond 67
 Richmond, David 739, 3186
 Richmond, Duke of 508
 Rida, Rashid 236, 1809
 Ridge, Lola 115
 Ridley, Nicholas 1094, 1095
 Riegel, N. D. 989
Riel, Louis 583–4, 2841–2
 Rif rebellion 1125, 2336
 Rifondazione Comunista 1307
 Rifqi, Uthman 3395
 Riga 1183
 Rigas Pheraios 1435
 Rigaud, André 995, 1534, 1535, 1545, 1546, 3308, 3310, 3311
 Riggs, E. Francis 2768
 Right to Privacy Committee (RTPC) 2099
 right-to-work protests, France 2842–3
 Rightboys 1785
 Righteous and Harmonious Fists 718, 3672
 see also Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Rebellion
 Rights Recovery Movement 735
 Rigoberta Menchú Foundation 2272
 Rikabi, Fuad al- 3224
 Rimke, Heidi M. 1091–2, 1411–14, 1568–70
Rinascita 379
 Rincon Hill, Battle of 3415
rinderpest 2392
Ringeren 2525
 Rini, Snyder 3082
 Rio de Janeiro 473, 474
 Riopelle, Jean-Paul 110
Ríos, Filiberto Ojeda 2843–4
 Rioss Montt, Efraim 1481, 2273
Riot Grrl 2844–5
 Ripley, George 1222
 Risley, H. H. 2574
 Risorgimento movement 1332, 2691, 2959
 see also Italian Risorgimento
 Rist, Gilbert 1665
Risveglio, Il 107
 Riswick, Treaty of 1540, 1543
 Ritter, Daniel 2490–7, 2505–12
 Ritter, J. 1572
 Ritter von Schoenerer, George 887
 Rivas, José Félix 3457
 Rivas Declaration 2306
 River Rouge protest march 837
 Rivera, Diego 2375, 2449
 Rivera, Francisco 1332
 Rivera, R. Z. 2774
 Rivera, Rudecindo 963
 Rivera, Sivlia 2108
 Rivera Cuesta, Marcos 1018
 Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia 1936–9
 Rivera Damas, Arturo 2060
 Rivera y Damas, Arturo 2868, 2958
 Riza Efendi, Ali 293
Rizal, José 444, 2668, 2669, 2672, 2676, 2845–6
 Rizzi, Bruno 973
 Roa Sierra, Juan 408, 1320
 road blockades
 Argentina 262
 Bolivia 1936
 Gleneagles G8 1313
 Paraguay 2603
 Thailand 3274
 USA 1054
 see also Reclaim the Streets
 Robert, François 1294
 Roberto, Holden 2359, 2449
 Roberts, W. R. 1192
Robeson, Paul 954, 1555, 1556, 2846–7
 Here I Stand 2847
 Robespierre, Augustin 441
Robespierre, Maximilien de 2847–51
 Babeuf on 328
 Girondins 403
 Jacobin Club 1288
 overthrown 2852, 2990
 Reign of Terror 2851–2, 2970
 rise to power 962
 and *sans-culottes* 2970
 treason arrests 1281, 1283, 1292
 Robin Hood school funding programs 781

- Robins, Philip 400
 Robinson, Arthur Napoleon 3320
 Robinson, J. A. G. 2614
 Robinson, Jo Ann 761, 1971, 2614
 Robinson, Samuel: *see* Rodríguez, Simón
 Robinson, Samuel S. 1013
 Robles, Alfonso 2470, 2475
 Robles, Amelia/Amelio 3017
 Robles, Francisco 1062
 Robles, Gil 291, 292
 Robles, Marcos 2594
 Robnett, Belinda 652
Robotnik 2689, 2698, 3078, 3556
Robotnik Wjbrzeza 3497
 Roca, Julio Argentino 257, 261
 Rocard, Michel 2459
 Rocco Law 1177
 Rocha, Otto de la 638
Rochambeau, Comte de 86, 1547, 2041, 2851–2
 Rochefort, Henri de 2172, 2457
 Rochester Riot 3398
 Rock Against the Round 3652
 rock music 221, 1344
 Rockefeller, John D. 3041
 Rockefeller, Nelson 244–5, 3399
 Rockefeller Foundation 2434
 Rocker, Rudolf 96, 108, 158, 3072
 Rockers and Mods 512
 Rockites 656
 Rodda, John 3297
Rodina group 3049–50
 Rodman, Henrietta 3625
Rodney, Walter 1497, 1502, 1660, 2852–3
 as alleged security threat 1862–3
 Groundings with My Brothers 1498, 2853
 How Europe Underdeveloped Africa 1497–8, 1660, 2853
 works 2852–3
 Rōdō Nōmintō (Labor–Farmer Party) 1911
Rodo Undo (Labor Movement) magazine 1848
Rodrigazo, el 249
 Rodrigo, Celestino 249, 250
 Rodrigues, Deolinda 3605
 Rodrigues, Olinde 2953
 Rodríguez, Abelardo 2542
 Rodríguez, Alí 3444
 Rodríguez, Andrés 2596–7, 2602, 2608
 Rodríguez, Carlos Rafael 932
 Rodríguez, Jorge 3443
 Rodríguez, Juan 1014
 Rodríguez, Silvio 3574, 3658
Rodríguez, Simón 413, 664, 2854
 Rodríguez, Teresa 262
 Rodríguez Bautista, Nicolás 1082
 Rodríguez Cristobal, Angel 2772
Rodríguez Domínguez, Silvio 2380, 2853
 Rodríguez Veltze, Eduardo 435, 789
 rodriguista culture, Chile 1226, 1227
 Rodzyanko, M. 2910
Roe v. Wade 1299, 3630
 Roediger, David 773, 774
 Rogdaev, Nikolai 142
 Roger–Ducos, Pierre 895, 1079
 Rogers, Joel 2620
 Rogers, William 400
 Rogers Plan 400
 Roggero, Gigi 3168–72
 Rogue States 738
 Roh Moo-hyun regime 1980, 1991, 1992, 2000, 2001
 Rohan, Chevalier de 3494
 Röhm, Ernst 1591, 2104
 Rohwedder, Detlev 1369
 Rojas, Ernesto 1120
 Rojas, Isaac 2638
 Rojas, Manuel 112
 Rojas, R. 688
 Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo 410, 800
 Rokossovsky, Konstantin 2699
 Roland, Madame 1297
 Roldan-Figueroa, Rady 843–5, 1491–2, 2323–4, 2828–31
 Rolfe, John 211
 Rolim, Padre 485
 Rolin, Françoise 1293
 Rolland, Romain 2217
 Rolling Thunder Operation 1600
 Rollins, Sonny 611
 Rolls, Albert 3327–8
 Rolón, Raimundo 2600
 Roma people
 Austria 320
 Croatia 3683
 expelled from Kosovo 2003
 Nazi Germany 1175, 1179
 Romania 2857
 Román, Juan Miguel 1014
 Roman, Peter 921–2, 935–40
 Roman Empire, Western 872, 3145
 Roman Republic 1332
Romania 2854–67
 anti-Soviet protests 2866
 boyars 2862, 2864
 counterrevolution 2867
 cultural developments 2863–4
 feudalism 2863
 Hungary, resistance to 2863–4, 2865
 Jewish people 2856, 2857
 Legion of the Archangel Michael 1173, 2857

- mineworker protests 2854–6, 2858–9
 Napoleon III 2865
 Ottoman empire 2864–5
 peasant uprising 2856, 2863
 protest and revolution 2856–62, 2862–5
 Revolution (1989) 2859–60
 Roma people 2857
 Russian language classes 2866
 student and worker protests 2865–7
 Transylvanian School 2863
 Turkish rule 2862
 Unification Day 2856
 Romanian Orthodox Church 1173, 2863
 Romanones, Conde de 351–2
 Romanos, Eduardo 847–50, 1187–9
 Romanov dynasty 1749
 Romanow, Roy John 2975–6
 Romanska, Magda 140–1, 348–9, 644–5, 1191–2
 Romanticism 1143, 2231
 Rome bombings 1837
 Rome General Peace Accords 1262
 Romegas, Hospitaller 2183
 Römer, Beppo 1377
 Romero, Carlos Humberto 1164, 2957
 Romero Bosque, Pio 2225
Romero, Óscar (Archbishop) 2867–9, 2868
 assassinated 2060, 2957
 Ronchi, Edo 2622
rondas campesinas (peasant patrols) 2362, 2644
 Rondeau, José 288
 Ronefelt, D. 3716
 Rongelap Atoll 199, 2303
 Rongerik Atoll 199, 2303
 Ronsin, Charles Philippe 1292
 Roosevelt, Eleanor 758, 3166
 Roosevelt, Franklin D.
 AFC 2489
 charisma 650
 Good Neighbor policy 1523
 Haiti 1515
 Mexico 607
 Morocco 2336
 New Deal 839, 887, 1568, 2036, 2248,
 2756–7, 3411
 Selective Service Act 757
 on Somoza 2466
 Taiwan 3239
 unemployment 3386
 Roosevelt, Theodore
 Anarchist Exclusion Act 1412
 meatpacking industry 3040
 Rosa, Maria Soledad 132
 Rosa Luxemburg group 3598
 Rosales, Manuel 3446
Rosario Uprising 251, 863–9
 Rosario Sanchez, Francisco del 1016
 Rosas, Juan Manuel de 1332
Rosca, La 425–6, 428, 430
 Rose, Ernestine 3619–20
 Rose, Flemming 992
 Rose, Hugh 1690
 Rose, Jacques 2787
 Rose, Margaret 1610
 Rose, Paul 2786, 2787
 Rose Revolution, Georgia 811, 812, 2510, 3011,
 3021, 3329
 Rosenbach, Ulrike 1191
 Rosenbaum, Peter 3525–6
 Rosenberg, Marcel 3140
 Rosenblum, April 1914–16
 Roses, Wars of the 514, 1092, 1804
Roshaniya movement 2869
 Ross, C. 1337
 Ross, Catherine 578–9
 Ross, Fred 661
 Ross, Horatio Nelson 900
 Ross, Larry 2528
 Ross, M. L. 2115
Rossanda, Rossana 2196, 2870
 Anno degli studenti, L' 2870
 Ragazza del secolo scorso, La 2870
 Rosseli, Nello 2871
Rosselli, Carlo 1383, 2835, 2870–1, 3342
 Rosselló, Pedro 3465
 Rossetti, Dante Gabriel 2341
 Rossi, Giovanni 131
 Rossi, Michael 948–52, 2251–2
 Rostock Action Conferences 1316
 Rostock Alternative Summit 1317
 Rostow, Walt Whitman 1665–6, 1669
Rote Fahne, Die 1376, 2046
Roter Wedding movement 2046
 Roth, Stephen Ludwig 1620, 1621
 Rothschild family 1920
 Roudy, Yvette 3576
 Rouerie, Marquis de la 892
 Rouget de Lisle, Claude Joseph 2380
 Rough Wooing 3000
Roumain, Jacques 1516, 1517, 2872
 Roume, Philippe-Rose 1530, 1531, 1534, 3310–11
 Roumer, Emile 1516
 Round for Free 3653
 Round Mountain attack 59
 Roundheads 289, 1097
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 2872–4
 anarchism 94, 95
 and Babeuf 328
 and Buonarroti 545
 Confessions 2873
 Discourse on the Arts and Sciences 2873

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (*cont'd*)

education 1203
 egalitarianism 2619
Emile 2873
Encyclopédie contributions 2873
 Enlightenment 1126, 2316
 and Holbach 1602
 as influence 3448
Julie 2873
 noble savage 95, 1203, 2872
 proto-socialism 1639
 and Robespierre 2848
 and Rodriguez 413
 on science 2992
Social Contract 1113, 1421, 2873
 social inequality 1409, 3494
 and Wollstonecraft 3541

Rousset, Pierre 705–12, 721–31, 1611–17,
 2670–6, 2676–8, 2678–88, 2746–8,
 3256–65, 3272–8, 3538–9, 3640–4

Roux, Jacques 1277, 1290, 1296
 Roux, Philip R. 149
 Rowbotham, Sheila 772, 2249, 2263
 Rowe, Trevor 559
 Rowlatt Act 1325, 1677, 1701–2, 2403
 Rowlatt Satyagraha 1709, 2430
 Roxas, Manuel 1614, 2675
 Roy, Chittapriya 1676
 Roy, Ishan Chandra 372
Roy, Manabendra Nath 2874–6
 CPI 1677
 and Dange 961
 followers 450, 2875
 independence 2792
 Marxism 2249
 and Stalin 2875
 works 2875–6

Roy, Prafulla Chandra 1698
 Roy, Raoul 2784
 Roy, T. 1688, 1689
 Royal, Gérard 1273
 Royal, Ségolène 3577
 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 2099,
 2557, 2563, 2831
 Royal Commission on Trade Unions 519
 Royal/Dutch Shell 1053
 Royal Franchise Commission 3315
 Royal Indian Navy 1705–6
 Royal Irish Constabulary 1026, 1048
 Royal Philippine Company 2666–7
 Royal Society of London 2989–90
 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 1797, 1802,
 2572
 Ruam Wongphan 3260
 rubber goods factory 2941

rubber plantations 620
 Rubia, Charles 1948, 1950, 1951
 Rubin, Robert 1430
 Rubiner, Ludwig 1609
 Rubinson, Paul 193–9, 1052–5, 1212–19,
 2756–63
 Rubisohn, Zeev 3148
 Rubison, Paul 646–54, 776–83
Ruche, La 1517
 Ruche, La (model school) 3217
 Ruckus Society 3663
 Rudd, Kevin 304
 Rudd, Mark 818
 Rudé, George 296, 1284, 1286, 1287, 2249, 3211
 Rude Boys, Jamaica 1861–2
 Rüdiger, Helmut 3082, 3083
 Rüdiger von der Goltz, General 1202
 Ruge, Arnold 333, 2230, 3147
 Rugege, S. 2110
 Rüger, Sigrid 3580
 Rugova, Ibrahim 2002
 Rühle, Otto 3082
 Ruiz, Henry 2469
 Ruiz, Hermann 798–800, 801–3, 808–10, 3388–9
 Ruiz, Samuel 480
 Ruiz, Vince 107
 Ruiz Cortinez, Adolfo 2296, 2298
 Ruiz Guevara, Esteban 664
 Ruiz Ortiz, Ulises 2290, 2295, 2535, 2536
 Ruling, Anna 2104
 Rumbold, Horace 3358
Rumiñahui 2876–7
 Rumney, Ralph 3044
 Rump Parliament 909, 910, 1099, 1100, 2120
 Rumveldt Riots 1500
 Rummyantsev, Sergei 541
runanga (tribal assemblies) 2206, 2207
 Runyoro language 3371
 Rupert, Prince 909
 Rupp, L. J. 1742
 Ruppert, Kathleen 1415–16, 1803–7, 2571–3
 Ruptura 3444
 Rural Associations of Collective Interest (ARICs)
 2288, 2290
 Rural Mobile Police Patrol Units (UMOPAR)
 2320
 Rural Society of Planters and Cattle Breeders of
 Pernambuco (SAAP) 2351
 Rural Workers' International Union 3039
 Rush, Benjamin 87
 Ruskin, John 1324, 2340, 3061
 Ruskin Colony of Tennessee 2454, 3418
Russell, Bertrand 190, 195, 196, 2877
 CND 513
 on Itō Noe 1848

- Vietnam Solidarity Campaign 218
War Crimes in Vietnam 222
- Russell, Dora 3568
- Russell, John 2827–8
- Russell, Thomas 1786, 3302, 3392
- Russell–Einstein Manifesto 190, 2877
- Russia 2877–8, 2920–8, 2940–5**
 anarchism 141–3
 anti-Jewish pogroms 1851, 2881–2, 3741
 aristocracy 2921, 2942
 as autocracy 2920
 bourgeoisie 2923, 2942
 cholera riots 2877–8
 class divisions 2932
 factories 2923–4
 famine 2922
 feudalism 2921
 and Finland 2932
 food shortages 1751, 2895, 2934–6
 Greek Orthodox Church 2925
 harvest failures 2922
 IMF 3126
 intelligentsia 2924–5, 2930, 2943
 IWW 1736
 multinationalism 2925
 mutual aid 2879
 nationalization 2935
 New Economic Policy 3510
 oil industry 3127
 Old Belief 3028
 peasants 3506–8
 political parties 2925–6
 post-Soviet 3126–8
 racism 2921
 revolutionary labor upsurge 2940–5
 revolutions/sources 2920–7
 serfdom ended 2921
 social revolution 1663
 strikes 2940–5, 3511
 temperance movement 2927–8
 tsarist 1668
 urban society 2922
 wages 2923
 women's rights 3390, 3554
 worker militancy 2922–4, 2940–1
 World War I 3115
see also Bolotnikov's Rebellion; Bolsheviks;
 Bulavin's Rebellion; Mensheviks; Moscow
 fire and protest, 1547; Pugachev's Rebellion;
 Razin's Rebellion; Russian Civil War;
 Russian Revolution (1905–7); Russian
 Revolution of February/March (1917);
 Russian Revolution of October/November
 (1917); Soviet Union; war communism
- Russian Church 2921
- Russian Civil War 2928–40**
 Bolshevik Revolution 2085–6
 Constituent Assembly 2930–2
 famine and poverty 2003
 foreign intervention 2936–7, 2940
 Lenin on 2086–7
 party dictatorship 2937–9
 red terror 2939
 socioeconomic consequences 2939–40,
 3509–10
- Russian Marxism 975–9**
Russian News 3551
- Russian Revolution (1905–7) 2878–89**
 background for 2878–9
 Bloody Sunday 1746–7, 2879–81
 class divisions 2881–3, 2889
 Days of Freedom 2882, 2883
 labor protest 2883
 October Manifesto 2881–3, 2884
 Spiridonova 3152–3
 terrorism 3153
- Russian Revolution of February/March
 (1917) 2889–902**
 autocracy fallen 2890–1
 casualties 2890
 dual power 2896–9, 2902
 factory workers 2899–901
 insurrection 2894–6
 Lenin 2893–4
 Liberal Opposition 2891–2
 Nicholas I overthrown 2889
 peasants/workers 1279–80, 1285–6, 2895,
 2899
 Shlyapnikov 3029
 socialist positions 2892–3
 women's protests 1743, 2084, 2895–6, 3554
 worker protests 2889–91, 2897
- Russian Revolution of October/November
 (1917) 721, 778, 2902–20, 3550–5**
 April Theses 2902–3
 April Days 2904–5
 attempted coup 2912–14
 Bolshevik debates 2916–17
 coalition government 2905–6
 counterrevolution 2910–12
 Decree on Land 2918
 Decree on Peace 2918
 economic crisis 2906–8
 influence on Europe 318, 1818
 July Days 2911–12
 Kornilov 2912–14
 land reform 2902, 2903
 Lenin's return from exile 2902–3
 Liberty Loan 2904
 New Economic Policy 3156

Russian Revolution of October/November

- (1917) (*cont'd*)
 origins of 2762
 peasant revolution 2908–10
 science 2993–4
 sexuality 3016
 Skocpol 1214
 Trotsky on 439
 Whites 2920
 women 1751, 3550–5
 workers' control 2906–8
 workers' support 2928
see also Bolshevik Revolution
- Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP)
 436–9, 1979, 2082, 2083, 2693, 3321, 3552,
 3720
- Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party
 (RSDWP) 1914, 3029
 Second Congress 2926
- Russian Worker Social Democratic Party
 (RWSDP) 975
- Russo, Vito 9
- Russo-Anglo battles 642
- Russo-Japanese War 734, 1746, 1896, 2689,
 2717, 2879
- Russo Spena, Giovanni 2622
- Russo-Swedish Wars 3208
- Russo-Turkish War 34, 2711
- Rustemi, Avni 29
- Rustin, Bayard 762, 1259, 1975, 2803
- Ruthenberg, Charles Emil 596, 836
- Rutherford, Jeff 1170–84
- Rutz, Michael 2827–8
- Rwanda 852, 858
- Rwanda Patriotic Army 859
- Ryabushinskii, Pavel 2906, 2912, 2939
- Ryan, Joseph 3414
- Ryan, Peter 1818–21, 1827–9
- Ryan, Susan 3563
- Ryder, Guy 809
- Ryesgade revolt 992
- Rykov, Alexei 535, 3159, 3162, 3606
- Ryzhkov, N. 3124
- Saad, Marouf 2070
- Saadi dynasty 2332–3
- Saakashvili, Mikheil 3330
- Saba Saba rally 1950–1, 1952
- Sabbat, A. 2698
- Sabbir Shah 1934
- Sabinada rebellion 491
- Sabino Vieira, Francisco 491
- sabotage** 143–4
 alienation 784
 ecological 1039, 1040
 factory machinery 658
 German workers 1371
 Italy 130
see also Luddism, machine breaking
- Sabra camp massacre 1814, 2071
- Sacasa, Juan Bautista 2541, 2966
- Sacco, Ferdinando Nicola 104, 158, 254, 836,
 1321, 2947–8
- Sacco and Vanzetti case** 104, 254, 258, 836,
 1204, 2947–8
- Sachikonye, L. 3732
- Sachs, Jeffrey 422, 1402–3, 1671
- Sachs, Solly** 2948–9, 3093
- Sackoum, Margueritte 884
- Sacks, Karen Brodtkin 2249
- SACP:** *see* South African Communist Party
- Sacred Bond of Greek Army Officers (IDEA)
 1445
- Sadat, Anwar al- 359, 1070, 1073, 1078, 2407
- Saddam Hussein
 and Baath Party 1777, 1781, 1782–3, 3226–7
 Cold War 1782
 coming into power 2779
 Lebanese Shi'a 2405
 Soviet support 1782
 US invasion 2504
 US support 1770, 1775, 1782
- Saddiq al-Mahdi 3191
- Sadhvabana 2438
- Sa'di, Ali Saleh al- 3225, 3226
- Sadiq Pacha Bey 3334
- Sadler, Mary 1872
- Sadok Bey 3334
- Sadr, Baqir al- 2405
- Sadr, Hasan al- 1778
- Sadr, Muhammad al- 1778, 1779
- Sadr, Musa al- 2405
- Saefkow-Jacob group 1377
- Sáenz, Manuela** 2949–50
- Sáenz Peña, Roque 266
- Sáenz Peña Law 104, 247, 271, 273
- Safe Drinking Water Act 617
- Sagarará battle 3338
- Saget, Nissage 1513
- Sa'he, Vicente 1042
- Saheb, Nana 1688, 1689, 1690, 1709
- Sahiun, Jorge Christ 797
- Sa'id, Sheikh 3358, 3359, 3361
- Saigon 1600, 2260, 3487
- Saigon, Battle of 1716
- Saigon, Treaty of 3475
- sailors: *see* Atlantic port seaman resistance;
 Marine Transport Workers (MTW)
- Sailors', Soldiers', and Airmen's Union (SSAU)
 510

- Sailors' Union of the Pacific 1754
St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre 2950
 St. Adrià del Besòs Power Station 183
 St. Andrews 3000, 3001
 St. Anthony's Indian Mission 3034
Saint-Domingue 1537–40, 1540–5
 abolition of slavery 204, 1533, 1535
 Civil Commissions 1530–3
 colonial system 1525–9
 Créoles 1544
 formation of 1542–3
 and French Revolution 1539, 1540–5
 French Rule 1262–3, 1540–5
 Hegel on Revolution 1572–3
 Jefferson 996, 1546
 Ogé's Revolt 2552–5
 petits blancs 1526, 1527, 1541, 1543, 1544
 produce 1530, 1541–2
 slave mortality rates 1542
 slave revolt 88, 203–4, 1263–4, 1525–30,
 1537–40, 3145, 3306
 slaves' origins 1544
 Spain and Britain 1533, 1535
 see also Haiti
 St. Enda's school 2627
 St. Francis Acres 3419
 St. George's Hill 3536–7
 St. Ita's school 2627
 St. John, James 1073
Saint-Just, Louis Antoine 894, 2849, 2951–2
 St. Kitts 1866, 2075, 2076, 2077
 Saint Léger, Edmond de 1530, 1531
 St. Louis Commune 2027
 St. Lucia 351, 1264, 1866
 St. Martin island 1031, 1033
 St. Peter's Field, Manchester 2661
 see also Peterloo Massacre
 St. Petersburg
 cholera riots 2878
 lockouts 2883
 massacre 2083, 2880
 metalworking 2941
 militant workers 2941
 Nicholas II 2924
 printers' strike 2881, 2882
 strikes 2884, 2891, 2924, 2944
 see also Petrograd
 Saint Petersburg, Florida 3373
 Saint-Saëns, Camille 3147
Saint-Simon, Henri de 2952–3
 and Comte 842, 2953
 followers 1439, 1574, 2230, 2953
 utopian socialism 2231
 works 2953
 St. Vincent 351, 1264, 1866
 Sainteny, Jean 3471
 Saintine, Thierry 278–80
 Sainville, Léonard 2427
 Saitoti, George 1952
 Sakai, Yohichi 1889–96
 Sakazov, Yanko 540
 Sakdalistes 2673
 Sakharov, Andrei 196, 198, 2698
 Salafism 1809–10
 Salafist Group for Combat and Predication
 (GSPC) 2182
 Salam, Abdus 1704
 Salam, Saeb 2069
Salam 'Adel 2953–6
 Salamanca, Daniel 427
 Salamat, Hashim 2329, 2331
 Salandra, Antonio 3015
 Salas, Rodolpho (Rudy) 2680, 2685
 Salavarría, Tirso 3707
 Salazar, António de Oliveira 563, 2355, 2730–1
 Salazar, Othón 2298
 Salazar, Vicente Lucio 1063
 Salcedo, Antonio 1016
 Salcedo, Guadalupe 409
 Salinas de Gortari, Carlos 1395, 2284, 2287,
 2292, 2538, 3714, 3716
 Sallust 3146
 Salmerón, Catalina 3611
 Salmi parish incident 2516
 Salmon, Joseph 1104
 salmon runs, fouled 1119
 Salnave, Sylvain 1513
 Salonika 1440
 Saloth Sar: *see* Pol Pot
 Salt, Henry 1075
Salt of the Earth (film) 1752
 Salt Pan Creek 307
 salt *satyagraha* 1329, 1681–3, 2431, 2493–4
 women's participation 1682, 2389
 saltpeter production 692, 3598
Salvador 2776
 Salvador, Apo Ipe 2672
 Salvador, David 934
Salvadoran Civil War 1163, 2956–9
 see also El Salvador
Salvemini, Gaetano 2871, 2959–60, 3341
 Sam-bo-it-bae (three steps, one bow protest)
 3652
 Samahan ng Demokratikong Kabataan (SDK)
 2677
 Samakee-kum (Solidarity) 3260
 Samakkhitham party 3272–3
 Samarakkody, Edmund 2053
 Samaria 1816–17
 Samasamajist Party 2052

- Samba 2377
 Sambo, Robert 3729
 same-sex relations 2092, 2094–5
 see also lesbian, gay, transsexual, bisexual
 movements (LGTB)
 Sami people 2519
 Samiti, Anushilan 1674, 1675, 1678
samitis (associations) 1699
samizdats (illegal publications) 1618, 2252, 3050
**Samkange, Stanlake John William
 Thompson 2960–2**
 Sammaniyya brotherhood 2163
 Samoilova, Konkordia 3553, 3606
 Samoza Garcia, Anastasio 605
 Samper, Ernesto 808–9, 1169
 Sampson, Nicos 948
 Samways, Tom 2522
 Samyukt Vidhayak Dal 1923
 San Andrés Accords 2285, 2286, 3713, 3718
 San Antonio, Battle of 1332
 San Francisco 161, 3401, 3629
 San Francisco Mime Troupe 1482
 San Francisco Peace Treaty 1885, 1909
 San hunter-gatherers 2390
 San José I accord 1166
 San Luis Obispo 1
 San Luis Potosí Plan 2276
 San Martín, José de 2555, 3458
 San Precario 1147–8, 1841
 San Remo Conference 1778
 San Stefano, Treaty of 34
 Sanabria, Herbert Anaya 2958
 Sanabria, Victor Manuel 879
 Sanabria Martínez, Victor 2058
 Sanbetsu Federation 1878, 3069
 Sanbetsu Kaigi 1891, 1893, 1894–5
 Sánchez, Celia 929, 3573–4
 Sánchez, Josefa Joaquina 3631
 Sanchez Cerro, Luis M. 1567
 Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo 422, 432, 434, 787,
 789, 2320
Sánchez Saornil, Lucía 2367, 2962–3, 3611
 Sanchez-Vasquez, Adolpho 2839
 Sancho, Ignatius 202, 206
 Sanclemente, Manuel Antonio 806
 Sanctuary 2502
 Sand, Carl Ludwig 558
 sandalwood harvest 3425
 Sandburg, Carl 1555, 2253
 Sanders, Grace L. B. 3583–6
Sandhya 1674
 Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS) 2474–5
**Sandinista National Liberation Front
 (FSLN) 2564, 2963–5**
 agrarian reform 2473, 2476
 Borge 447
 Cardenal 606
 Chilean troops 1226
 corrido 637
 democracy 2474–5
 Fonseca 1205
 guerilla foco 2467–8
 Jesuits 2473
 music 637–8
 National Directorate 2470
 Ortega and 2564
 Samoza ousted 1164, 2470
 Tercerista 2469, 2564
 Torrijos 3304
 see also Nicaraguan Revolution
 Sandinista Popular Army 2473, 2564
 Sandinista Popular Revolution 637
 Sandinista Renovation Movement 2965
 Sandinista Revolutionary Front 2061
 Sandinista Worker Federation (CST) 2474
**Sandino, Augusto César 161, 2466, 2564,
 2965–7**
 Bolivarianism 414
 and FSLN 2964, 2966
 killed 1205
 and Martí 2225
 music 637
Sands, Bobby 1798, 1801, 2967–8
 Sandwip Revolt 369–70
 SANE (Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy)
 195, 1303, 2501
 Sanes, Angel 3464
 Sanes, David 2773
 Sanfelice, Luisa 3591
 Sangala, Frederick 2174
Sangamo Journal 2122
Sangathan campaign 1583
Sanger, Margaret 1412, 2968–9, 3595, 3625–6
 Sangkum National Congress 570
 Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist
 Community) 569
 Sanguinetti, Julio Maria 3340, 3406
 Sangyo Hokoku Kai (Industrial Patriotic
 Federation) 1890
Sanjibani 1697
 Sankara, Thomas 547
 Sankoh, Foday 3031
 Sanlakas 2686
 Sanrizuka Organic Farm Association 1903
 Sanrizuka unrest 1901, 1902–4, 1907–9
sans-culottes 2969–70
 Bastille 1275
 Brissot 506
 class struggle 778
 Jacobins 1277–8, 1287–8

- and Montagnards 1290–1
and Robespierre 894, 2850
sans-jurons 1295
Sans-Souci 1266
Sanson, G. B. 1898–9
Santa Clara 933
Santa Inés, Battle of 3707
Santa Maria La Antigua 2592
Santa Maria Massacre 112, 692
Santal Rebellion 1708, 2970–1
Santamaria, Haydée 929, 3574
Santana, Pedro 1015
Santander, Francisco de Paula 3458
Santella, Agustin 250–3
Santiago demonstration 690
Santiago General Strike 112
Santibañez, Felipe 999
Santo Agostinho, José María de 467
Santo Domingo 601, 1542
Santora, Joseph C. 654–5, 1025–6
Santos, Eduardo 407
Santos, Evangelista and Abad 2674
Santos, Juan: *see* Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion
Santos, Mateo 116
Santos, Pedro Abad 2673
Santos López, Colonel 2467
Santry, James 793
Santucho, Mario Roberto 245, 272
Sanusi, Muhammad ibn Ali al-: *see* al-Sanusi, Muhammad ibn Ali
Sanusi Sufis 50–1
Sanyal, Kanu 2422
Sanyal, Sachindranath 3041
São Paulo 474, 476
São Tomé e Príncipe 2971–2
Sarabha, Kartar Singh 3041
Sarabhai, Ambalal 1325
Sarafis, Stefanos 1437
Saragih, Henry 3462
Saraiva de Carvalho, Otelo 2729
Saraswati, Dayanand 1583, 1697
Saraswati, Sahajanand 451
Saratoga, Battle of 508
Sardar, Bishwanath 1712
Sardinia
banditry 1847
barbagia 1846–7
House of Savoy 1825
Victor Emanuel II 1826
Sarekat Dagang Islam 1725, 1728
Sarekat Priyayi (Union of Priyayi) 1728
Sargent, Aaron A. 3164
Sargon of Akkad 1654
Sarit Thanarat 659, 3260
Sarkar, Nil Ratan 1698
Sarkar, Raju 372
Sarkar, Sumit 1324–5, 1330, 1673
Sarkozy, Nicolas 645, 1235, 1238–9, 2263, 2382, 3577
Sarla Mudgal case 1585
Saro-Wiwa, Ken 1053, 2479, 2483, 2972–3
Sárraga, Belén de 124, 3598
Sarrat, revolt of 2667
Sarraud, Albert 3466
SARS outbreak 1606
Sartelli, Eduardo 247–8, 248–9, 265–7, 270–3
Sartre, Jean-Paul 2973–4
“Black Orpheus” 2428
and Césaire 645
and Beauvoir 356, 2974
and de Gaulle 2261
and Deleuze–Guattari 980
dialectics 2839
existentialism 2260, 2974
on Flaubert 2974
Manifesto of the 121, 226
Marxism 2249, 2974
Neto 2449
Temps Modernes, Les 226, 1420
on violence 1163
works 2973–4
Saskatchewan Grain Growers’ Association (SGGA) 2975
Saskatchewan socialist movement 2975–6
SASOL 3110, 3113
sati (self-immolation of widow) 1582
Satrom, Leroy 1946
Sattar Khan 1768
Sattler, Michael 92, 1357
Saturday Mothers, Turkey 3344
satyagraha (peaceful protests) 1324, 1679, 1681–2, 1701, 1966, 2429, 2492–4
Satyagraha Sabha 1701
Satyasodhak Samaj 955
Sau, Antonio 116
Saud, Abd al-Aziz ibn 2976–7
Saudi Arabia 2976–7
Saunders, J. P. 3042
Saurin, Bernard Joseph 3146
Savage, Benjamin 3047
Savanhu, Jasper 3729
Savarkar, Ganesh 1674
Savarkar, V. D. 1331, 1583–4, 1674, 1689
Save the Seeds (Beej Bachao Andolan) movement 736
Savelev, P. I. 2227
Saverio Merlino, Francesco 100, 1321, 2168, 2171
Saville, John 3282
Savimbi, Jonas 167, 2449

- Savio, Mario 377, 378, 3169
 Savo, Battle of 3081
 Savona, Sigismondo 2186
 Saw, U 557, 2527, 2977–8
 Saw Maung, U 3068
Samat el-Mara (Woman's Voice Magazine) 3199
 Sawyer, Amos 2115
 Sawyer, Stephen W. 1242–5, 1607–8
 Say, Jean-Baptist 403
Saya San (Hsaya San) movement 553, 2977, 2978–81
 Sayre, Stephen 508
 Sayyid, Mufti Muhammad 1933
 Sazonov, D. 2892
 scabs, strikes 503, 1753, 2495
 Scajola, Claudio 1310
 Scalmer, Sean 305–7, 312–16
 Scargill, Arthur 529
 Scarman Report 512, 531
 Scarnecchia, Timothy 2384–5, 3727–31, 3731–3
 Scavenius, Erik 991
 Scelba, Mario 1833
 Scerri, Mikiel 2185
 Schaack, Nick 2832
 Schachtman, Max 596
 Schaefer, Richard 1148–51, 1302–3
 Schaerer, Eduardo 2609
 Schama, Simon 1285
 Schappeler, Christoph 2830
 Scharenberg, Albert 391–7
 Scharff, Werner 1380
 Schechner, Richard 1191
 Schedules Castes Federation 54, 958, 2433
 Scheerbarth, Paul 1609
 Scheidemann, Philipp 1361, 1373, 3055
 Schell, Paul 3663
 Schenkel, Emilie 451
 Scheu, Andreas 2341, 2820, 3061
 Scheuer, Sandra 1947
 Schiff, Paolina 3592
 Schiffmann, Michael 8
 Schiffrin, H. Z. 732
Schill, Ferdinand Baptista von 189, 2981–2
 Schiller, Friedrich von 357, 3189
 Schilling, George 2026, 2027
 Schinas, Alexandros 126
Schindler, Oskar 2982
Schindler's List (film) 2982
 Schirdewan, Karl 1340
 Schleicher, Kurt von 2833
 Schleithem Confession 92, 1357
 Schlesinger, Arthur M. 396
 Schleswig Assembly 2984
Schleswig-Holstein uprisings 989, 2982–6
 Danish language 2984
 emigrants 2985
 Frederica, Battle of 2985
 Idstedt, Battle of 2985
 Schleyer, Hanns-Martin 1368
 Schmid, Bernard 41–7
 Schmidt, Helmut 3056, 3523
 Schmidt, Ingo 826–9, 1369–72, 1594–5, 2832–3
 Schmitt, Jenö Henrik 128
 Schmorell, Alexander 3525, 3526
 Schneider, M. 1370
 Schneider, René 680
 Schneiderman, Rose 3313
 Schodt, David W. 1062
 Schoeters, Georges 2784
 scholarships 3517
 Scholl, Hans 3525, 3526
 Scholl, Sophie 3525
 Scholtz-Klink, Gertrud 1591
 Schonbrunn, Treaty of 443
 Schönherr, Bishop 1343
 Schopenhauer, Arthur 2477
 Schrecker, Ellen 73
 Schroeder, Gerhard 1913, 3056
 Schroeder, William Knox 1947
 Schroeder-Arce, Roxanne 406–7, 2312–13
 Schult, Reinhard 1345
 Schultze, Guillermo 259
 Schulze-Boysen, Harro 1377
 Schuman Plan 360
 Schumann, Peter 500
 Schutzbund march 319
 Schutzman, Mady 407
 Schutzstaffeln (SS) 320, 1591, 2591, 2982, 3512
Schutztruppe, Namibia 2392, 2393
 Schwab, Michael 1569, 1570, 2029
 Schweikart, David 2620
 Schweitzer, A. 651
 Schwerner, Mickey 747, 1258, 1975
 Schybi, Christian 3212
science and revolution 2986–99
 Anabaptists 2987–8
 Aristotelian/empirical 2987
 Bacon 2988–9
 Chinese Revolution 2994–6, 2999
 Cuban Revolution 2996–8, 2999
 Descartes 2988–9
 English Revolution 2988
 French Revolution 2990, 2991–2
 Lavoisier 2990–1
 Marat 2990–1
 Marxism 2996
 Mechanick Preachers 2988–9
 Newtonianism 2989–90
 Paracelsians 2987–8
 Royal Society 2989–90

- Russian Revolution 2993–4, 2999
 Scientific Revolution 2986–7
 Socialist Revolution 2992–3
Science and Society 2249
 Scientific Humanitarian Committee (WhK)
 2093, 2104
 scientific management 1398
 scientific socialism 2240, 2992
 Scientists Against Nuclear Arms 2528
SCLC: *see* Southern Christian Leadership
 Conference
 Scobie, Ronald 1437, 1444
 Scotch Cattle 3498–9
Scotland 1384–5, 2818–22, 2999–3002
 anti-war movement 2820–1
 Bishops' War 1097, 3000
 Calvinism 1111, 3001
 Catholic Church 3001
 Charles I 1096
 class consciousness 2820
 coal industry 2819, 2821
 Cromwell 909–10
 Culloden, Battle of 1854
 emigrants 2821
 Enlightenment 1114
 Episcopal Church 1854, 1855
 home rule 2819
 Independent Labour Party 2820, 2821
 National Covenant 1097
 Newark, Battle of 1098
 October Revolution's impact 2820
 printed word 3001
 radical left 2818–22, 3061
 Reformation 2999–3002
 road protests 1040
 Social Democratic Federation 2819, 2820
 socialism 2819
 Socialist Labour Party 2820
 Socialist League 860, 2820
 Socialist Party 1040
 strikes 519, 1384–5, 2818–19
 unemployment 2820, 2821
 see also Glencoe Massacre; Jacobite risings,
 Britain
 Scott, Michael 2398, 3300
 Scott, Rose 3561
 Scott, Walter 2340
 Scottish Enlightenment 1114
 Scottish Land and Labour League (SLLL) 2820
 Scottish Martyrs 2366
 Scottish Militia Act 3394
 Scotto, Clemente 3447
Scottsboro Resistance 838, 840, 3002–3
 Scramble for Africa 453, 883, 1659, 2172
 Berlin Conference 883, 2353
 Screen Actors' Guild 1603
 Scruggs, T. M. 637–41, 2750–2
SDS: *see* Students for a Democratic Society
 Seabrook reactor 1051
 Seaga, Edward 608, 2198
 Seale, Bobby 395, 398, 613
 seamen strikes 518
 Search Light Operation 347
 Seattle
 general strike 22
 Indymedia 1739–40
 PGA 2635
 Reclaim the Streets 2807
 see also World Trade Organization (WTO)
 protests, Seattle
 Sebastian, of Portugal 187, 2333
 Sebata, Cranmer 2110
 Secchia, Pietro 3299
 Séchan, Renaud 2382
 Second Adventism 2596
 Second Congress of Russian Social Democratic
 Workers' Party 2926
 Second Institutional Act, Brazil 3039
 Second Intergalactic Encuentro for Humanity and
 Against Neoliberalism 1386, 2809
 Second Party Congress, Bolsheviks 437
 Second People's Summit of the Americas 3654
 Secrett, Charles 1040
 Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière
 (SFIO) 824, 851
 secularism 1109, 1116
 Securitate secret police 2857, 2859–60, 2867
 Security Administration Department (DAS)
 801, 802
 Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) 3659
 Seddon, D. 1209
 Seddon, Richard 830
 Sedition Act 1300, 1301, 1412, 2489, 3734
 Seditious Organization Act 3729
 Seeckt, Hans von 1364, 1365
 Seekers after Contradictions Club 2301, 2695
 Seepaul, Occah 3320
 Seferis, Georgis 1434
 segregation
 armed forces 757
 Johnson 762
 Paulus 2625–6
 USA 755, 2822
 Ségui, René Degni 881
 Seguí, Salvador 351
 Segundo, Juan Luis 2059
 Sehestedt, Battle of 2983
Sei Maggio (May 6) 2186
 Seigenthaler, John 742, 1257
Seito (Blue Stocking) 1848, 3595

Seitsha (Blue Stocking Society) 1848, 3595
 Sejong, King 1996
 Sekirankai (Red Wave Society) 1848
 Selander, Ted 3412
 Selbmann, Fritz 1340
 Selective Service Act 757
 self-defense 1007, 1168, 1480, 1583
 Jewish people 1851, 1914
 Korean workers 1987
 self-determination 322
 African Americans 395, 750
 Australia 5
 autonomism 322
 Caribbean 3552
 Lenin 322
 Native Americans 2411–12
 Nigeria 1640
 USA 87
 self-government 2765
 self-help groups 2021, 3558
 self-immolation
 Buddhist monks 2500, 3481
 Czech student 220, 2744, 3174, 3176, 3433
 Korean worker 1981
 Quakers 2500
 self-representation 1740
 Self-Respect movement 956–7, 1329
 Selim III, emperor 3346
 Selma march 740, 748, 1975–6
 Selous Game Reserve 3254
Semana Roja, Argentina 265–7
Semana Trágica, Argentina 103, 247–8
Semana Trágica, Barcelona 145, 1125
 Semaun 1728
Sembène, Ousmane 3003–4
 Seminarios Indígenas 1477
 Seminoles 59, 212
 Sen, Amartya 128
 Sen, Amulya 2423
 Sen, Latika 3587
 Sen, Manikuntala 645
 Sen, S. N. 1689
 Sen, Surya 1678, 1682, 1710
 Sen Gupta, Shatarupa 961–2, 1922–3, 2265–6,
 2421–5, 3229–30
 Sénard, Antoine Marie Jules 1244
 Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) 1058, 2063,
 2362, 2363, 2644–5, 2651, 2652
 annihilation squads 2658, 2660
 Guzmán 2658–9
 Maoist influence 2199, 2643
Sendi 1724
Sendic, Raúl 3004–5, 3340, 3408, 3409
 Sène, Jean-Jacques 2181–2
Seneca Falls convention 3005–6, 3620–1

Senegal

anti-neoliberal protests 3006–7
 IMF 3007
 independence 3007
 Sembène 3003–4
 structural adjustment 3007
 troops to Madagascar 1250
 Sénégal battalion, Côte d'Ivoire 883
 Senegalese Democratic Bloc Party 3007
 Senesh, Hanna 1917
Senghor, Léopold 563, 1554, 2427, 3006,
 3007–8, 3578
 Sengupta, Jatindra Mohan 449
 Seni Pramoj 3258
 Seniloli, Jopi 1200
 Seoul 3183
 Seoul-Gyeonggi-Incheon Migrant Worker's
 Union 1994
 Separate Representation of the Voters Act 3087
Sepé Tiarajú 3008–9
 Sepoul, John 148
Sepoy Revolt, India 1685–7
 September 11, 2001 attacks 889, 1401, 1886,
 2504, 3649, 3664
 September 23 Movement 2284
 September 30 movement, Indonesia 1733
 September 19 Movement (M-19) 800, 801, 802,
 808, 1082, 2149–50
 September Massacres 962, 1286, 1290
 Séptima Papeleta (Seventh Paper) 808
 Sequoia National Park 861, 3417
 Serantini, Franco 131
Serbia
 anti-bureaucratic revolution 3009–11
 Austria-Hungary 318
 autonomy 319
 Četnik movement 3296, 3682, 3684, 3685
 clientelism 3685
 corruption scandals 3012
 military conflicts 223
 Milošević 2509–10, 3021
 neoliberalism 3685
 OTPOR 3011–12
 revolution 811
 strikes 3686
 US aid 3012
 World War II 3682
see also Kosovo
 Serbian League of Communists 3010
Serbian Revolution 2509–10, 3011–12,
 3021
 Serdaru, Mihai Victor 2866
 Seregni, Liber 3409
 serfdom 2921
Serge, Victor 3012–13

- Sergeants' Conspiracy 1015
 Sergi, Vittorio 620–1, 998–9, 2295–7, 3296–8, 3427–8, 3431–2
 Seri, Guillermina S. 863–9
 Seri Thai (Free Thai) 3258
seringueiros (rainforest peasants) 2273–4
 Serra, Rafael 912
 Serrano, Isagani 2682
 Serrat, Joan Manuel 2380
Serrati, Giacinto Menotti 3013–14
 Seruvakula, Viliame 2798
 Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO) 1240
 Servile War 3145, 3146, 3147
 Sesay, M. A. 2115–16
 Sétif massacres 226
 Seton-Watson, R. W. 1143
Sette Giugno (7 June) 2183
Settimana Rossa (Red Week) 997, 1822, 2168, 3013, 3014–15
 Settlement of Ireland, Act of 909
 Settlers' Nyasaland Association 2175–6
Sevastopol 2004
 Seven Party Alliance (SPA) 230, 2439
 Seven Peoples Missions 3009
 Seven Pines battle 60
 7 Year Bitch 2845
 Seven Years' War 424, 1124, 1126, 1785, 2666, 2851
 Sèvres Treaty 293, 1326, 1702, 3345, 3349, 3355, 3558
 Sex Pistols 2777
Sexenio Rosquero 430
 sexual difference 3564–6, 3568
 sexual intercourse, abstention
 as birth control 3567
 feminism and 3567
 Namibian women 3603
 sexual liberation
 Britain 512–13
 German anarchist movement 1609
 Kollontai 1979, 1980, 3607–8
 Soviet Union 3607–8
 see also sexuality, revolution and
 sexual relations 1979, 3561
 sexual violence 3560
sexuality
 Canadian indigenous people 2098
 counterrevolution 889
 double standards 1111, 3622
 Enlightenment 1110, 2101
 Foucault 1221
 Gandhi 1329
 Judeo-Christian values 2092
 Oneida community 2559–60
 and race 1180–1
 revolution and 3015–18
 state and 2092
 Seymour, Edward: *see* Somerset, Duke of
 Seymour, Edward Hobart 3674
 Seymour, Henry 108
 Seymour, Jane 516, 1094
 Seyn, Franz Albert von 1201
 Shabanova, Anna 3554
 Shabazz, Betty 2181
 Shah, A. B. 1930
 Shah, G. 955
 Shahidullah, Muhammad 2577
 Shahin, Tanyus 2074
 Shakai Minshūtō (Social Mass Party) 1911
 Shakaishugi Kenkyukai (Association for the Study of Socialism) 1910
Shakers 2491, 3614
 gender equality 2560, 3019
 utopian communities 3018–20, 3417
 Shakir, Zaid 1811
 Shalom Achsav (Peace Now) 1814, 1815
 Shamir, Itzhak 358, 1759
 Shamsher, Juddha 2441
 Shamsher, Mohan 2442
 Shamsher, Padma 2441–2
 Shamsher Gazi's Revolt 369
 Shamva mine strike 3728
 Shan Byu 2980
 Shanghai
 Green Gang 2201
 International Settlement shootings 724
 strikes 724
 Shanghai, Battle of 1926
 Shanin, Teodor 767
 Shanmugathanan, N. 2632, 3526
 Shantz, Jeff 164–7, 378–9, 1029–30, 1321–3, 3012–13
 Shao Lizi 3725
 Shaonian Zhongguo 3724
 sharecropping 17
 barga 2574
 Bengal 1706
 India 2265
 Philippines 2672
 see also *tebhaga* movement
Shari'a law
 Egypt 1557
 Iran 1771–2, 1774, 1962, 1963, 1965
 Nigeria 2483
 Saudi Arabia 2977
 Turkey 3342
 Shariati, Ali 1811
 Shariatullah, Haji 371
 Sharif, Khalifa 3192
 Sharif, Mohammad al- 2333

- Sharif, Nawaz 2584
 Sharif, S. M. 346
 Sharlach, Lisa B. 3733–8
 Sharma, O. P. 1693
 Sharon, Ariel 1759, 1814, 1817
Sharp, Gene 3020–1
 From Dictatorship to Democracy 815, 3020, 3021
 Gandhi Wields the Weapons of Moral Power 3020
 on La Boétie 2018
 Orange Revolution 3375, 3377
 Politics of Nonviolent Action, The 815, 3020
 Theory of Power, The 815
 Sharp, Geoff 305
Sharp, Granville 3021–2
 anti-slavery cases 202, 203
 and Benezet 367, 368, 3521
 Black Poor 209–10
 and Clarkson 764
 colonization 206, 208, 209
 and Equiano 1124
 Representation of the Injustice, A 3022
 Sierra Leone Company 3528
 Sharpe, Michael Orlando 942–3
 Sharpe, Samuel 205
 Sharpeville massacre 172, 1414, 2192, 2346, 2357, 3087
 aftermath 3094, 3249
 Shatila camp massacre 1814, 2071
 Shaw, Anna Howard 3313, 3626
 Shaw, George Bernard 3061
 Shaw University 740
 Shaykan, Battle of 3198
 Shayqiyya people 3196
 Shays, Daniel 3022–3
Shays' Rebellion 87, 156, 1300, 3022–3
 Sheehan, Cindy 229
 Sheffield metalworkers 203
 Shehab, Fouad 2069
 Shehu, Mehmet 32
 Shekhawat, Seema 3335–6
 Shell Oil 2479, 2972
 Sheller, Mimi 1868–70
 Shelley, Mary 1409, 3428, 3542
 Shelley, Percy Bysshe 896, 1409
 Shen Shicai 3506
 Shenandoah Valley 67
 Shepard, Benjamin 8–10, 3312–13
 Shepard, William 3023
 Sher Ali Khan 15
Sheridan, Richard Brinsley 1203, 3024
 Sheriffmuir, Battle of 1854
 Sherman, William Tecumseh 62, 66, 67
 Sherritt, Aaron 1943
 Sheth, D. L. 2621
 Shevardnadze, Eduard 812, 2510, 3021, 3329, 3377
 Sheykh Mosleheddin Friday Mosque 3244
 Shidlovsky Commission 3553
 Shiel, Richard Lalor 633
 Shifu 113, 115
 Shih, V. Y. C. 3235
 Shi'ite Muslims 1961–5
 Hezbollah 2404
 Iran 1770
 Iraq 1776, 1782
 Shikhradov, Boris 3368
 Shiloh, Battle of 59, 61
 Shimonoseki, Treaty of 732, 3201, 3672
 Shin Chaeho 135
 Shin Fujinkyōkai (New Women's Association) 3595
 Shining Path: *see* Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)
 Shinji, Ishii 1907
shipboard insurrections, Atlantic slave trade 3024–7
 Shippen, Nichole 355–7, 1420
 Shirazi, Muhammad Taqi al- 1778
 Shishakli, Adib al- 3222
 Shitetsusoren 1879
Shiva, Vandana 2734, 3027–8
 see also Chipko movement
Shlyapnikov, Alexander Gavrilovich 2087, 3028–30
 Shoman, Assad 1634
 Shona people 698–9, 700, 701–4, 3602, 3734, 3735
 Shonekan, Earnest 2481, 2483
 “SHOP” (Suburban Homosexual Outreach Project) 2109
 Shore, M. 2742
 Shoreham mutiny 510
 Short, Clare 3648
 Shotgun Policy, Mississippi 20
 Shoup Mission 1900
 Shramik Sangathana (Workers' Organization) 3587
 Shrestha, Marich Man Singh 2443
 Shreveport 65
Shrew 3569
 Shriver, Sargent 741
 Shuahj, Shah 15
 Shuar Federation 1056
Shuddhi campaign 1583
 Shumayyil, Sibli 235
 Shumilin, Boris 2867
shunto (wage claims) 1879, 1881, 3069
 Shuqayr, N. 3198
Shurugis (rural migrants) 3516

- Shuster, Morgan 1768
 Shuttlesworth, Fred 17, 1973–4
 Shuysky, Vassily 436
 Si Votha revolt 566, 567, 575, 3475
 Siam (Thailand) 3256
 Siantos, Giorgis 1444
 Sibanda, Eliakim 694–6, 2172–6, 2363–5
 Sicily
 Bourbons 1825
 Fanelli 1661
 fascists 1176, 1846
 food riots 1846, 1847
 Mafia 1833, 2160–1
 and Malta 2183
 rebellion 1848, 3014
 rural unrest 1846
 Spanish occupation 1847
 Side, Vyborg 3067
 Sidelsky, Lazar 2191
 Sidi Mohammed 1248, 1249, 2334
 Sidmouth, Lord 3281
 Sidney, Henry 1805
 Sidqi, Aziz 1072
 Siebert, Battle of 1511
 Sierakowski, Robert 1205–6, 2465–76, 2564,
 2963–5, 2965–7
 Sierra Club 617
 Sierra de Manantlan resistance 2287
Sierra Leone 209–11, 3030–2
 black response to 206, 207, 208
 civil war 3030, 3031–2
 Clarkson 764, 3022
 Cuffe 394, 941
 Equiano 207, 1124
 founding of 206, 209–11
 independence 3030
 protest and revolution 3030–2
 RUF 3030
 Sharp 1124, 3022
 Wilberforce 3022, 3528
 Sierra Leone Company 3528, 3529
 Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) 3030
 Sierra Maestra Declaration 930
 Sierra Tarahumara 2284
Sieyès, Abbé Emmanuel Joseph 3032–4
 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen
 3032
 Directory 441–2, 895, 1004, 1079
 Estates General 1126, 2312, 3032
 What Is the Third Estate? 1004, 3032
Sigamoney, Bernard L. E. 151, 3034, 3092
 Sigurimi (Albanian Secret Service) 31
Sihanouk, Norodom 569, 572, 573, 576, 578,
 1713, 1715, 3034–6
 anti-American 3479
 assassination attempt 2465
 in China 3035–6
 Crusade for Independence 3474
 house arrest 3036
 Khmer Rouge 1959
 neutrality 3482
 overthrown 1716, 1959
 and Pol Pot 1960, 3036
 Šik, Ota 3638
 Siles Zuazo, Hernán 416, 421–2
 National Revolution 431
Silesia, uprisings 1350, 3036–7
 Silicosis Act 1087
 silk production 1900, 2073
 Silos, Jill 1050–1
 Silva, Fernando T. 473–8
 Silva, Jacobo 2285
 Silva, José Fernando da: *see* Frei Chico
Silva, Luis Inácio Lula da 495, 3037–9
 Bolsa Familia 500, 3038
 electoral victory 477
 and MDB 498
 Mensalão Scandal 3038
 MST 2352–3
 on neoliberalism 3658
 presidency 500
 and PT 494, 497, 498, 499–500
 rise of 477
Silva, Lyndolpho 3039, 3388
 Silva Henríquez, Raúl 2060
 Silveira, Onesimo 603
 silver 691, 3230
 Silver, Lynette Ramsay 3490
 Silvério dos Reis, Joaquim 485
 Silvern, Steven E. 2411–20
 Silvertown Strike of Rubber Workers 2229
 Silvestre, Manuel 2336
 Sima, Hoira 2857
 Simeon II, of Bulgaria 538
 Simmel, Georg 771, 2136
 Simmons, Terry 1460–2
 Simnel, Lambert 1804
 Simó, Alejo 868
 Simon, John 1680, 3042
 Simón Bolívar Guerilla Coordination (CGSB)
 802
 Simon Commission 53, 957, 1327, 1680, 1683,
 2431
 Simone, Anna 2870
 Simonoff, Peter 2039
 Simons, Jack 3040
 Simons, Menno 93
Simons, Ray Alexander 171, 834, 2398,
 3039–40, 3093
 Simpkins, Dulcey 3274

- Simpson, Joseph 984
 Simpson, Sockless Jerry 2727
 Sims, Yvonne D. 1020–1
 Sin, Jaime Cardinal 2506, 2683
 SINALTRAINAL (National Union of Food Industry Workers) 809
Sinclair, Upton 1125, 2127, 2344, 2947, **3040–1**
Jungle, The 49, 1571, 3040, 3429
 Scottsboro case 3003
 Sindacato Ferrovieri Italiani (railwaymen's union) 1822
 Sindacato Italiano Dell'Auto (SIDA) 1835
 Sindacato de Trabajadores Técnicos Pintores y Escultores 2376
 Sindall, Thomas 1040
 Sindicatos Libres 2486
 Singapore
 Japanese invasion 2792
 WTO 1429
 Singer, Peter 305, 3429
 Singh, Amar 1691
Singh, Bhagat **3041–2**
 on anarchism 3042
 and Bose 449
 hanged 1683, 3042
 Saunders 1680
 sentenced to death 1328
 sentenced to transportation 1328, 1677
 Why I Am An Atheist 3042
 Young India Association 1677
 Singh, Gulab 1708
 Singh, Kunwar 1689, 1691
Singh, Makhan 1954, **3042–3**
 Singh, Mohan 451, 1679
 Singh, Moni 2582
 Singh, Raja Man 1691
 Singh, Ranjit 1708
 Singh, Sardar Ajit 3041
 Singh, Sardar Bhagat 1710
 Singh, Shamsher 371
 Singh, Viswanath Pratap 1692–3
 Singing Revolution 811
 Sinhala Buddhist nationalism 3527
 Sinhala Maha Sabha movement 2050
 Sinistra Proletaria 2814
Sinn Féin **3043–4**
 Connolly 860
 Easter Rising (1916) 1800–1
 electoral candidates 971
 electoral success 1047
 IRB 793
 Provisional 1797
 tricolor 2572
 Sino-Filipinos 2667
 Sino-Indian border dispute 961, 1922, 2421
 Sino-Indochinese War 2747, 3262
 Sino-Japanese War 926, 1896, 3236
 boycotts 185
 Chiang Kai-shek 719, 727
 Chinese defeat 734, 3671
 Qing Dynasty 3239
 Shimonoseki treaty 732
 Sino-Soviet split 710, 2995
 Sinti 1175, 1179
 Sinvoz plant 3687
 Sinyetha Wunthanu 554, 555
 Sioui, Jules 584
 Sioux tribe 899–900
Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents 759
 Siqueiros, David Alfaro 2375, 2376
 Sir George Williams University 2786
 Siraj-ud-Daulah 368, 369, 1708
 Sirajganj revolt 372
 Siregar, Hariman 1724
 Sirik Matak, Prince 572, 573
 Sirikmatak, Sisowath 571
 Sirinelli, Jean-François 1237
 Sisavang Vong 1715, 1716
 Sison, José Maria 2677, 2680–1, 2684, 2685
 Sison, Juliet 2681
 Sistani, Ali al- 1783
 Sisterhood of International Peace 303
 Sisulu, Albertina 2193
 Sisulu, Walter 2196, 3086, 3087
 and Tambo 2191, 3249
 sit-ins 222, 3186
 Sita, Nana 2191
 Sitarmayyah, Pattavi 450
 Sithole, Ndabangingi 2364, 3735
 SITRAC-SITRAM 864
 Sitrin, Marina 1084–7
Sitting Bull **899–902**
 situated knowledge 2306
 Situationist International (SI) 325, 972, 3044, 3423
situationists 159, 973, 1237, 1844, 2808, 2839, **3044–6**
 Six Acts 465, 2662, 3281
 Six Articles, Act of 1093
 Six-Day War 1758, 1812, 1816
 Six Federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba 1939
 Six Nations community 584, 586
 Six Weeks' War 2102
 Sixth Coalition, War of 188
 "Sixty-Eight" 3168
 ska 611
 Skalidakis, Giannis (Jean-Marie) 1436–9, 1447–50
 Skanderbeg, G. K. 37

- Skanthakumar, Balasingham 2631–4, 3526–7
 Skeffington, Francis Sheehy 1047
 Skilling, H. G. 2746
 Skinner, E. P. 547
 Skirving, William 2366
 Sklair, L. 3655
 Skocpol, Theda 1213, 1214–15
 Skoglund, Carl 3413
 Skoropadskii, General 2938
 Skrypnik, N. 2916
 Skycák, František 1595
 Slansky, Rudolf 3691
 slash and burn tactics 704
 Slatin, Rudolf von 2164
 Slav Congress 1143, 1149
 Slave Codes 75
slave rescues 90, 156, 212, 216, 2491, 3046–8, 3327–8
slave revolts
 Barbados 90, 350
 Caribbean 201
 Demerara 204, 983–4
 Palmares 2586–9, 3745
 shipboard 89, 3024–7
 South Carolina 212
 Turner 233, 2407–9
 Vesey 3459–61
 see also American slave rebellions; Maroon resistance
 slave stealing 3047
 slave trade 1657, 3024–7
 slaveholders 56–7
slavery
 American Civil War 59, 70–2, 755–7
 Brazil 494, 598
 chattel 1112–13, 2021
 Cuba 90, 917–18
 Enlightenment 91
 French Guiana 1269–70
 Haiti 1525, 3584
 Hegel on 356, 2839
 Jamaica 90, 2320
 Lincoln 61, 2024, 2122
 wage-slaves 2021
 see also abolitionism; anti-slavery movement
Slavery Abolition Act 205
slaves
 buying freedom 211
 dress as resistance 1871–3
 freed and repatriated 213, 214
 property accumulation 211, 559
 resistance 88, 212
 runaway 70, 88, 212, 533
 as sailors 296
 shipboard insurrections 88, 3024–7
 see also Maroon resistance; slave revolts;
 Underground Railroad
 Slavic Morning Star 3632
 Slavov, Atanas 538
 Slavs 1142, 1442, 1451
 Sloan, John 1125
 Slonimski, Antoni 2301
 Sloterdijk, Peter 140
 Slovak National Council (SNC) 3048, 3051, 3435
 Slovak National Uprising 3049
Slovak People's Party 1595–6, 3293–4
 Slovak Republic 3293, 3294
 Slovak Social Democratic Party (SSDS) 1025
 Slovak Volunteers 1621
Slovakia 3048–51
 1944 Uprising 3048–9
 autonomy 1595, 3435
 dissidence 3049–50
 Gentle Revolution 811, 3050, 3435
 languages 3051
 PAV 3435
 religious dissidence 3049–50
 Soviet invasion 3048
 Štúr generation 3050–1
 Tiso 3293–4
 Slovenia 223, 319, 1175, 3683
 see also Žižek, Slavoj
Slovenian National Liberation Front (Osvobodilna Fronta) 3051–2
Slovo, Joe 172, 173, 175, 1552, 2192, 2358, 3052–3, 3093, 3104
 arrested 3249
 Has Socialism Failed? 3106
 Slutskaya, Vera 3555
 Small, Gail 2418
 Small, Tony 1203
 Small Landholders' Party 1627
 Small-Scale Farmers of the Northeast 3275
 Smallholders' and Hungarian People's Parties 1618
 Smallwood, Joey 589
 SMATA Córdoba 864, 865
 Smeathman, Henry 206, 209
 Smedley, Agnes 2969
 Smelser, N. J. 776, 779
 Smets, Dore 361
 Smidovich, Sofia 3607
 Smirnov, V. 2915
Smith, Adam 3053–5
 as influence 2231, 2436
 on labor 2024
 Wealth of Nations, The 508, 1112, 1113, 2451, 3054–5
 Smith, Bessie 1555
 Smith, David Michael 227–30, 2187–9, 3056–60

- Smith, Earl T. 930
 Smith, Ethel M. 2625
 Smith, Gerrit 216, 3005
 Smith, Harold L. 526–9
 Smith, Ian 2153, 3730, 3735, 3739
 Smith, J. B. 177
 Smith, James Mc-Cune 216
 Smith, Jen 2844
 Smith, John 204
 Smith, John (Rev.) 984
 Smith, Matthew J. 1514–21, 2872
 Smith, Vern 836
 Smith Act 596, 1204
 Smith O'Brien, William 3680–1
Smith v. Allwright 759
 Smithfield burnings 1095
 Smrkovský, Josef 2744
 smuggling 75, 76
 Smulewicz-Zucker, Gregory R. 2586–9,
 3214–15, 3745–7
 Smuts, J. C. 2395, 2397
SNCC: *see* Student Non-Violent Coordinating
 Committee
 Sneevliet, Henk 725
 Sneh, Moshe 359
 Snow, D. A. 652, 2758
 Snow, P. G. 650
 Snowden, Philip 522
 Snowden, Thomas 1013
 So Thein 553
 Soberanis Gómez, Antonio 365
 Sobhuza II, of Swaziland 2111, 3206, 3747
 Soboul, Albert 1283, 1284, 1286, 2249
 Sobrino, Jon 478, 2059
 Sobukwe, Robert Mangaliso 2111, 2192, 3086
 Soccer War 2956–7
 social activists 613
 social banditry 1944
 social capital 3171
 social centers 324
 social Christianity 10
 Social Committee for Ecological Protection of
 Russe 3068
 social contract
 Locke 76, 1113
 Tennis Court Oath 3256
 social Darwinism 912
 Social Defense Law, Argentina 266
 Social Democracy of America 3064
 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)
 1797
 Social Democratic Confederation 990
 Social Democratic Federation
 Cape Town 148
 Morris 2341, 3061
 Social Democratic Federation (SDF), Scotland
 2819, 2820
 Social Democratic Labor Party, Netherlands 870
 Social Democratic Movement of the Kingdom of
 Poland (SDKPiL) 2718, 2719
 Social Democratic Party of Austria 318, 1745
 Social Democratic Party of Britain 1748, 2040
 Social Democratic Party of Costa Rica 879
 Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia 1391
 Social Democratic Party of Finland 1201
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)
 381, 826, 975, 1338, 1359, 1366, 1375,
 3055–6, 3522
 Godesberg Program 1910
 Hilferding 1581
 Kautsky 1942
 Liebknecht 2116, 2213
 Luxemburg 2084, 2142, 2143, 2145–6, 2213
 Marcuse 2213
 Marx and Engels 3056–7
 membership 1373, 1742–3, 1756
 against Nicholas II 1746
 resisting Nazi Party 1377, 1378–9
 Social Democratic Party of Hungary 128
 Social Democratic Party of Portugal 2732
 Social Democratic Party of Russia 1418, 3552,
 3721
 Social Democratic Party of Sweden 1745
 Social Democratic Party of Thailand 3265
 Social Democratic Party of the USA 974
 Social Democratic Student Organization (SDS)
 3522, 3580
 Social Democratic Union (SDE) 1444
 Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP) 3066
 Social Democratic Workers' Party of Austria
 (SDAPÖ) 354
 Social-Democratic Workingmen's Party of North
 America 2026
 Social Democrats, USA 3065
 social ecology 99, 161, 1052, 1053, 2620, 2808
 Social Gospel movement 3419
 social justice 661, 3660
 Social Justice Program, Philippines 2673
 social movements
 changes in 782
 emergent 2762
 European 2401
 Italy 2401
 Japan 1876
 poverty 780–1
 rhizomatic 981
see also new social movements; punk movement
 social physiology, Kropotkin 1561
 Social Revolutionary Congress 157
 Social Security Act 782, 3381

- Social Self-Defense Committee (KSS-KOR) 2697–8, 3078
- Social Transformation Involving Women in Africa 3548
- Social Well-Being 404
- Sociale, La* 120
- “socialfascism” period 3298
- socialism** 3056–62
- African 3702
 - agrarian-based 677
 - Albania 29–33
 - anarchist movement 95–6
 - Arab 233–7, 1069–73
 - Argentina 270–3
 - Britain 3060–2
 - Chávez, César 663
 - Chile 678–83, 684
 - Christianity and 1343
 - cooperatives 861
 - Cuba, transition to 921–2
 - Draper 2250
 - Germany 1373–81
 - Ghana, transition to 1381–3
 - Greece 1439–51
 - Iran, Mossadegh era 1763–6
 - Kautsky 1653
 - libertarian 2877
 - Marxist 2240
 - Nkrumah 1382
 - non-Marxist 333
 - Owen 2567
 - Pilsudski 2689
 - reformist 1913
 - Senghor 3008
 - third-way Yugoslavian 1011
 - Ujamaa* 2532–3, 3374–5
 - Venezuela 3455
 - Weimar Republic 1374
 - working class 3056
 - Yemen 3670–1
 - see also* international socialism: mass politics; utopian socialism
- Socialism and Democracy* 2249
- Socialisme ou Barbarie** 325, 621, 2839, 3062–3
- Socialist* 961
- Socialist Ashram, Almorea 1923
- Socialist Citizens League 1910
- Socialist Courier* 2228
- socialist feminism 2595, 3569
- Socialist German Student Union (SDS) 1037, 3580
- Socialist Ideas and Action (PAS) 112
- Socialist International: *see* Internationals, Second
- Socialist Labor Party (SLP), USA 1735, 2028, 3064
- Socialist Labor Party of Greece (SEKE) 1441, 3220
- Socialist Labour Party (SLP), Scotland 2820
- Socialist League (LS) 2229, 2341, 3443
- Socialist League of Scotland 860
- Socialist Left, Peru (IS) 2652
- Socialist Party of Albania (PS) 32
- Socialist Party of America (SPA)** 3063–6
- and Communist Party 835–6
 - Debs 974, 2031
 - Haywood 1571
 - and IWW 2489
 - London, Jack 2128
 - and Thomas 596
 - unemployment 3383
- Socialist Party of Argentina 1747
- Socialist Party of Burma 556
- Socialist Party of Chile (PS) 683, 692, 693, 1468
- Socialist Party of France 1746, 1748–9
- Socialist Party of Germany (SPD) 1253
- Socialist Party of Greece (SKE) 1436, 1440, 1444
- Socialist Party of Guiana (PSG) 1270
- Socialist Party of India 2403
- Socialist Party of Italy: *see* Italian Socialist Party (PSI)
- Socialist Party of Japan: *see* Japan Socialist Party (JSP)
- Socialist Party of Michoacán (PSM) 3432
- Socialist Party of Nicaragua (PSN) 2964
- Socialist Party of Peru 2649
- Socialist Party of the Philippines 2673
- Socialist Party of Poland 1915
- Socialist Party of Portugal 2732
- Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) 3011
- Socialist Party of Spain (PSOE) 182–3, 184
- Socialist Party of Thailand (SPT) 3262
- socialist realism 28, 3160
- Socialist Register* 3282
- Socialist Revolutionary (SR), Russia 142, 2892, 2908, 2919–20, 2926
- and CEC 2928
 - Chernov 676, 3551
 - dual power 2902
 - Party Dictatorship 2937
 - Spiridonova 2082, 3152–4
 - Tajikistan 3242
- Socialist Revolutionary Party, Colombia** 805–6
- Socialist Trades and Labor Alliance 1735
- Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) 826, 828, 1337, 1338, 1369, 3067
- Socialist Women’s Conference 1750
- Socialist Workers’ Party of Germany (SAP)** 1351, 1371, 1379, 3066–7

- Socialist Workers' Party of Germany (SAPD)** 3066–7
- Socialist Workers' Party (SWP) of Britain 1402
- Socialist Workers' Party (SEK) of Greece 1444
- Socialist Workers' Party (SWP) of the USA 596–7, 840, 3383
- Socialist Working Party, Chile 692
- Socialist Youth International 3678
- Socialist Youth Organization of Germany (SJV) 3067
- Socialista, El* 270
- socialization of land 676
- Sociedad de Estudios Afrocubanos 2565
- Sociedad del Folklore Cubano 2565
- Sociedad de la Igualdad (Equality Society) 111
- Sociedad Italiana de Socorros Mutuos 253
- Sociedad Obrera de Oficios Varios 276–7
- Società Nazionale 2267
- Société des Amis des Noirs 203, 1525–6, 1527, 1530, 2553, 2554
- Société des Citoyennes Républicaines Révolutionnaires 1296
- Société Française des Nouvelles-Hébrides (SFNH) 3426
- Société Fraternelle des Minimés 1295
- Société des Inventions et Découvertes 2992
- Société du Point Central des Arts et Métiers 2992
- Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade 3022
- Society for Academic Courses (TKN) 3077
- Society for Cheap Lodgings** 3067
- Society for Constitutional Information (SCI) 1553
- Society of Equals 403
- Society of Factory Owners 2916, 2943
- Society of Families 403
- Society of Friends: *see* Quakers
- Society of the Friends of the Rights of Man and Citizen 1288
- Society of Muslim Brothers 1548, 1560
- Society of Planters of Pernambuco (SAPP) 2117–18
- Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts 3520
- Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings 2341
- Society of Revolutionary Republican Women 1291
- Society of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 1015
- Society of Separatists 3417
- Society of Spencean Philanthropists 3151, 3280
- Society for the Struggle against Communism, Turkey 3353
- Society for Theoretical Psychoanalysis 3743
- Society of United Irishmen 1203, 1786, 3302
- sodomy laws 2101, 2107, 3016
- Soe, Thakin** 555, 556, 3068, 3279
- Sofia, Pietro 2402
- Sofia demonstrations** 3068–9
- Sofri, Adriano 2622
- Sogavare, Manasseh 3082
- Sohyo** 1876, 1878, 1879, 1881, 1882, 1909, 3069–70
- Sojourner Truth Organization** 3070–1
- Sokomanu, Ati George 3426
- Sol, El* 2340
- Solano Lopez, Francisco 2452
- Solares, Jaime 789
- Soldatki* 3554
- Soldiers Against Silence 1814
- Soledad Brothers 964–5
- Solemn League and Covenant 1098
- Soler, Adolfo 2608
- SolFed: *see* Solidarity Federation
- Solidaarisuus 119
- Solidaridad* 2668, 2846
- Solidaridad Internacional Antifascista (SIA) 2962
- Solidaridad Obrera* 145, 1440
- Solidaridad Obrera (Workers' Solidarity) 145, 847
- Solidarios, Los* 1187
- Solidaritas Perempuan 1726
- Solidarity: *see* Solidarność
- solidarity 2021
- class 102
- Galleani 1322
- Solidarity, cycling association 903
- Solidarity 80 2708
- Solidarity Committee 150
- Solidarity Federation (SolFed)** 3071–2
- Solidarity of Filipino Workers (BMP) 2686
- Solidarity for Palestinian Human Rights 845
- Solidarity Party, Cape Verde 603
- Solidarity Weekly* 3074
- Solidarność (Solidarity)** 3072–80
- emergence of 140, 810, 2698
- fragmented 2709, 3076
- and GDR 1346
- going underground 3075, 3078
- ideology 3079
- importance of 2707–8, 3079–80
- KKP 3073
- KOR 2013, 2301, 2302, 2694–8, 3077–8
- Kuroń 2014, 2301
- Michnik 2301, 2707
- National Executive Council 3076
- organization of 3078–9
- Polish Revolution 2507–8
- printed word 3077, 3557–8

- roots of 3077–8
 telerevolution 3557–8
 women in 3555–8, 3633
see also Walentynowicz, Anna; Walesa, Lech
- Solmonson, Le'Ann L. 1010–11
- Solomon Islands** 1197, 3080–2
- Solt, Ottillia 118
- Solzhenitsyn, Alexander 2262
- Somali Abo Liberation Front 1139
- Somali women, OCAP Women of Etobicoke 2562
- Sombart, Werner 2244
- Somerset, Duke of 509, 516, 1094, 1095
- Somerset, James 202, 3022
- Somerset Decision 367, 3021
- Somoza Debayle, Anastasio 2466, 2467, 2468
 assassins of 2597
 family lands nationalized 2964
 Nicaraguan Revolution 640, 1164, 2061, 2465
 ousted 2957
 and Sandino 1205, 2564
- Somoza Debayle, Luis 2466
- Somoza García, Anastasio 447, 2466, 2966
- Somsanith, Prince 2055
- Son Sen 574, 1960, 1961
- Song of Freedom* (film) 2846
- Song Yu-jin 1997
- Sonnelitter, Karen 1088–9, 1203, 2402–3, 3210, 3302–3, 3392–4
- Sonoran generation** 2539–42
- Sonthi Boonyaratkalin 3277
- Sonthonax, Léger-Félicité 1264, 1531, 1532, 1533, 1535, 1537
 Third Civil Commission 3310
 Toussaint Louverture 2554, 3307, 3311
- Sope, Barak Tame 3426
- Sorel, Georges 463, 2136, 2244, 2257, 2766, 3228
- Sorge, Friedrich 2026, 2028, 2030
- Sorie, Mohammed 3031
- Soros, George 816
- Soros Foundation 816, 3333, 3633
- Soroush, Abdolkarim 1811
- SOS Femme-Alternative 3575
- SOS Femmes Violées 3575
- Sosa, Mercedes 2377
- Sossi, Mario 2815
- Sotelo, Calvo 3131
- Sotho popular resistance 2112
- Soto, Ana 3630–1
- Souchy, Augustin** 3082–3
- Soul Students Advisory Council 398
- Soulouque, Faustin 1512
- sound money theories 2728
- soup kitchens 1206–7
- Souphanouvong, Prince** 1716, 2054, 2055, 3083–4, 3472
- Soustelle, Jacques 45
- South Africa**
 African nationalism 3084–90
 agricultural sector 3097
 anarchism 148–9
 ANC 3084–90
 anti-apartheid movement 170–6
 apartheid 2222, 2502–3, 3094–6
assimilado elite 153
 extraction industries 3090–2
 formation of 147, 3091
 Gandhi 2492–3
 GDP 3092, 3110
 global capitalism 2502
 labor movement 3090–9
 Marks 2222–3
 Mayekiso 2264–5
 Motsoaledi 2345–6
 multiracial democratic elections 3546
 National Party 170–1, 2222
 neoliberalism 3095, 3096, 3098
 Pact government 3092
 Pass Laws 172, 3087, 3603
 post-apartheid 176, 3097
 privatization 3099–100
 Raditsela 2801–2, 3096
 segregation 3084, 3091
 syndicalism 148
 trade unions 3084–5, 3090–2, 3095
 water struggles 3099–103
 women's activism 3603
see also Mandela, Nelson; Slovo, Joe
- South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU) 3096
- South African Clothing Workers' Union 2948
- South African Colored Organization 171
- South African Communist Party (SACP)** 3103–9
 and ANC 2192, 3052, 3084, 3103, 3249
 Batswana miners 455
 Congress Alliance 171
 and COSATU 875
 in exile 3104–6
 Hani 1552
 Mayekiso 2265
 MK 3104
Path to Power 3107
 post-apartheid 3107–9
 Slovo 3052, 3104
 socialist Marxism 3086
 unbanned 175, 3107
see also Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA)

- South African Confederation of Labor (SACL) 1087, 3094
- South African Confederation of Trade Unions (SACOTU) 3097
- South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) 171, 173, 349, 2346, 2357, 3039, 3089, 3094
- South African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) 1957, 2112
- South African Indian Congress (SAIC) 2, 171, 2357, 3103
- South African Industrial Federation (SAIF) 149, 3091
- South African Labor Party (SALP) 148, 331, 832, 1028, 3091, 3094
- South African Mineworkers' Union (SAMWU) 1087, 1088, 1556–7, 2625, 3091, 3097, 3098, 3101, 3696
- South African National Civic Organization (SANCO) 2265
- South African Native National Congress (SANNC) 152, 1414, 3085, 3205
- South African Student Organization (SASO) 3088
- South African Trades and Labor Council (SATLC) 834, 1087, 3093
- South African Transport and Allied Workers' Union (SATAWU) 3733
- South African Worker* 832
- South Asia 1810, 3643
see also individual countries
- South Carolina 85, 212
- South China Club 1926
- South Colombo Youth League 969, 2050
- South End* 2067
- South Korea
economic crisis 2000
economic success 1998
GDP 2000
Global Day of Action 1389
GNP 1663
homeless 2000
military dictatorships 1999–2000
neoliberalism 2000
student uprising 2014–15, 3169, 3180
see also Korea
- South Korea–US Free Trade Agreement 2001
- South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty 1272
- South Russian Group of Anarchosyndicalists 142
- South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act 2398
- South West Africa National Union (SWANU) 2530, 3203
- South West Africa Progressive Association (SWAPA) 3202–3
- South West African People's Organization (SWAPO)** 2398–9, 2530, 3112, 3202–5, 3300, 3604–5
- Southborough Committee 957
- Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 2676
- Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 2676, 3259
- Southern Africa** 147–55, 3109–14, 3601–6
anarchism and syndicalism 147–55
colonial struggles 3602–4
economic statistics 3110
health statistics 3110
ILO 3112
labor force 3112–13
migrant labor 3110–11
popular resistance to neoliberalism 3109–14
Structural Adjustment 3110–11
women leaders 3602–4
women's movement 3601–6
World Bank 3113
- Southern African Customs Union 2395
- Southern African Development Community (SADC) 858, 2111, 3110
- Southern African Trade Union Coordinating Council (SATUCC) 2356, 3111–12
- Southern California Anarchist Federation (SCAF-LA) 862
- Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)** 17, 332, 652, 740, 762, 1852, 1971–7, 2498, 3186, 3187
- Southern Homestead Act 63
- Southern Indigenous Creole Community (SICC) 2473
- Southern Mercury* 2726
- Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) 2221
- Southern Rhodesia African Trade Union Congress (SRATUC) 3730
- Southern Rhodesia Trade Union Congress (SRTUC) 2221, 2730
- Southern Rhodesia Labor Party (SRLP) 2385
- Southern Rights faction 56, 57
- Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching 3520
- Souvanna Phouma 1716, 2054, 3083, 3485
- Souvarine, Jeanne 2257
- Sovereign Revolutionary Convention 2540
- Soviet, II* 446
- Soviet and Food Committee Congress 2935
- Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies 2907
- Soviet–Polish War 3037
- Soviet Republics 3124, 3156–7
- Soviet system 2005, 2083, 2903, 3115–18

Soviet Union

- Afghanistan 388, 1465
- agriculture 3163
- anti-nuclear protests 198
- and anti-Soviet revolts 1217
- break-up 1386, 1418, 1663–4, 2088, 2762, 3115–28, 3367–8
- Central Asia 642–3
- conformism 3160–1
- counterrevolution 3608–9
- Cuba 934
- education 3609
- elite 3115–16
- Family Code 3608
- famine 3160
- German invasion 1181–2, 1183, 1377, 2792, 3048
- Gulags 3159, 3161
- Hungary 3062
- influence on Nkrumah 1381
- marriage 3608, 3609
- modernization 3162
- motherhood 3607, 3608
- nationalisms 3366–7
- purges 3161–2
- science 2993
- and Vietnam 3481
- women workers 3608–9
- women's movement 3606–9
- World War II 3117
- see also* Gorbachev, Mikhail; Stalin, Joseph; war communism
- Sovnarkom 2086
- Soweto uprising 2194, 3089, 3095–7, 3113
- soy cultivation 2603
- Sozialdemokrat, Der* 1941
- Sozialist, Der* 2047, 2048
- Sozialistengesetz* 1351
- Sozialistische Aktion* 1380
- Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschland:**
see Socialist Workers' Party of Germany (SAPD)
- Sozialistischer Bund 2048, 2049, 3082
- Spa Fields Riots 3151
- Spain**
- anarchism 97, 100, 144–7, 1161
- anarchosyndicalism 847–50
- anti-clericalism 3132
- Bourbons 424, 1848
- campaign of terror 3132
- fascism 291–2, 1175
- foreign investment 180–1
- Global Day of Action 1389, 1397
- immigrants 1643
- imperialism 1654–5

- memory wars 2776
- Muslims expelled 2056
- Napoleon 442–3
- repression 3132
- strikes 183–4
- student movement 180, 3170
- women's movement 3609–12
- women's suffrage 3611
- Workers' Commissions 181–3
- World Bank 180
- see also* Catalonia; Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA); Spanish Civil War; Spanish Revolution
- Spanish–American War 1566
- Spanish Civil War 3135–7
- Abraham Lincoln Brigade 6–7, 2847
- and anarchism 100, 158, 2248
- anarchist vaudeville 116
- anarchosyndicalism 3135, 3136–7
- anti-fascists 104
- Asturias 291–3, 3138
- Basque Country 629
- Catalonia 629
- CNT-FAI 131, 848, 849, 1030, 1188, 1413
- Durruti 1029
- Falange Española* 180, 1587
- famine 180
- German volunteers 1372, 1379
- International Brigades 851, 3138–9, 3678, 3683
- international factors 3138–9
- Jews 3139
- Landau 2046
- literary output 116
- Madrid 3138
- Mexican aid 3138
- Moroccan troops 3138
- Nin 2486
- propaganda 3133, 3143
- radio's role 3133
- Rosselli 2870–1
- Russian fighters 3139
- Spanish Republic 1128
- Stalin on 3140
- US neutrality 6
- women's roles 124, 2962, 3133–4
- workers' control 162
- working class 180
- see also* Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI); Franco, Francisco; Mujeres Libres (Free Women); Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (POUM); Sánchez Saornil, Lucía
- Spanish conquistadors 28, 29
- Spanish Revolution 3128–45**
- agrarian collectivists 3134, 3135
- collectivization 3134–5

Spanish Revolution (*cont'd*)

- cultural associations 3134
- Durruti 1030
- Popular Army 3137–8
- resistance 3131–3
- women's role 2367–8
- Spanish Succession, War of 484
- Spanish War of Independence 3456
- Spare Rib* 3569
- Spartacus** 3145–50
 - historical character 3145–6
 - political hero 3146–9
 - portrayals in arts 3149–50
 - and slavery 3146–7
- Spartacus* 3147
- Spartacus* (film) 3149–50
- Spartacus League 826, 1361, 1362, 1373, 1374, 3147
- Spartacus Uprising 827, 1253, 2117
- Spartakiad 3149
- Spartakusbund 2117
- Special Night Squad 374
- Special Operations Executive (SOE) 1240
- spectacle, society of: *see* Debord, Guy
- Spector, Maurice 596
- Speight, George 1199, 1200, 2797
- Spence, Thomas** 2127, 3150–1, 3280, 3391
- Spencer, Herbert 2007
- Spendiff, Harry 151, 154
- Speras, Konstantinos 126
- Speyer, Carl 2026, 2028
- spice trade 1656, 1718
- Spicer, André 1739–40
- Spielberg, Steven 2982
- Spies, August 116, 1569, 1570, 2029
- Spinanes 2845
- spinning jennies 1040
- Spínola, Antonio de 2729, 2731
- Spinoza, Baruch** 3151–2
 - Negri on 1845, 2369, 2427
 - Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being* 3152
 - Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* 3152
- Spiridonova, Maria** 3152–4, 3552
- Spiritual Board of Central Asian Muslims 3244
- Spithead mutiny** 3154–5
- Spoden, Elizabeth 3154–5
- Spontaneists 107
- Spontis 1366
- Spooner, Lysander 157
- Spotsylvania Court House 66
- Springbok rugby tour protests** 3155–6
- Springfield, Buffalo 221
- Springsteen, Bruce 1737
- Sprinkle, Annie 1191

- Spurlock, R. Scott 1096–100
- Sputnik* 196
- Squandermania scandal 1463
- squatting
 - anarchism 109
 - Australia 1944
 - autonomism 323
 - Chile 680, 682
 - Denmark 992
 - Germany 324
 - Greece 127
 - Homes not Roads 1039
 - Iran 780
 - Italy 323, 1147, 1846
 - Leoncavallo 1006
 - London 1039
 - Prague 1394
 - Salt Pan Creek 307
 - Swaziland 3207
- Squire, Heather 1203–4, 2063–4, 2314–15, 2436–7, 2528–9, 2628–9, 2972–3, 3155–6
- Sri Lanka** 1493–5, 2049–54, 2631–3
 - Black July 3251
 - De Silva 969–70, 2050, 2052, 2053
 - Federal Party 3250–1
 - Gunawardena 969, 1493–5, 2050, 2052
 - independence 2052
 - insurrection (1971) 2632
 - insurrection (1987–9) 2633–4
 - radicalism 2049–54
 - Tamil minority 2633, 2634
 - United Front 2632
 - see also* Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP); Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP); Tamil nationalist struggle; Wijeweera, Rohana
- Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) 969, 1494, 2052, 2631, 3527
- Sri Narayana Guru Dharma Paripalana Yogam (SNDP) 956
- Srinivas, M. N. 955
- Srinivasan, Rao Bahadur 53
- SS: *see* Schutzstaffeln
- Stack, Austin 1046, 1049
- Stackelberg, Otto von 2710
- Ståhlberg, K. J. 1202, 2519
- Stakhovich, Mikhail 1201
- Stalin, Joseph** 3156–64
 - bureaucracy 3158–9
 - collectivization 3159–60
 - coming to power 3158, 3608
 - Congress of the Victors 3162
 - critics of 3163
 - death of 1618, 3163, 3282
 - Fourth International 2239
 - and Hitler 1377

- Khrushchev on 839, 1220, 2262, 2387, 2698,
 3062, 3282, 3299, 3367
 and KPD 1374
 Lenin on 2087–8, 3059, 3511
 Leninism 2088–9
 and Mao 705, 2630
 modernization 3159–61
 and Nazis 2248–9
 revolution from above 3156–64
 Socialist Offensive 644
 on Soviet system 3115
 on Spartacus 3148
 terror 2994
 and Tito 339, 3296
 and Togliatti 3298
 toppling of statue 1625, 1626
 totalitarianism 3156, 3511
 and Trotsky 3321
 Stalin–Hitler Pact 1494, 2051
 Stalinism 2247–9
 Stamboliski, Aleksander 540, 541
 Stammheim prison 1368
 Stamp Act 77, 84, 295
 Stampacchia, Mauro 379–81, 1146–7, 1204–5,
 3013–14, 3298–9
 Stanca, Teodor 2866
 Standard Fruit Company 1603, 1866, 2018
 Standard Oil 428
 Standfield, John 3301
 Standfield, Thomas 3301
 Standing Rock Reservation 902
 Standstill Act 3384
 Stanford, Maxwell (Muhammad Ahmad) 18, 2840
 Stankevich, Nikolai 333
 Stanley, Robert C. S. 3081
 Stanton, Edwin 69
Stanton, Elizabeth Cady 3164–5
 AERA 3622
 History of Woman Suffrage, A 3624
 NAWSA 3623
 NWSA 170
 racism 3165
 Seneca Falls convention 3005, 3620–1
 “Solitude of Self” 3624
 universal suffrage 3165
 Woman’s Bible, The 3624
 women’s rights 167, 168, 3619
 and Woodhull 3621, 3636
 works 3164
 World Anti-Slavery Convention 205, 3620,
 3639–40
 Stanton, Henry 3005, 3164, 3639
 Star Chamber, Court of 514, 591
 STAR (Street Transvestite Action
 Revolutionaries) 2108
 Starbucks 1737
 Starhawk 1052
 Starr, Ellen Gates 10, 11
 Starr, Henry 1459
 Stasi 1340, 1341–2, 1343, 1369
 Stasova, Nadezhda 3067, 3390
State Adversary 139
 State Alliance Exchange 2726
 state capitalism 1567, 2934, 2935
 state/civil society 1409
 State Cooperative Exchange 2725
 state feminism 3633
 State Law and Order Restoration Council
 (SLORC) 551
 state ownership 1382
 State Protection Authority (ÁVH) 1626
 state repression 2757
 State Security Service (SSS) 2481
 Staten Island 81
 Statev, Hristo 537
 statism, critiqued 621–2
 Statuti, Michelangelo 129
 Staudenmaier, Michael 38–9, 199–200, 382–3,
 2766–74, 3070–1
 Stauffenberg, Claus Schenk Graf von 1594–5
 Stavisky Affair 824
 Steakley, James 2101
 Stedile, João Pedro 483, 2352
 steel drums 612
 Steelboys 1785, 1807
 Stefanski, Walenty 2702
 Steger, Manfred B. 381–2
 Steinberg, James 3290–3
Steinem, Gloria 1299, 3165–8
 Sten Sture the Elder 1495
 Sten Sture the Younger 1495
 Stendhal 886
 Stephens, Alexander Hamilton 57
 Stephens, James 1192
 Stephens, Joseph Rayner 657
 Stephens, Uriah S. 1977
 Stepniak (Stapan Kravchinsky) 976
 sterilization, forced 1179
 Stern, Avraham 358, 374
 Stern gang 358, 359, 1550, 1759
 Steuben, Friedrich von 82–3, 3514
 Steunenberg, Frank 1570–1
 Stevens, Jimmy 3426
 Stevens, John L. 1564–5
 Stevens, Reginald 2077
 Stevens, Siaka 3031
 Stevens, Thaddeus 217
 Stevenson, John 502
 Steward, Ira 2025, 2026
 Stewart, A. T. Q. 3305

- Stewart, Bruce E. 1060–8
 Stewart, Charles 202
 Stewart, Maria 3618
 Stewart, William 3328
 Stewart, Willie 2821
 Stewart-Steinbeck, Suzanne 2316–17
 Stickland, Gerald 2186
 Stiglitz, Joseph 1670
 Stimson, Henry 2965
 Stinnes-Legien Agreement 1362
 Stirner, Max
 and Debord 973
 egoism 97, 116, 134
 individualism 1322
 as influence 2382
 and Kropotkin 2007
 and Mackay 2155
 and Marx 335
stimanism 3548
 Stock, Robin 2362–3, 3339
 Stockholm Bloodbath 988, 1495
 Stoddard, Lothrop 21
 Stoddard, T. S. 1531, 1541, 1542
 Stoecker, Adolf 887
 Stokes, E. 1688, 1689
 Stokes, Rose Pastor 22
 Stolpe, Manfred 1343
 Stolypin, Pyotr 2719, 2886, 2893, 2926, 3551
 Stone, Dan 2122
 Stone, Lucy 169, 3618–19, 3622
 Stones River, Battle of 62
 Stonewall Riots 2094, 2107, 2108
 Stono Rebellion 75, 88, 212
 Stony Gut incident 1869, 2322
 Stop Killer Coke movement 809
 Stop the City 1387, 1388
 Stop the War 2504
 Stop the War Coalition (STWC) 227, 228
 Stopes, Marie 3568
 Storch, Nicolas 92
 Storni, Alfonsina 3597
 Stowe, Harriet Beecher 216, 2492
 Uncle Tom's Cabin 216
 Stoykewych, R. 592
 Strachan, Selwyn 1464
 Strasser, Adolph 2026, 2028
 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) 197
 Strategic Hamlets program 2465
 Stratimirović, Djordje 1620
 Strauss, David 2230, 2477, 3679
 Strauss, Richard 2155
 Stravenhaven, Rodolfo 1669
 Stree Mukti Sanghatana (Women's Liberation Organization) 3589
 Stree Sangharsh (Women's Struggle) 3588
 Stresser, Balentione 3031
 strike, strikes
 Argentina 101–5, 247–9, 259–61, 2641–2
 Belgium 360–1, 361–2
 Belize 364
 Berlin Garment Workers 2047
 Biratnagar 2441–2
 Bloody Sunday anniversary (Russia) 2891, 2894, 2941
 Britain 109, 518–19, 529–30, 2821
 Bryant and May 2229
 Caribbean islands 3559
 Chile 691–2
 Chrysler 250, 2067
 Colombia 808–10
 Cuba 914–17, 932, 2151
 Denmark 2495
 Dublin 860, 1026–7, 1046
 Durban 174
 Finland 2517
 France 2933, 3216
 Gdańsk shipyard 2302, 2698, 3073, 3497, 3502
 General Motors 250, 589, 3413
 Germany 1359–63, 2932–3
 Glasgow 519, 1384–5
 Gordon College 3194
 Great Southwest 2724
 Guyana 1499, 1866
 Homestead 379
 Honduras 1603–4
 India 1705, 1922
 Iran 1769, 1779
 Jakarta 1723
 Kalamata 126
 Korea 1988–9
 Kosovo 3010
 Kuro Solidarity Strike 1983–4, 3182
 Lawrence textile workers 502–4, 836, 1204, 2623
 Łódź 2718
 London dock workers 2229, 3061
 London matchgirls 3061
 Lowell factory girls 2023
 Lupeni 2858
 McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. 2259
 mill children 2345
 Minneapolis 3413–14
 Mombasa dock workers 2269
 Mooloya 2051
 MOZAL metal workers 2356
 Nevskii Prospect 2896, 2904
 New Jersey mill 2825
 Norway 2495, 2519
 Oshawa 589

- Patagonia 276–8
 Peru 2651, 2654
 postal workers, Canada 2618–19
 Pullman 2031
 Radom 2696
 rent 2819
 Russia 2940–5, 3511
 St. Petersburg 2881, 2882, 2884, 2891, 2924, 2944
 Scotland 519, 1384–5, 2818–19
 Seattle 22, 3663
 Serbia 3686
 Spain 183–4
 Sweden 2518
 Szczecin 3073
 Telefónica 2962
 Tokyo street car 1898
 Trinidad and Tobago 3316
 UNAM 3297, 3378–9
 United Fruit Company 240, 343, 805
 Ursus 2696
 Valparaiso harbor 691
 Vietnam 3469
 Walvis Bay 3203
 Warsaw school 2718
 Women's Strike for Equality 1299
 ZiSPO 2699
see also Barcelona General Strike; Bread and Roses Strike; hunger strikes; miners' strikes; Paterson Silk Strike; Winnipeg General Strike
Strike (Eisenstein) 1080
 strike action
 as non-violent resistance 2494
 reverse strikes 2502
 see also hartals; strike, strikes
 Strike Pageant 2623–4
 Striler War 2515
 Stroessner, Alfredo 2060, 2135, 2450, 2456, 2596, 2598, 2599–600, 2601
 and Catholic Church 2605–6
 Colorado Party 2604–5, 2607
 end of rule 2603–4, 2607
 MOPOCO 2605
 Ströhle, Isabel 2002–3
 Strong, Jonathan 3021
 Strong, Walter 1458
 Stroop, Jürgen 3513
 Structural Adjustment Participatory Review
 International Network (SAPRIN) 301
 Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) 1431
 conditionalities 1398
 Côte d'Ivoire 880
 Nigeria 2483
 Southern Africa 3110–11
 Struve, Lynn 2311
 Stuart, Charles Edward (Young Pretender) 1853–5
 Stuart, John, of Bute 3530
 Stuart, Roy R. 3412
 Stuart dynasty 517, 1099
 Stubbe, Lars 2275–82
 Stübner, Mark Thomas 92
 Studdart, Captain 2790
 Student, Peasant, and Worker Movement (MOEC) 800
 student activism
 anarchism 127
 international socialism 218
 LGBT 2107–8
 May 1968 323, 1234–6, 2260–4
 see also Kwangju student uprising; student movements; student protests
 Student Council of the National University (CUUN) 1205
 Student Homophile League 2107–8
 Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID) 3187
student movements 2705–7, 3168–85
 Burma 553, 554
 Czechoslovakia 3172–7
 Europe 3177–9
 Frankfurt School 3170
 Germany 558, 1347
 Global South 3179–81
 Greece 126, 127, 3168
 Korea 3181–5
 Pakistan 3181
 Paraguay 2601
 Poland 2705–7, 3170
 Spain 180, 3170
 USA 3169–70
 see also Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC); Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
 Student Movement of Popular Unity (MEUP) 3443
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 3186–7
 Baker 332, 740
 Black Power 1259
 Carmichael 613, 3169
 civil rights 651
 and CORE 869–70
 Freedom Rides 1257
 Freedom Summer 750
 interracialism 2499
 police brutality 748
 RAM 2840
 Zinn 72

- Student Press and Information Center (STIS)
3176
- student protests**
- Bolivia 419–20
 - China 708–9, 718–21
 - Concordia University 845–6
 - France 2260–4, 3172, 3178
 - Greece 126, 127, 1434, 1448, 3170
 - Kent State student uprising 1236, 1946–7, 2500
 - Korea 2014–15
 - Malta 2186
 - Mexico 2262, 2291, 3169, 3296–8, 3378–9
 - Netherlands 2447
 - Pakistan 2262, 2577
 - Romania 2865–7
 - Yugoslavia 3170, 3692–3
- Student Solidarity Committees 3077
- Student Struggle Council 2578
- Student Voice* 3187
- Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)**
3187–9
- anarchists 159
 - Canada 2785
 - collapse of 3070
 - Columbia University 818
 - Dutschke 12
 - emergence of 222, 2500
 - HUAC 73
 - participatory democracy 2619
 - SNCC 3186
- Stuha (Ribbon) 3176
- Štúr, Ludovít 1621, 3050–1
- Štúr generation, Slovakia** 3050–1
- Sturge, Joseph 205, 658
- Sturm und Drang** 3189–90
- Sturmabteilung (SA) 319, 1172, 1179, 1589, 2104, 3386
- Stuurman, Shepherd 2393
- Styron, William 233
- Suara Ibu Peduli (Voice of Concerned Mothers)
1726
- Suárez, Adolfo 184
- Submission of the Clergy Act 1093
- Subsistencia 2064
- sub-treasury system 2726–7, 2728
- Subversive Aktion 1037
- Success Operation 240
- Succession, Act of 515
- Suchinda Kraprayoon 3273
- Sucre, Antonio José de 424, 1061, 3458
- Sudan** 2163–5, 3191–8
- Aba Island Rebellion 3191–2
 - Anglo-Egyptian rule 3192–5
 - Bin Laden 388
 - independence 3191
 - Mahdist revolt 2163–5, 3192–3, 3198
 - nationalism 3192
 - October Revolution 3191
 - School Graduates Club 3193
 - Turko-Egyptian era 3196–8
 - writers 3193
- Sudan Campaign: *see* Mahdist Revolt
- Sudan Workers' Trade Union Federation (SWTUF) 3195
- Sudanese Women's League** 3198–9
- Suez Crisis 237, 946, 1071–2, 1078–9, 1776, 1780
- Pan-Arabism 2068
 - and Syria 3223
- suffrage
- gradualist approach 169
 - Mother Jones 2345
 - universal 889, 3006, 3165
 - universal male 2828
 - women 889, 3005
 - see also* Pankhurst, Sylvia; voting qualifications
- Suffrage Law, Venezuela 3631
- Suffragist* 3626
- Sufis 34, 50, 1761, 3197, 3245, 3356
- Sugai, Masuro 191–3
- sugar cane cultivation
- Argentina 866
 - Brazil 2350
 - Caribbean 1657
 - Cuba 627, 916, 928
 - Dominican Republic 1014
 - Fiji 1196
 - Guatemala 1474–5
 - Guyana 608, 1498, 1500, 1856
 - Haiti 1530, 1541
 - Hawaii 1564
 - Jamaica 1868–9
 - Leeward Islands 2075–6
 - Micronesia 2304
 - Puerto Rico 39
 - strikes 1014
 - see also* burning of sugar cane
- Sugar Duties Act 1869
- Suharto government 1043, 1721–2, 1723
- fall of 3273
 - protests against 1044, 1724–6
 - reelected 1726
 - socialism 1733
 - and Untung 1732
- Suicidal Tendencies 2778
- suicide
- in custody 132, 1570
 - Delgrès and men 1266
 - against marriage 2200

- Marx, Eleanor 2229
 as protest 1996
 ritual 1720
 as self-determination 3190
 slaves 1871
 as social mass movement 2252
 unemployment and 3382–3
see also self-immolation
- suicide bombings 1760
- Sujatmiko, Budiman 1725
- Sukarno 3199–200**
 equality 1729
 Indonesian independence 1730, 1731
 New Order 1722–3
 protests against 1724, 3180
 writing banned 1733
- Sukhair* uprising 2576
- Sukhanov, N. 2893, 2903, 2917, 2919
- Sukru, Ali 294
- Suleau, François-Louis 1295
- Sulehria, Farooq 1160–1, 1637–8, 1761–2,
 1857–8, 2404, 2579–86
- Suleiman the Magnificent 2183
- Sullivan, Françoise 110
- Sullivan, Kenneth 612–14
- Sultaneh, Samsam ul 1768
- Sumatra, Western 1718, 1719
- Summer University 300
- Summerfield, Rose 2453
- Summerhill 117
- Sumner, Charles 217
- Sun City Agreement 858, 859
- Sun Yat-Sen 3200–2**
 anti-tax riots 734, 3201
 death of 724
 Guomindang 114, 724, 2200, 2630, 3238
 Hsing Chung Hui 732
 May 4th movement 712, 3232–3
 modernization 732
 Revolutionary Alliance 3727
 Second Chinese Revolution 723
 three principles of the people 3201
 Tung Meng Hui 735, 3201
- Sun Yat-Sen University of the Toilers of China
 (UTK) 3724
- Sunagawa struggle 1886
- Sunar, Setu 232
- Suni, Porfirio 2657
- Sunni Muslims
 Dar'ul-Islam 532
 Future Movement 635
 Iraq 1776, 1782
 Khilafat movement 1326
 Turkey 3354
- Sunningdale Agreement 2572
- Sunrise Co-Operative Farm Community 3419
- Sunrise Operation 2176
- SUNY-Buffalo campus 222
- Suomen Anarkistiliitto 118
- Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP)
 2472
- supermarkets/grocery stores 1662
- Supplex Libellus Vallachorum* 2863
- Suppression of Communism Act 171, 172, 835,
 2346, 2949, 3053, 3087, 3103
- Supremacy Act 517, 1092
- Supreme Administration of Civil Servants' Trade
 Unions (ADEDY) 3220
- Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
 (SCAP) 1878, 3069
- Surachman, Ali 1733
- Surat Congress 1699
- Surayud Chulanont 3269
- Surendra, of Nepal 2441
- Suriname 1031, 1032, 1271
- Suriya Mal campaign 2050
- Surjeet, Harkishen Singh 1935
- Surkh Posh* (Red Shirts) 1967
- surplus value 2233
- surrealism 2428
- Survival International (SI) 462
- Survival of American Indians Association
 2412
- Suryadi, Beathor 1723
- sus laws 531
- Susavang Vong, King 2054
- Susquehannocks 330
- SUTERM 2299
- Sutherland, Donald 221
- Suture 2845
- Suzuki, Mosaburō 1882, 1909
- Svensson, Anders 1153
- Sverdlov, Yakov 3606
- Svinhufvud, Pehr Evind 1202, 2519
- Svyatopolk-Mirsky, Prince 2878–9
- Swabeck, Arne 596
- Swabian League 1354
- Swadeshi* products 1697, 1698–9, 2573, 2574
- Swaminathan, Lakshmi 451, 764–5, 1679
- Swaminathan, Srividhya 367–8, 1123–4,
 3021–2, 3520–1, 3527–9
- Swamp '81 Operation 531
- Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
 Education* 753
- SWAPO: see** South West African People's
 Organization
- swaraj* (self-rule) 1324, 1680, 1701, 1702
- Swarajya Party 448, 1326
- SWAT team 1153
- Swatos, W. H., Jr. 652

- Swaziland** 3205–8
 as British High Commission 2111
 decolonization 3747
 demonstrations 3207–8
 labor force 3112
 modernization 3206–7
 squatter evictions 3207
Tinkhundla regime 3207–8
 Zwane 3747–8
- Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions 3207
 Swaziland Progressive Association (SPA) 3206, 3747
 Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) 3206, 3747
 Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO) 3207
Sweatt v. Painter 759
- Sweden**
 anti-monarchist riots 2518
 collective action 2519
 defeated by Russia 2517
 food riots 2518
 Gustav Rebellions 1495–7
 Kalmar Union 1495–6
 lynching 2518
 neoliberalism 1151
 nuclear weapons ban 197
 police tactics 1153–4
 recession 1152
Regeringsformen 3209
 social democracy 1152, 1154
 strikes 2518
 supporting ANC 173
see also Nordic countries; Swedish Revolution (1809)
- Swedish Estates 3208
Swedish Revolution (1809) 3208–10
 Sweet and Jam Workers' Industrial Union 152, 3092
 Sweezy, Paul 1649, 1669, 2249
 Swift, Jonathan 1785, 3210
 Swift, R. 3654
 Swiney, Frances 3567
Swing Riots 655, 1041, 1090, 2720, 3211–12
 Swiss Brethren: *see* Anabaptist movement
Swiss Peasants' War 3212–13
 Sword Society 1997
 Syahrir, Sutan 1724, 1729
 Sydney
 Day of Mourning 307
 green bans movement 1456–8, 2373
 Mardi Gras 2097–8
see also Munday, Jack
 Sydney Libertarians 107
 Syed, Mufti Muhammad 1934
 Syed, Rubiya 1934
 Sylvain-Bouchereau, Madeleine 3584
- Sylvis, William H. 2025–7, 3214–15
 Symbolists 116, 2312
 Synaspismos 1449–50
syndicalism 147–55, 3215–21
 anarchism and, Southern Africa 147–55
 Britain 108, 518, 3061
 and education 3217
 France 3215–19
 Greece 3219–21
 humanistic 850
 One Big Union 1026
 South Africa 148
 Syndicalist International 870
 Syndicalist Workers' Federation (SWF) 109, 3072
Syndicaliste Révolutionnaire: see
 Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT)
- Syria**
 Baathists 353, 3221–7
 Britain 2073
 Christians 235
 in Lebanon 635–6, 2072
 Suez Crisis 3223
 UAR 1072
 Syrian Socialist National Party 2069, 3223
 Syrkin, Nahman 3742
Szabó, Ervin 1622, 2136, 3227–8
 Szálasi, Ferenc 1175
 Szalay, András 127
 Szczecin strike 3073
 Szczepkowska, Joanna 3077
 Szczesna, Joanna 3556, 3557
 Széchenyi, István 1143, 1619
 Szechwan-Chando rebellion 3291
 Szekely people 2862
 Szeto Wah 1604, 1605
 Szilard, Leo 193
 Szlajfer, Henryk 2706
 Szold, Henrietta 1917
 Szulc, T. 930, 932
- Ta Mok 1961
 Ta Thu Thau 3470
 Ta'ayush (life in common) 1815
 Tabaré 237
 Tabasco oil blockades 2288
 Tabata, I. B. 834
 Taborites 2830
TAC: see Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)
 Tachikawa USA air base 1886
 Tacho, Commandante 3713
 Tacitus 1587
 Tacky Rebellion 1263, 1871, 2790
 Tactical Combat Unit Nestor Zerpa Cartolini (UTCNZC) 3445

- Tacuarembó, Battle of 288
 Taejo, King 1996
 Taft-Hartley Act 1754
 Tagalog language 2666, 2668, 2674
Tageszeitung, Die 1317
 Tagore, Rabindranath 450, 1697, 1698, 1702, 2389, 2574
Tagore, Saumyendranath 3229–30
 Meerut Conspiracy Case 3229
 works 3229
 Taha, Fadwa A. A. 3192–5, 3196–8
 Tahiti
 Pomare IV 1272
 Tahitian battalion
 World War II 1272
 Tahupotiki Wiremu Ratana 2208
 Taif Agreement 636, 2072, 2405
 Tailors' and Upholsterers' Union 2905
 Taine, Hippolyte 1287
 Taino people 28, 1561, 2767, 3404
Taino revolt 1116–17
Taiping Rebellion 71, 3230–5, 3476, 3672
Taiwan 3235–40
 anti-imperialism 3235–7
 Chinese control 3235–7
 Dangwai candidates 2270
 Dutch control 3235–6
 February 28 protests (1947) 3236, 3239–40
 GNP 1663
 Guomindang 2270–1, 3235–7, 3238–9
 indigenous peoples 3235
 International Human Rights Day 2270
 Japanese control 2270, 3239
 land reform 3238–9
 martial law 3236
 nationalism 3235–7
 peasants 3238–9
 UN seat 2271
 Taiwan Expedition 1896
 Taiwan Garrison Command 3240
Tajikistan 3241–6, 3421
 Basmachi movement 643, 3243–4
 collectivization of agriculture 3244
 cotton growing 3244
 creation of 3241, 3243, 3421
 elections 813
 guerillas 15
 Islam 3244–5, 3246
 Jadidism 3241, 3242, 3244
 national identity 3241–2
 resistance fighters 329
 Russian Revolution 3242–3
 Taliban 3246
 Takagi, I. 1876
 Takamura Itsue 133, 3596
 Takashi, Tsumura 1904
 Take Back the Night 2411, 3629
 Takeda, Junko 962–3, 2210–12, 2311–12, 3032–4
 Takeda Rising 1898, 1899
 Takeo, Miki 1881
 Takeuchi, Aiko 2958–69
 Talbot-Williams, R. 152
 Talib, Fatima 3198
Taliban 14, 3246–8
 Talleres Ulgor 2314–15
 Talleyrand, Charles 895
taluqdars (landed intermediaries) 1687, 1703
 Talwar, Bhagat Ram 451
Tambo, Oliver 171, 172, 1940, 3203, 3248–50
 ANC 3248
 arrested 3249
 Harare Declaration 3250
 and Mandela 2190, 2194, 3248
 Tambroni, Fernando 1834
 Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)
 3251
Tamil nationalist struggle 2633, 3250–3, 3527
 Tamil Nadu politicians 2741, 3252
 Tamil New Tigers 2741, 3251
 Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) 3251
 Tammany Hall Democrats 69
 Tampere, fall of 2932
 Tampoe, Bala 2053
 Tamtakos, Yiannis 126
 Tan Chung 3234
 Tan Malaka 2249
 Tan So 3477
 Tañada, Lorenzo 2682
 Tanaka, Kakuei 192, 1724
 Tanco, Raúl 244
 Tanganyika 2532
 see also Tanzania
 Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)
 3254–5
 Tangier, Treaty of 2334
 Tangney, Dorothy 3562
Tanka uprising 2576
 Tanna island 3426
 Tannenbaum-Tamarov, Mordecai 1917
Tanzania 3253–5, 3374–5
 and ANC 173
 British rule 3254
 cotton growing 3253–4
 Frontline States 461
 Maji-Maji Revolt 3253–4
 Nyerere 3254–5
 protest and independence 3253–5
 Ujamaa socialism 2532–3, 3374–5
 see also Nyerere, Julius; Tanganyika
 Tanzimat (New Order) period 1452, 3346

- Tao Cheng-chang 733
 TAO (Transsexual/Transvestite Action Organization) 2108
 Taoists 94
 Tappan, Arthur and Lewis 215
 Tappan Massacre 85
 Tara Devi, Queen 1931
 Taranaki War 2207
 Tarasevich, William 510
 Tarcus, Horacio 253–4, 254–7, 276–8
 tariff system 1280–1
 Tariq, Farooq 2585
 Tarleton, Banastre 85
 Tárnovan, Aristid 2866
 Tarrida del Mármol, Fernando 98
 tarring and feathering 296
 Tarrow, S. G. 649, 650, 653, 2756–7, 2758, 2759, 2760–1
Társadalmi Forradalom (Social Revolution) 128
 Tartar cavalry 1074
 Taruc, Luis 1614, 1616, 2675, 2677
 Taruc, Peregrino 1616
 Taschereau Affair 404
 Tasco, Angelo 1422
 Tashkent 1710, 2874, 2919
 Tasman, Abel 1196, 2205
 Tasmania 2097
 Tata, Jamshedji 1698
 Tata-Birla Plan 2433
 Tatars 436
 Tati Company 459
 Taukei movement 2797
 Taurogen, Convention of 189
 Tavares, Josimo 482
 Tavárez Justo, Manuel A. 1014, 1018
 Tavini Huia'atira Party 1273
 Távora, Juarez 470
 Tawanka, Igñi 638
 Tawfiq, Khedive 1076, 3395
 Tax Law Opposition, Japan 1898, 1900
 taxation
 Bengal 1682
 Germany 1352–3
 Japan 1898, 1899, 1900
 non-payment 371, 1682, 1846, 3193
 peasants 1352–3
 state churches 1110
 whiskey 3524–5
 see also ATTAC (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens)
 Taxco meeting 3599
 taxi strike, Seattle 3663
 Taylor, A. J. P. 513
 Taylor, Charles 2115
 Taylor, Eric Robert 3024–7
 Taylor, F. W. 1398, 1399
 Taylor, LeRoy 1862
 Taylor, Maxwell 3481
 Taylor, Richardson 1319
 Tblisi 2510
 Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki 2207
 Te Whiti-o-Rongomai 2208
 Tea Act 77
 teach-ins 222
 Teachers' League of South Africa 2
 Teachers' Revolutionary Movement (MRM) 2298
 Teatro Campesino 1482
 Teatro Porvenir 444
tebhaga movement 1706, 1711, 1922, 2265, 2574–5
 techno-rationality, rejected 622
 Técnica, La 2597, 2598
 Tecumseh 583, 584
Tecún Umán 1474, 3255–6
 Teelucksingh, Jerome 3318–19
 Tegart, Charles 1677
 Teheran American embassy 1964
 Teheran Conference 3683
 Tejada Gómez, Armando 2377
 Tejar, Battle of 878
 Tekebaev, Omurbek 3332
 Tekkororen federation 1883
 Telangana struggle 1707, 1711, 3586
 Télé Diffusion France (TDF) 1268
 TELECOM 809
 Telefónica strike 2962
 Telephone Workers' Union (STRM) 2294
 Television 2777
 TELKOM 3099–100
 Téllez, Dora María 2469
 Telmex 2298
Telos 907
 Temaru, Oscar 1273
 temperance 168, 3233
 temperance movement, Russia 2927–8
 see also Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU)
 Temponeras, Nikos 1450, 3168
Temporary Autonomous Zone tactic 1741
 Temporary Bulgarian Representation 538
Temps, Le 402
Temps Modernes, Les 1420
Temps Nouveaux, Les 120, 1124, 2628, 3217
 Ten Hours Act 2464
 Ten Years' War, Cuba 911, 917–21, 2226, 2565
 Tenali Convention 2265, 2422
 tenant farmers 1458–60
 Tenentismo movement 466, 468–70, 2748
Tennis Court Oath 1127, 2312, 3033, 3256

- Tepos people 884
 Tequila Effect 261
 Terán, Reque 418, 420
 Terboven, Josef 2525
Tercerista (Third Way) 2469, 2564
 Teresa Lives Movement Without Work 264
 Teresa Rodriguez Movement (MTR) 264
 Terjesen, E. A. 2524
 Termination policy 2412
 terms of trade 1661
Terra Livre 3388
terra nullius doctrine 5
 Terra Preta 1211
 Territorial Movement of Liberation 264
 terror: *see* Archive of Terror, Paraguay
 terrorist attacks 280, 889, 2504, 3649
 Teruel, Battle of 3143
 Tesfaye, Aaron 1132–42
 Test Act 633, 655, 1405, 2826
 Testa, F. J. 1566
Testvériség (Fraternity) 128
 Tet offensive 818, 2260, 3168, 3483, 3493
 Teuku Umar 1720
 Texas 2726, 2824
 Texas Alliance 2725
 textile industry
 Ahmedabad 1325, 1694, 1700, 2429
 Bombay 961, 1684, 1695
 Ivanovo-Voznesensk 2891, 2898, 2905, 2907,
 2914
 Korea 1981
 Lawrence strike 502–4, 836, 1204, 2623
 strikes 1750, 1751
 women workers 1750, 1751
 Textile Workers' Union 2907
 Tha Thu Thau 2249
 Thach Chia 573
Thai Communist Party: *see* Communist Party
 of Thailand (CPT)
 Thai Labor Campaign 3275
 Thai National Trade Union Confederation
 (TNTUC) 3259
 Thai Nguyen 3466, 3472
 Thai Rak Thai (Thai Love the Thais) 3277
Thailand 3265–71, 3272–8
 AIDS 3273
 anti-communism 3259
 Assembly of the Poor 290–1
 Buddhism 3259, 3266–8, 3270
 Carter 3486
 Charusathira 659
 communism 3257–8
 coup 3277, 3278
 currency devaluation 3274
 democracy crisis 3272–3, 3276–8
 feminism 3275
 financial crisis 1430, 3273–4
 free trade zones 3274
 French 568
 IMF 3272, 3273–4
 Islam 3266, 3267, 3270
 and Laos 2054
 Marxism 3259, 3264
 migrant laborers 3273
 NGOs 3274–5
 Patani Malay nationalism 3265–71
 peasantry 3257, 3270–1, 3274
 People's Party 3257
 popular movements 3272–8
 reeducation of dissidents 3539
 revisionism 3264
 Revolution (1932) 3257
 road blockades 3274
 sex tourism 3273
 student demonstrations 2746, 3169
 and USA 1431, 3277
 World Bank 3272, 3273–4
 Thailand Social Forum 3278
 Thailmann, Ernest 1375–6
 Thakin Party 302, 555
 Thaksin Shinawatra 1431, 3268, 3276–7
 Thakur, Guruchand 956
 Thakur, Harichand 956
 Thalia Theater 2136
 Thamilchelvan, S. P. 3253
 Thammasat University protests 3261
Than Tun, Thakin 303, 555, 3278–9
thangata (bonded labor) 2173
 Thanh, Son Ngoc 569, 572, 577, 1716
 coming to power 3035
 exiled 1713
 Umbrella Revolt 1958
 Thanksgiving Day protests 2416–17, 2420
 Thanom Kittikachorn 659
 Thant Myint-U 549
 Thapa, Surya Bahadur 2443
 Thapar, Romila 955
 Thatcher, Margaret 2040
 on anti-nuclear movement 198
 Clause 28 2094
 and Haughey 2573
 hunger strikers 2967
 immigration 512, 531
 and Jamaica 2198
 Lancaster House Conference 3736
 miners' strike 422, 529
 neoliberalism 690, 1387, 1395, 1882, 2807
 poll tax 513, 1040
 privatization 3062
 protest song about 2382

- Thatcher Ferry Bridge, renamed 2593
 Thayer, Webster 2948
 Theater of Cruelty 1482
 Theater of the Absurd: *see* absurdist theater
 Theater of the Oppressed 406
Thelwall, John 1607, 3151, 3279–80
 Theodorakis, Mikis 1433, 1434
 Theodore I, of Corsica 872
 Theodosius I 2828
 Thep Jotinuchit 3259
 There Is A Limit 1814, 1815
 Thermidor 894–6, 2992
 Thermidorean Convention 895
 Thermidoreans 328, 2847
 Thésée, Lucie 2428
 Thet Kywe 553
 Thibedi, T. W. 150, 152, 154, 349, 832, 833, 1414, 3092, 3093
 Thierry, Albert 3216
 Thierry, Augustin 2953
 Thiers, Adolphe 1230, 1323, 2610, 2612
 Thimmel, Stefan 237, 1497, 2134–5, 3004–5, 3339–41
 Thiounn 567
 Third Estate 2311–12, 3256
 Third National Conference of the Commission on the Status of Women 2410
 Third Party Congress, Bolsheviks 437–8
 Third Way 322, 1395, 1913
 Third Worldism 1395, 1669, 1670, 1773
 Thirty-Nine Articles 1092, 1096
 Thirty Years' War 1034, 1046, 1110, 1358
 France 1303
 Spain 1847
 Switzerland 3212
Thistlewood, Arthur 3280–1
 Thloome, Dan 3107
 Tholoniati, Yann 401–2
 Thomas, Hugh 918
 Thomas, J. J.: *Fraudacity* 3316
 Thomas, John 3499
 Thomas, Norman 596, 1756, 3065
 Thomášek, Johann 1620
Thompson, Edward Palmer 3281–4
 Beyond the Frontier 3283
 on Blake 401, 3283
 and brother, Frank 3282, 3283
 class 769–70, 773
 CND 190, 513
 Combination Laws 819
 Customs in Common 3283
 experience concept 252
 Karl Marx's Theory of History 770
 on Luddites 144, 2133–4
 Making of the English Working Class, The 993, 2133–4, 3282
 Marxism 2249
 nuclear disarmament 3283
 Out of Apathy 3282
 on riots 1207–8
 William Morris 3282
 and Williams 3282
 Thompson, Lyn 308
 Thompson, Michael J. 2131–2, 3284–9
 Thompson, Thomas Perronet 210
 Thompson, William 1102
 Thompson, William Hale 2823
 Thomson, Charles 566
 Thoreau, Henry David 156, 652, 761, 1305
 non-violence 2491, 2492
 Thorez, Maurice 824, 825
 Thornton, Henry 210
 Thornton, John 1263
 Thornton, Merle 3563
Thousand Days' War, Colombia 806–7, 2045
 Thrace 1453, 1454
 Thrane, Marcus 2518, 2523
 Thranites 2523, 2524
 Three Electric Utility Laws 192
 Three Kings, Battle of 2333
 Three Mile Island 1, 192
 threshing machines, destroyed 1040, 3211–12
 Thuku, Harry 3545–6
Thuriya (Sun) 2977
 Thurston, J. B. 1196
 Thurston, Lorrin A. 1564–5
ti legliz (little church) movement 279, 1519
Tiananmen Square 3284–9, 3289–90
 annual vigils 3652
 demonstration (1919) 719–20
 demonstration (1989) 721, 987, 2509, 3181, 3284–9
Tibet
 Buddhism 2496, 3293
 China 2433, 2435
 CIA 3292
 religion and protest 2496
 uprising and resistance 3290–3
 Tientsin, Treaty of 3232
 Tickers 2070
 Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) 1138, 1139
 Tigrayans 1133
 Tigre, Le 2845
 Tikhvinsky, S. L. 3233
 Tilak, Bal Gangadhar 1674, 1682, 1696, 1699
 Till, Emmett 651, 761, 762, 1155

- Tilly, Charles 647, 778–9, 783, 1213, 1215, 2490, 2590, 2757, 2760
- Tilly, L. A. 1208
- Tilsit, Treaty of 442, 486, 3209
- Tilton, Elizabeth 3622
- Time* 617, 820, 1902, 1973, 3167, 3493
- Times, The* 178, 510, 2617, 2720, 3235
- Timor 1042, 1045
- Timoté, Eutiquio 2045
- Timur Shah 1029
- tin mining 425–6, 432
- Tio, El 426
- Tipu the Garos 371–2
- Tiradentes 485
- Tirado, Victor 2469
- Tirelli, Vincent 3187–9
- Tirofino 1168
- Tishiwa 703
- Tiso, Josef** 1596, 3293–4
- Tisquesuza** 3294–5
- Tisse, Edouard 1080
- Tisza, Kálmán 1621
- Tito, Josip Broz** 3295–6
coming to power 3683
CPY 3691
dictatorship 3063
Dimitrov 31, 339
and Djilas 1011
and Khrushchev 3691
non-alignment 3688
PCI 621
on *Praxis* 3690
and Stalin 339, 3296
student protests 3692
Third Way socialism 950
- Tito Winyi 3371
- Tiutiukin, S. V. 2227, 2694
- Tjibaou, Jean-Marie 2458
- Tkachev, Pètr 976
- Tlatelolco 1968 massacre** 2298, 3169, 3180, 3296–8
- tobacco industry 75, 2666–7
- Tobacco Workers' Union 3034
- Tobago: *see* Trinidad and Tobago
- Tobago Independence movement 3532
- Tobias de Aguiar, Rafael 493
- Tobin, Dan 3414
- Tobin, James 298
- Tobin tax 298, 3656
- Tocqueville, Alexis de 1234, 1279, 2044
- Tocsin* 106, 2172
- toddy tax 2802
- Todmorden textile mill 2720
- Todorov, Todor 538–9
- Toekes, Laszlo 2859
- Toer, Pramoedya Ananta 1725, 1728
- Togliatti, Palmiro** 998, 1384, 1422, 1842, 3298–9
PCI 1819, 1833, 1834
polycentrism 2699
- Toivo ya Toivo, Andimba** 2530, 3202, 3300
- Tojo, Hideki 451, 1679, 1887
- Tokoi, Oskari 1201
- Tokugawa era 133, 1896
- Tokyo
Chinese radicals 113
earthquake 1848, 2566
Natural Justice 113
street car strike 1898
- Tokyo Electric Power Company 191, 192
- Tokyo Printers' Union 134
- Tolain, Henri 2765
- Tolbert, William 2114–15
- Toledo, Francisco de 3336
- Toledo Auto-Lite workers 2035, 3412–13
- Toleration Act 1406
- Toller, Ernst 116, 1193
- Töller, Inga 2592–3, 3304–5
- Tolpuddle Martyrs** 656, 3300–1
- Tolstoy, Leo N.** 99, 634, 2323, 3301–2
as influence 140
non-violence 2491, 2492
works 3301–2
- Tolstoy Farm 1324
- Tom, Ateke 2485
- Tomek, Beverly 206–9, 941–2, 3504, 3514–15
- Tomic, Radomiro 50
- Tomsky, Mikhail 535, 3159
- Ton That Thuyet 3477, 3478
- Tone, Theobald Wolfe** 3302–3
on Catholic peasantry 1790
conspiracy writings 1787
Directory 2545
and French Revolution 1786, 1793
Great Rebellion 633, 1790, 1793
as martyr 1795
and Napper Tandy 2402
United Irishmen 1800, 2545, 3392
- Tongogara, Josiah 3740
- Tonkin 2054, 3468, 3469, 3476, 3477–8
- Tonkin Gulf Resolution 220
- tontons macoutes* 278–9, 1503, 1504, 1505, 1506, 1507, 1518
- Tonypandy Riots 518
- Toomer, Jean 1555
- Topi, Tantia 1689, 1690
- Topolobampo 2454
- Toptani, Essad Pasha 36
- Torch Operation 1240, 2336
- Torchon Brûle, Le* (Burning Rag) 3576

- Toro, David 427–8
 Torogoces de Morazán, Los 639
 Toronto 2562
Torpille, La 110
 Torre Santos, Jorge 1821–4
 Torrence, Jason 1039, 1040
 Torres, Eloy 3442, 3445, 3451
 Torres, Elpidio 868
 Torres, Juan José 418–19, 420
 Torres Apablaza, Iván 1226–7
Torres Restrepo, Camilo 414, 1081–2, 2059, 2061, 3303–4
 Torrijos, Martín 3305
 Torrijos–Carter Treaty 2594
Torrijos Herrera, Omar 414, 2594, 3304–5
 torture
 Algeria 1022
 Alleg 226
 Argentina 1427–8
 Chile 688
 CIA 2597–8
 Codigo Negro 1269
 Greece 1433, 1439
 Ireland 1794
 Philippines 2684
Tory rebellion, Ireland 1046, 3305–6
 Toscano, Joe 108
 Tosco, Agustín 866, 868
 Tosta Carrasco, Vicente 2019
 totalitarianism 1175
 Arendt against 242
 Chen on 676
 GDR 1337
 Germany 1590–1
 Havel on 1563
 Lenin 2089
 Nazism 1917
 Stalin 3511
 Tou Samouth 569, 570, 1959
 Touareg peoples 2181, 2182
 Touraine, A. 3078
 Touré, Amadou Tournani 2182
 Touré, Samory 883
 Touré, Sékou 1252, 2488, 3545
 Tours, Congress of 823
 Toussaint, Michael F. 3314–18, 3319–21
Toussaint Louverture 1522, 2428, 3306–12
 Bonaparte 1265–6, 1523
 and Christophe 1511
 compared with Spartacus 3145
 and Dessalines 995, 1264–5
 Haitian Revolution 89, 1533, 1534–7
 and Jean-Baptiste 2552
 racial egalitarianism 1265
 Sonthonax 2554, 3307, 3311
 Towers, Dorothy (later Thompson) 3282
 Townsend movement 782
 Townshend Revenue Act 77, 452
 Townsville Peace Agreement 3081
 toxic waste 1053
 Toxteth riots 511
 Toynbee Hall 11
 TPAJAX 1765
 Trade Dispute Bill 3042
 Trade and Labor Union (Prohibition) Ordinance 2077
 Trade and Transit Treaty 2442
 Trade Union Act (1871) 519, 2819
 Trade Union Act (1984) 3062
 Trade Union Advisory Coordinating Council (TUACC) 3095
 Trade Union Congress: *see* Trades Union Congress (TUC)
 Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) 3094, 3095, 3097
 Trade Union Educational League (TUEL) 836, 1220, 2034
 Trade Union Law, Japan 1898
 Trade Union Law, Turkey 3364
 Trade Union Unity League 2034
trade unions 519–26, 808–10, 1821–4, 3720–1
 Australia 312–13
 Britain 510, 519–26
 Colombia 808–10
 Combination Laws 818–19
 Germany 1365
 Italy 1821–4
 Japan 1875–8, 3720–1
 Kenya 3042
 legality of 819
 reform groups 2021
 South Africa 3084–5, 3090–2, 3095
 see also Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)
 Trade Unions Act, Canada 587, 588
 Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining Law 2708
 Trades Disputes Act 520
 Trades and Labor Councils 313
 Trades Union Congress (TUC) 519, 520
 Trafalgar, Battle of 442, 486
 Trafalgar Square demonstration 190, 405–6
 Trail of Broken Treaties 40, 2414, 2629
 Train, George 169
 Train Apartheid Resistance Committee 834
Tramontana, La 145
 Tran Cao Van 3466
 Tran Duc Thao 3479
 Trân Van Giau 1715, 1716, 3472
 Trân Van Tra 3485

- Tranquillity Act 1966
 transcendence/immanence 980–1
 Transcendentalists 761, 1222–3, 1305
 Transform Columbus Day Alliance (TCDA) 2416
 transgender activism 2108
 transnationalism 135
 Transport Workers' Union (TWU) 838
 Transsexual Counseling Unit 2108
 transubstantiation, doctrine of 1356
 Transvaal Federation of Trade Unions 3091
 Transvaal Miners' Association 3091
 Transvaal Native Congress 152
 Transylvania 2857, 2858, 2862–3, 2865
 Transylvanian School 2863
 Trapnel, Anna 1194–5
 Traugutt, Romuald 2704
 Trautmann, William E. 1735
Travail, Le 3492
Travailleur/The Worker 110
 Travancore struggles 1707
 Traveso, Trinidad 578
 Travis, Hark 2408, 2409
 Travis, Joseph 2408
 Treason Trials 172, 3087, 3103
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) 3113, 3312–13
 Treblinka camp 3512
 tree spiking 1039, 1054
 Trejo, R. 2162
 Trent, Evelyn 2874
 Trentin, Silvio 1384
 Trepov, Fyodor F. 3719
 Tresca, Carlo 131, 158, 2032, 2033
 trespass as protest 1119
 Trespass on Commonwealth Lands Ordinance 310
 Tretiakov, Sergei 1080
 Treugol'nik Rubber Factory 2931
Triangle Shirtwaist fire protests 3313–14
 Trianon, Treaty of 1622
 Tribhuvan, of Nepal 2442
Tribune 1340, 3279
Tribune of the People 328
 Tribunisten 2446
 Triennial Act 1097
 Trier, Gerson 990
 Trikoupis, Charilaos 3220
Trinidad and Tobago 3314–21, 3531–2
 anti-colonial movement 3314–18
 British rule 3315–17
 Butler Riots 3316, 3318–19
 Carnival 611, 612
 IMF loans 608–9
 indentured servants 3318
 independence 3317–18
 labor protests 3318–19
 oil workers 1866
 parliamentary crisis 3319–21
 self-help groups 3558
 sugar 2076, 3318–19
 US base 3317
 Water Riots 3316, 3318
 waterfront strike 3316
 Williams 3317, 3320, 3531–2
 World War I 3316
Trinidad Workingmen's Association (TWA) 3316, 3318
 Trinitario movement 1015
 Tripartite Alliance 3098
 Tripartite Union (Syria–Iraq) 3225
Triple Alliance: see Paraguay, Triple Alliance
 Triple Alliance (Alianza Anti-comunista Argentina) 273, 1580
 Triple Alliance, War of 493, 494, 2452
 Triple Entente 2890
 Triple Industrial Alliance 2821
 Tripuri Congress 2432
 Tristán, Flora 3610
 Troaré, Moussa 2182
 Trocchi, Alexander 3044
 Trolle, Gustav 1495
 Tronti, Mario 323, 1836, 1842, 1843
 Troops Out Now Coalition (TONC) 229
 Tropical Federation 2320
 Tropicalia 2378
Tropiques 2428
 Trotha, Lothar von 2392–3
Trotsky, Leon 3321–7
 American followers 2035
 and Balkans 337
 Bolsheviks 437, 439, 3323
 bureaucracy 3324–5
 Chen 675
 coalition government 2905
 Communist International 596
 counterrevolution 3116
 in exile 2894
 February Revolution 2894, 2901
 Fourth International 2250
 History of the Russian Revolution 276, 3322
 influence in Bolivia 427, 430
 influence on James 1874
 influence in Vietnam 3469
 on Jack London 2128
 Jewish origins 1920
 Kronstadt Mutiny 2003, 2005
 and Lenin 2244–5, 3158
 Leninist philosophy 2003, 2089
 Loewenheim 1380

- Trotsky, Leon** (*cont'd*)
 maximalist position 2894
 on Mensheviks/Bolsheviks 2888–9, 3323
 and Nin 2486
 October Revolution 439
 on Paris Commune 2613
 permanent revolution 2083, 2247, 3323–6
 Petrograd soviet 2916, 2919
 and Qu 2782
Results and Prospects 2888
 St. Petersburg 2885
 and Serge 3013
 socialism 3322
 on Soviet system 3115, 3128
 against Stalin 3059, 3115, 3324
 Tilly on 2760
 and Togliatti 3298
 uneven/combined development 773, 1666–8
 Vanguard party 3425
 war/revolution 424, 2901
 and Well 2046
 women's rights 3608
 workers' democracy 3326
- Trotskyism**
 Argentina 272
 Australia 317
 CPSA 272, 833
 Italy 2165
 USA 595–7
- Trott, Ben 1386–91, 1395–404
 Trovoada, Miguel 2972
 Trubnikova, Maria 3067, 3390
 Trudeau, Pierre 584, 592, 2197, 2783–4, 2787
 Trudoviks 2886, 2892, 2895, 3551
 True Path Party 3344
 True Whig Party 2114
trujillismo 1017
 Trujillo, Rafael Leónidas 933, 1013, 1014, 1017, 1217
 Trujillo revolt 48
 Truman, Harry 758, 2769, 2770
 Truman Doctrine 838, 1438, 1445
 Trumbo, Dalton 3150
 Trump, Eric Frederick 1945–6
 Trumpbour, John 1458–60
 Truong Chinh 1600, 1714, 2065, 2066, 3472, 3479, 3480, 3492
 Truong Cong Dinh 3475
 Truong Dinh Dzu 3482
Truth, Sojourner 215, 3327
 Truth Commission on El Salvador 2959
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Peru 2363, 2646
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South Africa 2195
- Tsai Yuan-pei 733
 Tsaldaris, Constantinos 1438, 1445
 Tsang, John 3651
 Tsankov, Alexander 541
 Tschombé, Moïse 3522
 Tshisekedi, Etienne 852, 853
 Tshombe, Moïse 854, 855, 856, 2138
 Tsikouris, George 1433
 Tsiranana, Philibert 1250, 2157
 Tsoebebe, Archie 459, 460
 Tsolakoglou, Georgios 1436
 Tsou Jung 733
 Tsuji, Teruyuki 1497–502
 Tsumeb copper mines 3204
 Tsvangirai, Morgan 2364–5, 3731, 3732
 Tu Duc 2663, 3476
Tubman, Harriet 3047, 3327–8
 Tubman, William V. S. 2114
 Tucapel, Battle of 2064
 Tucker, Benjamin 97, 106, 157, 2007, 2155, 3159–60
 Tucker, Corin 2845
 Tucker, Josiah 508
 Tucker, Marge 307
 Tucker, Robert C. 3158
 Tudeh Party (Communist Party of Iran) 1763, 1765, 1769, 1773, 2343
 Tудjman, Franjo 224
 Tudu, Munshi 2422
 Tuileries uprising 962
 Tuka, Vojtech 3293–4
 Tuke, Mabel 2596
 Tukhachevsky, Mikhail 2005
 Tulagi, ruined 3081
Tulane Drama Review 1482
 Tularam, Rao 1690
Tulip Revolution 811, 813, 2511, 3021, 3328–34
 Tulsa riot 17
 Tung Meng Hui (Revolutionary Brotherhood) 734, 735, 3201
- Tunisia**
 French rule 1247–8
 independence movement 3335–6
 NLA 1247
 as protectorate 42
 protests under Ottoman (Bey) rule 3334
Tunisien, Le 3335
 Tunublá, Floro 804
 Tuol Sleng center 574
 Túpac, Sayri 3336
Túpac Amaru 2362, 3336–7
Túpac Amaru Rebellion II 2362, 3337–9
Túpac Katari 789, 3339
 Túpac Katari Indian Movement (MITKA) 1937, 1938

- Túpac Katari Revolutionary Movement (MRTK) 1937
- Tupamaros** 1491, 2149, 2815, 3004, **3339–41**, 3405, 3408, 3445
- Tür, Özlem 3342–6, 3346–50, 3350–4, 3359–65
- Turajonzoda, Qazi-kalon 3245
- Turati, Filippo** 1818, 1828, 2009, 2871, 2959, 3013, **3341–2**
- Turbay, Gabriel 408
- Turbay Ayala, Julio César 2149
- Turbay Cote, Rodrigo 797
- Turco-Napolitano law 1830
- Turè, Kwame:** *see* Carmichael, Stokely
- Turgenev, Ivan 678
- Turgot, A. R. J. 846, 2842
- Turgot, Jacques 1114, 1280
- Turin 1835, 1843
- Türk-Iş* 3344, 3345, 3352
- Türk İş Workers' Union 3364
- Türk İsci Partisi (TWP) 3351
- Turkestan 643, 1029
- Turkey** **3342–6**, **3346–50**, **3350–4**, **3359–65**
 agriculture 3343, 3362
 alphabets 294, 3361
 anti-secular protest **3342–6**
 civil liberties 3350–1
 coal mines 3352
 coalition government 3344–5
 coup 3350
 debt 3360
 economic liberalization 3343
 European Union 3345
 gender issues 3348
 GNP 3353
 and Greece 1441, 3349, 3355
 IMF 3344, 3354
 import-substitution 3351
 Islam 3342, 3344
 Land Distribution Law 3364
 Land Reform Law 3363
 language 3361
 Liberation War 3355–6
 Marshall Plan 3365
 modernization 3359
 multi-party politics 3346, 3363–5
 Ottoman empire 3346–8
 protest and revolution **3346–50**, **3359–65**
 rebellions **3354–9**
 Saturday Mothers 3344
 Spring Demonstrations 3343
 Sunni Muslims 3354
 Tanzimat (New Order) period 1452, 3346
 War of Independence 3348–50
 workers' movements 3345, 3353
 working-class protest **3350–4**
 World War I 3348–50, 3355
 World War II 3362–3
see also Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal
- Turki, Daoud 1812
- Turkish Cypriots 1455
- Turkish embassies, occupied 280–1
- Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) 3349, 3356
- Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSIAD) 3353
- Turkish-Islamic synthesis (TIS) 3342
- Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) 946
- Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic 3366
- Turkmenistan** **3365–8**, 3421
 independence 3367–8
 Jadidism 3365, 3366
 Latin alphabet 3367
 Qur'an law 3367
 women's roles 3367, 3368
- Turnbull, Clive 2044
- Turner, Brian 2599–601, 2601–3, 2603–8, 2608–10
- Turner, Christina 2596–8, 2599–601, 2601–3, 2603–8, 2608–10
- Turner, Henry McNeal 393
- Turner, Ian 2044
- Turner, John 108
- Turner, Nat 71, 89, 214, 1334, 3504
see also Nat Turner Rebellion
- Turner, R. H. 776, 779
- Turner, William 465
- Tuscaloosa 18
- Tuscarora War 75, 2412
- Tute Bianche** **1006–10**, 1307, 1308, 1392, 1393, 1830
- Tutela Legal* 2060
- Tutsi rebels 852
- Tutu, Desmond 2194, 2503
- Twenty-One Demands, Japan 185, 719
- 21 Party 552
- 26th of July Movement (J-26-M) 624, 625, 626, 916, 924, 928, 929, 930
 and Communist Party 934
 factions 929, 930–1
Granma 1486
 Ojeda Ríos 2843–4
- Twickel, Christoph 603–5, 664–8
- Two Acts 3394
- Twyford Down 1040, 1054, 2807
- Tygodnik Mazowsze* (Regional Weekly) 3075, 3556, 3557, 3558
- Tyler, C. B. 150
- Tyndale, William 514, 1092, 3000
- Tyrkova, Ariadna 3390, 3551
- Tyrone's Rebellion 1805

- Tyssowski, Jan Józef 2701
 Tzara, Tristan 953
 Tzimas, Andreas 1437
 Tzu Hsi, Empress Dowager 718, 734, 3201
- U-Thant 1019
 Ubico Casteñeda, Jorge 240, 1472, 1475, 3180
 Udom Srisuwan 3258
- Uganda**
 anti-colonialism protests 3369–73
 as British protectorate 3371–2
 Kabaka's Protest 3546
 Ndaiga Settlement Scheme 3372
 Uganda People Congress 3372
 Uganda People's Defense Force 859
 Uhl, Petr 3175
 Uhrig, Robert 1377
- Uhuru movement** 3373–4
- UIZENSEN 1877
- Ujamaa* villages 2532–3, 3374–5
- Ukraine** 1957–8, 3375–8
 dictatorship 2938
 ethnic mix 3378
 independence 1418, 2919
 Jewish people 1958
 Khmelnytsky Uprising 1957–8
 NGOs 814
 Orange Revolution 811, 812, 814, 815, 817,
 2510, 3011, 3021, 3329, 3375–8
 Polish invasion 3507, 3508
 starvation 1182
- ulama* 1326, 1963, 2505
- Ulate Blanco, Otilio 878, 879
- Ulbricht, Walter 1338, 1339, 1340, 1341
- Ulema* (religious scholars) 3356
- Ulivo 1307
- Ullrich, Jan 411–12, 878–80, 3455–9
- Ulotrichian Universal Union (UUU) 2077
- Ulrich, Nicole 26–7, 2222–3, 2264–5, 2801–2,
 3039–40, 3090–9
- Ulrichs, Karl Heinrich 2101–2
- Ulster**
 collective punishment 1794
 composition of 1796
 Cromwell 909
 Great Rebellion 1794
 Home Rule 783
 martial law 1793–4
 Presbyterians 1045, 1790
 set up 3044
 Steelboys 1785
 Tory rebellion 3305
- Ulster Constitution Defense Committee (UCDC)
 2572
- Ulster Unionist Covenant 1045
- Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 1047, 1797, 2573
- Ulster Workers' Council 2572
- ULTAB-Brazil:** *see* União dos Lavradores e
 Trabalhadores Agrícolas do Brasil
 (ULTAB-Brazil)
- ultra-imperialism 1316, 1653
- Ultramontanism 2841
- Ulufa'alu, Bartholomew 3081
- Uluji Ali 3334
- Ulyanov, Aleksandr 978, 2081
- Ulyanov, Vladimir Ilyich: *see* Lenin, V. I.
- Um Nyobe, Reuben 579, 580
- Umanità Nova* (New Humanity) 130
- 'Umar 234
- 'Umar Fāruk 3356
- Umberto I, of Italy 130, 1419, 2170
- Umberto II, of Italy 3298
- Umbrella Revolt 568, 1713, 1958
- Umkhonto We Sizwe* (MK) 172, 2193, 2222,
 2346, 3087, 3094, 3104, 3105, 3249
- Umm Diwaykarat, Battle of 2165
- Umma (Nation) Party 3708, 3709, 3191, 3194
- Umphrey, George W. 2312
- Umsebenzi* 455, 3106
- Una* 3621
- UNAM strike** 3297, 3378–9
- Uncia Massacre 426–7
- underclass 772
- underdevelopment 1655, 1660, 1665–6
- Underground Railroad** 90, 156, 212, 216,
 2491, 3046–8, 3327–8
- Underhill Convention 1869
- UNEF-Strasbourg 3045
- Unemployed Brigade 365
- Unemployed Leagues 837, 3386, 3412
- unemployed protests** 3379–88
 Argentina 261–3
 Bonus Army Unemployed Movement (1932)
 445–6, 2489
 collective action 781
 Coxey's Army 898–9
- Unemployed Workers' Council (UWC) 1860–1
- Unemployed Workers' Movements 264
- unemployment
 class struggle 3385
 Comintern 3383
 Great Depression 837, 2831, 3379–80
 hidden 3381
 suicide and 3382–3
see also individual countries
- Unemployment Assistance Boards 525, 3384
- unemployment benefit 3380, 3381
- UNESCO
 Bangla language 2578
 International Language Day 2578

- Menchú 2272
 Nicaraguan literacy 2471
 Oral Intangible Patrimony of Humanity 1939
 protected sites 3254
 Ungar, Molly Pulver 2562–4
Ungdomshuset 1741
 Unger, Brian 1089–90
 União Africano 2355
 União Democrática Timorense (UDT) 1042
**União dos Lavradores e Trabalhadores
 Agrícolas do Brasil (ULTAB-Brazil)**
 3039, 3388
 União Nacional para a Independência Total de
 Angola (UNITA) 164
 Uariate Church 2712
 Unidad Acción Sindical Popular (UASP) 1477
 Unidad Popular (UP) 112, 678, 680, 683, 693
 Unidade Sindical 498
 Unidades Táticas de Combate (UTC) 3442
 UNIFEM 3633
 Unification Day, Romania 2856
 Unification Socialist Party, Korea 1926
 Unified General Confederation of Greek Workers
 (EGSEE) 1442
 Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) 1165
 Unified Socialist Party of Algeria, (PSU) 47
 Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM) 2291
 Unified Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)
 674, 3443, 3446, 3447–8
 Uniform Civil Code (UCC) 1584, 1693, 3586,
 3589–90
 Uniformity Act 516, 633, 1092
 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)
 3730, 3735
 Union, Act of (Canada) 594
 Union, Act of (Ireland) 1045, 1789, 1796, 2043,
 2544, 2616
 repeal movement 2043, 2544
 Union, Peasant, Social, Indigenous, and Popular
 Front (FSCISP) 2294
 Union to Advance (UPA), Mexico 3437
 Union for the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA) 45
 Union Anarchiste (UA) 121
 Union Anarchiste Communiste Révolutionnaire
 121
 Union of Australian Women 3563
 Union Calédonienne 2457, 2459
 Union Carbide 3590
 Union of the Center 1445
 União Cívica Radical (UCR) 243, 271, 273, 277,
 2640
 União Cívica Radical Intransigente (Intransigent
 Radical Civic Union) 2640
 Union of Democratic Forces 3068–9
 Union of the Democratic Left (EDA) 1432, 1445
 Unión Democrática, Argentina 271
 Unión Democrática Nacionalista (UDN) 1164
 Union Démocratique pour la Défense des Intérêts
 Africains (UDDIA) 854
 Union Federation of Mining Workers of Bolivia
 (FSTMB) 422, 426, 429, 430, 1938
 Union des Femmes 2612
 Union General de Trabajadores (UGT) 102,
 145, 181, 266, 848, 3130, 3137
 Union Générale de l'Agriculture Tunisienne
 (UGAT) 1248
 Union Générale des Travailleurs de Côte d'Ivoire
 (UGTCI) 880
 Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens
 (UGTT) 1248
 Union of Great Britain and Ireland Act 1789
 Unión Gremial Femenina 3597
 Union of Guiana's People (UPG) 1271
 Union League 2799
 Union of Liberation, Russia 3550–1
 Union Minière 855
 Union of Moderate Parties (UMP) 3426
 Union Movement 2526
**Unión Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria
 (UNIR) 1320–1**
 Unión Nacionalista 915
 Union Nationale Party 2783
 Union Obrera Democrática (UOD) 2672
 Unión Obrera Metalúrgica (UOM) 249, 251, 864
Unión Patriótica (UP) 808, 1121, 2063, 3388–9
 Union Patriotique 3584
 Union of Peoples of Angola (UPA) 164
 Union of Poor Guadeloupean Peasants (UPG)
 1470
 Union of Popular Democracy (ELD) 1436, 1444
 Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) 645
 Union des Populations du Cameroon (UPC)
 579, 1251
 Union of Post and Telegraph Workers 2882
 Union and Progress government 283
 Unión Republicana Democrática (URD) 3442,
 3450
 Union of Russian People 2882, 2921, 2926
 Union of Russian Workers 2589
 Union of School Teachers 3552
 Unión Sindical de Trabajadores del Magdalena
 (USTM) 343
 Union of Socialistic Youth (SSM) 3175–6
 Union of South American Nations (UNASUR)
 871
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 2085, 3160,
 3162
 see also Soviet Union
 Union des Syndicats Confédérés du Cameroon
 (USCC) 579

- Union of Textile Workers 3553
 Unión de Trabajadores Azucareros de Artigas (UTAA) 3004
 Union des Travailleurs Agricoles (UTA) 1470
 Union of Unions 2880, 3551
 Union of University Students (UUS), Czechoslovakia 3174
Union for Women's Equality 3389–90
 Union of Workers and Shareholders of Serbia 3687
 Union of Young Communists (UJC) 936
 Unione Anarchica Italiana (UAI) 385, 2169
Unione Donne Italiane (UDI) 3593
Unione Femminile 3592
 Unione Italiana dei Lavoratori (UIL) 998, 1835
 Unione Italiana del Lavoro (UIdL) 1822
 Unione Sindacale Italiana (USI) 130, 1822, 3015
Unionism, Northern Ireland 2571–3
UNIR: *see* Unión Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria (UNIR)
Unità, L' 1422, 2960
 Unitarian Grassroots Committee (CUB) 1837, 1838
 Unitary Home 156
Unitas Fratrum (United Brethren) 2830
 United African Welfare Association (UAWA) 3697
 United American Indians of New England (UAINE) 2417
 United Arab Republic (UAR) 1072, 1781, 2068, 3223
 United Auto Workers (UAW) 589, 1876, 1974, 2066, 2494–5
 United Black Association for Development (UBAD) 366, 1634
 United Brethren 2323
United Britons 3390–2
 United Brothers 348
 United Communist Party of Germany (VKPD) 1942
 United Communist Party of India 961–2
 United Communist Party (UCP) 836
 United Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) 1937, 1938
 United Democratic Front (UDF) 174, 874, 3084, 3088, 3096, 3249
 United Democratic Party 366, 2442
 United Development Party (PPP) 1722, 1725
 United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (UE) 3627
United Englishmen 3390–2
United Farm Workers 660–4, 1170, 1609
 United Farm Workers of America (UFWA) 2499
 United Farmers of Canada 2975
 United Federal Party (UFP) 2961
 United Front (FU), Sri Lanka 1081, 2632
 United Front of Revolutionary Action (FUAR) 800, 1163
 United Front for Sudan Liberation 3195
 United Front for Women's Rights (FUPDM) 3597
 United Fruit Company
 Ecuador 1065
 Guatemala 1472, 1473, 1475, 1485
 Honduras 1603, 2018
 Jamaica 1866
 land nationalized 1217
 strikes 240, 343, 805
 United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) 2488
United Ireland 2617
 United Irish Society 994, 1088, 3390
 banned 3393
 and French Revolution 1792–3, 3393
 Great Rebellion 1786–7, 1795–6
 leadership in exile 1796
 Tone 2546, 3392
United Irishmen 633, 993, 994, 1786, 1791, 3392–4
 French support 1793
 Muir 2366
 O'Connor 2545, 2546
 social equality 1792
 transported to Australia 3490–1
 and Young Ireland 3680
 United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and the Algarve 486–7
 United Labor Front (ULF), Trinidad 3319
 United Left, Greece 1447
 United Left Front, Nepal 2437
 United Mine Workers (UMW) 2035–6, 2344, 3411–12
 United National Congress (UNC), Trinidad 3320
 United National Front, Lebanon 2069
 United National Independence Party (UNIP) 696, 3111, 3699, 3700–3
 United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) 1758
 United National Liberation Front (FULNA) 2605
 United National Party (UNP), Sri Lanka 1495, 2052, 2633, 3526
 United Nations
 anti-terrorism 1401
 Castro at General Assembly 626
 Congo Crisis 855, 857
 formation of 2497
 human rights protocol 654
 Namibia 2530

- Six Nations 584
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights 959, 2497, 3563
- United Nations Charter on Human Rights 1861
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) 2471, 3111
- United Nations Commission on the Status of Women 2625
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 311, 2319
- United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 283
- United Nations Decade for Women 3547, 3559, 3560
- United Nations Decolonization Committee 2771
- United Nations Development Program 1431, 3111
- United Nations Economic Commission on Africa 3111
- United Nations General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord 3246
- United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 626, 2359, 2398
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 37, 796, 3246
- United Nations International Conference on Population and Development 2969
- United Nations Millennium Development Goals 1671
- United Nations Organization in the Congo (UNOC) 855, 857
- United Nations Security Council
 - Congo 859
 - Guatemala 240–1
 - Kashmir 1931
 - Resolution 1244 38
 - Resolution 1559 636
- United Nations Subcommission for Human Rights 284
- United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 1045
- United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) 21, 756, 837, 1024, 1336, 1634, 3558
- United Norwegian Labor Association 2524
- United Opposition 3159
- United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA) 839, 3627
- United for Peace and Justice 227, 229, 2504
- United People's Front (SJM) 2438
- United People's Movement (MPU) 2469
- United Popular Action Front (FAPU) 1164
- United Progressive Party (UPP) 2703
- United Provinces, India 2794
- United Provinces of the Netherlands 1034, 2444–5
- United Representation of the Guatemalan Opposition (RUOG) 2272
- United Rhodesia Party Congress (URP) 2961
- United Scotsmen** 3391, 3394–5
- United Self-Defense (AUC) 796, 798
- United Socialist Front (USF) 3262
- United Socialist Party, Italy 2871, 3342
- United Socialist Party, South Africa 149
- United States Colored Troops 68
- United States of America**
 - anarchism 154–60
 - Angola 164–5
 - anti-slavery movement 211–18
 - anti-Vietnam War movement 219–23, 3482–3
 - Archive of Terror 2597–8
 - ATTAC 297–301
 - birth control movement 2968–9
 - civil rights 739–49
 - cooperatives 2725–6, 3041, 3215 and Cuban sugar industry 926
 - Environmental Protection Agency 617, 2418
 - environmental protest 1117–21
 - European immigrants 3620
 - exclusion laws 185
 - Food Not Bombs 159, 161, 1206–7
 - foreign intervention 1218–19
 - Guatemalan Human Rights Commission 1481
 - Haiti 1504, 1509, 1515, 1538
 - imperialism 1660, 1663, 1664
 - Iraq invasion 1401, 1664, 1672, 1783, 2504
 - labor rebellions 3411–15
 - labor revolutionary currents 2020–31, 2031–8
 - LGBT 2106–9
 - Marxism 2249
 - May Day 2258–9, 2295
 - Mexican immigrants 2295
 - missionary work 2058
 - non-interventionists 2488–90
 - non-violence 2498–500
 - Office of Strategic Services 1598, 1715
 - population:consumption of resources 1654
 - Reconstruction 755, 2027, 2798–801
 - Red Summer 22, 2822–4
 - Russian Jewish immigrants 1746
 - slave rebellions 88–90, 2407
 - student movement 3169–70
 - Thailand 1431, 3277
 - Trotskyism 595–7
 - Underground Railroad 90, 156, 212, 216, 2491, 3046–8, 3327–8
 - unemployment 3380, 3381–2
 - urban rebellions 3396–404
 - War on Drugs 788

- United States of America** (*cont'd*)
 women in public life 214
 women's movement 3612–30
see also American entries; US entries; utopian communities
- United Steelworkers of America 3662
 United Tajik Opposition 3245
 United Tanganyika Party (UTP) 3095, 3254
 United Textile Workers (UTW) 3412
 Unity and Peace Party 3068
 Unity and Struggle 348
 Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) 1640
 Universal Benevolent Association (UBA) 2077
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 959, 2497, 3563
 Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) 21, 22, 392, 1024, 1336, 2179, 2396
 Universal Union Artisan Confederation 2647
 Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (UMSA) 418
 Universidad Tecnológica Nacional (UTN) 865
 University Federation of Paraguay (FUP) 2601
University of California Regents v. Bakke 754
 University of the West Indies (UWI) 1862, 3560, 3578, 3579
- University Reform, Argentina** 864, 273–4
 University Student Council (CEU) 2292
 University Students' Union (UEU) 2593
 Unlawful Organization Act 2221
 UNRRA 31
 UNSITRAGUA 1481
 untouchables
 Ambedkar 53, 955, 957–8, 2434
 Hindu communalism 1582–3
see also Dalits; Harijans
- Untung, Colonel 1732
 unveiling as protest 1766
 Urabi, Ahmad 1076
- Urabi movement** 2163, 3395–6
 Uranism 2102
 Urano, Edson I. 1875–8
 Urban Advisory Councils (UACs) 3698
 Urban League 2498
 Urban Popular Movement (MUP) 2292
- urban rebellions, USA** 3396–404
 Birmingham Campaign 3398
 Chicago 3396, 3400–1
 Cincinnati 3403
 Detroit 3397–8, 3401
 Harlem 3397, 3398
 Los Angeles 3399–400, 3403
 Oklahoma 3396
 Philadelphia 3399
 Rochester Riot 3399
- Urban Self-Managed Community of Villa El Salvador (CUAVES) 2654, 2658
 Urbánek, Karel 3434
 Urbina, José María 1062
 Urdaneta Hernández, Jesús 3448
 Urdu language 345, 1922, 2577
 Ure, Midge 1314
 Uregei, Yann 2459
 Uri Party 1991
 Uribe Márquez, Thomas 805
 Uribe Vélez, Alvaro 797, 798, 809, 1083, 1085, 1169
 Uriburu, José Félix 104
 Uriona, Viviana 28–9, 287–9, 601–2, 1116–17, 1925–6, 2080, 2876–7, 3336–7, 3404
 Uritskii, M. 2938
- Urracá, Cacique of Veraguas** 3404
 Urriolagoitia, Mamerto 431
 Urrutia, Manuel 625, 922, 932, 934
 Ursus strikes 2696
- Uruguay** 287–9, 3339–41, 3404–11
 Artigas 287–9
 Blanco Party 3340
 CNT 3404
 Colorado Party 3340, 3405, 3408, 3410
 economic downturn 3410
 Frente Amplio 2135, 3340, 3404, 3408–10
 IMF 3404–5, 3408
 labor and populist movements 3404–7
 left-wing politics 3408–11
 National Party 3405, 3408
 poverty 3410
 sugar industry 3408
 Tupamaros 3339–41, 3408–10
 women's rights 3597
- Uruguay Round 1995, 3644, 3650
 Uruguayan Alliance for the Women's Vote (AUSF) 3597
 Uruguayan Women's Alliance 3597
 US Agency for International Development (USAID) 3012, 3633
 US Constitution
 Thirteenth Amendment 20, 68, 70, 217, 755
 Fourteenth Amendment 20, 68, 167, 217, 755, 2800, 3165, 3616, 3621, 3636
 Fifteenth Amendment 68, 167, 168, 755, 2800, 3165, 3616, 3622, 3636
 Eighteenth (Prohibition) Amendment 3543
 Nineteenth Amendment 170, 1209, 2625, 3543, 3624, 3626
- US Fish and Wildlife Service 1460, 1461
 US Foreign Policy Association 2151
 US Labor Against the War (USLAW) 227
 US Navy 80
US v. Classic 759

- Usmani, Shaukat 961
 USSR: *see* Soviet Union
 Ustasha people 1173, 1176, 3296, 3683, 3684, 3685
 ‘Uthman, Hamid 2955
 Uthmani, Mahmud ul Haq 2581
 utilitarianism 1409–10, 2460, 3033
utopian communities 156, 3415–17
 Amana Inspirationists 52–3
 Brook Farm 3618
 Harmony 1185–6, 3417
 Icaria 1639
 Kingdom 3327
 Nashoba 2024, 3617
 New Harmony 156, 1185, 2460–1, 2567, 3417, 3617
 New Lanark 2567
 Shakers 3018–20
utopian intentional communities 3417–20
 utopian socialism 402, 677, 1574, 2231, 2567, 2766
 Owen 678, 2231, 2460, 2551, 3061
 Utraquists 2323, 2830
 Utrecht, Treaty of 1854
 Uttar Pradesh 736
 Uturuncos (Tiger-Men) 244, 1491, 2642
 Uvero, Battle of 930
Uzbekistan
 cotton growing 3422
 hybrid color revolution 811, 813
 independence 3421
 Jadidists 3241
 national movement 3420–2
 resistance fighters 329
 Užica, Republic of 3683

 Vaca Diez, Hormando 435
 Vaculík, Ludvík 949
 Vafeiadis, Markos 1438, 1439, 1445
 Vahdettin, Sultan 3349
 Vail, Tobi 2844
 Vaillant, Auguste 120
 Vaillant, Eduard 1745, 1748
 Vakanovic, Antony 1143
 Valcour Bay 80
 Valdez, Luis 28
 Valdivia, Pedro de 2064
 Vale, Antonio Caban 2380
 Valech Commission 688
 Valencia Conference 1187
 Valentinian I, Emperor 2831
 Valle, Juan José 244, 2639
 Valle Giulia, Battle of 1836
 Vallejo, Demetrio 2296, 2298
 Vallès, Jules 115

 Valletta 2183, 2186
 Vallières, Pierre 2783, 2785, 2787
 White Niggers of America 2783, 2785
 Valmy, Battle of 893
 Valparaiso harbor strikes 691
 Van Buren, Martin 3667
 Van Cott, Donna Lee 788
 van der Enden, Franciscus 3151–2
 van der Lubbe, Marius 2833
 van der Walt, Lucien 147–55, 331–2, 349, 1028–9, 1414–15, 2345–6, 2948–9, 3034, 3039–40, 3090–9
 Van Hoesen, Brett M. 1483–4
 van Onselen, Charles 3728
 Van Pattern, Philip 2027
 Van region 287
 Van Rhyn, A. J. R. 1087
 Van Tien Zung 3484
 Van Vechten, Carl 1555
 Vancouver Island 785
 Vancouver protest 2832
 vandalism as protest 2777
 Vanderbilt, Cornelius 3636
 Vandiver, Ernest 741
 Vador, Augusto T. 249, 864, 865, 868
 Vandrè, Geraldo 2378
Vaneigem, Raoul 2808, 3044, 3045, 3421–3
 Vaněk, Miroslav 3175–7
 Vanguard Books 833
Vanguard party 3424–5
Vanguardia, La 248, 270, 631
 Vanguardia Popular 879
Vanu Bil uprising 2576
 Vanua’aku Party (My Land Party) 3426, 3427
Vanuatu 3425–7
 Vanunu, Mordecai 2522
 Vanzetti, Bartolomeo 104, 158, 254, 836, 1321, 2947–8
 Vaptsarov, Nikola 543
 Varela, Héctor Benigno 104, 243, 277, 278
 Vargas, Antonio 1067
 Vargas, Getúlio 428, 470, 475, 495, 2219, 2748
 Vargas Llosa, Mario 2652
Variedades 2218
 Varkiza, Agreement of 1438, 1444
 Várkonyi, István 128
 Varlet, Jean 1290, 1291
varna-jati system 958
Varnashrama (caste ideals) 1327
 Vasa, Gustav 1495–6
 Vasconcelos, José 2375
 Vasena Workshops 247
 Vashandi 3739
 Vasi, Ion Bogdan 2854–6
 Vasile, Radu 2855

- Vasilev, Nikolai 3068
 Vasili, Pyotr 1159
 Vásquez Castaño, Fabio 1081, 1082
 Vassalli, Michele Antonio 2184
 Vatican II 2058–9, 2351
 Vaughn, Henry 1608
 Vaux, Comte de 2851
 Vavi, Zwelinzima 3108
 Vázquez, Tabaré 3341, 3408
Vázquez Rojas, Genaro 1122, 2283, **3427–8**
 Veblen, Thorstein 3041
 Vega, Father 903
 Vega, Louis Mercier 143
 vegans 3428
vegetarian protests and movements 3428–9
 Vegetarian Society 3428
 Veiga, Carlos 603
 Veil, Simone 3575, 3576
 Velasco, Íñigo de 844
Velasco Alvarado, Juan Francisco 414,
 3430–1
 agrarian reforms 2643
 anti-imperialism 1568
 political alliance 3405
 Velasco Ibarra, José María 1058
 Velásquez, Cayetano 1016
 Velásquez, Febe Elizabeth 1189, 2959
 Velásquez, Ramón 3440
velayat-e faqih (jurisprudence) 1963
 Velázquez, Andrés 3447
 Velázquez, Fidel 2299
Velázquez, Francisco José 3431–2
 Velázquez de Cuéllar, Diego 602, 1562
 Velho, Domingos Jorge 2588, 3746
 Véliz, Alejo 1938
 Veloso, Caetano 2378
 Velouhiotis, Aris 1436
 Veltmeyer, Henry 1066
Velvet Revolution 810, 1025, 1391, 1563,
 2509, 3176, 3178–9, **3432–6**
 Velvet Underground 2777
 Vendée region 442, 893–4, 1004, 1277
 vendetta, Corsican practice 872
 Vendôme Column 898, 1228
 Venepal factory 3453
 venereal disease 2968
Venezuela
 banking crisis 3440
 Bolivarianism **412–16**
 Burla mining region 3451
 Caracazo **603–5**
 Catholic Church 3437
 co-management **3454**
 coffee production 3459
 cooperatives 3453
 Creole elite 3459
 democracy **3436–41**
 earthquake 3456–7
 endogenous development 3454–5
 gold mining 1471, 3451–2
 Guaicaipuro **1471–2**
 guerilla movements **3441–5**
 IMF 604, 3439, 3446
 independence 3706
 indigenous resistance 3630–1
 kidnapping 3443–4
 looting 3439
 martial law 3439
 MAS and Causa Radical **3445–8**
 massacre **603–5**
 MBR-200 **3448–50**
 MERCOSUR 3658
 military uprisings **3448–51**
 National Electoral Council 672
 Negro Miguel Rebellion **3451–2**
 neoliberalism 3438–41
 oil industry 670, 942, 3436, 3438, 3453
 Primera 2750–2
 recovered companies 3453–4
 resistance **3436–41**
 Social Production Enterprises 2453
 socialist enterprises 3455
 solidarity economy **3452–5**
 women's movement **3630–2**
 women's rights 3598
 worker control **3452–5**
 see also Chávez, Hugo
Venezuelan War of Independence 3455–9
 Venizelos, Eleftherios 1441, 1442, 1452, 1453
 Venkiah, Kolla 2423
 Venner, Thomas 1103
 Venstre (Left) Party 990, 2524
 Ventiris, Constantinos 1438
 Veqilharxhi, Naim 34
 Veracruz Revolutionary Syndicate of Tenants
 2755
Verbote 2027
 Verdeç, Ilie 2866
 Verdi, Giuseppe 1496
 Verdonk, Rita 2448
 Verdun, Treaty of 2829
 Verein Unabhängiger Sozialisten 2047
 Verma, Shiv 3041
 Verma, Shyamji Krishna 1675
 Vernengo Lima, Héctor 275, 276
 Versailles, storming of 2611
 Versailles, Treaty of
 aftermath 1588
 China/Japan 719, 2200, 2995, 3202
 Chinese students' protest 3179

- Corsica 872
 Germany 889, 1179, 1363, 1365, 1592, 3036–7
 Versailles Peace Conference 713, 722, 971, 1597, 1778
 Versailles System 1172
 Verschueren, Nicolas 360–1, 361–2
 Vertov, Dzigo 1080
 Vesela, Pavla 2227–8, 2693–4, 3632–4, 3719–20
 Vesey, Denmark 71, 89, 214, 2408
 see also Vesey's rebellion
 Vesey, Robert 3460
 Vesey, Susan 3460
Vesey's rebellion 3459–61
 Vetruba, Brian 1368–9
Vía Campesina 1210, 1211, 1996, 2621, 3461–3, 3642, 3645–6, 3651
 Vian, Boris 2380–1
 Viani, Osvaldo Gnocchi 1821
 Vicari, Angelo 1833
 Vicariate of Solidarity 2060
 Vichy regime 1240
 Vicksburg, siege of 63
 Victor Emmanuel II 1150, 1333, 1824, 1826, 1827
 Victor Emmanuel III 30, 1176, 2383
 Viores, Mejia 1481
 Victoria, of Britain 16, 368, 1691, 2206
 Victoria Agreement 701
 Victorian Women's Trust 3563
 Victory y Suárez, Bartolomé 270
 Vidal, Gore 74, 1458
 Vidali, Enrico 3149
 Videla, Jorge Rafael 255, 2159
 Videnov, Zhan 539
 Vidyarthi, Ganesh Shankar 3041
Vie Nuove 3149
Vie Ouvrière, La 3217
 Vieira, Joao Nino 1493
 Vienna, Congress of 189, 1148, 1347, 1744, 1825, 2445, 2715
 Vienna, Treaty of 2185
 Vienna World Peace Congress 1922
Vieques 3464–5
 environmental concerns 3464
 military occupation 3464
 and Puerto Rico 2772, 2773
 Viera Gallo, José Antonio 904
 Viet Minh 1714, 1716, 3480
 Viet Nam Quoc Zan Dang (VNQZD) 3467–8, 3480
 Viet Nam Zuy Tan Hoi (Society for the New Vietnam) 3465
 Vietcong (National Liberation Front) 218, 572
Vietnam 3465–71, 3475–89
 anti-colonial movements 3465–71, 3475–8
 August Revolution 1716–17
 collectivization 3487
 communist movements 3465–71
 divided 3474
 feminism 3467
 French Foreign Legion 219
 Indochina War I 3471–5
 Indochina War II 1600, 2663, 3479–86
 Indochina War III 3262–3, 3486–9
 land redistribution 3480
 neoliberalism 3488
 peasants 3466, 3487, 3488
 protests 3486–9
 reeducation camps 3487
 reformist nationalism 3466
 reunification 1600, 3479, 3486
 Soviet Union 2066
 strikes 3469
 worker demonstrations 3468
 WTO 3488
 see also Hồ Chi Minh (Nguyen Tat Thanh); Indochina
 Vietnam: A Television History 2663
 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (DRV) 1596, 1598, 1716, 2464–5, 2663, 3471, 3479, 3487
 Vietnam, Republic of 1599, 3479
 Vietnam, Socialist Republic of 3487
 Vietnam Action Committee (VAC) 304
 Vietnam Bulletin 218
 Vietnam Conference 3523
 Vietnam Duy Tan Hoi 2663
 Vietnam Restoration League 2664
 Vietnam Revolutionary Youth League 1579
 Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC) 218
 Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) 221
 Vietnam War 303–4, 1887, 2260, 2499–500
 Vietnamese Federation of Christian Workers 2465
 Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD) 1598
 Viglietti, Daniel 2380
 Vigor Youth of EOKA (ANE) 946
 Vila Piola, Ramón 1014
 Vilafrancada Revolution 187
 Vilas, Carlos 773, 2470
 Vile Ordinance 1271
Villa, Francisco Pancho 606, 2162, 3489–90
 Division of the North 2277, 2540
 peasant army 2539
 Red Battalions 138
 Reed on 2825
 and Zapata 3710
Villa Constitución 251
 Villaflo de Devincenti, Azucena 255, 2159
 Villalar, Battle of 2569
 Villalba, Jovito 3436

- Villalobos, Marti 2684
 Villanova Castro, Maria Cristina 240
 Villarroel, Aurora 420
 Villarroel regime 429
 Villatte, General 3310
 Villeda Morales, Ramón 2128
 Villepin, Dominique de 1238, 1646
 Villistas 606, 2540
 Vinagre, Antônio 562
 Vinagre, Francisco 561
 Vincent, Cuthbert 2727, 2728
 Vincent, Henry 2463, 2727
 Vincent, Jean-Marie 1845
 Vincent, Stênio 1516–17, 2872
 Vincent, Steven 2766
 Vinci, Luigi 2622
Vinegar Hill Rebellion 1788, **3490–2**
 Viola, Roberto 2159
 violence against women
 Australia 3564
 Bahamas 2734
 Caribbean 3560
 Hindu/Muslim 1585
 see also rape; sexual violence
 violence/religion 2490
Violencia, La, Colombia, **407–10**, 795, 798, 801, 1167
 Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Act 3665
 Viplavakari LSSP 1494, 2052
 Viqueque Revolt 1042
 Virginia
 American Civil War 66
 American Revolution 79
 Bacon's Rebellion 75, 330–1
 Brown 534
 Saint-Domingue refugees 1319
 slave laws 201, 331
 Virno, Paolo 1845, 2369–72
 Visconti, Francisco 3449
 Visigoths 2828
 Visser, Paul 1088
 Visser, Wessel P. 1087–8, 1556–7, 2625–6
 Vitale, Luis 692
 Vitoria Workers' Coordinating Committee 184
 Vivekananda, Swami 1674, 1696
 followers 1698
 Vladimirescu, Tudor 2864, 2865
 Vlasic Foods 1170
 Vllasi, Azem 3010
Vo Nguyen Giap **3492–3**
 communism 3472
 Dien Bien Phu 3474
 Easter offensive 3485
 and Hô 1598, 1599, 1600, 1714
 PLA 3471, 3472
 as pro-Soviet 3480
Voce degli italiani, La 998
 vodka 2927
 Vodou: *see* voodoo
 Vodun religion 1513
 Vogel, Lise 772
 Vohor, Serge 3427
 Voice of America 3077
 Voice of Coloradism 2606
 Voice of Dalits International (VODI) 959
Voice of Industry 2130
Voice of Labour 108, 148, 149
 Voitinsky, Grigorii (Zharkin) 674
Voix des Femmes, La 3584, 3620
Voix du Peuple, La 870
volcanto (political music) 637
 Voline 98
 Volkenstein, Olga 3551
 Volkova, Varvara 3390
Volksgemeinschaft (people's community) 1591
Volksverein 1350
Volontà 2170
 Vol'skii, Vladimir Kazimirovich 3153
Voltaire **3493–5**
 anti-clerical 1110, 1111
 Candide 1112
 on history 2263
 Newtonianism 2990
 on Spartacus 3146
 works 3494–5
 Volunteer Organization for Armed Opposition to Japan 3258
 von Busche, Baron 3146
 Von Hayek, Friedrich August 2436
 Von Tessmar, Richard Karl 2141–2
 von Weichs, Raphaela 3369–73
 Vonnegut, Kurt 73
 voodoo 2154
 Vorkuta labor camp 143
 Vörösmarty, Mihály 1920
 Vorse, Mary Heaton 2253
Vormwärts 1582, 2116
 Vorwärts Association 259, 270
Vormwärts Weekly 259
 voting qualifications 2826
 Voting Rights Act 748–9, 1975
La Voz de la Mujer 103, 124
 Voz Propia 2063
 Vradis, Antonios 126–7, 1740–1
 Vuelvan Caras 3454–5
 Vula Operation 3107
 Vulamanzi Operation 3102
 Vyborg district 2898–9
 Vychinski, A. Y. 705

- Wada Kyutaro 1848
 Waddedar, Pritilata 1678
 Wade, Abdoulaye 3006, 3007
 Wade-Davis Bill 66
 Wadud, Amina 1811
 Wafd Party 1069, 1077, 1557
 Wage Act, South Africa 3093
 Wagenmann, Uta 688–90
 wages
 Australia 314
 gender (in)equality 512, 3134, 3554
 Jamaica 1866
 Japan 1879
 maximizing 784
 Russia 2923
 Wages for Housework 2099
 Wagner, H. L. 3190
 Wagner, Richard 2477
 Wagram, Battle of 443
 Wahehe Uprising 2392
 Wahhabis 371, 1809, 1810, 2365, 2976, 3422
 Wahid, Abdurrahman 1726
 Wahlert, Matthew H. 410–11, 1192–3
 Waikato War 2207
 Wainwright, J. 3658
 Waitangi, Treaty of 2206, 2208
 Waiters and Caterers' Union 3730
 Wakasa Bay 191
 Waldeck-Rousseau Act 850
 Walden, Herwarth 1609
 Waldman, Louis 3065
 Waldorf Astoria Declaration 1602
Walentynowicz, Anna 2508, 2695, **3073**,
 3497
Wales **2463–4**, **3497–501**
 Chartism 657, 3500–1
 coal miners 518, 3497–8
 communism 524
 iron industry 3499
 language 3501
 means testing 524
 Merthyr Riots 3499–500
 nationalist protest **3497–501**
 Newport Rising 657, **2463–4**
 Rebecca Riots 520, 3500
 rebellion 1804
 Scotch Cattle 3498–9
 unemployment 525
Walesa, Lech **3501–4**
 and Kiszczak 3076
 KKP 3073
 KOR 3502
 and Kuroń 2013
 and Michnik 2301
 OPZZ 2708
 as president 2508
 reinstatement 2709, 3073
Walker, David 214, 215, 395, **3504**
 Walker, William 637, 2465–6, 2472
Walker's Appeal 3504
 Wall, Derek 1039–40
 Wall Street Crash 521, 3380
 Wallace, George 744, 748, 754
 Wallace, Henry 838
 Wallace, Ian 1193–4
 Wallachia 2862, 2863, 2865
 Wallachian Uprising 2864
 Wallerstein, Immanuel 1217, 1669, 3647
 Walloon Popular Movement 361
 Walloons 361, 362–4
 Walsall by-election violence 177
 Waltham-Lowell system 1118
 Walton, J. 1209
 Walus, Janusz 1552
 Walvis Bay strike 3203
 Walwyn, William 1100, 1102, 2119
 Wandel, Torbjörn 1323–4
 Wandycz, P. 2720
 Wang Dan 3287
 Wang Hongwen 2204
 Wang Jinwei 725
Wang Ming 726, 727, 2782, **3505–6**, 3726
 Wang Ruoshui 2839
 Wani, Asfaq 1934
war communism 535, 2003, 2086–7, 2936,
 3158, **3506–12**
 War to Death Decree 3457
 War Economy Enabling Act 318
 War Measures Act 2787
 War Precautions Act 303, 2039
 War Resisters' International (WRI) 2500
 war on terrorism 72, 803, 1401–2, 2778, 2779
 War on Want 1312
 Ward, Colin 109, 2171
 Wardha CWC 2793
 Wardley, James and Jane 3019
 Wardour Castle 289
 Ware, John 2096
 Warren, Bill 1648, 1669
 Warren, Joseph 78
 Warren, Josiah 156
 Warren, Mercy Otis 84, 3615, 3616
 Warriors of Christ the King 183
 Warsaw
 anti-Jewish riot 1915
 Great Synagogue destroyed 3513
 lynching 2716
 school strike 2718
Warsaw ghetto uprising 1915, 1917, **3512–14**
 Warsaw Pact 32, 197, 198, 628, 950

- Wartburgfest* 1347, 1349
 Waruhiu Itote, Chief 2255
 Washington 745, 3402
 Washington, Booker T. 392, 756, 1023, 1608
Washington, George 3514–15
 American Revolution 76, 79
 Continental Congress 3514–15
 freeing slaves 3514
 and Lafayette 505, 2041
 resigning 87
 and Rochambeau 2851
 Whiskey Rebellion 3525
 Washington, Harold 1852
 Washington Conference 724
 Washington Consensus 267, 787, 2263, 3407
Washington Post 222, 2958
 Wasielewski, P. L. 650, 651
 Waskey, Andrew J. 50–1, 293–4, 366–7,
 1021–3, 1638, 1927–8, 1957–8, 2163–5,
 2365–6, 2404–5, 2728–9, 3068, 3151–2,
 3191–2, 3199–200, 3395–6, 3681–2
 Wasmosy, Juan Carlos 2601, 2602
 Watch Tower church 3697, 3700, 3728
 Water Riots, Trinidad 3316
 water supplies
 ANC 3099, 3100
 multinational corporations 3099
 pollution 1119–20
 prepayment meters 3100
 privatization 790–2, 3099–100
 South Africa **3099–103**
 USA 1118, 1119–20
 Water Wars, Cochabamba **790–2**
 Watergate scandal 223, 3484
 Waterloo, Battle of 189, 443, 1282, 2445
 Waters, Ethel 1555
Wathbah 1776, 1777, 2954, **3515–16**
 Watson, David 1052
 Watson, James 3280
 Wattasid dynasty 2332
 Watts, Susannah 204
 Watts riots 749, 3399–400
 Wave Hill dispute 315
 Wavell, Viceroy 1704, 1705
 Wawer, Battle of 2716
 Waxhaw Creek 85
 Wayland, J. A. 2454, 3418
 Wayne, Anthony 83
 Waz (Labor) League 1137
WCTU: see Woman's Christian Temperance
 Union
 weapons of mass destruction 1783, 2779
 Weather 395
 Weather Underground 818, 2500, 3189
 Weathermen 2757
 Webb, Philip 2341
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice 3061, 3516–18
 Webb, Todd 3053–5
 Webber, John 77
 Weber, Max
 bureaucracy 647, 2244
 capitalism and religion 479
 Catholicism 481
 charisma 647–8, 647–9
 class 769
 and Lukács 771, 2136
 socialism 1743
 status 771
 Webster, Delia 3047
Weckruf, Der (Dawn) 1609
 Wedderburn, John 202
 Wedgwood, Josiah 203
 Wedman, Homme 870–1
 Wei Chang-hui 3231
Wei Jingsheng 985, 3285, **3518**
 Weil, Felix J. 1253
 Weill, Kurt 504
 Weimar Republic
 equality for women 3580
 and German Revolution 888, 889, 1359
 Hitler 2832
 homosexuality 2104
 KPD 827
 socialism 1374
 start of 1587, 1588
 Weinberg, Bill 2286–90, 2539–42
 Weinberg, Jack 377
 Weinbren, Ben 832, 3093
Weinsberger Bluttat 1354
 Weinzierl, Karolin 2854
 Weishaupt, Adam (Spartacus) 3146
 Weiskel, Timothy 884
 Weisman, Jean 3571–4
 Weiße Rose (White Rose) 1370, 3525–6
 Weitling, Wilhelm 333, 2025, 2234
 Weizmann, Chaim 372, 1816, 3742
 Welensky, Roy 3700
 Welfare Dictatorship 1341
 welfare state 1351, 3171
 Well, Roman 2046
 Wellawatte Spinning and Weaving Mills 969,
 2051
 Welles, Sumner 2151–2
 Wellesley, Arthur: *see* Wellington, Duke of
 Wellington, Duke of 187, 189, 443, 633, 2826
Wells, Ida B.
 and Addams 11, 3519
 anti-lynching campaign 16, 3518–20
 Red Record, A 756
 Wells, R. 2720

- Welsh Trades Union Congress 3384
 Wenceslas IV 2829
 Wendt, Simon 16–19, 19–21, 88–90
 Went, Robert 1670
 Wentworth, Thomas 1806
 Wentworth, W. C. 105
 Werfel, Franz 287
 Werkspoor Caribbean (WESCAR) 942, 943
Wesley, John 3520–1
 abolitionism 202, 368
 Advice to the People call'd Methodists 3521
 American War of Independence 508
 colonization 206
 Thoughts upon Slavery 3521
 Wesselényi, Miklós 1619, 1620
 Wessin y Wessin, General 1018, 1020
 West, Rebecca 3569
 West Africa National Secretariat (WANS) 2487
 West Bank 1816, 2502
 West Germany: *see* German Federal Republic
West Indian Gazette 2527
 West Indies 86
 West Indies Federation 1862
 West Indies Sugar Company (WISCO) 1866
 West Timor 1043
 Westad, Odd Arne 1218
 Westergaard, Kurt 992
 Western Desert Campaign 1181
 Western Federation of Miners (WFM) 1570,
 1735, 2030, 2345
 Western Labor Conference, Calgary 3535
Western Labor News 3535
 Western Province General Workers' Union
 (WPGWU) 3095, 3096
 Western Province Workers' Advice Bureau
 (WPWAB) 3095
 Western Rebellion 509, 1094
 Western Somali Liberation Front 1139
 Westmoreland, General 3482
 Westmoreland Tollgate Riots 1869
 Weston, Randy 611
 Westphalen, Jenny von 2230
 Westphalen, Ludwig von 2230
 Westphalia, Kingdom of 1281
 Westphalia, Peace of 1358, 1919, 2323
 Wetherell, Charles 507
 Wetie Operation 2481
 Wexford 1788
 Weydemeyer, Joseph 999, 2025
 Weydemeyer, Otto 2026, 2028
 whales 1460
 Whampoa Military Academy 3202
 wheat county riots: *see* East Anglian Wheat
 County Riots
 wheat market 501, 593, 2975
 Wheelock, Jaime 2469
 Wheelwright, John 155
 Whelehan, Niall 1161–2, 2691–2
 Whipps, J. D. 1742
Whiskey Rebellion 1300, 3524–5
 Whitaker, Ann-Maree 3490
 White, Doug 305
 White, R. J. 465
 White, Robert W. 1797–8, 1800–2, 1802–3
 White, Walter 758
 White Army 3507
 White Australia Policy 1738, 3425
 White Bicycle Plan 161
 White Citizens' Council 2275, 2614
 White Defense League 2526
 White Flag League 3193
 White Lotus Society 716, 718
 White Overalls 1152
 White Revolution 1770
White Rose (Weiße Rose) 1370, 3525–6
 white supremacists 19, 755, 1608, 2801
 white terror, Chiang Kai-shek 2201, 2202
 White Warriors Union 2957
 Whiteboys 656, 1785, 1807
 Whitefield, George 3520, 3614
 Whitehead, Anne 2449–56
 Whitelaw, William 531
 Whiteman, Unison 1464
 Whitfield, George 3019
 Whitlam, Gough 3, 4, 223, 305, 310, 315, 316,
 2458
 Whitman, Walt 1555
 Whitney, Dwight 903
 Whitney, Jennifer 3661–5
 Whitney Museum of American Art 1483
 Whorton, J. C. 3428, 3429
 Whyte, William 973
 Wickens, Peter 153
 Wiehahn Commission 874
 Wielopolski, Franciszek 2703
 Wiesel, Elie 2857
 wig manufacturing protest 1982
 Wiik, Karl H. 975
Wijeweera, Rohana 2621, 2632, 2633, 2634,
 3526–7
Wik People v. Queensland High Court 5
Wilberforce, William 203, 204, 764, 3022,
 3521, 3527–9
 Clapham Sect 210
 colonization 206
 Letter on the Abolition of the Slave Trade 3529
 Wilbur, C. Martin 3202
 Wilckens, Kurt Gustav 278
 Wilcox, Robert W. 1564, 1565–6
 Wildcat Anarchist Collective 831

- Wildman, John 1100
 Wilhelm I, of Germany 887, 2101
 Wilhelm II, of Germany
 abdication 1361, 1587, 2117
 coronation of 1351
 fleeing Berlin 1373, 3055
 shipbuilding 1349
 Wilkens, Kurt 104, 243
Wilkes, John 508, 1606, 2210
 Wilkes and Liberty movement 3529–31
 Wilkie, David 530
 Wilkins, Roy 3187
 Wilkinson, Ellen 525
 Wilkinson, Jemima 3614
 Will, Brad 2537
 Willard, Frances 3543
 William I of Orange 1035
 William III of Orange 1385, 1405, 2445, 2591–2
 William IV, of Britain 2826
 William V of Orange 1718
 Williamite Wars 1784
 Williams, Bert 309
 Williams, Betty 2522
 Williams, David 505
 Williams, Donovan 3084, 3085
Williams, Eric 3317, 3320, 3531–3
 Capitalism and Slavery 3531, 3532
 Documents Illustrating the Development of
 Civilization 3531–2
 Negro in the Caribbean, The 3532
 Williams, Eugene 2823
 Williams, Fannie Barrier 11
 Williams, Gary 308
 Williams, Howell 2967–8
 Williams, Hugh 3500
 Williams, K. 2746
 Williams, Kath 3563
 Williams, Kieran 2742–6
Williams, Raymond Henry 765, 2249, 3283,
 3533
Williams, Robert F. 17, 2067, 2840, 3533–4
 Williams, Ruth 1955–6
 Williams, William Appleman 73
 Williams, Yohuru 397–9
 Williams, Zephania 2463
 Willingdon, Viceroy 1684
 Willis, Albert S. 1565
 Willisen, Wilhelm von 2702
 Willner, A. R. 650
 Wilmot, Swithin 2320–3
 Wilpert, Gregory 668–74, 3436–41, 3448–50
 Wilson, Charlotte 123
 Wilson, Dick 2415
 Wilson, George 3460
 Wilson, Harold 512, 2039
 Wilson, Henry 1046, 2895
 Wilson, Henry Lane 2277
 Wilson, James 1385
 Wilson, Joseph 774, 2803–4
 Wilson, Woodrow
 “Fourteen Points” speech 319, 1742, 2186,
 2200, 2932
 Germany 1360
 Haiti 1522
 and Huerta 2278, 2540
 against IWW 1737
 Mexico 3490
 Oklahoma protesters 1458
 Palmer raids 1412
 protest at inauguration 2625
 Russian Revolution 1217
 and Socialist Party 3064
 suffrage march 3626
 Wilson’s Creek 58
 Wimmin’s Fire Brigade 110
 Winch, D. 3055
 Windhoek 2390, 2530
 Windischgrätz, Alfred 1621
Windward Islands 350–1, 1273, 3578–9
 Winiger, José 259, 260
 Wink, W. 2502
 Winkler, Hans 1380
 Winkler, Inga T. 3099–103
 Winne, George Jr. 220
Winnipeg General Strike 588, 591, 3554–6
Winstanley, Gerrard 99, 122, 3536–8
 class 3537
 Diggers 1099, 1103–4, 2988, 3536–7
 Law of Freedom, The 3537–8
 New Law of Righteousness, The 3536
 pamphlets 3536
 St. George’s Hill 3536–7
 Winter Palace siege 2918
 Winthrop, John 1633, 3416
Wirat Angkathawon 3538–9
 Wiremu Tamihana Tarapipipi 2206
 Wisconsin-Madison University 222
 Wishart, George 3000
Wissenschaftlich-humanitäres Komitee 1586
Witbooi, Hendrik 2391, 2393, 2530, 3539–40
 WITCH 3630
 witchcraft 3697
 Without Languor 1814
 Witko, Tashunke: *see* Crazy Horse
 Witkop, Milly 158
 Witkop-Rocker, Milly 125
 Witness for Peace 2502
 Witt, Cornelius de 2591–2, 3152
 Witt, Jan de 2591–2, 3152
 Witte, Sergie 2719

- Wittenberg, Joseph 1917
 Wittig, Monique 3575
 Wittner, Lawrence 193, 197
 Witwatersrand 147–8, 3091
 Witwatersrand Middlemen Tailors' Association 2948
 Witwatersrand Mine Employees' and Mechanics' Union (Labor Union) 331
 Witwatersrand Shop Stewards' Council 150
 Władysław IV Vasa 1957
 Wobblies: *see* Industrial Workers of the World
 Wodié, Francis 880
 Wofford, Harris 741
 Wohlschwil, Battle of 3213
 Wojtyła, Karol 2308, 2508, 3078
 see also John Paul II, Pope
 Wolde, Aklilu Habte 1135
 Wolf, Eric 766, 1474
 Wolf, Martin 299
 Wolf Watershed Educational Project 2419
 Wolfe, Bertram D. 2089
 Wolfe Tone, Theobald: *see* Tone, Theobald Wolfe
 Wolff, Wilhelm 3036
 Wolle, Stefan 1337
 Wollstonecraft, Mary 122, 886, 1409, 1421, 3540–2
 Wolman, Gil J. 3044
 Wolseley, Garnet 944, 2164
 Wolsey, Thomas 514–15
 Wolstenholme Elmy, Elizabeth 3567
 Wolton, Douglas 832
 Womack, John, Jr. 1459
Woman Rebel 2968, 3626
Woman Voter 3562
Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) 3542–3
 Woman's Commonwealth 3419
 Woman's Property Bill 3164
 Woman's State Temperance Society 3164
women
 anti-slavery movement 3620
 Caribbean 3558–60
 fiction writers 3579
 Chartists 657
 China 707–8, 730, 3233
 English Revolution 1106–9
 Fifth Monarchists 1109, 1194–5, 1225
 French Revolution 1292–7
 Hungary 1630–1
 Islamic dress 644, 1644–5, 1766, 1774, 1964, 3345
 in labor force 3134
 Levelers 1107–8
 motherhood 1177, 2344, 3557, 3591, 3607, 3608, 3616, 3633
 National Guard 2410
 national liberation in Africa 3545–50
 Nepal 231–2
 Poland's 1848 Revolution 3544–5
 in Polish Solidarity movement 3555–8
 Puerto Rican politicians 38, 39
 reproductive health and rights 2969
 Russian Revolution 3550–5
 self-sacrifice 1582
 as soldiers 3546–7
 voting rights 1108
 see also feminism; women's movement; women's rights
 Women in Black 224, 1814, 1815
 Women and Development Unit (WAND) 3560
 Women against Free Trade Zones 3560
 Women and Law in Southern Africa Research Trust 3605
 Women in Nigeria (WIN) 3548
 Women for Peace 3633
 Women against Pornography 3629
 Women of Union Action 2292
 Women's Affairs Department, Botswana 3605
 Women's Anti-Clerical Center 3598
 Women's Battalion of Death 3554
Women's Bell 2200
 Women's Club for Equal Rights (CFDIM) 3598
 Women's Committee, UOM 252
 Women's Cultural Group 3598
 Women's Day, Namibia 3603
 Women's Electoral Lobby 3563
 Women's Emancipation Bill 528
 Women's Employment Board 3562
 Women's Evolution 3598
 Women's Indian Association 2388
 Women's International Democratic Federation 646
 Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 12, 303, 1742
 women's liberation: *see* feminism
 Women's Military Congress 3554
women's movement
 Africa, postcolonial 3547–9
 Australia 3561–4
 Britain 3564–70
 Caribbean islands 3558–60
 Colombia 798
 Cuba 3571–4
 Eastern Europe 3632–4
 France 3575–8
 Germany 3579–81
 Greece 3581–3
 Haiti 3583–6
 India 3586–90

women's movement (*cont'd*)

- Iran 1767, 1774
- Italy 3591–3
- Japan 3594–6
- Latin America 3596–601
- Nigeria 2734, 3547
- Southern Africa 3601–6
- Soviet Union 3606–9
- Spain 3609–12
- USA 3612–30
- Venezuela 3630–2
- Windward Islands 3578–9
- Women's National Liberal Union (WNLU) 3624
- Women's Peace Army 303
- Women's Political Council (WPC) 761, 1971, 2614
- Women's Prisoners' Defense League (WPDFL) 1416
- Women's Progressive Party 3551
- Women's Revolutionary Socialist Movement (WRSM) 3559
- women's rights
 - and African Americans 217
 - American Revolution 3612–13
 - Condorcet 846
 - Davis 965
 - Douglass 1021
 - France 1293
 - Quakers 1106, 1108, 3613
 - Russia 3390, 3554
 - Seneca Falls convention 3005–6, 3620–1
 - Wright 2024
- Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU) 527, 2595, 2624, 3567, 3626
- Women's Strike for Equality 1299
- women's studies, Cuba 3571–2
- women's suffrage campaign, Britain 526–9
- Women's Technical Institutes 3554
- Women's Trade Union League (WTUL) 2229, 3313–14
- Women's Union, Russia 3551, 3553
- Women's Union Tokyo 1876
- Women's War of 1929** 3634–5
- Won Young-su 1980–1, 1981–93, 1993–4, 1994–5, 1995–6, 1996–8, 1998–2001, 2001–2, 2014–15, 3181–5
- Wood, Bill 2454
- Wood, Enrique 2455
- Wood, Robert 1459
- Woodcock, George 2167
- Woodford, Charles Morris 3080
- Woodhull, Victoria** 123, 3622, 3623, 3636–7
- Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly* 123, 3622, 3636, 3637
- Woodlawn, Chicago 49
- Woods, Ngairé 1430
- Wood's Halfpence affair 1785
- Woodward, Richard 1785
- Woodworth, Fred 159
- Woollen Acts 1785
- Woolman, John 201, 213
- Woolsey, Garnet 3396
- Woolworth store sit-in 739–40, 1973, 3186
- Wootten, D. 2369
- Worcester, Battle of 1099
- Work Centres 525–6
- Work-Study movement 114
- Worker, The* 990, 3469, 3499
- Worker Accident Law 2647
- Worker–Campesino–Student Coalition of the Isthmus (COCEI) 2287
- worker cooperatives 2047, 2843
- worker–peasant alliance 2245
- Worker Socialist Party, Argentina 271
- Worker Solidarity with Haitian Women (SOFA) 3585
- Worker Woman's Federation of Peace 3598
- Worker's Power* 2786
- workerism 174, 1420
- workers
 - atomization 1007
 - dignity 3711–12
 - factory committees 2907
 - self-management 2901
 - self-organization 2765
 - skilled/unskilled 2021, 2029, 3498
 - Socialisme ou Barbarie 3063
 - solidarity 2021, 3499
 - Trotsky 3321
 - undocumented 1642
 - women 658
- Workers' Alliance of America (WAA) 3387
- Workers' Alliances against Fascism 291
- Workers' and Peasants' Party (WPP) 3041, 3229
- Workers' Commissions 181–3, 631
- Workers (Communist) Party 836
- Workers' Confederation of Paraguay (CPT) 2599, 2600, 2604
 - in Exile 2605
- Workers' Defense Committee (KOR)** 2694–8
 - founding of 2696–7
 - membership 2695
 - Solidarność 2013, 2301, 2302, 2694, 3077–8
- Workers' Dreadnought* 151, 153
- Workers' Education Project 332
- Workers' International League (WIL) 834
- Workers' Interunion Plenary (PIT) 3406
- Workers' Laboratory Theater 27
- Workers' League of Salonika 1440
- Workers' Liberation League (WLL) 1863

- Workers' Opposition 1980, 3028, 3029
 Workers' Party of Jamaica (WPJ) 1863, 1864
 Workers' Party of Kampuchea 1959
Workers' Party of Marxist Unification (POUM): *see* Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista
 Workers' Party of South Africa (WPSA) 833
 Workers' Party of the Philippines (PMP) 2686
 Workers' Party of Vietnam: *see* Lao Dong
 Workers' Pensions Act 851
Workers' Republic 860
 Workers' Rights Charter 3502
 Workers' Self-Defense Group (ADO) 801
workers' self management
 Japan 1881
 Yugoslavia 3295, 3637–9
 Workers' Struggle Party 3577
 Workers' Theatre movements 582
 Workers' Unemployed Insurance Bill 3386
 Workers United Front (FUT) 1058
Workers' Voice 833, 1440
 workhouses 2720
 working class 767–8
 Bolsheviks 2942–3
 capitalism 768, 2920
 Chile 690
 dual consciousness 3070
 Epic Theater 28, 1482
 fragmentation 2021
 French Revolution 1280
 Germany 1178
 India 2793
 labor movement 2020–1
 living conditions 2341
 Mandel 2188
 Marxism 2240
 Morris 2341
 nomadic 96
 post-Fordism 2370
 Proudhon 161, 2765
 self-organization 3425
 socialism 3056
 Spanish Civil War 180
 syndicalism 3215–16
 Trotsky 1668
 women in labor unions 3627
 Working Class Union (WCU) 1458
 working conditions 784
 Working Federation of Magallanes 692
 working hours
 Australia 106, 312, 313
 France 1646
 Mexico 619
 Russia 2923
 USA 502
 Working People's Alliance (WPA) 1498, 1502, 1856, 2853
 Working Women's Trades Union 3561
 Workingmen's Party of New York 2461, 3666–7
 Workingmen's Party of the United States (WPUS) 2026–7
 Workingwomen 3579
World Anti-Slavery Convention, London 205, 3005, 3620, 3639–40
 World Bank
 Bolivia 791
 conditions attached to loans 1661–2
 Ecuador 1067
 food sovereignty 1210, 1211
 Kedung Ombo project 1723
 Mali 2182
 Mexican study 2287
 Prague 1390
 Southern Africa 3113
 Spain 180
 Thailand 3272, 3273–4
 Turkey 3354
 see also Global Day of Action Against the IMF and World Bank (S26)
 World Charter for Immigrants 2306
 World Confederation of Labor (WCL) 808
 World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs 1887
 World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) 3113
 World Conference on Human Rights 960
 World Development Movement 1312
 World Economic Forum
 Davos 301, 1401, 1432
 Kuroń 2014
 Melbourne 2636, 3655
 World Federation of Democratic Youth 3679
 World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) 3259
 World Food Summit 1210
 World Forum for Alternatives 301
 World Health Organization 2997, 3102
 World Hindu Council 1693
 World League for Sexual Reform 1586, 2093
 World Peace Council (WPC) 195, 2358
World Social Forums 3640–4, 3660
 and ATTAC 301
 Brazil 1009, 1401, 1431–2
 Charter of 982
 Chávez, Hugo 667
 churches 3643
 G8 Alternatives 1313
 Internationals 1755
 Italy 1831
 Karachi 2585
 Latin America 3641

World Social Forums (*cont'd*)

- Mumbai 959, 2306
- participatory democracy 2619, 2621
- PGA 2638
- Porto Alegre 2687
- Thailand 3274
- Via Campesina 3461

World Student and Youth Festival 3184

World Summit on Sustainable Development 3102

world systems theory 1217

World Trade Center attacks: *see* September 11, 2001 attacks

World Trade Organization (WTO)

- established 1396
- food sovereignty 1210, 1211
- July Framework 3651
- Mexico 2294
- neoliberalism 97, 1996
- and PGA 2635
- Qatar 3665
- resistance to 1396–7, 3461
- Vietnam 3488

World Trade Organization (WTO) protests 1210

- Australia 317
- Cancun 1400, 1431, 2636, 3644–8, 3650, 3665
- Doha 1400, 3645, 3646, 3648–50, 3651, 3659, 3665
- Geneva 1386, 2636, 3655
- Hong Kong 1400, 1431, 3647, 3650–4, 3665
- Quebec 3654–61
- Seattle 72, 160, 300, 500, 1152, 1307, 1386, 1390, 1392, 1393, 1395, 1397–8, 1400, 1431, 1450, 2503, 2807, 3644–5, 3655, 3661–5
- Singapore 1429

World turn'd upside down, The (Taylor) 1096

World War I

- African American soldiers 2822
- Austria 318–19
- Bolshevik Party 438–9
- food riots 1208–9
- gender roles 1171
- IRB 1046
- New Caledonian volunteers 2457
- Russia 2889, 2903–4, 3115
- Trinidad 3316
- Turkey 3348–50, 3355
- unemployed veterans 445–6
- war industries 2822

World War II

- African Americans 17
- Balkans 1453
- Baltics 340–1
- Bolivia 429

Bulgaria 542–5

Canada 589

civil rights movement 2497

CPSA 834–5

Gandhi 1329–30

Indochina 1713–17

Iran 1762

Ireland 971–2

Japan 727, 1711, 1884, 1889, 1998–9, 2202, 3200

Malta 2186–7

Nazi–Soviet Pact 1593

resistance 2495–6

Soviet Union 3117

US involvement 2489

Yugoslavia 1011, 3682, 3691

World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 1268

World Woman's Party (WWP) 2625

World Youth Congress (WYC) 3678

World Zionist Organization (WZO) 1851, 3741

Worms, Imperial Diet of 1355

Worsley, Peter 2249

Woss y Gil, Alejandro 1016–17

Wounded Knee 40, 585

Wounded Knee II 2414–15, 2629

Woyane Rebellion 1133, 1139

Wrangel, General 3507

Wray, John 983

Wright, Erik Olin 773

Wright, Frances "Fanny" 1186, 2024, 2460–1, 3617–18, 3666–7

Wright, Jaime 2060

Wright, Martha Coffin 3620

Wright, Paulina (later Davis) 3617, 3621

Wright, Richard 2428

Writers' Association 2782

WTO: *see* World Trade Organization

Wu Kejian 3505

Wu Shimo 3235

Wu'er Kaixi 3287

Wuhan uprising 2200

Wunthanu Athins 553

Wunthanu Movement 552–3

Wyatt's Rebellion 1095

Wybrzeze Theater 3073

Wycliffe, John 514, 1092, 2829, 3000

Wyllie, John Curzon 1675

Wyndham (Land Purchase Act) 968, 1799

Wyoming Valley Massacre 85

Wysocki, Piotr 2715

Wyvill, Christopher 508

xenophobia 1645, 2565, 3110

Xiang Jingyu 2201

Xiangdao 3505

- Xin qingnian* (New Youth) 674, 2132
Xin shehui (New Society) 2781
 Xinhai Revolution 3727
Xinhua (New China) 2780
 Xinjiang province 3506
 Xochimilco, Pact of 2279
 Xolotl 639
 Xoxe, Koçe 31
 Xoxi, Niko 29
 Xu Xinliang 2271, 3237
 Xuma, A. B. 171, 2191, 3087
- Ya Basta 1006
Yaa Asantewaa, Nana 3669–70
 Yagi Akiko 3596
 Yahya Ghālip 3357
 Yahya Khan 346, 348, 2425, 2579, 2582–3
 Yahya Mohammed Al-Mansour Hamid Al-Din 3670
 Yakovlev, Kornila 2806
 Yalla, Kumba 1493
 Yalta agreement 339, 729, 730
 Yamba, Dauti 3698
 Yan'an, Philippines 2680–1
 Yaneekian, Kurken 284
 Yanev, Sotir 543
 Yannios, Nikos 1441
 Yanoulopoulos, Yanis 1451–6
 Yanukovych, Viktor 2510, 3329, 3375, 3377–8
 Yao tribe 2174, 3231
 Yao Wenyuan 2204
 Yaqui rebellion 2541
 Yarmolinsky, Avrahm 678
 Yaruquies community 963
 Yarur textile industry 684
 Yasin, Shaykh Ahmad 1548, 1549
 Yates, Michael 778, 1671, 2249
 Ye Shengtao 713
 Years of Indigenous Resistance Campaign 2289
 Yeats, W. B. 1415, 2389
 Kathleen Ni Houlihan 1416
 Yeiwene Yeiwene 2459
 Yekka, Kabaka 3372
 yellow-dog contract 3411
 Yellow Ford, Battle of 1805
 Yellow Hat Buddhists 3290
 Yellowstone National Park 1120
 Yeltsin, Boris
 banning Communist Party 3245
 dissolution of Soviet Union 644, 3422
 emergency rule 3126–7
 and Gorbachev 3124–5
 power 3125–6
 as president 3124
 public election 1417
 shock therapy 3126–7
 Yèm Sambaur 577, 578
 Yemen Arab Republic 3670–1
Yemen Socialist Revolution 3670–1
 Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) 3671
 Yen Bay mutiny 1598, 3467
 Yeshitela, Omali 3373
Yi Ho Tuan (Boxer) Rebellion 3671–5
 Yiangou, Anastasia 943–8
 Yiannios, Nikos 1440
 Yippies 159, 1482
 Ynagban elite 1996
 Yogurt Revolution 3010
 Yolocamba Ita 639
 Yom Kippur War 1813, 2338
 YoMango collective 1147
 Yomiuri Newspaper Company 1891, 1892
 Yone, Ohki 1902
 Yorck von Wartenburg, Johann Ludwig Graf 189
Yorkshire Rising 819, 3675–6
 Yorktown 86
 Yorktown siege 2851
 Yoruba
 Agbekoya Peasant Uprising 23–6, 2481
 inter-ethnic wars 3677–8
 Mekunnu movement 2481
 OPC 2484
 Oyo 3676
 pre-colonial 2558
Yoruba Wars 3676–8
 Yosemite National Park 1119
 Yoshida, Shigeru 1894–5
 Yoshikuni, Tsuneo 3728
 Youlou, Abbe Fulbert 854, 1251
 Young, C. M. 857
 Young, Christopher 2100–6
 Young, M. C. 2138
 Young, Robert A. 395
 Young, Steven 3333
 Young, Thomas 78
 Young, Whitney 73, 3187
 Young Bukhara 643, 3242, 3366
Young Communist International 3678–9
 Young Communist League (YCL) 2948, 3108, 3109, 3678–9
 Young Finnish Party 1201
 Young Gay and Proud 2097
Young Hegelians 2230, 3679
 Young India 1326
 Young India Association 449, 1677
Young Ireland 1192, 1415, 1800, 2544, 3394, 3680–1
 Young Italy 1161, 1332, 1825, 2266

- Young Maori Party 2208
 Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) 551–2
 Young Ottomans 3347
 Young People's Forum (YPF) 332
 Young Pioneers 1382
 Young Poland's Movement (RMP) 3077
 Young Socialist League 1862
 Young Tunisian Party 3335
 Young Turk Unionists 3355
Young Turks 281, 286, 293, 1440, 1452, 3272, 3347–8, 3681–2, 3742
 Youtévong, Sisowath 576, 577
Youth Aliyah 242
 Youth Brigade, Japan 1903, 1904
 Youth House 992
 Youth Improvement Society 553
 Youth Patriotic Front 2593
 Youths of First Line 1714
 YouTube 1740
 Yozgat uprising 3357
 Yrigoyen, Hipolito 248, 266, 273, 274, 277
 Yu Pingbo 713
 Yuan Shikai 735, 736, 2200, 3201, 3675, 3727
 Yucatan: *see* caste war of Yucatan (Guerra de castas en Yucatán)
 Yudelman, David 148
 Yudenich, General 3507
Yugantar 1674
 Yugoslav Communist Party 3637
 Yugoslav Royal Army 3682
Yugoslavia
 anti-privatization struggles 3685–8
 anti-war activism 223–4
 breaking up 1455
 humanitarian intervention 224
 ICTY 3011
 IMF 3011
 Korčula Summer School 3690
 Marxist humanism 3689–90
 non-aligned movement 3688–9, 3691
 participatory democracy 2620
 People's Liberation War 3682–5, 3691
 Praxis group 3689–90
 resistance to Cominform 3690–2
 state feminism 3633
 student protests 3170, 3692–3
 workers' self-management 3295, 3637–9, 3691, 3692
 in World War II 1011, 3682–5, 3691
 see also Tito, Josip Broz
 Yugoslavia, Kingdom of 3295
 Yukanthor Affair 567
 Yung-li, Emperor 2310–11
 Yupanqui, Atahualpa 2377
 Yuppies 1281
 Yushchenko, Viktor 812, 2510, 3330, 3374, 3376–8
 Yushin regime 1982, 2014, 3182
 Yusuf, Hamza 1811
 Yusuf, Naji 2954
 Yusuf, Yusuf Salman: *see* Fahd, Yusuf Salman
 Yusuf
 Yusupov, Shodmon 3245
 Yuvasala organization 568

Z magazine 3687
 Zachariadis, Nikos 1443, 1444, 1445, 1454
 Zack, Bernhard 2155
 Zadnikar, Darij 3051–2
 Zafra Roja (Red Harvest) 419
 Zagary group 2308
 Zaghoul, Sa'd 1076
 Zagoria, D. S. 3235
 Zagreb University 3693
 Zahar, Mahmud al- 1548
 Zahedi, General 2344
 Zahir, Khaldia 3198
 Zahle, Carl Theodor 991
Zahra, al- 3335
zaibatsu system 1890
 Zaim, Lebanon 2071
 Zaim, Husni al- 3222
 Zaimis, Alexandros 944
 Zaimov, Vladimir 543
 Zaire 164, 166, 1217, 2338
 see also Congo
 Zaisser, Wilhelm 1339, 1340
 Zajic, Jan 951
 Zald, M. N. 652, 779–80, 2759
 Zaldivar, Felipe Nery 2597
 Zalkind, Aron 3608
 Zalmu Jirga (Youth League) 1966, 1967
zamba 2377
 Zambetsu Federation 3720
Zambia 696–8, 3695–706
 anarchism 147
 Chiluba 696–8, 1941, 3111, 3702, 3705
 Christianity 3696–7, 3704
 color bar 3695
 copper industry 1941, 3695, 3697–8, 3700–1, 3704
 Frontline States 461
 Great Depression 3697
 IMF 696–7, 3111, 3703–4
 mining industries 3695–8, 3701
 MMD 697, 2940, 3111, 3112, 3704, 3705
 pro-democracy 3704
 raw materials 3695

- welfare associations 3697–8
 witchcraft 3697
see also Kaunda, Kenneth; Rhodesia
- Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) 3699
 Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)
 696, 3701–2, 3704, 3731–3
- zamindars*
 Bengal 370, 371, 372, 1703, 1712, 2574
 Land Acquisition Act 2575
 Pakistan 2575
 Permanent Settlement 2575, 2970
 Santal rebellion 2970–1
- Zamora, Ezequiel** 413, 664, 2854, 3706–7
Zamora, Jacinto 2667
Zamoyski, Andrzej 2703
Zanco, Jean-Philippe 850–1, 2628
 Zanjon peace agreement 919
 Zanón workers 2348–9
Zanzara, La 3593
Zanzibar 3707
 Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) 3708
 Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) 3708
Zanzibar Revolution 3707–9
- Zapata, Emiliano**
 agrarian revolution 2282
 Comuna Morelense 3709–11
 Ejército del Sur 2277
 killed 2280
 Liberator Army 2283
 and Madero 3710
 peasant army 2539
 Red Battalions 138
 Tierra y Libertad 2162
 and Villa 3489
- Zapata, Mario** 2226
- Zapatismo** 2063, 3711–14
 anarchism 100, 138
 indigenous communities 3713–14
 minoritarian 982
- Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN)**
 Aguascalientes 2540
 Army of the Convention 2540
 Autonomous Councils 3717–18
 Chiapas 284, 1395, 1396, 2162, 2293, 3711, 3714–19
 Consultation Center for Propaganda and Revolutionary Unification 2281
 and EPR 1122
 First Intergalactic Meeting 3713, 3716
Juntas de Buen Gobierno 3713
 liberation theology 480
 as model 1006, 1152, 1739, 3662
 NAFTA 1053, 1386, 3600
 netwar 3716–17
- Obregón 3711
Otra campaña, La 1403, 2286
 PGA 2635
 politics of dignity 3711–12
 Second Encuentro 1396
 women soldiers 3017
see also Marcos, Subcomandante
- Zaragoza** 3131
 Zaragoza Conference 848
 Zárate, Pablo 425
 Zarkhin (Voitinsky) 674
Zasulich, Vera 1914, 2228, 3550, 3719–20
 Zavala, Consuelo 3597
 Zavaleta Mercado, René 427
 Zay, Károly 1619, 1620
 Zayas Sotomayor, María de 3609–10
 Zealots 2490
 Zedillo, Ernesto 2285, 2293, 3379, 3718
 Ze'ev: *see* Jabotinsky, Vladimir
 Zeitler, Michael 1023–5, 1554–6, 2846–7
 Zeituntsians, Berj 281
 Zelaya, José Santos 2466
 Zelaya, Lorenzo: *see* Lorenzo Zelaya Popular Revolutionary Forces (FPRLZ)
- Zemene Mesafint* 1132
zemstva (local self-government) 2879
 Zengakuren 3169
 Zenkyoso 1895
 Zenminrokyo (All-Japan Private Labor Union Council) 1883
 Zeno of Elea 2836
Zenrō 1909
- Zenroren Labor Federation** 3720–1
 Zensendomei federation 1883
 Zenteisin Rodokumiai 1895
 Zervas, Napoleon 1436
 Zerzan, John 99, 160, 979, 1052
- Zetkin, Clara** 124, 3551, 3580, 3721–2
 on GDR currency 3633
 and Kollontai 1979
 and Luxemburg 2243
 Second International 1756
 Spartacus League 3147
 women's suffrage 1750
- Zetkin, Ossip 3721
 Zhang Binglin 114
Zhang Guotao 2781, 3722–4
 Zhang Ji 114, 674
 Zhang Qiubai 3723
Zhang Wentian 3724–5
 Zhang Xianzhong 714
 Zhang Zhongxiang 713
 Zhange Chungqiao 2204
 Zhao Ziyang 987, 3286, 3288
 Zhelev, Zhelyu 3068, 3069

- Zhenotdel* (Women's Section of Communist Party) 3606
- Zhivkov, Todor 3068, 3069
- Zhongguo nu bao* (Chinese Women's Journal) 2781
- Zhou Enlai** 3725–6
and Bognot 2672
cooperatives 709
and Hoxha 32
Nanchang Uprising 725
and Philippine labor union leaders 2672
and Qu Qiubai 2113, 2782, 3723, 3725
recentralization 2204
treaty with Soviet Union 705
Vietnam 223, 1599
and Wang 3505
Whampoa Military Academy 3202
- Zhovti Vody, Battle of 1958
- Zhu De** 2120, 3726–7
- Zhu Yuanzhang 714
- Zhu Ziqing 713
- Zhuangzi* 113
- Zhunyi meeting 2201
- Zia ul Haq regime 1637, 1857, 2584
- Zibechi, Raul 3404–7
- Zicchitella, Martino 2402
- Ziemecka, Eleonora 3544
- Ziller, Gerhart 1340
- Zimba, Newstead 3702
- Zimbabwe**
anarchism 147
Chimurenga armed struggles 698–705
food riots 3732
HIV/AIDS 3738
homosexuality 2364
IMF 2364
independence 3546
labor movement 3727–31, 3731–3
Mugabe 2363–5
Mzingeli 2384–5
national liberation movement 3604, 3733–8
Samkange 2960–2
UN Development Program 3111
women's role in liberation struggle 3604
see also Rhodesia
- Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) 3604, 3735, 3737
- Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 1940, 2363, 2364, 2961, 3112, 3735–7, 3739–40
- Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) 2364–5, 3604, 3731–3, 3734
- Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) 2363, 2364, 3105, 3730, 3734, 3735–7, 3739
- Zimbabwe Liberators' Platform 3740
- Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA)** 3736, 3738–40
- Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) 3105, 3604, 3735–6
women soldiers 3736
- Zimbabwe War Veterans' Association 3604
- Zimmering, Raina 805–6, 902–3, 1120–1, 1167–70, 1320–1, 2149–50, 2212–13
- Zimmerwald conference 1440, 1756
- zinglins* 1513
- Zinn, Howard** 72–4
- Zinoviev, Gregory
Bolshevik Revolution 2085–6
executed 3162
and Lenin 2084, 2918
Leninism 2089
and Trotsky 438, 595, 3158
on women's congress 3606
- Zionism** 1550, 1560, 3740–3
Arab-Palestinian 1813
Ben-Gurion 372–5
Bund 1914–15
Canada 845
Eretz Israel 359, 1816
Jewish anarchism 158
youth movements 3742
- Zionism, revisionist** 1851–2
- Zionist Socialist Party 373
- Zipa people 3294
- Zirakzadeh, Cyrus Ernesto 660–4, 1170, 1609–10
- Zisly, Henry 99
- ZiSPO strike 2699
- Zito, Dima 240–1, 2272–3, 3255–6
- Ziyou zhongguo* 3236–7
- Žižek, Slavoj** 983, 3743–4
- Zizka, John 2323
- Žmichowska, Narcyza 3544–5
- Zoellick, Robert 3647, 3649, 3665
- Zog, Ahmet 29
- Zogby International 636
- Zola, Emile** 3744–5
Dreyfus Affair 887, 1022
Germinal 1744, 3744
J'accuse 1022, 3741, 3744
Thérèse Raquin 3744
- Zolberg, A. 1151, 1153
- ZOMO (riot police) 3075
- Zone One Tondo (ZOTO) 2681
- Zong* massacre 203, 3022
- Zorlu, Fatın Rüstü 3350
- Zrenjanin factories 3687–8
- Zube, John 107
- Zuckerman, Yitzhak 3512

- Zukas, Alex 436–40, 1358–66, 1979–80,
3379–88, 3721–2
- Zukas, Lorna Lueker 2733–5, 3601–6, 3634–5
- Zulu, Grey 3703
- Zulu peoples 3086, 3601
- Zulu Territorial Authority 3088
- Zuma, Jacob 876, 3108, 3112
- Zumbi** 2588, 3745–7
- Zunes, Stephen 2511
- Zurich agreements 947
- Zuy Tân 3466
- Zveno group 542
- Zwane, Ambrose Phešeya** 3747–8
- Zwanziger Brothers 3036
- Związek Syndykalistów Polskich (Union of Polish
Syndicalists) 140
- Związek Związków Zadowowych (ZZZ) 140
- Zwickau Prophets 92
- Zwingli, Huldrych** 1353, 1356, 1358, 3748–9
- Zwyer, Sebastian Peregrin 3213